FOREWORD 
Peacetime dangers are increasing in frequency and severity. They include such perils as natural disasters, industrial and transportation accidents, fires, explosions, civil disturbances, and environmental pollution. 
In addition, we now face two relatively new dangers-the continuing threat of nuclear attack with its widespread lethal radioactivity which would result from nuclear detonations, and a reduction of energy due to dwindling petroleum resources. If we are to survive in the modern world, we must adapt to its challenging new and age-old hazards. We must utilize our technical knowledge and skills to protect from these hazards. 
When we examine some of the "now" problems facing us, such as noise pollution, vandalism, natural disasters, radiation shielding, and energy conservation, we soon realize that the Nation's buildings, existing and in the planning stage, represent a major resource in reducing the impact of each of these problems. It therefore becomes a direct responsibility of our many architects and professional engineers to expand their knowledge of the problems and the various possible solutions. 
Architects and professional engineers have always been called upon to provide protection from hostile aspects of the environment, and it is primarily to this uniquely skilled group that this publication 

....... 

is addressed. Through proper analysis, planning, and design, architects and engineers can not only enhance a building's potential for combating the effects of various hazards, but they can also maximize a building's potential in this regard. 
Two of the myriad of problems selected for study in this publication are: (1) providing protection from fallout radiation-a problem unimaginable a few decades ago, and (2) reducing energy consumption-a problem which has only recently gained prominence. This publication presents design techniques, sometimes referred to as design "slanting" techniques, for including fallout radiation protection and energy conservation features into building designs without adversely affecting aesthetics, function, or cost. 
The architectural design techniques presented here include judicious use of standard construction materials, informed siting, and attention to such details as window and door placement. They do not require the user to be expert in the fields of nuclear radiation or energy conservation. Instead, they simply require the architect and engineer to recognize certain influential factors which would have a nullifying effect on the problems of radiation protection and energy conservation; and then to apply existing skills in the most beneficial manner. 


MAR 12 1979 

CONTENTS 

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Fallout Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Fallout Radiation and Buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Radiation Paths To the Shelter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Protection Factor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Principles of Fallout Protection . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 1 0 Architectural Design Techniques for 
Fallout Radiation Protection .. . ........... 12 Architectural Design To Conserve Energy ..... 19 Terraset Elementary School 
(Subsurface Construction) ............... 20 Campus Bookstore, Cornell University (Subsurface Construction) ... . ... . . . .... . 22 Fremont Elementary School (Subsurface Construction) .. .. .. . ........ 24 Application of Fallout Radiation 
Design Techniques . . . ................. 26 Westgate Elementary School. . . .. .. . . .. . . .. 27 Devonshire Elementary School, Waterloo, 
Iowa ............................... 33 Williamson Hall Bookstore, University of Minnesota (Subsurface Construction) ....... 34 Edgewood Highland School, Cranston, Rhodels~nd ......................... 36 Ketterlinus Junior High School, St. Augustine, Florida .................. 38 Shelter Analysis by Electronic Computer 
D.C.P.A. Publications Available to Archi-
SUNY AT BUFFALO tects, Engineers, and Building Owners 
JHE LIBRARIES 
D.C.P.A. Regional Offices 	......... ... ..... 40 1 

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Detonation 
The split-second blast of a nuclear weapon releases awesome amounts of energy-so awesome that it is usually measured by comparison with the force of thousands or millions of tons of TNT (kilotons or megatons). A 2-megaton nuclear weapon, for instance, would release or yield an amount of energy comparable to a block of TNT approximately the size of the Empire State Building. 
When a nuclear weapon is detonated aboveground, there is first a blinding flash of light. Observers can suffer retinal burns, even at distances of hundreds of miles if the weapon is in the megaton range. 
Millionths of a second after detonation, the fireball forms and grows by engulfing surrounding air. When the burst is low and the fireball touches the earth, all aboveground buildings within it are vaporized or otherwise destroyed, except for especially hardened facilities . 
Simultaneously, the explosion releases an initial burst of radiation-about 5 percent of the bomb' s total energy. This radiation includes high-energy neutrons and gamma rays . Additional gamma rays come from radioactive bomb materials and fission products. 

Thermal Effects 
The fireball sends out thermal radiation in two pulses, making up 35 percent of the bomb's total energy. The first pulse, a split-second ultraviolet flash, isn't a major hazard. But the second is. This is mostly infrared radiation, which carries nearly all the heat of the burst and lasts several seconds. As heat radiates from the fireball, the fireball spreads over ever-greater areas, so heat levels diminish sharply with distance. Low clouds or fog tend to cut heat, but high clouds can act as reflectors, raising heat levels on the ground. 

Blast Effects 
In about the time it takes for a thunderclap to follow a lightning bolt, the blast wave follows the thermal flash. About 50 percent of the energy of a nuclear burst is in this form. The blast wave starts as a high-pressure shock front, traveling somewhat faster than the speed of sound. After a few seconds, a negative-pressure phase follows. The effect is to first squeeze, and then expand or explode, structures and human tissues. 
Along with these great swings in pressure, there are short wind gusts of enormous velocities-up to 1 ,000 mph near Ground Zero (GZ). Drag forces of these winds would inflict much of the damage to buildings and the bulk of blast injuries to people. Due to the relatively slow speed of the blast wave, there can be time to take protective action, such as dropping flat, or seeking shelter. 
Near Ground Zero, pressures and winds are higher if a weapon is detonated at the surface of the earth, as compared to one detonated in the air. Farther out, an air burst creates stronger pressures and winds because the blast wave bounces off the earth and reinforces the primary wave. 
In areas of heavy blast damage, fires would be started by broken gas mains and downed electric lines. These fires would feed on the kindling produced by the blast. 
A nuclear explosion vents about 90 percent of its total energy immediately in the form of initial radiation, heat, and blast. These initial effects can be devastating at and near the vicinity of the point of detonation. However, the remaining 10 percent of a nuclear weapon's energy can pose a threat to areas far beyond the limits of the initial effects. This energy shows up after the detonation mainly as radiation from fission products that rise with the mushroom cloud, and later descend as fallout. 

