The 
 
 DIVORCE 
 
 PROBLEM 
 
 IN THE’ 
 
 United States 
 
 BY 
 
 PATRICK L. CRAYTON, S.T.L. 
 
 1904: 
 
 THOMAS J. FLYNN & CO. 
 PUBLISHERS 
 
 62 AND 64 ESSEX STREET 
 
 Boston, Mass. 
 
 b&Wm p?: RAHT 
 
 cm&WWE Mass*' 
 
THE 
 
 Divorce Problem 
 
 in 
 
 THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 PATRICK L. CRAYTON, S. T. L. 
 
 1904 
 
 THOMAS J. FLYNN & CO. 
 Publishers 
 
 62 and 64 Essex Street 
 Eoston, Mass. 
 
Imprimatur : 
 
 * JOANNES JOSEPHUS, 
 
 Archiepiscopus Bostoniensis. 
 
 \ 
 
 Nihil Obstat : 
 
 EDMUND T. SHANAHAN, D. D., 
 
 Censor Deputatus. 
 
 Copyrighted, 1904. 
 
 PRINTED BY 
 
 Washington Press, 
 Boston, Mass. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 These pages are written- to illustrate the fact that 
 divorce, with its present legislation in the United States, is 
 an appalling menace to social order and morality; to demon- 
 strate that the reforms ordinarily proposed do not meet the 
 exigencies of the case; and to suggest the remedy for the 
 existing disastrous condition of affairs. They are addressed 
 to “the general reader” in whom, it is thought, the import- 
 ance of the subject is well calculated to awaken a more than 
 passing interest. They are hardly intended for the special- 
 ist: there is no discussion of the moot-points of law so 
 pleasing to the lawyer; nothing new and, perhaps, hut little 
 of interest to the statistician; no exhaustive theological 
 inquiry. Some facts of the law and of our practice are pre- 
 sented; a few statistics, confirmatory of stated views, are 
 inserted; the doctrinal tenets of certain religious bodies on 
 this subject are outlined. 
 
 To those kind friends who have in word and deed 
 encouraged the presenting of these pages to the public, the 
 writer desires to express his gratitude. 
 
 Gloucester, Mass. 
 
 Feast of St. Anne, 1904. 
 
 3 
 
THE DIVORCE PROBLEM IN THE 
 UNITED STATES. 
 
 Occasional rumors to the effect that President Roose- 
 velt intends recommending that Congress provide means for 
 making an exhaustive inquiry into the question of divorce 
 in this country with a view to enacting a Federal divorce 
 law; hills, presented to Congress in recent years, seeking to 
 advance some reform in this matter; the hill prepared hy 
 a committee of The State Bar Association of Ohio, and pre- 
 sented to the Legislature of that State, looking for the 
 regulation of judicial procedure in matters of divorce; the 
 growing agitation in many spheres of secular and ecclesiasti- 
 cal activity manifested a few months ago in the recommend- 
 ation that divorcees and their consorts he ostracized from 
 society, and more recently in the meeting, in New York 
 City, of eminent Protestant ministers and laymen, repre- 
 sentatives of the Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian, Re- 
 formed, Evangelical, Lutheran, Baptist, Congregational, 
 Universalist, Unitarian, and Reformed Presbyterian 
 churches “to decide upon some final method involving a 
 comity of relation and uniform practice to treat the great 
 evil of divorce in this country, so that persons who were 
 married under the rites of one church cannot, after securing 
 divorces, re-marry under the rites of some other Protestant 
 Church;”* — all seem to indicate that the question of 
 divorce in this country is on the verge of one of its periodi- 
 cal discussions. Though it savors of the impossible to 
 attempt giving expression to anything new or original on so 
 threadbare a topic, yet an exposition of the more important 
 aspects of the problem in our own country may he, at this 
 time, not an unwelcome contribution to the already volu- 
 minous literature of this ever-recurring theme. 
 
 * Rt. Rev. David H. Greer, Bishop-Coadjutor of the Episcopal Archdiocese of New 
 
 York. 
 
 5 
 
The divorce question is, indeed, one of the most serious 
 problems presented to us. It demands its answer more and 
 more urgently every day, and nowhere more imperatively 
 than here in the United States. Divorce is one of the 
 crying evils of our country, and has been greatly aggra- 
 vated in recent years by the operations of “the divorce 
 mills” in New York City, Buffalo, and elsewhere. It seems 
 destined to bring upon the country disaster far greater than 
 the bitterest political strifes, and it is no exaggeration to 
 state that of the many evils now arrayed against society 
 none is greater than that threatened by the facility and the 
 frequency with which divorces are obtained. This bane of 
 our day has already cast a blight on our morals; it has 
 shaken our best institutions, infested all classes of society, 
 and its demoralizing work is not yet consummated. It is 
 not alone our congested cities that are infected with this 
 moral cancer, hut it has spread to the quiet of hillside and 
 hamlet, and no part of the land is a stranger to its presence. 
 It continues to grow amongst us day by day; it strikes 
 deeper root on all sides. Its hideous aspect is ever becoming 
 more and more familiar to us. Many even smile over its 
 attendant disclosures of depravity as pleasant tid-bits of 
 scandal with which the morning papers agreeably enliven 
 the breakfast table, while too few reflect upon the alarming 
 magnitude of the danger with which it is fraught. Indeed, 
 so dulled has the public conscience become in this respect, 
 so slow its apprehension of this mighty evil pressing upon 
 us that hut too rarely has a warning voice been raised 
 against it. 
 
 The interest which should, and among thoughtful men 
 does, attach to the divorce problem in the United States is, 
 indeed, great. The late Mr. Gladstone, in reference to this 
 matter, wrote : “I incline to think that the future of 
 America is of greater importance to Christendom at large 
 than that of any other country; that that future, in its 
 highest features, vitally depends upon the incident of mar- 
 riage; and that no other country has ever been so directly 
 challenged as America now is to choose its course defi- 
 nitively with reference to one, if not more than one, of the 
 
 6 
 
very greatest of those incidents.” (The Question of Divorce, 
 North American Review, Dec. 1889.) And from time to 
 time, in the press and otherwise, the attention of the public 
 has been particularly directed to the abuses of divorce, and 
 to the facilities afforded by American law — and by the 
 looseness of its administration — for the disruption of the 
 family tie. The United States may truly claim a sort of 
 disgraceful pre-eminence in this matter of divorce, since 
 so many of its States are so lavish in the accumulation of 
 causes for which absolute separation may he procured, and 
 that with consequent freedom to enter legally into new ties. 
 
 It is not the purpose of these pages to enlarge upon the 
 evils of the American system of divorce. These evils are 
 notorious. In 1887, an appropriation was authorized by 
 Congress providing means “to enable the Commissioner of 
 Labor to collect and report to Congress the statistics of 
 and relating to marriage and divorce in the several States 
 and Territories, and in the District of Columbia.” This 
 work, notwithstanding the many difficulties necessarily en- 
 countered, was well accomplished, and a voluminous report, 
 prepared under the supervision of the Hon. Carroll D. 
 Wright, was transmitted to Congress and printed. 
 
 Even a superficial examination of this report will ac- 
 quaint one with the magnitude of the proportion to which 
 the business of divorce has attained in this country. Col. 
 Wright’s report covers a period of twenty years, from 1867 
 to 1886 inclusive. It appears that during this entire period 
 there were granted in the United States (160 counties, or 
 6 per cent, of the counties not included) 328,716 divorces. 
 The rate varies considerably in the different States. Illinois 
 heads the list with 36,072. Ohio is second with 26,327. 
 Indiana has 25,193. Michigan is next with 18,433. Some 
 of the smaller States return proportionally large numbers. 
 Rhode Island offers 4,462; New Hampshire returns 4,979; 
 Connecticut, 8,542. But these numbers are not to be 
 equalized through the years covered by the report, because 
 it is shown that during the entire period divorce has been 
 increasing at a rate more than twice as great as that of 
 the increase of the population. Each year, with the sole 
 
 7 
 
1 
 
 exception of the year 1884, witnessed a larger number of 
 divorces than any preceding year.* From 9,931 divorces 
 granted in the United States in 1867 the total reached 
 25,535 for the year 1886; an increase of nearly 157 per cent, 
 in twenty years, while the population increased but 60 per 
 cent, in the same period. 
 
 Changes in legislation, either an extension of the 
 privileges of divorce laws, facilitating the securing of de- 
 crees, or an addition of causes to those already existing, and 
 especially the changed social and economic condition of 
 woman, may account, in some measure, for the marked in- 
 crease in the number of divorces granted in 1886 compared 
 to the number granted in 1867. However, a very satisfac- 
 tory method of establishing a comparison which will show 
 a steady increase of divorces during those twenty years is 
 to be found in using periods, for instance, the quinquennial 
 and decennial periods into which the twenty-year period 
 naturally divides itself. In the first quinquennial or five- 
 year period 53,574 decrees of divorce were granted in the 
 whole country; 68,547 in the second period; 89,284 in the 
 third; 117,311 in the fourth. In other words, there is ever 
 an increase, and no instance of a decrease, for in the country 
 as a whole the number of divorces granted in the second of 
 these periods is 27.9 per cent, more than in the first, the 
 number granted in the third period is 30.3 per cent, more 
 than in the second, the number granted in the fourth 
 period is 31.4 per cent, more than in the third, and the 
 total number of divorces granted in this fourth five-year 
 period (1882-1886) is 119 per cent, more than the total 
 number granted in the first five-year period (1867-1871). 
 Grouped into decennial or ten-year periods, the first of 
 these periods has 122,121 divorces; the second, 206,595. In 
 other words, the total number of divorces granted in the 
 whole country during this latter period (1877-1886) is 69.2 
 per cent, more than the number granted in the first decen- 
 nal period (1867-1876).** 
 
 * “ Marriage and Divorce.” — Carroll D. Wright, pp. 442-443. 
 
 ** “Marriage and Divorce.” — Wright, pp. 141-142. 
 
 “ Marriage and Divorce.” — D. Convers, p. 169. 
 
 8 
 
This brief statement of the leading facts gathered from 
 official statistics — facts which acquire additional signifi- 
 cance when pursued into detail — is enough to show that 
 there has been a steady increase in the number of divorces 
 granted in those years covered by Col. Wright's report. 
 Nor is there much reason to suppose that the rate of in- 
 crease which had prevailed during those twenty years has 
 been in any degree checked in the years that have followed. 
 On the contrary, it is notorious that the business of divorce 
 has been, and is, everywhere accelerating, and it is probable 
 that the ratio of increase is also steadily rising. This is 
 the case in Massachusetts. The statistics of that State 
 show that in the twenty-year period (1867-1886) 9,853 
 divorces were granted, a yearly average of less than 500. 
 But in 1902 the whole number of divorces granted was 
 1,480, which is 104 more than the number granted in 1901, 
 and 322 more than the number granted in 1900; and it 
 further appears that the total number of divorces granted 
 in 1902 is greater by 278 than the average number granted 
 in the ten-year period of 1893-1902, and greater by 537 than 
 the average number granted in the twenty-year period of 
 1883-1902.* The report of the Indiana Department of 
 Statistics shows that there was one divorce for about every 
 six marriages in that State for the year ending October 
 31, 1900. In other words, there were 27,671 marriages to 
 4,699 decrees of divorce. The court officials estimate that 
 not less than 2,000 other suits for divorce were brought 
 which were either withdrawn, or in which the decree was 
 denied by the court. This State has shown some improve- 
 ment of late, for in 1901 there were 3,585 divorces granted, 
 and 3,552 divorces in 1902. In Ohio things have been get- 
 ting worse. In 1900, there were granted 2,306 divorces, or 
 one divorce to 14.5 marriages, but in 1902 there were 4,276 
 divorces, or one to 8.8 marriages. In Maine matters are 
 still worse, for in 1902 there were 905 divorces, or about one 
 divorce to every six marriages. 
 
 * nuD ! lber °* bbe * s which decrees nisi were entered during the year 1902 is 
 hi li , ' Sixfc y- first Report of Births, Marriages and Deaths in Massachusetts,” pp. 96- 
 
 111 ; lDa—loo. 
 
 9 
 
Owing to the fact that not all of our States publish 
 annually the number of divorces granted within their re- 
 spective jurisdictions, it is extremely difficult to state 
 exactly the number of divorces granted in the whole coun- 
 try in any one year, though from time to time this has been 
 attempted. The calculation of the Rev. B. J. Otten, S. J., 
 is worthy of special notice. “In the monthly Bulletin of the 
 Department of Labor for September, 1902, are given the 
 divorces granted in sixty cities in all parts of the United 
 States, the total number of these divorces granted in 1901 
 being 6,998. The population of these cities was at the 
 time 8,146,833, or a little less than one-ninth that of the 
 whole country. Hence, multiplying 6,998 by nine and one- 
 tenth, we obtain for the whole country 63,681 divorces. . . 
 
 Yet it may be objected that it is not fair to take only cities, 
 because divorces are apt to be more numerous in cities than 
 in the country. To remove this objection I have also gath- 
 ered the divorces granted in sixty counties, the total num- 
 ber of which was found to be 11,120. The population of 
 these sixty counties was at the time 13,359,714, or two- 
 elevenths of the population of the whole country. There- 
 fore, multiplying 11,420 by eleven halves, we again obtain 
 for the whole country 61,160. Consequently, the lowest 
 limit we can assign to the number of divorces granted in 
 1901 is 61,160. This, at an increase of 6 per cent, a year, 
 as calculated above, gives for 1903 the respectable number 
 of 68,499. Hence our courts broke up in 1903 nearly sev- 
 enty thousand homes — a number sufficiently large to con- 
 stitute a fair-sized city.”* So summarily it is to be said 
 that the divorce evil is as a tide, it “is rising all over the 
 world, but nowhere is it so high, nowhere does it rise so 
 fast as in these United States.” (W. F. Wilcox.) 
 
