JOHN EEDMOND'S 
 LAST YEAES 
 
 BT 
 
 STEPHEN GWYNN 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN & CO. 
 
 1919 
 
 [All rights reHen'ttl] 
 
40943 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In writing this book, I liave had access to my late leader's 
 papers for the period beginning with the war. These were 
 placed at my disposal by his son, Major William Archer 
 Redmond, D.S.O., M.P. I had also the consent of Mrs, 
 Redmond to my undertaking the task. But for the book 
 and for the opinions expressed in it I am solely responsible. 
 No condition having been imposed upon me, it seemed best, 
 for many reaisons, that it should be written, as it has been 
 written, without consultation, 
 
 A writer in whom such a trust has been placed may well be 
 at a loss how to express his gratitude, but can never convey 
 the measure of his anxiety. From those who cherish Red- 
 mond's memory, and especially from those who were nearest 
 to him in comradeship and affection, I must only crave 
 the indulgence which should be accorded to sincere effort. 
 Differences of interpretation there will be in any review 
 of past events, and others can claim with justice that on 
 many points they were better situated for full understanding 
 than was I. Yet for the period which is specially studied, 
 if there is failure in comi^rehension it cannot be excusetl 
 by lack of opportunity to be thoroughly informed. 
 
 To readers at large I would say this — that if any sentence 
 in these pages be uncandid or ungenerous, it is most imworthy 
 to be found in the record of such a man. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHATTER rlGE 
 
 I. INTRODUCTORY . . . . .1 
 
 II. REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN . . . . 23 
 
 III. THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 . . .62 
 
 IV. THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES . . 90 
 V. WAR IN EUROPE . . . . .126 
 
 VI. THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES . 152 
 
 VII. THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL . . 218 
 
 VIII. THE CONVENTION AND THE END . . 259 
 
 INDEX ...... 343 
 
 PORTRAIT OF JOHN REDMOND . . Frontiapiece 
 
 Vii 
 
Shall a mau understand. 
 He Eball know bittevness because his kind, 
 Being perplexed of mind, 
 Hold issues even that are nothing mated. 
 And he shall give 
 
 Counsel out of his wisdom that none shall hear 
 And steadfast in vain persuasion must he live. 
 And unabated 
 Shall his temptation bu. 
 
 John Dbinkwaxeb, in Abnilium Lincoln. 
 
JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 THE time has not yet come to write the biography 
 of John Redmond. Not until the history of the 
 pledge-bound Irish Parliamentary party can be treated 
 freely, fully and impartially as a chapter closed and 
 ended will it be possible to record in detail the life of 
 a man who was associated with it almost from its begin- 
 ning and who from the opening of this century guided 
 it with almost growing authority to the statutory accom- 
 plishment of its desperate task ; who knew, in it and for 
 it, all vicissitudes of fortune and who gave to it without 
 stint or reservation his whole life's energy from earliest 
 manhood to the grave. 
 
 But when the war came, unforeseen, shifting all 
 political balances, transmuting the greatest political 
 issues, especially those of which the Irish question is 
 a type, it imposed upon men and upon nations, but above 
 all on the leaders of nations, swift and momentous 
 decisions. Because that critical hour presented to Red- 
 mond's vi-sion a great opportunity which he must either 
 seize single-handed or let it for ever pass by ; because he 
 rose to the height of the occasion with the courage which 
 counts upon and commands success ; because he sought 
 by his own motion to swing the whole mass and weight 
 
 2 1 
 
2 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 of a nation's feeling into a ncAv direction — for all these 
 reasons his last years were different in kind from any 
 that had gone before ; and as such thej^ admit of and 
 demand separate study. Intelligent comprehension of 
 what he aimed ^ at, what he achieved, and what forces 
 defeated him in these last years of his life is urgently 
 needed, not for the sake of his memor}-, but for Ireland's 
 sake ; because until his policy is understood there is 
 little chance that Irishmen should attain what he aspired 
 to win for Ireland — the strength and dignity of a free 
 and united nation. 
 
 It is of Redmond's polic}^ for Ireland in relation to 
 the war, and to the events A\hicli in Ireland arose out 
 of the war, that this book is mainly designed to treat. 
 Yet to make that policy intellig ^^ome history is needed 
 of the startling series of polit developments which 
 
 the war interrupted but did not terminate — and which, 
 though still recent, are blurred in public memory by 
 all that has intervened. Further back still, a brief 
 review of his early career must be given, not only to 
 set the man's figure in relation to his environment, but 
 to show that this final phase was in reality no new 
 departure, no break with his past, but a true though 
 a divergent evolution from all that had gone before. 
 
 Ireland, although so small in extent and population, 
 is none the less a country of many and locally varying 
 racial strains ; and John Redmond sjjrang from one of 
 the most typical. He was a Wexfordman ; that is to 
 say, he came from the part of Ireland where if you 
 cross the Channel there is least difference between the 
 land you leave and the land you sail to ; where the 
 sea-divided peoples have been always to some extent 
 assimilated. Here in the twelfth century the first 
 Norman-Welsh invaders came across. The leader of 
 their first party, Raymond Le Gros, landed at a point 
 between Wexford and Waterford ; the town of Wexford 
 
INTRODUCTORY 3 
 
 was his first capture ; and where he began Iii.s con- 
 quest he settled. From this stock the Redmond name 
 and line descend. 
 
 Thus John Redmond came from an invading strain 
 in which Norman and Celt were already blended ; and 
 he grew up in a country- thickly settled with men whose 
 ancestors came along with his from across the water. 
 Till a century ago the barony of Forth retained a dialect 
 of its own which was in effect such English as men spoke 
 before Chaucer began to write ; and even to-daj^ in anj^ 
 Wexford fair or market you will see among the strong, 
 well-nourished, prosperous farmers many faces and figures 
 which an artist might easily assimilate to an atliletic 
 example of the traditicn-^l John Bull. Redmond himself, 
 hawk-faced and thick-, ('died, might have been taken 
 for no bad reincarnatieny^of Raymond Le Gros. To this 
 extent he was less of a Celt than many of his country- 
 men ; but he was assuredly none the less Irish because 
 he was a Wexfordman. The county of his birth was 
 the county w^hich had made the greatest resistance to 
 English power in Ireland since Sarsfield and his " Wild 
 Geese " crossed to Flanders. Born in 1857, he grew up 
 in a country-side full of memories of events then only 
 some sixty years old ; he knew and spoke with many 
 men who had been out with pike or fowling-piece in 1798. 
 Rebel was to him from boyhood up a name of honour ; 
 and this was not only a phase of boyish enthusiasm. 
 In his mature manhood, speaking as leader of the Irish 
 party, he told the House of Commons plainly that in his 
 deliberate judgment Ireland's situation justified an aj)peal 
 to arms, and that if rebellion offered a reasonable prospect 
 of gaining freedom for a united Ireland he would counsel 
 rebellion on the instant. 
 
 But if he was always and admittedly a potential 
 rebel, no man was ever less a revolutionary. As much a 
 constitutionalist as Hampden or Washington, he was so 
 by temperament and by inheritance. The tradition of 
 
4 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 parliamentary service had been in his family for two 
 generations. Two years after his birth his great-uncle, 
 John Edward Redmond, from whom he got his baptismal 
 names, was elected unopposed as Liberal member for 
 the borough of Wexford, where his statue stands in the 
 market-place, commemorating good service rendered. 
 Much of the rich flat land which lies along the railway 
 from Wexford to Rosslare Harbour was reclaimed by 
 this Redmond's enterprise from tidal slob. On his death 
 in 1872 the seat passed to his nephew William Archer 
 Redmond, whose two sons were John and William 
 Redmond, with whom this book deals. Thus the present 
 Major William Archer Redmond, M.P., represents four 
 continuous generations of the same family sent to 
 Westminster among the representatives of Nationalist 
 Ireland. 
 
 Not often is a family type so strongly marked as among 
 the men of tliis stock. But the portraits show that while 
 the late Major " Willie " Redmond closely resembled his 
 father, in John Redmond and John Redmond's son there 
 were reproduced the more dominant and massive features 
 of the first of the parliamentary line. 
 
 To sum lip then, John Redmond and his brother came 
 of a long strain of Catholic gentrj^ who were linked by 
 continuous historic association of over seven centuries to 
 a certain district in South Leinster, and who retained 
 leadership among their own people. The tradition of 
 military service was strong, too, in this family. Their 
 father's cousin, son to the original John Edward Redmond, 
 was a professional soldier ; and their mother was the 
 daughter of General Hoey. They were brought up in 
 an old-fashioned country house, Ballytrent, on the Wexford 
 coast, and the habits of outdoor country life and sport 
 which furnished the chief pleasure of their lives were 
 formed in boyhood. Their upbringing differed from that 
 of boys in thousands of similar country houses through- 
 out Ireland only in one circumstance ; they were Catholics, 
 
INTRODUCTORY 5 
 
 and even so lately as in their boyhood Catholic land- 
 owners were comparatively few. 
 
 John Redmond was four years older than his younger 
 brother, born in 1861. He got his schooling under the 
 Jesuits at Clongowes in early days, before the system 
 of Government endowment by examination results had 
 given incentive to cramming. According to his own 
 account he did little work and nobod}^ pressed him to 
 exertion. But the Jesuits are skilful teachers, and they 
 left a mark on his mind. It is scarcely chance tl\at the 
 two speakers of all I have heard w ho had the best delivery 
 were pupils of theirs — Redmond and Sir William Butler. 
 They taught him to write, they tauglit him to speak 
 and to declaim, they encouraged his natural love of 
 literature. His taste was formed in those days and it 
 was curiously old-fashioned. His diction in a prepared 
 oration might have come from the days of Grattan : 
 and he maintained the old-fashioned habit of quotation. 
 No poetry written later than Byron, INIoore and Shelley 
 made much appeal to him, save the Irish political ballads. 
 But scarcely any English speaker quoted Shakespeare in 
 public so often or so aptly as this Irishman. 
 
 From Clongowes he went to Trinity College, Dublin, 
 where he matriculated in October 1874 at the age of 
 seventeen. His academic studies seem to have been 
 half-hearted. At the end of a year his name was taken 
 off the College books by his father, but was replaced. 
 At the close of his second year of study, in July 1876, 
 it was removed again and for good. 
 
 But apart from what he learnt at school, his real educa- 
 tion was an apprenticeship ; he was trained in the House 
 of Commons for the work of Parliament. He was a boy 
 of fifteen, of an age to be keenly interested, when the 
 representation of Wexford passed from his great-uncle 
 to his father. Probably the reason why he was removed 
 from Trinity College was the desire of Mr. William Red- 
 mond to have his son with him in London. Certainly 
 
6 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 John Redmond was there during the session of 1876, 
 for on the introduction of Mr. Gladstone's second Home 
 Rule Bill ho recalled a finely apposite Shakespearean 
 quotation which he had heard Butt use in a Home Rule 
 debate of that j^ear. In May 1880 his father procured 
 him a clerkship in the House. The post to which he was 
 assigned was that of attendant in the Vote Office, so that 
 his days (and a great part of his nights) were spent in 
 the two little rooms which open off the Members' Lobby, 
 that buzzing centre of parliamentary gossip, activity 
 and intrigue. Half a dozen steps only separated him 
 from the door of the Chamber itself, and that door he 
 was always privileged to pass and listen to the debates, 
 standing by the entrance outside the magical strip of 
 matting which indicates the bar of the House. From 
 this point of vantage he watched the first stages of a 
 Parliament in which Mr. Gladstone set out with so trium- 
 phant a majority — and watched too tlie inroads made 
 upon the power and prestige of that majority by the 
 new parliamentary force whicli had come into V)eing. 
 
 Redmond himself described thus (in a lecture delivered 
 at New York in 1896) the policy which came to be known 
 as " The New Departure " : 
 
 " Mr. Parnell found that the British Parliament in- 
 sisted upon turning a deaf ear to liekmds (.-hiim for 
 justice. He resolved to adopt the simple yet masterly 
 device of preventing Parliament doing any work at all 
 until it consented to hear."' 
 
 In the task of systematic and continuous obstruction 
 Parnell at once found a ready helper, Mr. Joseph Biggar. 
 But Parnell, Biggar and those wlio from 1876 to 1880 
 acted generally or frequently with them were only members 
 of the body led by Butt ; though they were, indeed, 
 ultimately in more or less open revolt against Butt's 
 leadership. When Butt died, and was at least nominally 
 replaced by Mr. Shaw, the growth of Parne'll's ascen- 
 
INTRODUCTORY 7 
 
 dancy became more marked. In the general election of 
 1880 sixty Home Rulers were returned to Parliament ; 
 and at a meeting attended by over forty, twenty-three 
 declared for Parnell as their leader. A question almost 
 of ceremonial observance immediately defined the issue. 
 Liberals were in power, and Government was more friendly 
 to Ireland's claims than was the Opposition. Mr. Shaw 
 and his adherents were for marking support of the Govern- 
 ment by sitting on the Government side of the Chamber. 
 Parnell insisted that the Irish party should be independent 
 of all English attachments and permanently in opposi- 
 tion till Ireland received its rights. With that view he 
 and his friends took up their station on the Speaker's 
 left below the gangway, where they held it continuously 
 for thirty-nine years. 
 
 Mr. William Redmond was no supporter of the new 
 policy. As the little group which Parnell headed grew 
 more and more insistent in their obstruction, the member 
 for Wexford spoke less and less. His interventions were 
 rare and dignified. In the debate on the Address in the 
 new Parliament of 1880 he acted as a lieutenant to Mr. 
 Shaw. Yet he was on very friendly terms with Parnell 
 — almost a neighbour of his, for the Parnell property, 
 lying about the Vale of Ovoca, touched the border of 
 Wexford. 
 
 Mr. William Redmond's career in that Parliament 
 was soon ended. In November 1880 he died, and, 
 normally, his son, whose qualifications and ambitions 
 were known, would have succeeded him. But collision 
 between Government and the Parnellite party was already 
 beginning. Mr. T. M. Healy, then Parnell's secretary, 
 had been arrested for a speech in denunciation of some 
 eviction proceedings. This was the first arrest of a 
 prominent man under Mr. Forster's rule as Chief Secre- 
 tary, and Parnell, with whom in those days the decision 
 rested, decided that ]Mr. Healy should immediatelj^ be 
 put forward for the vacant seat. In later davs he was 
 
8 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 to remind Mr. Healy how he had done this, " rebuking 
 and restraining the prior right of my friend, Jack 
 Redmond/' Redmond had not long to wait, however. 
 Another vacancy occurred in another Wexford seat, the 
 ancient borough of New Ross, and he was returned without 
 opposition at a crucial moment in the parliamentary 
 struggle. 
 
 That struggle was not onlj^ parliamentary. From the 
 famine year of 1879 onwards a fierce agitation had begun, 
 whose purpose was to secure the land of Ireland to the 
 people who worked it. Davitt was to the land what 
 Parnell was to the parliamentarj^ campaign : but it was 
 Parnell's genius which fused the two movements. 
 
 To meet the growing power of the Land League, Mr. 
 Forster demanded a Coercion Bill, and after long struggles 
 in the Cabinet he prevailed. Against this Bill it was 
 obvious that all means of parliamentary resistance would 
 be used to the uttermost. 
 
 They were still of a primitive simplicity. In the days 
 before Parnell the House of Commons had carried on 
 its business under a system of rules which worked per- 
 fectly well because there was a general disposition in 
 the assembly to get business done. A beginning of the 
 new order was made when a group of ex-military men 
 attempted to defeat the measure for abolishing purchase 
 of commissions in the Army by a series of dilatory motions. 
 This, however, was an isolated occurrence. Any English 
 member who set himself to thwart the desire of the 
 House for a conclusion by using means which the general 
 body considered unfair would have been reduced to 
 quiescence by a demonstration that he was considered 
 a nuisance. His voice would have been drowned in a 
 buzz of conversation or by less civil interruptions. This 
 implied, however, a willingness to be influenced by social 
 considerations, and, more than that, a loyalty to the 
 traditions and purposes of the House. Parnell felt no 
 such willingness and acknowledged no such loyalty. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 9 
 
 ** His object," said Redmond in the address already 
 quoted, " was to injure it so long as it refused to listen 
 to the just claims of his country." The House, realizing 
 Parnell's intention, visited upon him and his associates 
 all the penalties by which it was wont to enforce its 
 wishes : but the penalties had no sting. All the displays 
 of anger, disapproval, contempt, all the vocabulary of 
 denunciation in debate and in the Press, all the studied 
 forms of insult, all the marks of social displeasure, only 
 served to convince the Irishmen that they were producing 
 their effect. Still, the House continued to act on the 
 assumption that it could vindicate its traditions in the 
 old traditional way : it was determined to change none 
 of the rules which had stood for so many generations : 
 it would maintain its liberties and put doAvn in its own 
 way those who had the impertinence to abuse them. 
 The breaking-point came exactly at the moment when 
 Redmond was elected. 
 
 On Monday, Jan. 24th, 1881, Mr. Forster introduced his 
 Coercion Bill. It was open, of course, to any member 
 to speak once, and once onlj^ on the main motion. But 
 every member had an indefinite right to move the adjourn- 
 ment of the debate, and on each such motion every member 
 could speak again. The debate was carried all tlirough 
 that week. It was resumed on Monday, 31st. The 
 declaration of Redmond's election was fixed for Tuesday, 
 February 1st, in New Ross — there being no contest. A 
 telegram summoned him to come instantl}^ after the 
 declaration to London. He took the train at noon, 
 travelled to Dublin and crossed the Channel. At Holy- 
 head about midnight another telegram told him that 
 the debate was still proceeding. He reached Euston on 
 the Wednesday morning, drove straight to the House, and 
 there, standing at the bar, saw what he thus described : 
 
 " It was thus, travel-stained and weary, that I first 
 presented myself as a member of the British Parliament. 
 The House was still sitting, it had been sitting without 
 
10 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 a break for over forty hours, and I shnll never forget 
 the appearance the Chamber presented. The floor was 
 littered with paper. A few dishevelled and weary Irish- 
 men were on one side of tlie House, about a hundred 
 infuriated Englishmen upon the other ; some of them 
 still in evening dress, and wearing what were once white 
 shirts of the night before last. Mr. Parnell was upon 
 his legs, with pale cheeks and drawn face, his hands 
 clenched behind his back, facing without flinching a 
 continuous roar of interruption. It was now about 
 eight o'clock. Half of Mr. Parnell's followers were out 
 of the Chamber snatching a few moments' sleep in chairs 
 in the Library or Smoke Room. Those who remained 
 had each a specified period of time allotted him to speak, 
 and they were wearily waiting their turn. As they 
 caught sight of me standing at the bar of the House 
 of Commons there was a clieer of welcome. 1 was unable 
 to come to their aid, however, as under the rules of the 
 House I could not take my seat until the commence- 
 ment of a new sitting. My very presence, however, 
 brought, I think, a sense of encouragement and approach- 
 ing relief to them ; and I stood there at the bar with 
 my travelling coat still upon me, gazing alternately 
 with indignation and admiration at the amazing scene 
 presented to my gaze. 
 
 "This, then, was the great Parliament of England ! Of 
 intelligent debate there was none. It A\as one unbroken 
 scene of turbulence and disorder. The few Irishmen 
 remained quiet, too much amused, perhaps, or too much 
 exhausted to retaliate. It was the English — the Uiembers 
 of the first assembly of gentlemen in Europe, as they 
 love to style it — who howled and roared, and almost 
 foamed at the mouth with rage at the calm and pale- 
 featiu'ed young man who stood patiently facing them 
 and endeavouring to make himself heard." 
 
 An hour later the closure was applied, for the first 
 time in Parliament's history. The records of Hansard 
 spoil a story which Redmond was fond of telling — that 
 he took his oath and his seat, made his maiden speech 
 and was suspended all in the same evening. In point 
 of fact he took his seat that Wednesday afternoon, when 
 the House sat for a few hours only and adjourned again. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 11 
 
 Next day news came in that Davitt had been arrested 
 in Ireland. Mr. Dillon, in the process of endeavouring 
 to extract an explanation from the Government, was 
 named and suspended. When the Prime Minister after 
 this rose to speak, Mr. Parnell moved : " That Mr. 
 Gladstone be not heard.'" 
 
 The Speaker, ruling that Mr. Gladstone was in posses- 
 sion of the House, refused to put the motion. Mr. 
 Parnell, insisting that his motion should be put, came 
 into collision with the authority of the Chair and was 
 formally " named." Mr. Gladstone then moved his sus- 
 pension and a division was called — whereupon, under the 
 rules which then existed, all members were bound to 
 leave the Chamber. On this occasion the Irish members 
 remained seated, as a protest, and after the division the 
 Speaker solemnly reported this breach of order to the 
 House. For their refusal to obey the Irish members 
 present were suspended from the service of the House, 
 and as a body they refused to leave unless removed by 
 physical force. Accordingly, man by man was ordered 
 to leave and each in turn rose up with a brief phrase of 
 refusal, after which the Sergeant-at-Arms with an officer 
 approached and laid a hand on the recusant's shoulder. 
 Redmond, when his turn came, said : 
 
 " As I regard the whole of these proceedings as un- 
 mitigated despotism, I beg respectfully to decline to 
 withdraw." 
 
 That was his maiden speech. Having delivered it, 
 " Mr. Redmond," says Hansard, " was by desire of Mr. 
 Speaker removed by the Sergeant-at-Arms from the 
 House." It was a strange beginning for one of the 
 greatest parliamentarians of our epoch — and one of 
 the greatest conservatives. The whole bent of his mind 
 was towards moderation in all things. Temperamentally, 
 he hated all forms of extravagant eccentricity ; he loved 
 the old if only because it was old ; he had the keenest 
 sense not only of decorum but of the essential dignity 
 
12 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 which is the best guardian of order. Yet here he was 
 eommitted to a policy which aimed deliberately at out- 
 raging all the established decencies — at disregarding 
 ostentatiously all the usages by which an assembly of 
 gentlemen had regulated their proceedings. 
 
 What is more, it was an assembly which Redmond 
 found temperamentally congenial to him — an assembly 
 which, apart from its relation to Ireland, he thoroughly 
 admired and liked. In 1896, when Irish members were 
 fiercely in opposition to the Government, he concluded 
 his description of Parliament with these words : 
 
 "In the main, the House of Commons is, I believe, 
 dominated by a rough-and-ready sense of manliness 
 and fair-play. Of course, I am not speaking of it as a 
 governing body. In that character it has been towards 
 Ireland always ignorant and nearly always unfair. I 
 am treating it simply as an assembly of men, and I say 
 of it, it is a body where sooner or later every man finds 
 his proper level, wliere mediocrity and insincerity will 
 never permanently succeed, and w here ability and honesty 
 of purpose will never ^permanently fail.'' 
 
 That was no mean tribute, coming from one who held 
 himself aloof from all the personal advantages belonging 
 to the society whose rules he did not recognize. The 
 oj)inion to which the Irish members of Parnell's following 
 were amenable was not juade at Westminster ; it did 
 not exist there — exce])t, and that in its most rigid form, 
 amongst themselves. 
 
 It is worth while to recall for English readers — and 
 perhaps not for tliem only— what membership of Parnell's 
 party involved. In the first place, there was a self- 
 denying ordinance by which the man elected to it bound 
 himself to accept no post of any kind under Government. 
 All the chances which election to Parliament opens to 
 most men — and especially to men of the legal profession 
 — were at once set aside. Absolute discipline and unity 
 of action, except in matters specially left open to individual 
 
INTRODUCTORY 13 
 
 judgment, were enforced on all. These were the essentials. 
 But in the period of acute war between the Irish and 
 all other parties which was opening when Redmond 
 entered there was a self-imposed rule that as the English 
 public and English members disapproved and disliked 
 the Irishmen an answering attitude should be adopted : 
 that even private hosjHtality should be avoided and that 
 the belligerents should behave as if they were quite 
 literally in an enemy's country. 
 
 Later, when Mr. Gladstone had adopted the Irish 
 cause and alliance with the Liberal party had begun, 
 the rigour of this attitude ^Aas modified. Many Irish 
 members joined the Liberal clubs and went freelj'' to 
 houses where they were sure of sympathy. Yet neither 
 of the Redmonds followed far in this direction, and 
 the habit of social isolation which they formed in their 
 early days lasted with them to tlie end. If John Redmond 
 ever went to any house in London which was not an Irish 
 home it was by the rarest exception. 
 
 For society, Parnell's party depended on themselves 
 and their countrymen and sympathizers. But they Avere 
 in no way to be pitied ; they were the best of company 
 for one another. It was a movement of the young, it 
 had all the strength and audacity of youth, it was a great 
 adventure. A few men from an older generation came 
 with them, Mr, Biggar, Justin McCarthy and others. 
 But their leader, though older than most of his followers, 
 was a young man by parliamentary standards. In 
 1880 Parnell was only thirty-three ; and within four 
 years more he was as great a power in the House as Mr. 
 Gladstone. Some few years back I heard Willie Redmond 
 say in tlie Members' smoking-room, " Isn't it strange 
 to think that Parnell would be sixty now if he had lived. 
 I can't imagine him as an old man." Yet the accent of 
 maturity was on Parnell's leadership ; the men whom 
 he led were essentially young. In 1881, when Redmond 
 entered Parliament, Mr. JiLll^nwas thirty, Mr. T. P. 
 
 A C . T -v . ' ^' t- V j^ 
 
 V 7^ B , _ 
 
14 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 O'Connor and Mr. Sexton veterans of thirty-three, Mr. 
 Healy twenty-six. Mr. William O'Brien (who did not 
 come in until 1883) was of the same year as Mr. Dillon. 
 Redmond was younger than any of them, being elected 
 at the age of twenty-four. Yet nobody then thought it 
 surprising that he should be sent in 1882 to represent 
 the party on a mission to Australia and the United States 
 at a most difficult time. The Phoenix Park murders had 
 created widespread indiscriminating anger against all 
 Irish Nationalists throughout the Empire, and Redmond 
 found it difficult to secure even a hall to speak in. For 
 support there was sent to him his brother, then a youth 
 of twenty-one, and feeling ran so strong against the 
 two that the Prime Minister of New South Wales (Sir 
 Henry Parkes) proposed their exjDulsion from the colony. 
 Nevertheless, Redmond made good. " The Irish working- 
 men stood by me," he said, " and in fact saved the situa- 
 tion." Fifteen thousand pounds were collected before 
 they left the island continent. 
 
 It indicates well the changed conditions to remember 
 that when in 1 906 Mr. Hazleton and the late T. M. Kettle 
 were selected to go on a far less arduous and difficult 
 mission to America, there was much talk about the 
 astonishing youth of our representatives, Y^et both 
 were then older than John Redmond was in 1882 — to 
 say nothing of his brother, who must have been the most 
 exuberantly youthful spokesman that a serious cause 
 ever found. 
 
 The Redmonds' stay in Australia, which lasted over 
 a year, determined one important matter for both young 
 men ; they found their wives in the colony whose Prime 
 Minister proposed to exj^el them. John Redmond married 
 Miss Joanna Dalton and his brother her near kinswoman, 
 Miss Eleanor Dalton. Willie Redmond was elected to 
 Parliament in his absence for his father's old seat — Mr. 
 Healy having vacated Wexford to fight and win a sensa- 
 tional election in county Monaghan. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 15 
 
 This early visit to the great transmarine dominions, 
 and the ties which he formed there, left a marked impres- 
 sion on John Redmond's mind, which was reinforced 
 by other visits in later years, and by all the growing 
 associations that linked him to life and politics in the 
 dominions. Redmond knew vastly more, and in truth 
 cared vastly more, about the British Empire than most 
 Imperialists. His affection was not based on any in- 
 herited prejudice, nor inspired by a mere geographical 
 idea. He was attracted to that which he had seen and 
 handled, in Mhose making he had watched so many of 
 his fellow-countrymen fruitfully and honourably busy. 
 He felt acutely tliat the Empire belonged to Irish Nation- 
 alists at least as much as to English Tories. America 
 also was familiar to him, and he had every cause to be 
 grateful to the United States ; but his interest in the 
 dominions was of a different kind. He felt himself a 
 partner in their glories, and by this feeling he was linked 
 in sympathy to a great many elements in British life 
 that were otherwise uncongenial to him — and was, on 
 the other hand, divided in sympathy from some who 
 in Irish politics were his staunch supf)orters. He could 
 never understand the psychology of the Little Englander. 
 " If I were an Englishman," he once said to me, " I 
 should be the greatest Imperialist living." From first to 
 last his attitude was that which is indicated by a passage 
 of his speech on Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill : 
 
 "As a Nationalist, I may say I do not regard as 
 entirely palatable the idea that for ever and a day 
 Ireland's voice should be excluded from the councils of 
 an Empire which the genius and valour of her sons 
 have done so much to build up and of which she is 
 to remain a part." ' 
 
 1 This speech is iuckided in " Home Riile : Speeches of John 
 Redmond, M.P.,'* a vokune edited in 1010 by Mr. Barry O'Brien. 
 It contains also the American addiesses quoted in this chapter, and 
 a speech to the DubUn Convention in 1907, quoted in the next. 
 
16 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 II 
 
 To follow in detail Redmond's career under Parnell's 
 leadership would be beyond the scope of this book. Less 
 conspicuous in Parliament than such lieutenants of " the 
 Chief " as Mr. Sexton, Mr. Dillon and Mr. Healy, John 
 Redmond acted as one of the party whips and was in 
 much demand outside Parliament as a platform speaker. 
 In August 1886 he was once more sent overseas to attend 
 the Convention of the Irish Race at Chicago. He had 
 to tell his hearers of victory and of repulse. 
 
 " When you last assembled in Convention, two years 
 ago, the Irish party in Parliament did not number more 
 than forty ; to-day we hold five-sixths of the Irish seats, 
 and speak in the name of five-sixths of the Irish people 
 in Ireland. Two years ago we had arrayed against us 
 all English political parties and every English statesman ; 
 to-day we have on our side one of the great English 
 political parties, which, though its past traditions in 
 Ireland have been evil, still represents the party of pro- 
 gress in England, and the greatest statesman of the day, 
 who has staked his all upon winning for Ireland her 
 national rights. Two years ago England had in truth, 
 in Mitchel's phrase, the ear of the world. To-day, at 
 last, that ear, so long poisoned with calumnies of our 
 peofjle, is now open to the voice of Ireland. Two years 
 ago the public opinion of the world — aye, and even of 
 this free land of America — was doubtful as to the justice 
 of our movement ; to-day the opinion of the civilized 
 world, and of America in particular, is clearly and dis- 
 tinctly on our side." 
 
 On the other hand, in England the forces of reaction 
 had succeeded. The Home Rule Bill had been defeated 
 and the Liberal party broken up. A Government was 
 in power whose programme was one of coercion. But 
 Ireland, Redmond said, was ready for the fight and con- 
 fident that with the weapons at command the enemy 
 could be defeated. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 17 
 
 Who were the enemy, and what the weapon ? His 
 speech made this plain. 
 
 *' Once more Irish landlords have behaved themselves 
 with unaccountable folly and stupidity. They have 
 once more stood between Ireland and her freedom, and 
 have refused even an extravagant price for the land 
 because the offer was coupled with the concession of 
 an Irish Parliament. So be it. I believe the last offer 
 has been made to Irish landlordism. The ultimate 
 settlement of this question must now be reserved for 
 the Parliament of Ireland, and meantime the people 
 must take care to protect themselves and their children. 
 In many parts of Ireland, I assert, rent is to-day an 
 impossibility, and in ever}' part of Ireland the rents 
 demanded are exorbitant, and will not, and cannot, 
 be paid." 
 
 He was wrong. The settlement of this vast question 
 was to be accomplished through the Imperial Parliament, 
 not the Irish. Yet it was accomplished in essence by 
 an agreement between Irishmen for which Redmond 
 himself was largely responsible. 
 
 That settlement, however, merely ratified in 1903 the 
 final stage in the conversion of both countries to Parnell's 
 policy of State-aided land purchase. Tentative begin- 
 nings were made with it under the Government which was 
 in power from 1886 to 1892 ; but the main characteristic 
 of this period was a fierce revival of the land war. It 
 was virulent in Wexford, and in 1888 Redmond shared 
 the experience which few Irish members escaped or 
 desired to escape ; he was sentenced to imprisonment 
 on a charge of intimidation for a speech condemning 
 some evictions. He and his brother met in Wexford 
 jail, and both used to describe with glee their mutual 
 salutation : " Good heavens, what a ruffian you look ! " 
 Cropped hair and convict clothes were part of Mr. Balfour's 
 resolute government. 
 
 Yet in those daj^s Ireland was winning, and winning 
 fast. Mr. Gladstone's personal ascendancy, never stronger 
 
 3 
 
18 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 than in the wonderful effort of his old age, asserted itself 
 more and more. Public sympathy in Great Britain 
 was turning against the wholesale evictions, the knocking 
 down of peasants' houses by police and military with 
 battering-rams. The Tory party sought for a new poli- 
 tical weapon, and one day The Times came out with the 
 facsimile of what purported to be a letter in Parnell's 
 hand. This document implied at least condonation of 
 the Phoenix Park murders. 
 
 Other letters equally incriminating were published. 
 Parnell denied the authorship, his denial was not accepted ; 
 fierce controversy ended in the establishment of one of 
 the strangest Commissions of Enquiry ever set up — 
 a semi- judicial tribunal of judges. Its proceedings created 
 the acutest public interest, drawn out over long months, 
 up to the day when Sir Charles Russell had before him 
 in the witness-box the original vendor of the letters 
 — one Pigott. Pigott's collapse, confession of forgery, 
 flight and suicide, followed with appalling swiftness : 
 and the result was to generate through England a very 
 strong sympathy for the man against whom, and against 
 whose followers, such desperate calumnies had been 
 uttered and exploited. Parnell's prestige was no longer 
 confined to his own countrymen : and the sense of all 
 Home Rulers was that they fought a winning battle, 
 under two allied leaders of extraordinary personal gifts. 
 
 Then, as soon as it was clear that the attack of the 
 Pigott letters had recoiled on those who launched it, 
 came the indication of a fresh menace. Proceedings for 
 divorce were taken with Parnell as the co-respondent : 
 the case was undefended. Mr. Gladstone and probably 
 most Englishmen expected that Parnell would retire, 
 at all events temporarily, from public life, as, in Lord 
 Morley's words, " any English politician of his rank " 
 would have been obliged to do. Parnell refused to 
 retire ; and Gladstone made it publicly known that if 
 Parnell continued to lead the Irish party, his own leader- 
 
INTRODUCTORY 19 
 
 ship of the Liberal party, " based, as it had been, mainly 
 on the prosecution of the Irish cause," would be rendered 
 " almost a nullity." The choice — for it was a choice — 
 was left to the Irish. To retain Parnell as leader in 
 Gladstone's judgment made Gladstone's task impossible, 
 and therefore indicated Gladstone's withdrawal from 
 public life. To part with Parnell meant parting with 
 the ablest leader that Nationalist Ireland had ever found. 
 A more heartrending alternative has never been im- 
 j)osed on any body of politicians, and John Redmond, 
 unlike his younger brother, was not of those to whom 
 decision came by an instinctive act of allegiance. His 
 nature forced him to see both sides, but when he decided 
 it was with his whole nature. The issue was debated 
 by the Irish party in Committee Room 15 of the House 
 of Commons, with the Press in attendance. In this 
 encounter Redmond for the first time stepped to the front. 
 He had hitherto been outside the first flight of Irish 
 parliamentarians. Now, he was the first to state the 
 case for maintaining Parnell's leadership, and through- 
 out the discussions he led on that side. When Parnell's 
 death came a few months after the " split " declared 
 itself, there was no hesitation as to which of the 
 Parnellites should assume the leadership of their party. 
 Redmond resigned his seat in North Wexford and con- 
 tested Cork city, where Parnell had long been member. 
 He was badly beaten, and for some three months the 
 new leader of the Parnellites was without a seat in the 
 House — though not during a session. Another death 
 made a new opening, and in December 1891 his fight 
 at Waterford against no less a man than Michael Davitt 
 turned for a moment the electoral tide which was setting 
 heavily against the smaller group. It was a notable 
 win, and the hero of that triumph retained his hold on 
 the loyalty of those with whom he won it when the rest 
 of Ireland had turned away from him. The tie lasted 
 to his death — and after it, for Waterford then chose as 
 
20 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 its representative the dead leader's son, and renewed 
 that choice in the general election of 1918, when other 
 allegiances to the old party were like leaves on the 
 wind. 
 
 Other ties were formed in these years, which lasted 
 through Redmond's life. I have deliberately abstained 
 from entering into either the merits or the details of the 
 " split." But certain of its aspects must be recognized. 
 In the division into Parnellites and Anti-Parnellites, 
 Parnellites were a small but fierce minority. It needed 
 resolution for a man to be a Parnellite, all the more 
 because the whole force of the Catholic Church was thrown 
 against them, and in some instances disgraceful methods 
 were used. One of Redmond's best friends was the 
 owner of a local newspaper ; it was declared to be a 
 mortal sin to buy, sell, or read his journal. The business 
 was reduced to the verge of ruin but the man went on, 
 till a new bishop came and gradually things mended. 
 He, like Redmond, was a staunch practising Catholic, 
 and later on was the friend and trusted associate of many 
 priests ; but he stood for an element in Ireland which 
 refused to allow the least usurpation by ecclesiastical 
 authority in the sphere of citizenship. 
 
 Willie Redmond won East Clare, as his brother won 
 Waterford city, after a turbulent election with the priests 
 against him. He gave in that contest, as always, at 
 least as good as he got ; but his collision with individuals 
 never affected his devotion or his brother's to their 
 Church. 
 
 But in social life the estrangements of these days were 
 far-reaching, and, at least negatively, so far as Redmond 
 was concerned, they were lasting. His existence had 
 been saddened and altered shortly before the break up 
 by the death of his first wife, which left him a young 
 widower with three children. After the " split " the whole 
 circle of friends among whom he had lived in Dublin 
 and in London was shattered and divided ; and in 
 
INTRODUCTORY 21 
 
 later life none, I think, of those broken intimacies was 
 renewed. 
 
 In Redmond's nature there was a total lack of rancour. 
 Clear-sighted as he was, he realized how desperately 
 difficult a choice was imposed on Nationalists by Parnell's 
 situation, and he knew how honestly men had differed. 
 He could command completely his intellectual judgment 
 of their action, and there were many whom in later stages 
 of the movement he trusted none the less for their diver- 
 gence from him at this crisis. But he was more than 
 commonly a creature of instinct ; and the associations 
 of his intimate life were all decided in these years. His 
 affection was given to those who were comrades in this 
 pass of danger. The only two exceptions to be made 
 are, first and chiefly, Mr. Devlin, who was too young 
 to be actively concerned with politics at the time of 
 Parnell's overthrow ; and, to speak truth, it is not 
 possible to be so closely associated as Redmond was 
 with this lieutenant of his, or to be so long and loyally 
 served by him, and not to undergo his personal attrac- 
 tion. The other exception is Mr. J. J. Mooney, who 
 entered Parliament and politics later than the " split," 
 but whose personal allegiance to Mr. Redmond was 
 always declared. He acted for long as Redmond's secre- 
 tary and always as his counsellor — for in all the detail 
 of parliamentary business, especially on the side of private 
 bill legislation, the House had few more capable members. 
 He was perhaps more completely than Mr. Devlin one 
 of the little group of intimates with whom Redmond 
 loved to surround himself in the country. All the rest 
 were old champions of the fight over Parnell's body ; 
 but by far the closest friend of all was his brother Willie. 
 Their marriages to kinswomen had redoubled the tie 
 of blood. 
 
 It should be noted here that Redmond married for 
 the second time in 1899, after ten years of widowerhood. 
 His wife was, by his wish and her own, never at all in 
 
22 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 the public eye. All that should be said here is that his 
 friends found friendship with him easier and not more 
 difficult than before this marriage, and were grateful 
 for the devoted care which was besiowed upon their 
 leader. She accompanied him on all his political journey- 
 ings, whatever their duration, and gave him in the fullest 
 measure the companionship which he desired. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 
 
 THE Parliament of 1892-5 was barren of results for 
 Ireland, being consumed by factious strife, at West- 
 minster between the Houses and in Ireland between 
 the parties. With Gladstone's retirement it seemed as 
 if Home Rule were dead. But thinking men realized 
 that the Irish question was still there to be dealt with, 
 and approach to solution began along new lines. When 
 Lord Salisbury returned to power in 1895, Land Purchase 
 was cautiously extended with much success : the Con- 
 gested Districts Board, originally established by Mr. 
 Arthur Balfour, was showing good results, and his brother 
 Mr. Gerald Balfour, now Chief Secretary, felt his way 
 towards a policy which came to be described as *' killing 
 Home Rule with kindness." A section of Irish Nationalist 
 opinion was scared by the menace contained in this 
 epigram ; and consequently, when in 1895 Mr. Horace 
 Plunkett (as he then was) put forward proposals for a 
 conference of Irishmen to consider possible means for 
 developing Irish agriculture and Irish industries under 
 the existing system, voices Avere raised against what was 
 denounced as a new attempt to divert Nationalist Ireland 
 from its main purpose of achieving self-government. 
 Mr. Plunkett's original proposal was that a body of four 
 Anti-Parnellites, two Parnellites and two LJ^nionists should 
 meet and deliberate in Ireland, during the recess. In 
 the upshot the Nationalist majority refused to take 
 any part ; but Redmond, with one of his supporters, 
 
 23 
 
24 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Mr. William Field, served on the " Recess Committee " 
 and concurred in its Report, out of which came the 
 creation of the Department of Agriculture and Technical 
 Instruction. 
 
 In 1896 the Commission on Financial Relations, which 
 had been set up by the Liberal Ministry in 1894, reported, 
 and its findings produced a state of feeling which for a 
 moment promised co-operation between divided interests 
 in Ireland. Unionist magnates joined with Nationalists 
 in denouncing the system of taxation, which the Com- 
 mission — by a majority of eleven to two — had described 
 as oppressive and unjust to the weaker country. 
 
 Redmond was one of the members of this Commission, 
 which included also distinguished representatives of his 
 Nationalist opponents — Mr. Blake and Mr. Sexton ; and 
 he no doubt cherished hopes arising from the resolute 
 demands for redress uttered by Lord Castletown and 
 other Irish Unionist Peers. Those hopes were soon 
 dispelled ; nothing but much controversy came of the 
 demand for improved financial relations. Mr. Gerald 
 Balfour's schemes were more tangible, and in 1897 
 Redmond announced that the Government's proposal 
 to introduce a measure of Local Government for Ireland 
 should have his support. The Bill, when it came, ex- 
 ceeded expectation in its scope, and Redmond gave it 
 a cordial welcome in the name of the Parnellites. The 
 larger group, however, then led by Mr. Dillon, declined 
 to be responsible for accepting it. 
 
 Later, in the working of this measure, Redmond pressed 
 strongly that elections under it should not be conducted 
 on party lines and that the landlord class should be brought 
 into local administrative work. His advice unfortunately 
 was not taken. 
 
 Then followed the South African struggle, and in 
 giving voice to a common sentiment against what 
 Nationalist Ireland held to be an unjust war the two 
 Irish parties found themselves united and telling together 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIBMAN 26 
 
 in the lobby. Formal union followed. By this time the 
 cleavage between Parnellite and Anti-Parnellite was 
 less acute than that between Mr. Healy's section and 
 the followers of Mr. Dillon and Mr. O'Brien. The choice 
 of Redmond as Chairman was due less to a sense of his 
 general fitness than to despair of reaching a decision 
 between the claims of the other three outstanding men. 
 
 The sacrifice to be made w^as made at Mr. Dillon's 
 expense, and he did not acquiesce willingly or cordially. 
 The cordiality which ultimately marked his relations 
 with Redmond was of later growth — fostered by the 
 necessity which Mr. Dillon found imposed on him of 
 defending loyally the party's leader against attacks 
 from the men who had been most active in selecting him. 
 
 A part of the compact under which Redmond was 
 elected to the chair limited the power of the newly chosen. 
 He was to be Chairman, not leader ; that is to say, he 
 was not to act except after consultation with the party 
 as a whole : he was not to commit them upon policy. 
 This meant in practice that he acted as head of a cabinet, 
 which from 1906 onwards consisted of Mr. Dillon, Mr. 
 Devlin and Mr. T. P. O'Connor — the last representing 
 not only a great personal parliamentarj^ experience and 
 ability, but also the powerful and zealous organization 
 of Irish in Great Britain. Redmond adhered scrupu- 
 lously to the spirit of this compact. There w^as only one 
 instance in which he took action without consultation. 
 But that instance was the most important of all — his 
 speech at the outbreak of the war. 
 
 Another thing which governed his conduct in the chair 
 of the party, as indeed it governed that of nearly all 
 the rank and file, was his horror of the years which 
 Ireland had gone through since Parnell's fall. He loathed 
 faction and he had struggled through murky whirlpools 
 of it ; for the rest of his life he was determined, almost 
 at any cost, to maintain the greatest possible degree 
 of unity among Irish Nationalists. Yet in the end he 
 
26 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 unhesitatingly made a choice and took an action which 
 risked dividing, and in the last event actually divided, 
 Nationalist Ireland as it had never been divided before. 
 There were things for which he would face even that 
 supreme peril. Deep in his heart there was a vision which 
 compelled him. It was the vision of Ireland united as 
 a whole. 
 
 All this, however, lay far in the future when he was 
 elected to the chair ; for the moment his task was to 
 reunite Irish Nationalists, and it began prosperously. 
 From the first his position was one of growing strength. 
 Irishmen all the world over were heartsick of faction 
 and rejoiced in even the name of unity. Redmond made 
 it a reality. While leading the little Parnellite party, 
 reduced at last to nine, his line of action was comparable 
 to that pursued by Mr. William O'Brien from 1910 on- 
 wards. It had, to put things mildlj', not been calculated 
 to assist the leader of the main Nationalist body. In 
 1904, Justin McCarthy, then retired from politics, wrote 
 in his book on British Political Parties : " Parnell's chief 
 lieutenant had shown in the service of his chief an energy 
 and passion which few of us expected of him, and was 
 utterly unsparing in his denunciations of the men who 
 maintained the other side of the controversy. From 
 this it was not unnatural to expect difficulties occasioned 
 both by the leader's temper and by the temper of those 
 whom he led. But men who had been adverse assured 
 me that they had changed their opinions and were glad 
 to find they could work with Redmond in perfect harmony 
 and that his manners and bearing showed no signs what- 
 ever of any bitter memories belonging to the days of 
 internal dispute." 
 
 In truth, the man's nature was kindly and tolerant ; 
 courtesy came more natural to him than invective. 
 Above all, he was sensitive for the reputation of his 
 country in the eyes of the world, and the spectacle of 
 Irishmen heaping vilifications on each other always filled 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 27 
 
 him with distaste. Whether the taunts passed between 
 Nationalist and Unionist or Nationalist and Nationalist 
 made little difference to his feeling. With him it was 
 no empty phrase that he regarded all Irishmen in equal 
 degree as his fellow-countrymen. 
 
 In 1002 he was once more a party to a continued effort 
 made by Irishmen outside of party lines to solve a part 
 of the national difficulty. The policy of land purchase 
 had proved its immense superiority over that of dual 
 ownership and had even been introduced on a consider- 
 able scale. But its very success led to trouble, because 
 on one side of a boundary fence there would be farmers 
 who had purchased and whose annual instalments of 
 purchase money were lower than the rents paid by their 
 neighbours on the other side of the mearing. Renewed 
 struggle against rent led to new eviction scenes on the 
 grand scale ; and by this time landlord opinion was half 
 converted to the purchase policj^, as a necessary solution. 
 The persistency of one young Galway man, Captain 
 John Shawe Taylor, brought about the famous Land 
 Conference of 1902, in which Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Healy, 
 Mr. Redmond and Mr. T. W. Russell on behalf of the 
 tenants met Lord Dunraven, Lord Mayo, Colonel Hutche- 
 son Poe and Colonel Nugent Everard representing (though 
 not officially) the landlord interest : and the result of 
 the agreement reached by this body was seen in Mr. 
 Wyndham's Land Purchase Act of 1903. This great 
 and drastic measure altered fundamentally the character 
 of the Irish problem. Directly by its own effect, and 
 indirectly by the example of new methods, it changed 
 opinion alike in Ireland and Great Britain. In Ireland 
 hitherto, as has been already seen, resistance to Home 
 Rule had come primarily from the landlord class, by 
 whom the Nationalist desire for self-government was 
 construed as a cloak for the wish to revive or reverse the 
 ancient confiscations. Now, the land question was by 
 general consent settled, at least in principle ; in propor- 
 
28 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 tion as landlords were bought out the leading economic 
 argument against Home Rule disappeared. The opposi- 
 tion reduced itself strictly to political grounds ; and it 
 began to be plain that the true heart of resistance lay 
 in Ulster. 
 
 Also, lines of cleavage in the Unionist camp began to 
 appear. Already, landlords in the South and West had 
 found a common ground of action with representatives 
 of the tenants. It was felt, alike in Ireland and England, 
 that this precedent might be developed further. 
 
 In England political opinion was much affected by 
 the apparent success of an attempt to deal with the Irish 
 problem piecemeal. The Congested Districts Board had 
 done much to relieve those regions where famine was 
 always a possibility ; Local Government had given 
 satisfactory results ; and now Land Purchase was hailed 
 as the beginning of a new era. The idea of seeing how 
 much farther the principle of tentative approach could 
 be carried took strong hold of many minds, and the word 
 '* devolution " came into fashion. 
 
 When it became known that Sir Antony MacDonnell, 
 then Under-Secretary at Dublin Castle, had, in consulta- 
 tion with Lord Dunraven, drafted a scheme for trans- 
 ferring parts of Irish administration to a purely Irish 
 authority, a situation rapidly defined itself in which Ulster 
 broke away from the more liberal elements in Irish 
 Unionism. The Ulster group demanded and obtained 
 the resignation of Mr. George W3'ndham ; they demanded 
 also the dismissal of the Under-Secretary. But Sir Antony 
 MacDonnell was not of a resigning temper ; he had not 
 acted without authority, and he was defended zealously 
 by the Irish members. The section of Liberal opinion 
 which adhered rather to Lord Rosebery than to Sir Henry 
 Campbell-Bannerman probably drew the conclusion that 
 the Irish party were prepared at least to tolerate the 
 policy of approaching Home Rule step by step ; and 
 beyond doubt they were impressed by the prestige of 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 29 
 
 Sir Antony MacDonnell's record and personality. The 
 son of a small Irish Catholic landlord, educated at the 
 Galway College of the Queen's University, he had entered 
 the Indian Civil Service and in it risen to the highest 
 point of power. The recommendation that he should 
 be brought home to assist in the Government of Ireland 
 had come from Lord Lansdowne, then Governor-General 
 of India, who knew that the famous administrator of 
 the Punjab was a Catholic Irishman of Nationalist sym- 
 pathies. He had been accepted by Mr. Wyndham, his 
 official chief, "rather as a colleague than as a subordinate." 
 Officially and publicly, the credit for the Land Act of 
 1903 went to the Chief Secretary, and Mr. Wyndham 
 deserves much of it. But no one who knew the two 
 men could have doubted that in the shaping of a measure 
 involving so wide a range of detail, the leading part must 
 have been taken by the Irish Civil Servant who in India 
 had acquired most of his fame from a sweeping measure 
 of land reform. 
 
 Proposals to alter the method and conduct of Irish 
 administration before touching the parliamentary power 
 to legislate and to tax came with extraordinary weight 
 in coming from such a man ; and the history of the 
 previous Home Rule Bills was not encouraging to any- 
 one, especially to those who had been members of Mr. 
 Gladstone's two last administrations. From the time 
 of the Parnell divorce case onwards, the Irish question 
 had brought to Liberals nothing but embarrassment 
 and embitterment. The enthusiasm for Home Rule 
 which grew steadily from 1886 up to the severance between 
 Gladstone and Parnell had vanished in the squalid con- 
 troversies of the " split." Moreover, now, by the action 
 of Mr. Chamberlain, a new dividing line had been brought 
 into British politics. The cry of Protection seemed in 
 the opinion of all Liberals to menace ruin to British 
 prosperity ; the banner of Free Trade offered a splendid 
 rallying-point for a party which had known fifteen years 
 
30 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 of dissension and division. Prudent men thought it 
 would be unsafe, unwise and unpatriotic to compromise 
 this great national interest by retaining the old watch- 
 word on which Gladstone had twice fought and twice 
 been beaten. 
 
 It was clear, too, that a Home Rule Bill would provoke 
 a direct conflict with the House of Lords and would raise 
 that great struggle on not the most favourable issue. 
 Statesmen like Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith pro- 
 bably believed that a partial measure, an instalment of 
 self-government, to which some influential sections of 
 the Tory party would not be unfriendly, might have 
 strong hopes of passing into law. 
 
 So it came to pass that in the election of 1906 the 
 Liberal Party came into power with a majority of un- 
 exampled magnitude, but with a Government pledged, 
 negatively, not to introduce a Home Rule Bill in that 
 Parliament, but, positively, to attempt an Irish settle- 
 ment by the policy of instalments. 
 
 In all this lay the seeds of trouble for the Irish leader. 
 Liberals have never understood that Ireland will not take 
 from them what it would take from the Tories. It will 
 accept, as a palliative, from the party opposed to Home 
 Rule what it will not accept from those who have 
 admitted the justice of the national demand. 
 
 II 
 
 " For myself," said Redmond in his speech to the 
 Irish Convention in May 1907, " I have always expressed 
 in public and in private my opinion that no half-way 
 house on this question is possible ; but at the same time 
 I am, or at any rate I try to be, a practical politician. 
 In the lodgment this idea of instalments had got in the 
 minds of English statesmen I recognized the fact — 
 and after all in politics the first essential is to recognize 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 31 
 
 facts — I recognized the fact that in this Parliament we 
 were not going to get a pure Home Rule Bill offered, 
 and I consented, and I was absolutely right in consenting, 
 that whatever scheme short of that was put forward 
 would be considered calmly on its merits." 
 
 This meant that during the whole of the year 1906 
 and a part of 1907 the proposal of the new Irish Bill 
 was under discussion with the Irish leaders. The course 
 of these deliberations was undoubtedly a disappointment. 
 Mr. Bryce was replaced by Mr. Birrell as Chief Secretary, 
 but the scheme still fell short of what Redmond had 
 hoped to attain. Unfortunately, and it was a character- 
 istic error, his sanguine temperament had led him to 
 encourage in Ireland hopes as high as his own. The 
 production of the Irish Council Bill and its reception in 
 Ireland was the first real shock to his power. 
 
 Mr. Birrell in introducing the measure spoke with his 
 eye on the Tories and the House of Lords. He repre- 
 sented it as only the most trifling concession ; he empha- 
 sized not the powers which it conveyed but the limitations 
 to them. Redmond in following him was in a difficult 
 position. He stressed the point that to accept a scheme 
 which by reason of its partial nature would break down 
 in its working would be ruinous, because failure would 
 be attributed to natural incapacity in the Irish people. 
 Acceptance, therefore, he said, could not be uncondi- 
 tional ; and undoubtedly to his mind it was conditioned 
 by his hope of securing certain important amendments, 
 which he outlined. None the less, the tone of his speech 
 was one of acceptance, and he concluded : 
 
 " I have never in all the long years that I have been 
 in this House spoken under such a heavy sense of respon- 
 sibility as I am speaking on this measure this afternoon. 
 Ever since Mr. Gladstone's Bill of 1886 Ireland has been 
 waiting for some scheme to settle the problem — waiting 
 sometimes in hope, sometimes almost in despair ; but 
 the horrible thing is this, that all the time that Ireland 
 
32 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 has been so waiting there has been a gaping wound in 
 her side, and her sons have had to stand by helpless while 
 the}'^ saw her very life-blood flowing out. Who can say 
 that is an exaggeration ? Twenty years of resolute 
 government by the party above the gangway have dimin- 
 ished the population of Ireland by a million. No man 
 in any position of influence can take upon himself the 
 awful responsibility of despising and putting upon one 
 side any device that may arrest that hemorrhage, even 
 although he believed, as I do, that far different remedies 
 must be applied before Ireland can stand upon her feet 
 in vigorous strength. We are determined, as far as we 
 are concerned, that these other remedies shall be 
 applied ; but in the meantime we should shrink from 
 the responsibility of rejecting anything which, after 
 that full consideration which the Bill will receive, 
 seems to our deliberate judgment calculated to relieve 
 the sufferings of Ireland and hasten the day of her full 
 national convalescence." 
 
 There is no doubt that the element in him which urged 
 him to welcome anything that could set Irishmen work- 
 ing together on Irish problems made it almost impossible 
 for him to throw aside this chance. It was clear to me 
 also that by long months of work in secret deliberation 
 the proposals originally set out had been greatly altered, 
 so much so that in surveying the Bill he was conscious 
 mainly of the improvements in it ; and that in this 
 process his mind had lost perception of how the measure 
 was likely to affect Irish opinion — especially in view 
 of his own hopeful prognostications. At all events, the 
 reception of Mr. Birrell's speech, even by Redmond's 
 own colleagues, marked a sudden change in the atmo- 
 sphere. Some desired to vote at once against the 
 measure ; many were with difficulty brought into the 
 lobby to support even the formal stage of first reading. 
 In Ireland there was fierce denunciation. A Convention 
 was called for May 21st. The crowd was so great that 
 many of us could not make our way into the Mansion 
 House ; and Redmond opened the proceedings by moving 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 33 
 
 the rejection of the Bill. In the interval since the debate 
 he had been confronted with a definite refusal to concede 
 the amendments for which he asked. 
 
 These were mainly two, of principle : for the objection 
 taken to the finance of the Bill was a detail, though 
 of the first importance. The Bill proposed to hand 
 over the five great departments of Irish administration 
 to the control of an Irish Council. The decisions of that 
 Council were to be subject to the veto of the Lord-Lieu- 
 tenant, as are the decisions of Parliament to the veto of 
 the Crown. But the Bill proposed not merely to give to 
 the Viceroy the power of vetoing proposed action but 
 of instituting other action on his own initiative. Secondly, 
 the Council was to exercise its control through Com- 
 mittees, each of which was to have a paid chairman, 
 nominated by the Crown. 
 
 " It would be far better," Redmond had said in the 
 House of Commons, " to have one man selected as the 
 chairmen of these committees are to be selected, to have 
 charge, so far as the Council is concerned, of the working 
 of the Department, and then all these chairmen acting 
 together could form a sort of organic body which would 
 give cohesion, would co-ordinate and give stability to 
 the whole of the work. I am afraid that the Government 
 seem to have shrunk from that for fear the argument 
 would be used against them that they were really creating 
 a Ministry." 
 
 That was the real difficulty. A Council subject only 
 to a veto on its acts, even though it could neither pass 
 a by-law nor strike a rate, would undoubtedly be said 
 by the Unionist opposition to be a rudimentary parlia- 
 ment. A group of chairmen possessing administrative 
 powers like those of Ministers would be labelled a 
 Ministry ; and the Liberals who had pledged themselves 
 not to give effect to their Home Rule principles were 
 sensitive to charges of breach of faith. 
 
 It is a curious fact in politics that the public promise 
 
 4 
 
34 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 conveyed in the adoption of certain principles is generally 
 taken to be on the level of ordinary commercial obliga- 
 tion. Failure to keep it jeopardizes a man's reputation 
 for political stability, just as failure to pay a tailor's 
 bill imperils a man's financial character. But a promise 
 to political opponents that you will not give effect to 
 your principles stands on the level of a card debt : it 
 is a matter of honour to make good ; and on this point 
 Mr. Asquith in particular has always shown an adamantine 
 resolution. 
 
 From 1907 onwards it was with Mr. Asquith that 
 Redmond had chiefly to count. Sir Henry Campbell- 
 Bannerman, who, personally, had given no such limiting 
 pledges, and who during his two years of leadership 
 commanded a respect, an affectionate allegiance, from 
 his followers in the House without parallel at all events 
 since Mr. Gladstone's day, was fast weakening in health. 
 He lived long enough to give freedom to South Africa, 
 the one outstanding achievement of that Parliament ; 
 and by the success of that great measure he did more 
 to remove British distrust of Home Rule than even 
 Gladstone ever accomplished. It was no fault of his if 
 Liberalism failed to settle the Irish question at the moment 
 when Liberal power reached its highest point. 
 
 The failure of the Council Bill had one good result, 
 and one only. It cleared the way for a definite propa- 
 ganda on Home Rule. But before this could be under- 
 taken it was necessary to pull Nationalist Ireland to- 
 gether, for it was once more rent with division and distrust. 
 Mr. Healy, who in 1901 had been expelled from the Irish 
 party and its organization on the motion of Mr. O'Brien 
 and against Redmond's advice, and Mr. O'Brien, who 
 had subsequently retired from the party against Red- 
 mond's wish, were both of them formidable antagonists ; 
 and each was vehement in attack on the main body of 
 Nationalists and their leader. It was some time before 
 Redmond braced himself to the struggle ; but from the 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 35 
 
 opening of the autumn recess in 1907 he undertook a 
 campaign throughout Ireland which it would be difficult 
 to overpraise. In a series of speeches at chosen centres, 
 delivered before great audiences, he laid down once more 
 the national demand as he conceived it ; and in each 
 speech he dealt with a different aspect of the case for 
 Home Rule. 
 
 A formal outcome of this campaign was the re-estab- 
 lishment of national unity. Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Healy 
 returned to the Irish party for a brief period. But the 
 more important result was the re-establishment of 
 Redmond's personal position. He had made an effort 
 which would have been great for any man, but for him 
 was a victory over his own temperament. That tempera- 
 ment had in it, negatively, a great lack of personal 
 ambition and, positively, a strong love for a quiet life. 
 He did his work in Parliament regularly and conscien- 
 tiously, always there day in and day out ; and it was 
 work of a very exacting kind. This had become the 
 routine of his existence and he did it without strain. 
 But to go outside it was for him always an effort. He 
 hated town life ; but more than this, he hated ceremonies, 
 presentations, receptions in hotels, and all the promis- 
 cuous contact of political gatherings. Nevertheless, when 
 he came to such an occasion no living man acquitted 
 himself better. Apart from his oratory, he had an admir- 
 able manner, a dignified yet friendly courtesy which 
 gained attachment. In the course of the autumn and 
 winter following the Irish Council Bill he must have met 
 and been seen by a hundred times more of his adherents 
 than in any similar period of his leadership. People all 
 over Ireland heard him not only on the public platform 
 but in small addresses to deputations, in impromptu 
 speeches at semi-public dinners, and all of this strength- 
 ened him where an Irish leader most needs to be 
 strengthened — in the hearts of the people. The hold 
 which he gained then stood to him during the years which 
 
36 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 followed and up to the outbreak of the war. But it 
 could have been still further strengthened, and if am- 
 bition had been a motive force in him, he would have 
 strengthened it. More than that, if he had realized his 
 full value to Ireland, he would have felt it his duty to 
 do so. Modesty, combined with a certain degree of 
 indolence, made him leave all that contact with the mass 
 of his followers which is necessary to leadership to be 
 effected through his chief colleagues, Mr. Dillon and 
 Mr. Devlin — who, through no will of theirs, became 
 rather joint leaders than lieutenants, so far as Ireland 
 was concerned. 
 
 Circumstances helped to emphasize this tendency. 
 His work lay very greatly in London. Parliament 
 occupied every year a longer and longer space. The 
 task of platform advocacy all over England was urgent, 
 and in England Redmond stood out alone. It was little 
 to be wondered at that when each long deferred recess 
 came he made it a vacation and not a change of work. 
 The seclusion from direct intercourse with the mass of 
 his followers which conditions imposed upon him was 
 further accentuated by his personal tastes and his choice 
 of a dwelling. 
 
 In the early years of the nineteenth century the 
 mountain range which runs along the east coast from 
 outside Dublin through Wicklow into county Wexford 
 was a country difficult of access and unsubdued. Here 
 in 1803 Emmet found a refuge, and after Emmet's death 
 here Michael Dwyer still held out : Connemara itself 
 was hardly wilder or less accessible, till the " military 
 road " was run, little more than a hundred years ago, 
 from Dublin over the western slopes of Featherbed, past 
 Glencree, and through Callary Bog, skirting Glendalough 
 and traversing the wild recesses of Glenmalure, so that 
 it cuts across the headwaters of those beautiful streams 
 which meet in the Vale of Ovoca. From Glenmalure 
 the road climbs a steep ridge and then travels in wide 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 37 
 
 downward curves across the seaward side of Lugnaquilla 
 — fifth in height among Irish mountains. Here, at the 
 head of a long valley which runs down to the Meeting 
 of the Waters, was built one of the barracks which 
 billeted the original garrison of the road. Later, these 
 buildings had been used for constabulary ; but with 
 peaceful times this grew needless, for there was little 
 disturbance among these Wicklow folk, tenants of little 
 farms, each with a sheep-run on the vast hills. Nothing 
 could be less like the flat sea-bordering lands of the 
 Barony of Forth in which the Redmonds spent their 
 boyhood than these wild, sweeping, torrent-seamed folds 
 of hill and valley ; but the place came to him as part of 
 his inheritance from " the Chief." Parnell's home at 
 Avondale was some ten miles from here, lying in woods 
 beside the Ovoca River ; but the Parnell property 
 stretched up to the slopes of Lugnaquilla, and the 
 dismantled barrack was used by him as a shooting 
 lodge. Here, in the early days before his life became 
 absorbed in the masterful attachment which led finally 
 to his overthrow, he spent good hours ; and here the 
 two Redmonds and those others of his followers who 
 were his companions came to camp roughly in this 
 strange, gaunt survival of military rule. After Parnell's 
 death Redmond bought the barrack and a small plot 
 of land about it, and it became increasingly and ex- 
 clusively his home in Ireland. It was, indeed, Ireland 
 itself for him. In it and through it he knew Ireland 
 intimately, felt Ireland intensely and intensively, not 
 only as a place, but as a way of being. Ireland to him 
 meant Aughavanagh. 
 
 Partlj^ no doubt, the almost unbroken wildness of 
 his surroundings appealed to an element of romance in 
 his character, which was strongly emotional though 
 extremely reticent. Only an artist would have recog- 
 nized beauty in those scenes, for in all Ireland it would 
 be difficult to find a landscape with less amenity ; the 
 
38 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 hill shapes are featureless, without boldness or intricacy 
 of line. Redmond, a born artist in words, possessing 
 strongly the sense of form, was sensitive to beauty in 
 all kinds — 3^et rather to the beauty that is symmetrical, 
 graceful and well-planned. A sailor does not love the 
 sea for its beauty, and Redmond loved Ireland as a 
 sailor loves the sea — yet with a difference. Ireland to him 
 in a great measure was Aughavanagh, and Aughavanagh 
 was a place of rest. Ireland is a good country to rest 
 in. But it would have been far better for Redmond 
 and for Ireland if Ireland had been the place not of his 
 rest, but of his work. 
 
 His work was essentially that of an agent of Ireland 
 carrying on Ireland's affairs in a strange capital. He 
 spent more of his time in London than in Ireland, but 
 he was never part of the life of London, never in any 
 sense a Londoner. He was part of the life of the House 
 of Commons, for that was his place of work ; and when 
 he left it he went to Aughavanagh as a man returns from 
 the City to his home. This home of his was in no sense 
 connected with his active occupations. He was no lover 
 of gardening or of farming ; he had none of the Irish- 
 man's taste for the overseeing of stock or land ; he 
 enjoyed shooting, but he was not a passionate sports- 
 man. What was a passion with him — for he sacrificed 
 much to it — was rest in the place of his choice. 
 
 It was not a lonely habitation. He was no recluse, 
 and when there he was always surrounded by his friends. 
 I do not know precisely how one could constitute a list 
 of them — but half a dozen men at least came and went 
 there as they chose. Mr. Mooney, Mr. Hay den, " Long 
 John " O'Connor, Dr. Kenny — these, and above all, 
 Paddy O'Brien, the party's chief acting whip — were 
 constant there. Some came to shoot, and Willie Redmond 
 used to come over from his house at Delgany, where the 
 Glen of the Downs debouches seaward ; walking generally, 
 for he was the fastest and most untiring of mountaineers : 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 39 
 
 very few cared to keep beside him on the hills. Others 
 were content to share the daily bathes, morning and 
 afternoon, in a long deep pool where the little stream 
 tumbling down a series of cascades makes a place to 
 dive and swim in. These were the friends of Redmond's 
 own generation, and they were also his son's friends ; 
 but the two daughters had their allies, and one way or 
 another the party was apt to be a big one — very simply 
 provided for. When I went there first (in 1907) you 
 climbed a narrow stone stair to the first floor ; on the 
 left was a dining-room, beyond that a billiard-room ; 
 on the right, Redmond's study, and beyond that his 
 bedroom. Another flight took you to the upper regions, 
 where were two dormitories — the girls to the right, the 
 men to the left. Later, he made some alterations, and 
 the upstair rooms were subdivided off ; the garden was 
 developed ; it became more of a house and less of a 
 barrack ; but the character of the life did not change. 
 It was most simple, most hospitable, most unconventional 
 and most remote. 
 
 Certainly a great part of Aughavanagh's charm for 
 him lay in its remoteness. It was seven Irish miles 
 up a hilly road from the nearest railway station, post 
 office or telegraph station. Aughrim was three hours' 
 train journey from Dublin, on a tiny branch line, and 
 trains were few. Until motors brought him (to his 
 intense resentment) within reach, he was as inaccessible 
 as if he had lived in Clare or Mayo. 
 
 So it came to pass that though he knew to the very 
 core one typical district of Ireland, and was far more 
 closely in touch with a few score of Irish peasants through 
 their daily life than any of his leading associates, he was 
 yet cut off by his own choice from much that is Ireland 
 — and perhaps from much that was most important to 
 him. Political opinion is created in the towns, and he 
 knew the Irish townsfolk, so far as he could manage it, 
 only through his correspondence, and through those 
 
40 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 business visits to Dublin which he made aa few as 
 possible. 
 
 If his work had lain, where it should by rights have 
 lain, in a ministerial office in Dublin, all would have 
 been well. As it was, the deliberate and extreme seclusion 
 of his life in Ireland weakened his influence. He was 
 far too shrewd not to know this, and far too unambitious 
 to care. Work he never shrank from. But the daily 
 solicitations of people with personal grievances to lay 
 before him, personal interests which they desired him 
 to promote, made a form of trouble which in his periods 
 of rest from work he refused to undergo. 
 
 The same qualities in him were responsible for his 
 persistent refusal to accept private hospitality where he 
 went on public business. Whether in Ireland or in 
 Great Britain, he must stay at a hotel, and many were 
 the magnates of Liberalism whose ruffled feelings it was 
 necessary to smooth down on this account. He detested 
 being lionized and wanted always, when the public affair 
 was over, to get away to his own quarters. 
 
 The demands on him in England for platform work 
 were portentous. Every constituency which wanted a 
 meeting on the Home Rule question wanted Redmond 
 and no other speaker. Of course he could not go to 
 one-twentieth of the places where he was asked for ; 
 and his objection to going was not the effort involved 
 but the impossibility either of indefinitely repeating him- 
 self or of finding something new to say each time. " If 
 it was in America," he would say, " I would speak as 
 often as you asked me " (it was my misfortune to have 
 to do the asking), " because they never rejDort a speech." 
 The fact is worth noting, for in scores of instances what 
 was adduced by opponents as quotation from his utter- 
 ances in the United States represented simply some 
 American journalist's impression, perhaps less of what 
 Redmond said than of what, in the reporter's opinion, 
 he should have said. Those who represented him as 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 41 
 
 putting one face on the argument in America and another 
 in Great Britain did not know the man. *' I have made 
 it a rule," he said to me more than once, " to say 
 the extremest things I had to say in the House of 
 Commons." 
 
 However, all the machinery which was employed by 
 the opponents of Home Rule to prejudice Ireland's case 
 in the British constituencies proved very inefifectual. 
 For one thing, the lesson of South Africa had gone home. 
 For another, and perhaps a greater, no cause ever had 
 a missionary better adapted to the temperament of the 
 British democracy. The dignity and beauty of Redmond's 
 eloquence, the weight which he could give to an argu- 
 ment, his extraordinary gift for simplifying an issue and 
 grouping thoughts in large bold masses — all these things 
 carried audiences with them. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Between 1908 and 1910 we were still, though witli 
 rapidly increasing success, trying to get a hearing for 
 the Irish question — trying to push it once more to the 
 front. The change of leadership from Sir Henry Campbell- 
 Bannerman to Mr. Asquith had damped Liberal enthusi- 
 asm. We got solid work done for Ireland in the University 
 Act of 1908, though Redmond would have preferred a 
 university of the residential type, like that in which he 
 had himself been an undergraduate. A highly conten- 
 tious measure was also carried in the Land Act of 1909. 
 But a new power was coming to the front, at once assist- 
 ing and thwarting our efforts. Mr. Lloyd George put 
 a new fighting spirit into Liberalism : but the objects 
 which he had at heart could only be achieved by a great 
 expenditure of electoral power, and among those objects 
 Irish self-government found only a secondary place. 
 
42 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 When Mr. Gladstone spoke of liberty he thought of what 
 he had helped to bring to Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and 
 Montenegro — what he had tried to bring to Ireland. 
 When Mr. Lloyd George spoke of liberty, he thought 
 of what he wanted to bring to England first, and to 
 Ireland by the way ; his conviction that Ireland needed 
 self-government was not so deeply rooted as his con- 
 viction that the poor throughout the United Kingdom 
 needed help. 
 
 Old Age Pensions had been popular, but had not been 
 a fighting issue. Mr. Lloyd George provided the fighting 
 issue with a vengeance when he set himself to pay for 
 them. Unfortunately, Nationalist Ireland had no enthu- 
 siasm for the Budget which English Radicalism made 
 its flag. A country of peasant proprietors was easily 
 scared by the very name of land taxes. But above 
 all the Finance Bill dealt drastically, and many thought 
 unfairly, with the powerful liquor trade, which in its 
 branches of brewing and distilling included the main 
 manufacturing interest of southern Ireland, and on its 
 retail side was incredibly diffused through the whole 
 shopkeeping community. 
 
 The dissident Nationalists saw their chance. Mr. 
 O'Brien emerged from one of his periodic retirements to 
 lead a whirlwind campaign against the " robber Budget." 
 Redmond and our party were obliged to oppose a 
 measure which pressed so hard as this undoubtedly did 
 on Ireland. Our opposition to the land taxes was with- 
 drawn when valuable concessions had been made, but 
 no such compromise was considered possible on the 
 liquor taxes. On the other hand, it grew clear that 
 the measure was likely to produce a conflict in which 
 the power of the House of Lords might be challenged 
 on the most favourable ground : and for that reason, 
 when the third reading was reached, the Irish party 
 abstained from voting against it. This course, while 
 it facilitated close co-operation with Liberalism in the 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 43 
 
 general election which followed, weakened us in Ireland ; 
 and eleven out of the eighty-three Nationalist members 
 returned in January 1910 ranked themselves as outside 
 the party ; though Mr. O'Brien's actual following was 
 limited to seven Cork members and Mr. Healy. 
 
 IV 
 
 The action of the Lords in rejecting the Budget of 
 
 1909 had an important personal result. It placed Mr. 
 Asquith in a role which no one was ever better qualified 
 to fill — that of a Liberal statesman defending principles 
 of democratic control menaced after a long period of 
 security. The Prime Minister, not the Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer, now became the protagonist ; and this 
 was to Redmond's liking, for he felt that Mr. Asquith 
 was more concerned with the problems which had 
 occupied Gladstone's closing years and Mr. Lloyd George 
 with those of a later day. 
 
 Yet in the first grave encounter after the rejection 
 of the Budget, Redmond and the leader of the Liberal 
 party came to sharp differences. The general election 
 had amply justified the advice which was urged by him 
 on Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman when the House of 
 Lords rejected the Education Bill in 1906 — namely, that 
 the Liberal party should take up at once the inevitable 
 fight before their enormous strength had been frittered 
 away in a series of disappointments. The majority of 
 1906 was too swollen to be healthy : owing to the ruling 
 out of Home Rule, it included a number of men only 
 partial adherents of the full Liberal programme ; and 
 a diminution of its proportions owing to the traditional 
 swing of the pendulum was certain. But in January 
 
 1910 the losses were more than even sanguine Tory 
 prophets predicted. Tories came back equal in strength 
 
44 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 to the Liberals : Labour was only forty, so that the 
 Irish party held the balance in the House. 
 
 The election had been fought expressly on the issue of 
 Government's claim to enable a Liberal Government to 
 deal with certain problems, among which the Irish 
 question occupied the foremost place. It was easy now 
 for the Tories to argue that the Government appealing 
 to the country on that issue had lost two hundred 
 seats. They said : " You have authority to pass your 
 Budget — but for these vast unconstitutional changes 
 you have no mandate." The temper of their party, 
 which had more than doubled its numbers, was very 
 high : in the Liberal ranks depression reigned and 
 counsels were divided. 
 
 At the beginning of the election Mr. Asquith had made 
 a great speech in the Albert Hall in which he outlined 
 the Liberal policy. In it he declared that the pledge 
 against introducing a Home Rule Bill was withdrawn, 
 and that the establishment of self-government for Ireland, 
 subject to the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, 
 was among the Government's main purposes. But the 
 House of Lords was in the way. 
 
 " We shall not assume office and we shall not hold 
 office unless we can secure the safeguards which experi- 
 ence shows us to be necessary for the legislative utility 
 and honour of the party of progress." 
 
 This was universally taken to mean that he would 
 obtain a guarantee that the King would, if necessary, 
 consent to the creation of sufficient new peers to over- 
 ride the hostile majority. But as the election progressed, 
 uncertainties developed and an alternative policy of 
 attempting to reform the Upper House was advocated 
 in certain quarters. The question arose also as to whether 
 the first business of the new House should be to pass the 
 Budget which the Lords had thrown out or to proceed 
 with the attack on the power of veto. 
 