~ 
r
1 
0 
c: 
-1 
"U :xJ 
m 
~ 

r
-

2 C) 
~ 
2 
c 
-

2 
=i 
)> 
r
,m 
, 

m 
(') 
-1 
fl) 
~ 
r
r
0 
c: 
~ 
FALLOUT RADIATION 
Fallout has its origin in the fission chain reaction that triggers the nuclear blast. This forms more than 200 different radioactive isotopes, which begin at once to decay, each at its own rate. Some decay almost completely in a matter of minutes, others so slowly that years later they are only slightly less radioactive. The differences in decay rate are a 
crucial factor in determining the hazards of fallout radiation, and also in distinguishing between the two types of fallout: global and local. 
Global fallout results when nuclear weapons are detonated and the fission products formed by the burst vaporize, then condense as extremely fine 
particles that ascend into the stratosphere and travel in the high-altitude winds for long periods of time. Radioactive decay eliminates all but the longlived isotopes such as strontium-90. When the particles do drift down to earth, they are widely 
distributed and are often barely perceptible. 
Local fallout has a more immediate effect, and the danger is more apparent. This type of fallout results from the detonation of a nuclear weapon at or close to the surface of the earth. Fission products from the explosion agglomerate with larger particles of debris, and roughly 80 percent of them set
tle to earth in a matter of hours. Heavier particles 
descend in the first hour or so; lighter ones take 
several hours or more, and winds carry them over 
hundreds of square miles. The major and im
mediate danger of this local fallout is radiation as 
these particles settle over land and buildings. 
The other 20 percent of the fission products from 
a surface burst go into the stratosphere and 
become global, or worldwide, fallout. 
In most cases, fallout would be visible, appearing 
as a fine film of dust on all horizontally exposed sur
faces such as the ground or roofs of buildings. The 
fineness of film, often no thicker than a small frac
tion of an inch, can be deceptive. However, it is the sole source of the fallout radiation hazard. Each tiny particle acts as a miniature "sun." Radioactive decay results in emission of alpha and beta particles and electromagnetic energy bundles called gamma rays. These rays are emitted uniformly in all directions at the speed of light. Alpha particles are dissipated in 1 to 3 inches of air. Beta particles can cause burns up to 10 feet, but ordinary clothing provides necessary shielding. Gamma rays have extremely high energy and penetrating power; and, as such, are a major concern when providing protec

tion from nuclear weapons. It would require Y2 mile of air or 21-'2 feet of earth to attenuate gamma rays by a factor of 1 ,000. Gamma rays act on the human body as if they were tiny "bullets," and cause internal injury by damaging or destroying cells. When this destruction impairs the functioning of the blood or the manufacturing centers of the bone marrow and the lymph glands, illness follows. Recovery is possible, although slow. Continued exposure to high intensities of gamma radiation can result in death. 
Gamma radiation is like X-rays and exposure, or 
the dose, is gauged in the same units: Roentgens 
(R). To measure the dose rate or radiation intensity, 
Roentgens per hours (R/hr) are used. An hour after 
detonation, the accumulated fallout on a 30 x 40
ft. lawn, measuring approximately 1/10 of an inch 
deep, might subject a person standing in the center 
to a dose rate as high as 1,000 R/hr. Effects of radia
tion on humans depend on such factors as age and 
general health. But statistical projections show that 
some people would not survive a dose of 300 
Roentgens over a 24-hour period; and a few others 
would recover from twice the dose. Studies sug
gest it is possible to survive even greater total 
doses accumulated in small units over long periods 
of time. 


' .. . ·.· ·.
,.' ~ . 
~ 0 4 
... 
[) 'V 4 \~/.... ~ 
4 .. ..·.
<d 0 " > '7""> 0
W'\c...-._j"
~ ~"o4 ~ .17
c1 d 
. . 

. . . . ~ A"• 4<w . . . 
.. ·:· A \) .d 4 • "_A ~ 4 
-Qa ..: 

... . ·. . . ' • . .. 
f1 
"' .. 
. ...... .: ... : . 

!·•. ·.. . . ·•< . i ' <.. 
.... 
' 
.' : : 

. . . 
' . RADIOACTIVE PARTICLE .
.. , ' . . . 
.. 
.:.: EARTH PARTICLE·..~·-·._ · : _· .: .· = _:·: _ . :_ .·-:. : 
. . ' . . 
1 inch 10feet 1/2 mile
Fallout particles emit three forms of radiation: 
of air of air of air

Alpha and beta radiation consist of atomic particles 
that do not travel far, and can be stopped easily. 
Gamma radiation consists of true rays, like X-rays. 
Gamma rays can travel relatively far, and have great 
penetrating power. When the vaporized materials, BETA 
including fission products and materials made 
radioactive by neutron bombardment, condense in
to fine particles, many adhere to larger debris par
ticles. The resulting size keeps the particles from Fallout particle 
rising high, and causes them to settle out over large 
areas as the radioactive cloud moves with the 
winds. The air through which fallout passes, and 
the surfaces on which it settles, do not become 
radioactive. 

Alpha particle Beta particles Gamma rays attenuated by a stopped by 1 stopped by 10 factor of 1,000 by 0.5 miles of inch of air or feet of air or air or 21h feet of earth sheet of paper heavy clothing 


FALLOUT RADIATION AND BUILDINGS 
The architectural techniques shown later in this report for incorporating protection from fallout radiation into the design of buildings can be understood much easier with an understanding of how fallout gamma radiation reaches building occupants. First, we assume that all the fallout particles from a nuclear weapon detonation are down, and are now on the roof of a building or the surrounding ground. We do not consider the effects of falling radioactive particles, as this would be of no consequence. 
Since the fallout particles are either on the ground around the building or are on the roof, we say that a standard radiation detector assumed to be 3 feet above the floor and centrally located would be subject to only radiation contributions from the ground or the walls through which the radiation must pass and the roof. No matter which path the radiation takes to reach the radiation detector, the origin of the radiation is at the ground plane or the roof plane. 
Gamma radiation reaches the detector from all directions. Five ways in which gamma radiation will reach a detector in a building are described below: 
Skyshine Radiation 
Some radiation emanating from particles on the ground is reflected or scattered by interaction with molecules of the air . This is identified as "skyshine radiation" and is assumed to be limited to the area of an exterior wall above the plane of the detector. 

Direct Radiation 
Gamma radiation that reaches the detector from the ground-source plane having undergone no interactions with the exterior wall barrier, is classified as "direct radiation." This occurrence is limited for analysis purposes to the lower 3 feet of the exterior wall. 

Wall-Scatter Radiation 
Gamma radiation from the ground source plane that experiences interactions within the materials of exterior walls, and which is scattered or deflected into a building, is known as "wall-scatter" radiation. This occurrence affects the entire height of an exterior wall. 

Ceiling-Shine Radiation 
Some gamma radiation can enter a building by passing through an exterior wall and interacting with the ceiling . This interaction might ultimately cause the gamma rays to be deflected into the occupied space. This is classified as "ceiling-shine radiation." 

Roof Contribution 
Gamma radiation from fallout particles on the roof might enter a building as direct, wall-scattered, or air-scattered radiation. Analysts do not attempt to distinguish between the various radiation paths when considering the roof-source plane. Radiation from fallout particles on the roof is simply analyzed as a roof contribution . 
Once the fallout shelter analyst evaluates the skyshine, direct, wall-scatter, and ceiling-shine radiation, and determines the radiation contribution from the roof, the building components that need special attention can be easily identified. As an example, if the roof contribution is responsible for a substantial portion of the total amount of radiation reaching the inside of the building, there may be a need to increase the weight of the materials in the roof . Also, if direct radiation is a major contributor, there may be a need to alter the building materials in the lower portion of the exterior wall. 



