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THE 
 
 ORATIONS 
 
 OF 
 
 DEMOSTHENES 
 
 ON THE CROWN 
 
 * 
 
 AND ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 TRANSLATED, WITII NOTES, &c., 
 
 CHARLES RANN KENNEDY. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES. 
 
 YOL. II. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, 
 FRANKLIN SQUARE. 
 
 1862 . 
 
 BOSTON college LIBRJkx 
 
 CHESTNUT HILi, MASS. 
 
Harper’s New Classical Library. 
 
 Comprising Literal Translations of 
 
 C2ESAR. 
 
 VIRGIL. 
 
 HORACE. 
 
 SALLUST. 
 
 CICERO’S ORATIONS. 
 CICERO’S OFFICES, &c. 
 CICERO ON ORATORY, &c. 
 TACITUS. 2 vols. 
 TERENCE. 
 
 JUVENAL. 
 
 XENOPHON. 
 
 HOMER’S ILIAD. 
 
 HOMER’S ODYSSEY, &c. 
 
 THUCYDIDES. 
 
 HERODOTUS. 
 
 EURIPIDES. 2 vols. 
 
 SOPHOCLES. 
 
 2ESCHYLUS. 
 
 DEMOSTHENES. 2 vols. 
 
 
 12mo, Muslin, 75 cents a Volume. 
 
T1 
 
 V 
 
 P R E V F ACE. 
 
 The delay in bringing out this volume has been chiefly 
 owing to the labor bestowed upon the Oration for the 
 Crown, in which after all I feel I have but imperfectly 
 succeeded. He is indeed a confident man who can sat¬ 
 isfy himself upon such a task. The previous translations 
 which I have consulted, I should rather say which I have 
 constantly had before me, are those of Leland, Francis, 
 Lord Brougham, Spillan, Auger, Jacobs, and Pabst. I 
 believe there are some others, which I have not seen. 
 These, however, I have carefully perused and compared; 
 and to all the translators I am indebted for their assist¬ 
 ance, but especially to Jacobs, of whose valuable notes 
 and dissertations I have made ample use. It is a pity 
 that his labors have been confined to the political speeches 
 of Demosthenes. 
 
 Shilleto’s edition of the Oration on the Embassy was 
 unfortunately not put into my hands until I had completed 
 the first half of the translation. The author has proved 
 himself to be one of the profoundest of English scholars. 
 His plan of writing critical notes in Latin, and explana¬ 
 tory in English, is novel, but not unattended with ad¬ 
 vantage. 
 
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 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface . iii 
 
 Orations :— 
 
 On the Crown. 1 
 
 On the Embassy. 116 
 
 Appendices :— 
 
 I. The Sacred War...... 223 
 
 II. Orators and Statesmen. 319 
 
 III. The Council of Areopagus.• .. 342 
 
 IY. The Council of Five Hundred. 345 
 
 Y. The Popular Assembly. 349 
 
 VI. The Opinion of Polybius.— 354 
 
 VII. Revision of Laws. 358 
 
 VIII. Affairs of Peloponnesus . 363 
 
 IX. Chseronea. 3*76 
 
 X. Whether Ctesiphon broke the Law . 413 
 
THE 
 
 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 THE ORATION ON THE CROWN. 
 
 THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 This, has justly been considered the greatest speech of the greatest ora¬ 
 tor in the world. It derives an additional interest from the circum¬ 
 stance that it was the last great speech delivered in Athens. The 
 subject matter of it is virtually a justification of the whole public 
 policy and life of Demosthenes; while in point of form it is a defense 
 of Ctesiphon for a decree which he proposed in favor of Demos¬ 
 thenes, b.c. 338, not long after the battle of Chseronea. 
 
 When the news of that disastrous battle reached Athens, the people 
 were in the utmost consternation. Nothing less was expected than 
 an immediate invasion of Attica by the conqueror; and strong meas¬ 
 ures were taken, under the advice of Hyperides, to put the city in a 
 posture of defense. One of the most important was the repair of the 
 walls and ramparts. Demosthenes at this time held the office of 
 conservator of walls, having been appointed by his own tribe at the 
 end of the year b.c. 339. The reparation, which had been com¬ 
 menced before, but suspended during the late campaign, was now 
 vigorously prosecuted. He himself superintended the work, and ex- 
 
 f >ended on it three talents of his own money, beyond what was al¬ 
 ow ed out of the public treasury. 
 
 The fears of the people were not realized. Philip, while he chastised 
 the Thebans, treated the Athenians with moderation and clemency; 
 restoring their prisoners without ransom, burying their dead upon 
 the field, and sending their bones to Athens. He deprived them in¬ 
 deed of most of their foreign possessions, but even enlarged their 
 domestic territory by the addition of Oropus. 
 
 It seemed that the whole foundation upon which the credit and influ¬ 
 ence of Demosthenes had rested was overthrown. The hopes which 
 he had held out of successful resistance to Philip, of re-establishing 
 Athenian ascendency, or maintaining the independence of Greece, 
 were now proved to be fallacious. The alliance of Thebes, his last 
 great measure for the protection of Athens, appeared to have been 
 the immediate cause of her defeat and disgrace. The very moderation 
 
 Vol. II.—A 
 
2 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 with which Philip had used his victory looted like a reproach'to the 
 orator, who had so often denounced his cruelties before the Athenian 
 assembly, and warned them of his deadly hostility to Athens. 
 
 The Macedonian party considered that the time was come for the hu¬ 
 miliation of their adversary. . They assailed him with prosecutions. 
 The peace which Athens concluded with Macedonia was the signal 
 for war against Demosthenes. But his enemies were mistaken in 
 their reckoning, when they supposed that the people would feel re¬ 
 sentment against him as the author of their misfortunes. The Athe¬ 
 nians took a juster and nobler view of the matter: they judged not 
 of his counsels by the result, but by their own intrinsic merit. De¬ 
 mosthenes came clear and triumphant out of every prosecution ; and 
 while Lysicles the general was condemned to capital punishment 
 for his misconduct of the war, Demosthenes received from his coun¬ 
 trymen a signal proof of their esteem and confidence, being appoint¬ 
 ed to pronounce the funeral oration in honor of the citizens who had 
 fallen at Chaeronea. 
 
 About the same time, and not many months after the battle, Ctesiphon 
 introduced a bill to the Council of Five Hundred, proposing to reward 
 Demosthenes for his gifts of money to the public, and for his general 
 integrity and good conduct as a statesman. It is not unlikely that 
 the very object of this measure was to stop the attacks upon Demos¬ 
 thenes, and to give him the opportunity, in case it should be opposed, 
 of justifying the whole course of his political life. With that view 
 was inserted the clause eulogizing his general character as a states¬ 
 man. The Macedonian party naturally regarded this clause as a 
 reflection upon themselves, and a virtual condemnation of the policy 
 which they had for so many years espoused. They felt themselves 
 therefore compelled to make a stand against it; and they resolved 
 upon a course, which was open to them according to the Athenian 
 laws, of indicting Ctesiphon as the author of an illegal measure. His 
 bill, having been approved by the council, and then brought before 
 the popular assembly, was passed in the shape of a decree, by which 
 it was declared to be the will of the council and people of Athens, 
 “ that Demosthenes should be presented with a golden crown, and 
 that a proclamation should be made in the theatre, at the great 
 Dionysian festival, at the performance of the new tragedies, an¬ 
 nouncing that Demosthenes was rewarded by the people with a 
 golden crown for his integrity, for the good-will which he had in¬ 
 variably displayed toward all the Greeks and toward the people of 
 Athens, and also for his magnanimity, and because he had ever both 
 by word and deed promoted the interests of the people, and been 
 zealous to do all the good in his power.” This decree, as the opposite 
 party conceived, was open to three objections, two of which were 
 chiefly of a legal nature; the other, while it equally assumed a legal 
 form, called in question the real merits of Ctesiphon’s motion. An 
 indictment, embodying all the objections, was preferred before the 
 archon, the chief magistrate of Athens, to whose cognizance a crim¬ 
 inal proceeding of this kind appertained. The prosecutor was 
 ./Eschines, the second of Athenian orators, the deadly enemy of 
 Demosthenes, who would not only bo considered by his party as the 
 
 & 
 
OX THE CROWN. 
 
 3 
 
 fittest person to conduct the cause, but was stimulated to it by every 
 motive of rivalry and revenge. The indictment, after reciting the 
 decree, alleged that it violated the Athenian laws in three points, as 
 follows:— 
 
 First, because it was unlawful to make false allegations in any of the 
 state documents: 
 
 Secondly, because it was unlawful to confer a crown upon any person 
 who had an account to render of his official conduct; and Demos¬ 
 thenes was both a conservator of walls and the treasurer of the theoric 
 fund: 
 
 Thirdly, because it was unlawful to proclaim the honor of a crown in 
 the theatre at the Dionysian festival, at the performance of the new 
 tragedies; the law being, that if the council gave a crown, it should 
 be published in the council-hall; if the people, in the pnyx at the 
 popular assembly. 
 
 The first of these points raised the substantial question at issue—viz., 
 whether the decree of Ctesiplaon had stated a falsehood, when it as¬ 
 signed the virtue and patriotism of Demosthenes as reasons for con¬ 
 ferring public honor upon him. The other two, while they were 
 mainly of a technical character, were strongly relied on by JEschines 
 as affording him the means of securing a verdict. 
 
 Notice of intention to indict had probably been given at the time when 
 the decree was passed. The bill was actually preferred on the sixth 
 of Elaphebolion, b.c. 338, eight months after the battle of Chseronea, 
 and a few days before the Dionysian festival, at which the honor 
 conferred upon Demosthenes was to have been proclaimed. It had 
 this immediate consequence, that the decree of Ctesiphon could not 
 be carried into effect till after the trial; and thus one end, at least, 
 was gained by JEschines and his party,—the satisfaction of having 
 suspended their adversary’s triumph. But whether they were de¬ 
 terred by the failure of other prosecutions against Demosthenes, or 
 whether they judged from the temper of the people that they had 
 but little chance of success, the indictment of Ctesiphon was suffered 
 to lie dormant for more than seven years, and was not brought to 
 trial till the year b.c. 330. It may seem strange that the law of 
 Athens should have allowed a criminal prosecution to hang over a 
 man for so long a period; but it must be borne in mind that the pro¬ 
 ceeding against Ctesiphon not only involved a charge personally af¬ 
 fecting him, but had the further, and ostensibly the more important, 
 object of maintaining the purity of the law itself, and preventing an 
 unconstitutional decree from being recorded in the public archives. 
 It is probable, however* that the case would never have been re¬ 
 vived, but for the occurrence of political events which seemed to af¬ 
 ford a favorable opportunity. 
 
 Within two years after his victory at Chaeronea, Philip had perished by 
 the hand of an assassin. The hopes that were excited in Greece by 
 the news of his death were quickly dispelled by the' vigorous meas¬ 
 ures of his successor. Notwithstanding the efforts of Demosthenes, 
 it was found impossible to concert any feasible plan for a union of 
 the Greek states against Macedonia. The rash revolt of the Thebans 
 was punished by the extirpation of their city, which struck terror 
 
4 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 into the very heart of Greece. Athens, suspected of aiding the in¬ 
 surgents, hastened to appease the conqueror by humble submission ; 
 and when he insisted on the delivery up of their principal orators, 
 including Demosthenes, it was with difficulty that he was prevailed 
 upon to accept a less severe measure of satisfaction. The debate 
 which took place in the Athenian assembly upon this demand of 
 Alexander shows that Demosthenes must still have been in high 
 esteem at Athens. The feelings of the people, notwithstanding their 
 fears, were against the delivery of the orators: and Phocion’s coun¬ 
 sel, urging them to surrender themselves for the public good, was not 
 well received. Alexander in the year following (b.c. 334) passed 
 over into Asia, and commenced his career of conquest. Meanwhile 
 Greece had a breathing time. The states that sighed for freedom 
 looked with anxious expectation for every intelligence from the scene 
 of war, as if all their hopes depended on the fate of one man. The 
 farther he penetrated into Asia, the better chance there seemed to 
 be of his being overwhelmed by the force of the Persian empire. 
 While he was yet in the defiles of Cilicia, it was confidently asserted 
 by Demosthenes at Athens, that his army would be trampled under 
 foot by the cavalry of Darius. The battle of Issus belied this proph¬ 
 ecy ; yet it was still believed that the Persian monarchy had re¬ 
 sources in itself sufficient to prevail in the war: and the length of 
 time that Alexander was occupied in Phoenicia and Egypt, while 
 Darius was collecting the strength of his empire in the East, seemed 
 to favor these sanguine views. 
 
 About the time that Alexander was marching to fight his last and de¬ 
 cisive battle against the Persian king in Mesopotamia, Agis, king of 
 Sparta, put himself at the head of a confederacy, which comprised the 
 greater part of the Peloponnesian states, and prepared to throw off 
 the Macedonian yoke. Taking his opportunity, while Antipater was 
 engaged in suppressing a Thracian insurrection, he raised his standard 
 in Laconia, and declared war; but, after gaining some successes and 
 laying siege to Megalopolis, which refused to join the league, he was 
 defeated in a hard-fought battle by Antipater, and died fighting with 
 the valor of an ancient Spartan. This was in the beginning of the 
 year b.c. 330. The confederacy was dissolved, and the voice of free¬ 
 dom was again changed to that of submission. 
 
 Athens had taken no part in the last movement. The cause of her 
 neutrality is not quite clear, though it is probably to be attributed to 
 a want of proper concert and preparation. Had the Athenians sent 
 their forces to assist Agis in Peloponnesus, they would have been 
 exposed to the first attack of the enemy, and the dread of this may 
 have restrained them from rising. A Macedonian garrison was main¬ 
 tained in the Cadmea, which would gain speedy intelligence of any 
 movement on the part of the Athenians, and the people of the 
 Boeotian towns were friendly to Macedonia. It is not quite clear 
 either what part Demosthenes took upon this occasion. Hlschines 
 represents him as boasting that he had kindled the flames of war in 
 Peloponnesus; and both Plutarch and Dinarchus intimate that he 
 exerted himself for that purpose: yet ./Eschines accuses him also 
 of neglecting so good an opportunity for engaging Athens in the 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 5 
 
 contest. Demosthenes may in prudence have abstained from plung¬ 
 ing the Athenians into a war, for which he saw they were ill pre¬ 
 pared ; and at the same time he might have encouraged the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians to make an effort of which, in the event of success, his own 
 country would equally have reaped the benefit. So timid a policy 
 he would not certainly have adopted eight years before; but under 
 existing circumstances it could hardly be a reproach to him, es¬ 
 pecially when he observed the timid and temporizing spirit which 
 was gradually gaining ground among his countrymen. Presents of 
 Persian spoil had been sent to Athens, to decorate the Acropolis. 
 Phocion corresponded with Alexander as a friend; and it was gen¬ 
 erally represented by all who belonged to his party, that resistance 
 to him was hopeless. 
 
 If such feelings prevailed to a great extent before the defeat of Agis, 
 they must have been greatly strengthened after that event. Mace¬ 
 donian arms were every where triumphant. Alexander had seated 
 himself on the throne of Darius ; Antipater, his viceroy, was irresist¬ 
 ible in Greece: Macedonian ascendency, which Demosthenes had 
 exerted himself all his life to oppose, seemed now to be completely 
 secured. Athens was not what she was even at the time of Chaeronea, 
 for sixteen years before that disastrous battle, the voice of Demos¬ 
 thenes had been continually resounding in the assembly, instructing, 
 animating, improving, elevating the minds and hearts of his hearers; 
 exerting such an influence over them, that he may be said to have 
 raised up, by the force of his own eloquence, a new generation of 
 patriots. But in the eight years that followed it was very different: 
 his voice in the cause of freedom and glory had been little heard; 
 and besides that the people were cowed by the events which had 
 occurred, a lethargy had fallen on their spirit, for want of some one 
 to rouse them. 
 
 This was the time chosen by iEschines for bringing to an issue the long- 
 suspended cause. The aspect of affairs both at home and abroad 
 seemed favorable to the undertaking; and he summoned up all his 
 force and resolution for the contest. It was to be not only a trial of 
 strength between the contending parties at Athens,—the favorers of 
 Macedonian power, and those that regretted the loss of independence, 
 —but a final and decisive struggle between two rival statesmen, 
 exasperated against each other by a long series of hostilities. It was 
 manifest that Ctesiphon was but "the nominal defendant; the real ob¬ 
 ject of attack was Demosthenes, his whole policy and administration. 
 The interest excited was intense, not only at Athens, but throughout 
 all Greece; and an immense concourse of foreigners flocked from all 
 parts to hear the two most celebrated orators in the world. A jury 
 (of not less than five hundred) was impanneled by the archon; and 
 before a dense and breathless audience the pleadings began. 
 
 As the speeches of both the orators are preserved to us, we have the 
 means of comparing one with the other, and forming our opinion of 
 their respective merits. The world in general have decided as the 
 people of Athens did, not only upon the oratorical merits of the two 
 rivals, but upon the principal questions at issue between them. The 
 accuser, who thought to brand his opponent with eternal infamy, lias 
 
6 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 only added to the lustre of his renown. Independently of the internal 
 evidence furnished by this and other orations of Demosthenes, which 
 have carried to the hearts of most readers a conviction of his patriot¬ 
 ism, we can not fail to be strongly influenced by the judgment of the 
 Athenians themselves, whom neither their own past misfortunes, nor 
 the terror inspired by the late victory of Antipater, could deter from 
 giving a verdict, by which, while they acquitted Demosthenes from 
 all blame, they in effect declared their approbation of his measures 
 in opposition to Macedonia. 
 
 The reader who carefully examines the speech of iEschines will not fail 
 to observe, that he betrays a consciousness of weakness in that part 
 of his case where he attacks the political character of his rival. He 
 seems to feel also that he is speaking in opposition to the general 
 feeling of his hearers. His own character as a politician had been so 
 dubious, his conduct so open to suspicion, that while he most bitterly 
 assails his adversary, he is constantly under the necessity of defending 
 himself. On the whole life, public and private, of Demosthenes, he 
 pours a torrent of invective; to this the greater part of his speech is 
 devoted: yet he seems to have been impelled to it rather by hate and 
 revenge, than by any calculation of advantage. On the other hand, 
 when he deals with the legal parts of his case, commenting on those 
 specific violations of Athenian law which Ctesiphon’s measure was 
 charged with, it is evident that his strength lay there; he handles 
 his subject temperately, skillfully, and carefully, laboring to make 
 every point clear to the jury, and to impress them with the convic¬ 
 tion that to uphold the laws was the sure way to maintain constitu¬ 
 tional government. On these points he mainly relied, hoping by this 
 means to secure a verdict, which would give him a triumph over his 
 enemy, and carry the general opinion over Greece, that the credit 
 and influence of Demosthenes were extinguished. 
 
 Demosthenes, feeling his weakness as to the legal questions, dexterously 
 throws them into the middle of his speech, and passes lightly and 
 rapidly over them, while he devotes his greatest efforts to the vindi¬ 
 cation of his own merits as a patriot and a statesman. Refusing to 
 comply with the insidious demand of AEschines, that he should take 
 the questions in the same order as his accuser, he insists upon his 
 legal right to conduct his defense as he pleases. Opening with a 
 modest exordium, to conciliate the favor of the jury, he launches 
 gradually into the history of his own conduct and measures: present¬ 
 ing first a general view of the condition of Greece -when he entered 
 public life, and of the difficulties under which the Athenians labored 
 in their contest with Philip; then setting forth his own views, plans, 
 and objects, and showing that he had advised a course of action which 
 both the circumstances of the time and the honor of the country 
 required. He apologizes for the self-praise mixed up with his speech, 
 on the ground that he was driven to it by his opponent. Entering 
 on the Sacred War, and the peace of b.c. 346, he labors to exculpate 
 himself from all share in the errors then committed, imputing them 
 chiefly to the negligence of the other embassadors, and to the treach¬ 
 ery of Philocrates and JEschines, who, by the false hopes which they 
 excited at Athens, prevented the people from assisting the Phocians. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 7 
 
 Coming to the events which brought on a renewal of the war, he 
 shows how Philip’s ambitious projects and encroachments in evei'y 
 part of Greece made it necessary to oppose him, especially for the 
 Athenians, who were menaced at home as well as abroad by his 
 aggressions in Thrace, Euboea, and Megara. He pursues these topics 
 until he has carried with him the feelings of his hearers, which must 
 have been strongly on his side when he dilated on the glorious issue 
 of the campaigns in Euboea and the Propontis, and read to them the 
 decrees of the Byzantines, Perinthians, and Chersonesites, in honor 
 of Athens, all which were due to the vigorous measures of his own 
 administration. Having thus secured the good-will and sympathy of 
 his judges, he proceeds to discuss the legal charges against Ctesiphon. 
 Dwelling on them but for a short time, he plunges into a personal 
 attack upon JEschines, holding up to ridicule the meanness of his 
 birth and parentage, and retorting on him the same coarse and op¬ 
 probrious language which had been used toward himself. The bitter¬ 
 ness of his invective is only to be excused on the ground of strong 
 provocation, added to an assurance that his more grave charges of 
 corruption and treason were well founded. Those charges, so often 
 advanced before, he here repeats, denouncing more particularly the 
 conduct of Aeschines upon his mission to Delphi, b.c. 339, to which the 
 disaster of Chseronea was attributable. The account which iEschines 
 had given of this affair he shows to be false, and enters upon a minute 
 examination of the proceedings which caused Philip to be appointed 
 Amphictyonic general, and to march with an invading army, nomi¬ 
 nally against the Ampliissian Locrians, really against Boeotia and 
 Attica. A graphic description is given of the consternation at Athens 
 on hearing that Philip had seized Elatea. The meeting of the people, 
 the advice of Demosthenes to them, his embassy to Thebes, the suc¬ 
 cess of his negotiations, and the conclusion of the alliance between 
 Thebes and Athens are briefly recounted, Demosthenes forcibly point¬ 
 ing out the advantage of his measures, contending that they were not 
 to be judged by the mere event of the battle, and that it was far 
 more glorious for his country to be defeated in a struggle for the 
 independence of Greece, than it would have been to keep aloof from 
 the contest. Here he makes that noble adjuration, which has in all 
 ages been admired, appealing to his countrymen by the deeds of their 
 ancestors, of whom they would have acted most unworthily, had they 
 ■without a struggle abandoned the post of honor bequeathed to them. 
 He himself as a statesman would have deserved execration, had he 
 advised such a course. The failure of their arms was not to be im¬ 
 puted to the minister, who had done all he could to insure their suc¬ 
 cess, but rather to the commanders, or to evil fortune. As Aeschines 
 had said so much about the ill fortune which attended him, he draws 
 a comparison between the different fortunes of himself and his ri¬ 
 val, first, of their early life and education, next, of their career as 
 public men. Aeschines from the beginning had taken a part which 
 put him in opposition to the true interests of Athens, which caused 
 him to rejoice at her disasters, to quail and tremble at her successes. 
 He never came forward to assist her by his counsels when she needed 
 them, but only to censure others who had given their honest advice, 
 
8 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 because it had not turned out as well as was expected. It was a signal 
 proof of his malignant disposition, that he had expatiated on the 
 late disastrous events as if they were a subject of triumph to him, 
 without shedding a single tear, without any faltering in his voice, 
 without betraying the least emotion or symptom of grief. In reply 
 to the challenge of H2scliines, to say for what merit he claimed the 
 reward of a crown, Demosthenes boldly declares, for his incorrupti¬ 
 bility, by which he was distinguished not only from ^Eschines, but 
 from the multitude of venal orators in the Grecian world. Had there 
 been but a few more like himself in other states, Macedonia could 
 never have risen to greatness upon their ruin. He had done all that 
 was possible for a single man; and Athens, while she shared the mis¬ 
 fortune of all the Greeks, had the consolation of reflecting, that she 
 had striven gallantly and bravely to avert the common calamity. 
 ^Eschines had lauded the great men of a by-gone age, drawing an 
 invidious contrast between Demosthenes and them. This, says De¬ 
 mosthenes, was not a fair way of judging him: he should be tried by 
 reference to his own acts, as compared with those of his contempo¬ 
 raries. Yet even from the former comparison he did not shrink; for 
 he had acted on the same principles as the statesmen of olden time, 
 striving always to maintain the honor and dignity of Athens. At¬ 
 tachment to his country, and earnest anxiety for her welfare, had 
 been his constant and abiding motives of action: throughout his 
 whole life, in the day of power, in the hour of trial and adversity, 
 those feelings had never deserted him: that was the test of a good 
 and honest citizen ; by that he ought to be judged. 
 
 Such is, in substance, the argument of this celebrated Oration, as far 
 as relates to the main question in the cause. Some remarks on the 
 legal points will be found in an Appendix. The effect produced by 
 the speech upon an Athenian audience can be but faintly imagined 
 by us who read it at this distance of time. Although Athens was not 
 then what she had once been; although she was humbled by defeat, 
 shorn of her honors, stripped of her empire and dependencies, with¬ 
 out allies, without resources, without means of resistance to that iron 
 power under which all Greece had succumbed; there was still the 
 remembrance of the past, not yet extinguished by habitual servitude; 
 there were still vague hopes of future deliverance, and a fire of smoth¬ 
 ered indignation burning in the hearts of the people, ready to burst 
 into a flame at the first favorable opportunity. That such were their 
 feelings is proved by what occurred seven years afterward upon the 
 death of Alexander; when Athens made one convulsive effort for 
 freedom, ere she finally submitted to her fate. Demosthenes stood 
 before his countrymen, representing all which remained of Athenian 
 dignity and glory. If any man could help them, it was he. His ad¬ 
 vice had always been steady and constant; his warnings should have 
 been earlier attended to; but even yet there might be need of him. 
 He was their consolation for the past, their hope for the futxire. 
 During the progress of his address, such thoughts rushed upon their 
 minds with greater and greater force, till they were elevated above 
 themselves, and all the spirit of their ancestors was for the moment 
 regenerate within them. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 9 
 
 They could forgive him all his egotism and self-praise. It was the 
 praise of a life devoted to their service. Where he lauded his own 
 acts most strongly, he identified them with the glories of his coun¬ 
 try. Whatever good results might have accrued from his measures, 
 he ascribed the merit less to himself than to the fortune of Athens, or 
 to the gods, of whom he was but the humble instrument in a right¬ 
 eous cause. His own eloquence would have been of no avail, had 
 it not touched the true chord of Athenian feeling. Throughout his 
 whole political career he had been supported by the judgment and 
 convictions of the people. Thus he argued, and the people felt it 
 was impossible for them to find him guilty, without passing sentence 
 upon themselves, without condemning the policy which Athens had 
 for a long series of years consistently pursued. The genius of Athens 
 protected her from such disgrace; and by an overwhelming major¬ 
 ity, which left the accuser no choice but to retire into exile, a verdict 
 was given for the defendant. 
 
 I begin, men of Athens, by praying to every God and God¬ 
 dess, that the same good-will, which I have ever cherished to¬ 
 ward the commonwealth and all of you, may be requited to 
 me on the present trial. 1 I pray likewise—and this specially 
 concerns yourselves, your religion, and your honor—that the 
 Gods may put it in your minds, not to take counsel of my op¬ 
 ponent touching the manner in which I am to be heard—that 
 would indeed be cruel!—but of the laws and of your oath ; 
 wherein (besides the other obligations) it is prescribed that 
 you shall hear both sides alike. This means, not only that 
 you must pass no pre-condemnation, not only that you must 
 extend your good-will equally to both, but also that you must 
 allow the parties to adopt such order and course of defense as 
 they severally choose and prefer. 
 
 Many advantages hath iEschines over me on this trial; and 
 two especially, men of Athens. First, my risk in the contest 
 is not the same. It is assuredly not the same for me to for¬ 
 feit your regard, as for my adversary not to succeed in his in- 
 
 1 Quintilian commends the modest opening of this oration, which he 
 attributes to a cautious timidity. Cicero thus remarks upon it in the 
 Orator :— 
 
 “ Hie, quem praestitisse diximus cseteris, in ilia pro Ctesiphonte ora- 
 tione longd optima, submissus a primo; deinde, dum de legibus dispu- 
 tat, pressus; post sensim incedens, judices ut vidit ardentes, in reliquis 
 exultavit audacius.” 
 
 It was not unusual with the ancient orators to commence with a 
 prayer. Thus Lycurgus begins his speech against Leocrates; and Ci¬ 
 cero his defense of Murena. Also, in the defense of Rabirius, (near the 
 beginning,) there is an appeal, like this of Demosthenes, to all the 
 Gods and ^ oddesses. 
 
 A 2 
 
10 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 dictment. To me—but I will say nothing untoward 1 at the 
 outset of my address. The prosecution however is play to 
 him. 2 My second disadvantage is, the natural disposition of 
 mankind to take pleasure in hearing invective and accusa¬ 
 tion, and to be annoyed by those who praise themselves. To 
 AEschines is assigned the part which gives pleasure ; that 
 which is (I may fairly say) offensive to all, is left for me. 
 And if, to escape from this, I make no mention of what I have 
 done, I shall appear to be without defense against his charges, 
 without proof of my claims to honor : whereas, if I proceed to 
 give an account of my conduct and measures, I shall be forced 
 to speak frequently of myself. I will endeavor then to do so 
 with all becoming modesty: what I am driven to by the ne¬ 
 cessity of the case, will be fairly chargeable to my opponent 
 who has instituted such a prosecution. 3 
 
 I think, men of the jury, you will all agree that I, as well 
 as Ctesiphon, am a party to this proceeding, and that it is a 
 matter of no less concern to me. It is painful and grievous 
 to be deprived of any thing, especially by the act of one’s 
 enemy ; but your good-will and affection are the heaviest loss, 
 precisely as they are the greatest prize to gain. 
 
 Such being the matters at stake in this cause, I conjure 
 and implore you all alike, to hear my defense to the charge 
 in that fair manner which the laws prescribe—laws, to which 
 their author, Solon, a man friendly to you and to popular 
 rights, thought that validity should be given, not only by the 
 recording of them, 4 but by the oath of you the jurors: not that 
 
 1 Auger: sinistre. Jacobs: anstossiges. Leland: ominous. There 
 is a reference, of course, to the fear of an evil omen, which causes the 
 orator to suppress* what he would have said. 
 
 3 Because he can afford to be beaten; he has not much to lose. He 
 possesses not, like me, the esteem and affection of the people; and 
 therefore has not the loss of these to fear. It is difficult to translate 
 the phrase pointedly. Axiger: “ il m’accuse sans avoir rien a perdre.” 
 Spillan: “ he accuses me without any risk.” Brougham : “ he brings 
 his charge an unprovoked volunteer.” Jacobs: er klagt mich aus 
 Muthwillen an. 
 
 3 Upon this Quintilian remarks: “ Neque hoc dico, non aliquando 
 de rebus a se gestis oratori esse dicendum, sicut eidem Demosthe'ni pro 
 Ctesiphonte: quod tamen ita emendavit, lit necessitatem id faciendi 
 ostenderet, invidiamque omnem in eum regereret, qui hoc se coegisset.” 
 
 4 Leland and Spillan are wrong in translating ro ypdipai “ by enact¬ 
 ing and Lord Brougham, who has rendered it “ by engraving on 
 brazen tablets,” has been unjustly and ignorantly censured. The only 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 11 
 
 he distrusted you, as it appears to me; but, seeing that the 
 charges and calumnies, wherein the prosecutor is powerful by 
 being the first speaker, can not be got over by the defendant, 
 unless each of you jurors, observing his religious obligation, 
 shall with like favor receive the arguments of the last speak¬ 
 er, and lend an equal and impartial ear to both, before he de¬ 
 termines upon the whole case. 
 
 As I am, it appears, on this day to render an account both 
 of my private life and my public measures, I would fain, as 
 in the outset, call the Gods to my aid; and in your presence 
 I implore them, first, that the good-will which I have ever 
 cherished toward the commonwealth and all of you may be 
 fully requited to me on the present trial; next, that they may 
 direct you to such a decision upon this indictment, as will con¬ 
 duce to your common honor, and to the good conscience of 
 each individual. 
 
 Had JEschines confined his charge to the subject of the 
 prosecution, I too would have proceeded at once to my justifi¬ 
 cation of the decree. 1 But since he has wasted no fewer words 
 in the discussion of other matters, in most of them calumnia¬ 
 ting me, I deem it both necessary and just, men of Athens, to 
 begin by shortly adverting to these points, that none of you 
 may be induced by extraneous arguments to shut your ears 
 against my defense to the indictment^ _ 
 
 To all his scandalous abuse of my private life, observe my 
 plain and honest answer. If you know me to be such as he 
 alleged—for I have lived nowhere else but among you—let 
 not my voice be heard, however transcendent my statesman¬ 
 ship ! Rise up this instant and condemn me! But if, in 
 your opinion and judgment, I am far better and of better 
 descent than my adversary; if (to speak without offense) I 
 am not inferior, I or mine, to any respectable 2 citizen; then 
 
 fault of such version is, that it Las too many words. He probably fol¬ 
 lowed Auger, who has “de les graver sur l’airain;” which, in fact, is 
 the meaning. Jacobs and Pabst are right. The ordinary meaning of 
 ypaipcu vo/xovg, “to propose laws,” is here manifestly inapplicable. I 
 may here also observe that the censure of Lord Brougham for joining 
 dina'ujc with ukovocu is equally absurd. The Germans both have it as 
 he has; nor is it possible, with such a collocation of the words, to take 
 it otherwise. 
 
 1 The decree of the Senate procured by Ctesiphon in favor of De¬ 
 mosthenes. , 
 
 2 Jacobs: der rechtlichen Burger. Auger: “aucune famille estimable.” 
 
12 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 give no credit to him for his other statements—it is plain 
 they were all equally fictions—but to me let the same good¬ 
 will, which you have uniformly exhibited upon many former 
 trials, be manifested now. With all your malice, iEschines, 
 it was very simple to suppose that I should turn from the 
 discussion of measures and policy to notice your scandal. I 
 will do no such thing: I am not so crazed. Your lies and 
 calumnies about my political life I will examine forthwith; 
 for that loose ribaldry I shall have a word hereafter, if the 
 jury-desire to hear it. 
 
 The crimes whereof I am accused are many and grievous: 
 for some of them the laws enact heavy—most severe penal¬ 
 ties. The scheme of this present proceeding includes a com¬ 
 bination of spiteful insolence, insult, railing, aspersion, and 
 every thing of the kind; while for the said charges and ac¬ 
 cusations, if they were true, the state has not the means of 
 inflicting an adequate punishment, or any thing like it. 1 For 
 
 1 Two ways of explaining this difficult passage have occurred to me. 
 The first is as follows:—The whole scheme of the prosecution shows 
 that it was instituted to gratify private enmity, not for the good of the 
 public. If the charges of JEschine* against me were true, you could 
 not sufficiently punish him (^Eschines) for preferring them in such a 
 manner. Why? Because he prefers them by way of insult and slan¬ 
 der, and would not let me be heard in answer to them, if he could 
 have his way; a course which is most unjust and unconstitutional. He 
 ought to have made such charges against me directly, and at the time 
 when the offenses were committed; not to have assailed me through 
 Ctesiphon so long after the time. 
 
 The second method has been partly indicated by a German critic, 
 cited by Jacobs, and is thus:—The whole scheme of the prosecution 
 bears.the marks of private enmity and malice, while, if the charges were 
 true, the prosecutor does not put you in a situation to punish me ac¬ 
 cording to my deserts. Why? Because he does not prosecute me 
 directly for the crimes which he lays to my charge. The penalties of 
 the law for such crimes could not be enforced by means of the present 
 prosecution, which is a collateral proceeding, not against me, but against 
 a third party. The charges in question are made incidentally, and by 
 way of slander and abuse. The very proposal of ^Eschines, that J should 
 not be allowed to speak freely in defense of my political conduct, proves 
 that his attack upon me is not for the public good; for he must know 
 that you could never punish me for the crimes of which I am accused, 
 without giving me a proper and full hearing. No such thing is allowed 
 by the law, or could be tolerated on any principle of justice. His attack 
 on me, therefore, can have no good object; it is manifestly dictated 
 by personal hatred and malice, &c. 
 
 The latter method, I think, is preferable. , 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 13 
 
 it is not right to debar another of access to the people and 
 privilege of speech ; moreover, to do so by way of malice and 
 insult—by heaven! is neither honest, nor constitutional, nor 
 just. If the crimes which he saw me committing against the 
 state were as heinous as he so tragically gave out, he ought 
 to have enforced the penalties of the law against them at the 
 time; if he saw me guilty of an impeachable offense, by im¬ 
 peaching and so bringing me to trial before you; if moving 
 illegal decrees, by indicting me for them. For surely, if he 
 can prosecute Ctesiplion on my account, he would not have 
 forborne to indict me myself, had he thought he could con¬ 
 vict me. In short, whatever else he saw me doing to your 
 prejudice, whether mentioned or not mentioned in his cata¬ 
 logue of slander, there are laws fo£ such things, and pun¬ 
 ishments, and trials, and judgments, with sharp and severe 
 penalties; all of which he might have enforced against me: 
 and had he done so—had he thus pursued the proper method 
 with me, his charges would have been consistent with his 
 conduct. But now he has declined the straightforward and 
 just course, avoided all proofs of guilt at the time , 1 and after 
 this long interval gets up, to play his part withal, a heap of 
 accusation, ribaldry, and scandal. Then he arraigns me, but 
 prosecutes the defendant. His hatred of me he makes the 
 prominent part of the whole contest; yet, without having 
 ever met me upon that ground, he openly seeks to deprive a 
 third party of his privileges. Now, men of Athens, besides 
 all the other arguments that may be urged in Ctesiphon’s be¬ 
 half, this methinks, may very fairly be alleged—that we 
 should try our own quarrel by ourselves; not leave our pri¬ 
 vate dispute, and look what third party we can damage. That 
 surely were the height of injustice. 
 
 It may appear from what has been said, that all his 
 charges are alike unjust and unfounded in truth. Yet I wish 
 
 1 In translating tovq nap’ avra rd npay/uaTa kheyxovp, as just above 
 in the expression Trap’ avra rudiM/para, I adhere to the interpretation 
 of Wolf and Reiske, which is followed hy Lei and, Brougham, Spillan, 
 and others. And so Pabst: ist der Riige gegen mich auf frischer That 
 ausgewichen. Taylor, however, understands napd in the sense of “ ac¬ 
 cording to ripupia napd to ddtiiri/ua he renders, poena jnxta formam 
 criminis. r E/ieyx°C tt apd to npuyga would thus be “ a proof applicable 
 to the fact,” “a proof by evidence'.” Jacobs has: statt den Beweis aus 
 urirklichen Thatsachen zu fuhren, 
 
14 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 4 
 
 to examine them separately, and especially his calumnies 
 about the peace and the embassy, where he attributed to me 
 the acts of himself and Philocrates. It is necessary also, and 
 perhaps proper, men of Athens, to remind you how affairs 
 stood at those times, that you may consider every single 
 measure in reference to the occasion. 
 
 When the Phocian war 1 had broken out—not through me, 
 for I had not then commenced public life—you were in this 
 position: you wished the Phocians to be saved, though you 
 saw they were not acting right; and would have been glad 
 for the Thebans to suffer any thing, with whom for a just 
 reason you were angry ; for they had not borne with moder¬ 
 ation their good fortune at Leuctra. The whole of Pelopon¬ 
 nesus was divided: they that hated the Lacedaemonians were 
 not powerful enough to destroy them; and they that ruled 
 before by Spartan influence were not masters of the states: 
 among them, as among the rest of the Greeks, there was a 
 sort of unsettled strife and confusion . 2 Philip, seeing this—it 
 was not difficult to see—lavished bribes upon the traitors in 
 every state, embroiled and stirred them all up against each 
 other; and so, by the errors and follies of the rest, he was 
 strengthening himself, and growing up to the ruin of all. 
 But when every one saw that the then overbearing, but now 
 unfortunate, Thebans, harassed by so long a war, must of 
 necessity have recourse to you; Philip, to prevent this, and 
 obstruct the union of the states, offered to you peace, to 
 them succor. What helped him then almost to surprise you 
 in a voluntary snare? The cowardice, shall I call it? or 
 ignorance—or both—of the other Greeks; who, while you 
 were waging a long and incessant war—and that too for their 
 common benefit, as the event has shown—assisted you neither 
 with money nor men, nor any thing else whatsoever. You, 
 being justly and naturally offended with them, lent a willing 
 ear to Philip. 
 
 The peace then granted was through such means brought 
 about, not through me, as .iEschines calumniously charged. 
 The criminal and corrupt practices of these men during the 
 
 1 See Appendix I. 
 
 2 The very words here seem to be borrowed from Xenophon, where 
 he describes the result of the battle of Mantinea. ’A Kpioia teal Tupa^r) 
 Itl Tileiov perd. rfjv pdxyv kyhero i) TcpoaOev kv ry 'EA Tiddt. 
 
 I 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 15 
 
 treaty will be found, on fair examination, to be the cause of 
 our present condition. The whole matter am I for truth’s 
 sake discussing and going through ; for, let there appear to be 
 ever so much criminality in these transactions, it is surely 
 nothing to me. The first who spoke and mentioned the sub¬ 
 ject of peace was Aristodemus the actor: the seconder and 
 mover, fellow-hireling for that purpose with the prosecutor , 1 
 was Philocrates the Agnusian 2 —your associate, JEschines, not 
 mine, though you should burst with lying. Their supporters 
 —from whatever motives—I pass that by for the present— 
 were Eubulus and Cephisophon. I had nothing to do with it. 
 
 Notwithstanding these facts, which I have stated exactly 
 according to the truth, he ventured to assert—to such a pitch 
 of impudence had he come—that I, besides being author 
 of the peace, had prevented the country making it in a gen¬ 
 eral council with the Greeks. Why, you—I know not what 
 name you deserve!—when you saw me robbing the state of 
 an advantage and connection so important as you described 
 just now, did you ever express indignation ? did you come 
 forward to publish and proclaim what you now charge me 
 with? If indeed I had been bribed by Philip to prevent 
 the conjunction of the Greeks, it was your business not to 
 be silent, but to cry out, to protest, and inform the people. 
 But you never did so—your voice was never heard to such a 
 purpose, and no wonder; for at that time no embassy had 
 been sent to any of the Greeks—they had all been tested long 
 before; and not a word of truth upon the subject has Aes¬ 
 chines spoken. 
 
 Besides, it is the country that he most traduces by his 
 falsehoods. For, if you were at the same time calling on 
 the Greeks to take arms, and sending your own embassadors 
 to treat with Philip for peace, you were performing the part 
 of an Eurybatus , 3 not the act of a commonwealth, or of hon¬ 
 est men. But it is false, it is false. For what purpose could 
 
 1 Mer<i tovtov is wrongly referred by most translators to Aristodemus. 
 
 2 I e. of the 6/j/j.oc, or township of Agnus. A brief account of the 
 orators and statesmen of the period will be found in Appendix II. 
 
 3 This name, having once belonged to a notorious thief and trickster, 
 had passed into a by-word of reproach. See the comment of Eustathius 
 on the Odyssey, T. 24/7. Suidas mentions a Zev? Evpvparot ,who changed 
 himself into all manner of shapes. Alschines had in his speech com¬ 
 pared Demosthenes to Eurybatus. 
 
16 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 ye have sent for them at that period? For peace? They all 
 had it. For war? You were yourselves deliberating about 
 peace. It appears therefore, I was not the adviser or the au¬ 
 thor of the original peace; and none of his other calumnies 
 against me are shown to be true. 
 
 Observe again, after the state had concluded the peace, 
 what line of conduct each of us adopted. Hence you will 
 understand who it was that co-operated in every thing with 
 Philip; who that acted in your behalf, and sought the advant¬ 
 age of the commonwealth. 
 
 I moved in the council that our embassadors should sail 
 instantly for whatever place they heard Philip was in, and 
 receive his oath: they would not however, notwithstanding 
 my resolution . 1 What was the effect of this, men of Athens ? 
 I will explain. It was Philip’s interest that the interval 
 before the oaths should be as long as possible ; yours, that it 
 should be as short. Why? Because you discontinued all 
 your warlike preparations, not only from the day of swearing 
 peace, but from the day that you conceived hopes of it; a 
 thing which Philip was from the beginning studious to con¬ 
 trive, believing—rightly enough—that whatever of our pos¬ 
 sessions he might take before the oath of ratification, he 
 should hold securely; as none would break the peace on such 
 account. I, men of Athens, foreseeing and weighing these 
 consequences, moved the decree, to sail for whatever place 
 Philip was in, and receive his oath without delay; so that 
 your allies, the Thracians, might be in possession of the 
 places which -ZEschines ridiculed just now, (Serrium, Myr- 
 tium, and Ergisce,) at the time of swearing the oaths; and 
 that Philip might not become master of Thrace by securing 
 the posts of vantage, nor provide himself with plenty of 
 money and troops to facilitate his further designs. Yet this 
 decree he neither mentions nor reads; but reproaches me, 
 because, as Councilor, I thought proper to introduce the 
 embassadors. Why, what should I have done? Moved not 
 to introduce men who were come for the purpose of con¬ 
 ferring with you? or ordered the Manager 2 not to assign 
 
 1 It is implied that the motion was carried. It then became a reso¬ 
 lution of the senate, on the motion of Demosthenes, and may be called 
 his resolution. 
 
 2 The apxireicTcjv was the lessee of the theatre, who undertook to keep 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 17 
 
 them places at the theatre 1 They might have had places for 
 their two obols, if the resolution had not been moved. Was 
 it my duty to guard the petty interests of the state, and have 
 sold our main interests like these men °? Surely not. Take 
 and read me this decree, which the prosecutor, knowing it 
 well, passed over. Read. 
 
 THE DECREE . 1 
 
 “ In the Archonship of Mnesiphilus, on the thirteenth of 
 Hecatombaeon, in the presidency of the Pandionian tribe, De¬ 
 mosthenes son of Demosthenes of Pseania moved:—Whereas 
 Philip hath sent embassadors for peace, and hath agreed upon 
 
 it in repair and proper order, he himself taking the profits. The en¬ 
 trance fee of two obols was paid to him. 
 
 Demosthenes, as member of the council, had introduced the Macedo¬ 
 nian embassadors, Parmenio, Antipater, and Eurylochus, and moved 
 that they should be invited to seats of honor at the Dionysian festival. 
 This was no more than a necessary act of civility, due to the eminent 
 ministers whom Philip had sent to treat with the Athenians; and there 
 could not be a more fit person to make the motion than Demosthenes, 
 who had been one of the ten embassadors to Philip, and (it seems) the 
 only councilor among them. Nor did he confine himself to these form¬ 
 al acts, but during their stay at Athens hospitably entertained them 
 at his own house, and on their departure accompanied them a part of 
 the way on horseback. For these attentions he was reproached by 
 HSschines, as if he had overacted his part, and either sought to curry 
 favor with Philip, or to make an idle display of his wealth and import¬ 
 ance. 
 
 1 In this, as in most of the documents quoted in the first half of the 
 present speech, there are found serious difficulties, which have led 
 critics to the conviction that it is not genuine. In the first place, the 
 name of the archon for the year b . c . 347 was not Mnesiphilus, but 
 Themistocles. Secondly, not five, but ten embassadors, were sent to 
 receive the oath of Philip; and indeed the same ten who had been on 
 the previous embassy. Thirdly, it is called a resolution of the senate 
 and people, whereas that which Demosthenes refers to was a resolution 
 of the senate alone. Fourthly, the ten embassadors were sent to receive 
 Philip’s oath only, not to take the oath on behalf of their country, 
 which had been done before. These and some other discrepancies have 
 led to the conclusion, that the decree (which is not found in all the 
 manuscripts) is an interpolation; and Bockh, in a treatise De Archon - 
 tibus Pseudeponymis, suggests the following way of accounting for the 
 error. He supposes that the decree in the text was found in some an¬ 
 cient collection by the interpolator; that he mistook the name of the 
 Tpa/u/uarevg, or secretary of the council, which was usually appended 
 to decrees, for the name of the archon; and that, for want of due atten¬ 
 tion to times and circumstances, he mistook one document for another. 
 Thus, in the endeavor to supply the defect of his manuscript, he cor- 
 
18 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 articles of treaty, it is resolved 1 by the Council and People 
 of Athens, in order that the peace voted in the first assembly 
 may be ratified, to choose forthwith from the whole body of 
 Athenians five embassadors; and that the persons elected do 
 repair, without any delay, wheresoever they shall ascertain 
 that Philip is, and as speedily as may be exchange oaths with 
 him, according to the articles agreed on between him and the 
 Athenian people, comprehending the allies of either party. 
 For embassadors were chosen, Eubulus of Anaphlestus, Ais- 
 cliines of Cothocidoe, Cephisoplion of Rhamnus, Democrates of 
 Phlya, Cleon of Cotliocidse.” 
 
 Notwithstanding that I had passed this decree for the ad¬ 
 vantage of Athens, not that of Philip, our worthy embassa¬ 
 dors so little regarded it, as to sit down in Macedonia three 
 whole months, until Philip returned from Thrace after entirely 
 subjugating the country, although they might in ten days, or 
 rather in three or four, have reached the Hellespont and saved 
 the fortresses, by receiving his oath before he reduced them: 
 for he would never have touched them in our presence, or we 
 should not have sworn him; and thus he would have lost 
 the peace, and not have obtained both, the peace and the 
 fortresses. 
 
 Such was the first trick of Philip, the first corrupt act of 
 these accursed miscreants, in the embassy: for which I avow 
 that I was and am and ever will be at war and variance 2 with 
 
 rupted the text of the author; but gave up the unprofitable work 
 when he had got half through the speech: and so it happens that the 
 latter half is free from such interpolation. 
 
 Jacobs, who concurs with this view of Bockh, appears to agree with 
 him also in another conjecture, viz., that the peace referred to in this 
 decree is the same which is stated by Diodorus (lib. xvi. 77) to have 
 been concluded between the Athenians and Philip after his unsuccess¬ 
 ful siege of Byzantium. Other writers have doubted the fact of such a 
 peace having ever been made. 
 
 1 The Sedox^aL depends in construction upon eItze, “ moved that it be 
 resolved.” Such was the style in which a decree was drawn up, 
 
 3 Lord Brougham charges Leland with an anti-climax in translating 
 ttoXe/ueIv kcll diafyEpEcOcu, “ war and opposition.” But he has an incorrect 
 notion of the meaning of diatyEpopai, which he says “ indicates a constant 
 agitation—a restless enmity.” The truth is, that diacpipo/Liai is not a 
 strong word, but means simply—“I differ with—I dispute with—I am 
 at variance,” or the like. People not familiar with a language maybe 
 misled by etymology; for example, the common meanings of versari, 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 19 
 
 them. But mark another and still greater piece of villainy im¬ 
 mediately after. When Philip had sworn to the peace, hav¬ 
 ing secured Thrace through these men disobeying my decree, 
 he again bribes them not to leave Macedonia, until he had got 
 all ready for his expedition against the Phocians. His fear 
 was, if they reported to you his design and preparation for 
 marching, you might sally forth, sail round with your galleys 
 to Thermopylae as before, and block up the strait: his desire, 
 that, the moment you received the intelligence from them, he 
 should have passed Thermopylae, and you be unable to do any 
 thing. And jn such terror and anxiety was Philip, lest, not¬ 
 withstanding he had gained these advantages, if you voted suc¬ 
 cor before the destruction of the Phocians, his enterprise should 
 fail; he hires this despicable fellow, no longer in common with 
 the other embassadors, but by himself individually, to make 
 that statement and report to you, by which every thing was 
 lost. 
 
 I conjure and beseech you, men of Athens, throughout the 
 trial to remember this ; that, if Aeschines in his charge had not 
 traveled out of the indictment , 1 neither w r ould I have spoken 
 a word irrelevant; but since he has resorted to every species 
 both of accusation and calumny, it is necessary for me to re¬ 
 ply briefly to each of his charges. 
 
 What then were the statements made by JEschines, through 
 
 conversant, prevaricate, discourse, would not be discovered from the 
 mere derivation of the words. Familiarity only makes you acquainted 
 with the conventional usages of language, with the ordinary meanings 
 of words, and all their niceties and peculiarities. Lord Brougham was 
 partly deceived by the lexicon, which gives liinc inde jactor as one 
 of the meanings of diacpipogai, and partly by his assuming that De¬ 
 mosthenes himself would never have been guilty of an anti-climax. I 
 have myself observed that the ancients were not so particular about 
 climaxes as modern writers are. But it is further to be observed, that 
 the force of the passage greatly depends upon the words tote icai vvv 
 Kal del, which are applicable to both the verbs ; and also, that the war 
 which Demosthenes denounces is only a political war, and, so under¬ 
 stood, it does not in effect amount to more than political opposition 
 or enmity. 
 
 Jacobs expresses dta^epecdaL by Zwist, Pabst by ZwiespaJt, Auger by 
 opposition. 
 
 1 AJawyer-like phrase is suitable here; and I have adopted the one 
 furnished by Lord Brougham’s reviewer in the Times. Leland’s ver¬ 
 sion, “if ^Eschines had urged nothing against me foreign to his cause,” 
 is not so good. Jacobs wenn nicht ZEschines uber die Grenzen der 
 Klage ausgeschritten ware. 
 
20 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 which every thing was lost ? That you should not be alarmed 
 by Philip’s having passed Thermopylae—that all would be as 
 you desired, if you kept quiet; and in two or three days you 
 would hear, he was their friend to whom he had come as an 
 enemy, and their enemy to whom he had come as a friend— 
 it was not words that cemented attachments, (such was his 
 solemn phrase,) but identity of interest; and it was the 
 interest of all alike, Philip, the Phocians, and you, to be 
 relieved from the harshness and insolence of the Thebans. 
 His assertions were heard by some with pleasure, on account 
 
 of the hatred which then subsisted against the Thebans._ v 
 
 But what happened directly, almost immediately, afterward? 
 The wretched Phocians were destroyed, their cities demol¬ 
 ished ; you that kept quiet, and trusted to .HEschines, were 
 shortly bringing in your effects out of the country, while 
 -dEschines received gold; and yet more — while you got 
 nothing but your enmity with the Thebans and Thessalians , 1 
 Philip won their gratitude for what he had done. To prove 
 what I say, read me the decree of Callisthenes, and the letter 
 of Philip, from both of which these particulars will be clear 
 to you. Read. 
 
 THE DECREE . 2 
 
 “In the Archonship of Mnesiphilus, an extraordinary 
 assembly having been convened by the Generals, with the 
 sanction of the Presidents 3 and the Council, on the twenty- 
 
 1 The truth of the matter is a little warped by the verbal antithesis 
 of the orator. It is not strictly true, that the enmity with the Thebans 
 and Thessalians was caused by these proceedings ; it existed before, the 
 Athenians having all along favored the Phocians; though it was cer¬ 
 tainly increased by their display of ill-will upon the occasion referred 
 to, as Demosthenes says in the Oration on the Embassy, rr/v tyOpav tt)v 
 tt poQ Qrj(3aiovg peifa TrenotqKev (368). The verb yevecOcu applies well 
 to the latter clause, but not to the former; as is frequently the case. 
 
 3 This decree, like the last, appears to be spurious. Not only the 
 name of the arclion, but the date and other circumstances are incorrect. 
 The assembly held after the news of the conquest of Phocis was not in 
 the month here stated, but at the end of Scirrophorion (June). And 
 the contents of the decree vary from those which Demosthenes himself 
 mentions in the Oration on the Embassy (359, 379). Winiewski 
 thinks that there may have been two decrees on the motion ok Callis¬ 
 thenes, similar in character, but on different occasions. 
 
 3 To explain the constant references to the npvruvetc, irpoefipoi, &o., 
 <fcc., a brief account is given of the two Athenian Councils in Append¬ 
 ixes III. and IV., and of the Popular Assemblies in Appendix V. 
 
OX THE CROWN. 
 
 21 
 
 first of MEemacterion, Callisthenes, son of Eteonicus of Pha- 
 lerum, moved:—No Athenian shall on any pretense sleep in 
 the country, but all in the city and Piraeus, except those who 
 are stationed in the garrisons; and they shall every one keep 
 the posts assigned to them, without absenting themselves by 
 night or day. Whosoever disobeys this decree, shall be 
 amenable to the penalties of treason, unless he can show 
 that some necessity prevented him: the judges of such neces¬ 
 sity shall be the General of Infantry, and he of the Finance 
 department , 1 * * * * 6 and the Secretary of the Council. All effects 
 shall be conveyed out of the country as speedily as may be; 
 those that are within a hundred and twenty furlongs into 
 the city and Piraeus, those that are beyond a hundred and 
 twenty furlongs to Eleusis, and Phyle, and Aphidna, and 
 Rhamnus, and Sunium. On the motion of Callisthenes of 
 Plialerum.” 
 
 Was it with such expectations you concluded the peace? 
 Were such the promises this hireling made you? Come, read 
 the letter which Philip sent after this to Athens. 
 
 1 The duties of the generals were more numerous and varied in the 
 time of Demosthenes than in the early period of the republic. Formerly 
 (as mentioned in vol. I. p. 66, note 3) the ten generals were sent out 
 
 all together on warlike service. But this practice was discontinued, as 
 
 the wars of Athens began to be more frequent and on a larger scale. 
 
 One, two, or three only were then put in command of a single armament. 
 The generals had also various duties of a civil nature assigned to them, 
 
 which required the presence of some of them at home. Such were the 
 superintendence of all warlike preparations, and the collecting and 
 dispensing of the military funds. The management of the property- 
 tax was confided to them, on account of its being peculiarly a war- 
 impost. (See Appendix IY. vol. I.) Like other Athenian magistrates, 
 they had judicial functions to perform in matters under their adminis¬ 
 trative control; as in questions arising out of the property-tax assess¬ 
 ments, and charges for breach of military duty. The power of convok¬ 
 ing extraordinary assemblies of the people was given to them, as being 
 the persons peculiarly intrusted with the defense of the city and com¬ 
 monwealth. In the time of Demosthenes it would seem that their 
 functions were divided, probably for convenience; so that one com¬ 
 manded the infantry, 6 kirl tu>v otzAuv, or otc^ituv, another the cavalry, 
 
 6 M tuv Imreuv, another took charge of the militai-y chest and fund, 
 6 hrl tt/c diouajoeug. Perhaps others had other tasks assigned to them. 
 See the page above referred to in vol. I. Reiske thinks 6 enl tuv oirluv 
 is simply “ the general in military command.” Jacobs renders it, der 
 befehlfuhrende Strateg. 
 
22 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 THE LETTER OF PHILIP. 
 
 “Philip, king of Macedonia, to the Council and People of 
 Athens,greeting. Ye know that we have passed Thermopylae, 
 and reduced Phocis to submission, and put garrisons in the 
 towns that opened their gates; those that resisted we took by 
 storm, and razed to the ground, enslaving their inhabitants. 
 Hearing however, that ye are preparing to assist them, I have 
 written unto you, that ye may trouble yourselves no farther 
 in the business. For it seems to me, ye are acting altogeth¬ 
 er unreasonably; having concluded peace, and nevertheless 
 taking the field, and that too when the Phocians are not com¬ 
 prehended in our treaty. Wherefore, if ye abide not by your 
 engagements, ye will gain no advantage but that of being the 
 aggressors.” 
 
 You hear how plainly, in his letter to yon, he declares and 
 asserts to his own allies—“ all this I have done against the 
 will of the Athenians, and in their despite ; therefore if ye 
 are wise, ye Thebans and Thessalians, ye will regard them as 
 enemies, and put confidence in me not writing in such 
 words, but meaning so to be understood. And by these 
 means he carried them away with him , 1 insomuch that they 
 had neither foresight nor sense of the consequences, but suf¬ 
 fered him to get every thing into his power: hence the misfor¬ 
 tunes under which those wretched people at present are. The 
 agent and auxiliary who helped to w r in for him such confidence 
 —who brought false reports here and cajoled you—he it is 
 who now bewails the sufferings of the Thebans, and dilates 
 upon them so pathetically , 2 he himself being the cause both 
 of these calamities, and those in Phocis, and all the rest which 
 the Greeks have sustained. Truly must you, Aeschines, grieve 
 at these events, and compassionate the Thebans, when you 
 hold property in Boeotia and farm their lands ; and I rejoice at 
 a work, whose author immediately required me to be delivered 
 into his hands . 3 
 
 1 That is, “he won them completely over—he got them entirely 
 under his influence, so that they had scarce a will of their own.” The 
 metaphorical use of our word transported is not dissimilar. Jacobs: 
 cr Jene mit sich fortriss. Pabst: er diese ganz fur sich einnahm. 
 
 2 “ Describes at length how pitiable they are.” 
 
 3 After Thebes had been taken by Alexander, the Athenians, on the 
 motion of Demades, sent embassadors to congratulate him. He sent 
 them a letter, demanding that Demosthenes, and eight others (or nine 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 23 
 
 But I have fallen upon a subject which it maybe more con¬ 
 venient to discuss by-and-by. I will return then to my proofs, 
 showing how the iniquities of these men have brought about 
 the present state of things. 
 
 When you had been deceived by Philip through the agen¬ 
 cy of these men, who sold themselves in the embassies, and 
 reported not a word of truth to you—when the unhappy 
 Phocians had been deceived and their cities destroyed—what 
 followed ? The despicable Thessalians and stupid Thebans 
 looked on Philip as a friend, a benefactor, a saviour: he was 
 every thing with them—not a syllable would they hear from 
 any one to the contrary. You, though regarding his acts 
 with suspicion and anger, still observed the peace; for you 
 could have done nothing alone. The rest of the Greeks, 
 cheated and disappointed like yourselves, gladly observed the 
 peace, though they also had in a manner been attacked for a 
 long time. For when Philip was marching about, subduing 
 Illyrians and Triballians and some also of the Greeks, and 
 gaining many considerable accessions of power, and certain 
 citizens of the states (JEschines among them) took advantage 
 of the peace to go there and be corrupted; all people then, 
 against whom he was making such preparations, were at¬ 
 tacked. If they perceived it not, that is another question, no 
 concern of mine. I was for ever warning and protesting, both 
 at Athens and wheresoever I was sent. But the states were 
 diseased ; one class in their politics and measures being venal 
 and corrupt, while the multitude of private men either had 
 
 others, according to Diodorus) of the principal orators and statesmen 
 of the anti-Macedonian party, among whom were Chares, Hyperides, 
 and Lycurgus, should be delivered up to him. Phocion advised that 
 they should be given up, and even urged them to surrender themselves 
 for the good of their country. Demosthenes recited to the people the 
 fable of ASsop, where the wolf required the sheep to give up their dogs. 
 After some discussion Demades offered to intercede with the conqueror. 
 He was sent on an embassy for that purpose, and by his entreaty 
 Alexander was prevailed upon to withdraw the demand as to all but 
 Charidemus. 
 
 That Demosthenes was obnoxious to Alexander can hardly be won¬ 
 dered at. ^Eschines relates that, on Alexander’s first march to Thebes, 
 Demosthenes was sent on an embassy to him from Athens, and went as 
 far as Cithoeron, where, apprehending danger to himself, he invented 
 an excuse for turning back. There is no doubt that both then and 
 afterward he had been concerting measures to shake off the yoke of 
 Macedonia. 
 
24 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 no foresight, or were caught with the bait of present ease and 
 idleness; and all were under some such influence, only they 
 imagined each that the mischief would not approach them¬ 
 selves, but that by the peril of others they might secure their 
 own safety when they chose. The result, I fancy, has been, 
 that the people, in return for their gross and unseasonable 
 indolence, have lost their liberty: the statesmen, who imag¬ 
 ined they were selling every thing but themselves, discovered 
 they had sold themselves first; for, instead of friends, as they 
 were named during the period of bribery, they are now called 
 parasites, and miscreants,.and the like befitting names. Just¬ 
 ly. For no man, O Athenians, spends money for the traitor’s 
 benefit, or, when he has got possession of his purchase, em¬ 
 ploys the traitor to advise him in future proceedings: else 
 nothing could have been more fortunate than a traitor. But 
 it is not so—it never could be—it is far otherwise! When 
 the aspirant for power has gained his object, he is master also 
 of those that sold it; and then—then, I say, knowing their 
 baseness, he loathes and mistrusts and spurns them . 1 
 
 1 In this, as in the passage a little below, I have in my version made 
 no distinction between (piXuv and %hiov, simply because the English 
 language does not furnish me with the means. Eevol (in the sense here 
 used) are absent friends, who would be <plXoi, if they dwelt in the same 
 place, but being separated, can only correspond, or occasionally visit 
 each other and exchange hospitality. The relation that exists be¬ 
 tween such persons is called tjevia, but we have not in our language 
 any word which expresses that mutual relation; nor indeed any which 
 expresses the relation between host and guest, as I have before ob¬ 
 served. (Yol. I. p. 97, note 2.) Leland here renders tjivog, guest, (which 
 is but half the sense,) and below, intimate, and £ma, intimacy . Spil- 
 lan makes &voq, friend, and (j>L?ioq, intimate. Brougham has guest for 
 tjevoq, and hospitality for %Ev'ia. Francis the same. But hospitality 
 will not bear the enlarged sense necessary for £ma. The Gastfreund 
 of the German unfortunately can not be imitated in English. Auger 
 (like Leland) is inconsistent. In the first passage he has “d’hotes et 
 d’amis;” in the next, “ami” for both. The true meaning of %evoi is 
 fully expressed by a paraphrase in the following passage of Shakspeare: 
 
 “Sicilia can not 6how himself over-kind to Bohemia. They were 
 trained together in their childhood, and there rooted between them 
 then such an affection, which can not choose but branch now. Since 
 their more mature dignities and ro} T al necessities made separation of 
 their society, their encounters, though not personal, have been royally 
 attornied, with interchange of gifts, letters, loving embassies; that they 
 have seemed to be together, though absent, shook hands, as over a 
 vast, and embraced, as it were, from the ends of opposed winds.”— 
 Winter's Tale, Act I. Scene 1. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 25 
 
 Consider only—for, though the time of the events is past, 
 the time for understanding them is ever present to the wise: 
 Lasthenes was called the friend of Philip for a while, until he 
 betrayed Olynthus—Timolaus for a while, until he destroyed 
 Thebes—Rudicus and Simus of Larissa for awhile, until they 
 brought Thessaly under Philip’s power. Since then the world 
 has become full of traitors, expelled, and insulted, and suffer¬ 
 ing every possible calamity . 1 How fared Aristratus in Sicyon ? 
 how Perilaus in Megara? Are they not outcasts'? Hence 
 one may evidently see, it is the vigilant defender of his coun¬ 
 try, the strenuous opponent of such men, who secures to you 
 traitors and hirelings, JEschines, the opportunity of getting 
 bribes: through the number of those that oppose your wishes, 
 you are in safety and in pay; for had it depended on your¬ 
 selves, you would have perished long ago. 
 
 Much more could I say about those transactions, yet me- 
 thinks too much has been said already. The fault is my 
 adversary’s, for having spirted over me the dregs , 2 I may say, 
 of his own wickedness and iniquities, of which I was obliged 
 to clear myself to those who are younger than the events. 
 You too have probably been disgusted, who knew this man’s 
 venality before I spoke a word. He calls it friendship indeed; 
 and said somewhere in his speech— u the man who reproaches 
 me with the friendship of Alexander.” I reproach you with 
 friendship of Alexander! Whence gotten, or how merited? 
 Neither Philip’s friend nor Alexander’s should I ever call 
 you; I am not so mad; unless we are to call reapers and 
 other hired laborers the friends of those that hire them. That 
 however is not so—how could it be? It is nothing of the 
 
 1 I agree with the German translators, who join the participles klctv- 
 vo/xevuv, &c. with npodoruv, not referring them to the persons above 
 mentioned. ’H otKovgevr], as Schaefer truly remarks, is intended for 
 Greece only; yet it is proper to translate it “ the world.” In like 
 manner we use such expressions as “all the world says,” “all the world 
 knows,” <tc., when they apply to a very small portion of it. 
 
 With respect to the reproaches cast by Demosthenes on these men, 
 there is an interesting passage in Polybius, which the reader will find 
 in Appendix YI. 
 
 2 Jacobs: die schmutzigen Hefen uber mick ausgeschuttet hat. Pabst: 
 denganzen Bodensatz ausgegossen. Leland and Spillan : “ disgorged the 
 foulness.” Brougham: “poured out the crapulous remains.” Auger: 
 “qui s’est decharge sur moi de ses iniquites, qui m’a souilld de ses pro- 
 pres noirceurs.” 
 
 Vol, II.—B 
 
26 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 kind. ^ Philip’s hireling I called you once, and Alexander’s I 
 call you now. So do all these men. If you disbelieve me, 
 ask them ; or rather I will do it for you. Athenians! is 
 iEschines, think ye, the hireling, or the friend of Alexander % 
 You hear what they say . 1 
 
 I now proceed to my defense upon the indictment itself, 
 and to the account of my own measures, that Aeschines may 
 hear, though he knows already, on what I found my title both 
 to these which have been decreed and to far greater rewards. 
 Take and read me the indictment itself. 
 
 ' THE INDICTMENT. 
 
 “ In the archonship of Chaerondas, on the sixth of Elaphe- 
 bolion, JEschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae preferred 
 before the archon an indictment against Ctesiphon son of 
 Leosthenes of Anaplilystus, for an illegal measure : 2 for that 
 he proposed a decree against law, to wit, that it was right to 
 
 1 Auger remarks upon this as follows: “Apr£s que les Atheniens 
 ont repondu tout d’une voix qu’Escliine est un mercenaire, Demos- 
 th6ne reprend, en lui adressant la parole a lui-meme: ‘ Vous entendez 
 ce quils disent?’’ II falloit etre bien sur de son eloquence et de son 
 pouvoir sur les auditeurs, pour risquer une telle interrogation. Re- 
 marquons neanmoins que l’orateur ne se hasarde a la leur faire, que 
 quand il a enflamrae et embrase' leurs coeurs par la sortie la plus vive 
 contre les traitres, et que par-la il les a disposes a repondre suivant son 
 desir.” 
 
 Leland has the following note: “ Commentators seem surprised at the 
 boldness and the success of this appeal. Some tell us, that the speaker 
 was hurried into the hazardous question by his impetuosity; some, 
 that his friend Menander was the only person who returned the answer 
 he desired; others again, that he pronounced falsely on purpose, and 
 that the assembly intended but to correct his pronunciation, when they 
 echoed back the word /j.igOcjtoc, hireling. But the truth is, he was too 
 much interested in the present contest to suffer himself to be really 
 transported beyond the strictest bounds of prudence and caution; he 
 was too well supported to rely upon a single voice, if such could be at 
 all heard in the assembly; and he had too much good sense to recur to 
 a ridiculous and childish artifice. The assembly to which he addressed 
 himself was of a quite different kind from one of our modern courts of 
 law, where order and decorum are maintained. The audience were not 
 at all concerned to suppress the emotions raised in thdm by the speaker: 
 and Demosthenes had a large party present, who, he was well assured, 
 would return the proper answer loudly.” 
 
 The event seems to prove that Demosthenes could safely hazard the 
 question. 
 
 2 See Appendix VII. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 27 
 
 crown Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Poeania with a 
 golden crown, and to proclaim in the theatre at the great 
 Dionysian festival, at the exhibition of the new tragedies, 
 that the people crown Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of 
 Pseania with a golden crown, on account of his virtue, and of 
 the good-will which he has constantly cherished toward all 
 the Greeks as well as toward the people of Athens, and of 
 his integrity, and because he has constantly by word and 
 deed promoted the advantage of the people, and is zealous to 
 do whatever good he can: all which clauses are false and 
 illegal; the laws enacting, first, that no false allegations shall 
 be entered in the public records; secondly, that an account¬ 
 able officer 1 shall not be crowned (but Demosthenes is a con¬ 
 servator of the walls, and has charge of the theoric fund); 
 thirdly, that the crown shall not be proclaimed in the theatre 
 at the Dionysian festival, on the new exhibition of tragedies, 
 but if the council confer a crown, it shall be published in 
 the council-hall, if the people, in the Pnyx 2 at the assembly. 
 
 1 All magistrates and public officers at Athens, whether civil or mili¬ 
 tary, including the members of the two councils, were obliged, at the 
 expiration of their term of office, to render an account to the people of 
 the manner m which they had performed their duties. Thirty days 
 was allowed for that purpose, and any citizen was at liberty to come 
 forward within that period, and prefer an accusation against them. 
 The scrutiny was not confined to pecuniary questions, but embraced an 
 inquiry into their whole conduct and administration. It w r ill easily 
 however be understood, that with respect to general matters the ac¬ 
 counting must in the first instance have been of a negative character, 
 the magistrate having only to defend himself m case any charge was 
 preferred , while, with respect to pecuniary transactions, he would have 
 to give a positive account of all public moneys that had been received 
 by him, or passed through his hands. There were officers specially ap¬ 
 pointed to superintend this business: Aoyiaral and E vdvvoi, Auditors 
 and Scrutineers , ten of each, and one for every tribe, elected by the 
 council of five hundred. The auditors had a court under their jurisdic¬ 
 tion, to which all charges for embezzlement, bribery, and malversation, 
 as well as more general accusations for official misconduct, were re¬ 
 ferred by them to be tried by a jury. The scrutineers assisted the au¬ 
 ditors, and were subordinate to them. 
 
 The importance attached by the framers of the Athenian laws to the 
 institutions of the E vOvvtj, which secured the responsibility of all func¬ 
 tionaries to the people, is apparent from this law, which iEschines made 
 the foundation of his indictment, as well as from divers other passages 
 in the speeches of both the rival orators. 
 
 2 The place where the assemblies of the people were commonly held. 
 See Appeudix V. 
 
28 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 Penalty, fifty talents. Witnesses to the summons , 1 Cephiso- 
 phon son of Cephisophon of Rhamnus, Cleon son of Cleon 
 of Cothocidm.” 
 
 The clauses of the decree which he prosecutes are these, 
 men of Athens. Now from these very clauses I think I shall 
 immediately make it clear to you, that my whole defense will 
 be just; for I shall take the charges in the same order as my 
 adversary, and discuss them all one by one, without a single 
 intentional omission. 
 
 With respect to the statement, “ that I have constantly by 
 word and deed promoted the advantage of the people, and am 
 zealous to do whatever good I can,” and the praising me 2 on 
 such grounds, your judgment, I conceive, must depend on my 
 public acts ; from an examination of which it will be dis¬ 
 covered whether what Ctesiphon has alleged concerning me is 
 true and proper, or false.* As to his proposing to give the 
 crown without adding “ when he has passed his accounts,” 
 and to proclaim the crown in the theatre, I imagine that this 
 also relates to my political conduct, whether I am worthy of 
 the crown and the public proclamation, or not. However, I 
 deem it necessary to produce the laws which justified the de¬ 
 fendant in proposing such clauses. 
 
 Thus honestly and simply, men of Athens, have I resolved 
 to conduct my defense. I now proceed to my own actual 
 measures. / And let no one suppose that I wander from 3 the 
 
 1 These were persons who accompanied the prosecutor when he sum¬ 
 moned the defendant to appear before the magistrate. Anciently they 
 were sureties also for the proper carrying on of the cause, like our 
 ancient pledges to prosecute. In later times they were mere servers of 
 the citation or summons ; but the plaint, or bill of indictment, always 
 had their names subscribed. 
 
 2 ’Ercaivelv is connected with rov, and not governed by ypaipcu, as 
 Schaefer thinks. Tot) ypdxpcu depends in construction upon Kpioiv. In 
 the clause below, I make cretyavovv dependent on KeXevcai. Spillan 
 connects it with to. Jacobs joins it with npocrypaipavra. 
 
 3 Literally: “Disconnect my speech from the indictment.” Leland 
 had a wrong idea when he translated it, “ that I am suspending the dis¬ 
 cussion of this cause.” So had Francis, who renders it: “ that I pro¬ 
 pose to evade the force of the indictment.” 
 
 With respect to the anxiety shown by the orator to justify this line of 
 defense, Lord Brougham remarks as follows: “The extreme importance 
 to Demosthenes’ case of the skillful movement, so to speak, by which he 
 availed himself of ^Eschines’ error, and at once entered on the general 
 subject of his whole administration—thus escaping the immediate 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 29 
 
 indictment, if I touch upon Grecian questions and affairs: he 
 who attacks that clause of the decree, “ that by word and deed 
 I have promoted your good”—he who has indicted this for be¬ 
 ing false—he, I say, has rendered the discussion of my whole 
 policy pertinent and necessary to the charge. Moreover, there 
 being many departments of political action, I chose that which 
 belonged to Grecian affairs : therefore I am justified in draw¬ 
 ing my proofs from them. 
 
 The conquests which Philip had got and held before I com¬ 
 menced life as a statesman and orator, I shall pass over, as I 
 think they concern not me. Those that he was baffled in from 
 the day of my entering on such duties, I will call to your rec¬ 
 ollection, and render an account of them; premising one thing 
 only—Philip started, men of Athens^ with a great advantage. 
 It happened that among the Greeks—not some, but all alike 
 —there sprang up a crop 1 of traitors and venal wretches, such 
 as in the memory of man had never been before. These he 
 got for his agents and supporters: the Greeks, already ill- 
 disposed and unfriendly to each other, he brought into a still 
 worse state, deceiving this people, making presents to that, 
 corrupting others in every way; and he split them into many 
 parties, when they had all one interest, to prevent his aggran- 
 dizement^-While the Greeks were all in such a condition— 
 in such ignorance of the gathering and growing mischief—you 
 have to consider, men of Athens, what policy and measures it 
 became the commonwealth to adopt, and of this to receive a 
 reckoning from me; for the man who assumed that post in 
 the administration was I. 
 
 Ought she, Aeschines, to have cast off her spirit and dig- 
 ^ nity, and, in the style of Thessalians and Dolopians, helped to 
 acquire for Philip the dominion of Greece, and extinguished 
 the honors and rights of our ancestors? Or, if she did not 
 
 charge, to which he had no answer, and overwhelming his adversaiy 
 by a triumphant defense on ground of his own choosing—requires that 
 he should again and again defend this movement, which he here does 
 very carefully.” 
 
 1 I have adopted Lord Brougham’s word. Leland and Spillan: sup¬ 
 ply. Francis: harvest. Jacobs: Fulle. Pabst: ein reichlicher Nach- 
 wuvhs. Reiske: proventus. 
 
 The same expression is used by Diodorus, in reference to the corrup¬ 
 tion of Greek statesmen at this time. (XYI. 54.) He evidently had the 
 words of Demosthenes before his eye. 
 
30 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 this—which would indeed have been shameful—was it right, 
 that what she saw would happen if unprevented, and was for 
 a long time, it seems, aware of, she should suffer to come to 
 
 pass '? 1 
 
 I would gladly ask the severest censurer of our acts, with 
 what party he would have wished the commonwealth to side 
 —with those who contributed to the disgraces and disasters 
 of the Greeks, the party, we may say, of the Thessalians and 
 their followers—or those who permitted it all for the hope of 
 selfish advantage, among whom we may reckon the Arcadians, 
 Messenians, and Argives But many of them, or rather all, 
 have fared worse than ourselves. If Philip after his victory 
 had immediately marched off and kept quiet, without molest¬ 
 ing any either of his own allies or of the Greeks in general, 
 still 2 they that opposed not his enterprises would have merit¬ 
 ed some blame and reproach. But when he has stripped all 
 alike of their dignity, their authority, their liberty—nay, even 
 of their constitutions, where he was able—can it be doubted 
 that you took the most glorious course in pursuance of my 
 counsels ? 
 
 p V But I return to the question—What should the common¬ 
 wealth, AEschines, have done, when she saw Philip establishing 
 an empire and dominion over Greece? Or what was your 
 statesman to advise or move ?—-I, a statesman at Athens ?— 
 for this is most material—I who knew that from the earliest 
 time, until the day of my own mounting the platform, our 
 country had ever striven for precedency and honor and re¬ 
 nown, and expended more blood and treasure for the sake of 
 glory and the general weal than the rest of the Greeks had 
 expended on their several interests ?—Avvho saw that Philip 
 himself, with whom we were contending, had, in the strife for 
 power and empire, had his eye cut out , 3 his collar-bone frac- 
 
 1 Pabst is the only translator who has rendered Trepudelv yiyvogeva 
 accurately: aber das, was er bevorstehen sah, wenn Niemand Widerstand 
 leistete, und was er lange voraus erkannte, ungehindert geschehen lassen ? 
 
 2 "Ogwg and ovk are omitted in some manuscripts. Without them, 
 the sense is: “ If Philip had quietly withdrawn after his victory, some 
 blame might have fallen on yon for opposing him; because it would 
 then have appeared that he had no evil designs.” 
 
 3 Philip lost his eye at the siege of Methone. (See vol. I. Appendix I.) 
 The other wounds were inflicted on his return from Scythia, in a bat¬ 
 tle with the Triballi, b . c . 340. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 31 
 
 tured, his hand and leg mutilated, and was ready and willing 
 to sacrifice any part of his body that fortune chose to take, 
 provided he could live with the remainder in honor and 
 glory ?j££Hardly will any one venture to say this—that it be¬ 
 came a man bred at Pella, then an obscure and inconsiderable 
 place, to possess such inborn magnanimity, as to aspire to 
 the mastery of Greece and form the project in his mind, while 
 you, who were Athenians, day after day in speeches and in 
 dramas reminded of the virtue of your ancestors, should have 
 been so naturally base, as of your own free-will and accord 
 to surrender to Philip the liberty of Greece. No man will 
 say this ! 1 
 
 L c \ The only course then that remained was a just resistance 
 to all his attacks upon you. Such course you took from 
 the beginning, properly and becomingly; and I assisted by 
 
 1 Lord Brougham’s reviewer censures him for translating Oeuprjfiaat 
 “ spectacles,” taking it in the more general sense of “every thing which 
 you see,” which is in accordance with Schaefer’s opinion. Undoubtedly 
 it would make very good sense, if Demosthenes referred to every thing 
 which might be seen in Athens reminding the people of their ancient 
 glory, such as their public buildings, their walls, the Parthenon, Pro- 
 pylsea, and the like. But deuprjpa is more commonly used to signify a 
 theatrical spectacle or exhibition; and perhaps in connection with 
 dpucn one rather expects a word of a confined signification. I am there¬ 
 fore inclined to prefer Lord Brougham’s version, which agrees with those 
 of Jacobs, Pabst, Spilland, Leland and Auger. A oyoi and deupjjpara are 
 aptly joined together; the “public harangues,” and the “ dramatic exhi¬ 
 bitions.” In such dramas as the Persse, the Supplices, the Heraclidte, 
 Athenians were constantly hearing the praises of their ancestors. 
 
 Lord Brougham has been censured likewise for translating dptim 
 “contemplate.” No doubt he did so purposely, in order to avoid the 
 use of a verb which would not suit 7ioyoip. And he was right. The 
 application of a word to two clauses, which strictly is applicable to one 
 only, is a Greek idiom, but not an English. It might be rendered, 
 “ having before 3 ’ou.” I have given it a turn, for brevity’s sake. 
 
 The same critic, correcting Lord Brougham’s version of 
 TTapaxupvoaL y “surrender to Philip,” (which I have adopted,) proposes, 
 “let slip out of your own keeping into that of Philip;” which shows 
 that he does not even understand the true sense of ■napax^pdv, which is, 
 “to yield to another by retiring, or stepping out of the way,” loco 
 cedere. A yet more amusing essay at translation is the following:—• 
 ovS ’ dv dp ravra <p?joEiev, “that no man would have dared to assert.” 
 In this, which the critic designates as a literal and verbatim translation, 
 there is one pleonasm and one gross error, which any good school-boy 
 will point out. Lord Brougham certainly has committed the same er¬ 
 ror, but then he does not set it up as a verbatim and literal version. 
 
32 
 
 THE OKATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 motions and counsels during the period of my political life:— 
 I acknowledge it. But what should I have done ? I put this 
 question to you, dismissing all else: Amphipoli^,, Pydna, 
 Potidzea, Halonnesus—I mention none of them A'Serrinm, 
 Doriscus, the ravaging of Peparethus, and any similar wrongs 
 which the country has suffered—I know not even of their oc¬ 
 currence. You indeed said, that by talking of these I had 
 brought the people into a quarrel, although the resolutions 
 respecting them were moved by Eubulus and Aristophon 
 and Diopithes—not by me, you ready utterer of what suits 
 your purpose! ^Neither will I speak of these now. But I 
 ask—the man who was appropriating to himself Euboea, and 
 making it a fortress against Attica, and attempting Megara, 
 and seizing Oreus, and razing Porthmus, and setting up 
 Philistides as tyrant in Oreus, Clitarchus in Eretria, and 
 subjugating the Hellespont, and besieging Byzantium, and 
 destroying some of the Greek cities, restoring exiles to others 
 —-was he by all these proceedings committing injustice, 
 breaking the truce, violating the peace, or not ? Was it meet 
 that any of the Greeks should rise up to prevent these pro¬ 
 ceedings, or not?\vlf not—if Greece was to present the spec¬ 
 tacle (as it is called) of a Mysian prey , 1 while Athenians had 
 life and being, then I have exceeded my duty in speaking on 
 the subject—the commonwealth has exceeded her cluty, which 
 followed my counsels—I admit that every measure has been 
 a misdeed, a blunder of mine. But if some one ought to have 
 arisen to prevent these things, who but the Athenian people 
 should it have been ? Such then was the policy which I es¬ 
 poused. I saw him reducing all men to subjection, and I op¬ 
 posed him: I continued warning and exhorting you not to 
 make these sacrifices to Philip. 
 
 It was he that infringed the peace by taking our ships: it 
 was not the state, .ZEschines. Produce the decrees themselves, 
 and Philip’s letter, and read them one after another. From 
 an examination of them, it will be evident who is chargeable 
 with each proceeding. Read. 
 
 1 A proverbial expression applied to a people in an utterly helpless 
 and defenseless state. It was derived, we are told, from the times of 
 the Trojan war, when the Mysians were exposed to the enemy by the 
 absence of their king Telephus. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 33 
 
 THE DECREE . 1 
 
 “ In the archonship of Neocles, in the month Boedromi- 
 on, an extraordinary assembly having been convened by the 
 generals, Eubulus son of Mnesitheus of Cytherus 2 moved; 
 Whereas the generals have reported in the assembly, that 
 Leodamas the admiral, and the twenty vessels dispatched 
 with him to the Hellespont for the safe-conduct of the corn, 
 have been carried to Macedonia by Philip’s general Amyntas, 
 and are detained in custody, let the presidents and the gener¬ 
 als take care that the council be convened, and embassadors 
 to Philip be chosen, who shall go and treat with him for the 
 release of the admiral, vessels, and troops: and if Amyntas 
 has acted in ignorance, they shall say that the people make 
 no complaint against him; if the admiral was found wrong¬ 
 fully exceeding his instructions, that the Athenians will make 
 inquiry, and punish him as his negligence deserves: if it be 
 neither of these things, but a willful 3 trespass on the part of 
 him who gave or him who received the commission, let them 
 state this also, 4 that the people, being apprised, may delib¬ 
 erate what course to take.” 
 
 This decree Eubulus carried, not I. The next, Aristophon: 
 then Hegesippus, then Aristophon again, then Philocrates, 
 then Cephisophon, then the rest. I had no concern in the 
 matter. Read the decree. 
 
 1 The archon mentioned in this and the two following decrees is in¬ 
 correct. Nicomachus was archon of that year. For an account of the 
 events, see Yol. I. Appendix III. p. 293. 
 
 2 Cytherus was one of the drj/uoi of Attica. The common reading is 
 Kutt piog. Reiske seems to think that Eubulus might be called a Cy¬ 
 prian, though a citizen of Athens, if he had been educated or long re¬ 
 sided at Cyprus. However that may be, such would not be his descrip¬ 
 tion in a state paper. 
 
 3 The term willful applies to Philip as well as Amyntas. “In his 
 own person,” or “on his own account,” would hardly be suitable to 
 Philip. The student should notice the use of the plural ayvufiovovciv, 
 followed by the disjunctive clauses. It is perhaps an expi'ession of the 
 following thought:—“If it be a trespass on the part of the captors, 
 whether committed by Amyntas on his own account, or under the 
 special orders of Philip.” 
 
 4 The clause Kdt tovto ypdipai ?Jyecv depends on eittev, and is to be 
 construed thus: ypuipai , “ to insert an order in the decree,” hsyEiv, for 
 the embasf-dors to state,” <tc. 
 
 B 2 
 
34 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 THE DECREE . 1 
 
 “ In the archonship of Neocles, on the last day, of Boedro- 
 mion, at the desire of the council, the presidents and generals 
 introduced their report of the proceedings of the assembly, to 
 wit, that the people had resolved to appoint embassadors to 
 Philip for the recovery of the ships, and to furnish them with 
 instructions and with the decrees of the assembly; and they 
 appointed the following: Cephisophon son of Cleon of Ana- 
 phlystus; Democritus son of Demophon of Anagyrus; Poly- 
 critus son of Apemantus of Cothocidse. In the presidency of 
 the Hippothoontian tribe, on the motion of Aristophon of 
 Colyttus, committee-man.” 
 
 Now then, as I produce these decrees, so do you, -ZEschines, 
 point out what decree of my passing makes me chargeable 
 with the war. You can not find one: had you any, there is 
 nothing you would sooner have produced. Why, even Philip 
 makes no charge against me on account of the war, though 
 he complains of others. Read Philip’s own letter. 
 
 THE LETTER OF PHILIP. 
 
 “ Philip, king of Macedon, to the Council and People of 
 Athens, greeting. Your embassadors, Cephisophon, Democ¬ 
 ritus, and Polycritus, came to me and conferred about the 
 release of the galleys which Laomedon commanded. Upon the 
 whole, I think you must be very simple, if you imagine I do 
 not see that those galleys were commissioned, under the pre¬ 
 tense of conveying corn from the Hellespont to Lemnos, to 
 relieve the Selymbrians, whom I am besieging, and who are 
 not included in the friendly treaty subsisting between us. 
 
 1 We have seen that by the last decree the people had ordered a 
 meeting of the council to be convened, to elect embassadors to Philip. 
 The presidents and generals, to whom that task was intrusted, convene 
 the council accordingly, and lay before them the business for which 
 they were called—( xpW aT, '& LV i s the usual word, signifying “ to intro¬ 
 duce the topic of discussion, the business of the day”). The council 
 proceed to execute the order of the people, and elect the embassadors. 
 That is their ipr/cpio/ici, the senatorial decree containing their appoint¬ 
 ment of embassadors, pursuant to the decree of the popular assembly. 
 The document has perplexed commentators, but really has no difficulty. 
 Schumann explains it in his treatise “ De Comitiis” (94). As to npoe- 
 dpof, which I translate “ committee-man,” see Appendix IY. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 35 
 
 And these instructions were given, without leave of the 
 Athenian people, by certain magistrates and others who are 
 not now in office, but who are anyways desirous for the 
 people to exchange our present amity for a renewal of war, 
 and are far more anxious for such a consummation than to 
 relieve the Selymbrians. They suppose it will be a source of 
 income to themselves: however, I scarcely think it is for 
 your advantage or mine. Wherefore I release you the vessels 
 carried into my port; and for the future, if, instead of allow¬ 
 ing your statesmen to adopt malignant measures, you will 
 punish them, I too will endeavor to maintain the peace. 
 Farewell.” 
 
 s£\r 
 
 Here is no mention by him of Demosthenes, or any charge 
 against me. Why then, while he complains of the others, 
 makes he no mention of my acts? Because he must have 
 noticed his own aggressions, had he written aught concerning 
 me; for on these I fixed myself—these I kept resisting. And 
 first I proposed the embassy to Peloponnesus, 1 when into 
 Peloponnesus he began to steal; next that to Euboea, 2 when 
 on Euboea he was laying his hands; then the expedition (no 
 longer an embassy) to Oreus, and that to Eretria, when he 
 established rulers in those cities. ‘.Afterward I dispatched all 
 the armaments, by which Chersonesus was preserved, and By¬ 
 zantium, and all our allies; whence to you there accrued 
 the noblest results—praises, eulogies, honors, crowns, thanks 
 from those you succored; while the people attacked—those 
 that trusted you then obtained deliverance, those that disre¬ 
 garded you have had often to remember your warnings, and 
 to be convinced that you were not only their friends, but wise 
 men also and prophets: for all that you predicted has come 
 v to pass. 
 
 That Philistides would have given a great deal to keep 
 Oreus—Clitarchus a great deal to keep Eretria—Philip him¬ 
 self a great deal to have these vantage-posts 3 against you, and 
 
 1 This was the embassy referred to in the third Philippic, which pre¬ 
 vented the advance of Philip into the Peloponnese, b . c . 343. For a brief 
 account of Philip’s proceedings in Peloponnesus, see Appendix VIII. 
 
 2 As to Euboea, see vol. I. pp. 107, 128, 150. 
 
 3 Or perhaps simply “these advantages.” Jacobs: vm diese Vor~ 
 theile gegen Euch zu erhalten. Pabst: urn dieses alles gegen Euch aus- 
 zufuhren. 
 
36 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 in other matters to avoid exposure, and any inquiry into his 
 wrongful acts in general—no man is ignorant, and least of all 
 you. V For the embassadors who came here then from Clitar- 
 chus and Philistides lodged with you, jEschines, and you were 
 their host. The commonwealth regarded them as enemies, 
 whose offers were neither just nor advantageous, and expelled 
 them; but they were your friends. None of their designs 
 then were accomplished; 1 you slanderer — who say of me, 
 that I am silent Avlien I have got something, and bawl when 
 I have spent it ! 2 That is not your custom. You bawl 
 when you have something, and will never stop, unless the 
 jury stop you by disfranchisement to-day. 3 
 
 When you crowned me then for those services, and Ariston- 
 icus drew up the same words that Ctesiphon here has now 
 drawn up, and the crown was proclaimed in the theatre—for 
 this now is the second proclamation in my favor 4 —JEschines, 
 being present, neither opposed it, nor indicted the mover. 
 Take this decree now and read it. 
 
 THE DECREE. 
 
 “ In the arclionship of Chasrondas, son of Hegemon, on the 
 twenty-fifth of Gamelion, in the presidency of the Leontian 
 
 1 The argument is—Philistides and Clitarclius were unable to ac¬ 
 complish their purpose, and that chiefly through my opposition. Yet 
 it is notorious, they would have given a large bribe to have obtained 
 powerful support at Athens. Then what becomes of your charge of 
 corruption against me ? 
 
 8 JEschines, defending himself against the reproach of having retired 
 from public affairs, said that his own habits were so simple, and his 
 desires so moderate, that he was not compelled to speak in public for 
 lucre’s sake—Demosthenes, on the contrary, never opened his mouth 
 but when he was hired. The words here referred to are: ai) d’ ol/icu 
 2.a(3dv [itv aeoly^Kag, uvakuoaq de neKpayag. 
 
 Many idle stories to the same effect were circulated against Demos¬ 
 thenes, besides the celebrated charge in the affair of Harpalus. There 
 is one told by Aulus Gellius, that he had been bribed by the Milesian 
 embassadors to withdraw his opposition to them in the assembly, and 
 afterward, hearing from Aristodemus the actor that he had received a 
 talent for his performance—“I,” said he, “have received more than 
 that for being silent.” 
 
 3 If the prosecutor failed to obtain a fifth part of the votes, besides 
 a fine of a thousand drachms, he incurred a partial disfranchisement, 
 which incapacitated him to prefer a similar charge in future. 
 
 4 Tovtov means “this of Ctesiphon.” So Schaefer rightly explains 
 it. Pabst’s version is: so class dies sehon die zweite Verkundigung die- 
 ser Ehre fur mich ist. I have adopted the turn of Leland. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 37 
 
 tribe, Aristonicus of Phrearrii moved : Whereas Demosthenes 
 son of Demosthenes of P^eania hath tendered many important 
 services to the people of Athens, and to divers of her allies 
 heretofore, and hath also on the present occasion aided them 
 by his decrees, and liberated certain of the cities in Euboea, 
 and perseveres in his attachment to the people of Athens, and 
 doth by word and deed whatever good he can for the Athe¬ 
 nians themselves and the rest of the Greeks: It is resolved 
 by the Council and People of Athens, to honor Demosthenes 
 son of Demosthenes of Pasania with public praise 1 and a 
 golden crown, and to proclaim the crown in the theatre at 
 the Dyonysian festival at the new tragedies, and the procla¬ 
 mation of the crown shall be given in charge to the presiding 
 tribe and the prize-master. 2 On the motion of Aristonicus 
 of Phrearrii.” 
 
 Is there one of you that knows of any disgrace falling on 
 the state by reason of this decree, or any scorn or ridicule— 
 consequences which this man now predicts, if I am crowned ? 
 It is when acts are recent and notorious that, if good, they 
 obtain reward, if the contrary, punishment; and it appears 
 that I then obtained reward, not blame or punishment.^ So, 
 up to the period of those transactions, I am acknowledged on 
 all occasions to have promoted the interests of the state—be¬ 
 cause my speeches and motions prevailed in your councils— 
 because my measures were executed, and procured crowns for 
 the commonwealth and for me and all of you—because you 
 have offered sacrifices and thanksgivings to the gods for their 
 success. 
 
 '» When Philip therefore was driven out of Euboea, witli 
 arms by you, with counsels and decrees—though some 
 persons there should burst! 3 —by me, he sought some new 
 
 1 The epithet “ public” seems necessary in our language to express 
 the distinction conferred upon Demosthenes; though indeed we say 
 “to praise God,” in the sense of “to glorify:” and fehakspeare has, 
 
 I come to bury C£$sar, not to praise him. 
 
 Lelandhas: “pay public honors.” Brougham: “signalize.” Spillan: 
 “bestow honors.” Auger: “accorder publiquement des louanges.” 
 Jacobs: Lob zu ertheilen. Pabst: beloben. 
 
 2 The person who adjudged the prizes in the various contests during 
 the festival. 
 
 3 Demosthenes is fond of this expression. Compare Virgil, Eclog. 
 
 vii. 26. 
 
 Tnvidid rumpantur ut ilia Codro, 
 
38 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 position of attack upon Athens . 1 Seeing that we use more 
 foreign corn than any people, and wishing to command the 
 passage of the corn-trade, he advanced to Thrace; the Byzan¬ 
 tines being his allies, he first required them to join in the war 
 against you, and when they refused, saying (truly enough) 
 that they had not made alliance on such terms, he threw 
 up intrenchments before the city, planted batteries, and laid 
 siege to it.V What course hereupon it became you to take, I 
 will not ask again; it is manifest to all. But who was it 
 that succored the Byzantines, and rescued them ? who pre¬ 
 vented the alienation of the .Hellespont at that crisis? You, 
 men of Athens. When I say you, I mean the commonwealth. 
 But who advised, framed, executed the measures of state, 
 devoted himself wholly and unreservedly to the public busi¬ 
 ness ?—I!—What benefits thence accrued to all, you need 
 no further to be told; you have learned by experience. For 
 the war which then sprang up, besides that it brought honor 
 and renown, kept you in a cheaper and more plentiful supply 
 of all the necessaries of life than does the present peace, 
 which these worthies maintain to their country’s prejudice in 
 the hope of something to come. Perish such hope! Never 
 may they share the blessings for which you men of honest 
 wishes pray to the gods, nor communicate their own principles 
 to you! 
 
 Bead them now the crowns of the Byzantines, and those of 
 the Perinthians, which they conferred upon the country as a 
 reward. 
 
 THE BYZANTINE DECREE. 
 
 “ In the Presbytership 2 of Bosporichus, Damagetus moved 
 
 1 Leland: “lie raised another engine against this state.” Spillan 
 follows him. Francis has “battery.” So has Auger. Jacobs: versuchte 
 er einen Angriff andrer Art gegen die Stadt. Pabst: andere Schutz- 
 wehr zum Kampf. Brougham: “some new mode of beleaguering our 
 state.” A critic in the Times suggests: “another mode of annoyance.” 
 That, no doubt, is the general meaning; but in the translation we 
 should not lose sight of the strict signification of erciTeiXLcrgov. The 
 occupation of Byzantium would be, in reference to the corn-trade, what 
 the occupation of Euboea might have been for the purpose of a more 
 direct attack upon Athens. See my observations in the Preface to the 
 First Volume, p. 5. 
 
 2 Hieromnemon (the word in the original) appears to have been the 
 name of the chief magistrate at Byzantium, whose term of office fur¬ 
 nished the date of the year, as the archon did at Athens. The name 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 39 
 
 in the assembly, having obtained permission of the Council: 
 Whereas the people of Athens have ever in former times been 
 friendly to the Byzantines and their allies, and to their kins¬ 
 men the Perinthians, and have rendered them many signal 
 services, and also, on the present occasion, when Philip of 
 Macedon attempted by invasion and siege to exterminate the 
 Byzantines and Perinthians, and burned and ravaged their 
 country, they succored us with a hundred and twenty ships 
 and provisions and weapons and soldiers, and rescued us from 
 grievous perils, and preserved our hereditary constitution, our 
 laws, and our sepulchres : it is resolved by the people of By¬ 
 zantium and Perintlius to grant unto the Athenians the right 
 of intermarriage, citizenship, purchase of land and houses, the 
 first seat at the games, first admission to the Council and Peo¬ 
 ple after the sacrifices, and exemption from all public services 
 to such as wish to reside in the city: and that three statues 
 of sixteen cubits be erected in the harbor , 1 representing the 
 People of Athens crowned by the People of Byzantium and 
 Perinthus : 2 and deputations sent to the general assemblies 
 of Greece, the Isthmian, Nemean, Olympian, and Pythian, 
 to proclaim the crowns wherewith the people of Athens hath 
 been honored by us, that all the Greeks may know the virtue 
 of the Athenians, and the gratitude of the Byzantines and 
 Perinthians.” 
 
 Now read the crowns given by the people of Cliersonesus. 
 
 THE DECREE OF THE CHERSONESITES. 
 
 “ The Chersonesites, inhabitants of Sestus, Eleus, Madytus, 
 and Alopeconnesus, crown the Council and People of Athens 
 with a golden crown of the value of sixty talents , 3 and build 
 
 (which was held by the magistrates of some other Dorian states) im¬ 
 ports the performance of some priestly or religious duties. As it sounds 
 harsh in English, I have ventured to translate it at the risk of cavil. 
 With respect to the Amphictyonic deputies so called see Appendix I. 
 
 1 Such, perhaps, is the meaning of kv tu> BoaTvoptx^. Others would 
 read Boa-nopu. 
 
 2 Statues of countries and people are often mentioned. Thus, Pau- 
 sanias saw in the Piraeus a statue of the Athenian Demus by Leochares, 
 and another by Lyson. (Lib. i. c. 1 and 3.) Polybius mentions a statue 
 of the Rhodian People crowned by the Syracusan, which Hiero and 
 Gelo erected in the great square of Rhodes. (Lib. v. 88.) And there 
 was a celebrated one of the Athenian by Parrhasius. 
 
 3 According to Gronovius, Bockh, and Jacobs, we are not to suppose 
 
40 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 an altar to Gratitude and tlie Athenian People, because that 
 People hath helped the Chcrsonesites to obtain the greatest 
 of blessings, by rescuing them from the power of Philip, 
 and restoring their country, their laws, their liberty, their 
 sanctuaries: and in all future time they will not fail to be 
 grateful, and do what service they can. Decreed in general 
 Council.” 
 
 Thus the saving of Chersonesus and Byzantium, the pre¬ 
 venting Philip’s conquest of the Hellespont, and the honors 
 therefore bestowed on this country, were the effects of my 
 policy and administration; and more than .this—they proved 
 to all mankind the generosity of Athens and the baseness of 
 Philip. He, the ally and friend of the Byzantines, was before 
 all eyes besieging them—what could be more shameful or out¬ 
 rageous?—You, who might justly on many grounds have re¬ 
 proached them for wrongs done you in former times, instead 
 of bearing malice and abandoning the oppressed, appeared as 
 their deliverers ; conduct which procured you glory, good-will, 
 honor from all men. That you have crowned many of your 
 statesmen, every one knows; but through what other person 
 (I mean what minister or orator), besides myself, the common¬ 
 wealth has been crowned, no one can say. 
 
 To prove now the malignity of those calumnies, which he 
 urged against the Euboeans and Byzantines, reminding you 
 of any unkindness which they had done you—prove it I shall, 
 not only by their falsehood, which I apprehend you know 
 already, but (were they ever so true) by showing the advant¬ 
 ages of my policy—I wish to recount one or two of the noble 
 acts of your own state, and to do it briefly; for individuals, as 
 well as communities, should ever strive to model their future 
 conduct by the noblest of their past. 
 
 Well then, men of Athens—when the Lacedajmonians had 
 the empire of land and sea, and held the country round 
 Attica by governors and garrisons, Euboea, Tanagra, all 
 Boeotia, Megara, Angina, Cleonae, the other islands; when 
 our state possessed neither ships nor walls; you marched out 
 
 that a crown was given of the actual weight or value of- sixty talents, 
 but that six drachms of gold are (by a form of speech usual in some 
 cases) called a talent. A similar crown of a hundred talents, given by 
 the Carthaginians to Demareta, the wife of Gelo, is mentioned by 
 Diodorus. (Lib. xi. 26.) 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 41 
 
 to Haliartus , 1 and again not many days after to Corinth; 
 albeit the Athenians of that time had many causes of resent¬ 
 ment against both Corinthians and Thebans for their acts in 
 the Decelean war : 2 but they showed no resentment, none. 
 And yet neither of these steps took they, JEschines, for bene¬ 
 factors, nor were they blind to the danger; but they would 
 not for such reasons abandon people who sought their protec¬ 
 tion ; for the sake of renown and glory they willingly exposed 
 themselves to peril; just and noble was their resolve! * For 
 to all mankind the end of life is death, though one keep one’s 
 self shut up in a closet ; 3 but it becomes brave men to strive 
 always for honor, with good hope before them , 4 and to endure 
 courageously whatever the Deity ordains. 
 
 Thus did your ancestors, thus the elder among yourselves. 
 For, though the Lacedaemonians were neither friends nor 
 benefactors, but had done many grievous injuries to our state, 
 yet when the Thebans, victorious at Leuctra, sought their 
 destruction, you prevented it, not fearing the power and repu¬ 
 tation then possessed by the Thebans, nor reckoning up the 
 merits of those whom you were about to fight for. And so 
 you demonstrated to all the Greeks, that, however any peo¬ 
 ple may offend you, you reserve your anger against them for 
 other occasions; but should their existence or liberty be im¬ 
 periled, you will not resent your wrongs or bring them into 
 account. 
 
 1 This was b.c. 395, at the breaking out of the war, in which Athens; 
 Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, combined against Lacedaemon. (See vol. I. 
 p. 64.) The battle of Corinth, in which the Lacedaemonians defeated 
 the allies, took place in the year following the siege of Haliartus. 
 
 2 The latter part of the Peloponnesian war, so called from the occu¬ 
 pation of Decelea, a fortress in Attica, fifteen miles from Athens, b.c. 
 413. By means of this post the enemy got the command of the terri¬ 
 tory round Athens, and reduced the Athenians to great distress by cut¬ 
 ting off supplies of corn and provisions. 
 
 3 Spillan, Jacobs, and Pabst render oinicKcp “a cage,” Kcifich; an in¬ 
 terpretation found in Harpocration. Compare the lines of Propertius: 
 
 Ille licet ferro cautus se condat et sere, 
 
 Mors tamen inclusum protrahit inde caput. 
 
 4 I have here taken 7tpo [3 aX^ogevov pin the simple sense of “proposing 
 to themselves,” or “having before their eyes.” So Spillan has it. And 
 Jacobs: mit froher Iloffnung vor Augen. But Reiske understood it in 
 the more ordinary sense of “putting before them as a defense.” And 
 so Leland renders it: “armed in fair hopes of success.” And Pabst: 
 sich dazu mit dem Schilde der guten Iloffnung waffnen. 
 
42 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 And not in these instances only hath such been your tem¬ 
 per. Again, when the Thebans were taking possession of 
 Euboea , 1 you looked not quietly on—you remembered not the 
 wrongs done you by Themison and Theodorus in the affair of 
 Oropus , 2 but assisted even them./ It was the time when the 
 volunteer captains 3 first offered themselves to the state, of 
 whom I was one;—but of this presently. However, it was 
 glorious that you saved the island, but far more glorious that, 
 when you had got their persons and their cities in your power, 
 you fairly restored them to the people who had ill-used you, 
 and made no reckoning of your wrongs in an affair where you 
 were trusted. 
 
 Hundreds of cases which I could mention I pass over— 
 sea-fights, land-marches, campaigns, both in ancient times and 
 in your own, all of which the commonwealth has undertaken 
 for the freedom and safety of the Greeks in general. Then, 
 having observed the commonwealth engaging in contests of 
 such number and importance for the interests of others, what 
 was I to urge, what course to recommend her, when the ques¬ 
 tion in a manner concerned herself?—To revive grudges, I 
 suppose, against people who wanted help, and to seek pre¬ 
 tenses for abandoning every thing. And who might not justly 
 have killed me, had I attempted even by words to tarnish any 
 of the honors of Athens? For the thing itself, I am certain, 
 you would never have done—had you wished, what was to 
 hinder you ?—any lack of opportunity ?—had you not these 
 men to advise it ? 
 
 I must return to the next in date of my political acts; and y 
 here again consider what was most beneficial for the state. I 
 saw, men of Athens, that your navy was decaying, and that, 
 while the rich were getting off 4 with small payments, citizens 
 
 1 As to the war in Euboea, see vol. I. pp. 114, 275. 
 
 2 Themison and Theodorus were the rulers of Eretria, who seized 
 upon Oropus, b.c. 366. See vol. I. p. 210. 
 
 3 The exertions of these voluntary trierarchs enabled the Athenians 
 to ship off their troops in three days. The orators frequently boasted 
 of this expedition: for example, Demosthenes in the speech against 
 Androtion; Aeschines in the speech against Ctesiplion. 
 
 4 Schaefer rightly explains arelelg, “qui tarn pauca contribuerent, 
 nihil ut dare viderentur.” My translation expresses this by a vernacu¬ 
 lar phrase. "VVe might say, “escaping with.” Brougham has “ escaping 
 all taxes by paying an insignificant contribution.” Leland: “ purchase 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 43 
 
 of moderate or small fortunes were losing their substance, 
 and the state, by reason thereof, missing her opportunities of 
 action. I therefore proposed a law, by which I compelled 
 the one class (the rich) to perform their duty, and stopped 
 the oppression of the poor; and—what was most useful to 
 the country—I caused her preparations to be made in time. 
 And being indicted for it, I appeared on the charge before 
 you, and was acquitted; and the prosecutor did not get his 
 portion 1 of the votes. But what sums, think ye, the chief 
 men 2 of the Boards, or those in the second and third degrees, 
 offered me, first, not to propose that law, secondly, when I 
 had recorded it, to drop it on the abatement-oath u ? 3 Such 
 sums, men of Athens, as I should be afraid to tell you. And 
 no wonder they did so ; for under the former laws they might 
 divide the charge between sixteen, spending little or nothing 
 
 a total exemption from public taxes at the expense of a trifling contri¬ 
 bution.” But they should have avoided a reference to any other pay¬ 
 ments than what relate to the trierarchy. 
 
 1 The fifth part, to save him from the penalty. * 
 
 2 According to Ulpian, the first three hundred among the Symmoriae 
 were called f/yepoveg. See as to this subject, vol. I. Appendix V. 
 
 3 'TTzufioaia commonly meant an oath or affidavit sworn by a party 
 to a cause, in order to obtain some adjournment or delay. But, accord¬ 
 ing to the explanation of Julius Pollux, it was applied also to the oath 
 .sworn by a person who threatened another with a ypacpi) napavopuv or 
 indictment for an illegal measure. Any citizen was at liberty to indict 
 the author of a decree, though passed by the popular assembty, within 
 a twelvemonth after the passing; and it became void, if the indictment 
 succeeded. He gave notice of his intention to prosecute by a public 
 declaration, supported by oath, that he believed the decree, in question 
 to be illegal or unconstitutional; and this had the effect of suspending 
 the validity of the decree until after the trial. Therefore, asSchomann 
 observes (De Comitiis, 159), this oath, which had the effect of adjourn¬ 
 ing a law, was so called by analogy to the legal oath. See the Append¬ 
 ix to this volume on the ypatyr) napavopuv. 
 
 In none of the translations do I find any explanation of naTafiaTiovTa. 
 I take it to mean, “having entered it in the public register,” i. e. in the 
 temple of the Mother of the Gods, kv Tip Myrpucp, where the records of 
 all decrees were kept. (See Schomann, De Comitiis, 129.) 
 
 Demosthenes, after canying his measure in the assembly, and de¬ 
 positing it according to custom in the public archives, might have 
 abandoned the defense of it, had he chosen to compromise the matter 
 with his opponents; as Wolf rightly explains it—“ Quo pacto impune 
 tulisset Demosthenes praevaricationem istam? Si collusisset cum ad- 
 versario, is actionem non persecutus esset, ac Demosthenes, anno elapso, 
 indemnis fuisset.” 
 
44 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 themselves, and grinding down the needy citizens; whereas 
 under my law every one had to pay a sum proportioned to 
 his means, and there was a captain for two ships, where be¬ 
 fore there was a partner with fifteen others for one ship; for 
 they were calling themselves not captains any longer, but 
 partners. They would have given any thing then to get these 
 regulations annulled, and not be obliged to perform their du¬ 
 ties. Read me, first, the decree for which I appeared to the 
 indictment, then the service-rolls, that of the former law, and 
 that under mine. Read. 
 
 THE DECREE . 1 
 
 “In the archonship of Polycles, on the sixteenth of Boedro- 
 mion, in the presidency of the Hippothoontian tribe, Demos¬ 
 thenes son of Demosthenes of Pa3ania introduced a law for 
 the naval service, 2 instead of the former one under which 
 there were the associations of joint-captains; and it was 
 passed by the council and people. And Patrocles of Phlyus 
 preferred an indictment against Demosthenes for an illegal . 
 
 1 Schomann, in his chapter on Decrees (De Comitiis, 130), after 
 mentioning the ordinary signification of the word i pr/tyiopa, viz., “ a law 
 passed by the people in assembly,” and a bill or decree of the council,” 
 proceeds to say, that it has a third and more extended meaning. “By 
 that name,” he says, “ the Athenians designated those public records 
 which did not contain the actual bill or decree, but merely an account 
 of the circumstances connected with the proposal or adoption thereof, 
 or a statement of the measures passed in consequence by the people. 
 The object of this was, to have at hand always, in case they should be 
 wanted again, authentic documents of the whole transaction.” In sup¬ 
 port of his assertion, he refers to this and some other of the records 
 cited in the Oration on the Crown. Their genuineness, however, has 
 been questioned. In this one, as well as in others, the name of the 
 archon is false. I doubt whether the word ever bore the extended 
 meaning assigned to it by Schomann. Suppose the record in the text 
 could be called \prj(j)i(jp.a, it could hardly be the i pjjcptopa naO’ o elot] 16 ov 
 tt)v ■ypaQ/jv, which Demosthenes requires to be read, but of which it 
 contains only a short recital. It is possible, indeed, that Demosthenes, 
 though he calls on the clerk to read the decree, produced in fact only 
 the document which is preserved to us, and which might answer his 
 purpose quite as well, and even better, because it contained a memorial 
 of his own acquittal, and the consequent establishment of his decree. 
 
 2 Reiske understands dpxelov. Taylor translates it “for the admi¬ 
 ralty.” Schaefer adopts Stephens’ explanation, that rb TpMjpapxtKbv is 
 nothing more than rodg rpLrjpupxovg. Then it means “a law for the 
 regulation of the trierarchs.” 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 45 
 
 measure, and, not having obtained his share of the votes, paid 
 the penalty of five hundred drachms.” 
 
 Now produce that fine roll. 
 
 THE ROLL. 
 
 “ Ijet sixteen captains be called out for every galley, as 
 they are associated in the companies, 1 from the age of twenty- 
 five to forty, defraying the charge equally.” 
 
 Now for the roll under my law. 
 
 THE ROLL. 
 
 “Let captains be chosen according to their property by 
 valuation, taking ten talents to a galley: if the property be 
 valued at a higher sum, let the charge be proportionate, as far 
 as three ships and a tender; and let it be in the same propor¬ 
 tion for those whose property is less than ten talents, joining 
 them in a partnership to make up ten talents.” 2 
 
 Think ye I but slightly helped the poor of Athens, or that 
 the rich would have spent but a trifling sum to escape the 
 doing what was right? I glory, however, not only in having 
 refused this compromise, and having been acquitted on the 
 indictment, but because my law r was beneficial, and I have 
 proved it so by trial. For during the whole war, while the 
 armaments were shipped off according to my regulations, no 
 captain ever appealed to you 3 against oppression, or took 
 sanctuary at Munychia, 4 or was imprisoned by the clearing- 
 officers ; 5 no galley was lost to the state by capture abroad, 
 
 1 Literally, “ according to the associations in the companies.” Aoxot 
 here are the same as crvpjuopiat, according to Wolf. 
 
 2 The ten talents, which are made the basis of this regulation, are 
 the ratable value of the property, as Bockh explains it, which would 
 be one-fifth of the whole for the highest class, if the valuation of b.c. 
 379 was in force; so that a man possessing fifty talents would have 
 the charge of one ship, a hundred talents, of two ships, a hundred and 
 fifty talents, of three ships; and a tender would have to be found in 
 addition for a certain sum beyond, which is not specified. Higher the 
 charge was not carried. Those who had less than ten talents of rata¬ 
 ble capital clubbed together for one ship, but the rating was in a low¬ 
 er proportion. See Yol. I. Appendixes IY. and Y. 
 
 3 'iKEvppiav deivai is literally, “ to deposit (at the altar or elsewhere) an 
 olive bough wrapped with wool,” which was the symbol of supplication. 
 
 4 In a temple of Diana in the port of Munychia. 
 
 5 The u-KocTo'kElq were ten officers, whose business it was to expedite 
 the equipment of the fleet, and its clearance out from port—a Board 
 of Dispatch. 
 
* 
 
 46 the ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 or left behind from unfitness to go to sea. Under the former 
 laws all these things happened—because the burden was put 
 upon the poor, and therefore difficulties frequently arose. I 
 transferred the charge from the poor, to the wealthy, and then 
 every duty was done. For this itself too I deserve praise, 
 that I adopted all such measures as brought glory and honor 
 and power to the state: there is no envy, spite, or malice in 
 any measure of mine, nothing sordid or unworthy of Athens. 
 The same character is apparent in my home and in my for¬ 
 eign policy. At home, I never preferred the favor of the 
 wealthy to the rights of the many: abroad, I valued not the 
 presents or the friendship of Philip above the general interests 
 of Greece. 
 
 I conceive it remains for me to speak of the proclamation 
 and the accounts: for, that I acted for the best—that I have 
 throughout been your friend and zealous in your service—is 
 proved abundantly, methinks, by what I have said already. 
 The most important part of my policy and administration I 
 pass by, considering that I have in regular course to reply to 
 the charge of illegality; and besides—though I am silent as * 
 to the rest of my political acts—the knowledge you all have 
 will serve me equally well. 
 
 As to the arguments which he jumbled together about the 
 counter-written laws, 1 I hardly suppose you comprehend 
 them — I myself could not understand the greater part. 
 However I shall argue a just case in a straightforward way. 
 So far from saying that I am not accountable, as the prose¬ 
 cutor just now falsely asserted, I acknowledge that I am all 
 
 1 The laws alleged to have been violated were copied out and hung 
 on a board side by side with the impugned decree, as iEschines clearly 
 describes it in his speech against Ctesiphon (82). "ilcnrep yap tv ry 
 TEKTOvucrj , orav Eidtvai fioviiupeOa to bpdov Kal to pi), tov navova izpoa- 
 tytpopev (1) diayivuoKETai, ovtu Kal tv Talc ypa<palc Talc T( *>v napavopw 
 napuKELTai Kavuv tov dinaiov tovtI tq oavidtov Kal to iprjcjno/ua Kal ol napa - 
 yeypapptvoi vopoi. Compare Demosth. cont. Aristoc. 640. There is no 
 doubt of this being the true meaning; the only difficulty is to translate 
 TcapayEypappivoL neatly. Spillan has : “ the transcribed laws.” Francis 
 the same. Leland: “authentic transcript.” Brougham: “his com¬ 
 parative exhibition of the laws;” which expresses the meaning more 
 fully. The German translators would seem to have followed Wolf’s . 
 interpretation. Jacobs has iiber den Widerspruch rn.it den Gesetzen. 
 Pabst: iiber die Gesctzividrigkeiten. Perhaps we might render it, “ con¬ 
 trasted or, “put in counter-view.” 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 47 
 
 my life accountable for what as your statesman I have under¬ 
 taken or advised; but for what I have voluntarily given to 
 the people out of my own private fortune, I deny that I am 
 any day accountable—do you hear, Aeschines?—nor is any 
 other man, let him even be one of the nine archons. 1 For 
 what law is so full of injustice and inhumanity as to enact, 
 that one who has given of his private means, and done an act 
 of generosity and munificence, instead of having thanks, shall 
 be brought before malignants, appointed to be the auditors 
 of his liberality? None. If he says there is, let him pro¬ 
 duce it, and I will be content and hold my tongue. But there 
 is none, men of Athens. The prosecutor in his malice, be¬ 
 cause I gave some of my own money when I superintended 
 the theatre fund, says—“ the Council praised him before he 
 had rendered his account.” Not for any matters of which I 
 had an account to render, but for what I spent of my own, 
 you malignant! 
 
 “Oh, but you were a Conservator of Walls!” says he. Yes; 
 and for that reason was I justly praised, because I gave the 
 sums expended and did not charge them. A charge requires 
 auditing and examiners; a donation merits thanks and praise: 
 therefore the defendant made this motion in my favor. 
 
 That this is a settled principle in your hearts as well as in 
 the laws, I can show by many proofs easily. First, Nausicles 
 has often been crowned by you for what he expended out of 
 his own funds while he was general. Secondly, Diotimus 
 was crowned for his present of shields; and Charidemus too. 
 Again, Neoptolemus here, superintendent of divers works, 
 has been honored for his donations. It would indeed be 
 cruel, if a man holding an office should either, by reason of 
 his office, be precluded from giving his own money to the 
 state, or have, instead of receiving thanks, to render an ac¬ 
 count of what he gave. To prove the truth of my state¬ 
 ments, take and read me the original decrees made in favor 
 of these men. 
 
 A DECREE . 2 
 
 “ Archon, Demonicus of Phlyus. On the twenty-sixth of 
 Boedromion, with the sanction of the council and people, Cal- 
 
 1 The archons were not only liable to the evdvvrj, but to an examin* 
 ation by the council previous to admission to their office. 
 
 2 The event referred to in this decree seems to have taken plae# 
 
48 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 lias of Plirearrii moved: That the council and people resolve 
 to crown Nausicles, general of foot, for that, there being two 
 thousand Athenian troops of the line in Imbrus, for the de¬ 
 fense of the Athenian residents in that island, and Philo of 
 the finance department being by reason of storms unable to 
 sail and pay the troops, he advanced money of his own, and 
 did not ask the people for it again; and that the crown be 
 proclaimed at the Dionysian festival, at the new tragedies.” 
 
 ANOTHER DECREE . 1 
 
 “ Cal lias of Phrearrii moved, the presidents declaring it to 
 be with the sanction of the council: Whereas Charidemus, 
 general of foot, having been sent to Salamis, he and Dioti- 
 mus, general of horse, after certain of the troops had in the 
 skirmish by the river been disarmed by the enemy, did at 
 their own expense arm the young men -with eight hundred 
 shields: It hath been resolved by the council and people to 
 crown Charidemus and Diotimus with a golden crown, and 
 to proclaim it at the great Panathenaic festival, during the 
 gymnastic contest, and at the Dionysian festival, at the 
 exhibition of the new tragedies: the proclamation to be 
 given in charge to the judges, 2 the presidents, and the prize- 
 masters.” 
 
 during the Social War, b.c. 355, when the Chians, Rhodians, and By¬ 
 zantines made a descent upon Lemnos and Imbrus. In that year Cal- 
 listratus was archon. The heading 'Ap^wv, instead of enl *Ap^ovrof, is 
 noticed by Jacobs as unusual. Nausicles is frequently mentioned by 
 Alschines and Demosthenes in terms of praise. He commanded an 
 Athenian force in the Sacred War, b.c. 352. 
 
 1 As this decree was moved by the same person as the preceding 
 one, it is perhaps referable to the same period. Winiewski has con¬ 
 jectured that, while Nausicles was sent to Imbrus, some hostile neigh¬ 
 bors, perhaps the Megarians, took the opportunity of invading Salamis. 
 Reiske understands it of the Cyprian Salamis; but this is not so prob¬ 
 able. The Charidemus here mentioned is not to be confounded with 
 Charidemus of Oreus, but is the person who, with Demosthenes and 
 others, was demanded by Alexander after the taking of Thebes, and 
 thereupon fled to the court of Darius, by whom he was afterward put 
 to death. (Diodorus, xvii. 30.) Diotimus also was one of the men de¬ 
 manded by Alexander. 
 
 2 Such is the name which I give to the six junior archons, to avoid 
 the uncouth title of Thesmothetes. It does not indeed (any more than 
 Thesmothetes itself) convey a perfect idea of the official duties which 
 they had to discharge; yet it is by no means inappropriate, seeing that 
 the most important part of them were of a judicial character. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 49 
 
 s t> 
 
 Each of these men, -ZEschines, was accountable for the office 
 which he held, but not accountable for the matters in respect 
 ' of which he was crowned. No more then am I; for surely I 
 have the same rights, under the same circumstances, as other 
 men. Have I given money? I am praised for that, not be¬ 
 ing accountable for what I gave. Did I hold office ? Yes; 
 and I have rendered an account of my official acts, not of my 
 bounties. Oh, but I was guilty of malpractices in- office! 
 And you, present when the auditors brought me up, 1 accused 
 me not? 
 
 1o show you that he himself bears testimony to my having 
 been crowned for what I had no account to render of, take 
 and read the whole decree drawn up in my favor. By the 
 portions of the bill which he never indicted it will appear that 
 his prosecution is vexatious. Bead. 
 
 THE DECREE . 2 
 
 “In the arclionship of Eutliycles, on the twenty-second of 
 Pyanepsion, in the presidency of the (Eneian tribe, Ctesiphon 
 son of Leosthenes of Anaphlystus moved: Whereas Demos¬ 
 thenes son of Demosthenes of Pasania, having been superin- 
 tendant of the repair of the walls, and having expended on 
 the works three additional talents out of his own money, hath 
 given that sum to the people; and whereas, having been 
 
 1 Either before the popular assembly, or before their own court, the 
 AoyiaT7jpLOv. But I rather think the former. The accounts having been 
 sent in to the A oytoTal, and there not appearing to be any pecuniary 
 deficit, they were passed as a matter of course, unless some accuser ap¬ 
 peared ; but the law afforded an opportunit}' for an accusation at the 
 popular assembly, before which the A oyiaral were obliged to bring the 
 parties as a matter ofform,andby public proclamation to ask whether 
 any citizen desired to accuse them. (iEsch. contra Ctesiph. 57.) 
 
 Schomann indeed (De Comitiis, 293) appears to take a different view. 
 
 Demosthenes had passed the scrutiny of the Logistse, and had no 
 charge preferred against him at the close of his official year. This 
 however, in point of law, was no answer to his opponent’s argument; 
 for the legality of Ctesiphon’s measure w T as to be tried by reference to 
 the time when he introduced it, at which time Demosthenes had not 
 cleared himself of his official responsibility. 
 
 2 The name of the archon is wrong here, and the decree is not in all 
 manuscripts. The terms of it do not agree with the recital in the in- 
 diotment, though it is the same in Substance. It may possibly be that 
 in one we have the Trpo(3ovXevjua } in the other the ipijQicjua as sanctioned 
 by the assembly. 
 
 Vol. IL-—C 
 
50 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 appointed treasurer of the tlieoric fund, he hath given to the 
 theoric officers 1 of the tribes a hundred minas toward the 
 sacrifices, the council and people of Athens have resolved to 
 honor Demosthenes son of Demosthenes ofPseania with public 
 praise, for the goodness and generosity which he has shown 
 throughout on every occasion toward the people of Athens, 
 and to crown him with a golden crown, and to proclaim the 
 crown in the theatre, at the Dionysian festival, at the perform¬ 
 ance of the new tragedies: the proclamation to be given in 
 charge to the prize-master.” 
 
 These were my donations; none of which have you in¬ 
 dicted: the rewards which the council says I deserve for 
 them are what you arraign. To receive the gifts then you 
 confess to be legal; the requital of them you indict for illegal¬ 
 ity. In the name of heaven ! what sort of person can a .mon¬ 
 ster of wickedness and malignity be, if not such a person as 
 this ? 
 
 Concerning the proclamation in the theatre, I pass over 
 the fact, that thousands of thousands have been proclaimed, 
 and I myself have been crowned often before. But by the 
 Gods! are you so perverse and stupid, .ZEschines, as not to 
 be able to reflect, that the party crowned has the same glory 
 from the crown wherever it be published, and that the proc¬ 
 lamation is made in the theatre for the benefit of those who 
 confer the crown? For the hearers are all encouraged to 
 render service to the state, and praise the parties who show 
 their gratitude more than the party crowned. Therefore has 
 our commonwealth enacted this law. Take and read me the 
 law itself. 
 
 THE LAW. 
 
 “ Whensoever any of the townships bestow crowns, proc¬ 
 lamations thereof shall be made by them in their several 
 townships, unless where any are crowned by the people of 
 Athens or the council; and it shall be lawful for them to be 
 proclaimed in the theatre at the Dionysian festival.” 
 
 Do you hear, JEschines, the law distinctly saying—“ unless 
 where any are voted by the people or the council; such may 
 
 1 Reiske prefers taking Oeupiicols as the neuter gender, “ the theoric 
 contributions from all the tribes.” Schaefer, Jacobs, and Pabst read 
 decjpnlp. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 51 
 
 be proclaimed V* Why then, wretched man, do you play the 
 pettifogger % Why manufacture arguments % Why don’t you 
 take hellebore 1 for your malady ? Are you not ashamed to 
 bring on a cause for spite, and not for any offense ?—to alter 
 some laws, and to garble others, the whole of which should in 
 justice be read to persons sworn to decide according to the 
 laws'? And you that act thus describe the qualities which 
 belong to a friend of the people, as if you had ordered a statue 
 according to contract, and received it without having what 
 the contract required ; or as if friends of the people were 
 known by words, and not by acts and measures ! And you 
 bawl out, regardless of decency, 2 a sort of cart-language, 3 ap¬ 
 plicable to yourself and your race, not to me. 
 
 Again, men of Athens — I conceive abuse to differ from 
 
 1 Hellebore was used by the ancients to purge the brain, and cure 
 people of insanity ; and because it grew abundantly in the island of 
 Anticyra, “ to send a person to Anticyra,” was as good as saying he was 
 mad. Horace, Sat. II. iii. 82:— 
 
 Bum doceo insanire omnes, vos ordine adite. 
 
 Danda est Hellebori multo pars maxima avaris: 
 
 Nescio an Anticyram ratio illis destinet oninem. 
 
 And ibid. 166 :— 
 
 Naviget Anticyram: quid enim differt, barathrone 
 
 Bones quicquid hab«s, an nunquam utare paratis ? 
 
 3 With the expression in the original compare Yirgil, J3n. IX. 595:— 
 Bigna atque indigna relatu 
 
 Vociferans. 
 
 3 Billingsgate, as the Londoners would say. 
 
 It was the custom of the Athenian women, in divers solemn proces¬ 
 sions, especially at the Eleusinian mysteries, when they were conveyed 
 in open wagons or carts, to amuse themselves by jeering and joking one 
 another, without the slightest regard to modesty or propriety of lan¬ 
 guage. Hence ra kn ruv apaguv onumiaTa came to signify licentious 
 and indecent abuse. HojuTreveiv is used in the like sense, and also 
 yetyvpi&Lv, because at a certain bridge over the Cephisus, where the 
 procession stopped, the bantering of the ladies waxed peculiarly warm. 
 Leland observes—“ The French translator is extremely shocked at this 
 interpretation, and can not persuade himself that the Athenian ladies 
 could so far forget the modesty and reserve peculiar to their sex. But 
 it is well if this were the worst part of their conduct, or if they were 
 guilty of no greater transgression of modesty in the course of their at¬ 
 tendance on these famous rites.” Bionysius of Halicarnassus, in his 
 Roman Antiquities (VII. 72), compares this custom of the Athenians 
 with the license allowed at a Roman triumph, where those who follow¬ 
 ed the procession were permitted to make fun of the generals and other 
 men of distinction by squibs and jests. 
 
52 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 accusation in this, that accusation has to do with offenses for 
 which the laws provide penalties, abuse with the scandal 
 which enemies speak against each other according to their 
 humor. 1 And I believe our ancestors built these courts, not 
 that w r e should assemble you here and bring forth the secrets 
 of private life for mutual reproach, 2 but to give us the means 
 of convicting persons guilty of crimes against the state. 
 Aeschines knew this as well as I, and yet he chose to rail 
 rather than to accuse. 
 
 Even in this way he must take as much as he gives ; 3 but 
 before I enter upon such matters, let me ask him one ques¬ 
 tion — Should one call you the state’s enemy, or mine, 
 Aeschines'? Mine, of course. Yet, where you might, for any 
 offense which I committed, have obtained satisfaction for the 
 people according to the laws, you neglected it—at the audit, 
 on the indictments and other trials; but where I in my own 
 person am safe on every account, by the laws, by time, by 
 prescription, 4 by many previous judgments on every point, 
 by my never having been convicted of a public offense—and 
 where the country must share, more or less, in the repute of 
 measures which were her own—here it is you have encoun¬ 
 tered me. See if you are not the people’s enemy, while you 
 pretend to be mine ! m 
 
 Since therefore the righteous and true verdict is made 
 
 1 Compare Cicero pro Coelio: “ Aliud est maledicere, aliud aceusare. 
 Accusatio crimen desiderat, rem ut definiat, hominem ut notet, argu- 
 mento probet, teste eonfirmet; maledictio autem nihil habet propositi, 
 prseter contumeliam; quae si petulantius jactatur, convicium, si face- 
 tius, urbanitas nominatin'.” 
 
 2 Literally: “ speak to the reproach of one another secrets from pri¬ 
 vate life;” adhering to Bekkers reading of /ca/c<5<:. Jacobs: und schma- 
 hend die Geheimnisse des Privatlebens gegenseitig aufzudechen. Pabst, 
 to the same effect. 
 
 3 Lord Brougham justly censures the English translators, who have 
 not preserved the familiar expression in the Greek, that so well corre¬ 
 sponds with our own. They are all upon stilts. He himself has: 
 “ But even in this kind of conflict it is right that he should get as good 
 as he brings.” 
 
 4 “ By the Statute of Limitations,” as we should say. The ypacpi) 
 nagavojuuv could only be brought within a year after the decree. The 
 ewovrj was to take place within thirty days after the expiration of the 
 term of office, and the accuser was bound to appear when the accounts 
 were rendered, or before they were passed. See my article Tlpodeopia 
 in the Arch. Diet., also article EtidiV?. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 53 
 
 clear to all; 1 but I must, it seems—though not naturally 
 fond of railing, yet on account of the calumnies uttered by 
 my opponent—in reply to so many falsehoods, just mention 
 some leading particulars concerning him, and show who he is, 
 and from whom descended, that so readily begins using hard 
 words—and what language he carps at, after uttering such 
 as any decent man would have shuddered to pronounce. 2 — 
 Why, if my accuser had been JEacus, or Rhadamanthus, or 
 Minos, instead of a prater, 3 a hack of the market, a pestilent 
 scribbler, I don’t think he would have spoken such things, or 
 found such offensive terms, shouting, as in a tragedy, “ O 
 Earth! O Sun! O Virtue!” 4 and the like; and again ap¬ 
 pealing to Intelligence and Education, by which the honor¬ 
 able is distinguished from the base:—all this you undoubted¬ 
 ly heard from his lips. Accursed one! 5 What have you or 
 
 1 Leland, following Wolf, infers from this passage that there had 
 been some acclamation in the court, which Demosthenes affects to con¬ 
 sider as the general voice of the jury. I agree with Lord Brougham, 
 that this is not a necessary inference from the text, where the con¬ 
 nection with what goes before is plain and easy. 
 
 2 I have preserved the anacoluthon of the oi'iginal. In tlq ovk dv 
 uKVTjae I have converted the interrogative, which is unsuitable to our 
 language, into an affirmative. This weakens the sentence, but as a 
 compensation I strengthen ukvtjge. 
 
 3 The word oirep/uohoyog in the same sense occurs in the Acts of the 
 Apostles, xvii. 18, where our version is “babbler.” The origin of this 
 meaning is uncertain. UepiTpi/nfia dyopug describes a low fellow who 
 frequented the market, where loose and dissolute characters of all 
 sorts used to congregate. Jacobs and Pabst render it, MarJctschreier, 
 “mountebank,” or “blackguard,” as we should say. Aristophanes 
 says in the Knights: 
 
 otlt) 7rovjjpdc nut; dyopdg el nal Opacvg. 
 