 Redmond's view on this was not in doubt. At a 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 45 
 
 meeting in Dublin on February 10, 1910, he declared in 
 the most emphatic manner that to deal with the Budget 
 first would be a breach of Mr. Asquith's pledge to the 
 country, since it would throw away the power of the 
 House of Commons to stop supply. This speech attracted 
 much attention, and the memory of it was present to 
 many a fortnight later when Mr. Asquith was replying 
 to Mr. Balfour at the opening of the debate on the 
 Address. The Prime Minister dwelt strongly on the 
 administrative necessity for regularizing the financial 
 position disturbed by the Upper House's unconstitutional 
 action. He indicated also the need for reform in the 
 composition of that House. But, above all, he disclaimed 
 as improper and impossible any attempt to secure in 
 advance a pledge for the contingent exercise of the Royal 
 prerogative. 
 
 " I have received no such guarantee and I have asked 
 for no such guarantee," he said. 
 
 The change was marked indeed from the moment 
 when he uttered in the Albert Hall his sentence against 
 assuming office or holding office without the necessary 
 safeguards — an assurance at which the whole vast assembly 
 rose to their feet and cheered. Every word in his speech 
 on the Address added to the depression of his followers 
 and the elation of the Opposition. Redmond followed 
 him at once. In such circumstances as then existed, 
 it was exceedingly undesirable for the Irish leader to 
 emphasize the fact that his vote could overthrow the 
 Government : and the least unnecessary display of this 
 power would naturally and properly have been resented 
 by the Government's following. No one knew this 
 better than Redmond, yet the position demanded bold 
 action. His speech, courteous, as always, in tone, and 
 studiously respectful in its reference to the position of 
 the Crown, was an open menace to the Government. He 
 quoted the Prime Minister's words at the Albert Hall, 
 he appealed to the House at large for the construction 
 
46 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 which had been everywhere put on them ; and it was 
 apparent that he had the full sympathy not only of his 
 own party and of Labour, but of most of Mr. Asquith's 
 own following. He concluded in these words : 
 
 ** If the Prime Minister is not in a position to say that 
 he has such guarantees as are necessary to enable him 
 to pass a Veto Bill this year, and if in spite of that he 
 intends to remain in office and proposes to pass the 
 Budget into law and then to adjourn — I do not care for 
 how short or how long — the consideration of the Bill 
 dealing with the veto of the House of Lords, that is a 
 policy which Ireland cannot and will not support." 
 
 The effect on the House was such that no one rose 
 to continue the debate. Next day it was resumed, and 
 not only Labour speakers, but one after another of the 
 Liberals, including some of the Prime Minister's most 
 docile, old-fashioned supporters rose and declared that 
 Redmond and not the Leader of the House had expressed 
 their views. So began a remarkable struggle in which 
 the combined forces of the private members — Liberal, 
 Labour and Irish — united by a common desire to destroy 
 the domination of the Peers, contended against the 
 Cabinet's policy of attempting not merely to limit the 
 power of veto but to reconstitute the Upper House. In 
 such a process men saw that the driving force of the 
 majority would waste away and that the composite 
 character of their alliance would lead to certain disruption. 
 
 Before the debate on the Address concluded it was 
 plain that Redmond had won. From that period on- 
 wards his popularity, and, through him, the popularity 
 of the party which he led, was immensely increased in 
 Great Britain. He was regarded as one of the men 
 who had rendered best service to democracy against 
 privilege. He himself believed that in this first contest 
 Ireland had decided the victory — had decided the over- 
 throw of the House which had so long opposed its 
 liberties. Labour had then neither the essential leader 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 47 
 
 nor the necessary parliamentary strength : Liberalism 
 was confused and uncertain at the critical moment. 
 
 Yet in the very process of achieving this success Red- 
 mond laid himself open to attack. The Budget was 
 regarded with dislike by a very large section of Irish- 
 men, and apart from considerations of political strategy 
 the Irish members would certainly have voted against 
 it. Now, the power was in their hands to defeat it 
 finally. By so doing they would, of course, justify to 
 some degree the unconstitutional action of the Lords ; 
 but this consideration did not weigh with Mr. O'Brien 
 and Mr. Healy. They accused Redmond of selling the 
 real interests of Ireland to keep a Government in office 
 which could oifer nothing in return but a gambling chance 
 of limiting the veto of the Lords. Mr. O'Brien was 
 firmly confident that no such measure would ever pass. 
 He denounced the bargain, not merely because it was a 
 bargain in which Redmond accepted what was in his 
 view a ruinous injustice to Ireland, but because it was 
 a bargain in which the Irish had been outwitted. This 
 line of argument was to be dinned into the ears of Ireland 
 during all the remaining years of Redmond's life. The 
 only conclusive answer to it was to gain Home Rule. 
 If, in the long run, it came to appear that the attackers 
 had been right in their contention, and that Ireland 
 had never received the expected return, the fault for 
 that result lay with Ireland itself no less than with 
 England ; it most assuredly did not lie with John 
 Redmond. A great weight of responsibility rests on 
 those who from the first hour of Ireland's opportunity 
 ingeminated distrust to an over-suspicious people. 
 
 For the moment, however, the attack made no head- 
 way. Irishmen have a shrewd political sense, and they 
 felt that in the struggle to pin Liberal Ministers to the 
 true fighting objective Redmond had won. They were 
 also delighted to see the Irish party openly exert its 
 power — not quite realizing that such exhibitions were 
 
48 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 against the interest of the democratic alliance, whicJi 
 had to undergo a grave test. The Government's vacil- 
 lation had rendered another general election necessary 
 if the Veto question were to be fought out. 
 
 On April 29th the House adjourned for the Whitsuntide 
 recess, after which the crisis was to come with the decision 
 of the House of Lords whether to accept or reject the 
 Veto Resolution, which had then passed the Commons. 
 On May 7th, after a short and sudden illness, King Edward 
 died. Both the great English parties were unwilling to 
 renew the most acute political struggle of modern times 
 at the opening of a new reign, and means of accom- 
 modation was sought through a Conference which sat 
 first on June 16th and held twenty-one meetings. 
 No representative of Ireland was on this body. On 
 November 10th it reported that no result had come of 
 its efforts, and a new general election was fixed for 
 December 1st. 
 
 When the Conference finally broke down Redmond 
 was on his way back from America, whither he had gone 
 accompanied by Mr. Devlin. Mr. T. P. O'Connor at 
 the same time undertook a tour in Canada. The success 
 of these missions showed that the interest and the con- 
 fidence of the Irish race were higher than at any previous 
 period : the ambassadors brought back a contribution 
 of one hundred thousand dollars to the election funds, 
 and the ship on which they came was saluted by bonfires 
 all along the coast of Cork. Ireland, too, was subscribing 
 as Ireland had not subscribed since Parnell's zenith : 
 and this was an Ireland in which the land-hunger had 
 been largely appeased. The theory that Ireland's demand 
 for self-government was merely generated by Ireland's 
 poverty began to look ridiculous. 
 
 It was the cue of the Tory Press at this moment to 
 excite prejudice against the Liberals by representing 
 them as the bondslaves of the " dollar dictator " — 
 ordered about by an Irish autocrat with swollen money- 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 49 
 
 bags from New York. This line of argument did us little 
 harm in Great Britain ; in Ireland it improved Redmond's 
 position, for it was a useful answer to Mr. O'Brien's repre- 
 sentation of him as the abject tool of Liberal politicians. 
 The election, on the whole, strengthened our party. 
 Mr. Healy was thrown out ; and Mr. O'Brien, though he 
 retained the seven seats held by his adherents in Cork, 
 failed in two out of three personal candidatures. 
 
 In Great Britain the second election of the year 1910 
 had the surprising result of reproducing almost exactly 
 the same division of parties : and this added greatly to 
 the strength of the Government. The Tory leaders 
 now, instead of insisting on a maintenance of the old 
 Constitution, went into alternative proposals — including 
 the adoption of the Referendum. This was their con- 
 structive line ; the destructive resolved itself largely 
 into an endeavour to focus resistance on the question 
 of Ireland — the purpose for which alone, they said, 
 abolition of the veto was demanded. As has often hap- 
 pened, action taken by the Vatican gave the opponents 
 of Home Rule a useful weapon. The Ne Temere decree, 
 promulgated in the year 1908, laid down that any marriage 
 to which a Roman Catholic was a party, if not solemnized 
 according to the rites of the Church of Rome, should be 
 treated as invalid from a canonical point of view. 
 Although legally binding, it should be regarded as no 
 marriage in the eyes of an orthodox Roman Catholic 
 until it was regularized in the manner provided by the 
 Church. The case of an unhappy mixed marriage in 
 Belfast was exploited with fury on a thousand platforms. 
 Another decree, the Motu Propria, was construed as 
 seeking to establish immunity for the clergy from pro- 
 ceedings in civil courts. This, however, was of less 
 platform value, because no instance could be found of 
 a practical application ; whereas the McCann case 
 unquestionably gave Tory disputants a formidable 
 instrument for evoking the ancient distrust of Roman 
 
 6 
 
60 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Catholicism which is so deeply ingrained in the Protestant 
 mind. 
 
 In spite of all, the English democracy remained steady 
 in its purpose. Party feeling, however, ran to heights 
 not known in living memory. In July 1911 the Parlia- 
 ment Bill went to the Lords, where it was altered out 
 of all recognition. On July 20th Mr. Asquith sent a 
 letter to Mr. Balfour stating that the King had guaranteed 
 that he would exercise his prerogative to secure that 
 the Bill should be passed substantially as it left the 
 Commons. On the 24th the extreme section of the 
 Tory party, headed by Lord Hugh Cecil, refused to allow 
 the Prime Minister a hearing in the House of Commons. 
 
 From an Irish point of view the episode was note- 
 worthy. At the outset of this critical session Redmond 
 had cautioned his party to abstain from giving provo- 
 cation and from allowing themselves to be provoked. 
 The counsel was the harder to follow because some of 
 the most vehement of the younger Tories sat below the 
 gangway, almost in physical contact with Irish members, 
 and hot words passed. Still, it was grounded into all 
 that we should not allow the great issue then at trial 
 to be represented as an Irish quarrel. Our cause was 
 linked with the whole cause of democracy as against 
 privilege : it was an issue for the whole United Kingdom ; 
 and that was never plainer than on this day of July. 
 English, Scottish and Welsh members hurled interrup- 
 tions and taunts at each other across the floor of the 
 House, while Irish members sat watching. Something 
 older and more far-reaching than the opposition to Ire- 
 land's demand now was felt itself assailed ; and a force 
 in which the Irish movement was only one stream of 
 many swept against it. Anger in the Tory party was 
 not directed against Ireland's representatives ; and an 
 odd chance made this plain. The fierce scene in the 
 House reached its culmination when Ministers withdrew 
 in a body from the Treasury Bench and the two sides 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 61 
 
 oi the House stood up, one cheering, the other hooting, 
 in opposite ranks. For a moment it seemed as if the 
 affair would come to blows, till Mr. Will Crooks, with a 
 genial inspiration, uplifted his voice in song : " Should 
 auld acquaintance be forgot ? " The tension was re- 
 laxed and members moved out in groups — we Irishmen 
 necessarily among the Tories. In the movement I saw 
 Willie Redmond go up to one of the fiercest among the 
 Ulstermen, whose face was dark with passion. CoUoquy 
 began : " Isn't it a hard thing that you wouldn't let us 
 speak ? " The Ulsterman turned : " Not let you speak ? 
 My dear fellow, we'd listen to you for as long as you 
 liked — it's only these accursed English Liberals." And 
 upon this mutual understanding the two Irishmen walked 
 down the floor into the Lobby exchanging expressions 
 of mutual goodwill and possibly of mutual comprehension. 
 
 This little piece of by-play, so full of Irish nature, 
 struck me at the time as something more than amusing 
 — as having in it a ray of hopeful significance. But the 
 most sanguine imagination would never have foreseen 
 the series of events which brought it to pass, not merely 
 that these two men should wear the same uniform, on 
 a common service, but that the same Gazette should 
 publish both their names as enrolled on the same day 
 in the French Legion of Honour. On that day Mr, Charles 
 Craig was a prisoner in Germany, wounded in a famous 
 fight ; and Willie Redmond was in a grave towards 
 which Ulster comrades had been the first to carry him. 
 There is an Irish saying, " Men may meet, but the 
 mountains stand apart." In July 1911 such an asso- 
 ciation as the Gazette of July 1917 illustrated would 
 have seemed hardly more possible than the meeting of 
 the everlasting hills. 
 
 The dramatic crisis of the parliamentary struggle 
 between the two Houses of Parliament did not, and 
 could not, come in the House of Commons. Its place 
 was in the final citadel of privilege, and privilege sur- 
 
32 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 rendered on August 10th, when the Bill passed the Lords 
 after the most exciting and uncertain division that is 
 ever likely to be known. But there were elements in 
 the Tory party which did not accept defeat, though 
 they had not yet clearly decided on what battleground 
 to renew their efforts. For the moment, however, men 
 were disposed to pause and take stock of the new situation. 
 
 But at such a time events cannot stand still, and 
 almost at the same moment as the Parliament Act was 
 carried, the Government took a step which gravely 
 affected the Irish party. Payment of members was 
 established by a resolution of the House of Commons. 
 
 Irish Nationalist members had always been paid from 
 the party fund, that is to say, by their supporters. Pay- 
 ment was conditional, not of right, and it was not made 
 except when the member was in attendance : it amounted 
 only to twenty pounds a month. The new payment 
 came from the British Treasury ; it was made irrespec- 
 tive of the desire of constituents, or of any other con- 
 sideration ; and it amounted to a sum which in a country 
 of small incomes sounded very imposing. Unquestion- 
 ably the receipt of it weakened the position of the party 
 in the eyes of Ireland, and gave a new sting to the charge 
 of a bargain. 
 
 All this was clearly discerned in advance, by no one 
 more than by Redmond ; and an amendment was moved 
 to strike Irish members out of the application of the 
 resolution. But the situation was hopelessly involved, 
 the Irish party having repeatedly voted for payment of 
 members as part of the Radical programme which they 
 supported as affecting any normally governed country ; 
 and Government refused to make the exception. 
 
 As a result, Redmond's following lost much of the 
 prestige which had resulted from scrupulous observance 
 of the understanding that no Nationalist member should 
 take office under Government. To join the Irish party 
 had been, in effect, for most men, to make a vow of 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 53 
 
 poverty. Now, on the contrary, it involved acceptance 
 of what was in Ireland's eyes a well-paid and un- 
 laborious office. The Irish are no less prone than any 
 other nation to take a cynical view of these matters. 
 
 Yet assuredly no man ever gave more service for less 
 pay than the Nationalist leader, and it was the harder 
 because he was a man who liked comfort and had no 
 ambition. If at the time of the great " split " he had 
 stood down from politics, success would have been assured 
 to him at the Bar in Ireland, or, more surely still, and far 
 more profitably, at Westminster itself. There never was 
 anyone so well-fitted for the work of a parliamentary 
 barrister who has to deal with great interests before a 
 tribunal largely composed of laymen. No one had the 
 House of Commons tone more perfectly than Redmond, 
 and no one that I ever heard equalled his gift for making 
 a complicated issue apj)ear simple. When he was thrown 
 out of Parliament at the Cork election, he thought of 
 retirement, mainly for one reason : it would be better 
 for his children. Yet, first by personal loyalty to 
 Parnell, later by his loyalty to Ireland, he was held firm 
 to his task — always a poor man, always knowing that 
 it lay in his power, without the least sacrifice of principle, 
 to become rich by a way of work less laborious and 
 infinitely less harassing than that which he pursued. 
 
 The effect upon the Irish situation produced by the 
 payment of members was slow to develop, and obscure. 
 But an obvious and grave complication was introduced 
 into both British and Irish politics at the moment when 
 the democratic alliance had achieved its first great objec- 
 tive. Parliament had been in session almost continu- 
 ously since the beginning of 1909, with the added strain 
 of two general elections thrown in. There was a wide- 
 spread desire to clear the autumn of 1911, so that members 
 might have some breathing space, and, not less important, 
 devote themselves to propagandist work in their con- 
 stituencies for the new struggle of carrying measures 
 
54 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 under the hardly won Parliament Act. Each of these 
 measures must involve a fight prolonged over three 
 years. 
 
 But this desire ran against the purposes of Mr. 
 Asquith's chief lieutenant, whose power and popularity 
 were now at their height. Mr. Lloyd George in the 
 course of the session had introduced his Insurance Bill, 
 and it was welcomed v;ith astonishing effusion from 
 both sides of the House. As discussion proceeded, how- 
 ever, the complexity and difficulty of its proposals, and 
 the number of oppositions which they provoked, became 
 so apparent that it was not in human nature for politicians 
 at such a crisis to forgo the opportunity. Most of the 
 Liberal party would have preferred to drop the Bill 
 temporarily and refer it to a Committee of Enquiry. 
 Mr. Lloyd George was convinced that this would be fatal 
 to his measure, concerning which he was possessed by 
 a missionary zeal. Probably when his career comes 
 under the study of impartial history it will be perceived 
 that never at any moment was he so passionately and 
 so honestly in earnest as upon this quest. But it is 
 certain that by pursuit of it he created enormous diffi- 
 culties in the way of those reforms which the democratic 
 alliance at large most desired to achieve. He carried 
 his point ; an autumn session followed, in which the 
 mind of the electorate was diverted from the Irish ques- 
 tion and all other questions except that of Insurance, 
 and Parliament itself was jaded to the brink of 
 exhaustion. 
 
 The matter was difficult for us in Ireland because, 
 owing to the different system of Public Health Adminis- 
 tration, many of the most important provisions could 
 not appl}?^, and because the Bill as a whole was framed 
 to meet the needs of a highly industrialized and crowded 
 community. Broadly speaking, it was less desired in 
 Ireland than in Great Britain ; and even for Great 
 Britain Mr. Lloyd George was legislating in advance 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 66 
 
 of public opinion rather than in response to it. Mr. 
 O'Brien and his following vehemently opposed the appli- 
 cation of the Bill to Ireland ; and the Irish Catholic 
 Bishops, by a special resolution, expressed their view to 
 the same effect. The Bill, however, had a powerful 
 advocate in Mr. Devlin, and the Irish party decided to 
 support its extension to Ireland, subject to certain modi- 
 fications which they obtained. 
 
 Apart from the new unsettlement of public opinion 
 which it created both in Great Britain and in Ireland, 
 the Insurance Act added to our difficulties on the Home 
 Rule question. It was clear already that the question 
 of finance lay like a rock ahead. Up to 1908 the proceeds 
 of Irish revenue had always given a margin over the 
 cost of all Irish services, though that margin had dwindled 
 almost to vanishing-point. Old Age Pensions completely 
 turned the beam and left us in the position of costing 
 more than we contributed. Now the outlay on Insur- 
 ance added half a milUon a year to the balance against us. 
 
 Still, difficulties and perplexities were not limited 
 to one side. The Tory party were much divided since 
 the crisis on the Parliament Act. A section, and the 
 most active section, had been violently opposed to the 
 surrender on the critical division, and these men were 
 profoundly discontented with Mr. Balfour's leadership ; 
 so Mr. Balfour, yielding to intimations, suddenly re- 
 signed. Somewhat unexpectedly, Mr. Bonar Law was 
 chosen to succeed him, Mr. Long and Mr. Chamberlain 
 waiving their respective claims. 
 
 This choice was of sinister augury. Mr. Law did not 
 know Ireland. But, Canadian-born, he came from a 
 country in which the Irish factions and theological 
 enmities had always had their counterpart ; his father, 
 a Presbyterian Minister, came of Ulster stock. All the 
 blood in him instinctively responded to the tap of the 
 Orange drum. As far back as January 27, 1911, he had 
 urged armed resistance to Home Rule. 
 
66 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 This was a line which Mr. Balfour did not see his way 
 to take, and probably here rather than elsewhere lay 
 the reason for the choice of Mr. Bonar Law. The most 
 active section of the Tory party — probably a minority, 
 for in such cases minorities decide — regarded the passing 
 of the Parliament Act as an outrage on the Constitution, 
 which should be resisted by any means, constitutional 
 or unconstitutional. But no possibility existed of mobil- 
 izing a force in Great Britain to fight for the veto of the 
 House of Lords, nor again did the resistance to a new 
 Franchise Act, or even to Welsh Disestablishment, promise 
 to be desperate. In one part only of these islands was 
 there material for a form of struggle in which the ballot- 
 box and the division lobby might be supplemented, if 
 not replaced, by quite other methods of political war. 
 The Tory party saw in Ulster their best fighting chance. 
 There was no use in telling them that they jeopardized 
 the British Constitution ; from their point of view the 
 British Constitution — as they had known it — was already 
 gone ; it was destroyed in principle and must be either 
 restored or refashioned according to their mind. 
 
 This temper, with the attitude towards parliamentary 
 tradition which it produced, rendered the political history 
 of the next two and a half years unlike any other in the 
 history of these countries. The main purpose of this 
 book is to record and illustrate Redmond's action during 
 the period which began with the opening of the Great 
 War. But since that action was conditioned by the 
 circumstances preceding the war — since in two notable 
 ways it aimed at a solution of the tierce political struggle 
 which the war interrupted — the political history con- 
 nected with the passage of the Home Rule Bill through 
 Parliament must be outlined in detail, with avoidance, 
 so far as may be, of a controversial tone. 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 57 
 
 It is however necessary, before closing this preliminary 
 review, to take some account of Redmond's relation to 
 his party, and, in general, of the working of the parlia- 
 mentary machine. Difficulties were imposed on him and 
 on the party from 1910 onwards by our very success. 
 
 Electoral chances had placed us apparently in the 
 position of maximum power. From January 1910 on- 
 wards we had a Government committed to Home Rule, 
 yet so far dependent on us that we could put it out at 
 any moment. Yet this was by no means an ideal state 
 of affairs. The Government's weakness was our weak- 
 ness, and they were liable to the reproach that they 
 never proposed a Home Rule measure except when they 
 could not dispense with the Irish vote. Still, from this 
 embarrassing position we achieved an extraordinary 
 result. Right across our path was the obstacle of the 
 House of Lords. It was not an impassable barrier for 
 measures in which the British working classes were keenly 
 interested — for it let the Trades Disputes Bill go through ; 
 but it was wholly regardless of Irish and of Welsh popular 
 opinion. Under Redmond's leadership we smashed the 
 House of Lords. The English middle class instinct for 
 compromise was asserting itself, when he took hold 
 and gave direction to the great mass of popular indigna- 
 tion which the hereditary chamber had roused against 
 itself. 
 
 Yet guiding action in an alliance of which he was not 
 the head was delicate work. A clumsy speaker in debate 
 might do infinite mischief. When a party is in opposition, 
 all its members can talk, and are encouraged to talk, 
 to the utmost ; little harm can be done to one's own 
 side by what is said in criticism of measures proposed. 
 Support and exposition is a much more ticklish business. 
 Add to this the fact that under the fully developed system 
 
58 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 of parliamentary obstruction — that is, of using discussion 
 to prevent legislation from being put through — the best 
 service that a member can render to Government is to 
 say nothing, but vote. 
 
 • The tactics of limiting discussion to chosen speakers 
 in important debates and of discouraging sharply any 
 intervention which might help to delay a division were 
 pushed further in the Irish party than elsewhere. We 
 were there under different conditions from the rest ; our 
 objective was as clearly defined as in a military operation : 
 and we all understood the position. We recognized also 
 that negotiation must be a matter for Redmond and 
 his inner cabinet of three, and that many things could 
 not be usefully discussed in a body of seventy men. But 
 the net result was that the bulk of the party lost interest 
 in their work, and, which was worse, that Ireland lost 
 interest in the bulk of the party. It followed, not un- 
 naturally, that the constituencies held one voting machine 
 to be as good as another, and they did not generally 
 send any men who could have been of service in debate. 
 They did not any longer see their members heading a 
 fiery campaign against rents, or flamboyant in attack 
 on the Government ; they heard very little of them at 
 all. They knew little and cared less about the work of 
 education in British constituencies, which had to be 
 carried on through the mouths of Irish members. 
 
 Redmond has often been blamed, but quite unjustly, 
 for failure to attract men of talent into his ranks. Parnell 
 had that power. He had, and used, the right of suggest- 
 ing names. But under the constitution of the United 
 Irish League (originally the work of Mr. William O'Brien 
 when reunion was accomplished in 1900) the machinery 
 of local conventions was set up and no interference with 
 their choice was permitted to the central directorate — 
 which could only insist that a man properly selected 
 must take the party pledge. Whether this machinery 
 was inevitable or no, cannot be argued here ; but Red- 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 69 
 
 mond himself complained repeatedly in public that it 
 worked badly. Candidates were often chosen purely 
 for local and even personal considerations, and seldom 
 with any real thought of finding the man best fitted 
 to do Ireland's work at Westminster. 
 
 This evil, for it was an evil, resulted from the political 
 stagnation in a country where one dominant permanent 
 issue overshadowed all others. There being no Unionist 
 candidature possible in the majority of constituencies, 
 any contest was deprecated — and from some points of 
 view rightly — as leading to possible faction between 
 Nationalists. The choice of a member really fell into 
 too few hands ; the electorate as a whole was not suffi- 
 ciently interested. Nevertheless, several able men came 
 into our ranks, and under the conditions it was not possible 
 to utilize their talents fully, as they would have been 
 utilized had we been in opposition, not in support of 
 the Government. More could have been done, however, 
 to give them their opportunity, and the responsibility 
 for not varying the list of speakers rests on Redmond. 
 It was his policy to avoid personal intervention, and to 
 leave such choices to be settled by proposals from the 
 party itself. This was a real limitation to his excellence 
 as leader — for leader he was. 
 
 There was, however, an even more important limitation 
 arising out of his personal temperament. As chairman, 
 I never expect to see his equal. He had the most perfect 
 public manners of any man I have known, whether in 
 dealing with some vast assembly or small confidential 
 gathering. The latter type of meeting is the more difficult 
 to handle, and nothing could exceed his gift for presiding 
 over and guiding debate. He could set out a political 
 situation to his party with extraordinary force and 
 lucidity. He could also, when he chose, so present an 
 issue as to suggest almost irresistibly the conclusion which 
 he desired — and this was how he led. Where he came short 
 in the quality of leadership was in the personal contact. 
 
60 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 His relations with all his followers in the party were 
 courteous and cordial ; yet without the least appearance 
 of aloofness he was always aloof. He did not invite 
 discussion. It needed some courage to go to him with 
 a question in policy, and if you went, the answer would 
 be simply a " Yes " or *' No." He lacked what Lord Morley 
 attributed to Gladstone, " the priceless gift of throwing 
 his mind into common stock." No one thought more 
 constantly, or further ahead ; but he could not, rather 
 than would not, impart his mind by bringing it into 
 contact with others. Men like being taken into their 
 leader's confidence, and he knew this and, I have reason 
 to believe, knew the disability which his temperament 
 laid upon him. Yet he never made an effort to combat 
 it, partly I think from pride, for he hated everything 
 that savoured of earwigging ; he Avas not going to put 
 constraint upon himself that his following might be 
 more enthusiastic. There was no make-believe about 
 him, and he was never one who liked discussion for 
 discussion's sake. 
 
 Profoundly conservative, he had no welcome for novel 
 points of view. I cannot put it more strongly than by 
 saying that he was more apparently aware of the qualities 
 which made T. M. Kettle difficult to handle in his team 
 than of those which made that brilliant personality an 
 ornament and a force in our party. A more serious 
 aspect of this conservatism was the separation which 
 it produced between him and the newer Ireland. He 
 welcomed the Gaelic League and disliked Sinn Fein, 
 but undervalued both as forces : he was never really in 
 touch with either of them. Ideally speaking, he ought 
 to have seen to it that his party, which represented mainly 
 the standpoint of Parnell's day, was kept in sympathy 
 _with the new Young Ireland. 
 
 But from the point of view of those who shared his 
 outlook — and they were the vast majority, in Ireland 
 and in the party — Redmond's essential limitation, as a 
 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 61 
 
 leader, was that he lacked the magnetic qualities which 
 produce idolatry and blind allegiance. What his followers 
 gave him was admiration, liking and profound respect.- 
 No less than this was strictly due to his high standard 
 of honour, his scorn of all personal pettiness, his control 
 of temper. In twelve years I heard many complaints of 
 the manner in which things were managed in the party : 
 I scarcely ever remember to have heard anyone complain 
 of him. He was always spoken of as " The Chairman " ; 
 no one attributed to him sole responsibility ; and he 
 was the last on whom any man desired to lay a fault. 
 Yet when it came, as it often did, to a question of 
 weighing advices one against the other, there was no 
 mistake how men's opinions inclined. He had taught 
 his party by experience to have almost implicit confidence 
 in his judgment ; and by this earned confidence he led 
 and he ruled. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 
 
 THE year 1912, in which the straight fight on Home 
 Rule was to begin, opened stormily. Mr. Churchill 
 was announced to speak under the auspices of the Ulster 
 Liberal Association in the Ulster Hall at Belfast. It was 
 the hall in which his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, 
 had used the famous phrase " Ulster will fight and Ulster 
 will be right." Belfast was determined that the son 
 should not unsay what the father had said in this conse- 
 crated building ; it would be, as an Ulster member 
 put it in the House of Commons, " a profanation." On 
 this first round, Ulster won ; Mr. Churchill spoke at 
 Belfast, but not in the Ulster Hall. There were angry 
 demonstrations against him ; his person had to be 
 strongly protected and he went away from the meeting 
 by back streets. It was noticeable that no such pre- 
 cautions were needed for Redmond, who attended the 
 meeting and walked quite unmolested through the crowd. 
 The British electorate, as a whole, was somewhat scan- 
 dalized by the exhibition of so violent a temper ; but 
 the education of the British electorate was only beginning. 
 Congestion of business from the previous session deferred 
 the introduction of the Home Rule Bill till April. Great 
 demonstrations for and against it were held in advance. 
 In Dublin on March 31st was such a gathering as scarcely 
 any man remembered. O'Connell Street is rather a 
 boulevard than a thoroughfare ; it is as wide as Whitehall 
 and its length is about the same. On that day, from the 
 Parnell monument at the north end to the O'Connell 
 monument at the south, you could have walked on the 
 
 62 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 63 
 
 shoulders of the people. Four separate platforms were 
 erected, and Redmond spoke from that nearest to the 
 statue of his old chief. He dwelt on the universality of 
 the demonstration ; nine out of eleven corporations 
 were represented officially by their civic officers ; pro- 
 fessional men, business men, were all fully to the fore. 
 But one section of his countrymen were conspicuously 
 absent. To Ulster he had this to say : 
 
 '* We have not one word of reproach or one word of 
 bitter feeling. We have one feeling only in our hearts, 
 and that is an earnest longing for the arrival of the day 
 of reconciliation." 
 
 A feature of that gathering, little noted at the time, 
 assumes strange significance in retrospect. At one plat- 
 form Patrick Pearse, then headmaster of St. Enda's 
 school, spoke in Irish. What he said may be thus roughly 
 rendered : 
 
 " There are as many men here as would destroy the 
 British Empire if they were united and did their utmost. 
 We have no wish to destroy the British, we only want 
 our freedom. We differ among ourselves on small points, 
 but we agree that we want freedom, in some shape or 
 other. There are two sections of us — one that would 
 be content to remain under the British Government in 
 our own land, another that never paid, and never will 
 pay, homage to the King of England. I am of the latter, 
 and everyone knows it. But I should think myself a 
 traitor to my country if I did not answer the summons 
 to this gathering, for it is clear to me that the Bill which 
 we support to-day will be for the good of Ireland and 
 that we shall be stronger with it than without it. I am 
 not accepting the Bill in advance. We may have to 
 refuse it. We are here only to say that the voice of 
 Ireland must be listened to henceforward. Let us unite 
 and win a good Act from the British ; I think it can 
 be done. But if we are tricked this time, there is a 
 party in Ireland, and I am one of them, that will advise 
 
64 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 the Gael to have no counsel or dealings with the Gall 
 [the foreigner] for ever again, but to answer them hence- 
 forward "v^ith the strong hand and the sword's edge. Let 
 the Gall understand that if we are cheated once more 
 there will be red war in Ireland." 
 
 The platform where Pearse spoke was set up within 
 a stone's throw of the General Post Office in which, four 
 years later, he was to give effect to the words he spoke 
 then and to earn his own death in undoing the work of 
 Redmond's lifetime. At that moment no one heeded 
 his utterance, nor the speech, also in Irish, of Professor 
 John MacNeill from another platform, which went, as 
 its speaker was destined to go, half the way with Pearse. 
 
 But Redmond never attempted to conceal the existence 
 of this element in Ireland. Speaking on the introduction 
 of the Home Rule Bill on April 11th, he dealt at the very 
 opening with the charge that the Irish people wanted 
 separation and that the Irish leaders were separatists in 
 disguise : 
 
 *' I will be perfectly frank on this matter. There 
 always has been, and there is to-day, a certain section 
 of Irishmen who would like to see separation from this 
 country. They are a small, a very small section. They 
 were once a very large section. They are a very small 
 section, but the men who hold these views at this moment 
 only desire separation as an alternative to the present 
 system, and if you change the present system and give 
 into the hands of Irishmen the management of purely 
 Irish affairs, even that small feeling in favour of separa- 
 tion will disappear ; and if it survives at all, I would 
 like to know how under those circumstances it could be 
 stronger or more powerful for mischief than at the present 
 moment." 
 
 Sincerer words were never spoken, nor, I think, a better 
 justified forecast. Where Redmond and all of us were 
 wrong was that we underestimated the possibility of 
 accomplishing what Pearse ultimately accomplished, even 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 65 
 
 when assisted by the widespread disillusionment and 
 sense of betrayal which was the atmosphere of 1916. 
 
 But no one in Ireland in 1912 thought of a separatist 
 rebellion. What M'as on all tongues was the possibility 
 of physical resistance to Home Rule. The debate on 
 the first reading went by with little reference to this 
 contingency, but Mr. Bonar Law closed his speech on that 
 note. He had attended the great counter-demonstration 
 in Belfast which followed ours in Dublin and had seen 
 in it " the expression of the soul of a people.'* 
 
 " These people look upon their being subject to an 
 executive Government taken out of the Parliament iu 
 Dublin with as much horror, I believe with more horror, 
 than the people of Poland ever regarded their being put 
 under subjection by Russia ; they say they will not 
 submit except by force to such government. These 
 people in Ulster are under no illusion. They know they 
 cannot fight the British Army. But these men are 
 ready, in what they believe to be the cause of justice 
 and liberty, to lay down their lives." 
 
 Bloodshed, if bloodshed there was to be, was antici- 
 pated in Ulster only, and the resistance indicated at this 
 point was purely passive. But oven after the Bill had 
 been introduced, Tories entertained the hope that a 
 Nationalist Convention might save them trouble and 
 reject what the Government offered. Even Mr. O'Brien, 
 however, had given the Bill a lukewarm approval, and 
 at this moment Redmond's prestige stood very high. 
 When the Convention assembled, he utilized that advantage 
 to the full. These assemblies presented a problem which 
 might intimidate the most capable chairman. Theoreti- 
 cally deliberative, they had at least a representative 
 character ; all branches of the United Irish League, all 
 branches of the Hibernians and Foresters, all county 
 and district councils sent up their chosen men, to whom 
 were added such clergy as chose to attend. The result 
 was a mass of over two thousand persons packed into 
 
 6 
 
66 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 a single room ; they deliberated in the physical con- 
 ditions of a crowd ; hearing was difficult, disorder only 
 too easily brought about. I have seen one of these 
 Conventions sharply divided in opinion, and counting 
 of votes would have been impossible. On this day, 
 however, there was only one opinion : the business was 
 to manifest support and to strengthen the leader's hand. 
 Redmond at the outset laid down the proposition that 
 it was their " duty " as Nationalists to accept what he 
 described as a far better Bill than Gladstone ever oflfered. 
 He further indicated the ne«d for a resolution that the 
 question of supporting, proposing or rejecting amend- 
 ments should be left to the Irish party. This was 
 promptly carried by acclamation. All decisions were 
 unanimous that day. 
 
 But before this or any other resolution was put to 
 the Convention, Redmond asked the multitude there to 
 give, what they gave most willingly, a v/elcome to Mr. 
 Gladstone's grandson, who as a young member of Parlia- 
 ment had just voted for the Bill. The greeting which he 
 received showed that Ireland had not forgotten what 
 Gladstone's last years had been. 
 
 In the first of his speeches upon the Bill, Sir Edward 
 Grey, a survivor from Gladstone's Ministry, said, as he 
 threw a glance back over the struggle from 1886 to 1893 : 
 
 " Two things stirred me at the time ; they stir me 
 still. One is Mr. Gladstone's intense grip of the fact 
 that there was a national spirit in Ireland, and the 
 splendour of the effort he made in his last years to 
 acknowledge and reconcile that spirit. The other is the 
 Irish response to Mr. Gladstone. It was not the assent of 
 mere tacticians who had gained an advocate and a point. 
 It was genuine, warm and living feeling, a response of 
 gratitude and sympathy the same in kind and as living 
 as his own." 
 
 If Redmond's task from 1912 onwards was not light- 
 ened by the existence of any such genuine, warm and 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 67 
 
 living feeling for any of Mr. Asquith's Ministry, perhaps 
 Ireland is not to blame. There was no intense grip of 
 any fact in the Government's attitude, and on one 
 cardinal point they were unstable as water. Sir Edward 
 Carson, in opposing the introduction of the Bill, had used 
 the words r " Vv^h»at argument is there that you can 
 raise for giving Home Rule to Ireland that you do not 
 equally raise for giving Home Rule to that Protestant 
 minority in the north-east province ? " Redmond, fol- 
 lowing him, made one of his few false moves in debate. 
 " Is that the proposal ? Is that the demand ? " he 
 asked. Sir Edward Carson shot the question at him : 
 " Will you agree to it ? " Seldom does the House see a 
 practised speaker so much embarrassed ; Redmond in 
 confusion passed to another topic. He was soon to be 
 confronted with that same Line of reasoning, pushed not 
 dialectically by an opponent, but as a step in parliamentary 
 negotiation from the Treasury Bench. Mr. Churchill, who 
 introduced the Second Reading, made it apparent that 
 the demonstration in Belfast had not been wasted on 
 him. 
 
 " Whatever Ulster's rights may be," he said, " they 
 cannot stand in the way of the whole of the rest of Ireland. 
 Half a province cannot impose a permanent veto on the 
 nation. The utmost they can claim is for themselves. 
 I ask, do they claim separate treatment for themselves ? 
 Do the counties of Down and Antr' n and Londonderry, 
 for instance, ask to be excepted from the scope of this 
 Bill ? Do they ask for a parliament of their own, or 
 do they wish to remain here ? We ought to know." 
 
 This was to proceed at once into the region of a bargain. 
 Mr. Gladstone, with his grip on the existence of a national 
 spirit in Ireland, would have known that concession on 
 such point was a very different matter from some altera- 
 tic I in the financial terms or in the composition of the 
 Parliament. It admitted, in fact, the contention that 
 Ireland was not a nation but a geographical expression. 
 
68 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 As soon as the Bill went into Committee, the result 
 was seen. The first serious amendment proposed to 
 exclude the four counties, Antrim, Down, Armagh, and 
 Derry, and it M^as moved from the Liberal benches. Three 
 Liberal speakers supported it in the early stages of a 
 debate which lasted to the third day — and on the division 
 the majority, which had been 100 for the Second Reading, 
 fell to 69. Mr. Churchill did not vote — nor, although 
 this was not then so apparently significant, did Mr. 
 Lloyd George. 
 
 Thus from the very first the point of danger revealed 
 itself. By the mere threat of a resistance which could 
 only be overcome through the use of troops, Ulster had 
 made the first dint for the insertion of a wedge into the 
 composite Home Rule alliance, and into the Cabinet 
 itself. All this had been gained without any tactical 
 sacrifice, without even anything like a full disclosure 
 of the force which lay behind this line of attack. 
 
 Nor was the full extent of weakness revealed. In 
 such a case, much depended on the personality of the 
 man who moved the amendment, and Mr. Agar-Robartes 
 was one of the most whimsically incongruous figures in 
 the Government ranks. Twentieth-century Liberalism 
 wears a somewhat drab and serious aspect, but this ultra- 
 fashionable example of gilded youth would have been 
 in his place among the votaries of Charles James Fox. 
 The climax of his incongruity was a vehement and rather 
 antiquated Protestantism ; he was, for instance, among 
 the few who opposed the alteration of the Coronation 
 oath to a formula less offensive to Catholics. Nobody 
 doubted that his Cornish constituents would endorse 
 whatever he did, for the House held few more popular 
 human beings, but no one took him very seriously as a 
 politician. This particular view of his certainly made 
 no breach between him and his inseparable associate, 
 Mr. Neil Primrose, who, as time went on, took as strong 
 a line against Ulster's claims as Agar-Robartes did for 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 69 
 
 them. — Sunt lacrimce rerum. I remember vividly in 
 August 1914 the sudden apparition of this pair, side 
 by side as always, in their familiar place below the gang- 
 way, but in quite unfamiliar guise, for khald was still 
 new to the benches. The two brilliant lads — for they 
 were little more — have gone now, swept into the abyss 
 of war's wreckage ; the controversy which divided them 
 remains, virulent as ever. 
 
 Agar-Robartes stuck to his guns and voted against 
 the Bill henceforward ; the other Liberals who supported 
 him were ultimately brought into the Government lobby. 
 What had really mattered was Mr. Churchill's speech on 
 the Second Reading. Captain Pirrie, one of Redmond's 
 few closely attached friends outside the Irish party, 
 bound, I think, far more in affection to the Irish leader 
 than to his own chiefs, complained angrily of the Govern- 
 ment's evasive reticence. This brought up the Prime 
 Minister, whose speech was brief and direct : 
 
 " This amendment proceeds on an assumption which 
 I believe is radically false, namely, that you can split 
 Ireland into parts. You can no more spUt Ireland into 
 parts than you can split England or Scotland into parts." 
 
 When Sir Edward Carson had spoken, the Ulster leader's 
 speech enabled Redmond to point out that Ulstermen 
 refused to accept this proposal as a means by which 
 Ulster might be reconciled to Home Rule, but were ready 
 to vote for it simply as a wrecking amendment. General 
 opinion on both sides of the House agreed that the amend- 
 ment made the Bill impossible ; and the majority held 
 that therefore Ulster must give way. Ulster, on the 
 other hand, held that therefore there must be no Home 
 Rule Bill. But there was a Liberal element evidently 
 not convinced that Home Rule might not be possible 
 with Ulster excluded. Mr. Birrell admitted that the 
 plan of segregating a portion had been considered, but 
 had been rejected, on the merits, as unworkable. Still 
 he professed himself open to conviction. The argument 
 
70 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 which Mr. Bonar Law decided to use was a threat. 
 Government are saying to the people of Ulster, he said, 
 " Convince us that you are in earnest, show us that you 
 will fight, and we will yield to you as we have yielded 
 to everybody else." Captain Craig, following, said that 
 the Prime IMinister anticipated that Ulster's objection 
 would after a few years be merely a ripple on the surface. 
 " If the right honourable gentleman has challenged this 
 part of his Majesty's dominions to civil war, we accept 
 the challenge." 
 
 This temper soon had ugly expression. On June 29th 
 an excursion party of the Ancient Order of Hibernians 
 (the Roman Catholic counterpart to the Orange Order) 
 met with another excursion party of Protestants, mainly 
 Sunday-school children, at a place called Castledawson. 
 Taunts were exchanged and one of the Hibernians tried 
 to snatch a flag from the other procession ; so a dis- 
 turbance began in which some of the children were hurt 
 and many frightened. This discreditable incident was 
 magnified with all the rancour of partisanship — as in 
 the state of feeling must have been expected. But the 
 reprisals were startling. All Catholics were driven out 
 of the Belfast shipyards ; many were injured, and over 
 two thousand men were still deprived of work on July 
 12th, when the Unionist party held a great meeting at 
 Blenheim. Mr. Bonar Law, facing for the first time a 
 vast typical gathering of his supporters, said that, on 
 a previous occasion, when speaking as little more than 
 a private member of Parliament, he had counselled action 
 outside constitutional limits. Now, he emphasized it 
 that he took the same attitude as leader of the Unionist 
 party. 
 
 " We shall use any means — whatever means seem to 
 us to be most likely to be effective — any means to deprive 
 them " (the Government) " of the power they have usurped 
 and to compel them to face the people whom they have 
 deceived. The Home Rule Bill in spite of us may go 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 71 
 
 through the House of Commons. There are things 
 stronger than parliamentary majorities. I can imagine 
 no length of resistance to which Ulster will go in which 
 I shall not be ready to support them, and in which they 
 will not be supported by the overwhelming majority of 
 the British people." 
 
 Sir Edward Carson said on behalf of Ulster : 
 
 " It will be our duty shortly to take such steps — and, 
 indeed, they are already being taken — as will perfect 
 our arrangements for making Home Rule absolutely 
 impossible. We will shortly challenge the Government 
 to interfere with us if they dare. We will do this regard- 
 less of consequences, of all personal loss and inconvenience. 
 They may tell us, if they like, that this is treason." 
 
 Well might Mr. Bonar Law say in returning thanks 
 that this day " would be a turning-point in their political 
 history." 
 
 Moderate opinion was by no means glad to have 
 reached this turning-point, and The Times rebuked Mr. 
 Law for his violence. But, tactically, the Unionists 
 were right : they had a Government indisposed to action 
 and they made the most of their opportunity. Mr. 
 Churchill again took up the conduct of the controversy, 
 and in the recess proceeded to outline a policy which 
 he described as federal devolution. The Prime Minister 
 had said you could no more split Ireland into parts than 
 England or Scotland. But Mr. Churchill argued that, 
 in the interest of efficiency, England must be divided 
 into provincial units with separate assemblies ; that 
 Lancashire, for instance, had on many matters a very 
 different outlook from that of Yorkshire. He did not 
 draw the conclusion ; but it w^as not difficult to infer 
 that Mr. Churchill was at least as ready to give separate 
 rights to Ulster as to any group of English counties, and 
 was equally ready to pitch overboard the Prime Minister's 
 argument for refusing partition in Ireland. 
 
 In the meantime Ulster's preparations continued. It 
 
72 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 was indicated that they would bear a religious character, 
 and the Protestant Churches were deeply involved. The 
 proposal of a Covenant was made public in August, though 
 the actual signing of it was deferred to " Ulster Day," 
 September 28th. Sir Edward Carson was provided with 
 a guard carrying swords and wooden rifles, and in one 
 instance dummy cannon made a feature of the pageant. 
 These things excited a good deal of derision, and the 
 language of the Covenant was held to be only " hypo- 
 thetical treason." The main words were : 
 
 " We stand by one another in defending for ourselves 
 and our children our cherished position of equal citizen- 
 ship in the United Kingdom and in using all means which 
 may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy 
 to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland." 
 
 The Covenant in that committed the signatories to 
 no breach of the law ; it was only a pledge to refuse to 
 recognize the authority of a Parliament not yet in being. 
 All Ulster's proceedings might so far be dismissed, as 
 the Attorney-General, Mr. Rufus Isaacs, dismissed them, 
 as being " a demonstration admirably stage-managed, 
 and led by one of great histrionic gifts." The threats 
 of the use of force, said tlie Attorney-General, would not 
 turn them aside by a hair's-breadth. Mr. Asquith, 
 equally vigorous in his speech, was less decisive in his 
 conclusions. Speaking at Ladybank on October 6th, 
 he denounced " the reckless rodomontade of Blenheim, 
 which furnishes forth the complete grammar of anarchy." 
 But he was careful to point out that there was no 
 demand for separate treatment for Ulster, and that Irish 
 Unionists were simply refusing to consent to Home 
 Rule under any conditions. He refrained from saying 
 how a demand for separate treatment of Ulster would 
 be dealt with if it were made. 
 
 When Parliament resumed its sittings, in a temper 
 much heated by all the challenge and controversy of the 
 recess, Mr. Lloyd George pushed tliis line of argument 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 73 
 
 a shade further. He argued that Sir Edward Carson 
 himself persisted in treating Ireland as a unit, 
 
 " Until Ulster departs from that position there is no 
 case. Ulster has a right to claim a hearing for separate 
 treatment ; she has no right to say, ' Because we do 
 not want Home Rule ourselves the majority of Irishmen 
 are not to have Home Rule.' " 
 
 Yet upon the balance of events, Unionists were probably 
 disappointed. A very strong British feeling against Sir 
 Edward Carson and his Belfast following had been gener- 
 ated by the expulsion of Catholics from the shipyards 
 and in general by the advocacy of civil war. In October 
 1912 several notable men who had previously counted 
 as Unionists — Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Sir Frederick 
 Pollock, Sir J. West-Ridgway — all declared for Home Rule. 
 Exasperation against the incidence of the new Insurance 
 Act lost the Government votes at every by-election ; but 
 the Irish cause on the whole gained ground, and the 
 chief cause of that advance was the respect universally 
 felt for Redmond's personality and leadership. On 
 November 22nd he attended a huge meeting of the 
 National Liberal Federation at Nottingham along with 
 the Prime Minister and received a wonderful welcome. 
 The step was novel. Never since Parnell's w^ork began 
 had the leader of the Irish people stood on the same 
 platform in Great Britain with the leader of any English 
 party. It was, however, the return of a compliment, 
 for Mr. Asquith had come to Dublin in the summer and 
 there spoken along with the Irish leader. Moreover, a 
 recent incident had showTi how necessary it was to 
 maintain the closest co-operation ; a snap division on 
 November 11th had inflicted defeat on the Govern- 
 ment and occasioned loss of perhaps a fortnight's 
 parliamentary time. 
 
 But in the very act of tlius strengthening his hold 
 on the British electorate, Redmond gave ground to those 
 in Ireland who desired to represent him as a mere tool 
 
74 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 of the Liberal party, a pawn in Mr. Asquith's game. 
 Foreseeing this evil did not help to combat it, and on the 
 whole it was Redmond's inclination to take a sanguine 
 view of his countr5'''s good sense and generosity. 
 
 The Committee stage of discussion lasted beyond the 
 end of the year. On the finance arrangements Redmond 
 had to face fierce opposition from Mr. O'Brien's party, 
 which was endorsed by the Irish Council of County 
 Councils. Here difficulties were inevitable, and attack 
 was easy either for the Unionists, who pressed the argu- 
 ment that Ireland was to be started on its career of self- 
 government with a subsidy of some two millions per 
 annum from Great Britain, or for the O'Brienites, who 
 urged that the country was already overtaxed in pro- 
 portion to its resources, that it needed large expenditure 
 for development, and that the possible budget indicated 
 by the Bill left no serious possibility for reducing taxes 
 or for undertaking even necessary expenditure. Redmond, 
 on the other hand, was bound to conciliate the vested 
 interests of civil servants, officials in all degrees, and the 
 immense police force. Retrenchment on the vast area 
 of unproductive expenditure which Castle government 
 had created could only be hoped for at a very distant 
 date. He could not therefore promise substantial 
 economy ; nor could he argue for a further increase of 
 subsidy without playing into the Tories' hands. On all 
 this detail of the measure, the attack in debate was bound 
 to be very powerful. 
 
 So far as Great Britain was concerned, the reply of 
 Home Rulers was tolerably effective. In 1886 it had 
 been feasible to propose Home Rule with an Imperial 
 contribution of two and a half millions. By 1893 the 
 possible margin had dropped heavily, and Mr. Gladstone 
 had foretold that within fifteen years Ireland would absorb 
 more money for purely Irish services than Irish taxation 
 produced. This prophecy had been fulfilled to the letter, 
 and everyone saw that to continue the Union meant 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 75 
 
 increasing this charge automatically. It was better to 
 cut the loss and at least say that it should not exceed 
 a fixed figure. 
 
 But in Ireland men dwelt always on the Report of 
 the Financial Relations Commission, which had repre- 
 sented the balance as heavily against England and the 
 account for overtaxation of the poorer country as reach- 
 ing three hundred millions. No man quoted this docu- 
 ment oftener than Redmond, and none was a firmer 
 believer in its justification. But he realized, as his 
 countrymen did not, that such a claim could never hope 
 for cash settlement, that its value was as an argument 
 for the concession of freedom upon generous terms. How 
 could he urge that the terms proposed were ungenerous, 
 when Great Britain offered to pay the cost of all Irish 
 services — amounting to a million and a half more than 
 Irish revenue — and to provide over and above this a 
 yearly grant of half a million, dropping gradually, it is 
 true, but still remaining at a subsidy of two hundred 
 thousand a year so long as the finance arrangements 
 of the Bill lasted ? 
 
 Nevertheless, these arrangements were bad ones, and 
 this was where the Bill was most vulnerable on 
 its merits ; for self-government without the control 
 of taxation and expenditure is at best an unhopeful 
 experiment. 
 
 But in the public mind at large only one difficulty 
 bulked big, and that was Ulster. Men on both sides 
 began to be uneasy about the consequences of what 
 was happening, and this temper reflected itself in the 
 House. On New Year's Day 1913, at the beginning of 
 the Report stage. Sir Edward Carson moved the exclu- 
 sion of the province of Ulster. His speech was in a new 
 tone of studied conciliation. But, as the Prime Minister 
 immediately made clear, there was no offer that if this 
 concession were made opposition would cease. It was 
 merely recommended as the sole alternative to civil 
 
76 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 war. Redmond, in following, let fall an obiter dictum on 
 the position of the Irish controversy : 
 
 " No one who observes the current of popular opinion 
 in this country can doubt for one instant that if this 
 opposition from the north-east corner of Ulster did not 
 exist, Home Rule would go through to-morrow as an 
 agreed Bill." 
 
 For this reason, he said, he would go almost any length 
 within certain well-defined limits to meet that section 
 of his fellow-countrymen. His conditions were, first, 
 that the proposal must be a genuine one, not put forward 
 as a piece of tactics to wreck the Bill, but frankly as 
 part of a general settlement of the Home Rule question ; 
 secondly, that it must be of reasonable character ; and 
 thirdly, not inconsistent with the fundamental principle 
 of national self-government. Ulster's present proposal, if 
 accepted, carried with it no promise of a settlement ; 
 it was unreasonable as proposing to strike out of Ireland 
 five counties with Nationalist majorities. But finally, 
 on a broader ground, it destroyed the national right 
 of Ireland. 
 
 " Ireland for us is one entity. It is one land. Tyrone 
 and Tyrconnell are as much a part of Ireland as Munster 
 or Connaught. Some of the most glorious chapters con- 
 nected with our national struggle have been associated 
 Viith Ulster — aye, and with the Protestants of Ulster 
 — and I declare here to-day, as a Catholic Irishman, 
 notwithstanding all the bitterness of the past, that I am 
 as proud of Derry as of Limerick. Our ideal in this 
 movement is a self-governing Ireland in the future, when 
 all her sons of all races and creeds within her shores will 
 bring their tribute, great or small, to the great total of 
 national enterprise, national statesmanship, and national 
 happiness. Men may deride that ideal ; they may say 
 that it is a futile and unreliable ideal, but they cannot 
 call it an ignoble one. It is an ideal that we, at any 
 rate, will cling to, and because we cling to it, and because 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 77 
 
 it is there, embedded in our hearts and natures, it is an 
 absolute bar to such a proposal as this amendment makes, 
 a proposal which would create for all times a sharp, eternal 
 dividing line between Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants, 
 and a measure which would for all time mean the partition 
 and disintegration of our nation. To that we as Irish 
 Nationalists can never submit." 
 
 Later in the debate, Mr. Bonar Law admitted quite 
 frankly the argument against treating all Ulster as 
 Unionist, and he proceeded to suggest that any county 
 in Ulster might be given power to decide whether or 
 not it should come into the new Parliament. It was 
 plain, however, and Mr. Churchill made it plainer, that 
 the Unionist loader did not speak for Ulster ; Ulster's 
 intention was still to use its own opposition to Home 
 Rule as a bar to self-government for the whole of Ireland. 
 
 Equally was it plain that the pl6biscite by counties 
 would not be unacceptable to Mr. Churchill. 
 
 The proposal for the exclusion of the entire province 
 was defeated by a majority of 97 and the Third Reading 
 was carried by 110. A few days later the city of Derry 
 returned a Home Ruler, and the Ulster representation 
 became seventeen for the Bill and sixteen against. This 
 dramatic change produced a considerable effect on British 
 opinion. Redmond, speaking at a luncheon given to 
 the winner, Mr. Hogg, indicated the lines on which he 
 was disposed to bargain. He would be willing to give 
 Ulster more than its proportional share of representation 
 in the Irish Parliament. 
 
 The debate in the House of Lords was marked by certain 
 speeches which showed that public opinion had moved 
 considerably. Lord Dunraven declared for the Second 
 Reading, though pressing all the line of objection to the 
 Bill which had been taken by Mr. O'Brien and his party. 
 He heaped scorn also as an Irishman upon *' this 
 absurd theory of two nations which is only invented to 
 make discord where accord would naturally be." Lord 
 
78 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 MacDonnell, whose administrative experience could no 
 more be questioned than his genius for administration, 
 held that though amendment was needed the framework 
 of the Bill was good, and that urgent necessity existed 
 for the change to self-government. He alluded to the 
 opinion expressed by Mr. Balfour in 1905, that the proper 
 y>"ay of reforming Dublin Castle vras by increasing the 
 power of the Chief Secretary and his Under-Secretary, 
 and thereby getting a stronger grip on the various 
 departments of the " complicated system " prevailing. 
 "I thought so too," said Lord MacDonnell, who in 1905 
 as Under-Secretary had tried his hand at this reform. 
 " It was one of the illusions that I took with me to Ireland 
 twenty years ago — but I am now a wiser man. . . . My 
 observation of the Boards had convinced me before I 
 left Ireland that no scheme of administrative reform 
 which depends on bureaucratic organization for its success, 
 or which has not behind it a popular backing, has the 
 least chance of success in an attempt to establish in 
 Ireland a government that is satisfactory to the Imperial 
 Parliament or acceptable to the Irish people." — This was 
 a repudiation of the Irish Council Bill of 1907 by its main 
 author. 
 
 Lord Grey, a vivid and attractive personality, declared 
 strongly for " such a measure of Home Rule as will give 
 the Irish people power to manage their own domestic 
 affairs." It was a conviction that had been forced upon 
 him by his experience of Greater Britain. " Practically 
 every American, every Canadian, every Australian is a 
 Home Ruler." But the settlement must proceed upon 
 federal lines ; his ideal for Ireland was the provincial 
 status of Ontario or Quebec, linked federally to a central 
 parliament at Westminster. 
 
 The most significant speech, however, came from the 
 Archbishop of York. Disclaiming all party allegiance. 
 Dr. Lang claimed to express " the opinions of a very 
 large number of fair-minded citizens." He admitted that 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 79 
 
 there was an Irish problem, which could not be solved 
 by " a policy however generous of promoting the economic 
 welfare of Ireland." " Some measure of Home Rule is 
 necessary not only to meet the needs of Ireland 
 but the needs of the Imperial Parliament." This Bill, 
 however, in his opinion, was ill-adapted to the latter 
 purpose. It would be a block rather than a relief to 
 the congestion of business. But these objections were 
 " abstract and academic " in face of the real govern- 
 ing fact. 
 
 " The figure of Ulster, grim, determined, menacing, 
 dominates the scene. . . . We may not like it. Frankly, 
 I do not like it. It carries marks of religious and racial 
 bitterness and suspicion. It uses language about dis- 
 obedience to the law which must provoke disquiet and 
 dislike in the minds of all who care for the good govern- 
 ment of the country. I am not competent, because I 
 have not shared in the experience of the history of the 
 Ulster people, to decide whether or not their fears are 
 groundless. All these tilings seem to me to be beside 
 the point. If Ulster means to do what it says, then the 
 results are certainly such as no citizen can contemplate 
 without grave concern. ... I admit, everyone must 
 admit, that there are circumstances in which a Govern- 
 ment is entitled and bound to run this kind of risk. At 
 the present time I think we all feel that there is a call 
 upon Governments to stiffen rather than to slacken 
 their determination in the presence of threats of dis- 
 obedience or disorder. I will go further and admit that 
 there is one condition which would justify in my mind 
 His Majesty's Government in running the risk of the 
 forcible coercion of Ulster. That condition is that they 
 should have received from the people of this country 
 an authority, clear and explicit, to undertake that risk. 
 It is perfectly true that the Prime Minister gave notice 
 that if his party were returned to power they would be 
 free to raise again the question of Homo Rule, but there 
 
80 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 is a great difference between the abstract question of 
 Home Rule and a concrete Home Rule Bill." 
 
 That speech undoubtedly represented the temper pre- 
 vailing in the class of balancing electors which is so large 
 in England. Some of us who read it at the time recog- 
 nized how far the long struggle for autonomy had pre- 
 vailed, but also how strong were the forces which no 
 argument could reach. Men like Dr. Lang might be 
 offended, even shocked by the action of those who claimed 
 to be England's garrison in Ireland ; but they would 
 be very slow to use force against such a section, although 
 quite ready to justify coercion of the Irish majority. 
 Yet what impressed Redmond was the advance made, 
 rather than the revelation of what resistance remained. 
 He had been more than thirty years an advocate of 
 Ireland's cause ; and now by the spokesman of the im- 
 partial educated mind of England the justice of that 
 cause was admitted. The argument that a general 
 election was necessary, or would bo efficacious in solving 
 the problem, was one with which he felt well able to 
 contend. In that speech the Archbishop of York admitted 
 his impression that in by-elections there had been " much 
 more of Food Taxes and the Insurance Act than of Home 
 Rule." 
 
 On the other hand, for Ulster such a speech had the 
 plainest possible moral : Ulster's game was to become 
 more grim, more determined, more menacing. The 
 Home Rule controversy had now resolved itself into 
 a question whether Ulster really meant business. Sir 
 Edward Carson set himself to make that plain beyond 
 yea or nay. 
 
 In a speech delivered in Belfast, at the opening of a 
 new drill hall, he asked and answered the question, " Why 
 are we drilling ? " He and his colleagues did not recog- 
 nize the Parliament Act, he said ; a law passed under it 
 would be only an act of usurpation, a breach of right. 
 *' We seek nothing but the elementary right implanted 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 81 
 
 in every man : the right, if you are attacked, to 
 defend yourself." 
 
 Ulster was going to stand by its Covenant. 
 
 " When we talk of force, we use it, if we are driven 
 to use it, to beat back those who will dare to barter away 
 those elementary rights of citizenship which we have 
 inherited. ... Go on, be ready, you are our great army. 
 Under what circumstances you have to come into action, 
 you must leave with us. There are matters which give 
 us grave consideration which we cannot and ought not 
 to talk about in public. You must trust us that we will 
 select the most opportune methods of, if necessary, taking 
 on ourselves the whole government of the community 
 in which we live. I know a great deal of that will in- 
 volve statutory illegality, but it will also involve much 
 righteousness." 
 
 Some of the questions which needed grave considera- 
 tion were suggested by happenings that followed hard 
 on this speech. Much ridicule had been poured on the 
 drillings with dummy muskets. Ulster evidently decided 
 to push the matter a step further. A consignment of 
 one thousand rifles with bayonets, in cases marked 
 " electrical fittings," was seized at Belfast on June 3, 1913. 
 Other incidents of the same nature followed. It was 
 argued, by those who sought to represent the whole 
 campaign as an elaborate piece of bluff, that the weapons 
 were useless and that they were deliberately sent to 
 be seized. A feature which scarcely bore out this view 
 was that one consignment was addressed to the Lord- 
 Lieutenant of an Ulster county who was also an officer 
 in the Army. A justice of the peace, or an officer, to 
 whom a consignment of arms had been sent for a National- 
 ist organization would have been ordered to clear himself 
 in the fullest way of complicity, and even of sympathy, 
 or he would have forfeited his commission. The noble- 
 man involved, however, made no explanation, and was 
 probably never officially asked to do so. 
 
 7 
 
82 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 It was commonly believed in the House of Commons 
 that at some point, if not repeatedly, Government con- 
 sulted the Irish leader or his principal advisers as to 
 whether measures of repression should be undertaken 
 against Ulster. No such consultation took place. But 
 the opinion prevailing among the leading Nationalists 
 was no doubt known or inferred. Mr. Dillon, speaking 
 on June 16, 1914, when the danger-point had been clearly 
 reached, justified the previous abstinence from coercion. 
 
 *' I have held the view from the beginning that it would 
 not have been -wise policy for a Government engaged in 
 the great work of the political emancipation of a nation 
 to embark on a career of coercion. I knew, and knew 
 well, all the difficulties and all the reproaches that the 
 Government would have to face if they abstained from 
 coercion. It is a difficult and almost unprecedented 
 course for a Government to take, and it is, as the 
 Chief Secretary said, a courageous one. But with all 
 its difficulties and dangers it is the right course. We 
 who have been through the mill know what the effect 
 of coercion is. We know that you do not put down 
 Irishmen by coercion. You simply embitter them and 
 stiffen their backs." 
 
 It is therefore unquestionable that the decision to do 
 nothing had Redmond's approval. Whatever may be 
 thought of that policy, one factor was assuredly under- 
 estimated — the effect produced on the public mind by 
 the spectacle of highly placed personages defying the 
 law and defying it with impunity. It was possible to 
 argue that a conviction for hypothetical treason would 
 be difficult to secure and that failure in a prosecution 
 would only encourage lawless conduct. But Privy Coun- 
 cillors who made preparations for prospective rebellion 
 and remained Privy Councillors were a new phenomenon. 
 The public thought, and it was apparent that the public 
 would think, that Government was afraid to quarrel 
 with what is called Society. Society shared that belief 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 83 
 
 and began to extend its influence in a new direction. 
 No Government can permit itself to be defied without 
 general relaxation of discipline, and the effects extended 
 themselves to the Army, At a meeting on July 12th 
 in Ulster a telegram was read out from " Covenanters " 
 in an Ulster regiment, urging " No surrender until ammu- 
 nition is spent and the last drop of blood." In his speech 
 on that occasion Sir Edward Carson declared that every 
 day brought him at least half a dozen letters from British 
 officers asking to be enrolled among the future defenders 
 of Ulster. One officer, he said, having signed the Cove- 
 nant, was ordered to send in his papers and resign his 
 commission. The officer refused to do so, and after a 
 short time was simply told to resume his duty. 
 
 " We have assurance from the Prime Minister," said 
 Sir Edward Carson, " that the forces of the Crown are 
 not to be used against Ulster. Government know that 
 they could not rely on the Army to shoot down the people 
 of Ulster." 
 
 Later events in Ireland furnished a grim commentary 
 as to what the Army would be willing, and would not 
 be willing, to do in the way of shooting down in Ireland ; 
 and such words as these of Sir Edward Carson were 
 destined to be among the chief difficulties which Redmond 
 had to encounter when he sought to lead Ireland into 
 the war. 
 
 At the meeting of that day, delegates were present 
 from a British League to assist Ulster in her resistance. 
 Behind this new quasi-military organization stood now the 
 whole of one great party. Sir Edward Carson trans- 
 mitted a message from Mr. Bonar Law in these words : 
 
 " Whatever steps we may feel compelled to take, 
 whether they be constitutional, or in the long run whether 
 they be unconstitutional, we will have the whole of the 
 Unionist party under his leadership behind us," 
 
 Later in the autumn, on the first anniversary of Ulster 
 Day, there was formally announced the formation of an 
 
84 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Ulster Provisional Government, with a Military Committee 
 attached to it. A guarantee fund to indemnify all who 
 might be involved in damaging consequences was set on 
 foot, and a million sterling was indicated as the necessary 
 amount to be obtained. 
 
 In the meantime signs of distress came from the Liberal 
 camp. Mr. Churchill, in speeches to his constituents, 
 renewed the suggestions for partition. More notable 
 was a letter from Lord Loreburn, who had till recently 
 been Lord Chancellor, and who was known as a steady 
 and outspoken Home Ruler. He appealed in The Times 
 of September 11, 1913, for a conference between parties 
 on the Irish difficulty. Irish Nationalist opinion grew 
 profoundly uneasy, and Redmond at Limerick on October 
 12th set out his position with weighty emphasis. He 
 referred to the fact that during the summer he himself, 
 assisted by Mr. Devlin, had followed Sir Edward Carson 
 and other Ulster speakers from place to place through 
 Great Britain, and on the same ground had stated the 
 case for Home Rule. He claimed, and with justice, a 
 triumphant success for this counter-campaign. 
 
 ** The argumentative opposition to Home Rule is dead, 
 and all the violent language, all the extravagant action, 
 all the bombastic threats, are but indications that the 
 battle is over." 
 
 Still, he was too old a politician, he said, not to build 
 a bridge of gold to convenience his opponents' retreat, 
 provided that the fruits of victory were not flung away. 
 Mr. Churchill had told the Ulstermen that there was 
 no demand they could make which would not be matched, 
 and more than matched, by their countrymen and the 
 Liberal party. On this it was necessary to be explicit. 
 
 " Irish Nationalists can never be assenting parties to 
 the mutilation of the Irish nation ; Ireland is a unit. 
 It is true that within the bosom of a nation there is 
 room for diversities of the treatment of government 
 and of administration, but a unit Ireland is and Ireland 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 85 
 
 must remain. . . . The two-ritation theory is to us an 
 abomination and a blasphemy." 
 
 These were carefully chosen words, and they iudicalod 
 a possible acceptance of the proposal that Ulster should 
 have control of its own administration in regard to local 
 affairs, but that Irish legislation should be left to a common 
 parliament. 
 
 This plan Sir Edward Grey described as his " personal 
 contribution " to a discussion of possibilities which had 
 been inaugurated by a notable speech from the Prime 
 Minister. At Ladybank, on October 25th, Mr. Asquith 
 invited " interchange of views and suggestions, free, 
 frank, and without prejudice." Nothing, however, could 
 be accepted which did not conform to three governing 
 considerations. First, there must be established " a 
 subordinate Irish legislature with an executive responsible 
 to it " ; secondly, " nothing must be done to erect a 
 permanent and insuperable bar to Irish unity " ; and 
 thirdly, though the process of relieving congestion in the 
 Imperial Parliament could not be fully accomplished by the 
 present Bill, Ireland must not be made to wait till a 
 complete scheme of decentralization could be carried out. 
 The second of these conditions was plainly the most 
 significant. It was taken to mean that " county option " 
 — the right for each county to decide whether it would 
 come under a Home Rule Government — would not create 
 ** a permanent and insuperable " obstacle, since each 
 county could be given the opportunity to vote itself 
 in at any time. Redmond's next important speech in 
 England showed by its emphasis that he felt a danger. 
 He denounced " the gigantic game of bluff and black- 
 mail " which was in progress. The proposed exclusion 
 of Ulster was not a proposition that could be considered. 
 It would bring about, he thought, the ruin of Ulster's 
 prosperity. " For us it would mean the nullification 
 of our hopes and aspirations for the future." It would 
 stereotype an old evil in the region where it still existed. 
 
86 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 What Ulster really feared, he said, was the loss, not of 
 freedom or prosperit}^, but of Protestant ascendancy. 
 
 This was the truth ; Protestant ascendancy, which in 
 his boyhood had existed throughout all Ireland, was in 
 consequence of the Irish party's work dead in three 
 provinces. It remained and must remain in Ulster, 
 where Protestants were a majority, but it would be 
 qualified if that region came under the control of a parlia- 
 ment elected by all Ireland. That was and is the true 
 reason of Ulster's resistance to national self-government. 
 What he would concede and what he would reject, Red- 
 mond indicated in general words : " There is no demand, 
 however extravagant and unreasonable it may appear to 
 us, that we are not ready carefully to consider, so long 
 as it is consistent with the principle for which generations 
 of our race have battled, the principle of a settlement 
 based on the national self-government of Ireland. I 
 shut no door to a settlement by consent, but . . . we 
 will not be intimidated or bullied into a betrayal of 
 our trust." 
 
 It was noted at that time that he had said nothing 
 to rule out Sir Edward Grey's proposal, which would 
 have left the local majority predominant in Ulster's own 
 affairs ; and on December 4th Sir Edward Grey spoke 
 again, showing a firmness that was the more impressive 
 because of his habitual moderation of tone. One thing, 
 he said, was worse than carrying Home Rule by force, 
 and that would be the abandonment of Home Rule. Two 
 suggestions had been made — a proposal for the temporary 
 exclusion of Ulster and a plan for giving to Ulster admin- 
 istrative autonomy. Neither had been received by Ulster 
 " in a spirit which seemed likely to lead to a settlement. 
 . . . Was it a settlement by consent they wanted, or 
 was their aim simply the destruction of the Bill ? " 
 
 This emphasized what Redmond had said a few days 
 earlier at Birmingham, when he declared that the fight 
 against Home Rule was not an honest one, that its real 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 87 
 
 purpose was to defeat the Parliament Act and restore 
 to the Tory party its special control over the legislative 
 machine. 
 
 The facts were plain on the surface. The Tories 
 clamoured for a fresh general election, urging that the 
 electors never realized that the Liberal programme in- 
 volved civil war. But to concede this claim indirectly 
 defeated the Parliament Act, which would then have 
 broken down at the first attempt to apply it. What 
 added to the insincerity of the argument was Ulster's 
 repeated refusal to be influenced by the result of any 
 election. Under no circumstances, speaker after speaker 
 from Ulster declared, would they submit to Home Rule. 
 The prospect of civil war remained, with only one limi- 
 tation. Mr. Bonar Law undertook that if a general 
 election took place and the Liberals again came back, 
 the British Unionist party would not support Ulster in 
 physical resistance. They would, however, continue to 
 oppose a Home Rule Bill by aU constitutional means. 
 
 Nevertheless, the English disposition to compromise 
 was already operating. Mr. Asquith was the last of 
 mankind to make a quixotic stand for principle, and 
 the most disposed to pride himself on a practical recog- 
 nition of realities. His Government was in rough water. 
 During the summer Mr. Lloyd George's transaction in 
 Marconi shares had been magnified by partisan rancour 
 into a crime. Much more serious was the split with 
 Labour, which led to the loss of seat after seat at by- 
 elections, when the allied forces which stood behind the 
 Parliament Act attacked each other and let the Tories 
 in. The Women's Franchise agitation was also coming 
 to its stormiest point. 
 
 Redmond's part was one of extraordinary difficulty. 
 The cause for which he stood was one affecting the interests 
 of only a small minority of the total electorate concerned 
 in the struggle which now spread over both islands. The 
 Irish problem belonged in reality to the Victorian era ; 
 
88 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 those in the British electorate whom it could stir to 
 enthusiasm were stirred by a memory, not by a new gospel. 
 Normally, but for the chance of Parnell's overthrow, it 
 would have been solved in Gladstone's last years. For 
 most Liberals, for all Labour men, the fact that it had 
 passed beyond the sphere of argument meant a lack of 
 driving force. It was a part of accepted Liberal ortho- 
 doxy ; minds were centred rather on those social con- 
 troversies in which Mr. Lloyd George was the dominant 
 figure, and upon which opinion had not yet crystallized. 
 
 Further, the cry of Protestant liberties in danger, the 
 cause of Protestants who conducted their arming to the 
 accompaniment of hymns and prayer, made inevitably 
 a searching appeal to the feelings of an island kingdom 
 where the prejudice against Roman Catholics is more 
 instinctive than anywhere else in the world. Looking 
 back on it all, I marvel not at the difficulties we encoun- 
 tered, but at the success with which we surmounted 
 them ; and the great element in that success was Redmond's 
 personality. His dignity, his noble eloquence, his sin- 
 cerity, and the large, tolerant nature of the man, won 
 upon the public imagination. His tact was unfailing. 
 In all those years, under the most envenomed scrutiny, 
 he never let slip a word that could be used to our dis- 
 advantage. This is merely a negative statement. It is 
 truer to say that he never touched the question without 
 raising it to the scope of great issues. Nothing petty, 
 nothing personal came into his discourse ; he so carried 
 the national claim of Ireland that men saw in it at once 
 the test and the justification of democracy. 
 
 That is why the Irish cause, instead of being a mill- 
 stone round the neck of the parliamentary alUance, was 
 in truth a living cohesive force. But in order to keep 
 it so it must be pleaded, not as a question for Ireland 
 only but for the democracy of Great Britain and, in a 
 stiU larger sense, for the Commonwealth of the British 
 Empire. 
 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 89 
 
 Liberal statesmen in their desire to simplify their own 
 task underestimated altogether the difficulty which their 
 professed short-cuts to the goal — or rather, their attempted 
 circuits round obstacles — created inevitably for the Irish 
 leader. They did not realize that his genuine feeling — 
 based on knowledge — for the British democracy at home, 
 and still more for its offshoots overseas, was unshared 
 by his countrymen, still aloof, still suspicious, and daily 
 impressed by the spectacle of those who most paraded 
 allegiance to British Imperialism professing a readiness 
 to tear up the Constitution rather than allow freedom 
 to Ireland. Liberal statesmen did not understand that 
 Redmond could only justify to Ireland the part which 
 he was taking if he won, and that he and not they must 
 be the judge of what Ireland would consider a defeat. 
 In all probability, also, they overrated his power and that 
 of the party which he led. They did not guess at the 
 potency of new forces which only in these months began 
 to make themselves felt, and which in the end, breaking 
 loose from Redmond's control, undid his work. A new 
 phase in Irish history had begun, of which Sir Edward 
 Carson was the chief responsible author. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 
 
 THE first stir of a new movement in Nationalist 
 Ireland outside the old political lines came from 
 Labour — from Irish Labour, as yet unorganized and 
 terribly in need of organization. On August 26, 1913, 
 a strike in Dublin began under the leadership of Mr. 
 Larkin. It had all the violence and disorder which is 
 characteristic of economic struggles where Labour has 
 not yet learned to develop its strength ; it opened new 
 cleavages at this moment when national union was most 
 necessary : it was fought with the passion of despair by 
 workers whose scale of pay and living was a disgrace 
 to civilization ; and after five months it was not settled 
 but scotched, leaving dark embers of revolutionary hate 
 scattered through the capital of Ireland. 
 
