■ '.-r- i in- I /i- . -• . .* . r. ■- • Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries A https://archive.org/details/campaigninginphi00faus_0 OPPORTUNITY Master ot human destiny am I; Fame, love and fortune on my footsteps wait , Cities and fields I walk ; I penetrate Deserts and seas remote, and passing by Hovel, mart and palace, soon or late I knock unbidden once at every gate. If sleeping, wake ; if feasting, rise before I turn away. It is the hour of fate. And those who follow me reach every state Mortals desire, and conquer every foe. Save death ; but those who doubt or hesitate, Condemned to failure, penury and woe. Seek me in vain and uselessly implore — I answer not and I return no more. —fOHN /. INGALLS. CAMPAIGNING IN THE PHILIPPINES ILLUSTRATED BY KARL IRVING FAUST SAN FRANCISCO I HE HICKS-JUDD COMPANY PUBLISHERS ^<5 Copyright 1899 by THE HICKS-JUDD COMPANY vSan Francisco, Cal. O’NEILL LIBRAh* BOSTON COLLEGE U" NOV 1 6 1994 Preface. W HEN the idea of compiling an historical account of the operations of the American forces in the Philippine Islands was conceived, the war clouds had nearly all disappeared from the horizon, and all that remained were those caused by the prospect of trouble with the insurgents, which, however, were not supposed to be serious. It was expected that the volun- teer regiments would be speedily replaced by regulars, who would only be needed for policing the islands. It was intended, therefore, to give in this book an accurate description of the campaign, from Dewey’s great victory to the return of the volunteers, and, in addition, a brief description of the islands. It was also proposed to publish special editions of the book for each of the volunteer regiments, which would contain, in addition to the foregoing, a detailed account of the experience of the regiments from date of mustering into service as volunteers to their return to the United States. In order to obtain this information, it was found necessary to go to Manila, and consequently on December 24, 181)8, Mr. Kare Irving P'aust, to whom is due the credit of having conceived and carried into execution this work sailed from San Francisco on the steamer Gaelic, bound for Manila via Hongkong, with plans and prospectus for com- piling such a book. Arriving at Manila on February 2, 1899, it soon became apparent that the plans must be changed. Dark foreboding clouds were hanging over the city, and for more than a month there had been ominous rumors of an outbreak of hostilities Two days later the expected happened, and the real campaign of the Eighth Army Corps commenced in dead earnest. It at once became evident that there would be great deeds to be recorded on many fields, involving time and labor far exceeding that which had been anticipated and provided for. Mr. Faust at once set about organizing a competent staff of writers who would follow up the troops and be eye-witnesses to whatever happened. The data thus collected must be collated, condensed and arranged. Fortunately the volunteer regiments furnished abundant material for doing this most important work. The commanding officer of each regiment was visited with the object of securing his co- operation in compiling an accurate account of the operations of his regiment. A man was found in each of these regiments competent to write the story, and the official records of the regiments were placed at his disposal. From first to last we enjoyed the hearty and effective co-operation of all the division brigade, and regimental commanders, who placed at our com- mand all facilities, records and information so far as military regulations would permit. We were fortunate in securing the services of Mr. PETER MacQueen. the Boston clergyman and journalist, who had come fresh from the battles about Santiago, where he had become associated in a non-official way with the famous “Rough Riders,” among whom his conduct had been such as to win the distinction of being one of the two civilians to be decorated with the medal of the regiment, and formally adopted as one of its members. He had also rendered, during the Cuban campaign, important services to the government which were recognized when he came to Manila, by letters from the Secretary of War, which gave him ready access, for the purpose of obtaining information, to all commanding and other officers in the govern- ment service. Mr. MacQueen at once entered heartily into the spirit of the enterprise, and from the time of his joining the staff assumed the direct charge of the collection of official data from general, division and brigade headquarters. As it was intended that the book should be profusely illustrated, photographers were em- ployed to go with the different expeditions, and the many pictures secured of troops in action speak more plainly than words the danger and difficulties under which they were taken. The old Spanish galleries of Manila were ransacked for views of the interior of Fuzon and beyond the lines occupied by our troops. A canvass was also made of the members of the different IV CampaignUig ifi the Philippines. regiments who had cameras in the field, and some very fine views of troops in action were obtained in this way. The views which appear in this book are those selected from more than fifteen hundred photographs collected by our staff. Maps of all the battlefields and movements of the expeditions are shown in the book. The maps were made by Mr. P. E. Lamar, C. E., the official map-maker of the Second Division, Eight Army Corps, who personally accompanied each expedition with a company of surveyors, and the maps made by him have been endorsed as officially correct by the commanding generals. These maps have been copyrighted by Mr. Lamar, who has published a large map, 64x46 inches, and permission has been secured at considerable expense to use the map in sections in this book. We desire to acknowledge our great obligations to Admiral Dewey and Lieutenant-Com- mander Colvocoresses of the Olympia, Major-Generals Lawton, Mac Arthur and Anderson and Brigadier-Generals King, Ovenshine, Hale, Wheaton, H. G. Otis, Hall, Funston, Summers and Smith for facilities, suggestions, and such information as military regulations permitted them to give. This history will be found accurate, so far as earnest zeal and industry on the part of those best informed can make it so. The narrative in the first chapter, describing the naval battle of Manila Bay, was written by Lieutenant-Commander G. P. Colvocoresses of the Olympia, an old schoolmate of Admiral Dewey. The other chapters were prepared in the office, from data collected as above stated in the field and from official records. While this method prevents a certain uniformity of expression and literary finish which would appear in the work of one writer, the fact that many thousands of the book have been sold in advance of publica- tion makes it imperative to complete the work at the earliest possible date, consistent with accuracy, and it would be the work of at least two years for one person to digest the immense quantity of original data which we have collected, and prepare a narrative therefrom. Special editions containing about one hundred pages additional matter giving a complete history of the regiment from date of muster-in to muster-out are published for sale in States which sent volunteer regiments to the Philippine Islands. Each of these editions contain the name, rank, postoffice address, and occupation of every man in the regiment ; a list of killed and wounded ; all deaths, with date and cause ; all discharges, promotions, etc. A certificate from the commanding officer of the regiment verifies the history as officially correct. Cuts of each company, the field and staff officers, band and hospital corps are shown. Many of these company pictures were taken in view of the enemy, while the regiment was entrenched, and in several cases the company was fired upon while being photographed. THE HICKS-JUDD PUBLISHING COMPANY. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter. Page. I. The American Fleet at Manila 1 The Battle of Manila Bay, 3 ; A Spanish Version of the Battle, 8 ; Disputed Points, 10; The Actions of the German Fleet, 13; Impressions of Admiral Dewey, 15. II. Events Leading to the War with Spain 17 The Cuban Atrocities, 17 ; Senator Proctor’s Report, 18 ; The Destruction of the Maine, 21 ; Report of the Court of Inquiry, 22 ; The President’s Message, 25 ; Further Official Acts, 27 ; Congress Recognizes the Indepen- dence of Cuba, 29 ; War Declared Between the United States and Spain, 30. III. After the Battle of Manila Bay 33 American Policy Undetermined, 33 ; Conditions Under Spanish Rule, 34 ; Society of the Katipunan, 35 ; Rebellion of 1890, 35 ; Aguinaldo Appears, 36 ; Changes in the Governor Generalship, 37 ; The “ Pact of Peace,” 38; Money Paid by the Spanish to the Insurgents, 39 ; The Tragedy of the Calle de Camba, 41 ; Allocution by the Archbishop of Madrid, 42 ; Aguinaldo Meets the American Consul-General, 42 ; The Terms of an Alleged Agreement, 44; Proclamation of the Philippine Junta, 46; Constitution Proclaimed by Aguinaldo, 49 ; Aguinaldo’s Message to his People, 52. IV. The Reinforcement of Dewey 55 The Strength of the Reinforcement Determined, 55; General Merritt Assigned to Command, 56; Departure of First Expedition, 56; The Capture of Guam, 57 ; Naval Reinforcements, 58 ; More Reinforcements Arrive, 58 ; Difficulties of Rapid Mobilization, 59 ; The Troops in San Fran- cisco, 60 ; Supply and Transportation System Organized, 60 ; The Transport System, 61; Cost of Transport Service and Charters, 62; Troops Sent to Manila, 63-70. V. The Capture of Manila 71 The Fortifications of Manila, 71 ; The Spanish Dungeons, 72 ; The Gates, Forts and Barricades, 72 ; The Spanish Block-houses, 73 ; Construction of Spanish Trenches, 74 ; The Filipino Insurgents, 75 ; Filipinos not to Share in the Attack, 76 ; Camp Dewey Established, 76 ; Position of the American Troops, 77 ; Embarrassments of the American Com- manders, 78 ; Misconduct of German Amiral, 78 ; Rumored Coming of Camara’s Fleet, 79 ; The Plan of Attack, 81 ; Organization of the American Forces, 82 ; The Nature of the Ground, 82 ; Difficulties in Landing Troops, 84 ; The Health of the Command, 84 ; Aguinaldo Addresses the Powers, 85 ; Growing Antagonism between the Amer- icans and Filipinos, 85; Work of Troops before Fall of Manila, 86; Arrangements with Aguinaldo, 87 ; Americans Occupy Filipino Trenches, 88 ; The Battle in the Rain, 89 ; Good Conduct of the Volunteers, 93 ; The Americans Ready to Attack Manila, 94 ; The P'leet Takes Position, 95 ; Efforts to Induce Surrender 95 ; Alleged Arrange- ment for a Sham Battle, 96 ; The Fleet Begins the Attack, 96 ; General Merritt Orders an Attack, 97 ; The Alleged Peaceful Program Miscarries, 98; The Fall of the City, 100 ; Articles of Capitulation, 101. VI Caniparg7ii7ig hi the Philippines. CHAPTER. PAGE. VI. From the Capture oe Manila to Revolt op' the Filipinos 1<'3 Proclamation of General Merritt, 103; P'ilipinos in Control of the Country, 105 ; Complications with the Filipinos, 105 ; General Merritt Consults Aniiral Dewey, 107 ; The President Gives Instructions, 108 ; General Merritt Reports on Aguinaldo, 108 ; Otis Succeeds Merritt, 109; The P'ili- pinos Ordered to Remove, 109; The Filipinos Evacuate, 110; The Mili- tary Government. Ill ; The Filipinos Object to Cleanliness, 111 ; News of the Coming Peace, 112; The Filipinos Accumulate Arms, 113 ; Sanitary Regulations Enforced, 113 ; The Spanish Prison-Houses Opened, 114 ; The Pdscal Admi istration, 114; A Commission Appointed, 115; The Treaty of Peace Signed, 115; The President Declares the United States Sovereign in the Philippines, 117 ; Aguinaldo Replies to the President, 118 ; Military Government in the Philippines, 120. VII. The Revolt of the Filipinos 125 The Military Situation, 125 ; The Disposition of our Troops, 126; A Period of Suspense, 127 ; Otis’ Brigade of MacArthur’s Division. 129 ; Hale’s Bri- gade of MacArthur’s Division, 131 ; Operations South of Pasig River, 135 ; The Troops of the Provost Guard, 139 ; Operation of the Fleet, 140; The Filipinos Plan a Massacre, 143 ; The Attempt to Loot Manila, 144 ; Great Destruction of Property by Fire, 145 ; The Attempted Massacre Fails, 145 ; The Insurrectos Ask a Conference, 147 ; Renewed Attacks on the Water-Works, 147 ; Wheaton’s Flying Column, 148 ; Reorganization of Army Coips, 151 ; The Philippine Commission, 152. VHI. The March ON Malolos 155 Position of Opposing Armies, 155 ; Reorganization of MacArthur’s Division, 156; The Nature of the Country, 156 ; No General Engagement, 157 ; Operations of Hale’s Brigade, 158 ; Operations of Otis’ Brigade, 165 ; Operations of Wheaton’s Brigade, 169 ; The Gilmore Incident, 173. IX. MacArthur’s March on San Fernando 175 Wheaton’s Operations Along the Railroad, 175 ; Hale’s Operations from Malolos to Calumpit, 177 ; Operations of Wheaton’s Brigade to Calumpit, 184 ; Hale’s Brigade from Calumpit to San Fernando, 187 ; Operations of Wheaton’s Brigade, Calumpit to San Fernando, 192 ; General Funston Succeeds General Wheaton, 193 ; Hall’s Move on Morong, 194. X. Lawton’s Lake Expedition 197 Object of the Expedition, 197 ; Detail for the Expedition, 198 ; The Com- mand Begins the Move, 2('0 ; The Expedition Landed, 201 ; The Loss on Both Sides, 202 ; The Work of the Gunboats, 202 ; Movements After the Fight, 202 ; Heroism of the Wounded, 204 ; Return to Manila, 206. XI. Lawton’s Northern Expedition 207 Organization of the Command, 207 ; Purposes of the Expedition, 207 ; Novaliches Occupied, 208 ; The Column Reaches San Jose, 210 ; Partial Burning of Angat, 211; General Lawton Reports Progress, 212; Com- munications Disturbed, 213 ; Gallant Behavior of Wm. H. Young, 214 ; The Command Occupies San Rafael, 214 ; Young’s Scouts Organized, 215; San Rafael Captured Again, 215 ; The Column Reaches Baliuag, 216 ; Natives Fed from Captured Stores ; 217 ; Maasim Occupied, 218 ; Large Amounts of Stores Captured, 218 ; A Mythical Insurgent Army, 220 ; A Civil Government Established at Baliuag, 220 ; A Concerted Movement Planned, 222 ; Remarkable Gallantry of Young’s Scouts, 223 ; Chief Scout Young Mortally Wounded, 225 ; San Miguel Occupied, 225 ; Lieu- tenant Thornton Succeeds Chief Scout Young, 227 ; Scout Harrington Campaigning in the Philippines. vii Killed ; The Column Reaches San Isidro, 228 ; The Filipino Peace Com- mission, 228 ; An Engagement near San Fernando, 229 ; The Expedition Breaks up at Candaba, 230. XII. Lawton’s Paranaquk Campaign 233 The Click of the Guns, 233 ; The Signal Corps at Work, 234 ; The Work of the Expedition, 235 ; Paranaque Occupied, 236 ; The Fighting Continued, 237 ; Result of the Operations, 240. XIII. Expeditions to the Southern Iseands 241 Operations on Panay, 241 ; Operations in Cebu, 245 ; Occupation of Negros, 217 ; The Sulu Archipelago, 249. XIV. The Gunboat Flotiei.a 253 The Laguna de Bay, 254; Various P'ights on the Rivers, 255; Captures by the Flotilla, 257; Later Events in the Islands, 257 ; Character of the Campaign now Opening, 258. XV. The Phiuippine Iseands and Their Peopee 259 Physical Aspects, 259 ; Early History Unknown, 260 ; Political Subdivisions, 261 ; The Visayas, 263; The Sulu Archipelago, 265 ; An Early Account of the Islands, 266 ; The Visayans in Early Times, 269 ; Ancient Form of Government, 270 ; The System of Slavery, 271 ; Marriage Institutions, 272 ; Deterioration of the Filipino, 272 ; A British Opinion of the Filipinos, 275 ; Business Capacity of the Natives, 276 ; Climatic Conditions, 277 ; The Typhoons, 279 ; The Oceanic Currents, 280 ; The Unhealthfulness of Manila, 281 ; Commerce of the Islands, 282 ; Natural Products, 283 ; Mining Industries, 286. The Voyage from San Francisco to M^niea 289 SUPPEEMENT 301 The Staff Department of the Army, 301 ; The Engineer Corps: 301 ; The Batcalion of Engineers, 301; The Engineer Corps in the Philippines, 302 ; The Quarter- master’s Department, 302; Operating a Railroad, 302; The Subsistence Depart- ment, 303; Rations on the Transports, 304 ; Rations in the Field, 304 ; The Travel Ration, 301 ; The Medical Department, 301 ; The Supply and Ambulance Service, 305 ; Medical Department of the 8th Army Corps, 305 ; Victims of War in the Philippines, 306 ; Noble Work of the Volunteer Lady Physicians, 307 ; The Red Cross Work, 307 ; The Signal Corps, 308 ; The Chaplains in the Army, 309; Sketches of some Chaplains, 313 ; A Deserved Acknowledgment, 314. CHAPTER 1. THE AMERICAN FLEET AT MANILA. Take a hold o’ the wings o’ the morhin’ And flop ’round the world till you’re dead; But you can’t get away from the tune that they play To the bloomin’ old rag overhead. — Kipling. NE of the most wonderful events of history is the American occupation of the Philippines. When the Spanish-American war began, these islands were hardly thought of in the prob- lem. The archipelago was to most of us simply a few blotches on our geographies; and Admiral Dewey was a Com- modore at the close of an honorable but obscure career. The big headlines were all about Santiago and Havana, Ponce and Porto Rico, Sampson, Schley and the Rough Riders. Sud- denly from a clear sky and an un visited sea, rose clouds and constellations; nations were confused; American patriotism and glory were put on pinnacles; and the deeds of a simple, quiet gentleman with a company of American Jacktars were placed in the pantheon of history along with those of Earragut and mighty Nelson. It was expected by the civilized world that this war would keep its limits in the West Indies. In fact one of the great nations made a move to have the United States understand that the trade of the world was not to be interfered with outside the zone affected by the principles at stake in the island of Cuba. The theater of war has changed. The West Indies are no more interesting than Van Dieman’s land; and the focus of American history and the cynosure of statesmen is the remote archipelago, lying in the China Sea, seven thousand miles from our western coast. Nor was the change in scene the only miracle. The change in the attitude of the nation was greater than the distance that separates Havana from Manila. The war began in the sacred name of libera- tion for a fettered people, dragging their chains in pain and sweat. To-day in jungles of Euzon, by the rivers of Panay, and along the shores of Cebu a sullen people dispute us inch by inch, straining every human effort to be free from the governance of the liberators. To the Filipinos in their long contest for liberty, we appear as the European oppressor appeared to our forefathers who wrought out human rights at Valley Forge and Bunker Hill. Flying with their wives and children to the hills, burning their homes with their own hands; killed by the thousand in the rice-fields and the cane-brakes; driven like wild beasts back to mountain lair — the mightiest nation in the world can not but dread the audacity of their despair. The problem is as grave as any that ever put swordcuts of thought on human brows. These islands lie in fair summer seas. They are rich in furrowed field o CiiDipaigHDig in the Philippines. and forest height; in the river beds that gleam and the hills that are crowded with waiting metals. Yet their history has been and is to-day a history of blackness and darkness; a history of work and want, of ignorance and fear. No star, no hope as yet shines out for them. In the ruthless game of nations where the pawns are men, the Filipinos must play a losing game. The chains of Spain must be exchanged for the strong government which America, however unwil- lingly, in the evolution of history, must place upon these islands. The history of how this has come about is one of the romances of the nineteenth century. There was a time when England trembled at Philip the Tyrant, called the Second of Spain. He was a supreme bigot and thief. He stole, among his many thefts, 1 14,000 square miles of island real estate in the Malay archipelago, and called them the Philippines. Spain never conquered them; Euzon, the largest, was never colonized; Mindanao, the second largest, was never explored. Some of the flora and fauna of these ... islands are at this moment no better known than tidious gentleman in said to a friend that and would like more before he man was ap- rather obscure Pacific. The large, and the might have one of its many had a small well equipped great deal about sailor. He had been and had tied a certain top of the Hartford. At turned up at Hongkong with those of Mars. A fas- the American navy he was getting old just one voyage retired. This pointed to a post in the Pacific is quite old gentleman been lost in monsoons. He fleet, but it was Nobody knew a this American in the Civil War, Farragut to the main last the fastidious sailor about twenty dress suits. He was a perfect gentleman. Very difficult to snub this man. A German prince tried it once, but was severely taken down. A message of import having arrived shortly after our sailor reached China, he sailed away towards the Malay archipelago. The next heard from him was a story so astonishing that the world was shaken. It was said that this American gentleman, with his slim fleet, had entered a defended harbor at night, silenced its guns, and destroyed utterly and beyond remedy the fleet which guarded the entrance. Wilder than all was the incredible story that he had not lost a single man in the action. The man of many suits had played well. King Philip’s real estate suffered a considerable jar. America had long been a sinister omen for Spain. In 1783 the United States were declared free ; in that year Bolivar was born. By the time Bolivar died, Spain had lost South America. The Antilles alone were left her in the west. She could not reform. On February 15, 1898, the Maine was destroyed at Havana, and the war was on. Cauipaigiiing in the Philippines. THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 3 INTBRIOR FT. SAX ANTONIO. On the 24th of April, 1898, the Secretary of the Navy of the United States sent the following cablegram: Dewey, Hongkong, China. War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philip- pine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy them. That same day the British Commander of Hongkong, owing to the fact that his government had declared its neutrality, gave notice to the American squadron that it would have to clear port inside of twenty-four hours. The American fleet left Hongkong, China, under the com- mand of Commodore Dewey in the flagship Olympia on Friday, April 25th, bound for the Philippine Islands, fully equipped as to ammunition, coal and provisions, and with an extra supply carried along in the transports Nanshan and Zajiro, recently put under the American flag. After a short stop at Mirs Bay the fleet got under way for the seat of future operations in the following formation: Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Concord, Petrel and Bosto7i, and after arriving off the Island of Uuzon steamed slowly in the direction of Manila Bay. On the afternoon of Saturday, April 30th, the Bosto^i, Concord, and later the Baltimore, were sent ahead to reconnoiter Point Subig. Finding no sign of the enemy, our ships again assembled in the original forma- tion, with the transports convoyed by the despatch boat, McCulloch, forming a separate column to the right. For the further operations of the fleet in the battle of Manila Bay, we quote from an article prepared for Campaigning in the Philippines, by Uieutenant-Commander G. P. Colvocoresses, executive oflicer of the Olympia. “When the United States squadron was off Subig Bay on the afternoon of April 30th the captains were as.sembled on board the flagship, and on returning to their vessels it was learned that we go immediately to Manila Bay, anchor and ^ be prepared to bombard the arsenal at eight o’clock in the morning. We proceeded at a speed of eight knots in the following formation, single column, four hundred yards distance: Olympia (flying the broad pennant of George Dewey), Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord and the Boston, the despatch boat, McCulloch and the transports Nanshan and Zafiro. The ships were cleared for action and the crews were at their guns. The entrance to Manila Bay was made at midnight. There were known to be batteries there, and it was probable that EFFECT OF SHELLS ON FORT SAN ANTONIO. 4 Campaigning in the Philippines. SAN JUAN DR AUSTRIA. Photo hy Bishop. the channels had been mined. Corregidor Island is at the mouth of the bay, and on either side of it are channels named Boca Chica and Boca Grande, two and one-half and six miles wide respectively. It was a beautiful starlight night. A gentle breeze tem- pered the intense tropical heat. A young moon, occas- ionally veiled by clouds, was in the zenith, and the sea was smooth. Silently and in perfect order the squadron entered the Boca Grande, and suddenly a light gleamed from the summit of Corregidor, probably signaling our approach. As we passed a large rock called El Fraile, a rocket was fired, followed by the boom of a gun over the still waters, and a shot hurtled between the main and mizzen masts of the Concord. It was immediately replied to and the Raleigh had the honor of firing the first shot. We had been fired upon by a battery of four seven-inch guns on El Fraile. The squadron continued up the bay, the stillness occasionally broken by the cry of the lookouts announcing a light upon the distant shore. ‘ ‘ At the first break of dawn we could make out the shipping of the city of Manila, apparently consisting only of merchant vessels. At 5:05 A. m. a battery near the city opened on the squadron, and immediately a number of shots were exchanged with it. The Spanish range, however, proved too short. Our trans- ports here left us in order to keep out of fire, and the increasing daylight disclosed the shadowy forms of the Spanish men-of-war at Cavite on the eastern shore of the bay about five miles distant — phantom-like they appeared gliding about in the mist. The smoke was pouring from their stacks and it was evident that they were forming in line of battle. This line extended from behind and beyond a long low sandy spit known as Sangley Point, which partly encloses the little bay of Canacao, in the rear of which is Cavite, where the arsenal is situated. The point was defended by batteries which protected the left flank of the line. The vessels behind it were fairly , sheltered from fire, while the right flank was ex- tended into such shallow water that it could not be turned. The Spanish vessels were in close order, and as the mist lifted, the proud red and yellow banners of Castile and Leon could be seen grandly floating from each masthead. ‘ ‘ Our fleet in splendid order turned to the right and went for the foe at full speed, the Stars and Stripes fluttering in the breeze, and the signal ‘ Commence Action ’ flying from the yards of the Olympia; only one other signal, ‘ Close Up,’ was made during the first part of the combat. It was a grand moment, and as we advanced the Spaniards opened fire. The zip-zip of their shells increased; soon a reply was given as each of our Photo hy Bishop. ISLA DR CUBA. Caiiipaioiiiui^ i)i the Philippines. 5 vessels came within range, and the steady booming of the guns became a deafening roar. Everyone was almost deaf, and altogether begrimed with smoke before the action was over. “ A supposed torpedo-boat was seen, making for our leader, but it was obliged to turn back and was beached and abandoned. No torpedo-boat in the world could have passed that shell-swept interval of a mile and a half. Our squadron defiled before the Spanish line, pouring in its shower of death with terrible effect from the port battery; and turning, it continued the same steady shower with the starboard guns. Seven separate times our ships performed this evolution as if on parade, and the Spaniards met our fire with the greatest bravery. They had fully a hundred guns playing upon us from their vessels and batteries; but their aim was poor, and the power of their artillery was inferior to ours, although they had a number of five-inch and six-inch breech-loading rifles. The effect was soon apparent; a large lead-colored cruiser which was taken to be the Reina Christijia presented the best target, and suffered terribly. Her ensign was shot away, but it was soon rehoisted, and it was evident that she was on fire, as we could see the fire- hose playing aloft. A Spanish vessel went to her relief and appeared to be taking men from her. Two gunboats particu- larly distin- guished them- ! selves, steam- i n g up and down behind the point and keeping a steady fire up- on us. These vessels were the Is la de Cuba and the Isla de Luzon. battle of Manila bay. “At 7:40 A. M. firing ceased by signal from the commander-in-chief, and we withdrew from action, the men going to breakfast. They had stood at their guns all night. The commanding officers were ordered to repair on board the flagship and a council was held. Affairs looked grave; the extent of damage done the enemy was not fully known; and the hot cannonade had expended a great quan- tity of our ammunition. The spirit of men and officers was most admirable. For two hours and a half they had served the guns with unflinching zeal and bravery, and cheered at every telling shot, and now as their captains passed in their gigs, they manned the rails and shout after shout rent the air. Sullenly the Spanish guns joined in the uproar. “No time was lost, and again our squadron stood in for the enemy and renewed the contest with redoubled animation. The Spanish fire was slack. One of their ships suffered an explosion and was wrapped in flames and smoke. The BaltP more' s fire told heavily against the remaining guns of the Sangley battery. The Concord received orders to go inside the Spanish line and destroy a large Canipaifrmng in the Philippines. 7 steamer that was in shallow water, obstructed by fish weirs, an ideal place for torpedoes and mines. At the first volley, which was opened at long range, ten boats loaded with men were seen to leave the steamer and land upon the beach. Our position was particularly favorable for enfilading two Spanish men-of-war behind the mole at the arsenal, and this was improved to the best advantage by all the division, whose work was most excellent. Every shot seemed to tell; stones and clouds of dust flew from the walls of houses, and the shells passed through the roofs, bursting beyond. “At 12:25 not a Spanish flag was seen in the Canacao Bay except from the staff of the sunken cruiser Don Antonio dc Ulloa submerged behind Sangley Point. This vessel went down with her colors flying in the most gallant manner. The Reina Christina, that had so bravely borne the brunt of battle, was a mass of fire, sinking near the bastion of Cavite, while the Castilla was burning rapidly in Canacao Bay. The remainder of the Spanish fleet had sought shelter behind the arsenal, and several of them were also on fire. The guns of the batteries at Sangley Point were silent and a white flag appeared on the shee .'s of the arsenal. Concord continued to shell the steamer, and in order to hasten operations, boats were hoisted out and provided with combustibles for the purpose of burn- ing; but before she had got any distance it was seen that our shells had set her on fire. “At 1:45 we were ordered to join the Petrel at Cavite, where she was destroying the vessels at the arsenal. As we neared her, she signaled, ‘ Have destroyed eight vessels,’ and she had six small ves- sels, tugs and launches in tow as prizes. When we anchored, white flags were seen flying from various points on shore and there was no longer any resistance. The battle was won, and all the vessels of the Philippine fleet had been destro 3 ^ed. “ The Boston joined us at five o’clock, and we guarded the approach of Canacao Bay for the night, while the remainder of the squadron anchored near the city. The sun went down upon a ‘ wide and woeful sight ; ’ the beautiful cruisers Reina Christina and Castilla were outlined from trucks to water line in flames that burst out in great columns of rose-colored smoke as the fire reached some ex- plosive. The Isla de Mindanao was a mass of fire on the shores of Eas Pinas, while behind the arsenal tongues of flames shot high above the walls. “ All night the calm moon looked down upon this scene of devastation, silvering alike the cross upon the quaint old church of Cavite, the grey walls of the fort and the shattered hulks in the bay. Our crew remained at the guns all night, and early in the morning a launch flying a flag of truce came out. In it were an aide-de-camp and his orderly, and they were taken to the flagship. Eater in the morning the General commanding at Cavite and his staff passed us in mournful procession. They had been to the flagship to surrender. Our men stood at atten- tion as they neared, and saluted, which the Spanish officers returned with punc- tiliousness. 8 Campaiguuig in the Philippines. “ The Spanish force at Cavite was about 2000 men belonging to the navy, with a good many soldiers whose numbers we cannot ascertain. Their loss was esti- mated from 900 to 1200 killed and wounded. The arsenal was abandoned in great haste, only a few taking time to get away their personal effects, and large quantities of stores, provisions and ammuni- tion fell into our hands. The REiNA CHRISTINA. churcli aiid hospitals of Cavite were filled to overflowing with dead and wounded, and ten Spanish surgeons and some Sisters of Mercy remained to take care of them. The following is a list of the vessels destroyed or captured : Burned and sunk in action : Rciiia Clu'istifia, flagship of Admiral Montejo; Castilla, cruiser; Don Antonio de Ulloa, cruiser; Isla de Mindanao, mail steamer armed. Scuttled and burned after the action; Don Jnan de Austria, cruiser; Isla de Cuba, gunboat; Isla de Luzon, gunboat; Gen. Lezo, gunboat; Marquis del Duero, gunboat; Eleano, gunboat; Velasco, gunboat; Argos, hydrographical vessel. Captured since the battle : Manila, armed transport ; Callao, gunboat ; also several tugs and launches. All the batteries in the bay had been dismantled. Our casualties consisted in four slightly wounded, on board the Baltimore. Some shots struck our vessels, but without doing the least harm.” A SPANISH VERSION OF THE BATTEE OF MANILA BAY. As General Otis said to one of the writers of this book: “All histories lie. One man sees a battle and describes it ; another man sees it and describes it. Their, accounts differ entirely.” Therefore, it may be interesting to know how this battle seemed to the beaten foe. For this reason we quote from the Diario de Manila of May 4, 1898, the following description of the great sea-fight as seen by a Spaniard. The translation is by the chief officer of the Olympia, G. P. Colvocoresses : THE NAVAL COMBAT AT CAVITE. As the sun rose above the mists and clouds that overhung our shores on the morning of May 1st., the inhabitants of Manila saw with surprise and dismay the enemy’s squadron in well-ordered line of battle on the waters of the bay. Who could have imagined that they would have had the rashness to stealthily approach onr shores, provoking our defenders to an unavailing display of skill and valor, in which, alas ! balls could not be propelled by heart throbs, else the result might have been different? The sound of shots from our batteries and those from the enemy’s ships, which awakened the citizens of Manila at five o’clock on that May morning, trans- formed the character of our u.sual peaceful and happy surrounding. Frightened at the prospects of dangers that seemed greater than they were, women and children place of execution, cavite. in carriages, or by whatever means they could, sought refuge in the outskirts of the city, while all the men, from the highest to the lowest, the merchanband the mechanic, the soldier and the peasant, the dwellers of the mainland and those of the coast, repaired to their posts and took up arms, confident that never, except by passing over their dead bodies, should the Cauipaignins: in ihc Philippines. 9 soil of Manila be defiled by the enemy, notwithstanding that from the first it was apparent that their armored ships and powerful guns were invulnerable to any effort at our command. The walls of the public square, the towers of the church, the upper stories of houses and every place that commanded a view of the bay was thronged by citizens whose duties as regulars or volunteers did not assign them to posts within the city or on the decks of our ships. All were eager to observe the least detail of the enemy’s vessels, which in perfect line of battle advanced toward Cavite, parallel to the Manila shore, as if steaming out of the harbor. vShots from the batteries and plaza produced no impression on the cruisers. The spectators on the shore, with and without glasses continued to scan the advancing enemy ; they may have been brave, but had no occasion to prove it since the range of their guns and the deficiencies of our artillery enabled them to do us all the harm they wished with impunity. Those who comprehended the undisturbed movements of the enemy, seemingly so inoffen- sive, were filled with rage and desperation, realizing that there was no remedy, and only a choice between honorable death or remaining in impassive cowardice. ^ A soldier of the first battalion of sharpshooters who saw a squad- ron so far out of range of our batteries, said, glancing up to heaven, “ If Holy Mary would only transform that water into land then the Yankees would see how we could fight;” and a Malay squatting near by exclaimed, “ Let them land and we will crush them under heel.” Meanwhile the enemy proceeded with speed and safety in perfect formation toward Cavite with a decision born of security. At about 4:45 a., m. absolute silence reigned. All was ready. Ideas of death and danger vanished at approach of conflict, and the battle flags waved proudly from the masts of the national vessels. Majestically (for why should we not admit it), and in perfect order of battle the nine Yankee vessels bore down on our line. The Olympia flying the Admiral’s flag led the way to Cavite at full speed and behind her defiled the other vessels. As the enemy’s squadron approached Cavite the crew of the mail steamer I si a de Mindanao heard on board the Spanish vessels the order to clear ship for action, and the three cheers for the king, for the queen and for Spain, and responded with frantic enthusiasm. At 5:00 A. M. the Olympia opened fire, which was instantly replied to by the battery mounted on the angle of the works of the ports, and pursued her way to Cavite, pointing her armored prow at the Christina and the Castilla, and opening a murderous fire upon both vessels. This was followed by the broadsides of the six vessels that accompanied her. The Baltimore'' s fire took particular effect upon our ships, and this cannonade continued until 7:45 a. m. At this time we saw the Austria advance against her enemies with the intention of boarding the Olympia and if a tremendous volley had not checked her career of vengeance perhaps both vessels would now be at the bottom of the bay. The captain of the Christina seeing that the efforts of his consort had failed, started full speed ahead to within two hundred meters of the Olympia, intending to engage her at close quarters. A hail of grape-shot swept the deck and shelters, filling the ship with dead and wounded. Heroes and martyrs that the motherland will never forget as long as she exists! A thick column of smoke burst out of the forward store-room of the Christina indicating that an incendiary projectile, of the kind prohibited by divine and human laws, had taken effect in the cruiser. Without ceasing her fire she retired toward the shore and was scuttled. The EFFECT OF SHEET, CHURCH AT CA\ ITE. 10 Campaigning in the Philippines. indignation of the sailors of the Christina was raised to the highest pitch at seeing the Castilla on fire from the same incendiary causes. Our principal vessels were now out of the combat, and as several of the Yankees were badly injured by our vessels and batteries, they withdrew toward Mariveles, ceased firing, and occu- pied themselves in repairing damages until ten o’clock, when they commenced their second attack, which was to complete their work of destruction. In the second combat the fire of the arsenal was silenced and the cannonade continued upon our ships that were burning in all directions. A gunboat that seemed to have no more daring object than the destruction of the Isla de Mindanao detached herself from the enemy’s squadrons and riddled the vessel with balls. The Spanish vessels that had not succumbed to the flames or the shots of the enemy were run aground, as they could not be disposed of in any other way. This was the last stroke. We could do no more. The combat at Cavite was ended and our last vessel went down flying her colors. It is impossible to picture the bloody scene presented by the waters of Cavite on that Sab- bath morning. We will not attempt a description that would be weak and imperfect and unworthy of the heroic deeds that should be perpetuated in the pages of history. To mention those who distinguished themselves in this combat would be to transcribe the names of the crews from captain to cabin boy. For them our words of praise, for them our congratulations, for the living our laurels, for the dead our prayers, for all our deepest gratitude. For more than an hour and a half cannonading had continued, keeping in suspense the hopes of those on the opposite shore of the bay, who with their hearts took part in this unequal struggle, in which, as ever, the Spanish sailors went down with their ships rather than strike their colors. Anx- iou.sly we asked, “ What is going on at Cavite?” From Manila we could see by the aid of . . glasses the two squadrons almost con- founded and enveloped in clouds of smoke. Owing to the inferiority of our batteries it was evident that the enemy was triumphant, and, secure in his armored strength, he was a mere machine requiring only motive power to keep in action his destructive agencies. Only the cheers of our intrepid boarders and the glitter of their cutlasses could have checked this automatic confidence, but alas! we could not reach them. Who can describe the heroic acts, the prowess, the deeds of valor performed by the sailors of our squadron as rage animated them ? All who were beneath the folds of the banner of Spain did their duty as becomes the chosen sons of the fatherland. They slacked not their fire nor yielded to superior force, and preferred to perish with their ships rather than live with them in the hands of the enemy. DISPUTED POINTS. Since the battle of Manila Bay or Cavite, as it is sometimes called, several questions have been disputed. The first point about which discussion has been raised is which entrance to Manila harbor the ships entered. Some said that it was by way of the Boca Chica or “little mouth,” others that it was by way of the Boca Grande or “great mouth.” This que.stion is .settled by the description given by the Lieutenant-Commander of the Olympia in the earlier part of this chapter, viz., that it was by way of the Boca Grande. THREE OK THE SUNKEN SPANISH SHIPS. Campaigning in the Philippines. il The second point at issue was the reason for the withdrawal of the American fleet between the first and second fight. Some maintained that it was for the purpose of giving the men their breakfast. Others assert that it was in order to count the ammunition, which, it was feared, was running short. To settle these points beyond all dispute and also to make this book an abso- lutely correct history, the writer of this chapter visited Admiral Dewey on the Olympia on May 15, 1899. The Admiral was most courteous and obliging in the matter, and put at our disposal the best sources of information. He said, “there was talk of a lack of ammunition.” Referring to the article of Mr. Joseph T. Stickney in Harper's Moiithly for February, 1899, Admiral Dewey .said that the account therein given was accurate as to its details of the withdrawal of the fleet. We quote Mr. Stickney’s language: It has always been assumed in the United States that, from start to finish, there was nothing felt on our side except a buoyant certainty of victory. It will do no harm now to tell the real facts. It will be remembered that the battle began at six minutes past five o’clock on the morning of May 1st; that Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Dewey led the line of American war-ships into action in his flagship Olympia ; that after a fierce fight, lasting two hours and a half, the attacking fleet retired from the battle into the center of Manila Bay, and did not renew the attack until nearly four hours later. When we hauled off from the fighting line, at 7:36 o’clock, the situation had become appar- ently serious for Commodore Dewey. We had been fighting a determined and courageous enemy for more than two hours without having noticeably diminished the volume of his fire. It is true, at least three of his ships had broken into flames, but so had one of ours — the Boston. These fires had all been put out without apparent injury to the ships. Generally speaking, nothing of great importance had occurred to show that we had seriously injured any Spanish vessel. They were all steaming about in the bight back of Sangley Point, or in Bakor Bay, as actively as when we first sighted them in the early dawn. So far, therefore, we could see nothing indicating that the enemy was less able to defend his position than he had been at the beginning. On the other hand, our condition was greatly altered for the worse. There remained in the magazines of the Olympia only eighty-five rounds of five-inch ammunition, and though the stock of eight-inch charges was not proportionately depleted, it was reduced enough to make the continuance of the battle for another two hours impossible. When it is remembered that Commodore Dewey was more than 7000 miles from a home port, and that under the most favorable conditions a supply of ammunition could not be obtained in less than a month, the outlook was far from being satisfactory. The Commodore knew that the Spaniards had just received an ample supply of ammu- nition in the transport Mindanao, so that there was no hope of ex- hausting their fighting power by an action lasting twice as long. If we should run short of powder and shell, we might become the hunted instead of the hunters. I do not exaggerate in the least when I say that, as we hauled off into the bay, the gloom on the bridge of the Olympia w^as thicker view of the sunken Spanish ships from cavite. than a Dondon fog in November. Neither Commodore Dewey nor any of the staff believed that the Spanish ships had been sufficiently injured by our fire to prevent them from renewing the battle quite as furiously as they had previously fought. Indeed, we had all been distinctly 12 Campaigning in the Philippines. A Comparative View of the American and the Spanish Fep:ets Engaged at Maniea. AMERICAN FEEET. Name. Class. Armament. iMen and Officers. Built in Olvmpia Protected Cruiser , Four 8-in., ten 5-in., 24 R. F. . . 466 1892 Baltimore Protected Cruiser i Four 8-in., six 6-in., 10 R. F. . . 395 1888 Boston Par. Protected Cruiser Two 8-in., six 6-in., 10 R. F ... 272 1884 Raleigh Protected Cruiser One 6-in., ten 5-in., 14 R. F' . . 295 1892 Concord Gunboat Six 6-in., 9 R. F' 1.50 1891 Petrel . . Gunboat . . Four 6-in., 7R.F 100 1888 McCulloch (not in action) . . Revenue Cutter Four 4-in 130 1888 1,808 * SPANISH FLEET. Reina Christina Steel Crui.ser Six 6.2-in., two 2.7-in., 13 R. F. 352 1887 Castilla Don Antonio de Elloa Don Juan de Austria . Isla de Luzon Isla de Cuba Velasco Marques del Duero General Lezo Argos Wooden Cruiser Iron Cruiser Iron Cruiser Steel Protected Cruiser Steel Protected Cruiser Iron Cruiser Gunboat Gunboat Gunboat i Four 5.9, two 4.7, two 3.4 i two 2.9, 12 R. F Four 4.7, 5 R. F Four 4.7, two 2.7, 21 vSix4.7, 8 R. F Six 4.7, 8 R. F Three 6-in., two 2.7, 2 R. F One 6.2, two 4.7, 1 R. F One 3.5, 1 R. F Two torpedo boats and two transports, practically not in action. 1881 1875 1887 1887 1887 1881 1875 1885 '^El Correo is mentioned in Admiral Dewey’s list of May 4, but is omitted in that given in his despatch oi July 9. Campaigning in the Philippines. 13 disappointed in the results of our fire. Our projectiles seemed to go too high or too low — just as had been the case with those fired at us by the Spaniards. Several times the Commodore had expressed dissatisfaction with the failure of our gunners to hit the enemy. We had begun the firing at too great a distance, but we had gradually worked in further on each of the turns, until we were within about 2500 yards at the close of the fifth round. At that distance, in a smooth sea, we ought to have made a large percentage of hits; yet, so far as we could judge, we had not sensibly crippled the foe. Consequently Commodore Dewey hauled out into the open bay at the end of the fifth round to take stock of ammunition and devise a new plan of attack. As I went aft the men asked me what we were hauling off for. They were in a distinctly different humor from that which prevailed ou the bridge. They believed that they had done well, and that the other ships had done likewise. The Olympia cheered the Baltimore and the Baltimore returned the cheers with interest. The gun-captains were not at all dissatisfied with the results of their work. Whether they had a better knowledge of the accuracy of their aim than we had on the bridge, or whether they took it for granted that the enemy must have suffered severely after so much fighting, I do not know, but, at any rate, they were eager to go on with the battle, and were confident of victory. I told one of them that we were merely hauling off for breakfast, which statement elicited the appeal to Captain Lamberton, as he came past a moment later, captain, don’t let us with breakfast!” Commodore that I ute our withdrawal breakfast, he inti- not a matter of much reason I gave, so give the true one. episode went to the excuse for what traordinary strategic which has been the nient than almost during the battle, said to me that it spoil so good a stoiy^ but, as the Comiiio- let the cat out of the as well let her have Of course we about the effect of ‘‘For God’s sake, stop now. To hell W hen I told the intended to attrib- to the need for mated that it was importance w h a t long as I did not And so the breakfast world as a plausible seemed like an ex- m a n o e u V e r — one .subject of more com- an y other event IMany people have would be a pity to by telling the truth; dore will be sure to bag .some day, I may her freedom now. W.^LLS OK FORT s.^x ANTONIO. learned the truth our fire when we .saw, .soon afterward, the flames rising from the Reina Christina and the Castilla, and heard the explosion of their ammunition, and the former’s magazine. We could not understand why the Castilla did not blow up. vShe burned fiercely, and was in a bright glow even as late as IMoiida}* night, having been on fire since Sunday forenoon. It is probable that her magazine had lieen flooded before the vSpaniards abandoned her, .so that no explo.sion accompanied her destruction. Although built partly of wood, the Castilla was aLso to a great extent a steel vessel; and when we boarded her, after the flames had left nothing but her bare bones, her sponsons and gun platforms were found to be .so littered with pieces of our shells that it was impo.ssible to walk there without displacing some of them. Nothing gave a better idea of the .storm of pro- jectiles that must have .struck this .ship than these heaps of rusty fragments. THK GERMAN FLKKT IN MANILA BAY There is .still another matter that has interested the American public very greatly — the actions of the German fleet in Manila Bay. Personally after grave investigation the writer thinks that the Germans have at no time had .serious 14 Caiiipaigiiijig in the Piiilippincs. thoughts of opposing the American control of the Philippine Islands, or of caus- ing any friction between the United States and Germany. The German com- mander was undoubtedly using what in other countries is called diplomacy, but in our country is - .... ; ■ ■ ■ "Ay •: • ■ . % called “bluff.” If the bluff had worked the officer would have been pro- moted; it failed and he was recalled. VIEW OF THE BAY FROM CAVITE. About the relations of the German fleet and ours Mr. Stickney in the article already quoted, says : And speaking of the Germans, it may be well to point out that, while they made themselves as offensive as they dared, and while the}' acted in a very disagreeable way from the first. Com- modore Dewey refrained from taking any notice of their discourtesy until he should be able to do so in such a manner as to admit of no reply. It would require too much space to repeat all the annoyances to which the Germans lent themselves during the early part of their stay in Manila waters. Their ships came into and went from the harbor at all hours of the day and night. When a steamer made her appearance to seaward, a German vessel would run out to examine her with great promptitude. After one such instance, which occurred at a time when Vice-Admiral Von Diederich’s flag-lieutenant was on board the Olympia Admiral Dewey said to the German officer: “ One might almost think your ships were blockading Manila, and not mine.” The lieutenant chuckled com- placently, as though he thought it was a compliment to the activity of his commander-in- chief, but he was wholly unable to comprehend that, when Dewey became so sweetly suave, it was a good time to look out for squalls. One night one of the German steam-launches came steaming toward our fleet at full speed. She was picked up by the search-lights of our squadron fully a mile away, and was kept in the focus of their rays until she came alongside. Our officers almost universally believed that the object of her unnecessary and untimely visit was to discover whether it would be possible for a Spanish torpedo-boat to get within range of our vessels without being discovered by us. Then the Princess Wilhelmina, lying off Subig Bay, notified the insurgents that she would not permit them to attack the Spanish troops at that point. At another time one of the Ger- man ships tried to sneak into the anchorage off the city of Manila at night, all her lights being extinguished, and her course being an unusual one. She was detected, and promptly “ brought to ” by a shell across her bows from the United States cruiser that was on picket duty that night. Our courteous and courtly Commodore made no sign. He was waiting until he could put an end to the whole annoyance with one crushing blow. At last the opportunity came. He learned, on unquestionable authority, that one of the German vessels had landed provisions in Manila, thereby violating neutrality. I was not present when he sent his message to Admiral von Diederich, and therefore I do not speak from personal knowledge concerning it; but I learned the facts from a perfectly authentic source, as follows: “ Orderly, tell Mr. Brumby I would like to see him,” said Admiral Dewey, one forenoon. “ Oh, Brumby,” he continued, when the flag-lieutenant made his appearance on the quarter-deck, ” I wish you to take the barge and go over to the German flagship. Give Admiral von Diederich my. compli- ments, and say that I wish to call his attention to the fact that the vessels of his squadron have shown an extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse, and that finally one of them has committed a gross breach of neutrality in landing provisions in Manila, a port which I am blockading.” Canipaigniui!; in the Philippines. 15 The Conimodore’s voice had been as low and sweetly modulated as if he had been sending von Diederich an invitation to dinner. When he stopped speaking, Brumby, who did not need any better indication of the Commodore’s mood than the usually formal and gentle manner of his chief, turned to go, making the usual official salute, and replying with the customary, “ Ay, ay, sir.” ” And, Brumby,” continued the Commodore, his voice rising and ringing with the intensity of feeling that he felt he had repressed about long enough, ” tell Admiral von Diederich that if he wants a fight, he can have it right now ! ” Brumby went with his message, and the Commodore paced the quarter-deck in silence for a considerable time, evidently working off some of the high pressure that had brought forth his emphatic message to the German Admiral. The latter sent back the extraordinary reply that he had not known anything about these actions of his captains, and that they would not be repeated. When one considers the rigidity of discipline that is supposed to exist in the Ger- man navy, the character of Admiral von Diederich 's a])ology is all the more incomprehensible. But whatever may have been the new methods adopted by Admiral von Diederich to pre- vent his captains from violating neutrality and showing bad manners, they were entirely effica- cious. There was never the least further need to refer to the possibility of giving Commodore Dewey the job of disciplining them. IMPRESSIONS OF ADMIRAD GEORGE DEWEY. On a beautiful May morning, a year after the events recorded in this chap- ter, I went down the harbor of Manila to visit the grand old man of the fleet, and to authenticate this part of our history. I found him an agreeable, chivalrous, courteous gentleman endeared to his countrymen by simplicity and honor. After giving me the information that I needed, and the confirmation of the data on which this chapter is based, the Admiral sat down on the quarter-deck and, looking away towards Cavite and the sunken ships of Spain, began to think about his home-going to America. He deeply appreciated the warmth and unani- mity of the love his country bears him. But he said he was afraid of the great strain so many receptions would be upon his health. The Admiral, though over sixty, still looks hale and stout, every inch a man, every wit a “gentleman unafraid.” He thought that now, after his many voyages and battles, he would like to go up and rest among the green hills of Vermont. He wanted, he said, to settle down in Montpelier, his old New England home. “If the folks up in Montpelier will give me a reception in the town hall, that will be enough,” said this world- loved man. One could see that, after his long and honorable career, and after his superb successes, the old man longed for the spot of earth where he had been a boy. He looked at the far, fair moun- tains of Mariveles, and the green crown of Corregidor, but not to him like the wind-swept hillsides of dewy New England were these Southern scenes. I spent the whole forenoon on board the Olympia., the officers and men showing me the wonders of their trig little crui.ser. And one said this was where the 16 Campaigning in the Philippines. Admiral stood during the great fight ; and one said that was a dent made in the ship by a cannon ball. The Lieutenant-Commander was busy writing a history of the battle. He told me that Dewey and he were schoolmates together in the Academy of Norwich, Vermont. He was going to have a sketch of the Admiral and him- self made ready for the little school paper. It was a very grave matter, this coun- try school, and the bulletin of it which was dignified by the name of a paper. He must have the best matter and the finest pictures for it, he said — that was the old place where he and the Admiral were schoolboys together. This mood of Admiral Dewey and his chief officer gave me matter to ponder over. They did not think of the grand acclaims and the wonderful applause of the free, proud nation they had honored. But “ How will the folk of Montpelier receive me?” and “Can I write an article worthy of the Norwich country school ? ’ ’ Men who would be welcomed as writers by the best magazines and gladly honored by the Czar, asking themselves these questions ! It is only one more example of the old truth of how strong a grasp on men have the associations of a pure home life. It is this love of home, deep-rooted and enduring, this fond- ness for the earliest part of life, which followed these men through life and crossed the chasm of years and wars and stormy seas — this shall save the Republic when the battleships are futile and the cannon dumb. CHAPTER II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR WITH SPAIN. T is, of course, well known that neither the Philippine Islands nor the conditions therein were in any degree a consideration which led to our war with Spain. It is even true that after the naval battle at Manila, the people stood with finger-tips upon the little spots in the map of the Pacific and questioned one another as to where and what might be “ Manila” Bay. It is proper, however, to complete this record of achievement by a brief account of the civil and military affairs antedating the action in Manila Bay. In palliation of Spanish inhumanity to her colonial subjects, it may be said that her internal dissensions have been such that the government was powerless as against the will of certain classes of its subjects. A brief reference to the late successions to the Spanish crown may throw some light on this matter. Ferdinand VII died in 1833, and his daughter, Isabella, was proclaimed Queen, with her mother, Maria Christiana of Naples, as Regent. Then Don Carlos, Ferdinand’s brother, asserted that the choice of Isabella violated the Salic Law, which forbids the inheritance of women, and that he should have been preferred. This pretension had much support in the north of Spain, and this was the origin of the ” Carlist ” party, which has been a constant menace to the govern- ment when not in open rebellion against it. The character of Isabella II, who was declared of age in 1843, added new elements of perplexity. A successful revolution drove her from the throne and, in 1870, (the ten years’ war in Cuba being then in progress) Amadeus of Aosta, the second son of Victor Emanuel of Italy, was invited to govern as a constitutional king. Within three years he resigned the office. A provisional government was then created, with Castilla at its head, after which, for a brief time, a committee of officers undertook the administration. In 1874 Isabella’s son, Alphonse XII, accepted the crown. He died in 1885, and his widow, Christiana of Austria, was made Regent. Their son was born May 17, 1886, and he is now known as the ” Little King.” THE CUBAN ATROCITIES. However, whatever might have been the origin or cause of Spanish misrule, the knowledge that Spain was helpless in the hands of its subjects only helped to goad into a frenzy the apprehension and alarm of her colonists in regard to the 2b 18 Lainpaigning in the Philippines. intolerable barbarities practiced upon them. This was especially the case in Cuba, where the oppression was so grievous and so long continued that not only the Cubans were crying out against it, but the civilization of the world was aghast at the spectacle. We of the TJnited States were so placed that the appeals of these sufferers came to us with great force. Our own material interests had long paid tribute to the shrine of this intolerance, and to our private and public remonstrances the Span- ish government paid no heed. Our benefactions to relieve the distresses had been treated with disdain by Spain, and our contributions largely diverted into Spanish hands. So universal and pronounced had public sentiment in this country become, that all the great political parties declared against further endurance of the evil, and the platform upon which President McKinley was nominated and elected, insisted that some solution must be made in the interests of humanity. For the purpose of verifying the rumors and reports, many private commis- sions visited Cuba, and all returned with the statement that the enormities there had only in part been told. Senator Proctor of Vermont, who was Secretary of War in Harrison’s administration, was one of those who visited the island. On his return, at the earnest request of the Senate, in his place in the Senate Cham- ber, he made this remarkable statement: SENATOR PROCTOR’S REPORT. “Outside of Havana all is changed. It is not peace, nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village is surrounded by a trocha (trench), a sort of rifle pit, but constructed on a plan new to me: the dirt being thrown up on the inside, and a barbed wire fence on the outer side of this trench. “These trochas have at every corner, and at frequent intervals along the sides, what are called forts, but which are really small block-houses, many of them more like a large sentry-box, loopholed for musketry and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each. The purpose of these trochas is to keep the reconcentrados in as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding country the people have been driven into these fortified towns and held there to sub- sist as they can. They are virtually prison yards, and not unlike one TIDAL WAVE IN MANILA. in general appearance, except that the walls are not so high and strong, but they are sufficient, where every point is in range of a soldier’s rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children. Every railroad station is within one of these trochas, and has an armed guard. Every train has an armored freight-car, loopholed for musketry, and filled with soldiers, Cauipaiirmuir in the Philippines. 19 and with, as I observed and was informed was always the case, a pilot engine a mile or so in advance. There are frequent block-houses inclosed by a trocha, and with a guard along the railroad track. With this exception there is no human life or habitation between these fortified towns and villages and throughout the whole of the four western provinces, except to a very , p ' / - ^ ^ b limited extent among the hills, where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and burn their dwellings. I saw no ^ house or hut in the four hundred miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio province in the west, across the full width of Havana and Matanzas provinces, and to Sagua la Grande on the north shore, and to Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish trochas. There are no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and pastures, except such as are under guard in the immediate vicinity of the towns. In other hold in these four western provinces just what man, woman, and child, and every domestic ■»'S words, the Spaniards their army sits on. Every wherever their columns animal, have reached, is under guard within their so-called fortifications. To describe one place is to describe all. To repeat, it is neither peace nor war. It is concentration and desolation. This is the ‘ pacified ’ condition of the four western provinces. “All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns where Weyler’s order was made, were driven into these towns, and these are the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry (many of them farmers) some land owners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches — and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family. It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these people was very different from what prevails in this country. Their standard of comfort and prosperity was not high, measured by our own. But according to their standards and requirements their conditions of life were satisfactory. They live mostly in cabins made of palm, or wooden houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened walls of which are all that remain to show that the country was ever inhabited. The first clause of Weyler’s order reads as follows; “ ‘I order and command: First, all the inhabitants of a country (district) outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such.’ “ The other three sections forbid the transportation of provisions from one town to another without the permission of the military authority; direct the 20 Campaignino^ hi the Philippines. wear, but little clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize, and with large families or with more than can be accomodated in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Conditions are unmen- tionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water and foul food, or none, what wonder that one-half have died, and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved ? A form of drops)^ is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Tittle children are still walk- ing about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless. “Deaths in the street have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that many have been found dead about the markets in the morning, where owners of cattle to bring them into the towns; prescribe that eight days shall be counted from the publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal districts, and state that if news is furnished of the enemy which can be made use of it will ser^^e as ‘ a recommendation.’ “ Many doubtless did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. It was left largely to the guerrillas to drive in all who did not obey, and I was informed that in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerrillas. When they reached the town they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and left to live if they could. Their huts are about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, no furniture, and after a year’s STREET SCENES IN MANILA. Campaigning in the Philippines. 21 they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market, surrounded by food. These people were independent and self-supporting before Weyler’s order. They are not beggars even now. There are plenty of profes- sional beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the reconcentrados, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them makes an appeal stronger than words. “Of these I need not speak. Others have described their conditions far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been over- drawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents and they had given free play to a strong natural, and highly cultivated imagination. Before starting I received through the mail a leaflet published by the Christian Herald., with the cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and^^<-r*“ took it with me, thinking these would be rare specimens gotten up to make the worst possible showing. I saw t)ad and worse ; many that should not llj A be photographed and shown. I could not believe that out of a pop- ulation of 1,600,000, 200,000 had died with- in these Spanish forts, KMbS; ' \ ' practically prison walls, within a few months dr past, from actual star- vation and i s e a s e caused by insufficient and improper food. My inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of our medical officers, of our consuls , of city alcaldes, (mayors), of relief committees, of leading mer- chants and bankers, physicians native dog. and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated. What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It must be seen with one’s own eyes to be realized. The Tos Palos Hospital in Havana has been recently described by one of my colleagues. Senator Gallinger, and I cannot say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile pen could not do that. He visited it after Dr. Lesser, one of Miss Barton’s very able and efficient assistants (in the Red Cross work), had renovated it and put in cots. I saw it when four hundred women and children were lying on the stone floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of rags — and such rags! Sick children as naked as they came into the world. And the conditions in the other cities are even worse.’’ In the United States this conservative, candid statement of Senator Proctor put feeling to a pitch, and there was loud clamor against Congress and the Executive for its unfeeling delay. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE “MAINE.” At this time there was an occurrence which set the country aflame. On the night of February 15, 1898, while peacefully at anchor in the harbor Campaignifig in the Philippines. o? of Havana, the United States battle-ship Marne was sunk by an explosion and two officers and 264 of her crew killed or drowned. Prior to this, the Spanish government had protested against our sending cruisers with supplies to the reconcentrados, and there was much talk of the designs of the Spanish fleet upon our Atlantic Coast. The attitude and feeling in Spanish circles was such that this destruction pf the Maine was at once charged to the perfidy and cruelty of the Spanish government. At once the President created a commission to consider and report upon the cause of the destruc- tion of the Maine, but in the minds of the public there was an ample casus belli, and it would hardly brook the A FAMILIAR STREET SCENE. delay iiecessary for a report. The con- servatism of Congress kept it well in check, but the importunities of constituents drove it to preparatory action. On March 8, 1898, the House, by unanimous vote, passed a bill appropriating $50,000,000 for national defense. By unanimous vote, and without debate, the bill passed the Senate on the same day, and was immediately signed by the President. On the 16th of March, a protest by the Spanish government against our measures of defense and our fleet in Key West was received. On March 28th the President sent to Congress the report of the Court of Inquiry on the Marne disaster. The following is its full text: REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY. J “ United States Steamship Iowa. j First Rate. “ Key West, Florida, Monday, March 21, 1898. “After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it the court finds as follows: “ 1. That the United States battle-ship Maine arrived in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898, and was taken to buoy No. 4, in from five and one-half to six fathoms of water, by the regular government pilot. The United States Consul-General at Havana had notified the authorities at that place the previous evening of the intended arrival of the MaUie. “ 2. The state of discipline on board the Maine was excellent, and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly carried out. All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled. Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell-rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there. The magazines and shell-rooms were always locked after having been opened, and after the destruction of the Maine the keys were found in their proper place in the Captain’s cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening at 8 p. M. « Campaignin^r in the Philippines. T “The temperature of the magazines and shell-rooms was taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the after ten-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the Maine was destroyed. The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft, and remote from the scene of the explosion. Waste was carefully looked after on the Maine to obviate danger. Special order in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer. Varnishers, dryers, alcohol and other combustibles of this nature were stowed on or above the main deck, and could not have had anything to do with the destruction of the Maine. “ The medical stores were stowed aft under the ward-room, and remote from the scene of the explosion. No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in ,any of the other store rooms. “ The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the for- ward magazines and shell- rooms, four were empty, namely: ‘B3, B4, B5, B 6.’ ‘A 15’ had been in use that day, and ‘ A 16’ was full of New River coal. This coal had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth side at this time on account of bunkers ‘ B 4 ’ and ‘ B 6 ’ being empty. This bunker, ‘ A 16,’ had been inspected that day by the engineer officer on duty. The fire-alarms in the bunk- ers were in working order, and there had never been a case of spontaneous com- bustion of coal on board the Maine. The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but for auxiliary pur- poses only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a re- liable watch. These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the divers, and are in a fair condition. “ On the night of the destruction of the Maine everything had been reported secure for the night at 8 p. m. by reliable persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding officer. At the time the Maine was destroyed the ship was quiet, and therefore least liable to accident caused by movements from those on board. SCENE ON THE RIO GRANDE. 24 Campaigning in the Philippines. “ 3. The destruction of the Maine occurred at forty minutes past nine in the evening of the 15th day of February, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short, but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the nature of a report, like that of a gun; while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater vol- ume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the Maine. “ The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers, did not enable the court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the wreck, although it was established that the after part of the ship was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of the forward part. The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however, established by the testimony. SPANISH SOLDIERS AT PRAYER. “ 4. That portion of the port side of the protective deck which extends from about frame 30 to frame 41 was blown up aft and over to port. The main deck from about frame 30 to frame 41 was blown up aft and slightly over the starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over and on top of the after part. This was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the Maine. “ 5. At frame 17, the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one- half feet from the middle line of the ship, and six feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the sur- face of the water; therefore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be, had the ship sunk uninjured. The outside bottom-plating is bent into a reversed V-shape, the aft wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25) is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating extending forward. “ At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom-plating. This break is now about six feet above its normal position. Campaigning in the Philippines. 25 “ In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18, and somewhat on the port side of the ship. “ 6. The court finds that the loss of the Maine, on the occasion named, was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel. “7. In the opinion of the court the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her for- ward magazines. “8. The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons. “W. T. Sampson, Captain U. S. N., President. “A. Marix, Tieutenant-Commander U. S. N., Judge- Advocate. “The court, having finished the inquiry it was ordered to make, adjourned at 11 A. M to await the action of the convening authority. “ W. T. Sampson, Captain U. S. N., President. “ A. Marix, Tieutenant-Commander U. S. N., Judge-Advocate.” “ U. S. Flagship York, off Key West, Fla., March 22, 1898. “ The proceedings and findings of the Court of Inquiry in the above case are approved. “ M. SiCARD, Rear Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station.” THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE. Accompanying this report was the following explanatory message of the President: “ For some time prior to the visit of the Mahie to Havana harbor our Consu- lar representatives pointed out the advantages to flow from the visit of national ships to Cuban waters, in accustoming the people to the presence of our flag as the symbol of good will, and of our ships in the fulfillment of the mission of pro- tection to American interests, even though no immediate need therefor might exist. “ Accordingly on the 24th of January last, after a conference with the Spanish Minister, in which the renewal of visits of our war vessels to Spanish waters was discussed and accepted, the peninsular authorities at Madrid and Havana were advised of the purpose of this government to resume friendly naval visits to Cuban ports, and that, in that view, the Mahie would forthwith call at the port of Havana. This announcement was received by the Spanish government with appreciation of the friendly character of the visit of the Maine, and with notifica- tion of an intention to return the courtesy by sending Spanish ships to the princi- pal ports of the United States. Meanwhile the Maine entered the port of Havana on the 25th of January, her arrival being marked with no special incident besides the exchange of customary salutes and ceremonial visits. Cainpaignin^^ in the Philippines. ^'8 “ The Maine continued in the harbor of Havana during the three weeks fol- lowing her arrival. No appreciable excitement attended her stay; on the con- trary, a feeling of relief and confidence followed the resumption of the long- interrupted friendly intercourse. So noticeable was this immediate effect of her visit that the Consul-General strongly urged that the presence of our ships in Cuban waters should be kept up by retaining the Maine at Havana, or in the event of her recall, by sending another vessel there to take her place. “ At forty minutes past nine on the evening of the 15th of February, the Maine was destroyed by an explosion, by which the entire forward part of the ship was utterly wrecked. In this catastrophe two officers and two hundred and sixty-four of her crew perished; those who were not killed outright by her explosion being penned between decks by the tangle of wreckage and drowned by the immediate sinking of the hull. Prompt assistance was rendered by the neighboring vessels anchored in the harbor, aid being especially given by the boats of the Spanish crniser, Alphonse Xn, and the Ward Tine steamer, City of JVashi'n^ion, which lay not far distant. The wounded were generously cared for by the authorities of Havana, the hospitals being freely opened to them, while the earliest recovered bodies of the dead were interred by the municipality in a public cemetery in the city. Tributes of grief and sympathy were offered from all official headquarters of the island. “ The appalling calamity fell upon the people of our country with crushing force, and for a brief time an intense excitement prevailed, which, in a community less just and self-controlled than ours, might have led to hasty acts of blind resent- ment. This spirit, however, soon gave way to the calm processes of reason, and to the resolve to investigate the facts and await material proof before forming a judgment as to the cause, the responsibility, and, if the facts warranted, the remedy due. This course necessarily recommended itself from the outset to the Executive, for only in the yXX ^ light of a dispassionately ascertained ceitainty could it de- termine the nature and measure of its full duty in the matter. The usual procedure was followed, as in all cases of casualty or disaster to national vessels of any maritime state. A naval court of inquiry was at once organized, com- posed of officers well qualified by rank and practical experience to discharge the onerous duty imposed upon them. Aided by a strong force of wreckers and divers, the court proceeded to make a thorough investigation on the spot, employing every available means for the impartial and exact determination of the causes of the explosion. Its operations have been conducted with the utmost deliberation and judgment, and, while independently pursued, no source of information was neglected, and the fullest opportunity was allowed for a simultaneous investigation by the Spanish authorities. Canipaigjiijis; in the Philippines. 