S. •f. }: BISON Yo v THE AIR ASSAULT BATTALION "TASK FORCE: "HO~u!H,fJ9~T" j .THE UBRA.R!ES ; j 1 1984 101 st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT) FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY 53 01 84 FORWARD The Air Assault Battalion Task Force "How to Fight" Manual is not a substitute for the knowledge contained incurrent publications, but an extension designed to complement existing manuals in the area of Air Assault Operations,from the Battalion Task Force point of view. In essence, it is designed to inform the reader how the 101st AirborneDivision (~ir Assault) organizes and employs the Air Assault Battalion Task Force. Air Assault is an evolving concept. As we deploy, execute, experiment, and evaluate, we learn more and more aboutour capabilities. We need to capture our concepts, our ideas, and our standards in writing. You are the Air Assault experts. Share your ideas. Recommended changes should be submitted to ACofS, G3/DPT. Our efforts will do much to standardizeour operations and to promote a commonality of thought as we conduct air assault operations. "AIR ASSAULT" MISSION 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT) TO DEPLOY RAPIDLY, WORLDWIDE, TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND TO CONTROL LAND AREA, INCLUDING POPULATIONS AND RESOURCES IN JOINT, COMBINED, OR UNILATERAL OPERATIONS, BY EMPLOYING THE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES OF THE AIR ASSAULT DIVISION. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1-1 General 1-1 1-2 Organization 1-1 1-3 Task Force Support Elements 1-2 1-4 Air Assault Battalion 1-12 1-5 Air Assault Missions 1-13 CHAPTER 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL 2-1 Command Responsibilities 2-1 2-2 Command Relationships 2-1 2-3 Liaison Requirements 2-1 2-4 Liaison Responsibilities 2-2 2-5 Confirmation of Support Assets 2-2 2-6 Command and Control 2-2 2-7 Communications 2-4 CHAPTER 3 BATTALION TASK FORCE SUPPORT 3-1 General 3-1 3-2 Organization of Support 3-1 3-3 Combat Service Support Execution 3-2 3-4 The Array of Combat Service Support Elements 3-4 CHAPTER 4 THE COMBAT AVIATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CAMS) 4-1 General 4-1 4-2 Organization 4-1 4-3 Functions 4-2 4-4 Communications 4-2 4-5 Duties of Key Aviation Battle Team Captains 4-2 4-6 CAMS Organization 4-3 4-7 CAMS Lines of Communication 4-4 CHAPTER 5 THE AIR ASSAULT 5·1 General 5-1 5·2 Planning Considerations 6-1 5·3 Phases of the Air Assault 6-1 5-4 Terminology 5-2 5-5 Insertion 5-4 5-6 Extraction 5-17 5·7 Night Operations 5-18 5-8 FRAGO 5-24 5·9 Warning Order 5-27 5-10 OPORD 5-28 CHAPTER 6 AIR ASSAULT LIMITED OBJECTIVE OPERATIONS 6·1 General 6·1 6·2 The Air Assault Task Force Raid 6·1 6-3 FRAGO 6-7 6-4 OPORD 6-9 6-5 The Air Assault Task Force Reconnaissance in Force 6·15 6-6 OPORD 6-20 6-7 FRAGO 6-26 6-8 The Air Assault Company Team 6-27 6·9 The Air Assault Platoon Team 6-27 CHAPTER 7 AIR ASSAULT ATTACK/LINKUP 7-1 7-1 7-3 7-3 7-3 7-4 7-4 7-7 7-8 7-11 8-1 8-1 8-5 8-6 8-7 8-7 8-7 8-13 8-14 8-19 9-1 9-1 9-2 9-7 9-7 9-8 9-9 9-10 10-1 10-1 10-2 10-2 10-3 10-4 11-1 11-1 11-3 A-1 B-1 C-1 D-1 ii 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 7-6 7-7 7-8 7-9 7-10 CHAPTER 8 8-1 8-2 8-3 8-4 8-5 8-6 8-7 8-8 8-9 8-10 CHAPTER 9 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4 9-5 9-6 9-7 9-8 General Planning Staging Loading Air Movement Landing Ground Tactical Operations Sustaining the Force FRAGO OPORD AIR ASSAULT DELAY General Planning Staging Loading Air Movement Landing Ground Tactical Operation Resupply OPORD FRAGO AIR ASSAULT DEFENSE General Concept Planning Staging, Loading, Air Movement, Landing Ground Tactical Operations Command and Control Sustaining the Force OPORD CHAPTER 10 CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 10-1 General 10-2 Strong Point Defense 10-3 Stay Behind/Interdiction Operations 10-4 Breakout From Encirclement 10-5 Escape and Evasion Routes 10-6 Linkup/Reentry Plan CHAPTER 11 OPERATIONS REQUIRING SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 11-1 11-2 11-3 APPENDIXES A. B. c. D. General Heavy/Light Operations Desert Operations Glossary of Terms Air Mission Brief Fire Support References CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION· 1-1. GENERAL. a. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) must be ready to deploy rapidly for combat in varying climatic extremes, in widely differing terrain, and against threat forces which vary from the highly modern forces of the Warsaw Pact to the light irregular units of the less developed parts of the world. To meet this challenge, the Division must be prepared to fight battles of greater scope, range, and intensity than ever before. b. The Brigade Task Force is the nucleus of the Division's combat power. Reminiscent of the Regimental Combat Teams of World War II, brigade task forces are formed through task organization of combat support and combat service support units under the Brigade Commander. However, it is the unique integration of ground and aviation assets and use of the Combat Aviation Management System (CAMS) which make the 101st Airborne Division the Army's (one and) only "Air Assault Division." c. The composition and command support relationships of the air assault brigade task force provide the framework for task organizing the air assault battalion task force for specific tactical operations. To properly employ the impressive array of assets available, commanders and staff officers must understand their basic organization, capabilities, and distinguishing features. This chapter discusses these assets and provides valuable information to the air assault commander. d. The aviation force contributes at all operational levels, and can help bring about the winning concentration of forces, either by mass or firepower, at the critical time and place. 1-2. ORGANIZATION. a. Combat power is that complex integration of tangible and intangible factors which, correctly applied at the decisive place and time, produces victory in combat. On the battlefield, combat power is transitory in nature; it must be generated by skillful leadership and make the best use of all available resources. Air land Battle doctrine recognizes that superior combat power is the product of artful combinations of maneuver, firepower, protection, and intelligent leadership in a sound battle plan. b. Within the Air Assault Division, missions are accomplished with infantry battalions which are assigned to brigades based upon operational requirements. Normally three battalions are assigned to each brigade; this figure, however, may vary from two to five, depending upon the situation. c. In addition to providing infantry battalions, the Division also provides combat support and combat service support elements. Those which normally support a brigade include: (1) Combat Support Units: ·Field Artillery Battalion (105 T) ·Air Defense Artillery Battery (Vulcan/Stinger) -Engineer Company -Engineer Platoon (Corps) -Military Intelligence Company Team ·Chemical Platoon ·Forward Area Signal Center Platoon (FASC) ·Military Police Platoon ·Air Cavalry Troop -Aviation Battalion Task Force* -Aviation Battalion Headquarters ·Attack Helicopter Company (AH-1S) -Assault Helicopter Companies (2 ea) (UH-60) -Assault Support Helicopter Platoon (CH-47) -Pathfinder Platoon -Civil Affairs Team -Psychological Operations Platoon -Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (2) Combat Service Support Units: -Forward Service Support Element (FSSE) -Maintenance Company -Supply and Service Company -Medical Company -Aircraft Maintenance Contact Teams *NOTE: The aviation battalion is DS; the others are normally OPCON to the DS aviation battalion. d. Since the air assault battalion is rarely committed without augmentation, the assets used to augment the battalion are routinely allocated from the assets assigned to the Air Assault Brigade Task Force. With these assets the battalion becomes an Air Assault Battalion Task Force (AATF), and the battalion commander becomes the Air Assault Battalion Task Force Commander (AATFC). 1-3. TASK FORCE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. a. Aviation Battalion Task Force. (1) Mission. The mission of the Aviation Battalion Task Force is to provide the ground commander with the ability to concentrate combat power rapidly, provide observed fire and an anti-armor capability, and sustain combat operations through resupply. (2) Organization and Equipment. The Aviation Battalion Task Force normally consists of two Assault Helicopter companies, one Attack Helicopter company, an Assault Support Helicopter platoon, and one Pathfinder platoon. Of these assets, a brigade task force commander can plan on the availability of 20 UH-60's, 15 AH-1's, 9 OH-58's, 2 UH-1 's, and 4 CH-47's. A typical Aviation Battalion Task Force is shown below. · + lii1 I • + ~ .I ·1· ' ' H 21 AH-1 's 12 OH-58's 15 UH·60's ea 8 CH·47's 20 PFDR's 2 UH-1's AVIATION BATTALION TASK FORCE 53 02 84 1-2 (3) Employment. The Aviation Task Force headquarters is collocated with the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) and provides the brigade commander with the aviation assets required to support the air assault mission. The Assault Helicopter company, Attack Helicopter company, and Assault Support Helicopter platoon are placed in suitable locations within the brigade area. Missions for aviation support will be directed from the brigade S3 to the Combat Aviation Control Center (CACC), which in turn tasks subordinate elements to support the mission request. To assist in aviation planning, the aviation task force provides a Combat Aviation Party (CAP) to each Air Assault Battalion Task Force. The CAP advises the Task Force Commander on all matters involving aviation and exercises command and control over the Pathfinder personnel supporting the battalion. The Aviation Task Force headquarters controls all aviation assets within the brigade (except for the Air Cavalry, which will coordinate with the CACC for purposes of air space management and assistance as appropriate). (4) Capabilities. The Aviation Task Force has the capability to: (a) Conduct sustained Airland combat, both day and night. (b) Provide a base of fire for maneuver elements. (c) Destroy tanks and other combat vehicles. (d) Dominate terrain by firepower. (e) Exploit the effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. (f) Conduct observation and reconnaissance. (g) Provide aerial observation and adjustment of indirect fires. (h) Maneuver freely across and around ground obstacles. (i) Provide a responsive counterattack force. (j) Conduct cross-FLOT operations. (k) Provide aerial resupply. (I) Conduct aeromedical evacuation. (5) Limitations. The major limitations of the Aviation Task Force are: (a) Limited ability to provide security its for aircraft during operations. (b) Limited flight operations capability during periods of extreme weather conditions. (c) Limited NBC protection and decontamination capability. (d) Sustained operations limited by maintenance requirements. (e) High fuel and ammunition consumption rates. (f) Vulnerability to enemy air defense and enemy aircraft. (6) Additional Considerations. Additional factors to be considered when employing aviation assets are: (a) When Night Vision Goggles (NVG) are employed, additional planning time is required by the Air Mission Commander (AMC) and/or Battle Team Captain (BTC). 1-3 (b) Flight involving the use of NVG increases crew fatigue and reduces the period of time that crews are available for mission support. (c) In peacetime, the moon angle and percent of available illumination are extremely important planning aspects for Night Hawk/NVG operations. (d) The use of filtered cargo lights during landing zone/pickup zone (LZ/PZ) operations, while affecting light discipline, reduces loading time and enhances mission accomplishment. (e) Attack and air cavalry aircraft have a shorter radius of action that do lift aircraft; therefore, during missions over extended distances, additional Forward Area Rearming and Refueling Points (FARRPS) are required. This difference becomes critical in cross-FLOT operations. (f) During missions in which aircraft are required to laager, a fifteen minute notice is required for run-up and last minute briefings. This requirement can be eliminated if mission times are known and provided in advance. (g) All aircraft have UHF, VHF, and FM secure (VINSON) radio capabilities. (h) When aircraft are laagering, they may shut down to conserve fuel. This reduces their communications ability to PRC-77 radios. (i) For planning purposes, a 90 km radius of action may generally be used for all aircraft. (j) The Combat Aviation Management System (CAMS) has been developed to insure that aviation assets are properly utilized within the Division. A discussion of CAMS is included in Chapter 4. b. Air Cavalry Squadron. (1) Mission. The mission of the Air Cavalry Squadron is to conduct reconnaissance and security operations for the Division and to engage in offensive, defensive, delay, and economy of force operations as part of the combined arms team. (2) Organization and Equipment. The Air Cavalry Squadron consists of four troops: a Headquarters troop and three Air Cavalry troops. Each Air Cavalry troop consists of three maneuver platoons -Aeroscouts, Aeroweapons, and Aeroreconnaissance. The Aeroreconnaissance squads are trained to work closely with the other platoons in the troop, and to fill the gaps where the aeroscouts are unable to see. In addition to five UH-60 aircraft, this platoon is equipped with six motorcycles, three M60 machine guns (MG), a demolitions kit, and two Dragons . .This platoon sets the cavalry troop apart from the other aviation units by giving the troop commander a ground manuever platoon, and hence an all weather ground reconnaissance capability, to supplement his air assets. 4 UH60A 10 OH58C 9 AH1S 7 UH60A 6 MOTORCYCLES 3 M60 MG 10 OH58C 9 AH1S 7 UH60A 6 MOTORCYCLES 3 M60 MG 10 OH58C 9 AH1S 7 UH60A 6 MOTORCYCLES 3 M60 MG AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON 53 03 84 1-4 (3) Employment. The employment of the Air Cavalry Squadron is normally controlled by Division. Using its flexibility, mobility, and firepower, the air cavalry is particularly effective in the economy of force role, using minimum resources to find and fix the enemy. In this role, it develops the situation so that the Task Force Commander can effectively employ his combat power at the proper place and time. The squadron commander organizes his assets, in accordance with the situation and the mission. (4) Capabilities. The major capabilities of the Air Cavalry Squadron are: (a) Providing continuous surveillance of the battlefield by dividing personnel and aircraft into day and night crews. (b) Conducting independent combat operations. (c) Moving and resupplying with internal assets. (5) Limitations. The Air Cavalry Squadron has the same limitations as the Aviation Task Force. c. Field Artillery. (1) Mission. The mission of the Field Artillery is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, or missile fire and to integrate all available fire support into combined arms operations. (2) Organization and Equipment. Field Artillery within the Air Assault Division consists of the Division Artillery Headquarters, three Field Artillery battalions, and a Target Acquisition battery. The battalions are organized into three firing batteries and a consolidated headquarters and service battery. Each firing battery has six M102, 105mm howitzers, with M561 Gama Goats as prime movers. The battalion is equipped with the TACFIRE system for the execution of technical and tactical fire control. In addition to the organic assets, a 155mm howitzer battalion is attached to the Division to provide general support artillery fire and nuclear capabilities. This battalion is also equipped with TACFIRE. X ~:~ I I v [!] • ll [!] TAB HQ DIVISION ARTILLERY 53 04 84 (3) Employment. Artillery battalions are deployed by either ground or air means to provide direct support to the br.igade. Each air assault brigade is habitually associated with a field artillery battalion, and each air assault battalion is habitually associated with an artillery battery. Although this latter association is encouraged, control of the firing batteries is normally retained by the brigade's direct support artillery battalion. In those instances when an AATF is operating independently, a firing battery may be attached or a dedicated battery may be provided. (4) Capabilities. The most important capabilities of the field artillery organizations include: (a) Providing fires in all weather conditions and over all types of terrain. (b) Shifting and massing of fires quickly. 1·5 (c) Adding depth to combat. (d) Providing a variety of conventional shell/fuze combinations. (e) Delivering nuclear (155mm only) and chemical fires. (f) Providing continuous support by judicious displacement. (g) Providing counterfire and suppressive fires as needed. (5) Limitations. Artillery support from the direct support battalion is limited by its small caliber (105mm),short range (11 ,500m), and lack of special munitions (FASCAM, DPICM, CLGP, EXJAM). (6) Additional Information. For additional information on fire support, see Appendix C. d. Engineer Battalion. (1) Mission. The mission of the Engineer Battalion is to deploy rapidly, world-wide, on short notice and toincrease the combat effectiveness of the Air Assault Division by accomplishing mobility, countermobility, and survivability missions, and general engineering tasks; and to perform infantry combat missions when required. (2) Organization and Equipment. The Air Assault Engineer Battalion is composed of a heaquarters companyand four line companies. Each company consists of a company headquarters and three engineer platoons. The engineercompany organization functions as a sapper engineer unit with limited earth moving capabilities. The organization of the Engineer Battalion and the major items of equipment in a line company are shown below: vI ~ HHiilll m "' .. A B c• o• m I ~ I ••• 1~2~ac:::!.l ENGINEER BATTALION 53 05 84 WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT Company Headquarters Engjneer Platoon Company Total M60 machine gun 4 12 90mm recoilless rifle 3 9 2% ton dump trk5 ton dump trk 1 4 12 Dozer, Case 550 1 2 Backhoe 2 3*Chainsaws 3 9 27Tool trailer 1 *NOTE: Currently only one is on hand in each company. The J-series TO&E authorizes an increase as shown. 1-6 (3) Employment. The Air Assault Engineer Battalion normally places one company in direct support to each brigade. The engineer company commander (the Brigade Engineer) then recommends allocation of engineer resources based upon the commander's concept and the tactical situation. Normally, an engineer platoon will be placed in support of each AATF. Once employed, the engineer assets will be used as far forward as possible, to facilitate close coordination and support to maneuver units. Engineer assets are not usually held in reserve, except for specific contingencies. (4) Capabilities. To accomplish their respective missions, engineer units have the ability to: (a) Create obstacles using demolitions, fortification materials, and natural resources. (b) Construct or improve LZs and PZs. (c) Provide equipment support, tools, and technical advice in the construction of fighting positions. (d) Build and maintain essential Main Supply Routes (MSR) and routes to PZs. (e) Deny the enemy use of key roads, railroads, airfields, and other items of military value. (f) Breach obstacles to enhance mobility. (5) Limitations. The amount of equipment in Air Assault engineer units is limited in comparison to that in mechanized division or corps engineer units. The primary use of the lighter construction equipment found in the Air Assault Division is to dig anti-armor positions and to emplace small earthen obstacles. Additionally, because of the large amounts of class IV and V materials that a company may use, resupply is often a serious problem. Air delivery of demolition and field fortification materials can greatly offset this limitation if air assets are made available. (6) Additional Considerations. Additional considerations for the employment of air assault engineer assets, include: (a) The three combat engineer platoons within an engineer company can emplace 3040 demolition obstacles in a 24-hour period when fully employed in demolition work. These expedient demolition obstacles include road craters, abatis, bridge destruction, and rubbling buildings. (b) Engineer platoons, augmented with equipment from the headquarters platoon, can emplace 12 to 18 construction obstacles in a 24-hour period when fully employed in this work. Construction obstacles include ditches and craters, abatis, log obstacles, and wire obstacles. (c) An engineer company can emplace tactical and point minefields. If each platoon is fully employed in constructing point minefields, it can emplace 8 to 12 point minefields in a 24-hour period. The engineer company can emplace a 1200 by 1500 meter tactical minefield (density 1·1·1) in a 24-hour period. The number of tactical minefields can be significantly increased by using infantry troops under engineer guidance and supervision. (d) The engineer company has the ability to breach and clear minefields, log obstacles, earthen obstacles, concrete or timber fortifications, and rubble. (e) Engineers assist in the hardening of anti-tank positions and in the construction of overhead cover. An engineer company has the ability to clear a small LZ or PZ. The clearing rates are dependent (f) upon the number and size of trees and the underbrush density. (g) All equipment in the engineer battalion is capable of being transported by CH47 helicopter. Use of the CH47D helicopter reduces the sectionalization requirement for engineer equipment. 1-7 e. Air Defense Artillerv. (1) Mission. The mission of the Air Defense Artillery Battalion is to defend high priority assets in theDivision's area of operation from low altitude air attack, and to provide Vulcan ground fires, as necessary. (2) Organization and Equipment. The Vulcan/Stinger Air Defense Artillery Battalion is organized into twoStinger batteries and one Vulcan battery. Each Stinger battery normally consists of three platoons with 11 Stinger teamseach, with the Stinger platoon consisting of a heavy section of six Stinger teams and a light section of five Stinger teams.The Vulcan battery is divided into three platoons, each platoon having six Vulcan guns. v ~VULCAN ~STINGER ~18 ~33TMS 53 oe 84 AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BATTALION (3) Employment. Air Defense elements are normally task organized down to Brigade Task Force level.Given the limited number of ADA weapons in the Air Assault Division and the large number of assets to defend, theAATFC will not normally receive significant ADA support for air assault operations. When given ADA elements to supporta specific operation, the AATFC will most often receive a Stinger section (5 or 6 Stinger teams) as his ADA task forceelement. NOTE: A section is capable of adequately defending one point asset at any given time. All other assets shouldbe assigned as "on order" missions. (4) Capabilities. (a) Vulcan provides effective point coverage of critical assets. (b) Stinger, a man-portable, shoulder-fired, infrared seeking ADA missile, provides a significantlyimproved engagement range and envelope, increased effectiveness against head-on targets, and identification Friend/FOE (IFF) capability. (c) Forward Area Alerting Radar serves as a cueing device for air defense systems. (5) Limitations. (a) Vulcan has severe tactical and logistical limitations. As a system, it has a mobility problem because of the need for CH-47 support to airlift its prime mover (M561 Gama Goat). The Vulcan is marginally effective againsthigh speed, crossing targets. Its ammunition consumption rate is extremely high and the weapon uses a different type ofammunition when firing indirect fire missions. (b) The Stinger team's mobility is severely hampered by the limitations of the team's prime mover(M274 Mule). To move rapidly on the battlefield, the Stinger team needs to be moved by air. (c) The FAAR requires CH-47 support for air assault operations. 1-8 f. Chemical Company. (1) Mission. The mission of the Chemical Company is to quickly locate NBC contaminated areas and conduct decontamination operations in the combat zone as far forward as possible. (2) Organization and Equipment. The Chemical Company is organized into a headquarters platoon and three chemical platoons. The NBC platoon consists of three decontamination squads and a reconnaissance squad. I • •!. . ! . [!!] HEADQUARTERS CHEMICAL COMPANY 53 07 84 (3) Employment. One decontamination platoon usually operates in support of each maneuver brigade. The reconnaissance squad of the platoon is used to locate and post contaminated areas and to determine suitable decontamination sites. NBC platoons are normally not further task organized. (4) Capabilities. Each decontamination platoon can: (a) Establish three personnel decontamination stations and three equipment decontamination stations or a mix of these stations. (b) Decontaminate 240 personnel per hour. (c) Decontaminate 3 vehicles during the first hour, then a combination of the following during each additional hour. 1· Twelve mules, Y.. ton trucks or 105mm howitzers. 2. Four Gama Goats, 2% ton or 5 ton trucks. ~· Six flatbed trailers. (d) Exchange 900 sets of NBC protective clothing, supply 900 bath towels, and 1,440 bars of soap before requiring resupply. (5) Limitations. (a) The NBC platoon requires engineer, security, medical, and fire support. (b) After 900 personnel have been processed, the platoon must be resupplied. (c) The supported unit may need to prepare the site, supervise personal gear decontamination, transport personal effects, control entry and exit from the site, and resupply regular replacement clothing. 1-9 (6) Additional Considerations. (a) US soldiers are equipped with NBC defense equipment that is among the very best in the world.Each soldier should have the following: 1. Protective Mask with Hood. ~-M258A1 Skin Decontamination Kit. 3. M9 Detector Paper. 1_. Mark I Injector. 5. Chemical Protective Overgarment. Q.. Chemical Protective Overboots. 7. Chemical Protective Gloves. (b) Each commander must balance the possible threat of chemical casualties against mission requirements, weather, and the severity of heat casualties versus chemical casualties. When soldiers are in a high levelMission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), tasks take longer and are more physically demanding. Soldiers may becomeineffective because of heat stress in less than an hour unless work/rest cycles are established. Standard MOPP levels areshown below. For more information, see FM 2140, NBC Defense. MOPP Level Overgarment Overshoes Mask Gloves worn carried carried carried2 worn worn carried carried3 worn worn worn carried4 worn worn worn worn (c) Complete decontamination of aircraft is almost impossible, so once an aircraft is contaminated itwill stay that way. Contaminated aircraft should be parked downwind of the unit area, marked, and managed so that theyare not used to transport clean troops. (d) Commanders will need to know what support is available from the local area. Fire hydrants andirrigation pumps may well be the best way to get water for decontamination. (e) The Battalion Chemical Officer and NCO must be part of the battalion TOC, and physically nearthe ADA Early Warning Broadcast Net (EWBN). The division chemical cell will pass information on NBC strikes over theEWBN, allowing the battalion to get this information faster. NBC attack information received by the AATF shouldimmediately be passed to subordinate units. g. Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) Battalion. (1) Mission. The mission of the CEWI Battalion is to provide combat intelligence, electronic warfare, andoperations security support for the Division. (2) Organization and Equipment. The Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion is organized intofour companies: a Headquarters and Headquarters Operations company, a Collection and Jamming company, a GroundSurveillance company, and a Service Support company. 