 One incident showed some of the consequences ready 
 to spring, even in England itself, from the action taken 
 in Ulster. Mr. Larkin at the end of October 1913 was 
 sentenced to six months' imprisonment for sedition and 
 inciting to disturbance. A fierce outcry ran through 
 the Labour world in Great Britain ; by-elections were 
 in progress, and Government was angrily challenged with 
 having one law for the rich and another for the poor, 
 one law for Labour and another for the Unionist party. 
 To this pressure Government yielded, and Mr. Larkin 
 was liberated after a few days in jail. 
 
 But in Ireland more formidable symptoms soon made 
 themselves manifest. Captain J. R. White, son of Sir 
 George White, the defender of Ladysmith, was a soldier 
 by hereditary instinct and had won the Distinguished 
 
 90 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 91 
 
 Service Order in South Africa. But some strain in his 
 composition answered to other calls, and upon Tolstoyan 
 grounds he ceased to be a soldier, without ceasing to be 
 a natural leader of men. His first public appearance 
 was at a meeting in London in support of Home Rule 
 addressed by a number of prominent persons who were 
 not Roman Catholics, But his interests were plainly 
 not so much Nationalist as broadly humanitarian ; free- 
 dom for the individual soul rather than for the nation 
 was his object : and he suddenly enrolled himself among 
 Mr. Larkin's allies. His proposal was outlined to a great 
 assembly of the strikers gathered in front of Liberty 
 Hall : Mr. Larkin set it out. They must no longer be 
 " content to assemble in hopeless haphazard crowds " 
 but must " agree to bring themselves under the influences 
 of an ordered and sympathetic discipline." " Labour in 
 its own defence must begin to train itself to act with dis- 
 ciplined courage and with organized and concentrated 
 force. How could they accomplish this ? By taking a 
 leaf out of the book of Carson. If Carson had permission 
 to train his braves of the North to fight against the 
 aspirations of the Irish people, then it was legitimate 
 and fair for Labour to organize in the same militant way 
 to preserve their rights and to ensure that if they were 
 attacked they would be able to give a very satisfactory 
 account of themselves." 
 
 Thus began in a small sectional manner a national 
 movement which led far indeed. Mr. O'Cathasaigh, 
 from whose Story of the Irish Citizen Army I quote, attri- 
 butes the failure of that purely Labour organization 
 chiefly to the establishment of the Irish Volunteers. 
 
 This was a development which Redmond on his part 
 neither willed nor approved, yet one which in the cir- 
 cumstances was inevitable. Who could suppose that 
 the formation of combatant forces would remain a mono- 
 poly of any party ? There was no mistaking the weight 
 which a hundred thousand Ulster Volunteers, drilled 
 
92 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 and regimented, threw into Sir Edward Carson's advocacy. 
 As early as September 1913, during the parliamentary 
 recess, Redmond received at least one letter — and possibly 
 he received many — urging him to raise the standard of 
 a similar force, and pointing out that if he did not take 
 this course it might be taken by others less fit to guide 
 it. The letter of which I speak elicited no answer. It 
 was never his habit to reply to inconvenient communi- 
 cations — a policy which he inherited from Parnell, who 
 held that nearly every letter answered itself within six 
 months, if it were let alone. Certainly in this case it 
 so happened. Long before six months were up, facts 
 had made argument superfluous. 
 
 Wisdom is easy after the event, and few would dispute 
 now that the constitutional party ought either to have 
 dissociated itself completely from the appeal to force, 
 or to have launched and controlled it from the outset. 
 Neither of these lines was followed, and the responsi- 
 bility for what was done and what was not done must 
 lie with Redmond. Yet, as I read it, the key to his 
 policy lay in a dread, not of war, but of civil war. To 
 arm Irishmen against each other was of all possible 
 courses to him the most hateful. It opened a vision of 
 fratricidal strife, of an Ireland divided against itself by 
 new and bloody memories. 
 
 Moreover, though he had, as the world came to know, 
 soldiering in his blood — though the call to war, when 
 he counted the war righteous, stirred what was deepest 
 in him — by training and conviction he was essentially 
 a constitutionalist : he realized profoundly how strong 
 were the forces behind constitutionalism in Great Britain, 
 how impregnable was the position of British Ministers if 
 they boldly asserted the law with equality as between 
 man and man. Where he was mistaken was in his esti- 
 mate of the Government with which he had to deal, and 
 especially of Mr. Asquith. Speaking to his constituents 
 early in the New Year of 1914 he said, "The Prime 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 93 
 
 Minister is as firm as a rock, and is, I believe, the strongest 
 and sanest man who has appeared in British politics in 
 our time." The verdict of history might have borne 
 out this judgment had Mr. Asquith never been forced 
 to face extraordinary times. In the event, it was Mr. 
 Asquith's lack of firmness and failure in strength which 
 drove Redmond into belated acceptance of a policy 
 modelled on Sir Edward Carson's. 
 
 As early as July 1913 the demonstrations in Ulster 
 led to discussion of a countermove among young men in 
 Dublin. But there was no public proposal, until at the 
 end of October Professor MacNeill, Vice-President of 
 the Gaelic League, published an article in the League's 
 official organ calling on Nationalist Ireland to drill and 
 arm. The first meeting of a provisional committee 
 followed a few days later. Support was asked from all 
 sections of Nationalist opinion ; but, as a whole, members 
 of the United Irish League and of the Ancient Order of 
 Hibernians, who constituted the bulk of Redmond's 
 following, refused to act. Still, about a third of the 
 committee were supporters of the parliamentary party ; 
 they included Professor Kettle, who was from 1906 to 
 1910 among its most brilliant members. It was, however, 
 significant that the Lord Mayor, a prominent official 
 Nationalist, refused the use of the Mansion House for 
 a meeting at which it was proposed to start the enrolment 
 of Irish Volunteers. As a result, the venue was changed 
 to the Rotunda, and so great enthusiasm was shown that 
 the Rink was used for the assembly. Even that did not 
 suffice for half the gathering. Three overflow meetings 
 were held, and four thousand men are said to have been 
 enrolled that evening. 
 
 Yet the movement did not spread at once with rapidity. 
 By the end of December recruits only amounted to 
 ten thousand. For this two causes were answerable. 
 The first was the honourable refusal of the committee 
 to allow companies to be enrolled except according 
 
94 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 to locality. They would have no sectional companies 
 of Sinn Fein volunteers, of United Irish League Volun- 
 teers, of Hibernian Volunteers. All must mix equally 
 in the ranks. The second was the fear of most National- 
 ists that by joining an organization with which the national 
 leader was not identified they might weaken his hand. 
 This operated, although the declared intention of the 
 organization was to strengthen Redmond's position. 
 At Limerick in January Pearse said : "In the Volunteer 
 movement we are going to give Mr. Redmond a weapon 
 which will enable him to enforce the demand for Home 
 Rule." 
 
 Briefly, for several months the numbers of the new 
 force did not show that the whole of Nationalist Ireland 
 was in support of it. Ireland was waiting for a sign 
 from Redmond, and it did not come. The events which 
 literally drove Irish constitutional Nationalists into fol- 
 lo\ving Ulster's example had still to occur. 
 
 There was, however, a wide extension of the cadres 
 of the organization, and it was being spread by men 
 some of whom — like Professor MacNeill — dissented from 
 Redmond's attitude of quiescence, while some were 
 general opponents of the whole constitutional policy. 
 They covered the country with committees, recruited, 
 it is true, from all sections of Nationalist Ireland, But 
 it was inevitable that the element who distrusted Red- 
 mond, and whose distrust he reciprocated, should attain 
 an influence out of all proportion to its following in the 
 country. 
 
 Government's action — and this sentence will run like 
 a refrain through the rest of this book — contributed 
 largely to strengthen the extremists and to weaken 
 Redmond's hold on the people. During eleven months 
 the Ulster Volunteers had been drilling, had been import- 
 ing arms, and no step was taken to interfere. Within 
 ten days after the Irish Volunteer Force began to be 
 enrolled, a proclamation (issued on December 4, 1913) 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 95 
 
 prohibited the importation of military arms and ammuni- 
 tion into Ireland, A system of search was instituted. 
 But the Ulstermen were already well supplied. Redmond 
 was blamed for not forcing the withdrawal of the pro- 
 clamation. He controlled the House of Commons, it 
 was said. This was the line of argument constantly 
 taken by dissentient Nationalists ; and it was true that 
 he could at any moment put the Government out. Critics 
 did not stop to ask for whose advantage that would be. 
 Government by issuing this proclamation had effected 
 no good : they had embarrassed their chief ally, and 
 they had laid the foundation for an imposing structure 
 of incidents which grew with pernicious rapidity into a 
 monumental proof that law, even under a Liberal admin- 
 istration, has one aspect for Protestant Ulster and quite 
 another for the rest of Ireland. 
 
 But in England at the beginning of the fateful year 
 1914 the Irish Volunteers had not yet become recognized 
 as a factor in the main political situation. An attitude 
 of mind had been studiously fostered which found crude 
 expression soon after the House met. One of the Liberal 
 party was arguing that Ulster had made Home Rule 
 an absolute necessity, because Nationalists would have 
 " fourfold justification if they resisted in the way you 
 have taught them to resist the Government of this country 
 in maintaining the old system." " They have not the 
 pluck," interjected Captain Craig, the most prominent 
 of the Ulster members. The present Lord Chancellor, 
 Mr. F. E. Smith, was voluble in declarations that Nation- 
 alists would " neither fight for Home Rule nor pay for 
 Home Rule." These taunts did not ease Redmond's 
 position, especially as it became plain that Ulster's threat 
 of violence had succeeded. 
 
 Mr. Asquith, referring to the " conversations " between 
 leaders which had taken place during the winter, said 
 that since no definite agreement had been reached the 
 Government had decided to reopen the matter in the 
 
96 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 HouBe. This meant, as Redmond pointed out with 
 some asperity, that the Prime Minister had accepted 
 responsibility for taking the initiative in making pro- 
 posals to meet objections whose reasonableness he did 
 not admit. The Opposition, he thought, should have 
 been left to put forward some plan. 
 
 Yet Redmond's attitude, and the attitude of the 
 House, was considerably affected by an unusual speech 
 which had been delivered by the Ulster leader. 
 
 Sir Edward Carson, as everyone knows, is not an Ulster- 
 man, and the chief of many advantages which Ulster 
 gained from his advocacy was that Ulster's case was 
 never stated to Great Britain as Ulstermen themselves 
 would have stated it. It is not true to say that Ulster- 
 men by habit think of Ireland as consisting of two nations, 
 for all Ulstermen traditionally regard themselves as 
 Irish and so have always described themselves without 
 qualification. But it is true to say that Ulster Protes- 
 tants have regarded Irish Catholics as a separate and 
 inferior caste of Irishmen. The belief has been ingrained 
 into them that as Protestants they are morally and 
 intellectually superior to those of the other reUgion. 
 Their whole political attitude is determined by this con- 
 viction. They refuse to come under a Dublin Parliament 
 because in it they would be governed by a majority whom 
 they regard as their inferiors. It is in their deliberate 
 view natural that Roman Catholics should submit to be 
 controlled by Protestants, unnatural that Protestants 
 should submit to be controlled by Roman Catholics. 
 
 It does not express the truth to say that Sir Edward 
 Carson was adroit enough to avoid putting this view of 
 the case to the electors of Great Britain or to the House 
 of Commons. Temperamentally and instinctively, he 
 did not share it. He was a Southern Irishman who at 
 the opening of his life held himself, as not one Ulsterman 
 in a thousand does, perfectly free to make up his mind 
 for or against the maintenance of the Union. He reached 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 07 
 
 the conclusion not only that Home Rule would be dis- 
 astrous for Ireland, for the United Kingdom, and for 
 the British Empire, but that it would mean for Irishmen 
 the acceptance of an inferior status in the Empire. As 
 citizens of the United Kingdom, he held, they were more 
 honourably situated than they could be as citizens of 
 an Irish State within the Emi3ire. This was an attitude 
 of mind which Ulster could endorse, although it did not 
 fully represent Ulster's conviction : but this was the 
 case which Sir Edward Carson always made on behalf 
 of Ulster, and he made it as an Irishman whose personal 
 interests and connections lay in the South of Ireland, 
 not in the North. His argument was the more persuasive 
 because it was based on a view of Ireland's true interest — 
 not of Ulster's only ; and it was the harder on that account 
 for Redmond to repel peremptorily. More than this, 
 between him and Redmond there was an old personal 
 tie. The Irish Bar is a true centre of intercourse between 
 men of varying political and religious beliefs, and as 
 junior barristers Edward Carson and John Redmond 
 went the Munster circuit together. 
 
 All this lay behind the appeal which on February 11, 
 1914, was implied rather than expressed in the novel 
 phrase and still more unaccustomed tone of a con- 
 summate orator. 
 
 " Believe me," Sir Edward Carson said, " whatever 
 way you settle the Irish question " (and that phrase 
 thrcAv over the cry of '"' No Home Rule "), " there are 
 only two ways to deal with Ulster. It is for statesmen 
 to say which is the best and right one. She is not a part 
 of the community which can be bought. She will not 
 allow herself to be sold. You must therefore either 
 coerce her if you go on, or you must in the long run, by 
 showing that good government can come under the Home 
 Rule Bill, try and win her over to the case of the rest 
 of Ireland. You probably can coerce her — though I 
 doubt it. If you do, what will be the di;iastrous conse- 
 
 8 
 
98 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 quences not only to Ulster, but to this country and the 
 Empire ? Will my fellow-countryman " — and at this 
 emphatic word, which jettisoned absolutely the theory 
 of two nations, the speaker turned to his left, where 
 Redmond sat in his accustomed place below the gangway 
 — " will my fellow-countryman, the leader of the Nation- 
 alist Party, have gained anything ? I will agree with 
 him — I do not believe he wants to triumph any more 
 than I do. But will he have gained anything if he takes 
 over these peojDle and then a^Dplies for what he used to 
 call — at all events his party used to call — the enemies 
 of the peoi^le to come in and coerce them into obedience ? 
 No, sir ; one false step taken in relation to Ulster will, 
 in my opinion, render for ever impossible a solution of 
 the Irish question. I say this to my Nationalist fellow- 
 countrymen, and, indeed, also to the Government : you 
 have never tried to win over Ulster. You have never 
 tried to understand her position. You have never alleged, 
 and can never allege, that this Bill gives her one atom 
 of advantage." 
 
 Then, carried away by the course of his argument, an 
 angry note came into his voice, and before a minute had 
 passed we were back in the old atmosphere. He accused 
 us of wanting " not Ulster's affections but her taxes." 
 
 Well might Redmond say when lie rose that Sir Edward 
 Carson had been heard by all of us with very mixed 
 feelings. " I care not about the assent of Englishmen," 
 he said ; " I am fighting this matter out between a fellow- 
 countrj^man and myself, and I say that it was an un- 
 worthy thing for him to say that I am animated by these 
 base motives, especially after he had lectured the House 
 on the undesirability of imputing motives." 
 
 On the personal note Redmond was to the full as 
 effective as his opponent, and his speech of that day 
 was memorable. It was also very much more to the 
 taste of the Liberal rank and file than what came from 
 their own front bench. *' We do not by any means 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 99 
 
 take the tragic view of the probabilities or even the 
 possibilities of what is called civil war in Ulster," he 
 said ; and added that the House of Commons ought, in 
 his opinion, " to resent as an affront these threats of civil 
 war." Yet in the end he promised, for the sake of 
 peace, " consideration in the friendliest spirit " (not very 
 different from accei)tancc) of any proposals that the 
 Government might feel called upon to put forward. 
 
 It is noteworthy that in this prolonged debate there 
 was no reference to the new fact of a second volunteer 
 force. But on February 12th a question was asked 
 about it. On the 17th there was allusion to another 
 growing element of danger — the discussions among officers 
 of the Army of a combined refusal to serve against Ulster. 
 All these factors must have weighed with Redmond and 
 with his chief colleagues in their discussions with the 
 Government during the next three weeks. " Friendly 
 consideration " passed into acceptance on March 9th, 
 when Mr. Asquith, introducing the Home Rule Bill for 
 its passage in the third consecutive session (as required 
 by the Parliament Act), outlined the proposed modifi- 
 cations in it. They involved partition. But the exclusion 
 was to be optional by areas and limited in time. 
 
 The proposal to take a vote by counties had, it will 
 be remembered, been originally suggested by Mr. Bonar 
 Law, and in following the Prime Minister he could not 
 well repudiate it. The test, however, which he now put 
 forward was whether or not the proposals satisfied Ulster : 
 and he fixed upon the time-limit of six years as being 
 wholly unacceptable. Redmond, on the other hand, while 
 declaring that the Government had gone to " the extremest 
 limits of concession," said that the proi:)osals had one 
 merit : they would " elicit beyond doubt or question by 
 a free ballot the real opinion of the jDcople of Ulster." 
 This indicated his conviction that if Home Rule really 
 came the majority in Ulster would prefer to take their 
 chances under it ; the proposal of exclusion being merely 
 
100 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 a tactical manoeuvre to defeat Home Rule by splitting 
 the Nationalists. 
 
 Its efficacy for that purpose was immediately demon- 
 strated. Mr. O'Brien followed Redmond with a virulent 
 denunciation of " the one concession of all others which 
 must be hateful and unthinkable from the point of view 
 of any Nationalist in Ireland." Opposition from Mr. 
 O'Brien and from Mr. Healy was no new thing. But 
 by acceptance of these proposals the Nationalist leader 
 made their oj)position for the first time really formidable. 
 Telegrams rained in that March afternoon — above all 
 on Mr. Devlin, from his suj^porters in Belfast, who felt 
 themselves betrayed and shut out from a national triumph 
 which they had been the most zealous to promote. From 
 this time onward the position of Redmond personally 
 and of his party as a whole was perceptibly weakened. 
 Especially an alienation began between him and the 
 Catholic hierarchy. It was impossible that the clergy 
 should be well disposed towards proposals which, as Mr. 
 Heal}'' put it, would make Cardinal Logue a foreigner 
 in his own cathedral at Armagh. 
 
 Yet upon the whole the shake to Redmond's power 
 was less than might have been ex^Dected — largely, no 
 doubt, because the offer was repelled. Sir Edward Carson 
 described it as " sentence of death with stay of execution 
 for six years." With a great advocate's instinct, he 
 fastened on the point in the Government's proposal 
 which was least defensible. 
 
 In my opinion these modifications of the Bill were 
 never adequately discussed in the meetings of the Irish 
 party. All was done between the Government and 
 Redmond's inner cabinet, consisting of Redmond himself, 
 Mr. Dillon, Mr. DevHn and Mr. T. P. O'Connor. The 
 negotiations were most delicate and difficult, and above 
 all secrecy is hard to maintain when a body of over seventy 
 men, each keenly concerned for the view of his consti- 
 tuents, comes to be consulted. Yet I think it a pity 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 101 
 
 that the party never thrashed this question out. Once 
 the principle of option was admitted, a great deal had 
 to be considered. Voting must be a referendum either 
 to the province as a whole, to the constituencies separ- 
 ately, or to local units of administration. A referendum 
 by constituencies was as impossible as one by parishes : 
 for instance, Mr. Devlin's West Belfast, out of the city's 
 four divisions, would certainly have voted to remain 
 under the Irish Parliament, and an absurd situation 
 would have resulted. The choice lay between a vote 
 by counties or by the province as a whole. In the pro- 
 vince, three counties out of nine were as j^redominantly 
 Nationalist as any part of Leinster. In two others, 
 Tyrone and Fermanagh, Nationalists were about 55 per 
 cent, of the electorate. But the bulk of the population 
 of Ulster resided in four counties of the north-east, so 
 that Protestants over the whole province had a majority 
 of some two hundred thousand. An appeal to the pro- 
 vince, therefore, might involve the exclusion from Home 
 Rule of a very large area which was thoroughly National- 
 ist. On the other hand, every scheme of exclusion had 
 in view the possibility of the excluded area changing 
 its mind on the question after a short trial. To separate 
 the four overwhelmingly Protestant counties was to set 
 up a body in which a change of vote would be much 
 harder to bring about than in the province. As a matter 
 of statesmanship there was much to be said for closing 
 with the LHstermen's original demand that the province 
 should come in or stay out as a whole. It satisfied Leister's 
 sentiment and lessened the chances of crystallizing a 
 Protestant block of excluded territory, which would tend 
 to become less and less Irish. 
 
 The answer to this was that Nationalists would never 
 consent and did never consent to the possibility of per- 
 manent exclusion for anj^ part. Insistence on the time- 
 limit was from this point of view a matter of absolute 
 principle. Yet many believed then, and believe now, 
 
102 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 that if any part of Ulster were excluded by legislation 
 it would certainly come in voluntarily after a short period. 
 On the other hand, if any part were excluded even for 
 a year, it was difficult to believe that it could ever be 
 brought in except by its own consent. The view, how- 
 ever, to which we were committed (with the party's 
 general approval), was expressed by Redmond at the 
 customary St. Patrick's Day Nationalist banquet in 
 London. 
 
 " To agree to the permanent partition of Ireland would 
 be," he said, " an outrage upon nature and upon history." 
 He quoted a phrase used by Mr. Austen Chamberlain, 
 who had described it as " the statutory negation of 
 Ireland's national claim." But, he argued, no such 
 sacrifice of principle had been made. The demand of 
 Nationalists was for a Parliament for the whole of Ireland, 
 having power to deal with " every purely Irish matter." 
 Temporary limitations of this demand had alreadj'' been 
 accepted. 
 
 " We have agreed, as Parnell agreed in the Bill of 1886, 
 and as we all agreed in the Bill of 1893, that the power 
 of dealing with some of the most vital of Irish questions 
 should not come within the purview of the new Parlia- 
 ment for a definite number of years." The control of 
 police, for instance, was reserved to the Imperial Parlia- 
 ment in all those Bills for a term of years. But this did 
 not mean that Parnell or we abandoned Ireland's right 
 to manage her own police. Reservation of the police 
 in perpetuity would have been impossible to accept. 
 In the same way, said Redmond, " the automatic ending 
 of any period of exclusion is for us a fixed and immutable 
 principle." 
 
 To maintain this conformity with national sentiment 
 great advantages were sacrificed. The whole debates 
 of this period turned on the question of the time-limit. 
 If it had never been raised, opposition would still have 
 existed, but the fact would have been plain from the 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 103 
 
 outset that Protestant Ulster claimed to dictate not 
 only where it had the majority, but where the majority 
 was against it. Redmond probably believed that the 
 opinion of Nationalists in the North could not be brought 
 to consent to abandonment of the time-limit. If so, 
 he probably underrated, then as always, the influence 
 he possessed. It is always easy to persuade Irishmen 
 that if you are going to do a thing you should do it 
 " decently." What is more, a real effect could have 
 been produced on much moderate opinion in Ulster by 
 saying to Ulster : " Stay out if you like, and come in 
 when you like. When you come in, you will be more 
 than welcome." But the decision for this course would 
 have needed to be taken before the proposals were made, 
 since any attempt to enlarge them was bound to renew 
 and intensify the inevitable storm of Nationalist dissent. 
 Whatever the proposal, it should have been absolutely 
 the last word of concession. 
 
 If a clear proposal of local option by counties without 
 time-limit had been put before Parliament and the elec- 
 torate, I do not think our position in Ireland would have 
 been worse than it was made by the proposal of temporary 
 exclusion, and it would have been greatly strengthened 
 in Parliament and in the United Kingdom. All moderate 
 men, and many pronounced LTnionists, were becoming 
 uneasy under the perpetual menace of trouble. Events 
 which now followed rapidly turned the uneasiness into 
 grave anxiety, but did not turn it to the profit of the 
 Government. 
 
 The policy which was adopted in Mr, Asquith's pro- 
 posal of March 9th was the policy which Mr. Churchill 
 had pushed from the first introduction of the Home Rule 
 Bill, even when it was formally disavowed by the Prime 
 Minister. Contemptuous rejection of it by the Ulster- 
 men when it was proposed was not calculated to strengthen 
 Mr. Churchill's personal position, or to soothe his temper, 
 and on March 14th he made a speech at Bradford which 
 
104 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 very greatly stirred public feeling. If Ulster really 
 rejects the offer, said Mr. Churchill, " it can only be 
 because they prefer shooting to voting and the bullet 
 to the ballot." Should civil war break out in Ulster, 
 the issue would not be confined to Ireland : the issue 
 would be whether civil and parliamentary government 
 in these realms was to be beaten down by the menace 
 of armed force. Bloodshed was lamentable, but there 
 were worse things. If the law could not prevail, if the 
 veto of violence was to replace the veto of privilege, 
 then, said the orator, " let us go forward and put these 
 grave matters to a proof." 
 
 When Mr. Churchill next ajDpeared in the House of 
 Commons, a great outburst of cheering showed what a 
 volume of feeling had found expression in his speech. 
 Redmond came to the St. Patrick's Day banquet under 
 the impression of that scene, and he spoke with a confi- 
 dence which gives to his words a tragic irony to-day. 
 He cited " the suj)erb speech of Mr. Churchill " as evidence 
 that " what is our last word is also the last word of the 
 Government." 
 
 " If the Opposition have spoken their last word," he 
 said, " the Bill will now j^roceed upon its natural course. 
 It will proceed rapidlj?^ and irresistibly, and in a few short 
 weeks become the law of the land." 
 
 The weeks have lengthened into years, and so much 
 has happened in them that I keep no clear memory of 
 that evening, though I was present. But it represented 
 the temper of the time, among Home Rulers, and more 
 particularly among Irish Nationalists, who generally 
 held the opinion that the military preparations in Ulster 
 were, as Mr. Devlin called them, " a hollow masquerade." 
 
 We saw the other side of the picture on Thursday, 
 March 19th, when a Vote of Censure was moved. Mr. 
 Bonar Law launched on the House of Commons a new 
 and sinister suggestion. 
 
 " What about the Army ? If it is only a question of 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 105 
 
 disorder, the Army I am sure will obey jou, and I am sure 
 that it ought to obey you ; but if it reallj'' is a question 
 of civil war, soldiers are citizens like the rest of us." 
 
 Sir Edward rose immediately the Prime Minister had 
 replied to Mr. Bonar Law, and his speech was furious. 
 " In consequence of the trifling with this subject by 
 the Prime Minister and the provocation, which he has 
 endorsed, by the First Lord of the Admiralty last Satur- 
 day, I feel I ought not to be here but in Belfast," he 
 said ; and he indicated his intention of proceeding there 
 as soon as he had spoken. What he had to say chiefly 
 concerned the Army, and the preparations which were 
 being made at the War Office for the despatch of troops 
 to Ulster. He suggested that there was the intention 
 to provoke an attack so that there might be " pretext 
 for putting them down." 
 
 " You will be all right. You will be no longer 
 cowards. The cowardice will have been given up. 
 You will have become men in entrenching yourselves 
 behind the Army. But under your direction they will 
 have become assassins." 
 
 With these words — memorable in connection with 
 what haj)pened later, but not in Ulster — the Ulster leader 
 left the House, followed by Captain Craig. Friday's 
 papers were of course full of the debate. At noon on 
 that day, March 20, 1914, General Sir Arthur Paget, 
 Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, held a meeting with the 
 officers at the Curragh and received the intimation that 
 the majority of them would resign their commissions 
 rather than go on duty which was likelj?^ to involve a 
 collision with Ulster. 
 
 It seems only fair in dealing with this whole incident 
 to print here an account of what happened, written from 
 the soldier's point of view, by the man who was the spokes- 
 man and leader of the resigning officers — Brigadier (now 
 Lieutenant) General Sir Hubert Gough.^ 
 
 ' Manchester Guardian, February 4, 1919 
 
106 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 ' " I never refused to obey orders. On the contrary, 
 I obeyed them. I was ordered to make a decision — namely, 
 to leave the Army or ' to undertake active operations 
 against Ulster.' These were the very words of the terms 
 offered. As I was given a choice, I accepted it, and chose 
 the first alternative, and as a matter of fact I have a letter 
 in existence written the night before the offer was made 
 by Sir A. Paget to my brother, saying : ' Something is 
 up ' (we had been suddenly ordered to a conference). 
 ' What is it ? If I receive orders to march North, of 
 course I will go.' '" 
 
 ' All the officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade took the 
 same line ' (continues the correspondent of the Manchester 
 Guardian) ' and resigned. This decision seems not to have 
 been expected by the authorities, and caused great pertur- 
 bation. General Gough was urged b}' Sir Arthur Paget 
 to withdraw the resignation. Sir Arthur Paget told them 
 that the operations against Ulster were to be of a purely 
 defensive nature. Unfortunately, Sir Arthur Paget based 
 his appeal on expediency and private interest, and not 
 sufticientlj' on the call of public duty. This failed to 
 influence the officers. They persisted in their resigna- 
 tions, and only finally withdrew them on receiving a 
 written undertaking from the War Office that they would 
 not be again presented A^ith the alternative of resigning 
 or attacking Ulster.' 
 
 The Irish Party had no guess at the inner aspect of 
 the occurrence. Naturally, but regrettably, we were 
 the section of the House which had least touch with 
 what was thought and felt in barrack-rooms and regi- 
 mental messes. Naturally, but most regrettably, the 
 opinion of the Army regarded us traditionally as a hostile 
 body ; and at this time every effort to accentuate that 
 belief was made by the political party with which the 
 Army had most intercourse and connection. 
 
 Writing now, as I hope I may write without offence, 
 of a state of things not far off in time, but divided from 
 us of to-day by the marks of a vast upheaval, it can be 
 said that the old professional Army was a society governed 
 in an extraordinary degree by tradition. Part of that 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 107 
 
 tradition was that the Army had no politics ; and as 
 everyone knows, the man who says he has no poUtics 
 is in practice ahnost invariably a Conservative. In the 
 Army, usage was at its strongest — stronger even than 
 at a public school ; it was almost bad manners, *' bad 
 form," to hold political opinions differing from those of 
 your mess. Political discussion was sharply discouraged ; 
 but this never meant that a man might not express 
 vehemently the prevailing opinion. On the broad facts 
 it was inevitable that the prevailing opinion should be 
 unfriendly to Irish Nationalists. Irish Nationalists had 
 taken passionately the line of opposition to the South 
 African War ; they had been sharply critical of all the 
 minor campaigns in which the Army had been engaged 
 for repression or for conquest during the Avhole period 
 since Parnell began his leadership. In Ireland itself, 
 every man who reflected for a moment saw at the Curragh 
 the very embodiment of that force which had maintained 
 for over a hundred years a Government which had not 
 the consent of the governed ; and unless he was one of 
 those who regarded themselves as " England's faithful 
 garrison in Ireland," protestations of enthusiasm for 
 the armed forces of the Crown could not be the natural 
 expression of his feelings. 
 
 Yet mingled with the Nationalists' attitude of estrange- 
 ment from the forces which upheld a detested system of 
 government there was a deep-seated pride in the exploits 
 of Irish trooj)s ; and no man ever felt this more strongly 
 than Redmond. He seldom spoke of the distinguished 
 men he met, but again and again I remember hearing 
 him mention with pleasure some talk over a dinner-table 
 with this or that famous soldier — Sir John French (as 
 he then was), for instance. It was happiness for him to 
 find himself on friendly terms with the service to which 
 so many sentiments bound him. The Curragh incident 
 was to him more than a grave political event ; it pained 
 him beyond measure that this opposition should be 
 
108 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 headed by a representative of one of the Irish families 
 most famous for their military record. In the debates 
 which dealt with all this matter he said no word, and 
 he kept our party silent — a wise course, and one to which 
 every instinct prompted him. 
 
 In its political aspect, this action of General Gough 
 and the fifty officers allied with him revealed a new and 
 formidable impediment on the path to Home Rule ; 
 yet it was one of those barriers which rally forces rather 
 than weaken them, and in surmounting which, or sweep- 
 ing them aside, a new impetus may be gained. The 
 incident was first discussed in the House on Monday, 
 March 23rd, and continued to dominate all other questions 
 for several days. From the Labour benches Mr. John 
 Ward (now Colonel), who had been a private soldier, gave 
 the first indication of the volume of resentment. His 
 speech, remarkable in its power both of phrasing and 
 of thought, was delivered quite unexpectedly in a thin 
 House ; but its effect was electrical. Later, Mr. J. H. 
 Thomas spoke in tlie same strain. When a railway 
 strike was threatened, the soldiers had been called out 
 and had come without a murmur. Was the Army to 
 be used against all movements except those under the 
 patronage of the Tory party ? If so, he would tell his 
 four hundred thousand railway men to equip themselves 
 to defend their own interests. 
 
 These speeches set people thinking very gravely, but 
 their effect was to increase the confidence of Home Rulers 
 — the more so as Sir Edward Grey, in one of his rare 
 moments of emphasis, declared his determination to go 
 as far as either speaker if the case which they fore- 
 shadowed should arise. But new occurrences disquieted 
 the public ; the bungling which had characterized deal- 
 ings with the officers at the Curragh was not ended there. 
 General Gough received a document from Colonel Seely, 
 Secretary of State for War, countersigned by Sir John 
 French and Sir Spencer Ewart, the military heads of 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 109 
 
 the War Office ; and this document was in part disavowed 
 by the Cabinet. The two Generals resigned and Colonel 
 Seely followed their examj)le. I have never seen the 
 House of Commons so completely surprised as on the 
 afternoon when the Prime Minister announced that he 
 himself would succeed to the vacant office. The surprise 
 passed at once into a feeling of immense relief, very widely 
 shared by all parties. The right thing had been done 
 in the right way, and it was clear that Mr. Asquith pos- 
 sessed enormous authority, if he chose to assert it. 
 
 The effect of all these happenings was immediately 
 perceptible in the resumed discussion on the Home Rule 
 Bill. Mr. Dillon, speaking on the second day, said : 
 " Yesterday for the first time I heard this question 
 debated in a spirit of reasonableness and conciliation 
 and with an evident desire on both sides to reach an 
 agreement." A proposal frequently put forward from 
 the Tory side suggested exclusion until a federal arrange- 
 ment for the United Kingdom could be completed. The 
 official Tory demand was for either a referendum or a 
 general election. But, as Redmond pointed out when 
 he spoke on the fourth and last day of the debate, any 
 proposal for a settlement must be a settlement which 
 Ulster would accept, and Ulster declared that it would 
 not be influenced by any vote of the British peoiDle or 
 by any Act of Parliament. In a passage of very genuine 
 feeling he indicated what Ulster might do to assist him 
 in securing for Ulster the extremest limit of concession : 
 
 " Anything which would mean burying the hatchet, 
 anything which would mean the consent of these Ulster- 
 men to shake hands frankly with their fellow-countrymen 
 across the hateful memories of the past, would be wel- 
 comed with universal joy in Ireland, and would be gladly 
 purchased by very large sacrifices indeed. If the right 
 honourable and learned gentleman (Sir Edward Carson) 
 would say to me, ' We are both Irishmen ; we both love 
 our country ; we both hate — and I am sure this is 
 
110 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 absolutely true of both of us — we both hate all the 
 old sectarian animosities, all the old wrongs, all the old 
 memories which have kept Irishmen apart ; let us come 
 together and see what we can do for the welfare of our 
 common country, so that we can hand down to those 
 who come after us an Ireland more free, more peaceful, 
 more tolerant, an Ireland less cursed by racial and 
 religious differences ' ; if an appeal like that were made 
 to me, I say without the smallest hesitation that there 
 are no lengths that Nationalist Ireland would not be 
 willing to go to assuage the fears, allay the anxieties, and 
 remove the prejudices of their Ulster fellow-countrymen. 
 
 " But, alas ! that is not the position. Even the per- 
 manent exclusion of Ulster is not put forward as the price 
 of reconciliation ; it is simply put forward as the one 
 and sole condition upon which they will give up their 
 avowed intention of levying war upon their feUow- 
 countrymen." 
 
 He dealt with the federal proposal, and once more 
 avowed his desire for that solution. " I have been all 
 my political life preaching in favour of federalism." 
 But he could not consent that the exclusion of Ulster 
 should be prolonged indefinitely pending a settlement 
 on federal lines, nor consent to any " watering down 
 of the powers in the present Home Rule Bill." 
 
 What remained then, if Ulster would not accept the 
 offer ? Nothing but " to proceed calmly with the Bill." 
 Threats of civil war he discounted. Disturbances there 
 M'ould probably be ; but when the first Home Rule 
 Bill was defeated, there were weeks of the most terrible 
 riots in Belfast. The House could not afford to be 
 deterred from any course by threats of violence ; and 
 he was confident that the Bill Avould pass into law and 
 profoundly confident it would never be revoked. 
 
 He gave his reasons for that confidence in a passage 
 almost autobiographical in character — if only because 
 it made the House realize how comx^letely this man's 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES HI 
 
 whole adult life had been devoted to this one long service, 
 and how far the labours of our party had achieved their 
 purpose. 
 
 " In a sense I may say I have lived my whole life within 
 these walls. I came in here little more than a boy, and 
 I have grown old in the House of Commons, and in the 
 long space of 3"ears which have passed since then I have 
 witnessed the most extraordinary transformation of the 
 whole public life of this country, and I have witnessed 
 an almost miraculous change in the position and the 
 f)rospects of the Irish National Cause. When I came to 
 this House, Irish Nationalist members, in a sense, were 
 almost outcasts. Botli the great British parties — there 
 was no Labour party then — divided on everything else, 
 were united in hostihty to the national movement and 
 the national ideal. Home Rule seemed hopelessly out 
 of the range of practical politics. There were only a 
 handful of men in this whole House of Commons besides 
 us who were in favour of any measure of Home Rule for 
 Ireland. Outside, the public opinion of this country 
 was ignorant, and it m as actively hostile, and we found 
 it impossible to gain tlie ear of the democracy of England 
 for the voice of Ireland. All that has vanished into thin 
 air. All that has radically changed. The change has 
 been slow and gradual, but it has been continuous and 
 sure. Such a change as that can never be reversed. 
 You might as well talk of the world going back to the 
 days before electricity' or petrol as hope to bring back 
 the j)rejudices and the ignorance of the masses of the 
 people in this country about Ireland, as they existed in 
 the past." 
 
 His confidence was strong and it communicated itself 
 to Ireland, But whatever could be said to shake confi- 
 dence was said by Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Healy, who 
 denounced the Bill as worthless when linked to the plan 
 of even temporary partition, and declared that, whatever 
 the Government might say at present, we had not yet 
 
112 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 reached the end of their concessions. On the division 
 they and their party abstained, so that the majority 
 dropped to 77. 
 
 Up to this point it is still true to say that the Nationalist 
 party Avere constant to their faith in strictly constitutional 
 action. But a new development was imminent. On the 
 night of Friday to Saturday, April 24th-25th, Ulstermen 
 brought off their first overt act of rebellion. They seized 
 the ports of Lame and Donaghadee, cut off telephone 
 and telegraph, landed a very large quantitj^ of rifles 
 and ammunition, and despatched them to every quarter 
 of the province by means of a great fleet of motor-cars 
 which had been mobilized for the occasion. It was a 
 clean and excellent piece of staff work, planned by a 
 capable soldier and carried out under military direction : 
 and the Tory Press hailed it with no less enthusiasm 
 than was elicited by the most imjiortant victories in the 
 recent war. 
 
 One coastguard, running to give the alarm, died of 
 heart failure : otherwise there was no casualty. The 
 police and customs officers Avere confronted with force 
 majeure and submitted without show of resistance. The 
 Prime Minister, in answering a question as to the action 
 which he proposed to take, used these words : 
 
 " In view of this grave and unprecedented outrage 
 the House may be assured that His Majesty's Government 
 will take without delay appropriate steps to vindicate 
 the authority of the law and protect officers and servants 
 of the King and His Majesty's subjects in the exercise 
 of their legal rights." 
 
 The Opposition was noticeabl}'^ silent, and next day 
 some embarrassment was apparent when they proceeded 
 with a previously arranged Vote of Censure on the 
 Government for the military and naval movements in 
 connection with which the Curragh incident had occurred. 
 The sum of these movements amounted to desj)atching 
 four companies to points in Ulster at which very large 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 113 
 
 stores of arms and ammunition were lying under very 
 small guard — and at one of which Ihere was a battery of 
 field guns with no protecting infantry. It was regarded as 
 at least possible that the stores might be rushed by " evil- 
 disposed persons, not fully under the control of their 
 leaders," It was also regarded as possible that the 
 movement of these companies might be resisted and 
 that much larger operations might be thereby involved. 
 The stationing of the Fleet opposite the Belfast coast 
 was part of the measures taken against this latter 
 contingency^ 
 
 All this preparation was denounced as a conspiracy 
 organized by Mr. Churchill with intent to provoke re- 
 bellion and put it down by a massacre. In view of the 
 important military operation which Ulster had just carried 
 out against the Crown, Mr. Churchill was not without 
 justification in comparing the motion to a vote of censure 
 by the criminal classes on the police. Yet, after much 
 hard hitting in speech, he once more led the way in retreat 
 from the Government's position. Sir Edward Grey had 
 declared, speaking for the Government, that beyond the 
 six years' limit they could not go. Mr. Churchill him- 
 self had declared the Government's offer would be 
 and should be their last word. Yet now, avowedly on 
 his own account, and not speaking for the Cabinet, he 
 proposed that a new negotiation should be ojiened with 
 Sir Edward Carson. 
 
 This proposal elicited no response, and the debate 
 continued that day in a line of violent recrimination. 
 But next day Sir Edward Carson rose and affirmed that 
 he had previously declared his willingness to advise 
 LTlster to close with a proposal giving exclusion until 
 a Federal scheme had been considered, when the whole 
 matter should be reviewed " in the light of the action 
 of the Irish Parliament and how they got on." Now 
 he said : 
 
 " I shall try to make an advance on whvat I said before. 
 
 9 
 
114 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 I will say this — and I hope the House will believe me, 
 because, though I do not want to be introducing my 
 own personality into it, I am myself a southerner in 
 Ireland — I would say this : That if Home Rule is to pass, 
 much as I detest it, and little as I will take any respon- 
 sibility for the passing of it, my earnest hope, and indeed 
 I would say my most earnest prayer, would be that the 
 Government of Ireland for the South and West would 
 prove, and might prove, such a success in the future, 
 notwithstanding all our anticipations, that it might be 
 even for the interest of Ulster itself to move towards 
 that Government, and come in under it and form one 
 unit in relation to Ireland. May I say something more 
 than that ? I would be glad to see such a state of things 
 arising in Ireland, in which you would find that mutual 
 confidence and goodwill between all classes in Ireland 
 as would lead to a stronger Ireland as an integral unit 
 in the federal scheme. While I say all that, that depends 
 upon goodwill, and never can be brought about by 
 force." 
 
 Redmond remained silent ; but months later it became 
 known that he had taken action to foster this new spirit. 
 He advised the Prime Minister not to proceed with the 
 prosecution which had been threatened against the Larne 
 gun-runners. But at the same time he urged upon 
 Government that they should withdraw the proclamation 
 against importing arms : and for this he had good reason. 
 The Larne affair had rendered the movement in support 
 of the Irish Volunteers irresistible, and Redmond had 
 decided to throw himself in with it. 
 
 The result was an amazing upward leap in the numbers 
 of the Volunteers. On June 15th a question brought 
 out that they were estimated at 80,000 against 84,000 
 of the Ulster force ; but the Nationalist body was in- 
 creasing at the rate of 15,000 a week. By July 9th they 
 were reckoned (on police information) at 132,000, of 
 whom nearly forty thousand were Army reservists. 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 115 
 
 These facts now dominated the situation. It was now 
 abundantly clear that if passing Home Rule meant 
 civil war, so also would the abandonment of Home Rule. 
 On June 16th Lord Robert Cecil raised a debate on the 
 new danger. In that debate words were quoted from 
 Sir Roger Casement, one of the most active promoters 
 of the movement : " When you are challenged on the 
 field of force, it is upon that field you must reply." Mr. 
 Dillon, who exulted in the " splendid demonstration of 
 national sentiment shown in the uprising of the National 
 Volunteers," urged strongly that the growth of a rival 
 body was not a menace to public order but an added 
 security. The armed Ulstermen would be " much slower 
 to break the peace " when they realized the certainty 
 of formidable resistance — and this, be it said, was no 
 ungrounded observation. Yet at the same time the 
 very success of the Volunteer movement was disquieting 
 Redmond. He was not in the same position as Sir 
 Edward Carson, who from the first had directed, presided 
 over, and controlled the raising and equipment of his 
 force ; and unless the force were to be a menace to his 
 leadership, he must secure control. As Mr. Bulmer 
 Hobson puts it in his History of the Irish Volunteers : 
 
 " The Volunteers had men in their ranks who were 
 political followers of Mr. Redmond's, and men who were 
 not, and who never had been. The latter were willing 
 to help him if he had been ready to help them ; they 
 would have made terms with him, but were not prepared 
 to be merely absorbed into his movement," 
 
 The strength of Redmond's position lay in the fact 
 that the vast majority of the enrolled men looked to him 
 as their leader : his weakness, in that the committees 
 under which enrolment had taken place were largely 
 composed of the extremist section. He now determined 
 to unite the Volunteers with the parliamentary party 
 as the Ulster Volunteers were linked with Sir Edward 
 Carson and his civilian organization. 
 
116 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 The men with whom he had to deal were principally 
 Professor MacNeill and Sir Roger Casement. His first 
 proposal was to replace the existing Provisional Com- 
 mittee by another, consisting of nine members, with Pro- 
 fessor MacNeill, who was regarded as a general supporter 
 of Redmond's, in the chair. Oddly enough, the negotia- 
 tions broke down because Redmond nominated Michael 
 Davitt's son along with Mr. Devlin and his own brother 
 to be representatives. The young Davitt had at an 
 early stage expressed dissent from the movement, and 
 this, coming from his father's son, left bitter resentment. 
 The existing Committee now proposed to call a National 
 Convention of the Volunteers. Such a body would 
 clearly have become a rival, and a powerful rival, to the 
 National Convention of a purely citizen type, and Redmond 
 felt himself forced to take drastic action. In a public 
 letter dated June 9th he wrote : 
 
 " I regret to observe the controversy which is now 
 taking place in the Press on the Irish National Volunteer 
 movement. Many of the writers convey the impression 
 that the Volunteer movement is, to some extent at all 
 events, hostile to the objects and policy of the Irish 
 party. I desire to say emphatically that there is no 
 foundation for this idea, and any attempts to create 
 discord between the Volunteer movement and the Irish 
 party are calculated in my opinion to ruin the Volunteer 
 movement, which, properly directed, may be of incal- 
 culable service to the National Cause. 
 
 " Up to two months ago I felt that the Volunteer 
 movement was somewhat premature, but the effect of 
 Sir Edward Carson's threats upon public opinion in 
 England, the House of Commons, and the Government ; 
 the occurrences at the Curragh Camp, and the successful 
 gun-running in Ulster, have vitally altered the position, 
 and the Irish party took steps about six weeks ago to 
 inform their friends and supporters in the country that 
 in their opinion it was desirable to support the Volunteer 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 117 
 
 movement, with the result that within the last six weeks 
 the movement has spread like a prairie fire, and all the 
 Nationalists of Ireland will shortly be enrolled. 
 
 " Within the last fortnight I have had communications 
 from men in all parts of the country, inquiring as to the 
 organization and control of the Volunteer movement, 
 and it has been strongly represented to me that the 
 Governing Body should be reconstructed and placed on 
 a thoroughly representative basis, so as to give confidence 
 to all shades of National opinion." 
 
 Redmond's proposal was that to the existing Committee 
 there should be added twenty-five representative men 
 from different parts of the country, nominated at the 
 instance of the Irish party and in sympathy with its 
 policy and aims. Failing this, he intimated that it would 
 be *' necessary to fall back on county control and govern- 
 ment until the organization was sufficiently complete 
 to make possible the election of a fully representative 
 Executive by the Volunteers themselves." 
 
 The intimation was not at once accepted. An order 
 was issued calling on the Volunteers to elect additional 
 representatives by counties to be added to the Committee. 
 Redmond at once publicly declared that this amounted 
 to refusal of his offer, and he put the issue very plainly. 
 The Provisional Committee was originally self-constituted 
 and had been increased only by co-option. The majority 
 of its members, he was informed, were not supporters 
 of the Irish party : of the rank and file at least 
 95 per cent., he said, were supporters of the Irish 
 party and its policy. 
 
 " This is a condition of things which plainly cannot 
 continue. The rank and file of the Volunteers and the 
 responsible leaders of the Irish people are entitled, and 
 indeed are bound, to demand some security that an 
 attempt shall not be made in the name of the Volunteers 
 to dictate policy to the National party, who, as the 
 elected representatives of the people, are charged with 
 
118 JOHN REDxMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 the responsibility of deciding upon the policy best calcu- 
 lated to bring the National movement to success, 
 
 " Moreover, a military organization is of its very nature 
 so grave and serious an undertaking that every responsible 
 Nationalist in the country who supports it is entitled 
 to the most substantial guarantees against any j)ossible 
 imprudence. The best guarantee to be found is clearly 
 the presence on the Governing Body of men of proved 
 judgment and steadiness." 
 
 As a last word he renewed his threat of calling on his 
 supporters to organize separate county committees inde- 
 pendent of the Dublin centre. This was carrying matters 
 with a high hand, and the fact that he succeeded proves 
 the greatness of his prestige at the moment. The Com- 
 mittee in a published manifesto accepted his terms, but 
 accepted them with declared regret, and eight of the 
 original members seceded. Among them was Patrick 
 Pearse, with whom went three others who suffered death 
 in Easter week two years later. 
 
 All this was a disastrous business, and the worst part 
 of it lay in the public avowal of divided councils. More- 
 over, a committee so constituted could not, and did not, 
 operate efficiently. The original members were primarily 
 interested in the Volunteer Force ; the added ones 
 primarily in the parliamentary movement. Nearly all 
 of the latter — selected for their " proved judgment and 
 steadiness " — were men past middle age ; and of the 
 whole twenty-five Willie Redmond alone subsequently 
 bore arms. 
 
 There was indeed an underlying difference of principle. 
 Redmond knew well, and all parUamentarians with him, 
 that under the terms of the Home Rule Bill no army 
 could be raised or maintained in Ireland without the 
 consent of the Imperial Parliament. The original Volun- 
 teer Committee laid it down as an axiom that the 
 Volunteer Force should be permanent ; they were, as 
 Casement put it, " the beginning of an Irish army." 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 119 
 
 Sir Edward Carson's policy had produced a new 
 mentality among Irish Nationalists, and it made many 
 take Redmond's constitutionalism for timidity. 
 
 But in the eyes of the world and of Ireland generally, 
 Redmond was just as much as Sir Edward Carson the 
 accredited and accepted leader of his Volunteer organi- 
 zation, and to him the Volunteers looked for provision 
 of arms and equipment. One of his chief preoccupations 
 in those months was with this matter, and it explains 
 his desire to have the proclamation against the import 
 of arms withdrawn. The Larne exploit had proved the 
 futility of it ; articles by Colonel Repington in The Times 
 testified to the completeness of the provision which had 
 been made for Ulster. But smuggling is always a costly 
 business, and Nationalists were hampered by the cost. 
 More than that, there was ground for suspicion that 
 the scales were not equally weighted as between Ulster 
 and the rest of the country. On June 30th Redmond 
 wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary repeating his case 
 for withdrawal of the proclamation. It is all memorable, 
 but especially the warning which concludes the following 
 passages from it : 
 
 " In the South and West of Ireland, not only are the 
 most active measures being taken against the importa- 
 tion of arms, but many owners of vessels are harassed 
 unnecessarily. 
 
 " The effect of this unequal working of the proclama- 
 tion has been grave amongst our people, and has tended 
 to increase both their exasperation and their apprehensions. 
 
 *' The apprehensions of our people are justified to the 
 fullest. They find themselves, especially in the North, 
 faced by a large, drilled, organized and armed body. 
 Furthermore, the incident at the Curragh has given 
 them the fixed idea that they cannot rely on the Army 
 for protection. The possession of arms by Nationalists 
 would, under these circumstances, be no provocation 
 for disorder, but a means of preserving the peace by 
 
120 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 confronting one armed force ^^ith another, not helpless 
 but, by being armed, fully able to defend themselves. 
 
 " Finally, we want to call your most serious attention 
 to the grave and imminent danger of a collision between 
 Nationalists and the police in the effort to import arms. 
 The police in the South and West might not be so passive 
 as they were in the recent affair at Larne, and there 
 might be serious conflicts, and even loss of life, and from 
 this day forward every day Avhich the proclamation is 
 enforced as strictly as it is now against the Nationalists 
 brings increased danger of disastrous collision between 
 the police and the people." 
 
 Within a fortnight a minor incident illustrated the 
 " unequal working " referred to in the first of these points. 
 General Richardson, who commanded the Ulster Force, 
 had issued on July 1st an order authorizing all Ulster 
 Volunteers to carry arms openly and to resist any attempt 
 at interference. In Ulster accordingly no search was 
 ever attempted. But on July 15th Mr. Lawrence Kettle, 
 brother to Professor Kettle, who had from the first been 
 a prominent official of the Volunteers, was returning in 
 his motor from the electric works at the Pigeon House ; 
 he was stopj^ed by the police and his car searched for 
 arms. Such an occurrence in Ulster would have been 
 held to justify immediate rebellion, and would have been 
 carefully avoided. In Dublin there was no such avoidance 
 of provocation. 
 
 Yet the avoidance of anything which might precipitate 
 strife was indeed in these days most desirable. June 28th 
 saw the murder of the Archduke at Sarajevo. The 
 European sky grew rapidly overcast. Days passed, and 
 the possibility of civil war was exchanged for the near 
 probability of European war which might find the British 
 Empire divided against itself. 
 
 It was necessary in the highest interests of State for 
 the Government to make an effort to compose the cause 
 of so much violent faction, which might at any moment 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 121 
 
 assume acute form. The Amending Bill, introduced in 
 the House of Lords with the Government's offer embodied 
 in it, had been altered by the Peers in a manner which 
 Lord Morley described as tantamount to rejection. In 
 this shape it was to come before the House of Commons 
 on July 20th. But on that Monday, when the House 
 reassembled after the weekly holiday, the Prime Minister 
 rose at once and announced in tones of no ordinary 
 solemnity that the King had thought it right to summon 
 representatives of parties both British and Irish to a 
 Conference next day at Buckingham Palace, over which 
 Mr. Speaker would preside. 
 
 Redmond in two brief sentences guarded his attitude. 
 He disclaimed all responsibility for tlie policy of calling 
 the Conference and expressed no opinion as to its chances 
 of success. The invitation had reached him and Mr. 
 Dillon in the form of a command from the King, and as 
 such they had accepted it. 
 
 Some may remember how radiantly fine were those 
 far-off days in July which led us up to the brink of such 
 undreamt-of happenings. On the Tuesday night I was 
 sitting alone on the Terrace, when Redmond came out. 
 For once, he was in a mood to talk. His mind was full 
 of the strangeness and interest of that first day's Confer- 
 ence — a council, or parley, so momentous, so unprece- 
 dented. It touched what was very strong in him — the 
 historic imagination. He told me how the King had 
 received them all, stayed with them for some intercourse 
 of welcome, and had been specially marked in his courtesy 
 to Redmond himself, who had of course never before 
 been presented to him. Then, he had accompanied 
 them to the room set apart for their deliberations and 
 had left them with their chairman, the Speaker. When 
 I think over Redmond's description of the Sovereign's 
 personality, it seems to me that he was describing one so 
 paralysed, as it were, by anxiety as to have lost the 
 power of easy, genial and natural speech. But the 
 
122 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 dominant thought in his mind did not concern King 
 George. One figure stood out — Sir Edward Carson. 
 " As an Irishman," Redmond said, " you could not help 
 being proud to see how he towered above the others. 
 They simply did not count. He took charge absolutely." 
 
 As I gathered, the eight members sat four on each 
 side of a long table, with the Speaker at the head. The 
 Irish leaders were on his right and left, and the discussion 
 was chiefly between them. 
 
 It turned mainly on the question of the area to be 
 excluded. Enormous trouble had been taken, and Red- 
 mond told me later that a great map in relief had been 
 constructed, showing the distribution of Protestant and 
 Catholic population. This brought out with astonishing 
 vividness the contrast : the Catholics were on the mountains 
 and hill-tops, the Protestants down along the valley lands. 
 
 Nothing could be more cordial, Redmond said, than 
 Sir Edward Carson's manner to him. They met as old 
 friends, and I believe that when they parted, one asked 
 the other that they should have " one good shake-hands 
 for the sake of old times on the Munster circuit." But 
 it was clearly recognized that there was a point beyond 
 which neither of them could take his followers, and these 
 points could not be brought to meet. Even if adjustment 
 had been possible on the question of time-limit, neither 
 would give up the debatable counties, Tyrone and 
 Fermanagh, in which the Nationalists had a clear though 
 small majority of the population, but in which the Ulster 
 Volunteer organization was very strong. On Friday, July 
 24th, Mr. Asquith announced the failure of the attempt. 
 *' The possibility of defining an area for exclusion from 
 the operation of the Government of Ireland Bill was con- 
 sidered, and the Conference being unable to agree either 
 in principle or in detail on such an area, it concluded." 
 
 An incident which did not lack significance was that 
 on the second day of these meetings Redmond, returning 
 with Mr. Dillon along Birdcage Walk to the House, was 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 123 
 
 recognized by some Irish Guards in the barracks, who 
 raised a cheer for the NationaHst leaders which ran all 
 along the barrack square. The Army was not all disposed 
 to take sides with Ulster and against the Nationalists. 
 
 But parts of it were. The collision between forces of 
 the Crown and Irish Volunteers trying to land arms, 
 which Redmond had foretold and deprecated in his letter 
 of June 30th, was fated to occur. 
 
 On Saturday, July 25th, five thousand Ulster Volunteers, 
 fully armed, with four machine guns — in short, an infantry 
 brigade equii^ped for active service — marched through 
 the streets of Belfast, no one interfering. On Sunday, 
 the 26th, a private yacht sailed into Howth harbour 
 with eleven hundred rifles on board and some boxes of 
 ammunition. By preconcerted arrangement a body of 
 some seven hundred Irish Volunteers had marched down 
 to meet the yacht. These men took the rifles, and with 
 them set out to march back in column of route to Dublin. 
 Two thousand rounds of ammunition were with them in 
 a truck-cart, but none was distributed. 
 
 Meanwhile the telephones had been busy. The Assistant- 
 Commissioner of Dublin Police, Mr. Harrel, an energetic 
 officer, was informed, and he acted instantly. The 
 Under-Secretary, permanent official head of Dublin Castle, 
 was at his Lodge in the Phoenix Park some two miles 
 distant : Mr. Harrel informed him of what was happening 
 and was ordered to meet him at the Castle. But Mr. Harrel 
 was not content to delay. He called out what police he 
 could muster, some hundred and eighty men, and judging 
 that they would be insufficient, decided on his own 
 authority to requisition the military. At the Kildarc 
 Street Club he found the Brigadier-General in command 
 of the troops in Dublin, and this officer immediately 
 ordered out a company of the King's Own Scottish 
 Borderers. With this force of soldiers and police Mr. 
 Harrel proceeded to a point on the road from Howth 
 to Dublin and blocked the way. When the body of 
 
124 JOHN REDMONDS LAST YEARS 
 
 Volunteers reached him, he demanded the .surrender of 
 their rifles. This was refused. He then ordered the 
 police to disarm the men. A scuffle followed, in which 
 nineteen rifles were seized. Some of the Volunteers 
 without orders fired revolvers, and by this firing two 
 soldiers were slightly wounded. One Volunteer received 
 a slight bayonet wound. 
 
 Then there was a stop and a parley, and the Volunteer 
 leaders threatened to distribute ammunition. While the 
 parley lasted the Volunteers in rear of the column dis- 
 persed, carrying their rifles, leaving only a couple of ranks 
 drawn across the road in front, Mho blocked the view. 
 When Mr. Harrel perceived what Avas happening, he 
 ordered the soldiers to march back to Dublin and took 
 the police with him. 
 
 By this time wild rumours had spread through the 
 city, and on the way back the troops were mobbed. They 
 were pelted Avith every kind of missile and many Avere 
 hurt, though none .seriously ; and it understates the 
 truth to say that they AA^ere in no danger. They had 
 their bayonets, and from time to time made thrusts at 
 their assailants. At last, on the quays, at a place called 
 Bachelor's W^alk, the company Avas halted, and the officer 
 in command intended, if necessary, to give an order for 
 a few individual men to fire over the heads of the croAvd. 
 But the troops had lost their temper, and Avithout order 
 given a considerable number fired into the croAvd. Three 
 persons Avere killed and some thirty injured. 
 
 The first that I knew of these events Avas on the Monday, 
 when I got the paper at a station in Gloucestershire, on 
 my Avay to the House. The raihvay-carriage was full 
 of casual English people, and I have never heard so much 
 indignant comment on any piece of news. " Why should 
 they shoot the people in Dublin Avhen they let the Ulster- 
 men do Avhat they like ? " That AA'as the burden of it. 
 It is easy to guess what was felt and thought and said 
 in Dublin and throughout Ireland. 
 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 125 
 
 What Redmond said in the House of Commons is char- 
 acteriytic of his attitude. He demanded that full judicial 
 and military inquiry into the action of the troops should 
 be held, and that proper punishment should be inflicted 
 on those found guilty. 
 
 " But," he said, " really the responsibility rests upon 
 those who requisitioned the troops under these circum- 
 stances. So far as the troops are concerned, I deplore 
 more than I can say that this has occurred — this incident 
 calculated to breed bad blood between the Irish jieople 
 and the troops. I deplore that. I hope that our people 
 will not be so unjust as to hold the troops generally respon- 
 sible for what, no doubt, taking it at its worst, was the 
 offence of a limited number of men." 
 
 I do not think any soldier could have wished for a 
 fairer or more friendly statement ; and a chance assisted 
 to realize his hope that the troops generally would not 
 be held responsible. One of the killed was a woman 
 whose son was a Dublin Fusilier. This man published 
 a letter in the Press calling on all Dublin Fusiliers and 
 all soldiers who sympathized with him to attend the 
 funeral. It was well that the populace should feel on 
 such a matter as this that all the troops were not against 
 them ; and well that they should be counselled by the 
 leader of their nation to be reasonable in the direction 
 of their resentment. 
 
 This whole incident should never be forgotten by those 
 who are disposed to judge the Irish harshly for what 
 they did, and did not do, in the succeeding years. Above 
 all, it should be remembered that the news of it, terribly 
 provocative in itself to any people, but tenfold pro- 
 vocative by reason of the contrast which it revealed as 
 compared with the treatment of Ulster, was published to 
 the world less than ten days before Redmond had to 
 face the question, What should Ireland do in the war ? 
 
CHAPTER V 
 WAR IN EUROPE 
 
 rriHE week which began on Monday, July 27th, was 
 __L feverish and excited. Formal discussion on the 
 occurrences at Clontarf and Bachelor's Walk was confined 
 to the Monday ; but each day had a stormy scene during 
 question-time arising out of it. The Amending Bill from 
 the Lords was to have been taken on Tuesday, but Mr. 
 Asquith postponed it till Thursday, to get a calmer atmo- 
 sphere. When Thursday came, it was postponed again 
 and indefinitely. " We meet," said the Prime Minister, 
 " under conditions of gravity which are almost unparalleled 
 in the experience of any one of us." It was therefore 
 necessary to " present a united front and be able to speak 
 and act with the authority of an undivided nation." 
 To continue the Home Rule discussion must involve 
 the House in acute controversy in regard to " domestic 
 differences whose importance to ourselves no one in any 
 quarter of the House is disposed to disparage or belittle." 
 The Leader of the Opposition assented. Two sentences 
 in his speech have importance. The first laid it down 
 that this postponement should not " in any way pre- 
 judice the interests of any of the parties to the con- 
 troversy." The second indicated that he spoke not 
 only for the Unionist party but for Ulster. 
 
 It is very difficult now, after all that has crowded in 
 upon us, jading the sensitive recipient surface of memory, 
 to reconstitute the frame of mind in which we passed 
 those days. One thing I clearly remember, perhaps worth 
 
 126 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 127 
 
 noting for its significance. In a division lobby, probably 
 on the Wednesday night, I came in touch with a friend, 
 then a subordinate member of the Government, who 
 had been among the keenest advocates of our cause. 
 I asked how he thought things were going. My question 
 had reference to our affairs, which had been for so many 
 months the dominant issue ; but he answered with 
 reference to the European situation, as if that alone 
 existed. Looking back, it seems to me strange that 
 one should have been so engrossed in any preoccupation 
 as in reality to ignore the vast and imminent possibilities . 
 Yet, after all, I believe my case was typical of many. 
 For us Irish, this was the crucial point, the climax of a 
 struggle which had been intense and continuous now 
 for a period of four years — which in its wider sense had 
 gone on, with ebb and flow, yet always in progress during 
 tlie whole adult lifetime of our leader and his principal 
 colleagues. For more than us, for scores of Labour men 
 and Liberals, it had become almost a fixed belief that 
 European war was only a nightmare of the imagination. 
 War in the Balkans, war possibly in the East of Europe, 
 we could think of ; but war flinging the complex organi- 
 zation, so potent yet so delicate, of great and fully civilized 
 States into the melting-pot — that we never reallj'- believed 
 in. Prophets of finance, prophets of the labour world, 
 had told us the thing was impossible. Even our most 
 recent experience, the irruption of armed forces into the 
 political arena, had contributed to fix in our minds the 
 view that all armaments were merely in terrorem, part 
 of a gigantic game of bluff. 
 
 In a world organized as was Europe in 1914 on the 
 basis of universal military service, it is dangerous, not 
 only materially but morally and intellectually, to be as 
 the people of these islands were, segregated from all 
 military experience. We were almost like children in 
 a magazine of explosives : we knew, of course, that there 
 were dangerous substances about us ; but we did not 
 
128 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 realize how suddenly and irretrievably the whole thing 
 might go off. 
 
 I do not know how Redmond gauged the situation. 
 But he spent the end of the week in town, and must have 
 been less unprepared than was one like myself, who during 
 the Saturday, Sunday and the Monday Bank Holiday 
 was away in a most peaceful country-side, remote from 
 news. Even on the Tuesday, the instant bearing on our 
 own questions and our own lives of what we read in the 
 newspapers was not clear to me. There was to be a 
 debate, of course ; but only when I saw the attendants 
 setting chairs on the floor of tlie House itself — a thing 
 which had not been done since Gladstone introduced 
 his second Home Rule Bill — did I grasp the fact that 
 something wholly unusual was expected. 
 
 My strong impression is that the House as a whole was 
 in great measure unprepared for what it had to face. 
 You could feel surprise in the air as Sir Edward Grey 
 developed his wonderful sj^eech. Men, shaken away 
 from all traditional attitudes, responded from the depths 
 of themselves to an appeal which none of us had ever 
 heard before. 
 
 Having failed to secure my place on the Irish benches, 
 I was sitting on one of the chairs close by the Sergeant 
 at Arms, just inside the bar of the House, so that I saw 
 at once both sides of the assembly : there were no parties 
 that day. The Foreign Secretary's speech, intensely 
 English, with all the quality that is finest in English 
 tradition, clearly did not in its opening stages carry the 
 House as a whole. Passages struck home, here and 
 there, to men not to parties, kindling individual senti- 
 ments. Appeal to a common feeling for France did not 
 elicit a general response ; but here and there in every 
 quarter there were those who leapt to their feet and 
 cheered, waving the papers that were in their hands ; 
 and the two figures that stand out most vividly in ray 
 recollection were Willie Redmond, our leader's brother. 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 129 
 
 and Arthur Lynch. We -were in a very different 
 atmosphere already from the days of the Boer War. 
 
 It was not until the speaker reached in his statement 
 the outrage committed on Belgian neutrality that feeling 
 manifested itself universally. Appeal was made to the 
 sense of honour, of fair play, of respect for pledges, by 
 a man as well fitted to make such an appeal as ever 
 addressed any audience ; and it was the case of Belgium 
 that made the House of Commons unanimous. 
 
 Later in the evening speeches from the Radical group 
 made it clear that unanimity was not yet definitive. 
 Labour was hesitant ; Germany had still to complete Sir 
 Edward Grey's work. With this disposition in England 
 itself, what was likely to be the feeling in Ireland ? No- 
 body, I think, expected that anything would be said from 
 our benches. There had been no consultation in our party, 
 such as was customary and almost obligatory on important 
 occasions, I have said before that Redmond's position 
 was by understanding and agreement that of chairman, 
 not of leader. Mr. Dillon, by far the most important 
 of his colleagues, was away in Ireland. Anj'^ action that 
 Redmond took he must take not merely in an unusual 
 but in a new capacity, as leader, at a great moment, 
 acting in his own right. 
 
 Neither had there been any consultation between him 
 and the Government. He knew only what the general 
 public knew. Parts of Sir Edward Grey's speech were 
 to him, as to the other members of the House, a surprise 
 at many points. At one point it certainly was. After 
 summing up the situation, first in relation to France, 
 then in relation to Belgium, the Foreign Secretary, speaking 
 with tlie utmost gravity, foretold for Great Britain terrible 
 suffering in this war, " whether we are in it or whether 
 we stand aside." He made it clear that the island safety 
 was not unchallengeable ; there could be no pledge to 
 send an expeditionary force outside the kingdom. Then, 
 with a sudden lift of his voice, he added : " One thing I 
 
 10 
 
130 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 would say : the one bright spot in the very dreadful 
 situation is Ireland. The position in Ireland — and this 
 I should like to be clearly understood abroad — is not a 
 consideration among the things we have to take into 
 account now." 
 
 The history of this passage is strange. All who heard 
 assumed that the speaker relied on definite promises. 
 Such a promise had been given, from one party. The 
 Ulster leader had, with the sure instinct for Ulster's 
 interest which guided him throughout, conveyed to 
 the Government through Mr. Bonar Law an assurance 
 that they could count on Lester's imperial patriotism. 
 Ulster, so far as pledges went, was the bright spot. Where 
 Germany had counted on finding trouble for Great 
 Britain, no trouble would be found. But Sir Edward 
 Grey at that moment of his career was lifted perhaps 
 beyond himself, certainl}^ to the utmost range of his 
 statesmanship. He was a chief member of the Ministry 
 which had brought to the verge of complete statutory 
 accomplishment the task which the Liberal party inherited 
 from Gladstone. He knew — his words have been already 
 quoted-— what Ireland's gratitude to Gladstone had been 
 even for the unfinished effort ; and now, in this crucial 
 hour, he counted upon Ireland. From LTlster, which 
 had its bitter resentment, assurances were needed : but 
 if Ulster were contented to fall into line, then all was 
 well with Ireland. Speaking as one who had done his 
 part by Ireland, with the confidence that counts upon 
 full comradeship he assumed the generosity of Ireland's 
 response. That did not fail him, sudden and unfore- 
 seen though the challenge came — for it was an appeal 
 and a challenge to Ireland's generosity. 
 
 When the notable words concerning Ireland were 
 spoken, Redmond turned to the colleague who sat next 
 him, one of his close personal friends, and one of his wisest, 
 most moderate and most courageous counsellors. He 
 said : " I'm thinking of saying something. Do you 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 131 
 
 think I ought to ? " Mr. Hayden answered, " That 
 depends on what you are going to say." Redmond said ^ 
 *' I'm going to tell them they can take_all their tjcoops 
 out of Ireland and'we will defend the_country ourselves." 
 
 InTLat case," said Mr. Hayden, " you should certainly 
 speak," Redmond leant over to Mr. T. P. O'Connor, 
 who sat immediately below him, and consulted him also. 
 Mr. O'Connor was against it. Though the war had no 
 more enthusiastic supporter, he thought the risk too 
 great. It was just a week and a day since Redmond 
 had moved an adjournment to consider the occasion 
 when Government forces were turned out to disarm 
 Irish Volunteers, and when troops fired without order 
 on a Dublin crowd. Ireland was still given over to a 
 fury of resentment, issuing not alone in speeches but in 
 active warlike preparation. On Sunday, August 1st, 
 memorial masses for the victims were held up and down 
 the country. In Belfast there was a parade of four 
 thousand Irish Volunteers ; and finally, at a point on 
 the Wicklow coast, some ten thousand rifles were landed 
 and distributed in defiance of Government and its 
 troops. Now, forty-eight hours after these demonstra- 
 tions, would the Irish leader ask his countrymen to 
 blot from their minds and from their hearts so 
 recent and so terrible a wound ? Would he attempt 
 to change the whole direction of a nation's feeling ? 
 The boldest and the most generous might well have 
 hesitated. Redmond did not. 
 
 This is not to say that he spoke without full reflection. 
 He always thought far ahead ; and in these tense days 
 of waiting upon rumour, he must have pondered deeply 
 upon all the possibilities — must have had intuition of 
 what this opportunity, England's difficulty, might mean 
 for Ireland. Other minds were on the same trail. In 
 the Dublin papers of that morning were two letters of 
 moment — one of them from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. 
 
 " The chief point which has divided Protestant Ulster 
 
132 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 from the rest of Ireland," he wrote, " is that Nationalists 
 were not loyal to the Empire." Then, recalling briefly 
 the extent to which Irish Nationalists had helped in 
 creating that Empire, he went on : " There is no possible 
 reason why a man should not be a loyal Irishman and a 
 loyal Imperialist also. ... A whole-hearted declaration 
 of loyalty to the common ideal would at the present 
 moment do much to allay the natural fears of Ulster and 
 to strengthen the position of Ireland. Such a chance 
 is unlikely to recur. I pray that the Irish leaders may 
 understand its significance and put themselves in a 
 position to take advantage of it." 
 
 The other letter, written from a different standpoint, 
 was signed by Mr. M. J. Judge, a most active Irish Volun- 
 teer who had been wounded in the scuffle on the way 
 back from Howth. " England," he said, " might inspire 
 confidence by restoring it. She could bestow confidence 
 by immediately arming and equipping the Irish Volunteers. 
 The Volunteers, properly armed and equipped, could 
 preserve Ireland from invasion, and England would be 
 free to utilize her ' army of occupation ' for the defence 
 of her own shores." 
 
 Redmond could not have seen either of these letters, 
 but those two trains of thought were blended in his speech 
 — which was less a speech than a supreme action. It 
 was the utterance of a man who has a vision and who, 
 acting in the light of it, seeks to embody the vision in a 
 living reality. 
 
 Mr. Bonar Law followed Sir Edward Grey with a few 
 brief sentences of whole-hearted support. Then Redmond 
 rose, and a hush of expectation went over the house. 
 I can see it now, the crowded benches and the erect, solid 
 figure with the massive hawk-visaged head thrown back, 
 standing squarely at the top of the gangway. While 
 he spoke, as during Sir Edward Grey's speech, the cheering 
 broke out first intermittently and scattered over the 
 House, then grew gradually universal. Sitting about 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 133 
 
 me were Tory members whom I did not know ; I heard 
 their ejaculations of bewilderment, approval and delight. 
 But in the main body of the Unionists behind the front 
 Opposition bench papers were being waved, and when 
 Redmond sat down many of these men stood up to cheer 
 him. In five minutes he had changed the whole atmosphere 
 of domestic politics in regard to the main issue of contro- 
 versy. — Here is the speech : 
 
 " I hope the House will not think me impertinent 
 to intervene in the debate, but I am moved to do so a 
 great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Foreign 
 Secretary in which he said that the one bright spot in 
 the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. Sir, 
 in past time, when this Empire has been engaged in these 
 terrible enterprises, it is true that it would be the utmost 
 affectation and folly on my part to deny that the sympathies 
 of Nationalist Ireland, for reasons deep down in the 
 centuries of history, have been estranged from this country. 
 But allow me to say that what has occurred in recent 
 years has altered the situation completely. I must not 
 touch upon any controversial topic, but this I may be 
 allowed to say — that a wider knowledge of the real facts 
 of Irish history has altered the view of the democracy 
 of this country towards the Irish question, and I honestly 
 believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with 
 the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in 
 every trial and danger with which she is faced. ---' 
 
 " There is a possibility of history repeating itself. The 
 House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the 
 disastrous American War, when it might be said that 
 the military force of this country was almost at its lowest 
 ebb, the shores of Ireland were threatened with invasion. 
 Then a hundred thousand Irish Volunteers sprang into 
 existence for the purpose of defending those shores. At 
 first, however — and how sad is the reading of the history 
 of those days ! no Catholic was allowed to be enrolled in 
 that body of Volunteers ; yet from the first day the Catholics 
 
134 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 of the South and West subscribed their money and sent 
 it for the army of their Protestant fellow-countrymen. 
 Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics 
 of the South were armed and enrolled as brothers-in-arms 
 with their fellow-countrymen. May history repeat itself ! 
 To-day there are in Ireland two large bodies of Volunteers, 
 one of which has sprung into existence in the North and 
 another in the South. I say to the Government that 
 they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops 
 from Ireland. Ireland will be defended by her armed 
 sons from invasion, and for that purpose the armed 
 Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms 
 with the armed Protestant Ulstermen. Is it too much 
 to hope that out of this situation a result may spring 
 which will be good, not merely for the EmpirCj but for 
 ^tlie future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation ? 
 Whilst Irishmen are in favour of peace and would desire 
 to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors 
 of war, whilst we will make any possible sacrifice for that 
 purpose, still, if the necessity is forced upon this country, 
 we offer this to the Government of the day : They may 
 take their troops away, and if it is allowed to us, in 
 comradeship with our brothers in the North, we will 
 ourselves defend the shores of Ireland." 
 
 It needed no gift of prophecy to be certain that such 
 a speech would be popular in the House of Commons, 
 and many Unionists that day were almost aggrieved 
 that Sir Edward Carson had not risen at once to reply 
 to the offer in the same spirit. They did not realize the 
 difficulty of the Ulster leader's position. To admit and 
 welcome the unity of Ireland was to give away Ulster's 
 case. To accept the Nationalist leader's utterance as 
 sincere, still more to assume that Ireland as a whole 
 would endorse it, was to weaken, if not to give away, 
 Ulster's best argument, and from that hour to the end 
 of the war Sir Edward Carson was most loyal to Ulster's 
 interests. 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 135 
 
 Further, it is conceivable that by some who cheered 
 it the speech may have been misunderstood. Yet it is 
 not probable that many who heard Redmond believed 
 that in order to serve England he was flinging away 
 Ireland's national claim, to the successful furtherance 
 of which his whole life had been devoted. The Unionist 
 party as a whole certainly understood tirair°toaccept 
 ^K^mond's offer in the spirjt in which it was made meant 
 accepting the principle of Home Rule: and on that 
 afternoon in August they were not unready to accept it. 
 They felt, for the speech made them feel, that a great 
 thing had happened. Yet they might well be pardoned 
 for some scepticism as to how the utterance might be 
 taken in Ireland, and how it would issue in action. A 
 famous Nationalist said some ten days later : *' When 
 I read the speech in the paper, I was filled with dismay. 
 Now I recognize that it was a great stroke of statesman- 
 ship which I should never have had the courage to 
 advise." 
 
