:I> ,..,_I(): BJSON MP-62 1~ December 1976 -~~ Supersedes Oct. 1971 I CIVIL DEFENSE AND THJE PUBLIC I I An Overview of Public Attitude Studies i i RESEARCH REPORT NO. 17 DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS GENCY SUNY AT BUFFALO Washington, D, C. 20301 DEPO::JlTQ;{'( COPY 948~ CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE PUBLIC An Overview of Public Attitude Studies RESEARCH REPORT NO. 17 Revised December 1976 by Ralph L. Garrett Research Social Scientist Emergency Operations Systems Division Research Directorate for Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Washington, D. C. 20301 This research summary overview is provided for use in the DCPA Staff College Career Development Program. The reports from which the summary has been made have been reviewed and released by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. The views, conclusions, and recommendations included in this summary and in the original reports do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED UNCLASSIFIED SECURITV CLASSIFICATIO~ OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entf'red) READ INSTRUCTIONSREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETING FORMrGOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBERI. REPORT NUMBER Research Report No. 17 ~. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED 4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Civil Defense and the Public: An Overview Research Summary 1950-76 of Public Attitude Studies 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER e. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(•)7. AUTHOR(s) Ralph L. Garrett 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK 9. PERFORMING OR.GANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS ARE A II WORK UNIT NUMBERS Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Emergency Operations Sys- Washington, D. c. 20301 terns Div. Research Rpt. 12. REPORT DATE II. CONTROLLI.NG OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS December 1976 Defense Civil Preparedness Agency 13. NUMBER OF PAGES Washington, D.C. 20301 52 MONITORING AGENCY NAME a AOORESS(If dil/erent from Contr.-,lling Olt;co) IS. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) 14. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Washington, D. c. 20301 IS a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING-SCHEDULE 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thi• Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20. II different /rom Report) 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if neC'essary tmd Identify by block number) civil defense public attitudes target audiences 20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse aide If necessary and ldf"ntify by block number) The report outlines relevant aspects of civil defense history and provides a general overview of public attitudes during the past 25 years. Public attitude findings are summarized under such topics as the international context, threat perception, general favorability, program support, salience, perceptions of local programs, perceptions or shelters as a survival resource, response to warning, and EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETEDD FORM 1473 I JAN 73 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Wht'n nata Enterrd) PREFACE In the review and evaluation of research reports and findings, we occasionally have requests to share selected studies with the civil defense operating staffs at the State and local levels. Recently we were requested to summarize the results of studies of public attitudes, levels of knowledge, and response for a wider audience than we feel it useful to provide the research reports. The author has been making periodic presentations at the DCPA Staff College Career Development Program and this summary was undertaken so that participants might have the material for future use. The reports used in this paper are indicated in the footnotes. It is not the plan for DCPA to reproduce and distribute these reports. Each of the reports have been approved for public release and sale, and may be purchased from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. The various surveys being reported were undertaken for specific research purposes in which the measurement of public attitudes were only incidental to the central objectives. The statements reported in this analysis represent only a few paragraphs from lengthy reports. In general, the national surveys completed by the University of Pittsburgh provide the best general overview of the state of public attitudes, levels of knowledge, and behavior. Since some of the studies have attempted to explain in some detail the underlying meanings inherent in the studies, they may be more detailed and technical than the reader might wish to study. A number of individuals and research efforts have made this summary possible. The research programs of the University of Pittsburgh, headed by Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa; Michigan State University, headed by Dr. David K. Berlo; and Iowa State University, headed by Dr. George Beal, have provided a significant amount of the data used. This summary overview is drawn from research reports which have been reviewed by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and approved for public distribution. This approval does not signify that the contents of the reports necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. The views and opinions reported in this summary are those ~f the author and likewise do not represent the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. 1 PURPOSE The objective of this paper is to develop a general framework for thinking and discussing civil preparedness programs and their various implementing audiences; review briefly the historical development of the present national fallout shelter-based civil preparedness program; summarize selected findings about public attitudes, levels of knowledge and response to civil preparedness measures; and assess their likely meanings for civil preparedness programs in the decade of the 80's. INTRODUCTION Some twenty five years ago, after several years of discussion in government, with the passage of the Civil Defense Act, the United States undertook the development of programs designed to protect life and property by preparing the United States population for carrying out nonmilitary defense functions designed to minimize, repair, and recover from injury and damage resulting from attack. The measure of worth and effectiveness of civil defense programs is their con tribution to lifesaving and recovery potential. In achieving the mission, a wide range of systems choices are possible, each having cost effectiveness ratios which must be evaluated on a continuing basis. A part of this evaluation is an assessment of the constraints imposed on systems feasibility by social and psychological factors. These constraints are major determinants of effectiveness not only during the operational phase of the program but, probably more important, they limit ability to develop a system for operations. use emergency systems developed to save lives and recover from attack. For this overriding rcacon, a major factor in assessing effectiveness is the level of public cooperation in using the countermeasure systems under conditions of nuclear war. A more "here and tlow" dimension of these same factors is the requirement that elements of the public must become active agents in the development of emergency systems, and for their proper During the operational phase the American people would the in the maintenance of their continued readiness, functioning in the environment for which the systems were designed. Programs can be designed which require varying levels of coop eration, particularly during their development phase. However, ultimately people must accept, be knowledgeable about and use the programs to save their own lives. This is such an obvious require ment that assessment of human behavior factors havl3 been made at all levels of civil preparedness and influence program choices and levels of implementation. In fact, the history of the civil defense program can be viewed as a series of changes and redirections resulting notonly from changes in size of nuclear arsenals, weapons effects, andpossible levels of damage but from reassessments of the likelysocial and psychological feasibility factors. Greater energy hasbeen applied to more limited objectives and some aspects of theprogram have been deferred to crisis periods when target audiencesare expected to be more receptive. HISTORY A brief summary of some of the past civil defense history isneeded to set a framework for discussion of public attitudes. Inmany ways the history of civil defense funding reflects changes inthe public's perception of the urgency of the civil defenseprogram. (Figure I). The small peak in funding in 1975 followed aperiod of Soviet weapons testing. During this period the thenFederal Civil Defense Administration proposed a large scale shelterprogram. This program was not submitted to Congress for funding.The big peak in funding occurred at the Berlin crisis, then fundingdeclined to the 1950 levels. Also important is the history ofCongressional action on Civil Defense budget requests (Figure II).Note that during the first three years appropriations were only 10%of the President's budget request. During this period Defenseappropriations increased steadily and the concept of massiveretaliation was the primary national defense strategy. Decisionsregarding civil defense have been strongly influenced by strategic policy. During the 1950's, the dominance of US offensive power,coupled with a strategic policy of "massive retaliation," kept civil defense in a minor role. It is useful to review changesoccurring in the civil defense program resulting in a changing strategic environment and reassessment of the social, psychologicaland political feasibility of implementing the protective measuresneeded. The 1950's The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was enacted due toconcern for civil defense on the part of both the public and Stateand local governments. This concern arose from the detonation in1949 of the first Soviet nuclear device and the Korean War. The Actmade operational civil defense the primary responsibility of theState and local governments, with the Federal government providingguidance and some matching-fund aid. Lack of suitable protectionagainst fire and blast effects led to plans for rapid ("tactical")evacuation of cities during the several hours anticipated betweenwarning that an attack had been launched and the arrival of enemy 2 APPROPRIATION 300 r--- 250 CIVIL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS CONSTANT VALUE DOLLARS NORMALIZED TO YEAR OF INITIAL FUNDING (1951) ACTUAL ...,__APPROPRIATIONS 250 Cl)a: <( ..J ..J 0 0 u. 0 Cl) z 0 :::i ..J ~ 200 150 100 J, I \ I \ I \ I \: \ I \ 'I \ If ', ~If 1 \ ,, SOUTHEAST 200 150 100 s: r r 0 z Cl) 0., 0 0 r r )> ::0 Cl) 50 CUBAN '... CRISIS -,' ' ' /'~--------........ --t 50--ADJUSTED VALUES -- 0 R I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Q 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 FISCAL YEARS Figure 1 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON BUDGET REQUESTS FISCAL YEAR 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 l'%j 1959 1-'• ()Q 1960 s: ti 1961 .r> (!) 1962 H H 1962 AMEND 1963 1963 SUPP 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1976T 1977 * INCLUDED PREPARING ADMINISTRATION TRUMAN TRUMAN TRUMAN/EISENHOWER EISENHOWER EISENHOWER EISENHOWER EISENHOWER EISENHOWER EISENHOWER EISENHOWER EISENHOWER/KENNEDY KENNEDY KENNEDY KENNEDY KENNEDY KENNEDY JOHNSON JOHNSON JOHNSON JOHNSON JOHNSON JOHNSON/NIXON NIXON NIXON NIXON NIXON NIXON NIXON/FORD FORD FORD OEP TYPE FUNCTIONS C.D. ORGAN. FCDA FCDA FCDA FCDA FCDA FCDA FCDA OCDM* OCDM* OCDM* OCDM* OCDM* OASD (CD) OASD (CD) OASD (CD) OASD (CD) OCD (ARMY) OCD (ARMY) OCD (ARMY) OCD (ARMY) OCD (ARMY) OCD (ARMY) OCD (ARMY) OCD (ARMY) DCPA DCPA DCPA DCPA DCPA DCPA IN ADDITION TO BUDGET 403.0 537.0 601.6 153.3 88.5 78.8 125.5 132.4 76.5 101.7 77.3 104.5 207.6 695.0 61.9 346.9 358.0 193.9 134.4 111.0 77.3 75.3 73.8 78.3 88.8 88.5 86.3 88.6 20.0 71.0 CIVIL DEFENSE PERCENT APPRO. REDUCTION 31.8 92 77 .o 86 44.3 93 49.3 68 50.2 44 70.9 11 95.8 24 41.6 69 45.3 41 52.9 48 61.1 21 86.6 18 207.6 0 113.0 84 15.0 76 111.6 68 105.2 71 106.8 45 102.1 24 86.1 22 61.0 21 69.2 08 72.1 03 78.3 0 83.5 06 82.0 07 82.0 05 85.6 03 19.5 02 82.5 +14 bombers. Such evacuation planning--as a low-cost substitute for expensive blast shelters--was recommended by the Project East River study in 1952, and was initiated several years later. The advent of thermonuclear weapons, with a nationwide threat of fallout, and the prospect of rapid delivery of these weapons by ICBM, led to a major change in concept. By 1956, there was a consensus that an "ultimate" civil defense posture must be based on blast-resistant shelters in major cities and fallout protection elsewhere, and such a program was proposed by the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). The problem of continental defense was studied the following year by the Gaither Panel. The Panel's 1957 report, "Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age," recommended a nationwide program for the construction of fallout shelters, to be "tied into a broad pattern of organization for the emergency and its aftermath." not for Construction of blast shelters in cities was recommended the time being, although research in depth on blast protection was recommended. The Gaither report failed to result in a program for construction of fallout shelters, but two organizational changes did ensue. FCDA and the Office of Defense Mobilization were merged into a new agency, the Office of Civil and Defense located in the Executive Office of the President. Mobilization, OCDM was responsible to administer 1950 legislation for relief following major peacetime disasters, as FCDA had done since 1953.) Also, the Federal Civil Defense Act was amended in 1958, to make civil defense a joint responsibility of the Federal Government and of the States and their political subdivisions. Matching-fund authority was broadened to include the salaries and expenses of State and local civil defense staffs. Although Public Law 920 significantly limited the Federal role in civil defense to that of an advisory and coordinating service with the operational responsibility vested in the State and local governments, the Federal Civil Defense Administration nevertheless proposed ambitious programs, including surveys to identify structures that would provide blast shelter, and proposals for upgrading existing structures on a matching funds basis. These proposals failed to to gain Congressional support. Frustrated in its efforts improve protection against blast and fire in target cities, civil defense turned to evacuation of cities as a low-cost survival alternative. 5 By 1955 civil defense concepts were reconsidered because of increasing stockpiles of large yield nuclear weapons and improved delivery systems. A review of civil defense by the Kefauver, Committee resulted in the development of survival plans funded by the Federal Govern~ent. The plans provided for evacuation and fallout shelter in reception areas. However, the shrinkingwarning time, resulting from the development of improved delivery systems, argued against this policy and it became quite obvious that reliance on both blast and fallout shelters was the only viable base for the protection of the population. Since a replacement programof blast and fallout shelter was not available, the concept of evacuation persisted in planning and training for many years. In 1956, the Holifield Committee held extensive hearings on civildefense. The final report called for a suspension of evacuation planning and the initiation of a Federally financed program of buildingblast and fallout shelters on the basis of risk. The Federal CivilDefense Administration proposed such a program to Congress. Therewere extensive discussions within the Administration and a number ofstudies completed inside and outside the government. These discussions did not result in a shelter building program, but didresult in organizational changes. The first was a merger of the Officeof Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administrationinto the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and a change in the1950 Act making civil defense a joint responsibility of FederalGovernment and the States and their political subdivisions. The 1960's Research during the latter 1950's disclosed the value, in termsof added survivors, of fallout protection provided by existing buildings.A practical and low-cost answer to at least part of the fallout problemappeared within reach. After considerable discussion, a phased seriesof shelter program objectives were proposed. The program had thefollowing characteristics: (1) Each phase was to produce an improvedcivil defense posture that could be justified in its awn right, (2) Each phase should have a natural terminal point--meaning that adecision to undertake a given phase did not carry with it a commitment to undertake subsequent phases, (3) Each phase should have high legacyvalue for subsequent phases, and (4) Each phase would incorporate thenext least costly element leading to an improved civil defense posture. The end result of such a phased program would provide (1) anationwide full fallout shelter program, (2) blast protection forsome portion of the urban population, and finally (3) blast protectionfor most of the urban population, completing the ultimate posture. 