1-10 If Ml (CEWI) I I I EJ r+, I I B c (GRD (SERVICE SURVL) SUPPORT) ~ CEWI BATTALlON 53 08 114 (a) CEWI battalion equipment includes: 1. PPS-5 and PPS-15. Ground surveillance radars that provide observation, detect targets, and produce more accurate distance and direction readings than visual estimates. The PPS-5 has a range of 6 km for personnel and 10 km for vehicles. The PPS-15 has a range of 1.5 km for personnel and 3 km for vehicles. 2.., TA0-30. A tactical, man-portable VHF/HF communications intercept, line-of-bearing, and direction finding system for tactical support, particularly in special situations such as airborne insertions, patrol, and probe operations. The system is normally deployed in three·man teams and has a range of approximately 30 km (VHF). 3. TA0-32. A tactical, vehicular mounted VHF/HF communications intercept and line-of-bearing system which consists of two intercept positions. The system has a range of approximately 30 km (VHF). 4_. WATKINS-JOHNSON Systems. Commercial, lightweight receivers that provide variable range communications intelligence collection capabilities. 5. TL0-17. The primary electronic warfare jammer for the Division that is capable of jamming HF and VHF signals. 6. HEXJAM. Hand-emplaced expendable jammers that are capable of jamming HFIVHF communications (non-radar) in a radius of 700-1000 meters. 7. A!=MBASS. A remote sensor system that is to be added to the Ground Surveillance Company in the near future. (b) The CEWI battalion commander organizes these assets for combat to provide the most reliable and responsive support possible to the Air Assault Brigade. Essentially, the assets are team organized under an Ml company that receives assets from each of the companies in the battalion. (c) The AATFC will normally have ground surveillance radars in support of his operations. He may also be given IPW and counterintelligence support from the brigade. The AATFC must be aware that an array of collection and jamming equipment could feasibly be deployed in his area of operations, occupying key terrain in support of brigade and division operations. (3) Employment. In the defense, GSA and C&J elements will initially be deployed forward with the covering force. Their mission will be to locate the enemy's main effort and high value targets, perform post strike analysis, detect enemy use or intended use of NBC weapons, and determine the effects of terrain and weather on enemy positions. In the offense, assets will be used to locate enemy reserves, NBC delivery units, gun and rocket artillery, enemy forces attempting to outflank or envelop the attacking force, and ADA weapons systems. (4) Limitation. Communications are both necessary and critical to support the tasking, reporting, and dissemination functions of intelligence assets. Every aspect of intelligence operations is dependent on immediate, secure, and reliable communications. FM voice radio is the primary communications means used by intelligence assets for command and control, logistics, administration, tasking and reporting. 1-11 (5) Additional Considerations. (a) IPW -the interrogation prisoner of war team (IPW) interrogates ~nd screens enemy prisoners, detainees, and refugees. The team also is capable of providing translator and interpreter support to the AATFC. Theemphasis of the team is on brief tactical interrogation and rapid reporting of combat information. (b) EW -Electronic warfare is a force multiplier that disrupts and deceives the enemy command andcontrol system, while protecting the friendly communications system. (c) OPSEC -Operations Security identifies friendly vulnerabilities, assesses enemy collectioncapabilities, and recommends and assesses the effectiveness of countermeasures to the commander. h. Communications. The division signal battalion provides a forward area signal center (FASC) platoon to the brigade trains which allows the BSA entry through DISCOM into the Division Communications System. The FASCplatoon provides the BSA with data, facsimile, telephone communication center (hard copy), and special circuitry, asrequired. At brigade headquarters, a multichannel communications terminal allows similar entry into the DivisionCommunications System for the Brigade CP. The division signal battalion also provides a single channel tactical satellite(TACSAT) capability to Brigade and Battalion Task Forces, as required. 14. AIR ASSAULT BATIALION. a. Mission. The mission of the Air Assault Infantry Battalion is to close with the enemy by means of fire andmaneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. b. Organization. The organization of an air assault infantry battalion is as shown below. MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS MORTAR (81MM) 9 DRAGON 36 TOW 22 M60 MG 22 ANTI·HHC RIFLE CO ARMOR CO14/1/167 5/129 5/112 81mm MORT 9 TOW 22DRAGON 12M60 MG 4 M60 MG 6 113 01 84 AIR ASSAULT INFANTRY BATTALION c. Tactical Employment Considerations. An air assault battalion may be assigned any standard combat mission. Itis particularly suited to offensive operations where its mobility can be exploited to the greatest advantage. In assigning missions to an air assault infantry battalion, the commander not only must attempt to maximize its unique capabilitiesbut also must carefully consider its inherent limitations. For example, an air assault battalion should not normally beassigned the mission of conducting a deliberate defense of a key terrain feature for an extended period of time. Such amission would cause the battalion to forfeit its superior tactical mobility. 1-12 1-5. AIR ASSAULT MISSIONS. ARTEP 7-15 contains 14 Light Infantry Missions, nine of which are specified as dismounted infantry missions. a. The AATF is not only capable of executing those nine missions, but can do so vigorously without regard to normal terrain limitations. One mission, the parachute assault, is designated for airborne units. The four remaining missions, designated as air assault, are: (1) Air Assault. (2) Air Assault Reconnaissance in Force/Night Attack. (3) Air Assault Delay in Sector. (4) Air Assault Raid. b. These missions will be discussed in detail in later chapters. Two operations not listed in ARTEP 7-15, but essential to this Division, which also will be discussed in detail, are the Air Assault Attack/Linkup and the Air Assault Defense. 1-13 t CHAPTER 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL 2-1. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES. Air Assault Task Force Commander (AATFC). The AATFC commands the AATF and is responsible for the overall planning and conduct of the air assault operation. He controls units assigned, attached, or placed OPCON to the AATF. Other units, in OS or GS, remain under the command of the supporting commanders, but the AATFC establishes their mission priorities. a. b. Air Mission Commander (AMC). The AMC, provided by the assault helicopter unit, controls the operation of all aviation elements supporting the AATF. The CAP is subordinate to the AATFC and serves as a special staff officer and technical advisor (for helicopter employment) throughout the conduct of the air assault. c. Subordinate Unit Commanders. The field artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, and other commanders in the AATF have the same responsibilities and command relationships to the AATFC as they do when under any other infantry task force control. 2-2. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. Command relationships are briefly summarized below as a reminder of the specific obligations between the supported and supporting units. a. Attachment binds a unit to a command other than that to which it is normally assigned. When attached, the unit is under the command of the unit to which it is attached. Unless otherwise specified, attachment implies full responsibility on the part of the supported commander for all logistics, administration, training, and operations. b. Operational Control (OPCON) places one unit under another for assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, composition of subordinate forces, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish a mission. c. Support. A unit that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another unit supports that unit. The supporting unit remains under the command of its parent headquarters; however, the supporting unit is authorized and required to respond directly to the supported unit's requests for support. (1) Direct Support (OS) is that support provided by a unit or force not attached or under the command of the supported unit or force, but required to give priority to the support requested by that unit or force. (2) General Support (GS) is that support provided to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular element. (3) Attachment for Movement is a supporting relationship unique to the Air Assault Division. During air assault operations some elements (e.g., artillery, air defense artillery, engineers) may be attached to maneuver elements for movement only. Attachment would be effective from the planning phase to touchdown in the LZ. After touchdown, the elements revert to their tactical missions (e.g., DS, GS). STATUS CMD LOG TASK INF ROLE DS p p s p GS p p p p ATTACHED s s s s OPCON s p s s P-PARENT UNIT S-SUPPORTED UNIT 2-3. LIAISON REQUIREMENTS. 2·1 a. The following liaison personnel habitually support the infantry battalion. (1) Fire Support Officer (FSO)-battalion level. (2) Fire Support Team (FIST) chiefs-company level. (3) Air Liaison Officer (ALO)-battalion leve!. (4) Combat Aviation Party (CAP)-battalion level. (5) Combat Aviation Team (CAT)-company level. 2-4. LIAISON RESPONSIBILITIES. a. Supporting unit. The supporting unit provides transportation, communications, and major logistical assets to their liaison officer (LNO). The supporting unit insures that the LNO is prepared to function with the AATF for an extended period, and has 24-hour per day capability. Establishing and maintaining communications between the unit and its LNO is the responsibility of the supporting unit. Typical LNO responsibilities are: _ (1) Before departing for a unit, a liaison officer must thoroughly understand his unit's mission and become familiar with the situation. He insures that arrangements for communications are made. (2) On arriving at the supported unit's headquarters, the liaison officer reports to the commander or appropriate staff officer. He familiarizes himself with the situation of the supported unit and makes arrangements for securing information and transmitting this information to his own unit. (3) During his liaison tour, the liaison officer keeps himself informed of the situation of his own unit and makes this information available to the supported commander and his staff. He makes continuous reports on these matters, keeps records, and advises the commander. (4) A liaison officer must be thoroughly familiar with the situation, plans, and policies of his own command. Therefore, he frequently visits his own headquarters for briefings and to obtain updated tactical information. b. AATF. The AATF is responsible for providing limited logistical support (food, water, POL), and transportation as necessary, and for coordinating the utilization of the supporting assets through its LNOs. 2-5. CONFIRMATION OF SUPPORT ASSETS. Before planning the operation and tailoring the force, the AATFC must: a. Confirm with the CAP the actual numbers and types of helicopters available for the operation. b. Confirm with the air cavalry LNO the exact composition of its elements supporting the operation. c. Confirm the specific composition of all other units placed in support of the AATF. Confirming these assets reveals not only what has to be lifted into the operational area, but also what assets are available to do the lifting. Once these are known, the AATFC can proceed to tailor his force and, in conjunction with the CAP, begin planning the operation. 2-6. COMMAND AND CONTROL. a. The mission of the battalion CP is threefold: (1) Command and control of tactical operations. 2-2 (2) Planning for subsequent operations. (3) Information flow and analysis. b. These missions are shared among three elements: TAC (or Jump) CP, Main CP, and Rear CP. c. The TAC (or Jump) CP provides command and control for current combat operations. The following are characteristics of the Jump CP. It (1) Is normally composed of the AATFC, his S3, the FSO, S2 (or representative). CAP, ALO, and a CEO representative, all mounted in four jeeps. (2) Operates on radio listening silence, except when in control of the battle. (3) Moves frequently, collocating with a subordinate element for security whenever possible. (4) Assumes control automatically when the Main CP is rendered ineffective or is displacing. (5) Operates well forward in the AATF sector. d. The Main provides control of combat operations when the TAC is not deployed, and is responsible for planning future operations and coordinating all supporting elements. When the TAC is deployed, the battalion executive officer may come forward to take charge of the Main. The following are characteristics of the Main. It (1) Monitors current combat operations and maintains current enemy and friendly situations. (2) Gathers and disseminates intelligence. (3) Keeps higher and adjacent organizations informed of the friendly situation, to include submitting recurring reports. (4) Provides liaison to higher and adjacent organizations. (5) Coordinates combat support (CAS, Avn, Engr, ADA, etc.) and advises the commander on the use of combat support for current and future operations. (6) Maintains the status of combat support resources and missions. (7) Continually plans for future operations, overseeing the preparation of all contingency plans. (8) Issues combat orders, and warning orders as necessary. e. The Rear CP coordinates all logistical and personnel operations and requirements. It is located with the field trains in the Brigade Support Area (BSA) and is controlled by the battalion S4 or support platoon leader. The Administration and Logistics Operations Center (ALOC) is the nerve center of the Rear CP and executes the following functions. It (1) Coordinates between the battalion trains and the Forward Area Support Team (FAST). (2) Maintains responsibility for administration and logistics within the battalion to include: (a) Availability of service support assets. (b) Status of all classes of supply. 2-3 (c) Status of services. (d) Status of replacements (personnel and equipment). (e) Status of weapons systems and vehicles. (f) Personnel strength. (g) NCS for the battalion Admin/Log FM net. (h) Command of battalion field trains. f. The battalion should plan for redundant command and control in order to continue the battle should thecommand group be killed or captured, or if communications fail. g. The AATF CP needs to accommodate liaison officers and to provide an efficient working environment withoutbecoming unwieldly. Below is a sample CP. 10 TYPICAL AATF CP u 14 2-7. COMMUNICATIONS. a. To maintain the necessary control of all elements during an air assault operation, careful communicationsplanning is mandatory for each operation. Communications systems and procedures should be standardized wheneverpossible. b. The communications network at the battalion level is characterized by VHF-FM radio, (either vehicle mountedor man pack), wire, and courier. External and internal nets for the AATF are shown below. (1) External Nets. (a) Brigade Command/Operations FM Net. (b) Brigade Intelligence FM Net. (c) Brigade Intelligence RTT Net. (d) Tactical Air Direction UHF Net. 2-4 (e) Brigade Administrative/Logistics FM Net. (f) Air Force Air Request AM/SSB Net. (g) Division Air Defense AM/SSB Broadcast Net. (h) Artillery Fire Direction FM Net. (2) Internal Nets. (a) Battalion Command/Operations FM Net. (b) Battalion Command/Operations AM/SSB Net. (c) Battalion Administrative/Logistics FM Net. (d) Battalion Anti-Tank (D Co) Command/Operations FM Net. (e) Battalion GS Mortar Platoon Fire Direction FM Net. (f) Combat Aviation FM Net (during Air Assault operations only). c. The air assault rifle company communications nets are listed below: (1) External Nets. (a) Battalion Command/Operations FM Net. (b) Battalion GS Mortar Platoon Fire Direction FM Net. (c) Artillery Fire Direction Net. (2) Internal Net. Company Command/Operations FM Net. 2-5 CHAPTER 3 BATTALION TASK FORCE SUPPORT 3-1. GENERAL The role of the air assault logistican is a demanding one, keeping the air assault task force supplied in a manner that supports the maneuver. He must understand the needs and capabilities of the maneuver elements and, at the same time, understand the capabilities and limitations of the combat service support units. This chapter will identify and explain in detail the functions of the AATF trains and how they interact with the elements in the Brigade Support Area (BSA) to furnish combat service support. See Annex J of the 101st Abn Div (AASLT) TAC SOP for detailed implementing instructions. 3'2. ORGANIZATION OF SUPPORT. a. Company Trains. The scarcity of organic ground transportation assets normally prohibits the formation of company trains in the AATF. b. Battalion Trains. (1) Combat Trains. The AATF combat trains are tailored to provide immediate support to the companies. The combat trains are normally supervised by either the AATF S4 or the support platoon leader. If the situation permits, the combat trains are located within 1 or 2 kilometers of the AATF main command post. Although the exact composition will vary depending upon the availability of logistical air support and the tactical mission, the AATF combat trains will normally include some or all of the elements listed below. (a) Fast moving stocks of Classes I, Ill, V, and water. (b) Limited maintenance support in the form of a maintenance team equipped with a Gama Goat for transportation. (c) The battalion aid station. (2) Field Trains. The AATF field trains are normally located in the vicinity of the Brigade Support Area. The field trains consist of the support platoon headquarters, supply section, mess section, and the remaining elements of the maintenance platoon. The majority of Class I, Ill, and V supplies are located here. This is where requests for supplies are prepared, supplies are received, mess operations are conducted, and the majority of organizational maintenance is performed. The chaplain normally operates from the field trains. c. Brigade Support Area (BSA). (1) Command and Control. The Brigade Task Force S4 has overall responsibility for organizing, planning, and directing combat service support to the task force units. His principal partner for accomplishing this task is the Forward Area Support Coordination Officer (FASCO), who represents DISCOM. The FASCO and his staff are responsible for planning, organizing, and directing the actions of the DISCOM Forward Service Support Elements (FSSE) in support of the Brigade Task Force, and other divisional or attached units located in the brigade area. (2) Composition. The Forward Service Support Element has four major components. They are: (a) Forward Area Support Coordination Office (FASCO). The FASCO consists of logistics, maintenance, and movements sections. (b) Forward Supply and Services Company. The Forward Supply and Services Company receives, stores, and issues all classes of supply, water, and unclassified maps as required, less Classes VIII and IX, supplies peculiar 3-1 to COMSEC equipment, rail mission equipment, air drop equipment, aircraft, and approved operational project items. If augmented, it can provide clothing exchange, bath, graves registration, and water purification services. (c) Forward Medical Company. The Forward Medical Company establishes the brigade clearing station which provides medical support on an area basis. The Forward Medical Company is designed to treat the patient (return to duty, or evacuate within 72 hours). to provide medical supplies and equipment on a requisition basis, and to provide evacuation from the battalion aid station to the medical company. (d) Forward Direct Support Maintenance Company. The Forward Direct Support Maintenance Company provides direct support maintenance and repair parts supply service for automotive, engineer, power generation, communications-electronics (less COMSEC), and fire control equipment, and service and evacuation support to AATF vehicles. It is augmented by a missile maintenance contact team for TOW and Dragon maintenance support. (3) Tailored Augmentation Support. (a) Ground Transport. Because of the limited transportation assets available in the division, transportation augmentation will come from the Corps. Ground transportation requests are passed to the AATF. The FASCO then decides which requests to fill, based on a priority system established by the AATF S4. (b) Helicopter Maintenance Contact Teams (A VIM). A forward support aircraft maintenance element, capable of limited support, may be provided in those cases where mission characteristics or distances require it. 3-3. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EXECUTION. a. LOGSTAT Report. This document serves as a summary of current logistical status, and automatically initiates resupply actions by the DMMC. This report is the most critical logistics report generated by the AATF. Battalion S4s provide the brigade S4 their LOGSTATs, and the brigade S4 provides the FASCO a consolidated LOGSTAT. The FASCO will add information provided by each forward support company to the Brigade LOGSTAT and then transmit it to the DMMC. b. Battle Loss Report. The Battalion S4 submits this report through the brigade S4 and the FASCO, to the DMMC immediately upon discovering the loss of a major end item of equipment. This report also automatically generates a request for that item by the DMMC. c. fu!m!!y. (1) Class I. Class I is normally drawn from the ration breakdown point of the Forward Supply and Service Company by the field trains using supply point distribution. The field trains then makes distribution to the companies. (2) Class II. The AATF S4 consolidates requests for Class II items and forwards the request to the Forward Supply and Service Company. The S4 then picks up these items and distributes them to company level. (3) Class Ill. The Forward Supply and Service Company operates a Ground Refuel Point (G RP) and a Rapid Refuel Point (RRP) in the BSA. The AATF S4 draws fuel from the GRP; and coordinates with the brigade S4 for unit distribution of Class Ill products to the combat trains. Supply point distribution is then used to resupply the companies. Forward ground refuel points may be arranged on a mission basis for high volume fuel users (e.g., FA units) that lack organic means to transport and dispense fuel. (4) Class IV. Requisitions for Class IV items are submitted through the brigade S4. Class IV items are then issued using supply point distribution at the Forward Supply and Service Company, or by throughput by ground or air to the combat trains or companies as required. (5) Class V. Unit basic loads are carried by the units to the field, where the Forward Supply and Service Company ASP provides temporary storage. The AATF S4 requests resupply and coordinates delivery, as far forward as possible, using available air and ground assets. 3-2 (6) Class VI. Class VI items are distributed with Class I items using supply point distribution. (7) Class VII. Class VII items such as vehicles and weapon systems are normally issued based on input from daily Battle Loss Reports or on requisition. Large replacement items would be delivered directly to the BSA for supply point distribution to the AATF. (8) Class VIII. AATF aid station personnel draw supplies from the Forward Medical Support Company in the BSA, and then make distribution to company medics. (9) Class ix. The AATF field trains obtains repair parts to augment its own supply of PLL items from the Forward Maintenance company and issues repair parts in response to specific requests from the using units. (10) Water. The AATF field trains draws water from the water point operated by the Forward Supply and Service Company, using its organic 400-gallon water trailers pulled by its organic Gama Goats. Water is distributed to the forward companies using 50-gallon collapsible drums or 5-gallon cans in addition to the water trailer. d. Medical. The AATF aid station is normally located in the combat trains but may be split between the combat and field trains. A Physician's Assistant (PA) supervises the aid station. The Aidman section is normally allocated on the basis of four aidmen per air assault company. (1) FLAs or Gama Goats are used to evacuate wounded personnel from the company aid post to the battalion aid station. (2) MEDEVAC helicopters are used for direct evacuation of seriously wounded personnel to the Brigade clearing station or a combat support hospital. 3-3 3-4. THE ARRAY OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS ~------~~--17KM--~--~ /-v-...,xcx I BATH ' \ ...... 53 11 84 CHAPTER 4 THE COMBAT AVIATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CAMS) 4-1. GENERAL. The Combat Aviation Management System (CAMS) has been established within the Air Assault Division to assist air and ground commanders in the control and movement of aviation assets about the battlefield. It is the means by which the Air Assault Division maintains its flexibility to employ the combined forces of the division, i.e., the Combined Arms Team. The CAMS organization is shown at paragraph 4-6. 4-2. ORGANIZATION. a. The Combat Aviation Command Post (CACP). (1) The Division Aviation Officer is responsible for advising the Division Commander and staff on all matters concerning the employment and utilization of divisional aviation assets. He is responsible for establishing the CACP, which is collocated with the DTOC. The CACP receives information and establishes relationships for command and control of aviation elements and management of airspace in the division tactical area of operations. This information is obtained and controlled through coordination with the CAME, FSE, TASE, ADADO. G2/3, CACCs, and other liaison personnel. (2) Under the CACP there are two functional elements -the Current Operations and Intelligence (COl) Section and the Airspace Management Element (AME). The COl is comprised of the 101st Aviation Group S2/3 and has direct access to the AME, the G2/3, and the CACCs. The COl serves as the focal point for the G3 on matters pertaining to planning combat operations and the task organization of aviation units to provide responsive aerial maneuver and combat support to the division. b. The Combat Aviation Control Center (CACC). (1) At the Brigade Task Force level, the CACC is established and operated by the OS aviation battalion commander, who has total responsibility for all facets of aviation support (except the Air Cavalry) provided to the Brigade Task Force, to include planning, operations, and logistics. The Aviation Battalion Commander has radio communication with the Combat Aviation Party (CAP), and through them with the Combat Aviation Team (CAT). Additionally, he has radio communication with the CACP, allowing changes in aviation task organization to be made rapidly. The CACC is collocated with the Brigade Task Force TOC. (2) The CACC also has the responsibility of managing the brigade airspace. The Brigade Airspace Management Element (BAME), under the supervision of the aviation battalion task force S3, is the staff element that performs this critical function. It consists of personnel from the S3 operations section, either working as a separate section or performing these duties in conjunction with their other designated S3 responsibilities. Additionally, an ADA liaison officer may be present to assist in the operation of the BAME. The CACC receives information necessary for the management of airspace in the brigade sector through coordination with the CACP, FSO, Air Force LNO, brigade staff, and ADA LNO. c. The Combat Aviation Party (CAP). At AATF level the CAP consists of a combat-arms qualified aviator (an experienced warrant officer, lieutenant, or captain), two pathfinders, and one vehicle with two radios. The primary role of the CAP is to assist the AATFC in the proper utilization and control of air assault aviation assets. Concurrent planning for aviation support is necessary so that harmonious fire support, air assault support, TAC air, and other supporting plans can be developed. The role of the CAP is important, because aviation units will be shifted rapidly to diff.erent ground units in order to capitalize fully on the mobility offered by helicopters. The CAP is the individual who conducts the AMB, plans the flight routes in concert with the AATF S2, develops the AATF LZ/PZ overlay, and controls the CATs. The CAP is the key to successful aviation planning and should be located as close to the AATFC as his FSO and S3. d. The Combat Aviation Team (CAT). The CAT is normally composed of four (4) pathfinder qualified airborne soldiers from the Pathfinder Company. The CAP is responsible for command and control of the CATs, and for task 4-1 organizing the pathfinders to meet specific mission requirements. The CAT is equipped with PRC-77 radios which ~nable the pathfinders to communicate with various agencies through the Combat Aviation Net (CAN). The CAT can assist in rigging, sling load operations, establishing PZs and LZs, and providing terminal guidance for aircraft. 