 4 This occurs at the end of the speech against Ctesiplion. 
 
 5 Lord Brougham’s translation of uddapfxa is—“You abomination;” 
 upon which his reviewer has the following note:— 
 
 “ It is quite clear that Lord Brougham himself has no notion of the 
 real meaning of the word. We refer for explanation of it to Mitchell’s 
 edition of the Knights of Aristophanes, v. 708 and v. 1099. He will 
 there see that uddap/m was an expiatory victim, offered up to atone for 
 the guilt, and avert the punishment, of the parties sacrificing. Two 
 such victims—both men, according to some writers, but a male and 
 female, according to others—were provided annually by the Athenian 
 state for this purpose. A feeling of the utmost contempt and horror 
 was attached to these Kadapfiara. But of all this Lord Brougham seems 
 perfectly unconscious. We can not translate, we can only approximate 
 to the meaning of udOapna. It is a sort of frozen word, which, as Mr. 
 
54 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 yours to do with virtue ? How should you discern what is 
 lionorable or otherwise? Plow were you ever qualified? 
 What right have you to talk about education? Those who 
 really possess it would never say as much of themselves, but 
 rather blush if another did : those who are destitute like you, 
 but make pretensions to it from stupidity, annoy the hear¬ 
 ers by their talk, without getting the reputation which they 
 desire. 
 
 I am at no loss for materials concerning you and your 
 family, but am in doubt what to mention first—whether 
 how your father Tromes, being servant to Elpias, who, kept 
 a reading-school in the temple of Theseus, wore a weight of 
 fetters and a collar; 1 or how your mother, by her morning 
 spousals in the cottage by Hero Calamites, 2 reared up you, 
 the beautiful statue, the eminent third-rate actor ! 3 —But all 
 
 Mitchell remarks on another occasion, requires the warm breath of 
 commentatorship to come over it before it can be thawed into life and 
 animation/' 
 
 This is a most unfair attack upon his Lordship. There is not the 
 least objection to his translation, nor does it at all appear that the 
 meaning of Kudapiua was unknown to him. The observation about 
 frozen words is good enough, but it is misapplied. Comment is dif¬ 
 ferent from translation. Jacobs renders it: l)u Schandjleck. Pabst: 
 Scheusal. Auger: “Scelerat.” 
 
 1 EvPlov, according to Reiske, is a round board with a hole in the 
 middle, put on the necks of thievish slaves, to prevent them from 
 reaching their hands to their mouths. Or it may be, as Jacobs says, 
 the stocks; as in the Knights of Aristophanes, v. 702. 
 
 iv r <j ZvTiip drjcro) oe, vrj rdv ovpavov. 
 
 where the Scholiast interprets iv Tij 'Kodona.Kij. Or simply a collar worn as 
 a badge of servitude. Compare Plautus, Captivi, Act II. Sc. 3, v. 107:— 
 
 Di tibi omnes omnia optata afferant, 
 
 Cum me tanto honore honestas, cumque ex vinclis eximis. 
 
 Hoc quidem baud molestum est jam, quod collus collaria caret. 
 
 2 A Hero of that name is the common interpretation. Schaefer, how¬ 
 ever, referring to the oration of Demosthenes on the Embassy (419), 
 where Atrometus is said to have taught his boys npog tu> tov *H pu tov 
 iarpov , thinks that Heros was the name of a physician, who received 
 the title of Calamites, because he set fractured bones with splinters of 
 reeds. Dissen’s explanation, to which Pabst inclines, is, that there 
 was a statue surrounded with reeds, of -some unknown hero, a sort of 
 JEsculapius, to whom the people ascribed a healing power. 
 
 3 A TpiTayuvioT7)c was an actor of the lowest description. The reader 
 will remember that the characters in an Athenian tragedy were few 
 in number: the dialogue was never carried on by more than three 
 persons besides the chorus, generally by two only. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 55 
 
 know these things without my telling—Or how the galley- 
 piper Phormio, the slave of Dion of Phrearrii, removed her 
 from that honorable employment. But, by Jupiter and the 
 gods! I fear, in saying what is proper about you, I may be 
 thought to have chosen topics unbecoming to myself. All 
 this therefore I shall pass by, and commence with the acts 
 of his own life; for indeed he came not of common parents, 
 but of such as are execrated by the people. 1 Very lately— 
 lately do I say?—it is but yesterday that he has become both 
 an Athenian and an orator—adding two syllables, he converted 
 his father from Tromes to Atrometus, 2 and dignified his mother 
 by the name of Glaucothea, who (as every one knows) was 
 called Empusa ; 3 having got that title (it is plain) from her 
 doing and submitting to any thing—how else could she have 
 got it? However, you are so ungrateful and wicked by na¬ 
 ture, that after being raised through the people from servitude 
 to freedom, from beggary to affluence, instead of returning their 
 kindness, you work against them as a hireling politician. 
 
 Of the speeches, which it may possibly be contended he has 
 made for the good of the country, I will say nothing: of the 
 acts which he was clearly proved to have done for the enemy, 
 
 I will remind you. 
 
 What man present but knows of the outcast Antiphon, 4 
 who came into the city under promise to Philip that he 
 
 1 Reiske’s interpretation is, “ ovk tjv elg rig tu>v tvxovtuv , non enim 
 est AEschines de genere liominum triviali, vulgari, sed unus illorum 
 inventu rarorum hominum, quos populus per prseconem publice de- 
 vovet.” Dissen refers these words to d (3e/3iuKev. Schaefer and Jacobs 
 understand uv Ztvxw of the parents of JEscliines, but, on the authority 
 of one manuscript, transpose the clause ovd£—Karapurai immediately 
 after oyovg. According to my view, there is no necessity for the trans¬ 
 position, the argument running thus—I will pass by this topic: his 
 parentage was so disgraceful that he himself was ashamed of it; and 
 so he changed the names of his parents, to escape the shame. 
 
 2 Tromes, from rpepu, would be a fit name for a slave; ’A Tpoprjrog, 
 
 “ Intrepid,” for a freeman. The lengthening of names was often re¬ 
 sorted to by the ancients, as it is now, as a device to exalt the dignity 
 of the party. 
 
 3 This denoted a frightful spectre or hobgoblin. According to Aris¬ 
 tophanes (Frogs, 293), it could change itself into various shapes. 
 
 4 ’ATTorpijcpiadevTa is, “ ousted from the register by the votes of his 
 fellow-townsmen,” d^poraL. The members of each dr/pog, or township, 
 
 of Attica occasionally assembled to revise their register, and if any ^ 
 member was adjudged by a majority of votes not to be a true citizen, 
 his name was expunged. He might still appeal to a court of justice at 
 
56 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 would burn your arsenal ? I foifnd him concealed in Piraeus, 
 and brought him before the Assembly; when this mischief- 
 maker, shouting and clamoring that it was monstrous in a 
 free state that I should ill-treat unfortunate citizens, and enter 
 houses without warrant, 1 procured his release. And had not 
 the Council of Areopagus, discovering the fact, and perceiving 
 your ill-timed error, made search after the man, seized and 
 brought him before you, a fellow like that would have been 
 rescued, would have slipped through the hands of justice, and 
 been sent out of the way by this declaimer. As it was, you 
 put him to torture and to death, as you ought this man also. 
 The Council of Areopagus were informed what JEschines had 
 done, and therefore, though you had elected him for your 
 advocate on the question of the Delian temple, 2 in the same 
 ignorance by which you have sacrificed many of the public 
 interests, as you referred the matter to the council, and gave 
 them full powers, they immediately removed him for his 
 treason, and appointed Hyperides to plead; for which pur¬ 
 pose they took their ballots from the altar, 3 and not a single 
 
 Athens; but if the court affirmed the decision of the townsmen, he was 
 sold for a slave. 
 
 Antiphon (as it would appear) had been thus degraded from his rank 
 as a citizen, and, in resentment of such usage, had entered into a trea¬ 
 sonable engagement with the king of Macedon. Plutarch calls this 
 proceeding of Demosthenes a very arbitrary measure, acpoSpa dpLaro- 
 KpaTiicbv TTO?LiTEvpa. Dinarchus brings it up against him in the speech 
 upon his trial, but does not deny the guilt of Antiphon. 
 
 1 Without the authority of the Council. 
 
 2 The Athenians claimed the superintendence of the temple of Delos, 
 which the Delians disputed with them. The question was referred to 
 the decision of the Amphictyonic Council at Thermopylae, and each of 
 the two states sent a deputy to plead their cause. Some fragments 
 remain of a speech made by Hyperides on this occasion, entitled De¬ 
 li acus. 
 
 3 This was the most solemn method of voting. An example is men¬ 
 tioned by Herodotus (VIII. 123), on a memorable occasion, when the 
 Greek generals met at the Isthmus after the battle of Salamis, to de¬ 
 clare what two men had done the greatest service in the war. They 
 voted standing at the altar of Neptune; and while each awarded the 
 first place to himself, the great majority concurred in allowing the 
 second place to Themistocles. 
 
 Another example may be seen in the speech of Demosthenes against 
 Macartatus, 1054. 
 
 Compare Cicero pro Balbo, 6: “Athenis aiunt, cum quidam apud 
 eos, qui sancte graviterque vixisset, et testimonium publice dixisset, et, 
 ut mos Grcecorum est, jurandi causa ad aras accederet,” <fcc. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 57 
 
 ballot was given for this wretch. To prove the truth of my 
 statements, call me the witnesses. 
 
 witnesses. 
 
 “We, Callias of Sunium, Zenon of Phlyus, Cleon of Phale- 
 rum, Demonicus of Marathon, testify for Demosthenes in the 
 name of all, that, the people having formerly elected Aeschines 
 for their advocate before the Amphictyons on the question of 
 the Delian temple, we in council determined that Hyperides 
 was more worthy to plead on behalf of the state, and Hype¬ 
 rides was commissioned.” 
 
 Thus, by removing this man when he was about to plead, 
 and appointing another, the council pronounced him a traitor 
 and an enemy. 
 
 Such is one of this boy’s 1 political acts, similar—is it 
 not ?—to what he charges me with. Now let me remind you 
 of another. When Philip sent Python 2 of Byzantium, to¬ 
 gether with an embassy from all his own allies, with the in¬ 
 tention of putting our commonwealth to shame, and proving 
 her in the wrong, then—when Python swaggered and poured 
 a flood of abuse 3 upon you—I neither yielded nor gave way; 
 I rose and answered him, and betrayed not the rights of the 
 commonwealth. So plainly did I convict Philip of injustice, 
 that his very allies rose up and acknowledged it; while Aes¬ 
 chines fought his battle, and bore witness, ay, false witness, 
 against his own country. 
 
 Nor was this enough. Again, some time afterward, he 
 was found meeting Anaxinus the spy at Thraso’s house. 4 A 
 
 1 It means “ a fine fellow,” as we say ironically. Jacobs preserves 
 the original term: des Junglings. Pabst: JBuben. Leland and Spillan: 
 “ this noble personage.” Francis: “ You have here one gallant instance 
 of his politics.” 
 
 2 Probably on the same occasion when the second Philippic wa8 
 spoken. 
 
 3 With the original tzoIIu fieovrt compare Horace, Sat. I. vii. 28:— 
 
 Turn Prienestinus salso multoque fluenti 
 Expressa arbusto regerit convicia. 
 
 * Anaxinus was an Orite. The transaction is supposed to have oc¬ 
 curred b.c. 342. HCschines, in his speech (85), asserts that the whole 
 affair was a contrivance of Demosthenes, to prevent an impeachment 
 with which he had threatened him; and he reproaches Demosthenes 
 with having put a man to the rack, at whose house in Oreus he had 
 lodged and received hospitality. 
 
58 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 # 
 
 man, I say, who had a private meeting and conference with - 
 an emissary of the foe, must himself have been a spy by na¬ 
 ture and an enemy to his country. To prove these statements, 
 call me the witnesses. 
 
 WITNESSES. 
 
 “Teledemus, son of Cleon, Hyperides son of Callaeschrus, 
 Nicomechus son of Diophantus, testify for Demosthenes, as 
 they swore before the generals, that Atschines son of Atro- 
 metus of Cothoeidae did, to their knowledge, meet by night in 
 Thraso’s house, and confer with Anaxinus, who was adjudged 
 to be a spy of Philip. These depositions were returned before 
 Nicias, 1 on the third of Hecatombseon.” 
 
 A vast deal besides that I could say about him I omit. 
 For thus (methinks) it is. I could produce many more such 
 cases, where Aeschines was discovered at that period assisting 
 the enemy and harassing me. But these things are not treas¬ 
 ured up by you for careful remembrance or proper resent¬ 
 ment. You have, through evil custom, given large license to 
 any one that chooses to supplant and calumniate your honest 
 counselors, exchanging the interest of the state for the pleas¬ 
 ure and gratification of hearing abuse; and so it is easier and 
 safer always to be a hireling serving your enemies, than a 
 statesman attached to you. 
 
 That he should co-operate openly with Philip before the 
 war, was shocking—O heaven and earth! could it be other¬ 
 wise?—against his country! Yet allow him if you please, 
 allow him this. But when the ships had openly been made 
 prize, Chersonesus was ravaged, the man was marching against 
 Attica, matters were no longer doubtful, war had begun— 
 nothing that he ever did for you can this malicious iambic- 
 
 mouther 2 show—not a resolution has JEschines, great or small, 
 
 • • • ^ 
 
 1 It is uncertain whether this Nicias is the name of a spurious archon, 
 
 or the secretary of the council, or an error for Nicomachus, who was 
 archon b.c. 341. Jacobs translates it: unter dem Nikias. Pabst, Auger, 
 Leland, and Francis, the same. Spillan is with me. 
 
 2 Some of the translators, following an interpretation given by the 
 grammarians (vppiaTije, QL'XoTioi.dopoc, j, take this word as having refer¬ 
 ence to the acrimonious language of vEschines, the Iambic metre having 
 anciently been the vehicle of satire, as we learn from Horace, Ars 
 Poet. 79, 
 
 Arcliilochum proprio rabies armavit Iambo. 
 
 But it is better to understand the epithet as having reference to the 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 59 
 
 concerning the interests of the state. If he asserts it, let him 
 prove it now while my waterglass is running. 1 But there is 
 none. He is reduced to an alternativeeither he had no 
 fault to find with my measures, and therefore moved none 
 against them; or he sought the good of the enemy, and there¬ 
 fore would not propose any better. 
 
 Did he abstain from speaking as well as moving, when any 
 mischief was to be done to you*? Why, no one else could 
 speak a word. Other things, it appears, the country could 
 endure, and he could accomplish without detection: but one 
 last act he achieved, O Athenians, which crowned all he had 
 done before; on which he lavished that multitude of words, 
 recounting the decrees against the Amphissian Locrians, in 
 hopes of distorting the truth. But the thing admits it not. 
 No! never will you wash yourself clean 2 from your perform¬ 
 ances there—talk as long as you will! 
 
 In your presence, men of Athens, I invoke all the gods and 
 goddesses to whom the Attic territory belongs, and Pythian 
 
 theatrical profession of JEschines. Schaefer takes it to signify a person 
 who spoils the verses by bad pronunciation (“an iambic-gulper”— 
 Iambe7i-verschiucker). Passow, in his dictionary, explains it of one who 
 learns by heart and repeats a great number of Iambics. Jacobs follows 
 §ehaefer. Pabst: Iamben-schnapper. Leland: “theatrical ranter.” 
 
 1 The Athenians, to prevent the parties from saying more than was 
 necessary, timed them by a glass, in which water trickled through a 
 narrow tube, like sand in one of our minute-glasses. The measure of 
 water was not alwaj’s the-same, and varied according to the import¬ 
 ance of the cause. Mention is made of a certain quantity of water be¬ 
 ing allowed in certain causes; but this gives us no idea of the length 
 of time, as we do not know the construction of the glass. Our best 
 evidence of this is the length of the speeches which have come down to 
 us. Each party was commonly allowed to have two speeches, the de¬ 
 fendant having the last reply; and the second speech might be half as 
 long as the first. If either got a friend to plead for him, he gave up so 
 much of his own time as the friend’s speech would occupy. The ad¬ 
 measurement of the water was seen to by the superintending magistrate. 
 An officer of the court stood by the glass, and stopped it whenever a 
 witness was called, or a law or other document was read to the jury. 
 
 8 The reviewer of Lord Brougham very appositely quotes the lines 
 in Macbeth , Act II. Scene 2— 
 
 “Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this blood 
 Clean from my hand ?” 
 
 Compare also what Lady Macbeth says, Act V. Scene I— 
 
 “ Out! damned spot,” <fcc. 
 
60 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 Apollo the Father-god 1 of our state; and I implore them all! 
 As I shall declare the truth to you, as I declared it in your 
 assembly at the time, the very moment I saw this wretch put¬ 
 ting his hand to the work—for I perceived, instantly perceived 
 it—so may they grant me favor and protection! If from 
 malice or personal rivalry I bring a false charge against my 
 opponent, may they cut me off from every blessing! 
 
 But wherefore this imprecation, this solemn assurance? Be¬ 
 cause, though I have documents lying in the public archives, 
 from which I shall clearly prove my assertions, though I know 
 you remember the facts, I fear this man may be considered 
 unequal to the mischiefs which he has wrought; as before 
 happened, when he caused the destruction of the unhappy 
 Phocians by his false reports to you. 
 
 The Amphissian war, 2 I say—which brought Philip to 
 Elatea, which caused him to be chosen general of the Am- 
 phictyons, which ruined every thing in Greece—was this 
 man’s contrivance. He is the single author of all our heaviest 
 calamities. I protested at the time, and cried out in the as¬ 
 sembly—“You are bringing a war, JEscliines, into Attica, an 
 Amphictyonic war”—but his packed party 3 would not let me 
 be heard; the rest wondered, and supposed that I was bringing 
 an idle charge against him out of personal enmity. However, 
 the real character of those transactions, the purpose for which 
 they were got up, the manner in which they were accomplish¬ 
 ed, hear ye now, men of Athens, as ye were prevented then. 
 You will see that the thing was well concerted, and it will 
 help you much to get a knowledge of public affairs, and what 
 craftiness there was in Philip you will observe. 
 
 Philip could neither finish nor get rid of the war with 
 Athens, unless he made the Thebans and Thessalians her 
 enemies. Though your generals fought against him without 
 
 1 So called as being the father of Ion, the ancient king of Athens. 
 See the Ion of Euripides. 
 
 2 See Appendix IX. 
 
 3 Literally, “those who had come on request and were sitting to¬ 
 gether,” i. e. at the special request or invitation of H£schines and his 
 friends—by appointment or concert. Pabst has: welche der Verabre- 
 dung gemdss zusammenhielten. Jacobs: die zufolge der Aufforderung 
 zusammenhielten. Francis, the only English translator who expresses 
 the meaning, has: “ some of his party, convened by him for that pur¬ 
 pose.” But the some is wrong, for ol goes with avy/cadTj/uevoi. 
 
PN THE CROWN. 
 
 61 
 
 fortune or skill, yet from the war itself and the cruisers he suf¬ 
 fered infinite damage. He could neither export any of the 
 produce of his country, nor import what he needed. He was 
 not then superior to you at sea, nor able to reach Attica, un¬ 
 less the Thessalians followed him and the Thebans gave him a 
 passage ; so that, while he overcame in war the generals whom 
 you sent out—such as they were—I say nothing about that— 
 he found himself distressed by the difference of your local posi¬ 
 tion and means. 1 Should he urge either Thessalians or The¬ 
 bans to march in his own quarrel against you, none, he thought, 
 would attend to him: but should he, under the pretense of 
 taking up their common cause, be elected general, he trusted 
 partly by deceit and partly by persuasion to gain his ends more 
 easily. 2 He sets to work therefore—observe how cleverly—to 
 get the Amphictyons into a war, and create a disturbance in 
 the congress. For this he thought they would immediately 
 want him. Now, if any of the presbyters commissioned by 
 himself or any of his allies brought it forward, he imagined 
 that both Thebans and Thessalians would suspect the thing, 
 and would all be on their guard; whereas, if the agent were 
 an Athenian and commissioned by you his opponents, it would 
 easily pass unnoticed. And thus it turned out. 
 
 How did he effect his purpose? He hires the prosecutor. 
 No one (I believe) was aware of the thing or attending to it, 
 and so—-just as these things are usually done at Athens— 
 JEschines was proposed for Pylasan deputy, three or four held 
 up their hands for him, and his election was declared. When 
 clothed with the dignity of the state he arrived among the 
 Amphictyons, dismissing and disregarding all besides, he 
 hastened to execute what he was hired for. He makes up a 
 pretty speech and story, showing how the Cirrhsean plain 
 came to be consecrated; reciting this to the presbyters, men 
 unused to speeches and unsuspicious of any consequences, he 
 procures a vote from them to walk round the district, which 
 
 1 That is, the position of the countries that were the seat of war, and 
 the different character of the resources which each of the belligerent 
 parties possessed. For example, Philip’s standing army could not pre¬ 
 vent the Athenians annoying him with their fleets and cruisers. Jacobs: 
 durch die Natur der Oertlichkeit und durch das, was Beiden zu Gebot 
 stand. 
 
 3 Jacobs: so hoffe er leichter, hier durch Beruckung, dort durch Ueber- 
 redung , zum Zicle zu kommen. 
 
62 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 the Amphissians maintained they had a right to cultivate, but 
 which he charged to be parcel of the sacred plain. The Lo- 
 crians were not then instituting any suit against us, or any 
 such proceeding as-ZEschines now falsely alleges. 1 This will 
 show you—It was impossible (I fancy) for the Locrians to 
 carry on process against our commonwealth without a cita¬ 
 tion. Who summoned us then ? In whose archonship ? Say 
 who knows—point him out. You can not. Your pretense 
 was flimsy and false. 
 
 When the Amphictyons at the instance of this man walked 
 over the plain, the Locrians fell upon them and well-nigh 
 speared them all; some of the presbyters they carried off 
 captive. Complaints having followed, and war being stirred 
 up against the Ampliyssians, at first Cottyphus led an army 
 composed entirely of Amphictyons; but as some never came, 
 and those that came did nothing, measures were taken against 
 the ensuing congress by an instructed gang, the old traitors 
 of Thessaly and other states, to get the command for Philip. 2 
 And they had found a fair pretext: for it was necessary, they 
 said, either to subsidize themselves and maintain a mercenary 
 force and fine all recusants, or to elect him. What need of 
 many words? He was thereupon chosen general; and im¬ 
 mediately afterward collecting an army, and marching pro- - 
 fessedly against Cirrlia, he bids a long farewell to the Cir- 
 rliaeans and Locrians, and seizes Elatea. Had not the The¬ 
 bans, upon seeing this, immediately changed their minds 
 and sided with us, the whole thing would have fallen like a 
 torrent upon our country. As it was, they for the instant 3 
 stopped him; chiefly, O Athenians, by the kindness of some 
 divinity to Athens, but secondly, 4 as far as it could depend on 
 
 1 ZEschines had stated in his speech (70), that the Amphissian Locri¬ 
 ans proposed to fine the Athenians fifty talents, for an inscription which 
 they had put on a golden shield in the temple, commemorating the 
 alliance of the Thebans with Persia. This he alleged to have been the 
 cause of his own proceeding against them. See, as to all these details, 
 Appendix IX. 
 
 2 Pabst: wirktcn die von den Thessaliern und aus andern Stddten, 
 welche dazu schon angeleitet und Idngst schlejht gesinnt waren, dans Phil¬ 
 ipp zum Feldherrn erwdhlt ward. 
 
 3 Jacobs: hielten Jene ihn wenigstens vom plotzlichen Vordringen ab. 
 Pabst: hielten Jene wenigstens den plotzlichen Andrang auf 
 
 4 Brougham expresses elra by “under Providence.” Leland had 
 given the same turn before him. And it is a good one. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 63 
 
 a single man, through me. Give me those decrees, and the 
 dates of the several transactions, that you may know what 
 mischief this pestilent creature has stirred up with impunity. 
 Read me the decrees. 
 
 THE DECREE OF THE AMPHICTYONS. 
 
 “ In the priesthood of Clinagoras, at the spring congress, it 
 hath been resolved by the deputies and councilors 1 of the 
 Amphictyons, and by the assembly of the Amphictyons, 
 seeing that the Amphissians trespass upon the sacred plain 
 and sow and depasture it with cattle, that the deputies and 
 councilors‘do enter thereupon and define the boundaries with 
 pillars, and enjoin the Amphissians not to trespass for the 
 future.” 
 
 ANOTHER DECREE. 
 
 “ In the prieshood of Clynagoras , 2 at the spring congress, 
 it hath been resolved by the deputies and councilors of the 
 Amphictyons and by the assembly of the Amphictyons, see¬ 
 ing that the people of Amphissa have partitioned among them¬ 
 selves the sacred plain and cultivate and feed cattle upon 
 the same, and on being interrupted have come in arms, and 
 • with force resisted the general council of the Greeks, and have 
 wounded some of them : that Cottyphus the Arcadian , 3 who 
 hath been elected general of the Amphictyons, be sent em¬ 
 bassador to Philip of Macedon, and do request him to come 
 to the aid of Apollo and the Amphictyons, that he may not 
 suffer the god to be insulted by the impious Amphissians; 
 and do announce that the Greeks who are members of the 
 Amphictyonic Council appoint him general with absolute 
 powers.” 
 
 Now read the dates of these transactions. They correspond 
 with the time when ^Eschines was deputy. . Read. 
 
 1 As to the constitution of the Amphictyonic Council, see Appendix I. 
 
 2 The name of the priest seems to mark the year, as that of the 
 archon at Athens. As this decree must have been passed at a differ¬ 
 ent congress from the one first cited, it has been conjectured that either 
 the name of the priest is wrong, or that dirupiv^g should be read here 
 instead of kapivi}?. See Appendix IX. 
 
 3 Aeschines calls Cottyphus a Pharsalian. Winiewski supposes he 
 may have migrated from Arcadia to Pharsalus. Of ^apcd?uog may be 
 an error for Ha/j^dcno^. 
 
64 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 DATES. 
 
 “ Mnesithides 1 archon, on the sixteenth of the month An- 
 thesterion.” 
 
 Now give me the letter which, when the Thebans would 
 not hearken to Philip, he sends to his allies in Peloponnesus, 
 that you may plainly see even from this, how the true motives 
 of his enterprise, his designs against Greece and the Thebans 
 and yourselves, were concealed by him, while he affected to be 
 taking measures for the common good under a decree of the 
 Amphictyons. The man who furnished him with these han¬ 
 dles and pretexts was HEschines. Read. 
 
 THE LETTER OF PHILIP. 
 
 Philip, king of Macedon, to the magistrates 2 and coun¬ 
 cilors of the confederate Peloponnesians and to alPthe other 
 allies greeting: Whereas the Locrians surnamed Ozolian, dwell¬ 
 ing in Amphissa, commit sacrilege against the temple of 
 Apollo at Delphi, and coming with arms despoil the sacred 
 plain, I propose with your assistance to avenge the god, and, 
 to chastise people who violate any part of our recognized reli¬ 
 gion. Wherefore meet me with arms in Phocis, bringing pro¬ 
 visions for forty days, in the ensuing month of Lous, as we 
 style it, Boedromion, as the Athenians, Panemus, as the Co¬ 
 rinthians. Those who do not meet us with all their forces, 
 we shall visit with punishment . 3 Farewell.” 
 
 You see, he avoids all private pleas, and has recourse to an 
 Amphictyonic. Who was it, I say, that helped him to this 
 contrivance—that lent him these excuses? Who is most to 
 blame for the misfortunes which have happened ? Surely 
 .ZEschines. Then 4 go not about saying, O Athenians, that 
 
 1 The archon is wrong. It was Theophrastus, as we learn from the 
 speech of JEschines. 
 
 2 Arjjuiovpyoi was the title given to magistrates in many of the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian states, especially in Elis and Achaia. 
 
 3 I have followed the reading of Schaefer and Jacobs, who omit the 
 words rolg St cvp,[ 3 ovAoig 7jp.1v neipevoig. Pabst follows Wolf and Taylor, 
 _who read rolg St rjplv ovvavrijoacc navSrjpei xprjGopeOa cvpftovhoig, rolg 
 St fiT) TrpooOepevoig Em&pioig. Spillan renders it: “ Such as attend us 
 with all their forces we shall use as our advisers, those who obey us 
 not we shall fine.” 
 
 4 Leland renders this: “Yet mistake me not, Athenians: when our 
 public calamities are the subject of your conversation, say not that we 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 65 
 
 one man has inflicted these calamities on Greece. Heaven 
 and earth! It was not a single man, but a number of mis¬ 
 creants in every state. JEschines was one of them ; and, 
 were I obliged to speak the truth without reserve, I should 
 not hesitate to call him the common pest 1 of all that have 
 since been ruined, men, places, cities : for whoever supplies 
 the seed, to him the crop is owing. I marvel indeed you 
 turned not your faces away the moment you beheld him. 
 But there is a thick darkness, it seems, between you and the 
 truth. 
 
 The mention of this man’s treasonable acts brings me to 
 the part which I have myself taken in opposition to him. It 
 is fair you should hear my account of it for many reasons, but 
 chiefly, men of Athens, because it would be a shame, when I 
 have undergone the toil of exertions on your behalf, that you 
 should not endure the bare recital of them. 
 
 When I saw that the Thebans, and I may add the Athe¬ 
 nians, were so led away by Bhilip’s partisans and the cor¬ 
 rupt men of either state, as to disregard and take no precau- 
 * tion against a danger which menaced both, and required the 
 utmost precaution, (I mean the suffering Philip’s power to in¬ 
 crease,) and were readily disposed to enmity and strife with 
 each other; I was constantly watchful to prevent it, not only 
 because in my own judgment I deemed such vigilance expe¬ 
 dient, but knowing that Aristophon, and again Eubulus, had 
 all along desired to bring about that union, and, while they 
 were frequently opposed upon other matters, were always 
 agreed upon this. Men whom in their lifetime—you reptile! 
 —you pestered with flattery, yet see not that you are ac¬ 
 cusing them in their graves : 2 for the Theban policy that 
 
 owe them entirely to a single person.” From this it appears that he 
 understood v<p &vo£ to mean ^Eschines. I agree with those interpret¬ 
 ers who understand it of Philip. 
 
 1 Compare Yirgil, JEneid II. 573: 
 
 Troja3 et patriae communis Erinnys. 
 
 And Cicero, Philippic II. “ Ut Helena Trojanis, sic iste huic reipubliese 
 causa belli, causa pestis atque exitii fuit.” That Cicero had this pas¬ 
 sage of Demosthenes in his eye, appears also from another sentence, 
 occurring shortly before—“Ut igitur in seminibus est causa arborum 
 et stirpium, sic hujus luctuosissimi belli semen tu fuisti.” 
 
 2 K ivados has been variously rendered by the translators. The idea 
 intended to be conveyed is that of a sly, sneaking fellow. Spillan has: 
 
66 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 you reproach me with is a charge less affecting me than 
 them, who approved that alliance before I did. But I must 
 return.—I say, when Aeschines had excited the war in Am- 
 pliissa, and his coadjutors had helped to establish enmity 
 with Thebes, Philip marched against us—that was the object 
 for -which these persons embroiled the states-—and had we 
 not roused up a little in time, we could never have recovered 
 ourselves: so far had these men carried matters. In what 
 position you then stood to each other, you will learn from 
 the recital of these decrees and answers. Here, take and 
 read them. 
 
 DECREE . 1 
 
 “In the archonship of Heropythus, on the twenty-fifth of 
 the month Elaphebolion, in the presidency of the Erechtheian 
 tribe, by the advice of the Council and the Generals: Where¬ 
 as Philip hath taken possession of certain neighboring cities, 
 and is besieging others, and finally is preparing to advance 
 against Attica, setting our treaty at nought, and designs to 
 break his oaths and the peace, in violation of our common 
 engagements: The Council and People have resolved to send' 
 unto him embassadors, -who shall confer with him, and ex¬ 
 hort him above all to maintain his relations of amity with us 
 and his convention, or if not, to give time to the Common¬ 
 wealth for deliberation, and conclude an armistice until the 
 month Thargelion. These have been chosen from the Coun¬ 
 cil ; Simus of Anagyrus, Euthydemus of Phlyus, Bulagoras of 
 Alopece.” 
 
 ANOTHER DECREE. 
 
 “ In the archonship of Heropythus, on the last day of the 
 month Munychion, by the advice of the Polemarch: Where¬ 
 as Philip designs to put the Thebans at variance with us, 
 and hath prepared to advance with his whole army to the 
 places nearest to Attica, violating the engagements that sub¬ 
 sist between us, the Council and People have resolved to send 
 
 “base wretch.” Francis: “vile animal.” Leland: “scandal to hu¬ 
 manity.” Brougham: “crafty creature.” Jacobs: Schlange. Pabst: 
 schlauer Fuchs. Auger: “ cceur faux et perfide.” 
 
 I have followed Bekker’s reading of aladuvei. But the other trans¬ 
 lators read aloxvveL, which is found in most manuscripts. 
 
 1 The arclion in this and the following decree is wrong, Lysimach- 
 ides having been archon in the year when these events happened. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 67 
 
 unto him a herald and embassadors, who shall request and 
 call upon him to conclude an armistice, so that the people 
 may take measures according to circumstances; for now they 
 do not purpose to march out in the event of any thing reason¬ 
 able . 1 Nearchus, son of Sosinomus and Poly crates son of 
 Epiphron have been chosen from the Council; and for herald, 
 Eunomus of Anaphlystus from the People.” 
 
 Now read the answers:— 
 
 THE ANSWER TO THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 “ Philip king of Macedon to the Council and People of 
 Athens greeting: Of the part which you have taken in refer¬ 
 ence to me from the beginning I am not ignorant, nor what 
 exertions you are making to gain over the Thessalians and 
 Thebans, and also the Boeotians. Since they are more pru¬ 
 dent, and will not submit their choice to your dictation, but 
 stand by their own interest, you shift your ground, and send¬ 
 ing embassadors and a herald to me, you talk of engagements 
 and ask for an armistice, although I have given you no offense. 
 However I have given audience to your embassadors, and I 
 agree to your request and am ready to conclude an armistice, 
 if you will dismiss your evil counselors and degrade them as 
 they deserve. Farewell.” 
 
 - THE ANSWER TO THE THEBANS. 
 
 ei Philip king of Macedon to the Council and People of 
 Thebes greeting: I have received your letter, wherein you 
 renew peace and amity with me. I am informed however 
 that the Athenians are most earnestly soliciting you to 
 accept their overtures. I blamed you at first, for being in- 
 • dined to put faith in their promises and to espouse their 
 policy. But since I have discovered that you would rather 
 maintain peace with me than follow the counsels of others, I 
 
 1 That is, “if Philip conducts himself with moderation—with toler¬ 
 able forbearance—giants reasonable conditions—or the like.” The 
 commentators have been puzzled by this sentence. Lord Brougham 
 thinks it was purposely made obscure by the Athenians, to avoid com¬ 
 mitting themselves. Schaefer sees in it the symptoms of irresolution 
 and despondency. Jacobs: deun jetzt hat es noch nicht beschlossen 
 auszurucken hex irgend massigen Bedingungen. Pabst: denn jetzt ist 
 das Volk bei Bewilligung ertrdglicher Bedingungen keineswegs entschlossen 
 gegen Philipp auszurucken. 
 
I 
 
 68 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 praise you the more on divers accounts, but chiefly because 
 you have consulted in this business for your safety, and pre¬ 
 serve your attachment to me, which I trust will be of no 
 small moment to you, if you persevere in that determination. 
 Farewell.” 
 
 Philip having thus disposed the states toward each other 
 by his contrivances, and being elated by these decrees and 
 answers, came with his army and seized Elatea, confident 
 that, happen what might, you and the Thebans could never * 
 again unite. What commotion there was in the city you all 
 know ; but let me just mention the most striking circum¬ 
 stances. 
 
 It was evening. A person came with a message to the 
 presidents, that Elatea was taken. They rose from supper 
 immediately, drove off the people from their market-stalls, 
 and set fire to the wicker-frames ; 1 others sent for the 
 generals and called the trumpeter; and the city was full of 
 commotion. The next morning at daybreak the presidents 
 summoned the council to their hall, and you went to the 
 assembly, and before they could introduce or prepare the 
 question , 2 the whole people were up in their seats . 3 When 
 fP the council had entered, and the presidents had reported 
 their intelligence and presented the courier, and he had 
 made his statement, the crier asked—“Who wishes to 
 
 speak 1 ?”—and no one came forward. The crier put the 
 * * • 
 
 1 Reiske thinks the object of this proceeding was to clear the ground 
 of the market, that the people might be stationed there in arms during 
 the night. Leland says it was “ to clear the place for an assembly, and 
 in their confusion and impatience they took the speediest and most 
 violent method.” But the assembly was held in the Pnyx, and not in 
 the market. Another writer has conjectured that the presidents meant « 
 to force the citizens to attend to public business. Schaefer’s is the more 
 probable explanation, that the stalls were burned for a fire-signal, to 
 bring the people from the rural districts into the city’'. 
 
 2 According to the usual course of law, the council prepared and 
 drew up some formal question or bill to be submitted to the people. 
 This wa3 the 7Tpof3ov?,evua. In the present case, being a special meeting . 
 on a sudden emergency, they would probably draw up nothing more 
 than the heads of a question, to be afterward put in the shape of a de¬ 
 cree if necessary. Jacobs translates these words: ehe der Senat noch 
 sein Geschaft vollbracht und einen volaufingen Besclduss gefasst hatte. 
 Pabst: ehe noch der Senat seine Verhandlungen beendigt undein Gut- 
 achten abgefasst hatte. See Schomann, de Comitiis, chap. ix. 
 
 3 On the hill of the Pnyx. 
 
 
OX THE CROWN. 
 
 69 
 
 question repeatedly—still no man rose, though all the gener¬ 
 als were present and all the orators, and our country with 
 her common voice called for some one to speak and save her 
 —for when the crier raises his voice according to law, it may 
 justly be deemed the common voice of our country .yi' If those 
 who desired the salvation of Athens were the proper parties 
 to come forward, all of you and the other Athenians would 
 have risen and mounted the platform; for I am sure you all 
 desired her salvation—if those of greatest wealth, the three- 
 hundred 1 —if those who were both, friendly to the state and 
 wealthy, the men who afterward gave such ample donations; 
 for patriotism and wealth produced the gift. But that occa¬ 
 sion, that day, as it seems, called not only for a patriot and a 
 wealthy man, but for one who had closely followed the pro¬ 
 ceedings from their commencement, and rightly calculated for 
 what object and purpose Philip carried them on. A man who 
 was ignorant of these matters, or had not long and carefully 
 studied them, let him be ever so patriotic or wealthy, would 
 neither see what measures were needful, nor be competent to 
 advise you. 
 
 Well then—I was the man called for upon that day. I / ) 
 came forward and addressed you. What I said, I beg you 
 for two reasons attentively to hear—first, to be convinced, that 
 of all your orators and statesmen I alone deserted not the 
 patriot’s post 2 in the hour of danger, but was found in the 
 very moment of panic speaking and moving what your neces¬ 
 sities required—secondly, because at the expense of a little 
 time you will gain large experience for the future in all your 
 political concerns . 3 
 
 I said—those who were in such alarm under the idea that 
 Philip had got the Thebans with him did not, in my opinion, 
 
 1 See Yol. X. pp. 52, 301. 
 
 2 Auger lias the following note, whether fanciful or not, I leave to 
 the judgment of the reader:—“On doit remarquer que Demosthene 
 affecte de se servir de ce mot poste dans plusieurs endroits de son dis¬ 
 cours, comme p<5ur faire entendre que s’il avoit, comme guerrier, aban- 
 donne son poste h la bataille de Cheronee, il ne l’avoit jamais aban- 
 donn6, comme ministre, h, la tete des affaires.” 
 
 3 Tr/$- ttuotjc noTiiTccac, “the whole range of politics—that political 
 knowledge which concerned the Athenian public.” As Lord Brougham 
 expresses it: “you may acquire a fuller insight into our whole polity 
 for the future.” Leland and Spillan refer it wrongly to the political 
 actions of Demosthenes. 
 
70 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 understand the position of affairs; for I was sure, had that 
 really been so, we should have heard not of his being at Ela- 
 tea, but upon our frontiers: he was come however, I knew 
 p,' for certain, to make all right for himself in Thebes. “ Let 
 \ "me inform you,” said I, “how the matter stands.—All the 
 Thebans whom it was possible either to bribe or deceive he 
 has at his command those who have resisted him from the 
 first and still oppose him he can in no way prevail upon: 
 what then is his meaning, and why has he * seized upon 
 Elatca? He means, by displaying a force in the neighbor¬ 
 hood, and bringing up his troops, to encourage and embolden 
 his friends, to intimidate his adversaries, that they may either 
 concede from fear what they now refuse, or be compelled. 
 Now”—said I—“if we determine on the present occasion to 
 remember any unkindness which the Thebans have done us, 
 and to regard them in the character of enemies with distrust, 
 in the first place, we shall be doing just what Philip would 
 desire; in the next place, I fear, his present adversaries em¬ 
 bracing his friendship and all Philippizing with one consent, 
 they will both march against Attica. But if you will hearken 
 to me, and be pleased to examine (not cavil at) what I say, I 
 believe it will meet your approval, and.1 shall dispel the 
 danger impending over Athens. What then do I advise?— 
 First, away with your present fear; and rather fear all of ye 
 for, the Thebans—they are nearer harm than we are—to them 
 the peril is more immediate:—next I say, march to Eleusis, 
 all the fighting-men and the cavalry, and show yourselves to 
 the world in arms, that your partisans in Thebes may have 
 equal liberty to speak up for the good cause, knowing that, as 
 the faction who sell their country to Philip have an army to 
 support them at Elatea, so the party that will contend for 
 freedom have your assistance at hand if they are assailed. 
 Further I recommend you to elect ten embassadors, and em¬ 
 power them in conjunction with the generals to fix the time 
 for going there and for the out-march. When the embassa¬ 
 dors have arrived at Thebes, how do I advise that you should 
 treat the matter? Pray attend particularly to this—Ask 
 nothing of the Thebans; (it would be dishonorable at this 
 time;) but offer to assist them if they require it, on the plea 
 
 1 So Lord Brougham, whom I have followed; and so Jacobs ex¬ 
 presses it: hat er alle in seiner Gewalt . 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 71 
 
 that they are in extreme danger, and we see the future better 
 than they do. If they accept this offer and hearken to our 
 counsels, so shall we have accomplished what we desire, and 
 our conduct will look 1 worthy of the state: should we mis¬ 
 carry, they will have themselves to blame for any error com¬ 
 mitted now, and we shall have done nothing dishonorable or 
 mean.” 
 
 This and more to the like effect I spoke, and left the plat¬ 
 form. It was' approved by all; not a word was said against 
 me. Nor did I make the speech without moving, nor make 
 the motion without undertaking the embassy, nor undertake 
 the embassy without prevailing on the Thebans. 2 From the 
 beginning to the end I went through it all; I gave myself 
 entirely to your service, to meet the dangers which encom¬ 
 passed Athens. 
 
 Produce me the decree which then passed. Now, JEschines, 
 how would you have me describe you, and how myself, upon 
 that day? Shall I call myself Batalus, 3 your nickname of 
 reproach, and you not even a hero of the common sort, but 
 one of those upon the stage, Cresphontes or Creon, or the 
 
 1 I have taken Trpoaxvp.a.Toq as Jacobs, Pabst, Auger, Leland, and Spil- 
 lan have taken it. Compare Sophocles, Electra, 680, and Brunck’s note. 
 
 h^tX yap t/TlOov elg to K?,etvbv 'EX?m dog 
 Tcp6oxv, u ’ uytivog. 
 
 But the sense of “ pretext,” in which Schaefer understands the word, 
 is by no means unsuitable to the passage. 
 
 2 Lord Brougham has a good note on the different modes of turning 
 this famous climax, which is cited as an example by Quinctilian, and 
 thus imitated by Cicero, pro Milone,—“Neque vero se populo solum 
 sed etiam Senatui commisit; neque Senatui modo, sed etiam publicis 
 praisidiis et armis ; neque iis tantum, verum etiam ejus potestati cui 
 Senatus totam rempublicam, omnem Italia} pacem, cuncta populi Ro¬ 
 mani arma commiserat.” 
 
 3 The origin of this nickname is doubtful. The early critics were 
 not agreed upon it, as we learn from Plutarch. Libanius, in the Life of 
 Demosthenes, says that Batalus was an effeminate flute-player in Asia 
 Minor; which seems to agree with the words of ALschines, in his speech 
 on the Embassy, (p. 41,) where he says that Demosthenes was called 
 Batalus when a boy, 6 C aioxpovpyiav Kal tuvaidiav ; afterward he re¬ 
 ceived the name of ’Apyilc (a sort of serpent), on account of the un¬ 
 natural action against his guardians; and, in his later years, 'EvKocpavr^c, 
 “ the common name of all scoundrels.” Compare page 45 of the same 
 speech ; and pages 17 and 18 of the speech against Timarchns, where 
 it is alleged, that Demosthenes himself joked about the name of Batalus, 
 and said it was a term of endearment used by his aunt. 
 
72 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 CEnomaus whom you execrably murdered once at Colyttus? 1 
 Well; upon that occasion I the Batalus of Pseania was more 
 serviceable to the state than you the CEnomaus of Cothocidae. 
 You were of no earthly use; I did every thing which became 
 a good citizen. Read the decree. 
 
 THE DECREE OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 “ In the archonsliip of Nausicles, 2 in the presidency of the 
 -ZEantian tribe, on the sixteenth of Scirophorion, Demosthenes 
 son of Demosthenes of Pseania moved : Whereas Philip king 
 of Macedon hath in time past been violating the treaty of 
 peace made between him and the Athenian people, in con¬ 
 tempt of his oaths and those laws of justice' which are recog¬ 
 nized among all the Greeks, and hath been annexing unto 
 himself cities that no way belong to him, and hath besieged 
 and taken some which belong to the Athenians without any 
 provocation by the people of Athens, and at the present 
 time he is making great advances in cruelty and violence, 
 forasmuch as in certain Greek cities he puts garrisons and 
 overturns their constitution, some he razes to the ground 
 and sells the inhabitants for slaves, in some he replaces a 
 Greek population with barbarians, giving them possession of 
 the temples and sepulchres, acting in no way foreign to his 
 own country or character, making an insolent use of his 
 present fortune, and forgetting that from a petty and insignifi¬ 
 cant person he has come to be unexpectedly great: and the 
 people of Athens, so long as they saw him annexing barbarian 
 or private cities of their own, 3 less seriously regarded the 
 
 1 Crespliontes, king of Messenia, and one of the Heraclidae, was the 
 hero of a lost play of Euripides; Creon is the well known character in 
 the CEdipus and Antigone of Sophocles: CEnomaus, the king of Elis, 
 and father of Hippodamia, was the hero of a tragedy of Isehander, in 
 the performance of which iEschines was hissed off the stage at Colyt- 
 tus, one of the Attic townships. 
 
 2 The archon was Lysimachides. 
 
 3 Jacobs: dass er nur barbariscke, wenn gleich ihm angehorige Stadte 
 wegnahrn. Pabst: die zwar diesern Volke gehorten, aber von Barbaren 
 bewohnt waren. They have both adopted Schaefer’s interpretation of 
 idiag, as I have done. Schaefer thus comments on the passage : “ Scili¬ 
 cet totius psephismatis haec vis, hie tenor est, ut Athenienses arma sum. 
 ere videantur, non suorum causa commodorum, quae amissa recuperent, 
 sed ob communem Graeciae salutem. Ceterum hoc decretum numerem 
 in illustrissimis monumentis summae Atheniensium vanitatis, cui ora- 
 tores ita velificarenter, ut vel e mythicis temporibus mellitos verborum 
 globulos repeterent.” 
 
ON THE CROWN, 
 
 73 
 
 offense given to themselves, but now that they see Greek 
 cities outraged and some destroyed, they think it would be 
 monstrous and unworthy of their ancestral glory to look on 
 while the Greeks are enslaved: Therefore it is resolved by the 
 Council and People of Athens, that having prayed and sacri¬ 
 ficed to the gods and heroes who protect the Athenian city 
 and territory, bearing in mind the virtue of their ancestors, 
 who deemed it of greater moment to preserve the liberty of 
 Greece than their own country, they will put two hundred 
 ships to sea, and their admiral shall sail up into the straits 
 of Thermopylae, and their general, and commander of horse 
 shall march with the infantry and cavalry to Eleusis, and 
 embassadors shall be sent to the other Greeks, and first of all 
 to the Thebans, because Philip is nearest their territory, and 
 shall exhort them without dread of Philip to maintain thpir 
 own independence and that of Greece at large, and assure 
 them that the Athenian people, not remembering any variance 
 which has formerly arisen between the countries, will assist 
 them with troops and money and weapons and arms, feeling 
 that for them (being Greeks) to contend among themselves 
 for the leadership is honorable, but to be commanded and de¬ 
 prived of the leadership by a man of foreign extraction is de¬ 
 rogatory to the renown of the Greeks and the virtue of their 
 ancestors: further, the people of Athens do not regard the 
 people of Thebes as aliens either in blood or race; they re¬ 
 member also the benefits conferred by their ancestors upon 
 the ancestors of the Thebans; for they restored the children 
 of Hercules who were kept by the Peloponnesians out of their 
 hereditary dominion, defeating in battle those w r ho attempted 
 to resist the descendants of Hercules; and we gave shelter to 
 CLklipus and his comrades in exile ; and many other kind 
 and generous acts have been done by us to the Thebans : 
 wherefore now also the people of Athens will not desert the 
 interests of the Thebans and the other Greeks: And let a 
 treaty be entered into with them for alliance and intermar¬ 
 riage, and oaths be mutually exchanged Embassadors: De¬ 
 mosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania, Hyperides son of 
 Oleander of Spettus, Mnesithides son of Antiphanes of Phre- 
 arrii, Democrates son of Sophilus of Phlyus, Callteschrus son 
 of Diotimus of Cothocidse.” 
 
 That, was the commencement and first step in the negotia- 
 Vol. II.—D 
 
74 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 tion with Thebes -, 1 before then the countries had been led by 
 these men into discord and hatred and jealousy. That decree 
 caused the peril which then surrounded us to pass away like 
 a cloud. It was the duty of a good citizen, if he had any 
 better plan, to disclose it at the time, not to find fault now. 
 c,V A statesman and a pettifogger, 2 while in no other respect are 
 they alike, in this most widely differ. The one declares his 
 opinion before the proceedings, and makes himself responsi¬ 
 ble to his followers, to fortune, to the times, to all men: the 
 other is silent when he ought to speak; at any untoward 
 iv —event he grumbles. Now, as I said before, the time for a 
 man who regarded the commonwealth, and for honest coun¬ 
 sel, was then: however I will go to this extent 3 —if any one 
 now can point out a better course, or indeed if any other was 
 practicable but the one which I adopted, I confess that I was 
 wrong. For if there be any measure now discovered, which 
 (executed then) would have been to our advantage, I say it 
 
 1 Jacobs : Dies icar der An fang und das erste Verfaliren in der 
 thebdischen Sache. Pabst: Dies war der Anfang und der erste Schritt, 
 der in den Angelegenheiten der Thebener gethan wurde. 
 
 3 Lord Brougham, objecting to Leland’s translation of “sycophant/’ 
 says, “he might as well call a player a ‘hypocrite,’ or a peasant a 
 ‘villain.’ ” This criticism I assent to; yet it is not easy to find an apt 
 word for ovKo<pdvTT ]{~, and hence the German translators, as well as some 
 of the English, have retained the Greek term. It has various modifi¬ 
 cations of meaning in the Orators, all having reference, more or less 
 remote, to the original meaning of an “informer.” (See my article 
 hvKocpuvTJic in the Archaeological Dictionary, where this is fully ex¬ 
 plained.) It may often be rendered “a slanderer,” and so Auger renders 
 it here, “ calomniateur.” Sometimes it denotes a “ vexatious meddler,” 
 a “ malignant and sneaking enemy.” Thus Demosthenes says, wovrjpbv 
 6 avKO(j>dvT7]c Kal fiaonavov. And again, ovKofydvTTjc tovt’ eanv, airiucdai 
 fitv navra, e^eMyxei-v fit grjbev. And (as we have seen) JEschines says 
 it was a common name for all scoundrels. 
 
 As contrasted with ffvgpovhot;, an honest adviser or statesman, it 
 signifies a factious politician, one who seeks his own interest or that 
 of his party, or the gratification of private malice, rather than the good 
 of his country; one capable of doing the things which Demosthenes 
 charges his adversary witf^ Such a person may be called a pettifogger 
 in politics, just as a dirty practitioner is called a pettifogger in the Taw. 
 The version, I must admit, is not perfectly satisfactory, yet it seems 
 preferable to any other single word. Lord Brougham’s “partisan” is 
 too weak. If I chose to use two words, I would say “ an honest poli¬ 
 tician and a factious one,” <fcc. 
 
 3 “I will go to this extreme length in making concession.” Or as 
 Lord Brougham has it: “I will go to such an excess of candor.” 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 75 
 
 ought not to have escaped me. But if there is none, if there 
 was none, if none can be suggested even at this day, what was 
 a statesman to do 1 ? Was he not to choose the best measures 
 within his reach and view ? That did I, -ZEschines, when the 
 crier asked, “Who wishes to speak 1 ?”—not, “Who wishes to 
 complain about the past, or to guarantee the future?” While 
 you on those occasions sat mute in the assembly, I came for¬ 
 ward and spake. However, as you omitted then, tell us now. 
 Say, what scheme that I ought to have devised, what favor¬ 
 able opportunity was lost to the state by my neglect ?—what 
 alliance was there, what better plan, to which I should have 
 directed the people ? But no ! The past is with all the world 
 given up; no one even proposes to deliberate about it: the fu¬ 
 ture it is, or the present, which demands the action of a coun¬ 
 selor. At the time, as it appeared, there were dangers im¬ 
 pending, and dangers at hand. Mark the line of my policy at 
 that crisis; don’t rail at the event. The end of all things is 
 what the Deity pleases: his line of policy it is that shows the 
 judgment of the statesman. Do not then impute it as a crime 
 to me that Philip chanced to conquer in battle : that issue de¬ 
 pended not on me, but on Go<i. Prove that I adopted not all 
 measures that according to human calculation were feasi¬ 
 ble—that I did not honestly and diligently and with exertions 
 beyond my strength carry them out—or that my enterprises 
 were not honorable and worthy of the state and necessary. 
 Show me this, and accuse me as soon as you like. But if the' 
 hurricane that visited us hath been too powerful, not for us 
 only, but for all Greece besides, what is the fair course? 1 As 
 if a merchant, after taking every precaution, and furnishing 
 his vessel with every thing that he thought would insure her 
 safety, because afterward he met with a storm and his tackle 
 was strained or broken to pieces, should be charged with the 
 
 1 The Orator, as Schaefer rightly observes, suppresses the answer to 
 his own question, which, if fully expressed, would be qp follows:—“The 
 fair thing is, not to blame me for events which were inevitable. You 
 might as well blame a shipowner,” <fcc. Leland saw the true meaning, 
 and expresses it in his translation: “What then? Ami to be accused? 
 With equal justice might the trader,” <fcc. And thus Auger: “ Que faire, 
 je vous prie ? Faut il m’imputer ce contre-temps ?” <fcc. Other translators 
 have read %pvv apparently, and misconceived the sense of the passage. 
 
 I have thought it better to preserve the looseness of the original, which 
 is not at all unnatural, and will not mislead the intelligent reader. 
 
76 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 shipwreck! “ Well, but I was not the pilot”—he might say— 
 
 just as I was not the*general.—“Fortune was not under my 
 control: all was under hers.” 
 
 Consider and reflect upon this—If, with the Thebans on our 
 side, we were destined so to fare in the contest, what was to be 
 expected, if we had never had them for allies, but they had 
 joined Philip, as he used every effort of persuasion to make 
 them do? 1 And if, when the battle vyas fought three days’ 
 march from Attica, such peril and alarm surrounded the city, 
 what must we have expected, if the same disaster had happened 
 in some part of our territory? As it was (do you see?) we 
 could stand, meet, breathe ; mightily did one, two, three days, 
 help to our preservation : 2 in the other case—but it is wrong 
 to mention .things, of which we have been spared the trial by 
 the favor of some deity, and by our protecting ourselves with 
 the very alliance which you assail. 
 
 All this, at such length, have I addressed to you, men of the 
 jury, and to the outer circle of hearers; for, as to this con¬ 
 temptible fellow, a short and plain argument would suffice. 
 
 If the future was revealed to you, -ZEschines, alone, when 
 the state was deliberating on these proceedings, you ought to 
 have forewarned us at the time. If you did not foresee it, 
 
 1 That is, Philip, by his letters and by his embassies. Compare p. 
 
 SOI, ’AAAd fiTjv olaq tot' j/cpiei (f>uvu{ ■ 6 of k. t. /L Most of the 
 
 translators take knelvos to mean ^Escbines. The writer of an article in 
 the Edinburgh Review , vol. xxxvi. p. 483, said to have been the late 
 Justice Williams, has the following note:—“If ineivoc be the true read¬ 
 ing, we are aware that Philip must be meant. But the spirit of the 
 passage itself, and the analogy of the whole oration, lean to ovTog, as we 
 translate it.” I can not assent to this criticism. The orator wishes to 
 impress upon his hearers the great importance which Philip attached to 
 the alliance of Thebes. He does not mean to charge ^Eschines with 
 openly advocating Philip’s cause: on the contrary, he represents ff£s- 
 chines as having then held his tongue. Leland saw the ti-ue meaning. 
 His vei*sion is: “ but united with our enemy in compliance with all his 
 urgent solicitations.” So did Auger, whom the Edinburgh reviewer 
 calls “a babbling* cackling Frenchman.” His version is: “ce prince 
 alors epuisoit sa politique pour s’attacher ce peuple.” The Germans 
 ai*e wrong. 
 
 2 The infinitives, ott/vcll , <rvve?ideZv, uvaTrvevacu, depend upon edocrav. 
 I have given a turn in the translation to preserve the force of the oi'ig- 
 inal. The translators, all but Jacobs, have made a shocking mess of 
 this passage. Jacobs: Weisst Du nicht , dass jetz ein und zwei und drei 
 Tage uns aufrecht zu stehn, zusammen zu /common, aufzuathmen, und vie- 
 les Andre der Stadfzur Rettung verschajft haben ? 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 77 
 
 you arc responsible for the same ignorance as the rest. Why 
 then do you accuse me in this behalf, rather than I you ? 
 A better citizen have I been than you in respect of the 
 matters of which I am speaking, (others I discuss not at 
 present,) inasmuch as I gave myself up to what seemed for 
 the general good, not shrinking from any personal danger, 
 nor taking thought of any; while you neither suggested 
 better measures, (or mine would not have been adopted,) nor 
 lent any aid in the prosecuting of mine: exactly what the 
 basest person and worst enemy of the state would do, are you 
 found to have done after the event; and at the same time 
 Aristratus in Naxos and Aristolaus in Thasos, the deadly foes 
 of our state, are bringing to trial the friends of Athens, and 
 Aeschines at Athens is accusing Demosthenes. Surely the 
 man, who waited to found his reputation upon the misfor¬ 
 tunes of the Greeks, 1 deserves rather to perish than to accuse 
 another; nor is it possible that one, who has profited by the 
 same conjunctures as the enemies of the commonwealth, can 
 be a well-wisher of his country. You show yourself by your 
 life and conduct, by your political action, and even your 
 political inaction. 2 Is any thing going on that appears good 
 for the people ? ^Eschines is mute. Has any thing untoward 
 happened or amiss ? Forth comes AEschines ; just as fractures 
 and sprains are put in motion, when the body is attacked 
 with disease. 
 
 But since he insists so strongly on the event, I will even 
 assert something of a paradox: and I beg and pray of you 
 not to marvel at its boldness, but kindly to consider what I 
 say. If then the results had been foreknown to all, if all 
 had foreseen them, and you, Aeschines, had foretold them and 
 protested with clamor and outcry—you that never opened 
 your mouth—not even then should the Commonwealth have 
 abandoned her design, if she had any regard for glory, or 
 ancestry, or futurity. As it is, she appears to have failed in 
 
 1 Literally : “for whom the misfortunes of the Greeks were kept in 
 store to get repute by.” Pabst: Wer auf die Unglucksfalle der Helle- 
 nen gewartet, urn durch dieselben beruhmt zu werden. 
 
 2 The Edinburgh reviewer: “ by what you do in public affairs, and 
 by what you decline doing.” Auger: “ Par vos discours, et nieme par 
 votre silence.” Jacobs: was ini Staate trcibst und wiederum nicht 
 treibst. Pabst: durch Deinc Theilnahrne und Nichttheilnahme an der 
 Verwaltung des Slaats . 
 
78 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 her enterprise, a thing to which all mankind are liable, if the 
 Deity so wills it: but then—claiming precedency over others, 
 and afterward abandoning her pretensions—she would have 
 incurred the charge of betraying all to Philip. Why, had we 
 resigned without a struggle that which our ancestors en¬ 
 countered every danger to win, who would not have spit 
 upon you 1 ? Let me not say, the commonwealth or myself! 1 
 With what eyes, I pray, could we have beheld strangers 
 visiting the city, if the result had been what it is, and Philip 
 had been chosen leader and lord of all, but other people 
 without us had made the struggle to prevent it; especially 
 when in former times our country had never preferred an igno- ’ 
 -minious security to the battle for honor? For what Gre¬ 
 cian or what barbarian is ignorant, that by the Thebans, 
 or by the Lacedaemonians who were in might before them, or 
 by the Persian king, permission would thankfully and gladly 
 have been given to our commonwealth, to take what she 
 pleased and hold her own, provided she would accept foreign 
 law and let another power command in Greece? But, as it 
 seems, to the Athenians of that day such conduct would not 
 have been national, or natural, or endurable: none could at 
 any period of time persuade the commonwealth to attach 
 herself in secure subjection to the powerful and unjust: 
 through every age has she persevered in a perilous struggle 
 for precedency and honor and glory. And this you esteem 
 so noble and congenial to your principles, that among your 
 
 1 I. e. “ Let me not say any thing so shocking, so revolting to my 
 feelings, as to suppose that the commonwealth or myself could deserve 
 such an indignity!” According to the natural course of the argument 
 w r e should rather have expected the orator to conclude by saying— 
 “ the commonwealth w r ould have acted a despicable part,” or the like. 
 But adopting a strong expression, he takes care to preserve a respectful 
 euphemism toward the Athenian people, and surprises his adversary by 
 suddenly denouncing him as the supposed adviser of the degenerate 
 policy. Immediately afterward he reverts (but in milder language) to 
 the disgrace which would have fallen upon the country. 
 
 This I take to be a better interpretation than Schaefer’s, who under¬ 
 stands KaraTTTvaeie. Another, to which, if it were borne out by the 
 words, I should be much inclined, is offered by the Edinburgh reviewer, 
 w r ho translates it: “ to say nothing of the state or myself,” and observes, 
 “The meaning is, not that the state and I are blameless, but if such a 
 line of policy had been adopted, who would not have regarded even yon, 
 iEscliines, the most worthless animal in the city, with new and addi¬ 
 tional contempt, d fortiori , me, and d fortissimo, the city itself?” 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 79 
 
 ancestors you honor most those who acted in such a spirit; 
 and with reason. For who would not admire the virtue of 
 those men, who resolutely embarked in their galleys and quit¬ 
 ted country and home, rather than receive foreign law, choos¬ 
 ing Themistocles who gave such counsel for their general, and 
 stoning Cyrsilus to death who advised submission to the terms 
 imposed—not him only, but your wives also stoning his wife? 1 
 Yes; the Athenians of that day looked not for an orator or a 
 general, who might help them to a pleasant servitude: they 
 scorned to live, if it could not be with freedom. For each 
 of them considered, that he was not born to his father or 
 mother only, but also to his country. 2 What is the differ¬ 
 ence? He that thinks himself born for his parents only, waits 
 for his appointed or natural end: he that thinks himself born 
 for his country also, will sooner perish than behold her in slav¬ 
 ery, and will regard the insults and indignities, which must 
 be borne in a commonwealth enslaved, as more terrible than 
 death. 
 
 Had I attempted to say, that I instructed you in senti¬ 
 ments worthy of your ancestors, there is not a man who would 
 not justly rebuke me. What I declare is, that such princi¬ 
 ples are your own; I show that before my time such was the 
 spirit of the commonwealth; though certainly in the execu¬ 
 tion of the particular measures I claim a share also for my¬ 
 self. The prosecutor, arraigning the whole proceedings, and 
 imbittering you against me as the cause of our alarms and 
 dangers, in his eagerness to deprive me of honor for the mo¬ 
 ment, robs you of the eulogies that should endure forever. 
 
 1 Cicero (de Officiis, III. 11) has borrowed this anecdote from Demos¬ 
 thenes. The same story isolated by Herodotus (IN. 4, 5), who calls 
 the person not Cyrsilus, but Lycidas. The terms were offered by Mar- 
 donius to the Athenians, while they were in Salamis. The advice of 
 Lycidas was given to the council, and the people outside hearing of it, 
 proceeded immediately to inflict summary punishment upon him. 
 
 2 Compare Cicero pro Milone—“Hiccine vir patriae natus usquam 
 nisi in patria morietur?” The “necessaria mors” of Cicero is the same 
 as the tov Trjp el/xapfibrjc davarop of Demosthenes. These expressions 
 are illustrated by Aulus G'ellius, XIII. 1, who quotes the following pas¬ 
 sage from the first Philippic of the Roman:— 
 
 “Hunc igitur ut sequerer properavi, quern praesentes non sunt secuti; 
 non ut proficerem aliquid; neque enim sperabam id, nec praestare po- 
 teram; sed ut, si quid mihi humanitus accidisset, (multa autem impen- 
 dere videntur praeter naturam prseterque fatum,) hujus diei vocem tes- 
 tem reipublicae relinquerem meae perpetuae erga se voluntatis.” 
 
80 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 For should you, under a disbelief in the wisdom of my policy, 
 convict the defendant, you will appear to have done wrong, 
 not to have suffered what befell you by the cruelty of fortune. 
 But never, never can you have done wrong, O Athenians, in 
 undertaking the battle for the freedom and safety of all! I 
 swear it by your forefathers—those that met the peril at Mar¬ 
 athon, those that took the field at Platsea, those in the sea- 
 fight at Salamis, and those at Artemisium, and many other 
 brave men who repose in the public monuments, all of whom 
 alike, as being worthy of the same honor, the country buried, 
 -dEschines, not only the successful or victorious! Justly! For 
 the duty of brave men has been done by all: their fortune has 
 been such as the Deity assigned to each. 1 
 
 Accursed scribbler! 2 3 you, to deprive me of the approbation 
 and affection of my countrymen, speak of trophies and battles 
 and ancient deeds, with none of which had this present trial 
 the least concern; but I!—O you third-rate actor!—I, that 
 rose to counsel the state how to maintain her pre-eminence! 
 in what spirit was I to mount the hustings? In the spir¬ 
 it o$ one having unworthy counsel to offer V —I should 
 
 1 So much criticism has been lavished, both in ancient and modern 
 times, on the beauty of this celebrated passage, that even to refer to all 
 that has been said would be impossible. I shall content myself with 
 transcribing the remarks of the writer, whom I have before adverted 
 to, of the Edinburgh Review: —“The whole passage,” he says, “is teem¬ 
 ing and bursting with proofs of superhuman high-mindedness and de¬ 
 votion.” But he observes further—“The argument is not lost sight of 
 for an instant in the midst of this inflammation. The sentence contain¬ 
 ing the apostrophe is not closed, before we find it recurring, and in such 
 a shape as induces us to suppose, that for its sake the oratory is intro¬ 
 duced. Longinus says that DemosthenesAere gives a proof of the ne¬ 
 cessity of keeping sober even in excesses, diddonuv otl kuv (3anxevpa(H 
 vrjcpeiv avayaalov. He notices also the dexterity and address with which 
 the difference*of success in the two cases is managed. They are not 
 
 called conquerors of Marathon, &c., but the combatants ; and then the 
 orator is beforehand with any objection, ( tov dupoari/v <pddvuv,) by turn¬ 
 ing short round upon iEschines, and reminding him that all, whether 
 successful or not, had equal honors.” 
 
 3 VpappaTOKixpuv is “one that stoops or pores over papers and writ¬ 
 ing.” He alludes to the office of clerk, formerly held by HSschines, 
 not to his father’s school, as some have supposed. Jacobs renders the 
 word Buchstabenhocker. Pabst: Aktenhocker. 
 
 3 Literally: “intending to offer counsel unworthy of these ( tovtuv ) 
 my countrymen?” Let the student be careful not to connect tovtuv 
 with TcpuTELuv. The orator looking, or pointing with his hand, to the 
 
OX THE CROWN. 
 
 81 
 
 have deserved to perish! You yourselves, men of Athens, 
 may not try private and public causes on the same principles: 
 the compacts of every-day life you are to judge of by partic¬ 
 ular laws and circumstances; the measures of statesmen, by 
 reference to the dignity of your ancestors. And if you think 
 it your duty to act worthily of them, you should every one of 
 you consider, when you come into court to decide public ques¬ 
 tions, that together with your staff and ticket 1 the spDirit of 
 the commonwealth is delivered to you. 
 
 But in touching upon the deeds of your ancestors, there 
 were some decrees and transactions which I omitted. I will 
 return from my digression. 
 
 On our arrival at Thebes, we found embassadors there from 
 Philip, from the Thessalians and from his other allies; our 
 friends in trepidation, his friends confident. To prove that I 
 am not asserting this now to serve my own purposes, read me 
 the letter which we embassadors dispatched on the instant. 
 So outrageous is my opponent’s malignity, that, if any advant¬ 
 age was procured, he attributes it to the occasion, not to me; 
 
 • 
 
 plaintiff, or defendant, (who were always in court,) or to their respect¬ 
 ive friends and supporters who stood near them, or to the jury or sur¬ 
 rounding spectators, designates them simply as ovrog or ovtol, and is 
 easily understood by his hearers. But in a translation for English 
 readers, these terms require to be varied according to circumstances. 
 Jacobs here has: Sollt’ ich sagen was der Stadt unwurdig war? * 
 
 1 There were 6000 jurors chosen by lot for the service of the year, 
 600 from each of the Attic tribes. The whole number was then divided 
 into ten sections of 500 each, a thousand being left as supernumeraries, 
 to supply deficiencies occasioned by death or any other cause. There 
 were ten courts at Athens, among which the services of these jurors 
 were to be distributed; and it was managed in the following way. Each 
 court w T as designated by a color, and also by a letter over the doorway. 
 Each of the jury sections wrns likewise designated by a letter. "When 
 the juries had to be impanneled, the letters indicating the different 
 sections ■were drawn out of one box, and the letters indicating the dif¬ 
 ferent courts were drawn out of another: each pair of lots so drawn 
 out determined what section should be assigned to what court. When 
 the whole section was not required, the individual jurors who were to 
 form the pannel were chosen by lot, each juror having a counter with 
 his section and name marked upon it. The courts being thus allotted, 
 every juryman received a staff and a ticket. The staff, on which was 
 marked the letter and color of his court, served to distinguish him 
 from the crowd, and procure him instant admission. The ticket, which 
 he returned to the magistrate when the business was concluded, en¬ 
 titled him his fee. 
 
 D 2 
 
82 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 while all miscarriages he attributes to me and my fortune. 
 And according to him, as it seems, I, the orator and adviser, 
 have no merit in results of argument and counsel, but am the 
 sole author of misfortunes in arms and strategy. Could there 
 be a more brutal calumniator or a more execrable ? Read the 
 letter. 
 
 [The letter is ready 
 
 On the convening of the assembly, our opponents were 
 introduced first, because they held the character of allies. 
 And they came forward and spoke, in high praise of Philip 
 and disparagement of you, bringing up all the hostilities that 
 you ever committed against the Thebans. In fine, they 
 urged them to show their gratitude for the services done by 
 Philip, and to avenge themselves for the injuries which you 
 had done them, either—it mattered not which—by giving 
 them a passage against you, or by joining in the invasion of 
 Attica; and they proved, as they fancied, that by adopting 
 their advice the cattle and slaves and other effects’ of Attica 
 would come into Bceotia, whereas by acting as they said we 
 should advise Bceotia would suffer pillage through the war. 
 And much they said besides, tending all to the same point. 
 The reply that we made I would give my life to recapitulate, 
 but I fear, as the occasion is past, you will look upon it as if 
 a sort of deluge had overwhelmed the whole proceedings, and 
 regard any talk about them as a useless troubling of you. 2 
 Hear then what we persuaded them and what answer they re¬ 
 turned. Take and read this: 
 
 [The answer of the Thebans .] 
 
 After this they invited and sent for you. You marched to 
 their succor, and—to omit what happened between—their 
 reception of you was so friendly, that, while their infantry 
 and cavalry were outside the walls, they admitted your army 
 into their houses and citadel, among their wives and children 
 and all that was most precious. Why, upon that day three 
 of the noblest testimonies were before all mankind borne in 
 your favor by the Thebans, one to your courage, one to 
 
 1 This, and all the documents subsequently referred to by the Orator, 
 are lost. 
 
 * Spillan: “ useless trouble.” Leland: “useless and odious.” Fran¬ 
 cis: “ idle impertinence.” Jacobs: ■title Belcistigung. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 83 
 
 your justice, one to your good behavior. 1 For when they 
 preferred fighting on your side to fighting against you, they 
 held you to be braver and juster in your demands than 
 Philip; and when they put under your charge what they and 
 all men are most watchful to protect, their wives and chil¬ 
 dren, they showed that they had confidence in your good 
 behavior. In all which, men of Athens, it appeared they 
 had rightly estimated your character. For after your forces 
 entered the city, not so much as a groundless complaint was 
 preferred against you by any one; so discreetly did you be¬ 
 have yourselves: and twice arrayed on their side in the 
 earlier battles, that by the river and the winter-battle, 2 you 
 proved yourselves not irreproachable only, but admirable in 
 your discipline, your equipments, and your zeal: which called 
 forth eulogies from other men to you, sacrifice and thanks¬ 
 giving from you to the Gods. And I would gladly ask 
 iEschines—while these things were going on, and the city 
 was full of enthusiasm and joy and praise, whether he joined 
 with the multitude in sacrifice and festivity, or sat at home 
 sorrowing and moaning and repining at the public success. 
 For if he was present and appeared with the rest, is not his 
 conduct monstrous, or rather impious, when measures, which 
 he himself called the Gods to witness were excellent, he now 
 requires you to condemn—you that have sworn by the Gods ? 
 If he was not present, does he not deserve a thousand deaths 
 for grieving to behold what others rejoiced at? 3 Read me 
 now the decrees. 
 
 [The decrees for sacrifice .] 
 
 1 2 GHppoavvijc is variously rendered by the translators: “continence 
 
 “self-command;” “virtue;” “honor.” Auger; “ sagesse;” and after¬ 
 ward, “vertu.” Jacobs: Enthaltsamkeit. Pabst: Ma&sigung. And in 
 truth the word includes more or less of all these meanings. 
 
 3 See Appendix IX. 
 
 3 Lord Brougham observes as follows:— 
 
 .“The beauty of this passage is very striking. Not merely the ex¬ 
 quisite diction—the majesty of the rhythm—the skillful collocation— 
 the picturesque description of^Eschines’ dismay and skulking from the 
 public rejoicings; but the argument is to be observed and admii’ed. It 
 is a dilemma, and one which would be quite sufficient for the momen¬ 
 tary victory at which alone an orator often aims. It is not closely 
 reasoned; it is not a complete dilemma; a retort is obvious, (to use 
 the language of the logicians,) and this is always fatal, being the test 
 before which no bad dilemma can stand. NCschines had only to em- 
 
84 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 We thus were engaged in sacrifice; the Thebans w’ere in 
 the assurance that they had been saved through us; and it 
 had come about, that a people, who seemed likely to want 
 assistance through the practices of these men, were them¬ 
 selves assisting others in consequence of my advice which you 
 followed. What language Philip then uttered, and in what 
 trouble he was on this account, you shall learn from his let¬ 
 ters which he sent to Peloponnesus. Take and read them, 
 that the jury may know what my perseverance and journeys 
 and toils, and the many decrees which this man just now 
 pulled to pieces, accomplished. 
 
 Athenians, you have had many great and renowned orators 
 before me; the famous Callistratus, Aristoplion, Cephalus, 
 Thrasybulus, hundreds of others; yet none of them ever 
 thoroughly devoted himself to any measure of state: for in¬ 
 stance, the mover of a resolution w'ould not be embassador; 
 the embassador would not move a resolution; each one left 
 for himself some relief, and also, should any thing happen, an 
 excuse. 1 How then—it may be said—did you so far surpass 
 others in might and boldness as to do every thing yourself? 
 I don’t say that: but such was my conviction of the danger 
 impending over us, that I considered it left no room or 
 thought for individual security; a man should have been 
 only too happy to perform his duty without neglect. 2 As to 
 
 brace the second alternative—the second horn—and it never could 
 have transfixed him. 
 
 “ ‘I did remain at home, not mourning over the success of your meas¬ 
 ures, but their wickedness; not grudging the people their short-lived 
 joy, but grieved to see them deluded by your arts to their ruin.’ This 
 answer was complete. Nevertheless, there are but very few complete 
 dilemmas in the whole course of any argument upon any subject: and 
 the one under consideration is quite good enough to pass with an audi¬ 
 ence in a speech. Many much less complete are every day used with 
 us both in the senate, in popular assemblies, and even at the bar, and 
 with sufficient success. This whole passage would be of certain suc¬ 
 cess in our parliament.” 
 
 I may add, that Demosthenes was safe from the retort, ^Eschines hav¬ 
 ing no reply. 
 
 1 ’Avaipopu means “ power of casting or shifting the blame upon some 
 other person or thing.” This is not sufficiently expressed by the word 
 “resource,” which Leland and other translators have: nor indeed have 
 we any word exactly corresponding. Auger: “une surete.” Jacobs: 
 Riickenhalt. 
 
 2 Schaefer explains this differently : “ sed boni consulendum esse, si 
 
ON THE GROWN. 
 
 85 
 
 myself I was persuaded, perhaps foolishly, yet I was per¬ 
 suaded, that none would move better resolutions than myself, 
 none would execute them better, none as embassador would 
 show more zeal and honesty. Therefore I undertook every 
 duty myself. Read the letters of Philip. 
 
 [The letters .] 
 
 To this did my policy, Aeschines, reduce Philip. This lan¬ 
 guage he uttered through me, he that before had lifted his voice 
 so boldly against Athens ! For which I was justly crowned 
 by the people; and you were present and opposed it not, and 
 Diondas who preferred an indictment obtained not his share 
 of the votes. Here, read me the decrees which were then ab¬ 
 solved, and which this man never indicted. 
 
 [The decrees .] 
 
 These decrees, men of Athens, contain the very words and 
 syllables, which Aristonicus drew up formerly, and Clfesiphon 
 the defendant has now. And ^Eschines neither arraigned 
 these himself, nor aided the party who preferred an indict¬ 
 ment. Yet, if his present charge against me be true, he 
 might then have arraigned Demomeles the mover and Hype- 
 rides with more show of reason than .he can the defendant. 
 Why*? Because Ctesiphon may refer to them, and to the 
 decisions of the courts, and to the fact of -ZEschines not having 
 accused them, although they moved the same decrees which he 
 has now, and to the laws which bar any further proceedings 
 in such a case, 1 and to many points besides:—whereas then 
 the question would have been tried on ns own merits, before 
 any such advantages had been obtained. 2 But then, I Imagine, 
 it would have been impossible to do what -ZEschines now does 
 
 quis, nullA. non cur a adhibita, sorte fatali uteretur.” And so Jacobs: 
 sondern dass man sich gef alien lassen musse, bei dem Bewusstseyn nichts 
 unterlassen zu haben, das, was syen muss, zu leiden. I do not assent to 
 this interpretation, which would give too emphatic a sense to the words 
 [iTjdtv 7rapa?ie'nrov. As I take it, they refer to a Sel, so that we under¬ 
 stand re jv deovruv after ygdev. 
 
 1 Spillan has it literally: “ concerning matters thus transacted.” 
 Brougham : “ for things so settled.” Pabst: gegen das, was schon also 
 verhandelt worden ist. It refers undoubtedly to the previous decision 
 of the courts, though wpaxOevTuv does not signify “ decided,” as Leland, 
 Auger, and Jacobs express it in their translations. 
 
 2 II piv ti tovtuv npohaftelv, “ before it [i. e. before the party accused] 
 had secured any of these advantages,” i. e. any of those preliminary ob- 
 
86 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 —to pick out of a multitude of old dates and decrees what no 
 man knew before, and what no man would have expected to 
 hear to-day, for the purpose of slander—to transpose dates, 
 and assign measures to the wrong causes instead of the right, 
 in order to make a plausible case. That was impossible theift 
 Every statement must have been according to the truth, soon 
 after the facts, while you still remembered the particulars and 
 had them almost at your fingers’ ends. Therefore it was that 
 he shunned all investigation at the time, and has come at this 
 late period; thinking, as it appears to me, that you would 
 make it a contest of orators, instead of an inquiry into politic¬ 
 al conduct; that words would be criticised, and not interests 
 of state. 
 
 Then he plays the sophist, 1 and says, you ought to dis¬ 
 regard the opinion of us which you came from home with— 
 that, as when you audit a man’s account under the impression 
 that h^has a surplus, if it'casts up right and nothing remains, 
 you allow it, 2 so should you now accept the fair conclusion of 
 the argument. Only see, how rotten in its nature (and justly 
 so) is every wicked contrivance ! For by this very cunning 
 simile he has now acknowledged it to be your conviction, that 
 I am my country’s advocate and he is Philip’s. Had not this 
 been your opinion of each, he would not have tried to persuade 
 you differently. That he has however no reasonable ground 
 for requiring you to change your belief, I can easily show, 
 not by casting accounts—for that mode of reckoning applies 
 not to measures — but by calling the circumstances briefly 
 to mind, taking you that hear me both for auditors and 
 witnesses. 
 
 Through my policy, which he arraigns, instead of the 
 Thebans invading this country with Philip, as all expected, 
 
 jections which enable the accused to defend himself irrespectively of 
 the merits of the question. Schaefer reads npoaTiafielv, and renders it: 
 “priusquam horum quidquam subsidio assumpsisset.” Pabst follows 
 him. If I adopted that reading, I would translate thus: “ before it got 
 any of these points mixed up with it.” 
 
 1 So Spillan : and Jacobs: spielt er den Sophisten. 
 
 2 The illustration is taken, not from common tradesmen’s accounts, 
 
 as Reiske supposes, nor from the census for classification of citizens, as 
 Schaefer thinks, but rather from the audit of official accounts by the 
 Ao-yiaral at Athens. To them he clearly refers in the expression be¬ 
 low, A oyiaralc upa /cat pdprvoi The passage in ^Eschines 
 
 cont. Ctesiph. (62) confirms this view. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 87 
 
 they joined our ranks and prevented him ;—instead of the 
 war being in Attica, it took place seven hundred furlongs 
 from the city on the confines of Boeotia ;—instead of corsairs 
 issuing from Euboea to plunder us, Attica was in peace on 
 the coast-side during the whole war ;—instead of Philip being 
 master of the Hellespont by taking Byzantium, the Byzan¬ 
 tines were our auxiliaries against him. Does this computa¬ 
 tion of services, think you, resemble the casting of accounts ? 
 Or should we strike these out on a balance, 1 and not look 
 that they be kept in everlasting remembrance % I will not set 
 down, that of the cruelty, remarkable in cases where Philip 
 got people all at once into his power, others have had the 
 
 The expressions nOelgipijcpovg, uvraveXelv, refer to the use of counters 
 by the ancients in their arithmetical processes. Hence comes our word 
 “ calculation,” from calculus, a stone Or counter used for such purpose. 
 A literal translation of these expressions would hardly be intelligible 
 in our language, and therefore I have avoided it. 
 
 1 I. c. strike them out of the credit side of the account, by means of 
 a set-off on the debit side. Lord Brougham: “must these events be 
 taken out of the opposite side of my account ?” The meaning is prop¬ 
 erly explained by Reiske: “Existimasne, res has prceclare ft.me gestas 
 ex hominum memoria tolli debere propter ingentes clades^ias passi 
 sumus?” Schaefer, w r ho is followed by Jacobs and Pabst, has given a 
 different interpretation. Taira, according to him, means both the serv¬ 
 ices of Demosthenes, and the malpractices of iEschines; and dvrave?.elv 
 ravra is to set them off against one another, to mutually cancel them. 
 Pabst introduces this amplification of ravra into his text, feeling per¬ 
 haps that the reader would not gather it from the context: glaubst Du, 
 dass man Das, was ich fur, Du gegen das Vaterland gethan hast, gegen 
 einander aufheben mussc. This interpretation is not only not borne 
 out by the words, but contrary to the scope of the wdiole passage. De¬ 
 mosthenes is not saying any thing here about the misdeeds of iEschines; 
 and the notion of setting them off against his own services was too 
 palpably absurd to suggest for a moment. He has been enumerating 
 certain good results of his administration. His argument is : “ These 
 are positive services which I have rendered you, deserving gratitude 
 and permanent record. You can not treat them as credits, to be can¬ 
 celed by a debit side of the question. Such a mode of reckoning is 
 w r ell enough for an arithmetical computation, but is inapplicable to a 
 case of this kind.” Here he stops short, and why? He felt that at this 
 very moment Clueronea and its results, constantly present to his own 
 thoughts, might cross the minds of his hearers; and that he might be 
 met with the objection,—“If you take credit for the victories, you 
 must have the discredit of the defeats: your policy must be judged of 
 as a whole.” To this indeed he had an answer, but not exactly in the 
 present line of argument; therefore he turns it off, spurning the bare 
 idea of ^Eschines’ illustration. 
 
88 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 trial; while of the generosity, which, casting about for his fu¬ 
 ture purposes, he assumed toward Athens, you have happily 
 enjoyed the fruits. I pass that by. 
 
 Yet this I do not hesitate to say; that any one desirous of 
 truly testing an orator, not of calumniating him, would never 
 have made the charges that you advanced just now, inventing 
 similes, mimicking words and gestures : (doubtless it hath de¬ 
 termined the fortune of Greece, whether I spoke this word or 
 that, whether I moved my hand one way or the other!) no! 
 he would have examined the facts of the case, what means 
 and resources our country possessed, when I entered on the ad¬ 
 ministration, what, when I applied myself to it, I collected for 
 her, and what was the condition of our adversaries. Then, if 
 I had lessened her resources, he would have shown me to be 
 guilty; if I had greatly increased them, he would not have 
 calumniated me. However, as you have declined this course, 
 I will adopt it. See if I state the case fairly. 
 
 For resources—our country possessed the islanders; not 
 all, but the weakest; for neither Chios, nor Rhodes, nor 
 Corcyra^yas with us : subsidies 1 she had amounting to five- 
 and-forty talents; and they were anticipated : infantry or 
 cavalry, none besides the native. But what was most alarm¬ 
 ing and wrought most in favor of the enemy—these men had 
 got all our neighbors to be hostile rather than friendly to us; 
 Megarians, Thebans, Euboeans. Such were the circumstances 
 of our state; no man can say any thing to the contrary: look 
 now at those of Philip, whom we had to contend with. In 
 the first place, he ruled his followers with unlimited sway, the 
 most important thing for military operations: in the next 
 place, they had arms always in their hands : besides, he had 
 plenty of money, and did what he pleased, not giving notice 
 by decrees, not deliberating openly, not brought to trial by 
 calumniators, not defending indictments for illegal measures, 
 not responsible to any one, but himself absolute master, 
 leader, and lord of all. I, who was matched against him—for 
 it is right to examine this—what had I under my control? 
 Nothing. Public speech, for instance, the only thing open to 
 me—even to this you invited his hirelings as well as my¬ 
 self ; and whenever they prevailed over me, (as often happened 
 
 1 The tribute from the islanders. See vol. I. p. 77, note 1. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 89 
 
 for some cause or other,) your resolutions were passed 1 for 
 the enemy’s good. Still under these disadvantages I got you 
 for allies Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Mega- 
 rians, Leucadians, Corcyraeans; from whom were collected 
 fifteen thousand mercenaries and two thousand horse, besides 
 the national troops . 2 Of money too I procured as large a 
 contribution as possible. 
 
 If you talk about just conditions with the Thebans , 3 Aes¬ 
 chines, or with the Byzantines or Euboeans, or discuss now 
 the question of equal terms, first I say—you are ignorant 
 that of those galleys formerly which defended Greece, being 
 three hundred in number, our commonwealth furnished two 
 hundred, and never (as it seemed) thought herself injured by 
 having done so, never prosecuted those who advised it or ex¬ 
 pressed any dissatisfaction;—shame on her if she had!—but 
 was grateful to the gods, that, when a common danger beset 
 the Greeks, she alone furnished double what the rest did for 
 the preservation of all. Besides, it is but a poor favor you 
 do your countrymen by calumniating me. For what is the 
 use of telling us now what we should have done?—Why, 
 being in the city and present, did you not make your pro¬ 
 posals then; if indeed they were practicable at a crisis when 
 we had to accept not what we liked but what the circum¬ 
 stances allowed? Remember, there was one ready to bid 
 against us, to welcome eagerly those that we rejected, and 
 give money into the bargain. 
 
 But if I am accused for what I have actually done, how 
 would it have been, if, through my hard bargaining, the states 
 had gone off and attached themselves to Philip, and he had be¬ 
 come master at the same time of Euboea, Thebes, and Byzan¬ 
 tium? What, think ye, these impious men would have said 
 or done? Said doubtless, that the states were abandoned— 
 that they wished to join us and were driven away—that he 
 had got command of the Hellespont by the Byzantines, and be- 
 
 1 Literally: “You left the assembly, having passed resolutions.” 
 See my observations in the Preface, p. 14. 
 
 3 I believe this means the national troops of the allies. See Append¬ 
 ix IX. Schaefer, however, takes 7r oXltikuv to be the same as olke'luv 
 just above. 
 
 3 Aschines, in his speech (73), complains that the terms of the treaty, 
 concluded by Demosthenes with the Thebans, were most disadvanta¬ 
 geous to Athens. 
 
90 
 
 THE ORATION S*OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 come master of the corn-trade of Greece—that a heavy neigh¬ 
 bor-war had by means of the Thebans been brought into 
 Attica—that the sea had become unnavigable by the excur¬ 
 sion of pirates from Euboea! All this would they have said 
 sure enough, and a great deal besides. A wicked, wicked thing, 
 O Athenians, is a calumniator always, every way spiteful and 
 fault-finding. But this creature is a reptile by nature, that 
 from the beginning never did any thing honest or liberal; a 
 very ape of a tragedian, village CEnomaus, counterfeit orator ! 1 
 What advantage has your eloquence 2 been to your country? 
 Now do you speak to us about the past? As if a physician 
 should visit his patients, and not order or prescribe any thing 
 to cure the disease, but on the death of any one, when the 
 last ceremonies were performing, should follow him to the 
 grave and expound, how, if the poor fellow had done this and 
 that, he never would have died! Idiot! do you speak now ? 
 
 Even the defeat—if you exult in that which should make 
 you groan, you accursed one! — by nothing that I have 
 done will it appear to have befallen us. Consider it thus, 
 O Athenians. From no embassy, on which I was commis¬ 
 sioned by you, did I ever come away defeated by the em¬ 
 bassadors of Philip—neither from Thessaly, nor from Am- 
 bracia, nor from the kings of Thrace, nor from Byzantium, 
 
 1 Leland renders this passage as follows: “A false accuser, my coun¬ 
 trymen, is a monster, a dangerous monster, querulous and industrious 
 in seeking pretenses of complaint. And such is the very nature of this 
 fox in human shape,—a stranger to every thing good or liberal,—this 
 theatrical ape, this strolling player, this blundering haranguer!” Ja¬ 
 cobs : Fin boshaftes Wesen,Ihr Manner Athens, ist der Sycophant , boshaft 
 burner und uberall, misgunstig und schinahsiichtig ; aber' dieser Wicht 
 hier ist eine Bestie von Natur; von Anbeginn hat er nichts Gesundes, 
 nichts Freisinniges gethan, dieser leibhafte Affe der Tragodie, dieser 
 dorjische Oenomaus, dieser Iiedner von schlechtestem Sclirot und Korn. 
 
 As to Kivadot;, see page 65, note 2; and as to (Enomaus, see page 72, 
 note 1. 
 
 2 A eivorrjc is used not* only to signify craft and cleverness in general, 
 but specially to describe the quality of a powerful and effective speaker. 
 So it occurs several times in Dionysius. It is applied, however, both in 
 a good and in a bad sense, according to circumstances, as many other 
 words are. Thus we may call a man an orator, either simply, meaning 
 a public speaker, or by way of praise, meaning a good speaker, or in¬ 
 vidiously, meaning to say that he is an artful speaker, able to make 
 the worse appear the better cause. Compare Alschines cont. Ctes. 73, 
 83; Demosth. De Cor. 318. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 91 
 
 nor from any other place, nor o®the last recent occasion from 
 Thebes; but where his embassadors were vanquished in argu¬ 
 ment, he came with arms and carried the day. And for this 
 you call me to account; and are not ash^ned to jeer the same 
 person for cowardice, whom you require single-handed to over¬ 
 come the might of Philip-—and that too by words ! For what 
 else had I at my command 1 ? Certainly not the spirit 1 of each 
 individual, nor the fortune of the army, nor the conduct of 
 the war, for which you would make me accountable; such a 
 blunderer are you! 
 
 Yet understand me. Of what a statesman may be respons¬ 
 ible for I allow the utmost scrutiny ; I deprecate it not. What 
 are his functions'? To observe things in the beginning, to 
 foresee and foretell them to others—this I have done : again; 
 wherever he finds delays, backwardness, ignorance, jealousies, 
 vices inherent and unavoidable in all communities, to contract 
 them into the narrowest compass, and on the other hand, to 
 promote unanimity and friendship and zeal in the discharge 
 of duty. All this too I have performed; and no one can dis¬ 
 cover the least neglect on my part. Ask any man, by what 
 means Philip achieved most of his successes, and you will be 
 told, by his army, and by his bribing and corrupting men in 
 power. Well; your forces were not under my command or 
 control; so that I can not be questioned for any thing done in 
 that department. But by refusing the price of corruption I 
 have overcome Philip: for as the offerer of a bribe, if it be 
 accepted, has vanquished the taker, so the person who refuses 
 it and is not corrupted has vanquished the person offering. 
 
 Therefore is the commonwealth undefeated as far as I am con- 
 
 » 
 
 cerned. 
 
 These, and such as these, (besides many others,) are the 
 grounds furnished by myself to justify the defendent’s motion 
 in my behalf. Those which you my fellow-citizens furnished, 
 I will proceed to mention. Immediately after the battle the 
 people, knowing and having witnessed every thing which I 
 did, in the very midst of their alarm and terror, when it would 
 not have been surprising if the great body of them had even 
 treated me harshly, passed my resolutions for the safety of the 
 country; all their measures of defense, the disposition of the 
 
 1 Jacobs: Muth. Pabst: Geainnung. Augur: “valeur.” Other 
 translators take ipvxve to signify “ life.” 
 
92 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 garrisons, the trenches, the*vies for our fortifications, were 
 carried on under my decrees: and further, upon the election of 
 a commissioner of grain, they chose me in preference to all. 
 Afterward, when tnose who were bent to do me a mischief 
 conspired, and brought indictments, audits, impeachments and 
 the rest of it against me, not at first in their own persons, but 
 in such names as they imagined would most effectually screen 
 themselves, (for you surely know and remember, that every 
 day of that first period I was arraigned, and neither the despe¬ 
 ration of Sosicles, nor the malignity of Philocrates, nor the 
 madness of Diondas and Melantus, nor any thmg else was left 
 untried by them against me;) on all those occasions, chiefly 
 through the Gods, secondly through you and the other Athe¬ 
 nians, I was preserved. And with justice! Yes, that is the 
 truth, and to the honor of the juries who so conscientiously 
 decided. Well then: on the impeachments, when you ac¬ 
 quitted me and gave not the prosecutors their share of the 
 votes, you pronounced that my policy was the best: by my 
 acquittal on the indictments my counsels and motion were 
 shown to be legal; by your 'passing of my accounts you ac¬ 
 knowledged my whole conduct to have been honest and in¬ 
 corruptible. Under these circumstances, what name could 
 Ctesiphon with decency or justice give to my acts ? Not that 
 which he saw the people give—which he saw the jurors give— 
 which he saw truth establish to the world ? 
 
 Ay, says he; that was a fine thing of Ceplialus, never to 
 have been indicted. Yes, and a lucky one too. But why 
 should a man, who has often been charged, but never con¬ 
 victed of crime, be a whit the more liable to reproach ? How¬ 
 ever, men of Athens, against my opponent I have a right to 
 use the boast of Cephalus; for he never preferred or prosecu¬ 
 ted any indictment against me; therefore I am a citizen as 
 good as Cephalus by his admission. 
 
 From many things one may see his unfeelingness and ma¬ 
 lignity, but especially from his discourse about fortune. For 
 my part, I regard any one, who reproaches his fellow-man 
 with fortune, as devoid of sense. He that is best satisfied 
 with his condition, he that deems his fortune excellent, can 
 not be sure that it will remain so until the evening: how 
 then can it be right to bring it forward, or upbraid another 
 man with it ? As JEschines, however, has on this subject 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 93 
 
 (besides many others) expressed himself with insolence, look, 
 men of Athens, and observe how much more truth and 
 humanity there shall be in my discourse upon fortune 1 than 
 in his. 
 
 I hold the fortune of our commonwealth to be good, and 
 so I find the oracles of Dodonsean Jupiter and Pythian Apollo 
 declaring to us. The fortune of all mankind, which now pre¬ 
 vails, I consider cruel and dreadful : for what Greek, what 
 barbarian, has not in these times experienced a multitude of 
 evils ? That Athens chose the noblest policy, that she fares 
 better than those very Greeks who thought, if they aban¬ 
 doned us, they should abide in prosperity, I reckon as part of 
 her good fortune: if she suffered reverses, if all happened not 
 to us as we desired, I conceive she has had that share of the 
 general fortune which fell to our lot. As to my fortune (per¬ 
 sonally speaking) or that of any individual among us, it 
 should, as I conceive, be judged of in connection with personal 
 matters. Such is my opinion upon the subject of fortune, a 
 right and just one, as it appears to me, and I think you will 
 agree with it. Aeschines says that my individual fortune is 
 
 1 “Les anciens donnoient beaucoup 4 la fatalite: c’etoit une force 
 aveugle qui entrainoit les homines dans le malheur, et meme dans le 
 crime, sans qu’il fut possible de resister a sa violence. Cette fatalite est 
 le mobile presque unique de leurs tragedies, et c’est peut-etre, pour le 
 dire en passant, ce qui les a rendus un peu trop uniformes. Non seule- 
 ment ils croyoient que le destin s’attachoit a poursuivre un homme, 
 mais encore que la mauvaise fortune, que le sort malheureux qui le 
 suivoit, se communiquoit a ceux qui l’approchoient. Oreste, dans 
 Racine, dit a Pylade:— 
 
 Je ne sais de tous temps quelle injuste puissance 
 Laisse le crime en paix et poursuit l’innocence. 
 
 De quelque part sur moi que je tourne les yeux, 
 
 Je ne vois que malheurs qui condamnent les Dieux. 
 
 Mais toi, par quelle erreur veux-tu toujours sur toi 
 Detourner un courroux qui ne clierche que moi? 
 
 “En consequence de ces principes Eschine, mechamment, a represente 
 Demosthene, dans un endroit de son diseours, comme un miserable 
 poursuivi par la fortune, et qui communiquoit son malheur a tous ceux 
 qui lui confioient leurs affaires. 
 
 “Demosthene lui repond ici en faisant voir, 1°. que quand meme il 
 auroit ete poursuivj par la fortune, il seroit cruel de lui np-ocher son 
 malheur: 2°. qu’il est ridicule de pretendre que la destinee d’un particu¬ 
 lar influe sur la destinee de la republique: 3°. qu’il n’a ] as ete si mal¬ 
 heureux pendant sa vie, que sa fortune n’a pas ete si miseiab.e; et de 1& 
 il prend occasion de comparer sa fortune a celle d’Eschine.”— Auger. 
 
94 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 paramount to that of the commonwealth, the small and mean 
 to the good and great. How can this possibly be? 
 
 However, if you are determined, Aeschines, to scrutinize my 
 fortune, compare it with your own, and, if you find my for¬ 
 tune better than yours, cease to revile it. Look then from 
 the very beginning. And I pray and entreat that I may not 
 be condemned for bad taste . 1 I don’t think any person wise 
 who insults poverty, or who prides himself on having been 
 bred in affluence: but by the slander and malice of this cruel 
 man I am forced into such a discussion ; which I will conduct 
 with all the moderation which circumstances allow. 
 
 I had the advantage, Aeschines, in my boyhood of going to 
 proper schools, and having such allowance as a boy should 
 have who is to do nothing mean from indigence. Arrived at 
 man’s estate, I lived suitably to my breeding ; was choir¬ 
 master, ship-commander, rate-payer ; backward in no acts of 
 liberality public or private, but making myself useful to the 
 commonwealth and to my friends. When I entered upon 
 state affairs, I chose such a line of politics, that both by my 
 country and many people of Greece I have been crowned 
 many times, and not even you my enemies venture to say 
 that the line I chose was not honorable. Such then has 
 been the fortune of my life: I could enlarge upon it, but J 
 forbear, lest what I pride myself in should give offense. 
 
 But you, the man of dignity, who spit upon others, look 
 what sort of fortune is yours compared with mine. As a boy 
 you were reared in abject poverty, waiting with your father 
 on the school, grinding the ink, sponging the benches, sweep¬ 
 ing the room, doing the duty of a menial rather than a free¬ 
 man’s son. After you were grown up, you attended your 
 
 mother’s initiations , 2 reading her books and helping in all the 
 
 + 
 
 1 Most of the commentators take 'ipvxporr/Ta in the sense of “insi¬ 
 pidity or absurdity.” Jacobs has: abgeschmackten Frostes. Pabst: 
 Abgeschmacktheit. Schaefer compares the Tpvxpu heyeiv of Xenophon, 
 Conviv. vi. 7. Francis translates it, “ any thing offensive,” which is not 
 the meaning of the word, though undoubtedly it was the object of 
 Demosthenes to deprecate giving offense. He knew that a large num¬ 
 ber, perhaps the majority, of the jurors were taken from the humbler 
 class of citizens, and they might be offended if he boasted too much of 
 his wealth and origin. Therefore he is anxious to show that he was 
 forced into this comparison by Alschines himself. 
 
 2 The rites, which Demosthenes represents to have been performed 
 by the mother of JEschines, were brought into Greece from Phrygia and 
 
ON THE .CROWN. 
 
 95 
 
 ceremonies: at night wrapping the noviciates in fawn-skin, 
 swilling, purifying, and scouring them with clay and bran, 
 raising them after the lustration, and bidding them say, “ Bad 
 
 the east, and from Thrace. They appear not to have been of the most 
 reputable kind, at all events the officiating parties were a low class of 
 people. Plato, in the second book of his Republic, tells us, that at this 
 period there were a multitude of jugglers and adventurers going about 
 Greece, who acquired influence over ignorant men by pretending to 
 the exercise of supernatural power. They carried books with them, the 
 authorship of which they ascribed to Musaeus and Orpheus, and which 
 contained directions as to various rites of sacrifice and purification, and 
 other mystic ceremonies. These, they said, had the effect of expiating 
 crime and averting evil. Bacchus and Ceres were the divinities to 
 whose worship tlie^B mysteries were devoted, especially the former, as 
 appears abundantly ‘from the passage before us. 
 
 N eppifav is putting on the fawn-skin worn by the Bacchanalians. 
 Compare the Bacchae of Euripides, 137, 176, and Statius Theb. II. 664: 
 Nebridas et fragiles thyrsos portare putastis 
 Imbellem ad sonitum. 
 
 Kparripifav was a species of Bacchic baptism, either by immersion, 
 or pouring the bowl over the head. 
 
 ’Atto/mittuv Tvrfkip teal Trtrvpoig refers, according to Harpocration, to 
 the Orphic myth of A lovvcoq Z aypevg, the infernal Bacchus, son of Pros¬ 
 erpine, whom the Titans tore to pieces, having plastered their own 
 faces with clay to escape detection. Jupiter destroyed the Titans with 
 his thunder, and from the smoke of their burning bodies man was gener¬ 
 ated. See Orph. Hymn. 29, Procli Hymn, ad Athen. and Olympio- 
 dorus on the Pliaedo. Taylor, whom Leland and Francis follow, in¬ 
 terprets uiropaTTuv in the sense of modeling images or idols for the 
 mysteries. Reiske thinks the clay and bran was nothing more than a 
 kind of soap, used for lustration. Jacobs says the bran reminds him 
 of the flour (Tranrd?.7i) with which Strepsiades is powdered in the Clouds 
 of Aristophanes (v. 265), where it is evident that the poet is ridiculing 
 some initiatory or mystic ceremony. 
 
 *E <j>vyov Kcrndv evpov ufxecvov, is a form of words pronounced by the 
 initiated, a sort of thanksgiving for the blessings of civilized life 
 introduced by Ceres and Bacchus, mystically referring to religious 
 blessings. To this there is a manifest allusion in the chorus of the 
 Bacchae, v. 900. 
 
 evdai/xcjv fitv oq ka dalaooag 
 £<pvye Kvfia, hi/iiva d’ c/a^av. 
 
 Taylor compares Cicero de Legibus, II. 24,—“ Nam mihi cum multa 
 eximia divinaque videntur Athenae tuae peperisse atque in vitam homi- 
 num attulisse, turn nihil melius iis mysteriis, quibus ex agresti imma- 
 nique vitd exculti ad humanitatem et mitigati sumus, initiaque 
 ut appellantur, ita re vera principia vitae cognovimus, neque solum 
 cum laetitid vivendi rationem accepimus, sed etiam cum spe meliori 
 moriendi.” 
 
 ’OXoXv^ai is the religious or orgiastic howl. See Bacchae, 24, 688. 
 
96 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 X have scaped, and better I have foundpriding yourself 
 that no one ever howled so lustily—and I believe him ! for 
 don’t suppose that he who speaks so loud is not a splendid 
 howler ! In the daytime you led your noble orgiasts, crowned 
 with fennel and poplar, through the highways, squeezing the 
 big-cheeked serpents, and lifting them over your head, and 
 shouting Evoe Sabce, and capering to the words Hyes Attes, 
 Attes Hyes, saluted by the beldames as Leader, Conductor, 
 Chest-bearer, Fan-bearer, and the like, getting as your reward 
 tarts and biscuits and rolls; for which any man might well 
 bless himself and his fortune ! 1 
 
 When you were enrolled among your fellc^-townsmen—by 
 
 Claudian, Raptus Pros. lib. i. Ululatibus lde Bacchatur, and lib. ii. 
 ululantia Dindyma Gallis. 
 
 Poplar, supposed to be the growth of the infernal region, was sacred 
 (as Harpocration sa 3 T s) to the son of Proserpine. Fennel was supposed 
 to have a peculiar virtue. A species of fennel is mentioned by Virgil 
 (Eclog. X. 25) as carried by Sylvanus: 
 
 Florentes ferulas et grandia lilia quassans. 
 
 As to the serpents, see Bacchse, v. 697. Ceres is drawn by serpents 
 in Claudian Rapt. Pros. lib. i. Compare Plutarch, Vit. Alex. 2. 
 
 The exclamations evol oa(3oi are Thracian, perhaps of eastern origin. 
 Bacchus is called Evius and Sabazius. See Orph. Hymn 47, Pint. 
 Symp. iv. 5. "Tyg arryg are Phrygian. Qiaoog is the common term 
 for a troop of Bacchanals (Bacchae, 56). The god himself is called 
 l^apxog (Bacchae, 141). A invog is the “mystica vannus Iacchi” (Virgil 
 Georg. I. 166). He is called A Luvtryg A iovvaog in Orph. Hymn 45. See 
 Callimach. Hymn, ad Jovem, 48. The kloto. contained the arcane 
 symbols of the mysteries. Such was the KaXadog of Ceres (Callimach. 
 Hymn, ad Cererem, 1, Taylor’s Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries, 119). 
 
 1 I consider it better to give this turn than to write, “for which who 
 would not,” <fec., which suits not the English idiom so well. But you 
 may keep the interrogative, if you turn “for which” into “for such 
 things,” as Pabst and Jacobs do.. ^ 
 
 Here I can not foi'bear noticing the fulsome eulogy pronounced by the 
 Times reviewer upon Mitchell’s version of this passage. I concede that 
 it is clever, but it certainly deserves not the epithets of “ terse and 
 pointed,” w T hich have been applied to it. He himself would disdain such 
 an encomium, for he insists that it is necessary to expand and dilute 
 the expressions of the original, and he translates upon that system. 
 Thus, 6 diaiTTvcjv is, “ who considers worthy only of the spittle of his 
 mouth hpu<pyg must be enlarged into “ born and bred ypadiuv, 
 “ all the crones and beldames of the quarter,” and so on. I suppose 
 these are questions of taste. For my own part, I think there was much 
 wisdom in the saying of the clergyman, who excused himself to his 
 congregation for preaching longer than usual, on the plea that he had 
 not had time to make his sermon shorter. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 97 
 
 what means I stop not to inquire—when you were enrolled 
 however, you immediately selected the most honorable of 
 employments, that of clerk and assistant to our petty magis¬ 
 trates. From this you were removed after a while, having 
 done yourself all that you charge others with ; and then, sure 
 enough, you disgraced not your antecedents by your subse¬ 
 quent life, but hiring yourself to those ranting players, as they 
 were called, Simylus and Socrates, you acted third parts, col¬ 
 lecting figs and grapes and olives like a fruiterer from other 
 men’s farms, and getting more from them than from the play¬ 
 ing, in which the lives of your whole company were at stake; 
 for there was an implacable and incessant war between them 
 and the audience, from whom you received so many wounds, 
 that no wonder you taunt as cowards people inexperienced in 
 such encounters . 1 
 
 But passing over what may be imputed to poverty, I will 
 come to the direct charges against your character. You es¬ 
 poused such a line of politics, (when at last you thought of 
 taking to them,) that, if your country prospered, you lived 
 the life of a hare, fearing and trembling and ever expecting to 
 be scourged for the crimes of which your conscience accused 
 you ; though all have seen how bold you were during the 
 misfortunes of the rest. A man who took courage at the 
 death of a thousand citizens—what does he deserve at the 
 hands of the Rving? A great deal more that I could say 
 about him I shall omit: for it is not all I can tell of his tur¬ 
 pitude and infamy which I ought to let slip from my tongue, 
 but only what is not disgraceful to myself to mention. 
 
 1 The commentators and translators have all misunderstood this pas¬ 
 sage, imagining that Alschines and his troop are charged with strolling 
 about the country and robbing orchards. Nothing could be more for¬ 
 eign to the meaning. Taking Bekker’s text, and omitting the first 
 Tpavfzata, the explanation is simply as follows:— 
 
 jfEschines and his fellow-players acted so badly, that they were pelted 
 by the audience with figs, grapes, and olives,—as we should say, with 
 oranges. The players picked up these missiles, and were glad to pocket 
 the affront. Such quantities were show'ered upon the stage, that they 
 got enough to stock a fruiterer’s shop; so they were supplied, uai rep 
 onupuvrjg in tuv a^Tiorpiuv xupiuv, like a dealer in fruit, who purchases 
 his stock from various farmers and gardeners. From this source JEs- 
 chines derived more profit, nTieiu 'KapQavuv and tovtuv, than from the 
 dramatic contests, tuv ayuvuv, for which the company were ill paid, 
 and in which they ran the risk of their lives every day from the indig¬ 
 nation of the audience. 
 
 VOL* II.—E 
 
98 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 Contrast now the circumstances of your life and mine, 
 gently and with temper, Aeschines; and then ask these people 
 whose fortune they would each of them prefer. You taught 
 reading, I went to school: you performed initiations, I re¬ 
 ceived them: you danced in the chorus, I furnished it: you 
 were 1 assembly-clerk, I was a speaker: you acted third parts, 
 I heard you : you broke down, and I* hissed: you have work¬ 
 ed as a statesman for the enemy, I for my country . 1 I pass 
 by the rest; but this very day I am on my probation for a 
 crown, and am acknowledged to be innocent of all offense; 
 while you are already judged to be a pettifogger, and the 
 question is, whether you shall continue that trade, or at once 
 be silenced by not getting a fifth part of the votes. A happy 
 fortune, do you see, you have enjoyed, that you should de¬ 
 nounce mine as miserable! 
 
 Come now, let me read the evidence to the jury of public 
 services which I have performed. And by way of comparison 
 do you recite me the verses which you murdered: 
 
 From Hades and the dusky realms I come. 
 
 And - S I 
 
 m news, believe me, I am loth to bear. 
 
 Ill betide thee, say I, and may the Gods, or at least the Athe¬ 
 nians, confound thee for a vile citizen and a vile third-rate 
 actor ! 2 3 
 
 ip 
 
 1 The best version of this series of antitheses is, I think, that of 
 Jacobs: 
 
 Du hieltest Schule ; ich bcmchte die Sckulen ; Du besorglest die Wei- 
 hungen ; ich ernpfing sie ; Du tanztest im Chor; ich stattete Chore aus ; 
 Du dientest als Schreiber ; ich sprach vor dem Volke ; Du spieltest die 
 dritten Rollen ; ich sah zu ; Du fieht durch , und ich zischte ; Du wirk- 
 test fur die Feindc ; ich fur das Vaterland. 
 
 Milton has imitated this passage in the Apology for Smectymnuus 
 (vol. i. p. 221, Symmons’ Edition). Speaking of the young divines and 
 students at college, whom he had seen so often upon the stage prosti¬ 
 tuting the shame of that ministry, which they either had or were nigh 
 having, to the eyes of courtiers and court ladies, he proceeds thus:— 
 
 “ There while they acted and overacted, among other young scholars, 
 I was a spectator: they thought themselves gallant men, and I thought 
 them fools; they made sport, and I laughed; they mispronounced, and 
 I misliked ; and, to make up the Atticism, they were out, and I hissed.” 
 
 3 The first quotation is from the beginning of the Hecuba. The words 
 KaKbv KaKug are supposed by Wolf to be the beginning of another quo¬ 
 tation which the orator converts abruptly into an imprecation upon 
 HSschines. The position of the words however is against this inter- 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 99 
 
 Head the evidence. 
 
 [Evidence. 
 
 Such has been my character in political matters. In private, 
 if you do not all know that I have been liberal and humane 
 and charitable to the distressed, I am silent, I will say not a 
 word, I will offer no evidence on the subject, either of persons 
 whom I ransomed from the enemy, or of persons whose daugh¬ 
 ters I helped to portion, or any thing of the kind. For this 
 is my maxim. I hold that the party receiving an obligation 
 should ever remember it, the party conferring should forget it 
 immediately, if the one is to act with honesty, the other with¬ 
 out meanness. To remind and speak of your own bounties is 
 next door to reproaching . 1 I will not act so; nothing shall 
 induce me. Whatever my reputation is in these respects, I 
 am content with it. 
 
 I will have done then with private topics, but say another 
 word or two upon public. If you can mention, ^Fschines, a 
 single man under the sun, whether Greek or barbarian, who 
 has not suffered by Philip’s power formerly and Alexander’s 
 now, well and good; I concede to you, that my fortune, or 
 misfortune (if you please), has been the cause of every thing. 
 But if many that never saw me or heard my voice have been 
 grievously afflicted, not individuals only but whole cities and 
 nations; how much juster and fairer is it to consider, that 
 to the common fortune apparently of all men, to a tide of 
 events overwhelming and lamentable , 2 these disasters are to 
 
 pretation: for gdXiGTa //£v must be connected with what follows, and 
 ak standing alone could not have the required emphasis. Schaefer with 
 greater probability supposes nanov nanus ge to be the commencement of 
 a verse. I have followed Bekker, who throws them into the next clause. 
 Demosthenes, after repeating two Iambic lines, and ridiculing his op¬ 
 ponent’s declamatory style, suddenly, as if he was weary of such stuff, 
 breaks into the curse, the introductory words being suggested by the 
 nanayysTielv. 
 
 1 Compare Terence, Andria, Act I. Sc. i. 16 :— 
 
 Sed mi hoc molestum est; nam isthaec commemoratio 
 Quasi exprobratio est immemoris benefici. 
 
 a Brougham: “some force of circumstances untoward and difficult to 
 resist.” Leland: “torrent of unhappy events that bore down upon us 
 with irresistible violence.” Francis: “the rapid impetuosity of partic¬ 
 ular conjunctures, cruel and unaccountable,”—a lame version indeed! 
 Auger: “ concours fatal de circonstances malheureuses.” Jacobs: einer 
 harten und ividrigen Gewalt der Ereignisse. Pabst: einen gewaltsamen 
 Umschwung der Ereignisse, vsie er nicht hatte stattjinden sollen. 
 
100 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 be attributed. You, disregarding all this, accuse me whose 
 ministry lias been among my countrymen , 1 knowing all the 
 while, that a part (if not the whole) of your calumny falls 
 upon the people, and yourself in particular. For if I assumed 
 the sole and absolute direction of our counsels, it was open to 
 you the other speakers to accuse me: but if you were con¬ 
 stantly present in all the assemblies, if the state invited pub¬ 
 lic discussion of what was expedient, and if these measures 
 were then believed by all to be the best, and especially by 
 you ; (for certainly from no good-will did you leave me in pos¬ 
 session of hopes and admiration and honors, all of which at¬ 
 tended on my policy, but doubtless because you were compelled 
 by the truth and had nothing better to advise;) is it not iniqui¬ 
 tous and monstrous to complain now .of measures, than which 
 you could suggest none better at the time ? 
 
 Among all other people I find these principles in a manner 
 defined and settled—Does a man willfully offend? He is the 
 object of wrath and punishment. Hath a man erred uninten¬ 
 tionally ? There is pardon. instead of punishment for him. 
 Has a man devoted himself to what seemed for the general 
 good, and without any fault or misconduct been in common 
 with all disappointed of success? Such a one deserves not 
 obloquy or reproach, but sympathy. These principles will 
 not be found in our statutes only: Nature herself has defined 
 them by her unwritten laws and the feelings of humanity. 
 -ZEschines however has so far surpassed all men in brutality 
 and malignity, that even things which he cited himself as mis¬ 
 fortunes he imputes to me as crimes. 
 
 And besides—as if he himself had spoken every thing with 
 candor and good-will—he told you to watch me, and mind 
 
 1 The meaning is—“you charge me with this universal ruin, though 
 I was merely an Athenian citizen who took my share, together with 
 my fellow-citizens, in the politics of my own country, but could have 
 nothing to do with the affairs of other people, on whom similar calami¬ 
 ties fell.” So Reiske interprets napd tovtoigl —“ designat pro more 
 judices civesque Athenienses.” Pabst however takes these words to 
 refer to the (popuv TTpaygurov, and thus translates: der ich unter dem 
 Einflusse dieses Umschwunges der Ereignisse die Staatsverwaltungfuhrte. 
 Lord Brougham, following Francis, translates to the same effect: “ called 
 upon, as I was, to carry on the government in such a crisis.” The 
 words do not favor such an interpretation. "Airaai refers to tovtoigI, 
 and, if it stood alone, could be hardly understood to signify “all the 
 Athenians.” 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 101 
 
 that I did not cajole and deceive you, calling me a great or¬ 
 ator , 1 a juggler, a sophist, and the like: as though, if a man 
 says of another what applies to himself, it must be true, and 
 the hearers are not to inquire who the person is that makes 
 the charge. Certain am I, that you are all acquainted with 
 my opponent’s character, and believe these charges to be more 
 applicable to him than to me. And of this I am sure, that 
 my oratory—let it be so: though indeed I find, that the 
 speaker’s power depends for the most part on the hearers ; for 
 according to your reception and favor it is, that the wisdom 
 of a speaker is esteemed—if I however possess any ability of 
 this sort, you will find it has been exhibited always in public 
 business on your behalf, never against you or on personal 
 matters; whereas that of JEschines has been displayed not 
 only in speaking for the enemy, but against all persons who 
 ever offended or quarreled with him. It is not for justice or 
 the good of the commonwealth that he employs it. A citizen 
 of worth and honor should not call upon judges impanneled 
 in the public service to gratify his anger or hatred or any > 
 thing of that kind; nor should he come before you upon 
 such grounds. The best thing is not to have these feelings; 
 but, if it can not be helped, they should be mitigated and 
 restrained. 
 
 On what occasions ought an orator and statesman to be ve¬ 
 hement % Where any of the commonwealth’s main interests 
 are in jeopardy, and he is opposed to the adversaries of the 
 people . 2 Those are the occasions for a generous and brave' 
 citizen. But for a person, who never sought to punish me for 
 any offense either public or private, on the state’s behalf or 
 on his own, to have got up an accusation because I am 
 crowned and honored, and to have expended such a mul¬ 
 titude of words—this is a proof of personal enmity and spite 
 and meanness, not of any thing good. And then his leaving 
 the controversy with me, and attacking the defendant, com¬ 
 prises every thing that is base . 3 
 
 I should conclude, JEschines, that you undertook this 
 
 1 See p. 90, note 2. 
 
 2 Or, “ lie has to do with the adversaries of the people,” omitting n 
 with Bekker. But with rt the sense is as Jacobs, Reiske, and others 
 give it: -wo es der Sache den Volkes gcgen die Feinde gilt. 
 
 3 “This once more pressed, because, after the brilliant declamation 
 that precedes, it was sure to be doubly effective.”— Lord Brougham. 
 
102 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 cause to exhibit your eloquence and strength of lungs, not to 
 obtain satisfaction for any wrong. But it is not the language 
 of an orator, AEschines, that has any value, nor yet the tone of 
 his voice, but his adopting the same views with the people, and 
 his hating and loving the same persons that his country does. 
 He that is thus minded will say every thing with loyal inten¬ 
 tion : he that courts persons from whom the commonwealth 
 apprehends danger to herself, rides not on the same anchorage 
 with the people, and therefore has not the same expectation 
 of safety. But—do you see?—I have: for my objects are 
 the same with those of my countrymen; I have no interest 
 separate or distinct. Is that so with you ? How can it be 
 —when immediately after the battle you went as embassador 
 to Philip, who was at that period the author of your country’s 
 calamities, notwithstanding that you had before persisted in 
 refusing that office , 1 as all men know ? 
 
 And who is it that deceives the state? Surely the man 
 who speaks not what he thinks. On whom does the crier 
 pronounce a curse ? 2 Surely on such a man. What greater 
 crime can an orator be charged with, than that his opinions 
 and his language are not the same? Such is found to be 
 your character. And yet you open your mouth, and dare to 
 look these men in the faces! Do you think they don’t know 
 you ?—or are sunk all in such slumber and oblivion, as not to 
 remember the speeches which you delivered in the assembly, 
 cursing and swearing that you had nothing to do with Philip, 
 and that I brought that charge against you out of personal 
 enmity without foundation ? No sooner came the news of 
 the battle, than you forgot all that; you acknowledged and 
 avowed that between Philip and yourself there subsisted a 
 relation of hospitality and friendship—new names these for 
 
 1 This is to be understood only of the last six years before Chaeronea. 
 
 2 This curse was pronounced at every assembly of the people and 
 every meeting of the council, before the business began. It was in¬ 
 cluded in a form of prayer prescribed by law, in which the gods were 
 implored to bless and prosper the consultations of the citizens, and to 
 destroy and extirpate all persons who were ill-affected to the common¬ 
 wealth, or plotted or conspired against the people, or were bribed to 
 mislead or deceive them. There are many allusions to this curse in the 
 Attic orators. In the speech on the Embassy (p. 363), Demosthenes 
 causes it to be read to the jury. At the meeting of ladies in the Thes- 
 mophoriazusse of Aristophanes, there is an amusing mock prayer read 
 by the crier, vv. 295—351. See Schomann De Comitiis, 92. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 103 
 
 your contract of hire. For upon what plea of equality or jus¬ 
 tice could .ZEschines, son of Glaucothea the timbrel-player, ] be 
 the friend or acquaintance of Philip ? I can not see. No! 
 You were hired to ruin the interests of your countrymen : and 
 yet, though you have been caught yourself in open treason, and 
 informed against yourself after the fact, you revile and reproach 
 me for things which you will find any man is chargeable with 
 sooner than I . 2 
 
 Many great and glorious enterprises has the commonwealth, 
 .ZEschines, undertaken and succeeded in through me; and 
 she did not forget them. Here is the proof—On the election 
 of a person to speak the funeral oration immediately after 
 the event, you were proposed, but the people would not have 
 you, notwithstanding your fine voise, nor Demades, though 
 he had just made the peace, nor Hegemon, nor any other of 
 your party—but me. And when you and Pythocles came for¬ 
 ward in a brutal and shameful manner, (O merciful heaven!) 
 and urged the same accusations against me which you now do, 
 and abused me, they elected me all the more. The reason— 
 you are not ignorant of it—yet I will tell you. The Atheni- 
 
 1 The drum or timbrel was an instrument peculiarly used in the or¬ 
 gies of Bacchus and Cybele, derived from Phrygia. Compare Bacchse, 
 68 :— 
 
 aipeade TuTUXupC lv <bpvytiv. 
 
 Tvfircava ; 'P sag re prjrpbg kpd 6’ evpypara • 
 and Virgil, Ain. IX. 619:— 
 
 Tympana vos buxusque vocat Berecynthia matris 
 Idseae. 
 
 Compare also Virgil, Georg. IV. 64; Apulei. de Gen. 49, “ Algyptia 
 numina gaudent plangoribus, Graeca choreis, barbara strepitu cymba- 
 listarum et tympanistarum et ceraularum.” 
 
 3 “ Here is the same leading topic once more introduced; but intro¬ 
 duced after new topics and fresh illustrations. The repetitions, the 
 enforcement again and again of the same points, are a distinguishing 
 feature of Demosthenes, and formed also one of the characteristics of 
 Mr. Fox’s great eloquence. The ancient however was incomparably 
 more felicitous in this than the modern ; for in the latter it often arose 
 from carelessness, from ill-arranged discourse, from want of giving due 
 attention, and from having once or twice attempted the topic and for¬ 
 gotten it, or perhaps from having failed to produce the desired effect. 
 Now in Demosthenes this is never the case: the early allusions to the 
 subject of the repetition are always perfect in themselves, and would 
 sufficiently have enforced the topic, had they stood alone. But new 
 matter afterward handled gave the topic new force and fresh illustra^ 
 tion, by presenting the point in a new light .”—Lord Brougham. 
 
104 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 ans kneW as well the loyalty and zeal with which I conducted 
 their affairs, as the dishonesty of you and your party; for 
 what you denied upon oath in our prosperity, you confessed 
 in the misfortunes of the republic. They considered there¬ 
 fore, that men Awho got security for their politics by the 
 public disasters had been their enemies long before, and were 
 then avowedly such. They thought it right also, that the 
 person who was to speak in honor of the fallen and cele¬ 
 brate their valor, should not have sat under the same roof 
 or at the same table 1 with their antagonists; that he should 
 not revel there and sing a paean over the calamities of Greece 
 in company with their murderers, and then come here and 
 receive distinction; that he should not with his voice act the 
 mourner of their fate, but that he should lament over them 
 with his heart. This they perceived in themselves and in 
 me, but not in any of you: therefore they elected me, and 
 not you. Nor, while the people felt thus, did the fathers and 
 brothers of the deceased, who were chosen by the people to 
 perform their obsequies, feel differently. For having to order 
 the funeral banquet (according to custom ) 2 at the house of the 
 nearest relative to the deceased, they ordered it at mine. And 
 with reason: because, though each to his own was nearer of 
 kin than I was, none was so near to them all collectively. 
 He that had the deepest interest in their safety and success, 
 had upon their mournful disaster the largest share of sorrow 
 for them all . 3 
 
 1 Literally: “joined in the same libations.” Brougham : “ drunk out 
 of the same cup.” Pabsthas happily expressed the two words: Haus- 
 und Tisch-Genosse , “ house and board-fellows.” We might say, “ shared 
 house and board with.” I have adopted the turn of Jacobs. 
 
 2 Literally : “as other funeral banquets [ i. e. as funeral banquets in 
 general] are wont to be held.” 
 
 3 This passage, which has not been particularly noticed by any of 
 the critics, appears to me one of the most touching in the whole oration. 
 The sfintiment is like that which (Edipus expresses in the beautiful lines 
 of Sophocles ((Ed. Rex, 58), which very possibly were in the mind of 
 the orator:— 
 
 to 'Traldeg ohcrpol, yvorti kovk ayvora poi 
 npoGJjWed’ ipeipovreg • ev yap old ’ oti 
 voaelre navreg, nal voaovvreg, ug kyu 
 ovk. eot iv vptiv oortg eg loov vooel. 
 rb plv yap vpuv a?iyog elg ev' Epxerai 
 povov KaO’ avrov, novdiv' ukhov * rj 6’ kpr) 
 
 Ipvxi) TTO/Uv TE KUjUE Kal o’ OUOV GTEVEL. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 105 
 
 Read him this epitaph, which the state chose to inscribe on 
 their monument, that you may see even by this, JEschines, 
 what a heartless and malignant wretch you are. Read. 
 
 THE EPITAPH . 1 
 
 These are the patriot brave, who side by side 
 Stood to their arms, and dash’d the foeman’s pride: 
 
 Firm in their valor, prodigal of life, 
 
 Hades they chose the arbiter of strife ; 
 
 That Greeks might ne’er to haughty victors bow, 
 
 Nor thraldom’s yoke, nor dire oppression know; 
 
 They fought, they bled, and on their country’s breast 
 (Such was the doom of heaven) these warriors rest. 
 
 Gods never lack success, nor strive in vain, 
 
 But man must suffer what the fates ordain. 
 
 Do you hear, -ZEschines, in this very inscription, that u Gods 
 never lack success, nor strive in vain?” Not to the statesman 
 does it ascribe the power of giving victory in battle, but to 
 the Gods. Wherefore then, execrable man, do you reproach 
 me with these things? Wherefore utter such language? I 
 pray that it may fall upon the heads of you and yours. * 
 Many other accusations and falsehoods he urged against 
 
 1 The reader will doubtless be pleased to see the lines of Campbell, 
 which appeared in Lord Brougham’s translation, and therefore I take 
 the liberty of subjoining them:'— 
 
 These are the brave, unknowing how to yield, . 
 
 Who, terrible in valor, kept the field 
 Against the foe, and higher than life’s breath 
 Prizing their honor, met the doom of death, 
 
 Our common doom, that Greece unyoked might stand, 
 
 Nor shuddering crouch beneath a tyrant’s hand. 
 
 Such was the will of Jove; and now they rest 
 Peaceful enfolded in their country’s breast. 
 
 Th’ immortal gods alone are ever great, 
 
 But erring mortals must submit to fate. 
 
 The following also is submitted for the judgment of the reader:— 
 
 These for their country stood in war-array, 
 
 And check’d the fierce invader on his way; 
 
 Into the battle rush’d at glory’s call, 
 
 With firm resolve to conquer or to fall; 
 
 That Greeks should ne’er to tyrants bend the knee, 
 
 But live, as they were born, from thraldom free. ^ 
 
 Now in the bosom of their fatherland ’ 
 
 These warriors rest; for such was Jove’s command. 
 
 The Gods in all succeed and have their will, 
 
 But mortals must their destinv fulfill. 
 
 E 2 
 
106 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 me, O Athenians, but one thing surprised me more than all, 
 that, when he mentioned the late misfortunes of the country, 
 he felt not as became a well-disposed and upright citizen, he 
 shed no tear, experienced no such emotion : with a loud voice 
 exulting, and straining his throat, he imagined apparently 
 that he was accusing me, while he was giving proof against 
 himself," that our distresses touched him not in the same 
 manner as the rest. A person who pretends, as he did, to 
 care for the laws and constitution, ought at least to have this 
 about him, that he grieves and rejoices for the same cause as 
 the people, and not by his politics to be enlisted in the ranks 
 of the enemy, as JEschines has plainly done, saying 1 that I 
 am the cause of all, and that the commonwealth has fallen 
 into troubles through me, when it was not owing to my views 
 or principles that you began to assist the Greeks; for, if you 
 conceded 2 this to me, that my influence caused you to resist 
 the subjugation of Greece, it would be a higher honor than 
 any that you have bestowed upon others. I myself would 
 n<tt make such an assertion—it would be doing you injustice 
 —nor would you allow it, I am sure; and iEschines, if he 
 acted honestly, would never, out of enmity to me, have dis¬ 
 paraged and defamed the greatest of your glories. 
 
 But why do I censure him for this, when with calumny far 
 more shocking has he assailed me ? He that charges me with 
 Philippizing—O heaven and earth!—what would he not say? 
 By Hercules and the Gods! if one had honestly to inquire, 
 discarding all expression of spite and falsehood, who the per¬ 
 sons really are, on whom the blame of what has happened 
 may by common consent fairly and justly be thrown, it 
 would be found, they are persons in the various states like 
 Aeschines, not like me—persons who, while Philip’s power 
 was feeble and exceedingly small, and we were constantly 
 warning and exhorting and giving salutary counsel, sacrificed 
 the general interests for the sake of selfish lucre, deceiving 
 and corrupting their respective countrymen, 3 until they made 
 them slaves—Daochus, Cineas, Thrasylaus, the Thessalians; 
 Cercidas, Hieronymus, Eucampidas, the Arcadians; Myrtis, 
 Teledam us, Mnaseas, the Argives; Euxitheus, Cleotimus, 
 
 1 Confer ^Eschines contr. Ctes. 61. 
 
 3 Perhaps “ attributed;” as Jacobs and Pabst render it. 
 
 3 Schaefer explains rods vTcdpxovTag tvoTiitu^, “ cives su£e factionis.” 
 
. ON THE CROWN. 
 
 107 
 
 Aristaechmus, the Eleans; Neon and Thrasylochus, sons of 
 the accursed Philiades, the Messenians; Aristratus, Epichares, 
 the Sicyonians; Dinarchus, Demaratus, the Corinthians; 
 Ptoeodorus, Helixus, Perilaus, the Megarians; Timolaus, 
 Theogiton, Anemoetas, the Thebans; Hipparchus, Clitarchus, 
 Sosistratus, the Euboeans. The day will not last me to re¬ 
 count the names of the traitors. 1 All these, O Athenians, 
 are men of the same politics in their own countries as this 
 party among you,—profligates, and parasites, and miscreants, 
 who have each of them crippled 2 their fatherlands; toasted 
 away 3 their liberty, first to Philip and last to Alexander; 
 who measure happiness by their belly and all that is base, 
 while freedom and independence, which the Greeks of olden 
 time regarded as the test and standard of well-being, they 
 have annihilated. 
 
 Of this base and infamous conspiracy and profligacy—or 
 rather, O Athenians, if I am to speak in earnest, of this 
 betrayal of Grecian liberty—Athens is by all mankind ac¬ 
 quitted, owing to my counsels; and I am acquitted by you. 
 Then do you ask me, -ZEschines, for what merit I claim to be 
 honored? I w r ill tell you. Because, while all the statesmen 
 in Greece, beginning with yourself, have been corrupted for¬ 
 merly by Philip and now by Alexander, me neither oppor¬ 
 tunity, nor fair speeches, nor large promises, nor hope, nor 
 fear, nor any thing else could tempt or induce to betray aught 
 that I considered just and beneficial to my country. What¬ 
 ever I have advised my fellow-citizens, I have never advised 
 like you men, leaning as in a balance to the side of profit; 
 all my proceedings have been those of a soul upright, honest, 
 
 1 See the opinion of Polybius in Appendix YI. 
 
 Cicero appears to have imitated this passage in the oration against 
 Yerres, Act. II. lib. 4,—“Nulla domus in Sicilia locuples fuit, ubi iste 
 non textrinum instituerit. Mulier est Segestana, perdives et nobilis, 
 Lamia nomine; per triennium isti, plena domo telarum, stragulam 
 vestem confecit: nihil nisi conchylio tinctum. Attalus, homo pecu- 
 niosus, Neti; Lyso Lilybaei; Critolaus Ennae; Syracusis Alschrio, Cleo- 
 menes, Theomnastus; Elori Archonides, Megistus. Yox me citius 
 defecerit quam nomina.” 
 
 3 Literally: “mutilated.” 
 
 3 I have given for ttpottekukotec; the version of Lord Brougham, who 
 justly censures the paraphrases of the other translators. Jacobs ren. 
 ders it darbot, but says in a note: wortlich: zutrank. Pabst: wie ein 
 Geschenk beim Zutrinken hingegeben haben. 
 
I 
 
 108 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 and incorrupt: intrusted with affairs of greater magnitude 
 than any of my contemporaries, I have administered them 
 all honestly and faithfully. Therefore do I claim to be 
 honored. 
 