 Redmond's instinct had been right. He trusted in 
 the appeal to national pride and to the sense^rn&rtiohal"'~='' 
 .j^ty." Ireland was perfectly willing, and he knew it, to 
 give loyal friendship to England on the basis of freedom. 
 But the test of freedom had now come to be the right to 
 bear arms, and this was a proposal that Ireland should 
 undertake her own defence. Ireland was sick of the 
 talk of civil war, and this was a proposal that Ulstermen 
 and the rest should make common cause. It was an 
 appeal addressed by an instinct, which was no less subtle 
 than it was noble, to what was most responsive in the 
 best qualities of Irishmen. None the less it was a states- 
 man's utterance addressed to a people politically quick- 
 minded ; Ireland saw as well as Redmond himself that 
 what stood in the way of Ireland's national aspiration 
 was the opposition of one section of Irishmen. To that 
 extent, and to that extent only, was the speech political 
 in its purpose. .Whatever made for common action made"^ 
 
 i 
 
136 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 for unity ; and whatever made for unity made for Home 
 Rule. That is the key to Redmond's attitude throughout 
 the war — perhaps also to Sir Edward Carson's. 
 
 II 
 
 The response from Nationalist Ireland had not long 
 to be waited for — although the inquest on the victims 
 of the Bachelor's Walk tragedy was in progress on the 
 very day when Redmond's speech appeared in the Press. 
 Waterford Corporation instantly endorsed their member's 
 utterance, and throughout the week similar resolutions 
 were passed all over the country, Unionist members of 
 these bodies joining in to second the proposals. In Cork, 
 the City Council had before it a resolution condemning 
 the Government for its attempt to disarm the Irish 
 Volunteers, and calling for stringent penalties on the 
 offenders in the Bachelor's Walk affair : the resolution 
 was withdrawn and one of hearty support to Redmond's 
 attitude adopted. 
 
 Yet Irish opinion did not go so far as Mr. Willia m , 
 O'Brien, who proposed the complete dropping of the 
 TlOTile Rule Bill till after the war, in order to bring about 
 a genuine national unity. The action of the Offaly corps 
 of Volunteers, for instance, was typical. They agreed 
 to offer their services gladly on two conditions : first, 
 that the Home Rule Bill should go on the Statute Book ; 
 secondly, that the Volunteers should be subsidized and 
 equipped by Government. 
 
 But it was assumed in Ireland that no question arose 
 about the safety of the Bill, and people gave themselves 
 to the new emotion. Troops were cheered everywhere 
 at stations and on the quays : National Volunteers and 
 local bands turned out to see them off. Even the battalion 
 of King's Own Scottish Borderers, which had been confined 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 137 
 
 to barracks since the events of July 26th, was cheered 
 like the rest as it marched down to the transports ready 
 for it.i 
 
 This was the attitude of the general populace. Broadly 
 speaking, Redmond's speech pleased the people. It 
 was welcomed by generous-minded men in another class,_^ 
 '"who"responded at once in the same spirit. Lord Monteagle 
 wrote :~ "~Mr. Redmond has risen nobly to the occasion " ; 
 Lord Bessborough, that he trusted all the Unionists in 
 the South would at once join the Irish Volunteers. The 
 Marquis of Headfort, the Earls of Fingall and of Desart, 
 Lord Powerscourt, Lord Langford, all chimed in with 
 offers of help. Mr. George TaafEe WTote : "I thank 
 God from the bottom of my heart that to-day we 
 stand united Ireland." In county Wexford sixty young 
 Protestants came in a body to join up, led by a very 
 Tory squire. 
 
 It should be clearly noted that while Redmond's aim 
 was to make this Ireland's war, in which Irishmen should 
 serve together without distinction of North or South, 
 all that he asked of the land in his speech of August 4th 
 was that the Volunteers should undertake duties of home 
 defence. This was precisely what Sir Edward Carson 
 had asked of Ulster. On August 14th, in a letter to the 
 Press, the commander of a Fermanagh battalion of Ulster 
 Volunteers wTote : " No one will be asked to serve outside 
 Ulster until Sir Edward Carson notifies that he is satisfied 
 
 I Tliis fact was verified for me oddly enoiigh. When the 16th 
 Division went to France, it was put through the usual period of 
 apprenticeship with trained troops, and our brigade was attached 
 for training to the Scottish Fifteenth Division. Two companies 
 of our battalion of the 6th Connaught Rangers were attached to 
 the 8th and 9th K.O.S.B. I met two officers who had been in 
 Dublin on July 26th, and it was one of these who told me of the 
 cheering. Perhaps I may add that the relations between our 
 Cormaught Rangers and the Scots were most friendly, and that 
 we found probably a hundred Irish Catholics in that battalion — 
 Irishmen living in the North of England %\ho had at once rushed 
 to enlist in the nearest corps available. 
 
138 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 with the attitude of the Government with regard to the 
 Home Rule Bill and Ulster." 
 
 Redmond neither could nor did ask any man to serve 
 outside Ireland till he was satisfied with the Government's 
 attitude in regard to Home Rule. In the first days of 
 the war, however, the critical question for him was to 
 know how his offer of assistance from the Volunteers 
 would be accepted by the Government, and at the outset 
 all promised favourably. On August 8th a telegram 
 was sent to the Lord-Lieutenant : 
 
 " His Majesty's Government recognize with deep grati- 
 tude the loyal help which Ireland has offered in this 
 grave hour. They hope to announce as soon as possible 
 arrangements by which this offer can be made use of to 
 the fullest possible extent." 
 
 That unquestionably represented the mind of Mr. Asquith 
 and his civilian colleagues. But a new power had trans- 
 formed the Cabinet, Lord Kitchener, refusing to accept 
 the post of Commander in Chief, had insisted on becoming 
 Secretary of State for War. 
 
 No one is likely to underestimate Lord Kitchener's 
 value at that hour. But probably no one now will dispute 
 that the political control which this soldier obtained was 
 excessive and was dangerous. Years of fierce faction 
 had shaken the public confidence in politicians, and a 
 soldier was traditionally above and beyond politics. 
 But in Lord Kitchener's case the soldier was certainly 
 remote from and below the regions of statesmanship. 
 Narrow, domineering, and obstinate, he was a difficult 
 colleague for anyone ; and for a Prime Minister with so 
 easy a temper as Mr. Asquith he was not a colleague but 
 a master. He claimed to be supreme in all matters relating 
 to the Army, and in such a war this came near to covering 
 the whole field of government. It most certainly covered 
 the question of dealing with the Irish Volunteers and 
 with the Ulster Volunteers, which meant in reality the 
 whole question of Ireland. 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 139 
 
 Immediately on Lord Kitchener's appointment Redmond 
 had an interview with him. Redmond's report was 
 that he had been most friendly — and most limited in 
 his expectations. " Get me five thousand men, and I 
 will say ' Thank you,' " he had said. " Get me ten 
 thousand, and I will take of! my hat to you." Yet the 
 very smallness of the estimate should have been a note 
 of warning to us ; it indicated a cynical view of Ireland's 
 response to Redmond's public declaration. 
 
 On the question of the Volunteers he made friendly 
 promises. As the Sirdar in Egypt he had been used to 
 giving fair words to native chiefs. There is not the least 
 reason to suppose that Lord Kitchener would have felt 
 bound to show Redmond his real mind. •— -««.-^ 
 
 The truth was that Lord Kitchener held in respect \ 
 to Ireland the traditional opinions of the British Army. \ 
 Nobody could blame the professional soldier for dislike \ 
 and distrust of Irish Nationalist politicians generally ; \ 
 but when at such a crisis a professional soldier, by no means \ 
 conspicuous for breadth of mind, came to hold such a \ 
 position as Lord Kitchener seized, the result was certain j 
 to be disastrous for Irish policy unless Liberal states- | 
 manship exercised a strong control over him. Neither I 
 Mr. Asquith nor Mr. Birrell was likely to do this. _ , | 
 
 Two views were taken of the proposal to encourage 
 and utilize the Irish Volunteers. The first view was that 
 Volunteers of any kind were a superfluous encumbrance 
 at a moment when the supreme need was for men in the 
 actual fighting-line ; that encouragement of Volunteers 
 gave an excuse for shirking war ; and further, that 
 Volunteers outside the State's control were a danger ; 
 that the danger was increased when there were two rival 
 Volunteer forces which might fly at each other's throats ; 
 and that it was a matter for satisfaction that one of these 
 forces should be very greatly inferior to the other in 
 point of arms and equipment, so that considerations of 
 prudence would lessen the chance of collision. This 
 
140 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 satisfaction was greatly heightened by the reflection 
 that the armed force was thoroughly loyal to the Empire 
 and could be trusted to assist troops in the case of any 
 attack upon the Empire begun by the other — a contingency 
 which should always be taken into account. 
 
 This line of thought was certainly Lord Kitchener's. 
 He had no distrust of Irish soldiers in ordinary regiments ; 
 no professional soldier ever had. But he had a jdeep 
 distrust of a purely Irish military organization under 
 Irish^contfol, At tlie back of Lord Kitchener's mind 
 was the determination " I will not arm enemies." _This 
 was the very negation and the aniilhesis of the second 
 view,~wKich was Redmond's. 
 
 "" '^edinond's aim was to win the war, no less than Lord 
 Kitchener's. But if Lord Kitchener realized more clearly 
 than other men in power how far-reaching would be 
 the need for troops, Redmond realized also far more 
 than the men in power how vital would be the 
 need for America. He saw from the first, knowing 
 the English-speaking world far more widely than per- 
 haps any member of the Government, that the Irish 
 trouble could not limit its influence to Ireland only. 
 Greater forces could be conciliated for war purposes by 
 "feconciliation with Ireland — by bringing Ireland heart 
 and soul into the war — than the equivalent of many 
 regiments. Yet even from the narrower aspect of finding 
 men7~lie regarded the same policy as essential. He 
 assumed that recruiting in Ireland must always be volun- 
 tary — at any rate a matter for Ireland's own decision : 
 the question was how to get most troops. Knowing 
 Ireland, he recognized how complete was the estrangement 
 of its population from the idea of ordinary enlistment. 
 The bulk of the population were on the land, and in 
 Ireland, as in Great Britain, " gone for a soldier " was 
 a word of disgrace for a farmer's son. More than that, 
 the political organization of which he was head had in- 
 culcated an attitude of aloofness from the Army because 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 141 
 
 it was the Army which held Ireland by force. Enlistment 
 had been discouraged, on the principle that from a military 
 point of view Ireland was regarded as a conquered country. 
 A test case had arisen over the Territorial Act, which 
 was not extended to Ireland, any more than the Volun- 
 teer Acts had been. We had voted against Lord Haldane's 
 Bill on the express ground that it put Ireland into this 
 status of inferiority and withheld from Irishmen that 
 right to arm and drill which was pressed upon English- 
 men as a patriotic duty. We had explicitly declared 
 then in 1907 that our influence should and must be used 
 against enlistment. 
 
 These facts of history had not merely produced in 
 Ireland an attitude of mind hostile to the idea, so to say, 
 of the British Army as an institution, though the individual 
 soldier had always been at least as popular as anyone 
 else. They had produced a population extraordinarily 
 unfamiliar with the idea of armament. The old Volunteers 
 and the Territorials had at least conveyed to all ranks 
 of society in Great Britain the possibility of joining a 
 military organization while remaining an ordinary citizen. 
 In the imagination of Ireland, either you were a soldier 
 or you were not ; and if you were a soldier, you belonged 
 to an exceptional class, remote from ordinary existence. 
 To cross that line was a far greater step to contemplate 
 with us than in England. Redmond reckoned, and reckoned 
 rightly, that to bring Irishmen together in military forma- 
 tions, learning the art of war, was the best way to combat 
 this disinclination to enter the Army — this feeling tuat 
 enlistment meant doing something " out of the way," 
 something contrary to usage and tradition. He reckoned 
 that the attitude of Nationalist Ireland would alter to- 
 wards a Government which put arms in their hands on 
 their own terms ; and that with a great war on foot a 
 temper of adventure and emulation would very soon 
 draw young men flocking to the ranks in which they 
 could see the reality of war. That was Redmond's policy 
 
142 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 and it was the statesman's. Nationalist Ireland was 
 perfectly ready to adopt the ideals which moved the 
 British Empire at home and overseas in the war : but 
 first the British Empire must show that it respected the 
 ideals of Nationalist Ireland. The Empire's statesmen 
 did so : the British democracy did so : but Lord Kitchener 
 stood in the way. 
 
 From Ulster, it was clear that immediate cordial co- 
 operation could not be anticipated. Yet Redmond had 
 implicit faith in the ultimate effect of comradeship in 
 danger, and here we know he was right. He was to pay 
 a heavy price in blood for the seal set upon that bond ; 
 but in the end the seal was set. For the moment, Ulster 
 as a whole was sullen and distrustful. Feeling that to 
 admit the good faith of Nationalists jeopardized their own 
 political cause, they belittled what in the interests of 
 the common weal it would have been wise even to over- 
 value. At the outset *' An Ulster Volunteer " wrote to 
 the papers " Let us all unite as a solid nation " ; but such 
 an utterance was exceptional. Hardly less exceptional 
 was the line taken by " An Officer of National Volunteers " 
 who wrote, " If the necessity arose to-morrow and the word 
 went out from Headquarters, the National Volunteers 
 would be prepared to fight to the very death in defending 
 the homes and liberties of France and England." *' For 
 Ireland Only " was a motto much inculcated in those 
 days among the Irish Volunteers. Suspicion on the one 
 side bred estrangement on the other ; and every hour 
 lost increased the mischief. 
 
 Moreover, in spite of the generous action taken by 
 outstanding individuals, the general mass of Unionist 
 opinion was grudging and uncordial. A friend who was 
 then closely in touch with it described to me the attitude 
 of Dublin clubs : *' They were almost sorry Redmond 
 had done the right thing." Such men were part of Ireland, 
 and all Ireland was remote from war. For them, now 
 as always, Home Rule was the paramount consideration, 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 143 
 
 and none could deny that the prospects for Home Rule 
 were immensely improved by Redmond's action. In 
 these days, when an end of the conflict was expected in 
 three months, when every check to the Germans was 
 magnified out of all reason, there was no sense of the 
 relative value of issues. Everywhere in Unionist society 
 and in the Irish Unionist Press there was ungenerous 
 and unfriendly criticism which did much harm. 
 
 Two things could have checked these forces for evil. 
 The first would have been an. immediate decision to make 
 Home Rule law. This would have put an end to the 
 pestilent growth of suspicion among Nationalists, and it 
 would have enabled Redmond to launch at once his appeal 
 for soldiers. The other would have been a decision to 
 make good the pledge contained in the Government's 
 message to Lord Aberdeen and to accept in some practical 
 way the offered service of the Volunteers. 
 
 The latter of these courses involved no controversy 
 with Ulster, and to it Redmond first addressed himself. 
 He made constant appeals in private to Ministers ; he 
 was angry and disappointed over the delay : and after 
 a week he thought it necessary to raise the matter in the 
 House. He asked the Prime Minister whether British 
 Territorials were to be sent to Ireland to replace the 
 troops which had been withdrawn — a step which would 
 have been equivalent to a rejection of his offer. On this 
 point he received satisfaction ; Territorials would not 
 be sent. He asked then if the Prime Minister could not 
 say at once what steps would be taken to arm and equip 
 the Volunteers. Mr. Asquith's reply emphasized the 
 great difficulty which stood in the way. *' I do not say," 
 he added, " that it is insuperable." The first part was the 
 voice of Lord Kitchener ; the second, the voice of the 
 Government which had sent the telegram of August 8th. 
 
 In the War Office the desire to give the National Volun- 
 teers as far as possible what they wanted did not exist, 
 and the Government, who had that desire, had not the 
 
144 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 determination to enforce it. Such a position can never 
 be for long concealed. Let it be remembered, too, that 
 all through these days there was proceeding in Dublin 
 a public inquiry into the events of the Howth gun-running 
 and the affray at Bachelor's Walk, and some measure 
 of Redmond's difficulties may be obtained. 
 
 Nevertheless, his policy was winning : and when 
 Parliament rose for an adjournment, he spent his first 
 Sunday in Ireland motoring to Maryborough, where he 
 inspected a great muster of Volunteers, and was able to 
 speak to them with gladness of the response to his appeal. 
 
 "From every part of Ireland I have had assurances from 
 the Irish Volunteers that they are ready to fulfil this 
 duty : and from every part — perhaps better and happier 
 still — evidences of a desire on the part of men who in the 
 past have been divided from us to come in at this hour 
 of danger." 
 
 He told his audience how a battalion of that famous 
 regiment, the Inniskilling Fusiliers, had been escorted 
 through the town of Enniskillen, in which Orange and 
 Green have always been equally and sharply divided, by 
 combined bodies of the Irish and Ulster Volunteer Forces. 
 Then turning to the question of equipment, and reminding 
 them that the proclamation against importing arms had 
 been withdrawn, he announced that he had secured 
 several thousand rifles to distribute. ^ He went on then 
 to pledge himself — it must be said with characteristic 
 overconfidence — as to the intentions of the Government : 
 " The Government — which has withdrawn its troops from 
 Ireland and which has refused to send English Territorials 
 to take their place — is about to arm, equip and drill a 
 large number of Irish Volunteers." Very soon, he told 
 them, every man in the force would have a rifle — and this 
 involved a grave responsibility, and the need for discipline 
 in the work which was laid upon them. 
 
 ^ Bought in Belgium by John O'Connor M.P, and T. M Kettle, 
 after the Germans had entered Brussels. 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 145 
 
 " I wish them God-speed with their work. It is the 
 holiest work that men can undertake, to maintain the 
 freedom and the rights and to uphold the peace, the order 
 and safety of their own nation. You ought to be proud — 
 you, the sons and the grandsons of men who were shot 
 down for daring to arm themselves — you ought to be 
 proud that you have lived to see the day when with the 
 good will of the democracy of England you are arming 
 yourselves in the light of heaven." 
 
 The note of exultation in this passage rings again and 
 again through his utterances. He saw, or thought he 
 saw, the symbol of achieved liberty in the muster of 
 young men, ready to take up the sword, and no longer 
 branded with the name of felons for so doing. Nor was 
 he alone in his rejoicing. The host at that meeting was a 
 great Irish landlord. Colonel Sir Hutcheson Poe. He, 
 upon reading Redmond's speech of August 4th had 
 written to the Press saying that since he was too old to 
 serve he was taking steps to arm and equip a hundred 
 National Volunteers. Now, in Redmond's presence, ad- 
 dressing a body of the Volunteers, he told them what 
 he thought of Redmond's action. 
 
 " That five minutes' speech did more to compose our 
 differences, to unite all Irishmen in a bond of friendship 
 and good will, than could have been accomplished by 
 years of agitation or by a conference, however well-inten- 
 tioned it might be." 
 
 That was a notable tribute from one of the eight men 
 who formed the historic Land Conference of 1902 ; and 
 Sir Hutcheson Poe was not the man to rest on compli- 
 mentary expressions. He set to work at once to promote a 
 memorial praying for joint action between Ulster and the 
 Irish Volunteers and for settlement of the political question 
 which alone prevented such action. 
 
 Unhappily, this was not easy of accomplishment. When 
 the House reassembled after its adjournment of a fortnight, 
 negotiations were resumed, with the result that on August 
 
 11 
 
146 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 31st the Prime Minister asked for a fresh adjournment 
 for ten days, at the end of which time the Government 
 hoped to be able to produce satisfactory proposals as to 
 the Irish and Welsh Bills. Redmond felt himself obliged 
 to enter a protest. It had been agreed that the circum- 
 stances of the war should not be allowed to inflict political 
 injury on any party in the House ; and he would give 
 the friendliest consideration to any proposal for giving 
 to the Opposition what they might have gained by a 
 discussion on the Amending Bill. 
 
 " But we must emphatically say that any proposal 
 which would have the effect of depriving us of the enact- 
 ment of the Irish measure — and I presume I may say 
 the same with reference to the Welsh measure — an enact- 
 ment to which we were entitled practically automatically 
 when the circumstances of the war arose, would do infinite 
 mischief, and would be warmly resented by us. 
 
 " Just let me say one word more. There has arisen 
 in Ireland the greatest opportunity that has ever arisen 
 in the history of the connection between the two countries 
 for a thorough reconciliation between the people of 
 Ireland and the people of this country. There is to-day, 
 I venture to say, a feeling of friendliness to this country, 
 and a desire to join hands in supporting the interests 
 of this country such as were never to be found in the past ; 
 and I do say with all respect, that it would be not 
 only a folly, but a crime, if that opportunity were in any 
 degree marred or wasted by any action which this country 
 might take. I ask this House — and I ask aU sections 
 of the House — to take such a course as will enable me to 
 go back to Ireland to translate into vigorous action the 
 spirit of the words I used here a few days ago." 
 
 An angry scene followed. Mr. Balfour asked whether 
 " it was possible decently to introduce subjects of acute 
 discussion in present circumstances " — in other words, 
 whether all mention of Home Rule must not be postponed 
 till after the war. This provoked hot debate, checked 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 147 
 
 only by a strong appeal from the Prime Minister. But 
 the general effect was not reassuring to Ireland. The 
 contrast with the Tsar's prompt grant of autonomy to 
 Poland was sharply drawn. Nobody rated high the 
 chances of an amicable agreement. On September 
 4th Sir Edward Carson outlined his views in Belfast. 
 Home Rule " will never be law in our country." But 
 " in the interests of the State and of the Empire we will 
 postpone active measures." This indicated sufficiently 
 that in his judgment the Bill might become law, and 
 that they would not be encouraged to set up immediate 
 resistance. The Prime Minister, as chief Minister of the 
 nation, must be supported in the war at all costs. 
 
 Next day, renewing at Coleraine his appeal for recruits, 
 he said : 
 
 *' We are not going to abate one jot or tittle of our 
 opposition to Home Rule, and when you come back from 
 serving your country you will be just as determined as 
 you will find us at home." 
 
 This was the answer to Redmond's proposal of fraterniza- 
 tion. Clearly Sir Edward Carson had made up his mind 
 that he could not prevent the passage of the Bill, and he 
 decided upon the strongest course, which was to advocate 
 unlimited support to the war. Any other course would 
 have been ruinous to his cause, which depended always 
 upon a profession of the extremest loyalty. Yet only 
 a strong man, confident in his leadership, could have 
 taken this line at a moment when Ulstermen were about 
 to feel that all their preparations were wasted and that 
 the game had been won against them by a paralysing 
 chance. 
 
 Before the House reassembled there was a meeting at 
 the Carlton Club ; a report communicated to the Press 
 attributed these words to Sir Edward Carson — they are 
 typical of the tone of the time : 
 
 " We asked for no terms and we got none. We did 
 not object to go under the War Office. We did not make 
 
148 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 speeches calculated to humbug or deceive while we meant 
 to do nothing." 
 
 On September 15th Government announced its inten- 
 tions. Both Bills were to be placed on the Statute Book, 
 but their operation deferred till the end of twelve months, 
 or, if the war were not then over, till the end of the war. 
 During the suspensory period Government would introduce 
 an Amending Bill. Mr. Asquith made a flattering reference 
 to Sir Edward Carson's action in appealing to his organi- 
 zation for recruits, and admitted that " it might be said 
 that the Ulstermen had been put at a disadvantage by 
 the loyal and patriotic action which they had undertaken." 
 — This meant that their preparations for resistance to Mr. 
 Asquith's Government were disorganized. — He proceeded 
 to promise that they should never have need of such 
 preparations ; they should get all the preparations aimed 
 at without having to use them. 
 
 " I say, speaking again on behalf of the Government, 
 that in our view, under the conditions which now exist — 
 we must all recognize the atmosphere which this great 
 patriotic spirit has created in the country — the employ- 
 ment of force, any kind of force, for what you call the 
 coercion of Ulster, is an absolutely unthinkable thing. 
 So far as I am concerned, and so far as my colleagues 
 are concerned — I speak for them, for I know their 
 unanimous feeling — that is a thing we would never 
 countenance or consent to." 
 
 This utterance has dominated the situation from that 
 day to this. Ulster had organized to rebel, sooner than 
 come under an Irish Parliament ; and had refrained 
 from rebellion because the Great War was in progress. 
 For this reason Ulster should never be coerced, no matter 
 what might happen. Sir Edward Carson's line of action 
 had secured an enormous concession : he might have 
 gone back to his people and said, " We have won." But 
 he was strong enough to represent it as a new outrage, 
 which they for the sake of loyalty must in the hour of 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 149 
 
 common danger submit to endure. By this course, 
 risky for himself, he vastly improved their position in 
 all future negotiation. — After a violent speech from 
 Mr. Bonar Law the Tory party walked out of the House 
 in a body. 
 
 Redmond rose at once. He denounced the view that 
 Ireland had gained an advantage, or desired to gain one. 
 The Prime Minister had at every stage assured him that 
 the Bill would be put on the Statute Book in that session, 
 and therefore it was unjust to say that his loyalty was 
 only conditional ; he had asked for nothing that was 
 not won in advance. Now, instead of an Act to become 
 immediately operative, Ireland received one with at least 
 a year's delay. Yet this moratorium did not seem to 
 him unreasonable. 
 
 " When everybody is preoccupied by the war and 
 when everyone is endeavouring — and the endeavour will 
 be made as enthusiastically in Ireland as anywhere else 
 in the United Kingdom — to bring about the creation of 
 an Army, the idea is absurd that under these circumstances 
 a new Government and a new Parliament could be erected 
 in Ireland." 
 
 Further, it gave time for healing work. The two things 
 that he cared for most " in this world of politics " were : 
 first, that " not a single sod of Irish soil and not a single 
 citizen of the Irish nation " should be excluded from the 
 operation of Irish self-government ; secondly, that no 
 coercion should be applied to any single county in Ireland 
 to force their submission. 
 
 The latter of these ideals was cast up to him by many 
 in Ireland, first in private grumblings, afterwards with 
 public iteration. He saw and admitted, what these 
 critics urged, that the one aspiration made the other 
 impossible of fulfilment, for the moment. Would it 
 be so, he asked, after an interval in which Ulstermen 
 and other Irishmen, Nationalist and Unionist, would be 
 found fighting and dying side by side on the battlefield 
 
150 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 on the Continent, and at home, as he hoped and believed, 
 drilling shoulder to shoulder for the defence of the shores 
 of their own country ? 
 
 On that hint he renewed his appeal to the Ulster Volun- 
 teers for co-operation and regretted that he had got no 
 response from them. More than that, he urged that his 
 appeal to Government had got no response. " If they 
 had done something to arm, equip and drill a certain 
 number at any rate of the National Volunteers the re- 
 cruiting probably would have been faster than it had been." 
 Alluding to the taunts at Ireland's shirking which had 
 been bandied about in interruptions during the debate, 
 he recalled the stories which already had come back from 
 France of Irish valour ; of the Munster Fusiliers who 
 stood by their guns all day and in the end dragged them 
 back to their lines themselves ; the story told by wounded 
 French soldiers who had seen the Irish Guards charge 
 three German regiments with the bayonet, singing a 
 strange song that the Frenchmen had never heard before — 
 " something about God saving Ireland," 
 
 " I saw these men," said Redmond, " marching 
 through London on their way to the station ; they 
 marched here past this building singing * God save 
 Ireland ! ' " 
 
 But he could not rest his claim, and had no inten- 
 tion of resting it, merely on the prowess of the Irish 
 regulars already in the army. 
 
 *' Speaking personally..ior. in^^self, I_..do,_ not _ think it.. is« 
 an exaggeration to say that on hundreds of platforrns in,. 
 this country durfng the lasf few years I have publicly 
 'promised, not only for myself, but in the name of my 
 country, that ^vhen the rights of IreUn^ were fLdmitted 
 Jby the democracy of England^ .Ireland would become 
 the strongest arm in the defence of the Empire. The^ 
 
 test has come sooner than I, or anywiej expected. Ijfcell _ 
 
 the Prime TVIinistef that this test will be honourably met. 
 T^8j;y JPbr myself thatZLj would f eel myself personally 
 
WAR IN EUROPE 151 
 
 dishonoured if I did not say tq_my_ .f ellos^-countrymen as 
 say to them here to-day, and as I willsay from the_ 
 
 public platform when I go back tqireland, that rt„isj}heir,. 
 
 duty, and should be their honour, to _take ,^their. .place 
 
 in the fighting-line in this contest." 
 
 That was a clear pledge. The Home Rule BilLrjeceiyed. 
 
 the Royal Assent on Septeraber. 18th. , But before the 
 
 seal was affixed Redmond's manifesto to the Irish people 
 
 was in all the newspapers. It was his call to arms^ 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 
 
 AT the ending of the long session of Parliament in 
 1914 there was a curious scene in the House of 
 Commons, where members were crowded to assist at 
 the formal passing of the Irish and Welsh Bills. On the 
 adjournment, Mr. Will Crooks, from his seat on the front 
 bench below the gangway, called out, *' Mr. Speaker, 
 would it be in order to sing ' God save the King ' ? " 
 and without more ado uplifted his voice and the House 
 chimed in. There must have been strange thoughts in 
 the minds of Redmond, of Mr. Dillon, and others of the 
 Irish, standing in the places where they had fought so 
 long and bitter a battle, where they had been so often 
 the object of fierce reproaches, whence they had hurled 
 back so many taunts, now to find themselves the centre 
 of congratulation, and joined with English members in 
 singing on the floor of the House that national anthem 
 which in Ireland had been for decades a symbol of 
 ascendancy, rigidly tabooed by every Nationalist. 
 
 When the singing ended, Mr. Crooks's genial voice rose 
 again. " God save Ireland ! " he shouted. 
 
 " And God save England too ! " Redmond answered. 
 
 That exchange of words outside the period of debate 
 is, contrary to usage but very properly, recorded in 
 Hansard. 
 
 From this time forth Redmond was on his trial. He 
 had given pledges ; he must make good to Ireland and 
 make good to Great Britain. For the first, since Home 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 153 
 
 Rule could nnf V>A hrn^1^j1i^^^^ff^f^PTat,^•on^hft rnii^sf, secure_ 
 
 recognition of the National Volunteers, must establish 
 anH^ regularize their status ; for the second, he must _ 
 obTain recruits as Ireland's contribution to the war. 
 'THe"two proposals were in his view — and indeed were^n 
 reality — inseparably connected. For both, in order to 
 succeed, he needed to have the cordial support of his 
 fellow-countrymen ; for both, he needed whole-hearted 
 co-operation from the British Government. It would 
 be too much to say that Ireland backed him cordially ; 
 but for the limitation of Ireland's response the fault 
 lay chiefly and primarily with the Government, which 
 failed him completely. The War Office could not actually 
 and directly oppose his effort to raise troops ; what they 
 could do was to hamper him by the adoption of wrong 
 methods and the refusal of right ones. Yet in that part 
 of his task which involved making good to England, 
 laying England and the Empire under a debt of living 
 gratitude, his apjDcal was made to Ireland, and he succeeded 
 so far that only Ireland herself could have destroyed 
 his work. But on the other point, which involved gaining 
 satisfaction for Ireland, the appeal was made to Govern- 
 ment and the refusal was complete. It was worse than 
 absolute, for it was tainted with bad faith. Mr. Asquith 
 as Prime Minister accepted the mutual covenant which 
 Redmond had proposed, and allowed Lord Kitchener 
 to disallow fulfilment of it. 
 
 Redmond's view wasjaQt.iimit&d^iaJjreland's interest. 
 No manHving in these islands felt more keenly for flie"* 
 great underlying principles at issue in the war. His 
 missiaOL^^asJie jjonceived it, was to lead Ireland to serve 
 those principles. But It was Tufile" to suppose that Fe~' 
 could secure for England all that England expected of 
 Ireland if he could obtain from England nothing of what 
 Ireland asked. Redmond wanted recognition for the 
 Volunteers chiefly as a basis upon which Ireland could 
 feel that she was building an Irish army worthy of her 
 
 BOSTON 01 
 
154 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 record in arms ; and this army would be no mean assistance 
 to the nations allied against Germany's aggression. Con- 
 sidering all the facts which have to be set out, the true 
 cause for wonder is not the limitation but the extent of 
 his success. 
 
 There was neither delay nor uncertainty in his exposition 
 of Ireland's duty. Quite literally, he seized the first 
 chance that came to his hand. He left London on the 
 evening when the Act was signed, motored to Holyhead, 
 as he liked to do, in the big car which his friends had 
 presented to him — it was the only material testimonial 
 which he ever received — and crossed by the night boat, 
 driving on in the morning to Aughavanagh. When he 
 reached the Vale of Ovoca he found a muster of the East 
 Wicklow Volunteers. These were the nearest thing to 
 him in all the force — his own friends and neighbours 
 from the Wicklow hills. Aughrim, his post-town at the 
 foot of his own particular valley, had its company, com- 
 manded by a friend of his, the local schoolmaster — typical 
 of what was best in the Volunteers, a keen Gaelic Leaguer, 
 tireless in work for the old language and old history. 
 This man, well on in the forties, but mountain-bred and 
 hardy, had thrown himself into the new movement — 
 little guessing that a few months would see him a private 
 in the British Army, or that he would come with honour 
 to command a company of a famous Irish regiment on 
 the battlefields of a European war. 
 
 If it had been only for the sake of Captain MacSweeny 
 (he was then, of course, only a captain of Volunteers), 
 I think Redmond would have stopped. But it was a 
 gathering of many friends, who pressed him to speak 
 at a moment when his heart was full. Grave results 
 followed from what he said that day ; but a week sooner 
 or later he was bound to ssij these things, and the results 
 were bound to follow. Here is the pith of his utterance : 
 
 " I know that you will make efficient soldiers. Efficient 
 for what ? Wicklow Volunteers, in spite of the peaceful 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 155 
 
 happiness and beauty of the scene in which we stand, 
 remember this country at this moment is in a state q1^ 
 war. and the duty of the manhood of Ireland is twofold. ' 
 
 Its duty *ii at" alT cost ~fo" defend the shores of Ireland / 
 
 'Trpin- for.eign invasion. It has a duty more than that, |_ 
 " of taking^ care that IrislT valour proves itself on tlie field / 
 *of war as IF has' always proved itself in" the past. The / 
 interests of Ireland, of the whole of Ireland, are at stakg i 
 in this war. Tliis war is undertaken in defence of tlTe A 
 highest principles of religion and morality and right, | 
 and it would be a disgrace for ever to our country, a .; 
 reproach to her manhood, and a denial of the lessons of ; 
 her history, if young Ireland confined their eiforts to i 
 remaining at home to defend the shores of Ireland from 
 an unlikely invasion, or should shrink from the duty of 
 proving on the field of battle that gallantry and courage 
 which have distinguished their race all through all its 
 history. I say to you, therefore, your duty is twofold^ 
 I am glad to see such magnificent material for soldiers 
 around me, and I say to you : go on drilling and make 
 yourselves efficient for the work, and then account for 
 yourselves as men, not onlj'' in Ireland itself, but wherever 
 the firing-line extends, in defence of right and freedom 
 and religion in this war." 
 
 On the following Thursday Mr. Asquith, as Redm.ond 
 had publicly urged him to do, came to Dublin and spoke 
 at the Mansion House with the Lord Mayor in the chair. 
 Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin, as well as Redmond, were 
 on the same platform and spoke also. The papers of 
 September 25th, which reported the speeches of this 
 notable gathering, contained also a manifesto from twenty 
 members of the original Committee of the Volunteers, 
 definitely breaking with Redmond's policy and taking 
 his speech to the Wicklow Volunteers as their cause of 
 action. Having recited a version of the facts which led 
 up to the inclusion of Redmond's nominees on the Com- 
 mittee, it continued : 
 
 " Mr. Redmond, addressing a body of Irish Volunteers 
 on last Sunday, has now announced for the Irish Volunteers 
 a policy and programme fundamentally at variance with 
 
156 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 their own published and accepted aims and objects, but 
 with which his nominees are, of course, identified. He 
 has declared it to be the duty of the Irish Volunteers to 
 take foreign service under a Government which is not 
 Irish. He has made this announcement without con- 
 sulting the Provisional Committee, the Volunteers them- 
 selves, or the people of Ireland, to whose service alone 
 they are devoted." 
 
 The next paragraph announced the expulsion of Red- 
 mond's nominees and the reconstitution of the Committee 
 as it existed before their admission. Six resolutions 
 followed. It is noteworthy that the attitude taken up 
 with regard to autonomy was simply " to oppose any 
 diminution of the measure of Irish self-government 
 which now exists as a Statute on paper," and to 
 repudiate any " consent to the legislative dismember- 
 ment of Ireland." There was no word of an Irish 
 Republic and no explicit claim beyond immediate 
 operation for the Home Rule Act. 
 
 Ireland's attitude towards the war was defined by a 
 resolution : 
 
 " To declare that Ireland cannot, with honour or 
 safety, take part in foreign quarrels otherwise than 
 through the free action of a National Government of 
 her own ; and to repudiate the claim of any man to 
 offer up the blood and lives of the sons of Irishmen and 
 Irishwomen to the service of the British Empire while 
 no National Government which could speak and act 
 for the people of Ireland is allowed to exist." 
 
 Mr. Asquith, when he spoke on Thursday night, must 
 have been informed that this split was imminent, and he 
 spoke with a view to that situation. He said : 
 
 " Speaking here in Dublin, I address myself for a moment 
 particularly to the National Volunteers, and I am going 
 to ask them all over Ireland — not only them, but I make 
 the appeal to them particularly — to contribute with 
 promptitude and enthusiasm a large and worthy con- 
 tingent of recruits to the second new army of half a 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 167 
 
 million which is now growing up, as it were, out of the 
 ground, I should like to see, and we all want to see, an 
 Irish Brigade — or, better still, an Irish Army Corps. 
 Don't let them be afraid that by joining the colours they 
 will lose their identity and become absorbed in some 
 invertebrate mass, or what is perhaps equally repugnant, 
 be artificially redistributed into units which have no 
 national cohesion or character. 
 
 " We shall, to the utmost limit that military expediency 
 will allow, see that men who have been already associated 
 in this or that district in training and in common exercises 
 shall be kept together and continue to recognize the 
 corporate bond which now unites them. One thing 
 further. We are in urgent need of competent officers, 
 and when the officers now engaged in training these 
 men prove equal to the test, there is no fear that their 
 services will not be gladly and gratefully retained. But, 
 I repeat, gentlemen, the Empire needs recruits and needs 
 them at once. They may be fully trained and equipped 
 in time to take their part in what may prove to be the 
 decisive field in the greatest struggle of the history of 
 the world. That is our immediate necessity, and no 
 Irishman in responding to it need be afraid he is jeopard- 
 izing the future of the Volunteers. 
 
 " I do not say, and I cannot say, under what precise 
 form of organization it will be, but I trust and I believe 
 — indeed, I am sure — that the Volunteers will become a 
 permanent, an integral and characteristic part of the 
 defensive forces of the Crown. 
 
 " I have only one more word to say. Though our 
 need is great, your opportunity is also great. The call 
 which I am making is backed by the sympathy of your 
 fellow-Irishmen in all parts of the Empire and of the 
 world. . . . There is no question of compulsion or bribery. 
 What we want, what we ask, what we believe you are 
 ready and eager to give, is the freewill offering of a free 
 people." 
 
 This was a double pledge as to Redmond's two objects. 
 It promised, first, that every inducement should be given 
 to join a corps distinctively Irish and having national 
 cohesion and character ; secondly, that the Volunteers 
 should obtain recognition as part of the defensive forces 
 
158 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 of the Crown. Over and above this was an assurance of 
 enormous importance. There was to be no question of 
 compulsion. Nothing was asked, nothing would be asked, 
 but *' the freewill offering of a free people." 
 
 Lord Meath followed, a representative figure of L^nionist 
 Ireland and a most zealous promoter of recruiting. Then 
 Redmond spoke, and as usual dwelt on Ireland's contri- 
 bution to the forces of the Regular Army so far actually 
 engaged, which was fully adequate in numbers. *' As 
 to quality, let Sir John French answer for that, and let 
 my friend and fellow-countryman Admiral Beatty from 
 Wexford speak from Heligoland." — Nothing gave him 
 more pleasure at all times than to dwell on the personal 
 achievement of Irishmen ; his voice kindled when he 
 named such names. — He went on to give confident assur- 
 ance, having in it the note of defiant answer to the revolt 
 which had been raised : 
 
 " I tell the Prime Minister he will get here plenty of 
 recruits and of the best material. We will maintain 
 here in Ireland intact and inviolate our Irish National 
 Volunteers, and in my judgment that body of Volunteers 
 will prove to be an inexhaustible source of strength to the 
 new army corps and the new army that is being created." 
 
 Then, with disdainful reference to the " little handful 
 of pro-Germans " who had " raised their voices in Ireland," 
 he declared that it would be no less absurd to consider 
 them representative than to take General Beyers and not 
 General Botha as expressing the sentiments of South Africa. 
 
 Yet, as we know, the danger in South Africa was serious, 
 and South Africa possessed freedom, not the promise of 
 freedom. General Botha had what Redmond was denied 
 — power to act and act promptly. In Ireland the menace 
 was far less grave at this moment, but it was destined to 
 become overpowering because Redmond lacked the power 
 to deal with the situation in his own way. Already 
 much had been lost. Between the declaration of war 
 and the passage of the Home Rule Bill more than six 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 159 
 
 weeks had been allowed to elapse in which nothing was 
 done in response to Redmond's proposal, except the 
 purely negative decision that Territorials should not be 
 sent to garrison Ireland. This inevitably strengthened 
 the hand of those who never liked the offer he had made. 
 From the first an accent of dissent from the new policy 
 was plainly distinguishable in what came from the Com- 
 mittee of the Volunteers. Mr. Bulmer Hobson says of 
 the famous speech of August 4th : 
 
 " This statement amounted to an unconditional offer 
 of the services of the Irish Volunteers to the English 
 Government, and was made without any consultation 
 with the Volunteers themselves. The first that members 
 of the Provisional Committee heard of their being offered 
 to the Government was when they read it in the news- 
 papers, and Mr. Redmond's nominees on the Committee 
 were as much surprised as the older members. At the 
 next meeting of the Standing Committee, held a couple 
 of days later, the nominated members strove hard to 
 induce us to endorse Redmond's offer. The utmost they 
 could get, however, notwithstanding their clear party 
 majority, was a statement of ' the complete readiness 
 of the Irish Volunteers to take joint action with the 
 Ulster Volunteer Force for the defence of Ireland.' 
 Further than that the older members of the Committee 
 declined to go. This statement in reality committed, and 
 was meant to commit, the Volunteers to nothing, though 
 it was interpreted by the Press as a complete endorse- 
 ment of Mr. Redmond's policy." 
 
 At the beginning of the war, there were two strong 
 currents of desire in the Volunteer body and its backers. 
 One sought that the Volunteers should retain complete 
 freedom of action and in no way be brought under the 
 War Office. The other craved to see them trained and 
 armed with the least possible delay. Colonel Moore, i 
 
 ' Lieutenant-Colonel Maiirice Moore, C.B., an officer who had 
 served with distinction in South Africa, and whose father, George 
 Henry Moore, had been a famous advocate in Parhament of Tenant 
 Right and Repeal. 
 
160 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 who was the chief of their military staff at this time, 
 says Mr. Hobson, saw no way of accomplishing the latter 
 object without the assistance of the military authorities. 
 Other men, who had come in since Redmond's speech, 
 impressed on the public that without legal recognition 
 from the Crown no Volunteer could act against the Germans 
 in case of a landing without exposing himself and others 
 to the penalties which Germany was inflicting in Belgium 
 wherever the civilian population fired a shot. As a 
 result, negotiations were opened in August 1914 with the 
 Irish Command, and Colonel Moore, in concert with 
 General Paget's staff, drew up a scheme for training the 
 Irish and Ulster Volunteers and for using them when 
 trained for a short term of garrison duty in Ireland. The 
 scheme was submitted to the Provisional Committee, who 
 added conditions designed to lead to rejection by the War 
 Office ; and in the upshot Colonel Moore's proposals 
 were refused by Lord Kitchener on one side and by the 
 Standing Committee of Volunteers on the other. 
 
 Redmond was of course aware of the failure of this 
 scheme, and took up the matter personally. He wrote 
 to the Chief Secretary : 
 
 House of Commons, 
 September 9, 1914. 
 Private. 
 
 My Dear Mr. Birrell, 
 
 I am very anxious to put shortly before you 
 on paper my views with reference to the Volunteer 
 question, which we discussed with the Prime Minister 
 to-day. I take so strong a view on the subject that I 
 think I must ask you to show him this letter and to urge 
 upon him the importance of getting the War Office to 
 move. I know the influences that are at work in the 
 War Office throwing cold water on the Volunteers and 
 causing intense dissatisfaction in Ireland by unnecessary 
 delays. 
 
 What I suggest should be done is this : 
 There are two separate questions : (1) Recruits ; 
 and (2) Volunteers for Home Defence. 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 161 
 
 The first absolutely depends upon the way in which 
 the second is treated. If the existing Volunteer organi- 
 zation is ignored and sneered at and made little of, 
 recruiting in the country will not go ahead. 
 
 On the other hand, if the Volunteers are properly 
 treated, I believe that recruiting will go ahead. 
 
 Now, my suggestion is this : that an announcement 
 should be made immediately that the War Office are 
 taking steps to assist in the equipment and arming and 
 instructing of a certain number of the Irish Volunteers 
 for Home Defence, and that this will be done without 
 interfering in any way with the character or organization 
 of the existing Volunteer Force. 
 
 Carrying out this programme will really not stand 
 in the way of the preparing of the new Army. All that 
 is required is a few thousand rifles, and there are plenty 
 of them in the military stores in Ireland at this moment 
 which are not being used and will not be used, because 
 they are too old, in the training of the recruits, but which 
 would be quite suitable for making a beginning at any 
 rate in the drilling of the Volunteers. It might be stated 
 that they would be replaced by better weapons gradually, 
 as soon as the rush was over. 
 
 A few instructors should be placed at the disposal 
 of the Volunteers. » 
 
 If this is done, intense satisfaction will be given all 
 through the countrj'', and the pride and sentiment of the 
 Volunteers will be touched, and the appeal for recruits 
 generally through the country, and even in the ranks of the 
 Volunteers themselves, will, I am confident, be responded to. 
 
 But, as I have said, if this course is not taken, in- 
 evitably recruiting will flag. 
 
 I would earnestly beg of you to take this matter 
 vigorously in hand, so that some satisfactory announce- ^ 
 ment may be made before I return to Ireland next week, 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 Right Hon. A. Birrell, M.P. J- E- RedmONDJ 
 
 I Rifles were really not available, nor competent instructors. 
 But the essential was recognition. A grant towards equipment 
 should have been given, and possibly other assistance. We secured 
 several thousand rifles in Belgium about this time. For instructors, 
 any old crippled veterans paid by Government would have con- 
 veyed the sense of recognition. 
 
 12 
 
162 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Mr. Asquith's spee ch on S fi|it£mhsr_24th was at least 
 _an indication that the Prime Minister desired to act in 
 the spirit of Redmond's suggestions. The Chief Seci-e- 
 tary was of the same disposition. But neither of them 
 was able to control the imperious colleague who now had 
 taken charge of the Army, and who in the most critical^ 
 moment thwarted effectuaUy^ jtlie_desi^s_ of Liberal 
 statesmanship in Ireland. 
 
 After Redmond's death an " Appreciation " published 
 in The Times (with the signature " A. B.,") by Mr. Birrell, 
 contained this passage : 
 
 ** He felt to the very end, bitterly and intensely, the 
 stupidity of the War Office. Had he been allowed to 
 deflect the routine indifference and suspicion of the War 
 Office from its old ruts into the deep-cut channels of Irish 
 feelings and sentiments, he might have carried his country- 
 men with him, but he jumped first and tried to make 
 his bargain afterwards and failed accordingly. English 
 people, as their wont is, gushed over him as an Irish 
 patriot and flouted him as an Irish statesman. Had he 
 and bis brother been put in charge of the Irish Nationalist 
 contingents, and an Ulster man, or men, been put in a 
 corresponding position over the Irish Protestant con- 
 tingents, all might have gone well. Lord Kitchener, w^ho 
 was under the delusion that he was an Irishman no less 
 than Redmond, was the main, though not the only 
 obstacle in the path of good sense and good feeling." 
 
 Yet it is, to say the least, not clear why Lord Kitchener 
 should have been allowed to be an obstacle. Redmond 
 was not fortunate in his allies. He had set an exa mple 
 of generous c oura ge ; it was not followed by British 
 statesmen. 
 
 Froin the very outset of his campaign in Ireland he 
 had two hostilities to meet. The first was that of the 
 section which had always been opposed to him — the 
 Unionist party. Into this block he had already driven 
 a wedge. The Irish Times, its principal organ in the 
 South and West, was now backing him heartily, and, as 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 163 
 
 has been seen, not a few leading Unionists were doing 
 their utmost to assist. But the real opposition, that 
 of Ulster, was in no way conciliated. On September 
 28th, " Covenant Day," a great meeting was held at which 
 the Ulstermen denounced what they called the Govern- 
 ment's treachery, and declared their implacable deter- 
 mination never to submit to Home Rule. Mr. Bonar 
 Law for the British Unionists proclaimed that whereas 
 heretofore his party were willing to be bound by the 
 verdict of a general election, they now withdrew that 
 condition, and without any reservation would support 
 Ulster in whatever course it chose to adopt. 
 
 In a purely partisan sense these speeches, and this 
 attitude, did Redmond no harm in his campaign with 
 Nationalists. IWhen a certain section of Home Rulers ? 
 [were clamouring that he had been tricked and betrayed f 
 i by the Government, had given all and got nothing, it 
 / was a good rejoinder to point to the fact that in Ulster's 
 I opinion the opportunity had been used to gain an unfair ^ 
 I victory for Home Rule. \ But Redmond from the outbrealT" 
 of the war had no concern with party or partisan argu- 
 ments. He wanted a real truce, an end of bitterness, 
 in Ireland. 
 
 There was, moreover, a feature of the Ulster propa- 
 ganda in these days which disturbed him. General 
 Richardson, a retired Indian officer, who had chief com- 
 mand of the Ulster Volunteer Force, in appealing for 
 recruits, urged the Volunteers " to recollect the events of 
 March last and what the Navy and Army did for Ulster. 
 They came to the help of Ulster in the day of trouble, 
 and would come again." He added his assurance to the 
 Volunteers that " when the war was over, and their ranks 
 were reinforced by some 12,000 men, thoroughly well 
 trained and with vast field experience, they would return 
 to the attack and relegate Home Rule to the devil." 
 
 It did not assist Redmond in gaining recruits for the 
 Army that a general officer should represent the services 
 
164 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 as trusty and proven allies of gentlemen whose leading 
 idea in life was to relegate Home Rule to such a destina- 
 tion. The average Nationalist civilian did not easily dis- 
 criminate between what was said by a retired ofl&cer out 
 of commission and what was said by officers in uniform. 
 There was a tendency to regard General Richardson as 
 speaking of right for the Army — for which Nationalist 
 recruits were desired. 
 
 The Liberal Government could not help Redmond to 
 allay Ulster or Unionist hostility. One thing they could 
 do ; they could ensure that whatever concession or 
 privilege was extended to those who followed Sir Edward 
 Carson should be equally accorded to those who followed 
 Redmond. This one thing which they could have done . 
 they did not do. They allowed the War Office to / 
 increase the arrogance of the Ulstermen and to weaken/ 
 Redmond's hand, by giving Ulster special privileges, 
 which inevitably created jealousy and suspicion in 
 Nationalist Ireland — as shall be shown in detail. 
 
 But first it is necessary to indicate the other element 
 of hostility — far more serious than that of Ulster, because 
 it challenged Redmond's leadership. It was that of the 
 extremist group, which rapidly began to welcome German 
 successes, not for any love to Germany but because it 
 could not conceive of any hope for Ireland except in 
 the weakening or destruction of British power. These 
 men, as has been already seen, had acquired an influence 
 in the Volunteer Force out of all proportion to their 
 numbers, owing to the fact that the Irish party had stood 
 aloof from the movement in its early stages. Professor 
 MacNeiU said later that but for the Gaelic League and 
 the Gaelic Athletic Association there would have been 
 no Irish Volunteers. The bulk of both these bodies 
 was always antagonistic to the parliamentary move- 
 ment. When their opposition openly declared itself, in 
 consequence of the East Wicklow speech, Redmond 
 was not sorry to have a clear issue raised, involving a 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 166 
 
 formal breach. In a public letter to Colonel Moore he 
 wrote that he read " this extraordinary manifesto with 
 feelings of great relief," because communications from 
 all parts of the country had forced him to the conclusion 
 that so long as the signatories to this document remained 
 members of the governing body, " no practical work 
 could be done to put the Volunteer organization on a 
 real business basis." 
 
 By a real " business basis " he meant that the Volun- 
 teers should be made a defensive force to act in concert 
 with the troops engaged in the war. That was the clear 
 issue. You must be for the troops or against them. 
 In these days the official attitude of those who signed 
 the dissenting manifesto was that Ireland should be 
 neutral. But at such a crisis, as Mr. Dillon said in a 
 telling phrase, a man who calls himself a neutral " is 
 either an enemy or a coward." 
 
 It became only too clear later that we had to do with 
 a body of men who were enemies and were certainly not 
 cowards. Their number at this moment was difficult 
 to determine. What immediately revealed itself was 
 that the vast majority of the Volunteers, when choice 
 was forced on them, adhered to Redmond. 
 
 The case of my own constituency, Galwaj?" City, may 
 be given as typical, though rather of the towns than 
 of the country. The country-side was apathetic ; the 
 towns were both for and against Redmond's policy. In 
 Galway, Sinn Fein had a strong hold on the college of 
 the National University, but, on the other hand, the depot 
 of the Connaught Rangers was just outside the city at 
 Renmore, and that famous corps had many partisans ; 
 while in the fishing village of the Claddagh nearly every 
 man was a naval reservist. 
 
 I came to Galway on the day the Home Rule Bill was 
 signed and attended a couple of Volunteer drills, where 
 I noted the activity of some young men going round 
 with a password : *' For whom will you serve ? " " For 
 
166 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Ireland only." After the publication of the dissenting 
 manifesto a Committee was called, and I obtained leave 
 to be present. There was a sharp discussion, and at 
 the finish the vote was a tie, whether to support Redmond 
 or the dissentients. This did not at all please me or 
 my friends, so we determined to have a big general 
 meeting to see on which side public support really lay. 
 Everybody was invited, and a great many people could 
 not get into the hall ; this mattered the less because 
 the Sinn Feiners cut the electric wires leading to the 
 building and plunged us in darkness ; luckily, it was a 
 fine night, and we took the meeting outside with great 
 success. A couple of interruptions were drastically dealt 
 with, and complete peace then prevailed. Two of the 
 four county members were among the many speakers, 
 and the last man to address the meeting was a wounded 
 Connaught Ranger back from the line. We cheered for 
 the Rangers, and then we cheered for the King ; the 
 local band was present, but unable, though quite willing, 
 to assist at this point. " Isn't it a pity," the chief 
 bandsman said to me, " there was three of us knew the 
 tune well, but they've all gone to the front, and not a 
 one of us ever heard it." 
 
 But as a net result the original Volunteer organization 
 was killed. The pick of the young and keen who were 
 with us went off to the war ; the young and keen who 
 stayed kept up an organization with very different pur- 
 poses. There was plenty of material in Galway and 
 everywhere else to build up a volunteer corps such as 
 Redmond desired to see ; but the organizing spirits 
 were in the opposite camp, and our friends did not 
 interest themselves in what seemed to be a kind of play- 
 acting when such serious business was afoot in the world. 
 Had they been set to duties of coast patrol, under officers 
 who were available on the spot, and given clear recogni- 
 tion as part of the defensive forces, their body would 
 have been alive and active ; as it was, it atrox^hied and 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 167 
 
 grew inert. Broadly speaking, the same was true all 
 over the country. Redmond was willing to make bricks 
 for the War Office to build with ; they insisted that he 
 should make them without straw. 
 
 Facts directly connected with recruiting ultimately 
 convinced the British public that the War Office had 
 spoilt a great opportunity in Ireland. But the funda- 
 mental blunder, the deep-seated cause which undermined 
 the force of Redmond's appeal, was the refusal of recog- 
 nition to the National Volunteers and the failure to 
 fulfil the promise held out in Mr. Asquith's Dublin 
 speech. 
 
 II 
 
 The other respects in which the War Office crippled 
 the Nationalist efforts after recruiting were matters of 
 detail, not of principle. The first and best help which 
 Redmond might expect would have come from his col- 
 leagues in the party ; and all the recruiting authorities 
 in Ireland should have been directed to secure that help 
 locally. No such step was taken. No attempt was 
 made to enlist Nationalists of position as patrons of the 
 recruiting campaign. In Catholic Nationalist districts 
 it was the rule rather than the exception to select gentle- 
 men of the Protestant Church, and of strong Unionist 
 opinions, as recruiting officers. If Catholic Nationalists 
 had been selected as the official agents to assist in raising 
 the Ulster Division, there would have been an outcry, 
 and very rightly ; it would have been contrary to common 
 sense. But the War Office, always even obsequiously 
 readj'' to consider the Ulstermen's point of view, com- 
 pletely lacked sympathy for that of the majority in 
 Ireland. In some cases the choice of a man locally 
 unpopular on public grounds afforded — to speak plainly 
 — an excuse for those leading Nationalists who were 
 
168 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 loath to depart from all the tradition of their lifetime. 
 Some of Redmond's colleagues held that they had been 
 " extreme men " all their lives, and they thought it too 
 hard that they should be expected to ask Irishmen to 
 join the English Army. Yet these same men would have 
 worked enthusiastically for the Volunteers, and by sym- 
 pathy for their comrades who went out could have been 
 led into a very different attitude. 
 
 Many of them, too, felt an honourable scruple about 
 asking others to do what they could not do themselves. 
 As a parliamentary group we were under a singular 
 disability. In its early days the Irish party had been, 
 what Sinn Fein is now, a party of the young. But so 
 strong was the tie of gratitude that service in its ranks 
 became an inheritance, and in most cases a man once 
 elected stayed on till he died or resigned. By 1914, of 
 all parties in the House we had by far the largest propor- 
 tion of men over military age. I question whether three 
 out of the seventy could have passed the standard then 
 exacted — for two or three of the younger men were 
 medically unfit. In these circumstances the War Office 
 would have been well advised to waive a regulation or 
 two to facilitate matters ; but the rigour of the rules 
 was maintained. One of my colleagues, a man in the 
 early forties, offered to join as a private ; he was refused. 
 In my own case a similar refusal was based on Lord 
 Kitchener's personal opinion against that of the Under- 
 Secretary for War, to whom, as a personal friend, I had 
 written ; it took nearly six months to get the decision 
 altered ; and by that time the value of examj)le was 
 much depreciated. The beginning was the chance to 
 give a lead. 
 
 Far graver was the intolerable delay in forming a 
 corps which should appeal definitely to Irish national 
 and Nationalist sentiment. The First Army included 
 one Irish Division — the Tenth, destined to a splendid 
 history, under a popular commander, Sir Bryan Mahon ; 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 169 
 
 but it had no specially Nationalist colour, so to say, and 
 no connection with the Irish Volunteers. Redmond 
 wanted the counterpart of what had been readily 
 granted to Sir Edward Carson ; and this was what 
 Mr. Asquith had outlined in his speech at Dublin. The 
 Sixteenth Division already existed ; its commander was 
 appointed on September 17th. But the first step to 
 give it the desired character was not taken without long 
 delay, and much heart-burning and confusion resulted. 
 
 Part of the confusion is attributable to the fact that 
 Redmond, in his desire to touch the historic memories 
 connected with the famous corps which attained its crown- 
 ing glory at Fontenoy, always spoke of "a new Irish 
 Brigade." But at the Mansion House meeting Mr. 
 Asquith spoke of something more than a brigade — an 
 army corps ; and Redmond, following him, instantly 
 accepted the idea. " I used the word ' brigade ' in my 
 ignorance — I meant an Irish army corps." There was 
 always present to his mind the hope that in some larger 
 formation the Ulster Division might find itself shoulder 
 to shoulder with other Irish troops. 
 
 Yet intending recruits were puzzled, and Lord Heath, 
 writing to Redmond on October 10th that he had formed 
 a Recruiting Committee in Dublin " for the purpose of 
 endeavouring to raise the Irish Army Corps for which 
 you spoke," reported that men came in asking to know 
 where was the Irish Brigade, and refused to join anything 
 else. Lord Meath suggested that Redmond should 
 obtain from Lord Kitchener " an official declaration 
 sanctioning the enlistment of Irishmen in an Irish Brigade, 
 or Irish Army Corps, consisting exclusively of Irish 
 officers and men." He wrote again on the 14th, asking 
 that the Prime Minister himself should be approached, 
 and on the 17th, in reply to some communication from 
 Redmond : "I hope jou will insist on some official and 
 unmistakable statement that your request has been 
 granted." 
 
170 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 The tone of these letters, coming from no fire-eating 
 Nationalist but the staunchest of Unionist peers, is 
 sufficient proof that Lord Kitchener's action or inaction 
 was resented by those who knew Ireland and had the 
 best interests of Ireland at heart. The Irish Times 
 wrote in the same sense ; and on October 19th a formal 
 attack was launched in the Daily Chronicle, which drew 
 a sharp contrast with the treatment accorded to Ulster. 
 " Up to this hour," the writer said, " the Irish Division 
 asked for by Mr. Redmond has been refused sanction 
 by the War Office," This was an overstatement, but 
 it was true that up to this time such a belief naturally 
 prevailed, because the War Office could not be induced 
 to make the desired announcement that sanction had 
 been given. Moreover, although the concession had been 
 made, it was made in a very different way from that 
 used in dealing with Sir Edward Carson. Redmond 
 had no voice whatever in the organization. The choice 
 of a divisional commander was of infinite im.portance ; 
 and it fell upon Lieutenant- General Sir Lawrence Parsons, 
 K.C.B., an artillery officer of great distinction, a man 
 of wide general knowledge and culture and of strongly 
 marked individuality. Yet his individuality did not 
 make him easy for Redmond to work with. He was 
 not simply a typical professional soldier of the old Army ; 
 he was an idealist in his profession ; and part of the 
 professional soldier's idealism is to resent and despise 
 political considerations. He recognized that Redmond 
 had spoken and acted with a statesman's vision ; he 
 failed to recognize that in many matters political tactics 
 are necessary to carry out a statesman's plan. Also, 
 it was very difficult for him or for any other professional 
 soldier to realize that recruiting, under such conditions 
 as then prevailed, was a politician's task, not a soldier's, 
 even in Great Britain ; and that this was tenfold more 
 true of Ireland. 
 
 The point requires to be emphasized, because it applies 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 171 
 
 to a greater personage — Lord Kitchener himself. I 
 believe that Lord Kitchener honestly desired the success 
 of Redmond's mission. To my personal knowledge he 
 sent for one officer long known to him and took him from 
 a command in which he was comfortably placed and 
 sent him, against his will, to raise one of our battalions 
 in a difficult area. The choice was absolutely sound, 
 and success was achieved by methods which did not 
 always follow strictly the letter of King's Regulations. 
 But these departures from rule were quite in accordance 
 with the spirit of the old Army, and Lord Kitchener was 
 ready to stand over any of them. He would do the best 
 he could for our division on the old lines. He would, 
 I am certain, have said that he had done the best thing 
 possible for it in appointing to the command an Irishman 
 who was a first-rate soldier and a first-rate man to super- 
 vise the training of troops. So far as my judgment is 
 able to go, the credit for making the Sixteenth Division 
 what it was when we went to France belongs chiefly to 
 the divisional general under whom we trained. 
 
 General Parsons had the gift, which appears to be 
 rare in soldiers, of imparting ideas not merely about 
 discipline but about the art of war ; and he had an 
 enthusiasm which communicated itself. But these were 
 the qualities of the soldier in his own sphere, with which 
 Redmond had no contact. What Redmond knew was 
 the writer of letters which now lie before me. Running 
 through them all is the tone of a soldier in authority 
 who accepts assistance from a friendly, influential, well- 
 meaning but imperfectly instructed civilian. There is 
 no recognition of the fact that Redmond was the accepted 
 leader of a Volunteer Force numbering over a hundred 
 thousand men ; no glimpse of any perception that morally, 
 and almost officially, Redmond was the accredited head 
 of the nation in whose name the division was being raised 
 — a nation to which the statutory right of self-government 
 had just been accorded. 
 
172 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 The whole position was extraordinary. Legally and 
 theoretically, Redmond was a simple member of Parlia- 
 ment. Practically and morally, he was the head of Ire- 
 land, exactly as Botha was of South Africa ; and he was 
 trying to do without legal powers what Botha was doing 
 by means of them. He was far more than the Leader 
 of the Opposition in Great Britain ; for in Ireland there 
 really was no Government. Moral authority, which must 
 proceed from consent of the governed, the Irish Govern- 
 ment had not possessed for many a long day ; but its 
 legal status had been unimpeachable. Now even that 
 was gone ; it was merely a stop-gap contrivance, carrying 
 on till the Act of Parliament should receive fulfilment ; 
 and, as a bare matter of fact, it was powerless. No 
 operative decision of any moment was taken or could 
 be taken at this moment in Ireland. Everything was 
 referred to the Cabinet, and that body had no power 
 to carry out a popular policy in Ireland. 
 
 Redmond had put forward a i)olicy which they had 
 accepted in principle. It could only be carried out 
 through him, and for success he must be consulted in 
 detail. Neither Lord Kitchener nor General Parsons 
 in fact recognized the status which this implied. They 
 were prepared to listen to suggestions from him ; they 
 were not prepared to accept guidance, as they must have 
 done had he been Prime Minister of the country. 
 
 It was impossible that Redmond's attitude in dealing 
 with General Parsons should not imply some sense of 
 the position which he held ; equally impossible, from the 
 temper and mentality of the man, that there should not 
 be in General Parsons's letters an underlying assertion 
 that in military matters the military must decide. 
 
 The correspondence between the two men opened by 
 a letter from Sir Lawrence Parsons, who had just estab- 
 lished his headquarters at Mallow ; and its chief purpose 
 was to direct Redmond's attention to the fact that an 
 Irish Division was a much finer and nobler unit than an 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 173 
 
 Irish Brigade. Two points in it, however, are of interest. 
 ** I have been appointed, by Lord Kitchener," said General 
 Parsons, " because I am an Irishman and understand 
 my countrymen." Also, " I have had a considerable 
 share in selecting the officers of the Division, almost 
 all Irishmen of every political and religious creed." 
 
 What lay behind the first of these sentences was a 
 profound conviction that the writer thoroughly under- 
 stood the necessities of the situation. That was a 
 disastrous mistake. To understand Ireland at such a 
 moment was difficult for anyone, impossible for a man 
 who had not been in close touch with the mental condi- 
 tion produced by all these extraordinary happenings. 
 The effect of the preparations for rebellion in Ulster, 
 of the Curragh incident, and of the collision between 
 troops and people in Dublin — the effect of the existence 
 of a permitted Nationalist Volunteer Force — the effect 
 of Redmond's appeal : these were three completely 
 novel and conflicting currents in the stream of Irish life. 
 Nobody could hope to estimate these developments from 
 a general view, however intelligent, of Irish history and 
 character, nor even from the most intimate and sympa- 
 thetic acquaintance with Irish troops of the old Army. 
 
 A proof of the unhappy lack of comprehension is 
 furnished by the second sentence I have quoted. General 
 Parsons had been most rightly allowed by the War Office 
 to assist in selecting officers for the Division. But it 
 had never occurred to either party to consult Redmond 
 on this critical matter. Does anyone suppose that 
 Sir Edward Carson had no voice in the staffing of the 
 Ulster Division ? He had at all events received from 
 the first a clear promise that all professional soldiers 
 who had been officers in the Ulster Volunteers would 
 be officers in the Division, and that any who had been 
 mobilized should be restored to their associates in the 
 Division. 
 
 General Parsons brought to this whole matter the 
 
174 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 fine principle that no man's religious or political beliefs 
 should stand in his way. He omitted to consider the 
 effect produced on the situation by the fact that the 
 Ulster Division had been actually allowed to exclude all 
 Catholics, as such, and to accept no officer who was not 
 politically in sympathy with Unionist Ulster. Redmond 
 had not the least wish to exclude either Protestants or 
 Unionists ; he wanted all Irishmen on an equality. But 
 he was bound by common sense and by a perception of 
 realities to desire that Protestants and Unionists should 
 not appear to monopolize the command. 
 
 Not one of the three brigadiers appointed was generally 
 known in Ireland, personally or by his connections. One 
 was an Englishman. Of the officers originally appointed 
 not one in five was a Catholic. No Catholic commanded 
 a battalion, scarcely half a dozen were field officers. The 
 only Catholic field officer appointed to the Division who 
 had been prominently connected with the Volunteers 
 was Lord Fingall, and he had severed his connection 
 with that body. 
 
 All this was a terrible blunder. Whether it was wise 
 or unwise to allow the formation of a division having 
 the peculiar character of the Ulster Division may be 
 argued — but certainly Redmond never took exception 
 to it, and no man who ever saw these Ulstermen in the 
 field can regret its inception. But once it was formed, 
 its existence created a situation which had to be recog- 
 nized. An equivalent ought to have been given ; but 
 no genuine attempt to do this was made. 
 
 In replying to Sir Lawrence Parsons, Redmond raised 
 no controversy as to what had been done ; he was, indeed, 
 not cognizant of the facts. But he addressed himself 
 from the first to making friendly suggestions. 
 
 Amongst other things he referred to an appeal which 
 Sir Lawrence Parsons had addressed to the women of 
 Ireland, that they should provide regimental colours for 
 the battalions of the Division, This appeal was promptly 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 175 
 
 met, to Redmond's great delight — delight which was 
 soon changed into vexation, for the War Office stepped 
 in, declared the proceeding irregular, and prohibited the 
 holding of colours by any temporary battalion. General 
 Parsons was obliged to publish an explanation which 
 must have been galling to himself, and which went far 
 to confirm the impression that the War Office, with all 
 its preoccupations, had time to keep an unfriendly eye 
 on the Nationalist recruiting effort. 
 
 Another trivial matter led to prolonged and irritating 
 controversy. Towards the end of October the Belfast 
 and Dublin papers announced that the Army Council 
 had approved of '* an Ulster badge similar to that worn 
 by Ulster Volunteers " as a cap badge for all troops in 
 the Ulster Division. It was pointed out that this would 
 have the effect of preserving the identity of the Ulster 
 Division. Immediately, and not unnaturally, the demand 
 for a similar concession was put forward on behalf of 
 the Sixteenth Division. General Parsons was opposed, 
 as any old soldier would be, to a variation in the distin- 
 guishing marks of old and famous regiments. He did 
 not allow for the fact that we needed to attract new 
 soldiers in masses — men who as yet knew nothing of 
 regimental tradition. Still, he co-operated in forwarding 
 Redmond's desire, which was to meet a widely spread 
 sentimental demand. Now that the war is over, many 
 soldiers argue that there is no reason in the nature of 
 things why Irish regiments should not have a clearly 
 distinguishing uniform, as the Scots or the Colonials do. 
 In the last months, when recruiting was a matter of 
 urgency. Colonel Lynch induced the War Office to consent 
 to equipping an Irish Brigade with a completely dis- 
 tinctive dress ; unhappily the pattern was (after several 
 months) still under discussion when the war ended. I 
 have little doubt that from the point of view of recruiting 
 even the badge, to say nothing of a distinctive uniform, 
 would have been an asset ; I have no doubt at all that 
 
176 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 the refusal of it was a set-back, because it was a refusal 
 given after a discussion and correspondence which lasted 
 from November till February. The most interesting 
 point, however, is that Lord Kitchener found time to 
 occupy himself repeatedly with this question in the period 
 between the first and second battles of Ypres. If his 
 intervention had been judicious, it would have been as 
 impressive as the spectacle of a battery elephant stopping 
 in action to pick up a pin with his trunk. 
 
 On one point Redmond's representations, heartily 
 backed by General Parsons, were successful. Catholic 
 chaplains, of whom no adequate number were at first 
 provided for Irish troops, were secured. It is pleasant 
 to note that Lord Roberts, who before the war had been 
 vehement on the Ulster side, used his personal influence 
 to support this application. A month or two later, when 
 death came to the veteran, dramatically, among the 
 troops in France, Redmond told the House of Commons 
 how on that question Lord Roberts had met him in the 
 friendliest way and endeavoured to arrange for attending 
 the great meeting at the Dublin Mansion House. 
 
 On another matter Redmond was able to assist the 
 equipment of the Division. He suggested, and General 
 Parsons fully admitted the value of, regimental bands ; 
 but the War Office made no grants for them. Redmond 
 drew upon a large sum which had been placed at his dis- 
 posal by a private individual to further his campaign, 
 and all our battalions were indebted to him for their 
 fife and drum equipment. There was, in short, no detail 
 in which he was not willing and anxious to assist the 
 Division and its commander. But the friction between 
 the two men was unmistakable. 
 
 The most serious cause of it was the line taken by 
 General Parsons about the appointment of officers. He 
 laid down a rule, which I think would have had excellent 
 results if enforced throughout the whole of the new 
 armies, that no man should be recommended for a 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 177 
 
 commission without previous military experience, and that 
 candidates lacking that experience must put in a period 
 of service in the ranks. He set apart a special company 
 in one battalion, the 7th Leinsters, to which such men 
 should be sent, so that while drilling and exercising 
 with the rest of the battalion, and enjoying no special 
 privilege, they ate and slept and lived together in their 
 own barrack rooms. 
 
 Yet the obstacle thus set up deterred a good many 
 of the less zealous, who could not understand why that 
 should be made a condition in the Irish Division which 
 was not so in the Ulster Division — nor, indeed, so far as 
 I know, anywhere else at that time. Men who had been 
 officers of Ulster Volunteers got their commissions as a 
 matter of course ; the officer of National Volunteers 
 had to prove his competence in the cadet company. 
 General Parsons fully admitted this difference of treat- 
 ment, and justified it by saying to Redmond that in 
 consequence of it he would be very sorry to change officers 
 with the Ulster Division. One cannot refuse to admire 
 such a spirit ; but he ought to have asked himself whether 
 it was fair to impose a handicap on Redmond's efforts. 
 Everything turned on getting representative young men 
 from the Volunteers, and from the correspondence it 
 appears that few were coming from the South and West. 
 From the North they poured in. In our 47th Brigade, 
 the 6th Royal Irish Regiment was mainly composed of 
 Derry Nationalists ; the 7th Leinsters and the 6th Con- 
 naught Rangers were almost to a man followers of Mr. 
 Devlin from Belfast. 
 
 Next after Redmond, Mr. Devlin was the man to 
 whom our Division owed most. But the first and the 
 main impetus came from Redmond himself. He spoke 
 on October 4th at Wexford, the capital of his native 
 county ; on the 11th at Waterford, his own constituency ; 
 on the 18th at Kilkenny, the constituency of his close 
 friend Pat O'Brien. A week later he was at Belfast 
 
 13 
 
178 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 and in the glens of Antrim, among the Nationalists of 
 Ulster. Then Parliament kept him for a few weeks ; 
 in December he was back, and sjDoke at Tuam and in 
 Limerick. Everywhere the Volunteers turned out in 
 great numbers to receive him ; and to them his appeal 
 was primarily addressed. 
 
 At Wexford he laid stress on Mr. Asquith's pledge 
 that the Volunteers should remain as a recognized per- 
 manent force for the defence of the country, and this 
 led him to raise frankly the question of control. Who 
 should have authority over Volunteers in a State ? 
 Surely the elected and responsible government. But 
 pending Home Rule, " the policy and control of the 
 Volunteers must rest with the elected representatives 
 of the country." 
 
 More generally, he reminded them that he had always 
 spoken of the possibility of some great political con- 
 vulsion that might destroy their plans. " Nothing but 
 an earthquake can now prevent Home Rule," he had 
 said. " The outbreak of this overwhelming war might 
 easily have overwhelmed Home Rule. But we have 
 survived it." 
 
 And he went on to argue that the delay might be a 
 blessing in disguise. Civil war between Irishmen had 
 always seemed to him an impossibility. That impossi- 
 bility was now universally admitted. In a passage of 
 unusual heat he denounced the " so-called statesmen " 
 who came over unasked to our country to inflame 
 feelings — as Mr. Bonar Law had done ; and he appealed 
 to all sections " to enable us to utilize the interval before 
 a Home Rule Parliament assembles to unite all Irishmen 
 under a Home Rule Government." 
 
 At Waterford he was largely occupied with repelling 
 the charge that he and his colleagues had made a bargain 
 with the Government to ship Irish Volunteers overseas 
 to fight whether they would or no. This was the line on 
 which opposition was developing, and it was assisted by 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 179 
 
 articles in the English Press, which laid it down that 
 unless the Irish furnished a sufficiency of recruits, Home 
 Rule should be repealed. 
 
 An extension of this argument, that Redmond was 
 buying Home Rule with the blood of young Irishmen, 
 raised the question whether Home Rule was worth the 
 price. While the Bill was not yet law, it was a flag, a 
 symbol. Once it became an Act, men's attitude changed ; 
 they turned to criticizing what they had got ; and one 
 powerful newspaper, bitterly hostile to the Parliamentary 
 party, expended much ingenuity in exaggerating the 
 limitations of what had been gained. While one set of 
 critics endeavoured to show how miserable was the price 
 obtained, another dwelt on the unrighteousness of making 
 such a bargain without Ireland's consent. In Redmond's 
 speech at Kilkenny there was a note of resentment. 
 He refused at any great crisis to consider " what might 
 please the gallery or the crowd, or might spare him the 
 insults of a handful of cornerboys." 
 