RADIATION PATHS TO THE SHELTER 
':~\ 
XX.KXXXX 

Ground Contribution-Skyshine 
Some radiation is scattered to the interior by interaction with molecules of the air. 
xxxxxxxx 

Ground Contribution-Wall-Scatter 
Some radiation interacts with particles in the wall and is deflected or scattered to the interior. 
Ground Contribution-Direct 
The ground contribution refers to radiation which reaches the interior directly from the ground source plane without being deflected or scattered. 

xxxxxxxx 
Roof Contribution 
The roof contribution refers to radiation which 
reaches the interior from fallout that may ac
cumulate on an overhead-source plane. 


X X'X X X 
Ground Contribution-Ceiling Shine 
Some radiation interacts with particles in the ceiling and is deflected or scattered to the interior. 



PROTECTION FACTOR 
Protection Factor (PF) expresses the relationship A one-story house provides fallout protection in between the amount of fallout gamma radiation the PF 1 %-2 range . If you have a typical one-story that would be received by a person in an unbuilding with a partially exposed basement, the protected location with the amount he would basement will probably be in the PF 2-1 0 range. A receive inside shelter at the same location. For excompletely belowgrade basement in a one-story ample, an occupant of a shelter with a PF of 40 building will have a PF of 1 0-50. This is contingent would be exposed to a gamma radiation dose of upon the actual geometry of the building and the only 1/40th (or 2.5%) that to which he would be exmass weight of its floors, walls, and roof. This same posed if he were unprotected in the same location. PF range is probable in central areas of upper Current policy of the Federal Government requires stories in medium-rise buildings. More massive that fallout shelters for the general public should multistory buildings can reach the PF 50-250 range have a minimum PF uf 40 . in the center of some upper floors and in the base
The illustration gives a general idea of the relative ment. Basements and central portions of some upprotection found in common structures. The actual per floors in high rise buildings (more than 10 PF rating should be determined in consultation with stories) with heavy floors and walls, can be exany of the thousands of fallout shelter analysts pected to have PF's in the 250-1 ,000 range. Subacross the country, or with the assistance that is basements of multistory buildings, mines, caves, available from DCPA regional offices via your local and specially constructed underground fac ilities civil preparedness office. usually have a PF of 1,000 and above. 
xxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
400 R/h 	10 R/h PF=40 
XXYXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
illiillliiiililiilllliiii l\111 11111111111111 


Relative protection found in structures 
protection factors 
1%-2 2-10 10 -50 50-250 250-1000 1000 and above 
•
•
• 
PRINCIPLES OF FALLOUT PROTECTION 
There are three means of protecting against external radiation, basically gamma rays: time, distance, and shielding. Protection is provided by: 
(1) controlling the length of time a person is exposed to fallout radiation, (2) controlling the distance between a person and the source of radiation, and (3) placing radiation-absorbing materialthat is, a shield-between a person and the radiation source. Time is always involved, and is used in combination with distance or shielding or both. 
Lapse of time after a nuclear explosion protects against the radiation hazard of fallout through a characteristic known as "radioactive decay". This means that the radioactivity produced by a nuclear detonation "decays" or diminishes at a specific rate. The rate of decay is usually expressed by the term "half-life". A half-life is the time it takes for the radioactivity to decay to one-half its original value. Some radioactive materials in a weapon's residue have half-lives measured in millionths of a second, some in seconds, and some in minutes and hours. Others may take days, months, or years to lose half their activity. 
The total radioactivity of newly formed fallout decreases very rapidly at first, because it contains many materials with very short half-lives. But the rate of decrease lessens when, as time goes by, these short half-life materials have decayed, and a residue of materials with a longer half-life remains. 
Although the average decay of the typical nuclear weapon's residue may be described by a mathematical formula, a less rigid "rule-of-thumb" may be used. An estimate of the intensity of the fallout radiation at any given time may be made by considering that with every seven-fold increase in time following the detonation of a nuclear weapon the radiation intensity or dose rate is decreased by a factor of 1 0, or by 1 0-fold. In general, the dose rate at 49 hours after explosion will have dropped to about 10 percent of its value at 7 hours. If, for exam ple, at 1 hour after detonation the rate were 1 ,000 R/hr, at 343 hours (approx. 2 weeks) the rate would be down to 1 R/hr. 
The principle of distance, or "geometry shielding," can be explained simply by noting that the further we are from the source of radiation, the safer we are. When the distances are large in relation to size of the radioactive source, the dose rate varies inversely as the square of the distance from the source. 
The geometry of buildings, as defined by the exterior walls and the roof, can enhance the shielding potential by creating distance between fallout on the ground, roof, and points within a building . lmagine yourself standing in a large open area such as a field, a parking lot, or your lawn. Consider that you are in a circular area contaminated with radioactive fallout. Only about 1 0 percent of the radiation reaching you will originate from the surface of the ground farther away than 250 feet; about 30 percent of the radiation reaching you will come from the circular area that is greater than 1 00 feet from you; about 50 percent of that reaching you will come from outside a 25-foot radius around you; and radiation from fallout particles within 25 feet would account for another 50 percent of all radiation received by you. 
In multi-storied buildings, there may be a lot of distance between radiation sources and people being sheltered. When considering shielding against fallout radiation, it is important to note that one of the ways in which gamma rays damage body ti ssues is by knocking electrons out of their orbits in the atoms of the materials in the body. If this happens to a sufficient number of atoms in the body tissue, without time for recovery, radiation damage results. 
If we want to stop a high proportion of the gam ma rays before they get to the tissues of the body, we can place materials that have many electrons in their makeup between ourselves and the source of radiation. The more electrons in the materials, the more gamma rays will be stopped before they get to us, since the chances for gamma rays to strike electrons in the materials have been greatly increased. Generally speaking, the denser the materials (the heavier the barrier), the greater the number of electrons there are to act as absorbers of, or shields against the gamma radiation. Examples of shields in structures are walls, floors, and roofs. 
Shielding in a shelter is the effect of the comb ination of all the materials in the structure acting as a barrier against gamma radiation. 