6 It was against this background that President Kennedy, moved by the Berlin crisis, decided in 1961 to initiate a nationwide long range program to provide fallout shelter to the U. S. population. He also decided to transfer responsibility for civil defense to the Secretary of Defense. The transfer of civil defense functions to the Department of Defense carried with it a budget proposal based on a national fallout shelter survey, marking and stocking program. The budget called for "an accelerated program in the field of civil defense." A supplemental appropriation was voted by Congress and the National Fallout Shelter Survey was initiated on a crash basis. The principal reasons adduced for the transfer of civil defense functions were that the Secretary of Defense was responsible for the defense of the United States and that the DoD represented a large and relevant program capability that could be drawn upon for civil defense purposes. It was also noted that there were strategic requirements for civil defense, and that development of a civil defense posture should go hand-in-hand with development of the strategic force structure. In making the transfer, however, the President made explicit the need for the life-saving potential of civil defense, independent of its relationship to strategic forces or deterrence: civil defense represented "insurance," a lifesaving capability it would be prudent to develop, in case of the failure of deterrence. The 1963 budget submitted to Congress as a part of a pltnsed program provided funds to continue the survey, marking and stocking program for another year and the beginning af a subsidy payment to educational and health institutions for the inclusion of shelter in new construction. Most of the budget was for the subsidy program which required authorizing legislation before appropriations could be obtained. Congress cut the funds for the survey, marking and stocking program and authorizing legislation was not heard that year. In 1964, the House Committee of the Armed Services considered a bill to authorize the subsidy program. After extensive hearings, the legislation was passed by the House, but was buried in the Senate Committee. MAK~NG FULL USE OF EXISTING SHELTERS In a general budget environment of 1964 -1969, when available funds declined substantially and the prospects of a shelter subsidy receded, civil defense gave increased attention to maximizing the fallout capability inherent in existing buildings. It was originally estimated that the survey of existing buildings would provide 50 million shelter spaces. By 1970 more than 226 million spaces were in the inventory. Because most of this shelter space was in downtown buildings 7 in major cities, shelters were not properly located for population use when the population was in their residences. In fact, our studies showed only about one-third of these spaces were located properly for use during a period when the population was at home. COMMUNITY SHELTER PLANNING Research on practical means of planning for maximum use of the limited shelter capability being generated by the survey began in 1962. A crucial element in this was the problem of matching people to shelter within certain time constraints or movements. By 1965,the planning methods had been field tested and a nationwide communityshelter planning program was launched. Accepting movement limitations, about 30% of the population could be sheltered. An inadequate use of basement space resulted from ventilation requirements. Only about half as many people could be sheltered in basement areas as might be possible if better systems of ventilation were available. In the total picture about 35% of the shelter inventory was basement space. A further increase in basement shelter space was possible with cheap improved ventilation systems. Research devel oped an inexpensive bicycle-type ventilation kit which could also be powered by an electric motor. Funds were requested for procurementand stocking of the kit in 1966 and 1967, but appropriations were not forthcoming. HOME BASEMENT SURVEY Another low-cost shelter option was the location of shelter in home basements. After several years discussion and the development of shielding survey technology, a pilot test of home surveys was conducted in 1964 in areas of Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Mississippiand Florida. The test involved the distribution of questionnaires,printed on IBM cards, to some 97,000 home owners. Approximately20% were completed and returned. In 1965, another test was conducted involving the mailing of a questionnaire to a sample of U. S. householders, with a follow-up by letter and finally telephone calls. This resulted in 85% return On the questionnaire. The study also documented that the information provided by householders was reliable. Uoing the Bureau of Census to gather the data, OCD then conducted a survey of home fallout shelters in 26 States. The survey produced 30 million spaces with a Protection Factor (PF) of 40 or better. Returns averag~d 74%. The military services conducted a similar survey for on-and off-military post housing and located an additional 227,000 spaces. These home shelter spaces are better distributed than are public shelter spaces. If plans could be 8 developed to share this space with neighbors and use home shelters like public shelters, this resource might provide a valuable means of sheltering the population under continued budgetary limitations. Based on this data and the 1970 Census data, there appear to be about 67,700,000 single residence in the U. S. of which 53.3 percent have basements. About 10 percent of these have a protection factor of 40 or above, and 78 percent have a protection factor of between 20 and 39. This 78 percent could be easily upgraded at moderate cost. In fact, much of this upgrading might be accomplished during crisis periods which might precede a war. If this home-basement shelter space were occupied on the basis of 10 square feet per person, which has been this same fallout shelter demonstrated to be a feasible occupancy rate, space would be more than adequate to shelter the total population. Such an occupancy rate might result in as many as 60 people occupying a typical home-basement shelter. This rate of occupancy would be needed only in areas of severe shelter shortage, such as much of the South and in California. In most areas of the country, even under conditions of crisis relocation, an occupancy rate of two or three families in a home shelter would be sufficient. The private home basement is a major survival resource of the Nation, particularly in the rural or reception areas. In relation to high-risk areas, civil preparedness studies have evaluated this home basement resource from the standpoint of the protection it provides against the effects of blast, heat, and fallout; its location in relation to the distribution of the population; and the degree to which it supports strategies of crisis relocation of populations from high-risk areas and the sheltering of the population without movement. Shelter protection against the effects of blast and heat effects of nuclear weapons is a different problem from protection from fallout. In blast protection, the most important factor is how the structure responds to overpressures and finally fails. In fallout protection, the most important factors are: distance from the source of fallout radiation and the amount of mass or thickness and density of materials between the survivor and the source of radiation. Studies of the best-available shelter in high-risk areas which might experience blast and heat effects, rate the single-family, below ground shelter as providing better protection than most public fallout shelters. The best-available blast shelter is, of course, subway stations, tunnels, mines, and caves, followed by basements and sub-basements of large masonry buildings. Below-ground basement 9 space in wood-framed or brick-veneer structures, ~ncluding single family residences, is the next-best protection. In terms of the amount of space available, this is a significant shelter resource 1n high-risk areas. The protection from fallout varies from structure to structure.However, as a generalization, home shelter provides less protectionthan public fallout shelters in large buildings; but, because of itslocation, it is more accesible to the population, and therefore,the only shelter available to some people. The 1970's The civil defense program was broadened starting 1971-72 toconsider peacetime as well as attack hazards, and those arising gradually as well as rapidly. This broadening to "full-spectrum" preparedness was undertaken by new agency leadership partly because of 1972 Presidential direction. The latter resulted from a study of alternative civil defensepolicies conducted in 1969-70. The President decided, based on thestudy, that the US should maintain the "current overall level ofeffort in its civil defense activities" and that there should beincreased emphasis on preparedness activities applicable to peacetime as well as attack emergencies. The broadening to full-spectrum preparedness was welcomed byState and local civil defense professionals, and by those at theFederal level as well. To the latter, the dual-use approach wasseen as making sense on grounds of economy and effectiveness-basically because the concern of State and local governments forpeacetime disaster preparedness helped motivate them to take actionswhich were also essential for attack readiness. The 1970's also brought a new stress on operational capability--the ability to make· coor 1 dinated use, in a major disaster, of allassets available to a community, from warning systems to shelters andradiological detection instruments and personnel, to police and firefighting forces, to doctor~ and hospitals, to the talents of its keyexecutive officials. !The primary vehicle used to develop these emergencyoperating capabilities was termed On-Site Assistance. This involved intensive work with key local officials and leaders by a Regional/Stateteam of civil defense .. professionals. The essence of the approach was to work with local officials todefine the community's emergency readiness needs, in light of whathad previously been accomplished, and to develop an Action Plan formaking the specific improvements needed. This plan specified localresponsibilities and schedules, and also committed both State andRegional offices to provide specific assistance to the locality. 10 FY's 1974 through 1976 also saw the development of the last major element of full-spectrum preparedness--contingency planning to relocate (evacuate) population from US metropolitan areas and other risk areas during a period of severe international crisis. Research work and prototype projects developed planning techniques and established the basic feasibility of crisis relocation planning, certainly for parts of the country other than the Northeast urban corridor and similar densely-urbanized areas. November 1975 brought a sudden change of emphasis which resulted in a substantial shock to the civil defense organization at all levels. Effective with FY 1977 the program was to be reoriented to focus DoD support on those functions related to nuclear disaster preparedness. Nuclear requirements were to be built upon a "common base" to be provided by State and local governments for natural disasters. In short, the Federal program was to be nuclear-oriented and any non attack elements of full-spectrum preparedness were to be provided by State and local governments. In addition, the President's FY 1977 budget request for DCPA, reflecting the change in focus, was for $71 million, which among other things reduced matching funds requested for support of State and local civil defense staffs from the FY 1976 level of about $30 million to approximately $20 million. Support for training activities was also reduced sharply, but requests for shelter surveys, crisis relocation planning and other attack oriented elements of the program were at levels consistent with those of FY 1976. These changes in Federal policy stimulated serious Congressional for the first time since 1963. A special consideration of civil defense civil defense panel of the Subcommittee on Investigations, House in February Committee on Armed Services, held eleven days of hearings and March 1976, considering strategic factors, Soviet civil defense, the dual-use issue, funding, and other matters. The Panel's Report of April 1976 stated that "it is clear that the program today is under-funded," and recommended, among other things, that"... as a first step toward a more adequate civil defense the Administration's budget request for civil defense be increased from $71 million to $ll0 million." The narrowing in the focus of the program, and the FY 1977 reductions in matching funds and other areas, were not welcomed by State and local governments. At House and Senate hearings in 1976, State and local CD directors argued strongly for Congressional recog~ition of preparedness for peacetime disasters as in effect a secondary but important objective, as well as for restoration of $10 million in matching funds for their agencies. The funding was restored by Congressional action, and an appropriation of $82.5 million enacted. 