27 “ The finding of the Court of Inquiry was reached, after twenty-three days of continuous labor, on the 21st of March instant, and, having been approved on the 22d by the Commander-in-Chief of the United States naval force of the North Atlantic Station, was transmitted to the Executive. ^ ^ “It is herewith laid before the Congress, together with the voluminous testimony taken be- fore the court. Its purport is, in brief, as follows : ‘ ‘ When the Maine arrived at Havana she was conducted by the regular government pilot to buoy No. 4, to which she was moored in from five and one-half to six fathoms of water. The state of discipline on board and the condition of her yy/ magazines, boilers, coal- bunkers and storage com- partments are passed in review, with the conclusion no indication of any cause for an internal explosion existed in any quarter. “At eight o’clock in the evening of February 15th everything had been reported secure, and all was quiet. At forty minutes past nine o’clock the vessel was suddenly destroyed. There were two distinct explosions, with a brief interval between them. The first lifted the forward part of the ship very perceptibly; the second, which was more open, prolonged,- and of greater volume, is attributed by the court to the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. ‘ ‘ The evidence of the divers establishes that the after part of the ship was practically intact and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the explosion. The forward part was completely destroyed. “ Upon the evidence of a concurrent external cause the finding of the court is as follows: “ (As in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Report.) “ I have directed that the finding of the Court of Inquiry, and the views of the government thereon, be communicated to the government of Her Majesty, the Queen Regent, and I do not permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the friendly relations of the two governments. It will be the duty of the Executive to advise the Congress of the result, and in the meantime deliberate consideration is invoked. William McKinley. “Executive Mansion, March 28, 1898.’’ FURTHER OFFICIAL ACTS. In both branches of Congress the next day bills were introduced on Cuban affairs, and on April 1st, Congress passed a naval appropriation bill. In the days following there was a tempered discussion in Congress on Cuban affairs. NATIVES SAWING WOOD. that excellent order prevailed, and that 28 Campaigning in the Philippines. On April 7tli, a note was received from the representatives of foreign powers, expressing a hope “that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the establishment of order in Cuba.” This was signed by the representatives of Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia. President McKinley’s reply was diplomatic and concilia- tory but not in harmony with the voice of the people. On March 27th, Presi- dent McKinley had sub- mitted to the Spanish gov- ernment propositions look- STREET SCENE IN SAN FERNANDO. ing to an armistico between Spain and the Cuban insurgents until October, with a view of coming to an adjustment of Cuban affairs. Soon thereafter General Blanco issued this proclamation : “ His Majesty’s Government, yielding to the reiterated wish expressed by His Holiness, the Pope, has been pleased to decree a suspension of hostilities, with the object of preparing and facilitating the restoration of peace on this island, in virtue whereof I believe it convenient to order: “ Article 1. From the day following the receipt in each locality of the present proclamation hostilities are ordered to be suspended in all the territory of the Island of Cuba. “The details for the execution of the above article will be the subject of special instructions that will be communicated to the several commanders-in-chief of the army corps for easy and prompt execution according to the situation and circumstances of the case. Blanco.” An ineffective revocation of Weyler’s reconcentrado orders had been issued and Spain appropriated J600,000 for Cuban relief. However, all came to naught. The conditions mentioned in the Blanco proclamation were such that the insur- gents could not comply — one being that they must surrender their arms. The appropriation failed of its ostensible intent, one of the conditions being that no one who was a relative of an insurgent in arms could have the benefit, and this would include nearly the whole Cuban population. In a message to Congress, during this time. President McKinley used this significant language: “ I need not speak of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.” On the 11th day of April, President McKinley submitted his message to Congress, which put an end to controversy, and brought Congress to immediate and definite action. Its great length precludes a recapitulation of the whole. It dwelt upon the policies of his predecessors in regard to the vital questions involved ; told of the Spanish aggressions in Cuba, and the great menace to our material interests, CampatgJiing in the Philippines. 29 while this government had practiced the utmost prudence at enormous expense, having in view international relations, to protect Spanish interests in spite of their career of intrigue and destruction, and concludes : “In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.’’ “ In view of these facts and these considerations, I ask Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintain- ing order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tran- quillity, and the security of its citizens as well as our own ; and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes. ‘ ‘ And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island, I recommend that the distribution of food and sup- plies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens. “The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the constitution and the law, I await your action.” CONGRESS RECOGNIZES THE INDEPENDENCE OF CUBA. In this there was no mincing of words. It had the true ring. It was a cen- ter shot, and hit a vital part. At once Congress made its response and it likewise came in no uncertain terms. On the 13th of April, the House of Representatives passed a resolution directing the President to intervene in Cuban affairs at once, and authorized him to use the land and naval forces of the United States in his effort to stop the war. The Senate passed a substitute for the House resolution. Not that all did not concur in its spirit, but it was thought to be too loose in its wording. The Senate substitute was adopted by the House, and the measure as finally passed is the following; “Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demand- ing that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island a filipino hut. of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect. CampaiiTuing in the Philippines. P/0 ‘ Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three 3’ears in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, and have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminat- ing, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle- ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot be longer endured, as had been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; therefore, be it resolved : “First — That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent. “Second — That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the govern- ment of the United States does demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. “ Third — That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect. “ Fourth — That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or inten- tion to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.” WAR DECLARED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. On April 20th the United States government presented its ultimatum to Spain to, before noon on April 23rd, relinquish authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw both land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. Spain protested and refused compliance, and at once our North Atlantic squadron was ordered to Cuban waters to blockade Havana and other port cities. At noon on April 23rd the President issued his proclamation calling for 125,000 men for service in the military and naval forces of the government in the war with Spain. It is as follows: “ Whereas, by a joint resolution of Congress, approved on the 20th day of April, 1898, entitled ‘Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its SPANISH FORT AT CAVITE. Campaigmu}]; in the Philippines. 31 authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry this resolution into effect,’ and, “Whereas, by an Act of Congress entitled ‘An Act to provide for tempora- rily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war and for other purposes,’ approved April 22, 1898, the President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army, to issue this proclamation calling for volunteers to serve in the army of the United States. “ Now therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have thought it fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, vol- unteers to the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the pur- pose of the said resolution ; the same to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several states and territories and the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the proper authorities through the War Department. “ In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. “ Done at the City of Washington this twenty-third day of April, A. D. 1898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second. “By the President : William McKinley. “John Sherman, Secretary of State.’’ Upon the issuance of this proclamation. Chairman Dingley, of the Ways and Means Committee, introduced in the House a War Revenue Bill. At the instance of the President, Congress, on the 25th day of April, made the following formal declaration of war : “ A bill declaring that war the Kingdom of Spain. Be it enacted, etc. “1. That war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, 1898, including said day, be- tween the United States of ^ America and the Kingdom of I Spain. I “2. That the President of I the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and em- powered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into active service of the United States the militia of the several states to such extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect.” exists between the United States of America and A FILIPINO EQUIPAGE. * n Campaigiiuig in the Philippmes. On the same day a bill passed the Senate increasing the regular army. Pur- suant to the call for troops, the enlistment of men exceeded all expectations, and tenders were made by the governors of many states largely in excess of their quotas. By the 16th of May, 70,000 volunteers had been mustered in, and by the 18th, 92,580, and the following States had completed their quotas: California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming and District of Columbia. On May 25th the President issued his proclamation, calling for 75,000 more volunteers, making a total force of regulars and volunteers of 278,500 men. A statement from the Treasury Department of June 2d showed that for April the expenditure for a navy was $12,557,000, and for the army, $6,223,000. For May it was, navy, $9,093,000, and the army, $17,093,000. Congress passed a deficiency bill, appropriating $17,845,000 for war expenditures, and on June 10th, the War Revenue bill and the Secretary of the Treasury asked for subscriptions to the $200,000,000 three per cent bonds. CHAPTER III. AFTER THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. FTHR the destruction of the Spanish fleet the holding of Manila Bay was a military necessity. The American fleet was 7000 miles from an American port, and among all the hundreds of Asiatic ports which would have been available in time of peace there was not one which was open to an American war-vessel except for temporary refuge from stress of weather, and once only for each ship for such repairs and coal supply as might enable her to reach the nearest home port. It was therefore a military necessity to hold the bay and the naval docks and shops which had been wrested from the Spaniards. To this extent Admiral Dewey’s duty was clear. What should be done with the city of Manila was a different, and far more difficult problem. That it was within his power, by bombardment, to compel the capitulation of the city there could be no doubt. Had a Spanish fleet been approaching with the intent to attack him in Manila Bay, it would have doubtless been a military necessity to promptly reduce the city, no matter at what hazard, that in the event of another naval battle, his ships might not be subject to the fire of shore batteries. This condition, however, for the time being, did not exist. The only Spanish fleet in Oriental waters had been destroyed. Dewey’s fleet was safe in Manila harbor, with full possession of the stores, docks and shops of Cavite, and it was perfectly certain that so long as he did not attack Manila its batteries would not fire upon the American ships. If, on the other hand, he should take possession of Manila, international law would hold the United States responsible for the protection of non-Spanish persons and property in the city, and the law of humanity would hold them equally responsible for the protection of all other non-combatants. For this duty Admiral Dewey had no force, and his obvious course, therefore, was the one adopted — to leave things as they were, pending instructions and reinforcements, for which he promptly applied, mean- while, of course, maintaining a close blockade of the port. THE AMERICAN POEICY UNDETERMINED. Whether or not the opening thus made should be followed by the conquest and annexation, or other disposal of the Philippines, was a matter to be deter- mined at Washington, and for the pre.sent the authorities there had no means of forming an opinion. There was absolutely no public sentiment upon the subject other than the general desire to seize everything belonging to the enemy,, which 8b 34 Campaigning in the Philippines. prevails in all countries in time of war; nor was there any such special informa- tion immediately available to the President and Congress as would warrant the formation of any fixed judgment by them. The decision was made, however, and put into execution as rapidly as possible, to despatch troops to the islands in sufficient numbers to capture and hold the city of Manila, and be pre- pared to enforce, as to the remainder of the territory, whatever decision might ultimately be reached. As a matter of fact the most important factor in the ultimate solution of the problem was the character and disposition of the inhab- itants of the islands, and the probability of a satisfactory affiliation between them and the Americans. It is, perhaps, even yet too early to form definite opinions on this subject, but the following resume of some of the events which have occurred upon the islands during the past few years will throw some light upon the subject, and is at any rate essential to a proper understanding of the course of events since the American occupation. CONDITIONS UNDER SPANISH RULE. The Philippines, like all other Spanish colonies, were ruled with an iron hand. All authority was concentrated in the Governor-General, residing at Manila. There were provincial and municipal governments, but all subject to review by the central authority. To what extent the Governor-General was directed from Madrid does not appear, but apparently it depended upon his personal influence with the home government. It is stated that the Governor-Generals always went to the islands as poor men, and returned very rich. If this were true, and it is common report, their riches were obtained by peculation, because it is impossible to become rich from the legitimate emoluments of public office. There is no authentic statement known to us of the exact forms of tyranny practiced by the Spaniards upon the Filipinos, but in general it appears to have taken the form of corrupt administration rather than of oppressive laws. Both the fiscal ad- ministration and the courts are said to have been corrupt. The rich oppressed the poor, and divided the plunder with ofiicials. There appears to have been cases of enforced colonization, in which natives were compelled to leave their homes and settle in other islands. Those forms of oppression, however, which most directly affected the masses, seem to have been connected with the church. During the course of the three centuries of Spanish control, Christianity has become firmly implanted among the natives. With the exception of some Mohammedans in the southern islands, and the few tribes which are entirely uncivilized, all Filipinos are good Catholics. Those who know them best have least doubt as to the sin- cerity of the belief of the masses in the tenets of the Catholic faith. The Catholic church, as is well known, is a hierarchy with the parish priest as the unit, locally SPANISH TARGET PRACTICE ON THE LUNETA. '^ampaigJiiiig in the Philippines. 35 directed by his bishop and archbishop. But within the church there are a large number of religious orders, supposed to be devoted to good words and works, and actually so, so far as we in America know them, but independent of the authority of the priests and bishops, and respon- sible mainly to their own superiors, and through them, like the parish priests and bishops, to the Pope. The testimony is universal that in the Philippines these “friars” were wholly unlike the good men whom we know as such in this country, and, to a very great extent, were ignorant, brutish, licentious and rapacious. Educa- tional affairs, at least in the rural districts, were largely in their hands, and in many ways they were employed by the Governors in connection with the civil administration, in which capacity they could, and, as alleged, did practice all forms of petty extortion, while leading, as is stated, in many cases, grossly immoral lives. At any rate, the one clear and emphatic demand which stood out above all others from this sincerely Catholic people was that the friars should be banished from the islands, and all religious work committed to the parish priests, as to whom no complaint was made, and who appear to have acquired and deserved the entire respect of the people. SOCIETY OF THE KATIPUNAN. As the result of misgovernment there have been, since 1868, several Filipino insurrections, none of them attaining any great measure of success until that of 1896, which was coincident with the rebellion in Cuba. During all these years, however, the spirit of discontent has been spreading, and the art of secret organ- ization acquired. It is said that educated Filipinos residing in European capitals were initiated as Freemasons, and introduced into the islands many of the methods of that organization in the formation of the society of the “ Katipunan” — a Tagalo word meaning “brotherhood” — which was devoted to the attainment of the inde- pendence of the islands. This brotherhood became very strong on the island of Euzon, and gradually spread over most of the islands of the archipelago, largely aided, it is said, by the enforced colonization schemes of the government, from the fact that the suspected persons who were selected for deportation became new centers of conspiracy in the islands to which they were taken. REBEEEION OF 1896. Warfare between the Spaniards and their subject people has always been savage on both sides, and the preparations for the revolt which broke out on August 20, ' • ' 1896, are said to have included a conspiracy for the massacre of the entire Spanish, and perhaps foreign population. The night attack, on the 20th of August, in which the Spaniards were to have been slaughtered, was frustrated through the confession of the wife of a member of the Katipunan to a priest, and this led to the arrest and t - » 3 (> Caiupc.igmng in the Philippines. imprisonment at once of some 300 of the suspects. Some time before this, a petition, signed by 5000 of these natives, had been presented to the government of Japan, asking for annexation to that government, and this was at once forwarded by the Japanese government to that of Madrid. This action of J apan only added fuel to the fire. While the Spanish government was for the time lenient with these petitioners, it was compulsory lieniency, as there were then in the Philippines only about 1500 Spanish soldiers, and 6000 auxiliaries (natives). By the 1st of December following, this force had been increased to 10,000 Spanish regulars, with the addition of some small war-craft. Arrests fol- lowed, and discontent became rampant. On the 26th of August, 1896, Caloocan was raided by the insurgents, some Chinese killed and others captured. The Spanish cavalry started in pursuit, but all had vanished. On the morning of August 30th the first battle of the insurrection occurred at San Juan del Monte, just outside Manila, the rebels making the attack at four o’clock in the morning. BRIDGE OF SPAIN. A FIESTA DAY. They had no military skill or leadership, Sancho Valenzuela being in command, and he, by occupation, a ropemaker. One Spaniard was killed and several wounded. There were eighty of the rebels killed. On September 4th four of the leaders of the San Juan fight were executed on the Luneta. This was followed by the execution of others. The rebellion now spread like an infection, reaching into the provinces, the populace being quite universally allied with the rebellion. Everywhere, however, the little conflicts were favorable to the Spanish. AGUINALDO APPEARS. The province of Cavite soon attracted most attention from its connection with Don Emilio Aguinaldo. He was there teaching school at Silan, a small place, but a hotbed and resort of rebels. He was born in this province on the 22d of March, 1868, at Cauit. Cauipaii^nuig in the Philippines. 37 Aguinaldo at once sprang into prominence by issuing an address to the people, counseling resistance. There was not formulated in this proclamation a plan of government. At San Francisco de Malabon he organized the revolutionary move- ment, and at once marched to Imus, in the province of Cavite. Here there was a slight engagement, and several priests were captured and cruelly tortured to death. Aguinaldo fortified Imus. The insurgents also held Paranaque and Las Pinas, and built trenches one and one-half miles long, south of Cavite fort and arsenal; they were splendidly entrenched. Here the Spaniards, with a large force, sought to dislodge them, but were defeated with the loss of nearly the half of a whole regiment of auxiliaries; sixty Spanish regulars were killed and fifty wounded. The Spaniards retired behind trenches. In the meantime executions were the order of the day; in Manila thirteen of the “promoters” were executed at one time. There was an organized force of insurgents north of Manila, in the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga. Their estimated strength was 3000. Against these the Spaniards had a cavalry c’etachment of 500 men. Nothing effective, however, was done. With the augmentation of the Spanish forces an attempt was made to capture the insurgents, but everywhere the rebels seemed victorious. At Car- mona, Silan, Imus, Binicayan — all were Spanish defeats, but still these defeats served the purpose of keeping the rebel forces out of Manila. It was a savage warfare and no mercy shown by either faction. CHANGES IN THE GOVERNOR-GENERALSHIP. Governor-General Blanco, not being in harmony with the archbishop, was recalled to Spain in December. At this time the insurgent force was practically in possession of the whole province of Cavite, except the fortifications of Cavite, and there were in the province about 7000 insurgent troops, mostly equipped with Mauser rifles. They were well entrenched, but with no sufficient artillery. Their total fighting force at this time was about 35,000 men. General Camilo Polavieja succeeded General Blanco. His available force was increased to 28,000 men, and a vigorous campaign was at once inaugurated. General Lachambre was his deputy commanding in the field, and a large number of small engagements followed, the result of which, for the time, re-established Spanish rule in Cavite province. General Polavieja and his deputy resigned and left for Spain, April 15, 1897. He was succeeded in command by General Fernando Primo de Rivera, who arrived later in the spring in Manila. At this time, Aguinaldo had united his forces with Llaneras, and they overran a number of the northern provinces, including Tarlac. General Monet conducted the Spanish campaign against these forces, but his barbarities were such that the rebellion only spread and strengthened. His native auxiliaries, and the native priests, almost in a body joined the rebellious army. The rebellion, from now until the making )f that remarkable pact of peace which so long brought Aguinaldo and his ss Cauipaii^ning in the Philippines. party into obloquy, took on the form of guerrilla warfare. There were no actions known as battles, between the forces, but a series of raids and assaults by small detachments. THE PACT OF PEACE. On August 6, 1897, General Rivera commissioned a Filipino to negotiate terms of peace with the insurgents; and an agreement or treaty, known as the “ Facto de Biac-na-bato,” was made, on the part of the Spanish government, by Pedro A. Paterno, the Filipino mentioned, and Agui- naldo and thirty-four of his leaders; in which among other stipulations, it was agreed, — 'that the rebels should be paid $1,000,000, and the families who had been damaged by the war $700,000; that Aguinaldo and his associates should leave the islands, and not return without the consent of the Spanish government; all arms and ammunition of the rebels were to be sur- rendered, and the}" were to evacuate all places and A SORE CROWD. fortlficatlons held by them b}" force of arms. An armistice for three years was provided for, in which certain promised reforms were to be made, and the rebels should not again engage in rebellious acts. There has been much dispute as to the full terms of that compact, the insur- gents claiming that many reforms were provided for, which the Spaniards deny. As the treaty or agreement has never been published or made known by any of those who were party to it, there is cause for suspicion, that in its scope, and afterwards in its execution, there was that which would compromise those con- nected with it. On the 15th of December, 1897, however, the General-in-Chief, and his mediator, Pedro A. Paterno, signed the following agreement which appears to be a part of the unpublished compact: “ In the peace proposals presented b}" the sole mediator, Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, in the name and on behalf of the rebels in arms, and in the Peace Pro- tocol which was agreed to and sub- mitted to His Majesty’s Government, which approv- ed of the same, there exists a principal clause relat- ing to the sums of mon- ey which BRIDGE AT BULACAN. were handed over to the rebels and their families as indemnity for the loss of their goods consequent on the war, which sums amounted to a total of $1,700,- 000, which the mediator, Senor Paterno, was to distribute absolutely at his CanipcAij^mng i)i the Philippines. 39 discretion, but the payment of the said sum will have to be subject to the conditions proposed by the representative of the government, H. K. the General-in-Chief of this army. These conditions were agreed to be as follows, viz : 1. For the rebels in arms a draft for the sum of $400,000 will be handed to Sehor Paterno, payable in Hongkong, as well as two cheques for $200,000 each, payable only on the condition of the agreement being fulfilled on the other part. 2. For the families of those who were not rebels in arms, or engaged in rebel- lion, but who likewise suffered the evils of war, the balance of the sum offered shall be paid in three installments, the last to be paid six months after the date on which the Te Deum shall be sung, assuming the peace to become an accomplished fact. Peace shall be held to be effectively concluded if, during the interval of these installment periods, no party of armed rebels, with recognized leader, shall exist, and if no secret society shall have been discovered as existing here or abroad with the proved object of conspiracy by those who benefit by these pay- ments. The representative of the rebels, Don Pedro Al- ejandro Pater- no, and the representative of the govern- ment, the Cap- tain-General Don Fernando Primo de Ri- vera, agree to the above con- ditions, in witness whereof each representative now signs four copies of the same tenor and effect, one being for the government, another for the archives of the Captain- Generalcy, and one copy each for the said representatives. *Done in Manila on the 15th of December, 1897. Fernando Primo de Rivera, The General-in-Chief. Pedro A. Paterno. MONEY PAID BY THE SPANISH TO THE INSURGENTS. Pursuant to this agreement certain sums were paid by the Spanish to the rebels. Aguinaldo and his party embarked for Hongkong on December 27, 1897, escorted by Spanish officers, and counseling submission to Spanish authority. The rebels delivered up their arms, the Spanish government sent home 7000 of its troops, and there was an interval of peace. It is claimed on one hand, and has generally been believed in America, that in this transaction Aguinaldo and his leaders were bribed by the Spanish *The original of the above document was read in public session of Congress in Madrid, on the I6th of June, 1898, by the Deputy Sehor Muro. ENTRANCE TO FORT SAN FILIPA. 40 Campaigning^ in the Philippines. government to desert their cause, and that as matters turned out they were guilty of the double infamy of accepting a bribe and refusing to “ stay bought.” On the other hand it is insisted by the friends of Aguinaldo that the money paid by the Spaniards was in no sense a personal matter, but constituted a trust fund, to be employed as circumstances might determine; if the pledges alleged to have been made by the Spanish in connection with the payment were kept, the money was to be distributed among those who had suffered loss by the rebellion; if otherwise it was to be used in a renewal of the revolutionary movement. What the real intent was cannot now be known. There can be little doubt that the Spanish authorities be- lieved that whatever the ostensible purpose for which the money was paid, it would in the end be retained by Auginaldo and his leaders, who would thereby be dis- credited and incapable of further mischief. Wheth- er this would have been the case can now never be known, as the advent of the Americans made a complete change in the situation, opening as it did to the imagination of Aguinaldo, possibili- ties of which he could not have dreamed. It is interesting to note in this connection what General Francis V. NATIVE THEATER. Grccne, of the United States Army in the Philippines, thought of the bribery phase of the affair and of Aguinaldo. In his official report to the Secretary of War, dated August 30, 1898, he says: “ Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A portion of the mone}", $400,000, was deposited in banks at Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms. Caiupaigmng in the Philippines. 41 and if they failed to do so, it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insur- rection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho $5000. No steps have been taken to introduce the reforms. More than 2000 insurgents who had been deported to Fernando Po and other places are still in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to carry on the opera- tions of the present insurrection.” General Whittier’s statement shows that Aguinaldo even refused to take money for his personal expenses when asked to return to Manila by the American Consul at Singapore, Spencer Pratt, who offered him. ^ soldikr has varied experiences. money for that purpose. Did the Spanish government keep its pact ? It is known before General Rivera left Manila in April, 1898, the chiefs in Hong- kong had been paid $300,000. What further pacification they have received is not clear. THE TRAGEDY OF THE CALLE DE CAMBA. It now became apparent that the government, believing that the rebellion was conquered, the forces scattered, the fortifications surrendered, and the rebels without arms, thought it could treat with impunity the rights of the people in utter disregard of its promises and pledges. The public, mind was soon again in a ferment, and the agitation was becoming tense. At this time, March 25th, occurred what is known as the 2 Tragedy of the Calle de Camba.” A large number of Viscayan sailors were assembled in one of the outskirts of Manila, and in a little carnival, were vehemently discussing the national wrongs. A passer-by informed the police; the civil guard attacked the place, and, without warning, shot down seventy of the Viscayans. Within nine days from this time an army of insurgents in Cebu, in the Viscayan group, 5000 strong, organized and took the city, except the fort. Government House, college and the foreigners’ houses; the government places were kept in a state of siege. Reinforcements came from Manila and the rebels were driven from the city. At Labangan another great battle was fought, in which the rebel loss was reported at 1000. In Euzon Island rebellion was again rife. In the provinces adjoining and north ' of Manila the looting and killing was like that of savages. A Spanish force of about 1000 men, under General Monet, was sent agaimst the rebels; but still the violence and destruction was not abated. General Basilio Augustin now succeeded Rivera in command in the Philippines. Upon the breaking out of war with this country the Spanish policy towards the natives was at once changed, and every effort made to attach them to the Spanish cause. Relying upon their attachment to the Catholic church, the strongest appeals were made to them by the church authorities. The following “allocution,” issued by the archbishop of Madrid, may serve as an example of these documents which were strongly reinforced by the resident prelates and the press. It was sought to convince the Filipinos that a Protestant army was coming to devastate their homes and destroy their religious liberty. 42 Campai(^)ii}io- m the Philippines. ALLOCUTION BY THE ARCHBISHOP OF MADRID “Very Beloved Sons: The cursed hunger for gold and the unquenchable thirst for power have com- bined to tarnish that flag which the great Queen Isabella raised, by the hand of Columbus, in the West Indies. With justice trodden under foot, the voice of the Pope unheeded, and the interventions of the nations despised with arrogance, every road to the counsels of peace has been barred, and the horrors of war have become a necessity. Tet heaven be witness that we are not the authors of this disaster, and let the responsibility before God be on that vain people whose dogma seems to be that money is the god of the world There, ploughing the seas, go our soldiers and our sailors. Have no fear, let no one weep, unless, indeed, it be for fear of arriving too late for the fray. Go, braves, to fight with the blessing of the Fatherland. With you goes all Spain, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, from Irun to Tarifa. With what envy do we contemplate you weighing anchor to leave our shores! Oh! why does juvenility, or decrepitude, or duty deprive us of the joy of taking part in your enterprise? But no! with you goes our Spanish heart May the Immaculate Virgin, whose scapulary hangs around your necks and whose blessed image floats on your flags, protect you under her mantle in the moment of danger, deliver you from all evil, and shower blessings upon you! May Saint James, patron of Spain, and the martyr Nico- demus and Saint Telmo and Saint Raymond and the King Saint Ferdinand, go before you and ever march in the vanguard wherever you may go and make you invulnerable to the bullets of the enemy, so that you may return victorious to tread once more this noble soil and kiss the cheek of the weeping mother who bore you! .... We, who cannot go to take part in the battles, will hold and brandish the arms of prayer, like Moses, who prayed on the mountain whilst Joshua slew his ferocious enemies in the valley God has triumph in His hand and will give it to whom He pleases. He gave it to Spain in Cova- donga, in Las Navas, in El Salado, in the river of Seville, on the plain of Granada, and in a thousand battles which overflow the pages of history. Oh, Lord, give it us now! Let the nations see that against the right of might there is the might of right! To all beloved sons, from our heart we have pleasure in sending you our pas- toral benediction, in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Amen. Given in our palace in Madrid on the 23d of April, 1898. JosE Ma, Archbishop of Madrid- Alcala.’^ AGUINALDO MEETS THE AMERICAN CONSUL-GENERAL. At Hongkong, in the m.eantime, there had been established by Aguinaldo and his self-exiled followers, a junta known as the “Philippine Patriotic League.” In view of the alleged Spanish violation of the pact, it was seeking foreign help and recognition with the intent to again attack Spanish rule in the Philippines. The breaking out of the American war seemed to open a new prospect for the Campaigning in the Philippines. 4 :? MAGELLAN’S MONUMENT. Singapore a Malay police sergeant was illegally employed to investigate the private acts of a Filipino. The editor of the Singapore Free Press and Mr. Bray had become acquainted. The editor introduced Mr. Bray to the American Consul-General, Mr. Spencer Pratt, and Mr. Bray presented Emilio Aguinaldo to the Consul-General. The midnight meeting of the above-named four persons took place at ‘ The Mansion,’ River Valley Road, Singapore, on the 24th day of April, the day following the outbreak of American-Spanish hostilities. The original idea in making Aguinaldo and the Consul-General known to each other was to utilize Aguinaldo’ s services and prestige with the armed natives to control them and prevent reprisals when the American forces should appear before Manila. It was hoped that, in this way, the lives of many Spaniards in the islands would be spared. The result of this Singapore meeting was that a draft agreement between Consul-General Pratt and Emilio PACO CEMETERY. attainment of Philippine independence. Aguinaldo at once sought to open commu- nication with the American representatives at Hongkong, who were of course ready to forward any enterprise directed against Spain. The manner in which this meeting was brought about, with a summary of the agreement alleged to have been made, is given as follows by John Foreman, F. R. G. S., an English author then in Hongkong: “The Filipinos were now anxious to co-operate with the Americans in com- pelling the Spaniards to evacuate the archipelago. The American Consul in Hongkong, Mr. Wildman, accepted the honorary post of treasurer of the Patri- otic League Fund. Emilio Aguinaldo and suite went to Singapore, where they found Mr. Howard W. Bray, an Englishman and old personal friend of mine, who had resided some years in the islands. Aguinaldo and his party were obliged to travel incognito, because secret paid agents were on his track to endeavor to fetter his movements, and in 44 Ca}iipai_^)ii}ij^' in the Philippines. Aguinaldo was drawn up, subject to the approval of Commodore Dewey and subsequent confirmation from Washington. The essence of this provisional un- derstanding was as follows, viz: THE TERMS OF AN ALLEGED AGREEMENT. 1. Philippine independence to be proclaimed. 2. A Federal republic to be established by vote of the rebels; pending the taking of this vote Aguinaldo was to appoint the members of that government. 8. The Federal republic to recognize a temporary intervention of American and European Administrative Commissions to be appointed by Commodore Dewey. 4. The American Protectorate to be recognized on the same terms as those fixed for Cuba. 5. Philippine ports to be open to all the world. 6. Precautionary measures to be adopted against the influx of Chinese. 7. The existing judicial system to be reformed. 8. Liberty of the press and right of assembly to be proclaimed. 9. Ample tolerance of all religions and sects, but abolition and expulsion of all monastic orders. 10. Measures to be adopted for working up the natural resources of the archipelago. 11. The wealth of the country to be developed by the construction of high roads and railways. 12. The obstacles operating against the development of enterprises and employment of foreign capital to be removed. 13. The new government to preserve public order and check all reprisals against the Spaniards. 14. Spanish officials to be transported to another safe and healthy island until there shall be an opportunity for their return to Spain. 15. This agreement is subject to ratification (by telegraph) by Commodore Dewey and President Mc- Kinley. Consul-Gen- eral Pratt then sent Em- ilio Aguinaldo with his staff to Hongkong with instruc- tions to Con- sul Wildman to put him in communi- cation with Commodore Dewey, which he did, and Commodore Dewe}^ before he left China for Manila, gave orders to Consul Wildman to see that Aguinaldo and his staff followed on in an American war-ship.” Cauipaigiiing lu the Philippines. 45 Whatever the actual facts attending this meeting, they have never been officially disclosed by the United States government. There can be no doubt that what Aguinaldo had in mind was the independence of the islands, with himself as the President or Sovereign. It would be very natural to suppose that with the Spanish fleet still safely at Manila, the fighting powers of Spain still undeter- mined, and no thought of the conquest of the Philippines in the mind of any American, our Consular and other officers might have assumed that the policy of the United States towards those islands would be precisely that solemnly announced with reference to Cuba — the independence of the islands under the friendly supervision, and possibly, the protectorate of the United States. That Consul-General Pratt made any promises is impossible, for he had no authority, and Aguinaldo knew that he had none. The summary as given by Mr. Foreman in fact expressly provides for the ratification of the agreement at Washing- ton. It is very likely indeed, however, that both Consul-General Pratt and Com- modore Dewey believed at the time that the agreement was desirable on the part of the United States, and would be ratified at Washington. It may be con- sidered as certain that this was expected by Aguinaldo. Neither President McKinley and his advisers, however, nor Congress were apparently prepared to say yes or no. They knew little of Aguinaldo and less of the Filipinos. They did know that hostilities in the Philippines had been con- ducted by the most brutal methods, and were probably not willing to become responsible before the world for a warfare conducted with savage barbarity, and certainly no conditions existed — nor did they exist before the ratification of the Treaty of Paris — which would warrant the President in acknowledging indepen- dence or even belligerency on the part of the Filipinos. Beyond this, the Presi- dent himself had no authority except during war, as a military commander. He could not pledge the course of the United States except as to the conduct of military affairs during the existing war with Spain, and for whatever Aguinaldo and the Filipinos might do while serving under the direction of an American commander, the United States would be responsible, pecuniarily and otherwise to neutral nations, and morally to the Spanish government and the world, for the treatment of Spanish citizens. What apparently happened was this: Admiral Dewey, and subsequently the commander of the army, were given, or assumed, the authority to make whatever use they deemed possible of the Filipinos against Spain, so long as it could be assured that the war would be conducted in accordance with the usages of 46 Cauipaigfuyi^ in the Philippines. civilized nations. The proposals of Aguinaldo looking to the independence of the islands apparently received no definite answer until the signature of the Treaty of Paris. The result was that Aguinaldo, as previously arranged with Commodore Dewey, proceeded to Cavite, where he arrived on May 19, 1898, on the despatch boat McOilloch. The object of Aguinaldo was to work and fight for independ- ence. On the part of the American authorities there was no policy as to this sub- ject, and doubtless no direct reply made to Aguinaldo. The conditions of trouble existed, and in due time developed. Previous to his arrival, Aguinaldo had prepared and sent forward the follow- ing proclamation which seems to have been distributed in the islands by the American generals: PROCLAMATION OF THE PHILIPPINE JUNTA. “ Philippine Patriots. A nation which has nothing good can give nothing. It is evident we cannot depend on Spain to obtain the welfare we all desire. A country like Spain, where social evolution is at the mercy of monks and tyrants, can only communicate to us its own instincts of calumny, infamy, inquisitorial proceedings, avarice, secret police, false pretences, humiliation, deprivation of liberties, slavery and moral and material decay which characterize its history. Spain will need much time to shake off the parasites which have grown upon and cling to her; she has no self-dependence so long as her nationality is composed of inquisitorial monks, ambitious soldiers, demoralized civil servants, and a populace bred to support this state of things in silence. It is, therefore, useless to expect anything from Spain. “ During three and a half centuries Spain’s policy has been a delusion. Is there a conflict between Spain and England or Holland ? Then the friars come and relate to us preposterous absurdities of the miracles of Saint Francis and of the Image of the Virgin of the Rosary, whilst Simon de Anda calls the Pampango natives his brothers so long as they fight to save the Spanish flag falling into the hands of English or Dutch savages! Is the foreign invasion ended ? Then the friars, through their salaried agents in the press, reward us with epithets such as monkey, buffalo, etc. Is there another conflict imminent between Germany and Spain ? Then the friars call the natives Spaniards and the military officers own us as their sons, and they dub us brave soldiers. Is the conflict finished ? Then we are again overgrown boys, beings of inferior race and incapable of being civil- ized. Is there now to be a struggle with Americans ? Then General Augustin, who is the living symbol of Spanish authority, who ought to be the most prudent of the prudent, the most cultivated of the cul- tivated, points at America as a nation composed of all* social excrescences; the friars and their enslaved Spaniards want to again cajole and cheat us with offers of participation in public affairs, recognition of the military grades of ex-rebel chiefs, and other twaddle degrading COOKS’ QUARTERS. Camfaigniuir in the JVii/ippities. 47 to those who would listen to it. In fact, they have called into their councils the sons of the country, whilst they exclusively carry out their own ideas, and reserve to themselves the right to set aside all the resolutions at a stroke. They offer to enroll in their ranks the insurgents of yesterday, so that they can have them all shot on the morrow of the present difficulty. What irrision ? Do you want another trick exposed ? Now that Spain is in danger of losing the Philippines, the executioners of the other day — the everlasting tyrants — tell us that America will sell the islands to England. No, America has its past and its present. America will preserve a clear intelligence; she is not dominated by friars and tyrants like Spain; she is liberal; she has liberated her slaves against the will of the Spaniards who were, for the most part, their owners. A country is known by its national character, — review its past history and it is easy to understand the calumny launched against the Americans. But even though we became English should we not gain by PICCANINNIES. it ? The English have conceded self-government to many of their colonies and not of the frail delusive sort that Spain granted to Cuba. In the English colonies there are liberties which Spain never yielded to hers in America or Philippines. “ Our country is very rich, and as a last resource we can buy it from the Amer- icans. Do not be deceived by the Spaniards ! Help the Americans, who promise us our liberty. Do not fall into the error of taking Spain to be a civilized country. Europe and America consider her the most barbarous of the century. There the weakest is the most persecuted. In no country to-day but Spain is the inquisi- tion tolerated. It is proved by the tortures imposed on the prisoners of Mont- juich, of the Philippines, and of Cuba. Spain did not fulfill the agreement entered .. ^ — LiH/e Photo. RITRAE SCENES. CaDi'yai^nins; in the Philippijics. EP'FECT OE SHELLS ON CONVENT AT CAVITE. Darcey Pltolo. Remember the into with Maximo Gomez at Zanjon, nor that made with Aguinaldo at Biac-na- bato. Spain is a nation always more ready to promise than to perform. But ask for friars, soldiers and state dependents to come and devour our wealth and instantly you will get them. Spain has nothing else to give, and God grant she will keep what she has. Spain will flat- ter 3 ^ou under the present cir- " cum stances, but do not be deceived. Submit every fawning offer to your conscience. Remember the execution of the innocents, the tortures and atrocities which have been the means of covering with decorations the breasts of those who took the blood of 3 'our fathers, brothers, relations and friends. Providence will aid the Americans in their triumph, for the war is a just one for the nation elected to lead us to the goal of our liberty. Do not rail against the designs of Providence; it will be suicidal. Aid the Americans ! ” At once upon the arrival of Aguinaldo, he was found at the head of 30,000 “insurrectos,” and on such terms of amit}^ with Admiral Dewey, that the latter furnished him, two cannon, 500 rifles, and 200,000 rounds of ammunition. Agui- naldo was found to have retained his oldtime prestige with his countrymen, and at once began an active campaign to cripple and harass the Spanish forces. There now followed a series of small engagements between the Spaniards and the insurgents, in which the Spaniards were driven into a small radius in and around iManila; and there was an effective blockade of that city from the interior. As the result of six days’ campaign they captured 1500 prisoners, including Brigadier-General Garcia Pena of the Spanish forces, a colonel, and many staff officers, and 500 Filipino volunteers, as prisoners. General Monet, who was now operating north of Manila, against the “insurrectos,” lost practically his whole command, and was fortunate to get into Manila himself, without his followers. Aguinaldo had been ordered not to attack the city of Manila. During this period there was a comparative tranquillity in the outlying dis- tricts of Manila, and the country reclaimed by the rebels. Aguinaldo, at the time of his return from Hongkong, declared a dictatorship for the islands, and this government was in control in the territory mentioned. Within two months this jurisdiction had been so effective, that Aguinaldo convened a Provisional Congress, on June 23d, giving the government the name of “Revolutionary,” instead of “ Dictatory,” and proclaimed a constitution. The lines of the insur- gent army were gradually drawn round the city of Manila, and in this con- dition affairs remained until the arrival of the advance of the American army. Cainpaigmng 7// the Philippuies. 49 “ Don Emii.10 Aguinai^do y Famy, “President of the Philippine Revolutionary Government and Commander-in-Chief of its Army, “This government, desirous of demonstrating to the Philippine people that one of its objects is to abolish with a firm hand the inveterate vices of Spanish administration, substitut- ing a more simple and expeditious system of public administration for that superfluity of civil service and ponderous, tardy and ostentatious official routine, I hereby declare as follows, viz : CHAPTER I. Of the Revolutionary Government. “ Article 1. The Dictatorial government shall be henceforth called the Revolutionary gov- ernment, whose object is to struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations, including Spain, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country for the establishment of a real republic. The dictator shall be henceforth styled the President of the Revolutionary government. “ Article 2. Four government Secretaryships are created: (1) of Foreign Affairs, Navy and Trade; (2) of War and Public Works; (3) of Police, Public Order, Justice, Public Educa- tion and Health; (4) of Finance, Agriculture and Manufactures. The government has power to increase the number of secretaryships when experience has shown that the above distribu- tion of public offices is insufficient to meet public requirements. “ Article 3. Each Secretary shall assist the President in the administration of affairs con- cerning his particular branch. The Secretary at the head of each respective department shall not be responsible for the Presidential decrees, but shall sign the same to give them authen- ticity. But if it should appear that the decree has been issued on the proposal of the Secre- tary of the corresponding branch, then the Secretary shall be jointly responsible with the President. “Article 4. The Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs shall be divided into three centers, one of Diplomacy, one of Navy, and another of Trade. The first center shall study and execute all affairs which concern the direction of diplomatic negotiations with other powers and the correspondence of this government connected therewith. The second shall study all that relates to the formation and organization of our navy, and the fitting out of whatever expedi- tions the circumstances of the revolution may require; and the third shall attend to all matters concerning home and foreign trade and the preliminary work in connection with the treaties of commerce to be made with other nations. “ Article 5. The Secretaryship of War shall be divided into two centers, the one exclusively of War and the other exclusively of Public Works. The first center shall be divided into four sections, one of Campaign, one of Military Justice, one of Military Administration, and the other of Military Health. The Campaign section shall draw up and attend to all matters concerning the service and enlistment of the Revolutionary militia, the direction of campaigns, the making of plans, fortifications, and the editing of the announcement of battles, the study of military tactics for the Army, and organization of the respective staffs, artillery, and cavalry corps, and all other matters concerning campaigns and military operations. The section of Military Justice shall attend to all matters concerning court-martials and military sentences, the appointment of judges and assistant judges in all military-judicial affairs. The Military Administrator shall take charge of the commissariat department and all Army equipment, and the Military Health department shall take charge of all matters concern- ing the health and salubrity of the militia. “ Article 6. The other Secretaryships shall be divided into so many centers corresponding to their functions, and each center shall be sub-divided into sections as the nature and import- ance of the work requires. “ Article 7. The Secretary of each department shall inspect and watch over the work therein and be responsible to the President of the government. At the head of each section there shall be a director, and in each section there shall be an official in charge assisted by the necessary staff. 4b 50 CiDupaigning in the rhilippines. “Article 8. The President shall have the sole right to appoint the Secretaries, and in agree- ment with them he shall appoint all the staff subordinate to the respective departments. Nevertheless, in the election of individuals, favoritism must be avoided on the understanding that the good name of the Fatherland and the triumph of the revolution need the services of the most really capable persons. “Article 9. The Secretaries can take part in the sessions of the Revolutionary Congress, whenever they have a motion to present in the name of the President, or on the interpellation of any deputy, but when the question under debate, or the motion on which they have been summoned is put to the vote, they shall retire and not take part in that voting. “ Article 10. The President of the government is the personification of the Philippine peo- ple, and as such he cannot be held responsible for any act whilst he holds that position. His position is irrevocable until the revolution shall triumph, unless extraordinary circumstances should compel him to tender his resignation to Congress, in which case only Congress shall elect whomsoever is esteemed most fit. CHAPTER II. Of the Revolutionary Congress. “Article 11. The Revolutionary Congress is the assembly of those deputies from the Philippine provinces, elected in due form, as prescribed in the decree of the 18th inst Nevertheless, if any province could not elect deputies because the majority of its towns had not yet been able to free themselves from Spanish dominion, the government can nominate provisional deputies chosen from the persons of highest consideration by reason of their educa- tion and social position up to the number fixed by the said decree, always provided that such persons shall have been born or have resided for a long time in the provinces to be represented. “ Article 12. When the deputies shall have met in the town and in the building to be pro- vided by the Revolutionary government, the preliminary act shall be the election by majority of votes of a commission of five persons who shall examine the documents accrediting the personality of each person, and another commission of three persons who shall examine the documents exhibited by the first commission of five. “ Article 13. The next day the said deputies shall again meet and the two commissions shall read their respective reports on the validity of the said documents, all doubts on the same to be resolved by an absolute majority of votes. They shall then at once proceed to the elec- tion, by absolute majority, of a President, a Vice-President, and two Secretaries, to be chosen from among the same deputies, after which the Congress shall be held to be constituted, and notice of the same shall be given to the government. “Article 14. The meeting place of Congress is sacred and inviolable, and no armed force can enter therein except on the summons of the President of the Congress for the purpose of restoring order, should the same have been disturbed by those who know not how to honor themselves and their solemn functions. “Article 15. The powers of Congress are: To look after the general interests of the Philippine people and the fulfillment of the Revolutionary laws; to discuss and vote laws; to discuss and approve before ratification, all treaties and loans ; to examine and approve the accounts of the general expenses which shall be presented annually by the Finance Secretary and to fix the extraordinary taxes, and others which, in future, may be imposed. “ Article lb. The voice of Congress shall also be heard in all matters of grave importance the resolution of which will admit of delay, but the President of the government can resolve questions of an urgent character, rendering an account of his acts to Congress by means of a message. “ Article 17. Any deputy can present a bill in Congress and any Secretary can do so by order of the President of the government. “ Article 18. The sessions of Congress shall be public, and only in cases where reserve is necessary shall secret sessions be held. ‘ ‘ Article 19. The order of debate and parliamentary usages shall be determined by instructions to be formulated by Congress. The President shall lead the debate, but shall not vote unless there fail to be a majority, in which case he shall give his casting vote. CauipaiiTjiijiir tn the Philippines. 51 “ Article 20. The President of the government cannot, in any manner, impede the meet- ing of Congress nor interfere with the sessions of the same. “ Article 21. Congress shall appoint a permanent judicial commission, to be presided over by the Vice-President, assisted by one of the Secretaries, and composed of these persons and seven assessors elected by a majority of votes from among the deputies. This commission shall revise the sentences given in criminal cases by the provincial councils, and shall judge and sen- tence, without right of further appeal, cases brought against the Government Secretaries, Provincial Chiefs and Provincial Councilors. “ Article 22. In the office of the Secretary to Congress there shall be a book of honor, in which shall be noted the great services rendered to the Fatherland and esteemed as such by Congress. Any Filipino, military or civil, can solicit of Congress inscription in the said book on producing the documents which prove the praiseworthy acts performed by him for the good of the Fatherland since the present revolution began. For extraordinary services which may in future be rendered, the government will propose the inscription, the proposal being accom- panied by the necessary justification. “ Article 23. Congress shall determine, on the proposal of the government, the money rewards to be paid, once for all, to the families of those who were victims to duty and patriot- ism in the execution of heroic acts. “Article 24. The resolutions of Congress shall not be binding until they have received the sanction of the President of the government. When the said President shall consider any resolution undesirable, or impracticable, or pernicious, he shall state his reasons to Congress for opposing its execution, and if Congress still insists on the resolution the said President can outvote it on his own responsibility. CHAPTER III. Of Military Justice. “ Article 25. When any commandant of a detachment shall receive notice of an individual in the service having committed a fault or having performed any act reputed to be a military misdemeanor, he shall inform the commandant of the district of the same, and this officer shall appoint a judge and secretary to constitute a Court of Inquiry in the form prescribed in the instructions dated 20th instant. If the accused held the rank of lieutenant, or a higher one, the same commandant shall be the judge, and if the commandant himself were the a.ccused, the Superior Commandant of the province shall appoint as judge an officer of a higher rank, and if there were none such the same commandant of the province shall open the inquiry. The judge shall always hold the rank of chief. “Article 26. When the Court of Inquiry has finished its labors, the Superior Commandant shall appoint three assistant judges of equal or superior rank to the judge, and a court-martial shall be composed of the three assistant judges, the judge the assessor, and the president. The commandant of the district shall be the judge if the accused held the rank of sergeant, or a lower one, and the Superior Commandant shall be judge if the accused held the rank of lieutenant, or a higher one. This court shall pass sevitence in the same form as the Provincial Courts, but the sentence can be appealed against before the Superior Council of War. “ Article 27. The Superior Council of War shall be composed of six assistant judges, who shall hold the minimum rank of Brigadier-General, and the War Office Adviser. If the num- ber of generals residing in the capital of the Revolutionary government are insufficient, the number shall be made up by deputies to be appointed on commission by Congress. The presi- dent of this council shall be the general of the highest rank among them, and if there is more than one of the same rank, one shall be elected by themselves by majority of votes. “Article 28. The Superior Council shall judge and sentence, without right of further appeal, Superior Commandants, Commandants of Districts, and all officers who hold rank of Commandant, or a higher one. “ Article 29. Military misdemeanors are the following : (11 Violation of the immunity due to foreigners, both as to their persons and their goods, and violation of the privileges appertaining to sanitary establishments and ambulances, as well 52 Campaigning in the Philippines. as the persons and effects in, or belonging to, one or the other, and persons employed in the service of the same so long as they commit no hostile act. (2) Want of respect for the lives, money, and jewelry of the enemy who surrenders his arms, and for prisoners of war. (3) The entry of Filipinos into the service of the enemy as spies, or to discover war secrets, make plans of the revolutionists’ positions and fortifications, or present themselves to parley without proving their mission or their individuality. (4; Violation of the immunity due to those who come with this mission, duly accredited, in the form prescribed by international law. The following persons also commit military misdemeanors : (1) Those who endeavor to break up the union of the revolutionists, fomenting rivalry between chiefs, and forming divisions and armed bands. (2) Those who collect taxes without being duly authorized by government, or misappropriate public funds. (3) Those who, being armed, surrender to the enemy or commit any act of cowardice before the same ; and (4) Those who sequester any person who has done no harm to the revolution, or violate women, or assassinate, or seriously wound any undefended persons, or commit robbery or arson. “ Article 30. Those who commit any of the above-named misdemeanors shall be con- sidered declared enemies of the revolution, and shall be punished in the highest scale of punishment provided for in the Spanish Penal Code. If the misdemeanor were not provided for in the said code, the culprit shall be confined until the revolution has triumphed, unless his crime shall have caused an irreparable injury, which, in the opinion of the court, would justify the imposition of capital punishment. AdDITIONAI. CIvAUSES. “ Article 31. The government shall establish abroad a Revolutionary committee, composed of an indefinite number of the most competent persons in the Philippine archipelago. This committee shall be divided into three sections, viz ; Of diplomacy ; of the navy and of the army. The diplomatic section shall negotiate with the foreign cabinets the recognition of belligerency and Philippine independence. The naval section shall be entrusted with the study and organization of Philippine navy and prepare the expeditions which the circum- stances of the revolution may require. The army section shall study military tactics and the best form of organizing staff, artillery and engineer corps, and all that is necessary to put the Philippine army on a footing of modern advancement. “Article 32. The government shall dictate the necessary instructions for the execution of the present decree. “ Article 33. All decrees of the Dictatorial government which may be in opposition to the present one are hereby rescinded. Given at Cavite, 23d of June, 1898. EMILIO AGUINALDO.” A MESSAGE OF AGUINALDO TO HIS PEOPLE. One week before the arrival of the first American troops at Manila, Aguinaldo promulgated the following “message ’’ to the people explanatory of the objects of the revolution: “ It is an established fact that apolitical revolution, judiciously carried out, is the violent means employed by nations to recover the sovereignty which naturally belongs to them, when the same has been usurped and trodden under foot by tyrannical and arbitrary government. Therefore, the Philippine revolution cannot be more justifiable than it is, because the country has only resorted to it after having exhausted all peaceful means which reason and experience dictated. “ The old Kings of Castile were obliged to regard the Philippines as a sister nation, united to Spain by a perfect similarity of aims and interests, so much so that in the constitution of 1812, promulgated at Cadiz, as a consequence of the Spanish War of Independence, these islands were represented in the Spanish Parliament. But the monastic communities, always unconditionally propped up by the Spanish government, stepped in to oppose the sacred obli- gation, and the Philippine Islands were excluded from the Spanish constitution, and the country placed at the mercy of the discretional or arbitrary powers of the Governor-General. Campaigning in the Philippines. 53 “ Under these circumstances the country clamored for justice, demanding of the metropolis the recognition and restitution of its secular rights through reforms which should gradually assimilate it to Spain. But its voice was soon stifled, and its children were rewarded for their abnegation by punishment, martyrdom and death. The religious corporations, whose interests were always at variance with those of the Filipinos and identified with the Spanish govern- ment, ridiculed these pretensions, calmly and persistently replying that liberty in Spain had only been gained by the sacrifice of blood. “What other channel, then, was open to the country through which to insist upon the recovery of its lawful rights ? No other remedy remained but the application of force, and, convinced of this, it had recourse to revolution. “ Now its demands are no longer limited to assimilation with the Spanish constitution. It asks for a definite separation therefrom ; it struggles for its independence, with the certainty that the time has arrived when it is able and ought to rule itself. “ Hence, it has constituted a Revolutionary government, based on wise and just laws, suited to the abnormal circumstances it is passing through, preparatory to the founding of a real Republic. Accepting right as the only standard of its acts, justice as it sole aim, and honor- able labor as its sole means, it calls upon all Filipinos, without distinction of birth, and in- vites them to solidly unite with the object of forming a noble society, not by bloodshed, nor by pompous titles, but by labor and the personal merit of each one ; a free society where no egoism shall exist, where no personal politics shall overthrow and crush, nor envy, nor partial- ity debase, nor vain boasting, nor charlatanry throw it into ridicule. “ Nothing else could be expected from a country which has proved by its long suffering and courage in tribulation and danger, and industry and studiousness in peace, that it is not made for slavery. That country is destined to become great ; to become one of the most solid instru- ments of Providence for ruling the destinies of humanity. That country has resources and energy sufficient to free itself from the ruin and abasement into which the Spanish govern- ment has drawn it, and to claim a modest, though worthy place in the concert of free nations. “ Give7i at Cavitk, 23d of June, 1898. EMILIO AGUINALDO.” CHAPTER IV. THE REINFORCEMENT OF DEWEY. HE news of the battle of Manila Bay came to the American people like a thunder clap out of a clear sky. Few of our people knew that there was in the United States service an officer named George Dewey, and many, and possibly the majority, had no idea where Manila was situated, or that there had been a Spanish fleet there. The first that was known of any of these things was that a Commodore Dewey had destroyed the fleet, was holding the bay, and had called for soldiers to occupy the city. Certainly he should have them. Whoever Commodore Dewey might be and wherever Manila might be could be determined later, but if there were an American like that afloat and calling for soldiers he should have what he wanted, and have it quick. On such distant service of indefinite duration it might possibly seem best to send regiments of the regular army, but regular troops were very scarce at that time, and the volunteer regiments then forming were anxious to go. San Francisco was the natural point of departure from the United States to the Philippines, but at the outbreak of the war the entire Pacific Coast had been almost denuded of regular troops, which had been hurried to Cuba, and the few volunteer regiments which formed the quota of the Pacific States were not yet in readiness. One regiment — the Fourteenth In- fantry — remained on the coast, whose colonel, Thomas N. Anderson, was ordered to San Francisco, made brigadier-general of volunteers, and put in charge of the preliminary arrangements, pending the selection of the officer to command the expedition. Assignments of volunteer regiments, mostly from the Western States, were rapidly made, and such regular troops as were available were concentrated at San Francisco. The transportation and commissary service was organized as rapidly as possible, and every exertion made to get help to the victorious Commo’ dore — already made Admiral — at the earliest possible moment. THE STRENGTH OF THE REINFORCEMENT DETERMINED. At first a force of 5000 men was contemplated. This was very soon increased to 10,000, and when the command in the Philippines was offered to Major-General Wesley Merritt, second in command in the United States Army, his estimate of the number required was 20,000 men, of whom a large portion should be regulars. This number was finally agreed upon to comprise the expedition, of which number 56 Caiupaigmiig in the Philippines. 471 officers and 10,43‘2 enlisted men actually reached Manila before the capture of the city on August 18, 1899. At the end of this chapter will be found a com- plete vStatement of the forces despatched to the Philippines up to June 80, 1899, with dates of sailing and arrival. GENERAL MERRITT ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND. On May 20th, Major-General Elwell S. Otis, U. S. V., assumed command at San Francisco of “All United States troops now assembled and upon arrival of such troops as are to be assembled at this point for contemplated expedi- tionary purposes.” On May 21st, General T. N. Anderson, U. S. V., was assigned to the command of the First Expedition to the Philippine Islands. On Ma}^ 29th, a locality in the “Bay District Track” was designated by order as ‘ Camp Merritt.” On May 80th, Major-General Wesley Merritt, U. S. A. assumed command of the expeditionary forces at San Francisco, and on the same day assigned General Otis to the command of Camp Merritt as an independent division for administrative purposes. June 2d, General Otis assumed com- mand of this division and put in force a strict camp discipline. On June 28d, General Merritt assumed command of the Eighth Army Corps, composed of forces comprising the Philippine Expedition, and on June 29th, General Otis assumed command at San Francisco of “All the Philippine Islands’ Expeditionary Forces in this locality, and, upon arrival, of all troops directed to the port for further expeditionary purposes.” On July 11th, Brigadier-General N. P. Miller, U. S. V., assumed command of all troops at Camp Merritt and the Presidio, including the so-called “Expeditionary Forces, ” General Otis relinquishing command to serve in the Philippines. Loading horses on transport. DEPARTURE OF THE FIRST EXPEDITION. Prior to the arriv^al of General Merritt at San Francisco in command, as noted, the First Philippine Expedition had sailed for the islands with General Anderson in command. General Anderson in speaking of conditions then, said: “I was ordered to Manila, when things were very unsettled, with a few regiments. I was hurried away with no explicit instructions. ‘ Do the best you can ’ were the orders I received.” The cruiser Charlestoii had preceded this expedition to Honolulu from which place it was to convoy the expedition to Manila. At Honolulu the expedition disembarked, where it was received with much enthusiasm by all classes, and most hospitably entertained. The expedition left Honolulu in good condition on the 15th, under convoy of the Charleston, Captain Glass being in command of the cruiser. On this date, while at sea, according to instructions. Captain Glass Campais^nins^ in the Philippines. 57 opened his sealed orders, and at once signaled General Anderson, then on board the Australia-. “My instructions require me to capture the Spanish forts and vessels at the Island of Guam, en route to Manila. The transports will accom- pany this ship as only two or three days’ delay will occur. This may be made public. Glass.’’ THE CAPTURE OF GUAM. Guam was reached June 20th, after an uneventful voyage. Soon after the battle the press of the country was filled with tales of the heroism of the capture of Guam, but it should be said no one in the command thought of it especially as an exploit. This may be said — it was not known exactly in what the fortifica- tion consisted, the condition of the force, or the strength of the Spanish military occupation; and such precaution was taken as would be observed had they been of a formidable nature. In Guam there were two forts, St. lago and Santa Cruz, and the ruins of an old fort called San kuis. The fort St. lago was also at the time an old, unoccupied fort. The Charlesto7i left the convoy so as to be unexposed to shells from the fort, and proceeded to the attack. She passed the old fort St. lago in silence and moved up against fort Santa Cruz to shell the fort. There was no response and it was unoccupied. In all, the Charleston discharged thirteen shells at the fort, seven shells from the starboard three pound battery, and three from the port battery. The “battle’’ lasted four and a half minutes. By this time the Spanish settlement !was aroused, and the captain of the port came aboard the Charleston and said he had recognized the salute but could not answer as he had no battery, but would try in the future to have one so salutations could be answered. Authorities in Guam had no knowledge that a declaration of war had been made. Upon being apprised of this, they parleyed for delay, but were notified that they were prisoners of war ; that the Governor and garrison must surrender and become prison- ers. The garrison consisted of 108 men, 54 Spanish regulars and the balance natives (Chamorros.) The garrison surrender- ed its arms, the Cha- morros being al- lowed to remain on the Island of Guam, which condition they gladly accept- ed. The regulars were, with the Governor and staff, taken aboard ship. After the necessary preparation the expedition set sail for Manila. There are a dozen and perhaps more of the Mariana or kadrone Islands, Guam being the largest. The capital 58 Campaig}iini:[ in the Philippines. of the group is Agana. These islands were given the name Lad rone by the Spaniards because of the thieving propensities of the natives. In 1668, the name of Mariana was given them in honor of Maria Ana of Austria, the widow of Philip IV of Spain. The population of the group is estimated at 27,000 ; that of Guam 12,000 ; and Agana 4000. The soil is very productive and well adapted to the culture of all tropical plants. The harbor of San Luis d’ Apra could easily be made a fine coaling station, being nearly in direct line between Honolulu and Manila, at which place the expedition arrived on June 30, 1898, and the reinforcement of Dewey had begun. NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS. It is proper to state in this place that while, as had been demonstrated, the Admiral had a naval force quite sufficient to take care of any Spanish ships then in eastern waters, there was no heavy armed battle-ship in his fleet, and there was always a possibility of the despatch of heavy armed vessels from Spain by way of the Suez Canal, which later grew into a strong probability when Admiral Camara’s fleet sailed for the east. It was also not impossible that complications might arise — — with European powers having interests in the Philippines, and whose naval forces on the Asiatic station were far in ex- cess of Dewey’s. It was, therefore, highly import- WAITING FOR TENTS. 4. 4. 1. • a i. ant that his fleet should be promptly strengthened. The cruiser Charleston, as already stated, accompanied the first expedition, and the monitors Mo)iterey and Monadnock, although intended for coast defense and not for long voyages, were made ready as soon as possible and despatched from San Francisco, the Mojiterey arriving safely at Manila on August 4th, and the Monadnock later. They would have been a few days too late to meet Camara’s fleet had it con- tinued its voyage from Suez and met no mishap, and it is said to have been Dewey’s intention, had the Spanish fleet continued its course, to leave Manila Bay and cruise until his reinforcements were met, after which he would have returned for another battle for the possession of the bay. The necessity of this was pre- vented by Admiral Camara’s return to Spain. Upon the arrival of the monitors Admiral Dewey was equipped for any emergency, and the subsequent changes in his fleet did not affect the course of events, and do not fall within the scope of this narrative. MORE REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE. The troops of the second expedition, under command of Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, reached Manila on July 17th, and those of the third expedition, in Campaignifijr in the Philippines. 59 command of Major-General Merritt, on July 25th. The fourth expedition, under Major-General Otis, reached Manila on August 21st, a few days after the fall of the city. DIFFICULTIES OF RAPID MOBILIZATION. To people not familiar with military operations the despatching of an army to the Philippines may seem a simple matter. There were plenty of men to go, and officers, more or less inexperienced, in superabundance. Apparently in the popu- lar mind, there was nothing to hinder their going — but there were many things. There were no modern guns, no smokeless powder, no suitable clothing, no com- missary stores, no hospital equipment, and no ships. The organization of the supply and transport service took far more time than the organization of the troops, but while waiting for these essentials of warfare to be provided there was time for drill. A newly organized regiment is but one remove from a mob, and to un- necessarily lead such a force against a disciplined enemy is to invite disaster. Fortunately most of the volunteer regiments were largely composed of National Guardsmen, and had had valuable training, but real war is very different from a militia encampment in time of peace, and there was a large number of recruits who had received no training at all. The organization of the staff services seemed slow to the people, but in reality it was rapid, and such de- lay as there was was turned to good purpose in training the offi- cers and men for service in the field. It is desirable that the public be better informed as to the details of the various services upon whose effective administration the success of campaigns so largely depends, and it is convenient, in connection with the movement of an army to the Philippines, to give some account of the transport service which accomplished it. The energies of the government, at the beginning of the war, were directed toward the preparation for the invasion of Cuba, and in pursuit of this plan, officers and men were taken from all sections and mobilized at points accessible to the Eastern seaboard. When finally attention was given to the situation in the Philippines, it was found that a base must be established on the Pacific Coast, and San Francisco was made the place. From the fact that supplies had been diverted eastward to furnish and equip the army for Cuba, the difficulty of the work of furnishing and equipping this new army was largely augmented. To house, clothe and feed the troops was not the only factor. The men had to be disciplined and drilled, and then arose the problem of transportation. In this it was not only to secure .suitable transports, but to determine how best to feed and furnish, not only for the long voyage, but for the needs of the new and untried climate. LINFD UP FOR DINNER. Campaigning in the Philippines. THE TROOPS IN SAN FRANCISCO. Soon nflei the troops began to arrive from the different States at San Franeisco, tbi‘ qiiesticii of climate effects became serious. Men heretofore strong and vipoK us were attacked with divers’ ailments, mostly of a pulmonary nature, and soon fatalities were alarm- ingly frequent. From May - 23d to September 2d, in- # elusive, there were ninety- ■"mW one deaths in the military hospitals in the city. The first camp was located ■ in the western outskirts of the city, on a sandy piece of ground, and fearing that the locality might contribute to the mortality, a new camp was established at the Presidio. Here, by choosing the locality least exposed to the ocean winds, and with every precaution of sanitation, the death rate decreased. With improved sanitary conditions came restored health, so that the army sent to the Philippines was in excellent condition. It should be borne in mind that, at this time, the government owned no transports on the Pacific Coast and they must be obtained, either by charter or purchase, and in every instance refitted and made suitable for transporting the troops. Already commerce on the Pacific had received such an impetus that ships were difficult to get, and for some time could only be had after threatened seizure by the government. SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT SYSTEM ORGANIZED. After much effort transportation was secured for the first expedition, and in time, by dint of great energy and perseverance, an excellent transport system was perfected. It grew with the requirements, and met emergencies. A table will be found at the end of this chapter which includes the transport service performed by this department, from the time of departure from San Francisco of the first expedition to June, 1899, showing the number of officers and men and organizations carried. Something of the magnitude of the supplies carried in connection with this transportation may be inferred when it is stated that, outside of clothing and other essential supplies, including tents, camp equipage and medical supplies, there accompanied each man in the expedition 400 rounds of ammunition and four months’ rations, and as their stay prolonged beyond this time, their future supplies were to be subsequently added. The public eye seldom looks beyond the glamour of the battle-field to find merit in military life, but ROLL CALL. Campaigning in the Philippines. 