 But before touching more directly the other elements 
 of the divorce problem in this country, it is well that our 
 readers’ attention be directed to one fact which has an 
 indisputable bearing on the question. Many and varied 
 are the religious denominations in our midst, and it is 
 
 * “The National Evil of Divorce,” by Rev. B. J. Otten, S. J., in The Messenger for 
 April, 1904, p. 376. 
 
 10 
 
patent that religious sentiment and teaching has its influ- 
 ence on divorce,* for to marriage, the antecedent of divorce, 
 the people of the United States — of whatever professed be- 
 lief — attach some religious characteristics. Therefore it is 
 proper that something be inserted regarding religious teach- 
 ing and practice in this matter. And since divorce is a 
 consequent of marriage, as introductory to the exposition 
 of the doctrinal tenets of the various religious denomina- 
 tions in our country whose influence on divorce legislation 
 is undeniable, the nature and institution of marriage itself 
 is outlined. 
 
 Marriage is the germ of human society; the seed which 
 has developed into the family, the tribe, the nation in one 
 line; the town, the city, the empire in another. Marriage 
 marks the beginning of mam’s social development ; it is the 
 foundation of his social life; it is the basis of human soci- 
 ety, and our existing civilization unquestionably rests upon 
 marriage as Christianity has shaped it. For centuries, while 
 that order of things which we call Christendom endured, 
 the Catholic Church was the great ethical teacher of the 
 developing civilization. The burden of her teaching was 
 duty — the whole duty of man — and nowhere was that teach- 
 ing clearer, more imperative, and productive of greater 
 results than in her doctrine concerning matrimony. The 
 Church, accepting in their entirety, the original attributes 
 of marriage, brought to view the sacrament enfolding and 
 consecrating them. She taught that marriage was insti- 
 tuted in the beginning by the Creator as a union between 
 the first man and the first woman, made by a bond which 
 was not to be broken except by the ending of the natural 
 life to which it belonged. It began in Eden in that state 
 of original justice in which the first human pair was con- 
 stituted, but like other human things, it was subject to the 
 consequences of the fall, and by degrees its original attrib- 
 utes of unity and indissolubility were impaired by the intro- 
 duction of polygamy and divorce. These departures from 
 the pure idea of marriage, due to the “hardness of heart” 
 
 * “ Marriage and Divorce,” — Wright, p 122. 
 
 “ Marriage, Divorce and Separation,” — J. P. Bishop, Nos. 92-95. 
 
 11 
 
of the people, were tolerated under the primitive law given 
 to the patriarchs and to Moses, polygamy being tacitly 
 allowed, and divorce expressly regulated by that law.* This 
 Mosaic dispensation was imperfect, provisional and partial, 
 hnt with the coming of Christ upon earth, “That which was 
 in part was done away, that which was perfect,” had come. 
 Christ, in the fulness of His power, promulgated the perfect 
 moral law, and enacted with a new and more stringent 
 obligation the laws of unity and indissolubility of marriage. 
 He raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament of the 
 New Law, and He set upon its indissolubility the seal of His 
 sanction, “What God hath joined together, let no man put 
 asunder.” This grafting of the natural properties of mar- 
 riage — unity and indissolubility — upon a divine sacrament 
 was the doctrine which Christ entrusted to His Church. To 
 her He gave the office of preserving intact the natural and 
 divine law in this matter and the authoritative promulga- 
 tion of the same. 
 
 But it was one thing for the Church to set forth a 
 doctrine in theory and quite another thing to carry it out 
 in practice. And it would be impossible that the Church — 
 “the knight-errant of the moral world,” — should have failed 
 to break a lance through succeeding centuries for the integ- 
 rity of the marriage bond. She was at once brought into 
 conflict with existing civilization, and when public opinion, 
 universal custom, depraved nature and its powerful passions 
 rose up in their might against her, she had to guard and 
 protect the unity and indissolubility of marriage. For nine- 
 teen centuries she has maintained the sacramental charac- 
 ter of matrimony, its unity and indissolubility, in the face of 
 Boman despotism, under crushing persecution, in the face 
 of untamed barbarian conquerors, amid the ruin of civil 
 institutions, the license and anarch}? - of violent change. And 
 in our own age, before a spirit of self-will, which assumes 
 the guise of liberty and sweeps over modern nations as the 
 flame over the prairie, the Church still maintains the self- 
 same law of marriage as the last rampart of the family and 
 
 * Deut. XXIV., lssq. Matt. V., 31 ; XIX., 7 ; Mark X., 4. 
 
 12 
 
of society against their invaders. Marriage in the mind of 
 the Church is, as it ever was, the most inviolable and irrevo- 
 cable of all contracts. Every human contract may be law- 
 fully dissolved, but, by the law of God, the bond uniting 
 husband and wife can be broken only by death. The sword 
 of earthly justice cannot sever the nuptial knot which the 
 Lord has tied, for, “What God hath joined together let no 
 man put asunder.” 
 
 For her own subjects the Catholic Church has a full 
 code of law on marriage and divorce. But like any other 
 code of law which amounts to anything, it is not thoroughly 
 understood by any except those who study it professionally. 
 Summarily, her law may be stated as follows : — 
 
 (a) . A valid Christian marriage, (i. e. of baptized per- 
 sons) not consummated, (ratum et non consummatum) may 
 be dissolved by the spiritual death of one of the parties who 
 takes the solemn vows of a religious order* *; or by dispen- 
 sation from the Pope. 
 
 (b) . A marriage between unbelievers (i. e. unbaptized 
 persons) becomes dissolved if one of the parties becomes a 
 Catholic and contracts a valid Christian marriage, pro- 
 vided, however, that the unconverted unbelieving spouse 
 will not continue the marriage relation with the other, or 
 will not continue it amicably (pacifice) ; without reviling the 
 Creator (sine contumelia Creatoris) ; or without the spiritual 
 disadvantage of the converted and believing spouse (damno 
 spirituali fidelis). 
 
 (c) . Separation — a mensa et toro — either perpetual or 
 temporal (equivalent to a limited divorce as allowed in 
 American law) is permitted in the case of a valid and con- 
 summated Christian marriage for most of the causes for 
 which, in civil legislation, absolute divorce, i. e., divorce 
 a vinculo matrimonii, is granted. 
 
 (d) . The Catholic Church denies all power to any tri- 
 bunal, secular or ecclesiastical, to grant divorce “a vinculo 
 matrimonii,” for any cause whatsoever, in the case of mar- 
 riage validly contracted and consummated (ratum et con- 
 summatum) according to the institution of Christ. It is. 
 
 * Council of Trent, sess. XXIV., can. 6. 
 
 * 13 
 
therefore, one of the cardinal doctrines of the Catholic 
 Church that the marriage of Christians, i. e., of baptized 
 persons, validly ratified and consummated is absolutely 
 indissoluble. Consequently, there can he no legal and valid 
 divorce a vinculo of the parties to such a marriage. Divorce 
 in the modern sense, i. e., a vinculo matrimonii, has no place 
 in Catholic doctrine or practice. 
 
 Moreover, this Church proclaims and establishes a con- 
 siderable number of impediments invalidating marriage, 
 which impediments may, for the most part, he removed 
 either in general or in the particular case by the supreme 
 authority in the Church; and this power is often delegated 
 more or less entirely to bishops and other subordinates, and 
 thus no difficulty need beset any conscientious Catholic con- 
 templating matrimony. Occasionally he may have to con- 
 sult a clergyman beforehand with regard to this or that 
 impediment, as any man of sense would consult a lawyer 
 before taking an important step of which he did not fully 
 know the legal bearing.* 
 
 This condition of affairs prevailed for many centuries, 
 and so long as the Church was permitted to exercise full 
 control of matters relating to marriage all moved smoothly 
 on ; for although abuses appeared at times, they were known 
 to be such and opposed. However, a lamentable change 
 was ushered in by the dawn of the Reformation. At that 
 time the sacramental character of marriage was rudely as- 
 sailed and persistently denied. It was sought to degrade 
 matrimony to a mere civil contract, and to place it under 
 the sole guardianship of the State. In all Protestant coun- 
 tries and communions this attempt succeeded. And it is to 
 the eternal infamy of the memory of the founder of the 
 Reformation, Martin Luther, and of his associates, that they 
 laid the foundations of, and made possible, the present de- 
 testable system of divorce by deliberately sanctioning the 
 open bigamy of the Landgrave of Hesse who appealed to 
 them, as expositors of the law of Christ, for permission to 
 have two wives.** 
 
 * S. Thom. Supp. q. 61-67 ; Sanchez, 1 II., disp. 18-23; VII., disp. 74; X., disp. 1 ; 
 Carriere, n. 213 sq., 228 sq., 302 sq ; Perrone, 1. II., sect. 1, c. 7, a. 2; 1. Ill sect. 2, 
 c. 1-4 ; c 6, a. 1 ; De Augustinis, a. 8; th. 10. Palmier!, th. 16-27. 
 
 ** “History of the Reformation,” vol. 1, Spalding. 
 
 14 
 
Now of the numerous religious denominations which 
 have evolved from the Reformation, or come into being 
 since that time, and which exist in our country today, and 
 of their doctrinal tenets concerning marriage and divorce, 
 it is, to some extent, due the Protestant Episcopal Church 
 to state that no other Protestant communion in this country 
 has stood more firmly for the stricter view of marriage and 
 divorce. The doctrine and law of this Church on the sub- 
 ject of divorce is contained in Canon 13, title II. of the 
 “Digest of Canons” of 1887. Nowhere has this Church 
 defined marriage. Negatively it is affirmed (art. XXV.) 
 that “matrimony is not to be counted for a sacrament of 
 the Gospel.” This seems to reduce marriage to a civil con- 
 tract, and accordingly the first rubric in the “Form of Sol- 
 emnization of Matrimony” directs, on the ground of differ- 
 ences of law in the various States, that, “the minister is 
 left to the directions of those laws in everything that re- 
 gards the civil contract, between the parties.” Laws de- 
 termining what persons shall be capable of contracting 
 marriage would seem to be included in “everything that re- 
 gards the civil contract,” and, as a matter of fact, the 
 Protestant Episcopal Church has never, by canon or express 
 legislation, published a code of impediments. The present 
 canon of this Church allows the complete validity of divorce 
 a vinculo in the case of adultery, and the right of re-mar- 
 riage to the innocent party. But the Church has not deter- 
 mined in what manner either the grounds of the divorce, or 
 the “innocence” of either party is to be ascertained. 
 
 The law of this Church is by no means identical with 
 the opinion of either the entire clergy or the laity. Many 
 Episcopalians are of the opinion that in the authoritative 
 teaching of their Church the existing law is far too lax, or, 
 at least, the whole doctrine of marriage is too inadequately 
 dealt with. This sentiment has been active for several 
 years, among the High Church party more particularly, and 
 it showed itself to be so powerful at a General Conference 
 held in Washington, October, 1898, that its efforts for 
 reform in this matter were defeated by only a small major- 
 ity. 
 
 15 
 
At that Conference the whole subject of marriage and 
 divorce received much attention. A committee of twelve 
 was appointed for the purpose of taking the matter under 
 more special consideration and of making such recommenda- 
 tions to the next General Conference as would seem to be 
 warranted. This committe met the following year. It 
 failed, however, to reach any definite agreement relative to 
 a change in the existing canon. On November 14, 1900, 
 this committee assembled a second time and definite changes 
 were agreed upon. By a canon, unanimously adopted by 
 this committee, re-marriage of divorced persons by clergy- 
 men of the Protestant Episcopal Church was absolutely 
 forbidden. Ministers of this Church were positively for- 
 bidden to unite in matrimony either the guilty or innocent 
 party to a divorce while the former husband or wife lives. 
 This canon, however, did not declare the marriage of such 
 innocent parties, if contracted under civil sanction, to be 
 unlawful, and it did not declare the parties thereto to be 
 subjected to any discipline for this cause. The canon pre- 
 scribed that it is hereby enacted that, “No minister shall 
 solemnize a marriage between any two persons unless, nor 
 until, by inquiry, he shall have satisfied himself that neither 
 person has been, nor is, the husband or wife of any other 
 living; unless the former marriage was annulled, by a de- 
 cree of some civil court of competent jurisdiction, for cause 
 existing before such former marriage.” (Canon 2, sect. IY.) 
 In another canon, adopted without a dissenting voice, a 
 divorced person who re-marries during the lifetime of the 
 former husband or wife was excluded from the sacraments, 
 except when at the point of death, or when penitent and 
 separated from the person whom the husband or wife sub- 
 sequently married. This canon, however, applied only to 
 the offending party to a divorce, practically tending to ex- 
 communicate him or her so far as church membership goes; 
 it did not apply to the innocent party when a divorce is 
 obtained for the cause of adultery.* 
 
 * “Literary Digest," Dec. 15, 1900, p. 738. 
 
 16 
 
These canons indicate a reaction in the “public opinion” 
 of the Episcopalian body against the freedom of divorce. 
 The unanimous action of the committee was wholesome and 
 inspiring, and was a step in the right direction, if taken 
 somewhat late in the day. Were the canons adopted by the 
 General Conference it would be, perhaps, as far as the Epis- 
 copal Church will ever go in this matter until it is ready to 
 join with the Catholic Church in definitively holding mar- 
 riage to be a sacrament and indissoluble. And, as a matter 
 of fact, the sentiment in favor of the stricter view of mar- 
 riage and divorce has become so pronounced among so 
 many of the communicants of this Church that the advisa- 
 bility of forbidding divorce altogether is a matter which 
 will come up for discussion before the House of Bishops at 
 the General Conference to be held in Boston this year. 
 