-n-c 

Q) :::::!. =::l 
on 
c:: -· 
r+"'C 1:JCD 
""" en 
s0 0 .... n 
r+ 
0 -· 
::l 
(/) 
:I: 
m 
r 
-0 2 
G') 
-o
G')_ 
Cl) (/) 
0 -1
3 )>
!2 
... n 
~m 
~I 

ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN TECHNIQUES FOR FALLOUT RADIATION PROTECTION 
Architectural techniques may provide immediate improvement or may be of such nature as to facilitate later conversion of a building for protective purposes. Every building is a natural shield against fallout radiation. Some buildings, however, are better than others. Fallout shelter surveys conducted by the Federal Government in existing facilities indicated that millions of shelter spaces (one space = one person) were inherently available. Many other buildings had weak points which nullified otherwise good protection. These weak points can be detected by someone knowledgeable in radiation shielding analysis during the initial design phase of a project, and "no-cost" design changes can be incorporated to maximize the protection without exceeding budget limitations. 
Examples of items to be considered in architectural design for protection from fallout radiation are: 
a. 	
Location and quantity of window areas -Can window areas be reduced or can sills be raised to reduce exposure to radiation? 

b. 	
Site conditions-Is the structure located so that maximum advantage is taken of mutual shielding from adjacent structures? Has consideration been given to use of retaining walls, planters, and overhangs -or to grading a slope away from the structure -to minimize the effect of radiation from the ground? 

c. 	
Basement-Is it possible to depress the ground floor partially or completely below grade to reduce the effect of radiation from the ground? 

d. 
Entrances 	and Exits -Have these been located to maximize the protection by baffles or do they permit direct entry of the ground radiation? Can stairwells be positioned so they will provide additional shielding at the ends of corridors and hallways? 

e. 	
Have interior partitions been placed to block radiation? 


f . 	Have dense, solid walls been used advantageously? Have hollow walls been filled with low-cost materials where feasible? 

g. 	
Floors and Roofs-Has a comparison been made of various systems such as concrete slabs on precast tee beams or bar joists, composite floor systems such as tile or terrazzo on concrete, or two-way slab design versus panjoist construction? Cost differentials may be negligible, but one system may provide significant additional shielding . 

h. 	
Architectural Arrangement -Has maximum advantage been taken in arrangement of the building modules to provide a protected core area which could be used for shelter? 



I' the protective requirements are clearly understood, the architect and engineer will find many ways in which the building can contribute to the safety of personnel and material without an increase in cost and without sacrificing esthetics and efficiency. This procedure might not always provide shelter spaces with high protection factors, but certainly will provide some protection at no cost. 
In addition to using the design procedure noted above, there are other low-cost techniques in handling shielding and geometry factors which would enhance inherent shelter characteristics to meet standards and criteria . 
Examples of some of these low-cost techniques are: 
a. 	
Wall Construction -Utilize reinforced concrete or concrete block construction in lieu of lightweight aggregate block or other lightweight wall construction . Use hollow tile or concrete block with sand or gravel fill to provide additional mass in interior and exterior walls . 

b. 
Provide masonry screen walls, or planter boxes for esthetic value as well as increasing the mass for shielding purposes. 

c. 	
Add, where possible, a few inches of concrete topping to a precast concrete tee roof or floor slab system. This will do much to enhance the protection afforded occupants. 

d. 	
Take advantage of site conditions, and use earth berms as shielding to improve the shelter provided in a structure. 



On the next few pages, architectural design techniques have been isolated and diagrammed for the purpose of clarification. Each diagram shows how that particular technique employs geometry or shielding to increase protection from radiation sources. Just as an architectural design is the synthesis of many requirements, shelter development often involves the use of a combination of design techniques as opposed to a single slanting technique. 

ARCHITECTURAL SLANTING TECHNIQUES 

1.  Utilize Mutual Shielding: Group other buildings  2.  Use Sloping Ground: Slope ground away from  
around shelter as a shield from radration sources  building.  This  limits  the  contaminated  ground  
located beyond the buildings.  source plane's influence on the shelter.  

3. 	Build Into Slope. 4. Create Earth Berms: Build up earth mounds around the building . This technique can also help reduce the effect of external noise on the building occupants. 

IN.11 B] 
5. 	Develop Areas That Are Partially or Fully 6. Arrange Building Elements To Form a Protected Core Area.
Below Grade. 
2: 	I 
l 
I. I .I I I I
I 
I 
I I I I I I I 
7. Develop Interior Corridors: Arrange building 8. Use Elevators and Stairways To Shield elements to form protected interior corridors. Entrances. 
oio io o\oiiio\oiif~,,~,,,,,,.,,, .,.,, ,.,,,,.,.,,~;r,;i[Cffi';iiiioi;fi/ioi ;i'o\i'' 
9. 	Consider a Heavier Type of Structural 10. Increase Interior Partition Weight. System. 
-· 	0
I 	I
-
-
l .. l I I I
~-· 
11. Stagger Openings in Exterior Wall and 12. Raise Sill Heights. Interior Partitions. 15 
13. Reduce Window Size. 
NORMAL CONSTRUCTION ROOF MASS • 31""/ S. F. 
ENHANCED SH EL TEA IN CORRIDOR ROOF MASS • 82*/ S. F. 
Overhead mass weight can be increased simply by adding more inches of concrete. If necessary, the additional weight can be limited to the area over the corridor. 
14. Increase Overhead Floor or Roof Weight. 
Pr.ast Cone. T · B ..mt 
vv 
. 
.
. 
. 
I '' M..onrv 
ROOF MASS • 100 -/S. F. 
PCK!rl'd Gy psum on G yp.um Bo•d 
ft><D 
ROOF MASS • 60 */S. F. 
Concrete T-Beams and similar systems provide excellent overhead mass weight. 
0 

15. Increase Exterior Wall Weight. 
OFFICES 
SERVICE 
B 

OFFICES 
PLAN 
16. Increase Mass Weight of Outside Wall of the Corridor. 
FILLED WITH SAND OR GRAVEL 
Hollow masonry wall units can be filled with sand 
or gravel to increase mass weight. 

OFFICES 
SERVICE 
[] 
OFFICES 
PLAN 
17. Increase Mass Weight of Permanent Walls. 
OFFICE 
,... 
0 
"' 
"' -< 
OFFICE 	OFFICE 
PLAN 
18. 	
Increase Mass Weight of Corridor Walls That Connect Fire Exits. 

19. 	
Use Multistoried Shelter Areas: Close-in gamma radiation must pass through floor barriers to reach the shelter area; also the greater the height of the shelter, the greater the distance the gamma radiation must travel. 



ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN TO CONSERVE ENERGY 
Energy conservation is becoming more and more a serious objective. Fossil fuels someday will be exhausted and it is expected that energy from alternative sources will not become available rapidly over the next decades. Further, the cost of existing energy sources as well as new sources of energy is almost certain to increase. It is essential, therefore, to conserve energy in the areas responsible for greatest consumption such as transportation, industrial processes, and building utilization -the latter being our major concern . 
Energy conservation in buildings is generally considered in two categories-passive and active. Those conservation features in a building which are made permanent either at the time of initial construction or during subsequent modifications are classified as passive features. These would include insulation in walls and attics to reduce the flow of heat, overhangs for shading walls, selection of building materials with acceptable thermal qualities, site orientation to reduce the effect of the sun on the building, and the location of windows and the selection of glass for them . 
Active energy conservation features in buildings are features such as lighting controls (switches), operable shading devices (screens and louvers), thermostats, planning the use of areas within the building to reduce heating and cooling requirements, and using energy-efficient equipment. These active features, unlike passive features, may be varied over the useful life of a building . 
An architect must solve many problems when designing a building. Hopefully, protection from fallout radiation and energy conservation features are looked upon as simply two additional components in the design criteria . There is much that can be done by the architect to combat both problems simultaneously. The majority of architectural design techniques for fallout protection represent excellent passive features for energy conservation in buildings; for instance, the size and location of openings in a building wall have a direct influence upon the radiation shielding characteristics of a building, as well as its thermal efficiency. The same can be said about the selection of materials for their thermal properties. 
One particular architectural design technique for providing fallout radiation protection in buildings is becoming a popular technique among architects and engineers who desire to reduce building energy consumption . This technique -building into or beneath the ground-was previously relegated primarily to public works projects and defense projects. Today it is increasingly viewed as a viable alternative to aboveground locations. Some of the reasons for this increased interest in subsurface construction are: 
1. 	
Shortage of space in urban areas; 