4-3. FUNCTIONS. At each level of CAMS (except theCAT), the status of missions, aircraft, crew rest, fuel, flight hours, NVG capability, weather considerations, safety, and standardization are kept current. 4-4. COMMUNICATIONS. This section will discuss in detail the communications requirements for a successful air assault operation. A sample CAMS Communication Net is shown in paragraph 4-7. a. The Aviation Task Force Command Net is found in the CEO I in the Combat Aviation Control Center layer. It is the Command FM net of the aviation battalion headquarters supporting the brigade TF. This net is monitored by all aviation company headquarters within the Aviation Task Force. b. The Combat Aviation Net is a radio net for use exclusively by aviation elements within the Aviation Task Force (CACC, aviation companies, CAPs, CATs, and aircraft). It is a non-secure net listed in the CACC layer of the CEOI. This net is unique in that it readily disseminates and "cross levels" information (i.e., a mission request from a CAP simultaneously constitutes a warning order to the aviation companies). c. The UHF frequency of the lifting assault helicopter aviation company is the primary air to air means of communication between lift, attack, and cavalry elements. d. The VHF frequency of each individual section (lift, attack, and cavalry) is used for internal communications during company team operations. e. The Air Assault Net is the Command FM net of the AATFC. This is his net to communicate with his elements aFld will be monitored by the Flight Lead and the Air Mission Commander. When cavalry and attack elements support the AATF ground tactical operations, they will switch to this net after the ground force has been landed in the LZ. 4·5. DUTIES OF KEY AVIATION BATTLE TEAM CAPTAINS. a. Air Mission Commander (AMC). The AMC is provided by the lifting aviation company. The aviation company commander will normally be the AMC for movement of the AATF. For company team operations, the operations officer or a platoon leader usually serves as the AMC, while section leaders and senior warrant officers serve for platoon team or smaller operations. The AMC insures that the air operations are conducted in accordance with the AMB, coordinates actions along the flight route, employs CAV, ATK, TAC AIR, or ARTY as necessary enroute, and advises the AATFC of any situation which might cause the AATFC to make the decision to abort, go to an alternate LZ/PZ, or elect some other course of action. Downed aviator procedures are the responsibility of the AMC unless directed otherwise. The AATFC should ride on the AMC's aircraft. The AMC's aircraft (its position in the flight) will be designated at the AMB. b. Flight Lead. The flight lead navigates the Air Assault along the flight route adjusting airspeed as required to meet pre-planned artillery SEADS and preparation fires and to arrive at the LZ/PZ within 30 seconds of the scheduled time; and chooses a mode of flight commensurate with the threat, (i.e., low level, contour, NOEl. c. Cavalry Team Battle Team Captain (BTC). The Cavalry Team usually preceeds the flight and recons the flight route and alternate routes as required, recons the LZ/PZ as required, and responds to the AMC until wheels down, at which time the Cavalry will proceed to complete its mission as briefed. The Cavalry Team BTC also monitors the FA net and calls for fire as required. d. Attack Team BTC. The Attack Team protects the lift from PZ to LZ, reacts to calls for fire from the CAV or AMC, assumes the missions of the Cavalry in its absence, and monitors the TAC AIR frequency. Upon wheels down in the LZ, the Attack Team BTC will proceed to complete the mission as briefed. 4-2 4-6. MANEUVER XX 101 X 1 II CAMS ORGANIZATION AVIATION Ill CACP --------101 ... II ·--------------- 229 ... ----------------· r--- ,.. ____ 53 12 84 4-3 4-7. CAMS LINES OF COMMUNICATION 101 CMD I I CMD 229 C! e) CACC CMD CAP CAN CAN CAT CAN 53 13 84 4-4 CHAPTER 5 THE AIR ASSAULT 5-1. GENERAL The air assault is a basic part of every operation conducted by the AATF. Air assault is the integration of combat, combat support, and combat service support elements in the movement of the AATF into or out of an objective area. The specific types of air assault operations having been highlighted earlier, the following chapters will discuss those operations in more detail. Every air assault operation consists of five distinct phases: Staging, Loading, Air Movement, Landing, and Ground Tactical Operations. This chapter examines the principles, practices, and fundamentals common to all air assaults. Generally we apply the term, Insertion, when discussing the air assault into the objective area, and the term, Extraction, when discussing the air assault from the objective area. 5-2. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS. Planning is critical for air assault operations. Planning time, however, is a function of the availabJe time, and the results range from a full field operations order to an oral FRAGO issued enroute to a PZ. Planning is continuous throughout an operation, but we will limit our discussion to those planning requirements that must be satisfied before the operational sequence begins. a. Task Organization. The AATFC must decide on his task organization during the initial planning stages. b. Warning Order. This planning step is indispensable. The warning order can be oral, written, or written on an overlay, but the AATFC must issue one alerting all TF elements of the pending operation as early as possible in order to maximize planning time for the subordinate elements. The warning order may lack specific details of the operation, but it allows subordinate leaders to begin their planning activities. Examples of warning orders are provided for each of the air assault operations discussed in this manual. c. OPORD. If time is available, the AATFC should prepare a thorough OPORD and appropriate annexes. Usually at the beginning of a major operation, there is time to perform the full range of command and staff procedures. Do it! This OPORD may be the last one the AATFC and his staff have time to prepare; subsequent FRAGOs will rely on the detailed instructions that were issued earlier. Regardless of the detail published in the OPORD, the Air Movement Table is an indispensable annex. · d. FRAGO. Once an operation commences, the FRAGO invariably becomes the key to disseminating plans. It can be oral or written, but a written FRAGO is obviously preferred. If an oral FRAGO is issued~ the AATFC can follow it up with a hard copy to confirm understanding before execution. NOTE: Because of their importance, air movement tables should be supplied even with FRAGOs. 5-3. PHASES OF THE AIR ASSAULT. a. Staging. Activities during this phase include movement to the PZ, the positioning of troops and assets, coordination among elements of the AATF, and other functions that must be accomplished prior to beginning an operation. The necessity for and complexities of staging vary with the particular operation and the time available. Staging activities and the other phases in general will be discussed later in this chapter and the unique aspects of staging for particular operations will be discussed in subsequent chapters. b. Loading. Actions during the loading phase center around PZ operations. The staging and loading phases often occur simultaneously, but they are separated in this discussion for clarity. c. Air Movement. This complex phase is the unique aspect of air assault operations. Execution is complicated because it can occur at •145 knots. The AATFC and the. CAP must work closely during planning to insure that the air movement phase is accomplished efficiently. The roles of the various helicopters involved, the steps to recover downed aircraft, the suppression of enemy air defense, and command/control problems are but a few of the aspects that characterize the air movement phase. 5-1 d. Landing. This phase deals with operations at the LZ. Its complexity varies with the operation. e. Ground Tactical Operation. This phase is similar to any infantry TF operation. The AATFC knows that his primary mode of transport is the helicopter, and he must constantly recognize that dependency during his ground tactical operation. Accordingly, actions enroute to and from PZs and LZs may complicate the mission. The execution of the Air Assault Delay when compared to the Mechanized Delay dramatizes the complexity of employing helicopters as an integral part of a ground tactical operation. 54. TERMINOLOGY. To maximize operational control, helicopter assets are designated in lifts, serials, and loads (see sketch). a. Lift. A lift is composed of all helicopters assigned to a particular mission for movement of troops and equipment. Each time all assigned helicopters pick up troops and equipment and set them down in the LZ, one lift is completed. The return of aircraft to the PZ is not a lift. b. Serial. A serial is a grouping of two or more helicopters under the control of a serial commander (aviator) separated from other groupings within the lift by time and space. Serials are used to maintain effective control of helicopter assets. Serials may also be employed to take simultaneous advantage of several available flight routes. c. Loads/Chalks. A load or chalk refers to personnel and equipment designated to be moved by a specific helicopter; it also refers to the aircraft within the lift that is to carry the personnel and equipment. The number of loads is the number of helicopters in the lift. Loads are also designated within serials, just as they are within lifts. 5-2 AIR ASSAULT TERMINOLOGY @ LIFT LIFT RETURN FLIGHT (FLIGHT) @) (NOT A LIFT) 53 14 84 5-3 5-5. INSERTION. a. Concept. Multiple PZs and LZs are desirable for dispersion and flexibility. As the AATF rarely receives more than one assault helicopter company, the entire force cannot normally be inserted in a single lift. When this limitation exists, the initial lifts must be organized to place maximum combat power into the objective area as rapidly a~ possible in order to compensate for the vulnerability of the AATF as it builds its strength. The air assault may be conducted beyond the range of supporting friendly artillery; however, when it is within range of the LZ, artillery will normally be used to support the insertion. Artillery may also be air assaulted forward to place it within range of a planned air assault LZ. b. Planning. (1) Reverse Planning Sequence. Air assault insertions are planned using the reverse planning sequence. This sequence is the reverse of the order of execution. Each successive step has a direct influence on the preceeding step. The landing plan, for example, will determine the composition and sequence of lifts during the air movement. The sequence in which these plans are developed is as follows: (a) Ground Tactical Operations. (b) Landing. (c) Air Movement. (d) Loading. (e) Staging. REVERSE PLANNING SEQUENCE ACP GROUND AIR OPERATIONS LANDING MOVEMENT LOADING STAGING 53 15 84 54 (2) Task Organization. Depending upon the tactical mission, the AATF may be supported by the following elements in the comrnand and support relationships indicated: (a) Air Cavalry Team (OPCON). (b) Aviation Battalion Task Force (OS). 1. Aviation Battalion Headquarters. 2. Attack Helicopter Company. 3. Two Assault Helicopter Companies. 4. Assault Support Helicopter Platoon. (c) Field Artillery Battery (OS or attached). (d) Stinger Section (attached for movement; then OS). (e) Engineer Platoon (attached for movement; then OPCON). (f) Military Intelligence Section (attached for movement; then OS). (g) Fire Support Element (FSE) (attached). (h) Combat Aviation Party (CAP) (attached). (i) TACP (collocated). (3) Warning Order. The AATFC must issue a warning order as soon as possible. Coordination is essential to the success of the air assault and must be started as soon as possible. The warning order can be written on an overlay with the known TF boundaries and locations for the operation; it can be written separately with an overlay attached; or it can be issued orally. (4) Air Mission Briefing. The air mission briefing (AMB) is the key to a successful air assault operation. The Combat Aviation Party (CAP) develops the AMB in conjunction with the AATFC. The AMB should be conducted as early as possible (at least six hours prior to PZ time) to allow maximum planning and preparation time for task force elements. The CAP presents the AMB to all task force elements, with the AATF 52 and S3 briefing intelligence and the ground tactical plan respectively, and the FSO briefing the fire support plan if it applies. Note: The AMB is normally conducted at the AATF HOs; it can, however, be held at any location designated by the AATFC. (5) OPORD. See the sample OPORD in this chapter. While the labeling of PZs and LZs in the OPORD is largely a matter of convention, whether named, lettered, or numbered, the technique must be consistent. The OPORD may contain an Operations Schedule (OPSHED) as an annex. Now we will discuss in detail the five phases of the air assault operation in the order in which they occur. c. Staging. Staging activities include movement of the AATF to the PZ, and the joining of ground forces and the supporting aviation elements at the PZ. (1) Responsibilities. (a) The AATFC designates the ground movement times, routes of movement, assembly and/or holding area locations, and arrival times at the PZ. The PZ Control Officer (PZCO). normally the AATF 53 Air, is responsible for seeing that the PZ times on the air movement table are met by both ground and aviation elements. 5·5 (b) The CAP identifies the flight routes and coordinates the movement and arrival times of aviation units at the PZ. (c) The AMC insures that the aircraft meet the PZ and LZ times in the air movement table. (d) The AATF subordinate commanders move their units from the assembly or holding areas at the designated times, follow the specified routes, and arrive at the PZ when required. (2) OPSEC. Because of the AATF's use of helicopters, requirements for a large logistical base, and large communications signature, it is especially vulnerable to enemy intelligence collection. The AATF counters these collection efforts with the following OPSEC measures: (a) Radio listening silence and other standard SIGSEC procedures are mandatory throughout both the planning and conduct of the air assault. (b) Camouflage of assembly areas and helicopter holding areas, noise and light discipline, and minimal PZ and LZ occupation times are passive security methods that are used during staging and loading operations. (3) Location of Assets. Normally the supporting aircraft will not be collocated with the ground force. PZs should be relatively close to the troops and not require extensive ground movement (it takes less time and effort for the helicopter to fly an additional four kilometers to a PZ than it takes for an infantryman to walk that distance). Multiple PZs are preferable to a single large PZ, as they avoid concentrating forces. (4) Rendezvous Timing. Ground and aviation unit movements to the PZ are coordinated so that the troops arrive at their respective loading points just before the helicopters land. This prevents congestion, preserves security, and reduces vulnerability to enemy actions during staging. (5) Command and Control. The PZ Control Officer (PZCO) is the AATFC's representative on the PZ and commands the movement of both ground and aviation units using field phones, arm and hand signals, or (as a last resort) FM radio. FM radio frequencies will be established for both ground and air/ground control of the PZ. The AATF Command Net will ·not used for PZ operations. The AATFC locates himself wherever he can best monitor the flow of personnel and equipment to the PZ, and at the same time prepares to accompany the first lift when it departs; the PZCO handles the PZ, thus freeing the AA TFC to move with the assault elements. (6) Rehearsals. (a) Ground Tactical Plan. Whenever possible, allocate time for subordinate commanders to conduct rehearsals of both the ground tactical plan and the actions to be taken on the LZ. If time does not permit full rehearsals, all commanders should conduct chalk talks or sand table discussions with their subordinates. (b) Staging Plan. The AATFC.insures that the following actions have been taken: 1-That the PZCO has rehearsed the PZ control party in its duties and actions on the PZ. 2. That both ground and aviation forces have verified the time required for their respective elements to move from assembly or holding areas to the PZ. 3. That ground unit commanders have briefed or rehearsed their personnel on safety procedures to be used in and around the aircraft. d. Loading. (1) PZ Selection. When possible, each PZ should accommodate all supporting helicopters at one time. Time permitting, PZs should be confirmed by air or ground reconnaissance. Alternate PZs are also identified. PZ's are selected on the basis of the following considerations: 5-6 (a) Tactical situation. .L Where possible, selected PZs should not require extensive ground movement by troops. PZs should be accessible to vehicles moving support assets. b 3. PZs should be masked from enemy observation, and if possible, outside the range of enemy artillery. (b) Size. 1. The size of the PZ required depends upon the number and type of helicopters used. 2. A usable surface is important in that it may affect the Allowable Cargo Load (ACL) of the helicopters. ;L The size of the PZ affects helicopter separation and dispersal on the ground. (c) Slope. UH-60 helicopters may land on slopes if the following limitations are not exceeded: 6 degrees downslope, 15 degrees upslope, and 15 degrees cross-slope. A ten knot wind in the LZ is equivalent to adding 4 degrees to the existing slope. When these limitations are exceeded, helicopters will not land, but terminate at a hover. (d) Obstacles. The terrain surrounding a PZ or LZ is analyzed for its effect on air traffic patterns. Approaches should be free of obstacles, and landings should be made into the wind. Approaches and departures are made along the long axis of the LZ, over the lowest obstacle. In a tactical situation, constantly approaching the PZ/LZ over the same ground track should be avoided. 1. An obstacle clearance ratio of 10 to 1 is used on the approach and departure ends of the PZ/LZ. That is, a landing point requires 100 feet of horizontal clearance if a helicopter must depart directly over a 10-foot tall tree. 2. All obstacles within the PZ/LZ will be marked with red lights at night (turned on only when the PZ/LZ is in use), or red panels during the day. If red panels are used, they will be securely staked to the ground. (e) Weather. The AATFC must realize in planning any air assault operation that weather is a critical factor in deciding the success or failure of the mission. Weather information should be analyzed for trends, and the AATFC must consider this information in his decision-making process. (2) PZ Control/Organization. A sketch of a typical PZ physical layout is provided on the next page. (a) Responsibilities. The PZCO organizes, controls, and coordinates operations in the PZ selected by the AATFC. In order to establish PZ control, the PZCO forms a control group consisting of the Combat Aviation Team (CAT), subordinate unit PZ control teams, and support personnel (manpower for security, messengers, and clearing the PZ), and positions them on the PZ. (b) Communications. Communications on the PZ must be by the most secure means available. The PZ control group will have the capability to operate on two primary radio frequencies (FM): the Air Assault Net and the Combat Aviation Net. Helicopters landing at the PZ will normally do so on radio listening silence, taking visual signals from pathfinders or ground guides. If radio communications are necessary, only preplanned code words will be used to indicate variations from the original plan. (c) Markings. The PZCO directs the marking of the PZ. An effective method is to name the PZ a color and to mark it accordingly with lights or panels. Smoke is not normally used because of its signature. In daylight the standard method of marking the initial touchdown point for the lead helicopter is for a ground guide to hold his M-16 over his head when the flight is on short final. Other ground guides are used when the landing formation is different than that briefed in the AMB. At night the standard lighted "Y" is used to mark the touchdown point for the lead aircraft. 5-7 PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF PZ ~i~~ PAX PAX DD ox ox gxgx 'AX PAX 00 ~ ¢ ¢ ¢ 100--7-QM fo fo lo f¢ SLINGLOADS D D D D D D D D 5-B (d) Security. The PZCO coordinates to insure that adequate security is provided. Security forces protect the main body as it assembles, moves to the PZ, and is lifted out. Security elements may be provided by other units if the PZ is within a friendly area. (e) Disposition of Loads. Loads, both personnel and equipment, must be positioned on the PZ to conform to the helicopter landing formation. The PZCO will designate separate locations for sling loads and personnel loads. In configuring the PZ, personnel loads will be located to the left of the aircraft landing points and external loads to the right. After the aircraft lands, personnel will load using both sides of the aircraft. The aircraft then may move to pick up an external load. External loads are not normally scheduled in the initial serials because of security considerations at the LZ. During extraction operations, however, the AATFC may decide to schedule external loads in the initial serials and extract personnel last. (f) Helicopter Formation and Approach Headings. The PZCO receives helicopter landing formation and approach heading information. from the CAP. Flight formations are used in PZs to facilitate loading. The formations may be dictated by the number and type of helicopters and the configuration and size of the PZs. Factors for Air Loading Table. At company and lower levels, the air loading table assigns specific (3) chalk-numbered helicopters to carry personnel and major items of equipment and supplies into the objective area. When preparing an air loading table, certain procedures must be followed. (a) Sequencing. The PZ departure sequence is based on the mission to be accomplished by each subordinate unit upon landing. Unit departure priorities are based on their required sequence of arrival at the LZs. (b) Unit Tactical Integrity. When planning loads for an air assault, squads are normally loaded intact on the same helicopter, with platoons located within the same serial. This insures fighting unit integrity upon landing. (c) Self-Sufficiency of Loads. Each chalk load should be self-sufficient. This means that each towed load is usually accompanied by its prime mover, and that crews are loaded with their vehicles or weapons. (d) Cross Loading. Loads should be planned so that all leaders or crew served weapons are not loaded on the same helicopter. This prevents the mission from being jeopardized if a helicopter is lost. (e) Bump Plan. Each helicopter load should have an alternate loading plan to be used if one or more aircraft do not arrive at the PZ. This "bump plan" specifies personnel in each chalk who will be offloaded or "bumped," if all personnel cannot be lifted as planned. A bump plan insures that necessary personnel and equipment arrive on time in the objective area, and that key personnel or loads are not bumped arbitrarily and left in the PZ. As with normal loading, the principles of self-sufficiency and crossloading must be followed. e. Air Movement. (1) Flight Route Selection. (a) The CAP selects the primary and alternate flight routes and coordinates them with the AATFC, usually as part of the AMB. The following sketch shows three methods used to depict flight routes in the air movement annex. 5-9 AREA OF SP OPERATION CP 6 CORRIDOR ACESUE •SP ®@SP @j) @ ACP ACPQUEEN JACK 53 17 84 FLIGHT ROUTES (THREE VARIETIES OF NOTATION SHOWN) (b) Once tentative flight routes are identified, they are designated for use by each unit. When largenumbers of helicopters are employed, dispersion is achieved by using a separate route for each serial. (c) Considerations. 1. Overflying ground elements may interfere with supporting fires, but is inherently more secure. Flight routes should be selected that are clear of gun target lines. f.. To reduce the vulnerability of the AATF, flight routes should facilitate rapid approach, landing, and departure from the LZ';. ;!. Flight routes should not interfere with supporting USAF tactical air cover. (d) Flight routes and altitudes should use terrain to the maximum advantage ~2 MIN~c::::::>~1•c:::>~2 MIN-+<::::>~1 ~2MIN-+<:::::>_..1 I*· 9 MIN • • 1 MIN~ 7 MIN 3d RIFLE CO (1st SERIAL/2d LIFT) COMBAT SPT CO (2d SERIAL/2d LIFT) ~ I 0 ~30SEC~OSEC+-ooo:1• 7 MIN**" r:=-1-c:::::>-2 Ml~1~ ADA (ad LIFT) BN HQs FA ADA . 12 MIN *** /1 ~ •..--....=1..<:::>2-<:>-1<::::>2..c::::::>-2<:::>-1~15 MINp=-1-c:::::>-2 MIN--c=>--....v" I • 10 MIN -.) ~ 10 MIN-----' 0 -H-60 PZ *-ALLOWS FOR TURN AROUND OF 1st AH CO W/2d LIFT • I c:::> -CH-47 **-ALLOWS FOR TURN ARROUND OF ASH CO(-) W/2d LIFT***-ALLOWS FOR TURN AROUND OF ASH CO(-) W/3d LIFT 53 18 84 c. Night PZ Operations. (1) PZ Organization. (a) The PZ layout is essentially identical to that used during the day, except that lights are used in lieu of panels. (b) All PZs will be lit with the tactical "Y." However, during the conduct of an air assault delay, the use of minimal lighting such as a strobe light is acceptable when agreed upon by the ground and aviation commanders. In multi·ship lifts it is mandatory to mark the touchdown point for each helicopter. NIGHT LANDING ''Y'' 1M WIND § H,- DIRECTION ~ 0 7t LANDING 0 t 14M VAPI 1 AMBER GREEN 0 0 RED I • 14M .. I 53 19 84 5·21 (c) An individual, not necessarily a pathfinder, will be located at the head of each landing area with a radio on the internal PZ frequency and a strobe light. His function is to turn on the lights (the landing "Y") two minutes prior to the arrival of each lift and to turn them off again after its departure. This individual is also responsible for turning the Visual Approach Path Indicator (VAPI) on and off in the same manner. The preceding sketch shows the setup of the ''Y.'' (d) Troop loads, in premarked locations, will wait for the signal to load; the signal is usually the turning on of the red dome lights in each helicopter. The dome lights are turned off as each individual helicopter is loaded and the troops are secured. (2) PZCO. At night, the PZCO has the same responsibilities as during the day with the addition of the following: (a) The azimuth of the lighted "Y" and the alignment of the load position markers are checked after placement. (b) Obstacles on the PZ that are hazards to safe air movement are checked for proper markings (red bean bag lights). (3) Air Traffic Control. (a) The PZCO is responsible for air traffic control at night. Normally this mission will be delegated to a member of the pathfinder platoon. The pathfinder works directly for the PZCO and advises him on aerial guidance procedures and techniques. (b) The following subjects should receive special emphasis in planning for and operating a night PZ: 1· Emphasis must be placed during the AMB on using only minimum essential aircraft lights. 