 For the other Protestant sects of our country, suffice it 
 to state that they have never professed the doctrine of the 
 indissolubility of marriage. All permit divorce for adul- 
 tery, and likewise sanction it for other causes. But the 
 inter-church conference above referred to, while not limit- 
 ing the causes of divorce, seems destined to be productive 
 of some good results. The General Assembly of the Presby- 
 terian Church of the United States held at Buffalo, N. Y., 
 May, 1904, by a two-thirds vote, passed the following reso- 
 lution: “Recognizing the comity which should exist between 
 the denominations of the inter-church conference, and be- 
 lieving that it would be desirable and tend to the increase 
 of a spirit of Christian unity, we earnestly advise all the 
 ministers under the care and authority of this General 
 Assembly to refuse to unite in marriage any person or per- 
 sons whose marriage such ministers have good reason to 
 believe is forbidden by the laws of the Church in which 
 such person or persons seeking to be married may hold 
 membership.” Similar resolutions are anticipated on the 
 part of the other churches interested in this movement 
 against divorce. 
 
 There is, however, in the United States, one religious 
 body whose singular doctrine has, of late, attracted much 
 attention because of revelations made at the inquiry, by a 
 
 17 
 
Committee of the United States Senate to determine the 
 right of the Hon. Reed Smoot, Senator-elect from Utah, to 
 retain his seat in that body. 
 
 The Mormon Church, or “The Church of Jesus Christ 
 of Latter-Day Saints” was organized in Hew York in 1830, 
 but soon transferred to Ohio, and thence to Illinois. Later, 
 its adherents, under Brigham Young, emigrated to Utah, 
 and, in 1847, established the seat of the Church at Salt 
 Lake City, where it remains today. This sect recognizes 
 two kinds of marriage, namely, temporal and spiritual; the 
 former joining the parties thereto for this world, the latter 
 “sealing” them for eternity; in the former instance death 
 effects a divorce, in the latter only a temporary separation. 
 However, it is plural marriage which is the one great ques- 
 tion, the one article of the Mormon faith beside which in 
 Christian eyes all its other tenets have been minor, and it 
 is the dogma which has evoked the sharpest criticism of 
 this Church. Until recently, two views regarding plural 
 marriage were in vogue, the one very positively asserting it 
 to he obligatory, the other contending it to be only per- 
 missive. Its sanction is derived from the so-called reve- 
 lations made to Joseph Smith, a famous Mormon elder, and 
 also from the Mormon system of theology. “ Tncrease and 
 multiply* is the supreme law of God, since in its exercise 
 His kingdom is enlarged and more beings become like Him. 
 Giving birth to children hastens the work . . . who helps 
 most in this does best. It is physically impossible to rear 
 many children with one wife. To him therefore whom God 
 knows as a superior man who would train children well, 
 He reveals the privilege of taking more than one wife, and 
 honors him by giving him a larger share in the great work. 
 Not all, hut a chosen number are destined for polygamists. 
 Such are the practical deductions from Mormon theology. 
 Under the system which it creates marriage is made a duty, 
 hut polygamy becomes a virtue.”* 
 
 * “ Marriage and Divorce.”— Wright, pp. 72, 123-125. Cf. also “ Book of Mormon ” ; 
 “ Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,” p. 463 seq. ; 
 “ The Vitality of Mormonism,” by Ray Stannard Baker, in the Century Magazine, June, 1904. 
 
 18 
 
As the Mormon Chruch recognizes two kinds of mar- 
 riage, so it likewise acknowledges two kinds of divorce: the 
 one separative for this life, the other operative in the world 
 to come. When divorce is sought in the case of first wives 
 and husbands the civil courts are utilized; but in the case 
 of plural wives, who have no legal status in such courts, the 
 appeal is to the power which united them, namely, to the 
 Church. The jurisdiction of the civil court extends to this 
 life only, and parties divorced in this court must also obtain 
 a decree from ecclesiastical authority if they desire to live 
 apart in the life to come. Ecclesiastical divorces, either for 
 time or eternity, or both, may be obtained for the following 
 causes: — murder, adultery, infanticide, foeticide, incom- 
 patibility of temper rendering it impossible to live together 
 in harmony. A woman may obtain a divorce also for cruel 
 treatment, refusal or neglect to support her and her chil- 
 dren, etc. The divorce is granted by the President — the 
 supreme authority — of the Church upon the application of 
 one or both of the interested parties, and upon the recom- 
 mendation of the bishop of the ward wherein they reside. 
 
 Today, polygamous or plural marriages are forbidden 
 under heavy penalties by the Constitution and statutory 
 law of Utah. But, “law no more stifled polygamy, short off, 
 in Utah, than law suddenly cured the drink habit in Maine/’ 
 for, while there may be some question as to whether or not 
 such marriages have been entered into since this prohibition 
 was enjoined, the Smoot inquiry has made it evident that 
 in violation of the statutes and with the apparent sanction 
 of the ecclesiastical body, some members of the Mormon 
 Church — the President and other officers included — prac- 
 tived polygamous living. Polygamy still exists. “There are 
 still Mormons,” as a citizen of Salt Lake City graphically 
 put it, “who can take a car going any direction and get 
 home.” However, it seems fair to state that henceforth this 
 Church intends co-operating with the enactments of the 
 statutory law in this matter. A notable feature of the Sev- 
 enty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Mormon Church held 
 in Salt Lake City in April of this year was the official dec- 
 laration of President Joseph Smith on the subject of plural 
 
 19 
 
marriage. “All such marriages are prohibited, and if any 
 officer or member of the Church shall assume to solemnize 
 or enter into any such marriage he will be deemed in trans- 
 gression against the Church, and will he liable to he dealt 
 with according to the rules and regulations thereof and ex- 
 communicated therefrom.” 
 
 Summarily, therefore, with reference to the numerous 
 religious denominations in our country it may he said that 
 whatever may he their authoritative doctrinal tenets in this 
 matter of marriage and divorce, with the sole exception of 
 the Catholic Church, they all conform in practice, to a 
 greater or a lesser extent, to the enactments of the civil law. 
 This is but natural, for the absence of any real authoritative 
 religious teaching on the subject and the principle of pri- 
 vate judgment, introduced at the Reformation, logically 
 force' Protestants, in this matter, to the only tribunal left 
 them — that of the State. 
 
 But marriage is regulated by the common law. And 
 our common law is a heritage of the past. It has descended 
 from nation to nation in the course of modern jurispru- 
 dence. To Europe, then to America, it came as an inheri- 
 tance from the Roman law, through the mediaeval church or 
 canon law, with certain modifications resulting from the 
 practice of it in the different colonies.* The earliest colo- 
 nists who settled New England brought with them views 
 of marriage and divorce which prevailed among their re- 
 formed brethren, and in the Reformed Churches generally, 
 of the Old World. It was part of their belief that in the 
 New Testament adultery and desertion were recognized as 
 the only sufficient grounds for the dissolution of marriage. 
 In the course of years the descendants of these first settlers, 
 and the respective States which they peopled, passed from 
 the strict observance of what was regarded as Scriptural 
 grounds for divorce into the loose practices of the Protest- 
 ant States on the European continent in the eighteenth 
 century.** 
 
 * Kent, “ Commentaries,” 2 ed., vol. II., p. 88. 
 
 ** “Divorce and Divorce Legislation.” — Woolsey. 
 
 20 
 
The first enlargement of causes for divorce came after 
 the Revolution, when the States had become independent. 
 Limited divorce, i. e., divorce “a mensa et toro,” which was 
 unknown in earlier colonial legislation, came to be granted 
 on account of extreme cruelty by a statute of Massachusetts, 
 in 1786, and again in 1810, to a wife utterly deserted, or 
 for whose support the husband refused or failed to provide. 
 In 1860, gross and confirmed habits of intoxication, with 
 cruel and abusive treatment, became new causes for this 
 kind of severance of the marriage tie. In 1870, a statute 
 was passed abolishing divorce from bed and hoard, and since 
 that date such divorces have not been allowed by any new 
 statute. In Rhode Island, a divorce from bed and board — 
 until reconciliation — came to be granted for any cause for 
 which absolute divorce was decreed, and for such other 
 causes as might seem to require it. This is the present law 
 in that State. In Connecticut, limited divorce could be 
 granted, in 1843, for habitual intemperance and intolerable 
 cruelty. Today there is no limited divorce in this State. 
 New York, to some extent, followed England or English 
 sentiment in its divorce legislation. An act of the Legisla- 
 ture, in 1787, authorized divorce “a vinculo matrimonii” for 
 adultery only; separation or limited divorce being granted 
 for other causes. New Jersey came to grant divorce, for 
 a time or permanently, on the ground of cruelty. Dela- 
 ware empowered the courts having cognizance of divorce 
 to decree separation at their discretion in several cases. 
 Louisiana seems to have followed to some extent, the French 
 law of post-Revolutionary times. The Civil Code of that 
 State declares that “the law considers marriage in no other 
 light than as a civil contract,” meaning by this that it has 
 nothing to do with the religious aspects of the institution. 
 Absolute divorce came to be granted only for adultery, 
 which, in the husband’s case, was understood as keeping a 
 concubine in the common house or publicly elsewhere. 
 Limited divorce was, and is, decreed for many causes. South 
 Carolina is the one State in the Union which knows not 
 divorce. In 1868, a statute was enacted to the effect that 
 “Divorces from the bond of matrimony shall not be allowed 
 
 21 
 
but by the judgment of a court, as shall be prescribed by 
 law” An act, approved Jan. 31, 1872, made legal divorces 
 on • the ground of adultery or willful desertion in either 
 party; but by an act, approved in 1878, it was provided that 
 “all acts and parts of acts relating to the subject of grant- 
 ing divorce be, and the same are, hereby repealed.” The 
 power to pass such laws at some future time still remains 
 under the new Constitution. The newer States of the West 
 and Northwest seem to have adopted, in a great measure, 
 the existing laws of the older — and especially of the New 
 England — States, as may be judged from the tendency to 
 multiply causes for divorce. 
 
 Correspondingly with the gradual growth of statute 
 enactments relative to causes for divorce came a develop- 
 ment in the method of granting the decree. It appears that 
 at first divorces were generally, if not exclusively, granted 
 only by an act of the respective colonial legislatures. Many 
 of the States, in fact, nearly all the older ones, for a long 
 time adhered to this method of dissolving the marriage 
 bond. This was in accordance with the practice then, and 
 until quite recently, in vogue in England. Of New York, 
 in this connection, Chancellor Kent writes : “For many years 
 after New York became an independent State there was 
 not any lawful mode of dissolving a marriage in the life- 
 time of a person but by a special act of the legislature.”* 
 This was, in all probability, the custom of the great major- 
 ity, at least, of the other States in the early days.** How- 
 ever, as the States developed, and new, more pressing, and 
 seemingly more important duties became incumbent on the 
 Legislatures of the various States, the matter of divorce 
 was relegated to the courts in whose jurisdiction it now is. 
 By an act of Congress, approved July 30, 1886, the Legisla- 
 tures of the territories of the United States are prohibited 
 from passing any special laws granting divorce, and a simi- 
 lar prohibition with regard to the granting of divorce by 
 the Legislature itself is now contained in the constitutions 
 
 * Woolsey, “Divorce and Divorce Legislation,” p. 204. 
 
 ** Bishop. “ Marriage, Divorce and Separation,” vol. I., Nos. 1422-1471. 
 
 22 
 
of all the States except Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, 
 Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
 Rhode Island and Vermont. Tennessee in the Constitution 
 of 1834, was, perhaps, the first State to prohibit legislative 
 divorce. This prohibition was renewed in the Constitution 
 of 1870. In the Constitution of Mississippi, framed in 1868, 
 a similar restriction is found. Pennsylvania, in the Consti- 
 tution of 1873, expressly forbids the Legislature to pass any 
 local or special law “for granting divorce.” In the New 
 England States and the other States in whose constitutions 
 there is no such restriction of legislative power, the grant- 
 ing of divorce by special legislative act is now hardly known. 
 In Massachusetts, a law of 1792 transferred divorce to the 
 courts. No special law has been enacted since then, and 
 Mr. Bishop remarks that “a legislative divorce would not 
 now be sustained by the courts.”* This, too, is the opinion 
 of Carroll D. Wright. Of Massachusetts and New Hamp- 
 shire he writes : “In both States jurisdiction has been vested 
 by the Legislature in the courts, and hence legislative 
 divorces cannot be granted therein.”** In Connecticut, the 
 Legislature still has power — petitions being presented to it 
 up to 1878 — to vote divorce in special cases, v. g., in cases 
 not provided for by existing law, though the business is 
 ordinarily transacted by the courts. In Maine, in 1876, an 
 amendment to the Constitution authorized the Legislature 
 “from time to time, to provide as far as practicable, by gen- 
 eral laws, for all matters usually appertaining to special or 
 private legislation.” Divorce coming, as it does, under this 
 head, the Maine Legislature retains the right to grant it. So 
 in general it may be said that in all the States legislative 
 divorces are, in effect, prohibited, and the granting of 
 divorce by the courts is provided for and regulated by the 
 statutes of all the States except, of course. South Carolina 
 where divorce is unknown.*** And this brings us at once 
 to a consideration of the legislative peculiarities of our 
 divorce system which constitute what has been termed “The 
 Conflict of Laws.” 
 
 * “ Marriage, Divorce, and Separation,’ vol. II., No. 1456. 
 