61 attributable to defects in the Quartermaster’s Department and, with 3500 horses forwarded, the loss is less than that which occurred in their transit from the place of purchase to the place of shipment. It will not exceed two per cent. The business done exceeds five times the whole of the five great commercial lines from the city. Stevedoring costs about 15 cents a ton. Private firms pay from 23 to 30 cents for the same kind of service. It is thought that about $15,000,000 have been expended for supplies in the transport service at the port of San Francisco, and the total number of men employed in the various departments, including manufacturing, approximates 11,000. The expense is about 40 per cent of what it costs private companies. But one ship has had an accident worthy of note — and this occurred in a fog on the coast of Japan. In the English transport system, each man is allowed a minimum of 70 cubic feet of air in his berth and a maximum of 77 cubic feet. In the system which Colonel Eong supervises, every man is allowed a minimum of 80 cubic feet and the exigencies of the staff services require equal ability and devotion, while yielding none of the glory, so dear to the soldier’s heart. Up to the present tune about 53,000 troops with their supplies have been forwarded to the Philiopines and preparation is now well in hand to forward .soon, and as required, about 30,000 more, besides the return of the volunteer troops from the islands. THE TRANSPORT vSYSTEM. This work has been and now is under the direct supervision and management of Colonel Oscar F. Tong, Quartermaster of the department. As indicative of the ability with which it has been managed, it should be mentioned that at no time has there been a lack of supplies in the Philippines for the troops, and these have been commended both for quantity and quality. Not a life has been lost BREAKING CAMP AT THE PRESIDIO. 62 Campaigning ifi the Philippines. a maximum of 100 cubic feet. Take the Scaiidia as further illustration. In the Russian service she carried 2400 men. In our service she carries 1100. Colonel Tong has had four commissioned assistants in this work, his staff being Captains N. P. Bachelder, John T. Barneson, C. G. Lyman and J. H. Humphreys. The sub-joined table in a condensed form shows : First — The cost of the transport service on this coast since the war began to July 1, 1899 ; second, the cost of charters ; and third, the time not in transit. COST OF TRANSPORT SERVICE. Cost of charters (of 22 vessels) $4,223,400 Cost of Arizona (Hancock) 600,000 Cost of Scandia (Warren) 200,000 Tug Fearless 150,000 Tug Active 75,000 Tug Vigilant 60,000 Fitting up transports up to June 30, 1898 88,268 Fitting up transports subsequently (estimated) 50,000 Cost of water (estimated) 40,000 Cost of coal 443,550 Total cost of transport service $5,930,218 COST OF NAME OF VESSEL DATE OF CHARTER City of Peking. . . .May 1, 1898, to Sept. 1. . . City of Sidney. . . .May 10 to August 30 Australia May 10 to August 29 Colon May 27 to Sept. 7 China May 27 to Sept. 22 Zealandia May 27 Senator June 8 Morgan City June 7 to Nov. 3 Morgan City January, 1899 City of Para (just recliartered) . . . June 7 to Nov. 26 Indiana June 7, 1898 Ohio June 7, 1898 Valencia June 19 Newport June 30 Peru June 25 to Nov. 2 City of Pueblo. . . June 23 to June 2, 1899. . Pennsylvania July 7 Rio de Janeiro. . . July 7 to October 22 St. Paul July 19 to Nov. 1 St. Paul Nov. 6 to June 12, 1899 . . Tacoma (sailing) . .July 11, 1898, to July 3, 1899 Centennial February, 1899 Cleveland March, 1899, to June 24. . Portland March to May, 1899 CHARTERS. DURATION OF CHARTER COST $1,500 per day, 123 days $184,000 1,500 per day, 112 days 112,000 20,000 per month, 3X months 72,000 750 per day, 104 days 78,000 1,500 per day, 119 days 178,500 20.000 per month, 13 months 260,000 100 per day, 390 days 390,000 660 per day, 150 days 99,000 550 estimated, 180 days 90,000 1,000 per day, 172 days 172,000 25.000 per month, 13 months 325,000 25,000 per month, 13 months 325,000 650 per day, 380 days 247,000 1,000 per day, 379 days 379,000 1,000 per day, 131 days 131,000 900 per day, 345 days 310,500 25,000 per month, 12 months 300,000 1,000 per day, 108 days 108,000 1,000 per day, 105 days 105,000 700 per day, 219 days 153,300 200 per day, 358 days 71,600 500 per day, 150 days 75,000 300 per day, 116 days 34,800 300 per day, 74 days 22,200 $4,223,400 Total cost of charters Ca}npaijs^Hi}i(r in ike Philippines. 63 DAYS NOT IN TRANSIT. Vessels City of Sidney. . City of Peking. . Australia Colon China Zealandia . . . . | Senator | Morgan City. . | City of Para . . . . Indiana Ohio Valencia Newport Peru City of Puebla . . Pennsylvania . . Rio de Janeiro. . St. Paul I^eft San Francisco Arrived Manila L,ay Over in Manila Awaiting Cancellation of Charter in San Francisco Out of Transit Charter Price per Day or Month Cost May 25 June 30 20 days 17 days 37 $ 1,000 per day $37,000 May 25 June 30 30 “ 11 “ 41 1,500 “ “ 61,500 May 25 June 30 23 “ 12 “ 35 20,000 “ mo. 23,333 June 15 July 17 21 “ 3 “ 24 750 “ day 18,000 June 15 July 16 44 “ 44 1,500 “ “ 66,000 June 15 July 17 37 “ Oct. 30 Nov. 28 57 “ 94 20,000 “ mo. 62,666 June 25 July 17 38 “ 65 Oct. 17 Nov. 21 27 “ 1 ,000 ‘ ‘ day 65,000 June 27 July 31 59 “ Jan. 26 Mar. 2 12 “ 1 day 72 660 ‘ ‘ day 47,520 June 27 July 31 87 “ 87 1,000 “ “ 87,000 June 27 July 31 30 “ 30 25,000 “ mo. 25,000 June 27 July 31 35 “ 35 25,000 “ “ 29,166 June 28 July 31 34 “ 34 650 ‘ ‘ day 22,100 June 29 May 25 50 “ 50 1,000 “ “ 50,000 July 15 Aug. 21 45 “ 1 day 46 1,000 “ “ 46,000 July 15 Aug. 21 30 “ 30 900 “ “ 27,000 July 19 Aug. 24 20 “ 20 25,000 “ mo. 16,666 July 27 Aug. 24 28 “ 28 1,000 “ day 28,000 July 29 Aug. 31 27 “ 27 1,000 “ “ 27,000 Total cost .$738,951 It should be said in explanation of the last table that any delay in San Fran- cisco was caused by the transports being refitted, refurnished and repaired, and often a little delay in waiting for cargo or the arrival of troops. Similar con- ditions may be considered as existing in Manila. The following is a statement of the troops despatched to the Philippines up to September 15, 1899, with date of sailing and arrival: FIRST EXPEDITION- 158 Officers and 2386 Men. Australia left San P'rancisco May 25, 1898, and arrived at Manila June 30, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. V.; Elmer W. Clark, 2d Lieut., 14th Inf., Aid-de-Camp; Henry P. McCain, Lst Lieut., 14th Inf., Adjutant- General; Samuel R. Jones, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster; Sydney A. Cloman, 1st Lieut., 15th Inf., Chief Commissary; Harlan E. MeVay, Capt., Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A., Commis- sary Sergeant; 1st and 2d Battalions and Company C, 2d Oregon, 38 officers and 732 men, making a total of 44 officers and 733 men. City of Sidney left San Francisco May 25, 1898, and arrived at Manila June 30, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Companies F, I, and M, 3d Battalion, 2d Oregon Inf., U. S. V.; detachment of Batteries A and D, California Volunteer Heavy Artillery ; band and Com- panies A, C, D, E and F, 14th Inf.; Hospital Corps; Commissary Sergeant, making a total of 22 officers and 674 men. City of Pekinyi left San Francisco May 25, 1898, and arrived at Manila June 30, 1898, carry- ing the following officers and men : 1st Regiment California Volunteer Inf. and Commissary Sergeant, making a total of 49 officers and 979 men. SECOND EXPEDITION— 158 Officers and 3404 Men. China left San Francisco June 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 17, 1898, carrying the fol- lowing officers and men : Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, U. S. V.; W. G. Bates, Capt., Assis- tant Adjutant-General, U. S. V., Adjutant-General ; Frank S. Bourns, Maj., Chief Surgeon, 04 Campaigning in the Philippines. U. S. V.; W. H. Anderson, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V., Chief Commissary; Schuyler Schieffelin, 2d Lieut., 47th New York Volunteers, Aide-de-Camp. Attached; Lieutenant- Colonel C. L. Jewett, Judge- Advocate, U. S. V.; Maj. J. F. Bell, Engineer Officer, U. S. V.; Capt. W. A. Tucker, Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; 1st Lieut.; J. B. Clayton, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. R. H. Allen, 14th Inf., Aide-de-Camp; 1st Regiment Colorado Inf., U. S. V.; Company A, 18th Inf.; Company G, 18th Inf.; Sections 3, 4 and 5, Battery B, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery; detachment Company A, Engineer Battalion, U. S. A.; Detach- ment Hospital Corps, making a total of 61 officers and 1208 men. Senator left San Francisco June 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 17, 1898, carrying the 1st Regiment Nebraska Inf., U. S. V.; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 43 officers and 950 men. Zealandia left San Francisco June 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 17, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: 10th Regiment Pennsylvania Inf., U. S. V.; Sections 1, 2 and 6, Battery B, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total cf 34 officers and 665 men. Colon left San Francisco June 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 17, 1898, carrying the fol- lowing officers and men: Companies B and E, 18th Inf.; Companies D, E, F, and H, 23d Inf.; Battery A, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 20 officers and 581 men. THIRD EXPEDITION— 198 Officers, 4642 Men and 34 Civilians. Newport left San Francisco June 29, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 25, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Major-General Wesley Merritt, U. S A.; John B. Babcock, Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific; Lewis H. Strother, Maj., U. S. V., Aide-de-Camp; Harry C. Hale, Maj., U. S. V., Aide-de-Camp; T. Bentley Mott, Capt. Aide-de-Camp; C. A. Whittier, Lieutenant-Colonel, Inspector-General, U. S. V.; James W. Pope, Lieutenant-Colonel, Chief Quartermaster, U. S. V.; David L. Brainard, Lieutenant- Colonel, Chief Commissary Sergeant, U. S. V.; W. A. Wadsworth, Maj., U. S. V., Assistant to Chief Quartermaster; Charles McClure, Maj., Paymaster, U. S. A., Chief Paymaster; Charles E. Kil- bourne, Maj., U. S. A., Paymaster; Charles H. Whipple, Maj., S. A., Paymaster ; R. B. C. Bement, Maj., Engineer Officer, U. S. V.; William A. Simpson, Maj., U. S. V., Chief of Artillery; Samuel D. S. Sturgis, Maj., U. S. V., Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific; Enoch H. Crowder, Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V., Judge- Advocate ; Henry Lippencott, Lieuten- ant-Colonel, U. S. A., Chief Surgeon; Charles E. Woodruff, Maj., U. S. V., Attending Sur- geon, Department of the Pacific; Julian M. Cabell, Capt., (retired). Assistant Surgeon; Charles L. Potter, Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V., Chief Engineer Officer; Richard E. Thompson, Maj., U. S. V., Chief Signal Officer; Frank R. Keefer, Capt., Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; G. W. Day wait. Acting Surgeon, U. S. A.; G. W. Matthewes, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Astor Battery, Batteries H and K, 3d Art.; Detachment Hospital Corps attached to Headquarters, making a total of 15 civilians, 33 officers and 548 men. Astor Battery left Manila for San Francisco, Cal., December 15, 1898, on transport Senator. Armament and ammunition of Battery turned over to Light Battery D, 6th United States Art. Indiana left San Francisco June 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V.; F. J. Kernan, 1st Lieut., 21st Inf., Acting Assistant Adjutant-General; C. G. Sawtelle, Jr., Assistant Quarter- master, U. S. V., Quartermaster; Pegram Whitworth, 2d Lieut., 18th Inf., Aide-de-Camp; Herbert M. Lord, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; William B. Rochester, Jr., Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; Henry C. Fitzgerald, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V. ; Timothy D. Keheler, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; William B. Gambrill, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; John M. Sears, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; R. H. Fitzhugh, Maj., Commissary Sergeant, U. S. V.; W. A. Harper, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.; Dr. Titus, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Dr. Henry Brodek, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 19 civilian clerks; 1 newspaper correspondent; Headquarters band and Companies B, C, G and L, 23d Inf.; recruits for 1st Battalion, 23d Inf.; Companies D and H, Photo hy Hodson. TRANSPORT “SHP:rMAN.” One of the largest and best troopships in Uncle Sam’s service. Photo hy Hodson. “ ’TWPIEN DECKS” ON THPl ‘‘ SHPlRMAN.” Showing sleeping quarters occupied by the rank and file of onr soldiers I'l I f f) ■Ii; -L Captain J. H. Mathews, Superintending Engineer. Capt.^in N. P. Batchetder, a. Q. M., U. S. V. Assistant to General Superintendent, A. T. S., San Francisco, Cal. Captain John Barneson, Marine Superintendent. I j i; I Jas. H. Humphreys, Asst, to Superintending Engineer. Colonel Oscar F. Fong, U. S. A., General Superintendent Army Transport Service, San Francisco, Cal. C. G. Eyman, Asst, to Marine Superintendent. OFFICERS ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE SAN FRANCISCO, CAE. Campaigning in the Philippines. 65 18th Iiif.; recruits for 1st Battalion, 18th Inf.; Detachment U. S. V. Signal Corps; Company A, Engineer Battalion, U. S. A.; detachment Company H, North Dakota Volunteer Inf.; Hospital Corps making a total of 36 officers, 944 men and 20 civilians. JMorgan City left San Francisco June 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 31, 1898, carry- ing the following officers and men: 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Idaho Inf., U. S. V.; privates, 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf.; Detachment Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 32 officers and 677 men. left San Francisco June 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Headquarters band and Companies C and F, 18th Inf.; recruits for 1st Battalion, 18th Inf.; Batteries G and D, 3d Art; 1st Battalion, 1st Wyoming Inf., U. vS. V.; Detachment Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 24 officers and 886 men. Valencia left San Francisco June 28, 1898, and arrived at Manila July 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men : 1st and 2d Battalion, 1st North Dakota Inf., U. S. V.; Detach- ment Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 29 officers and 606 men. City of Para left San Francisco June 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila, June 31, 1898, carry- ing the following officers and men: Forty-four officers, 963 men ; 13th Regiment, Minnesota Inf., U. S. V.; Detachment Signal Corps, 2; Detachment Hospital Corps, 16, making a total of 44 officers and 981 men. FOURTH EXPEDITION— 172 Officers, 4720 Men and 17 Civilians. Pern left San Francisco July 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 21, 1898, carrying the following officers and men : Major-General Elwell S. Otis, U. S. V.; Thomas H. Barry, Eieu- tenant-Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; Fred W. Sladen, 1st Lieut., 4th Inf., Aide-de-Camp ; Capt. C. H. Murray, 4th Cav., Aide-de-Camp ; R. P. Hughes, Brigadier- General, Inspector-General, U. S. V.; J. S. Mallory, Maj., Inspector-General, U. S. V.; Charles McClure, Capt., 18th Inf., Judge- Advocate. Attached: G. P. Scriven, Maj., Sergeant-Quarter- master, U. S. V.; P. B. Strong, Capt., Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; C. du P. Coudert, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; C. A. Devol, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. A.; G. H. Richardson, A. S. S., U. S. A.; Clarence W. Quinan, A. S. S., U. S. A.; C. M. McQuestin, A. S. S., U. S. A.; 9 civilians; Troops C, I, K, L, E and G, 4th Cav., Batteries D and G, 6th Art ; detachment 3d Art.; Engineer Corps, attached to 3d Art.; 13th Minnesota, attached to 3d Art.; Detachment Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps, making a total of 34 officers, 916 men and 9 civilians. left San Francisco July 15, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 21, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: S. O. L. Potter, Maj., Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.; H. C. Cabell, Capt., Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; S. B. Bootes, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; P. S. Kellogg, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. A.; C. C. Pierce, Chaplain, U. S. A.; Franklin M. Kemp, 1st Lieut., Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Non-Commissioned Staff, 14th Inf.; General Staff, Naval Engineer Officers, 10; Companies G, I, K, L and M, 14th Inf.; recruits of 14th Inf.; detachment 23d Inf.; United States Signal Corps, 1st California Volunteers; 1st Wyoming Volunteers, making a total of 16 officers and 822 men. Pennsylvania left San Francisco July 18, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 24, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: John D, Merit, Maj., Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.i G. Tilley, Lieut., U. S. V., Signal Corps. Attached: 14th Inf.; 1st Regiment Montana Inf., U. S. V.; recruits, 1st California Volunteer Inf.; Hospital Corps, making a total of 51 officers and 1274 men, Rio de Janeiro left San Francisco July 23, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 24, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General H. G. Otis, U. S. V.; George F. Shields, Maj., Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.; Edward Murphy, 2d Capt., Assistant Adjutant- General, U. S. V.; A. W. Kimball, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.; Seth M. Miliken, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; L. P. Sanders, 1st Lieut., 1st Montana, Aide-de-Camp to Briga- dier-General Otis; Charles W. Whipple, Lieutenant-Colonel, Inspector-General, U. S. V.; A. W. Bradbury, 2d Lieut., 1st California, Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier-General Otis; S. W. Bel- ford, Capt., Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st South Dakota 5b 06 CiunpaifTfiifij^ in the Philippines. Volunteer Inf.; recruits, Utah Light Artiller}' Volunteers; band of 1st Battalion, 1st South Dakota Volunteer Inf.; Detachment Volunteer Signal Corps; Detachment Hospital Corps; Ordnance Department, U. S. A.; 1st Montana Inf.; 1 Red Cross steward; 8 civdlian clerks, making a total of 46 officers and 820 men. St. left San Francisco July 29, 1898, and arrived at Manila August 31, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: J. G. Blaine, Capt., Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; Lee Linn, Capt., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; Raymund Sulzer, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.; C. C. Walcutt, Capt., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V. (from Honolulu). Attached: 1st Battalion, 1st South Dakota Volunteer Inf.; recruits for the 13th Minnesota Volunteers; recruits for 1st Colorado Volunteers; Detachment U. S. V. Signal Corps; Detachment of Hospital Corps, making a total of 25 officers and 788 men. Scandia left San Francisco August 27, 1898, and arrived at Manila October 2, 1898, carry- ing the following officers and men: William A. Kobbe, Maj., 3d Art.; W. O. Owen, Map, Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.; H. Pahe, 1st Lieut., U. S. A.; E. K. Johnstone, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; H. du R. Phelan, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; William B. Schofield, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; M. F. Sheary, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; T. Sternberg, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; E. A. Wedgwood, 1st Lieut., Battery B, Utah Volunteer Art.; N. T. Messer, Capt., Acting Chief Surgeon, U. S. V., Acting Assistant Quartermaster; 4 civ- ians; Detachment Hospital Corps; detachment 1st Montana; detachment California Volunteer Heavy Artillery. Attached: CommissarySergeant, U. S. A.; Red Cross nurses, male, making a total of 11 officers and 166 men. FIFTH EXPEDITION— 233 Officers and 6258 Men. Senator left San Francisco October 17, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 21, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Companies A, I, K and M, 23d Inf.; detachment 14th United States Inf.; detachment 18th United States Inf.; detachment Battery D, Califor- nia Heavy Artillery Volunteers; recruits for 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf.; 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Inf.; 1st South Dakota Volunteer Inf. ; 1st Montana Volunteer Inf.; 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf.; 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf.; 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf.; 1st Tennessee Volunteer Inf.; U. S. V. Signal Corps; Acting Assistant Surgeons, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 20 officers and 747 men. left San Francisco October 17, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 22, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Companies F, G, I and L, 1st Washington Volunteer Inf.; Batteries A and D, California Heavy Artillery Volunteers; Commissary Sergeant, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 18 officers and 491 men. Arizona left Honolulu November 10, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 25, 1898, carry- ing the following officers and men: Brigadier-General Charles King, U. S. V.; 2d Lieut. Henry M. Meriam, 3d Art., Aide-de-Camp; 2d Lieut. James R. Goodale, 1st New York Inf. Volun- teers, Aide-de-Camp; Maj. E. R. Morris, Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.; Capt. J. B. Handy, Chief Surgeon, U. S. V., Chief Commissary; Companies I, K, L and M, and recruits, 18th United States Inf.; recruits, 1st Nebraska Inf., U. S. V.; recruits, 1st Colorado Inf., U. S. V.; recruits, 10th Pennsylvania Inf., U. S. V.; Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 18 officers and 1006 men. Ohio left San Francisco October 28, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 26, 1898, carry- ing the following officers and men: Headquarters and Companies A, B, C, D,E, H, K and M, 1st Washington Inf., U. S. V ; detachment California Heavy Artillery, U. S. V.; 4th United States Cav.; 23d United States Inf.; 2d Oregon Inf., U. S. V.; 1st Montana Inf, U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 27 officers and 759 men. Zealandia left San Francisco October 30, 1898, and arrived at Manila November 28, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Headquarters and Companies A, B, C, E, F, L and M, 1st Tennessee Inf ; U. S. V.; 23d United States Inf.; 13th Minnesota U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 25 officers and 534 men. Cai)ipai(^)ii)i(j^ in the Philippines. 67 Indiana left San Francisco October 27, 1898, and. arrived at Manila November 30, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Headquarters and Companies C, D, E, G, H, I, K, and M, 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf.; Hospital Corps, U. vS. A., making a total of 30 officers and 717 men. City of Puebla left San Francisco November 6, 1898, and arrived at Manila December 6, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Companies D, G, H, I and K, 1st Tennessee Volunteer Inf.; Troop A, Nevada Cav., U. S. V.; detachment California Heavy Artillery, U. S. V.; 2d Oregon Inf., U. S. V.; 1st Tennessee Inf., U. S. V.; 23d Inf.; 18th Inf.; Bat- tery D, 6th United States Art.; Commissary Sergeant, U. vS. A.; 13th Minnesota Inf., U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 24 officers and 572 men. Newport left San Francisco November 8, 1898, and arrived at Manila December 7, 1898, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General M. P. Miller, U. S. V.; 1st Uieut. C. G. Woodward, 3d United States Art., Aide-de-Camp; 1st Lieut. M. K. Barroll, 3d United States Art., Aide-de-Camp; Capt. John B. Jeffrey, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster; Capt. Daniel Van Voorhies, Chief Surgeon, U. S. V., Chief Commissary; Compa- nies A, B, F and L, 26th Kansas Inf., U. S. V.; Light Battery A, Wyoming Art., U. S. V. Attached: Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; California Heavy Artillery, U. S. V.; 1st Washington Inf., U. S. V.; 23d United States Inf.; Commissary Ser- geants U. S. A.; making a total of 24 officers and 466 men. Pennsylvania left San Francisco November 3, 1898, and arrived at Manila December 7, l:-98, carrying the following officers and men: 51st Iowa Inf., U. S. V.; 14th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 2d Oregon Inf., U. S. V.; 1st Colorado Inf., U. S. V.; 20th Kansas Inf., U. S. V.; 1st Nebraska Inf., U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 47 officers and 964 men. SIXTH EXPEDITION— 69 Officers, 2505 Men and 3 Civilians. Scandia left San Francisco January 26, 1899, and arrived at Manila February 23, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-Geneial Loyd Wheaton, U. S. V.; Maj. C. E. Stanton, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; Acting Assistant Surgeon W. R. Van Tuyl, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon T. M. McCullom, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon B. L. John- son, U.S. A.; 4th United States Cav. ; 14th United States Inf.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 51st Iowa Volunteer Inf.; 20th United States Inf., making a total of 34 officers, 1193 men and 3 civilian clerks. Tacoma, sailing ship, (supplies,) left Honolulu January 21, 1899, and arrived at Manila March 1, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon C. Y. Brownlee, U. S. A.; 4th United Stated Cav.; 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., making a total of 2 officers, 28 men, 19 civilians, also 81 cavalry horses and 119 mules. Morgan City, (supplies,) left San Francisco January 26, 1899, and arrived at Manila March 2, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: 1st Lieut. W. J. Kirkpatrick, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps; 20th United States Inf., making a total of 5 officers and 7 men. Senator \Cl\. San Francisco February 1, 1889, and arrived at Manila March 4, 1899, carry- ing the following officers and men: Capt. J. S. Kulp, Assistant Surgeon, U.S. A.; Acting As- sistant Surgeon, I. W. Brewer, U. S. A.; Capt. E. H. Fitzgerald, Chaplain, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. vS. A.; 22d United States Inf., Headquarters and Companies A, B, D, H, K and M, making a total of 18 officers and 602 men. left San Francisco February 1, 1899, and arrived at Manila March 5, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: 1st Lieut. R. P. Strong, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; C. N. Andrews, Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 4th U. S. Cav.; 10th United States Inf.; 3d United States Art. (recruits); 6th United States Art. (recruits); 14th United States Inf. (recruits); 18th United States Inf. (recruits); 23d United States Inf. (recruits); Hospital Corps, U. S, A.; 22d United States Inf., Companies C, E, F, G, I and L, making a total of 17 officers and 710 men. left New York January 19, 1899, and arrived at Manila, via Suez Canal, March 10, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Major-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V.; Maj. 68 Canipai^s^nin^ in the Philippines. C. R. Edwards, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.; Maj, C. G. Starr, Inspector-General, U. S. V.; Capt. R. Sewell, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V., Aide-de-Camp to General Lawton; 1st Lieut. W. Brookes, 4th United States Inf., Aide-de-Camp to General Lawton; 2d Lieut. E.L. King, 8th United States Cav., Aide-de-Camp to General Lawton; Brigadier-General R. H. Hall, U. S. V., commanding 4th United States Inf.; Capt. E. Reichman, Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. V., commanding Company G, 17th Inf.; Capt. G. de Shon, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon P. M. Ashburn, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Sur- geon A. C. Ghiselia, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon L. E. Hess, U. S. A.; 14th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf.; Signal Corps, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 4th United States Inf.; 17th United States Inf., making a total of 53 officers, 1688 men and 4 civilian clerks. Sherman left New York February 3, 1899, and arrived at Manila, via Suez Canal, March 22, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Capt. J. D. Poindescter, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. R. B. Westnedge, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon G. S. Pitcher, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon J. B. Darling, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon F. B. Bowman, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon A. B. Smith, U. S. A.; Capt. P. J. Hart, Chaplain, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 3d United Stated Inf.; 17th United States Inf., making a total of 39 officers, 1689 men and 1 civilian clerk. Sheridan left New York February 19, 1899, and arrived at Manila, via Suez Canal, April 14, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Capt. F. A. Winter, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. E. W. Pinkham, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon O. C. Heise, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon T. L. Lowe, 12th United States Inf.; 17th United States Inf., Headquarters and Companies A, C, E and F; 3d United States Inf.; 4th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 20th United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; Hospital Corps, making a total of 57 officers and 1786 men. Roanoke^ (supplies,) left San Francisco February 26, 1899 and arrived at Manila March 29, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Miley, Inspector- General, U. S. V.; Acting Assistant Surgeon S. F. Fraser, U. S. A.; 14th United States Inf.; 20th United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf.; Hospital Corps, mak- ing a total of 3 officers, 100 men and 1 civilian clerk. Portland, (supply ship,) left San Francisco March 2, 1899, and arrived at Manila April 10, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Capt. J. A. Logan, Jr., Chief Surgeon, U. S. V.; Acting Assistant Surgeon T. A. McCulloch, U. S. A.; 2d United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf.; 3d United States Art.; Hospital Corps, making a total of 11 officers and 95 men. Cofmemaugh (supply ship,) left San Francisco March 11, 1899, and arrived at Manila April 20, 1899, carrying the following officers and men : Capt. E. R. Butler, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 1 officer, 2 men ; and also 1 civilian clerk, 32 civilian teamsters and 284 mules. City of Puebla left San Francisco March 24, 1899, and arrived at Manila April 23, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: 9th United States Inf., Headquarters and Companies A, F, G, I, L and M ; Hospital Corps, making a total of 14 officers and 680 men. Zealandia left San Francisco March 28, 1899, and arrived at Manila April 27, 1899, carry- ing the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon H. W. Elliott, U. S. A.; 9th United States Inf., Companies B, C, D, E, H and K; Hospital Corps, making a total of 12 officers and 524 men. Nelson (supply ship,) left San Francisco March 30, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 2, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon S. Wythe, U. S. A.; 18th United States Inf. ; 3d United States Inf.; 6th United States Art.; Signal Corps; Hospital Corps; General Staff, making a total of 2 officers and 60 men. Hancock (formerly Arizona) left San Francisco April 18, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 11, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Maj. W. P. Kendall, Surgeon, U. S. V.; 1st Lieut. H. E. Wetherill, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon J. H. Hepburn, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon C. M. Drake, U. S. A.; 21st United States Inf./ 9th United Caiiipaifrnin^ in the Philippines. 69 States Inf.; Light Battery E, 1st United States Art.; 7th United States Art. ; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 40 officers and 1450 men. Warren (formerly Scandia') left San Francisco April 20, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 18, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Brigadier-General E. B. Williston, U. S. V.; Maj. G. L. Edie, Surgeon U. S. V.; 1st Lieut. W. J. Calvert, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. E. H. Hartness, Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.; 1st Lieut. P. C. March, 5th United States Art., Aide-de-Camp to Major-General MacArthur; Acting Assistant Surgeon E. E. Persons, U. S. A. ; Acting Assistant Surgeon W. P. Benta, U. S. A.; 6th United States Art.; 3d United States Art.; 4th United States Cav. ; 3d United States Inf.; 9th United States Inf.; 12th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 17th United States Inf.; 20th United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; Hospital Corps, making a total of 28 officers and 1182 men. Newport left San Francisco April 20, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 23, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon E. F. Robinson, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon H. L. Coffin; 1st United States Art.; Light Battery F, 4th United States Art.; Light Battery F, 5th United States Art.; General Staff; Hospital Corps, making a total of 11 officers, 224 men and also 15 officers, 258 enlisted men. Marine Corps; 6 government female nurses, 8 Red Cross female nurses, 2 women and 4 civilians. ]\[orga7i City left San Francisco April 25, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 27, 1899, carry- ing the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon J. G. Reifsnydeer, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon J. M. Williams, U. S. A.; 4th United States Cav.; 6th United States Art.; 9th United States Inf.; 12th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 21st United States Inf.; 22d United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf.; Signal Corps, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A., making a total of 10 officers and 606 men. Ohio left San Francisco April 27, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 29, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Acting Assistant Surgeon P. W. Beckman, U. S. A.; Acting As- sistant Surgeon H. E. Stafford, U. S. A.; 13th United States Inf., Companies B, D, E, K, Land M; recruits; Signal Corps, U. S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A ; Commissary Sergeants; making a total of 15 officers and 763 men. Senator left San Francisco April 27, 1899, and arrived at Manila May 29, 1899, carrying the following officers and men: Maj. H. I. Raymond, Surgeon U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon G. W. Roberts, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon C. B. Mittelstaedt; 13th United States Inf., Headquarters and Companies A, C, F, G, H and I; recruits Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; 9th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf., making a total of 19 officers and 679 men. Sher7}ian left San Francisco May 22, 1899, and arrived at Manila June 18, 1899, carrying the following officers and men : Brigadier-General J. C. Bates, U. S. V.; Brigadier-General F. D. Grant, U. S. V.; Capt. S. E. Smiley, 15th United States Inf., Aide-de-Camp to General Bates; 1st Lieut. C. W. Fenton, 5th United States Cav., Aide-de-Camp to General Grant; Maj. B. Halloway, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; Maj. J. A. Canby, Additional Paymaster, U. S. V.; Capt. J. Baxter, Jr., Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. A.; Capt. J. A. Randolph, Post Chaplain, U. S. A.; Capt. and Assistant Surgeon C. Lynch, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon H. E. Manage, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon B. F. Van Meter, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Sur- geon W. L. Whittington, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon J. T. Halsell, U. S. A.; 4th United States Cav. ; 3d United States Art.; 6th United States Art.; 3d United States Inf.; 4th United States Inf.; 6th United States Inf.; 9th United States Inf.; 12th United States Inf.; 13th United States Inf.; 14th United States Inf.; 17th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 20th United States Inf.;. 21st United States Inf.; 23d United States Inf.; Company A Engineer Battalion, U. S. A.; Signal Corps, U S. A.; Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; Commissary Sergeant, U. vS. A., making a total of 46 officers, 1743 men and 5 civilian employees. Grant left San Francisco May 30, 1899, and arrived at Manila June 26, 1899, carrying the following officers and men’: Maj. Henry S. T. Harris, Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.; Acting Assistant Surgeon W. H. Dade, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon C. D. Lloyd, U. S. A ; Acting Assistant Surgeon S. Richmond, U. S. A.; Capt. M. M. McMillan, Acting Quarter- master, U. S. V., Capt. Walter Marvine, Post Chaplain, U. S. A.; 16th United States Inf.; 1st 70 Campaigniii{r in the Philippines. United States Art.; 6th United States Art.; 9th United States Inf.; 12th United States Inf.; 18th United States Inf.; 21st United States Inf.; 13th Minnesota Inf.; Signal Corps, U. S. A.; Hos- pital Corps ; Post Quartermaster Sergeant ; recruits, making a total of 42 officers and 1655 men. VESSEUS SAIEED FROM SAN FRANCISCO SINCE JUNE 1, 1899. June 22, Zealandia; June 24, Sheridan; June 28, Valencia. July 1, Pennsylvania; 3, Wyefield, freight and 140 horses; July 11, Covenaugh, freight and 300 horses; July 13, City of Para; July 24, Tarter; July 26, New York; July 27, Ohio; July 27, (Ship) Tacoma, 260 horses. August 10, Indiana; August 10, Morgan City; August 14, St. Paul; August 15, Senator; August 18, City of Sidney; August 19, Siam, 373 horses and freight; August 29, City of Puebla; August 29, Leelanaw , 260 horses and freight. September 2, Warren; September 8, Columbia; September 16, Aztec, 364 horses and freight; September 16, Belgian King. CHAPTER V. THE CAPTURE OF MANILA. HE arrival of the first detachment of American troops on June 30, 1898, found Dewey in possession of Manila Bay and of all the shore fortifications from Corregidor to Malate. The Filipinos had possession of all the interior of Luzon Island, and the Spanish forces, numbering about 5600 men, under Governor-General Augustin, were hemmed in Manila. With the American fleet in possession of the bay and the Filipinos holding the interior, there was but one possible out- come of the siege, and yet the Spanish position in the city was by no means weak. If well defended by a force sufficient to man the fortifications, it was well nigh impregnable to troops unsupported by heavy artillery. The defenses consisted of two walls surrounding the old town, known as the “Walled City,” and numerous outlying works. The attack of the American forces was directed against the fortifications on the south and east of the city, and a description of these will serve for a description of the whole. THE FORTIFICATIONS OF MANILA. The west wall was built to ward off a sea attack; the south and east an attack by land. The total length of the south and east wall is 4900 feet, the south wall being 3300 and the east wall 1600 feet long. There are two of these walls, known as the inner and the outer wall. The outer wall is 15 feet high, on an incline from the top to the bottom on the outside, and the inner wall has a height of 25 feet, and is so arranged that firing is done over the heads of those occupying the outer wall. These walls are built of heavy masonry and are from 15 to 25 feet in width on the top, and so arranged that a large force can occupy them and be sheltered from a front fire. For instance, on the top of the inner wall there is a space about 20 feet in width which the troops occupy in action. In front of them is a stone wall 6 feet high, through which are loopholes. There is a moat sur- rounding the outer wall 100 feet wide, now nearly filled with debris and offal, in which water stands the year round. Between the walls is another moat varying in width from 125 to 150 feet, in a condition like the outer moat. In this inside moat are three bastions, built in the same manner as the walls and connected with the inner wall by foot bridges. All these bastions and walls are surmounted by guns, some modern and heavy, others ancient and comparatively useless in modern warfare. Campaigning in the Philippines. THE SPANISH DUNGEONS. Beneath these walls and covering their length underground are the “dun- geons.” They are built in three apartments, the first 50 by 25 feet, the other two 30 by 25 feet. All are connected by stone causeways and built of solid masonry. The guard-room to these is a little struc- ture 8 by 12 feet. From this is an en- trance to dungeon No. 1 by a series of stone steps, and the end of this descent is the gate of entrance, 2 feet high and lyi feet wide. The exit to the next dungeon was of the same size and kind, and here another descent of a number of stone steps through a stone causeway and the same kind of entrance to dungeon No. 2. From dungeon No. 2 was a like causeway and descent to No. 3, which was located below sea level. There was a gate with iron grates opening from the third dungeon, which, when raised, would permit the water from the sea or Pasig River to flow into the dungeon. In this last dungeon it was the habit of the Spanish authorities to keep the Filipino prisoners, and when they failed to die of starvation or become too numerous, they could raise the gates. When the Spanish sought diversion in their executions they would take out the prisoners and publicly shoot them by the score. Two places were specially appropriated for this. One at the northwest corner of the wall, near the barracks and arsenal, and another across the street, south of the moat. Here most of the civilians were shot. THE GATES, FORTS AND BARRICADES. There are six gates leading into the walled city, one of these being in the south wall mentioned, another in the east wall, and the remainder opening upon the bay or river. Nearly opposite the south gate and a little west of Luneta barracks is another fort similar in construction to the old wall, with moat and double walls. It covers nearly an acre of ground, and is 900 feet inland from the shore. Here was a powder magazine. At the place called Ermita, 1500 feet south of the city wall, were strong earthworks mounting a battery of Krupp guns, built as a defense against naval attack. Through this place extended the street or Calle Real from the wall southward to Malate, a distance of one mile. It runs nearly parallel to the shore and distant there- from 200 to 500 feet. Here, extending across the street, was a strong barri- cade. It was 6 feet high and 6 feet wide at the top, with substantial buildings at either end, with openings between the sandbags on the top. SPANISH TRENCHES AT CAVITE. Campaignhig in the Philippines. 73 At different places between this and Fort San Antonio, Abad, or Fort Malate, were three of these street barricades. In this suburb of Malate, all the streets or roads were crossed with these barricades. All through this section, also, were such barricades in the open, covering all approaches to the city. Twenty-four hundred feet south along the Calle Real Road, was another trench, commencing at the beach and extending eastward 700 feet. This barricaded the approach to Malate, the last suburb of the city south. The beach formed the west flank of this trench, and an impassable swamp the east flank. Five hundred feet south from this trench, is Fort Malate. This was a stone fort, built of solid masonry and mounted with modern guns. Instead, however, of a moat in front, there was a slough or waterway, 100 feet wide and varying in depth, depending upon tide and rain. The slough approached the fort from the east, thence deflected southward, and thence westward into the bay. The approaches to this were swamps and brush. A stone bridge crosses this stream by the fort on the Calle Real Road, and the approaches to this bridge were covered by strong stone walls. Connecting with this stone bridge and the fort, was a strong line of trenches. They extended from the fort to the beach, west, a distance of 200 feet, and from the fort eastward, a distance of 3000 feet to block-house No. 14, which was flanked on the east by an impassable swamp, and by the bay on the west. THE SPANISH BEOCK-HOUSES. All over the country wherever the Spaniards had outposts, is found the block- house. They are all on the same plan, although of different material. Some are of stone, some stone in part and partly wood, and some are all of wood. Block- house No. 14 was the kind known as the wooden block-house. It was thirty feet square, two stories high, built on raised ground, sloping from the base outward at an incline of about fifty degrees. At the corners are ten-inch timbers to which heavy planks are nailed, extending from one corner to the other, both on the in- side and outside, making a double wall of plank. The space between these walls is filled with a mixture of earth and stone, forming a kind of ce- ment or mac- adam, though not hardened. Each story has loopholes suitable for rifle firing; the holes are six inches in diameter, have an incline of thirty-five degrees, the bottom of which is steel- lined, so that a shot entering the hole would strike the steel plate and glance Upward above the heads of the men behind the guns. There was a trench around I 74 Campaigning in the Philippines. block-house No. 14, so built that it intercepted and commanded the Cingalon Road, hereafter mentioned, also another highway, these two roads being the only approach to Manila from this district. CONSTRUCTION OF THE SPANISH TRENCHES. The Spanish trench is always about the same. There is a ditch in front about six feet wide and three feet deep, and the earth back of this is thrown up five feet high. They are five to seven feet thick on the top, and slope from this outward to the ground. They are usually covered with sandbags, between which are loopholes. Sometimes the breastwork is made entirely of sandbags. The ap- proach to the trench at block-house No. 14 is a swamp, almost impassable, and brush. South of this trench along the Calle Real Road, and reaching to the trench, is the Spanish cemetery. The wall has a stone base and was a good protection against an assault. Adjoining this on the south is the American cemetery, where our soldiers are interred. South of this last trench, at an average distance of 1100 feet, runs a highway extending eastward at right angles from the Calle Real Road, which here inter- cepts it from the north. This highway bears north- ward and passes block- house No. 14, and from there on forms what is known as the Cingalon Road. On both sides of this road were Spanish trenches commanding open spaces where attacks could be made. South of the above intersection of the highway was another line of entrenchments extending from the Calle Real Road to the beach, the distance being 650 feet. This was the last Spanish outpost entrenched in front of the American line. All these fortifications, under the plan of battle of August 13th, were to be attacked and overcome by Gen. Greene’s j Brigade, known as the 2d Brigade of the division, with Gen. MacArthur’s Brigade in supporting distance to the right. Gen. MacArthur’s Brigade, under the plan of battle, was to move directly against other Spanish strongholds, with Greene’s brigade in supporting distance on the left. These fortifications remain to be noticed. For this purpose we go back to block-house No. 14. The dis- tance of block-house No. 13 from block-house No. 14 is 425 yards, air-line, vary- ,j ing north by ten degrees east, and between these two were a number of short trenches and rifle-pits, and a stone house and barricades, all so situated as to en- filade the approaches from different directions. This was a formidable place. Campaigning^ in the Philippines. 75 Block-house No. 13 rested on the west side of the Cingalon Road and was strongly built, and from this eastward and extending across the highway to an impassable swamp was a strong barricade. On the west of this fortified line was also a swamp. The only traveled way between these two block- houses was the Cingalon Road, which ran eastward from block- house No. 14 255 yards and thence turned at right angles to block-house No. 13, 360 yards. Between this highway and the fortified line were cultivated fields. Back of block-house No. 13 and extend- ing northeast towards block-house No. 12 were numerous trenches which gave protection against an advance from the south by a swamp and slough. The dis- tance between these two block-houses is 750 yards, and between them there is no direct traveled way. The only connection is by highway eastward to Cingalon, where it is intersected by a road leading past block-house No. 13, and thence ex- tending to Paco. The distance from Cingalon to block-house No. 12 is 440 yards, and from block-house No. 13 to Cingalon 600 yards. The highway continues from Cingalon to Paco and intersects the main highway from Malate to Paco, a distance of 830 yards. From this intersection to Paco bridge is 180 yards. The main traveled highway to the walled city gates from this locality intersects this highway 80 yards from the bridge, and this would be the line of approach to the south gate of the city. On this line of road lies the Paco cemetery, distant from intersection 700 yards. From Paco cemetery there are two ways to the city gates. By direct way to the south gate it is 1200 yards; the other makes a circuit northward. The gate also may be reached by a road going west to Ermita and thence north. The extent of the fortifications held by the Spaniards against the American troops was from the city wall to the south line of the entrenchment, two miles, and from east to west at the furthest point in width, one mile. THE FIEIPINO INSURGENTS. In front of the Spanish fortifications, and surrounding the city, the Filipinos had thrown up trenches, many of them skilfully constructed, and were occupying them on the arrival of the American forces. They were very deficient in military discipline, and did not hold the trenches with any regularity. The trenches were I often inadequately guarded, and at times an entire trench might be vacated. It was evident to our commanders that the Filipinos would be utterly unreliable as an auxiliary, or even a supporting force. In the event of their entering Manila i with our forces it was evident that neither their own officers nor the Americans * could control them. There were arms and equipments but for a small part even of the actual soldiers, and in case of success there would be no limit to the num- ber of vengeful and bloodthirsty followers who would rush into the city, and who could not be distinguished from those actually under military discipline, or from I the inhabitants of the city. It was certain that under such circumstances it would i LANDING OF TROOPS AT CAVITE. 1 Catnpaigniiig iji the Philippines. 7 () be impossible for the small American army to prevent the sack and burning of the city, with accompan 3 dng horrors such as the world has not seen since the days of Attila, and for which, if permitted, America would be held responsible. FILIPINOS NOT TO SHARE IN THE ATTACK. It was determined from the first, therefore, that the Filipinos should have no part in the attack, or recognition as an army in entering and occupying the city. Not the least difficult of the tasks assumed by the American commanders, was the inducing of Aguinaldo and his arm}^ to peacefully assent to this program. On the other hand they were doubtless aided in the negotiations for the final surrender by the fear of the Spanish and foreign residents of Manila of the terrible scenes which would follow the entrance of armed Filipinos, and the knowledge that the Amer- ican commanders would probably not be able to restrain them if the city were taken by assault. Spanish military tradition, if not law, forbids the surrender of a fortified place, no matter what the force brought against it, until there has been such an exercise of that force as to actually demonstrate the futility of resistance. Some bad things have been done in the Philippines, as in all wars, but too much praise cannot be given to the American commanders for the care and tact dis- plaj^ed in so managing, in the interest of humanity, that open rupture with the Filipinos was avoided, while giving to the brave Spanish officers in comrrand the opportunity to save themselves from the rigor of Spanish military law, while assuring to non-combatants in Manila the protection which civilization demands. CAMP DEWEY ESTABLISHED. The first duty of Gen. T. N. Anderson, upon the arrival of the first ex- pedition, was to reconnoiter the position of the enemy, and decide upon his base of operations, and the nature of his campaign. His base must be under the protection of the fleet, in the most healthful position possible, and easily accessible with supplies and reinforcements to the trenches, where the fighting must be done. For this purpose he settled upon a place, afterwards called Camp Dewey, by wagon road twenty-one miles from Cavite, and by boat six miles. The place was formerly a peanut field; the soil is sandy loam and about four feet above sea level. It was a mile and a quarter in length, by two hundred and fifty to three hundred 3 ^ards in width. The place was protected from sea winds by trees and shrubs. The 1st Bat- talion of California Vol- unteers first went into camp here July 15th, and was soon followed by the other troops. Upon the arrival of the next expedition, Gen. GRAVES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN SAN FRANCISCO. Greene made his head- quarters at Camp Dewey, Gen. Anderson still retaining his headquarters at Cavite. Camp Dewey was located on the now famous Calle Real Road, which continued its way south from the place we last left it on the Spanish Campaigning in the Philippines. 77 line. The distance from headquarters northward towards the Spanish line to the entrenchments occupied by the insurgents was one mile and a half, these extended from the beach to the Calle Real Road, the length of the trench being three hun- dred yards. The distance from this trench to the next insurgent trench was three hundred and fifty yards. This also extended from the beach to the Calle Real Road. East of these lines were the swamps in which the army could not operate. It was this last trench that was finally vacated by the in- surgents for the Ameri- cans, and then, afterwards, the line was advanced by the Americans from fifty to one hundred and fifty yards, and a new line constructed, extending from the beach to a highway westward, and thence to a swamp seven hundred yards. It was built for enfilading, and to cover approaches from the north. The left rested on the bay, and the right was covered by an impassable swamp. POSITION OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS. At the time of the advance on Manila, Gen. Greene’s Brigade held this line of entrenchments with his reserve within supporting distance. Two hundred and fifty yards north on the Calle Real Road, is the intersection of the highway to Pasai, the distance being 700 yards. At Pasai, the road turns at right angles and extending northward, forms the Cingalon Road. Along this road were the trenches held and covered by MacArthur’s Brigade, at the time of the advance, the first of which is 700 yards from Pasai. The trench here extends west 300 yards and 100 yards east from the road. The west approach is covered by a swamp, and the left by a trench held by Greene’s Brigade. All along this highway were a number of short earthworks extending northward a distance of 650 yards to another main trench 200 yards long. Here was a strong barri- cade built for enfilading. This was north and east of Greene’s last trench, and in advance of it 350 yards, and 300 yards south of block-house No. 14, oc- cupied by the Spanish force. In front of this was a strong outpost about 60 yards distant. Here began the insurgent trenches, extending northeast 350 yards. Their left had for support the American line and their right an impassable swamp. These were strong earthworks and would be effective in making an assault on the strong Spanish position which was supported by the block-houses. It was these trenches which our forces wished to occupy before making the advance on Manila. Our operations prior to this advance taking Camp Dewey as a base, covered three-quarters of a mile east and west, and two CHURCH AT MALABON. 78 Campaigning in the Philippines. and a half miles north and south. The west was protected the ba}^ and the east by an impassable swamp, and the whole was covered by the guns of the fleet. EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE AMERICAN COMMANDERS. The position of the American commanders, previous to the arrival of a military force sufficient to make them masters of the situation, was very trying. There were large foreign interests in Manila, and the well known temporary lack of power on the part of the Americans to give due protection to non-combatants and their property from the possible excesses of the Filipinos was a legitimate cause of anxiety to the governments whose citizens were in Manila. The result was a speedy gathering of British, French, Japanese and German war-ships to observe events, and afford such protection to their own citizens and other non-combatants as the exigencies of the case might require. MISCONDUCT OF THE GERMAN ADMIRAL. The number of German ships, however, was unnecessarily large. * There were five in all, two of which were armored and outclassed any ship of Dewey’s fleet; and considering their number and size the German squadron in Manila Bay CRAVES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN PACO CEMETERY. almost constituted what is called a “naval demonstration,” a term which is used to describe a naval force sufficient in strength to control an existing situation, and which is very seldom displayed under such circumstances, except for the purpose of a warning against some possible action. The actions of the German squadron were very peculiar. The rules of naval etiquette in a blockaded port, or in the presence of belligerents, are very closely drawn and perfectly understood by all naval commanders. It was the constant practice of the ships of the German squadron to strain these rules to the utmost, and in some cases they certainly overstepped them. There was a studied discourtesy, which could apparently have no object except to irritate the Americans and engage them in a controversy. As naval commanders are always presumed to be acting in pursuance of instructions, it was difficult for Admiral Dewey to interpret the actions of the German admiral except upon the supposition that he desired to provoke a contest which would serve as an excuse for Germany’s intervention in affairs in the Philippines. Admiral Dewey endured these petty annoyances with such patience as he might, *Mr. Stickney’s account of this matter has already been given, (see page 1(>) but it seems proper to make the narrative complete in this place, Campaigning in the Philippines. 79 until, what he deemed a sufficient occasion arising, he is said to have .sent, in con- nection with a protest against an improper action, a request to Admiral Von Died- erich to be informed “Whether Germany and the United States were at peace or at war, in order that he might take measures accordingly,” with the added notifica- tion that “If Admiral Von Diederich wanted a fight he could have it right now.” No official report of any such message has been published, but unque.stionably some mes.sage was sent which relieved the situation, for there was no more trouble from that source. What instructions Admiral Von Diederich may have had, or what designs, if any, the German government may have had, is not likely to be known, but so far as we can now .see, whatever trouble there was grew out of the fact that the German commander was an impertinent and foolish man. At an}" rate he was quietly recalled by his government. RUMORED COMING OF CAMARA’S FLEET. In addition to this cause of anxiety, and the strain of managing the Filipinos, there was a very po.s.sible danger from a Spanish fleet. The battle-ships of the American navy were all in the Atlantic, while Spain had at home a good number of formidable vessels, from which a squadron, far more powerful than that of Dewey, might easily be fitted out, and reach Manila, by way of the Suez Canal long before any American battle-ship, even if it could be spared from the Atlantic, could reach there. In anticipation of this, and as the only thing possible to be done, the monitors Monterey and Monadnock, then lying in San Francisco, were fitted out for the Philippines, and the Monterey was promptly got off. As a mat- ter of fact, as is well known, a squadron, including the battle-ship Pelayo, was made up in the Mediterranean, and despatched eastward under Admiral Camara. Dewey knew this, and also that the Monterey had sailed to his assistance. The anxiety and strain which grew out of this situation is well described in the follow- ing language of Gen. F. V. Greene: “We had been thirty days without news from the outer world. The Boston brought us the latest information by way of Hongkong, which was dated July 2d, and consisted of a few brief telegrams, to the effect that Admiral Camara’s fleet had passed through the Suez Ca- nal, was coaling in the Red Sea, and as soon as this was completed would continue its voyage to Manila; and that Gen. Merritt had sailed from San Fran- cisco in the steamer Newport on June 28th. “The.se telegrams capturkd Spanish guns. showed that a most interesting race was in progress on two sides of the globe, each of the contestants with about 7000 nautical miles to go. Camara was coming east, and Merritt was coming west; and the monitor Moyiterey., which 80 Campaigniji^ in the Philippiiies. we had left coaling at Honolulu, and the arrival of which was of such vital importance to Dewej^ was also coming west, all having the same objective — Manila Bay. As we steamed down the coast of Luzon, I spent several hours figuring on a time table to see who would come in first. Allowing the Monterey six knots, Camara’s fleet ten knots, and the Newport twelve knots, I figured out that Camara would reach Manila July 26th, Merritt July 28th, and the Monterey August 4th. Would Camara come straight to Manila ? Would he sail east to intercept Merritt ? Would his arrival be delayed beyond August 4th ? Would he come at all ? “I handed the time table to Admiral Dewey, and he spent most of the night and the following day studying over it. On the morning of the third day (July 19) he came to the China in his barge, and asked me to go ashore with him to see Gen. Anderson, of his expedition, was racks at Cavite. The vinced that if Camara age he would reach Monterey. Having no mand, he was out- The safety of the army such an enormous ica, depended upon tact. He therefore nation, in case news less than a week that back, to take his fleet the north of Luzon, eastward until he met Mo7iadnock , which then he would return fleet. He felt reason- would be gone not 10th, and he asked was the senior officer, what he would do. BONES OF THE DEPARTED, who, with 2500 men quartered in the bar- Admiral was con- continued his voy- Manila before the battle-ship in his corn- classed by the Pelayo. and the transports, at distance from Amer- keeping his fleet in- came to the determi- was not received in Camara had turned and the transports to and then to cruise the Moiiterey and the was following her; and destroy Camara’s ably confident that he longer than August Gen. Anderson, who The latter promptly replied that he would take thirty days’ rations, march into the hills about twenty miles east of Cavite, entrench and await the return of the fleet. My opinion was asked, and I fully concurred in the wisdom of the departure of the fleet, and the propriety of taking the troops inland to await its return. “ If Camara’s nerve had held out, the result would have been a very interesting campaign in the Philippines. Merritt arrived three days ahead of schedule time, and the Monterey arrived on the very day calculated, but Camara did not come at all. Definite information that Camara had turned back reached the Admiral on July 22d, just as it was becoming necessary to take steps to carry the above plan into operation.” Such is the fortune of war. Conceding the arrival of Camara with the Pelayo and his fleet as expected, the destruction of the transport fleet, with Gen. Merritt, MAJOR GKNKRALS IN TIIK KIOHTH ARMY CORPvS. 1. Wesley Merritt, first Governor-General of the Philippine Islands; resigned, August 26, 1898, to go as Peace Commissioner to Paris. 2. PIlwell S. Otis, present Governor-General, Philippine Islands, succeeding General Merritt. 3. Thomas N. Anderson, commanding First Division, resigned, March 18, 1899. 4. Arthur MacArthur, commanding Second Division. 5. H. W. Dawton, commanding First Division, succeeding General Anderson. 6. Henry C. Merriam, commanding Dept, of California, relieved, January 19, 1899. I BATTI.E OF AVGUST 13 , 1898 . Cauipaigning in the Philippines. 81 was among the probabilities. Among the certainties would have been the Spanish occupation of all the fortifications from Corregidor to Manila, the American forces, twenty miles inland, the insurgents driven out of every fortified place in and about Manila, and this powerful Pelayo and the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay under the protection and support of the heavy guns on the fortified walls of Manila. But none of these things happened. THE PLAN OF ATTACK. On the arrival of the second expedition Gen. Anderson and Gen. Greene deliberated on the plan of attack, Greene having brought information to Ander- son from Gen. Merritt that, if he was certain of success, he might make the attack before his (Merritt’s) arrival; otherwise, to await his coming. Gen. Anderson and Gen. Greene had under con- GATES TO THE WALLED CITY. sideration two plans of attack. One, to make San Pedro Macati the base, and the other to proceed direct against the Spanish position on the Manila Bay side. In this there were two considerations. From the San Pedro Macati base, the eastern and less fortified part of the city could be easily reached. On the east, the insurgents already held the city water-works, and effectually blockaded the city from all egress into the interior. But to attack from the San Pedro Macati base involved the great difficulty of hauling the artillery by hand to the place, and moving the army so that it would practically be detached from the present base, while the San Pedro Macati base would be out of effective range of the fleet, and without its support. Gen. Anderson, accord- ing to Gen. Greene, favored the San Pedro Macati base, while he favored the bay side attack. In any case, it was considered that the attack should be. 6b S2 Cauipaii]^)ii)ig^ in the Philippines. postponed until the arrival of Gen. Merritt, and he, upon his arrival, ordered the attack on the Greene plan. At that time, the reputed strength of the Spanish force was 10,000 men, but Gen. Greene says that at the time of the surrender it was found to be 18,000- Opposed to this force was that of the insurgent forces which, while not allowed to co-operate with the Americans in their aggressive movements, still held strong defensive positions against the Spaniards. Gen. Anderson was the ranking officer prior to the arrival of Gen. Merritt, and the American forces being formed into a division, Gen. Anderson was placed in command, and upon the arrival of Gen. MacArthur with the third expedition, the whole command was divided into two brigades, Gen. MacArthur being assigned to the command of the 1st Brigade and Gen. Greene to the 2d Brigade. ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN FORCES. The formation of the force into brigades and the assignment of the different regimental and other organizations for the brigades was made by Gen. Merritt, by general order, August 1st, as follows : Gexerat. Orders, [ Headquarters Department of the Pacific No. 2. \ AND Eighth Army Corps. I Manila Bay, P. I., August 1, 1898. j I. The United States forces assembled at Cavite, Camp Dewey and in transports off Cavite are hereby organized as the 2d Division of the 8th Army Corps, composed of two brigades. Biigadier-General T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., is assigned to the command of the division; The brigades are organized as follows; FIRST BRIGADE — Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., commanding; 23d U. S. Inf., two battalions; 14th U. S. Inf. , one battalion; I3th Minnesota Volunteer Inf.; 1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf., two battalions; 1st Idaho Volunteer Inf., two battalions; 1st Wyoming Volunteer Inf., one battalion; Astor Battery. SECOND BRIGADE— Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, U. S. V., commanding; 18th U. S. Inf., two battalions; battalion four-foot batteries, 3d U. S. Art.; Company A, Battalion U. S. Engineers; 1st California Volunteer Inf.; 1st Colorado Volunteer Inf.; 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf.; 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Inf. ; Light Battery A, Utah Volunteer Art. ; Light Battery B, Utah Volunteer Art. H. The 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. and detachment of California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, now at Cavite, will remain at that place on their present duties, the commanding officers reporting direct to division commander. III. The Signal Detachment will remain at Cavite, and will report to the chief signal officer at the.se headquarters. By command of Major-General Merritt. J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General. THE NATURE OF THE GROUND COVERED BY OUR ARMY. The first expedition under Gen. Anderson, had arrived in the bay on June 30, 1898, and landed next day at Cavite. This city and fortifications are on a narrow neck which connects with the main peninsula. This neck is a mile long to a point where it is so narrow that only a single wagonway connects with the peninsula. This road always overflows at high tide. The large peninsula to Campaigning in the Philippines. 83 which this neck connects, is five miles long to a point where it connects with the mainland, and here there is only room for a single wagonway, and during the rainy season this roadway is quite impassable. In the interior, and north and east of the Cavite peninsula, and extending to within a short distance of where Camp Dewey was afterwards located, the country is composed largely of swamps and rough, uneven ground, through which many small streams flow, which have their sources in the innumerable swamps, the larger ones taking their rise in the mountain range, which lies inland near the Cake Laguna de Bombon, and thence flowing westward and emptying into Manila Bay. Over this whole region was a rank tropical vegeta- tion. Luckily this district, at the time of the first debarkation, had been cleared of the Spaniards by the insurgents, and thus all possibility of opposition in landing prevented. There is practically but one wagon road through this region from Cavite northward towards Manila, to a place where Camp Dewey was subsequently established, and this, most of the year in an almost impassable condition. The distance is about twenty miles. The Spaniards on their official maps, designate their public travel ways as “roads,” “bridlepaths” and “paths.” The first is something of an improved way, the streams bridged or supposed to be so, and the road-beds thrown up much after the manner of our Western country roads, and averaging about twenty-five feet in width. The “ bridle path” is a way over which a carabao may haul a sled. The “ path” is suitable only for travel by foot or on horseback. From the roads, notably that which leads from Cavite to Manila, there are many of these bridle paths and paths leading back into the interior. This interior, after leaving the plain south and east of Manila, over which the campaign was made, consists of foot- hills merging into a mountain range, the highest peaks of which are from 5000 to 7000 feet, and this range extends from the southwest border of Lake Laguna de Bombon to the Pasig River, making a circuit much in the form of a half moon. It became at once evident to Gen. Anderson that Cavite could not, for the reason stated, be made a base of operations in an active campaign against Manila, and, luckily again, to enable him to establish his base as he desired, the insur- gents had driven the Spaniards out of the locality which he wished to occupy. That is to say, at the time of the arrival of the first expedition, the insurgents occupied San Francisco de Malabon, Cavite Viejo, Imus, Bacoor, Las Pinas, Para- naque and Malibay. After a further reconnaissance, Gen. Anderson selected as a new base of operations in the active campaign a plot of ground near Paranaque. The plan of his campaign had for its objective, first, the capture of the entrenchments and strongholds of the Spanish positions south and eastward FLAG RAISED OVER FORT SAN ANTONIO, AUGUST 13 , 1898 . 84 Caitipaigniug in the Philippines. of the walled city, many of which, owing to the obstacles shutting them from view of the fleet and other causes, could not be bombarded successfully by the fleet, and second, the capture of the walled city. DIFFICULTIES IN LANDING TROOPS. Debarkation when once begun on the part of the troops, was pushed with vigor, although under unpropitious conditions. The rainy season was on. There was a heavy downpour and the men were heavily loaded with rations. Personal supplies and ammunition were carried ashore by lighters called “cascos.” This was the only kind of craft obtainable. The casco is a kind of hybrid affair, unwieldy and cumber- some, without sail or steam; neither Chinese junk nor Amer- ican scow, but partaking of the characteristics of both. They COL. HALE DIRECTING MOVEMENTS IN THE FIELD. ^gaVy timberS, With outlying riggers and towed from one position to another. Without any material mishaps the expedition was thus landed at Cavite, as were likewise the second and third expeditions, the only troops which took part in the campaign of Manila. THE HEALTH OF THE COMMAND. Few can realize the conditions at the time that the first expedition cast anchor in Manila Bay. With the best that could be done, it was impossible, in the hurried departure from the States, and the many hindrances unavoidable in securing transports, to properly equip and supply the troops. As a consequence, the mem- bers of the first expedition endured many discomforts which were largely avoided in the subsequent expeditions. The germs of disease, which soon after landing became widespread and alarming, were undoubtedly fostered on board the trans- ports. The 2d Oregon were the worst sufferers. It was reported that within thirty days after debarkation, not more than one-half of the regiment was fit for camp duties. There was much complaint on shipboard of improper food supply and clothing, and shoes were not up to the standard. Hygienic conditions aboard ship were doubtless neglected. The change from civil to military life brings new and untried conditions, which usually put to the test the best physical conditions. Add to this climatic change, improper diet and bad sanitation, and many break down under the strain. As the transport and supply service became better organ- ized, and the troops got under better discipline, these conditions gradually disap- peared. The most prevalent disease, especially in the second expedition, was measles. Gen. Greene, accounting for this, says that there was a great strife among the regiments at San Francisco to be the first in taking transports; that at the time Campaigning in the Philippines. 85 his expedition left San Francisco a number of the members of the different regi- ments were in hospitals, some afflicted with measles, and about a dozen of these men by stealth escaped from the hospital, and secreted themselves on shipboard, and were not found until far out at sea. AGUINALDO ADDRESSES THE POWERS. Gen. Wesley Merritt arrived at Manila on July 25th. He at once assumed command, and on August 1st issued the order, already quoted, organizing the brigades of his army. On the 6th day of August, Aguinaldo, as President of the Revolutionary government, addressed a note to the Powers, asking their recogni- tion of his government. In this he did not consult any representative of the United States, nor had he the concurrence or consent of any such representative. It was a plain, unequivocal act, indicating a determination to no longer act in concert with the United States. He said in his note: “The revolution has about 9000 prisoners of war, and a regularly organized army of 30,000 men, and they are now besieging Manila, the capital.” On the 12th of August, 1898, the protocol between Spain and the United States was made, and among other recitals it provided: “That the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and govern- ment of the Philippines.” The issue was thus plainly drawn. Aguinaldo demanded the recognition of his government. The United States decided that the status of the Philippines should be settled between them and Spain by a treaty yet to be made. GROWING ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND FILIPINOS. Ante-dating these events, a gradual antagonism between the personnel of the two armies had grown up. An indistinct, undefined color-line had been drawn between the armies. At first the Filipino sought fraternity, but his overtures fell on barren ground, and he was taught that there could be no social affinity between him and the Americans When once the breach be- gan, it was but a step to open insults. Before and during the engagement which ended in the capture of Manila, animosities be- tween the Americans and Filipinos became very manifest. During the ad- vance, Aguinaldo was ordered out of his trenches, then to cease firing, and at a time during the advance, a part of the two commands stood opposed to each other at the “fire” command. At the surrender the Filipinos were not allowed to participate, and, GUNS IN THE ARSENAL AT MANILA. 86 Catnpaig fling in the Philippines. with the exception of their commanding officers, were excluded from the city while bearing arms. Some time before this Aguinaldo’s headquarters were at Bacoor, in close proximity to the American land and naval forces. It was to free himself from this supposed dangerous proximity that he removed his headquarters to a place three miles north of Manila. To this Gen. Otis demurred, and Aguinaldo, paying no heed, on the 13th of September he was ordered peremptorily by Gen. Otis to evacuate by the afternoon of the 15th. On the 14th Aguinaldo, in consequence, moved his force to Malolos, where he established his headquarters and that of the Provisional government, making Malolos its capital. At this time, as stated, his forces, in part, were distributed as follows: At Caloocan, 3000 men; his cannon were pointed towards Binondo; at Pasig, 400; south of Malate, 1200, and at Pasai, Pandacan, Paco and Santa Ana, about 500 each. During this time, and up to the signing of the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States, the insurgents claim that they had so conducted their cam- paign that the Spanish soldiery had been practically driven out of the Philippines, with the exception of Manila and its suburbs, and there was no civil control out- side of this limit for the Spanish government to transfer to the United States. On August 9th the following general order was issued by Gen. Merritt: General Orders, ) Headquarters Department of the Pacific ' k No. 3. \ and Eighth Army Corps. I Manila Bay, P. I., August 9, 1898. j In view of the extraordinary conditions under which this army is operating, the command- ing general desires to acquaint the officers and men composing it with the expectations which he entertains as to their conduct. You are assembled upon foreign soil, situated within the western confines of a vast ocean separ iting you from your native land. You have come, not as despoilers and oppressors, but simply as the instruments of a strong, free government, whose purposes are beneficent, and which has declared itself in this war the champion of those oppressed by Spanish rule. It is, therefore, the intention of this order to appeal directly to your pride in your position as representatives of a high civilization in the hope and with the firm conviction that you will so conduct yourselves in your relations with the inhabitants of these islands as to convince them of the lofty nature of the mission which you have come to execute. It is not believed that an^ acts of pillage, rapine or violence will be committed by soldiers or others in the employ of the United States, but should there be persons with this command who prove themselves unworthy of this confidence, their acts will be considered not only as crimes against the sufferers, but as direct insult to the United States flag, and they will be punished on the spot with the maximum penalties known to military law. By command of Major-General Merritt. J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General. WORK OF AMERICAN TROOPS BEFORE THE FADE OF MANILA.. It was a vigilant command during the six weeks intervening between the landing of the first expedition and the fall of Manila, and during this interim both the officers and rank and file, without murmur, endured the hardships and vicissitudes of campaign life in the trenches. The rainy season was at its height, and the downpour was almost incessant. Life in camp, aside from the exposures on duty, was almost intolerable. Resort was had to every device to provide some Campaigning in the Philippines. 