11 Continued discussions between the Department of Defense and the Congress have further clarified the intent of Congress. The major focus of civil preparedness must continue to be preparedness for an attack on the United States. It is also the intent of Congress to provide assistance to State and local governments in emergency situations arising from natural disasters and such assistance may include preparedness type activities. This allows the application of personnel, facilities, and equipment to be applied to a common base of preparedness for nuclear attack and peacetime disasters. CURRENT STATUS The low priority and resulting fiscal constraints since the early 1960's has resulted in a partial or limited coverage in such areas as shelter surveys of protection in existing structures, shelter use planning, development of State and local capabilities, training, and establishment of Emergency Operating Centers. Through the mid 1960's, the US civil defense program aimed at developing in-being readiness for attack operations, with relatively limited reliance on crisis buildup actions to develop basic elements of the system. Since that time, however, fiscal constraints have resulted in erosion of capabilities. Crisis actions ("surging") have of necessity come to be relied upon to bring to full readiness many of the elements required for operations under attack conditions. It would take at least one year of intensive effort, during an extended period of international tension or crisis, to bring the current civil defense system to full readiness. Contingency planning for the evacuation of population from US metropolitan centers and other risk areas during a period of severe crisis is being starte~, and plans are expected to be completed by about the mid-1980's. An initial, relatively low-confidence capability is expected to be attained by about end-FY 1979, to be .followed by development of more detailed operational plans, resulting in substantially improved confidence of.ability to conduct crisis relocation operations. The current US program does not include provision for physical protection of key industrial installations, either by peacetime actions or by planning for actions to be taken during a crisis. U. S. And European Civil Defense Doctrine and Programs Civil Defense doctrine and programs of Europe and the U. S. have developed along significantly different lines resulting largely from overall differences in defense strategies. Recognizing their inability 12 to deter war by a build up in weapons systems most European nations developed security systems designed to use the concept of massive resistance to attack. The objective was to make it as difficult and costly as possible for a potential enemy to conquer each country. Military and civil defense became equal partners in the strategy. The sheltering of the population therefore was an important aspect of massive resistance. With the experiences of World War II still fresh, it was clear that the protection of the people in specially designed hardened shelters would be needed in resisting attack and in assuring survival and continued resistance. Consequently, in many countries legislation was passed which required the construction of shelters in all new buildings. This legislation was strengthened over time to create an organization and management structure for the civil defense program. In the U. S., with its greater resources and experience in World War II, the defense debate focused on concepts of developing a capability of massive retaliation in the event of an attack. Military capability was designed to assure destruction of any enemy starting a war and its mere existence would effectively deter an attack. Civil defense programs were merely a hedge against failure of the primary strategy. The construction of hardened shelters never became a part of the U. S. national defense strategy. The U. S. program focused almost exclusively on the nuclear war hazard and since fallout shelter provided protection against a wide spread radiation hazard and was more manageable in terms of costs, the low-cost fallout program was developed. Later evacuation or crisis relocation was planned as a means of protecting those living in high risk areas. U. S. Fallout Shelter Program and the European All War Effects Shelter Program Shelter protection against the combined heat, blast, gas warfare, and radiation effects of conventional and nuclear weapons is a significantly different problem than protection from the fallout radiation effects of nuclear weapons. The all war eff~cts shelter must be below ground, be hardened for blast protection, have an air tight door to protect from gas and have an adequate ventilation system to protect from heat and radiation. Since such a shelter must be specially constructed, a legislative mandate was necessary, including the subsidizing of its cost. The legislative mandate usually required that the shelter have a peacetime use and utility and that this factor not interfere with its rapid conversion to wartime use. The role of the government in the creation and use of the shelter is specified in the legislation and therefore clear to all including the owner of the building in which the shelter is constructed. 13 Fallout shelter has virtually none of these characteristics. It is located through surveys of existing buildings and seldom created or built. Generally, it provides better protection if it is below ground, but most of the fallout shelter spaces existing in the U. S. national shelter inventory are above ground space in the interior corridors of large buildings. An additional resource exists in private home basements. State and local governments make community shelter plans for the allocation of this shelter space to the population, but other than periodic planning there is little direct contact between the owner of the shelter space and the govern ment. The legislation passed in the early 1950's and improved upon and modified over the years since, has been effective in creating an all war effects shelter program for some European nations. In Sweden, for example, it has resulted in 3.8 million shelter spaces or about enough for one-half of its population. Shelter building is now focused in meeting specific shelter needs of geographic locations. Peacetime utility and use of shelter space is an integral part of the shelter planning. Most of the costs of shelter construction are reimbursed generally on shelter space created basis. Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland all reported relatively advanced shelter program. The U. S. effort has located, marked, and stocked fallout shelter spaces for about one-third to one-half of its total population. This space can be augmented in a crisis period by home basement fallout shelter which is an extensive resource. Virtually no new all-effects shelter protection construction has occurred in the U. S. We have tried in the foregoing discussion to map some of the road that civil defense has had to travel to discharge its responsibilityunder the law. Regardless of future courses relative to the choice of more effective shelter options, we must direct our efforts toward creating an organization capable of managing and using the shelter system we have developed. Civil defense differs from othe "strategic systems" in one veryvital respect: For civil defense to perform effectively, both citizens and government officials in localities throughout the country must know what to do and must act accordingly, in a time of unprecedented stress. Readiness, that is, must be developed where the people are, and any feasible US civil defense program must be implemented primarily bycivilians whose attitudes, beliefs, and aspirations must be taken into account. Since the need for civil defense resulted from changes in the basic environment of man with respect to the nature of conflict and war, and the general environment during this period has been threatening and described as "a cold war," one might wonder about public 14 attitudes relative to the civil preparedness issues. What can we say about the public's concern for their civil protection during this period while civil defense was developing a fallout shelter based survival system? Public Opinion Survey -Rationale and Overview Surveys of attitudes, levels of knowledge and general adaptive behavior in civil preparedness have been undertaken periodically. The basic purpose of these surveys have been to (1) provide civil preparedness planners with assessments of the feasibility and likely costeffectiveness of alternative civil preparedness systems, and (2) provide a means of periodic measurement of effectiveness of public information and training and education programs. The goal of civil preparedness 1s to provide a system for improving the probability of survival of the population and the recovery of the nation from the effects of nuclear and other forms of attack. It is concerned with measures to counter these effects and the organization, public education, training, and other actions to support these measures. In order to be fully effective, countermeasure systems usually require active support by segments of the population. Each countermeasure system usually has its implementing audience. Attitudes, values, levels of knowledge, and willingness to participate in learning countermeasure actions tend to limit the effectiveness of civil preparedness programs. The assessment of these factors is important in the choice of future systems and in the selection of programs for implementation of these program alternFtives. In relation to future planning, the reader will readily recognize that the function of the agency research program is to provide a con tinuous exhaustive analysis of the full range of possible future vulnerabilities, strategic environments, and civil preparedness program requirements. Such an assessment results in the definition and description of feasible civil preparedness systems. One aspect of this assessment is the likely acceptance and response of the population to the proposed system. A second and, perhaps, more important aspect of surveys is the development of a system to provide needed feedback for improving the effectiveness of communication strategy, organizational and promotional efforts. Under Section 201 (f) of Public Law 920, the Office of Civil Defense is to "publicly disseminate appropriate civil defense information by all appropriate means." In support of this function and as a part of 15 the systems analysis research effort, we have undertaken a periodic but continuing analysis of attitudes, levels of knowledge, adoptive behavior of the various publics participating in civil preparedness programs. The studies focus on various programs and on the audiences we are trying to inform and involve in these efforts. A basic research tool used in accomplishing these objectives is the attitude survey. Such surveys are used for other purposes than the measurement of opinions, such as measurement of communication effectiveness, and studies of the social action and decision-making processes associated with the adoption at the local level of civil preparedness programs. For all studies involving surveys, we have attempted to develop sampling techniques that would allow us to generalize the results of the surveys to wider audiences. Surveys, in addition to accomplishing our prime objectives, help us isolate and describe salient attitudes, levels of knowledge and behavior associated with our program. BACKGROUND OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS SURVEYS From its very beginning the civil preparedness program has beensubjected to speculative and journalistic interpretations of itsstanding with the public.l After the transfer of civil preparednessactivities to the Department of Defense, at about the time of theBerlin crisis, the rate of speculation increased. Numerous smallprivate surveys of attitudes find their way into the public mediaand become the basis of generalizations about the total population.In reality, of course, general statements about public attitudesrequire a much larger population sample. This paper is intended toprovide a synopsis of current public attitudes toward civil preparedness, based on a population sample of adequate size. Morerecently this debate has largely subsided. While the study of public opinion has been a relatively smallpart of the civil preparedness research program, it has been aconsistent one. Civil preparednccs has conducted national probabilitysurveys every three or four years since 1950. Since the response to the cold war is of continuing concern, many other privatelysponsored surveys have included civil preparedness and related coldwar questions in their surveys. We have assembled data from all ofthese surveys in a data bank at the University of Pittsburgh, andhave the capability of viewing public attitudes over the twenty yearspan. To give some idea of the extent of this data, the bankrepresents about 500 studies and about one-half million individual surveyrespondents. We have the data needed to analyze public opinion andresponse during both periods of crisis and periods of noncrisis. 2 1 These arguments are reviewed in Civil Defense and Society byJiri Nehnevajsa, University of Pittsburgh. 1963. AD 445285. 2 Data Bank Inventory, University of Pittsburgh. 1970. AD None. 16 Civil preparedness is the element of national security most intimately related to the citizenry. In many ways it is the means by which the individual becomes aware of threat to his personal safety and wellbeing and the resulting present war technology. When aroused by international events, public opinion is extremely volatile. For example, during the Berlin crisis of the early 60's, public reaction was marked. All levels of civil defense were innundated with inquiries. The political structure became immediately involved in managing public reaction. This probably resulted in the attention of major decision-makers diverted from a sensible start on a long range civil defense program to issuing a handbook which finally became a modest government pamphlet, quickly distributed and drawing on the content of earlier materials available to the public. The Cuban crisis marked another clamor for information. In contrast, during periods of low tension the public remains passive. Public surveys over a period of twenty years show a very consistent level of public support for civil preparedness, all kinds of civil preparedness programs, fallout shelters, blast shelters, and evacuation. Few public programs command such a broad base of passive support. There is, indeed, a form of "national consensus," with stability over time, toward the need for civil preparedness. In most public programs there exists opposition and support, and this is generally somewhat patterned. There is so little public opposition to civil defense programs it is difficult to determine who the opposition is. In fact, the public just does not perceive opposition to civil preparedness. During the Berlin crisis, which has sometimes been characterized as "the great civil defense debate," the public did not attend to opposition arguments. The debate was about where are the shelters and will they work. If there ever was a question in the minds of the public about whether we should have a civil preparedness program, it was resolved in favor of the program during the Berlin crisis and has now reached a sort of "ceiling" at wlich support cannot significantly increase. It is not likely that we will experience greater support or opposition in the future. A persistent question in civil preparedness is how can we make civil preparedness more acceptable to our people. In view of a large body of public attitude evidence, this looks like the wrong question. Public education or information programs designed to "sell" civil preparedness probably are not worth the cost. Not because it is difficult to convince them of the value of the civil preparedness effort, but because they are already convinced of it. An effort to "sell" the small opposition is not likely to be useful because opposition sentiments are couched in a broader ideological conception of the world's strategic environment. In fact, they are related to peace or war issues, completely independent of civil preparedness programs. 