1_. Slingloading areas must be selected with care to insure that hovering helicopters do not stir up dangerous amounts of dust. ~- The color of the lights making up the lighted "Y" should be selected for their ground·to·air recognition capabilities. The recognition qualities of the available colors in order are red (for hazard warning lights only). amber, white, green, and blue. 1· As a minimum, selected LZs and PZs will allow a 30 meter clearance zone for each aircraft and 30 meters separation'between all aircraft in the flight. 5. Extensive rehearsals should be conducted with the hookup and signal men for better control and safety. d. Command and Control. (1) Signal. The primary means of communication during the conduct of a night air assault will be visual. On the PZ, wire and visual signals will be used extensively. FM radio communications should be held to a minimum. (2) Command. The AATFC will follow the same procedures during the night air assault as during the day. e. Advance Party. An advance party can be used to prepare the LZ for the main force. If one is to be used, the following is a workable concept. (1) Mission. The mission of the advance party is to determine whether the LZ is HOT or COLD, to verify the correct location of the LZ, to organize the LZ to facilitate landing, and to provide terminal guidance for the lift helicopters. The advance party has little capability to fight for a sustained period or to secure the LZ for the main body. 5-22 (2) Composition. The advance party is composed of command, pathfinder, and security elements. (a) Preferred Method. The advance party is landed at last light on an LZ distant from tb~ primaP l. It then moves cross-country to organize the primary LZ for the assaulting elements. (b) Alternate Methods. 1. The advance party lands on the primary LZ immediately preceding the assaulting force. This technique is used when dictated by mission requirements and time constraints. 2. The advance party lands at night on an LZ away from the primary LZ and then moves cross-country to organize the primary LZ for the arrival of the main force. ;!. The advance party rappels two pathfinders or scouts into the primary LZ, who then clear a sufficient area to land the aircraft carrying the remainder of the advance party. This procedure is used when the surface of the LZ is unsuitable for receiving helicopters. (3) Actions on the LZ. The following are those tasks which the advance party should accomplish prior to the arrival of the main body: (a) Confirm the LZ status (HOT or COLD) and report to the AATFC on the air assault net. (b) Establish local security. (c) Establish navigational aids to provide terminal guidance. f. Night LZ Operations. Night LZ operations will normally be conducted in a manner similar to operations during the day. (1) LZ Organization. (a) LZ lighting is dictated by the tactical situation, but will be agreed upon by the aviation unit commander and ground unit commander at the AMB. (b) Sling loads may be landed in a specified portion of the night LZ away from the troop lift touchdown points. (2) LZ Control. Night LZ control is similar to that for the night PZ. However, due to the confusion normally inherent on a night LZ, it is essential that a straggler control point be established and its location on the LZ be known by all troops prior to insertion. A knowledgeable individual is located at the straggler control point with a radio on the LZ ground frequency to aid lost individuals in rejoining their parent units. One technique is to establish the straggler control point at the lighted "Y." g. Resupply. Resupply m1ss1ons are not normally flown for an operation in which the unit is inserted and extracted during the same night. The AATF personnel will carry all they require for the operation and should not require a resupply. 5-23 SCENARIO The AATF is located in a secure assembly area within two kilometers of three suitable PZs. 5-8. FRAG ORDER. (classification) FRAGO 4-83 (GREEN GRAPE) Reference: Map, Series V741S Ft Campbell Special Edition, 1:50,000. Time Zone: SIERRA Changes to Task Organization: None 1. SITUATION. Enemy advance guard elements have been reported vic DR3248 and DR3526. Their advance continues, but has been slowed by stiff resistance from elements of the 6th CB(AC) and CAS. The 6th CB(AC) continues to delay to the east to LINE PURPLE (42 N/S grid line). 2d Bde air assaults to occupy defensive sector from DR416478 to DR411560 commencing 010500 Sep. 2. MISSION. TF 1-502 lnf conducts air assault operations commencing 010500 Sep to secure high ground alongKILLEBREW ROAD vic DR4153; on order, moves to and occupies positions to defend in sector from DR416478 to DR411560. 3. MISSIONS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. a. CoA: (1) Conduct air assault commencing 010500 Sep from PZ X (DR544515) to LZ A (DR413550) to seize OBJ RED (DR412551). (2) Conduct reconnaissance patrols to BP 11 and BP 17. (3) On order, move to, occupy, and retain BP 11 or BP 17. (4) On order, detach one platoon to TF control for air assault reconnaissance missions in selected areas (20 minute standby). b. CoB: (1) Conduct air assault commencing 010500 Sep from PZ X (DR544515) to LZ B (DR416536) to secure OBJ WHITE (DR415536). (2) Conduct reconnaissance patrols to BP 13. (3) On order, move to, occupy, and retain BP 13. (4) On order, detach one rifle squad with LMG to provide security for the TF CP vic DR431527. c. CoC(-): (classification) 5-24 (classification) (1) Conduct air assault commencing 010537Sep from PZ Y (DR545446) to LZ C (DR412517) to secure OBJ BLUE (DR411519). (2) Conduct reconnaissance patrol to BP 15 and BP 16. (3) On order, move to, occupy, and retain BP 15 or BP 16. (4) On order, send a contact patrol to the coordination point at Line CLAW vic DR431422. d. Tm D: (1) Conduct air assault commencing 010655 Sep from PZ Y (DR546496) to LZ 8 (DR426538) and establish screen line generally from DR402617 to DR393620. (2) Employ TOWS in ground mounted role. (3) Establish antiarmor positions on all E·W hard surface road$. (4) Report all antiarmor positions to TF HO NLT 011200 Sep. (1) Accept attachment of ADA and engineer elements for the AASLT. (2) Supervise the ADA, engineer preparation and departure at PZ Y. (3) Release attachment of ADA and engineers upon their arrival at specified LZs. (4) Be prepared to release GS mortars to TF Con on 26 minute notice. f. Tm B. 101 Avn: (1) Establish laager site vic DR2623~4 from 291400 to 011400 Sep. (2) Execute air movement. Annex C, Air Movement Table. (3) Provide air assault route security to LZ A and LZ B. (4) Be prepared to reinforce by fire the antiarmor fires of Tm D to the west of Tm D line. g. Tm B/2·17 ACS (OPCON): (1) Conduct route reconnaissance of all flight routes NLT 010446 Sep. (2) On order, screen to the west of OBJs RED, WHITE, BLUE. h. Sec/1/B/1-3 ADA (Stinger): Protect in sequence: (1) B/101 AHB laager site vic DR262334 from 291400 to 011400 Sep. (classification) 5·26 (classification) (2) Tm D vic DR285462 commencing 011400 Sep. i. 1/B/326 Engr: Priority of work: (1) Emplace road cratering demolitions at DR436412, DR342336, DR441432, DR400315, and DR386344. (2) Prepare target folders on all bridges and key intersections in sector. (3) Construct abatis at DR227314, DR362614, and DR382622. j. 1/1/B/311 Ml (GSR): Provide surveillance: (1) Vicinity DR416478 to the west. (2) Report immediately all enemy activity by number, type, location, and direction of movement. k. Fire Support: (1) Priority of fires initially to Co A. (2) Develop a three minute prep to be fired on each LZ from H-5 to H-2. I. Coordinating Instructions: (1) Report all PZs by location and size (in numbers of aircraft) to TF CP NLT 012200 Sep. (2) Annex A, Operations Overlay. (3) Annex B, Air Movement Table. (4) Assume MOPP 1 NLT 010400 Sep. (5) ADA Weapons Controls Status: TIGHT. (6) Excess vehicles remain vicinity of combat trains under control of BN XO. ACKNOWLEDGE. CDR OFFICIAL: S3 Annexes: A-Operations Overlay (Same as OPORD) B-Air Movement Table (Same as OPORD) (classification) 5·26 5-9. WARNING ORDER. (classification) WARNING ORDER 4-83 (GREEN GRAPE) Reference: Map, Series, V741S Ft Campbell Special Edition, 1:50,000 Task Organization: TF Control 2 Sec/1/D 2 Sec/2/D Tm B/158 Avn (DS) FIST/1-321 FA FIST/1-321 FA Tm B/2-17 ACS (OPCON) Sec/1 /B/1-3 ADA (Stinger) (DS) 1/B/326 Engr (OPCON) 1/1/B/311 Ml (GSR) (DS) FSE/1-321 FA CAP/TF 158 Avn 2 Sec/1/D Plt/C TACP FIST/1-321 FA 1. SITUATION. Enemy armored forces conducted river crossing operations across the CUMBERLAND RIVER vic DOVER, TN (DR2240) commencing 311700S Aug. The 2d Bde TF air assaults commencing 010500S Sep to secure assigned objectives; on order, moves to and occupies positions in defensive sector from DR416478 to DR411560. 2. MISSION. TF 1-502 Infantry conducts air assault operations commencing 0105005 to secure high ground along KILLEBREW ROAD vic DR4153; on order, moves to assigned battle positions in defensive sector. 3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. a. Task Organization effective 3111005 Aug. b. AMB 31 0800S Aug at 2d Bde CP vic DR785750. c. TF 1-502 OPORD will be issued at 311200S Aug at TF 1-502 CP. d. All units carry three days C Rations. e. All companies report deployment strength figures to 51 NLT 3107305 Aug. f. Sec/1/B/1-3 ADA (Stinger), 1/B/326 Engineers and 1/1/B/311 Ml attached for movement. CDR AUTHENTICATION (classification) 5-27 5-10. OPERATIONS ORDER. AIR ASSAULT (EXAMPLE) (classification) Copy No __ of_Copies TF 1·502 lnf DR578676 291000S Aug JT22 OPORD 4-83 (GREEN GRAPE) Reference: Map, Series V741 S, Ft Campbell Special Edition, 1 :50,000. Time Zone: SIERRA Task Organization: 2 Sec/1/D 2 Sec/2/D Tm B/101 Avn (OS)FIST/1-321 FA FIST/1-321 FA Tm/B/2-17 ACS (OPCON) Sec/1/B/1-3 ADA (Stinger) (OS) 1/B/326 Engr (OPCON) 1/1/B/311 Ml (GSR) (OS) FSE/1-321 FA CAP/TF 158 Avn2 Sec/1/D Plt/C TACPFIST/1-321 FA 1. SITUATION. a. Enemy Forces. Annex A, Intelligence. b. Friendly Forces. (1) 2d Bde air assaults from present location commencing 010500 Sep to secure assigned objectives; onorder, moves to and occupies positions to defend in sector from DR416478 to DR411560. (2) TF 2-502 air assaults from present location commencing 010600 Sep to secure assigned objectives; onorder, moves to and occupies positions to defend assigned sector. (3) TF 3-502 air assaults from present location commencing 010500 Sep to secure assigned objectives; onorder, moves to and occupies positions to defend assigned sector. (4) 1-321 FA OS to 2d Bde. c. Attachments and Detachments. (1) Task Organization. 5·28 (2) Sec/1/B/1-3 ADA, 1/B/326 Engr, 1/1/B/311 Ml attached to HHC for movement. 2. MISSION. TF 1-502 conducts air assault operations commencing 010500 Sep to secure high ground along KILLEBREW ROAD vic DR4153; on order, moves to and occupies positions to defend in sector from DR416478 to DR411560. 3. EXECUTION. a. Concept of Operation. Annex B, Operations Overlay. (1) Maneuver. TF 1-502 conducts multiple company-size air assaults from PZ X and PZ Y to separate LZs to secure designated objectives. Co A and Co B air assault simultaneously commencing 010500 Sep, with Co A to LZ A (DR413550) to secure OBJ RED (DR412551) and CoB to LZ B (DR416536) to secure OBJ WHITE (DR415536). Co C(-) follows to LZ C (DR412517) at 010537 Sep to secure OBJ BLUE (DR411519). Tm D air assaults to LZ 8 (DR425538) last to screen to the west of the TF objectives. On order, all companies move by ground to·assigned battle positions in sector. (2) Fires. Annex D, Fire Support Overlay. (a) Priority of fires initially to Co A. (b) A three minute prep will be fired on each LZ from H-5 to H-2. b. CoA: (1) Conduct air assault commencing 010500 Sep from PZ X (DR544515) to LZ A (DR413550) to secure OBJ RED (DR412551). (2) Conduct reconnaissance patrols to BP 11 and BP 17. (3) On order, move to, occupy, and retain BP 11 or BP 17. (4) On order, detach one platoon to TF control for air assault reconnaissance missions in selected areas (20 minute standby). c. CoB: (1) Conduct air assault commencing 010500 Sep from PZ X (DR544515) to LZ B (DR416536) to secure OBJ WHITE (DR415536). (2) Conduct reconnaissance patrols to BP 13. (3) On order, move to, occupy, and retain BP 13. (4) On order, detach one rifle squad with LMG to provide security for the TF CP vic DR431527. d. Co C(-): (1) Conduct air assault commencing 010537 Sep from PZ Y (DR546446) to LZ C (DR412517) to secure OBJ BLUE (DR411519). (2) Conduct reconnaissance patrol to BP 15 and BP 16. (3) On order, move to, occupy, and retain BP 15 or BP 16. 5-29 (4) On order, send contact patrol to coordination point at Line CLAW vic DR431422. e. Tm 0: (1) Conduct air assault commencing 010655 Sep from PZ Y (DR545496) to LZ 8 (DR425538) and establish screen line generally from DR402617 to DR393620. (2) Employ TOW sections in ground mounted role. (3} Establish antiarmor positions on all E-W hard surface roads. (4) Report all antiarmor positions to TF HQ NLT 011200 Sep. f. HHC: (1) Accept attachment of ADA and engineer elements for the AASLT. (2) Supervise the ADA, engineer preparation and departure at PZ Y. (3) Release attachment of ADA and engineers upon their arrival at specified LZs. (4) Be prepared to release GS mortars to TF Con on 26 minute notice. g. Tm B/101 Avn: (1) Establish laager site vic DR262334 from 291400 Aug to 011400 Sep. (2) Execute air movement. Annex C, Air Movement Table. (3) Provide air assault route security to LZ A and LZ B. (4) Be prepared to reinforce the antiarmor fires of Tm D to the west of the Tm D screen line. h. Tm/B/2-17 ACS: (1) Conduct route reconnaissance of all flight routes NLT 010445 Sep. (2) On order, screen to the west of OBJs RED, WHITE, BLUE. i. Sec/1 /B/1·3 ADA (Stinger): Protect in sequence: (1) B/101 AHB laager site vic DR262334 from 291400 to 011400 Sep. (2) Tm D vic DR285462 commencing 011400 Sep. j. 1/B/326 Engr: Priority of work: (1) Emplace road cratering demolitions at DR436412, DR342336, DR441432, DR400315, and DR386344. (2) Prepare target folders on all bridges and key intersections in sector. (3) Construct abatis at DR227314, DR362614, and DR382622. k. 1/1/B/311 Ml (GSA): OS; protect in sequence: 5·30 (1) Co A during the initial assault. (2) TF when consolidated at BP. 1. Fire Support: (1) Priority of fires initially to Co A. (2) Develop a three minute prep to be fired on each LZ from H-5 to H-2. (3) Annex D, Fire Support Overlay. m. Coordinating Instructions: (1) Report LZ status immediately upon landing. (2) Report all PZs by location and size (in numbers of aircraft) to CP N L T 012200 Sep. (3) Assume MOPP 1 NLT 010400 Sep. (4) ADA Weapons Control status: TIGHT. (5) Excess vehicles remain vicinity combat trains under control of BN XO. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. a. Annex E, Logistics. b. Annex F, Personnel and Administration. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Signal. Current CEO I in effect. b. Command. (1) Command group with Co A for the air assault. (2) Jump CP to be established with Co A vic DR413550. (3) Main CP displaces on order to DR431527. ACKNOWLEDGE CDR OFFICIAL: S3 Annexes: A-Intelligence (omitted) B -Operations Overlay C -Air Movement D-Fire Support Overlay E-OPSCHED F -Logistics (omitted) G-Personnel and Administration (omitted) 5-31 ANNEX B, OPERATIONS OVERLAY TO OPORD 4-83 (GREEN GRAPE) BEAK~--------------------------------------•BEAK NOT TO SCALED~ 1-502=2-502 3-502=1-502 I (15', .... I.,; C-8 CLAW ,-... f 17 l 3-502 =1-502 .... ,., 1-502=2-502 FEATHER 53 23 84 5-32 Annex C (Air Movement) to OPORD 4-83 (GREEN GRAP.E) 1. SITUATION. a. Enemy Forces. Annex A. Intelligence. b. Friendly Forces. Basic OPORD. c. Attachments and Detachment. Basic OPORD. 2. MISSION. TF 1-502 conducts air assault commencing 010600 Sep to secure assigned objectives. 3. EXECUTION. a. Concept of Operation. TF 1-502 air assaults from two PZs to multiple LZs via UH60. Companies will stage and load as shown in Appendix 1 (PZ Layout). Air Assaults will be from designated PZs to designated LZs as per Appendix 2 (Air Movement Table). Alternate LZs will be used if the primary LZ is occupied by enemy forces or the reconnaissance aircraft draw fire. b. B/101 AHB (OS): (1) Provide 10 operational UH60s. (2) Provide headset in AMC UH60 for AATFC to monitor operation. c. Coordinating Instructions: (1) ACL for UH60 is 11 Pax. (2) PZ marked with hand-held VS17 panel for lead aircraft in each serial. (3) Flight routes indicated at Appendix 3 (Flight Routes). (4) SEAD targets onflight route overlay at Appendix 3. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. a. RRP at DR552431. b. FARP at DR541462. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Signal. (1) PZ Control will be A/L frequency. (2) Colored smoke on LZ means NO LAND--USE ALTERNATE. b. Command. (1) AATFC will ride in AMC aircraft initially. (2) Basic OPORD. Appendixes: 1 -PZ Layout 2-Air Movement Table 3 -Flight Routes 5-33 N APPENDIX 1, ANNEX C, PZ LAYOUT, OPORD 4-83 (GREEN GRAPE) A~ ~ c c:c 0 a: NOT TO SCALE 53 21 84 5-34 LHIN-liN I T B/101 l1 I!="T I ·Ar~T 5-UH60 GND liN IT A1-502 .CARGO PAX ACl 55 PZ X PZ TIME 0500 T/0 .JLME 0505 EN ROUTE TIME 5 MIN II z A ALT ILZ 2 z iriMF br;ro R~MdRJ(C:: >"tt "tt (1) ::I Q..... :< N ,..... >.... 11 B/101 12 l'l-UH60 s1-502 II) I) X osoo 0505 I) B li b:c;1 0 ~ <(1) ~· l.n I w l.n B/101 B/101 B/101 B I b I5-UH60 15~UH60 I5-UH60 c1-5.02 AI-S02 B11-502 Iss IS5 II) I) y X X 0537 0537 .0554 O'l42 0542 0559 ' I) 5 5 lr A B 1 12 B hc:u7 b'l47 p6o4 ::I rt 1-3 Ill. 0"' t-' (1) (/l ...... M' 0 ~ ::I (1) :< 0 B/101 & 5-UH60 c... 1-502 55 y 0611 0616 5 ~ I p621 ,..... >.... 11 IR/ 1n1 B/101 ~ 18 IS-UH60 I5-UH60 A"11-1)02 B1-502 1-!T w/trl 130 1-!T w/trl 30 X X 0611 0628 0616 0633 5 5. A B 2 3 p621 P638 ~ 0 < ~ ::I M' ...... B/101 8 5-UH60 c1-502. 1-iT w/trl 30 y 0628 0633 5 c I b638 REFUEL Scouts B/101 10 5-UH60 . D1-502 20 y ,0645 0650 5 8 2A J655 REFUEL D B/101 II 5-UH60 1-502 25 y 0710 0715 5 8 2A :>720 5 gnd Tows ,...-++ l.LUl.hL UNIT LIFT ACFT UNIT ICARGO PAX ACL PZ PZ TIME T/0 TIME EN ROUTE TIHE LZ ALT LZ LZ TIME REM.I\RKS >'0 '0 (!) ::s p. t f-'• >< ,B.LlOl 12 I}-UH60 Dl-502 21) ff 0720 0725 5 Q" 2.4. 0730 5 gnd Tows N ,...... >f-'• >1 B/101 13 5-UH60 Dl-502 25 f.t 0727 0732 5 8 2A 0737 5 gnd Tows ~ 0 <(!) ~ ::s,.,. D ~ IB/ 101 14 Ir;-UHGo l-502 25 ~ 0737 07L12 5 8 2A 07l•7 5 Clnd Tows ~ .... 3 n (!) rtl B/101 15 5-UH60 Dl-502 w/trl 25 ~ 07Lf4 0749 5 8 2A 075lt '-' ,.,. 0 U1 I w CJ'I B/101 t6 5-UH60 l/3ADA l ~1ULE ~N HQ 4-F w/ ~/train t r 1 30 X 0754 0759 5 lA 2A 080!! 2-UH60 MC REFUEL 3-UH60 Cont to lift 18 5'"::s (!) >< (") ,...... 1 > f-'• B/101 17 I5-UH60 B-326 30 v 0801 0806 5 2 3 0811 >1 s B/101 18 3-UH60 l/3 ADA l-H56l 12 PAX X 0811 0816 5 1/\ 3 0821 MC REFUEL <(!) ~ ::s,.,. .._, GS 3 Mortar Section5 B/101 1<3 I5-UH60 MORT 35 y 0821 0826 5 lA B 0831 MC REFUEL PZ rx=- DR54 51 5 Y- DP. 5 5L~96 ~ \.J1 I (,.) -.....1 ~ A -DR413550 B -DR416536 C -DR412517 1 -DR425523 h 11 -nRL..'H\<;?f. 2 -DR424546 2A-DR440534 8 DR425538 > '0 '0 (!) ::l c.. f-' :< N .--.. > H :;d 6 <: ~ z 1-'3 ~ ~ tEl en '-' M" 0 > ::l ::l (!) :< n .--.. > H i :;d z 1-'3 '-' APPENDIX 3, ANNEX C, FLIGHT ROUTE OVERLAY OPORD 4-83 (GREEN GRAPE) ., t: ;:!1 C')iS ~~ 0 5 MIN C) 5 MIN 5 MIN g SEAD TGT 0 ::ua0 § ( 3 ~ ...fC40221 ~,._, _,fC4021 NOT TO SCALE NOTE: 1. SEAD MISSION BASED ON FLAK MAP 2. LZ PREP TARGETS CONTAINED IN ANNEX D (TARGET LIST) 5-38 53 22 84 ANNEX D, FIRE SUPPORT OVERLAY TO OPORD 4-83 (GREEN GRAPE) SEE APP 1 TO ANNEX D, TGT LIST FLIGHT CORRIDOR NOT TO EXCEED 500 FT (AGL) NOT TO SCALE 3-502=1-502 1-502=2-502 ~C2021 I -#C2020 -fC2017 -FC2019' ~C2018 C-B B-A -f9C2015 -fC2016 x~ ___&:c2o1a +CC2014 D)': ~· I ~ 1-502=2-502 -fC2002 53 20 84 5-39 Appendix 1 (Target List) to Annex D (Fire Support Overlay) to OPORD 4-83 (GREEN GRAPE) LIN No. TGTNo. 1 cc 2001 2 cc 2002 3 cc 2003 4 cc 2004 5 cc 2005 6 cc 2006 7 cc 2007 8 cc 2008 9 cc 2009 10 cc 2010 11 cc 2011 12 cc 2012 13 cc 2013 14 cc 2014 15 cc 2015 16 cc 2016 17 cc 2017 18 cc 2018 19 cc 2019 20 CC2020 21 cc 2021 22 cc 2022 23 cc 2023 GRID DESCRIPTION 469522 ZSU 23-4 (SEAD) 465546 SA 7 (SEAD) 442513 ZSU 57-2 (SEAD) 443528 BP 19 443565 LZ 1A 450576 ZSU 23-4 (SEAD) 448591 SA 7 (SEAD) 423512 P16 255260 LZC 422532 OBJ BLUE 436543 BP 18 432578 LZ B 432583 LZA 432593 BP 17 265900 OBJ RED 424574 OBJWHITE 410519 BP15 412565 ZSU 23-4 (SEAD) 410572 BP 13 403591 BP 17 400580 BP 12 399545 BP 14 392562 LZ 8 5-40 Annex E (OPSCHED) to OPORD 4-83 (GREEN GRAPE) Activity No. Time Unit Commence route reconnaissance with FAC aboard H-60 Tm/8/2-17 ACS AATF PZ posture on all PZs 2 H-30 Report progress on route reconnaissance 2a Tm/8/2-17 ACS 3 H-15 Tm/8/2-17 ACS Reconnaissance LZs A, 8 4 H-10 Tm/8/2-17 ACS Report LZ status of LZs A, 8 4a Tm/8/229 Atk Rendezvous at PZs X, Y 5 H-8 8/101 AH8 Lifts 1, 2 arrive at PZs X, Y 5a Co A(-). Co 8(-) Load aircraft H-5 8/101 AH8 Depart PZ 6 6a Co A(-), Co 8(-) Depart PZ 6b Tm/8/229 Depart PZ Commence prep fires on LZs A, 8; SEADs fired sequentially 6c 1-321 FA 7 H-2 8/101 AH8 Enroute Co A(-), Co 8(-) Enroute 7a 7b Tm/8/229 Atk Enroute; air assault route security 7c Tm/8/2-17 ACS Rendezvous with lead elements of AATF for terminal guidance 7d 1-321 FA Cease fire on prep 8 H-1 8/101 AH8 Enroute Co A(-), Co B(-) Enroute Sa Bb Tm/B/229 Atk Prep fires on LZs A, 8 Tm/8/2-17 ACS Reconnaissance LZ C Be 9 H-hour 8/101 AH8 Land at LZs A, 8 9a Co A(-) Land at LZ A 9b Co 8(-) Land at LZ 8 Tm/B/229 Overwatch to west 9c 5-41 No. Time Unit Activity 10 H+1 8/101 AH8 Enroute to PZs X, Y 10a Tm/8/229 Atk Enroute; air assault route security 11 H+7 8/101 AH8 Lifts 3, 4 arrive PZ X, Y 11a Tm/8/2-17 ACS Report LZ status of LZ C 11 b Co A(-), Co C(-) Load aircraft 12 H+12 8/101 AH8 Depart PZ X, Y 12a Co A(-), Co C(-) Depart PZ X, Y 12b Tm/8/229 Atk Enroute; air assault security 12c 1-321 FA Commence prep fires on LZ C; SEADs fired sequentially 13 H+15 8/101 AH8 Enroute 13a Co A(-). Co C Enroute 13b Tm/8/2-17 ACS Rendezvous with lead elements of AATF for terminal guidance to LZ C 13c Tm/8/229 Atk Enroute; air assault route security 13d 1-321 FA Cease fire on prep of PZ C 14 H+16 8/101 AH8 Enroute 14a Co A(-), Co C(-) Enroute 141:1 Trr-/8/229 Atk Prep fires on LZ C 14c Tm/8/2-17 ACS Reconnaissance LZs 8, 1A 15 H+17 8/101 AH8 Land at LZs A, C 15a Co A(-) Land at LZ A 15b CoC(-) Land at LZ C 15c Tm/8/229 Atk Overwatch to west 5-42 CHAPTER 6 AIR ASSAULT LIMITED OBJECTIVE OPERATIONS 6-1. GENERAL The AATF may be called upon to conduct air assault limited objective operations, notably the Raid and the Reconnaissance in Force. These missions may be conducted at the platoon, company, or battalion level. 6-2. THE AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCE RAID. a. Concept. The air assault raid is a swift, violent, cross·FLOT operation conducted to destroy, capture, disrupt, or deceive the enemy. It is characterized by bold execution to gain surprise and by rapid withdrawal from the objective. SCENARIO The enemy has launched a major attack in an attempt to gain control of key terrain in the division sector. The enemy attack is being supported by a logistical base approximately 50 kilometers behind the enemy FEBA. The Corps Commander has directed the formation of an AATF to conduct an air assault raid on that logistical base to destroy it and to disrupt the momentum of the enemy's attack. b. Warning Order. Because of the extraordinary planning and coordination needed to conduct a raid, a warning order must be issued as soon as possible. The warning order can be written on an overlay showing the known locations for the operation, or it can be written separately with an overlay attached. A sample warning order is shown below. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * • (classification) WARNING ORDER 3-83 (COBRA JOLT) TF 4-187 IN Reference: Map, Series V741S, Ft Campbell Special Edition, 1:50,000 Task Organization: TM A (Assault Element) CO B (Support Element) 1 /C/326 Engr(-) FIST/3-319 FA FIST/3-319 FA TM C (Security Element) co 0(-) TFCON 3/0 TF 158 Avn (OS) Sqd/1 /C/326 Engr C/2-17 CAV (OPCON) FIST/3-319 FA Set Sec 2/B/1·3 ADA (Stinger) (·) GS Mort Pit FSE/3-319 FA CAP/158 Avn TACP 1. SITUATION. Enemy forces have been attacking along the division front to seize high ground vic center town (DR421652) and Highway 94 from DR363351 to DR426615. A key logistical base supporting this attack is located at DR364618. Enemy security forces at the base are light. 2. MISSION. TF 4-187 lnf conducts an air assault raid to destroy the enemy POL transfer and storage point vic DR364618 commencing 271700S Dec. (classification) 6-1 (classification) 3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. a. Task organization effective immediately. b. AMB 261300S Dec at TF 4·187 CP (DR361402). c. TF 4-187 OPORD will be issued 261600S Dec at TF 4·187 CP (DR361402). d. All units commence operations with two days rations. e. Rehearsal will commence 270600S Dec; S3 will coordinate units and location. f. Each squad will carry four LAWS. g. Engineer platoon will draw 300 lbs of plastic explosive, 500ft of detcord, 4 non-electric blasting caps, 200ftof time fuse, and 5 igniters from the S4 at 271000S Dec. CDR AUTHENTICATION S3 (classification) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * c. Planning. The planning steps for an air assault raid are similar to those for any air assault operation; however,the planning is much more detailed, as elements of the raiding force must function independently within the area of operations, yet still be capable of supporting each other. (1) Task Organization. The AATF tailors its forces into four essential elements: Command and ControlElement, Security Element, Support Element, and Assault Element. External augmentation that the AATF may receive includes: (a) Air Cavalry Troop (OPCON or attached). (b) Aviation Battalion Task Force (DS). (c) FA Battery (DS). (d) Stinger Section (DS). (e) Engineer Platoon (DS). (f) CAP (attached). (g) FSE/FIST (attached). (h) TACP (collocated). (2) OPORD. For this operation we assume the objective is 50 km behind enemy lines and that threat airdefense systems are employed in accordance with threat doctrine. A sample OPORD and FRAGO are provided atparagraphs 6-3 and 6-4 respectively. Key features in the OPORD include: 6·2 (a) OPSCHED. 1., Prepare the OPSCHED in conjunction with the OPORD. The OPSCHED gives a detailed time schedule of events from mission receipt to mission debrief. ~ The OPSCHED should maximize time for detailed rehearsals by all elements, with rehearsal priority given to actions at the objective and during landing zone operations. (b) Contingency plans for downed helicopters, loss of communications, action upon enemy contact outside the objective area, and escape and evasion. d. Staging. This is the time for reconnaissance, rehearsal, inspection, and final coordination. (1) Reconnoiter flight routes, LZs, and objectives. (2) OPSEC in the staging area must include: sterilization of the staging area of all documents, plans or notes on the operation, and isolation of the AATF from other elements of the reserve. (3) Conduct detailed rehearsals, both day and night. Preferably, the rehearsal area will be similar to the objective area in topography and building construction. Rehearsals should focus on the following actions in order of priority: actions at the objective, actions on the LZ, actions on the PZ, immediate action drills, and contingency plans. Conduct detailed inspections of all AATF personnel and equipment. Make equipment accountability (4) and function checks. (5) Confirm communications with all AATF elements. e. Loading. (1) Consider the use of multiple PZs as follows: (a) One PZ for the security element. (b) One PZ for the support element. (c) One PZ for the assault element. (2) Timing. Helicopters arrive, load, and depart in accordance with the OPSCHED. (3) OPSEC. Radio listening silence and light discipline (during night operations) are employed. f. Air Movement. Lifts should fly a planned route from the PZ to the penetration point on the FEBA. From there, they will use terrain flight techniques on multiple routes to the release points (RP). The RPs may be distinguishable terrain features or beacons emplaced by pathfinders prior to the air assault. In this scenario, the pathfinders wiil parachute approximately 12 hours prior to execution and will emplace beacons on the RPs. From the RPs, the lifts will fly directly to the designated LZs. Fire support will include SEAD targets within available artillery range and extensive suppression along (1) the front to allow the AATF to cross enemy positions. Once across enemy positions and beyond artillery range, tactical air assets and attack helicopters will provide support. (2) False insertions can be made to deceive the enemy about the actual objective. 