 As to this fortification, for which you ridiculed me, 1 of the 
 wall and fosse, I regard them as deserving of thanks and 
 praise, and so they are; but I place them nowhere near my 
 acts of administration. Not with stones nor with bricks did 
 I fortify Athens: nor is this the ministry on which I most 
 pride myself. Would you view my fortifications aright, you 
 will find arms, and states, and posts, and harbors, and 
 galleys, and horses, and men for their defense. 2 These are 
 the bulwarks with which I protected Attica, as far as was 
 possible by human wisdom; with these I fortified our terri¬ 
 tory, not the circle of Piraeus or the city. 3 Nay more; I 
 was not beaten by Philip in estimates or preparations; far 
 from it; but the generals and forces of the allies were over- 
 
 i 
 
 * 
 
 1 iEschines had urged in his speech—“that the merit of repairing 
 the fortifications was far outweighed by the guilt of having rendered 
 such repairs necessary; that a good statesman should not seek to be 
 honored for strengthening the ramparts, but for doing some real service 
 to the commonwealth.”—P. 87. 
 
 2 I have here taken tovtov as Wolf, Reiske, Jacobs, and Pabst do. 
 But Taylor, Maryland, and Schaefer understand it to mean “ these 
 men,” i. e. the Athenians. 
 
 3 I subjoin Lord Brougham’s note:— 
 
 “ The fame of this noble passage is great and universal. It is of a 
 beauty and force made for all times and all places; its effect with us 
 may be imagined by supposing Mr. Pitt to have been attacked for his 
 Martello towers, the use of which was far more doubtful than Demos¬ 
 thenes’ reixio/ibc and raippela, and to have indignantly and proudly 
 appealed to the other services he had rendered and the other outworks 
 he had erected for our internal protection against foreign and domestic 
 enemies. One seems to hear him nobly pour forth his magnificent 
 periods, alike majestic in structure and in tone, upon the Tines of cir- 
 cumvallation far mightier than any fortress, lines which the energy of 
 a united people and the wisdom of a British parliament had drawn 
 around our glorious constitution, placing it in proud security above all 
 the assaults either of an insulting enemy from without, or a more 
 desperate foe at home,’—and ‘ desiring that his title to the gratitude of 
 his country should be rested on foundations like these, far more im¬ 
 perishable than any works which the hands of men could raise.’ Or 
 would he haply have spoken figuratively of ‘ the loftier towers which 
 he had raised in the people’s hearts, and the exhaustless magazines of 
 their loyalty and valor?’ ” 
 
 » 
 
ON THE CROWN. 109 
 
 come by his fortune. Where are the proofs of this ? They 
 are plain and evident. Consider. 
 
 What was the course becoming a loyal citizen—a states¬ 
 man serving his country with all possible forethought and zeal 
 and fidelity ? Should he not have covered Attica on the sea¬ 
 board with Euboea, on the midland frontier with Bceotia, on the 
 Peloponnesian with the people of that confine? Should he 
 not have provided for the conveyance of corn along a friendly 
 coast all the way to Piraeus? preserved certain places that 
 belonged to us by sending off succors, and by advising and 
 moving accordingly, — Proconnesus, Chersonesus, Tenedos? 
 brought others into alliance and confederacy with us,—By¬ 
 zantium, Abydus, Euboea?—cut off the principal resources 
 of the enemy, and supplied what the commonwealth was de¬ 
 ficient in? All this has been accomplished by my decrees 
 and measures; and whoever will examine them without prej¬ 
 udice, men of Athens, will find they were rightly planned 
 and faithfully executed; that none of the proper seasons were 
 lost or missed or thrown away by me, nothing which depend¬ 
 ed on one man’s ability and prudence was neglected. But if 
 the power of some deity or of fortune, or the worthlessness 
 of commanders, or the wickedness of you that betrayed your 
 countries, or all these things together, injured and eventually 
 ruined our cause, of what is Demosthenes guilty ? Had there 
 in each of the Greek cities been one such man as I was in my 
 Station among you; or rather, had Thessaly possessed one 
 single man, and Arcadia one, of the same sentiments as my¬ 
 self, none of the Greeks either beyond or within Thermopylae 
 would have suffered their present calamities; all would have 
 been free and independent, living prosperously in their own 
 countries with perfect safety and security, thankful to you 
 and the rest of the Athenians for such manifold blessings 
 through me. 
 
 To show you that I greatly understate my services for fear 
 of giving offense, here—read me this—the list of auxiliaries 
 procured by my decrees. 
 
 [The list of auxiliaries.'] 
 
 These and the like measures, JEschines, are what become 
 an honorable citizen; (by their success—O earth and heav¬ 
 en !—we should have been the greatest of people incontest- 
 
110 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 ably, and deserved to be so: even under their failure the re¬ 
 sult is glory, and no one blames Athens or her policy: all 
 condemn fortune that so ordered things:) but never will he 
 desert the interests of the commonwealth, nor hire himself to 
 her adversaries, and study the enemy’s advantage instead of 
 his country’s; nor on a man who has courage to advise and 
 propose measures worthy of the state, and resolution to perse¬ 
 vere in them, will he cast an evil eye, and, if any one privately 
 offends him, remember and treasure it up ; no, nor keep him¬ 
 self in a criminal and treacherous 1 retirement, as you so often 
 do. There is indeed a retirement just and beneficial to the 
 state, such as you, the bulk of my countrymen, innocently 
 enjoy: that however is not the retirement of JEschines; far 
 from it. Withdrawing himself from public life when he 
 pleases, (and that is often,) he watches for the moment when 
 you are tired of a constant speaker, or when some reverse of 
 fortune has befallen you, or any thing untoward has happened 
 (and many are the casualties of human life): at such a crisis 
 he springs up an orator, rising from his retreat like a wind; 
 in full voice, 2 with words and phrases collected, he rolls them 
 out audibly and breathlessly, to no advantage or good purpose 
 whatsoever, but to the detriment of some or other of his fel¬ 
 low-citizens and to the general disgrace. 
 
 1 As to the meaning of vttovXoc;, the Edinburgh reviewer, whom I 
 have before quoted, remarks as follows (vol. xxxvi. p. 493) 
 
 “ He accuses Aeschines of maintaining an unfair and, hollow silence, or 
 quiet, rjovxiav udinov ical vttovIov. This translation we consider a very 
 tolerable one, but how far it falls short of the original will be seen 
 when, in order to express the literal meaning of that single word, we 
 are of necessity driven to this periphrasis— a hollow silence, like that 
 particular state of a wound which has just skinned over, as if about to 
 heal, but which is nevertheless rankling underneath, and just upon the 
 point of breaking out into fresh mischief ” 
 
 Leland renders it “insidious.” Brougham: “traitorous.” Auger: 
 “perfide.” Jacobs: heimtiickische. Pabst: arglistige. 
 
 3 Leland renders this aptly enough: “ hiswoice is already exercised.” 
 Spillan follows him; and Pabst is to the same effect. It is not correct 
 to say, “ raising his voice,” or the like, as others have it. 
 
 It appears from the testimony of ancient writers, as well as from the 
 sneers of Demosthenes, that Aeschines had a remarkably fine voice, and 
 was not a little proud of it. A good voice must indeed have been a 
 great advantage to an Athenian speaker, who had to address thousands 
 of people in the open air. But JEschines not only possessed a voice 
 that was loud and clear, but had a wonderful ease and fluency of speech, 
 in these natural gifts surpassing Demosthenes himself. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Yet from this labor and diligence, JEschines, if it pro¬ 
 ceeded, from an honest heart, solicitous for your country’s 
 welfare, the fruits should have been rich and noble and pro¬ 
 fitable to all—alliances of states, supplies of money, con¬ 
 veniences of commerce, enactment of useful laws, opposition 
 to our declared enemies. All such things were looked for 1 in 
 former times; and many opportunities did the past afford 
 for a good man and true to show himself; during which time 
 you are nowhere to be found, neither first, second, third, 
 fourth, fifth, nor sixth 2 —not in any rank at all—certainly 
 on no service by which your country was exalted. For what 
 alliance has come to the state by your procurement ? What 
 succors, what acquisition of good-will or credit? What em¬ 
 bassy or agency is there of yours, by which the reputation of 
 the country has been increased? What concern domestic, 
 Hellenic, or foreign, of which you have had the management, 
 has improved under it ? What galleys ? what ammunition ? 
 what arsenals ? what repair of walls ? what cavalry ? What 
 in the world are you good for ? What assistance in money 
 have you ever given, either to the rich or the poor, out of 
 public spirit or liberality? None. But, good sir, if there is 
 nothing of this, there is at all events zeal and loyalty. Where ? 
 
 1 ’Egtracuc r/v, “ there was an inquiry after—they were wanted,”— 
 the word being strictly applicable to a seai*ch or muster, where the 
 names of persons are called over—the things needed or missing are 
 inquired for. Hence kt-eru&oOai gets the meaning,of “ to be found 
 being strictly, “to be called over at muster,” and more loosely, “to 
 appear in your place at call.” Leland’s translation is: “ such were the 
 services which the late times required.” Spillan: “ for all these services 
 there was a demand.” Francis : “ these were objects of great attention.” 
 The Germans, however, understand it differently. Jacobs: Alle diese 
 Gcgenstande dienten in friiherer Zeit zur Prufung. Pabst: Ditrch 
 alles dies konnte man in den fruhern Zeiten sick crproben, which is 
 pretty nearly the same thing as is expressed by the next clause. Com¬ 
 pare the passage below (p. 331, Orig.), eneLdrj ovketl cvpfiov'kuv aA/ld 
 tuv rolg hTuraTTOfiEvoLg vTiTjpETOvvrtov Kal tuv Kara rr/g Trarpidog fuoOap- 
 veiv kroi/iuv Kal tuv noXaneveiv eripovg dovXopevuv E^Eraai£ rjv , TjjviKavra 
 av Kal tovtcjv EKaarog ev Tuijei. 
 
 2 Auger contents himself with rendering this: “ni le premier, ni le 
 second, ni le dernier, dans aucun rang enfin,” and observes, “il me 
 semble que cette enumeration arithmetique n’auroit eu aucune grace en 
 franfois.” It refers, however, to an ancient answer of the Delphic oracle, 
 which to an inquiry, what rank the iEgaeans held, responded, that “ they 
 were neither thira, nor fourth, nor twelfth ; of no number or account 
 at all.” 
 
112 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 when? You infamous fellow! Even at a time when all who 
 ever spoke upon the platform gave something for the public 
 safety, and last Aristonicus gave the sum which he had 
 amassed to retrieve his franchise, 1 you neither came forward 
 nor contributed a mite—not from inability—no! for you have 
 inherited above five talents from Philo, your wife’s father, and 
 you had a subscription of two talents from the chairmen of 
 the Boards for what you did to cut up the navy-law. But, 
 that I may not go from one thing to another and lose sight of 
 the question, I pass this by. That it was not poverty pre¬ 
 vented your contributing, already appears: it was, in fact, 
 your anxiety to do nothing against those to whom your po¬ 
 litical life is subservient. On what occasions then do you 
 show your spirit? When do you shine out? 2 When aught 
 is to be spoken against your countrymen !—then it is you are 
 splendid in voice, perfect in memory, an admirable actor, a 
 tragic Theocrines. 3 
 
 You mention the good men of olden times;'and you are 
 right so to do. Yet it is hardly fair, O Athenians, that he 
 should get the advantage of that respect which you have for 
 the dead, to compare and contrast me with them,—me who 
 am living among you; for what mortal is ignorant, that to¬ 
 ward the living there exists always more or less of ill-will, 
 whereas the dead are no longer hated even by an enemy ? 4 
 Such being human nature, am I to be tried and judged by 
 * 
 
 1 His civic privileges were suspended, until he had discharged the 
 debt due from him to the state. 
 
 2 N eavtaq — hapirpoe. Leland : “spirited and shining.’’ Brougham: 
 “bold and munificent.” Francis : “ on what occasions has your spirit 
 been excited and your abilities displayed ?” Jacobs: wacker — kraftig. 
 Pabst: Bei welchen Gelegenheiten zeigtest Du Dich also mit jugend- 
 licher Kraft, bei welchen glanzend und ausgezeichnet. See note 1, p. 67. 
 
 3 Theocrines was a notorious informer and slanderer. There is an 
 oration attributed to Demosthenes against such a person. Reiske in 
 his Index says, apparently from conjecture—“ Yidetur Athenis Roscius 
 sevi sui fuisse, i. e. perfectus histrio comicus; cum quo Demosthenes 
 iEschinem comparans Theocrinem tragicum appellat, ut agentem his- 
 trionicam in rebus seriis et funestis.” 
 
 4 Compare Thucydides ii. 45.—< pdovoe ydp roig &oi irpoc to uvrliralov 
 rd dt pi] kp7roddv av array uvloru evvota TETi/urjTai ; and the declamation 
 attributed to Cicero against Sallust: “ Quare noli mihi antiquos viros 
 objectare. Neque me cum iis conferre decet, Patres Conscript!, qui jam 
 decesserunt, omnique odio carent et invidia, sed cum iis qui mecum una 
 in republic^ versati sunt ” 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 113 
 
 the standard of my predecessors ? Heaven forbid! It is not 
 just or equitable, JEschines. Let me be compared with you, 
 or any persons you like of your party who are still alive. 
 And consider this—whether it is more honorable and better 
 for the state, that because of the services of a former age, 
 prodigious though they are beyond all power of expression, 
 those of the present generation should be unrequited and 
 spurned, or that all who £ive proof of their good intentions 
 should have their share of honor and regard from the people ? 
 Yet indeed—if I must say so much—my polities and princi¬ 
 ples, if considered fairly, will be found to resemble those of 
 the illustrious ancients, and to have had the same objects in 
 view, while yours resemble those of their calumniators; for 
 it is certain there were persons in those times, who ran down 
 the living, and praised people dead and gone, with a malignant 
 purpose like yourself. 
 
 You say that I am nothing like the ancients. Are you like 
 them, iEschines? Is your brother, or any of our speakers? 
 I assert that none is. But pray, my good fellow, (that I 
 may give you no other name,) try the living with the living 
 and with his competitors, as you would in all cases—poets, 
 dancers, athletes. Philammon did not, because he was infe¬ 
 rior to Glaucus of Carystus and some other champions of 
 a by-gone age, depart uncrowned from Olympia, but, because 
 he beat all who entered the ring against him, was crowned 
 and proclaimed conqueror . 1 So I ask you to compare me 
 with the orators of the day, with yourself, with any one you 
 like: I yield to none. When the commonwealth was at liberty 
 to choose for her advantage, and patriotism was a matter 
 of emulation, I showed myself a better counselor than any, 
 and every act of state was pursuant to my decrees and laws 
 
 1 An anecdote of this Glaucus is told by Pausanias (vi. 10). He used 
 to drive his father’s plow, and one day, when the coulter was loose, 
 lie knocked it in with his fist. His father, having seen this feat, took 
 him to Olympia, and entered him in the ring as a pugilist. He was 
 nearly beaten for want of skill, when his father called out, “Strike as 
 you did the coulter,” on which he redoubled his efforts, and won the 
 battle. 
 
 The argument here advanced is anticipated by ^Escliines, (cont. 
 Ctes. 81,) who asserts that on questions of political merit the true test 
 is, not a mere comparison with men of the day, but a positive standard 
 of excellence. 
 
114 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF. DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 and negotiations: none of your party was to be seen, unless 
 you had to do the Athenians a mischief. After that lament¬ 
 able occurrence, when there was a call no longer for advisers, 
 but for persons obedient to command, persons ready to be 
 hired against their country and willing to flatter strangers, 
 then all of you were in occupation, grand people with splendid 
 equipages; I was powerless, I confess, though more attached 
 to my countrymen than you . 1 % 
 
 Two things, men of Athens, are characteristic of a well- 
 disposed citizen :—so may I speak of myself and give the 
 least offense:—In authority, his constant aim should be the 
 dignity and pre-eminence of the commonwealth ; in all times 
 and circumstances his spirit should be loyal. This depends 
 upon nature; power and might upon other things. Such a 
 spirit, you will find, I have ever sincerely cherished. Only 
 see. When my person was demanded—w'hen they brought 
 Amphictyonic suits against me—when they menaced—when 
 they promised — when they set these miscreants like wild 
 beasts upon me—never in any way have I abandoned my 
 affection for you. From the very beginning I chose an honest 
 and straightforward course in politics, to support the honor, 
 the power, the glory of my fatherland, these to exalt, in these 
 to have my being. I do not walk about the market-place 
 gay and cheerful because the stranger has prospered, holding 
 out my right hand and congratulating those who I think will 
 report it yonder, and on any news of our own success shudder 
 and groan and stoop to the earth, like these impious men, 
 who rail at Athens, as if in so doing they did not rail at 
 themselves; who look abroad, and if the foreigner thrives by 
 the distresses of Greece, are thankful for it, and say we should 
 keep him so thriving to all time. 
 
 Never, O ye Gods, may those wishes be confirmed by you! 
 If possible, inspire even in these men a better sense and 
 feeling! But if they are indeed incurable, destroy them by 
 themselves; exterminate them on land and sea; and for the 
 
 1 iEschines declares (cont. Ctes. 76) that soon after the battle of 
 Chseronea Demosthenes rose in the assembly, trembling and half-dead, 
 and asked that he might be appointed to draw up the terms of peace; 
 but the Athenians would not allow his name to be subscribed to their 
 decrees. 
 
ON THE CROWN. 
 
 115 
 
 rest of us, grant that we may speedily be released from our 
 present fears, and enjoy a lasting deliverance I 1 
 
 1 Lord Brougham’s version of this concluding passage is spirited, 
 though not free from faults:' 
 
 “ Let not, 0 gracious God, let not such conduct receive any measure 
 of sanction from thee! Rather plant even in these men a better spirit 
 and better feelings! But if they are wholly incurable, then pursue 
 them, yea, themselves by themselves, to utter and untimely perdition, 
 by land and by sea; and to us who are spared vouchsafe to grant the 
 speediest rescue from our impending alarms, and an unshaken security.” 
 
 ’ETnvevoeie ravra is not translated quite correctly, and pakioTa is 
 omitted. “Themselves by themselves” is a Greek idiom, notan En¬ 
 glish. For example, avrog avrov aTTEKTeivev is, in plain and good En¬ 
 glish, “ he killed himself,” not, “he himself killed himself.” We might 
 say, “by themselves alone;” and Leland’s turn is not bad: “on them, 
 on them only discharge your vengeance.” 
 
 It may be thought that my own version of the k&Tieig Kal tv pouleiq 
 TToerjaare is too wide. I look upon it as a phrase, like dyeiv Kal (pipeiv 
 and many others, to be represented by some general equivalent, and 
 not by taking the words piecemeal. There is no advantage that I see 
 in giving a particular verbal expression to the npo in TTpou^eig, since 
 in any form of imprecation, such as “perdition seize,” or the like, it is 
 necessarily implied that the destruction is to be premature, or before 
 the ordinary course of nature. 
 
 Lord Brougham justly says that “ the music of this passage is almost 
 as fine as the sense is impressive and grand, and the manner dignified 
 and calm;” and he remarks upon the difficulty of preserving this in 
 a translation. The last two lines are perhaps the most difficult of all. 
 I have resorted to a little expansion, in the attempt to preserve their 
 harmony; yet I-am unable to satisfy myself, ’kctyalfj auTTjpiav is 
 variously rendered—bySpillan: “safe securit} 7 ”—Leland: “blessings 
 of protection and tranquillity.” Lord Brougham’s “ unshaken security” 
 is a good expression, and sounds well at the close. “ Inviolable secu¬ 
 rity” had occurred to me; but I rather think that curypiav indicates 
 the idea of divine protection, or safety derived from the Gods. The 
 prayer of Demosthenes is, that his countrymen may not only be extri¬ 
 cated from their present state of suspense and anxiety, but may have 
 the insurance of divine protection for the future. In effect, he prays 
 for the deliverance of Athens from a foreign yoke, and the restoration 
 of her ancient dignity. His language is purposely vague, but was not 
 the less felt and understood by his hearers. The very prayer which 
 invokes a blessing upon the Athenians is designed to impress the con¬ 
 viction upon them, that HDschines was their deadly enemy, wdio would 
 regard their welfare as his own ruin. . 
 
 The version of Jacobs is subjoined. He has been bold enough, like 
 Leland, to omit “by land and sea;” which, perhaps, to modern ears, 
 does not much add to the force. It means, that the whole gang of 
 traitors should be destroyed, in whatever part of the world they might 
 be, without chance or possibility of escape. 
 
 Moc/ite dock, o all’ i/ir Glitter I keiner von Ench dieses billigen, son - 
 
116 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 * 
 
 THE ORATION ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 Demosthenes appears in this cause as the conductor of a prosecution 
 against AEschines for treasonable practices in the embassy which pre- 
 ceded the peace of b.c. 346. The circumstances connected with that 
 embassy are so fully explained in the third Appendix to A r olume I., 
 and in the first Appendix to this Volume, that it will be sufficient to 
 advert briefly to them, while we inquire more particularly^lnto cer¬ 
 tain matters that took place after the conclusion of the peace and be¬ 
 fore this prosecution. An interval of three years elapsed between 
 those two events. Aeschines was then accused and brought to trial, 
 not only for neglect and misconduct in the performance of his duty 
 as embassador, but for positive corruption and betrayal of his coun¬ 
 try’s interests to Philip. It will naturally be asked why*the pro¬ 
 ceeding against him on such grave charges was so long delayed. For 
 this various causes may be assigned. 
 
 Notwithstanding the dissatisfaction of the Athenians at the conditions 
 and consequences of the peace, and at the triumph and advantage 
 which Philip had obtained, there was a general reluctance to bring on 
 any public discussion of the matter, which might possibly provoke 
 a new quarrel, for which the Athenians were ill prepared. It was felt 
 that an exposure of the artifices by which the people were deluded 
 would reflect some disgrace upon them for their credulity., All parties 
 concerned in the negotiation for peace were in some measure respons- 
 
 dern Ihr vor alien Bingen auch diesen hier einen bcssern Sinn und bes- 
 seres Gemuth verleihen ; wenn sie aber unheilbar sind, sie allein fur sick 
 dem Verderben uberliefern, uns, den Uebrigen, aber die schnellste Befrei- 
 ung von den obschwebenden Besorgnissen und unerschiltterte Woihlfahrt 
 g ewd.hr en. 
 
 Now let the reader compare with this the peroration of the first. 
 Catilinarian speech: 
 
 “ Hisce ominibus, Catilina, cum summa reipublicaj salute et cum tua 
 peste ac pernicie, cumque eorum exitio, qui se tecum omni scelere pai*- 
 ricidioque junxerunt, proficiscere ad impium bellum ac nefarium. Turn 
 tu, Jupiter, qui iisdem, quibus h£ec urbs, auspiciis a Romulo es consti- 
 tutus; quern Statorem hujus urbis atque imperii vere nominaraus; hunc 
 et hujus socios a tuis aris ceterisque templis, a tectis urbis ac mcenibus, 
 a vita fortunisque civium omnium arcebis: et omnes inimicos bonorum, 
 hostes patrise, latrones Italise, scelerum foedere inter se ac nefaria socie- 
 tate conjunctos, leternis suppliciis vivos mortuosque mactabis.” 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 117 
 
 ible for it, and among these Demosthenes himself: and therefore, 
 ■while he was the first to call the attention of his countrymen to the 
 misdeeds of his colleagues, he forbore for some time to take any act¬ 
 ive steps against them. Again, whatever ground there might be for 
 suspecting JEschines and Philocrates of corrupt practices, there ap¬ 
 peared no substantial proof against them, at least none such as would 
 be sufficient to convict them in a court of justice. Moreover, they 
 were supported by a powerful party, at the head of which were 
 Eubulus and Phocion, and which comprised most of those citizens 
 who were anxious to preserve peace with Macedonia. Demosthenes, 
 although he had acquired a great reputation both as a statesman and 
 an orator, had not yet attained that high position as minister of the 
 commonwealth, to which a few more years served to raise him. 
 These were the causes which for a long time prevented any formal 
 pi’oceeding against the suspected parties. 
 
 The discontent at Athens however continued to increase. Tho com¬ 
 plaints against the embassadors were kept alive, not only by private 
 discussion, but by frequent indirect attacks upon them in the public 
 debates. Thus, in the Oration on the Peace, Demosthenes reminded 
 the people how they had been deluded by false reports and promises. 
 In the second Philippic, without expressly naming either JEschines 
 or Philocrates, but in language that could not fail to be understood, 
 he publicly denounced them, and declared that they ought to be 
 called to account. The part which HEschines took when Python came 
 to Athens, his addressing the people in support of the Macedonian 
 envoys, and defending Philip’s conduct, by no means tended to in¬ 
 crease his popularity. News was continually arriving at Athens of 
 some warlike or ambitious movement of Philip, plainly showing that 
 he would not rest contented evengwith his present position, but was 
 making advances in every direction to extend his influence and pow¬ 
 er. All this, while it excited the alarm of the Athenians, exalted 
 Demosthenes in their estimation as a man who possessed more fore¬ 
 sight than his adversaries, and brought them in a corresponding degree 
 into disrepute. Before the close of the year n.c. 343, many important 
 events had occurred, showing what advantage Philip had gained by 
 terminating the Sacred War, and how the safety of Athens was en¬ 
 dangered by his influence in Southern Greece. Such were, the divis¬ 
 ion of Thessaly into tetrarchies, and the establishment of Philip’s 
 adherents in the government—the conspiracy of Ptoedorus at Megara, 
 which nearly threw that city into Philip’s hands—his intrigues in 
 Euboea—and those in Elis, where a Macedonian faction had become 
 predominant.* Negotiations had been entered into between Philip 
 and the Athenians, with a view to amend the articles of the peace, 
 and put them on a basis which should preclude future disputes; but 
 they had proved wholly ineffectual. Philip was so incensed at the 
 demands made by the Athenian embassadors, that he treated them 
 with rudeness, and even banished from his dominions the poet Xeno- 
 clides, because he had received them into his house. These events 
 are alluded to in the speech of Demosthenes. Before the trial came 
 on, it is clear that the Athenian people had begun to regard Philip 
 with increased suspicion and anger. 
 
118 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 It would appear also, from a particular passage in the Oration on the 
 Embassy, that the affair of Antiphon (related more fully in the Oration 
 on the Crown, ante p. 55) occurred shortly before the present trial. 
 The part which HEschines took in it caused him to be deprived of an 
 honorable appointment, that of pleader before the Amphictyonic 
 council; so that, if the date which has been assigned is correct, he 
 must about this time have been in no little disgrace with the public. 
 The allusions of Demosthenes, however, are not so distinct as to en¬ 
 able us to speak with much certainty upon the point. 
 
 Notwithstanding all the suspicion under which HEschines might lie, it 
 is very doubtful whether any legal proceeding would ever have been 
 taken against him, but for the imprudence of his colleague Philo- 
 crates, who by his conduct at Athens, by open talk and conversation, 
 afforded the strongest evidence against himself, and almost provoked, 
 his enemies to bring him to justice. Of the treason of Philocrates 
 there remains no historical doubt. He had received from Philip large 
 sums of money and grants of land in Phocis, which brought him in 
 a considerable income; all this wealth he displayed ostentatiously, 
 and made no secret of the quarter from which it was derived. About 
 two years after the peace, and probably not long after the delivery 
 o’f the second Philippic, Hyperides undertook to prosecute him. The 
 law of Athens, in case of high crimes and misdemeanors against the 
 state, afforded a method of proceeding not unlike an impeachment in 
 our own law. This method Hyperides adopted. He brought Philo¬ 
 crates before the popular assembly, and there charging him with 
 treasonable conspiracy, procured a decree of the people ordering him 
 to be brought to trial. Philocrates, having (as we may presume) 
 given bail for his appearance to answer the charge, was so conscious 
 of guilt, and so hopeless of escaj^ that' he sought safety in voluntary 
 exile. 
 
 This confession of crime on the part of one with whom on the most 
 important occasions he had acted in concert was a severe blow to 
 HEscliines. He had already been menaced with a similar accusation: 
 for at the time when Hyperides preferred his impeachment, Demos¬ 
 thenes rose in the assembly, and declared, that there was one thing 
 in it which dissatisfied him, and this was, that Philocrates was the 
 only person accused; for it was certain, there must have been accom¬ 
 plices among the embassadors. “ Let those,” said he, “who disapprove 
 the conduct of Philocrates, and disclaim connection with him, come 
 forward and declare themselves, and I will acquit them from all 
 blame.” No one responded to this challenge; and Demosthenes stood 
 pledged to follow up his own words, and bring another delinquent 
 to justice. The flight of Philocrates left no room for hesitation ; and 
 the only question was, what sort of criminal process it was most 
 advisable to adopt. 
 
 It was open to him to take the same course against HEschines which 
 Hyperides had taken against Philocrates, viz. to proceed by impeach¬ 
 ment. But the more regular way of proceeding against a public 
 functionary for any crime or misdemeanor relating to his office, was 
 to prefer an accusation against him when he presented himself before 
 the logisfai, or auditors, to render an account of his official duties. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 119 
 
 We have seen that every person holding an office of importance at 
 Athens was compelled, after the expiration of his term, to render an 
 account of the manner in which he had acquitted himself. Embas¬ 
 sadors were subject to the same liability as other servants of the pub¬ 
 lic, except that no particular time was fixed for their submission to 
 the audit, as in other cases. The reason for such difference may be 
 found in the nature of their employment; embassadors not*being ap¬ 
 pointed like ordinary magistrates for any stated term, or at regular 
 periods, but occasionally, as circumstances might require. There¬ 
 fore, while it was competent for any citizen to summon an embassa¬ 
 dor before the auditors, and call him to account for the manner in 
 which he had executed his mission, the law prescribed no positive 
 time for the embassador himself to tender his accounts. 
 
 Many embassies must have been simple affairs, involving little or no 
 responsibility; and we may presume, the ministers employed upon 
 them would hardly be called upon to go through the ceremony of an 
 audit. On the other hand, we may reasonably suppose, that persons 
 commissioned to represent their country on questions of moment, and 
 to conduct arduous and critical negotiations, would for their own 
 6akes come before the auditors at the earliest opportunity, and offer 
 themselves to that public inquiry which the Athenian law in all such 
 cases invited or allowed. • ^Eschines had not done so; on the con¬ 
 trary, he had suffered three years to elapse without submitting to this 
 ordeal. But he had raised a point of law, on which his excuse partly 
 rested. He contended that there was no necessity to render an ac¬ 
 count of the second embassy, as all the substantial part of the busi¬ 
 ness had been transacted upon the first; the second journey to Mace¬ 
 donia was for a matter of form only, to receive the oath of Philip: 
 having therefore obtained his legal discharge as to the first embassy, 
 he was to all intents and purposes discharged as to both. Demos¬ 
 thenes took a different view of the question, and presented himself 
 before the auditors as having a distinct account to render of his con¬ 
 duct upon the second embassy. HCschines, seeing that this might be 
 turned into a precedent against him, came with a large number of 
 friends to the audit-room, and objected that the account of Demos¬ 
 thenes could not be received, he being no longer accountable. The 
 objection was overruled; Demosthenes went through the necessary 
 forms, and his account was passed. It does not appear however that 
 this decision had any immediate influence upon the conduct of 
 ^Eschines. The time when Demosthenes presented himself to the au¬ 
 ditors is not stated; yet I should be disposed to think, it was a con¬ 
 siderable time before the commencement of this prosecution. It was 
 not the legal precedent, but the force of circumstance, which after¬ 
 ward determined .Eschines to follow his adversary’s example. Find¬ 
 ing after the flight of Philocrates, that a prosecution against himself 
 was inevitable, he deemed it the most prudent policy to take a bold 
 step; and accordingly he demanded Ins audit, thereby challenging 
 any accuser who dared to come forward and arraign him. 
 
 Several accusers appeared, the principal among them being Timarchus 
 and Demosthenes. Timarchus had long been known as an active 
 politician, and for the last few years had zealously exerted himself 
 
120 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 in opposition to Philip.- He was however a man of profligate habits, 
 and notoriously guilty of certain infamous practices, which by an old 
 statute of Solon incapacitated him to appear as a speaker in the 
 public assembly. iEschines seized the opportunity, which this law 
 afforded him, of striking a blow, which might at the same time crush 
 a formidable adversary, and create a prejudice that should help him 
 materially in his own defense. He demanded, according to the form 
 of the Attic law, a judicial scrutiny into the character of Timarchus, 
 and a jury being summoned to try the case, he accused and convicted 
 him of the crimes above mentioned. The legal consequence of such 
 conviction was disfranchisement; and iEschines thus in a summary 
 way got rid of one of his accusers. Demosthenes remained: and his 
 own trial soon afterward came on. 
 
 The nature of the case is best learned from the speeches of the rival 
 orators. Demosthenes, feeling what difficulties he had to contend 
 with, and how much his own credit was at stake, uses every exertion 
 to bring home toHiischines those charges which he had been for three 
 years proclaiming incessantly to the Athenian public, and labors to 
 supply the want of direct proof by close reasoning, and inferences 
 from a variety of facts and circumstances. He calls attention at the 
 outset to the efforts which the defendant’s party were making to 
 screen him from justice. Timarchus had been destroyed, he says, 
 not for the good of society, but to deter any other accuser from taking 
 up the case. Notwithstanding the lapse of time, he undertakes to 
 prove the following points—that iEschines had deceived the Athe¬ 
 nians by false reports; that he had given treacherous counsel; that 
 he had neglected his instructions; that he had lost precious opportu¬ 
 nities by delay; and that he had done all this from corrupt motives. 
 The charge is in terms confined to the transactions upon the sec¬ 
 ond embassy; but the discussion is by no means confined to them. 
 HSschines, according to his opponent’s view, was bribed by Philip on 
 the first embassy, but no one suspected him till some time after. 
 Dionysius, in his treatise on Rhetoric, commends the skill shown by 
 Demosthenes in dealing with this part of the subject. It would not 
 have lain in his mouth to complain of any thing done upon the first 
 journey to Pella, as on his return he had expressed himself satisfied 
 with all the proceedings, and praised the embassadors for their con¬ 
 duct. The prosecution therefore is nominally directed to the affairs 
 of the second embassy, and the orator, contending that ^Eschines had 
 previously hired himself to Philip, excuses his own apparent inconsist¬ 
 ency by alleging that up to a certain time he, in common with the rest 
 of his fellow-citizens, had been deceived as to the defendant’s motives. 
 He comments-upon the remarkable change which ^Eschines had un¬ 
 dergone in his political views:—he had been sent embassador to Pel¬ 
 oponnesus, to rouse the Arcadians against Philip; he had made a 
 brilliant speech at Megalopolis, in which he assailed the king of 
 Macedon with the fiercest invective; he talked in the same strain 
 when he returned to Athens, and boasted of what he had done; he 
 was appointed on that very account to be one of the embassadors to 
 Pella, that he might be a check upon his colleagues, who were sus¬ 
 pected of being too favorable to Philip; yet, after all this, he was 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 121 
 
 found suddenly acting in concert with Philocrates, and doing every 
 thing to secure Philip's advantage in the negotiations. Among other 
 circumstances, prominently advanced as evidence of guilt, are—the 
 time which the embassadors wasted on their journey to Pella, in dis¬ 
 obedience to the decree’of the council; their lingering afterward at 
 Pella, until Philip returned from Thrace ; their consenting to accom¬ 
 pany him to Pherae, and postponing the signature of the treaty until 
 their arrival at that city. By all this delay Philip was enabled to 
 reduce Thrace into subjection, and complete the preparations for his 
 march southward. It was the duty of the embassadors to apprise 
 their countrymen of Philip’s preparations and objects; yet not only 
 had they neglected to do so themselves, but they refused to permit 
 a letter, which Demosthenes had written for that purpose, to be sent 
 to Athens. Philip had sent a letter to the Athenians, apologizing 
 for their delay : this, says Demosthenes, was an argument that they 
 were colluding with him, and it was plain that .Eschines had dic¬ 
 tated the letter. 
 
 Eschines had had many private interviews with Philip, and on one 
 particular occasion, at Pherse—of this Demosthenes gives evidence 
 —he had been watched coming out of the king’s tent at midnight. 
 It is further asserted by Demosthenes, that on the first embassy Philip 
 offered a sum,of money to the whole body of the embassadors ; that 
 he also sounded them each separately, himself among the rest, with a 
 view to seduce them from their allegiance. Eschines was known to 
 have received land in Phocis, yielding an income of thirty minas; (this 
 apparently is not denied by Eschines;) it could not be doubted that 
 this was the price of corruption. The conduct of Eschines after his 
 return home could only be explained on the supposition of treachery. 
 He professed to be perfectly acquainted with Philip’s intentions; he 
 assured the people that Philip meant to deprive the Thebans of their 
 sovereignty in Boeotia, and to punish them for their designs upon 
 Delphi; to restore Thespiaj and Platsea, and to give Euboea and 
 Oropus to Athens. Afterward, when it turned out that these prom¬ 
 ises were nugatory—when Philip had destroyed the Phocian cities, 
 and confirmed Thebes in her sovereignty over Boeotia—how had 
 Eschines acted? Instead of denouncing Philip for breach of faith, 
 —which would have been the natural course if he had been him¬ 
 self deceived by Philip—he remained quite silent: and not only 
 that; he had gone to Phocis, and shared the festivities of Philip’s 
 camp, and continued ever after to sound his praises at*Athens. Not 
 very long ago he had supported the Macedonian envoi's before the 
 popular assembl}", and, to gratify them, had spoken disparagingly of 
 liis own countrymen. He had throughout assisted and upheld Philoc¬ 
 rates, clearly because he was the partner of his treason, and had 
 been afraid to disclaim connection with him, lest his royal master 
 should be displeased. 
 
 Such are the principal matters of fact adduced by Demosthenes in sup¬ 
 port of the charge. Many stories are told, not bearing directly upon 
 the case, but tending to throw discredit on the character of the de¬ 
 fendant and his supposed accomplices, Philocrates and Phrynon. 
 Great pains also are taken by the orator to explain the part which he 
 
 Vol. II.—F 
 
122 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 himself took in the same transactions, "with a view to clear himself 
 from all imputation of connection with the guilty parties, or any 
 other share of the blame. His anxiety on this head rendered it more 
 difficult for him to confine himself to the question properly at issue; 
 and the speech has not that clear order and arrangement which is com¬ 
 monly observable in Demosthenes. The arguments indeed are often 
 pointed and forcible, but they are not well put together. He dwells 
 with much emphasis on the destruction of the Phocians, on the evil 
 consequences resulting from Philip’s possession of Thermopyke, and 
 the great extension of his power; all wffiicli are attributed to HEschines 
 and his colleagues. If, after they had discovered the designs of Philip, 
 they had given immediate information to the Athenians, there was 
 plenty of time to send a fleet and army to Thermopyke, and prevent 
 his passing the straits: even after he had passed, they might have 
 saved Phocis, if they had not been prevented by false intelligence and 
 insidious counsels. The men who had thus deceived their country¬ 
 men had been hired ta betray a sacred trust, and they ought not to 
 be spared. It was urged, that their punishment would excite the 
 resentment of Philip: but, says Demosthenes, they deserved punish¬ 
 ment on this very account, that they had made Philip’s resentment 
 a thing to be dreaded; and Philip should be made to see that it 
 would not answer his purpose to bribe the citizens of Athens. He 
 reminds the jury how severely Timarchus had been dealt with, and 
 how HEschines had in his case insisted upon general notoriety as 
 a sufficient ground of conviction: if they tried HEschines upon his 
 own principles, they must convict him, for his guilt was known to 
 all. He comments at great length upon the general increase of cor¬ 
 ruption in the Greek states, showing what baneful effects it had pro¬ 
 duced in Chalcidice, Peloponnesus, and elsewhere, and how perilous 
 it would be to themselves, if they suffered it to spread yet further. 
 Strong measures should be taken to check the progress of the mis¬ 
 chief; and now that HEschines w T as brought before them on a clear 
 charge of treason, they should, without regard to his abilities, his 
 position, or his party, make a signal example of him, and strike ter¬ 
 ror into the host of traitors in the Hellenic world. 
 
 HEschines replied, in a speech little, if at all, inferior to that of his 
 adversary; and, as we are informed by Idomeneus the Epicurean, he 
 was acquitted by a majority of thirty votes. Nor can this surprise 
 us, when we look at the circumstances of the case—the length of 
 time which.had elapsed—the lack of any direct proof of criminality 
 —the able defense made by HEschines—the advantage which he had 
 gained by the conviction of Timarchus—and the powerful aid of 
 Eubulus and other friends, who appeared in his behalf, or supported 
 him by their influence. 
 
 Notwithstanding the express testimony of Idomeneus, who wrote not 
 very long after the event, and who is confirmed by Ulpian, there are 
 writers, both ancient and modern, who have inclined to the opinion 
 that HEschines was never brought to trial, but the orations on both 
 sides were only published. The doubt was first suggested by Plutarch, 
 who thought it strange that no mention of this trial should be made 
 in either of the speeches on the Crown. The same view is espoused 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 123 
 
 by Albert Gerhard Beeker, in his treatise on the character of Demos¬ 
 thenes, ( Demosthenes als Staatsman und Redner, p. 320,) who argues 
 the matter more fully. It appears to me, that the negative evidence 
 on which they rely has but little force under the circumstances, for 
 the reason assigned by Auger, (which Becker does not satisfactorily 
 answer,) viz., that botli the orators had motives for their silence: 
 
 ’ Demosthenes had lost the verdict, and therefore had nothing to boast 
 of; HCschines had so small a majority—the whole number of jurors 
 being not less probably than five hundred—that he was considered 
 not to have obtained an honorable acquittal. 
 
 As to the title to this oration, and further information as to the law, see 
 my article Farapresbeia in the Archaeological Dictionary. 
 
 Of the intrigue and canvassing which there has been about 
 this trial, men of Athens, I imagine you are all aware, having 
 seen what a throng assailed you at the ballot just now . 1 I 
 shall only ask at your hands—what those who don’t ask it 
 are entitled to—that you will value no person and no one’s 
 favor more highly than justice and the oath which each juror 
 has sworn, remembering that this is for the good of yourselves 
 and the community ; whereas all this intrigue and importunity 
 of partisans is to get advantages for some persons over the 
 rest, which the laws assemble you here to prevent, not to se¬ 
 cure for the benefit of the unjust. 
 
 Other men, who enter honestly upon the service of the 
 public, even after their audit, I see, profess a continued re¬ 
 sponsibility : Aeschines does the very reverse; for before he 
 appeared in court to give a reckoning of his actions, one of 
 the persons who came to demand it he has removed out of 
 the way ; 2 others he goes about threatening, and thus intro¬ 
 duces into the commonwealth a practice most flagitious and 
 injurious to you ; for if a man who has discharged or admin¬ 
 istered any public office can by intimidation, and not by hon¬ 
 esty, keep people from accusing him, you will be deprived of 
 all authority. 
 
 That I shall prove the defendant to be guilty of many grave 
 misdemeanors, and to merit the severest punishment, I am 
 confident and persuaded: what, notwithstanding such con¬ 
 viction, I am afraid of, I will tell you without disguise. It 
 appears to me, O Athenians, that all the causes which come 
 before you depend on the time of bringing them as much as 
 
 1 For the election of jurors. See page 81, note 1. 
 s Timarchus. See Appendix II. • - 
 
124 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 upon the merits, and I fear, the length of time since the 
 embassy may have caused you to forget or become reconciled 
 to your wrongs. Yet, even under these circumstances, you 
 may, 1 think, arrive at a correct judgment and decision: I 
 will tell you how. You must consider among yourselves, 
 men of the jury, and reflect for what things the common¬ 
 wealth should receive an account from an embassador. First, 
 it should be, on the subject of his reports; secondly, of his 
 counsels; thirdly, of your instructions to him; next, as to 
 the circumstances of time; and after all, whether in each of 
 these points he has acted incorruptly or not. Why these in¬ 
 quiries ? Because, from his reports you have to deliberate on 
 your course of action ; if they are true, you determine rightly, 
 if not so, otherwise. The advice of embassadors you give 
 more credit to, because you listen to them as to men who 
 understand what they were sent about: never then ought 
 an embassador to be convicted of giving bad or mischievous 
 advice. And of course, whatever you instructed him either 
 to do or say, whatever commission you expressly gave him, it 
 is his duty to have executed. But why the account of time? 
 Because it often happens, men of Athens, that the season for 
 many important measures falls in a short space, and if it be 
 sacrificed and betrayed to the enemy, do what you will, it 
 can not be recalled. As to the absence of corrupt motive— 
 I am sure you will all agree, that to take reward for acts 
 which injure the-commonwealth is shocking and abominable. 
 The legislator indeed does not define it so, but absolutely for¬ 
 bids the taking of bribes in anyway, considering, as it appears 
 to me, that a person who is once bribed and corrupted ceases 
 to be even a safe judge of what is useful for the state. If 
 then I shall prove and demonstrate clearly, that JEschines 
 the defendant has reported what is untrue, and prevented 
 the people hearing the truth from me—that he has given 
 advice totally opposed to your interests, and fulfilled none of 
 your instructions on the embassy—that he has wasted time 
 in which many important opportunities have been lost to the 
 commonwealth—and that for all this he has received presents 
 and wages in conjunction with Philocrates,—convict him, 
 punish him as his crimes deserve: if I prove not these state¬ 
 ments, or not all of them, look with contempt on me, and 
 acquit the defendant. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 125 
 
 Many grievous things can I lay to his charge besides those 
 which I have mentioned, O Athenians — enough to make 
 every one detest him—but before I enter upon other topics, I 
 will remind you (though nearly all indeed must remember) 
 what character iEschines first assumed in politics, and what 
 language he thought proper to address to the people against 
 Philip, that you may see, his own early acts and speeches will 
 most surely convict him of taking bribes. 
 
 He is the first Athenian (as he declared in his speech) who 
 discovered that Philip was plotting against the Greeks, and 
 corrupting certain of the leading men in Arcadia. He it is 
 who, having Ischander, son of Neoptolemus, to play second 
 part to him, 1 applied to the council on this matter, and also 
 to the people, and persuaded you to send embassadors every 
 where to assemble a congress at Athens for consulting about 
 war with Philip ; who afterward, on his return from Arcadia, 
 reported those fine long speeches, which he said he had de¬ 
 livered on your behalf before the ten thousand at Megalop¬ 
 olis, 2 in answer to Philip’s advocate Hieronymus, and dwelt 
 on the enormous injury done, not only to their own countries, 
 but to the whole of Greece, by the men who took presents 
 and money from Philip. Such being his politics then, such 
 the specimen which he had given of himself, when Aristo- 
 demus, Neoptolemus, Ctesiphon, and the rest, who brought 
 reports from Macedonia, without a word of truth, prevailed 
 on you to send embassadors to Philip for peace, this man is 
 put into the embassy, not as one of a party who would sell 
 your interests, not as one of those who trusted Philip, but as 
 one who would help to watch the others; for, on account of 
 his former speeches and hostility to Philip, you all naturally 
 held that opinion of him. He came then to me, and arranged 
 that we should act in the embassy together; and strongly 
 
 1 Pabst: indem er dem Ischander dem Sohne des Neoptolemus die 
 zweite Rolle bei seinen Umtrieben zu spielen iibertrug. Others connect 
 dEvrepayuvioTT/v with rbv NeoTTTO?.efJov, and understand it literally, as 
 if Ischander had been an actor, as Photius says he was. See Thirl- 
 wali’s Gr. Hist. v. 326. Taylor takes rdv NeoTTTohe/uov to mean “the 
 servant or assistant of Neoptolemus.” 
 
 3 The general Pan-Arcadian assembly, which met at Megalopolis, and 
 had power to determine questions of peace and war. See Diodorus, xv. 
 69. And as to the embassy of Alschines to Peloponnesus, see Appendix 
 VIII. 
 
& 
 
 126 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 urged, that we should both watch that impudent profligate 
 Philocrates. And until his return home from the first em¬ 
 bassy, men of Athens, I certainly never discovered that he was 
 corrupted and had sold himself; for, besides the speeches 
 which, as I said, he had made before, he rose in the first of 
 the assemblies in which you debated on the peace, and began 
 —I think I can repeat his opening to you in the very same 
 words which he used—“ Had Philocrates been meditating 
 ever so long, men of Athens, upon the best means of opposing 
 the peace, he could not, methinks, have found a better way 
 than a motion like the present. Never will I, while a single 
 Athenian is left, advise the commonwealth to make a peace 
 like this: peace, however, I do advise”—and to such purport 
 briefly and fairly he expressed himself. Yet the same man 
 who had thus spoken on the first day in the hearing of you 
 all, on the next, when the peace was to be ratified, when I 
 supported the resolution of our allies, and exerted myself to 
 make the peace equitable and just, and you were of my 
 opinion, and would not even hear the voice of the despicable 
 Philocrates, — he then got up and addressed the people in 
 support of Philocrates, and said what (O heavens!) deserved 
 a thousand deaths—that you ought not to remember your 
 ancestors, nor put up with persons who talked about trophies 
 and sea-fights, and that he would propose and pass a law to 
 prevent your succoring any Greeks who had not previously 
 succored you. All which this impudent wretch dared to utter 
 in the presence and hearing of the embassadors, whom you 
 sent for out of Greece at his persuasion before he had sold 
 himself. 
 
 How he wasted the time, O Athenians, after you had 
 appointed him again to receive the oaths; how he ruined all 
 the affairs of the commonwealth, and quarreled with me 
 about it when I sought to prevent him, you shall hear pres¬ 
 ently. But when 1 we had returned from that embassy for 
 the oaths, which is the subject of your present inquiry—we 
 not having obtained a particle, great or small, of what was 
 promised and expected when you made the peace, but having 
 been cheated in every thing, and these men having a second 
 
 1 Auger’s turn of the passage is a good one: “ecoutez auparavant ce 
 qui a suivi le retour de cette seeonde ambassade, dont je lui demande 
 compte aujourd’hui. Nous etions revenu,” &c. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 127 
 
 time outstepped their duty as embassadors, and neglected 
 your orders—we went before the council. What I am about 
 to say is known to many people ; for the council-hall was full 
 of strangers. 1 I came forward and reported the whole truth 
 to the council, and accused these men, and reckoned every 
 thing up, beginning with those first hopes which Ctesiphon and 
 Aristodemus brought you, showing what speeches -ZEschines 
 had made at the time of your concluding peace, and into 
 what position they had brought the commonwealth; and as 
 to what remained, that is, the Phocians and Thermopylae, I 
 advised that we should not sacrifice them and repeat our 
 errors, not keep hanging on hopes and promises, till we let 
 things come to an extremity. And so I persuaded the council. 
 But when the assembly came, and we had to address you, 
 .ZEschines advanced before any of us: and do, I entreat you, 
 try and recollect, as I go on, whether I am telling the truth ; 
 for what marred and utterly ruined all our affairs is just this. 
 From any report of our proceedings on the embassy, from 
 any mention of what was said in the council, whether or 
 no he disputed the truth of my statements, he altogether 
 abstained; but told a tale promising such mighty advant¬ 
 ages, that he carried you all away with him. He said that 
 he had brought Philip entirely over to the interests of Athens, 
 both on Amphictyonic questions and all others; and he went 
 through a long speech, which he said he had addressed to 
 Philip against the Thebans, and repeated to you the heads, 
 and computed that in two or three days (thanks to his own 
 diplomacy) you would hear without leaving home or having 
 any field-service or trouble, that Thebes, alone and separately 
 from the rest of Boeotia, was besieged, that Thespiae and 
 Platsea were having their people restored, and the treasures of 
 the Cxod were demanded not from the Phocians, but from the 
 Thebans, who had formed the design of seizing his temple; 
 for he had taught Philip, he said, that those who designed 
 were guilty of as much impiety as those who executed; and 
 on that account the Thebans had set a price upon his head. 
 He declared further, he had heard some of the Euboeans, who 
 were frightened and alarmed at the connection of our state 
 
 1 I e. people not councilors. As Thirlwall expresses it, (Gr. Hist, 
 v. 363,) “thronged with spectators.” Auger: “plein de peuple.” 
 Pabst: mit Biirgern ohne Staatsamt angefiillt. 
 
128 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 with Philip, say to the embassadors, “ We are not unaware of 
 the terms on which you have concluded peace with Philip; 
 we are not ignorant, that you have given Amphipolis to him, 
 and Philip has agreed to surrender Euboea to youthere 
 was indeed another thing which he had arranged, but he 
 would not mention it yet a while ; for some of his colleagues 
 were jealous of him—hinting in obscure words at Oropus. 
 Exalted in your opinion by this plausible tale, judged to be 
 a consummate orator and a wonderful man, he quitted the 
 platform with much solemnity. I rose, and declared that I 
 knew none of those things, and was proceeding to tell what 
 I had reported to the council; but the defendant standing 
 up on one side, and Philocrates on the other, shouted and 
 clamored me down, and at last mocked me. You laughed, 
 and would neither hear nor believe any thing but what 
 JEschines had reported. And, by the Gods! I think your 
 behavior was not unnatural; for who - could have endured, 
 with such splendid prospects of advantage, to hear any one 
 say they were delusive, or arraign what these men had done? 
 Every thing else, I fancy, at that time was secondary to the 
 hopes and prospects before you; opposition looked like spite 
 and annoyance merely; 1 the results achieved for the country 
 were so marvelously advantageous, as it seemed. 
 
 Why have I begun by reminding you of these things, and 
 going over these speeches ? Chiefly and principally, men of 
 Athens, for this reason, that when you hear me speak of any 
 proceeding, and it appears outrageously bad, you may not cry 
 in astonishment, “Why didn’t you speak at the moment, and 
 inform us ?” but remembering the promises of these men, by 
 means of which on every occasion they prevented others from 
 being heard, and also that specious announcement ofiEschines, 
 you may see that he has injured you in’ .this way among 
 others, because you were not suffered to learn the truth at 
 
 1 I do not agree with Schaefer, in thinking that ol 6’ avrileyovreg 
 oX^oq alTuog are to be separated from the following words. Ol avrtkt- 
 yovrec is, in effect, the same as to avTiheyEiv, and the sentence, though 
 loose, is not inelegant. Pabst expresses it at too great length : und von 
 denen die dem widersprachen nahm man an, dass sie ohne hinlang- 
 lichen Grund als widerwartige und hamische Menschen sich bendhmen. 
 Auger is much neater: “les contredire, c’etoit vous troubler inutile- 
 ment, c’etoit jalousie.” Francis: “whoever contradicted them appeared 
 actuated merely by a spirit of opposition and envy.” 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 129 
 
 the instant when it was needful, but cheated by hopes and im¬ 
 postures and promises. Such was the chief and principal cause 
 of my entering into these details. What was the second “? 
 One of no less importance ; that, while you remember his 
 political principles before he was corrupted—how wary, how 
 mistrustful he was of Philip—you may observe his sudden 
 conversion to confidence and friendship ; and if his reports to 
 you have been verified, and the results are all right, you may 
 hold his conversion to have been honest and for the country’s 
 good ; but if the events have all been contrary to what he said, 
 and are fraught with deep disgrace and grievous peril to the 
 country, you may see that he has changed from sordid avarice 
 and bartering of the truth for money. 
 
 As I have been led into these topics, I would take the ear¬ 
 liest opportunity of mentioning how they took the Phocian 
 business out of your hands. And you must not suppose, 
 men of the jury, when you look at the magnitude of that 
 affair, that the crimes and charges imputed to ^Eschines are 
 too great for his character, but consider, that any person whom 
 you had placed in that position and made the arbiter of events, 
 had he sold himself, like iEschines, for the purpose of cheat¬ 
 ing and deceiving you, would have wrought the same mischief 
 as JEschines. It is not because you often put mean persons 
 in public employments, that the affairs which other people 
 deem our state worthy to administer are mean ; quite other¬ 
 wise. And again—Philip, I grant, has destroyed the Pho- 
 cians; but these men helped him: and we must look and see, 
 whether such chance of saving the Phocians as depended on 
 the embassy was sacrificed and lost by the treachery of these 
 men; not that AEschines 1 destroyed the Phocians by himself 
 —how could he? 
 
 Give me the resolution which the council passed on my 
 report, and the deposition of the person who drew it up 
 * —to show you, I am not repudiating acts which I was 
 silent about before, for I denounced them immediately, and 
 
 1 "Ode means AEschines, as Reiske, Auger, and Pabst take it; not 
 Philip, as Schaefer and Francis. The argument is—It is not necessary 
 to make out, for the purpose of conviction, that AEschines was the sole 
 destroyer of the Phocians; of course he was not, and could not be. 
 Philip was the principal author of that result. The question is, wheth¬ 
 er AEschines and his accomplices did not help to bring it about by 
 their treacherous conduct in the embassv. 
 
 F 2 
 
130 
 
 TIJE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 foresaw the consequences ; and the council, who were not pre¬ 
 vented hearing the truth from me, would neither vote thanks 
 to these men, nor invite them to the city-hall. 1 Such an 
 indignity is not known to have befallen any embassadors 
 since the foundation of the city, not even Timagoras, 3 whom 
 the people condemned to death: yet it has been suffered by 
 these men. 
 
 i 
 
 Head them first the evidence, and then the resolution. 
 
 [The evidence.'] 
 
 [The resolution of the council] 
 
 Here is no vote of thanks, no invitation of the embassadors 
 by the council to the city-hall. If JEschines says there is, let 
 him show and produce it, and I will sit down. But there is 
 none. I allow, if we all acted alike in the embassy, the 
 
 1 The Prytaneum, or town-hall of Athens. This was a public build¬ 
 ing near the market-place, where the Prytanes, or presidents of the 
 council, met to dine every day during their term of office, in company 
 with a few select citizens, to whom the state gave the honor of a pub¬ 
 lic dinner. This honor was sometimes given for life, to men who had 
 done some signal service, or to the children of such persons; but it was 
 a reward reserved for rare occasions. Hence the Athenians were so 
 incensed with Socrates, when, being asked after his conviction what 
 penalty he deserved, he replied, “Dinner in the Prytaneum.” Cicero 
 de Oratore, i. 54:—“ Respondit sese meniisse ut %mplissimis honoribus 
 et pnemiis decoraretur, et ei victus quotidianus in Prytaneo publice 
 prseberetur; qui honos apudGrsecos maximus habetur. Cujus responso 
 sic judices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condem- 
 narent.” Here also the presidents, representing the hospitality of the 
 state, entertained embassadors and other foreigners of distinction. And 
 it appears from this passage of Demosthenes, that it was usual to invite 
 the Athenian embassadors after their return home, unless they had mis¬ 
 conducted themselves, and the omission to give such invitation would 
 be regarded as a stigma. 
 
 2 Timagoras and Leon were the Athenian embassadors to the court 
 of Persia, at the same time when the Thebans and their allies sent 
 a joint embassy with Pelopidas at their head, b. c. 367. According to 
 Xenophon, (Hell. vii. 38,) Leon, upon his return to Athens, accused 
 Timagoras of having refused to lodge with him, and having acted in 
 concert with Pelopidas; and the Athenians for this put him to death. 
 Plutarch, in the life of Pelopidas, relates that the Athenians condemned 
 Timagoras for receiving a large number of presents from Artaxerxes, 
 and traveling to the coast in a carriage provided by the king; though 
 the real cause of their displeasure was, that Pelopidas, by means of 
 his superior credit and abilities, had gained greater success than the 
 Athenian envoys. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 131 
 
 council did right in thanking none of us; for the conduct of 
 all was truly shameful: but if some of us acted uprightly and 
 some not, through the rogues, it would seem, honest men have 
 come in for a share of the disgrace. How then may you easily 
 distinguish who is the knave? Recollect among yourselves, 
 who it is that denounced the proceedings from the beginning: 
 for it is clear that the guilty party was content to be silent, 
 to elude the present time, and never afterward submit his con¬ 
 duct to inquiry; while to a man conscious of nothing wrong 
 it occurred, that possibly by holding his tongue he might seem 
 to be an accomplice in misdemeanor and crime. Well then, I 
 am the person who accused these men from the beginning; 
 none of them accused me. 
 
 The council had passed their resolution. The assembly 
 was convened, and Philip already at Thermopylae. This 
 indeed was their prime offense, that they gave the conduct of 
 such an affair to Philip, and when the proper course was, that 
 you should have information, and then deliberate, and after¬ 
 ward execute what you determined, you received intelligence 
 only at the moment of his arrival, and it was difficult even to 
 advise what should be done. And besides, no one ever read 
 to the people that resolution of the council; the people never 
 heard it; but JEschines got up and harangued as I have 
 just told you, stating what immense advantages he had per¬ 
 suaded Philip to grant, and that the Thebans on that ac¬ 
 count had set a price upon his head; at which you, though 
 terrified at first by Philip’s arrival, and angry with these 
 men for having given no warning, became as gentle as possi¬ 
 ble, 1 in the expectation of getting all that you desired, and 
 would not suffer me or any one else to speak. And then 
 was read Philip’s letter, which JEschines wrote without our 
 privity, 2 and which is in terms a plain and direct apology for 
 
 1 “As gentle as any thing.” The familiar expression in English is 
 like that of the Greek. And it is the same in German: see Reiske’s 
 note. But Schaefer prefers the reading of rivcig, “ some of youthe 
 orator confining his observation to a part of the assembly, to avoid 
 giving offense. Pabst adopts the same reading, and translates: aber 
 gar bald gewissermassen milder gestimmt vmrdet. 
 
 2 I follow Reiske, Auger, and Schaefer. Pabst renders it: wahrend 
 seines Zuriicfcbleibens nach unserer Abreise. And Francis the-same. It 
 does indeed appear that ^Eschines staid behind with Philip after the 
 
 * departure of Demosthenes. See p. 396, orig. 
 

 132 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 these men’s faults. For it states, that he hindered them 
 from going to the cities as they wished and receiving the 
 oaths, and that he kept them to assist him as mediators be¬ 
 tween the Halians and Pharsalians; and he adopts and takes 
 upon himself all their delinquencies: but as to the Phocians 
 or Thespians, or the defendant’s reports to you, there is not 
 a syllable. And it was not done in this way by accident: 
 but where you ought to have punished these men for non¬ 
 performance and neglect of your positive instructions, Philip 
 takes the blame off their shoulders, and says that he him¬ 
 self was in fault, because (as I imagine) you were not likely 
 to punish him: when he desired to cheat and surprise us 
 out of some advantage, JEschines made the report, that you 
 might have no charge or complaint against Philip afterward, 
 the statements not being in a letter or any other communica¬ 
 tion of his. Read them the letter itself, which this man 
 wrote and Philip sent. You will see, it is just as I explained. 
 Read. 
 
 [The letter .] 
 
 You hear the letter, O Athenians—how fair and friendly 
 it is. About the Phocians however, or the Thebans, or the 
 other matters which this man reported, there is not a word: 
 and therefore there is nothing honest in it, as you shall see 
 directly. He kept them, as he says, to help him in making 
 up the quarrel of the Halians: but a pretty making-up the 
 Halians have got—they have been outcast, and their city has 
 been razed to the ground. As to the prisoners, this man who 
 was considering what he could do to oblige you says, he never 
 thought of ransoming them: but it has often, as you know, 
 been testified before the assembly, that I went with a talent 
 to redeem them, and it shall be testified now: therefore, to 
 deprive me of the credit of a generous act, Aeschines per¬ 
 suaded him to insert this. 1 But here is the most important 
 
 1 “Aw aoOai idem valere quod activum Tivgcu, ut Kusteri doctrinam 
 convellat, ait Clei’icus, antestans HSschinem, qui diserte affirmet, 
 
 7 tov ev tcj noXifKf) ovdeva ttuttote ’Adrjvaiuv "Xvrpa TTpu^aodaL. Sed vera 
 ilium ratio fugit. Scilicet Philippus gratis potuit dimittere eos qui 
 ipsius mancipia essent; qui essent aliorum, si vellet liberare, a dominis 
 redimere debuit pretio soluto. Illos igitur e?ivoev, hos hAvaaro. Omnem 
 tollit dubitationem quod legitur p. 393.”—Schaefer, App. Crit. And 
 
 compare what Thirwall says, Gr. Hist. v. 356,—“Demosthenes wished 
 
 \ 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 133 
 
 thing:—He that wrote in the first letter which we brought— 
 “I should have expressly mentioned what benefits I had in 
 store for you, had I been sure of the alliance also”—after the 
 alliance had been concluded says, he knows not what he can 
 do to oblige you; he knows not even his own promise! Of 
 course he knew that, if he was not playing false. 1 To prove 
 that he wrote so at first—here, read the passage out of the 
 letter—begin here—read. 
 
 [The passage from the letter. ] 
 
 You see, before he obtained peace, he promised, if alliance 
 also was granted him, he w'ould write and say what benefits 
 he had in store for you. Now that both have been granted 
 him, he says he knows not what he can do to oblige you, 
 but, if you will tell him, he will do any thing that is not 
 disgraceful or dishonorable; having recourse to these pre- 
 
 it to be believed that the debates on the peace had raised such suspi¬ 
 cions in his mind as to the integrity of his former colleagues, especially 
 Philocrates and HSschines, that he would have declined the office, if he 
 had not undertaken to procure the release of some of the Athenian 
 prisoners who were detained in Macedonia. JEscliines treats this as an 
 empty pretext, because Philip had never been used to exact ransom for 
 his Athenian prisoners during the war; and a promise had been given 
 in his name that all should be released as soon as peace should be con¬ 
 cluded. But it is clear that this related only to those whom he kept in 
 his own hands; and JEschines himself admits that, among the instruc¬ 
 tions of the second embassy, one was to negotiate foi;tke release of the 
 prisoners.” 
 
 The distinction between 2 vaai and ?.voacrOai is properly explained by 
 Schaefer; and the first part of the charge here made against Philip is 
 perfectly clear. Philip had said he was considering what service he could 
 render to the Athenians: and yet in his letter he states that he never 
 thought of redeeming'the prisoners. How could this obvious method 
 of obliging them have escaped him, if he had really desired to do so ? 
 But what does Demosthenes mean when he says that Philip put that 
 clause in his letter, in order to deprive him of credit for his liberality’ ? 
 We should have the whole letter before us, to understand this fully; 
 but pei’haps the meaning of Philip was as follows: It did not occur to 
 me to redeem the prisoners who were in the hands of my subjects ; the 
 moment it was suggested, however, I acceded to the request: there 
 could be no occasion for Demosthenes, or any one else, to come to Pella 
 for the purpose of effecting their ransom. Compare what Demosthe¬ 
 nes says at pp. 393, 394, which looks like an answer to this very ar¬ 
 gument. 
 
 1 The ) tip might be expressed more fully, thus—“a likely thing, 
 indeed 1 Surely he must have known that!” Ac. 
 
134 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 tenses, and (should you mention any thing and be induced to 
 make a proposal) leaving himself an escape. 
 
 These and many other tricks one might then instantly 
 have exposed, and enlightened you on the subject, and not 
 permitted you to abandon every thing, had not Thespiae and 
 Platcea and the expectation of immediate punishment being 
 inflicted on Thebes blinded you to the truth. If these things 
 were merely to be heard, and the commonwealth to be de¬ 
 luded, it was proper enough to tell you of them: but if they 
 were really to be performed, they should not have been talk¬ 
 ed about. For if matters had gone so far, that the Thebans 
 even discovering the design could not have helped themselves, 
 why has it not been executed? If they discovered it in time 
 to prevent the execution, who let out the secret? Was it not 
 JEschines? But no—he never had any such meaning or in¬ 
 tention, 1 and -ZEschines never expected it: so I acquit him 
 entirel yof letting the secret out. The fact is—it was neces¬ 
 sary that you should be amused by these statements, and refuse 
 to hear the truth from me, and that you should yourselves re¬ 
 main at home, and a decree pass by which the Phocians would 
 be destroyed. Therefore were these statements fabricated, and 
 therefore publicly announced. 
 
 I, when I heard the defendant making such magnificent 
 promises, being quite certain of their falsehood—and I will 
 tell you why: first because, when Philip was about to 
 swear the oath of peace, the Phocians were by these men 
 expressly excluded from the treaty, a thing they should have 
 been quite silent about, if the Phocians were to be saved— 
 secondly, because Philip’s embassadors used no such language, 
 nor Philip’s letter, but only the defendant. 2 Making my 
 conjectures accordingly, I got up to speak, and attempted to 
 answer him: but, as you refused to hear me, I held my 
 tongue, protesting only—I pray and entreat you to recollect 
 —that I had no knowledge of these things, that I had no 
 
 1 I follow Markland, Auger, and Pabst, in understanding Philip as 
 the nominative to rj^eTOiev and ijfiovhrjdr]. It is true that Philip has not 
 been mentioned in the sentences preceding; but then he was throughout 
 in the orator’s thoughts as the party promising and designing the things 
 alluded to. Schaefer explains ovt’ Jj/ieTiTiev, “necfutura erant quse fore 
 jEschines jactaverat;” and connects T/fiovTirjdT] with ovrog. But there 
 is not much sense in saying that “HSschines never desired.” 
 
 2 I preserve the anacoluthon of the original. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 135 
 
 concern in them, and what was more, I did not expect them. 
 At this (the not expecting) you fired up. “Athenians,” I 
 said, “ if any of this comes true, be sure you praise and 
 honor and crown these men, and not me; but if it turns 
 out differently, let them feel your resentment. I am out of 
 it altogether.” 1 “ Don’t be out of it now,” said JEschines, 
 interrupting—“Mind you don’t want to be in it another 
 time.” “ Certainly,” said I, “ or I should be acting unfairly 
 at which Philocrates rose in a flippant manner and said, 
 “ No winder, men of Athens, that I and Demosthenes agree 
 not in opinion; for he drinks water, and I drink wine” 2 —and 
 you laughed. 
 
 Read the decree, which Philocrates presented afterward, 
 of his own drawing. 3 It is very well just to hear: but when 
 one takes into account the occasion on which it was prepared, 
 and the promises which the defendant then made, it will ap¬ 
 pear, they plainly delivered up the Phocians to Philip and the 
 Thebans, all but tying their hands behind them. Read the 
 decree. 
 
 [The decree .] 
 
 You see, men of Athens, how full the decree is of fair and 
 flattering words; that it extends the peace with Philip to 
 his descendants, and the alliance, and awards praise to Philip 
 for offering to do what was just. But Philip offered nothing 
 at all—so far from offering, he says he knows not what he 
 can do to oblige you : it was the defendant that spoke and 
 
 1 “ I wash mj’ hands of it,” as we familiarly say. “ I disclaim all 
 
 connection with the business; (that is) with what iEschines has been 
 telling you.” The reply of jEschines might be rendered with equal 
 force, but with a tui’n of expression, thus—“Don’t disclaim connection 
 now and claim it hereafter.” Pabst: Ich fur meinen Theil sage mich 
 los von der ganzen Sache ! Hierauf sprach die set TEschines: sage Tick 
 jctzt nicht los davon, und siehe zn, dass JDu nicht hernach daran An- 
 theil wirst Jiaben wollen. Francis, without either force or accuracy: 
 “ For my part I retire. Not yet, replied Alschines: do not yet l’etire: 
 onlv remember not to claim any of these rewards, when they are dis¬ 
 tributed.” . 
 
 2 Demosthenes was often joked about his water-drinking. Thus, in 
 allusion to the Clepsydra (as to which, see page 59, note 1), it was said, 
 that other men spoke by water, but Demosthenes composed by it. 
 
 3 Philocrates had drawn it up, and then put it in the hands of the 
 assembly-clerk, to be read as his own motion before the people. See 
 Appendix Y. 
 
136 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 promised in his name. Philocrates, seeing you jump at the 
 defendant’s promise, 1 inserts in the decree, that, unless the 
 Phocians did what was r|ght and gave up the temple to the 
 Amphictyons, the Athenian people would send forces against 
 those who resisted. So, men of Athens, as you were staying 
 at home and had never been out, as the Lacedaemonians 
 seeing the artifice had withdrawn, and no other Amphictyons 
 were present besides Thessalians and Thebans, he has pro¬ 
 posed 2 in the blandest possible language to deliver up the tem¬ 
 ple to them, proposing (as he does) to deliver it up to the Am- 
 phietyons—what Amphictyons 1 ? for none were there but The¬ 
 bans and Thessalians—not that you should convoke the Am- 
 phictyonic body, or wait till they assembled ; not that Proxe- 
 nus should carry succor to the Phocians, or that the Atheni¬ 
 ans should take the field, or any thing of the kind. Philip 
 however twice summoned you by letter—not to induce you to 
 march, most assuredly : or he would never have destroyed your 
 opportunities of marching and summoned you then ; he would 
 not have prevented my sailing home when I desired it, or or¬ 
 dered JEschines to make statements calculated to stop your 
 march: no—it was that you, under the belief that he would 
 do all you desired, might vote nothing against him; that the 
 Phocians might not be encouraged by hopes from you to hold 
 out and resist, but might in utter despair surrender them¬ 
 selves into his hands. Read Philip’s letters, and let them 
 speak for themselves. 
 
 [The letters .] >» 
 
 You see, the letters summon you, and verily for the first 
 time: but these men—had there been any thing honest about 
 it—ought surely to have pressed for your going out, 3 and 
 moved that Proxenus, whom they knew to be in the neigh¬ 
 borhood, should immediately carry succor. Yet it appears, 
 they have done just the contrary : and no wonder. They heeded 
 not his epistles, for they understood his intentions in writing 
 them : those intentions they seconded and strove to forward. 
 
 1 Pabst: der Euch durch die Reden des TEschines angeloclct sah. 
 
 2 This tense is used because the decree, which Demosthenes had 
 caused to be read, was before the court. Francis translates inaccurate¬ 
 ly: “then did iEschines write in the gentlest language in the world.” 
 The mover of the decree was not iEschines, but Philocrates. 
 
 3 More literally : “ what else should they have done but second hia 
 request for your march ?” <fcc. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 137 
 
 The Phocians, when they learned your views from the 
 assembly, 1 and received this decree of Philocrates, and heard 
 the defendant’s report and his promises, were in every way 
 undone. Consider only. There were some intelligent per¬ 
 sons there who distrusted Philip: they were induced to put 
 faith in him—why?—because they supposed that, if Philip 
 deceived them ten times over, he would at all events not 
 dare to deceive the Athenian envoys, but that the defend¬ 
 ant’s reports to you were correct, and destruction menaced the 
 Thebans, not themselves. There were others inclined to re¬ 
 sist at any price: but even their zeal was slackened by the 
 persuasion that Philip was on their side, and that, if they 
 refused compliance, you would attack them, you from whom 
 they had expected succor. Some however believed, that you 
 repented having made peace with Philip: to these they 
 showed, that you had voted the same peace with his poster¬ 
 ity, so that all hope from you must have been despaired of. 
 Therefore they got all this into one decree. And here, in my 
 opinion, have they done you the most grievous wrong. In 
 drawing a treaty of peace with a mortal man raised to power 
 by certain accidents, to have covenanted for an immortality 
 of disgrace to the commonwealth !—to have deprived her not 
 merely of other things, but also of the chances of fortune!— 
 to have been so wantonly wicked as to injure not only the 
 existing Athenians, but all hereafter to come in being! 2 —is 
 not this most dreadful? Never afterward would you have 
 consented to add to the treaty this clause, “and to his pos- 
 
 1 “They got intelligence about you from the proceedings in the as¬ 
 sembly, which were reported to them.” Others construe it differently, 
 joining rd Trap’ vpCdv with ek rf/e etc nip dag. Francis: “what you had 
 determined in your assembly.” Pabst, to the same effect. 
 
 3 “Selon la formule assez ordinaire, les Atheniens avoient insere dans 
 leur traite de paix les mots de paix perpetuel, d e paix conclue avec eux 
 et leur descendants. Ce n’etoit a-peu-pres qu’une formule; car cette per- 
 petuite se bornoit souvent a un petit nombre d’annees. La declama¬ 
 tion de Demosthene, quoiqu’eloquente, n’est done dans la realite qu’une 
 declamation.”— Auger. 
 
 These observations are not quite correct. It was common enough 
 among the Greeks to conclude a peace for a limited number of years; 
 and when for a small term, it was little better than an armistice. (See 
 Thucydides, v. 18, 23, 41; Aristophanes, Acharn. 186—202, 251.) The 
 argument of Demosthenes is good, assuming the peace with Philip to 
 have been a dishonorable and injurious one. Had the peace been satis¬ 
 factory, it could not be too firmly cemented. 
 
138 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 terity,” had you not relied on the promises announced by 
 JEschines. On these the Phocians relied, and were ruined: 
 for, after they had surrendered to Philip and put their cities 
 into his hands, they met with treatment the very opposite of 
 what he assured them. 
 
 To convince you that all has been lost in this manner and 
 through these men, I will compute to you the dates of the 
 several transactions. Whoever disputes any of these par¬ 
 ticulars, may get up and speak while my water is running. 
 The peace was concluded on the nineteenth of Elaphebolion, 
 and we were away to receive the oaths three whole months; 
 and during all that time the Phocians were safe. We re¬ 
 turned from the embassy for the oaths on the thirteenth of 
 the month Scirophorion, and Philip was by that time at Ther¬ 
 mopylae, and making promises to the Phocians, of which they 
 believed not a single word. The proof is this;—they would 
 not otherwise have come here to you. The assembly, in 
 which these men ruined all by their false and delusive state¬ 
 ments to you, was held afterward, on the sixteenth of Sciro¬ 
 phorion. On the fifth day after that, as I reckon, intelligence 
 of your proceedings reached the Phocians; for the Phocian 
 envoys were here, and it much concerned them to know what 
 these men would report, and what resolution you would pass. 
 I reckon then, it was on the twentieth that the Phocians 
 heard of your proceedings, for that is the fifth day from the 
 sixteenth . 1 Then comes the twenty-first, twenty-second, twen¬ 
 ty-third: on this the convention 2 took place, and it was all 
 over with Phocis. How does this appear? On the twenty- 
 seventh you were assembled in Piraeus on the business of the 
 arsenal, and Dercylus came from Chalcis, and reported to you 
 that Philip had put every thing into the hands of the Thebans; 
 and he computed it to be the fifth day from the convention. 
 Twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-five, twenty-six, twenty- 
 seven—that makes it exactly the fifth. So, you see, by the 
 date of their report, by the date of their motion, by all the 
 dates , 3 are they convicted of having acted in concert with 
 Philip, and assisted in the destruction of the Phocians. 
 
 1 Reckoning inclusive, according to custom. 
 
 2 Between Philip and the Phocians. See Appendix I. 
 
 3 I follow Pabst in connecting ole with xpovoie, not Reiske, who takes 
 it neutrally. But I differ with Pabst as to nucuv. He explains it, “ by 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 139 
 
 Again, the circumstance that not a city of the Phocians was 
 taken by storm or blockade, but that they were utterly de¬ 
 stroyed by the convention, is a decisive proof that they suffered 
 because these men had persuaded them that they would be 
 saved by Philip. For of his character they were certainly 
 not ignorant. Give me the treaty of alliance with the Pho¬ 
 cians, and the decrees 1 under which they dismantled the for¬ 
 tifications—to show you in what relation you stood to them, 
 and how they were treated notwithstanding through these ac¬ 
 cursed men. Read. 
 
 [The treaty of alliance between the Athenians and the 
 
 Phocians .] 
 
 That is what they had to expect from you—friendship, al¬ 
 liance, succor. Now hear what treatment they got through 
 this man who prevented your succoring them. Read. 
 
 [The convention between Philip and the Phocians.'] 
 
 You hear, O Athenians. A convention between Philip and 
 the Phocians, it says, not between the Thebans and Phocians, 
 nor Thessalians and Phocians, nor Locrians, nor any other of 
 the people present. And again it says, that the Phocians shall 
 deliver up these cities to Philip; not to the Thebans, nor the 
 Thessalians, nor any other people. Why ? Because this man 
 reported to you that Philip had come to save the Phocians. 
 To him they trusted for all; to him they looked for all; with 
 him they concluded peace. Now for the rest. Look what 
 they trusted to, and what they got. Any thing like was it or 
 similar to this man’s assurance? Read. 
 
 [The decree of the Amphictyons.] 
 
 Results more awful and momentous, O Athenians, have 
 not been wrought in Greece within our time, nor I should 
 think in any time heretofore. l r et such mighty results has 
 Philip singly been able to accomplish during the existence of 
 the Athenian commonwealth, whose hereditary privilege it is 
 
 all the circumstances.” But Demosthenes is here summing up his ar¬ 
 gument as to the dates only. See the clause just above, near the be¬ 
 ginning of p. 359 (orig.), Tovf xpbvovg vfiv hoyiovyai tad’ ovg bylyved’ 
 inaara. v 
 
 1 The Amphictyonic. 
 
140 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 to take the lead in Greece, and not permit any proceeding of 
 this kind. 
 
 The ruin which has .fallen on the poor Phoeians may be 
 seen not only by these decrees, but by what has actually been 
 done—a shocking and pitiabje spectacle, O Athenians! On 
 our late journey to Delphi 1 we were forced to see it all— 
 houses razed to the ground, walls demolished, a country 
 stripped of its adult population, a few women and little chil¬ 
 dren and miserable old men. No language can come up to 
 the wretchedness now existing there. I hear you all say, 
 that once this people gave the opposite vote to the Thebans 
 on the question of enslaving us . 2 How think ye then, O 
 Athenians ?—could your ancestors return to life, what vote or 
 judgment would they pass upon the authors of this destruc¬ 
 tion ? In my opinion, though they stoned them with their 
 own hands, they would consider themselves pure. For is it 
 not disgraceful—is it not, if possible, worse than disgraceful 
 —that people who had then saved us, who gave the vote for 
 our preservation, should have met with an opposite return 
 through these men, and been suffered to incur greater mis¬ 
 fortunes than any Greeks ever knew? Who then is the 
 author of them? Who was the deceiver? JEschines—who 
 but he ? 
 
 For many things, men of Athens, might one felicitate 
 Philip on his fortune, but for one thing with the greatest 
 justice—one piece of luck which (by the gods and goddesses!) 
 I don’t think has fallen to any other man in our time. To 
 have taken great cities and subdued a large territory, these 
 and the like feats are wonderful, I allow, and splendid — 
 how can they help being ? Yet they have been achieved, it 
 may be said, by many others. This however is a peculiar 
 good fortune which has occurred to no other mortal—what ? 
 —That, when he wanted base men for his purposes, he found 
 baser than he desired. Can we avoid holding such an opinion 
 of these men, when falsehoods which Philip dared not utter in 
 his own behalf, notwithstanding their importance to him— 
 
 1 To the Amphietyonic meeting. 
 
 3 In the council of war, after the capture of Athens by Lysander, 
 when the Thebans proposed that Athens should be razed to the ground, 
 and Attica thrown into pasture. See Xenophon, Hell. ii. 2. As to the 
 phrase i prjdov TrpoTedelaav, see Schomann, De Comitiis, 104. 
 
On the embassy. 
 
 141 
 
 which he neither wrote in any letter nor commissioned any 
 embassador to state—they lent themselves to for hire, and de¬ 
 ceived you by them ? Antipater and Parmenio, who were 
 serving a master, and not likely to encounter you afterward, 
 contrived not to be the instruments of your deception: yet 
 embassadors appointed by the Athenian state, the freest in the 
 world, had the hardiness to deceive you—you whom they were 
 certain to look upon face to face, and to pass the remainder of 
 their lives with, and before whom they would have to render 
 an account of their conduct. Could any men be more wicked 
 or abandoned? 
 
 To show that he is devoted by you to execration, that after 
 such falsehoods you could not with any regard to sanctity or 
 religion acquit him—recite thg curse—read it from the law 
 here. 
 
 [The curse^ 
 
 This imprecation, men of Athens, the crier pronounces on 
 your behalf according to law in every assembly, and also be¬ 
 fore the council when it sits. JEschines can’t say that he 
 was not well acquainted with it: for as your clerk and serv¬ 
 ant to the council, he himself dictated this law to the crier. 
 Would it not be a strange and monstrous proceeding, if what 
 you enjoin, or rather request the gods to do in your behalf, 
 you should fail to do yourselves when it is in your power to¬ 
 day, and acquit a man whom you implore the gods to extir¬ 
 pate with his house and family ? Don’t think of such a thing. 
 When a man escapes you, leave the gods to punish him : when 
 you catch him yourselves, trouble them about him no more. 
 
 So far will lie carry his impudence and audacity, I am told, 
 that, leaving the facts of the case, his reports, his promises, his 
 impostures upon the state, as if he were tried before some other 
 people, and not before you who know it all, he will accuse 
 first the Lacedaemonians, then the Phocians, then Hegesippus. 
 But this is mockery, or rather abominable effrontery. For, 
 whatever he may say now about the Phocians, or the Lacedae¬ 
 monians or Hegesippus—that they would not receive Proxenus, 
 that they are guilty of impiety, or any thing else against them 
 surely it had all taken place before these embassadors re¬ 
 turned, and w r as no obstacle to the Phocians being saved, as 
 
 1 See page 102, note 2. 
 
142 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 is said—by whom ?—by Aeschines the defendant himself. For 
 he did not then report, that but for the Lacedaemonians, or 
 but for their not receiving Proxenus, or but for Hegesippus, 
 or but for this thing and the other, the Phocians would have 
 been saved—No: he passed over all that, and said expressly 
 that he had prevailed on Philip to save the Phocians, to re¬ 
 people Boeotia, to arrange things to your advantage ; 1 that it 
 would all be accomplished in two or three days, and on that 
 account the Thebans had set a price upon his head. There¬ 
 fore, if he talks about what the Lacedaemonians or what the 
 Phocians had done before he ma&fe these reports, don’t listen 
 to him nor hear a word ; and don’t suffer him to make charges 
 of immorality against the Phocians. It was not for their 
 merit that you rescued the Lacedaemonians formerly, or these 
 accursed Euboeans, or many others, but because their safety 
 was for the interest of the commonwealth, as that of the Pho¬ 
 cians was lately. And what fault did the Phocians or the 
 Lacedaemonians or yourselves or any other people commit 
 after this man’s statements, to cause the miscarriage of what 
 he then told you ? Ask him this : he won’t be able to explain. 
 There have been but five days in which he made his false re¬ 
 port, you believed him, the Phocians got the news, yielded 
 themselves up, and perished. From this, I imagine, it appears 
 clearly, that the whole fraud and artifice was contrived for the 
 purpose of destroying the Phocians. For in the interval after 
 the peace, while Philip was unable to march, but was making 
 preparations, he sent for the Laced asm oni an Sj and promised to 
 do every thing for them, that the Phocians might not get 
 them for auxiliaries through you. But when he arrived at 
 Thermopylae, and the Lacedaemonians perceiving the snare 
 withdrew, he then put this man fqrward 2 to deceive you ; for he 
 
 1 Pabst: Euch Einjluss auf die dortigen Angelegenheiten zu ver- 
 schaffen. Auger : “ a vous rendre maitres des affaires.” 
 
 s Reiske in his Index gives the following explanation of the verb 
 nporcadiivai : “ aliquem pnemittere, summittere, subornare, qui ante 
 tuum adventum omnia quse tu parata velis prseparet atque instruat; 
 ut si tu exempli causa fratrem in puteum demittas explorandi aut 
 elimandi ergo, antequam tute temet eo demittas. Tovrov TrponaQrjKev 
 k!;cnTaruv vpuc, ericulum facturum, possitne Philippus vobis imponere.” 
 Pabst renders it: sandte er diesen Mensclien vrieder voran , urn Euch 
 listig zu hetrugcn. Francis: “ he secretly employed JEschines to de¬ 
 ceive you.” 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 143 
 
 feared, if you discovered that he was acting for the Thebans, 
 he might get into war and delay and embarrassment, by the 
 Phocians defending” themselves and your assisting them, and 
 he wished rather to complete his conquest without a struggle; 
 which indeed has been the case. Don’t then, because Philip 
 deceived the Lacedaemonians and the Phocians also, let this 
 man escape punishment for his deception of you. That would 
 hardly be just. 
 
 If, to compensate for the Phocians and Thermopylae and 
 the rest of our losses, he alleges that the Chersonese is pre¬ 
 served to us, by heavens! men of the jury, don’t admit the 
 excuse; don’t endure that, in addition to the injuries which 
 you have sustained by the embassy, he should by his defense 
 cast reproach upon the state, as if you made a reservation for 
 certain of your own possessions, while you sacrificed the wel¬ 
 fare of your allies. You did no such thing: for, after the peace 
 was made and the Chersonese was in security, the Phocians 
 were safe during the four ensuing months, and the falsehoods 
 of this man afterward, by imposing on you, caused their ruin . 1 
 Besides, you will find the Chersonese is in greater danger now 
 than it was then. For let me ask, would it have been easier to 
 punish Philip for attacking it before he had snatched any of 
 
 1 “Si quid cerno, argumentum hoc, cui tantum tribuit Demosthenes, 
 parum aut nil valet. Ecquis enim non videt in arcanis Philippo cum 
 Atheniensibus condictis, quse non fuerunt publicata, hoc fuisse, ut Athe- 
 nienses pro Cherrhoneso Phocidem Philippo permitterent ? Et renun- 
 tiatio legationis falsa ab .Eschine ad populum Atheniensem potuerunt 
 esse merse prsestigise ad oculos Grceciae occaecandos et invidiam ab 
 Atheniensibus avertendam commissse erga socios proditionis. Tales 
 mimi aguntur inter optimates. Quse intra siparium fiunt, multum ab 
 iis diversa sunt, quse foris.”— Reiske. 
 
 “Non co^itavit Reiskius Atheniensium illis temporibus publice, hoc 
 est, in concionibus, talia transigentium esse non potuisse arcana ttoXi- 
 revpara. Quidquid igitur hoc in negotio fraudis fuit,.commissum est 
 a Philippo, non consciis Atheniensibus, sed parariis role Trapanpeofiev- 
 aaoiv.” — Schaefer. 
 
 Reiske was undoubtedly quite mistaken in his view of this transac¬ 
 tion. There is not the slightest evidence of any instructions having 
 been given by the Athenians to their ministers, to effect a peace with 
 Philip by which their allies were intentionally sacrificed. They acted 
 foolishly indeed and weakly, in suffering themselves to be deceived, 
 and not seeing their real interests; and it is true also that they were 
 prejudiced in some degree by the forms of their political government, 
 by reason of which their embassadors were not sufficiently checked by 
 a vigorous executive power. 
 
144 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 these advantages from us, or is it easier now? I imagine it 
 was much easier before. What sort of preservation then is 
 it for the Chersonese, when he that would violate it is released 
 from fear and danger? 
 
 I understand however, that he intends to say something of 
 this kind—that he wonders how it is Demosthenes accuses 
 him, and not any of the Phocians. It is better you should 
 , hear the explanation from me beforehand. Among the ex¬ 
 patriated Phocians, the best and most respectable being in 
 exile and consequent distress keep themselves quiet, and 
 none of them would like to incur private hostility on account 
 of the public misfortunes; while those who would do any 
 thing for money can find no one to give it them. I certainly 
 would not have feed any of them, to stand up for me here and 
 cry out what they had suffered : for the truth and the facts 
 cry out of themselves. As to the Phocian commonalty, they 
 are in such a wretched and deplorable condition, that they 
 have no thought of being prosecutors at Athenian audits, but 
 are every one of them slaves, frightened to death at the 
 Thebans and the mercenaries of Philip, whom they are forced 
 to maintain, scattered themselves over villages, and deprived 
 of their arms. Don’t allow him then to use that argument, 
 but make him show that the Phocians have not been ruined, 
 or that he never promised that Philip would save them. 
 These are the questions at the account of an embassy—What 
 has been negotiated? what was your report? If true, take 
 your acquittal; if false, pay the penalty. What matters it 
 whether the Phocians are present or not ? They are in such a 
 plight, I fancy—and you did your best to bring them into 
 it—they can neither help their friends nor punish their ene¬ 
 mies. 
 
 But besides the general discredit and disgrace which these 
 proceedings are attended with, it is easy to show that serious 
 perils consequently menace the state. For which of you is 
 ignorant that by the Phocian war, and the Phocians being 
 masters of Thermopylae, we were out of all apprehension from 
 the Thebans; never could they or Philip make their way to 
 Peloponnesus, nor to Euboea, nor Attica? This security, 
 which place and circumstances guaranteed to the common¬ 
 wealth, you, trusting to the falsehoods and artifices of these 
 men, abandoned: fortified though it was by arms, by con- 
 
ON.THE EMBASSY. 
 
 145 
 
 tinued war, by great cities of an allied people, and by an ex¬ 
 tensive territory, you suffered it to be overthrown . 1 And your 
 former expedition to Thermopylae has become fruitless, which 
 cost you more than two hundred talents, reckoning the pri¬ 
 vate expenses of those who served. Your hopes about the 
 Thebans are fruitless also. But what, among many shameful 
 services which this man has performed for Philip, involves 
 really the most contemptuous treatment of the commonwealth, 
 and all of you, I beg you to hear—it is this : that Philip hav¬ 
 ing determined from the beginning to do all that he has done 
 for the Thebans, JEschines, by reporting the contrary, and 
 making it manifest that you were against what he did, has in¬ 
 creased your enmity with the Thebans and their friendliness 
 to Philip. How could a man have treated you more con- 
 tumeliously ? 
 
 Take and read the decree of Diophantus, and that of Callis- 
 thenes, to show you that when you performed your duties, 
 you were recompensed with thanksgivings and praise both at 
 Athens and elsewhere, but after you had been deluded by 
 these men, you brought in your women and children from the 
 country, and decreed to perform the Heraclean sacrifice within 
 the city in time of peace: which makes me wonder whether 
 you will let off with impunity a man who caused even the 
 gods to be deprived of their customary worship. Read the 
 decree. 
 
 [The decree .] 
 
 Thus worthily of your conduct, O Athenians, you voted 
 
 then. Now read the next. 
 
 # 
 
 [The decree.'] 
 
 Such was the vote you then passed through the conduct of 
 these men; though it was not with such prospects that you 
 
 1 The emendation of Reiske, who* for nal x^PV 'xoXky substitutes 
 Xupav tzo7i?^v, has met the approval of some critics, and among others, 
 of Pabst, who thus renders the passage: und ein durcli Waffen tend 
 fortdauernden Kneg gescliutztes Land , was mit bedeutenden Stadten und 
 verlundcten Bewohnern bcvolkert, und von anscnhlichem Umfange war, 
 habt Irh ruhig, ohne cs zu hindern, verheeren lassen. I agree with 
 Schaefer, that it is much better to preserve the old reading and under¬ 
 stand d(j<pd?i£iav as the subject of the whole sentence. The metaphor, 
 he observes, is by no means harsh, but suitable to the dignity of the 
 argument. And he refers to the famous passage r dv <J£ tecxio/uov 
 tovtov, k. r. A. (p. 325 Orig. and p. 108 in this volume.) 
 
 Von. II—G 
 
146 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 either originally concluded peace and alliance, or were after¬ 
 ward persuaded to insert the clause, “ and to his posterity,” 
 but under the belief that through these men you would get 
 marvelous benefits. You all know how often afterward you 
 were alarmed by hearing of Philip’s army and mercenaries 
 in the neighborhood of Porthmus or Megara . 1 Therefore, 
 though he may not yet have invaded Attic ground, it is not 
 that you must look at, nor relax in your vigilance: you must 
 see whether he has through these men got the opportunity of 
 doing it when he pleases ; this peril you musjt keep in view, 
 and abhor and punish the guilty person who has furnished him 
 with such opportunity. 
 
 I know indeed that JEschines will avoid all discussion of the 
 charges against him; that, seeking to withdraw you as far as 
 possible from the facts, he will rehearse what mighty blessings 
 accrue to mankind from peace, and, on the other hand, what 
 evils from war; in short, he will pronounce a panegyric on 
 peace, and take up that line of defense. Yet even these are so 
 many arguments to convict him. For if the cause of bless¬ 
 ings to others has been the cause of so many troubles and such 
 confusion to us, what else can one suppose, but that by taking 
 bribes these men have spoiled a thing in its own nature ex¬ 
 cellent ? 
 
 Oh, but—he may say perhaps—have you not preserved, 
 and won’t you preserve through the peace three hundred 
 galleys, with stores for them and money 1 ?—In regard to this 
 you must understand, that Philip’s resources likewise have 
 been largely augmented through the peace, in supplies of 
 arms, in territory, in revenues, of which he has gained an 
 abundance. True, some have come in to us also. But that 
 establishment of power and alliances, through which people 
 hold their good things either for themselves or their supe¬ 
 riors 2 —ours has been sold by these men, and gone to ruin 
 
 1 See vol. i. pp. 119, 128. 
 
 2 Schaefer explains it: “ Potentioribus, ubi aut unus regnat, aut 
 oligarchis civitas subjecta est.” Pabst renders it thus: durch welchen 
 einst Alle, theils fur sich, theils fur einen machtigern Staat, Guter und 
 Vortheile gewonnen haben. And with this latter interpretation I agree. 
 Thus the whole Athenian empire is that establishment of power and 
 alliances, Karaonevr) irpay/udruv ual ovppuxov, through which the Lem- 
 nians, Imbrians, and other subject people, hold what they have, (their 
 country, their harbors, their revenues, Ac,) partly for themselves. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 147 
 
 and decay his hath become formidable and mightier by far. 
 It is not just, that Philip should through these men have 
 augmented both his alliances and his revenues, while what 
 Athens must naturally have gained by the peace they set off 
 against what was sold by themselves. The one has not come 
 to us in exchange for the other—-very far from it: one we 
 should equally have had, and the other in addition, but for 
 these men. 
 
 Speaking generally, men of Athens, I presume you will 
 agree, that on the one hand, however many and grievous 
 have been the misfortunes of the commonwealth, if .yEschines 
 be not to blame for any, your resentment ought not to fall upon 
 him; and, on the other hand, if any advantages have been 
 achieved through others, they ought not to save him. Con¬ 
 sider what the defendant has been the cause of; look favor¬ 
 ably on him, if favor he deserves, but with anger, if he has 
 done aught to excite it.* How will you ascertain the truth of 
 the matter? In this way—you must not let him confound 
 all things together—the misdeeds of the generals, the war 
 with Philip, the blessings of peace—but you must consider 
 each point by itself. For example—Was Philip at war with 
 us? He was. Does any man complain of JEschines on that 
 account? Would any man wish to arraign him for the 
 transactions of the war? No man. Well then; upon those 
 points he is acquitted, and has no need to say any thing: for 
 it is a defendant’s business to produce witnesses and proofs 
 upon the matters in issue, not to mystify the court by pleading 
 
 partly for the Athenians, who are at the head of the empire. The 
 power of the general confederacy supports every constituent part of it. 
 
 1 On the expression, anoTiuTie nal yeyovev aoOevrjg, Schaefer observes: 
 “ Gravius prsecedit, sequitur levius. Sic passim Orator. ’AttuXXve nal 
 kXvfiaivEro, p. 119. ’AttoXuXe nal vev6ct]kev, p. 121. ’AtcoXoXe nal di£- 
 < pOaprai , p. 372. Qualia non mirer si nostris Technicis parum proben- 
 tur. Sea Critici caveant, ne haec similiaque transponendo corrumpant: 
 nam sunt longe sanissima.” 
 
 See my observations about Anti-climaxes, p. 18, n. 2. In the ancient 
 writings, both Greek and Roman, the weaker word or clause often 
 follows to explain or qualify the preceding. Compare Virgil, iEneid 
 II. 353,— 
 
 Moriamur et in media arma ruamus; 
 and ^Eneid VII. 50,— 
 
 Filius liuie fato Divum prolesque virilis 
 
 Nulla fuit, primdque oriens erepta juventd est 
 
148 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 I 
 
 what no one disputes. Mind then, that you say nothing about 
 the war; for no one charges you with any thing concerning 
 it. Afterward certain persons advised us to make peace; we 
 followed their advice; we sent embassadors; they brought 
 people to Athens to conclude peace. Here again, does any 
 one blame JEschines for this? No one. Does any man say 
 that he introduced the question of peace, or is guilty of crime 
 for having brought people here to conclude it ? No man. No 
 more should he say any thing about the fact of our concluding 
 peace: for he is not chargeable with it. 
 
 What then do you say, man?—suppose I were asked— 
 from what point do you commence your accusation? From 
 this, men of Athens—when, at the time you were deliberating, 
 not whether you should make peace or no, (for that had 
 already been resolved upon,) but what sort of a peace you 
 should have, he opposed the men who offered honest advice, 
 and supported the mover of a corrupt resolution, himself 
 being bribed; and afterward, on being chosen to receive the 
 oaths, he entirely neglected your instructions, destroyed those 
 allies who had come safe through the whole war, and told 
 such huge falsehoods as no mortal ever did either before or 
 after. At first indeed, until Philip got leave to’negotiate for 
 peace, Ctesiphon and Aristodemus commenced the beginning 
 of the plot; but when things were ripe for execution, they 
 handed it over to Philocrates and the defendant, who took up 
 the matter and ruined every thing. Now that he must render 
 an account of what has been done, and stand his trial for it, 
 the defendant, I imagine, like a rascally and abominable 
 clerk 1 as he is, will plead his defense as if he were tried for 
 the peace—not that he may render an account of more than 
 he is accused of; that were madness—but he sees, that in his 
 own conduct there is nothing good and every thing criminal, 
 while a defense of peace; if it-have nothing else about it, has 
 in name at least a show of humanity. I fear indeed, O 
 
 1 In Bekker’s edition /ecu stands before ypapfiaTevp, which appears to 
 be thrown in as an additional terra of reproach. And so Reiske under¬ 
 stands it: “erat convicium usurpatum pro nomine vilissima stirpe, 
 qusestus sordidi, versuto, impuro, scelerato, audaci.” Schaefer dissents 
 from this view, and expunges /ecu. Demosthenes does often refer to the 
 early occupation of Aeschines, but rather contemptuously than by way 
 of strong reproach. Where he means the latter, he adds an epithet, as 
 ohedpoc ypappare tlf. See page 80, note 2. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 149 
 
 Athenians, I fear, that without knowing it, like persons who 
 borrow money, we are enjoying the peace at a high rate: for 
 these men betrayed what constituted its strength and security, 
 the Phocians and Thermopylae. However, it was not through 
 the defendant we originally made it: for what I am about to 
 say is strange, yet perfectly true—if any one is really glad of 
 the peace, let him thank the generals for it, whom all accuse. 
 Had they carried on the war as you desired, the very name 
 of peace would have been intolerable to you. Peace therefore 
 is owing to them: perilous and unstable and insecure has it 
 become through these men having taken bribes. Bar him 
 then, bar him from any argument in favor of peace, and put 
 him to his defense for what he has done. For Aeschines is 
 not tried for the peace; no: the peace is discredited through 
 Aeschines. Here is the proof—if the peace had been con¬ 
 cluded without any deception being afterward practiced on 
 you, or any of your allies being ruined, what mortal would 
 the peace have aggrieved, independently of its being dishonor¬ 
 able? Of this indeed the defendant was in part the cause, 
 by supporting Philocrates: nothing fatal however would have 
 taken place. Now, I conceive, he is answerable for a great 
 deal. 
 
 That these men have shamefully and basely wrought all 
 this ruin and mischief, I suppose you are all satisfied. I 
 however, men of the jury, am so far from entering upon these 
 questions in a vexatious spirit, or wishing you to do so, that 
 if it has all been brought about through thoughtlessness or 
 good nature or any kind of ignorance, I acquit JEschines 
 myself and I advise you also. Though indeed none of these 
 excuses is constitutional or just, for no one is required or 
 compelled by you to perform public business; but when a 
 man has persuaded himself of his ability and applies for it, 
 you, acting the part of worthy and benevolent people, receive 
 him with favor and without envy; you elect him, and put 
 your affairs into his hands. Then if a man be successful, he 
 will be "honored and have an advantage over the bulk of the 
 people in this respect; if he fails, shall he set up excuses and 
 apologies? That would not be fair. It would be no satis¬ 
 faction to our ruined allies or to their wives or children or 
 any other parties, that my incapacity (not to say the 
 defendant’s) had brought such misfortune upon them—far 
 
150 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 from it indeed. However, you may forgive ^Eschines these 
 dreadful and monstrous things, if it appears that he has 
 damaged the cause through stupidity or any kind of igno¬ 
 rance : but if he has done it from a base motive, having re¬ 
 ceived money and presents, and if he is clearly convicted by 
 the facts themselves, put him to death if it be possible, or if 
 that can not be, make him a living example to others. Now 
 consider in your minds, how convincing the proof of his guilt 
 will be. 
 
 I presume that Aeschines the defendant must have addressed 
 those speeches to you, those about the Phocians and Thespise 
 and Euboea, (supposing he was not from a corrupt motive 
 intentionally playing false,) from one of two causes; either 
 because he had heard Philip expressly promise to effect and 
 do the things in question, or else because he was charmed 
 and beguiled by Philip’s general liberality, and therefore 
 expected those things from him also. There is no other 
 alternative. Now in either of these cases he ought beyond 
 all other men to detest Philip. Why ? Because, so far as it 
 depended on Philip, he has suffered the utmost indignity and 
 disgrace. He has deceived you; he has become infamous; 
 he is judged to be a lost man, if he had his deserts . 1 Had 
 due proceedings been taken, he would have been impeached 
 long ago; but now through your simplicity and good nature 
 he attends his audit, and chooses his time for it. Is there 
 one of you who has heard the voice of iEschines accusing 
 Philip?—who has seen him pressing any charge or speaking 
 to the point? No one. Every Athenian is more ready to 
 accuse Philip—any indeed that you like—though none of 
 them assuredly has sustained any personal injury. I should 
 have expected language like this from him, if he had not sold 
 himself—“Men of Athens, deal with me as you please: I 
 believed, I was deluded, I was in error, I confess it: but be¬ 
 ware of the man, O Athenians : he is not to be trusted, he is a 
 juggler, a villain. See you not how he has treated me? how 
 he has cajoled me?” I hear no language of this kind, nor do 
 you. Why? Because he was not cajoled or deceived, but had 
 hired himself and taken money when he made those state¬ 
 ments, and betrayed you to Philip, and has been a good, true 
 
 1 According to Bekker’s reading, diKalug. But I rather incline to 
 dtKaiog, with Wolf and Schaefer. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 151 
 
 and faithful hireling to him, but a traitorous embassador and 
 citizen to you, deserving to perish not once but three times 
 over. 
 
 Nor is this the only proof that he was bribed to make all 
 those statements. There came to you lately some envoys 
 from Thessaly, and some of Philip’s with them, requiring you 
 to acknowledge Philip as an Amphictyon. Now of all men 
 who was most especially bound to oppose them? JEschines 
 here. Why ? Because his reports to you were contradicted 
 by Philip’s acts. This man. said that he would fortify Thespim 
 and Platafia, and not destroy the Phocians, but humble the 
 insolence of the Thebans: whereas Philip has made the 
 Thebans greater than they should be, the Phocians he has 
 utterly destroyed; and instead of fortifying Thespiae and 
 Platasa, he has reduced Orchomenus and Coronea also to 
 slavery. How could any things be more contrary to one 
 another? Yet he opposed them not; he never opened his 
 mouth or uttered a word against them. And this, bad as it 
 is, is not the worst:—he spoke on their side, he and no other 
 person in the state. Even the profligate Philocrates ventured 
 not to do this ; Aeschines, the man before you, did: and when 
 you clamored and refused to hear him, he came down from 
 the platform, and said, showing himself off to Philip’s embas¬ 
 sadors who were present—“There were many to clamor, but 
 few to fight when it was needfulthis you surely remember 
 —he himself doubtless being a wonderful soldier, O Jupiter! 
 
 Yet more—if we were unable to show that any of the em¬ 
 bassadors had got any thing, and it was not plain enough for 
 all men to see, we must have resorted to question by torture 1 
 and the like. But if Philocrates not only confessed his gains 
 frequently in your assembly, but even displayed them before 
 you, selling wheat, building houses, declaring that he would 
 
 1 This refers to the practice, common not only in criminal but also 
 in civil proceedings at Athens, of examining slaves by torture. The 
 parties to a cause were at liberty either to give up their own slaves to 
 be examined in this way, or to demand those of the adversary; and 
 though it was not compulsory to give up a slave, the refusal might be 
 attributed to fear of the truth coming out. No slave was admissible 
 as a witness, except on this condition; such was the degraded state to 
 which men were reduced by servitude in Greece. On the other hand, it 
 was not lawful to apply the torture to freemen, except under extraor¬ 
 dinary circumstances, when the necessities of the commonwealth re¬ 
 quired it. 
 
152 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 make his journey , 1 whether you elected him or not, importing 
 timber, changing gold openly at the banks; he surely can 
 not deny that he has had money, he that himself makes a con¬ 
 fession and display of it. Then is there any man so senseless 
 or infatuate, that, to procure money for Philocrates, and bring 
 discredit and danger upon himself, when he might appear in 
 the ranks of the innocent, he would rather be at enmity with 
 them, and side with Philocrates to be prosecuted ? There is 
 no such man, I believe. All these, if you examine them 
 rightly, O Athenians, you will find to be clear and ample 
 proofs that iEscliines has taken bribes. 
 
 A thing which has last occurred, but is as good a proof as 
 any that he has sold himself to Philip, I beg you to consider. 
 You know of course, that when Hyperides lately impeached 
 Philocrates, I came forward and said, I was dissatisfied with 
 one point in the impeachment, if it alleged that Philocrates 
 had alone been guilty of so many grave misdemeanors, and 
 the other nine embassadors were entirely innocent. And I 
 declared it was not so; for he by himself would have been of 
 no account, if he had not had some of these men to co-operate 
 with him. “ However,” said I, “ that I may neither acquit 
 nor accuse any man, but that facts themselves may discover 
 the guilty, and clear those who are not implicated, let any 
 man that pleases get up and declare before you, that he has 
 no concern in the acts of Philocrates, and approves them not. 
 And whoever does so, I will acquit him,” I said. This you 
 remember, I suppose. Well: no one came forward or showed 
 himself. And the rest have each an excuse: one was not 
 accountable; one perhaps was not present; another had a 
 son-in-law yonder . 2 The defendant however has no such 
 
 1 I. e. to Macedonia. When Philocrates said this does not appear. 
 In the construction I follow Auger and Pabst. But Francis connects 
 ^vTirjycjv with /dadieladau. 
 
 Philip had abundance of timber in the Macedonian forests, of which 
 he made presents to his friends at Athens and elsewhere. Compare 
 the passages which follow in this oration, pp. 386, 426. 
 
 2 This, according to Ulpian, is a piece of bitter irony against Phry- 
 non, who is accused by Demosthenes of prostituting his own son to the 
 king of Macedon. Taylor, Reiske, Francis, and Pabst adopt Ulpian’s 
 interpretation. Others read inelvoc, meaning Philocrates. Schaefer 
 thinks that the supposed reflection upon Phrynon would be beneath 
 the dignity of an orator. The charge itself is distinctly made q,t page 
 412 (Orig.). 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 153 
 
 reason. So completely hath he sold himself, and not only re¬ 
 ceived wages for past services, but makes it plain that here¬ 
 after, should he now get off, he will help Philip against you, 
 that, to avoid letting fall even a word in opposition to Philip, 
 he accepts not even acquittal when we offer it, but chooses to 
 incur infamy, prosecution, any kind of indignity at Athens, 
 rather than do any thing to give Philip displeasure. 
 
 But what is this connection, this over-anxiety for Philoc- 
 rates? Had he done ever such great things, and got every 
 advantage by his diplomacy, yet, if he confessed having made 
 money by it, as he does confess, this is the very thing 1 from 
 which an incorrupt embassador should have kept himself 
 aloof and clear, and protested against it for his own part. 
 AEschines however has not done so. Are not these facts 
 plain, men of Athens ? Don’t they cry aloud, that AEschines 
 has taken bribes and is a scoundrel systematically for lucre’s 
 sake, not in thoughtlessness, nor in ignorance, nor by reason 
 of failures *? 
 
 And what witness proves that I have taken bribes ?—says 
 he. This is his grand point.—The facts, JEschines, which are 
 the surest of all things; and it is impossible to charge or 
 allege, that they are what they are in obedience or out of 
 favor to any person. No: just what your treason and mis¬ 
 chief has made them, they on examination appear to be. But 
 in addition to the facts, you shall bear testimony against your¬ 
 self immediately. Come, stand up and answer me. 2 You 
 can’t urge that from inexperience you have nothing to say. 
 You that conduct new prosecutions, like new dramas, and win 
 them without witnesses even, in the division of a day, you 
 must surely be a prodigy of an orator. 3 
 
 1 That is, the money-making, as I understand it. But Schaefer refers 
 it to the connection with Philocrates, tt/v KOtvuviav nai tt/v TroTikrjv npo- 
 voiav intp 4> I'koKpuTovg . 
 
 2 The question does not follow, probably because iEschines did not 
 step forward to intimate that he was ready to answer questions. 
 
 3 “He alludes to the extraordinary prosecution of Timarchus, un¬ 
 supported by evidence, and founded only upon general reports of the 
 impurity of his life. He alludes also to the theatrical profession of 
 Alschines, who treated such prosecutions as if they were only dramatic 
 performances, but in which however he is allowed to have performed 
 a principal eharacter, and to have appeared a very powerful orator.”— 
 Francis. 
 
 Taylor supposes naivovg to refer to the first appearance of ^Eschines 
 
 G 2 
 
154 
 
 TIIE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 Many dreadful things hath JEschines the defendant perpe¬ 
 trated, involving a high degree of baseness, as I think you 
 will agree; yet there is nothing in my judgment so dreadful 
 as what I am about to mention; nothing that will so pal¬ 
 pably convict him of having taken bribes and sold every 
 thing. * 
 
 When you were for the third time again dispatching envoys 
 to Philip, under those great and splendid expectations which 
 the defendant had held out, you elected him and me and most 
 of the others the same as before. I came forward directly and 
 excused myself, 1 and when certain persons clamored and call¬ 
 ed on me to go, I declared I would not leave Athens: the 
 defendant had then been elected. After the assembly had 
 broken up, these men met and consulted whom they should 
 
 as prosecutor in a court of justice; but it refers rather to the novelty 
 of the proceeding itself, as Francis understands it. The credit due to 
 AEschines was enhanced by the circumstance that he had a very limited 
 time allowed him to plead in. This may have been for the reason 
 assigned by Reiske, that the causes for that day were so numerous, they 
 were obliged to circumscribe the time for each. Or perhaps the time 
 allowed for that species of trial (viz. a doK.cfj.aota ) was shorter than for 
 ordinary causes. Harpocration explains diafCEfieTprifievr] rffiepa by stat¬ 
 ing, that the whole time for a cause was divided by the Clepsydra 
 into three portions,—one for each of the parties, and one for the jury. 
 Whether such explanation suits this passage may be doubtful. De¬ 
 mosthenes seems rather to speak of something out of the common 
 course, or there would be no point in the words 7r pdg 6. r. if. I under¬ 
 stand 7 rpoc in the sense of “ against,” the limitation of time being an 
 adverse circumstance against which the orator had to contend: so we 
 say, “ to speak against time.” Francis takes these words in quite a dif¬ 
 ferent sense. His version is: “which were of such importance as to 
 demand a particular day for their determination.” Pabst: in abgemes- 
 senen Tagestunden. 
 
 Auger translates the whole passage as follows: “Puisque dans un 
 temps limite vous plaidez des causes toutes neuves avec l’art d’un 
 poete qui compose un drame, et que vous les gagnez sans le secours 
 des temoins; peut-on douter un moment de la subtilite de votre elo¬ 
 quence?” 
 
 As to the Clepsydra, see p. 59, note 1. And as to 7 ravdeivog, see p. 
 90, note 2. 
 
 1 Literally: “ excused myself on oath—swore off.” As Francis has 
 it: “declared upon oath I could not accept the employment.” A man 
 desirous of excusing himself from such an appointment as the one in 
 question was obliged to assign some reason for it, as illness or the like, 
 and to put in an affidavit stating such reason. The affidavit was called 
 kfafiocca, and was recorded. It would appear from this passage, that 
 almost any formal excuse was admitted. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 155 
 
 leave behind: for, while things were yet in suspense and the 
 future was uncertain, conferences and discussions of all kinds 
 took place in the market; they feared therefore that an ex¬ 
 traordinary assembly 1 might be convened on a sudden, that you 
 might hear the truth from me, and pass some proper resolu¬ 
 tions in favor of the Phocians, and so things would slip out 
 of Philip’s hands. Indeed, had you but voted and shown them 
 a glimpse of hope, they would have been saved. For impos¬ 
 sible, impossible was it for Philip to remain, if you had not 
 been tricked; as there was neither any grain in the country, 
 it not having been sown on account of the war, nor could 
 any grain be brought while your galleys were there and com¬ 
 manded the sea; and the Phocian cities were numerous and 
 hard to take, except by a long siege; for if he took a city in 
 a day, they are twenty-two in number. For all these reasons, 
 that you might not change the course into which you had 
 been entrapped, they left -ZEschines at home. Well, but to 
 excuse himself without some ground was dangerous, and 
 fraught with suspicion.—“ What say you ? aren’t you going, 
 after these mighty advantages of your own announcing, and 
 won’t you be on the embassy?”—Still it was necessary to 
 stay. How to act then ? — He pretends to be ill, and his 
 brother, taking Execestus the physician and going to the 
 council, made affidavit of the defendant’s illness, and was 
 himself appointed. Five or six days after, when the Phocians 
 had been destroyed, and this man’s hire had come to an end 
 like any thing else, and Dercylus had returned from Chalcis, 
 and reported to you, in assembly at Piraeus, that the Phocians 
 were destroyed, and you, men of Athens, naturally on re¬ 
 ceiving that intelligence were smitten with compassion for 
 them and terror on your own account, and passed a vote to 
 bring in your women and children from the country, and to 
 repair the garrisons and fortify Piraeus, and offer the Heraclean 
 sacrifice within the city,—in this state of things, when the 
 commonwealth was in the midst of such confusion and alarm, 
 this clever and powerful and loud-voiced orator, without any 
 appointment by the council or the people, went off as embas¬ 
 sador to the author of all the mischief, taking into account 
 neither the illness on which he grounded his excuse, nor the 
 fact that another embassador had been chosen in his stead, 
 
 1 See Appendix y. 
 
156 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 nor that the law provides the penalty of death for such con¬ 
 duct, nor how monstrous it was, after reporting that a price 
 had been set upon his head in Thebes, when the Thebans had 
 in addition to the lordship of all Boeotia become masters also 
 of the Phocian territory, to take a journey then to the heart 
 of Thebes and the Theban camp: so insane was he, so intent 
 upon his pelf and reward, that in defiance and despite of all 
 these considerations he took himself off. 
 
 Such is the character of this proceeding : but what he did 
 on his arrival there is far more shocking. For when all of 
 you here, and the Athenians in general, considered the poor 
 Phocians so shamefully and cruelly treated, that you would 
 not send either members 1 of the council or the judges to rep¬ 
 resent you at the Pythian games, but abstained from your cus¬ 
 tomary deputation to the festival, iEschines went to the sacri¬ 
 fice which Philip and the Thebans offered in honor of their 
 success and conquest, and was feasted, and joined in the liba¬ 
 tions and prayers which Philip offered up in thanksgiving for 
 the lost fortresses and territory and troops of your allies, and 
 donned the garland and sang the paean in company with Phil¬ 
 ip, and pledged to him the cup of friendship. 
 
 Nor is it possible that I should state the matter thus, and 
 the defendant otherwise. With respect to the affidavit, there 
 is an entry iri your public register in the temple of Cybele, 
 which is given in charge to the superintendent, and a decree 
 has been specially drawn concerning that name. 2 With respect 
 
 1 The Athenians, as well as all the other people who belonged to the 
 Hellenic community, sent deputies regularly to the great periodical 
 festivals—the Olympian, Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean. These dep¬ 
 uties represented the state, and it would appear that certain members 
 of the council, and of the six junior archons, (whom I call in my trans¬ 
 lation the judges,) or at least persons chosen from one or the other of 
 these bodies, formed part of the deputation. They were called Qeupol, 
 which name signifies simply “ spectators,” derived from did, a spectacle, 
 unless we adopt the explanation of Pollux, who derives it from 6edg 
 and upa, as if it properly designated parties concerned in some divine 
 service or ceremony. The common uses of the word deupelv and its 
 derivatives perhaps favor the former derivation, though it is true that 
 the spectacles which these deputies were sent to attend partook al¬ 
 ways of a religious character; and persons dispatched on more purely 
 religious missions—as to consult an oracle, or the like—received the 
 same appellation. For further information, see the Archteological 
 Dictionary, title Theori. Pabst translates the word, Festgesandte. 
 
 2 A decree (probably of the council) was drawn up, ordering the name 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 157 
 
 to his doings yonder, there will be evidence against him by 
 his colleagues and persons present, who told the particulars 
 to me ; for I did not go with them on the embassy, but ex¬ 
 cused myself. Now read me the decree and the register, and 
 call the witnesses. 
 
 [The Decree. The Public Register. The Witnesses.~\ 
 
 What prayer do you suppose Philip offered to the gods 
 when he poured his libation ? What do you suppose the The¬ 
 bans ? Did they not pray for might and victory in battle for 
 them and their allies; the contrary for the allies of the Pho- 
 cians? Well then; AEschines joined in that prayer, and in¬ 
 voked a curse upon his country, which you ought now to 
 make recoil upon his head. 
 
 He departed therefore in violation of the law which makes 
 such an act punishable with death: on his arrival, it has been 
 shown, he did what he deserves to die for a second time: and 
 his former acts and measures in this behalf 1 as embassador 
 will justify his execution. Consider then what penalty there 
 can be of severity enough to be deemed adequate to all his 
 crimes. For would it not be shameful, O Athenians, that 
 you and the whole people should publicly condemn all the 
 proceedings consequent upon the peace, and refuse to take 
 any part in Amphictyonic business, and regard Philip with 
 displeasure and distrust, because the proceedings are impious 
 and shocking, opposed at the same time to your interests and 
 to justice; yet, when you have come into court to adjudi¬ 
 cate at the audit of these matters, a sworn jury on behalf of 
 the commonwealth, you should acquit the author of all the 
 mischief, whom you have caught in the very act when his 
 guilt was complete? And which of your fellow-citizens, or 
 
 of ^Eschines to be expunged from the list of embassadors, and that of 
 his brother to be substituted. 
 
 1 T ?rip tovtuv. “ Dubium est, ad quos referatur, Philippumne et 
 Thebanos, pro his, an ad Athenienses, horum nomine .”— Reiske. “Pos- 
 terius malim .”—Schaefert 
 
 There is a difficulty about either of these interpretations. If it meant 
 the Athenians, we should rather expect vgtiv ; if Philip and the The¬ 
 bans, eiceivuv. I am therefore more inclined to the explanation suggested 
 by Wolf: rd)v vvv yeyevTjfievov ev «3> orcevot . If Schaefer is right, we must 
 suppose Demosthenes to be making a sort of computation to himself, 
 instead of directly addressing the jury. 
 
158 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 rather of the Greeks at large, will not have reason to com¬ 
 plain of you, seeing that you are wroth with Philip, who, in 
 the transition from war to a treaty of peace, purchased his ad¬ 
 vantages from those that would sell them, a thing very venial 
 in himyet you will acquit this man, who so disgracefully sold 
 your interests, although the laws prescribe the heaviest penal¬ 
 ties for such conduct. 
 
 Perhaps however an argument of the following kind may 
 be advanced by these men—that it will cause enmity with 
 Philip, if you convict the embassadors who negotiated peace. 
 If this be true, I can’t imagine any thing stronger to be urged 
 against the defendant. For if the man who expended money 
 to obtain the peace has now become so formidable and mighty 
 that you must disregard your oaths and obligations, and 
 consider only what you can do to gratify Philip, in what 
 way can the authors of such a result be sufficiently punished? 
 Though I think indeed I can show, that it will more probably 
 lead to a friendship advantageous for you. For it should be 
 understood, men of Athens, that Philip does not despise your 
 commonwealth, and did not prefer the Thebans to you, be¬ 
 cause he thought you less capable of serving him; but he 
 was instructed by these men and informed—as I told you 
 once before in the assembly, and none of them contradicted 
 me—“ that the people 1 is of all things the most unstable and 
 
 1 The word “people,” notwithstanding a little ambiguity, is preferable 
 to “populace,” or “mob,” because it increases the odium sought to be 
 thrown upon HSschines, that he spoke thus disrespectfully of the sover¬ 
 eign people of Athens by the very name that constitutionally belonged 
 to them. The comparison in the text reminds one of the famous simile 
 in Virgil, ^Eneid I. 148. The fickleness of the vulgus infidum has been a 
 theme for innumerable orators and poets. Even Jack Cade exclaims, aft¬ 
 er he has been deserted by his followers, “ Was ever feather so lightly 
 blown to and fro as this multitude ?”—Henry VI. Part II. Act IV. Sc. 8. 
 
 Shilleto cites Cicero pro Muren. 17 (35), pro-Planc. 6 (15), Liv. 
 xxviii. 27, and the following passage from Clarendon’s History of the 
 Rebellion:—“The Duke of Buckingham was utterly ignorant of the 
 ebbs and floods of popular councils, and of the winds that move those 
 waters.” 
 
 Of the words olov avrog 6rj he gives the following explanation in the 
 same note:—“It is for his advantage to have ready at hand certain 
 friends who will transact and manage every thing for him with you, for 
 instance, myself (the speaker).”—So Dobree nearly: “Your Majesty,” 
 say these persons, “ wants able managers” (each of them of course 
 meaning such a one as himself). 
 
 The same was my own impression originally, and it was with some 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 159 
 
 inconstant, like a restless wind in the sea, put in motion by 
 any accident—one comes and another goes; no one cares for 
 the public interests, or keeps them in mind—he should have 
 friends to transact every thing for him with you, and manage 
 just as he would himself: if that were contrived for him, he 
 would accomplish all that he desired with you easily.”—If he 
 had heard, I fancy, that the persons who used such language 
 to him then had immediately after their return home been 
 cudgelled to death, he would have done the same as the 
 Persian king. What did the Persian king? He had been 
 deceived by Timagoras, and given him forty talents, as report 
 says; but W'hen he heard that Timagoras 1 had been put to 
 death at Athens, and had not the means even to insure his 
 own safety, much less to perform his late promise to him, he 
 saw that he had not given his fee to the party with whom the 
 power rested. So, in the first place, he made Amphipolis 
 again your subject, which before he had registered as his own 
 ally and friend ; 2 and, in the rtext place, he never afterward 
 gave money to any man. And Philip would have done the 
 
 hesitation that I took a different view. There is an awkwardness in 
 the change from the plural tovtuv to the singular avrog. Again, it 
 would be clumsy to make avrog refer to the speaker, when there is an 
 avru) so close both before and after it referring to Philip. And there 
 would be a little difficulty in the construction. It is true, there is some 
 harshness in the other method. I should prefer reading ol’ uv. 
 
 1 As to this story, see p. 130, note 2. 
 
 3 I adhere to Bekker’s reading, and understand it thus: “ Artaxerxes, 
 seeing the fate of Timagoras, sought to conciliate the people of Athens 
 by acknowledging their right to the possession of Amphipolis, which 
 before he had treated as independent, and registered in the archives of 
 the kingdom as his own ally. When he made such acknowledgment 
 does not appear. After the embassy of Pelopidas to Susa, the Persian 
 king sent a letter to Greece, containing the terms on which he desired 
 a general peace to be established. This was publicly read at Thebes, 
 at which city the Greek states had been invited to hold a congress, the 
 Thebans hoping to be placed in the same situation as the Lacedaemonians 
 had been at the peace of Antalcidas. The king’s wishes were entirely 
 in favor of Thebes, and there was a clause in the letter which virtually 
 required the disarming of the Athenian naval powei\ The Athenians 
 • however and the Greeks in general refused to abide by the terms which 
 Artaxerxes sought to impose; and it may be that he, on receiving in¬ 
 telligence of this, as well as of the execution of Timagoras, and the' 
 probability of some new combination among the Greek states, which 
 might increase the influence of Athens, adopted a different tone, and 
 expressed his willingness to consent to a different settlement of affairs, 
 acknowledging (among other things) her title to Amphipolis. 
 
 r 
 
160 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 same, if he had seen any of these men punished; and now, if 
 he sees it, he will do so. But when he hears that they enjoy 
 reputation among you as speakers, as prosecutors of other 
 men, what should he do ? Seek to incur large expenses, when 
 he may incur less, and volunteer to court all, instead of two 
 or three? Why, he would be mad. 
 
 Even the Thebans Philip had no desire to serve as a people 
 —far from it; but he was persuaded by the embassadors, and 
 I will tell you in what manner. Embassadors came to him 
 from Thebes, at the same time that we were there from you. 
 He offered them money, and (according to their statement) a 
 great deal. The Theban envoys would not accept or receive 
 it. Afterward at a certain sacrifice or banquet, when Philip 
 was drinking and making himself agreeable to them, he of¬ 
 fered them over the cup divers things, such as captives and 
 the like, and lastly some gold and silver goblets. All these 
 things they rejected, and would in no way compromise them¬ 
 selves. At length Philon, one of the embassadors, made a 
 speech worthy, O Athenians, to have been spoken not on 
 behalf of the Thebans, but on yours. He said he was de¬ 
 lighted and rejoiced to see Philip liberally and generously 
 disposed to them: they, for their part, were his friends 
 already without those gifts; but they desired him to apply 
 his generosity to the affairs of the commonwealth, in which 
 he was then engaged, 1 and to do something worthy both of 
 himself and the Thebans; and they promised then that the 
 whole commonwealth as well as themselves would be attached 
 to him. Now only see what has come of this, what events 
 have happened, to the Thebans; and consider in good sooth, 
 what an important thing it is not to sell the interests of the 
 state. First, they have obtained peace when they W'ere dis¬ 
 tressed and harassed by the war and getting the worst of it; 
 secondly, their enemies the Phocians have been utterly de¬ 
 stroyed, and all their fortifications and cities demolished. Is 
 that all ? No indeed! Besides that they have Orchomenus, 
 Coronea, Corsise, Tilphossasum, as much of the Phocian terri¬ 
 tory as they please. Such advantages have the Thebans 
 gained by the peace: greater they could not wish for, I 
 
 1 kv olg rjv rore. So Francis: “ which -were then before him.” It is 
 possible however, that i] 7roTug may be the nominative to fjv, and thus 
 Auger has taken it. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 161 
 
 imagine: but what have the Theban embassadors gained ? 
 The advantage of having done so much for their country— 
 that is all; but that is honorable and glorious, O Athenians, 
 in regard to praise and renown, which these men bartered 
 away for gold. 
 
 Now let me contrast what the Athenian commonwealth 
 has gained by the peace, and what the Athenian embassadors ; 
 and see if the commonwealth and these men themselves have 
 fared alike. To the commonwealth the result has been, that 
 she has relinquished all her possessions and all her allies, and 
 has sworn to Philip, that, should any one else interfere ever 
 to preserve them, you will prevent it, and will regard the 
 person who wishes to restore them to you as an adversary 
 and a foe, the person who has deprived you of them as an 
 ally and a friend. These are the terms which JEschines the 
 defendant supported, and his coadjutor Philocrates proposed; 
 and when I prevailed on the first day and had persuaded you 
 to confirm the resolution 1 of your allies, and to summon 
 Philip’s embassadors, the defendant drove it off to the follow¬ 
 ing day, and persuaded you to adopt the decree of Philocrates, 
 in which these clauses, and many others yet more shameful, 
 are contained. To the state then such consequences have 
 resulted from the peace:— consequences more disgraceful 
 could not easily be found: but what to the embassadors who 
 caused them? I pass by all the other matters which you 
 have seen—houses—timber—grain; but in the territory of 
 our ruined allies they have estates and farms of large extent, 
 bringing in to Philocrates an income of a talent, to Aeschines 
 here thirty minas. Is it not shocking and dreadful, O Athe¬ 
 nians, that the misfortunes of your allies have become a source 
 of revenue, to your embassadors; that the same peace has to 
 the country which sent them proved to be destruction of allies, 
 cession of dominions, disgrace instead of honor, while to the 
 embassadors, who wrought these mischiefs to the country, it 
 
 1 Schaefer interprets this, “ decretum de sociis,” taking it, I suppose, 
 to mean the decree of the Athenians that all the allies should be in¬ 
 cluded in the peace; as to which see page 391 (orig.). But there had 
 been a resolution passed by the deputies of the allies themselves, then 
 assembled at Athens, which Demosthenes says he supported. See page 
 345 (orig.). To this he refers again. 
 
 For further particulars on the subject, the reader is referred to Ap¬ 
 pendix I. 
 
162 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 has produced revenues, resources, estates, riches, in exchange 
 for extreme indigence ? To prove the truth of my statements, 
 call me the Olynthian witnesses. 
 
 [ Witnesses.~] 
 
 I shall not be surprised however, if he ventures to say 
 something of this kind—that it was not possible to conclude 
 the peace honorably or in the manner I desired, as the 
 generals had conducted the war badly. Should he say this, 
 pray remember to ask him, whether he went embassador 
 from any other state, or from this only. If he went from 
 another, which he can say had been victorious in war and 
 possessed generals of ability, he has taken money with good 
 reason : l but if he went from this, why on a treaty, where 
 the state which sent him renounced her own rights, did he 
 receive presents into the bargain ? The state which sent the 
 embassy should have got the same advantages as her embas¬ 
 sadors, if any justice were done. 
 
 And again, consider this, men of Athens,—Which, think 
 ye, more prevailed in the war, the Phocians over the Thebans, 
 or Philip over you ? I am quite clear, the Phocians over the 
 Thebans. They held Orchomenus and Coronea and Tilphos- 
 sseum, and had cut off the Theban force at Neones, 2 and had 
 slain two hundred and seventy at Hedyleum, and a trophy 
 was erected, and their cavalry were masters of the field, and 
 an Iliad 3 of misfortunes beset the Thebans. You had suffered 
 nothing of the kind, and I trust you never may: the worst 
 
 1 The argument is somewhat lame. The point of it is, that there is 
 more excuse when a minister of the victorious party is bribed to make 
 concessions to the enemy, than w T hen a minister of the vanquished party 
 does the same thing. The former only diminishes his country’s gain, 
 the other augments his country’s loss. The moral delinquency is the 
 same in both cases; the positive mischief done may be less in the 
 latter case. 
 
 2 A city of Phocis, also called Neon. Reiske prefers the reading of 
 avruv, with which the meaning is,—“they had recovered their own 
 troops captured at Neon.” Auger, Francis, and Pabst adopt that read¬ 
 ing ; but it does not so well suit this passage, where the orator is re¬ 
 counting the positive disasters inflicted on the Thebans. 
 
 3 The expression “ Iliad of misfortunes” was proverbial, and is plain 
 enough. 
 
 Shilleto cites Cicero ad Attic. VIII. 11,—“Tanta malorum impendet 
 ’I ?uuc” And Ovid, II. Epist. ex Pont. V :— 
 
 Ilias est fatis longa futui'a meis. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 103 
 
 thing in the war with Philip was, that you could not do him 
 harm when you desired; but you were perfectly secure against 
 being damaged yourselves. How comes it then, that by the 
 same peace the Thebans, who were so much beaten in the 
 war, have recovered their own possessions and won those of 
 their enemies, while you, the Athenians, have lost in time of 
 peace even what was preserved in war ? It is because their 
 interests were not sold by their embassadors, while these men 
 have bartered yours away. That such has been the character 
 of these transactions, you will learn yet more clearly from 
 what follows . 1 
 
 When this treaty of Philocrates, which the defendant spoke 
 in favor of, was concluded, and Philip’s embassadors had 
 received the oaths and departed, (and up to this point no 
 incurable mischief had been done, but, though the peace was 
 dishonorable and unworthy of tfie state, yet we were to have 
 those wonderful advantages by way of compensation,) I asked 
 your leave , 2 3 and urged these men to sail with the utmost 
 speed for the Hellespont, and not to sacrifice or let Philip get 
 possession of any of the places there in the interval. For I 
 knew well, that whatever is sacrificed in the transition from 
 war to peace is lost to the neglectful parties: for when once 
 people have made up their minds on the whole for peace, 
 they won’t renew the war for what has been abandoned, but 
 that remains the property of the captors. Besides, I believed 
 the state would be sure to get one of two advantages, if we 
 sailed;—for either, we being on the spot and having sworn 
 him according to the decree, he would restore the places 
 which he had taken from the republic, and forbear to attack 
 
 1 The preceding clause, which Bekker has included in brackets, and 
 which does not appear to fit the passage, I have omitted, as Francis 
 has. Auger’s translation shows how little it suits the context, though 
 he tries to make it more intelligible by expansion: “ Contre la verite 
 des faits qui precedent, Eschine aura le front de dire que vos allies 
 etoient fatigues et harasses par le guerre. Au reste, vous verrez encore 
 
 mieux, par ce qui suit, que vos deputes, gagnes par l’or de Philippe, ont 
 prevarique dans leur embassade.” 
 
 3 So Schaefer rightly explains fj&ovv v/j.uc : and Auger: “ Je deman - 
 dois au peuple.” But it must not be understood of a request to the 
 assembly, but rather of an application to the pi’oper authorities, as the 
 generals, or the council, to expedite the preparations for sail, provide 
 the traveling expenses, <fcc. 
 