17 The public also regards civil preparedness as a governmental responsibility; not a private do-it-yourself exercise. People associate civil preparedness with national defense and trust the government in this area. They believe what needs to be done is being done. They believe more is being spent and done than is the case, and feel that even this is not enough. Even though the public worries some about war, they do not spend much time thinking about civil preparedness measures other than in a time of crisis. A small opposition is quite vocal in a cr1s1s period and crisis periods are generally civil preparedness discussion periods. The 1963 anti-civil defense anti-war groups are presently the anti-ABM groups. In crisis periods they are likely to come to the surface again with their allegations that (1) civil defense cannot save all, (2) the post attack environment is too hostile for survival, (3) civil preparedness might be too effective and generate a garrison state, (4) it makes people accept nuclear war, or (5) would upset the stability of deterrence based on mutual catastrophe. In short, the public environment of civil preparedness is a problem to decision-makers. Political decisions about the program are difficult, and public attitudes have too low a profile in noncrisis periods to generate and maintain the kinds of politicalactions required. During crisis periods decision-makers tend to focus on information requirements of the public and not on program development. These characteristics of public opinion have also generated an ambivalent policy attitude in the civil preparedness orga~i?.ation.On the one hand there has been a view at all levels of the~~rgani zation that we need a quite professional approach to build~ng a civil preparedness system with minimal involvement of the~public. This view argues that crisis periods will be of sufficient length to inform the public how to use the civil defense system. On the other hand, the authority provided civil preparedness to "publicly disseminate appropriate civil defense information by all available means" is taken as a directive to keep the public knowledgeable on a continuing basis. The public education and training task is also linked to the need fo:r public acknowledgement and support for the allocation of funds to operate the system. It is also a fact that the accomplishment of many civil preparedness program elements depend on some form of public support. It is argued that human history is almost completely devoid of experience where a crisis was perceived as such by major decisionmakers and communicated to the public in such a way as to have them 18 act on it as a cr1s1s. We have a better history indicating that decision-makers and people tend to deny the existence of a crisis, particularly that it is likely to lead to conflict. When a crisis was recognized to exist, there has been a tendency to refrain from communicating this information widely for fear of further escalating the cr1s1s. Public attitudes, while persistently favorable, never seems to be in the form we can best use. They seem to be either too much, or too little. They have just not provided the kind of sustaining environment that hard decisions about civil preparedness require. NATURE CF CIVIL DEFENSE MESSAGESDIMENSIONS OF ATTITUDES AND At this point, a discussion of attitudes and civil defense message content might help put the remainder of the summary 1n a better context. The first level of prediction of target audiences' response to a communication is the level of comprehension or attitude of the audience relative to the communication. The most likely response is the further reinforcement of a previously held attitude. It is, therefore, important for civil preparedness change agents to understand pre-existing attitudes. It is also important to understand that attitudes have dimensions, or perhaps better stated, varying levels of intensity. One dimension of an attitude might be defined as its general direction. It could be favorable or unfavorable, or some place between these poles. An attitude may also vary in the degree or intensity with which it is held. One may feel quite favorable toward the idea that he has a fallout shelter capability in his basement right now, but if he clearly perceives that a nuclear exchange will occur in the next few weeks his favorability may be much more intense. An individual has an attitude about everything of which he 1s aware. These attitudes all have direction and intensity. In fact, people have a sort of hierarchy of attitudes; that is, some attitudes are more important than others in affecting behavior. The relative importance to an individual of a given attitude we call salience. Attitudes of importance which influence individual decision making are described as salient. Attitudes that are peripheral to decision making are not salient. Salient attitudes are usually well develope~ystems of cognitions, evaluations, and action tendencies toward an object. Nonsalient attitudes are usually loosely organized. 19 In public attitude surveys we measvre the salience of attitudes by asking the respondent to rate the intensity of his attitude within a range of other re~,ated issues. While about 90% of the population reports a favorability toward civil preparedness on an attitude directional basis, it is rated low on attitude salience scales. It is important to remember this distinction. In general, all attitudes are highly favorable toward civil preparedness systems. These attitudes are not held intensely and are usually nonsalient. It may also be useful to discuss briefly the nature of the civil preparedness message. One might describe the central concept of all civil preparedness communications as a negative contingency; a very bad thing that might happen some time. The negative aspectof the message; a possible nuclear war on the homeland, is threatening and tends to increase, become more persuasive, and less manageable as one understands more about the nature of nuclear war. The contingency aspect of the message relates to one's assessment of the possibility of nuclear war occuring. The passage of time, experiences with past threats or crises, and the highly irrational aspect of such a war tends to lower the assessment of the likelihood of it occurring. From this point of view, it might be argued that low saliency of civil preparedness issues is induced by exposure to civil preparedness messages. One of the ways of handling the anxiety resultingfrom assessment of deterrence failure is to reduce assessments of the likelihood of its occurrence. It is probably psychologically not tolerable or credible to believe that nuclear weapons will be used, that they will be catastrophic in effects, and that one is personally vulnerable to effects of this magnitude. A way of dealing with this threat is to reduce its saliency. One might argue that in its general nature the civil preparedness message is difficult to communicate to people. It is uniquely the type of message that people tend to distort or change. Behavior, suggested in civil preparedness messages to reduce threat and anxiety, cannot resolve these issues for responding audiences. Personal worry over civil preparedness messages can be more easily handled by an a~&essment of a low likelihood of the threat materializing, by distorting the message, or just not hearing it. In the following summary, we are discussing the direction of attitudes. Our objective is to allow the reader a concise glance at various aspects of public opinion concerning civil preparedness in general and fallout shelters in particular. The topics chosen are those which we feel are of most interest to operating staffs. 20 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT3 Since civil preparedness programs are influenced by the international environment, it is useful to study and describe public perception of this environment. Our national surveys, conducted since 1961, provide a rich body of data about these perceptions. These studies have measured Americans' perceptions of the problem areas of the world, levels of world tension, perceptions of the likelihood of World War III, and the countries seen as the threat to peace. The 1968 survey, when compared with previous years, indicated the international environment was viewed as increasingly tense. The proportion of respondents who perceived high world tension increased from three-fifths in 1963-1964 to about three-fourths in 1966-1967. In 1968, about one-half of those having an opinion thought World War III was likely, or very likely. China is viewed by one-half of our population as the greatest threat to world peace now, and as becoming an even greater threat 1n the next five years. But important changes have been in the making throughout the period in which our surveys have been carried out. Basically, a thermonuclear war likelihood has been characterized by declining overall trend. By 1972, not more than one in four Americans had thought that another major war would come about. Throughout the period and up to about 1966, the Soviet Union was seen as the greatest threat to America's security and to world peace. Even in 1968, some three out of ten respondents held such a view. But China displaced the Soviet Union as the major per ceived threat by the mid-1960's, perhaps due to the fact that the conflict in Vietnam seemed to have been more frought with risks of confrontations with China than with the Soviet Union. By 1972, the evidence indicates, in part directly related to the visits both to the People's Republic of China and to the Soviet Union by President Nixon, hopes for modest improvements in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and also between China and the United States have become quite manifest. 3Americans' Views on Civil Defense in the Cold War Context. Jiri Nehnevajsa, University of Pittsburgh. 1966. AD 649543. Americans' Perceptions of the International and Civil Defense Environments: 1968. Robert H. Mast, University of Pittsburgh. September 1968. AD 687296 Americans and Civil Defense: Some Highlights of the 1972 National Survey. Jiri Nehnevajsa, University of Pittsburgh. April 1972. AD 748-3333. 21 A 1976 survey conducted by the Gallop organization concluded that Americans see the Soviet Union as virtually equal to the United States in military power. The United States is seen as no longer the number one military power in the world. The public also assess this to be the state of military balance ten years from now.4 In general, Americans held the view that the cold war is likely to go on indefinitely. People desire disarmament and are favorably disposed toward a wide range of proposals for lessening and controlling world conflict. However, when asked about possible outcomes, they have a low appraisal of these measures becoming a reality, or if they do that they will significantly reduce world tensions. Data gathered over the last ten years clearly demonstrate that the public perceives the international environment as increasingly threatening. The analysis of the nation's perception of threat has centered upon the public opinion regarding anxiety about war, the nature of the threat perceived, the consequences of threat perception for action, and the consequences of threat perception on feelings about civil defense. All available empirical evidence on these topics was reviewed and permits us to draw some overall conclusions.5 WORRY ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR A little under half of the population say they are worried about nuclear attack. People in the eastern part of the United States and on the Pacific Coast worry more. The less educated and those having low socio-economic status tend to worry more. People with greater responsibilities--young parents--worry more. Yet, of course, there are fewer people who do worry about nuclear war hazards in the 1970's than there were in any preceding period. TARGETS When no opportunity to discriminate among types of attacks or targets are offered, we can infer that people generally expect the nation's cities to be bombed as well as their own city. Also, people generally expect some cities in their immediate vicinity or in their part of the country to be subject to an attack. However, given a chance to discriminate between targets, the large majority of the 4 The Pursuit of National Security: Defense and Military Balance. W. Slocombe, Potomic Associates 1976. 5 Threat Perception and Civil Defense. Donna Kontos, University of Pittsburgh. March 1965. AD 614586. 22 population does not perceive c1t1es and populations as high priority targets. They see military bases, factories, and transportation centers as having much higher priority. This is true regardless of demographic characteristics. Although people generally expect their own city or community to be a target, it was found that people can identify differential risk. Thus, people who live in metropolitan areas perceive more danger than do those in rural areas. Also, once the attack is posited, it is the higher educated and those of high socio-economic status who perceive the greater local danger. CHANCES OF SURVIVAL More than six out of every ten Americans estimate their chances for survival in the event of nuclear attack as bad. People who live in highly industralized urban areas estimate their chances as worse than do others. Again, it is the educated respondent having a high socio-economic status who has the most pessimistic they are about their chances of survival. Even though the basic pattern of responses has not substantially altered, even survival odds are seen somewhat better by early 1970's than they had been before. In the 1972 national survey, some five out of ten Americans thought that survival prospects were "bad" or "very bad" should nuclear war occur "next week" (and another two out of ten rated their chances as being about 50-50) WEAPONs6 The percentages of people who mention nuclear or thermonuclear weapons spontaneously have been increasing throughout the years. this is to be expected. Spontaneous references to chemical and biological agents are less frequent and represent a distinct minority concern. Nonetheless, when people are asked explicitly about such weapons, they think that such agents might indeed be used. However, there have been as many people who do not anticipate their deployment as there are those who do. When asked about their knowledge of chemical and biological weapons, the data suggest that some two out of three Americans know either nothing or very little about them. Thus, there is evidence of public concern with thermonuclear weapons; the evidence on concern with chemical and biological devices is not as clearcut. Without any question, systems to protect lives and property are viewed chiefly as those that must deal with thermonuclear weapons. 6Americans and Civil Defense: Highlights of the 1972 National Survey. J. Nehnevajsa, University of Pittsburgh. April 1972. AD 748-3333. 23 FALLOUT HAZARD People have become very aware of nuclear fallout over the years since about 1956. By 1964, it was safe to conclude that fallout was viewed as more of a danger to more people than are immediate effects. However, although fallout is seen as the greatest danger, particularly if their own city or community was not directly under attack, people do not think that much can be done to protect them from it. More than six out of ten Americans say they could do nothing, or don't know what they could do to protect themselves against fallout radiation even if bombs were dropped on or close to their communities. If directly attacked, people do not believe that much can be done in the way of protection at all. VOLUNTEERING FOR CIVIL DEFENSE There is no doubt that the worried tend to think about and volunteer for civil defense more than those who express no worry.There is also no doubt, based on the early Michigan studies, that those people who have a realistic notion of weapons effects, and who do believe their city to be target, tend to have a more constructive response to threat. They also tend to volunteer more readily than those with exaggerated estimates of bomb effects. The nuclear threat per se, except for the above mentioned tendencies, has little or no affect on people's plans for the future. This may be because it is too abstract a notion for most. When the threat becomes more specific,such as during the Cuban crisis, there is the expected but slight increase in protective behavior. However, the general tendency is to feel that there is very little one can do in the face of a nuclear threat. In our 1912 national survey we gathered data about a range of issues dealing with willingness to volunteer for civil defense. 7 Some 54.2 percent of respondents in our 1972 national study stated that they would "definitely" or "probably" volunteer for civil defense should there be a need for volunteers and a call for their help made. In general, people who see the world environment as more threatening tend to volunteer more than people who do not see it that way. People who believe that the survival chances would be 50-50 or better even if hostilities were to be initiated "next week" are much more likely to volunteer than those who are more pessimistic about the odds of survival. 7volunteering for Civil Defense: Insights from a 1972 National Survey. J. Nehnevajsa, University of Pittsburgh. April 1976. AD A-026-210. 24 Favorable attitudes toward civil defense in general, toward financing of civil preparedness, toward public shelters, toward home basement use, and toward home basement sharing induce higher willingness to volunteer. The differences between those who favor various civil preparedness programs and those who do not favor them are both consistent and large. What, in this context, are our major conclusions? If there were a need for volunteers, and the help of Americans on a volunteer basis were required, there is no question whatsoever that Americans in large numbers, would respond favorably to such a call. Our results, of course, predict--within reasonable limits--volunteering behavior under conditions which somewhat parallel the conduct of the survey: face-toface contacts and direct, personal appeals, to volunteer. In this situation, our data should be very well predictive of the outcome. Colorado State area research data also indicate that telephone contacts, to follow mail surveys, would come close to accomplishing results similar to those of face-to-face interactions and, thus, yield very high numbers of volunteers per number of requests for volunteering. 