 But the kernel of all his thought was put into one 
 sentence by him at Belfast. " Tlie proper place to guard 
 Ireland is on the battlefields of France." It was from 
 Belfast after this meeting that the first strildng demon- 
 stration of response came — organized and inspired by 
 Mr. DevHn. On November 20th nearly a full battalion 
 of recruits, many National Volunteers, entrained for 
 Fermoy ; a week later they were followed by another 
 great detachment. The example spread ; and when 
 Redmond spoke at Limerick on December 20th, the 
 Irish Times in a friendly leading article admitted that 
 '• the National Volunteers were now coming forward in 
 large numbers and the Irish Brigade was going to be a 
 credit to the country." This was a very different note 
 from that which had come from Unionist quarters at 
 earlier stages. 
 
180 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 III 
 
 So far as recruiting went, Redmond had won. He was 
 sure of making good to England. But in what concerned 
 making good to Ireland, he had no progress to report. 
 He stated that already nearly 16,500 men from the Volun- 
 teers had joined the Army, and he could not understand 
 why Government was so chary of giving assistance to 
 train and equip this force. There was no doubt as to 
 the mass of men available. Figures supplied by the 
 police to the Chief Secretary estimated that between 
 September 24th, when the split took place, and October 
 31st, out of 170,000 Volunteers, only a trifle over 12,000 
 adhered to Professor MacNeill. 
 
 But in Dublin the opponents were nearly 2,000 out 
 of 6,700 ; and two strong battalions went almost solid 
 against Redmond. These battalions, along with the 
 Citizens' Army, were destined to alter the course of Irish 
 history. It was specially true of them, but true gener- 
 ally of all the minority who left Redmond, that they were 
 kept together by a resolute and determined group who 
 had a clear purpose. 
 
 The " Irish Volunteers," as the dissentients called 
 themselves, were made to feel that they were a minority, 
 and an unpopular minority in more than one instance. 
 In Galway, when they turned out to parade the streets, 
 they were driven off with casualties — retaliation for their 
 interference with our meeting in September. In Dundalk 
 there was a somewhat similar occurrence. But they 
 got more than their own back one day in November 
 by a bold cou2) — forerunner of many. Ninety rifles 
 belonging to the National Volunteers were being moved 
 in a cart from one place to another. Half a dozen men 
 armed with revolvers held up the cart and its driver and 
 carried off the rifles. At their Convention, held in the 
 end of October, Professor MacNeill said : " They would 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 181 
 
 go on with the work of organizing, training and equipping 
 a Volunteer force for the service of Ireland in Ireland, 
 and such a force might yet be the means of saving Home 
 Rule from disaster, and of compelling the Home Rule 
 Government to keep faith with Ireland without the 
 exaction of a price in blood." 
 
 That forecast has not as yet realized itself ; and many 
 of us think that the chief achievement of this section 
 has been to turn to waste a heavy price that was paic^^^ 
 in blood by other men for the sake of Ireland., '''But 
 unquestionably they were, though the minority, far more 
 of a living reality than the mass of the original force — 
 and for a simple reason. Their purj)ose, whether good 
 or bad, was within their own control. The purpose of 
 the majority was to carry out Redmond's policy — which 
 was to make the Volunteers part of an Irish army of 
 which the striking force was designed to defend Ireland 
 on the battlefields of Flanders. But to carry out that 
 policy the National Volunteers must be accepted as a 
 purely local Irish military organization for home defence 
 — controlled, in the absence of a popularly elected Irish 
 Government, by the elected Irish representatives. The 
 War Ofifice thwarted that policy. Lord Kitchener would 
 not accept it. He continued to be of the opinion that 
 by equipping Redmond's followers he would be arming 
 enemies. 
 
 It is worth noting that one of the ablest and most 
 detached students of Irish affairs was wholly on Redmond's 
 side. Lord Dunraven, appealing on behalf cf " the new 
 Irish Brigade," pointed out that both sides of Redmond's 
 policy must be accepted. " No scheme which fails to 
 take some account of the National Volunteer Force can 
 do justice to what Ireland can give," he wrote. But 
 was there everywhere a desire to do justice to what 
 Ireland could give — and was willing to give ? Redmond 
 was warned in those days by an influential correspondent 
 in England that a deliberate policy was being pursued 
 
182 JOHN REDMONDS LAST YEARS 
 
 by the opponents of Home Rule, who undoubtedly had 
 strong backing in the War Office. The National Volun- 
 teers were to become the objects of derision and contempt, 
 which would extend to himself. By keeping the Volun- 
 teers out of active participation in war service, it could 
 be proved that Redmond did not speak for Ireland or 
 represent Ireland ; that the Irish were raising unreal 
 objections so as to keep an excuse for avoiding danger. 
 It was urged on him that he should press for the extension 
 of the Territorial Act to Ireland and endeavour to bring 
 his men in on this footing. 
 
 There were two difficulties in the way of this scheme 
 which nevertheless attracted him strongly. The first 
 was that enlistment in the Territorials for home service 
 had been stopped — so that the proposal had little advan- 
 tage, if any, over enlistment in the Irish brigades. The 
 second was due to the Volunteers themselves, many of 
 whom, though willing to serve in the war, M^ere unwilling 
 to take the oath of allegiance. 
 
 There were limits to the length to which Redmond 
 felt himself able to go, and he never dealt with this 
 objection by argument. The example which he set was 
 plain to all. He joined in singing " God save the King," 
 in drinking the King's health, and at Aughavanagh now 
 he flew the Union Jack beside the Green flag. He was 
 willing to take part in any demonstration which implied 
 that Nationalist Ireland under its new legal status accepted 
 its lot in the British Empire fully and without reserve. 
 It was superfluous for him to argue that Nationalists 
 might consistently take the oath of allegiance when 
 Nationalists were pledging their lives in the King's service 
 beside every other kind of citizen in the British Empire. 
 
 Over and above his own example was the example 
 of his brother and his son. On November 23rd Willie 
 Redmond addressed a great meeting in Cork and told 
 them, " I won't say to you go, but come with me." He 
 wa-s then fiftv- three — and for most men it would have 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 183 
 
 been " too late a week." But no man was ever more 
 instinctively a soldier, and to soldiering ho had gone by 
 instinct as a boy. He was an officer in the Wexford 
 Militia for a year or two, till politics drove him out of 
 that service and drew him into another. Now he went 
 to the war gravely but joyfully. I think those days 
 did not bring into relief any more picturesque or 
 sympathetic figure. 
 
 One thing ought to be said. Mr. Devlin wished to 
 join also, but Redmond held that he could not be spared 
 from Ireland, where his influence was enormous ; and 
 he was placed in a somewhat unfair position, even though 
 everyone who knew him knew that his chief attribute 
 was personal courage. But he was indispensable for the 
 work which had to be done, of helping at this strange 
 crisis to keep Ireland peaceful and united at a time when 
 Government was at its lowest ebb of authority. 
 
 Trouble threatened. On October 11th, the anniversary 
 of Parnell's death, three bodies of Volunteers turned out 
 in Dublin — the National Volunteers, the Irish Volunteers, 
 and the Citizen Army. A collision occurred which might 
 easily have become serious. This passed off, but early 
 in December the Government suppressed three or four 
 of the openly anti-British papers, which were, of course, 
 still more virulent against Redmond. They reappeared 
 under other names. But a meeting of protest against 
 the suppression was held outside Liberty Hall. Mr. 
 Larkin had, by this time, gone to America. His chief 
 colleague, Mr. James Connolly, who was the brain of the 
 Irish Labour Movement, presided, and at the close de- 
 clared that the meeting had been held under the protection 
 of an armed company of the Citizen Army posted in the 
 windows and on the roof of Liberty Hall. Had the police 
 or military attempted to disperse the meeting, he said, 
 ** those rifles would not have been silent." 
 
 Ulster was not the only place where armed men thought 
 themselves entitled to resist coercion. 
 
184 JOHN REDMOND'S LA8T YEARS 
 
 Dublin was the more dangerous because the war, which 
 created so much employment in Great Britain, brought 
 no new trade to Ireland, outside of Belfast. Agriculture 
 prospered, but the towns knew only a rise of prices. 
 Redmond began with high hopes, which Mr. Lloyd George 
 fostered, of rapidly-developing munition works, which 
 would at the close of hostilities leave the foundation for 
 industrial communities. Here again, however, Redmond's 
 representations were in vain. When the heavy extra 
 tax on beer and sj^irits was levied by the first supple- 
 mentary Budget, he opposed it angrily : 
 
 *' You are doing some shipbuilding at Belfast, you 
 are making a few explosives at Arklow, you are buying 
 some woollen goods from some of the smaller manufac- 
 turers, but apart from that, the bulk of the hundreds 
 of millions of borrowed money which you are spending 
 on the war is being spent in England and in increasing 
 the income of your country." 
 
 This tax on alcohol would curtail the most important 
 urban industry of the South and West of Ireland, and 
 he feared that it was the old story of crushing Ireland's 
 trade under the wheel of British interests. 
 
 Here again Redmond could only plead with the Irish 
 Government that they, in their turn, should plead with 
 the Imperial authorities. He should have been able to 
 act in his own right as the head of an Irish Ministry, 
 knowing the importance of providing employment at 
 such a time. He saw the need and how to meet it ; but 
 he had none of the resources of power. As compared 
 with the other men who occupied, in the public eye, a 
 rank equivalent to his — with General Botha, for instance 
 — he was like a commander of those Russian armies 
 which had to take the field against Germans with sticks 
 and pikes. 
 
 Yet power he had — power over the heart and mind of 
 Ireland — the power which was given him by the response 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 185 
 
 to his appeal. From January onwards the Sixteenth 
 Division grew steadily and strongly. Recruiting began to 
 get on a better basis. The appointment of Sir Hedley Le 
 Bas in charge of this propaganda brought about a healthy 
 change in methods. Appeals were used devised for Ireland, 
 and not, as heretofore, simple replicas of the English 
 article. Heart-breaking instances of stupidity were still 
 of daily occurrence, but imagination and insight began 
 to have some play ; and there was no longer the complete 
 separation which had existed between the effort of 
 Redmond and his colleagues and the effort of men like 
 Lord Meath. In January Willie Redmond was posted 
 to his battalion, the 6th Royal Irish, at Fermoy, where 
 the 47th Brigade had its headquarters. In his case, as 
 in my own, there had been much avoidable and most 
 undesirable delay ; but his presence with the Division 
 was worth an immense deal. There was delay also about 
 his younger namesake, John Redmond's son — who was 
 for a long time refused a commission in the Division 
 in whose formation his father had played so great a part. 
 Naturally, trained speakers who had joined the Division 
 were utilized for recruiting purposes. Willie Redmond 
 did comparatively little of this work. It is no light job 
 to take over command of a company, if you mean really 
 to command it ; and with him, from the moment he joined 
 everything came second to his military duty. But 
 private soldiers have a less exacting time, and there was 
 scarcely one week of my three months in the 7th Leinsters 
 in which I did not spend the Saturday and Sunday 
 on this business — generally in company with the most 
 brilliant speaker, taking all in all, that I have ever heard. 
 Kettle, then a lieutenant in the battalion, was wit, essayist, 
 poet and orator : whether he was most a wit or most 
 an orator might be argued for a night without conclusion ; 
 but as talker or as speaker he had few equals. He was 
 the son of a veteran Nationalist, who had taken a lead 
 in Parnell's day ; but the farmer's son had become the 
 
186 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 most characteristic product of Ireland's capital, which, 
 rich or poor, squalid or splendid, is a metropolis — a centre 
 of many interests, a forcing-house of many ideas. Nothing 
 in Ireland is less English than Dublin, and its tone differs 
 from that of England in having active sympathy with 
 the continental mind. 
 
 Kettle was always to some extent in revolt against 
 the theories of the Gaelic League, which he thought 
 tended to make Ireland insular morally as well as 
 materially. He was a good European because he was a 
 good Irishman ; and because he was both, he was, though 
 largely educated in Germany, a fierce partisan of France. 
 
 More than all this, he had seen with his own eyes the 
 actual martyrdom of Belgium. Sent out by Redmond 
 to purchase rifles, he was in the country when Antwerp 
 was occupied, and he wrote with passion of what he 
 heard, of what he saw. Louvain to him was more than 
 a mere name. All the Catholic in him, and all the Irish 
 Catholic, for Ireland's association with Louvain was 
 long and intimate, rose up in fury ; he went through 
 Ireland carrying the fiery cross. 
 
 Everywhere we went we had friendly and even 
 enthusiastic audiences ; the only place where I met any 
 suggestion of hostility was at Killarney, and there it 
 took the form of avoiding our meeting. We were cheered 
 and encouraged — but we did not get many recruits, so 
 to say, on the nail. Yet they came, generally dribbling 
 in afterwards. From one small meeting in county 
 Waterford we came away badly disappointed, having 
 thought an effect was made, yet we did not take a single 
 man. I heard later that within the next fortnight thirty 
 men from that parish had come in by ones and twos to 
 sign on — but at a town several miles away. Local pres- 
 sure, personal not political, was against us, especially 
 that of the mothers ; and there was a shyness about 
 taking this plunge into the unknown. 
 
 One exception stands out, iu my mind, unlike the 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 187 
 
 general run of these gatherings. It was the first field 
 day of our brigade, when, dressed in the khaki that had 
 at last been served out, we mustered on the race-course 
 at Fernioy, five thousand strong ; and I went from the 
 review to the train for Waterford, There was no mis- 
 taking the temper of Redmond's constituency ; we got 
 men there in hundreds, including a score or so of cadets 
 — young men of education — for our special company of 
 the Leinsters, which was filling up fast. 
 
 At that meeting we had one force with us which was 
 not often active on our side. The Bishop of Waterford 
 was strong for the war ; the leading parish priest of the 
 town took the chair and spoke straight and plain, while 
 one of the Regulars, a Carmelite friar, made a speech 
 which was among the most eloquent that I have ever 
 listened to. 
 
 At the beginning of April I was gazetted to a lieutenancy 
 in the 6th Connaught Rangers, and began to know the 
 Division from another aspect. Broadly speaking, the 
 men with whom I had been sharing a hut were Nationalist 
 by opinion and by tradition — though ))y no means all 
 Catholics. There were Unionists, but they were few. 
 In the society which I now joined — a joint mess of the 
 Royal Irish and the Rangers — matters were different. 
 
 The personnel of the 6th Royal Irish was strongly 
 characteristic of the old Army. The commanding officer, 
 Curzon, was of Irish descent, but of little Irish associa- 
 tion ; his second in command was an Irish Protestant 
 gentleman of a pleasant ordinary type. The senior 
 company commander was an Englishman. As an offset, 
 Willie Redmond had one company, and another was 
 commanded by an ex-guardsman, who had been a chief 
 personage in the Derry Volunteers, and brought so many 
 of them with him that General Parsons gave him a 
 captaincy straight off. 
 
 In my own battalion, no Catholic had then the rank of 
 captain. The colonel and the adjutant belonged to well- 
 
188 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 known families in the North of Ireland, deeply involved 
 in Covenanting politics. My own company commander 
 was a very gallant little Dublin barrister, who, before 
 the war, had exerted on English platforms against Home 
 Rule the gift of racy eloquence which he now devoted 
 to recruiting. Not half a dozen of the subalterns would 
 have described themselves as Nationalists. 
 
 It is easy to see how all this could be represented, and 
 was represented, to the outside public of Ireland. From 
 the inside, one thing was clear. In our battalion every 
 man desired the success of the Division, and more par- 
 ticularly of the Connaught Rangers, absolutely with a 
 whole heart. Anything said or done that could have 
 offended the men — practically all Catholic and Nationalist 
 — would have drawn the most condign chastisement 
 from our commanding officer. I never heard of any 
 man or officer in the battalion who would have desired 
 to change its colonel ; we were fortunate, and we knew 
 it. There was very little political discussion, and what 
 there was turned chiefly on the question how far Redmond 
 might be held to speak for Ireland. So far as Redmond 
 himself was concerned, I think there were few, if any, 
 who did not count it an honour to meet him — and some 
 who had never been won to him before were won to him 
 for his brother's sake. 
 
 Looking back on it all, it is clear to me that a change 
 wrought itself in that society. I do not know one sur- 
 vivor of those men who does not desire that accomplish- 
 ment should be given to the desire of those whom they 
 led. In not a few cases one might put the change higher ; 
 some opinions as to what was good for Ireland were 
 profoundly affected. 
 
 Yet this also is true. The atmosphere of the mess 
 was one in which Willie Redmond found himself shy 
 and a stranger. He had lived all his life in an intimate 
 circle of Nationalist belief. Knowing the other side in 
 the House of Commons, where many of his oldest friends 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 180 
 
 and the men he liked best (Colonel Lockwood comes 
 most readily to my mind) wore political opponents, he 
 had nevertheless always lived with people in agreement 
 with his views ; and you could not better describe the 
 atmosphere of our mess than by saying that it was a 
 society in which every one liked and respected Willie 
 Redmond, but one in which he never really was himself. 
 He was only himself with the men. 
 
 In short, so far as the officers were concerned, our 
 Division was not a counterpart to the Ulster Division ; 
 it was not Irish in the sense that the other was Ulster. 
 No attempt was made to make it so, and General Parsons 
 would have quite definitely rejected any such ideal — 
 though less fiercely than he would have repudiated the 
 idea of handicapping a man for his opinions or his creed. 
 Yet many persons without design, and some with a 
 purpose, spread broadcast the belief that Catholics and 
 Nationalists as such were relegated to a position of 
 inferiority in the command of this Catholic and Nationalist 
 Division. 
 
 The worst of our difficulties lay in the long inherited 
 suspicions of the Irish mind. At a recruiting meeting 
 one would argue in appealing to Nationalists that the 
 Home Rule Act was a covenant on which we were in 
 honour bound to act, and that every man who risked 
 his life on the faith of that covenant set a seal upon it 
 which would never be disregarded. The listeners would 
 applaud, but after the meeting one and another would 
 come up privately and say : " Are you sure now they 
 aren't fooling us again ? " The Sinn Fein propaganda, 
 always shrewdly conducted, did not fail to emphasize 
 the pronouncement of the Tory Press that there should 
 be no Home Rule because Ireland had failed to come 
 forward ; or to point the moral of Mr. Bonar Law's 
 excursion to Belfast, with its violent asseveration that 
 Ulster should be backed without limit in opposition to 
 control by an Irish Parliament. Ireland, always suspect, 
 
190 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 has learnt to be profoundly suspicious ; and suspicion 
 is the form of prophecy which has most tendency to 
 fulfil itself. 
 
 In one part of the Irish race, however, this cold para- 
 lysis of distrust had no oi^eration. The Irish in Great 
 Britain, always outdoing all others in the keenness of 
 their Nationalism, were nearer the main current of the 
 war, and were more in touch with the truth about English 
 feeling. They had a double impulse, as Redmond had ; 
 they saw how to serve their own cause in serving Europe's 
 freedom ; and their response was magnificent. Mr. 
 T. P. O'Connor probably raised more recruits by his 
 personal appeal than any other man in England. 
 
 A great part of Redmond's correspondence in these 
 months came from Irishmen in England who were joining 
 as Irishmen, and who had great difficulty in making their 
 way to our Division. Many thousands had already 
 enlisted elsewhere ; hundreds, at least, tried to join the 
 Sixteenth Division, and failed to get there. But there was 
 one instance to which attention should be directed. In 
 Newcastle-on-Tyne a movement was set on foot to raise 
 Tyneside battalions, including one of Irish. Mr. O'Connor 
 went down, and the upshot was that four Irish battalions 
 were raised. They were in existence by January 1, 1915, 
 when General Parsons was already writing that unless 
 Irishmen could be found to fill up the Division, we must 
 submit to the disgrace of having it made up by English 
 recruits. The obvious answer was to annex the Tyneside 
 Irish Brigade. Redmond, moreover, held that to bring 
 over this brigade to train in Ireland, and to incorporate it 
 bodily in the Sixteenth Division, would please the Tyneside 
 men — for a tremendous welcome would have greeted them 
 in their own country — and would have an excellent effect 
 on Irish opinion generally. But the proposal was rigor- 
 ously opposed by the War Office. It was argued that 
 these men had enlisted technically as Northumberland 
 Fusiliers and Northumberland Fusiliers they must remain. 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 191 
 
 In reality, as far as one can judge, the War Office were 
 penny wise and pound foolish. " We have got these 
 men," they said, " and we have a promise from Redmond 
 to fill a Division. Why relieve him of one-third of his 
 task ? " 
 
 Redmond knew, and wo all knew, that the essential 
 was to get our Division complete and into the field at 
 the earliest possible moment. He had confidence that 
 once they got to work they would make a name for them- 
 selves, which would be the best attraction for recruits. Let 
 it be remembered that at this moment popular expecta- 
 tion put the end of the war about July. When I joined 
 the Rangers in April 1915, our mess was full of young 
 officers threatening to throw up their commissions and 
 enlist in some battalion which would give them the chance 
 of seeing a fight. We could not expect to move to France 
 before August, and by that time all that we could hope 
 would be to form part of the army of occupation. Rumour 
 was rife, too, that the Division would be broken up and 
 utilized for draft-finding, that it would never see France 
 as a unit. All this talk came back to Redmond and 
 increased his anxiety to make the work complete. 
 
 He held, and I think rightly, that the whole machinery 
 of recruiting worked against us ; that every officer had 
 instructions to send no man to the Sixteenth Division who 
 could be got into a draft-finding reserve battalion. Know- 
 ing what we know, I cannot blame them ; but the game 
 was not fairly played. A man would come in and say 
 he wanted to join the Irish Brigade. " Which regiment ? " 
 Often he might not realize that a brigade was made up 
 of regiments, but if he knew and answered, for instance, 
 " The Dublins," he was more likely than not to be shipped 
 off to the Curragh, where the reserve of the regular 
 battalions was kept, instead of to Buttevant, where our 
 Dublins were in training. 
 
 Still, with all our troubles, things were marching ahead 
 in that April of 1915 ; recruits were coming in to the 
 
192 JOHN REDxMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 tune of 1,500 a week. Then came a political crisis and 
 the formation of a Coalition Government. Redmond 
 was asked to take a post in it. The letter in which the 
 invitation was conveyed made it clear that the post 
 could not be an Irish office. 
 
 Redmond refused. He said to me afterwards that 
 under no conditions did he think he could have accepted. 
 But he added, " If I had been Asquith and had wished 
 to make it as difficult as possible to refuse, I should 
 have offered a seat in the Cabinet without portfolio 
 and without salary." 
 
 He was well aware how many and how unscrupulous 
 were his enemies in Ireland ; he was not prepared to 
 give them the opportunity of saying that he had got 
 his price for the blood of young Irishmen and the betrayal 
 of his principles. Even apart from the question of salary, 
 the tradition against acceptance of office under Govern- 
 ment till Ireland's claim was satisfied would have been 
 very hard to break. Yet Redmond saw fully how dis- 
 astrous would be the effect on Irish opinion if he were 
 not in the Government and Sir Edward Carson was. 
 
 Knowing Ireland as he did, he knew that the accept- 
 ance of Sir Edward Carson as a colleague would be taken 
 in Ireland to imply that the Government had abandoned 
 its support of Home Rule. Ireland would assume that 
 the Ulster leader would not come in except on his own 
 terms. Redmond made the strongest representations 
 that he could to the Prime Minister to exclude both 
 Irish parties to the unresolved dispute. But Sir Edward 
 Carson in those days was making himself very disagree- 
 able in the House of Commons and Mr. Asquith, as usual, 
 followed the line of least resistance. 
 
 The effect of the Coalition as formed was seen when 
 recruiting in Ireland dropped from 6,000 in April-May 
 to 3,000 in May-June. It stayed at the lower figure 
 for several months, till it was raised again by efforts for 
 which Redmond was chiefly responsible. I do not know 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IKISH BRIGADES 193 
 
 whether Sir Edward Carson's presence in the Attorney- 
 General's office, or his absence from the Opposition 
 benches in debates, was worth ten thousand men ; but 
 that is a small measure of what was lost in Ireland by 
 his inclusion. 
 
 IV 
 
 The formation of the Coalition Government marks the 
 first stage in the history of Redmond's defeat and the 
 victory of Sir Edward Carson and Sinn Fein. 
 
 Of what he felt upon this matter, Redmond at the 
 time said not a word in public. Six months later, on 
 November 2, 1915, when a debate on the naval and 
 military situation was opened, he broke silence — and his 
 first words were an explanation of his silence. He had 
 not intervened, he said, in any debate on the war since 
 its inception. " We thought a loyal and as far as possible 
 silent support to the Government of the da}' was the best 
 service we could render." This silence had been main- 
 tained " even after the formation of the Coalition " — 
 when the Irish view had been roughly set aside, and 
 when the personal tie to the Liberal Government with 
 which he had been so long allied had been profoundly 
 modified. He claimed the credit of this loyalty not 
 merely for himself but for the whole of his country. 
 " Since the war commenced the voice of party controversy 
 has disappeared in Ireland." 
 
 This was pushing generosity almost to a stretch of 
 imagination, for the voice of party controversy had not 
 been absent from the Belfast Press, nor had it spared 
 him. But he was speaking then, and he desired that 
 the House should feel that he spoke, as Ireland's spokes- 
 man ; he claimed credit for North and South alike in 
 the absence of all labour troubles in war supply. " The 
 spectacle of industrial unrest in Great Britain, the 
 
 14 
 
194 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 determined and unceasing attacks in certain sections of 
 the Press upon individual members of the Government and 
 in a special way upon the Prime Minister, have aroused 
 the greatest concern and the deepest indignation in 
 Ireland," he said. " Mr. Asquith stands to-day, as before 
 the war, high in the confidence of the Irish people." 
 The " persistent pessimism " had effected nothing except 
 to help in some measure *' that little fringe which exists 
 in Ireland as in England, of men who would if they could 
 interfere with the success of recruiting." 
 
 No doubt there was an clement of policy, of a fencer's 
 skill, in all this. Sir Edward Carson had not maintained 
 silence and certainly had not spared the Prime Minister. 
 But in essence Redmond was relying on the plain truth. 
 He had pledged support and he gave it to the utmost 
 of his power, even at his peril. Mr, Birrell in the 
 posthumous " Appreciation " which has been already 
 quoted has this passage : 
 
 " Although it was not always easy to do business with 
 him, being very justly suspicious of English politicians, 
 ho could be trusted more implicitly than almost every 
 other politician I have ever come in contact with. Ho 
 was slow to pass his word, but when he had done so, 
 you knew he would keep it to the very letter, and what 
 was almost as important, his silence and discretion could 
 be relied upon with certainty. He was constitutionally 
 incapable of giving anybody away who had trusted him." 
 Nothing but considerations of loyalty had kept him 
 publicly silent in the months of this year when so much 
 was done, and so much left undone, against his desire 
 and his judgment. In June, the Sixteenth Division was 
 within IjOOO of completion. The shortage existed in one 
 brigade — the 49th — which had been formed of battalions 
 having their recruiting areas in Ulster — two of the Royal 
 Irish Fusiliers, one of the Inniskillings and one of the 
 Royal Irish Rifles. The conception had undoubtedly 
 been to provide for the Nationalists of Ulster. But, as 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 195 
 
 it proved, these men vastly preferred to enlist in units 
 which were not associated with the avowedly Unionist 
 Division, all of whose battalions belonged to one or other 
 of these three regiments ; and the 49th Brigade was 
 not nearly up to strength. The Tenth Division was now on 
 the point of readiness for the field ; but when the final 
 weeding out of unfit or half trained men was completed 
 its ranks were 1,200 short. The War Office decided to 
 draw, not on both the other Irish Divisions, but on the 
 Sixteenth only, and only upon the deficient brigade. 
 When the offer of immediate service was made, every man 
 in its four battalions volunteered, and the Tenth Division 
 was completed ; but the Sixteenth was thrown back, 
 and the discouraging rumour that it was to be only used 
 as a reserve gained a great impetus. Redmond was very 
 angry. He wrote to Mr. Tennant demanding that at 
 least the Division's deficiency should at once be made 
 up, by giving to us the full product of one or two weeks' 
 recruiting in Ireland. Nothing of the kind was done 
 to meet his request. 
 
 It was, however, some compensation to think that 
 at least one of our purely Irish formations was going to 
 take the field ; and we hoped that its fortunes might 
 remedy a complaint which began to be loudly made — 
 that credit was withheld from the achievements of Irish 
 troops. 
 
 The main source of this grievance was the publication 
 of Admiral de Robeck's despatch concerning the first 
 landing at Gallipoli. In the original document, a schedule 
 was given showing the detail of troops told off to each 
 of the separate landings ; and the narrative, in which 
 a sailor spoke with frank enthusiasm of the desperate 
 valour shown by soldiers, was written with constant 
 reference to the detail given. As some evil chance willed, 
 the narrative mentioned by name several of the regiments 
 engaged ; but when it came to describe the forlorn hope 
 at '* V " Beach, it dealt fully with the special difficulties, 
 
196 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 and said in brief but emphatic phrase, " Here the troops 
 wrought miracles." The War Office, in editing the 
 despatch for publication, suppressed the schedule, as 
 likely to give information to the enemj*, so that in this 
 case it did not appear to whom the praise applied. 
 
 Certain things are unbelievable. No officer and no 
 man that ever lived could from a partisan feeling against 
 Ireland have sought to rob regiments who had done 
 and suffered such things as the Dublins and Munsters 
 did and suffered at " V " Beach of whatever credit could 
 be given to them. Yet in such times as we were living 
 in, the unbelievable is readily believed, and men saw 
 malice in the suppression of what could not long be 
 secret : Ireland had too many dead that day. What 
 made the suggestion more incredible only gave a poignancy 
 to rei^entment, for Admiral de Robeck was an Irishman, 
 with his home some few miles from the regimental depot 
 of the Dublins. 
 
 Two things, however, should be said. If only in fair- 
 ness to Admiral de Robeck, the explanation should 
 instantly have been given : it was never given in full 
 until he came before the Dardanelles Commission, many 
 months later, and it has not been officially published to 
 this hour. And further, whoever edited the despatch 
 was presumably a soldier, and knew how jealous soldiers 
 are, and how jealous their friends are for them, of every 
 word that goes to the recognition of such service. The 
 effect of omitting the schedule ought to have been fore- 
 seen. 
 
 Even before the middle of August, when angry letters 
 over this despatch were appearing in the Irish Press, 
 other news began to come to Ireland, ill calculated 
 to help recruiting. The Tenth Division had come into 
 action, but under the unluckiest conditions. When the 
 great attempt was made to cut across the peninsula by 
 a renewed push from Anzac and by a new landing at 
 Suvla Bay, the Irish were among the reinforcements 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 197 
 
 told off for that surprise. But from lack of room on the 
 island bases it was considered impossible to keep them 
 together as a division, and one brigade, the 29th, lay 
 so far off that it could not be brought into the con- 
 certed movement on Suvla. It was therefore sent 
 separately to Anzac. and joined in with the Australians. 
 Broken up by regiments and not operating as a unit, 
 it furnished useful support ; but no credit for what the 
 men did could go to Ireland. The other two brigades, 
 the 30th and 31st, were left under the command of 
 their divisional general and were to attack on the left 
 of the bay. But owing to some defect in exploration 
 of the coast-line, the movement was not so carried out ; 
 six battalions out of the eight were landed on the south 
 of the bay and were attached to the right-hand force. 
 Thus, in the actual operations Sir Bryan Mahon had 
 under his command only two battalions of his own men. 
 The remaining six operated under the command of the 
 divisional general of the Eleventh Division, who delegated 
 the conduct of the actual attack to one of his brigadiers. 
 It is sufficient to say that immediately after the action 
 both these officers were relieved of their commands. 
 The same fate befell the corps commander under whose 
 directions this wing of the concerted movement was 
 placed. 
 
 In face of these facts it would be absurd to deny that 
 the troops were badly handled. They suffered terribly 
 from thirst, and the suffering was in large measure pre- 
 ventible. The attack was a failure. All the success 
 achieved was the capture of Chocolate Hill, and the 
 Irish claim that success. It is disputed b}- other regi- 
 ments. This much is certain : the Irisli were part of 
 the troops who carried the hill, and at nightfall, when 
 the rest were withdrawn to the beach, the Irish were 
 left holding it. 
 
 But they had paid dearly, and in the days which 
 followed many more were sacrificed in the hopeless effort 
 
198 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 to retrieve what had been lost when the surprise attack 
 failed. The loss fell specially on a picked battalion, 
 the 7th Diiblins, which had grown up about a footballers' 
 company, the ver}^ flower of j'oung Irish manhood. Grief 
 and indignation were universal when tales of what had 
 happened began to come through. 
 
 But of all this Redmond said no word in public. He 
 threatened disclosure in debate at one period ; yet on 
 a strong representation from Mr. Tennant — in whose 
 friendliness, as in the Prime Minister's, he had confidence 
 — he refrained. To this abstention he added the most 
 practical proof of good will. Lord Wimborne, now Lord- 
 Lieutenant, seriously concerned at the continued drop 
 in recruiting, which had not shown any v'^ign of recovery 
 since the Coalition Government was formed, came to 
 him with the proposal for a conference on the subject. 
 In pursuance of this suggestion Redmond went to 
 London, where an interview took place between him and 
 Lord Kitchener, Mr. Birrell and Mr. Tennant assisting. 
 Redmond put in a memorandum stating his complaints, 
 and thrashed out the subject to satisfactory conclu- 
 sions on all points that directly affected recruiting. 
 The conference ultimate!}^ met at the Viceregal Lodge 
 on October 15th. It included the Primate of All Ireland, 
 Lord Londonderry, Lord Meatli, I^ord P(>wer.scourt, Sir 
 Nugent Everard, the O'Conor Don and Colonel Sharman 
 Crawford, the Lord Mayors of Dublin, Belfast and Cork, 
 and Redmond. The military were represented by Major- 
 General Friend, commanding the troops in Ireland, with 
 whom Redmond always had the most cordial relations. 
 
 Only those who understand something of Irish tradition 
 will realize how great a departure from established usage 
 it was for ParnelFs lieutenant and successor to take part 
 formally in a meeting at the Viceregal Lodge — or indeed 
 to cross its threshold for any purpose. But Redmond 
 always had the logic of his convictions. As part of a 
 compact, he was helping to the best of his power the 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 199 
 
 Government which must carry on till Home Rule could 
 come into operation ; and here as elsewhere he waa ready 
 to mark his conviction that the enactment of Home Rule 
 had made possible a complete change in his attitude. 
 
 Among his papers is a very full note of what passed 
 on this occasion. It is confidential, but one may note 
 the extreme friendliness of attitude as between Redmond 
 and the Ulster representatives, and also the fact that 
 the operative suggestions agreed on were proposed first 
 by Redmond himself. They were the result of his inter- 
 view with Lord Kitchener. Recruiting in Ireland should 
 no longer be left to voluntary effort, but a Department 
 should be formed corresponding to that over which Lord 
 Derby had been appointed to preside in Great Britain ; 
 and the Lord-Lieutenant himself should accept the posi- 
 tion of its official head, and should appoint or nominate 
 some man of known business capacity to preside over 
 the detail of organization. Redmond pressed also that 
 the country should be told definitely what Lord Wim- 
 borne had told the conference, that the need was for a 
 total of about 1,100 recruits per week. 
 
 He insisted also very strongly on the publication of 
 a letter which Lord Kitchener at his instance had written 
 to the conference. Its last paragraph read : 
 
 " The Irisli are entitled to their full share of the com- 
 pliments paid to the rest of the United Kingdom for 
 their hitherto magnificent response to the appeal for 
 men ; but if that response is to reap its due and onlj^ 
 reward in victory, the supply must be continued." 
 
 Over 81,000 recruits had been raised in Ireland since 
 the war started — a period of eighty-two weeks. Viewed 
 in comparison with Lord Kitchener's original anticipa- 
 tions, the result might well be called " magnificent." 
 But it was necessary to maintain the same weekly 
 average, and for four months the figure had been much 
 below this. The result of the new campaign was to 
 raise nearly 7,500 men in seven weeks. 
 
200 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 In the campaign thus launched, as Redmond so 
 keenly desired, under the joint auspices of Ulstermen, 
 Southern Unionists and Nationalists, one circumstance 
 attracted attention. It was proposed to hold a great 
 meeting at Newry, the frontier town where Ulster 
 marches with the South — a centre in which recruiting 
 had been singularly keen and successful. The scheme 
 was to unite on one platform the Lord-Lieutenant, 
 Redmond and Sir Edward Carson. Sir Edward Carson, 
 however, " did not think the proposal would serve 
 any useful purpose," and the meeting was held without 
 him, in December 1915. 
 
 By this time the Sixteenth Division was under orders 
 for France. We had been since September in training 
 at Blackdown, near Aldershot ; and here Redmond was 
 one of several distinguished visitors who came to eee 
 us and address the troops. He came down also un- 
 officially more than once, for his brother had a pleasant 
 house among the pine-trees — where he guarded, or was 
 guarded by, the brigade's mascot, the largest of three 
 enormous wolfhounds which, through John Redmond, 
 were presented to the Irish Division. 
 
 Towards the end of the year new rumours were afloat. 
 The 49th Brigade had never been made up to strength, 
 and there were stories that a non-Irish brigade was to 
 b© linked up with us. Letters from two commanding 
 officers of the 49th Brigade illustrate the extent to which 
 Redmond had come by all ranks to be regarded as our 
 tutelary genius ; to him they appealed for redress, fearing 
 that they would be turned into a reserve brigade. The 
 matter was settled at last to his content and theirs by a 
 decision that the two brigades which were ready should 
 go out in advance, to be followed by the 49th ; and we 
 entrained accordingly on December 17th. 
 
 Sir Lawrence Parsons wrote to Mr. Birrell : "As the 
 last train-load moved out of Farnborough station the 
 senior Railway Staff Officer came up to me and said, 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 201 
 
 * Well, General, that i3 the soberest, quietest, most 
 amenable and best disciplined Division that has left 
 Aldershot, and I have seen them all go.' " The compli- 
 ment was well paid to General Parsons, and it may 
 have been some consolation for a sore heart : that keen 
 spirit had to be content to be left behind. Major-General 
 W. B. Hickio, C.B., who had greatly distinguished him- 
 self in France, now took over command. It would be 
 disingenuous to say that John Redmond was not content 
 with this change ; but his brother was deeply impressed 
 by the hardship inflicted on a gallant soldier. 
 
 The Ulster Division had preceded us by three months. 
 All three Irish Divisions were now in the field, and reserve 
 brigades were established to feed them. Redmond could 
 feel that in great measure his work was done, and that 
 he could await the issue in confidence. 
 
 He wrote at this time, in a preface contributed to 
 Mr. MacDonagh's book The Irish at the Front, a passage 
 of unusual emotion which tells what he thought and 
 felt upon this matter. 
 
 "It is these soldiers of ours, with their astonishing 
 courage and tJieir beautiful faith, with their natural 
 military genius, carrying with them their green flags 
 and their Irish war-pipes, advancing to the charge, their 
 fearless officers at their head, and followed by their 
 beloved chaplains as great-hearted as themselves — bring- 
 ing with them a quality all their own to the sordid modern 
 battlefield — it is these soldiers of ours to whose keeping 
 the Cause of Ireland has passed. It was never in holier, 
 worthier keeping than with these boys offering up their 
 supreme sacrifice of life with a smile on their lips because 
 it was given for Ireland." 
 
 He wrote this when fresh from a sight of troops in the 
 field. This visit took place in November 1915, and lie 
 was full of the experience when he came down to say 
 good-bye before we went out. Nothing in all his life had 
 approached it in interest, he said to me. The diary of 
 
202 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 his tour is prefixed to Mr. S. P. Ker*a book, What the 
 Irish Regiments Have Done — but it conveys little, except 
 this dominant impression : " From the Irish Commander- 
 in-Chief himself right down through the Army one meets 
 Irishmen wherever one goes." On that journey he got 
 the same welcome from Ulstermen as from his own 
 nearest countrymen in the Royal Irish Regiment. 
 
 One thing at least Redmond gained, I think, from liis 
 visit to the front — the sense that with the British Army 
 in the field he was in a friendly country. He never had 
 that sense with regard to the War Office. Running all 
 through this critical year 1915 is the history of one long 
 failure — his attempt to secure the creation of a Home 
 Defence force in Ireland. Given that, he would be confi- 
 dent of possessing the foundation for the structure of 
 an Irish Arnij^ — an army which would be regarded as 
 Ireland's own. Without it, the whole fabric of his efforts 
 must be insecure. He desired to build, as in England 
 they built, upon the voluntary effort of a people in whom 
 entire confidence was placed. In the War Office un- 
 doubtedly men's minds were set upon finding a regular 
 supply of Irish troops by quite other methods — by the 
 application of compulsion. 
 
 Redmond saw to the full the danger of attemj^ting 
 compulsion with an unwilling people ; it was a peril 
 which he sought to keep off, and while he lived did keep 
 off, by securing a steady flow of recruits, by gaining a 
 reasonable definition of Ireland's quota, and by exerting 
 that personal authority which the recognition of his 
 efforts conferred upon him. I do not think he was with- 
 out hope of a moment when Ireland might come, as 
 Great Britain had come by the end of this year, to 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 203 
 
 recognize that the voluntary system levied an unfair toll 
 on the willing, and that the community itself should accept 
 the general necessity of binding its own members. But 
 before this could be even dreamed of as practicable, 
 the whole force of Volunteers, North and South, must 
 feel that they were trusted and recognized, a part in 
 the general work. 
 
 The practical organization of the great body at his 
 disposal was under discussion between him and Colonel 
 Moore from February 1915 onwards ; and the idea was 
 mooted tfc^at by introducing the territorial system Ulster 
 Volunteers and National Volunteers might be drawn 
 into the same corps. This, however, was for the future ; 
 the immediate need was to extend the arming and training 
 under their own organization. Redmond learnt at once 
 that Lord Kitchener was against this ; that he pointed 
 to the existence of another armed force in the North of 
 Ireland and argued that to create a second must mean 
 civil war ; that he believed revolutionary forces to exist 
 in Ireland which Redmond could not control and perhaps 
 did not even suspect. Those who then thought with 
 Lord Kitchener can say now that events have justified 
 his view. They omit to consider how far those events 
 proceeded from Lord Kitchener's refusal to accept 
 Redmond's judgment. 
 
 Of the danger Redmond was fully aware. " I under- 
 stand 5'our position to be," Mr. T. P. O'Connor wrote to 
 him in January 1915, " that unless your plan as to the 
 Irish Volunteers is adopted we are face to face with a 
 most critical and dangerous situation in Ireland." Just 
 as fully was he convinced of the way to meet it. In 
 February, replying indignantly to Sir Reginald Brade, 
 who had complained that Irish recruiting was " distinctly 
 languid," he enumerated the points at which the War 
 Office had failed to act on his own advice, and urged once 
 more, in the first instance, his original policy of employing 
 both Ulster and Nationalist Volunteers for Home Defence. 
 
204 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 " If the two bodies of volunteers were trusted with the 
 defence of the country under proper military drill and 
 discipline, the result would unquestionably be that a 
 large number of them would volunteer for the front. 
 Recruiting can best be promoted by creating an atmo- 
 sphere in which the patriotism of the younger men of 
 the country can be evoked, and we have done a good 
 deal already in this direction." 
 
 On April 4th a display was made of the force available. 
 A review was held in the Phoenix Park of 25,000 men — 
 splendid material, but half of them with neither arms 
 nor uniform. The Unionist Press was friendly in its 
 comments upon the statement which Redmond supplied 
 after the parade, claiming that these men should be 
 utilized for Home Defence. That day was Easter Sunday 
 of 1915. No one guessed then what the next Easter 
 was going to bring about. 
 
 On April 19th I find him writing officially to Mr. Birrell, 
 seeking the Chief Secretary's influence with the War 
 Office, and claiming, what was the truth, that the Irish 
 Command shared his view. But at the moment recruit- 
 ing was increasing weekly and the War Office were in 
 no mood to make further concessions than those by 
 which the improvement had been brought about. Then 
 came the Coalition, and the consequent reduction of 
 recruiting from close on 7,000 to 3,000 a month ; and in 
 July the Adjutant-General, Sir Henry Sclater, of his 
 own motion approached Redmond. He suggested a 
 meeting between Redmond and the War Office, with 
 Sir Matthew Nathan and General Parsons in attendance. 
 Redmond agreed to the proposal, but formulated his 
 views in a lengthy memorandum. The first three points 
 dealt with matters directly concerning the Sixteenth 
 Division, but in the fourth, weighty emphasis was laid 
 on the suggestion of recruiting Volunteers for Home 
 Defence. Sir Henry Sclater's reply omitted completely 
 all reference to this last — an omission on which Redmond 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 205 
 
 commented sharply. He elicited the official answer that 
 by urging men to join on a special enlistment for home 
 service the numbers who would join for general service 
 would be reduced. This was diametrically opposite to 
 Redmond's view, and he said so, and urged again that 
 the Irish Command was of his opinion. 
 
 The proposed conference resolved itself — to Redmond's 
 indignation — into a discussion of Redmond's memorandum 
 between the Adjutant-General and Sir Lawrence Parsons. 
 Only in September, when at Lord Wimborne's instance 
 he interviewed Lord Kitchener, did he have the oppor- 
 tunity of raising the matter by direct speech. Lord 
 Kitchener then declared himself willing to admit that 
 on the question whether enlistment for Home Defence 
 would promote or retard recruiting, Redmond's judgment 
 was probably more valuable than his own, and he 
 promised to review the question of Home Defence again 
 in the light of it. But of this promise nothing came. 
 
 Meantime Redmond was being warned that the Volunteer 
 organization as it stood had exhausted its usefulness ; 
 its enthusiasm was gone — a natural result of having no 
 purpose. A new opening seemed to be created by the 
 Bill which Lord Lincolnshire introduced to recognize 
 a Volunteer Force in Great Britain which should perform 
 military duties under the War Office control. Redmond 
 hoped to see this carried with an extension of it to Ireland, 
 and this was the practical proposal with which he con- 
 cluded his speech when, on November 2nd, for the first 
 time in that year, he raised in debate the questions 
 to which so much of his time and thought had been 
 given. 
 
 How was the Irish recruiting problem to be dealt with ? 
 He declared himself absolutely against compulsion, to 
 impose which would be " a folly and a crime " unless the 
 country was " practically unanimous in favour of it." 
 The voluntary system had never had fair play — at all 
 events in Ireland. 
 
206 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 ** It is a fact, which has its origin in history, and which 
 I need not refer to more closely — it is a fact that in the 
 past recruiting for the British Army was not popular 
 with the ma.^s of the Irish people. But when the war 
 broke out, my colleagues and I, quite regardless, let 
 me say, of the political risks which sta.red us in the face, 
 instantly made an appeal to those whom we represented 
 in Ireland, and told them that this was Ireland's war 
 as well as England's war, that it was a just war, and 
 that the recent attitude of Great Britain to Ireland had 
 thrown upon us a great, grave duty of honour to the 
 British Empire. We then wont back from this country, 
 and we went all through Ireland. I myself, within the 
 space of about a montli after that, made speeches at 
 great public meetings in every one of the four provinces 
 of Ireland. We set ourselves to the task of creating in 
 Ireland — creating, mind j'ou — an atmosphere favourable 
 to recruiting, and of creating a sentiment in Ireland 
 favourable to recruiting. I say most solemnly, that in 
 that task we were absolutely entitled to the sympathy 
 and the assistance of the Government and the War Office. 
 I am sorry to say we got neither." 
 
 He disclaimed all imputation upon the Prime Minister 
 or the Under-Secretary, Mr. Tennant — exceptions which 
 pointed the reference to Lord Kitchener. 
 
 '' The fact remains that when we were faced with 
 that difficult and formidable task, practically every 
 suggestion that wo made, based on the strength of our 
 own knowledge of Avhat was suitable for Ireland and 
 the conditions there, was put upon one side. The gentle- 
 men who were responsible for that evidently believed 
 that they knew what was suited to the necessities of 
 Ireland far better than we did. A score of times, at 
 least, I put upon paper and sent to the Government and 
 the War Office my suggestions and my remonstrances, 
 but all in vain. Often, almost in despair, I was tempted 
 to rise in this House and publicly tell the House of 
 Commons the way in which we were hampered and 
 thwarted in our work in Ireland. I refrained from doing 
 so from fear of doing mischief and from fear of doing 
 harm. To-day I am very glad that I so refrained, because 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 207 
 
 in spite of these discouragomcnts, in spite of this thwart- 
 ing and embarrassing, and in spite of the utterly faulty 
 and ridiculous system of recruiting that was set on foot, 
 we have succeeded, and have raised in Ireland a body 
 of men whose numbers Lord Kitchener, in his lettc-r to 
 the Irish conference, declared were magnificent." 
 
 He quoted the Unionist Birmingham Post for the 
 saying that what had happened in Ireland was " a 
 miracle." From the National Volunteers 27,054 men 
 had joined the colours ; from the Ulster Volunteers 
 27,412. In both forces there must be manj^ left \^ho 
 could not leave Ireland, yet might be utilized in Ireland. 
 
 " It ma}' bo remembered that the very day the war 
 broke out I rose in my place in this House and offered 
 the Volunteers to the Government for Home Defence. 
 1 only spoke, of course, of the National Volunteers. I 
 was not entitled to speak for the Ulster Volunteers, but 
 I suggested tiiat they and we might work sliouldcr to 
 shoulder. From that da}'^ to this the War Office have 
 persistently refused to have anj'thing to say to these 
 Volunteers. The Prime Minister, a few da\s after I 
 spoke, in answer to a question told me that the Govern- 
 ment were considering at that moment how best to 
 utilize these Volunteers. They have never been utilized 
 since. A few daj'^s after I made my speech I went myself 
 to the War Office, and as a result of my interviews there 
 I submitted to the Government a scheme which would 
 have provided them at once with 25,000 men. If that 
 offer had been accepted, rot 25,000, not 50,000, but 100,000 
 men would have been enlisted for Home Defence within 
 the month. But no, it was obstinately refused. I hear 
 that an lion, member below me is now apparently in- 
 clined to take the point that the W^ar Office took. The 
 War Office said that would interfere with recruiting in 
 Ireland. Of course, we know Ireland better than the 
 hon. member. We know our difficulties in Ireland, We 
 do not believe that it would. On the contrary, we believe 
 that it would have promoted recruiting. Wc believe 
 that the enlistment of these men, their association in 
 barracks and in camp, with the inevitable creation and 
 fostering of a military spirit, would have led to a large 
 
208 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 number of volunteers for foreign service. Our views 
 counted for nought. In this instance they were not 
 only our views. These views had the approval of the 
 Irish Command, and from the purely military point of 
 view the Irish Command was in favour of some such 
 scheme as I had outlined, and the reason was plain. 
 They have to provide, and are providing to this day, 
 20,000 to 25,000 men from the Regular Army for the 
 defence of the coasts of Ireland — guarding the coast, 
 guarding piers, railways, bridges, and so forth. If these 
 men of ours had been taken up, within two or three months 
 of training and in camp they would have been able to 
 do this work, and would have done it ever since, and 
 would thereby have released from 20,000 to 25,000 men. 
 That is the chief reason, I fancy, why the Military Com- 
 mand in Ireland were in favour of this idea. But to 
 this moment the refusal continues. I see that an un- 
 official Bill was introduced by the Marquess of Lincoln- 
 fthire into the House of Lords doing, to a great measure, 
 for England and Wales what we have been asking should 
 be done for Ireland. I claim that that Bill shall be 
 extended to Ireland." 
 
 The Volunteer Bill came to the House of Commons 
 in a form making it applicable to Ireland. There it 
 was opposed by Sir Edward Carson, who demanded 
 that no man of military age should be accepted as a 
 volunteer unless he consented to enlist for general service 
 if called. This killed the Bill. 
 
 Sir Edward Carson was of opinion that the necessities 
 oi the case demanded universal compulsory service ; 
 and conscription was already in sight. With that prospect 
 Redmond's anxiety became very grave. 
 
 On November 15th he wrote his mind to the Prime 
 
 Minister : 
 
 House ok Commons, 
 
 _ . November 15, 1915. 
 
 Private. 
 
 My Dear Mr. Asquith, 
 
 I have been in a state of great anxiety for some 
 time on the question of a possible Conscription Bill, and 
 I have discussed the matter fully \\ith Mr. Birrell, who 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 209 
 
 know3 my viewa, and who, no doubt, has communicatod 
 them to you. 
 
 I think it well, however, to shortly put, in writing, 
 our position. 
 
 In your Dublin speech you asked the Irish people for 
 " a free offering from a free people," and the response 
 has been, taking everything into account, in the words 
 of Lord Kitchener, " magnificent/' 
 
 Recruiting is now going on at a greater rate than 
 ever in Ireland, and it would be a terrible misfortune 
 if we were driven into a position on the question of con- 
 scription which would alienate that public opinion which 
 we have now got upon our side in Ireland. 
 
 The position would, indeed, be a cruel one, if con- 
 scription were enacted for England, and Ireland excluded. 
 
 On the other hand, I must tell you that the enforce- 
 ment of conscription in Ireland is an impossibility. 
 
 Faced with this dilemma, if a Conscription Bill be 
 introduced, the Irish party will be forced to oppose it as 
 vigorously as possible at every stage. 
 
 I regret having to write you in this way, but it is 
 only right that I should be quite frank in the matter. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 J. E. Redmond. 
 
 Rt. Hon. H. H. Asquith, M.P., 
 Prime Minister. 
 
 Assurances reached him that the first tentative Bill 
 for compelling unmarried men to enlist would only be 
 introduced to fulfil a pledge given by Mr. Asquith in 
 connection with the Derby Scheme, and that as the 
 Derby Scheme had not applied to Ireland, the pledge 
 also had no bearing there. By December 21st the matter 
 was raised in the House of Commons. Redmond, after 
 the Prime Minister had spoken, defined what he was 
 careful to call " my personal view " on the question of 
 compulsory service. 
 
 ** I am content to take the phrase used by the Prime 
 Minister. I am prepared to say that I will stick at 
 nothing — nothing which is necessary, nothing which is 
 calculated to effect the purpose — in order to end this 
 
 16 
 
210 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 war." He added : " That is the view, I am certain, of 
 the people of Ireland." 
 
 The whole question was presented by him as " one 
 of expediency and necessity, not of principle." From 
 that standpoint he declared himself unconvinced that 
 the adoption of compulsion in any shape was either 
 expedient or necessary. It was inexpedient because it 
 would " break up the unity of the country " — unnecessary 
 because they had already many more men than they 
 could either train or equip. In Ireland, a limited task 
 had been defined, to keep up the necessary reserves for 
 fifty-three battalions of infantry, and he pointed to the 
 fact that so far the new organization of recruiting was 
 producing the stipulated flow. 
 
 On these grounds, he said, the Irish party would oppose 
 the measure, and on January 5th that opposition was 
 offered, though Ireland was excluded from the Bill. But 
 the first division showed a majority of more than ten 
 to one for the proposal ; and in face of that, when the 
 House returned to the discussion, Redmond declared that 
 Irish opposition must cease — especially in view of the 
 support given by the responsible leaders of Labour. 
 Sir Edward Carson, following, pressed him to go one 
 step farther and accept the inclusion of Ireland in the 
 Bill. Nothing, he said, could do so much to conciliate 
 Ulster. This was the first time that any suggestion of 
 this possibility had come from that quarter, and it came 
 in backing a suggestion which Redmond could not accept. 
 I was not present at the debate, and it is hard to judge 
 of such matters from the printed record, but the im- 
 pression on my mind is that the suggestion was made 
 without any desire to embarrass. A few days later, in 
 the Committee stage, an Ulster member moved an 
 amendment which would have included Ireland. Mr. 
 Bonar Law, speaking for the Government, advised against 
 it — on the ground of expediency ; it would not be an 
 easy thing to put this measure into operation in Ireland. 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 211 
 
 Sir Edward Carson spoke later and counselled the dropping 
 of the amendment. With matters in this stage Redmond 
 spoke very fully to the House, recognizing the absence 
 of all partisan tone in the speeches of Ulster members. 
 He had long felt, he said, that '' if conscription came, 
 Ireland's whole attitude towards the ^^'ar was likely to 
 suffer cruel and unjust misrepresentation," because it 
 must emphasize a difference between the two countries. 
 Conscription in Ireland would be " imi^racticable, un- 
 workable and impossible." Instead of leading to the 
 increase in the supply of men it would have the oj^posite 
 effect. 
 
 " It would most undoubtedly paralyse the efforts of 
 myself and others who have worked unsparingly — and 
 not unsuccessfully — since the commencement of the war, 
 and would play right into the hands of those who are 
 a contemptible minority among the Nationalists of 
 Ireland, and who .are trying — unsuccessfully trying — to 
 prevent recruiting and to undermine thus the position 
 and power of the Irish party because of the attitude we 
 have taken up." 
 
 Ho complained once more of the Government's failure 
 to utilize the Volunteers and of the damping effect which 
 had resulted from the non-fulfilment of Mr. Asquith's 
 words. Yet Ireland was doing all that was asked of 
 it — maintaining the reserves of Irishmen for Irish regi- 
 ments at the front. — This was true at the moment ; but 
 the Sixteenth Division had scarcely yet begun to come 
 into the line and the Ulster Division, during its first few 
 months, suffered slight casualties. In point of fact, how- 
 ever, the bare rumour of conscription had checked 
 recruiting, and Redmond was guarded in his terms. It 
 was, he said, " on the whole very satisfactory, and in the 
 towns amazing " ; but he admitted that the country 
 districts had not given an adequate response. 
 
 But he made now an appeal to the House as a 
 whole to lift the consideration of this whole matter on 
 
212 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 to broad lines, to view it on the plane of statesmanship. 
 If five years earlier anyone had foretold that in a 
 great war Ireland would send 95,000 volunteer new 
 recruits to fight by the side of England, would he not 
 have been regarded as a lunatic ? " The change in 
 Ireland has been so rapid that men are apt to forget its 
 history." That was a true saying ; his own success 
 had created diificulties for him. Once more he quoted 
 the example of the other statesman in the Empire whose 
 position had most analogy with his own. " I honestly 
 believe," he said, " that General Botha's difficulties 
 were small compared with those we had to confront in 
 Ireland. ... It is true to say at this moment that the 
 overwhelming sentiment of the Irish people is with the 
 Empire for the first time." 
 
 That was his claim, and in that month of January 1916 
 he was fully entitled to make it ; and the House, I think, 
 recognized his justification. His speech has in it the 
 ring of confidence, of assurance that he would be taken 
 at his word. 
 
 " Rest satisfied," he said ; "do not try to drive Ire- 
 land." Wise words, and they were not unwisely listened 
 to. There was no room for doubting this man's earnest- 
 ness when he went on to tell how he himself had recently 
 met Irish troops in the field, and had then pledged him- 
 self to them to spare no effort in raising the necessary 
 reserves for their ranks among their own countrymen. 
 *' Trust us," he said to the House, indicating himself 
 and his colleagues, " trust us to know, after all, the best 
 methods. Do not carp at Irish effort, and do not belittle 
 Irish effort." Then they might count on loyal and 
 enduring support till the great struggle was ended. 
 
 That speech, as I read it, marks the highwater-line 
 of Redmond's achievement. His statesmanship in the 
 counsels of the Empire had prevailed for his own country. 
 The Home Rule Act was on the Statute Book, and though 
 not in legal operation it was present in all minds ; and 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 213 
 
 now on a supreme issue — the blood-tax — Ireland's right 
 to be treated as self-governing was recognized in fact. 
 The argument which underlay implicitly Redmond's 
 whole contention was never set out ; it was contentious, 
 politically, and he wisely avoided it. He spoke for a 
 nation to which autonomy had been accorded by statute ; 
 he preferred men to feel for themselves rather than be 
 asked to admit that no self-governing nation will submit 
 voluntarily to the imposition of the blood-tax without 
 its own most formal consent. All that he said was, in 
 effect : You have Ireland with you for the first time, 
 by our assistance ; do not destroy our power to continue 
 that assistance, do not alienate Ireland. In the counsels 
 of the Empire his argument prevailed ; and during the 
 early months of 1916 the relations between Great Britain 
 and Ireland were better and happier than at any time 
 of which history holds record. An utterance from one 
 Irishman, and the general response to it, showed this 
 in extraordinary degree. 
 
 Our Division, or rather two brigades of it, had detrained 
 in France on the 19th of December ; the first impression 
 as we shook ourselves together for the march to strange 
 billets was? the sound of guns. Scattered about in different 
 villages lying round B6thune, our battalions passed the 
 next two months in the usual training before we should 
 take up our own sector of the line, and we saw little 
 or nothing of each other. March found us engaged, 
 though still only attached by companies to more seasoned 
 troops, in some rough crater-fighting on the ugly mine- 
 riddled stretch between Loos and Hulluch. It was when 
 we were marching out from broken houses about the 
 minehead at Annequin that we first met again our old 
 stable companions, the Royal Irish — and that I first 
 saw Willie Redmond in France at the head of his company. 
 
 He was on foot as always, for he never could be per- 
 suaded to ride while the men were marching, and I never 
 saw more geniality of greeting on any countenance than 
 
214 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 was on his when he came up with outstretched hand to 
 where I was sitting by the roadside — for we had halted 
 to see them go by. Here was a man utterly in his element, 
 radiant literally in the enthusiasm of his devotion. He 
 refused to listen to our talk of the bad time we had been 
 through in the place M'here they were to succeed us (and 
 in two winters of that war I never saw worse) ; all his 
 talk was of the good time which we should have in the 
 billets we were going to, which they had just left. Back 
 there, in and about AUouagne, they rejoined us ; and 
 I remember dining with him in his company mess and 
 hearing his eulogies of the splendid felloAvs that his com- 
 pany officers were. Then, about the time we moved 
 up into trenches, our first leaves began and he got home 
 in March. Naturally, he looked in at the House of 
 Commons, and realized for the first time how uneasy 
 well-informed persons in the lobbies were about the 
 chances of the war. Everybody who ever came home 
 from the front must have experienced the effect of that 
 strange transition from unquestioning confidence to 
 worried anxiety ; but Willie Redmond was the only man 
 who ever adequately gave expression to it. 
 
 It was on the eve of St. Patrick's Day, and the Army 
 Estimates were under discussion in a very thin House 
 — a wrangling, fault-finding debate. In the middle of it 
 Willie Redmond got up, and said that as he was not 
 likely to be there again, he had one or two things to say 
 which he thought the House would be glad to know. 
 Speaking as one of the oldest members, who had all but 
 completed his thirty-third year in Parliament, he told 
 them that every soul in the House should be proud of 
 the troops — not of the Irish troops, but of the troops 
 generally'' — because more than anything else of the 
 splendid spirit in which they were going through the 
 privations and dangers, — which he described with passion. 
 If he were to deliver a message from the troops, he knew 
 well what it would be : 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 215 
 
 *' Send us out the reinforcomenta which are necessary, 
 and which are naturally necessary. Send us out, as we 
 admit you have been doing up to this, the necessary 
 supplies, and when j^ou do that, have trust in the men 
 who are in the gap to conduct the war to the victory 
 which everyone at the front is confident is bound to come. 
 * And when victory does come,' the message would run 
 on, ' you in the House of Commons, in the countr\% and 
 in every newspaper in the countr^^ can spend the rest 
 of your lives in discussing as to whether the victory has 
 been won on proper lines or whether it has not,' Nothing 
 in the world can depress the spirits of the men that I 
 have seen at the front. I do not believe that there was 
 ever enough Germans born into this world to depress 
 them. If it were possible to depress them at all, it can 
 only be done by pursuing a course of embittered con- 
 troversy in this country — as to which was the right way 
 or the wrong way of conducting affairs at the front. When 
 a man feels that his feet are fi-eezing, when he is standing 
 in heavy rain for a whole night with no shelter, and when 
 next morning he tries to cook a piece of scanty food over 
 the scanty flame of a brazier in the mud, he perhaps sits 
 down for a few minutes in the day's dawn and takes up 
 an old newspaper, and finds speeches and leading articles 
 from time to time which tell him that apparently everj^- 
 thing is going wrong, that the Ministers who are at the 
 head of affairs in this country, upon whom he is depend- 
 ing, are not really men with their hearts in the work, but 
 are really more or less callous and calculating mercen- 
 aries, who are not directing affairs in tlie best way, but 
 are simply anxious to maintain their own salaries. I 
 say that when speeches and articles of that kind are found 
 in the newspapers they are calculated, if anything is or 
 can be so calculated, to depress the men who are at the 
 front." 
 
 Then came a few words in praise of the Irish troops 
 and in deprecation of the failure to recognize some of 
 their services ; a confident assurance that, " whether they 
 are remembered or not," the Sixteenth Division would do 
 their duty, with an equal assurance that the Ulster men 
 would do as well as they — and he reached to his conclusion ; 
 
216 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 *' Since I went out there I found that the common 
 salutation in all circumstances is one of cheer. If things 
 go pretty well and the men are fairly comfortable, they 
 say ' Cheer ! ' If things go badly, and the snow falls 
 and the rain comes througih the roof of a billet in an 
 impossible sort of cow-house, they say ' Cheer ! ' still 
 more. All we want out there is that you shall adopt 
 the same tone and say ' Cheer O ! ' to us." 
 
 It is not too much to say that this speech was received 
 with a cry of gratitude all over the country and through- 
 out the Army. It said what badly needed to be said, 
 and said it with a freshness and a dash that came superbly 
 from a company commander in his fifty-fourth year. 
 It was the best service that had yet been rendered to 
 John Redmond's policy. Everybody quite naturally 
 and simply accepted the Nationalist Irishman as the 
 spokesman for all the troops who were actuallj'^ in the 
 line. Mr. Walter Long, always a generous and candid 
 human being, was quick to give voice to this feeling : 
 
 '* The honourable and gallant member for East Clare 
 has been in conflict, not only with one particular political 
 party, but during the greater part of his career with 
 every party in turn, and has engaged in bitter controversy 
 with them. Does anybody doubt the fact that when 
 war was declared one great factor in the mind of the 
 Emperor responsible for this war was that dissension 
 would paralyse the hands of Great Britain ? Ireland, 
 whatever may have been our differences in the past, and 
 whatever may be our differences in happier days again 
 when wo are at peace, everybody must feel by the action 
 of her representatives, who have fought so bitterly in 
 this House and in the country, has created a new claim 
 for herself upon the affection, the gratitude, the respect 
 of the people of the Empire b)'' the great and proud part 
 that she has played in this great struggle." 
 
 That was the position to which Redmond's policy, 
 backed by the Irishmen who supported it with their 
 lives, of whom his brother was the outstanding represen- 
 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 217 
 
 tative, had brought this great issue. The next thing 
 which brought the name of Ireland prominently before 
 the world was the story of action taken by other Irish- 
 men, also at the risk of their lives, to reverse the strong 
 current which was then carrying us forward with so 
 hopeful augury. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 
 
 THE facts of the Irish rebellion are too generally 
 familiar to need more than the briefest restatement 
 — and perhaps too little known for an attempt at detailed 
 analysis. Broadly, a general parade of the Irish Volun- 
 teers all over the country was ordered for Easter Sunday. 
 On the night before Good Friday a German ship with a 
 cargo of rifles was off the Irish coast. This ship, the 
 And, was a few hours later captured and taken in convoy 
 by a British sloop, so that the arms were never landed. 
 Emissaries from the Volunteers who had gone to Kerry 
 by motor-car to receive and arrange for distributing the 
 arms were killed in a motor accident while hurrying 
 back to get in touch with their headquarters. On Satur- 
 day the general parade was cancelled by order of Professor 
 MacNeill, chief of the Volunteer organization. On 
 Monday, against his wish, a portion of the Volunteer 
 force in Dublin, including the battalion specially under 
 command of Pearse and MacDonagh, with the Citizen 
 Army under James Connolly, paraded, scattered through 
 the city and seized certain previously selected j)oint8, 
 of which the most important was the Post Office. From 
 it as headquarters thej- proclaimed an Irish Republic. 
 Slight attempts at rising took place in county Wexford, 
 where the town of Enniscorthy was seized, in county 
 Galway, and in county Louth. At Galway, at VTexford 
 and at Drogheda the National Volunteera turned out 
 
 to assist in suppressing the rising. Except for a serious 
 
 sas 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 219 
 
 encounter with a police force in county Dublin, the fight- 
 ing was confined to the capital. It terminated by the 
 unconditional surrender of the rebels on the Saturday. 
 The struggle was prolonged by the total lack of artillery 
 in the early stages. Riflemen established in houses 
 could not be dislodged by direct assault of infantry 
 without very heavy casualties to the attacking force. 
 
 The purpose of this book is to show Redmond's con- 
 nection with tliis event and the succeeding developments 
 from it. He failed to foresee the event ; he failed to 
 direct its develoi^ments into the course he desired. How 
 far he is to be held responsible, or blameworthy, for 
 these failures, readers may be assisted to decide. 
 
 From the beginning of 1916 onwards the Irish Govern- 
 ment was earned of danger. One of its members — the 
 Attorney-General, Sir James Campbell— advocated the 
 seizure of arms from men parading with what were 
 evidently stolen service rifles or bayonets. But the 
 Chief Secretary refused to take any action w'hich could 
 be described as an attempt to suppress or disarm the 
 Irish Volunteers until there was definite evidence of 
 actual association with the enemy. 
 
 Proof of sympathy was not difficult to obtain, and the 
 propaganda against recruiting had now^ reached the 
 point of attempts to break up recruiting meetings. Still, 
 Mr. Birrell was in a difficulty. He had a logical mind, 
 and he knew what had been permitted to Ulster. The 
 fact that the Attorney-General himself had been a main 
 adviser of the Provisional Government did not make it 
 easier to follow his advice to disarm men who professed 
 disaffection to the existing authority. Mr. Birrell 
 knew that if he took such action he could be attacked 
 in the official Nationalist Press for having one law in 
 Ulster and another in the South. Further, Redmond 
 would certainly not have disavow^ed, and might even 
 have endorsed, such a line of criticism. The reason 
 was that Redmond, as he had never believed in the 
 
220 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 reality of the Ulster danger, so now did not believe 
 in this one. 
 
 Later, when Mr. Birrell resigned his post after the 
 insurrection was suppressed, Redmond chivalrously took 
 on himself a part of the responsibility. " I feel," he 
 said, " that I have incurred some share of the blame 
 which he has laid at his own door, because I entirely 
 agreed with his view that the danger of an outbreak of the 
 kind was not a real one, and in my conversations with 
 him I have expressed that view, and for all I know that 
 may have influenced him in his conduct and his manage- 
 ment of Irish affairs." A later debate — on July 31st — 
 showed that his strong personal feeling for Mr. Birrell 
 had moved him rather to overstate than to belittle his 
 advisory responsibility. Dublin Castle had never con- 
 sulted him as to policy. Conferences had taken place 
 with the L'nder-Secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, but 
 these were concerned with considering and framing the 
 machinery to be created for bringing the Home Rule 
 Act into operation, whenever the time came. 
 
 " There was no conference at all about the state of 
 the country or about Sinn F6in. When once or twice 
 in casual consultation the matter came up — I hope the 
 House will listen to this — I did not hesitate to say what 
 in my opinion ought to be done in certain cases by the 
 Government. For example, I expressed a strong view 
 to them as to how they should deal with seditious news- 
 papers and with prosecutions. What I did suggest, they 
 never did ; what I said they ought not to do, they always 
 did. And I want to say something further. They 
 never gave me any information, bad or good, about the 
 state of the country. From first to last I never saw 
 one single confidential Government report from the 
 police or from any other source. I know nothing what- 
 ever about their secret confidential information." 
 
 It is fair to add that the Under-Secretary was in com- 
 munication from time to time with other members of 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 221 
 
 the party, who were of course In touch with Redmond. 
 But the substantial accuracy of Redmond's statement 
 is sufficiently evidenced by one fact. Everybody knew 
 that Sir Roger Casement was in Berlin and had tried — 
 most unsuccessfully — to recruit an Irish Brigade from 
 among the Irish prisoners. But neither Redmond nor 
 any Irish member knew that from April 17th Dublin 
 Castle had warning that a ship was on its way from 
 Germany with rifles. The Navy was on the alert, and 
 when the And came off Fenit, in Kerry, on Good Friday 
 morning, she was promptly challenged. » But in the 
 dark hours of that morning she had landed Sir Roger 
 Casement and his two confederates, one of whom was 
 arrested with him the same day. On Saturday morning 
 Government decided to take action against what was 
 now clearly a rebel organization. But as the Chief 
 Secretary and the General Commanding in Chief were 
 both in London, and as the available force of men in 
 Dublin was small, a postponement was decided on. No 
 special precautions appear to have been taken against 
 the contingency of an immediate rising. On Monday 
 a very large proportion of the officers from the Curragh 
 and the Dublin garrison were at the Fairyhouse races. 
 In the Castle itself there was only the ordinary guard. 
 Redmond at this date was also in London. His lack 
 of apprehension is sufficiently indicated by the fact that 
 his son and daughter were both at the races, and drove 
 up unknowinglj' to an armed barricade. Had he been 
 in authority and known, as the Government knew on 
 Saturday, that the Irish Volunteers expected and had 
 arranged for the landing of a heavy cargo of arms on 
 Good Friday, and that a general parade of their men 
 had been ordered for Easter, I hope that he would have 
 either had troops in the utmost readiness to move, or 
 have put strong guards in places of importance. But 
 
 ' The Admiralty do not appear to have communicated their 
 information to Dublin Castle. 
 
222 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 thi8 is a futile speculation, for had he been in power 
 the situation would never have arisen. 
 
 The decisive thing which drove most of the relatively 
 small number among the Volunteers who broke away 
 from Redmond into their original hostility was Govern- 
 ment's failure to recognize them. Their force stood in 
 their own eyes for the assertion of Ireland's nationality ; 
 and many of those who took active part in the rebellion 
 were at the outset fully prepared to assert that nationality 
 in jeopardy of their lives in the Allied cause. Redmond's 
 policy, had effect been given to it by the Government, 
 still more had he himself been invested with the right 
 to embody it in action, would have prevented the estrange- 
 ment of all but a very few. Once the estrangement 
 took place, however, I think that he undervalued what 
 was opposed to him, both in respect of its power and of 
 its quality. He lacked appreciation and respect for 
 the idealists whose ideals were not his own. He under- 
 rated their sincerity, and the danger of their sincerity. 
 The beauty of sacrifice in the young men who went out 
 to the war, carrying Ireland's cause in their keeping, 
 moved him profoundly ; and he saw the practical bearing 
 of their acts on the great practical problem of statesman- 
 ship to which his life had been given. He did not guess 
 at the sway which might be exercised over men's minds 
 by an almost mystical belief which disdained to count 
 with practicalities. Redmond for fifteen years had been 
 the leader, and for thirty-five years had been a member, 
 of a party which presented itself — with great justification 
 — as the winner for Ireland of many positive material 
 advantages on the way to an ultimate goal. Pearse, 
 at a time when all the world was plunged in a prodigal 
 welter of destruction, came forward, demanding from 
 Irishmen nothing but a sacrifice — promising nothing but 
 the chance for young men to shed their blood sacramentally 
 in the cause of Ireland's freedom. Redmond also was 
 calling for the extreme risk, but on a sane and sound 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 223 
 
 calculation, to ensure the full development of something 
 already gained. Pearse preached, raystically, the e£B- 
 oacious power simply of blood shed in the name of Ireland. 
 Those whom he brought with him into the pass of danger 
 were few, but they were touched with his own spirit ; 
 and even the very recklessness of their act touched the 
 popular imagination. Irish regiments, after all, could 
 do only what other regiments were doing ; their deeds 
 were obscured in a chaos of war from which individual 
 prowess could not emerge. Pearse and his associates 
 ojffered to Irishmen a stage for themselves on which 
 they could and did secure full personal recognition — the 
 complete attention of Ireland's mind. 
 
 All this would have seemed vanity to Redmond's solid, 
 positive intelligence — vanity in all senses of the word. 
 It would have moved him to nothing but angry contempt 
 — anger against the spirit which was prepared to divide 
 Ireland's effort, contempt for the futility of the reasoning. 
 But one aspect of the rising dominated all the others 
 in his mind. He had neither tolerance nor pity for Roger 
 Casement, who was in his eyes simply one who tried to 
 seduce Irish troops by threats and bribes into treason 
 to their salt, one who made himself among the worst 
 instruments of Germany. At the re-assembly of Parlia- 
 ment on April 27th he expressed the " feeling of detes- 
 tation and horror " with which he and his colleagues 
 had regarded the events in Dublin ; a feeling which he 
 believed to be shared " by the overwhelming mass of 
 the people of Ireland." On May 3rd, in a statement 
 to the Press, he denounced fiercely " this wicked move " 
 of men who *' have tried to make Ireland the cat's-paw 
 of Germany." " Germany plotted it, Germany organized 
 it, Germany paid for it." The men who were Germany's 
 agents ** remained in the safe remoteness of American 
 cities," while " misguided and insane young men in 
 Ireland had risked, and some of them had lost, their lives 
 in an insane anti-patriotic movement." It was anti- 
 
224 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 patriotic, he urged, because Ireland held to the choice 
 she had made, to the opinion which thousands of Irish 
 soldiera had sealed with their blood. It was " not half 
 so much treason to the cause of the Allies as treason to 
 the cause of Home Rule." 
 
 On the day when that statement appeared the sequel 
 had begun to unroll itself. In the House of Commons 
 Mr, Asquith announced the trial, sentence and shooting 
 of three signatories to the Republican proclamation — 
 Pearse, Clarke and MacDonagh, With the exception of 
 James Connolly, these were the men most directly answer- 
 able for launching an attempt which had cost five hundred 
 lives and destroyed over two millions' worth of property. 
 Redmond accepted their doom as just. 
 