6·3 AIR MOVEMENT ON RAID (INSERTION) ACP ACP RP ACP 53 24 g. Landing. (1 I Use multiple LZs, if at all possible, to minimize helicopter losses and facilitate quick execution of theraid. (2) LZ Locations. The two options are: (a) Land on the objective. Factors favoring this option are: L The AATF is immediately on key terrain. ~ Greater surprise is achieved. ~ The AATF spends less time behind enemy lines, thus minimizing enemy reaction. (b) Land away from the objective. Factors favoring this option are: L Exposure to enemy fire is lessened (preserves lift assets). ~ It allows for final reconnaissance of the objective. ~ LZ availability on the objective is poor or inadequate. 1, Indirect fire support (mortars) can be established. (c) OPORD Decision: Land on the objective. h, Ground Tactical Plan. (1) Missions of Subordinate Units. These are selected reminders that should govern the actions of theAATF ground units. (a) Security Element. L Position elements to cover and seal off likely enemy avenues of approach and egress. ~ Destroy enemy vehicles and personnel upon observation or detection. ~ Emplace AT weapon systems forward and along high speed avenues of approach. !, Establish a small force to secure the LZ. §., Dispatch engineers to emplace hasty obstacles on high speed avenues of approach. 2, Secure aircraft laager sites. (b) Support Element. 6·4 1.: Position elements to provide direct fire support for the assaulting element. ~ Establish a small force to secure the LZ if it is to be used as the extraction PZ. ;L If suitable terrain is not available in the objective area, the support element may be combined with the assault element or be given a supplementary objective. (c) Assault Element. 1.: Establish a small force to secure the LZ, if it is to be used as the extraction PZ. ~ Attack the objective and destroy all enemy personnel and equipment. ;L Dispatch engineers to breach obstacles and destroy any facilities or vehicles. 1_, After securing the objective, dispatch special teams to search the dead, take POWs, and treat friendly and enemy wounded. (2) Fire Support. Two options exist. (a) If the objective is within artillery range: 1.: Artillery support can be planned in detail to complement the scheme of maneuver. ~ Artillery can assist the security element in sealing off the objective area. (b) If the objective is outside artillery range: 1.: Consider inserting artillery with the AATF behind enemy lines to provide the required support. ~ Consider using mortars, air cavalry, attack helicopters, and/or tactical air in lieu of artillery. (c) Attack helicopters and air cavalry can destroy point targets within the objective area and assist the security elements in destroying enemy vehicles and personnel. (d) OPORD decision. Rely on mortars, air cavalry, and attack helicopters in the objective area. (3) Laager Locations. Consider using a laager site if the terrain and enemy situation permit. Although it is not desirable, the helicopters may have to orbit while waiting, but if they do, the time in minutes becomes critical. A security force may be established at the laager site(s), or the air cavalry may provide laager security, or the AATF may use no physical security at these sites, relying instead on surprise. The degree of security provided by the air cavalry will be limited to ·early warning from a screen. (4) Resupply. Normally, the raid force carries all supplies and equipment necessary to accomplish the mission. Consider that the aircraft may need refueling and rearming to make the return trip. (5) Withdrawal. (a) Air extraction should use multiple routes different from the insertion routes. (b) SEAD missions will be planned along the flight routes and for crossing the line of contact (LC). (c) Pathfinders may plant a beacon at the penetration point to direct flights through enemy front lines. 6-5 (d) Ground Infiltration. Unanticipated enemy reinforcements may negate extraction by helicopters. Consider: !, Establishing escape routes and rally points. l, Breaking contact, moving to alternate PZs, and extracting. AIR MOVEMENT ON RAID (EXTRACTION) MULTIPLE FLT ROUTES SP ACP SP RP ACP 53 25 84 6·6 6-3. FRAGO. (classification) FRAGO 3-83 (COBRA JOLT) Reference: Map, Series V741 S Ft Campbell Special Edition, 1 :50,000 Time Zone: SIERRA Change to Task Organization: None 1. SITUATION. Enemy is attacking. A key logistical base has been identified at DR364618. 2. MISSION. TF 4-187 conducts air assault raid commencing 271700 Dec to destroy enemy POL transfer and storage point vic DR364618. 3. MISSIONS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. a. TmA: (1) Provide assault element. (2) Air assault and secure OBJ STONE (DR364618). (3) Destroy all POL equipment and storage facilities on objective. (4) Insertion LZ will be extraction PZ. (5) Occupy assembly area A upon return and conduct reconstitution operations. Be prepared for future operations within 24 hours. b. CoB: (1) Provide support element. (2) Air assault and secure OBJ ROCK (DR385620). (3) On order, provide supporting fires on OBJ STONE (DR364618). (4) On order, assume assault element mission. (5) Insertion LZ will be extraction PZ. (6) Occupy assembly area B upon return and conduct reconstitution operations. Be prepared for future operations within 24 hours. c. TmC: (1) Provide security element. (2) Air assault and establish blocking positions PEBBLE (DR364620) and BOULDER (DR374620). (classification) 6-7 (classification) (3) Insertion LZ will be extraction PZ. (4) Occupy assembly area C upon return and conduct reconstitution operations. Be prepared for future operations within 24 hours. d. Co DH: Remain at present location. e. TF 158 Avn: (1) Execute air movement in accordance with Annex C. (2) Provide air assault route security for TF insertion and extraction. (3) On order, suppress enemy in vicinity of objective area. (4) Laager aircraft vicinity LZs. Be prepared for extraction from insertion LZs with 30 minute warning. f. C/2-17 CAV: (1) Recon flight routes, LZs, and objective area. (2) Provide screen of objective area once insertion is complete. (3) Screen aircraft laager sites to prevent compromise of aircraft location. g. GS Mort Pit: GS, initial location vic DR437611. h. Coordinating Instructions: (1) All ground vehicles remain at present location. (2) XO in charge of rear echelon. (3) Report objective secured. (4) Report extraction complete. (5) Report capability for future operations. (6) Downed A/C per AMB. (7) E&E Plan per AMB. (8) Annex 8, Operation Overlay. (9) Annex C, Air Movement. ACKNOWLEDGE CDR OFFICIAL: S3 Annexes: A -Intelligence B-Operations Overlay (Same as OPORD) C-Air Movement Table (Same as OPORD) (classification) 6·8 6-4. OPORD. (classification) Copy No 1 of 1 Copies TF 4-187 In DR361402 GS47 OPORD 3-83 (COBRA JOLT) Reference: Map Series V741 S, Ft Campbell, Special Edition, 1:50,000 Time Zone: SIERRA Task Organization: TF CON 1 /C/326 Engr (-) TF 158 Avn (OS) FIST/3-319 FA C/2-17 CAV (OPCON) Set Sec GS Mort Pit 2/B/1-3 ADA (Stinger) (-) FSE/3-319 FA CAP FIST/3-319 FA TACP 3/D Sqd/1 /C/326 Engr FIST/3-319 FA 1. SITUATION. a. Enemy Forces. Annex A, Intelligence. b. Friendly Forces. (1) TF 1-39 AR defends along PL JANE from DR486512 to DR499553. (2) TF 1-13 Mech defends along PL PINK from DR479586 to DR499536. (3) Elements of the 9th USAF provide CAS to TF 4-187 lnf. c. Attachments and Detachments. Task Organization. 2. MISSION. TF 4-187 conducts air assault raid commencing 271700 Dec to destroy enemy POL transfer and storage point vic DR364618. (classification) 6-9 (classification) 3. EXECUTION. a. Concept of Operation. Annex B, Operations Overlay. (1) MANEUVER. This operation will be conducted in two phases: (a) Phase I. TF 4-187 air assaults behind enemy lines to destroy enemy POL transfer and storage facilities. Tm A (assault element) air assaults and secures OBJ STONE (DR364618); destroys all POL equipment and storage facilities. Co B (support element) air assaults and secures OBJ ROCK (DR385620) and provides supporting fires on OBJ STONE (DR364618). Tm C (security element) air assaults and establishes blocking positions PEBBLE (DR354620) and BOULDER (DR374620). C/2-17 CAV screens entire objective area. Annex C, Air Movement. (b) Phase II. TF 4-187 secures extraction PZs, conducts air assault to assembly areas in division rear area, reconstitutes, and prepares to conduct air assault operations within 24 hours. (2) Fl RES. Annex D, Fire Support Overlay. (a) SEAD and extensive suppression on the FEBA will be fired by Corps Artillery to allow TF to cross enemy positions. (b) Once outside available artillery range, TAC AIR and TF air assets will be used. (c) Priority of fires will be to Co A. (d) Prep fires by C/229 Atk Hel will be fired from H-15 to H-1 to suppress LZs. b. TmA: (1) Phase I. (a) Assault element of the AATF. (b) Air assault from PZ Amber (DR874613) to LZ 1 (DR365618). (c) Secure OBJ STONE (DR364618). (d) Destroy all facilities/equipment on objective. (e) Accept attachment of scout section and one stinger section for air assault. (2) Phase II. (a) Air assault from PZ 1 (DR365618) to LZ Amber (DR874613). (b) Accept attachment of scout section and one stinger section for extraction. (c) Occupy assembly area A, reconstitute, and prepare for air assault operations within 24 hours. c. CoB: (1) Phase I. (classification) 6-10 (classification) (a) Support element of the AATF. (b) Air assault from PZ Blue (DR862710) to LZ 2 (DR394620). (c) Accept attachment of GS mortars for air assault. (d) Secure OBJ ROCK (DR385620). (e) Provide supporting fires on OBJ STONE (DR364618). (2) Phase II. (a) Air assault from PZ 2 (DR394620) to LZ Blue (DR862710). (b) Accept attachment of GS mortars for extraction. (c) Occupy assembly area B, reconstitute, and prepare for air assault operations within 24 hours. d. TmC: (1) Phase I. (a) TF security element. (b) Air assault from PZ CLEAR to LZs 3 and 4. (c) Accept attachment of one stinger section for air assault. (d) Establish blocking positions PEBBLE (DR354620) and BOULDER (DR374620). (2) Phase II. (a) Air assault from PZs 3 and 4 to LZ Clear. (b) Occupy assembly area C, reconstitute, and prepare for air assault operations within 24 hours. e. CO 0(-): Remain at present location. f. TF 158 Avn: (1) Phase I. (a) Execute air movement in accordance with Annex C. (b) Provide air assault route security for TF insertion. (c) On order, suppress enemy in vicinity of LZs and objective area. (d) Attack helicopters provide overwatch on high speed avenues of approach. (e) Provide AMC. (classification) 6-11 (classification) (2) Phase II. (a) Provide air assault route security for extraction. (b) On order, suppress enemy vicinity PZs 1, 2, 3, 4. (c) Provide AMC. g. C/2-17 CAV: (1) Recon flight routes, LZs, and objective area. (2) Provide 360 degree screen of objective area upon completion of TF insertion. h. Scout Sec: (1) Attached to Tm A for air assault from PZ Amber to LZ 1. (2) Provide security for TF CP (DR437611 ). (3) Provide courier service on order. i. 2/B/1-3 ADA (Stinger)(-): (1) Attach one section each to Tm A and Tm C for air assault from PZ AMBER and PZ CLEAR to LZ 1 and LZ 3. (2) Protect units on STONE, PEBBLE, and BOULDER. j. GS Mort Pit: (1) Attached to Co B for air assault from PZ BLUE to LZ 2. (2) Initial location vic DR437611. k. Coordinating Instructions: (1) All ground vehicles will remain with rear echelon. (2) Rear echelon under the control of the XO. (3) Assemble in PZ 30 minutes prior to PZ lift-off. (4) Report when objective and blocking positions are secured. (5) Report when extraction from objective area is complete. (6) Downed aircraft procedures per AMB. (7) Escape a"ld Evasion plan per AMB. (classification) 6-12 (classification) (8) MOPP 1 in effect. (9) ADA weapon status: TIGHT. (10) Annex F. OPSCHED. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. a. Annex F, Logistics. b. Annex G, Administration. 5. COMMAND and SIGNAL a. Signal: (1) Current CEO I in effect. (2) Retrans site established vic DR283338, NLT 271200. b. Command. (1) AATFC air assaults with Tm A. (2) TAC CP to be established vic DR437611. (3) Main CP remains vicinity current position (DR123456). ACKNOWLEDGE CDR OFFICIAL: S3 Annexes: A-Intelligence (omitted) B-Operations Overlay C-Air Movement Table D-Fire Support Overlay E-OPSCHED (omitted) F-Logistics (omitted) G-Administration (omitted) (classification) 6-13 (classification) Appendix 1 (Target List) to Annex D (Fire Support Overlay) to OPORD 3-83 (COBRA JOLT) LIN NO. TGT NO. DESCRIPTION REMARKS 1 CC3001 zsu 23-4 SEAD 2 CC3002 SA 7 SEAD 3 CC3003 zsu 57-2 SEAD 4 CC3004 OBJ ROCK GS Mortar 5 CC3005 Brigade GS Mortar 6 CC3006 OBJ STONE GS Mortar 7 CC3007 Road Junction GS Mortar (classification) 6-14 6-5. THE AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCE RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE. a. Concept. The AATF may conduct a Reconnaissance in Force (RIF) to locate and gain intelligence on the enemy force. Execution of the RIF is similar to a deliberate attack, with zones of action or areas of operation being assigned to subordinate elements. Once contact with the enemy is made, the AATF either exploits identified enemy weaknesses or withdraws. The mission of the R IF is to gather intelligence on enemy forces, not to become decisively engaged. The RIF may be conducted at the platoon, company, or battalion level. SCENARIO The AATF, as Corps reserve, is in an assembly area. The Corps Commander has indications that enemy light infantry forces in the rugged terrain to the west may be massing for an attack on the Corps flank. b. Warning Order. This order is issued promptly to initiate planning and troop loading procedures. A sample warning order is shown below. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * (classification) WARNING ORDER 4-83 (EAGLE SEARCH) TF 1-327 IN Reference: Map, Series V741 S, Ft Campbell Special Edition, 1 :50,000 Task Organization: FIST/2-320 FA FIST/2-320 FA TF 229 Avn (OS) A/2-17 CAV (OPCON) A/2-320 FA (OPCON) Sec/2/B/1-3 ADA (STINGER) 1/A/326 Engr (OPCON) CoD(-) GS Mortar Pit Scout Section FIST/2-320 FA FSE/2-320 FA CAP/TF 229 Avn TCAP 1. SITUATION: An estimated regimental-size dismounted enemy force has been reported vic the rugged terrain west of the 30 NS grid line vic DR2951 and DR2849. 2. MISSION: TF 1-327 lnf conducts an air assault reconnaissance in force in assigned zone commencing 260800S Sep. 3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. a. Task organization effective 2511005 Sep. b. AMB 251800S Sep at TF 1-327 CP. c. TF 1-327 OPORD will be issued 251600S Sep at the TF 1-327 CP. d. Company A, B, and C commanders report PZ locations to S3 NLT 261400S Sep. (classification) 6-15 (classification) e. Company D remains at present location. CDR AUTHENTICATION (classification) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * c. Planning. (1) Task Organization. External augmentation that the AATF may receive includes: (a) Air Cavalry Troop (OS). (b) Avn Battalion TF (-) (OS). 1 AH Company. ~ ATK Company. ~ ASH Platoon. (c) FA Battery (OPCON). (d) Stinger Section (attached). (e) FSE/F1ST (attached). (f) T ACP (collocated). (g) CAP. (2) OPORD. A sample OPORD and FRAGO are at paragraph 6-6 and paragraph 6-7 respectively. Key features in the OPORD include: (a) Selection of Objectives. March objectives are used to control the movement of forces. Higherheadquarters may assign either march objectives or a zone reconnaissance. If a zone reconnaissance is assigned, the AATFCwill assign his own march objectives which will be key terrain features of such importance that enemy forces in the areawill be forced to react. (b) Zones of Action. These control features delineate fire control and maneuver responsibilities. (c) Control of Lift Assets. The control of lift assets will normally be retained by the AATFC. (d) Control of Nonorganic Reconnaissance Assets. Control of these assets is normally retained by theAATFC. d. Staging. Normally, staging will be the same as in the air assault with the following areas receiving increasedemphasis: (1) Selection of LZs. Because of the vague enemy situation and the possible need for immediate reinforcement by air, a larger number of LZs, located throughout the zone of action, are selected. 6-16 (2) Immediate actions upon landing must be rehearsed in detail, as well as those for withdrawal under enemy fire. e. Loading. These activities are similar to those of the air assault raid. f. Air Movement. Air movement is identical to that of the air assault; however, because of the vague enemy situation, the use of air cavalry to reconnoiter flight routes and LZs requires additional emphasis. g. Landing. (1) Actions on landing are identical to those of the air assault. (2) Multiple LZs are preferred over a single LZ in order to minimize congestion and confusion. (3) LZs are normally selected beyond the observed fire range of the objectives or other areas of suspected enemy activity. h. Ground Tactical Operations. There are three major elements in most A IF operations; the maneuver force(s). the reserve, and the fire support element. These will be discussed in the normal sequence of their insertion into the objective area. (1) Fire Support Element. (a) When the AIF is conducted within range of the brigade's field artillery assets, the AATFC's job is simplified. However, in AIF operations, the AATF often operates beyond the range of the 106mm OS battalion. In these instances, a 105mm battery may be placed OPCON to and air assault with the AATF. The AATFC then becomes responsible for moving and securing the battery. One of the rifle companies will normally be detailed as the battery security force. (b) The first unit into the zone of action is the security force for the artillery battery. The fires covering its insertion are usually provided by attack helicopters and whatever artillery assets are within range. Its objective is located on defensible terrain with a good LZ and a suitable site for the artillery battery. Ridgelines and hilltops often fit these criteria. (c) Once the security force has cleared the objective, the artillery battery is inserted. Prime movers are unnecessary unless ground displacement is planned for succeeding moves; however, insertion of a single prime mover permits short moves and ammunition hauling. Once the artillery is in position, augmented with the GS mortar platoon, the objective is termed a Fire Support Base (FSB). (NOTE: If TACFIRE is used-another M561 Gama Goat, loaded with the BCS must be inserted along with the one prime mover.) (d) The FSB is a good location for the TOC and any logistical support which must be close to the line units. Helicopters will not laager on the FSB due to the proximity of artillery and lack of space for dispersion. (2) Maneuver Force. The maneuver forces of the AATF, normally consisting of from one to three rifle companies, begin their operations after the essential elements have been inserted into the FSB. (a) Securing the Objective. The maneuver forces will normally land beyond the observed fire range of their objectives and other suspected enemy locations. After consolidating, each force moves to and secures its objective. A common pattern for this phase of the operation is for the unit to move to a defensible piece of terrain within its objective area, establish a perimeter defense, and dispatch reconnaissance patrols to find the enemy. A unit can clear a point objective, such as a bridge, within a few hours; on the other hand, an objective covering several square kilometers may take several days to clear. 6-17 (b) Objective Cleared, Unit Not in Contact. Once the unit commander is convinced that there is no significant enemy activity on or near his objective, he will report this information to the AATFC, who may then: !, Order the unit to proceed to the next objective by air or ground. ~ Hold the unit in position for use as the AATF reserve. (c) Action on Contact. When contact with the enemy is made, the AATFC has three options: 1.: He may order the unit in contact to develop the situation if additional intelligence is necessary. In addition to gaining a clearer picture of the enemy force, developing the situation may cause the enemy to: !: Commit his reserves. Q, Compromise his fire support means, necessitating their displacement. ~ He may reinforce the unit in contact with additional assets, in order to further develop the situation. If only light resistance is met and the unit in contact has not committed its entire force, the unit will probably receive only an increased priority for the battalion's fire support and reconnaissance means (priority of fires, attack helicopters, tactical air missions). If heavy resistance is met and the AATFC desires to develop the situation or to exploit an identified enemy weakness, additional ground forces may be committed. During a RIF, the majority of the AATF will not normally be committed to contact without the concurrence of the higher headquarters. ~ If the AATFC determines that the mission requirements have been satisfied or that the enemy force is too powerful, he may order the unit in contact to withdraw. The unit in contact will normally conduct a delay back to a PZ masked from enemy observation, and then be extracted by air. The extraction is normally covered by commitment of most or all of the AATF's fire support means. In some instances, it may be necessary to commit additional ground forces to assist in the withdrawal, but this technique is used only when absolutely necessary. (3) Reserve. (a) The AATFC will normally retain one company in reserve. The responsibility for the reserve can be rotated to different companies as they secure their objectives. The reserve company should normally be capable of achieving PZ posture within 30 minutes of alert, but it should not be held directly on an obvious PZ. (b) A solution to the problem of where to laager the assault helicopters is to site them with the reserve company. This improves reaction time and provides security for the helicopters. (c) The company securing the FSB should not be designated as the primary reserve force because, if it is committed, the FSB would be left unsecured. (d) Prior to being committed, the commander of the reserve company must be given the following information. !, General situation. ~ Identified enemy locations, strengths, and dispositions. ~ Locations of friendly units. ~ Method of attack. §: If he is to reinforce another unit, a point on the ground where he can link up with a guide from the unit in contact. 6·18 (e) The AATFC will immediately reconstitute his reserve. Priorities are: 1 An uncommitted rifle company. b Any other uncommitted force. (f) The attack helicopter company provides an excellent reserve. i. Resupply. (1) A vague enemy situation demands a secure resupply base within reasonable flight time of the deployed units. The brigade support area normally meets these criteria and the majority of the AATF logistical assets should be centralized there. The AATF combat trains will normally be located on the FSB. Although the presence of the FSB allows a larger than normal combat trains operation, there is neither the necessary space nor security for an extensive logistics site. (2) Prepackaged aerial resupply loads of ammunition, POL, and rations should be located in both the field and combat trains. 6·19 6-6. OPORD. (classification) Copy No. 1 of 1 Copies TF 1-327 lnf DR546512 251200S Sep CK24 OPORD 4-83 (EAGLE SEARCH) Reference: Map, Series V741 S, Ft Campbell Special Edition, 1:50,000 Time Zone: SIERRA Task Organization: FIST/2-320 FA FIST/2-320 FA TF 229 Avn (DS) A/2-17 CAV (OPCON) A/2-320 FA (OPCON) Sec/2/B/1-3 ADA (STINGER) 1IA/326 Engr (OPCON) GS Mortar Pit Scout Sec FSE/2-320 FA FIST/2-320 FA CAP/TF 229 Avn TCAP 1. SITUATION. a. Enemy Forces: Annex A, Intelligence. b. Friendly Forces: (1) X Corps attacks to seize HOPKINSVILLE; on order, continues attack. (2) 1st AD continues attack to the north to seize PEE DEE. (3) X Corps artillery GS. c. Attachments and Detachments: Task Organization. 2. MISSION. TF 1-327 conducts air assault reconnaissance in force in assigned zone commencing 260800 Sep. 3. EXECUTION. a. Concept of Operation: Annex B, Operations Overlay. (1) Maneuver. This operation will be conducted in three phases: (classification) 6-20 (classification) (a) Phase I. TF 1-327 conducts air assault operations to establish fire support base. Commencing 260800 Sep, Co C air assaults to LZ 2 (DR298516) to secure OBJ Z (DR300612). On order, A/2-320 FA air assaults to LZ 2 and establishes fire support base (FSB) Eagle to provide supporting fires. (b) Phase II. On order, Co C(-) air assaults to LZ 5 (DR289508) to secure OBJ Y (DR290504) for helicopter laager site and assumes TF reserve. One Pit of Co C attached to A/2-320 FA to provide security for the FSB. (c) Phase Ill. TF 1-327 conducts air assault reconnaissance in force with alternating air assaults by Co B and Co A. On order, Co B air assaults to LZ 1 (DR289506) to secure OBJ B1 (DR298622). Co A follows with air assault to LZ 3 (DR318510) to secure OBJ A1 (DR315520). On order, CoB air assaults to LZ 8 (DR300525) to secure OBJ B2 (DR300535), followed by Co A which air assaults to LZ 9 (DR314536) to secure OBJ A2 (DR310534). On order, Co B continues with air assault to LZ 6 (DR279540) to secure OBJ B3 (DR297550) and Co A air assaults to LZ 13 (DR497552) to secure OBJ A3 (OR507552). Annex C, Air Movement. (2) Fires. Annex 0, Fire Support Overlay. Priority of fires during Phase I to Co C, during Phase II, to Co C(-); during Phase Ill initially to CoB and then to unit in contact. b. CoA: (1) On order, conduct air assault from PZ 1 (DR410420) to LZ 3 (DR318510) to secure OBJ A1 (DR315520). (2) On order, conduct air assault to LZ 9 (DR314536) to secure OBJ A2 (DR310534). (3) On order, conduct air assault to LZ 13 (DR497552) to secure OBJ A3 (DR507652). (4) Be prepared to reinforce Co B. c. CoB: (1) TF reserve during Phases I and II. (2) On order, conduct air assault from PZ 1 (DR410420) to LZ 1 (DR289506) to secure OBJ 81 (DR298522). (3) On order, conduct air assault to LZ 8 (DR300525) to secure OBJ B2 (DR300635). (4) On order, conduct air assault to LZ 6 (DR297540) to secure OBJ 83 (DR297660). (5) Be prepared to reinforce Co A. d. CoC: (1) On order, conduct air assault from PZ 1 (DR410420) to LZ 2 (DR298616) to secure OBJ Z (DR300512). (2) On order, detach one platoon to A/2-320 FA to provide security for FSB Eagle. (3) On order, air assault to LZ 5 (DR289508) to secure OBJ Y (DR290604) for aircraft laager site and assume TF reserve. (classification) 6-21 (classification) (4) TF reserve, be prepared to reinforce or assume mission of Co A or Co B. e. A/2-320 FA: On order, air assault to LZ 2 and establish FSB Eagle. Be prepared to accept attachment of one platoon from Co C. f. 1/A/326 Engr: GS, priority survivability, countermobility, and mobility at FSB Eagle. g. A/2-17 CAV (OS): Conduct zone reconnaissance commencing H-1 hour, with priority to LZ 2, LZ 5, OBJ Y, and OBJ Z, in that priority. h. Sec/2/B/1-3 ADA (Stinger): Protect laager site at OBJ Y (DR290504). Be prepared to provide air defense for the Fire Support Base at OBJ Z (DR300512) and PZ 1 (DR410420) in that priority on order. i. TF 229 Avn: (1) Execute air movement in accordance with Annex C. (2) Establish laager site vic OBJ Y (DR290504) after completion of Phase II. (3) Be prepared to reinforce AATF with aerial fires. (4) Be prepared to conduct MEDEVAC operations. j. GSR Pit: (1) GS, on order, air assault to FSB Eagle. (2) Provide surveillance on OBJ Z to the north. k. Coordinating Instructions: (1) Report and maintain contact with all enemy forces. (2) Movement to subsequent objectives may be by foot. (3) No MOPP in effect. CDE will be carried. (4) ADA weapon control status: TIGHT. (5) Annex E OPSCHED. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT: a. Vehicles not deploying will remain with field trains. b. Field trains remain in present location. c. Combat trains displace on order to FSB Eagle. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: a. Signal: (classification) 6-22 (classification) (1) Current CEO I in effect. (2) Retrans displace on order to FSB Eagle. b. Command: (1) Command group airborne through Phase II; inserts with Co B during Phase Ill. (2) On order, Jump CP air assaults to FSB Eagle. (3) Main CP displaces on order. ACKNOWLEDGE CDR OFFICIAL: S3 Annexes: A-Intelligence (omitted) B -Operations Overlay (omitted) C-Air Movement Table (omitted) D -Fire Support Overlay (omitted) E-OPSCHED (omitted) F -OPSEC (omitted) G-Logistics (omitted) H -Administration (omitted) (classification) 6·23 (classification) Appendix 1 (Target List) to Annex D (Fire Support Overlay) to OPORD 4·83 (EAGLE SEARCH) LINE NO. TGT NO. 1 CA2001 2 CA2002 3 CA2003 4 CA2004 5 CA2005 6 CA2006 7 CA2007 8 CA2008 9 CA2009 10 CA2010 11 CA2011 12 CA2012 13 CA2013 14 CA2014 15 CA2015 16 CA2016 17 CA2017 18 CA2018 19 CA2019 20 CA2020 21 CA2021 22 CA2022 23 CA2023 24 CA2024 25 CA2025 26 CA2026 27 CA2027 28 CA2028 29 CA2029 30 CA2030 GRID DESCRIPTION 412226 Recon Pit 449208 SA 7 (SEAD) 452215 ZSU 23·4 (SEAD) 430230 ZSU 57·2 (SEAD) 441231 SA 7 (SEAD) 461232 Road Junction 289508 LZ 5 290504 OBJY 429241 ZSU 23-4 (SEAD) 402435 SA 7 (SEAD) 454247 COP 403265 Bridge 289516 LZ 2 445256 LZ4 318510 LZ3 315550 OBJ A1 289506 LZ 1 289522 OBJ B1 310534 OBJA2 314536 LZ9 402285 122mm Btry 297540 LZ6 300535 OBJ B2 300525 LZ 8 439289 LZ 10 497552 LZ 13 507552 OBJ A3 465282 LZ 12 460288 LZ 11 297550 OBJ B3 (classification) 6·24 6-7. FRAGO. (classification) FRAGO 4-83 (EAGLE SEARCH) Reference: Map, Series V741S, Ft Campbell Special Edition, 1:50,000 Time Zone: SIERRA Changes to Task Organization: None 1. SITUATION. An estimated regimental-size dismounted enemy force has been reported vic DR2951 and DR2849. The enemy is believed to be disorganized and dispersed throughout the area, but may constitute a significant. threat to the 1st AD's western flank. 2. MISSION: TF 1-327 conducts air assault reconnaissance in force in assigned zone commencing 260800 Sep. 3. MISSIONS TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS. a. Co A: On order, air assault to LZ 3 to secure OBJ A 1 (DR315520). On order, air assault to LZ 9 to secure OBJ A2 (DR310534). On order, air assault to LZ 13 to secure OBJ A3 (DR507552). Be prepared to reinforce Co B. b. Co B: Initially AATF reserve; on order, air assault to LZ 1 to secure OBJ B1 (DR298522). On order, air assault to LZ 8 to secure OBJ B2 (DR300535). On order, air assault to LZ 6 to secure OBJ B3 (DR297550). Be prepared to· reinforce Co A. c. Co C: Air assault commencing 260800 Sep to secure OBJ Z (DR300612). Secure FSB Eagle. Be prepared to attach one platoon to A/2-320 FA. On order, air assault to LZ 5 to secure OBJ Y for aircraft laager site. Assume TF reserve. Be prepared to reinforce or assume the mission of Co A or B. d. A/2-320 FA. On order, air assault to LZ 2 and establish FSB Eagle. Be prepared to accept attachment of one platoon of Co C. e. 1/A/326 Engr. GS, priority survivability, countermobility, and mobility at FSB Eagle. f. Sec/2/B/1-3 ADA (Stinger): Protect in priority: laager site, fire support base, and PZ 1 (DR410420). g. TF 229 Avn: See Air Movement Table. h. GSA Pit: GS, or order, air assault to FSB Eagle. i. Coordinating Instructions: (1) Report and maintain contact with all enemy forces. (2) Movement to subsequent objectives may be by foot. (3) No MOPP in effect. CDE will be carried. (4) ADA weapon control status: TIGHT. (5) Combat trains displace on order to FSB Eagle. (classification) 6-25 (classification) ACKNOWLEDGE CDR OFFICIAL: Annexes: A-Operations Overlay (same as OPORD) B-Air Movement Table (same as OPORD) C-Fire Support Overlay (classification) 6-26 6·8. THE AIR ASSAULT COMPANY TEAM. a. Task Organization. The air assault company team consists of a rifle company and supporting aviation assets. Typically, the aviation assets will include two aeroscout weapons teams (2 OH58s, 2 AH1s) from the air cavalry squadron or the attack battalion, two attack teams (4 OH58s, 4 AH1s) from the attack battalion, and five to seven UH60A assault helicopters from the aviation task force. In addition to the aviation assets, the company team may also be tailored to include engineer, artillery, and air defense assets as dictated by mission requirements. This mixture of combat and combat support elements enables the air assault company team to accomplish a wide variety of missions including the raid and the reconnaissance in force. b. Command and Control. Command of the company team is the responsibility of the rifle company commander. The AMC is responsible to the team commander for the flight to the LZ and control of all aviation assets in the flight. The decision to land the company team is a joint decision between the AMC and the rifle company commander with the rifle company commander retaining the final authority to land, abort, or use an alternate plan. c. Employment. The air assault company team provides one of the division's fundamental fighting units in cross·FEBA and counterattack operations. d. Cover and Deception. Its tactical mobility makes the air assault company team an ideal force to conduct cover and deception operations. The objective of a cover and deception operation is to confuse the enemy commander about the friendly unit's intentions. One technique for this is the use of false insertions. 6·9. THE AIR ASSAULT PLATOON TEAM. a. Task Organization. The air assault platoon team is a further refinement of the air assault company team. Air assets are allocated from the brigade, and may include one aeroscout weapons team (1 OH58, 1 AH1) from the air cavalry squadron or attack battalion, two attack escorts (2 AH1 s) and two or three assault helicopters (UH60As). The platoon may or may not receive external assets, depending on the mission and the assets available. b. Command and Control. Command and control of the air assault platoon team is the same as for the company team, discussed in paragraph 6·8b. c. Employment. The AATFC conducts a detailed analysis ofthe factors of METT with emphasis on the following: (1) Vulnerability to air defense systems. The destruction of enroute air defense sites is a typical mission for the air assault platoon team. Such attacks will further enhance surprise, confuse the enemy, and reduce aircraft vulnerability during AATF operations. (2) Relative Combat Power. In offensive operations, the platoon team should be employed for deep, precision-type raids of short duration, typically of one hour ground time or less. Missions for the platoon team may include the destruction of enemy command, control and communications centers, supply facilities, ammunition and POL storage facilities, transportation networks, air defense sites, and other soft targets. Properly configured, it could be used for quick hitting ambushes and countermobility tasks in defensive or delay operations. The platoon team can be used effectively to man strong points, to cover obstacles, and to attack the enemy in his flank or rear. d. Cover and Deception. Platoon team operations conducted at night make excellent cover and deception operations. The platoon team is the ideal unit to conduct deception operations in support of the company team and the AATF. 6·27 ' CHAPTER 7 AIR ASSAULT ATTACK/LINKUP 7-1. GENERAL The air assault attack is the basic offensive operation conducted by an air assault battalion. The key to success in this or any other air assault operation is the successful integration of the combat, combat support, and combat service support elements in a well planned, coordinated, and executed air movement and ground operation. To accomplish this, the AATF air assaults to a landing zone, secures an objective, establishes a strong point or perimeter defense to protect the objective from enemy forces, and links up with an advancing friendly force. Normally, objectives for this type operation are terrain features or enemy facilities that must be controlled to facilitate the attack of a larger force. Examples of these objectives include bridges, mountain passes, terrain that dominates LOC's, airfields, dams, fording sites, and road junctions. In some instances, the AATF could receive additional combat and combat support elements and be given the mission to secure and defend an airhead. Such a mission would indicate a longer waiting period before linkup, and might require the AATF to be self-sustaining for that period. SCENARIO The enemy force is withdrawing in disarray. Corps has begun the exploitation phase of the operation. The AATF is given the mission to attack and secure key terrain in the enemy rear and conduct linkup operations with a friendly heavy force moving overland. The AATF will secure three key road junctions ahead of this attacking heavy force. 7-2. PLANNING. a. Reverse Planning Sequence. Once the mission has been received from the brigade, the AATFC must commence planning immediately. The use of what is known as the reverse planning sequence will facilitate a logical approach to mission accomplishment. b. Task Organization. The AATF may receive assets that normally are reserved at brigade level. The AATFC will need air cavalry and attack helicopter elements enroute to, and on the objective, until artillery fires become available. The AATF normally receives the following assets: (1) Air Cavalry Team (OPCON). (2) Aviation Company Team (DS). (a) AH Company. (b) ATK Helicopter Team. (c) ASH Platoon. (3) Field Artillery Battery (attached). (4) Stinger Section (attached). (5) Engineer Platoon (attached). (6) GSR Squad (attached). (7) FSE/FIST (attached). (8) CAP (attached). (9) TACP (collocated). c. Warning Order. The warning order is issued almost immediately after receipt of the order from the brigade. The warning order can be written or oral. If the order is written, the necessary information may be included on an overlay, or may be issued separately with an attached overlay. 7-1 (Classification) WARNING ORDER 5-83 (BOLD JUMP) TF 3-187 IN Reference: Map, Series V741 S, Ft Campbell Special Edition, 1 :50,000 Task Organization: TmA Tm B TmC 1/D 2/D 3/D SEC/MORT SEC/MORT SEC/MORT FIST/3-319 FA FIST/3-319 FIST/3-319 FA TF CON TM C/2-17 Cav (OPCON) TM B/158 AH (DS) C/3-319 FA SCT SEC MORT PLT (-) Sec/1 /B/1-3 ADA (Stinger) 1 /C/326 Engr 2/3/B/311 Ml (GSA) FSE/3-319 FA CAP/TF 158 Avn TACP 1. SITUATION. Enemy forces are disorganized and withdrawing to the east. Enemy supply lines have been destroyed by heavy air bombing. 2. MISSION. TF 3-187 Infantry air assaults commencing 090530S Mar to attack and secure three road junctions vic DR221613, DR282641, and DR313592; conducts linkup operations with advancing elements of 2d Armored Division. 3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. a. Task Organization effective 080001 S Mar. c. d. All units will commence operations with three days of rations. b_ AMB at 080900S Mar at TF 3-187 CP (DR114612). TF 3-187 OPORD will be issued at 081300S Mar at TF 3-187 CP (DR114612). CDR AUTHENTICATION S3 (classification) 7-2 OPORD. The FRAGO and OPORD at paragraphs 7-9 and 7-10, respectively, are provided as examples. d. Depending on available planning time, the AATFC may use either means to communicate the mission to subordinate units. For this operation, we have portrayed the AATF objective to be 15 kilometers behind the line of contact. Key features in this OPORD include: (1) Selection of Restrictive Fire Line (R F L). The RF L is the primary fire control measure used by the AATF and must be planned and closely coordinated prior to the operation. It is normally established on identifiable terrain by the common commander of the converging forces. (2) Selection of Linkup Points. Linkup points should be mutually agreed upon points on the ground at which linkup forces expect to make initial physical contact. These points should be easily identifiable terrain features, and may be adjusted after the operation begins. (3) Additional Control Measures. Checkpoints, phase lines, zones of action, and axes of advance must be considered and may be used as necessary. (4) Recognition System. A system for long and short range recognition must be devised. The long-range recognition system should employ visual signals such as panels, flags, smoke, pyrotechnics, lights of a distinctive color or pattern, infrared devices, or arm and hand signals. Audio signals, such as whistles, horns, and the challenge/password, should be used as a short-range recognition system in restrictive terrain or during limited visibility. e. Command and Control. The Battalion Main CP. Normally in the attack, the battalion main CP is not part of the assault element, but plans are (1) developed to displace this element as soon as possible after the assault is complete and the situation on the ground permits. During the air assault, the Main CP may displace forward to a location immediately behind the friendly FEBA to maintain positive communications with the assault echelon. The Battalion Jump CP. The Jump CP has two possible modes of operation:(2) (a) Airborne. During the air assault phase, the AATFC may desire to monitor the flow of the operation from a command and control aircraft provided by the brigade aviation platoon. This type of C&C will depend on the enemy air defense threat and could be conducted either from behind the line of contact or by following one of the assault Iihs. Ground. Once the bulk of the task force has been inserted into t~e objective area, the AATFC (b) should dismount and control the battle from the ground. A small, man-portable Jump CP should air assault early and locate close to the fighting to facilitate contact with the assaulting companies, while still being able to maintain contact with the brigade commander and the TF Main CP. As soon as the tactical situation permits, one or more command vehicles should be inserted to provide the Jump CP with mobility and enhanced communications capability. (c) If the AATFC chooses to be airborne, the TF S3 will normally air assault with the Jump CP. 7-3. STAGING. Staging for this operation is similar to staging for a raid, except now an artillery battery may air assault with the infantry force as an attached element. The artillery battery is normally lifted from a separate PZ distant from the AATF location. The AATFC must closely coordinate the artillery's integration into the air flow. LOADING. Loading is similar to that for any air assault, though the special considerations for a raid often apply. 7-4. 7-5. AIR MOVEMENT. The planning and execution of the air movement are similar to those of a raid, except that the enemy forces on the line of contact are comparatively ineffective. Thus, extensive SEAD or preparation fires may not be required. 7-3 7-6. LANDING. a. Use multiple LZs if at all possible to minimize the chance of the force being detected and to increase helicopter survivability. b. Perform LZ actions quickly. (1) Secure the LZ and maintain security until movement to the objective begins. (2) Account for personnel and equipment. (3) Move to the objective. c. Land away from the objective if the ground tactical plan permits, to decrease the chance of helicopter losses. 1·1. GROUND TACTICAL OPERATIONS. This discussion describes the actions that occur during the Air AssaultAttack/Linkup. Assume that the AATF has completed the air assault, moved to and secured the objectives. It nowaccomplishes the following: a. Perimeter/Strongpoint Defense. The positions selected must provide 360 degree security of the terrain featureoccupied. A perimeter defense is established initially, and should be continually improved until it becomes a strongpointdefense, capable of sustained combat to deny the enemy use of the area until linkup. The perimeter defense may also beorganized along the lines of a battalion perimeter or airhead if the terrain and available forces permit. Below are alternative positions that may be selected and the considerations pertinent to the selection process. (1) Battalion Positions. (a) There are several objectives involving one or more closely-located key terrain features. (b) The AATF controls the terrain features in the objective area. BN PERIMETER/STRONGPOINT BN AIRHEAD -OPs ~r .!_ 0 LIN~'0 • ~POINTS A532884 1-4 (2) Company Perimeter/Strongpoint. (a) There are several company-size objectives to secure, but the terrain does not permit a battalion perimeter that encloses all objectives. (b) The AATF controls the terrain features within the TF objective area. (3) OPORD Decision. Secure three road junctions with companies in different objective areas; use separate company perimeters while awaiting linkup. b. Missions of Organic Units. (1) Infantry. (a) Establish a perimeter (strongpoint) defense with particular attention to the construction and improvement of fighting positions to withstand enemy artillery and air strikes. As mentioned, this defense is initially a perimeter defense, but it is continually hardened until friendly forces arrive. (b) Establish linkup points. Linkup points function as combat outposts to provide early warning, to direct fires a_g~~lnst enemy forces, and to guide the friendly forces moving forward. (c) Provide security for the attached artillery. (2) Antiarmor Platoons and Sections. Position antiarmor platoons and sections to cover likely avenues of approach and armor kill zones. Use obstacles on these approaches if possible. (3) Mortar Platoon. Position mortar sections within the perimeter (strongpoint) defense to cover the area out to 4000 M in all directions, as coordinated with the Battalion FSO. c. Missions of Attached Units. (1) Engineers. Improve the mobility of the combat elements by providing sapper teams to breach obstacles. (a) 7-5 (b) Create obstacles to increase the protection of the AATF from counterattack and to delay enemyforces in the kill zones of the AATF's direct fire weapons. (c) Assist in reorganization and consolidation. (d) Assist in the construction of hasty LZs/PZs. (e) Assist in the construction and hardening of fortified positions. (2) Cavalry. (a) Recon LZs and•flight route(s). (b) Screen forward and to the flanks during the air assault and the ground attack. (c) Screen in the direction of potential counterattack to provide early warning. (d) Screen in the direction of the linkup force to provide early coordination. (3) Attack Helicopters. (a) Provide route security and escort to the AATF during the air assault by suppressing and attackingtargets designated by the AATFC and the AMC. (b) May suppress enemy forces on the LZs, attack targets in the objective area, or assist in sealingthe objective as part of the security force to prevent the enemy from successfully counterattacking. (4) Artillery. Develop an integrated and coordinated fire support plan to include FA, CAS, mortars, andattack helicopters, to support initially the air assault with primary emphasis on SEAD and Line of Contact penetration.Subsequently, plan fires to support the attack on the ground objective. This plan must include provision of adequate firesupport prior to the arrival of the supporting artillery in the objective area. (5) Air Defense. (a) Prevent accidental engagement of friendly aircraft. (b) Protect ground elements by inserting Stinger teams during the early stages of the air assault. (6) CAS. (a) Strike preplanned targets enroute and/or prep the LZ. (b) In a JAAT role, support the assault on the objective or assist in defeating probable counterattacks. d. Conduct of the Linkup. This sequence is idealized and discusses points of procedure and logic forincorporation. (1) The AATF establishes a perimeter (strongpoint) defense around the objective and secures the linkuppoints. (2) The AATFC and the linkup force commander establish radio contact on a specific, prearranged net. (3) The linkup force orients on the AATF, and the AATF keeps the linkup force advised on the situationat the objectives and linkup points. 7-6 The AATF guides the linkup force to the linkup point by radio, or, situation permitting, uses a patrol (4) to meet and guide the linkup force. Recognition signals are given by both forces as previously coordinated. (5) (6) Guides assist in the passage through minefields and other defensive obstacles in front of and within the AATF positions. Guides. deploy the linkup force quickly and efficiently. Ideally, guides should move the linkup force along predetermined routes which bypass the AATF's defensive position(s). (7) Higher headquarters will dictate the command relationship between the AATF and the linkup force. (8) Depending on the mission after linkup, either force may be attached to the other, or both may remain under brigade control. 7-8. SUSTAINING THE FORCE. a. Unit Trains. The combat trains will normally displace as part of the assault element to provide needed Class Ill, Class V, maintenance, and medical support. It will monitor resupply requirements and be prepared to rapidly distribute supplies as needed. A three-day supply of ammunition, demolitions, rations, batteries, and other essential supplies should be airlifted during the air assault. The field trains will be located well to the rear of the line of contact and will normally displace forward after the linkup has been accomplished. b. Aerial Resupply. Helicopter resupply will be employed if the situation is unstable or if the linkup force is significantly delayed by the enemy. The Air Force Container Delivery System (CDS) is the preferred method of resupply if helicopter resupply is not possible. 7-7 7-9. FRAGO. AIR ASSAULT ATTACK/LINKUP (classification) FRAGO 5-83 (BOLD JUMP) 1. SITUATION. Enemy is disorganized and withdrawing to the east. 2. MISSION. TF 3·187 air assaults commencing 090530S Mar to secure road junctions at DR221613, DR282641, andDR313592; conducts linkup operation with 2d AD. 3. MISSIONS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. a. Im.A: (1) Air Assault from PZ Amber to LZ 1. (2) Be prepared to accept attachment of one mortar section. (3) Secure OBJ RED (DR221613). (4) Upon consolidation of objective, defend to retain as BP RED. (5) Establish and effect linkup at linkup point 1 (DR232611). (1) Air Assault from PZ Blue to LZ 2. (2) Be prepared to accept attachment of one mortar section. (3) Secure OBJ WHITE (DR282641). (4) Upon consolidation of objective, defend to retain as BP WHITE. (5) Establish and effect linkup at linkup points 2 (DR293644) and 3 (DR271622). (1) Air Assault from PZ Clear to LZ 3. (2) Be prepared to accept attachment of one mortar section. (3) Secure OBJ BLUE (DR313592). (4) Upon consolidation of objective, defend to retain as BP BLUE. (5) Establish and effect linkup at linkup point 4 (DR303611 ). d. C2....0.1.:1: (1) Establish Battalion Alternate CP. (2) Establish liaison with linkup force commander. (classification) 7-8 (classification) e. TM C/2-17 ACS (OPCON): (1) Reconnoiter flight routes commencing H-35 minutes. (2) Reconnoiter objectives and LZs from H-20 to H-7 minutes. (3) On order, screen high speed avenues of approach into OBJs RED, WHITE, and BLUE. f. Tm. B/158 AH (DS): (1) Execute Air Movement in accordance with Annex B. (2) Provide AASLT route security for Task Force insertion. (3) On order, suppress enemy forces vic LZs. (4) Destroy enemy armor vic OBJs RED, WHITE, and BLUE. g. C/3-319 FA: (1) Air assault commencing 090600S Mar. (2) Establish firing positions vic LZ 4. (3) On order move to vic OBJ WHITE. h. Mortar Platoon: Detach one section to each rifle company. i. SCT Section: (1) Air assault from PZ Amber to LZ 1 commencing 090530S Mar. (2) Recon LZ 4 for C/3-319. (3) Establish linkup points and effect linkup. j. Sec/1/B/1-3 ADA (Stinger): Protect in priority C/3-319 FA. Be prepared to establish air defense of the TF Main CP. k. 1/C/326 Engr: (1) Air assault from PZ Blue to LZ 2. (2) Establish road blocks and craters vic DR291632 and DR287616. (3) Prepare demolitions on bridges at DR292604, DR299613, and DR306607; execute on order. I. GSR: Provide surveillance of area to the NE from vicinity OBJ RED. m. Coordinating Instructions: (1) Linkup frequency will be 46.10 FM. Call Sign W4D87--2d AD LNO. (2) Far Recognition Signal: White Star Cluster; Near Recognition Signal: Orange flag; Challenge/Password: MOOSE/BUS. (classification) 7-9 (classification) (3) Report when objective is secured (codeword CELEBRATION) and linkup effected (codeword MATCHMAKER) with 2d AD. (4) Annex A, Operations Overlay. (5) Annex B, Air Movement Table. (6) Annex C, Fire Support Overlay. (7) No change to Warning Order Task Organization. ACKNOWLEDGE. CDR OFFICIAL: S3 Annexes: A-Operations Overlay (Same as OPORD)B-Air Movement (Same as OPORD)C-Fire Support Overlay (Same as (OPORD) (classification) 7-10 7-10. OPORD. AIR ASSAULT ATTACK/LINKUP (classification) Copy No_of_Copies TF 3-187 lnf DR162133 SWG 27 OPORD 5-83 (BOLD JUMP) Reference: Map, Series V741 S, Ft Campbell, Special Edition, 1:50,000. Time Zone: SIERRA Task Organization: 1/D 2/D 3/0 Sec/Mort Pit Sec/Mort Pit Sec/Mort Pit FIST/3-319 FA FIST/3-319 FA FIST/3-319 FA TM C/2-17 CAV (0PCON) TM B/158 AH (OS) C/3-319 FA MORT PLT (-) SCT SEC. Sec/1 /B/1-3 ADA (Stinger) 1/C/326 Engr 2/3/B/311 Ml (GSR) FSE/3-319 FA CAP/TF 158 Avn TACP 1. SITUATION. a. Enemy Forces. Annex A, Intelligence. b. Friendly Forces. (1) 3d Brigade air assaults commencing 090530 Mar behind enemy lines to secure key terrain and road intersections to disrupt enemy withdrawal; conduct I ink up with 2d Armored Division moving east. (2) TF 4-187 air a·ssaults commencing 090530 Mar to secure OBJ FEATHER (DR617322). (3) TF 1-503 air assaults commencing 090530 Mar to secure OBJ TALON (DR712330). (classification) 7-11 (classification) (4) Elements of the 9th USAF provide CAS to TF 3 187. c. Attachments and Detachments. Task Organization. 2. MISSION. TF 3-187 air assaults commencing 090530 Mar to secure road junctions at DR221613, DR282641, andDR313592; conducts linkup operations with 2d Armored Division. 3. EXECUTION. a. Concept of the Operation. Annex B, Operations Overlay. (1) Maneuver. This operation will be conducted in two phases: (a) Phase I. TF 3-187 air assaults sequentially with Tm A securing OBJ RED, Tm B securing OBJWHITE, and Tm C securing OBJ BLUE in order. (b) Phase II. Upon consolidation of each objective, TF 3-187 defends with Tm A retaining BP RED,Tm B retaining BP WHITE, and Tm C retaining BP BLUE. Tm A establishes and effects linkup at linkup point 1. Tm Bestablishes and effects linkup at linkup points 2 and 3. Tm C establishes and effects linkup at linkup point 4. (2) Fires. (a) Phase I: 3-319 FA fires SEAD and three-minute preparation on LZ commencing at H-5 minutes.Priority of fires to Tm A. Ten-minute objective preparatory fires on call. Six CAS sorties available on call commencingH-35 minutes. (b) Phase II: Priority of fires to Tm A. One 1 05mm FPF to Tm A. One 81 MM FPF each to Tm A, B, c. b. TmA: (1) Phase I. (a) Conduct air assault from PZ Amber to LZ 1. (b) Be prepared to accept attachment of one mortar section. (c) Secure road junction at OBJ RED (DR221613). (2) Phase II. (a) Defend to retain BP RED. (b) Establish and effect linkup at linkup point 1 (DR232611 ). c. Tm B: (1) Phase I. (classification) 7-12 (classification) (a) Conduct air assault from PZ Blue to LZ 2. (b) Be prepared to accept attachment of mortar section. (c) Secure road junction at OBJ WHITE (DR282641 ). (d) Secure C/3-319 FA in OBJ WHITE. (2) Phase II. (a) Defend to retain BP WHITE. (b) Establish and effect linkup at linkup points 2 (DR293644) and 3 (DR271622). d.~: (1) Phasel. (a) Conduct air assault from PZ Clear to LZ 3. (b) Be prepared to accept attachment of one mortar section. (c) Secure OBJ BLUE (DR313592). (2) Phase II. (a) Defend to retain BP BLUE. (b) Establish and effect linkup at linkup point 4 (DR303611 ). e. CoD(-): (1) Establish Battalion Alternate CP. (2) Establish liaison with linkup force commander. f. Tm B/158 AH (DS): (1) Provide AMC for AASLT operations. (2) Provide air assault route security for Task Force insertion. (3) Execute air movement in accordance with Annex D, Air Movement. (4) On order, suppress enemy forces vic LZ's. (5) Destroy enemy armor vic OBJs RED, WHITE, and BLUE. g. Tm C/2-17 CAV (OPCON). (1) Phase I. (a) Reconnoiter prima·ry air assault routes commencing H-35 minutes. (classification) 7-13 (classificationI (b) Reconnoiter OBJs RED, WHITE, and BLUE and LZs 1, 2, 3, and 4 from H-20 to H-7 minutes. (2) Phase II. Screen high speed avenues of approach into OBJs RED, WHITE, BLUE. h. Scout Section: (1 I Air assault from PZ Amber to LZ 1 commencing 090530 Mar. (2) Recon LZ 4 for C/3-319 FA. (3) Establish linkup points and effect linkup. i. Fire Support: (1 I FA: C/3-319 FA. (a) Organization for combat: Task Organization. (b) C/3-319 FA conducts air assault to LZ 4 commencing 090600 Mar. (c) On order, move to vic OBJ WHITE, establish fire base WHITE. (d) Priority of Targets: In order, enemy ADA affecting flight routes for air assault, armor and troop concentrations along main avenues of approach, enemy artillery and mortar locations, and enemy command and control. (e) Annex C, Fire Support Overlay. (2) CAS: (a) All TACAIR controlled by FAC. (b) Allocation for planning. 