87 comfort in tent life, but to little avail. The ground was in an overflow, and the continued tramping to and fro made a mixture of mud which rendered passage almost impossible. To cook, eat and sleep, to live, to endure, put to the test all their fortitude. The work of the soldiers consisted, aside from the duties in camp, in doing service in the trenches, sometimes to fight, always under the enemy’s aim and always in mud and rain. Usually the trench filled with water as it was dug, and often the upthrown dirt washed down as fast as placed. The trenches were held and the work there done in relays, the relays serving for twenty-four hours. ARRANGEMENTS WITH AGUINALDO. It was to make more effective our own operations that a request was made of the insurgents to vacate their trenches, giving place to the Americans. This caused much parleying, the matter being referred to Aguinaldo, who then had his AGUINALDO AND FILIPINO LEADERS’ HEADQUARTERS. headquarters eleven miles inland, and whose consent was obtained, the condition being that the transaction should be put in written form. Our troops occupied this insurgent trench the next morning. Express instructions were given by Gen. Merritt in this negotiation that no force should be used or threatened. This removed the whole insurgent force from the line desired to be occupied by the Americans. This was not the first instance in which the insurgents hesitated to comply with the requests of the American commanders. Soon after the arrival of the first troops, land transportation facilities were badly needed by the Ameri- cans. All of these facilities were in the hands of the insurgents, who refused to allow their use by the Americans upon any consideration. Gen. Anderson thereupon seized such animals and means as he required, but in all instances paid far more than their worth. The treatment of the Spanish prisoners at Cavite by the insurgents was so barbarous that our general in command interfered and 88 Carnpaignm^ in the Philippines. called the attention of the insurgent officers to the starving condition of their prisoners, and asked that they be accorded more humane treatment. This being refused, the prisoners were suitably furnished by our army. AMERICANS OCCUPY FILIPINO TRENCHES. The trench vacated by the Filipinos was occupied by one battalion 18th Reg- ulars, one battalion 1st Colorado Inf. and four guns, two from each of the Utah Batteries. Owing to defects in profile and location, it was determined to remove the trench to a new location, which would better command the Spanish position and could be better strengthened and extended so as to cover the whole line of the Spanish trenches. Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy surveyed the ground and deter- mined upon the location and character of the trench, and it was placed under his direction. The construction of this trench went on for two days and nights, and during this time the change of occupants had apparently not been noticed by the Spaniards. The first day, the 18th Inf. and Colorado Inf. were relieved by two battalions of California Inf., and on the next morning, being July 31st, the two California battalions were relieved by two battalions of the 10th Pennsylvania Volunteers, one of the Nebraska Volunteers and by 200 of the 3d Regular Artillery as infantry. During this day there was occasional picket firing. The trench at this time had been built to and from the Capuchin chapel, a total dis- tance of about 300 yards, extending from the beach to the Calle Real, and was nearly completed. It had a height averaging about seven feet. A wide hall runs through the center of the Capuchin chapel, east and ^vest. The trench began just north of the chapel door, which opened into this hall-way and thence direct to the road. Connecting on the west corner of the building, the trench extended to the beach, connecting the trench with this corner. The earth was piled high against the iron-barred window. Near the beach, the trench inclined forward a short space, and thence a few yards across to a wrecked cais- son. During the day there had been slight desultory firing by the Spaniards, but not sufficient to materially interfere with the construction of the trench. It was seen, however, that the Spaniards had become extremely watchful of the work going on. The insurgents in the trenches had a habit, prior to this, of a “hit-or- miss” fashion of firing, as the spirit caught them. One or several would elevate their guns and blaze away, without any aim and no special object. The Spaniards r ; v ’,^ 7 '''; " seemed to have a like faculty of random firing, but seemingly always firing high. As a result, the insurgents in the trenches were not in danger, but our troops occupying positions in their rear were exposed. Gen. Merritt had re- quested Aguinaldo to stop this firing and, after much persuasion, they SIXTH ARTILLERY IN ACTION. deSisted The particular danger to our troops occupying these trenches, in consequence of the Spanish high firing, was not so much in the trench as in going to and from it. It is indisputable that had our troops in the trenches paid no heed to this firing^ Ca^npaigning m the Philippines. 89 it would have been an accident if any loss of life had occurred prior to August 13th, and even then there would have been no loss had the program, as arranged, been strictly followed. It was Admiral Dewey’s desire and plan to effect the capture of Manila without the loss of a single man. But our soldiers could not resist the temptation, although against orders, to now and then take a shot. It was always the case, if they kept quiet behind the trenches, that the Spaniards would fire a few shots or volleys and then subside. THE BATTLE IN THE RAIN. On the night of July 31st, however, the tension reached a climax, and there occurred between the forces what is known as the “ Battle in the Rain.” It was one of those typical tropical night storms in which there was a raging wind and a furious downpour, and, in the darkness, objects were not discernible beyond your reach. In the rush and roar of the storm you could neither see nor hear. It was CONVENT OF GUADALUPE BEFORE DESTRUCTION. certainly a reckless enthusiasm which could drive our soldiers out on such a night I against orders and at the hazard of their lives. Exactly what occurred when the I conflict was at its height would be difficult to learn. At the time it was sup- I posed and believed, and the order of the command so stated, that the Spaniards { had left their trenches and attempted to turn our right flank. It is now conceded j this \^as not so, and the Spaniards, after their surrender of Manila, said they j never left their trenches. The Spanish trench was much longer than our own, i and their left extended far eastward of our right. I The 10th Pennsylvanians were the chief sufferers. They might have been in ! error in supposing the enemy were turning their flank, but there can now be no I doubt as to their own position and actions in the affair. While conflicting state- ! ments are made in official reports and by those not participating, the narration given in the Tenth Pennsylvania Regimental History in the Pennsylvania edition of this volume puts the question at rest. It says: ” On the morning of July 31st it fell to the lot of the 10th Pennsylvania Inf. to be detailed for outpost duty for the next twenty-four hours. Col. Hawkins and the entire command was at or near this advanced line, except Company B, which was posted on guard on a i Cainpaijrjiijij^ in the Philippines. yo road near the village of Pasai, nearly two miles to the right rear of the line occU' pied by the rest of the regiment. Maj. H. C. Cuthbertson, in command during the day, placed the 2d Battalion, composed of Companies A, C, H and I, Maj. Everhart Bierer commanding, and the Utah Eight Artillery in the entrenchment and Companies E and D of the 1st Battalion in reserve about 200 yards in the rear of the center of the advanced line. Company K’s position was about the same distance in the rear of the right of the line east of the Manila Road, and it fur- nished outposts and pickets from a point seventy-five yards east, distant and in a curved line to the north and west. During the day there was no movement or firing of any account, and most of the time the Keystone State soldiers were busy strengthening their earthworks. “That night about eleven o’clock the Spanish forces opened a heavy fire of shell from four pieces of artillery at Fort Malate, which continued for a half hour, the Pennsylvania Regiment being the first American troops to be fired upon in the Philippines. The attack caused no material damage to the regiment’s works, nor casualties to its members. The enemy then advanced, delivering a heavy round of infantry firing by squads until within about 400 yards of our line, when, halting, he formed a line and delivered many volleys. This lasted for about three hours. When this volley firing had continued nearly a half hour the enemy evidently relieved a part of his line from the extreme right at the beach and again opened fire from two pieces of artillery with shell and shrapnel. The casualties of the regiment behind the entrenched line during the entire engagement were one man killed and four wounded. About 11:30 p. m. the enemy advanced a line of infantry toward the point east of the entire prolongation of the lOth’s en- trenched line with the evident intention of turning the regiment’s right flank. Seeing this, Maj. Cuthbertson withdrew the pickets and outposts and advanced the reserve line under the command of Maj. Bierer, who made his disposition as follows: Company K (Capt. Thomas S. Crago), about sixty feet to the right of the road, the eastern end of the entrenched line, the left resting on a dense thicket of heavy timber, the line extending east of the entrenched line and about thirty feet in advance of the same; the right resting about five degrees north of* the entrenched line. Companies E (Capt. James A. Eoar), and D (Capt. F. B. Haw- kins), prolonged this line to the right in the order mentioned. “ When this new line had been placed in position the enemy, firing volleys, had advanced to within 200 yards of the same. The three companies of the 10th Pennsylvanians which were deployed on the right of the Calle Real Road num- bered about 200 men, and they made the assault upon, at the lowest estimate, 1000 of the enemy. RAID ON OPIUM DEN BY THIRTEENTH MINNESOTA POLICE. Canipaigjiiii^^ in the Philippines. 91 “ The Pennsylvanians made this advance with continuous volley firing and the enemy continued his movements until within about 100 yards from our front.’' Their account, however, must be in error as to the enemy’s position and move- ments. If they left their trenches and were in such close prox- imity to our line, there would have been dead or wounded there after their retreat to their trenches, and no such were found after the firing ceased. The Spanish fire was mostly by heavy volleys, which would not have been the case had the force been deployed and A SCOUTINO PARTY UNDER FIRE. scattered. Again, the outposts of the second platoon of Battery K, 3d U. S. Art., were not driven in, and did not come in until they were relieved at their station the next morning. This platoon, which was stationed on the Pasai Road, Lieut. Ke.ssler in command, sent forward four or five cossack posts, composed of four men and a non-commissioned officer. These outposts were to the right and ahead of the Pennsylvania line. They did not participate in the fight. The enemy was not seen nor heard firing outside of their trenches, and there was no approach to their outposts. In order to determine to a greater certainty from whence came the fire upon our men, it is necessary to consider the disposition of our forces and what they did. The force occupying the trenches has been noted. The Pennsylvania troops also had the cossack- outposts in front of the line. Back of the trenches and in reserve was the following disposition of troops: One company of the 3d Art. was in the rear of the trenches, and promptly moved forward into them when the firing began, and apprised the command of the movement. The other company of the 3d Art. was ordered forward, but before the order reached them they had already left camp for the scene of action. The 1st California Inf. was sent forward — one battalion to the trenches, the second battalion to halt in reserve about 1200 yards in the rear, and the third battalion just in the rear of the second, and out of the range of the Spanish fire. The 1st Colorado occupied like positions in rear of the Californias. Between ten and eleven o’clock. Fort Malate and the whole Spanish entrenched line opened fire on our little line of trenches. The infantry did mostly volley firing. The Pennsylvania cossack outposts came in and reported their belief that the Spaniards were flanking our right. At once the v/hole camp was aroused, and the troops went forward. It is readily seen that with both wings of the Spanish line focusing their fire on the trench it would seem to the occupants like an enfilading or flanking fire. Many thought by the sound of the shots that they were nearer than the entrenched Spanish line. But it has since been thought, in accounting for this, that these sounds were made by the “spats” of the bullets against the bamboo trees. The approach to our trenches during this fire was a hot zone, owing to the high-firing habit of the Spaniards. For about 700 yards 92 Campaigning in the Philippines. back from the trench, along the Calle Real, owing to the focus of the Spanish range, there was a perfect maelstrom of firing. During the “battle” our forces fired 60,000 rounds, and it may be safely estimated that the Spanish during the same time fired nearly double that quantity, the heavy firing, including the can- nonading, being centered in this locality. How it happened that so few were killed or wounded is inexplicable. The bullets were falling like a torrent, and the shells were bursting in a con- tinuous roar, and this continued for about four hours. With all this the only casualty reported, caused by the shells, was the wounding of Lieut. Buttermore of the Pennsylvanians. He was knocked down by a piece of shell striking him over the eyes. He got up at once and went on with the fight. The Pennsylvan- ians in going into this position were undoubtedly in the thickest of the fight. Here the first soldier in the Philippines was killed in battle. He was Corp. N. B. Brown of Company D. Many were wounded here, and a little beyond this others w^ere killed. In the trenches the men were standing two to the yard, and no more men could be worked there. The reserves were in position and chafing to get to the front. In their anxiety a serious mis- take was made. Maj. Boxton’s Battalion of California Inf., under orders, rushed to the front under a heavy fire. Capt. Reinhold Richter, of Company I, was SPANISH TRENCHES NEAR FORT SAN ANTONIO. the first to fall, hit on the top of the head, on the right side, by a bullet. In the further advance, 1st Sergt. Maurice Justh of Company A, was instantly killed by a shot through the body. A number were wounded. Coming to the old trench, complying, as they supposed, with their order, they saw the flash of guns in their immediate front, which was our firing line in the new trench. Mis- taking this for the reported advanced line of the Spaniards, they at once opened fire by volleys, and discharged three volleys straight into the backs of the Penn- sylvanians and Regulars. Col. Smith of the 1st Californias, had caught up with the Regulars of Battery H, and was with Capt. O’Hara in the trench, and at once sent one of his officers back to warn Maj. Boxton of his mistake. The officer ran with the message, but before it could be delivered the three volleys had been fired. The result of these volleys is not known. The surgeons, how- ever, believe that no man was killed by a shot from the rear. When the California Battalion finally got into position, it was sent to the relief of the Pennsylvanians. The cruiser Bostoji was at anchor in position to rake the whole Spanish trench, but Admiral Dewey did not wish to bring on an Campaigning in ihe Philippines. 93 engagement unless from necessity, and it was arranged that the Boston should not be signaled to open fire, unless as a last resort. Gen. Greene says he became con- vinced, after watching the Spanish fire, although reports were continually coming in of the Spanish advance, that they were still in their trenches, and hence did not signal the Boston. GOOD CONDUCT OF THE VOLUNTEERS. There were many heroic acts done during this engagement, but there is no space here for incidents.. It was amply shown, however, that the old-time American valor was not wanting in the command. While Gen. Greene truthfully says, that when compared with the battles of the Civil War, this was an unim- portant skirmish, and that during that war there were many affairs much larger in fatalities than this, of which no record was . ' made, still he says the conditions were such as usually create consternation among green soldiers, and the Veterans of the Civil War could not have done more thoroughly what was required that night than did these young men from Pennsyl- vania, California, Colorado and Utah, and from the various States whose men were found in the 3d Regular Artillery. On the night of August 1st, the Colorado Regiment held the trenches, but under strict orders not to return the enemy’s fire unless they quit their trenches. With few exceptions this order was observed, but in the darkness the men would find an excuse for firing, alleging as a pre- tense that the Spaniards were advancing. In consequence of this unnecessary exposure one was killed and three wounded. Up to August 4th, the time when the Monterey arrived, our total loss while in these defensive tactics, was twelve killed and fifty-four wounded. At this time, Gen. Mac- Arthur and his command had arrived, but not landed, being prevented by a rough sea. On the night of August 5th, occurred other conflicts be- tween the lines, the usual excuse being that “the Spaniards were advancing.” The trenches were held by one battalion each of the 14th and 23d Regulars and 1st Nebraskas. Firing began at half-past seven o’clock, and lasted till ten. About 20,000 rounds were fired by our men. The loss was three killed and seven wounded. Gen. Merritt and Admiral Dewey now hit upon a plan to end this skirmish firing, and the Governor-General at Manila was notified that within forty-eight hours, if these attacks on our lines did not cease, an attack by the land and naval forces on the city would take place, and that this notice was given so that CHURCH AT MALATE. 94 Campaigning in the Philippines. non-combatants and women and children might be removed. This had the desired effect, and from thenceforth until the final attack on the city, on August 13th, there was no further molestation of our outposts, and the Spaniards were to be seen on their parapets with impunity. The third expedition arrived on July 31st, but did not go into camp until the 9th of August. The Astor Battery was among the first to land. One of their cascos was capsized, her ammunition ruined, and most of the rations lost. Another boat was upset, but no one was drowned. THE AMERICANS READY TO ATTACK MANIDA. With the arrival of Gen. MacArthur and the Monterey, the complement of men and equipment was at hand, and work was pressed for an attack on Manila. On the 10th, Gen. Anderson came over from Cavite and assumed command of the division, and their work went hurriedly on. Every point of weakness was con- sidered and strengthened; the troops were looked carefully after, and every van- tage ground and stragetic maneuver determined. The brigade commanders GATE TO LA LOMA CHURCH. urged the necessity of occupying the strong insurgent trenches by a part of Gen. MacArthur’s Brigade prior to the advance, but Gen. Merritt persisted in his policy of not using force, strictly forbidding anything being either said or done that would give offense to the insurgent command, and further ordered that the trenches should not be extended. There were but two important objective points against which the forces should move — MacArthur’s Brigade against the stronghold which included block-houses Nos. 13 and 14, in the first attack, and Greene’s Brigade against the rest of the Spanish line west, resting on Fort Malate. For this pur- pose the forces were massed as follows: Against Fort Malate’ s front, and in Gen. Greene’s Brigade, were seven battalions in the trenches and eight in reserve, the reserve being at Pasai cross-road, before described, under Gen. Anderson’s im- mediate command. Seven guns of the Utah Battery were placed in the trenches at intervals, and in addition three guns of the navy, manned by a volunteer de- tachment of the 3d Art. These were on the extreme right of the column. MacArthur occupied a position, as seen, with a narrow front, owing to the fact that no further trenches were allowed and no interference with the insurgents, so that his force was massed in support of this narrow line back along the Pasai Campaigning in the Philippines. 95 Road. His front lay between impassable swamps, and back of this, to the Pasai Road, the brigade occupied invulnerable positions. The Astor Battery was on the right, one Utah gun in an insurgent emplacement on the Cingalon Road, the 13th Minnesota on the right, and the 23d Regulars on the left. THE FEEET TAKES POSITION. Having thus located the land forces at the time of the attack, we must now take up the matters pertaining to the fleet, which was to join in a joint attack on the Spanish positions at Manila on the 13th. In the preparations for this attack. Admiral Dewey and Gen. Merritt acted in concert. At this time there was a large fleet of foreign war-ships in Manila Bay, composed of four English, five German, two Frenchman, and a Japanese. Admiral Dewey wanted the place occupied by them in which to maneuver, and they moved out of the way. Every precaution was taken by the fleet for bombardment as though it actually might occur. EFFORTS TO INDUCE SURRENDER. For some time before this, negotiations had been going on to effect a surrender without the loss of property or life. In this the Spanish held to their tradition of requiring defeat before surrender. They had, too, been watching and hoping for Camara’s fleet and the Pelayo, and the 3000 men which the fleet was said to be convoying from Spain; but when Camara turned back, the last hope of holding the Philippines by force vanished; consequently, they were inclined to consider terms of surrender. The Belgian consul, M. Andre, had been for some time occupying a Belgian craft in the bay, and put forth his good ofiices as an inter- mediary between Admiral Dewey and Gen. Merritt and Captain-General Augustin, looking to a pacific capitulation. The Spanish authorities, however, held out for honor, and it required no little strategy to perfect the plan of mimic battle without I it verging into the real. The American commander would not permit this if the j play should go so far as to imperil the life of a single man. Still, if Spanish I pride could be assuaged and no evil follow, it would be far better than to incur the loss of life and property which was sure to follow should a general engage- ment be precipitated. Augustin became so convinced of the folly of resistance j that he was prepared to surrender without further show, and even, as is stated, i hoisted the white flag. It was pulled down, however, and subsequently he was called to Madrid, and Fermin Jaudenes made Captain-General, which position he held when the “ultimatum” was made to him, as before stated, on August 7th. When the final demand was made for surrender, the Cap- j tain-General got twentyfour hours’ time, but after a conference, refused to surrender without an attack. In the meantime the Belgian consul was busy, and his trips were frequent between the fleet and the Captain-General’s oflice. During this time the fleet had cleared for action and was ready at a moment to commence the attack. Gen. Merritt, at the time it was arranged the attack SIGNAL CORPS GOING TO THK FRONT. 96 Campaigning in the Philippines. should be made, came on board the Olympia and stated that the American forces were not in position sufficiently eastward to protect the city from the incoming insurgents at the time of surrender, so a little time was taken to accomplish this. ALLEGED ARRANGEMENT FOR A SHAM BATTLE. By the 12th of August, the full details of the coming “battle” were arranged between Admiral Dewey, Gen. Merritt and Captain-General Jaudenes. In this, on the part of the American forces, such display was to be made as would satisfy an observer that further resistance on the part of the Spaniards would not only be futile, but ground for censure by all non-combatants; when this point was reached the white flag of surrender was to be hung out from the Spanish fort, when further assault should cease. So definite were the details as to this, that the maneuver of the fleet was specified, the time when the attack should begin, where it should be made, its continuance and character; that the Spaniards should fire no shots in return, the exact time when the flag of surrender should be raised, the proceedings pertaining to this and the place and disposition of the American and Spanish forces after this, until the American occupation was made complete, so as to prevent looting and destruction, and ward off the insurgents from the city. Ail the principal officers in both commands were fully apprised, and specific instructions given so that no mistakes be made or loss of life occur. Pursuing this plan, the American fleet was put as fully in readiness as when it first went into the engagement in Manila Bay. THE FLEET BEGINS THE ATTACK. At nine o’clock on the morning of the 13th, the fleet commenced to maneuver into position for the attack, and within one-half hour the Olympia was in position for shelling Fort Malate, followed by the Raleigh and Petrel, the Callao and the little Bareelo closer in shore; and back of these was Gen. Merritt and staff on a transport, and the Kwonghai with the Oregon troops. The Boston, Charleston and Balti- more were on the port quarter of the Olympia. The AfeC?il- loch was on the starboard quarter, while the Moyiterey moved up close in shore, where her twelve-inch muzzles stood grinning at the heavy Krupp batteries at the Luneta; and on the north the Concord lay at the mouth of the Pasig. The threatening array would have amply justified the Spanish surrender without a shot, but the play went on, with the head of the army and escort in the rear, waiting for the white flag and the peals of victory, which should call him from his seclusion to receive the capitulation of the city as per arrangement. OUR PHOTOGRAPH WAGON, A QUILESA USED AS A DARK ROOM FOR CHANGING PLATES AT THE FRONT. Campaigning in the Philippines. 97 The Olympia opened fire at 9:30 in the morning on the old Fort Malate; her shells falling short, the Raleigh and Petrel took it up. The shots improved, the Olympia changed position, and then did more effective work, as did the others. In the meantime, the remnants of the Spanish forces that had been about the fortifications had withdrawn toward the city. The firing continued till 10:30, when '> the order to cease firing was given to the fleet, and the surrender signals shown to the Spanish fort. There not being an immediate answer, the fleet was ordered to close up. Every captain in the fleet, it is stated, was watch- ing for the white flag. Capt. Lamberton was on the after- bridge of the Olympia with the Admiral and said: “ I don’t se^ FLAG RAISING AT GUAM ISLAND. that white flag yet over that red roof. They were to raise the flag on the southwest corner. The Admiral said it had been there for some time, and by close observation all discovered it, raised at the appointed place. The Spanish signaled back and asked a conference, and nego- tiations forthwith were begun and completed as per agreement. During all this time not a shot was fired from a Spanish gun, and the Span- iards remained within the walled city. ’ GEN. MERRITT ORDERS AN ATTACK. Turning now to the land forces, it should be noted that on the afternoon of Friday Gen. Merritt had issued this general order: “A combined land and naval attack will be made on the enemy’s works to-morrow, the 13th inst., at noon. “ It will consist of a naval and artillery attack. Our lines will make no advance, but will hold the trenches, the infantry covering the artillery. “ The 1st Brigade will hold the right of the line, and, operating on the Manila- Pasai Road, have for its immediate objective the Spanish block-house No. 14 and adjoining trenches. “ The 2d Brigade will hold the left of the line, operating along the beach and the trenches adjoining. “ The 1st Brigade will put eight battalions in the firing line, and hold three in reserve. The 2d Brigade will put three battalions in the firing line, and hold eight in reserve. The reserves of both brigades will be held in column of battal- ions in the open field to the west of Camino Real and 500 rods south of the inter- section of the Camino Real and the road to Pasai. The reserves will be under the general direction of the division commander, whose position will be on the Camino Real near the reserves. 7b ?8 Canipai(rnuig hi the Philippines. “ The men will take one day’s cooked rations, canteens filled with water, and a minimum of 100 rounds of ammunition for the Springfield rifle and 150 for the Krag-Jorgensen. The reserve ammunition will be held with the reserves. “ Brigade commanders will distribute necessary entrenching tools among the several organizations. “ The general hospital will remain in camp. Ambulance stations will be established on the beach in the rear of the left, one at Pasai, in the rear of the right, and one on the Camino Real, near the reserves. “All positions should be taken up by 9 a. m., the 13th inst., except the reserves, which will take position at 11 A. m. Our line will not advance except under orders of the commanding general in the field.” This order, however, was not fully observed, as shown by the following: All instructions to division and brigade commands were of the nature that precluded a determined assault, although the men were equipped for a long, hard struggle. Besides his gun and accouterments, each man carried 200 rounds of ammunition, two days’ rations of meat and hard bread, and mess kit. The front rank filled their canteens with coffee and the rear rank with water. Distributions of spades and axes were made to the com- panies, so that each set of fours had an entrenching tool. A hatchet and ax was provided for each section and one pick for each platoon. The ser- geants were provided with a TRANSPORT LEAVING SAN FRANCISCO. wire cutter. Strict instructions as to fire, so that waste of ammunition and time should be avoided, and for the movements of regiments, had been given. If an assault was ordered, it was to have been made by successive battalions in extended order, each regiment covering a battalion front and the distance between the battalions to be about 200 yards. The whole command were intact and silent for some time, while the bombardment from the fleet of Fort Malate was going on, its effects being in plain view of most of the command. Then the Utah Battery opened fire at 1000 yards’ range, aiming just below the crest of the parapet of the fort, as directed. The shots were very effective. A six-inch shell from the Olympia now pierced through the three-foot wall of the fort and exploded in the magazine, wrecking it completely. THE ALLEGED PEACEFUL PROGRAM MISCARRIES. In the morning, just before the attack, Gen. Merritt sent instructions to Gen. Greene to send forward one regiment as soon as the bombardment had produced any effect, and without waiting for the signal given on the fleet to surrender, he now ordered the Colorados to advance. The advance was made through an open field in front of the trench, and partly along the beach in the water. Upon this advance the Spaniards opened fire from the woods and trenches back of the fort. It is claimed that had the advance not been made there would not have been a Campaigning in the Philippines. ^>9 HELIOGRAPHIC WORK BY THE SIGNAL CORPS. single rifle shot fired that day. The program was that the advance should not be made till after the surrender signal was given. The Spaniards, therefore, not knowing of this late order, could not understand this advance, and opened fire. The Colorados continued their ad- T . vance, wading up the beach and entered the now vacant fort, Lieuten- ant-Colonel McCoy of the Colorados being in command. The Spanish flag was hauled down and the Stars and Stripes ran up in its stead. The ex- hibition brought a round of hurrahs from the troops. Here the color- bearer of the Colorados was killed. Gen. MacArthur was shut off from the view of the fleet, but seeing the flag raised on the fort, he ordered the attack on block-house No. 14. The two bat- teries, AvStor and Utah, quickly made this a ruin. The 13th Minnesota rushed in and captured part of the forces there and in the trenches. The command pressed on to block-house No. 13, which took fire, a great quantity of small cartridges therein exploding. The whole front of the column now moved rapidly onward, the 13th Minnesota being in advance, and with them the Astor Battery, dragging their guns by hand and pushing on along the Cingalon Road, and the 23d Inf., pressing forward on the road which parallels this west. All through this locality a hot fire was being poured into the ranks. The locality was such that a view of the signal of surrender could not be seen, and the Americans continued advancing and firing by volleys. At Cingalon cross-road was a strong position held by the enemy, and from this a galling fire was being poured into our advance, also an enfilading fire from a block-house about 200 yards east. Capt. Sawtelle, of Gen. MacArthur’ s staff, reconnoitered the position while the troops were mass- ing for assault, and, with Lieut. March of the Astor Battery, then led the charge against this position with detachments from both the battery and the 13th Minnesota, they volunteering for the purpose. The artillerymen, leaving their guns and charging with revolvers, the Spaniards were quickly driven from their positions. It is difficult to reconcile all this with the theory that the program was entered into which should provide for the surrender of Manila without loss of life, unless it be that some of the subordinate commands were not apprised of the arrangement and that the Spaniards resisted under a misapprehension. They were on the alert to hold positions against the insurgents, and as the insurgents were known to occupy advanced positions here, they might have mistaken our advance for that of the insurgents. This ended the fighting of MacArthur’ s Brigade, which had instructions, after this place had been secured, to move westward and eastward and occupy the approaches to the city from Paco, locating the forces at the bridges near Paco, and also in the suburbs of Hrmita and Malate. Greene’s instructions were, if no great resistance was met in the advance, to go on through Malate and Hrmita, and thence move the columns around the city walls and occupy the suburbs east 100 Canipaignmg m the Philippines. and south of the city and cover all approaches. None of the force was to enter the walled city. After carrying the first line of the Spanish entrenchments and fort, the advance columns of Greene’s Brigade moved forward toward the city and deploy- ed from the Calle Real, the 18th Infantry and the 3d Artillery to the right, and, moving against the Spanish trenches back of the first line, uncovered the forces in the thick woods and brush and marsh. The 1st California and the 1st Colorado held positions covering the Calle Real barricades and thence to the shore line west. In this way they moved up to Malate, where the force was reformed in the open square about Malate church. Up to this time the advancing column had met sharp random firing from the enemy, much of it coming from the houses and places of cover, which the Californias and those exposed routed, often by assault. Reforming, the 18th Inf. and the 1st California were to move through the main streets, the 1st Colorado in the parallel streets on the right and the 1st Nebraska along the beach. The Callao kept slightly in advance in the bay and in position to rake all lines of trenches in advance of the moving columns. The 3d Art. and the 10th Pennsylvania occupied the reserv^e. The Pennsylvanians had been in the trench for twenty-four hours, but were pressing hard for an advance position. Desultory firing met this advance, and when the open near the Uuneta was reached, the firing was sharp from the right. THE FATE OF THE CITY. At this time the white flag was flying from the southwest bastion of the city wall. Some of the insurgents had gone through by some of the approaches at Paco, and it was thought the firing came from them. There were now several thousand Spanish regulars within the city walls, and no firing came from any of this body. The day’s work was done. What remained to be done was to take and hold possession of the approaches to the city and distribute the forces accord- ing to previous instructions. The capitulation was now going on. After hoisting the white flag, the Spaniards signaled for a conference. Flag- Lieutenant Brumby and Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, representing the army and Campaigning in the Philippines. 101 navy, were despatched in response to this, and the preliminary terms of surrender were arranged between them and Captain-General Augustin, Acting Governor- General Jaudenes and Admiral Montejo. This occurred in the City Hall. Gen. Merritt, on the return of the American representatives, went ashore to the City Hall with escort of the 2d Oregon. Two other battalions of the Oregon followed and took position in front of the Government Building at 2:36 p. M. On return of Cieut. Brumby to the flagship with the preliminary terms of sur- render, Admiral Dewey hoisted the signal, “Enemy has surrendered.” With some modification, the preliminary terms as drawn were signed, and the Spanish flag hauled down and replaced with the Stars and Stripes. The following are the articles of capitulation: articles of capitulation. The undersigned, having been appointed a commission to determine the details of the surrender of the city and defenses of Manila and its suburbs, and the Spanish forces stationed therein, in accordance with agreement entered into the previous day by Major-General Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., American Commander-in-Chief in the Philippines, and His Excellency Don Fermin Jaudenes, Acting General-in-Chief of the Spanish army in the Philippines, have agreed upon the following: 1. The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate, with the city and defenses, with all honors of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States and remaining in the quarters designated and under the orders of their officers and subject to the control of the aforesaid United States authorities until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations. All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their homes, which shall be respected as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force. 2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property. All public horses, and public property of all kinds, shall be turned over to staff officers designated by the United States. 3. Complete returns, in duplicate, of men by organizations, and full lists of public prop- erty and stores shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date. 4. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces and of their families and of the expenses which said repatriation may occasion, shall be referred to the government of the United States at Washington. Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them. The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city, or when the American army evacuates. 5. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid, as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain. All the funds of the Spanish treasury and all other public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States. 6. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational estab- lishment<5, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army. F. V. Greene, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, U. S. A. B. P. Lamberton, Captain U. S. N. > ChareES a. Whittier, Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General. V. E. H. Crowder, Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge-Advocate. Nichoeas De La Pena, Oidor-General de Ejercito. Careos Reyes, Coronel de Ingenieros. Jose Maria Oeaquen, Jefe de Estado Mayor. Weseev Merritt, Major-General. 102 Campaigning in the Philippines. By the capture of Manila, there was surrendered to our command about 5600* prisoners, 22,000 small arms, 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 70 pieces of modern artillery of various calibers and several hundred ancient bronze pieces, and $900,000 of public money, besides the city and fortifications. The day previous to the capture, the protocol of peace between Spain and the United States had been signed at Washington. * There seems to be some uncertainty about the number of Spanish troops surrendered with the city. We have been able to find no official report. If, as stated on page 82, Gen. Greene gave 13,000 as the number, he must have included prisoners in the hands of insurgents. The figures in the list are those of Mr. Foreman, who appears to have had access to official records. ARMS USED BY NATIVES OF MINDANAO. CHAPTER VI. FROM THE CAPTURE OF MANILA TO THE REVOLT OF THE FILIPINOS. HE situation in Manila at the time of the capitulation was chaotic. Civil government was disrupted and the only law in force was military law. It is remarkable with what celerity the military authorities brought order out of confusion, so that within a few days a system of government was established, as effective as that which obtains in most of our large cities. From the hour of surrender, there was not a hostile demonstra- tion against the American army. The Spaniards, whatever their regret for the defeat of their arms, were ready to co-operate heartily in establishing and maintaining order. For twenty-four hours, and until it suited the pleasure of the Americans to disarm them, they held their positions with their guns. The great batteries on the Luneta were still in their possession, and Admiral Dewey next day sent Eieut. Calkins ashore to learn the situation, fearing that there might be some danger unforseen, his attention having been directed to these batteries, and Eieut. Calkins still finding the Spaniards in possession, he took from the guns the breech-plugs and brought them to the ship. In the eastern part of the city, the next day still found the Spaniards on duty, and, upon their notifying the American commander that they could not hold their positions against the insurgents, were relieved by the Ameri- cans and ordered to surrender their arms. So universal within the city was the feeling that order would be maintained, that within two days business was gen- erally resumed. The disturbing force was far less in the city proper than in its surroundings, and the danger was not from the Spaniards within, but the insurgents without. On the 14th of August, the day the capitulation was signed, Gen. Merritt issued the following proclamation: PROCLAMATION OF GEN. MERRITT. Manila, August 14, 1898. To The People of the Philippines: 1. War has existed between the United States and Spain since April 21st of this year. Since that date you have witnessed the destruction by an American fleet of the Spanish naval power in these islands, the fall of the principal city, Manila, and its defenses, and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to the forces of the United States. 2. The Commander of the United States forces now in possession has instructions from his government to assure the people that he has not come to wage war upon them, nor upon any 104 Canipaig7iing in the Philippines. party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, by active aid or honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its effort to give effect to this beneficent purpose, will receive the reward of its support and protection. • 3. The government established among you by the United States army is a government of military occupation, and for the present it is ordered that the municipal laws, such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions, and provide for the punish- ment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force, so far as compatible with the pur- poses of military government, and that they may be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the government of occupation. 4. A Provost Marshal-General will be appointed for the city of Manila and its outlying districts. This territory will be divided into sub-districts, and there will be assigned to each a Deputy Provost Marshal. The duties of the Provost Marshal-General and his deputies will be set forth in detail in future orders. In a general way, they are charged with the duty of making arrests of military, as well as civil offenders, sending such of the former class as are triable by court martial to their proper commands, with statements of their offenses and names of witnesses, and detaining in custody all other offenders for trial by military commis- sion, provost courts or native criminal courts, in accordance with law and the instructions hereafter to be issued. 5. The port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the Philippines which may be in actual possession of our land and naval forces, will be open, while our military occupation may CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH NEAR MANILA. continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation. 6. All churches and places devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all edu- cational institutions, libraries, scientific collections and museums, are, so far as possible, to be pro- tected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places or property, of historical monuments, archives or works of science, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity. Severe punishment will be meted out for all violations of this regulation. The custodians of all properties of the character mentioned in this section will make prompt returns thereof to these headquarters, stating character and location, and embodying such recommendations as they may think proper for the full protection of the properties under their care and custody, that proper orders may issue enjoining the co-operation of both military and civil authorities in securing such protection. 7. The commanding general, in announcing the establishment of military government and in entering upon his duties as military governor, in pursuance of his appointment as such by the government of the United States, desires to assure the people that so long as they pre- serve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States, they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines. WESLEY MERRITT, Major-General U. S. A., Commanding. Canipaig7ii7ig ui the Philippmes. 105 This proclamation was rapidly followed by a series of orders, having in view the establishment and maintenance of law and order in the city. Under the terms of the capitulation, the Spanish authority surrendered to the American command “the Spanish troops, European and native, with the city and defenses,” and there were now within this area approximately 4000 insurgent troops and occupying fortified positions held by the Spaniards at the time of surrender. There was no question as to the limits of the territory held by the Spanish forces at the time of surrender, and no question that the insurgents were not in- captured guns. eluded by the terms of the surrender as one of the victors, and under its terms the Americans succeeded alone to the Spanish possession. The insurgents, however, insisted that they also had a claim of rights, and based their claim upon the assump- tion that they were allies of the American force. It was not claimed by them that they were such allies by express stipulation or even recognition, but they did insist that the circumstances of their investment of the city made them so. It was their claim that their participation forced the surrender of the city and that they had the right to participate in its control, independent of the terms of the sur- render or the parties to it. The insurgents surrounded the city, except where the Americans were entrenched, holding most of the block-houses and all the out- lying Spanish trenches and the approaches to the city. THE FILIPINOS IN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY. The business of Manila depended largely upon its commercial intercourse with the interior, and this could not go on without the consent of the insurgents. They also held possession of the city water-works. Their possession and reten- tion was considered dangerous to our command. Aguinaldo afterward com- plained that he was not notified of the time or plan of the American attack. In this he was in part correct. He was not informed of the plan, but he knew of the time, and intended to force his command into recognition at the time of surrender, as is plainly evident by events preceding the attack. COMPLICATIONS WITH THE FILIPINOS. The evening of the 12th, under instructions from Gen. Merritt, Gen. Ander- son had telegraphed to Aguinaldo, in substance that the Americans would pro- ceed to the attack without his forces, and that his command should be kept out of the city. This Aguinaldo answered with the memorable despatch, “Too late.” This was but a pretense, for there was ample time for him to countermand any 10() Campaig)iitig hi the J Philippines. previous instructions he might have given. One of the first acts of Gen. Merritt, then, after the surrender, was to take measures to rid the city of the armed insur- gents. On the day of the surrender many of them had been intercepted and turned back, and others, hav- ing gotten within the city, were disarmed. Gen. Ander- son was ordered by Gen. Merritt to rid the city of the insurgents, and Anderson telegraphed Aguinaldo to withdraw his men at once. Aguinaldo answered him, that he had already sent a commission to present the matter to the Americans, and asked that Gen. Anderson consider the matter with them. There has been some censure of Gen. Anderson from military sources because he recognized this condition, but he had precedent for so doing all through the cam- paign. Even Gen. Merritt’s proclamation had been read to Aguinaldo’ s com- mission in parts, and was made in part to conform to their protest. As it was originally drawn, it provided that the Spanish laws governing civil affairs, prop- erty rights and the punishment of crime, should remain in force and be admin- istered by local Spanish officers. The commissioners said they could not submit to Spanish officials, and Gen. Merritt provided that American officers should be appointed to hold important offices. Also, when the staff officer brought the order to Gen. Anderson, he asked if he was authorized to use force. The officer did not know, and if it were simply to be a matter of persuasion, it is difficult to see what other course was open to him. When the commissioners met Gen. Anderson, they submitted to him ten propositions, as follows: 1. That the insurgents would retire to a line running from Malate to Paco, thence down the Paco Creek to the Pasig, up the Pasig to the bridge of Aviles, along the Calle Aviles to Santa Mesa; thence through Sampaloc, San Lazaro and Tondo, to the beach at the north. (This would have given them Malate and Paco and important positions on the east and north of the city.) 2. That the Filipinos should retain certain convents in Malate, Paco and the northern suburbs, and should have the palace of the Captain-General in Malacahan. 3. That the Filipinos should have the free navigation of the Pasig for their vessels and the “ protection of the Patria.” (Nobody knows what the Patria is, or has been able to find out, but .subsequent negotiations showed that it had something to do with our protection of their ships in all waters under our control.) 4. That the Filipinos share in the booty of war. 5. That the civil offices be filled entirely by North Americans. Gf Gen. Merritt desired to appoint Filipinos to any such places, Aguinaldo suggested through the commissioners that he Campaigning in the Philippines. 107 would be glad to consult Gen. Merritt about such appointments and to recommend men for them whom he knew to be fit for the places.) 6. That the Phlipinos should retain control of the reserv-oir and ])umping station of the water-works. 7. That the Filipino officers should be permitted to enter the city at all times wearing their side arms. 8. That the arms taken from the Filipinos on the night of August llltli should be returned 9. That the American troops should retire within the lines proposed by Aguinaldo, and should not pass beyond those lines with arms. 10. That all regulations should be in writing, and to be binding should be confirmed by the commanders-in-chief of the two forces. Gen. Anderson, in reply, said he had just one condition to make, and that was that the insurgents should withdraw at once to the line he then drew, before there should be any further negotiation. The line ran from the Bocano de Vista to San kazaro, Cemeterio de Sampaloc to block-house No. 5, block-house No. 6, the Depot des Aguas Patables, the Spanish works beyond San Juan del Monte; thence in a straight line to San Pedro Macati; thence in a straight line to block- house No. 14, on the Pinda Road; thence in a straight line to the beach at May- tubig, south of the Polvorin at Malate. Gen. Anderson yielded to the commis- sioners in their Is-EBRASKA regiment marching into MANILA, AUGUST 13 , 189 S. request to have the matter submitted to Gen. Merritt, and all appeared before Gen. Merritt. Now, while Gen. Anderson had been told to take sole charge of the matter, Merritt listened to the commissioners and asked for time in which to consider their proposal, promising an answer later. GEN. MERRITT CONSULTS ADMIRAL DEWEY. Leaving Anderson at headquarters, and in waiting, Merritt went out to consult Admiral Dewey. On his return, he ordered Anderson back to Cavite in charge of his command. After much deliberation, Gen. Merritt consented to the following: That, as the insurgents had captured the water- works, they should retain them; that the insurgent officers should enter the city with side arms, but suggested that they should do so without revolvers; that the arms captured from the Filipinos should be returned to them when they left the city. The answer was delayed in getting to Aguinaldo. The insurgents in the meantime were strengthening their positions. Aguinaldo, on receipt of Merritt’s communication, sent three proposi- tions in lieu of those previously sent. They asked, first, that the first line desig- nated by his commissioners be the line of separation between the forces; second, that the insurgent vessels be protected by our navy in American waters, or waters 108 Cat)ipaigning in the Philippines. under our control; third, that in case the Americans should return the city to Spain in consequence of the impending treaty, the insurgents should be placed in possession of all they now hold. THE PRESIDENT GIVES INSTRUCTIONS. Gen. Merritt left for Paris on August 30th, leaving this letter unanswered. Gen. Merritt had been in the Philippines, or, to speak definitely, on the Newport, in the bay most of the time, a little over a month, and during this time he had announced the policy of the government, and in a large part formulated its meas- ures. Whether wise or unwise, however, the responsibility must rest with his superiors. On August 13th, the day of the surrender, the following despatch was sent to the Adjutant-General at Washington: “Since occupation of town and suburbs the insurgents on the outside are pressing demand for joint occupation of city. Situation difficult. Inform me at once how far I shall proceed in forcing obedience in this matter and others that may arise. Is government willing to use all means to make natives submit to the authority of the United States ? Merritt. Dewey.” The answer was the following: “Major-General Merritt, Manila, Philippines; The President directs that there must be no joint occupation of the insurgents. The United States, in pos- session of Manila City, Manila Bay and Harbor, must preserve the peace, and protect persons and property within the territory occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupa- tion and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use whatever means, in your judgment, is necessary to this end. All law-abiding people must be treated alike. By order of Secretary of War. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General.” GEN. MERRITT REPORTS ON AGUINALDO. The official report of Major-General Merritt, dated August 31, 1898, has the following bearing upon the relation of the two commands: As Gen. Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that “ the powers of the military occu- pant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants,” I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his preten- sions should clash with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasai Road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations by prearranged plans of mutual attack to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs. CaiiipaigJiing in the Philippines. 109 After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of my office as military gov- ernor, I had direct written communications with Gen, Aguinaldo on several occasions. He recognized my authority as military governor of the town of Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters in this connection had not been settled at the date of my departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact; but, notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious dis- turbances, as they are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement. OTIS SUCCEEDS MERRITT IN COMMAND. Gen. Klwell E. Otis arrived in Manila on August 20th, and when Gen. Mer- ritt was ordered to Paris, he succeeded to the command. He had to take up the unfinished work of Gen. Merritt and he required some little time to familiarize himself with the situation. The insurgent occupation continually increased in SIGNING DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AT MALOLOS. aggressiveness — their entrenching and fortifying continually went on, and with it the show of resistance increased. Orders had been issued to the effect that no interference should be made with them, while they did not disturb our lines or positions. There was a prospect that the city water supply might be shut off. Americans desiring to pass the insurgent lines required a pass from the insurgent commander, and the demonstrations of the soldiers became insolent. A few companies of the Colorados were ordered to the water-works, but met with resist- ance so that they were about to use force when the situation was reported to headquarters and they were ordered back. THE FIDIPINOS ORDERED TO REMOVE. When Gen. Otis assumed command, the insurgents while infesting the whole city, had some especial strongholds, notably, Tondo, Paco, Sampaloc, Ermita, and Malate. Gen. Otis sent word to Aguinaldo that it would take some time for him to 110 Campaigning in the Philippines. familiarize himself sufficiently with the matter to answer his last letter to Gen. Merritt. The insurgents had now been infesting the city for a month; and Gen. Otis determined that the only solution compatible with the duties and obligations of the command was to order the removal of the insurgents from their posi- tion, and to such distance that there would be no inter fere nee with the occu- pation of the Americans in the territory surrendered by the Spaniards. After submitting to the War Depart- ment his views of the situation he was instructed to proceed, and, if need be, use force to effect a removal. Gen. Otis now addressed a letter to Aguinaldo in which the exigencies of the case were set forth, and closed by giving Aguinaldo notice to remove his forces from the jurisdictional limits of Manila by September 15th on penalty of being forcibly removed by the Americans. Aguinaldo was at this time establishing his headquarters and seat of government at Malolos, with communication by railroad north and south, and a country of large resources tributary. Aguinaldo demurred and again sought his favorite method of doing business by commission. An encounter seemed likely to occur, and the Americans strengthened their positions and prepared for the worst. In the conference which followed, the insurgent leaders still professed their cordial amity towards the American occupation, but wanted an agreement made that in case Manila was put back into Spanish control, they should have the same positions before Manila that they now held. They desired also to know whether the Spaniards would have returned to them the guns and supplies captured by the Americans, and be re-instated in the position they occupied before the attack of August 13th. Gen. Otis in reply said, “If the Americans quit control the Spaniards will be re- instated in their defensive positions and their arms restored to them.” There was intense dissatisfaction on the part of a large element of the insurgent command with this disposition of the matter, and an open rupture was imminent. Gen. Pio del Pilar was the leader of this faction. THE FILIPINOS EVACUATE. After acceding to all requirements the Filipinos made a last request that in removing from their position they be allowed to march up the Luneta with their arms and pass the ground of the many bloody executions of their friends by the Spaniards. To this Gen. Ovenshine in command of the Krmita and Malate pre- cincts consented. On the morning of the 14th, there were indications of a move. Campaigning in the Philippines. Ill and all our sentries were on the keen lookout for events. Early on this morning, that part of the insurgent forces which would make their departure by the Euneta, began to move. The columns passed from the Calle Real into the Calle San Luis, the rank and file in blue drilling led by the famous Pasig band of ninety pieces and the column headed by Col. Callis. Down the Paco Road they went to the Calle Bagumbayan where they soon stood beside the wall where so many of their comrades had endured Spanish execution. As they passed the Wyoming Reg- iment, cheer upon cheer was given by the Wyoming boys. It was an incident long remembered by the insurgents. With the removal of the insurgents there was no further immediate opposition to American control. THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. The withdrawal of the Filipinos from the immediate vicinity of the city left the commanding general free to arrange the details of the civil administration. The most important orders upon this subject will be found at the end of this chapter. Military rule required first, order; next, justice. As has been said, the people of Manila were anxious for the maintenance of order, but there were many adverse conditions to be met. During the inter- regnum the constabulary and all administrative functions had been sus- pended. It was a meet- ing of strangers in method, manner, and tongue, and the purposes of each were difficult of understanding by the ether. Some misunder- ^.n kngagemknt in a kamboo thicket. standings and mistakes, under these circumstances, were unavoidable. That none which were serious occurred may be attributed to the forbearance of all parties concerned. Our habits and customs were so unlike those of the inhabitants that often our intent was in doubt, and the requirements under our rule were, in many essentials, so unlike those which preceded us that they were often considered severities. Our design was the betterment of the social life of the citizen and the security of his personal and property rights; but the two civilizations were so unlike that those intended to be benefitted were often disposed to rebel. Spanish custom approved much that is not only dis- tasteful, but iniquitous, under our laws and civilization, and the interference with native habits naturally brought enmity and discontent. This was especially the case as to gambling, which was a national habit. THE FILIPINOS OBJECT TO CLEANLINESS. The many restrictions put upon the citizens in social life and essential to the maintenance of military rule were irksome, and our sanitary measures brought our rule squarely in conflict with the daily life of the great mass of people. 112 Campais;ni7ig in the Philippines. When our army took possession of the city it seemed that the rot and ruin of centuries were within its borders. Degeneration and decay were everywhere. It was essential that this be remedied, but the enforced cleanliness was very dis- tasteful. The orders hereafter given show the character of our government. The system of constabulary was in the hands of the Provost Marshal- General’s Department, bamboo thicket cut down by bullets. and was apportioned into districts, and these again into precincts. The Provost Marshal had direct supervision of the patrol, which, by details, was constantly on the guard, and thus the whole area of the city was constantly under the scrutiny of the military eye. This patrol was composed of the rank and file of the army, and it was the only part of the army that came directly in personal contact with the mass of the people. Every act of this strange people was to be interpreted by this patrol; their methods learned, their intentions measured, their purposes understood. NEWS OF THE COMING PEACE. News of the signing of the peace protocol arrived in Manila on the 15th of August, and the Spaniards now asked for re-instatement into their position held before the attack of August 13th, claiming that the protocol was in force at the time of the attack, and it was in its violation that the attack and capitulation were made. The provisions of the protocol affecting the situation in the Philipines were as follows : Third. The United States will occupy and hold the city, hay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. Fifth. The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace. The commissioners are to meet at Paris not later than the 1st of October. Sixth. On signing the protocol, hostilities will be suspended, and notice to that effect will be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces. The protocol was immediately circulated extensively among the native popula- tion, and was not only read, but “read between the lines,’’ and from this on the native temperature, t\hich for a time had been cool, fast lowered towards the freezing point. Notwithstanding this tendency to frigidity, the patrol, with trifling exceptions, had no conflicts with the people. From the 20th of August to February 4th, eight people had been shot in the city. These were cases where there was either open hostility or attempted escape from arrest, and in every case, after full consideration, were approved by the Provost Marshal-General. A number o^ Cavipaiirtiing in the Philippines. 113 minor offenses were treated, but the percentage of crime was no greater than other American cities of like size. The crimes committed were mostly charged to a party of Macabebees, who, seventy-fire in number, entered the city by the Pasig River, and for a time kept their haunt secret from the patrol. When once dis- covered they were readily disposed of, but for a time they terrorized the city. A number of patrolmen were injured by these tribesmen. Their habit was to approach their victim with their head bared, their wide hats held to their breasts, and when within striking distance, thrust the hat into the face of and plunge the dagger into the victim. THE FIIvIPINOS ACCUMULATE ARMS. It soon became known that the insurgents without the city were being supplied with arms and ammunition. On the 81st of August the steamer Abbie landed a cargo of these supplies at Batangas, and afterwards landed a second cargo before being detected, when she was seized by order of Admiral Dewey. After a time the death rate of the Filipinos became surprising, and the frequency of burials led to further investigation, whereby it was learned that the putative corpse was in AGUINALDO’S CARRIAGE. reality arms and ammunition, being carried through the lines for the insurgents. These arms had, at some prior time, been secreted, largely in the cathedrals and monasteries, by the Spanish authorities to be distributed in case of emergency and used against the Filipinos in an uprising. On August 16th, soon after the surrender, the Mo7iadnock had arrived, and on the 20th, the expedition under Gen. Elwell E. Otis. This expedition brought about 5000 men, which somewhat served to dampen the warlike ardor of the insurgents. SANITARY REGULATIONS ENFORCED. Sanitation received immediate attention after the American control began, and a series of orders were issued, formulated by Deputy Surgeon-General Lippincott, prescribing the methods of averting disease. These orders prescribed cleanliness of person and surroundings, proper diet and abstinence from drink, and caution as to intercourse with the native class. These regulations were rigidly enforced. Smallpox of a mild type is very common among the natives, and few attain their majority not having had the disease. If not closely watched and well treated the malignant type sets in. Fevers of various types were prevalent, especially typhoid. 8b 114 Campaigning in the Philippines. THE SPANISH PRISON-HOUSES OPENED. There were 2900 prisoners left by the Spaniards in the Presidio and Bilibid Prisons. In the Bilibid Prison were 28 women and 1300 men, mostly “suspects,” that is, the}^ had been arrested and incarcerated upon the suspicion of being in league with the enemies of the realm, and there many had remained for years without a trial or the formality of indictment. Most of the women were charged with insurrection and open revolt against the government. It was a very common thing to find that their property had been confiscated by officials, and the vic- tims left penniless. Ever}" case was promptly taken up and considered. Many of the men were held upon suspicion of being in sympathy with the revolution of 1896, and had been entitled to their liberation for a long time. Some, whose prop- ert\" had been confiscated, were detained long after their sentence had expired. With few exceptions, they were all Filipinos. Over 1200 were summarily dis- charged by the American authorities, which went far to pacify the Filipinos in their distrust of the Americans. One of the first acts after investigating prison afiairs was the arrest of some prison officials on the charge of embezzling prison funds. They were tried and found guilty of thus embezzling $1600. THE FISCAL ADMINISTRATION. One of the first duties of the military governor was to provide a revenue. This was derived from the customs, internal revenue, licenses, water rents, fines and miscellaneous sources. The revenue was honestly collected and disbursed, and the following statement of the receipts and disbursements for the first two months of American occupation will give an idea of the sources of income and expenditure: receipts and disbursements for two months. Receipts. Seized fund $ 890,144.25 Internal revenue collections . . . 156,378.97 Customs 1,811,358.21 Captain of Port — fees 1,823.24 Quartermaster 58.00 Subsistence Department 3,150.15 Refund 90.16 Fines — Provost Court $10,455.81 Water rents 37,060.82 Markets 13,966.98 Butchers 23,075.04 Cemeteries 4,167.43 Licenses 11,039.91 Disburseniejits. Treasury $ 1,000.00 Provost M a rshal-General, for schools, street cleaning. Sani- tary Department and Fire De- partment 193,963.47 Internal Revenue Office, includ- ing $7,000 re-fund of taxes ille- gally collected 10,182.24 Custom House, general expenses. 17,754.16 Chief Commissary, for support of Spanish prisoners 537,244.74 Captain of the Port, for clearing river of obstructions and for launch hire $24,870.88 General expenses, stationery and printing 495.66 Medical supplies for Spanish pris- oners 1,284.95 Chief Quartermaster, general ex- penses, mostly transportation. . 300,424.75 Chief Ordnance Officer, arsenal repairs 1,200.00 Cainpaigiiing in the Philippines. 115 A COMMISSION APPOINTED. A commission appointed by the President of the United States had been for some time endeavoring to come to an understanding with Aguinaldo that should form the basis of a settlement satisfactory to himself and to the United States. The commissioners were men as well qualified for the task as in the President’s judgment could be found, combining a knowledge of civil, military and legal affairs far beyond the common — namely, Gen. R. P. Hughes, Provost Marshal- General, and Inspector-General of Manila; Col. Enoch H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General, and Col. (now General), James F. Smith of the 1st California Regiment. These men met the Filipino commissioners appointed by Aguinaldo — namely, Florentine Flores, Ambrosio Flores, and Manuel Arguieles, many times in the attempt to secure a frank statement of their views — how they were to establish a stable government, and how to meet the just demands of the United States, which in the eyes of the civilized world was bound to protect the Philippines from the rapacity of other nations until they were strong enough to protect themselves. Such protection as it seemed, could only be afforded by the United States assuming the responsibility of establishing a provisional government, which was to lead up to complete autonomy as rapidly as the lesson of self-government was learned. To this proposition Aguinaldo had not consented — would not consent. Whatever of patriotism was in his heart, his brain seemed to be inflamed by the ambition to rule. The following short colloquy at a session of the commission brings out very clearly some of the difiiculties of the case : Col. Crowder asked the insurgents : Has any foreign power recognized your government ? No. ‘ Have you been recognized even as belligerents ? No. Then the United States and Spain are the only powers recognized here? Yes. Then the United States is responsible to other nations for these islands? Yes. If we should leave you, what would happen to you ? Don’t leave us, for other powers would come in and take possession of the islands. Then if our remaining here is essential, why do you insist on making trouble ? The people are beyond control. THE TREATY OF PEACE SIGNED. On the 10th of December, 1898, the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States was signed, containing in the third article those fateful words ceding the Philippine Islands to the United States. The treaty in so far as it relates to the Philippines is as follows: ARTICLE HI. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprising the islands lying within the following lines : A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth U18th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of 116 Campaigning in the Philippines. Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longi- tude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes ( 4*^ 45' ) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nine- teen degrees and thirty-five min- utes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longi- tude one hundred and nineteen de- grees and thirty- five minutes (119^ 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth lOth) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000), within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty. ARTICUK IV. The United States will, for the term of ten years from date of exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise tO the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States. ARTICLE V. The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the Ameri- can forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its pro- visions are completely executed. The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be com- pleted shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war-vessels, small arms, guns of all calibers, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, live stock, and material and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agree- ment between the two governments on the subject shall be reached. ARTICLE VI. Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisioners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses, in connection with the insurrections of Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States. MOVING ARTILLERY TO THE FRONT. Cainpaio^nins^ in the Philippuies. 117 Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. The government of the United vStates will, at its own cost, return to Spain and the govern- ment of Spain will, at its own cost, return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article. (Other articles of the treaty provide for the protection of the inhabitants of the ceded territory in their civil rights.) THE PRESIDENT DECLARES THE UNITED STATES SOVEREIGN IN THE PHILIPPINES. A few days after the signing of the treaty of peace, Gen. Otis made public the following instructions of the President : Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., December 21, 1898. To the Secretary of War. Sir : The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the con- quest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th inst., and as the result of the victories of the BLOCK-HOUSE NO. 2, LA LOMA CHURCH IN THE DISTANCE. American arms, the future control, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands is ceded to the United States. In fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible despatch to the whole of the ceded territory. In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that, in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the sovereignty of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or honest submission, co-operate with the government of the United States to give effect to these benefits and purposes, will receive the reward of its sup- port and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed with firmness, if need be, b)it without severity so far as may be possible. Within the absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression 118 Campaigning in the Philippines. of crime are to be considered as continuing in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals so far as possible. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be per- formed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen as far as may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands. While the control of all the public property and the revenues of the State passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States, private property, whether belonging to individ- uals or corporations, is to be respected except for cause fully established. The taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late government become payable to the authorities of the United States unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government, whether general or local. If private property be taken for military use it shall be paid for, when possible, in cash at a fair valuation and when payment in cash is not practicable receipts are to be given. All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares, not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement of the military authority, will be admitted upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their importation. Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that full measures of individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of free people and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and the right for arbitrary rule. In the ful- fillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress the disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States. WIULIAM McKINLEY. AGUINALDO REPLIES TO THE PRESIDENT. Within two days after the promulgation of the foregoing by Gen. Otis, Aguinaldo issued the following statement: The government of the Filipinos has concluded that it is obliged to expound the reasons for the breaking off of friendly relations wdth the army of the United Seates in these islands, so that all can be convinced that I have done everything on my part to avoid it, and at the cost of many rights necessarily sacrificed. After the naval combat of May 1st, the Commander of the American squadron allowed me to return from Hongkong, and distributed among the Filipinos arms taken from the arsenal at Cavite, with the intention of starting anew the revolution (that had settled down in conse- quence of the treaty made between the Spaniards and the Filipinos at Biak-na-bato) in order that he might get the Filipinos on his side. The different towns now understand that w’ar was declared between the United States and Spain and that it was necessary for them to fight for their liberty, sure that Spain would be annihilated and would be unable to do anything to put the islands in the way of progress and prosperity. My people rejoiced at my return, and I had the honor to be chosen as chief for the services I had rendered before. Then all the Filipinos, without distinction of class, took arms, and every province hurried to turn all the Spaniards outside the lines of its boundary. So it is easy to understand how my government would have had the power over the whole island of Luzon, Bisayas and a portion of Mindanao had the Americans taken no part in the military operations here, which have cost us so much blood and so much money. My government is quite aware that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and giving of arms to them from the arsenal has helped them much in the way of arms. I was quite convinced Canipaignm^ in the Philippines. 