 ** “ Marriage and Divorce,” p. 79. 
 
 *** “ Marriage, Divorce, and Separation,” vol. II., Nos. 1472-1492. 
 
 23 
 
In his report on “Marriage and Divorce in the United 
 States/* Col. Wright has enumerated forty-two causes for 
 which absolute divorce is granted in the various States and 
 Territories of our Union.* It may he observed here that a 
 number of the causes which he has specified are grounds on 
 which a marriage is, by law, declared null and void, and 
 such an adjudication is in no strict sense divorce, although 
 the statutes of many States so term it. Therefore, it would 
 seem that the number of causes for which divorce in a strict 
 sense is granted could he materially reduced.** However, 
 these causes are numerous enough. They range from the 
 alleged Scriptural ground of adultery down through the 
 dismal gamut of cruelty, drunkenness, desertion and con- 
 viction of felony to that butt of the humorist, “incompati- 
 bility of temper.** The various States differ, too, with re- 
 gard to the number of causes which they admit as justifying 
 divorce. For instance, New York admits hut one ground; 
 Maryland allows divorce for five causes, Massachusetts, for 
 nine; Kentucky and Washington, for eleven. 
 
 Moreover, with regard to the same statutory ground, 
 striking differences are manifest in the various States. We 
 will consider several of the more generally acknowledged 
 statutory causes. Adultery is the one cause which is most 
 general throughout the country, and the cause which is 
 most seriously advocated as being admitted in Sacred Scrip- 
 ture. Yet with regard to it surprising differences exist in 
 the various State statutes. In some of our States, v. g., 
 New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, and most of the others, 
 a single act of adultery — admitted or proved — by either 
 party is sufficient ground for divorce. In other States, v. g. 
 in Kentucky and North Carolina, while this is sufficient 
 cause for divorce in favor of the husband, it is not such for 
 the wife; her husband must he found actually “living in 
 adultery** with his paramour. Kentucky, too, allows divorce 
 to the husband for “lewd and lascivious behavior** on the 
 part of the wife without actual proof of an act of adultery, 
 hut declines to extend this right to the wife. In justifica- 
 
 * “ Marriage and Divorce,” p. 113. 
 
 ** “ The Divorce Problem : A Study in Statistics.” — W. F. Wilcox, p. 42. 
 
 24 
 
tion of this enactment it has been asserted that the conse- 
 quences of such conduct by the woman may be more serious 
 in the eyes of the law than in the man’s case, but this is 
 hardly true in the eyes of the moralist. 
 
 Conviction and imprisonment for crime is another well 
 established ground for divorce — being admitted in all but a 
 few States and the District of Columbia — yet the same want 
 of uniformity regarding its interpretation exists. In some 
 States, v. g. Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, 
 and Mississippi, divorce is not granted for any crime unless 
 the conviction is subsequent to the marriage; in others no 
 such restriction exists, as is the case in Arkansas, California, 
 and Colorado. In North Carolina and Louisiana, a wife may 
 obtain a divorce if her husband has been simply indicted for 
 an infamous crime, even though he may never be arrested, 
 brought to trial and convicted of the offence of which he is 
 charged. In many more States, v. g. Arkansas, California, 
 Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Mis- 
 souri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, 
 a conviction is absolutely necessary. In many, too, the con- 
 viction must have been followed by actual imprisonment, 
 as is the case in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, 
 Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hamp- 
 shire, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, Wiscon- 
 sin and Wyoming. Moreover, the place of confinement and 
 the term of imprisonment vary in the different States. For 
 instance, it requires nearly twice as long an imprisonment 
 in Massachusetts (five years) as in the adjoining State of 
 Vermont (three years) to authorize a divorce. In Michi- 
 gan, Wisconsin and Maine, sentence to imprisonment for 
 life, and confinement under it, renders the marriage abso- 
 lutely dissolved without any decree of divorce or other legal 
 process. In New York, a subsequent marriage is permit- 
 ted to one whose former husband or wife has been sentenced 
 to imprisonment for life. In this State, and several others, 
 viz., Arizona, Minnesota, Michigan, Nebraska, Massachu- 
 setts, Vermont, Virginia, Delaware, and Wyoming, the stat- 
 utes provide that no pardon granted, after a divorce for 
 imprisonment is obtained, shall be deemed to restore the 
 party to his or her previous conjugal rights. 
 
 25 
 
In Arizona, Indiana, Washington, and Wisconsin, “any 
 cruel treatment” entitles a wife to a divorce; in Massachu- 
 setts, “any cruel or abusive treatment.” In California, 
 Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Mon- 
 tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode 
 Island, and Wyoming, it must be “extreme cruelty,” which 
 Illinois requires to he “repeated.” In xHabama, Arkansas, 
 Iowa, and Missouri, the cruelty must he such as to “en- 
 danger life;” in New Hampshire and Delaware, such as “to 
 endanger health or reason;” in Pennsylvania, such as “to 
 render living longer together absolutely insupportable.” In 
 Pennsylvania, and a few other States, the wife alone can 
 sue for divorce on the ground of alleged cruelty; hut most 
 States concede this right, also, to the Jiusband. In New 
 Hampshire, cruelty must exist at the very time the petition 
 is filed. In most of the States it suffices that either has 
 been, at any time since the marriage, guilty of cruelty 
 towards the other party. In Kentucky, it is necessary that 
 such treatment shall have continued for at least six months. 
 
 Desertion is another common cause for divorce, and 
 more decrees are granted for this than for any other one 
 cause. It invites “collusion,” and leaves no such stigma as 
 does “adultery,” or “cruelty.” But with regard to it the 
 language of the various State statutes is confusing. In one 
 State it is simple “abandonment,” in others “utter deser- 
 tion,” or “wilful desertion,” or “wilful, continued, and ob- 
 stinate,” or “wilful and malicious.” In some States, v. g. 
 Louisiana and Rhode Island, desertion must have continued 
 for five years to enable the aggrieved party to sue for di- 
 vorce, though the court may in the latter State, issue a 
 decree for desertion of a shorter period. Three years’ 
 absence is required in Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, 
 Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
 Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia two years, in 
 Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Ne- 
 braska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Ten- 
 nessee; while in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
 Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
 Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, 
 
 26 
 
Utah; Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, one year is 
 all that is required by law; and Arizona enjoys the dis- 
 tinction of granting divorce on the ground of desertion if 
 either party has been absent six months. Pennsylvania dif- 
 fers from the adjoining States of Maryland, Ohio, Dela- 
 ware, and West Virginia; Kentucky, from Tennessee; 
 Georgia from North Carolina and Florida, etc. In Connec- 
 ticut and Vermont, mere “disappearance” of the husband, 
 for seven years, without having been heard from is suffi- 
 cient; in New Hampshire and Ohio an absence of three 
 years without having been heard from suffices, while in 
 Colorado and Montana the accused party must he proven to 
 have “left the State without intention of returning.” Other 
 variations, too, exist with regard to this cause for divorce, 
 hut we need not dwell on them. 
 
 It would seem that so simple an offense as drunken- 
 ness would not admit of much variety or diversity of appli- 
 cation. In all States and Territories, except Illinois, Mary- 
 land, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Texas, Ver- 
 mont, and Virginia, it is a sufficient cause for divorce. In 
 California, it is “habitual intemperance,” such as disquali- 
 fies the person a great portion of the time from properly 
 attending to business, or such as would reasonably imply a 
 source of great mental anguish to the innocent party. In 
 Nevada and Kentucky, the habit must he “so great as to in- 
 capacitate the party from contributing his or her share to 
 the support of the family.” In Louisiana, it must be of 
 such a nature as to render the living together of man and 
 wife insupportable. In many States the wife is entitled to 
 a divorce if her husband has contracted “gross and con- 
 firmed habits of intoxication.” But even this, simple as it 
 may seem, is attended with not a few variations, especially 
 as regards duration. In New Hampshire and Ohio, it must 
 have existed three years; in Illinois, Colorado, and Oregon, 
 two years; in most States only one year, while in Georgia 
 and a few others the statutes read “for such time as the 
 jury in its discretion may deem sufficient.” Moreover, what 
 is understood by “gross and confirmed habits of intoxica- 
 tion,” or how often one must he drunk to constitute “habit- 
 
 27 
 
ual intemperance,” is nowhere carefully defined, so the 
 requirements of particular cases may vary as the character 
 of the judges before whom the cases are brought. 
 
 Looking beyond the specific causes considered above, 
 let us direct our attention to the vague and indefinite 
 grounds for divorce contained in what is called “The Om- 
 nibus Clause” in our divorce laws. Formerly, in many of 
 our States, the list of causes entitling one to a divorce 
 ended with, “any other cause within the discretion of the 
 court.” The statute of Arizona once read: “When the case 
 is within the reason of the law, within the general mischief 
 the law is intended to remedy, or within what it may he 
 presumed the legislators establishing the foregoing causes 
 would have provided against had they foreseen the specific 
 case.” At present this “Omnibus Clause” has generally 
 disappeared from our statute law, but not wholly, for a 
 near equivalent still disfigures the statutes of a few States. 
 In Florida, “the habitual indulgence of a violent and un- 
 governable temper” is ample ground for divorce. Ken- 
 tucky, Missouri, Oregon, Wyoming, and Washington, will 
 grant divorce for “indignities sufficient to render life bur- 
 densome,” and the list of specific causes for which Wash- 
 ington will decree divorce concludes with, “For any other 
 cause deemed by the court sufficient, if satisfied that they 
 can no longer live together.” What case could not he cov- 
 ered by this statute! Sad experience but emphasizes the 
 opinion that the discretionary power of the courts, in this 
 particular matter, does not always work to the best inter- 
 ests of the morality of the community at large. 
 
 Turning from the consideration of the great variety 
 and diversity in the specified causes for divorce found in 
 our law, if we examine the legal proceedings by which 
 divorces are obtained, we find an equal, if not a greater, 
 diversity. The first inquiry under this branch of the prob- 
 lem is as to the residence required in a State before one 
 can sue for a divorce. In Massachusetts and Vermont, “No 
 divorce shall he decreed (except under special circum- 
 stances in Massachusetts) for any cause, if the parties never 
 lived together as husband and wife” in these States; “nor 
 
 28 
 
for a cause which accrued in another State or country, un- 
 less the parties, before such cause accrued, lived together 
 as husband and wife” in these States; “nor for a cause 
 which accrued in another State or country, unless one of 
 the parties lived in” these States. In many of our States 
 no such restrictive cause exists; for instance, in Maine, 
 there is no statutory requirement as to length of residence 
 when the “parties were married in this State or cohabited 
 there after marriage.” And as to causes occurring out of 
 the State in which suit for divorce is filed the most perplex- 
 ing differences exist in the statutes of our States and Ter- 
 ritories. In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, 
 the petitioner must have resided three years next preceding 
 the filing of the libel when both parties were residents, 
 otherwise five years; in Florida, Indiana, Maryland, North 
 Carolina, and Tennessee, two years. One year is the statu- 
 tory requirement in all the other States, except Idaho, Ne- 
 braska, Nevada, and South Dakota, in which States only 
 six months’ residence is required. 
 
 In many States and Territories the statutes make pro- 
 vision as to the manner in which the defendant in a divorce 
 suit shall be served with notice thereof, and reasonable care 
 is taken that the notice is served on him or her. In other 
 States the provisions on this point evidently admit of great 
 abuse, it being left to the unsupported affidavit of one inter- 
 ested party, or to the mere statement of the applicant to 
 determine the fact of the defendant’s absence beyond the 
 reach of the court. Notice by publication or mail, or both, 
 is very frequently regarded as sufficient. 
 
 In the modes of proof, rules of trial, etc., hardly any 
 two States can he said to entirely agree. However it is true 
 that a large measure of uniformity in substance underlies 
 the differences with regard to this point, and there is little 
 evidence to prove that the variations in procedure have 
 exerted a marked influence on the divorce rate of the coun- 
 try. As this aspect of the question would involve too much 
 of the technicality of law, the plain statement of the fact 
 is deemed sufficient for our purpose. 
 
 29 
 
Again, the effect and consequences of a decree of 
 absolute divorce vary according to the latitude and longitude 
 of the place where it is obtained. In most of our States 
 such a decree fully and completely dissolves the marriage 
 contract as to both parties. In California and Louisiana, it 
 places them in the same situation as if the marriage had 
 never been performed. After an absolute divorce, either 
 party may, in most States, marry again at any time, as in 
 Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Kentucky, Ten- 
 nessee, Texas, Oregon, and the same would follow where 
 the law is silent. However, in some States certain limita- 
 tions exist. The libellee (or either party in Minnesota and 
 Kansas) cannot, in Mississippi, Maine, and Nebraska, marry 
 until two years (in Missouri, five years; in Vermont, three 
 years; in Kansas, six months) shall have elapsed from the 
 issuance of the final decree; or, as in Missouri, sooner by 
 special decree of the court. In New York, a party con- 
 victed of adultery and subsequently divorced on this ground 
 cannot marry again at any time during the lifetime of the 
 former partner, but the parties may remarry each other. 
 In Maryland, Virginia, and Mississippi, — as to the person 
 against whom a divorce has been granted for adultery, or 
 in Maryland and Virginia for abandonment, the court may 
 decree that he or she is not to marry again under the pains 
 and penalties of adultery. Such a decree, however, may be, 
 at any time afterwards, revoked or annulled in Virginia. In 
 a few States, no husband nor wife divorced for his or her 
 adultery, can marry the “particeps criminis” during the 
 lifetime of former husband or wife, as is the case in Penn- 
 sylvania, Delaware, and Tennessee; nor at any time, as is 
 the case in Louisiana, where such marriage renders the 
 divorced party thereto guilty of bigamy. But in many 
 States no such statute exists relative to this case, and, there- 
 fore, the defendant guilty of adultery may be married at 
 any time, even to the “particeps criminis.” In Georgia 
 and Alabama, the whole matter of rights and disabilities of 
 marriage after divorce is left to the discretion of the jury 
 or court granting divorce. And as a matter of fact, the 
 statutory provisions of all these States framed for the 
 
 30 
 
laudable purpose of preventing the guilty party from marry- 
 ing again are utterly futile because they do not operate out- 
 side the limits of these respective States. In many another 
 State the party affected by these statutory limitations can 
 be lawfully married, and a marriage good and valid where it 
 is celebrated is, by universal and necessary rule, good and 
 valid everywhere. Such a statutory restriction, therefore, 
 imposes on the affected party only the inconvenience of 
 going; into another State to enter 'into his or her second 
 marriage. This fact was made very patent a few years ago 
 by a “tramp marriage” of two members of New York’s 
 exclusive set, — the woman being divorced in New York, and 
 married again a few hours later in Connecticut. 
 