164 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 the rest, or, if he did not, we should immediately report it to 
 Athens; and so you, seeing his rapacity and perfidy in those 
 distant and less important matters, would not be careless 
 about these more important and nearer home—I mean the 
 Phocians and Thermopylae: on the other hand, if he had not 
 captured those places and you had not been tricked, all your 
 interests would be secure, and your just demands cheerfully 
 accorded by him. And I had reason for supposing it would 
 be so. For if the Phocians were safe, as they were then, and 
 masters of Thermopylae, Philip could have held out no threat 
 to prevent your insisting upon any of your rights: neither a 
 land march nor a victory by sea would have opened him the 
 road to Attica, while you, if he refused to give you satisfac¬ 
 tion, would instantly close his ports, and again reduce him to 
 distress for money and to a state of general blockade; so that 
 he would be the party dependent on the benefits of peace, not 
 you. That I am not now inventing and assuming the merit of 
 these things after the event, but that they were perceived by 
 me at the time, and foreseen on your behalf and communi¬ 
 cated to these men, I will now give you the proof:—As all 
 the assemblies had been exhausted , 3 and therefore no new one 
 could be had, and these men were not gone, but lingering here, 
 I as councilor frame a decree, (the people having given full 
 power to the council,) ordering the embassadors to depart 
 without delay, and the general Proxenus to convey them to 
 whatever place they should hear Philip was in; and I drew it 
 up just as I am telling you, in those express words. Here— 
 read me the decree. 
 
 [The Decree.~\ 
 
 1 did rb ’KpoKaTanexpycsOai — i. e. ralg tKK.'Xrjaiau ;: “ by reason that the 
 people had already held all the assemblies appointed by law,”— i. e. all 
 the ordinary assemblies; and therefore none but an extraordinary one 
 could be called. As to the Athenian law, see Appendix Y. Reiske in 
 his Index explains these words as follows: “ propterea quod, concioni- 
 bus antea nimis multis incassum habitis, salutare nihil neque decretum 
 neque effectum esset.” In his notes he suggests another interpretation: 
 “propterea quod omnia hue facientia peracta et absoluta essent.” 
 Schaefer renders it: “ propterea quod omne tempus concionibus haben- 
 dis destinatum abierat.” So Francis: “ When there no longer remain¬ 
 ed any assembly to be called, the days of convening them being already 
 past.” And Pabst: da keine Versammlung des Volks mehr bevorstund, 
 toeil die gauze Zeit, wo dergleichen stattjinden , schon abgelaufen war . 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 165 
 
 I carried them from Athens downright against their will, as 
 you will see clearly by what they did afterward. When we 
 arrived at Oreus and joined Proxenus, these men, instead of 
 sailing and performing your instructions, took a circuitous 
 journey, and before we. came to Macedonia we wasted three- 
 and-twenty days ; all the rest of the time before Philip came we 
 sat down in Pella, making fifty days altogether with those of 
 the journey. In that interval Doriscus, Thrace, the Fortresses , 1 
 the Sacred Mountain—every thing, in short, during a time of 
 peace and truce was taken and disposed of by Philip ; though 
 I was constantly speaking and remonstrating, at first giving 
 my opinion as in consultation, afterward by way of instruc¬ 
 tion to ignorant men, lastly as if I were addressing venal and 
 impious wretches without any reserve. The man who openly 
 opposed what I said, who thwarted all my counsels and your 
 decrees, was the defendant. Whether that pleased the other 
 embassadors, you will know presently ; for as yet I say noth¬ 
 ing about any one—I make no accusation—there is no need 
 for any of them to appear honest to-day by compulsion, but 
 of their own choice, and by having had no connection with the 
 crimes. For that the acts done are disgraceful and flagitious 
 and not unpaid for, you have all seen : the thing itself will 
 disclose who have been concerned in them . 2 
 
 But, forsooth, in that interval they received the oaths from 
 the allies, or performed other duties. Very far from it. Al¬ 
 though they were absent for three whole months, and had 
 received from you a thousand drachms for their traveling 
 expenses, from not a single state, either on the journey there 
 or on the journey back, did they receive the oaths ; but in 
 the inn before the temple of Castor and Pollux—if any of 
 
 1 “Fuisse tractum Thraciae rd T elxv dictum, ut in Belgio sunt les 
 Barrieres, e. p. 397, constat.”— Reiske. 
 
 2 The reader will notice the artifice of the orator. He was appre¬ 
 hensive that the colleagues of ^Eschines might support him by their 
 testimony or influence. He seeks to deter them from such a course, by 
 insinuating that it would prove them to be accomplices. He affects to 
 suspend his own judgment, as if he waited to see the result. But this 
 affectation is not consistent with the general tenor of the speech, in 
 which Demosthenes is continually talking of these men (meaning the 
 embassadors in general, or at least the greater number of them, who 
 were doubtless in court and supporting yEschines) as being all more 
 or less associated with him, and participators in his misconduct. 
 
166 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 you has been at Pherse, he knows the place I mean—here the 
 oaths were administered, when Philip was marching hither 
 with his army, in a manner disgraceful, O Athenians, and 
 unworthy of you. Philip indeed would have given a great 
 deal to have'it managed in this way. For when they were 
 unable to draw up the treaty as these men attempted at first, 
 excluding the Halians and Phocians, but Philocrates was 
 compelled by you to expunge that clause and insert expressly 
 the Athenians and allies of the Athenians, he did not wish 
 any of his own allies to have sworn that oath, (for then they 
 would not have marched with him to attack those possessions 
 of yours which he now holds, but would have made the oaths 
 an excuse,) nor did he wish them to witness the promises on 
 which he was obtaining the peace, nor to have it shown to 
 all, that in fact the Athenian commonwealth had not been 
 beaten in war, but it was Philip who desired peace, and was 
 making large promises to the Athenians if he could obtain 
 peace. So, for fear what I say might be publicly known, he 
 objected to these men going any where; and they did every 
 thing to gratify him with an ostentation of zeal and extrava¬ 
 gant servility. 
 
 I say then—when they are convicted of all these things— 
 having wasted the time, sacrificed the posts in Thrace, done 
 nothing that you directed or that your interests required, 
 brought false intelligence to Athens—how is it possible for 
 them to escape with intelligent and conscientious judges? 
 To prove the truth of these statements, read first the decree 
 prescribing how the oath was to be administered, then the 
 letter of Philip, then the decree of Philocrates and that of 
 the people. 
 
 [The Decree prescribing the Oath.'] 
 
 [The Letter of Philip.] 
 
 [The Decree of Philocrates.] 
 
 [The Decree of the People amending that of Philocrates.] 
 
 To show that we should have caught Philip in the Hel¬ 
 lespont, if they had followed my advice and executed your 
 commands as expressed in the decrees, call the witnesses there 
 present. 
 
 [ Witnesses.] 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 
 167 
 
 Now read the other deposition, what answer Philip made to 
 Euclides here, who came afterward . 1 
 
 [The Deposition.~\ 
 
 They can’t deny they did all this to serve Philip—attend, 
 and you will see. When we started on the former embassy 
 for the peace, you sent a herald before us to stipulate for our 
 safe conduct. On that occasion, as soon as they arrived at 
 Oreus, they did not wait for the herald or create any delay, 
 but, though Halus 2 was under siege, they crossed over to it, 
 and again coming out of that city to Parmenio, who was be¬ 
 sieging it, they set off through the hostile army for Pagasse, 
 and going on met the herald at Larissa: with such expedition 
 and diligence they proceeded then. Yet when there was peace 
 and every security for traveling, and your command to make 
 haste, if never occurred to them either to expedite their 
 journey or to go by sea. How came this about*? Because 
 on the former occasion it was Philip’s interest that the peace 
 should be concluded as quickly as possible, but on this it was 
 for his advantage that the interval before demanding the oaths 
 should be as much as possible protracted. To show that 
 these statements are also true, here—take this deposition. 
 
 [The Deposition.~\ 
 
 Is there any evidence to convict men of entire subservience 
 to Philip stronger than this—that on the same journey they 
 loitered when they ought to have made haste in your service, 
 and hurried when they ought not even to have traveled 3 before 
 the arrival of the herald? 
 
 During the time that we were there and loitering in Pella, 
 
 1 Euclides was sent by the Athenians to remonstrate with Philip for 
 having invaded the dominions of Cersobleptes. He replied, that his 
 
 embassadors had not informed him that peace had been concluded, and 
 therefore he had a right to pursue his conquests. The deposition of 
 Euclides to this effect is now read, he being present to confirm it. 
 
 3 Halus was near the coast, about the centre of the Pagaseean bay, 
 and a few miles from Pagasse. 
 
 3 The opposition here is between arcevdeiv and ovSi (3adlfriv, “ to 
 hasten,” and “ not to travel at all—not to begin the journey.” There¬ 
 fore there is no necessity to express (as Schaefer would have us) the 
 opposition between n Aav and fiadlfriv, which elsewhere occurs. (See 
 pp. 392, 398 orig.) 
 
168 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 see what different employments we each chose for ourselves. 
 Mine was to deliver the captives and seek them out, to ex¬ 
 pend money of my own, and request Philip to ransom them 
 with what he would have given in presents to us. What the 
 defendant made it his business to accomplish, you shall hear 
 immediately. What was it? That Philip should make us a 
 common present of money. For you must know, among 
 other things, Philip sounded us all—in what way ?—by send¬ 
 ing to each privately, and offering, O Athenians, a heap of 
 gold. Failing with one, no matter whom—(for it is not for 
 me to mention myself; the facts and circumstances will 
 show ;)—he thought that a common present would be ac¬ 
 cepted without suspicion 1 by all, and thus there would be 
 security for those who had privately sold themselves, if in 
 ever so small a degree we all joined in the acceptance. There¬ 
 fore the offer was made, under pretense of being a gift of 
 hospitality. I having stopped it, these men divided the 
 money among themselves—this besides what they had had 
 before. Philip, when I requested him to expend it upon the 
 captives, could neither inform against these men with honor, 
 or say—“ Oh ! but this and that person have it”—nor yet 
 escape the outlay; so he consented, giving an evasive promise 
 to send them home by the Panathensean festival. Read the 
 deposition of Apollophanes, then that of the other persons 
 who were present. Read. 
 
 [The Deposition."] 
 
 Now let me tell you how many of the prisoners I ransomed 
 myself. During the time that we staid in Pella, before the 
 arrival of Philip, some of the captives who were out on bail, 
 doubting (I suppose) whether they should afterward be able 
 to prevail on Philip, said they should like to ransom them¬ 
 selves, and not be under an obligation to Philip; and they 
 applied for loans, one of three minas, another of five, and so 
 on, according to what each man’s ransom came to. When 
 Philip therefore consented to redeem the rest, I called the 
 
 1 Eirfdoc ,—“without scruple or misgiving—in simple and thought¬ 
 less honesty of heart.” Pabst: in gutmuthiger Einfalt. But Schaefer 
 connects it with ^yaro, and renders it, “pro e& ou4 erat stultitia 
 existimabat.” 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 169 
 
 men together, to whom I had advanced 1 the money, and 
 reminding them of what had been done, that they might not 
 seem to be in a worse position for their haste, or to have been 
 ransomed (poor as they were) out of their own private means, 
 while the others expected to be released by Philip, I made 
 them a present of the redemption-money. To prove my 
 statements, read these depositions. 
 
 [The Depositions .] 
 
 The sums that I forgave and made a present of to our 
 unfortunate fellow-citizens are what you hear. Should the 
 defendant say to you presently—“ How comes it, Demosthe¬ 
 nes, having discovered (as you say) from my supporting Phi- 
 locrates, that we were after no good, you went with us on the 
 subsequent embassy for the oaths, and did not excuse your¬ 
 self?”—remember, I had promised the men whom I ransom¬ 
 ed, that I would come and bring the redemption-money, and 
 do my best to deliver them. It would have been shameful 
 then to break my word, and abandon fellow-citizens in misfor¬ 
 tune. But, had I got off the appointment, I could not have 
 made a private excursion there with propriety or safety: for, 
 but that I desired to release the captives, perdition seize me, 
 if I would have taken a very large sum of money to be the 
 colleague of these men. And I can prove it—for you twice 
 elected me for the third embassy, and I twice excused myself; 
 and during the whole of my absence on this I opposed them 
 in every thing. 
 
 Thus went your affairs, so far as I had the control on the 
 embassy: what these men carried by being the majority has 
 ruined all. Indeed all our measures would have been con¬ 
 sistent with what I have just stated, had my advice been fol¬ 
 lowed. For I was not such a wretched idiot, as to give money, 
 when I saw others receiving it, for the sake of standing well 
 with you, while things that might be accomplished without 
 expense, and that drew with them far greater advantages to 
 the commonwealth, I was in my wishes opposed to. I wished 
 for them earnestly, O Athenians ; but these men, I trow, were 
 too many for me. 
 
 1 Demosthenes had lent the money as a friend (typvoe, not kduueice). 
 We have not the same distinction in our language. To lend is indiffer¬ 
 ently used, whether the loan be with interest or without. 
 
 Vol. II. -,H 
 
/ 
 
 170 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 Come now—see what have been the defendant’s acts in 
 comparison with mine, and what those of Philocrates; for in 
 contrast they will appear more glaring. First, they excluded 
 the Phocians and the Halians and Cersobleptes from the 
 treaty, contrary to your decree and the declaration 1 made to 
 you: secondly, they attempted to disturb and alter the de¬ 
 cree, which we had been commissioned to execute: further, 
 they set down the Cardians as allies of Philip. And the letter 
 writtenjby me to you they determined not to send, while they 
 sent one written by themselves without a word of truth. Then 
 this brave fellow here said I had promised Philip to over¬ 
 turn your democracy, because I denounced those acts, not 
 only regarding them as disgraceful, but fearing I might be in¬ 
 volved in the ruin of these men through their fault; while 
 he himself never ceased during the whole time holding private 
 interviews with Philip. And the rest I say nothing about— 
 but Dercylus, (not I,) with the assistance of this boy of 
 mine, watched him during the night at Pherse, and having 
 caught him coming out of Philip’s tent, told the boy to report 
 it to me and keep it in his own remembrance; and finally' 
 this abominable and shameless fellow for a night and day 
 after our departure stayed behind with Philip . 2 To prove 
 
 1 I e. by Philip’s embassadors, as Pabst understands it. Francis 
 renders it: “in contradiction to the assurances they themselves had 
 given you.” 
 
 2 Reiske in his Index gives a different explanation of these words: 
 
 “ quoties nos a Philippo discederemus, sive interdiu sive ndctu cum eo 
 congressi essemus, iEschines cum eo solus remanebat totum ilium reli- 
 quum diem noctemve.” This would require aireXeineTo. 
 
 JSschines, in his answer (p. 44), states the charge of Demosthenes to 
 have been, that he went in a boat by night down the river Lydias, on 
 purpose to assist Philip in writing the letter. If this was the charge, it 
 must have appeared in the deposition read to the jury. JEschines ridi¬ 
 cules the idea of it being necessary for Philip to have his assistance 
 in composing the letter, when there was Python of Byzantium and 
 the exile Leosthenes, either of them fully capable of writing it; and 
 indeed Philip could easily have done it himself. And it would have 
 been absurd (he argues) to go by night for such a purpose, when the day 
 would have suited quite as well. Yet neither of these arguments 
 touches the point of the matter; for it might be necessary to Philip’s 
 objects to concert things with the person who was to be his agent at 
 Athens, and the night might, for more than one reason, be more suit¬ 
 able than the day. He proceeds next to confute the charge, by direct 
 counter evidence, calling Aglacreon and Iatrocles to prove what we call 
 an alibi: that it was impossible he could have passed the night in 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 171 
 
 the truth of my statements, in the first place, I will draw up 
 my own deposition and make myself responsible as a witness; 
 in the next place, I call each of the other embassadors, and will 
 force them to do one or the other, to give testimony or swear 
 they are unable . 1 If they swear they are unable, I shall con¬ 
 vict them of perjury before you clearly. 
 
 [The Deposition .] 
 
 With what annoyances and troubles I was beset during the 
 whole of the expedition, you have seen. You may guess in¬ 
 deed what they did in the neighborhood of their paymaster, 
 
 Philip’s company, because he lodged in the same apartment with them, 
 and was never absent for a single night. The value of such evidence 
 depends in some measure upon the terms in which it was expressed; 
 but the proof of. an alibi, without cross-examination, could never be 
 satisfactory. 
 
 The use of uTxe7.u<i>Qr] in this passage tends certainly to confirm the 
 translation of Pabst and Francis in the former passage {ante, p. 131). 
 
 1 To make this passage intelligible, it is necessary to explain the 
 method of giving evidence in Athenian courts of law. Any party 
 intending to call a witness in court drew up his evidence in the shape 
 of a deposition, and summoned him before the magistrate who had 
 cognizance of the cause. The deposition having been sworn to was put 
 into a box, together with other documents in the cause, to be produced 
 when the trial came on before the jury. On the day of trial the witness 
 again attended, his deposition was read out, and he confirmed it by 
 signifying his assent. No vivd vote testimony (in our sense of the term) 
 was permitted. It was required to be in writing, in order that there 
 might be no mistake about what the witness deposed to, and to afford 
 the opposite party the means of obtaining redress in case he lost his 
 cause by false evidence. A party might be a witness for himself; and 
 then he prepared his own deposition in the same w r ay, and, having 
 sworn to it, produced and had it read in court, making himself answer- 
 able, like any other witness, to a charge of perjury. 
 
 Where a man called a doubtful or unfriendly witness, he drew up a 
 statement of the facts which he supposed him capable of proving, and, 
 having caused it to be read by the clerk of the court, he asked the 
 witness whether he would swear to it. The witness was then required 
 either to give his testimony to that effect, or swear that the statement 
 was untrue, or not true to his knowledge. 
 
 While some advantages attended this method of proceeding, and, 
 among others, a saving of time, (for the evidence was all produced and 
 read during the course of the party’s address to the jury, though ex¬ 
 cluded from the measurement of time allotted to him,) there were other 
 obvious disadvantages, one of which was the absence of cross-examina¬ 
 tion, and another (in the case of a hostile witness) was the extreme 
 difficulty of preparing such a deposition as he could not escape from. 
 
172 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 when such are their doings before your eyes, in whose power 
 it is either to reward or to punish. 
 
 I will now reckon up the charges from the beginning, to 
 show you I have performed all that I promised in the outset 
 of my speech. I have shown by the evidence not of words, 
 but of the facts themselves, that his reports have been utterly 
 false and that he imposed on you. I have shown, that ow¬ 
 ing to him you refused to hear the truth from me, being in¬ 
 fluenced by his promises and assurances ; that all his advice 
 was contrary to what it should have been: that he opposed 
 the peace of the allies and supported that of Philocrates; he 
 wasted the time, to prevent your marching to Phocis, even 
 if you desired it; he has committed many grievous things 
 besides during his absence; he has betrayed and sold every 
 thing, taken bribes, stopped short of nothing that is villainous. 
 All these things I promised in the beginning; all I have made 
 out. Mark then what follows—this that I have next to say 
 to you is simple:—You have sworn to give your verdict ac¬ 
 cording to the laws and the decrees of the people and the coun¬ 
 cil of five hundred: the defendant is proved by his whole con¬ 
 duct as embassador to have violated the laws,* the decrees, the 
 obligations of justice : it is fit therefore he should be convicted 
 before an intelligent jury. 
 
 Were he guilty of nothing else, two of his acts are sufficient 
 to kill him: for he has betrayed not only the Phocians, but 
 Thrace also to Philip. Two places in the world more import¬ 
 ant to our commonwealth could not be pointed out than Ther¬ 
 mopylae by land, and the Hellespont by sea: both which to¬ 
 gether have these men disgracefully sold and delivered into 
 Philip’s hands against you. What an offense even this is, 
 without any thing further—the sacrificing of Thrace and the 
 Fortresses—would be an infinite topic of discussion: and it 
 were easy to show, how many persons have on that account 
 been sentenced to death before you, or incurred heavy fines— 
 Ergophilus, Cephisodotus, Timomachus, in ancient times Er- 
 gocles, Dionysius , 1 and others, all of whom together (I may 
 
 1 As to the first three persons named in the text, see vol. i. pp. 271 
 —274. 
 
 Ergocles is a person against whom there is an extant oration of 
 Lysias, and who, it appears, was condemned by the Athenians for pec¬ 
 ulation. Of Dionysius nothing is known. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 173 
 
 nearly say) have injured the commonwealth less than this 
 man. But then, O Athenians, you were still, on calculation, 
 wary and provident of danger: while now, what for the day 
 gives you no trouble, no present annoyance, you disregard; 
 and here you pass idle votes:—that Philip shall take the 
 oaths to Cersobleptes—that he shall not interfere in Amphic- 
 tyonic business—that you will amend the peace. But there 
 would have been no necessity for any of these decrees, if the 
 defendant had chosen to sail and perform his duty: what 
 might have been preserved by sailing, he has lost by advising 
 a land-journey; what might have been saved by telling truth, 
 he has lost by lying. 
 
 He will make it a grievance presently, as I am informed, 
 that he should be the only orate** in the assembly who is 
 called to account for words. I will not press the argument, 
 that all men should be made responsible for their words, if 
 they speak for lucre; but I say this—If Aeschines in his 
 private capacity played the fool or made any slip, don’t be 
 over-nice ; let it pass, forgive him: but if in the character of 
 embassador he has for lucre’s sake purposely deceived you, 
 don’t let him off, don’t tolerate that he is not to be brought 
 to trial for what he said. For what else ought we to call 
 embassadors to account but for words? Embassadors have 
 not galleys or post or soldiers or citadels under their control, 
 (for no one intrusts embassadors with these things,) but only 
 words and times. With respect to time—if he never de¬ 
 stroyed the opportunities of the state, he is innocent; if he 
 has destroyed them, he is guilty. And as to words—if his 
 reports have been true or serviceable, let him be acquitted; 
 if false and corrupt and injurious, let him be convicted. A 
 man can do you no greater wrong than by telling falsehoods: 
 for where the government depends on words, how is it pos¬ 
 sible, if these be untrue, to cariy it on safely? And if 
 speakers will even take bribes for the interest of the enemy, 
 how can you avoid being in peril? Nor indeed is it the 
 same thing to rob oligarchs or despots of their opportunities, 
 as it is to rob you : nor any thing like. For in those govern¬ 
 ments, I take it, every thing is done sharply according to order: 
 but with you, first the council must hear of all matters and 
 frame their previous order, and that only after publication of 
 
174 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 notice for heralds and embassies , 1 not always; then they must 
 convene an assembly, and that only when it is allowable by 
 the laws: then your honest counselors must get the day, and 
 prevail over those who ignorantly or wickedly oppose them. 
 And after all this, when a resolution has'passed, and its ad¬ 
 vantage is apparent, time has to be allowed for the indigence 
 of the multitude to provide themselves with what is needful, 
 that they may be able to execute your resolve. A man, I say, 
 who destroys these times of action in a government such as 
 ours, has done more than destroy times of action; he has ab¬ 
 solutely robbed you of your main chance. 
 
 There is a ready argument however for all who wish to • 
 deceive you—“the disturbers of the commonwealth!—the 
 persons who prevent Philip from doing the state a service!” 
 To them I shall offer not a word in reply, but read you 
 Philip’s letters, and remind you of the occasions on which in 
 every instance you have been cheated, that you may see, by 
 cajoling you, he has forfeited that boastful title that one got 
 sick of hearing . 2 
 
 [Letters of Philip. 
 
 His acts in the embassy having been thus disgraceful, so 
 many, nay all of them, having been treason against you, he 
 goes about saying—“What name does Demosthenes deserve, 
 who accuses his colleagues?” Verily I accuse, whether I will 
 or no, having been so plotted against by you during the 
 
 1 A program or notice was always posted up in the city, to announce 
 the holding of an assembly. But where heralds or embassadors from 
 foreign states were to have reception, a notice was required to be pub¬ 
 lished before the council could meet on the business, and frame their 
 preliminary decree. Tlpo(3ov?ievoaL is, “to pass the decree or order of 
 council, which was necessary before it could be laid before the people.” 
 It was called then Tipofiov'Xevpa. (See Schomann, De Comitiis, 58, 97.) 
 
 I take Krjpv^i nal tcpeo(3£lcu£ to refer only to foreign heralds and embas¬ 
 sies. Pabst otherwise; whose version is: bei Euch muss iiber Alles erst 
 der Senat gehort, und Alles durch ihn zuvor berathen werden, und zwar 
 nur dann, wenn diesfiir Absendung von Herolden und fur Gesandtschaften 
 zuvor angekundigt ist, und nicht immer . 
 
 3 I e. the title of “ friend” or “ benefactor of Athens,” which Philip 
 was continually assuming in his letters, and which the Macedonian party 
 at Athens studiously repeated. Such is Reiske’s- interpretation of this 
 obscure passage, which I have followed as being, though not wholly 
 satisfactory, yet the best. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 175 
 
 whole of my absence, and having the choice of two things 
 left me, either in acts of such a description to be thought 
 your accomplice, or to accuse. I say that I have not been 
 your colleague at all in the embassy, but that you did many 
 heinous things as %embassador, and I did what was best for 
 these people. Philocrates has been your colleague, and you 
 his, and Phrynon: for you all did these things, and approved 
 of them. 
 
 But where is the salt ? where the social board and liba¬ 
 tions P Such is the rant he goes about with: as if doers of 
 justice, and not doers of iniquity, were the betrayers of these 
 things! I know that all the presidents on every occasion 
 sacrifice in common, and sup with each other, and pour liba¬ 
 tions together; and the good do not on this account imitate 
 the bad, but if they find any of their body committing an 
 offense, they inform the council and the people. In like 
 manner the council offer their opening sacrifice , 1 2 banquet 
 together, join in libations and ceremonials. So do the gener¬ 
 als, and I may say nearly all the magistrates. But do they 
 on such account allow impunity to their members who com¬ 
 mit crime? Far from it. Leon accused Timagoras , 3 after 
 having been four years his co-embassador: Eubulus accused 
 Tharrex and Smicythas, after having been their messmate; 
 
 1 To have eaten salt together, sat at the same table, and poured the 
 same drink-offering, have in most countries been regarded as sacred 
 obligations of mutual friendship or good faith. Compare Odyssey, 
 xiv. 158:— 
 
 Totcj vvv Zevg rcpura Oefiv Zevbf re rpuTz^a, 
 
 ’lOTLT] T’ ’O 6vG7/Og UfJ.VjU.OVOg T]V d(j)lKCtV(J, 
 
 T1 fiev roc rude rcuvra reXeterat dg dyopevco. 
 
 Eurip. Hecub. 787 :— 
 
 Koivjjg rparre^ifg TtoXXuKig rvxdv e/uot. 
 
 Cicero quotes an old saying having reference to this (De Amicitia, 19): 
 “ Verum illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, 
 ut amicitiae munus expletum sit.” 
 
 iEschines frequently reproaches Demosthenes with his disregard of 
 these obligations. De Fals. Leg. 31, 52; Cont. Ctes. 85. 
 
 2 E laiTifpt.a are the sacrifices offered by the council at the opening of 
 their session in honor of Jupiter and Pallas. Suidas however, whose 
 account is adopted by Schomann, says it was the first day of every year, 
 when the magistrates entered upon their offices. 
 
 3 .As to Leon and Timagoras, see ante, p. 130. Of Tharrex and 
 Smicythas nothing is known. 
 
176 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 the famous Conon of old accused Adimantus , 1 after having 
 shared the command with him. Which then violated the 
 salt and the cup, Aeschines—the traitors, the false embassa¬ 
 dors and acceptors of bribes, or their accusers'? Assuredly 
 the men of iniquity violated, as you have done, the sanc¬ 
 tities of their whole country, not merely those of private 
 fellowship . 2 
 
 To show you however, that these men have been the vilest 
 and basest not only of all public deputies to Philip, but of all 
 (without exception) who ever privately visited him, let me tell 
 you a little circumstance unconnected with the embassy. 
 
 When Philip took Olynthus, he celebrated Olympic games, 
 and invited all kinds of artists 3 to the sacrifice and the 
 festival. While he was feasting them and crowning the con¬ 
 querors, he asked Satyrus , 4 our comic actor, why he was the 
 
 1 Adimantus was one of the commanders at the fatal battle of HCgos- 
 potamok In the general massacre of the Athenian prisoners ordered 
 by Lysander, he alone was spared, because he had opposed the order 
 for cutting off the thumbs of the Peloponnesian captives. He was sus¬ 
 pected however of having betrayed the fleet to the enemy, and after¬ 
 ward brought to trial on such charge by Conon. 
 
 2 Others take gttovSuc; to be governed by udiKOvvreg, as Pabst, who 
 thus renders the passage: Gcwiss Diejcnigen, welche, wie Du, alle 
 heiligen Vcrbindlichkeiten gegen ihr Vaterland verletzten und nicht etwa 
 nur die gegen einzelne Burger. 
 
 3 Theatrical people were often specially called artists among the 
 Greeks, just as painters are in these days. 
 
 4 The person of whom this pleasing anecdote is told was an early 
 friend of Demosthenes, who first directed his attention to his faults in 
 elocution, and fliowed him how to overcome them. Plutarch, in the 
 Life of Demosthenes, relates that the young orator, after making one 
 of his earliest essays at speaking in the assembly, and having been ill 
 received by his audience, was returning home in a melancholy humor, 
 when he met Satyrus, and complained to him of his misfortune, saying 
 how hard it was that, after having spent so much time in the study of 
 oratory, he was unable to please the people of Athens: the most igno¬ 
 rant and illiterate persons were heard with pleasure, while he was not 
 listened to. “Ay,” said Satyrus ; “but I can remedy this. Just repeat 
 me some verses of Sophocles or Euripides.” Demosthenes did so, but 
 without that accompaniment of graceful action and pi’onunciation, by 
 which Satyrus was accustomed to charm his hearers on the stage. 
 Satyrus then repeated the same verses himself, showing how it ought to 
 be done, and making the orator see his own deficiencies. Demosthenes 
 had the wisdom to profit by this lesson, and from that hour set himself 
 resolutely to work to overcome all his natural impediments, to perfect 
 his organs of speech, and to acquire the external graces of address and 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 177 
 
 only person who preferred no request, whether it was that he 
 had observed in him any meanness or discourtesy toward 
 himself. Satyrus (they say) replied, that he wanted none of 
 the things which the others asked, that what he should like 
 to propose it would be very easy for Philip to oblige him 
 with, but he was fearful of being refused. Philip bade him 
 speak out, assuring him in handsome terms, that there was 
 nothing he would not do; upon which (they say) he declared, 
 that Apollophanes of Pydna was his friend; that, after he had 
 been assassinated, his relations in alarm secretly removed his 
 daughters, then little children, to Olynthus. “ They,” said he, 
 “ now that the city is taken, have become prisoners, and are 
 in your hands: they are of marriageable age. Give me them, 
 I pray and beseech you. Yet I wish you to hear and under¬ 
 stand, what sort of a present you will give me, if you do give 
 it. I myself shall derive no profit from the grant; for I shall 
 give them in marriage with portions, and not suffer them to 
 be treated in any manner unworthy of myself or their father.” 
 When the company at the banquet heard this, there was a 
 clapping of hands and tumult of applause from all sides, 
 insomuch that Philip was touched, and gave him the girls. 
 Yet this Apollophanes was one of the persons who killed 
 Philip’s brother Alexander. 1 
 
 Now let us contrast with this banquet of Satyrus another 
 banquet, which these men held in Macedonia; and see if it 
 has any likeness or resemblance. 
 
 These men were invited to the house of Xenophron, the son 
 of Phsedimus, 2 one of the Thirty, and off they went. I did 
 not go. When they came to the drinking, he introduces a cer¬ 
 tain Olynthian woman, good-looking, and well-born also and 
 modest, as the case proved. At first (I believe) they only 
 
 manner. He even shut himself up, refusing to see any of his friends, 
 and keeping his head shaved for several months together, that lie might 
 have perfect leisure to pursue his training without interruption. In 
 the result he acquired a style of delivery which fully recompensed him 
 for all this exertion, and proved the justice of the player’s advice. 
 
 The story which Demosthenes tells appears to have been introduced 
 more for the purpose of doing honor to Satyrus, than for any purpose 
 connected with the trial; and we may regard it as being really a trib¬ 
 ute of gratitude to the man to whom he was so much indebted. 
 
 1 See Vol. I. Appendix I. pp. 232, 250. 
 
 a In the list of the thirty tyrants given by Xenophon, occurs the 
 name of Phsedrias. 
 
 H 2 
 
178 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 made her drink quietly and eat dessert; so Iatrocles told me 
 the next day : but as it went on, and they became heated, 
 they ordered her to sit down and sing a song. The woman 
 was in a sad way; she neither would do it nor could; where¬ 
 upon the defendant and Phrynon said it was an insult, and 
 not to be tolerated that a captive woman, one of the accursed 
 and pestilent Olynthians, should give herself airs; and— 
 “ Call the boy and—“ A lash here.” A servant came with 
 a whip: and as they were in liquor, I imagine, and it took 
 but little to exasperate them, upon her saying something or 
 other and bursting into tears, the servant rips off her tunic and 
 gives her several cuts on the back. The woman, maddened 
 by the pain and the whole treatment, jumps up, throws her¬ 
 self at the knees of Iatrocles, and overturns the table: and 
 had he not snatched, her away, she would have “perished by 
 drunken violence ; for the drunkenness of this scoundrel is 
 terrible. There was a talk about this female in Arcadia 
 before the Ten Thousand ; ‘and Diophantus made a report to 
 you-, which I will compel him now to give evidence of; and 
 there was much talk in Thessaly and every where. 1 
 
 1 In support of this charge, as it appears, Demosthenes gives no evi¬ 
 dence, though he asserts that he heard the story from Iatrocles, whom he 
 calls as his witness for another purpose. HCschines declares the whole 
 story to be a fabrication, and produces the evidence of an Olynthian, 
 named Aristophanes, to prove that Demosthenes had offered him a bribe 
 to come forward as a witness, and that he had refused. It is remark¬ 
 able however, that ^Eschines produces none of the embassadors who 
 were present at the party to disprove the statement. (See his reply, 
 pp. 48, 49.) In the opening of his speech JEscliines adverts to the in¬ 
 dignant reception which the charge had met with from the jury, stat¬ 
 ing that they had hissed the accuser, and expressed their confidence in 
 his innocence. This is apparently confirmed by Ulpian, who states 
 that when the charge was preferred, Eubulus instantly got up and ap¬ 
 pealed to the jury, whether they would permit his friend to be slan¬ 
 dered in such a way ; the jury then rose and stopped it. 
 
 Many topics of remark suggest themselves as we peruse these contra¬ 
 dictory statements. In the first place, Demosthenes was wrong and 
 unfair in lugging in this story at all; and the Athenians, if they stopped 
 him, did perfectly right, though they were not always so scrupulous 
 about what the speakers chose to say. The tale itself, apart from some 
 exaggerations, is not so very improbable. Demosthenes may have made 
 some inquiries of Aristophanes respecting the parentage and condition 
 of the female; but he could not have been a witness to the facts them¬ 
 selves which took place at Xenophron’s house. It is an odd thing that 
 HSscliines should have been prepared with the evidence of Aristophanes; 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 179 
 
 Notwithstanding his guilty conscience, this polluted wretch 
 will dare to look you in the face, will raise his voice presently 
 and talk about the life that he has lived; which chokes me to 
 listen to. Don’t these people know, that in early life you 
 used to read the books for your mother at her initiations, and 
 as a boy were rolled about among orgiasts and drunkards?— 
 that afterward you were an office under-clerk, and did dirty 
 work for two or three drachms?—that it is but lately you 
 got a wretched livelihood for your services as third-rate 
 player on the boards of other men? 1 What sort of a life can 
 you mention which you have not lived, when that which you 
 have lived appears to be of such a character? But his assur¬ 
 ance forsooth! He brought another man to trial before you 
 for infamous practices! But of that by-and-by. Read me 
 first these depositions. 
 
 {Depositions.'] 
 
 Such being the number, men of the jury, such the charac¬ 
 ter of the offenses which he has committed against you, 
 including every species of criminality—a receiver of bribes, a 
 
 and it seems like a confirmation of what Demosthenes says that the 
 story had been talked about. The cruel treatment of the woman would 
 have been equally reprehensible, whether she was an Olynthian or not, 
 though the prejudice which Demosthenes helped to raise against his 
 opponent might have been enhanced by that circumstance; and it is 
 strange that iEschines brings no witness to disprove the occurrence. 
 
 These and many other points may naturally occur to the reader, but 
 it is perhaps waste of time to dwell upon them too long. The difficulty 
 of ascertaining the truth is increased by the absence of the depositions, 
 and the uncertainty how far the speeches which have come down to 
 us are correct reports of the speeches which were actually delivered; 
 for even the orators themselves, when they published their own speech¬ 
 es, may have added or omitted what suited their purpose. The dis¬ 
 crepancies which we find in these very passages, between what Demos¬ 
 thenes says, and what Aeschines represents him to have said, may be 
 accounted for possibly in this way. 
 
 1 Literally, “ in the training-rooms of other choirmasters— choregi” 
 Xopr/yeiov, or xopijyiov, was the place which the choregus provided to 
 train the youths who formed his chorus. He also maintained them 
 during that time, and found the dresses and accoutrements. The words 
 mean nothing more in effect than “in the theatres found by other 
 men,” who hired JEschines to take third parts. In the Oration on the 
 Crown, (ante, p. 97,) lie says that AEschines hired himself out to Sirny- 
 lus and Socrates. Reiske renders it: “alliis choregos agentibus.” &hil- 
 leto: “in the green-rooms of other choregi.” ILapaTpiQeodai is, “to be 
 maintained as a dependent.” 
 
180 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 flatterer, under the curse, a liar, a betrayer of his friends—all 
 the most heinous crimes are included;—from none of these 
 charges will he defend himself, no plain and honest defense 
 will he be able to plead: what I have heard he intends to 
 say amounts almost to madness, though perhaps a person who 
 has no other plea to urge is obliged to employ what artifices 
 he can. I am told he will say, that I have been a partner 
 in all that I denounced, that I approved of all and co-opera¬ 
 ted with him, but I have suddenly changed and become ac¬ 
 cuser. This is no fair or proper justification of his conduct, 
 but only an accusation of me: for if I had so acted, I am a 
 good-for-nothing man, and yet the proceedings are none the 
 better for that; quite otherwise. However, I consider it my 
 duty to show to you, both that the assertion, if he makes it, 
 will be false, and what the fair line of defense is. The fair 
 and honest defense is, to show either that the things alleged 
 against him have not been done, or that, being done, they ben¬ 
 efit the state. Neither of these points can he establish. For 
 neither surely can he say, that it is to our advantage for the 
 Phocians to be destroyed and Philip to hold Thermopylae and 
 the Thebans to be strong and troops to be in Eubceaand form¬ 
 ing designs on Megara and the peace to be unsworn j 1 the con¬ 
 trary to all which his reports to you announced as being to 
 your advantage and about to take place: nor can he persuade 
 you, wdio have yourselves seen and known all the circum¬ 
 stances, that these results have not been accomplished. It 
 remains then for me to. prove that I have had no connec¬ 
 tion with these men in any thing. Would you like me to pass 
 over all the rest—how I spoke against them before you, how 
 I quarreled on the journey, how I have opposed them all 
 along—and produce these men themselves as witnesses, that 
 my acts and theirs have been entirely different, and that they 
 have received money to be your enemies while I refused to 
 take it? Mark then. 
 
 What man in the commonwealth should you say was the 
 most odious blackguard, with the largest stock of impudence 
 and insolence? Not one of you, I am certain, could even by 
 mistake name any other than Philocrates. What man speaks 
 thQ loudest, and can utter what he likes w T ith the clearest 
 
 * I. e. to have remained bo loDg unsworn, owing to the dilatoriness 
 of the embassadors. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 181 
 
 voice ? .iEschines the defendant, I am sure. Whom do these 
 men call spiritless and cowardly with the mob, while I call 
 him reserved ? Myself: for never was I intrusive in any way; 
 never have I done violence to your inclinations. Well: in all 
 the assemblies, whenever there has been a discussion upon 
 these matters, you hear me always both accusing and convict¬ 
 ing these men, and positively declaring that they have taken 
 money and sold all the interests of the state. And none of 
 them hearing my statements ever contradicted them, or opened 
 his mouth or showed himself. What can be the reason that 
 the most odious blackguards in the commonwealth and the 
 loudest speakers are overpowered by me, who am the timidest 
 of men, and speak no louder than any one else? It is that 
 truth is strong, and, on the other hand, the consciousness of 
 having sold your interests is weak. This takes off from the 
 audacity of these men, this warps their tongue, stops their 
 mouths, chokes and keeps them silent. You know of course, 
 on the late occasion in Piraeus, 1 when you would not allow him 
 to be your envoy, how he shouted out that he would impeach 
 and indict me, with cries of “ Shame! shame!” Yet all that 2 
 is the prelude to numerous contests and arguments, whereas 
 these are simple, and perhaps but two or three words, which a 
 slave bought yesterday might have spokenAthenians, it is 
 atrocious: here is a man accusing me of what he has himself 
 been concerned in; and saying that I have taken money, when 
 he has taken it himself.”—Nothing of this kind did he say or 
 utter; none of you heard him ; but he threatened something 
 different. Why? Because he was conscious of guilt, and 
 not independent enough to speak those words : 3 his resolution 
 
 1 This, it is supposed, refers to the story of Antiphon, which Demos¬ 
 thenes speaks of more fully in the Oration on the Crown (ante, pp. 55, 
 56). Alschines threatened to impeach Demosthenes for his own uncon¬ 
 stitutional proceedings against Antiphon in that affair. 
 
 2 “Sensus—Atcpii haec quae mihi tunc minatus est, scilicet y eiaay- 
 yeXia nal y ypaQy, sunt longi temporis multseque operae; poteratque 
 me, nisi culpae sibi conscius esset, continuo vel tribus verbis proster- 
 nere.”— Schaefer. 
 
 Pabst: Dock eine solche Anklage vmrde der Anfang vieler undgrosser 
 Kampfe und langer Reden scyn. 
 
 I rather understand ravra to mean “ that declaration—that kind of 
 talk.”. 
 
 3 Literally: “he was the slave of those words.” “In haec ei verba 
 non magis quidquam quam mancipio in dominum licebat, h.e. haec in 
 
182 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES 
 
 never reached that point, but shrank back, for his conscience 
 checked it. No one however prevented him from indulging in 
 general abuse and calumny. 
 
 The strongest point of all, a matter not of argument but of 
 fact, I am about to mention:—Upon my offering to do what 
 was just, namely, as I had been twice embassador, to render 
 my account twice, Aeschines the defendant came up to the 
 auditors with divers witnesses, and warned them not to sum¬ 
 mon me into court, on the ground that I had passed my audit 
 and had no further liability. And the thing was beyond meas¬ 
 ure ridiculous. What was the meaning of it ? He having ren¬ 
 dered his account of the former embassy, which no one ar¬ 
 raigned, did not wish to attend a fresh audit for that which he 
 is now tried upon, which included all his misdeeds: but if I 
 attended twice, the consequence would be that he too must 
 come into court again; therefore he would not let them sum¬ 
 mon me. Now, men of Athens, this circumstance proves both 
 points clearly to you, both that Aeschines has condemned him¬ 
 self, so that none of you can conscientiously acquit him now, 
 and that he will not utter a word of truth about me; for had 
 he any thing to say, he would have come forward with it then 
 and accused me, never have given notice not to summon me 
 into court. In support of my statements, call the witnesses to 
 them. 
 
 [ Witnesses.] 
 
 Should he speak any slander about me foreign to the em¬ 
 bassy, on many accounts you should refuse to hear him. 
 I am not on my trial to-day; and after this no water is 
 poured in for me. 1 What is it then but lack of honest argu¬ 
 ments? For who upon his trial would elect to accuse, if he 
 had a good defense? Again, consider this, men of the jury. 
 
 me jactare reformidabat ut 6ov7io^ aTrapfirjmacTog cui ?/ y'XuTra dederai: 
 nam si in me jactaret, suo se gladio jugulaturus erat.”— Schaefer. 
 
 Auger gives the sense of the passage well enough: “C’est qu’intime- 
 ment convaincu de ses debts, il apprehendoit, il trembloit de rien dire 
 qui y eut rapport. Si la pensee par hasard le portoit de ce cote la, un 
 remords importun le repoussoit aussi-tot.” 
 
 Pabst: weil er sich bewusst war , dies begangen zu haben , unddiese Worte 
 aus sklavischer. Furcht vor ihnen nicht auszusprechen wagte, so wendete 
 sich sein Sinn nicht dazu, sondern bebte zuriick und wurde von seinern Oe~ 
 wissen iibermannt. 
 
 1 Into the water-glass. See p. 59, note 1. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 183 
 
 If I were tried, and .iEschines accusing, and Philip the judge, 
 and I, having no means of showing my innocence, began 
 maligning JEschines and trying to blacken his character, don’t 
 you think Philip would on this very account be indignant, 
 that any one before him should malign his benefactors? 1 Do 
 not you then be worse than Philip, but compel him to make 
 his defense upon the points in issue. 
 
 [The Deposition .] 2 
 
 You see, I, because I was conscious of no wrong, thought 
 proper to render my account, and submit to all that the laws 
 required: HEschines did the reverse. How then can his ac¬ 
 tions and mine have been the same ? or how can he possibly 
 maintain before you what he has never even alleged against 
 me before ? Surely he can not. He will, however; and 
 verily I don’t wonder. For you surely know this—that since 
 the creation of man, and since trials have been instituted, no 
 one ever was found guilty confessing his crime: no ; they'put 
 on a bold face, deny the charge, tell lies, invent excuses, do 
 any thing to escape punishment. 3 
 
 You must not be duped by any tiling of this sort to-day, 
 but decide the case by your own knowledge, and pay no heed 
 to my statements or the defendant’s, no, nor to the witnesses 
 whom he will have ready to prove what he likes, with Philip 
 for his paymaster; (you’ll see how promptly they will give 
 evidence for him :) neither care whether JEschines has a loud 
 and fine voice, or I a poor one. For it is not your business, 
 if you are wise, to have a trial of orators or speeches to-day, 
 but to regard the dire and shameful ruin of your affairs, and 
 to cast back the infamy upon its authors, having inquired 
 into these doings that are within your own knowledge. What 
 doings? These which you know, and need not be informed 
 by me. If all which they promised you has resulted from the 
 peace, and you confess yourselves to be so full of cowardice 
 
 1 The petitio principii is remarkable in this argument. 
 
 2 This is the deposition of the witnesses called just above. While 
 they are coming up, or standing for a minute or two, the orator inter¬ 
 poses a few more words to the jury. This is common. 
 
 s Compare Winter's Tale, Act ill. Scene 2 :— 
 
 I ne’er heard yet, 
 
 That any of these bolder vices wanted 
 Less impudence to gainsay what they did, 
 
 Than to perform it first. 
 
184 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 and baseness, that without enemies in the country, without 
 being blockaded by sea, without the city being in any danger, 
 while you were purchasing cheap corn, and in other respects 
 no worse off than at present, when you knew and had been 
 told by these men, that your allies would be ruined and the 
 Thebans would become powerful and that Philip would take 
 the fortresses in Thrace and that sallying-places would be es¬ 
 tablished against you in Euboea and that all which has been 
 done would happen, you-were content to make the peace 
 notwithstanding—acquit Aeschines, and do not in addition 
 to so many disgraces incur the sin of perjury: for he does 
 you no.wrong; I am a fool and a madman to accuse him. 
 But if just the reverse—if they spoke in the kindest manner 
 of Philip, saying that he loved the commonwealth, he would 
 save the Phocians, he would humble the pride of Thebes, 
 yet more, he would confer benefits on you beyond the value 
 of Amphipolis, if he obtained the peace, and would restore 
 Euboea and Oropus—if after saying and promising all this 
 they have cheated and cajoled you, ^nd all but stripped you 
 of Attica, pronounce your verdict against him, and let it not 
 be that, in addition to the other outrages put upon you, (for 
 I know not what else to call them,) you, for the bribes taken 
 by these men, carry home the curse and the perjury. 1 
 
 Consider again, men of the jury: for what object could I 
 have chosen to accuse these men, if they were innocent? 
 You can find none. Is it pleasant to have many enemies? 
 It is not even safe. Was there any quarrel subsisting be¬ 
 tween jEschines and-me? None. What then? You feared 
 for yourself, and through cowardice thought this was your 
 security:—that I have heard he says.—Well, but without 
 there being any danger or crime, iEschines, as you allege ! 2 
 
 1 This is a fine sentence, pregnant with meaning. Don’t let it hap¬ 
 pen, says the orator, that, instead of taking vengeance on these men 
 for their venality, you take their sins upon your own heads; for if you 
 acquit JEschines, the curse to which he is liable (rah; apalc; hoxog, p. 404, 
 orig.) will justly be transferred to you, and by violating your oaths as 
 jurors and giving a verdict contrary to the evidence you will have in¬ 
 curred the crime of perjury. 
 
 2 The supposed assei’tion of JEschines involved the assumption of 
 crime having been committed, which was adverse to his case. If the 
 embassadors had done nothing wrong, as HEsehines would make out, 
 then Demosthenes could have had nothing to fear, and the last assigned 
 motive for accusation was absurd. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 185 
 
 Should he repeat that, consider, men of the jury, whether for 
 crimes, which I who a«m innocent feared would be my ruin 
 through those persons—what ought they to suffer who are 
 the guilty parties ? 1 But it is for no such reason. Wherefore 
 then do I accuse you ? Yexatiously, forsooth, that I may get 
 money from you! And pray, was it better for me to receive 
 a large sum, as large as any of these men, from Philip who 
 offered it, and have both him and these for my friends, (for 
 they would, they would have been my friends, if I had been 
 their accomplices : even now the feud between us is not hered¬ 
 itary, but because I have not been a partner in their acts:) 
 or to beg from them a portion of their receipts, and be at 
 enmity both with Philip and them ?—and while I ransomed 
 the prisoners at such an expense out of my own means, to ask 
 these men for a disgraceful pittance which made them my 
 enemies? Impossible. I reported what was true, and ab¬ 
 stained from taking presents out of regard to justice and 
 truth and my future life, believing that, if I was virtuous, I 
 should be honored among you no less than certain other 
 people, 2 and that I must not barter away my public spirit for 
 any lucre: and these men I abhor, because I saw them in 
 the embassy to be villainous and execrable, and I have been 
 deprived too of my personal distinctions, 3 since through the 
 corruption of these men your displeasure has fallen upon the 
 whole embassy: and I accuse now and am come to the audit 
 foreseeing the future, and wishing to have it determined by 
 the verdict of this tribunal, that my actions have been the 
 opposite of theirs. And I fear, I fear, (all my thoughts shall 
 be declared to you,) hereafter you may drag me who am 
 innocent along with them, but you will remain passive now. 4 
 
 1 I have kept the anacoluthon of the original; but it is not very ele¬ 
 gant in this passage. 
 
 2 This is a modest way of saying that he hoped to receive the same 
 honors as other distinguished citizens. 
 
 3 4> L/.OTLfjLia , like apery, signifies not only the meritorious quality or 
 action of the person himself, but also the honorable distinction attend¬ 
 ing it 
 
 Demosthenes had lost not only the vote of thanks and invitation to 
 dine in the City Hall (as Schaefer observes, see ante, p. 130), but suffered 
 in his general credit and reputation, through the misconduct of the 
 embassadors. 
 
 4 ’AvaneTTroKoreg, “fallen back.” Reiske: “remissi, supini.” Pabst: 
 nachldisig und nachsichtig. 
 
 1 
 
186 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 For it seems to me, O Athenians, you are wholly paralyzed, 
 waiting till calamity falls upon you; and while you see other 
 people suffer, you take no precaution, nor give a thought to the 
 commonwealth, now so long in many fearful ways declining. 
 
 Don’t you think it dreadful and monstrous 1 —for though I 
 had resolved to be silent, I am led on to speak:—You must 
 know Pytliocles 1 the son of Pythodorus. With him I was 
 on very friendly terms, and up to this day nothing unpleasant 
 has passed between us. He turns out of my way now when 
 he meets me, ever since he has been with Philip; and if he is 
 compelled to cross my path, he starts away in a moment, for 
 fear some one should see him speaking to me: yet with 
 HEschines he walks all round the market, and holds consulta¬ 
 tion. It is really dreadful and shocking, O Athenians—while 
 people who have chosen Philip’s service have this advantage, 
 that his perception is in either case so keen, they believe each 
 of them, as surely as if he were standing at their side, that 
 nothing they do even here can escape him, and they regard 
 as friends whom he thinks proper, and as enemies likewise— 
 those who are devoted to you, who are ambitious of your 
 esteem and have never sacrificed it, find in you such a deaf¬ 
 ness and blindness, that these miscreants are here contending 
 on equal terms with me, and that too before a jury who know 
 all the circumstances. Would you like to know and hear the 
 reason ? I will tell you; and pray be not offended at my 
 speaking the truth. It is because Philip, I take it, having 
 one body and one soul, loves with his whole heart the people 
 that do him good, and hates those that do the contrary; 
 whereas any one of you never thinks that a person serving 
 the state serves him, or that a person damaging the state 
 damages him ; each individual has things of greater import¬ 
 ance to himself by which you are frequently led astray— 
 compassion, envy, resentment, granting favors, a thousand 
 things besides—indeed, should one escape every thing else, 
 there is no escaping persons who don’t like one to be such. 2 
 
 1 Mentioned in the Speech on the Crown (p. 320, orig.) as an adver¬ 
 sary of Demosthenes. His stately manner of walking is noticed further 
 on in this speech (p. 442, orig.). He was many years after condemned 
 to death. 
 
 2 This sentence, which perplexed Taylor, and which Francis omits 
 from his translation, is explained by Reiske, and not badly rendered by 
 Auger, “Quand on 6chapperoit 4 tout le reste, pourroit on echapper 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 187 
 
 The fault in each of these instances gradually undermines and 
 ends in being the total ruin of the commonwealth. 1 
 
 Do not, O Athenians, commit any such error to-day; do 
 not acquit the man who has so greatly wronged you. For 
 really what will be said of you, if you do acquit him?—Cer¬ 
 tain embassadors went from Athens to Philip; Philocrates, 
 JEschines, Phrynon, Demosthenes. What then ? One of them, 
 besides that he made no profit by the embassy, redeemed the 
 captives out of his own private means: another with the 
 money for which he sold the country’s interests went about 
 purchasing harlots and fish. Another sent his son to Philip, 
 before he had entered him in the roll of citizens ; 2 the brutal 
 Phrynon: while the first did nothing unworthy of the com¬ 
 monwealth or himself. One, though choir-master and cap¬ 
 tain, thought it right in addition to incur these voluntary ex¬ 
 penses, to redeem the captives, and not permit any of his 
 fellow-countrymen to be in distress for want: another, so far 
 from delivering any already in captivity, helped to bring a 
 whole district, and more than ten thousand infantry and near¬ 
 ly a thousand cavalry of an allied nation, into the- power of 
 Philip. What followed? The Athenians got hold of them— 
 having known all about it long before—well ?—the men who 
 
 a l’envie, qui ne peut souffrir un citoyen integre et zele!”—The orator 
 partly alludes to himself, as being the patriotic citizen whose vocation 
 did not please a certain class of the people. And it is not impossible 
 he might have been led to this remark by some signs of displeasure 
 which he observed in some of the jurors. Pabst makes him speak ex¬ 
 pressly of himself (wie ich bin ); but it is better not to introduce this 
 into the text. 
 
 1 I have followed the interpretation of vTrofifieovoa indicated by F. A. 
 Wolf in his note on the Leptines, p. 471. Shill eto, who quotes F. A. 
 Wolf, and adopts his view, misapplies his learning, w r hen he desires us 
 to translate—“The error in each of these cases gradually giving way 
 from under you, results in a universal and momentary destruction to 
 the state.” The transitive force of vnofifieiv is derived from the notion 
 of “slipping from under;” but to translate it so here is not advisable. 
 
 Reiske, in his Index, agreeing with F. A. Wolf as to the meaning in 
 the Leptines, here renders vtt offieovca simply subrepens, in which he has 
 been generally followed. Francis: “These particular and separate 
 errors advancing by degrees, fall at last in one collected ruin on the 
 republic.” Pabst: Aber solche bei alien einzelnen' Sachen dieser Art be- 
 gangenen Fehltritte brivgen, wenn sie allmahlig und uninerklich weiter 
 schreiten, dem Staat endlich in seiner Gesammtheit Verderben. 
 
 2 At the age of eighteen an Athenian citizen was enrolled in the 
 register of his township (Ay^of). 
 
188 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 had taken money and presents, who had disgraced themselves 
 and the country and their own children, they acquitted, con¬ 
 sidering them to be men of sense and the country to be in a 
 flourishing state;—but what of the man who accused them ?— 
 him they judged to be an idiot, ignorant of the country, not 
 knowing how to throw his own away . 1 
 
 And who, O Athenians, after seeing this example, will wish 
 to prove himself an honest man ? Who will be an embassador 
 for nothing, if he is neither to take reward, nor with you to 
 be held more trustworthy than persons who have taken it? 
 Therefore you are not only trying these men to-day; no: you 
 are legislating for all time to come, whether embassadors 
 should take money to work disgracefully for the enemy, or do 
 their best in your behalf without bribe or fee. 
 
 Upon the other matters you require no witness: but as to 
 Phrynon sending his son, call me the witnesses to that . 2 
 
 m [ W itnesses.' ] 
 
 iEschines never prosecuted this man on the charge of send¬ 
 ing his son to Philip for dishonor. But if one being in his 
 youth better looking than another, not foreseeing what sus¬ 
 picion might arise from such comeliness, hath been a little 
 wild in after-life, iEschines must prosecute him for infamous 
 crime. 
 
 Now let me speak of the entertainment and the decree: 
 I had nearly forgotten what was most material to say to you. 
 
 1 Tijv no'Kiv uyvoelv is explained thus by Reiske: “non nosse mores 
 civium degeneres, inimicos suos ornantium, bene de se meritos abjici- 
 entium.” By Schaefer otherwise: “ignorare quam prospers sint res 
 civitatis.” 
 
 Owe ix ELV utzol ru kavrov (tinny refers to the boasted liberality of Demos¬ 
 thenes, in ransoming the pi'isoners, Ac. His enemies represented him 
 as a fool, who threw away his money, and even didn’t know how to 
 throw it away. Auger: “qui ne savoit ou jeter son argent.” 
 
 2 It may seem strange to an English reader that Demosthenes should 
 call witnesses to a fact so remote from the point at issue. But the 
 Athenians appear to have admitted all kinds of evidence which tended 
 to show the general character of the parties. Demosthenes seeks to 
 create a prejudice against Alschines, as being connected with such an 
 infamous person as Phrynon, and he turns this to still better account, 
 when he comments upon his prosecution of Timarchus. This (says he) 
 could only have been for the purpose of screening himself. Had his 
 motive been the pure love of virtue, he would have proceeded against 
 Phrynon also. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 189 
 
 In drawing up the order of council concerning the first em¬ 
 bassy, and again before the people at the assemblies in which 
 you were to debate the question of peace, when nothing either 
 spoken or done wrong by these persons was known, I accord¬ 
 ing to customary usage commended and invited them to the 
 city-hall. And what is more, I entertained Philip’s embas¬ 
 sadors, and very splendidly too, O Athenians : for when I saw 
 them in Macedonia glorying even in such things as proofs of 
 wealth and splendor, it occurred to me that I should begin 
 directly to surpass them in these things, and display greater 
 magnificence myself: however, the defendant now will bring 
 the matter forward, and say, “ Demosthenes himself com¬ 
 mended us, himself feasted the embassadors”—not distinguish¬ 
 ing the when. It was before the country had sustained an 
 injury, before it was discovered that these men had sold them¬ 
 selves; when the embassadors had just Arrived for the first 
 time, and the people had to hear what they proposed, and it 
 was not yet known that the defendant would support Philoc- 
 rates, or that he would make such a motion. If therefore he 
 should bring this forward, remember the dates ; they are ear¬ 
 lier than the offenses: since that time there has not been the 
 slightest connection or communion between these men and me. 
 Read the deposition. 
 
 [The Deposition.'] 
 
 Perhaps his brothers Philochares and Aphobetus 1 will 
 plead for him. To both of them there is much that you 
 may with justice reply: (I must speak freely, O Athenians, 
 without any reserve:)—Aphobetus and Philochares ! you 
 being a painter of perfume-boxes and drums, your brothers 
 under-clerks and common persons; (there is no reproach in 
 these things, yet they hardly deserve a general’s rank); we 
 dignified you with embassies, generalships, and the highest 
 honors. Now supposing that none of you committed any 
 crime, we should have nothing to be grateful for to you, but 
 you for these things ought to be grateful to us ; for we, 
 passing by many persons more worthy of honor, exalted 
 you. But if in the very exercise of your dignities one of you 
 has committed crime, and crime too of such a nature, don’t 
 
 1 See Appendix II. 
 
190 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 you much more deserve execration than pardon ? Much more, 
 in my opinion. 
 
 They will be violent perhaps, with their loud voices and 
 impudence, and with the plea that “it is pardonable to assist 
 a brother.” But don’t you give way : remember, while it is 
 their duty to regard ^Eschines, it is yours to regard the laws 
 and the whole commonwealth, and (above all) the oaths that 
 you have yourselves sworn as jurors. If indeed they have 
 requested any of you to save the defendant, see whether they 
 mean, in case he is not shown to have injured the common¬ 
 wealth, or even in case he is. If they mean in case of inno¬ 
 cence, I am also for saving him ; if unconditionally and how¬ 
 ever guilty he has been, they have asked you to commit per¬ 
 jury. For though the ballot is secret, it will not be hidden 
 from the gods. Most wisely was it seen by him that enacted 
 the law of secret voting, that none of these men 1 will know 
 which of you has obliged him, but the gods and the divine 
 spirit will know who has voted iniquitously: from whom it 
 is better for each of you to secure good hopes for himself and 
 his children by giving a righteous and proper judgment, than 
 to confer a secret and uncertain obligation upon these men, 
 and to acquit a person who has given evidence against him¬ 
 self. For what stronger witness, JEschines, can I produce, to 
 prove your misconduct as embassador, than you against your¬ 
 self? You that thought it necessary to involve in such a 
 dreadful calamity the man who would have brought some of 
 your deeds to light, certainly expected some heavy punish¬ 
 ment yourself, should the people hear what you had done. 
 
 This proceeding, if you are wise, will turn out to his own 
 prejudice, not only on this account, that it is a flagrant indi¬ 
 cation of what his acts as embassador have been, but because 
 in conducting the accusation he used those arguments which 
 stand good against him now: for surely the same principles, 
 which you laid down when you prosecuted Timarchus, are 
 available also for others against yourself. You then said to 
 the jury—“ Demosthenes will defend him, and will arraign 
 my conduct as embassador: and then, if he misleads you by 
 - his speech, he will brag and go about saying—how ? what do 
 
 1 Tovtuv means here not only iEschines and his colleagues, but all 
 criminals brought to the bar of justice. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 191 
 
 you think ? 1 I led the jurors right away from the question, 
 and stole the case out of their hands.” Don’t yourself act 
 thus. Confine your defense to the subject of your trial. When 
 you were prosecuting him, then was the time for accusing and 
 saying what you pleased. 
 
 Again you recited before the jury, having no witness to 
 bring in support of your charge against the accused— 
 
 Rumor which many people noise abroad 
 Not wholly dies: a goddess eke is she. 2 
 
 Well, -ZEschines; and all these people say that you have re¬ 
 ceived money from the embassy; so that against you too, I 
 should think, Rumor which many people noise abroad not 
 wholly dies. For inasmuch as more accuse you than him, see 
 how the matter stands. Timarchus even his neighbors did 
 not all know; but of you embassadors there is no Greek or 
 barbarian who does not say, that you have received money 
 from the embassy. If rumor therefore is true, that of the 
 
 1 These words rcug-, tl\ which have puzzled the critics, are under¬ 
 stood by most to be put in the mouth of Demosthenes. Perhaps the 
 better way is to Understand them as referring to what precedes, thus: 
 “how will he bragl what will he say? why, as follows.” 
 
 2 These lines are from Hesiod, Opera et Dies, 761. H^scliines, in the 
 passage referred to (cont. Timarcli. 18), quotes also Homer and Euripi¬ 
 des on the subject of Fame or Rumor. Compare the celebrated lines 
 of Yirgil, JEneid IY. 173. 
 
 Whether this goddess, the personification of common rumor or 
 report, should in English be rendered Fame, as it more generally is, 
 or Rumoi\ 1 have entertained some doubt: Fame is nearer in point of 
 form to the Greek and Latin original; and it may be said that Rumor, 
 derived from the Latin Rumor, can not so well be made feminine. But 
 on the other hand, the meaning of our Fame is not so like the Fama 
 of Virgil and Hesiod as Rumor is. And with respect to the gender, 
 we have as much right to follow the French Rumeur as the Latin 
 Rumor, or pei'liaps to exercise an arbitrary discretion upon such a 
 matter. Shakspeare, no doubt, makes his Rumor a male personage, 
 in the Introduction to Henry IY. Part 2, and one of a character more 
 like Virgil’s than Hesiod’s deity. The lines are quite equal to Virgil’s. 
 I make no apology for quoting some of them:— 
 
 Open your ears ; for which of you will stop 
 The vent of hearing, when loud Rumor speaks? 
 
 I from the orient to the drooping west, 
 
 Making the wind my post-horse, still unfold 
 The acts commenced on this ball of earth. 
 
 Upon my tongues continual slanders ride, 
 
 The which in every language I pronounce, 
 
 .» Stuffing the ears of men with false reports, <fcc. <Src. 
 
192 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 multitude is against you all; and that such rumor is credible, 
 and that a goddess eke is she, and that the poet who wrote 
 this was a wise man, you have yourself laid down. 
 
 And besides, he got up a number of Iambics, and repeated 
 them ; for instance— 
 
 IAMBICS FROM THE PHCENIX OF EURIPIDES. 
 
 Who loves the fellowship of evil men, 
 
 Of him I never ask, assured that whom 
 He seeks for comrades he resembles most. 
 
 “ The man 1 who frequented the cockpits and walked about 
 with Pittalacus”—these were his words and others like them 
 —“ don’t you know,” said he, “ what sort of a person to con¬ 
 sider him?” Well, -ZEschines: these iambics will suit me 
 now against you ; and I shall speak fitly and properly, if I 
 recite to the jury—Who loves the fellowship of Philocrates, 
 and that too on an embassy, of him I never ask, assured that 
 he has received money like Philocrates who confesses it. 
 
 When he calls other men speech-writers 2 and sophists, and 
 attempts to vilify them, he will prove to be himself liable to 
 these reproaches. For those iambics are from the Phoenix 
 of Euripides: and that drama was never acted by either 
 Theodorus or Aristodemus, to whom the defendant used to 
 take third parts, but Molon played in it, and other old per¬ 
 formers whoever they were. The Antigone of Sophocles 
 however Theodorus has often acted, and so has Aristodemus; 
 in which there are iambics beautifully written and in a strain 
 
 1 HSscliines (cont. Timarch. 8, 9) charges Timarchus with cock-fight¬ 
 ing and gambling, and with a disgraceful intimacy with Pittalacus, a 
 town-slave. 
 
 Others, following Reiske, made rovp opvig “ the bird-market,” which 
 does equally well. A cock-fighter would naturally frequent the market 
 where cocks were sold. Francis: “aviaries.” 
 
 3 “ Aoyoypu<j>ov<;. Properly, persons who wrote speeches either fo¬ 
 rensic or epideictic, i. e. which turn on praise or censure, such as those 
 of Isocrates. Such persons would probably introduce into their written 
 speeches many far-fetched allusions and passages from the old poets, 
 who were generally neglected in those stirring and active and there¬ 
 fore unreading times. Hence the word would nearly get the meaning 
 of our pedant . That it was used in an opprobrious sense (compare our 
 pamphleteer) is stated by Thom. Mag. p. 580, and is attested by Plato, 
 (Phiedr. p. 257,) which shows that XoyoypdQoc and oo<pLCT7]g were used 
 to convey the same idea.”— Shilleto. 
 
 The passage here referred to by Demosthenes is from the speech 
 against Timarehus, p. 13. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 193 
 
 useful to you, which, though he has himself often spoken and 
 knows them quite by heart, he omitted. You are of course 
 aware, that in all tragic pieces it is a sort of special privilege 
 for third-rate actors to come on as tyrants and sceptre-bear¬ 
 ers. See then what the verses are in this drama, which the 
 poet has put into the mouth of Creon iEschines, which he 
 neither conned over to himself to serve him in the embassy, 
 nor repeated to the jury. Read: 
 
 IAMBICS FROM TIIE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. 
 
 Ye can not tell the spirit of a man, 
 
 His wisdom, nor his worth, till they be tried 
 In public life and acts of policy. 
 
 The statesman, who to serve the common we 1 
 Adopts not what in counsel is the best. 
 
 But closes up his mouth for fear of danger, 
 
 Base have I ever deem’d, and deem him still. 
 
 And whoso dearer than his country loves 
 A private friend, as nothing I esteem. 
 
 For I (bear witness, thou all-seeing Jove!) 
 
 Should not keep silence, if I saw destruction 
 Advancing toward my people ’stead of safety; 
 
 Nor e’er would I accept as friend of mine 
 My country’s enemy: for w r ell 1 know, 
 
 ’Tis she preserves us all; in her embark’d, 
 
 While steadily she sails, we lack not friendship. 
 
 None of these verses did .ZEschines repeat to himself on 
 the embassy: instead of the commonwealth, he deemed 
 Philip’s friendship of the greatest importance and advantage 
 to himself, bidding a long farewell to the wise Sophocles: 
 when he saw destruction advancing nigh, the expedition 
 against Phocis, he gave no warning or notice, but on the 
 contrary helped to conceal and forward it, and those who 
 wished to give information he prevented; not remembering 
 that she it is who preserves us all, and in her his mother 
 initiating 1 and purifying, and making a profit from the 
 houses of her employers, reared up all these children , 2 3 and 
 
 1 This turn is Aristophanic. As to the father and mother’s occupa¬ 
 tions, and as to Heros the physician, see ante, pp. 54, 94—96, and 
 the notes. Shilleto observes: “Schaefer is, in my judgment, right in 
 
 erasing from the Greek Hero-Calendar one unknown Calamites, and 
 restoring to the contemporary chirurgeons the name of Heros. KaA- 
 aficTTjg appears to have been a by-word for mrpdf from the KaXa/uoi 
 used for surgical purposes.” 
 
 3 I refer rocroarouf, as Reiske does, to number. Francis: “ these her 
 • VOL. II—I 
 
194 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 that his father teaching the alphabet, as I am informed by 
 older men, lived how he could next door to Heros the phy¬ 
 sician, but lived at all events in this city; and they themselves 
 got money by being under-clerks and servants to all the pub¬ 
 lic functionaries, and at last having been appointed clerks by 
 you were maintained for two years in the Round-room , 1 and 
 from this city was the defendant sent but just now as embas¬ 
 sador. None of these things did he consider ; no care he took 
 that the commonwealth should sail steadily, but overturned 
 and sank her, and did his utmost to throw her into the pow¬ 
 er of her enemies. Are not you then a sophist, and a vile one 
 too ? Are not you a speech-writer, ay, and one hated by the 
 gods? you that passed over what you had often played and 
 knew perfectly by heart, while what you never acted in your 
 life you searched out and quoted to injure one of your fellow- 
 citizens ? 
 
 Come, consider now his remarks about Solon. He said 
 there was a statue of Solon exemplifying the decorous style 
 of the orators of that day, with his hand folded inside the 
 mantle ; 2 this by way of reproach and rebuke to the forward¬ 
 ness of Timarchus. But the Salaminians say the statue has 
 not been erected fifty years, and it is nearly two hundred and 
 forty years from Solon to the present time, so that the artist 
 who shaped that figure was not only himself no contemporary 
 of Solon, but his grandfather was not either. However, he 
 said this to the jury, and gave an imitation: but what was 
 of far greater advantage to the state than Solon’s attitude, 
 to see (namely) his heart and mind — of them he gave no 
 imitation, quite the contrary. Solon 3 (after Salamis had re- 
 
 illustrious sons.” Auger: “ de merveilleux personnages.” Pabst: diese 
 stattlichen Sohne. 
 
 1 The room in the centre of the Prytaneum, where the Prytanes 
 dined. See ante, p. 130, note 1. 
 
 2 Literally: “ having his mantle wrapped round him, with his hand 
 inside.” 
 
 3 Here we have the celebrated legislator of Athens introduced to our 
 notice in the character of a poet and a warrior. Of his poetry a few 
 fragments only remain, and are remarkable for elegance and simplicity 
 rather than for any merit of a higher description. The story respecting 
 the recovery of Salamis is told in Plutarch’s Life of Solon, as follows:— 
 The Megarians had wrested the island of Salamis from the Athenians, 
 who, after many unsuccessful attempts to retrieve their loss, became 
 heartily sick of the war, and passed a decree making it punishable with 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 195 
 
 volted from the Athenians, and they had decreed to punish 
 with death whoever advised its recovery,) at the risk of his 
 own life composed and sang an elegy, and preserved that 
 country to Athens, and removed the disgrace which had fallen 
 upon her. JEschines, although the Persian king and all the 
 Greeks had acknowledged Amphipolis to be yours, gave up and 
 sold it, and supported Philocrates who moved the resolution. 
 Worth his while (was it not?) to mention Solon! And not 
 
 death for any one to advise its renewal. Solon, who was a native of 
 Salamis, was greatly discontented; and by-and-by, having observed that 
 the youth of Athens were beginning to change their minds but afraid 
 to violate the law, counterfeited insanity, and, keeping himself at home, 
 composed an elegy on the loss of the island. It contained a hundred 
 verses, and is said to have been a poem of considerable merit. Having 
 these verses by heart, he suddenly ran into the market-place with a cap 
 on his head,—(the cap was a sign of sickness,)—and mounting the her¬ 
 ald’s platform, sang them out in a loud voice to the people. His sup¬ 
 posed madness and the exciting character of the verses gave it the ap¬ 
 pearance of inspiration. Pisistratus, then a young man, was among the 
 hearers, and urged them to obey the voice of Solon. In the moment of 
 their enthusiasm the people repealed the decree, and prepared for war. 
 Solon recovered Salamis by a stratagem, which is variously related. Ac¬ 
 cording to one account, he by a false message enticed a large body of 
 Megarians to the Attic coast, and having put them to the sword, sailed 
 instantly to Salamis and took it. After some further struggles, the bel¬ 
 ligerent parties referred their claims to the arbitration of Sparta. Solon 
 pleaded his country’s cause before the arbitrators, and urged (among 
 other arguments in favor of the Athenian title to Salamis) that the Sa- 
 laminians buried their dead in the Athenian fashion, turning their faces 
 to the west, and not to the east, as the Megarians did; and also that 
 they had separate tombs for each body, whereas the Megarians put 
 several bodies into one tomb. He urged also that Salamis was called 
 Ionian in some of the Delphic oracles. A further story is told, that he 
 inserted a line in the catalogue of ships in the second book of the Iliad, 
 which is now read thus :— 
 
 A lag 6’ £/c Eaka/jlvog uyev dvona'ideiia vr/aq, 
 
 Ett/oc d’ uyuv iv’ ’A drjvaiuv ioravro (pdhayyeg. 
 
 The second of these lines is said to have been Solon’s interpolation, to 
 prove that Salamis was, even so early as the Trojan war, subject to, or 
 at least connected with Athens; and some critics have thought that the 
 spuriousness of the line appears from other passages of Homer, where 
 the fealaminians are made to occupy a station separate from the Athe¬ 
 nians. (See Heyne’s learned note to Iliad, II. 553.) The Megarians are 
 said to have contended for a different reading in Ilomer, which estab¬ 
 lished their own connection with Salamis. Judgment was given by the 
 arbitrators in favor of Athens. 
 
 The cap which HSschines went out with was, as Demosthenes hints 
 (below, p. 196), an effected imitation of Solon. 
 
196 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 only here acted he so, but on his arrival there he never 
 uttered the name of the place which he came to negotiate 
 about. And so he himself reported to you; for you must 
 remember his saying — u I too had something to say about 
 Amphipolis, but I omitted it, to give Demosthenes an oppor¬ 
 tunity of taking up the subject.”—I came forward and said, 
 that he had left nothing for me that he wished to say to 
 Philip; for he would sooner give a part of his blood than 
 a part of his speech to any one. The fact, I apprehend, was 
 —having received money, he could say nothing on the other 
 side of the question to Philip, who had paid him on purpose 
 that he might not restore Amphipolis. Here—take and read 
 these elegiacs of Solon, and let the jury see, that Solon ab¬ 
 horred men like the defendant. 
 
 Not to speak with the hand folded, HEschines—not that— 
 but to perform your embassage with the hand folded, is need¬ 
 ful. You, after extending and holding it open yonder and 
 disgracing your countrymen, talk pompously here, and, hav¬ 
 ing got up and spouted some wretched phrases, imagine you 
 can escape punishment for all these grievous crimes, if you 
 put a cap on your head and walk about and abuse me. 
 
 Read, if you please: 
 
 THE ELEGIACS OF SOLON I 
 Our city everlastingly shall stand; 
 
 So Jupiter and all the Gods command: 
 
 Athenian Pallas lends her guardian aid, 
 
 She of the mighty Father, heavenly Maid. 
 
 Yet the fair city breedeth for her bane 
 A generation covetous and vain, 
 
 Ill-minded statesmen, who shall yet be tried 
 In many sorrows to rebuke their pride; 
 
 Insatiable, in riot they devour 
 
 The fleeting pleasures of the festal hour, 
 
 Indulge their lustful appetence of gain, 
 
 And sparing neither sacred nor profane, 
 
 By spoil and rapine thrive, nor hold in awe 
 Omniscient Themis and her holy law, 
 
 Who sits in watchful silence, and the day 
 . Of vengeance bides, more dreadful for delay. 
 
 Thus on a people creeps the dire disease, 
 
 Till perish all their ancient liberties: 
 
 Or civil strife or warfare is at hand, 
 
 To waste the youthful promise of the land. 
 
 A factious race the sword shall overthrow; 
 
 Who wrong their friends are pillaged by the foe. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 197 
 
 Over the country these misfortunes brood: 
 
 The poor meanwhile, a hapless multitude, 
 
 Are dragg’d to foreign shores and long exile, 
 
 To slavery sold, and bound in fetters vile. . 
 
 The common Pest of all comes home to each ; 
 
 No door can guard him from the Fury’s reach ; 
 
 She leaps the lofty wall; hide where he will, 
 
 In cell or chamber, she shall find him still. 
 
 Fain am I thus, Athenians, to advise, 
 
 "What evils under Anarchy arise, 
 
 How Discipline the public weal maintains, 
 
 Curbs wicked men with penance and with chains; 
 How she can tame the wild, the proud put low, 
 And wither mischief ere to strength it grow ; 
 
 How straighten crooked justice, and assuage 
 The might of passion and unruly rage: 
 
 Under her sway confusion, discord cease, 
 
 And men abide in fellowship and peace. 1 
 
 1 These are not from the Salamis, but verses of a purely political 
 character, addressed to the Athenians during some period of discord 
 and trouble. The future legislator, preparing the way for that great 
 work which has transmitted his name to all ages, endeavors to kindle 
 the flame of patriotism in his countrymen, rebukes the leading states¬ 
 men for their selfishness and vicious conduct, and exhorts all classes to 
 maintain civil harmony and obedience to the laws. Whether this was 
 the whole poem, or is but an extract, we can not determine. There 
 are errors in the text, and some verses manifestly lost. Pabst in his 
 version, which is in hexameter and pentameter, leaves the hiatuses as 
 he finds them. I have taken a different course, and have not kept so 
 close to the original as he. Francis has given a spirited version, which 
 I subjoin:— 
 
 Nor Jove supreme, whose secret will is Fate, 
 
 Nor the blest Gods have doom’d th’ Athenian State; 
 
 For Pallas, with her Father’s glories crown’d, 
 
 Spreads the protection of her H^gis round. 
 
 But dire Corruption wide extends its sway; 
 
 Athenians hear its dictates, and obey. 
 
 Oppressive demagogues our counsels guide, 
 
 Though various mischiefs wait to quell their pride. 
 
 Untaught with cheerful appetite to taste 
 
 The calm delights that crown the temperate feast, 
 
 A lust of gold their restless bosoms fires ; 
 
 A lust of gold their guilty schemes inspires. 
 
 Vain are all laws, or human or divine, 
 
 To guard the public wealth, or sacred shrine, 
 
 While private life is fill’d with mutual fraud, 
 
 By Justice and*her sacred laws unawed. 
 
 Silent she sits, the past, the present views, 
 
 And in her own good time the guilty scene pursues. 
 
198 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 You hear, O Athenians, what Solon declares pf such men, 
 and of the gods who (he says) protect the commonwealth. 
 For myself, I believe as I hope, that his statement is eternally 
 true ; that the gods do indeed protect our commonwealth: 
 and in some sort I believe, that all which has taken place 
 upon this audit has been a manifestation to the common¬ 
 wealth of divine benevolence. Only see :—A man who has 
 grossly violated his duty as embassador, who has given up 
 places in which the gods had ought to be worshiped by you 
 and your allies, disfranchised an accuser who obeyed his chal¬ 
 lenge . 1 To what end? That he may obtain neither pity 
 nor pardon for his own offenses. Further, in accusing that 
 person he chose to speak ill of me, and again before the 
 
 Thus other states their mortal wound receive, 
 
 And servile chains their free-born sons enslave; 
 
 Sedition rages; wars, long-slumbering, rise, 
 
 And the loved youth in prime of beauty dies; 
 
 For soon the foe lays waste that hapless state, 
 
 Where joyless Discord dwells, and foul Debate. 
 
 For the poor wretch a harder lot remains, 
 
 Sold like a slave to pine in foreign chains. 
 
 His proper woes the man of wealth await, 
 
 Bound o’er his walls, and thunder at his gate; 
 
 Close on th’ unhappy fugitive they press, 
 
 And find him in his chamber’s dark recess. 
 
 Thus my good genius speaks, and bids advise 
 The sons of Athens to be just and wise ; 
 
 To mark attentive what a stream of woes 
 From civil discord and contention flows ; 
 
 What beauteous order shines, where Justice reigns, 
 
 And binds the sons of Violence in chains: 
 
 Folly, of thousand forms, before her flies, 
 
 And in the bud the flowering mischief dies. 
 
 She guides the judge’s sentence, quells the proud. 
 
 And midst sedition’s rage appalls the crowd; 
 
 While clamorous Faction and Contention cease, 
 
 And man is blest with Happiness and Peace. 
 
 1 When the embassador presented himself to the Logisbe to pass his 
 audit, it was in effect a challenge to any of his fellow-citizens who 
 thought proper to come forward and accuse him. Schaefer explains it 
 differently: “ Sensum pulchre intellexit Marklandus, citans p. 434. 
 Orator dicit, Timarchum non sponte sua, non ut petulantem sycophan- 
 tam, sed rogatum ab amicis invitatumque a bonis civibus ad accusan- 
 dum iEschinem prodiisse.” Shilleto follows him, interpreting vnanoveiv 
 “to get up to speak when called upon.” I scarcely think it can bear 
 such a meaning, unless connected with other words. In the passage 
 cited from p. 434, it is vTcanovaai KaTiOVfxevog. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 199 
 
 people he threatened to prefer indictments and the like. For 
 what purpose? That when I accuse him, who thoroughly 
 know his villainies and have closely watched them all, I may 
 be received by you with the utmost indulgence. Further¬ 
 more, by pushing off his trial during all the former period he 
 has been led on to a crisis, at which, out of regard to future 
 consequences, if to nothing else, it is neither safe nor possible 
 for you to let him escape punishment for his bribery . 1 You 
 ought indeed, O Athenians, at all times to execrate and to 
 punish men guilty of corruption and treason; but now it will 
 be most especially seasonable and for the common benefit of 
 all mankind. For a plague, O Athenians, has fallen upon 
 Greece, a grievous and severe one, that requires some extraor¬ 
 dinary good fortune and carefulness on your part. The nota¬ 
 bles intrusted with the administration of state affairs are be¬ 
 traying their own liberty, unhappy men, and bringing upon 
 themselves a voluntary servitude, which they call friendship 
 and intimacy and connection with Philip, and other flattering 
 names: the rest of the people and the authorities (whatever 
 they are) in the several states, who ought to punish those men 
 and put them instantly to death, so far from doing any thing 
 of the kind, admire and envy them, and would like every one 
 to be in their places. 
 
 This sort of thing, this kind of ambition, men of Athens, 
 until but the other day had destroyed the sovereignty and 
 national dignity of the Thessalians, and is at this moment 
 stealing away their liberty ; for the citadels of some of them 
 are garrisoned by Macedonians. It has entered Peloponnesus, 
 and caused the massacres in Elis; and with such frenzy and 
 
 1 The skill of the orator in this passage is worthy of observation. 
 There were three points greatly to the advantage of his opponent, as he 
 could not fail to see: first, the successful proceeding againstTimarchus; 
 secondly, the invidious character of the present prosecution, being 
 against a colleague with whom he had acted harmoniously in the be¬ 
 ginning ; thirdly, the length of time which had elapsed since the com¬ 
 mission of the supposed offense. Demosthenes, briefly adverting to 
 these points, turns them skillfully to his own account, without any labo¬ 
 rious argument, and without any appearance of doubt as to the effect 
 which they might produce on the minds of his hearers. He then 
 launches out into that splendid description of the state of Greece, and 
 the baneful effects of subservience to Philip, (beginning vooppa yhp 
 uvdpec, ’A drjvaloi,) which has been praised by most critics, and especially 
 by Pliny, IX. Epist. ‘2ti. 
 
200 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 madness did it inspire those wretched people, that, to'get do¬ 
 minion over each other and gratify Philip, they would spill the 
 blood of their kindred and fellow-countrymen. And it stops 
 not even here. It entered into Arcadia, and has turned every 
 thing there upside down; and now many of the Arcadians, 
 (who ought like yourselves to be eminently proud of freedom, 
 for the only indigenous people are you and they,) hold Philip 
 in admiration, and set him up in brass, and crown him; and 
 to complete all, should he visit Peloponnesus, they have pass¬ 
 ed resolutions to receive him in their cities. The Argives have 
 done the same. By Ceres, if one must speak in earnest, these 
 matters require no little precaution ; as the plague, advancing 
 in a circle, has entered, men of Athens, even here. While 
 then you are yet in safety, be on your guard, and punish with 
 infamy the persons who first introduced it; or else, see that 
 my words be not deemed to have been wisely spoken, when 
 you have no longer any resource. 
 
 See you not, O men of Athens, how notable and striking 
 an example the poor Olynthians are; who owe their destruc¬ 
 tion, unhappy men, to nothing so much as to conduct of this 
 kind? You may discover it plainly by what has befallen 
 them. When they had only Lour hundred horse, and were 
 not more than five thousand altogether in number, the Chal- 
 cidians not yet being all united, although the Lacedaemonians 
 attacked them with a considerable army and fleet,—for of 
 course you know that the Lacedaemonians had the command 
 (so to speak) both of sea and land at that period,—notwith¬ 
 standing the attack of so mighty a force, they lost neither 
 their city nor a single fortress, but even won many battles, 
 and killed three of the enemy’s generals, and at last put an 
 end to the war upon their own terms . 1 But when certain 
 men had begun to receive bribes, and the multitude, through 
 stupidity or through ill fortune rather, regarded them as 
 more trustworthy than their honest counselors, when Las- 
 thenes roofed his house with timber given from Macedonia, 
 and Euthycrates fed herds of kine without paying a price to 
 any one, and one man came with sheep, another with horses, 
 and the mass of the people, against whom these treasons were 
 
 1 This, as well as several other statements of Demosthenes on the 
 subject of Olynthus, is not inexact accordance with the truth of his¬ 
 tory. See vol i. Appendix I. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 201 
 
 committed, instead of being incensed or calling for punishment 
 of the traitors, looked on them with respect and admiration, 
 honored and esteemed them for manliness,—when things pro¬ 
 ceeded thus far and corruption got the ascendency, although 
 they possessed a thousand horse and were more than ten thou¬ 
 sand in number, and you sent to their assistance ten thousand 
 mercenaries and fifty galleys and four thousand citizens be¬ 
 sides, all of it could not save them; before a year of the war 
 had expired, the betrayers had lost all the cities in Chalci- 
 dice; Philip could no longer be at the call of the betrayers, 
 and was puzzled what he should first take possession of. Five 
 hundred horse, betrayed by their own leaders, did Philip cap¬ 
 ture with all their arms, such a number as no mortal ever did 
 before. And the perpetrators of all this were not ashamed to 
 look at the sun, or at the earth (their country) on which they 
 stood, or at her temples or sepulchres, or at the infamy that 
 upon such doings was sure to follow. So mad and senseless, 
 O Athenians, are people rendered by the taking of bribes! 
 You therefore, you the people, must be wise, and not permit 
 such practices, but punish them by public sentence. It would 
 indeed be monstrous, if, having passed so many severe resolu¬ 
 tions against the betrayers of Olynthus, you should fail to pun¬ 
 ish criminals in your own country. Read me the decree con- . 
 cerning the Olynthians. 
 
 [The Decree .] 
 
 These resolutions, men of the jury, you have in the opinion 
 of all people, whether Greek or barbarian, righteously and 
 nobly passed against traitors and miscreants. Since therefore 
 the acceptance of bribes precedes such practices, and it is on 
 that account that people are found to commit such acts, 
 whomsoever you see accepting bribes, men of Athens, look 
 upon him as a traitor. If one person betrays opportunities, 
 another measures, another troops, each of you, I take it, ruins 
 that of which he has the management: but all persons of this 
 kind ought equally to be detested. Y r ou, O Athenians, are 
 the only people in the world who upon such matters may 
 take examples from home, and imitate in action the fore¬ 
 fathers whom you justly praise. Though the battles, the 
 campaigns, the adventures, by which they were renowned, 
 there is no occasion for imitating, since for the present you 
 
 12 
 
202 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 are at peace, imitate at least their wisdom. This there is al¬ 
 ways need for, and a wise judgment is not a whit more trou¬ 
 blesome or irksome than a foolish one: each of you will sit 
 here for as long a time, whether by a right decision and ver¬ 
 dict upon the case he improves the condition of the common¬ 
 wealth and acts worthily of your forefathers, or by an improp¬ 
 er decision he damages the public interests and acts unworthi¬ 
 ly of your forefathers. What then was their judgment upon 
 such a case? Take and read this inscription, clerk. You 
 ought to know, that the acts which you regard with apathy 
 are such as your ancestors have passed capital sentence upon. 
 Read. 
 
 [The Inscription .j 1 
 
 You hear, men of Athens, the inscription declaring Arth- 
 mius the son of Pythonax of Zelea to be an enemy and a foe 
 to the people of Athens and their allies, himself and all his 
 race. On what account ? Because he brought the gold of the 
 barbarians among the Greeks. You may see then, as it ap¬ 
 pears from this, that your forefathers were anxious to prevent 
 even strangers being hired to injure Greece; while you make 
 no provision even to prevent your fellow-citizens doing wrong 
 to the state. 
 
 Oh, but this inscription stands in some ordinary place! 
 No. While the whole of yonder citadel is sacred and of con¬ 
 siderable extent, it stands on the right by the great bronze 
 statue of Pallas, which the republic offered up as the chief 
 memorial of their war with the barbarians, the Greeks having 
 given the money. At that time then justice was so revered, 
 so honorable was it to punish people who did such things, 
 that the same station was appropriated to the prize-offering of 
 the goddess and the sentence against offenders of that kind: 
 now all is mockery, impunity, disgrace, unless you repress 
 these extravagant liberties to-day. 
 
 I think therefore, ye men of Athens, you will do right to 
 imitate your ancestors, not in one point only, but in the 
 whole series of their conduct. They—I am sure you have all 
 heard the story — after Callias the son of Hipponicus had 
 negotiated that peace 2 which is in the mouths of all men, 
 
 1 The inscription on the pillar recording the decree against Arth- 
 mius; as to which see vol. i. p. 125, note 1. 
 
 2 See vol. i. p. 200, note 3. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 203 
 
 providing that the king should not approach within a day’s 
 ride of the sea-coast, nor sail with a vessel of war within the 
 Chelidonian islands and Cyanean rocks, because it appeared 
 that he had taken gifts on his embassy, they fined him fifty 
 talents at his audit, and were near putting him to death. 
 Yet no man can say, that the commonwealth has ever made a 
 better peace either before or after: but it was not that they 
 looked at. For that they considered was owing to their own 
 valor and the reputation of the commonwealth; while the 
 taking or not taking of money depended on the disposition of 
 the embassador ; they expected therefore of any man who en¬ 
 tered on public duties, that he should show a disposition for 
 honesty and integrity. Your ancestors thus considered bribe¬ 
 taking so inimical and injurious to the state, that they would 
 not suffer it upon any occasion or in any person; but you, O 
 Athenians, though you have seen that the same peace has de¬ 
 molished the walls of your allies and is building the houses 
 of your embassadors, that it has taken away the possessions 
 of the commonwealth and has earned for these men what they 
 never imagined even in a dream, have not spontaneously put 
 these men to death, but require an accuser, and hear on their 
 trial persons whose crimes are actually beheld by all. 
 
 But one needs not confine one’s self to ancient events, nor by 
 such examples incite you to vengeance, for in the time of you 
 that are here present and still living many have been brought 
 to justice; the rest of whom I will pass by, and mention only 
 one or two, sentenced to death upon an embassy which has 
 wrought far less mischief to the state than this. Take and 
 read me this decree. 
 
 [The Decree.~\ 
 
 According to this decree, men of Athens, you condemned 
 to death those embassadors, of whom one was Epicrates , 1 a 
 
 1 This (though Pabst thinks otherwise) must be the same Epicrates 
 referred to in Athenseus (vi. 229, 251), where it is said, that he received 
 divers presents from the Persian king, and paid him the coarsest flat¬ 
 tery; and even ventured to say (partly in joke, no doubt) that there 
 ought to be an annual election, not of nine archons, but of nine em¬ 
 bassadors to the king. The writer expresses his wonder that the 
 Athenians should not have brought him to trial; which seems not to 
 agree with this passage of Demosthenes; but he may have been igno¬ 
 rant of the fact. 
 
204 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 I 
 
 man (as I hear from my elders) of good character, who was 
 on many occasions serviceable to the state, one of those that 
 marched from Piraeus 1 and restored the democracy, and gen¬ 
 erally a friend to the people. However, none of these things 
 helped him ; and justly: for one who undertakes to manage 
 such important concerns should not be honest by halves, nor 
 take advantage of your confidence to do greater mischief, but 
 should never do you any wrong at all willfully. 
 
 Well: if these men have left undone any part of what 
 those have been sentenced to death for, kill me this very mo¬ 
 ment. Just see. “Since those-men,” it says , 2 “acted con¬ 
 trary to their instructions on the embassyand this is the 
 first of the charges. And did not these act contrary to their 
 instructions? Did not the decree say, “ for the Athenians and 
 allies of the Athenians,” and did not these men exclude the 
 Phocians expressly from the treaty? Did not the decree or¬ 
 der them to swear the magistrates in the states, and did not 
 they swear the persons whom Philip sent to them ? Did not 
 the decree say, that they should nowhere meet Philip alone, 
 and did not they incessantly hold private conferences with 
 him? “And some of them were convicted of making false 
 reports in the council”—ay, and these men before the people 
 too, and by w'hat evidence?—for this is the grand point—By 
 the facts themselves: for surely the very reverse of what they 
 reported has taken place. “ And sending false intelligence by 
 letter,” it says. So have these men. “ And calumniating the 
 allies and taking bribes.”—Well; instead ofealumniating, say, 
 having completely ruined: and this surely is far more dread¬ 
 ful than calumniating. With respect to the having taken 
 bribes, I can only say, if they denied it, proof would have been 
 necessary; since they confess it, they should have been led off 
 to punishment surely . 3 
 
 1 When Thrasybulus and his band of exiles marched from Phyle, and ' 
 occupied the Piraeus, until by consent of the Lacedaemonians the Thirty 
 Tyrants were expelled, and popular government restored at Athens. 
 
 2 The decree of condemnation against Epicrates and his accomplices.' 
 Passages from this are contrasted with the charges against ^Eschines. 
 
 3 See Reiske’s Index dirayeiv and dirayuyij. And the Archaeological 
 Dictionary, under title "ErAiftf. By the Athenian law, if a man con¬ 
 fessed his crime, or was caught in the fact (flagrante delicto ), he might 
 in some cases have immediate punishment inflicted by the magistrate ; 
 not as in our law, which requires proof of such facts to be given on 
 the trial. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 205 
 
 How say ye then, O Athenians? Under these circum¬ 
 stances, you being the descendants of these men, yourselves 
 being some of them still living, will you endure that Epicrates, 
 the benefactor of the people and the liberator from Piraeus, 
 should be degraded and punished ?—that again lately Thrasy- 
 bulus, the son of Thrasybulus the people’s friend, who march¬ 
 ed from Phyle and restored the democracy, should have in¬ 
 curred a penalty of ten talents ?—and that the descendant of 
 Harmodius and Aristogiton 1 and men who have conferred on 
 you the greatest benefits, whom, on account of their meritori¬ 
 ous services, you have by law adopted to be partakers of the 
 cup and libations in all your temples at the sacrifices, whom 
 you celebrate and honor equally with your heroes and gods, 
 should all have suffered punishment according to law; and 
 that neither mercy nor pity, neither weeping children named 
 after your benefactors, nor any thing else should have helped 
 them?—and shall the son of Atrometus the pedagogue and 
 Glaucothea (the assembler of Bacchanals for performances 
 which another priestess has died for, 2 ) shall he, when you 
 have caught him, be let off, he, the issue of such parents, 
 he that in no single instance has been useful to the state, 
 neither himself, nor his father, nor any other of his family ? 
 For what horse, what galley, what expedition, what chorus, 
 what state service, what contribution, what present, what feat 
 of valoiy what thing of the kind has at any time come from 
 these men to the republic? Even though he possessed all 
 these merits, without the addition that he has been an honest 
 and incorrupt embassador, he ought assuredly' to suffer death. 
 But if he has neither the one nor the other, will you not 
 avenge yourselves on him ? Will you not remember what he 
 
 1 What person is here alluded to is not known. The reader will 
 notice the peculiarity of calling a descendant of one of these men a 
 descendant of both. Pabst cites other instances. Shilleto comments 
 upon it as follows:— 
 
 “The names of these miscalled patriots and worthless men were so # 
 intimately associated in the minds of an Athenian audience, that they 
 could hardly be disunited even in such a passage as the present. The 
 reader will probably recollect that the heiress of a partner in a noted 
 firm rejoiced in the name Miss A and B." 
 
 2 Ulpian says this refers to a woman of the name of Nino, who was 
 brought to trial for mixing a love-potion. As to Glaucothea, see ante, 
 p. 94, note 2. 
 
206 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 said on his accusation of Timarclius , 3 that there was no good 
 in a commonwealth which had not sinews to stretch against 
 malefactors, or in a government where mercy and canvassing 
 had greater power than the laws; and that you ought to have 
 no pity either for the mother of Timarchus, an old woman, or 
 for his children or any one else, but consider this, that, should 
 you abandon the laws and the constitution, you would find 
 none to have pity on yourselves. And shall that unhappy 
 man remain in infamy, because he saw the defendant to be a 
 criminal, and will you allow the defendant to go unscathed ? 
 For what reason ? If JEschines thought fit to demand such 
 heavy satisfaction from trespassers against him and his party, 
 what should you, sworn judges, demand from such heinous 
 trespassers against the state, of whom the defendant is proved 
 to be one ? Oh, but our young men will be all the better for 
 that trial! Well; and this will improve our statesmen, on 
 whom the most important chances of the commonwealth de¬ 
 pend. They also need your attention. 
 
 To convince you however, that he destroyed this man 
 Timarchus, not (good heavens!) out of any desire to make 
 your children virtuous, (for they are virtuous already, O 
 Athenians: never may such misfortune befall the common¬ 
 wealth, that her younger members should need Aphobetus 
 and JEschines to reform them!) but because he moved in the 
 council, that whoever should be convicted of carrying arms 
 or naval implements to Philip should be punishable with 
 death. To prove this, let me ask—how long was Timarchus 
 a public speaker? A considerable time. Well: during all 
 that time AEschines was in the city, and never took umbrage, 
 or thought it a shocking matter that such a person should 
 open his mouth, until he went to Macedonia and became 
 a hireling. Here, take and read me the decree of Timarchus 
 itself: 
 
 [The Decree.~\ 
 
 You see, the person who proposed on your behalf, that no 
 one, on pain of death, should carry arms to Philip in time of 
 war, has been ruined and disgraced; and this man, who de¬ 
 livered up to Philip the arms of your allies, was his accuser, 
 
 1 These statements are not in the extant speech of iEschines. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 207 
 
 and declaimed upon prostitution, (O heaven and earth !) while 
 by him were standing his two brothers-in-law , 1 at the sight 
 of whom you would cry out with astonishment, the odious 
 Nicias, who hired himself to Chabrias to go to Egypt, and 
 the accursed Cyrebion, who plays his, part in the procession 
 revels without his mask. But this is nothing — he did it 
 with his brother Aphobetus before him! Verily, upon that 
 day all the haranguing about prostitution was a flowing up 
 the stream . 2 
 
 To show you what dishonor our commonwealth has been 
 brought to by this man’s wickedness and falsehood, I will 
 pass by every thing else, and mention a thing which you all 
 know. Formerly, men of Athens, what you had decreed was 
 looked for by the people of Greece; now we go about in¬ 
 quiring what the others have resolved, listening what news 
 there is of the Arcadians, what of the Amphictyons, where 
 Philip is about to march, whether he is alive or dead. Is it 
 not thus we employ ourselves ? I for my part am afraid, not 
 if Philip is alive, but if the abhorring and punishing of 
 criminals is dead in the commonwealth. Philip alarms me 
 not, if all is sound with you; but if you allow impunity to 
 men who are willing to be his hirelings, if certain of the 
 people in your confidence will plead for these men, and, after 
 denying all along that they are Philip’s agents, will get up 
 for them now—this alarms me. How comes it, Eubulus, 
 
 1 Aeschines, in allusion to this passage, (De fals. Leg. 48,) speaks of 
 Philon, and not Nicias. As to Philon, see Demosthenes, De Coron. p. 
 329 ; this volume, p. 112. Cyrebion is a nickname, derived from Kvpij- 
 (3ia, bran, denoting a worthless, good-for-nothing person, applied to 
 Epicrates, brother-in-law of Aeschines, not the same Epicrates as the 
 one mentioned above, p. 203. AEschines describes him as an easy, 
 good-natured sort of man. 
 
 2 That is, was unnatural and absurd, coming from the mouth of such 
 a person; perhaps further intimating that the whole trial was a per¬ 
 version of justice. The expression was proverbial: the words are found 
 in Euripides, Medea, 411:— 
 
 *Avu 7rorajuojv lepcjv 
 %upovoi 7r ayal, 
 
 Kal d'lna nal ndvra 'Kukiv crTpeQeTai. 
 
 Francis translates • “ But all remarks that day upon impudicity ran 
 upward like rivers against their fountain-heads.” Pabst: Freilich 
 Jlossen auch an jenem Tape die Reden uber Unzucht wie Strom-auf warts 
 aus seinem Munde. 
 
208 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 that on the trial of Hegesilaus , 1 who is your cousin, and on 
 that of Thrasybulus lately, the uncle of Niceratus, on the 
 first voting 2 you would not even hearken to their call, and 
 on the question of punishment you got up, yet never spoke 
 a word on their behalf but begged the jury to excuse you ? 
 And do you refuse then to get up for relatives and con¬ 
 nections, but will stand up for JEschines, who, when Aristo- 
 phon was prosecuting Philonicus and through him assailing 
 your conduct, joined him in accusing you, and appeared as one 
 of your enemies ? And when you having terrified the Athe¬ 
 nians, and told them they must immediately go down to 
 Piraeus and pay a property tax and make the theatric fund 
 a military one, or vote for the measures which this man sup¬ 
 ported and the odious Philocrates moved, it came about that 
 the peace was made on disgraceful instead of honorable 
 terms, and these men by their subsequent misdeeds have 
 ruined every thing 3 — then is it that you are reconciled ? 
 And before the people you cursed Philip, and swore with im¬ 
 precations on your children, that you would like him to be 
 destroyed, and now will you help the defendant *? How can 
 he be destroyed, when you come to the rescue of those who 
 take his bribes'? Yes! How on earth could you prosecute 
 Moerocles, because he got the mine-tenants 4 to give him 
 twenty drachms each—and indict Cephisophon for embezzle¬ 
 ment of sacred moneys , 5 because three days after the time he 
 
 1 Hegesilaus, according to Ulpian, supported Plutarch of Eretria at 
 Athens, and led troops to his assistance in Euboea. 
 
 2 On the question of “ guilty or not guilty.” In many cases, where 
 the Athenian law did not fix the penalty, the jury had to give a sec¬ 
 ond verdict, to decide what sentence should be passed on the convict. 
 
 3 In the original there is a nominativus pendens, oi> — ded^upevog — 
 < prjaac , after which one would, in the usual course of grammar, have 
 expected knoiTjoas, instead of ovve^rj yeveodcu. But Shilleto well ob¬ 
 serves that, “probably Demosthenes, at the outset of the sentence, in¬ 
 tended to signify that Eubulus had caused the people, by the alterna¬ 
 tive which he suggested, to pass the disgraceful measure ; yet he pru¬ 
 dently thought proper to disguise this as he proceeded under the vague 
 language, it so resulted, especially as he could then with more weight 
 contrast the anti-Macedonic feeling which Eubulus had or pretended 
 to have evinced, with his becoming reconciled to and advocating the 
 Philippizing party.” 
 
 4 Moerocles seems to have been guilty of some extortion in getting 
 money from the lessees of the Laurian mines; as to which see vol. i., 
 Appendix II. 
 
 4 Cephisophon may have been a treasurer of some temple, raiiia f 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 209 
 
 paid seven minas into the bank ; while persons who have 
 received money, who confess it, who are caught in the fact, 
 and proved to have done it on purpose to ruin your allies, 
 these, instead of bringing to trial, you desire us to acquit? 
 That the charges in this case are fearful, and require a deal of 
 prudence and precaution, whereas what you prosecuted those 
 men for were laughing matters, will appear from the following 
 considerations:—There were persons in Elis who plundered 
 the public? Very probably. Well: were any of those per¬ 
 sons concerned in overthrowing the democracy there lately ? 
 Not one. Again : while Olynthus existed, there were persons 
 of the same kind ? I should think so. Did Olynthus fall 
 through them? No. At Megara, again, think ye not there 
 was a thief or two who pilfered the public moneys? Un¬ 
 doubtedly ; and it has come to light. WTiich of them caused 
 the events which have occurred there ? Not one. What sort 
 of people then are they who commit these heavy crimes? 
 The men who deem themselves of importance enough to be 
 called friends and acquaintances of Philip,—men who covet 
 command and are invested with civic dignity, and who con¬ 
 sider they ought to be greater than the common people. 
 Was not Perilaus tried lately at Megara 1 before the Three 
 
 lepuv xpWutuv, and had the management of its revenues, or he may 
 have been a mere collector. He would be required by law to pay cer¬ 
 tain moneys in his custody into the bank within a given time; and be¬ 
 ing a defaulter, though for a few days only, was liable to a fine or 
 other penalty. 
 
 1 Philip’s attempt on Megara, which appears to have been made in, 
 or just before, the year b.c. 343, is thus described by Thirlwall, History 
 of Greece, vi. 15:— 
 
 “ It seems to have been while he was still occupied with the affairs of 
 Thessaly, or at least before he withdrew from the country, that he made 
 an attempt in another quarter, which, if it had succeeded, would have 
 brought him nearer by a great step to one of his principal objects. 
 Megara was at this time, as it had probably never ceased to be, divided 
 between rival factions, which however seem not to have been so turbu¬ 
 lent as to prevent it from enjoying a high degree of prosperity, and there 
 are indications that its form of government was not unhappily tempered. 
 The old animosity against Athens had perhaps now in a great measure 
 subsided: Philip indeed had his adherents; but there was a strong 
 party which opposed them, and which looked to Athens for protection. 
 The contending interests, however, seem not to have been exactly those 
 of democracy and aristocracy or oligarchy. Philip’s leading partisans 
 appear to have been some of the most powerful citizens, who hoped with 
 his aid to rise to sovereign power, which they would have been content 
 
210 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 Hundred, because he had gone to Philip; and did not Ptoeo- 
 dorus, a man for wealth, birth, and reputation the first of the 
 Megarians, come forward and beg him off, and again send 
 him out to Philip; and afterward the one came with his 
 mercenary troops, while the other was cooking up 1 matters 
 in the city ? That is one example. There is nothing, nothing 
 in the world, more to be guarded against than allowing any 
 one to be exalted above the people. Don’t let me have men 
 saved or destroyed at the pleasure of this or that individual; 
 but whoever is saved by his actions, or the contrary, let him 
 be entitled to the proper verdict at your hands. That is con¬ 
 stitutional. Besides, many men have on occasions become 
 powerful wfith you : Callistratus, again, Aristophon, Dio- 
 phantus, others before them: but where did they each exer¬ 
 cise their sway? In the popular assembly. In courts of 
 justice no man up to the present day has ever had an au¬ 
 thority greater than yourselves or the laws or your oaths. 
 Then don’t suffer this man to have it now. To show you 
 that it will be more reasonable to take such precaution than 
 
 to hold under him. Ptoeodorus, the foremost man in Megara, in birth, 
 wealth, and reputation, was, according to Demosthenes, at the head of 
 a conspiracy for the purpose of placing the city in Philip’s hands, and 
 had opened a correspondence with him, in which he employed another 
 Megarian, Perilaus, as his agent. Perilaus was brought to trial for his 
 unauthorized dealings with a foreign court, but was acquitted through 
 the influence of Ptoeodorus, who sent him again to obtain a body of 
 Macedonian troops, while he himself staid to prepare for their recep¬ 
 tion at Megara. The plot appears to have been baffled by some unusu¬ 
 ally vigorous measures of the Athenians. It is difficult to determine, 
 whether an expedition which they made about this time to their 
 frontier on the side of Drymus and Panactus was connected with these 
 movements at Megara ; and equally uncertain, though perhaps more 
 probable, that it was on this occasion Phocion was sent, at the request 
 of their Megarian partisans, to guard the city. Though he could not 
 secure it from treachery within, he took the most effectual precautions 
 against a surprise from without: he fortified Nicsea, and again annex¬ 
 ed it to the city by two long walls. However this may be, the at¬ 
 tempt of Ptoeodorus failed, and Philip’s hopes in this quarter were for 
 the time frustrated.” 
 
 1 In the original the literal expression is, “ cheese-making. “ The same 
 metaphor is used by Aristophanes, and very likely it was common. So 
 we are in the habit of saying familiarly, “ to hatch a plot,” “ to concoct,” 
 “to dress up,” and the like. Pabst: so grosse Vcrwirrung anrichtete. 
 Auger: “ intriguitp our lui.” Francis: “ had totally changed the civil 
 constitution of his country ;” which is wide of the meaning. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 211 
 
 to put confidence in these men, I will read you an oracle of 
 the gods, who always protect the commonwealth far better 
 than her statesmen. Read the verses : 
 
 [The Oracle.~\ 
 
 You hear, O Athenians, what the gods admonish you. If 
 now they have given you this response during a time of war, 
 they mean that you should beware of your generals; for the 
 generals are conductors of war: but if after the conclusion 
 of peace, they mean your chief statesmen; for they have the 
 lead, their counsels you follow, by them are you in danger of 
 being deceived. 
 
 And you are told by the oracle to hold the commonwealth 
 together, so that all may have one mind, and not cause grati¬ 
 fication to the enemy. Think ye now, O Athenians, tha,t the 
 preserving, or the punishing, of a man who has done all this 
 mischief would cause gratification to Philip? I think the 
 preserving. The oracle however says, you should do your 
 best to prevent the enemy rejoicing. So it exhorts all with 
 one mind to punish those who have in any way been subser¬ 
 vient to the enemy: Jupiter, Dione, all the gods. They that 
 intend you evil are outside, their supporters are inside; the 
 business of the former is to give bribes, of the latter to receive, 
 and get off those who have received them. 
 
 Besides, even by human reasoning one may see, that the 
 most mischievous and dangerous of all things is, to suffer a 
 leading statesman to become attached to those who have not 
 the same objects with the people. Consider by what means 
 Philip has become master of every thing, and by what means 
 he has achieved the greatest of his works. By purchasing suc¬ 
 cess from those who would sell it; by corrupting and excit¬ 
 ing the ambition of leading statesmen: by such means. Both 
 these however it is in your power, if you please, to render in¬ 
 effective to-day: if to one class of men you will not listen, 
 when they plead for people of this kind, but show that they 
 have no authority with you (for now* they say they have au¬ 
 thority) : and if you will punish him that has sold himself, and 
 this shall be seen by all. 
 
 With any man you might well be wroth, O Athenians, who 
 had done such deeds, and sacrificed allies and friends and op¬ 
 portunities, which make or mar the fortunes of every people, 
 
212 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 
 but with none more strongly or more justly than the defers 
 dant. A* man who took his place with the mistrusters of 
 Philip — who first and singly discovered him to be the com¬ 
 mon enemy of all the Greeks, and then deserted and turned 
 traitor, and has suddenly become a supporter of Philip—can 
 it be doubted that such a man deserves a thousand deaths? 
 The truth of these statements he himself will not be able to 
 gainsay. Who is it that brought Ischander to you in the 
 beginning, whom he represented to have come here from the 
 country’s friends in Arcadia ? Who cried out, that Philip was 
 packing 1 Greece and Peloponnesus, while you were sleeping ? 
 Who was it that made those fine long orations before the 
 assembly, and read the decree of Miltiades and Themistocles, 
 and the young men’s oath in the temple of Aglauros ? 2 Was 
 it not this man? Who persuaded you to send embassies 
 almost to the Red Sea, urging that Greece was plotted against 
 by Philip, and that it became you to foresee it and not 
 abandon the interests of the Greeks ? Was not the mover of 
 the decree Eubulus, and the envoy to Peloponnesus the de¬ 
 fendant Aeschines ? What he may have talked and harangued 
 about when he got there, is best known to himself; but what 
 he reported to you I am sure you all remember. Several 
 times in his speech he called Philip a barbarian and a pest , 3 
 and told you the Arcadians were delighted that the Athenian 
 commonwealth was now attending to her affairs and rousing 
 herself. But what most of all had made him indignant, he 
 said, — coming home he met Atrestidas on his way from 
 Philip’s court, and there were about thirty women and chil¬ 
 dren walking with him ; and he was astonished, and asked 
 one of the travelers who the man was, and who the crowd 
 
 • 1 ovGKEVu&cdai. Reiske: “ convasare, compilare, in manticam in- 
 fercire, tanquam fures solent furta raptim auferre festinantes. Senten- 
 tia est: alia Peloponnesi oppida ex aliis sibi devincire et in servitutem 
 pertrahere.” Augerenvahisswfc.” Francis: “pillaging.” Perhaps 
 it rather means “ packing against you,” as in the oration on the Cher¬ 
 sonese, p. 91,— ovonevd&TaL irdvraq uvdpdrrovc kfi v/itdg. 
 
 2 Athenian youths, before they were enrolled in the register of cit¬ 
 izens, underwent a scrutiny with regard to their birth and other mat¬ 
 ters. If approved, they received a shield and lance, and took a solemn 
 oath in the temple of Aglauros, daughter of Cecrops, by which they 
 bound themselves to defend their country, to obey her laws, and re¬ 
 spect all her civil and religious institutions. 
 
 3 So Pabst and Francis render dXdoTopa. Auger: “ fl^au.” 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 213 
 
 that followed him; but when he heard that these were Olyn- 
 thian captives, whom Atrestidas was bringing away as a pres¬ 
 ent from Philip, he thought it shocking, and wept, and be¬ 
 wailed the miserable condition of Greece, that she should re¬ 
 gard such calamitous events with indifference. And he ad¬ 
 vised you to send persons to Arcadia to denounce the agents 
 of Philip; for he heard, he said, from his friends, that if the 
 commonwealth would turn their attention to it and send an 
 embassy, they would be punished. Such was then his lan¬ 
 guage, honorable indeed, O Athenians, and worthy of the 
 state. But after he had gone to Macedonia, and beheld this 
 Philip, the enemy of himself and the Greeks, was it like or 
 similar ? Very far from it. He said you were not to re¬ 
 member your ancestors, not to talk of trophies or succor any 
 one; and he was surprised at the men who advised you to 
 consult with the Greeks about peace with Philip, as if any 
 one else had to be persuaded on a question that concerned you 
 alone ; and that Philip himself was (O Hercules!) a thorough 
 Greek , 1 an eloquent speaker, a warm friend of Athens, and 
 that there were some men in the city so unreasonable and per¬ 
 verse, as not to be ashamed of abusing him and calling him a 
 barbarian. 
 
 Is it possible that the same man, after having made the 
 former speeches, could have ventured to make these, without 
 having been corrupted? But further; is there a man who, 
 after having then execrated Atrestidas on account of the wo¬ 
 men and children of the Olynthians, could have endured now 
 to co-operate with Philocrates, who brought free-born Olyn- 
 thian women hither for dishonor, and is so notorious for his 
 abominable life, that I have no need to say any thing scan¬ 
 dalous or offensive about him, but let me only say that Philoc¬ 
 rates brought' women, you and the by-standers know all the 
 rest, and feel pity, I am sure, for those poor unhappy creatures, 
 whom JEschines pitied not, nor wept for Greece on their ac¬ 
 count, that among an allied people they should be outraged by 
 the embassadors. 
 
 But he will shed tears for himself, such an embassador as 
 
 1 Auger: “le meilleur ami des Grecs.” And so Francis: “best af¬ 
 fected to Greece.” But it rather has reference, I think, to the charac¬ 
 ter and manners of Philip, and perhaps also to his parentage. Shilleto: 
 “a most genuine Greek.” 
 
214 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 he has been: perhaps he will bring forward his children and 
 mount them up on the bar. But remember, ye men of the 
 jury—against his children—that you had many friends and 
 allies, whose children are wanderers, roaming about in beg¬ 
 gary, having suffered cruel injuries through this man ; who are 
 far more deserving of your compassion than the sons of such 
 a malefactor and traitor; and that these men, by adding to 
 the treaty the words “ and to his posterity,” have deprived 
 your children even of their hopes. Against his own tears 
 harden yourselves by reflecting, that you have in your power 
 a man who bade you send accusers into Arcadia against the 
 agents of Philip. Now then you need not send an embassy 
 to Peloponnesus, or go a long journey, or incur traveling ex¬ 
 penses, but only advance each of you up to the bar here* 
 and give your righteous and just verdict for your country 
 against a man, who, (O heaven and earth!) after having de¬ 
 claimed, as I told you in the outset, about Marathon, Salamis, 
 battles, and trophies, all of a sudden, when he had set foot 
 in Macedonia, used the very opposite language — that you 
 should not remember your ancestors, not talk of trophies, 
 not succor any one, not deliberate in conjunction with the 
 Greeks, but should almost dismantle your city walls. Surely 
 more disgraceful language has never at any period of time 
 been spoken among you. For what Greek or barbarian is there 
 so stupid, so uninformed, so bitter an enemy of our state, who, 
 if the question were asked—“ Tell me, of this present land 
 and country of Greece is there a part which would have had 
 the name, or been occupied by the Greeks who now possess it, 
 if the heroes of Marathon and Salamis, our ancestors, had not 
 enacted those feats of valor on their behalf?”—there is not 
 one, I am certain, who would not answer, “ No; it must 
 all have been taken by the barbarians!” Persons that even 
 an enemy would not rob of their praise and honor, are you 
 their descendants, I say, forbidden to remember by JEschines, 
 for the sake of his own pelf? And observe, other advantages 
 are not shared in by the dead, but praise for glorious actions 
 is the peculiar property of those who have died in achieving 
 it; for then even envy opposes them no longer; and the 
 defendant, for depriving them of this, deserves now to be 
 deprived of his rank, and you will do well to inflict this 
 punishment upon him on behalf of your ancestors. But by 
 
215 
 
 ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 such language, you miscreant, while of the deeds of our 
 ancestors you made spoil and havoc with your tongue, you 
 ruined all our affairs. And out of all this you are a land- 
 owner and become a considerable personage. For here again : 
 Before he had wronged the state so grievously, he acknowl¬ 
 edged that he had been a clerk and was under obligation to 
 you for electing him, and he behaved himself with decency; 
 but since he has wrought such infinite mischief, he has drawn 
 up his eyebrows, and if any one says, “ the ex-clerk -ZEschines,” 
 he is at once his enemy, and says he has been slandered ; and 
 he traverses the market with his robe down to his ankles, 
 walking as stately as Pythocles, puffing out his cheeks, one of 
 the friends and acquaintances of Philip for you,—that’s what 
 he is now,—one of those that would be rid of the people, and 
 regard the present establishment as a raging sea : 1 he that 
 formerly worshiped the dining-hall ! 2 
 
 Let me now recapitulate to you, in what manner Philip 
 outmanoeuvred you by getting these abominable men to assist 
 him. It is well worth your while to examine and look into 
 the whole artifice. At first when he wanted peace, his do¬ 
 minions being pillaged by corsairs, and his ports having been 
 closed so that he could enjoy none of their advantages, he sent 
 those gaen who made such friendly declarations in his name, 
 Neoptolemus, Aristodemus, Ctesiphon ; but after we embas¬ 
 sadors had been with him, he engaged the defendant’s services 
 directly, to second and support the beastly Philocrates, and to 
 overpower us whose intentions were honest; and lie composed 
 a letter to you, through which he mainly expected to obtain 
 peace. Yet even this did not enable him to do any thing 
 important against you without destroying the Phocians ; and 
 that was not easy ; for his affairs had been brought as it were 
 by accident to such a critical point, that either it was impos- 
 
 1 Literally: “storm and madness.” Francis: “confusion and mad¬ 
 ness.” Pabst: ein wildes Getummel unci sinnlose Raserei. See ante, 
 p. 158. Compare also Psalm lxv. 7 : “Who stilletli the raging of the 
 sea: and the noise of his waves, and the madness of the people.” And 
 Shakspeare, Coriolanus, Act III. Scene 1 :— 
 
 -Will you hence 
 
 Before the tag return ? whose rage doth rend 
 Like interrupted waters, and o’erbear 
 What they are used to bear. 
 
 * See ante, p. 130. 
 
216 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 sible for him to accomplish any of his objects, or he must 
 commit falsehood and perjury, and have all men, Greeks and 
 barbarians, witnesses of his baseness. For should he accept 
 the Phocians as allies, and take the oaths to them in conjunc¬ 
 tion with you, it became necessary at once to break his oaths 
 to the Thessalians and Thebans, the latter of whom he had 
 sworn to assist in subjugating Bceotia, the former in restoring 
 the Pylasan congress. Should he refuse to accept them, (as in 
 fact he did refuse,) he thought you would not suffer him to 
 pass, but would send forces to Thermopylae, as, but for be¬ 
 ing overreached, you w r ould have done, and in that case he 
 reckoned it would be impossible to pass. This indeed there 
 was no need for him to be informed by others; he had his 
 own testimony to the fact: for the first time when he van¬ 
 quished the Phocians, and overthrew their mercenary troops 
 and their chieftain and general Onomarchus, when no people 
 in the world, Greek or barbarian, succored the Phocians but 
 you, so far from passing the strait or accomplishing any of 
 his objects by the passage, he could not even approach it. 
 He was certain therefore, I take it, that now when Thessaly 
 was quarreling with him,—the Pherseans for example refused 
 to join his march,—when the Thebans were getting the worst 
 and had lost a battle, and a trophy had been erected over 
 them, it was impossible to pass, if you sent forces,^or to 
 attempt it with impunity, unless he had recourse to some 
 artifice. 11 How then shall I escape open falsehood, and effect 
 all my objects without the imputation of perjury ? How ? In 
 this way—if I can find some Athenian citizens to deceive 
 the Athenians ; for that disgrace will not devolve upon me.” 
 Therefore his embassadors gave you notice, that Philip would 
 not accept the Phocians for allies; but these men explained 
 it to the people thus—that it was not proper for Philip openly 
 to accept the Phocians for allies, on account of the Thebans 
 and Thessalians; but if he got things into his hands and 
 obtained the peace, he would then do exactly what we should 
 now desire him to agree to. By such promises and lures he 
 obtained peace from you, excluding the Phocians ; but he had 
 next to prevent your sending succor to Thermopylae, for the 
 chance of which even then your fifty galleys were lying at 
 anchor, so that, if Philip advanced, you might oppose him. 
 “ Well? what contrivance shall I have again about this ?” 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 217 
 
 To deprive you of your opportunities, and bring matters sud¬ 
 denly upon you , 1 so that, even if you wished, you should not 
 be able to march from home. It was managed by these men 
 accordingly, it appears. I, as you have heard several times, 
 was unable to depart earlier, and though I hired a vessel, 
 I was prevented from setting sail. But it was necessary also 
 that the Phocians should put confidence in Philip, and volun¬ 
 tarily surrender themselves, so that no delay might intervene, 
 and no hostile decree come from you. “Well then; it shall 
 be reported by the Athenian embassadors, that the Phocians 
 are to be saved, so that even those who mistrust me will 
 deliver themselves up, relying on the embassadors: the Athe¬ 
 nians themselves I will send for, that they, believing all their 
 objects to be secured, may pass no adverse vote; and these 
 men shall carry such reports and assurances from me, that un¬ 
 der no circumstances will they be induced to stir.” 
 
 In this manner and by such contrivances, through men 
 doomed themselves to destruction, was every thing brought to 
 ruin; for immediately, instead of seeing Thespiae and Plataea 
 re-established, you heard that Orchomenus and Coronea were 
 enslaved; instead of Thebes being humbled and her pride 
 and insolence abated, the fortifications of your allies the 
 Phocians were being razed to the ground, the persons razing 
 them were the Thebans, who by AEschines in his speech had 
 been scattered into villages. Instead of Euboea being given 
 to you as a compensation for Amphipolis, Philip is even es¬ 
 tablishing places in Euboea to attack you from, and is con¬ 
 tinually forming designs upon Geraestus and Megara. Instead 
 
 1 So it is well explained by Reiske in his Index, under Icpioruvai ,— 
 “repente admovere, immittere, utcopias, quibus eum opprimas.” 'A ya- 
 yovras refers not to any particular persons, as the Athenian embassadors, 
 but generally to Philip and all his party—“that they should bring,” 
 &c.; as Pabst has it: Man wird machen miissen , dass Ihr zum Handeln 
 keine Zeit mehr jindet , und die Sache so leiten miissen dass er plbtzlich 
 Euchuber den Hals kommt; in which version however the last clause 
 deviates a little from the original. Schaefer properly says the sentence 
 is resolvable into dyayelv uipvu tu TTpuy/zara nal bTucTf/oai. Shilleto is 
 wrong in supposing that ^iXitt'kov could be understood after ETuoTijoai. 
 He translates the passage—“ that they (the Athenian envoys) should 
 rob you of your times and opportunities of action, and all on a sudden 
 bring on affairs, and place Philip at their head.” Francis had fallen 
 into a similar error, rendering it, “ and proper persons must be ap¬ 
 pointed to conduct and suddenly bring it to such a conclusion,” <fcc. 
 
 Vol. II.—K 
 
218 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 of Oropus being restored to us, we are marching out with 
 arms to fight for Drymus and the country by Panactus , 1 
 which we never did while the Phocians were in safety. In¬ 
 stead of the ancient rites in the temple being restored, and 
 his treasures being recovered for the god, the genuine Am- 
 phictyons are exiled and expelled, and their country has been 
 laid desolate ; they that never were Amphictyons in the olden 
 time, Macedonians and barbarians, are mow thrusting them¬ 
 selves into the council; whoever*makes mention of the holy 
 treasures is thrown down the precipice, and Athens has been 
 deprived of her preaudience at Delphi . 2 The whole business 
 has been a sort of enigma to the state. Philip has been dis¬ 
 appointed in nothing, and has accomplished every one of his 
 purposes; you, after expecting all that you could wish, have 
 seen the reverse come to pass, and, while you appear to be 
 at peace, have suffered greater calamities than if you were at 
 war; and these men have their wages for it, and up to the 
 present day have not been brought to justice. 
 
 That they have been bribed outright for all this, and have 
 received the price of it, has in many ways, I imagine, been 
 apparent to you for some time; and I fear I am doing the 
 reverse of what I intend—I have been annoying you all this 
 
 1 Panactus is on the confines of Attica and Boeotia, and so is Drymus, 
 according to Suidas. What gave rise to this particular expedition of 
 which Demosthenes speaks, w r e have no certain information; but there 
 can hardly be a doubt, mentioned as it is in connection with Oi’opus, 
 that it related to a quarrel between Thebes and Athens, and not, as 
 Winiewski supposed, to Philip’s designs on Megara. Thirlwall, in a 
 note on the passage already quoted (ante, p. 210), writes as follows:— 
 
 “ The language of Demosthenes would rather incline one to suppose 
 that the expedition was sent to resist some aggressions of the Thebans 
 on the debatable frontier. Both Winiewski, (p. 146,) and Yoemel, (in 
 Orat. de Halonneso, p. 46,)—who also believes that these forces were 
 sent to oppose the passage of Philip’s troops to Megara,—conceive that 
 this Drymus lay on the confines, not of Attica and Boeotia, like Pan¬ 
 actus, but of Phocis and Doris. Their only reason for this opinion 
 seems to be the accent. A pv/uog is mentioned by Herodotus, viii. 33, as 
 a Phocian town on the Cephisus. Whether a town of that name ex¬ 
 isted there in the time of Demosthenes is doubtful. The place seems 
 then to have been called A pv/uaia. Paus. x. 3. 2. But Ilarpocration has 
 A pvfj.bg, noXic [xera^v rrjg B oiuriag kcll ri)q, A.ttuc7/£. Even independently 
 of this authority, it seems hard to believe that Demosthenes would have 
 coupled the name of a place in Phocis with that of one on the Attic 
 frontier, as Winiewski and Voemel suppose him to have done.” 
 
 s See Appendix I. 
 
ON THE EMBASSY. 
 
 219 
 
 time in striving to make out a complete demonstration of 
 what you knew yourselves. However, do let me add one 
 thing more: Is there any of the embassadors sent by Philip 
 to whom you, men of the jury, would erect a brazen statue in 
 the market-place ? Nay : would you give dinner in the city- 
 hall, or any other of those rewards which you honor your 
 benefactors with 1 ? I should think not. Why? You are 
 certainly neither ungrateful nor unjust nor bad men. It is, 
 you would say, and with truth and justice, because they did 
 every thing for Philip and not a thing for you. Think ye 
 then that your sentiments are such, and Philip’s are different, 
 —that he confers upon these men presents of such number 
 and value, because on their embassy they acted well and 
 faithfully for you? Impossible. You see how he received 
 Hegesippus and his co-embassadors. I pass by the rest; but 
 he banished our poet Xenoclides for entertaining them, his 
 fellow-countrymen. Such is the way he behaves to those who 
 honestly speak their opinions on your behalf, while to those 
 who have sold themselves he behaves as he does to these men. 
 Are witnesses required for this? Are any stronger proofs 
 wanted for this ? Can any one get this away from you ? 
 
 A person however came up to me just before the opening 
 of the court , 1 and told me the strangest thing, 2 —that he was 
 prepared to accuse Chares , 3 and expected, by taking that 
 course and talking in that style, to impose on you. Now 
 I will not strongly insist upon this fact, that Chares (howso¬ 
 ever brought to trial) has been found to have acted faithfully 
 and loyally, as far as lay in his power, for your interests, 
 though he has incurred many failures through persons who 
 from corrupt "motives ruin every thing; but I will make a 
 large concession. Let me grant that the defendant will speak 
 nothing about him but the truth: even then, I say, it is a 
 perfect mockery for the defendant to accuse him ; for I charge 
 not ^Eschines with any of the transactions in the war, (for 
 them the generals are accountable,) nor with the state’s having 
 concluded peace: but thus far I acquit him entirely. What 
 
 1 I have followed Schaefer’s interpretation of irpo rov dutaoTijpLOv. 
 Pabst makes it refer to place. 
 
 2 Pabst incorrectly renders these words: und sagte mir ah eine 
 vnerhorte Neuigkeit. 
 
 3 See Appendix II, 
 
220 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 then do I say, and from what do my charges take their rise ? 
 From his speaking, when the state was concluding peace, on 
 the side of Philocrates, and not on theirs who moved for the 
 good of the country ; and 'from his having taken bribes; 
 from his afterward on the second embassy wasting the times, 
 and performing none of your instructions ; from his tricking 
 the state, and, after giving us to expect that Philip would do 
 all we desired, having utterly ruined our affairs; from his 
 afterward, when others warned you to beware of a man who 
 had done so many wrongs , 1 appearing as that man’s advocate. 
 These are my charges; keep these in remembrance: for a 
 just and equitable peace, and men who had betrayed nothing 
 and not afterward told lies, I would even have commended, 
 and advised you to honoi* them with a crown. But if any 
 general has injured you, it has nothing to do with the present 
 inquiry. For what general has lost Halus, or who has 
 destroyed the Phocians? who Doriscus? who Cersobleptes ? 
 who the Sacred Mountain? who Thermopylae? who has 
 given to Philip a road all the way to Attica through the 
 territory of friends and allies? who has alienated Coronea, 
 Orchomenus, Euboea? who nearly Megara lately? who has 
 made the Thebans powerful? Of all these important mat¬ 
 ters none was lost through the generals ; none has Philip had 
 yielded to him at the peace with your consent: they have 
 been lost through these men and their venality. If there¬ 
 fore he shirks these points, if, to lead you astray, he will talk 
 of any thing sooner than them : meet him as I suggest— 
 “ We are not sitting in judgment upon a general; you are not 
 tried upon those charges. Don’t tell us who else has caused 
 the destruction of the Phocians, but show that you are not 
 the cause. Why, if Demosthenes did any wrong, do you 
 mention it now, but did not accuse him when he rendered 
 his account? For this very reason you have deserved to 
 perish. Don’t tell us that peace is a fine thing or an advan¬ 
 tageous thing, for no one charges you with the state’s having 
 concluded peace; but that the peace is not a shameful and 
 ignominious one—that we have not been cheated in many 
 ways and all was not lost after it—this you may tell us. 
 
 1 Philip; in whose favor iEschines spoke when the Macedonian 
 embassadors came to Athens, and required the Athenians to acknowl¬ 
 edge his title as member of the Amphictyonic Council. 
 
221 
 
 // 
 
 OH THE EMBASSY. 
 
 For all these consequences are proved to have been brought 
 upon us by you ; and how is it that up to this very day you 
 praise the author of such things V* If you keep watch upon 
 him thus, he will have nothing to say, but will raise his 
 voice here and have exercised himself in spouting all to no 
 purpose . 1 
 
 About his voice too it may be necessary to say something; 
 for I hear that upon this also he very confidently relies, as if 
 he can overpower you by his acting. I think however, you 
 would be committing a gross absurdity, if, when he played 
 the miseries of Thyestes and the men at Troy, you drove and 
 hissed him off the boards, and nearly stoned him to death, so 
 that at last he desisted from his playing of third-rate parts, 
 yet now that, not upon the stage, but in public and most 
 important affairs of state, he has wrought infinity of evil, 
 you should pay regard to him as a fine speaker. Heaven 
 forbid! Do not you be guilty of any folly, but consider: if 
 you are' making trial of a herald, you should see that he has 
 a good voice, but if of an embassador and undertaker of public 
 duties, that he is honest, that he demeans himself with spirit 
 as your representative, like a fellow-citizen toward you ; 2 as 
 I (for example) had no respect for Philip, but respected the 
 prisoners, delivered them, and never flinched; whereas the 
 defendant crouched before him, and sang the paeans, but you 
 he disregarded. Further, when you see eloquence or a fine 
 voice or any other such accomplishment in a man of prob¬ 
 ity and honorable ambition, you should all rejoice at it and 
 encourage its display; for it is a common advantage to you 
 all: but when you see the like in a corrupt and base man, 
 who yields to every temptation of gain, you should discourage 
 aftd hear him with enmity and aversion ; as knavery, getting 
 from you the reputation of power, is an engine against the 
 state. You see what mighty troubles have fallen upon the 
 
 state from what the defendant has got renown by. And 
 
 — • 
 
 1 Auger, not badly: “ Inutilement alors fera-t-il eclater cette belle 
 voix qu’il aura bien exercee.” Schaefer: “Incassum hie toilet vocem 
 ad hoc ipsum prius exercitam.” 
 