8 Regional, state and city heterogeneity suggests that the cost and manpower effort associated with mobilizing similar numbers of volunteers would be highly different dependent on the community and its state and regional setting. Thus, the data cannot be used in a location-specific way to predict volunteering, but they can be used to forecast the over all patterns of willingness to volunteer. Even more than regional, state or local variations, attitudes to civil defense are a key determinant of volunteering willingness. Since most Americans are favorably disposed to civil defense, the estimates of volunteers based on dispositions toward civil defense should prove quite valid as long as the contact conditions (face-to-face type) approximate the approach used in our research. The potential pool of volunteers for civil defense is a very large one. Since the more typical civil defense volunteer has a profile quite different from the typical volunteer for all other activities, there is little risk of a call for volunteers on the part of civil defense to lead to significant depletion of volunteering re sources for other needed tasks. 8Field Testing the Feasibility of Using Residential Shelter as Group Shelter. John R. Christiansen. Brigham Young University, January 1976. 25 If volunteers were needed by civil defense, and a program was developed to seek them out and to use them effectively to the nation's benefit, there is absolutely no question that millions of Americans could be mobilized, that they would be most willing to help, and that they would do whatever the country needs to be done. WORRY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD FALLOUT SHELTER Generally, the worried tend to favor fallout shelters more than those who express no worry. Also, people who thought U. S. cities and their own community would be targets tended to feel a greater need for civil preparedness and to give it high priority as a community problem more than those who didn't see their community as a target. Worry did not create the greatest support for shelters where it was most expected--among those with the greatest responsibilities-the parents. It seems that the more ties and obligations a person had the less likely he was to favor shelters. Thus, although parents are the most anxious about nuclear war, shelters offer them little relief from that anxiety. This is apparently related to misg~v~ngs about the adequacy of shelters, procedures in the event of attack, and about survival later in a hostile environment. It was also found that respect for the bomb is not always a sufficient condition for a feeling of need for civil defense. People with exaggerated ideas of bomb effects felt less need. It would seem that the best condition for a constructive response to the threat of war is for a person to have realistic but not exaggerated ideas about threat and protection. It was found that an increase in threat, such as during a crisis, tends to make attitudes toward shelters more favorable. Also, although a large majority had a very pessimistic estimate of their chances of survival in the event of an attack, more than one out of two saw their chances .as enhanced in a fallout shelter. We can infer from the above that the public has a reasonable estimate of threat. They do not think an attack ~s aimed at them. Not only have the respondents been expressing favorable attitudes toward fallout shelters, they have increasingly come to the conclusion that fallout shelters would help save lives. In the latest, 1972, survey we find that only about 14 percent of Americans thought their survival chances would be "very bad" or "bad" if they were in fallout shelters--and over 40 percent thought that their survival prospects would be, in fact, "very good" or "fairly good." 26 GENERAL FAVORABILITY9 When asked whether or not they favor fallout shelters, Americans National surveys conducted consistently indicate substantial approval. in recent years show a large majority of the American public in favor of shelter protection. The surveys completed in recent years found 87% of the population in favor of fallout shelters. This level of favorability was 20% higher than in 1963. Other studies also found the level of favorability in recent years reaching and remaining around the nineteenth percentile. With reference to fallout shelters, the combined categories of "opposed" and "strongly opposed" have dropped from 29% in 1963 to 13% in 1968. During the same period, those who strongly favored shelters increased by slightly over 25%, indicating a much greater awareness and acceptance of fallout shelters. In 1972, those who were in favor of public fallout shelters amounted to 75 percent of the nationwide sample--and those opposed, or strongly opposed, were 13 percent of the respondents. PROGRAM SUPPORTlO Specific program proposals have been presented to the American public for evaluation in a number of surveys. We have included the same alternative program proposals in four national surveys conducted over the past several years. This has enabled us to study trends in program desirability by the American public. In practically every instance there has been majority support for each program or alternative, even when the alternatives differed considerably. During the period from 1963 to 1966, the proportion of the citizenry finding most of the civil defense program proposals "highly desirable',' increased by some 10% to 15%. Hwwever, the proposal that large communities be evacuated in tense situations which might precede a war lost some 12% of its previous support in overall desirability between 1964 and 1966. Yet, even though public fallout shelter programs sponsored by the government receive the most support, it still must be stressed that the public seems willing to support a vast range and variety of civil preparedness programs. This is not surprising when we find that half of the population in one study supported the statement, "A person should go along with any fallout shelter program the government proposes. " 9Favorability Toward Civil Defense, A Critical Analysis. Howard Myers, University of Pittsburgh. 1968. AD 687581; Americans and Civil Defense: Highlights of the 1972 National Survey. J. Nehnevajsa, University of Pittsburgh, 1972. AD 748-3333 10Americans Perceptions of the International and Civil Defense Environments: 1968. Robert H. Mast, University of Pittsburgh, 1968. AD 687296; Americans' Views on Civil Defense in the Cold War Context. J. Nehnevajsa, Univ. of Pittsburgh. 1966. AD 649543. Americans and Civil Defense: Highlights of the 1972 National Survey. J. Nehnevajsa, U. of Pittsburgh, April 72. AD 748-3333. 27 This summary does not examine the relative public acceptance ofthe various programs but is concerned with the overall patterns ofacceptance and support that respondents are willing to provide to awide range of proposals. The examination of the alternative, desirability of civil preparedness programs, finds substantial consensuson most of the alternative programs. The only real "split" in publicop1n1on is found with regard to the provision of family fallout sheltersat the family's own expense. SALIENCY OF CIVIL DEFENSEll When placed on a list of 15 problems facing the United Statestoday and asked to rate them according to their importance, none ofthe respondents rated civil defense as an important problem in the 1968national survey. Saliency of civil defense has been very low in all ofour studies, but now seems to be dropping off all lists. This hasoccurred during a period when perceptions of world tensions areincreasing. About 76% of the same sample felt world tensions were high.The same indicated 44% of the population felt World War III was likely orvery likely some time in the future. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS 12 Past studies indicate that the public interest in civil defense andtheir willingness to cooperate with the program are related to whethera nuclear crisis is seen as imminent or very probable. Even though the1968 survey found a greater level of fear than before, the public stilldoes not see itself as precariously living in the shadow of nuclearconfrontation. Under these conditions, it is no surprise that publicknowledge of the local civil defense proram was minimal. Three out offour respondents know nothing of what is being done at the local level.Only 5% associated civil defense with natural disaster preparedness.There was an inability or refusal by respondents to evaluate the localcivil defense efforts. This lack of opinion is pr9bably a reflectionnot only on the lack of information, but also the remoteness of civildefense from the lives and concerns of the people. A sizable part of thesample said civil defense had "no personal meaning tothem." Of those who had an opinion (27%), a little over half (59%) felt the localprograms were inadequate. Public evaluation appeared to be relatedto the receipt of information such as booklets or assignment to shelters. 1Americans' Perceptions of the International and Civil DefenseEnvironments: 1968. Robert H. Mast, University of Pittsburgh.September 1968. AD 649543. 12The Public's Perception of Local Civil Defense Efforts and Facilities.Pearl B. Cohen, Univ. of Pittsburgh. March 1970. AD 710302. 28 PERCEPTION OF SHELTERS AS A SURVIVAL RESOURCE13 Most Americans are convinced that shelters would have a reasonable degree of effectiveness. The data indicate that year by year there is an increase in the number of Americans who believe that shelters would provide reasonable chances to survive an enemy attack. Moreover, people feel that something can be done to provide protection against the secondary effects of thermonuclear warfare. National surveys show that Americans believe fallout shelters can provide such protection, provided they are not in the target area. When queried specifically, Americans are optimistic about their chances of survival in fallout shelters, some 83% regard their chances as being 50-50 to good. They also feel that, after surviving from fallout radiation, they will be able to cope with the postattack world. In general, variations in survival outlooks seem to relate to general moods of people, i. e., whether they are generally optimistic or pessimistic in their outlook. Questions were asked about perceptions of shelter living in the 1968 national survey. The data indicate that people's perception of the nature of shelter living is associated with their willingness to make plans for the use of shelters. An individual's perception of his chances of survival in fallout shelters is strongly related to his willingness to even think about the actions he would take in a nuclear emergency, including his plans to seck fallout shelter. Respondents were asked to imagine what it would be like to live in a shelter. They were then given a series of statements concerning possible conditions and asked to agree or disagree on the likelihood of each occurring. Respondents perceive a lack of privacy and hysteria, or panic. However, most people also felt some form of organization will emerge and people could get along with each other. Civil defense public information programs could help with family planning on the use of shelters by providing a more realistic image of shelter living. 13Americans' Perceptions of International and Civil Defense Environments: 1968. Robert H. Mast, University of Pittsburgh. September 1968. AD 687296. 29 CIVIL DEFENSE WARNING14 We recently completed the state of knowledge assessment about likely public response to warning. This study analyzed data from studies of accidental alerts, and surveys of public attitudes about warning gathered in aational and community studies. Data from studies were analyzed and organized into 17 summary statements. One might make the assumption that an effective warning system will have a signal that is audible, correctly interpreted and properly responded to by the public. In attempting to evaluate civil defense warning systems, one of the inputs is the amount and quality of information held by the public with regard to responding appropriately to an alert situation. If it is discovered that the public's knowledge is inadequate, this may suggest training and education programs to provide the needed information. Yet, a lack of information may not seriously impair the proper functioning of the warning system in the case of a crisis having a gradual escalation of intensity. In such a situation, it is assumed that there would be sufficient time and motivation to search for the information to cope with the problem. Indeed, it has been suggested that such crises can be useful in educating the public provided, of course, prior planning is done for disseminating the needed inputs. Over the history of the existence of civil defense, our warning system has changed. Some of the following results relate to earlier aspects of the warning message system. However, they provide useful insights about public knowledge and opinion and will, therefore, be summarized. The survey evidence indicates a substantial number of people cannot discriminate between the alert and take cover signals (now not used.). About half of the population recognized radio as a source of warning information. The telephone was also thought to be a source of warning or warning confirmation. (Present plans call for the use of the Emergency Broadcasting System to confirm warning.) About 15% to 20% of the population say they cannot hear outdoor warning signals. 14An Ev-..luation of Public Response to the Civil Defense Warning System. Roy T. Knestrink, University of Pittsburgh. September 1969. The NEAR System: A Study of Public Acceptance. J. Nehnevajsa. University of Pittsburgh. Feb. 1964. 30 The public responds to warning by searching for additional information rather than directly responding by taking shelter. This is expected in the present low saliency environment. This could change rapidly under crisis conditions. In early 1964, we sought to check on the potential acceptability of what was then called the NEAR device. Americans were quite favorable to having a NEAR receiver, and millions were estimated as potential customers. In 1972, we tried to determine the extent to which the public might be favorable to DIDS type device, a warning system that could be attached to television or radio. The research discovered that some 69 percent of the respondents were in favor of having such a device, and that they were willing to pay, on the average, about $15 for it. This, of course, does not mean necessarily that some 70 percent of the nation's households would avail themselves of the warning device were it marketed. Rather, particular methods of.marketing and, of course, the eventual price factor would be determinants of the saturation level of purchases. Yet, the results do suggest considerable potential.l5 COST FINANCING 16 It is clearly seen that Americans find public fallout shelters desirable and the provision of such shelters is regarded as essentially a Federal responsibility. In many respects the public thinks of civil defense much the same manner as they do military defense. Community and State sponsored shelter systems receive considerable support, but Federally sponsored programs are the most popular. On terms of the level of expenditure, the public seems to generally support rather extensive programs and definitely does not regard even elaborate public shelter proposals as "wasteful." Interestingly, a 1963 national survey found that the public thinks civil defense is doing and spending substantially more than it actually is, and the public's preferred level of annual spending is considerably higher than even their inflated estimate of what is currently being spent. 15Americans and Civil Defense: Some Highlights of the 1972 National Survey. J. Nehnevajsa. University· of Pittsburgh. 1972. AD 748-3333. 16costs and Financing of Civil Defense: Some Public Views. Alan Colemen, University of Pittsburgh. 1967. AD 651167. Americans' Perceptions of the International and Civil Defense Environments: 1968. Robert H. Mast, University of Pittsburgh. September 1968. AD 687296. 