 Therefore, it may, it must be said that the result of 
 the varied legislation and the loose administration of the 
 divorce laws of our States is that, far from protecting the 
 rights of our citizens and of the marital union, these very 
 laws invite, as it were, the very evils which they claim to 
 repress and punish. Ostensibly the causes for divorce are 
 limited, and theoretically this should curtail the number 
 of divorces granted, but practically — given the desire for 
 divorce and the requisite money for counsel fees — the cov- 
 eted release from the marriage tie is almost certain. If 
 the statutory enactments of one State prohibit the grant- 
 ing of the decree, a temporary removal to another jurisdic- 
 tion is all that is necessary to secure it. There the disso- 
 lution of the marriage contract can be effected for causes 
 and upon notice and testimony which would be insufficient 
 in the State of actual residence. The number of divorces 
 continues to increase, many of which, legally valid in the 
 jurisdiction where they were obtained, would be declared 
 fraudulent and void in other States, and marriages by the 
 divided parties, held to be legal in the State where they 
 were entered into, would be considered bigamous in other 
 places. If it is the husband who secures the divorce and 
 remarries, the personal status of two women and the prop- 
 erty rights of two families are involved. The first wife is 
 still the lawful wife, entitled to all the rights and privileges 
 of a wife, in the State in which the first marriage was con- 
 
 31 
 
tracted, and probably in many others, except the one in 
 which the fraudulent divorce was obtained. The second 
 wife is entitled to dower in the real estate of her husband 
 under the law of the State in which her marriage took place, 
 and the children of that marriage are legitimate in that 
 State, but elsewhere they may be illegitimate, and their 
 mother entitled to no dower. 
 
 Should things be as they are? Should a slight varia- 
 tion in latitude and longitude present such conflicting rights 
 and obligations in the same marital relation? Is there, in 
 the nature of things, a reason why the invisible line between 
 adjoining States and Territories should give rise to such 
 visible and marked contrasts in the statutory law of each 
 under exactly the same fact and circumstance? Is it con- 
 sistent that, in the same country, the law of one place should 
 be such as to subject one woman to a life of continued and 
 inevitable hardship, when another woman, a few miles dis- 
 tant, is legally entitled to complete and permanent relief? 
 If, in the opinion of the citizens, it is to the best interests 
 of one State not to permit divorce for any other cause than 
 the alleged Scriptural ground, is it advisable and conducive 
 to sound morality to recognize any other reason as suffi- 
 cient just across the border line? And if in one State 
 other injuries to a wife besides marital infidelity are con- 
 sidered sufficient reasons for the dissolution of the marriage 
 bond, does not consistency demand that this view of things 
 be taken elsewhere in a country throughout the length and 
 breadth of which the conditions of life are practically the 
 same? It has well been said that, “Without at all under- 
 rating the moral guilt of adultery, and whatever views may 
 be taken of it by those whose conceptions of personal purity 
 are most exalted, it is not easy to see how in its legal char- 
 acter and effect it is a greater crime against a wife that 
 her husband should have committed an act of infidelity, 
 than that he should have made an assault upon her with 
 intent to murder, or should have rendered her life intoler- 
 able by a long series of brutal cruelties or by excessive and 
 incurable intemperance, or without excuse should have 
 deliberately deserted her, or brought about the same result 
 
 32 
 
by the commission of some felony that consigned him to a 
 prison for a term of years.” Should we have, then, on this 
 vital subject of divorce, one law in New York and another 
 in Chicago; one rule in Boston and another in San Fran- 
 cisco? Certainly not. Uniformity is desirable, and it has 
 been urged for many years. 
 
 Can uniformity be obtained in this matter? What 
 steps are necessary to procure a practical measure of 
 reform ? This is the important question. Opinions are, and 
 will be, divided concerning the other questions on the sub- 
 ject. Divorces will continue to be granted. At present we 
 have forty odd States and Territories. We are over seventy 
 millions of people; stretched three thousand miles from 
 ocean to ocean, dwelling on sea-coast, plain and mountain; 
 men and women of diverse nations and races, with diverse 
 customs, holding diverse religions, and varying shades of 
 opinion on all social questions. The sentiment of the peo- 
 ple of the different States is, and in the nature of things 
 will continue to be, diverse upon the subject of divorce, 
 thereby making it inevitable that there shall be a corre- 
 sponding diversity of laws concerning it. Divorce legisla- 
 tion has come in response to a decided public sentiment in 
 its favor. It has not been brought about by vicious or 
 necessarily irreligious people. Nor was it instituted by 
 those who believe in yielding to an evil if you cannot cor- 
 rect it, but rather by sincere and thoughtful legislators who 
 were, it can hardly be doubted, honest in their convictions 
 that in compelling ill-mated couples to remain united society 
 was perpetrating upon itself an evil vastly more serious in 
 its consequences than that which might come from the en- 
 actment of divorce laws. However much we may deplore 
 the weakening of the family tie — that seems to be a feature 
 of our modern civilization — the causes will be found, to a 
 great extent, in the changed and changing religious, social, 
 economic, and industrial conditions of our people, and not 
 so much in the divorce laws which follow, but do not create, 
 the demand for them. At the present time a great major- 
 ity of the thinking people of the country recognize the dis- 
 astrous consequences of our lax divorce laws and their care- 
 
 33 
 
less administration. At the same time they are alive to the 
 necessity of reform in the matter, which necessity is patent 
 from the want of uniformity in the laws of the several 
 States prescribing causes for divorce, concerning the resi- 
 dence, in the respective States, of the parties to a divorce 
 suit, the notice to he served on the defendant, and also from 
 the want of uniformity in the force and effect of a judicial 
 decree dissolving the marriage contract. But how can uni- 
 formity of divorce legislation, and consequently reform in 
 this matter, be obtained? Two methods are advocated: 
 either by State or by National legislation. 
 
 There are present forty odd law-making powers con- 
 tinually in action within the United States; some of them, 
 in the newer States, called upon to frame new codes on 
 the basis of older ones, and all more or less busy at read- 
 justing the old laws to a somewhat altered condition of 
 society, trying experiments in legislation, or correcting the 
 errors of earlier legislation. As a consequence, there is a 
 wearisome amount of laws on divorce existing at any one 
 time. At present, as in the past, each State prescribes the 
 qualifications of the parties to the marriage contract, the 
 manner in which it shall be solemnized and authenticated, 
 the causes for which it may be set aside or annulled, and 
 the effect of the dissolution upon the personal status and 
 property rights of the parties and of their children. Now 
 the movement to obtain uniformity in divorce legislation 
 throughout the country by State law advocates the follow- 
 ing: — “Let one State, like New York, take an advanced 
 scientific position. Let it formulate a scientific, harmonious, 
 homogeneous system of marriage and divorce law; and . . 
 
 then, by convention or otherwise” influence the other States 
 to adopt a similar system. And thus have “the Legisla- 
 tures of the various States act together and co-operate in 
 this matter.”* 
 
 When Mr. Hill was Governor of New York, a commis- 
 sion was appointed to act in accordance with this move- 
 ment, and later a Conference of Commissioners, appointed 
 by the various States — to the number of thirty odd at the 
 
 * Judge Barret, “ New York Daily Tribune,” Nov. 25, 1883. 
 
 34 
 
present writing — has been organized for the purpose of 
 affecting legislation in this matter. Some progress toward 
 securing uniformity has been made by the action of these 
 State Boards of Commissioners. At least, some uniformity 
 of public sentiment has been secured. One step at a time is 
 a good motto in all legal reform, and this securing of a uni- 
 form public opinion is, perhaps, in the light of our present 
 divorce legislation, the first step to be taken. Yet when one 
 considers that there are now over forty distinct and sover- 
 eign States, each with its own system of divorce laws and 
 procedure; its own usages, customs, and traditions; its own 
 views of the sacredness or laxity of the marriage relation; 
 its natural attachment to its historic legislation, it is easy to 
 conceive how difficult it is to confidently expect uniformity 
 through the action of the many State Legislatures. The 
 efforts of “The American Bar Association/'’ too, illustrate 
 the case. This association was formed in 1878, and is com- 
 posed of the leading members of the bar and of legislators 
 from all over the country. One of its leading objects is, 
 by the interchange of thought and opinion, to secure uni- 
 formity of legislation in business matters, such as commer- 
 cial law, the law of land titles, and the like, by separate 
 legislative action in each State. However, notwithstanding 
 the earnest efforts of so many influential men in so many 
 quarters, but little progress has been made in this direc- 
 tion. So it would seem that there is not much to encour- 
 age the hope of uniform divorce legislation bv any such 
 means. In a movement of this nature there is wanting an 
 acknowledged standard to which to appeal. In the nature 
 of things, each State is reluctant to retrace its steps, or to 
 abandon its long established code. Yet, to thave this move- 
 ment effective, there must be concession and compromise; 
 the various State systems must, as it were, be fused together 
 and a new system cast from the mass. The manifold diffi- 
 culties attending this process are manifest. Uniformity by 
 separate legislative action can be brought about only by 
 many years of persistent and arduous labor. 
 
 A most important measure of reform, or, at least, a mo- 
 mentous step in that direction, and one strongly advocated 
 
 85 
 
today, is the entrusting of the entire matter to the one 
 controlling power of the National Congress. That body now 
 has the right to enact laws regulating marriage and divorce 
 for the District of Columbia and for the various Territories. 
 Extend this power over the remaining portion of the coun- 
 try, and the first step is gained, so it is affirmed; and more- 
 over, the advocates of this movement assert, there is noth- 
 ing in the structure of our government to prevent this 
 power being conferred on the Federal authority. True, this 
 would necessitate an amendment to the Federal Constitu- 
 tion, and the securing of such an amendment may prove 
 impracticable. That it is beset with many difficulties is 
 conceded; but, it is maintained, these are not so great as 
 has been imagined, nor are they so unconquerable as those 
 necessarily encountered in the plan for securing uniform 
 legislation through the co-operation of the individual States. 
 Those who advocate this method of reform in divorce legis- 
 lation contend that the controversy as to which shall legis- 
 late on the subject — the State or the Federal Government — 
 reduces itself to a mere question of public convenience and 
 welfare. Therefore, let it he clearly shown that Congress 
 can best legislate on the subject, and in a manner conducive 
 to the best interests of the nation at large, and then the 
 people can he trusted to demand that their representatives 
 authorize it. 
 
 The objections to the amendment have been more or 
 less magnified. To the objection that if Congress is em- 
 powered to legislate on matters pertaining to marriage and 
 divorce "it will eventually absorb all powers incidental to 
 the subject,” it is answered that "Congress could exercise 
 only such express powers as were granted by the amend- 
 ment — the powers necessarily implied in the express grant.” 
 It is true that the United States’ courts would have juris- 
 diction to enforce the laws which Congress might enact 
 under such an amendment. That jurisdiction, however, 
 would extend only to cases brought under these laws, and to 
 cases in which some question arising under them is involved. 
 Such an amendment would not necessarily confer upon Con- 
 gress or the United States courts jurisdiction over the other 
 
 36 
 
relations of “husband and wife ;” over the relations of 
 “parent and child;” of “dower and courtesy,” etc. Jurisdic- 
 tion on these matters could he left where it now is — with 
 the States. Divorce might, also, be left to the State courts, 
 if neither party chose to resort to the Federal tribunals. 
 
 But granted that such an amendment as proposed 
 would involve the surrender by the States of jurisdiction in 
 these matters, that, it is asserted, would not be an invincible 
 argument against its adoption. The real point at issue is 
 whether or not it would be better for the people of the 
 United States, in order to secure- uniformity in the laws 
 regulating marriage and divorce, and in the personal status 
 and property rights of divorced parties and their children, 
 that the Federal authority should possess the additional 
 power proposed by the amendment? 
 
 To take domestic relations from State control and make 
 them Federal questions is, indeed, a momentous step. Those 
 who admire paternal government, under any plausible name, 
 may well favor the project as a long step towards centraliza- 
 tion, for if Congress is given control of marriage and divorce 
 it is hard to say what shall be refused it. However, though 
 the vacillating policy of Congress in finance, tariff, and 
 other matters, gives but little assurance of wise or even 
 steady legislation in family affairs, as Federal legislation 
 on marriage and divorce seems to be very much advocated 
 today it is well that we should consider it at some length. 
 So supposing a constitutional amendment made and the 
 matter brought within the control of Congress, would the 
 present difficulty, the present evil, be removed ? Uniformity 
 of law might be obtained, the present legal uncertainty of 
 marital relations would be, to some extent, remedied, and, if 
 the law is like that of the stricter States, much would be 
 gained for the stability of the family. But would the in- 
 crease of divorces be checked, or even appreciably affected ? 
 Would the general morality of the country be much better? 
 
 In legislating on the subject. Congress — if it did not 
 adopt a “liberal” system of divorce, and of the deplorable 
 results of which on the family and on society at large there 
 can be no question — would most likely adopt one or more of 
 
 37 
 
tlie following courses which are open to it, namely, restric- 
 tion of marriage; restriction of divorce laws; restriction of 
 re-marriage after divorce; or the institution of civil mar- 
 riage and divorce. 
 