2. 	
Increased sensitivity to the historical value of buildings that have to be demolished to make way for new construction; 

3. 	
Continually rising costs of real estate; 

4. 	
Reduction in excavation costs due to major advancements in technology; 

5. 	
Recognized need to reduce energy consumption by building in subsurface locations where environmental conditions are more constant. While reason number 5 above is cited most 


often, there are many other reasons why architects and engineers and their clients are increasing underground construction. Clients indicate there are machine-operating savings -machines remain accurate longer since temperature and humidity are easier to control below the ground; machines that require the utmost in stability have fewer problems in subsurface construction -there is little or no vibration, so costly vibration-isolating foundations are not required ; subsurface facilities are subject to little or no structural shear during an earthquake; and maintenance costs are generally reduced , since there is less wear and tear brought on by extremes of weather. 
We can add to the many favorable reasons for underground construction: increased safety from tornadoes and high winds, insulation from noise pollution, and a potential reduction in vandalism , since the frequent targets of vandals (the windows) are nonexistent. 
Whether or not energy-conservation goals as well as radiation shielding goals are achieved, depends directly upon an awareness of the problems and the design skills of the architects and engineers responsible for synthesizing the building . Obviously, the time to make the rational design choices that. will enhance the function and security of a building is in the early design stage -the conceptual stage, before less effective features are locked in. 19 

TERRASET ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 

HEAT TRANSFER THROUGH A MATERIAL 

Heat transfer through a material occurs differently than passage of gamma radiation through a material. Both energy forms will be attenuated, but by different processes. The different processes result from vastly different scales of the wavelength of gamma radiation, as compared to heat. Infrared radiation impacts upon a material, and because of the relatively large wavelength as compared with the size of the molecules which make up the barrier, is transformed to molecular kinetic energy. The 
Location: 	Reston, Virginia 
Owner: 	Fairfax County Public School System 

Architect: 	Davis, Smith and Carter Inc. Reston, Virginia 
resulting heat then is transferred through the barrier by conduction if the barrier is solid, and by conduction and convection if the barrier is a fluid . 
Heat transfer through a barrier occurs significantly more slowly than nuclear radiation passing through. In the heat transfer process, there is a time lapse or time lag associated with conduction. This time lag in heat transfer is a favorable factor and is, in addition to the thermal energy attenuation, characteristic of building materials. 
Mechanical Engineer: 	Vinzant and Associates Washington, D.C. 
Features: 	Energy Efficiency Protection From Fallout Radiation 
Time-Lag occurs as heat flow passes by conduction 


., 
J: 0 
-t 
0 0
., 
;!; 
0 0 
m 
r 
(/) 
J: 0 
~ 
z 
(;) 
z 
-t 
m 
:D 
6 
:D 
(/)
., 
)> 
() 
m 
:D 
m 
r 
)> 
-t 
6 
z 
(/) 
.,! 
(/) 
., 
J: 0 
-t 
0 0
., 
;!; 
0 
0 
m 
r (/) 
J: 0 
~ 
z 
(;) 
m 
)> 
:D 
-t 
J: () 
0 
< 
m 
:D 
!! 

.,., 
r 
0 
0 
::IJ "'U 
r 
)> 
z 
Architect: Earl R. Flansburgh and Associates
CAMPUS 
Building Area: 33,000 sq. ft. 
BOOKSTORE 
Construction Cost: $1 ,524,000 
CORNELL 
Cost/sq. ft.: $46.18
UNIVERSITY 
Completion: 1977 
ITHACA, 
This three-level campus bookstore is located on a site across from the student union and in the main 
NEW YORK 
part of the campus -an ideal location for its purpose. However, use of the site in the more conventional manner would have destroyed an extraordinary view of the valley below and jeopardized existing trees. The solution was to construct the building underground. This decision not only left, virtually undisturbed, one of the most environmentally pleasing spots on the campus, but it also insured reduced consumption of energy and increased protection from fallout radiation. 
• 
J
I t-~
' 	'' , I I 
1 .,,~ I I '_...' j · ! I I I I ·--T g
:rt ·-
• 	l ~ 
r~~--~~ I ~ : ~ 
llll • l ,.~ 
I 	I I I : I I I i 
"'-'"""o(.A~tQuo'"'*.~T~ 
FIRST FLOOR PLAN 
r 



FREMONT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 
Location: 	Santa Ana, California 
Owner: 	Santa Ana Unified School District 
Architect: 	Allen and Miller, AlA Santa Ana, California 
Mechanical Engineer: 	F. T. Andrews, Inc. Fullerton. Cal. 
Completed: 1975 
Capacity: 850 Students-Grades K-5 
Floor Area: 46,000 Sq. Ft. 
Construction Cost: $1 ,595,000 or $34.23 Per Sq. Ft. 

Energy efficiency, earthquake resistance, and fallout protection are among the features of Fremont Elementary School. Opened in 1975, the school has received local and national acclaim for its energy-conserving and other design qualities-including awards from the Concrete Reinforcing Steel Institute (CRSI), the Orange County Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, and the 1976 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation's Fifth Annual Energy Conservation Awards Program. 
The ~chool's energy-conservation concepts are embodied in a reinforced-concrete structure which has been depressed into its 2.8-acre urban site. The building is depressed about 5 feet into the site, and earth berms are mounded to the roof level where the surface doubles as outdoor playyard for the small site. More than one-third of the exterior wall surface is covered by earth berms. Other walls are partially buried. These construction techniques provide seismic resistance (to meet California's 1968 code for earthquake safety in school buildings) and fallout radiation protection (an unplanned benefit). 
~ 

reception counsel teachers lounge teaching area 

BUILDING SECTION 
Energy efficiency of the building results from the thermal inertia of the earth berms and the concrete structure framing. In combination with roof insulation, the mass of the surrounding earth and concrete is said to reduce the cooling load alone by 20 percent below that for conventional school designs. Delayed heat transfer-caused by the mass of earth and concrete-shifts heat gain for the building into the afternoon and evening, a time period after normal school hours. Dampening effects of the material mass further reduce the internal heat gain. 
The low profile of Fremont is achieved with functional innovation. From the street, entry is via a depressed, terraced courtyard and amphitheater. Gently sloped berms, stairs, and ramps extend the surrounding playground to the roof playyard. "Understated, restrained, and effective site planning for maximum utilization," was a comment of the CRSI award jury. 
Radiation shielding is an additional benefit resulting from the design concept. Protection is further enhanced by an absence of windows in the building, except at the entry court (north side). Even there, an 8-in. sculptured concrete wall, 6-feet high with windows above, acts as a radiation barrier across the entire facade, except for the doorways. 