 Demosthenes by his frequent sneers at the fine voice of his adversary 
 betrays his fear of that which he affects to undervalue. 
 
 2 Auger: “doit avoir de la fierte quand il agit pour vous, de la 
 douceur quand il vit avec vous.” 
 
222 
 
 THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 other powers are tolerably independent; but that of speak¬ 
 ing is crippled, if you the hearers are unfavorable. Listen 
 then to this man as to a venal knave, who will not speak a 
 syllable of truth. 
 
 Observe now, that not only in other respects, but in relation 
 to your dealings with Philip, it is in every way expedient for 
 the defendant to be convicted. For, on the one hand, should 
 he ever arrive at the necessity of doing justice to Athens, he 
 will alter his plan;—now he has determined to cheat the 
 many and court the few; but if he hear that these men are 
 destroyed, he will choose hereafter to serve you the many 
 and masters of all. On the other hand, should he continue in 
 the same position of power and pride, the persons who are 
 ready to do any thing for him you will have removed from 
 the country, if you remove these. How think ye ?—men that 
 acted so, believing they should be called to account—what will 
 they do if they have your license for their acts ? What Eu- 
 thycrates, what Lasthenes, what traitor will they not surpass ? 
 And which of all the rest will not be a worse member of the 
 commonwealth, seeing that those who have sold your interests 
 obtain riches, credit, a capital in Philip’s friendship, while 
 those who behave themselves like honest men and have spent 
 money of their own get annoyance, enmity, ill-will from a cer¬ 
 tain class of people ? Never let it come to this ! Neither for 
 your honor, nor for your religion, nor for your safety, nor in 
 any other point of view, is it desirable to acquit the defendant. 
 You must avenge yourselves, and make him an example to all, 
 both to your fellow-citizens and to the rest of the Greeks. 
 
APPENDIX I. 
 
 THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 .. • 
 
 Justin commences the chapter, in which the subject of this war 
 is introduced, with the following passage : 1 
 
 11 Grseciae civitates, cum imperare singula) cupiunt, imperium 
 omnes perdiderunt.” And he attributes the destruction of Greek 
 liberty to the ambition of the Thebans, and the impolitic measures 
 which they took to secure their own predominance. It was indeed 
 the weakness to which they had been reduced by the long continu¬ 
 ance of a war provoked by themselves, together with the distrac¬ 
 tions of Thessaly, and the necessity which there seemed to be for 
 some controlling power, which caused Philip of Macedon to be put 
 at the head of the Amphictyonic League, gave him a victorious 
 inroad into southern Greece, and made him the arbiter of her des¬ 
 tinies. 
 
 Phocis, 2 the principal seat of this war, is a country bounded on 
 the east by Boeotia, on the south by the Corinthian bay, on the west 
 by the Ozolian Locrians and a part of JEtolia. To the north-west is 
 the little triangular district called Doris, anciently occupied by the 
 Dryopes, but wrested from them by the more warlike tribe of 
 Dorians, who afterwards became so powerful a part of the Hellenic 
 body, and issued from this very district to effect the conquest of 
 Peloponnesus. North and north-east are the Epicnemidian Locrians 
 and the Opuntian Locrians. The rugged ridges of Mount (Eta 
 stretch across the northern frontiers of Doris, Phocis, and Epic- 
 nemidian Locris, and separate them from Thessaly. This chain of 
 mountains, forming the principal barrier of southern Greece, js ter¬ 
 minated by the sea at the extremity of the Malian bay. Here was 
 the pass of Thermopylae, which extended more than a mile in 
 • • r 
 
 1 Lib. viii. c. 1. 
 
 2 The ninth book of Strabo, chapter 3, contains a description of Pho¬ 
 cis. The tenth book of Pausanias is on the same subject, the greater 
 part being devoted to Delphi. 
 
224 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 length between the cliffs of (Eta 1 and a marshy tract close to the 
 shore of the bay, and opened by a narrow pass into the territory of 
 Epicnemidian Locris. In early times it belonged to the Phocians, 
 who carried a wall across the western end of the pass, to check the 
 incursions of the Thessalians. The Phocian territory then extended 
 as far as the Euboean strait, and there was a Phocian town on the 
 coast called Daphnus. A Locrian tribe afterwards got possession of 
 this district as far as the sea-coast, and Phocis was separated from 
 them by the mountains of Cnemis, from which that tribe took its 
 name. 2 
 
 The river Cephissus, rising in the Dorian hills near the town of 
 Lilaea, flows through the northern part of Phocis, and empties itself 
 into the Copaic Bake in Bceotia. 3 On a slight eminence between 
 the valley of this river and Mount Cnemis stood Elatea, the second 
 city of Phocis; and some miles eastward a road by the mountains 
 led to the city of Abae, where there was an ancient oracular temple 
 of Apollo destroyed by Xerxes, the ruins of which were long pre¬ 
 served by the Greeks as a memorial. 4 
 
 The far-famed mountain of Parnassus rises a little above the centre 
 of Phocis, its highest summit being nearly 8,000 feet above the level 
 of the sea. On a slope of the mountain, about seven or eight miles 
 below the summit, and itself 2,000 feet above the level of the sea, 
 stood the ancient Pytho, afterwards Delphi, the capital city of 
 Phocis, and seat of the famous oracle of Apollo. Homer calls it the 
 rocky Pytho. 5 Seven miles and a half to the south, at the head of 
 the Crissaean bay, was Cirrha, anciently called Crissa. A mountain 
 called Cirphis overhung the town, and the river Plistus, rising in the 
 Parnassian hills, flowed through it into the bay. This afterwards, 
 as we shall see, became the port of Delphi. 6 
 
 Under the eastern declivity of Parnassus, two or three miles from 
 the Boeotian frontier, was Daulis, whose people are said by Pausa- 
 
 1 At that point the mountain took the name of Callidromus. Strabo, 
 ix. 428. 
 
 2 Strabo, ix. 416, 424, 425. Daphnus for some time divided the ter¬ 
 ritory of the Epicnemidian Locrians from that of the Opuntian Locrians; 
 then it became a Locrian town, but was at length destroyed. There 
 was an ancient monument here to Schedius, the Homeric leader of the 
 Phocians. 
 
 3 Lilaea, near to its source, is mentioned as a Phocian town by Homer; 
 Iliad, ii. 528. 
 
 4 Pausanias, x. 84, 35. Sophocles, (Edipus Rex, 899. 
 
 6 TlvO&vu te TTETprjEoaav. Iliad, ii. 619. 
 
 6 Pausanias, x. 1, 37. But Strabo, ix. 418, represents Crissa and Cir¬ 
 rha to have been different towns. Grote has adopted this view, though 
 he rejects Strabo’s account of the two wars, one in which Cirrha was 
 destroyed by the Crissaeans, the other in which Crissa was destroyed by 
 the Amphictyons. (History of Greece, iv. 82.) 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 225 
 
 nias to have been the most warlike of the Phocians. 1 The town of 
 Anticyra stood at the head of a gulf bearing the same name, to the 
 east of the Crissaean gulf, and is said to have been the same town 
 which Homer in the catalogue of warriors calls Cyparissus. 2 
 
 Other Phocian towns were Charadra and Amphiclea (called Am- 
 phicsea by Herodotus) on the borders of Doris; Hyampolis on the 
 confines of Opuntian Locris ; Ledon (the birth-place of Philomelus) 
 and Parapotamii, situated in the vale of the Cephisus, the most fer¬ 
 tile part of Phocis : Neon, to the north-west of Mount Parnassus; 
 Anemorea, the most central town; Panopeus and Ambrysus, on the 
 Boeotian frontier, the last of which became of importance in the war 
 of Thebes and Athens against Philip. 3 
 
 Altogether Phocis comprised from twenty to thirty small cities or 
 communities, which were federally united. A general congress was 
 held at a place on the road from Daulis to Delphi, where there was 
 a large national building called Phocicum, to which deputies were 
 sent by each of the communities. 4 Delphi, however, notwithstand¬ 
 ing its local position, had from an early period separated itself from 
 the Phocian confederacy, and the inhabitants did not even like to be 
 called Phocians. 5 The government was in the hands of a few noble 
 families, who traced their descent from Deucalion, and from whom 
 were chosen a council of five, to manage the affairs of the temple. 
 The members of this council held their offices for life, and were 
 called “The Sacred ones.” 6 
 
 The Delphian oracle was the most celebrated of all in the Grecian 
 
 1 Pausanias, x. 4. It was here that the metamorphosis of Philomela 
 took place according to the fable, whence the nightingale is called 
 Daulias ales. Ovid, Epist. Sappho, 154. Thucydides, ii. 29. Strabo, 
 
 ix. 423. 
 
 3 Homer, Iliad, ii. 519, and Heyne’s notes on the passage. Pausanias, 
 
 x. 36. This, like the Thessalian Anticyra, was celebrated for its helle¬ 
 bore. Strabo, ix. 418. 
 
 3 Pausanias, x. 33, <fcc. 
 
 4 Pausanias, x. 5, 1. 
 
 6 Pausanias, iv. 34, 11. Thirlwall thinks that the Delphians were of 
 Dorian extraction, and that this may account for their generally favor¬ 
 ing the cause of the Spartans and their Dorian allies. (History of 
 Greece, i. 377.) It is probable enough that as Delphi, from a mere vil¬ 
 lage, grew by degrees into a large and flourishing city, enriched and 
 embellished by the tribute of visitors from all parts, the Delphians 
 chose to consider it as belonging to the whole Hellenic nation, rather 
 than to any local community, and on such grounds asserted their inde¬ 
 pendence ; in which they found themselves supported by some of the 
 stronger states of Greece, 
 
 6 Plutarch, Gr. Quaest. 9. In Euripides, Ion, 416, they are called 
 Ae?.(j>tjv upLOTElg, ovg lK?.rjpuaev nd?.oc. Herodotus, viii. 36, speaks of 
 tov irpo(f>7jTeu. Was he the chief member of the council ? 
 
 K 2 
 
226 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 world, and held from the earliest times in the highest veneration. It 
 was consulted on the most important occasions, both for political pur¬ 
 poses, as on questions of war and peace, the establishment of laws, 
 the institution of religious ceremonies, the founding of colonies, and 
 the like, and also for advice in the concerns of private life. 1 Its 
 origin is necessarily obscure. It is said that a vapor, issuing from 
 the well of Cassotis, intoxicated those that approached it, and threw 
 them into delirium. The discovery was made by some shepherds, 
 whose flocks straying near the spot had been seized with convulsions. 
 It was then found that human beings were similarly affected, and 
 that, while the fit was on them, they received a miraculous power of 
 prophetic vision and speech. This led to the idea of securing the ben¬ 
 efit of the divine agency, which produced such miraculous effects, by 
 establishing a permanent oracle on the spot. A temple was built 
 accordingly: the chasm from which the vapor ascended was exactly 
 in the centre: a tripod was placed over it; on this sat the priestess 
 and inhaled the sacred smoke, under whose influence she poured 
 forth the supernatural sounds inspired by Apollo. 2 
 
 1 Colonies were rarely founded without the sanction of Apollo. Cal¬ 
 limachus says, in his hymn :— 
 
 fyoifiog yap del 'KoXtecai (fuljjSei 
 K Ti^ofievaiq, avrdg <5e de/LteiXia <j>olj3og vtyatvei. 
 
 Instances of consulting the oracle before making war, or taking other 
 decisive measures, abound in Herodotus, Thucydides, and other ancient 
 historians. The cases of Lycurgus and Croesus are familiar. The Cor- 
 cyrseans offer to refer their dispute about Epidamnus to the arbitration 
 of the Delphian oracle. (Thucydides, i. 28.) Apollo commands the 
 Lacedaemonians to remove the sepulchre of Pausanias^and erect statues 
 to him in the temple of Pallas. (Thucydides, i. 134.) Many examples 
 occur of private men consulting the god. To consult him however for 
 a wicked purpose was a dangerous experiment. The general be* 
 lief on that subject is illustrated by the story of the Spartan Glaucus, 
 who inquired whether it would be safe to refuse restoration of a deposit, 
 and was punished by extirpation of his race. Herodotus, vi. 86. Ju¬ 
 venal, Sat. xiii. 199. 
 
 Spartano cuidam respondit Pythia vates, 
 
 Ilaud impunitum quondam fore, quod dubitaret 
 Depositum retinere, et fraudem jure tueri 
 Jurando : quaerebat enim quae numinis esset 
 Mens, et an hoc illi facinus suaderet Apollo. 
 
 Reddidit ergo metu, non moribus, et tamen omnem 
 Vocem adyti dignam templo veramque probavit, 
 
 Extinctus tot& pariter cum gente domoque, 
 
 Et quamvis longa deductis gente propinquis. 
 
 3 Pausanias, x. 24, 7. Strabo, ix. 419. Diodorus, xvi. 26. As to the 
 ancient legend of Apollo, his choice of the oracular seat, his killing of 
 
THE SACRED WAR, 
 
 227 
 
 The priestess, or Pythia, as she was called, was a native of Delphi, 
 and chosen from a humble family. She was anciently a girl; but 
 one having been seduced by a young Thessalian, it was determined 
 by the Delphians that, for the future, no priestess should be ap¬ 
 pointed under the age of fifty, though she was always to be dressed 
 in the garb of a maiden. As the importance of the oracle increased, 
 it became necessary to appoint two and even three women to per¬ 
 form the prophetic functions. For these they were duly prepared 
 by a three days’ fast, by bathing in the holy spring of Castaly, and 
 other religious rites. The due observance of such rites was seen to 
 by the Delphian managers, to whom the business of the oracle was 
 confided. It has been supposed, that the priestess frequently acted 
 under their dictation in delivering the responses; in later times, when 
 powerful states made a tool of the oracle, this was very frequently 
 the case ; but to suppose that it was an ordinary occurrence in the 
 early times, would be inconsistent with the received traditions of 
 history, as well as with probability. In the great multitude of 
 instances in which the god was consulted, the Delphians had no 
 interest in practicing deception; while they had an interest, which 
 in the early ages must generally have been paramount to all other 
 motives, in maintaining the .reputation of the oracle for truth and 
 wisdom. The priestess was usually, from either physical or mental 
 causes, or both, excited to a species of frenzy; and sometimes even 
 died in convulsions after her prophetic labors. We can hardly 
 believe that her madness was habitually feigned, and it is not com¬ 
 patible with a system of craft on the part of the Pythia or her 
 employers. 1 
 
 the serpent that guarded it, the origin of the names Pytho and Delphi, 
 &c.; see the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, and also Pausanias, x. 6, 3. 
 Compare Strabo, ix. 422. 
 
 1 Plutarch, de Defectu Oracul. 51. The general respect in which the 
 Delphian oracle was held by the Grecian world inclines one to believe 
 in some superhuman agency, whether of a divine or of an evil spirit. 
 Many of the responses were (no doubt) expressed with designed ambi¬ 
 guity ; but the well attested truthfulness of others can not be set down 
 to chance. Strabo agrees with Herodotus as to the character of the 
 oracle. He calls it dxlJEvtiecraTov tuv ndvrov, (ix. 419, 422.) Cicero in 
 his first book de Divinatione (c. 19) urges in favor of the oracle, that it 
 never could have been so celebrated but for its veracity. Admitting its 
 decline in later times, he says, “ Ut igitur nunc minori gloria est, quia 
 minus oraculorum veritas excellit, sic turn, nisi summd veritate, in tantd 
 glorid non fuisset.” He suggests as a possible cause of its decline, that 
 the inspiring vapor may have disappeared : “ Potest vis ilia terrse, quae 
 mentem Pythiae divino afflatu concitabat, evanuisse vetustate, ut quos- 
 dam exaruisse amnes aut in alium cursum contortos et deflexos vide- 
 mus.” The decline of the oracle after the Christian era, which Milton 
 has so beautifully touched upon in his Christmas hymn, favors the no- 
 
228 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 Certain days in every month were appointed for consulting the ora¬ 
 cle, to which people came from every state of Greece. The Delphians 
 regulated the order of consultation, which was generally determined 
 by lot; but sometimes, as a mark of honor or favor, they granted 
 precedency to particular states, as for example, to Croesus, to Sparta, 
 to Athens, and afterwards to Philip of Macedon. Sometimes also 
 they granted exemption from payment of the usual fees. 1 
 
 Delphi stood pretty nearly in the centre of Greece, a position 
 highly favorable for the oracle. 2 The temple was built on rising 
 ground in the highest part of the city, the front (after its reconstruc¬ 
 tion, b.c. 548) being of Parian marble. The sacred precinct was 
 adorned with a multitude of beautiful statues and sculptures, pre¬ 
 sented by the different states of Greece. 3 Gifts of all kinds, ingots 
 of gold and silver, vases, bowls, statues, shields, and other orna¬ 
 ments, were sent by kings and people, as well as by private individ¬ 
 uals, from Greece, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, the iEgsean isles, and Asia 
 Minor; particular cells or compartments being appropriated for 
 their reception. 4 Even in Homer’s time Delphi was celebrated for 
 its riches. 5 
 
 These were continually augmented till the period of the second 
 Persian invasion, when Xerxes, having received accurate intelli¬ 
 gence of the accumulated treasures, marched to Delphi for the ex- 
 
 tion of demoniacal agency. Lucan expresses the feelings of the most 
 pious heathens, when he says :— 
 
 Non ullo ssecula dono 
 
 Nostra carent majore DeCim, quam Delphica sedes 
 Quod siluit. 
 
 1 Euripides,. Ion, 421. iEschylus, Eumenid. 32. Demosthenes, 3 
 Philipp. 119. De Fals. Leg. 446. Herodotus, i. 64, and Schweighmu- 
 ser’s note. Plutarch in Yit. Pericl. 21, Vit. Alexand. 14. Alexander, 
 when the priestess demurred about the time of consultation, dragged 
 her by force into the temple ; upon which she exclaimed, “ My son, thou 
 art invincible and he said there was no further need to question the 
 god. 
 
 3 Hence called yrjg dialog. Strabo, ix. 419. The allusion to this by 
 the poets are frequent. Ex. gr. Euripides, Orest. 591. 
 
 'Opcic ; ’Atto/IAcjv, of pecopcpdlovg sdpa? " 
 vaiuv jSporoloL cropa vi/xet ca^icrarov. 
 
 3 Pausanias, x. 8, 9. The following chapters contain a long enumera¬ 
 tion of what he had seen. Herodotus, v. 62. 
 
 A Herodotus, i. 14, 50, 51. Strabo, ix. 421. 
 
 6 Iliad, ix. 404. 
 
 Ov6’ oca 1 aivog ovduc u(j)7]Topog kvTog cepyei 
 $ol/3ov ’Atto^ovoc TLvdol evi Trerpijeccri, 
 
 Sophocles calls it Tro?ivxpvaov HvOuvoc. CEdipus Tyr. 151. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 229 
 
 press purpose of pillage. 1 , After his defeat Apollo shared with the 
 other gods in the spoil of the invader. 2 
 
 The importance of Delphi was yet further increased by the insti¬ 
 tution of the Pythian games, and by its having been at a still earlier 
 period chosen as one of the seats of the Amphictyonic council. The 
 nature and functions of this council are so intimately connected 
 with the subject before us, that I must stop to explain them. 
 
 It is related by ancient historians, that Amphictyon, the son of 
 Deucalion, founded the institution which bears his name, and the im¬ 
 portance of which was in course of time so greatly enlarged as to have 
 been called a general council or diet of all Greece. 3 Modern writ¬ 
 ers consider Amphictyon to be a fictitious personage, invented by 
 mythologists, and deriving his name from the very council which he 
 is supposed to have founded, and which really signifies (according 
 to the etymology of the word) 4 an association of neighboring peo¬ 
 ple for some common purpose, whether of mutual defense, inter¬ 
 course, or sacrifice. The habits of the ancient Greeks inclined them 
 to form associations of this kind, especially those, of a religious 
 character; and that many such existed, and were called Amphicty- 
 ones, we are distinctly informed; for example, one in the island 
 Calauria, one at Onchestus in Boeotia, and the more celebrated one 
 of Delos. But that which held its meetings at Delphi and Ther¬ 
 mopylae acquired so much greater a celebrity than all the rest, as to 
 be specially called the Amphictyonic assembly. 5 
 
 Twelve different people or tribes united to form this association; 
 Boeotians, Dorians, Ionians, Thessalians, Perrhsebians, Magnetes, 
 (Etaeans, Phthiots, Malians, Locrians, Phocians, Dolopians. 6 Such, 
 gathered from the somewhat varying accounts of different authors, 
 is considered to be the most probable enumeration of its members. 
 
 1 Herodotus, vii. 35. 
 
 2 Herodotus, viii. 121; ix. 81. Delphi, like other temples, was 
 greatly enriched by the spoils of war, as appears from a multitude of 
 cases mentioned by ancient authors. Compare Herodotus, vii. 132; 
 viii. 27. Thucydides, ii. 84; iv. 134. Xenophon, Hellen. iii. c. 3, s. 1. 
 Diodorus, xii. 29 ; xiv. 93, where it is mentioned that the Romans sent 
 to Delphi a tithe of the spoils of Veii. 
 
 8 So Cicero calls it, De Inventione, ii. 23. “ Accusantur apud Am- 
 
 phictyonas, id est, apud commune Graeciae concilium.” In the Amphicty¬ 
 onic decree cited in Demosthenes de Coron. 198, it is called to kolvov tuv 
 'EK kyvuv avvidpiov. 
 
 4 ’A iKbiKTLovzq. See Pindar, Isthm. iv. 13. How the vowel came to 
 be changed, we can not tell. 
 
 5 Pausanias, x. 8. Strabo, ix. 429. Herodotus, vii. 200. Thirlwall, 
 Gr. Hist. i. 373. Grote, ii. 321. Archaeological Dictionary, Title Am- 
 phictyones. 
 
 6 Thirlwall, (i. 377,) thinks that the Dolopians were finally supplant¬ 
 ed by the Delphians, who appear in another list. 
 
230 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 They met twice a year; in the spring at Delphi, in the autumn at 
 the temple of Ceres in Thermopylae, near to the town of Anthela. 
 Each tribe sent deputies to the congress, called Pylagoroe and Hier- 
 omnemones. The former attended and spoke in the debates, and 
 voted for their respective tribes, each of whom had two votes. The 
 latter were persons of a sacerdotal character, whose functions were 
 principally executive, and related to the sacrifices and religious 
 observances, though they seem also to have attended the debates 
 and assisted the Pylagorse, but without the right of voting. From 
 Athens there were sent three Pylagorse, annually elected by the 
 people, and one Hieromnemon, chosen by lot. 1 2 It appears both 
 from iEschines and Demosthenes, that besides the ordinary con¬ 
 gress of deputies, which sat in the temple or sacred building, there 
 was occasionally convened a sort of popular Amphictyonic assem¬ 
 bly, composed not only of the Pylagorse and Hieromnemons, but 
 also of the inhabitants of the place, and such strangers as had come 
 to worship or consult the Deity. 3 
 
 The list of tribes indicates that it was anciently a local rather 
 than a national confederacy. Peloponnesus was altogether exclud¬ 
 ed ; for the Dorians, at the institution of the council, were simply 
 the Dorians under Mount (Eta, not the conquering race who at a 
 later period comprised the most warlike states of Greece. These 
 states afterwards became Amphictyonic, by virtue of their Dorian 
 origin, as Athens did by virtue of its Ionic. Arcadia, Elis, and 
 Achaia, however, at no time belonged to the confederacy; neither 
 did iEtolia, or Acarnania. 
 
 Another thing to be remarked is the preponderance of Greeks 
 north of Thermopylae, and the power thereby given to the Thessa¬ 
 lians ; a circumstance which became of great moment in the struggle 
 with Philip of Macedon. Thessaly, 3 in its widest sense included 
 the whole district bounded on the north by Olympus and the Cam- 
 bunian range of mountains, on the east by the HCgaean sea, on the 
 south and west by Mounts (Eta and Pindus. Thus considered, it 
 
 1 Aristophanes, Nubes, 624. The office of Hieromnemon was deemed 
 a very honorable one (See Demosthenes cont. Timocr. 747), and the bet¬ 
 ter opinion is, that it was held for a longer period than one year, and 
 perhaps for life. See the Archseol. Diet, title Amphictyones. 
 
 2 iEschines, cont. Ctesiph. 71. De Fals. Leg. 48. Demosthenes, de 
 Coron. 278. Who are the cvvedpoi, mentioned in the Amphictyonic de¬ 
 crees in Demosthenes, is uncertain; but perhaps it means the Hierom¬ 
 nemons, who sat as assessors with the Pylagorse, to suggest and advise, 
 (see p. 276), and are said even in a loose way (p. 277) iprjtyLcacOaL. By 
 the decree it was resolved, etceWelv tovq nvAayopovg Kal roik avvEdpovg, 
 and by the showing of Demosthenes, the Hieromnemons did walk over 
 the district in question. 
 
 3 The description of Thessaly occupies the fifth chapter of the ninth 
 book of Straba 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 231 
 
 comprehends half of the Amphictyonic tribes; but the Thessalians, 
 strictly so called, occupied only a portion of this district, the re¬ 
 mainder being held by other races, more or less subject or sub¬ 
 ordinate to them. The Perrhaebians dwelt between the river 
 Peneus and Mount Olympus. The Magnetes on the coast of the 
 iEgaean, under Mounts Ossa and Pelion: their country was called 
 Magnesia. The Achaean Phthiots occupied the plain beneath 
 Mount Othrys, stretching from thence in a south-easterly direction 
 as far as the Pagasaean bay, upon which was the town of Halus. 
 The Malians were between Phthiotis and Thermopylae, giving name 
 to the Mahan bay ; in their country were the cities of Anticyra and 
 Trachis; and afterwards Heraclea was founded by the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians. 1 West of the Malians were the (Etaeans, occupying the north¬ 
 ern slopes of Mount (Eta: they included the JEnianes, whom 
 Pausanias enumerates as one of the Amphictyonic people. Dolopia 
 w-as to the north-east of Mount Othrys, and stretched beyond Pin- 
 dus as far as the river Achelous. 
 
 The people strictly called Thessali inhabited chiefly the central 
 plain between Mounts Pindus, Olympus, Ossa, Pelion, and Othrys. 
 Their chief cities were Larissa, Pharsalus, Crannon, and Pherse. 
 Originally they came from Thesprotia in Epirus, and after subduing 
 a jfelasgic or iEolian race, whom they found in occupation, they 
 established themselves in their new country as a sort of dominant 
 aristocracy. The conquered people were reduced to the condition 
 of serfs, and were called Penestae; 2 being bound to cultivate the 
 land, and follow their masters to battle when required. The Thes¬ 
 salians gradually extended their power over the circumjacent tribes; 
 and, could they have been united and under a firm government, 
 would have become formidable to the southern states of Greece: 
 but they had no organized system of government, and the feuds 
 between.the great families prevented any union taking place, ex¬ 
 cept on particular occasions, and for short periods. The ancient 
 quadruple division of Thessaly, which Philip revived for his own 
 purposes, was probably established at a time when the Thessalians 
 had arrived at a considerable height of power. The four districts 
 were called Thessaliotis, Histiseotis, Pelasgiotis, and Phthiotis; of 
 which the first comprised the central plain, the second the territory 
 of the Perrhaebians and the north-western parts, the third the east- 
 
 ‘ Thucydides, ii. 92. They hoped that it would give them the com¬ 
 mand of Thermopylae, and the means of making a descent upon the 
 northern coast of Euboea. 
 
 2 The word is either derived from irevta, poverty ; or, according to 
 another account, is a corruption of peveoTcu, from ptvcj',' because they 
 were permanently attached to the soil, and could not, like slaves, be 
 sold or sent away. Dionysius, Antiq. Rom. ii. 9. Athenaeus, vi. 264. 
 
232 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 era coast, and the fourth the country of the Achaean Phthiots al¬ 
 ready described . 1 
 
 Another thing to be noticed is, that Amphictyonic membership 
 belonged not to cities, but to tribes or races, each of whom had the 
 same number of votes, however great, or however small; so that, 
 after the great expansion of the Ionic and Doric races, the right of 
 representation in the Amphictyonic congress was shared by Athens 
 and Sparta with the numerous communities which had sprung out 
 of those races respectively. It is supposed that the different cities 
 of one tribe took their turns of sending representatives, according 
 to some arrangement of which we have no particular information. 
 It is probable that a leading and powerful state would gradually as¬ 
 sume to itself the rights of the whole tribe; yet still its constitutional 
 power in the congress would be limited to the original number of 
 votes; and Athens or Sparta could only acquire a preponderating 
 weight among the Amphictyons through the influence which they 
 exerted over the other constituent tribes. To such influence is 
 partly to be ascribed the increasing importance of the Amphictyonic 
 body, and its growth from a mere local association into the sem¬ 
 blance of an Hellenic diet. The sanctity of the Delphian temple gave 
 an additional lustre to its meetings . 2 
 
 The oath anciently taken by the members of the league was to 
 the following effect:—“ That they would not destroy any city of 
 the Amphictyonic tribes; that they would not cut of their springs 
 of water either in peace or war; that they would turn their arms 
 against any people who did such things, and destroy their cities; 
 that, if any one committed sacrilege against the god, or formed, or 
 was privy to, any design to injure the temple, they would exert 
 themselves with hand, foot, tongue, and all their, might, to punish" 
 him .” 3 
 
 History furnishes us with a few examples in which the Amphic¬ 
 tyons at an early period interposed in the affairs of Greece, to vin¬ 
 dicate national rights or public justice, or to maintain the honor of 
 Apollo. Thus, when the conductors of a procession to Delphi were 
 insulted by some Megarians, the Amphictyons passed sentence on 
 the offenders . 4 When the Dolopians Scyrus, who had long been 
 addicted to piracy, seized and imprisoned some Thessalian mer¬ 
 chants who put into their port, and the merchants escaping preferred 
 their complaint to the Amphictyons, they condemned the islanders 
 
 1 Strabo, ix. 430. Diodorus, iv. 67. Herodotus, vii. 129, 176. Thu¬ 
 
 cydides, i. 2; ii. 22; iv. 78. Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 1. Grote’s His¬ 
 tory of Greece, ii. 367. 
 
 3 The meeting at Delphi, as well as that at Thermopylae, was called 
 7j Uv?~.aia, the Pylcean meeting , a circumstance tending to show the 
 greater antiquity of the latter. See Grote, ii. 328. 
 
 3 ^Eschines, De Fals. Leg. 43. 
 
 4 Plutarch, Gr. Quaest. 69. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 233 
 
 to pay a fine. The guilty people, rather than pay the fine, chose 
 to surrender the island to Cimon, who took advantage of the occa¬ 
 sion to annex it to the dominion of Athens. 1 2 At the close of the 
 Persian war, the Amphictyons offered a reward for Ephialtes who 
 betrayed the pass over the mountains to Xerxes. 3 They erected 
 a monument to Leonidas. 3 After the burning of the Delphian tem¬ 
 ple, b.c. 548, we find them intrusted with the task of rebuilding it, 
 and the Alcmasonids taking the contract from them for three hun¬ 
 dred talents. 4 They claimed the right, supposed to be derived from 
 their earliest institution, of sitting in judgment upon disputes be¬ 
 tween Amphictyonic cities; a right which it must have been diffi¬ 
 cult to exercise, except over the less powerful of their members. 
 Traces of such a jurisdiction however are to be found. 5 * 
 
 The most memorable instance of Amphictyonic action in the early 
 times is that known by the name of the first Sacred war, which ter¬ 
 minated in the destruction of the city of Crissa, and afforded a pre¬ 
 cedent for the punishment of the Phocians and Locrians two or 
 three centuries after. The Crissaeans were charged with taking 
 extortionate tolls from the visitors who came to Delphi by sea from 
 the western parts of Greece, or from Italy and Sicily, and who came 
 across the Corinthian gulf into the Crisssean harbor. They were 
 charged (according to another account) with having encroached upon 
 the land of Apollo, and with having committed outrages upon some 
 Phocian and Argive women returning from the temple. Perhaps 
 all these charges were mixed together.® War was declared by the 
 Amphictyons, at the instigation (according to Plutarch) 7 of Solon 
 the Athenian. Clisthenes, king of Sicyon, was chosen to conduct 
 the war, in which the Athenians took an active part, under the 
 command either of Solon himself or of Alcmseon, and the Thessalians 
 under Eurylochus. The Crissaeans were besieged, but they made 
 an obstinate resistance, and the war, like that of Troy, is said to 
 have lasted ten years. It was declared by the oracle, that Crissa 
 would never be taken, until the waves washed the territories of 
 
 1 Plutarch in Yit. Cimon. 8. Thucydides, i. 98. 
 
 2 Herodotus, vii. 213. 
 
 3 Herodotus, 228. 
 
 4 Herodotus, ii. 180; v. 62; Strabo, ix. 421; Pausanias, x. 5. The 
 temple built by the Amphictyons was said to be the third. 
 
 8 Strabo, ix. 420. Demosthenes de Coron. 271. The suit there re¬ 
 ferred to was probably an Amphictyonic suit. Compare the same ora¬ 
 tion, p. 277. 
 
 0 They are stated with vague generality by Aeschines, Cont. Ctes. 68. 
 It is probable, that the Delphians, who owed their prosperity to the 
 donations of visitors, were jealous of any thing which diverted that 
 source of profit into another channel. 
 
 7 In the life of Solon. He professes to follow Aristotle’s treatise on 
 the victors at the Pythian games. 
 
234 
 
 APPENDIX I.' 
 
 Delphi. Solon advised, that the way to fulfill the oracle was to con¬ 
 secrate to Apollo all the land of the Crissaeans. This was done; 
 the besiegers solemnly vowed that the Crissaean land should be 
 given to Apollo, and should for ever lie waste: soon after this the 
 city was taken by stratagem. Solon diverted the stream of the 
 Plistus, and after poisoning the waters with the roots of hellebore, 
 suffered them to return to their former channel; the besieged drank 
 them with avidity and miserably perished. Thus Crissa fell, in the 
 year b.c. 585. The victors performed their vow, and after razing 
 the city to the ground, turned the whole of its domain into a wil¬ 
 derness. The harbor was given to the Delphians, who now became 
 masters of the whole plain from Parnassus to the sea. 1 
 
 To commemorate this victory, the Amphictyons, enriched by the 
 spoil of the conquered city, established the Pythian games, which 
 thenceforth were celebrated quadriennially in the third year of 
 every Olympic period. There had been anciently, established by 
 the Delphians themselves, an octennial musical festival, in one of 
 which it was said the poet Thamyris had obtained the prize. This 
 was enlarged into a more comprehensive one, including not only 
 competition in music and poetry, exhibitions of art in painting and 
 sculpture, but also gymnastic contests, with foot, horse, and chariot 
 races, after the model of the Olympic. These were not indeed es¬ 
 tablished all at once, but with additions in successive periods: the 
 chariot race was introduced in the second Pythiad, when Clisthenes 
 of Sicyon was the victor: a part of the Crissaean plain was con¬ 
 verted into the race-course. At the same time the prizes (which 
 were at first awarded as in the old musical contests) were abolished, 
 and the victor’s meed was thenceforth a simple wreath of laurel; 
 no less efficacious than the Olympian olive to excite the emulation 
 of competitors, striving for glory before the eyes of assembled 
 Greece. The games were under the immediate superintendence of 
 the Amphictyonic deputies. 2 
 
 1 Pausanias, x. 37. Strabo, ix. 418. iEschines, Cont. Ctes. 69. 
 Athenaeus, xiii. 660. Polyaenus, vi. 13. 
 
 2 Pausanias, x. 7, 33. Strabo, ix. 421. Archaeological Dictionary, 
 title Pythia. The course is called the Crissaean Plain by Sophocles, 
 Electra, 729. 
 
 7cuv c5’ ETTLimTiaro 
 
 N avayiov Kpiouiov ltttukC)v nedov. 
 
 The Pythian games were open to all the Greeks, not only to the mem¬ 
 bers of the Amphictyonic association: an iEtolian is mentioned in the 
 same passage as one of the competitors, v. 704. 
 
 Whether the games were celebrated in the spring or the autumn, has 
 been a contested point. Boeckh is for the spring : Clinton and Grote 
 are for the autumn. See Grote’s History of Greece, iv. 86. 
 
 The surprise of the Persian on hearing that the Greek athletes con¬ 
 tended for an olive garland is well described by Herodotus, viii. 26. 
 
THE SACRED WAH 
 
 235 
 
 Of the history of the Phocians little is known till just before the 
 second Persian invasion. We learn that they had much difficulty in 
 maintaining their independence against the Thessalians, who, after 
 subduing most of the tribes north of Mount (Eta, endeavored to 
 push their conquests southward. To check their incursions, the 
 Phocians had anciently, at a time when Thermopylae belonged to 
 them, closed up its western entrance with a wall, which, when prop¬ 
 erly guarded, was deemed a complete barrier against an enemy 
 advancing from the Malian side. The pass had two gates or open¬ 
 ings ; one where the wall was built, which opened into the road from 
 Anthela to Trachis, giving room for a single wagon only to enter; 
 another, equally narrow, which opened about a mile to the east just 
 above the town of Alpeni. The space between the two gates was 
 considerably wider, and contained hot springs, salt or sulphurous, 
 which gave to the pass the name of Thermopylae, or Hot Gates.' 
 The Phocians, besides blocking up the entrance, endeavored to 
 make the road impassable by turning into it the water of the mineral 
 springs. These precautions however were rendered of no avail by 
 the discovery of a new road; which, commencing near Trachis, and 
 taking a westerly course up the gorge of the river Asopus, ascend¬ 
 ed the mountain by a track called Anoptea, then turned eastward 
 and descended to Alpeni. The Trachinians having revealed this road 
 to the Thessalians, the pass ceased to be an invincible barrier, and the 
 wall soon afterwards was neglected or abandoned. It was probably 
 owing to this, that the Phocians lost the territory, which was after¬ 
 wards acquired by the Epicnemidian Locrians. Certain it is, that 
 they became exposed to invasion from the north, and were reduced 
 to rely on their own valor for their safety. 1 2 We have no particulars 
 of the wars carried on between them and the Thessalians, until not 
 many years before the Persian invasion, when a Thessalian army 
 crossed the Locrian frontier, and were defeated by a stratagem at 
 Hyampolis. The Phocians, dreading their superiority in cavalry, put 
 into the ground a quantity of pots covered with loose earth; the 
 horses charging over these were lamed, and their riders overthrown 
 and slaughtered. To avenge this disaster, the Thessalians entered 
 Phocis with an immense force collected from all their confederate 
 cities. The Phocians terrified by their numbers, and further dis¬ 
 heartened by the loss of a detachment whom they had sent to recon¬ 
 noitre the enemy, made a huge funeral pile, and bringing together 
 all their women and children, their gold, silver, and other valuables, 
 and the images of their gods, gave them in charge to thirty of their 
 countrymen, with orders, in case they should be defeated, to kill the 
 
 1 Thermopylae was the name given by the Greeks in general; Pylae, 
 by the neighbors and surrounding people. Herodotus, vii. 201. Strabo, 
 ix. 428. 
 
 2 Herodotus, vii. 176, 199, 200, 215, 216. 
 
236 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 women and children, and bum their bodies together with all the 
 property on the funeral pile, then to kill themselves or rush upon the 
 swords of the enemy. Having given such order, they marched J,o 
 meet the Thessalians, and fought with such desperation, that they 
 gained a great victory and delivered their country. From this Pho- 
 cian desperation became a proverb . 1 
 
 Herodotus and Pausanias, from whom we pick up these scraps 
 of history, mention also a successful night-attack made upon the 
 Thessalian camp by a select body of Phocians, having first whitened 
 their faces and shields with chalk, to distinguish them from the 
 enemy. According to Herodotus, the PhOcians had first been 
 driven to the fastnessess of Parnassus. Pausanias relates, that the 
 Phocians in their alarm consulted the Delphian oracle, which returned 
 a mysterious answer, that Apollo would cause a mortal to encounter 
 an immortal, that he would give victory to both, but more complete 
 victory to the mortal. This was understood to be fulfilled after the 
 final battle, in which the Thessalians chose for their watchword 
 Itonian Pallas, the Phocians their Eponymous hero, Phocus. To 
 show their gratitude, the Phocians sent to Delphi statues of Apollo 
 and their own commanders, including the prophet Tellias of Elis, 
 under whose counsel they had acted. 
 
 After the battle of Thermopylae the Thessalians had their revenge. 
 They were at first opposed to Xerxes, notwithstanding that the 
 Aleuadae had invited him into Greece; and, while he was preparing to 
 cross the Hellespont, they sent envoys to Peloponnesus, urging*that 
 troops should be brought to guard the passes of Olympus, and prof¬ 
 fering their assistance. Themistocles and Euaenetus sailed with this 
 force to Halus, from whence they marched across Thessaly, and 
 joined by the Thessalian cavalry occupied the defiles of Temper 
 being informed however, that their position could easily be turned by 
 the enemy, they re-embarked their troops and sailed home. The 
 Thessalians then, finding that they could have no support from the 
 southern Greeks, tendered their submission to Xerxes, in which they 
 were followed by the Perrhaebians, Magnetes, and other northern 
 tribes, and also by the Dorians, Locrians, and Boeotians excepting 
 Thespiae and Plataea. The Greeks determined on defending Ther¬ 
 mopylae, which Leonidas with an advanced body was sent to occupy, 
 whilst the fleet sailed to Artemisium, on the north of the Euboean 
 channel, from which point they could freely communicate with Le¬ 
 onidas, and prevent the Persians landing troops in his rear . 2 
 
 Leonidas, arriving at Thermopylae, invited the Phocians and the 
 Opuntian Locrians to join him. They both complied; the Phocians 
 joining him with a thousand men, the Opuntian Locrians with their 
 
 1 Herodotus, viii. 27, 28. Pausanias, x 1. 
 
 2 Herodotus, vii. 6, 172, 173, 174, 175. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 237 
 
 whole force. 1 He set to work immediately to repair the ancient 
 wall; but hearing now for the first time, that there was another 
 road over the mountains, he sent the Phocians, at their own request, 
 to defend it, while with the remainder of his forces he kept his sta¬ 
 tion in the pass. Most of the Greeks were struck with terror at the 
 approaching multitudes of the enemy, and desired to retreat to the 
 isthmus; it was with some difficulty, and chiefly owing to the 
 remonstrances of the Phocians and Locrians, anxious for the safety 
 of their own countries, that they were induced to remain at Ther¬ 
 mopylae. Xerxes, having marched through Macedonia and Thes¬ 
 saly, arrived in the Malian territory, and encamped at Trachis, two 
 miles from the pass. After two days fighting, in which the Persians 
 suffered prodigious loss, Xerxes learned from the Trachinians the 
 existence of the mountain road, and dispatched Hydarnes with a 
 body of Persians (who were called the Immortals) to march by 
 night over the cliff and fall upon the rear of Leonidas. The Per¬ 
 sians, under the guidance of Ephialtes the Trachinian, marched all 
 night, and at daybreak had mounted to the highest part of the 
 rocky road, and were heard by the Phocians, wffio grasped their 
 arms and prepared for battle; but soon, overwhelmed by the 
 arrows of so numerous a host, they fled to the brow of the cliff, 
 where they awaited the enemy with the intention of selling their 
 lives dearly. Hydarnes, not caring to attack the Phocians, pursued 
 his march and descended the mountain. The Greeks, hearing of 
 his advance, had just time to retire from their perilous situation, 
 where Leonidas and his devoted band preferred to remain and sac¬ 
 rifice themselves for the honor of their country. 2 
 
 Xerxes, advancing from Thermopylae, was reinforced by an 
 addition of Greek auxiliaries, the Malians, Dorians, Locrians, and 
 Boeotians, who now joined him with all their troops, excepting (as 
 before) the people of Thespiae and Plataea. 3 The Locrians would 
 , probably have joined him at Thermopylae, for they had engaged to 
 seize the pass for him, but had been prevented by the arrival of 
 Leonidas. 4 The Phocians, notwithstanding the advance of so 
 numerous an army, still refused submission. A message of a singu¬ 
 lar kind was sent to them by the Thessalians, stating that they (the 
 Thessalians) had great influence with Xerxes, and that it depended 
 on them whether the Phocians should be reduced to slavery or 
 otherwise; that they were willing to forget past injuries, and, if the 
 Phocians would give them fifty talents, they would undertake to 
 
 1 HavoTpaTirj. (Herodotus, vii. 203.) This means their whole force 
 of heavy armed troops. The Opuntiau Locrians, as well as the Pho¬ 
 cians, were armed in this fashion. Pausanias, i. 23. 
 
 2 Herodotus, vii. 201, 207, 208, 211, 213—23. 
 
 2 Herodotus, viii. 66. 
 
 4 Diodorus, ad. 4. 
 
238 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 avert the tempest that was about to fall upon them. The Phocians 
 spurned this proposal. Herodotus says, they sided with the Greeks 
 purely out of hatred to the Thessalians; that, if the Thessalians 
 had been on the other side, the Phocians would have been with 
 the Mede. There seems however scarcely any ground for at¬ 
 tributing their conduct to such a motive. The answer which 
 the Phocians returned was, that they would give .no money, 
 that they were at liberty to Medise as well as the Thessalians, 
 if they chose; but they would not consent to betray the cause 
 of Greece . 1 
 
 The Thessalians, on receiving this answer, conducted the barba¬ 
 rian army into Phocis, entering it from the north by a narrow strip 
 of Doris which separates it from Mount (Eta, and commenced 
 ravaging the rich valley of the Cephisus. The Phocian people 
 every where fled before them. Some took refuge in the heights of 
 Parnassus, on a ridge of rocks called the Tithorea, above the city of 
 Neon. The greater part found shelter at Amphissa in Ozolian Lo- 
 cris. Meanwhile the Persians laid waste the whole country, plun¬ 
 dering and destroying all in their way, and setting fire to the cities 
 and the temples. Fifteen of the principal cities, including Drymus, 
 Charadra, Tethronium, Amphicsea, Neon, Elatea, Hyampolis, Para- 
 potamii, Abse with its oracular temple, and Panopeus, were'burned 
 to the ground . 2 
 
 A division of the army was sent to Delphi, with special orders to 
 seize the treasures of the temple. The Delphians in alarm inquired 
 of the oracle, whether they should bury their treasures, or carry 
 them away into another land; Apollo assured them, that he was 
 able to defend his own without their assistance. They then left 
 their city, seeking refuge on the mountains, in the Corycian cave, or 
 at Amphissa; their wives and children they sent over to Achaia. 
 Sixty men only remained, with the chief-priest 3 Aceratus. The 
 barbarians advanced, but hardly had they reached the temple of 
 Pallas, which stood in front of the Phoebean sanctuary, when their 
 progress was arrested by dreadful prodigies; a burst of thunder, the 
 rolling of two immense crags from Parnassus, which struck down 
 several of their host, and a war-cry issuing from the shrine of Pallas. 
 Smitten with sudden panic, they turned and fled; the Delphians 
 at that moment rushed upon them and completed the rout, assisted 
 (as the surviving Persians themselves reported) by two superhuman 
 figures in panoply, who never ceased pursuing and slaughtering 
 them till they reached Bceotia. The Delphians declared these to be 
 their own native heroes, Phylacus and Autonous, who had portions 
 of ground consecrated to them in .the neighborhood of the temple. 
 
 1 Herodotus, viii. 29, 30. 
 
 3 Herodotus, viii. 31, 32, 33, 35. 
 
 3 See ante, page 225, note 4, 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 239 
 
 Thus did Apollo fulfill his promise, and vindicate the sanctity of the 
 oracle . 1 
 
 After this, it appears, a part of the Phocian people, those probably 
 whose cities had been spared, submitted with reluctance to Xerxes ; 
 the rest maintained themselves in the mountains, from which they 
 made incursions from time to time against the Persian army. A 
 thousand Phocians however were sent to join Mardonius. They 
 came so tardily, that Mardonius, to mark his displeasure, or to in¬ 
 timidate them for the future, or perhaps at first with a more serious 
 intention, ordered their troop to be drawn up in a plain, and sur¬ 
 rounded them with his numerous cavalry. The Phocians, supposing 
 they were doomed to destruction, formed in a square, and with 
 firm countenance awaited the attack. The horsemen rode up with 
 lifted javelins, making a feint to charge, but as suddenly they 
 wheeled round and retreated. Mardonius applauded the Phocians 
 for the courage which they had shown, and assured them, if they 
 behaved themselves well in the ensuing campaign, they would be 
 rewarded by the king. At Plataea they were stationed with the 
 Thebans and other Greek allies of Xerxes, and in the battle were 
 opposed to the Athenians; but all, except the Thebans, fled without 
 striking a blow, and Pausanias indeed states, that the Phocians 
 deserted in battle to the Greeks . 2 
 
 Of the spoils of the battle of Salamis the choicest part was sent to 
 Delphi, and devoted to the construction of a colossal statue. The 
 united Greeks inquired of the god, whether he was content with 
 their offerings; and he replied, that he was satisfied with those of 
 the other Greeks, but looked for a special gift from the iEginetans, 
 to whom the palm of valor had been awarded; they sent him ac¬ 
 cordingly three golden stars fixed on a brazen mast . 3 At the close 
 of the war a tithe of the spoil was given to Apollo, and out of it was 
 made a golden tripod, placed by the Delphians on a three-headed 
 brazen serpent, which endured to the time of Pausanias. Shares 
 were assigned also to the Olympian Jupiter and Isthmian Neptune . 4 
 A circumstance is related by Plutarch in the life of Aristides, which 
 proves the peculiar veneration in which the Delphian sanctuary was 
 held by the Greeks. Soon after the battle of Platsea the oracle 
 directed that an altar should be raised on the Plataean ground to 
 Jupiter the Deliverer; but, as the fires in the country had been 
 polluted by the barbarians, it commanded them to be extinguished, 
 
 1 Herodotus, viii. 36—39 ; who represents that the two crags were 
 shown to him in the sacred grove of Pallas Prongea. Compare Pausa¬ 
 nias, x. 23. 
 
 2 Herodotus, ix. It, 31, 6t. Pausanias, x. 2. 
 
 8 Herodotus, viii. 121, 122. 
 
 4 Herodotus, ix. 81. Pausanias, x. 13. Diodorus, xi. 33. Thucydi¬ 
 des, iii. 5t. 
 
240 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 and no sacrifice to be offered, till fire was brought from the hearth 
 of Apollo. To comply with this injunction, Euchidas, a Plataean, 
 ran in one day from Plataea to Delphi and back, carrying with him 
 the sacred fire, and at the moment of his return dropped down 
 dead with exhaustion. He was rewarded for his act of piety with 
 a monument in the temple of Diana. 1 
 
 A congress of the Amphictyons was held somewhere about this 
 time, at which divers resolutions were passed touching the events 
 of the war; among others, to offer a reward for Ephialtes, and 
 decree a monument to Leonidas, as I have already mentioned. It 
 was moved by the Lacedaemonians, that the Greeks who had joined 
 Xerxes should be expelled from the Amphictyonic council; but this 
 proposal was rejected by the deputies, under the advice of Themis- 
 tocles, who feared that, if the Thessalians, Thebans, and so many 
 other members were removed from the council, it would fall entirely 
 under the influence of Sparta. 2 
 
 In the long period which elapsed between the Persian and the 
 second Sacred War the Phocians interfered but little in the general 
 affairs of Greece; they were forced from time to time into alliances 
 with the more powerful states, Athens, Sparta, or Thebes, in whose 
 wars they played but a subordinate part. To recover their power 
 at Delphi; was a thing which they still aimed at, but were never 
 able fully to accomplish, owing to the interference of Sparta. In 
 the year 457 b.c. they invaded the country of the Dorians, and took 
 one or two of their cities; but the Lacedaemonians marching against 
 them with a large Peloponnesian force defeated them in battle, and 
 compelled them to restore their conquest. 3 After the victory of 
 (Enophyta, won in the following year by the Athenians under My- 
 ronides over the Boeotians, not only the whole of Bceotia, but Pho- 
 cis also and Opuntian Locris, fell into the power of the Athenians, 
 and furnished them with auxiliary troops in an expedition which 
 they made against Pharsalus in Thessaly. 4 • 
 
 Just at this period Athens had acquired a vast accession of 
 strength as a land as well as a naval power, and the Phocians by 
 their connection with her were enabled, it seems, to become masters 
 of Delphi; for, in the year 448 b.c. it became necessary for the La¬ 
 cedaemonians to send an army into Phocis, to commence a sort of 
 sacred war, in which they got possession of the temple and delivered 
 it up to the Delphians; but no sooner had they retired, than the 
 Athenians marched into the country and restored the temple to the 
 Phocians. 5 This state of things however was of short duration; for 
 
 1 Plutarch, in Yit. Aristid. 20. 
 
 2 Plutarch, in Yit. Themistocl. 20. 
 
 3 Thucydides, i. 107. Diodorus, xi. 79. 
 
 4 Thucydides, i. 108, 111. Diodorus, xi. 81, 82, 83. 
 
 6 Thucydides, i. 112. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 241 
 
 in the next year the Athenians suffered the calamitous defeat at 
 Coronea, by which they lost Boeotia and the whole of their power 
 in the northern parts of G-reece; and in two years after the thirty 
 years truce was concluded between them and the Lacedaemonians. 1 * 
 Nine years later we find the Lacedaemonians consulting the Del¬ 
 phian oracle, as to the prospect of success in a war with Athens, - 
 and the god replying, that, if they carried it on with all their might, 
 they would get the victory, and he would himself assist them: 
 which may seem to indicate that Spartan influence was then re¬ 
 established at Delphi. 3 The Corinthian speaker in the congress of 
 allies at Sparta suggests, that for the purpose of equipping a fleet 
 they could borrow money from Delphi and Olympia. 3 At the 
 breaking out of the war, the Phocians are in alliance with the Pelo- 
 ponnesians, and together with the Boeotians and Locrians furnish, a 
 contingent of cavalry. 4 Their old enemies the Thessalians are not 
 classed among the regular allies of Athens, though the great mass 
 of the people were friendly to her, and succors of Thessalian horse 
 were occasionally sent to the Athenians; but many of the nobles in 
 Thessaly favored the Lacedaemonians, and they furnished assistance 
 to Brasidas upon his march to Thrace. 5 
 
 At the truce for a year concluded between the Spartans and 
 Athenians, in the ninth year of the Peloponnesian war, the first 
 articles of their convention were the following: 6 
 
 1 Thucydides, i. 113, 115. Diodorus, xii. 6, 7. 
 
 * Thucydides, i. 118. 
 
 8 Thucydides, i. 121. 
 
 4 Thucydides, ii. 9. Diodorus, xii. 42. But the Ozolian Locriana 
 
 were allied with Athens. Thucydides, iii. 95, 101. 
 
 6 Thucydides, ii. 22; iv. 78; v. 13. Compare Demosthenes, Ilepl 
 SwruZeoSj 173. The division of parties among the Thessalians may 
 account for their so often changing sides even in battle. Thucydides, l. 
 107. Diodorus, xv. 11 ; xviii. 12. 
 
 6 Thucydides, iv. 118, where Haack correctly observes, that the first 
 clause refers solely to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, by whom the 
 privilege of access to Delphi was a concession made to Athens. The 
 Athenians were by the war excluded generally from the continent of 
 Greece, and unable either to consult the oracle, or attend the Pythian 
 games. This they sorely felt, and therefore in the peace that followed, 
 we find them expressly stipulating for liberty to all to attend the pub¬ 
 lic games. The grand display made by the Athenians, especially Alci- 
 biades, at the Olympic festival, which was celebrated in the eleventh 
 year of the war, is particularly noticed by Plutarch in his life of that 
 extraordinary man. Compare Thucydides, vi. 16. G rote’s History 4 of 
 Greece, vil 74, note. 
 
 Whether any particular offenders are alluded to by the rove ufiucovv- 
 rag in the clause of the truce, has been a subject of question. It is not 
 improbable that the Athenians may have charged their adversaries with 
 Vol. II.— L 
 
242 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 11 With respect to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, 
 we are content that all people who please may use them safely and 
 fearlessly, according to the national customs. The Lacedaemonians 
 and their allies who are present consent to this, and declare that 
 they will send heralds and persuade the Boeotians and Phocians, if 
 . they can. With respect to the treasures of the god, we will take 
 measures for the discovery of all offenders, both we and you, right¬ 
 eously and honestly, according to the customs of our countries, and 
 the rest who agree, according to the customs of their countries re¬ 
 spectively.” , V 
 
 At the peace of Nicias, concluded in the ensuing year, the first 
 articles were as follows: 1 
 
 “ With respect to the national temples, it is agreed that all people 
 who please may sacrifice, and visit them, and consult the oracle, and 
 attend the festivals, according to the customs of their country, trav¬ 
 eling fearlessly both by sea and land. The temple and sanctuary 
 of the Delphian Apollo, and Delphi, shall be subject to their own 
 laws, their own taxation, and their own judicature, in regard both 
 to persons and land belonging to them, according to their ancient 
 customs.” 
 
 From the above clauses we may perceive the great importance 
 attached by the leading states of Greece to Delphi and its oracle, to 
 the Pythian and other national festivals, and their anxiety to secure 
 free access to them for all the Greeks. 
 
 We may notice also, that at this period every thing is done by 
 Athens or Lacedaemon; the rest are all absorbed into the alliance of 
 one or other of those cities; no national congress decides any thing; 
 the Amphictyons are never even mentioned. 
 
 Diodorus relates that in the year b.c. 418, during the interval of 
 the general peace, a war broke out between the Phocians and 
 Locrians, and that a battle was fought in which more than a thousand 
 of the Locrians were slain; 2 this is not mentioned by Thucydides, 
 but the fact is not therefore to be doubted. That there was a feud 
 between the Phocians and the Opuntian as well as Ozolian Locrians, 
 w r hich led at a later period to important consequences, is abundantly 
 clear. Jealousies between neighbors in Greece, about some disputed 
 
 taking some of the sacred property, and that this clause was inserted to 
 quiet them. 
 
 1 Thucydides, v. 18. It is scarcely possible to translate accurately 
 the word lepov , which signifies not only the sacred edifice, but all the 
 precinct and ground consecrated to the god, including often an exten¬ 
 sive, walk or grove. Naof is the building only. See Valckanaer and 
 Schweighaeuser ad Herod, vi. 19. The Delphians had their boundaries 
 fixed, when they were definitely separated from the Phocians. (Strabo, 
 ix. 423.) 
 
 2 Diodorus, xii. 80. He does not say which Locrians. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 243 
 
 territory, or for other causes, were only too common: thus the 
 Phocians hated not only the Locrians, but the Boeotians; while 
 towards the Athenians they had friendly feelings, and were drawn 
 into the Peloponnesian alliance by compulsion. 1 During the blockade 
 of Athens, when the allies debated whether mercy should be shown 
 to the vanquished, and many, especially the Corinthians and Thebans, 
 pressed for their destruction, the Phocians voted on the merciful 
 side of the question, which was carried, the Lacedaemonians having 
 strongly pronounced themselves in its favor. 2 
 
 In the year b.c. 359, a new combination was formed among the 
 states of Greece. Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos were at the 
 head of a league against Lacedaemon; contrived originally by the 
 satrap Tithraustes, who sent money to Greece, in order to excite a 
 war and withdraw Agesilaus from Asia. Certain leading men in 
 Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, acpepted the Persian gold, and pro¬ 
 ceeded at once to perform the required service, in which they found 
 not much difficulty; for even at Thebes and Corinth the ancient 
 feeling of attachment to Sparta had for some time past been ex¬ 
 changed for one of distrust and jealousy. 3 The immediate cause 
 of war was a proceeding of the Theban statesmen, Androclidas, 
 Ismenias, and Galaxidorus, who, wishing to throw the odium of 
 breaking peace upon the Lacedaemonians, contrived to raise a quarrel 
 between the Phocians and Opuntian 4 Locrians, which they expected 
 would lead to Spartan interference. They persuaded the Locrians 
 to commit a trespass upon some land which was the subject of 
 dispute between them and their neighbors. To punish this, the 
 Phocians invaded Locris, and carried off a large quantity of plunder. 
 Androclidas and his party then urged their contrymen to assist the 
 Locrians; and accordingly the Thebans marched into Phocis, and 
 ravaged the country. The Phocians sent to Sparta for succor, 
 which was readily granted; and Lysander was sent to Phocis, with 
 orders to assemble the forces of all the allies in that neighborhood, 
 namely, the Phocians; CEtseans, Heracleots, Malians, and iEnianians, 
 and lead them to Haliartus in Boeotia, where the king Pausanias, 
 who was to follow with the Peloponnesian troops and take the chief 
 command, appointed to meet him on a given day. Lysander as¬ 
 sembled the allies and marched into Boeotia, where he rendered an 
 
 1 Thucydides, iii. 95, 101. Xenophon, Hellen. iii. c. 5, s. 3. 
 
 3 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 361. He mentions this as a current 
 report at Athens. Nor is it at all inconsistent with the accoupt of Xen¬ 
 ophon, Hellen. ii. c. 2, s. 19, 20, though he does not state that the ques¬ 
 tion was formally put to the vote. 
 
 3 Xenophon, Hellen. iii. c. 5, ss. 1, 2. Plutarch, in Yit. Lysand. 27 ; 
 in Vit. Artaxerx. 20. 
 
 4 Pausanias, iii. 9, says it was the Amphissian Locrians ; but prob¬ 
 ably he confounds this with subsequent events. 
 
244 
 
 APPENDIX I 
 
 important service by detaching Orchomenus from the Theban con¬ 
 federacy, but afterwards, making a rash attack upon Haliartus before 
 the arrival of Pausanias, he was defeated and slain. The Phocian 
 and other allies dispersed. Pausanias arrived soon after; but the 
 Thebans being reinforced by an Athenian army under Thrasybulus, 
 he entered into a convention and returned home; for which act he 
 was banished from Sparta, and died in exile. 1 
 
 Soon after this a congress was held at Corinth, to consider what 
 measures should be taken against Sparta, and it was determined to 
 send embassies to the different states of Greece, to excite them 
 against her. A message came to them from Medius, chief of the 
 Alcuadae of Larissa, requesting their aid against Lycophron, the 
 despot of Pherae, who was supported by the Lacedaemonians. Two 
 thousand of the allies under the command of the Theban Ismenias 
 were sent into Thessaly; with whose assistance Medius took the 
 city of Pharsalus, then held by a Lacedaemonian garrison; after 
 which Ismenias with a force of Boeotians and Argives surprised the 
 Trachinian Heraclea. 2 and, after putting to the sword the Lace¬ 
 daemonians whom he found in that city, delivered it up to the 
 ancient inhabitants, whom he brought back from exile, strengthen¬ 
 ing them with a garrison of Argives. He then persuaded the iEni- 
 anians and Athamanians to change sides, and collecting an army of 
 about six thousand men, prepared to take revenge on the Phocians. 
 They, under the conduct of Lacisthenes a Laconian, marched into 
 Locris to meet him, but were defeated with a loss of nearly a thou¬ 
 sand men: Ismenias himself lost half that number; and the Phocians 
 returned home without further molestation. 3 
 
 The aspect of things was changed upon the return of Agesilaus 
 from Asia. That general, having crossed the Hellespont, marched 
 
 ‘ Xenophon, Hellen. iii. c. 5, ss. 3—7, 17—25. The Thebans, expect¬ 
 ing the Spartan invasion, send to Athens for succor. The speech of the 
 Theban embassador, and the reply made, occur ih sections 8—16. Com¬ 
 pare Diodorus, xiv. 81. 
 
 3 This city, though a pet colony of Lacedaemon, had never prospered. 
 The Thessalians and mountaiueers of (Eta, who considered it was forti¬ 
 fied against them, continually annoyed and made war upon the new 
 settlers, till they reduced it to a very scanty population. The misgov- 
 ernment of the Lacedaemonian officers contributed to its ruin. In the 
 twelfth year of the Peloponnesian war, it was in such a state of weak¬ 
 ness, that the Boeotians took possession of it, for fear the Athenians 
 might do the same, and they dismissed the Lacedaemonian governor. 
 This however gave great offense at Sparta. (See Thucydides, iii. 92, 
 93, 100 ; v. 51, 52.) In the year b.c. 399, the Lacedaemonians had taken 
 strong measures to re-establish their power at Heraclea, and driven 
 from their homes large numbers of the mountaineers who were opposed 
 to them. (Diodorus, xiv. 38,) 
 
 * Diodorus, xiv. 82. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 245 
 
 \ 
 
 through Thrace and Macedonia into Thessaly. There he encountered 
 a large body of Thessalian horse, chiefly those of Larissa, Crannon, 
 Scotussa, and Pharsalus, who, being in close alliance with the 
 Boeotians, gathered round him to dispute his passage. Unsupported 
 by infantry, they would not venture to join in close combat with 
 the heavy-armed veterans of the Spartan, but hovered on his rear, 
 and distressed him by frequent charges, till at length Agesilaus by 
 a successful manoeuvre attacked and put them to the rout. He then 
 pursued his march through Phthiotis, and passed the strait of Ther¬ 
 mopylae. 1 Joined hy the troops of Phocis and Orchomenus, and by 
 a reinforcement from Peloponnesus, he met the united army of his 
 opponents, consisting of Boeotians, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, 
 iEnianians, Euboeans, and Locrians, at Coronea. The victory won 
 in this field was purchased with hard fighting. Agesilaus severely 
 wounded withdrew to Delphi, where he offered up a tithe of his 
 spoils /being no less than a hundred talents) to Apollo: meanwhile 
 has lieutenant Gylis made an irruption into Locris, and plundered 
 the country without opposition till towards the evening, when the 
 Locrians, occupying some high ground by which the enemy had to 
 return, fell upon their rear, and assailing them with missiles from the 
 heights, slew both Gylis himself and many of his officers and soldiers. 
 The army of Agesilaus was soon afterwards disbanded, and he sailed 
 to Sparta. 2 
 
 The scene of war was afterwards removed to Peloponnesus, and 
 the Lacedaemonians, being occupied nearer home, had not leisure'to 
 invade Boeotia or Attica. 3 The war continued eight years, from b.c. 
 395 to b.c. 387, and was terminated by the peace of Antalcidas. 4 
 By this it was stipulated that the Greek states should be indepen¬ 
 dent; an arrangement which virtually secured the leadership to 
 Sparta; for she was constituted guardian of the peace, and remained 
 at the head of a great alliance, keeping also her governors, or Har- 
 mostae, in a great number of cities, while Athens had no subjects 
 left her but the small islands of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Sycrus; and 
 Thebes was entirely deprived of her sovereignty over the Boeotian 
 cities. At first the Thebans demurred to accept the peace with that 
 condition, and insisted on taking the oath in the name of all the 
 Boeotians; but the threat of a war, in which they would be isolated 
 from all their allies, compelled them to accept the terms dictated 
 by Sparta and the Persian king. The Spartans were especially 
 rejoiced at the humiliation of Thebes, their views with respect to 
 
 ‘ Xenophon, Hellen. iv. c. 3, ss. 1—9. Diodorus, xiv. 83. Plutarch, 
 in Vit. Agesil. 16. 
 
 2 Xenophon, Hellen. iv. c. 3, ss. 15—23; c. iv. s. 1. Diodorus, xiv. 
 84. Plutarch, in Vit. Agesil. 19. 
 
 3 Xenophon, Hellen. iv. c, 7, s. 2. 
 
 4 Diodorus, xiv. 86. 
 
246 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 that city having been entirely changed since the end of the Pelopon¬ 
 nesian war. 1 
 
 The Spartans were the first to violate the conditions of that very 
 peace which they so earnestly promoted, by their attack upon Man- 
 tinea, whose walls they demolished, and whose citizens they dis¬ 
 persed into villages. 2 But their most signal violation of the treaty, 
 as well as of international faith and law, was the seizure of the Cad- 
 mea in the year b.c. 382, which brought a speedy retribution upon 
 themselves, and led to a total change in the position and prospects 
 of the other Greek states. 3 Of the events which followed I can 
 make but cursory mention. The Thebans three years afterwards 
 expel the Spartan garrison, and Sparta declares war, which however 
 she does not prosecute with her accustomed activity. The Athenians, 
 with the instinctive impulse which prompted them so often to assist 
 the weak against the strong (an impulse both of policy and gener¬ 
 osity), support their neighbors in the apparently unequal contest; 
 until, after a seven years’ war, the Thebans not only succeed in re¬ 
 pulsing the invader, but become strong enough to reconquer the 
 Boeotian towns, two of which, Thespise and Plataea, they raze to the 
 ground, and expel the inhabitants. Immediately after this, the 
 Athenians make peace on liberal terms with Sparta, and Thebes is 
 left to fight single-handed. The battle of Leucta proved, contrary to 
 the previous opinion of the Greeks, that Thebes was a match, or more 
 than a match, for her rival in military prowess, and transferred to 
 her that pre-eminence as a land power which had so long exclusively 
 belonged to Sparta. The breaking np of the old Peloponnesian al¬ 
 liance, the Theban invasion of Laconia, the foundation of Messene 
 and Megalopolis, were the rapid and most important consequences of 
 this victory. 4 
 
 This period was marked not only by the display of an extraordi¬ 
 nary martial spirit and energy on the part of the Thebans, but by a 
 great improvement in military tactics and organization, due to the 
 genius of Epaminondas. His chief aim in battle seems to have been 
 that which has been pursued with success by generals in modern 
 times; namely, to concentrate his efforts upon some vital and deci¬ 
 sive point, and at that point to make his attack with a numerous 
 force of the choicest troops; a system which often gives the advan- 
 
 1 Xenophon, Hellen. v. c. 1, ss. 31—36. Sixteen years after, the 
 
 Thebans preferred fighting Sparta and her allies alone to accepting such 
 terms ; but then Epaminondas was their counselor. 
 
 3 Xenophon, Hellen. v. c. 2, ss. 1—7. Diodorus, xv. 12. 
 
 3 Xenophon, Hellen. v. c. 4, s. 1. Diodorus, xv. 1, 20. 
 
 4 See my observations in the argument to the oration for the Megalo- 
 politans, i. 204. Compare Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 3, 4. Diodorus, 
 xv. 56, 59, 62. Pausanias, vi. 12; viii, 27 ; ix. 13, 14. Dinarchus, c. 
 Dem. 99. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 247 
 
 tage of superior numbers to an army less numerous on the whole 
 than the adversary. The institution of the Sacred Band—a select 
 body of three hundred men of the best families, intimately connected 
 by ties of friendship, animated by the same spirit, and trained to act 
 together as one man in battle—had a good effect in exciting emula¬ 
 tion and setting an example to the rest of the army. This band was 
 maintained in the Cadmea at the public cost. The whole body of 
 citizens composing the army were by constant exercises inured to 
 the discipline of war; and their fine appearance and martial bearing, 
 both in the camp and in the field, excited general admiration. The 
 leadership of Greece, thus transferred from Sparta to Thebes, may 
 be considered to have been held by her for about ten years, from 
 the battle of Leuctra to that of Mantinea, after which she de¬ 
 clined. 1 
 
 Meanwhile Athens had profited by the rupture between Sparta 
 and Thebes, and by the dissatisfaction which the harsh measures of 
 Sparta had excited in Greece, to put herself at the head of a new 
 confederacy, including a great number of her old alhes. Chios and 
 Byzantium, Rhodes and Mitylene, were the first to join her; others 
 soon followed: the alliance was formed upon an equitable basis; each 
 member of it was to be independent, and have an equal vote in the 
 congress, which was held at Athens. The Athenians applied them¬ 
 selves vigorously to the augmentation of their navy, and the battle 
 of Naxos, b.c. 376, made her again mistress of the sea. The Lace¬ 
 daemonians, making peace with Athens, b.c. 371, were content to 
 withdraw their governors from the towns which they had so long 
 kept in subjection, and to grant to the Greek states in reality that 
 independence of which the peace of Antalcidas had given them but 
 the name. 3 
 
 The further humiliation of Sparta, consequent upon the battle of 
 Leuctra, revived in the minds of the Athenians their ancient jeal¬ 
 ousies of Thebes, and alarmed them also, for fear the balance of 
 power should incline too much in her favor. This again brought 
 them into connection with Lacedsemon, and they conceived at one 
 time the idea that they might step into her place as protectors of the 
 
 1 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 4, s. 12 ; vii. c. 5, ss. 12, 23, 24. Diodorus, 
 xv. 55, 85, 88. Plutarch, in Yit. Pelopid. 18, 19. He states that Gor- 
 gidas, who first established the Sacred Band, distributed them among 
 the different ranks ; but Pelopidas, who proved their valor at Tegyra, 
 where they fought together, ever afterwards kept them united, and 
 charged at their head in the most difficult and dangerous enterprises. 
 This battle of Tegyra, he says, taught the Spartans, that it was not the 
 Eurotas that made men brave, but bravery was the produce of all 
 countries. 
 
 * Diodorus, xv. 28, 29, 34. Xenophon, Hellen. v. c. 4, bb. 61— 66; 
 vi. c. 3, 8. 18. 
 
248 
 
 APPEXDIX I. 
 
 Peloponnesian allies; a scheme not destined to' be realized. The 
 junction of these two states however greatly contributed to check 
 the ambitious efforts of the Thebans, who, after the battle of Man- 
 tinea, and the irreparable loss of their great general and statesman, 
 Epaminondas, found that they had only depressed their enemies 
 without being able to maintain their own position as the chiefs of a 
 great Hellenic confederacy. Athens, with her naval strength, her 
 insular alliance, and increasing commercial resources, was after the 
 battle of Mantinea unquestionably the first city in Greece. 1 
 
 The Phocians, during the first eight years of the war with Thebes, 
 remained faithful to the Spartan alliance. They accompanied the 
 Lacedaemonian armies in the campaigns of Agesilaus and Cleombro- 
 tus, and fought for them at Leuctra. In the year following the 
 battle of Tegyra, that is, b.c. 374, the Thebans, having reduced the 
 Boeotian towns, carried their arms into Phocis; a measure which 
 (according to Xenophon) caused offence to Athens, on account of 
 her ancient connection with that country. Cleombrotus arrived with 
 succors, and for the time the Thebans retreated; butfafter the battle 
 of Leuctra they were in a condition to persuade or compel almost 
 all their neighbors, except the Athenians, to join them. Xenophon 
 says, the Phocians became their subjects; Diodorus, their friends. 
 These different terms may perhaps represent the same thing; or it 
 may be, the mild and liberal policy of Epaminondas had prevailed 
 upon the Phocians to fall into his views. At all events they, with 
 the Euboeans, Locrians, Acarnanians, Heracleots, Malians, and Thes¬ 
 salians, formed a part of the army with which that general for the 
 first time invaded Laconia, b.c. 369. Yet on his last expedition, 
 before the battle of Mantinea, b.c. 362, the Phocians refused to fol¬ 
 low him, alleging that by the terms of their treaty they were bound 
 to defend the Thebans, if attacked, but n<3t to join them in offensive 
 war. 2 
 
 The Thessalians had made but little advance, either in power or in 
 general estimation, among the Greeks, owing chiefly to their, irregular 
 government and want of union. Unfaithful to their foreign-alliances, 
 they were not more steady among themselves. A licentious aristoc¬ 
 racy, devoted to the pleasures of the table and riotous amusements, 
 took no thought to improve the condition of their own dependents, 
 much less to promote the welfare of their own common country. 3 
 
 1 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 4, ss. 19, 20 ; c. 5, ss. 2, 3, 33—49. De. 
 mosthenes, Olynth. iii. 36. 
 
 2 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 1, s. 1 ; c. 2, s. 1 ; c. 3, s. 1; c. 5, s. 23; 
 vii. c. 5, s. 4. Diodorus, xv. 31, 53, 58, 85. 
 
 3 Isocrates, Epist. ad Philipp, ii. 410. Athenseus, vi. p. 260. De¬ 
 mosthenes, Olynth. i. 15, says they were utuotci tyvcrei nal del nuoiv uv - 
 GpuTvoic. Again, De Coron. 240, ol kcctuttwctoi GerraAoi Kal (ivaiadrjToi 
 Qyfiatoi. The Aleuadce were the most intelligent and refiW They 
 
THE SACRED WA.R 
 
 249 
 
 Commanding their various hordes of retainers, 1 they broke out 
 from time to time into dissension and war with each other. A few 
 great families, such as the Aleuadae of Larissa, the Scopadse of Phar- 
 salus and Crannon, obtained by their wealth and influence a political 
 power, which extended itself more or less over the adjacent people. 
 Occasionally some eminent man among these families was, either 
 with their consent, or by some other means, invested with a sort of 
 despotic authority under the title of Tagus. Thus, we have seen, 
 Medius was the chief of the Aleuadse at Larissa. 2 In early times, 
 as we gather from the speech (to be noticed presently) of Polydamas, 
 a Tagus was appointed for the whole of united Thessaly, who, having 
 a large army and national revenue at his disposal, became a very 
 formidable potentate. The jealousy of the nobles, and their love of 
 rude independence, prevented any such authority being permanently 
 established. At Pherao we find that a tyranny , that is, an unconsti¬ 
 tutional sovereignty assumed without the consent of the people, pre¬ 
 vailed for a considerable time. At the close of the Peloponnesian 
 war that city was governed by Lycophron, who formed the design 
 of reducing all Thessaly under his dominion, and defeated with great 
 slaughter the Larissacans and other Thessalians who opposed him. 3 
 This is the same Lycophron who was the ally of Sparta, and against 
 whom the Boeotians and their allies sent succors to Medius, as before 
 mentioned. Xenophon relates, that Aristippus of Larissa, being a 
 
 take the lead in putting down the tyranny at Pherse Diodorus, xvi. 
 14. Plato, in the beginning of the Meno, speaks of them as having been 
 instructed by the Sophist Gorgias. He was also entertained by Jason. 
 See Pausamas, vi. 17 ; and compare Isocrates, IJepi ’AvtcSooeuc, 166; 
 Cicero, Orator. 52. The Pharsalians were the most luxurious and idle 
 * people in Thessaly, according to Theopompus, apud Athenaeum, xii, 527. 
 
 1 The Penestae. See ante, p. 231. They sometimes revolted, like the 
 Helots of Laconia. See Xenophon, Hellen. ii. c. 3, s. 36. Memorab. i. 
 c. 2, s. 24. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xiv. 82. He makes a distinction between the constitu¬ 
 tional authority of Medius Swaarevovrog rfjg A aoioorjc, and that of 
 Lycrophon rdv (pepuv ropawov. Herodotus calls the Aleuadae Qeaoa- 
 Tariq \3aaDfieq. (vii. 6.) Orestes, whom the Athenians endeavored to 
 restore, is called BaaDevg. (Thucydides, i. 111.) 'The term is used vaguely 
 to denote the quasi-regal power exercised by the members of these noble 
 families, either jointly or singly, in those parts of Thessaly which ac¬ 
 knowledged their sway. Compare Pindar, Pyth. x. 8. Theocritus, 
 Idyll, xvi. 34. The Aleuadae had complete ascendency in Thessaly, 
 after the second Persian invasion. Leotychidas the Spartan was sent 
 to punish them for the assistance they had rendered to Xerxes, but was 
 bribed by them to withdraw his troops, when he had the opportunity 
 of conquering the whole country. (Herodotus, vi. 7 2. Pausanias, iii. 7.) 
 The word TagUs signified Marshal or Director , and was perhaps a mill 
 tary title. 
 
 * Xenophon, Hellen. ii. c. 3, s. 4, with Schneider’s note. 
 
250 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 friend of Cyrus, obtained from him the loan of four thousand soldiers 
 with pay for six months, to assist him against an opposing faction in 
 his own city, and that Cyrus requested him not to make up his 
 quarrel without first consulting him. A portion of these soldiers, 
 under the command of Meno, wiere sent back to Cyrus, and marched 
 with him against his brother Artaxerxes. 1 Whether the disturbances 
 which Aristippus desired to quell were, as Schneider thinks, con¬ 
 nected with the designs of Lycophron, or arose merely out of the 
 domestic quarrels of Larissa, we can not determine. 
 
 Lycophron was succeeded by his son Jason, a man whose history 
 deserves particular attention. Inheriting his father’s ambition, but 
 with greater vigor and capacity, he was enabled to accomplish the 
 scheme, which Lycophron had formed, of uniting all Thessaly under 
 his dominion. Connecting himself with Amyntas, king of Mace¬ 
 donia, and Alcetas, king of Epirus, he conceived the idea, (at. least 
 after the battle of Leuctra,) of seizing the vacant leadership of 
 Greece, with he considered that the Lacedaemonians had irretriev¬ 
 ably lost, the Thebans were not competent to hold, and no other 
 power was prepared to strive for. The character of his designs, and 
 the circumstances which favored them, are so vividly set forth in 
 the statement of Polydamas at Sparta, related by Xenophon, that I 
 can not do better than give it in the words of that historian. 2 
 
 In the year b.c. 374, about two years before the battle of Leuctra, 
 Polydamas of Pharsalus presented himse'lf to the authorities at Sparta, 
 and requested an audience. He was a man of high reputation 
 throughout all Thessaly, and so esteemed by the Pharsalians for his 
 honor and integrity, that in a time of civil broil they put their cita¬ 
 del into his keeping, and intrusted him with the receipt of their 
 revenues, out of which he was to expend a fixed sum upon the 
 public worship and the general administration. This duty he 
 faithfully discharged, maintaining a garrison in the citadel, defraying 
 all the expenses of government, and accounting every year for what 
 moneys he received, If there was a deficiency, he made it up out 
 of his own private purse, and repaid himself when there was a sur¬ 
 plus. He was in general given to hospitality and magnificence in 
 the Thessalian fashion. Introduced to the Lacedaemonian assembly, 
 he addressed them thus:—- 
 
 u Men of Lacedaemon, I have been your state-friend and bene¬ 
 factor, as my ancestors have been from time immemorial; and I 
 deem it proper to apply to you if I am in any difficulty, and to give 
 you notice if any scheme adverse to your interests is formed in Thes¬ 
 saly. You must have heard the name of Jason ; for he is a man of 
 
 1 Xenophon, Anabasis, i. c. 1, s. 10; e. 2, ss. 1, 6. Meno’s character, 
 as described by Xenophon, is a pretty good specimen of'Thessalian per¬ 
 fidy. See Lib. ii. c. 6, ss. 21—29. 
 
 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 1. Compare Diodorus, xv. 67, 60. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 251 
 
 great power and celebrity. This Jason made a trace with me, 
 obtained an interview, and spoke as follows:—‘ Polydamas,’ he said, 
 
 1 that I could force your city of Pharsalus to submission, you may 
 infer from what I am about to say. I have most of the Thessalian 
 cities, and those of the greatest importance, allied to me ; I brought 
 them into subjection, notwithstanding that you fought on their side 
 against me. You know, of course, that I have soldiers in my pay 
 to the number of six thousand, whom, I imagine, no city could 
 easily resist. A force equally numerous may be turned out else¬ 
 where ; but the state armies have some men advanced in age, others 
 not yet in their prime; and very few in any city undergo bodily 
 training; whereas no one is in my pay who is not able to toil 
 equally with myself.’ Jason (I must tell you the truth) has great 
 personal strength, is generally fond of labor, and makes a trial of 
 his followers every day. For he leads them with arms in hand both 
 in their exercises and on their marches; and whomsoever he sees 
 fond of the toils and perils of war, he rewards with double, treble, 
 and quadruple pay, besides other presents, and also with medical 
 attendance in sickness, and with a distinguished funeral; so that all 
 his soldiers are sure that merit in war procures for them a life of the 
 greatest honor and abundance. He showed me also (what I knew 
 before), that the Maracians 1 and Dolopians were subject to him, and 
 Alcetas, the governor of Epirus. 1 Therefore,’ said he, 1 why should 
 I have any doubt of being able to subdue you easily ? A person 
 unacquainted with me might say—Why then do you delay, and not ' 
 march directly against the Pharsalians ? Because I deem it infinitely 
 better to gain you for willing than for unwilling allies. For, were 
 you forced into subjection, you would be plotting all the mischief 
 you could against me, and I should desire you to be as weak as pos¬ 
 sible ; whereas, if you are persuaded to join me, it is plain we 
 should do our utmost to strengthen each other. I perceive, Poly¬ 
 damas, that your country looks on you with respect. If now you 
 will bring it into friendly relations with me, I promise you, that I 
 will make you the greatest man in Greece next to myself. What it 
 is that I offer you the second place in, I beg you to hear; and don’t 
 believe any thing I say, unless on reflection you judge it to be true. 
 Well; this is evident, that by the accession of Pharsalus and the 
 cities dependent on you, I should easily become Tagus of all the 
 Thessalians: it is certain also, that, when Thessaly is under a Tagus, 
 her cavalry amount to six thousand men, and her heavy-armed 
 infantry are more than ten thousand. Looking at their strength and 
 spirit, I think, if they were well taken care of, there is not a nation 
 to which the Thessalians would endure to be subject. Vast as is 
 the breadth of Thessaly, all the surrounding tribes are her subjects, 
 
 1 An AStolian people, adjacent to the Dolopians. See Schneider’s 
 note. . - 
 
252 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 when a Tagus is appointed here ; and nearly all the people in these 
 parts are armed with the javelin, so that probably -we should have 
 an overpowering force of Peltastae. Further, the Boeotians and 
 all now at war with Lacedaemon are my allies; and they are con¬ 
 tent to follow me, if I will only deliver them from the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians. Even the Athenians, I know, would do any thing to obtain 
 my alliance; but I am not inclined to be connected with them, for 
 I think I could get the empire of the sea still more easily than that 
 of the land. Consider if this again be a reasonable calculation. 
 Having possession of Macedonia, from which the Athenians import 
 their timber, surely we shall be able to build more ships than they 
 will; and for manning them, which do you think would have more 
 facilities—the Athenians, or we, with so many valuable retainers ? 
 For the maintenance - of seamen which would be the better pro¬ 
 vided, we, who have such an abundance of corn that we export it 
 elsewhere, or the Athenians, who have not sufficient for themselves 
 without buying it ? And in all probability, I take it, we should have 
 a more abundant supply of money, when we should not be depend¬ 
 ent on little islands, but enjoy the produce of continental countries; 
 for it is certain that all the people round pay tribute, when Thessaly 
 is under a Tagus. You know of course that the Persian king, who 
 is the richest of men, derives his revenue not from islands, but from 
 the continent. Him I believe I could conquer still more easily than 
 Greece; for I know that all people there but one are more addicted 
 to servitude than to fighting; and I know what a force marching up 
 with Cyrus, and what a force with Agesilaus, reduced the king to 
 extremities.’ To this I replied, that every thing which he had said 
 was worthy of consideration ; but as we were the friends of Lace¬ 
 daemon, it was impossible, I thought, to go over to their enemies, 
 without having any ground of complaint. He commended me, and 
 said that my friendship was the more to be desired for my fidelity; 
 and he gave me leave to come and declare to you the truth, that he 
 intended to attack the Pharsalians, if we complied not with his 
 request. He bade me apply to you for assistance : 1 and if they give 
 it you,’ said he, ‘ that is, if you can persuade them to send sufficient 
 succors to carry on war with me, let us then abide the issue of the 
 war, whatever it may be; but if their aid be not in your opinion 
 sufficient, your country may have cause to complain of you—that 
 country in which you are honored and enjoy the highest prosperity.’ 
 Upon this matter, therefore, I am come to you, and I tell you all 
 that I see myself in that country, and all that I have heard from 
 him. And, men of Lacedaemon, the state of things I conceive to be 
 this:—If you will send a force that, not only in my judgment, but 
 in that of the Thessalians in general, is adequate to maintain a war 
 with Jason, the cities' will revolt from him; for they are all watch¬ 
 ing with alarm the progress of his power. If you suppose, however, 
 that your emancipated Helots and a man of private station will be 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 253 
 
 sufficient, I advise you to keep quiet. For be assured, that the war 
 will be against a formidable array of strength, and against a man 
 who is so prudent a general, that whatever he attempts, whether in 
 the way of stratagem, or surprise, or open attack, he hardly ever 
 fails. He can make the. same use of the night as of the day, and on 
 occasions of haste he can work while he is taking his meals. He 
 thinks it time to rest, when he has returned to the place from which 
 he started and transacted his business. And his followers he has 
 inured to the same habits. When the soldiers have, by their exer¬ 
 tions achieved a good piece of success, he knows how to excite 
 their imaginations; so that his men are taught this, that relaxation 
 is procured by toil. Moreover, in regard to sensual pleasures, he is 
 the most temperate man I know; so that nothing of this kind keeps 
 him from the regular performance of his duty. Consider then, and 
 tell me, as-is but fair, what you will be able and what you intend 
 to do.” 
 
 For the particulars of this remarkable speech we can rely on the 
 account of Xenophon, who had good opportunities of learning them 
 at Sparta. It is interesting in one point of view especially, as show¬ 
 ing that the divisions of the Greek states had even at this time 
 excited in the breast of one ambitious man the hope of conquering 
 them all. The grounds upon which Jason founded his hopes were 
 pretty nearly the same as those which formed the basis of Philip’s 
 calculations, when he strove for the mastery of Greece. The ch> 
 cumstances were indeed much more favorable to Philip than to 
 Jason. We can scarcely help charging the latter with exaggeration 
 in his estimates, and perhaps with some degree of ignorance and 
 presumption, if we suppose him to have spoken his real opinions to 
 Polydamas. He seems to have overrated the quality of his own 
 infantry,'as compared with those of the Greek states; certainly he 
 overrated his chances of obtaining maritime ascendency. The facility 
 with which Alexander was afterwards overpowered by the Thebans 
 shows in some degree the precarious character of the force on which 
 Jason depended. Philip held a constitutional monarchy, inherited 
 from his ancestors, and had brought his army to a high state of dis¬ 
 cipline, the efficiency of which he had tried in many bloody encoun¬ 
 ters with his warlike neighbors, before he ventured to attack the 
 southern Greeks: even then he proceeded with the utmost caution. 
 He never in his life established a navy which was able to cope with 
 the Athenian; and when he attacked the Greeks, they were far 
 weaker and more divided than at the time of the battle of Leuctra. 
 It is next to certain, that Jason would havs failed in the attempt in 
 which Philip succeeded. The characters of the two men, however, 
 were very similar, 1 
 
 1 See the observations of Isocrates, Philipp, p. 106. Cicero compares 
 Jason, as a crafty politician, with Themistocles. (De Officiis, L 30.) 
 
254 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians took two days to consider their reply to 
 Polydamas, and on the third day, seeing how many of their troopn 
 were employed in the war with Thebes and Athens, they informed 
 him that for the present they were unable to send out any adequate 
 succors, and advised him to return and do the best that he could 
 for himself and his city. He thanked them for their straight-forward 
 answer, and left them. On his return, he begged Jason not to com¬ 
 pel him to give up the citadel, which had been intrusted to his 
 keeping; but gave his own sons as hostages, and promised that he 
 would bring his country over to Jason’s alliance, and help to make 
 him Tagus. Both these things were accomplished. The Pharsalians 
 entered into a treaty with Jason, and he was appointed Tagus of all 
 Thessaly. He then arranged the contingents which every city was 
 to furnish of cavalry and heavy-armed infantry; and it was found 
 that the cavalry of the Thessalians and their allies numbered more 
 than eight thousand, their heavy-armed infantry as many as twenty 
 thousand, besides an immense force of Peltastse. 
 
 In the following year, b. c. 373, Jason came with Alcetas of Epirus 
 to Athens, to intercede with the people on behalf of Timotheus, who 
 was brought to trial for his delay in carrying succors to Corcyra. 
 Timotheus was at that time so poor, that to entertain his illustrious 
 visitors, who lodged in his house in the Piraeus, he was obliged to 
 borrow some articles of dress and furniture, two silver cups, and a 
 mina in money. Their intercession prevailed, but he was removed 
 from his command. 1 
 
 After the battle of Leuctra the Thebans sent to Jason for assist¬ 
 ance, wishing to complete the rout of the defeated army, and fearing 
 the arrival of reinforcements from Peloponnesus. Jason, intending to 
 march through Phocis, gave orders to prepare a fleet, as if he was 
 going by sea; then with a small body of troops, before the Phocians 
 had time to assemble, he passed rapidly through their territory and 
 joined the Boeotian army. The Thebans wished him to fall upon the 
 rear of the Peloponnesians, who were still encamped in Bceotia, 
 while they attacked them in front; but Jason advised, that it was 
 better to let them quit the country than to risk the chance of another 
 battle, in which the desperation of the enemy might give them the 
 
 \ 
 
 Aristotle mentions a saying of his, that it is lawful to do some evil, in 
 order to effect great good.” (Rhetoric, i. 12, 31.) Compare the anec¬ 
 dotes of Polyeenus, Strateg, vi. 1. 
 
 1 Demosthenes, cont. Timoth. 1187, 1190, 1191. Xenophon, Hellen. 
 vi. c. 2, s. 13. Cornelius Nepos, in Vit. Timoth. 75, Alcetas assisted 
 in the transportation of Athenian troops to Corcyra. Xenophon, ibid, 
 s. 11. Jason was on friendly terms with the Thebans and Athenians, 
 but not in active alliance with them. His intimacy with Timotheus 
 made him of course acquainted with Isocrates. There is an extant 
 epistle of Isocrates to the sons of Jason, in which he declines an invita¬ 
 tion to Pherae. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 255 
 
 victory. He then went to the adversary’s camp, (for notwithstand¬ 
 ing his alliance with Thebes, he still kept up his hereditary connec¬ 
 tion with Sparta,) and he represented to the Lacedaemonians, how 
 dangerous it might be for them to stay in Boeotia in the presence of 
 a victorious army, with allies not hearty in their cause, and who 
 were thinking even of treating with the enemy. His counsels pre¬ 
 vailed, and the Lacedaemonians, after concluding an armistice, re¬ 
 treated. Jason gained his object, which was, to attach both parties 
 to himself, and let neither obtain any decisive advantage. He then 
 returned by Phocis, attacking Hyampolis on his road, and doing 
 considerable damage to its town and territory; after which, passing 
 by Heraclea, he razed the walls, to prevent it being used as a fortress 
 against him when he marched southward. 1 
 
 In the following year Jason took steps which opened the eyes of 
 Greece yet more clearly to his designs. The Pythian festival was 
 coming on. He ordered preparations to be made on a great scale for 
 the sacrifice; each city in his dominion was required to furnish a cer¬ 
 tain number of oxen, sheep, goats, and swine; the total of which, 
 without any city being heavily charged, amounted to a thousand 
 oxen, and ten thousand of the smaller animals : and he offered the 
 reward of a golden crown to the city which produced the finest ox. 
 He gave notice to the Thessalians to prepare themselves for a military 
 expedition by the time of the festival: it was supposed that he 
 intended to hold the games under his own presidency, and there were 
 misgivings as to his designs on the Delphian treasures. The Del- 
 phians asked the oracle, what was to be done if he laid his hands 
 upon them; and Apollo replied, that'he would see to it. Whatever 
 Ins schemes may have been, they were brought to a sudden termina¬ 
 tion. One day, after he had held a review of his cavalry at Pherse, 
 he sat in his chair of state to give audience to his subjects, when 
 seven youths, under the pretense of asking his judgment upon some 
 private quarrel, advanced close up to him, and, before his guards 
 had time to interpose, savagely attacked and murdered him. One 
 of them was slain in the act of striking; a second was taken and 
 instantly put to death; the other five jumped on horses that were 
 ready for them, and effected their escape. In every Greek city, 
 through which they passed, honors were conferred upon the assas¬ 
 sins ; a proof how great had been the terror excited by the enter¬ 
 prises of this man, 2 
 
 Jason was succeeded by his brothers Polydorus and Polyphron; 
 the former of whom came to a sudden death, not without suspicion 
 of foul play. Polyphron, on whom suspicion fell, confirmed the bad 
 
 1 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 4, ss. 20—27. The account which Diodo¬ 
 rus gives of these proceedings is somewhat different, and not so prob¬ 
 able. See Thirlwall, Hist, of Greece, v. 78. 
 
 8 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 4, ss. 28—32. Diodorus, xv. 60. 
 
256 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 opinion of his subjects by various tyrannical acts. He put to death 
 Polydamas and eight other of the principal citizens of Pharsalus; and 
 drove many from Larissa into exile. After governing Thessaly for 
 one year, he was murdered by his nephew Alexander, who surpassed 
 him in vice and cruelty, and in a short time drove the Thessalians 
 to solicit foreign aid. This brought back Thessaly to a state of dis¬ 
 union and weakness. Alexander, notwithstanding the combination 
 against him, maintained his power in Pherae and the adjacent towns, 
 and reigned altogether about eleven years, siding alternately with 
 Thebes and Athens, and doing no little mischief to both. 1 
 
 The Aleuads of Larissa made the first effort for the deliverance 
 of their country, by inviting to their assistance Alexander king of 
 Macedon. The young king, who had just succeeded his father 
 Amyntas, came promptly at their request, and while the tyrant of 
 Pherae was preparing to carry the war into Macedonia, took by sur¬ 
 prise the cities of Larissa and Crannon, and put garrisons in both. 2 
 But he was soon recalled to his own kingdom, probably by the in¬ 
 trigues of his mother Eurydice and Ptolemy of Alorus; and the 
 Thessalians, again pressed by the tyrant, invoked the aid of Thebes. 
 Pelopidas was sent with an army, and with orders to settle the af¬ 
 fairs of Thessaly in the best manner for Theban interests. Having 
 advanced to Larissa, which was surrendered to him, he had an in¬ 
 terview with Alexander of Pherae, and reproached him so severely 
 for his conduct, that Alexander, in alarm for his safety, retired to 
 Pherae, leaving the Theban general to settle matters as he chose 
 with his allies in Thessaly. Pelopidas made such arrangements for 
 the future government of Thessaly as were generally acceptable to 
 his allies, and in accordance with his instructions from home. He 
 proceeded also to Macedonia, where he strengthened his country’s 
 cause by an alliance which he concluded with king Alexander, re¬ 
 ceiving from him (according to Diodorus) his brother Philip, then 
 fifteen years old, as a hostage; 3 after which he returned into Boeo- 
 
 1 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 4, ss. 33—35. Diodorus, xv. 61, differs 
 from him in some particulars. Plutarch (in Yit. Pelopid. 29) agrees 
 with Xenophon in making Alexander the nephew, not the brother of 
 Polydorus. See Sclmeider and Wesseling’s notes. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xv. 61. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xv. 67. Compare section 61 ; according to which, Alex¬ 
 ander intended to hold Larissa and Crannon for himself. Pelopidas, 
 therefore, thought it necessary to secure his fidelity. Diodorus, how¬ 
 ever, gives a different account of the manner in which Philip came to be 
 sent to Thebes, Lib. xvi. 2. Plutarch (in Yit. Pelopid. 26 et seqq.) 
 states that Pelopidas was invited to Macedonia, to settle the disputes 
 between Alexander and Ptolemy; and also that lie went upon a second 
 occasion, after the murder of Alexander, and compelled Ptolemy to 
 give hostages to insure his proper administration as regent. See Grote’s 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 257 
 
 tia, leaving Thessaly, through which he again passed, apparently 
 tranquil. The year however had scarcely passed, when Theban in¬ 
 terference was again solicited, on account of some new oppressions 
 from Pherae. Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent, but without troops, 
 in the character of embassadors; for it was thought, that their name 
 and presence would be sufficient to overawe the tyrant. This ex¬ 
 pectation was futile. Alexander came with an army to Pharsalus, 
 where a conference was appointed 1 to be held between him and the 
 Theban generals; and they imprudently put both the city and them¬ 
 selves into the power of a man who was totally regardless of good 
 faith and honor. He seized their persons, carried them prisoners to 
 Pherae, and treated them with the utmost indignity. To avenge 
 this insult, the Thebans sent Hypatus and Cleomenes into Thessaly, 
 with an army of eight thousand foot and six hundred horse; to 
 oppose which, Alexander, not trusting entirely to his own forces, 
 applied to the Athenians, who dispatched to his assistance a fleet 
 of thirty sail and a thousand soldiers, under the command of Au- 
 tocles. The Thebans approaching Pherae -were met by Alexander 
 with a force greatly superior in cavalry, notwithstanding which, they 
 desired to attack him; but before they could join battle, their Thes¬ 
 salian allies deserted; Alexander was reinforced by the troops of 
 Athens and other auxiliaries, and the Thebans, distressed for pro¬ 
 visions, found it necessary to retreat. Their march was through an 
 open plain; Alexander assailed their rear with his cavalry and jave¬ 
 lin-men, who did such execution, that the whole of the Theban 
 army was in peril. The soldiers, almost in despair, called upon 
 Epaminondas, who was serving among them as a volunteer,- 1 to 
 take the command. He quickly restored confidence; forming a 
 rear-guard with his horse and light troops; he repulsed the pursuing 
 enemy, and effected His retreat in safety. 2 
 
 The Thebans fined Hypatus and Cleomenes on their return for 
 misconduct, and chose Epaminondas for their general, to retrieve 
 the fortune of the war. He proceeded early in the year b.c. 367 to 
 execute his commission; but Alexander, fearing to encounter a 
 Theban army under such a general, and perhaps disappointed of 
 some expected aid from Athens, thought proper to come to terms, 
 
 views as to the different expeditions of Pelopidas into Thessaly. (His¬ 
 tory of Greece, x. 361.) 
 
 1 He had been deposed from his office of Boeotarch, on a charge of 
 having shown undue favor to the Lacedaemonians in the last Peleponne- 
 sian campaign, by not pushing the advantage which he had gained in 
 the battle at the Isthmus. Diodorus, xv. 72. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xv. 71. Cornelius Nepos, in Yit. Pelopid. 101. Pausa- 
 nias, ix. 15 ; who represents Alexander to have laid an ambush for the 
 Thebans, soon-after they had passed Thermopylae. He also states, that 
 Alexander released Pelopidas on this first expedition. 
 
 * The Athenians advised that certain succors, which Dionysius had sent 
 
258 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 and consented to release his prisoners. Epaminondas, having 
 accomplished the main objects of the expedition, withdrew his 
 army. 1 
 
 During three years that followed, the Thebans, as it appears, had 
 no leisure to attend to the affairs of Thessaly; and Alexander used 
 the opportunity thus afforded him for exercising his cruelty and ex¬ 
 tending his power. He occupied with garrisons the districts of 
 Magnesia and Phthiotis. In Meliboea and Scotussa he perpetrated 
 frightful massacres. The citizens in each of these were summoned 
 to a general assembly, to- answer some complaints which he had 
 against them: he then surrounded them with his guards, who 
 speared them all, and cast their bodies into the town-moat. The 
 cities were given up to plunder, and the women and children sold 
 for slaves. 2 
 
 In the year b.c. 364 the Thebans were again solicited to chastise 
 the tyrant, and they determined to send seven thousand men under 
 the command of Pelopidas. It so happened, before the Theban 
 troops set out, there was an eclipse of the sun, an event which was 
 considered an unlucky omen among the Greeks. The expedition 
 was postponed : but Pelopidas with a small band of volunteers pro¬ 
 ceeded to Pharsalus, and putting himself at the head of his Thes¬ 
 salian confederates, did not fear to meet Alexander with an army 
 double his own number. They fought at Cynoscepalse, and Alex¬ 
 ander was defeated; but unfortunately Pelopidas, pressing rashly 
 forward and challenging the tyrant to personal combat, was over¬ 
 powered by numbers and slain. He was honored with a splendid 
 funeral by the Thessalians, who requested as a special favor of the 
 Thebans, that he might be buried in their country. 3 The war was 
 vigorously prosecuted; the Theban reinforcements arriving, defeated 
 
 that year to Peloponnesus, should be carried into Thessaly, to oppose 
 the Thebans. But the Lacedaemonians said they were wanted in Laco¬ 
 nia. Xenophon, Hellen. vii. c. 1, s. 28. Alexander, by his imprison¬ 
 ment of Pelopidas, and liberal promises to the Athenians, was in high 
 favor among them at this time. Demosthenes, contr. Aristoc. 660. 
 
 1 Plutarch, in Yit. Pelopid. 29. Diodorus, xv. 75, puts the liberation 
 of Pelopidas a year later, and says nothing of Epaminondas. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xv. 75. Pausanias, vi. 5. 
 
 3 Pelopidas was as able an officer, as Epaminondas was a general. The 
 victory at Leuctra was as much owing to his prompt and timely charge 
 with the Sacred Band, as to the main design of the battle by his col¬ 
 league. In other respects, Pelopidas was one of the best characters of 
 antiquity ‘ a true patriot, brave, generous, unselfish. These qualities 
 were perhaps not sufficiently tempered with prudence. His rashness 
 in battle (for which Plutarch blames him) cost him his life. He is com¬ 
 pared by the biographer with Marcellus, who owed his death to a simi¬ 
 lar and less excusable want of caution. Compare Polybius, viii. 1. Dio¬ 
 dorus, xv. 81, 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 259 
 
 Alexander in a second and more decisive battle, and constrained 
 him to accept a peace, by the terms of which he was to withdraw 
 his garrisons from Magnesia and Phthiotis, confine himself to his 
 hereditary dominion of Pheras, and also become a subject ally of 
 Thebes. Troops both of Alexander and the independent Thessa¬ 
 lians served under Epaminondas in the campaign of Mantinea. 1 
 
 Peace with Thebes had severed Alexander from the alliance of 
 Athens; and he turned his attention to the equipment of a navy, 
 chiefly with a view to enrich himself by piracy. Pagasse, the port 
 of Pherae, was conveniently situated for an outlet into the JEgaean 
 sea, and the small islands off the coast of Thessaly, then belonging 
 to Athens, were exposed to his attack. In the year b.c. 361 he 
 took the island of Tenus, and made slaves of the inhabitants. The 
 next year he took or pillaged several other of the Cyclad isles, and 
 made a descent on Peparethus; he even defeated an Athenian 
 fleet, captured six vessels and a large number of prisoners, and then 
 suddenly sailed into Piraeus, landed on the quay, and carried off 
 considerable plunder. The Athenians were so incensed with their 
 commander Leosthenes, for his negligence in permitting such disas¬ 
 ters, that they sentenced him to death. 2 
 
 We now approach the period of the Sacred War, the causes of which 
 could not easily be explained without first presenting before the 
 reader a general view of Grecian affairs, and of the relation in which 
 the various parties stood to each other at the time when the war 
 broke out. 
 
 After the general peace which followed the battle of Mantinea, 
 the Thebans found that their influence among the Greek states was 
 considerably diminished. This may have been owing partly to the 
 severity of their proceedings against the Boeotian cities, which of¬ 
 fended the feelings of the Greeks, partly to the fears and jealousies 
 of the independent states. Theban headship was a thing which 
 they had not been accustomed to, and which they could hardly rec¬ 
 oncile to sentiments of Hellenic patriotism. 3 Accordingly, though 
 alliance of the most friendly kind subsisted between the Thebans 
 and the Argives, Megalopolitans, and Messenians, the last of w r hom 
 owed their very existence as a nation to Epaminondas, the Thebans 
 could no longer sway the counsels of these confederates, so as to 
 
 1 Diodorus, xv. 80, 85. Xenophon, Hellen. vii. c. 5, s. 4. Plutarch, 
 
 in Vit. Pelopid. 32. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xv. 95. Demosthenes, contr. Polyd. 1207. De Coron. 
 Trierarch. 1230. Polygenus, Strateg. vi. 2. I have already noticed the 
 proceedings against some of the Trierarchs, who delegated their command 
 on this occasion. Yol. i. appendix v. p. 316. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xv. 60, represents Jason as asserting, Qjjfialovg ruv repo- 
 teluv fit) dtUovg elveu. Compare Demosthenes, De Coron. 231. Isocrates, 
 De Pace, 162, 171. Philipp. 93. 
 
260 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 make them subservient to ambitious views of their own. In the 
 north, they were in friendly connection with the Locrians and Thes¬ 
 salians ; while towards the Phocians they had entertained feelings 
 of anger and hostility, ever since that people had refused to join 
 them in their last expedition to Peloponnesus. But the principal 
 check to the ambition of Thebes was Athens, who by her maritime 
 situation and resources was secure against attack, and could offer 
 protection to her weaker neighbors against Theban encroachment. 
 Epaminondas had seen, that his country would never retain her as¬ 
 cendency in Greece, unless she applied herself to maritime affairs, 
 and strove to compete with Athens for the dominion of the sea. 
 The year before his death he made an exciting speech before the 
 people, encouraging them to aim at naval supremacy, and boldly de¬ 
 claring that the Propylsea of the Athenian Acropolis should be trans¬ 
 ferred to the Cadmea. A decree was passed at his suggestion for 
 the construction of an arsenal and a hundred vessels of war; and 
 Epaminondas was actually sent with an armament to the iEgsean 
 and the Propontis, to excite revolt among the Athenian allies. He 
 succeeded so far as to drive an Athenian squadron from the sea, and 
 obtain promises of alliance from Chios, Ehodes, and Byzantium, the 
 same states which, a few years later, took the lead in the Social 
 War against Athens. 1 * These naval projects however, died with 
 Epaminondas; nor indeed was Thebes favorably situated for be¬ 
 coming a maritime power, unless she had possession of Euboea. 
 Here again was a fruitful subject of contention with Athens, to 
 whom the dominion, or at least the friendship, of Euboea was of 
 immense importance in more than one point of view. The people 
 of that island had most of them joined the Attic and Theban con¬ 
 federacy against Sparta, with the exception of the Orites, who re¬ 
 sisted all the efforts of Chabrias to make himself master of their 
 city. 3 When Athens went over to Sparta, the Theban interest 
 seems to have prevailed in the island; for Euboeans are numbered 
 among the troops that followed Epaminondas to Peloponnesus. 
 Euboea itself, however, was much divided. Tyrants sprang up in 
 some of the cities, who were ready to side with either Athens or 
 Thebes, according as it suited their views. Such were Mneschar- 
 chus of Chalcis and Themison of Eretria. 3 The latter had in the 
 year b.c. 366 inflicted a great blow upon Athens, by causing her to 
 lose Oropus. He assisted some exiles, sallying from Euboea to get 
 possession of it; and the Athenians, after sending forces for its re¬ 
 covery, were persuaded to enter into an arrangement, by which the 
 
 1 Diodorus, xv. 78, 79; who asserts that, if Epaminondas had lived 
 longer, the Thebans would undoubtedly have acquired the empire of the 
 
 sea. Compare JEschines, De Fals. Leg. 42. Isocrates, Philipp. 93. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xv. 30. 
 
 8 uEsehines, contr. Ctesiph. 65. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 261 
 
 Thebans were to hold the city in trust, until the claims of the con¬ 
 tending'parties could be decided. Instead of this ever being done, 
 the Thebans, not liking to part with a place so desirable for the 
 command of Euboea, kept it in their own hands, nor was it restored 
 even at the general peace. 1 
 
 In the year b.c. 358 or 357, Euboea was the scene of a short but 
 fierce contest between the Athenians and Thebans. It was brought 
 about by some internal disputes in the island, in which the aid of 
 Thebes was invoked against the despots Menesarchus and Themison. 
 The Thebans, to support their partisans and maintain their suprem¬ 
 acy in Euboea, sent over a large force; while their opponents ap¬ 
 plied for succor to the Athenians. At this time hardly a city in 
 Euboea was connected with the Athenians, except Orcus perhaps, 
 which the Spartan alliance may have brought over to them. A 
 good opportunity now presented itself to recover their power in the 
 island. Still they hesitated, either doubting their chance of success, 
 or suspecting the sincerity of the parties who invited them: a 
 debate was held on the question, when Timotheus starting up made 
 that forcible appeal to his countrymen, which is related by Demos¬ 
 thenes in the Oration on the Chersonese— u Are you deliberating 
 what to do, when you have the Thebans in the island? Will you 
 not cover the sea with galleys ? Will you not rush to the Piraeus 
 immediately and launch your ships ?”—The people, roused by this 
 language, voted war on the instant; and such was their zeal, aided 
 by the patriotism of many wealthy citizens who voluntered to serve 
 the office of trierarch, (among them Demosthenes himself,) that the 
 whole armament was equipped and sent off within five days. The 
 campaign lasted about a month, during which there was no decisive 
 action, but a great deal of fighting and much loss of life on both 
 sides. The general result was to the advantage of the Athenians, 
 who forced their adversaries into a convention, by which they 
 agreed to evacuate the island; and having freed it from the pres¬ 
 ence of the Theban army, and withdrawing themselves from further 
 interference, were regarded as benefactors, and honored with a 
 golden crown. The Euboean cities, left to their own domestic 
 governments, were re-annexed to the Athenian confederacy, and 
 severed entirely from the dominion of Thebes. 2 
 
 Such was the positiou of affairs, when the Thebans in an evil 
 hour for Grecian liberty determined on taking a step, by which, 
 while they gratified their revengeful feelings against their enemies, 
 they hoped possibly to exalt themselves at their expense. This 
 
 Xenophon, Hellen. vii. c. 4, s. 1; where see the note of Schneider : 
 and compare the Oration for the Megalopolitans, vol. i. p. 210, note 1. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xvi. 7. AEschiues, contr. Ctesiph. 65, 67. Demosthenes, 
 De Cherson. 108 ; Pro Megalopol. 205 ; De Coron. 259; Contr. Mid, 
 666, 670; Contr. Androt. 697, 616; Contr. Timocr. 756. 
 
262 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 was to invoke upon them the sentence of an Amphictyonic assem¬ 
 bly. It was a long time since the Amphictyons had taken any 
 active part in Grecian politics. Their periodical meetings had been 
 regularly held as usual, in the spring at Delphi, in the autumn at 
 Thermopylae; but their attention had been confined wholly to 
 religious ceremonies and local business, without meddling in the 
 more momentous questions of war and peace or other international 
 concerns. The Thebans, on friendly terma with the majority of 
 the Amphictyonic tribes, deemed it a good opportunity to revive 
 the dormant functions of the council, and make it a political engine 
 for their own purposes. This, under existing circumstances, might 
 afford an easier and cheaper means of accomplishing their ends than 
 either war or diplomacy. Accordingly they preferred a complaint 
 against the Lacedaemonians for their perfidious seizure of the Cad- 
 mea, and induced the Amphictyons to impose on them a fine of 
 five hundred talents. The exact time when this sentence was 
 passed does not appear, but it was probably soon after the battle of 
 Mantinea. 1 The fine not having been paid was doubled; but the 
 Lacedaemonians took no notice either of one sentence or the other. 
 In the year b.c. 357 or 356, the Thebans preferred a charge against 
 the Phocians for having cultivated a portion of the Cirrhaean plain, 
 which had been condemned to lie waste ever since the first Sacred 
 War. It is probable enough, that both the Phocians and the Am- 
 phissian Locrians had committed trespasses upon this land, tilling or 
 inclosing from the waste portions which were of no value either to 
 the temple or to the Pythian festival; and it might be these very 
 encroachments which formed the debateable land of which Pausa- 
 nias speaks. 2 None but those in the neighborhood would care 
 really about the matter; but it made a good pretext for complaint 
 against people who were obnoxious on other grounds, and with 
 such view was eagerly taken up by the Thebans, and perhaps the 
 Thessalians. A decree passed against the Phocians, condemning 
 them to a fine of many talents; which not being paid, the Hierom- 
 nemons brought the case again before the council, and demanded 
 judgment against them for their contumacy; stating that there were 
 others too whose penalties ought to be enforced, to wit, the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, and that the defaulters merited public execration. 
 Judgment was passed, that the land of the Phocians should be 
 consecrated to Apollo. 3 Diodorus, who always takes what he 
 
 1 Where Diodorus (xvi. 23) narrates the charges preferred against 
 the Lacedaemonians and the Phocians, he is speaking of past events, not 
 
 referable to the year with which he prefaces the chapter. The* narra¬ 
 tive of the current year commences with the acts of Philomelus. 
 
 3 Pausanias, iii. 9. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xvi. 23, 29. Justin, viii. 1, states the charge against the 
 Phocians to have been, that they had ravaged the Boeotian territory. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 263 
 
 considered the religious view of the question, says that the sentence 
 of the Amphictyons was greatly approved by the Greeks. He 
 seems to forget that the Thebans, for having razed to the ground 
 Platae, Thespiee, and Orchomenus, were equally liable to Amphiety- 
 onic censure; and also that the motives of the parties concerned in 
 these proceedings were not the purest in the world. In asserting 
 that they were generally sanctioned by public opinion, he most 
 likely confounds the time when the sentence was passed with a sub¬ 
 sequent period, when the proceedings of the Phocians at Delphi 
 excited disapprobation even among those who were not well in¬ 
 clined to their enemies . 1 
 
 While this sentence impended over the Phocians, and they were 
 in alarm lest it should be immediately put in force, Philomelus, 
 a native of Ledon, and a man of high reputation among his coun¬ 
 trymen, addressed them in a tone of encouragement, urging that it 
 was impossible to pay the fine on account of its magnitude, and 
 that to allow their land to be taken as forfeit would not only be 
 cowardice on their part, but absolute and certain ruin. Hejshowed 
 the injustice of the sentence, and its disproportion to the alleged 
 crime; and then advised them to procure its reversal, which they 
 might easily do, if they would assert their ancient title to the pos¬ 
 session of Delphi and the presidency of the oracle; in support of 
 which he cited the well-known lines from the catalogue of the ships 
 in Homer . 2 If they would only make him their general with full 
 powers, he offered to guarantee their success . 3 
 
 The Phocians, stimulated by their fears, elected Philomelus to be 
 their general, and invested him with absolute powers . 4 He pro- 
 
 If this be well founded, it must have referred to the part they took in 
 the campaigns of Agesilaus and Cleombrotus ; and this would lead us 
 to suppose, that the charge was preferred soon after the battle of Leuc- 
 tra ; for it would have been absurd to revive it at a later period, after 
 the Phocians had been admitted to the Theban alliance. But this was 
 hardly the kind of offense to be a fit subject for Amphictyonic cogni¬ 
 zance. I could rather believe the story cited from Duris by Athenseus 
 (xiii. 560), that an outrage committed by some Phocian upon a Theban 
 lady was the cause of the war. Pausanias (x. 2) says he has not been 
 able to discover, whether the fine was imposed on the Phocians for any 
 real offense, or whether it was owing to the malice of their Old enemies, 
 the Thessalians. 
 
 1 Demosthenes (De Coron. 231) intimates distinctly, that the Athe¬ 
 nians, though they wished well to the Phocians in the war, disapproved 
 of their proceedings, by which he refers to their seizure of Delphi and 
 its treasures. 
 
 * Avrup (j>cjKr/uv Kai 'Eniarpodog r/pxou, 
 
 01 KvirupLCGOv ix ov n vOuvd re tt erpr/eaGav. ^ 
 
 8 Diodorus, xvi. 23. Pausanias, x. 2. 
 
 4 The Phocian generals were civil as well as military despots, during 
 
264 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 ceeded immediately to Sparta, and revealed his plans in confidence 
 to King Archidamus; saying, that it was the interest of Sparta no 
 less than of his own country, to rescind the illegal decrees of the 
 Amphictyons; that he had determined to seize upon Delphi for 
 that purpose, and the Spartans ought to make common cause with 
 him. Archidamus approved of his resolution; and declared that, 
 although he could not openly co-operate with him for the present, he 
 would render him secretly all the assistance in his power. He sup¬ 
 plied him for immediate exigencies with a loan of fifteen talents and 
 some mercenary troops. 1 . 
 
 If Theopompus is to be believed, the Spartan king was induced 
 to espouse the Phocian cause by bribes given to himself and his 
 queen, Deinicha; and a similar charge was made against the 
 Ephors and senate. Their hostility to Thebes, and the identity 
 of Spartan and Phocian interests, are sufficient of themselves 
 to account for the side which they chose; though it is likely 
 enough that some of the Delphic money was afterwards dis¬ 
 tributed at Sparta, as it was among the influential men of other 
 states . 2 
 
 The subsidy furnished by Archidamus, together with an equal 
 sum advanced out of his own private purse, enabled the Phocian 
 general to raise a considerable body of mercenaries. With these 
 and a thousand Phocian targeteers he marched suddenly upon 
 Delphi, and took possession of the temple; the Thracidse, one 
 of the five families connected with the oracle, who attempted 
 to oppose him, he put to death, and confiscated their property; 
 then, seeing that this had excited general alarm, he assured the 
 Delphians, that, if they would keep quiet, they had nothing to 
 fear . 3 The news was however quickly carried round. The 
 nearest neighbors were the Amphissian Locrians, who no sooner 
 heard of the seizure of Delphi, than they marched against the ag¬ 
 gressor. A battle took place in the outskirts of the city; and the 
 Locrians, after losing a large number of men, were put to flight. 
 Philomelus, emboldened by his victory, effaced the pillars on which 
 
 the period of their command, and are designated as rvcpavvoL, tivvaoTai. 
 Pausanias, iii. 10; iv. 5. Aeschines, De Fals. Leg. 45, 46. Athenaeus, 
 xiii. 605. Polysenus, Strateg. v. 45. 
 
 ‘ Diodorus, xvi. 24. 
 
 2 Pausanias, iii. 10; iv. 5. Philomelus was not in a condition to give 
 bribes at this tune. Whether he made promises, is another question 
 It is impossible to known for certain, either what the original intentions 
 of Philomelus were, or how far he opened his mind to the Spartan king. 
 After the spoliation of the temple had actually occurred, it was natural 
 that all kinds of reports should be circulated. 
 
 3 Pausanias^iii. 10) mentions a story, that the Delphians were saved 
 from a general massacre, and the women and children from slavery, by 
 the intercession of Archidamus. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 265 
 
 the Amphictyonic decrees were inscribed, and destroyed every 
 record of them; at the same time he gave out, that he had no 
 intention of plundering the temple or committing any illegal out¬ 
 rage ; his object was only to rescind an unjust sentence against his 
 countrymen, and to assert their ancient right to be administrators 
 and guardians of the sanctuary . 1 
 
 The intelligence having reached Thebes, an assembly of the peo¬ 
 ple was held, and a resolution passed to take arms in the sacred 
 cause . 2 While they were yet considering in what way they 
 should proceed to punish the offenders, Philomelus was busy forti¬ 
 fying Delphi with a wall, and making a general levy among all the 
 Phocians. who were fit for military service. He gathered round 
 him fresh bodies of mercenaries, by promising half as much again as 
 the usual pay; and boldly pitching his camp before the city, ap¬ 
 peared to bid defiance to his enemies. The number of his troops 
 (reckoning only the regular infantry) was about five thousand. 
 Seeing the advantage of bringing them speedily to action and 
 striking a blow before all his enemies were united, and with the 
 further object of enriching himself by plunder, he invaded and 
 ravaged the country of the Amphissian Locrians. In an attack 
 upon a strong fortress he received a check, and afterwards in a 
 skirmish with the Locrians lost twenty of his men. Having ap¬ 
 plied by a herald for permission to bury them, he was refused, the 
 Locrians answering, that it was the universal custom of the G-reeks 
 to cast away without sepulture the bodies of men guilty of sacri¬ 
 lege. In a subsequent skirmish the Phocians were left masters of 
 the field, and the Locrians, being compelled to ask permission 
 to bury their own dead, were glad to make an exchange. Philo¬ 
 melus, not able to bring the enemy to a general battle, continued 
 for some time to ravage the country, and then returned home laden 
 with spoil . 5 
 
 His next proceeding was to obtain the sanction of the oracle for 
 his cause. He commanded the priestess to deliver her prophecy from 
 the tripod according to ancient custom. She demurred at first, say¬ 
 ing that he sought to violate the ancient custom; but on his threaten¬ 
 ing her, she mounted the tripod, and pronounced that it was lawful 
 for him to do what he pleased. This response, which he declared to 
 be perfectly satisfactory, he reduced to writing, and exposed to 
 public view in the city of Delphi; he called an assembly for the 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 24. 
 
 2 Diodorn3 (xvi. 25) says, irapaxpvpa arparLurag ££ Eire/urpav . But of 
 the destination or proceedings of these troops we hear nothing farther. 
 The Thebans were not yet decided as to their course of action, and per¬ 
 haps recalled the troops whom in the first burst of anger they had sent 
 out. 
 
 8 Diodorus, xvi. 25. 
 
 Vol. II.—M 
 
266 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 special purpose of announcing it, and congratulated his friends on the 
 encouragement which Apollo had given them. A slight thing which 
 happened about the same time was hailed as a favorable omen. An 
 eagle, flying over the altar, snatched up some of the tame doves that 
 were kept in the temple; 1 which was interpreted as a sign, that 
 Philomelus would be the master of Delphi. Elated now with hope, 
 yet impressed with the necessity of conciliating the Greeks, and 
 averting the suspicion which some of his acts were likely to inspire, 
 he dispatched select envoys to the principal cities of Greece, not ex¬ 
 cepting even Thebes, to justify and explain his conduct; in particular 
 to show, that, while he asserted the claims of his country to the 
 guardianship of the Delphic temple, he had no design to plunder it 
 of its treasures; that he was willing to render an account of them 
 to all the Greeks; and that any who chose might come and examine 
 the sacred offerings, to see that their* weight and number were cor¬ 
 rect. 2 To those people who had ancient feuds with his countrymen, 
 he urged the injustice of making war upon a false pretext, to gratify 
 private enmity; praying that, if they would not assist him, they would 
 at least be neutral. At Thebes and in Locris these remonstrances 
 produced no effect, but were answered by a declaration of war. 
 Athens, Sparta, and some other cities concluded alliance with the 
 Phocians, and gave them promises of assistance. 3 Such were the 
 events of the first year of the war, b. c. 355. 
 
 To meet the exigencies of the ensuing campaign, Philomelus made 
 new levies of soldiers, and to provide pay for them, exacted heavy 
 
 4 Such an occurrence was likely enough. The number of birds that 
 flocked round the temple is noticed in Euripides, Ion. 106, 171. 
 
 3 Grote, in his History of Greece, xi. 350, has the following note upon 
 the subject of these treasures:—“ In reference to the engagement taken 
 by Philomelus, that he would exhibit and verify, before any general 
 Hellenic examiners, all the valuable property in the Delphian temple, 
 by weight and number of articles, the reader will find interesting mat¬ 
 ter of comparison in the Attic inscriptions, No. 137—142, vol. i. of 
 Boeckh’s Corpus Inscript. Grsecarum, with Boeckh’s valuable commen¬ 
 tary. These are the records of the numerous gold and silver donatives, 
 preserved in the Parthenon, handed over by the treasurers of the god¬ 
 dess annually appointed to their successors at the end of the year, from 
 one Panathenaic festival to the next. The weight of each article is for¬ 
 mally recorded, and the new articles received each year ( eireTeici ) are 
 specified. Where an article is transferred without being weighed ( uar- 
 adfxov), the fact is noticed. That the precious donatives in the Delphian 
 temple also were carefully weighed, we may judge from the statement 
 of Herodotus, that the golden lion dedicated by Croesus had lost a frac¬ 
 tion of its weight in the conflagration of the building. (Herod, i. 50.)” 
 Compare the note in the same volume, p. 354. 
 
 * Diodorus, xvi. 27. Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. 360) reads to the 
 jury the articles of treaty between the Athenians and Phocians. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 267 
 
 contributions from the wealthy citizens of Delphi. Collecting all 
 his troops together, he reviewed them, and made an imposing show 
 of strength; but if he hoped to deter his enemies from attacking 
 him, he was quickly disappointed. The Locrians, eager to revenge 
 their former defeat, without waiting for any auxiliaries, advanced 
 against him, and gave battle at the Phsedriad cliffs near Delphi. 
 Philomelus was again victorious, killing great numbers of the enemy, 
 and taking a multitude of prisoners: the Locrians, seeing that they 
 were not a match for the Phocians by themselves, sent to Thebes for 
 succor. We have, no explanation why the Thebans did not at an 
 earlier period enter actively into the war; but. in this as in other 
 parts of their conduct we perceive a want of that vigorous energy, 
 which they displayed in the time of Epaminondas. It is possible 
 that they delayed commencing hostilities till Philomelus had put 
 himself more completely in the wrong; and they were anxious to 
 procure a solemn vote of the Amphictyons, appointing them to con¬ 
 duct a holy war as champions of the god. With such view apparent¬ 
 ly, and to counteract the efforts'of the Phocian agents, they dispatched 
 embassies to the various Amphictyonic states, calling upon them to 
 unite in the cause of religion against the Phocians. The majority 
 complied, including the Locrians, Dorians, Thessalians, Perrhaebians, 
 Magnetes, Dolopians, Athamanians, Phthiots, and iEnianians; while 
 Athens, Lacedaemon, and some other states of Peloponnesus, adhered 
 to the Phocian cause. It may be inferred from the words of Dio¬ 
 dorus, that a formal declaration of war was passed at a congress of 
 Amphictyons (which must have been held at Thermopylae); and 
 severe sentences were passed not only upon the whole Phocian 
 people, as impious and sacrilegious criminals, but specially upon 
 Philomelus and the most prominent leaders of his party, who were 
 condemned to heavy fines. It does not appear, however, that the 
 Thebans were chosen to command the united force of the league, 
 nor that any plan was agreed upon for carrying on the war with 
 effect. 1 
 
 The remissness of his adversaries gave time to Philomelus for 
 preparation. Seeing the necessity of greatly augmenting his num 
 bers, and of providing pay for them by extraordinary means, he no 
 openly laid his hands upon the Delphic treasures, and giving notic 
 that the pay of his soldiers would be half as much again as before, 
 he invited the mercenaries, with whom Greece then abounded, to 
 enlist under his banners. No sooner were his intentions made pul 
 licly known, than a multitude of adventurers, chiefly men of des¬ 
 perate fortune and character, flocked from all quarters to his camp, 
 eager to share in the plunder that was promised them. Finding 
 himself at the head of a considerable army, he anticipated the 
 enemy’s attack by a rapid march into Epicnemidian Locris, where 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 28, 29, 32. 
 
268 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 he met the native troops joined by a small detachment of the Boeo¬ 
 tians ; and having defeated them in a cavalry action, fell suddenly 
 upon a body of six thousand Thessalians advancing from the north, 
 and defeated them separately on a cliff (forming one of the Locrian 
 range of hills) called Argolas. But now the main army of the Boeo¬ 
 tians, thirteen thousand strong, advanced into Locris, and pitching 
 their camp opposite to the Phocian general, offered him battle. 
 Philomelus was reinforced by fifteen hundred Achaeans: yet, as his 
 whole army did not much exceed eleven thousand, he thought it 
 more prudent to decline a general engagement. The foraging par¬ 
 ties, however, met in frequent skirmishes; and the Boeotians, hav¬ 
 ing taken some prisoners, Caused them to be led out in front of the 
 camp and executed as malefactors, declaring that such was the judg¬ 
 ment pronounced on them by the Amphictyons. The soldiers of 
 Philomelus, enraged at this savage conduct, insisted that he should 
 retaliate; and exerting themselves to take alive as many as they pos¬ 
 sibly could of the enemy, they soon put him in a condition to do so. 
 Philomelus without hesitation put all his prisoners to death. This 
 led to a mutual abandonment of a barbarous practice, which was 
 not sanctioned by the general usages of Grecian warfare. While 
 the armies remained in this position, no action occurred worthy of 
 notice; and at length Philomelus found it necessary to retreat into 
 his own country. He was followed by the enemy, whom he drew 
 into the mountainous and woody regions of Parnassus, hoping to 
 obtain advantage over them by his better knowledge of the locality. 
 After some marching and counter-marching, he was surprised by 
 the Boeotians near the city of Neon, and compelled to fight a battle 
 with one division of his forces against greatly superior numbers. 
 Here his -troops were totally routed ; he himself fighting bravely to 
 the last was driven to the edge of a precipice, from which, rather 
 than be taken alive, he threw himself headlong down, and met the 
 very death to which sacrilegious criminals were doomed by Hel¬ 
 lenic law; a sign, as Diodorus thinks, that the vengeance of the 
 gods had overtaken him. Onomarchus, his brother, succeeding to 
 the command, rallied the fugitives, and led them back to Delphi . 1 
 
 It might have been expected that the Thebans would have fol¬ 
 lowed up their victory, by marching instantly to the holy city, scat¬ 
 tering the remnant of their vanquished foes, and rescuing the temple 
 from further pillage. Instead of this, they relieved the beaten Pho- 
 cians from any immediate apprehension of danger, by retreating 
 themselves into Boeotia. The explanation which Diodorus gives of 
 their conduct is, that they considered the main objects of the war 
 were accomplished by the death of Philomelus; that the Phocians, 
 seeing him, the author of their calamities, to have been signally 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 30, 31. Pausanias, x. 2. The death of Philomelua 
 occurred b.c. 354. 
 
"THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 269 
 
 punished by gods and men, would repent of their folly and turn to 
 wiser counsels. If this were so, it is one among many proofs, that 
 the Thebans had among them at that time no able adviser. I am 
 more disposed however to take Thirlwall’s view, that the retreat of 
 the Thebans was owing to strategic causes, the victory of Neon not 
 having been so decisive as to encourage them to pursue the enemy, 
 much less to undertake a siege of Delphi. 
 
 The proceedings in that city after the battle show what important 
 results might have been accomplished by the rapid advance of a vic¬ 
 torious army. Among the national troops and counselors of the 
 Phocians there was a moderate party, who were desirous of peace, 
 dreading the consequences of opposition to so large a body of the 
 Greeks, and seeing how feebly they had been supported by their 
 professed allies. Some had religious scruples, and were shocked at 
 a state of things, under which they were as a nation excommuni¬ 
 cated from Hellenic society and brotherhood: others were jealous 
 of the despotic power exercised by the general, or disgusted with 
 the licentiousness of his mercenary camp. Onomarchus, on the 
 other hand, felt that the only chance of honor and distinction for 
 himself and his family lay in the continuance of the war; his very 
 safety depended upon it, as he was personally implicated in the 
 charges preferred by the Amphictyons, and sentenced by them to 
 the penalties of sacrilege. On his side were the more bold and un¬ 
 scrupulous part of the Phocians, and the whole body of mercenaries, 
 who saw their advantage in the prospect of pay and plunder. An 
 assembly or council of war was convened, and Onomarchus in a 
 powerful and well-prepared speech urged the necessity of resisting 
 the enemy, and persevering in the manly course begun by Philome- 
 lus. His eloquence, backed by the support of the army, carried the 
 day; and he was elected to fill the office of general with the same 
 absolute powers which had been conferred upon his predecessor. 
 His first care was to fill up the places of the soldiers who had fallen 
 in battle, to make new levies of mercenaries, and provide himself 
 with an immense quantity of arms and military stores. The work 
 of spoliation was now commenced on a larger scale than before. 
 Whatever donatives of brass and iron manufacture he found in the 
 temple, he converted into arms; the gold and silver he melted down 
 for coinage, employing it not only for the maintenance of his own 
 troops, but for distribution among the leading statesmen of Athens, 
 Sparta, and other cities in alliance with him. Experience had shown 
 that little was to be expected from the voluntary exertions of these 
 allies, occupied as they were by their own affairs, or distracted by 
 their own troubles. It was necessary to stimulate their zeal by 
 some extraordinary means, and gold was profusely lavished for this 
 purpose. But Onomarchus did not stop here. He employed the 
 ample means of corruption which he had at his command to pur¬ 
 chase peace from his enemies; some of whom he gained over to his 
 
270 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 side, others he persuaded to be neutral. Among these were the 
 Thessalians. 1 
 
 The feelings of pious men were further outraged, by seeing the 
 riches of the temple not only applied to purposes of war and ad¬ 
 ministration, but lavished on amusement and vanity. Onomarchus 
 was vicious in his pleasures. Precious ornaments, hallowed by their 
 antiquity and the memories associated with them, were taken from 
 the custody of Apollo, to hang on the necks or encircle the brows 
 of his mistresses and favorites. Philomenus had occasionally been 
 generous in this way at the expense of the god; yet there were 
 bounds to his liberality, which the extravagance of his successor 
 disregarded. Philomelus had been mild in his domestic goverment, 
 and gained a well-merited popularity, which had helped to secure the 
 succession to his brother. Onomarchus, irritable in his temper, and 
 intolerant of opposition, seized the principal Phocians who had either 
 resisted his election, or whom he considered to be forming a party 
 against him in the state, and condemned them to lose their lives 
 and property. With all this, he was not free from the superstition 
 of the age. He was encouraged by a dream, in which a colossal 
 statue, one of the ornaments of the temple, seemed to grow under 
 his hands in height and bulk; which portended, as he thought, an 
 > increase of glory under his own generalship; whereas, in the histo¬ 
 rian’s view, it signified that he would be an instrument for increas¬ 
 ing the penalties to which his countrymen were doomed. 2 3 
 
 Having now raised by his exertions a numerous and well-ap¬ 
 pointed army, he lost no time in making the best use of it. The 
 Amphissian Locrians, terrified by his approach, and isolated from 
 their confederates, had no resource but in submission. Entering 
 the territory of the Dorians, who were equally remote from all as¬ 
 sistance, he ravaged and plundered it with impunity. He overran 
 Epicnemidian Locris, taking and occupying with a garrison the city 
 of Thronium, the inhabitants of which he sold into slavery. 
 