1. Six sorties per day to TF. £. Immediate CAS available if needed. 3. Aircraft Include A-1 0, A-7. j. Mortar Platoon: Detach one section to each rifle company. k. Sec/1/B/1-3 ADA (Stinger): Phase I and II. Protect in priority: C/3-319 FA. Be prepared to establish air defense of TF Main CP on order. (classification) 7-14 (classification) I. 1/C/326 Engr: (1) Phase I. Air Assault from PZ Blue to LZ 2. (2) Phase II. Priority of work: (a) Establish road blocks and craters vic DR291632 and UR287616. (b) Prepare demolitions on bridges at DR292604, DR299613, and DR306607; execute on order. (c) Construct defensive positions and clear fields of fire. (d) Clear LZs. m. GSR: Provide surveillance of area to the northeast from vic OBJ RED. n. Coordinating Instructions. (1) Report when insertion is complete (code word PARTY). (2) Report when objective is secured (code word CELEBRATION). (3) Report when linkup points are established (code word INVITATION). (4) Report when linkup with 2d AD is effected (code word MATCH MAKER). (5) Linkup frequency will be 46.10 FM, Call Sign W4D87--2d AD LNO. (6) Far Recognition Signal: White Star Cluster; Near Recognition Signal: Orange flag; Challenge/Password: MOOSE/BUS. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. a. Field Trains located at DR113622. b. Combat trains air assault vic LZ 4. c. Annex E, Logistics. d. Annex F, Personnel. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. a. Signal: (1 l Current CEO I in effect. (2) Listening silence until 090500 Mar. (classification) 7-15 (classification) b. Command: (1) AATFC initially airborne. (2) Jump CP air assaults with Tm A, vic DR232611. (3) Main CP vic DR114612 displaces on order. ACKNOWLEDGE CDR S3 Annexes: A-Intelligence (omitted) B -Operations Overlay C-Fire Support Overlay (omitted) D -Air Movement E -Logistics (omitted) F -Personnel (omitted) (classification) 7·16 CHAPTER 8 DELAY 8-1. GENERAL. a. In the delay, the AATF trades space for time and enemy casualties. To accomplish this task, the AATF engages the enemy at every opportunity, and at maximum effective range, while repeatedly positioning its forces in front of, on the flanks of, or even in the rear of the advancing enemy. This process forces the enemy to repeatedly deploy and remount, coping in turn with each of a number of battle positions. b. The AATF is seldom given a "timed-delay" mission, which would require it to delay for a specified period. Such a mission would restrict the AATF's mobility and may subject it to unacceptable losses. Ideally, AATF elements will be able to disengage and move by helicopter before becoming decisively engaged. Against armored forces in open terrain, disengagement should occur at distances of no less than 2,000 meters because of the enemy's fire power and rapid closure rates. In armor restrictive terrain, facing a dismounted threat, disengagement may not take place until the enemy has closed to within 500 meters. In either case decisive engagement is accepted only to the degree neces~ary to accomplish the delay mission. In extreme cases, it may become necessary or even unavoidable for a platoon or company to accept such engagement. c. There are two basic situations to be considered in conducting the air assault delay. The first involves delaying in armor restrictive terrain, in which case the infantry's role is significant. The second involves delaying in open terrain with multiple armor avenues of approach. In this case the infantry's role is subordinate to that of AATF's long range weapon systems (TOWs, attack helicopters, field artillery, mortars, and tactical air). d. The key to any successful air assault delay is the AATFC's ability to array his forces on the battlefield in depth prior to the start of the delay. After a thorough terrain analysis, forces and weapon systems are fitted to the terrain, armor kill zones and antiarmor ambushes are established, fires are planned, and an obstacle plan is developed. The TOWs should be positioned within the battle positions to cover kill zones along likely avenues of approach. Whenever terrain permits, take advantage of the maximum TOW standoff range by engaging the enemy at 3,000 to 3,500 meters. The infantry's mission forward is to provide the TOW sections with security and close-in defensive capability if the element is bypassed or becomes decisively engaged. e. The AATFC should have the capability to lift all his forces positioned near the FLOT in one lift. He must be aware that if he positions his forces forward without this capability, he risks having them become decisively engaged, bypassed, penetrated, encircled, and/or destroyed. SCENARIO The AATF has been assigned a sector 10 km wide by 70 km deep in rolling terrain with one primary and one secondary armor avenue of approach. With a company of lift helicopters in support, it has deployed its forces forward, placing the majority of its TOW assets in the vicinity of the Initial Delay Line (IDL). Some TOW sections are positioned in front of the IDL to provide early warning and engagement, thus deceiving the enemy as to the exact location of the IDL. Some infantry has been positioned forward on the IDL in spots of armor-restrictive terrain to provide security for the TOW sections and for close-in defensive capability should the AATF elements become decisively engaged. Those infantry not positioned on the IDL are preparing battle positions and TOW firing positions on subsequent delay lines, and stocking ammunition and barrier materiels. 8-2. PLANNING. a. Task Organization. (1) The AATF will normally have the following elements: 8-1 (a) Engineer Platoon (+) (OS). (b) FIST/FSE (attached). (c) CAP (OS). (d) TACP (collocated). (2) The brigade has other assets available that the AATF may request in support on a mission·by-mission basis; those may include: (a) Air Cavalry Troop. (b) Aviation Battalion Task Force. (c) Artillery Battalion. (d) Engineer Company(s). b. Warning Order. As soon as the decision is made to conduct an air assault delay, the brigade should issue a warning order. With the brigade order as a basis, the AATF should immediately issue its own warning order. Issued early, it will allow the subordinate elements the maximum amount of time for their own planning and preparation, including resupply and moving quartering parties and unneeded equipment to the rear. 8·2 (classification) WARNING ORDER 6-83 (SHARP TALON) TF 2-327 IN Reference: Map, Series V741S. Ft Campbell Special Edition. 1:50,000 Task Organization: Co A(-) CoB(-) TF Con FIST/2-320 FA FIST/2-320 FA B/101Avn (DS) GSMORT CoC 2/A/326 Engr (DS) FSE/2-320 FA FIST/2-320 FA PLT/Co A CAP/TF 101 Avn PL T/CO B TCAP FIST/2-320 FA 1. SITUATION. Enemy forces continue air and ground reconnaissance activities to our east, with elements of the 32d MRR identified. 2. MISSION. TF 2-327 Infantry occupies Initial Delay Positions (lOPs) vicinity LINE PINK NLT 151200S Jan; conducts Air Assault Delay forward of LINE PURPLE until 171600S Jan. 3. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. a. Task Organization effective 131400S Jan. b. AMB at 131600S Jan vic TF 2-327 CP. c. TF 2-327 OPORD will be issued at 140800S Jan at TF 2-327 CP. d. All units will commence operations with three days of C rations; no A rations prior to 0+3. e. All equipment without organic transport on hand or in the combat trains or that cannot be carried on foot, will be backhauled to the TF field trains during the period 142200S Jan to 150400S Jan. f. Prepositioning of ammunition and rations will be accomplished. g. Destroy unused supplies prior to leaving BPs. h. PZ locations required this HO ASAP. CDR (classification) 8-3 c. OPORD. The OPORD at paragraph 8-9 and the FRAGO at paragraph 8-10 are provided as examples. A detailed and well thought out OPORD at the beginning of a delay will minimize confusion later when communications become difficult, and will provide a basis for controlling the battle for some time through the use of supplementary FRAGOs. (1) Selection of Battle Positions (BPs). The terrain and type of enemy force (light or heavy) being delayed will significantly affect the choice of BPs. (a) When facing a light enemy force, the infantry will fight the battle and must be positioned to use their machine guns and rifles to maximum effect. In this case, TOWs will be positioned to support from overwatch positions. (b) When facing a heavy force, the long range AT weapons will fight the battle, and their positioning must take priority. The infantry will be positioned to provide security for the AT systems. In this situation, the smaller the infantry force forward, the better. (2) Battle Position Considerations. (a) BPs are sited to control the likely enemy avenues of approach. (b) BPs are integrated with natural and man-made obstacles. (c) BPs are selected for platoon, company, and occasionally battalion occupations laterally and in depth throughout the sector. On order BPs may be occupied by other than the intended element. (d) BPs are identified by randomly assigned numbers or letters. (Note: although overlays depicting many small BPs, PZs, and LZs become cumbersome, their contribution to improved command and control justifies the effort.) (e) Contingency plans included in the OPORD and FRAGOs must allow for any BP becoming isolated and cut off during the battle. (f) Some initial TOW positions or BPs may be sited in front of the IDL as a deception technique. (3) Control of Lift Assets. Normally control of the lift assets is retained at the task force level instead of being decentralized to company or team level. This technique does not preclude locating lift assets forward in the AATF sector and using the CAP to orchestrate their operations during movement of the AATF. The following factors dictate the level of control: (a) Retain U'nder TF Control. 1. Communications are reliable within the AATF. 2. Company or battalion BPs are being used. 3. Lift assets are only sufficient to move one company at a time. (b) Decentralize Control to Company or Team. 1. Lift assets are sufficiently plentiful to move multiple companies simultaneously. 2. The situation requires simultaneous movement of multiple small elements. 3. BPs are small and widely dispersed (conversely, several small closely located BPs may converge on one PZ for lift). 4. Communications are unreliable. 84 d. Air Mission Briefing (AMB). As with the OPORD, a comprehensive initial AMB at the start of the delay will facilitate further operations with .brief updates. e. Obstacles. The primary purposes of obstacles in the delay area are: (1) To m .. l~~tC • ~ ATTACK c.:..::>~ 53 35 "' b. An alternate method is the exfiltration of small groups. c. The breakout should plan for foot movement, with air assault extraction as an unlikely possibility. d. The breakout operation may come as an order, be required as a necessity (the commander makes the decision), or be a timed option. When it is a timed option, instructions are included to remain in position for a period of time and then break out or move out under pressure to another location. After a breakout, a unit uses predesignated NFAs as rally points and assembly areas. 10-5. ESCAPE AND EVASION ROUTES. ESCAPE AND EVASION PLAN ROUTE ACE 53 38 "' These routes may be used as a follow-up to breakout operations or by small groups of soldiers if a unit is overrun and/or dispersed. The routes are designated in the contingency annex and are linked to NFAs so that there exists a small network of routes and areas through which units and troops can move without fear of friendly fire. 10-3 10·6. LINKUP/REENTRY PLAN. LINKUP/REENTRY PLAN ESCAPE AND EVASION ROUTES (\ f I 1/ \/ a. Units moving along predesignated escape and evasion routes will conduct linkup and reentry operations atspecified reentry points. Additionally; the plan identifies those areas to move to in order to effect the linkup. b. The plan specifies the long-range and short-range recognition signals to be used, and the radio frequencies thatwill be monitored to assist in the reentry operation. 104 CHAPTER 11 OPERATIONS REQUIRING SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 11-1. GENERAL Although the doctrine and procedures for standard air assault operations generally apply, certain operations require special planning and execution. The following operations are discussed in this chapter: a. Heavy/light operations. b. Desert operations. 11·2. HEAVY/LIGHT OPERATIONS. a. General. (1) Heavy forces (armored and mechanized units) and light forces (infantry, airborne, and air assault units) can operate together effectively if the ground force commander continually tailors his force mix to the ever changing dynamics of METT. The coordinated employment of heavy and light forces permits the commander to maximize his combat power by offsetting the inherent weaknesses of one type unit with the inherent strengths of another type unit. In this sense, heavy/light operations are merely an extension of the combined arms concept. (2) Many challenges face the commander who attempts to mix heavy and light forces. The pace and tempo of operations differ greatly between the two. Each force has significantly different logistical requirements. Worse still, the two forces rarely train together and remain generally ignorant of each other's tactics and techniques. With the advent of the US Army Regimental System, cross-training between heavy and light forces will virtually cease except at TRADOC schools and in major MACOM exercises. (3) Nevertheless, commanders following the doctrine of the coordinated AirLand Battle must "go deep" in both the offense and the defense. This operational imperative generates tremendous opportunities for ground forces that have both heavy and light characteristics. As command and communications break down, chaos and confusion will build rapidly on the next battlefield. While heavy forces maneuver against and destroy enemy forces in the main battle area, air assault forces are ideally suited to disrupt the cohesiveness of the enemy by conducting raids and spoiling attacks against his command posts, artillery batteries, combat service support installations, and other soft targets. In periods of unlimited visibility, the tanks and ATGMs of heavy forces will dominate the battlefield. As visibility decreases, however, light infantry may gain control of the battle. (4) Experience has shown that the mix of heavy and light forces is most effective when accomplished by the cross-attachment of brigades. The logistical doctrine for this level of force-tailoring is not firmly established, and decisions regarding the type and amount of logistics support to be detached with the air assault brigade would have to be made separately for each case considering the factors of METT and the expected duration of the attachment. Unlike the armored or mechanized brigade, which can deploy maintenance teams and fuel vehicles with a detached heavy battalion task force, the air assault brigade is capable of detaching an air assault battalion task force only by substantially degrading the tactical and logistical capability of the entire brigade. The logistical tail of the air assault brigade is not designed to support from multiple locations or to displace with the assault echelon; rather, it is semi-fixed. The density of helicopters normally allocated to an air assault brigade, unlike the density of personnel carriers in a heavy force, does not permit routine attachment below brigade level. Therefore, an air assault battalion task force can be detached to a heavy force for a short duration only, on a mission basis. When air assault forces are committed, there must be a plan for rapid linkup or extraction, subsequent return to the parent air assault brigade, and rapid reconstitution for the next operation. (5) Not all tactical scenarios are suitable for heavy/light operations. Heavy and light forces must not be considered interchangeable simply because they find themselves on the same battlefield. The force mix must be matched to the current mission, the enemy situation, and the terrain. The terrain itself must be analyzed in terms of the weather and visibility conditions that are expected during the conduct of the operation. In particular, the unique capabilities of air assault forces should be exploited to accomplish missions not suitable for heavy forces and vice versa, to increase the tempo of the battle until the enemy's C3 system is unable to react. 11-1 b. Attack through choke point. An air assault battalion task force or company team may be employed to rapidly seize a choke point (or other key terrain) in enemy territory and hold it to prevent its use by the enemy and/or to facilitate its use by advancing friendly heavy forces. This operation may be planned in support of an attack, exploitation, or. pursuit operation by a larger heavy force. Once such choke points are seized by air assault forces, heavy forces must move rapidly to linkup with and relieve the air assault force. Special considerations include: (1) Accurate intelligence on enemy dispositions, to include reinforcement capability, is essential to insure that the air assault force is sufficiently strong to seize and hold its objective until linkup is effected. (2) The depth of the air assault must be considered. If the objective is too deep, the enemy may be able to prevent rapid linkup with the advancing heavy force. If the objective is too shallow, the air assault may not cause the enemy to fight in two directions. Since the enemy normally defends in a series of defensive belts with tank-heavy counterattack forces, air assault forces should try to avoid an objective in one of these belts. (3) As the stationary element, the air assault force is responsible for the linkup and subsequent passage of lines. Every effort should be made·to maintain the momentum of the heavy force's attack and prevent it from being bogged down at the choke point. The AATFC must coordinate with his heavy force counterpart to exchange CEOI data, agree upon linkup points and long-and short-range recognition signals, and establish appropriate fire control measures. (4) A variation of this tactical scenario envisions the use of air assault forces to seize blocking positions between the enemy's covering force and his main defensive positions. This operation will disrupt enemy plans for the withdrawal of the covering force and force it to fight in two directions. It will promote the break down of tactical cohesion, and create unanticipated problems for the enemy C3 and CSS systems. (5) The seizure of choke points in the enemy's rear has a secondary effect: logistical movement is hindered and the enemy's requirement to conduct rear area security operations slows the pace of his combat service support. c. Rear area combat operations (RACO). Air assault forces are ideally suited to perform RACO for a larger heavy force. Timing is critical to dislodge the enemy when he is most vulnerable, before he consolidates his airhead or links up with an advancing enemy heavy force. An AATF can displace rapidly and possesses sufficient combat power to destroy an enemy light force. Attack helicopters and/or air cavalry can fix the enemy until the infantry and artillery arrive. Special considerations include: (1) The designated air assault force (AATF or Co Tm) should be positioned in an assembly area or reserve position from which it can rapidly counterattack. If possible, lift helicopters should be dedicated to this force. (2) The heavy force commander should consider the preemptive seizure of key terrain by friendly air assault forces to prevent its occupation by enemy airborne/air assault forces. d. Deliberate attack. Air assault forces cannot successfully attack heavy forces in open terrain. In conjunction with a night ground attack by heavy forces in restrictive terrain, however, air assault forces may be successful. Multiple company team air assaults into the enemy's regimental rear area work well because they do not provide the enemy with a target against which he can concentrate. Together with the ground attack, these shallow air assaults overwhelm the enemy's C3 system as it tries simultaneously to coordinate reactions to two dissimilar threats. The lateral movement of enemy heavy forces is hampered as they engage in local skirmishes with air assault forces. It takes time to neutralize or bypass these forces -time the enemy may not have if the heavy force's ground attack is well coordinated with the air assault raids and ambushes. Special considerations include: (1) Surprise is operative only for the first air assault. Thereafter, the AATFC must be able to suppress the enemy ADA systems. (2) Linkup must be carefully orchestrated. The intermingling of friendly and enemy forces in the enemy's rear should be anticipated. On order or at a specified time, air assault forces should move to predetermined rallying points 11-2 away from the axes of advance of friendly heavy forces. Linkup should be conducted during daylight the following day, after the air assault forces have already been bypassed by the fighting. e. Heavy/Light Defense. Air assault forces can contribute to the heavy/light defense as a TOW-heavy force capable of self-deploying on the battlefield for eventual extraction, or as an infantry-heavy force placed astride restrictive terrain where a prolonged position defense is possible. TOW-heavy forces can be deployed forward in a covering force role, with specific instructions to avoid decisive engagement. Infantry should be employed in the MBA when they have time to prepare the ground for a position defense. If time to prepare the battiefield is limited, air assault forces should be placed in depth on restrictive terrain behind the MBA. Special considerations include: (1) The distance between successive air assault battle positions must be sufficient to permit units to withdraw and to occupy and improve new positions without being overrun. (2) Air assault forces must be provided the time and engineer resources to adequately prepare their defensive positions to withstand deliberate and sustained attacks. (3) Air assault forces defending on restrictive terrain must be prepared to accept decisive engagement and lose their freedom of action. If they are to successfully serve as a "pivot point" for a heavy force maneuver, they must be placed on a choke point or other key terrain so that the enemy will be forced to commit his forces against the position, rather than bypassing it. f. Raid/Spoiling Attack. Air assault forces are ideally suited to conduct raids and spoiling attacks as part of a defensive or retrograde operation being conducted by a larger heavy force. Operating from assembly areas or reserve positions in the division or corps rear area, company teams can "go deep" and carry the battle to the enemy's second echelon. Special considerations include: (1) Targets such as command posts, communications sites, and logistical bases are more appropriate than combat units. Second-echelon combat units are better engaged by close air support, attack helicopters, or artillery. (2) Equipment should not be sling-loaded on a raid, because slingloads increase aircraft minimum altitudes to an unacceptable level. (3) Raid insertion and extraction should be executed by the same aircraft, which, during the raid itself, occupy a ground or aerial laager site to minimize the requirement for multiple penetrations of the FEBA. 11-3. DESERT OPERATIONS. a. General. (1) The AATF may find itself fighting in any of three major types of desert. The open desert of the Sahara differs greatly from the mountainous desert of Southwest Asia; however, most des~rts share the following characteristics: (a) Vast areas of open and relatively flat terrain, providing unrestricted observation and fields of fire to extended distances (10 to 20 kilometers). (b) Relatively few definable terrain features, making navigation difficult without electronic aids. (c) Temperature extremes and blowing sand and dust, both of which place unusual demands on soldiers and their equipment. (2) The AATF may operate in this hostile environment over distances two or three times greater than those associated with the NATO area. In addition to having greater frontage and depth, the AATF may operate in a perpetual state of scarcity because of extended lines of communication, small and barebase logistical facilities, and the high probability that it may be engaged in combat operations before deployment is complete. 11-3 (3) Vast distances and limited resources dictate that higher headquarters design their operations to gain time and conserve resources. The AATF may have to arrest the enemy's momentum in such a way as to minimize exposure of friendly combat power and avoid decisive engagement, at least initially. The AATFC can best accomplish this mission by .conducting raids and spoiling attacks against enemy C3 systems, CSS facilities, and other soft targets. Night air assault operations will be the norm, not only because of the heat, but also because of the unrestricted visibility during daylight. These tactics increase the probability of tactical error by the enemy and improve the chances of friendly heavy forces being able to outmaneuver the enemy and attack him from the flanks. (4) Heavy force closure rates in the desert are very rapid. Given the three to five hours required doctrinally for air assault mission planning, an enemy heavy force could move 100 kilometers if unopposed. The advantage of the shallow air assault is lost because heavy forces can concentrate combat power faster in the desert than air assault forces can. Air assault forces should instead be targeted to go deep (1 00 to 150 kilometers) against soft targets while heavy forces fight enemy tanks and keep them from overrunning the air assault force's logistical and staging bases. (5) Long-range communications present a significant problem for the AATFC in the desert. The AATF will routinely operate at distances greater than 50 kilometers from its staging area and field trains location, beyond the range of all organic radio equipment except the AN/VSC-2 RATT. Radio relay or retransmission sites will have to be established, perhaps clandestinely behind enemy lines, to maintain positive radio communications. Forward elements may have to communicate using HF-AM radios (AN/PRC-74 and AN/GRC-106) in the ICW (Morse code) mode. Field artillery communications will be enhanced by the use of digital burst communications devices. (6) Intelligence acquisition and rapid dissemination of that intelligence to the AATF's subordinate units become critical during desert air assault operations. b. Loading. The presence of large amounts of blowing sand and dust impacts significantly on PZ and LZ operations in the desert. Special considerations include: (1) The desert floor is not homogeneous. The load-bearing capacity and the looseness of the sand vary greatly. Every effort should be made to locate PZs and LZs on hard-packed gravel. (2) Blowing sand and dust may obscure aircrew vision during takeoff and landing. This effect can be minimized by landing into the wind in a line or echelon formation, rather than in trail. The landing distance between aircraft should be increased to 100 meters to minimize obscuration. (3) Air assaulting troops, and particularly slingload teams, must be protected from blowing sand and dust on the PZ or LZ. Goggles, dust masks, and cravat bandages worn tied around the face, are essential. Weapons must be protected by wrapping them in plastic or tightly woven cloth. (4) Chemical lights attached to the tie strings of sandbags make the best method of marking a night PZ or LZ. Orange panels, smoke, and/or ground guides suffice in daylight, but the contrasting green color of the standard sandbag is highly visible and also works well during the day. c. Air Movement. Special considerations include: (1) The lack of terrain features to mask air movement and the relatively easy acquisition of aircraft by both radar and visual means are serious drawbacks to formation flying during an air assault. In the desert, it may be necessary to break up lifts at the start point or at an ACP and have the aircraft fly singly or in small serials along multiple flight routes to the RP, then to the LZ in formation. (2) All air movements will require high speeds at minimum altitudes to increase survivability. However, high-speed contour flight at low altitude (less than 50 feet) creates some safety problems in the desert because sand, dust, and haze reduce visibility and obscure the horizon and terrain features. These problems are greatly increased when pilots fly at night under NVG conditions. 