Attention to radiation shielding techniques could have added to the fallout protection qualities (as noted, this was not considered by the architect)-particularly, improved baffling of entryways. However, the massive construction of the school is so effective a barrier that there is only minor loss of useful shelter space in the building. Almost the entire floor area, excluding the multipurpose room to the south, is useable shelter space. 
oQ l 
~ 
0 5 15 30 



I I ~ 
s :~ :": : ~ :.:: ~
! -~l /\ 
:~mr:mm:
l: ~ : : u 
!O~,~~!:i;~ ,.;:;-o • i!:ll!!9 •
d~a 
b.r------:r 
~~~ 
SITE PLAN ~ FLOOR PLAN 
VIEW OF BUILDING FROM NORTHEAST CORNER I INTERIOR OF OPEN-SPACE INSTRUCTION AREA I Photos by C. von Frankenberg 25 
APPLICATION OF 

FALLOUT 
RADIATION 
DESIGN 
TECHNIQUES 
A few years ago, the Fairfax County, Virginia, School Board was engaged in an immense building program in response to the demands of a fastgrowing population. The board's concern for the lack of fallout protection in the county's school buildings led to an interesting study. The study involved the Westgate Elementary School, which was being designed by the firm of Beery and Rio, AlA, of Annandale, Virginia. 
A decision was made to experiment with the Westgate Elementary School to determine the cost for inclusion of shelter in the design. Beery and Rio were retained to prepare alternate designs, including varying degrees of shelter. They were to (1) continue the normal school design, (2) optimize shelter in the basic design, using radiation protection design techniques, (3) redesign the school to shelter the whole school population, and (4) optimize shelter for more than the school population. The board decided to accept and build the optimized shelter design after reviewing bids for the two basic designs with alternatives. The increase in cost over the basic Fairfax County School design without fallout protection represented only 3.5 percent of the total construction cost. 
The unprotected school, identified as "Scheme A," was to be a typical Fairfax County elementary school housing 600 students and including the usual classrooms, administrative space, library, and 
multipurpose room. The protected school, while 
maintaining the same design criteria, was to gain a 
major area of PF 40, conform as closely as possible 
to standard Fairfax County school construction, and 
deviate only when necessary to provide the desired 
number of shelter spaces. 
The architect's first approach to providing fallout protection, which we call Scheme A-1, used the basic building layout as previously determined and devoted attention to the first-floor corridorarchitectural design technique number 7. Instead of the open web steel joist above the corridor, a 6 Y:z " structural concrete slab was proposed-design technique number 14. The original12" hollow concrete block corridor walls were changed to 12" solid concrete block walls to support the slab, and to reduce the effect of radiation from the ground source plane beyond the classrooms and the roof source plane above the classrooms-design technique number 10. This resulted in shelter for only 150 of the 600 building occupants. 
In Scheme A-2, which resulted in 150 more shelter spaces, the architect removed the concrete slab from above the first floor and placed it on the roof above the second floor corridor and reduced its thickness to 6". The solid block walls were also extended to the roof. 
Keeping in mind that the design criteria specified shelter for at least the school population (600), the architect decided to redesign the school with fallout protection in mind from the beginning and examine the results . This resulted in Scheme B. In redesigning the school, two stories were used throughout. The first level was lowered approximately 3Y:z feet into the ground (window sill height)-design technique number 5; and second floor construction changed to precast tees with concrete topping where feasible -design technique number 14 . The grade around the shelter area was raised to provide protection against through-the-wall radiation, and sloped away from the exterior walls to minimize the effects of ground direct radiation-design technique number 2. The exterior walls, between w in
dows and above grade, were increased in density, 
utilizing semisolid concrete masonry units, to 
reduce radiation through that portion of the wall 
design technique number 10. Corridors provide the 
maximum levels of protection available in the 
building. Openings at the ends of these corridors 
were placed so as to minimize direct-line 
radiation -design technique number 11 . Scheme B 
resulted in shelter spaces for 600 people. Since the 
school board had requested that additional fallout 
shelter spaces be provided if possible, the architect 
developed Scheme B-1 . 
This scheme represented an extension of Scheme B. Using all the slanting techniques which made up Scheme B, the architect added an addi tional inch of concrete topping over the multipurpose and chair storage area, in order to maximize the shelter in this area. The result was protected spaces for 200 additional spaces -bringing the total to 800, without sacrificing aesthetics or function. But what about cost? 
As stated previously, the extra cost due to the addition of various materials to enhance the fallout protection, represented only 3.5 percent of the total construction cost. The shelter which resulted is most desirable from many points of view. It is welllighted and ventilated and affords familiar surroundings for shelterees . In addition, noise transmission between floors is minimized by the heavier floor mass. Finally, the lower spaces are less susceptible to fire damage than might be expected with normal bar joist construction. 

None of the normal requirements, features, or finishes have been sacrificed in achieving fallout protection in the Westgate School. The mechanical and electrical systems are directly comparable, and the equipment and fixtures similar. The school provides fallout shelter for the entire student body of 600, with a protection factor of 40 or better; and has 200 additional spaces available to serve transients and the local community. 