 Whether it was at this time, as G-rote thinks, or a little later that 
 he took Nicaea and Alponus, is not clear. Certain it is, that he was 
 shortly afterwards master of the pass of Thermopylae, the access to 
 which those fortresses commanded. From the hills of Cnemis he 
 descended into Bceotia, approaching the north-western bank of the 
 Lake Copias, where stood the ruins of Orchomenus, once the first 
 of Boeotian cities. It had been destroyed by the Thebans, who 
 cherished a bitter hatred against the city for having sided with La¬ 
 cedaemon, and after the battle of Leuctra were only restrained from 
 wreaking their vengeance upon it by the entreaties of Epaminon- 
 das; but in the year b.c. 364, having discovered a conspiracy of the 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 32, 33, 57. Athenaeus, xii. 532. As to the bribery 
 
 at Sparta, see ante, p. 264. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xvi. 33, 64. Athenaeus, xiii. 605. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 271 
 
 Orchomenian knights and certain of their own exiles to overthrow 
 the government, they seized the occasion, during the absence of 
 Epaminondas, to punish the crime of a few citizens by the extirpa¬ 
 tion of the whole people, whom they massacred in cold blood, sell- 
 the women and children for slaves. 1 Onomarchus took possession 
 of the ruined city, intending to establish it -as a fortress and sallying 
 place against the enemy. There may have been a village popula¬ 
 tion in Orchomenus at this time; but there is no doubt that he left 
 a garrison in it, and repaired the fortifications; for it continued to 
 be occupied by the Phocians till the end of the war. He next 
 laid siege to Chseronea; but the Thebans coming to its relief, and 
 his army being weakened by the garrisons which he had detached, 
 he was driven with some loss from the walls of that city, and re¬ 
 turned into Phocis. 2 
 
 The inaction of the Thebans at this period is attributable to sev¬ 
 eral causes; chiefly to the disunion sown among their allies by the 
 craft of their opponent, and the great advantage which he had over 
 them in recruiting his military resources. They had vainly imag¬ 
 ined that they could maintain an army at their own cost, which 
 would overcome any mercenary force provided by the pillage 
 of Delphi, and they had found their mistake. 3 The want of 
 money now compelled them to send five thousand men under Pam- 
 menes to assist the satrap Artabazus, who had revolted against the 
 Persian king. 4 But such a number could be ill spared from a war, 
 in which they had to contend against a power growing every day 
 more formidable. Onomarchus, in the year b.c. 353, commanded 
 the largest standing army in Greece, and was seemingly supported 
 by the strongest alliances. There was but one man able to cope 
 with him, and that was Philip of Macedon; with whom a series 
 of events, which must now be adverted to, brought him into con¬ 
 flict. 
 
 Alexander of Pherae, after a reign of eleven years, in which he 
 had shown some vigor and aptitude for command, mingled with the 
 most inhuman and savage ferocity, was murdered in his bed by the 
 contrivance of his wife Thebe, assisted by her brothers Tisiphonus 
 and Lycophron. 5 Tisiphonus, either alone or jointly with his 
 
 1 Diodorus, xv. 57, 79. Pausanias, ix. 15. Demosthenes, contr. Lep- 
 
 tin. 490. ' f 
 
 2 Diodorus, xvi. 33. Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 387. ASschines, 
 De Fals. Leg. 45. Grote’s History of Greece, xi. 360. 
 
 3 Isocrates, Philipp. 93. 
 
 4 Diodorus, xvi. 34. 
 
 6 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 4, ss. 35—37. Plutarch, in Vit. Pelopid. 
 35. Diodorus, xvi. 14. The romantic incidents of this murder are 
 familiar to most readers—how Thebe removed the fierce dog that 
 usually guarded the chamber—how she laid wool upon the stairs, that 
 
272 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 brother, was raised to the supreme power, and having delivered 
 their country from an odious tyrant, they were at first highly 
 popular, but in course of time, as they became despotic, and rested 
 their support upon the mercenary troops, they excited an opposition, 
 which could only be put down by measures of violence. Tisipho- 
 nus survived but a few years, and at the time to which we are 
 drawing attention Lycophron had the sole sway. When Onomar- 
 chus opened his negotiations in Thessaly, Lycophron joined alliance 
 with him. Common sympathies attracted these two potentates to 
 each other; and it is likely enough that they entered into a compact 
 for mutual support in their schemes of ambition. Lycophron recom¬ 
 menced that system of encroachment upon the Thessalian body, 
 which had caused them in Alexander’s reign to invite foreign 
 assistance. The exact time when dissensions broke out between 
 them and the ruler of Pherse can not, in the absence of historical in¬ 
 formation, be clearly ascertained. There is evidence to warrant the 
 conjecture, that he had enlarged his dominions at their expense, 
 and got possession of some of their fortresses, as early as the year 
 355 b.c., and that the Thessalians were then in a distressed and im¬ 
 poverished condition: but it does not appear that any foreign aid 
 was called in before the year 353 b.c. It was then useless to apply 
 * to Thebes, cut off as she was from communication with the north, 
 and scarcely able to defend herself at home. The Aleuads there¬ 
 fore turned their eyes to Philip of Macedon, who, still carrying on 
 war against Athens and her dependencies, had advanced to besiege 
 Methone, the last remaining possession of the Athenians on the 
 Macedonian coast. 1 
 
 Methone fell after a long siege; and Philip, at the invitation to 
 the Aleuads, marched into Thessaly. The course of his operations 
 is not clear. It is probable that one of the earliest was against 
 Pagasae, which he would be anxious to take before the Athenians 
 could send relief to it by sea. They did send a fleet, which, as 
 usual, arrived too late, and Pagasae fell into his hands. 2 Lycophron 
 
 the steps of her brothers might not be heard—how, when they hesitated 
 at the last moment, she threatened them with discovery, if they did not 
 mount the staircase—and how she herself held the bolt of the door, 
 while they completed the murderous task. Plutarch mentions the third 
 brother, Pytholaus, as joining in it. 
 
 1 Isocrates, De Pace, 183. Diodorus, xvi. 14,34, 36. Thirlwall (History 
 of Greece, v. 280, note 2) rightly considers that Diodorus, in the first of 
 the above-cited chapters, is only giving a general view of the course of 
 events in Thessaly, and not speaking of any interference by Philip soon 
 after Alexander’s death. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, Olynth. i. 11. Philipp, i. 50. Diodorus, xvi. 31. Ila- 
 yag in this passage ought to be Hayacug, though the date is wrong, for 
 Philip never could have attacked Pagasae before his expedition into 
 Thessaly, b. c. 353. Diodorus rightly makes the siege of PagasaB follow 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 273 
 
 meanwhile had applied for succor to the Phocian general, who sent 
 seven thousand men under the command of his brother Phayllus; 
 but he was beaten by Philip, and driven back from Thessaly ; upon 
 which Onomarchus, seeing the great importance of repelling so 
 dangerous an adversary, mustered all his forces together, and 
 hastened in person to the scene of action. Twice did these two 
 generals, the ablest then in Greece, encounter each other in battle; 
 and twice was Philip worsted. In the first engagement Onomar¬ 
 chus, not trusting entirely to superior numbers, resorted to a strata¬ 
 gem difficult and dangerous to practice except with experienced 
 troops. He had occupied some rising ground under a semicircular 
 ridge of hills. On the high cliffs which flanked him on either side 
 he placed a heap of loose rocks and a body of men in concealment, 
 then descended into the plain to meet the enemy. They instantly 
 attacked him, the light troops discharging their missiles, and he by 
 a pretended flight drew them after him into the concavity of the 
 hills. As the Macedonians rushed tumultuously forward, their pro¬ 
 gress was suddenly arrested by crushing masses of rock hurled 
 down among them from the cliffs: at that moment Onomarchus 
 gave the signal, and the Phocians charging their disordered ranks 
 drove them back with slaughter to their camp. In the midst of the 
 flight Philip lost not his presence of mind, but coolly observed to 
 those about him, that he was retiring like a battering-ram, only to 
 be more terrible in the reaction. 1 Notwithstanding this vaunt, he 
 was again defeated, and the second time so severely, that he 
 escaped with some difficulty from the field, his soldiers deserting 
 him, or breaking into open mutiny. Using all his powers of per¬ 
 suasion to keep the discouraged remnant in obedience, he led them 
 back to his own kingdom. He was not however pursued, events 
 
 that of Methone; but he has evidently committed some mistake, for he 
 mentions the siege of Methone twice, the right place being in chapter 
 34. See Leland’s Life of Philip, i. p. 213. Grote’s History of Greece, 
 xi. 365, 412. Grote thinks that Pagasae was not taken till after Pherae. 
 
 . But against this w r e may observe, that there actually was a siege of 
 Pagasae, as we learn from Demosthenes; but there could have been no 
 occasion for it after Pherae had been surrendered. Again, had there 
 been a siege of Pagasae at that time, there was an Athenian fleet on the 
 coast to relieve it, and Demosthenes would hardly have imputed its fall 
 to the dilatoriness of Athens. 
 
 1 Polyaenus, Strateg. ii. 38. Thirlwall (History of Greece, v. 281) 
 thinks this anecdote should be referred to the second battle. It seems 
 to me that the words of Philip are more applicable to a partial defeat, 
 after which he might contemplate another immediate attack, than to 
 the severe defeat which followed, and which drove him for the time 
 from Thessaly. He said these words to cheer his soldiers kv avrij ry 
 <pvyy. 
 
274 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 having happened which required the presence of Onomarchus in 
 Boeotia. 1 
 
 The diversion made by Philip in Thessaly had encouraged the 
 Thebans again to try the fortune of war. They had taken the field, 
 with the intention perhaps of recovering Orchomenus; but what¬ 
 ever their plans were, they were disconcerted by* the rapidity of the 
 Phocian general, who with his victorious army appearing suddenly 
 in Boeotia overcame them in battle, and then besieged and took 
 Coronea. This city was near the south-western shore of Lake 
 Copais, and about twenty miles from Thebes. The loss of such a 
 place must have been a great blow to the Thebans, and proves how 
 incapable they were at this time to defend themselves against the 
 superior force of the enemy. It is not unlikely, the population of 
 Coronea were unfriendly to Thebes, and surrendered their city 
 without much reluctance: for it remained in possession of the Pho- 
 cians until the end of the war, and met then with the same severe 
 punishment which was inflicted upon Orchomenus. 2 The campaign 
 might further have been prolonged, with still more disastrous issues 
 to the Thebans; but, fortunately for them, Onomarchus was recalled 
 .by the alarming intelligence, that Philip had again raised his stand¬ 
 ard in Thessaly. 3 
 
 That indefatigable prince, having repaired the strength and disci¬ 
 pline of his army in Macedonia, returned with the resolute deter¬ 
 mination to accomplish his original purpose. Unless he could re¬ 
 trieve his honor and establish his ascendency in Thessaly, it was all 
 over with ulterior projects of empire. He therefore strenuously 
 exerted himself to levy troops among his allies. To stimulate then- 
 zeal, he proclaimed that he was come not only to deliver them from 
 the Phenean tyranny, but to subdue the sacrilegious Phocians, and 
 restore to the Amphictyons their Pylasan synod. 4 The Aleuads 
 seconded his efforts, and in a short time his army, reinforced by the 
 Thessalians, amounted to above twenty thousand foot and three 
 thousand horse. He ordered his men to wear wreaths of laurel, as 
 soldiers in the cause of Apollo; 3 and having raised their ardor 
 and courage to the highest pitch, he led them against the enemy. 
 Onomarchus had come promptly to the aid of Lycophron, and was 
 already in the Pheraean territory with a force of twenty thousand 
 foot and four hundred horse. The two armies met on the shore of 
 the Pagasaean gulf, not far from Pagasae, and within sight of an 
 Athenian squadron under Chares, which was cruising off the coast. 
 It was now to be decided, whether Philip or Onomarchus should be 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 35. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, De Pace, 62. De Fals. Leg. 375, 387, 445. 
 
 8 Diodorus, xvi. 35. 
 
 4 Demosthenes, De Chersoneso, 105. De Fals. Leg. 443. 
 
 ‘ Justin, viii. 2. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 275 
 
 the future lord of Thessaly, and perhaps of Greece. The battle was 
 long and obstinate, but the fortune of Philip prevailed, owing chiefly 
 to the numbers and valor of his Thessalian cavalry. The Phocians, 
 broken on all sides, fled to the beach; many plunging into the 
 waves, in the vain attempt to swim to the Athenian ships, were 
 either drowned or cut to pieces by pursuing horsemen. Among 
 these was Onomarchus himself. Six thousand of his troops were 
 slain; three thousand prisoners were drowned in the sea as crimi¬ 
 nals by the command of the conqueror. The body of Onomarchus 
 was nailed to a cross. 1 Thus perished, in the fourth year of the 
 Sacred War, the only general who had ability enough to compete 
 with the king of Macedon. 2 
 
 Phayllus, succeeding to the command, applied himself without 
 delay to repair the dreadful loss which his country had sustained, 
 and to put her in a posture of defense. The flower of the Phocian 
 army had been destroyed. Scarce a third part of the force which 
 had marched into Thessaly could have returned to their standards. 
 To obtain speedy succor was indispensable. Phocis might be 
 attacked by all her enemies at once. The Macedonians might 
 penetrate the straits of Thermopylae, while the Thebans and Lo- 
 crians invaded the eastern frontier. Phayllus, to recruit his army, 
 could employ the same means which his predecessors had done, and 
 those he did not neglect: but for new levies of soldiers some time 
 would be required, and every moment was of importance. He 
 therefore sent pressing messages to Athens, to Sparta, and to his 
 other allies, representing the urgency of the peril, and imploring im¬ 
 mediate-succor. 3 
 
 The Athenians, in the beginning of the war, notwithstanding 
 their treaty of alliance with the Phocians, had lent them no military 
 aid. They had been themselves impoverished and weakened by the 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 35. Pausanias, x. 2, states that Onomarchus was 
 killed by his own soldiers, attributing the defeat to his cowardice and 
 incapacity. As to this, and as to the punishment of criminals by drown¬ 
 ing, see Wessellng’s notes on the passage in Diodorus. 
 
 2 The ability of Onomarchus is sufficiently proved by his acts. The 
 loss of the battle is attributed by Diodorus to his inferiority in cavalry. 
 It would seem, that he had acquired experience as a commander in the 
 Leuctric war. Poly genus (ii. 38) relates a stratagem of his, which must 
 have occurred at that period. The Thebans, under Pelopidas, were 
 besieging Elatea. Onomarchus opened the gates of the city, brought 
 out the old men, woman, and children, and in front of them drew up 
 the whole force of the heavy-armed. Pelopidas, fearing to drive the 
 Phocians to despair, withdrew his army.—This reminds one of the 
 old tale of Phocian desperation, already cited from Pausanias (ante, p. 
 236). 
 
 3 Diodorus, xvi. 36. 
 
 
276 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 Social War, 1 and were still engaged in a harassing contest with 
 Macedonia. Their interest in the Phocian quarrel was remote; and 
 that any danger to the liberty of Greece was to be apprehended 
 from it, was a thing which the most acute politician could not have 
 dreamed of. It appeared in a short time, that the Phocians, so far 
 from needing foreign assistance, were more than a match for their 
 adversaries. We may be surprised that after the successes of Ono- 
 marchus, when the Thebans were so enfeebled- as not to be able to 
 defend their own territory, the Athenians should not have taken 
 advantage of the occasion to attempt the recovery of Oropus. This 
 may serve to show both the military weakness of Athens, and the 
 supineness of her people. The siege of Pagasse, so soon following 
 the capture of Methone, alarmed them a little on their own account, 
 and they sent a fleet to relieve it, which, as already mentioned, 
 arrived too late. Now however, when Philip, having destroyed 
 the army of Onomarchus, was ready to march with an overpower¬ 
 ing force to Thermopylae, the magnitude of the crisis became appar¬ 
 ent ; and it needed not the urgent appeal of Phayllus to convince 
 the Athenians, that they themselves were deeply concerned in 
 checking Philip’s further progress. Should he succeed in passing 
 the barrier of southern Greece, the road was open not merely to 
 Phocis but to Athens. Their own sailors, eye-witnesses of the 
 battle, must have brought them the earliest intelligence. Prom the 
 Phocian envoys they would learn, that Phayllus was unable to hold 
 the pass unassisted. Roused at once from their lethargy, the Athe¬ 
 nians voted the required succors, and shipped them off with the ut¬ 
 most expedition for the straits of Thermopylae. The land force 
 consisted of five thousand infantry and four hundred horse, com¬ 
 manded by Nausicles. These, properly supported by the Phocians, 
 would be sufficient to guard the pass, so long as the fleet, keeping 
 command of the sea, prevented Philip landing troops in their rear. 
 Succors came also from Peloponnesus; a thousand Lacedaemonians, 
 and two thousand Achaeans. 2 3 
 
 Philip immediately after his victory proceeded to the reduction 
 of Pherae. This was expected of him by the Thessalians, as the 
 prime object of the expedition. Pherae, garrisoned by the troops of 
 Lycophron, would be capable of holding out for some time; and it 
 might be policy in the tyrant to make some show of vigorous defence, 
 if it were merely for the sake of obtaining better terms. There could 
 
 1 Isocrates, De Pace, 163. This oration was composed at the close 
 
 of the Social War. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xvi. 37. The cost of the Athenian armament (according 
 to Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 367) was more than two hundred talents, 
 reckoning the private outlay of individuals as well as the public. 
 We can not doubt however that the Athenians received money from 
 Phayllus. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 277 
 
 be no chance for him however of ultimate success, cut off as he was 
 from all hope of assistance: he therefore capitulated, receiving per¬ 
 mission for himself and his brother Pitholaus to retire with their 
 mercenaries from Thessaly. Two thousand soldiers were carried 
 over by them to the Phocians. Pheree was surrendered to Philip, 
 who abolished the dynasty to which it had so long been subject, and 
 established a free or pc^ular government. After this he marched to 
 Thermopylae; but finding on his arrival that it was strongly guarded 
 by Athenian troops, he retreated without making any attempt to 
 force the pass. Thus did the Athenians by a prudent and timely 
 effort (more than once made the subject of eulogy by Demosthenes, 
 and cited by him as an axample for imitation), avert from themselves 
 apparently a very serious danger. 1 
 
 Thirwall, in his History of Greece, expresses a doubt whether the 
 retreat of Philip from Thermopylae was owing to any fear of the 
 Athenians; suggesting that perhaps he was not desirous of termi¬ 
 nating the war so soon; had this been so, he would have followed 
 up his victory more rapidly: it was to his advantage that the Sacred 
 War, which was wasting the strength of the Greeks, should be kept 
 up some time longer; he advanced perhaps at the request of the 
 Thessalians, and was glad to find a pretext for retiring from Ther¬ 
 mopylae. 2 There are, as it appears to me, very fair grounds for the 
 suspicion of the learned historian; though I am less inclined to con¬ 
 sider that Philip could have forced the pass against the Athenians, 
 than that he purposely delayed his own advance, deeming it prema¬ 
 ture at that moment to carry his arms southward. The motives of 
 his conduct are to be looked for in the affairs of Thessaly, and in his 
 relations with the people of that country. 
 
 The proceedings of Philip in Thessaly are but imperfectly known 
 to us. , That he ultimately acquired such a preponderance in that 
 country as to be a sort of Tagus, exercising both a military and a 
 political authority, is certain: the steps by which he arrived at that 
 power are not so clearly revealed. On the one hand, we learn from 
 Diodorus, that Philip, by his generous services to the Thessalians in 
 putting down the tyrants and restoring the freedom of their cities, 
 secured their grateful co-operation in his own wars. 3 Theopompus 
 attributes much of the popularity of Philip to his good companion¬ 
 ship. Knowing (he says) that the Thessalians were addicted to 
 intemperance and debauchery, he followed the bent of their humor, 
 which indeed was quite natural to him, as he was himself a hard 
 
 1 Demosthenes, Philipp, i. 44. De Coron. 236. De Fals. Leg. 367, 
 397, 443. 
 
 2 Thirl-wall, History of Greece, v. 283. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xvl 14. Ka.Teiro'hE/j.TjGe rovg Tvpdvvov q icai ralg iz67*egiv 
 uvaKTTjadfj-evog tijv tTievOepiav, fxeyd?u]v evvoiav eig rovg 0 ETTa’kovg kvedei- 
 Zaro' dconep kv ralg /uerd ravra npafrcnv dei ovvayuvicn-dg ia^ev. 
 
APPENDIX I. 
 
 278 
 
 drinker, fond of loose pleasures, coarse wit, and buffoonery; be there¬ 
 fore lived among them freely, and by thus making himself agreeable 
 he attached them to him more strongly than by his profuse liberality. 1 
 Isocrates, writing at the end of the Sacred War, tells us that the 
 Thessalians had become so attached to Philip as to put more confi¬ 
 dence in him than in their own countrymen. 2 Demosthenes, having 
 reference to the issue of that war, says thfey regarded him as a 
 saviour and benefactor: 3 and we know that they afterwards assisted 
 him in Thrace; they chose him for their general in the Amphissian 
 war, and followed him to Chseronea; and their embassadors supported 
 the Macedonian at Thebes against Demosthenes. 4 On the other 
 hand, we are told by Justin, that Philip after the victory of Pagasae 
 requited liis Thessalian allies with the most atrocious perfidy; that 
 he took hostile possession of the very cities which had furnished him 
 with auxiliaries; that he sold their women and children by public 
 auction, and spared not even the temples or the houses in which he 
 had been hospitably entertained. 5 This statement, which may be 
 regarded as an exaggeration, coincides in some measure with an 
 anecdote of Polygenus, who relates, that Philip came to Larissa to 
 destroy the houses of the Aleuads; that he sought by a pretended 
 sickness to entice them to visit him, and then to seize their persons; 
 and that the plot failed by the discovery of one Boescus: 6 some 
 additional confirmation is afforded by another passage of the same 
 author, in which he gives an account of Philip’s general policy towards 
 the Thessalians; stating that he contrived a means to subdue them 
 without making any open war; that, finding they were divided among 
 themselves and the different cities continually quarreling,—for ex¬ 
 ample, Pelinna with Pharsalus, Larissa with Pherae,—he interfered 
 from time to time on behalf of those who solicited his aid, but when 
 he overcame their adversaries, he never pursued them to destruction, 
 nor deprived them of their arms or fortifications; his plan was always 
 to take the part of the weak against the strong, to support the 
 lower against the higher classes, and to encourage the demagogues: 
 by such arts he got the dominion of all Thessaly. 7 Light is thrown 
 on this by the war which undoubtedly broke out between Pharsalus 
 and Halus, b.c. 347—346, in which Philip espoused the cause of the 
 
 1 Theopompus, apud Athenaeum, vi. 260. Compare iv. 167; x. 435. 
 Polybius censures Theopompus for his injustice to Philip. Lib. viii. 
 11 , 12 . 
 
 3 Isocrates, Philipp. 86. 
 
 3 Demosthenes, De Coron. 240. 
 
 4 Demosthenes, De Cherson. 93. De Coron. 237, 246, 277, 298. Iso¬ 
 crates, Philipp. 97. 
 
 6 Justin, viii. 3. 
 
 6 Polyaenus, Strateg. iv. c. 2, s. 11. 
 
 ' Polyaenus, Strateg. iv. c. 2, s. 19. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 279 
 
 Pharsalians, and gave them the city after its capture. 1 And it ap¬ 
 pears also, from divers passages of Demosthenes, that some of Philip’s 
 acts were unpopular among the Thessalians, or at least excited mur¬ 
 murs and complaints; for instance, his garrisoning of their towns, 
 and his appropriation of their public revenues; that during the first 
 few years of his connection with them he had some little difficulty 
 in keeping them under his command, and resorted occasionally to 
 harsh measures; and that at last he divided the country into te- 
 trarchies, placing his own creatures in the chief towns, to insure 
 their dependence on himself. 2 
 
 From these various statements, if we distinguish the different 
 times and circumstances to which they have reference, and make 
 due allowance for high coloring and exaggeration, we may gather, 
 not indeed an exact series of historical events, but a probable view 
 of the course of things. 
 
 Philip, when he entered Thessaly, never meant to put down the 
 tyrants of Pherae and then quietly go away; nor to set up the 
 Aleuads or any other aristocratical family in the place which that 
 dynasty had usurped. He intended to conquer Thessaly for himself, 
 and to use it as an instrument for ulterior purposes. But such con¬ 
 quest was not achieved by the defeat of Onomarchus, nor yet by 
 the capture of Pherae and Pagasae. It was not even certain that, if* 
 he advanced into Phocis and put an end to the Sacred War, the 
 Thessalians would afterwards follow him into Attica, or assist him 
 in any other aggressive movement of his own. 3 There was not 
 much reliance to be placed on the friendship or gratitude of that 
 people. 4 It was necessary to bring them entirely under his rule, 
 before he made any attempt against the Greeks south of Ther¬ 
 mopylae. How was this to be accomplished ? Partly by concilia¬ 
 tion and persuasion, partly by coercion and force. He must make 
 the Thessalians understand that Macedonian protection was indis¬ 
 pensable to them. With such view it was good policy to let the 
 
 1 Demosthenes, Orat. ad. Epist. 152. De Fals. Leg. 352, 353, 391, 
 
 392. He says of the Kalians, nal uvdararog tj 7r o?ug avruv 
 
 ■yiyove. Isocrates says, Philipp. 86, Tuv rcoheuv rtiv nepl rbv tottov 
 knelvov rug /ubv ralg Evepyeotaig rrpdg rijv avrov avppax'iav npoor/Krcu , rag 
 6b o<po6pa TiV'Kovaag avrov uvaarurovg ttettoitjkev. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, Olynth. i. 15 ; ii. 21, 22. De Cherson. 105. Philipp, 
 ii. 71; iii. 117, 119; iv. 148, 149. Orat. ad Epist. 153. De Coron. 
 241, 324. De Fals. Leg. 424, 444. Athenaeus, vi. 249. Harpocration, 
 sub. v. denadapxia. 
 
 3 Demosthenes, De Pace, 60. De Coron. 276. De Fals. Leg. 444. 
 ’Earaaia^e pbv avri j ru 0 erraPifiv, nal Qepaloi rcptirov ov ovvrjKohovOovv. 
 The Pheraeans were unwilling to follow him even against the Phocians, 
 to put an end to the Sacred War. Much more would they have been 
 reluctant to assist him in a private war of his own. 
 
 4 Demosthenes, contr. Anstocr. 657. 
 
 / 
 
280 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 Phocians gather new strength; and it was better also to let Lyco- 
 phron and Pitholaus retire with their adherents to a place of safety, 
 than entirely to uproot the regnant house and remove all fear of 
 their return. He knew again, that the same nobles who had invited 
 him to expel the tyrant would be dissatisfied with his own assump¬ 
 tion of power, though to the mass of the people it might not be so 
 unacceptable. He therefore made it his business to court favor with 
 the less wealthy classes, even with the Penestse, 1 who formed part 
 of the army; and strove to elevate them at the expense of the 
 nobility. The expression of Diodorus, that Philip restored freedom 
 to Pherae, may be literally true; 2 and he may have established in 
 that city a species of democracy. The Aleuads, who expected that 
 Pherae would be given up either to themselves or to parties in con¬ 
 nection with them, were indignant at Philip’s conduct; and gave 
 utterance' to their resentment in complaints and threats, the more 
 loud and vehement, as they were able with some justice to urge, 
 that, while he was meddling with the internal affairs of Thessaly, he 
 was neglecting his engagement to prosecute the Phocian war. A 
 party was formed against Philip, and it became necessary for him 
 either to intimidate his opponents, or to destroy their power and 
 influence. Strong measures were immediately adopted, such as 
 those indicated by Justin and Polygenus. Larissa was the strong¬ 
 hold of the Aleuads; and Philip, while he insulted and degraded 
 > the members of that ancient house, would take care not to leave so 
 important a city under their control. Of the manner in which he 
 proceeded to foment the divisions among the different cities of 
 Thessaly, we have no further particulars than those which have been 
 already stated. His operations at Pagasae must have been among 
 the earliest at this period. He there took possession of the shipping 
 and naval stores, and speedily turned them to account against the 
 Athenians, sending out cruisers to plunder their allies and seize the 
 merchant vessels in the HCgean. A Macedonian squadron made a 
 descent on Lemnos and Imbrus, and took some Athenian citizens 
 prisoners: another made a valuable prize of some merchantmen off 
 the southern coast of Euboea, and afterwards entered the bay of 
 Marathon and carried off the sacred galley. The Athenians now 
 discovered that not only their distant possessions, but those near 
 home, were in danger. Philip had for seven or eight years been 
 attacking them in Macedonia and Thrace; now he was threatening 
 even Attica itself. Demosthenes, in an assembly held at the close 
 of the year 352 b.c., delivered his first Philippic, in which he 
 
 1 Theopompus mentions one Agathocles (a Penest) who amused 
 Philip by his flattery and jesting powers, and was employed by him to 
 corrupt the Perrhaebians, and manage his affairs in their country. 
 Athenaeus, vi. 260. 
 
 2 noXei tt)v kTiEvdepiav uKodovc;. Diodorus, xvi. 38. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 281 
 
 specially notices these piratical excursions of Philip, and the damage 
 which they had done to Athens. 1 He makes, however, no allusion 
 to the place in which such expeditions were prepared; and it is 
 likely enough, that the proceedings of Philip in Thessaly were at 
 this time wholly unknown to him. One of the advantages resulting 
 to Philip from his occupation of the gulf of Pagasse was, that it 
 excluded the Athenians from communication with Thessaly by sea, 
 while it enabled him to carry on his intrigues in Euboea, and to 
 menace the neighboring islands, Sciathus, Halonnesus, and Pepare- 
 thus. 2 He also gathered a considerable revenue from the customs 
 and harbor-dues of Pagasse, which he took into his own hands 
 under the pretense at first of reimbursing himself for the expenses 
 of the war, and afterwards of maintaining a sufficient war establish¬ 
 ment for the defense of the country. To secure these advantages 
 to himself, he kept the city strongly fortified, and occupied it with 
 a Macedonian garrison. Having settled the affairs of the Phserean 
 kingdom, he turned his arms against the Magnetes and Perrhse- 
 bians. 3 Those tribes had perhaps asserted their independence of the 
 Thessalians, and refused to lend any assistance in the war against 
 Lycophron. Philip subdued them under the pretense of augment¬ 
 ing the security of Thessaly, but in reality for the purpose of 
 strengthening his own dominion. The city of Magnesia, which he 
 fortified and kept in his own possession, was conveniently situated 
 on the JEgean coast above the bay of Pagasse. 4 The Perrhaebians 
 commanded the passes of Mount Olympus, and by their conquest 
 an entrance to Thessaly was secured. 5 These proceedings occupied 
 Philip until the autumn of the year b.c. 352, when he entered upon 
 a Thracian expedition, which kept him actively engaged for about a 
 twelve-month; at the end of which time he fell ill, and was obliged 
 to return to his own kingdom. 6 During his absence the aristocrat- 
 ical parties began again to make head in Thessaly, and to intrigue 
 
 1 Demosthenes, Philipp, i. 49, 50. 
 
 2 Strabo, ix. 436, 437. Demosthenes recommends these islands as 
 winter quarters for the standing force which he proposed to establish 
 for the annoyance of Philip’s coast. (Philipp, i. 49.) The importance 
 which Philip attached to this position partly appears from the com¬ 
 plaints in his letter. (Epist. Philipp. 159.) Compare Demosthenes, 
 Philipp, iii. 120 ; iv. 133. 
 
 3 Isocrates, Philipp. 86. M dyvrjrar nal Tlepfiatfioiovg icac Uaiovag 
 
 KaTtarpanTat , nal iruvrag virrjKoovg avrovg elTirjtyev. 
 
 4 Grote thinks there was no city called Magnesia, but that this name 
 denotes the region only. (History of Greece, xi. p. 425, note 3.) It 
 looks as if a city were spoken of in Demosthenes, Olyntli. i. 13; ^epdg, 
 
 Tiayaadg, TAayvrjaiav, ndvd’ ov kfSovTiero evrpcmaag rpoKov. And also 
 in Polyaenus, Strateg. vi. 2. 
 
 6 Herodotus, vii. 128, 172. 
 
 • Demosthenes, Olynth. i. 13 ; iii. 29. 
 
282 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 against Mm. Exciting topics easily presented therftselves—Ms 
 retention of their cities and revenues, his arbitrary innovations, and 
 his intention to set himself up as a tyrant (no better than those of 
 Pherm) under the mask of a protector. Philip’s partisans on the 
 other hand were not idle : they reminded the people of his past ser¬ 
 vices, and promised that he would take the earliest opportunity of 
 chastising the Phocians and restoring the Pylaean congress. Not¬ 
 withstanding all their efforts, however, the opposite party obtained 
 a partial success, and adverse votes were passed in some of the 
 cities, asserting their own independence, calling upon Philip to 
 abandon his fortification of Magnesia, to make restitution of Pagasac, 
 and the like. 1 Things had taken such a turn, that the presence of 
 Philip was required to overawe the malcontents, and restore con¬ 
 fidence to his party. It happened fortunately for him at this crisis, 
 that an attempt was made by the exiled Pytholaus to recover Ms 
 power in Pheras. Philip’s adherents seized upon this as a pretext 
 for calling him into the country. Accordingly, about the middle of 
 the year b.c. 350 he re-entered Thessaly: his mere approach was 
 sufficient to frighten away the intruder; and all that remained for 
 him to do was, by liberal promises and politic measures to consoli¬ 
 date his power and popularity. 2 He was then preparing for the 
 Olynthian war, on the issue of which hung such important conse¬ 
 quences ; and he was glad to enlist under his standard the horse¬ 
 men of Thessaly. Many of them he kept permanently in Ms pay; 
 and, as victory and reward attached them to their commander, they 
 answered the double purpose of strengthening Ms army, and secur¬ 
 ing Ms ascendency in their native land. 3 
 
 1 Demosthenes, Olynth. i. 15. IT ayaodg dneiTeiv avrov eloiv EiprjtpLC- 
 /xevol, itai M ayvT]alav KeicG)?>vKaci teix'l&lv. The verb KEK.u'kvK.aci has 
 reference to intention only. The Thessalians endeavored to prevent 
 Mm by remonstrance. Compare Olynth. ii. 20, 21. In the first of 
 these passages he calls the Thessalians dEdov^upivoi. In drawing our 
 inferences from what Demosthenes says, we must make allowance for 
 the inaccuracy of his information, as well as for other things. That 
 there were meetings and debates in Thessaly, is indicated by the pas¬ 
 sages, De Cherson. 105 ; PMlipp. iv. 149 : Owe tjv do<paHg Myeiv iv 
 QETTalia to, $iM7nrov, /uj) ovvev'Kt'KOvdoTog tov TcH'jdovQ row Qetto^uv tu> 
 Tovg Tvpdvvovg ek/3o?i£lv QlXltttvov avTolg nai tt)v HvTialav a7rodovvai. 
 Here there is no doubt an exaggeration of the truth, for the sake of an 
 antithesis with what follows. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xvi. 52. The attempt of Pitholaus was so opportune for 
 Philip, that TMrlwall suspects him of having connived at it. (History 
 of Greece, v. 307.) Pitholaus however may have had a powerful party 
 in Pherse, who thought the occasion favorable for their coup d’etat. We 
 have seen that the Pheraeans showed reluctance to follow PMlip to the 
 Sacred War. Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 444. 
 
 3 Theopompus, apud Athen. iv. 167. 01 iTaipoi ovtov in no?.?iuv to- 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 283 
 
 I have carried the reader a little out of chronological order, to 
 give a clearer view of Thessalian affairs; and now return to the 
 more direct transactions of the Sacred War. 
 
 Phayllus, relieved by his allies from the pressure of immediate 
 danger, spared neither trouble nor expense to re-establish his own 
 military force. Drawing from the resources of the temple no less 
 profusely than Onomarchus had done, he now melted down the 
 golden ingots of Croesus, a hundred and seventeen in number, and 
 weighing two talents each or nearly; also the female Statue and 
 golden lion, and three hundred and sixty golden beakers, which to¬ 
 gether weighed thirty talents. All these were converted into coin. 1 
 The produce enabled him to make speedy levies of troops, and he 
 was soon strong enough to take the field in Boeotia. He was there 
 defeated in a severe engagement with the Thebans near Orchome- 
 nus, in another on the banks of the Cephisus, and in a third by 
 Coronea. It is not unlikely that the Thebans had advanced to be¬ 
 siege one or both of these cities, and that Phayllus had come to their 
 relief. His army, beaten in open field, took refuge within the walls, 
 and the Thebans, unable to follow up their victory, retired. Shortly 
 afterwards Phayllus made an incursion into Epicnemidian Locris, and 
 reduced all the cities'into his power, except Aryca or Naryx, from 
 which, after it had been betrayed to him in the night time, he was 
 driven out again with some loss. Leaving a force before it to carry 
 on the siege, he retreated into Phocis, but, while he was encamped 
 near Abae, he was surprised by the Thebans, who attacked him in 
 the night and killed a considerable number of his troops. Elated 
 with this success, they advanced further into the Phocian territory, 
 ravaged a large tract of it, and carried off a heap of plunder: re¬ 
 turning however through Locris to raise the siege of Aryca, they 
 were suddenly attacked and put to the rout by Phayllus; after 
 which he took the city by storm, and razed it to the ground. Thus 
 had he brought to a creditable issue a campaign checkered with 
 many reverses, when he was overtaken by a consumptive disease, 
 which, after long and painful suffering, terminated fatally b.c. 351. 
 In the manner of his death the ancient historian sees the visitation 
 of heaven. He was succeeded as general-in-chief by Phalaecus, 
 son of his brother Onomarchus, who, being a minor, was put under 
 the guardianship of Mnaseas, a friend of the family. 2 
 
 During these last occurrences both the Thebans and the Phocians 
 
 7tcjv r/aav cvvefifii njKorec’ ol plv ydp it; avrrjc rr/c ol c5’ etc GerraiUotf, 
 ol <5£ kic TTiq alXrjc 'E^Aadof. 
 
 ‘ Diodorus, xvi. 56, and Wesseling’s notes. Herodotus, i. 50, 51. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xvi. 38. Pausanias, x. 2 ; who says the disease of Phayl¬ 
 lus was the fulfillment of a dream, in which he fancied himself to be like 
 a certain skeleton statue, which had been presented to Apollo by Hip¬ 
 pocrates the physician. 
 
284 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 sent succors to their respective allies in Peloponnesus, where the 
 Lacedaemonians had commenced war against Megalopolis and Mes- 
 sene. The details of this I have given in another appendix. 
 
 The war was renewed by Mnaseas in Boeotia; but he having 
 been killed in a night-combat by the Thebans, Phalsecus himself 
 took the command. A cavalry action occurred near Chaeronea, in 
 which the Phocians were worsted; yet still they kept the field in 
 the enemy’s country, and at one time had succeeded in taking 
 Chaeronea, but were again driven out by the Thebans, who now, 
 reinforced by their troops returned from Peloponnesus, resolved on 
 attempting a diversion, by which, if they could not free their own 
 country from the presence of hostile garrisons, they would at least 
 retaliate the miseries of war upon their opponents. Accordingly 
 they invaded Phocis, and meeting with no resistance, laid waste 
 the greater part of it with fire and sword. One of the smaller 
 towns they captured, and returned laden with spoil into Boeotia. 1 
 
 Notwithstanding all the efforts of the Thebans, they were unable 
 to dislodge their enemies from the Boeotian fortresses, from which 
 they made continual incursions, and threatened them with further 
 conquest. It is probable that the mercenaries were employed in 
 this foreign service, while the native Phocians remained to defend 
 their homes. The Theban troops, consisting chiefly of heavy-armed 
 infantry, were superior in close combat to the mercenaries, who 
 were for the most part peltastae; this may account for the number 
 of Theban victories in the field : but the mercenaries were quicker 
 in their movements, easily rallied, and more efficient in desultory 
 fighting. Besides, the Theban army being composed of citizens, 
 their losses were not easily repaired; while the Phocian general 
 was continually recruiting his numbers, as all the fighting men in 
 Greece, who could find no better way to employ themselves, re¬ 
 paired to his camp for enlistment. Thus did the Thebans become 
 every year more and more embarrassed by the war, which at the 
 end of five years, instead of having accomplished the deliverance 
 of Delphi, had reduced them to contend with their neighbors for 
 supremacy in Boeotia. About 350 or 349 b. c., such was the low 
 condition of their finances, that they applied to the Persian mon¬ 
 arch for a subsidy, and received from him a present of three hun¬ 
 dred talents, which they shortly afterwards requited by sending a 
 thousand men under Lacrates to assist him in the re-conquest of 
 Egypt. Yet even this assistance did not enable them to achieve 
 any important advantage over their enemies; and the war was 
 kept up only by a repetition of petty skirmishes and mutual preda¬ 
 tory incursions. In the annals of Diodorus three consecutive years 
 following the Persian loan present a perfect blank; but his silence 
 will not warrant us in assuming that there was an entire cessation 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 38, 39. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xvi. 40, 44. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 285 
 
 of all warlike operations. We know that before the close of the 
 war the Phocians had taken Corsise, a city in the north-eastern part 
 of Boeotia, 1 and also the fortress of Tilphossaeum. 2 And yet Dio¬ 
 dorus never mentions the taking of either of these places, though 
 he casually alludes to the former as being in the possession of the 
 Phocians. 2 We collect also from other sources, that the war was 
 carried on both in Phocis and Boeotia; nor is it at all likely, either 
 that Phalsecus would keep his paid soldiers inactive in their quar¬ 
 ters, instead of employing them to annoy the enemy and gather 
 plunder, or that the Thebans would sit contentedly at home while 
 their territories were overrun and pillaged by the Phocian general. 
 The progress of the war was altogether to the disadvantage of the 
 Thebans. 4 
 
 In the summer of 348 b.c., the Thebans opened the campaign 
 with an invasion of Phocis, and gained a victory of no great im¬ 
 portance at Hyampolis. Returning home by Coronea, they encoun¬ 
 tered the army of Phalsecus, and were defeated with considerable 
 loss. Not discouraged by tills failure, they again entered and rav¬ 
 aged the enemy’s country, and again on their return suffered defeat. 5 
 We see by their style of warfare, that the Thebans knew but little 
 of the improved method of besieging fortresses, which Philip had 
 so successfully employed; or they were destitute of the means of 
 carrying on such operations. Annoyed and harassed though they 
 were by hostile garrisons in Boeotian cities, they make no vigorous 
 attempt to recapture them; but can only resort to the old system 
 of ravaging the land of their adversaries. 
 
 But while Phalsecus kept his ground in Boeotia, and conducted 
 the war there with success, his power was undermined by an ad¬ 
 verse party at home, who excited the people against him. It seems 
 that, as the spoliation of the temple was regularly continued, and 
 
 • 
 
 1 Pausanias, ix. 24. 
 
 2 Situated on a mountain of the same name, a little to the east of 
 Coronea. It was called also Tilphossium, or Tilphosium. There was a 
 fountain issuing from it, called Tilphosa, and near it the tomb of the 
 prophet Tiresias, who died after drinking its waters. Strabo, ix. 411, 
 413. Pausanias, ix. 33. 
 
 8 Diodorus, xvi. 58. In the same way he makes no mention of the 
 taking of Nicaea and Alponus. 
 
 4 Isocrates, Philipp. 93. HSschines, contra Ctesiph. 73, *74. Demos¬ 
 thenes, De Coron. 231. De Fals. Leg. 385, 387. E l%ov ye ’O pxop-evbv 
 Kal Kopuveiav Kal rb Tdl^wcr cralov, Kai rovg ev N eucuv aTTELXrqtyeaav avTuv , 
 Kai k(3dop.7/KovTa Kal diaKooiovc uireKToveoav km tu 'HdvAeiu, Kal Trpoira- 
 iov elotijkei, Kal lirnuKpuTovv, Kal KaKuv ’ITilag tceplelottikel QijPaiovc;. 
 We have no further historical information concerning the capture of 
 Tilphossaeum and the affairs at Neon and Hedyleum, which Demosthenes 
 alludes to as incidents well known at Athena. 
 
 ‘ Diodorus, xvi. 56. 
 
286 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 the treasures every year more and more sensibly diminished, the 
 moderate Phocian statesmen and the bulk of the people viewed the 
 affair with increased displeasure and alarm. The former generals 
 had given great offense by appareling their wives, mistresses, or 
 favorites, in some of the choicest ornaments of the temple, such as 
 the celebrated necklaces of Helen and Eriphyle. 1 Phayllus had 
 bestowed a golden ivy-wreath, a. present of the Peparethians to 
 Apollo, upon some favorite girl, a flute-player; and he introduced 
 her with this wreath to play the flute at the Pythian games; but 
 the audience would not permit her to appear. 2 The Phocians were 
 a simple people of primitive habits and tastes, insomuch that even 
 the better classes used to keep no servants in their houses, but the 
 younger members of a family waited upon the elder. They were 
 therefore a little scandalized, when the wife of Philomelus had two 
 female domestics to attend upon her; and far more so at the num¬ 
 ber of slaves soon afterwards brought into the country, who could 
 only subsist (it was thought) by eating the bread of the poorer citi¬ 
 zens. 3 Yet with all their luxury and extravagance, and with all the 
 shock which it gave to Phocian prejudices, the generals by means 
 of their military power, and by the success which usually attended 
 their arms, had silenced the murmurs of the people. But at length 
 it became obvious to every eye, that the fund which had supplied 
 their prodigality would in no very long time become exhausted; 4 
 and the Phocians in alarm began to ask themselves—“ What will 
 the Greeks say, when all the Delphian treasures are actually gone ? 
 and what means of defending ourselves shall we have then ?”— 
 Pear thus drove them into a condemnation of measures which they 
 had so long either sanctioned or tolerated. Phalaecus, at the sug¬ 
 gestion of one of his followers, had dug for a concealed treasure in 
 the very centre of the temple, under the ground of the prophetic 
 tripod. There was,a traditional belief, founded upon two verses in 
 Homer, 5 6 that immense riches lay under the stone floor of Apollo ; 
 and here they expected to find them. The soldiers however, who 
 began to excavate the ground, were stopped by an earthquake, 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 64. Athenaeus, vi. 231, 232. 
 
 2 Athenaes, xiii. 605 ; where other instances are quoted from Theo- 
 pompus. 
 
 3 Athenaeus, vi. 264. 
 
 4 Demosthenes, so early as 349 b.c., speaks of the Delphic fund as be¬ 
 ginning to be exhausted : ’Arceipr ]kotov xPW aaL 4>(j keuv. Olynth. iii. 30. 
 Compare Olynth. i. 16. Aeschines (De Fals. Leg. 45) partly attributes 
 the ruin of the Phocians to the failure of money to pay their troops: 
 
 K a,TE?ivOr)oav uTcopia xpvpdruv, E7TEidp KaTEfuodotyoprjcav t<X vndpxovra. 
 
 6 Iliad, ix. 404 : 
 
 Oik? oca Tiuivog ovdoe apropos evtuc EtpyEi 
 $oi/3ov ’AttoXXqvoc TlvOol iv\ neTprjeccy. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 287 
 
 which terrified all present: it seemed as if Apollo had given a sol¬ 
 emn warning, that the violators of his sanctuary would soon be 
 punished. The enemies of Phakecus were encouraged to try an 
 impeachment against him; and they accused him before the people 
 of having embezzled the sacred treasures. To have charged him 
 with expending them in the prosecution of the war would have 
 been palpably unjust. A distinction therefore was drawn between 
 their application to public and to private purposes. The people, 
 considering that Phalaecus had wasted the funds on objects of per¬ 
 sonal ambition and vanity, passed a vote of condemnation, and de¬ 
 posed him from his office. Three generals were elected in his room, 
 Dinocrates, Callias, and Sophanes, with instructions to make a search¬ 
 ing inquiry into the misapplication of the sacred fund. An account 
 was demanded of the persons through whose hands it had passed. 
 The chief manager was one Philo, who, not being able to render 
 any account, was convicted of embezzlement, and after suffering 
 the torture, betrayed his accomplices. They were all put to death; 
 the plunder which they had taken, at least what remained of it, was 
 restored, and brought into the public exchequer. It was computed, 
 that the aggregate of treasure, which had been taken from the Del¬ 
 phic temple since the beginning of the war, amounted in value to 
 more than ten thousand talents. 1 
 
 There could be little doubt, that such a wholesale destruction of a 
 property not only sacred in general estimation, but in some sort 
 national, would, as soon as its extent was fully known, raise a new 
 outcry against the Phocians in Greece. No one had ever been 
 known before to lay sacrilegious hands upon the Delphian temple. 
 The penalty which Xerxes paid for the attempt was a well-known 
 matter of history. 2 The proposal of the Corinthian envoy at 
 • Sparta, to borrow money from Delphi and Olympia for equipping a 
 fleet, had never been acted upon, though it may have given rise to 
 that clause in the treaty of peace, which provided for the security 
 of the sacred treasures. 3 Jason, as we have seen, was suspected of 
 designs upon Delphi, and his death was hailed with joy by the cities 
 of Greece. 4 A scheme is attributed to DionysiuSj of penetrating 
 through Epirus into Phocis, and seizing upon the temple; and it is 
 
 ‘ Diodorus, xvi. 56. Pausanias, x. 2. 
 
 a Ante, p. 238. 
 
 * Ante, p. 242. Compare Thucydides i. 143 ;• ii. 13. A borrowing 
 of the sacred moneys, with the intention of returning them, might upon 
 an occasion of necessity be unobjectionable and even proper. Thus the 
 Amphictyons made a loan to Clisthenes. (Isocrates, tt epl ’Ayridooeug, 
 s. 248. The advice of Hecataeus to the Milesians (which they rejected) 
 to take the treasures at Branchidae, more resembles the proceedings of 
 the Phocian generals. (Herodotus, v. 36.) 
 
 4 Ante, p. 255. 
 
288 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 related that, in order to get a footing on the Epirotic coast, he 
 entered into an alliance with the Illyrians, and assisted them to 
 restore Alcetas the Molossian to his kingdom ; but the project was 
 not carried any further. 1 Now, however, the whole accumulated 
 wealth of the sanctuary had been swept away by a people who 
 ought most especially to have been its guardians and protectors. 
 Such were the reflections likely to be made in Greece; and the 
 Phocians were filled with gloomy forebodings at the prospect before 
 them. 
 
 Their fears were soon'to be increased by more alarming intelli¬ 
 gence. The Thebans, worn out by a calamitous contest which there 
 seemed no hope of terminating by their own unaided efforts, deter¬ 
 mined to apply for succor to the king of Macedon. This fatal step 
 was taken in the year b.c. 347. Until then it does not appear that 
 the Thebans had ever desired his interference: fear or pride may 
 have prevented them from seeking it. But the continued encroach¬ 
 ment on their territories; the insults to which they were daily 
 exposed by marauding incursions, which not only weakened their 
 sway over the cities yet subject to them in Boeotia, but rendered it 
 unsafe to leave their home except with an armed force; again, 
 the shame of yielding to an adversary whom they once despised, 
 and a burning desire of revenge, overcame every other feeling. It 
 was just what Philip himself had most anxiously looked for. The 
 Thessalians had been long pressing him to take arms in the cause of 
 the Amphictyons; but the united petition of the Thessalians and 
 Thebans would invest him with a still more august character, and 
 enable him to terminate the war more easily. It excluded also the 
 probable contingency of a junction between Thebes and Athens, 
 leading to some peaceful settlement of the Phocian question. 2 He 
 did not hesitate, therefore, a moment in accepting the invitation of 
 the Thebans; and a solemn engagement was entered into between 
 them, and ratified by their mutual oaths, by which Philip bound 
 himself, with due support from his allies, to accomplish the deliver¬ 
 ance of Delphi, the punishment of the impious Phocians, and the 
 restitution of the Amphictyonic congress. 3 Diodorus says, that he 
 sent a small body of troops immediately into Boeotia, as an earnest 
 that he was sincere in the cause. 4 It is certain that Parmenio led 
 
 1 Diodorus, xv. 13. Other acts of sacrilege perhaps caused him to be 
 suspected of a design on Delphi; for example, his plunder of the tem¬ 
 ple at Agylla, ibid. 14. iElian Var. Hist. i. 20. He may, notwith¬ 
 standing this, have been impudent enough to rebuke the Athenians in 
 the manner related by Diodorus, xvi. 57. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, De Coron. 231. 
 
 3 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 443. De Pace, 62. 
 
 * Thirlwall (History of Greece, v. 340) says, the total silence of the 
 orators renders this statement of Diodorus suspicious; and that such an 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 289 
 
 an army this year into Thessaly, and proceeded at the request of 
 the Pharsalians to besiege Halus. He may have sent a few troops 
 across the gulf of Pagasae to Euboea, and thence to Boeotia. Their 
 presence may have encouraged the Thebans to try another invasion 
 of Phocis, in which they inflicted some loss upon the enemy, sur¬ 
 prising and dispersing a large body of them who were engaged in 
 erecting a fortress near Abae. The greater part of the Phocians 
 escaped; but five hundred, who fled for refuge into the temple, per¬ 
 ished by an accidental fire which consumed the sacred edifice. 1 
 
 Rumors of Philip’s hostile intentions having reached the Phocian 
 government, embassies were sent instantly both to Athens and to 
 Lacedaemon, praying for assistance. The most effectual means of 
 averting the threatened danger was to hold the pass of Thermopylae, 
 as before, which could not be done without the aid of a powerful 
 naval.force. The Phocian envoys offered to put the Athenians in 
 possession of the three fortresses, Alponus, Thronium, and Nicaea, 
 which commanded the entrance to Thermopylae. A decree was 
 passed by the Athenians, empowering their general Proxenus to 
 receive those places from the Phocians, and ordering an equipment 
 of fifty galleys and a muster of all their citizens fit for service under 
 thirty years of age. Proxenus, sailing with the Phocian envoys to 
 the Malian gulf, applied to the commanders of the fortresses, request¬ 
 ing them to be delivered up to him according to promise. Unfor¬ 
 tunately, however, the revolution which had taken place in Phocis 
 prevented the completion of this arrangement. It seems that Pha- 
 lsecus, after his deposition from office, still retained his command over 
 the mercenaries, whose confidence he possessed; and retiring from 
 Phocis, (if indeed he was not abroad when the revolution hap¬ 
 pened,) took up his quarters, as before, with the troops in Boeotia. 
 The commanders of the fortresses in Locris, as well as Boeotia were 
 his officers, and devoted to his cause. When the order came from 
 home, ^o deliver up the Locrian cities to the Athenians, Phalsecus 
 regarded it as an act of hostility to himself, rather than a measure 
 of defense against the common enemy; and so much did he resent 
 it, that he not only refused compliance with the order, but threw the 
 
 indication of Philip’s design must have excited attention at Athens. On 
 the other hand I may observe, that Philip from the first held himself 
 out as the professed enemy of the Phocians, and would not allow them 
 to be included in the treaty. It was only suggested by Aeschines, that 
 he would turn out to be their friend at the last. Moreover, it is likely 
 that Philip would be eager to secure the Thebans to his alliance by 
 some early demonstration of his good will. The-words of Diodorus are: 
 'O (5£ (lacuXEve f/decjc opuv tt)v Taneivuoiv avTuv, kclL fiovhopEvot; tu Aevk- 
 rpcKu (ppovTjpara cvoTEikai tuv Bolutuv, ovk ohiyovc utteoteiXe arparcu- 
 Ta^, avrb povov tyvTiaTTopevoc to 6okeIv pr/ irEpiopav to pavTslov oeovXtj- 
 pivov. I agree with Thirlwall, that the ovk should be omitted. 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 58. Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 891, 392, 395. 
 
 VOL. II —N 
 
290 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 Phocian envoys into prison, and insulted the Athenian heralds who 
 announced the truce of the Eleusinian myteries. This happened in 
 the month of Boedromion (September), 347 b.c. Soon afterwards 
 Archidamus arrived with a thousand Lacedaemonians, and offered to 
 guard the fortresses; but Phalaecus declined the offer, telling him 
 to mind his own business, and not trouble himself with that of the 
 Phocians. 1 Notwithstanding this answer, the Spartan king remained 
 for some time with his allies; and the Athenian fleet, which had - 
 been sent to the straits, was kept stationed at Oreus, to act as occa* 
 sion might require. 2 
 
 Thus, by the dissensions of the Phocian people, happening unfop 
 tunately at a most critical time, the Athenians were prevented from 
 occupying Thermopylae, the only measure which could prevent the 
 destructive inroad of Philip. There was time enough, however, to 
 rectify this false step. The pass might yet be defended: the Phocian 
 native troops and mercenaries united could form an army of twenty 
 thousand men; and, if well supported by their allies, would not be 
 vanquished very easily. Philip was aware of this, and with his 
 usual prudence studied how he could smooth his way to a certam 
 and easy conquest. His plan was to withdraw the Athenians from 
 the Phocian alliance, by concluding a separate peace with them; and 
 lest before the termination of the war they should change their 
 minds, he resolved to amuse them by deceitful promises, and lead 
 them into a false security, till it should be too late to save the 
 Phocians from ruin. That this was the general scheme of Philip, 
 and that it was ably and artfully accomplished by him, is certain. As 
 to the details of its execution-—and how far he was assisted by the 
 treason or by the culpable negligence of Athenian statesmen—there 
 is some degree of uncertainty, owing to the want of historical 
 information. 3 
 
 Already had Philip, even early in the year 347 b.c., caused it to 
 
 1 Aeschines, De Fals. Leg. 46. The rvpavvoi there mentioned are 
 the officers of Phalsecus. As to the whole of this passage, the reader 
 may profitably consult Thirlwall’s History of Greece, v. 367. Grote, 
 xi. 522, 523. Compare also Aeschines, De Fals. Leg. 33. Demosthenes, 
 
 De Fals. Leg. 364. 
 
 3 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 365, 389, 444. Diodorus, xvl 69. 
 
 * The materials for the history of these proceedings are chiefly de¬ 
 rived from the speeches of Demosthenes and ^Eschines on the Embassy 
 and the Crown, in which the orators not only frequently contradict each 
 other, but are not always consistent with themselves. We can not 
 therefore safely assume as true any one-sided statement in any of these 
 speeches, which is not supported by some collateral proof or strong 
 probability. There are many points of contention between them, rather 
 of a private and personal than of a political or historical bearing. 
 These I have generally passed over, confining myself to the prominent 
 and most important features of the embassies and negotiations* 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 291 
 
 be indirectly communicated at Athens, that he was desirous of 
 peace. According to HCschines, the intimation was first made by 
 some Eubcean envoys, who came to Athens to settle terms of peace 
 on their own account. 1 But not much attention was paid to them. 
 After the capture of Olynthus, the Athenians, exasperated against 
 Philip and terrified by his successes, passed vehement resolutions 
 against him in the assembly, and sent envoys to Peloponnesus and 
 elsewhere to warn the Greeks of the danger which threatened them 
 from his ambition. Tins was the occasion upon which JSschines 
 went to Arcadia, and addressed a violent Phillipic to the Ten 
 Thousand at Megalopolis. 2 About the same time Timarchus made 
 his motion, prohibiting, on pain of death, the carrying of arms or 
 naval stores to Philip. 3 Eubulus and his friends, who represented 
 the peace party at Athens, beginning now to see danger from Mace¬ 
 donia, looked to a reconciliation with Thebes as their best security, 
 and would gladly have taken measures to bring it about. Unhappily 
 the feelings of the two people were so embittered against each other, 
 that an amicable adjustment at this time was impossible, 4 and it was 
 soon discovered that there were no better hopes from the rest of the 
 Greeks, who could not be made to understand, that the cause of 
 Athens against Macedonia was one in which they were much inter¬ 
 ested themselves. 5 Under these circumstances, a renewal of Philip’s 
 pacific overtures met with a more favorable reception. He so con¬ 
 trived it, that they came through the mouth of Athenian citizens. 
 One Phrynon, complaining at Athens that he had been taken by a 
 Macedonian privateer during the Olympian truce, got himself to be 
 sent to Philip in the quality of an embassador, to recover the rffhsom 
 which he had been compelled to pay. 6 Ctesiphon was sent with 
 him, and brought back a report, not only that the ransom had been 
 restored, but that Philip professed the greatest good will towards 
 Athens, that he had reluctantly engaged in hostilities with her, 
 and was anxious to put an end to them. This report having been 
 well received by the people, Philocrates moved that Philip should 
 have permission to send a herald and embassadors to treat for peace. 
 The motion was carried without opposition: but the war party were 
 
 1 ^Eschines, De Fals. Leg. 29. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 344, 426, 427, 438, 439. HEschineB, De 
 Fals. Leg. 38. 
 
 8 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 433. 
 
 4 AEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 73. Demosth. De Coron. 237. Demos¬ 
 thenes himself was inclined to the same policy. HEschines, De Fals. 
 
 Leg. 42, 46, 47. Demosth. De Coron. 281. 
 
 6 AEschines, De Fals. Leg. 38. Demosthenes, De Coron. 231, 233. 
 
 6 There is a difficulty about the Olympic truce spoken of in the pas¬ 
 sage of JEschines, De Fals. Leg. 29. It has been conjectured that it 
 may refer to Philip’s Olympic festival at Dium. Thirlwall is inclined 
 to that opinion. But 6ee Grote, History of Greece, xi. 513, note S. 
 
292 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 still determined to try their strength, and they preferred an indict¬ 
 ment against Philocrates, charging him with having passed a 
 measure contrary to the spirit of the Athenian laws. He was de¬ 
 fended by Demosthenes, and acquitted, the accuser not obtaining a 
 fifth part of the votes. 1 It was evident that the current of feeling 
 at Athens w : as now for peace. The war, besides stripping them of 
 numerous possessions, had entailed on the Athenians a loss of fifteen 
 hundred talents; and the late conquest of Chalcidice had imperiled 
 their dominions in the Chersonese. 2 Athenian prisoners too had 
 been taken in Olynthus; among them Iatrocles, who was after¬ 
 wards embassador. The friends of these men, taking advantage of 
 the general feeling, presented a petition to the assembly, requesting 
 that their case might be considered. The appeal had its effect; and 
 the people consented that Aristodemus the actor might be sent to 
 Macedonia, to see what could be done on behalf of the prisoners, 
 and to ascertain what Philip’s intentions were on the subject of 
 peace. The commission was somewhat irregular, but the pro¬ 
 fessional character and celebrity of Aristodemus rendered him a sort 
 of privileged person. 3 He was absent for some time, engaged very 
 likely (together with Neoptolemus the actor, who obtained similar 
 leave of absence) in the Olympic festivities of Dium. His report 
 was, that Philip had the most friendly disposition towards Athens, 
 and wished to become her ally. Neoptolemus came back with the 
 same story: the appearance of Iatrocles, who had been liberated 
 without ransom, tended to confirm their statements. 4 
 
 Yet, notwithstanding these assurances of Philip’s desire for 
 
 10 
 
 1 Aeschines, De Pals. Leg. 29, 30. Contr. Ctesiph. 62. This state¬ 
 ment is made by iEschines alone, but it is abundantly clear that De¬ 
 mosthenes was at this time in favor of peace, having been disheartened 
 by the result of the Olynthian war. 
 
 2 ^Eschines, De Fals. Leg. 37. Demosthenes, Olynth. iii. 36. Philipp, 
 i. 52. De Syntax. 174. 
 
 3 Argumentum ii. ad Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 335. 
 
 4 iEschines, De Fals. Leg. 30. The order of these events is taken 
 from ASschines, and may perhaps be correct. Demosthenes appears to 
 differ from him in this only, that he makes Aristodemus to have first 
 mentioned the subject of peace. (De Coron. 232.) This indeed is not 
 absolutely inconsistent with the account of Aeschines; and it is not 
 clear that either of them pretends to give accurate details of the whole 
 proceeding. Compare Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 344, 371, 443. From 
 the statements of the two orators one is strongly induced to suspect, 
 that some at least of these men, Phrynon, Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, Ia¬ 
 trocles, and Neoptolemus, were from the first acting in corrupt concert 
 with Philip. Phrynon, if we can believe Demosthenes, was a man 
 steeped in infamy. (De Fals. Leg. 412.) Neoptolemus, after the peace, 
 sold all his property in Athens, and went to live in Macedonia. De- 
 mosth. De Pace, 58, 59. Diodorus, xvi. 92* 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 293 
 
 peace, the time passed on without his making any direct overture, 
 or sending any herald or minister to Athens. The Athenians, 
 having once entertained the hope of peace, became impatient for 
 its consummation; and their anxiety was still further increased by 
 the suspicious conduct of Phalsecus, and the apparent weakness of 
 the Phocian government. At length, upon the motion of Philo- 
 crates, a decree was passed, that ten embassadors should be sent to 
 ^ Macedonia, to open a treaty of peace, and discuss the terms with 
 " Philip. Thus was accomplished, by the agency of the same Philo- 
 crates, who continues henceforth to take the lead in every step of 
 this negotiation, the very thing which Philip had been contriving, 
 viz. that the first formal proposal for peace should come from the 
 Athenians. Ten embassadors were chosen accordingly—Demos¬ 
 thenes, JEschines, Aristodemus, Ctesiphon, Phrynon, Iatrocles, Phi- 
 loccates, Dercyllus, Cimon, and Nausicles—to whom was added 
 Aglacreon of Tenedos, as representative of the allies. Their instruc¬ 
 tions were, to ascertain positively whether Philip was desirous of 
 peace; and if he were, to bring embassadors from him with power 
 to conclude it. 1 
 
 A herald was sent before the embassadors, to procure them safe 
 conduct. They did not wait however for his return, but, having 
 sailed to Oreus in Euboea, they crossed over to Halus, then be¬ 
 sieged by Parmenio, and obtained permission to pass through his 
 lines to Pagasos, from which they pursued their journey to Larissa, 
 and there meeting the herald, proceeded with all the speed they 
 could to the Macedonian capital, and obtained an interview with 
 the king. This yras early in the year 346 b.c. The transactions of 
 the embassy are chiefly gathered from JEschines, who entertains us 
 with a good deal of gossip about the journey, and what passed 
 among the embassadors in private, but omits much that we should 
 have liked to know about more important matters. We are told 
 about the offensive conduct of Demosthenes towards his colleagues, 
 and his entire failure and breaking down in the attempt to address 
 Philip : we have an -account also of the speech made by JEschines 
 himself on the same occasion, in which he enlarged upon the 
 ancient connection between Amyntas, Philip’s father, and the 
 Athenians, and the grounds upon which his countrymen maintained 
 
 1 Argumentum ii. Demosth. De Fals. Leg. TU/j-ttovcu tovtov g eig 
 M anedoviav, Iva pddocuv ei per’ dTirjOeiag flovherai elfrijvrjv uyeiv 6 $ lKl'K- 
 Trog’ Kal ei d’X.rjdeg eonv, hveynai Trap' avrov 7rpeo(3eig rovg XrjTpopevovg 
 rodg op/covg. ASschines states, that Demosthenes was proposed by Phi- 
 loerates ; and that to obtain the services of Aristodemus on the embassy, 
 he being under an engagement to appear on the stage in certain Greek 
 cities, Demosthenes moved in the council, that envoys should be sent to 
 procure his release from the penalties. De Fals. Leg. 30. 
 
294 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 their right to Amphipolis. 1 Of the reply which Philip made to the 
 embassadors we learn nothing more, than that it was addressed 
 mainly to the arguments of JEschines; though we are assured that 
 he astonished them all by his good memory and powers of speech; 
 and still further charmed them by his hospitality and politeness at 
 the banquet. The end of it was, the embassadors brought back a 
 letter from Philip to the Athenians, in which he assured them that 
 he was desirous both of peace and alliance with Athens, that he 
 was inclined to be her friend, and he would have stated expressly* 
 what service he meant to render her, if he could have been sure of 
 being her ally. The terms of peace which he offered were, that 
 both parties should retain what they possessed; which of course 
 secured to Philip all his previous conquests, and, owing to a want 
 of firmness on the part of the Athenian envoys, enabled him to re¬ 
 tain conquests which he made between that time and the conclusion 
 of the treaty. Philip gave them to understand before they left 
 him, that he was about to march against Cersobleptes; yet no stip¬ 
 ulation was made on behalf of that prince, though he was an ally of 
 Athens: Philip only promised, that pending the negotiations for 
 peace, he would not attack the Chersonese. Whether any thing 
 passed between them on the subject of Phocis and the Sacred War, 
 we are not informed. The embassadors returned home with a 
 Macedonian herald about the first of Elaphebolion (March). Phil¬ 
 ip’s envoys were to follow shortly, to settle the terms of peace at 
 Athens. 2 
 
 A formal report of their proceedings was made by the embassa¬ 
 dors, in the manner required by Athenian law, first to the council 
 and afterwards to the popular assembly. Demosthenes, rising after 
 his colleagues, moved the formal grant of safe conduct and hospi¬ 
 tality to the Macedonian herald and embassadors; and further, that 
 the presidents of the council should, as soon as the embassadors 
 arrived, appoint two consecutive days for holding an assembly to 
 deliberate on the questions both of peace and alliance. He moved 
 also, as he had already done in the council, for the usual compli¬ 
 ments to the Athenian embassadors—a vote of thanks, and invita¬ 
 tion to dinner in the Prytaneum. The ministers of Philip, three 
 men of high distinction in their own country—Antipater, Parmenio, 
 and Eurylochus—arrived a few days after; and the eighteenth and 
 
 * See as to all these particulars Thirlwall, History of Greece, v. 342. 
 Grote, xi. 529. Leland’s Life of Philip, ii. 58. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 353, 354, 392, 421. De Halonn. 83, 85. 
 iEschines, De Fals. Leg. 31, 32, 33, 39. Contr. Ctesiph. 63. Demos¬ 
 thenes not only denies that JSschines spoke to Philip about Amphipolis, 
 but says he betrayed his country’s interests by not doing so. Here his 
 enmity somewhat perverts his judgment; for he must have known, that 
 Philip would never restore Amphipolis to Athens. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 295 
 
 nineteenth days of Elaphebolion were, on the motion of Demos¬ 
 thenes, appointed for discussing the questions of peace and alliance 
 with Philip. Demosthenes himself paid marked attention to the 
 Macedonian envoys, entertaining them handsomely at his own 
 house, and taking care that suitable places and comfortable seats 
 were provided for them at the Dionysian festival. 1 
 
 At the time when the embassy returned, there were assembled 
 at Athens the deputies of the Athenian confederacy, who had prob¬ 
 ably been sent for on the occasion. To them Aglacreon of Tenedos 
 made his report; and they on behalf of their constituents passed a 
 resolution, which, though it was not binding on the Athenians, it 
 behoved them, having regard to the interests of their whole em¬ 
 pire, duly to weigh and consider. Two clauses only of this resolu¬ 
 tion are preserved to us, by quotation in the speeches of AEschines. 
 One declared 2 —“ that, whereas the people of Athens were delib¬ 
 erating on the question of peace with Philip, and the embassadors 
 were not yet returned, whom the people had sent into Greece to 
 rouse the states in defense of Grecian liberty, it was the advice of 
 the confederates, that, after the embassadors had arrived and made 
 their report, the presidents should appoint two assemblies to be 
 held according to the laws for debating on the question of peace: 
 and whatever the people should decide, that should be agreed to by 
 the confederates.” The other clause recommended 3 —“ that any of 
 the Greek states should be at liberty within three months to be¬ 
 come parties to the treaty, by inscribing their names on the pillar 
 of record and taking the oaths.” These clauses are made by AEs- 
 chines the foundation of grave charges against Demosthenes— 
 namely, that by fixing an early day for the assembly, for which it 
 was impossible the Athenian envoys could return in time, he ex- 
 
 1 AEschines, De Fals. Leg. 34, 35, 36, 42. Contr. Ctesiph, 62, €3, 64. 
 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 414. De Coron. 234. AEschines says, De¬ 
 mosthenes played a practical joke upon him and his colleagues. On the 
 journey home he challenged them to speak, if they dared, in praise of 
 Philip to the people. Ctesiphon and himself accepted the challenge, 
 and in making their report talked about the good looks and agreeable 
 manners and pleasant companionship of Philip; Demosthenes then got 
 up, and reproved them for wasting the time of the assembly with idle 
 chit-chat. AEschines in the later speech, but not in the former, says, that 
 Demosthenes moved for an assembly to be held on the eighth of Ela- 
 phebolian, a day sacred to Aesculapius, and usually kept as a holiday. 
 His object is to prove the great anxiety of Demosthenes to hurry on the 
 peace. It is very possible that such a day may have been proposed, in 
 the expectation that the embassadors would arrive in time for it. There 
 is no doubt that Demosthenes was anxious for a speedy conclusion of 
 the peace. 
 
 a AEschines, De Fals. Leg. 35. 
 
 * AEschines Contra Ctesiph. 63. 
 
296 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 eluded all chance of benefit from their mission to the Greek states; 
 and further, that, by opposing the last clause of the resolution, he 
 prevented his countrymen acting in concert with the Greeks, which 
 would have been attended with this great advantage, that, if Philip 
 afterwards violated the treaty, they must have made common 
 cause with Athens. Demosthenes in answer to the charge asserts, 1 
 that there was no embassy at this time to the Greek states, for the 
 Greeks had all been tried long ago; and it would have been dis¬ 
 graceful to invite the Greeks to make war, when they were treat¬ 
 ing with Philip for peace: and he puts the following dilemma— 
 u For what purpose could you have been sending for the Greeks at 
 that crisis ? To make peace ? But they all had peace. To make 
 war? But you were yourselves deliberating about peace.” The 
 dilemma is a bad one for this reason, that the embassy had been 
 sent to the Greeks before any negotiation for peace was opened 
 with Philip. Yet the answer of Demosthenes was, I believe, sub¬ 
 stantially true: for the embassies to rouse the Greeks against 
 Philip had been dispatched six or eight months before, that of -<Es- 
 chines to Peloponnesus perhaps even earlier; and although it is 
 possible that some ofihe envoys had not returned by the month of 
 Elaphebolion, it had been pretty well ascertained, by the reports of 
 those that had returned, and from other sources, that no assistance 
 was to be expected from the Greeks; in fact, all thoughts of it had 
 been dropped at Athens, and the people had, partly on that very 
 account, been driven to seek for peace. This does not rest upon 
 the assertion of Demosthenes alone. iEschines justifies his own 
 conversion, from a strenuous opponent of Philip to a warm advocate 
 of peace, upon the ground that none of the Grecian states would 
 help Athens in her unequal war—that they were all either on 
 Philip’s side, or indifferent as to the issue of the contest. 2 Under 
 these circumstances, although the synod of allies might think proper 
 to revive this somewhat stale question of a Greek combination, and 
 to notice the possible contingency of some good result turning up 
 from the embassies, it can not surprise us that little attention was 
 paid to it by the Athenians. Demosthenes, in naming a day for the 
 discussion of the peace, fixed it without any reference to a resolu¬ 
 tion which would have postponed it indefinitely; and no objection 
 was raised by any one. The embassadors had very likely arranged 
 with Philip at Pella, that an early day should be appointed 
 for the conference with his ministers: and Demosthenes was 
 desirous that the treaty should be concluded as soon as pos- 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron. 233. Ovre yap rjv TTpeafieia npd<; ovdsvag 
 aneaTa'Xfj.Evri tote tuv 'EMqvov. AYe must take notice of the word tote. 
 There was no negotiation then on foot, no embassy whose return was 
 looked for. 
 
 a uEschines, De Fals. Leg. 38. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 297 
 
 sible, in order that Philip might have no time for making further 
 conquests. 
 
 The first assembly was held on the appointed day, the eighteenth 
 of Elaphebolion. Antipater and his colleagues attended, and were 
 introduced to the people in due form. The questions for discussion, 
 as prepared by the presidents of the council, were read: so was the 
 resolution of the confederacy. A motion was made by Philocrates, 
 embodying the terms of peace which Philip was willing to grant. 
 In the debate which followed, many points were hotly contested 
 between the different speakers. One was, whether there should be 
 peace only, or peace and alliance with Philip. Another was, 
 whether the Phocians and Halians should be included in the treaty. 
 Philocrates in his decree had inserted a special clause for their ex¬ 
 clusion, which he knew to be desired by Philip; but the sense of 
 the meeting was against him, and iEschines as well as Demosthenes 
 opposed the clause. 1 A discussion arose also upon that recom¬ 
 mendation of the allies, by which the Greek states were to have the 
 option of becoming parties to the treaty. According to .Eschines, 
 all the speakers (including himself) were in favor of it; and it was 
 the general opinion, that the alliance with Philip should be post¬ 
 poned until the Greeks had an opportunity of declaring themselves. 2 
 Many objections were raised to the terms offered by Philip, which, 
 it was said, involved concessions disgraceful to Athens, such as the 
 relinquishment of Amphipolis, Cardia, and other places of right be¬ 
 longing to her. Eubulus told the people what he considered the 
 plain truth, that they must either go down to the Piraeus imme¬ 
 diately, pay a property-tax, and convert the theatric fund into a 
 military one, or vote for the decree of Philocrates. 3 Notwithstand¬ 
 ing his admonition, the vehemence of anti-Macedonian orators 
 made an impression on the assembly. 
 
 The next day Demosthenes endeavored to allay the ferment which 
 had been excited. He advised the people to accept the proffered 
 alliance of Philip, pointing out to them the true position of things; 
 that it would be imprudent as well as inconvenient to postpone the 
 question—that it was one which concerned them and their allies 
 only, not the whole body of the Greeks—and that there was no ne¬ 
 cessity for people who were not at war with Philip to enter into a 
 treaty of peace with him. 4 At the same time he insisted that all the 
 
 1 That Eschines opposed the decree of Philocrates on the first day, 
 is stated by Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 345 ; and this was probably 
 the chief ground of his opposition. Grote however thinks differently. 
 See his reasons, History of Greece, xi. 546. 
 
 2 Aeschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 63. 
 
 * .Eschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 37, 38. Demosth. De Pace, 63. De Fals. 
 Leg. 434. 
 
 4 Demosthenes asserts (De Fals. 
 
 N 
 
 Leg. 345, 386), that he supported the 
 
298 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 allies of Athens should be comprehended in the treaty, condemning 
 as unjust and impolitic the proposal of Philocrates to exclude the 
 Phocians and Halians. AEschines spoke to the same effect, but still 
 more strongly, and in the strain of Eubulus, showing the folly and 
 danger 'of carrying on war without adequate means—reproving those 
 speakers who by unseasonable counsel would hurry on the people 
 to their ruin—and reminding them that, although the peace offered 
 by Philip might not be the most honorable in the world, it was not 
 more disgraceful than the war had been. The result was, that an 
 amended decree was carried, omitting the obnoxious article which 
 excluded the Phocians and Halians, but in other respects coinciding 
 with the original motion of Philocrates. It established peace and 
 alliance between Philip and the Athenians and their respective allies, 
 and secured to each party all such territory and dominion, whether 
 acquired by conquest or otherwise, as each actually possessed at the 
 time.J 
 
 To give any thing like a history of what passed in these assemblies, 
 one has to choose between the conflicting statements of the rival 
 orators. I reject as entirely false the assertion of AEschines, 2 that 
 there was no debate on the second day, notwithstanding the evi¬ 
 dence which he produces of a decree of Demosthenes, which re¬ 
 stricted the business of that day to taking the votes. In the first 
 place, the proof offered is suspicious and doubtful; and in the next 
 
 resolution of the allies. If by this he meant the clauses quoted by AS schines, 
 the assertion is not credible, since by his own showing (De Coron. 233) 
 there could have been no use in supporting them; nor does he pretend 
 in the later speech, where he replies to Aeschines, that he did support 
 them. It is possible however, that he refers to some other suggestion 
 in the decree which is not preserved, or to some general words recom¬ 
 mending a fair and equitable peace. In the first passage, ijuov to tov 
 ovfifxdxuv ovvrjyopovvTog doypaTL Kai tt/v elpr/vrjv ottos lor/ Kal ScKaia 
 ykvr/Tai ttputtovtos, the latter clause is explanatory of the former; so 
 that it signifies, “ when I, in conformity with the resolution of the allies, 
 labored to make the peace equitable and just.” In what particular 
 equitable and just, he does not say: he may refer either to the ques¬ 
 tion of including the Phocians, or to some other which is not mentioned. 
 We gather nothing definite from it. Nearly as vague is the assertion 
 at page 385. He affects however to disclaim all participation in the 
 decree of Philocrates, which is too improbable to be believed. Com¬ 
 mon experience shows how easy a thing it is, to misreport what a man 
 has said some time ago. 
 
 ' Aeschines, De Fals. Leg. 36—38. Contr. Timarch. 24. Contr. Cte- 
 siph. 63, 64. Demosthenes, De Halonn. 82, 83. De Coron. 234. De 
 Fals. Leg. 354, 385. That an attempt was afterwards made to bring all 
 the Greek states within the protection of the treaty, appears from the 
 oration De Halonn. 34. 
 
 2 De Fals. Leg. 36. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 299 
 
 place, the fact is inconsistent with other statements of his own. Let 
 us see how the matter stands. Demosthenes accuses him of having 
 spoken against Philocrates on the. first day, and in his support on 
 the second day. JSschines says: he could not have been guilty of 
 this, because there was no speaking allowed on the second day, by 
 reason of the decree which he produced. Now, supposing that there 
 was a decree which prohibited speaking, it is still very possible that 
 the irregularity might be committed, perhaps encouraged by the 
 people, or at least not objected to. iEschines should have produced 
 a witness to prove that there actually was no speaking, rather than 
 a documentary piece of evidence which only shows that there ought 
 to have been none, and is but an argumentative denial of the fact. 
 It appears that he came prepared to meet the charge, and therefore 
 we might expect better proof. But further; according to his own 
 statement, it is certain that this decree was not acted upon: and next 
 to certain, that there was a debate on the second day, in which iEs- 
 chines spoke more strongly in favor of the motion of Philocrates than 
 he had spoken on the first day. He says in the speech against Ctesi- 
 phon, 1 that on the first day all the orators (including himself) sup¬ 
 ported the recommendation of the allies, to bring the Greek states 
 into the treaty; that, when the assembly broke up, the general 
 opinion was, that it was not advisable to conclude an alliance with 
 Philip, till it could be done in conjunction with the Greek body. If 
 so, what caused the people to change their opinion the next morning? 
 How came they to pass the decree for alliance as well as peace ? 
 There must have been another debate; and that there was one, is 
 clear from AEschines himself, who says that Demosthenes addressed 
 the assembly. He says indeed, that Demosthenes cut the matter 
 very short; by simply telling the people that Philip would not have 
 peace without alliance, 2 and appealing to Antipater (with whom he 
 was in concert) in support of his assertion, he forced the assembly 
 to pass the decree of Philocrates. To suppose however that Demos¬ 
 thenes could have carried his point in this off-hand way, is out of the 
 question. The additions we may set down as rhetorical exaggera¬ 
 tion. The fact remains, that Demosthenes did address the people, 
 overthrowing the argument that no one could have done so; and 
 the change of opinion to which they were brought is a strong cir¬ 
 cumstance to prove that there was a regular debate. But again, 
 jEschines says, 3 he sided on the first day with all the speakers who 
 
 1 Contr. Ctesiph. 63. 
 
 5 Demosthenes said, “ they must not dissever the alliance from the 
 peace.” Ov yap e<p7j Selv uTrofifif/tjai tt/c; dpf/vric tt)v avfi/iaxLav. JEschines 
 says, he remembers his using these words, on account of the harshness 
 both of the phrase and the manner. 
 
 * Cont. Ctesiph. 63. Tovrcp t£> doyfian gweitteiv 6/xo\oyu. 
 
800 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 advised postponement of the alliance with Philip. He says also, 1 
 that he advised the measure which was ultimately carried. These 
 two statements are irreconcilable, except on the supposition that he 
 spoke on both of the assembly days; for on the first he was (by his 
 own admission) a dissentient to one of the most important articles, 
 and, as this ultimately passed, he must have supported it on the 
 second day. Thus by his own showing iEschines stands convicted 
 of paltering with the truth. I do not hesitate therefore in accepting 
 the statement of Demosthenes to this extent, that JEschines, in the 
 assembly held on the nineteenth of Elaphebolion, spoke decidedly 
 and strongly in favor of the amended decree. 
 
 On the other hand, it appears to me that Demosthenes, when he 
 accuses iEschin.es of having entirely shifted his ground on the second 
 day and given disgraceful advice to the Athenians, deals unfairly 
 with his adversary, and misrepresents the import of what he really 
 said. 2 The position of things at the beginning of that day has al¬ 
 ready been stated. In the previous debate the more violent orators 
 of the war party had talked about Marathon and Salamis, and the 
 great deeds of their ancestors, and the duty of upholding Grecian 
 liberty; themes proper and pertinent enough on some occasions, but 
 so often enlarged upon and misapplied by third-rate speakers on the 
 Athenian platform, that sober-minded statesmen must have been 
 heartily sick of them. iEschines, rising to combat the arguments 
 of these men, told the people that this was not the time for empty 
 
 1 iEschines, De Pals. Leg. 38. 'OpoTioyu cvp^ov^Evcac t& djj/uu dia- 
 TivaacOai npo£ ^IXittkov nal rr/v elprjvrjv ovvOeoOcu, rjv cv vvv aiaxpav vo- 
 fii^ELq ovde7TW7ro0’ aipdpevog okTlov, h/u tie tclvttjv elvcu 7roA/lw (f>Tjpl ac«A- 
 Xlo) tov tto?J/iov. Compare the same Oration, p. 49 ; and Contr. Tim- 
 arch. 24. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, De Eals. Leg. 345, 346, 439. The assertion that 
 JEschines gave this disgraceful advice in the presence of the Greek en¬ 
 voys is an aggravation of the charge, which is not very material in itself, 
 but has given rise to some difficulty ; since iEschines positively denies 
 that any Greek envoys had arrived in Athens, and boldly challenges 
 Demosthenes to name them ; and it has been thought to be inconsistent 
 with the denial, given by Demosthenes himself, to the fact of their being 
 any negotiation with the Greek cities. (See ante, p. 296.) It does not 
 seem to me, that the presence of some Greek envoys at Athens is in¬ 
 consistent with that denial. They may have brought refusals to co-ope¬ 
 rate with Athens ; or they may have been sent merely to watch the 
 proceedings there ; or there may have been Greeks present at the assem¬ 
 bly, without any special mission from their own countries, whom De¬ 
 mosthenes incorrectly dignifies with the title of envoys. The sugges¬ 
 tion of Thirlwall, (History of Greece, v. 350,) that by these envoys De¬ 
 mosthenes may have meant the deputies of the allies then present in 
 Athens, does not agree with the words: ovc unb rtiv 'EA/byvwv /liete- 
 nepipaode vnb tovtov nEiadivTsc. See Grote’s learned note on this sub¬ 
 ject : History of Greece, xi. 539. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 301 
 
 declamation about ancient trophies and glories, when the question 
 before them was, how to get rid of a war which they had been 
 wao-ifig many years without either glory or advantage; that the 
 Greeks during all those years had rendered them no assistance, and 
 they were not bound to fight the battle of Greece by themselves 
 without any reasonable chance of success. He advised them there¬ 
 fore to retire from the contest while they had the opportunity, be¬ 
 fore any irretrievable disaster had fallen upon the republic; warning 
 them emphatically against those hazardous and desperate courses, 
 into which evil counsels had plunged the Athenians in former times, 
 referring more particularly to the Sicilian expedition, and to their 
 refusal to accept the peace offered by Sparta before the end of the 
 Peloponnesian war. 1 
 
 Such is the account which iEschines gives of his own speech, not 
 only highly probable in itself, but exactly agreeing with what De¬ 
 mosthenes says in the Oration on the Crown, 2 viz., that the Athe¬ 
 nians were driven to make peace with Philip by the conduct of the 
 rest of the Greeks, who, out of cowardice or ignorance, refused to 
 lend any help in the common cause. Demosthenes, however, tor¬ 
 tures the language of his opponent into something very different; 
 as if he had counseled the Athenians to forget their ancestors alto¬ 
 gether, to shut their ears against all mention of the trophies of olden 
 time, and never to succor any people who had not previously suc¬ 
 cored them. Language of this sort would indeed have been too 
 absurd for any Athenian to utter in the assembly. Yet we may 
 observe how easily, by a little exaggeration or omission, what iEs- 
 chines really said is converted into what Demosthenes reports him 
 to have said. JEschines advises the Athenians “ not to listen to men 
 who talk about ancient glories idly and unseasonably.” Repeated 
 by the adversary, this becomes advice “ not to listen to them at all, 
 or under any circumstances.” Thus do the two orators, in their 
 mutual charges and recriminations, pervert and misrepresent the 
 words and acts of one another. iEschines ransacks the public 
 archives for documents to prove a case against Demosthenes, which 
 he knew to be contrary to the generally received opinion of his 
 countrymen; that throughout these proceedings he had acted with 
 corrupt purpose in concert with Philocrates to serve the interests of 
 Philip. 3 * * * * 8 Demosthenes, over-anxious to disconnect himself from 
 
 1 AUschines, De Fals. Leg. 87, 38. 
 
 a Demosthenes, De Coron. 231. 'H ru>v dWkav '~EiXkrjvuv elre XP^I 
 
 Ktav elr J uyvotav elre nal (ip6b~epa ravT* elnslv, ol TzoTiepov awexv nal 
 
 paicpbv noXepovvTuv vptiv, teal tovtov vtt bp tuv nucu avpcpepovruv, 
 
 ipy(p (pavepov yeyovev, ovte xpvp-Q-oiv ovre oupacuv ovt’ dXXu ovdevl tuv 
 
 dnavTuv ovve\ap.i3avov vp.lv‘ olg nal diKdiug' nal npoarjicovToc opyiCopevoi 
 
 trolpuc vTTT]KovoaTe 
 
 8 iEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 62, 65, 
 
302 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 Philocrates, with whom there is no doubt that up to a certain period 
 he had unsuspiciously co-operated, strives to conceal the part which 
 he took in the first instance as a joint promoter of the peace,* and 
 lays to the charge of HEschines many tilings for which he is himself 
 * at least equally responsible. 1 
 
 The terms of peace having been agreed upon, it remained that 
 the oaths of ratification should be sworn by both parties, by Philip 
 and his allies on the one side, and the Athenians and their allies on 
 the other. In order to administer the oath to Philip and his allies, 
 it was necessary for the Athenians to appoint another embassy; and 
 within a day or two after the nineteenth 2 they elected the same ten 
 embassadors as before. The Athenians and their alhes were to have 
 the oaths administered to them at Athens by the Macedonian envoys, 
 and an assembly was held on the twenty-third, to make the neces¬ 
 sary arrangements. 3 Here a question arose; what allies of the 
 Athenians were entitled to take the oaths ? It principally concerned 
 the Phocians. Philocrates had already informed his countrymen 
 that Philip would not accept them as parties to the treaty, and had 
 on this ground moved the clause for their exclusion. The rejection 
 of that clause by the Athenians was a virtual declaration that they 
 regarded the Phocians as comprehended under the name of allies. 
 Antipater and his colleagues, having positive instructions from Philip 
 not to enter into any terms of peace with the Phocians, were com¬ 
 pelled to speak out, and accordingly they gave formal notice to the 
 Athenian people of their master’s determination upon this point. 
 The assembly was adjourned to the next day for further considera¬ 
 tion. 4 
 
 Meanwhile Philocrates and his associates concerted their scheme 
 of operations. It has already been mentioned what impression had 
 
 \ 
 
 x 
 
 1 Demosthenes says as little as possible in either of his. speeches 
 about the proceedings between the first opening of the negotiations with 
 Philip and the debates on the treaty; nor does he seek to give any 
 clear account of his own share in the transactions of that period. He 
 answers iEschines by vague generalities, denying that he had any thing 
 to do with Philocrates, or was in any way accountable for the mischievous 
 diplomacy of him and his associates. (De Coron. 232.) 
 
 2 All that we can gather from .Eschines is, that the election took 
 place before the twenty-third. (De Fals. Leg. 39.) 
 
 8 It seems to have been necessary to pass a distinct decree, fixing the 
 time and manner of talcing the oaths. See JEschines, Contr. Cte- 
 siph. 64. 
 
 4 From the statements of ^Eschines, (De Fals. Leg. 39, 40; Contr. 
 Ctesiph. 64,) though they are confused, we may perhaps collect, that 
 there were two assemblies. The first may not have been well attended, 
 as only formal business was expected; but when questions arose about 
 the Phocians and Cersobleptes, it became desirable to have another 
 assembly. 
 
THE SACKED WAR. 
 
 303 
 
 been made on the Athenians by the reports which Aristodemus and 
 others brought from Macedonia, of Philip’s good will and friendly 
 feelings to Athens. His own letter, brought by the embassadors, 
 spoke mysteriously of the benefits which he designed for them in 
 the event of becoming their ally. Assurances to the same effect were 
 repeated by his envoys, and studiously disseminated among the 
 Athenians by his partisans and agents. To those who inquired what 
 Philip could mean by such mysterious promises, hints were given 
 about Euboea, Oropus, Thespiae, Plataea, the settlement of the Pho- 
 cian question, and the humiliation of Thebes. How, however, when 
 Philip’s ministers had announced that the Phocians must be excluded 
 from the general peace, it became necessary, in order to disarm sus¬ 
 picion of his intentions, that some explanation, resting on better 
 authority than mere rumor, should be given to the Athenian public. 
 Accordingly, on the day of the assembly, Philocrates came forward, 
 and in the presence of the Macedonian envoys boldly proclaimed to 
 the Athenians, that it was impossible for Philip, with any regard to 
 honor or decency, to accept the Phocians openly for his allies, be¬ 
 cause he was bound by solemn engagement with the Thebans and 
 Thessalians to prosecute the Sacred War; he must, therefore, osten¬ 
 sibly treat the Phocians as enemies for the present; but let him 
 once bring the war to an issue, and get the power into his own 
 hands, he would settle matters exactly as the Athenians desired; 
 the Phocians would be no sufferers by it, the Thebans would be no 
 gainers, and Philip would prove himself the friend and benefactor of 
 Athens, as he had promised in his letter. The Macedonians stood 
 by, and apparently assented to all this. Philocrates pretended to 
 speak from his own knowledge and information, as the confidante of 
 Philip’s views and plans; appealed, perhaps, to some of his colleagues 
 in the embassy, who confirmed his statements. No one stood up to 
 contradict him. What were the Athenians to do? The Phocian 
 question was altogether complex and difficult. On the one hand, 
 the seizure and pillage of Delphi, the exclusion of Amphictyonic 
 Greeks from the Pythian festival and synod, the occupation of Lo- 
 cris and a part of Boeotia by the Phocian army, were things not to 
 be defended. There was a general expectation that, as the Delphic 
 fund was beginning to fail, the Phocians could not much longer 
 maintain their position; and the inclination of the Athenians to as¬ 
 sist them had been greatly cooled by the late offensive conduct of 
 Phakecus. On the other hand, it would not be very honorable to 
 abandon allies with whom they were connected by treaty, and to 
 whom they had for so many years given a moral, if not an active 
 support. There would be danger attending the prostration of an 
 independent people, whose existence formed one of the safeguards 
 of southern Greece; and still greater peril, if Thermopylae should 
 fall into the hands of a powerful enemy. But how, if the solution 
 of all these difficulties was now before them ?—if Pliilip really in- 
 
304 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 tended to act as equitable mediator in the Sacred War, and fulfill 
 the promises which had been made in his name? The Phocians 
 would have no reason to complain, if they were really benefited 
 even against their will. The only doubt was, could Philip be trusted ? 
 But there was not much time for deliberation: the Macedonian en¬ 
 voys were about to quit Athens immediately. Unless their demands 
 were complied with, there was an end of the peace, which the 
 Athenians had made up their minds to have, and enjoyed by antici¬ 
 pation already. If they wavered for a moment, their wishes turned 
 the scale. It does not appear that there were any Phocian envoys 
 to protest against this sacrifice of their country; or that a single 
 warning voice was heard from any leading orator or statesman. 
 The Athenians were prevailed on by delusive promises, encouraging 
 their natural indolence, to swear to the treaty of peace without the 
 Phocians. 1 
 
 A question had also arisen about Cersobleptes. One Aristobulus 
 of Lampsacus appeared as his representative, and demanded to take 
 the oath in his name as one of the allies of Athens. An objection 
 was made, as JEschines states by Demosthenes, and, being referred 
 to the assembly, was overruled. Notwithstanding the decision of 
 the people, JEschines asserts in his later speech, that Cersobleptes 
 was excluded ultimately, but upon another ground, by the contriv¬ 
 ance of Demosthenes. It is impossible to determine what really 
 took place. 2 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 371, 387, 388, 391, 409, 444. There is 
 nothing to show that iEschines spoke in support of Philocrates in this 
 matter. The use of the plural ovtol, in the passage last cited, is no 
 proof that more than one person spoke; and it rather tends to prove 
 that iEschines /lid not. For if he had, Demosthenes would have men¬ 
 tioned him specially, as he does at p. 347, in reference to his reports 
 after the second embassy. It is probable that both Aeschines and Demos¬ 
 thenes were passive on this occasion. Neither of them gives us any 
 particulars of what passed; and each had his reasons for silence. The 
 decree perhaps contained the words mentioned in iEschines, Contr. 
 Ctesiph. 64, requiring the oaths to be taken by the deputies of the 
 Athenian allies; and possibly it was so drawn up for the very purpose 
 of shuffling over the difficulty about the Phocians, who, having no deputy 
 representing them at Athens, like the tributary allies, would not be 
 competent to swear to the treaty under a decree in such form. It then 
 may have accidentally created the question about Cersobleptes, which 
 uEschipes represents as designedly raised by Demosthenes, in order to 
 shut him out from the treaty. 
 
 2 -ZEschines, De Fals. Leg. 39, 40. Contr. Ctesiph. 64. Demosthenes, 
 De Fals. Leg. 395, 398. Philipp. Epist. 160. And see the last note. 
 It seems, by comparison of all the passages, that Cersobleptes was ex¬ 
 cluded from taking the oath; but on what ground, or through whose 
 opposition, is uncertain. Thirl wall’s conjecture is by no means improb- 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 305 
 
 The oaths were administered to the Athenians and their allies in 
 the board-room of the generals, on the same day that the assembly 
 passed their last decree. The Macedonian envoys then took their 
 departure, Demosthenes accompanying them, as a mark of respect, 
 a part of the way on their road to Thebes. 1 For this, as well as 
 for the other attentions which he paid them, he is reproached by 
 iEschines unjustly. The fact however is significant, as tending to 
 show, that up to that moment Demosthenes was not in opposition 
 to the promoters of the peace. It suited him at a later period to 
 represent, that he was disgusted with his colleagues before the sec¬ 
 ond embassy to Macedonia, and that he would not have accepted 
 the appointment, if he had not promised some of the Athenian 
 prisoners to bring money for their ransom. 2 But there is no evi¬ 
 dence of any act by which he testified displeasure against his col¬ 
 leagues or dissatisfaction with the treaty before his second appoint¬ 
 ment. He felt indeed, in common with the rest of his countrymen, 
 that the peace was not honorable to Athens; nor was it to be ex¬ 
 pected, when she had fared so badly in the war: yet still it drew 
 with it certain advantages, such as financial relief, security for her 
 remaining possessions, restoration of her captives: and as to other 
 matters, he shared to some extent in the general delusion. 3 
 
 It was deemed however a point of great moment by Demosthe¬ 
 nes, that the peace should be ratified by Philip immediately and 
 commenced in earnest. The Athenians, having once abandoned 
 themselves to the idea of peace, had from that moment discontinued 
 all warlike preparations; whereas Philip was still carrying on war 
 in Thrace. In order to put a stop to any further conquests, it was 
 important to give Philip speedy notice of the treaty having been 
 concluded; and Demosthenes pressed his colleagues to set off with¬ 
 out delay. They however were in no humor to leave Athens so 
 soon, and refused to comply with his entreaties. About this time 
 there arrived a letter from Chares, who commanded an Athenian 
 fleet in the Hellespont, announcing the defeat of Cersobleptes and 
 the capture of the Sacred Mountain by Philip. The case seeming 
 urgent, Demosthenes on the third of Munychion (April) applied to 
 the council, (of which he was a member, and which had a special 
 authority for such purpose from the assembly,) and procured an or¬ 
 der, commanding the embassadors to take their departure instantly, 
 and requiring Proxenus to convey them wherever he could ascer- 
 
 able; that an objection was raised by the Macedonians, and that it 
 was reserved by mutual consent to be discussed in a conference with 
 Philip. (History of Greece, v. 356.) 
 
 1 HSschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 64. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 394, 395. He felt the weakness of 
 that part of his case, and anticipates the adversary’s objection. 
 
 * Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 387, 388. 
 
306 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 tain Philip to be. The embassadors, thus compelled, sailed to Oreus, 
 where Proxenus was stationed with his squadron; but instead of 
 his conveying them to the Hellespont or the coast of Thrace, which 
 they might have reached easily in six or eight days, they were car¬ 
 ried to the coast either of Thessaly or Macedonia, and thence pur¬ 
 sued their journey to Pella, consuming three-and-twenty days. At 
 Pella they had to wait till Philip returned from his campaign, which 
 did not happen till the fiftieth day after they had left Athens. 1 
 
 The variance between Demosthenes and his colleagues began 
 upon this journey. He told them plainly that they were bound to 
 obey the order of the council; first he reasoned with them, then he 
 remonstrated more strongly, at last he reproached them for their 
 conduct in no lenient terms. All tins only excited their anger. 
 The whole body were against him, and refused either to take their 
 meals with him, or to put up at the same inn. iEschines says this 
 refusal was owing to the misbehavior of Demosthenes on the for¬ 
 mer embassy; and he defends the journey to Pella, by alleging 
 that they were not ordered to go to Thrace, and that it would have 
 been of no use to go there, when Cersobleptes had lost his kingdom 
 before they left Athens. It is manifest however, that the order of 
 council was disobeyed both in the letter and spirit; and, as HEs- 
 chines can suggest no better excuse, the complaint of Demosthenes 
 on this head must be taken as well founded. The event proved 
 that Philip’s Thracian campaign was not terminated when the em¬ 
 bassadors quitted Athens: it continued for five or six weeks after; 
 and during that time many important places were captured by him. 
 The son of Cersobleptes he brought with him as a hostage to 
 Pella. 2 
 
 There he found not only the Athenian embassadors awaiting his 
 arrival, but others also from various parts of Greece ; from Thebes, 
 Thessaly, Sparta, Phocis, and Euboea. An immense army was as¬ 
 sembled : it was notorious to all that Philip was about to march to 
 Thermopylae: what he intended to do was not certainly known to 
 any of the parties present; but all were deeply interested in the 
 result, and agitated by various hopes and fears. 3 
 
 The duty of the Athenian embassadors was by no means clear. It 
 might be argued, that they had nothing to do but to administer the 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron, 233—235. De Fals Leg. 388—390. -dEs- 
 chines, De Fals. Leg. 40. 
 
 a Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 390, 397. Philipp, iv. 133. De Halonn. 
 85. iEschines, De Fals. Leg. 38, 40, 41. As regards Cersobleptes, the 
 amount of blame with which the embassadors are chargeable depends 
 much upon the question, whether he was an ally included in the treaty. 
 See ante, p. 304. 
 
 3 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 384. JEschines, De Fals. Leg. 41. 
 Justin, viii. 4. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 307 
 
 oath to Philip and his allies, and then return to Athens and make 
 their report. As however the treaty had been concluded without 
 settling the question of the Sacred War; as Philip was virtually left 
 at liberty toffeal with it as he pleased, subject only to a loose prom¬ 
 ise that he would do what was right and promote the interests of 
 Athens; it might seem to be proper, when the embassadors were 
 in the presence of Philip, that they should come to some positive 
 understanding with him on the subject, and ascertain what he really 
 meant to do. By such means they would be enabled, on their re¬ 
 turn, to furnish such a report as might guide the Athenians in their 
 future counsels. True, there could be no guarantee that Philip 
 would perform any engagement which he made to the embassadors. 
 That however would not be the fault of the embassadors, but of the 
 Athenians themselves, who suffered the Phocian question to go off 
 upon vague assurances, instead of insisting upon the Phocians being 
 comprehended in the treaty. They had committed the grave error 
 of making peace, without settling the most important matter in the 
 war; so that in effect the war remained an open question, unless 
 they chose to leave the Phocians and all their own interests con¬ 
 nected with them entirely to the mercy of Philip. In the instruc¬ 
 tions to the embassadors there was, besides the special clauses, a 
 general one, requiring them to do whatever else they could for the 
 service of the commonwealth; which, under the circumstances, 
 might be construed as imposing an obligation to discuss with Philip 
 the affairs of the Sacred War, and bring him over, if possible, to 
 the side of Athens. 
 
 Such was the view taken apparently by iEschines, who states that 
 at a conference with his colleagues he urged upon them the necessity 
 of performing this part of their instructions, and exhorting Philip to 
 chastise the Thebans and restore the Boeotian cities. Though there 
 was no express order to this effect, (for such matters could not be 
 mentioned openly in a state paper,) yet it was clearly, he said, the 
 true intent and meaning of their countrymen. Demosthenes took 
 a different view; and after some discussion it was agreed, that each 
 of the embassadors should address Philip as he thought fit. 1 
 
 Of the audience which the Athenian embassadors had with the 
 king, JEschines gives the following account—That Demosthenes 
 made an offensive speech in disparagement of his colleagues and praise 
 of himself, recounting the services which he had rendered Philip in 
 promoting the peace, and the attention which he had paid to his 
 ministers at Athens, and endeavoring to ingratiate himself with him 
 by fulsome and coarse flattery: after which he (iEschines) com¬ 
 menced his address; first rebuking Demosthenes for his personalities, 
 then briefly touching upon the subject of the oaths and other formal 
 matters, lastly, entering upon the topic paramount to all, viz. the 
 
 1 .iEsehines, De Fals. Leg. 41, 42. 
 
308 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 march to Thermopylae, and the affairs of Delphi and the Amphictyons. 
 He entreated Philip to decide the quarrel by judicial sentence, and 
 not by arms; but if' that were impossible, (as the military preparations 
 seemed to indicate,) then, said JEschines, it behoved the champion 
 of Hellenic religion to consider what his sacred office required of 
 him, and to listen to those who could instruct him on the subject of 
 their ancient institutions. Upon which he explained to the king all 
 that he knew about the foundation of the temple, the origin of the 
 Amphictyonic league, the tribes that composed it, their oath and 
 obligations. He argued that, the Boeotian cities being Amphictyonic, 
 Philip could not justly allow them to be destroyed. The object of 
 his expedition was holy and just; but when the Amphictyons were 
 restored to their rights, punishment should be inflicted upon the 
 guilty parties only, upon those who actually seized the temple or 
 who advised it, not upon their countries, if they would deliver up 
 the offenders for judgment. Should Philip make use of his power 
 to confirm the iniquitous acts of the Thebans, he would not insure 
 their gratitude, (for they had been ungrateful to the Athenians, who 
 had done them still greater services,) and he would make enemies of 
 the people whom he betrayed. 1 
 
 What answer Philip made to this address, iEschines does not say. 
 It is not pretended that he gave to the collective body of embas¬ 
 sadors the promises which were afterwards reported at Athens. Yet 
 that did not prevent him from sending indirect communications to 
 some of them, whom he thought likely to become his instruments. 
 He was playing a profoundly artful game. While AEschines was 
 flattering himself with the impression made by his own harangue, the 
 Thebans and Thessalians were urging Philip to march against their 
 common enemy. To them be could speak more openly of his inten¬ 
 tions ; yet they were not free from uneasiness, seeing that intrigues 
 were still going on, that private conferences were held not only 
 with the Athenians, but with the Spartans and Phocians, and that 
 they were apparently not dissatisfied with their reception. The be¬ 
 trayal of any fears or misgivings on the part of his own intimate 
 allies favored the illusion which Philip was keeping up. It was im¬ 
 portant for him to amuse with hope those parties from whom he 
 most feared opposition. Phalaecus held the pass of Thermopylae; 
 Archidamus with a thousand Spartans was yet in Phocis; an Athe¬ 
 nian fleet was ready to occupy the straits, if the people should take 
 it in their heads to give the order. To prevent the combination of 
 these forces, which was a very possible contingency, if his designs 
 should be seen through; to- contrive things so that, when he arrived 
 at the pass, all resistance should be hopeless; these were points to 
 be accomplished by a tissue of artifice and deceit. AEschines declares 
 that it was the universal expectation at Pella, that Philip would 
 
 1 iEscliines, De Fals. Leg. 42, 43. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 309 
 
 humble Thebes; that the Spartan envoys were quarreling with the 
 Theban, and openly threatening them; that the Thebans were in 
 distress and alarm; that the Thessalians laughed at all the rest, and 
 said the expedition was for their own benefit; while some of Philip’s 
 officers told some of the Athenian embassadors, that he meant to re¬ 
 establish the Boeotian cities. This may be taken as no great exag¬ 
 geration of what really occurred 1 
 
 Demosthenes states, that during all the time they were at Pella he 
 was in opposition to his colleagues; he offered them honest and 
 sound advice, but every opinion of his was overruled by the majority. 
 All the service that he could do was, to seek out his captive fellow- 
 citizens and procure their release, ransoming some of them with his 
 own money, and prevailing on Philip to redeem the others. Philip 
 tried, to corrupt the embassadors, first separately, and then jointly. 
 Demosthenes refused a large present of gold that was sent him. 
 Another was offered to the whole body, under the pretense of hospi¬ 
 tality. It was of course a bribe iti disguise. As Demosthenes 
 would accep*t no share, his colleagues divided it among themselves: 
 he requested Philip to apply the money that he would have bestowed 
 in presents towards redeeming the Athenian captives, and Philip was 
 prevailed upon to promise that they should be sent home by the 
 Panathenaean festival. 2 
 
 All this time the embassadors never demanded that Philip should 
 swear the oath, nor said a word about the restoration of the places 
 captured since the peace, nor sent home any intelligence of tfe 
 preparations going on at Pella. They loitered there without any 
 other reason than the request of Philip himself, who told them he 
 wanted their mediation to settle the quarrel between the Pharsa- 
 lians and Halians; a quarrel which he himself not long afterwards 
 very summarily decided, by taking the city of Halus and expelling 
 the population. When all things were ready for his march, Philip 
 set out, and carried the Athenian embassadors with him as far as 
 Pherge, where at length they administered the oaths to him and his 
 allies. But here they are charged with two further acts of disobe¬ 
 dience to their instructions. They were commanded to administer 
 the oaths to the magistrates of the cities allied to Philip. Instead 
 of this, they accepted any persons whom Philip chose to send as 
 accredited agents for that purpose. Secondly, they allowed Philip 
 and his allies, on swearing the oaths, to except the Phocians, the 
 Halians, and Cersobleptes; thereby, it was said, overruling the de¬ 
 cree of the Athenian people, who had refused to admit a clause to 
 that effect in the treaty. The charge however (as far as regards 
 
 ' iEschines, De Fals. Leg. 46. Demosthenes, Philipp, iii. 113. De 
 Fals. Leg. 365, 384, 445. Justin, viii. 4. 
 
 * Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 393—395. As to the captives, see the 
 reply of ^Eschines, De Fals. Leg. 41. 
 
310 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 the Phocians at least) appears to be unfairly urged against the em¬ 
 bassadors. The Athenians, having consented on their side to ratify 
 the treaty without the Phocians, could not expect that Philip 
 would bind himself to any engagement with them. Indeed the 
 understanding was quite the contrary. If then the words of the 
 treaty left an ambiguity, it became necessary for Philip to protest 
 against a construction that would have been opposite to his declared 
 intentions. Such a protest was doubtless made. The Athenian 
 embassadors were informed distinctly, that Philip and his allies 
 would not swear to the treaty, except upon the condition of 
 excludiug the Phocians. What then was to be done ? The em¬ 
 bassadors were in an unavoidable dilemma. Either they must de¬ 
 cline to administer the oaths altogether, or they must accept the 
 qualification which Philip and his allies insisted upon. But for what 
 had passed at Athens, the former would have been the proper 
 course : under existing circumstances, the latter was perhaps more 
 prudent; otherwise they mu^have taken upon themselves the re¬ 
 sponsibility of renewing the war. 1 
 
 The chief grounds of complaint against the embassadors were, 
 their dilatoriness in dispatching the business for which they were 
 sent out, and their neglect to send or carry home correct informa¬ 
 tion of what was going on. If they acted thus from corrupt mo¬ 
 tives, they were of course guilty of treason. Demosthenes, from 
 what he had seen before, had formed no good opinion of Philip’s 
 designs, and at Pherse, observing what course things were taking, 
 and being alarmed both at the danger which threatened his country, 
 and for fear lest he should himself be implicated in the misconduct 
 of others, wrote a letter to the Athenians, which gave them full 
 information of every thing. His colleagues, he alleges, would not 
 allow this to be sent, but themselves dispatched another, containing 
 false intelligence ; a charge in great measure borne out by the re¬ 
 ports which they afterwards made at Athens. He says that he had 
 resolved to return home alone, and actually hired a vessel for his 
 conveyance, but was prevented from sailing by Philip. He ob¬ 
 served that yEschines had numerous private interviews with Philip 
 —a thing specially prohibited by a clause in their instructions;— 
 that one night in particular he was watched coming out of Philip’s 
 tent at Pherse ; and that he stayed for a day with Philip after the 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron. 236. De Fals. Leg. 352, 353, 390, 391, 395, 
 430. It appears by the quotation from Philip’s letter in ASschines, (De 
 Fals. Leg. 45,) that he furnished the Athenians with the names of those 
 parties who had taken the oaths, promising to send to Athens a few 
 who had not come in time. One of the charges of Demosthenes is, that 
 the Cardians w r ere allowed to appear as allies of Philip. For this how¬ 
 ever the embassadors were not to blame ; the Cardians having been ex¬ 
 cepted from the treaty by which the Chersonese was ceded to Athens. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 311 
 
 others had gone. iEschines produced evidence in the nature of an 
 alibi, to disprove that he ever visited Philip by night, yet apparently 
 does not deny that he had interviews with him alone in the day¬ 
 time. 1 
 
 Philip, having detained the embassadors until he was ready to 
 march to Thermopylae, dismissed them with a letter to the Athe¬ 
 nians, in which he formally notified to them the ratification of the 
 treaty, and apologized for the manner in which their embassadors 
 had administered the oaths, stating that they would have gone 
 round to the different cities, but that he had prevented them, as he 
 wanted their mediation between the Pharsalians and Halians. In 
 terms the letter was polite and gracious, but it contained not a 
 word about the Phocians, or about the promises which were made 
 in his name. 2 
 
 The embassadors arrived in Athens on the thirteenth of Sciropho- 
 rion (June), and presented themselves before the council, as the law 
 required. Here Demosthenes, being a member of the council, took 
 the initiative, and gave a full report of all that had taken place, de¬ 
 nouncing the treachery of his colleagues, showing into what peril 
 they had brought the people, and urging that measures should be 
 taken, before it was too late, to save the Phocians and Thermopylae. 
 His words produced such an effect upon the council, that in the or¬ 
 der which was drawn up, for bringing the matter before the as¬ 
 sembly, they withheld the vote of thanks and invitation to the public 
 dining-hall, which embassadors never failed to receive on other 
 occasions. 3 
 
 The assembly was held on the sixteenth; and here JEschines got 
 the first hearing. The people, alarmed by the rumor of Philip’s 
 march, were so eager for the report of the envoys, that they waited 
 not for the-order of council, introducing the business of the day, to 
 be read. HSschines assured them that they had nothing to fear; 
 that he had persuaded Philip to gratify their wishes in every par¬ 
 ticular, both on the Ampliictyonic question and others;—(he re- 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 352, 35*7, 396, 397,419, 446. HSschines, 
 De Fals. Leg. 44. There is a further charge that ^Eschines wrote 
 Philip’s letter, to which he alludes. See the remarks in this volume, 
 p. 170. 
 
 a See the forcible remarks of Demosthenes upon this letter. (De Fals. 
 Leg. 352, 353, 355.) It was a juggle, he argues, between Philip and 
 the embassadors. Philip took on him the blame of their neglect, and 
 left to them the responsibility of making false promises in his name. 
 And, although he had promised, if the Athenians would become his 
 allies, to declare what he meant to do for them, now, when they had 
 become his allies, he said he knew not what he could do to oblige them; 
 but if they would tell him, he would do any thing that was not dishon¬ 
 orable. 
 
 * Demosthenes, Do Fals. Leg. 346, 350, 351, 
 
312 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 peated the heads of the speech which he had made against the 
 Thebans;)—they need only remain quiet; in two or three days 
 they would hear the most satisfactory results;—the Phocians would 
 be preserved by Philip; Thebes would be besieged and broken up 
 into villages, Thespise and Plataea re-established, and compensation 
 exacted for the pillage of Delphi, not from the Phocians, but from 
 the Thebans, who had originally planned it: he himself had con¬ 
 vinced Philip that the first designers were more guilty than the 
 perpetrators; 1 and for giving such counsel, the Thebans had set a 
 price upon his head. -Further, he had heard from some of the Eu- 
 boean envoys as a current report, that their own island was to be 
 given up to the Athenians instead of Amphipolis; and there was 
 yet another thing which his diplomacy had obtained for them, which 
 he would not mention at present, because some of his colleagues 
 were jealous of him. He was understood to mean Oropos. 2 
 
 These assurances, confidently made by an envoy who had had 
 official communication with Philip, agreeing also with what they 
 had before heard from Philocrates, relieved the people from their 
 anxiety. The letter of Philip was produced and read. The Athe¬ 
 nians, charmed by its general professions of amity and good will, 
 did not detect their hollowness and insincerity. Demosthenes rose 
 to tell the plain realities of the case, as he had done in the council; 
 but the people, dazzled by their bright prospects, refused to be unde¬ 
 ceived, and he found it impossible to obtain a fair hearing. HSschines 
 and Philocrates hooted and interrupted him continually, and were 
 encouraged by the assembly. He could only get in a few words. 
 He protested his entire ignorance of what JEschines had told them, 
 and declared that he did not believe it. At this the people showed 
 signs of anger. “ Remember,” cried Demosthenes, “I am not re¬ 
 sponsible for any of this.” “ Dy and by,” said JEschines, “ he ’ll 
 want to have the credit of it.” “ Ho wonder,” said Philocrates, 
 “ that there is a difference of opinion between Demosthenes and 
 me; for he drinks water, and I drink wine:” at which the Athe¬ 
 nians laughed. 3 
 
 A decree was then carried, on the motion of Philocrates, thank¬ 
 ing Philip in the warmest terms for his liberality to the republic, 
 and extending the treaty of peace and affiance to his posterity. It 
 
 1 For this insinuation, made by their enemies apparently against the 
 Thebans, there seems to have been no foundation whatever. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, De Pace, 59. Philipp, ii. 72, 73. De Coron. 236, 237. 
 De Fals. Leg. 347, 348, 351, 352.. ^Eschines says in reply, that he only 
 reported what he heard ; he made no promises : ( tovto ovk a-Kayyz'ikai 
 dXX’ vnoaxsodai :) and that what he reported was generally believed by 
 others. (De Fals. Leg. 43, 44, 46.) This reply is beside the mark. He 
 was charged with misleading the Athenians by wilfully false report*. 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Pace, 69. De Fals. Leg. 348, 352, 355. 
 
THE SACRED WAR." 
 
 313 
 
 declared also, that, unless the Phocians did what was right and de¬ 
 livered up the temple of Delphi to the Amphictyons, the people of 
 Athens would enforce their wishes by arms. This-decree, says De¬ 
 mosthenes, in effect delivered the Phocians over to their enemies, 
 with their hands tied behind them. 1 
 
 There was time to have succored the Phocians and defended 
 Thermopylae, had the Athenians acted promptly after the return of 
 their embassadors. Phalaecus, who. (it seems) had been reinstated 
 in his command, and still held the Locrian fortresses with his gar 
 risons, could have maintained the pass alone against a greatly supe¬ 
 rior force, if the enemy were prevented from landing troops in 
 his rear. His safety depended on a continued maritime blockade, 
 and for. this purpose the co-operation of the Athenians was indis¬ 
 pensable. But he had some reason to doubt their friendly disposi¬ 
 tion towards his countrymen, much more towards himself; and 
 there was no time to be lost. He sent chosen messengers to Ath¬ 
 ens, with orders to learn the state of things, and bring him intelli¬ 
 gence immediately. These messengers were present at the assembly 
 held on the sixteenth of Scirophorion, and listening with anxiety 
 to the speeches and all the proceedings. Philip in the meantime, 
 approaching Thermopylae, invited the Phocians to surrender, repre¬ 
 senting to them that there was no hope of succor from Athens, who 
 had become his ally, and that they might safely throw themselves 
 upon his generosity. We may presume, that he had already made 
 this communication to them, before he began his march from Pherae ; 
 and perhaps their own envoys, who accompanied him from Pella, 
 brought home a tale of their kind t reception by Philip, and his fa¬ 
 vorable intentions towards their country. 2 The Phocians gave little 
 credit to it: they were not disposed to trust Philip, and they could 
 hardly believe that the Athenians, their old allies, would abandon 
 them: Phalaecus at all events would send no positive answer to 
 Philip, until he knew what the intentions of the Athenians were. 
 When however his messengers returned from Athens, bringing 
 news of what had passed in the assembly—of the announcements 
 of Aeschines, the implicit faith put in them by the Athenians, their 
 abandonment of every thing to Philip, and the menacing resolutions 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 356, 358. Philipp, ii. 
 
 3 Phalaecus must have sent his messengers to Athens before Philip 
 commenced his march from Pherae ; or they could not have arrived in 
 time for the assembly on the sixteenth. If the Phocians could have 
 been induced to have submitted at once, before the Athenians had time 
 for consideration, Philip’s object was more surely gained. The Phocian 
 envoys had been amused with promises to the last. Demosthenes, 
 Philipp, iii. 112. E Ig Quiceag ug tt pbg avppuxovg krcopevero, nal TTpicfteig 
 Qukeuv rjaav ol irapr/KohovOovv avru iropevopevu nal nap’ ijp.lv rjpi^ov tcq?.- 
 /-ol Qrjdaioig ov XvciT£?.ijoeiv ttJv ineivov ndpodov. 
 
 Vol. IT.—O 
 
314 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 which they had passed against the Phocians—he perceived that re¬ 
 sistance was hopeless; that neither himself nor his countrymen had 
 any choice left but to make the best terms they could with the all- 
 powerful king of Macedon. 
 
 Accordingly on the twenty-third of Scirophorion, while two or 
 three days after he had received the news from Athens, he entered 
 into a convention with Philip, agreeing to surrender the fortresses 
 which he held in Locris and Bceotia, on condition only that he might 
 retire where he pleased with his troops. It was carried into effect 
 immediately. Philip entered the pass, and took possession of Al- 
 ponus, Thronium, and Nicaea, while Phakecus, with eight thousand 
 mercenaries and such of the native soldiers as liked to follow him, 
 passed over to Peloponnesus. Archidamus with his thousand Spar¬ 
 tans had withdrawn shortly before, seeing the double game that was 
 played by his allies, and considering his position dangerous. The 
 Thebans marched out with all their forces to join Philip, who now, 
 proclaiming openly that he had come as the ally of the Thebans and 
 Thessalians and the champion of the god, marched with an over¬ 
 powering army into Phocis, to terminate the Sacred War. The cities 
 generally submitted to his arms; a few that offered a feeble resist¬ 
 ance were taken by storm and razed to the ground. He then took 
 possession of Delphi, and proceeded forthwith to hold an Amphic- 
 tyonic council, to pronounce judgment upon the violators of the 
 temple, and determine the various questions which the war had given 
 rise to . 1 
 
 The Athenians remained perfectly quiescent, expecting the accom¬ 
 plishment of all the good things which Philip had promised them, 
 until the twenty-seventh day of the month. They had appointed 
 an embassy to notify to Philip the decree which they passed in his 
 favor. It consisted mostly of the same ten who served on the former 
 embassies. Demosthenes, not wishing to go, swore an affidavit, as 
 the law permitted, and excused himself. jEschines stayed behind 
 on a plea of illness; a mere pretense, as Demosthenes alleges, in 
 order that he might be at home to prevent the adoption of any 
 measures adverse to Philip. The envoys had not long departed, 
 when there came a letter from Philip to the Athenians, followed soon 
 afterwards by another , 2 3 inviting them to join him with all their forces. 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 59. Demosthenes, De Coron. 288, 239 : De Pals. 
 
 Leg. 356, 358, 359, 360, 365. iEschines, De Fals. Leg. 45, 46. 
 
 3 JEschines mentions only one letter: Demosthenes, two. The sec¬ 
 ond may have come soon after the first; or it may have been dispatched 
 after the capitulation of Phalsecus. For there was yet a possibility 
 that the Phocians might resist, and give some trouble to Philip, if the 
 Athenians gave them any hope of support: though I can not credit the 
 assertion of Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. 379) that the Phocians might 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 315 
 
 He must have sent the first of these letters immediately after Pha- 
 lascus had refused to surrender, while he was yet in doubt what s 
 course things might take. According to the terms of his alliance, as 
 they had been interpreted and acted upon, he was entitled to make 
 this demand of the Athenians; though we can hardly imagine that 
 he either expected or desired their compliance. All that he really 
 wished was their neutrality; and this his letter, assuming a tone of 
 friendship, was calculated to secure. It was laid before the assembly; 
 but no one moved that Philip’s request-should be granted. Demosthe¬ 
 nes observed, that, if any troops were sent, they would be hostages in 
 Philip’s hands; and the matter was dropped. iEschines afterwards 
 asserted, that, if an Athenian force had been present, it might have 
 counteracted the influence of the Thebans and Thessalians, who, as 
 it was, compelled Philip to adopt their own violent counsels. But 
 if he thought so, why, it may be asked, did he not propose the 
 measure to the people, especially as it was in accordance with their 
 own decree? Perhaps he could not easily have prevailed upon them: 
 for, besides a lurking fear that Demosthenes was right, they must 
 have been somewhat ashamed of themselves for the attitude of hos¬ 
 tility which they had already assumed towards the Phocians. But 
 the punishment of their folly was at hand. On the twenty-seventh 
 day of the month the envoys, who had gone as far as Chalcis in 
 Euboea, returned suddenly with the intelligence, that Philip had 
 declared himself the ally of the Thebans, and had given up every 
 thing into their hands. The Athenians, who happened to be in 
 assembly at Piraeus when these tidings were brought, in the alarm 
 of the moment passed a vote to bring in all their women and chil¬ 
 dren from the country, to repair their forts, to fortify Piraeus, and 
 perform theft* sacrifice to Hercules in the city. This decree was 
 actually carried into effect; but the envoys were nevertheless sent 
 to Philip, and traveled by land through Boeotia, iEschines this time 
 going with them. The fears of the people were soon allayed by 
 finding that the allied powers had no thought of coming near Attica; 
 though perhaps their ill humor was increased by a letter which came 
 from Philip, calmly informing them of what he had done, and re¬ 
 proving them for their demonstration of hostility . 1 
 
 The Amphictyonic council, composed of the Thebans, Thessalians, 
 and their allies, proceeded to sit in judgment upon the Phocians. 
 
 in that event have been saved, owing to the impossibility of Philip’s 
 finding subsistence in their territory. 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron. 237—239: De Fals. Leg. 357, 359, 360, 
 378—381 : Philipp, ii. 69. HCschines, De Fals. Leg. 40, 46. That 
 jEschines should have gone upon this embassy after his plea of illness, 
 and that he should have passed through Thebes, after saying that the 
 Thebans had set a price upon his head, are urged as proofs of crime by 
 Demosthenes. 
 
316 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 Their first act was one of gratitude as well as justice. They deprived 
 the conquered people of their seat and votes in the council, and 
 transferred them to the king of Macedon and his descendants. Their 
 further sentence was, that the Phocian cities should be razed to the 
 ground, and the population of each dispersed into villages, containing 
 not more than fifty dwelling-houses, and at the distance of not less 
 than a furlong from each other. The Phocians were to have no 
 access to the temple of Delphi, and to possess neither arms nor 
 horses, but to be allowed to cultivate their land and take the produce 
 thereof, paying every year a tribute of sixty talents to Apollo, until 
 the whole of their plunder, estimated in value at ten thousand talents, 
 should be restored. Any guilty parties, yrhether Phocians or aux¬ 
 iliaries, who had fled from justice, were declared to be outlaws. All 
 arms which had been used by the troops were to be broken and 
 destroyed; their horses to be sold. Regulations were made for the 
 future management of the oracle, for the establishment of peace and 
 amity among the G-reek states, and the maintenance of their com¬ 
 mon religion. The Spartans were excommunicated from Amphic- 
 tyonic privileges: and it was determined that Philip should preside 
 over the Pythian games in conjunction with the Thebans and Thes¬ 
 salians. 1 
 
 Thus were the Phocians not only degraded from their rank as one 
 of the Amphictyonic communities, but reduced to become a mere 
 rural population, little better than the serfs of Thessaly. Their rank 
 they did not regain till many years after, when, by their valor in 
 repelling the Celtic invasion, they expiated the memory of their 
 former crime. One part of the sentence appears to have been in 
 violation of the engagement made by Philip with Phalsecus; yet 
 they had enemies in the council, who would have inflicted on them 
 a still heavier punishment. iEschines says, the CEtseans proposed 
 to cast all the adult males down the precipice, and that he himself 
 pleaded on their behalf and saved them. The sentence, however, 
 was rigorously executed. Of twenty-one cities enumerated by Pau- 
 sanias, Abse alone was spared, as having taken no part in the sacri¬ 
 lege: the rest were destroyed; their walls at least and principal 
 buildings were razed to the ground, and the inhabitants driven to. 
 seek homes elsewhere, according to the terms of the judgment. 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 60. Pausanias, x. 3. In the words of Diodorus, tuv 
 
 kv <&uK£voi TpiL)v ttoXeuv TTEpiE^elv r<2 tei%7/, it would seem that rptfiv 
 should be omitted ; and even then there remains a tautology, when he 
 says afterwards, ruf 6e tco'Xeis unuaap tuv $ukeuv KaraaKu^at. Leland, 
 in his Dissertation on the Amphictyonic Council, prefixed to the Life of 
 Philip, (page 40,) tries to explain this, by suggesting that there were 
 three Amphictyonic cities in Phoeis; and as they could not be entirely 
 demolished consistently with the oath of the Amphictyons, their walls 
 only were sentenced to be razed. See also Wesseling’s note. 
 
THE SACRED WAR. 
 
 317 
 
 That the expulsion from their ancient dwellings, the separation of 
 friends, neighbors, and relatives, must necessarily have been attended 
 with great hardship and suffering, is manifest. But the evil was 
 aggravated by the presence of an insulting and vindictive enemy. 
 The work of destruction was committed to the Thebans, who, occu¬ 
 pying the country with their army, in the license of military power 
 committed excesses of cruelty, against which it was impossible to 
 obtain redress, and useless to murmur. Large numbers of the people, 
 chiefly men in the prime and vigor of their life, emigrated to other 
 lands. Demosthenes, traveling through Phocis two or three years 
 after, describes what he saw with his own eyes; a dreadful scene of 
 desolation; cities lying in ruin, hardly any grown men in the country, 
 a population consisting almost entirely of the old and infirm, women 
 and children. Most of the spoil that could be collected became the 
 prize of Philip. But the Thebans were permitted to annex some 
 portion of the Phocian territory to their own dominion. The Boeo¬ 
 tian towns, Orchomenus, Coronea, and Corsise, were delivered up to 
 them; and the two former they punished by enslaving the inhabit¬ 
 ants. Yet the majority of these avoided their doom by flight, and, 
 together with a large number of Phocian exiles, found refuge in 
 Athens. 1 
 
 The allies of Philip thoughtlessly exulted in the vengeance which 
 they had inflicted on their enemies, and the advantages which they 
 had acquired for themselves. The Thessalians, pleased with the 
 restoration of the Pylaean synod and the festival, little heeded that 
 they had found a new master. The Thebans, having recovered their 
 lost dominion in Boeotia and got an accession of territory, thought 
 not for the moment that it was at the expense of their honor and 
 credit, that their acquisitions were the gift of the king of Macedon, 
 and that they were to see a Macedonian garrison established at 
 Nicaea, a monument of his power and their own weakness. In fact, 
 the real advantages were Philip’s, who had obtained an immense 
 increase both of power and reputation. His kingdom, but lately 
 regarded as semi-barbarous, now took her rank among the Amphic- 
 tyonic communities. He was further honored by the Delphians 
 with precedency in the consultation of the oracle—a distinction for¬ 
 merly conferred upon Athens and Lacedaemon. But, what was far 
 more important, he had extended his alliances, enlarged the sphere 
 of his influence, and got the command of Thermopylae, which gave 
 him at any time an entrance to southern Greece. The Athenians, 
 when all the mischief had been done, opened their eyes, and saw 
 how they had been duped and cheated. They made empty protests 
 and passed idle votes about the intrusion of barbarians into the 
 Amphictyonic council: they resolved to take no part in its proceed- 
 
 } Pausanias, x. 3, 8. Justin, viii. 5. ^Eschines, De Fals. Leg. 47. 
 Demosthenes, De Pace, 61, 62: De Fals. Leg. 361, 386, 445. 
 
318 
 
 APPENDIX L 
 
 ings, and send no deputies to the Pythian games. Yet all this had 
 no other effect than to exhibit their ill humor, and irritate the rest 
 of the Amphictyons; and when that body sent an embassy to Athens, 
 requiring them to accept the acts of the congress as legal, they dared 
 not refuse compliance. 1 
 
 Phalaecus, having carried away what remained of the Delphian 
 plunder, maintained his troops for a while in Peloponnesus; at 
 length, hiring a sufficient number of transports at Corinth, he 
 embarked and sailed for the Ionian sea, intending to cross over to 
 Italy or Sicily. There. he hoped either to get possession of some 
 city, or to find military employment; for he had heard there was a 
 war between the Lucanians and the Tarentines; and he gave out 
 that he had been invited to go over by the natives. His soldiers, 
 however, when they got into the open sea, observing that there was 
 no envoy on board from any foreign state, suspected that he was 
 playing them false, and mutinied; the principal officers came with 
 drawn swords to him and his pilot, and insisted that he should sail 
 back to Peloponnesus. He returned accordingly, and landed at 
 Malea, the southern promontory of Laconia; where he found an 
 embassy from the Cnossians of Crete, who had come to enlist troops 
 for a war against the Lyctians. Phalaecus, receiving a large sum of 
 money in advance, consented to enter their service, and sailing with 
 them to Crete, he attacked and took the city of Lyctus. Just at 
 this time there came an unexpected auxiliary to the Lyctians, no 
 less a person than Archidamus, king of Sparta. It so happened, the 
 people of Tarentum had applied for succor to the Spartans, who, 
 collecting a large force for the defense of their ancient colony, gave 
 the command to Archidamus; but, before he had set sail, envoys 
 arrived from Lyctus, and prevailed on the Spartans to assist them 
 first. Archidamus, therefore, was sent to Crete, and. strangely 
 enough, found himself opposed to his old ally, Phalaecus, whom he 
 defeated in battle, and drove out of the city of Lyctus. He then 
 hastened to the relief of the Tarentines, in whose cause some time 
 afterwards he perished with his whole army, fighting valiantly 
 against the Lucanians. Phalaecus, dispossessed of his former con¬ 
 quest, made an attempt on the city of Cydonia, and brought up his 
 battering engines; but ere they could be applied, they were struck 
 by lightning, and he himself and a considerable number of the 
 besiegers were consumed in the flames. According to another 
 account, Phalaecus was killed by one of his own soldiers, whom he 
 had offended. The relics of his army were transported by some 
 Elean exiles to Peloponnesus, where, in an invasion of Elis, they 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 380, 381, 446 : Philipp, ii. 74; iii. 119; 
 iv. 148: Ad. Epist. 153: De Coron. 240: and the whole of the Argu¬ 
 ment and the Oration on the Peace. Compare JEschines, Contr. Cte- 
 siph. 73. 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 319 
 
 were signally defeated, and four thousand of them taken prisoners. 
 The Elean government divided the captives between themselves 
 and their Arcadian allies. Those allotted to the Arcadians were sold 
 into slavery; the Eleans put theirs to death. 1 
 
 Thus, says Diodorus, all parties who had been concerned in the 
 plunder of Delphi met with signal retribution from heaven. Even 
 the women, who had worn any of the sacred ornaments, came to 
 a miserable and shameful end. To the same cause he attributes the 
 calamities that afterwards fell upon Athens and Lacedaemon. 
 Philip, who vindicated the oracular temple of Apollo, continued (lie 
 says) from that time forth to prosper more and more, till at length, 
 as the reward of his piety, he was elected generalissimo of the 
 Greeks, and established the greatest monarchy in Europe. 2 Such 
 was the strain in which the fanatics and parasites of the day extolled 
 the king of Macedon. JEschines chimes in with it, discordant as it 
 was with the true interests of his country, and with the feelings 
 which should have animated every well-wisher of the Hellenic hap¬ 
 piness and freedom. 3 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 AESCHINES. 
 