31 In the 1968 and 1972 national survey we attempted to assess attitud.es about the level of expenditure for civil defense since only the 1963 survey had dealt with this issue. About one-third of the respondents felt the amount spent on civil defense was about right, another third felt it was "much too little," and only one in ten felt too much money was being spent This is by no means to imply that public opinion has any direct bearing on the realities of budgets and the worth of program expenditures, but it does give some idea of the opinion environment in which such expenditures can be proposed and made. The 1972 survey indicates respondents think the country is spending roughly about ten times as much on civil defense as it actually has been in recent years. The public's views (though 35.2 per cent simply do not know) favor a $1.2 billion program. Roughly, again, this is about fifteen times the approximate 1971 expenditure pattern, and it is some 67 per cent over what people think is being spent. The finding that civil defense, for instance, ought to get more money (a $1.2 billion program) is supported by, and also interactively supports, the favorable attitudes toward civil defense which are so characteristic of the population. . 17 Home Basement Shar1ng In both of our 1968 and 1972 surveys, questions were asked about the willingness of the respondents to share their basement with others should it provide ade~uate protection against fallout. The studies show a great deal of support for such a program. That the results do not reflect only general attitudes which are subsequently not validated by actions is indicated further by studies conducted by Brigham ~oung University at Colorado Springs. The research coupled here with an actual attempt to get people to allow their basements to be share4 shows cooperativeness as high, or even higher, as the national survey revealed. Furthermore, the national results of 1972 also suggest that Americans would be particularly in favor of home basement sharing if it were to become part of an overall national plan, and that they are, in fact, womewhat less receptive to a program which would rely on voluntary arrangements with friends and neighbors. 17 h . Home Basement S ar1n~ : An Analysis and Possible Approach to Planning by J. Neyneyjsa. University of Pittsburgh. Sept 1976. 32 Furthermore, an analysis of ways by which home basement sharing planning might be accomplished (Nehnevajsa .... ) suggests not only that there may be significant gains from home basement sharing in bridging the extant deficits of shelter spaces but that viable approaches to incorporate home basement shelters into a national system could be developed and implemented. 18 PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERs Throughout the research of public op1n1on and attitudes on civil defense, it has been found that most Americans find civil defense generally desirable. Both interesting and important is the persistent finding that Americans see themselves as being more favorably disposed to civil defense than they see their neighbors or other members of their communities. The differences, while not sharp, suggest that there has been considerable room for misunderstanding in this regard: perhaps the feeling, itself not warranted by the actual data, that "others" in the community, while supportive, are less in favor of civil defense programs may bear on the low level of visible mobilization of public interest. However, there appears to be a lack of any real concern, and the support expressed is essentially passive in nature. This is not an uncommon public reaction to civic issues in general. However, we noted in the section on Cost Financing that Americans think a great deal more is being spent than actually is. Similarly, related to passivity is the fact that Americans not only favor civil defense themselves but see other segments of the population as also favoring the program, and particularly military leaders as being the most in favor of shelters. In general, people seem to think that their national and community leaders are in substantial favor of civil defense and fallout shelters. The usual ratio of perceived favorability versus disfavor is in the neighborhood of ten to one. The President, Congressmen, friends, neighbors, wives and husbands are all seen as favoring shelters and/or civil defense, usually more so than the respondent. In view of this, the lack of overt enthusiasm and the absence of letters to editors and Congressmen become somewhat more understandable. 18 Attitudes Toward Civil Defense: An Examination of Attribution of Maximum Approval. J. Elliot Selden, University of Pittsburgh. October 1965. AD None. 33 TRAINING ACCEPTANCE AND IMPACT Since the inception of the DOPA Training and Education Program, 29,833,500 people have received instruction and training in various civil defense courses. The Program supports civil defense activities nationwide at all levels of government, and provides instruction and training to civil defense officials, instructors, and others who need training in the skills to cope with emergencies. Such courses are: civil defense education courses to the public, conferences for officials and business and industry personnel, emergency operations simulations, plans and operations, civil defense management, and radiological defense. Instructor training includes Radiological Monitoring and Shelter Monitoring. In the 1968 national survey, we asked respondents to evaluate the importance of government programs to train persons in emergency work for use in the event of an attack. Eighty-six percent saw the training as important, or very important. Seventy-one percent of the respondents indicated they were favorably disposed to participate in at least one civil defense training program. 19 In surveys relating to acceptance of the Home Fallout Protection Program and Community Shelter Planning, we asked questions about participation in training programs. We came up with 14.5% of the respondents having participated in civil defense training programs. Of those who had participated, about 25% had enrolled in more than one training program. An additional 25% had participated in from three to eight courses. 20 A rather interesting aspect of this fact is the number who participated in more than one course. For example, 50% participated in at least one course, and the remaining 50% participated in more than one course. A major conclusion from these studies is the likelihood that there is an identifiable audience of persons receptive to civil defense messages, including training effort. Exposure to training strongly affects disposition to respond to civil defense programs. This responsively trained audience is composed of potential civil defense influentials and might be a useful target for additional public information inputs. 19 Americans' Perceptions of International and Civil Defense Environments: 1968. Robert H. Mast, University of Pittsburgh. Sept. 1968 AD 687296. 20The Home Fallout Protection Survey in Michigan: Its Impact on The General Public. Report No. 1. David K. Berlo, Michigan State Univ. May 1968. AD 701081. The Home Fallout Protection Survey and Resulting Changes in Shelter Adoption. Paul Yarbrough, Iowa State University. Sept. 1970. 34 INFORMATION SEEKERs21 Public attentiveness to civil defense tends to rise during periods of acute international crisis, then ebb again when the crisis eases. This low attentiveness to civil defense messages during periods of calm is a major constraining factor in achieving public readiness for operations. During periods of crisis, a widespread public information seeking activity is observed at all levels of civil defense. Research conducted in Detroit, Michigan, was designed to define the nature of the information diffusers during crisis periods. Seventy-seven persons who sought information during the Caban crisis were compared with 200 adults selected at random. The findings suggest that special attention to this audience may be warranted. These "information seekers" performed key conununication roles in groups of which they were a part. They performed an inter personal conununication role and were more likely to be asked their opinion and to seek information from others of their groups. They were better informed about major news events. They were active in social organizations and tended to hold key roles in these organiza tions. They are found in most segments of the population, and information provided to them will reach all segments of the population. For civil defenses purposes, information seekers should be considered as part of the media channel to the general public. We should prepare information for their use in crisis similar to other media information. SPECIAL AUDIENCES -YOUTH22 Of the special types of audiences for civil defense public information programs, youth is recognized as important since they have lived their entire lives in the atomic era and should have favorable predispositions toward the civil preparedness programs. Their views about civil preparedness countermeasure systems are important because (1) they are forming attitudes toward many public issues including civil defense which will remain relatively stable over the rest of their lives, (2) by comparing their views with those of the adult population, DCPA can gain insights about the likely feasibility and acceptance of future programs. 21Information Seeking During a National Crisis. Verling C. Troldahl Michigan State University. July 1964. AD 812102. 22The Development of Values and Beliefs in Young Americans. Report No. 1. Bradley S. Greenbert, Mich. State Univ. 1966. AD 637168. A Pilot Study of Young Americans' Beliefs and Knowledge About Civil Defense. Report No. 2. Bradley S. Greenberg, Michigan State University. March 1968. AD 670986. 35 The two studies of youth, addressed largely to problem definitions, have been completed. In the 1966 study, we asked 327 eighth and twelfth graders to write an extemporaneous essay on "What I Know About Fallout Shelters." Trained coders analyzed these essays for information about the person who wrote it, and the degree of favorability expressed toward (1) shelters generally, (2) family shelters, (3) public community shelters, and (4) civil defense in general. The findings indicated general favorability toward civil defense, fallout shelters, and both public and private fallout shelters. About 80% of all statements coded were classified as more positive than negative. The more significant aspects of the study resulted from further analysis of the social and demographic characteristics of the response. On the age differences, eighth graders were more favorable than twel~th graders. There was little difference between sexes and social classes. The 1968 study gathered information about 400 teenagers from two school systems in Maine. One school had an active civil defense program with teachers participating in the adult education program. The objective of the study was to determine differences between two groups of teenagers in terms of civil defense information and attitudes where one group was exposed to an intensive in-school civil defense program and the other was not; also, to determine the difference in information and attitudes existing between older and younger teenagers. Some of the major differences between those exposed and not exposed to the civil defense program include: 1. Having heard more about public fallout shelters from teachers and civil defense people and having read more about fallout shelters in magazines. 2. Mentioning government pamphlets, teachers, school programs, and civil defense people as their most useful sources of information. (Those without such a school program cited radio and television as most useful.) 3. Knowing more accurate information about civil defense and fallout shelters. (Eighty-seven percent of those receiving in-school training could correctly identify the black and yellow fallout shelter sign, compared to 58% of the students without such a program. Furthe~ore, in a six-item test of civil defense knowledge, the former were significantly more knowledgeable.) 4. Telling others something about fallout shelters or civil defense was related to exposure to the in-school program. 36 In addition, we found (1) little difference in overall attitudes toward civil defense between the two schools, (2) both held similar perceptions of shelter protection and living conditions, and (3) the effects of the in-school training were very apparent. 23 SPECIAL AUDIENCE -LOCAL GOVERNMENT BODIES This study is one of several which attempts to look at the local director's social environment and analyze how it affects program implementation. It considered roles of local government involving elected officials--county board members and mayors. The role of the local civil defense director was also studied. These three roles are considered to be among the most important decision-making and action roles relative to civil defense change induction programs. Local government officials have certain attributes (characteristics) which affect the civil defense system. One such is their authority to make decisions which may affect the implementation of civil defense programs at the local level. Another attribute is the ability of some local government officials to give or withhold legiti mation (approval) of action programs. If local elected officials hold favorable attitudes toward civil defense they are generally in a position to facilitate civil defense action programs. On the other hand, if their attitudes are unfavorable, they can place constraints (coercions and pressures) upon the civil defense systems which may handicap such programs. A further reason for taking local elected officials into account is the influence they may have upon the effectiveness of local civil defense directors. Local civil defense directors are appointed by local elected officials. These elected officials maintain a certain amount of control over them. Local elected officials may define, to some extent, the responsibilities (role expectations) of local civil defense directors. The directors, in turn, may define their own responsibilities. It is possible that local elected officials and local civil defense directors might disagree as to what the definition of the director's role responsibilities. High consensus may be important if the director is to effectively carry out the tasks expected of him in his role. In this study, a conceptual framework and techniques were developed in an attempt to increase the level of understanding about 23 Local Governing Bodies: Their Relations to Civil Defense. Gerald Klonglan, Iowa State University. 1967. AD 661060. 37 relationships between local governmental officials and the implementation of civil defense. The study analyzed the degree of consensus between role definitions of the same position and the degree of congruence between role definition and role performance. The sample was small, involving 9 counties and 39 interviews in the State of Iowa. Accepting the limitations of such a small sample and the exploratory nature of the research, the study still developed findings having implications to the civil defense program. These included identifying a need for a further effort to define the civil defense roles of local government officials since role understandings vary considerably. The role of the local civil defense director needs to be correctly communicated to local officials. The clarification of these roles should be more specific as to what is to be performed and not performed. The extent of incorrect perceptions of roles could result in role conflict and inefficiency. Not only do local elected officials and local civil defense directors need to understand their own civil defense roles, they also need to understand the roles of others with responsibility for civil defense. SPECIAL AUDIENCES -COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE24 Another important element in the social environment of civil defense is the community pGwer structure. Successful efforts to create social change within a social system depend on the appropriate involvement of numerous persons performing many roles with the system. One of the 1nost important groups of persons is the key leader in the system. Research has demonstrated that all social systems have individuals who predominate in the decision making of the system. These key leaders may derive their power from formal or informal sources. In the social science literature they are described as power actors, influentials, legitimizers or members of the power structure. By virtue of their position in the community, they are able to strongly influence the decisions and changes which are made within the social system. Three research reports have been developed which tested the concepts of social power in the civil defense social change intrusion area. The findings, generalizations, implications and procedures for 24community Power Structure and Civil Defense. Joe M. Bohlen, Iowa State University. 