 Restriction of Marriage. — In all, or nearly all, of our 
 States certain restrictions as to age, etc., exist at the pres- 
 ent time. Now it is contended, “that many of the evils 
 which spring up in married life might he prevented, the 
 number of divorces decidedly lessened, and the deplorable 
 consequences thereof in some measure avoided” if Con- 
 gress could enact laws by which the age of lawful marriage 
 would be raised to years of actual rather than assumed dis- 
 cretion, that lawful marriage could not be entered into 
 under full age without the written consent of parent or 
 guardian, and that the parties could be put under oath as 
 to their age, antecedents, etc., and false swearing made 
 perjury — and punishable as such.* In this connection. Dr. 
 William C. Robinson — the present Dean of the Catholic 
 University of America Law School — while a professor at 
 Yale wrote : — “No person should be marriageable under the 
 age of twenty-one, and a marriage celebrated between per- 
 sons either of whom is under age should be ipso facto 
 void.”** At first sight it would seem that in a law of this 
 nature would be found something of an effective remedy. 
 If marriage could be contracted only by persons of a ma- 
 ture age, with sufficient means of support, etc., it would be 
 but natural to expect a more stable condition of the marital 
 relations. However, no direct connection between the age of 
 marriage and the liability to divorce can be made out from 
 statistics. Yet it may be said that communities in which 
 early marriages are most common are comparatively most 
 free from divorce. Prince Krapotkine tells us that in Rus- 
 sia, “the peasants, for the most part, marry their sons at 
 eighteen and their daughters at sixteen,” and the Russian 
 peasantry are, perhaps, with the exception of the Irish, the 
 least subject to divorce. Moreover, 4,490 husbands or wives 
 
 * For the moral worth of the physiological aspects of this question cf. Catholic Uni- 
 versity Bulletin, April, 1900; “ The Restriction of Marriage,” by John W. Melody. 
 
 ** Journal of Social Science, (Am. As3. XIV.) 1881, p. 136, “The Diagnostics of 
 Divorce.” 
 
 38 
 
under twenty years of age were living in Massachusetts in 
 1902.* ** To this number must be added an indetermin- 
 able number of persons married between the age of twenty 
 and twenty-one to ascertain the number of persons whose 
 marriages would be declared void by such a law as Dr. 
 Robinson proposes. Now how large a proportion of these 
 5,000 persons — a very conservative estimate of the number 
 — would have remained virtuous and continent in the face of 
 a law forbidding their marriage ? It is difficult to say. The 
 experience of certain countries, v. g. Bavaria, in which 
 restrictions were placed upon marriage, may give us some 
 idea of what might be expected here if such a law were in 
 force. Where restrictions have been placed on marriage, 
 “the number of marriages in a year decreased rapidly, but 
 parallel with this decrease went a large increase in the num- 
 ber of illegitimate births.” When the law was repealed and 
 the restrictions were removed, the annual number of mar- 
 riages increased and “simultaneously with this came a 
 marked decrease in the number of illegitimate births.” A 
 consideration of the liability to immorality of this nature 
 evidences the wisdom of the Catholic Church in permitting 
 lawful wedlock to persons of the early age assigned in her 
 Canon Law. So in the present condition of affairs in our 
 country, “legal restrictions on marriage can hardly be 
 deemed a satisfactory method of checking divorce. Restric- 
 tions on marriage reduce the number of marriages, and thus 
 ultimately the number of divorces” . . . but, “the at- 
 
 tendant evils (or, at least, their grave probability) are so 
 great . . . as to make such restrictions unwise. 
 
 Restriction of Divorce . — Laws and their administra- 
 tion affect divorce. This is axiomatic. In fact, the first 
 impulse is to attribute the whole evil in our country to lax 
 and easy divorce laws, and to a more careless administration 
 of them. So the contention is that the enactment by Con- 
 gress of a code of stringent divorce laws, with stricter meth- 
 ods of administration would alleviate, if not completely ob- 
 literate, the present sad condition of affairs. 
 
 * “Sixty-First Report of Births, Marriages and Deaths in Massachusetts.” 
 
 ** “ The Divorce Problem. A Study in Statistics.” — Wilcox, pp. 60-66. 
 
 39 
 
It is true that were legal divorces less easy to obtain 
 such frequent separations would not occur. It is also true 
 that a stricter divorce law, v. g. one admitting fewer causes 
 should reduce the number of divorces. But when one con- 
 siders that divorce statutes are only the embodiment and 
 outgrowth of the increasing popular demand for a more easy 
 separation; that the laws only reflect public sentiment on 
 the subject, what reasonable prospect is there to expect that 
 Congress would enact any law on the subject which would 
 differ materially from the State laws ? What public opinion 
 demands in the States may he expected from the represen- 
 tatives of the people of these States in Congress, for gener- 
 ally Congressmen are guided by the sentiments of their 
 constituents. 
 
 However, suppose a code of stringent divorce laws was 
 enacted and the causes of divorce were thereby limited, 
 would this eradicate the evil? Would the stability of the 
 marital union be assured? Would its inviolability be guar- 
 anteed ? 
 
 Connecticut, in 1878, by repealing the law permitting 
 divorce in that State for “any such misconduct as perma- 
 nently destroys the happiness of the petitioner and defeats 
 the purpose of the marriage relation,” restricted her divorce 
 code. However, the number of divorces for that year was 
 412, exactly the same as for the year before. The law im- 
 mediately diminished the divorces for misconduct with or 
 without causes by 99, but there are just 99 more for other 
 causes, which would seem to show that it cannot be admit- 
 ted that the decrease is sufficient to indicate the influence 
 of the change of law. It may be urged, however, that Con- 
 necticut and some other States, which have repealed some 
 of the laxer laws, have been content with half-hearted meas- 
 ures. South Carolina, alone, by prohibiting divorce alto- 
 gether, has gone to the root of the matter. 
 
 It is probably true that many marry now with the 
 thought in their hearts that if they do not find the union to 
 their happiness, they may break it and marry again. But 
 if divorce was stringently restricted, or entirely abolished, 
 persons of common prudence would resign themselves to 
 
 40 
 
the inevitable, and when they lie under the necessity of 
 passing their lives together they would endeavor to forgive 
 or overlook many frivolous quarrels and disgusts which, 
 under the prospect of an easy separation, are frequently in- 
 flamed into the most deadly hatred. Therefore, such a law 
 as we are considering would seem to he conducive to good 
 results. However, setting aside as inadvisable and imprac- 
 ticable, in the present condition of things, the adoption by 
 the other States of the South Carolina legislation — which 
 has not tended to produce a very enviable morality in that 
 State* — we may say that restrictions on divorce by enact- 
 ment of stringent laws and limitations of causes for which 
 divorce is granted exert but a slight influence on the divorce 
 rate, for frequently a crime is committed for the very pur- 
 pose of having a cause for divorce, and as long as any cause 
 is admitted this is always possible. It cannot be gainsaid 
 that such restrictions would have some salutary effects, but 
 the effectiveness of such legislation would depend on the 
 moral sentiment of the people, which, at present, does not 
 seem to be such as would warrant the development of the 
 good results naturally inherent in the legislation proposed. 
 
 One efficient means of restricting divorce by law is 
 noted by Mr. Wilcox. It is to make the procuring of the 
 decree expensive. The necessary evidence might be readily 
 furnished, but the requisite money would not be forthcom- 
 ing. The English law, by which prior to 1858 divorces were 
 granted only by Parliament and consequently at a consid- 
 erable expense, illustrates the working of this principle. 
 But, as Mr. Wilcox further remarks, “the obvious objection 
 to having one system of law for the rich and another for 
 the poor, makes discussion of this method of restricting 
 divorce unnecessary.” (Wilcox, op. cit. p. 58). 
 
 Restriction of Re-marriage . — Almost invariably in a 
 discussion on this problem of divorce it is persistently as- 
 serted by many writers that most frequently divorce has 
 been sought after and obtained for the sole purpose of giv- 
 ing the party interested an opportunity of entering upon a 
 
 # “Marriage, Separation and Divorce.” — J. P. Bishop, vol. I., Nos. 58-59. 
 
 41 
 
new and more congenial marital relation. So it has been 
 affirmed that a limitation of re-marriage would greatly re- 
 duce the number of divorces. 
 
 In some States, as noted above, provisions have been 
 adopted prohibiting the guilty party from marrying again. 
 But, affording the really innocent party the right to re- 
 marry necessarily and consistently involves the extending 
 of this same privilege to the guilty party. If the former 
 marriage has been dissolved for the one party, it no longer 
 exists at all, and consequently it is also dissolved for the 
 other. A husband without a wife, and vice versa, is a con- 
 tradiction in words and in fact. Moreover, the present pro- 
 visions of certain States restricting the re-marriage of the 
 guilty party in a divorce suit are practically nil owing to 
 the comparatively easy access to other jurisdictions wherein 
 such provisions are set at naught. Therefore it is argued 
 that a uniform law denying the privilege or right of re- 
 marriage to either the innocent or the guilty divorced party 
 — except, perhaps, they re-marry each other — would he 
 something of a panacea for the divorce evil in our country. 
 The late Hon. E. J. Phelps has most emphatically stated this 
 position. “The question is not,” he wrote, “whether divorce 
 laws shall exist, hut whether they shall permit the divorced 
 parties to re-marry. Here, it is believed, will he found the 
 mainspring of the whole mischief. If that right were taken 
 away, nine-tenths, perhaps, ninety-nine hundredths . . 
 
 of the divorce cases would at once disappear. In the vast 
 majority of instances the desire on the part of one or other 
 or both to re-marry is the foundation of the whole proceed- 
 ing.”* 
 
 It may he remarked in passing that from the point of 
 view of fact it is most difficult, if not morally impossible, 
 to give any real appreciation of the scientific value, for our 
 country, of this emphatic statement of Mr. Phelps. No 
 means of subjecting it to a scientific test are at hand. We 
 have no statistics of re-marriage. 
 
 * “ Divorce in the United States.” — The Forum, Dec., 1889, p. 352. 
 
 42 
 
Now the total abolition of divorce in the sense of a 
 divorce so dissolving the marital union as to confer the 
 privilege of re-marriage on one or both parties would result 
 practically — and this is what Mr. Phelps advocates — in the 
 adoption of legal separation, i. e., separatio a mensa et toro. 
 This would he the adoption by the State of the policy of the 
 Catholic Church. While conceding that divorce is some- 
 times not only beneficial, but necessary to society, it is main- 
 tained that absolute divorce is not tolerable even from a 
 high ethical, apart from the theological, point of view. All 
 that can he accomplished by divorce for the protection of 
 the innocent and injured individual, and for the preserva- 
 tion of the household — the dissolution of which is threat- 
 ened by the infidelity of husband or wife — can he secured by 
 legal separation. It is a divorce to all intents and purposes 
 as effectual as any, except that it does not allow either party 
 to contract a second marriage while the other consort is 
 living. 
 
 However, suppose this kind of divorce were adopted and 
 recognized by civil law, and that all the sanction of the law 
 was applied to enforce the observance of the common law 
 and statute law in conformity with this principle, would 
 this be a satisfactory solution of the difficulty and an 
 effectual remedy for the evils in question? The practice of 
 divorce of this nature in the Catholic Church is certainly 
 effectual in the case of Catholics, and we believe that were 
 our civil law changed so as to permit only this kind of 
 divorce, such legislation would be productive of much good 
 in the country at large. It would create a good impression 
 which would he far-reaching. Persons contemplating matri- 
 mony would think seriously before entering into a union 
 from which there is no total escape. Persons already 
 united would, in many cases, make a virtue of necessity, and 
 the more readily resign themselves to bear with meekness 
 the many petty grievances which are so often the seed of 
 discord in married life, and’ which in the end lead to the 
 divorce court. Ultimately, such a law would create and 
 firmly ground a better and healthier public sentiment rela- 
 tive to the sacredness of marriage. 
 
 43 
 
But, were it introduced into our midst at present, the 
 moral condition of the country is such that its real moral 
 worth would not he immediately experienced. Separations, 
 undoubtedly very numerous, would take the place of the 
 present divorces, and not being allowed to re-marry, it is but 
 human to expect that the parties would resort to other 
 means of gratifying their desires. Passion knows no law. 
 All the objections to the restriction of re-marriage would 
 weigh with equal force against this restriction. But time 
 would tell. The better sentiment would eventually prevail; 
 the true man would conquer the tendency of his lower na- 
 ture. Combined with limitation of causes for granting such 
 a divorce this would he an ideal policy for a State to adopt, 
 it is as near to a complete solution of the question as is 
 possible to civil legislation, and in the course of time the 
 beneficial results of such a law would he experienced in the 
 family — in the peace and concord of which lie the happi- 
 ness and the prosperity of the State. 
 
 The Institution of Civil Marriage and Divorce. — Sup- 
 pose Congress should follow the example of countries on 
 the European continent, which exercise jurisdiction over 
 matters pertaining to marriage and divorce, and would in- 
 stitute civil marriage. Suppose it instituted a marriage 
 similar to the “marriage civil obligatoire” of the French 
 Code of 1792, in which was set forth the principle that mar- 
 riage is a civil institution, its celebration a civil transaction 
 requiring in no case the ministry of religion. This prin- 
 ciple was, in 1804, incorporated into the Napoleonic Code, 
 and its influence is still felt. Would such a system solve the 
 problem for our country? 
 
 The most fundamental and important part of such* 
 legislation as here proposed is the explicit and consistent 
 adoption of the theory of the civil contract as the ruling 
 principle of divorce statutes. In such a system marriage and 
 divorce would he considered together, and the laws in rela- 
 tion to them made harmonious and homogeneous. At pres- 
 ent it would seem as though our laws considered marriage 
 and divorce as independent problems. Marriage is called 
 “a civil contract,” and is permitted to he entered into as 
 
 44 
 
informally as any contract that can be made. Viewed in 
 itself it is considered as a civil contract, but when looking 
 at its dissolution our laws seem to regard it as more than a 
 contract, and, to some extent, as a sacrament. This is not 
 consistent. If laws are to regard marriage in the light of 
 religion and as something sacred, then divorce is properly 
 to he considered under the same aspect. But if marriage 
 is solely and simply a civil contract in the eyes of our law, 
 then it should be so regarded when laws are made for its 
 dissolution. 
 