 ^Eschines, the second in reputation of Athenian orators, was born 
 in the year b.c. 389, four years before Demosthenes. As to the rank 
 and character of his parents, different statements are made by him¬ 
 self and by his opponent. According to his own account, his father 
 Atrometus was an honorable citizen, connected by birth with the 
 illustrious priestly house of the Eteobutadae, who lost his property 
 in the Peloponnesian war; and, having ‘been forced to quit Athens 
 during the government of the Thirty, served for a time as a mer¬ 
 cenary soldier in Asia, and on his return lived in reduced circum- 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 61—63. Strabo, vi. 280. Pausanias, x. 2. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xvi. 64. He should have gone on to say, “ And two years 
 afterwards this same Philip perished by the hand of an assassin; an 
 inadequate punishment for his crimes, and for all the mischief he had 
 done to Greece.” 
 
 3 ^Eschines, Contr. Ctesiph. *72. Kai rovg avrovg dptipev rpg te do^rjg 
 TavTTjg Kal Trig rbv Tlepapv r/yepoviag rj^iupevovg, ol nai rd iv A ehtyolg 
 Upbv rjlevOepuaav. Compare De Fals. Leg. 60. 
 
320 
 
 APPENDIX IL 
 
 stances. His mother, Glaucothea, was the daughter of a respect¬ 
 able Athenian citizen. The account which Demosthenes gives of 
 the parents and early life of iEschines may be regarded in some 
 measure as a caricature ; 1 yet it is not improbable, that the pdverty 
 to which iEschines himself admits his parents to have been reduced, 
 compelled them to earn their livelihood by somewhat mean occupa¬ 
 tions. Notwithstanding the disadvantage of early poverty, their 
 three sons all raised themselves to honor and dignity at Athens . 2 
 That jEschines must have received a good education, is attested by 
 the works which he has left behind him; and it is possible that he 
 may have owed this to the very school which his father is said to 
 have kept. While he was yet very young, he obtained the situation 
 of clerk to Aristophon, one of the leading statesmen of Athens; 
 afterwards he went into the service of Eubulus, with whom he 
 continued to be connected for the rest of his life as a politician and 
 a friend. Being gifted with a handsome person and sonorous voice, 
 he tried his fortune as an actor; but in this profession, which was 
 by no means dishonorable at Athens, he appears, for some cause 
 or other, not to have succeeded . 3 Like other Athenian citizens, he 
 was called upon to perform military service for his country, and he 
 acquitted himself with honor in several campaigns; more particu¬ 
 larly at Phlius, at Mantinea, and at Tamynse. In this last battle he 
 displayed such signal courage, that he was chosen to carry home 
 the news of the victory, and rewarded by the Athenians with a 
 crown. Phocion, who had witnessed his bravery, not only praised 
 him on the spot, but honored and esteemed him ever afterwards. 
 But the laurels which he earned as a speaker soon threw into the 
 shade those of the battle-field. His connection with Eubulus pro¬ 
 cured for him the situation of clerk to the popular assembly, through 
 which he got an intimate acquaintance with the laws, the politics, 
 and the public business of his country. This he found of immense 
 advantage, when he came himself to take a part in the debates; 
 and it is no wonder, that with his powerful voice and delivery, his 
 literary acquirements, and great command of words, he quickly 
 obtained a prominent place among the orators of the day. 
 
 The capture of Olynthus caused iEschines to come forward as a 
 strong advocate of warlike measures against Philip. The statements 
 of Demosthenes upon this subject—how he introduced Ischander to 
 the council; how he proposed the sending of embassies to rouse 
 the Greeks, and invite them to a congress at Athens; how he him¬ 
 self undertook the mission to Arcadia, and discharged that duty with 
 zeal and ability—all are fully admitted by HSschines. How he came 
 
 1 See this translation, ante, pp. 54, 65, 94—97, 193. 
 
 2 See ante, p. 189. 
 
 3 The sneers of Demosthenes are at the failure of Aeschines, not at 
 the profession itself. 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 321 
 
 to change his opinion, and to see the necessity of making peace with 
 Philip at that crisis, he himself gives a not unreasonable explanation: 
 as to which, and as to the part which he took in the embassy to 
 Philip and the negotiation for peace, the reader is referred to the 
 preceding history of the Sacred War. 1 
 
 The circumstances attending the conclusion of this peace first 
 created hostility between HCschines and Demosthenes. The accu¬ 
 sation preferred by the latter against his rival brought them into an 
 antagonism, both political and personal, which never ceased till 
 iEschines finally quitted his native land. The peace had been so 
 signally discreditable to Athens, and so manifestly injurious in its 
 consequences, that in a very short time there was a strong reaction 
 in the feelings of the Athenian people, and the war-party recovered 
 their strength and popularity. Demosthenes stood forward as the 
 exponent of their views, and raised himself to the position, which 
 he had never occupied before, of a leading orator and governing 
 statesman; while JKschines, having with difficulty obtained his 
 acquittal on the charge of treason, notwithstanding the influence of 
 his friends Eubulus and Phocion, withdrew for a considerable time 
 from the strife of politics, and was rarely to be seen on the platform 
 of the assembly. Besides other grounds of suspicion against him, 
 the affair of Antiphon, in which he was charged with being an 
 accomplice, left a stain upon his character; and he must have felt it 
 as a deep disgrace, when the court of Areopagus took upon itself 
 to deprive him of an honorable office, to which the people had 
 elected him. 2 
 
 In the year b.c. 340 he appears again on the scene of public life, 
 as one ofthe Pylagorm, representing his countrymen in the Amphic- 
 tyonic congress. His conduct upon this occasion (whether by acci¬ 
 dent or design, it is impossible to say) contributed to kindle a third 
 Sacred War, and bring on the fatal campaign of Chaeronea. The 
 details of this are given in Appendix IX. 
 
 Having on the trial of Ctesiphon 3 failed to obtain a fifth part of 
 the votes, he quitted Athens, and lived in exile in Asia Minor, earn¬ 
 ing his livelihood by teaching rhetoric. During the lifetime of Alex¬ 
 ander he cherished hopes of returning to Greece. Upon the death 
 of that monarch he settled at Rhodes, where he lived peaceably for 
 nine years, and founded a school of eloquence, which afterwards, 
 under the name of the Asiatic, acquired considerable celebrity. It 
 was there that his scholars, hearing him recite his own oration 
 against Ctesiphon, expressed their astonishment at his having failed 
 to get the verdict. “You will cease to wonder,” said he, “ when 
 
 ‘ See especially pages 291, 293—312. 
 
 3 See ante, p. 56. And see the Argument to the Oration on the Em¬ 
 bassy. 
 
 3 See the Argument to the Oration on the Crown. 
 
 O 2 
 
322 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 you have heard the speech of my adversary.” On another occasion, 
 having read both of the speeches to a Rhodian assembly, and that 
 of Demosthenes, which he delivered with great energy, having 
 excited the admiration of all—“ What would you have thought,” 
 said JEschines, “if you had heard the man himself!” Cicero tells 
 this story, to illustrate the importance of manner and address in 
 speaking. “ Actio in dicendo una dominatur. Sine hac summus 
 orator esse in numero nullo potest; mediocris, hac instructus, sum- 
 mos saepe superare. Huic primas dedisse Demosthenes dicitur, 
 cum rogaretur quid in dicendo esset primum; huic secundas, huic 
 tertias.” 
 
 Of JEschines and his contemporaries Cicero, in his treatises on 
 Oratory, speaks as follows :— 
 
 “ Si qui se ad causas contulerunt, ut Demosthenes, Hyperides, 
 Lycurgus, JEschines, Dinarchus, aliique complures, etsi inter se 
 pares non fuerunt, tamen sunt omnes in eodum veritatis imitandae 
 genere versati; quorum quamdiu mansit imitatio, tamdiu genus 
 illud dicendi studiumque vixit: posteaquam, extinctis his, omnis 
 eorum memoria sensim obscurata est et evanuit, alia qusedam 
 dicendi molliora ac remissiora genera viguerunt.” 
 
 “Suavitatem Isocrates, subtilitatem Lysias, acumen Hyperides, 
 sonitum iEschines, vim Demosthenes habuit. Quis eorum non egre- 
 gius? Tamen quis cujusquam nisi sui similis?” 
 
 “ Nihil Lysise subtilitate cedit; nihil argutiis et acumine Hyperidi; 
 nihil lenitate JEschini et splendore verborum.” 
 
 Leland describes him thus:— 
 
 “JEschines was an orator whose style was full, diffusive, and 
 sonorous. He was a stranger to the glowing expressions and 
 daring figures of Demosthenes, which he treats with contempt and 
 ridicule. But, though more simple, he is less affecting; and, by 
 being less contracted, has not so much strength and energy. Or, as 
 Quintilian expresses it, 1 carnis plus habet, lacertorum minus.’ But, 
 if we would view his abilities to the greatest advantage, we must 
 not compare them with those of his rival. Then will his figures 
 appear to want neither beauty nor grandeur. His easy and natural 
 manner will then be thought highly pleasing; and a just attention 
 will discover a good degree of force and energy in his style, which 
 at first appears only flowing and harmonious.” 
 
 ARISTOPHON. 
 
 There are two persons of this name referred to in the orators: 
 Aristophon of Colyttus, and Aristophon of Azenia: though Reiske 
 is inclined to think they were the same person. 
 
 The former has been already mentioned as having taken JEtir 
 chines into his service as clerk. He was a friend of Eubulus, and a 
 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 323 
 
 politician of the same party. Demosthenes mentions them in con¬ 
 nection, as both desiring the Theban alliance. 1 
 
 Aristophon of Azenia was an older statesman, who took an active 
 part in Athenian politics for about half a century after the end of 
 the Peloponnesian war. He was an able speaker, and the author 
 of many new laws. One of them, passed soon after the expulsion 
 of the Thirty Tyrants, enacted, that no child should be deemed 
 legitimate whose mother was not a citizen. Aeschines in the oration 
 against Ctesiphon says, that he was seventy-five times indicted for 
 passing illegal measures, and every time acquitted. He conducted 
 the prosecution, instituted by Chares, against Iphicrates and 
 Timotheus, and procured the condemnation of the latter. One 
 of his last political acts was the defence of the law of Leptines, 
 b.c. 35o. 
 
 CALLISTRATUS. 
 
 An eminent orator and statesman during the early life of Demos¬ 
 thenes. He was employed in various commands with Chabrias, 
 Iphicrates, and Timotheus, during the war with Sparta. In the 
 year b.c. 373 he joined Iphicrates in the prosecution of Timotheus, 
 but failed to procure a conviction. 2 He was inclined to favor the 
 Spartan connection, and, having accompanied the envoys who 
 negotiated the peace of b.c. 371, he made a speech before the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian congress, which is reported at some length by Xenophon, 
 and which appears to have been much approved. 
 
 Two years afterwards, he supported the motion for assisting the 
 Spartans, when Epaminondas invaded Laconia. He was ruined by 
 the unfortunate affair of Oropus, having advised that it should be 
 put into the hands of the Thebans. 3 For this both he and Chabrias 
 were brought to trial, b.c. 366. Callistratus made a splendid speech, 
 which was heard by Demosthenes, and is said to have kindled in 
 his youthful breast the desire to become an orator. It was suc¬ 
 cessful; aqd Callistratus was acquitted. But the loss of Oropus 
 rankled in the minds of the Athenians; and five years afterwards 
 he was tried again, and capitally convicted. Notwithstanding the 
 sentence, he was allowed to withdraw into exile; and for some 
 years he lived in Macedonia or Thrace; but choosing to return to 
 Athens without permission from the people, he was arrested, 
 dragged even from an altar, and suffered the penalty of the law, 4 
 
 0 _ 
 
 1 Ante, p. 65; and see pp. 32, 33. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 254. 
 
 8 Ante, p. 260. 
 
 4 On the history of Callistratus, there is a learned note and excursus 
 of Schneider, Ad Xenoph. Hellen. vi, c. 3, s. 3. 
 
324 
 
 APPENDIX II.. 
 
 CHARES. 
 
 A general, contemporary with Demosthenes, whom during a 
 period of thirty years we find on various occasions commanding the 
 Athenian armies, more often to the disadvantage than the advan¬ 
 tage of his country. His first command was at Phlius, b.c. 367— 
 366, when he successfully defended that city against the Argives. 
 In 361 b.c., after Leosthenes had been defeated by Alexander of 
 Pherse, Chares was appointed admiral in his room; but he soon did 
 much greater mischief than his predecessor; for, sailing to Corcyra, 
 he lent his aid to a faction which overthrew the democracy, and 
 which a few years afterwards seized the opportunity, when the 
 Athenians were distressed by the Social War, to sever the island 
 from their alliance. In the campaign against the Thebans in 
 Euboea Chares held some command, and was immediately after¬ 
 wards sent to the Hellespont, where he compelled Charidemus to 
 surrender the Chersonese according to treaty. 1 Having thus .ac¬ 
 quired some credit, he was chosen to command in the Social War. 
 This was a series of disasters. He was defeated in the attack upon 
 Chios, where fell the gallant Chabrias. In the second year of the 
 war Iphicrates and Timotheus were associated with him in the 
 command; but they were unable to obtain any success against the 
 allies, who with a superior fleet ravaged Lemnos, Imbrus, and 
 Samos, and levied contributions from the other subject islands. To 
 relieve Byzantium, which was besieged by the Athenians, the allies 
 advanced into the Propontis, and the two fleets met; but a storm 
 arising, the two elder generals thought it not prudent to risk an en¬ 
 gagement : Chares, eager for battle, violently reproached them, and 
 afterwards wrote a letter to the people, accusing them of cowardice 
 and treachery. Iphicrates and Timotheus were recalled, and after¬ 
 wards brought to trial. Iphicrates with his son Menestheus was 
 acquitted; Timotheus was condemned to a fine of a hundred talents, 
 and retiring to Chalcis died in exile. The management of the war 
 was left to Chares; who, though no longer restrained by the pres¬ 
 ence of his colleagues, never ventured to attack the enemy—(per¬ 
 haps indeed they gave him no opportunity)—but carried his troops 
 over to Asia Minor, to assist the satrap Artabazus in his rebellion 
 against the Persian king. Having vanquished the royal forces, he 
 received his promised reward, a sum of money which enabled him 
 to maintain his army. But Artaxerxes having sent a wrathful 
 message to Athens, complaining of this attack upon his kingdom, 
 the Athenians, who at first had not been displeased at the assist¬ 
 ance rendered to Artabazus, ordered Chares to quit his service; and 
 not long afterwards, hearing that Artaxerxes- was fitting out an 
 armament of three hundred galleys, and being quite unprepared for 
 
 1 See Vol. I. Appendix III. pp. 280, 281. 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 y25 
 
 a contest against such formidable odds, they concluded peace with 
 the revolted allies, and acknowledged their independence. 
 
 Chares still commanded in the Hellespont, where it was neces¬ 
 sary for the Athenians to have a fleet constantly stationed, for the 
 protection of their Thracian settlements and of the corn-trade. In 
 the year 355 b.c. he took Sestus. Polyaenus relates a stratagem by 
 which Philip, having some transports to carry along the coast 
 from Maronea, contrived to elude the pursuit of Chares, who with a 
 squadron of twenty ships was lying in watch at Neapolis. Of his 
 sorry performances in the Olynthian war, and the inefficiency of 
 his operations in 346 b.c., when Philip was attacking Thrace, I 
 have spoken in the preceding volume. 1 We may presume indeed, 
 that during all this time he did some service by keeping Philip’s 
 squadrons at a distance, by blockading his coast and intercepting 
 his commerce. 
 
 That Philip suffered injury in this way from the war, is asserted 
 by Demosthenes, and is probable enough. But the cruisers of 
 Chares were no less formidable to neutral and even friendly states 
 than to the enemy; and this from the same cause which took him 
 away from his duty to serve Artabazus, viz. the want of proper 
 supplies from home. His troops were chiefly mercenaries, levied 
 partly by his own exertions; and, in order to keep them together, 
 he was obliged to provide pay in the best manner that he could, 
 which was too often by forced contributions from the merchants, 
 the iEgean islands, and the cities of Asia Minor. 2 This practice, 
 which in effect was a species of piracy, suited the views of a man 
 like Chares, for it gave him a more absolute command over his 
 troops, and made him in some measure independent of his country; 
 while the Athenians connived at it, because it relieved them from 
 taxes and contributions. Chares resided chiefly at Sigeum, while 
 he kept up his influence at Athens by means of the orators of his 
 party, and by lavish distributions of money. 
 
 For his reception at Byzantium in the war of 340 b.c. I refer to 
 the last volume; 3 and for his performances in the campaign of 
 Chaeronea, to Appendix IX. of this volume. Chares was one of 
 the Athenians whom Alexander required to be surrendered with 
 Demosthenes. When Alexander crossed over to Asia, Chares was 
 living at Sigeum, and came to meet him at Ilium. Afterwards we 
 read of his seizing Mitylene, apparently on behalf of Darius; from 
 which he was expelled by Hegelochus the Macedonian general. 
 
 The character of the man appears from the history of his public 
 life. He was a vain, dasliing officer, with a good deal of personal 
 
 1 See pp. 248—251, 288, 289. _ 
 
 2 One writer attributes the origin of the Social War to these very 
 practices of Chares. See ThirlwalTs History of Greece, v. 213, 229. 
 
 * Yol. I. Appendix III. p. 303. 
 
326 
 
 APPENDIX IL 
 
 bravery, but little strategic skill. He was too fond of luxury and 
 ease to perform his military duties properly. He used to carry 
 about with him on his expeditions music-girls and dancers and 
 other ministers of his pleasure. Funds which he received for war¬ 
 like purposes he scrupled not to dissipate on idle amusement, or 
 spend in bribing the orators and jurymen at Athens. Such is the 
 account of Theopompus, perhaps a little overcharged; yet that' it is 
 true in the main appears from other sources. According to Suidas, 
 his bad faith was so notorious, that the “promises of Chares” passed 
 into a proverb. The influence which such a man acquired at 
 Athens was owing partly to the absence of able competitors, partly 
 to the vice and corruption of the day. Statesman and general were 
 not united in the same person, as in the time of Pericles. The 
 general serving abroad was connected with the orator who stayed at 
 home; and they gave to each other a mutual support. Thus might 
 an indifferent commander be kept in his employment by party in¬ 
 fluence. Aristophon was for some time the fighting orator who 
 supported Chares at Athens. We find Demosthenes in the second 
 Olynthian censuring this as a vicious practice, and pointing seem¬ 
 ingly to Chares, though not by name. After the peace Chares and 
 his party joined Demosthenes, who was then confessedly the best 
 orator of the day, and had got the ear and confidence of the assem¬ 
 bly. In the oration on the Chersonese, Demosthenes somewhat 
 excuses the irregular practices of the generals abroad, and speaks 
 indulgently both of Chares and Aristophon. Yet of the faults of 
 Chares we can not doubt that he was fully conscious, though 
 friendship may' have tied his tongue. He speaks with extreme 
 caution, where he defends him against HSschines in the Oration on 
 the Embassy. 1 
 
 DEMADES. 
 
 A clever but profligate orator, who first becomes known to us in 
 the debate of 349 b. c., when he opposed the sending of succors to 
 Olynthus. From this time he attached himself wholly to the Mace¬ 
 donian party at Athens, and received the pay first of Philip, and then 
 of Alexander. As a necessary consequence, he was an enemy of 
 Demosthenes, with whom he came into frequent collision in the 
 popular assembly. His politics were not more opposite to those of 
 Demosthenes than was the style of his eloquence. Demades was an 
 off-hand and facetious speaker, without art and cultivation, but with 
 great natural powers, pleasing often by his coarse wit and vulgarity 
 more than others did by their studied rhetoric. If the people chanced 
 to be in the humor for his sallies, which was no rare occurrence, he 
 was a match even for Demosthenes himself. 
 
 It would appear, from the character given of him by Theophrastus 
 
 1 Ante, p. 219. 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 327 
 
 and Cicero, and by divers anecdotes which are related of him, that 
 Demades was capable of something better than levity and joking, 
 when he chose to exert himself; but his inordinate love of money 
 and pleasure rendered it impossible for him to be an honest man or 
 a good citizen. 
 
 Among the sayings ascribed to him are the following:— 
 
 Being told that his politics were unworthy of Athens, he said, 
 “ he ought to be excused, for he steered but the wreck of the com¬ 
 monwealth.” Being reproached for changing sides, he declared that 
 “he often spoke against himself, but never against the state.” 
 
 When the news of Alexander’s death was brought to Athens, he 
 said, “he did not believe it; for if it were true, the whole world 
 must by that time have smelt his carcass.” 
 
 Diodorus relates, that after the battle of Clueronea Philip in a fit 
 of intoxication insulted his prisoners, and was rebuked by Demades 
 in the following terms: “Fortune, 0 king, has placed you.in the 
 position of Agamemnon; are you not ashamed to act the part of 
 Thersites?”—that he took the reproof well, and even honored 
 Demades for his freedom; held friendly converse with him, and at 
 his persuasion released the Athenian prisoners without ransom. We 
 learn from Demosthenes, that he negotiated the terms of peace with 
 Philip. 1 
 
 When Alexander demanded the anti-Macedonian orators, Demades, 
 for a bribe of five talents, undertook to save them. An assembly 
 being held to consider the question of delivering them up, Demades 
 moved an artful decree, by which the people, while they excused 
 the orators, promised to punish them according to the laws if they 
 deserved it. The Athenians passed the decree, and chose Demades to 
 be the bearer of it to Alexander. He took Phocion with him, and by 
 their persuasion Alexander was induced not only to grant the required 
 pardon, but to allow the Theban exiles to be received at Athens. 
 
 By the ascendency of Macedonia Demades acquired influence at 
 Athens, notwithstanding his notorious corruption, of which he made 
 no secret, while he squandered his wealth as infamously as he got it. 
 He succeeded Demosthenes as treasurer of the theoric fund, and held 
 the appointment for twelve years. It is related by Plutarch, that 
 succors would have been sent to the Lacedaemonians against Anti¬ 
 pater, if Demades had not told the people, that they must then forego 
 the sum which he was about to distribute among them for a festival. 
 When Alexander claimed to receive divine honors from the Greek 
 states, Demades moved at Athens that the king’s demand be com¬ 
 plied with, and meeting some opposition, bade the people mind that 
 they did not lose earth, while they contested the possession of 
 heaven. His motion was carried; but, after the revolution which 
 followed Alexander’s death, he was sentenced to a fine of ten talents 
 
 1 See ante, p. 103. 
 
328 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 for being the author of so base a decree. In the affair of Harpalus, 
 we find Demades coming in for his share of the plunder, and con¬ 
 fessing it without scruple; his maxim being, never to refuse what 
 was offered him. 
 
 During the Lamian war Demades was in disgrace; but when 
 Antipater was marching upon Athens, he was again employed to 
 mediate for the people. Yet with all his powers of persuasion, 
 assisted by Phocion and Xenocrates, he could only obtain peace for 
 Athens, on the terms of her receiving a Macedonian garrison and 
 a new constitution, paying the cost of the war, and giving up Demos¬ 
 thenes and other obnoxious orators. To the last condition we may 
 presume Demades offered no objection; for he immediately after¬ 
 wards moved the decree which sentenced those men to death. 
 
 After this disgraceful peace, Phocion and Demades were the two 
 leading citizens of Athens; the real governor being Antipater’s 
 lieutenant Menyllus. Phocion preserved a moral, if not a political 
 independence; while Demades was in every respect subservient to 
 his foreign patron. Antipater used to say, that of his two Athenian 
 friends, he could not get Phocion to accept any presents, and to 
 Demades he could never give enough. Demades boasted of the 
 source from which he got his supplies; and when he celebrated the 
 marriage of his son, observed that the wedding-feast was furnished 
 by princes. Yet all the liberality of Antipater did not satisfy him, 
 and he at length brought about his ruin by his own treachery. He 
 wrote a letter to Perdiccas, urging him to come and deliver Greece, 
 which he said was “ hanging by an old rotten thread.” The letter 
 fell into the hands of Antipater. It so happened, that Demades was 
 shortly after sent by the Athenians to Macedonia, to petition for the 
 withdrawal of the garrison from Athens. Antipater, then in his last 
 illness, admitted him to an audience, and produced the letter. De¬ 
 mades, having not a word to say in his defense, was led away to 
 execution. 
 
 HEGESIPPUS. 
 
 An orator of the war-party at Athens. He supported the Pho- 
 cian alliance. He defended Timarchus, and seems to have been 
 greatly disliked by -ZEschines and his friends, who gave him the 
 nickname of Crobylus, from the manner in which he braided 
 his hair. 1 He was sent on the embassy to Philip, in 343, b.c., 
 to negotiate about the restitution of Halonnesus, the amendment 
 of the peace, and other matters; on which occasion he gave such 
 offense by his demands, that Philip banished the poet Xenoclides 
 from Pella for showing him hospitality. He afterwards denounced 
 Philip’s conduct at Athens. The extant oration on Halonnesus is 
 generally attributed to him. 
 
 1 Perhaps in the fashion mentioned by Thucydides, i. 6. 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 329 
 
 HYPERIDES. 
 
 One of the most distinguished Athenians who flourished in the 
 time of Demosthenes; with whom he was intimately connected, 
 and whom he supported in all his efforts to support the sinking cause 
 of Athens and of Greece against the king of Macedon. Though an 
 honest and generous politician, in his private character he was not 
 free from vice; and he was apt to display the violence of his passions 
 both in the assembly and elsewhere. In early life he received a 
 good education, having studied under Isocrates and Plato. Like 
 Demosthenes, he prepared forensic speeches for other men; and he 
 spoke and published many excellent orations, of which but a few 
 fragments have come down to us. In style he was subtle and argu¬ 
 mentative; occasionally bold and striking in his figures; yet, as 
 Cicero says, very unlike Demosthenes. His delivery wanted ani- 
 • mation. 
 
 Hyperides was one of the patriotic citizens who equipped galleys 
 at their own expense, to carry troops to Euboea, when the Thebans 
 invaded the island. We have seen that he impeached Philocrates 
 for his treasonable conduct on the embassy. After the battle of 
 Chseronea he exerted himself with Demosthenes to put the city in 
 a condition of defense, and moved a decree to restore the exiles and 
 the disfranchised, to enfranchise aliens, and give liberty to slaves who 
 fought in defense of Athens. Eor this he was indicted by Aristogi- 
 ton, and acquitted. A fragment of his speech is preserved:— 
 
 “ What is it you reproach me with ? Proposing to give slaves 
 their freedom ? I did so to save freemen from slavery. Restoring 
 exiles to their country ? I restored them that no man might be¬ 
 come an exile. Not reading the laws which forbade the measure? 
 I could not read them; for the arms of the Macedonians took away 
 my eyesight.” 
 
 He was one of the obnoxious statesmen whom Alexander de¬ 
 manded to be given up to him with Demosthenes and Chares. The 
 affair of Harpalus caused a rupture between him and Demosthenes, 
 against whom he appeared as an accuser. When Demosthenes had 
 gone into exile, Hyperides was the leader of the anti-Macedonian 
 party at Athens; and after Alexander’s death, he and Polyeuctus 
 proposed the warlike measures that were undertaken for the libera¬ 
 tion of Greece. When envoys came from Antipater, and praised 
 the mildness of his disposition, Hyperides answered, “We do not 
 want a mild master.” Upon the death of Leosthenes, who was 
 killed in a sally from Lamia, Hyperides spoke the funeral oration in 
 honor of the slain; of which the following remarkable sentence is 
 preserved:— 
 
 u If death is like the state of the unborn, these departed ones are 
 released from disease, and sorrow, and all the casualties to which 
 humanity is subject. But if, as we believe, there still remains in the 
 
330 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 invisible world a sense of the divine goodness, none surely can de¬ 
 serve it so well as those who have vindicated the profaned sanctity 
 of the gods.” , 
 
 The end of Hyperides is invested with the same melancholy in¬ 
 terest as that of Demosthenes. After the submission to Antipater, 
 they were both, on the motion of Demades, sentenced to death; but 
 they had previously escaped to iEgina. Here Hyperides entreated 
 his old friend to forgive him for his unkindness. They then took 
 a last farewell; Demosthenes retiring to the island of Calauria, Hy¬ 
 perides to Hermione, where he sought refuge in the temple of Ceres. 
 Both were soon to be hunted down by the bloodhounds of the vio- 
 tor. Hyperides, dragged from his sanctuary, was carried to Anti¬ 
 pater, who ordered his tongue to be cut out, and his body to be 
 thrown to the dogs. His bones were afterwards obtained by one of 
 his kinsmen, and carried to Athens to be buried. 
 
 LYCURGUS. 
 
 An eminent statesman and orator, chiefly known to us as the au¬ 
 thor of the speech against Leocrates, whom he prosecuted as a trai¬ 
 tor for having deserted his country after the battle of Chseronea. 
 The case is remarkable, as showing what sort of offenses might be 
 construed as treasonable at Athens; and the whole speech deserves 
 to be read. 1 Leocrates was a man of some wealth, who, on. hearing 
 of the signal defeat at Chseronea, packed up all his effects, and 
 sailed away to Rhodes, where he spread a report that Athens was 
 taken by Philip. After staying abroad for seven years he returned 
 home, and resumed his post as a citizen, but was immediately im¬ 
 peached by Lycurgus, brought to trial, and convicted. Thirwall, in 
 the seventh book of his history, where this circumstance is recorded, 
 gives an admirable description of the life and character of Lycurgus, 
 which I present, somewhat abridged, to my reader:— 
 
 u Lycurgus, the prosecutor, was one of the few men then living 
 at Athens who could undertake such a task with dignity, as con¬ 
 scious of a life irreproachably spent in the service of his country. 
 There are few Athenian statesmen of any age who can bear a com¬ 
 parison with him. Phocion equalled him in honesty and disinter¬ 
 estedness ; but in his general character, and in his political conduct, 
 seems to fall far below him. He was a genuine Athenian, his family 
 being one of the oldest and most illustrious in Athens. He traced 
 the origin of his house (the Eteobutads) to the hero Erechtheus. 
 By virtue of this descent his family possessed an hereditary priest¬ 
 hood of Poseidon. In the Erechtheum, the temple dedicated in 
 common to the hero and the god, the portraits of his ancestors who 
 had held that office were painted on the walls. Lycophron, his 
 grandfather, had been put to death by the Thirty, and both he and 
 
 1 See my article Tlpodocia, in the Archaeological Dictionary. 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 331 
 
 Lycomedes, another of the orator’s progenitors, had been honored 
 with a public funeral. Lycurgus had studied in the schools both of 
 Plato and Isocrates; but had not learned from the one to withdraw 
 from active life into a visionary world, nor from the other to culti¬ 
 vate empty rhetoric at the expense of truth and of his country. 
 His manly eloquence breathes a deep love and reverence for what 
 was truly venerable in antiquity. His speech against Leocrates, 
 which is still extant, shows that he dwelt with a fondness becom¬ 
 ing his birth and station on the stirring legends of older times; but 
 his admiration for them had not made him indifferent or unjust 
 towards those in which he lived. He possessed an ample hereditary 
 fortune; but he lived, like Phocion, with Spartan simplicity. In 
 an age of growing luxury he wore the same garments through sum¬ 
 mer and winter, and, like Socrates, was only seen with sandals on 
 extraordinary occasions. Yet he had to struggle against the aris- 
 tocrtftical habits and prejudices of his family. He was the author 
 of a law, to restrain the. wealthier women from shaming their 
 poorer neighbors by the costliness of their equipages in the festive 
 procession to Eleusis; but his own wife was the first to break it. 
 His frugality, however, did not arise from parsimony, and was con¬ 
 fined to his personal wants. He was reproached with the liberality 
 which he displayed toward the various masters of learning whom 
 he employed, and declared that, if he could find any that would 
 make his sons better men, he would gladly pay them with half his 
 fortune. He devoted himself to public life in a career of quiet, un¬ 
 ostentatious, but useful activity. He was a powerful, but not a 
 ' ready speaker: like Pericles and Demosthenes, he never willingly 
 mounted the bema without elaborate preparation; and his writing 
 instruments were constantly placed by the side of the simple couch 
 on which he rested, and from which he frequently rose in the night 
 to pursue his labors. But to shine in the popular assembly was not 
 the object of his studies; he seems only to have appeared there on 
 necessary or important occasions. His genius was peculiarly formed 
 for the management of financial affairs; and the economy of the 
 state was the business of a large portion of his public life. In the 
 latter part of Philip’s reign he was placed at the head of the treas¬ 
 ury. The duties of his office embraced not only the collection, but 
 the ordinary expenditure of the Athenian revenues, so far as they 
 were not appropriated to particular purposes. On the administra¬ 
 tion of the person who filled it depended both the resources of the 
 state and the manner in which they were regularly applied. The 
 office was tenable for four years ; a law dictated by republican jeal¬ 
 ousy, and (it seems) proposed by Lycurgus himselfj forbade it to re¬ 
 main longer in the same hands. Yet Lycurgus was permitted to 
 exercise its functions during twelve successive years, selecting some 
 of his friends for the last two terms to bear the title. In the course 
 of this period nearly 19,000 talents passed through his hands. He 
 
332 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 is said to have raised the ordinary revenue from 600 to 1,200 tal¬ 
 ents. We hear of no expedients but unwearied diligence by which 
 he effected this increase. It is only as to the application that we 
 are more fully informed. It seems that the amount and the nature 
 of the domestic expenditure were committed in a great degree to 
 his discretion. As the surplus not required for war fell into the 
 theoric fund, which was devoted to the transient gratification of the 
 people, it required all the influence of the treasurer to apply as large 
 a sum as possible to objects permanently useful. The administra¬ 
 tion of Lycurgus was distinguished above every other since Pericles 
 by the number of public buildings which he erected or completed. 
 Among his monuments were an arsenal, an armory, a theatre, a 
 gymnasium, a palaestra, a stadium. After the example of Pericles, 
 he laid up a considerable treasure in the citadel, in images, vessels, 
 and ornaments of gold and silver, which at the same time served to 
 heighten the splendor of the sacred festivals. It was in a different 
 capacity, under a special commission, that he also built four hundred 
 galleys, and formed a great magazine of arms. He seems likewise 
 to have taken Pericles for his model in a continual endeavor to 
 raise the character and to refine the taste of the people. We find 
 his attention directed to important branches of art and literature. 
 He was the author of a regulation for the better management of 
 the comic drama. But he conferred a more lasting benefit on his 
 country, and on all posterity, by another measure designed to pre¬ 
 serve the works of the three great tragic poets of Athens. The 
 dramas of Sophocles and Euripides, if not of iEschylus, were still 
 frequently exhibited: they were acknowledged as the most perfect 
 models of dramatic poetry; but this did not prevent them from un¬ 
 dergoing a fate similar to that which has so often befallen the 
 works of our early dramatists: they were frequently interpolated 
 and mutilated by the actors. Before the invention of the press this 
 was a serious evil, as it endangered the very existence of the origi¬ 
 nal works. To remedy it, Lycurgus caused a new transcript or 
 edition to be made of them by public authority, in many cases 
 probably from the manuscripts of the authors, and to be deposited 
 in the state archives. The value of this edition was proved by its 
 fate. It was afterwards borrowed by one of the Ptolemies to be 
 copied for the Alexandrian library, and fifteen talents were left at 
 Athens as a pledge for its restitution. The king however sent back 
 the copy instead of the original, and forfeited his pledge. By the 
 decree of Lycurgus it was directed, that the players should conform 
 in their representations to this authentic edition. 
 
 u All these works attest the influence of Lycurgus, while they 
 show the spirit in which it was exerted. As the state intrusted 
 him with its revenues, so private persons deposited their property 
 in his custody. When a piece of ground was required for his new 
 stadium, Dinias, its owner, made a present of it to the people, with 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN - . 
 
 333 
 
 the extraordinary declaration, that he gave it for the sake of Lycur- 
 gus. His testimony was sought as the most efficacious aid in the 
 courts of justice. He was once summoned by an adversary of De¬ 
 mosthenes. Demosthenes said he should only ask, whether Lycur- 
 gus would consent to be thought like the man whom he befriended. 
 He could venture sharply to rebuke the assembled people, when he 
 was interrupted in a speech by clamors of disapprobation. We 
 hear but of one case in which he may seem to have courted popu¬ 
 lar favor by a deviation from his principles in the management of 
 the public funds. He had convicted a wealthy man of a gross fraud 
 on the state in the working of the mines at Laurium. The offender 
 was put to death, and his whole estate confiscated, and Lycurgus 
 consented to distribute the sum which it brought into the treasury 
 among the people, as the whole produce of the mines had been dis¬ 
 tributed before the time of Themistocles. The general tendency of 
 his measures, 'and the impression produced by his character, were 
 rather of an opposite kind. He inspired a feeling approaching to 
 awe by his antique Spartan-like austerity, as he publicly avowed 
 his admiration of the old Spartan manners. When he was appoint¬ 
 ed to superintend the police of the city, the measures by which he 
 cleared it of rogues and vagrants were deemed so rigorous, as to be 
 compared with the laws of Draco. On the other hand, one of his 
 celebrated enactments was a provision against one of the grosser 
 abuses of the slave-trade, by which it sometimes happened that free 
 persons were sold under false pretexts in the Athenian market. 
 
 u The account, to which every Athenian magistrate was liable, 
 was rigidly exacted from one who filled such an office as Lycurgus 
 discharged for twelve years in succession. He rendered one at the 
 end of each quadriennial period, either in his own name, or in that 
 of the titular minister for whom he acted. No flaw was ever de¬ 
 tected in his reckonings, and it appeared that he had on various oc¬ 
 casions borrowed between 600 and 700 talents for the public service. 
 Still he himself was not satisfied with the ordinary inspection to 
 which his accounts were liable; he justly considered them as one 
 of his fairest titles to gratitude and esteem, and he therefore caused 
 them to be inscribed on a monument which he erected in the pa¬ 
 laestra founded by himself: and it appears that a considerable part 
 of this inscription has been preserved to our day. A short time 
 before his death, which seems to have a little preceded Alexander’s, 
 he directed himself to be carried to the council- chamber, and chal¬ 
 lenged a fresh scrutiny of his whole administration. The only per¬ 
 son who came forward to lay any thing to his charge was one 
 Menessechmus, whom he had prosecuted, and he now refuted all his 
 cavils. 
 
 “ Crowns, statues, and a seat at the table of the Prytanes, had 
 been bestowed on him in his life. After his death he was honored 
 with a public funeral, and with a bronze statue near the ten heroes 
 
334 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 of the tribes, and the distinction he had enjoyed as a guest of the 
 state was made hereditary in his family.” 
 
 PHOCION. 
 
 Phocion is one of the- heroes of Plutarch, who has written a very 
 interesting life of him, in which, however, he greatly overrates his 
 merits as a politician. He was born of humble parents in the year 
 402 b.c., and lived to the age of eighty. During all this time he 
 was remarkable not only for an inflexible integrity of conduct, but 
 for an austere virtue and simplicity, exemplified in his manners, his 
 dress, and his whole style of living. His early habits had accus¬ 
 tomed him to the endurance of hardships; and the precepts of phi¬ 
 losophy, which he imbibed from Plato and Xenocrates, under whom 
 he afterwards studied, taught him to despise riches and other exter¬ 
 nal advantages. Partly on such account, partly by his valor in the 
 field, and by means of a fluent and natural eloquence, he became a 
 favorite with the people, and was forty-five times elected to the 
 office of general, and on five occasions at least intrusted with im¬ 
 portant commands, in all of which he was successful. 
 
 At the battle of Naxos he served under Chabrias, and greatly dis¬ 
 tinguished himself. Chabrias observed, that his courage was tem¬ 
 pered with prudence, a quality in which he himself was somewhat 
 deficient, and for want of which he lost his life afterwards in the 
 action at Chios. He selected Phocion to execute an important com¬ 
 mission, that of collecting contributions from the islands, and offered 
 him a guard of twenty sail. Phocion said, if he was sent to ene¬ 
 mies, the force was not large enough; if to friends, one vessel was 
 sufficient. Accordingly he took a single ship, and managed things 
 so well, that he gathered all the arrears due from the allies. After 
 the death of Chabrias, Phocion, in requital of his kindness, took the 
 utmost pains to reform the morals of his son Ctesippus, but found 
 him incorrigible. 
 
 His first important command was in Euboea, when he carried 
 succors to Plutarch of Eretria against Callias of Chalcis, who had 
 received assistance from Macedonia. He found that Plutarch had 
 deceived the Athenians with respect to the amount of support which 
 he could offer. His own force was small, and through the negli¬ 
 gence or treachery of his ally he was brought into a perilous posi¬ 
 tion in the plain of Tamynae, where he was exposed to an attack by 
 superior numbers. He chose some rising ground, and fortified his 
 camp. Some of his men being mutinous, and straggling from the 
 camp, he told his officers not to mind them, as they would do him 
 more harm than good. When Chllias advanced with his Macedo¬ 
 nian auxiliaries, some of the Athenians were eager to charge: he 
 told them to wait till he had offered sacrifice; notwithstanding 
 which, his cavalry and the Eubceans rushed impetuously forward, 
 but were speedily routed, Plutarch being the first to fly. Callias, 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 335 
 
 thinking the battle won, led his troops in some confusion up to the 
 Athenian lines, when Phocion, informing his men that the sacrifices 
 were propitious, gave the order for attack ; and his small band of 
 infantry, falling with fury upon their enemies, after an obstinate 
 fight won the victory. Phocion afterwards expelled Plutarch from 
 Eretria, in which he established popular government, and secured it 
 by a fort called Zaratra, which he occupied, on a neck of land pro¬ 
 jecting into the channel. His successor Molossus managed things 
 so ill, that he was taken prisoner by the enemy; and Eretria was 
 lost to Athens. It fell soon under the tyranny of Clitarchus, a crea¬ 
 ture of Philip. 
 
 In the year 351 b.c., Phocion went to assist Evagoras in the ex¬ 
 pedition for the reduction of Cyprus, which in the following year 
 was re-annexed to the Persian empire. In 343, b.c., his services 
 were required to secure Megara against the intrigues of Philip. He 
 marched rapidly to the city with a large body of Athenians, and 
 being welcomed by the Megarian people, he proceeded to fortify the 
 harbor of NTissea and complete the long walls, thus bringing it under 
 the protection of Athens, and defeating the plot of Ptceodorus to in¬ 
 troduce Macedonian troops. In 341, b.c., he restored Euboea to his 
 country, driving out the tyrants and the Macedonian garrisons from 
 Eretria and Oreus. And in the following year he achieved the sig¬ 
 nal successes which preserved Byzantium and the Chersonese. 1 
 
 Seeing the warlike abilities displayed by Phocion, we can not help 
 deeming it unfortimate that he was not oftener employed, and par¬ 
 ticularly in the critical campaigns of Olynthus and Chaeronea. Had 
 he been sent to assist Phalaecus in the defense of Thermopylae, the 
 destiny of Greece might have been changed. He does not appear 
 to have been intrusted with any important command until he was 
 forty-eight years of age. For the cause of this we must look partly 
 to his own unambitious temper of mind, partly to the politics of the 
 time. Phocion was not a party man; both in private and in public 
 life, his views and his acts were independent: he did not command the 
 political influence, and he would have disdained to use the arts which 
 elevated such men as Chares to honors and dignities. He was gen¬ 
 erally opposed to the war-party; and it was but natural that, when 
 they had the opportunity, they should select for the execution of 
 their measures, the n^en who supported them. There is another 
 thing also to be noticed.—Phocion was an orator as well as a gen¬ 
 eral : he is said to have been the last of the Athenians in whom 
 those two functions were united. He never made long speeches; 
 yet he commanded as much attention as any of those who mounted 
 the platform. He spoke with a pithy and sententious brevity, which 
 comported well with the gravity of his demeanor, and had the more 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 32, 35, 37, 109, 209: and see Vol. I. pp. 107, 119, 
 128, 303, 304. 
 
336 
 
 APPENDIX IL 
 
 effect on account of the esteem in which his character was held. 
 Without being ill-natured or discourteous, he had a dry, caustic hu¬ 
 mor, which could administer very sharp reproof to those who, he 
 thought, by their folly or presumption, or by the dangerous tenden¬ 
 cy of their argument, deserved it. Even Demosthenes feared him, 
 and once, when Phocion rose to speak, whispered to a friend— 
 “ Here comes the chopper* of my harangues.” Nor did he spare the 
 people themselves more than his competitors, but was constantly 
 rebuking them for their follies. He told them once, he had given 
 them a great deal of good advice, but they had not the wit to follow 
 it. Yet for all that he was a favorite with the assembly; for they 
 respected his good qualities; and they always liked a man who 
 threw life into their debates. 
 
 A great number of his sayings are preserved by Plutarch; among 
 them the following:— 
 
 Chares rallied him in the assembly upon the gravity of his coun¬ 
 tenance : Phocion said, “My grave looks never hurt the Athenians; 
 but your mirth has cost them many a tear.” 
 
 Being asked, in the theatre, why he was looking so thoughtful ? 
 “I am considering,” said he, “how to retrench something in a speech 
 I am about making to the people.” 
 
 Demosthenes said to him, “ The Athenians will kill you some day 
 in one of their mad fits:” “And you,” said he, “if ever they come 
 to their senses.” 
 
 His speech having been received with applause in the assembly, 
 he asked one of his friends, “if he had let drop any thing silly or 
 impertinent.” 
 
 Being reproached for defending an unworthy man, he said, “ The 
 innocent have no need of an advocate.” 
 
 Anstogiton, a pettifogging orator, having been sentenced to a 
 heavy fine, requested Phocion to come and speak with him in prison. 
 His friends advising him not to go, Phocion said, “ I know no place 
 where I would rather meet Aristogiton.” 
 
 He reproved the people for their rejoicing at Philip’s death, saying, 
 “ Remember, the army that beat you at Chseronea is lessened only 
 by one man.” 
 
 When Demosthenes was inveighing against Alexander, then be¬ 
 fore the walls of Thebes, Phocion quoted the lines of Homer, in 
 which the companions of Ulysses entreat hirfi not to provoke Poly¬ 
 phemus : 
 
 1 Ko7ivf. This illustrates the passage in the Oration on the Embassy 
 (p. 450): 'H c5£ tov Xiyecv (dvva/us,) uv ra nap’ imuv ruv ukovovtuv uv- 
 TLOT7], diaKonreTCU' 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 337 
 
 What boots the godless giant to provoke, 
 
 Whose arm may sink us at a single stroke ?* 
 
 It is necessary however to advert to the political character of 
 Phocion, as to which there is some difference of opinion. Mitford 
 regards him as the best of Athenian statesmen. Plutarch takes but 
 little notice of those faults which Thirlwall and G-rote comment on 
 with not more severity than justice. Phocion as a statesman neg¬ 
 lected the duty, which as a general he would have been the first to 
 acknowledge; that of defending his country; defending her by his 
 foresight and his counsel; descrying the danger that was approach¬ 
 ing her, and advising the proper measures to avert it. He either 
 did not see the peril, or, when he did see it, he despaired of safety. 
 He gave up the game, while there was yet a chance of winning it. 
 This is proved even by the campaign of Chaeronea, the issue of 
 which was doubtful, and might have been different, if there had 
 been abler commanders on the Athenian side. Phocion was keenly 
 alive to the faults of his countrymen, but he did not strive to 
 amend them: he was content to sneer and moralize, without 
 endeavoring to instruct or improve. Athens, with all her faults, 
 was the best governed of all the states in Greece, and secured the 
 largest amount of rational happiness to her citizens. She was 
 worth preserving for the sake of Greece and of the world. It was 
 an injury to the cause of civilization and humanity, that such a state 
 should be overthrown by the brute strength, of a semi-barbarous 
 power. Phocion should have co-operated with those who labored 
 to save their country, and not have thrown difficulties in their way. 
 What Athens wanted was the energy which animated her citizens 
 of a former age, and the military training and organization which 
 gives efficiency to an army. No man was better able than Phocion 
 to advise the Athenians upon these subjects; yet we no where find 
 him exhorting them to rouse from indolence and prepare for a 
 struggle that was inevitable. Tamynse might have shown him that 
 they were capable of doing something if properly directed. Still he 
 persisted in looking at the dark instead of the bright side of things; 
 and though he always did his duty in the field, he damped the 
 spirits of his countrymen and fostered their apathy and idleness at 
 
 1 Pope’s translation of the Odyssey, ix. 494, where the companions 
 of Ulysses entreat him not to provoke Polyphemus :— 
 
 tlttt ’ kdeXeic ipeOi&fiev dypiov uvdpa ; 
 r Of Kat vvv ttovtovSe fiaTitiv jSiXoc, f/yaye vfja 
 A vtcc fjTceipov , k al dr) tyap-ev avToO’ otecOai. 
 
 Phocion was probably right in his counsel here. Yet Demosthenes 
 might have rejoined, that Ulysses was not convinced by his companions, 
 and quoted his words : 
 
 <j>doav‘ uaTJ ov nelOov kpbv fieyaXrjTopa Ovjiov. 
 
 Von. IT.— P 
 
338 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 home. His philosophy was one-sided, not teaching him to be a 
 good patriot as well as a good man. Even in his sayings we may 
 discover an inclination to be smart rather than just, to sacrifice 
 truth occasionally to repartee. When Demosthenes advised that 
 Philip should be engaged in war as far as possible away from 
 Attica, Phocion said, “Let us not be so careful about the place 
 where we fight, as how to get the victory.” Here, as it appears to 
 me, Demosthenes gave sound advice, and Phocion’s answer was 
 not to the point. Demosthenes might have said, “Yes; I am also 
 for taking every possible means to secure the victory; but still I 
 think it safer to fight Philip abroad than at home. Let us do this, 
 and not leave the other undone.” Phocion censured the measures 
 of Leosthenes which led to the Lamian war; and being asked by 
 Hyperides, when he would advise the Athenians to declare war, 
 answered, u When I see the young observant of discipline, the rich . 
 ready to contribute, and the orators abstaining from plunder.” This 
 was ill-timed. 
 
 Phocion seems to have thought, like Isocrates, that Macedonian 
 ascendency was not inconsistent with the freedom of the Greek 
 states. Chseronea soon undeceived him. When Philip invited a 
 general congress to meet at Corinth, and Demades proposed that 
 the Athenians should join it, Phocion advised them to wait until 
 they knew what Philip would demand. Afterwards, when it was 
 found that Philip demanded of them a contingent of cavalry and 
 ships, the Athenians (says Plutarch) repented that they had not 
 followed Phocion’s advice. Yet it may be doubted, whether they 
 would have done any good by merely absenting themselves from 
 the congress. 
 
 In the debate upon Alexander’s demand of the orators, Phocion 
 advised the people to surrender them, and urged the orators to 
 yield themselves up for the public good. We may credit the decla¬ 
 ration which Plutarch puts into his mouth, that he would have 
 been equally willing to resign his own life to insure the safety of 
 his country; and yet it is* painful to see Phocion recommending the 
 sacrifice of these distinguished men to his country’s enemy. Of the 
 relations which existed between Phocion and Demosthenes we 
 know but little. They were opposed in politics; yet it does not 
 appear that they were enemies in private: not a word is ever 
 uttered by Demosthenes in disparagement of Phocion; 1 and it is 
 observable that three important commands (upon the expeditions to 
 Megara, to Euboea, and to Byzantium) were conferred upon him 
 after Demosthenes had acquired political power. While we lament 
 
 1 Phocion appeared to support iEsehines on his trial: he was, as we 
 should say, a witness to character. Demosthenes, where he alludes to 
 his adversary’s supporters, does not name Phocion, though he addresses 
 Eubulus in language of strong reproof. See ante, pp. 189, 207, 208. 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 339 
 
 Phocion’s mistaken views of duty, we can not suppose that he acted 
 from any ill will towards Demosthenes or his friends. He went 
 with Demades on the deprecatory mission to Alexander, 1 and was 
 most favorably received by that prince, who is reported on that oc¬ 
 casion to have said, “The Athenians must keep their eyes open; 
 for, if any thing should happen to me, they alone are worthy to 
 command.” 
 
 Alexander during the short time that he conversed with Phocion 
 conceived a great regard for him, and, after he had gone to Asia, 
 corresponded with him as a friend. In the letters which he wrote 
 after his conquest of the Persian kingdom he omitted the word 
 Greeting (the common form of salutation) to all persons whom he 
 addressed except Antipater and Phocion. He could not however 
 induce Phocion to accept any presents from him. To some officers 
 who brought him a hundred talents Phocion said—“ How comes it 
 that among all the Athenians I alone am the object of Alexander’s 
 bounty ?” and being told, that it was because Alexander esteemed 
 him alone to be a mam of honor and probity; “then,” said he, “let 
 him allow mb to continue so.” Craterus was ordered to offer 
 Phocion his choice of four Asiatic citiefe: this also he refused. 
 Alexander in some displeasure wrote to say, that he could not 
 regard a man as his friend, who would accept no obligation from 
 him; upon which Phocion requested him to pardon four persons, 
 who for some offense were in custody at Sardis; and accordingly 
 they were set at liberty. 
 
 When Alexander sent for the ships which the Athenians had 
 promised to furnish, and some opposition was made in the as¬ 
 sembly, Phocion warned them to keep friendship with those in 
 power, until they had greater power themselves. It does not 
 appear what part he took upon the motion for deifying Alexander. 
 When Harpalus came to Athens, Phocion rejected his bribes, but 
 dissuaded the giving him up to Antipater. When the people 
 were in excitement upon the first news of Alexander’s death, 
 some saying it was false, others crying out that it was true— 
 “Well,” said Phocion, “if it is true to-day, it will be true to-mor¬ 
 row and the next day; and we shall have time to deliberate about 
 it at our leisure.” 
 
 He opposed the Lamian war from the first, thinking the Athe¬ 
 nians would not have the means to carry it on. In the midst of 
 their successes in the first year he disheartened them by his gloomy 
 forebodings. Those who judge by the event have praised ^iim; yet 
 the history of the war itself proves, in spite of all that Diodorus and 
 others have said to the contrary, that there was a very good chance 
 of success, and that the Athenians were fully justified in com¬ 
 mencing it. Had Phocion not shown so despondent a temper, he 
 
 ' See ante, p. 327. 
 
340 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 would probably have been chosen to succeed Leosthenes as general 
 of the allied army; and his military talents might have produced a 
 different result. Once more only was he destined to lead his coun¬ 
 trymen to victory. He had dissuaded them (perhaps prudently) 
 from invading Boeotia, while the flower of their army was engaged 
 in Thessaly. But when the Macedonian fleet, having been victo¬ 
 rious at sea, made a descent at Rhamnus, and landed a large force 
 which overran and ravaged the country, Phocion mustered all that 
 were capable of bearing arms, and putting himself at their head, 
 marched to the defence of Attica. Here again we find him, as in 
 his younger days, checking the too forward eagerness of his soldiers, 
 and exerting himself to keep them under command. Hor was this 
 without effect. The Macedonians were routed, and their general 
 Micion was slain. This was the last gleam of success which attended 
 the Athenian arms. 
 
 When Antipater was approaching Athens with his victorious 
 army, Phocion, as we have seen already, was sent with Demades 
 and Xenocrates to appease him ; but the only j^rms which he could 
 obtain were such as annihilated his country’s independence. Athens 
 was deprived of the few insular possessions which Philip had left 
 her. She was forced to accept a new constitution, by which nearly 
 two-thirds of her.citizens were disfranchised. Many of them emi¬ 
 grated to Thrace, where Antipater offered them an abode. Some 
 of the upper class were banished from the city. A Macedonian gar¬ 
 rison was established at Munychia, to overawe any malcontents that 
 might remain. 
 
 Amidst all the calamities and disgraces which had fallen upon his 
 country, Phocion preserved his serenity of mind. He had survived 
 all that was great and noble in Athens. There however he lived, 
 oh friendly terms with the Macedonian governor, Menyllus, with 
 whom he had been formerly acquainted: while he refrained from 
 all opposition to the ruling power, which then would have been 
 useless, he refused all the proffered favors of Antipater, as he had 
 once refused Alexander’s. The influence which he could exert at 
 Athens was greater than at any former period, owing indeed as 
 much to Menyllus as to himself. Yet even of this poor consolation 
 he was soon to be deprived by the death of Antipater, which occa¬ 
 sioned a new revolution. 
 
 Antipater, before he died, had nominated Polysperchon as his 
 successor in the regency: Cassander, his son, prepared to contest 
 this appofhtment, and, among other precautions which he took to 
 secure his own power, sent his friend Nicanor to Athens, to receive 
 from Menyllus the command of the garrison. Menyllus, ignorant of 
 Antipater’s death, resigned his charge immediately. Polysperchon, 
 to counteract the efforts of Cassander, drew up an edict in the name 
 of king Aridaeus, Philip’s son, making liberal promises in favor of 
 the Greek cities; and wrote a conciliatory letter to Athens, pro- 
 
ORATORS AND STATESMEN. 
 
 341 
 
 posing to restore the democracy. At the same time he sent troops 
 under his son Alexander to expel Nicanor from Munychia, and pre¬ 
 pared himself to follow with a larger force. 
 
 The Athenians, beguiled by the regent’s letter, were eager to get 
 rid of Nicanor and his garrison; and a plot was laid to seize him in 
 the Piraeus, where he was invited to attend a meeting of the coun¬ 
 cil. Nicanor, who was secretly collecting reinforcements to main¬ 
 tain his position, attended the meeting, upon Phocion’s undertaking 
 to be answerable for his safety; but hastily withdrew, upon receiv¬ 
 ing a hint of his enemies’ designs. Phocion was reproached by the 
 Athenians for not having seized Nicanor’s person, as he might have 
 done. He asserted that there was no reason to suspect Nicanor 
 of any hostile intention; but this only aggravated the displeasure 
 of the people, when Nicanor, having received his reinforcements 
 from Salamis, surprised Pirmus in the night. He then offered 
 to lead his countrymen against Nicanor, but they refused to 
 follow him, and soon afterwards, when Alexander appeared with 
 his troops before the walls, they deposed Phocion from his office 
 of general. 
 
 The Athenians had imagined, that Alexander was come to liberate 
 them from the garrison and to enforce the king’s edict; but they 
 soon found themselves mistaken. Alexander was observed to hold 
 private conferences with Nicanor. It was suspected that they were 
 concerting measures together, and that Phocion, who had himself 
 had interviews with Alexander, was at the bottom of the scheme. 
 A number of exiles, who had followed the march of the Macedonian 
 army, had got admission to the city, and helped to inflame the people 
 against Phocion. One Agnonides accused him of treason: upon 
 which he with some of his friends fled to the Macedonian camp. 
 Agnonides persuaded the Athenians to send embassadors with an 
 accusation against him to Polysperchon. Phocion was sent by 
 Alexander with a letter recommending him to his father’s pro¬ 
 tection. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, Polysperchon, who had now advanced with 
 an army into Phocis, received him with the utmost rudeness; and, 
 when he was accused by the Athenian envoys, refused to hear any 
 defense. An uproar being occasioned by'many of the Athenians 
 speaking at once, “ Put us all into one cage,” said Agnonides, “ and 
 send us to Athens to try our quarrel there.” This strange request 
 was after a while compiled with; and Phocion and the other accused 
 parties were put in a wagon, and sent in chains to Athens under 
 the escort of Clitus. 
 
 They were carried to the theatre, where the assembly was to sit 
 in judgment upon them. A vast crowd was gathered, consisting in 
 part of exiles, foreigners, and slaves. The exiles were peculiarly 
 exasperated against Phocion, because he had been the friend of 
 Antipater. Clitus read a letter from the king, which declared that 
 
342 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 lie believed all the prisoners guilty, but that he left their case to the 
 free judgment of the Athenian people. The accusers charged Pho- 
 cion with being the author of all the evils which had fallen upon 
 them since the Lamian war; the overthrow of the democracy, the 
 death and exile of so many citizens, the yoke of the Macedonian 
 garrison. It was in vain that he attempted to speak. His voice was 
 drowned by clamor. “ Athenians”—at length he exclaimed:—“ I 
 myself plead guilty: but what have these my friends done ?”—“ It 
 is enough”—cried the people — u that they are your accomplices.” 
 Agnonides moved, that they should decide at once, by show of 
 hands, whether the prisoners were guilty; and if so, that they 
 should be put to death. The sentence of condemnation was unani¬ 
 mous. Torture was proposed; but even Agnonides declared, he 
 could never consent to treat Phocion in such a manner: and one 
 honest voice was heard to exclaim — u You are right, Agnonides: 
 for if we put Phocion to the torture, what may you not expect ?” 
 
 Pour of the condemned persons were carried with Phocion to 
 execution. He was insulted as he passed along: one man spat in 
 his face : he turned to the archons and said—“ Will no one correct 
 this fellow’s rudeness ?” He preserved his own calm composure to 
 the last, and endeavored to cheer his companions. Being asked, if 
 he had any message to his son, he answered—“ Yes: tell him to 
 forget how the Athenians treated his father.” Nicocles, who had 
 been one of his dearest friends, entreated that he might drink the 
 hemlock first. “ Ah!” said Phocion; “ of all the requests you ever 
 made this is the most painful to me; but, as I never refused you 
 any thing, I must grant this also.” The executioner had not mixed 
 hemlock enough for all, and asked twelve drachms for a fresh sup¬ 
 ply : “ What ?” said Phocion: “ can’t one die free of cost at 
 Athens ?”—and he requested one of his friends to give the man his 
 fee. 
 
 Such was the end of Phocion. It was compared to that of 
 Socrates. It reminds one also of Sir Thomas More. 
 
 0 
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 THE COUNCIL OF AREOPAGUS. 
 
 This council, so called from the Hill of Mars, where it held its 
 sittings, near the Acropolis, was a judicial and deliberative body 
 greatly esteemed at Athens. It was from time immemorial estab¬ 
 lished as a court of criminal jurisdiction, to try cases of murder. 
 
THE COUNCIL OF AREOPAGUS. 
 
 343 
 
 maiming, and arson. It sat in the open air, to escape the pollution 
 of being under the some roof with the guilty. In its proceedings 
 the utmost solemnity was observed. Both parties were sworn to 
 speak the truth; and the facts alone were inquired into, without 
 appeals to the feelings or oratorical display. 
 
 The Areopagites used to be taken from the noble families of 
 Attica. But Solon introduced a new law, that the Archons whose 
 official conduct had been approved should be members of this coun¬ 
 cil for life. At the same time he enlarged the power of the coun¬ 
 cil, attaching to it political and censorial duties, in order that with 
 the council of five hundred it might act as a check upon the de¬ 
 mocracy. 
 
 In their censorial character the Areopagites kept watch over the 
 religion and morals of the city, maintained order and decency, 
 looked to the education of the young, inquired how people got 
 their living, and checked riotous excesses and debauchery. They 
 had power to summon before them and punish offenders. They 
 acted often from their own personal knowledge, without requiring 
 testimonial evidence. We read of their entering houses on feast 
 days, to see that the guests were not too numerous. Menedemus 
 and Asclepiades, two poor young men, were called before the coun¬ 
 cil, and asked how they could manage to live, when they spent all 
 their days in idleness in company with philosophers: they proved 
 that every night they earned two drachms by grinding at a mill; 
 whereupon the council rewarded them with a present of two hun¬ 
 dred drachms. 
 
 As a political body, it was their province to inquire into offenses 
 against the state and report them to the people. If the public safety 
 required it, or if there was not time to wait for the ordinary course 
 of law, they could interfere summarily to avert threatened danger, 
 to prevent the consummation of crime, or bring the offenders to 
 speedy justice. 
 
 For example : after the battle of Cliceronea, when it was expected 
 that Athens would be besieged, the Areopagites caused certain men, 
 who were preparing to leave their country, to be seized and put to 
 death. So also, they put Antiphon to the torture and sentenced him 
 to death, although he had been dismissed by the popular assembly; 
 and they deprived JEschines, suspected of being his accomplice, of 
 an office to which he had been elected by the people . 1 
 
 Or the people might give a special commission to be executed by 
 the Areopagites. Thus in the affair of Harpalus a decree was 
 passed, directing them to investigate what had become of the 
 treasure which that officer brought to Athens. They instituted a 
 rigid inquiry, searching the houses of the suspected parties; and 
 
 ' See ante, pp. 66, 118,181; and Vol. I. p. 168, note 3. 
 
 I 
 
344 
 
 APPENDIX IIL 
 
 then made a report, charging several persons with having received 
 presents, and among them, Demades and Demosthenes. 
 
 Had not the council maintained a high character for justice, pru¬ 
 dence, and moderation, it would have been impossible for such 
 inquisitorial and summary powers to have been tolerated in a free 
 state like Athens. That they were exercised generally to the advan¬ 
 tage of the people, and that public opinion supported them, appears 
 from the express testimony of Isocrates, iEschines, and other writers. 
 Isocrates in his Areopagitic oration contrasts the loose morals of 
 , his own time with those of a former age, over which the Areopagus 
 exercised a greater control: he says, that it was the most esteemed 
 tribunal in Greece; that even bad men,when they became members 
 of it, discarded their own nature, and conformed to the character 
 of the institution. 
 
 In the time of Pericles the democratical party, of which that 
 statesman was at the head, looked with jealousy upon the council 
 of Areopagus, on account of the support which they thought it gave 
 to the aristocratical or conservative interest: and they exerted them¬ 
 selves to bring it into discredit with the people, and to weaken its 
 authority. The opposite party, headed by Cimon, resisted this 
 attempt; and the poet iEschylus engaged his pen in the same 
 cause. The tragedy of the Eumenides is said to have been com¬ 
 posed for the express purpose of upholding the authority of the 
 Areopagus. He there shows how it was established by the tutelary 
 goddess of Athens; how its first sitting was appointed for the trial 
 of Orestes, pursued by the vengeful Puries for shedding his mother’s 
 blood; how it pronounced his acquittal with the aid and sanction of 
 the goddess; how Orestes vowed for himself and his country eter¬ 
 nal alliance with Athens; and how Pallas declared that the court 
 and council, composed of the best and worthiest Athenian citizens, 
 revered for its wisdom and incorruptibility, should endure to all 
 ages and be the safeguard of the country . 1 The inference was that, 
 
 1 See the Eumenides, 465 :— 
 
 K ptvaaa d’ aar&v rfiv e/utiv rd /JeArara 
 diaipelv tovto TTpuyp.’ iTijTv/iog, 
 bpnov nepuvTag pytitos enditcov (ppcciv. 
 
 And 651—670 
 
 KAt 'jolt’ uv fjdr) dec/ubv, ’ATTinbg heog, 
 irpuTag 6'mag Kpivovreg alfiaTog ^vrov. 
 eotcu 6b Kal to TiOtnov ’A pyeicp OTpaT<p 
 
 del dtnacTtiv tovto ftov’kevT'ripiov. 
 
 * * * * * 
 
 TOLOvSe TOL TapfioVVTEQ kvStKUg OEfiag, 
 lpvp.d te x^pag xal noleug cuTrjpiov 
 $Xolt’ dv, olov ovng dvdpuTcuv lx £L 
 qvte h/cvdyeiv, ovte IlEhoTcog hv ToTtotg. 
 
THE COUNCIL OF FIVE HUNDRED. 
 
 345 
 
 instead of seeking to encroach upon the power of this solemn and 
 awful tribunal, the people of Athens ought to regard it with venera¬ 
 tion, and maintain it in all its integrity. However, notwithstanding 
 this powerful appeal, and all the opposition of Cimon and his party, 
 Ephialtes in the year b.c. 458 carried a decree, which to some extent 
 abridged or limited the powers of the council. The exact nature of 
 the change which he introduced is a matter of controversy. That 
 the criminal jurisdiction of the court was not interfered with, appears 
 from the testimony of Demosthenes, who in the oration against 
 Aristocrates says, that neither tyrants nor people had ever deprived 
 it of that jurisdiction, and that even the condemned had never com¬ 
 plained of its verdicts. That it still continued to exercise large and 
 undefined powers of an inquisitorial and political character, appears 
 from the examples above mentioned, occurring in the age of Demos¬ 
 thenes. It is not unlikely, however, that some of the censorial 
 functions of the Areopagus may have been taken away altogether. 
 But what is still more probable is, that the Areopagites, as a politi¬ 
 cal body, were made accountable to the people for the proper dis¬ 
 charge of their duties. Tliis would be a regulation perfectly just of 
 ' itself, and in accordance with the spirit of the Athenian constitution, 
 which did not permit the existence of any irresponsible function¬ 
 aries. Under the check of such a law, they would be more cautious 
 how they interfered on ordinary occasions with the rights and lib¬ 
 erties of their fellow-citizens: but it would not prevent them from 
 taking strong measures for the public safety or advantage, when 
 necessity required it. 1 
 
 APPENDIX IY. 
 
 THE COUNCIL OF FIVE HUNDRED. 
 
 The council or senate of five hundred was an executive and de¬ 
 liberative body, appointed to manage various departments of the 
 public business, more especially that which related to the popular 
 assembly. As established by Solon, it consisted of four hundred 
 members, a hundred from each of the four tribes into which the 
 Athenian's were then divided: but when the ten tribes were substi- 
 
 Kepduv aOlKTOV TOVTO (3oV?i£VTTJpLOV, 
 aldoiov, o^vdvfiovy evdovruv vnep 
 kyprjyopog (ppovprjpa yr/c Kadiorapat.. 
 
 1 See Thirlwall’s History of Greece, iii. 18, 22 ; and Whiston’a article 
 on the Areopagus, in the Archaeological Dictionary. 
 
 P 2 
 
346 
 
 APPENDIX IY. 
 
 tuted by Clistbenes for the four, the number of counselors was raised 
 to five hundred, fifty being taken from each of the tribes. They 
 were annually chosen by lot—in Solon’s time from the three first 
 classes only, but afterwards from the whole body of the people—with 
 no other restriction than that they must be genuine citizens on both 
 the father’s and the mother’s side, and of the age of thirty. To 
 insure the legal qualification, the counselors elect underwent a 
 scrutiny 1 before the existing council, and if any one was rejected, 
 another was chosen in his room from the same tribe. Having passed 
 the scrutiny, they took an oath to observe the laws and consult for 
 the good of the commonwealth. At the expiration of their year of 
 office they had, like all other functionaries, to render an account of 
 their official conduct to the auditors: and during the term any one 
 was liable to be expelled by his colleagues for misbehavior. 
 
 For the more convenient dispatch of business, the tribes appor¬ 
 tioned the year among them, and took the duties in rotation. The 
 council was thus divided into ten bodies of fifty men, who were 
 called Prytanes , or Presidents, and who for the time represented the 
 whole council. Their term of office was called a Prytany , or Pres¬ 
 idency. As the lunar year at Athens consisted of 354 days, it was 
 so arranged, that there were six Prytanies of thirty-five days each, 
 and four of thirty-six, the supernumerary days being assigned to the 
 four last Prytanies. This was a little modified in intercalated years. 
 The turns were determined by lot. From the Prytanes again were 
 taken for every seven days of their term of office an executive com¬ 
 mittee, called Proedri. They had an Epistates , or chairman, chosen 
 for each of the seven days, by whom were kept the public records 
 and seal. 
 
 Besides the committee thus taken from the presiding tribe, the 
 chairman had to form a committee of nine counselors from the other 
 tribes, choosing one from each by lot. This mixed commitee attended 
 all the meetings of the council and the assembly, and nothing could 
 be done without their sanction. The object of this regulation was, 
 to give the other tribes a check upon the presiding tribe. And it 
 appears that in later times the mixed committee performed the duties 
 anciently appropriated to the committee of the single tribe; which 
 was a better arrangement. 2 
 
 The council was to be, according to Solon’s design, a sort of direc¬ 
 torial committee, to assist the people in their deliberations, and to 
 guide and control their acts in assembly. It was their duty to dis¬ 
 cuss beforehand, and also to prepare and draw up in proper form, 
 the measures that were to be submitted to the people, whether they 
 emanated from themselves, or were proposed by any private indi- 
 
 0 
 
 1 A oKiyaoia. 
 
 3 Such is the explanation of Schumann. De Comitiis, p. 84. Anti- 
 quitates Juris Publici, p. 217. 
 
THE COUNCIL OF FIVE HUNDRED. 
 
 347 
 
 viduals. This afforded some guarantee, that no ill-considered meas¬ 
 ures would be brought before the assembly. The proposition to be 
 introduced, having received the sanction of the council, was called 
 a Probouleuma , a decree or order of council, and when it was ratified 
 by the assembly, it became a Psephisma , 1 or decree of the people. 
 Thus, as we have seen, Ctesiphon’s decree in honor of Demosthenes 
 first passed the council, and afterwards the assembly. It would have 
 been impossible however, in a democracy such as that of Athens 
 became, to adhere to the ancient rule, which required every decree 
 moved in the assembly to have been first approved by the council. 
 This therefore was soon dispensed with. Amendments were proposed 
 during the discussion of a bill, which the people could adopt if' they 
 pleased. And any citizen was at liberty to move a decree, upon first 
 applying to the committee of council, and either getting them to pre¬ 
 pare it for him, or obtaining their assent to it as prepared by himself. 
 The form of the ancient practice was thus still preserved; for every 
 motion was made through the council, though they might not actually 
 have formed an opinion of its merits. And if it appeared to the com¬ 
 mittee of council, that any motion was objectionable, either in point 
 of form or on more serious grounds, they might refuse to bring it 
 before the assembly; for which refusal, if improper, they would of 
 course be responsible to the people. 
 
 It was the business of the Prytanes in general to convene the 
 popular assembly, and to give public notice of the business to be 
 transacted. Their committee attended with the chairman and pre¬ 
 sided over it. They proposed the subject of discussion; caused to 
 be read by the usher any bill which had been proposed; permitted 
 the orators to speak; put the question to the assembly; and took the 
 votes. 2 
 
 Besides preparing questions for the general assembly, the council 
 had a right to issue ordinances of their own, which, if not set aside 
 by the people, remained in force for the year. And sometimes, for 
 the sake of convenience, the people specially delegated to the Council 
 of Five Hundred, as they did to the Areopagus, extraordinary 
 powers, which they could not have ventured to exercise of their own 
 authority. Of this we have seen an example in the case of the em¬ 
 bassy to ‘Philip, when the council issued that order, which Demos¬ 
 thenes complains of his colleagues for disobeying. 3 
 
 The executive duties of the council were very numerous. The 
 
 1 But the decree of the council was called sometimes 'frrfyiG/j.a. 
 
 2 They were said— xpvyo.TLfriv (to open the business of the assembly); 
 yvuyag nporidevcu (to give leave to address the assembly); kTnrpTj^etv, 
 or £7 nxcipoToviav didovcu (to put the question to the vote). De Scho- 
 mann, De Comitiis, 89, 91, 120; Ant. Juris Publici, 221. For more on 
 the subject of the Assembly, see the following Appendix. 
 
 * See ante, p. 306. 
 
/ 
 
 348 APPENDIX IV. 
 
 whole financial department of the administration was under their 
 control. They superintended the letting of the public revenues. 1 
 They exacted payment from the lessees, and had power to send 
 defaulters to prison. The collectors and receivers accounted to them 
 for the public moneys. The treasurers of the revenue received the 
 moneys handed over to them by their predecessors in the presence 
 of some members of the council. In every Prytany an account of 
 the revenue was laid by the council before the people. 
 
 They had the charge of building a certain number of galleys every 
 year; and of rewarding those captains who had been most expedi¬ 
 tious in the equipping and launching of their vessels. It was their 
 peculiar duty to see that the horsemen whom the city maintained 
 were properly trained and exercised, and their horses kept in good 
 condition. And they attended in some measure to the musters of 
 infantry and seamen. 
 
 We have seen that the counselors of the year examined the coun¬ 
 selors elect as to their qualification for office. They had also to 
 examine the archons elect, to see whether they were qualified by 
 law, and worthy in all respects to undertake that important magis¬ 
 tracy. Any citizen might come before them to show grounds of 
 disqualification; and the council might hear arguments on both sides, 
 and send the case, if they pleased, to be determined by a court of 
 justice. The speech of Lysias against Evander is an example of a 
 case of this kind heard before the council. 
 
 Impeachments 2 for any grave misdemeanors, which could not so 
 well be dealt with by the ordinary processes of law, might be pre¬ 
 ferred to the council, who took cognizance of them in the first in¬ 
 stance, and could themselves impose a penalty not exceeding five 
 hundred drachms; but if the offense demanded a heavier punishment, 
 they had to bring it before the popular assembly or a jury. 
 
 The council sat every day in the year, except holidays, for the 
 transaction of business. To the multifarious character of their occu¬ 
 pations Xenophon bears testimony in a remarkable passage in his 
 treatise on the Athenian republic, as follows: 
 
 11 1 find some persons complain, that a man may wait a twelve- 
 month at Athens before he can get an audience of the council or the 
 people. The fact is, they have so much to do at Athens, they are 
 obliged to send away some without hearing them. How could it be 
 otherwise, when they have more festivals to keep than any city in 
 Greece, during which it is not easy to dispatch public business; and 
 they have more lawsuits, prosecutions, and audits, than all the rest 
 of the world ? The council has a multitude of questions to consider, 
 about war, about supplies of money, about the passing of laws, about 
 
 1 A board of officers, called Ilwil fjTcu, acted under their superintend¬ 
 ence. 
 
 8 'EloayyeTiicu. 
 
THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY. 
 
 349 
 
 the daily affairs of the city and those of their allies. They have also 
 to receive tribute, and attend to the arsenals and the service of the 
 temples. Is it'at all wonderful, that, with so many occupations, they 
 are not able to transact business with every body ?” 
 
 The council-chamber was open to the public, and strangers some¬ 
 times attended to hear their consultations, 1 but might be directed to 
 withdraw. 
 
 To assist them, the council had two secretaries; one 2 of whom 
 was chosen for each presidency, whose business it was to keep the 
 decrees and other records drawn up during that particular term; and 
 another, 3 elected for the whole year, who had custody of the laws. 
 There was also a checking-clerk, 4 whose especial duty it was to take 
 an account of the moneys received by his employers. And these 
 doubtless had under-clerks 5 to assist them. 
 
 The members received two drachms a day for their services, be¬ 
 sides dinner at the public cost in the Prytaneum, or city-hall, which 
 was close to the council-chamber. 6 During their year of office they 
 were exempt from military service: and, as a further mark of dis¬ 
 tinction, principal places in the theatre were assigned to them. At 
 their meetings they wore a wreath of myrtle; and at the end of the 
 year, if they had given satisfaction, it was customary for the people 
 to reward the whole body with a golden crown. 
 
 APPENDIX V. ‘ 
 
 THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY. 
 
 The will of the sovereign people of Athens was expressed in the 
 Ecclesia , or Assembly. Here were brought before them all matters 
 which, as the supreme power of the state, they had to order or dis¬ 
 pose of; questions of war and peace, treaties and alliances, levying 
 of troops, raising of supplies, application of the revenue, religious 
 ordinances, bestowing of citizenship and other honors, privileges, or 
 rewards: likewise, the revision of the laws, the election of a great 
 
 1 See an example, ante, p. 127- 
 
 a Tpann<iTEx)s Kara n pvravelav. See, as to this officer and the others 
 mentioned below, Schomann, De Comitiis, 319, 320. 
 
 8 Tpaju/jaredg rrjg fiovTirjg. 
 
 4 ’ A.vTiypa<f>evg rfjg fiovTiffg. 
 
 6 'YTro-ypafj.ua.TeZg. 
 
 * As to the Prytaneum, see ante, p. 130. 
 
350 
 
 APPENDIX V. 
 
 variety of magistrates and public functionaries, embassadors or other 
 persons intrusted with special commissions; impeachments and in¬ 
 formations for treason and high misdemeanors, which they either 
 determined finally themselves, or sent before a judicial tribunal. 
 Indeed, there was no question which could not ultimately be dealt 
 with by the assembled people, if they chose to exert their plenary 
 authority, though by the ordinary constitutional practice the duties 
 of the Ecclesia were pretty well defined. 
 
 Anciently the people used to assemble once only in each Prytany, 
 or ten times a year. After the democracy had grown stronger, and 
 the business to be done by the whole people increased in magnitude 
 and importance, they met four times in each Prytany. These were 
 called the ordinary or regular assemblies. 1 On what days they were 
 held, is not known; but it is thought they varied in the different 
 terms. 2 The Athenians avoided meeting on holidays or unlucky 3 
 days. Assemblies, however, might be convened for other besides 
 the regular days, if any emergency required it. These were called 
 extraordinary. 4 
 
 The Assembly used anciently to be held in the market-place. 
 Afterwards it was transferred to the Pnyx, 5 and at a later period to 
 the theatre of Bacchus. But it might be held any where, either in 
 the city, or the Pirmus, or elsewhere. The Pnyx, which was the 
 common place of meeting in the time of Thucydides and Demosthe¬ 
 nes, was an open semicircular piece of ground, opposite the Areo¬ 
 pagus. It was naturally on an incline; but to make it level; the lower 
 end was raised by a stone pavement. 6 Here was the entrance for 
 the people. 7 The other end was skirted by a wall, from the centre 
 of which projected the Bema , or speaker’s platform, which was cut 
 out of solid rock 8 ten feet from the ground, and to which there was 
 
 1 Kvptai, or vop.ip.oi. 
 
 2 See Schomann, De Comitiis, chapters i. and ii.: Antiq. Juris Pub- 
 lici, p. 219. 
 
 3 ’A7t ocbpddeg. Nefasti, as the Romans would say. 
 
 4 'ZvyK?i7]TOt. 
 
 6 Hence the joke in the Knights of Aristophanes, where Demus (the 
 impersonation of the Athenian people, like our John Bull) is called A ij- 
 i uog UvvKLTijg , Demus of Pnyx , as if the Pnyx were a township which 
 gave him his legal addition. 
 
 6 Hence the name of the Pnyx, according to Suidas, rrapd. rr/v tuv 
 lidcdv TzvKvoTTjTa (on account of its being thickly paved with stones). 
 Others have thought it took its name from the dense congregation of 
 people. 
 
 7 Hence the expression, dvaf3alvciv elg rr)v EKK^rjaiav (because they 
 had to ascend). See ante, p. 68. 
 
 * Hence it is called, the stone, in Aristophanes, Pax, 680: 
 
 "Oortg Kparel vvv tov Tiidov rov ’v ry TIwkl. 
 
THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY. 
 
 351 
 
 an ascent by eight steps. There were stone seats for the people 
 next the wall, and wooden benches in the middle. 
 
 The assemblies were usually convened by the presidents of the 
 council, who published a notice four days before, specifying the day 
 of meeting and the business to be transacted. 1 Extraordinary as¬ 
 semblies were called by the generals. All citizens of the age of 
 twenty, who had been duly registered, were entitled to attend and 
 vote. In early times it was considered by the greater number of 
 them a burden rather than a privilege, as we may see by the regula¬ 
 tions adopted to enforce attendance. A crier went round on the day 
 to collect the citizens. Those who absented themselves were liable 
 to a fine, which six officers called Lexiarchs were authorized to en¬ 
 force. The police carried a rope stained with ruddle round the 
 market and other public places; with this they drove the idlers to 
 the assembly, or marked them if they would not go; at the same 
 time blocking up the passages, to prevent their getting away. 3 To 
 encourage the attendance of the poorer citizens, a regulation was 
 introduced by Pericles, allowing a fee of an obol to those who came 
 early. This was afterwards increased to three obols. A ticket was 
 given to them on entrance, which entitled them afterwards to de¬ 
 mand their fee from the Tliesmothetge. The Lexiarchs took care, 
 after the business had begun, to keep the voters from coming out, 
 and prevent the intrusion of strangers. 
 
 The assembly was presided over by the Proedri, that is, the com¬ 
 mittee of the tribe in office, assisted by the mixed committee, as be¬ 
 fore mentioned. 4 They sat on the steps before the speaker’s platform, 
 and maintained order among the people, with the assistance of the 
 police, who were at hand to remove either from the platform or the 
 seats any person who violated the prescribed rules, or offended 
 against decency or propriety. They had power to impose on the 
 instant a fine of fifty drachms: graver offences were referred to the 
 council or the next assembly. At a later period a further regulation 
 was adopted, owing to the outrageous conduct of Timarchus, who 
 made an assault with his fists upon some of those about him. A 
 special body of men was appointed for every assembly day, to sit in 
 the front benches, and assist the presiding counselors in keeping 
 order. Each tribe took its turn of making the appointment. 5 
 
 1 Hence the expressions, -rrpoypucpEiv baiArjaiav, irpoTidtvai EKKArjolav. 
 
 2 Provided they were not under uripta. The age, Schomann thinks, 
 was eighteen. (De Comitiis, 76.) 
 
 3 Aristophanes, Acharn. 22 : 
 
 01 d’ ev uyopa AaAovci kuvu kcll kuto x 
 T t> ax°tvL°v tyevyovoi rb p.ep.iAT(j[iEvov. 
 
 4 See the last Appendix. 
 
 * Hence called, y npoedpevovaa QvAr/. Schomann, De Comitiis, 88. 
 
352 
 
 APPENDIX V. 
 
 Before the business of the day commenced, a sacrifice of purifi¬ 
 cation was offered. The lustral victims were young pigs, whose 
 blood was carried round and sprinkled on the seats, 1 while at the 
 same time incense was burned in a censer. The crier then pro¬ 
 nounced a form of prayer and commination, of imploring the gods 
 to bless and prosper the consultations of the people, and imprecating 
 a curse upon all enemies and traitors. 2 * 
 
 The chairman then opened the business of the day. If any bill 
 had been prepared by the council, it was read by the crier or usher, 
 and the people were asked if it met their approbation. If there was 
 no opposition, it passed. Any citizen, however, might oppose it, or 
 move an amendment. If the council had no decree framed by them¬ 
 selves, any citizen might propose one on the instant: it was neces¬ 
 sary only that it should be in writing and in a proper form. He 
 then delivered it to the presiding committee, to be read as a motion 
 to the assembly; and if the committee saw nothing objectionable 
 in it, they complied with his request. Cases occurred, where some 
 one or more members of the committee opposed the reading of a 
 motion, as being either illegal, or grossly improper, or irrelevant to 
 the question before them. They were responsible, however, to 
 the people, if they threw any vexatious impediment in the way of 
 a citizen moving a decree ; and sometimes the assembly itself would 
 insist upon the question being put to them, notwithstanding the veto 
 of the counselors. .ZEschines in his speech on the Embassy gives 
 us an example. He says that Aleximachus moved a decree, au¬ 
 thorizing the deputy of Cersobleptes to take the oath of peace to 
 Philip; that the decree was delivered to the committee, and read to 
 the assembly; that Demosthenes, being one of the committee, got 
 up and declared he would not allow the question to be put; the peo¬ 
 ple, however, were clamorous on the other side, and he was obliged to 
 yield. 3 
 
 Every member of the assembly was at liberty to speak, but only 
 once in the debate. According to the institution of Solon, those 
 who were above fifty years old were first called upon, and after¬ 
 wards the younger men. But this custom fell into disuse. We find 
 Demosthenes alluding to it in the opening of the first Philippic. 
 Although all citizens had the right of speaking, the privilege was 
 of course exercised by a few only, who felt themselves competent 
 to the task; and in the time of Demosthenes, when rhetoric was 
 studied as a science, the debates were mostly confined to a few 
 practiced orators and statesmen, as they are generally elsewhere. 4 
 
 ‘ Young pigs were considered by the Athenians to have peculiarly 
 expiatory powers. 
 
 * See ante, p. 102. 
 
 3 See Schomann, De Comitiis, 119. 
 
 4 Hence the fir/ropeg or dy/uijyopoi are distinguished from the l6iu>tcu, 
 or general body of citizens, who took no part in the debates. They are 
 
THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY. 
 
 353 
 
 Whoever rose to speak, put on a wreath of myrtle, as a token that 
 he was performing a public duty, and entitled on that account to 
 respect. It was a breach of decorum to interrupt the speaker; yet 
 one which it must have been impossible to prevent, except where it 
 proceeded from a small number of persons. How Demosthenes 
 was put down by the clamors of Philocrates and others, he himself 
 describes. 1 
 
 When the debate was ended, the chairman put the question to 
 the vote. The method of voting was either by show of hands, 2 or 
 by ballot. 3 Show of hands was the most common. The ballot was 
 resorted to in a few cases, where it was expedient to ascertain the 
 number of voters as accurately as possible, or to insure secrecy. 
 These were chiefly cases of privilegia, such as ostracism and con¬ 
 demnation of state criminals, granting of citizenship or exemption 
 from taxes, or restoration of the franchise. In all those cases the 
 law required that there should be at least six thousand voters in fa¬ 
 vor of the motion. Generally speaking, however, the questions 
 before the assembly were decided by a majority of votes. The 
 chairman declared the numbers. 4 
 
 When all the business was concluded, the crier by command of 
 the presidents dismissed the assembly. If the business could not 
 be finished in one day, it might be adjourned to the next day, or to 
 the one after. 5 This happened sometimes on a sudden shower of 
 rain or a thunder-storm. Any thing of this sort was considered as 
 an unlucky omen among the Greeks. 6 
 
 A decree having been carried by the votes of the people, it was 
 copied on a tablet, and deposited by the secretary among other pub¬ 
 lic records in the temple of Cybele. 7 Sometimes it was engraved 
 on brass or stone, and set up in a conspicuous place, to be seen by 
 
 not to be confounded with the ovvijyopoi, or public advocates; as to 
 whom, see the seventh Appendix. 
 
 * See ante, p. 128. 
 
 2 XeipoTovla. 
 
 3 •' i’ijQog . 
 
 * He was said, uvayopeveiv rdf xeipoToviag . 
 
 6 Aristophanes, Acharn. 171: 
 
 rovg Qpdicag uneven, Trapeivai 6’ elg evr/v. 
 ol yap II pvruveig 'Kvovgl rrjv eKK%r}Giav. 
 
 8 Such a phenomenon was called dioGrjpta. Any individual might 
 call the attention of the presidents to the occurrence; as Dicaeopolis 
 does in the Achamians, 168 : 
 
 &7JC uTrayopevu pi) noielv inK^rjoiav 
 rolg Qpa£l Tcepl piodov’ \eyu & vplv otl 
 dioGTjpia ’ gti , Kat fiavig (3ej3?iT)iii pe. 
 
 7 Tt> Mr/rpipov. 
 
354 
 
 APPENDIX YI. 
 
 all. As to the form in which decrees were* drawn up, the reader 
 may consult Schomann . 1 The mover’s name was usually inserted, 
 he being responsible for the measure, as we shall presently see. 
 
 We have to distinguish between decrees and laws , 2 in the Athe¬ 
 nian sense. Decrees are measures of government, relating to par¬ 
 ticular matters or occasions; as for example, the election of magis¬ 
 trates, or the punishment of offenders; a declaration of war, or a 
 resolution to make peace. They had indeed the force of laws for 
 the time being, so far as regarded the obedience due to them. But 
 by laws we are to understand the permanent institutions and ordi¬ 
 nances of the commonwealth, by which every man knows how he 
 is governed, and what are his franchises and rights. How these 
 might be enacted and repealed at Athens, is explained in a follow¬ 
 ing appendix. 
 
 APPENDIX YI. 
 
 THE OPINION OF POLYBIUS, 
 
 Polybius, in the seventeenth book of his history, defends against 
 the attack of Demosthenes those Greek statesmen, especially of 
 Messene and Megalopolis, who took the Macedonian side in politics, 
 and dissuaded their countrymen from taking arms against Philip . 3 
 The passage is as follows:— 
 
 “Demosthenes, deserving as he is of praise in many respects, 
 must be condemned for the reckless and indiscriminate manner in 
 which he reviles the most eminent Greek statesmen; saying, that 
 in Arcadia, Cercidas and Hieronymus and Eucampidas were traitors 
 to Greece, because they joined alliance with Philip ; in Messene, the 
 sons of Philiades, Neon and Thrasylochus; in Argos, Myrtis and 
 Teledamus and Mnaseas: likewise in Thessaly, Daochus and Cineas, 
 and among the Boeotians, Theogiton and Timolaus. And besides 
 these, he has given a long list of others, with their names and coun¬ 
 tries. Now all the above-mentioned statesmen have good and am¬ 
 ple grounds of justification for their conduct, but especially those of 
 Arcadia and Messene. For they, having invited Philip into Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus and humbled the Lacedaemonians, gave repose and security 
 to all the inhabitants of the Peninsula: further, by recovering the 
 
 1 De Comitiis, c. 12. 
 
 3 ' fij^cafiara and vofioi. 
 
 3 The principal passages of Demosthenes will be found ante, 23, 26, 
 29, 106, 109, 209. 
 
355 
 
 THE OPINION - OF POLYBIUS. 
 
 territory and towns, which the Lacedaemonians in their days of 
 prosperity had taken from the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans 
 and Argives, they unquestionably promoted the welfare of their 
 countries. So far therefore from going to war with Philip and the 
 Macedonians, they were bound to use every exertion to increase 
 their honor and glory. I grant, if at the same time they received 
 a garrison in their countries from Philip, or overturned the laws 
 and deprived their fellow-citizens of their rights and liberties, from 
 motives of avarice or ambition, they deserved the reproach cast 
 upon them. But if in the honest discharge of their duty as citizens 
 they differed in judgment with Demosthenes, not considering the 
 interests of Athens and of their own countries to be identical, 
 surely he ought not to have called them traitors on that account. 
 Measuring every thing by the interests of his own commonwealth, 
 and thinking that all the Greeks should have looked up to the Athe¬ 
 nians or else be stigmatized as traitors, it seems to me, he has taken 
 a very wrong and mistaken view. My opinion is confirmed by the 
 events that happened in Greece, which show that the true foresight 
 was exercised, not by Demosthenes, but by Eucampidas and Hier¬ 
 onymus and Cercidas and the sons of Philiades. For the Athe¬ 
 nians by their contest with Philip incurred signal disasters, being 
 defeated in battle at Chseronea; and, but for the king’s magnanim¬ 
 ity and regard for his own honor, they would have suffered still 
 more grievously than they did through the counsels of Demosthenes; 
 whereas those other statesmen enabled the confederate Arcadians 
 to enjoy perfect security against Lacedaemon, from which their re¬ 
 spective countries reaped many important advantages.” 
 
 If Demosthenes has been too severe upon the Greek statesmen, 
 Polybius has not been quite just to Demosthenes. Polybius, looking 
 at the state of Greece in his own time, argues as if the struggle 
 against Philip was desperate, forgetting that it was rendered so by 
 the very supineness and want of combination of which Demosthe¬ 
 nes complains. Had the Athenians been assisted at Chseronea by 
 such a force of Peloponnesians as afterwards battled with Antipa¬ 
 ter, Greece might have been saved. Again:—the facts of the case 
 are not exactly as Polybius represents them. Messene and Mega¬ 
 lopolis were capable of defending themselves against Sparta with¬ 
 out Philip’s protection. Even if it were not so, they but exchanged 
 one master for another. Though they might not feel the weight 
 of his yoke immediately, it was a yoke destined to gall them at no 
 distant time. The humiliation of Sparta was a poor consolation to 
 freemen who were humiliated themselves. The congress of Corinth 
 and Philip’s victorious progress through Peloponnesus, are evidences 
 to the world that Grecian independence was gone. The Peloponne¬ 
 sians follow Alexander to his wars, as they had anciently followed 
 Sparta, but less in the character of allies than of vassals. Alexan¬ 
 der insults and terrifies them by his edicts. A tyranny is estab- 
 
356 
 
 APPENDIX VI 
 
 lished in Messene. The Arcadians gain neither security nor repose 
 by their fidelity to a foreign potentate. Two bloody wars, and 
 Megalopolis twice besieged, first by Agis, and afterwards by Poly- 
 sperchon, are the speedy and bitter fruits of Macedonian protection; 
 disproving the foresight which Polybius claims for his country¬ 
 men. 1 
 
 It is true, that grievous faults were committed both by Sparta 
 and Athens. Sparta should have abandoned her pretensions to 
 Messenia and her aggressive designs against her neighbors. Athens 
 (not to speak of other errors) missed an excellent opportunity of 
 gathering to her side a Peloponnesian confederacy, when the Mega- 
 lopolitans solicited her aid against Sparta in the year b.c. 353. She 
 should then have stood boldly forward, and declared that she would 
 not permit Sparta to threaten the independence of her neighbors. 
 This was what Demosthenes advised. The Athenians chose a timid 
 course, which was not forgotten when she herself needed assistance. 
 Unfortunately, the patriotism of the G-reeks, in general, was too 
 narrow, and their wisdom too short-sighted, to perceive that the 
 cause of Athens against Philip was their own. 
 
 Polybius himself, in reference to the conduct of the Messenians at 
 a later period, reasons more justly. 2 Censuring generally that policy 
 which is determined to have peace at any sacrifice, he says the Mes¬ 
 senians had been guilty of such an error; and the consequence was, 
 that, although they escaped some trouble and danger for the time, 
 they incurred still greater misfortunes in the end. Having two 
 powerful people for their neighbors—the Lacedaemonians and the 
 Arcadians; the former of whom nourished an implacable hostility 
 against them, while the latter were their friends and well-wishers— 
 the Messenians did not meet either the enmity of the one, or the 
 friendship of the other, with a generous and brave spirit. When 
 their neighbors were at war, the Messenians kept aloof, and, as their 
 country lay out of the way, they were free from annoyance. But 
 when the Lacedaemonians had nothing else to do, they attacked the 
 Messenians, who had not the courage to resist by themselves, and 
 through their system of neutrality were deprived of auxiliaries. 
 
 He goes on to declare that, if there should be a new revolution in 
 Peloponnesus, the only chance of safety for the Messenians and 
 Megalopolitans would be, to form an intimate union for mutual pro¬ 
 tection, according to the original design of Epaminondas, and to 
 stand firmly and faithfully by one another in all difficulties and 
 dangers. 
 
 Jacobs has expressed his opinion to the following effect, in the 
 preface to his translation of Demosthenes:— 
 
 “The patriotic feelings which inspired Demosthenes were not 
 
 1 Polybius was a Megalopolitan. 
 
 2 Lib. iv. 32, 33. 
 
THE OPINION OF POLYBIUS. 
 
 357 
 
 equally felt by all the leading statesmen in Greece; but these feel¬ 
 ings did not allow him always to be just towards men, who, being 
 placed in different circumstances from himself, espoused a different 
 line of politics. He frequently complains of the number of traitors, 
 who sprang up like a crop of weeds in the states and cities of Greece, 
 and attached themselves to the interests of Macedonia. If the words 
 of the orator are to be taken in their literal sense, there must have 
 been such a depth of corruption among the Greeks, that Heaven it¬ 
 self could not have saved them. There can be no doubt that Philip, 
 in order to rule by division, availed himself of the party strife which 
 prevailed as well at Athens as in most of the other states; and that 
 he fomented it, both by his gold, and by the skillful manner in which 
 he flattered the passions of the political antagonists. Even repub¬ 
 lican Greeks were not insensible to the favor of a crowned head, es¬ 
 pecially if polished speech and manner lent their influence to capti¬ 
 vate tnem : 1 and it is probable enough, that many men of the best 
 intentions were caught in this net, without being in the least degree 
 conscious that their acts were treasonable. Where party spirit pre¬ 
 vails, the judgments of men are necessarily one-sided. Every man 
 thinks his own views alone are just, and looks upon one of different 
 sentiments as an enemy to the good cause for which he is striving. 
 That which at first is a contest of opinions becomes at length a con¬ 
 test of passions; which in their zeal for the cause which they espouse 
 finds an excuse even for lawless violence. So in relation to Athens, 
 it appears to me, that what Demosthenes so vehemently denounces 
 as a crime, is, in regard to many of the accused parties, to be viewed 
 in a milder light, as an error of party; and we would fain believe, 
 for the honor of the Athenian people, that the greater number of 
 the Philippising citizens intended to render the best service to their 
 country. With reference to the friends of Philip in other states, es¬ 
 pecially the Peloponnesian, whom Demosthenes stigmatizes as trai¬ 
 tors, the judgment of Polybius appears by no means unfair.” 
 
 He then cites the following remarks of Yalckenaer:— 
 
 11 Proditorum atrum catalogum ex ingenio suo Demosthenes am- 
 plificavit: nam inter illos, quos Atticus orator turpi hoc nomine de- 
 honestavit, fuisse credibile est, non pecunia sed humanitate regis 
 captos, qui hujus imperium anteponerent speciosse libertati quoo dice- 
 
 1 Compare, Justin, ix. 8 ; who says of Philip—“ Blandus pariter et 
 insidiosus alloquio ; qui plura promitteret quam praestaret: in seria et 
 jocos artifex. Amicitias utilitate, non fide colebat. Gratiam fingere in 
 odio, instruere in concordantes odia, apud utrumque gratiam quaerere, 
 solemnis illi consuetudo. Inter haec eloquentia et insignis oratio, acu- 
 minis et solertiae plena ; ut nee oratui facilitas, nee faeilitati inventio- 
 num deesset ornatus.” And Cieero, De Officiis, i. 26—“ Philippum re¬ 
 bus gestis et gloria superatum a filio, facilitate et humanitate video bu* 
 periorem fuisse.” 
 
358 
 
 APPENDIX VIL 
 
 batur, et supurbis dominis, plebi, quique plebem ducerent conciona- 
 toribus.” 
 
 This is but a sorry defense for traitorous correspondence with the 
 enemy. Such arguments would justify any kind of treason. What 
 the Philippising party gained by exchanging plebeian rule for Mace¬ 
 donian, is shown by the fate of Demades and Phocion. 
 
 / 
 
 APPENDIX VIL 
 
 REVISION OF LAWS. 
 
 The enactment of laws (distinguished from decrees, as mentioned 
 in Appendix V.) was not left by Solon to the people at large, but 
 confided to a select body of them under an arrangement which has 
 drawn praise from many modern critics and historians. That wise 
 legislator was anxious to secure the stability of his institutions, 
 knowing that laws which have been consecrated by long usage are 
 more readily and cheerfully obeyed : 1 while on the other hand he 
 foresaw, that the best constitution in the world might in course of 
 time require amendment and adaptation to existing circumstances. 
 Under the democracy which he created there would have been a 
 danger of exposing the laws to perpetual change, had it been left to 
 the multitude, upon the motion of any demagogue suddenly rising in 
 the Assembly, to make and unmake statutes at their pleasure. He 
 therefore so contrived matters, that, while his laws were subject to 
 constant revision, a check should be put upon crude and hasty 
 legislation. 
 
 There were annually chosen by lot six thousand citizens, of not 
 less than thirty years of age, who formed a judicial court called He- 
 lisea , 2 and whose functions corresponded in great measure with those 
 of our jurymen. From them were taken not only the ordinary juries 
 for the trial of civil and criminal causes, but also a select body of 
 men called Nomothetce , or law-revisors , 3 to whom the people referred 
 
 1 This is a truth frequently enunciated both by ancient and modern 
 philosophers. Compare Aristotle, Politic, ii. : 'O yap vopog iaxvv ov6e- 
 ptav exei tv pbc rb nelOeoOai , tv?it)v napd. to Wo? tovto 6b ov yiverai , el prj 
 6id xpovov tvTi rjdog’ ugte to fiadloe pETafiaXhetv etc tuv vopuv etc tTtpovq 
 vopovg Kacvovc;, uctOevt) tvoleIv koTi tt)v tov vo/uov 6vvap.iv. And Thucy¬ 
 dides, iii. 37 : Xeipoac vopoig uiavrjTOi f xP^pevr) ivoTug Kpelacuv eotcv )) 
 /caAwf exovglv unvpoic. 
 
 2 'H TiLala (an assembly). The whole body were called Heliastce. 
 
 3 The term vopodeTrjg (legislator) was given /car’ e^ox^v to Solon. 
 
REVISION OF LAWSl 
 
 359 
 
 all questions of legislation that came before them. And further, if 
 any new statute had been passed by these law-revisors, it might be 
 impeached before a jury taken from the same Heliastic body, who had 
 power to determine finally whether such statute should be abrogated 
 or confirmed. The method of proceeding was as follows :— 
 
 It was a part of the business in the first ordinary assembly, which 
 was held on the eleventh of Hecatombaeon, to consider the state of 
 the laws, and to receive proposals for their amendment. Any citizen 
 was at liberty to make such proposal, having previously obtained 
 leave from the council: but in order to insure a constant revision 
 of the laws, the Thesmothetse 1 of each year were directed to examine 
 the whole code, and to see if there were any statutes contradictory, 
 or useless, or improper to be retained. The people heard whatever 
 proposal either these magistrates or any private citizen had to offer 
 for an alteration in the law; and if they deemed it worthy of further 
 consideration, they consented that it should be referred to a court of 
 revisors, and they elected five advocates 2 to defend the old law 
 against the new one. A fair copy of the new law was put up before 
 the statues of the Heroes , 3 that every man might have an oppor¬ 
 tunity of seeing it: and to give it still further publicity, it was read 
 aloud in every assembly before the re visors held their court. The 
 third of the ordinary assemblies (towards the end of the month 
 Hecatombaeon (was appointed for the election of the revisors; of 
 which notice was to be given by the presidents of the council; and 
 the committee of council were directed (under severe penalties in case 
 of neglect) to consult the people as to the number of persons to be 
 elected, and as to their remuneration, duties, and term of office, 
 which of course depended chiefly upon the amount of business to 
 come before them. The number of the re visors was commonly about 
 a thousand; but it might be more or less. 
 
 The various legislative questions referred by the people were tried 
 on particular days appointed for each. The revisors were impaneled 
 like a jury; though their court very much resembled a popular as¬ 
 sembly, the presidents of the council being there as assessors, and 
 the committee presiding with their chairman. Arguments were ad¬ 
 dressed to the court with the same formalities as upon a legal trial, 
 
 But it was applicable to any individual who moved the passing of a 
 law ; and clearly the whole legislative body might properly be so called. 
 The court of the vo/iodercu at Athens was peculiarly constituted, having 
 no power of originating laws, and being judicial rather than legislative 
 in our sense of the term ; and there was, in effect, an appeal from them. 
 They may aptly be styled revisors of the laws. 
 
 ' As to this, see Schumann, De Comitiis, 259. 
 
 2 'ZvvdiKOi, or cvvrjyopoL . 
 
 3 Called Eponymi, ’Ettuvv/ioi, because they gave name to the ten 
 tribes. Their statues were in front of the council-chamber. 
 
360 
 
 APPENDIX VII. 
 
 first by the supporters of the new law, next by the defenders of the 
 old; and to prevent collusion, any one might appear as defender, 
 besides the advocates specially chosen for that purpose. After hearing 
 all that could be said on both sides, the question was put by the 
 chairman, and the revisors decided by show of hands, whether the 
 old law should stand, or the new be accepted. Their judgment was 
 drawn up in the shape of a decree; and if the new law was passed, 
 it became forthwith a binding statute, subject however to be im¬ 
 peached in the manner to be mentioned presently. 
 
 Thus we see, while all law-making orginated with the people, and 
 the humblest citizens were at liberty to propose new enactments, the 
 task of examining them at leisure, and considering all the questions 
 to which they might give rise, was delegated to a superior tribunal, 
 clothed with a judicial character, and more capable of exercising a 
 calm and deliberate judgment on such matters than the full assembly 
 of Athenian citizens. 
 
 That the general scheme was due to the genius of Solon we are 
 expressly assured, though it is most probable that improvements 
 were made in the details since his time. And here it may be ob¬ 
 served, generally, with respect to the Attic laws, which are quoted 
 by the orators and attributed by them to Solon, that we must not 
 suppose all the extracts which they cite to be the actual words of 
 the ancient law-giver: for not only did they receive additions and 
 amendments from time to time, but it is very likely, as Schomann 
 suggests, 1 that when the code was remodeled, after the expulsion of 
 the Thirty Tyrants, or possibly upon some other occasion, the anti¬ 
 quated phraseology of Solon’s time was translated into the language 
 of the day. In a few years it would become difficult to distinguish 
 what part of the code belonged to Solon, and what to a later period; 
 and so the whole body of statutes were, both by orators and other 
 persons, commonly spoken of as the laws of Solon. 
 
 Besides the regular time of holding the courts of revision, the 
 people might, doubtless, if they pleased, appoint them to be held on 
 extraordinary occasions. One such occasion happened after the ex¬ 
 pulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, who, having abolished many of Solon’s 
 laws, and corrupted them by interpolations, it was thought advisable 
 to restore and remodel the ancient code; and a decree was passed 
 authorizing the council to select a body of men to frame the neces¬ 
 sary amendments, and send them afterwards to be considered by a 
 court of revision in the usual way. We find Demosthenes, in his 
 Olynthiac oration, recommending the appointment of revisors, for 
 the special purpose of repealing the laws concerning the theoric 
 fund. 2 One of the charges against Timocrates is, that he induced 
 the people to appoint revisors out of the usual time. For thus the 
 
 1 De Comitiis, 267. 
 
 * See Vol. I. p. 64; and Schomann, De Comitiis, 270, 271. 
 
REVISION OF LAWS. 
 
 361 
 
 thing really stood:—It was competent for the people to pass a decree 
 dispensing with the regular course of law; and it was impossible to 
 call them to account for it. But, as in our own country, the maxim 
 that the king can do no wrong does not shield from responsibility 
 the minister who advises him, so at Athens, the author of an un¬ 
 constitutional measure was not protected by the fiat of the sovereign 
 people who decreed it. And this brings us to another important 
 branch of the subject, viz., the proceeding by indictment against the 
 movers of bad laws. 1 
 
 As a further precaution against rash legislation, a power was 
 given, after the passing of a law by the court of revision, to indict 
 the author of it at any time within a year, and thus to procure both 
 his punishment and the repeal of the law itself. The law might be 
 impugned either for matter of form, as for the omission of some nec¬ 
 essary step in the procedure; or upon the merits, as being incon¬ 
 sistent with some other law that was not repealed, or opposed to 
 the general spirit of the Athenian laws, or for any cause whatever, 
 mischievous in its tendency, or adverse to the interests of the com¬ 
 monwealth. Any citizen was at liberty to prefer an indictment 
 against the author of a new law, alleging it to be bad in any of these 
 respects. The case was then brought for trial before a jury, taken 
 from the same Heliastic body, who reviewed the law once more, 
 examining it in all its bearings upon the rest of the Athenian code, 
 and the general welfare of the state. If they thought it open to 
 the charges made against it, or any of them, they gave their verdict 
 accordingly, pronouncing the law to be bad and void, and sentencing 
 the author to such penalty as the nature of the case deserved. 
 After the expiration of the year, although the author could not be 
 punished, the law itself might still be impeached before a jury; but 
 in such case the people appointed advocates to defend it. Of this 
 the oration of Demosthenes against the law of Leptines is an ex¬ 
 ample. The law, which prohibited all exemptions from public ser¬ 
 vices, was repealed as being unjust and derogatory to the dignity 
 of Athens; but Leptines himself was safe by the lapse of time. 2 
 
 The same proceeding might be instituted to rescind illegal or im¬ 
 proper decrees, which had been passed in the popular assembly, and 
 to punish the movers of them. As there was a greater facility of 
 procuring decrees than laws, so, it appears, the indictments preferred 
 in these cases were much more numerous; and, in impugning a de¬ 
 cree, every possible ground of objection might be taken, in regard 
 either to legality or expediency. Very frequently, prosecution was 
 but a method of trying the question over again, or perhaps of pun¬ 
 ishing the author for the evil consequences of his measure. We 
 
 1 Tpadr) Trapavofiuv. 
 
 3 See Vol. I. Appendix Y. p. 314. Schomann, De Comitiis, 278— 
 280. 
 
 Yol II.—Q 
 
362 
 
 APPENDIX VIL 
 
 
 have seen that Aristophon was seventy-five times indicted for having 
 moved improper decrees, and every time acquitted, Cephalus, on 
 the other hand, boasted that he had never once been indicted . 1 To 
 prevent vexatious prosecutions, the accuser, if he failed to obtain a 
 fifth part of the votes, was liable to a fine of a thousand drachms, 
 and was rendered incapable of bringing any such accusation in future. 
 
 Divers examples, illustrating this Athenian practice, are furnished 
 by the orators. 
 
 Timocrates passed a law, allowing public debtors to be released on 
 bail. Diodorus indicted him on these (among other) grounds—that 
 he had not obtained the sanction of the council before he introduced 
 his law to the people: that he had got the court of revision to be 
 appointed for the twelfth of Hecatombaeon, immediately after the 
 first assembly, instead of waiting for the regular time, and that he 
 had never put up his law in the usual way for public perusal: that 
 it was contrary to other existing laws: and that it was bad on the 
 merits. From the speech composed by Demosthenes in support of 
 the prosecution we get most of our information upon the subject of 
 the Nomothetce. And here we find him complaining of a practice 
 which had grown up, in contravention of Solon’s regulation; 
 whereby legislative measures were brought before the popular as¬ 
 sembly out of the appointed time, and the people were persuaded to 
 pass them in the shape of decrees. It is clear, as I have before ob¬ 
 served, that the people could allow this to be done as often as they 
 pleased: public opinion alone could effectually check it, by insuring 
 the condemnation, in a court of justice, of the demagogue who mis¬ 
 led the assembly . 2 
 
 The case of Aristocrates, indicted for his decree in favor of Chari- 
 demus, is a memorable example; of which I have spoken elsewhere . 2 
 But the most familiar of all is the prosecution of Ctesiph'on by JEs- 
 chines; the grounds of which are fully explained in the argument 
 to the Oration on the Crown, and in the last appendix to this vol¬ 
 ume. 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 92, 323. 
 
 3 Through this abuse (as Demosthenes says, Adv. Lept. 485,) -ipTjtyio- 
 fidruv oi >(5’ otlovv Siatyepovoiv oi vo/ioi. See Schomann, De Comitiis, 
 264, 265, 268, 269. 
 
 9 Yol. I, Appendix III. pp. 282, 283. 
 
AFFAIRS OF PELOPONNESUS. 
 
 363 
 
 APPENDIX VIII. 
 
 AFFAIRS OF PELOPONNESUS. 
 
 After the battle of Mantinea, Peloponnesus, as Demosthenes 
 says, was divided. 1 Sparta could no longer domineer over her 
 neighbors, as she had used to do; yet her enemies were unable to 
 crush her entirely.. The oligarchical states remained still attached 
 to her—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, Troezen, Elis, and the Achaian 
 cities, excepting Sicyon. But the powerful league originally formed 
 under Theban protection, between the Messenians, Arcadians, and 
 Argives, maintained the balance of power in the peninsula. The 
 independence of Messene was acknowledged by the allies of Sparta 
 at the general peace of b.c. 362. Sparta herself protested against it, 
 refusing to accept as binding an arrangement by which she was hu¬ 
 miliated and degraded. For not only was the fairest portion of her 
 territory, which she had held, for three centuries, taken away from 
 her; 2 but she saw established on her confines a race of men whom 
 she regarded as sfaves and rebels, dangerous from the implacable 
 hostility which they were sure to cherish against their late oppressors, 
 and by the encouragement which they held out for further revolt 
 among the Laconian Helots. But Sparta stood alone in her oppo¬ 
 sition, and could only protest and wait for better times. 3 
 
 The feelings of the Spartan people upon this subject are pretty 
 well described in the oration of Isocrates, entitled Archidamus; 
 which was, in fact, a pamphlet published to vindicate the title of 
 the Spartans to Messenia, but is in the form of a speech addressed 
 by Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, to his countrymen, and seems to 
 have been composed on the occasion when Corinth, Phlius, and 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron. 231. 
 
 a The fertility of Messenia, as contrasted with the Laconian soil, is 
 described by the lines of Euripides, cited in Strabo, viii. 366. Of Laco¬ 
 nia, he says :— 
 
 TTvTikyV pkv uporov , kunovelv 6’ ov fifidtov' 
 
 Koi'kr] yap, vpeoL n epidpopog, rpax^ld re 
 dvodcfto'hog re TtoXepcoig. 
 
 Of Messenia:— 
 
 KaTi^LKapnov . 
 
 KaTufrfivTov re pvploioi vdpact, 
 
 Kai j3oval /cat Troipvcumv evfioTUTUTTjv, 
 ovf Iv Trvoalai xuparog dvoxupepov, 
 ovf av TedpLTnTOig fjTiLOV deppfjv uyav. 
 
 1 Pausanias, iv. 27 ; viii. 27. Polybius, iv. 33. Diodorus, xv. 66, 89. 
 
364 
 
 APPENDIX VIIL 
 
 Epidaurus seceded from the Spartan alliance, and made a separate 
 peace with the enemy, b.c. 366. 1 The substance of his advice is as 
 follows:— 
 
 He contends that it would be disgraceful to let their revolted 
 slaves retain possession of their land—the allies who urged them to 
 abandon it had given both weak and dishonorable advice—their title 
 to Messenia was unquestionable, being founded not only on length 
 of time, but on a valid gift, confirmed (as he shows from history) 
 by the Pythian oracle—the people who had been planted in Mes- 
 sene were not real Messenians, but Helots and vagabonds—their 
 own cause was just, and they should defend it to the last—great 
 things had been effected by individual Spartans in the defense of 
 other cities, as by Brasidas at Amphipolis, and Gylippus at Syracuse; 
 they should not then despair in -the cause of their own country— 
 the sympathies of the Greeks would probably be with them; even 
 the democratized states of Peloponnesus would find they needed 
 Spartan superintendence, for they had got nothing by their defection 
 from Sparta but war, and anarchy, and intestine broils. Should 
 their enemies insist on such hard terms as the emancipation of Mes¬ 
 senia, and should the rest of the Greeks give their consent, then he 
 advises his countrymen to remove their parents, wives, and children 
 to Italy, or Sicily, or Cyrene, or some other place of safety, to sally 
 forth from their home, as their ancestors had done in days of yore, 
 to enter the land of their enemies as an invading army, and there to 
 seize upon some stronghold, and commence a war of plunder and 
 devastation, until their enemies would be only too glad to purchase 
 peace by the restoration of Messenia. . He argues that it would be 
 impossible for peace to be maintained on the basis desired by their 
 opponents—that the settlement of the Messenians on their confines 
 would lead to perpetual quarrels and disturbances—that it would be 
 such a degradation as Spartans, accustomed to pre-eminence in 
 Greece, could never endure—that it might be well enough for Co¬ 
 rinthians, Epidaurians, and Phliasians, to care only for life and safety, 
 but for Spartans death was preferable to dishonor . 1 2 How could they, 
 go without shame to the Olympian and other national festivals: 
 where formerly every individual Spartan was received with as much 
 honor as the victors at the games, but now they would be looked 
 upon with scorn; their revolted slaves would bring from the land 
 which their fathers had bequeathed to them richer offerings than 
 they did, and would insult them in revenge for their past sufferings? 
 From such disgrace he calls upon them to rescue their country; to 
 struggle through their present difficulties, as the Athenians and 
 Thebans had out of theirs; and lastly, to remember that they had 
 
 1 Isocrates, Archidamus, 135. Xenophon, Hellen. vii. c. 4, ss. 8 — 10. 
 
 2 This passage reminds me of a similar one in Demosthenes, De Synt. 
 176. 
 
* AFFAIRS OF PELOPONNESUS. 365 
 
 never been defeated, when a king of his line had commanded 
 them. 
 
 This singular pamphlet, which the renewal of friendship between 
 Sparta and Athens encouraged Isocrates to publish, produced but 
 little effect. It served as a manifesto to the Grecian world of the 
 feeling, which for many years continued to animate the Spartans; 
 but the coalition against them at this time was too strong to heed 
 any of their threats, much less the desperate one contained in the 
 pamphlet. 
 
 The emancipation of Messenia was not the only cause of discon¬ 
 tent at Lacedaemon. The Arcadians from attached allies had been 
 converted into jealous and hostile neighbors, and were the more 
 likely to continue so on account of the political revolution which 
 they had undergone. The aristocracies, which had maintained them¬ 
 selves in their respective cities by Spartan influence, and secured 
 the connection of their country with Sparta, had been broken up or 
 reduced to insignificance by the establishment of Megalopolis. To 
 form this new city, designed to be the capital of the united Arca¬ 
 dians, and their barrier against the aggression of Sparta, a popula¬ 
 tion was drawn from forty different communities, chiefly those 
 bordering on Laconia. Of the smaller towns which contributed, 
 some were deserted, others were reduced to villages. The larger 
 cities were left in possession of their local governments, which for 
 ordinary purposes they carried on as before, but they were required 
 to send deputies to a federal congress held in the capital, which 
 exercised 'a controlling power over all the concerns of the union, 
 and represented the whole Arcadian body in their transactions with 
 foreign states. Of the formation of this congress we know little 
 more than that it was of a democratical character, consisting alto¬ 
 gether of ten thousand members sent by the various constituents. 
 From hence it took its name, and was called The Ten-thousand. 1 
 Heraea and Orchomenus were the only cities which refused to join 
 r the union. Tegea had at first opposed it, but through a revolution 
 effected by the popular party she was brought over to the other 
 side. This was a great blow to Sparta: for Tegea had been 
 one of her warmest adherents, and was near to the north-eastern 
 frontier of Laconia. Megalopolis was not far from the north-west¬ 
 ern : so that Sparta was cut off from her friends in both of those 
 directions. 2 
 
 In the year 363 b.c. dissensions arose in the Arcadian congress, 
 chiefly through the mutual jealousies of the leading cities, though 
 
 ‘ O i fxvpirn ; and also to kolvov tuv ’A picudov. Xenophon, Helle^ 
 vii. c. 1, s. 38; e. 4, ss. 2, 35 ; c. 5, s. 1. iEschines, De Fals. Leg. 38. 
 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 344. Pausanias, vi. 12. 
 
 3 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 4, ss. 6—11, 22. Diodorus, xv. 59,72. 
 Pansanias, viii. 27 ; ix. 14. 
 
366 
 
 APPENDIX VIIL 
 
 the immediate cause of dispute was concerning the Olympian treas¬ 
 ure which had been taken by the army. An aristocratical party 
 sprang up, adverse both to the federal union and to the Theban 
 alliance. The Mantineans, notwithstanding the zeal with which 
 they had originally promoted the union, took the lead in a counter¬ 
 movement which would have dissolved it, and sought to renew 
 their connection with the Lacedaemonians, by whom their city had 
 formerly been destroyed. It was owing to the measures taken by 
 this party that Epaminondas led his army for the last time into 
 Peloponnesus, the effect of which was to check the counter-revolu¬ 
 tion attempted in Arcadia, though the death of that great man pre¬ 
 vented the completion of any further designs which he may have 
 had for the settlement of Peloponnesian affairs. 1 
 
 In the year following, however, the disturbances in Arcadia were 
 renewed. Some of the families who had been settled in Megalopo¬ 
 lis became dissatisfied with their change of residence; and taking 
 advantage of a clause in the general peace, which ordered all parties 
 to return to their respective countries, (a clause evidently framed 
 with a different view,) they chose to migrate from the capital to 
 their ancient towns. The Megalopolitan government insisted that 
 they should come back: upon which they applied for aid to the 
 Mantineans and other Peloponnesians who had assisted them in the 
 late war. Theban intervention again became necessary; and Pam- 
 menes was sent with three thousand foot and three hundred horse 
 to Arcadia. He reduced the malcontents to submission, but not 
 till he had besieged and taken some of their towns; after which 
 they returned quietly to Megalopolis, and the dissensions were ap¬ 
 peased. 2 
 
 In the last movement Sparta had not interfered. Her losses in 
 the war with Thebes had greatly exhausted her. To recruit the 
 finances of his country, Agesilaus at the age of eighty went over to 
 Egypt, and engaged in the service first of Tachos, afterwards of 
 Nectanabis, whom he established on the throne, and received a 
 recompense of two hundred and thirty talents. On his return home 
 he was taken ill and died on the coast of Africa. 3 The money was 
 doubtless acceptable at Sparta: yet for the present she was not 
 strong enough to attempt any hostile measures against her neigh- 
 
 1 Xenophon, Hellen. viii. o. 4, ss. 33—40 : c. 5, ss. 1—3 ; Pausanias, 
 
 ••• o X 
 
 vm. 8. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xv. 94. It scarcely needs argument to show that ’Adrj- 
 vaiovg in this passage is a mistake. See Vol. I. p. 209, note 2. Thirl- 
 wall, Hist, of Greece, v. 287. Grote, x. 494. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xv. 93. Pausanias, iii. 10. Plutarch, Yit. Agesil. 40. 
 Xenophon, Agesil. ii. 29, <fcc.; who says that one of the causes of his 
 going to Egypt was, to punish the king of Persia for ordering that Mes- 
 sene should be free. 
 
AFFAIRS OF PELOPOXXESUS. 
 
 367 
 
 bors; nor did she receive the least encouragement to do so from 
 her old allies, who were anxious only for neutrality and repose. For 
 nine years after the battle of Mantinea the Peloponnesians enjoyed 
 internal peace, disturbed only by events which happened beyond the 
 peninsula,, in which the Spartans alone had a direct interest. I al¬ 
 lude to the proceedings of the Sacred War; in which, as we have 
 seen, the only peninsular states that took an active part were the 
 Spartans and Achacans, the latter partly influenced perhaps by their 
 enmity to the Locrians. 
 
 Soon after the breaking out of the Sacred War the Spartans 
 began to conceive that it might turn to their private advantage. 
 Fear of the Thebans had in great measure restrained them from at¬ 
 tempting to recover their lost dominion. Yet to the hope that they 
 should be able to recover it at some future time they still most tena¬ 
 ciously clung. 1 Archidamus inherited all the courage and ambition 
 of his father, and burned with the desire both to reconquer Mes- 
 senia, and to break up the federal union, which made Arcadia inde¬ 
 pendent of his country. A great point was gained, if the Thebans, 
 by being employed elsewhere, could be kept away from Pelopon¬ 
 nesus. 3 Yet even then Sparta would scarcely with her own force 
 alone be able to accomplish her designs. It was desirable to rally 
 round her as many as possible of her former allies, and attach them 
 to her cause by the bonds of a common interest. To effect this, 
 Archidamus conceived a scheme (which would be more or less 
 attractive to all of them) for a general restitution of rights; by 
 which Athens should recover Oropus, Elis the Triphylian towns, 
 Phlius Tricaranum, and she herself Messene; and further that Or- 
 chomenus, Thespiae, and Platsea, which the Thebans had destroyed, 
 should be re-established, and the Arcadians who wished it restored 
 to their ancient abodes. 3 The announcement of this project was 
 made in the year b.c. 353, when the tide of success had turned so 
 strongly against the Thebans, that they were unable to hold their 
 ground in Boeotia, and it seemed almost impossible that they could 
 spare any troops for the assistance of their friends in Peloponnesus. 
 It soon became known, with what view the Spartans were canvass¬ 
 ing their allies; nor could the warlike preparations in Laconia 
 remain a secret. That very year indeed they commenced war 
 against the Argives, whom they defeated, and took the town of 
 Orneae, probably with -a view to cut off their communication with 
 
 1 Xenophon, Hellen. vii. c. 4, s. 9. Polybius, iv. 32. 
 
 2 Their fear of the Thebans is strongly stated by Isocrates, Philipp. 
 92: A edioTeg yap dtaTehovoi /ur) 07 i(3aloi Sia?i,vad/j.evoL tu tt poc 4>o>/ceaf 
 Tzd'kLv ETraveXdovTec fieifyoiv avrovg cvfitpopalg TtEpLfidTiuoi tuv npoTEpov 
 
 lien. vii. c. 1, s. 26; c. 2, s. 1; c. 4, s. 11. Demosthe- 
 203, 206, 208. And see ante, pp. 246, 261, 271. 
 
 yEyEVTJflEVUV. 
 
 9 Xenophon, H< 
 nes, Pro Megalop. 
 
368 
 
 APPENDIX Yin. 
 
 Arcadia. 1 The Megalopolitans, alarmed at the danger which 
 threatened them, and having at this time little hope of assistance 
 from Thebes, sent an embassy to Athens, to solicit the protection of 
 the Athenian people. They were supported by envoys from Argos 
 and Messene, and opposed by a counter-embassy from Lacedaemon. 
 A warm debate took place in the Athenian assembly: for an ac¬ 
 count of which, and especially of the view which Demosthenes took 
 of the question, I may refer to the Oration for the Megalopolitans, 
 and to the argument and notes in the first volume. The result was, 
 that Athens determined to be neutral: a policy unfortunate in its 
 results, as will hereafter appear. 2 
 
 The Megalopolitans, being disappointed of Athenian aid, could 
 only look to Thebes; but affairs took such a turn, that, when the 
 time came, Thebes was able to assist them. The Lacedgemonians 
 in their endeavor to negotiate an offensive alliance entirely failed, 
 both at Athens and in Peloponnesus. This delayed their operations. 
 They may have been promised assistance by Onomarchus, as soon 
 as he could dispose of his enemies in the north. The battle of Pa- 
 gasae overthrew such hope, and rendered it necessary for them to 
 send succor into Phocis. But soon afterwards the exertions of 
 Phayllus, together with the support which he received from his 
 allies, enabled him to renew the war in Boeotia. The Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians readily seized this opportunity for commencing the long 
 meditated attack upon their neighbors. 
 
 Archidamus opened the campaign by invading the Megalopolitan 
 territory, which he ravaged for some time without opposition. The 
 Megalopolitans sent for succor immediately to Argos, Sicyon, and 
 Messene, and also to Thebes. Prom the three first-mentioned cities 
 a large force was soon collected, and Thebes sent to their aid four 
 thousand infantry and five hundred horse under the command of 
 Cephision. Thus reinforced, they marched out and pitched then- 
 camp near the sources of the river Alpheus. Archidamus, instead 
 of attacking them, led his troops off towards Mantinea, and took up 
 a position near that city, which he may have hoped was still friendly 
 to his cause. The allies advancing against him, he marched into 
 Argolis, surprised Ornese, which appears to have been retaken 
 since his last expedition, and routed a body of Argives who were 
 sent to its relief. But now the united force of the allies came up 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 34. 
 
 3 Pausanias, iv. 28, states that the Athenians promised to assist the 
 Messenians, if their country should be invaded, but declared they "would 
 not join them in any invasion of Laconia. If so, they made a distinction 
 between them and the Megalopolitans, whom we know they did not assist. 
 Compare however Demosthenes, Pro Megalop. 204; from which it would 
 rather appear, that the engagement entered into with the Messeniuna 
 took place before this occasion. 
 
AFFAIRS OF PELOPONNESUS. 
 
 369 
 
 with him, and offered him battle. He had been reinforced by- 
 three thousand Phocian mercenaries and a hundred and fifty of the 
 horsemen whom Lycophron had brought from Pheras: yet his num¬ 
 bers were but half th«ee of the enemy. An obstinate battle was 
 fought, in which the Spartans by their superior discipline made up 
 for the disparity of numbers: both sides, however, claimed the vic¬ 
 tory. The Argives and other Peloponnesian allies having returned 
 to their homes, as was customary with citizen-troops in Greek war¬ 
 fare, Archidamus took advantage of their absence to renew hi 3 
 ravages in Arcadia, and take by storm the city of Helissus, with 
 the spoils of which he returned to Sparta. Not long afterwards the 
 Thebans and their allies, falling upon Anaxander, who commanded 
 a Lacedaemonian division near Telphusa, defeated and made him 
 prisoner. This battle was followed by two others, in which the 
 Spartans were vanquished with much loss. In the next they gained 
 a victory, which fairly retrieved their honor; but immediately 
 afterwards they retreated to their own country. Archidamus, 
 weary of a contest which promised him no advantage, and in which 
 he had suffered no less damage than his adversaries, made over¬ 
 tures of peace, which the Megalopolitans accepted; and the foreign 
 auxiliaries on both sides retired from Peloponnesus. The ill- 
 advised project of Archidamus had no other effect, than to exhibit 
 the unabated animosity of the Spartans against Megalopolis and 
 Messene. 1 
 
 Not many years after these events the Peloponnesians were ap¬ 
 prised, that a more powerful enemy than Sparta was threatening 
 the independence of Greece. Before the battle of Pagasse they 
 knew little of the king of Macedon besides his name. This brought 
 him prominently before them as an able general, commanding 
 troops formidable by their numbers and discipline. As yet how¬ 
 ever these troops had not been tried against the heavy-armed in¬ 
 fantry of the leading states; and Philip was still looked upon as a 
 mere northern potentate, protecting Thessaly, as his brother Alex¬ 
 ander had done, and extending the frontiers of his own native king¬ 
 dom, but with no thought of pushing his conquests south of Ther¬ 
 mopylae. Even the capture of Olynthus did not open the eyes of 
 the Peloponnesians, although Athens sent her envoys round to their 
 cities, and iEschines in his philippic at Megalopolis denounced the 
 king of Macedon as a savage barbarian, who was rising up to be 
 the plague of the Grecian world. They heard indeed that he had 
 razed to the ground twenty or thirty Chalcidian cities, and they 
 saw with their own eyes the Arcadian Atrestidas bringing to the 
 slave-market a herd of Olynthian women and children. Yet all 
 this, though it may have excited pity or indignation, did not con¬ 
 vince them that Philip’s progress was a thing to excite alarm* The 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 39. Pausanias. viii, 27. 
 
 Q2 
 
310 
 
 APPENDIX VIII. 
 
 conqueror of Olynthus had become a dangerous neighbor to the 
 Athenian dominions in Thrace: they themselves were too far re¬ 
 moved from the scene to have much interest in it. So they rea¬ 
 soned. Nor did there want orators to support these short-sighted 
 views. One Hieronymus is said to have opposed JEschines and 
 spoken on Philip’s behalf in the Megalopolotan assembly. JKschines 
 reported of the Arcadians, that they were glad to hear that Athens 
 was bestirring herself: but whether this was true or not, they 
 showed no desire to assist her. 1 
 
 By the termination of the Sacred War Philip was raised to a po¬ 
 sition both novel and imposing, in which the magnitude of his power 
 was apparent to all. He stepped forward into the midst of G-reece 
 as the elected general of the Amphictyons, the avenger of outraged 
 religion, the arbiter of peace and war. He was at once, king of 
 Macedonia and Tagus of Thessaly: the mountain tribes of Olym¬ 
 pus and Pindus, Othrys and CEta, were ready to flock to his stand¬ 
 ard : the Thebans and Locrians were his grateful and devoted allies. 
 North of the Isthmus there were none to oppose him but the 
 Athenians; and they by themselves could offer but feeble resistance 
 to his power. Under these circumstances the Athenians turned 
 their eyes to Peloponnesus, as the quarter from which they might 
 reasonably hope to obtain support; it being now obvious that, if 
 Athens should succumb to Philip, the Peloponnesians would have 
 no barrier against him. Little was to be expected from the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, disgusted with Athens for her weak and seemingly 
 treacherous conduct in abandoning the Phocians. The best chance 
 was with the other peninsular states, and to them the Athenians de¬ 
 termined to apply, to form a league for mutual protection against 
 Philip. 
 
 If the Athenians, however, imagined that Philip intended to leave 
 the game of diplomacy in their hands, they were completely mis¬ 
 taken. Philip was no less active in negotiation than in war. Where, 
 he designed to extend his influence and power, his emissaries went 
 like skirmishers before him, winning and seducing both statesmen 
 and people to his side by every species of corruption and intrigue. 
 It was soon found that lie had been beforehand with the Athenians 
 in Peloponnesus; and circumstances had happened which greatly 
 favored his designs. 
 
 In a short time after the end of the Phocian war some territorial 
 disputes arose between the Lacedaemonians and their neighbors. 
 Pausanius says, that from early times it was the custom of the 
 Lacedaemonians, when they had nothing to occupy them out of 
 Peloponnesus, to raise a border quarrel with the Argives. 2 3 It was 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 291, 292. The apathy of the Greeks is forcibly de¬ 
 
 scribed by Demosthenes, in Philipp, iii. 119, 120. 
 
 3 Pausanias, ii. 20. „ 
 
AFFAIRS OF PELOPONNESUS. 
 
 371 
 
 not likely that the Messenians would fare much better with them. 
 Pliilip having now established agents in these countries, they 
 persuaded the people to solicit his support. There were plausi¬ 
 ble arguments for it. The Thebans, their former protectors, had 
 been befriended by Philip; while the Athenians had rather dis¬ 
 played a sympathy with Sparta. 1 Philip eagerly availed himself of 
 this favorable opportunity for putting himself at the head of the old 
 Theban confederacy. 2 He sent a body of mercenaries and a sup¬ 
 ply of money to the Messenians and Argives, and promised to come 
 in person, if necessary, to their assistance. At the same time he 
 sent a peremptory message to the Spartans, requiring them (among 
 other things) to abandon their pretensions to Messenia, and threat¬ 
 ening them with war, in case of refusal. To this he received a la¬ 
 conic answer of defiance: yet his measures seemed to have had the 
 desired effect of securing his allies against Spartan aggression, and 
 establishing his own popularity not only at Argos and Messene, but 
 also among their confederates in Arcadia. We read that shortly 
 afterwards both the Arcadians and Argives erected statues to Philip, 
 conferred crowns of honor upon him, and passed resolutions to re¬ 
 ceive him in their cities, if he came to Peloponnesus. Pausanias 
 declares, that the hatred of the Arcadians to Sparta was one of the 
 principal causes to which Philip and his kingdom owed their aggran¬ 
 dizement. 3 
 
 These proceedings quickly excited attention at Athens. Demos¬ 
 thenes carried a decree for sending an embassy to Peloponnesus, 
 and was himself put at its head. 4 He went to Argos and Messene, 
 and in both of those cities made instructive speeches, setting forth 
 the danger of their connection with Philip. He ha^* given us in the 
 second Philippic an extract from his speech to the Messenians, in 
 which he bade them take warning by the example of Olynthus, 
 which Philip first befriended and then destroyed, and also by that 
 of Thessaly, which he had reduced to vassalage : he conjured them 
 not to be deceived by the gifts or promises of Philip, not to trust a 
 man of such notorious bad faith, and not to ally themselves with a 
 despot, the natural enemy of republics. 5 6 This harangue was re- 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Pace, 61. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, Orat. ad Epist. 153 ; from which it appears, that the 
 Thebans were not well pleased at his interference with their allies. 
 