 ** This outbreak happily seems to be over. It has 
 been dealt with with firmness, which was not only right, 
 but it was the duty of the Government so to deal with it." 
 
 But now that example had been made, he held that 
 other thoughts should guide those in authority. 
 
 '* As the rebellion, or the outbreak, call it what you 
 like, has been put down with firmness, I do beg the 
 Government, and I speak from the very bottom of my 
 heart and with all mj'' earnestness, not to show undue 
 hardship or severity to the great masses of those who 
 are implicated, on whose shoulders there lies a guilt 
 far different from that which lies upon the instigators 
 and promoters of the outbreak. Let them, in the name 
 of God, not add this to the wretched, miserable memories 
 of the Irish people, to be stored up perhaps for genera- 
 tions, but let them deal with it in such a spirit of leniency 
 as was recently exhibited in South Africa by General 
 Botha, and in that way pave the way to the possibility 
 . . . that out of the ashes of this miserable tragedy 
 there may spring up something which will redound to 
 the future happiness of Ireland and the future complete 
 and absolute unity of this Empire. I beg of the Govern- 
 ment, having put down this outbreak with firmness, to 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 225 
 
 take only such action as will leave the least rankling 
 bitterness in the minds of the Irish people, both in Ireland 
 and elsewliere throughout the world." 
 
 It is well to recall what he liad in his mind. After 
 the suppression of the South African rebellion in 1014, 
 one man only was put to death — an officer wlio changed 
 sides during an action. No attempt Avas made to try 
 accused persons before a jury ; a special tribunal of 
 judges was set up by the South African Parliament. 
 But their power of inflicting punishment was limited 
 by the Parliament to a sentence of three years. General 
 de Wet, the chief figure in the rebellion, was dismissed 
 without punishment to his farm. That was the manner 
 in which a strong native Government, realizing the possi- 
 bilities of future trouble, dealt with an insurrection 
 infinitely more serious in a military sense than that 
 which broke out in Dublin. But in Ireland there was 
 no native government ; and the announcement of Mr. 
 Birrell's resignation meant in reality that Mr. Asquith's 
 Ministry had abdicated so far as Ireland was concerned. 
 Quite properly, they had called in a competent soldier 
 to deal with the military exigency. Quite shamefully, 
 they left him in sole authority to handle what was 
 essentially the task of statesmanship. 
 
 Everybody saw that in such a case the need was to 
 prevent a rebellious spirit from spreading. Sir John 
 Maxwell took the simple view that the way to secure 
 this was by plenty of executions. Knowledge of Irish 
 history cannot be expected in an English Minister, still 
 less in an English soldier ; but it could have taught 
 him how often and how ineffectually that recipe had 
 been applied. vStill less could it be hoped that a soldier, 
 in no sense bound to the study of contemporary politics, 
 should allow for the effect of two factors which must 
 certainly influence Irish judgment and Irish feeling. 
 The first of these was the precedent within the Empire 
 created by General Botha's Government. This, I think, 
 
 10 
 
226 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 English opinion generally, and particularly English 
 Imperialist opinion, wholly disregarded ; but it was 
 the point to which Redmond had instantly directed 
 attention. For him, the idea of an Imperial Common- 
 wealth of States was a reality, and within one Common- 
 w^ealth there cannot be two standards of justice. The 
 second factor was the licence accorded by a Liberal 
 Government, and the sanction given by a Tory Opposition, 
 to preparations for rebellion, and acts of rebellion, in 
 Ulster. This was generally recognized by public opinion, 
 though I think deliberately set aside by Sir John Maxwell 
 — who perhaps is not to be blamed. But the Prime 
 Minister, who had been chiefly and ultimately responsible 
 for the decision to let Ulstermen do as they liked, was 
 specially bound to consider and provide for the conse- 
 quences of that line of policy in the i^ast as it affected 
 the present development. He was also, as the Minister 
 responsible alike for carrying a Home Rule Act and for 
 denying to it operation, specially bound in such a pass 
 as this to be guided largely by the judgment of the man 
 who but for that postponement would have been head 
 of an Irish Government. But, under the various pressures 
 of the moment, Mr. Asquith moved in a wholly different 
 direction. Redmond's appeal and advice went totally 
 disregarded. Yet Redmond knew Ireland as no 
 Englishman could know it ; and his hands were clean 
 of guilt for what had happened. Mr. Asquith by his 
 past inaction, his Tory colleagues by their action before 
 the war, were deeply involved in resj)onsibility. It is 
 difficult, if not impossible, to find in Mr. Asquith's conduct 
 any recognition of this cardinal fact. He judged rebels 
 as if preparations for rebellion had never been palliated 
 or approved. 
 
 All that Redmond could achieve was by incessant 
 personal intervention to limit the list of executions, 
 to put some stay on what he called later " the gross and 
 panicky violence " with which measures of suppression 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 227 
 
 were conceived and carried out. He could not prevent 
 the amazing procedure of sending flying columns through- 
 out the country into places where there had been no hint 
 of disturbance, and making arrests by the hundred with- 
 out reason given or evidence produced. In manj^ cases, 
 men who had been tlioroughly disgusted by the outbreak 
 found themselves in jail ; and disaffection was manu- 
 factured hourly. 
 
 On May 3rd, when Redmond made his public appeal 
 to Mr. Asquith, it was still not too late to prevent the 
 mischief from spreading. By general consent, Redmond 
 was right when he said that the rising was thoroughly 
 unpopular in Ireland, and most of all in Dublin. The 
 troops on whom the insurgents fired were in the first 
 instance Irish troops. Later in that year I was attached 
 to one of these battalions (the 10th Dublins), and asked 
 them how they did their scouting work during the con- 
 flict. " We needed no scouts," was the answer ; " the 
 old women told us everything." The first volley which 
 met a company of this battalion killed an officer ; he 
 was so strongly Nationalist in his sympathy as to be 
 almost a Sinn Feiner. Others had been active leaders 
 in the Howth gun-running. It was not merely a case 
 of Irishmen firing on their fellow-countrymen : it was 
 one section of the original Volunteers firing on another. 
 
 Yet from the moment when English troops came on 
 the scene, another strain of feeling began to make itself 
 felt. A lady ordered tea to be made for one of the in- 
 coming regiments, halted outside her house on the line 
 of march. The refreshment was long in coming, and 
 she went down to see why. She found her cook up in 
 arms : " Is it me boil the kettle for Englishmen coming 
 in to shoot down Irishmen ? " Yet that was still the 
 voice of a minority. When I came home from France 
 a few weeks later, a shrewd and j^rosperous Nationalist 
 man of business said to me with fury : " The fools ! 
 It was the first rebellion that ever had the country 
 
228 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 against it, and they turned the people round in a 
 week." 
 
 Nothing could have prevented the halo of martyrdom 
 from attaching itself to those who died by the law for 
 the sake of Irish freedom : the tradition was too deeply 
 ingrained in Ireland's history. Yet Redmond did not go 
 beyond the measure of average Irish opinion when he 
 accepted the first three executions as just. People at 
 least knew who these men were, and their signatures to 
 the proclamation of an Irish Republic proved their leader- 
 ship. They were given the death of rebels in arms, 
 to which no dishonour attaches. But a fatal mistake 
 was made in suppressing all report of the proceedings 
 of the court-martial on them, and this mistake was to 
 be repeated indefinitely. Ireland was made to feel that 
 this whole affair was taken completely out of the hands 
 of Irishmen — that no attempt even was made to enlist 
 Irish opinion on the side of law by a statement of the 
 evidence on which law acted. Day by day there was a 
 new bald announcement that such and such men had 
 been shot ; and these were men whose names Ireland 
 at large had never heard of. 
 
 Then on top of all came the appalling admission that 
 an officer suffering from insanity had taken out three 
 prisoners and caused them to be shot without trial on 
 his OAvn responsibility, none of these men having any 
 complicity with the rebellion. This incident would have 
 inflamed public opinion in any community ; in Ireland 
 its effect was beyond words poisonous. It revived the 
 atmosphere of the Bachelor's Walk incident ; and there 
 was only too much justification for holding that the 
 military authorities were indisposed to take the proper 
 disciplinary action. Its effect detracted from the excellent 
 opinion which the troops generally had earned by their 
 conduct : it instilled venom into the resentment of those 
 few cases (and it was beyond hope that they should not 
 occur) in which soldiers had either lost their heads 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 229 
 
 or yielded to the temptation of revenge in its ugliest 
 shapes. 
 
 The result can be best expressed by recording the 
 experience of one Sinn Feiner who was captured in the 
 fighting. While the military escort was taking him 
 through the streets to his place of confinement, a crowd 
 gathered round and ran along, consisting of angry men 
 and women who had seen bloodshed and known hunger 
 during these days. They shouted to the soldiers to 
 knock his brains out there and then. Three weeks later 
 he was again marched through the streets on his way 
 to an English prison, and again a crowd mustered. But 
 this time, to his amazement, they were shouting : " God 
 save you ! God have pity on you ! Keep your heart 
 up ! Ireland's not dead yet ! " 
 
 These were the effects produced in Ireland on the mind 
 of common people by the action of Government in en- 
 forcing the ultimate sanction of law which the members 
 of that same Government by their action and by their 
 inaction had brought into contempt. In England, in 
 the meanwhile, a new Military Service Bill was going 
 through the House, and naturally attempts to include 
 Ireland in its operation were renewed. Sir Edward 
 Carson, criticizing the Government of Ireland, said that 
 (as Redmond put it in replying) Nationalists had held 
 the power but not the responsibility. There was a note 
 of angry protest in the Irish Leader's rejoinder. " I 
 wish to say for myself that certainly since the Coalition 
 Government came into operation, and before it, but 
 certainly since then, I have had no power in the Govern- 
 ment of Ireland. All my opinions have been overborne. 
 My suggestions have been rejected, and my profound 
 conviction is that if we had had the power and the respon- 
 sibility for the Government of our country during the 
 past two years, recent occurrences in Ireland Avould 
 never have taken place." 
 
 I think that view was at that moment very generally 
 
230 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 shared in England. The British Press had shown by 
 their attitude towards the events in Dublin how deeply 
 Redmond had made his mark. Almost without exception 
 Unionist papers refrained from any attempt to identify 
 Nationalist Ireland generally with the rising : they did 
 full justice to the valour and the sufferings of Irish troops 
 — who, indeed, at that very moment were passing through 
 a cruel ordeal. In that Easter week the Sixteenth Divi- 
 sion was subjected to two attacks with poison gas of a 
 concentration and violence till then unknown, and under 
 weather conditions wliich prolonged the ordeal beyond 
 endurance. The 48th and 49th Brigades had very terrible 
 losses. We of the 47th relieved them in the line. 
 
 That was a long tour of trenches, some eighteen days 
 beginning on the 29th of April, and throughout it papers 
 came in with the Irish news. I shall never forget the 
 men's indignation. They felt tliey had been stabbed 
 in the back. For myself, I thought that a situation 
 had arisen in which Irish members who were serving 
 had a more imperative duty at home, and I went to 
 discuss the matter with Willie Redmond, whose battalion 
 was then holding the front line to the left of Loos. 
 
 I found him in the deep company commander's dug- 
 out in the bay of line opposite Puits 14 bis, which will 
 be known to many Irish soldiers. We came up to the 
 light to talk, and he agreed with me in my view. We 
 arranged that each of us should discuss with his com- 
 manding officer the question of asking for special leave. 
 Mine advised me to go, and I have no earthly doubt 
 that his M'ould have said, or did say, the same ; but Willie 
 Redmond never brought himself to leave his men. Next 
 month, however, he was invalided back, very seriously ill. 
 
 But in our talk that day, when we discussed the possi- 
 bility of our having some special influence, he said this : 
 " Don't imagine that what you and I have done is going 
 to make us pojmlar with our people. On the contrary, 
 we shall both be sent to the right about at the first 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 231 
 
 General Election." I think he Avas wrong, at least to 
 this extent, that any man who served would not have 
 lessened his chance by doing so. When the tide flowed 
 strongest against us, in three provinces one Nationalist 
 only kept his seat — John Redmond's son, Major William 
 Archer Redmond. 
 
 II 
 
 Already the tide had begun to turn in Ireland. On 
 May 11th Mr. Dillon — who had been in Dublin during 
 the rebellion — moved the adjournment of the House to 
 demand that Government should state whether they 
 intended to have more executions upon the finding of 
 secret tribunals, and to continue the searches and whole- 
 sale arrests which were going on through the country. 
 The list of executions had now reached fourteen, and no 
 word of evidence had been published. Also the Prime 
 Minister stated that he heard for the first time of the 
 shooting of Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington and others by CajDtain 
 Bowen Colthurst. Unquestionably, discussion was ur- 
 gently needed, and Mr. Dillon was fully justified in 
 emphasizing the mischief done in Ireland by alienating 
 men's minds. But Mr. Dillon spoke as one who felt to 
 the uttermost the passion of resentment which he 
 depicted, and in his indignation against charges which 
 had been brought against the insurgents, he was led to 
 praise their conduct almost to the disparagement of 
 soldiers in the field. Even in print the speech seethes 
 with growing passion ; and its delivery, I am told, 
 accentuated its bitterness and its anti-English tone. 
 
 It would be futile to deny that this utterance had a 
 great effect in Ireland and in England, or to conceal 
 Redmond's view that the effect was most lamentable. 
 But it had one notable result. Mr. Asquith, in replying, 
 announced his intention to visit Ireland and look into 
 
232 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 the situation for himself. Within a fortnight — on May 
 25th — he reported to the House his impressions. 
 
 " The first was the breakdown of the existing machinery 
 of the Irish Government ; and the next was the strength 
 and depth, and I might almost say, I think without exag- 
 geration, the universality of the feeling in Ireland that 
 we have now a unique opportunity for a new departure 
 for the settlement of outstanding problems, and for a 
 joint and combined effort to obtain agreement as to the 
 way in which the Government of Ireland is for the future 
 to be carried on." 
 
 He indicated that an attempt would be made to renew 
 negotiations for a settlement which would enable the 
 Home Rule Act to be brought into operation at once ; 
 and that Mr. Lloyd George had consented to undertake 
 the task of reconciling parties. But he begged that 
 there should be no debate upon this proposal or upon 
 Irish affairs at all. Redmond, in accepting, said that 
 the request for acceptance without discussion was putting 
 the goodwill of Nationalists to a very severe test. — A 
 discussion would at once have produced this criticism : 
 that Ireland would say to-morrow, " The Parliamentary 
 party brought to Ireland a post-dated order for Home 
 Rule, liable to an indefinite series of postponements : 
 Sinn Fein by a week's rebellion secures that Home Rule 
 shall be brought into force at once." 
 
 In truth, the rapid growth of Sinn Fein from May 1916 
 onwards is due largely to this reasoning ; but also to 
 resentment against the Government's dealing with the 
 rebellion, and against the Irish party's silence in Parlia- 
 ment in spite of the numerous actions of the military 
 power which called for vigorous criticism. 
 
 Irish Nationalist members realized the unpopularity 
 of their silence and submitted to it, for the negotiations 
 appeared to offer a real chance. We held that Mr. Lloyd 
 George could not afford to fail, and had power enough 
 to carry through a settlement. We did not know, and 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 233 
 
 could not, that the Minister of Munitions had been called 
 off from his regular work within five weeks before the 
 beginning of the offensive on the Sonime, for which an 
 unprecedented outlay of material had been undertaken. 
 
 The negotiations proceeded, and were conducted on 
 the principle of discussion through a go-between. The 
 parties never met : Mr. Lloyd George submitted pro- 
 posals to each side separately. Redmond and his col- 
 leagues insisted on 2>rotecting themselves by securing a 
 written document, so that, as it was hoped, there could 
 be no understanding and the terms come to would be 
 final. 
 
 Those of us who hoped for a completely new approach 
 to the problem were doomed to disappointment. The 
 affair was taken up where the Buckingham Palace Con- 
 ference left it. The terms to be arranged were terms 
 of exclusion for LHster ; and the two questions of defining 
 the area and the period met the negotiators on the 
 threshold. 
 
 It has been shown above that Redmond regarded as 
 vital the distinction between temporary and permanent 
 exclusion. His purpose was to stamp the whole of this 
 proposed agreement with a provisional and transient 
 character. It was to be simply a war measure, subject 
 to re-arrangement at the close of hostilities ; and it was 
 to be adapted to a community still agitated by rebellion. 
 
 An Irish Parliament with an Executive responsible to 
 it was to be set up at once. But no elections were to 
 be held. The existing members for the existing con- 
 stituencies were to be the provisional Parliament till the 
 war ended. 
 
 The same considerations precluded the possibility of 
 a referendum in Ulster. Nationalists accepted an area 
 defined by agreement. It left out of " Ulster " the 
 three counties, Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan, in whose 
 eight constituencies no Unionist had been returned since 
 1885. But it left to the excluded area the counties of 
 
234 JOHN REDMOND'S Lx\ST YEARS 
 
 Tyrone and Fermanagh, each with a Nationalist majority, 
 and the boroughs of Newry and Londonderry, both 
 represented by Home Rulers. 
 
 This was a provision which no body of men could be 
 e::ipected to acquiesce in permanently as representing 
 the equity of the case. It was accepted for the sake 
 of peace, as a temporary expedient. A strong induce- 
 ment was added by Mr. Lloyd George's proposal that 
 at the close of the provisional period the whole matter 
 should be referred to a Council of the Empire with the 
 Prime Ministers of the Dominions taking a hand in the 
 settlement. But to guarantee and seal its provisional 
 and transitory character an extraordinary clause was 
 added. Until a permanent settlement was reached, the 
 Irish membership at Westminster was to remain at its 
 original number of 103. 
 
 The document embodjang these conclusions was accepted 
 in identical terms by each side, and each party of nego- 
 tiators set out for Ireland to endeavour to secure accept- 
 ance of it. But before he left London Sir Edward Carson 
 asked for an interpretation of the terms. Did the agree- 
 ment mean that none of the six excluded counties could 
 be brought under a Dublin Parliament without an Act 
 of Parliament ? In other words, was the exclusion 
 permanent until Parliament should otherwise determine ? 
 He was answered that the Prime Minister accepted this 
 interpretation, and would be prepared to t^ay so when 
 the matter came before Parliament. Knowledge of 
 these communications was not conveyed to Redmond. 
 Redmond's interpretation was that at the termination 
 of the war this arrangement lapsed, and the Home Rule 
 Act, which was the law of the land, came into force. If 
 Ulster, or any part of it, were to bo excluded, it must be 
 by a new amending Act. Had the assurance given to 
 Sir Edward Carson been conveyed to Redmond, either 
 the negotiations must have been resumed or they must 
 have been rendered abortive. 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 235 
 
 On June 13tli the Ulster Council accepted the terms, 
 no doubt with great reluctance. The signatories to the 
 Covenant in the three western counties felt themselves 
 betrayed. The whole body found itself committed to 
 acceptance of Home Rule in principle for twenty-six 
 counties. But the war necessity was pressed upon them 
 and they submitted. 
 
 The Nationalist Convention met ten days later in 
 Belfast. Mr. Devlin had been strenuous in his exertions 
 throughout the province, but the whole force of the 
 ecclesiastical power was thrown against him. Apart 
 from the detestation of partition, the Catholic Church 
 conceived that the principle of denominational education 
 would be lost in the severed counties, where the dominant 
 Presbyterian element was oi^posed to it. Very many 
 delegates came to the Convention pledged in advance 
 to resist the proposals : and the general anticipation 
 was that Redmond would be thrown over. 
 
 The proceedings were secret. But in the result the 
 Nationalists of the North refused to be any party to 
 denying the rest of Ireland self-government. A division 
 was taken, and consent to temporary exclusion was carried 
 by a large majority. The victory was in the main due 
 to Mr. Devlin's extraordinary personal gifts, exercised 
 to carry a conclusion which inevitably must injure himself 
 where he was most sensitive to a wound, in the hearts 
 of those among whom he was born and bred. 
 
 It must have been in the weeks immediately after 
 this that Redmond spoke to me, as I never heard him 
 speak of any other man, his mind about Mr. Devlin. 
 " Joe's loyalty in all this business has been beyond words,' 
 he said, " I know what it has cost him to do as he has 
 done." He knew well that the younger man's influence 
 had been more efficacious than the threat of his own 
 resignation — which was not withheld. A man of other 
 nature might have been jealous of the young and growing 
 power : but such an element as this was so foreign to 
 
236 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Redmond's whole being that even the thought of it 
 never entered the most suspicious mind. 
 
 The result of the Belfast Convention was communi- 
 cated and discussed at a meeting of the Irish party held 
 at the Mansion House on June 26th, It was one of the 
 most hopeful moments in our experience ; reaction from 
 a depression approaching to despair gave confidence to 
 the gloomiest among us. Hope was in the air. The 
 effect of Mr. Asquith's sentence upon the whole machinery 
 of Dublin Castle had not yet worn off. No new Govern- 
 ment had been installed : the Chief Secretarj'^ship re- 
 mained vacant, the Lord-Lieutenant also had retired 
 from his office. It seemed a certainty that we should 
 enter, under whatever auguries, into the realization of 
 a self-governing Ireland. Even those who were most 
 enthusiastic for the birth of a new and glorious era that 
 was to date from the stirring action of the rebels, and 
 who were most open-mouthed in condemnation of Red- 
 mond's futile efforts, in practice shared our view. I 
 asked one such man how he counted on securing the 
 necessary first step of establishing an Irish Government. 
 " Oh, I suppose,' was his answer, " the Irish party will 
 manage that somehow." 
 
 But soon delay began to hang coldly on this temper 
 of anticipation, and to delay were added disquieting 
 utterances. On June 29th Lord Lansdowne announced 
 in the House of Lords that the " consultations " which 
 had been taking place were " certainly authorized " bj^ 
 the Government but were not binding upon it ; and that 
 he, speaking for the Unionist wing of the Cabinet, had 
 not accepted the proposals. This was disturbing. Lord 
 Selborne had retired from the Government before the 
 negotiators went to Ireland, because he knew of the 
 proposals and was not prepared to sanction them. We 
 assumed that other Unionists who shared this view would 
 have followed him in his frank action. Now we perceived 
 that Lord Lansdowne and his friends had frugally hus- 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 237 
 
 banded their force. It was expected by many that 
 Ireland would do the work for tliem. Failing that, they 
 had still the last stab to deliver. But we counted upon 
 one thing : that Mr. Lloyd George, if not Mr. Asquith, 
 would feel himself committed to see the deal through — 
 and that his resignation would have to be faced as a 
 part of the consequences if attcmj)ts were made to go 
 back on the bargain. 
 
 Parliament reassembled and still nothing was said 
 and nothing done : but the Press was full of rumours. 
 On July 19tli Redmond asked that a date should be 
 fixed for the introduction of the proposed Bill, and next 
 day he renewed his demand, urging that the constant 
 delays and postponements were " seriouslj^ jeopardizing 
 the chance of settlement." This was only too true. A 
 furious agitation against the proposal of even temporary 
 partition was raging through Ireland. Once more, the 
 tide had been missed : time had been given to inculcate 
 all manner of doubts and suspicions — and once more 
 the suspicions i)roved to be only too well justified. The 
 whole story was revealed to the House on July 24th. 
 
 Redmond, in his speech, emphasized it that the pro- 
 posals had come not from the Nationalists, but from 
 the Government ; they had, however, been accepted, 
 after considerable negotiation and many changes in 
 substance, as a plan which Nationalists could recommend 
 for acceptance. Nationalists had been pressed to use 
 the utmost despatch, had been told that every hour 
 counted and that it was essential in the highest Imperial 
 interests, if Ireland endorsed the agreement, that it 
 should be put into operation at once. " That is two 
 long months ago," he said. Action had been taken ; 
 the unpopularity of the proposals, fully foreseen, had 
 been faced, on a clear understanding. 
 
 " The agreement was in the words of the Prime 
 Minister himself, for what he called a provisional settle- 
 ment which should last until the war was over, or until 
 
238 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 a final and permanent settlement was arrived at within 
 a limited period after the war. This was the chief factor 
 of this plan, and without it not one of my colleagues or 
 myself would for a moment have considered it, much less 
 have submitted it to our followers." 
 
 The retention of Irish members at Westminster in full 
 strength was covenanted for " as an indispensable safeguard 
 of the temporary character of the whole arrangement." 
 
 It was on this construction of the agreement that 
 consent to it had been secured, in the face of very strong 
 and organized opposition : and consent was secured to 
 it as a final document. Nevertheless, when Redmond 
 arrived in London he had been at once confronted with 
 a demand for modifications — of which the first were 
 unimportant. Yet to consent to any alteration was a 
 sacrifice of principle ; but he was told that this concession 
 would secure agreement in the Cabinet. Later, however, 
 came a public statement from Lord Lansdowne that 
 " permanent and enduring " structural alterations would 
 be introduced into the Home Rule Act. Redmond had 
 seen the draft Bill in which the Government's draftsmen 
 embodied the terms of the agreement, and he had 
 accepted this, as conforming to his covenant. In reply 
 to Lord Lansdowne, he had pressed for the production 
 of this Bill, but could not get it. The end was that, after 
 a Cabinet held on July 19th, he was told that " a number 
 of new proposals had been brought forward " ; that the 
 Cabinet did not desire to consult him about these at 
 all ; and on the 22nd Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Herbert 
 Samuel were instructed to convey to him the Cabinet's 
 decision, with an intimation that there would be no 
 further discussion or consultation. That decision was 
 to make the exclusion of six counties permanent, and 
 to withdraw the provision for retaining Irish members 
 at full strength during the transitory period. 
 
 Redmond attacked no individual. His anger was 
 beyond words. He said this, however ; 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 239 
 
 " Some tragic fatcality seems to clog the footsteps of 
 this Government in all their dealings with Ireland. Every 
 step taken by them since the Coalition was formed, and 
 especially since the unfortunate outbreak in Dublin, has 
 been lamentable. They have disregarded every advice 
 we tendered to them, and now in the end, having got 
 us to induce our people to make a tremendous sacrifice 
 and to agree to the temporary exclusion of these Ulster 
 counties, they throw this agreement to the winds, and they 
 have taken the surest means to accentuate every possible 
 danger and difficulty in the Irish situation." 
 
 That day really finished the constitutional party and 
 overthrew Redmond's power. We had incurred the 
 very great odium of accepting even temporary partition 
 — and a partition which, owing to this arbitrary extension 
 of area, could not be justified on any ground of principle ; 
 we had involved with us many men who voted for that 
 acceptance on the faith of Redmond's assurance that 
 the Government were bound by their written word ; 
 and now we were thrown over. 
 
 Apart from the effect on Redmond's position, the 
 result was to engender in Ireland a temper which made 
 settlement almost impossible. No British Minister's word 
 would in future be accepted for anything ; and any 
 Irishman who attempted to improve relations between 
 the countries was certain to arouse anger and contempt 
 in his countrymen. 
 
 More particularly the relations between Irish members 
 and the most powerful members of the Government were 
 hopelessly embittered. Mr. Lloyd George put aside 
 completely — probably he never for a moment entertained 
 — the thought of seriously threatening resignation because 
 his agreement with the Irish was repudiated by his 
 colleagues. He was entirely engrossed with the work 
 of the War Office, where he thought, and was justified 
 in thinking, himself indispensable. Mr. Asquith, whose 
 object was to keep unity in his Government at all costs, 
 
240 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 when it came to a choice whether to quarrel with the Irish 
 who formed no part of it, or with the Unionists who were 
 his colleagues, had no hesitation which side to throw over. 
 
 I have never seen the House of Commons so thoroughly 
 discontented and disgusted. There was much genuine 
 sympathy with Redmond. Sir Edward Carson evidently 
 shared it, and he made a conciliatory speech in which 
 he proposed that he and the Nationalist leader should 
 shake hands on the floor of the House. That is a gesture 
 which comes better from the loser than from the winner, 
 and there was no doubt that Sir Edward Carson had won. 
 But he knew Ireland well enough to realize the meaning 
 of his victory, and his speech indicated disquiet and even 
 horror at the prospect before us. He was quite avowedly 
 anxious to see a start made with Home Rule, Ulster 
 standing apart. In a later debate, when the Govern- 
 ment announced its intention to fill again the vacant 
 Irish offices (appointing Mr. Duke as Chief Secretary), 
 Redmond referred hopefully to this utterance of the 
 Ulster leader and generally to " the new and improved 
 atmosphere which has surrounded this Irish question 
 quite recently." 
 
 The end of this speech dealt with one of the elements 
 which had contributed most to the improvement. In 
 the great battle of the Somme, which opened on July 1st, 
 the Ulster Division went for the first time into general 
 action, and their achievement was the most glorious and 
 the most unlucky of that day. They carried their assault 
 through five lines of trenches, and, because a division on 
 their flank was not equally successful, were obliged to 
 fall back, adding terribly in this withdrawal to the 
 desperate losses of their advance. Side by side with 
 them on the other flank was the Fourth Division, contain- 
 ing two battalions of Dublin Fusiliers, in one of which 
 John Redmond's son commanded a company ; so that he 
 and the Ulstermen went over shoulder to shoulder. He 
 came back unwounded ; all other company commanders 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 241 
 
 in the battalion wore killed. The only thing in which 
 Redmond was entirely fortunate during these last years 
 of his life was in his son's record during the war. 
 
 Another Nationalist well known to the House of Com- 
 mons served also in the Dublin Fusiliers on the Somme, 
 with a different fortune. Professor Kettle, owing to con- 
 ditions of health, had been unable to come to France with 
 the Sixteenth Division, and had been mainly employed 
 in recruiting. Now in these summer months he pushed 
 hard to get out to France, though he was not physically 
 fit for the line. He got to France, and, as was e'dny to 
 foresee, broke down and was sent to work at the base 
 on records : but before he left his regiment he knew 
 that it was under orders for a general action, and he 
 insisted that he should have leave to rejoin for that day. 
 He came back accordingly, found himself called on to 
 take command of a compan}', and led it with great 
 gallantry, and on the second day of action was shot dead. 
 It was the fate that he expected ; he, like so many, had 
 a forerunning assurance of his end. So was lost to 
 Ireland the most variously-gifted intelligence that I 
 have ever known. 
 
 The Sixteenth Division were still on the sector about 
 Loos, and their casualties were heavy and continuous in 
 the perpetual trench warfare. With the last dajs of 
 August they were withdrawn — for a rest, as they believed 
 at first ; but their march was southwards to the Somme. 
 
 The purjjose was to use them for an attack on Ginchy ; 
 but a shift of arrangements brought the 47th Brigade 
 into line against Guillemont and its quarries, which had 
 on six occasions been unsuccessfully attacked. The Irish 
 carried them. Three days later the whole division was 
 launched against Ginchy. They equalled the Ulstermen's 
 valour, and were luckier in the result. For these achieve- 
 ments praise was not stinted. Colonel Repington in 
 The Times described the Irish as the '' best missile troops " 
 in all the armies. 
 
 17 
 
242 JOHJS^ REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 III 
 
 The deeds of Irish soldiers helped us greatly outside 
 of Ireland ; in Ireland, the news was received with mingled 
 feelings. There was passionate resentment against the 
 Government, and the question was asked, For what were 
 their men dying ? Redmond's answer could not be so 
 confident as it would have been six months earlier. There 
 were many who said that he dare not face the country. 
 His answer to this was given at Waterford, where on 
 October C, 191(5, his constituents received him with their 
 old loyalty — though now for the first time there were 
 hostile voices in the crowd. He spoke out very plainly, 
 saying with justice that in all his life he had never played 
 to the gallery and would not now. Things had to be 
 looked at squarely. 
 
 " We have taken a leap back over generations of pro- 
 gress, and have actuall}' had a rebellion, with its inevitable 
 aftermath of brutalities, stupidities and inflamed passions." 
 
 He would impugn no man's motives, least of all the 
 motives of the dead ; but those who had set this train 
 of events in motion had been always the enemies of the 
 constitutional movement. The constitutional movement 
 must go on, he said ; but it would be follj'' to pretend 
 that it could go on as if nothing had happened. Ireland 
 must face its share in the responsibility. But the real 
 responsibility rested with the British Government. 
 
 To establish this he entered on a review of the whole 
 series of circumstances, not omitting Ulster's preparations 
 for civil war, and stressing heavily the mischief that was 
 done when Sir Edward Carson %\as chosen " by strange 
 irony " to be the First Law Officer of the Crown. 
 
 Passing from his review, he issued grave warning against 
 the idea of conscription : it would be resisted in every 
 village and its attempted enforcement would be a scandal 
 which would ring through the world. For Ireland also 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 243 
 
 he had admonition. He had told them before that Home 
 Rule was an impregnable position. But " no fortress is 
 impregnable unless the garrison is faithful and united." 
 
 This, alas ! was already a counsel of perfection for a 
 country so deeply d:vided in opinion as Nationalist 
 Ireland had come to be. The old loyalties had gone — 
 and he felt it. Ending on a personal note, he referred 
 to his age : he was over sixty ; he had done thirty-five 
 years of work which would have broken down any man 
 less robust in constitution than it had been his luck to 
 bo born. Ho believed in youth, he said, and would 
 gladly give way to younger men. 
 
 "But one thing I will not do while I have breath in 
 my body. I will not give way to the abuse and calumny 
 and the falsehoods of men whom I have known for long 
 years as the treacherous enemies of Ireland." 
 
 With all his reticence, he was a sensitive man ; and for 
 months now he could scarcelj'^ take up a newspaper, 
 except his party's official organ, without finding himself 
 accused of imbecility, of idle vanity, of corrupt bargaining, 
 of everj'^ unworthy motive. Worse than all, he realized 
 the inherent weakness of his position. He told his hearers 
 at Waterford that the Irish party would not vary its 
 attitude upon the war, but that we should now become 
 a regular and active opposition. He was far too experi- 
 enced not to be aware that during a war — and such a 
 war — he neither could nor would offer to the Govern- 
 ment in power opposition in the sense in which Nationalist 
 Ireland would understand the word. 
 
 But he took steps at once for raising the Irish question 
 by a direct vote of censure. On October 18th he moved : 
 
 '* That the system of Government at present main- 
 tained in Ireland is inconsistent with the principles for 
 which the Allies are fighting in Europe, and has been 
 mainly responsible for the recent unhappy events and 
 for the present state of feeling in that country." 
 
 His speech avoided all controversial reference to what 
 
244 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 had preceded the war, but it reviewed with great power 
 the long series of bhinders, beginning with the delay in 
 putting the Home Rule Bill on the Statute Book, and 
 ending with the Cabinet's destruction of the agreement 
 entered into in June. Now, as the end of all, Dublin 
 Castle, after the Prime Minister's description of its hope- 
 less breakdown, was set up again with a Unionist Chief 
 Secretary and a Unionist Attorney-General ; with a 
 universal system of martial law in force throughout the 
 country, and with hundreds of interned men in prison 
 on suspicion. He warned the Government of the in- 
 evitable effect upon the flow of recruits for the Irish 
 Divisions ; and in a passage which showed how close his 
 attention was to all this matter of recruitment, he pressed 
 the War 0£&ce for certain minor concessions to Irish 
 sentiment which would help us to maintain the Division 
 that had so greatlj'^ distinguished itself at Guillemont 
 and Ginchy. 
 
 But the real pith of his speech was political in the 
 larger sense. He pressed upon the House the injurj' 
 which England's interest was suffering through the aliena- 
 tion of American opinion, and through the reflection of 
 Irish discontent in Australia ; he pleaded for the with- 
 drawal of martial law. Nothing came of the debate, 
 except a speech in which Mr. Lloyd George admitted 
 the " stupidities, which sometimes almost look like 
 malignancy," that were perpetrated at the beginning of 
 recruiting in Ireland. The Labour men and a few Liberals 
 voted for our motion. But as a menace to the Govern- 
 ment it was negligible. 
 
 I was in France during the period of intrigue which 
 followed, leading up to the displacement of Mr. Asquith. 
 VV^hen the change occurred, members of ParHament who 
 were serving were recalled by special summons. I found 
 Redmond in these days profoundly impressed with the 
 strength of Mr, Lloyd George's personal position. He 
 was convinced that the new Premier could, if he chose, 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 245 
 
 force a settlement of the Irish diflficulty, and was very 
 hopeful of this happening. Sir Edward Carson dared not, 
 he thought, set himself in opposition ; at this moment 
 the Ulster party was not popular, while there M-as in 
 the House a widespread feeling that Redmond in par- 
 ticular had been treated in a manner far other than 
 his due. Another of his brother's interventions in debate 
 gave an impetus to this sj-mpathy. 
 
 Again in a thin House, during some discussion on 
 Estimates, Willie Redmond got up and spoke out of the 
 fullness of experiences which had profoundly affected 
 his imagination. He told the House of what he had 
 seen in Flanders, where the two Irish Divisions had at 
 last been brought into contact, so that the left of the 
 Ulster line in front of Ploegstreet touched the right of 
 ours in front of Kemmel. It had always been said that 
 the two factions would fly at each other's throats : by 
 a score of happj' detailed touches the soldier built up 
 a jDicture of what had actually happened in the line and 
 behind the line, and then summed it up in a conclusion : 
 
 " They came together in the trenches and they were 
 friends. Get them together on the floor of an Assembly, or 
 where you will, in Ireland, and a similar result will follow." 
 
 Then, from this theme, he passed to one even more 
 moving — the fate of Irish Nationalists, who were con- 
 fronted daily with evil news of their own land. "' It is 
 miserable to see men who went out with high hearts and 
 hopes, who have acquitted themselves so well, filled 
 with wretchedness because their country is in an unhapjDy 
 condition." He appealed for a new and genuine attempt 
 to set all this right ; and he eulogized once more \vith 
 warm eloquence the conduct of the troops, Ulstermen 
 and the rest alike. Raw lads, who eighteen months before 
 had never thought of seeing war, had come in before 
 his eyes bringing prisoners by the hundreds from the 
 most highly trained soldiery in Euroi^e. 
 
 Man after man, when Willie Redmond had ended, rose 
 
246 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 and thanked him ; but the most notable words came 
 from Mr. Bonar Law : 
 
 " His name and his action, in connection with that 
 of the leader of his party, stand out as a landmark for 
 all the people of this country as to what is being done 
 by those who represent Nationalist feeling." 
 
 All this increased Redmond's hopes of what might be 
 expected from the new Premier, the representative of 
 another small nationality, whose early days in Parliament 
 had linked him almost more closely with Irish Nationalists 
 than with British Liberalism. I was on the upper bench 
 when Mr. Lloyd George came in, amid loud cheering. 
 " Look at him," said Willie Redmond (his senior in the 
 House by ten years), who sat beside me : " It seems 
 only the other day he was sitting over here cheering like 
 mad for the Boers ; and there he is now, Prime Minister." 
 
 But Mr. Lloyd George's speech, which had been deferred 
 for several days owing to illness, was long before it came 
 to Ireland, and then its tone was no way hopeful. He 
 referred back to the negotiations of June and July, with 
 their *' atmosphere of nervous suspicion and distrust, 
 pervasive, universal, of everything and everybody." 
 
 ** I was drenched with suspicion of Irishmen by English- 
 men and of Englishmen by Irishmen and, worst of all, 
 of Irishmen by Irishmen. It was a quagmire of distrust 
 which clogged the footsteps and made progress impossible. 
 That is the real enemy of Ireland." 
 
 No one could say that the transaction to which Mr. 
 Lloyd George was referring had helped to destroy dis- 
 trust : and in view of the opinion held by Irishmen — 
 and not by Irishmen only — of Ministers' dealing with 
 Ireland, it was natural that this passage should provoke 
 the resentment which was evident in Redmond when 
 he rose. 
 
 He followed Mr. Asquith, and made it clear that 
 Ireland did not keep its praises for the rising star. He 
 commended in weighty words the patriotism, the reticence 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 247 
 
 and tho magnani)nity of the dispossessed leader ; ho 
 renewed Ireland's expression of gratitude for the service 
 done in the Home Rule Act ; then, turning to the new 
 power, he told ]\Ir. Lloyd George bluntly that his words 
 would be received in Ireland with the deepest disappoint- 
 ment. This was to be a Ministry of quick and effective 
 decisions ; but so far as our question was concerned, 
 they had shown every disj)osition to wait and see. Was 
 Ireland only to be let drift ? Two courses might be 
 taken — the statesman's, of real remedy ; the politician's, 
 of palliatives. Even of the latter nothing had been 
 said. Martial law could be removed ; untried men could 
 be released from jail. Yet there was no sign. The 
 Prime Minister intervened angrily. He had been ill, 
 he said. Redmond was in no way inclined to accept 
 the reason as sufficient, and again Mr. Lloyd George 
 rose to say that it was " not merely unfair, but a trifle 
 impolitic " not to give him a couple of days to consult 
 with the Chief Secretary'-. 
 
 Still Redmond maintained his tone of aggression. 
 A radical reform was needed, and of those things that 
 must be borne in mind the first was that time was 
 of the essence of success. Promi)tness was essential. 
 Secondly, Government must take the initiative them- 
 selves ; they must not seek to evade their 'responsibility 
 by putting the blame on other shoulders (this was his 
 rejoinder to the allegation of paralysing distrust) ; there 
 was no use in resuming negotiations, going to this man 
 and to that man to see what he would be willing to take. 
 Thirdly, the problem must be approached by a different 
 method ; it must be dealt with on lines of a united Ire- 
 land. The time had gone by, in effect, for anj' proposals 
 of partition, temporary or permanent. 
 
 He added a caution that there must be no attempt 
 to mix up the problem of an Irish settlement with con- 
 ditions about recruiting or conscription. " That question 
 must be left to a change of heart in Ireland." In con- 
 
248 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 elusion he expressed to the House of Commons — though 
 in no sanguine accents — what he had expressed to me 
 a fortnight earlier in private talk : his belief that the 
 time was " ripe for drastic, decided and bold action " 
 by the Prime Minister. Powerful influences were at 
 Mr. Lloyd George's back — in the Press of all j^arties, 
 in the opinion of leading men of all parties. Three- 
 quarters of the House of Commons, Redmond said, would 
 M'elcome such action : the whole of the overseas Dominions 
 would be for it ; and it would have " the sympathy 
 of all men of good will in the Empire." 
 
 For the first time I noticed lack of cordiality in the 
 response of the House — not from want of agreement, 
 but from a profound depression. The old temper of 
 bickering had revived, especiallj^ between some of our 
 partj' and those who disagreed with them. One was 
 glad to get back to France for Christmas, even in that 
 grim winter. 
 
 When I was invalided back in February, I found that 
 things had not stood still in Ireland. Redmond's sug- 
 gested palliative had been applied, and the deported 
 persons were let back home for Christmas. But this 
 produced little easing of the situation, and within a few 
 weeks Government rearrested several of them. 
 
 One, however. Count Plunkett, was still in Ireland 
 when a vacancy occurred in Roscommon. He was not 
 in himself a likely man to appeal to that constituency. 
 He had been an applicant for the Under-Secretaryship 
 at Dublin Castle, and was therefore clearlj^ not a person 
 of extreme Nationalist views. But one of his sons, a 
 young poet, had been among the signatories to the pro- 
 clamation of an Irish Republic, and had paid for it with 
 his life ; Count Plunkett stood really as the father of 
 his son. He was returned by a very large majority. 
 This was the first open defeat inflicted by the jDhysical 
 force men on the Constitutional party since the beginning 
 of Parnell's day. 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 249 
 
 In March, Redmond desired to bring the Irish question 
 again before Parliament, and Mr. T. P. O'Connor intro- 
 duced a motion calling on the House " without further 
 delay to confer upon Ireland the free institutions long 
 promised her." 
 
 That debate will always be remembered by those 
 who heard it for one speech. Willie Redmond was among 
 the oldest members of the Parliamentary party ; not 
 half a dozen men in all the House had been longer con- 
 tinuously members ; he had always been one of the 
 most popular figures at Westminster and in Ireland ; 
 and he had always siaoken a great deal. Yet he had 
 never been in the front rank either as a speaker or as 
 a politician. The humour and the wit which made him 
 the joy of groups in the smoking-room on the occasions 
 when he was in full vein of reminiscence never got into 
 his set speeches — though no man oftener lit up debate 
 with some telling interruption. He was often merely 
 rhetorical ; he had the name — though in my experience 
 he never deserved it — for being indiscreetly vehement. 
 His early reputation, which he had never lived down, 
 is not unkindly represented by a story which he used 
 to tell against himself. When the first Home Rule Bill 
 was introduced he had a great desire to speak in the 
 debate, and went to Parnell with his request. " Will 
 you promise," said Parnell, " that you will write out 
 what you are going to say, and show it to me, and say 
 that and no more ? " He promised, and handed in his 
 manuscript. Days went by and he heard nothing, so 
 he went back to the Chief. " Ah yes," said Parnell, 
 " I have it in my pocket. An excellent speech, my dear 
 Willie. If I were you I shouldn't waste it on the House 
 of Commons. It's too good for them." 
 
 Later, in the days from 1906 onwards, with all his 
 experience, it cannot be said that he ever affected opinion 
 in the House. What he said was the common stuff of 
 argument : it was all what someone else might have 
 
2oO JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 said — until the war came. Then, he was a changed 
 creature. He went through in the Army the same experi- 
 ence as hundreds of other members of Parliament ; but 
 he and he only seemed to have got the very soul out 
 of it. He took to his soldier's duty as a religion : he 
 saw all that concerned him in the light of it. It has 
 been told already how his two speeches on almost casual 
 occasions affected public feeling : but in them he was 
 chieflj' an Irish member of Parliament speaking about 
 soldiers and about Irish soldiers. In this debate he was 
 an Irish soldier pleading with Parliament for Ireland in 
 the name of Irish soldiers — who had responded to the 
 call to arms because, as he said, they were led to believe 
 that a new and better and brighter chapter was about 
 to open in the relations of Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 " I do not believe that there is a single member of 
 any part}'- in this House who is prepared to get up and 
 say that in the past the government and treatment of 
 Ireland by Great Britain have been what they should 
 have been. Mistakes, dark, black, and bitter mistakes, 
 have been made. A people denied justice, a people 
 with many admitted grievances, the redress of which 
 has been long delaj^ed. On our side, perhaps, in the 
 conflict and in the bitterness of contest, there may have 
 been things said and done, offensive if you will, irritating 
 if you will, to the people of this country ; but what I 
 want to ask, in all simplicity, is this, whether, in face 
 of the tremendous conflict which is now raging, whether, 
 in view of the fact that, apart from every other considera- 
 tion, the Irish people, South as well as North, are upon 
 the side of the Allies and against the German pretension 
 to-day, it is not possible from this war to make a new 
 start ? — whether it is not possible on your side, and on 
 ours as well, to let the dead past bury its dead, and to 
 commence a brighter and a newer and a friendlier era 
 between the two countries ? Why cannot we do it ? 
 Is there an Englishman representing any party who 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 251 
 
 does not yearn for a better future between Ireland and 
 Great Britain ? There is no Irishman who ia not anxious 
 for it cilso. Why cannot there be a settlement ? Why 
 must it be that, when British soldiers and Irish soldiers 
 are suffering and dj4ng side by side, this eternal old 
 quarrel should go on ? ... . 
 
 *' If there ought to be an oblivion of the past between 
 Great Britain and Ireland generally, may I ask in God's 
 name the First Lord of the Admiralty [Sir Edward 
 Carson] why there cannot be a similar oblivion of the 
 past between the warring sections in Ireland ? All my 
 life I have taken as strong and as strenuous a part on 
 the Nationalist side as my poor abilities would allow. 
 I may have been as bitter and as strong in the heated 
 atmosphere of party contests against my countrymen 
 in the North as ever they have been against me, but I 
 believe in my soul and heart here to-day that I represent 
 the instinct and the desire of the whole Irish Catholic race 
 when I say that there is nothing that they more passion- 
 ately desire and long for than that there should be an 
 end of this old struggle between the North and the South. 
 
 *' The followers of the right honourable gentleman 
 the First Lord of the Admiralty should shake hands 
 with the rest of their countrymen. I appeal to the right 
 honourable gentleman here in the name of men against 
 whom no finger of scorn can be pointed ; in the name of 
 men who are doing their duty ; in the name of men who 
 have died ; in the name of men who may die, and who 
 at this very moment may be dying, to rise to the demands 
 of the situation. I ask him to meet his Nationalist 
 fellow-countrymen and accept the offer which they make 
 to him and his followers, and on the basis of that self- 
 government which has made, and which alone has made, 
 the Empire as strong as it is to-day, come to some arrange- 
 ment for the better government of Ireland in the future. 
 " Why does the right honourable gentleman opjjosite 
 not meet us half way ? I want to know what is the 
 
252 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 reason. It surely cannot be that the right honourable 
 gentleman and his friends believe that under a system 
 of self-government they would have anything to fear. 
 Nothing impressed me more than the opinion I heard 
 expressed b}- a high-placed Roman Catholic officer who 
 is in service with the Ulster Division, when he told 
 me of his experience there, and when he said that 
 although he was the only one of the Catholic religion 
 in that Division, it had dawned upon him that they cer- 
 tainly were Irishmen and were not Englishmen or Scots- 
 men. ^ The right honourable gentleman knows perfectly 
 well that it would not take so very much to bring his 
 friends and our friends together, and I ask him why 
 the attempt is not made ? I ask him whether the cir- 
 cumstances of the time do not warrant that such an 
 attempt should be made ? I ask him whether he does 
 not know in his inmost heart that it would bring to the 
 common enemy more dismay and consternation than 
 the destruction of a hundred of their submarines if they 
 knew that England, Scotland and Ireland were really 
 united, not merely within the confines of the shores of 
 these islands, but united in every part of the world where 
 the Irish people are to be found ? 
 
 " What is it that stands in the way of Ireland taking 
 her place as a self-governing part of this Empire ? Ire- 
 land is the only portion of the Empire now fighting which 
 is not self-governing. The Australians whom I meet 
 from time to time point to their government being free ; 
 the Canadians and the New Zealanders do the same, 
 and we Irishmen are the only units in France to-day 
 taking our part in the war who are obliged to admit 
 that the country we come from is denied those privileges 
 which have made the Empire the strong organization 
 
 » This might mislead. The exclusively Protestant charncter of 
 the Ulster Division was not maintained in France, and it came 
 to include many Catholic Irishmen in the rank and file and not 
 a few among the officers — all in equal comradeship. — S. G. 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 253 
 
 which it is to-day. If safeguards are necessary — I speak 
 only for myself, and I do not speak for anybody else 
 on these benches, because I have been away from this 
 House so long that I have almost lost touch with things 
 — as far as my own personal opinion goes, there is nothing 
 I would not do, and there is no length to which I would 
 not go, in order to meet the real objections or to secure 
 the real confidence, friendship and affection of my country- 
 men in the North of Ireland. 
 
 " For my own part, I would gladly, if it would ease 
 the situation, agree to an arrangement whereby it might 
 be possible for His Majesty the King, if he so desired, 
 to call in someone at the starting of a new Irish govern- 
 ment, a gentleman representing the portion of the country 
 and the section of the community which the First Lord 
 represents ; and if a representative of that kind were 
 placed with his hand upon the helm of the fir«t Irish 
 Parliament, I, at any rate, as far as I am concerned, 
 would give him the loyal and the strong support which 
 I have given to every leader I have supported in this 
 House. After all, these are times of sacrifice, and every 
 man is called upon to make some sacrifices. Men and 
 women and children alike have to do something in these 
 days, and is it too much to appeal to the right honour- 
 able gentleman and his friends to sacrifice some part 
 of their position in order to lead the majority of their 
 countrymen and to bring about that which the whole 
 English-speaking world desires, namely, a real recon- 
 ciliation of Ireland ? I apologize for having detained 
 the House so long, but this is a matter upon which I 
 feel strongly, and I feel all the more strongly about it 
 because I know that I am trjdng altogether too feebly, 
 but as strongly as I can, to represent what I Jcnow to 
 be the wishes nearest to the hearts of tens of thousands 
 of Irishmen who went with me and their colleagues to 
 France, many of whom will never return, all of Avhom 
 are suffering the privations and the hardship and the 
 
254 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 risk and the wellnigh intolerable circumstances of life 
 in France. I want to speak for these men, and if they 
 could all speak with one voice and with one accord, they 
 would say to this House, to men in every part of it, to 
 Conservatives, Liberals and Labour men, to their National- 
 ist countrymen and to their countrymen from the North 
 of Ireland : In the name of God, we here who are about to 
 die, perhaps, ask you to do that which largely induced 
 us to leave our homes ; to do that which our fathers 
 and mothers taught us to long for ; to do that which is 
 all wo desire: make our country happy and contented, 
 and enable us, when we meet the Canadians and the 
 Australians and the New Zealanders side by side in the 
 common cause and the common field, to say to them, 
 ' Our country, just as yours, has self-government mthin 
 the Empire.' " 
 
 I have given the speech almost in full as it stands in 
 print after the opening paragraph. But I cannot give 
 the effect of what was heard by a densely crowded House 
 in absolute silence. It was not an argument ; it was 
 an appeal. There was not a cheer, not a murmur of 
 agreement. They were not needed, they would have 
 been felt an impertinence, so great was the respect and 
 the sympathy. As the speaker stood there in war-stained 
 khaki, his hair showed grey, his face was seamed with 
 lines, but there was in every word the freshness and 
 simplicity of a nature that age had not touched. In 
 his usual place on the upper bench beside his brother, 
 he poured out his words with the flow and passion of a 
 bird's song. He was out of the sphere of argument ; 
 but the whole experience of a long and honourable life- 
 time was vibrant in that utterance. He spoke from his 
 heart. All that had gone to make his faith, all the inmost 
 convictions of his life were implicit — and throughout all 
 ran the sense in the assembly who heard him, not only 
 that he had risked, but that he was eager to give his life 
 for proof. It was not strange that this should bo eo, 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 255 
 
 for he was going on what he believed would be his last 
 journey to Fiance ; and when he reached the supreme 
 moment of hiy passion w ith the words " In the name of 
 God, we here who are about to die, perhaps," the last 
 word was little more than a concession to the conventions. 
 
 It was a speech, in short, that made one believe in 
 impossibilities ; but in Parliament no miracles happen. 
 Mr. Lloyd George replied, as John Redmond expected — 
 declaring that the Government were willing to give Home 
 Rule at once to " the parts of Ireland which unmistakably 
 demand it," but would be no party to placing under 
 Nationalist rule people who were " as alien in blood, in 
 religious faith, in traditions, in outlook from the rest of 
 Ireland as the inhabitants of Fife or Aberdeen." No 
 Liberal Minister had ever before so completely adopted 
 the Ulster theory of two nations. Taxed with the refusal 
 to allow Ulster counties to declare by vote which group 
 they belonged to, he declined to discuss " geographical 
 limitations " at present, but indicated that if Irish members 
 could accept the principle of separate treatment for two 
 peoples, there were " ways and means by which it could 
 be worked out." Suggestion of a Conference of Irishmen 
 was thrown out, or of a Commission to discuss the details 
 of partition. Redmond, in replying, answered to tliis that 
 *' after experience of the last negotiations he would enter 
 into no more negotiations." He warned the Govern- 
 ment that the whole constitutional movement was in 
 danger. There were in Ireland " serious men, men of 
 ability, men with command of money," who were bent 
 on smashing it. 
 
 " After fiftj' years of labour on constitutional lines we 
 had practically banished the revolutionary party from 
 Ireland. Now again, after fifty years, it has risen." 
 
 The rest was a prophecy only too accurate : 
 
 " If the constitutional movement disappears, the Prime 
 Minister will find himself face to face with a revolutionary 
 movement, and he will find it impossible to preserve 
 
256 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 any of the forms even of constitutionalism. He will have 
 to govern Ireland by the naked sword. I cannot picture 
 to myself a condition of things in which the Prime Minister, 
 with his record behind him, would be an instrument to 
 carry out a government of that kind. ... I say this 
 plainly. No Briti:sh statesman, no matter what his 
 platonic affection for Home Rule may have been in the 
 past, no matter what party he may belong to, who by 
 his conduct once again teaches the Irish jjeople the lesson 
 that any National leader who, taking his political life 
 in his hands, endeavours to combine local and Imperial 
 patriotism — endeavours to combine loyalty to Ireland's 
 rights with loyalty to the Empire — anyone who again 
 teaches the lesson that such an one is certain to be let 
 down and betrayed by this course, is guilty of treason, 
 not only to the liberties of Ireland but to the unity and 
 strength and best interests of this Empire." 
 
 After these bitter ^^ords he called on his colleagues 
 not " to continue a useless and humiliating debate," 
 but to withdraw from the House : and we accordingly 
 followed him into the lobbj'. In our absence the discus- 
 sion continued, in a tone not flattering to the Govern- 
 ment. It was remarkable for one utterance from 
 Mr. Healy, concerning Redmond : 
 
 " I wish to say at the outset that in my opinion this 
 Empire owes him a debt of gratitude which it can never 
 repay, and I wish also to say of him as an opponent that 
 in my opinion, if his advice had been taken by the War 
 Office, it is absolutely true, as he contends, that you 
 would have marshalled in Ireland from two hundred 
 thousand to three hundred thousand men, from whom 
 large drafts could have been drawn ; and I will further 
 say I believe if his advice had been taken the elements 
 of rebellion would have been appeased." 
 
 It was plain that matters could not stay at this 
 point ; but our breach with the Government was complete 
 for the moment. Redmond's demand was fur a full and 
 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 257 
 
 definite statement of policy, which should be made in 
 the House of Commons and there discussed. On May loth 
 Mr. Bonar Law announced that the Prime Minister would 
 make a communication to the leaders of Irish parties. 
 It was explained that this method of outlining the pro- 
 posals would be only preliminary to discussion. 
 
 On that evening a great banquet to General Smuts 
 was given in the House of Lords by Parliament. Strong 
 pressure was used with Redmond to attend it, and he 
 consented unwillingly. He w\as ill — physically ill, prob- 
 ably with the beginnings of his fatal disease — and morally 
 sick at heart and out of hope. Another Irish election 
 in South Longford had been strenuously fought by the 
 party and had been won by the Sinn Feiner ; a decisive 
 factor in the election was the issue of a letter from Arch- 
 bishop Walsh which grossly misrepresented Redmond's 
 whole policy and action. He was in no humour for 
 banquetings, and at this moment the Irish party was 
 nearly back at its old attitude, which dictated a refusal 
 to have part or lot with the House on such ceremonial 
 occasions. I But Redmond's feeling for South Africa 
 was specially strong, his feeling about the war was un- 
 changed ; and this was a recognition of a great South 
 African statesman's services in the war. He let himself 
 be persuaded into accepting. 
 
 At the dinner he sat next to a Liberal peer, a member 
 of the late Government, who talked with him of Irish 
 possibilities. Redmond did not know what the Govern- 
 ment intended. He was told, now, that the Government 
 had written a letter to him and to Sir Edward Carson 
 setting out plainly an offer for the immediate introduction 
 of Home Rule with the exclusion of the six counties. 
 
 Redmond said : "It is impossible that we should 
 accept ; nothing can come of it." He was asked then 
 
 » We had never been parties, for instance, to receptions of Prime 
 Ministers from the overseas Dominions, even when they were our 
 close friends and supporters. 
 
 18 
 
258 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 what hope he saw. He answered, as he had for some 
 time been saying in private, that the onlj' chance lay 
 in a Conference or Convention of Irishmen ; but it must 
 include everybody, and in no sense be limited to discussion 
 between the Irish party and the Unionists. The Liberal 
 peer expressed great interest and proved it in action. 
 Next morning he was with Redmond by ten o'clock, and 
 got his view in writing that it might be placed before 
 the Cabinet, who were to meet at eleven to decide finally'' 
 the terms of their letter. 
 
 As a result of this intervention, the letter, instead of 
 containing a single proposal, offered two alternatives : 
 the second was so oddly tacked on that many at the time 
 said it read like a postscript. So, in point of fact, it was. 
 That was the genesis of the Irish Convention. 
 
 His son, from whom I know this, said to me that more 
 than once, when things were hopeful in the Convention, 
 Redmond said to him, " What a lucky thing it was I 
 went to that dinner ! " 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 THE CONVENTION AND THE END 
 
 rriHE Longford election had in reality been not merely 
 JL a S3'mptom, but an event of great importance. It 
 was a notice of dismissal to the Parliamentary party. 
 There was no reason to suppose anything specially un- 
 favourable to us in the local conditions. Neither candi- 
 date made a special appeal to the electors ; nor was 
 the constituency in any sense a stronghold of Sinn Fein. 
 The fact was that the countrj^ as a whole had ceased to 
 believe in the Parliamentary j^arty as an efficient machine 
 for obtaining the national ends. The organization of 
 the United Irish League had lost touch with the young ; 
 the main support we had lay in the Ancient Order of 
 Hibernians, which many Nationalists disliked on principle 
 because it was limited to Catholics. What had not yet 
 disappeared up till July 1916, though it was threatened, 
 was belief in the principle of constitutional action as 
 against revolutionary methods. 
 
 Willie Redmond, who never lacked instinct, and whose 
 separation from party politics by conditions of service 
 gave him a vantage-ground of detachment, reached a 
 shrewd view of the position before the Longford vacancy 
 occurred. He pressed upon his brother that we should 
 all retire, saying plainly that we had been too long in 
 possession, and should hand over the task of representing 
 Ireland at Westminster to younger men. His association 
 with the Volunteer Committee, brief though it was, had 
 made him more aware than most of our colleagues how 
 
 269 
 
260 JOHN REDMOND'S LAIST YEARS 
 
 wide was the estrangement between us and the new 
 Ireland ; but it also taught him to believe that many 
 of the men whom he had met there would be willing 
 to take up the task on constitutional lines. 
 
 This proposal never came before the party. But after 
 Longford had given its decision, it was proposed that we 
 should accept the verdict in general and resign in a body. 
 Those who put forward the suggestion felt that some 
 drastic action was needed to force upon Ireland the 
 responsibility' for a clear choice between the two courses, 
 constitutional and unconstitutional. Redmond, as Chair- 
 man, advised strongly against this. He said that it would 
 be a lack of courage : that one defeat or two defeats 
 should not turn us from our course. But it is clear to 
 me that he welcomed the Convention as another and a 
 better means of effecting the same end — of replacing 
 the existing Parliamentary party by another body of men. 
 
 On May 21st Mr. Lloj^d George's speech gave the go-by 
 completely to the detailed proj)osal for a settlement on 
 the basis of partition to which the Cabinet — including 
 Sir Edward Carson — had consented. It dealt only with 
 the alternative plan suggested in the conclusion of the 
 published letter. The Government had decided to invite 
 Irishmen to put forward their own proposals for the 
 government of their country, he said. This invitation 
 was directed to a Convention not merely of political 
 parties, although they must all be represented — the 
 followers of Redmond, of Mr. O'Brien, the Ulster Union- 
 ists, the Southern Unionists, " and he hoped also the Sinn 
 Feiners as well.'' But in the main it was to consist of 
 " representatives of the local governing bodies, of the 
 Churches, of the trade unions, of the commercial interests, 
 of educational interests " ; it w'as to be ''a real repre- 
 sentation of Irish life and activity in all their leading 
 branches." It was to be pledged in advance to no con- 
 clusions — except one, and that was only indicated by 
 implication. " If substantial agreement should be reached 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 201 
 
 as to the character and scope of the Constitution for the 
 future government of Ireland within the Empire" (these 
 three words were the limitation), Government Avould 
 " accept the responsibility for taking all the necessary 
 steps to enable the Imperial Parliament to give legislative 
 effect to tb? con elusion a of the Convention." 
 
 A recommendation ■'yar' ?^.dded, amounting to a dirvoiion, 
 that the Convention should sit with closed doors and 
 publish nothing of its proceedings till their conclusion. 
 
 Nothing was said to define the all-important words 
 " substantial agreement." But the Prime Minister laid 
 grave emphasis on the importance of a settlement for 
 the purpose of the war. The limitation upon Ulster's 
 claim was plainly conceived by him to lie in Ulster's 
 sense of an Imperial necessity'. " The Empire cannot 
 afford uncured sores that sap its vigour. The entire 
 strength of Great Britain and the whole-hearted support 
 of Ireland are essential to victory." He appealed " to 
 Irishmen of all faiths, political and religious, and especial!}' 
 to the patriotic spirit of Ulster, to helji by healing." 
 
 Redmond, in following him. assumed that there would 
 be concurrence from all sections of Irishmen. It must 
 be ■' a free assembly "—no proposal must be barred in 
 advance : it must be representative of " every i-lass, 
 creed and interest "—and in recapitulating these, he 
 added the Irish peers. In regard to political parties 
 and bodies, as such, he desired a very limited represen- 
 tation. The United Irish League, " the militant official 
 organization of the Irish party," should be unrepresented, 
 and he advised the same in regard to other purelj'^ political 
 organizations and societies. For the Irish party itself 
 he asked a representation only equal in number to that 
 given to Irish Unionists. The Cork Independents must 
 have what they considered a full and adequate number ; 
 and for Sinn Fein he asked " a generous representation." 
 
 Then he added : 
 
 " So anxious am I that no wreckers, mere wreckers, 
 
262 JOHN REDMONDS LAST YEARS 
 
 should go on that body — I do not believe any men would 
 go on as MTeckers, but any men who would be regarded 
 bj' their opponents as going on it as wreckers — that on 
 the question of personalities, I would be verj- glad, if 
 there are protagonists on one side or the other who during 
 the last twenty or thirty years or more have been engaged 
 in tlie struggle and who — there have been faults on both 
 sides — have done things and said things which have left 
 bitter memories, I should be very glad that such men 
 should be left off. If there were any feeling that I am 
 such a man mj''self, I would be only too willing and happy 
 to stand down " (he was interrupted by cries of *' No, 
 No") "if by doing so I could promote harmony." 
 
 In tliis there was a genuine expression of the desire 
 which governed his whole conduct in the Convention, to 
 get away from the old lines with their old traditional 
 antagonisms, and refer the solution not to Irish politicians 
 but to Ireland as a whole. AVliat followed in his speech 
 gave positive development to the self-denying ordinance 
 whicli he had proposed for the party machines. He 
 asked for a nominated element — first, to make sure that 
 men obviouslj^ suitable, who none the less might not 
 happen to be elected, should find a place : and secondly, 
 to increase still further the Unionist rejiresentation. 
 
 He added once more a plea for quick action ; dilatori- 
 ness had had much to do, he said, with the (lovernment's 
 late failures in Ireland, But, if prompt stejjs were taken 
 on the path outlined, he would, in spite of all that had 
 come and gone, face the new venture with good heart. 
 Yet even in his confidence there was the pathetic accent 
 of one who feels need to bid defiance to despair. 
 
 " Although I know I lay myself open perhaps to ridicule 
 as too sanguine a prophet, I have some assured hoj^e that 
 the result msiy be blessed for Ireland as for the Empire. 
 . . . The life of a politician, especially of an Irish poli- 
 tician, is one long series of postponements and com- 
 promises and disapf>ointments and disillusions. , . . Many 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 263 
 
 of oiu' cherished ideals, our ideals of complete, speedy 
 and almost immediate triumph of our policy and of our 
 cause, have faded, some of them almost disappeared. 
 And we know that it is a serious consideration for those 
 of us who have spent forty years at this work and now 
 are growdng old, if we have to face further postponements. 
 For my part, I feel we must not shrink from compromise. 
 If by this Convention which is now proposed we can 
 secure substantial agreement amongst our jDeople in 
 Ireland, it will be worth all the heartburnings and post- 
 ponements and disappointments and disillusions of the 
 last thirty or forty years." 
 
 The omens were not favourable to this storm-beaten 
 courage. When he sat down, Sir John Lonsdale rose 
 to reiterate on behalf of the Ulster Unionists that they 
 " could not and would not be driven into a Home Rule 
 Parliament " — and that they relied absolutely on the 
 pledges that they should not be coerced. Mr. William 
 O'Brien followed. After years of advocating settlement by 
 conference among Irishmen, he condemned this proposal 
 as coming six or seven years too late, and as defective in 
 its machinery, in that it proposed a large body of men : 
 " A dozen Irishmen of the right stamp '" would be the 
 proper Conference ; and the proposal of partition should 
 be barred out in advance. If the experiment were tried 
 now and failed, the failure would " kill any reasonable 
 hope in our time of reconstructing the constitutional 
 movement upon honest lines." Ireland is always fruitful 
 in Cassandras who do not lack power to assist in the fulfil- 
 ment of their ill-bodings, and this speech foreshadowed 
 Mr, O'Brien's intention to abstain. Sir Edward Carson 
 and Mr. Devlin gave the debate a more promising tone : 
 but it was difficult for anybody to be sanguine. 
 
 Preparation, discussion, went on in private and in 
 public. It was soon indicated that Sinn Fein would take 
 no part, on the double ground, first, that the Convention 
 was not elective in any democratic sense, for all the repre- 
 
264 JOHN REDMONDS LAST YEARS 
 
 sentatives of local bodies had been elected before the 
 war, before the rebellion, before the new movement took 
 hold in Ireland ; and secondly, that it was committed 
 in advance to a settlement within the Empire. On the 
 other hand, Redmond was flooded with corresiDondence 
 concerning candidates for membership of the new body. 
 There was also the question of a meeting-place. The 
 Royal College of Surgeons offered its building with its 
 theatre, possessing admirable facilities. But Trinity 
 College offered the Regent House. The conveniences here 
 were in all ways inferior ; but Trinity was the nearest 
 place to the old Parliament House ; much more than 
 that, it was the most historic institution in Ireland. Its 
 political associations of the past and the present were 
 strangely blended and Redmond liked it none the less for 
 that. He decided to press for acceptance of this offer. 
 
 Then across the current of all our thought came the 
 news of the Battle of Messines. Troops had been massing 
 for some time on the sector of line which the Irish Divisions 
 had now held since the previous October ; and the day 
 was plainly in sight which had been expected since spring, 
 when they were to try and carrj^ positions in front of 
 which so much blood had been vainly shed. On June 7th, 
 at the clearing of light, all was in readiness : the Ulster- 
 men and ours still in the centre of the attack from Span- 
 broekmolen to Wytschaete. Just before the moment 
 fixed, men could see clearly : in half a minute all was 
 blotted out. The eighteen huge land-mines in whose 
 shafts our second line had been so often billeted were 
 now at last exploded and the sky was full of powdered 
 earth, with God knows what other fragments. In that 
 darkness the trooj)s went over. 
 
 For once staff-work and execution harmonized per- 
 fectly ; the success was complete, and the sacrifice small. 
 The Irish raced for their positions, and no one could say 
 who was first on the goal. News of the victory quickly 
 reached Loudon— great news for Ireland. Australians 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 265 
 
 and New Zealanders had their full share in it, but the 
 shoulder to shoulder advance of the two Irish Divisions 
 caught everyone's imagination : it was Ireland's day. 
 
 Then came through the message that Willie Redmond 
 had fallen. 
 
 E'^^er since hie illness in the previous summer he had 
 heen taken away from bis work as comp?,-ny commander ; 
 at his age — fifty-six — he was probably the oldest man 
 in any capacity with the Division. A post was found 
 for him on General Hickie's divisional staff which made 
 him specially responsible for the comforts of the men, 
 in trenches and out of trenches. In the battles on the 
 Somme he entreated hard to be let rejoin his battalion, 
 but General Hickie issued peremptor}^ orders which did 
 not allow him to pass the first dressing-station. Here, 
 indeed, he was under terrible shell fire and saw many of 
 his comrades struck down ; but he was not content. 
 For this new battle he insisted that he must be in the 
 actual advance. If he were refused leave, he said he 
 would break all discipline and take it. He was permitted 
 to be with the third attacking wave ; but he slipped 
 forward and joined the first, on the right, where the line 
 touched the Ulstermen. So it happened that when he 
 fell, struck by two rifle bullets, the stretcher-bearers 
 wlio helped him and carried him down to the dressing- 
 station were those of an Ulster regiment. He was brought 
 back to the hospital in the convent at Locre, familiar 
 to all of us by many memories ; for the nuns kept a 
 restaurant for officers in the refectory, and he and I had 
 dined there more than once with leading men of the 
 Ulster Division. His wounds were not grave ; but he 
 had overtaxed himself, and in a fcAv hours he succumbed 
 to shock. It was the death that he had foreseen, that 
 he had almost desired — a death that many might have 
 envied hini. He had said more than once since the 
 rebellion that he thought he could best serve Ireland by 
 dying ; and in the sequel, so deep was the impression 
 
266 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 left by his deatli that it seemed at timc!^ as if liis thought 
 had been true. 
 
 Yet one aspect of it was overlooked by many — the 
 loss inflicted on his brother, the Irish leader. It was not 
 merely that Redmond lost the sole near kinsman of his 
 generation ; he lost in him the closest of those comrades 
 who had been allied with him in all the stages of his life's 
 fight. The veterans of the old party had been vanishing 
 rapidly from the scene ; name succeeded name quickly 
 on our death-roll. This death left Redmond lonely, 
 and sorely stricken in his affections. But it did more. 
 It dej)rived him of a counsellor, and perhaps the only 
 counsellor he had who temperamentally shared his own 
 point of view. More especially now in the war, when 
 the leader's wisdom in giving the lead which he had 
 given began to be gravely questioned even by his own 
 supporters, it was invaluable for him to have backing 
 from one who had taken the war as part of his life's 
 creed — who knew no hesitancies, no reserves in his con- 
 viction that the right course had been followed, for the 
 right thing was to do the right. Finally and chiefly, 
 Willie RedTuond was the only man who could break 
 through his brother's constitutional reserve and could 
 force him into discussion. In the months that were to 
 come siicli a man was badly needed. The loss of him 
 meant to John Redmond a loss of personal efficiency. 
 Sorrow gave a strong grip to depression on a brooding 
 mind which had always a proneness to melancholy, which 
 was now linked with a sick body, and which lived among 
 disappointments and grief and the sense of rancorous 
 dislike in men who once thought it a privilege to cheer 
 him on his passing. 
 
 Add to all this that Redmond's one hope for Ireland 
 now lay in the Convention, and that he counted with 
 good reason on his soldier brother's influence there — as 
 no man could fail to do who had seen the effect which 
 his last speech produced upon the House of Commons. 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 267 
 
 No doubt, however, part of the service which Willie 
 Redmond rendered to Ireland in dying lay in the sympathy 
 which he conciliated to his leader — in whom men saw, 
 rightly, not only his nearest kinsman, but the represen- 
 tative of the principles for which the soldier-politician 
 died. The sjnnpathy was genuine and it was widespread ; 
 yet so reserved was John Redmond that few, I think, 
 guessed how deeply the blow had struck home. Still 
 less did they realize how much was meant by the bereave- 
 ment which followed immediately. Pat O'Brien, who 
 had been through all vicissitudes the faithful and devoted 
 helper of his friend and leader, was suddenly prostrated 
 by a stroke. He came down to the House again ; he 
 could not keep away from the place of his duty, where 
 for a quarter of a century he had scarcely missed one 
 division in a hundred, where he had kept watch for Red- 
 mond like the most trusty sheep-dog ; but death was 
 written over him and it came in a few days. He was 
 the one friend, I believe, whom Redmond would have 
 taken with him to Aughavanagh after Willie Redmond's 
 death. Now, Aughavanagh, which had been a place of 
 rest, was a place of intense loneliness. Yet to Augha- 
 vanagh Redmond had withdrawn himself, like a wounded 
 creature ; and from Augha\^anagh he came to Dublin 
 for Pat O'Brien's funeral in Glasnevin. Then, and then 
 only in his lifetime people saw him publicly ])rcak down ; 
 he had to be led away from the grave. 
 
 Meanwhile, he was beset by ceaseless correspondence 
 concerning the numbers and composition of the assembly 
 to which the British Government on his suggestion had 
 decided to entrust so great a charge. But a startling 
 politiccil event indicated only too plainly how much 
 belated that decision had been. 
 
 Directly the proposal for a Convention had been dis- 
 closed, with its attempt to create a new atmosphere, 
 it was put to the Government that Sinn Fein could not 
 be expected to take part in the Convention while its 
 
268 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 leaders were in jail or under detention as suspects. This 
 representation came from several quarters, and it was 
 soon publicly pleaded by the Nationalist party ; but 
 it was, to my knowledge, immediately put forward by 
 English members of Parliament, the prime mover being 
 a Unionist soldier, Major J. W. Hills, M.P. As usual, 
 the ?ydTsnt5ge of prompt action was urged ; and as usual, 
 the concession was delayed till it had lost its grace and 
 seemed to be extracted. Sinn Fein's opinion in all these 
 days was hardening against the Convention, which was 
 represented as a mere trick to gain time and to conciliate 
 American good will by an unreal offer. 
 
 When the prisoners were released, a new personage 
 immediately came into the public eye. It was certain 
 that one of them would be nominated to contest the 
 vacancy in East Clare left by Willie Redmond's death ; 
 the choice fell on Mr. de Valera ; and the world learnt 
 that in these months while the imprisoned Sinn Feiners 
 had been discussing their plans for the future — for the 
 right of association as political prisoners had been con- 
 ceded to them — this young man had been recognized by 
 his fellows as the leading spirit. Ireland as a whole knew 
 nothing of him. He was the son of a Southern American 
 and a county Limerick woman ; scholarly, a keen Gaelic 
 Leaguer, by profession a teacher of mathematics. In 
 the rebellion he had held Roland's bakery, a large building 
 covering the approaches to Dublin from Kingstown by 
 rail ; he had been the last of the leaders to surrender, 
 and had earned high opinions by his conduct in these 
 operations. This was the Sinn Fein candidate for East 
 Clare — a county Avhere " extreme " men had always 
 been numerous. 
 
 The view was expressed that he should have been 
 opposed by one who took up the cause where W^illie 
 Redmond left it — by a soldier who was a strong National- 
 ist and strongly identified with the Parnellite tradition. 
 It was decided that we should stand a better chance if 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 269 
 
 constitutional Nationalism were represented by a Dublin 
 lawyer with close personal ties to the constituency. How 
 it would have gone had a soldier been put up, no man 
 can say ; but it could not have gone worse. Mr. de Valera 
 won by a majority of five thousand. He was a stranger, 
 but he stood for an ideal. The alternative ideal — which 
 was John Redmond's and Willie Redmond's — had never 
 been put before the electors. The election W8«, rightly, 
 taken as a repudiation of Redmond's policy ; but in it 
 Redmond's policy had gone undefended. 
 