 It is not contended that legislation on this matter of 
 divorce is necessarily based upon the religious or sacra- 
 mental idea of marriage, but that something of this spirit is 
 found in the history, in the development, of our divorce stat- 
 utes is undeniable. It is this idea which seems to animate 
 the legislator when he takes under advisement any modifi- 
 cation of an existing code. It is justly argued, we think, 
 that legal restrictions in this matter of divorce may be 
 attributed to the fact that our legislators invariably attach 
 some religious idea to marriage. 
 
 But in the case of the institution of civil marriage, 
 when marriage is considered simply as a civil contract, — 
 and all idea of its religious and sacramental nature is set 
 aside — the law must grant no divorce at all, from the motive 
 of expediency, or it must grant it in certain cases from the 
 same motive. In other words, the law must grant or refuse 
 divorce as the public and private good may seem to require, 
 and if it grants divorce for one cause it must also grant it 
 for all causes similar and equal to this one. This throws an 
 altogether new aspect on the question. Instead of asking, 
 “What does the law of God command, forbid, or permit with 
 respect to the making or the dissolving of the marriage 
 contract?” — as seems to be the case, to some extent at 
 present — the law maker must only inquire, “What law does 
 human wisdom counsel me to make for the common good?” 
 
 With regard to the moral worth of such an alteration 
 in our marriage laws — if such a change were to be made — 
 it must be said that, unsatisfactory as things are at present, 
 it is preferable to leave them as they are rather than to flv 
 
 45 
 
into the arms of the dangers naturally inherent in this sys- 
 tem which, in principle, reduces marriage to the merest 
 contract and so degrades the family. It is an indisputable 
 fact that something of an idea of the religious sacredness 
 of marriage pervades the mass of the people of this coun- 
 try. We have seen that it is this idea which crops out occa- 
 sionally in the work of our lawmakers when engaged in 
 formulating our divorce legislation which is, in spirit, based 
 on this view of marriage. It is to the credit of our nation, 
 as well as to her welfare, that something of this old and 
 proper sacramental idea still exists and exercises its influ- 
 ence on the marital relations. It tends to preserve the sanc- 
 tity and inviolability of the family, though, in our modern 
 civilization, this seems to be in a decadent state. But sad, 
 indeed, is it to contemplate the lamentable condition of 
 affairs almost necessarily inaugurated under a system which 
 destroys the very prop of the family — its sacred character. 
 It is of the very essence of civil marriage to obliterate the 
 religious idea of the marriage state, and thus greatly weaken 
 the family tie. Of the result of such a system on society at 
 large there can be no doubt. Marriage is the very corner- 
 stone of the social structure, for the family is constituted 
 by marriage, and society is constituted by the family. And 
 the welfare of the nation demands that the family be more 
 stable than it could possibly be under a system of civil mar- 
 riage. Social corruption, whether ancient or modern, began 
 in the family, and the corruption of the family carried with 
 it the ruin of society and of all civilization. The voice of 
 history — sacred and profane — emphatically asserts that the 
 renowned and powerful nations of antiquity went out with 
 the family, and it is to the restoration of the family — to 
 the assertion and maintenance of the sanctity and stability 
 of marriage — that the modern nations chiefly owe the moral 
 greatness they possess. “History repeats itself,” is an old 
 and true saying, and judging from history, past and present, 
 it seems but natural to infer that the future greatness and 
 prosperity of our nation will increase or decrease in propor- 
 tion as the nation will approach to, or depart from, the ideal 
 of an absolutely stable marriage. The institution of civil 
 
 46 
 
marriage would certainly mark a decided step in the way of 
 departure. Such a system, threatening as it does the disso- 
 lution of the home, though it may wear the guise of law 
 and operate through so dignified an instrumentality as a 
 court of justice, is only the entering wedge of anarchy. 
 
 However, in general, suppose a constitutional amend- 
 ment made and a system of divorce legislation enacted pre- 
 scribing uniformity throughout the country, would it be 
 satisfactory? It is unfortunate, in the existing condition 
 of things, that a divorce obtained in one State should fail of 
 its effect in another, and that a man or woman should be a 
 husband or wife in New York, and at the same time a single 
 and unmarried man or woman in the Dakotas or Nebraska. 
 This, at least, is one of the troubles which Federal legisla- 
 tion might remove. And if the Federal law was a strict 
 one, similar to that of some States, the family would be, to 
 some extent, benefited. Its stability would be somewhat 
 the more firmly established. But would such legislation 
 remove all difficulty? There seems to be no reason why it 
 should fail to do so for those who believe in the power of 
 the nation to make laws of this kind; but those who main- 
 tain that the State has no rights in so far as the essence 
 and indissolubility of marriage are concerned cannot accept 
 the decisions of the civil power in this matter. Catholics 
 are among this number. They cannot, in theory, approve 
 of Federal legislation any more than of State legislation on 
 this subject; but they can nevertheless be glad of any 
 change, in the divorce laws of our country, which makes 
 the actual results of such legislation less disastrous. 
 
 The Catholic — as becomes a Christian — believes that 
 the words “What God hath joined together let no man put 
 asunder,” are final and decretive. The troublesome ques- 
 tions are, “What constitutes a true and valid marriage ?” and 
 “In what cases will God Himself annul it?” These are the 
 two points which touch, and most touch, the Christian con- 
 science, because that every true marriage has the divine 
 sanction no Christian can doubt. So it is, then, a matter 
 of the law of God. But who shall interpret this law ? Shall 
 it be the law of the land ? This may seem reasonable enough. 
 
 47 
 
The law of the land has, indeed, a right to speak in the 
 name of God, and speaking thus it commands our obedi- 
 ence. All authority, parental, social, ecclesiastical, national, 
 is from God, as St. Paul tells us. Therefore, it may seem 
 that the law of the land can speak in this matter as it can 
 in other matters — that of property, for instance. But when 
 we come to examine the question more thoroughly we find 
 a difficulty in this particular matter of marriage which does 
 not exist elsewhere. There is little or no danger that the 
 same property will be decided to belong to two different 
 persons within the territories of the law’s jurisdiction; and 
 even in the case of conflicting national laws, as in the mat- 
 ter of copyright, or patent, there is no essential inconsis- 
 tency in a thing belonging to one man in one place, and to 
 another man in another place. But in the Catholic view 
 of the fitness of things there is such an incongruity in a 
 man’s being the husband of one woman in one place and 
 of another woman in another place. As a Christian he can- 
 not believe that a man can in one country be divorced in 
 the sight of God from one wife and have another, and in 
 another country return to the one whom he left; and the 
 only logical solution of the difficulty is the one of which he 
 is in possession. 
 
 Naturally, the Catholic can hardly expect the world 
 in general, or the United States in particular, to accept his 
 views on the subject. But all who are professedly Chris- 
 tians believe, or at least should believe, that there is an 
 essential right and wrong in this matter which mere human 
 law cannot make or unmake, and to which human law should 
 conform. But how shall man find out what constitutes 
 this right and wrong? Scripture is vainly called to aid; 
 scholars disagree as to its meaning, and their conclusions 
 only become more widely divergent by discussion until, at 
 last, faith in Scripture itself begins to waver and mean- 
 while the evil we are striving to remedy grows daily worse 
 and worse. Therefore, the only way to have thoroughly 
 satisfactory marriage and divorce laws is to have a law- 
 making power, the jurisdiction of which is world-wide. 
 And the only way to get at the divine law on this most im- 
 
 48 
 
« 
 
 portant subject is to have a court which can interpret it — 
 a court from which there can be no appeal — so that all who 
 believe in the legitimate authority of this court shall be 
 able to act with a clear conscience in accepting its decisions. 
 This is the Catholic idea and practice. To a greater or 
 lesser extent, uo doubt, the same idea may prevail in other 
 Christian denominations; individual members of the various 
 religious sects in the country at large may be as firmly con- 
 vinced of this fact as Catholics are. But the absence of any 
 authoritative religious teaching outside the Catholic Church 
 and the principle of private judgment introduced at the 
 time of the Reformation, has forced those outside the com- 
 munion of this Church, in this as well as in other practical 
 matters, to the only tribunal left them — that of the State. 
 So the State has come to be the arbiter. And difficult as it 
 is for the State to make laws which seem on paper to meet 
 the exigencies of such a mixed community as ours, it is still 
 more difficult to execute such laws after they have been 
 | enacted. Mere external legislation cannot do much unless 
 the religious and moral convictions, sentiments and habits of 
 the people stand behind it, support it, and co-operate with 
 it. It has been well said that “Civil legislation and statutes 
 are merely a kind of mechanism serving a useful purpose in 
 the living, organic society when they are in harmony with, 
 and proportioned to its present, actual intentions and voli- 
 tions.” So far as these common intentions and volitions are 
 regulated by respect for the religious and moral sacredness 
 of marriage, thus far civil law can give protection to the 
 civil rights and redress the civil wrongs which arise out of 
 the marriage contract. But civil law, in the present condi- 
 tion of our country, with the diversity of religious opinions 
 which are current on this matter of marriage, may, to some 
 extent, alleviate the divorce evil,— it cannot satisfactorily 
 remedy it. And any reform to be really effective in this 
 matter, must of necessity go deeper than the mere question 
 i of divorce. It must begin at the bottom. It must strive 
 | to annihilate the root of the evil instead of lopping off the 
 ! branches. Rather than say, “It should be a matter of ex- 
 treme difficulty to obtain a divorce,” our law-makers can 
 
 49 
 
V 
 
 more profitably lament the looseness and utter recklessness 
 with which marriages are too often contracted and, if pos- 
 sible, devise ways and means to check this great social evil. 
 Unfortunately, our legislators do not heed measures in- 
 tended to place safeguards around marriage. They frown 
 upon such provisions, and characterize them as “an infringe- 
 ment of personal liberty.” This should not be so. Marriage 
 should be sedulously safeguarded. It is the germ of the 
 family, and moralists and sociologists all agree that the 
 family is the nursery of society, the hope of the State, and 
 the cradle of its destinies. Marriage is the bulwark of the 
 nation. If marriages are rightly contracted this protection 
 of a nation’s welfare is greatly fortified, and its weakness 
 minimized, for with the growth of right marriage — marriage 
 entered into with a sense of its sacred and inviolable char- 
 acter — divorce will disappear; but with wrong and thought- 
 less marriage divorce is parasitic. Therefore, let the beauti- 
 ful concept of Christian, Catholic marriage more abound; let 
 men and women learn to view marriage as something holy, 
 in which the husband is the protector, the wife the com- 
 forter. Then will we meet with more marriages in which, 
 while the husband performs his allotted role, the wife em- 
 bodies the beautiful picture of her drawn by Washington 
 Irving: — “As the vine which has long twined its graceful 
 foliage about the oak, and has been lifted up by it in sun- 
 shine, will, when the hardy plant is rifted by the thunder- 
 bolt, cling round it with caressing tendrils and bind up its 
 shattered boughs, so it is beautifully ordered by Providence 
 that woman, who is the mere dependent and ornament of 
 man in his happier hours, should be his stay and solace when 
 smitten with sudden calamity, winding herself into the rug- 
 ged recesses of his nature, tenderly supporting the drooping 
 head, and binding up the broken heart.” 
 
 If the American public had as strong and clean cut a 
 conception of the necessity of the stability of the family as 
 it has of the material demands of the individual, the chief 
 evils of our divorce system would soon disappear. We are 
 living in an age in which commercial interests are strong 
 and absorbing. Yet, beneath all the hustle and bustle of 
 
 50 
 
business — yea, at the bottom of all the rationalism, agnosti- 
 cism, and all the other troublesome "isms” of the hour — 
 there is a strong religious craving for light, life, and truth. 
 This instinctive religious craving should be fostered, nour- 
 ished, and cultivated. And it is to be hoped that the teach- 
 ing of the Catholic Church, and the example of all who are 
 docile and obedient to it, in proclaiming and insisting upon 
 the absolute indissolubility of every marriage, ratified and 
 consummated under the sacramental law of Christ, will con- 
 tinue to have a salutary influence on the community at large. 
 The instruction of other religious and moral teachers, defec- 
 tive as it may be, and the belief and practice of the consid- 
 erable number who adhere to that measure of sound doc- 
 trine which it contains, in so far as their influence prevails, 
 are conservative of public and private morality and pre- 
 servative against demoralization in the great body of the 
 people. 
 