1964. AD 451013. Community Power Actors and Civil Defense. Joe M. Bohlen, Iowa State University. 1965. AD 623918. A Comparative Analysis of Community Power Structures. Joe M. Bohlen, Iowa State University. April 1967. 38 identifying power actors are useful to civil defense change agents in developing strategies to initiate and sustain social change. In the five study communities, the research identified (1) personal and social characteristics of power actors, (2) relationship of civil · defense power structure to the power structure in other noncivil defense issue areas, and (3) the power actors' civil defense attitudes, knowledge, sources of information and actions. The power actors in the five communities studied had similar personal and social characteristics. They were perceived as having social power in the civil defense issue area by members of the community. The power actors' civil defense attitudes, knowledge, sources of information and actions were analyzed. The power actors (1) had a low perception of threat, (2) favored a civil defense program, (3) perceived both Federal and local civil defense programs as inadequate, (4) perceived that they (the power actors) had a civil defense responsibility, and (5) lacked knowledge about civil defense. The three most frequently named sources of civil defense information were (1) daily or weekly newspapers, (2) television news and special programs, involved in civil defense in their communities. These studies provided new insights about social power and a profile of community influentials' civil defense attitudes, knowledge, sources of information and actions. This data is useful in planning civil defense programs and in civil defense training efforts. SPECIAL AUDIENCES -VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONs25 Another part of the social environment of civil defense is a group of subsystems we call voluntary organizations. Mast of these organizations have vertical channels of communication which reach to the Federal level and many engage in some form of social change programs. Voluntary organizations have been a target audience for various civil defense communications efforts in past and their usefulness has been a continuing subject of discussion in civil defense. 25systems Linkage Among Women's Organizations. George M. Beal, Iowa State University. 1967. AD 651049; Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations in Civil Defense and Preparedness. Gordon F. Streib, Cornell University. 1964. AD 439612.; Kinship and Voluntary Organizations is Post-Thermonuclear Attack Society: Some Exploratory Studies. Scott A. Greer, Northeastern University, Evanston, Illinois. Sept. 1965. AD 653466; Field Testing the Feasibility of Using Residential Shelter as Group Shelter. J. Christiansen. Brigham Young University. 1974. 39 The state of our knowledge about civi.l defense use of voluntary organizations has bean pulled together in three reports. These studies includes assessments of the way voluntary organizations function to tie the community together, as well as assessments of the role they have played in civil defense and other action programs. A review of experience with volunteerism demonstrated some of the major constraints on organizing an army of volunteers for civil defense. In the absence of a clear and present danger, the reliance on volunteers for the key staff of the program results in unevenness in the level of participation and quality of task performance. Civil defense programs, to be effective, must be carried out on a relatively uniform basis. In such a program, volunteers cannot be used as decision-makers. The remaining rank and file role is not as interesting to activists desirous of exercising social power through voluntary efforts. The lack of saliency of civil defense is a major constraint on widespread volunteerism. This does not preclude use of voluntary efforts on a limited task basis. Studies have indicated very successful use of v0lunteer efforts in promoting local civil defense efforts, such as educational exhibits, community shelter plans, etc. One study demonstrated the linkage in membership of voluntary associations at the community level. In one local community with about 2300 adult women, 43% were members of 39 voluntary organizations. Within this group of 990 women, about 63 women held six or more memberships each. As a source of interpersonal communication and influence, these 63 members could reach most of the community through direct interpersonal communication. By selectively enrolling individual women and organizations in his program, the local director can maximize secondary contact with all voluntary organizations. Other studies identified the extent of volunteerism in American society. Volunteer associations are a source of considerable social influence in American society, and while civil defense may not be able to enroll volunteers on a massive basis, the selected use of voluntary associations for limited missions is an effective way of communicating with the public. For example, a major ACTION/Bureau of the Census study of volunteering in America (Americans Volunteer,l974) shows that about 24 percent of our people do some voluntary work (based on a Census sample of 24,751 Americans) and that they average about 118 hours volunteering each year. 40 Studies of willingness to volunteer for civil defense indicate actually very high levels of expressed willingness (over 50 percent who say that they would "definitely" or "probably" volunteer.) Recent Studies in the Colorado Springs area (Christiansen. .) tend to lend considerable support to this, and high rates of volunteering might be expected if there were enough opportunities to be active on alternative days, at alternative times, and for alternative and meaningful purposes. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS In the foregoing discussion, we have outlined in a general way some of the more relevant aspects of the history of civil defense and provided an overview of public attitudes during this period. We have also discussed public opinion and response in a general way, and have summarized research findings on such topics as the international context, threat perception, general fnvorability, program support, salience, perceptions of local programs, perceptions of shelters as a survival resource, response to warning, and training and education impact. We have reviewed findings about such special audiences as information seekers, youth, local governing bodies, community power structure, and voluntary associations. These subjects were chosen from a large number of possible areas about which we have public attitude data. We have discussed the fact that public attitudes are in some ways a problem in civil preparedness. During periods when civil defense might hope to involve the public in the program, both low salience and the negative contingency aspect of the message tend to reduce the effectiveness of our efforts. During periods of crisis, an over response tends to divert the decision-makers from consideration of policies about improved postures of readiness. As a result, government tends to become completely involved with the management of a volatile public concern about the state of community preparedness and the adequacy of survival measures. We have also suggested that the government strategic policy of massive retaliation and assured destruction may have been a constraining influence on the development of passive defense systems. We have also observed the European civil preparedness programs have been more successful in creating a protective shelter system. Their general strategy of defense is a system of massive resistance in which civil protection has a vital role. We have noted that the public sees a long period of international tension and perceive these tensions increasing over time. In trying to assess the meaning of these discussions to the civil defense efforts of the 1980's, we are of course reaching beyond. the available data and the following views represent largely the opinion of the writer. 41 The full effects of the 1977 budget shock and attending Congressional interest is not fully known at this time. It would appear we may have passed the period of declining budgets and lack of high level attention to the Civil Preparedness program. Legislation has been introduced designed to formally authorize dual use approach. Discussions of the for civil preparedness in a balanced national defense strategy is increasing within government and the scientific community. This is likely to result in increased funding and a reorientation of civil preparedness programs. The most important single aspect of the present situation is the outcome of these policy considerations. While the nature of the problemof nuclear attack precludes good solutions, it still seems reasonable that a better posture civil defense readiness will become the goal of government. The development of better linkage between passive (CivilDefense) and active (Military) systems will likely continue in the 1980's. The public and the government will prefer active defense systems over passive systems. However, general changes in the assessed capability of active systems deterring an attack, and concern with arms limitation agreements, could generate greater support for the development of Civil Defense systems. A level of prediction deals with public attitudes, or the degree that perception of the threat of war will motivate and drive governmental attention to the civil defense problems. A general look at attitude data suggests less of a driving force for civil defense programs coming from the public than was the case in the 1960's. In addition to studying acceptance, impact and perceived civil defense systems, our public attitude surveys have also measured perceptionsof the international strategic environment, or what we describe as cold war outcomes. The people's perceptions of the likelihood of a nuclear war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. have declined when compared with the 1960's. Beginning in the 1966, the public changed their perceptions of the central enemy from being the U.S.S.R. to China. Survey data would cause us to postulate that China is and will continue to be perceived as the likely initiator of a future war. However, from an objective point of view, China will remain a limited threat through the 1980's. Recent survey data indicates this is shiftin~ back to a perception of the U.S.S.R. as the likely central threat. 6 26The Pursuit of National Security: Defense and Military Balance. Walter Slocombe. Potomac Associates. 1976. 42 While there han not been a significant decline of perception of the threat of nuclear war, there has been an increase in concern about the magnitude and acuteness of domestic problems. While the saliency of civil preparedness has declined there continues an underlying worry about the international environment and the long term threat of war. International threat could bring this worry to the surface. These same factors might cause the government to increase the general posture of civil preparedness readiness. Research clearly indicates that crisis periods do significantly increase public interest and support for civil preparedness programs. Some believe we may have an increase in international stress during the 1980's. It is argued that changing the international situation relative to parity in the destructive capability of weapon systems creates conditions of a high level of mutual deterrence. When war becomes sufficiently unthinkable for all involved, a condition is created in which the threat of nuclear exchange might be used with greater freedom and less fear of an actual war resulting. This poses the prospect that the threat of war may significantly increase in the 80's. If this should result, these threats would be re~ponded to by the people and the only remedy for their fears is the use of civil defense preparedness systems. This seems to argue for extensive contingency planning not only as a help to the population in case of an attack, but probably just as important as a stress management system. In general, if the present trend toward lowering saliency of civil preparedness as a public issue continues, we have little hope of a large public involvement in demands for a better civil preparedness posture of readiness. If periods of crisis provide clear indication of impending danger of major war, both the nation's leadership and the public are likely to demand a better posture of civil preparedness readiness. These two facts of life sort of lock civil preparedness into crisis planning of a type. This will be required even though there is serious doubt about the feasibility of using crisis planning as a readiness measure. The Civil Defense program is receiving a slight increase of attention by the opposition at the present time. The same arguments that characterized the early 1960's are finding their way into some national publications. It is doubtful that opposition to civil defense will cause the public to react unforably to decisions to increase the posture of civil defense readiness. In the 1980's most Americans will continue to be favorably disposed to the concept of civil defense and to 43 actual programs being implemented. However, it is likely they will continue to respond to minimal requests to participate. This includes volunteering for limited efforts, engaging in training programs, and attending to public information programs. This is particularly true of those special civil defense audiences who seek information about the civil preparedness programs in periods of relative international calm and become very active during crisis periods. Civil preparedness should continue to seek out and use this audience as a part of its crisis information system. One of the factors which has marked civil preparedness efforts in the past twenty-five years is the continued organization . changes. This likely to continue in the 1980's. On the Federal level, it is likely that better organizational alignments between natural disaster functions, civil disorder functions, environmental hazards preparedness functions, and nuclear disaster functions, environmental hazards preparedness functions, and nuclear disaster functions will occur. The present politicaladministrative divisions at the State and local operational levels are also likely to change. Many problems transcend present political boundaries. A rethinking of organizational arrangements is occurring in air, water and pollution, and ciYil preparedness is likely to emerge as a part of any changes in this area. Civil preparedness is likely to be a part of an emerging organization arrangement which is not constrained by boundaries of municipalities, counties and States. An analysis of the cost effectiveness of a range of possible programs demonstrates that civil preparedness programs have very high effectiveness for the costs involved. In fact, against a wide range of possible futures, civil preparedness programs have an excellent cost effectiveness ratios. This has been true for many years and will likely continue to be so. In reviewing the history of the development of the present civil preparedness program and its possible future directions, the writer is impressed with the idea that the existing program is largely the result of a series of decision-making accidents. On a relatively small number of occasions during the last twenty-five years, the civil preparedness issue has been considered at the top levels of government. The general circumstances existing at the time and the personal orientations of a handful of key decision makers have resulted in at least partial indecision and some neglect of the program. 