 The newly elected 8inn Fein leader was very prominent 
 in these days, and a good deal of his eloquence was spent 
 in ridicule of the Convention. That body was certainly 
 starting its task under the most unpromising auspices. 
 
 II 
 
 The first meeting was fixed for Jul}- 2.5. On the evening 
 before, Redmond came up and there was an informal 
 discussion between the Nationalist members of Parlia- 
 ment and the Catholic Bishops. There were four of each 
 group. Five members had been allowed to the party 
 and as many to the Ulstermen. Redmond was not 
 present at the meeting when selection was made, but he 
 recommended a list, consisting in addition to himself 
 of Mr. Dillon, Mr. Devlin, and Mr. Clancy, K.C. — the 
 latter having been alwa^-s his most trusted adviser in 
 all points of draftsmanship ajid constitutional law. My 
 name was added in the place which should have been 
 his brother's, as representing Irish troops. 
 
 Mr. Dillon, however, thought it better not to serve, 
 though Redmond pressed him very strongly to do so. 
 He considered he could best lielp the Convention from 
 outside its ranks. Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Heal}' had, on 
 different grounds, come to the same conclusion, so that 
 
270 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 we lacked the assistance of three commanding person- 
 alities in Irish life, though we were thereby freed from 
 some dangers of personal friction. A vacant place was 
 thus left in our five, and since the Ulster party had decided 
 to put in only two members of Parliament, filling the 
 other places with local men, it was thought well that we 
 should take a similar representative, Mr. Harbison, who 
 spoke for the county of Tyrone. 
 
 Of the four representatives of the hierarchy. Archbishop 
 Harty of Cashel had always been a downright outspoken 
 supporter of the Parliamentary party. He had publicly 
 denounced the rebellion both on civil and on moral 
 grounds. But he had never been prominently concerned 
 with political affairs as such ; nor had the Bishop of 
 Down and Connor, Dr. MacRory, a man young for his 
 office and not long in it. He had been chosen, no doubt, 
 to guard the sj)ecial interests of Catholicism in the north- 
 east corner. The others were of a very different stamp ; 
 no two in Ireland had a better right to the name of states- 
 men. Dr. O'Donnell, the Bishop of Raphoe, had been 
 for many years officially one of the treasurers of the 
 United Irish League. Since the foundation of the Con- 
 gested Districts Board, he had been one of its members, 
 and served on the Dudley Commission which inquired 
 into these regions. His native Donegal could show the 
 traces of his influence in applying remedial measures to 
 what was once its terrible poverty. Dr. Kelly, the 
 Bishoj) of Ross, came from the extreme south of the 
 same western coast-line ; a keen student of finance and 
 economics, he had been a member of the Primrose Com- 
 mittee on Financial Relations, and, before that, of Lord 
 C4eorge Hamilton's Commission on the Poor LaAV. His 
 repute was great in his own order and outside his own 
 order. In any assembly these two brains would have 
 been distinguished. 
 
 The question which was discussed among us chiefly 
 on that evening concerned the choice of a chairman. 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 271 
 
 Government had originally proposed to nominate this 
 all-important oflficer, but having failed to solve the inter- 
 minable dil'ficulties, had left it to the assembly. Much 
 trouble was anticipated by the public. On the whole, 
 our conclusion pointed, but not decisively, to the choice 
 which was eventually made. Redmond swept aside 
 peremptorily the suggestion of himself. 
 
 Next day we assembled — some ninety persons. The 
 main bulk consisted of local representatives — thirty-one 
 chairmen of County Councils, one only having declined to 
 serve. Two of these, Mr. O'Dowd and Mr. Fitzgibbon, 
 were members of our party. There were eight repre- 
 sentatives of the Urban Councils, over and above the 
 Lord Maj^ors of Dublin, Belfast and Cork and the Mayor 
 of Derry. Labour had seven representatives, one of whom, 
 Mr. Lundon, representing the Agricultural Labourers' 
 Union of the South, was an Irish member of Parlia- 
 ment. One was a railway operative from Dublin ; one 
 a Catholic Trade-Unionist leader from Derry ; the remain- 
 ing four came from Belfast. Organized labour in Dublin 
 and the Southern towns had endorsed Sinn Fein's attitude 
 and declined to recognize the Convention. 
 
 The Southern Unionist Group was led by Lord 
 Midleton ; with him were Lords Mayo and Oranmore, 
 representing the Irish peers. The Irish Linionist Alliance 
 had sent Mr. Stewart, a great land-agent, and Mr. Andrew 
 Jameson (whose name, as someone said, was " a household 
 word written in letters of gold throughout Ireland "). 
 The Chambers of Commerce had their representatives 
 from Dublin, Belfast and Cork. 
 
 In the Ulster group, Mr. Barrie, M.P., acted as leader, 
 Lord Londonderry as secretary. Of the rest. Sir George 
 Clark, chairman of Workman and Clark's great ship- 
 building yard, had been known to us in Parliament. A 
 Scot by birth, with a life of thirty years spent in Belfast, 
 during which time he had seen his business grow from 
 two hundred hands to ten thousand, he knew nothing 
 
272 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 of Ireland but Belfast, and had no trace of Irish feeling. 
 In this he stood alone ; but unhappily no man carried 
 more weight in Belfast — with the possible exception of 
 one whom few of us outside Ulster knew before we came 
 to that body. Mr. Alexander McDowell was a solicitor 
 by profession, the adviser of policy to all the business 
 men of Belfast. From the first day of our meeting he 
 stood out by sheer weight of brain and personality. He 
 was to some of us the surprise of that assembly, and 
 made us realize how little part we had in Ulster when 
 the existence of such a man could be an unknown factor 
 to us. 
 
 Mr. Pollock, President of the Belfast Chamber of 
 Commerce, was also new to us, and was destined to play 
 a prominent part in our affairs. With the Catholic 
 prelates sat the two Archbishops of the Church of Ire- 
 land — Dr. Crozier and Dr. Bernard — to both of whom 
 the democratic constitution of their Church had given 
 great experience in management of business and dis- 
 cussion. Dr. MacDermott, Moderator of the Presby- 
 terian General Assembly, was the official head of his 
 Church for the year only and had not equal knowledge 
 of administration. An orator, M-ith a touch of the 
 enthusiast in his temperament, he was a simple and sym- 
 pathetic figure ; vehement in his political faith, yet 
 responsive to all the human charities and deeply a lover 
 of his country. There was no better representative 
 there of Ulster, of the Ulster difficulty— at once so 
 separate from and so akin to the rest of Ireland. 
 
 The Government nominees included, as was only 
 natural, the most personally distinguished group. First 
 of them should be named the Provost of Trinity, Dr. 
 Mahaffy, under whose segis we assembled — a great 
 scholar and a great Irishman. He brought with him 
 an element of independent unregimented political thought 
 — often freakish in expression, but based on a vast know- 
 ledge of men and countries. In a more practical sense, 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 273 
 
 Lord MacDonnell and Lord Dunraven were our chief 
 political theorists, devisers by temperament of consti- 
 tutional machinery. Lord MacDonnell's repute as an 
 administrator, Lord Dunraven's as a leading figure in 
 the Land Conference, gave weight to whatever came 
 from them. Lord Granard, who sat with them, was a 
 Catholic peer who had commanded a battalion of the 
 Royal Irish Regiment in the Tenth Division and had 
 held offices in Mr. Asquith's Government. He had now 
 the brilliant idea of reopening for the period of the Con- 
 vention one of the most beautiful eighteenth-century 
 dwellings, Ely House, and making it a centre of hospit- 
 ality and a meeting-place for friendly outside intercourse. 
 Few more useful assistances were rendered to our purpose, 
 and certainly none more pleasant. 
 
 Lord Desart, a distinguished lawj^er, acted closelj^ with 
 Lord Midleton. Sir Bertram Windle, President of Uni- 
 versity College, was another of Government's choices — 
 a man of science who was also very much a man of affairs. 
 Another, far less of a debater, far more of a power, was 
 Mr. William Martin Murphy, Chairman of the Dublin 
 Tramways, a powerful employer of labour who had 
 headed the fight against Larkin in 1913, and had been 
 mainly responsible for the character of the employers' 
 victory. He was the owner of the most widely circu- 
 lated Irish paper, the Irish Indepejident — which stood in 
 journalism for what Mr. Healy represented in Parlia- 
 ment — an envenomed Nationalist opposition to the 
 Parliamentary party. 
 
 Mr. Edward Lysaght, the son of a great manufacturer 
 in South Wales, combined like his father an aptitude 
 for literature and for business ; he wrote books, he was 
 concerned in a publishing venture, but he was chiefly 
 interested in his farm in county Clare — where he had 
 voted for de Valera, He had been chosen deliberately 
 as a link with Sinn Fein. It stamped an aspect of the 
 Convention that he was the youngest man there — for 
 
 19 
 
274 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 lie would not have been noticeably young in the House 
 of Commons. We were a middle-aged assembly. Another 
 link, though not so explicit, with Republican Ireland 
 was Mr. George Russell, " A.E.," poet, writer on co- 
 operative economics, a mystic, with all a mystic's shrewd- 
 ness, an orator with much personal magnetism. Lastly, 
 there was Sir Horace Plunkett, perhaps the onlj^ member 
 of the Convention except Redmond whose name would 
 have occurred to every Irishman as indispensably necessary. 
 
 Two other personages should be noted. Mr. Walter 
 MacMurrough Kavanagh, Chairman of the Carlow County 
 Council, was by tradition and training a strong Unionist, 
 by inheritance the representative of one of the old Irish 
 princely families. He had been elected to the Vice- 
 Chairmanship of his County Council while still a LTnionist ; 
 later, he adhered to Lord Dunraven's projDosals of devo- 
 lution, but finding no rest in a half-way house, came into 
 full support of Redmond and for some time was a member 
 of our party ; by temperament deei>ly conservative, he 
 was in no way separated by that from many of the ablest 
 Nationalists, lay and ecclesiastic. As a speaker he had 
 few equals in the Convention ; no man there, indeed, 
 except Redmond, could throw equal passion into the 
 plea of urgency for a settlement, for I think no other 
 man felt it with such earnestness. 
 
 Captain Doran, Chairman of the Louth Council, was 
 on his waj' back to France when the summons to the 
 Convention stopped him. A Methodist, he was divided 
 by religion from his neighbours in County Louth : but 
 that did not stop them from putting this prosperous and 
 capable farmer, working his land on the most modern 
 methods, into the Chair of their County Council. Before 
 the war, when the Larne gun-running took place, he 
 decided that matters looked serious, called his friends 
 together and formed a company of Volunteers, who 
 might be needed to protect themselves or to protect 
 other Nationalists across the adjacent Ulster border. 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 275 
 
 After the war had broken out and the Home Rule Act 
 was passed, and Redmond had launched his appeal, this 
 country farmer, then aged fifty, made his way to Mallow 
 and asked General Parsons to accept him as a recruit. 
 He was accepted, and very shortly given a commission 
 in the Dublin Fusiliers. Out of his local Volunteers he 
 took seventy-five into the Army with him. He was with 
 the Sixteenth Division from its landing in France till after 
 the day of Messines, commanding his company. All this 
 gave him an authority in an assembly where all voices 
 were in support of the war, and more particularly in an 
 appeal to Ulster ; and with this advantage went an 
 unusual gift of frank and eloquent speech, linked with 
 a fine idealism. 
 
 These were the main personal elements in the group 
 that came together on July 25th — Mr. Duke, the Chief 
 Secretary, acting as temporary Chairman and Sir Francis 
 Hop wood (soon to become Lord Southborough) having 
 been brought over as Secretary. Mr. Duke having ad- 
 dressed us with an earnest suavity, we were told to select 
 a Chairman : and on the motion of the Primate, Arch- 
 bishop Crozier, this embarrassing task was delegated to 
 a committee of ten, rapidly told off. We adjourned for 
 lunch, and on reassembling found that a unanimous 
 recommendation named Sir Horace Plunkett. The Ulster- 
 men had expressed a willingness to accept Redmond. 
 This he refused to discuss ; but he was put into the Chair 
 of the selecting committee. There was a recommendation 
 also that Sir Francis Hopwood should be Secretary to 
 the Convention. Both these proposals were welcomed, 
 and we dispersed feeling that w^e had done a good 
 day's work. 
 
 There was, however, one set-off to it. When the 
 Selection Committee had done its work, its members 
 went off singly, and outside the gate of College a small 
 group of ardent patriots were waiting, who mobbed 
 Redmond on the way to his hotel. They were young, 
 
276 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 no doubt ; but the Republican party claimed specially 
 the youth of Ireland ; and these lads expressed with a 
 simple eloquence very much what was said by older and 
 more articulate voices, uttering the same thought in 
 print. It is worth while to illustrate here the attitude 
 taken towards Redmond by much of Nationalist Ireland, 
 for it profoundly influenced Redmond's attitude and 
 action in the Convention. I take, not casual and partisan 
 journalism, but a passage from a book published by a 
 distinguished Irish writer who had never publicly attached 
 himself to any party. Mr. James Stephens was in Dublin 
 during the insurrection ; he wrote a book about his 
 own personal observation of it, which as a record of 
 observation is admirable. But when Mr. Stephens 
 comes to emit opinions, here is what he has to say : 
 
 ** Why it happened is a question that may be answered 
 more particularly. It happened because the leader of 
 the Irish party misrepresented his people in the English 
 House of Parliament. On the day of the declaration of 
 war between England and Germany he took the Irish 
 case, weighty with eight centuries of history and tradition, 
 and he threw it out of the window. He pledged Ireland 
 to a particular course of action, and he had no authority 
 to give this pledge and he had no guarantee that it 
 would be met. The ramshackle intelligence of his party 
 and his own emotional nature betrayed him and us and 
 England. He swore Ireland to loyalty as if he had 
 Ireland in his pocket and could answer for her. Ireland 
 has never been disloyal to England, not even at this 
 epoch, because she has never been loyal to England, and 
 the profession of her National faith has been un- 
 wavering, has been known to every English person alive, 
 and has been clamant to all the world beside. 
 
 " Is it that he wanted to be cheered ? He could very 
 easily have stated Ireland's case truthfully, and have 
 proclaimed a benevolent neutrality (if he cared to use 
 the grandiloquent words) on the part of this country. 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 277 
 
 He would have gotten his cheers, he would in a few 
 months have gotten Home Rule in return for Irish soldiers. 
 He would have received politically whatever England 
 could have safely given him. But, alas ! these careful- 
 nesses did not chime with his emotional m.oment. They 
 were not magnificent enough for one who felt that he 
 was talking not to Ireland or to England, but to the 
 whole gaping and eager earth, and so he pledged his 
 country's credit so deeply that he did not leave her even 
 one National rag to cover herself with. 
 
 " After a lie, truth bursts out, and it is no longer the 
 radiant and serene goddess we knew or hoped for — it 
 is a disease, it is a moral syphilis, and will ravage until 
 the body in which it can dwell has been purged. Mr. 
 Redmond told the lie, and he is answerable to England 
 for the violence she had to be guilty of, and to Ireland 
 for the desolation to which we have had to submit. With- 
 out his lie there had been no Insurrection, without it 
 there had been at this moment, and for a year past, an 
 end to the ' Irish question.' Ireland must in ages gone 
 have been guilty of abominable crimes, or she could 
 not at this juncture have been afflicted with a John 
 Redmond." 
 
 Politicians everywhere need to grow tough skins ; 
 but Redmond, though he was a veteran in politics, had 
 no special gift that way. It was not pleasant for the 
 Nationalist leader, when an assembly of Irishmen were 
 called together to attempt the framing of a Constitution, 
 to find himself the object, and the sole object, of public 
 insult ; it was not pleasant for him to feel that he might 
 at any time be subjected to a renewal of this experience 
 in the streets of Ireland's capital, where he had been 
 acclaimed as a hero so few years ago. It was not pleasant 
 for him to feel that whenever he took up a book or paper 
 dealing with Ireland he was liable to come upon some 
 outburst such as the one which I have quoted. These 
 things were pin-pricks, yet pin-pricks administered in 
 
278 JOHN REDMOND'S Lx\ST YEARS 
 
 public ; and the mere effort to endure such things without 
 wincing saps a man's vitahty. Behind them lay the 
 definite repudiation of his policy in election after election 
 — for Kilkenny City followed the example of Clare and 
 replaced Pat O'Brien by a Sinn Feiner. He was repu- 
 diated in the eye of the world, and repudiated with every 
 circumstance of contumely. Plainly in the Convention 
 he could no longer claim to speak for Ireland ; that 
 limited gravely his power to serve. 
 
 I think, however, that deep in his heart a resentment, 
 all the more rankling because he gave it no voice, prompted 
 him to be on his guard against lending the least colour 
 of justification to any plea that in the Convention he 
 had sought to pledge Ireland without due mandate or 
 had committed anyone but himself. All that was per- 
 sonal in his resources — his labour, his experience, his 
 judgment, his eloquence — all this he put unreservedly at 
 the Convention's service : but he abstained, and I think 
 not only out of policy but as the result of silent anger, 
 from making the least use of that authority which he 
 still possessed and which he might easily have augmented. 
 If in the result he took too little upon him, lest anyone 
 should ever say he had taken too much, and if because 
 he left too much to others Ireland was the loser, Ireland 
 must bear not the loss only but the blame. 
 
 ]Many even of those who most agreed with his action 
 had, under the influence and events of these years and 
 of public comments on these events, lost confidence in 
 him. Some weeks after the Convention assembled, a 
 very able priest said to me that he regarded Redmond 
 as "a worn-out man." The genuineness of his regret 
 was proved by the delight with which he heard what I 
 could tell him. Never in my life did I find so much cause 
 for admiration of Redmond as in the early stages — which 
 were in many ways the most important — of our meetings. 
 Never at any time did I know him exert so successfully 
 his charm of public manner. At the second day's meeting, 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 279 
 
 when the new Chairman took up his place and function, 
 there were several small points to be settled, each capable 
 of creating friction ; and it has to be admitted that in 
 the technical aspect of his duty 8ir Horace Plunkett 
 did not shine : business quickly became involved. For- 
 tunately he was of a temper to welcome help, and it was 
 quickly to hand. Archbishop Crozier showed himself 
 to be accomplished, resourceful, and most tactful on all 
 points of procedure : and Redmond then for the first 
 time did with extraordinary skill 'what he had to do at 
 many stcages later. By a series of questions to the Chair 
 he suggested rather than recommended a way of clearing 
 the involved issue ; and all this was done with a pre- 
 cision of phrase which was none the less exact because 
 it was easy, and with a dignitj' which was none the less 
 impressive because it had no pretence to effect. His 
 mastery both of the form and substance of procedure 
 was conspicuous. One of the ablest among the Southern 
 Unionists said to me in these days : " He is superb : ho 
 does not seem able to put a word wrong." 
 
 I think that the secret of his hapjiiness of manner 
 lay simply in this, that within the Convention he was 
 happy. There was a note in it that I never felt in the 
 House of Commons, even when he was at his best. There 
 he always spoke as if almost a foreigner, no matter among 
 how familiar faces. Here he was among his own country- 
 men, and for the first time in his life in an assembly in 
 no way sectional. For from the first it was plain that, 
 by whatever means, there had been gathered a compendium 
 of normal, ordinary Irish life : farmer, artisan, peer, 
 prelate, landlord, tenant, shoj)keeper, manufacturer — all 
 were there in pleasantly familiar types. The atmosj^here 
 was unlike that of a political gathering ; it resembled 
 rather some casual assemblage where all sorts of men 
 had met by accident and conversed without prejudice. 
 Everybody met somebody whom he had known in some 
 quite different relation of life and with whom he had never 
 
280 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 looked to be associated in any such task as the framing 
 of a Constitution. It was all oddly haphazard, full of 
 interest and surprises ; all of us were a little out of our 
 bearings, but much disposed to reconnoitre in the spirit 
 of friendly advance. 
 
 iVfter the first day of Sir Horace Plunkett's chairman- 
 ship there was an adjournment of something like a fort- 
 night to give the Chairman and secretariat time for 
 preparation : and in this interval a plan of action was 
 formed. The object in view Mas to avoid the danger 
 of an immediate break and to give play to the reconciling 
 influences. It was decided to begin by a prolonged 
 process of general discussion, in which men could express 
 their minds freely without the necessity of coming to an 
 operative decision on any of the controversial points, 
 until the value of each could be assessed in relation to 
 the possibility of a general agreement. 
 
 The plan adopted was to discuss, without division 
 taken, the schemes which had been submitted by members 
 of the Convention and by others. Members would pro- 
 pose and expound their own projects : for the exposition 
 of the others some member must make himself responsible. 
 
 At this " presentation stage " and at all stages, Red- 
 mond absolutely declined to put forward a plan in his 
 own name. This was not only from temperamental 
 reasons : there was an official obstacle. He was an 
 individual member of the Convention : but he was 
 Chairman of the Irish party, pledged not to bind it with- 
 out its consent. He felt, no doubt, that any detailed 
 proposal from him would be taken as binding the party, 
 whom he could not consult without bringing them into 
 the secrets of the Convention. 
 
 But this attitude of self-abnegation was pushed very 
 far by him, and perhaps too far. In his early utterances 
 he deprecated all official recognition of sections. Yet 
 from the moment when committees came to be appointed 
 this recognition was claimed ; and from the first the 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 281 
 
 Ulster group maintained a compact organization. They 
 had their own chairman, Mr. Barrie, and their secretary ; 
 they secured a committee-room for their own purposes ; 
 they voted solidly as one man. ^\11 this, though we did 
 not know it at first, was dictated by the conditions of 
 their attendance. They were pledged to act simply as 
 delegates, who must submit every question of importance 
 to an Advisory Committee in Belfast — behind which 
 again was the Ulster Unionist Council. They had there- 
 fore no freedom of action and were of necessity extremely 
 guarded in speech. 
 
 The Southern Unionists, including the representatives 
 of the Irish peers, were also organized as a group ; bub 
 they came to the Convention with much fuller powers. 
 They felt themselves bound to consider, and in certain 
 conditions to consult, those whom they represented ; 
 but they were free to originate suggestions, and indivi- 
 dually each man expressed his own view. But they too 
 had their meeting-place and their frequent consultations. 
 
 The handful of Labour men also met and discussed 
 action, though they were not organized as a group and 
 did not feel pledged to a joint course. Each, according 
 to his own lights, represented the interests of Labour. 
 Still, they met. 
 
 The only group which had no common centre of re- 
 union was that of the Nationalists — a majority of the 
 whole assembly. This included the representatives of 
 the Irish party and the County and Urban Councillors, 
 all of whom had been returned as its supporters. It 
 included also the four representatives of the hierarchy, 
 every one of whom liad been either actually or potentially 
 a part of Nationalist Conventions, and of whom three had 
 been most prominent supporters of the general organization. 
 
 But a difficulty existed in the presence of other per- 
 sonages who were in general support of us, but who outside 
 the Convention belonged to a different category. Lord 
 Dunraven was a Home Ruler, but had been no supporter 
 
282 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 of the Irish i)arty. Lord MacDonnell stood much nearer 
 to us, but was a power in his om^i right and had never 
 been a party politician. Mr. Lysaght had voted against 
 us in Clare. Mr. Russell had very often attacked the 
 party on aspects of its general action. Above all, there 
 was Mr. W. M. Murphy, who, like Mr. Healy, had been 
 at one time a member of the Irish party, and whose 
 paper had for long been in nominal support of its purposes, 
 but who had throughout recent years done more than all 
 forces together to discredit and weaken its influence. 
 
 All of these five men were Government nominees, as 
 were also Lord Granard and Sir Bertram Windle, who 
 in different ways gave Redmond complete and most 
 useful backing. It would have been possible to call 
 together a group consisting of men who had been members 
 of the national organization which would have excluded 
 all these and included the Bishops ; ^ but Redmond prob- 
 ably felt it would be ungracious to do this. His chief 
 desire was to avoid all recognition of party and still more 
 of partisan machinery. His conclusion was to do nothing ; 
 and it was a conclusion to which he was prone at all 
 times when he did not see his way clear. This tempera- 
 mental disinclination to take any action which might 
 create difficulties was in these days at its height with 
 him. Since the spring his usually perfect health had 
 been failing ; he suffered from the physical inertia which 
 accompanies the growth of a fatal disease ; and sorrow 
 upon sorrow, rebuff' upon rebuff, had weakened the 
 resilience of his mind. It was not that he lacked courage 
 or confidence in his own judgment ; but he was bound 
 as a statesman to make allowance for the estimate which 
 others, his followers, Avould put upon that judgment 
 when he declared it. Sensitive by nature, he was deeply 
 aware of failure which had resulted from the most dis- 
 paraging of causes — not flat rejection, but belated, half- 
 
 ' When ultimately we did meet, theae were the elements which 
 assembled. 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 283 
 
 hearted and blundering adoption, of whatever course ho 
 had proposed. He overrated, 1 am sure, the extent to 
 which his personal position had been depreciated in the 
 minds of those who were there. It was true, as the 
 event was to prove, that he could no longer count on 
 unquestioning sujDport of any policy simply on the ground 
 that he advocated it ; but any opinion which he pre- 
 sented would have been commended not only bj^ the 
 cogency of his argument but by an old esteem for his 
 wisdom, and, above and beyond this, by a pergonal 
 feeling Men would have inclined to his side not 
 for the argument's sake only, but for his sake. 
 
 There was fell, too, precisely at the moment when it 
 mattered most, the defect in his quality as leader. He 
 lacked the personal touch. It was not that he would 
 not, but that he could not, put himself into contact with 
 the individual nunds of men. He owed it, I think, to 
 the rank and file to give them more of his guidance than 
 they actually received. He was a genial presence when 
 they met ; but of confidential discussion upon details 
 I am sure that nothing passed. Had he called the group 
 together, had he spoken his mind to them collectively, 
 in confidence, things would in all ways have been better. 
 But there was ingrained in him a sort of shyness, a repug- 
 nance to force his view on others by argument, an indis- 
 position to controversy, which was his limitation ; and 
 all this was at this time accentuated by the hurt sense 
 that there would be alwaj^s in men's minds a memorj'^, 
 not of the hundred times when his wisdom had amply 
 Justified itself, but of recent occasions when he had 
 advised them and the result was not what he foretold. 
 
 To sum up, then, this criticism — what he said and 
 did publicly in the Convention could hardl}^ by stretch 
 of imagination have been bettered. But outside its 
 sessions he did not handle his team. On the balance, 
 probably, he thought it better to leave them to their own 
 devices ; but his temperament weighed in that decision. 
 
284 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 As a result, the County Councillors and other local repre- 
 sentatives used to hold meetings of their own. They 
 were shrewd and capable men ; but in the matters with 
 which we had to deal the most skilled direction was neces- 
 sary ; and there was never a man more capable of giving 
 them guidance out of a lifetime's experience than was 
 Redmond, nor one from whom they Mould have more 
 willingly accepted instruction. 
 
 Discussion in the Convention itself was not of great 
 value for the education of opinion, because men naturally 
 were reluctant to get up and state precisely their indi- 
 vidual diflficulties, which in a confidential interchange 
 of views might have been shown to proceed from some 
 defect in comprehension. The chief value in the debates 
 lay in what they revealed rather than what thej^ imparted. 
 One fact was salient. No Nationalist was prepared to 
 recommend acceptance of the Home Rule Act as it stood, 
 though some of its most vehement assailants adopted 
 great parts of its framework. Broadly speaking, National- 
 ists wanted for Ireland the powers which were possessed 
 by a self-governing Dominion, but were content to leave 
 all control of defence to the Imperial authority and did 
 not press any demand for a local militia. On the other 
 hand, there was strong insistence on the right of an Irish 
 Parliament to have complete power of taxation within 
 its jurisdiction. 
 
 It was manifest that the financial clauses of the exist- 
 ing Act would no longer apply. They were framed in 
 view of a situation which found Ireland contributing 
 ten millions in taxation and costing twelve to administer. 
 Now, less than half the taxation paid the cost of all Irish 
 services and the balance went towards the war. 
 
 It was also evident that Nationalists were prepared 
 to make concessions to the minority quite inconsistent 
 with the current democratic view of what a Constitution 
 should be. The Bishop of Raphoe, for instance, expressed 
 willingness to have the Irish peers as an Upper House. 
 
 BOSTON oTlfF^ 
 
 i- AC 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 285 
 
 Lord Midleton, however, for the Southern Unionists, 
 insisted that those whom he spoke for must have a voice 
 in the House of Commons — however they got it ; and 
 there was general desire to give it them, even by methods 
 which no one could justify for general application. 
 
 In short, it became increasingly clear as the debates 
 proceeded that we could come to an arrangement with 
 Unionists if Lord Midleton represented Unionism. But 
 he did not. Ulster was there ; and the Ulstermen made 
 it plain that their business was to hear suggestions, not 
 to put them forward. Two facts, however, emerged 
 about Ulster's attitude. The first was that in coming 
 to the Convention the Ulstermen had expected to nego- 
 tiate on the basis of taking the Home Rule Act as the 
 maximum Nationalist demand. The only compromise 
 which they had contemplated was a mean term between 
 the provisions of that Act and Ulster's demand for a 
 continuance of the legislative Union so far as Ulster 
 was concerned. The second was that Belfast regarded 
 as ruinous to its interests any possibility of a tariff war 
 with Great Britain, and believed that if Ireland were 
 given the power to fix its own customs duties the dominant 
 farming interest would seek to find revenue by new taxa- 
 tion on imports. Hence, the proposal to give Ireland 
 full fiscal powers could not be acceptable to Ulster. Here 
 lay the main rock in our course. 
 
 As the discussion proceeded, one category of pro- 
 posals was summarily dealt with — those which contem- 
 plated the setting up of some provincial authority 
 intermediate between the central Parliament, which all 
 postulated, and the existing local bodies in the counties. 
 This policy did not lack advocates. But the County 
 Councillors were solid against it : evidently their private 
 meeting discussed and decided against an expedient 
 which they held would detract from the dignity of the 
 central Parliament and from the dignity of the County 
 Councils. Those who defended it as a plan which might 
 
286 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 meet Ulster's difficulty got no backing from Ulster ; 
 that group said neither for nor against it. In the rest 
 of the assembly there was a strong feeling against any- 
 thing that looked like partition or might in public be 
 called partition. Several of us had thought in advance 
 that this was the most likely path to the solution ; and 
 looking back, I think it ought to have been much more 
 fully explored. But encouragement was lacking. 
 
 Another anticipation proved illusory. We all realized 
 that in the circumstances Ireland could come to a finan- 
 cial arrangement with Great Britain on easier terms than 
 at any time in her history ; that to settle at once would 
 be highly profitable ; and more particularly, that we 
 could probably secure the completion of land purchase as 
 part of the bargain. It was thought that this argument 
 would appeal to the commercial sense of Ulster. We 
 were met by a resolute reiteration that Ulster considered 
 it Ulster's duty and Ireland's duty to take a full share, 
 equally with the rest of the United Kingdom, in all the 
 consequences of the war — even if it cost them their last 
 shilling ; and Ulster speakers denounced our argument 
 as a bribe. Some Nationalists were inclined to discount 
 these protestations, yet I see no reason to doubt their 
 sincerity. At all events, no one disputed that it was 
 to Ireland's interest financially that a settlement should 
 be made. 
 
 It is quite unnecessary to summarize here in any detail 
 the course of these general discussions in full Convention, 
 which began on August 21st. One thing, however, 
 resulted from them on which too much emphasis cannot 
 be laid. In the process of " exploring each other's 
 minds," as the phrase went, we came to know and to 
 like one another. Later in the year, a friend of mine, 
 high placed in the LHster Division, but not an Ulsterman 
 by upbringing or sympathy, came home from France. 
 He told me that the main impression on the minds of 
 Ulster delegates had been made by the Nationalist County 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 287 
 
 Councillors. They had expected noisy demagogues ; they 
 had found solid, substantial business men, many of them 
 with large and prosperous concerns, all of them rather 
 too silent than too vocal, and all of them most good- 
 humoured in their tolerance of dissent. What Willie 
 Redmond had foretold in his last speech was coming true : 
 Irishmen brought into contact with one another in the 
 Convention, as other Irishmen had been brought into 
 contact in the trenches, and no longer kept apart by 
 those unhappy severances which run through ordinary 
 Irish life, came under the influence of that fundamental 
 fellowship, deeiDer than all divergence of politics or creed, 
 which draws our people into a sense of a common bond. 
 
 The desire to bring delegates together in friendly social 
 intercourse had shown itself in many quarters. The 
 Viceregal Lodge pressed invitations on us, and Redmond, 
 though in the circumstances he himself would go to no 
 entertainment anywhere, expressed his wish that National- 
 ists should alter their traditional attitude and accept 
 what was offered in so friendlj^ a spirit. But the first 
 place where we met as a bod}^ with informal ease was 
 at the Mansion House as guests of the Lord Mayor— a 
 jiopular figure in our assembly. 
 
 Next daj'^ the Lord Mayor of Belfast rose at the adjourn- 
 ment to express all our thanks, and to insist that there 
 should be a session in Belfast, where he could return the 
 compliment. Immediately, there came another proposal 
 for a similar visit to the South of Ireland. We went to 
 Belfast at the beginning of September, and the attitude 
 of the Ulster members, which had till then been somewhat 
 guarded and aloof, changed into that of the traditional 
 Irish hospitality. They showed us their great linen mills 
 and other huge manufactories ; they showed us the 
 shipyards, in which the frames of monster ships lay 
 cradled in gigantic gantries, works of architecture as 
 wonderful in their vast symmetry as any cathedral, and 
 having the beauty which goes with any perfect design 
 
288 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 combining lightness and strength. Perhaps the most 
 impressive sight of all was the disbandment of workmen 
 from the yards. Endless lines of empty tramcars drawn 
 up on the quay awaited the turn-out of some ten 
 thousand artisans, who streamed past where we stood 
 assembled ; and as the crowds swept along, all these 
 eyes, curious, but not unfriendly, scrutinized us, and 
 one word was in all their mouths as they came up — 
 ** Which is Redmond ? Where's John Redmond ? " 
 
 A fortnight later Cork completed what Belfast had 
 begun ; and, perhaps because Cork is less strenuous, 
 the whole atmosphere there was even friendlier. It had 
 almost the quality of a holiday excursion, for we assisted 
 at the ancient ceremony by which the Lord Mayor of 
 Cork asserts his jurisdiction over the harbour waters — 
 proceeding outside the protecting headlands and flinging 
 from him a ceremonial dart outwards to the sea. This 
 day, however, we accomf)lished the ceremony well within 
 the limits ; we passed the narrow gateway in the chain 
 of mines, but outside that, submarines were a very real 
 menace, and the Admiralty cut short our steamer's voyage. 
 We were none the less festive on board. 
 
 It was not all mere holiday in Cork. One speech in 
 particular at this meeting impressed the whole Convention. 
 A Southern delegate illustrated from his personal know- 
 ledge how cumbrous and uneconomic were the dealings 
 of a government at Westminster with the meat supply 
 from Ireland ; and a mass of complicated and important 
 trade detail was skilfully linked to the larger issue of 
 war interest and Imperial interest ; there was genuine 
 eloquence as well as commercial shrewdness in this dis- 
 course. A short speech, too, from one of the Ulster County 
 Councillors indicated by its tone, what was in my opinion 
 the general sentiment, that as a result of these preliminary 
 discussions almost everybody in the assembly expected 
 and desired an effective agreement. 
 
 At least for the purposes of this book, and perhaps 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 289 
 
 many purposes, the trend of our debates can be best 
 summarized by reproducing Redmond's main contribution 
 to them. He intervened on the first day when Mr. 
 Murphj-'s scheme was proposed, on August 21st, but 
 only with a few welcoming words, and to emphasize his 
 view that we were all there to accept whatever commanded 
 most support. But at Belfast on September 5th he spoke 
 fully ; and I do not think his speech would have been 
 materially different had he delivered it three weeks later 
 in Cork. What I print here is based on the unusually 
 full notes made by him, so full that they admit of being 
 treated like a press telegram, and read clearly when small 
 and obvious words are added. The manuscript is scored 
 with underlining, single, double and treble, to guide the 
 voice in reading from it ; it has interest as illustrating 
 the technical devices which a great orator employed for 
 a special occasion ; and for this speech he spared no 
 effort. I thought, then as always, that he was less im- 
 pressive and less effective in so fully prepared an oration 
 than when he was putting his thought into the form 
 which immediately came to him. But as a document 
 it represents beyond doubt his considered opinion and 
 his most deliberate advice. 
 
 Dealing briefly at first with the contention that the 
 system of the Union had been a success and should not 
 be touched, he outlined the familiar arguments. But, 
 as he said, the existence of the Convention was the final 
 answer. The head of a Coalition Ministry had declared, 
 without dissent from any of his Unionist colleagues, that 
 Dublin Castle had hopelessly broken down. The Prime 
 Minister of another Coalition, mainly Unionist in its 
 composition, had set up this assembly, charging it to 
 find another and better system of government. 
 
 Beneficent legislation had been quoted. Yes, but how 
 was it attained ? 
 
 " In any constitutionally governed country, once public 
 opinion is converted to some great reform, it naturally 
 
 20 
 
290 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 passes, surely and easily, though perhaps slowly, into 
 law. In Ireland, after Irish public opinion has made 
 up its mind, the reformer has to convert the public opinion 
 of another country which is profoundly ignorant or apa- 
 thetic, and unhappily it is uncontrovertible that scarcely 
 a single piece of beneficent legislation on land, or any- 
 thing else, has been passed since the Union except by 
 long, violent, semi-revolutionary agitation. 
 
 ** Are we to go on for ever upon this path ? Are we 
 to go back into the region of perpetual and violent 
 agitation in order to get the reforms we need ? Are 
 we never to be allowed to have peace in our 
 country ? " 
 
 He passed then to the complaint that Ulster's special 
 case had not been sufficiently considered. 
 
 *' The man who would hope to settle this great problem 
 without special consideration of the special case of Ulster 
 would indeed be a fool. Only for the special case of 
 Ulster we should not be here at all. Our chief business 
 is to endeavour to satisfy that special case. 
 
 " For myself, I am one of those Nationalists to whom 
 Mr. Barrie referred, who believe that the co-operation 
 of Ulstermen is necessary for a prosperous and free Ire- 
 land, and there are no lengths consistent with common 
 sense and reason to which I would not go to satisfy their 
 fears and doubts and objections. 
 
 " The special case of Ulster as put before us was this : 
 * We are contented under the Union, we have prospered 
 under the Union. Therefore from our particular stand- 
 point we have no reason to ask for a change.' But they 
 declare themselves not only Ulstermen but Irishmen. 
 They admit that the rest of Ireland is not prosperous as 
 they are, and is not contented ; and, that being so, they 
 have come here in a spirit of true patriotism to see what 
 is proposed as a remedy ; and, as I understand it, they 
 only stipulate that in any scheme of reform their rights 
 and interests and sentiments shall be safeguarded and 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 291 
 
 respected. That is a reasonable and patriotic attitude, 
 and I wish most heartily and most sincerely to respond 
 to it. 
 
 " Now let me say what are the main objections to 
 these schemes which have emerged from the debate. 
 Some may be regarded as more particularly affecting 
 Ulster, others as more particularly affecting the Southern 
 Unionists, but all of them taken together make up what 
 I maj' call the Unionist objection. 
 
 ** The Archbishop of Dublin grouped these objections 
 under three heads : 
 
 1. Imperial Security. 
 
 2. Fiscal Security. 
 
 3. Security for Minorities. 
 
 " On the question of Imperial Securitj% objection is 
 taken to what is called an ' Independent ' Parliament. 
 
 *' It is supposed that what is called Dominion Home 
 Rule implies an ' Independent ' Parliament. This is a 
 complete delusion. There is only one Sovereign and 
 Independent Parliament in the Empire — the Imperial 
 Parliament ; its supremacy is indefeasible and inalienable. 
 Every other Parliament in the Empire is subordinate, 
 and an Irish Parliament must be subordinate. 
 
 " The Imperial Parliament has created many Parlia- 
 ments and given to them power to deal in general as 
 they wish with local affairs, but it never parted with its 
 own overriding authoritj^ — it has no power to do so — 
 and in several of the colonies it has exercised that over- 
 riding authority from time to time. 
 
 '* Gladstone spoke of the Irish Parliament which he 
 proposed to set up as ' practically independent in the 
 exercise of its statutory functions.' But the overriding 
 authority of the Imperial Parliament would always be 
 there in the background to arrest injustice or ojDpression, 
 just as it is in regard to every Dominion Parliament in 
 the Empire to-day. 
 
2d2 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 " That position was specifically laid down and accepted 
 by Parnell in 1886. 
 
 " Lord Midleton demands that the rights and authority 
 of the Crown shall be preserved and safeguarded. There 
 is no difference whatever between us on this, and no 
 difficulty can arise upon it. 
 
 " As to the control of Army and Navy, no one suggests 
 any interference with the Imperial authority over the 
 Army and the Navy. I include in that such naval 
 control of harbours as is necessary for security. 
 
 ** Captain Gwynn has proposed that Ireland should 
 have power to raise a force for home defence. In other 
 words, to pass a Territorial Act for Ireland. My policy 
 about the Volunteers is known : I proposed at the beginning 
 of the war that the Government should utilize the exist- 
 ing Volunteer forces ; and had this proposal been acted 
 on in 1914 there would have been no rebellion in 1916. 
 If I understand Captain Gwynn, he did not suggest that 
 Irish Territorials should be under an Irish War Office 
 and an Irish Minister for War, but that in his opinion 
 a system of Irish Territorials was desirable, and inasmuch 
 as the English Territorial Acts are not suitable to us, 
 the Irish Parliament should be given the power to raise 
 under Imperial authority a force for itself and on its 
 own lines. 
 
 " If this is his view, I agree with it. But this is a 
 matter on which no one would think of breaking off. 
 
 " Speaking generally, I think the Archbishop of Dublin 
 and those who agree with him may take it for granted 
 that upon all those questions which he grouped under 
 the heading of Imperial Security there would be little 
 difficulty in arriving at an agreement with, at any rate, 
 men like myself. 
 
 " Now let me deal with the second group of eubjects 
 put forward by the Archbishop of Dublin under the 
 heading of Fiscal Security — or a reasonable prospect of 
 national prosperity. 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 203 
 
 *' The first objection is to what is called fiscal auto- 
 nomy, although, after listening most carefully to his 
 speeches, it seems to me that the real objection is not 
 so much an objection to fiscal autonomy as establishing 
 the full power of the Irish Parliament over the collection 
 and imposition of Irish taxes, as an objection to giving 
 that Parliament power to set up a tariff against Great 
 Britain." 
 
 He referred then at length to the Report of the Primrose 
 Committee on Irish Finance, dated October 1911. » That 
 Committee had for its chairman a great English Civil 
 Servant ; three of its members were famous English 
 financiers ; another was the Professor of Political Economj' 
 at Oxford. Of the two names associated closely with 
 Ireland, one was Lord Pirrie, whose fortune had been 
 made in Belfast, and the only Irish Nationalist was the 
 Bishop of Ross. They had reported unanimously for 
 giving to Ireland full fiscal powers. " We tried hard," 
 Redmond said, "to get the principle of their Report 
 adopted in framing the Bill of 1912." Government 
 insisted on adhering to the plan of " contract finance " 
 which their own non-partisan committee of experts had 
 explicitly condemned. 
 
 He quoted several passages from the weighty argument 
 by which the Committee had justified its conclusions, 
 especially those dealing with the contention that the 
 power would be used to set up a tariff against British 
 goods. 
 
 " Ireland is not a nation of fools. 
 
 *' If in framing a new Constitution you go on the 
 assumption that every power you confer will be abused, 
 it would be far better to desist from your task altogether, 
 and instead of increasing the powers of a people dead 
 to all sense of responsibility and manifestly unfit for 
 political freedom, you had better disestablish all existing 
 
 « His notes here are only references to quotationa. I supplement 
 on this page by my own notes. — S. G. 
 
204 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 forms of constitutional government and advocate the 
 government of Ireland as a Crown Colony. But none of 
 us so distrust our people. 
 
 " Dr. O'Donnell has proposed a solution of the diffi- 
 culty about imposing a tariff against England by means 
 of a Conference between the two nations. Other sug- 
 gestions will be made. Protection may be found for 
 Ulster by giving to them disproportionate representation. 
 It may be found in the power of the Senate, it may be 
 found in the power to suspend. If we are agreed some- 
 what on the general lines of the Primrose Report, the 
 outstanding difficulty will be capable of adjustment. 
 
 " Sir Crawford McCuUagh rightly pointed out the 
 terrible burden of war taxation, which is at present 
 over twenty millions, and he said we cannot go on on 
 those lines, and we must get back to pre-war burdens 
 or the country will be ruined. How are we to get back ? 
 
 " If nothing is done by us, and the war goes on, as it 
 may, for some years, we may easily be paying thirty, 
 forty, or fifty millions, and generations to come will 
 have to bear a crushing load. The income tax is certain 
 to be raised, and excess profits also, and no part of Ireland 
 will suffer more than Ulster, and especially Belfast. 
 
 " The highest interest of Ulster, therefore, is a speedy 
 settlement whereby the increase of war taxation will 
 cease and Ireland's contribution to Imperial purposes 
 will either disappear or, to put it at the very lowest, be 
 limited and stereotyped. 
 
 " Mr. Knight raised the question of land purchase. I 
 agree with every word he said, but what is the difficulty ? 
 The difficult}^ is in providing the additional money needed 
 at a low rate of interest. As part of a settlement I feel 
 quite sure we could obtain the completion of land pur- 
 chase on satisfactory terms. Indeed, I have the highest 
 authoritj' for the statement that this question would 
 be regarded as an essential portion of a settlement, and 
 that a most generous arrangement would be made. But 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 296 
 
 if there is no settlement, do j'ou imagine the Treasury 
 will do anything to help us ? No. I fear the British 
 Government will be more occupied in endeavouring to 
 deal with the state of open anarchy in Ireland than 
 in making great financial concessions on land purchase. 
 Mr. Knight, if he wants purchase completed, had better 
 help us to an agreement. 
 
 ** The third group of objections mentioned by the 
 Archbishop of Dublin deals with Security for Minorities. 
 
 " On this, it is impossible for the Convention to break 
 down, because we are all in favour of the object in view. 
 It is a mere question of the best machinery to carry out 
 our unanimous desire and intention. 
 
 ** Ulster may clearly claim a representation out of 
 proportion to her numbers, not only, I admit, in the 
 Senate, but in the lower chamber. Safeguards of the 
 most stringent character would be accepted, at any 
 rate by me, in the machinery of the Constitution to 
 prevent the possibiHty of Ulster's interest, Ulster's pros- 
 perity and Ulster's sentiments being injured or over- 
 ridden. 
 
 " For Southern Unionists, the case is unanswerable. 
 They must get proper representation in both Houses. 
 
 ** Some suggestions have been made : proportional 
 representation ; Mr. Murphy's proposal of a special 
 representation for property ; special representation for 
 creeds, and finally a nominated element in the House 
 of Commons. I have an open mind on them all. It 
 may be none of these will be found wholly satisfactory. 
 But where there is a will there is a way. We are all 
 agreed it must be done, and therefore it can and will 
 be done. 
 
 ** In none of these objections, and they are the chief 
 ones that have emerged on Imperial security, fiscal security, 
 and security of minorities, is there in my mind any 
 difficulty in coming to an agreement, if we are really 
 animated by the desire every speaker has professed to 
 
290 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 answer the appeal of the Empire ia this hour of her dire 
 extremity by removing one of her greatest weaknesses 
 and dangers. 
 
 " We were told by Lord Midleton to play for safety. 
 What is safety for us ? What is safety for the Empire ? 
 I strongly say the only safety is a settlement of this 
 question. 
 
 " What will be the certain effect of a breakdown ? 
 No one could fail to have been impressed by the serious 
 and solemn note upon which the Archbishop of Dublin 
 concluded his speech. He reminded you this was not a 
 question of Ulster and the rest of Ireland, not of Catholic 
 and Protestant, or L^nionist and Nationalist : it was a 
 question of the necessity for all men of good will, all men 
 of responsibility, all men who know that the foundation 
 of freedom is the maintenance of order, to join hands to 
 protect their common country from anarchy and chaos. 
 
 " The Archbishop spoke of Mr. Lysaght's speech as 
 a threat. No one here will be moved by threats, but 
 let us not be mad enough to shut our eyes to the facts. 
 Is there a man in this room who can contemplate without 
 horror the immediate future of Ireland if this Convention 
 fails ? For my part, I see clearly a future following on 
 our failure in which on one side there will be an angered, 
 if you like, a maddened people, with no responsible control, 
 and on the other. Government ruling by the point of the 
 bayonet. Between these two forces there will be no 
 place for a Constitutional party or for men like myself. 
 
 *' That would be the effect in Ireland. What would 
 be the effect throughout the Empire ? 
 
 " I have close relations with statesmen of all parties 
 in all the Dominions, and I am informed that twenty-five 
 per cent, of their troops are of Irish birth or of Irish 
 parents, and that they have practically joined because 
 they believed the Irish problem was as good as settled. 
 
 " What has happened about Ireland has caused untold 
 difficulties in every Dominion. Mr. Holman, the Prime 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 297 
 
 Minister of New South Walea, said that conscription was 
 defeated by the Irish vote. Mr. Hughes said the same. 
 Two hundred thousand troops have been lost to the 
 Empire by the feeling of disgust at the failure to 
 settle the Irish question. It has been the same in 
 Canada. Everywhere a breakdown will be regarded with 
 dismay. 
 
 " What will be the effect in America ? The position 
 of America is grave and dangerous. I have close 
 relations with many Americans of high position and 
 influence, and they all tell me the same. This is a secret 
 session, and I can repeat what they say. There is little 
 or no enthusiasm for the war. Mind, I am speaking of 
 Americans, not Irish Americans. The apathy is largely 
 due to distrust of England. They distrust her posing 
 as the champion of small nations while here at her doors 
 the Irish question is unsettled. Lord Midleton says 
 the Americans are uninformed. Perhaps so as to details. 
 Perhaps they only see the broad effect. But how does 
 that help us ? The fact remains. Ireland is the only, 
 or the chief, cause of American apathy to-day. This is 
 of vital importance. Could we hope to win the war if 
 America dropped out ? Russia has gone. The President 
 of the United States has many paciiist men around him. 
 Their movement is strong. Germany is abstaining from 
 outrages that would raise American feeling. I say, the 
 danger of peace proposals which we could not accept 
 being offered to America and accepted by her is a real 
 and a very serious one. 
 
 " Hence it is that the Government, the diplomatic 
 service, and all connected with our foreign affairs are 
 feverishly anxious as to the result of our deliberations. 
 If we break down in despair and helplessness, God only 
 knows how terrible and far-reaching may be the conse- 
 quence. 
 
 " Far better for us and for the Empire never to have 
 met than to have met and failed of an agreement. 
 
298 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 " Finally, what would be the effect of a breakdown at 
 the front ? 
 
 " We are called upon on all sides of this ancient quarrel 
 to make what people call sacrifices — sacrifices of inherited 
 predilections, of old-world ideas, and of ancient shib- 
 boleths, of perhaps ingrained prejudice. I would bo 
 ashamed to speak of the surrender of such things as 
 sacrifices, when I remember the kind of sacrifices our 
 brave boys have made and are making this very hour 
 while we are safe at home talking, I cannot trust myself 
 to speak upon this matter. Only the other day, once 
 again the Ulster Division and the Sixteenth Irish Division, 
 shoulder to shoulder, have fought and died for Ireland, 
 The full story is not j'et known, but it is full of tragedy, 
 of heroism and of glory. Surely they deserve some 
 encouragement. No set of men living would be prouder 
 and happier than they if we can send them the news of 
 a settlement of this question which will relieve them 
 from the daily shame they feel, every time they meet 
 their Allies, in the consciousness that their country, 
 Ireland, for which they are facing death, is distracted 
 and disunited and a source of reproach. 
 
 "No, we must come to a settlement. We must rise 
 to the occasion — if only to save ourselves from a lifelong 
 remorse for wrecking this venture — for what the historian 
 of the future would describe as a crime against the Empire 
 in her hour of deadliest peril, and a crime against the 
 peace and happiness of our own beloved and long-sutfering 
 country." 
 
 One result of this speech was seen at once in an utter- 
 ance from Mr. Andrew Jameson, a leading figure among 
 the Southern Unionists. He said at once that Redmond 
 had convinced him that all the difficulties as to main- 
 taining the Imperial connection and providing safeguards 
 for minorities could and would bo met. The fiscal 
 difficulty remained. He pressed the Lister group to 
 come to our assistanoe and depart from their attitude 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 299 
 
 of Bilence. This speech went further towards our desire 
 than any Unionist had previously gone. 
 
 In a later debate Mr. Pollock outlined two essentials 
 of the Ulster demand. The United Kingdom must 
 remain a fiscal unit ; and Ireland must be represented 
 at Westminster, If these points were conceded, agree- 
 ment, he thought, should be possible. 
 
 On the whole, as discussion grew franker and more 
 business-like, relations improved. There were small 
 passages at arms, but these onlj'' served to show how 
 strong was the general desire for harmony. One of my 
 colleagues said that he did not know what to make of a 
 political assembly where everyone applauded when you 
 got up, and applauded when you sat down, and never 
 interrupted you. Another said that the Convention 
 was the only society in Ireland from which one always 
 came away cheered up : and this was so generally felt 
 that an Ulster speaker reminded us that the atmosphere 
 of our proceedings was i)l^asant but exceptional. He 
 warned us to remember that, even if we agreed, either 
 side might be repudiated. Yet there was a marked 
 feeling that the Convention, and the tone which prevailed 
 in the Convention, had done good in the country. This 
 was admitted by the Grand Master of the Orange Order, 
 Colonel Wallace, in a speech which led to an important 
 illustration of the mutual process of education, for it 
 raised with great frankness the issue of religious differ- 
 ences and alluded specially to the recent Papal decrees 
 over which so much controversy had raged. The Bishop 
 of Raphoe rose to reply and expounded, as an ex-pro- 
 fessor of Canon Law, the true bearing of these documents. 
 His speech was a masterpiece ; its candour and its 
 lucidity commended itself to all hearers, but most of 
 all to the Ulstermen, who applauded at once Lord Oran- 
 more's comment that the odium theologicum had been 
 replaced by divina caritas ; and at a very late stage in 
 our proceedings, Mr. Barrie referred back to this speech 
 
300 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 of the Bishop's as one of the things which they would 
 never forget. 
 
 The Primate, who in this month of September was 
 one of the hopeful hearts (*' My confidence has grown 
 daily," he said), used words which met with widespread 
 response : " We can never leave this hall and speak of 
 men whom we have met here as we have spoken of them 
 in the past." There was good will in the air — good will 
 to each other and to the enterprise. At the close of the 
 proceedings in Cork the Lord Mayor of Belfast moved 
 a vote of thanks to the citizens through their Lord Mayor, 
 and he closed on a note of hope — anticipating " some- 
 thing in store for Ireland." 
 
 Yet already these anticipations were overcast. During 
 this week, while all seemed going so well, one of the end- 
 less unhappy and preventible things happened. It was 
 from Redmond that I first heard the news. One of the 
 Sinn F^in leaders who had been rearrested on suspicion 
 after the amnesty took part in a hunger-strike as a protest 
 against being subjected to the conditions imposed on a 
 convicted felon. He was forcibly fed and died under 
 the process, owing to heart-failure. Redmond told me 
 with fury how he liad urged again and again on the Chief 
 Secretary the possibility of some such calamity, and had 
 urged that these men should receive the treatment 
 proper in any case to political prisoners, but above all 
 to men who had been neither convicted nor tried. 
 
 The result was immediately seen in some hostile demon- 
 strations in Cork, chiefly against Mr. Devlin and Redmond. 
 But this was only the beginning. On the following 
 Sunday the body of the dead man, Thomas Ashe, was 
 carried through the streets of Dublin at the head of a 
 vast procession, in which large bodies of Volunteers, 
 openly defying Government's proclamation, marched in 
 uniform ; and he was buried with military honours and 
 volleys fired over his grave. With all this breach of 
 the law Government dared not interfere. They had put 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 301 
 
 themselvea in the wrong ; whether they prevented the 
 demonstration or permitted it, mischief was bound to 
 follow. A new incitement was given to the enthusiasm 
 for Sinn F6in, a new martyr was provided, and new 
 hostility was raised against the Convention, for whose 
 success Government was notoriously anxious. On the 
 other hand, Ulster Unionist opinion was violently offended ; 
 they were scandalized by the disregard for law and the 
 impotence of constitutional authority. This attitude, 
 however open to comments based on their own recent 
 history, did not render them any easier to deal with. 
 Above all, the Ashe incident emphasized the presence 
 in Ireland of a great force over which Redmond had no 
 control and which had no representative in the Con- 
 vention. How, men asked, even if a bargain could 
 be made with Constitutional Nationalists, should that 
 covenant be carried into effect ? 
 
 Ill 
 
 The Cork visit marks the close of the first stage in the 
 history of the Convention. At the opening of our 
 session there it was decided to appoint a Grand Com- 
 mittee of twenty, whose task should be, " if possible, to 
 prepare a scheme for submission to the Convention, 
 which would meet the views and difficulties expressed 
 by the different speeches during the course of the debate." 
 The Convention itself, after its deliberations of that week, 
 would adjourn until the Committee was in a position 
 to report. This second stage, purely of committee work, 
 was to last much longer than anyone anticipated : the 
 Convention did not reassemble till the week before 
 Christmas. If that length of adjournment had been 
 foreseen, the Committee would never have been appointed. 
 
 Mr. Lysaght in his first address to the Convention had 
 pressed upon us the view that Sinn Fein could b« won. 
 
802 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 But he warned us also (with such emphasis that some 
 speakers afterwards resented it as a threat) that if the 
 Convention produced no result, or an unacceptable result, 
 or provoked suspicion by delay, the result would be a 
 revolution. Already impatience was growing. We could 
 publish no account of our proceedings : but it became 
 known inevitabl}'' that we had not as yet reached one 
 operative conclusion in our task of Constitution building. 
 
 At Cork, Sir Horace Plunkett made an encouraging 
 speech at the public luncheon ; he announced the appoint- 
 ment of our Committee, which certainly looked like busi- 
 ness. But only when we got to detail did men fully 
 realize the difficulties and the embarrassing nature of 
 the position. 
 
 The Ashe affair had done more harm than we knew. 
 When the Primate was making the hopeful speech from 
 which a few words have already been quoted, he spoke 
 also of our experience as having been a process of mutual 
 education, which we needed to extend beyond our own 
 assembly. He promised his help in this, and it was 
 felt that Ulstermen generally were on their honour to 
 report well of what they commended in our presence. 
 They were, it seems, at least as good as their word ; the 
 Committee behind them was favourably impressed, and 
 when we went to Cork — so I have been informed — the 
 question of giving the delegates full powers to negotiate 
 was under discussion. But this mood was dissipated by 
 the angry temper in all sections which arose out of the 
 imprisonments, the hunger-strikes, the penalties imposed, 
 and the successive concessions to violent resistance. 
 
 To this was added a new cause of quarrel. The Fran- 
 chise Bill was now coming before the House of Commons ; 
 and under the provisions agreed to by the Speaker's 
 Conference, extension of the franchise was to be applied 
 in Ireland, but there was to be no redistribution. This 
 proposal was not unreasonable, since the Home Rule 
 Act was now a statute and under it new and properly 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 303 
 
 distributed constituencies were scheduled ; while over 
 and above this the Convention was in existence to occupy 
 itself with the matter. 
 
 On the other hand, the existing distribution of seats 
 was hard on Unionist Ulster : the great mass of popu- 
 lation in and about Belfast was under-represented. 
 Ulstermen said that while Nationalists professed great 
 desire to give favour to minorities, in reality they per- 
 sisted in keeping their political opponents at an unfair 
 disadvantage. There was no more question of enlarging 
 the delegates' authority in Convention : the Advisory 
 Committee hardened their attitude, and it was our task 
 to convince a body which could not hear our arguments 
 at first hand. Decisions lay with Ulstermen in Belfast, 
 not in the Convention — that is to say, not subject to 
 the daily, hourly, prompting to remember that they were 
 not only Ulstermen but Irishmen, which arose from 
 friendly intercourse with their fellow-delegates. 
 
 The Grand Committee of twenty, representing all 
 groups, met on October 11th. Sir Horace Plunkett had 
 in advance begged Redmond to undertake the presenta- 
 tion of a scheme which would serve as a basis for dis- 
 cussion. Redmond declined, on the ground that the 
 initiative should come from someone who was not there 
 as a politician ; but he admitted that the onus of making 
 a proposal was on Home Rulers. Dr. O'Donnell, though 
 an office-bearer in the United Irish League, was present 
 as a representative of the hierarchy ; he was charged 
 with the task. He had been throughout a strong advo- 
 cate of claiming for Ireland all the powers possessed 
 by any of the Dominions, with limitations on the military 
 side ; he had also been forward in his desire to give wholly 
 exceptional rights of representation to minorities. 
 
 But when we got into Committee one man immediately 
 took the lead. Sir Alexander McDowell » had not spoken 
 in any debate ; there is reason to believe that he was 
 
 ' He was knighted for his work in connection with the war. 
 
304 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 glad not to commit himself in advance before the moment 
 when his special gift might come into play. All his life 
 he had been carrying through agreements between con- 
 flicting interests : he was a great mediator and negotiator. 
 Now, he advocated what was, in strictness, an irregu- 
 larity. A task had been delegated to us : he asked us 
 to delegate it again to a smaller group. The whole case, 
 he said, had been fully opened up ; further debate would 
 be no use ; we all knew all the arguments. He deprecated 
 formal procedure ; it was plainly a family quarrel, and 
 we should treat it in that spirit. Honestly, he said, ho 
 should be sorry if the Convention failed. Ulster had no 
 fault to find with the Union ; but they were living next 
 door to a house already in flames. 
 
 That was the general tone, but it would be difficult 
 to convey the impression of experience and authority 
 which his manner left : and Redmond supported him. 
 It was plain that the two men would understand each 
 other. In the upshot their view prevailed ; Redmond, 
 Mr. Barrie and Lord Midleton were instructed to suggest 
 names, and after an interval they came back with a list 
 of nine. Lord Midleton was for the Southern Unionists ; 
 Mr. Barrie, Lord Londonderry and Sir Alexander McDowell 
 for the Northern ; Redmond, Mr. Devlin and Bishop 
 O'Donnell represented the parliamentary Nationalists, 
 and to them were added Mr. W. M. Murphy and Mr. 
 George Russell. 
 
 This left eleven of us unemployed, and some days later 
 we were formed into three sub-committees, the first 
 dealing with the question of Electoral Reform and the 
 composition of an Irish Parliament ; the second with 
 Land Purchase, and the third with a possible Territorial 
 Force and the Police. But the marrow of the business 
 rested with the original sub-committee of nine. 
 
 They, however, could not get rapidly to work ; other 
 affairs pulled them in different directions. Redmond 
 was forced to go to Westminster, where the Franchise 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 305 
 
 Bill was coming on ; moreover, the Irish party felt that 
 it must raise the question of Irish administration. 
 
 As our leader, he was obliged to speak on both matters. 
 His reply to the Ulster amendment proposing to extend 
 redistribution to Ireland was that this departed from the 
 compromise reached at the Speaker's Conference, and 
 moreover ignored the existence of the Convention. He 
 spoke with studied brevity and avoidance of party spirit : 
 but the debate became a wrangle. Mr. Barrie brought 
 back into it some of the Convention's friendlier atmo- 
 sphere ; but his argument was that in the interests of 
 the Convention this concession should be made. 
 
 The second debate, on October 23rd, was inevitably 
 contentious : it deplored the policy being pursued by 
 the Irish Executive and the Irish military authorities 
 " at a time when the highest interests of Ireland and 
 the Empire demand the creation of an atmosphere 
 favourable to the Convention." Redmond had an easy 
 task in convicting the Government's action of incoherence 
 and of blundering provocation — but to do this was of 
 no advantage to his main purpose, which he served as 
 best he could by a side-wind, eulogizing the temper of 
 the Convention and specially the " sincere desire for a 
 reasonable settlement " shown by the Ukter delegates. 
 
 Still, at the best, it was impossible for him not to feel 
 that the reaction of a debate which could not be kept 
 in the tone on which he started it must be unfavourable 
 to the meetings of the Nine which were about to take 
 place. He was to go in to negotiate a settlement for 
 his country while the voices of faction were yelping at 
 his heels all over Ireland, and all the forces of reconcilia- 
 tion which he had brought into play were neutralized 
 and sterilized. 
 
 A debate of these days gave him a happier occasion 
 to intervene than the domestic bickerings in which he 
 had been forced to take part ; yet even in this the note 
 of sadness predominated. On October 29th, when a 
 
 21 
 
306 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 vote of thanks was proposed to the Navy, Army and 
 Mercantile Marine, he joined his voice to that of other 
 leaders of parties, to emphasize, as he said, that they 
 spoke from an absolutely unanimous House of Commons. 
 He recalled the exploits of Irish troops and dwelt again 
 on the presence of a large Irish element in the Canadian 
 and Anzac Divisions. But his reference was chiefly to 
 those Nationalist Irish Brigades, who had remained true, 
 he said, to the old motto of the Brigade of Fontenoy, 
 Semper el ubiqne fidelis. These men had known in the 
 midst of their privations and sufferings a new and poignant 
 feeling of anguish : they had seen " a section at any rate 
 of their countrymen " repudiate the view that in serving 
 as they served they were fighting for Ireland, for her 
 happiness, for her prosperity and her liberty. 
 
 " I wish it were possible for me to speak a word to 
 every one of those men. If my words could reach them, 
 I would say to every one of them that they need have 
 no misgiving, that they were right from the first, that 
 time will vindicate them, that time will show that while 
 fighting for liberty and civilization in Europe they are 
 also fighting for civilization and liberty in their own land. 
 I would like to say to every one of them, in addition, that 
 even at this moment, when ephemeral causes have con- 
 fused and disturbed Irish opinion, they are regarded 
 with feelings of the deepest pride and gratitude by the 
 great bulk of the Irish race and by all that is best in 
 every creed and class in Ireland." 
 
 The Irish Divisions had once and again been engaged 
 shoulder to shoulder, but this time with very different 
 fortune, in the third battle of Ypres ; yet, win or lose, 
 they won or lost together. In that same fighting 
 Redmond's own son had earned special honour ; the 
 Distinguished Service Order was bestowed on him for 
 holding up a broken line with his company of the Irish 
 Guards. At a happier time this news would have 
 been received with enthusiasm all over Ireland ; now, 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 307 
 
 the most one could say was that it delighted the 
 Convention. 
 
 It would be quite wrong, however, to regard Redmond's 
 attitude in these days as unhopeful. The first meetings 
 of the Nine were fruitful of much agreement — conditional 
 at all points on general ratification. But the true spirit 
 of compromise was there. So far as concerned the pro- 
 vision to give minorities more than their numerical weight, 
 it was agreed that there should be two Houses, with 
 powers of joint session, and with control over money 
 bills conceded to the Upper House. In the Lower House 
 Unionists should (somehow) get forty per cent, of the 
 representation : so that in the joint session the influences 
 would be equally balanced. 
 
 The hitch came over finance. Nationalists wanted 
 complete powers of taxation, but would agree to a treaty 
 establishing Free Trade between the two countries for a 
 long period. Ulster wanted a common fiscal control for 
 Great Britain and Ireland. By November 1st a complete 
 deadlock had been reached. 
 
 On that date the Grand Committee met to take stock 
 informally of the position, especially in regard to the 
 procedure of the more detailed sub-committees, and to 
 face the fact that a grave misfortune had befallen us. 
 Sir Alexander McDowell had been prevented by illness 
 from attending any of the meetings. He had no further 
 part in the Convention's work, and died before it ended. 
 
 Redmond in a confidential talk spoke of his absence 
 as lamentable. The two had arranged — on the Belfast 
 man's proposal — to meet for private interviews before 
 the Nine came together. Neither had control of the 
 forces for which he spoke ; but both stood out, by every- 
 one's consent, from the rest of the assembly. It is im- 
 possible to say how much they might have achieved 
 had they come to an understanding ; but assuredly no 
 other representative of the North spoke with the same 
 self-confidence or the same weight of personality as Sir 
 
308 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Alexander McDowell. My own feeling about him — if it 
 be worth while to record a personal impression — was 
 that he was a man with the instinct for carrying big 
 things through — that the iDroblem tempted him, as a 
 task which called for the exertion of powers which he was 
 conscious of possessing. In losing him we lost certainly 
 the strongest will in his group, perhaps the strongest in 
 the Convention ; and it was a will for settlement. It 
 was, too, a will less hampered by regard for public opinion 
 than that of any popularly elected representative man 
 can be. He had, I think, also eminently the persuasive 
 gift which is not only inclined to give and take but can 
 impart that disposition to others. 
 
 Mr. Pollock, who replaced him, was an able man, but 
 singularly lacking in this quality. He held his own 
 views clearly and strongly, but his method of exposition 
 accentuated differences : it had always a note of asperity, 
 though this was certainly not deliberate. One of the 
 pleasant memories which remains with me is of a day 
 when debate grew acrimonious and hot words were used. 
 Mr. Pollock refused to reply to some phrases which might 
 have been regarded as taunts, because, he said, '* I have 
 made friendships here which I never expected to make, 
 and I value them too much to risk the loss of them." 
 That friendly temper, combined with his ability, made 
 him a valuable member of this Convention : but for the 
 critical work of bringing men's minds together, of sifting 
 the essential from the unessential, he was a bad exchange 
 for Sir Alexander McDowell. 
 
 Redmond said to me that he had found Mr. Barrie 
 much more conciliatory than in the earlier and public 
 stages. He was delighted with Lord Midleton, who was, 
 he said, " showing an Irish spirit which I never expected " ; 
 — standing up for the claims of an Irish Parliament if 
 there was to be one. In the discussion, however, one 
 man, Bishop O'Donnell, had been *' head and shoulders 
 above everyone else." 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 309 
 
 Argument had ranged about the question of customs 
 and excise. This was the dividing line. But when at 
 last a deadlock was definitely reached, the Ulster position 
 was stated in a letter which refused to concede to an 
 Irish Parliament the control of either direct or indirect 
 taxation. It was to be a Parliament with no taxing 
 power at all. 
 
 On the other hand, in the corresponding document 
 from the Nationalist side, the importance of immediate 
 and full fiscal control had been put very high. 
 
 " Self-government does not exist," it said, " where 
 those nominally entrusted with affairs of government 
 have not control of fiscal and economic policy. No 
 nation with self-respect could accept the idea that while 
 its citizens were regarded as capable of creating wealth 
 they were regarded as incompetent to regulate the manner 
 in which taxation of that wealth should be arranged, 
 and that another country should have the power of levy- 
 ing and collecting taxes, the taxed country being j)laced 
 in the position of a person of infirm mind whose affairs 
 are regulated by trustees. No finality could be looked 
 for in such an arrangement, not even a temporary 
 satisfaction." 
 
 The genesis of this passage should be told, for it had 
 importance in the history of the Convention ; and also 
 it conveys an idea of the limits to which Redmond carried 
 self-effacement. It is important because it acted on 
 Ulster like a red rag shown to a bull. Obviously, if this 
 were the Nationalist view, then the Home Rule Act 
 could not be said to give self-government — for under 
 its system of contract finance Ireland certainly had not 
 control of her fiscal and economic policy. A measure 
 accepted with enthusiasm in 1912 was now regarded as 
 impossible of giving " even a temporary satisfaction." 
 
 What had happened was this. The Chairman in his 
 tireless efforts to bring about agreement had addressed 
 two set^ of questions, to the Nationalists and to the 
 
310 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Ulstermen respectively, by answering which he hoped 
 they might clear the air. The direct answers for the 
 Nationalists were drafted by Mr. Russell, but were shown 
 to Redmond, Mr. Devlin and the Bishop of Raphoe. It 
 was, however, suggested that as an addendum a sum- 
 mary should be added. Redmond did not ask to see 
 this addition, and it was not shown to him. It led off 
 with the paragraph which has been quoted. The fact that 
 he allowed anything in any stage of such a negotiation 
 to go out in his name without his own revision marks 
 the loosening of grip — a tired man. 
 
 His exertions for the past years, the past ten years 
 at least, had been tremendous : they had been redoubled 
 from 1912 to 1916. Towards the end, one resource had 
 been failing him — the chief of all. A leader when he 
 is well followed gives and takes ; there is interchange 
 of energy. For more than a year now Redmond had 
 lacked the moral support, the almost physical stimulus, 
 which comes from the ready response of followers. Labour 
 at no time came easy to him, there was much inertia 
 in his temperament ; and the part which he had laid out 
 for himself in the Convention as merely an individual 
 member did not impose on him the same unremitting 
 vigilance as if he acted as leader. Yet, the leadership 
 was his ; if he did not exercise it, no one else could ; 
 and this incident shows that his abnegation of leadership 
 was not a mere phrase. 
 
 On November 22nd the Grand Committee reassembled 
 to hear the report from the Nine. Lord Southborough, 
 who had presided at all their meetings, detailed the 
 conclusions which had been reached or the point on 
 which they had broken down. 
 
 Then followed a discussion lasting some throe daj^s, 
 in which Ulstermen and Nationalists reaffirmed their 
 positions. Archbishop Bernard, the Primate, and Lord 
 MacDonnell all attempted mediation. Finally, Lord 
 Midleton, who described the position as ** a stone wall 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 311 
 
 on each side," announced that he and his group would 
 put before the Grand Committee certain proposals as 
 a via media. These in efiFect conceded to an Irish Parlia- 
 ment all that Nationalists claimed, subject only to the 
 reservation that customs must be fixed by the Imperial 
 Parliament and the produce of them retained as Ireland's 
 contribution to Imperial services. 
 
 At this point our work was interrupted by the re- 
 emergence of the redistribution question. Redmond 
 and the other Irish members were obliged to go to London 
 and assist for two days at a debate in the worst traditions 
 of the House of Commons. The change of atmosphere 
 was extraordinary — and the accusations of ])ad faith 
 were not limited to what passed at Westminster. One 
 virulent speech declared that the Convention had no 
 prospects, never had any, and was never intended to 
 have any. This was accompanied by an attack on the 
 action of the Ulster group — based, of course, on hearsay. 
 Those of us who felt that at any rate the Convention 
 offered a better hope for Ireland than any which now 
 could be based on action at Westminster j^leaded for 
 the acceptance of a proposal which Redmond put forward 
 as a compromise — that the proposed Irish clauses should 
 be dropped from the main Bill and the Irish matter 
 dealt with in a separate statute. It was so agreed at 
 last, and a conference between Irish members, with the 
 Speaker presiding, was set up, and quickly did its work. 
 But if all this had been agreed to in October or earlier, 
 much friction would have been saved and a cause of 
 quarrel with the Ulster tliat was not in the Convention 
 might have been avoided. Still, peace was achieved, 
 and the proposal to cut down Irish representation was 
 once more defeated. 
 
 Grand Committee met for another session, but was 
 chiefly concerned with getting ready for the reassembling 
 of Convention — fixed for Tuesday, December 18th. It 
 was decided that a group meeting of Nationalists for 
 
312 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 informal discussion should be held on the Monday night 
 — the first occasion on which this had been done. 
 
 Ill-luck, however, seemed to dog us. Dr. Kelly, the 
 Bishop of Ross, who was much closer in his point of view 
 to Redmond than any of the other Bishops, was gravely 
 ill. This was foreseen. But on the Monday a heavy 
 snowstorm fell ; Redmond, shut up in his hills at Augha- 
 vanagh, could not reach Dublin. The roads were not open 
 till the Thursday, and then he thought it too late to come. 
 He was in truth already too ill to face any unusual exertion. 
 
 The Convention had been summoned, not to receive 
 a final report from the Grand Committee, but to face 
 a new situation. An offer had been put forward by 
 one group which altered the whole complexion of the 
 controversy. Grand Committee had abstained from 
 deciding whether to counsel acceptance or rejection. 
 But for the first time an influential body of Irish Unionists 
 had agreed, not as individuals but as representatives, 
 to accept Home Rule, in a wider measure than had been 
 proffered by the Bills of 1886 and 1893 or by the Act 
 of 1914. Limitations which were imposed in all these 
 had been struck out by Lord Midleton's proposals. 
 
 On the other hand, it was certain that the Ulster group 
 would reject the scheme. Conversation among National- 
 ists made it plain that if Ulster would agree with Lord 
 Midleton we should all join them. For the sake of an 
 agreement reached between all sections of Irishmen, but 
 for nothing less conclusive. Dr. O'Donnell and Mr. Russell 
 were content to waive the claim to full fiscal independence. 
 Such an agreement, they held, would be accepted by 
 Parliament in its integrity. But if Ulster stood out, 
 there would be no *' substantial agreement," and the 
 terms which Nationalists and Southern Unionists might 
 combine to propose would be treated as a bargaining offer, 
 certain to be chipped down by Government towards 
 conformity with the Ulster demand. In the result there 
 would be an uprising of opinion in Ireland against a 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 313 
 
 measure so framed ; the fiasco of July, 1916, would repeat 
 itself. 
 
 Against this, and prompting us to acceptance, was 
 the view very strongly held by Redmond, that Govern- 
 ment iirgentlj' needed a settlement for the sake of the 
 war, and would use to the utmost any leverage which 
 helped them to this end. An agreement with Lord 
 Midleton would mean a Home Rule proposal proceeding 
 from a leading Unionist statesman who spoke for the 
 interest in Ireland, which, if any, had reason to fear 
 Nationalist government. This would mean necessarily 
 a profound change in the attitude of the House of Lords 
 and of all those social influences whose power we had 
 felt so painfully. Government could undoubtedly, if it 
 chose, carry a measure giving effect to this compact. 
 