 Besides the Church, and whatever else is strictly eccle- 
 | siastical or formally religious in its nature, there are many 
 potent agencies which can be made auxiliary in their re- 
 spective spheres. Education, literature, the press, volun- 
 tary association — if regulated by Christian principles — are 
 efficacious means of promoting Christian morality. Let 
 these implant on the soil of the American public the good 
 seed of a more wholesome literature, stronger virtue, and 
 nobler types of the matrimonial union. Let our law-makers 
 legislate in the presence of the fact that physical health and 
 strength of race, which is assured by the inviolability of the 
 family tie, is an indispensable element of national perpet- 
 uity. If it must needs be that divorce exist in our country, 
 let it be regarded as a necessary evil ; and its legislation may 
 be presumed to be what we will it to be. Let the pulpit, the 
 bar, the school, the press — every active agent — conspire to 
 create a healthy public sentiment on the question, tending 
 to suppress "divorce agencies,” to lessen the number of 
 legally recognized causes for divorce, and demanding the 
 hearing of divorce suits in open session of the court. In 
 the words of Judge George W. Wheeler of the superior 
 court of Connecticut, "Let the public-spirited citizens who 
 
 51 
 
are pressing for a contraction of the causes for which di- 
 vorce may he procured, turn a part of their energies toward 
 the procurement of a thorough investigation in court, of 
 each action for divorce, by a competent official. Before such 
 an investigation, aided by the cross-examination of a skilled 
 and honorable advocate, the statistics would change radi- 
 cally. Eliminate the fraudulent and utterly untenable and 
 unjustifiable divorce actions, and there would be less ques- 
 tioning of the propriety of the causes of divorce.” (June 22, 
 1904.) Let our legislators, and the press, strain every effort 
 to promote the movement of the American Bar Association 
 to secure some measure of uniformity of procedure in 
 divorce trials. This Association advocates each State’s en- 
 acting a law forbidding divorce for any cause arising prior 
 to the residence of the complainant in the State, unless for 
 a ground adequate in the State where the cause arose ; or for 
 any cause arising in the State unless the petitioner has been 
 an actual resident of said State for one year with a bona 
 fide intention of making it his or her permanent residence ; 
 or for any cause arising out of the State unless he or she 
 has been a resident for at least two years before bringing 
 suit. Such provisions, if adopted by all the States, would 
 go far to prevent the fraudulent divorces now so easily ob- 
 tained by persons migrating to the divorce granting State 
 for no other purpose than that of securing the decree. This 
 is the first, and perhaps the greatest, evil to be prevented. 
 If this measure of uniformity is procured, uniformity in 
 other respects is hut a short distance away. This would 
 ultimately tend to remedy the second element of our divorce 
 problem, namely “The Conflict of Laws,” and would directly 
 and immediately affect the first element, the increase of 
 divorces. 
 
 It is earnestly desired that in the near future the 
 whole question of marriage and divorce in this country will 
 he satisfactorily settled. The task is a difficult one; the 
 road is not all strewn with roses, and the goal cannot be 
 reached in haste. But it is surely worth the best thought 
 and effort of all who desire the advancement of true mor- 
 ality, and the increase of happy homes — where men and 
 
 52 
 
women may find the highest companionship, and bring up, 
 under the best possible conditions, children who will do 
 honor to themselves, to their parents, to their country, and 
 to their Creator. The problem came into being when the 
 matter was taken out of the power of the Church; it will 
 cease to be when the former condition of things is restored. 
 The only thoroughly satisfactory remedy is the return to 
 the Catholic idea of marriage, and this return alone can 
 remove the evil of divorce. “But Catholic marriage is im- 
 practicable, impossible even, in a non-Catholic society, as is 
 evident from the fact that no non-Catholic community re- 
 tains it. . . Catholic marriage cannot be re-established 
 
 by secular legislation.” Nor can there be any return to 
 Catholic marriage without a return to the bosom of the 
 Catholic Church, for “Catholic marriage is interwoven with 
 the whole Catholic system, and cannot be isolated from it, 
 or observed in its purity and integrity without the Catholic 
 faith, Catholic training and discipline, or without the gra- 
 cious aids the Catholic Church supplies to her faithful chil- 
 dren, and to none others.” (Brownson, “The Family, Chris- 
 tian and Pagan.”) 
 
 53 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 ALLIES, T. W. — “The Formation of Christendom.” 3 ed. 
 4 vols. London, 1897. 
 
 Cf. vol. I. Lecture V., “New Creation of the Primary 
 Relation Between Man and Woman.” 
 
 BILLUART, C. R. — “De Consensu ad Matrimonium Req.” 
 BISHOP, J. P. — “Marriage, Divorce, and Separation.” 2 
 vols. Chicago, 1891. 
 
 BROWNSON, 0. A. — “Brownson’s Works.” 20 vols. Detroit, 
 1887. 
 
 “The Family, Christian and Pagan.” Vol. XIII., p. 
 526 sq. 
 
 “The Woman Question.” Vol. XVIII., p. 381 sq. 
 “Index of Subjects.” Vol. XX., words : — “Marriage;” 
 “Divorce.” 
 
 CAIRD, MONA. — “The Morality of Marriage, and Other 
 Essays on the State and Destiny of Woman.” Lon- 
 don, 1897. 
 
 CARLIER. — “Le Manage aux Etats-Unis.” Paris, 1860. 
 CONVERS, D. — “Marriage and Divorce in the United 
 States.” Phila., 1889. 
 
 COUDERT, F. R., Jr. — “Marriage and Divorce Laws in 
 Europe.” New York, 1893. 
 
 DeAHOUSTINIS.— “De Re Sacramentaria.” 2 Vols. New 
 York, 1878. 
 
 DIKE, S. W. — “What Christianity Has Done for the Fam- 
 ily.” Auburndale, 1897. 
 
 DIJMAS (fils). — “Le Question du Divorce.” Paris, 1884. 
 ESMEIN, A. — “Le Mariage en Droit Canonique.” Paris, 
 1891. 
 
 FIELDS, ELIZ.— “Freedom in Marriage.” New York, 
 1902. 
 
 FOLK, E. E. — “The Mormon Monster, or The Story of 
 Mormonism.” Chicago, 1900. 
 
 54 
 
GASPARI. — “Tract. Canon, de Matr.” 2 Yols. Paris, 1891. 
 
 GIBBONS, CARD. — “Our Christian Heritage.” Baltimore, 
 1889. 
 
 KENT, J AMES. — “Commentaries.” 13 ed. 4 Yols. Bos- 
 ton, 1884. 
 
 LEO XIII. — Encyclicals ; “Arcanum,” Feb. 10, 1880; “Long- 
 inqna,” Jan. 6, 1895. 
 
 LILLY, W. S. — “On Right and Wrong.” London, 1881. 
 Cf. chap. IX. 
 
 LINN, W. A. — “The Story of the Mormons.” New York, 
 1902. 
 
 LITTLE, W. J. C.— “Holy Matrimony.” London, 1900. 
 
 LUCKOCK, H. M.— “The History of Marriage.” London, 
 1894. 
 
 MALLOCK, W. H. — “Studies of Contemporary Supersti- 
 tion.” London, 1895. 
 
 MONSABRE. — “Conferences snr le Mariage.” Paris, 1887. 
 
 MORROW, P. A. — “Social Disease and Marriage.” New 
 York, 1904. 
 
 NUTTING, J. D. — “The Private Doctrines of Mormon 
 Theology.” Cleveland, 1900. 
 
 “The True Mormon Doctrine.” Cleveland, 1901. 
 
 PALMIERI. — “Tractatus de Matrimonio Christiano.” 
 Rome, 1880. 
 
 PERRONE. — “De Matrimonio Christiano.” 3 Yols. Leodii, 
 . 1861. 
 
 REYNAUD, P. — “La Civilisation Paienne et la Famille.” 
 Paris, 1901. 
 
 ROSMINI. — “Des Lois Civiles concernant le Mariage des 
 Chretiens.” (Translated from the Italian by L. 
 Rupert, Paris, 1853.) 
 
 SCHOULER, J.— “On Husband and Wife.” Boston, 1882. 
 “On Domestic Relations.” 5 ed. Boston, 1895. 
 
 SPRAGUE, H. H. — “Women Under the Law of Massachu- 
 setts, their Rights, Privileges, and Disabilities.” Bos- 
 ton, 1903. 
 
 SNYDER, W. L. — “The Geography of Marriage. A Consid- 
 eration of the Legal Complexities Connected with 
 Marriage in the United States.” New York, 1895. 
 
 55 
 
STARCKE, C. 1ST.— “La Famille dans les Differentes Soci- 
 etes.” Paris, 1899. 
 
 STIMSON, F. J. — “American Statute Law.” 2 Vols. Bos- 
 ton, 1886-1892. 
 
 STIMSON, F. J.— “Uniform State Legislation.” Phila., 
 1895. 
 
 TANQUEREY, A.— “Synopsis Theologiae Dogma ticae.” 3 
 Yols. Baltimore, 1895. 
 
 WILCOX, D. F. — “Ethical Marriage.” Ann Arbor, Mich., 
 1900. 
 
 WILCOX, W. F.— “The Divorce Problem. A Study in Sta- 
 tistics.” New York, 1897. 
 
 WOOLSEY, T. D. — “Divorce and Divorce Legislation.” 2 
 ed. rev. New X°rk, 1882. 
 
 WEIGHT, C. D.— “Marriage and Divorce.” Report of the 
 U. S. Commissioner of Labor, 1889. Cf. revised 
 edition of 1897. 
 
 YOUNG, A. — “Catholic and Protestant Countries Com- 
 pared.” New York, 1895. 
 
 “Book of Mormon.” Orson Pratt’s edition of 1881. 
 “Digest of Canons.” Protestant Episcopal Church, 
 
 1887. 
 
 “Doctrine and Covenant of the Church of Jesus 
 Christ of Latter-Day Saints.” Salt Lake City, 1886'. 
 “Encyclopedia of American and English Law.” art. 
 “Marriage ;” “Divorce.” 
 
 “Sixty-First Report of Births, Marriages, and Deaths 
 in Massachusetts for 1902.” Boston, 1903. 
 MAGAZINE ARTICLES directly and indirectly pertaining 
 to the subject: — 
 
 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Boston, Mass.:— 
 
 “The Marriage Celebration in Europe.” Feb., 1888. 
 “The Marriage Celebration in the Colonies.” March,, 
 
 1888. • 
 
 “The Marriage Celebration in the United States.” 
 April, 1888. 
 
 “Reform in the Celebration of Marriage.” May, 1888. 
 (Four articles by Frank Gaylord Cook.) 
 
 56 
 
THE CATHOLIC WORLD, New York, N. Y. 
 
 “Divorce Legislation in Connecticut.” Vol.IV., p. 101. 
 “The Indissolubility of Christian Marriage.” No. I. 
 Yol. V., p. 567. 
 
 “The Indissolubility of Christian Marriage.” No. 
 II. Yol. V., p. 684. 
 
 “The Church — The Champion of Marriage.” Yol. 
 XVI., p. 585. 
 
 “Divorce and Divorce Laws.” Yol. XXV., p. 340. 
 “Divorce and Some of its Results.” Yol. XXXI., p. 
 550. 
 
 “Dr. Woolsey on Divorce.” A. F. Hewitt. Yol. 
 XXXV., p. 11. 
 
 “Some Aspects of the Law of Marriage.” A. F. Hew- 
 itt. Yol. XXXVIII., p. 721. 
 
 “The Catholic Law of Marriage.” A. F. Hewitt. 
 Yol. XXXIX., p. 145. 
 
 “Divorce.” L. C. B. Yol. XLVIII., p. 23. 
 
 “The Divorce Question.” G-eo. M. Searle. Vol. 
 XLVIII., p. 822. 
 
 “Divorce and Its Effects on Society.” Dr. Geo. Gig- 
 linger. Yol. LVIIL, p. 92. 
 
 THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW:— 
 
 “The Problem of the Family in the United States.” 
 S. W. Dike. Dec. 1893. 
 
 “The Limits of Divorce.” C. P. Garrison. Feb. 1894. 
 “Marriage and Divorce.” Canon Knox Little. Aug. 
 1895. 
 
 “Divorce in the United States.” Gertrude Atherton. 
 Sept. 1897. 
 
 THE FORUM:— 
 
 “National Divorce Legislation.” E. H. Bennet. Yol. 
 II., p. 429. 
 
 “Marriage Laws.” E. H. Bennet. Yol. III., p. 219. 
 “To Marry or not to Marry.” J. H. Browne. Yol. 
 VI., p. 432. 
 
 “Divorce in the United States.” E. J. Phelps. Yol. 
 VIII., p. 349. 
 
 57 
 
“The Ethics of Marriage.” W. S. Lilly. Vol. VIII., 
 p. 504. 
 
 “Matrimony and the State.” M. J. Savage. Vol. X., 
 p. 115. 
 
 “The Revolt Against Marriage.” E. L. Linton. Vol. 
 X., p. 585. 
 
 “The Census of Sex, Marriage and Divorce.” C. D. 
 Wright. Vol. XVII., p. 484. 
 
 “The Matrimonial Market.” Vol. XXI., p. 747. 
 THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW:— 
 
 “Divorce: Is It Wrong?” (several papers) Vol. 
 CXLIX., p. 513. 
 
 “The Question of Divorce.” (several papers) Vol. 
 CLXIX., p. 641. 
 
 “Women’s Views of Divorce.” (several papers) Vol. 
 CL., p. 110. 
 
 “Final Words on Divorce.” (several papers) Vol. CL., 
 p. 263. 
 
 “The Future of Marriage.” John L. Heaton. Vol. 
 CLIII., p. 126. 
 
 “Divorce from a French Point of View.” A. Naquet. 
 Vol. CLV., p. 721. 
 
 Divorce Made Easy.” Prof. S. J. Brun. Vol. CLVII., 
 
 p. 11. 
 
 “Some Comments on Divorce.” Mrs. Kate G. Wells. 
 Vol. CLXXIII., p. 508. 
 
 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY:— 
 
 “Statistics of Marriage and Divorce.” S. W. Dike, 
 Vol. IV. 
 
 “A Study in Vital Statistics.” W. F. Wilcox. Vol. 
 VIII. 
 
 HARPER’S MONTHLY MAGAZINE:— 
 
 “Economic Aspects of Mormonism.” Richard T. Ely. 
 April, 1903. 
 
 58 
 
Date Due 
 
 ft PiVH’33 . 
 
 <f> 
 
BOSTON COLLEGE LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS 
 CHESTNUT HILL, MASS. 
 
 Books may be kept for two weeks and may be 
 renewed for the same period, unless reserved. 
 
 Two cents a day is charged for each book kept 
 overtime. 
 
 If you cannot find what you want, ask the 
 Librarian who will be glad to help you. 
 
 The borrower is responsible for books drawn 
 on his card and for all fines accruing on the same.