ROOF 
SECOND FLOOR PL~N 
,. 
~/ .·;
.f,:. 
----.---rf.e<:'"~::;::::<·;_ft:;
/ '_,_, ."''~··•cr~·: .·:~··: --~ '~?' ' ... c;;·-~·~:;1 ~~ -.:..--: J..;.{~~-
MULTI-PURPOSE -:--:-1 LIBRARY 
ij[TI
ROOM 
n r·· .. CrROOMS
H (I' -·.-.. -... . '''f'I·"'". 
I;.' 
·.,i 
..~.: '>;;.. •.C j 
:,..· ..r 
\ ·' : • . . -...... . ' -· -~ i~ b~~-_;,:]"··~·" 
CLASSROOM
'-
FIRST FLOOR PLAN 
SCHEME A (unprotected) 
Normal Fairfax County School. 
No Shelter. 

EXTERIOR WALL CORRIDOR WALL SECTION SECTION 
ROOF 
SECOND FLOOR PLAN 
---------· 
·\>~-h·-~~-..
r .. 
,".. , ,.. ,•• •... K''""'r_·,··.•·;"""'.; ·-:~ ~ ·r.'• ;..~·~..-·~..-:~_r: :-·l'lii:-'"-"·' ·~·
/ ,.~·:",,,.,,,, ..,.....SERVICE 
I../ ::\ ~ ~' (''--~y-~, 
·.•/' 
B~ "":"'~gL+·A-:r.. 
12" SOLID MASONR
L.-_,__..... .. ~ ":'·,:~["~~ _;,:]£;••£ .. 
~"-
CLASSROOM 
CORRIDOR 
FIRST FLOOR PLAN 
SCHEME A-1 (unprotected) 6%" structural concrete slab over lower corridor, and 12" solid concrete block wall in first floor corridor. Shelter on first-floor corridor only. EXTERIOR WALL CORRIDOR WALL SECTION SECTION 
ROOF 
SECOND FLOOR PLAN 
12" SOUD MASONRY 
lot ,,,,..• , .., -..""T"'.....,......,;"'"!""Y.;,l I
f2~:'1(:
../:7··: :,"····:AER~cl;::f,j·;:~~L·7~;~··?~~::_~G.)7~;·'~~· ,."?1] l~:~·~>:::. jt, ~r' MASONARY
ftt/Jbl~~·~ !:! 
MULn-PURPOSE 
ROOM 

.~-...-.-;""'...."""· 
·:<
•· 
~..,,,,,. 
lot
'• ~ 
...... 
·~~:· I 
~-;-;. .\ ,... ...:: · ~ -~ l·\"".1~ . "". ~-----·~ ............ ,. _,..}J· .!·~·. 

!:! 
ClASSROOM 
FIRST FLOOR PLAN 
SCHEME A-2 (unprotected} 
6" structural concrete roof slab over cor· 
ridor, and 12" solid block walls in corridor 
on both floors. 
EXTERIOR WALL CORRIDOR WALL 
30 SECTION SECTION 

-r:r: I,£r-JLJ 
.. I
L L 
LOBBY 
J=+JJ~ 
~ JOI ~ 
SECOND FLOOR PLAN 
(-:"'1'"----·--....... ~.... _.......... -:·t•;_, ..,

~. 
i.. 
I 
!:! 
8" MASONRY 
It ·~ 
'<~'v.\ ''''' •..~:.J t...M >,.;,, • <. '''-'"'"'""'""'" "' ••••h•''-'<.,;}•1~~::·, 
i.. 
I 12" SOUD MASONRY 
FIRST FLOOR PLAN !:! 
CLASSROOM CORRIDOR 
SCHEME B (protected) 
School designed for radiation protection. ······

F':";;'~ L
~fcii~;.J·n-
Building lowered approximately 3V2 feet 
into the ground. Ground sloped away 
from exterior walls. 12" semisolid con
crete block corridor walls. EXTERIOR WALL CORRIDOR WALL SECTION SECTION 
' ('., CLASSROOMS TT,. T T
~~I;r-Iilll
, rJ STOR. L_ ;±: n ~CLASSRJOOiS I .L~~DING
L1T J---, J ~LOB~BY1: L,
/ ~ I ,1!'1 MULTI -PURPOSE !. ··" '•:.···'· ··-·'' 
CLASSROOMS . • ROOM ·, •'; 

-_!_ -. . . 
,o. 
SECOND FLOOR PLAN 
~ 
_,.r:.:I'·· 
C" 
./. / . ' ·~ SERVICE .'1 II) 
.1' ~ ··:.:'_,c. ~Jo ,-:··,.·~·---~-...............-~•• , ,.,•. • •., ... _, _4./t: .

-~ .J--~ 
' ' ~ 
/ ~ CD 
N 
.· ) _' ._..,T -· i 
~ 
~ 
"'C 
Q)
~ CLASSROOMS
c~oo~L;L_ ... ...Q) 
.~ CJ 
0
... 
c. 
~..._ ) 1} q lkl ::J c: '-·~ _..... 
;o;: 
~ li· 
• ~;\ .r;.:~ }.·..;. ;;-;:·" • • • ·;,..~.' '1-•..::-\· ·--< " ........ ' .......,. ·,,_..,...: ~ .. :. ''\__.'.•..L~...... ...-~·Y-]:;-.
-
'----
~ 
&
FIRST FLOOR PLAN 
II) 
en 
en 
(\') 
C"i 
~ 
"'C 
Q)
... 
CJ 
Q)
SCHEME B-1 (protected) ... 
1" additional concrete topping in multi0... 
Q. purpose room and chair storage area. 
COST DATA 
Percent of Total Schemes Spaces Construction Cost for Shelter 
A 0 0 
A-1 150 0.435 
A-2 300 0.520 

B 600 3.400 I 
I I 
' 
B-1 800 3.500 

DEVONSHIRE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 
WATERLOO, IOWA 
School District: 	Waterloo Community Schools, Waterloo, Iowa 
Architect: 	Howard Nickerson, Jr. Waterloo, Iowa 
Fallout Shelter Analyst: Donald I. McKeown, Iowa State University 
Two-story construction for this schoolhouse with one floor below ground proved to be less costly to Waterloo's school system than a comparable onestory schoolhouse. Tornado protection for pupils was a school district request in this midwest community. The architect not only designed a school that cost less than comparable one-story construction in the area, but he also provided one of Waterloo's first open-plan schools in a flexible, modular scheme. Fallout protection was another benefit of the tornado-resistant design. Early in schematics, the architect determined that he could provide fallout protection and tornado protection in the same design. Concrete topping on precast, prestressed concrete slabs (core-deck) was increased only slightly in thickness above that needed for the tornado-resistant design to provide adequate radiation shielding. Detailed cost analyses indicated a lower cost for the two-story scheme. 
l • L 0 0 , 
GRADE LEVEL 
LIBRARY 
UNEXC AVATED 
CLASSROOM 
10 20 30 40 feet 	SUBGRADE 


WILLIAMSON HALL BOOKSTORE AND ADMISSION OFFICE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 
The University of Minnesota's Williamson Hall is a courtyard or atrium type subsurface building . There are three levels below grade, with the lowest level 41 feet below the surface. The building's design preserves views of historic campus buildings and is energy efficient. Net energy savings as compared to those of a conventional building are expected to be 80 to 100 during the heating period, and approximately 45 percent during cooling periods. 
The original planning for Williamson Hall included these considerations: (1) preservation of scarce open space, (2) preservation of views of two historic buildings on campus, and (3) maintenance of unobstructed pedestrian traffic within the area. It was during the design phases that the conservation of energy became an additional major consideration. The architects attempted to maximize the building's natural energy conservation advantages by shielding it from the severe fluctuating ambient temperature differences of Minnesota. Building beneath the surface capitalized on the excellent inpotential for providing protection from fallout gamsulating properties of the earth and contributed ma radiation has also been greatly enhanced due to significantly to the control of heat transfer. The the subsurface location. 
C) 
:::0 
0 
c 
z 
0 r 
m 
< 
m 
r 
(") 
:::0 0 r m 
~ < 
m 
Cl) 
r 
n m 0 -1 z 
m
0 
z 
~--------------
! 
! 
1 r 
m
I < I
I ~ ! r m 
-1
i ~ ~ 
0 
EDGEWOOD HIGHLAND SCHOOL 
CRANSTON, RHODE ISLAND 
School District: 	Cranston School Department Cranston, Rhode Island 