119 that the American army was obliged to sympathize with a revolution which had been crushed so many times, had shed so much blood, and was’again working for independence. I had all confidence in the American tradition and history, for they were willing to fight for independ- ence and the abolition of slavery until it was attained. The Americans, having won the good disposition of the Filipinos, disembarked at Para- naque and took the position occupied by our troops in the trenches as far as Maytubig, taking possession as a matter of fact of many trenches that had been constructed by my people. They obliged the capitulation of Manila, and the city, being surrounded by my troops, was obliged to surrender at the first attack. Through my not being notified, my troops advanced to Malate, Ermita, Paco, Sampaloc and Tondo. Without these services in keeping the Spaniards in the city they would not have given up so easil 3 \ The American generals took my advice regarding the capitulation, but afterwards asked me to retire with my forces from Port Cavite and the suburbs of Manila. I reminded the Generals of the injustice they were doing me and asked them in a friendly manner to recognize in some expressed way my co-operation, but they refused to accord me anything. Then not wishing to do anything against the wishes of those who would soon be the liberators of the Filipino people, I even ordered my troops to evacuate the port of Cavite and all the suburbs of Cavite, retaining only one, the suburb of Paco. After all these concessions, in a few days Admiral Dewey, without any motive, took posses- sion of our steam launches that were circulating, by his express consent, in the bay of Manila. Nearly the same time I received an order from Gen. Otis, Commander-in-Chief of the army of occupation, obliging me to retire my army outside certain lines which were drawn and given me, and in which I saw included the town of Pandacan and the village of Cingalon, which never have been termed suburbs of Manila. In the actual sight of the two American generals I ordered a consultation of my military generals, and I consulted my assistant counselors and generals, and the two bodies conformed in a desire to appoint a commissioner to see Gen. Hughes. The General received my commissioner in a poor way and would not allow him to speak, but I allowed it to pass, by a friendly request from Gen. Otis, and withdrew my troops outside the given lines so as to avoid trouble and waited for the conclusion of the peace commission at Paris. I thought I would get my independence, as I was promised by the Consul-General of Singa- pore, Mr. Pratt, and it would come iu a formal, assured, friendly proclamation by the American generals who had entered these waters. But it was not so. The said Generals took my concessions in favor of friendship and peace as indicative of weakness, and, with growing ambition, sent forces to Iloilo with the object of taking that town, so they might call themselves the conquerors of that part of the Philippines, which is already occupied by my government. This way of proceeding, so far from custom and practice observed by the civilized nations, gives me the right to proceed, leaving them out of consideration. Notwithstanding this, and wishing to be in the right to the last, I sent to Gen. Otis a commissioner with a request to desist from this fearful undertaking, but he refused to do so. My government cannot remain indifferent in a view of violent and aggressive usurpation of its territory by a people who claim to be the champions of liberty, and so it is deter- mined to begin hostilities if the American forces intend to get, by force, the occupation of Visayas. I denounce these transactions before the world in order that the universal conscience may give its inflexible decision. Who are the manslaughters of humanity ? Upon their heads be all the blood that will be wasted ! EMILIO AGUINALDO. January 6, 1899. The crisis was fast approaching. At Iloilo the expedition, under Gen. Marcus P. Miller, was resisted, with arms, by the natives, and under instructions he desisted from using force. When the manifesto of Aguinaldo was posted on the 120 Caiiipaif^iiing in the Philippines. walls of the city, the native population very largely quit the city for the provinces and the insurgent army, the Spaniards sought safety in the walled city, the American forces doubled its guards, and the men were kept in quarters and under arms. MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES. The following is the series of orders organizing the administration of civil affairs in the Philippines, under military authority. General Orders, No. 4. Headquarters Department of the Pacific AND Eighth Army Corps. Manila, P. I., August 15 , 1898. } I. Ill addition to his duties as Division Commander, Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., is hereby assigned to the command of the district of Cavite, and will remove his head- quarters to that point. The garrison of the district of Cavite will be augmented upon the arrival of the next transports containing troops for this command. II. In addition to his duties as Brigade-Commander, Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., is hereby appointed Military Commandant of the walled city of Manila, and Provost Marshal-General of the city of Manila, including all the outlying districts within the municipal jnrisdiction. Gen. MacArthur will remove his headquarters within the walled city, and will bring with him one strong regiment of his command to take station within the walled town. The commanding officer of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., now stationed in the walled city, will report to Gen. MacArthur, and the companies of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., now at Cavite, will, upon being relieved by other troops, be sent to Manila to join the regiment. Gen. MacArthur will relieve the Civil Governor of his functions, and take possession of the offices, clerks, and all machinery of administration of that office, retaining and employing the present subordinate officers of civil administration until, in his judgment, it is desirable to replace them by other appointments. HI. Col. Janies S. Smith, 1st California Volunteer Inf., in addition to his duties as Regi- mental Commander, is appointed Deputy Provost Marshal for the district of the city north of the Pasig River, and will report to Gen. MacArthur. Col. S. Ovenshine, 23d U. S. Inf., is appointed Deputy Provost Marshal for the districts of the city, including Ermita and Malate, outside of the walled town and south of the Pasig River, and will report to Gen. MacArthur. IV. Under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the terms of capitulation, full lists of public property and stores, and returns, in duplicate, of the men by organizations, are to be rendered to the United States within ten days, and public horses and public property of all kinds, are to be turned over to the staff officers of the United States designated to receive them. Under these paragraphs, the chief of artillery at these headquarters and the chiefs of the staff depart- ments, will take possession of the public property turned over, as above, pertaining to their respective departments. ' The returns of the prisoners will be submitted to the Military Commandant of the city, who will assign the men for quarters in such public buildings and barracks as are not required for the use of the United States troops. The horses and private property of the officers of the Spanish forces are not to be disturbed. The Chief Paymaster at these headquarters will turn over such portion of the Spanish public funds received by him, by virtue of this order, to the Military Commandant above designated, as may be necessary for the administration of his office. V. All removals and appointments of subordinate officers of civil administration, and transfer of funds authorized by this order, must receive the approval of the commanding general before action is taken. VI. The Chief Quartermaster and Chief Commissary of Subsistence at these headquarters will establish depots of supply in Manila, with as little delay as possible. Quartermaster and subsistence depots will also be retained at Cavite. By command of Major-General Merritt. J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General. Ca}Hpaii}^ninQ; in the Philippines. 121 General Orders, } No. 8. f Hp:adouarters Department of the Pacific AND Eighth Army Corps. Manila, P. I., August 22, 1898. I. For the maiiiteiiaiice of law and order in those portions of the I’hilippines occupied or controlled by the army of the United States and to provide means to promptly punish infrac- tions of the same, Military Commissions and Provost Courts, composed and constituted in accordance with the laws of war, will be appointed from time to time, as occasion may require. II. The local courts, continued in force for certain purposes in proclamation from these headquarters, dated August 14, 1898, shall not exercise jurisdiction over any crime or offense committed by any person belonging to the army of the United States, or any retainer of the army, or person serving with it, or any person furnishing or transporting supplies for the army, nor over any crime or offense committed on either of the same by any inhabitant or temporary resident of said territory. In such cases, except when courts martial have jurisdiction, juris- diction to try and punish is vested in Military Commissioners and the Provost Courts, as here- inafter set forth. III. The crimes and offenses triable by Military Commission are murder, manslaughter, assault and battery with intent to kill, robbery, rape, assault and battery with intent to commit rape, and such other crimes, offenses or violations of the laws of war as may be referred to for trial by the commanding general. The punishment awarded by Military Commission shall conform, as far as possible, to the laws of the United States, or of either of the States, or the custom of war. Its sentence is subject to the approval of the commanding general. IV. The Provost Court has jurisdiction to try all other crimes and offenses referred to in Section II of this order, not exclusively triable by court martial or military commission, in- cluding violations of orders of the laws of war, and such cases as may be referred to it by the commanding general. It shall have power to punish with confinement, with or without hard labor, for not more than six (6) months, or with fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars ($250), or both. Its sentence does not require the approval of the commanding general, but may be mitigated or remitted by him. V. The Judge of the Provost Court will be appointed by the commanding general. When, in the opinion of the Provost Court, its power of punishment is inadequate, it shall certify the case to the commanding general for his consideration and action. By command of Major-General Merritt. J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General. General Orders, ) Headquarters Department j No. 1. ( OF THE Pacific. I Manila, P. I., August 25, 1898. j I. Until such times as by orders from these headquarters it shall be declared that the local courts are re-organized, under proclamation from Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated August 14, 1898, and have resumed their criminal jurisdiction, all crimes and offenses committed by inhabitants or temporary residents and not triable by court martial, are triable by Military Commissions and Provost Courts. The graver of these offenses, such as are usually punishable under the laws of the United States or either of the States, or under the laws of war, by death or long terms of imprisonment, will be referred for trial to Military Commissions, and charges in all such cases will be sent to the Judge Advocate at these head- quarters for such reference. To the Provost Courts the Provost Marshal-General is authorized to refer for trial all other crimes and offenses of the class referred to above which may, in his opinion, be adequately punished within the punishing power of such courts, as hereinafter established. H. So much of paragraph IV. G. O. 8, c. s.. Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps as limits the punishing power of the Provost Court for the city of Manila to confinement, with or’ without hard labor, for not more than six months, or to a fine not ex- ceeding two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) or both, is revoked, and the punishing power of said court is fixed at confinement, with or without hard labor, for a period of one year, or fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1000), or both. 122 Campaigning in the Philippines. III. An Inferior Provost Court with jurisdiction to punish by confinement, with or without hard labor, for a period of two (2) months, or by fine not exceeding fifty dollars (^50), or both, is hereby established. IV. Capt. Thomas R. Hamer, 1st Idaho Volunteers, is hereby appointed Judge of the Inferior Provost Court. He will hold the sessions of his court at such times and places as may be directed by the Provost Marshal-General. The procedure of this court will conform to that of the Provost Court for the city of Manila, and a record of all cases tried, assimilated to that of the Summary Court, will be kept. V. Upon the last day of each month transcripts of all cases tried by the Provost Courts during the month will be rendered by the Judges thereof, through the Provost Marshal-General, to these headquarters, setting forth the offenses committed and the penalties awarded. By command of Major-General Merritt. THOMAS H. BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General. General, Orders, No. 8. Office of the U. S. Mieitary Governor in the Phieippine Iseands. Maniea, P. I., October 7, 1898. j I. Until otherwise directed from these headquarters the civil courts, as composed and con- stituted by the laws of Spain, which were held and administered prior to August 13, 1898, within Philippine territory now subject to United States military occupation and control, are permitted to resume at once the exercise of the civil jurisdiction conferred by Spanish laws within the limits of that territory, subject, however, to such supervision by the military govern- ment of the United States, here instituted, as in its judgment the interests of that government may demand. This privilege does not extend to or embrace permission to institute criminal proceedings or to exercise criminal jurisdiction of any nature or character whatsoever. II. The provisions of orders heretofore issued by the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands inconsistent with the foregoing instructions and directions are hereby revoked. By command of Major-General Otis. THOMAS H. BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General. Generae Orders, No. 21. Office of the U. S. Mieitary Governor^ IN THE Phieippine Iseands. ( m. f Maniea, P. I., June 5, 1899. I. The Courts of First Instance of the province of Manila, and the Courts of the Peace, here- tofore held in the city of Manila, P. I., are hereby re-established and will exercise the juris- diction, civil and criminal, possessed by them prior to August 13, 1898, in so far as compatible with the supremacy of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the exercise of military government therein, and will administer the laws recognized as continuing in force by pro- clamation from these headquarters dated August 14, 1898, except in so far as these laws have been, or hereafter may be, modified by the authority of the United States. II. The division of the province of Manila into the four judicial districts of Binondo, Tondo, Quiapo and Intramuros, as such districts existed prior to August 13, 1898, is continued. The territorial jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace in each of these districts shall be co- extensive with that of the Court of First Instance therein. By command of Major-General Otis. THOMAS H. BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General. Generae Orders, No. 22. Office of the U. S. Mieitary Governor^ IN the Phieippine Iseands. b Maniea, P. I., June 17, 1899./ I. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and the Courts of First Instance and of the Peace for the province of Manila, re-established in General Orders Nos. 20 and 21, c. s.> this office, are announced as open and in the exercise of their jurisdiction, civil and criminal, Campaigning hi the Philippines. 123 I i on and after Wednesday, June 21, 1899. The sessions of the Supreme Court will be held in the building known as the “Audiencia;” those of the Courts of First Instance and of the Peace, in the building known as the “ Casa de la Moneda,” Intramuros. II. The jurisdiction of the courts, specified in paragraph I of this order, and of other civil courts which may hereafter be re-established, shall not extend to and include crimes and offenses, committed by either citizens of or persons sojourning within the Philippine Islands, which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority specially conferred by the Military Governor. Jurisdiction to try and award punishment in the class of cases designated remains vested in the provost courts, court martial or military commissions. By command of Major-General Otis. THOMAS H. BARRY, Assistant Adjutant-General. I.IKUT. NAYI^OR AND ME:n OF BATTFRY B, UTAH RIGHT ARTIRRFRY. These gvins did most effective work in the battle of February 5th, and throughout the northern campaign. CHAPTER VIL THE REVOLT OF THE FILIPINOS. F or some time previous to the 4th of February, 1899, the tension between the Americans and the natives had been great, both in the city of Manila and along the lines of the army surround- ing it. Within the city incidents were continually occurring which made it evident to the Provost Guard that important events were anticipated by the natives. Without the city the American outposts were subjected to continuous insults which daily were more marked as the Americans continued to endure them with patience. The restraints of discipline were mis- understood by the natives as manifestations of cowardice, and there was an evident and growing desire on the part of the natives to provoke a conflict in which they anticipated an easy victory. Upon the part of the rank and file of the Americans, and doubtless, also, upon the part of many of the officers, there grew up a feeling of intense personal hatred of their tormentors, and an earnest desire to be turned loose upon them and kill them. While many refused to believe that Aguinaldo would really reach the point of ordering an attack upon the American army, it was a general opinion among the officers of the Provost Guard that existing conditions could not long continue, and that they would end in a fight. The commanding generals, however, while fully alive to the danger of the situation, were powerless, until actually attacked, to make any movement to end it. It was felt that the Americans must not make the first hostile move against those who had been so lately their allies, and of whose liberty they had been proclaimed the champions. They could and did, however, take every pre- caution not to be taken unawares at any point. The little army was disposed in a thin line completely encircling the city, and facing the natives at all points. The division, brigade and regimental commanders all had their instructions, and were prepared to act at a moment’s notice. If an outbreak should occur, signals were arranged for directing the fire of the fleet. THE MILITARY vSITUATION. The military situation was a very simple one. The old Spanish line of defense against native attacks was a series of block-houses, more or less connected by trenches or other works, completely enclosing the city on an irregular semi-circle extending from the shore of the bay on the north to the shore on the south, and with a radius of from two and a half to three and a half miles from a center in the 126 Campaigning hi the Philippines. mouth of the Pasig River. These block-houses were from one-half to three-fourths of a mile apart, and were numbered regularly from 1, on the railroad, near the shore on the north, to 15, a little south of Malate, on the shore on the south. All the block-houses, from 1 to 9 inclusive, were north of the Pasig River, and all numbered higher than 9, were south of the river. The natives had taken possession of most of these defenses, all the block- houses, except Nos. 8, 10, 11 and 12, which were within the general line of the semi-circle, being occupied by them, on February 4th. UTAH LIGHT ARTILLERY IN ACTION. The Americau army was dis- posed on a much smaller irregular semi-circle within these lines and facing outward from the city. The object of the natives, in any attack, would be to find a weak place in our line, break through it and rush into the city, where their compatriots were all ready to rise, join them, and begin an orgie of massacre and plunder. The object of the Americans, on the contrary, should an attack be made, would be to repel it, maintain their line intact, assume the offensive, and pursue the natives wherever they might go, so far as they could do so without exposing the city to an attack from a new army which might spring into existence at any moment from the dense population of hostile natives. The natives had the advantage of overwhelming numbers, and better arms for their infantry, but the Americans had the advantage of discipline, good artillery and the smaller interior line, permitting rapid re-inforcement of threatened points, but again the disadvantage of operating from a city the great majority of whose in- habitants were intensely hostile and treacherous. The guns of the ships com- manded all the entrenchments of the natives as far inland as they could reach, and really rendered any attack upon our lines hopeless, except in the event of a sudden rush, overpowering our troops in their defenses, and so mingling the men that the ships would not dare to fire. This was doubtless what was expected by the natives. But it did not happen. DIvSPOSITION OF OUR TROOPvS. Our army was divided into two divisions of two brigades each, the first division, under Major-General T. M. Anderson, being stationed south of the Pasig River, and the second division, under Major-General Arthur MacArthur, on the north. Beginning on the north, in the Tondo district, on the shore of the bay, the troops of the .second, or MacArthur’s Division, were distributed as follows: The 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General H. G. Otis, extended from near the shore of the bay easterly to a point about 400 yards southwest of block-house No. 4, in the following order: 20th Kansas, 3d U. S. Art., 1st Montana, 10th Penn- Cainpaignin}r in the Philippines. 127 sylvania, facing northerly; on their right, and facing northeasterly, was the 2d Brigade, under Brigadier-General Irving Hale, extending from its connection with the 1st Brigade to block-house No. 8, near the junction of the San Juan and Pasig Rivers, in the following order: 1st South Dakota, at San Miguel, occupy- ing the line about half way to block-house No. 5; 1st Colorado, at Sampoloc, opposite block-houses Nos. 5 and 6; 1st Nebraska, from the right of the Colorados, through Santa Mesa and McReod’s Hill to block-house No. 8, near the river. The two brigades were supported by the Utah Right Artillery. On the south of the river, Anderson’s Division was disposed as follows: The 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Charles King, was made up of the 1st California, 1st Washington, 1st Idaho, and during February 5th, a Wyoming Battalion. This brigade occupied a line from near the river to block-house No. 12, and faced easterly or southeasterly; the 2d Brigade, under Brigadier-General Samuel Ovenshine, was composed of the 14th U. S. Inf., 1st North Dakota, and six troops of the 4th U. S. Cav., and occupied the line from block-house No. 12 to Fort Malate, on the bay, and faced southward. There were also in this division, two batteries of artillery, one, of six guns, under Capt. A. P. Dyer, 6th Art., and four mountain guns of the Astor Battery. The artillery was under the direction of the division commander. There was also one company of U. S. Engineers, acting as infantry A PERIOD OF SUSPENSE. During all the latter part of January, the two armies had faced each other substantially as has been described. The Filipinos were gathering their forces, organizing, drilling and fortifying, undisturbed by our generals. The orders against foraging or other misdemeanors were strictly enforced in the American army, and every effort made to avoid cause of collision. The Filipinos freely came and went through our lines, and were fully informed of the disposi- tion of our troops and their entrenchments. The attitude of the natives and their insulting actions and words have been described, and gradually it was felt that the lines must be drawn a little closer, and the armed Filipinos be somewhat restricted in their movements. A line of delimi- tation was arranged between the American and Filipino commanders which should not be crossed by armed men of either side. As the Americans, however. 12ipaignin(r in the Philippines. flying column, with orders to drive out the enemy along the Pasig River, and thereby break all communication between the northern and southern wings of Aguinaldo’s army. WHEATON’S FLYING COLUMN. Reference to the map will show that the American position at the water -works, which it was essential to maintain, was much in advance, on the eastward, of the general line of our army, and greatly exposed to flank attacks from Pasig and vicinity where the insurrectos were encamped. The repeated attempts on the water-works have been mentioned, and there was a constant feeling of insecurity with so vital a point so greatly exposed. Added to this was the easy communica- tion of the insurgents south of the Pasig with Aguinaldo’s headquarters and army at Malolos. The army having been strengthened by the arrival of re-inforcements, it was determined to put an end to these conditions by driving the insurrectos out of the Pasig district. To this end a “Provisional Brigade’’ was organized, which has been known as “Wheaton’s Flying Column,’’ and placed under the command of Brigadier-General Lloyd Wheaton, with instructions to clear the Pasig country. The following account of the operations of this brigade is given in the language of an officer who accompanied the expedition: “ By general orders No. 11, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Gen. Wheaton was assigned to the command of “A Provisional Brigade,’’ composed of the 20th and 22d Regiments of U. S. Inf., two battalions of the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., seven companies of the 2d Oregon Volun- teer Inf., a platoon of 6th U. S. Art., and a squadron of three troops 4th U. S. Cav. His instructions were to clear the enemy from the country to Pasig and to strike him wherever found. The brigade was formed on the night of March 12th, and bivouacked in line in rear of the entrenched position extending from San Pedro Macati on the Pasig one mile and a half in the direction of Pasai from right to left in the following order: Squadron 4th U. S. Inf., Lieutenant-Colonel TAKING SUPPLIES TO THE FRONT McCaskey; seven companies 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., Col. Summers; one platoon, two guns, 6th U. S. Art., Lieut. Scott; two battalions 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., Col. Wholley. Soon after daylight on the morning of March 13th, the brigade moved by Echelon, from the right, the cavalry and the 22d U. S. Inf. moving first, then the 20th U. S. Inf., followed by the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. Campaignifig in the Philippines. 149 When the cavalry and 22d Inf, had advanced one mile and a half, the line wheeled to the left and marched toward the river road along the Pasig. Scott’s guns had now opened fire upon the position of the enemy at Guadalupe, and the left of the line advancing, forced him out, the 20th Inf. and the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., reaching the church at Guadalupe at nearly the same time. The right of VIEW OF CALOOCAN, SHOWING BURNED DISTRICT. the 22d Inf., struck the enemy as he was retreating in the direction of Pasig, inflicting heavy loss. The whole line moved on and occupied the Pasig Road, and then marching east along the road, soon came under fire of the enemy from his entrenched position at Pasig, on the north side of the river; opened fire upon his entrenchments from one gun on the road, and placed the other upon a cliff or ridge, extending at right angles to the Pasig; occupied the ridge with infantry, and extended the 20th and 22d U. S. Infs, to the right on the high ground in the direction of Pateros. One battalion of the 22d Inf., under Capt. Tockwood, and the squadron of 4th Cav., under Maj. Rucker, attacked a force of the enemy in the direction of Pateros and drove him beyond Taguig. The gunboat Lagima de Bay., under Capt. Grant, came up, and night closed in with the enemy driven to the north side of Pasig. March 14th, Gen. Wheaton extended his line to the south and west of Pateros, and reconnoitered the country to the west and south. The cavalry engaged the enemy in force in the direction of Taguig and drove him beyond that place. “The enemy being entrenched in the bamboo thickets across the channel near Pateros, the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., one battalion under Maj. J. J. Weis- senburger, crossed the channels in canoes and by swimming, stormed the entrench- ments and captured or killed all the rebels there. The town of Pateros took fire and burned. March 15th one battalion of the 20th U. S. Inf. was ordered across the river at Pasig under command of Maj. Rogers; a gun was brought up and the entrenchments in front of Pasig and to the left shelled. The battalions of the 20th Inf. carried the city by storm. A part of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. were crossed below Pasig and when the rebels fled from Pasig they were exposed to a heavy flank fire from this detachment. The whole of the 20th Inf. was then sent over to Pasig, the regiment being carried across upon the steam launch Maritimo. The 1st Washington was advanced on the right to Taguig and captured about 500 prisoners. Night came on with the enemy in the front, and on the 150 Campaigning in the Philippines. right killed, captured or dispersed. The enemy lost at least 1000 men this day. March 16th Ivieiitenant-Colonel McCaskey, 20th U. S. Inf. at Pasig, was instructed to clear the country in his immediate vicinity of any of the insur- gents who might be lurking near, and soon after he sent a despatch that he had sent out two battalions to be deployed as skirmishers to clear the island of Pasig. Soon after a heav}" and continued firing was heard to the east and north of Pasig. At 12 M. it was learned that Maj. William P. Rogers, commanding 3d Battalion 20th Inf., had come upon the enemy entienched, 1000 strong, at the village of Cainta and that he had carried the entrenchments and burned the town, the enemy flying in the direction of Taytay. Maj. Rogers returned .with his bat- talion to Pasig. In this affair he lost two killed and fourteen wounded. On the 17th of March, by direction of the Corps Commander, the 20th U. S. Inf. returned to Manila, being relieved at Pasig by a part of the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf. On the afternoon of March 18th a force of the enemy appeared in the vicinity of Taguig, which was held by one company of the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf. The place was re-inforced with two companies of infantry, and the colonel of the 22d Inf. directed to send a battalion south of the position, held by his regiment, and to the west of Taguig to ascertain the force of the enemy. The latter was found about 800 strong, occupying the crests of the ridges, and a spirited combat ensued, which was terminated by darkness. The 22d Inf. had twenty men killed and wounded in this affair. Among the wounded was Capt. Frank B. Jones, 22d Inf., commanding the battalion. The enemy fell back toward the south. “The morning of March 19th, soon after daylight, Gen. Wheaton formed line, deployed in the extended order, facing to the south as follows: 22d U. S. Inf., six companies, center; 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., six companies, left. The line advanced and struck the enemy four miles south of Taguig; wheeling to the left the enemy was partly enclosed toward the lake and completely routed with great loss. The left of the line pursued him down the lake for fifteen miles from VIEW OF BURNING OF TONDO DISTRICT, SHOWING DEPOT OF MANILA & DAGUPaN RAILROAD. Taguig as far as San Pedro Tunasan, all the houses along the lake to that point being burned. The enemy’s entrenchments on the left and in front of the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf. were carried, the enemy leaving more than 200 dead upon the field. The command returned to the vicinity of Pateros and bivouacked there, receiving orders to return to their respective former encampments near Cauipai^niiig in the Philippines. 15T Manila, excepting that the 1st Washington Volunteer Inf. was designated to hold Pasig, Pateros and Tagiiig and adjacent country. This ended the operations of the “Provisional Brigade.” In one week all the enemy’s positions, that were attacked, were taken and his troops killed, captured, or dispersed. The towns, TRENCHES OVER WHICH THE PENNSYLVANIA REGIMENT PASSED IN CHARGE ON LA LOMA CHURCH. from where he brought over troops or in which he resisted, were burned or destroyed; he burned them himself. The enemy’s loss in killed, wounded and captured was not less than 2000 men. “Gen. Wheaton was ably supported and assisted by the several regimental commanders through the series of operations. He calls attention to the energetic conduct of Col. J. H. Wholley, 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., and the gallant conduct in action of Maj. William P. Rogers, 20th U. S. Inf., and Maj. J. J. Weis- senburger, 1st Washington Volunteer Inf., and to the gallant and meritorious services of Capt. Frank B. Jones, 22d U. S. Inf., 2d Rieut. K. D. Scott, 6th U. S. Art., rendered most efficient service with his guns, showing skill and intrepidity. He also calls attention to the very gallant conduct of Capts. Herbert S. Foster, James A. Irons and Benjamin Alrord, 20th U. S. Inf., in the storming of Pasig and in the combat of Cainta. First Tieuts. F. D. Webster and Chas. R. Howland, 20th U. S. Inf., Aides, gave valuable assistance, also 1st Lieut. Wm. D. Connor, Corps of Engineers, Acting Aide. Service, both efficient and gallant, was rendered by Capt. Elmore McKenna and Lieut. Charles E. Kilbourne, Vol- unteer Signal Corps.” About Manila, all was quiet, with the exception of a little skirmishing, until the morning of March 25th. During this time the insurgent army had massed its forces at Malolos, and Gen. MacArthur, by command of Major-General Otis, was preparing tor an advance for the capture of that stronghold. RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY CORPvS. At this time the American force was re-organized as follows: Major-General H. W. Lawton on March 18th, replaced Gen. Anderson in command of the first division, the latter returning to the United States according to orders. Gen. Lawton’s Division consisted of the following: The Washington, North Dakota and California Volunteers, under Gen. King; six troops of the 4th Cav., the 14th 152 Campaigning in the Philippines. Regiment, the Idaho Volunteers and a battalion of the Iowa troops, under Gen. Ovenshine; the 3d and 22d Regiments Inf., and the Oregon Regiment, under Gen. Wheaton, and D3^er’s and Hawthorne’s Right Batteries. Gen. MacArthur’s Division, — two batteries of the 3d Art.; the Kansas and Montana Volunteers, under Gen. H. G. Otis; the Colorado, Nebraska and South Dakota Regiments, and six companies of the Pennsylvania Regiment, under Gen. Hale; the 4th and 17th Regiments; the Minnesota and Wj^oming Volunteers, and the Utah Art., under Gen. Hall. A separate brigade was assigned to provost guard duty, consisting of the 20th Regiment, and eight companies of the 23d Regiment Inf. THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION. President McKinley, by appointment, had created a “Philippine Commission.’’ This consisted of five members as follows: Admiral Dewey; Gen. Elwell S. Otis; President J. G. Schurman, of Cornell University; Prof. Dean C. Worcester andChas. “LAGUNA DE BAY’’ BOMBARDING CONVENT OF GUADALUPE. This was the largest of four small boats, known as the “ mosquito fleet,’’ used to patrol the lake and rivers, where they did most effectual work. Denby. This commission was advisory to the Executive Department of the govern- ment, and was vested with the authority to proclaim to the people of the Philip- pine Islands a Modus Vivendi in their civic affairs, pending the action of Congress in the premises. This was a strong commission and well constituted to deal with the matter in hand. Mr. Denby had thirteen years’ experience, as Minister to China, in dealing with Oriental questions. Prof. Worcester had spent years in the Philippines in the study of the people and the country. Pres. Schurman was deeply learned in civic affairs and constitutional questions, and the military and naval situation could not have been in abler hands. This commission could not exceed the prerogative of the President, and the Executive only had such power as accrued by the treaty of peace and the military occupation of the country. The most this commission or the President could do was to arrange a temporary government, leaving to Congress the future govern- ment or final disposition of the islands, and to make a general study of the situation. Canipai^^ning in the Philippines. 153 for the information of the President and Congress in determining our ultimate policy with reference to the islands. Nothing came of any effort to establish a temporary government, and the report of the commission on the general situation was not publish- ed when these pages were printed. The commission ar- rived in Manila, March 4, 1899, and on March 20th, organized in session with Pres. Schurman, President, and T. R. McArthur, Secretary. On April 4, 1899, the commission issued a procla- mation to the Filipinos and after many recitals therein, showing the obligations of the government to establish and maintain order in the islands and its good wishes and desires in the interest of the people, it declared the intentions of our government as follows: 1. The supremacy of the United States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the archipelago. Those who resist can accomplish nothing except their own ruin. 2. The amplest liberty of self-government will be granted which is reconcileable with just, stable, effective and economical administration, and compatible with the sovereign rights and obligations of the United States. 3. The civil rights of the Filipinos will be guaranteed and protected, their religious free- dom will be assured, and all will have equal standing before the law. 4. Honor, justice, and friendship forbid the exploitation of the people of the islands. The purpose of the American government is the welfare and advancement of the Philippine people. 5. The United States government guarantees an honest and effective civil service, in which, to the fullest extent practicable, natives shall be employed. 6. The collection and application of taxes and other revenues will be put upon a sound, honest and economical basis. The public funds, raised justly and collected honestly, will be applied only to defraying the proper expenses of the establishment and the maintenance of the Philippine government, and such general improvements as public intentions demand. Local funds collected for local purposes shall not be diverted to other ends. With such prudent and honest fiscal administration, it is believed the needs of the government will, in a short time, become compatible with a considerable reduction in taxation. 7. The establishment of a pure, speedy and effective administration of justice, by which the evils of delay, corruption and exploitation will be effectively eradicated. 8. The construction of roads, railroads, and other means of communication and transporta- tion and other public works of manifest advantage to the people, will be promoted. 9. Domestic and foreign trade and commerce and other industrial pursuits, and the gen- eral development of the country, in the interest of its inhabitants, will be the constant objects of solicitude and fostering care. FLAGS OF TRUCE IN STREETS OF CALOOCAN. The appearance of some of the streets resembled a back yard on washday. 151 CampaiiTjiing in the Philippi7ics. 10. Effective provision will be made for the establishment of elementary schools, in which the children of the people will be educated. Appropriate facilities will also be provided for higher education. 11. Reforms in all departments of government, all branches of the public service, and all corporations, closely touching the common life of the people, must be undertaken without dehn- and effected conformably with common right and justice, in a way to satisfy the well- founded demands and the highest sentiments and aspirations of the Philippine people. The Filipino Junta, at Hongkong, issued in reply its manifesto, in substance denying the rights, claimed by the American commission, on the part of the United States, to govern or control the islands, or that the United States acquired any right with reference thereto by virtue of the treaty of peace, and said further: “The proclamation is a tissue of generalities, bristled with pharisaism and cant, and vaguely promises much and grants nothing to the Idlipinos, who are tired of promises and servitude, what Spanish promises seem to the Americans.” A HOT ENGAGEMENT ON THE PASIG RIVER, NEAR GUADALUPE. CHAPTER VIII. THE MARCH ON MALOLOS. N the latter part of March, there had arrived at Manila a force consisting of about 950 officers and 23,000 men, with more on the way, and allowing for sickness and the defense of Manila, Gen. Otis felt strong enough to assume the offensive. Agui- naldo had established his headquarters and the civil capital at Malolos, on the railroad, about twenty-five miles northwest of Manila, where he was maintaining some sort of a civil govern- ment, with a Congress and executive departments as prescribed by the constitution which he had “proclaimed.”* Funds were derived from a revenue system which, including customs and a poll tax, was rigidly enforced in all parts of the territory held by the insurrectos. There were also large donations, voluntary or enforced, from wealthy Filipinos. These funds were used for the purchase of arms and ammunition, which were obtained from foreign sources, our fleet being insufficient to entirely prevent their landing. There was little artillery except some old-fashioned pieces of little use in modern warfare. The strength of the insurgent army was not very well known, but was supposed to be about 30,000 men. It doubtless ffuctuated from week to week. The general in direct command of the insurrectos in front of Gen. MacArthur was Gen. Antonio Tuna. It was generally believed that with sufficient force the rebel army could be surrounded and captured, and with this capture of Aguinaldo there was good reason to suppose that the rebellion would come to end. At any rate it would be possible to dislodge and disperse the army and capture the capital, which of itself, and without the capture of Aguinaldo, might end the trouble. Thus Malolos was the obvious objective of the American army as soon as it should be strong enough to move at all, and preparations to that end were accordingly made. Major-General MacArthur, being in command upon the north of the Pasig River, was naturalljr assigned to the command of the movement. POSITION OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. MacArthur’ s Division lay substantially where we left them at the close of Chapter VII, facing northerly, and extending from a point on Manila Bay, near Caloocan; easterly by Ea Eoma church to the Deposito and water- works; Otis’ Brigade on the left, by the bay, occupying about two and a half miles of the line, and Hale’s Brigade on the right, occupying, with its extension to the Pasig River *See page 49. 156 Campaig7iing t)i the Philippines. opposite San Pedro Macati, about ten and a half miles. The line of the insur- rectos extended along the front of MacArthur’s Division from Polo, through Novaliches, to the Nanca River, with strong outposts at important points nearer the American line. RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION. For the purposes of this movement MacArthur’s Division was re-organized on March 17th, as follows: The Wyoming Battalion, the 13th Minnesota, occupying the line from the San Juan River to the water- works, with the 4th and one battalion of the 17th U. S. Inf., were formed into a new 3d Brigade, under command of Brigadier- Oeneral R. H. Hall, who had arrived on March 10th, and were left upon Hale’s ■old line to guard the water-works and Manila, and make such demonstrations as were found desirable to keep the enemy occupied on its front. The remainder of Hale’s old brigade, consisting of the 10th Pennsylvania, 1st South Dakota, 1st Colorado, and 1st Nebraska Regiments, remained under Hale’s ■command and formed the right of the line in the advance. There were also with this brigade two Nordenfeldt guns and a detachment of the Utah Tight Artillery. At the left of Hale, the brigade of Gen. H. G. Otis, consisting of the First Montana, 20th Kansas, and two battalions, 3dU. S. Art., (as infantry) occupied a portion ■ of the front hitherto held by this brigade, while to the left of Otis, and next to the bay, was stationed a new brigade transferred from the first division, consisting of one battalion, 3d U. S. Inf., the 22d U. S. Inf., and eleven com- panies of the Oregon Regiment. This brigade was commanded by Brigadier- General Tloyd Wheaton, who had arrived at Manila on February 23d. It was the intention that Wheaton’s Brigade should march in the rear as a support to the other brigades as needed. The total number of troops under Gen. MacArthur at the beginning of the movement was 11,578 officers and men, including Hall’s Brigade. The total of the three brigades engaged in the movement was 8682. The number of effectives, however, was rapidly reduced. THE NATURE OF THE COUNTRY. The line of advance to Malolos ran parallel with the shore of the bay, near which the ground was low and marshy and cut up by a large number of inter- connecting tidal estuaries called “esteros.” From these lowlands there is a gradual rise to a line of foothills which, near Caloocan, are about two and a half AN OLD SMOOTH-BORE CANNON CAPTURED FROM INSURGENTS AT CALOOCAN. Campaigning in the Philippines. 157 ' miles from the bay shore, but gradually retreat, leaving a broad plain, intersected, however, by frequent rivers and esteros, for the operations of the armies. The natural defenses of the insurrectos were along the lines of the rivers which flow down from the foothills to the bay. These lines were fully utilized, as well as rises of ground, timber, and all other natural points of defense. The country except where it was actual swamp, was densely popu- lated, and in a high state of cultivation. It was mostly rice- fields, intersected by low dykes for retaining the irrigating waters. During the rainy season the rice-fields are flooded, and at that time military movements over such lands^ are not merely difficult but impossible. There are quagmires with no bottom which the soldiers can reach. In the dry season the earth, thrown up in making the ditches, affords partial protection to troops lying down. There were roads, such as they were, traversing the plain, and the railroad embankment was of course utilized for troops, but as the ground was contested at all points from the start, the army moved forward, for the most part, over the fields, and for much of the way in line of battle. The line of advance at the beginning of the move- ment covered about eight miles. NO GENERAL ENGAGEMENT. While there was constant fighting along the whole line of the army, there was no general engagement between large bodies of massed troops. In a general way the line of advance was marked out for each brigade by the Division Commander, who pushed forward or restrained the different brigades, to conform to his general plan, which was quite carefully supervised by the Corps Commander at Mani-la; but the actual fighting was under the direction of the Brigade Commanders, who were charged with the duty of fighting their way to the points designated by Gen. MacArthur. The Signal Corps kept the division and brigade headquarters in touch by the field telegraph, so that general directions could be promptly given and received, but all details were necessarily in charge of the Brigade Commanders. The movement began on March 25th, and our army entered Malolos on March 31st, but the details of our operations can be best understood by following the for- tunes of the different brigades. The accounts of the movements of Hale’s and Otis’ Brigades, as here given, are by a member of the staff of this book, who accompanied the column, and are given as written, for the picture they give of the actual work of the troops. The account of the operations of Wheaton’s Brigade was written by an officer of the brigade, and, as will be seen, is a concise state- ment of the military movements and their results. The narrative will be more readily understood, if it is stated here, that on March 27th, Wheaton’s Brigade was detached from MacArthur’s Division and assigned to protecting the railroad SUPPLY TRAIN ON PONTOON BRIDGE, AT MARILAO RIVER. 158 Campaigning in the Philippines. ■communications, reporting directly to the Corps Commander. On April 2d, Gen. Wheaton was assigned to the temporary command of the 1st Brigade, relieving Gen. H. G. Otis, resigned, Gen. Wheaton retaining command of the troops on the railroad. OPERATIONS OF HALE’S BRIGADE. With the 2d Brigade, as stated, were two Nordenfeldt guns and a detach- ment of the Utah Light Battery, under Lieut. Naylor, accompanied by Lieut. Perry, of the brigade staff. These advanced on March 25th up the Masambong sunken road, under cover of the infantry fire. Very soon the Filipinos, who were well entrenched, opened on the infantry and artillery. The Americans advanced almost on a run, and in less than an hour drove the insurgents from their trenches. The Nebraskas, along the San Juan River, at San Francisco del Monte, rushed into a hand-to-hand fight. The South Dakotas and Pennsylvanias gallantly forced the barricades on the Masambong Road. Naylor’s guns did effec- tive work, keeping abreast of the infantry firing line throughout the advance. CALTFOKNIA TRENCHES NEAR CONVENT OF GETaDALUPE. As the writer crossed the field that morning, half an hour after the troops, he found that the Americans had thrown away their rations and blanket rolls, and that ambulance wagons were gathering up what could be found of the soldiers’ belongings ; also, however, they were bringing in the wounded of both forces, and, while the Americans exhibited more tenderness towards their own wounded, yet they did not neglect those of the enemy. A dozen Filipino prisoners had been captured, and these were given stretchers and made to carry their injured companions to the ambulances. Neither were correspondents overlooked. The Hospital Corps gave to us “first aid’’ bandages, and asked us to do what we could for the wounded rebels, who were scattered through the woods and in the rice- fields. Behind the breastworks were appalling sights. Here an old man lay wel- tering in his blood ; there a boy, his strong limbs shattered by Springfield bullets, and yonder in the rice-fields were rebel soldiers in all attitudes of pain — the life- blood bedewing the land they died to free. Some cried for water, and some for cigarettes, and some for death. The fields were brown and unsown, but the next year, how this red rain would nourish a harvest ! Campaigning in the Ptnhppines. 159 In the woods was an old man from Tarlac, who cried for water and a priest. His leg was shattered by a Springfield bullet, and he said he felt the chill of death. Through an interpreter we listened to his confession. He told us he had a wife and five children at Tarlac, and his last words were, “Forgive me for fighting the Americans, I did not know the kind of people they were.” Meanwhile the brigade kept advancing along the Novaliches Road. After a fierce struggle the in- surrectos gave up the villages of Cabataon and Talinapa. The day was extremely hot, and many men fell out of the march, overcome by the sun. About noon, the advance was ordered in a northwesterly direction along the Tuliahan River. At a ford of this river, where there was an uncompleted bridge, a small body of the 4th Cav. attached to the division, ran into a strong position of the enemy. In a few minutes twelve of the cavalrymen had fallen. Gen. Mac- Arthur immediately sent the Utah Battery to their aid. The rebels were driven out after a short fight, and the brigade bivouacked for the night along the river, the Nebraskas, South Dakotas and Peiinsylvanias guarding the ridges. The insurgents came in force towards the rear of our army that night, but were held in check by Maj. Allison’s Battalion of the South Dakotas, sent back as rear outpost. At the Tuliahan Bridge in one rail which had been used in an entrenchment, were found ninety-six bullet marks. On the 26th of March, Gen. Hale marched northwesterly across the country towards Polo, a town on the Dagupan railroad, supposed to contain a strong force of rebels. Near the railroad he effected a junction with the 1st Brigade, and soon after Gen. MacArthur directed him to deploy north of the 1st Brigade and take such action against the town of Polo as circumstances might render advisable. While he was deploying the Pennsylvanias, facing west towards Polo, the Filipinos opened a brisk fire on that regiment from the north, and the South Dakotas were directed to form on the Pennsylvanias’ right in a semi-circle around the crest of a hill facing north and east, while the Nebraskas, as a general reserve, were placed in the rear. By three o’clock in the afternoon. Hale was ready to begin operations on Polo, or rather, on Meycauayan, as it turned out, the enemy having retreated to the strong entrenchments south of the latter town. The insurrectos kept con- tinually harassing the brigade from the right flank, and Maj. Howard’s Battalion of the South Dakotas was sent into the woods in that direction to drive them off. The main attack began by the discharge of the Utah Battery guns, followed by the Nebraska Hotchkiss gun, which did effective work on the eastern entrench- ments. The Filipinos fought valiantly, and covered their retreat with considerable skill. At four o’clock the Pennsylvanias and South Dakotas advanced on the en- trenchments, the Nebraskas following as a reserve. Gen. Hale cleverly placed his men so that the South Dakotas’ right flanked the insurgents’ left, demoralizing the 160 Campaigiihig in the Philippines. ( X enemy and driving him back all along the line. While Gen. Hale was thus engaged, riding along the firing line, he came upon the South Dakotas while they were under a hot fire from the rebels, entrenched in woods and villages across the Mey- caua 3 ’an railroad bridge. In endeavoring to ascertain the position of the enem\^ he was exposed to a brisk fusilade and received a painful, though not serious wound on the knee. Seeing that it was necessarj" at once to flank the enemy’s trenches across the river, he sent Capt. Krayenbuhl to bring up Dieutentant-Colonel Stover’s Battalion for this work. Capt. Kra^^enbuhl had just brought up the battalion, under heavy fire, when he was fatall>^ wounded. Col. Stotsenberg came up with part of his Nebraska troops and reported that it would be necessary to flank the entrench- ments from the railroad bridge, and was told that the South Dakotas’ left had just swung around to this, and to co-operate with them in this work which he did gallantly and effectivel 3 \ Gen. Hale, his knee having been bandaged, conducted the companies on the right up the railroad, and personally directed the fire from the embankment against the trenches across the river. After capturing the railroad embankment, the river bank and the bridge, the South Dakota and Nebraska men drove the enemy from their earthworks and killed many of them as they ran across the plain. Ninety- six Filipino dead were counted in the vicinity. The Nebraska troops were then directed to take possession of the Meycauayan railroad station, about 1000 yards north of the bridge, and extend their line 500 yards eastward into the plain. The South Dakotas were deplo^-ed across the plain on the Nebraskas’ right, with their own right thrown back on the river. After locating the troops, Gen. Hale returned across the river, reconnoitered the town of Meycaua^^an and esteros to the west, and placed the Pennsylvanias on the Nebras- kas’ left, extending westward through Meycauayan. This arrangement put the brigade in a crescent, with its right flank on the river and its left flank on an estero. THE SUPPLY TRAIN FOLLOWING I’P TROOPS ON THE ADVANCE ON MALOLOS. This crescent formation prevents flanking by the enemy, and enables a skilled commander cleverly to change his formation to meet all exigencies. During the forenoon of the 27th of March, the 2d Brigade advanced toward the Marilao River, the South Dakotas acting as advance guard, the Nebraskas and Pennsylvanias as the main bod\\ At noon the insurrectos opened fire upon the I 'X I h MAP SHOWS THK OPERATIONS OF MACARTHUR’S DIVISION IN THE ADVANCE P'ROM CALOOCAN TO MALOLOS. Made by P. K- baniar, the oihcial map maker for this division. COI^OXKlvS OF VOFUNTKliR RKOIMENTS WHO WON THEIR STA.R IN THE JUNGEES OF EUZON. I. Bkigadier-Genkral Irving Hale (Colorado Regiment), appointed August 13, 1898. 2. Brigadier- Generae Frederick P'unston (Kansas Regiment), appointed May 4, 1899. 3. Brigadier-General Owen Summers (Oregon Regiment), appointed (Brevet) May 24, 1899. 4. Brigadier-General James F. Smith (Cali- fornia Regiment), appointed April 2."), 1899. 5. Brigadier-General Harry C. Kessler (Montana Regiment), appointed (Brevet) October 4, 1899. fi. Brig.vdier-General C. McC. Reeve (Minnesota Regiment), appointed August 13, 1898. 7. Colonp:l John H. Whollev (Washington Regiment) recommended for Brevet. Campaigning in the Philippines. 161 advance skirmish line of the South Dakotas (Maj. Howard’s Battalion) from entrench- ments in the woods south of the river. This line pressed on, and Lieutenant- Colonel Stover and Maj. Allison rushed forward their battalions to its support, Col. Frost personally superintending the advance of the entire line. The Filipinos contended foot by foot for the ground. From one line of trenches to the next, SAN JUAN BRIDGE, TAKEN SOON AFTER THE BATTLE OF SANTA MESA. Companies of the Tennessee, Colorado and Nebraska Regiments charged over the bridge m a most gallant manner, in the face of murderous fire. they fell back. Then they crossed the river and formed in strong trenches there. Again the victorious Americans pursued them, the South Dakotas wading waist- deep in the stream, and with wild cheers, charged up the opposite bank on the sullen foe. After one of the hardest fought battles of the campaign, the Filipinos were again routed, the South Dakota Regiment losing three officers and six men killed and twenty-three men wounded. Admiration is divided between the wild valor of the Americans and the courageous defense of the Filipinos. All through the afternoon they kept up a desultory fire from the woods across the plain to the north and a bitter enfilading fire along the north bank of the river, wound- ing several of our men, who returned their attacks with spirit, the enemy evidently covering in this way his obstinate retreat. As night came on, large bodies of insurrectos, apparently brought from the north by trains, formed and deployed along the north side of the plain, 2000 yards away, covering the entire front of MacArthur’s Division. These at once began a hot fusilade all along our lines. The 3d Art., (1st Brigade) on the left of the railroad replied with Krage-Jorgensens. Gen. Hale found his line exposed on the right to a galling enfilading fire and instructed his troops to lie low behind their entrenchments until the enemy were within 600 yards before returning their fire. This order was given in view of the fact that the Springfield rifle is much inferior in range to the Mauser of the Filipinos. On this occasion it seems that the enemy pressed very closely upon the right flank of the Nebraskas, who charged before the order was given. The rest of the regiment, seeing their comrades pursuing the foe, joined in the charge and drove the insurrectos across the plain two miles to a wooded ridge. The South Dakotas were sent forward half way across the plain to support the Nebraskas, who were afterwards withdrawn to the river where the whole brigade encamped for the night. lib 162 Ca})ipaigni7i(r m the Philippines. The next day the whole of MacArthur’s Division remained at Marilao recuper- ating, bringing up the supply trains and issuing rations and ammunition. On reconnoitering, the patrols found that the ridge captured by the Nebraskas the day before, was still unoccupied, although some insurrectos were found near the railroad. On March 29th, the brigade advanc- ed on the east side of the rail- road track. The Nebraskas then moved on the right of the brigade against PENNSYLVANIA AMBULANCE WAGON AT LA LOMA CHURCH. ridge Which they had captured on the night of the 27th. They swung to the left, and flanked the enemy in front of the Pennsylvanias and Dakotas. The Nebraskas engaged the enemy at 7:30 in the morning, and pursued them across the Bocaue River towards Santa Maria. A company of Nebraskas then caused the town to be evacuated. The South Dakotas and Pennsylvanias crossed the river without serious opposi- tion, and the whole command arrived at the Bigaa River about noon, where the enemy had partially destroyed the railroad and the bridges. A Are had been set to the bridge, and 100 feet of the railroad track torn up, but the Yankee troops came up too rapidly, and the fire was extinguished leaving the bridge practically uninjured, while the road was easily repaired. These marches were usually commenced just after daylight. The morning hours in the tropics are the coolest and the men can then work without suffering from the heat. The hours from four to six in the afternoon are also favorable for hard work. Accordingly, at half past three o’clock the march from Bigaa was assumed and the Guiguinto River reached about five. As there was no sign of a concealed foe the Pennsylvanias began to cross the bridge. When about fifteen men had passed over and deployed, the insurrectos, from a ridge at some distance, opened a hot fusilade on the bridge and the railroad track. Col. Hawkins, who was with his advanced line when the attack was made, gallantly returned the fire and the few men who were already on the ground deploying, the others as they came up held the position until enough troops were on the line to repulse the enemy, the Pennsylvanias standing well to their guns while Gen. Hale hurried the remainder of the regiment across, while Maj. Howard’s Battalion of South Dakotas quickly came up and took a position on the right. The 20th Kansas, of the 1st Brigade, and the Utah guns and rapid fire guns also crossed and came into the action. A barricade across the railroad track was demolished by the artillery. At this bridge the Filipinos were doing very good work with their Mausers with Campaigning in the Philippines. 103 which they fired on our men, armed with Springfields, without coming into effective range of the latter. But when the cannon began to speak, the enemy gave up their position on the hill. Lieut. Perry of the Brigade Staff, was slightly wounded in this engagement. As darkness was drawing on, the troops camped for the night on the river bank. The men enjoyed their evening meal in peace, and many of them had a swim in the mild waters. The forenoon of the following day was passed in bringing up the train, and issuing rations and ammunition. In the afternoon preparations were made to renew the march on the Filipino capital. When the brigade had reached a point west of the Guiguinto River, it met with a scattering, insurrecto fire. The Gen- eral perceived soon after that a party of Filipinos were coming down the railroad track, apparently with the intention to surrender. He sent out a man to meet them, but as he approached, the P'ilipinos ran back towards their own lines. Sometime later a second party appeared on the track, and this time a Filipino was sent out to interview them. They, however, made some paltry excuse for their action, and it became evident that they were trying to spy upon our lines, or lead our troops into a trap. No further attempt was made to communicate with them, but, as a precaution. Hale advanced one company of Pennsylvanias, and one com- pany of Kansas (1st Brigade), to take possession of entrenchments, supposed to be unoccupied. But the wily enemy, from his cover where he had been watching like a panther, sent his fire into our men the moment they advanced. Nothing daunted, however, the two companies with great dash and elan went at the posi- tion and took it, without the loss of a man. Then camp was made once more. In all our marching, fighting and bivouacking, it was cheering to see how readily the troops adapted things to their com- fort. Thus, one swam into a river to catch some ducks for his evening meal ; another boy had a game- cock, captured at the last vil- lage, while the rank and file fell upon the pigs and chick- ens and made a vast slaughter of them. In fact, it soon came to be a settled thing that no sell-respecting hen would trust herself inside the American lines. When we entered a captured place, the first question asked, was: “Well, comrade, are hens flying high?” If there were a 164 Campaigning in the Philippines. few shacks, or some bamboo tables, or Filipino stretchers, the boys would get at these things and put them to use in the most ingenious wa}^ The}^ sometimes entered the abandoned houses, but there was little left to take away. If there was a white flag or any sign of peaceful inhabitant, they were invariably left unmolested. All “pacificos” were encouraged to return to their homes, and to pursue their peaceful avocations. On the night of March 30th, a reconnaissance was made by Gen. Hale, and trenches with insurrectos in them, were found at Santa Isabel, the eastern suburb of Malolos. Outposts were placed along the edge of the woods, the Utah Battery and the infantry detachments built emplacements for guns on each side of the railroad, and preparations were made to attack Malolos in the morning. Shortly after dawn, on March 31st, the 2d Brigade advanced up the right side of the railroad in the following order: The Nebraskas on the right moved fifteen minutes after the Utah Battery had opened fire; the South Dakotas marched in the center five minutes after the Nebraskas; the Pennsylvanias, with their left near WARD IN FIRST RESKRVE HOSPITAL. Photo hy T.ilUe.. the railroad, moved five minutes later than the Dakotas. This made a crescent formation concave toward the enemy, enveloping his left flank, and compelling him to abandon his trenches and the town of Malolos, thus facilitating the entrance of the 1st Brigade which moved up the west side of the track into the town itself. At half past six the Filipinos began to fire. The fire at this time was not heavy nor long continued, and it soon became evident either that Malolos was being eva^ated by the enemy, or Aguinaldowas holding fire for stragetic reasons. The first supposition turned out to be the true one. After the brigade had crossed the Malolos Creek and the Malolos-Quingua Road it wheeled to the left across a broad open plain under a galling Mauser fire from the railroad embank- ment, which could not be effectively returned by our men, armed mostly with Springfield rifles. The Hotchkiss gun of the Nebraskas fired three shots at the foe, retreating up the railroad track 2000 yards away. The shots seemed to strike right among the fleeing insurgents. At half past ten, Gen. Hale’s command reached Barasoain Station, the northwest suburb of Malolos. In accordance with Ca)}ipaig-nins^ in the Philippines. 165 instructions from Gen. MacArthur, it was afterwards swung back upon the Malolos-Quingua Road, where it remained until the advance upon Calumpit began. In the advance from Manila to Malolos, the losses on the staff were four; in the Pennsylvanias, thirty - eight ; in the South Dakotas sixty - two ; in the Nebraskas, eighty-seven, making a total of one hundred and ninety-one. One officer on the staff was killed, and two officers and one orderly wounded; in the Pennsylvanias four enlisted men were killed, and two officers and thirty-two men wounded; in the South Dakotas three officers and four men were killed, and two officers and fifty-three men wounded; in the Nebraskas six enlisted men w^ere killed, and four officers and seventy-seven men wounded. This is the most eloquent tribute to the bravery of these regiments. The total distance marched by the right flank from March 25th to 31st was sixty-six miles, or over three times the air-line distance from Caloocan to Malolos. This was due to the repeated turning movements executed by the 2d Brigade to flank the enemy out of entrenched positions, and render the advance along the railroad less deadly. As the result of this arduous and dangerous campaign, in addition to those already mentioned, one officer and four enlisted men died from the effects of their wounds before the march on Calumpit, and large numbers were obliged to return to Manila sick and suffering from heat prostration. This is not surprising, when we consider the heavy weight which the men had to carry in this rough country. Each soldier was loaded with gun, with strap and bayonet, belt, haversack, mess-kit, canteen full of water or coffee, one day’s ra- tions, 100 to 150 rounds of ammunition, and poncho hung in belt. OPERATIONS OF GEN. OTIS’ BRIGADE. At 6 p. M. on the 25th, the column, consisting of 2184 officers and men, advanced from near the Ea Eoma church and to the right and left of it — at right angles to Caloocan and the Balantasig Road. The word was whispered down the Kansas line, “ Ret us throw away our rations and blankets and go at the niggers with guns, canteens and ammunition alone.” The writer crossed the field of war half an hour after the engagement. The boys had dropped their cans of beef and salmon, their blankets and camp kit; they kept their can- teens and guns, and went at the foe. With such a brigade of fighters, the Filipinos thought all pandemonium was after them. They fought bravely at the first onset, but it was soon evident that the white man’s nerve and the white man’s science were too much for the wild valor of Aguinaldo’s mountain men. Before two hours had passed the 3d Art. and the Kansans had gained the north bank of the Tuliahan River, the men intrepidly swimming the stream in the face of a severe fire. It was a short range, and the brave little regiment, the 3d Art., lost heavily. But the loss they inflicted was greater still. COL. STOTSENBERG, TAKEN SHORTLY BEFORE HE WAS KILLED. Campaigning in the Philippines. 1()B Lieut. Abernethy of the 3cl Art. distinguished himself for gallantry, but every man in the command was equally worthy of high praise. In a trench in front of the Kansans, there were thirty Filipinos. These men fought till twent 3 ’-six were dead, two mortally wounded, one slightly wounded, and only one man got away. Owing to the thorny thickets, dense jungles, bamboo belts, difficult streams and deep morasses, the Montanas were delayed, but they fought a terrific fight, and joined the line as the evening lights were beginning to soften the land. In the first day’s fight our loss in this brigade was sixty-eight killed and wounded. Information of the burning and evacuation of Malabon came to us here among the cane brakes. The brigade bivouacked at the Tuliahan River. On the morning of the 26th as we started out towards Polo and Malinta we saw a cloud of smoke like a great volcano towering up into the air. All along the sun-beaten track of road our men reclined in the shade where they could get it; or tried their luck in the empty houses along the march looking for water. The natives usually left a fine supply of good water in earth ern jars. We lay still for several hours in a hot tropic forenoon. A party of correspondents found two bushels of ripe tomatoes. They happened to be in the Pennsylvania lines just then and went down the lines with the tomatoes, the excellent find lasted till the^^ had gone along a line of 200 men. At last the order was given to advance. I saw one old grizzly captain, if I remember rightly it was Capt. Baltwood of the 20th Kansas, watching his men and carefully keeping them under the trees whenever there was a chance to find retreat from the pursuing rays of the sun. I noted also, that he and his men were like untamed panthers when the battle was on. Well, down a hot dusty road we rushed; soon firing, and by the tack-tack sound we knew that it was a Mauser; then an angry roar as of unchained lions where the penned martyrs are; then a confusion of such sounds punctuated b}^ the snarl of the cannon — then 'a hush. In the headquarters a party are waiting. Around are the officers and the reporters and foreign attaches. The attache from Japan is making careful notes; of how the Krag penetrates, of how the Mauser carries, of how the Springfield kicks, of how vSUperb and accurate is the firing of the American soldier. He starts suddenly and well he may; death came near enough his door to have made a call. A Remington in an angry way drilled a hole on the under side of his leg and after burrowing in the ground came out a foot away from him. The men across in the Cauipaii^riinir in the Philippines. 167 reserve are lying low, for bullets are barking the trees all around them — yet they talk and joke as if this was only an April holiday. The reserves are ordered up. Out of the woods and into the wide rice-fields they go; they deploy to the right; Wheaton’s Brigade is on their left cutting its way through woods afire and fields aflame. Already the brave Col. Egbert of the 22d Regulars, is down with his death wound, and other hearts .are going to break in far away America. Down the road we looked in the edges of the woods and the grass for any man that might need help. On a cot a man lay full six feet, a big brave boy ten minutes ago. He drew a few breaths and then reported for duty in other fields. Smashing us from one side and another the insurrectos retreated inch by inch stubbornly contesting the ground. At the close of day we had Polo and Malinta. Both towns had been fired by the signed order of Gen. Luna. This day the brigade lost eleven in killed and wounded. We passed the night near Polo. The 10th Pennsylvanias were detached for service in the 1st Brigade. BRIDGE AT MALABON, .SHOWING SPAN BLOWN OUT BY INSURGENTS. On the 27th of March the brigade advanced at 7 A. m. When they reached the next town, Meycauayan, they found it in flames, fired by the orders of Gen, Luna. Passing on up the railroad track in the direction of the insurrecto capital, they arrived at Marilao early in the day. The enemy was here discovered in unknown strength, and Col. Funston with three battalions went after him. It was a hot fight but the indomitable Colonel and the unsubdued Kansans drove him back. As before, the enemy fought well at first, but was overcome by the white man’s nerve, skill and staying power, and by his immense superiority in weapons. In the afternoon the Kansans crossed the bridge which had already been crossed by the 3d Art., which Gen. Otis calls “a small, but effective regiment,” with the loss of eighteen in killed and wounded. The Montanas, as a train and artillery guard, came up to mend the bridge. Camp was made for the night at the Marilao River. The lo.ss of the command at the bridge was four. On the following day the Bocaue and Bigaa Rivers were crossed. The horses were made to swim. The column flanked Bulacan, lying we.st near the bay, and reported to be occupied by Aguinaldo’s troops. The leader here was said to be Gen. Gregorio del Pilar with 500 men. Canipaigmn»; /;/ the Philippines. Guiguilito was reached on the afternoon; the 10th Pennsylvania and the Kan- sans crossed the bridge, and the 3d Art. and Montanas camped on the south side of the river. Indications of demoralization among the enemy were frequent. Yet from later knowledge of them, they were evidently conducting a rear guard fight and doing it with great skill, as they had done on former occasions. SQUAD OF MONTANA MEN ON THE FIRING LINE NEAR MALOLOS. Photo hy Lillie. All the bridges were saved, but many houses were destroyed. Sometimes the rebels set fire to them; sometimes they were burned after our army came into the towns. March 30th, we marched to the rebel trenches, two miles from Malolos. There we found a small party strongly entrenched near the railroad. The rail- road had been the vertebra, as it were, of the advancing division. On either side of this were long, low stretches of level grounds, dotted with villages and settle- ments, and interspersed by bamboo belts about every mile of the way. On this railroad then, the insurgent forces suddenly opened on Otis and his staff. Gen. MacArthur was also on the ground at the time with his staff. One company of the 10th Pennsylvania and one company of the Kansans repelled this attack; the 2d Brigade with the rest of MacArthur’ s Division marched on Malolos at the break of day on March 31st. The 20th Kansas were on the right of the brigade, the Montanas in the center, and the 3d Art. on the left. The advance uncoiled itself slowly, like a great python, across the lagoons and marshes. On the right there was some heavy firing, but Malolos was taken with scarcely a blow, the army of Aguinaldo having evacuated the place. Smoke and flames were seen issuing from the palace of the President of the Filipino Republic. The “ nipa ” huts were also in flames. The frenzied inhabitants were determined to destroy their homes and die for what they considered their sacred liberties. The Montanas were nearest the town, and Otis sent them forward to occupy it, which they did at 9:40, according to Gen. Otis’ report. At 9:45 the Montanas came to the public square. The house of the Filipino Congress was in flames. Col. Kessler, of the 3d Art., came up at once; Col. Funston and the Kansans had entered at 9:30, going in at a point near the railroad line. At ten o’clock the Kansans reported, and shortly after the 1st Brigade flag, .surmounted by the Cainpaii^yiijl^ in the Philippines. 169 nationaal colors, floated from the staff, erected in front of the headquarters of the insurgent government. The flag was given by Company G of the Montanas. When it was raised a mighty cheer went up. No burning by our troops was allowed. Tooting was strictly forbidden, and all public and private property was put under guard. Perfect order was main- tained in the city. The Montanas and the 3d Art. were sent to guard the town. Scouting parties and outposts were posted. The total loss of the brigade in the march to Malolos was 285 killed and wounded, being more than ten per cent of the strength of the whole command. Col. Funston, Col. Kessler, and Maj. Kobbe were mentioned for gallant con- duct, and special distinction was asked for them from the War Department. After seven days of hard fighting the insurgent capital was taken. Of the men under him Gen. Harrison Gray Otis writes: “They have shown in an eminent degree the qualities of good soldiers, obedient to discipline, enduring in courage, in steadiness, in patriotism, and magnificent order in battle.” OPERATIONS OF WHEATON’S BRIGADE* On March 22d, Gen. Wheaton received orders from Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps to report for temporary duty with his brigade to Major-General MacArthur. The brigade consisted of one battalion 3d U. S. Inf., just landed from transport, 22d U. S. Inf., and eleven companies 2d Oregon Vol- unteer Inf., in all 2241 officers and enlisted men effective for duty. The night of March 24th, this brigade relieved the 1st Brigade, second division, Brigadier- General Otis, in the trenches extending from the left, west of Caloocan, to the vicinity of Ea Toma church. This disposition was made in the darkness, without the enemy gaining any knowledge of it, although his entrenchments were close in r • TRENCHES AND BRIDGE AT CALUMPIT. Photo by Lillie.. front and our movements exposed to his short-range fire. The 2d Oregon was placed on the left, 22d U. S. Inf. on the right, the battalion 3d Inf. in the enclosure, or wall, about Caloocan church, and near the center. March 25th, soon after daylight, Major-General MacArthur commenced his movement by * Written by an officer of the brigade. 270 Campaigning m the Philippines. advancing his right brigade to attack the enemy in the trenches on his front, and to advance his right on Polo. Soon after, his left took up the movement and advanced to the front and left his artillery near the center, advancing with his lines. As soon as the left brigade moved, Gen. Wheaton advanced one battalion of the22d Inf. on his right to cover the movement of the 3d U. S. Art. — foot — on Gen. SECTION OF FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL, USED FOR WOUNDED FILIPINOS. Photo hy Lillie. MacArthur’s left. The turning movement having sufficiently developed to threaten the rebel entrenchments on their left flank, Gen. Wheaton directed that Are be opened on the rebel entrenchments on his front by the guns of the Utah Light Artillery, 1st. Lieut. George W. Gibbs, and at 8:30 a. m. directed his whole line to advance in the following order: 22d U. S. Inf., Col. H. C. Egbert, on the right to endeavor to keep in touch and communication with the 3d U. S. Art. on the left of Otis’ Brigade; MacArthur’s Division, one battalion 3d U. S. Inf., Capt. Cooke, center; two companies on the east side of the railroad track and two on the west side. Second Oregon Volunteer Inf., Col. O. Summers, left extending to near the channel separating Malabon from the mainland. The rebels were found in their entrenchments in great force, and line after line of their works was carried with the utmost gallantry. The roll of the infantry fire was now continuous and in- tense; the heaviest fighting at this time falling on the 2d Oregon and two companies of 3d U. S. Inf. By 11:30 A. m. the enemy was thrown to the line of entrench- ments along the Tuliahan River, he having been driven from his successive lines of entrenchments with great slaughter. The two guns of the Utah Light Battery were now brought up from the line of works in front of Caloocan to a point on the railroad track, nine hundred yards from the bridge across the Tuliahan; a Hotchkiss revolving cannon was sent to the extreme left to keep down the fire of the enemy coming from across the channel near Malabon. His block-houses and entrenchments along the river on the north bank were shelled. A battalion of two companies of the 23d U. S. Inf., one hundred and fifty-nine officers and enlisted men, Capt. S. B. Pratt, having been sent out from the city, were placed on the right with instructions to connect with the left of Otis’ Brigade, which was done by fording the Tuliahan. Late in the afternoon, a despatch was received from Campaigning in the Philippines. 171 Gen. Mac Arthur that it was probable, owing to the difficulties of the country, that he would not be able to place his right at Polo that day, but hoped to be there early next morning. Gen. Wheaton now suspended his forward movement, in order that the enemy might not be driven beyond Polo or Malinta before the ground in that vicinity had been seized by Gen. MacArthur. Night closed with Gen. Wheaton’s right connecting with Otis’ Brigade of the second division, and the line close to the Tuliahan, with the enemy all driven to the north bank. March 26th, at daylight, the indications were that the enemy was preparing for retreat. The city of Malabon, on the left, was on fire, and a stream of fugitive soldiers, of the enemy, and inhabitants, was pouring from the city toward the north. Col. Egbert was ordered to ford the Tuliahan River with his regiment — the 22d U. S. Inf. — near the right, and form line perpendicular to the river, his right to the north, his left to be supported by the battalion 23d U. S. Inf. By 11 A. m. all entrenchments near the river were carried, the 2d Oregons on the left meeting with an obstinate resistance. Gen. Wheaton crossed the river in person at this time near the railroad bridge, and the rebels opened fire from an entrenchment halfway, from the river to Malinta, from walls, loopholed for musketry about the church, and from entrenchments at Malinta. The 22d U. S. Inf. was ordered to form line, facing the entrenchments, and to charge and carry them, wffiich the regiment did with great gallantr3\ Col. H. C. Egbert was mortally wounded in this charge, and died soon after. At the same time the 2d Oregon, on the left, carried everything before it. The 3d U. S. Art. now — about 12 m. — entered Malinta. The enemy fled north, pursued by Gen. MacArthur’ s center and right. Gen. Wheaton’s whole brigade went into camp at Malinta, the two remaining battalions of the 3d U. S. Inf. having joined from the transport, about dark. March 27th, under order from the Division Commander, the 2d Oregon was left at Malinta, and the rest of the brigade joined head of column. The battalion of the 23d U. S. Inf. was returned to Manila. At 8:40 A. m. Gen. Wheaton received a despatch from the Department Commander to be under his orders direct, and to keep railroad open in the rear of Gen. MacArthur’ s Division. March 28th, the 3d JUST BEFORE THE ADVANCE. and 22d Infs, marched to Marilao. March 29th, the Marilao was crossed and the brigade marched up the railroad. March 30th, the 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf. was assigned to Gen. Wheaton’s command. Column moved at 6:30 A. m. All trains were left at Bocaue with one battalion, 22d U. S. Inf., as guard. The column reached Guiguinto at 9:30 A. m., and before dark the 3d U. S. Inf., Col. Page, and 172 Campaigning in the Philippines. two battalions ‘22d U. S. Inf. were in bivouac, one half mile in rear of Major- General MacArthur’s line of battle, one and one-half to two miles from Malolos. In conference with Gen. Mac Arthur it was decided that Gen. Wheaton should support his attack on the enemy’s position, in front of Malolos, by supporting his left with two battalions 22d U. S. Inf. and his right with three battalions 8d U. S. Inf. March 81st, soon after daylight, the five battalions mentioned were placed, deployed in two lines of skirmishers, closed to two and one-half paces interval ; distance between lines, 500 yards. The right and left battalions to lap over and beyond the line of battle of the division. Action commenced about 7 A. M., the left occupying Malolos, the enemy’s capital, early in the day. Gen. Wheaton was with the right and opened fire on an entrenchment of the enemy with Hotchkiss revolving cannon, soon after the line was formed. After some maneuvering, Hale’s Brigade carried the enemy’s works, and pur- sued him in the direction of Calumpit. The entire movement from the lines in front of Caloocan to Malolos was a complete success. Great damage and heavy loss in killed and wounded was inflicted upon the rebels, and nowhere was the WHERK THE NEBRASKA REGIMENT LOST TWELVE MEN WITHIN FIFTY AWARDS. Photo hi/ Roomer. enemy able to considerably retard the advance. He was in strong force in front of our lines on March 25th. In front of Gen. Wheaton’s Brigade his entrench- ments were held by not less than 4000 men, mostly armed with Mauser rifles. The conduct of our officers and men was distinguished by daring and the utmost energy. Gen. Wheaton expresses the highest admiration for the distinguished gallantry of Col. Harry C. Egbert, 22d U. S. Inf., who fell at Malinta during the charge of his regiment upon the enemy’s entrenchments. He should be held in grateful remembrance by his countrymen. The gallant conduct of Col. O. Summers, 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., on March 25th and 26th, is worthy of the highest praise. He maneuvered his regiment with ability and did excellent service, in- spiring his command which fought with courage and determination. The con- duct of Capt. John G. Ballance, 22d U. S. Inf., was distinguished for courage and skill. His ability in handling his battalion under the enemy’s fire is worthy of the highest consideration. Gen. Wheaton states that he is indebted for valuable asistance to Capt. H. C. Cabell, 8d U. S. Inf., Assistant Adjutant-General U. S. V.; 1st Eieut. F. D. Webster, 20th Inf., Aide-de-camp; 2d Lieut. W. D. Connor, Campaigning in the Philippines. 