 Further, weighing greatly with the instincts of the 
 rank and file was the motive which prompted Irish 
 Nationalists to welcome the advance made by those 
 whom Lord Midleton represented. The Southern Unionists 
 were the old landowning and professional class, friendly 
 in all ways of intercourse, but politically severed and 
 sundered from the mass of the population. Now, they 
 came forward with an offer to help in attaining our desire 
 — quite frankly, against their own declared conviction 
 that the Union was the best plan, but with an equally 
 frank recognition that the majority was the majority 
 and was honest in its intent. The personality of the 
 men reinforced the effect of this : Lord Oranmore, for 
 instance, whom most of them had only known by anti- 
 Home Rule speeches in the House of Lords, revealed 
 himself as the friendliest of Irishmen, with the Irish love 
 for a witty phrase. 
 
 This temperamental attitude was of help to Lord 
 Midleton when on December 18th he expounded the 
 position of himself and his friends in a very powerful 
 argument, the more persuasive because the good will 
 in his audience softened his habitual touch of conten- 
 
314 JOHN REDMONDS LAST YEARS 
 
 tiousness. It had seemed to them, he said, that both 
 in the Nationalist and Northern Unionist camp there 
 was a tendency to consider dispositions out of doors 
 and to conciliate certain antagonisms without consider- 
 ing whether tho}'^ excited others. He and his friends 
 had determined to fix their minds solely on the Conven- 
 tion itself, and to pursue the purpose for which they were 
 summoned of endeavouring after agreement within that 
 body. They were Unionists ; but they had asked them- 
 selves what could be removed from the present system 
 without disturbing the essence of Union ; and in that 
 effort thej^ would go to the extremest limit in their power, 
 without thought of conciliating opinions outside, and 
 without any attempt to bargain. 
 
 On one point only he indicated that their scheme was 
 tentative. Defence was by consent of all left to the 
 Imperial Parliament. This implied, he held, an adequate 
 contribution, and the yield of customs to be collected 
 by the Imperial Parliament seemed roughly to meet 
 the case, for the period of the war. But this was not 
 absolutely a hard-and-fast proposal. In any case, after 
 the war, the amount should be the subject of inquiry 
 by a joint commission. 
 
 Apart from this, the offer was their last word. It 
 conceded to Ireland the control of all purely Irish services. 
 This included the fixation of excise, because excise on 
 commodities produced in Ireland did not touch the treaty- 
 making power. Customs touched that power, and there- 
 fore customs, like defence, must be left to the Imperial 
 Parliament. But, he argued, Irish Nationalists were 
 not asked to give up anything which had been conceded 
 to them by any previous Home Rule proposal. 
 
 To all Unionists he said : These proposals keep the power 
 of the Crown over all Imperial services undiminished ; 
 they keep representation at Westminster — a corollary 
 from leaving the Imperial Parliament powers over Irish 
 taxation ; and bj^ accepting the suggestions already 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 315 
 
 agreed to, they give a generous representation to Unionists 
 in an Irish Parliament. This special representation of 
 minorities was, he thought, sufficient to give a guarantee 
 of " sane legislation " while it lasted ; and he suggested 
 that the period should be fifteen years. These concessions, 
 in his opinion, sufficiently protected Southern Unionists. 
 To Ulster he said, " We share every danger threatening 
 you — we have many dangers you need not fear. Yet, 
 we have no sinister anticipations. Are you still deter- 
 mined to stand out ? " 
 
 On the other hand, when so much of the full demand 
 was conceded, were Nationalists insistent, he asked, on 
 demanding what they had never asked in the discussions 
 upon any Home Rule Bill ? Nationalist leaders had 
 now the chance of leading a combination of all sane 
 elements in the landowning and land-cultivating classes. 
 No Irish leader had ever before been able to present such 
 an appeal to Unionist opinion as would come from the 
 man who represented a Convention Party. 
 
 It was a sf)eech which Redmond, if present, must have 
 replied to, and could not have replied to without indi- 
 cating profound sympathy — for he was in agreement 
 with its main lines ; and his expression of opinion upon 
 it must have influenced strongly the views of the rank 
 and file at the moment when they were most open to 
 suggestion. 
 
 In his absence, men's minds wore greatly affected by 
 the fear that if we adopted these proposals, our decision 
 would be exposed to attack from a combination of three 
 forces — Sinn F6in, which would at least officially con- 
 demn anything less than complete separation, and would 
 furiously assail a proposal that denied full taxing powers ; 
 the Roman Catholic Church, which would take its lead 
 from Bishop O'Donnell, who set out in an able memor- 
 andum the reasons why Ireland must have full control 
 of taxation ; and finally, the powerful newspaper whose 
 proprietor, Mr. Murphj^ at once gave signs of his hostility 
 
316 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEAR>S 
 
 by putting on the paper an amendment to Lord Midleton'a 
 resolution which amounted to a direct negative. 
 
 The reassembly of the Convention was fixed for 
 Wednesday, January 2nd. Redmond came to Dublin 
 on the Monday. He told me that he was inclined to 
 move that while we thanked Lord Midleton for his sub- 
 stantial contribution towards our purpose, we could not 
 accept his proposal, unless it opened the way to a settle- 
 ment. What he meant by this was not merely that if 
 Ulster agreed, we should accept ; for that would certainly 
 open the way. But he had also in his mind the possi- 
 bility of a guarantee from Government that an arrange- 
 ment come to, as this might be, by four-fifths of the 
 Convention, and repudiated only by the pledge-bound 
 Ulster block, would be regarded as substantial agree- 
 ment, and taken as a basis for legislation. In that case, 
 also, the Avay would be open ; but he had no written 
 assurance of such an understanding, though I gathered 
 that he was urging the Government to give it. We were, 
 however, told on good authority in these days that 
 if the Southern Unionists' proposal was accepted by 
 the Nationalists and other elements outside of Ulster, 
 the Prime Minister would use his whole influence with 
 his colleagues to secure acceptance of the compact and 
 immediate legislation uj^on it. This would mean, we were 
 also assured, that the whole thing would be done before 
 Easter. 
 
 On January 2nd the resumed debate for the first time 
 brought the Convention face to face with concrete pro- 
 posals for a settlement. In tone and in substance it 
 would have done credit to any Parliament that ever 
 sat. I shall not try to summarize the arguments, but 
 simply to note certain outstanding facts. 
 II Lord Midleton modified his original proposal that 
 collection of customs should be an Imperial service through- 
 out. He agreed that collection might be done by the 
 Irish Civil Service. Moreover, he admitted that Ireland 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 317 
 
 must have full means of checking the account for these 
 taxes, great part of which must necessarily be collected 
 at English ports, since tea, tobacco and the other dutiable 
 articles were seldom shipped direct to Ireland. 
 
 But he made it plain that the essential of his proposal 
 was the maintenance of a common customs system, 
 leaving the fixation of customs to the Imperial Parlia- 
 ment for Great Britain and Ireland. If this was denied, 
 as it would be by the acceptance of Mr. Murphy's amend- 
 ment, all Unionists would be driven once more into the 
 same lobby ; all chance of uniting elements heretofore 
 divided would disappear. 
 
 This was the fact against which we were brought up. 
 Insistence on the full Nationalist demand as it had been 
 outlined in the Convention meant the refusal of a new 
 and powerful alliance which now offered itself, and the 
 destruction of anything which could be called an agree- 
 ment. 
 
 In the close. Lord Midleton reinforced his appeal bj'^ 
 a solid material argument. The sub-committee presided 
 over by Lord MacDonnell had reached unanimous con- 
 clusions embodying proposals for the completion of land 
 purchase within a ver}- brief period. Landlords, agents, 
 tenants, representatives for Ulster as well as from the 
 South and West, were parties to this plan. Lord Midleton 
 now looked back on the past as one who had been in 
 the fight since Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill. 
 Every fresh settlement had been wrecked, he said, by 
 standing for the last shred of the demand. In 1885, if 
 Gladstone had abandoned the identity of democratic 
 franchise for both countries and had made to the Irish 
 minority such concessions as this Convention was willing 
 to make, he would have carried the Liberal Unionist 
 element with him. Then, as now, a great land purchase 
 scheme depended on the solution of the main problem. 
 To-day land purchase stood or fell with the Convention. 
 
 He was backed by Lord Dunraven — who waived his 
 
318 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 preference for his own original proposal — and by Lord 
 Desart, in moet able argument : the latter declaring that 
 the proposal to give Ireland a separate customs system 
 could never be carried in England. But the speech of 
 the day came from Mr. Kavanagh, who, speaking as a 
 Nationalist who had been a Unionist, ended a most moving 
 appeal for agreement with a declaration that he at all 
 events would vote for the compromise. There M'as no 
 mistaking the effect produced by the earnestness of this 
 speaker, who knew as much of Ireland and was as well 
 fitted to judge of its true interests as any man in the 
 room. That effect was felt, I think, in the tone of a 
 private meeting of Nationalists held the same night. 
 Redmond, with the art of which he was a master, indi- 
 cated support for the proposal without forcing a con- 
 clusion. He dwelt on the fact that if we did not agree 
 we not only lost our chance of immediate and complete 
 land purchase but left ourselves subjected to the entire 
 burden of war taxation. Other sjDcakers pointed out 
 that wo ought not to let ourselves be lured into driving 
 the Southern Unionists and the Ulstermen together 
 against us. Mr. Clancy said in his downright manner 
 that he would not as yet express his view publicly : but 
 that he was not going to reject this offer for the sake 
 of fixing taxes on tea and tobacco, and that when the 
 right time came, he would say so. The strongest argu- 
 ments used against this view were that in surrendering 
 control of customs we lost our management of the taxes 
 which pressed upon the poor ; and further, that even 
 if we agreed, no one knew what would result. We had 
 no guarantee that the compact would be expressed in 
 legislation. But on the whole the tone showed a dis- 
 position to accept, and especially to support Redmond 
 — who had spoken of his political career as a thing ended. 
 Next day the debate in Convention continued. Arch- 
 bishop Bernard, speaking as a Unionist, said that the 
 proposal was a venture beset with risks, but the greatest 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 319 
 
 danger of all wa« to do nothing. It would be a grave 
 responsibility for Ulster to wreck the chance of a settle- 
 ment. Lord Oranmore dwelt on the composition of 
 the proposed Legislature Power was to be entrusted 
 to a very different Parliament from that which they had 
 feared. He and his like were to get what they desired 
 — an opportunity of taking part in the government of 
 the country. It looked to him as if the only possible 
 Irish Government under this scheme must be Unionist 
 in its complexion. 
 
 Perhaps there was an echo of this in Redmond's speech, 
 by far the greatest he made in the Convention, when at 
 last ho intervened on January 4th — the Friday which 
 ended that session. 
 
 He dealt at once with Mr. Barrie's often repeated 
 view that the proper object of our endeavours was to 
 find a compromise between the Act of 1914 and the pro- 
 posal for partition put forward by Ulster. On that 
 basis the Convention could never have been brought 
 together. The Prime Minister's letter of May 16th which 
 proposed the Convention suggestesd that Irishmen should 
 meet " for the purpose of drafting a Constitution for 
 their own country." On May 22nd Mr. Lloyd George 
 had said, " We propose that Ireland should try her own 
 hand at hammering out an instrument of government 
 for her people." The only limitation was that it should 
 be a Constitution ** for the future government of Ireland 
 within the Empire." 
 
 Then he turned to the argument that all the sacrifices 
 were asked from Unionists. Let us weigh them, he said. 
 What sacrifices had been made by the Irish Nationalists, 
 since this chain of events began ? — Then followed a 
 passage which I recapitulate, not necessarily in full, but 
 in phrases which he actually used, and I noted down : 
 
 ** Personal loss I set aside. My position — our position 
 — before the war was that we possessed the confidence 
 of nearly the entire country. I took a risk — we took 
 
320 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 it — with eyes open. I have — we have — not merely taken 
 the risk but made the sacrifice. If the choice were to 
 be made to-morrow, I would do it all over again. 
 
 " I have had my surfeit of public life. My modest 
 ambition would be to serve in some quite humble capacity 
 under the first Unionist Prime Minister of Ireland." 
 
 As to other sacrifices, in the way of concessions, he 
 recited the list of what had been agreed to — proposals 
 80 strangely undemocratic — the nomination of members 
 of Parliament, the disproportionate powers given to a 
 minority. " Shall we not be denounced for making 
 them ? " he asked. 
 
 On the other hand, what sacrifices had been made by 
 the Southern Unionists ? These were the men who had 
 had the hardest battle to fight in the struggle over Home 
 Rule. They were not, like Ulster Unionists, " entrenched 
 in a ring-fence," but the scattered few, who had suffered 
 most and who might naturally have entertained most 
 bitterness. Yet Lord Midleton's speech had been instinct 
 with an admirable spirit. The speech of the Archbishop 
 of Dublin had touched him deeply. 
 
 " Between these men and us there never again can 
 be the differences of the past. They have put behind 
 them all bitter memories. They have agreed to the 
 framework of a Bill better than any offered to us in 1886, 
 1893 or 1914." 
 
 As for us Nationalists — he emphasized that each man 
 came here free, untrammelled. 
 
 ** I speak only for myself. But even if I stand alone, 
 I will not allow myself, because I cannot get the full 
 measure of my demand, to be drawn to reject the proffered 
 hand of friendship held out to us. In my opinion we 
 should be political fools if we did not endeavour to cement 
 an alliance with these men." 
 
 As concerned the Labour men, Mr. Whitley, who had 
 alwaj'^s been a Unionist, had declared willingness to agree. 
 But the Ulster Unionists — what sacrifice had thev made ? 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 321 
 
 •* The last thing I desire is to attack Mr. Barrie and 
 his friends. But they are not fre'. agents. I was shocked 
 when I heard that a section here openly avowed the 
 need to refer back to some outside body. If we had been 
 told we were going into a body which would consist of 
 two orders of members, it would have been difficult to 
 get us here." 
 
 On the essential point Ulster had made no concession. 
 What did Mr, Barrie say in his formal document ? ' We 
 are satisfied that for Ireland and for Great Britain a 
 common system of finances with one Exchequer is a 
 fundamental necessity.' If they denied the taxing power 
 to Ireland, any proposal on these lines must give Ireland 
 less than any proposal for Home Rule ever put forward. 
 This was Ulster's original position and they had not 
 budged an inch. 
 
 " This is their response to the Empire's S.O.S. Is it 
 worthy of Ulster's Imperial loyalty ? I don't believe it 
 is their last word." 
 
 Lord Londonderry, however, in replying, did not add 
 any ground of hope. The last speech of the day 
 announced that of six trade unionists five would support 
 the compromise. 
 
 Redmond that evening put on the notice paper a 
 motion adopting Lord Midleton's proposals provided 
 that they " be adopted by His Majesty's Government 
 as a settlement of the Irish question and legislative effect 
 be given to them forthwith." 
 
 On the day before this motion was tabled, a party 
 was given at Lord Granard's house which everybody 
 attended, and which marked the most festive moment 
 of our comradeship. When we separated on the Friday 
 most men were absolutely confident of an agreement 
 covering four-fifths of the Convention. 
 
 Unhappily, the motion could not come under con- 
 sideration for a period of ten days. In the following 
 week Lord Midleton thought it necessary to attend the 
 
 22 
 
322 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 House of Lords. It was settled that we should spend 
 the interval discussing the land purchase report, for 
 which his presence was not essential. Redmond, whose 
 health was still bad, did not come up to Dublin. All 
 this gave time for agitation, and agitation was at work. 
 
 Still, during that week there was no sign of any change 
 in tone. Members of the local bodies who had gone to 
 their homes at the week's end came back just as much 
 inclined to settle as before. 
 
 I met Redmond on the night of Monday, January 
 14th. He had seen no one in these ten days. He told 
 me that he was still uncertain what would happen, but 
 asked me to get one of the leading County Councillors 
 to second his motion. Next morning I came in half 
 an hour before the meeting to find the man I wanted. 
 When I met him he was full of excitement, and said, 
 " Something has gone wrong ; the men are all saying 
 they must vote against Redmond." Then it was evident 
 that propaganda had been busy to some purpose. 
 
 When Redmond came in to his place, I said, " It's all 
 right. Martin McDonogh will second your motion." 
 He answered with a characteristic brusqueness, *' He 
 needn't trouble. I'm not going to move it ; Devlin 
 and the Bishops are voting against me." 
 
 He rose immediately the Chairman was in his j)lace. 
 
 " The amendment which I have on the paper," he 
 said, " embodies the deliberate advice I give to the 
 Convention. 
 
 " I consulted no one — and could not do so, being ill. 
 It stands on record on my sole responsibility. 
 
 *' Since entering the building I have heard that some 
 very important Nationalist representatives are against 
 this course — the Catholic bishops, Mr. Devlin — and others. 
 I must face the situation — at which I am surprised ; and 
 I regret it. 
 
 *' If I proceeded I should probably carry my point 
 on a division, but the Nationalists would be divided. 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 323 
 
 Such a division could not carry out the objects I have 
 in view. 
 
 " Therefore, I must avoid pressing my motion. But 
 I leave it standing on the paper. The others will give 
 their advice. I feel that I can be of no further service 
 to the Convention and will therefore not move." ^ 
 
 There was a pause of consternation. The Chairman 
 intervened and the debate proceeded, and was carried 
 on through the week. During its course a letter to the 
 Chairman from the Bishop of Ross was circulated to 
 us, most dexterous in exposition, most affecting in the 
 tone of its conclusion. It can be read in the Report 
 of the Convention and it cannot with justice be quoted 
 except at full length — so admirable is the linking of 
 argument. It need only be said here that it was an 
 appeal " to my fellow-Nationalists who have already 
 made great concessions " to yield, for the sake of a settle- 
 ment, this further point, and that the appeal was signed 
 " from my sick-bed, not far removed from my death- 
 bed." That eloquent voice and subtle brain could ill 
 be spared from our assembly : but the letter came too late. 
 It is plain that the writer had no inkling of what would 
 happen till it was actually taking place. 
 
 No one can overstate the effect of this episode. 
 Redmond's personal ascendancy in the Convention had 
 become very great. I am certain there was not a man 
 there but would have said, *' If there is to be an Irish 
 Parliament, Redmond must be Prime Minister, and his 
 personality will give that Parliament its best possible 
 chance." The Ulstermen had more than once expressed 
 their view that if Home Rule were sure to mean Redmond's 
 rule, their objections to it would be materially lessened. 
 Now, they saw Redmond thrown over, and by a com- 
 bination in which the clerical influence, so much distrusted 
 by them, was paramount. 
 
 I These are my notes, jotted as he spoke. — S. G. 
 
324 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 IV 
 
 A new stage in the history of the Convention now 
 
 opens. In the interval between the meeting which began 
 
 by Redmond's withdrawal of his amendment and that 
 
 of the following week, Sir Horace Plunkett went to 
 
 London and laid the situation before the Prime Minister. 
 
 Redmond had also written to Mr. Lloyd George stating 
 
 that no progress could be made unless Government 
 
 would declare its intentions as to legislation. The 
 
 Chairman came back with the following letter in his 
 
 pocket : 
 
 10 Downing Street, 
 
 Whitehall, S.W. 1, 
 
 January 21, 1918. 
 
 Dear Sir Horace Plunkett, 
 
 In our conversation on Saturday you told me 
 that the situation in the Convention has now reached a 
 very critical stage. The issues are so grave that I feel 
 the Convention should not come to a definite break with- 
 out the Government having an opportunity of full con- 
 sultation with the leaders of the different sections. If, 
 and when, therefore, a point is reached at which the 
 Convention finds that it can make no further progress 
 towards an agreed settlement, I would ask that repre- 
 sentatives should be sent to confer with the Cabinet. 
 The Government are agreed and determined that a solution 
 must be found. But they are firmly convinced that the 
 best hope of a settlement lies within the Convention, 
 and they are prepared to do anything in their power 
 to assist the Convention finally to reach a basis of agree- 
 ment which would enable a new Irish Constitution to 
 come into operation with the consent of all parties. 
 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 D. Lloyd George. 
 
 Before acting on this, Sir Horace Plunkett allowed 
 the debate to continue during two days. Since no move- 
 ment towards agreement manifested itself, but only 
 evidence of widespread and various divergence, he laid 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 325 
 
 the Prime Minister's invitation before the Convention. 
 There was considerable difference of opinion before a 
 decision was reached for acceptance. Groups separated 
 to select their representatives on the delegation. 
 
 It was agreed in private conference that only one view 
 should be presented from the Nationalist side, and that 
 the view of what was at this point clearly the majority. 
 Redmond, in agreeing to act as a delegate, agreed to set 
 aside his own judgment and to press the claim for full 
 fiscal responsibility — which, like other Nationalists, he 
 regarded as in the abstract Ireland's right. But illness 
 prevented him from attending when at last the delegates 
 were received by the Prime Minister on February 13th. 
 
 On the 5th he had asked a question in Parliament — 
 the last he was to ask there. It concerned the starting 
 of a factory for the manufacture of aircraft in Dublin 
 — one of the things for which he was pressing in his cease- 
 less effort to bring Ireland some industrial advantage 
 from the war. I saw him towards the end of that month 
 in his room at the House, and he commented bitterly 
 upon a raid carried out by Sinn Feiners, in which some 
 newly erected buildings were destroyed at one of the 
 aerodromes near Dublin which he had helj^ed to estab- 
 lish. But the main thing he had to say concerned the 
 course of the Convention. Everything, in his judgment, 
 was wrecked ; he saw nothing ahead for his country but 
 ruin and chaos. 
 
 He spoke of his health. A bout of sickness which 
 had prostrated him at Christmas in Dublin had left him 
 uneasy. He was at the time, I thought, unduly alarmed 
 about himself, and I believed that the continuance of 
 this frame of mind was simply characteristic of a man 
 who had very little experience of ill-health. I left him 
 with profound compassion for his trouble of spirit, but 
 without any serious apprehension for his state of body. 
 
 The Convention reassembled on February 26th to 
 consider the result of the delegation, which was summed 
 
326 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 up in a letter from Mr. Lloyd George. This well-known 
 document begins with a definite pledge of action. On 
 receiving the report of the Convention the Government 
 would give it immediate attention and would " proceed 
 with the least possible delay to submit legislative pro- 
 posals to Parliament." — The date of this pledge was 
 February 25, 1918. — Mr. Lloyd George pressed, however, 
 for a settlement " in and through the Convention " ; 
 and he declared his conviction that " In view of previous 
 attempts at settlement and of the deliberations of the 
 Convention itself, the only hope of agreement lies in a 
 solution which on the one side provides for the unity 
 of Ireland by a single Legislature, with adequate safe- 
 guards for the interests of Ulster and of the Southern 
 Unionists, and, on the other, secures tlie well-being 
 of the Empire and the fundamental unity of the United 
 Kingdom." 
 
 Ireland's strong claim to some control of indirect 
 taxation was admitted ; but it was laid down that till 
 two years after the war the jBxation and collection of 
 customs and excise should be left to the Imperial 
 Parliament : and that at the end of the war a Royal 
 Commission should report on Ireland's contribution to 
 Imperial expenditure and should submit proposals as to 
 the fiscal relations of the two countries. 
 
 For the war period, Ireland was to contribute " an 
 agreed proportion of the Imperial expenditure," but 
 was to receive the full proceeds of Irish revenue from 
 customs and excise, less the agreed contribution. The 
 police and postal services were to be reserved also as 
 war services. 
 
 These provisions were laid down as essentials. A 
 suggestion was made of an Ulster Committee within the 
 Irish Parliament, having power to modify or veto 
 measures, whether of legislation or administration, in 
 their application to Ulster. 
 
 Lastly, Government expressed their willingness to accept 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 327 
 
 and finance the Convention's scheme for land purchase 
 and to give a large grant for urban housing. 
 
 The question now before the Convention was whether 
 it should or should not accept this offer, which differed 
 from the Midleton proposals in that it withheld the 
 control of excise as well as of customs, and that it 
 retained control of police and Post Office for the war 
 period. It also adumbrated an Ulster Committee, which 
 had been an unpopular suggestion when put forward 
 in the presentation stages. On the other hand, it offered 
 great material inducements in the proposed expenditure 
 for land purchase and for housing. Some of the County 
 Councillors who had been most vehement in their opposi- 
 tion to the Midleton compromise were now disposed to 
 think this too good an offer to let go, but believed it 
 could be obtained without their taking the responsi- 
 bility of voting for it. It was necessary to point out 
 that the Irish party could not lower a standard of national 
 demand set up b}^ the Nationalists in the Convention, 
 and that if they did so they would be hooted out of 
 existence. 
 
 The main argument of those who advised against 
 acceptance was that Ministers had pledged themselves 
 to act in any case. Let them. We could best help by 
 enunciating our own programme. Then they would 
 know the real facts of the Irish situation. If a majority 
 of the Convention accepted the proposals of the Prime 
 Minister's letter, there was no pledge that the Bill would 
 be on those lines. We needed to keep a bargaining 
 margin in what we put forward. It was even suggested 
 that the Government proposals would be more likely 
 to attract support in Ireland if put forward as a ger erous 
 offer from a largely Unionist Government than if pub- 
 lished as a compromise to which Nationalists had 
 condescended. 
 
 Our reply was that the essential thing was to make 
 a beginning with self-government, and that by refusing 
 
328 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEAHS 
 
 to accept the Government's offer, on which alone we 
 could combine with an influential Unionist section, we 
 gravely increased the difficulties in the way of carrying 
 Home Rule. If, as we held, the main need was to unite 
 Ireland, the last thing on which we should insist was 
 the concession of complete financial powers. When the 
 lack of those powers began to prove itself injurious to 
 Ireland's material interests, Ireland would certainly 
 become united in a demand for the concession of them ; 
 and the history of the British Empire since the loss of 
 America showed that every such demand had been 
 granted to a self-governing State. 
 
 At this moment interest centred on the discussion in 
 private councils of Nationalists. The debates in full 
 Convention Avere animated, but somewhat unreal by 
 comparison. Lord Midleton's motion had been dropped, 
 by consent, for a series of resolutions tabled by Lord 
 MacDonnell which were in substance an acceptance of 
 Government's proposal. 
 
 But neither in the private councils nor in the public 
 debates had we Redmond's presence. His illness had 
 grown serious ; an operation was necessary ; it passed 
 over hopefully, and on Tuesday, March 5th, when the 
 debate resumed, Mr. Clancy had a telegram saying that 
 he was practically out of danger. 
 
 It was plain in these days that we were nearing a most 
 critical decision, and Nationalist opinion was profoundly 
 uneasy. Many men were drifting back to Redmond's 
 view, and recoiled from the prospect of dividing the 
 Convention once more into its original component parts 
 — Nationalists on the one side, Unionists on the other. 
 It was proposed that on the Wednesday Nationalists 
 should meet and, if possible, concert joint action ; if 
 not, determine definitely each to go our own ways ; for 
 a painful part of the situation was that all of us had 
 been used to act together, and none now felt himself 
 free of some obligation. This had to be cleared up 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 329 
 
 When we came down to Trinity College that morning, 
 the news met us that Redmond was dead. 
 
 The Convention adjourned its work, although time 
 pressed most seriously, till after the interment. Ireland 
 is a country where a public man can always count on a 
 good funeral. The body was brought to Kingstown, 
 and thence by special train to Wexford, where he had 
 expressed the wish to be laid, in the burying-place of his 
 own people and in the town with which he had been 
 most closely associated. Hundreds of men came from 
 distant parts to mark their sorrow and respect : what 
 remained of him was carried in long and imposing pro- 
 cession through the streets. Over the grave Mr. Dillon, 
 who had been chosen to succeed him in the chair of the 
 Irish party, spoke eloquent and fitting words. Some 
 day, no doubt, a monument to his memory will be set 
 up in the streets of W^exford, where his great uncle's 
 statue stands, and where will be placed the memorial 
 to his gallant brother, subscribed for from all parts of 
 the kingdom and from all Irish regiments in the Army. 
 
 But I say without hesitation that the first and most 
 strildng endeavour to put in lasting shape a tribute to 
 John Redmond was made in the Convention, not by 
 great men, but by the ordinary rank and file of Irish 
 Nationalists, who went back from the graveside to the 
 work which his death had interrupted. 
 
 Those who had been inclined before to accept his 
 advice — still standing on our minutes — were now more 
 than ever determined to follow it. That advice was 
 not to refuse the hand of friendship which offered itself 
 from men who by alliance with us could take away from 
 the Home Rule demand all sectarian character : who 
 could bring for the first time a great and representative 
 body of Irish landlord opinion and Irish Protestant 
 opinion into line with the opinion of Irish tenants and 
 Irish Catholics. In order to act upon this advice men 
 needed to face a powerful combination of forces and 
 
330 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 much threatened unpopularity : they had to encounter 
 the hostility of an able and vindictively conducted news- 
 paper ; they had to separate themselves politically from 
 the united voice of their own hierarchy ; they had to 
 break away from the politician who for many years now 
 had equalled Redmond in his influence in Ireland and 
 surpassed him in popularity. All of them were repre- 
 sentative of constituents, all were living among those 
 whom they represented ; not a man of them but knew 
 he would worsen his personal and political position by 
 what he did. Yet, for that is the true way to state it, 
 they stood to their dead leader's policy. 
 
 It needs not to follow out in any detail the steps by 
 which we reached the end of our labours. In the upshot, 
 the Ulster group of nineteen dissented from every- 
 thing and joined in a report which renewed the demand 
 for partition. The Primate and the Provost signed a 
 separate note declaring that a Federal Scheme based 
 on the Swiss or Canadian system offered the only solu- 
 tion which could avoid the alternative choice between 
 the coercion of Ulster and the partition of Ireland. The 
 remaining members, sixty-six in all, accepted one common 
 scheme. I Their number included ten Southern Unionists, 
 five Labour representatives (three of whom were Protestant 
 artisans from Belfast), with Lords Granard, MacDonnell 
 and Dunraven, Sir Bertram Windle and the representa- 
 tives of the Dublin and Cork Chambers of Commerce. 
 
 The scheme on which we concurred recommended the 
 immediate establishment of self-government by an Irish 
 Ministry responsible to a Parliament consisting of two 
 Houses, composed on highly artificial lines. For a period 
 of fifteen years Southern Unionists were to be repre- 
 sented by nominated members, while Ulster was to have 
 extra members elected by special constituencies repre- 
 senting commercial and agricultural interests. The 
 
 Subject to the pviblication of a Report signed by Bishop 
 O'Donnell, and these in agreement with him reaffirmed theii* view. 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 331 
 
 Parliament was to have full control of internal legis- 
 lation, administration and direct taxation. The fixation 
 of customs and excise was to be from Westminster, 
 but the proceeds of these taxes to be paid into the Irish 
 Exchequer. There was to be a contribution to the cost 
 of Imperial defences, and representation at Westminster, 
 but a representation of the Irish Parliament rather than 
 of the constituencies. All of this was agreed to at our 
 last meeting, and nothing could have been more pleasant 
 than the atmosphere of good will which prevailed. But 
 this was after a critical division — the most critical in 
 which I have ever voted — in which those of us National- 
 ists who were for accepting the Government proposals 
 voted with the Southern Unionists and those who were 
 against with the Ulster group. The combination of 
 Ulstermen and extreme Nationalists was tliirty-four 
 strong ; those who adopted Redmond's policy and Lord 
 Midleton's were thirty-eight. We had in our lobby 
 sixteen of the Nationalist County and Urban Councillors ; 
 they had eleven. 
 
 If that vote had gone otherwise, we were told plainly 
 that the Southern Unionists would be no parties to the 
 rest of the compromise. They were willing to recommend 
 self-government only if the Convention recommended 
 the reservation of customs to the Imperial Parliament. 
 This point had become in their minds important even 
 more as a symbol of the close union between the two 
 kingdoms than by reason of the economic advantages 
 which they attributed to it. 
 
 Once the sticking-point was passed, the divided 
 Nationalists recombined, and we were all at one in our 
 mutual felicitations on the harmony which prevailed at 
 the close. But as one of our rank and file said in my 
 ear, " If we had not given the vote we did, where would 
 be all this talk of harmony ? And mind you now, it 
 was not easy to give it." 
 
 He was right, and within six months it cost him the 
 
332 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 chairmanship of his County Council. Others paid the 
 same penalty, I am sure, without grudging it, for most of 
 us were prouder of that action than of any other in our 
 political lives. It may be well to set down the names of the 
 local representatives and Labour men who voted as 
 Redmond would have advised on that first crucial division. 
 
 They were : W. Broderick, Youghal Urban Council ; 
 J. J. Coen, Westmcath County Council ; D. Condren, 
 Wicldow County Council ; J. Dooly, Kings County 
 County Council ; Captain Doran, Louth County Council ; 
 T. Fallon, Leitrim County Council ; J. Fitzgibbon, Ros- 
 common County Council ; Captain Gwynn, Irish Party ; 
 T. Halligan, Meath County Council ; W. Kavanagh, 
 Carlow County Council ; J. McCarron, Labour ; M. 
 McDonogh, Galway Urban Council ; J. McDonnell, Galway 
 County Council ; C. McKay, Labour ; J. Murphy, Labour ; 
 J. O'Dowd, Sligo County Council ; C. P. O'Neill, Pem- 
 broke Urban Council ; Dr. O'Sullivan, Mayor of Water- 
 ford ; T. Power, Waterford County Council ; Sir S. B. 
 Quin, Mayor of Limerick ; D. Reilly, Cavan County 
 Council ; M. Slattery, Tipperary (S. Riding) ; H. T. 
 Whitley, Labour. ^ 
 
 In so far as we were led by anyone, Mr. Clancy, ful- 
 filling in public what he had privately spoken, was our 
 leader and spokesman. 
 
 We were along with the Southern Unionists and our 
 natural allies. Lords Granard and MacDonnell and Sir 
 Bertram Windle. Archbishop Bernard and Dr. Mahaffy 
 voted with us in that pinch, so that both the late Provost 
 of Trinity and the jDresent one did their part to secure 
 an agreement. 
 
 In the other list, the Archbishop of Armagh and the 
 
 ^ The following, though Tinavoidably absent at the critical 
 moment, joined with us : M. K. Barry, Cork County Council ; 
 J. Butler, Kilkeimy County Council ; Patrick Dempsey, Belfast ; 
 M. Governey, Carlow Urban Council ; M. J. Minch, Kildare County 
 Coimoil, 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 333 
 
 Moderator were grouped with the Archbishop of Cashel 
 and the Bishops of Raphoe and Down and Connor ; 
 the Lord Mayor of Cork and Lord Mayor of Belfast were 
 together ; Mr. Devlin was with Mr. Barrie. This list 
 represented no unity except a common refusal to agree 
 to any compromise. Those who voted in it followed 
 one or other of two trains of cogent reasoning ; but 
 the reasonings led to opposite conclusions. These men 
 were beyond doubt as honest in their convictions as 
 those who went the other way ; but they took the easier 
 course, whether they were Nationalist or Unionist : 
 they swam with the tide. 
 
 The troubles which Nationalists brought on themselves 
 by supporting Lord Midleton were answered by the 
 troubles which his group met for supporting Nationalist 
 demands. The men who refused to make the compromise 
 possible have the laugh of us. Neither section of us who 
 voted for agreement achieved anything by facing the risk 
 of unpopularity. We had followed Redmond's policy and 
 we shared Redmond's fate. We had done our best to 
 help the British Government and that Government itself 
 defeated us. 
 
 By the Prime Minister's letter Government was pledged 
 to legislate for the better government of Ireland, not 
 upon condition of our reaching substantial agreement, 
 but in any event. Yet the letter emphasized the " urgent 
 importance of getting a settlement in and through the 
 Convention." We had secured a report for a scheme 
 in which sixty-six out of eighty-seven concurred in the 
 broad lines ; and of the twenty-one dissentients, nineteen 
 were a group sent to the assembly with a pledge which 
 they construed as giving them a special position, in that 
 no legislation afifecting them was to be passed without 
 their concurrence. The agreement which we had reached 
 enabled the Government, when it undertook legislation, 
 to quote Unionist authority on the one hand and National- 
 ist authority on the other for many wise provisions which 
 
334 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 otherwise a Coalition Ministry might have found it most 
 difficult to propose. 
 
 But no legislation followed. Once more an Irish issue 
 became involved in the wheels of the English political 
 machine. 
 
 We have ourselves in part to thank for it. We might 
 in January have taken Redmond's advice, and Lord 
 Midleton's declared view that legislation would follow 
 might have proved correct. Yet, what use are might- 
 have-beens ? History is concerned with what happened, 
 and our w'ork in the Convention dragged itself on till 
 the great German offensive had been launched and the 
 Allied line pushed back to the very gates of Paris, and 
 Government was at its wits' end for men. It is hard to 
 blame a Ministry for what harm was done in the frantic 
 rush to cope with perhaps the most critical instant in all 
 history ; but what was done produced infinite mischief 
 and no good result. Immediately after the Convention's 
 report (signed upon April 8th) had been received. Govern- 
 ment proposed to apply conscription to Ireland. 
 
 It is said, and it is not difficult to believe, that without 
 making this proposal they dare not have come upon the 
 British people with so extreme demands for compulsory 
 service as were made. But by making it Ministers tore 
 up and scattered in fragments whatever results the Con- 
 vention had to show for its labours, and by legislating 
 for conscription in Ireland they gained not one man. 
 The proposal, as Redmond had always told them, proved 
 impossible to carry out. 
 
 I do not believe that if Redmond had lived this would 
 ever have happened. His record in the war gave him 
 an authority in Parliament which no other Irishman 
 could possibly claim. It would have been impossible 
 for Mr. Lloyd George to take such a step without giving 
 him notice ; and once that notice came, Redmond could 
 have insisted upon the significance of the report of the 
 Convention's sub-committee on questions of defence. 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 335 
 
 This committee consisted of two civilians and three 
 soldiers. Lord Desart, a Unionist, was in the chair ; 
 Mr. Powell, K.C., a Unionist (afterwards Irish Solicitor- 
 General and now a judge), was the other civilian ; the 
 soldiers were the Duke of Abercorn, an Ulster Covenanter, 
 with Captain Doran and myself, Nationalists from the 
 Sixteenth Division. We found unanimously that if an 
 Irish Parliament existed, whatever might be the claims 
 of the Imperial authority, it would be impracticable to 
 impose conscription without the Irish Parliament's consent. 
 This unanimous finding was bound to influence the view 
 of any Ministry, no matter how hard pressed. But, as 
 debate revealed, Mr. Lloyd George had never heard of it. 
 
 I believe that Redmond could have persuaded Mr. 
 Lloyd George to adopt in Ax)ril the course on which — 
 but after the harm was done — he fell back in June, when 
 Lord French asked for a large, but limited, number of 
 recruits to refill the Irish Divisions within a specified 
 time — at the end of which time, failing the production 
 of the volunteers, other measures must be taken. Here, 
 however, we are back in the region of speculation. Con- 
 scription was proposed and anarchy let loose in Ireland. 
 Redmond's words, " Better for us never to have met 
 than to have met and failed," stand as the final sentence 
 on this notable episode in Irish history. 
 
 That is the Convention's epitaph as, I think, he would 
 have written it. How shall we write his own ? 
 
 No attempt has been made in this book, and none shall 
 be made, to represent him as a hero. But there are 
 certain attributes which malice itself can scarcely deny 
 him. All his ideals were generous. His love of country, 
 the master-motive in his life, had nothing in it exclusive 
 or tribal or partisan. His was a policy forward-looking 
 and constructive ; without narrowness or jealousy, it 
 aimed to bring the destinies of Ireland into the hands 
 of Irishmen, not greatly caring what Irishmen they were 
 — indeed, if they were in a real measure responsible to 
 
336 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Ireland, not caring at all. In tliis spirit lie grasped 
 masterfully at the chance which the war offered ; in 
 this spirit, he went out to meet his fellow-countrymen 
 in the Irish Convention. 
 
 And not only towards his countrymen was he mag- 
 nanimous. His love of Ireland was free from all attendant 
 hates. His resentment was never on private grounds, 
 and it was without rancour. He spent his whole life in 
 opposition, and was not embittered ; his mind remained 
 constructive after thirty years spent in criticism. His 
 experience of political life and of English Ministers had 
 rid him of any credulous faith in mankind ; yet his 
 instinct was always to perceive the best in men. The 
 friend who knew him best in Convention, and who had 
 seen him in his darkest hours then and long ago, said 
 this of him : " He was always an optimist." The speaker 
 did not mean — he could not have meant — that in those 
 last months Redmond was sanguine. He meant, I 
 think, that he had faith ; that in a country where sus- 
 picion is the prevailing disease, he credited men with 
 honest motives and with his own love of Ireland. 
 
 If he went wrong at any time, he went wrong by too 
 generous a judgment of other men, too open-handed a 
 policy. Perhaps, too, he may have erred — it was his 
 characteristic defect — in not pressing his policy upon 
 others with more vehemence. He had not the tempera- 
 ment which, when once possessed with an idea, rests 
 neither night nor day in pursuit of it and spares neither 
 others' labour nor its own to carry the conception into 
 effect. There was an element of inertia in his nature, 
 and of the ordinary self-seeking motives which impel 
 men not a trace. Ambition he had none — none, at all 
 events, in the last ten or fifteen years, during which I 
 have known him. As for vanity, I never saw a man so 
 entirely devoid of it. His modesty amounted to a defect, 
 in that he always underestimated his personal influence. 
 A man less single-minded, vainer, more ambitious of 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 337 
 
 success, might with the same gifts have achieved more 
 for Ireland in thrusting towards a personal triumph. 
 A man with more love for the homage of crowds might 
 have kept himself in closer touch with the mass of his 
 following. 
 
 The way of life to which he was committed was in 
 its essence distasteful to him. I do not believe that 
 history shows an example of a statesman who served 
 his country more absolutely from a sense of duty. 
 
 All this might be admitted without conceding great- 
 ness to him. But he was a great man, unlike others, 
 cast in a mould of his own. Without the least affecta- 
 tion of unconventionality, and indeed under a formal 
 appearance, he was profoundly unconventional. His 
 tastes, whether in literature, in art, in the choice of 
 society, in the choice of his way of life, were utterly his 
 own, unaffected by any standard but that which he 
 himself established. Without subtlety of interpretation, 
 his judgments cut deep into the heart of things. You 
 could not hear him speak, could not be in his presence, 
 without feeling the weight of his personality. 
 
 A statesman, if ever there was one, he was never given 
 the opportunity of proving himself in administration ; 
 he can be judged only by his gifts in counsel and by his 
 power of guiding action. As a counsellor, he was supreme. 
 He had that faculty for anticipating the future, that 
 broad, far-reaching vision of the chain of events which 
 can proceed only from long, deep and constant thought, 
 and which is truly admirable when united, as it was in 
 him, to a sovereign contempt for this or that momentary 
 outcry. In these qualities of insight and foresight I 
 have only seen one man approach him, the late Sir Henry 
 Campbell-Bannerman, to whose credit stands the greatest 
 work of Imperial reconciliation accomplished in our day. 
 But Redmond had supremely what the wise old Scotsman 
 lacked — the gift of persuasive speech, to win acceptance 
 for his wisdom and his vision. 
 
 23 
 
338 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 He could persuade, but he could not compel. His was 
 not the magnetism which constrains allegiance almost 
 in despite of reason — the power which was possessed by 
 his first and only leader, Parnell. Redmond's appeal 
 was to men's judgment and convictions, not to those 
 instincts which lie deepest and are most potent in the 
 heart of man. That was the limitation to his greatness. 
 He could lead only by convincing men that he was right. 
 
 If in the end it is true he failed to convince his country- 
 men and failed to carry them with him, this book has 
 told what difficulties were set in his way, not so much 
 by those who desired a different end than his, but by 
 those who desired the same end. Yet admit that he 
 failed and that he fell from power. No man holds power 
 for ever, and during seventeen continuous years he held 
 the leadership among hia own people with far more 
 than all the personal ascendancy of a Prime Minister in 
 one of the oversea Dominions ; and he held it without any 
 of the binding force which control of administration and 
 patronage bestows. He left his people improved in 
 their material circumstances to an almost incredible 
 degree, as compared with their state when he began 
 his work. 
 
 Yet Ireland counts his life a failure, and he most 
 assuredly accepted that view ; for he died heartbroken, 
 not for his own sake but for Ireland's, because he had 
 not won through to the goal. His action upon the war 
 was his life's supreme action ; he felt this, and knew 
 that it had failed to achieve its end. By that action 
 let us judge him, for all else is trivial in comparison 
 beside it. 
 
 It is said by his critics that he bargained badly. If 
 reply were made that he believed the Allied cause to 
 be right and desired to lead his country according to 
 his conception of justice, we should be answered that 
 he was in charge of his country's interests, not of her 
 morals ; and he would have admitted an element of 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 339 
 
 truth in this. Yet, as in the Boer War he had led his 
 countrymen to support what he conceived to be the 
 right cause, even with certain injury to their own, so 
 now assuredly he would not have acted as he did, had 
 he not been convinced that Ireland's honour was to 
 be served as well as her advantage. 
 
 But when there is talk of bargaining, it is well to con- 
 sider what he had to bargain with. No one in August 
 1914 anticipated the course of the war. No one foresaw 
 the need for the last man available. It was more than 
 a year before Great Britain could even equip the men 
 who pressed themselves forward for service. All that 
 he really had in his hand to give or to withhold was the 
 value of Ireland's moral support. Could he by waiting 
 his time have made a better bargain ? 
 
 When that critical hour came, Redmond knew in his 
 bones the weight of Ireland's history ; he knew all the 
 propensities which would instantly tend to assert them- 
 selves, unless their play was checked by a strong counter- 
 emotion. He knew that if Ireland said nothing and did 
 nothing at the crisis, things would be said of Ireland 
 which would rapidly engender rising passion ; and with 
 the growth of that passion all possibility, not of bargain- 
 ing but of controlling the situation between the two 
 countries would be gone. In plain language, if he had 
 not acted at once, his only chance for action would have 
 been in heading an Ireland hostile to England. In this 
 war, with the issue defined as it was from the outset, 
 he could only have done this by denying all that he 
 believed. But apart from his judgment of the merits, 
 there was his purpose of unity to be served. Ulster was 
 the difficulty ; all other obstacles were disposed of. How 
 could he hope for an Ulster united to Ireland, if Ulster 
 were divided from Ireland on the war ? 
 
 Everything depended on an instant and almost desper- 
 ate move. He might have left the sole offer of service 
 from Ireland to lie with Sir Edward Carson. What he 
 
840 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 did actually was to offer instantly all that the Ulstermen 
 had offered, and more, for he proposed active union in 
 Ireland itself. It was a bold stroke, but it was guided 
 by an ideal perpetually present with him — the essential 
 unity of Ireland. To set Irishmen working together at 
 such a crisis in the common name of Ireland Avas an 
 object for which he was willing to jeopardize the whole 
 organization which stood behind him, at a moment when 
 he could speak of full right for three-fourths of his 
 countrymen. And, when he is called a failure, let it 
 be remembered that in this he did not fail. 
 
 This fight is not yet ended, the long battle is not lost. 
 Had Ireland from the first stood aloof, had she been 
 drawn at the wear's opening into the temper which she 
 displayed in its closing stages, then indeed we might 
 despair of any hopeful issue, any genuine peace between 
 these two neighbouring islands, and, what matters in- 
 finitely more, between the strong yet divergent strains 
 that make up Ireland itself. 
 
 But as the mists of passion clear and deeds rather 
 than words come into sharp light, it will be seen and 
 realized that for a thousand Irishmen who risked their 
 lives to defeat Redmond's effort there were fifty thousand 
 who at his summons took on themselves far greater 
 hardships and faced dangers far more terrible. By 
 them we take our stand — we who followed Redmond, 
 who believed and still believe in his wisdom. We wish 
 no word of his last years unspoken, no act undone by 
 that great and generous-hearted Irishman in the supreme 
 period of his life. In his defeat and ours, we accept no 
 defeat ; we shall endeavour to keep our will set, as his 
 was, for a final triumph which can mean humiliation 
 for no Irish heart. Tangled as are the threads of all 
 his policy, he leaves the task far nearer to accomplish- 
 ment than he found it ; and if in the end freedom and 
 prosperity come to a united Ireland, they will be found 
 to proceed — however deeply overlaid by years and by 
 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 341 
 
 events may be the chain of causation — from the action 
 which John Redmond took in August 1914, and upon 
 which his brother, with a legion like him, set the seal 
 of his blood. 
 
 To have served long and faithfully without reward — 
 to have given all of life to one high purpose — to have 
 faced a great crisis greatly — these are claims enough 
 for Redmond that the allegiance of his comrades and 
 followers may be justified when it is judged. The grave 
 has closed over him, and the rest is for us to do, that 
 a coping-stone may be set on his life's labours, and that 
 reparation final and conclusive, for what he suffered 
 undeservedly, may yet be offered to the dead. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Agar-Robartes, Mr., 68-9 
 Ancient Order of Hibernians, 259 
 Arniy — 
 
 Irish Brigades raised for the 
 War- 
 Sixteenth Division, staffing 
 of, 174, 187-8 ; develop- 
 ment of opinions in, 188 ; 
 10th Division made up 
 from, 1 94-5 ; proceeds to 
 France, 200-1 ; in action, 
 230, 241 ; Messines, 264-5 ; 
 Ypres, 306 
 Tenth Division, 195 
 Tyneside Battalions, 190 
 Ulster Division, 201 ; on 
 the Somme, 240 ; Mes- 
 sines, 264-5 ; Ypres, 306 
 Irish Nationalist attitude to, 
 
 140-1 
 Irish recruiting — Redmond's 
 efforts, 154-5, 158, 170-9, 
 185, 191-2, 199, 202, 207, 
 211 ; efforts handicapped 
 by Government, 163, 
 175-6, 177, 190-1, 206; 
 letter to Birrell, 160 ; 
 Sinn Fein propaganda 
 against, 219 
 Irish Regulars* achievements, 
 150; in Gallipoli, 195 ff. 
 Ulster sympathies of, 83, 99, 
 104 ff. ; the Curragh in- 
 cident, 105-9 
 Ashe, Thomas, 300-2 
 Asquith, H. H., struggle of, 
 with House of Lords, 
 43-6, 50 ; on indivisi- 
 bility of Ireland, 69, 72 ; 
 
 Ladybank speech, (Oct., 
 1913), 85 ; War Minister, 
 109 ; response to Red- 
 mond's National Defence 
 offer, 138, 143; on Ulster 
 preparations for resisting 
 Home Rule, 148 ; fails 
 Redmond, 153, 167 ; re- 
 cruiting speech in Dublin, 
 155-7 ; the Coalition, 
 192 ; Redmond's letter 
 to, against conscription, 
 208-9 ; the Rebellion, 
 226 ; reports on his visit 
 to Ireland, 232 ; breaks 
 faith with Redmond, 
 239-40 ; displaced, 244 ; 
 estimate of, 87, 93 ; men- 
 tioned, 30, 34, 41, 73, 138, 
 139 
 Aughavanagh, 37-9, 267 
 
 Balfour, A. J., 55-6 
 
 Balfour, G., 23 
 
 Barrie, Mr., 271, 304, 308, 321 
 
 Beatty, Admiral, 158 
 
 Bernard, Dr., Abp. of Dublin, 
 272, 310, 318; three 
 points of, 291 ff. 
 
 Biggar, Joseph, 6 
 
 Birrell, A., Redmond's letter to, 
 on the Volunteers, 160 ; 
 on Kitchener's attitude 
 to Irish National Volun- 
 teers, 162 ; Appreciation 
 of Redmond quoted, 162, 
 194 ; the Rebellion, 
 219-20 ; mentioned, 31, 
 69, 139, 198 
 
 3ii 
 
344 
 
 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Blake, E., 24 
 Brade, Sir R., 203 
 Budget of 1909-10, 42, 47 
 Butler, Sir W., 5 
 Butt, Isaac, 6 
 
 Campbell, Sir James, 219 
 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., 
 
 34, 337 
 Carson, Sir E., the Covenant 
 demonstrations, 72 ; 
 moves exclusion of Ulster, 
 75 ; on Ulster and the 
 Army, 105 ; on possibility 
 of persuading Ulster, 114; 
 the Speaker's Conference, 
 121 ; attitude to Home 
 Rule enactment, 148-9 ; 
 joins the Coalition, 192-3 ; 
 interpretation of exclu- 
 sion proposals, 234 ; re- 
 fuses joint platform at 
 Newry, 200 ; kills Volun- 
 teer Bill, 208 ; on con- 
 scription for Ii'eland, 210, 
 211 ; final victory against 
 Redmond, 240 ; tempera- 
 mental attitude to Home 
 Rule, 96-7 ; quoted, 67, 
 71, 80-1, 83, 100; appeal 
 on Ulster's claim, 97-8 ; 
 mentioned, 89, 229, 260, 
 263 
 
 Casement, Sir Roger, 116, 221, 
 223; qvioted, 115, 118 
 
 Castletown, Lord, 24 
 
 Cecil, Lord Hugh, 50 
 
 Cecil, Lord Robert, 115 
 
 Chamberlain, Austen, 102 
 
 Churchill, Winston, Belfast 
 speech of (1912), 62, 67 ; 
 devolution proposal, 71 ; 
 Bradford speech (1914), 
 103-4 ; the Larne gim- 
 running, 113 ; mentioned, 
 77, 84 
 
 Citizen Army, the, 180, 183 ; 
 the Rebellion, 218 
 
 Clark, Sir George, 271-2 
 Clarke, — , execution of, 224 
 Clancy, J. J., 269, 318, 332 
 Coalition formed, 192-3 
 Coercion, 8-9, 16, 82 
 Colthvu-st, Capt., 228, 231 
 Commons, House of, Parnell's 
 obstruction in, 6 ff. ; pay- 
 ment of members, 52 ; 
 scene after passing Home 
 Rule Bill, 152; disgust 
 of, at Redmond's defeat, 
 240 ; Redmond's esti- 
 mate of, 12 ; his famili- 
 arity with. 111 
 Congested Districts Board, 28 
 Connolly, James, 183 ; the Re- 
 bellion, 218, 224 
 Conscription, Redmond's oppo- 
 sition to, 208 f¥., 242, 
 247-8 ; application of, to 
 Ireland, 334 
 Convention, see Irish Convention 
 Craig, Capt., 51, 70, 105 ; quoted, 
 
 95 
 Crooks, Will, 152 
 Crozier, Dr., Abp. of Armagh, 
 198, 272, 279, 300, 302, 
 310, 330 
 Curragh incident, 105-9 
 Ciirzon, Col., 187 
 
 Dalton, Miss (Mrs. John Red- 
 mond), 14, 20 
 
 Davitt, Michael, 8, 19 
 
 Davitt (young), 116 
 
 de Robeck, Admiral, despatch 
 of, 195-6 
 
 de Valera, E., 268, 269 
 
 Desart, Lord, 273, 318 
 
 Devlin, J., in Redmond's " inner 
 cabinet," 25, 36 ; his 
 supporters' disappoint- 
 ment on compromise, 109 ; 
 recruiting successes of, 
 177, 179 ; indispensable 
 in Ireland, 183 ; carries 
 Belfast Convention for 
 
INDEX 
 
 345 
 
 Devlin, J. {continued) — 
 
 exclusion proposals, 235 ; 
 on the Irish Convention, 
 269, 304, 310, 322 ; esti- 
 mate of, 21 ; Redmond's 
 estimate of, 235 ; men- 
 tioned, 48, 84, 155, 263 
 Devolution, 28, 71 
 Dillon, John, relations with Red- 
 mond, 25, 36 ; on coer- 
 cion, 82 ; an Irish Volun- 
 teer movement, 115 ; 
 speech on suppression of 
 the Rebellion, 231 ; de- 
 clines to serve on the 
 Irish Convention, 269 ; 
 mentioned, 16, 100, 109, 
 121, 129, 155 
 Doran, Capt., 274-5 
 Doyle, Sir A. Conan, cited, 131-2 
 Dublin strike (1913), 90, 273 
 Duke, Sir. H. E., 240, 275 
 Dunraven, Lord, 27, 28, 77 ; on 
 the Convedtion, 273, 282, 
 317-lS, 330 
 
 Ewart, Sir S., 108 
 
 Field, William, 24 
 
 Financial Relations Conxmission, 
 
 24, 75 
 Fingall, Lord, 174 
 Forster, W. E., 79 
 Franchise Bill (1917), 302, 304-5, 
 
 311 
 French, Sir John, 107, 108 
 Friend, General, 198 
 
 Gallipoli, Irish troops in, 195 ff. 
 General Elections — 
 1906, 43 
 
 1910 (Jan.), 43-4 
 1910 (Dec), 49 
 1918, 231 
 George V, King, 121 
 George, D. Lloyd, non -Irish pre- 
 occupations of, 41-2 ; Con- 
 ciliation mission after the 
 Rebellion, 232 ; a^ee- 
 
 George, D. Lloyd (continued) — 
 ment with the Irish, 234 ; 
 agreement thrown over, 
 239 ; Redmond's hopes 
 from, as Premier, 244-5 ; 
 on Irish distrust, 246 ; 
 supports the " two na- 
 tions " theory, 255; the 
 Convention, 260 ; letter 
 to Plunkett, 324 ; con- 
 ference with Convention 
 representatives, 325 ; pro- 
 posals to the Convention, 
 326 ff. ; quoted on Ulster, 
 73 
 
 Gladstone, W.E., 11, 17, 42, 130, 
 317; breach with Parnell, 
 18-19 ; retirement, 23 
 
 Gladstone, W. G. C, 66 
 
 Gough, Gen., quoted, 105 ff. 
 
 Government, delays of, 185, 
 236-7, 244, 247 ; general 
 attitude to Redmond, see 
 under Redmond 
 
 Granard, Lord, 273, 282 
 
 Grey, Earl, 78 
 
 Grey, Lord (Sir Edward), Ulster 
 proposals of, 85, 86 ; 
 speech on oiitbreak of 
 War, 128-30 ; quoted, 
 66 ; mentioned, 30, 108 
 
 Harbison, Mr., 270 
 
 Harty, Abp. of Cashel, 270 
 
 Hayden, Mr., 38, 130-1 
 
 Hazleton, Mr,, 14 
 
 Healy, T. M., retiu-ned for Wex- 
 ford, 7-8 ; attacks on 
 Redmond and Nationalist 
 Party, 34, 273 ; opposi- 
 tion to county option, 
 100, 111-12; declines to 
 serve on Convention, 269 ; 
 quoted, 256 ; mentioned, 
 15, 16, 47, 49 
 
 Hickie, Maj.-Gen. W. B., 201, 265 
 
 Hills, Maj.-Gen., 268 
 
 Hobson, Biilmer, quote-d, 115, 159 
 
346 
 
 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Home Rule Bill (1912), demon- 
 strations for and against, 
 62 ; National Convention, 
 
 65, 66 ; Ulster's attitude, 
 
 66, 67 £f. ; exclusion pro- 
 posals, 68, 78, 84, 99 ; 
 devolution proposals, 71 ; 
 Unionist converts, 73 ; in 
 Committee, 68, 74 ; finan- 
 cial arrangements under, 
 74-5 ; Report stage, 75 ; 
 Third Reading, 77 ; in 
 the Lords, 77 ff. ; tliird 
 Introduction (1914), 99; 
 inadequate private dis- 
 cussion of, by Irish Party, 
 100-1 ; the Amending 
 Bill, 121, 126; the 
 Speaker's Conference, 
 121 ff. ; amending Bill 
 postponed, 126 ; opera- 
 tion of, to be deferred, 
 148-9 ; Royal assent, 
 151 ; Asquith's move to- 
 wards securing immediate 
 operation of, after the 
 Rebellion, 232 ; O'Con- 
 nor's demand for, 249 
 
 Hopwood, Sir Francis, 275 
 
 Industrial depression in Ireland 
 
 under the War, 184 
 Irish at the Front, The, quoted, 
 
 201 
 Irish Brigades, see under Army 
 Irish Convention — 
 
 Committee of Nine, 304, 307, 
 
 310 
 Financial considerations, 285, 
 286, 293-5, 307, 309 ; 
 Lord Midleton's proposals, 
 312-23; Lloyd George's 
 proposals, 326-32 
 First meeting of, 271 
 Fraternization between repre- 
 sentatives, 286-7 
 Grand Committee of Twenty, 
 301, 303, 307, 311 
 
 Irish Convention {continued) — 
 Inception of, 258, 260 
 Intermediate Authority pro- 
 posal, 285-6 
 Land Purchase Sub -Commit- 
 tee, 304, 317 
 Personnel of, 271 ff. 
 Preliminaries, 269 
 Procedure adopted, 280 
 Reports presented by, 330 
 Sinn Fein attitude to, 263-4, 
 
 267-8 
 Spirit of, 279-80 
 Ulster representatives, atti- 
 tude of, 321 ; attitude to 
 Redmond, 323 ; Report 
 presented by, 330 
 Irish Council Bill (1907), 31 ff., 
 
 78 
 Irish Independent, 273, 330 
 Irish Party, discipline of, 12-13 ; 
 personnel of, 59 ; Red- 
 mond's relations with, 
 59-61 
 Irish relations with Eng- 
 land most cordial (1916), 
 213 
 Irish suspicion, 189-90 
 Irish Volunteers, Redmond's 
 policy repudiated by, 
 155-6 ; collisions with 
 National Volunteers, 180 ; 
 Rebellion of 1916, 218 ff. 
 {See also National Volun- 
 teers) 
 
 Jameson, Andrew, 271, 298 
 Judge, M. J., cited, 132 
 
 Kavanagh, W. M., 274, 318 
 Kelley, Dr., Bp. of Ross, 270, 
 
 293, 310, 323 
 Kenny, Dr., 38 
 Ker, S. P., quoted, 202 
 Kettle, Prof., T. M., 14, 93 
 
 recruiting work of, 186 
 
 killed in action, 241 
 
 estimate of, 185 
 
INDEX 
 
 347 
 
 Kitchener, Earl, attitude of, to 
 Irish Vokmteers, 138-40, 
 153, 160, 162, 175, 181 ; 
 Redmond's interview 
 with, on recrvTiting, 198-9, 
 205 ; letter on Irish recruit- 
 ing, 199 ; estimate of, 138 
 
 Knight, Mr., 294-5 
 
 Labour Party, 44, 87, 108 
 
 Land Act (1909), 41 
 
 Land League, 8 
 
 Land Purchase, 17, 27-8 
 
 Lang, Dr., Abp. of York, on 
 Ulster, 78-80 
 
 Lansdowne, Marquis of, 29, 236, 
 238 
 
 Larkin, James, 90, 183, 273 
 
 Larne Gun-rimning, 112-14 
 
 Law, A. Bonar, speeches of, on 
 Ulster, 65, 70; Ulster 
 pohcy, 77, 83, 87, 99, 
 163 ; protest against 
 enactment of Home Rule, 
 149 ; quoted on Major 
 Willie Redmond, 245 ; 
 estimate of, 55 ; men- 
 tioned, 132, 178 
 
 Liberal Party, 13, 29 
 
 Lincolnshire, Marquis of. Volun- 
 teer Bill of, 205. 208 
 
 Liquor trade in Ireland, 42 
 
 Local Government Act (1897), 24 
 
 Long, W., quoted, 216 
 
 Longford Election, 257, 259 
 
 Lonsdale, Sir John, 263 
 
 Lords, House of. Veto contro- 
 versy, 42 ff., 50, 52, 57 ; 
 Conference, 48 
 
 Loreburn, Lord, 84 
 
 Lynch, Arthur, 129 
 
 Lysaght, Edward, 273, 282, 296, 
 301-2 
 
 McCarthy, Jxistin, 13 ; quoted, 
 
 26 
 McCullagh, Sir C, 294 
 MacDermott, Dr., 272 
 
 MacDonagh, 201 ; the Rebellion, 
 218, 224 
 
 MacDonnell, Sir Anthony, devo- 
 lution scheme of, 28-9 ; 
 supports Home Rule Bill, 
 78 ; in the Convention, 
 273, 282, 310, 317 
 
 McDowell, Sir Alexander, 272, 
 303-4, 307-8 
 
 MacNeill, Prof., promotes Na- 
 tionalist arming, 93 ; vol- 
 unteer following of, 180; 
 the Rebellion, 219 ; cited, 
 164, 180-1 ; mentioned, 
 64, 116 
 
 jMacRory, Dr., Bp. of Down and 
 Connor, 270 
 
 MacSweeney, Capt., 153 
 
 Mahaffy, Dr., Provost of Trinity, 
 272, 330 
 
 Maxwell, Sir John, 225-6 
 
 Meath, Lord, 158, 169 
 
 Midleton, Lord, 271, 273, 285, 
 296, 304, 308 ; Customs 
 proposals, 310 ff. 
 
 Mooney, J. J., 21, 38 
 
 Moore, Lt.-Col. M., 159-60, 203 
 
 Murphy, W. M., 273, 282, 295, 
 304, 315, 317 
 
 Nathan, Sir M., 220 
 
 National Volunteers, establish- 
 ment of, 91-2, 94-5, 99 ; 
 Redmond's adhesion to, 
 114; foniiidable charac- 
 ter of, 114-15; com- 
 mittee difficiilties, 111 fi. ; 
 Bachelor's Walk affair, 
 123-5; Redmond's offer 
 of, for National Defence, 
 134 ff., 203 ff.; general 
 response, 136-8 ; demand 
 for recognition, 153, 
 159-61, 202-3 ; refused, 
 153, 162, 167, 181, 203, 
 207-8, 222 ; secession of 
 Irish Volunteers from, 
 155 ; Asquith's pledge 
 
348 JOHH REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 National Vokmteers(confmwe(?) — 
 regarding, 157 ; Review 
 of, in Phoenix Park, 204 ; 
 Bulmer Hobson's History 
 of, quoted, 115, 159 
 
 O'Brien, Patrick, 38, 267 
 O'Brien, William, attacks by, 
 on Redmond and Na- 
 tional Party, 34 ; opposi- 
 tion to Budget (1 GOO). 42, 
 47 ; to Home Rule Bill 
 (1912), 74; to county 
 option, 100, 111-12; to 
 the Convention, 263 ; de- 
 clines to serve, 269 
 O'Cathasaigh, Mr., cited, 01 
 O'Connor, " Long John," 3S 
 O'Connor, T. P., Canadian tour 
 1910, 48 ; recruiting suc- 
 cesses of, 190 ; motion for 
 immediate Home Rule, 
 249 ; cited, 203 ; men- 
 tioned, 25, 100, 130-1 
 O'Donnell, Dr., Bp. of Raphoe, 
 270, 284, 294, 303, 304, 
 308, 310, 312, 330 ; speech 
 on Papal Decrees, 299-300 
 Orann:iore, Lord, 313, 319 
 
 Paget, Gen. Sir Arthur, 105 f¥. 
 Parliament, see Commons and 
 
 Lords 
 
 Parnell, C. S., 6-13, 17-19, 92 ; 
 
 property of, 7, 37 ; power 
 
 of, 58 ; anecdote of 
 
 Willie Redmond and 
 
 House of Commons, 249 
 
 Parnellites, 19-21, 23-25 ; fusion 
 
 of, withanti-Parnellites, 25 
 
 Parsons, Lt.-Gen. Sir L., 170 ff., 
 
 200-1, 204-5 
 Pearse, Patrick, speech of, in 
 Dublin, 63-4 ; Limerick 
 speech, quoted, 94 ; se- 
 cedes from National Vol- 
 unteers, 118 ; the Rebel- 
 lion, 218, 222-3 ; execu- 
 tion, 224 
 
 Phoenix Park murders, 14 
 
 Pigott, 18 
 
 Pii-rie, Lord, 293 
 
 Plunket, Count, 248 
 
 Plunkett, Lord (Sir Horace), 
 Conference scheme of 
 (1895), 23; the Conven- 
 tion, 274, 302, 309 ; as 
 Chairman, 279 ; Lloyd 
 George's letter to, 324 
 
 Poe, Col. Sir Hutcheson, 145 
 
 Pollock, Mr., 272, 299, 308 
 
 Primate, the, see Crozier 
 
 Primrose, Neil, 68-9 
 
 Primrose Committee, 270, 293-4 
 
 Protestant Ascendency, 86, 96, 
 101 
 
 Raymond Le Gros, 2-3 
 Rebellion, Redmond's attitude 
 
 to, 3 
 Rebellion of 1916, 218-19, 221, 
 227 ; denounced by Red- 
 mond, 223-4 ; siippres- 
 sion of, 224-9 ; Govern- 
 ment's fomentation of dis- 
 affection, 227-9 ; com- 
 parison with South Afri- 
 can Rebellion (1914), 
 225 
 Recruiting, see under Army 
 Redmond, John Edward, 4 
 Redmond, John — 
 
 Ancestry and family of, 2-4 
 Career — education, 5 ; clerk- 
 ship in the House, 6 ; 
 returned for New Rose, 
 8 ; Parliamentary debut, 
 9-11 ; Australian and 
 American mission, 14 ; 
 marriage, 14 ; second 
 American mission, 17 ; 
 imprisoned (1888), 17 ; 
 chosen leader of Parnel- 
 lites, 19 ; returned for 
 Waterford, 19 ; attitude 
 to Roman Catholic 
 Church, 20 : widowed, 
 
INDEX 
 
 349 
 
 Redmond, John (continued) — 
 20 ; second marriage, 
 21-2; work with Plim- 
 kett, 23-4 ; on Com- 
 mission on Financial Rela- 
 tions, 24 ; Chairman of 
 United Irish Party, 25, 
 58 ; his inner cabinet, 25, 
 58, 100 ; attitude to 
 Irish Covincil Bill, 31-3 ; 
 campaign for Home Rule 
 (1907), 34-5; House of 
 Lords controversy, 45-6, 
 57 ; " Dollar Dictator," 
 48 ; the Nottingham 
 Meeting (1912), 73 ; Home 
 Rule campaign (1912) 
 following Carson, 84 ; on 
 proposed exclusion of 
 Ulster, 85-6 ; attitude to 
 National Volunteers, 92 ; 
 speeches on the Ulster 
 position, 98, 99, 102, 
 109-11 ; the Ulster gun- 
 running, 114 ; relations 
 with National Volunteers 
 thereafter, 114 ft'.; the 
 Speaker's Conference, 
 
 121-2 ; speech on out- 
 break of War, 132 ff. ; 
 offers the Volunteers for 
 national defence, 134 ff. ; 
 Recruiting manifesto ,151; 
 refuses office in Coalition 
 Government, 192 ; inter- 
 view with Kitchener on 
 recruiting, 198, 205 ; Con- 
 ference at Viceregal 
 Lodge, 198-9 ; visits 
 Irish troops at the Front 
 201-2 ; opposes Conscrip 
 tion for Ireland, 208 ff. 
 letter to Asquith, 208 
 Rebellion of 1916, 219 ff. 
 Govermnent breach of 
 faith, 238-40 ; moves vote 
 of censure, 243 ; criti- 
 cizes Lloyd George, 245 ; 
 
 Redmond, John (continued) — 
 
 renewed opposition to 
 conscription, 248 ; tho 
 Smuts dinner, 257 ; the 
 Convention, 258, 261-3 ; 
 death of his brother, 256 ; 
 death of Pat O'Brien, 
 267 ; in the Convention, 
 278-9 ; relations with 
 Nationalist representa- 
 tives, 283-4 ; speech in 
 Belfast, 289 ff. ; at West- 
 minster, 304 ; speech on 
 vote of thanks to the 
 Forces, 305-6 ; Meetings 
 of Committee of Nine, 
 307 ff. ; ill -health, 257, 
 282, 312, 322 ; attitude 
 to Lord Midleton's pro- 
 posals, 316, 318-21 ; 
 tables motion condition- 
 ally accepting, 321 ; with- 
 draws owing to Nation- 
 alist opposition, 322-3 ; 
 illness, 325 ; operation, 
 328 ; death, 329 
 
 Characteristics — 
 
 Ambition, lack of, 40, 336 
 Caution, 282 
 Com-tesy, 26, 35 
 Eloquence, 41, 88 
 Lucidity, 41, 53, 59 
 Moderation, 3, 11 
 Modesty, 36, 336 
 Optimism, 74 
 Peaceable temperament 
 and tolerance, 21, 25, 
 26, 35, 88 
 Rest, love of, 38 
 Reticence, 37 
 Romantic strain, 37 
 Self-abnegation, 278, 280 
 Sensitiveness, 243, 282 
 Tact, 88 
 Trustworthiness, 194 
 
 Comparison of, with Campbell- 
 Bannerman, 337 ; with 
 Parnell, 338 ; position 
 
360 
 
 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 
 
 Redmond, John (continued) — 
 
 Comparison (continued) — 
 
 compared with that of 
 Botha, 158, 172, 184, 212, 
 224 
 
 Estimate of, 335 ; Birrell's 
 estimate, 194 ; Healy's 
 tribute, 256 ; estiniate as 
 leader, 59-61, 283, 310, 
 338 ; estimate of his 
 work, 338-41 
 
 Government shghting of, and 
 disregard of his advice, 
 153, 163, 167, 175-6, 190- 
 1, 220, 226, 229, 238-9; 
 instances of bad faith, 153, 
 239-40, 246 ; recruiting 
 efforts handicapped, 163, 
 175-6, 177, 190-1, 206 
 
 House of Commons life of. 111 
 
 Imperialism of, 15 
 
 Irishmen, attitiide towards, 
 27, 63 
 
 MiUtary sympathies of, 107-8 
 
 Oratorical style of, 5 
 
 Recruiting efforts of, see under 
 Army 
 
 Status of, in Ireland, 171-2 
 
 Social isolation of, 13 
 
 Stephens'' attack on, 276-7 
 
 War policy of, 132, 216 
 Reimond, Major " Willie," 
 Australian missioii and 
 marriage, 14 ; impris- 
 oned (1888), 17 ; returned 
 for East Qare, 20; War 
 service, 182-3, 185, 
 213-14, 230 ; position in 
 his regiment, 188-9 ; 
 speeches in the House 
 quoted, 215-16, 245 ; ad- 
 vises resignation of Par- 
 liamentary party, 259 ; 
 last speech in the House, 
 249-54 ; killed in action, 
 61, 265 ; estimate of, 249 ; 
 mentioned, 4, 13, 19, 38, 
 118, 128 
 
 Redmond, Major William Archer, 
 4, 185 ; on the Somme, 
 240 ; wins D.S.O., 306 ; 
 returned as Nationalist 
 in 1918 election, 231 
 
 Redmond, William Archer, 4, 5, 
 7 
 
 Richardson, Gen., 163 
 
 Roberts, Lord, 176 
 
 Roman Catholic Church, 49, 187 
 
 Russell, George (" A.E."), in 
 the Convention, 274, 282, 
 304, 310, 312 
 
 Sclater, Sir Henry, 204-5 
 Selborne, Lord, 236 
 Seely, Col., 108-9 
 Sexton, Th., 16, 24 
 Shaw, Mr., 6 
 
 Sheehy-Skeffington, Mr., 228, 231 
 Sinn Fein — 
 
 Convention ignored by, 
 
 263-4, 267-8 
 Demonstration by, at funeral 
 
 of Thomas Ashe, 300 
 Electoral successes of, 231, 
 
 257, 268, 278 
 Growth of, from May 1916, 232 
 Propaganda, suspicion fostered 
 
 by, 189 
 Rebellion of 1916, see that 
 heading 
 Smith, F. E., quoted, 95 
 South African War, 24 
 Stephens, James, quoted, 276-7 
 
 Taylor, Capt., J. S., 27 
 Tennant, H. J., 198, 206 
 Thomas, J. H., 108 
 Times forgeries, 18 
 
 Ulster- 
 Administrative autonomy pro- 
 posal, 85, 86 
 Arms iinportation by, 81, 94 ; 
 Larne gun - running, 1 12-14 
 Asquith's moratorium conces- 
 sion to, 149 
 
INDEX 
 
 351 
 
 Ulster (continued) — 
 
 Belfast Convention (1916), 235 
 
 Churchill's speech (1912), 62 
 
 Convention, the (1917), repre- 
 sentatives at, 271-2, 285 ; 
 their attitude and pro- 
 cedure, 281, 299 
 
 County option proposals, 77, 
 85, 99 ff. ; difficulties of 
 the scheme, 101 
 
 Covenant, the, 72 ; military 
 covenanters, 83 
 
 Exclusion proposals, 68, 78, 
 84, 233-4 ; embodied in 
 the Bill, 99 ; time limit 
 discussions, 101-3 ; Coun- 
 cil of 1916 accepts exclu- 
 sion proposals, 235 
 
 Favouritisin applied to, 95, 
 120, 123, 125, 164, 169, 
 170, 174 
 
 Friendly relations with Na- 
 tionalists, 51 
 
 Home Rule, resistance to, 
 65, 67 ft. ; Parliamentary 
 majority for, 77 ; distri- 
 bution of Home Rulers, 101 
 
 Inseparability of, 69, 76-7, 84 
 
 Lloyd George's scheme, 234 
 
 Protestant ascendency, 86, 96, 
 101 
 
 Provisional G o v e r n na e n t 
 formed, 80, 83 
 
 Ulster (continued) — 
 
 Rebellion preparations of, 148 
 Redmond's efforts to concili- 
 ate, 76-7, 109-10, 114 
 War, attitude on outbreak of, 
 130 ; mistrustful of Irish 
 Volunteers, 142 
 United Irish League, 58, 259, 
 
 261 
 University Act (1908), 41 
 
 Vatican Decrees, 49 
 
 Wallace, Col., 299 
 
 Walsh, Abp., 267 
 
 War- 
 Outbreak, 126 ff. 
 Redmond's policy regarding, 
 132, 216 ; Nationalist 
 criticism of, 276-7 (see 
 also Army, reci-uiting) 
 Ulster's attitude, 130, 142 
 
 W^ard, Col. John, 108 
 
 Waterford, 19 
 
 Wexford, 3 
 
 What the Irish Regiments have 
 done quoted, 202 
 
 White, Capt., J. R., 90-1 
 
 Whitley, H. T., 320 
 
 Wicklow surroundings, 37-9 
 
 Wimborne, Lord, 198, 199, 205 
 
 Windle, Sir B., 282, 330 
 
 Wyndham, G., 27-9 
 
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