 3 Pausanias, viii. 27. Demosthenes, Philipp, ii. 68, 69; De Fals. Leg. 
 424, 425. Thirlwall, History of Greece, vi. 8. Cicero, Tus. Qu. V. 14. 
 
 4 Demosthenes, De Coron. 252: Hptirov plv ryv tig HtT^orcowriaov 
 7r ptofiuav eypaipa, ore tt purov inelvog tig Ht?.o7r6vv7jcrov 7rapedvtTo. This 
 
 expression does not necessarily import, that Philip was coming in person 
 to Peloponnesus, and therefore it may be referred to the occasion men¬ 
 tioned in the text. 
 
 6 Demosthenes, Philipp, ii. 70. 
 
372 
 
 APPENDIX VIII. 
 
 ceived, as lie tells us, with great applause; yet its effect was tran¬ 
 sient. The Peloponnesian allies of Philip could not be induced to 
 break with him by any Athenian arguments. They had an advan¬ 
 tage in Macedonian protection, which they doubted whether Ath¬ 
 ens was willing or able to afford. 1 The prospect of danger held 
 out to them by Demosthenes was (in their view) remote : but there 
 might be an immediate danger in offending Philip : as he was now 
 a powerful friend, so he might be a powerful enemy. Things had 
 already come about as Demosthenes feared they would. At first 
 people could not imagine that Philip’s power would ever be felt in 
 southern Greece: all of a sudden he appears before them as a giant 
 whom none can withstand : then the minor states are either desir¬ 
 ous of his protection, or afraid to provoke his hostility. Such was 
 his present influence over the Argives and Messenians, that he in¬ 
 duced them to send embassadors in company with his own, to de¬ 
 mand of the Athenians an explanation of their late embassy to 
 Peloponnesus. A joint remonstrance was prepared, identifying the 
 cause of Philip with that of his allies. The Athenians, it was al¬ 
 leged, had violated the treaty of peace by sending agents to stir up 
 the Greeks against Philip; and at the same time they were encour¬ 
 aging the Spartans in their aggressive projects. Python of Byzan¬ 
 tium was Philip’s principal envoy ? and it may perhaps have been on 
 this occasion that he poured out that torrent of invective against 
 Athens, which Demosthenes says he triumphantly answered, so as 
 to vindicate his country from the calumnies of Philip. A reply was 
 sent to the remonstrance, which left the dispute between Philip and 
 the Athenians unsettled. 2 
 
 Elis was next the theatre of intrigue. This city, formerly the 
 best governed of any in Greece, was thrown into strife and disor- 
 
 1 See what Demosthenes says about the selfish policy of the Argives, 
 Messenians, and Arcadians, De Coron. 246. 
 
 2 Argumentum ad Philipp, ii.: De Coron. 272. The occasion upon 
 which this contest of eloquence took place between Python and Demos¬ 
 thenes is matter of controversy. Some assign it to a later period, when 
 Python came to adjust disputes about the peace. Diodorus (xvi. 85) 
 refers it to the debate at Thebes. In the passage cited from the Oration 
 on the Crown, it is mentioned that iEschines spoke on Python’s side; 
 which indicates the debate to have taken place at Athens. It is men¬ 
 tioned also, that Philip’s allies were present, and that, after hearing 
 Demosthenes, they got up and admitted Philip to be in the wrong; 
 which rather points to this occasion, when the Messenians and Argives 
 accompanied the Macedonian embassadors. The second Philippic, it 
 seems clear enough, was spoken in support of a motion for a reply to 
 this embassy. (See Philipp, ii. 7 2. Dionysius, ad Ammseum, s. 10, p. 
 737.) It can not however have been the oration in which Demosthenes 
 so triumphantly answered Python; for it contains no answer to him 
 at all. 
 
AFFAIRS OF PELOPONNESUS. 
 
 373 
 
 der by the corrupting arts of Philip. A Macedonian party got the 
 upper hand, not without violence and bloodshed, and drove a large 
 body of their opponents into exile. Elis was then transferred from 
 the Lacedaemonian alliance to that of which Philip was at the head. 
 The exiles afterwards, hiring the remnant of that mercenary band 
 which had followed Phalsecus into Crete, invaded the country and 
 were defeated, as I have already mentioned, by the Elean and Ar¬ 
 cadian troops. 1 Demosthenes in the third Philippic speaks of Elis 
 as being virtually in the power of Philip. 2 
 
 It was Philip’s design to surround with enemies both Sparta and 
 Athens, so that, being cut off from support, they must ultimately 
 yield to his demands. Sparta was already isolated; and so would 
 Athens be, if Euboea, Megara, Corinth, and Achaia were either sub¬ 
 dued or gained over to his alliance. To make these acquisitions, 
 Philip laid his plans in the year b.c. 343. The enterprises against 
 Euboea and Megara were left to his generals: that against Pelopon¬ 
 nesus he resolved to conduct in person. It would have excited 
 alarm, if he had marched by the ordinary route to the Isthmus, es¬ 
 pecially as he had no ostensible cause of war: he therefore purposed 
 to take a westerly course through Epirus and Acarnania to the Co¬ 
 rinthian gulf. The kingdom of Epirus seems at this time to have 
 been divided between his uncle Arymbas and his brother-in-law 
 Alexander. 3 Philip led his army to the Cassopian coast, and took 
 by storm three cities, Elatea, Pandosia, and Bucheta, Elean col¬ 
 onies, which he annexed to the dominions of Alexander. He then 
 advanced to the Ambracian gulf, meditating an attack upon the Co¬ 
 rinthian colonies of Ambracia and Leucas; and it seems that he 
 was negotiating an alliance with the iEtolians, to whom he prom¬ 
 ised to give Naupactus, as soon as he had taken it from the Achae- 
 ans. 4 He would then have passed through Acarnania to join the 
 ^Etolians, and after taking the Achaean fortresses on the northern 
 coast of the Corinthian gulf, might have transported his forces over 
 to Achaia. It is not unlikely that the Achaeans and Corinthians got 
 information of these projects, and communicated them to Athens. 
 The Athenians by unwonted exertions contrived to baffle Philip at 
 this point, and arrest his further progress. An embassy, at the head 
 of which "\vere Demosthenes, Polyeuctus, Hegesippus, Clitomachus, 
 and Lycurgus, was sent to Acarnania and Peloponnesus, where they 
 
 1 Ante, p. 318. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, Philipp, iii. 118; iv. 133: De Fals. Leg. 424, 435. 
 Pausanias, iv. 28 ; v. 4. 
 
 8 See Thirhvall, History of Greece, vi. 16, note 3. 
 
 4 The possession by the Achaeans of Naupactus, Dyme, and Calydon, 
 was an annoyance to the uEtolians. Epaminondas had expelled them. 
 They regained possession after his death. See Diodorus, xv. 7 5. Xe¬ 
 nophon, Hellen. iv. c. 6, s. 14. 
 
374 
 
 APPENDIX VIII. 
 
 succeeded in forming a league and organizing active measures for 
 defense. Athenian troops were promptly sent into Acarnania. Me- 
 gara also promised assistance, having been secured against Macedo¬ 
 nian attack by the measures of Phocion, as already mentioned. 
 Philip, either not being prepared, or not wishing to attack the Athe¬ 
 nians at present, or failing in his negotiations with the JEtolians, 
 desisted from his attempt and retired to Macedonia. 1 
 
 No further movement occurred in Peloponnesus, until the cam¬ 
 paign of Chseronea. Philip then invited his Peloponnesian allies to 
 join him; but none of them came. The Achseans and Corinthians 
 fought for Athens. 2 After the battle, having completed the subju¬ 
 gation of northern Greece, Philip led his army into the peninsula, to 
 consolidate his power among the states, and enforce the submission 
 of those which held out against him or wavered. He then designed 
 to unite them all in a common league against Persia. None were 
 inclined to dispute his will but the Lacedaemonians; and them he 
 resolved to humble, both for the satisfaction of his allies, and as a 
 measure of precaution against future disturbance. At the head of an 
 overpowering force he entered Laconia, ravaging it on all sides, and 
 pillaging or destroying some of the rural townships. The Spartans 
 behaved worthily of their ancient reputation. Though not strong 
 enough* to encounter the enemy’s whole force in open field, they 
 still refused to capitulate. We read of one victory which they gained 
 over a detached body of Macedonians at Gythium. Philip forbore 
 to attack the capital. He sought to cripple the power of Sparta, not 
 to crush her entirely; perhaps, as the Acarnanian envoy says in 
 Polybius, he checked the more violent counsels of his Peloponnesian 
 followers. 3 The end of it was, that he stripped Sparta of territory 
 on every side, giving one portion of it to the Argives, another to the 
 Tegeans, a third to the Megalopolitans, and a fourth to the Messenians. 
 
 1 Demosthenes, Philipp, iii. 118—120, 129; iv. 133 : De Halonn. 84: 
 De Coron. 305, 306, 308. From the last of these passages, it would 
 appear that Demosthenes had encountered Philip’s agents at Ambraeia. 
 He justly boasts of his own zealous activity in executing, as well as de¬ 
 signing and advising, these important missions (ibid. 301). JEschines 
 (Contr. Ctesiph. 67) charges Demosthenes with giving a faflse account 
 of his success on these expeditions. The charge is a mere calumny. 
 That troops were sent into Acarnania, appears from the incidental men¬ 
 tion of them in Demosthenes, Contr. Olympiodorum, 1173. And the 
 harsh measures aftewards taken by Philip against the Ambraciots and 
 Acarnanians, are evidence of their successful resistance before. (Dio¬ 
 dorus, xvii. 3.) 
 
 2 Pausanias, iv. 28 ; v. 4 ; viii. 27. And see the next Appendix. 
 
 3 The Eleans, though they declined to aid him at Chseronea, are said 
 to have followed him in this invasion from hatred of the Lacedaemonians. 
 Pausanias, v. 4. 
 
AFFAIRS OF PELOPONNESUS. 
 
 375 
 
 His acts were ratified afterwards by the Greek congress, though they 
 were never acknowledged by the Lacedemonians. 1 2 
 
 On his return from Laconia, he visited some of the friendly states; 
 making stay among the Arcadians, whom he wished to attach firmly 
 to himself and draw entirely away from the cause of the Greeks. 
 How well he succeeded, was fully proved by subsequent events: at 
 this time it appeared in homage and flattery. At a village near 
 Mantinea, where he pitched his camp, a spring received the name 
 of Philip’s spring. The Megalopolitans gave his name to a portico 
 in their market-place. Similar compliments were paid him by the 
 Eleans. He erected on the sacred ground at Olympia a circular 
 building surrounded by a colonnade, which was named after him 
 Philippeum. 3 The gracious and winning manners of the king helped 
 doubtless to increase his popularity. 3 
 
 He next proceeded to the Isthmus of Corinth, where he had in¬ 
 vited a congress of all the Greeks to assemble. It was attended by 
 deputies from all the chief cities, except Sparta. The dream of 
 Isocrates was now about to be realized, though not exactly in the 
 manner which that philosopher would have desired. Philip proposed 
 to make war against the Persians, and take vengeance upon them 
 for their profanation of the Greek temples in days of old. The 
 deputies passed an unanimous vote in accordance with his desire. 
 War was declared. Each state was ordered to furnish a contingent 
 of ships or land force: and Philip was elected general of the national 
 • army. 4 
 
 1 Pausanias, ii. 20; iii. 24; vii. 11. Polybius, ix. 28,33. Strabo, 
 viii. 365. 
 
 2 Pausanias, v. 17, 20; viii. 7, 30. 
 
 8 As to this, see ante, p. 357, note 1. 
 
 * Diodorus, xvl 89. Justin, ix. 5. “Compositis in Grsecia rebus, 
 Philippus omnium civitatum legatos ad formandum rerum praesentium 
 statum evocari Corinthum jubet. Ibi pacis legem mniversae Graeciae pro 
 meritis singularum civitatum statuit, conciliumque omnium, veluti unum 
 senatum, ex omnibus legit. Soli Lacedaemonii et legem et regem con- 
 tempserunt, servitutem, non pacem rati, quae non ipsis civitatibus con- 
 veniret, sed a victore ferretur. Auxilia deinde singularum civitatum 
 describuutur, sive adjuvandus e& manu rex oppugnante aliquo foret, seu 
 duce illo bellum inferendum. Neque enim dubium erat imperium Per- 
 sarum his apparatibus peti.” 
 
376 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 CHiERONEA. 
 
 Diodorus thus commences his narrative of the year 338 b.c .: 1 
 
 u Philip, having won over the greater number of the Greeks to 
 his alliance, was anxious to strike terror into the Athenians and hold 
 without a rival the leadership of Greece. He therefore suddenly 
 took possession of Elatea, and there gathering his forces resolved to 
 attack the Athenians. As they were unprepared, by reason of the 
 treaty of peace, he expected that he should easily conquer them: 
 and such was the event.” 
 
 Justin, after relating Philip’s expedition into Scythia, his victory 
 over Atheas the Scythian prince, and the bloody battle fought on 
 his return with the Triballi, in which he was severely wounded, (the 
 date of which event seems to be in the spring or early summer of 
 339 b.c.) continues thus: 2 
 
 “ Ubi vero ex vulnere primum convaluit, diu dissimulatum bellum 
 Atheniensibus infert.” 
 
 The treaty of peace referred to in the passage of Diodorus is that 
 which he relates to have been concluded in the year b.c. 340, when 
 Philip raised the siege of Byzantium. 3 This, as I have before men¬ 
 tioned, 4 has given rise to controversy among modern historians. 
 The testimony of Diodorus, confirmed apparently by certain records 
 cited in the oration on the Crown, has induced some writers to ac¬ 
 cept the peace as an historical fact. Others, who deem it irrecon¬ 
 cilable with the language of Demosthenes, which represents the war 
 of 340 b.c. as continuing long after the date of the supposed peace, 5 
 and who also consider the records in the oration on the Crown to be 
 spurious, and the authority of Diodorus not sufficient of itself to 
 prove a doubtful point—and swayed also by some other arguments— 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 84. Wesseling justly observes in his note, that the 
 seizure of Elatea took place in the year 339 b. c. Diodorus has con¬ 
 fused the dates, as well as the other circumstances of this war. 
 
 2 Justin, ix. 3. 
 
 8 Diodorus, xvi. 77: Aio-rrep rearanhayelg rrj cvvdpo/ufj ruv 
 
 'E ^Ttr/vwv, TTjv TroTuopniav tuvttoXeuv eXvoe, koL npdg ’AOrjvaiovg ical tov f 
 u?.?iovg "E XTirjvag roi)f havriov/nevovg ovveOeto tt/v Elpjjvrjv. 
 
 4 Ante, p. 17, note 1. 
 
 * Demosthenes, De Coron. 275, 276 : Ovk t/v tov tt pdg vpdg tto2.e/uov 
 7 repag ovd’ a'Kak'kayii el fir] Qrjfta'iovc teal QettciXovc e^Opovc 
 
 iroiijcsLE tt} tzoIel' efre. Compare p. 262, where he speaks of th$ suc¬ 
 cessful results which attended his regulation of the trierarchy during 
 the whole of the war (navra rbv wolepov). Also, p. 804. 
 
CH^ERONEA. 
 
 377 
 
 reject the peace altogether. 1 Grote takes a middle view of the 
 question, supposing that Philip concluded peace with the Byzantines, 
 Perinthians, and some other of the Greeks who had assisted them, 
 but not with the Athenians and their more intimate allies. 2 This 
 may seem to reconcile Diodorus with Demosthenes: yet it is hardly 
 probable in itself, that the allies would consent to make such a dis¬ 
 tinction. Perhaps the simplest account of the matter is, that a mere 
 armistice was concluded between the parties, leaving a more formal 
 treaty of peace to be afterwards decided on; and that a naval war, 
 chiefly of a privateering character, was irregularly carried on between 
 Athens and Macedonia in spite of the armistice. 3 
 
 The words of Justin (diu dissimulatum helium Atheniensibus inferf) 
 throw no light on this question of the peace. They have reference 
 to the long forbearance of Philip to attack the Athenians in their 
 own country, which at length he determined'to do. 
 
 It is further to be remarked, that neither Diodorus nor Justin 
 makes the slightest mention of those extraordinary proceedings at 
 Delphi in the year b.c. 339, which kindled a new Sacred War, and 
 were, according to both of the Athenian orators, Demosthenes and 
 iEschines, the immediate cause of Philip’s march into Phocis and all 
 the calamities that followed. 
 
 Demosthenes informs us (I give the sum of what he says) : 4 — 
 
 That Philip was suffering greatly by the maritime blockade which 
 the Athenians kept up around his coast, and by the depredations of 
 their privateers: it therefore became desirable to carry the war into 
 Attica; which could not well be done, unless the Thessalians were 
 on his side, and the Thebans gave him a passage through their 
 country. Neither of these people would have liked to assist him in 
 a private quarrel; but if a new Sacred War could be stirred up, he 
 might be chosen to conduct it as before, and so gather round his 
 standard many of the Amphictyonic tribes. To accomplish this he 
 engaged the services of JSschines; who, as the first step in the busi¬ 
 ness, got himself appointed Amphictyonic deputy, no one at Athens 
 in the least suspecting what his design was; then proceeding to the 
 spring meeting at Delphi, and taking his place in the assembly, pre- 
 
 1 See Thirlwall, History of Greece, vi 59. The objections are there 
 very clearly stated. Is it possible that Diodorus confounds this •with 
 the peace of 346 b. c. ? It is remarkable that he gives no account of 
 
 the latter. 
 
 3 Grote, History of Greece, xi. 638. 
 
 3 Chiefly perhaps to the advantage of the Athenians, as Demosthenes 
 asserts; yet that Philip resorted to privateering, in order to recruit his 
 finances, is related by Justin, ix. 1 : “ Igitur Philippus, longa obsidionis 
 mor& exhaustus, pecuniae commercium de piratica mutuantur. Captis 
 itaque centum septuaginta navibus mercibusque distractis, anhelantem 
 inopiam paululum recreavit.” 
 
 4 Demosthenes, De Coron. 275—278. 
 
378 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 ferred a charge of impiety against the Locrians of Amphissa, for 
 cultivating a portion of the Cirrhaean ground. He made such an 
 inflammatory speech, appealing to the religious feelings of the depu¬ 
 ties, that they were persuaded to go in person and take a view of the 
 sacred ground. The Locrians speedily came and drove them off, not 
 abstaining from acts of violence. The council, resenting such an 
 insult offered to its members, declared war against the Locrians, 
 choosing Cottyphus for their general; but as it was found impossible 
 by the voluntary exertions of the Amphictyonic states to get an 
 army strong enough to enforce their authority, it was contrived by 
 Philip’s agents and partisans at the ensuing Pylsean congress, that 
 he should be elected general. Philip then, collecting an army, and 
 marching to Thermopylae with the professed intention of chastising 
 the Amphissians, suddenly took possession of Elatea. 
 
 If the statement of Demosthenes rested on his sole credit, one 
 might be inclined to suspect that he had greatly magnified the im¬ 
 portance of these transactions, or misrepresented the real truth. 
 When, however, we find his statement confirmed in all its main fea¬ 
 tures by ABschines, we can do no otherwise than accept it as his¬ 
 torical evidence; and it proves to us, how little such writers as 
 Diodorus and Justin are to be depended on for a correct outline of 
 the events which they profess to relate. 1 
 
 AEschines describes the scene at Delphi and the subsequent pro¬ 
 ceedings, in which he himself took an active part, with much greater 
 prolixity of detail than Demosthenes. He gives a somewhat dif¬ 
 ferent color to the affair; yet, so far from denying that his own 
 charge against the Locrians brought on a new Sacred War, he boasts 
 of it; and contends that Athens might and ought to have put her¬ 
 self at the head of the movement, and that it was owing to the 
 treacherous counsel of Demosthenes, that Philip was chosen to be 
 Amphictyonic general. The bold manner in which AEschines 
 launches into the history of this affair, denouncing his rival as the 
 prime author of the whole mischief, gives the idea, as it was in¬ 
 tended to do, that he himself brought the matter forward as an 
 accuser only, and not because he felt the necessity of defending his 
 own conduct. There is, however, no doubt, that his object was 
 more to exculpate himself than to attack Demosthenes; and this, 
 with all his craft, he can not help betraying. We have to bear in 
 mind, that AEschines was not for the first time in the oration on the 
 Crown charged by his opponent with having kindled the last Sacred 
 War. That charge had been urged against him frequently before, 
 both in public and in private; and Aeschines knew perfectly well 
 
 ' Plutarch, writing biography, not history, does not profess always 
 to follow the course of events. He makes a passing allusion only to 
 the Amphissian war. (Yit. Demosth. 18.) 
 
CHiERONEA. 
 
 379 
 
 what Demosthenes would have to say upon the subject in his reply. 1 
 For this very reason he prefers a counter-accusation, by which he 
 hoped to beget a prejudice in Inis own favor; but which, as we shall 
 see presently, is based upon little but the assertion of the accuser. 
 
 The account which iEschines gives of the whole proceeding is to 
 the following effect: 2 — 
 
 That the Locrians of Amphissa were cultivating and turning to 
 profane purposes the holy ground of Cirrha, notwithstanding the 
 solemn oath sworn in the first Sacred War, which forbade it ever 
 again to be appropriated to the use of man; that they had repaired 
 the harbor of that ancient town, and built houses round it, and were 
 taking tolls or duties of the visitors who landed there; that they 
 had bribed some of the Amphictyonic deputies, among others 
 Demosthenes, to say nothing about it; that Demosthenes had been 
 paid a thousand drachms in the first instance, when he was sent 
 as deputy from Athens, and they had engaged for the future to pay 
 him twenty minas a year, if he would constantly support them at 
 Athens. 
 
 That in the year 339 b. c. Midias, Thrasycles, and himself were 
 elected to serve the office of Pylagorae, and sent to Delphi, together 
 with Diognetus the Hieromnemon. That soon after their arrival 
 Diognetus and Midias were seized with a fever; the Amphictyons 
 had already assembled, when a message was brought to JEschines, 
 informing him that the Amphissians, to please their friends the 
 Thebans, were about to move a resolution against the people of 
 Athens ; which was, to fine them fifty talents for having hung up 
 in a new chapel, before it was finished, some golden shields with the 
 following inscription: 3 “By the Athenians, out of spoil taken from 
 
 1 That iEschines was all along anticipating an attack upon himself, 
 that he well understood the course of argument which Demosthenes 
 would pursue, and that he greatly feared the prejudice of the people in 
 his opponent’s favor, will appear from a careful perusal of the oration 
 against Ctesiphon: see pp. 61, 62, where occurs the artful illustration 
 which Demosthenes exposes, De Coron. 303: p. 71, where he anticipates 
 the charge of having caused Philip’s invasion: pp. 74, 77, where, from 
 the words a ircjc; rroO’ vpsh f o atdr/peoi inaprepelTE dupodpEvoi, one would 
 imagine he perceived signs of disapprobation among the jury: p. 81, 
 he forestalls the argument of Demosthenes, De Coron. 330, 331; (pp. 
 84, 85,) he betrays his dread of what Demosthenes will say about his 
 political life: ovro <5£ ralg alriaiq kvitppa^ag tuq Kara cravrov tl poplar, 
 octe top nlvdvvov elvai pi) col to uducijoavTi aXXa rolg ette^iovci, noXiiv 
 phi top ’AX E^avSpov nal top ^IXlttttov £v Talg dta^o'kalg <pEpdv. 
 
 ^ Aeschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 69—72. 
 
 3 According to the words of ASschines (p. 70), the charges were two-; 
 one relating to the time or mode of presenting the shields, the other to 
 the inscription. It would seem, that a new fane or chapel was in the 
 course of erection at Delphi, and the Athenians had exhibited their of- 
 
380 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 the Persians and Thebans when they fought against the Greeks.” 
 That Diognetus sent for him, and begged that he would go to the 
 council, and defend his country before the Amphictyons. He did so; 
 but scarcely had he begun to speak, when one of the Amphissians 
 rudely interrupted him, crying out, “ Men of Greece, if you were 
 wise, you would not allow the name of the Athenians to be men¬ 
 tioned on these days, but would drive them from the temple as a 
 people under a curse.” At the same time he brought up the Phocian 
 alliance and other matters of accusation against Athens; all which 
 so enraged JEschines, that in the heat of the moment he retorted 
 the charge of impiety against the Locrians, and reproached them 
 with the use which they had made of the consecrated plain. The 
 plain itself and the port of Cirrha were visible from the spot where 
 they were assembled. iEschines pointed them out to the deputies. 
 u Amphictyons 1” he cried : u you behold yonder plain cultivated by 
 the Amphissians, with the pottery works and farm-houses which 
 they have built upon it. You see with your own eyes the fortifi¬ 
 cations of the devoted harbor. You know yourselves, and need no 
 witnesses to tell you, that these men have taken tolls and are mak¬ 
 ing profits from the sacred harbor.” He then bade them read the 
 oracle, the oath of their ancestors, and the solemn imprecation, (all 
 which were before their eyes, inscribed on a tablet;) and having 
 first declared his determination, on behalf of the people of Athens, 
 himself, his children, and his family, to stand by the god and the 
 sacred land, as that ancient oath required, he solemnly adjured the 
 Amphictyons to do the same, and to free themselves from the curse 
 that must otherwise hang over them as the abettors or tolerators of 
 sacrilege. 
 
 The speech of AEschines—so he goes on to state—caused a great 
 tumult and uproar in the council. All question of the shields was 
 forgotten, and nothing thought of but the punishment of the Locri¬ 
 ans. As the day was far advanced, a proclamation was made by the 
 herald, commanding that all the Delphians of military age, both free¬ 
 men and slaves, should assemble the next morning with spades and 
 pickaxes at the place of sacrifice, and that the Hieromnemons and 
 other deputies should be at the same place to assist in the cause of 
 Apolio and the sacred land: and further announcing that, whatever 
 
 ferings before it was completely finished, or before some ceremony of 
 consecration had been peformed. The inscription was necessarily offens¬ 
 ive to the Thebans ; and, although the Athenians had probably pre-^ 
 sented these shields in lieu of others similarly inscribed, which £he 
 Phocian generals had destroyed, it gave a handle for censure, that they 
 should at this time have taken a step which would hurt the feelings of 
 their neighbors. See Thirlwall, History of Greece, vi. 54. Grote, xi. 
 650 ; who gives a somewhat different explanation. 
 
CELERONEA. 
 
 381 
 
 people failed to attend, would be excluded from the temple, and re¬ 
 garded as execrable and accursed. 
 
 At the time appointed, he says, the full multitude came together 
 and went down to Cirrha, where they quickly demolished the har- 
 ‘ bor and set fire to the houses which had been erected : but a large 
 body of Amphissians coming with arms to attack them, they took 
 to their heels, and with difficulty escaped to Delphi. The next day 
 Cottyphus, a Pharsalian citizen, who officiated as president of the 
 congress, called a general assembly of Amphictyons, composed not 
 only of the representative synod, but of all who came to take a 
 part in the sacrifice or consult the oracle. Here, after much abuse 
 of the Locrians and praise of Athens, a resolution was passed, that 
 the deputies should assemble at Thermopylae on a certain day before 
 the next ordinary meeting, to pass sentence on the Locrians for 
 their acts of sacrilege and insult to the Amphictyons.” 
 
 When this resolution was first communicated to the Athenians, 
 JSschines declares, they fully acquiesced in its propriety, and 
 expressed their readiness to comply with it. Demosthenes raised 
 some opposition, in pursuance of his engagement with the Locrians; 
 but he (AEschines) completely set him down. 1 Upon which Demos¬ 
 thenes had recourse to a maneuvre : he got a degree first secretly 
 passed by the council, and then carried in the assembly after the 
 regular business was all over, and when hardly any citizens were 
 present; which decree was to the effect:—“ That the deputies of 
 Athens should go regularly to Thermopylae and to Delphi at the 
 times appointed by their ancestors; and that they should take no 
 part whatever in the extraordinary meeting about to be held at 
 Thermopylae.” The consequence was, that Athens took no part in 
 the ensuing measures of the Amphictyons. The special meeting was 
 attended by representatives from all the other states except Thebes. 
 War was declared against the Amphissian Locrians, and Cottyphus 
 was electecr general. The Amphictyonic army marched into Locris, 
 but behaved with the utmost moderation, imposing a fine only on 
 the people, to be paid on a given day, banishing the principal 
 advisers of the sacrilege, and restoring the opponents who had been 
 driven into exile. As the fine, however, was not paid, and the Am¬ 
 phissians reversed the acts of Cottyphus after his troops had been 
 withdrawn, the second expedition against them took place after a 
 long interval, when Philip had returned from Scythia. u And so,” 
 says Aeschines, “ when the gods had given the lead in this pious 
 
 1 This quite agrees with what Demosthenes says (De Coron. 275): 
 Kal tot' evdvg £pov 6iafJ.apTvpofj.evov Kal fiotbvToc £v r y IkkAtiglc}. “tto- 
 hepov el<; tt)v ’Attikt/v elaayeic, A lax'tvTj, noTiepov ’ Ap<\>lktvovlkov ” ol 
 piv £k 7rapaK?iT/<jeu<; ovyKadrfpevoL ovk elcov pe Tieyeiv, oi d’ iOavpafyv Kal 
 Kevr/v a’lTiav diu ryv I6'iav t:x®P av k^ayeiv pe vneAupfiavov avT&. 
 
382 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 enterprise to Athens, she was deprived of it by the corrupt act of 
 Demosthenes.” 
 
 Here JEschines breaks off, just at the time when we should have 
 been glad to hear the rest of his narrative. Instead of giving any 
 explanation about Philip’s appointment and the circumstances 
 attending it, he quits these matters of fact, and runs into a rhapsody 
 of declamation, by which, as he had played upon the weak under¬ 
 standings of the Amphictyonic council, he might hope to excite the 
 feelings of the Athenian people : but he had not the same success. 1 
 
 The accounts of Demosthenes and JEschines, agreeing in their 
 main outlines, and especially in the important result of Philip’s elec¬ 
 tion to conduct the new Sacred War, differ in the following particu¬ 
 lars : 1. As to the Locrians having preferred a charge of impiety 
 against the Athenians : 2. As to the motives which each of the two 
 orators imputes to his rival: 3. As to some of the details of the 
 first Amphictyonic campaign. 
 
 That the Locrian people should have brought a formal accusation 
 against the Athenians, such as that mentioned by JEschines, is 
 improbable, not merely for the reason assigned by Demosthenes, 
 that no record is produced of a citation to answer the charge; but 
 also because the alleged offense is not one which the Locrian people 
 were likely to have cared about; and further, if (as JEschines says) 
 they were conscious of being themselves trespassers upon the sacred 
 land, this would naturally have deterred them from raising such 
 questions against others. If it be said, that they were instigated by 
 the Thebans, we may answer first, that there is no evidence of this; 
 secondly, it is disproved by the conduct of the Thebans themselves, 
 who showed pretty clearly by their keeping aloof from the special 
 meeting at Thermopylae, that they had had quite enough of Sacred 
 Wars and Amphictyonic quarrels. It is very possible, however, 
 that some individual Amphissian, either at Philip’s instigation or 
 from other motives, got up in the council to complain %f what the 
 Athenians had done; and this led to an angry debate, in which 
 iEschines retorted the charge of impiety upon the countrymen of 
 his opponent. 
 
 And what time the Amphissians began to take possession of the 
 port and plain of Cirrha, iEschines does not inform us: and modern 
 historians do not agree upon the subject. Grote says, 2 it appears 
 both from Demosthenes and iEschines, that it was an ancient and 
 established occupation. The passages which he cites however do 
 not bear him out; 3 on the contrary, the whole narrative of iEschines 
 
 1 The whole of the passage beginning at page 72, dX/ 1’ ov n povXeyov, 
 
 and ending at page 73, tvc rr/c tovtov noXiTEia^, is wretched affectation 
 and bombast. 
 
 3 History of Greece, xi. 648. 
 
 3 Demosthenes, De Coron, 277. JEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 69: 01 
 
CELERONEA. 
 
 383 
 
 tends to prove, that it was a recent intrusion of which the Amphissians 
 were accused. Had it been otherwise, it would not have been easy 
 to excite a tumult against them at Delphi: nor would there nave been 
 any color for the charge which JEschines brings against Demosthenes, 
 of having received bribes from the Amphissian people. Though we 
 may have no hesitation in rejecting the truth of that charge, it is 
 difficult to suppose • that it could have been advanced, unless the 
 Amphissians had some assignable motive for offering a bribe. If 
 what they were doing at Cirrha had been acquiesced in for so long a 
 period, they could have had little to fear, and had no occasion to 
 purchase the silence of the Amphictyonic deputies. If this usurpa¬ 
 tion had been recent, one can understand their motives in so doing. 
 But further, it is distinctly asserted by JEschines, that the Amphictyons, 
 when they invaded Locris, banished the principal authors of the sacri¬ 
 lege, and restored those who had been driven into exile for their 
 piety, that is, for their opposition to the sacrilege: a statement which 
 implies, as I conceive, that the alleged sacrilege had been recently 
 committed and was the subject of contest among the Locrians them¬ 
 selves. 1 
 
 That after the first Sacred War it became necessary to renovate 
 in some degree the port and town of Cirrha, for the accommodation 
 of visitors coming by sea to Delphi, we may with Grote very fairly 
 assume: but I see no reason for supposing that the Amphissian 
 Locrians took this duty upon them. It is more likely that the 
 Delphians provided the convenience of a harbor for their guests, 
 regarding it both as a duty and a privilege of their own. When the 
 second Sacred War broke out, Cirrha fell into the hands of the 
 Phocians; and we have no historical account of what they- did with it. 
 When however the Amphissian Locrians submitted to Onomarchus, 
 it is very possible that he permitted them to occupy that ancient 
 seaport under an arrangement beneficial to both parties. The 
 Locrians may then have enlarged and improved the harbor, built 
 new houses in the town, and plowed up and farmed a considerable 
 portion of the surrounding plain. We hear of no more war between 
 them and the Phocians after the peace made with Onomarchus; nor 
 could he have .taken a better way to disarm their hostility than by 
 making to them such a concession. At the end of that war the 
 Locrians must have felt that their title to this newly acquired district 
 
 AoKpoi oi ’ A/u<pioosIg, fiaTJ.ov <Jfc ol ttpo'egttjkote g avruv uv6pE( irapavofj.u- 
 TdToi, eTreipya&vTo rb nediov, Kal tov Tiifitva tov k%dy lotov Kal ivrdpaTov 
 ndXiv treixioav Kal ovvipx uTav i Ka l te^tj rovg KarcnzTiEOVTag ktjtTicyov, nal 
 tuv dfliKvovfiEvov Ei f A sXcpovg TTV^ayopuv hiovg xpVp aaL diEtydsipav. The 
 connection of the last clause with the preceding clauses proves that 
 JEschines is speaking of recent acts. 
 
 ‘ Aeschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 72 : K al roi)c p.bv bvaytlq Kal tuv nEnpay- 
 Hevuv aiTiovg fiETCOTTjoavro, rove 6b 61 evoE/3eiav (pvyovrag Karr/yayov, 
 
384 
 
 APPENDIX IX 
 
 was questionable and precarious. Although the Delphians in the 
 first rejoicing after victory might not wish to disturb them in their 
 possession, yet in the course of a short time they may have begun to 
 think more seriously of it, especially if the improvements of the 
 town and neighborhood of Cirrha were of such magnitude as to 
 excite attention. As soon as the title of the Locrians became the 
 subject of discussion, they would naturally be alarmed, and might 
 endeavor by intrigue or otherwise to make interest for themselves 
 with the Amphictyonic deputies. This may have afforded a color 
 for the charge of JEschines against Demosthenes. 
 
 That there was any thing more however then a colorable pre¬ 
 tense for such charge against Demosthenes, I altogether disbelieve. 
 The only ground alleged by JEschines is, that he dissuaded his coun¬ 
 trymen from taking any part in the hostile movement against the 
 Locrians. But in this he only exhibited the zeal and foresight of 
 a good statesman. His prediction was but too true, that Aeschines 
 was bringing an Amphictyonic war into Attica. The Athenians, 
 though at first they disregarded the warning; considering it to have 
 been dictated by private enmity, shortly afterwards came over to his 
 views, and passed a resolution virtually condemning the acts of the 
 Amphictyons. JEschines, to persuade his hearers that this resolution 
 was not the genuine opinion of the Athenians, resorts to the stale 
 device of asserting that it was irregularly and clandestinely obtained. 
 But it is far more likely, that the people of Athens upon further in¬ 
 quiry and reflection became convinced, that the violent measures of 
 the Amphictyons were uncalled for and unseasonable, that the affair 
 of Cirrha did not concern them, and the most prudent plan was 
 to keep themselves quiet, as Demosthenes advised. 1 
 
 Of JEschines the least we can say is, that he acted with great in¬ 
 discretion, and showed himself not a very fit person to manage any 
 important business of state. Whether he was stimulated by the 
 base motives which have been imputed to him, is a problem which 
 no mortal can solve. Difficulties present themselves, whatever 
 view we may be inclined to take. It can hardly be supposed that 
 the course which things took was planned by JEschines; for no one 
 could have foreseen that such results would flow from such causes, 
 or that by the contingency which happened Philip would get the 
 advantages which he did. Upon the Athenians declining to act 
 against the Locrians, Philip had no cams belli against them as Am¬ 
 phictyonic leader, while he involved himself in a war with the 
 Locrians, his former allies, at the risk also of displeasing the Thebans. 
 The only compensation for this was, that he took the Athenians by 
 surprise. It may however be thought, that the event which actually 
 
 1 Mitford, who is always adverse to Demosthenes, thinks that his 
 silence on the subject of this charge proves his guilt. (History of 
 Greece, iv. chap, xll s. 6.) 
 
CELERONEA. 
 
 385 
 
 happened was not the most favorable one for Philip, who rather 
 hoped that he should embroil the Athenians with the Locrians, and 
 step in himself as the protector of the latter, drawifig to his side the 
 Thebans and other allies. Yet one would imagine it would better 
 have suited Philip’s purpose to get up a religious cry against the 
 Athenians, so as to bring them into odium and disgrace with the 
 Amphictyons, and excite perhaps a Sacred War against them, of 
 which he might have the conduct. It is thus possible that the 
 Locrian who declaimed so fiercely against Athens at Delphi was 
 acting under his instigation, and that the reply of iEschines, made 
 on the spur of the moment, accidentally turned the wrath of the 
 assembly into another channel. It is by no means impossible, 
 however, that the Locrian and ACschines were both Macedonian 
 hirelings; yet that they had no definite object further than to 
 create discord and confusion among the Amphictyons, which Philip 
 might turn to his advantage according to circumstances. It is in 
 this vague way that Demosthenes shapes his accusation. 1 
 
 From a comparison of the two orators it appears, that the extra¬ 
 ordinary meeting of Amphictyons was held at Thermopylae at the 
 time appointed, and attended by deputies from most of the states 
 except Athens and Thebes. Cottyphus, being elected general, 
 summoned the Amphictyonic tribes to take arms; their contingents 
 however came in slowly, and not in sufficient numbers for*the 
 required purpose. Putting himself at the head of such force as he 
 could muster, Cottyphus made a show of opening the campaign; 
 but, not being strong enough to reduce the Locrians to submission, 
 he contented himself with imposing terms upon them, in particular 
 a pecuniary fine to be paid on an early day. These terms were 
 not complied with; it was never desired by Philip’s friends that 
 they should be: accordingly at the ensuing autumnal 2 congress of 
 Amphictyons it was proposed, as had been concerted by the Mace-” 
 
 1 Demosthenes does not pretend to say, that Philip marked out any 
 particular course for Aeschines or his other agents to pursue. Any war 
 or confusion among the Amphictyons would be a gain to him; for he 
 was sure then to be wanted: ’E7t Lx^ipei OeacacO' fig ev, nohe/iov TroLTjocu 
 rolg ’A/uQiktvocu Kal nepl rr/v HvXaiav rapaxvv eig yup tclvt ’ evdvg avrovg 
 vTTE?id/j.(3avev avrnv deijoeoOai. De Coron. 276. 
 
 2 Grote has taken the correct view of the chronology of these events. 
 (See the learned notes to his History of Greece, xi. pp. 657, 664.) The 
 extraordinary congress of Amphictyons was held at some time between 
 the spring and autumn, but at what particular time does not appear. 
 Philip was appointed general at the autumnal meeting, eig tt/v kmovcsav 
 TTv^acav, (Demosth. De Coron. 277.) The iapLvijg TrvTiaiag in the second 
 Amphictyonic decree (ibid. 278) is clearly a mistake, except upon the 
 improbable supposition that there were two decrees for the election of 
 Philip, one in the spring of 339 b.c., and one in the autumn. The rec¬ 
 ords cited in the oration of Demosthenes are certainly not to be relied 
 
 Vol. II.—R 
 
386 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 donian party, that Philip should be invited to subdue and punish 
 the refractory people, who had dared to defy the general council of 
 Greece. It does* not appear by what deputies this motion was sup¬ 
 ported, or whether or by whom it was opposed: as however the 
 tribes north of Thermopylae formed a majority in the council, it was 
 certain to be carried in the affirmative. Philip was invited; and 
 eagerly embracing the opportunity, for which doubtless he was well 
 prepared, he set out with his army for the south, proclaiming that 
 he had taken arms in the cause of religion as the Greeks had 
 requested him. He was speedily joined by the Thessalians and cir¬ 
 cumjacent tribes, and passing Thermopylae with a force which neither 
 the Locrians nor any single Grecian state could have resisted, he 
 entered the north-eastern part of the Phocian territory. Had his 
 sole purpose now been to prosecute the war which he had profess¬ 
 edly come to conduct against the Amphissian Locrians, he would 
 have pursued his march through Phocis towards their frontier. In¬ 
 stead of doing so, he halted suddenly at Elatea, and began to repair 
 its ruined fortifications. By this step (as Elatea was on the confine 
 of Bceotia, and commanded the entrance to that country) it became 
 manifest, that his designs were against the Athenians, or the The¬ 
 bans, or both. 
 
 How the Athenians viewed it, is plain enough from the cele¬ 
 brated description of Demosthenes. Whether Philip was openly at 
 war with them or not, mattered but little. Had there been ten 
 thousand treaties of peace between them registered on stone, the 
 result would have been the same. Philip’s approach was not the 
 less dangerous, because he had made no proclamation of hostility. 
 He had recent failures to avenge, losses at sea, and insults to hu 3 
 coast. Yet these were nothing compared with the intense desire 
 which he felt to strike a mortal blow at the power of Athens. It 
 was indeed a necessity, unless he meant to forego his ambitious 
 schemes. The moment the Athenians received intelligence that he 
 had occupied Elatea, the whole truth flashed upon them at once. 
 Here at length was that terrible king of Macedon, whom Demos¬ 
 thenes had been so many years alarming them about. He was 
 now ready to fall upon Attica, as he had fallen upon Olynthus; and 
 where were they to look for defense ? The whole city was para¬ 
 lyzed, until Demosthenes came forward to rouse the people from 
 their stupor, and point out to them what means of defense and what 
 hope remained. The Athenians were passive in his hands. 
 
 I shall not seek to describe in language of my own those scenes 
 of excitement and terror, which are so vividly brought before our 
 eyes by Demosthenes himself. The circumstances under which he 
 rose to address his countrymen, his own counsel, and all the pro- 
 
 on for their dates, if they are for any thing else. I see no evidence for 
 supposing that JEschines advocated the appointment of Philip. 
 
CHJERONEA. 
 
 387 
 
 ceedings of the popular assembly, are fully set forth in his most in¬ 
 teresting narrative, to which I refer the reader. 1 Suffice it here to 
 say, that under his advice, which was unanimously agreed to, a de¬ 
 cree was drawn up, 2 offering alliance on the most honorable 
 terms to the Thebans: an embassy was dispatched instantly to 
 Thebes, with Demosthenes at its head; and the Athenians with a 
 full muster of their pilitary strength marched to Eleusis, in order to 
 encourage their friends in Thebes, and to second the efforts of the 
 embassadors. 
 
 The advance of Philip into their neighborhood was a thing by no 
 means welcome to the Thebans. They had signified their disap¬ 
 proval of the late Amphictyonic movement by absenting themselves 
 from the special congress. The appointment of Philip to conduct 
 the war must have increased their uneasiness; and still more, his 
 fortification of Elatea. 3 For some time past the Thebans had re¬ 
 garded Philip with no friendly eye. They were oppressed by the 
 weight of their obligation to him, and felt a jealousy and a dread of 
 his growing power, which they dared not exhibit or express. His 
 garrison at Nicsea, which he had nominally given to the Thessalians, 
 both gave them offense and kept them in awe. 4 He had taken 
 possession of Echinus, a town on the Malian gulf, which formerly 
 belonged to them. 5 He had transferred to himself the Peloponne¬ 
 sian confederacy, of which they had once been at the head. 0 The 
 relation in which they stood to him was altogether painful and hu¬ 
 miliating. 7 Yet whatever their grievances might be, there seemed 
 no help for them: they were isolated from all alliances except those 
 which were devoted to Philip. Athens was the only independent 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 68—74. Orig. pp. 284—291. Diodorus, xvi. 84, has 
 
 this description before his eyes. 
 
 3 The decree cited in the oration (De Coron. 288—291) is clearly er¬ 
 roneous as to the archon and the month ; perhaps also in the number 
 of embassadors ; for there are only five, and Demosthenes had proposed 
 ten. See Grote, History of Greece, xi. 673, note 2. As to the merits 
 of the decree itself there is a difference of opinion among critics. Schae¬ 
 fer and others think it verbose and inflated. (See ante, p. 72, note 3.) 
 Lord Brougham and the Edinburgh Reviewer (cited by me, ante, p. 76, 
 note 1,) think it a fine piece of composition. Grote considers it improb¬ 
 able that intermarriage should be offered by the Athenians to the The¬ 
 bans in that state of the negotiation. But it was a great point with 
 Demosthenes to make the most liberal and friendly proposals. 
 
 3 How this would be regarded at Thebes, appears from Demosthenes, 
 Philipp, ii. 69. 
 
 4 Demosthenes, Orat. ad. Epist. 163. iEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 73. 
 
 6 Demosthenes, Philipp, iii. 120. 
 
 . 6 See ante, p. 371, n. 2. 
 
 7 See the remarks of Demosthenes upon their position after the peace, 
 
 De Pace, 62. * 
 
388 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 power to which they could have recourse; but, though there grad¬ 
 ually rose up at Thebes a party favorable to the Athenian connec¬ 
 tion, the prejudices against it were for a long time so strong as to 
 render it almost hopeless. Ancient animosities had been increased 
 by the events of the Sacred War, and especially by the course 
 which things had taken at its close . 1 The Thebans had reason to 
 complain of Athens for her intrigues with Philip, the violent lan¬ 
 guage of her orators, and her endeavors to dismember Boeotia; 
 while they were conscious that the retention of Oropus was an act 
 of injustice on their own part . 2 Since the peace there had been 
 little intercourse between the two cities. Border disputes had 
 arisen, and troops were sent to guard the frontiers, though without 
 leading to any actual conflict . 3 The inscription on the Athenian 
 offerings at Delphi, whatever may have been the motive which 
 prompted it, was an act hurtful to national feelings, and likely to 
 aggravate Theban ill will to Athens . 4 
 
 There had long been at Athens a party anxious for reconciliation 
 with the Thebans; but it had not been popular. iEschines re¬ 
 proaches Demosthenes for belonging to it . 5 Since the spring meet¬ 
 ing of the Amphictyons this party had been gaining strength, 
 chiefly through the exertions of Demosthenes, who foresaw danger 
 to Athens from the disturbances which had taken place at Delphi . 6 
 Divers embassies were about this time sent to Thebes, conducted 
 by statesmen supposed to be most popular in that city. They were 
 instructed (we may fairly presume) to offer an explanation of the 
 affair of the shields—to sound the Thebans as to their views of the 
 new religious question which had been agitated—to appease any 
 hostile feeling which might have sprung up against themselves— 
 and .lastly, when the Amphictyons had passed the fatal decree 
 which invited Philip into G-reece, to bring about, if possible, a de¬ 
 fensive alliance between Thebes and Athens. Meanwhile, however, 
 all these attempts were counterworked by an opposite party. 
 Philip kept his spies and agents in both cities, who informed him 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron. 237. 
 
 2 See ante, pp. 260, 307, 308, 312. 
 
 3 Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 446; c. Con. 1257. 
 
 4 At the time when the Athenians presented these shields, they were 
 flushed with their successes in Euboea and the Propontis ; and it is pos¬ 
 sible they may have given way to a foolish feeling of pride. .Eschines, 
 an anti-Theban, calls the inscription to TvpoofjKov kmypappa. (Contr. 
 
 Ctesiph. 70.) 
 
 6 Eschines, De Fals. Leg. 42 : Ka2 yap tt pb? rolg nanolt; (3ouj- 
 
 Tiufci. Compare pp. 46, 47, and Contr. Ctesiph. 73, where he says of 
 Aristophon, nXelarov xpovov ryv tov (3oiutiu&iv vnopeivag air lav. See 
 ante, p. 281, 
 
 6 Demosthenes, De Coron. 275, 281. 
 
CEDE RONE A. 
 
 389 
 
 of all that was going on . 1 Whilst he lay in apparent inaction at 
 Pella, recovering from his wound, he was laboring by every engine 
 of diplomacy to defeat the Athenian negotiations, and prevent 
 a conjunction which might put a check upon all his ambitious 
 schemes. And so well did he manage things, with the help of his 
 ministers and partisans; so artfully did he work on the jealousies, 
 the hopes, and the fears of the Theban people, that they were 
 induced to pass decrees in his favor, rejecting the overtures of 
 the Athenians: and when Philip set out on his march, it seemed 
 impossible that any union could take place between Thebes and 
 Athens . 2 3 * In one thing, however, he failed. The Thebans refused 
 to send any aid to the Amphictyonic expedition. They desired 
 neutrality and peace . 5 
 
 At length, Demosthenes and his colleagues arrived at Thebes. 
 Philip’s embassadors were already there, together with those of his 
 allies, Thessalians, JEnianians, JEtolians, Dolopians, Phthiots. The 
 Macedonian party were full of confidence, the friends of Athens in 
 despondence and alarm. Demosthenes, at first, seeing how things 
 stood, sent discouraging letters to Athens; but he quickly collected 
 his energies to meet the exigency of the case. It was plain, the 
 confidence of his adversaries was owing not merely to the assurances 
 which the -Thebans had lately given of their adhesion to the Mace¬ 
 donian alliance, but in a great measure, also, to the presence of 
 Philip and his army. This, however, might operate in two ways. 
 It intimidated the people; yet it also suggested thoughts favorable 
 to a union with Athens. So long as Philip kept himself at a distance, 
 the Thebans were content to be quiet, and not provoke his hostility 
 by forming new connections. Put if they were not to have the 
 benefits of peace; if their territory was to be traversed by Philip’s 
 armies, or be made the theatre of war; and still more, if he designed 
 to coerce them by keeping a strongly garrisoned fortress on their 
 borders; his alliance was no longer the advantageous thing which it 
 promised to be in the beginning. Such thoughts were sure to arise 
 in the breasts of the Theban multitude, who had no corrupt interest 
 
 1 Dinarchus (Contr. Demosth. 99) speaks of the traitors in Thebes. 
 Compare Demosthenes, De Coron. 241, '286. 
 
 2 .dSschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 73. Demosthenes, De Coron. 281—284. 
 Supposing the documents cited here to be partially genuine, it is certain 
 that we have not all the documents referred to by Demosthenes in the 
 oration. There must have been some decrees or answers of the Thebans, 
 to which he refers by the words: T ovroig hnapdelg rolg iprityiopag teal ralg 
 uKOKpiaeoiv. 
 
 3 Demosthenes, De Coron. 279: r £2f oi>x vtt^kovov ol Qrj/3aloi. I pre¬ 
 
 sume that Philip, soon after his nomination to be Amphictyonic general, 
 
 solicited the Thebans to join him. They declined; and then he solicited 
 the Peloponnesian states. 
 
390 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 in Philip’s friendship: and of these Demosthenes prepared to take 
 advantage . 1 
 
 A popular assembly was held, to consider whether the proposal 
 of Philip or that of the Athenians should be accepted. The embas¬ 
 sadors on both sides were introduced to the people. The Macedo¬ 
 nians, holding already the character of allies, were allowed to have 
 the first word . 2 They extolled the merits of the king of Macedon, 
 enlarged upon the services which he had done the Thebans, enumer¬ 
 ated the various causes of antipathy and jealousy which subsisted 
 between Thebes and Athens, the many injuries which the Athenians 
 had in a long series of years inflicted upon the Theban people. Now 
 was the time, they said, for the Thebans to show their gratitude to 
 Philip, and take vengeance upon long-standing enemies. But if 
 they were unwilling to join in the invasion of Attica, Philip would 
 be satisfied with their neutrality: let them only allow a passage to 
 his army, and he would himself chastise the Athenians. If Philip 
 had asked this of them before he lent them his aid in the Sacred 
 War, they would have promised it easily: it would be unjust to re¬ 
 fuse it because Philip had been generous and relied upon their 
 honor . 3 By adhering to Philip’s friendship they had every thing to 
 gain; their own country would be secure, and they would share in 
 the plunder of Attica; whereas, if they joined the Athenians, Bceotia 
 would be exposed to warfare and pillage . 4 
 
 Demosthenes rose to combat these arguments. Not a fragment 
 of his speech is preserved. In the oration on the Crown he dis¬ 
 creetly abstained from repeating any portion of it to the jury; as, 
 however gratifying the recital might have been to his own feelings, 
 it could at that time hafe answered no useful purpose. The position 
 of affairs suggests to us the topics upon which he must have princi¬ 
 pally dwelt ) and the substance of what he said may have been as 
 follows:— 
 
 Men of Thebes, if this were a question only of punishing Athens, 
 or even of destroying her, I might never have ventured to address 
 this assembly. But it is a question which deeply concerns you and 
 your own safety. Thebes is in no less danger than Athens; and as 
 
 1 The seizure of Elatea turned the tide of Theban feeling in favor of 
 Athens: M ereyvcdGav evdvg, wf tovt’ eldov. Demosthenes, De Coron. 278. 
 
 2 Amyntas and Clearchus were the chief Macedonian envoys, accord¬ 
 ing to Plutarch, in Yit. Demosth. 18. Python is mentioned by Diodo¬ 
 rus, xvi. 85. But quaere, whether he does not confound this with another 
 occasion. See ante, p. 373. 
 
 3 Aristotle, Rhetor, ii, 23. 6. Philochorus, apud Dionysium ad Amm. 
 s. 11, pp. 739, 742: E£ nplv fiorjOrjoai el$ QoiceZc V&° v , vtxegxovto av' 
 utottov ovv, el, 5l6tl npoEtro ical knioTEvoE , [it) dir/covoiv. Aristotle cites 
 this to illustrate a point of rhetoric—that a man should do out of grati¬ 
 tude for a past favor that which he would have promised to obtain it. 
 
 4 Demosthenes, De Coron. 298, 299. 
 
CILERONEA. 
 
 391 
 
 the Athenians would consider your subjection to Philip as one of the 
 greatest calamities to themselves, such they conceive should be your 
 feelings with regard to Athens. For if (which heaven forbid!) we 
 shouldube disabled from lending assistance to you in the hour of need, 
 what alliance, what protection will remain to you ? All your Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian confederates have gone over to Philip. He commands 
 the pass of Thermopylae. He has surrounded you with his garrisons. 
 The Thessalians, all the tribes of Pindus and Olympus, Oeta and 
 Othrys, are devoted to him. Why do they come to invade Attica, 
 and what mean they by this present embassy ? We have no quarrel 
 with the people of Thessaly, or with the HStolians or (Etaeans or any 
 of them. They follow the king of Macedon against us, because they 
 are his vassals; and they come here to dictate to you, what votes 
 you shall give to-day. Dolopians and Perrhaebians would compel 
 you, a free people, to render the same obedience to Philip which they 
 are content to pay themselves. Their very presence here is an insult; 
 and the whole conduct of Philip proves the light estimation in which 
 he regards you. His envoys have reminded you of the obligations 
 which you are under to him, and demand that they should be re¬ 
 quited. The merit of an obligation depends on the motives of the 
 party who confers it. Philip has shown, that the aid which he lent 
 you was to further his own ambitious schemes and to make you 
 subservient to them. There can be no gratitude, where there is no 
 equality. He imagines that, having once assisted you, he is entitled 
 to treat you as his inferiors. If he regarded you as allies on equal 
 terms, he would have consulted you before his march; he would 
 have asked leave for a passage through your territory before he ap¬ 
 proached the frontier. He has come without your permission, in¬ 
 tending to make Boeotia the marching-road for his army; and he is 
 now fortifying a post on your confines, in order to intimidate you. 
 His conduct agrees with the language of his ministers. They threaten 
 Boeotia with pillage, if you dare to refuse compliance with his will. 
 The occupation of Elatea is the strongest proof, what Philip’s opinion 
 is both of himself and you. It proves that he distrusts you, that he 
 regards you as doubtful friends; and for the best of all reasons, be¬ 
 cause he is conscious that he deserves not your friendship. It is but 
 a short step from a suspicious ally to a declared enemy. At this 
 very moment you are esteemed in no other fight than as enemies, to 
 be crushed on the first favorable opportunity. It is enough that you 
 have deliberated about alliance with Athens; this alone he will never 
 forgive: he expects from every people an unconditional and unhes¬ 
 itating obedience. Bethink you, how he treated the unhappy Olyn- 
 thians. They assisted him against Athens; they helped him to 
 deprive us of our Thracian dominions: yet, notwithstanding this, he 
 attacked them without any provocation, and razed their city to the 
 ground. Philip’s enmity is the more to be dreaded, when it is not 
 open and avowed. Every Grecian city is infested by his spies and 
 
392 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 agents. Among you, as among us, there are miscreants who would 
 sell their country to Philip, that they may rule in it by his influence. 
 These are the men who have hitherto contrived by their artifices to 
 keep you and the Athenians asunder. They know that citi^ns of a 
 free republic are the natural allies of the Theban people, whereas 
 Philip will help his own hirelings to oppress their fellow-countrymen. 
 Philip has the same motive for overthrowing your commonwealth 
 that he has for destroying ours; for we both set an example of free¬ 
 dom to the other Greek states, which is an obstacle in his way to 
 empire. But he declares no war against Thebes. He would be 
 foolish to do so, if he can gain his objects without it. There will be 
 no necessity for war, if, as he seems to expect, you submit to his 
 commands without a murmur. If you are inclined, like us, to dispute 
 Macedonian supremacy, then he considers it better to deal first with 
 us, and with you on a more convenient occasion. It is thus that 
 he proceeds step by step to reduce every Greek city to subjection. 
 Can you be blind to his projects ? Or are you afraid to resist them ? 
 I know not whether he calculates on your credulity or your fears. 
 He came hither under a religious pretense, to chastise the Locrians 
 for sacrilege: he never told the Amphictyons, whom he summoned 
 to join his standard, that he was about to lead them against Attica: 
 not till he is in within two days’ march of our frontier, does he avow 
 his real object. Who can safely trust a man, who thus ever dissem¬ 
 bles his plans, till they are ripe for execution ? Honor and good faith, 
 which prevent other people from committing acts of wanton aggres¬ 
 sion, are no manner of restraint to Philip. Pie pays an ill compliment 
 to your state, by supposing that you will aid and abet him in his 
 treachery. It is plain, he imagines you are no longer the soldiers of 
 Leuctra: he ranks you already among his dependents. Let him see 
 that he is mistaken in his estimate. Prove to the Greeks, that you 
 have the courage to stand up for their independence and your own. 
 No middle course is open to you. These envoys indeed say, that 
 Philip will be content with your giving him a passage through 
 Boeotia. Mark the insidious nature of their argument, and the con¬ 
 tempt which it shows of the Theban people . 1 If the Thebans (they 
 say) are unwilling to share with Philip the dangers of the field, he 
 kindly permits them to stay at home. Why, if the war with Athens 
 were just and beneficial to Thebes, and Philip had for the Theban 
 people that respect which he ought to have, he would not be satisfied 
 without their hearty co-operation. But he knows it is a war which 
 by aggrandizing him must injure you; and therefore he tempts you 
 to your ruin by offering you this base alternative. His orators are 
 instructed to suggest .this timorous counsel, in the hope that you will 
 sacrifice your country to the desire of present ease. If Philip can 
 succeed without your help, flatter not yourselves that you can be 
 neutral with impunity. No! You must either be with us for Greece, 
 or with Philip against her. If corrupt statesmen have already ac- 
 
CH^ERONEA. 
 
 393 
 
 quired such influence over your counsels, that they can persuade you 
 to forget what is due to yourselves, and to disregard the dignity of 
 the commonwealth, hearken to the call of Philip, obey his summons 
 to arms, follow him to the walls of Athens, and be content, like 
 Dolophians and Perrhaebians, to be the subjects of a prince whom 
 Pelopidas brought as a hostage to Thebes. But if you would rather 
 imitate those gallant men who raised your country to greatness and 
 renown, then join with us in resisting an aggressor who comes to 
 despoil us of all that is most dear and valuable. You have now the 
 opportunity, which may never come again, of defending Hellenic 
 liberty against barbarism, of blotting out other painful memories in 
 the glory of one heroic struggle for your father-land. Arouse ye then, 
 men of Thebes! Let the spirit of Epaminondas awaken in the 
 bosom of every man sentiments worthy of his country. The Athe¬ 
 nians will fight by your side. They that helped you when the 
 Spartan had seized your acropolis, will not desert you now. Are 
 there any in this assembly who look on Philip as invincible ? Have 
 we not driven him in confusion from the walls of Perinthus and 
 Byzantium ? Have we not expelled his tyrants from Eretria and 
 Oreus? And shall we not now chase him from your frontiers, from 
 the strongholds which he has chosen for his sallying-places against 
 the Greeks ? What need of many words ? Our troops are already 
 at Eleusis: at your call they will march to Thebes, and enable you 
 to bid defiance to this man who now so insolently threatens you. 
 Nor do we stand alone in the conflict. Achaia, Corinth, Megara, 
 other states are our allies, who will not permit the sacred soil of 
 Greece to be trampled on by a barbarian. But if you, men of Thebes, 
 adopt that course which your true welfare requires, the war will 
 speedily be brought to an issue. For when Philip sees that Athens 
 and Thebes are firmly united, he will lower his arrogance, he will 
 yield as he did at Byzantium, to a combination too powerful for him 
 to conquer. His hopes are founded on our discord. Let that cease; 
 and he will retire in haste to Macedonia. That you, men of Thebes, 
 understand your duties, and that all which I have said is in accord¬ 
 ance with your own honest judgment,*! know full well. There is 
 but one thing which gives me any anxiety: the remembrance of 
 those jealousies wdnch have divided us, and which have brought so 
 many evils upon Athens and upon you and the rest of the Greeks. 
 They indeed would have long since died away, but for the traitors in 
 both cities, who, bribed by the gold of Macedonia, have made it their 
 business to foment and keep them alive. It is these persons that 
 you should view with jealousy and suspicion; aye, that you should 
 execrate and abhor: and when they appear to support by their voice 
 or their presence the foreigner who has hired their services, let them 
 see by unmistakable signs, that you know them, and that you will 
 not suffer yourselves to be deceived and betrayed. The people of 
 Athens have by this resolution, which has been read to you, deliber- 
 
 R 2 
 
394 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 ately recorded the feelings with which they regard the people of 
 Thebes. It is their sincerest wish, that all former animosities be 
 buried in amnesty and oblivion. They will remember only the mu¬ 
 tual kindnesses which have passed between you; and that the The¬ 
 bans are Greeks of the same nation as themselves, for whose dignity 
 and prosperity they will consult as they would for their own. They 
 offer you alliance, friendship, brotherhood. I conjure and implore 
 you, men of Thebes, to receive this solemn act of the Athenian people 
 in the same spirit in which it was decreed. You have heard from 
 my lips the sentiments of my countrymen; and with a few more 
 words I shall have discharged my duty. Be assured, O ye Thebans, 
 that union with Athens brings you security and honor; connection 
 with Macedonia is but another name for servitude. You are about 
 to give your votes on a question of the deepest moment to yourselves 
 and your posterity. May the gods so direct your counsels that you 
 may decide as becomes Greeks and freemen! 
 
 These and other arguments, expanded into the glowing language 
 and delivered with the energy of Demosthenes, carried the day. 
 The Thebans voted alliance with Athens, and invited her troops into 
 the city. A large body of their own civic force was encamped 
 without the walls, while the Athenians were quartered in their 
 houses among their women and children, and received with the 
 kindest hospitality, of which by their strict discipline and good be¬ 
 havior they proved themselves fully worthy. It is touching to see 
 these two people, late such deadly foes, now in the expiring day of 
 Grecian freedom united as friends and brothers, preparing to issue 
 forth to their last common battle-field, and to shed their blood to¬ 
 gether in the same sacred cause . 1 2 
 
 AEschines, in the impotence of his malice, will not allow to his 
 adversary the least share of merit in the success of this negotiation ; 
 urging that it was the force of circumstances, and not the eloquence 
 of Demosthenes, which prevailed upon the Thebans to take the side 
 of Athens. This wretched piece of sophistry, which it is not worth 
 while to refute, has not found much favor either at Athens or else¬ 
 where. Modern readers of history lament only that a speech which 
 achieved so signal a triumph should be lost. 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron. 299, 300. 
 
 2 ASschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 73. He says also here, that the Thebans 
 sent for the Athenians to join them, before Demosthenes proposed one 
 word of a decree for an alliance. Of course the treaty was not finally 
 decreed until the return of DemQsthenes from Thebes. But Aeschines 
 insinuates something more. Demosthenes frequently boasted of his 
 triumph at Thebes, and not without reason. See De Coron. 278, 288, 
 308. His remarks in p. 298 are most just and forcible—that ASschines, 
 while he allowed him no credit as an orator or an adviser, attributed to 
 him all the failures in the war. Compare Dinarchus, Contr. Demosth. 
 
CELERONEA. 
 
 395 
 
 At the time when all the Athenians were rejoicing in the con¬ 
 summation of the Theban alliance, iEschines never muttered a word 
 of complaint against it; but long afterwards he found cause of re¬ 
 proach against his rival in the terms of the treaty, which he con¬ 
 tended were too favorable to Thebes. It was agreed, he says, that 
 the Athenians should assist the Thebans in maintaining their sov¬ 
 ereignty over Boeotia; that two thirds of the expenses of the war 
 were to be defrayed by Athens; that the command at sea was to 
 be shared between the two countries, though Athens was to pay 
 the whole expense; and the supreme command by land was given 
 virtually to Thebes: there could be no necessity for making such con¬ 
 cessions, because the Thebans were in much greater peril than the 
 Athenians, and were only too glad to obtain their succor. To all 
 this, however, Demosthenes himself furnishes a complete answer; 
 that it was neither prudent nor possible, to stand bargaining about 
 conditions, when Philip was ready to outbid them, and when there 
 was not a moment to be lost. We may add, that a liberal and gen¬ 
 erous policy was not only the best means for securing the immedi¬ 
 ate object, but the wisest thing also for the future, that there might 
 be an end to the jealousies which had so long kept Thebes and Ath¬ 
 ens at variance. 1 
 
 The Thebans having thus decided in favor of alliance with Ath¬ 
 ens, both sides prepared for war. Of the events of the war a very 
 imperfect description is given us in the few ancient works that re¬ 
 main. Of English historians, Grrote is the only one who has taken 
 a correct view of the campaign. Others, misled by the brevity of 
 Diodorus, and also by the records cited in the oration on the Crown, 
 have conceived that the whole war occupied but two months, from 
 Scirophorion to Metagitnion (June to August), 338 b.c It has been 
 already noticed, how inaccurate Diodorus is in the connection and 
 general outline of history. Not only does he omit many important 
 events, but he observes no proportion of length and brevity in his 
 narrative, sometimes wearying us with prolixity of description, at 
 other times cutting short matters about which we are curious to ob¬ 
 tain further information. And as to the records in the published 
 
 91. Plutarch, in Yit. Demostb. 18, cites the words of Theopompus: 
 Td fitu ovv avpitylpov ov tiilipvyE rove ruv Q7]/3aiuv Tioyiofiovg, a AY Iv opi- 
 fiaoLV EKaoToc elxe rd tov i toXe/uov detvd,, eti tuv ^ukikQv rpav/xuruv vea- 
 puv TrapapLEvovTov' r] 61 tov f)rjropog dvvafug, tig $7]at Osonopmog, lupin i- 
 fyv/ja tov dvpitiv avTjjv, nal dianaiovaa ri)v <j>i\oTipiiav, etzeck.6tt]oe Tolg 
 dAJotf unaac uxjte (j>of3ov Kal Tioyiopibv teal X“P lv Ih^ciXeIv avTovg, kvdov- 
 oiuvTag vnd tov 2.oyov npbg to kclXov. 
 
 1 Aeschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 73, 74. Demosthenes, De Coron. 306, 307. 
 A crown of gold was conferred by the people of Athens on Demosthe¬ 
 nes: De Coron. 302. 
 
 2 Mitford, in his History of Greece, vol. iv. ch. xlii. s. 4, says with 
 justice:—“ The narrative of Diodorus seems to imply that, before the 
 
396 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 editions of the oration on the Crown, we have seen that the dates 
 are incorrect; and if this be so, it is impossible to draw from them 
 any conclusions which are opposed to other and better evidence. 
 From the comparison of various passages in Demosthenes, iEs- 
 chines, Dinarchus, Pausanias, Plutarch, and Polyaenus, it appears 
 beyond all question, that a protracted war was carried on in Phocis, 
 Amphissian Locris, and Boeotia; during which there was much 
 maneuvering on both sides, and three or four battles were fought 
 before that of Chaeronea with various success, one of them occurring 
 in the winter season; 1 that Amphissa was taken by Philip; that 
 embassies were sent to Peloponnesus and other parts of Greece 
 both by Philip and his adversaries, and the latter succeeded in ob¬ 
 taining auxiliaries; that negotiations for peace were opened by 
 Philip; and that the Athenians and their allies exerted themselves 
 to reassemble the scattered population of Phocis, and to fortify 
 some of their more important towns. All this argues not only ex¬ 
 tended military operations, but diplomatic proceedings, councils of 
 war, plans, preparations, and arrangements, requiring a much longer 
 period of time than what Clinton and those who follow him allow 
 to the campaign of the Chaeronea. That Philip began his march 
 from Macedonia soon after the autumnal congress of b.c. 339, at 
 which he was appointed to be Amphictyonic general, and that the 
 war lasted for ten or eleven months from that time to the August 
 of the following year is the opinion of Grote, formed upon a juster 
 view of the historical data which are left us. 2 
 
 Philip, disappointed of that success at Thebes which he had rea¬ 
 son to expect, redoubled his efforts to procure assistance from the 
 Peloponnesians. They had already been requested to send contin¬ 
 gents in aid of the religious war against Amphissa; but none of 
 them had complied with the summons. His letters were now more 
 
 competition of oratory between Python and Demosthenes at Thebes, the 
 army of the Athenian confederacy had taken that station near Chaeronea 
 which it occupied to the time of the decisive battle. But Diodorus, 
 abridging greatly, and perhaps often writing from memory, notf unfre- 
 quently manages narratives so that it is difficult to guess whether he 
 intends that the reader should take what precedes or what follows as 
 prior in time; and he still* oftener omits, as here, to notice intervening 
 transactions necessary to connect parts of his story.” It is fair to state, 
 that Mitford has not fallen into the error of omitting the winter and 
 autumnal campaign: (ibid. ss. 4, 5.) 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron. 300: Taf tt purag ftdxag, rrjv r’ knl tov 
 nora/xov nai rr/v x £L pepivrjv. Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, 271), in order to 
 make this square with his chronology, says: “ The word x ei f JLE P lv V v i 3 
 probably corrupt; perhaps capable of another interpretation.” It has 
 accordingly been interpreted to mean “ the battle of the storm.” Schae- 
 fer, in the Apparatus Criticus, remarks that this should be x^ipkpLov. 
 
 3 Grote, History of Greece, xi. p. 683. 
 
CHAERONEA. 
 
 397 
 
 pressing, vet not more successful than before. None of the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians could be deceived by the religious plea which Philip set 
 up; for they speedily heard the truth from the envoys on the other 
 side; and the members of the old Theban confederacy would natu¬ 
 rally be reluctant to make war upon their former ally, with whom 
 they had had no quarrel. 1 In the meantime Philip remained at Ela- 
 tea, which he had chosen for the base of his operations; and we may 
 presume that he employed himself in strengthening his position, 
 while he awaited the arrival of reinforcements. 
 
 Nor was Demosthenes idle. After arranging the terms of alliance 
 at Thebes, he returned to Athens, and immediately passed a decree 
 to ratify the treaty. He dispatched embassies to the Peloponnesian 
 and other cities, to solicit succor: he went in person to some of 
 them, and obtained considerable success. Aid was promised by the 
 Ach'asans, Corinthians, Megarians, Eubceans, Leucadians, and Cor- 
 cyrseans. Contributions in money were furnished by some states, 
 and a large body of mercenaries was levied. 2 An unwonted vigor 
 was infused into the Athenian administration. The spirit of the 
 people rose to meet the peril which hung over them. Under the 
 advice of Demosthenes, they suspended some works that were 
 going on for the improvement of the docks and arsenal; and they 
 gave a still stronger proof of their warlike zeal, by repealing the 
 law of Eubulus, and allowing the theoric fund to be used for the 
 purposes of war. Thus was accomplished, under the pressure of 
 stern necessity, a measure which Demosthenes had long in vain 
 recommended. He was now (in all but military talents) the Peri¬ 
 cles of the day: an energetic and powerful war-minister, counseling, 
 directing, animating all. 3 
 
 Having completed all those measures of preparation which re¬ 
 quired his presence at Athens or elsewhere, Demosthenes hastened 
 back to Thebes, to assist at the councils of war. Such was the zeal 
 and ability which he had displayed, that even the Theban com¬ 
 manders paid the highest deference to his judgment. Doubtless he 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron. 279, 301, 302. The letters which Demos¬ 
 thenes refers to in the last passage would appear, from the context, to 
 have been written after the first successes of the allies against Philip. 
 But it is impossible to rely upon such an argument. Philip’s letters 
 would never have disclosed that he had been defeated. The date was 
 sufficiently vague for Demosthenes to refer them to the period which 
 suited his purpose. That none of the Peloponnesians joined Philip, ap¬ 
 pears from Pausanias. See ante, p. 374. 
 
 2 Demosthenes, De Coron. 306. AEsehines, Contr. Ctesiph. 74, allows 
 that ten thousand mercenaries were raised. Compare Plutarch, Vit. 
 Demesth. 17. Vit. Decern. Orat. p. 851. Justin, ix. 3. “ Legationibus 
 Graeciam fatigant.” 
 
 8 Philochorus, apud Dionysium ad Amm. xi. p. 742. Demosthenes, 
 De Coron. 301, 302. 
 
398 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 was incompetent to give advice on the details of military tactics ; 
 yet in concerting the plan of a campaign, many questions might 
 arise which required the help of a statesman and diplomatist. So 
 entirely was Demosthenes identified with the cause, that he would 
 spare himself no personal labor where he could be useful, and would 
 leave nothing to be done by others which he thought he could do 
 better himself. Aeschines, who charges him with mischievous inter¬ 
 ference, admits that his influence was great both in the assembly 
 and in the camp. 1 
 
 One of the first measures determined on by the allies was, to re¬ 
 establish the Phocian people, and to put their country in a state of 
 security against Philip.' It has been related how at the end of the 
 Sacred War the Phocian cities were destroyed, their population dis¬ 
 persed into villages, and large numbers of men driven into exile. 
 The country was at this time in a perfectly defenseless condition, 
 having neither a force of its own to resist invasion, nor shelter for 
 a protecting army. The Thebans, who had been so instrumental in 
 the depression of their neighbors, now repented of the mischief 
 which they had done, and exerted themselves to repair it. This 
 (says Grote) 2 evinced on their part the adoption of an improved and 
 generous policy, worthy of the Panhellenic cause in which they had 
 embarked. They marched with the Athenians into Phocis, restored 
 the ruined cities wherever it was practicable, and brought back the 
 scattered inhabitants : in some cases uniting together several com¬ 
 munities, which would have been too weak to defend themselves 
 singly. The work of restoration was complete and permanent. 
 Ambrysus, a city in the south-western part of Phocis, commanding 
 one of the passes into Boeotia, was fortified with a double wall of 
 extraordinary strength, the building of which must have cost much 
 time and labor, 3 During all this time, it is clear, the Athenians 
 and Thebans must have held the command of the Phocian territory. 
 That Philip, however, did not leave them wholly undisturbed, we 
 may infer from the mention of two engagements—one called the 
 battle by the river, another the winter battle; in which, according 
 
 1 iEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 74, 75. Demosthenes justly says of him¬ 
 self (De Coron. 288), E(5a>/c’ e/uavruv vfj.lv anhtig Eig Tovg izepLEGTrjKorag 
 ry nokzi Kivdvvovg. Plutarch, Yit. Demosth. 18, says : 'Ynyperelv c5£ fir) 
 povov Tovg orpaTTjyovg rtj A ypooOsvEi noiovvrag to npooTaTTopsvov, aXXtt 
 Kal rovg Boiurupxag‘ droiKEloOai rag iKnhycrtag unuoag ovdlv tjttov v tt* 
 hKELVOV tote Tag Qr/fSaluv f) Tag ’A Oyvaiuv, dyaTtopzvov nap’ ufapOTspoig 
 Kal dvvaTEvovTog , ovk udtKug avdi Trap ’ d^iav, tiaTCEp anomaly ETai Oeoko/j- 
 ■jrog, tlA/ld Kal 7ravv 7rpoc7/K6vTug. 
 
 2 History of Greece, xi. 682. Notwithstanding this, the Phocian sol¬ 
 diers in Alexander’s army exhibited a most revengeful spirit against the 
 Thebans. See Arrian, Anab. i. 8. Plutarch, Yit Alexand. 12. 
 
 8 Pausanias, x. chaps. 3, S3, 36 ; iv. 81. 
 
CHJERONEA. 
 
 399 
 
 to Demosthenes, the allies had so much the advantage, as to afford 
 occasion-for public rejoicings and thanksgiving at Athens. 1 
 
 It was, perhaps, in the spring of b.c. 338 that Philip, either hav¬ 
 ing serious misgivings about the issue of the contest, or, which is 
 more probable, with the intention of misleading his adversaries or 
 distracting their counsels, sent proposals of peace to Thebes. The 
 Boeotarchs were inclined to consider them favorably, but were 
 opposed by Demosthenes, whose counsel prevailed with the The¬ 
 bans, and caused them to reject Philip’s overtures. So far we may 
 safely credit the statement of iEschines, who, however, goes on to 
 charge his rival with the most unseemly conduct; viz. that he 
 jumped up in the Theban assembly before the question had even 
 been introduced, and swore that, if any one advised the making of 
 peace with Philip, he would seize him by the hair and carry him to 
 prison: and that, when the Theban magistrates had ordered the 
 return of some Athenian troops for the express purpose of deliber¬ 
 ating on the question of peace, Demosthenes became quite out of 
 his mind, denounced the Boeotarchs as traitors to the cause of 
 Greece, and said he would advise his countrymen to send an em¬ 
 bassy to Thebes and ask for a passage through Boeotia to attack 
 Philip: and that, by such menace, he forced the Thebans to con¬ 
 tinue the war. All these additions we may set down to the malice 
 of the accuser. Whether Demosthenes acted imprudently in dis¬ 
 suading all pacific negotiations, we are unable to judge, for want of 
 knowing the circumstances. If there was a chance of obtaining a 
 real peace, it might have been advisable to treat with Philip. But 
 if he was trying to negotiate separately with Thebes, with a view to 
 create disunion or dissension between the allies, or if he was maneu¬ 
 vering to gain time or any other advantage, and if there was any 
 danger that the allies would fall into the snare, we can only say, 
 that Demosthenes, by defeating Philip’s crafty design, acquired an 
 additional claim to the gratitude of his country. 2 
 
 1 Demosthenes, De Coron. 300. There is no occasion to suppose with 
 Reiske, that the battle by the river has any reference to the district of 
 Parapotamii. Yet it is likely enough, that it took place near the Ce- 
 phisus. 
 
 2 JSschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 74, 75. There is a difficulty about the 
 words —rovg aTparturag rovg vperepovg ndliv dvecrpeipav k^£Arj?ivd6rag, 
 iva /3ov?.evcr]ade nepl rr/g upr/vrjg. Thirlwall interprets them thus ,—“ A 
 body of troops, which had been sent perhaps to counteract the effects of 
 Philip’s proposals, was turned back by the Theban magistrates.” (His¬ 
 tory of Greece, vi..67.) I think him right in supposing, that it was only 
 a division of the Athenian troops that were sent back : as to the pur¬ 
 pose for which they were sent from Athens, his suggestion is very 
 doubtful. Grote explains the passage differently—“ They proposed, 
 even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the Athenian sol¬ 
 diers into Attica, in order that deliberations might be taken concerning 
 
400 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 The first advantage obtained by Philip over the allies was in forc¬ 
 ing his way to Amphissa. It was important for him to accomplish 
 the general object for which the Amphictyons had invited him into 
 G-reece. It would have discredited him with many of his followers, 
 if he made it appear that he had come on a false pretense, or if he 
 allowed himself to be baffled in his original purpose ; whereas, if he 
 succeeded in it, they would be encouraged to assist him in his own 
 private enterprises. The road from Delphi to Amphissa, probably 
 that which Philip took, traversed the declivities of Parnassus. The 
 defense of it was intrusted to Chares and the Theban Proxenus, 
 who commanded a large body of mercenaries furnished by the 
 Athenians. They occupied the entrance of a defile, which they 
 could have defended against very superior numbers. Philip, in order 
 to draw them from their strong position, forged a letter from him¬ 
 self to Antipater, stating that he had postponed his expedition to 
 Amphissa, and was about to march instantly for Thrace, where he 
 heard the people were rising. He contrived that this letter should 
 fall into the hands of the enemy. Chares and Proxenus, deceived 
 by its contents, neglected their guard of the passupon which 
 Philip, marching through without opposition, surprised and routed 
 their army, and afterwards made himself master of Amphissa . 1 
 iEschines bitterly reproaches Demosthenes for having lent the mer¬ 
 cenaries to the Amphissians, and for having thus divided the forces 
 of the allies, and enabled Philip to attach and defeat them separately. 
 For this there may be better ground than for most of his charges. 
 The defeat of the mercenaries was a severe loss and discouragement 
 to the allies, and perhaps it might have been avoided by keeping the 
 whole army together. While the generals are chargeable with the 
 immediate miscarriage, it is very possible that the plan of operations 
 was badly designed . 2 
 
 Philip, having inflicted due punishment on the vanquished people 
 
 the peace.” (History of Greece, xi. 689.) The word dvEorpE-ipav how¬ 
 ever points to an act done rather than one proposed to be done : while 
 the context indicates that the main body of the Athenian troops was not 
 separated from the Boeotian. A reinforcement may have been on its 
 way from Athens, which the Boeotarchs ordered to return, with a re¬ 
 quest that the Athenians would deliberate on the question of peace. 
 That they did deliberate appears from Plutarch, (Vit. Phocion, 16,) 
 which Grote with much probability refers to this period. 
 
 1 Polysenus, Strateg. iv. c. 2, s. 8, confirmed by Dinarchus, Contr. 
 Demosth. 99. ’Etu di: toIq Zivotg rolg slg " A/upLccav cvXktyElGL npotjevog 
 6 7 TpodoT?)g eyevETo, and the passage of ^Eschines cited below. 
 
 3 Aeschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 74, He accuses Demosthenes of taking 
 the public money to pay mercenary troops who did not exist; also, of 
 making a profit of those who were lent to the Amphissians. He says 
 that he himself protested against this last measure, but does not state 
 upon what grounds. 
 
CH^EROWEA. 
 
 401 
 
 of Amphissa/and having thus performed his promise to the Amphic- 
 tyons, and given them increased confidence in his fortune and abil¬ 
 ity, resolved vigorously to push the war against the Athenians and 
 Thebans. The intermediate steps are unknown to us. It appears, 
 however, that shortly after the midsummer of 338 b.c., by which 
 time he had received strong reinforcements from Macedonia, he was 
 in a condition to strike a decisive blow. The allies, after the loss 
 which they had sustained, retreated from Phocis, and took up a 
 defensive position in Boeotia; whither Philip speedily followed them, 
 taking (as it seems) the easiest road ^hich led by the vale of the 
 Cephisus from Panopeus to Chaeronea. 2 Binding that they were 
 posted on a hill commanding one of the passes, he began to ravage 
 and plunder the adjacent country; upon which the allies quitted 
 their vantage-ground, and descended into the plain to offer him 
 battle. 3 They met not far from Chseronea; Philip encamping on 
 the banks of the Cephisus, the Greeks near the temple of Hercules, 
 on a stream called Haemon. Plutarch says, he remembered an oak 
 near the Cephisus, which the people of the country called Alexan¬ 
 der’s oak, because his tent was pitched under it. 4 Philip’s army 
 numbered above thirty thousand foot, and two thousand horse, con¬ 
 sisting of Macedonians and troops from Thessaly and the north. The 
 allied army, composed of Athenians, Thebans, Achaeans, Corinth¬ 
 ians and Phocians, were, according to Diodorus, inferior in number; 
 according to Justin, greatly superior. The chief difference lay in 
 the quality of the troops and their commanders.” 5 ^ 
 
 ' Grote thinks it may be gathered from Diodorus, xviii. 56, that the 
 sacred domain was restored, and those Amphissians who had taken a 
 leading part against Delphi were banished. (History of Greece, xi. 687.) 
 
 2 Pausanias, x. 4; x, 35. Strabo, ix. 407. 
 
 3 Polyaenus, Strateg. iv. 2. 14. 
 
 4 Plutarch, Vit. Alexand. 7. Vit. Demosth. 19. He cites an ancient 
 oracle, which thus predicted of the battle :— 
 
 T rjc ini Oepfiudovn puxvc dndvEvde 'yevoi/j.Tjv 
 
 A ierog iv vetyieocu nal ?/ept drjTjcaoOcu. 
 
 K/t atet d vLKrjdelg, 6 tie VLurjcag uttoXuTie. 
 
 Of which one explanation was, that the river Haemon, which flows into 
 the Cephisus, was anciently called Thermodon, but after the battle got 
 a new name from the carnage which polluted its waters. A different 
 explanation however was given, -as he tells us, by Duris. 
 
 6 Diodorus, xvi. 85. Justin, ix. 3. Pausanias, vii. 6, 5; x. 3, 4. Strabo, 
 ix, 414. The account of Diodorus, as to the number of the Greek army, 
 seems nearer the truth than that of Justin. The Theban and Athenian 
 civic force would hardly exceed 22,000 foot. The Aehseans, (judging 
 from the succor which they lent in the Sacred War,) we may set down 
 at 2,000: the Corinthmns and Phocians at about the same. The mer- 
 «enaries who returned to their standards, and possibly some contingents 
 
402 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 The Macedonians had never yet fairly tried their strength against 
 the best troops of southern Greece. Philip had frequently encoun¬ 
 tered small bodies of the Athenians in Thrace and Macedonia, and 
 had generally, but not always, overcome them. He had defeated 
 the standing army of Onomarchus; superior on the whole to any 
 which a single Greek state could have brought into the. field, yet 
 consisting chiefly of mercenaries, not animated (it might be thought) 
 with the spirit of citizen-soldiers fighting for their country. He had 
 never engaged in a fair pitched battle with the heavy-armed infantry 
 of Athens, Thebes, or Sparta, the leading republics of Greece. The 
 present confederacy was the most formidable which had yet been 
 arrayed against him; nor could he have been entirely free from mis¬ 
 givings as to the result. We can not doubt, therefore, that, in order 
 to decide so important a contest, Philip took every precaution which 
 became a prudent commander; and that he had collected around 
 him not only a force powerful in point of numbers, but the flower 
 of the Macedonian army, and especially the celebrated phalanx, 
 which he had brought to perfection by his own training and disci¬ 
 pline . 1 Of this it may here be proper to give a brief description. 
 
 The Macedonian phalanx, as organized by Philip, was an improve¬ 
 ment on the order of battle already in use among the Greeks . 2 The 
 long fine of heavy-armed infantry, standing with spear and shield 
 in close array, was called a phalanx . 3 In this way most of the 
 Greek republican armies were drawn up for battle, the depth of the 
 line varying ^cording to circumstances. At Mantinea, in the Pe¬ 
 loponnesian war, the Lacedaemonians were drawn up in a fine of 
 four hundred and forty-eight men, eight deep . 4 At Leuctra the 
 Lacedaemonians stood twelve deep, the Thebans fifty deep . 5 The 
 soldiers held their spears couched in two hands, the left arm being 
 passed through the ring of the shield, which was also suspended by 
 a thong from the neck, and covered the whole body down to the 
 
 from other states, may be reckoned at 4,000 or 5,000. In number of 
 cavalry Philip was most probably superior. 
 
 1 Mitford in his History of Greece, vol. iv. c. 42, s. 4, contends that 
 Philip’s was a miscellaneous Amphictyonic army, with a small propor¬ 
 tion of Macedonians, and probably without the phalanx. In support of 
 his opinion he cites Demosthenes, Philipp, iii. 123. which however is 
 not in point. 
 
 3 Diodorus, xvi. 3. ’Ettevotjge <5e Kal r?)v rjjg (j>d?.ayyoc tcvkvotijto, kcu 
 KaTaonevrjv, /ULfiTjad/iEvog tov iv T poca rdiv r/puuv GwacmG/iov, Kal 
 TrptiTog GvvEGTTjoaTo TTjv M aKsdoviKT/v (f>d?iayya. He refers, as Polybius 
 does, to the descriptions of the close ranks (nvKtval (pdXayysg) in Homer. 
 See Iliad, xiii. 131; xvi. 214. 
 
 8 Hence km QdXayyoc; uyEiv , opposed to /card Kipac, See Schneider 
 ad Xenoph. Anab. vi. c. 5, s. 25. Zvyuv is a Jile. 
 
 4 Thucydides, v. 63. 
 
 6 Xenophon, Hellen. vi. c. 4, s. 12. 
 
CELERONEA. 
 
 403 
 
 knee . 1 In this order they made their charge, generally at a running 
 pace, endeavoring to bear down the enemy by the force and pressure 
 of their spears. Troops unprovided with good defensive armor were 
 unable to withstand the shock of the heavy-armed Greeks. Thus 
 the Athenians at Marathon, and the Spartans at Plataea proved 
 themselves superior to the numerous hosts of Darius and Xerxes: 
 after which the Persian infantry never dared to face the Greek in a 
 fair field of battle. 
 
 Philip, having in his younger days seen and admired the well- 
 trained battalions of Thebes, determined to introduce a similar dis¬ 
 cipline into the Macedonian army. He formed his phalanx upon 
 the general model of the Greek, making some alterations which he 
 thought would increase its efficiency. He adopted the shield and 
 other defensive armor of the Greek infantry, but lengthened the 
 spear and the sword, as Iphicrates had done for his Peltastas. The; 
 Macedonian spear, called sarissa, was at first sixteen cubits or 
 twenty-four feet long, though afterwards reduced to twenty-one 
 feet . 2 The tactical arrangements, which Arrian and other writers 
 describe as in use under Alexander or his successors, were substan¬ 
 tially the same as those adopted by Philip. The whole phalanx, 
 containing from sixteen to eighteen thousand men, was divided into 
 battalions, each of which was drawn up sixteen deep . 3 The file was 
 halved or doubled, if occasion required; but sixteen was the ordi¬ 
 nary depth. When the phalanx advanced to the attack, there was 
 a distance of three feet between the soldiers both in, rank and file; 
 the first five ranks couched their sarissas , 4 so that those of the first 
 rank projected fifteen feet in front, those of the second rank twelve 
 feet, those of the third nine, those of the fourth six, and those of 
 the fifth three. Thus the soldiers in the first rank were guarded by 
 five spears projecting on each side. The sixth and hinder ranks held 
 their speara uplifted, resting on the shoulders of those before, and 
 protecting them in some measure from the arrows and missiles that 
 flew over their heads. The pressure from behind added to the force 
 
 1 The arms of the are comprehensively described by iEschy- 
 
 lus in the Persae, v. 243:— 
 
 "Eyxv CTadala Kal (pepdomdsg aayac. 
 
 The spear for standing fight, and covering shield. 
 
 He carried also, but seldom used, a short sword; and wore a helmet, 
 cuirass, and greaves. 
 
 2 Polybius, xviii. 12. Karel plv ryv kt; dpxvc vnodeaev tnKaidena 
 mjXtiv, Karu dl tt/v up/uoyi/v rf/v irpoc ttjv uhqdetav deicaTeoodpuv. 
 
 3 In later times it was divided into ten battalions, each containing 
 sixteen hundred men, a hundred in rank, and sixteen in file. (Livy, 
 xxxvii. 40.) If all the battalions were in line, the whole phalanx would 
 occupy about three-fifths of a mile. 
 
 4 Supposing the spear to be of twenty-one feet. 
 
404 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 of the whole battalion, by rendering it impossible for the front ranks 
 to retreat . 1 
 
 Such was the phalanx, whose very aspect, two centuries after its 
 first formation, struck Paulus AEmilius with dismay . 2 Encountered 
 front to front, and upon ground favorable to its operations, it was, 
 as Polybius affirms, irresistible . 3 Its defects were, that it was un¬ 
 wieldy and slow in its movements, and not adapted to varieties of 
 place and occasion. The perfect order and regularity, which were 
 required for its efficient action, could not well be maintained except 
 upon level ground, free from impediments, such as trees, bushes, 
 ditches, streams, and the like. A plain perfectly suitable for the 
 movements of so large a body could not always be found. Again, 
 it could not act with advantage, if vigorously assailed in the flank 
 and rear. The wheeling round to meet a flank attack was a difficult 
 and dangerous evolution in the presence of an active enemy : 4 and 
 if the phalanx were threatened on both sides, and the rear had to 
 face about, every step which it made in advance had a tendency to 
 open the files and break the continuity of the mass. Once thrown 
 into disorder, the complex machine became utterly useless, and the 
 individual soldier with his long weapon was ill fitted for a hand-to- 
 hand combat. All these defects fully appeared in the wars with the 
 Romans: especially at Pydna, where the legionaries, attacking the 
 Macedonians on all sides at once, disordered their ranks, and break¬ 
 ing in at the openings, slaughtered them almost without resistance . 5 
 
 ‘ Polybius, xviii. 12, 13. 
 
 2 Polybius, Pragmentum, xxix. 6. Livy, xl. 40, suppl. 3. “ Progre- 
 
 diebatur interim AEmilius: utque aspexit quum reliquos Macedonas, 
 turn eos qui in phalangem contributi erant, partim clypeis, partim cetris 
 ex liumero detractis, inelinatisque uno signo sarissis, excipientes Roma- 
 norum impetum, admiratus et illam densatorum agminum->firmitatem, 
 et vallum protentis sarissis horrens, stupore simul et terro're perculsus 
 est, tanquam non aliud unquam tarn terribile spectaculum conspicacus: 
 ac postea id stepius commemorare et prse se ferre solitus est.” 
 
 3 Polybius, xviii. 13—15. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
 phalanx, as compared with the Roman legion, are here fully set forth. 
 A good description is given in Rollin’s Ancient History, lib. xiv. s.l. 
 
 4 Polybius, xviii. 9. T r/g dt- ruv Qalayyiruv xP Eta S udwaTov nadea- 
 Turnis ek fZETafio/ l;/f Kal /car’ uvdpa tavtiweveiv. These manoeuvres were 
 perhaps better executed in Philip’s and Alexander’s time than in the 
 later periods to which Polybius has reference. See Arrian’s description 
 of Alexander’s arrangements before the battle of Arbela: (Anab. iii. 12.) 
 from which indeed it appears that the light troops were called in aid, to 
 protect the phalanx from attacks on the flank and rear. 
 
 6 When the Italians attempted to close with the front ranks, and 
 break their pikes, they fared no better than the Persians did at Platzea. 
 (Livy, xliv. 40, suppl. 3.) “Illi prselongas Macedonum hastas aut ferro 
 incidere, aut uinbone impellere, aut nudis etiam interdum manibus aver- 
 
CEUERONEA. 
 
 405 
 
 The Greeks however, who fought the Macedonians in their own 
 way, ranks meeting and spears crossing in the accustomed fashion, 
 allowed them the full advantage of their improved organization and 
 discipline. 
 
 While the phalanx constituted the main strength of Philip’s army, 
 it was supported by other troops, which had often followed him to 
 victory. There were the foot guards , 1 who had been long talked of 
 in Greece; from whom afterwards were taken the Hypaspists of 
 Alexander, a body of men who wore the long shield of the phalanx, 
 but carried shorter spears and lighter armor. Of these there were 
 about six thousand. A select body of them, distinguished for their 
 superior bravery, were called Argyraspids, from the bright silver 
 plates on their shields . 2 Light troops of various kinds, slingers, 
 archers, and javelin-men, were furnished by the Thracians, Paeonians, 
 Illyrians, Agrianians , 3 and other warlike tribes of the north, who 
 
 tere. Hi ambabus firiniter comprehensas tant& vi adigere in temere ac 
 furore caeco ruentes, ut transfossis scutis loricisque transfixos etiam ho¬ 
 mines super capita projicerent.” ^Emilius however soon discovered the 
 true way of proceeding: (Ibid, suppl. 4.) “ Animadvertit peritus dux 
 non stare ubique confertam illam hostium velut compagem, eamque de- 
 hiscere ftientidem quibusdam intervallis, sive ob inaequalitatem soli, sive 
 ob ipsam porrectae in immensum frontis longitudinem, dum qui superiora 
 occupare conantur ab inferiora tenentibus, vel tardiores a citatioribus, 
 et progredientes a subsistentibus, instantes denique hosti ab impulsis, 
 inviti licet, necessario divelluntur. Ergo ut omnino rumperet ordinem 
 hostium, et inexpugnabilem illam universae phalangis vim in multa mi- 
 nutatim prcelia carperet, imperat suis, ut intenti quacunque rimas agere 
 hostilem aciem viderint, illuc quisque impetu inferantur, seque cuneatim 
 in hiantia v$f tantillum spatia insinuantes strenue rem agant.” The 
 result is described with equal clearness: (Ibid. 41.) “Neque ulla evi- 
 dentior causa victoriae fuit, quam quod multa passim prcelia erant, quae 
 fluctuantem turbarunt primo, deinde disjecerunt phalangem; cujus con- 
 fertae et intentis horrentis hastis intolerabiles vires sunt; si carptim 
 aggrediendo circumagere immobilem longitudine et gravitate hastam 
 cogas, confusa strue implicantur; si vero ab latere aut ab tergo aliquid 
 tumultus increpuit, ruinae modo turbantur. Sicut turn adversus cater- 
 vatim incurrentes Romanos et interrupts multifariam acie obviam ire 
 cogebantur; et Romani, quacunque data intervalla essent, insinuabant 
 ordines suos. Qui, si universa acie in frontem adversus instructam 
 phalangem concurrissent, quod Pelignis principio pugnae incaut6 con- 
 gressis adversus cetratos evenit, induissent se hastis, nec confertam 
 aciem sustinuissent. 
 
 1 Ue&rcupoi. Demosthenes, Olynth. ii. 23. 01 viraamoTal tuv frai- 
 
 puv. Arrian, Anab. i. 14. 
 
 2 Diodorus, xvii. 57. To tuv ’ApyvpacTrlSuv ireCfiv rdyua, diatpipov rrj 
 T£ tuv ottXuv ’hap.TtpoTT\T i Koi Trj tuv avdpuv upeTy. Justin, xii. 7. 
 
 3 These four people are described by Alexander as Tovc evpuGTord- 
 rovf re tu>v Kara Tr/v E vpdkrjv koI paxtp^drovq. Arrian, Anab. ii. 7. 
 
406 
 
 APPENDIX IX 
 
 a-j 
 
 were now annexed to the Macedonian empire. The Pseonians and 
 Thracians supplied squadrons of light horse: the heavy cavalry 
 came from Macedonia and Thessaly . 1 It is not unlikely that there 
 were JEtolians in Philip’s army; as that people, afterwards the 
 deadly enemies of Macedonia, were now ranked among his allies . 2 
 
 The choicest of the troops opposed to him were the heavy-armed 
 of Thebes and Athens. Twenty years before, the Thebans were 
 considered the best soldiers of Greece. The military exercises, to 
 which they partly owed their pre-eminence, were probably not dis¬ 
 continued ; yet, that their discipline and energy had greatly declined 
 since the battle of Mantinea, is shown by the events of the Sacred 
 War. Among the Athenian ranks there were plenty of brave men; 
 the whole body of them were animated with a good spirit: but they 
 were deficient in that training, which teaches soldiers to act in com¬ 
 bination, and converts a multitude into an arirfy. It had been the 
 boast of Pericles, that his countrymen fought well enough by their 
 native valor, and did not need to prepare themselves by laborious 
 drilling . 3 But Delium and many other battles proved how unsafe it 
 was to rely upon such a principle. In the time of Pericles, indeed, 
 the constant service for which Athenian citizens were called out 
 was of itself a species of training. At this time they were little 
 used to serving in person; many of them had never seen the face 
 of an enemy in the field, and knew little of the art and practice of 
 war beyond the use of their arms, which they learned in early years. 
 How could such men, a mere national militia, be a match for the 
 veterans of Philip, who had not only been the victors in numerous 
 battles, but even in time of peace were exercised in toilsome 
 marches, to keep them in perpetual activity ? 4 ’ 
 
 But if the soldiers of the allied army were not equal to those of 
 Philip, still less were their cqjnmanders to be compared with him. 
 Well might they have exclaimed —“ Oh for one hour of Epaminon- 
 das!” He would have contrived some means, by charging on the 
 flanks of the phalanx or otherwise, to counteract the skillful tactics 
 of his adversary and turn the fortune of the day. But there was 
 no man at all equal to the emergency. Phocion had been absent in 
 the Aegean when hostilities began: on his return to Athens he de¬ 
 clared himself favorable to peace; perhaps he expressed himself too 
 
 1 Alexander led from Europe an equal number of Macedonian and 
 Thessalian horse, fifteen hundred of each. (Diodorus, xvii. 17.) Philip’s 
 army at Cha3ronea could not have differed much from that which fol¬ 
 lowed his son into Asia a few years after. See the descriptions in 
 Arrian, Anab. i. 14; ii. 9; iii. 11, 12. Thirlwall, History of Greece, vi. 
 147—149. 
 
 2 See ante, pp. 373, 389. 
 
 3 Thucydides, ii. 39. 
 
 4 Polyamus, Strateg. iv. 2, s. 10. 
 
CILERONEA. 
 
 407 
 
 strongly against the war, and this prevented his obtaining an ap¬ 
 pointment, for which, of all his countrymen, he was the best fitted . 1 
 The Athenians were now commanded by Lysicles, Chares, and Stra- 
 tocles; the Thebans by Theagenes; none of them fit to be at the 
 head of an army. Demosthenes was with them, sanguine himself 
 as to the result, and advising them to seek the enemy in spite of 
 discouraging omens and unpropitious sacrifices : 2 but he could ren¬ 
 der no service irr the hour of battle. 
 
 For a description of the battle itself we have but scanty materials. 
 The best history of it is to be found in the comparison of the two 
 armies. A few special incidents only are recorded. Athenians and 
 Thebans rushed upon the bristling forest of sarissas, and fought with 
 a valor worthy of ancient times and of a better fate. It is said that 
 Philip, knowing the Athenians to be impetuous in onset but incapa¬ 
 ble of endurance, ordered his soldiers to keep on 'the defensive till 
 the strength of their adversaries was exhausted. At one point so 
 furious an attack was made by Stratocles, that the Macedonian fine 
 gave way; Stratocles drove before him the retreating phalangites, 
 crying—“Let us chase them to Macedon;” but pressing on too 
 hastily, he threw his own troops into disorder; when Philip directed 
 a timely charge which put them to the rout. On the other wing 
 Alexander, supported by the ablest of his father’s generals, was 
 opposed to the Thebans, and was the first to charge the hitherto 
 invincible Sacred band. The contest was bloody, and for a long 
 time doubtful. Alexander made extraordinary efforts to prove him¬ 
 self worthy of the post assigned to him. The Thebans, after obsti¬ 
 nately disputing every inch of ground, yielded at last to the superior 
 strength of their opponents. As soon as they had given way, Philip, 
 determined not to be outdone by his son, led his phalanx in person 
 against the Athenian line, and decided the victory. A fearful slaugh¬ 
 ter was made of the allied army, now broken on all sides. Of the 
 total loss of the Thebans we have no account. Their general The¬ 
 agenes was slain , 3 and the three hundred of the Sacred Band fell 
 
 1 Plutarch, Vit. Phocion, 16. 
 
 3 ./Eschines reproaches him for this : and also for his sneering at the 
 Delphian oracle, which they had proposed to consult, and saying that 
 the priestess philippised. (Contr. Ctesiph. 72.) Ov tv epl tovtuv ’A/jel- 
 viudrfq fj.lv tv povTieyev ev?ia(3eiodcu Kal tve/jtvelv elg Aea (povq iTvepTjoo/uevovt; 
 rdv Qeov otl xpr) wparreiv , ArffjoaOevrfg dl uvTe?.eye <f>t?UTVTvifriv ttjv tlvdiav 
 <pdcrKCJV, dtvaldEVToq uv Kal dnoTiavov Kal EfnvLTv'XdfJ.Evoq Tjjq 6i6ofiEVT]q vQ’ 
 i'fiuv avru) i^ovaiaq ; ov to rcXevTalov ddvrov Kal aKaKkiEprfTuv ovtov tuv 
 lepuv k^ETVEuifjE rovq oTpariuraq etvI tov tv podr/Aov klv6vvov. Conf. Cice¬ 
 ro, De Divinat. ii. 57. 
 
 3 Dinarchus, seemingly without cause, denounces him as a traitor: 
 ’ AvdpuTvoq drvxvq Kal 6upo6oKoq. (Contr. Demosth. 99.) Timoclea, who 
 after the capture of Thebes pushed the Thracian soldier into the well, 
 was his sister. (Plutarch, Vit. Alexand. 12. Polyaenus, Strateg. viii. 40.) 
 
408 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 side by side, perishing to a man. Of the Athenians there fell more 
 than a thousand, and two thousand were taken prisoners. Demos¬ 
 thenes, who had fought in the ranks, escaped with the fugitives to 
 Athens. In one short day all his lofty hopes had been overthrown: 
 all his toils and labors for the safety of his country and the inde¬ 
 pendence of Greece had been rendered fruitless.*—“ Hie dies uni¬ 
 verse Graeciae et gloriam dominationis et vetustissimam libertatem 
 finivit .” 2 * 
 
 The news of this dreadful calamity was speedily brought to Athens. 
 It is said to have killed Isocrates, who at the age of ninety-eight 
 was in the full possession of his health and faculties, but now ab¬ 
 stained from food, heart-broken at the sad tidings of his country’s 
 defeat . 3 The general grief and terror may well be imagined; but 
 they are described to us by an eye-witness . 4 It was uncertain for 
 the moment, how many of the citizens had been slain or captured. 
 Almost all capable of bearing arms, between the ages of twenty and 
 fifty, had been sent out: and the hopes of defending Athens seemed 
 to rest upon those who were past the age of active service. Women 
 were seen standing at their doors in an agony of distress, asking 
 every one that passed if their husbands, fathers, sons, or brothers 
 were alive. # Old and infirm men were walking about the streets 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 86. Pausanias, ix. 40. Plutarch, Vit. Alexand. 7; 
 Yit. Pelopid. 18. Demosthenes, De Coron. 314. Demades, Fragment. 
 179. Polysenus, Strateg. iv. 2, s. 2, and s. 7. What is told in this book 
 of Stratocles, is attributed to Theagenes in viii. 40. That Demosthenes 
 was accused of cowardice in the field, of having shamefully deserted his 
 post and thrown away his shield, is well known. (See Dinarchus, Contr. 
 Demosth. 91. iEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 74, 76, 89.) But, as Grote ob¬ 
 serves, the continued confidence and respect shown to him by his coun¬ 
 trymen prove that they did not credit these charges. It seems that he 
 only shared in the general flight of the army. A story is told in the 
 Lives of the Ten - Orators, p. 845—that, as he was running away, his 
 cloak was caught by a bramble, and he, thinking the pursuers were be¬ 
 hind him, cried Z uypei, “ Take me alive 1” This looks very like an in¬ 
 vention of his enemies. 
 
 2 Justin, ix. 3. Compare Lycurgus, Contr. Leocrat. 154. "A pa ydp 
 ovtol te tov (3lov pEvqXka^av /cat rd TTjg 'E/l/\ adof elg fiovPieiav peTEitEGE' 
 ovvETu<p7j yap Tolg tovtuv oupamv rj tuv uXkuv 'EAAyrwv bhevdepia. 
 
 3 Pausanias, i. 18. Upog rr/v dyyeXiav rf/f kv XaipuvEia pdxvc d'Kyri- 
 cag ETE?i£VTr)G£v £0£?iOVT}jg. Milton refers to it in one of his sonnets:— 
 
 As that dishonest victory 
 At'Chaeronea, fatal to liberty, 
 
 Killed with report that old man eloquent. 
 
 The fact however has been contested. See Mitford’s disquisition at the 
 end of section 6, chap. 42, vol. iv. of his History of Greece. 
 
 4 Lycurgus, Contr. Leocrat. 149, 152, 153. 
 
CHJERONEA. 
 
 409 
 
 with their mantles doubled up, as if girding themselves to perform 
 the duties of the young. As the fugitives successively flocked in, 
 the real extent of the disaster was ascertained, and the people, rally¬ 
 ing from their first dismay, hastened to meet as became them the 
 distressing exigency of the hour. It was no longer possible to act in 
 co-operation with the Thebans; each of the allied cities was thrown 
 entirely upon its own resources: and it was uncertain against which 
 of them the conqueror would first advance. It was necessary to put 
 Athens in a condition to sustain a siege, and that without any delay. 
 Resolutions for that purpose, framed chiefly by Hyperides and De¬ 
 mosthenes, were immediately passed in full assembly, ordering 
 (among other things) that the women and children should be brought 
 in from the country; that the generals should be empowered to 
 require for garrison duty the services of all residents in Athens, 
 whether citizens or foreigners; that the members of the council 
 should go down in arms to the Piraeus, and execute what measures 
 they thought best for its security; that slaves bearing arms for the 
 commonwealth should be emancipated, aliens be made citizens, and 
 the disfranchised restored to their rights. Energetic measures were 
 taken for the restoring and strengthening the fortifications. Men of 
 every age lent a helping hand for the national defense. The country 
 (says Lycurgus) contributed her trees, the dead their sepulchres, the 
 temples their arms. Patriotic citizens came forward with large 
 donations of money for the public service, Demosthenes himself 
 contributed liberally towards the repair of the walls, which he had 
 been appointed to superintend. It was further deemed expedient 
 to solicit aid from some of the nearest friendly states. Embassies 
 were sent to Troezen and Epidaurus: and subsidies were collected 
 from some of the nearest islands. Demosthenes, who was sent on 
 one of these expeditions, is reproached for it by MDschines and Di- 
 narchus, as if he had deserted his country for fear of the enemy. 
 We learn from Dinarchus, however, that Demosthenes was by a 
 decree of the people appointed envoy, and it appears that at this 
 time, notwithstanding the unfortunate issue of his counsels, he con¬ 
 tinued to enjoy the confidence of the Athenians; for not only did 
 they pass divers decrees which he had moved for the public safety, 
 but they appointed him to hold the office of a commissioner of grain, 
 and afterwards conferred upon him a still higher proof of their es¬ 
 teem, by selecting him to speak the funeral oration in honor of their 
 fellow-citizens who had fallen in battle. Further, when his adver¬ 
 saries, thinking their position strengthened by the peace, assailed 
 Demosthenes with indictments and other legal proceedings, he ob¬ 
 tained a triumphant acquittal upon all . 1 
 
 1 Lycurgus, Cont. Leocrat. 149, 153. Dinarchus, Contr. Demosth. 
 100. iEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 76. Demosthenes, De Coron. 267 285, 
 309, 310, 320, 321, 329. Plutarch, Vit. Dec. Orat. 846. 
 
 Vol. II.— S 
 
410 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 To the general zeal displayed by the citizens of Athens a few 
 disgraceful exceptions are recorded. There were men who left or 
 attempted to leave the city, in order to secure themselves and their 
 families: and the example was considered so dangerous, that a 
 special decree was passed, making it treasonable to desert the 
 country in such a way. One man who had embarked for Samos 
 was apprehended by the Council of Areopagus, and on the same 
 day sentenced to death. Autolycus, an Areopagite, was condemned 
 for having sent away his wife and children, though he himself 
 remained- in Athens. But the most remakable case is that of Leo- 
 crates; who, as soon as he had heard that the battle was lost, 
 sailed away clandestinely with all his family and moveable effects to 
 Rhodes, where he reported that Athens was taken, that Piraeus was 
 besieged, and he was the only person who had escaped. The 
 Rhodians, believing his story, sent out cruisers to commit piracy in 
 the iEgean; and the merchants in the harbor unshipped the corn 
 and other goods which they were about to export to Athens. 
 When the real truth became known, Leocrates quitted Rhodes, and 
 came to live at Megara, contriving by means of his friends to sell 
 what property he had left at Athens. After the lapse of seven years 
 he returned to his country, and was impeached by Lycurgus in the 
 manner already mentioned . 1 
 
 While we admire the spirit with which the people of Athens bore 
 up against their misfortunes, and the generous support which they 
 gave to Demosthenes in the hour of his humiliation, one is sorry to 
 find an act of the Athenian public recorded, which it is impossible 
 to view with the same approving eye. Lysicles, who had com¬ 
 manded the army at Chseronea, was on the accusation of Lycurgus 
 brought to trial, condemned, and executed, apparently for no other 
 reason than because he had lost the battle. Mitford conceives it to 
 have been a bold stroke of the war party, who, knowing that popu¬ 
 lar vengeance would demand a victim, resolved to sacrifice Lysicles 
 to secure their own safety . 2 Thirlwall seems to think, that the 
 character of Lycurgus the prosecutor affords some proof of the just¬ 
 ness of the sentence . 3 The extract from his speech, preserved to 
 us by Diodorus, exhibits the Spartan-like severity of the speaker’s 
 character, but indicates no special ground of cowardice or miscon¬ 
 duct, distinguishing the case of Lysicles from that of his colleagues 
 or any other unfortunate generals. His words are these: 4 —“ You, 
 Lysicles, were the commander: a thousand citizens have fallen; 
 two thousand have been made captive; a trophy has been raised 
 
 1 Lycurgus, Contr. Leocrat. 149, 150. Aeschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 39. 
 
 Ante, p. 330. 
 
 3 Mitford, History of Greece, vol. iv. c. 42, s. 5. 
 
 3 Thirlwall, History of Greece, vi. 72. 
 
 * Diodorus, xvi. 38. 
 
CHiERONEA. 
 
 411 
 
 against Athens; and the whole of Greece is in servitude. "When all 
 this has taken place under your conduct and command, dare you to 
 live, and to behold the light of the sun, and to make your appear¬ 
 ance in the market-place: you that are a monument of shame and 
 disgrace to your country ?” 
 
 Whether the Athenians with all their preparations could have 
 successfully defended themselves against Philip’s army, had he ad¬ 
 vanced to besiege Athens, was not put to the trial. Philip adopted 
 such prudent and conciliatory measures, that they were tempted to 
 abandon the high ground of resistance to Macedonian power, and 
 to accept terms of peace which he prescribed. It is said that in the 
 first moment of victory Philip gave way to feelings of indecent tri¬ 
 umph, and insulted over his fallen enemies. Having drunk to ex¬ 
 cess at the banquet, he walked over the field of battle, and sang in 
 iambic verse the prefatory words of Demosthenes’ decree, stamping 
 with his feet and dancing to the cadence . 1 Visiting the Athenian 
 prisoners, he derided their misfortunes, and was rebuked by De- 
 mades in the manner already related . 2 These were but the intem¬ 
 perate sallies of the moment. It is said however, that he at first 
 refused the Athenians the customary permission to bury their dead, 
 which they had sent a herald to demand. His object in so doing 
 perhaps was, to prevent their opening any communication with the 
 Thebans: and he may for prudential reasons have assumed an ap¬ 
 pearance of rigor, which he never meant really to exercise. Cer¬ 
 tain it is, he very quickly decided upon adopting lenient measures 
 
 1 Plutarch, Vit. Demosth. 20— 
 
 A TjjuoGdeveg Arj/iocdevovc Uaiavievc rad ’ ehrev. 
 
 In the Life of Pelopidas (18) he is represented to have expressed his 
 admiration of the Sacred Band, whose bodies he saw on the field. 
 
 2 Ante, p. 321. It may be thought that Demades, who is said to 
 have been long before this engaged in the cause of Philip, would not 
 have ventured to use such freedom with him. Demades however was a 
 strange compound. It is certain that he was a man of consummate as¬ 
 surance ; and it is not at all unlikely that he may have taken this way 
 of introducing himself to Philip. The positive testimony of Diodorus is 
 not lightly to be rejected ; for, with all his faults of omission and negli¬ 
 gence, he is too honest to record any thing destitute of authority. The 
 accounts of Philip’s conduct given by Diodorus and Plutarch are seem¬ 
 ingly indeed at variance with those of other writers. Justin says, (iv. 4) 
 —“ Hujus victorise callide dissimulata laetitia est. Denique non solita 
 sacra Philippus ill4 die fecit: non in convivio risit: non ludos inter epu- 
 las adhibuit; non coronas aut unguenta sumpsit; et, quantum in illo 
 fuit, ita vicit ut victorem nemo sentiret.” Compare iElian. Var. Hist, 
 viii. 15. The different statements are perhaps not irreconcilable. Philip 
 assumed a grave and severe deportment; but it gave way on one or two 
 occasions to a fit of intemperance. What is more likely ? 
 
*12 
 
 APPENDIX IX. 
 
 towards the Athenians. He entered into confidential discourse 
 with Demades, who must have been already known to him as an 
 opponent of Demosthenes and the war party at Athens; and whom 
 he found to be a man of agreeable manners, and likely to be a use¬ 
 ful instrument to serve his present purposes. The orator doubtless 
 exerted his powers of persuasion to recommend a mild and pacific 
 policy: and a careful reflection upon his position and prospects con¬ 
 vinced Philip, that it was wiser to conciliate the Athenians than to 
 drive them to desperation . 1 He therefore intimated his willingness 
 to restore the Athenian prisoners without ransom: he burned the 
 bodies of the slain, and sent a deputation carrying their bones to 
 Athens. It was headed by his son Alexander and Antipater, who 
 communicated the terms upon which he was willing to treat for 
 peace. These, though not honorable, were much better than the. 
 Athenians had expected, and they were favorably received by the 
 people: the war party could not venture under existing circum¬ 
 stances to advise a prolonged resistance. Demades, who had been 
 sent home for this very purpose, framed a treaty of peace, which he 
 carried in the assembly without any opposition: by the terms of 
 which the Athenians renounced all their pretensions to naval sover¬ 
 eignty, and all their dominions in the HSgsean sea, except Lemnos, 
 Imbrus, and Samos. Virtually, though not in words, they acknowl¬ 
 edged Philip as the head of the Hellenic community. In exchange 
 for these concessions, they obtained peace and present security, and 
 a return of their prisoners; likewise the city of Oropus, which was 
 .transferred to them from the Thebans, but to recover which in such 
 a way was more of a disgrace than an advantage. Votes of honor 
 to Philip were passed in the assembly on the motion of Demades; 
 who now, together with the other members of his party, began to 
 regain credit and influence in Athens. iEschines boasted that he 
 was on terms erf friendship with the king of Macedon, and went on 
 an embassy to his camp. Submission and subserviency were the 
 order of the day . 2 
 
 1 Philip’s title to the praise, which Polybius bestows upon him for 
 his lenity to Athens, is upon good grounds disputed by both Thirlwall 
 and Grote. The former observes, that after his severity to Thebes he 
 had the less reason to dread the hostility of Athens ; that it was by no 
 means certain that he could have made himself master of the city and 
 Piraeus; the danger of a failure, and even the inconvenience of delay, 
 was greater than the advantage to be reaped from it; he had more 
 brilliant objects in view : time was precious to him, and it would have 
 been wantonly to tempt his fortune, if by too grasping a policy he had 
 raised unnecessary hindrances to his designs. (History of Greece, vi. 
 * 74 .) 
 
 2 Diodorus, xvi. 87 ; xviii. 56. Demades, Fragment. 179. Demos¬ 
 thenes, De Coron. 319, 320, 321, 352. Plutarch, Vit. Decern. Orat. 349. 
 Pausanias, i. 25. 
 
CHiERONEA. 
 
 413 
 
 While Philip was carrying on peaceful negotiation with Athens, 
 he was taking measures of a very .different character against the 
 Thebans. Towards them his conduct was as harsh as it was lenient 
 to their allies. ^ He not only exacted ransom for their prisoners, but 
 made them pay a price for the burial of their dead. Yet this was 
 nothing in comparison with what followed. Very shortly after 
 the battle, he contrived to make himself master of Thebes itself. 
 Whether he took it by surprise, or whether it was surrendered to 
 him by the philippising party or otherwise, we are not informed. 
 There are no Theban writers to give us any historical particulars 
 about their countrymen. It may be presumed that Philip lost no 
 time in following up his victory; and the severe loss which the 
 Thebans had sustained at Chaeronea must have materially impaired 
 both their courage and their means for defense. Philip, having got 
 possession of the city, treated it as the Spartans had done forty-four 
 years before, subjecting it to all the rigors of military occupation. 
 A Macedonian garrison was placed in the Cadmea. As a further 
 check upon insurrection, Orchomenus and Platsea were re-estab¬ 
 lished, and Med with a population hostile to Thebes. All the Boeo¬ 
 tian towns were declared independent. Some of the principal 
 Theban statesmen were put to death by Philip’s order; others were 
 banished; their property was seized for his -use. He recalled a 
 large number of exiles, three hundred of whom he formed into a 
 council, invested with summary powers, both executive and judicial. 
 One of their first acts was, to bring their political enemies to trial 
 for having sentenced them to exile. The accused gloried in their 
 crime, and courted the vengeance that was prepared for them. 
 This was but a foretaste of what the unhappy Thebans were to 
 suffer under an oligarchy devoted to the conqueror and upheld by 
 his troops. Three years of domestic and foreign oppression drove 
 them into a new war, which ended in the extirpation of Thebes. 1 
 
 V 
 
 1 Diodorus, xvi. 37; xvii. 8, 9, <fcc. Justin, ix. 4. Dinarchus, Contr. 
 Demosth. 92. Pausanias, iv. 27 ; ix. 1 and 6. Arrian, Anab. i. 7. 
 
414 
 
 APPENDIX X. 
 
 APPENDIX X. 
 
 WHETHER CTESIPHON BROKE TflE LAW. 
 
 The two special grounds upon which iEschines contended that 
 Ctesiphon had violated the law, were, 
 
 First, because he had proposed to crown Demosthenes, before he 
 had rendered an account of his official administration, Demosthenes 
 having been a conservator of walls, and a treasurer of the Theoric 
 fund: 
 
 Secondly, because he had proposed to publish the coronation in 
 the theatre of the Dionysian festival, at the performance of the new 
 tragedies. 
 
 In support of the first proposition, JEschines 1 cites a law which 
 expressly forbade the bestowing of a crown upon any magistrate 
 or official personage who had still his account to render. Anticipat¬ 
 ing an objection, that the offices held by Demosthenes were not 
 magistracies, such as the law applied to, but rather inferior agencies 
 or employments , 2 he shows that by the law of Athens all offices to 
 which the people elected were to be deemed of a magisterial char¬ 
 acter, and that all superintendents of public works, and all persons 
 who were intrusted with any of the public money for more than 
 thirty days, or who held a legal jurisdiction, were to be considered 
 as holding such offices, and were subject to the usual scrutiny 3 be¬ 
 fore they entered upon their duties. A conservator of walls was 
 clearly a superintendent of public works ; and he also presided in 
 a court of judicature. Demosthenes had been appointed to that 
 office by the Pandionian tribe in pursuance of a decree of the peo¬ 
 ple, and had had the disbursement of ten talents of the public money. 
 He had been elected treasurer of the Theoric fund by the people in 
 general assembly. It made no difference, whether or not he had 
 expended any of his own money gratuitously. He was liable to 
 render an account in one or both of the aforesaid characters, even 
 though none of the public moneys had passed through his hands. 
 It was a principle of the democracy, that no magisterial functionary 
 should be irresponsible. 
 
 He then proceeds to the second point , 4 and produces a law, en- 
 
 1 For this part of the argument, see iEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. pp. 
 55—68. 
 
 2 ’EmgeXeiai, duiKovlcu, npayyareiai, commissions, agencies, employ¬ 
 ments, are distinguished from dprai, maqisterial offices. See Schumann, 
 De Comitiis, 308, <fcc. 
 
 s A oKiyaoia. 
 
 4 iEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 58—60. 
 
WHETHER CTESIPHON BROKE THE LAW. 
 
 415 
 
 acting that, if the council bestowed a crown upon any citizen, it 
 should be proclaimed in the council-chamber, if the people, in the 
 assembly, but not in any other place ; the object of which law he 
 declares to have been, that honors of this kind, which concerned 
 the commonwealth and its members only, should not be ostenta¬ 
 tiously displayed before foreigners. Ctesiphon had infringed this 
 statute, for the pnrpose of making an idle parade of his friend’s 
 honors at the Dionysian festival, when a large number of the Greeks 
 were present. 
 
 Upon this part of the case he anticipates the answer which we 
 find to have been actually made—viz. that there was a law which 
 permitted crowns to be proclaimed in the theatre, if the people au¬ 
 thorized it by their decree. That law, says iEschines, is not incon¬ 
 sistent with the one upon which I rely : nor indeed can there be two 
 inconsistent laws : but it relates to an entirely different matter. A 
 bad practice had sprung up; that men, who possessed influence in 
 foreign states, got crowns presented to them by those states, and 
 then had them proclaimed in the theatre at home. To put a stop 
 to such an objectionable custom, a statute was passed, making it un¬ 
 lawful for crowns given by foreign states to be proclaimed in the 
 theatre, except under a special resolution of the Athenian people. 
 The law which Ctesiphon violated, which defined the places where 
 crowns were to. be proclaimed, applied to those which were given 
 at home. 
 
 To these arguments Demosthenes makes but a short reply . 1 He 
 does not at all dispute his general accountability in respect of the 
 offices which he had held. He denies, however, that he was ac¬ 
 countable to the state for what he had expended out of his private 
 purse; and he contends that the crown was bestowed upon him, not 
 for the acts of which he had an account to render, but for his gifts, 
 which were not the subject of account. With respect to the place 
 of proclamation, he adduces a law (as JEschines had expected) 
 seemingly at variance with that on which the prosecution was 
 founded, and not admitting the construction which vEschines had 
 put upon it. He censures ACschines for misrepresenting the object 
 of the lawgiver in fixing the place of proclamation, and not seeing 
 that the proclamation was for the benefit of those who conferred, 
 not those who received the honor. He refers also to a variety of 
 cases, in which decrees similar to that of Ctesiphon, and under simi¬ 
 lar circumstances, had been passed in favor of other men. 
 
 With regard to the contradictory laws, we have not sufficient 
 data to form an opinion. Each of the orators accuses the other of 
 garbling the law which he cites: and we have not the whole of the 
 statutes before us to enable us to see which is right. But the defense 
 which Demosthenes sets up as to the time of crowning we have 
 
 1 See ante, pp. 46—51. 
 
416 
 
 APPENDIX X. 
 
 little difficulty in pronouncing to be sophistical. The law which en¬ 
 acted, that no public functionary who had not passed his audit should 
 be crowned, meant that the honor should not be conferred either 
 for official services or on any other account. Besides, the crown 
 given by Ctesiphon to Demosthenes actually purported to be a re¬ 
 quital of his official services: for those donations to the public, 
 which were specially commended, related to the business of his ad¬ 
 ministration. In any point of view, therefore, Ctesiphon had by 
 his decree violated the letter of the Athenian law : but it is clear 
 also, that he violated the spirit of it. Eor a magistrate might be 
 very liberal in donations to the public, and yet might in some way 
 or other grossly abuse his trust: he might be generous with the one 
 hand, and squander the public money with the other. At his official 
 audit the whole of his administration would be inquired into : and 
 he would be liable to punishment, if in any particular he had se¬ 
 riously neglected his duty. But by commending him for one part 
 of his conduct, while the other was kept out of view, the merits of 
 the case were unfairly prejudged before it came to the auditors. 
 And this is the very abuse of which iEschines complains: crafty 
 orators got premature votes of honors for their friends, to screen 
 them from charges for official misconduct . 1 
 
 The precedents cited by Demosthenes prove no more than what 
 iEschines admitted; that the law had often been broken before; 
 not that it ought to be broken, or was not still in force. If any 
 weight were attached to them, it concerned the penalty rather than 
 the verdict of guilty or not guilty. 
 
 Had iEscliiftes confined himself to these two questions upon the 
 laws, it appears undeniable, that the verdict ought to have been in 
 his favor. But this did not satisfy him. He wished to cast re¬ 
 proach upon the character and politics of Demosthenes; and there¬ 
 fore he introduced the third charge, which raised the issue, whether 
 Demosthenes had deserved well of his country. By mixing the 
 three issues together, he thought to insure success in the cause; 
 and he expected that a verdict against Ctesiphon, on whatever 
 
 1 iEschines, Contr. Ctesiph. 55. ’Ev ydp rolg i/uirpoodev xpovoig dp- 
 Xovrig rives rdf peylarag dpxdg nai rdg rcpoobSovg SioiKOvvreg, nal dupo- 
 Sonovvreg irepl enaara rovruv, TrpooTiapftdvovres rods re ek rov (3ovXevrrj- 
 piov (niropaq nal rovg in rov drj/uov nop^udev 7rpoKareXdpl3avov rdg evdv- 
 vag inaivovg nal Krjpvypaaiv, wot’ iv ralg evOvvaig ruv upxtiv elg ri)v pe- 
 ytorrjv piv d'Kopiav dcjuKvelodai rovg narr/yopovg, rro?.d Si in pdXkov 
 roi)g Sinaarag—yaxvvovro ydp olpai oi Sinaaral, el (pavrjoerai 6 avrog 
 dvf/p iv rrj avry tcoaei, rvxov Si nal iv rCi avr<p hviavrC), npdrjv piv tcote 
 uvayopevopevog iv rolg dytioiv on areipavovrai dperrjg evena nal Sinaioav * 
 vijg vi to rov Sr/pov XP va V OTecpdvip, 6 Si avrog dvf)p pinpbv imaxd>v i£eiciv 
 in rov Sinaarripiov nTiOTcyg evena rug EvOvvag dxpTnjn&s' w are pvayna^ovro 
 rr/v ipijipov <j)ipeiv ol Sinaar.al ov nepi rov napovrog ddiKrjparog ufc l’ vjrbp 
 rr/g aiaxvvrjg rov Sr/pov, 
 
WHETHER CTESIPHON BROKE THE LAW. 417 
 
 ground obtained, would be a triumph over Demosthenes, and would 
 have the effect of disgracing him and his party in the eyes of all the 
 Greeks. Hereupon arises a question—whether JEschines should 
 have been allowed to succeed in his manoeuvre, and obtain such an 
 indirect triumph over his rival. Hot that Demosthenes ever raised 
 such a point for the consideration of his judges—he was too old an 
 orator to admit that any part of his case was weak. It is a point, 
 however, which the Athenians who decided the cause ought to have 
 considered, and perhaps did consider—a question of ethical juris¬ 
 prudence, upon which the merits of their decision very much de¬ 
 pend. The reader will be better able to form his opinion upon this 
 and other parts of the subject, after seeing in what light they are 
 presented by the always just and clear-sighted Thirlwall: 1 
 
 “uEschines had indicted Ctesiphon as having broken the law in 
 three points: first, because it was illegal to crown a magistrate be¬ 
 fore he rendered an account of his office : next, because it was for¬ 
 bidden to proclaim such an honor, when bestowed by the people, 
 in any other place than the assembly-ground in the Pnyx, but par¬ 
 ticularly to proclaim it, as Ctesiphon had proposed: and lastly, be¬ 
 cause the reason assigned in the decree, so far as related to the public 
 conduct of Demosthenes, was false, inasmuch as he had not deserved 
 any reward. Among these points there was one, on which it seems 
 clear that the charge of illegality was well grounded. Though the 
 superintendence of the repairs was probably not a magistracy imthe 
 eye of the law, which indeed forbade any one to hold two at once, 
 the treasurership of the Theoric fund certainly was one, and one to 
 which the law, which forbade the crowning of a magistrate still 
 accountable, applied with peculiar force. As to the mode of the proc¬ 
 lamation, it seems doubtful, whether the law on which the prosecu¬ 
 tion rested had not been modified by another, which declared that 
 proclamation might be made, as Ctesiphon proposed, if the people 
 should so decree; though iEschines speciously contended, that this 
 exception was only meant to relate to crowns bestowed on citizens, 
 not by the people, but by foreign states. But the third point, the truth 
 or falsehood of the reason alleged in the decree, was that on which, 
 according to the manifest sense of both the parties, of the court, 
 and of all present at the trial, the case really turned. The question 
 at issue was in substance, whether Demosthenes had been a good or 
 a bad citizen. It was on this account that the court was thronged 
 by an extraordinary conflux of spectators, both citizens and stran¬ 
 gers. Hence the prosecutor, after a short discussion of the dry 
 legal arguments, enters, as on his main subject, into a full review 
 of the public and private life of Demosthenes: and Demosthenes, 
 whose interest it was to divert attention from the points of law, 
 which were not his strong ground, can scarcely find room for them 
 
 1 History of Greece, vol. vii. 135. 
 
418 
 
 APPENDIX X. 
 
 in his defense of his own policy and proceedings, which, with bitter 
 attacks on his adversary, occupies almost the whole of his speech. 
 
 “ The spirit displayed by the tribunal, which decided in favor of 
 Demosthenes on such grounds as he alleged, is at least as noble as 
 that of the Eoman senate and people, when they went out to meet 
 and thank the Consul on his return from Cannae. But the case may 
 seem to exhibit the Athenian administration of justice in a much 
 less favorable light. On one point at least it is clear that Ctesi- 
 phon’s decree was contrary to law. The attempt made by Demos¬ 
 thenes to prove that the law, which forbade an accountable magis¬ 
 trate to be crowned, did not apply to his case, only shows the 
 extreme looseness of legal reasoning which was tolerated in Athe¬ 
 nian courts. It seems indeed to have been admitted, that there had 
 been numerous precedents for whatever was illegal in the decree as 
 to the circumstances of time and place. But this only proves the 
 laxity which prevailed in the observance of the laws. It appears 
 that, according to that theory of the constitution, which had been 
 universally approved and acted on in the purest times, immediately 
 after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, the court which tried the 
 author of a decree denounced as illegal was bound to compare it 
 with the letter of the law, and to give judgment on the simple ques¬ 
 tion of their strict agreement. But it is evident that the courts had 
 afterwards assumed greater freedom; and it is not at all certain 
 that this was repugnant, either to the spirit of the constitution, or 
 to the practice of preceding ages, with the single exception of the 
 short period in which the restoration of the democracy awakened 
 extraordinary jealousy for the maintenance of the laws. The will 
 of the people, declared in a decree, had been subjected to the revi¬ 
 sion of a tribunal which might be expected to possess superior 
 means of information, to secure the people itself against the perni¬ 
 cious consequences of temporary measures into which it might be 
 surprised. This seems to have been the general object, to which all 
 others were subordinate ; and for this purpose it might be necessary 
 that in such cases the courts should be invested with an ample dis¬ 
 cretion, and should not be required to adhere to the letter of the 
 laws, so as themselves to commit wrong, or to injure the common¬ 
 wealth. The form of the proceedings was such, that a verdict 
 against Ctesiphon must have been interpreted as a condemnation of 
 Demosthenes: and it was the deliberate will, and the highest inter¬ 
 est of the people, to show that it still honored the man who had 
 not despaired of the commonwealth. It would have been better 
 that the prosecutor should not have been able so to embroil the 
 question: but where he did so, it was desirable that the court 
 should have the power to decide on what it deemed the most im¬ 
 portant point.” 
 
 THE END. 
 
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