173 Corps of Engineers, Acting Aide-de-camp, and 2d Lieut A. P. Hayne, Battery A, California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, Acting Aide-de-camp; that they carried his orders to all parts of the field during these operations; he expresses his thanks for the courage and ability with which they carried his orders. Gen. Wheaton also states that Maj. G. F. Shiels, Brigade Surgeon of Volunteers, rendered valuable service in bringing wounded from the most exposed places, and in many instances carrying orders under the heaviest fire of the enemy. THE GIEMORE INCIDENT. In the latter part of March, during the period covered by this chapter, the gunboat Yorktown was ordered to patrol the coast of Luzon. After liberating foreign residents in towns where they were held as prisoners, the Yorktown proceeded northward as far as the province of El Principe, stopping at the capital town of Bales, where she arrived April 12th. The province contains about 50,000 inhabitants, and is a mountainous country. The town of Bales has a population of nearly 12,000, and is ten days’ distant by land from Manila — three days on horseback, and seven by coach. So isolated is tne place that neither the natives nor Spanish residents were aware of events transpiring in Manila, nor of their changed relations to each other, or the world. The Spanish had maintained a garrison at Bales, which for nearly a year had oeen besieged by the insurrectos, a siege which was continued nothwithstanding surrender of Spain’s claims to sovereignty. The garrison consisted of eighty- three soldiers, three officers and two priests, who were defending themselves in a church. The mission of the Yorktowyi was to acquaint the insurrectos with the change in government, and to rescue the beleaguered garrison. On the arrival of the Yorktowji, Lieut. J. C. Gilmore, and Ensign W. H. Standley were directed to proceed up the river in the Yorktown' s launch, making soundings, and discover- ing the conditions of affairs at Bales. On arriving at the mouth of the river. Ensign Standley landed, and Gilmore with a party from the gunboat proceeded up the stream, soon being concealed from view by a bend in the shore. Shortly after losing sight of the boat, Standley heard a bugle call, followed by three volleys and cheering. That the launch had been surprised by insurrectos, he did not doubt, and as the automatic gun with which the boat was equipped, made no reply, it seemed almost certain that Gilmore and party had been killed, or taken prisoners. Returning to the ship with this report, search was instituted for the Lieu- tenant, his party, and the launch, but nothing coming to light about either, after a few days, during which the Filipinos refused to communicate with the American officers, the Yorktown continued her voyage to Iloilo. From that time, and to the time when these pages are printed, the party have been held as prisoners by the Filipinos. 1 CHURCH AT MAUOUOS. Used as headquarters for our troops. i CHAPTER IX. MacARTHUR’S march on SAN FERNANDO. R some weeks after the capture of Malolos, MacArthur’s Division remained there awaiting further developments. The position of affairs was not much changed, except that the headquarters of the insurrectos had been pushed back a few miles. The insurrectos were as active as ever, and their lines confronted ours near Malolos, just as they had previously confronted them at Caloocan. Whenever the Americans appeared in force the insurrectos retired. When the Americans fell back, the insurrectos returned. About this time Gen. H. G. Otis resigned and returned to the United States, and was succeeded in the command of the 1st Brigade by Gen. Lloyd Wheaton on April 2d. The regiments of Wheaton’s Brigade were partly returned to Manila and partly scattered along the line of the railroad upon guard duty, under command of Gen. Wheaton. Gen. Wheaton remained in command of the 1st Brigade until our forces reached San Fernando, and was also in general charge of the railroad communications with Manila. On April 14th, the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment was relieved by the 51st lowas. During the second week in April, a body of insurrectos appeared near the railroad between Malolos and Manila, threatening our communications. Gen. Wheaton proceeded to attend to that matter, and the following, written by an officer of his brigade, describes his operations in so doing: WHEATON’S OPERATIONS ALONG THE RAILROAD. At 1 A. M. April 11th, Gen. Wheaton received a despatch from the command- ing officer at Bigaa that the enemy had attacked in force at Bocaue, on the rail- road, our line of communication; that he was attacked and that he wanted re-inforcements. In compliance with instructions from Major-General MacArthur, commanding the second division, Gen. Wheaton immediately proceeded (on foot) in the direction of points attacked, taking with him a detachment of twenty-five men of the 4th Cav. (dismounted), under command of Lieut. Charles Boyd, 4th U. S. Cav. Upon reaching a company of the 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf., encamped two and one-half miles south of Malolos and along the railroad track, it was found that an additional company had been sent there from Guiguinto. The company was ordered to follow the General, and also one platoon of the other company. Upon arriving at the bridge, one mile or less from Guiguinto, the company there was ordered to follow. The command arrived at Guiguinto as the 17*5 Campaigning in the Philippines. enemy attacked the outposts there. The commanding officer seemed to have made no adequate preparation for combat. Gen. Wheaton immediately deployed the whole force, amounting to about 400 men, along the railroad track, and pushed by hand the armored train lying there into position to command the ground east and north of Guiguinto. The enem}' now attacked by firing from all the bamboo thickets and timber near the station and north and east of the depot. Fire was opened upon him from the six-pound rifle, and the Hotchkiss revolving cannon and the two machine guns on the armored train. The whole infantr}^ line opened fire, and before daylight the enemy was driven off and dispersed. Gen. Wheaton then proceeded to Bigaa, taking the troops at Guiguinto with him and leaving the detachment 4th Cav. to guard the station, until relieved by troops sent from Malolos by the Division Commander. The armored train was pushed by hand. The enemy was driven from the vicinit}* of Bigaa, and taking the troops there, excepting detachment left as guard, the General proceeded to Bocaue. Upon arriving within a mile of that place he found the troops 3 ’et engaged. He opened fire on the enem^’ with machine guns and attacked him with infantr}^ deployed in the extended order, and drove him in flight in the direction THE ADVAXCE OX MALOLOS. of Santa Maria and east of Bocaue. It was found that there had been a spirited combat at Bocaue, and the four companies of infantr}" there and in the vicinity had preser\*ed the railroad track intact and had inflicted loss upon the enem 3 ^ It was also learned that the three companies of the Oregon Regiment at Marilao had been attacked by about 400 rebels, who were driven off. The telegraph line betu^een Bocaue and Marilao had been cut in several places, and it was not until afternoon that the line was restored. The enem 3 " had attacked in considerable force all the places held b 3 ' troops, from Marilao to Guiguinto inclusive. He was beaten off ever 3 'wffiere b 3 ' da 3 flight and driven from the vicinit 3 ^ of all the stations before 6:30 A. M. The General ordered four companies of the 2d Oregon from Malinta and two from Marilao, and with two companies at Bocaue assembled at that point two battalions of the regiment and had there the entire Minnesota Regiment. Major-General MacArthur sent from Malolos one 3.2-inch gun and one Hotch- kiss revolving cannon. At da 3 dight, on the morning of the 12th of April, a move was made upon Santa Maria with this force. Fire was opened upon the position and entrenchments of the enem 3 ^ at that place with artiller 3 q and the Campaigning in the Philippines. 177 infantry advanced in the extended order. The enemy — eleven companies o^ infantry — offered a feeble resistance, and fled north and east of Santa Maria. Strong detachments were sent on all north and east roads. They pursued the enemy in every direction, but were unable to come up with him, as he had dis- persed. The command returned to Bocaue, during the afternoon, and from there the troops were sent to the several stations they occupied before the enemy’s attack upon the points, held by the troops along the railroad track. From inform- ation obtained from prisoners and from escaped Spanish refugees, it was learned that this attack upon our communications was made under the orders and super- vision of Aguinaldo, who was at Santa Maria the 11th of April. The loss of the enemy, as near as could be ascertained, was about 250 killed and wounded. Thanks are due Col. O. Summers, 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., for prompt co- operation and to Capt. H. C. Catell for able assistance, also to 1st. Tieut. F. D. Webster, 20th Inf., Aide-de-camp, and 1st Lieut. H. B. Ely, 22d Inf., Acting Assistant Quartermaster and Acting Chief Surgeon. Maj. Bell, U. S. V. Engineers, of Major-General MacArthur’s staff, rendered valuable services on the 12th of April, and had charge of an important reconnaissance from Santa Maria. In the latter part of April, Gen. MacArthur was instructed by the command- ing general to renew his pressure upon the insurrectos, and drive them from Calumpit and San Fernando, which had become their headquarters. HALE’vS OPERATIONvS FROM MAEOLOS TO CALUMPIT. The country from Malolos to Calumpit is level for the most part. A wagon road runs five miles northeasterly to Quingua, bordered with a fringe of woods most of the way, with open fields on both sides. For half a mile about Quingua, the country- is covered with woods, but just before reaching the woods there was half a mile of open space defended by trenches — the scene of the battle of Quin- gua. Around the town itself - . ■ - was a strong line of trenches. The Quingua River flows west- ward past the north edge of the town of Quingua, and the south edge of the town of Pulilan toward Calumpit, eight miles west of Quingua. The railroad runs northwest from Malolos to Calumpit, through a rich farming country like the English downs. Five miles from Malolos it crosses the Bagbag River, which here flows southwesterly. The rail- road has an iron bridge, the gen. wheaton at malolos. puotohymue . farther span of which had been dropped into the river by the insurrectos, — a fact discovered by Maj. Bell in a reconnaissance from Malolos. A mile and a quarter further on, the road crosses the Rio Grande de la Pampanga on a fine iron bridge ^ 12b 178 Campaigning in the Philippines. the condition of which was unknown. Three hundred yards above and north- east of the broken Bagbag Bridge, the Bagbag River is formed by the junction of the Quingua River, flowing from the east, and the Calumpit River, a narrow, deep, canal-like stream extend- ing from this junction north- westerly parallel to the railroad to the Rio Grande, thus forming a connecting link between the two rivers. The town of Calumpit lies in the rectangle formed b}^ the railroad, the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, the Calumpit and the Bagbag, being thus sur- rounded on three sides by rivers said to be unfordable. It was known to be very strongly fortified by entrenchments built in a practically continuous line along the river banks, covered in some cases with bomb proofs, and other cases with loopholed breastworks, having individual coverings for each rifleman. The railroad enbankment was also converted into a parapet for firing in either direction, and was gashed with trenches cut across it, to fire on troops advancing along the road. The Americans fully appreciated that the capture of this place, so strongly fortified, both by nature and the insurgents, was a serious problem — the most difficult yet encountered. The insurgents regarded it as absolutely impregnable. Buencameno, one of their leaders, stated in a letter to Aguinaldo, picked up on the battle-field after the capture, that ‘ ‘ Calumpit will be the sepulcher of the Americans,” and he was certainly justified in this opinion by the strength of the position. The original plan was for the 1st Brigade to work up the railroad, Hale’s Brigade moving due north from Malolos across the Quingua River, and thence westward to the Calumpit, from which position it could partially enfilade the trenches along the Bagbag, near the railroad bridge in front of the 1st Brigade, and thus enable the latter to effect a crossing. The Quingua part of the fight was not premeditated, but events so shaped themselves that the 2d Brigade had to go to Quingua and fight its way along the Quingua River, past Pulilan to Calumpit, and so attack the city in that way. Before the march commenced, Maj. Bell went with a cavalry troop in the direc- tion of Quingua, to reconnoiter the river. At the camp in Malolos, at six o’clock on the morning of April 23d, a heavy firing was heard coming from the direction of Maj. Bell’s expedition. The firing being so heavy and continuous, as to indicate something more than a mere brush with an outpost, Gen. Hale immediately sent an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, of the 51st lowas, to send two companies to Maj. Bell’s support, and, as the firing did not abate, increased this to four companies. A cavalryman rode in and reported that Maj. Bell had sent for a OREGON BOYS ON THE FIRING LINE. Photo hy Lillie. Campaigning in the Philippines. 179 battalion of Nebraskas, whose camp was nearest the Quingua Road, and that the}" were already on the way out. A little later another battalion of lowas and one of Nebraskas went out to re-inforce their comrades. About this time Capt. Lockett, Gen. MacArthur’s Aide, who had ridden out to investigate, reported that the morn- ing skirmish had developed into quite a serious situation, and that artillery would be required to drive the Filipinos from their strong position. Gen. MacArthur ordered four guns to the post. Gen. Hale at once took the field in person, and reached the firing lines to find that the Nebraskas were deployed behind a rice-ridge in the field, at the right of the road ; that the lowas had taken a position on their right and the cavalry were posted on the left. The Filipinos were pouring a fierce and deadly fire on our lines. The General waited for our guns, which were rapidly coming up the road, placed them at the edge of the woods, ordered the Nebraskas, who were between his cannon and the enemy on the right, to withdraw to the woods as soon as the artillery began firing on the left, thus permitting the shelling of the insurgent trenches in front of the Nebraskas before they advanced, and then opened with the artillery. The Nebraska firing line, however, began to advance under a terrific musketry discharge. Thinking that his instructions had been misunderstood. Hale ran down the road towards the Nebraskas and discovered that Col. Stotsenberg, who had just come out and was not aware of the General’s plan and orders, had gone to the front, and, with his characteristic, impetuous bravery, had given the order to advance. It was too late to recall the men who had by this time almost reached the enemy’s trenches and were fighting with the courage and spirit of Napoleon’s Old Guard. The Filipinos in this fight delivered a very effective fire, and within a few hundred yards Col. Stotsenberg, Lieut. Sisson and two enlisted men were killed, and thirty-one men wounded, out of not over 200 men actually on the firing lines. But the charge of this “thin, brown line’’ was irresistible, and the Filipinos were beaten back from their position and driven through the town only after they had made several stands behind the barricades. When the artillery fire was about to begin, Capt. Brooks, Adjutant-General of the brigade, had been sent above the line, to the right, to direct the Iowa troops to advance with the Nebraskas, which they did, meeting strong resistance from the enemy, entrenched around the southwest side of the town, but gallantly carrying these works and entering the town with the Nebraskas. The unexpected events of the day having put our troops in possession of Quingua, it was considered better to hold it, and effect a crossing of the Quingua River at that point, and march from there against Calumpit GUNS OF THE UTAH BATTERY TRAINED ON MALABON. 180 Campaigning in the Philippines. instead of carrying out the former plan of advancing north from Malolos and forcing a passage at a new place which would probably be strongly defended. The events of the next day proved the wisdom of this judgment, and showed that the battle of Quingua was a blessing in disguise. Accordingly, the South Dakotas, and the remaining companies of the Nebraskas and lowas were marched to Quingua. Rations and ammunition were distributed, and everything put in readiness to force the passage of the river on the following morning. During the night the enemy made an attempt to destroy the bamboo bridges, but was frustrated b}^ the American outposts. Sergeant-Major Coleman of the Nebraskas succeeded in recon- noitering the ford, although the enemy on the opposite bank fired on everyone approaching the river, and found that it was shallow enough for troops to pass. After a busy and anxious night the infantr}' and artillery were placed, at 5 A. M., along the south bank of the river, the guns being located in such a wa}’- that they could partially enfilade the Filipino trenches. At 5:30 the firing began. Twenty-five minutes later Company B of the Nebraskas, under Lieut. Osborne, advanced through the ford, and Company F, of the South Dakotas, under Capt. IX THE TRENCHES AT THE PUMPING STATION. Brockway, dashed across the frail bambooo foot-bridge. This boldness of the Americans, which was not down in the books, and which Spain had not taught them, seemed to paralyze the insurgents, and they left their trenches forthwith. After four hours’ hard work, owing to the rickety condition of the bridge, and the steep approach to the ford, and the soft bottom of the river, transportation and army were all taken across, and a northwesterly march on Pulilan began. Pulilan lies on the north bank of the Pulilan River, about two miles northwest of Quin- gua and six miles east of Calumpit. The thick jungles rendered the maintenance of an extended line extremely difficult, but b}" hard riding up and down the line and constantly passing of signals, the continuity of the brigade was preserved as it forced its way through the dense, thorny brush. The artillery was kept within 100 yards of the firing line, to be ready for quick action in an emergency. Gen. Hale is a strong advocate of this departure from the text-book rules for location of artillery, when applied to warfare with the Filipinos. On account of the high fire of the Filipinos, it was fully as safe on the firing line as farther back. The guns did not have to come up under fire, and a few shells and shrapnel promptly administered at the very outset of an attack, exert a wonderful influence. Campaigning in the Philippines. 181 At 10:20 A. M. the line was met by a heavy fire from the dense bamboo thickets in its front, where the enemy was strongly entrenched in a line of earthworks built across the road, and in the woods. One field gun opened immediately to the front, and a few well directed shots from an- other put to flight a party of the enemy who had attack- ed our right and TRENCHES AT SAN FERNANDO. Photo by Darcey. rear. The SoUth Dakotas and Nebraskas charged the enemy’s earthworks, and, as a longer resist- ance than usual was made, a large number were killed. In one barricade thirty- eight dead were counted, at another, twenty-eight, and at a third, fifteen, while many more were seen along the lanes and in the woods. The brigade halted at Pulilan, resuming the march at 3 p. m. As the sun was sinking towards the horizon, and the weary skirmish line was plodding along past the ford of the Quingua where the crossing would have been made if the plan had been carried out, and thinking that the enemy would probably not make another stand before the final and crucial conflict at the stronghold of Calumpit, they were rudely awakened by the crackling of Mausers from a line of invisible trenches extending perpendicularly to the river along the entire front of the brigade for a distance of nearly a mile. The left battalion of the Nebraskas and the artillery took up some earthworks which had been vacated by the Fili- pinos, and which made a splendid defense at this time. Tieut. Webber’s com- pany was sent up the road on the left to turn the enemy’s right flank. The right battalion of the Nebraskas, under Maj. Eager, in company with the South Dakotas, under Col. Frost, charged across the intervening space. When they were half way across, the Filipinos retreated, leaving twenty-five dead. This ended the third fight of the day. Without counting those scattered through trees and jungles, over one hundred of the enemy were found killed and wounded in four groups alone during the day, and it is a conservative estimate to place their dead at two hundred. * The Americans lost in the day’s fight six killed and fourteen wounded, one of w^hom after- • wards died. The command camped on the battle-field during the night. Under the cover of the darkness supplies were brought from Malolos and taken across the river on the men’s backs. The dead, wounded and PENNSYLVANIAS SKIRMISHING JUST AFTER DAYBREAK sick were carried across and sent in the march on malolos. back to Malolos in ambulances, and in the wagons and bull-carts which brought out the supplies. The next morning, April 25th, after a practically sleepless night, mak- ing forty-eight hours of almost continual fighting, marching and handling supplies, 182 Campaigning in the Philippines,. the advance upon Calumpit was resumed. The order of battle was for the main body to march in an extended line, leaving one battalion of each regiment in reserve. When within a mile of the Calumpit River, Gen. Hale, by means of the compass, established a new line, forty degrees west of north, and swung his brig- ade around, so that it would be parallel with the river, before he made his final advance on the town. Maj. Mulford, of the Nebraskas, and the General made a reconnaissance, locating the Ragbag railroad bridge, the west span of which had THE ADVANCE ON MALOLOS. been broken down, and the enemy’s entrenchments across the river. The 1st Brigade was working up the railroad, on the south side of the Quingua River in conjunction with the 2d Brigade on the north side. When sure that the 1st Brigade was up, the guns, which had been placed to command the bridge and trenches, opened fire. The enemy replied with much vigor. When the artillery had sufficiently shaken things up, the infantry advanced, firing, until they came to the east bank of the Calumpit River, where they engaged with the enemy only fifty yards away, defended by the strong entrenchments already mentioned, and with a deep and apparently impassable stream. The brigade staff and the artillery came forward, Tieut. Fuller, Aide-de-camp, going back to hurry up the last piece. Tieut. Fleming, with great coolness, placed his guns on the bank and poured death into those wonderfully constructed trenches. Not in the whole Filipino war have our troops occupied more dangerous ground, and it is only owing to the fact that the insurgents were obliged to fire without aiming, that our men escaped a heavy slaughter. The conduct of the men was gallant, and so heavy and accurate was their fire that the frame of the covered and loopholed earthworks was afterwards seen to be cut in shreds by bullets passing through the loopholes themselves. The insurgents were afraid to raise their heads above the ramparts, but their hands and guns could be seen rising over the edge, firing and dropping back to load. Consequently, their sheet of bullets flew over the prostrate forms of the Americans, lying on the opposite bank, and delivering a cool and aimed fire that played like a garden hose along the top of the enemy’s parapets. After half an hour, when the enemy’s fire was practically silenced on our left, it seemed feasible to Hale to get a line of troops across, near the junction of the Calumpit and Quingua Rivers, and put an end to the agony. He therefore told Maj. Mulford to take Company K of the Nebraskas, which was on the left, and make the attempt. Mulford and Lieut. Webber waded in with their men, but were soon beyond their depth. A second attempt farther out on the Quingua showed the water to be only shoulder deep, and at this point the line was sent across. Campaigning in the Philipphies. 183 ' Gen. Hale and his staff intrepidly plunged through with the first fording party, at the same time hurrying about fifty more men across, and formed them in line to sweep through Calumpit and take the river trenches in flank. The Nebraska men at once marched through the town, and the lowas and South Dakotas were told not to fire across the river while this move was going on. Several times Aguinaldo’s men rallied, but at each stand they were routed and left their slain in the blood-stained trenches. Forty dead, and fourteen wounded, were found as the result of this movement through the town. The number killed and wounded in the earlier part of the fight can not be estimated, as they were removed before our troops crossed the river. When the Americans approached Calumpit church, which the insurgents had fired before retreating, a reconnoitering party went forward and discovered that the insurrectos had left the district south of the Rio Grande, and were in strong force on the north bank. Soon afterward the Filipinos opened fire with artillery as well as infantry. It was one of the few instances in which they used artillery. A shrapnel burst over the heads of our men. Receiving no reply, the insurgents soon tired of their artillery and rifle practice, and stopped firing. The Nebraskas bivouacked on the Calumpit and Ragbag Rivers, with their left on the railroad track. The Adjutant-General of the brigade, Capt. Brooks, was sent up the railroad with a detail of ten men, to ascertain the condition of the track and the Rio Grande Bridge. He found that the road-bed had been stripped of ties and converted into a breastwork for resisting the American advance, either along or across the road, but that the trusses of the railroad bridge were apparently unin- jured. As he approached within 400 ^mrds of the Rio Grande Bridge, he had been fired on by infantry and artillery. The total number of our losses during these engagements at Calumpit, were three killed and thirty-three wounded, of which one, later, died. During the rest of April, the command remained at Calumpit, guarding the bridges over the Ragbag and Rio Grande Rivers. On May 2d, Gen. Hale took the South Dakota and Iowa Regiments with a MINNESOTA FIRING LINE IN THE ADVANCE ON SAN ISIDRO. Photo by Lillie. platoon of cavalry and three guns to a point on the Pulilan-Quingua Road, east of Pulilan, holding them there as a re-inforcement for Gen. Fawton’s Division in the movement, then proceeding against Baliuag, in case assistance should be required. Baliuag, however, was captured with little resistance, and the next morning the command was ordered back to Calumpit, and in the afternoon moved north of the Rio Gronde in preparation for the advance on San Fernando the following day. The total distance marched in the two days was twenty-one miles. 134 Campaigning m the Philippines. OPERATIONS OF WHEATON’S BRIGADE TO CAEUMPIT * Pursuant to orders of Major-General MacArthur, Gen. Wheaton moved his brigade, now consisting of a battalion of 3d U. S. Cav., one of Montana Volunteer Inf. and one 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf., out of Malolos, on the morning of April 24th, with instructions to attack the enemy on the north bank of the Bagbag River, but the brigade of Gen. Hale, with which it was desired he should co-operate, not having advanced from the direction of Quinga on Calumpit sufficiently to attack at that point that day, Gen. Wheaton was directed by Major-General Mac- Arthur to hold his brigade in the vicinity of the railroad at Barasoain until Hale had fought his way to the vicinity of a ford across the Quinga, not far from the Calumpit River. About 8:30 A. m., on the morning of April 25th, by direction of the Division Commander, Gen. Wheaton marched his brigade on the enemy’s position, moving the 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf. on the left of the railroad and the 1st Montana Volunteer Inf. on the right. The battalion of the 3d U. S. Art., Maj. Kobbe, was left at Malolos and Barasoain to guard the line of road. The armored train was directed to follow up the track, after the brigade was well on INSURGENT TRENCHES AT CALUMPIT. the march. His movements being well screened from the enemy by extensive lines of bamboo jungle, the General moved both regiments of infantry into a well- protected position, about 1200 yards from the enemy’s entrenchments along the Bagbag. The armored train, having reached at this time a point on the road near the infantry, it was ordered that fire be opened from the rifled six-pounder and the three machine guns on the train, and at this minute Hale’s Artillery, in front and on the right, across the Quinga, opened fire, and the guns of the Utah Battery on the right commenced firing. Soon after the armored train was moved to the front and several companies of infantry, from both regiments, were advanced to seize all places near the river, from which an effective fire might be directed upon the enemy’s entrenchments. The converging fire of the two brigades of the division and the artillery now began to shake the enemy. Col. Funston, 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf., with Lieut. C. M. Warner, 1st Sergt. Raymond Enslow and Sergt. C. P. Barshfield, Company K 20th Kansas, endeavored to rush across the railroad bridge. A span of the bridge being * Written by an officer of the brigade. Campaigning in the Philippines. 185 1 j broken, Col, Funston, Lieut. Ball and the two sergeants named, swam the river j and drove the enemy out of the entrenchments near the bridge. At the same j time Hale’s Infantry on the right, forded the Calumpit to the front and right, turned the enemy out of his entrenchments along the Calumpit and pursued him to the vicinity of the Rio Grande, near the town of Calumpit, which the enemy burned. The two regiments of Gen. Wheaton’s Brigade bivouacked near the Bagbag. April 26th, the enemy was in force on the north bank of the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, a broad and deep river. He was protected by a most elaborate system of field fortifications and had near the railroad bridge three t pieces of artillery, and one rapid fire Maxim. The important stragetic position ; of Calumpit would be untenable until he was driven off. Gen. Wheaton was directed to do this, his force to be the 20th Kansas, and 1st Montana Volunteer Inf., five guns Utah Light Artillery, and three machine guns. It was effected in , thirty-six hours as follows: The infantry was advanced in deployed lines in the :| extended order from the Bagbag, to an entrenched position about 600 yards from :■ the Rio Grande, which position had been abandoned by the enemy, placing the 20th Kansas on the left of the railroad, and the 1st Montana on the right. The main body now being well screened from the enemy’s fire, detachments and several parties of skirmishers were advanced, and seized all sheltered places near the river, and within long rifle range of the railroad bridge. Two brick and stone buildings near the river were seized and loopholed for musketry. The machine guns and a part of the artillery were placed in position for fire upon the enemy’s I entrenchments. The river was reconnoitered below the railroad bridge for the ' purpose of ascertaining any place feasible to cross. A constant and continued fire of sharpshooters was kept up, and a slow, but continued fire from the 3.2-inch guns, during the 26th. On the night of the 26th, the railroad bridge was found to be in such condition that to rush it with men carrying arms would be impracti- cable. A reconnaissance at night by Col. Funston, made it apparent that the enemy \ ' was entrenched in force at all points for a considerable distance down the river. ! The morning of the 27th of April, a 3.2-inch gun was brought up to the brick ; house near the bridge and opened fire at ‘ short range upon the enemy’s works. , ^ Upon consultation with Col. Funston : a point about 900 yards below the rail- road bridge was selected as the place I that he would endeavor to cross part of I his regiment. The enemy’s entrench- j ments opposite this point were well [ screened by bamboo thickets, but a well- directed fire from the brick house near the bridge from the 3.2-inch gun and I by the companies of infantry was kept . : up. Col. Funston also advanced to a snapshot behind the filipixo trenches. the river bank strong parties that kept up a fire of great volume. The effect of the heavy and continued fire was to drive a part of the enemy’s force from his works and Privates Edward White and W. B. Trembly of Company B, 186 Cainpai^Q;niiig in the Philippines. 20th Kansas swam the river with a rope and fastened it to a stake on the enemy’s entrenchments while yet occupied. Rafts were pulled over by means of this rope, Col. Funston going over on the first raft. The artillery had during this time kept up a heav3^ fire from positions selected by Maj. Richard W. Young, Utah Light Artillery. Under direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, 1st Montana, a heavy and continuous fire was directed on the enemy near the railroad bridge, the machine guns also being directed upon the same place. When Col. Funston had crossed fortj^-five officers and men he attacked the enemy, turning him out of his works near the bridge. Gen. Wheaton with his staff then crossed the bridge followed by the 20th Kansas and 1st Montana as fast as they could pass over such frame work as the enemy had not destroyed. Upon reaching the north bank of the river two bodies of the enemy, each about 1500 strong were observed, one about one and a half miles to our left which had evidently been guarding the river below. The^^ formed in deployed line in extended order and advanced, but after being subjected to fire about twenty minutes they fell back in disorder and retreated out of range. The other body was in front and along the railroad. The 20th Kansas and 1st Montana were deployed on the left and right side of the railroad embankment and drove them beyond Apalit Station in the direction of St. Tomas. The whole force of the enemy disappearing in that direction, the nature of the OUTLOOK ,N THE TREE TOP. -P*"" % coutitry beiiig sucfa that they were compelled to march along the embankment, Gen. Wheaton estimated as 4000. The night of the 27th of April the brigade bivouacked in the town north of the rail- road bridge. The next morning two commissioned officers came from the rebels under a flag of truce and asked for an armistice sa^dng, “They wished to acknowledge the valor of the American soldier,’’ They were sent to the Division Commander. Gen. Wheaton invites attention to the gallant conduct of Col. Frederick Fun- ston — now Brigadier-General U. S. V., — during these operations. Also to the very efficient ser\dces and meritorious conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Wallace, Commanding 1st Montana Volunteer Inf., and Maj. Richard W. Young, Utah Light Artillery, for the courage and skill with which he directed the operations Campaigning in the Philippines. 187 of his guns. The extraordinary and most gallant conduct of Private Edward White, Company B, 20th Kansas and that of Private W. B. Trembly same com- pany and regiment in swimming the Rio Grande in face of the enemy’s fire and fastening a rope to a stake in his occupied works is worthy of high commendation and re- ward. The conduct of Eieut. C. H. Ball and of Sergts. Emer- son and Barshfield and Corp. A. M. Ferguson of Company E, 20th Kansas Volunteer Inf. in swimming the Bagbag with Col. Funston under the fire of the enemy is worthy of reward and great praise. Gen. Whea- ton also states that he is in- SENomo a message to mac Arthur from calumpit. debted for efficient assistance to Maj. G. F. Shiels, Brigade Surgeon of Volun- teers; to Capt. H. C. Cabell, 3d U. S. Inf.; to 1st Eieut. F. D. Webster, 20th Inf., Aide-de-camp; to Eieut. A. P. Hayne, Battery A, California Heavy Artillery. Eieut. Philip P. Russell, 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf., A. A. G. rendered gallant and effective service during these operations. HALE’S BRIGADE FROM CALUMPIT TO SAN FERNANDO. Beyond Calumpit the Dagupan Railway runs northwesterly ten miles to San Fernando, past the towns of Apalit and Santo Tomas. The 2d Brigade marched on the right on the railroad. It moved for two miles north, along the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and by wagon road ten miles more, in a northwesterly direction, parallel to the railroad and a mile or two from it. From the river to San Fernando the country is flat and cut by esteros, mud-bottoms, swamps and bayous. It is a country which only an adventurous huntsman would venture over in search of the wild fowl that inhabit its dark fen a land of moors and tarns, difficult to cross in most peaceful times — a horrible with artillery, baggage and accoutrements, and with an entrci- its passage through every river and swamp. Into this country of aebo.^t. \d dangerous bogs the American army plunged. Hale’s Brigade advanced in a northwesterly direction along the wagon road toward Santo Tomas and San Fernando, co-operating with the 1st Brigade which was to move up the railroad. The Divisional Artillery (Utah and 6th U. S., under Maj. Young), squadron of 4th Cav. and the wagon train, went with the 2d Brigade. The 3d Battalion of the 51st lowas was left at the Rio Grande Bridge to guard the stores and bridge. On May 4th the column formed in the following manner: 2d Battalion of the 51st lowas advance guard; two field guns and one Gatling gun behind the advance party, for prompt action if resistance was encountered; 1st Battalion of 51st lowas; remainder of artillery; 1st Nebraska Inf.;: 1st South Dakota Inf, and wagon train escorted by squadron of 4th Cav. At five o’clock the advance began. After marching a couple of hours, they" 188 Cauipaigni7i'. The advance during the day had been without contact with the enemy. The 4th Cav., Hawthorne’s Battery, and the North Dakotas, with the wagon train went into camp about four miles back toward Novaliches, the men and ani- mals being almost completely exhausted by hauling the transportation over sun-scorched divides, and through swampy valle3's and rock}' gullies. THE COLUMN REACHES SAN JOSE. Early on the morning of the 24th, the command, now separated into two parts, through the failure of the wagon train to reach the river before going into camp the night before, was in motion. The 22d Inf. advanced to, and occupied San Jose without opposition, being accompanied by Scott’s platoon. The 3d Inf. oc- cupied the approaches to the ford and the adjacent thickets to guard the trans- portation. The remainder of the command, with wagon train, resumed the advance toward the river. The same condition, or worse, if possible, continued to impede the progress of the wagon train as on the day previous. Capt. Gale, r BRIDGE AT BAGBAG RIVER, SHOWING SPAN CUT OUT BY INSURGENTS. Photo by Darcey. with his dismounted squadron of the 4th Cav., furnished the advance guard and convoy of the train, and with his entire command rendered valuable aid as en- gineers in assisting to prepare the roads, building bridges, etc. Lieut. Hawthorne, with his mountain battery detached, and even Maj. Penrose, Lieut. Kemp of the Medical Corps, with their hospital squad, and Chinamen, lent a willing hand to overcome what frequently appeared insurmountable obstacles to further progress. But of the North Dakotas, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, Gen. Lawton expresses special appreciation. They exchanged their well performed duties of advance guard of the day before, for the laborious one of rear guard of the two days necessary to reach Norzagaray. This regiment had orders to leave nothing behind, and literally carried transportation over bad places and put squads of men in the shafts to replace worn-out and dead bulls. Every serv'ice, even to the use of pick and shovel was performed, from the Colonel down to the private, with the same commendable earnestness that has given this regiment its reputation for cheerful and effective accomplishment of any task set them. Campaigning^ in the Philippines. 211 As rapidly as the troops came in, they occupied the deserted huts of the town, (San Jose) and remained all night. The wagon train came in during the night, men and animals completely exhausted, many carabao having died, the men tak- ing their places and hauling the carts along. During the afternoon 2d Tieut. C. H. Boyd, 4th Cav., reported Troop I, of that regiment, for duty with the expedition. He had come with his troop, which was mounted on native ponies, from the vicinity of Norzagaray, to which point a provisional brigade, composed of seven companies of the 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. and eight of the 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf., and a section (one gun) of the Utah Light Artillery, under command of Col. Owen Summers, 2d Oregon Volun- teer Inf. had been accompanied by Maj. Charles G. Starr, Inspector-General, U. S. V., from Bocaue, with a view to joining the expedition. Lieut. Boyd reported that, while with Col. Summers’ command, the enemy had been encoun- tered and had made a stubborn resistance, but had been driven back through Norzagaray and across the river, just east of that town, wdthout serious cuasalty on our side. Lieut. Boyd and his troop returned at once to Norzagaray. The march was resumed at the usual hour, on the morning of the 25th instant, for Norzagaray, with Troop L, 4th Cav., as escort, and advanced with headquarters, without waiting for the remainder of the command, arriving at Norzagaray about 12:30 P. M., without incident. PARTIAIv BURNING OF ANGAT. While on the march, dense smoke was observed, rising from the valley in the direction of Angat. It was found, on arrival at Norzagaray, that Maj. Kastwick’s Battalion, of the Oregons, and Capt. Masterman’s, of the Minnesotas, with the Utah gun, had that morning routed the enemy from, and occupied the town of Angat, some four miles northwest of Norzagaray, and that during the engage- ment a portion of the town had been burned. During the engagem.ent at Angat about 200 men of those left behind at Norzagaray, while swimming in the river, were surprised by a heavy fire from the enemy on the opposite bank. The mounted troop was watering at the same time, but fortunately not a man was hit. The enemy, in small force, were entrenched across the river from Norzagaray and scattered through the bamboo. During the afternoon they kept up a desultory and annoying fire upon the town, the bullets striking the church in which a hospital had been established. No casual- ties resulted, as the firing was at long range and not intelli- gently dii ected. The transporta- tion made but little progress as the road, over which our route lay, did not improve until Norzagaray was sighted. The train camped some distance back, toward San Jose, and, advancing next morning, was directed to continue to Angat and BRINGING IN WOUNDED MEN ON A HANDCAR. 212 Cainpaigjiiiig hi the Philippines. go into camp at that place, which the 3d and 22d Inf. and the 1st North Dakotas, accompanied by Hawthorne’s Mountain Battery, occupied the same day. The mounted troop was sent on a recon noissance along the west bank of the river and about two miles west of Angat, at Marunco, encountered the enemy in force reported to be about 500 — 200 were actually counted by Capt. W. E. Birk- himer, 3d Art., Acting Judge- Advocate. At the same time the cavalry started, one battalion of the Oregons, under Maj. Eastwick, forded the river, just above Norzagaray, and successfully dispersed the insurgent forces from the thickets, along the river bank from east to west. Maj. Eastwick reported an insurgent loss of five killed and several wounded. The following report will explain Gen. Eawton’s view of the situation at this time. GEN. LAWTON REPOPvTS PROGRESS. Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps, ) In the Field, Norzagarar 3 ', Luzon, April 26, 1899. ) To the Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific and 8th Army Corps, Manila, P. I. Sir — Your messages of 9:30 and 9:35, 25th inst., reached me this a. m. The command with transportation has not yet reached this point. I hope to get it all up this evening. The mounted troops were sent this a. m. , on a reconnoissance west along the bank of the river to look at roads and fords. Two miles west of Angat, the enemy was encountered in force, reported to be about 500 — 200 were actually counted by Capt. W. E. Birkhinier who accompanied the cavalry. At the same time cavalry started, one battalion of the Oregons forded the river oppo- site this place and drove the enemy from the country opposite; they were plainly seen from this point scattering, some fifty moved up the river in southeast direction, others moved toward the main body. Our troops occupied high ground and moved down river opposite Angat. As soon as my command arrives will cross Col. Summers’ command and move by both flanks down river and endeavor to throw flanks around the enemy and destroy some of them. Concerning your message of 9:30, there seems to be no direct road from this place to Quingua. The only route for wagons is via Baliuag to Bocaue. I will be prepared to follow instructions contained in message of 9:35 as soon as nn' column has arrived with transportation, and I have drawn the enemy from this vicinity. I desire, however, to submit the following suggestions: From the best information I can obtain, I learn that there were at this place and at Angat about 1000 men. They were reported to have plenty of ammunition and expended it freely at long range, mostly Remington, but very little food. Gen. “Punta” Pantelon Garcia, command- ing a few local troops, but mostly troops driven from Malabon about March 25th or 26th. The action of the enemy indicates that they are disintegrating, as small detachments have been wandering in different directions over the country and there seems to be little organization. They have been well cut off from the east and south and the mountains in the up-river country, and the main force have been pushed north and west. I feel sure we are on their extreme left and can double them up. Our problem is transportation. Buffalo carts are out of the question for even ordinaiA’ marching except over smooth, hard roads, for rapid moving over rolling coun- try they are impracticable. The conditions of marching are such that the soldier is taxed to his utmost capacity of endurance to carr}' his rifle, ammunition and blanket roll, without being yoked to a cart to haul the supplies as we have been obliged to do, and are doing at this moment. A number of our bulls have died, I cannot ascertain how many, but ten or more, and the men pull along the carts. These bulls have died from exhaustion and not from disease. The four- mule teams have done verj- well, with help over bad places and on the hills, but the two-horse and mule teams could not pull more than the empty wagons. I have therefore no spare trans- portation even after the reduction of weight after the consumption of rations; we have, however, traveled over a rough country with no road. I hope when I get my transportation in to replace dead bulls with others found in the country, to re-adjust and arrange it so that it can continue Campaigning hi the Philippines. 213 over good roads and make short marches each day. The fifty pack mules will give us very little material assistance, as they will not carry one day’s rations for the whole command, and I must still rely on the bull teams. I can, however, give the pack train to the squadron of cavalry, including the mounted troops, and it will carry ten days’ rations for the whole squad- ron, and I can use them for flank or rapid movements as they will be strong enough to main- tain themselves anywhere. IVIy suggestion then is to let me move west down the river by both banks to or near Baliuag, where I should be met by a supply train with ten days’ rations. Then let me move north along the road through San Ildefonso to San Miguel, and let Mac Arthur move over the road to the west of the swamp along the river. I can keep my cavalry squadron on my right flank, and in communicating distance, and thus the whole country between the mountains on the east and the Rio Grande on the west will be covered. I believe the movement would disintegrate the insurgent army in that section, and I gather from information received that the roads suggested are very good. The signal officer has reported it impossible to maintain the telegraph line, it having been cut many times between San Jose and Novaliches. He has sent out twice or oftener each day to repair it, but it is as often cut, and the last time a long section was removed, and he did not have wire enough along to repair it. I suggest that it be taken up from Manila and toward Novaliches, and I will send out and take up from this end as far as possible, and then that a line be laid out to me with supply train, if it be sent. I do not believe I will be much in advance of MacArthur, if my suggestion is approved; at any rate I feel that I have force enough for any emergency. A reply by return of this escort will reach me before I can be ready to move. Very respectfully, H. \V. LAWTON, Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding. LAWTON’S COMMUNICATIONS DISTURBED. As there was no other means of communication Gen. I^awton was obliged to send this by courier. No one had been over the route from Norzagaray to Bocaue since Col. Summers’ advance, and therefore the security of this route to small parties was problematical. Maj. Charles G. Starr, Inspector- General, U. S. V., was selected for this duty, which he unhesitatingly performed, accompanied only by his personal orderly. With the exception of Troop I, 4th Cav., all the troops left Norzagaray for Angat on the morning of the 27th, Col. Summers’ command continuing two miles further down the river to and occupying the town of Marunco. Much trouble was experienced with the telegraph line, it having been cut many times between San Jose and Novaliches. Information was received from Corps Headquarters, that the line would be taken up from Manila to Novaliches, and the remainder would be abandoned unless the command could recover it from the north. This was afterwards done by Capt. F. A. Perkins, U. S. V., Signal Corps, escorted by Troop I, 4th Cav. From an insurgent officer captured by Maj. Eastwick’s Battalion, of the 2d Oregons, on the 26th, it was learned that the San Jose and Novaliches insurgents did not obey orders from Aguinaldo, but acted separately; and that the insurgent forces were falling back to San Miguel where Aguinaldo was supposed to be. It was also learned from the same source, that if the soldiers of the insurgent army knew of the treatment they would receive from the Americans, many would desert and come into our lines, and that the officers, particularly, feared maltreatment by Americans. 214 Campaigning in the PhilippUies. At 9 A. M. , the commanding officers of regiments, battalions and separate organi- zations were called together at headquarters, and were advised regarding treat- ment of the property and persons of non-combatants, the purpose of the expedition, and what was contemplated for the future. Two companies of the 22d Inf. were sent back to Norzagaray to re-inforce Troop I, 4th Cav., the insurgents having attempted to re-occupy the town. Information was received from headquarters, that the fifty pack mules loaded with ammunition, and the additional four-mule teams, hauling rations, would leave Bocaue the morning of the 29th, and request was made that they be sent via Angat to join the command. Instructions were received on the 29th, after the first battle of San Rafael, to remain at Angat until supplies arrived. GALLANT BEHAVIOR OF WILLIAM H. YOUNG. At daybreak, on the 29th, the 1st North Dakotas, 3d U. S. Inf. and Scott’s platoon, moved down the south bank of the river toward San Rafael. At the same time Col. Summers’ command, to which was added Hawthorne’s Separate Moun- tain Battery, moved down the north bank of the river in the same direction. About noon Col. Treumann’s command developed a force of the enemy, afterwards estimated at 400, which they drove on down the river. Here an incident took WORK OF IXSFRGENTS AT SAN FERNANDO. Photo 'ay Darce.xj. place which Gen. Lawton says he shall not soon forget, in that it made him acquainted with that splendid and gallant man and scout, William H. Young. He, in citizen’s clothing, was noticed walking well in front of the right flankers of the advance point. Gen. Lawton ordered him in, intending to reprimand and send him to the rear. Something in the man’s bearing and appearance made the General change his mind, and he directed him to go to the front and bring in a citizen that the General might get definite information about the location of San Rafael. He cheerfully complied, and in less than five minutes Gen. Lawton heard three shots and Young appeared as cool and collected as ever, bearing a rifle and haversack with eighty-six rounds of ammunition, dripping with blood. He had run into an insurgent outpost of eight men, and had alone killed one and driven the others off. His action prevented a surprise to our advance guard which was soon under a rapid and hot fire. THE COMMAND OCCUPIES SAN RAFAEL. Col. Summers’ command occupied San Rafael without opposition. Our casual- ties: 2d Lieut. C. C. Todd, 3d Inf., slight gun-shot wound, right thigh, and two enlisted men, 3d Inf., and one enlisted man, 1st North Dakotas, wounded, the latter severely. One insurgent is known to have been killed. Scott’s platoon of Campaigning in the Philippines. 215 artillery participated in the engagement with some effect. Telegraphic instructions were received from Corps Headquarters that peaceful conditions would obtain while representatives of insurgent government, who had come in through Gen. Mac Arthur’s lines, remained. April 30th, two companies of the 22d Inf. were sent with wagons from Angat to meet supply train coming from Bocaue and relieve its escort, a battalion of the 51st Iowa Volunteer Inf, and allow part of the wagons to return. In- structions were received from Corps Headquarters that upon moving, the objective would be Baliuag, where a strong force (3000) of insurgents was reported to be. Information was received from the same source that the armistice requested by the enemy had not been granted. Much difficulty was experienced by the Quartermaster Department in bringing supplies from Bocaue. The mules were very soft, and the teamsters and packers, almost without exception, were inexperienced. YOUNG’S SCOUTS ORGANIZED. Mr. W. H. Young, previously mentioned, was employed as guide and scout, and placed in charge of twenty-five selected men who were detailed by name from the 4th Cav., 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf, and the 1st North Dakotas. SAN RAFAEL CAPTURED AGAIN. The rations arriving at Angat in good season, May 1st, issue was made as speedily as possible, and the Oregons, Minnesotas, 3d Inf, Scott’s platoon, under command of Col. Summers, moved down the right bank of the river toward San Rafael. Gale’s squadron, 4th Cav., was ordered to be reported to Col. Summers for duty with his column. The remainder of the expeditionary forces, under com- mand of Col. Treumann, moved down the left bank of the river as a co-operative force. Gen. Tawton accompanied Col. Summers’ column, and Maj. Charles G. Starr of the staff, the force on the south bank. The enemy was developed on the north bank by the scouts about one and one- half miles above San Rafael. Private Harrington, scout, accompanied by one other, was well in advance of the left of our skirmish line. They steadily ad- vanced, taking advantage of every shelter, entered the village, constantly firing, and steadily pushed back and drove a large force from the village and rang the bell in the belfry before our troops entered. The enemy were driven through the town under the fire of the Oregons and Minnesotas, and made a stand across the river from the town. Scott’s Battery was brought into action, and the force on the south bank of the river co-operating, the enemy dispersed. The strength of the enemy estimated at about 1000. Our casualties, one enlisted man, 13th Min- nesota, killed; one man. Battery D, 6th Art., and three men, 2d Oregon, wounded. SUPPLIES FOR GEN. LAWTON’S TROOPS. 216 Canipaignhig in the Philippines. The town of San Rafael thus occupied by our forces was found deserted by the inhabitants. But little rice was found in the grainaries of the town. The troops on the north bank of the river remained in the town during the night, those on the south bank bivouacked opposite the town. Telegraphic communication was now via Bocaue, from which point a line had been constructed with the advance of the supply train. Information was received that a line was now in progress of construction via Quingua, to meet the expedition at some favorable time and place in the future. THE COEUMN REACHES BAEIUAG. At daybreak, the 2d of May, the commands on both sides of the river left their bivouacs of the night and continued the advance down the river toward Baliuag on the north bank, and Bustos on the opposite bank. About one mile from the latter town. Col. Treumann’s command encountered the enemy, and forced them back and through the town which our forces occupied at 11:30 a. m. A half hour later. Col. Treumann’s scouts crossed the river to Baliuag and rang the cathedral bells to announce their arrival. Col. Summers’ column developed a force of the enemy about two miles out from San Rafael and easily forced them back for about two miles, when we came in view of the troops and citizens fleeing in great con- fusion along the road to the north (toward San Miguel). Owing to the great number of women and children and what appeared to be wounded, being carried on litters, our fire ceased, and a flag of truce was sent out, hoping we might assure them of their safety. Capt. J. F. Case, 2d Oregons, Acting Engineer Officer of the expedi- tion, with Private Schnutenhaus, 1st Idaho Volunteer Inf., as orderly, conducted the flag toward these people until at a point wdthin about 500 yards of them, fire was opened on the flag detachment, and it returned to our lines without casualty. Col. Summers’ troops were then deployed in the hope of surrounding the fugitives by advancing our right flank, but they scattered in dire confusion. Capt. Gale, in charge of his three dismounted troops and the mounted Troop I, 4th Cav., was sent up the San Miguel Road in the hope that a hurried march would allow him to get far enough north to turn to the left and cut off the fleeing force that was making for the marsh. When about three miles out, this command run into what was believed to be the rear guard of the enemy, belonging to, or bound for San Miguel. A sharp engage- ment followed, in which the enemy were driven rapidly north. It was midday INSURGENT TRENCHES NEAR PASAI. Cauipaignbig in the Philippines. 217 1 and excessively hot, and this pursuit was at the end of a day’s march. The resultant strain on the men of this seasoned organization, as well as on others of the command, may be imagined, when the facts are considered, that in less than twenty minutes thirty-five men fell out from the two dismounted troops with heat prostration, eight of them were in a comatose con- dition. For this reason the pursuit was discontinued. The loss suf- fered by the enemy was undoubted- ly severe, as seen by our troops, and corroborated by a Spaniard, found at Baliuag. Large numbers of dead and wounded insurgents were carried toward San Miguel on wheeled vehicles and on litters Several commissioned officers were fishing for alligators in the pasig river. included in the casualties of the enemy. It is known that six insurgents were killed, and fourteen wounded. It was learned that Gen. Gregorio del Pilar had had his headquarters at Baliuag with a force of 800 men, but on our advance had fallen back to San Miguel. Our casualties in the occupation of Baliuag were two enlisted men wounded. NATIVES FED FROM THE CAPTURED STORES. The citizens of Bustos and Baliuag, like those of the other towns along our advance, had fled from their homes, but within a short time after our occupation of Baliuag many of the poorer class had returned to that town, and by dark, on the first night our troops were there, the native population had increased from a scant half dozen at noon, when we entered the town, to several hundred — so great was their confidence in our humanity as reported to them by the natives, through whose territory we had hitherto passed. They immediately commenced to beg for food, of which they claimed to have none, having been robbed by the insurgents. Under the supervision of Capt. G. H. Gale, 4th U. S. Cav., Provost Marshal, the granary of the tax collector of the place, Capt. Esteban, of the insurgent army, was opened, and its 30,000 bushels distributed, each native, man or woman, who asked, receiving as much pilai, or unhulled rice, as he or she could carry. To prevent conveyance of stores to the enemy, strict orders were enforced, prohibiting the departure of any one from the town, to the north only, except on presentation of a pass from headquarters or other competent authority. All who wished were permitted to enter the town, and in many instances the male members of families having come in and investigated the conditions, they were allowed to return outside our lines for the purpose of bringing in their women and children. VARIOUS MINOR OPERATIONS. On the 3d, Col. Treumann’s command forded the river from Bustos, and joined the remainder of the expedition at Baliuag. A suitable guard was left at Bustos. About three o’clock on the afternoon of the 3d of May, a scouting party was fired 218 Campaigning in the Philippines. on b\' the insurgents, some three miles northeast of Baliuag on the San Miguel Road. Troop I, 4th Cav., was promptly sent out to assist the scouts. The enem}’, in strength about two hundred, was dispersed without casualty to us. The pursuit was kept up until darkness came on. Upon information from the Department Headquarters to the effect that the insurgents were constructing store-houses in the Maasim River country, scouts were sent out with instructions to destroy all stores and property belonging to insur- gents, but to respect the persons and property of non-combatants. Telegraphic communication was established via Malolos and Quingua, and proved much more reliable than the Bustos- Angat-Bocaue line, which was a source of much annoyance and hard work for the signal detachment, being frequently cut. On the 4th, one company of the 22d Inf. was sent to Quingua in accord- ance with instructions from Corps Headquarters, for the purpose of preserving telegraphic communication, and to assist in guarding railway lines in the vicinity of Malolos. MAASIM OCCUPIED. Col. Summers with the Oregons, Minnesotas, 3d U. S. Inf., and the section of Utah Volunteer Light Artillery was ordered out, and left Baliuag about 6 A. m.. May 4th, and advanced toward Maasim, a village on the Baliuag-San Miguel Road. Instructions were given that scouting parties be sent out from Maasim to make care- ful search of the country thereabouts to discover the insurgent stores reported to have been taken there, and to destroy the same, great care being taken to respect private property. Shortly before noon Col. Summers encountered the enemy and an engagement ensued, lasting about an hour, when the insurgents were forced to evacuate Maasim and retreat toward San Miguel. The enemy occupied trenches, and their strength was estimated at about four hundred. Our casualties were Capt. P. S. Heath, 2d Oregons, and two enlisted men, 13th Minnesotas, slightly wounded. Four dead insurgents were found on the field. This advance was beautifully made in the shape of a “V,” enveloping the enemy’s position. Col. Summers in his report of the occupation of Maasim stated that two store- houses, containing about four tons of rice, had been found. He found the road in some places impassable without repairs, and that another heavy rain would render it altogether impassable for wagons. LARGE AMOUNTS OF STORES CAPTURED The search for insurgent supplies from Baliuag had resulted in the finding of thirty-seven store-houses containing, on conservative estimate, 100,000 bushels of rice and 160 tons of sugar. Many other store-houses had not been examined when Lawton’s report was made to Corps Headquarters. The buildings were of stone, with iron roofs, rendering it almost impossible to burn their contents — and from their location, to have burned these store-houses would have resulted in the destruction of much of the town. Instructions were requested as to the disposi- tion of stores. Chief Scout Young was instructed to proceed, on the afternoon of the 4th, with the entire detachment of scouts, in a northeasterly direction, covering the country between the San Rafael Road and the Maasim River, for the purpose of Campaigning in the Philippines. 219 locating and destroying all magazines, store-houses and caches of insurgent sub- sistence, or other supplies. He was instructed to keep a careful record of stores destroyed; that his party would not carry rations, but would subsist on the country traversed by them ; that the expedition should continue; that reports of progress be sent in at every opportunity practicable, and that his movements should be concealed from the enemy as much as possible, with whom no avoidable contact should be had, though he might, when returning, secure as many guns as possible from the insurgents. The usual instructions as to private persons and property were given. Troop I, 4th Cav., was sent up the river toward the foothills of the mountains, to search out supplies of the enemy. The wagon train left Baliuag on the 4th, with ninety-two sick and wounded for Malolos, the sick and wounded to proceed thence by rail to Manila, and the wagons to bring the supplies back to Baliuag. GROUP OF WOUNDED MEN AT FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL. On May 6th, Col. Summers reported the destruction of 2000 bushels of rice, and that a reconnoissance toward San Miguel had developed the enemy entrenched near San Ildefonso in force, about 1500, and extending for about one mile. No shots were exchanged. It was reported to Corps Headquarters that the examina- tion of store-houses had been completed, and that they contained at least 150,000 bushels of rice and 265 tons of sugar, in which estimate were not included small, or apparently private stores. These amounts did not include the stores found in Bustos, of which there was a large quantity, including maize. As the river from Baliuag is navigable for bancas, it was suggested the stores be shipped to market and sold at auction. To this suggestion, reply was received that until the naviga- tion of the river had been tested, it was not apparent how the stores could be moved in that way. It was later directed that the stores be confiscated, and pend- ing final determination of the matter that they be distributed to families residing in the vicinity who desired them. Col. Summers reported that scouting parties returning on the 5th, had destro^^ed 17,045 bushels and 644 sacks of rice and 220 Cainpaigning in the Philippines. 100 rounds of Remington ammunition. On the 6th, Capt. Perkins and a detachment of the Signal Corps, escorted by a company of infantry, commenced recovering the Bustos-Angat-Bocaue telegraph line. A MYTHICAL INSURGENT ARMY. At this time information was received from Corps Headquarters, that Gens. Geronimo with 3000 troops at San Mateo, and Pio del Pilar with 2000 at Antipolo, were reported as having received instructions from Aguinaldo, to proceed with their united forces by a mountain road to Norzagaray and Angat, for the purpose of co- operating against this expedition, and cutting off our communication with the base of supply, evidently thinking our route of supply was via Angat. The reported line of advance of this large force was Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael and Bustos. Caution was ordered to watch with scouting parties the country to the east- ward. To these instructions, reply was made, that the mounted troop of cavalry would be on the hills southeast of Norzagara}^, on the San Jose Road, from which they can view the country for miles around, and that a company of infantry was at Angat, and that three would be sent to San Rafael to watch for the enemy. Col. Summers at Maasim, and the command at Quingua, were similarly instructed. Request was made for authority to advance Col. FILIPINO TRENCHES NEAR RAGBAG. Summors, driving out the enemy from San Ildefonso, and to threaten San Miguel. Reply was received from the Corps Com- mander, that it was “not prudent to advance Summers north until the reported movement of insurgents from the south developed,” and that his command should be held in readiness to unite with the troops at Baliuag in crushing force on this large body of insurgents, should they appear. From Col. Summers, it was learned that the enemy, who still continued on his front, were reported by a captured spy to be about 2000 strong, and that at San Miguel, they had two large pieces of ordnance. Col. Summers also reported that the parties from his command had just destroyed 3500 bushels and 644 sacks of rice, 15 bells of sugar, and as many gallons of syrup, within a radius of two and one-half miles from Maasim. Reports were received of the destruction of quantities of military stores by Young’s scouts in the country northeast of Maasim. These scouts also reported the killing of an insurgent officer and the capture of his mount, an excellent one. A CIYIL GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED AT BALIUAG. On May 6th, large numbers of the inhabitants having returned to their homes in Baliuag, a meeting, by permission of the Division Commander, was held in the public square or plaza, for the purpose of electing a Mayor or Capitan Municipal, Campaigning in the Philippines. 221 who might administer the civil affairs of the town, and represent its civil population in its official business with the military forces occupying it. Sehor Francisco Guerrero was the unanimous choice of the people, and on the following day was announced in Spanish, English and Tagalog, as Mayor of Baliuag, and given authority to select and appoint such assistants as might be necessary, no responsibility for salaries or compensation of these civil officers to devolve on the United States government. A party of twenty-five insurgents was reported to have been seen in the vicinity of Norzagaray, and supposed to belong to a force of some two or three companies scattered through the mountains to the northeast of that place, and that they were foraging for food. Young’s scouts were ordered to search for the enemy through the foothills east of Norzagaray, and southward toward San Jose, co-operating with the mounted troop. From an insurgent officer, captured by the mounted troop, it was learned that four or five miles to the northeast, in the mountains, there were four or five companies of insurgents, and from captives it was learned that two days’ march to the northeast there were insurgents in large numbers, but nothing could be learned of the large force under Gens. Geronimo and Pilar. Maj. Fraine, commanding North Dakota Battalion, along the river, in the vicinity of San Rafael, reported that, with the excep- tion of a force of 150 some four miles away, traveling northward, his scouts had not been able to discover any body of insurgents. He also reported that from natives it was learned that the hospital and cartridge factory had been moved by the insurgents from San Miguel to San Isidro. He also stated that he had about 20,000 bushels of rice under guard in warehouses. Capt. Case, Acting Engineer Officer, was sent to Maasim, and reconnoitered the lines of the enemy for the purpose of sketching their fortifications, which he did on the 8th inst., under the fire of the enemy, accompanied by a portion of Col. Summers’ command. Our casualties were Maj. A. W. Higgles, com- manding 13th Minnesotas, seriously wounded in the head, and one enlisted man, 2d Oregons, slightly wounded. Shortly after noon, on the 9th, the Corps Commander authorized the with- drawal of the scouting parties which had been searching in vain for the San Mateo Much difficulty was experienced by the Quartermaster Department in bringing up supplies from Malolos. The acting engineer officer devoted considerable time and effort toward making a satisfactory ferry or ford, over the river at Quingua. While the command remained at Baliuag, practically the whole time was occupied INTERIOR VIEW OF LA LOMA CHURCH. and Antipolo insurgent column. 222 Cainpaignhig in the Philippines. by the transportation in bringing up rations, ammunition and quartermaster’s sup- plies. The roads were in a passable condition, and the river at Quingua falling slowl}^ but a heavy rain would render the roads, through a low, swampy country, too muddy for wagons, and the river too deep to be forded, and too swift for safe ferriage. EXTENSIVE RECONNOISSANCE MADE. Being still dissatisfied with the results of the reconnoissances made at San Ilde- fonso, and anticipating that any day might bring favorable answers to Gen. Lawton’s repeated request to make an advance on San Miguel, on the 11th of May, Young’s scouts were ordered to report to Col. Summers. Capts. Birkhimer and Case were sent to Maasim to thoroughly reconnoiter the enemy in Summers’ front. Capt. Birkhimer was especially directed to look up good artillery positions. These officers were advised to confer with Col. Summers and request of him such aid, including the use of the scouts, as was proper. The enemy’s right and left were to be investigated, but especially the roads to the enemy’s left and rear, (San Miguel way) with a view to a turning movement and subsequent advance on San Miguel. A CONCERTED MOVEMENT PEANNED. Information was received from Corps Headquarters that the command should be prepared for a forward move on the 14th inst., and be rationed to include the 25th; that a battalion of the 17th would be sent Saturday to join the command; that Gen. MacArthur and the gunboats on the Rio Grande would be ready to advance on Monday; that the movement would be by San Ildefonso and San Miguel; and that Gen. MacArthur could join Gen. Lawton at the latter place if found necessary. Information was also received that one gun of Battery D, 6th Art., would be sent by Gen. MacArthur, with two companies of the 3d Inf., from Calumpit to join at Baliuag; and that three guns of Light Battery B, 3d Art., would be sent to join the command. Word was received from Capt. Birkhimer that he and Capt. Case, with Young’s scouts, and eighty-four men, under Maj. Eastwick, of the Oregons, had flanked and routed the enemy about noon from their trenches in front of San Ildefonso and pursued them until they had fallen back to a point some three miles from San Ildefonso toward San Miguel ; and also that 2d Lieut. Perfort Reyes, of the insurgent army, with an orderly, had come into our lines under a flag of truce, with request from Gen. Gregorio del Pilar for safe conduct to Manila for the pur- pose of arranging with the military authorities there for a conference of the representatives of the so-called Filipino government v/ith the United States Peace Commissioners. The mission of the insurgent officer and our occupation of San Ildefonso was immediately reported to Corps Headquarters with the remark that Capts. Birkhimer and Case were sent to make reconnoissance, and it was not intended to make any advance. Our casualties were, one scout wounded in knee. Insurgent loss, four killed and six or more wounded, including one officer. Instructions were received to have Col. Summers occupy San Ildefonso, leav- ing the 3d Inf. at Maasim; and to send in the insurgent officer to Corps Head- quarters. Lieut. Reyes 'vas promptly brought in, and was accompanied from Catnpaigning in the Philippines. 223 Baliuag by Capt. Sewell, Aide-de-camp, going to Malolos by honseback, and from there by rail to Manila, and reporting to the Corps Commander, who, after receiv- ing him, gave Capt. Sewell written instructions for the Division Commander to make the necessary arrangements for Gen. Pilar’s visit to Manila, Capt. Sewell and the representative of Gen. Pilar immediately returned by the same route they pursued in going in. Lieut. E. L. King, 8th U. S. Cav., Aide-de-camp, escorted the Filipinos through our lines. REMARKABLE GALLANTRY OF YOUNG’vS SCOUTS. When Capts. Birkhimer and Case arrived at San Ildefonso they requested, and were granted, two companies as a reconnoitering force. They first went to the right of the line, and there found Young’s scouts, who had preceded them, heavily engaged, or rather by their tactics, drawing a heavy and continued fire from the insurgents, and only returning a shot when a good target presented itself. CONVALESCENTS AT THE FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL. The enemy’s line was thus well developed and was conservatively estimated at about 500 men, who wasted about 7000 rounds of ammunition. The scouts were then sent to the left of the enemy’s line with directions to the commanding officer of the supporting battalion to make quite a detour, and keep themselves entirely concealed. The scouts finally took position on a knoll that commanded the enemy’s left. A heavy fire was at once opened on them. Range flags, as well as the fact that all bullets struck dangerously close, showed that ranges had been carefully measured. The enemy could easily see and count on this hill our forces, which consisted of the scouts and Capts. Birkhimer and Case, in all less than twenty men. Their courage accordingly increased, in spite of the deadly aim of the scouts, and it appeared that the latter would soon be surrounded. Messengers were sent to tell Maj. Eastwick, but Anally Capt. Case was successful in finding him, and the battalion hurried gallantly to the rescue. As soon as the insurgents saw this supporting force, although only eighty-four men, they faltered and fell back, ■t- 224 Ca}>ipaig7iing hi the Philippines. closely pressed, and finally fled and evacuated the town. This heroic act of the men on that knoll was to be duplicated, if not excelled, on the following day. A list of the scouts selected by Chief Young and detailed by special field orders fol- lows, as their achievements up to this time had already made the list an honor roll: Fourth U. S. Cav. — Privates EH E. Watkins, Troop C; S. Harris, Troop G; Peter Quinn, Troop E. First North Dakota Volunteer Inf. — Corp. W. F. Thomas, Compan}’ K; Privates A. Jensen, Company D; D. Powell, Company H; J. H. Illion, Company H; J. C. Smith, Company K; P. Hussey, Company K; Christiansen, Company G; Charles Davis, Company G; F. Andres, Company B; C. M. Euthur, Company B; McBain, Company B; Sletteland, Company C; M. Glasley, Company A; C. Wilson, Company A; J. R. Desmond, Company I; Otto Boehler, Company I. Second Oregon Volunteer Inf. — Privates Jas. Harrington, Company G; F. High, Company G; W. Scott, Company K; J. B. Oneal, Company E; E. C. Eyon, Com- pany B; M. Robertson, Company B. Eieut. Reyes, the insurgent officer who entered the lines, reported that their losses that day were twent 3 -five killed, including his Captain and 1st Eieutenant, and about forty wounded, and also that the charge was blown three times without results against that small body of men on the knoll. Telegraphic information was received on the 12th, from Corps Headquarters, that it was contemplated sending the entire 17th Inf., and one battalion of the 9th Inf., also part of Andrews’ Eight Battery, with three mountain guns, as an independent column, on Candaba, with the gunboats. It was stated that junction with this column could be made by this command at San Miguel, or on the river south of San Isidro. Suggestion was made that a detachment be left at Baliuag, as the town is an important produce mart, seven roads centering there, and the large quantities of rice and sugar enough for six months’ supply for the insurgent army, left by the insurgents, showing in part, the amount brought to that place for shipment to market. Its strategic value is also great. Early in the afternoon of Ma}^ 13th, Capt. Case telegraphed from San' Ilde- fonse that San Miguel was being held by our forces. Shortly afterwards informa- tion was received from Capt. Birkhimer, stating that the scouts, supported by Company A, 2d Oregons, commanded by Eieut. Kelly, and Company H, 13th Minnesotas, Capt. Bjornstad, commanding, both under Capt. Heath, 2d Oregons, Capts. Birk- himer and Case accom- paning, routed the enemy, and occupied the town of San Miguel at 12:30 p. m.. May 13th, with a loss of one enlisted man, 13th Minnesota, seriously wounded. Insurgent loss, three killed and several wounded, including two officers. Our force was 118 strong; the insurgents under Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, were reported Campaigning in the Philippines. 225 to have numbered 600. Again was demonstrated the value of these scouts. In the quest of information for the objective attack on this reported stronghold of San Miguel de Mayumo, Capt. Birkhimer urged forward the scouts, only eighteen of them beitig able to turn out that morning. After a stead}^ advance before anything definite had been developed or known, the outskirts of the town were reached. CHIEF SCOUT YOUNG MORTAULY WOUNDED. All of a sudden a heavy skirmish line appeared. It consisted of what was then estimated at 300 in view, behind rice dykes; the right upon the river con- cealed in the bamboos, and left on a hill with ravine in front, both flanks unturn- able. The enemy were not more than 150 to 175 yards distant, — with Chief Young opposite the center. There hap- pened to be only 11 other scouts present, their names follow: First North Dakota Volunteer Inf. — Privates P. Hussey, Company K;J. Mc- Intyre, Company B; J. R. Desmond, Company I; G. Jensen, Company D; F. Summerfield, Company K. Fourth U. S. Cav. — Privates P. Quinn, Troop L; S. Plarris, Troop G; Eli E. Watkins, Troop C. Second Oregon Volunteer Inf.