11-4 (3) Tactical desert flying, especially at night, requires the pilots' constant observation, attention, and than twice the normal rate, impacting significantly on aircrewconcentration. Aircrew fatigue may increase at more availability. (4) The high density altitude conditions common to some desert environments may restrict aircraft payload. (5) Aviation maintenance is extremely difficult in the desert, particularly if the helicopters are not operating from a hard-surfaced, fixed installation. During extended desert operations, aircraft availability could severely limit the conduct of air assault operations. (6) Doppler navigation aids, the use of a third pilot as a navigator, and other techniques make navigation relatively simple. Nevertheless, non-directional beacons should be emplaced by pathfinders to mark ACPs and/or the RP in featureless desert. Pathfinder insertions should be made by Doppler-equipped aircraft to insure accurate insertion. (7) The long distances involved in deep air assault operations may dictate the insertion of a clandestine FARRP. The AATFC may have to divert lift assets and/or ground troops to insert and/or secure this operation. (8) In conjunction with a large air assault, platoon or company team raids may have to be conducted against known ADA sites along the flight routes. Attack helicopters, instead of escorting the lift element to and from the LZ, may laager enroute and in the vicinity of the objective to suppress enemy locations as required. d. Landing. (1) Because of the lack of terrain relief, enemy forces on key terrain may be able to observe air assaults as far as 10 to 20 kilometers away, even at night with the aircraft flying NOE. If surprise is to be achieved, the AATFC has two landing options: (a) Land on, or immediately adjacent to, the objective. (b) Land 10 to 20 kilometers away and foot march to the objective. (2) If the LZ is on or near the objective, pathfinders should be inserted to mark the RP. If the LZ is some distance from the objective, pathfinders should mark the LZ itself. (3) The special considerations for loading, listed in subparagraph 11-3b, also apply to landing. Because of the additional time required to move from a trail or staggered trail movement formation to a line or echelon landing formation, the RP may be placed 10 to 15 kilometers from the LZ. e. Ground Tactical Operations. (1) Maneuver. (a) Identifying key terrain in the open desert is a complex task. Prominent hill masses become magnets for every unit seeking cover, concealment, communications, and observation, but also tend to be among the first targets of enemy artillery. In many cases, key terrain may be a small sand dune or hillock that dominates a great expanse of terrain and offers increased observation and protection without drawing attention to the unit occupying it. Units holding such key terrain will usually be widely separated and must be capable of operating independently. (b) Dismounted infantry can be effective in wadis and mountains, but once the enemy has closed to within 2000 meters in the open desert, infantry loses its freedom to maneuver or disengage. (c) In the open desert, company battle positions may be able to provide mutually supporting fires only with TOWs and mortars. Similarly, platoon positions may be able to interlock only Dragon and machine gun fires. 11-5 (d) Heavy/light operations will be routine in the desert, and the whole spectrum of missions discussed in paragraph 11-2 is appropriate to air assault forces operating in the desert. (e) Counterreconnaissance patrols are essential to ·deny the enemy vital intelligence concerning friendly dispositions. Conversely, friendly scouts should be inserted into the enemy's area to 'report his disposition .and intentions. (2) Fire Support. (a) SEAD fires are mandatory because of the increased vulnerability of helicopters to enemy ADA weapons in the open desert. (b) In a desert environment, artillery must be able to attrit enemy heavy forces at maximum range. Therefore, 155mm GS artillery support becomes essential to the successful accomplishment of the AATF's mission. The basic load of GS artillery should be tailored to include a higher proportion of Copperhead, DPICM, FASCAM, and RAP rounds. (c) Light artillery and mortars are unable to defeat enemy armored vehicles, but their fires are required to suppress enemy direct fire weapons and to keep enemy armored vehicles buttoned up. (3) Obstacles. (a) Mountains and some wadis are excellent natural obstacles which engineers can reinforce to create excellent barriers. In the open desert, however, terrain reinforcement may require minefields or antiarmor ditches 10 to 20 kilometers long if they are to produce a continuous barrier tied to naturally restrictive terrain on the flanks. Unless this major engineer effort is feasible, obstacles will be used primarily to create kill zones in the vicinity of battle positions. (b) Units must maximize the use of choke points (3 to 6 kilometers in area). Most of the terrain is too open and only at these places can the engineer effort be best utilized. Furthermore, these obstacles must be covered by direct and/or indirect fires. f. Sustaining the Force. (1) Desert logistical operations may be hindered by extended lines of communication, intermittent radio communications, and insufficient ground transportation assets. With proper planning and preparation, however, air assault forces can be sustained in the desert. (2) The AATFC should consider carefully his logistical task organization. The XO may have to remain in the rear to take charge of the task force logistical and staging base. The S4 may be forward with a large combat trains. Additional lieutenants may be assigned to assist the service platoon leader in his myriad of duties, and to command ground resupply convoys through the desert. (3) Given the increased demands on the logistical system, a dedicated logistics helicopter at the AATF level is an absolute requirement. In areas where density altitude problems significantly reduce UH-1 payload, this may mean the diversion of UH-60 aircraft to logistics missions. (4) Vehicle convoys will normally move at night under blackout drive conditions. Consider the use of motorcycle scouts to guide convoys. The MSR may be marked in the open desert by driving stakes (such as 3-foot lengths of reinforcing bar) with engineer tape strips into the ground every 200 to 400 meters. (5) Water resupply is critical to desert operations. Water must also be kept cool after it is delivered to forward units. Several methods have been identified: (a) In a position defense, an M149 water trailer with a water chiller may be delivered (by convoy or sling-loaded by UH-60) to a company battle position. If no water chillers are available, 100 to 150 pounds of potable 11-6 block ice should be placed In the wat• trailer. Water trailers should be placed under camouflage screens to shade them from direct sunlight. (b) Forward units can be resupplied using &0 g~llon water blivets and &gallon water cans. These noninsulated contain«s will not accept block Ice and during the day will keep water cool only 2 or 3 hours. This time can be extended by digging them in to at least 18 Inch• below the desert surface, and by shading them from direct sunlight. (c) Forward units can be resupplied using insulated food containers (mermlte cans) filled with block ice. Water can then be poured into these containers for chilling before being transferred to soldiers' canteens using a canteen cup. 11·7 Appendix A GLOSSARY OF TERMS -A- AAE Army Aviation Element/Air Assault Element AASLT Air Assault AATFC Air Assault Task Force Commander AATF Air Assault Task Force A/C Aircraft ACP Air Control Point ACS Air Cavalry Squadron ACT Air Cavalry Troop AD Armor Division ADA Air Defense Artillery ADMIN Administration AFSCOORD Assistant Fire Support Coordinator AH Assault Helicopter (UH 60) AKZ Armor Kill .Zone ALO Air Liaison Officer ALOC Administration and Logistics Center/Air Line of Communication AM Amplitude Modulated Radio AMB Air Mission Briefing AMC Air Mission Commander AME Airspace Management Element ANGLICO Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company AO Area of Operation APP Appendix ARTY Artillery AS Assault ASH Assault Support Helicopter (CH 47) ASL Authorized Stockage List ASP Ammunition Supply Point AT Anti-Tank ATC Air Traffic Control ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile ATOC Alternate Tactical Operations Center ATK/ATIK Attack AVIM Aviation Intermediate Maintenance AVN Aviation -B- BAME Brigade Airspace Management Element BCS Battery Computer System BDE Brigade BN Battalion BP Battle Position BSA Brigade Support Area BTC Battle Team Captain BTRY Battery A-1 -C- C2 (Also C&C) Command and Control C3 Command, Control, and Communications CACC Combat Aviation Control Center CACP Combat Aviation Command Post CAME Corps Airspace Management Element CAMS Combat Aviation Management System CAN Combat Aviation Net CAP Combat Aviation Party CAT Combat Aviation Team CAS Close Air Support CAV Cavalry CCP Communications Checkpoint CDS Container Delivery System CEO Communications-Electronic Officer CEO I Communications-Electronic Operationing Instructions CEWI Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence CFL Coordinated Fire Line CH Cargo Helicopter CHEM Chemical CL Class CLGP Cannon Launched Guided Projectile CMD Command co Company COl Current Operations and Intelligence COM INT Communications Intelligence COMSEC Communications Security CON Control COSCOM Corps Support Command CP Command Post cs Combat Support GSR Controlled Supply Rate css Combat Service Support DAO Division Aviation Officer DIV Division DISCOM Division Support Command DIVARTY Division Artillery DMD Digital Message Device DMMC Division Materiel Management Center DOS Day of Supply DPICM Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition DS Direct Support DSA Division Support Area DTOC Division Tactical Operations Center DX Direct Exchange -E- E&E Escape and Evasion EM Enlisted Man ENG/ENGR Engineer EST/ESTAB Establish EW Electronic Warfare EXJAM Expendable Jammer A-2 -F- FA Field Artillery FAAR Forward Area Alerting Radar FAC Forward Air Control FARES Forward Area Refueling Equipment System FARRP Forward Area Rearming/Refueling Point FASC Forward Area Signal Center FASCAM Family of Scatterable Mines FASCO Forward Area Support Coordinator FAST Forward Area Support Team FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area FFA Free Fire Area FFAR Folding Fin Aerial Rocket FIST Fire Support Team FLA Front Line Ambulance FLOT Front Line of Troops FM Frequency Modulated Radio; Field Manual FO Forward Observer FPF Final Protective Fires FRAGO Fragmentary Order FSB Fire Support Base FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line FSCOORD Fire Support Coordinator FSE Fire Support Element FSO Fire Support Officer FSSE Forward Service and Support Element FWD Forward -G- GDU Gun Display Unit GRP Ground Refuel Point GS General Support GSR Ground Surveillance Radar -H- HHB Headquarters and Headquarters Battery HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company HHT Headquarters and Headquarters Troop HO Headquarters HR Hour HSB Headquarters and Service Battery HSC Headquarters and Service Company -I lAW In Accordance With IFF Identify Friend or Foe INF Infantry INFO Information INT Internal IPW Interrogation Prisoner of War A-3 -J- JAAT -Joint Air Attack Team -K- KM Kilometer -L- LAPES Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System LAW Light Anti-Tank Weapon LC Line of Contact LD Line of Departure LMG Light Machine Gun LNO Liaison Officer LOGSTAT Logistics Status LZ Landing Zone -M- M Meters MAC Military Airlift Command MAINT Maintenance MBA Main Battle Area MC Mission Complete MECH Mechanized MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation METT-T Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops Available,and Time MG Machine Gun Ml Military Intelligence MM Millimeter MMC Materiel Management Center MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture MRR Mot~ized Rifle Regiment/Minimum Risk Route MSR Main Supply Route -N- NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Net Control Station Not Earlier Than No Fire Area Not Later Than Nap· of the Earth NVG Night Vision Goggle -0-OBJ Objective OH Observation Helicopter OIC Officer in Charge A4 OP OPCON OPLAN OPORD OPS (also OPONS) OPSCHED OPSEC PA PAX PL PLT POL POW PREP PZ PZCO RACO RAP RATT/RTT REM BASS RIF RFA RFL RP RAP RSR SCT SEADS SEC SEA!= ··siGiNT SIGSEC SITREP SOP SP SOD S&S S&T TAB TACAIR TACCP TACFIRE TACP TF Observation Post Operational Control Operation Plan Operations Order Operations Operations Schedule Operations Security -P- Physicians Assistant Passengers Phase Line Platoon Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Prisoner of War Preparation Pick-up Zone Pick-up Zone Control Officer -R- Rear Area Combat Operations Rear Area Protection/Rocket Assisted Projectile Radio Teletypewriter Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System Reconnaissance in Force Restrictive Fire Restrictive Fire Line Release Point Rapid Refuel Point Required Supply Rate -S· Scout Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Systems Section Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Signal Intelligence Signal Security Situation Report Standard Operating Procedures Start Point Squad Supply and Service Supply and Transport -T- Target Acquisition Battery Tactical Air Tactical Command Post Tactical Fire Direction System Tactical Air Control Party Task Force TM -Team TO -T•eOff TOC -TIICtical ()peretiom c.nter TOW -Tube Launched, Optically Trecked, Wire CommendLink Guided Mitlilt TRK Truck TRLR -Trailer .u. UH Utility Helicopter UHF -Ultre H'-Frequency Rldlo USAF -United Stltn Air Force USMC -United Stites Mlrine Corps .y. VAPI VFMED -Viluel Approach Path lndk:ltor -Verieble Format Mtaegt Entry Device VH -Very High Frequency Rldlo VIA -ByWey Of VIC -Vicinity ·W· wx -WNthtr Appendix B AIR MISSION BRIEF This is Fort Campbell Form 2672 (1 Sep 82). AIR ~·1ISSION BRIEF I. GENERAL 1. MISSION---------------------------------------------- 2. UNITS PARTICIPATING 3. 'niREAT FORCES 4. WEATHER CEILING_________VIS_________WIND__________ TEMP________~DA__________~PA SR___________ SS MR MS ILL_____________ EENT___________BMNT__________~~PZ ALT________________ LZ ALT________~PREVALENT WX~------------------------- II. FLIGHT DATA 1. TROOP LOAD_·------------------------------------------ 2. EQUIPMENT LOAD________________________________________ 3. PZ__________________~_______________TIME_____________ 4. LIFT OFF_______________________________________________ 5. ALTERNATE PZ__~~------------------TIME_____________ TIME_____________ 6. LZ TIME_____________ 7. ALTERNATE LZ 8. DECEPTION MEASURES____________________________________ 9. PENETRATION POINTS____________________________________ 10. FLIGHT ROUTE TO OB~ECTIVE____________________________ II. FLIGHT ROUTE FROM OBJECTIVE__________________________ 12. ALTERNATE ROUTES TO OBJECTIVE________________________ 13. ALTERNATE ROUTES FROM OBJECTIVE______________________ 14. AIRCRAFT LINKUP POINT_________________________________ 15. AIR CONTROL POINTS--------------~------------------- 16. DOWNED AVIATOR PICK-UP POINTS________________________ 17. ABORT CRITERIA·--------------------------------------- 18. ENEMY AD LOCATIONS____________________________________ I 9 . SEAD MEASURES A. B. c. D. 20. GUN TARGET LINES______________________________________ 21. PROMINENT FEATURES ON ROUTES/LZ A. B. c. D. E. 22. AIRCRAFT FORMATION LIFT ATK CAV 23. AIRCRAFT SPEED 24. AIRCRAFT ALTITUDE 25. AIRCRAFT CRANK TIME 26. PATHFINDERS 27. EXTRACT ION TIME 28. EXTRACTION PZ 29. ALTERNATE EXTRACT ION PZ B-1 I Ill. TACTICAL PLAN 1 . GROUND TACTICAL PLAN_________________ 2. FIRE SUPPORT PLAN________________________________ 3. AIR CAVAl.RY 4. ATTACK HELICOPTER 5. LIFT AIRCRAFT 6. TAC AIR 7. ORDINANCE 8. HAN) OFF POINT 9. A I RCRAFT SECURITY FORCE IV. COMMIJN I CATIONS FREQUENCY CALL·SIGN 1. BATTALION Ca.1MAND 2. ~ER 3. S· 3 4. S·3 AIR 5. FSO 6. CAP 7. o:IMPANY c:ot.'MAND 8. <:ClMMNDER 9. FIST 10. CAT 11. FIRE SUPPORT 12. QUICK FIRE 13. AIR ASSAULT 14. CAN 15. AMC 16. ATTACK 17. CAV 18. LAAGER SITE SECURITY FORCE A. ~/CONTROL B. COMMIJN I CAT ION W/GROUND FORCE c. DEPARTURE SEQUENCE D. ALTERNATE LAAGER SITE 20. PZ CONTROL 21. PATHFINDERS 22. CEOI IN EFFECT TIME CHANGE 23. IFF MODE 4 KY 28 24. CHALLENGE PASSWORD v. MARKINGS I. PANELS z. STROBES 3. BEAN BAGS 4. PYROTEOfll cs 5. SMOKE 6. LIGHT GUN 7. FLASHLIGHTS WITH FILTERS VI. CODE WORDS I. CLEAN 6. ALTERNATE LZ 2. SECURE 7. ALTERNATE PZ 3. HOT 8. REQUEST RESUPPLY 4. COLD 9. FIRE PREP 5. ABORT 10. REQUEST EXTRACTION--- VII. SYNCHRONIZE WATCHES TIME ZONE ~ VIII. MISCELLANEOUS AIR TABLE______________ 8·2 Appendix C FIRE SUPPORT 1. INTRODUCTION. Fire support is the collective and coordinated employment of mortars, field artillery, attack helicopters, close air support, naval gunfire, and other fires in support of battle plans. The mission of fire support is to suppress, neutralize, or destroy surface targets with indirect fires and close air support aircraft, using guns, cannons, rockets, bombs, and missiles. GENERAL. While the maneuver commander is responsible for the integration of all fires with the maneuver plan,2. the Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) is his principal assistant for the proper integration and application of fire support. Working together as a team, the supported commander and the FSCOORD generate the maximum combat power available to support the ground forces. 3. ORGANIZATION. Fire Support Delivery Svstems: The air assault brigade is unique in its mission and organization and so are a. its support elements. They are specifically tailored to be integrated into an air assault brigade task force. The indirect fire assets are light and maneuverable by ground and air, capable of maintaining the fast pace of the brigade. The fire support delivery means available to the air assault brigade may include: (1) 81 mm Mortars. Organic to each battalion in the brigade is a platoon of nine 81 mm mortars. They are used to provide close-in indirect fire support. 105mm Towed Artillery Battalion. Each brigade is supported by a habitually associated direct support (2) (DS) field artillery battalion, consisting of three firing batteries with six light howitzers each. When the air assault brigade is operating as an independent task force, an additional firing battery of six medium howitzers may be attached to the direct support battalion. (3) Air Defense Artillery -Supporting air defense artillery (ADA) can be called upon to provide direct fire support when the situation demands and the commander so directs. In most cases, USAF aircraft {A-10, A-7, or F4) will be available to provide (4) Close Air Support (CAS) close air support. Requests for these aircraft are processed through the TACP collocated with the AATF. {5) Naval Gun Fire -Navy cruisers and destroyers provide fire support, when available in the area. Naval gunfire spotters from a USMC ANGLICO may be attached to the AATF to control these fires. The direct support artillery battalion commander is the Brigade Fire b. Fire Support Coordination System: Support Coordinator (FSCOORD). His full·time representative, the Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO). remains at the brigade TOC as part of the brigade commander's operations staff. There, the FSO acts as the primary advisor to the brigade commander and his staff on the collective employment of mortars, field artillery, close air support, and other fire support delivery systems. He coordinates the employment of available weapon systems, linking fire power with maneuver in order to provide maximum support for the task force. Fire Support Officer/Fire Support Team (FSO/F 1ST) Organization and Responsibilities: Fire support(1) personnel from the direct support field artillery battalion are located throughout the brigade, down to and including platoon level. Fire support personnel are trained to function as an integral part of the task force. In accomplishing their mission, fire support personnel must accompany their respective ground commanders during all phases of air assault planning and execution to insure their mutual support. The Brigade AFSCOORD establishes the brigade fire support coordination facility at the brigade (a) TOC. The brigade Fire Support Element (FSE) is configured as follows: C-1 1. Personnel. One officer and three enlisted personnel (one 04, one E7, and two E4's). 2. Equipment. PAC 74 1 EachPRC77 2 EachVRC46 2 Each*KY 57 (Vinson Secure) 1 Each* KY 38 (Nestor Secure) 1 Each1Y.. Ton Truck w/% Ton Trailer 1 EachVFMED Computer Terminal 1 Each *NOTE: One or the other will be available, but not both. (See illustrations on page C3.) (b) Responsibilities of the brigade AFSCOORD include: 1. Advising the commander on fire support delivery system capabilities and limitations. 2. Keeping higher and lower FSEs informed of the supported force's situation and its firesupport needs. 3. Exchanging battlefield information between the artillery and maneuver units. 4. Recommending fire support coordinating measures in support of tactical operations. 5. Preparing and disseminating fire support documents, records, and reports. §.. Advising the supported commander and other fire support representatives on friendly andenemy fire support matters. ?..: Coordinating the integration of fire support into the battle plan. !"!_. Preparing and executing the TF commander's fire support plan. !!_. Monitoring requests for fire support and analyzing targets for attack by fire support assets. (2) The direct support artillery battalion also provides a fire support element to each maneuver battalion.The battalion FSE is headed by a FSO and is configured as follows: (a) Personnel: One officer and three enlisted personnel (one 03, one E7, and one E4). (b) Equipment: PAC 77 1 Each KY 57 (VINSON Secure) 2 Each VRC46 2 Each 1Y.. Ton Truck w/% Ton Trailer 1 Each VFMED Computer Termininal 1 Each (See illustrations on page C-4 .) C-2 BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT L----.J VRC-46 ~~ PRC-77 PRC-77 PRC-74 *KY-57 *KY-38 E7 E4 E4 VFMED (COMPUTER 53 38 84 TERMINAL) *NOTE: One or the other will be available, but not both. C-3 BATTALlON FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT L-----J VRC·46 ~ KY-57PRC·77 KY·57 E7 E4 E4 CPT VFMED(COMPUTERTERMINAL) 53 39 C-4 " ·.:~ -. "· _, ·,·. ' ' .;: ·._-' .·. i~... ;.:.;: ,~-.-, .. •_:~~.~·f.~,¥-4o,l;...:1;.;..(•...... ,... •..•••."""......_ ... , ---~-,_,;,.... _. ··-.•.•;. .. ·......,_., ... : ••. _,. -~-. ·····-··--... --~--. -----· ..:.. (c) Responsibilities of the battalion FSO include: Advising the supported commander and staff on all fire support matters, both friendly u 1 enemy. 2. Insuring duplication of fires is avoided at all times. 3. Planning and coordinating all fire support in the sector of the supported force. 4. Preparing and executing the battalion fire support plan. ~· Monitoring requests for fire support and substituting weapon systems as warranted. §., Advising other fire support representatives (e.g., mortars, ADA, ATK, and ALO) of the current fire support plan. L Assisting in the integration of fire support into the AATF battle plans. !i Exchanging battlefield information between the field artillery and the supported unit. ~ Recommending and adhering to the fire support coordinating measures. (3) Each rifle company is supported by a Fire Support Team (F 1ST). DMD (COMPUTER TERMINAL) *Mountiiilcle ~ ~~LL-. '''I•·TonTruck PRC-77 * GRC-160 * 'I•·Ton Trailer E5 E3 E5 E3 E5 E3 ~flii)~ KY·57 -KY-57 KY-57 DMD DMD DMD (COMPUTER (COMPUTER (COMPUTER TERMINAL) TERMINAL)• TERMINAL) FIRE SUPPORT TEAM 53 40 c-s (a) The rifle company FIST is organized into four elements: a FIST HO supporting the companycommander and a Forward Observer Party for each of the three rifle platoons. 1. TheFISTChief: a. Plans, coordinates, and executes fire support. b. Advises on fire support matters. c. Integrates fire support into company battle plans. d. Resolves fire support conflicts and eliminates duplications. e. Assigns target numbers. f. Coordinates FO party activities. 9..: Keeps the battalion FSO informed. ~· The Forward Observer Party: a. Calls for, adjusts, and directs fire support. b. Keeps the platoon leader informed on the fire support situation and accompanies him in combat. c. Selects and locates targets and reference points. d. Selects observation posts and movement routes. e. Prepares and submits FO reports. (b) FSO/F 1ST communications nets are as shown: C-6 l2SJ (BNFSO) FSE ~ (BDE FSO) X ~ FSE FDC F3 l2SJ(BNFSO) FSE ~ I [!]--............: FDC Fl _:F:3~.=-------- ':lNG BTRY) '\ * RELAY CAPABILITY TO BN FDC THRU BCS FSO/FIST COMMUNICATIONS NETS ~ FIST 3 TEAMS FIST 3 TEAMS FIST 3 TEAMS 53 41 84 Appendix D REFERENCES FM 1-100 Combat Aviation Operations FM 1-103 Airspace Management and Army Air Traffic in a Combat Zone FM 6-1 TACFIRE Operations FM 6-20 Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations FM 6-20-1 Field Artillery Cannon Battalion FM 7-20 The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger) Infantry, Airborne and Air Assault Brigade Operations FM 7-30 FM 11-50 Combat Communications Within the Division FM 11-50J Combat Communications in the Division FM 11-35 Aeroscout Procedures FM 17-50 Attack Helicopter Operations FM 17-95 Cavalry FM 24-1 Combat Communications FM 34-1 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations FM 34-12 Collection and Jamming Company Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) FM 34-21 Military Intelligence Bn (CEWI) Corps FM 44-3 Air Defense Artillery Employment Chapparai/Vulcan FM 44-18 Air Defense Artillery Employment Stinger FM 47-38 Pathfinder Operations FM 71-2 The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force FM 71-101 Infantry, Airborne and Air Assault Division Operations Employment of Army Aviation Units in a High Threat Environment FM 90-1 FM 90-3 Desert Operations FM 90-4 Airmobile Operations FM 100-5 Operations FM 100-10 Combat Service Support FM 100-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics TC-6-20-3 Fire Support Operations in Brigade Size Units TC 101-5 Control and Coordination of Division Operations TRADOC Pam 525-XX US Army Operational Concept for Airspace Management RB 1-1-5 Command and Control of Combat Operations RB 101-999 Staff Officer's Handbook Manual: The.Air Assault Brigade Task Force: How to Fight 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Tactical Standing Operating Procedures 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Readiness Standing Operating Procedures 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Commander's Green Tab Memoranda 101 st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Combat Service Support Standing Operating Procedures 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Planning Factors Book 1 01st Aviation Group Aviator 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Implementation Letter for Combat Aviation Command Post Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 8 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 9 ARTEP 7-15 Army Training and Evaluation Program for Infantry Battalions ARTEP 100-1 Maneuver Brigade Command Group and Staff How to Fight Series TV Tapes 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Commander's Notes for 12 Feb 83 Chief of Staff, Army Conference Carlisle Barracks, PA. 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Air Assault School, The Air Assault Handbook CAM Reg 95-1, Fort Campbell Aviation Policies and Procedures D-1 '(:U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTIN.G.O~.FICE ·;.~984"-7.50~720/90)9 Region #4