44 At the present, however, Civil Preparedness has a clearer view of the directions the program should go than has been the situation in the past. It is the writer's opinion that the indecision about civil preparedness which has characterized the past is not likely to continue during the 1980's. Civil Preparedness will get a clearer mandate for action. Future program emphasis will probably be in the areas of (1) the development of programs to better use home basement shelters, (2) the conversion of the present fallout shelter system into a riskoriented effort to reduce risks of blast, fire and fallout. Systems for surveying the buildings for this purpose have been studied. Based on criteria developed and the degree of accuracy required, alternative approaches to the survey of buildings have been identified and are being developed. In order to maintain the existing fallout shelter system, it may be necessary to further augment food survival stocks in a crisis period. These stocks undoubtedly represent an important symbol of the continued existence of the fallout shelter system. An option for increasing civil defense survival and recovery capa bility includes efforts to increase shelter in new construction through some type of construction incentive. Past efforts to influence building owners and architects to include more shelter in new construction by providing information and technical assistance are achieving fair results. However, many builders and architects will not take these programs seriously unless the government appears to be more fully committed. An incentive program is likely to communicate this governmental commitment to such a program. Disaster preparedness for a range of hazards must deal with the problem of low saliency. Several uncoordinated efforts are more likely to be doomed to failure than a single highly coordinated effort. An all hazards preparedness effort is likely to enjoy more public support than the sum total of several independent efforts. The present separation of preparedness for natural, environmental, and man-made disasters is largely a phenomenon at the Federal level only. The 1980's will undoubtedly mark a period of search for further rationalization of these preparedness efforts. This includes a basic a way transformation and recasting of civil defense systems in such that the nation's preparedness for war-caused disaster will be increased as a byproduct of an all hazards approach. This will require a careful analysis of the manner in which preparedness for all hazards is useful in increasing operational readiness in the area of nuclear disaster preparedness. In such an approach, it should be 45 recognized that the relatively low salience of civil defense and the negative contingency aspect of civil defense messages create a possible threat of goal displacement and program drift. This, however, might be minimized through training efforts designed to emphasize civil defense system goals and teach how these goals might be realized as a byproduct of an all hazards approach to planning. In analyzing the costs and possible benefits of using other community preparedness programs to augment nuclear disaster preparedness, it is important to penetrate deeper into issues than such gross generalities as, for example, whether or not disaster preparedness is the same for all disaster hazards, or whether programs are exactly alike. All disasters are somewhat different but in some ways all are much alike. A disaster plan useful in meeting community needs for a flood would be inadP.quate in most details as a response to an earthquake or nuclear attack. More appropriate considerations for such cost benefit analysesdeal with the acquisition of skills, capabilities, resources, and possible program support and stability. This would include consideration of such areas of increased civil defense capability as contingency planning, opportunities for training and public information activities, experience in moving large numbers of people, and mobilization and coordination of community resources. All of these activities are important to civil defense readiness. Basically, civil defense is a community effort to plan for unusual contingencies and rare events. Most people are not verygood at such planning and do not like it. The more unlikely the event is to occur, the more difficult it is to give sustained attention to it. Contingency planning deals with hypothetical events which have only paper reality. A good deal of imagination and attention to detail are required, and such planning is alwaystreated as a low priority. The planner gets little or no feedback from others on such planning, and consequently receives no short term regards. It also requires skills in coordination and in motivating others in government to assist in the effort. In order to do a good job of planning for operations, civil defense must increase contingency planning skills at all levels of government and by so doing help government to better respond to emergencies of all kinds. It seems quite obvious that an all hazards approach to civil defense programs would increase the likelihood of improving contingency planning capabilities. This would occur as a straight forward result of more opportunities to practice these planning skills. 46 An important aspect of contingency planning is the opportunity to exercise or test the plan. This can occur as a result of experiencing a disaster emergency and thus learning directly from this experience. Short of such experience, plans can be tested by simulation or practice in the use of the plan. Simulated exercises can be used to focus on testing all aspects of plans and to train people to use the plan in an emergency. This generally involves a scenario or a description of an unfolding event which occurs over time and a series of responses to the event which are made by program actors playing the simulation, or game. Both the occurence of a disaster and a simulation exercise create an experience base for response to future emergencies. Generally, people like to participate in such simulation exercises. An all hazards approach to civil defense planning obviously increases the opportunity to test contingency plans and to teach others how to function under emergency crisis situations. Another central aspect of all civil defense efforts is the dissemination of information. This dictates a continuing relationship with a variety of audiences. Civil defense has a continuing responsibility for "getting the information out." The public as a whole should know what to do and where to go in the event of an attack and selected audiences tend to be involved in each specific civil defense program. This involves training programs for specialists, such as radiological monitors and shelter managers, and general public training programs, such as personal and family survival. In this respect, the civil defense structure might be viewed as a distribution system for a variety of emergency response informa~ion. As such, it must know its audiences, and have access to and use the channels to these audiences. The v!lue of incorporating all hazard response information with nuclear response information has been amply demonstrated in the experience of distributing H-14, "In Time of Emergency." The content to this booklet, which deals with public response to various emergencies continues to generate its own readership and distribution requirements. The use of the civil defense information dissemination system for other disaster hazards would obviously strengthen the civil defense capability of maintaining a state of readiness in this area. Civil defense must be prepared to manage the movement of large numbers of people during emergency operations. A range of peacetime activities deal with increasing movement capability. These efforts probably provide the opportunity to gain experience and know-how that is useful in civil defense. 47 The Civil Preparedness program could make a useful contribution to government at all levels because of its. ability in the area of mobilization and coordination of community resources. Civil Preparedness must develop local governmental capability to bring together private and governmental organizations into systems which will function during periods of great stress. Basically, the civil preparedness emergency response systems involve social action programs which will bring together material and organizational resources, and coordinate their use during periods of high utress. The coordinator is a new emerging role of government. Civil Preparedness staffs, if successful, must develop coordination skills. The civil preparedness Emergency Operating Center is a useful symbol of the requirements for coordinated community action in an emergency. In several communities, the utility of the control center in facilitating peacetime governmental coordination has been demonstrated. The control center provides a setting in which community leaders interact with each other on problems and approaches. The control center might be used as the means of effecting increased interagency coordination which is recognized as a current need of government. Experience in coordinating community resources for other than nuclear disaster hazards not only provides an increased base for such coordination but probably generates what might be called "reciprocal obligations." This means that the local director has helped others carry out their emergency roles and, therefore, can usually call for increased voluntary cooperation from recipients of his help in nuclear preparedness social action programs. Some of the possible costs should also be identified. These include the problems of goal displacement, limited manpower resources which must be carefully focused on specific goals, and the affects on acceptance and support of civil defense war emergency roles resulting from an all hazards approach to planning. We noted earlier the negative contingency aspect of the civil defense message and the fact that it might generate a distortion of the message or at least cause the respondent to make a low assessment of the probability of a nuclear war occurring. People do not like to talk about or dwell too long on war effects or preparations. In fact, a typical staff member working in the civil defense program may be somewhat isolated from normal interactions with others outside of the civil defense program. While all, contingency planning experiences a 48 lack of sustained public interest, this characteristic may not be as marked in the natural disasters area since they are less threatening to the individual than nuclear disaster preparedness. It is interesting to note that local directors prefer planning natural disasters rather than nuclear disaster, and that they also think their community prefers this emphasis. This may result from the fact that disaster planning is more manageable, less comprehensive, and also less threatening. These response patterns may provide the motivation to substitute other programs for nuclear preparedness. Generally, all disaster hazards provide opportunities to achieve nuclear disaster preparedness. However, none are sufficiently comprehensive to encompass total nuclear preparedness requirements. An all hazards approach to planning should enhance nuclear disaster planning, not displace it. In the past some have argued that the nuclear preparedness requirements were so large and comprehensive that a small civil preparedness organization was not capable of engaging in other programs and that, in fact, civil preparedness might become completely ineffective in a nuclear disaster preparedness area if it also engaged in other preparedness efforts. Basically, any organization must limit its goal to its resources and this argues against an all hazard approach. It is also argued that civil preparedness has had a sustained preparedness effort for some twenty years in support of preparedness for war-caused disasters. A review of past history indicates that planning and preparedness for all types of hazards has received low priority in government at all levels as it has in the community as a whole. Even though these costs may be real, it appears to the writer that an all hazards approach to planning is socially and psychologi cally more feasible than a series of unrelated and uncoordinated efforts. Nuclear disaster preparedness is likely to be the under lying motivation for such planning. It is also undoubtedly easier to discuss the need for such planning in an all ha~nrds context. In this sense, an all hazards approach is certainly more feasible and acceptable to the public and government than several single hazard approaches. In fact, a number of separate social action efforts dealing with preparedness are likely to appear competitive for community interest and commitment, and tend to further limit support for each effort. During the 1980's, civil preparedness will attempt to deal with the lowering saliency of the program by focusing on an all hazards approach to planning. In addition to increasing the saliency 49 of the program, this approach will undoubtedly diffuse thenegative contingency aspect of the CD message. Greaterpreparedness is likely to be achieved by focusing on allhazards simply because it is less threatening to audiencesto talk about the nonnuclear war hazards in a broadenedcontext. This brief review of research in the area of publicattitude studies and analyses of their meaning to the civilpreparedness program of the 1980's was undertaken to share more widely some of the pertinent findings. Some closelyrelated studies of adoption-diffusion of civil defense programs and communication processes have not been treated inthis summary. These findings are being consolidated intoa separate report. 50 CIVIL DEFENSE AND TaR PUBLIC: An Overview of Public Attitude Studies Unclassified Emergency Operations Systems Division, Research Directorate, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Research Report No. 17, December 1976. This report outlines relevant aspects of civil defense history and provides a general overview of public attitudes during the past 25 years. Public attitude findings are summarized under such topics-as-the international context, ~perception, general favorability, program support,salience, perceptions of local programs, perceptions of shelters as ~ survival resource, response to warning, and training and education impact. Findings are reviewed relevant to such special audiences as information seekers, youth, .!2£!.! governing bodies, community P2!!!. at~ and voluntary organizations. Projections are made rela tive to the meaning of these findings for civil defense in the 1980• a • CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE PUBLIC: An Overview of Public Attitude Studies Unclassified This report outlines relevant aspects of civil defense history and provides a general overview of public attitudes during the past 25 years. Public attitude findings are summarized under such topics as the international context,!h!!!! perception, _general favorability, program supportsalience, perceptions of local programs, perceptions of shelters as a survival resource, response to wa~i~, and tra1n1ng and-educat1on 1mpact. Findings are rev1ewed relevant to such. special audiences as information seekers youth, local governing bodies, community power at~ and voluntary organizat~ Projections are made relative to the meaning of these findings for civil defense in the 1980's. CIVn DEFENSE AND THE PUBLIC: An Overview of Public Attitude Studies Unclassified Emergency Operations Systems Division, Research Directorate, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Research Report No. 17, December 1976. This report outlines relevant aspects of civil defense history and provides a general overview o~l~tudes during the past 25 years. Public attitude findings are summarized under such topics as the 1nternational context, threat perception, general favorability, program a~ salience, perceptions of local programs, perceptions of shelters as ~ survival resource, response to warning, and training and education impact. Findings are reviewed relevant to such special audiences as information seekers, youth, local governing ~.community power str'iiC"tiire, and voluntary organizations. Projections are made rela tive to the meaning of these findings for civil defense in the 1980's. CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE PUBLIC: An Overview of Public Attitude Studies Unclassified This report outlines relevant aspects of civil defense history and provides a general overview of publrc-attitudeaduring the past 25 years. Public attitude findings are summarized under such topics as the international context, threat perception, general favorability, program supportsalience, perceptions of local programs, perceptions of shelters !! ~ survival resource, response to warning, and training and education impact. Findings are reviewed relevant to such special audiences as information seekers youth, local governing bo.ies, community power at~ and voluntary organizations. Projections are made relative to the meaning of these findings for civil defense in the 1980's.