— Private J as. Harrington, Company G. (Privates McIntyre and Summer- field voluntarily joined the scouts after detail was made.) Taking the situation at a glance, with the favorable endorsement of Capt. Birkhimer, who was with this party throughout. Chief Young, with scout Harrington at his side, gallantly and desperately charged the center of this line, unhesitatingly followed by the above loyal ten. The line faltered, and finally broke and fled to the other side of the river. It was on this side of the river, on this side of the bridge, that this gallant leader received a severe wound through his knee, that subsequently proved fatal. These ten scouts were recommended by Gen. Eawton, for a medal of honor. Four companies of the 3d Inf., were moved forward to San Miguel, where they arrived about 8:30 p. m. without incident, and the telegraphic communication was established with that place about the same time. THE COMMAND OCCUPIES SAN MIGUEL. Col. Summers had during the afternoon occupied San Miguel with his com- mand, except two companies left at Maasim, and two at San Ildefonso. In com- pliance with telegraphic authority, thirty dollars reward was offered for each insurgent rifle turned in. This information was published in Spanish and Tagalog, and every effort made to get it within the insurgent lines. On account of desired 15b 226 Campaigning in the Philippines. concert of movement, with the column moving toward Candaba, the movement of Lawton’s headquarters from Baliuag toward San Miguel was postponed by the Corps Commander. The piece of artillery (Battery D, 6th Art.), and Companies E and I, 3d Inf., reported at Baliuag about four o’clock on the afternoon of the 14th. Orders were then received for the movement of all the command, except a battalion of 22d Inf. from Baliuag to San Miguel. This was made next day. It commenced early in the morning and headquarters arrived at San Miguel about 10 A. M., without incident. About three o’clock in the afternoon Col. Summers with the 2d Oregons and 13th Minnesotas, accom- panied by a section of artillery, were advanced from San Miguel and proceeded north toward San Isidro, to the village of Bulac (or on most maps, San Jose), a distance of about three miles. About two and one half miles out, the scouts were fired on, and the command deployed, driving the enemy who were strongly entrenched on the north bank of a stream, about one and one-half miles north of Bulac, toward San Isidro. Our casualties — one enlisted man, 13th Minnesotas, very slight wound, not disabling for continuance on duty with regiment. The insurgent loss — sixteen killed, including at least one officer, and five wounded, left on the field. Twenty-one or more guns and equipments were captured from the enemy. On the morning of May l6th, Capt. Gale, commanding 4th Cav. , moved out with his dismounted squadron, two battalions 3d Inf., Troop I, 4th Cav., and Hawthorne’s Mountain Battery, toward Sibul, for the purpose of reconnoitering that town, and the insurgent stronghold known as Split Rock, and to destroy the supplies supposed to be at the first-named place. Sibul was reached by the middle of the forenoon and found deserted by the insurgent troops, although a few of the residents of the town remained. Much difficulty was experienced by the wagons and artillery as the road passed through muddy sloughs. An attempt was made to find the trail into the mountains, but owing to unreliable information of natives, nothing was accomplished and the reconnoissance was concluded by the return of the command to San Miguel, in the evening. San Miguel was the most important town occupied thus far by the expedition, with the exception of Baliuag. There were many handsome residences and other evidences of the wealth of the people who had, with the exception of a very few of the wealth}" class, and a few hundred of the poorer classes, deserted their homes, and gone to the mountains. Many came in as soon as the troops arrived, and the insurgents had fallen back toward San Isidro, and hundreds were returning daily Campaigning in the Philippines. 227 as long as we remained there. As is the case with all these towns of considerable size, no reliable information is at hand concerning their population. The inhabi- tants cannot even guess, and it is not easy to form a satisfactory estimate, owing to the crowding of houses and huts customary among the lower classes of the natives and Chinese. Of the latter a large number appear to have lived in each of these larger provincial towns, and to have constituted the commercial class, conducting a multitude of small shops. These Chinese merchants have been scattered by the unsettled conditions in the provinces, some remaining, paying heavy war taxes to the insurgent officials, for which they are supposed to receive protection from the Filipino soldiers who are said to have ruthlessly slaughtered many. LIEUT. THORNTON SUCCEEDS CHIEF SCOUT YOUNG. About the time that Capt. Gale’s column moved out on its reconnoissance toward Sibul, Col. Summers and his column advanced toward, and occupied San Roque, where they arrived about nine o’clock. The scouts under 2d Rieut. J. E. Thornton, 2d Oregons, (successor to Chief Scout Young) were sent forward in search of water. About two and one-half miles out they were fired on by the enemy, whom they engaged and forced back across a river about forty feet wide, and too deep to be forded, necessitating the use of a large wooden bridge by any one desirous of crossing to the north bank. The insur- gents retreated across the bridge, which they set on fire, and entered their trenches which commanded the approach to the bridge by a frontal and enfilading fire. The scouts charged across the bridge, followed by a battalion of the Oregons, and engaged the enemy in their trenches, completely routing them, with a known loss of six killed and eight prisoners, six of whom were wounded. Fourteen Mausers, and two Remingtons with equipments and ammunition, were captured. Many killed and wounded are known to have been carried away to San Isidro, which is not far from the bridge. SCOUT HARRINGTON KILLED. Our loss was numerically small, but was nevertheless severe, in that Scout James Harrington of the 2d Oregons was killed. As Young’s assistant, he had done many gallant deeds of which official records exist. Prior to the organization of Young’s scouts, Harrington’s reputation as a successful, intelligent scout had ^extended beyond his regiment, his many daring encounters with outposts of the INSURGKNTS FISHED OUT OF THE MARILAO RIVER. 228 Canipaigning in the Philippines. eneni}' being known generall 3 ' throughout the whole command; and after the iDeginning of the operations of the scouts as an organization, he was invariabl}^ placed in charge of aii}^ detachment sent out from Young’s charge. The bridge was saved from destruction by the efforts of the Oregons and the scouts, and, occupying both sides of the river, they set about repairing it, wisely recognizing the delay that would otherwise be caused the main command in advancing. Col. Summers and his troops were again commended in reports, and great regret expressed at the loss of the two most important and valuable members of the detachment of scouts. ? THE COEUMN REACHES SAN ISIDRO. Orders were then issued for an advance on San Isidro, the new objective, to take place early on the morning of the 17th. Col. J. W. French, 22d Inf., command- ing his own regiment and the 1st North Dakotas, was sent forward in the evening of the 16th to join Col. Summers for the contemplated movement of the morrow. About four o’clock. May 17th, Gen. Lawton and .staff left San Miguel for the front, which was found to be just north of the bridge and trenches occupied the day before by the scouts and the 2d Oregons. Telegraphic communication was e.stablished with San Miguel, and Corps Headquarters without dela}^, and the movement on San Isidro commenced. Col. Summers deployed the column; the 22d Inf. on the left, their right resting on the road, the 1st North Dakotas and 1st Battalion, 2d Oregons on right of road; along which Scott’s Battery followed; the scouts preceded the right of the line. Troop I, 4th Cav., operated on the left of the road. The command advanced toward the town, and when within about 1800 yards of it, fire was opened on the scouts and on the right of our line. The advance was continued and the city occupied by our forces. Our casualties, one enlisted man, each, 13th Minnesotas and 2d Oregons slightly wounded. Insurgent loss, fifteen killed, twenty wounded, three prisoners. Seven guns and four horses fell into our hands. Several Spaniards who claimed to have been held prisoners by the insur- gents were found in the city, among them three officers. Many wealthy natives remained with their property and families, and at once applied for, and were accorded protection by our troops. Dr. Albert a former Peace Commissioner .selected by the Filipino Congress, of which he was still a member, reported the presence at his residence of a large number of non-combatants, including the wives and children of insurgent officers, and gave much imformation concerning the doings of the insurgent leaders. THE FILIPINO PEACE COMMISSION. Arrangements were made for the entry of Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, and three other members of the Filipino Peace Commission, who desired to go to Manila for conference with the American Commission, with a view to the termination of hostilities. These per.sons came within our lines. May 18th, and next morning started for Manila, accompanied by Lieut. E. L. King, Aide-de-camp, with orders to com- manders of all forces of this expedition, located on their route, to .secure for the party every accommodation and courtesy possible. It was learned that the CaiHpai^nins; in the Philippines. 229 insurgents had had at this place fourteen prisoners, thirteen Americans, including a lieutenant of our navy, and one Englishman, whom they had moved back into the mountains on our advance. The afternoon of the capture of San Isidro, it was reported that the enemy had fled toward Gapan, a town of considerable importance, about four miles east of San Isidro. The insurgents had a hospital there, which was reported to be filled with wounded Filipinos. It was further alleged that stores and munitions were there located. One battalion of Oregons and one of Minnesotas were sent to Gapan from San Isidro, and their departure so timed as to eflect a junction with another column, under Capt. Hannay, from San Miguel, by way of cross-roads at San Roque, the second column consisting of Gale’s dismounted squadron and a battalion of the 8d Inf. The two columns joined as anticipated, and with the exception of a desultory fire from the other side of the river, no resistance was encountered. The town was deserted. The San Isidro troops were returned next morning and the San Miguel troops were sent to San Miguel the same afternoon. Capt. Hannay, with ten companies of the 3d Inf. and one gun from Haw- thorne’s Mountain Battery, was ordered to remain at San Miguel, and Gale’s squadron, with another gun from Hawthorne’s Battery, were ordered to re-inforce the garrison at Baliuag, which was reported to be in danger of attack by a large force of the enemy. AN ENGAGEMENT NEAR SAN FERNANDO. Col. French with the 22d Inf., 1st North Dakotas and Scott’s Battery (two guns), proceeded down the Rio Grande toward Candaba, on the afternoon of the 18th. When near San Fernando they met the enemy in trenches, or behind embank- ments commanding the road, and an engagement ensued which lasted until ENGINEER CORPS REPAIRING RAILROAD TRACK TORN UP BY INSURGENTS. darkness came on, the enemy being forced back across the river, where they poured in a hot fire from that side of the stream. Scott’s guns were brought up, and threw shrapnel at point-blank range. Many of these shrapnel burst in the piece, the projectiles falling harmlessly into the water. This frequently occurred during the campaign, and experience had rendered the use of shrapnel for the protection of our advancing infantry too dangerous an experiment to hazard. 230 Campaigning in the Philippines. However, the effect of such shrapnel as did reach, was the next day attested by our column on that side of the river finding several rifle-pits filled with new earth. Our loss, suffered from the first fire from the barricade across the road, was five wounded, two of whom afterward died. The enemy left tw^o killed and four wounded. Col. French’s command bivouacked when darkness overtook them, and next morning moved out and occupied Cabiao. THE EXPEDITION REACHES CANDABA AND BREAKS UP. On the morning of the 20th, the entire command left San Isidro, proceeding down the river toward Candaba, with the exception of the signal detachment, which returned toward San Miguel, recovering the telegraph line, kieutenant- Colonel Yoran and the two battalions of the 2d Oregons, crossed over to the west bank of the river, the remainder of the command moving along the road on the east bank, arriving at Cabiao about 10 A. m., at which point Col. French’s com- mand joined the main column, and all proceeded on down to the vicinity of Mount Ara3’at, and went into camp about dark. Just before starting from San Isidro, two or three Mauser volleys were fired from across the river, some of the bullets going through the house occupied as Division Headquarters. The scouts under Lieut. Thornton, 2d Oregons, as planned the night before, shortl}^ afterwards crossed over, and under cover of the morning mist, secured a good position directly in the enemy’s rear, and waited to communicate with the force under Col. Yoran. Col. Yoran’s column after cross- ing the river at San Isidro proceeded up the road toward San Antonio, where, after a junction was effected, they engaged the enemy under Col. Tecson, in force of about five hundred and fiftjq who were driven back in great disorder, leaving five dead on the field, and with an estimated loss of twenty-five. Col. Yoran then proceeded down the west bank of the river and re-crossing, joined the main com- mand at Cabiao. The entire command left its bivouac earl}^ on the morning of May 21st, and proceeding down the river, arrived at the ferry near the town of Arayat shortly after sunrise. Much to our surprise, no resistance was encoun- tered. It was an ideal place for defense, and the crossing was commanded by man}’ deserted rifle trenches. Much difficulty was experienced in preparing the approach to the ferry for the passage of wheeled vehicles, and in improvising a suitable raft for the crossing of stores and ammunition. The river at this point was about four and half feet deep, and, as indicated by its banks, is subject to a considerable rise at some seasons of the year. The advance of the column, a battalion of the 22d Inf., entered the town of Arayat at 7:12 a. m., and found no evidence of the presence of the enemy any- where in the vicinity. Many of the residents of the town were in their houses, and many others came in during the day. As rapidly as possible the command was ferried over to the west bank of the river, and entered the town. Col. French’s command was brought over before dark, and even Col. Summers completed his crossing before the end of the day. The column which had been advancing up the river under command of Maj. J. A. Kobbe 3d Art., joined the expedition at Arayat, and remaining over night Cainpai^nini^ in the Philippines. 231 accompanied the main column down the river toward Candaba where they arrived without incident. The launch and cascos carrying supplies had grounded about two miles below Arayat, and no effort was made to push them further up the river. At Candaba were found the U. S. A. gunboats, Laguna de Bay and Covadonga^ the armored launch Oceania, and cascos carrying supplies. Telegraphic commu- nication was again secured, and instructions were received to send the Oregons, Minnesotas and Andrews’ Battery to the south side of the river at Calumpit. These organizations left en route to Calumpit early in the morning of the follow- ing day. During the day, after the departure of the troops for Calumpit, considerable firing was heard to the eastward in the direction of San Miguel and Baliuag. A battalion of the 22d Inf., commanded by Capt. Ballance and the detachment of scouts were sent in the direction from which the sound of firing came, but were unable to discover anything, the swamp preventing their continuing to the San Miguel-Baliuag Road. Rater it was learned that the troops in San THIRD ARTILLERY TRENCHES NEAR CALOOCAN. Miguel in obedience to orders from Corps Headquarters had, under command of Capt. Hannay, 3d Inf., started to Baliuag to join the garrison at that place, and had met the enemy near San Ildefonso, and were engaged almost continuously all the rest of the way to Baliuag. The insurgents were in strong force and suffered severely. Capt. Hannay was prostrated by heat, result of over- work during the expedition. Insurgent loss estimated at fifty killed and fifty wounded. Capt. Hannay’ s command performed an excellent day’s work, comprising, as it did, fifteen hours marching, covering a distance of fourteen miles, during which time the command fought four different battles. Capt. J. W. Hannay was awarded much credit for the way he handled his regiment, (ten companies) during a series of difficult situations. A battalion of the 22d Inf., came to the support of the 3d just after the last skirmish. The two Captains who had been captured were sent to Manila, and turned over to the Provost Marshal-General. During the evening of the 23d, telegraphic orders were received from the Corps Commander breaking up the expedition, stating that it was contemplated assigning Gen. Lawton to the command of the forces, including, and south of the 282 Ca))ipaigning in the Philippines. Caloocan, Taguig and Pasai line of trenehes, except certain organizations in the city of Manila performing special duties. In accordance with these instructions, one battalion of the 22d Inf., and one Utah gun were left at Candaba and San Luis, with orders to report to Gen. MacArthur. The remainder of the troops composing the expedition with the exception of the four troops of 4th Cav., the 1st North Dakotas, the battalion of the 9th Inf., and Scott’s Battery, which were ordered to return to Manila, were turned over to Major-General MacArthur. On May 24th, Gen. Lawton proceeded by steam launch to Calumpit and thence by rail to Malolos to carry out instructions from the Corps Commander in regard to distribution and rationing of troops, added to Gen. MacArthur’s command, and to supervise the re-arrangement of the 13th Minnesotas, guarding the railway. On May 26th, it was reported that a force of the enemy was being concentrated in the vicinity of Baliuag, and instructions were given to the commanding officer at that point to send out reconnoitering parties in the direction of the enemy to ascertain the facts. One company of the 3d Inf., under 1st Lieut. Moore, of that regiment, developed a force of the enemy in the direction of San Rafael, and being encumbered with two wounded men was forced to continue the engagement until relieved by two more companies, when the enemy were dispersed in short order. Other scou-ting parties failed to discover evidences of the enemy. The troops destined for Manila were shipped in by rail from Calumpit as rapidly as possible, and the wagon train marched in overland. Gen. Lawton returned to Manila on the 27th, with his staff. The wagon train arriving in the city on the 30th, closed the expedition, although it was practically completed at the breaking up on the 23d at Candaba. VIEW OK KORTSON’S KNOI.E. Photo hij Jackson. CHAPTER XII. LAWTON’S PARANAQUE CAMPAIGN. EN. LAWTON’S command, composed of the following-named troops, concentrated at San Pedro Macati on June 9th, for opera- tion against the insurgent forces in the vicinity of Paranaque, Gen. Wheaton now commanding King’s old brigade. Gen. Ovenshine’s Brigade — 13th U. S. Inf., (complete); 14th U. S. Inf., (nine companies); 12th U. S. Inf., (two companies); two guns, 6th Art., (Battery D); two guns, Hawthorne’s Separate Mountain Battery; two guns, Andrew^s’ Battery H, 1st Art. Gen. Wheaton’s Brigade — 9th U. S. Inf., (eight com- panies); 21st U. S. Inf., (eight companies); 1st Colorado Volunteer Inf., (six companies); two guns, 6th Art., (Battery D); two guns, Haw- thorne’s Separate Mountain Battery; two guns, Andrews’ Battery E, 1st Art. On the following morning, June 10th, the command left camp at San Pedro Macati at 5 A. m., and moved in the direction of Paranaque. The line of march was over the ridges of Guadalupe to attack the town in the rear. The intention was to clear out the country lying between Laguna de Bay and Manila Bay. It is a rough grazing country, cut by gulches and overgrown by grass and chaparral. While the men slept with no tents, the rain poured down heavily for an hour. The men only laughed, for in the gentle air of these favored isles, rain, however it may dampen, seldom chills one. Then again, the lust of war was in our blood, and we knew that to-morrow would show us the terrible beauty of skilled and legal murder. Before dawn we passed out of the shadow of the church and in sight of the benediction in the chapel. Out to war and past the blessed Christ who taught us to love one another; along Pasig River; then up past ruined Guadalupe; over the hill, till we came to a high ridge, where the white tents of the 12th Inf. kept watch and ward over the sleepy fields. A long procession of men, miles long, a file of ruthless steel, a wall of iron and will, came over the ridge and went across the face of the ground, towards Paranaque, hidden in the woods, yet revealing the white steeple of a church, and pointing a finger to the skies, and to the infinite Justice throned there. THE CLICK OF THE GUNvS. . A kind of soothing rap-tap-tap, tickety-tick-tick, comes to your ears, and some- body looks two miles off among the ranges and ridges. “They are using black powder,’’ he says. We had heard that the Filipinos were manufacturing their own powder at Lipa, in Batangas province, out of the sulphur from the volcano of Taal. 234 Campaignmg in the Philippines. This tapping is not hard or unpleasant. If this is death, you say, it is an easy death ; some such quiet feeling as a man has who has taken laughing gas. He knows something tragic is going on, but he does not care nor bother about it. At last, as we look over the land we see long files of brown men stalking knee deep in long grass. Some one says, “that looks like the Colorados.” No. The Colorados are away a mile and a half making those rapid tick-tacks which are so soothing. A big vase seemed to burst at our feet. But it was not a vase, it was lyieut. Scott’s first shot from the artillery at the line of insurgent de- fense. He hit close to it and exploded some shells right over them. But sly Pio del Pilar was too old a rat to be caught in a cheese trap like that. You could see his men vamoose over the hill, and no cannon could shoot away a hill. Not yet. Pilar, whether you are a traitor or a patriot, shall Yankee hands be laid on you. We are standing under a tree, which, from its shape, the boys have christened the “T” tree. It is on the topmost ridge and commands the prospect of the field of fight and flight. But we want to hear those tick-tacks a little closer. So we follow a trail down the hillside and into a valley. Tick-tacks over in these wolds. The 14th Inf. must be tacking up proclamations of the peace commis- sioners. What did you say about peace? Did you notice those “rookies,” or new men, duck? Did you hear an angry bee buzz past your ear? Well, then listen, and look out. You may not be an inch from death. THE SIGNAL CORPS AT WORK. As we marched into the rough land, we were surprised to see a man uncoiling a wire. He must be out surveying the land for a farm. No. He is the Signal Corps man. His wire does not measure land, but conveys thoughts. It runs from Lawton’s headquarters to those of Otis. It took a curt message to-day. Otis is fussy, sends word to Lawton about something. He thinks so and so, and like a school girl, wants to talk it over. Lawton can’t be reached. Again and again Otis tries to reach the Indian Exterminator. At last, he gets this out to him: “Where is Lawton?” The grizzly fighter sends back in reply: “At the front firing line with his men, where he ought to be.” The Signal Corps are brave. To-day they got ahead of their body-guard, and were almost bagged by Pilar’s men. Anon, Maj. Penrose of the staff goes over a hill to a grassy field. Here he establishes a temporary hospital. No sooner is this done, than the enemy fires Campaigning in the Philippines. 235 into the hospital. We, who are unarmed get behind the ammunition boxes and “Suave qui peut,” is in order. Forty riflemen come up and fight the trees and fields for two hours and a half. But thick and fast flow events. Here is a wounded man: “Company K, wounded in right forearm, not serious.” A hundred feet behind, the Chinese have a litter. They carry a silent form. A young boy of seventeen years. Ten minutes ago, that was Healy — little Joe Healy of Company M, 13th Regulars. Somebody in America to-day is poorer because of the rich Philippines. Joe was terribly young. He had a surprise look of wonder on his face. What could death have told him that surprised him so ? Ask the Sphinx. Why did the tap-taps come out of the woods and cut his throat like that? Not much had happened to Joe. Only “shot in the neck fatally.” Ah, Joe, what makes you lie so still, gazing intently up? You are not always serious, you were gay and sprightly, Joe. And now the tropic sun is getting up above our heads. The boys are young, and many are for the first time under fire. Under a tent cover in this long, hot grass, are two men overcome by heat. A comrade watches by. This one is pros- trated by the heat, and that one has fever coming on. THE WORK OF THE EXPEDITION. What had happened in military details is this: The Colorado Inf., the 9th and 21st Inf., and one troop of the Nevada Cav., swung around the hilltop of the ridge above Guadalupe church and opened battle at 6:30 A. m. The rebels made no response from the hills and the Colorado men cautiously advanced through the thick grass until they were confronted by a trench. The Colorado Regiment then advanced toward Laguna de Bay. Two com- panies encountered trenches on the top of a knoll, where the Filipinos stood waist high above a trench, pouring a volley upon them. They charged and drove out the enemy, Lieutenant-Colonel Moses being wounded in the arm as he jumped into the trench. On the Paranaque side, mean- time, Scott’s Battery of the 6th Art. , shelled the first line of insur- gent defense with good effect. Then a part of the 13th and 14th Regi- ments formed in skir- mish line, extending a mile to the right, and supported by the rest of the regiments swept the burning of caloocan. Photo hy k. t. f. down the valley and up the hillside toward another trench. The approach through the morass seriously hampered the 14th, and the rebels, taking advantage of this, poured a galling fire upon them for thirty minutes. The 14th was twice compelled to withdraw for the purpose of finding a safe crossing in the swamp. Finally the trench was enfiladed on both flanks. The rebels fled to the woods 286 Ca>>ipai 1 05 Nevada Volunteer Cav 1 1 i . . 1 1 •• 1 1 1 1 1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf. 5 2 2 , 4 I 1 . . i 1 • • •• ! 1 1 ■ 15 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. 12 3 9 3 7 i i 2 ‘ • • i 2 46 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer In f. 6 9 1 2 1 1 ! 1 1 1 .. 1 •• • ■ 1 21 1st South Dakota Volunteer Inf. , 20 5 6 I 4 1 7 i 2 5 1 1 2 55 1st Tennessee Volunteer Inf. . . . . 7 •• •• 1 1 1 2 10 Utah Volunteer Tight Artillery. . ‘3 1 1 1 1 1 .. 1 : 1 0 1st Washington Volunteer Inf.. . i5 9 8 i 3 1 •• i 36 1st Wyoming Volunteer Inf .... 2 1 4 1 i i 1 1 9 Third U. S. Art 18 8 1 ; 2 1 1 i 1 i . . 33 Sixth U. S. Art 1 1 1 !! i 1 .. 5 Fourth U. S. Cav 4 3 ! 1 2 1 i 1 13 Third U. S. Inf 7 1 1 5 2 i 'i i 1 19 Fourth U. vS. Inf 1 2 i 2 1 1 2 8 Ninth U. S. Inf. i 2 3 Twelfth U. S. Inf i 1 .. ^ '6 8 9 Fourteenth U. S. Inf is '4 3 '2 ^ 1 9 38 Seventeenth U. S. Inf 1 i i ' ! 2 Eighteenth U. S. Inf '4 2 6 2 4 3 1 3 4 'i 3 33 Twentieth U. S. Inf 3 1 2 1 7 Twenty-second U. .S. Inf 10 2 •• 12 Twenty-third U. S. Inf. 5 6 2 6 i •• 6 i 5 31 U. S. Flngineer Corps U. S. Hospital Corps '2 ‘‘2 6 2 i ] 3 U. S. Signal Corps 1 1 1 •• 1 2 Total 193 124 F 50 ' 18 85 4 2 1 3 22 23 i ^ 24 6 1 : 8 1 37 721 Total died of disease, 404. Total died of wounds, 124. Total killed in action, 193. The total number of fatalities given is 736 — 23 officers, 699 privates and 14 civilians attached to the army. The mortality of officers from disease was small, but the officers killed in battle were out of all proportion to the number of privates. Of the 23 officers killed. 16 Campaigning in the Philippines. 307 were shot down in battle and the other 7 died of disease. In the case of the men, 294 died of wounds received in action and 9 were killed accidentally. In addition to the above, I officer and 18 enlisted men died on transports returning to San Francisco, and 1 officer and 155 enlisted men had died in the general hospital at San Francisco up to September 30, 1899. The grand total of deaths in the Philippine campaign up to October 1, 1899, is 25 officers, 1 retired officer, 872 enlisted men and 14 civilians, in addition to deaths in the islands between June 2d and October 1st, and a small number who died on hospital ships not reported at Department Headquarters. NOBLE WORK OF THE VOLUNTEER LADY PHYSICIANS. It would be improper to close this sketch of the work of the Medical Department in the Philippines without mention of the effective aid given by several lady physicians, who were early on the ground, by permission of the government, and who placed their services at e disposal of the medical officer. The true physician is devoted to his profession and unsparing of himself in emergencies, and it would be improper to say that these ladies were any more zealous in the service than the medical officers, who exposed themselves on the field when occa- sion demanded, as freely as those bearing arms; but it is true that in the womanly touch there is a deftness and in the womanly nature a tenderness which are wanting in the kindest man; and the gentle ministrations of thesi faithful co-workers in the hospitals, comforted the departing hour of many a dying soldier, and live as a grateful memory in the hearts of hun- dreds of those who survive. THE RED CROSS WORK. In connection with the Medical Department, it is appropriate to make some mention of the “ Red Cross Society.” It is the duty of all governments to care for their wounded and sick soldiers, and they all seek to discharge that duty, but with the progress of civilization there has arisen an earnest and world wide desire to supplement government care with the gifts and services of private devotion. During the Crimean War, in 1854, Miss Florence Nightengale at the head of a body of women nurses sent out by the British government, first demonstrated, on a great scale, the effectiveness of women in organized work of relief, and while the Red Cross Society was not founded by women, they have always born their full share of the work, and, in this country, have usually been the recognized leaders. The immediate occasion of the founding of the Red Cross organization, was the dreadful suffering which followed the Battle of Solferino in 1859, when the army surgeons were utterly unable to deal with the thousands upon thousands of the wounded of the two armies. Henri Dunand, a Swiss gentleman, who was present and aided in this care, was so much impressed with the inadequacy of government efforts, that he began an agitation which resulted, in August, 1894, in an official convention of delegates representing sixteen governments, which formulated articles ” for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded in the armies in the field,” and which, as modified in a later convention, have received the formal adhesion of the governments of nearly all civilized nations. The badge, the red cross on a white ground, is the national colors of Switzerland reversed, and was adopted as a compliment to the nation where both the treaties have been formulated, and’which is the home of the International permanent Committee. This Committee however, is only maintained as a bond of unity between the national committees, which are entirely independent The United States was very slow in giving its adhesion to the movement. In 1864, during our Civil War, the ‘LSanitary Commission” wassuccessfully doing its work, audit was not, at the time, thought best' to commit the government to any other movement. Subsequently, in 1877, a letter from the President of the International Committee sent through Miss Clara Barton, to President Hayes, does not seem even to have elicited a reply. Later, however, in 1881, a copy of the same letter presented by Miss Barton to President Garfield, received prompt attention, and as a result, the American Association of the Red Cross was immediately organized, and the United States, in 1882, agreed to the convention of Geneva, being the thirty-second nation to do so. The American National Society has its auxiliaries in all parts of the United States. Its organization is permanent, and it pursues its work of mercy, not only in war, but at all times when sudden emergencies arise. It seeks to be constantly ready for duty, both as to material I Canipaii^)ii)ii^ in the Philippines. 30. -i and personnel. Its badge has become familiar wherever there is great trouble. Miss Clara Bar- ton, as is well known, has been at the head of the American Society ever since its organization. The American Red Cross had been active in Cuba, previous to the breaking out of the war, and immediately upon that event, and coincident with the raising of volunteer troops, Red Cross Societies, with or without formal connection with the National Society, sprang into existence everywhere. The headquarters of the National Society are at Washington, but its greate.st center of work is in New York, where, at the beginning of the war, a powerful Relief Committee was organized, under the Presidency of Bishop H. C. Potter, which had received, up to March 17, 1899, over $320,000 to be applied to the work. To “Auxiliary No. 3,” at New York, of which Mrs. Janies Speyer is President, was assigned the duty of caring for the soldiers in the Philippines, and nur.ses and supplies went forward by the first transport sailing from New York. Immediately upon the call for volunteers a meeting of patriotic ladies and gentlemen was called in San Francisco and met at the California Hotel, on April 23d, Mrs. W. B. Harrington presiding. Other meetings were held in rapid succession in other cities of the State, and the result was the organization of a California State Red Cross Society of wdiich Mrs. W. B. Har- rington has been President, and which has been remarkable for its effectiveness and for the personal devotion of its officers and members. At first the main thought was for provision for the California soldiers, and the natural official affiliation of the society was with the California National Guard. There was no time to seek instructions from the National Society, and apparently no necessity, the proposed duty being mainly the proper equipment and care of the California Yolunteers; Init with Dewey’s victory, and the American occupation of the Philip- pines, all this was changed. San Francisco would evidently be the post of departure for the troops for the Orient. Soldiers from many States would be for weeks in camp here, and later would be returning, in both cases needing such care as no government ever did or ever can .supply. How nobly the women of California rose to the unexpected opportunity has been told in emphatic language from the lips of every soldier who has passed through San P'rancisco. Originally organized to aid the soldiers of California, the charit}" and loving care of the society has known no bounds. Soldiers have been cared for regardless of State bounds. Although a local society it has been doing a national work. It has not only cared for soldiers in San Fran- cisco, but has sent nurses, agents and supplies to the Philippines for the succor, not only of Californi ms, but of all in distress. It has had the aid of more than one hundred local auxil- iaries, of which that of San I'rancisco, under the presidency of Mrs. John F. Merrill, has naturally been the largest. Large .sums of money have been expended by the State, San PTan- cisco and Oakland societies. It is not yet possible to give the aggregate of the disbursements of the California Red Cross Societies, but the State Society alone expended |22,494 during the year ending October 17, 1899. The money was expended for the support of nurses and supplies sent to the Philippines, and employed in San Francisco, wdiere a convalescent hospital w’as main- tained. Indentification medals w^ere supplied to all soldiers, and nearly all organizations, passing through San Francisco, were met and fed on arrival. The Society acted as bankers for soldiers paid off, and distributed literature and stationery in great quantities. THE SIGNAL CORPS. The Signal Corps is the staff department which is charged with the duty of maintaining communications between commanding generals and their subordinates in the field, by means of telegraphs, telephones, flag signals, balloons, carrier pigeons or whatever other means of communication may be found practicable. The head of the department is a Brigadier General, at Washington, and there are signal officers attached to all armies in the field according to their requirements for the time being. The enlisted force consists of Sergeants, Corporals and Pri- vates, as in the line. In the reorganized regular army there are six companies, fully officered, the aggregate enlisted force being about 750 men. There is a school of instruction maintained on the Atlantic Coast where men are trained for their duties. In time of war the service is rapidly recruited, mainly from telegraph operators and others accustomed to electrical work, and where- ever an army moves the Signal Corps men go with it, the telegraph lines being kept as close as necessary to the firing line, so that the commanding general is kept in constant touch with Ca}Hpaip:;nin_s^ in the Philippuics. 809 Division and Brigade Headquarters. It is a laborious and hazardous service, as no point is more eagerly sought for attack than the communications of an enemy. The lines are often p)ut up and maintained under fire, and during the Philippine campaign many acts of heroism have been performed by the men of this corps who freely exposed themselves to sharpshooters in climbing poles and trees while stringing the telegraph lines. Dieutenant-Colonel R. E. Thompson has been Chief Signal Officer upon the staff of the Corps Commander, during the operations of our armies in the Philippines. THE CHAPEAINS IN THE ARMY. [According to army regulations, there is attached to each regiment a Chaplain whose duty is to conduct religious services when possible, and otherwise to minister to the regiments in the field as he would to a congregation at home. Being non-combatants, they are not necessarily exposed to the fire of the enemy, but to the credit of our Chaplains be it said, that where there was a soldier needing their attentions, there they were to be found, whether on the firing line or elsewhere. It has not been found possible to procure any complete record of the services of the Chaplains in the Philippines, and it has seemed best to give in full the following personal narrative, which includes merely a record of a few incidents coming under ihe personal observa- tion of the writer, Init illustrates better than any more formal statement, the life and work of the Chaplains in the army. It is proper to say that the writer of the following was a Press Correspondent who is also a congregational clergyman, who was himself several times wounded, and who was as active and helpful in ministering to the soldiers, as those whose services he chronicles]. “ The Chaplain is the true knight of the battlefield. His high duty it is to march with the soldiers, assist the weak, succor the wounded, administer to the dying, and bring the consolation of God to the dripping edges of the battlefield. “ There were not wanting in our army in the Philippines splendid and heroic Ministers of various denominations and creeds of Christianity, who abandoned their homes and their work in order to be of use and blessing to the soldiers fighting in the distant land. I have seen these Chaplains on the firing line, with the Hospital Corps, the Military Reserve Hospitals, and be- side the soldier’s grave. No class of men behave with more gentleness and chivalry than these devoted Soldiers of the Cross. It would be invidious to select from so able and perfect a body of men any particular members for special praise or consideration, but I was fortunate enough to meet and campaign with several of them, while I was not able to see them all on the battle- field. Among the very best and most heroic of these men was Rev. P'ather W. D. McKinnon, Chaplain of the 1st California. He it was, who entered Manila under the fire of the Spaniards, walking along the shore near old Malate, in order to interview the Archbishop and to ask him if Manila could not be surrendered without loss of life. He told me himself that in this expedi- tion he received a wound in the fleshy part of the leg, which he tried to treat himself, and which after a couple of days gangrened, giving him considerable trouble. He was not a spectacular man, P'ather McKinnon, but did his work in a kind, gentle and modest way which attracted to him the hearts of all who met him. Among all the regiments I think no Chaplain was more sincerely loved by men of all denominations and creeds than Father McKinnon. Together we trudged along dusty roads, through the rice-fields and through the cane-brakes on the torrid, dusty battlefields between Caloocan and Malolos. “ I remember one morning, as we came along the railroad beyond Bocaue, how we found a poor P'ilipino lying with his leg broken at the thigh. He must have been running and fell into one of the deep ravines, for his clothes were saturated with water, and his handsand feet were all pale and white. Two soldiers had brought him from the swamp and laid him on the dry ground beside the railway. I was very much touched at the way in which Father McKinnon, with the aid of Mr. Waage, of the California Red Cross, worked over the restoration of this poor man. The Padre went across the scorching rice-fields to get some branches of bamboo to shade the man withal, while Mr. Waage, from his medical kit, gave restoratives and hypodermic injec- tions to the sufferer. “ Again on the Santa Cruz expedition, I met Father McKinnon and Mr. Waage. There was no duty too menial, no work too hard, and no task too perilous for the Chaplain to under- take. He would walk by the side of a soldier and encourage him in a kindly way and help him 310 in the Philippines. with his knapsack, or try and get food or medicine for the poor fellows who fell ont from the heat of the snn. Between Santa Cruz and Pagsanjan, while we were on the roadside waiting for the artillery to come up, a great fellow over six feet tall broke in from the cocoanut groves, saying he was prostrated by the heat. It was evident that he was thoroughly demoralized, and perhaps his brain touched by the sun. It was a telling sight to see P'ather McKinnon encour- age the poor fellow, and by a few restoratives bringing him around so that by afternoon I saw this same man fighting away on the firing lines as if he had never been injured. I shall never forget a night that the reporters, chaplains and military attaches encamped at Bongos church on Laguna de Bay. That day a part of the North Dakota Regiment had been ambushed aud five of its men killed and .several wounded. The killed and wounded were brought back as the evening shades grew to gray around the old church walls. One poor fellow was shot through the lungs, another was shot through the neck. They were both alive when brought to the church. Still a third had been shot through the spine. He also was alive. From five in the afternoon until midnight. Father McKinnon was engaged with these men. From some he took their confessions, to some he brought tea and such other restoratives as we could get ready. “There was also with us that night a very noble man, the Rev. Mr. Stephenson of Idaho. These two Chaplains exercised a wonderful influence in the tragic scene. Here in the dim church aisle were stretched in pathetic windrows, the living and the dead, and up under the altar, where the dim light of the candles throws a shadow, lay the man who was wounded in the lungs, and in the little sacristy lay two of the mortally wounded. When the Chaplain told these men they had but an hour to live, one of them, a young bugler, sipped a cup of tea and turning to his friend, who was also mortally wounded, said: ‘Well, Jack, let us die bravely.’ Chap- lain McKinnon sat up most of the night with the man who was shot through the lungs. I remember looking along the floor of the church that night, and the shadow of the sentinel pacing to and fro, mingled strangely with the shadow of the preacher as he bent above the agonized and dying. It was a scene to live in a man's memory forever. As I went outside the stifling church — for in that tropic country decomposition sets in as soon as death, and the odor of choloroform and decomposition was .stifling— I looked up at the sky and saw the ‘ Southern Cross.’ It seemed to me almost a sign from Heaven. Out in the dew’ where the stars are always peaceful, the ‘ Cross ’ seemed like an emblem of Hope. It .seemed as if God knew that our hearts were hurt and weary. In the early gray of dawn, I walked down to the church again and found the Chaplain there. Still those pathetic windrows of the dead, and those pathetic faces of the living. The .stars were .shining still. The ‘Sign ’ was hung out in the branding sky, and in the dim aisles where the altar candles burned the face of ‘ Our Lady ’ was suffused as with tears. “ In Lawton’s expedition north, there campaigned with us Father Hart of the 3d Art., and Father Fitzgarald. In the expedition to San Isidro, we traversed a country that was almost impassable. Few armies would have been able to cross it except under such a brilliant and determined a man as Major-General Lawton. To watch the battle was interesting, and to march with and talk to the men was an education for a lifetime, but as a change I sometimes fell back to talk and interchange views with the Chaplains. In places, these men were under severe Are because the insurgents fire high and the spent bullets usually take effect with the Hospital Corps, and the Signal Service men, who are in the rear. At San Rafael we had various skirm- ishes, but you could see these Chaplains moving to and fro along the road, which was a very exposed and dangerous place, helping the men and cheerfully doing any task or duty that came their way. One day we were led off into ambush by a spy, who was our guide. After the army had wandered two or three miles acro.ss the country, we discovered a native priest who offered to .show us the way to San Jose, our next town. It was impossible, however, to get very much out of him, as he did not understand Spanish very well, but Father Fitzgarald, was in the expedition, and I suggested to Gen. Lawton, that perhaps Father Fitzgarald could understand the priest’s way of expressing him.self. I went back about two miles and found Father Fitz- gerald at dinner, which consisted of one slice of bacon and one and a half hardtack. He immediately left his luxurious meal, aud accompanied me across the hot stifling landscape in the middle of the day. Reaching the tent where Gen. Lawton and the Filipinio priest were, Father B'itzgerald engaged the priest in conversation in Latin, and in a few moments was burial scenes in the graveyard near fort SAN ANTONIO. CHAPLAIN PIERCE, OFFICIATING. 312 Canipaignins[ in the Philippines. able to find out from him the various trails and roads leading to the town we were looking for. Gen. Lawton spoke to me in terms of highest commendation of Father Fitzgerald. “ It was upon a dark night in front of San Rafael. I reached the camp at midnight, worn out with the journey of thirty-five miles, and lay down upon the road beside a carabao wagon. A bull was tied to one side of the wagon and in between the shafts was a heap of hay. As I lay down with a groan I was surprised to see this heap of hay move, and Father Fitzgerald extri- cate himself from the shafts of the wagon, saying to me in a kindly voice, ‘ I know you have come all the way from Manila. You get in this hay. I can sleep on a board which the China- man, our cook, offered me this evening.’ It rained that night and, as I was a sick man, I felt how good a turn the priest had done me. I should have been very comfortable under my coverlet of hay, only the old bull, in the middle of the night, became hungry and ate up this unusual counterpane. “After the fall of Malabon, Father Hart was stationed in that town for sometime. The natives were a little shy of him when he came in an American uniform, but when he brought his Catholic vestment and conducted their services for them, they opened their hearts and homes to him, and he told me that never in his life had he been received with such courtesy and loving kindness as by the inhabitants of Malabon. I think it would be of immense value to these Philippine Islands to import into the Catholic Church there a large number of our American priests. Here in America the Catholic priests have become so thoroughly imbued with the ideas of universal liberty that they could not but impart to the PTlipinos a great deal of the results of American training. A man like Archbishop Ireland, in my opinion, could do more for the Islands, with an able staff of Catholic priests, than all the armies that we can send against these benighted folk. “ Chaplain Stephenson of the Idaho Regiment was a man for whom the whole army had the highest respect; a man who lived with the troops, who partook of their scanty fare, journeyed in their hard marches, shared their dangers, and did all these things with a modesty of forgetful- ness for self, which creates the true gentleman hero. “ Chaplain Pierce of the First Reserve Hospital, has been of great help to the sick soldiers, and of great use to the country by reason of his carefulness in burying the dead and marking their graves against the time that their friends at home may wish to remove their heroic ashes. Since Chaplain Pierce came to this work no single American soldier has been buried without military honors. We have lost by disease and battles a good many men in the Philippines. The cemetery at Battery Knoll is filled, and a new cemetery was opened on the level ground, near old Malate Fort. As we passed one day, we saw a long trench like a deep gash in the face of nature. A few graves were already there. A week later I visited the same place and found the significant line of graves had lengthened, and the gash in nature was being filled. After a few w’eeks this long trench was nearly filled in, and one quiet afternoon, as we neared the place, we saw four hearses there. There were no mourners, only Chaplain Pierce standing bareheaded, while four coffins were lowered into the graves. The wild waves beat on the shore of Manila Bay, as if to sing a requiem for the brave dead who would never see their native land again. A strong wind was blowing across the level lands, and in the woods the cooing of the ring-dove sounded strange and weird. The Chaplain read, as he stood alone, the glorious words of the burial service of the Episcopal Church The weed-grown grave, already, nearby, was the scene of the burial of a child, and the service of the Chaplain, as it rose free to the sky in that desolate and lonely place seemed a fitting prayer for the child who had died c n its mother’s knee, and the man who had hobbled across the hospital of life to the grave on the other side. There was a prayer for the ‘Martyr,’ a prayer for the ‘Suffering,’ a prayer for all in ‘ Trouble ’ and a Benediction. “ As I went away from that sad place the grand words seemed to mingle still upon the air and make it sweet, tho’ lonely. Some of the words kept coming back like the words of an unforgotten song. “ ‘ Lord, have mercy upon all who are wounded or suffering. Let thy grace be their comfort, tho’ kindred and friends be faraway . . . Almighty God, with whom do live the spirits of just men, made perfect after their delivery from their earthly presence, we humbly command the souls of these thy servants, our brothers, into thy hands. CainpaiQ;nin^Q; in the PJiilippmcs. 313 “ ‘ Lord, support ns all day long of this troublous life, until the shadows lengthen and the evening conies, and the busy world is hushed, and the fever of life is over and its battles done. Then, in thy mercy, grant us a safe lodging and holy rest and peace at last.’ “These words seemed so gracious on the horrid edge of war. They seem to grow into our memory like a little root of daisies blooming undefiled amid the riot of the battlefield. It seemed to send the throes of grace and poetry into the hard and sordid world. The dead had not died in vain, their friends remembered them: ‘ Tho’ kindred and friends were far away.’ They were sustained by the prayers of those across the sea: ‘ Support us all day long of this troublous life, until the shadows lengthen and the evening comes, and the busy world is hushed and the fever of life is over and its battles done.’ SKETCHES OF SOME CHAPLAINS. “ Rev. Charles C. Pierce of the P^piscopal Church in Philadelphia, a graduate ofShurtleff Col- lege, Illinois, was the Chaplain of the Regulars at Camp Merritt. He has been in the army for thirteen years. When active operations began in the Philippines, he was in the Second Divi- sion, Chaplain with the Regulars ou Gen. Mac Arthur’s staff, and was ordered to the First Reserve Hospital, his duty being to take charge of and identify the dead, prepare them for burial, make arrangements for the sounding of the taps over their graves, and for the sending of the clergyman to conduct the services. He has charge of the coffins and the supplying of clothes, carriage escorts and buglers. When there is no other Chaplain at hand he goes to the grave himself. He told me of a case of five men who were killed at Paete and brought down in the middle cf the night. They had been dead several days, and in the tropical climate decomposition had strongly set in. These bodies were placed in the aisle of a hospital among the sick people and were a danger and menace to health. Dr. Pierce came in at mid- night and found this condition of things. He made a protest but could find no one to help him in the difficulty. Pfinally he engaged a dozen natives and with them set out himself to Battery Knoll, placed the soldiers in graves and located each body, so that they could be found when their friends at home sent for them. He had buried, when I saw him on the 16th of June, since March 29th, 217 American soldiers. Not one man had been buried without the honors of war and the Chaplain. That is, the sounding of the taps and the wreathing of the grave with the American flag. The work of this one man shows the value, courage and constancy of the work done by the Chaplains in the army. “ vSometirnes men are inclined to .slight the Chaplains. This happened to be the case in the Kansas Regiment, where the Chaplain, Dr. J, S. Schliemann, was supposed to be too much of a recluse and religious man to suit the fighting blood of Funston’s soldiers. Time went on and open war began, and the temper of the Chaplain had never been known to his regiment until the night of the fight at Caloocan, when the Kansans discerned the tall and rail-like figure of their Chaplain stalking through the woods with a gun, bringing down the wily sharpshooter from his perch in the trees, even as the hunter brings down his game. From that moment Dr. Schliemann was one of the chief heroes in the Kansas Regiment, ‘ that bodyof heroes and hero- worshipers.’ “ We read of the Tennessee Chaplain dying at his post from the plague of smallpox; of the Washington Chaplain also falling martyr to duty, and it would be invidious to mention one without naming all for heroism and duty well performed. The only reason why I cannot give a sketch of the work of each Chaplain, is that I am speaking now only of those with whom I came in contact. I have heard of the work of all of the Chaplains, and I have heard them all highly praised. “ Rev. W. S. Gilbert, Presbyterian, of the Oregon Regiment, was a man who impressed me with his great common sen.se, and his deep interest in the welfare of his men. He prepared a tablet for me, showing how the army influences the character of young men. He prepared several questions which he gave to each one of the Captains and Sergeants of the Oregon Regi- ment, in relation to the moral influence of the army life, and received in reply an almost unanimous answer, that in every respect, with the exception of profanity, the men had improved in character since coming to the Philippines. P,14 C aiupaio-iiino; ?;/ the Philippujes. “ There is every reason for me to believe that the Chaplain was an instrument of good among the men. This is true, not only in regard to those I have mentioned, but in regard to all the Chaplains in the field. “ Chaplains Stull and Cressy were especially prominent in their efforts to give the soldiers and civilians religions exercises on Sunday. There .seemed to be no distinction of sect, all difference of belief seemed to sink in the face of heroism and duty. I have seen a Catholic priest and a ^Methodist minister bending over the same, wounded, dying man, and giving him whatever human help they could. “ The Y. ]M. C. A., under INIessrs. Glunz and Jackson, did splendid and effective w’ork in helping the men along the lines. They used to go along the firing lines with note paper, pens and pencils so that the soldier did not feel himself utterlj' abandoned if he happened to fall in the fight, but was able thus to send messages, oftentimes his last w'ord to his kin beyond the .sea. The Y. ]M. C. A. akso had a tent near the Bridge of Spain, near Manila. Their books, papers, periodicals, and all kinds of writing material were given to the soldiers free of charge. As one crossed the Bridge of Spain, nights, the kindly lights of the Y. M. C. A. tent gleamed out amid the tents of war and the .streets of turmoil, like a silver beacon along the wave- tormented coast. “ Rev. James B. Rodgers and the Rev. E. S. Hubbard of the Presbyterian Board of P'oreign ^Missions, conducted the missionary work in the city of IManila, in a quiet, modest and sub- stantial way. Just at present, owing to the unsettled condition of Luzon, and, in fact, of all the Philippines, the work of the missionar)" will necessarih' be ver}’ slow. Only the very wi.se and level-headed preachers should attempt any of that work to-day in the Philippines, because the people are very strongly opposed to Protestantism, and feel that if we thrust Protestantism into the islands, we will take away their religious, as well as their political liberty. This was the case with the Rev. Dr. Hermann in Cebu. He had distributed some tracts among the Bisayans. The tracts were harmless in themselves, but the town priest and local i)aper immediate!}^ became enraged, and Col. Hamer, the American Military Commander, was forced to send Mr. Hermann to Manila.” A DESERVED ACKNOWLEDGMENT. An interesting chapter might be w'ritten, describing the circumstances under which man}- of the views which appear in this book were taken. The w’riter’s own personal experience with a kodak could be made, with a little embellishment, into a very exciting tale. Many of the pictures were taken in the open battlefield, under the fire of the enemy, and several men were wounded while thus engaged. It requires as much nerve to take a photograph of a company of soldiers charging the enemy’s trenches, as for one of those engaged in the movement — possibly more, when the enemy is firing wild, or when they happen to select the camera for a target. Special mention is due to the following soldiers of the different regiments, who have furnished us with photographs, taken on the field or elsewhere. Their addresses, as far as we have them, are given for the benefit of those who may be collecting war views: W. H. Lillie, official photographer, 8th Army Corps, box 614, Leadville, Col. Harry Coombs (1st Washington), North Yakima, Wash; C. C. Jackson (1st Washington), Dayton, Wash.; Howard Page (13th Minne.sota), Minneapolis, jMinn; Wni. Darcey (remained in Manila); J. E. Northrup (20th Kansas), Lawrence, Kas.; C. C. Cole, (20th Kansas); Arthur C. Johnson (1st Colorado), Denver. Col.; Lieut G. E. Thomas (1st Colorado), Pueblo, Col ; Geo. R. Boomer (1st Nebraska), Beatrice, Neb.; Wni. H. Reedy (1st Nebraska), Beatrice, Neb.; Lieut. Van Valin (1st Nebraska), Nelson, Neb.; John W. Jones (2d Oregon), Portland, Or.; C. C. Stoakley (6th U. S. Art.), remained at Manila; C. B. Bishop (6th Art.), remained at Manila; Steward Wells (Hospital Corps), Corregidor Island, P. I. Sam C. Partridge, 121 Post street, San Francisco; B. F. Rahmeyer, Greenwich street, San Francisco; Hodson, 416 Geary street, San Francisco, have photos of companies and ofi&cers in volunteer regiments. GOVKRXOR ROBERT B. SMITH, MONTANA, OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE First Montana Infantry, U. S. V. IN THE CAMPAIGN IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS WRITTEN BY LIEUTENANT ALEXANDER LAIST Who served as Chief Clerk and Chief of Orderlies on General MacArthur’s Staff IHROUGH THE CCURTESY OF GENERAL HARRY C. KESSLER DEUTENANT LAIST WAS PERMITTED TO USE THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE REGIMENT IN COMPILING THIS HISTORY. To Whom it May .Concern: I certify that the accompanying historical matter and rosters, written especially for “ Campaigning in the Philippines,” relative to the First Montana Volunteer Infantry, are official, the account of the field operations having been compiled by Lieutenant Alexander Laist, from the official records of the regiment. HARRY C. KESSLER, Colonel First Montana Infantry. BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. C. KESSLER (Formerly Colonel of the Regiment.) THE FIRST MONTANA INFANTRY. 'HE marvelous industrial development of the Great Republic has always been the wonder of Europe. It has become the fashion of late years for her statesmen, writers and industrialists to direct their Cook’s tours to these shores, and the journals and letters published by these men have been eagerly read by our people. It is always instructive to learn how others see us, but the productions of these car-window observers have been, too frequently, simply repetitions of how, through the distorted spectacles of the writers for partisan newspapers, we see our- selves. All the unpleasant things which are there said about those of our fellow-citizens who are unfortunate enough to be candidates for office, and all the charges of corruption which are heaped upon the party in power by the organs of the party out of power, are taken as absolutely true; received, in fact, as admissions against interest. A big nation — that is the verdict — but not great; wonderful prosperity, it is true, but low public morals. Great mines, railroads, factories, commercial houses, but that is all; everywhere the sordid spirit of money-getting, and nowhere the higher aims that make life worthy and distinguishable from the strife of the barbarian for the material neces- saries of existence. The men who are at the head of our Government and defenses, it was charged, were mere jobbers and traders of the nation’s honor, anxious only to enrich themselves. Was it not only in February of the year 1898 that the letter of the Spanish Minister at Washington, in which he denounced the President of the United States as a low politician, was pronounced, by almost the entire continental European press, to be correct and truthful, although perhaps a little unwise and impolitic? Was it not only a few days later, after the blowing up of the Maijie, that the same press almost unanimously agreed that the Ameri- can naval officers were, through their incompetence and inefficiency, themselves responsible for the destruction of the ill-fated battleship? How they must have changed their opinion ! And the army, what a ridiculously small body that was; scarcely numbering two-thirds of the standing army of Denmark, and that is a little kingdom with a much smaller total population than one of our great cities, and only a little larger than that of at least one more. Then that the discordant elements of European immigration could have become welded into a nation, was another matter incomprehensible to, and not believed by, our critics. We think, however, that recent events have sufficiently opened their eyes. The outbreak of hostilities with Spain found the United States well prepared on the sea, but, according to the standards of Europe, almost entirely without land forces. Even Spain, small a country as she is, outnumbered us four to one with her standing army. But, as in 1861, we showed our capacity for rapid mil- itary development. The nucleus of our forces was, of course, our regular army Campaii^uijio^ in the Philippines. small but efficient. The next reliance of the Government was upon onr National Guard; citizen-soldiers, who had patiently subjected themselves to military instruc- tion and discipline for years past, ready for the call of the nation at the appearance of internal or external foe. When the President issued his proclamation for 125,000 volunteers, on April 2od, it was found that the number allotted to Montana was a little over 500. However, the existence in the State of a regiment of National Guard Infantry led to its acceptance as a whole, recruited to a war strength of 50 officers and 1019 enlisted men. The membership of the regiment before the war had been about 500, so that, it will be seen, over one-half of the body that went to the Philippines was drawn from the general population. The 1st Regiment of Inf., Montana National Guard, had been organized in 1887, and this was the organization that was expanded to form the 1st Montana Inf., U. S. Its Colonel, Harry C. Kessler, of Butte, had been the old National Guard Colonel; Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace was a 1st Lieutenant in the 6th L. S. Cav. and military instructor of the Montana National Guard; Maj. James W. Drennan had been Adjutant General of Montana; Benj. E. Calkins, 1st Lieut, and Adjt., and Albert Seadorf, 1st Lieut, and Quartermaster, had held the same positions in the guard. All the old officers of the guard, except two, volunteered and joined. Maj. Miller had been Captain of a battery of light artillery" at Helena. The regiment numbered many others who had had some previous military training, and many had, at one time or other, belonged to the regular army, among them Capt. Thomas S. Dillon of Company K; Chief Musician Henry Roberts, 1st Lieut. Bryan Conrad, afterward Lieutenant in the 18th U. S. Inf.; 1st Sergt. Albert J. Erickson of Company G, afterward Captain in the 37th U. S. V. Inf., and Private Charles R. Valentine of Company F. Maj. Asa L. Duncan had been a member of the 3d Virgina Regiment of National Guard and commandant of cadets at the military school at Lexington, Virginia; there were a few graduates of military schools and many who had been members of the National Guards of other States. Nor was the regiment entirely without those who had seen practical warfare. Col. Kessler had fought as 1st Lieutenant in the 104th Pennsylvania Vols. under ^IcClellan at Vorktown, Lee’s ^lills, Williamsburg, Bottom’s Bridge and Fair Oaks; Maj. Drennan had served under Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher (whose name is historical in Montana as that of one of its first Governors) at the san- guinary combat of Gettysburg and throughout the campaigns of the army of the Potomac, and later gained renown upon the expedition in 1866, of Gen. E. S. Otis, up the Missouri River against the Sioux, and of Gen. Crook, in 1876, against Chief Dull Knife of the Cheyenne tribe, being wounded at Slim Butte, Neb. Capt. Hallahan had fought in the 47th New Vork Vols. under Gens. Sherman, Terry and Schofield at Chapin’s Farm, in front of Petersburg, at Wilmington, Faisen’s Station and Bentonville, was with Gen. Terry on the Fort Fisher expe- TAKIXG THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. Cauipaigniug in the rhilippines. clition, and after the close of the Civil War, aided for three years, as a member of the 14th U. S. Inf. in the Apache campaigns of Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden. Capt. Reif, then in the 2d U. S. Cav., took part in the eight months’ campaign of 1877 of Gen. Nelson L. Miles on the Rosebud against the Nez Perce tribe and was present at the surrender of Chief Joseph. Capt. Wynne had been a member of an expedition of the pioneers of Montana who organized themselves for defense against the Indian outbreak of 1877 and took part in the engagement of Camas Meadows in that year. Lieut. Seadorf was an old Indian campaigner. He had served under Capt. Kennington against the Utes in 1875, and in 1876 he was with Gen. Crook in Montana, Wyoming and Idaho in the expedition against the Sioux, taking part in the Battle of Sim Butte on September 9th. Privates Andrew McGinnis and Walter L. Whann were both veterans of the Civil War. So it will be seen from this list of names, which is necessarily incom- plete, that the population of Montana, although devoted to the arts of peace, was, as the other States of the Union, not without those who had some proficiency in the arts of war. Company A was the old National Guard company of Great Falls; B, F and G of Butte; E of Dillon; D of Virginia City; H of Kalispell; I of Lewistown and K of Anaconda. Company C was composed chiefly of the Bozeman troop of cavalry and the Helena Light Battery, its Captain, James F. Keown, having been commander of the troop. Company L was principally from Helena, and M from Anaconda, neither having been represented in the National Guard, but were organized to bring the number of companies up to twelve, in accordance with the call of the President. The first signs of war revived interest in the guard. Armories that had been deserted became the gathering place for men anxious to enlist, and drill nights, which had been neglected, were attended, not only by the members of the guard, but by the embryo soldiers as well. When enrollment finally did commence (April 28th), it proceeded as rapidly as the clerical facilities permitted. There was no lack of recruits. The only diffi- culty was to adjudicate the rival claims of those who, from procrastination, had failed to present themselves prompthv The roll of enlisted men included the names of prominent and prosperous Montanans. John C. Heilig was at the time Alderman of Butte; Thomas P. A. Howe was a well-known civil engineer of Great Falls, and had formerly been a Captain of the National Guard; Robt. H. Paxson was, and is yet, one of the leading druggists of Butte; E. K. Cheadle was County Attorney of Meagher County when he enlisted; Albert Pfaus was a Presbyterian minister at Lewistown; Wm. J. Hannah was a member of the Montana State Senate; Robert H. Sprague and S. J. Murph}- are well-to-do ranchers of the Gallatin and Prickly Pear Valleys, respectively, and so on. Col. Ke.ssler issued orders to the guard on April 28th, to report for duty at their several armories throughout the State. From that time drilling was begun “ DRILL, YE TARRIERS.” 4 Campaigning in the Philippines. in earnest. Montana, like the rest of the country, was agog over war news. Crowds besieged the bulletin boards ; those who intended to enlist hastily arranged their business affairs, and when Dewe^^’s victory at Manila was announced, it was realized that war had actualh" begun. The unexpectedness with which this news came, and the enchantment and romance lent by the distant scene of this battle fired the imagination of all. On May 4th, the companies began to arrive at Helena. D, the Virginia City Company, was the first, and was mustered in on May 6th. The Helena Company, L, was already on the ground and was mustered in on the 5th. B, F and G arrived on the 5th, and the first was mustered in on the 6th, and the two latter on the 7th. E, K, and M arrived on the 6th and were mustered in on the 8th. A reached camp on the 7th and was mustered in on the 8th. C, H, and I arrived on the 7th and were mustered in on the 9th. On May 9th the mustering-in was completed by Lieut. Geo. P. Ahern, of the regular service, who had been on duty as military instructor at the agricultural college at Bozeman. On the same day Col. Kessler formally took command of the regiment and appointed Lieuts. Ben. E. Calkins and Alford Seadorf Adjutant and Quartermaster, respectively. The several companies in their journeys to Helena, were the recipients of ovations all along the line. The enthusiasm was great everywhere. The farewell meetings, festive decorations and last cheers at the home towns were never to be forgotten. At the way stations the village band, if there was one, played patriotic airs ; school-children, wearing the national colors, sang ‘ ‘ America, ’ ’ and those of the townsmen who had friends among the departing bade them good-bye. The first camp of the regiment at Helena, called “Robert B. Smith,” in honor of the Governor, was a sorry place. It was situated not far from the Broadwater Hotel. During the first few days the weather, although cold, was sunny and dry; but when, later, it began to snow, the melting snow, becoming churned into the ground by the tramp of the soldiers going out to drill or passing to and fro in the discharge of their duties, turned the camp into the semblance of a duck pond. It was impossible to keep dr}^ or clean or warm. Colds became numerous and the brown mixture provided by Uncle Sam was dispensed to the long crowds that lined up every morning at the hospital tent, by the barrel. The chorus of coughs that was to be heard whenever a company formed for roll call would have been amusing had it not been indicative of considerable suffering. Finally, condi- tions became unbearable and on May 16th Camp “Mud,” as it was familiarly called, was abandoned and another location, nearer to the town, was selected. The new Camp Smith, although equally cold, was at least healthy, and by the provision of straw for the tents and cord wood for camp fires, was made moderately com- fortable. The lack of clothing was another cause of discomfort. The Government made no issues of anything except blankets until the regiment reached San Francisco. CAMP LIFE— THE SUNXY SIDE. Campaigning in the Philippines. 5 The only company that was fully uniformed was the Great Falls company, and some of the others, like M, had no uniforms at all. Rifles, too, were very scarce. Those on hand, of the Springfield pattern, had belonged to the guard and were sufiicient to arm only half the regiment. Each company was given its proportionate share and the men had to take turns practicing the manual of arms. In the meantime, instruction in mili- tary duties was going on apace. Six hours per day were devoted to drill and officers’ and non-commissioned officers’ schools were instituted. Everyone went to work with a will. Heated discussions were to be heard about the camp fires and in the tents on doubtful points in the drill regulations. The regiment about this time was subdivided into battalions, the 1st Battalion, under Maj. Drennen, including Companies C, H, E and K; the 2d, under Maj. Cook, D, E, G and M, and the 8d, under Maj. Miller, A, B, F and I. Rumors became rife that the regiment was among those to go to the Philip- pines. Considerable impatience was felt on account of the delay in the start for San Francisco. On account of the severity of the weather, as well as a desire to take the first step in the voyage to the seat of war, everyone was anxious to leave Camp R. B. Smith. Finally, the Government was able to provide transportation and the orders to break camp came. Everything was carefully packed and loaded in the baggage cars and when on May 25th at 8 A. m. the trumpets blew the “general,” all the tents fell together, and the regiment’s days in the home State were over. The train, in four sections, was soon speeding to its destination. Whenever a stop was made the boys were sure of a hearty welcome and the best wishes on their journey. The reception at Dillon, where the ladies of the town entertained the entire regiment at supper, was especially remembered. The route lay south through Idaho and Utah and then westward over the Central Pacific. The trip was without incident and was accomplished by the morning of May 28th. By noon of the same day the regiment reached Camp Merritt, in the Bay District of San Francisco, and was quartered on a block fronting on Point Eobos avenue, opposite the Odd Fellows’ Cemetery. The bo^^s were given a splendid breakfast at the ferry-house by the San Francisco Red Cross ladies, and they feasted their eyes on a wealth of flowers to which they had been unaccustomed in their rather bleak and cold mountain homes. The tents were pitched in the bottomless sands of San Francisco. Straw was provided, but after a few days, for sanitary reasons, was removed. Sand got into everything, the eyes, ears, clothes and food; and besides, the district was infested by a minute sand flea which few ever saw but from which all suffered. At night the camp was overhung by thick fogs that blew straight in from the ocean. When this settled on the tents and boards, it was difficult, from the amount of moisture, to distinguish from a rainfall. Still, the new location was not unhealthy. The drill ground lay about a quarter of a mile away and consisted of a gently sloping hill- 6 Cainpaig}ii)ij^ in the Philippines. side in the Presidio, overlooking the Pacific Ocean. When the regiment first marched to it, many of its members got their first view of saltwater. Drilling was actively carried on, as well as instructions in the other duties of a soldier. Guard duty received especial attention, and the careful training the boys then got, under the direction of Col. Kessler, proved of the greatest advantage in the Philippines. One detachment of nine privates, two Corporals and a Sergeant were sent to a Gov- ernment woodpile about three blocks away from camp. They measured the pile and discovered that it was worth $2.40, so they made up a pot to pa}" for the wood that they might go to sleep. The cruel officer of the day refused the offer, but afterwards it was realized that the benefits of the work at Camp Merritt lay not so much in its present value as in the training it afforded for the night vigils in Manila. At this time the first summary court was instituted, Maj. Brennan being detailed on field officer’s court on June 4th. The court soon began to get in its deadly work, although the good- hearted Major was sometimes very loath to inflict punishments as severe as the regulations of the army con- templated. The minor offenses were followed by a few da 3 "s’ work in the kitchen, and some had employment there so steadily that by the time they were mustered out, they had learned the worthy trade of cooking. Drinks cost from $2.00 up, according to size and quality. Shortly after the Montanas reached San Francisco, they, together with the South Dakotas, the Wyomings and 7th Californians, were included in a brigade under command of Gen. Arthur Mac- Arthur. On June 21st, Gen. MacArthur departed for the Philippines. Col. Kess- ler, who was the ranking Colonel, and, for that matter, the ranking volunteer Colonel in the country, took command, and retained it for something like three weeks, when he was relieved by Brigadier-General Harrison Gray Otis, U. S. V. About the middle of June the regiment had its first pay day, being paid for the months of May and June, and for a few days the business of the summary court was good. The monthly pay of a private was $15.60, an increase of 20 per cent on the regular $18 being allowed for war service. The Fourth of July was spent in Oakland, where, in a beautiful public park, a sham battle was fought with blank cartridges, and the boys were entertained at luncheon and supper by the good people of that town. Six companies represented the Americans, and the others, very reluctantly, had to play the part of Spaniards. In the combat the old struggle between love and duty presented itself to the “Spaniards,” whether, as soldiers, they should strain every nerve to win, or, as real Americans, the Spaniards should be beaten. As it has happened in similar THE FIRST PAY-DAY. Campaigning in the Philippines. THE AWKWARD SQUAD. cases, love conquered, and by a judicious throwing off by the “Spaniards,” the Americans won the day. The fight was in every respect a mimic battle, with the exception, of course, of the whistling of the bullets, and was hugely enjoyed by spectators and participants as well. Men were detailed to fall as though wounded, and the Captain of one company, who had thoughtlessly designated a man for this duty who weighed 216 pounds, came in for considerable criticism at the hands of the unfortunate litter-bearers, who had to carry him off the gore-stained field. In the meantime, the Govern- ment had made its issue of arms, accoutrements and clothing, and in the pattern and quality of these, the lack of preparation was well shown. The rifle was the old Springfield model of 1878, a venerable antiquity, whose failings were to be well demonstrated later on when in hostile conflict with the modern Mausers of the Filipinos. On the advance to Malolos, the unfortunate soldiers who were armed with these weapons were dubbed “ bolomen ” by their luckier comrades, who had the Krag-Jorgen- sens, in allusion to Aguinaldo’s “ bolo ” or machete battalions. The uniforms were something indescribable. The appellation of “Boys in blue” was not literally exact for the Montanans, because, after a few days’ exposure, the blouses assumed a dead purple hue, and the trousers a glaring, horrible green. Nor was the Regimental Quartermaster to blame, or even the Government. For the former had to take what was offered, or nothing, and the latter was in much the same position. Armies or their supplies cannot be created in a moment. On July 6, 1898, death claimed its first victim. Hospital Corps Private Robert Lennington, who had enlisted with Company K and had been transferred to the Hospital Corps, on May 11th, passed away on that day after a severe illness of pneumonia. The entire regiment joined in the impressive ceremonies of his funeral. The Montana soldiers were now becoming impatient of remaining in the country. Three expeditions had already departed for foreign shores, and it was thought that they should also be given their turn. Their claims were actively pressed by the Colonel, but, under existing circumstances, the authorities in control could not be hurried. Finally, the orders came. The transport allotted was the Pennsylvania, an American-built ship which had, a short time before, rounded the Horn, having been brought to San Francisco to engage in the Klon- dike trade, which was then very prosperous. Last leaves were taken, and at the camp the ridiculous alternated with the pathetic. Whenever a lady approached a soldier friend to shake hands, a chorus of bystanders would break out into an ear-splitting, hoarse howl of “Good-bye,” and “God bless you,” and fall on each others’ necks, simulating uncontrollable grief. On July 18th, at 8:15 in the morning, the tents fell at the sounding of the “general,” and the regiment marched through the gaily decorated streets, thronged by an enthusiastic multi- tude, to the dock. The ship pulled into the stream and anchored at 5 p. m. On "S were com- pelled to spend their aluminum identification medals, provided by the Red Cross ladies of San Francisco. The only thing that was really cheap was cigars, and of these, one could enjoy the best the Islands afforded for two cents apiece. Ever\Tody smoked them, men, women and children alike. The situation at Manila was becoming such that the Commanding General issued orders for the regiment to come to that cit^v On October 24, 1898, the 1st and 2d Battalions left Cavite, and on November 21st, the 3d followed. The 2d and 3d Battalions were quartered at No 6. San Miguel street, and the 1st near by, on Gunao street, headquarters being established at 23 San Miguel street. The barracks were crowded, and those at 6 San Miguel had been a warehouse for dried cocoanuts, the smell of which remained to the last. Mosquito nets and can- “ CLEANLINESS IS NEXT TO GODLINESS.” 