Architect: 	Turoff Associates Providence, Rhode Island 
Fallout Shelter Ted Sande Analysts: Providence, Rhode Island 
Wilbur E. Yoder 
Rhode Island School of Design 
This new school in a south-Providence suburb was constructed to relieve overcrowding in three existing elementary schools. An irregular site with poor soil conditions led to a two-story, split-level scheme. Two levels of classrooms wrap around a central, split-level library-learning center. A low, residential-scale profile and simple, geometric forms comfortably match the existing neighborhood. Fallout protection was designed into the schoolhouse in compliance with a 1967 shelter law of Rhode Island. The law requires that fallout protection be included where economically and functionally feasible in buildings constructed with public funds. The lower classroom level of the Edgewood Highland School was adapted to satisfy the shelter law through use of an 8-inch concrete upper floor slab, peastone gravel fill in exterior walls, and a stepped-wall scheme which permits outside light in classrooms without seriously impairing the shelter. 
BUILDING SECTION 


MULTIUSE ROOM 
FIRST FLOOR PLAN 
' 
CLASSROOMS ' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
I 
~ ' ::ulr: 
~ 
I 
l! CLASSROOMS 
' 
'
I 
: 
' 
' 
I I 
! 
i 
: 
: I 
r--------------.J 
I 
i' 
I 
I 
I 

i 
I ~ r-------1 
l : : 
L_________ _____J ~ 
: 
' 
' 
: 
------- 
CLASSROOMS  
LOWER LEVEL PLAN  
~ I I I I I I I I : I  


KEITERLINUS JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL 
ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA 
School District: 	School District of St. John's 
County 

Architect: 	Craig Thorn St. Augustine, Florida 
Fallout Shelter M. H. Johnson and Analysts: Jack A. Samuel University of Florida 
Additions in 1969 doubled the floor area and student capacity of this school. Sited in historic St. Augustine, Ketterlinus is the only junior high school in the district. The several addition units are grouped to create an enclosed court. A traditional 
classroom layout gains efficiency through func-~ ~~ 
tional zo·ning of activities. Fallout protection was designed into the addition in compliance with State regulations which require consideration and inclu-! 
sion of shelter facilities in public buildings where feasible. CLASSROOM WING CROSS SECTION 
~ !' ~'''I~ I'~ I I''
;;i ,~ [!· !/: .::il'll!llllllil n1.1 n 111 ·1:1 11'111111111 1111 !J ,,,,.;, i , I .I: 111 •'1 
l" '"''WU1Jl/IIUUII 
KITCHEN-CAFETERIA-INDUSTRIAL TRAINING WING CROSS SECTION 


.,., 
::0 
(I) 
~ 
.,., 
r0 0 ::0 
, 
r
)> 2 
I 
)> 0 0 
~ 
0 
2 
(I) 
rr_ 
(I) 
m 
(") 
0 2 0 
.,., 5 
0 ::0
, 
~ 
2 
I 
)> 0 0 
:::! 
0 
2 
(I) 
1 
w 
co 
Fallout Shelter 
DCPA PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE TO 
SHELTER 
TR-65 12 Protected Schools 
ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, AND 
TR-67 School Design Study

ANALYSIS BY BUILDING OWNERS 
Environmental Hazards TR-68 Mass Thickness Manual 


ELECTRONIC 
for Walls, Floors and 
A partial list of publications TR-52 Radiation Shielding for 
Roofs 
available by writing to A.G. PublicaArchitects

COMPUTER 
TR-69 Cost Benefits in Shelters 
tions Center, Civil Defense Branch, 
TR-53 Existing Schools: Their TR-71 Decontamination 2800 Eastern Boulevard, (Middle
Protection Factor (PFl ratings can Future Considerations -for ArRiver), Baltimore, Maryland 21220,
be obtained using the DCPA Fallout TR-54 Fallout Shelter Design chitects and Engineers follows:
Shelter Analysis by Computer form, Techniques -Apartment TR-72 A Case for Protective which is explained in DCPA TechMP-20 Publications Index Buildings Design, Nuclear and nical Report TR-55, Shielding TR-48 Fallout Shelter in Otherwise
TR-58 HUD -Aids for Fallout Analysis for New Designs. Copies of Industrial and CommerShelter Development TR-73 Environment: Problems, cial Buildings Solutions, and Emergency 
the form and instructions can be ob
TR-60 Shelters in New Homes Preparedness

tained from DCPA Regional Offices, TR-49 1966 Architectural TR-62 Increasing Blast and Fire TR-74 Shelters in New
or from Survey and Engineering Awards-Buildings with Resistance in Buildings Apartments
Division, Plans and Operations, Fallout Shelter TR-75 Protecting Mobile Homes 
DCPA, The Pentagon, Washington, TR-51 Design Modification TR-63 1969 Architectural from HiQh Winds
D.C. 20301. Studies Awards-Buildings with TR-78 Protected Educational 
Facilities in Found Space 
TR-79 Schools in Kansas with DCPA Region Three DCPA Region Six Field Office Tornado Protection 
DCPA REGIONAL 
Federal Regional Center 	Room 1510 TR-80 Sound Control in


OFFICES 
Thomasville, Georgia 31792 	The Traders National Bank Building Buildings 1125 Grand Avenue 
TR-83 Wind-Resistant Design 

DCPA Region One 	DCPA Region Four Kansas City, Missouri 64106 Concepts for Residences 
Federal Regional Center Federal Center 
Maynard, Massachusetts 01754 Battle Creek, Michigan 49016 DCPA Region Seven 

TR-83A Interim Guidelines for 

Building Occupant ProtecDCPA Region One Field Office DCPA Region Five Post Office Box 7287 tion from Tornadoes and Santa Rosa, California 95401
Room 2354 	Federal Regional Center 
Extreme Winds 26 Federal Plaza Denton, Texas 76201 DCPA Region Eight 
TR-83B Tornado Protection 

New York, New York 10007 	Federal Regional Center 
DCPA Region Six 	Selecting and Designing 
Bothell, Washington 98011

DCPA Region Two Federal Regiona l Center 	Safe Areas in Buildings 
Federal Regional Center Building 710 TR-85 Building Design For Olney, Maryland 20832 Denver, Colorado 80225 Radiation Shielding and Thermal Efficiency 
*U.S. GOV ERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1978 0-727-320 


BOOKLET PREPARED BY: 
Chuck House School of Architecture and Planning Howard University 
DISTRIBUTION 
DCPA Regions, Staff College State CP Directors Defense Coordinators of Federal Agencies A&E's Qualified in Fallout Shelter Analysis Professionals interested in Shelter 
Construction Industrial Defense Coordinators 
Technical Information (Mise) 
NATO CD Directors 
3 9072 02024466 5 Engineering Libraries 
IIIII~lllil/~i~~ill~l~~~~m~ll~~~lii~]IIIII