12 Campaigning in the Philippines. vas cots were furnished, which made living much more comfortable. The rains were severe, and the lot where the cooking was done soon became a trackless swamp. One who has never seen a tropical rain can have no conception of the deluge of water that is poured from the heavens. The city of Manila has an abundant water supply. Shower baths were provided and were used by the sol- diers sometimes as often as four to five times a day. It was the onl}^ way of keeping cool. For drinking purposes the water had to be boiled. Drilling was cut down to half an hour in the morning, and in the evening a march and dress parade, occupying about the same length of time, was had. The regiment, besides guarding its own camp, was required to furnish a guard for the Escolta, Manila’s principal thoroughfare, from November 10th to December 8th, and the sentries at the headquarters of the 2d Division of the 8th Army Corps, Maj. Gen. MacArthnr, No. 16 General Solano street, were Montana men from the beginning of January until the middle of July. The sanitar}" conditions at the barracks and their surroundings, the kind of water and food and the amount of work and hardship to which the soldiers were subjected, made themselves felt in the daily sick reports, a never-failing barometer. Thus, at Cavite, the 1st Battalion, which was quartered in an old Spanish fort, with thick and damp walls, had thirty to forty sick men where the others had only fifteen or twenty. The percentage of sick in San Francisco had been about four. In Cavite it speedily rose to ten, and fluctuated in that neighborhood until the trouble broke out, when at one time it rose as high as thirty-two in the Mon- tanas, although other regiments had it as high as sixty-five per cent. Artificer John C. Adams, Company A, died at Cavite, September 2, 1898, of typhoid fever; Private Cary A. Sayler, Company A, at the same place and of the same disease, on September 5th; Private William C. O’Leary, at the same place, Sep- tember 5th, of spinal meningitis; Private Daniel McElliott, Company A, October 22d, at Cavite, of dysen- tery; Private Walter J. McLean. Com pan}" L, October 28th, at Cavite. There were no further deaths until Private Harry Archibald, Com- pany M, died at Manila, January 6, 1899, of ty- phoid fever, and his was the last death before the trouble broke out. On December 1, 1898, 1st Lieut, and Regimental Adjt. Ben E. Calkins, who was called home on pressing business affairs, received his discharge from the service. He sailed for home two days later. Second Lieut. William B. Knowlton, Company G, who was extremely popular with the officers and enlisted men, was detailed as Acting Regimental Adjutant on December 2d, and on the 24th of the same month he received his promotion as 1st Lieutenant and Adjutant, and served in that capacity until muster out, with great credit to himself and to his regiment. DISHING UP RATIONS. Campaigning in the Philippines. 13 First Ivieiit. Edgar S. Paxson, Company G, was given sick leave to the United States on October 15, 189S. His health was such that he could not return and he was mustered out of the service. Pdrst Lieut. Louis P. Sanders was detailed as aide to the General commanding the American troops, and remained on that duty during his stay in the Philippines. Capt. Charles Gardner and 1st Lieut. Wil- liam F. McGrath, both of Company B; 2d Lieut. Adolph Kappner, Company F, and 2d Lieut. Gerald Sullivan, Company M, were discharged from the ser- vice on January 8, 1899. First Lieut. Jacob M. Kennedy, Company K, was discharged on account of sickness on December 81st. First Lieut. Bryan Conrad, Company M, was discharged September 1st, to go into the 18th U. S. Inf. The following promotions were made from the muster-in of the regiment until the outbreak of hostilities: Louis P. Sanders, Captain of Company B, January 28d; Clarence I. Boardman, 1st Lieutenant of Com- pany B, January 28d; S. A. J. Dorn, 2d Lieu- tenant of Company M, January 9th and 1st Lieu- tenant same company, January 23d; Byron J. McIntyre, 1st Lieutenant, Company G, January 24th; Philip Greenan, 1st Lieutenant, Company K, January 6th; William C. Gardenhire, 2d Lieu- tenant, Company P', January 22d; Ernest V. D. Murphy, 2d Lieutenant, Company G, January 6th; Arthur O’Leary, 2d Lieuten- ant, Company M, January 23d; Valentine Laubenheimer, 2d Lieutenant, Company A, January 23d, and Myles Kelly, 2d Lieutenant, Company H, January 23d. On December 24, 1898, the Montanas were assigned a place in the line of defenses of Manila. The regiment was then, as throughout the campaign, a part of the 2d Division, under Major-General Mac Arthur, which occupied the portion of Manila north of the Pasig River, and was brigaded with the 20th Kansas, 10th Pennsylvanias, and 3d Art. (acting as infantry), under Brigadier- General Harrison Gray Otis. The Montanas occupied a position, the center of which was a point on the Dulumbayan Road, about one thousand yards north of the leper hospital. The 3d Art. was to the left and the Pennsylvanias to the right. There was a small cemetery nearby, heavily walled, which was used as a fortress on the night of February 4th. The post was about two miles from the barracks. At first it was occupied by one company at a time, on duty for twent 3 -four hours at a time. On January 7th, two companies were on at night and one in the day, and on February 1st, four companies were held in reserve at the barracks with orders to march out at the first sign of difficulty. The attitude of the Filipinos w^as hostile throughout, and the relations between the two forces became more and more strained every day. The patience with which the Americans received the insults of the insurgents was mistaken for cowardice. All sorts of challenges were called to the sentries in bad Spanish. “ Quiere combatir ! Americano mucho malo! Poco tiempo, no mas Montanas!” meaning, ” Come and fight,” “The Americans are no good.” “Pretty soon the A CAMP PEDDI.ER. Mont. 2 14 Cainpaig)iino in the Philippines. Montanas will be exterminated,” and so on. The commanding General was determined not to use violence until attacked by force of arms, and all this had to be borne. About the middle of January a painful accident occurred. A sentry belonging to Company B carelessly discharged his rifle, the ball lodging in the hip of a Fili- pino woman, and inflicting a mortal wound. Maj. (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Cook, who was field officer of the day, quelled the excitement, which was run- ning high. A money contribution by Col. Kessler to the bereaved widower, large enough to bury the remains with pomp and enable him to get a handsomer and younger wife, sufficed to smooth over the incident. The first actively hostile demonstration at the Montana line was made on Jan- uary 18th. Company E was on duty and Capt. Jenson was in charge of his com- pany. At about 2 p. M., a squad composed of Corp. \V. H. Mace and Privates Robert Johnston, J. L. Banks, G. L. Banks, M. Phelan, \V. P. Mulchay, Otto Olson and Eli Loucks, posted 150 3’ards in front of the main body, observed a bod}' of Aguinaldo’s soldiers with rifles leveled, coming toward it. The sentry called a halt, which was received with shouts of derision. The P'ilipinos crossed into the American lines and soon had the squad completely surrounded. Private Loucks BREAKING CAMP. was sent to the Captain as messenger, and the squad, under the circumstances, not being allowed to fire, reluctantly began to slowly fall back. Soon Capt. Jen- son arrived, brought the outpost back to the main body, and deployed the com- pany at the right and left of the road, in line of skirmishers, some distance in front of the walled cemetery. In accordance with instructions, he telegraphed Gen. MacArthur, “Outpost attacked.” In half an hour Brigadier-General H. G. Otis and Inspector-General John S. Mallory, of MacArthur’s staff, arrived and had a parley with the Filipinos. Their commander apologized and quiet was soon re- stored, the outpost re-occupying its old position. A day or two later. Col. Kessler, when field officer of the day, was called upon to pour oil on the troubled waters at the Kansas outpost, where a sentry was holding a mob of over three hundred at bay, by loading his rifle with ball car- tridges in the presence of some insolent Filipinos, who persisted in entering the lines armed. This difficulty, too, was adjusted. During the night of February 2d, the first hostile shots were fired at the Mon- tana men. Companies G and B were on duty. Early in the evening the Cor- poral of the guard, John J. McLane, had noticed unusual activit}' in the native houses of the vicinity. A larger number than common of natives was seen to be VlKWvS ABOUT MANILA. IG Caiiipaionuig in the Philippines. about, and about 9 o’clock a dusky messenger was seen to go from house to house. Trouble was anticipated, and it came. At midnight the sentries of Com- pany G were relieved by Company B men. About half an hour later two shots were fired at the men on the foremost post. The alarm was given in a minute, and, directly, Capt. Wynne and Tieut. Corby had deplo^'ed their men as skir- mishers, B to the left and G to the right of the road. Officers and men, long held at bay, were eager for the fray, but Maj. Drennan, field officer of the day, of cour.se, could not permit it. Peace was restored, and hostilities were put off a little while longer. The humdrum of barrack life and the monotony of what was practically imprisonment in the limits of Manila, had made all anxious to strike the blow. The opportunity came on the evening of February 4th. The long-continued hostile attitude of the insurgents culminated in their attack on the Nebraskas, who occupied the extreme right of Gen. MacArthur’s line. A sentry of this regiment fired the finst shot of the war. The volunteers in the Philippines had enlisted against the Spaniards, but fighting was now a matter of self-defense and just vengeance, and to a man they were eager for the call of duty and the orders of their superiors. When the attack began. Companies M and I were on the line, and I), F, A and K were in reserve quarters. Capt. Hallahan, Company M, was in com- mand of the force at the front. The night was a very dark one. A little before 9 o’clock he called the attention of Maj. Bierer, of the 10th Pennsylvania, field officer of the day, to some shots heard in the distance. Being repeated, they discussed them, and first thought they might be fire-crackers. Maj. Bierer finally said: ‘ ‘ Those are not fire-crackers. The ball is opened. ’ ’ They listened a moment longer and then formed the two companies, M and I, and ten or fifteen minutes later they heard the Filipino bugles blow a call in the distance that was new to them. It was quite long, and presumably a call to arms. Corp. William S. Lincoln, Company M, was then at the cossack post, some 550 paces north of the main body, with a squad of twelve men be- longing to both Compan- ies M and I. Private Michael Henry was the sentry to the left. He was the first Montana man fired upon, and promptly returned the fire. Soon the entire detachment was engaged. The Filipinos endeavored to surround it, but it gallantly held its own, retreating slowly to the main body, keeping up a steady fire and taking advantage of the conformation of the ground. The two companies were deployed, 500 yards to the left of the road, to connect with the 3d Art., and 360 yards to the right to touch Pennsylvania’s left, a long line for so few to defend, allowing only one man MARCHING TO THE TRAIN. Campaigning in the Philippines. 17 KN ROUTK TO SAN FRANCISCO. to every twelve paces. This position was held for over an hour, when, in obedience to repeated orders. Companies M and I retired to the small walled ceme- tery 800 paces to the rear, and rather reluctantly, because at this .station the ground could be only imperfectly covered, so that there was some danger that the insurgents might sneak through to the leper hospital. They had approached as close as twenty yards, but after that the shots were long range, immediate hopes of penetrating the lines having apparently been given up. Our soldiers were much ex- posed by their black-powder cartridges, which they had to use in part, and which belched forth long tongues of flame that gave the enemy complete indication of their position. In the meantime. Col. Kess- ler arrived with reinforcements. At half-past nine, the order had come at the barracks to fall in. Maj. Miller had been placed in command of the companies that were left to guard the safety of Manila. Tieut. Col. Wallace and Maj. Cook had gone to the left of the Kansas, the extreme left of the north line, with Companies G, E, and B. The latter two immediately returned, but G fought with Kansas until the morning of the 6th, when it, too, joined the regiment. The command was halted on the corner of Dulumbayan Road and Calle Iris, where Maj. Gen. MacArthur had established temporary headquarters. The Colonel took Companies L and C forward, and the.se, with M and I, were, by 11 p. m., disposed about the small cemetery; Company I, Capt. Preston, to the left of the road, using the rice-dikes for shelter. The thick walls of the cemetery afforded ample protection for the other companies. Two guns of the Utah Light Artillery — three 2 -inch field pieces — also took post here, and began their destructive work under Capt. Grant of that organiza- tion. Firing was kept up all night, and by daylight the boys, although there had been no casualty, were pretty well exhausted. The vigorous kick of the ancient Springfield muskets had made many an arm black and blue, and many a shoulder painfully sore. However, Manila was still American, and the battle had been won. Capt. Keown then, with a squad of Company C men, was detailed to clear the territory in the immediate front of nipa huts, by burning them to the ground, and about 10 o’clock in the forenoon. Companies M and I advanced about one thousand yards, also clearing away obstructions. Gen. MacArthur now (Sunday morning, February 5thl ordered an advance of about a mile to La Loma Church and the Chinese Cemetery. Capt. Hill, with a squad of about a dozen men of Company F, which had in the meantime arrived, was sent to reconnoiter the position to the right. Considerable resistance was met, but the Chinese Hospital was gained, being found deserted, and about the same time Lieut. Gardenhire, with another detachment of Company F, appeared. IS CainJ:aij^)ii?ig in the Philippines. Col. Kessler now moved the regiment forward, and after sharp fighting, occupied the line contemplated in the General’s orders. It included, besides tbe church and cemetery mentioned, the town of Lico and also block-house Xo.* 2, a strong fortress of hewn stone, provided with numerous port-holes for musketry. Com- panies C, F, H, I, K, Iv and M had taken part in the engagement, while G (Capt. W^vniie) was on the lefc of the Kansas, and fought bravely with that regiment. The next day (Monday, the fith) an adjustment of the lines was made, involving a slight advance. Trenches were thrown up, and the position retained until Feb- ruary 10th. The bulk of the regiment was stationed to the left of block-house Xo. 2; Company E was at the block-house, and C and M were to the right near La Loma Church, with the Pennsylvanias, under command of Maj. Drennan. The fight of the 5th claimed six victims. The following were wounded: Pri- vate L. L. Pierstorff, Company C; Private Charles Runnels, H; Private George A. Rowland, H; Corp. Edward L. Skinner, I; Corp. William Meyersick, I, (died February 18th), and Private John Sorensen, L, (died February 20th). Private Henry Slack, Company B, was wounded on the 7th. The extension of the line, to include the village of Caloocan, was now decided upon by the division commander. The movement was set for the 10th of Feb- ruary, and made with the co-operation of the fleet. For thirty minutes, beginning at 8:09 p. m., upon signal from the high cupola of La Loma Church, the division headquarters, the rebel entrenchments were bombarded by the big 10-inch guns of the navy, and the shrapnel of the Utah Artil- lery. The ardor of the cannoneers was such that it was impossible to control their Are within the time limits fixed, so that it was not safe for the infantr}’ advance to com- mence until 8:50 p. m. Then the signal was given and the Montana boys swept forward in a hail of Mauser and Remington bullets. The enemy fled before them in confusion, man}' falling before the well-directed fire. The programme placed Companies D, G, A and I between Kansas on the left and the 8d Art. on the right, on the firing line, but Companies L, K, B and F, who had been designated as support to remain in the rear, could not be controlled, and they, too, pressed forward on the advance line. Col. Kessler was in command of these eight companies. Company E held block-house Xo. 2, and C was with the Pennsylvanias at La Loma Church. Company M and its Captain were selected for a duty which is referred to in the report of the division commander in the following words: “ In the connection with the occupation of Caloocan, Company M of the Mon- tana Regiment, Capt. Hallahan commanding, was placed under the orders of Maj. Bell, U. S. V. engineers, in charge of the office of Military Information, with a view to utilizing a ravine for a concealed advance, in the hope of deriving advantage from the sudden and unexpected appearance of troops on that part of the field. This duty, which was special in its nature, and also involved the pos- sibility of extra hazard, was well performed.” Cainpai(rning in the Philippines. 19 Capt. Hallahaii, in a personal interview with Gen. MacArthur, received the instructions for his command. The company, at 1:30 on the afternoon of the battle, concealed by a rank growth of bamboos and grasses, took position some distance in advance of the troops. At the preconcerted signal, the discharge of a cannon, the men stealthily crawled forward, unobserved by the enemy, endeavor- ing to gain the left flank of the enemy’s trenches, and to drive them therefrom by enfilading fire. When within 300 yards, they opened on the enemy, and were then attacked both front and rear. After a determined stand, the firing from the insurgents in the rear subsided, the rest of the American forces having in the mean- time commenced their advance. Capt. Hallahan then moved forward and soon arrived at his destination, the final charge being made with fixed bayonets, ammunition having given out. Company D arrived at Caloocan about the same time from the other direction. Privates James Casey and William E. Edwards of Company M raised the American flag on the town at 5:15 p. m., while rebel bullets were still flying. The ardor of the Montana boys was such, and the “niggers” ran so well, that our men were carried over a mile beyond their destination, but before nightfall were ordered back to Caloocan. The insurgents had fired the village before evacuating and nothing was standing save the railroad shops and the church, which had been used as a fort and partly ruined by the shells from the battleships in the bay. The victory, however, was costly. Private Frederick Hall of the band, was killed. The following were wounded: Lieut. Col. R. B. Wallace; Private John C. Bullard, Company A; Musician Seth H. Dibble, Company A.; Corp. David A. Bruneau, Company A; Private Adolph F. Charette, Company A; Sergt. Everett Metcalf, Company B; Sergt. Geo. W. Lowman, Company D; Private James M. Box, Company D; Private Edward G. Reynolds, Company D; Capt. Wm. F. Hill, Company F; Lieut. Wm. C. Gardenhire, Company F; Private James Cravere, Company F; Pri- vate James W. Kennedy, Com- pany G ; Private Delos D. Bab- cock, Company G; Artificer Wm. J. Borthwick, Company G; Pri- vate Karl J. Peterson, Company G; Private Thomas Malloy, Company K; Private John J. Campbell, Company M (died February 16th); Private Joseph Callahan, Company M, and Private Clarence G. Briggs of the band (died February 12th), a total of one killed and twenty wounded. Private Percy C. Bullard, Company I, had been wounded the day before. The Montana boys now entrenched themselves a little beyond Caloocan and to the right of the railroad track, and here they remained until March 24th, when 20 Campaigniuir m the Philippines. further advance was ordered. The camp consisted of a long single row of shelter tents, pitched directly in the trenches, and here, for a month and a half, the soldiers, from Colonel down, slept, ate, drank, chatted, wrote letters and fought The life was trying. Outposts were maintained at some distance to the front, and this dangerous duty was attended with frequent casualties. In the trenches it was necessary to be on the alert at all hours of the day and night. The favorite hours for insurgent attack were 11 at night, and 8 in the morning; but at any time one was likel}' to be disturbed at mess, during a nap, or while washing or shaving, and compelled to pick up the rifle for an exchange of compliments with the dusk}^ warriors. Such things as leaves-of-absence were unknown. Ever^^one had to sta}' right on the fighting-line. From Malabon, separated by a marsh and an arm of the sea, the deadly fire of the insurgents entirely covered the camp. The bullets came not only from the front but also from the rear. The dangerousness of the position is attested by the following list of casualties, which occured during the occupation: killed. Private Henry C. Beecher, Company A, on March 1 5th ; wounded , Private Francis G. A n s p a c h , Company A, Feb- ruary 25th ; Pri- vate Alvin F. Plottner, A, Feb- ruary 28th ; Pri- vate Otto Nel- son, A, February 23d ; Private John \V. Shan- non, A, Febru- ary 23d; Private Charles Brinton, B, February 11th; Private Martin Hyman, B, February 22d; Private John F. Funn, C, Februar}^ 23d; Private Glen Hurd, C, February 23d; Private Albert S. Hicks, C, February 25th; Private William F. Kraemer, D, February 23d ; Private Frederick A. Chaxel, F, Februar}' 23d ; Private Theodore H. Manchester, G, February 23d; Private Edward S. Moore, G, Febru- ary 27th (died February 28th); Private William A. Bonham, I, February 23d; 1st Lieut. Philip Greenan, K, February 23d; Private Howard L. Turner, K, Feb- ruary 28th ; Private Thomas P. Dunn, L, February 23d ; Private William J. Cheastey, M, Februar}^ 28th, and Private Alfred Cashmore of the band, ^larch 2d ; a total of one killed and one wounded, in this period. There was much suffering from the heat, the poor quality of the food, the bad- ness of the water, the unhealthiness of the neighborhood, and the close confine- ment to the camp. The days at Caloocan were unrelieved by engagements of any magnitude. The events of February 23d are, however, noteworthy. On that day a formidable uprising was undertaken in the city of Manila by the combined efforts of the natives, assisted by insurgent soldiers, who had apparently passed our lines VIEWS IN TIIK INTERIOR OF EUZON. -- Ca})ipaig)iing in the Philippuies. disguised, for the purpose of eiicouragiiig their friends in the city. Information of a successful attack by natives on the Tondo car-shed of the tramway line con- necting ]\Ianila and IMalabon, and which lay directly on the road from camp to the city, was reported to Gen. MacArthur. The enemy was thus cutting off commun- ication with Manila. Troops of the Provost Guard was sent in their pursuit, and Company L, accompanied by Maj. Mallory, of the division staff, assisted from the other direction to effect their dislodgement, which was soon accomplished. Corp. William A. Stedman was wounded and kieut. Eugene S. French was killed under circumstances that illustrated the treacherous nature of the foe. A party of natives had been cornered and so hard pressed that the}^ raised a white flag to invoke the mercy of our sharpshooters. French commanded his men to cease firing, and while he was assuring the insur- gents in a few words of Spanish of their safety, one of them quickly picked up a rifle concealed in the grass and inflicted a wound upon him of which he instantly died. Fred S. Yaeger and George E. Kumpe were mustered in as 2d Lieutenants on March 6th and 24th, respectively. The forward movement, which culminated in the capture of Malolos, the rebel capital, began for the Montanas on the night of March 24th. On the fighting line the 3d Art. and Kansas were to be at the left, then the Montanas and the Pennsylvanias at their right. To effect the new arrangement the Montanas, under the cover of darkness, marched from Caloocan to La Loma Church, a dis- tance of three miles. At this time the total fighting strength, through casualties and disease, had dwindled to 42 officers and 796 enlisted men. The entire regi- ment was united, except Compain’^ A (Capt. Moran), which had been temporarily detailed as guard in town and arrived too late to reach La Loma, but which, re- porting to Gen. Wheaton, fought with the 2d Oregons at ^lalabon, joining its own command on the morning of the 27th. All soldiers were provided with 200 rounds of ammunition, weighing about twenty pounds, and twenty-four hours’ rations. The main body of the insurgent army had been located by reconnoissance at Polo and Xovaliches, but the enemy was strongly entrenched on the farther banks of the Tuliahan River, a stream averaging a width of forty feet and a depth of five feet, and running nearly parallel to the old Caloocan-La Loma entrenchments at a distance of about three miles in front. The ground which was to be taken, placed our troops at serious disadvantage. For the most part it consisted of hard, dried- up rice fields terraced down to the enemy’s position, who was concealed b}’ the rank growth of bamboo along the banks of the Tuliahan. The scheme was for the 2d Brigade, under Hale, to execute a turning movement, come upon the enemy from the rear, and thus imprison him between the 1st Brigade, which in- cluded the Montanas, in front, and the 2d Brigade behind. On account of the dense tropical jungle, it could not be carried out. The start was made in line of skirmishers at 6 a. m.. Col. Kessler in com- mand. Wallace, with H, K, and C, was to the left of the road leading north ; Campaigning in the Philippines. Cook, \\ith M, E, G, and D, to his left, and Miller, with E, F, I, and B, to the left of Cook. Some confusion was caused by Pennsylvania companies getting in between the ‘2d and 3d Battalions, but this was soon straightened out. The enemy’s fire proved deadly from the first. Sharp resistance was encountered at every inch of the ground. Almost more harassing than the hostile bullets, were the blighting rays of the tropical sun, and the thorns of the jungle which tore clothes and flesh. Heat prostrations were numerous and had soon decimated the command. The entrenchments at the Tuliahan were formidable works, but the well- directed bullets from our side soon cleared them of living Filipinos. Two strong block-houses of the enemy also impeded the progress of the Montanas, but EMBARKING FOR MANILA. Companies D and G killed six insurgents by firing at and through the port-holes. It was the latter Company, too, that suffered most severely on this day. By 10 o’clock in the morning the trenches had been cleared, and the Montanas took a well-deserved rest on the near bank of the Tuliahan. At noon, the entire command crossed, the 1st Battalion wading through water that reached to the armpits, and the 2d, about waist deep. The 8d came up the Polo Road, and forded at the Malabon pumping station. Here, just north of the river, the Montanas pitched camp, or rather laid down on the ground in their company formation for a few hours’ rest, for they had no tents, no bedding, and no blankets. The losses of the day were: killed. Private Percy R. Lockhart and Private Steve Stephens, both of Company G; Private William Meitschke, M, and Artificer Joseph A. J. Beckmann, F. Private Robert Brown, G, died the next day of a mortal wound received at the Tuliahan. The wounded were Private Thomas Rickard, Company D; Private John Cavanaugh, E; Private James Enright, E; 24 Cai)ipaigning in the Philippines. Musician James M, McOuary, E; Private George T. Banks, E; Private William H. McCarthy, G; Private Hayes Axtell, G; Private Gomer Williams, G ; Private Joseph P. Meyer, G; Private John T. McLaughlin, G; Private Charles E. Young, G ; 2d Lieut. ]\Iyles Kelly, H ; Private Louis Pollat, H ; Private Edvard J. Lynn, I ; Private Edward ]\I. Weaver, I, and Private John TC Robinson, M ; a total of five killed and sixteen wounded, of which three killed and six wounded belonged to Company G. Fighting the next day was desultory. Early in the morning the regiment formed column of fours and marched northward until it came in sight of Polo and the railroad. The dense smoke of the burning village of Malabon, which the rebels had put to the torch before evacuation, obscured the horizon to the west. In the early afternoon Gen. H. G. Otis had a drill of his brigade. Later, the marc h was resumed, and by 5 p. m. the regiment was encamped in the trenches of the* e nemy a mile or so north of Polo and to the right of the track of the Manila and IJagnpan Railway. Xearby was a salt-water pond, and most of the men availed themselves of the opportunity of a cooling bath, although the whistle of occasional bullets from rebel sharpshooters was still to be heard. To the front the glare of burning towns, abandoned by the enemy, lit up the night. Maj. and Surgeon Francis J. Adams, who had been in the thickest of the fight, binding up wounds and alleviating the suffering of those overcome by heat, and Private Edward Mor- rissey, Company B, were wounded this day (March 26th). On the 27th, the regiment was in reserve, the 3d U. S. Art. constituting the firing line of the 1st Brigade. Camp was broken about 6:45 A. m., and the march proceeded in column of fours. Meycauayan was reached about 10:30 a. m. At about 5 p. 31. the command moved northward on the road about a mile, to the Marilao River, finding the bridge destroyed. Here it bivouacked for the night. The road to the rear was crowded with the supply train of the army, and means had to be provided for its crossing. Fording was impossible, for the river was from fifteen to twenty feet deep. Under the direction of Capt. Francis P. Shrink of the Corps of Engineers, the Montanas built a pontoon bridge. Work was begun about 9 p. 3i. Some cascoes were found in the river and lumber was obtained from the church. This lumber was very hard and heavy. Much of it had to be sawed into suitable lengths, and there was much delay on account of having only one saw. The bridge was supported by two cascoes, one transverse to the length of the bridge, the other longitudinal. It was finished by 7 :30 a. 3i. the next morning, details of sixty men each working all night for two-hour shifts. The position of reserve is almost as perilous as the firing line, for eight men were wounded this day (March 27th). They were Private Harry T. Athay, A; Pri- vate Theodore Volkey, C; Private William H. Yost, G; Private Frank A. Gibson, H; Corp. Joseph Lorenz, I; Private Seymour Addison, I; Private John T. Tier- ney, K, and Private Lawrence Keenan, K. During the afternoon Maj. Miller LAST MAX ABOARD. Cauipaigning in the Philippines. 25 crossed the ri'ver to the left, in cascoes, with Companies I and B, to protect the left flank of the 8d Art., who were just then in considerable straits. Early on the 28th, the Marilao River was crossed on the bridge which had been built. The day was quite uneventful. The regiment advanced to Bocaue, and camped there. There were no casualties on this day. At b:80 the next morning (March 2hth) the 2d and 8d Battalions (Cook’s and Miller’s) were formed in line of skirmishers and the 1st (Wallace’s') was held as support. The advance proceeded amid the whistle of rebel bullets. By 10 o’clock Bocaue bridge was passed, and Bigaa to the front was burning, set afire b}^ the fleeing insurgents. It was taken by our troops by 1 p. m. It was now necessary to wait for the supply train. The draught animal in the Philippines is the carabao, or water buffalo, and the speed of this ponderous beast is about five miles a day, and he had been entirely unable to keep up with the in- fantry. At Marilao, however, most of the food had been transferred to a railway train, and this now came up, carrying also an abundant supply of good water. Through the lack of water the troops had suffered much, for that which had been encountered by the way, was not only “green, crawling and stinkin’ ,” like Gunga Din’s in Kipling’s poem, but .strongly brackish as well. The troops were issued LBAVING GOLDEN GATE. rations, made a hasty meal, and by 3:15 p. m. were again under way. The com- mand crossed on the railroad bridge and camped near Guiguinto. The casualties for the day (March 29th) were the following, wounded: Corp. William H. Tol- bert, A; Private James P. Eennox, E; Private Axel Peterson, E; Private William Borkowski, F; Private Edward Bowen, F; Private Frederick Wheaton, H, (died next day); Private Alex. F. Smith, H, and Private Charles F. Meyer, H; a total of eight. Col. Kessler’s orderly, William G. Marshall, of Company D, was killed on this day while standing by the Colonel’s side, holding his horse. There were no further casualties until after Malolos had been taken. The advance next day (March 30th) was again delayed by shortage of rations. It began at 2 o’clock in the afternoon in column of fours, but some resistance being encountered. Companies A and F were deployed as skirmishers. The enemy soon fled, and the regiment bivouacked at Santa Isabel, about three miles from Malolos, by the side of the Kansas and the 3d Art. Malolos could have been gained the same day, but owing to the fact that it was the rebel capital, considerable resistance was anticipated, and this was confirmed by natives who entered the American lines from the north, during the day of the Campaigning in the Philippines. 2 () oOth. From the boasts of the insurgents, a desperate stand, it was believed, was to be made. Malolos was known to be strongly entrenched. Preparations were accordingly made for a premeditated battle of considerable proportions, the *2d Brigade being to the right of the railway track and the 1st to the left, Montana in the center of the latter, between the 3d Art. on its left and the Kansas on its right. An artillery bombardment of twenty-five minutes opened the engagement, and thereafcer, at 7:25 A. m., March 31st, the advance of the infantry began. Although there was a large force of insurgents present, there was but little opposition. The enemy seemed to have been thoroughly cowed by this time by their constant defeat. Montana moved forwards in line as skirmishers, and by 10 K - .MR .RACING .\T Ho-xoLULr. o’clock the towii wus reached. At 10:30 the 2d Battalion (Cook) received orders to enter. The convent, which had been occupied bv Aguinaldo as headquarters was found in flames, and the last dozen or so retreating P'ilipinos fired from behind street barricades of stones. The Montana men charged, killed some, and routed the rest. A flag belonging to some members of Company G was soon hoisted, and it was the first American flag to wave over the rebel captial. The regiment went into camp in a line about a mile long on the banks of a small creek north of Malolos, remaining there nearly two months. The problem now was to ascertain the direction taken by the fleeing enemy. Two days later (April 2d), the 3d Battalion, under Maj. Miller, composed of Com- panies F, I, B and A, made a reconnoissance to the north in the neighborhood of the Bagbag River and found the enemy in considerable force on the opposite bank. No one was hurt. On April 4th, the entire regiment, accompanied by two 3.2-inch field pieces and one Colt’s automatic gun, the latter borrowed from the navy and in charge of Lieut. Cleland Davis, U. S. N., made another reconnoissance in the same direc- tion, along the railway. The start was made at 5:30 A. m., and by 10 o’clock the regiment reached a point within two hundred yards of the Bagbag. The enem}^ had strong trenches, masked by banana trees, on the other bank. One span of the railway bridge had been broken. The 1st and 3d Battalions found shelter in a clump of bamboos, but the 2d (Cook’s), being in the lead, was compelled to lay in the open rice fields, exposed to the glaring sun, and the enemy’s bullets, as well. A messenger was sent to Gen. Mac Arthur and the return to Malolos or- dered by him, and commenced by 5:30 p. m. The day had been very trying to the 2d Battalion. Over thirty men were prostrated by the intense heat, and Corp. Owen H. Rowlands, Company L, was killed, and Principal Musician George Crowell, Private \Vm. J. Boast, Company G, and Private Frank Landreman, M, were wounded. On April 14th a permanent scouting and reconnoitering detachment was or- ganized under Maj. Bell, of Gen. MacArthur’s staff, and 1st Lieut. Charles W. Mead, Company D, was put in practical charge. Lieut. Mead’s experience as civil engineer and his ability at map making, as well as his fearlessness in pene- trating into the lines of the enemy, proved of great service at divisioiCheadquar- Campaigning in the Philippines. 27 ters. Corp. D. W. Vickers of Company D and Private W. Chatelle of E, were other Montana men on this detachment. Gen. MacArthur had established his headquarters in the building formerly oc- cupied by the insurgent treasury. It contained, among other things, three prom- ising looking safes. Hospital Corps Private Alex. G. Ralston, formerly of the Montana Regiment, was detailed to break them open. Two were found empty, but the third yielded over $23,000 in Mexican mone 3 v Eife at Malolos was much the same as it had been in the trenches at Caloocan. There was the same necessity of being constantly on the alert, and in attendance on camp, to await the favorite night attacks of the enem 3 \ Outpost duty, occa- sional drills and going to the train for rations was the order of the da^^ All water had to be brought from Manila on the cars, for the wells of the neighbor- hood are strongly brackish. Private Joseph A. Wright of Company B was wounded on April 13th. The Montanas had, in the meantime, fought their battles with the Springfield rifle, an antiquated weapon, which placed them at great disadvantage with the Filipinos, who were mostly provided with Mausers. The Springfields could shoot well to a distance of 800 3 'ards; the Mausers twice that far. So, it will be seen, an insurgent could safely stand, say 1500 yards awa}^, and inflict the most deadly punishment on our boys. Throughout the campaign there had been experiences of having to advance through a hail of hostile bullets for quite a distance before the fire of the shorter ranged Springfields could be made effective. The use of smokeless powder soon destroyed the rifling of the barrels, and the bamboos of the jungles through which it became necessary to fire, deflected the heavy lead bullets of the Springfield. The Montana boys were now (about the middle of April) partly armed with Krag-Jorgensens, twenty-five of these to each compaii}', and so became a much more formidable fighting body. In April, Col. Kessler became ill and had to keep to his bed in Manila. Rieut. Col. Wallace took temporary" command. Col. Kessler rejoined at the Rio Grande. The monotony and humdrum of garrison duty at Malolos was becoming distasteful. The boys longed to again go “on the hike, ’ ’ and when, on April 22d, Gen, MacArthur’s field order (No. 26), ordering further advance, was re- ceived, every one was well pleased. The plan contemplated an advance of only ten miles, but necessitated the crossing of two wide and deep rivers, the Ragbag and Rio Grande de la Pampanga, and the taking of two fortifications of the enemy, much more formidable than any hitherto encountered. Upon these works the rebels had built almost their last hopes, and Col. Aguelles, Chief of Staff to Gen. Tuna, the insurgent commander in the premises, who afterwards entered our lines to negoti- ate for a suspension of hostilities, said that he had been charged by his chief to 28 Caitipaigniug in the Philippines. express the warmest admiration of the valor of the American soldier in fording the Rio Grande, a feat which theretofore by them had been considered impossible. On April 24th, the regiment moved about a mile north without resistance. A halt was made to give the 2d Brigade, which was making a detour to the right, a chance to come up. By the next morning at 6 o’clock (April 25th) the command was again under way, this time advancing cautiously in line of skirmishers, and reaching the Bagbag a little before noon. The engagement that followed was sharp, but short, and by 1 o’clock the enemy was dislodged. The Kansas were to the right of the railway and the Montanas to the left. In the center was the armored car, carrying four cannon and Gatling guns. Musician William Patton, Company H, and Private Joseph E. Jette, Company K, were wounded, and Private James Kenned}^ Company K, was drowned while bathing in the Bagbag. A span of the railroad bridge was down, as had been thertofore determined by the reconnoissance of April 4th. It became necessary, therefore, to wait until the engineers could erect a suit- able foot bridge, the river being entirely unfordable. This task was completed - during the night. Next morning, April 26th, the Kansas and Montana boys crossed and advanced in deployed lines to some abandomed trenches within 600 3^ards of the Rio Grande. The river at this point is about 200 feet wide, very deep and swift, and runs between steep, high banks. The steel bridge had been de- nuded of all timbers. Only the frame- work was left intact. On the opposite bank lay the main body of the Filipino army, out-numbering our men three to one. It was protected b}' elaborate field fortifications, constructed of railroad iron and boiler plates. Mounted so as to icommand the bridge were three pieces of artillery and a rapid-fire Maxim gun. The main body of our forces being screened from the enemy’s fire, detach- ments and small parties of skirmishers, Kansas and Montana men, were advanced and siezed all sheltered places near the river and within long rifle range of the bridge. Two brick and stone buildings near the river were occupied and loop- holed for musketry. The machine guns and a part of the artillery were placed in position for fire upon the enemy’s entrenchments. The river was reconnoitered below the railroad bridge for the purpose of ascertaining any place possible to cross. A constant and continued fire of Montana sharpshooters was kept up, and slow but continuous fire from the three 2-inch guns. The distance separating the combatants was scarcely greater than a stone’s throw. The losses of the day were Sergt. Thomas G. Anderson, Company B, and Private James A. Callahan, 'LIGHTHOUSE. AT CORKEGIDOR. Caiiipaii^nijig in the Philippines. 29 K, killed; and Private Andrew Davis, B; Corp. Adolph M. Clay, F; Private Edward B. Harvey, I, and Sergt. James O’ Deary, M, wounded. The fusilade and cannonade were kept up the morning of the next day (April 27th). Part of the Kansas Regiment, about forty men, crossed on a raft and en- filaded the enemy. By 1 o’clock the fire had subsided to such an extent that the river could be crossed. The Montana men, carrying only their rifles and ammu- nition, pushed across such framework of the bridge as was still standing. On reaching the north bank, two bodies of the enemy, each about two thousand strong, and which had evidently been guarding the river below, were observed, about one and a half miles to the left They moved in a deployed line, extended order, and advanced, but after being subjected to fire about twenty minutes, fell back in disorder and retreated out of range. The Kansas and Montanas drove them beyond Apalit Station, in the direction of Santo Tomas. In the distance the smoke of a locomotive was seen, hauling a trainload of Filipino warriors for whom running was not sufficiently fast. One cannon was captured. Thecasual- MANILA AND MALABON RAILROAD. ties were: killed. Private Charles A. Murphy, Company M; wounded, Maj. John R. Miller; Private James Tierney, Company B; Private Gotlieb Molsen, C; Capt. Andrew Jensen, E; Private Martin B. Hall, F; Private Frank E. Tate, F; Private John Kirley, K, and Private Robert Murphy, K. The regiment then camped in the town of Apalit for a week, Company G acting as Provost Guard. The advance was resumed on May 4th, at 4:15 A. m. The Montanas and their old partners, the Kansas, held to the railway. The fire of the enemy was at its height at about 10 o’clock. The insurgents had set fire to Santo Tomas, and the contest was for the six-span railway bridge over the Malolos River. By 11 :30 A. m. the bridge was taken, but it was found that one span was destroyed. After the bridge was passed, a considerable number of the enemy were found strongly entrenched at the Santo Tomas Station, and from there delivering a galling fire. A charge was made, and the insurgents routed with considerable loss, thirty prisoners being taken. The regiment bivouacked in Santo Tomas. The work of the day had Mont. 3 30 Campciigning in the Philippines. been the most exhausting of the campaign, but the results were entirely satisfactory. The countr}’ traversed is swamp}- and intersected with numierous streams. The heat was son:ething indescribable, and many were overcome. The casualties were: Private Thcmas Scallcn, Company K, killed; and Private Fred W. Smith, Corn- pan}- C, Capt. Thomas S. Dillon, Company K, and Private Bruce Belknap, Company K, wounded. On the 5th, the regiment remained at Santo Tomas. San Fernando, the objective point, was captured by the 2d Brigade on this day, but the 1st Brigade could not break camp on account of the delay in bringing forward the supply train. On the 6th, at 5:30 A. m., the 2d and 3d Battalions set out on a reconnoissance to the west, but finding no enemy returned to Santo Tomas at about 10:30. At 11:30 A. M. the command marched into San Fernando, occupying deserted native houses on the north bank of the San Fer- nando River and to the west of the railw-ay. It made no further advance from here, but for the next two months was part of the garrison of the towm, the prin- cipal part of the Filipino army being here held at bay. The regiment had reached its new camp wdth less than 450 men able to do duty. To the Montanas w-as assigned the duty of protecting the w-estern limits of the tow-n, which involved the guarding of the road to Bacolor. Beyond this town, at Santa Rita and Porac, w^as stationed a large division of the insurgent army under Gen. Mascardo. On May 7th, the Companies H and K made a reconnoissance under Capt. Green, but found no enemy. On the 8th, the outpost was attacked. The entire regiment was under arms, and 1st Sergt. Patrick McBride of Company K was wounded. On the 17th, a platoon of Company L made a reconnoissance. On May 19th, Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace was appointed Provost Marshal of San Fernando, and the 1st Battalion became the Provost Guard. They w^ere re- lieved on May 25th. On the 24th of May, the insurgents completely surrounded and isolated the American forces at San Fernando. On parts of the line the attack was made as early as 3 o’clock in the morning, but there was no firing on the Montana patrol until about 5:30 A. m. Col. Kessler took out the whole regiment. The enemy was occupying a long and deep entrenchment to the west of the town. Tw^o bat- talions of the Montanas, Companies A, F, G, H, K, L, H and C, took position unobserved at one of his flanks and two battalions of Kansas on the other. The Montanas then began the fire, which caused the insurgents to run from their end of the ditch only to fall into the hands of the Kansans at the other end. The slaughter was great, and the enemy fled towards Bacolor in wild confusion. The Montanas went in pursuit of them, advancing as far as Bacolor, but the fleetness of the Filipinos before the volleys sent after them, was such that our boys had to give up the race at this place, and returned to camp. It had been necessary to wade, part of the distance, through rice fields filled with water, and the physical Ca})ipaignin(r in the Philippines. 31 effort attending this was indescribably exhausting. The casualties were: Corp. James C. Taylor, Company F; Private Joseph Frantzen, F; Private George B. Raymond, G, and Private Barney O’Niel, M, wounded. June od, the outpost was again fired upon. Private Theodore Schuele, of Company C, was wounded. On the Ifith, another extended attack was made by the enemy. The events of that day show the peculiar methods of the Filipinos, and illustrates to what extent they are in the habit of violating the most ordinary rules of civilized warfare. Company C was on outpost. At the extreme left, Corp. Charles J. Lisle and Privates William Howen, William Kincade and Lester P\ Pierstorff were on guard. About 5:15 A. m., they were approached by a party of 150 Filipinos in single file, carrying white flags. The fact that the part}^ instead of coming up the road, was advancing across the rice fields, and also the regularity of their formation, excited suspicion and led the guards to think that they might not be what they pretended, namely, friendly natives, seeking pro- tection. In order to test their intentions, one shot was fired at them, knowing that if they were friendly they would fall to the ground to wait for identifica- tion. Instead, a volley from their concealed Mausers was the response, and they were thus revealed in a true light. Our fire that followed soon put them to rout. After an hour and a half’s sharp fight, in which all the forces in San Fernando were engaged, the enemy fled. Over 150 of them were killed. Sergt. George W. Boardman, Company A; Sergt. James W. Dennis, D; Private Warren Morris, C ; Private Charles Robb, E, and Private David Silver, M, were wounded. The latter died of his wounds the same day. To make the lesson an impressive one to the natives, the division commander ordered all of the enemy killed to be brought to San Fernando and laid together in one place in the cemetery, so that the amount of punishment would be realized. This was the last battle in which the Montanas took part. On June 10th, Companies D and L made a reconnoissance of the countrjr lying between Bacolor and Santa Rita. They found the enemy in some force and had a sharp brush with him. Privates Abraham Clem and Wil- liam F. Kraemer, both of Com- pany D, were wounded. On June 22d, the enemy again attacked the right of the outpost line, and the regiment was ordered out, but there was no engagement on the Montana front. The department commander had, in the meantime, promised Montana outpost attack. to relieve the regiment from garrison duty at San Fernando. The term of enlist- ment had long expired, for war with the Spaniards had ended a year before. Other volunteers were being sent home, and as the rainy season, which was then a month old, prevented the further prosecution of active warfare, they, too, thought it should soon be their turn to embark for America. Accordingly, on the 28th of June, the 32 Campaigning in the Philippines. 3d Battalion, composed of Companies F, I, B and A, were sent to Cavite. The former two were kept in the town, and the two latter, under :\Iaj. Miller, occupied an outpost of Cavite, at Punta Caridad. On the 29th, the rest of the regiment, headquarters, band, and the 1st and 2d Battalions, moved from their quarters to the south side of the river to make room for the 12th U. S. Inf., which was to relieve the Montanas, and on July 3d these, too, left San Fernando, stopping at Manila. On the 6th, headquarters, band, and the 1st Battalion proceeded to Cavite for guard and provost duty, relieving the California Heavy Artillery. Col. Kessler was put in command of the District of Cavite. On the 12th, the 2d Bat- talion was ordered from Manila to Zapote bridge. Soon after their arrival the river began to rise and the country became a lake. Storing their baggage on the roofs of houses and on rafts moored to high trees, the men sought higher ground at Bacoor, three miles awa}^ wading and swimming along the highroad. By the 25th, the floods had subsided sufficiently to permit of return. The following promotions were made before leaving the Philippines: Philip Greenan, Captain, August 1st; Walter J. Bradshaw, Captain, July 14th; John F. Mercer, Captain, August 15th; Asa L. Duncan, Major, May 11th; James F. Keown, Major, May 9th; William C. Gardenhire, 1st Lieutenant, May 1st; Valen- tine Laubenheimer, 1st Lieutenant, July 24th; Arthur O’Leary, 1st Lieutenant, July 5th; Edward J. Gainan, 1st Lieutenant, July 22d; Fred S. Yaeger, 1st Lieu- tenant, July 14th; George E. Kumpe, 1st Lieutenant, August 2d; Colin S. Hill, 2d Lieutenant, May 1st, (John C. Heilig being ap- pointed Sergeant Major in his place on the same day); Charles W. Lane, 2d Lieutenant, Jul}^ 24th, (Lloyd R. Hood being made Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant in his place); Archibald Logan, 2d Lieutenant, July 5th; George E. Lowman, 2d Lieutenant, August 3d; Alexander Laist, 2d Lieutenant, xAugust 5th; Charles H. Virden, 2d Lieutenant, August 18th; Arthur W. Church, 2d Lieutenant, August 4th; Byron H. Cook, Lieutenant-Colonel, August 4th; Arthur W. Stoddard, 2d Lieutenant, August 18th; William H. Poorman, 1st Lieutenant, July 14th. Preparations for return now actively began. ‘Such Government property' as was no more needed was turned in. Three regiments of veterans were being organized and for these the Montanas furnished fifty-five enlisted men as recruits, besides the following officers: R. B. Wallace, Colonel, 37th U. S. V. Inf.; Daniel T. Bowman, 1st Lieutenant; A. J. Erickson, Captain; William B. Hanna, Captain; John E. Moran, Captain; E. D. Murphy, 1st Lieutenant, all the same regiment; Frank E. Green, Captain, 11th U. S. V. Cav. (Lockett’s), and Charles W. Mead and Charles French, Captains, 36th U. S. V. Inf. (Bell’s). Seventy -six enlisted men were discharged at Manila to engage in civil pursuits in the land which they had helped to add to America. First Lieutenant Byron J. McIntyre also remained, to open a law ig in the Philippines. 41 paiiy L, 1st Montana Inf., U. S. V., and served with the regiment a part of 1898 and 1899. He was promoted to the rank of Major in July, 1899. W. B. KNOWLTON, 1st Lieutenant, Regimental Adjutant, was born in Wis- consin, August 13, 1868. He belonged to the National Guard in Montana for eight years before the outbreak of the Spanish- American War. He was mustered in at the outbreak of the war as 2d Lieutenant of Company G, and was promoted to 1st Lieutenant of the same company, December 26, 1898, at the resignation of Lieut. Paxson. He was appointed Regimental Adjutant, January 24, 1899. He was with his regiment in all engagements. WILLIAM BROWN, Battalion Adjutant of the 1st Battalion, under Maj. Miller, and Regimental Commissary Officer, was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, November 12, 1872. He came to America in July, 1889. He joined the National Guard in Montana. He first joined a troop in the winter of 1892-93, and was then promoted to Corporal in Company C, Infantry, and was commissioned 2d Lieutenant in 1893, and promoted to 1st Lieutenant in 1894, in the same company. He resigned and joined the Signal Corps, and was two years in that order, under Maj. Miller. The Signal Corps was abolished, and a battery of light artiller3y Battery A, was organized. Commencing service therein as 1st Sergeant, he held that appointment until the Spanish-American War, which he entered as Battalion Adjutant, 1st Montana, already commissioned first in the 45th U. S. V. WILLIAM B. HANNA, 1st Lieutenant and Battalion Adjutant, was born in Indianapolis, Ind., 1874. He was enrolled and mustered in as Sergeant in Company L, 1st Montana, U. S. V., May 5, 1898, at Helena, Mont., and appointed 1st Lieu- tenant and Battalion Adjutant, May 11, 1898, to fill the original vacancy. He was on special dut^" as Inspector of Immigrants, per Special Order 123, Headquarters Department Pacific and 8th Army Corps, dated November 30, 1898. He was on special duty as Captain of the Port at Iloilo, Island of Panay, per Paragraph 3, General Orders 8, Headquarters U. S. Military' Governor in Philippines, dated March 14, 1899. He was discharged, July 13, 1899, to accept a commission as Captain in the 37th U. S. V. JAMES M. CROFT, 1st Lieutenant, 3d Battalion Adjutant, was born in Waterbury, New Haven County, Conn., January 3, 1858. He went to Montana in the spring of 1881, and has been engaged in business there ever since. His first military service was in Company A, 2d Connecticut National Guard. He served four years ^ in that company, and was promoted to Corporal. He next became identified with the National Guard in Montana, March 19, 1898, when he was elected 2d Lieutenant, and afterward commissioned by Governor Smith in Company I, 1st Montana National Guard. He was mustered into the service of the United States, May 7, 1898, as 2d Lieutenant, Company I, 1st Montana Inf., U. S. V. He was promoted to 1st Lieutenant and Battalion Adjutant, September 28, 1899. He has been constantly with the regiment since the mustering into service, and has been present at all engagements in which the regiment has 42 CaDipaigiiifig in the PhiUppines. participated, with the exception of one, the engagement of June 16th at San Fernando. He was detailed as exchange officer in Manila, November 25, 1898. He was assigned to the command of Company M at Malolos on April 17, 1899, and commanded the company from that date until July 1, 1899. He returned with the regiment from San Fernando to Manila, July 3, 1899, and was assigned to duty as Adjutant of the 1st Battalion, July 5, 1899. He is Adjutant of the battalion up to the present time. The battalion was detached and sent to Zapote bridge, July 12, 1899, where it remained until August 13, 1899, when it was relieved and proceeded to Manila, preparatory to taking passage on the transport for the United States. He was appointed and commissioned by the President as Captain in the 37th U. S. Inf., in July, 1899, but declined for private reasons. FRANCIS JOSEPH ADAMS, Major and Staff Surgeon, 1st Montana Inf., was born at Fort Crook, Cal., December 16, 1859. He was a graduate of the University of Georgetown, classical and medical department. He was resident physician of the Children’s Hospital of Washington, D. C. From 1881 to 1885 he was Assistant Surgeon of the U. S. Army stationed at New York Harbor and at Newport, R. I., and the Department of Columbia and the Department of Da- kota. He accepted the appointment as Assistant Instructor in the St. Eouis Post Graduate Medical School. He went to Great Falls, Mont., in 1891, and en- gaged in civil practice there. He was appointed Major-Surgeon of the 1st Mon- tana, May 1, 1898, served in that capacity through the Spanish-American War, and was appointed Brigade Surgeon, 1st Brigade, December, 1898, and served on the staffs of Gen. Otis, Gen. Uloyd Wheaton and Gen. Fred Funston. He had charge of the Canacoa Hospital for Filipino prisoners from July 1st until August 23d, and was wounded at Polo, March 26, 1899. He was sent with Col. Wallace, as hostage, to the insurgent forces under Gen. Tuna at Santo Tomas. Maj. Adams is a member of the Sons of the American Revolution and the Aztec Society, Mexican War. U. C. BRUNING, 1st Eieutenant, Assistant Surgeon, was born in Louisville, Ky., November 3, 1867. -He graduated from the University of Louisville in 1894, serving as House Surgeon in the Louisville City Hospital during 1894 and 1395. He practiced the profession in Miles City, Mont., until the outbreak of the Spanish-American War and has been serving during the Philippine campaign. LE ROY SOUTHMAYD, 1st Lieutenant, Assistant Surgeon, was born in Alder Gulch, Mont., July 19, 1869. He was educated at the University of Michigan in arts and medicine. He was appointed by the Governor of Montana as 1st Lieutenant, Assistant Surgeon, May 4, 1898, and was with the regiment until its arrival in the Philippines, when he was placed on detached duty at Cavite Hospital. He was on duty at the hospital from August 23, 1898, until December 9, 1898, and was then transferred to the 2d Reserve Hospital in Manila, and was on duty there from the 9th of December until April 15, 1899. During this time he was also chief of the ambulances of the 1st Division, 8th Army Corps, and served daily in the field in that capacity with the troops of the 1st Division, participating Campaigning in the Philippines. 4a in all their engagements np to that time and then was returned to the regiment, after repeated request by the Major-Surgeon of the regiment at Malolos, and made the advance with them from there to San Fernando, participating in all engage- ments. He returned to San Francisco on the U. S. transport Zealandia. G. C. STULL, Chaplain, 1st Montana, was born in Pennsylvania in 1858 and came to Montana in 1882, and was appointed by Gov. Rickards as Chaplain of the National Guard in 1892. He was appointed by Gov. Smith, Chaplain of the 1st Montana in May, 1898, and has been with that regiment constantly since. His duties have varied from the distribution of shoe strings and the taking of money and valuables of the men, to getting the last message from the dying soldier and committing his body to the ground in the lonely cemeteries in Manila. At no time has he been sick or incapacitated from duty and was not absent' from any engagement from the time the regiment left Manila until it went on board the transport for the United States. Chaplain Stull was the pastor of a church in Montana from 1882 to 1887, and from 1887 to 1892 in Idaho, then a part of the Montana Conference. In 1892 and 1897 he was Presiding Elder of the Helena district, and in 1898 he came to the Spanish-American War. He expects to be returned to Montana. He will go back to his native State and will then return to Montana to resume his work. While at Manila he was placed in charge of sixty Spanish prisoners held by the insurgents and continued to feed them and provide them with clothing and medical attendance until the breaking out of hostilities between the Americans and insurg- ents. He was granted a pass by Gen. Estrella of Cavite Province, on the 1st of February to visit any part of Cavite Province, and in going in the insurgent line was shown every courtesy that might possibly be extended. He had a con- ference with Aguinaldo and found him a perfect gentleman and a scholar, and also found that his aide were men who had been educated in England and in Germany, and were men of more than average intelligence. A. SEAUORF, 1st Lieutenant and Quartermaster, was born in Germany in 1848 and came to America in 1866. In civil life his occupation was that of bookkeeper. He served ten years in the 14th Inf. and was discharged as 1st Sergeant in 1884. He has belonged to the National Guard in Montana since 1888. At the outbreak ■of the Spanish-American War he was mustered in as 1st Lieutenant and Quarter- master and was in all the engagements with his regiment. Campaignirig m the Philippines. 45 Instrumentation of First Montana Infantry Band* Harry Roberts, Chief Musician and Conductor Chas. D. Tomlinson, Principle Musician Solo Bl> Cornet Geo. W Crowell, Principle Musician Solo Bb Clarinet Wm. D. Alexander, Private Third Alto Edw. C. Biganess, “ E^ Tuba Alfred C. Cashmore, “ Second Trombone Herman Fashman, “ Bass Trombone Wm. A. Flowers, “ Solo Alto Alfred Force, “ First Tenor Frank Hawkins, “ Bass Drum John H. McPherson, “ B Bb Tuba John F. Pearson, “ First Bb Cornet Oliver M. Ross, “ Second Tenor Harry B. Stevens, “ Piccolo Walter L. Verge, “ Eb Clarinet Chas. M. Walker, “ Cymbals Wm. H. Wilton, “ Baritone Albert Breitlove, Sergeant First Alto Leon D. Alexander, Private Solo Bb Cornet Ernest H. Boyd, “ Snare Drum Ray Conger, “ Second Clarinet Fred’k Eythe, “ Fourth Alto Edgar J. Thomson “ Drum Major DISCHARGED. Asa F. Fisk, Sergeant By order, June 1st, 1899. George B. Mead, Private, 37th U. S. V “ Aug. 22, 1899. WOUNDED. Geo. W. Crowell, Prin. Musician, wounded in right leg at Malolos, P.I., April 4, 1899. Alfred Cashmore, Private, wounded in left leg at Caloocan, P. I., Mar. 2, 1899. DEAD. Clarence G. Briggs, Private, died in Manila, P. I., Feb. 12, 1899, of wounds received at Caloocan. Fred’k Hall, Private, killed in action at Caloocan, Feb. 10, 1899. Mont 4 CO. F, 1st MONTANA INFANTRY. Taken at Malolos shortly after arrival. Campaigning in the Philippines. 47 COMMIvSSIONEl) OFFICERS OF COMPANY F. B I O C't R A P H I C AF SK P:TC H PFS . WILEIAM L. HILL, Captain, Company F, Est Montana Inf., was born in Devonshire, FEigland. He came to the United States in 1884, and went to Butte, Mont., in 1888, and has lived there ever since. He served two terms in Butte, Mont., as County Treasurer, and has been in the National Guard ten years. When the Spanish-American War broke out, he was mustered in as Captain of Company P'. He was seriously wounded at Caloocan, Island of Luzon, on PAbruary 10, 1890, and was sent home in May on sick leave, arriving there on the 22d. Were it not for Dr. Brnning, he would not be alive to-day. WILLIAM C. GARDENHIRE, 1st Lieutenant, Company F, was born in Chattanooga, Tenn. His occupation in civil life is a traveling salesman. He went from Tennessee to Montana in 1894. He enlisted in the Spanish-American War as private, Company G. He was commissioned 2d Lieutenant January 21, 1899. May 1, 1899, he was promoted to 1st Lieutenant and placed in command of Com- pany F, until the regiment was mustered out. He was in all engagements, and was wounded at Caloocan, February 10, 1899. C. S. HILL, 2d Lieutenant, Compaii}^ F, was born in Devon, Eng., July 9, 1869. In civil life he was occupied as a druggist. He has been living in Butte, Mont., for the last eight years, and belonged to the National Guard of that place for four years. At the outbreak of the war, he was mustered in as Quarter- master Sergeant of Company F, and was promoted to Sergeant-Major, in May, 1898, acting in that capacity until April 80, 1899. May 1, 1899, he was promoted to 2d Lieutenant. He was absent from his regiment from March 28 to April 28, on account of sickness. 48 Canipaigjiijig in the PhilippUies. Co. F — 1st Battalion. NAME OCCUPATION William L. Hill, Capt Accountant William C. Gardenhire, 1st Ivieut Traveling Salesman. . Colin S. Hill, 2d L,ieut Bookkeeper James E- Weaver, 1st Sergt Carpenter William Johnson, Q. M. Sergt Teamster Adolph Keppeler, Sergt Jeweler Thomas J. Coberly, Sergt . Miner Eouis Olsen, Sergt Engineer Arlin R. Ayers, Sergt Assayer John Stenzel, Corp Miner John H. Caddy, Corp Photographer Ernest H. Eeosch, Corp Butcher Charles H. Evans, Corp Baker Charles M. Pyle, Corp Miner William Raymond, Corp Tinsmith Eugene Gastiger, Cook Cook John G. Vigeant, Mus Chemist Herbert P. Galbraith, Artificer Printer John Strasser, Wagoner Eocksmith Alex. C. Abbott Joseph J. Baker William Barkowski . Joseph Brauer Herbert R. Bucks. . . . Alfred E. Caddy George E- Chapman Frederick Chaxel . . James F. Craver Charles W. Elwell. John J. Evans John S. Forsberg Joseph Frantzen Robert E- Gaffin Samuel Gillam Abel H. Hall Martin S Hall William B. Harris . William P. Harris Edward W. Harvey Victor E- Hitter Thomas Johns Jesse E. Jones Owen King George F. Mardel . . . Bruce H. Mason Timothy J. McAuliff , Acle McMahone Michael Nugent Mathias Ostberg Frank Otis Charles F. Patton — T. J. Renaux Gus A. Schudoma. . . . Alvin D. Sheldon Frank E. Tate James C. Taylor William F. Turner.. . Charles R. Ubele Eug'^ne '"’’alencourt . . Charles xv. Valentine William H. Walsh . . . Eugene A. Whitten .. PRIVATES. .Glass-blower .Boiler-maker .Potter .Tile-setter .Engineer . Carpenter . Engineer . Painter . Millman . Clerk .Miner .Clerk . Miner .Harness-maker .... .Miner . Plasterer .Miner . Miner Miner . Cook . Butcher . Smelterman . Horse-trainer . Miner .Upholsterer . Miner .Miner . Miner Miner . Carpenter . Miner Miner Stone-mason Teamster .Clerk . Cabinet-maker . Paper-hanger Machinist Blacksmith .... . . . Min ?r Waiter . Cook . Stone-cutter ADDRESS Butte, Mont. . Seattle, Wash. . Butte, Mont. Philadelphia, Pa. Butte, Mont. . . Middletown, N. Y. Butte Mont. . .Aurora. 111. Butte, Mont. Eeminster, Mass. Butte, Mont. Belt, Mont. .... Butte. Mont. Monticello, Minn. Butte, Mont. .... Eureka, Utah. Butte, Mont. Ishpeming, Mich. Butte, Mon' Colton, Ohio. Butte, Mont. .Iron Mountain, Mich. Butte, Mont. Campaigning in the Philippines. 49 NAME. Gustav T. Nickel, 1st kieut Adolf Keppner, 2d kieut . . . , Gustav H. B. Hess, Sergt.. . Adolph M. Clay, Corp Alex McAlpey, Corp Albert Ackerman kdw. B. Bowen Dugal Carmichael Wm. Gottlieb Henry B. Hinton Michael k- James John Jonas Wm. McCartney Jesse J. Norgaard Thos. W. Robinson korenz Schaub Jos. k. Trahant kouis Weigle DISCHARGED. ADDRESS. OCCUPATION. Butte, Mont Saloon-keeper . “ “ Clerk “ Machinist .San Francisco, Cal Civil Engineer Butte, Mont Miner Cavite, P. I Saloon-keeper. Butte, Mont Miner “ Baker “ “ Cook “ ‘ ’. Miner ‘‘ “ Miner “ “ Marble-cutter. “ “ Miner Kalispel, “ Miner Butte, “ Miner “ Baker “ “ Shoe-cutter “ “ Butcher REMARKS. .Resigned April 18, 1899. By order, Jan. 6, 1899. By order, Nov. 14, 1898. Disability, Sept. 3, 1899. , By order. May 16, 1899. .By order, Oct. 6, 1898. Disability, Sept. 5, 1899. . By order, Aug. 19, lb99. . Disability, Sept. 5, 1899. .By order, Sept. 5, 1899. By order, July 23, 1899. .By order. Sept. 5, 1899. By order. Sept. 5, 1899. By order, Aug. 13, 1899. By order, Aug. 19, 1899. .By order, Aug. 19, 1899. By order, Aug. 19, 1899. . By order, Aug. 19. 1899. transferred. Milan D. Elderkin Butte, Mont Machinist To Co. I, June 6, 1898. Frank S. McNeil Manila, P. I kaborer To Co. B, Dec. 23, 1898. Wm. P. Mulcahy Helena, Mont F^ectrician To Co. E, June 6, 1899. Chas. M. Walker Butte, “ Soldier To Reg. Band, Nov. 26, ’98. Wm. k. Hill, Capt Wm. G. Gardenhire, 1st kieut Adolph M. Clay, Corp Wm. Bartawski Edw. B. Bowen Fred Chaxel Jas. F. Craver Jos. Frantzen Martin S. Hall Frank E. Tate Jas. C. Taylor WOUNDED. Wounded at Caloocan, P. I., in right groin, Feb. 10, 1899. Wounded at Caloocan, P. I., in leg, Feb. 10, 1899. Wounded at Calumpit, P. I., in jaw, April 26, 1899. Wounded near Bocaue, P. I., in left lung, March 28, 1899. Wounded near Bocaue, P. I., in forehead, March 28, 1899. Wounded at Caloocan, P. I., in right elbow, Feb. 23, 1899. Wounded at Caloocan, P. I., in back, Feb. 10, 1899. Wounded at San Fernando, P. I., in right cheek. May 24, 1899. Wounded at Calumpit, P. I., in ear, April 26, 1899. Wounded at Calumpit, P. I., in nose, April 26, 1899. Wounded at San Fernando, P. I., in head. May 24, 1899. DEAD. David k. Williams, Musician Died at Manila, P. I., of dysentery. May 31, 1899. Jos. O. J. Beckman, Artificer Killed in action at ka koma Church, P. I., March 25, 1899. Wm. F. Stanley Died at Manila, P. I., of typhoid fever, Feb. 19, 1899. CO. I, l.st MONTANA INFANTRY. Taken at Malolo.s shortly after arrival. Campaigning in the Philippines. 51 COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF COMPANY I. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES. G. H. PRESTON, Captain, Company I, was born in New Ipenwich, N. H., July 30, 1865. He belonged to Company M of the 6th Massachusetts and was Corporal in Company C, 1st Iowa. He served fourteen months as Sergeant in Company C of the 1st Montana National Guard and was 1st Sergeant, 2d Lieu- tenant, 1st Lieutenant and Captain of the company. He was made Captain of Company I of the 1st Montana, April 28, 1898, and was mustered into the service as Captain of that company. May 8, 1898. He was with his regiment in all its engagements. EDWARD A. FOSTER, 1st Lieutenant, Company I, was born in Marion, Ohio, in 1867. He was elected 1st Lieutenant in the Montana National Guard at date of organization and was appointed 1st Lieutenant when the regiment was mustered into the U. S. V. service. May 1, 1899. He was in all engagements of his company from February 6, 1899, to time of discharge, and was mustered out at Manila, P. I., August 18, 1899, to enable him to return to the United States via Europe. ALEXANDER WESSITSH, 2d Lieutenant, Company I, was born in Mos- cow, Russia, August 23, 1874. He came to Montana April 12, 1890, where he has lived for the past nine years. At the outbreak of the war he was enrolled as 1st Sergeant of Company C, and was promoted to 2d Lieutenant, Company I, September 29, 1899. He was in all the engagements up to Marilao, P. I., when he went to Cebu. On June 22, 1899, he was sent home for treatment on the Hos- pital Ship, Relief. He reported for duty with his regiment September 25, 1899. 52 Campaignmg in the Philippines. NAME Guy H. Preston, Capt Alex Wessitch, 2d Lieut Benj. C. Wiedeman, 1st Sergt.. Thos. A. Harrison, Q. M. Sergt Wm. A. Shauls, Sergt P NAME John H. Selzer John F. Sullivan John S. Taylor . . Nicholas Vincent . Robt. A. Waddell. Guy W. Wade Fred. Walker Geo. D. Wenceslaw Flarl V. Williamson John W. Wynes Geo. W. Zeigler ... . .Miller Miner Clerk vSwitchiuan Miner Laborer . . . Farmer. . . . Miner Butcher ... Laborer . . . . Clerk ADDRESS Lincoln, Neb. Butte, Mont. Dillon, Mont. Butte, Mont. . . . Wadena, Iowa. Amity, Or. Butte, Mont. Sacramento, Cal. . . .Chappell, Neb. . . . Toledo, Ohio. DISCHARGED. NA.ME ADDRESS OCCUPATION Lorenzo Cushing. Sergt Dillon, Mont Clerk Rich’d F. Wells, Sergt Manila, P. I Assayer Walter M. Powers, Corp Dillon, Mont Student Harry Chamberlain Manila, P. I Painter Wilfred Chetelle “ “ Miner Harry C. Falls U. S. A. Transport Fhigineer . . Win Leaton Manila, P. I Miner Win. P. Mulcahy “ “ Electrician.. Jens Nelson “ “ Clerk REMARKS .Disability, November, 11. 1898. .By order, August 20, 1899. .By order, August 31, 1899. By order, Aug. 20, 1899. 136th U. S. V .By order, July 11, 1899. Re-enlisted . By order, October 8, 1898. .By order, August 20, 1899. . By order, August 20, 1899. . By order, August 20, 1899. Geo. W. Crowell, Sergt Alfred Cash more John F'. Pearson TRANSFERRED. Dillon, Mont Clerk To Regimental Band, September 10, 1898. “ “ Painter To Regimental Band, June 6, 1898. Butte, Mont Butcher To Regimental Band, June 6, 18' 8. PROMOTED. Chas. H. Virden, 1st Sergt .... Dillon, Mont Carpenter. . . .To 2d Lieut. Co. C, 1st Mont., Aug. 17, 1899. Andrew Jensen, Capt Wm. F. Dudley, Artificer... Geo. T. Banks John Cavanaugh Jas. Enright Jas. P. Lenox, Corp John H. McQuary, Musician Axel Peterson Chas N. Robb WOUNDED. Wounded in right forearm, near Apalit, P. I.. April 27, 1899. Wounded in right leg at Caloocan, P. I., February 17, 1899. Wounded in right arm at La Loma Church, P. I., March 25, 1899. Wounded in neck at Tuliahan River, P. I., March 25, 1899. Wounded in chest at La Loma Church, P. I., March 25, 1899. Wounded in right knee, near Bocaue, P. I., March 28, 1899. Wounded in chest at Tuliahan River, P. I., March 25, 1899. . . .Wounded in right forearm, near Bocaue, P. I., March 28, 1899. Wounded in right thigh at vSaii Fernando, P. I., June 16, 1899. if. CO M, 1st MONTANA INFANTRY. Taken at Malolos shortly after arrival. Campaigning in the Philippines. 91 * COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF COMPANY M. BIOGRAPHICAL vSKPLICHtLS. JOHN H ALLAH AN, Captain, Company M, was born in Cork, Ireland, December, 184(), and came to America in 18b4. He enlisted in the 47th N. Y. Volunteer service in the Army of the James, and was with Gen. Terry at Fort Fisher. He was at the capture of Wilmington, FMison Station, and served in several campaigns, under Sherman and Schofield, and was mustered out at New^ York Harbor on the 80th of August, 1805. He enlisted in the 14th L. vS. Inf. and w^as detailed to the Presidio at San Franci.sco in 1805, and thence to Arizona, wTere he remained for two \ears fighting Apaches. June, 1800, he visited Madelena, State of Sonora, wdth the Mexican troops. Maxmillian’s army w^as there at the time. He crossed the line near Santa Cruz, and carried mail betw^een Tuzon and Maricopa, Arizona. He then returned to California and lived in Truckee from 1808 to 1878, and in Reno, Nevada, from 1878 to 1875. He lived in Virginia City from 1875 to 1877, and pro.spected in Bighorn County, Wyoming and Montana, from 1877 to 1878, returning to Nevada and w^orking in the mines there. In 1880 he w^as foreman of the “ Maylundy,” Mono County, Cal. He w^ent from there to the Comstock, wTere he remained about a year wwking in the mines ; he then went to Colorado and had charge of some mines and mills there from May, 1882, to 1886. In 1886 he w^ent to Butte, Mont., and has been in that State since that time, chiefly engaged in mining. In 1898 he joined the 1st Montana Regiment, U. S. V., as Captain, on the Governor’s staff. In the first fray at Manila he was in charge of twm companies, I and M, and w^ent to outpost and w^as attacked. He next led an advance on the Chinese Cemetery and La Loma Church. He continued in the campaign nearly to Malolos. Before reaching Malolos he w^as taken sick and went to the hospital at Corregidor Island, where he remained two months, returning to his regiment at San Fernando. When the battalion went to Zapote he accompanied it and w^as on the last reconnoissance made by the regiment under Gen. Grant from Zapote to Casa San Nicolas near Imus. He w^as mustered out wdth his regiment. ARTHUR O’LEARY, 1st Lieutenant, Company M, was born in Hastings, Minn., January 6, 1877. He belonged to the National Guard of Montana for three years. At the outbreak of the Spanish- American War he enlisted as Corporal, Company K, 1st Montana, May 1 , 1898. He w^as promoted to 2d Lieutenant, January 8, 1899, and on July 8, 1899, w^as promoted to 1st Lieutenant. He was with his regiment in all its engagements. Biography of 2d T.ieutenant A. H. t,ogan appears on page 94. 92 Campaigyiing in the Philippines. Co* M — 3d Battalion* NAME John Hallahan, Capt Arthur O’Leary, 1st Lieut. Archibald Logan, 2d Lieut. . . Edward J. Haulon, 1st Sergt. Swift D. Hunter. Q. M. Sergt William Reilly, Sergt Pnilip McDonnell, Sergt James O’Leary, Sergt Peter Brackman, Sergt Charles B. Buck, Corp Thoma.s DoiinelU', Corp Jacob L. Schiffmau, Corp Janies O’Donnell, Corp George C. Downing, Corp. . . Ole T. Onarheim, Corp Andrew S. Jensen, Cook Guy W. Hankins, Musician.. George L- Spier Musician James Haughey, Artificer. . . Barney O’Neill, Wagoner . OCCUPATION .Liquor Dealer .Student . Stenographer . Bookkeeper . . . Assayer .Trainer Butcher Laborer . Laborer Teacher Laborer . Dj^er Laborer Teamster Barte-'der . Laborer Barber Laborer Laborer Laborer ADDRESS Anaconda, Mont. ...Helena, Anaconda, “ PRIVATES. Daniel P. Boyle Miner John Brooks Laborer Fred M. Cain Laundryman Joseph C. Callaghan Miner Janies Casey Laborer Patrick Doherty Laborer Dominick Dougherty Laborer Thomas Eaton Laborer William E. Edwards Coreuiaker. . William P. Fisher Brakeman . . Jesse H. Getchell Fireman Thomas J. Gorman Laborer Byron Griffin Painter Frank C. Haniill Bricklayer . . William H. Hamly Laborer Michael Henry Laborer Bart N. Kenned}' Clerk Robert W. McCulloch Brakeman . . . Adolph Meihofer Brickmaker . Cornelius O’Connor . Stonecutter .. Janies H. O’Neill Laborer Alfred Ouillette Laborer Morton S. Railey Clerk ... Charles L Rice Cook John E. Robinson Laborer Charles Rogers Laborer Thomas Ryan Fireman Floyd Shipman Fireman Carl A. Steinmetz Jeweler Gustav J. Tente Laborer Butte, Mont. Anaconda, Butte, Anaconda, ... Hull, England Anaconda, Mont. Marquette, Mich. . . St. Paul, Minn. Anaconda, Mont. . . Helena, Anaconda, . . . Helena, .Anaconda, DISCH.ARGED. NAME ADDRESS OCCUPATION S. A. J. Dorn, 1st Lieut Helena, Mont .Accountant. Gerald Sullivan, 2d Lieut Anaconda, “ Policeman .. George Deis, Q. M. Sergt Manila, P. I Butcher Martin O’Shea, Sergt Manila, P. I Miner Florence W. Condon, Corp Manila, P. I Laborer REMARKS Resigned, July 2, 1899. By order, January 6, 1899. ,By order, August 19, 1899. [36th U. S. V. By order, .Aug. 19, 1899. Re-enlisted [36th U. S. V. B}' order, Aug. 18, 1899. Re-enlisted Campaigning m the Philippines. 98 NAME Robert A. Dodson, Corp,. William S. Lincoln, Corp, James Noonan, Corp Charles F. Bateman John L. Brooks William J. Cheastey Alfred P. Daily Anton Dali F^dwin J. Godahl Wm, E. Hall ADDRESS OCCUPATION Manila, P. I Laborer.. “ “ Laborer.. Manila, P. I Laborer.. Manila, P. I Laborer. . “ “ Laborer.. “ “ Laborer . . Anaconda, Mont Laborer. . . Manila, P. I Laborer.. Manila, P. I Laborer. . Manila, P. I Laborer.. John Hendrickson.. Wm. A. Hill Patrick H. Holland.. Frederick P. Hudson Henry Jebe Frank Landreman.. Hugh McKenzie Frank Mills Chas. P. Monroe Bevan Montague John Smith Manila, P. I Miner “ “ Engineer.. .Anaconda, Mont Millnian . . . Manila, P. I Machinist., Anaconda, Mont Butcher. . . . “ “ Laborer... Manila, P. I Electrician “ “ Laborer . . . “ “ Miner “ “ Clerk “ “ Waiter REMARKS By order, August 19, 1899. By order, August 19, 1899. [36th U. S. V. By order, July 1, 1899. Re-enlisted [36th U. S. V. By order, July 29, 1899. Re-enlisted By order, August 19, 1899. [llth Cav. By order, Aug. 19, 1899. Re-enlisted By order, Feb. 2, ’99. [36th U. S. V. .By order Aug. 19, 1899. Re-enlisted [37th U. S. V. .By order, Aug. 19, 1899. Re-enlisted [36th U. S. V. ..By order, July 29, 1899. Re-enlisted [37th U. S. V. . By order, Aug. 19, ’99. Re -enlisted . By order, August 20, 1899. ..By order, December 2, 1898. By order, August 19, 1899. Disability, September 13, 1898. By order, August 18, 1899. . . By order, Aug. 19, 1899. [36th U.S.V. By order, July 1, 1899. Re-enlisted .By order, August 19, 1899. . . By order, August 19, 1899. ..By order, August 19, 1899. Byron Conrad, 1st Lieut, Alfred M. Finley Rudolph Herbst Fred. Johnson transferred. . Manila, P. I Lawyer. . .To 2d Lieut., 18tk Inf., U. S. A., September 1, 1898. “ “ Sailor To Company H, June 7, 1898. Great Falls, Mont.. . Nurse To Hospital Corps, June 18, 1898. Helena, Mont Tel. Operator To Signal Corps, March 17, 1899. Jas. O’Leary, Sergt Barney O’Neill, Wagoner. Jos. Callaghan Wm. J. Cheastey Frank Landreman Frank Mills John E- Robinson WOUNDFID. Wounded in right shoulder at Calumpit, P. I., April 26, 1899. Wounded in right leg at San Fernando. P. I., May 24, 1899. Wounded in left side at Caloocan, P. I., February 10, 1899. . . . .Wounded in right hand at Caloocan, P. I., February 28, 1899. Wounded in chest near Malolos, P. I., April 4, 1899. Wounded in right hand at San Fernando, P. L, May 24, 1899. Wounded in right arm, at La Loma Church, P. I., March 25, 1899. DEAD. Harry Archibald Died of typhoid fever, at Manila, P. I., January 6, 1899. John J. Campbell Died of wounds received at Caloocan, P. I., February 16, 1899. William Meitschke Killed in action at Tuliahan River, P. I., March 25, 1899. Charles A. Murphy Killed in action at Calumpit, P. I., April 27, 1899. John A. Saxton Died of typhoid fever at Manila, P. I., June 3, 1899. David Silver Died of wounds received in action at San Fernando, P. I , June 3, 1899. rl-* Mont 7 94 Campaigning in the Philippines. ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES. COMPANY G. H. V. D. MURPHY, 2d Lieutenant, Company G, was born in New York City in 1874. He enlisted as a Corporal in Company C, 1st Montana, U. S. Y., May 8, 1898. He was promoted to 1st Sergeant of Compaii}^ B, same regiment, in June, 1898, and held position as 1st Sergeant until January 22, 1899, when he was discharged to accept commission as 2d Lieutenant in Company G. He was mustered into service January 23, 1899, and assigned to Company B for temporary duty; was discharged from Compan}^ G on Jul}' 16, 1899, to accept commission as 1st Lieu- tenant in the 37th U. S. Y. Inf. at Manila, P. I. COMPANY M. A. H. LOGAN, 2d Lieutenant, Company M, was born in Dubuque, Iowa, August 3, 1872. He belonged to Company I, “Governor’s Guard,’’ of Montana, in 1894. He was mustered in as Corporal of Company H, 1st Montana, and served as such until the 17th of March, 1899, when he was transferred to the 19th Company, Signal Corps, and served with them until July 3, 1899. He was promoted to 2d Lieutenant, Company M, on the 3d of Juh\ He was in all the engagements up to the 17th of March, and was with Gen. Lawton’s expedition north, May 21, 1899. DATE DUE MAY 1 c : 2007 UNIVERSITY PRODUCTS, INC. #859-5503 BOSTON COLLEGE 3tnr^ixii*'\ ' 'Tliyji.r c^.jcfiriC igt® L" j'T'J y^^^CT^V; Pfx^