IG-11.25 MAY 1976 BISO /~ BASIC RADIOLOGICAL OfffNSf OFFICfR INSTRUCTOR GUIDE • ~.~ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY • IG-ll.25 May 1976 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE FOR BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY STAFF COLLEGE BATTLE CREEK, MICHIGAN • • CONTENTS Page LESSON PLAN TITLES AND SCOPES l INFORMATI ON FOR THE INSTRUCTOR 5 LESSON PLANS : l . Introduction and Role of RADEF in Civil Preparedness l-l 2 . Basic Concepts of Nucl ear Radiation 2-l 3 . Effects of Nuclear Weapons 3-l 4 . Radioactive Fallout 4-l 5 . Civil Preparedness Radiological Instr uments 5-l 6 . Protection from Nuclear Radiation 6-l 7 . Biological Effects 7-l 8 . Fallout Forecasting 8-l 9 . Quiz No . l 9-l l O. Monitoring Techniques and Operations lO-l ll. Exposure and Exposure Rate Cal culations il-l l2. Fallout History Curves l 2-l l 3 . Development of a RADEF Capability l 3-l l 4 . QQiz No . 2 l 4-l l 5 . Source Handling Techniques l 5-l l 6 . Planning and Directing Monitori ng Operations l 6-l l 7 . Reporting Requirements and Procedures l7-l l8. Radiation Exposure Countermeasures l 8-l i Page • 19-1 19. RADEF Emergency Operations Planning 20-1 20. National Civil Preparedness Program 21. Quiz No. 3 21-1 22-1 22. Basic Concepts of an EOC 23. Course Examination 23-1 24. Examination Review 24-1 25. Course Summary and Graduation 25-1 ii BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER LESSON PLAN TITLES AND SCOPES Time INTRODUCTION AND ROLE OF RADEF IN CIVIL PREPAREDNESS -Lesson Plan No. l l.O Welcome and administrative announcements; the threat; concept of organization; examination of course schedule. BASIC CONCEPTS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION -Lesson Plan No. 2 2. 0 Introduction; definition, classification, and basic concepts of matter; atomic structure --the three basic particles; isotopes of the elements; the source and nature of radioactivity; modes of decay; ionization; units of radioactivity and radiation measurement; instructor reference tables. EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -Lesson Plan No. 3 l.5 Introduction; characteristics of nuclear weapons; blast and shock; thermal pulse and fire; electromagnetic pulse; and initial nuclear radiation. RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT -Lesson Plan No. 4 l.O Sources, formation and distribution of radioactive fallout; factors affecting the dispersion of fallout; example fallout patterns and magnitude of the threat. CIVIL PREPAREDNESS RADIOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS -Lesson Plan No. 5 2.0 Principles of radiation detection; types of instruments; theory of operation for dosimeters and survey meters; operational check and use of instruments. PROTECTION FROM NUCLEAR RADIATION -Lesson Plan No. 6 l.5 Ionization, time, distance, barrier shielding, geometry shielding, shielding effectiveness of building materials . BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS -Lesson Plan No. 7 2.0 Short-and long-term exposure; radiation sickness; levels of sickness; cell damage; beta burns; ingestion of fallout; inhalation of fallout; late effects of radiation lnJury; care of radiation casualties; effects of fallout on plants; effects of fallout on livestock. l Time • FALLOUT FORECASTING -Lesson Plan No. 8 2 . 0 Introduction; purpose of DF messages; use and limitations of fallout forecasts; basic data requirements; weapon yield and cloud dimensions; transmission of DF data; decoding DF messages; selecting correct DF time group; identifying DF data points; plotting DF vector indicators; streamline analysis; fallout forecast template; initial fallout forecast plotting procedures; update fallout warnings; plotting exercises. QUIZ NO. l -Lesson Plan No. 9 Ten multiple-choice questions on selected points in lesson plans Nos. 1 through 8. MONITORING TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS -Lesson Plan No. 10 Shelter area monitoring ; unsheltered exposure rates; unsheltered exposures; personnel exposures; area monitoring; exposure rate readings from dosimeters; monitoring operations; peacetime operations; shelter operations; monitoring and reporting station operations; supporting emergency operations; guidance for independent operations. EXPOSURE AND EXPOSURE RATE CALCULATIONS -Lesson Plan No. ll Introduction; multiple decay; use of nomograms; exposure rate nomogram; exposure rate problems; entry time -stay time -total exposure ncmogram; exposure problems; entry t ime problems; stay time problems. FALLOUT HISTORY CURVES ~ Lesson Plan No. 12 Fission products half-life; decay characteristics; fractionation; weathering effects; plotting of fallout curves for single and multiple weapon detonations; determining decay exponent; computing exposure and exposure rates from representative history curves. DEVELOPMENT-OF A RADEF CAPABILITY-Lesson Plan No. 13 Criteria for selection of locations with a monitoring capability; selection and training of monitors; decontamination; the RADEF staff; Federal assistance; tests and exercises; standards for local civil preparedness; program paper. 2 . 5 1.5 2.0 2.0 l.O QUIZ NO. 2 -Lesson Plan No. l4 Questions and problems on selected points in lesson plans Nos . lO through l3. SOURCE HANDLING TECHNIQUES -Lesson Plan No . l5 Equipment included with DCPA training source sets; discussion and demonstration of the proper care, maintenance and techniques of handling the individual sealed sources included in the set; hazards involved in handling the training source set and general protective measures required; legal regulations governing the possession, use and storage of the training source sets. PLANNING AND DIRECTING MONITORING OPERATIONS -Lesson Plan No . l6 Review of monitoring operations; mobile monitoring (including aerial monitoring); areas of monitoring operations; practical exercise on planning and directing monitoring operations. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES -Lesson Plan No . l7 Introduction; information requirements; reporting criteria; reporting channels; types of reports ; Weapons Effects Reporting System; State and local systems; reporting time ; reporting frequency; summary. RADIATION EXPOSURE COUNTERMEASURES -Lesson Plan No. l8 Introduction; the basic counter.me~sures; time phasing of RADEF operations; hazards and goals of each phase of RADEF operations; radiological defense as a countermeasure system; basic elements of the countermeasure system; remedial movement; other peripheral countermeasures ; applied shielding; diking or clearing; exposure sharing; mutual shielding of people; and summary. RADEF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANNING -Lesson Plan No . l9 Introduction; the planning process sequence; organization of a local emergency operations plan; the radiological service plan: organization and contents, execution and operational responsibilities, st andard operating procedures; coordination functions; some basic planning assumptions; conclusions. Time .5 l.5 2.0 l.5 l.O l.O 3 Time • NATIONAL CIVIL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM -Lesson Plan No. 20 l.O Introduction; definition of civil defense and civil preparedness; objectives of civil defense; responsibility for civil defense; history and organization of civil preparedness; the National Shelter Program; warning and communications systems; emergency operations system; radiological defense system; financial assistance; training and education; information activities; additional support; research and development; traditional program elements; current program emphasis; summary. QUIZ NO. 3 -Lesson Plan No. 21 .5 Multiple-choice and matching questions in lesson plans Nos. 15 through 20. on selected points BASIC CONCEPTS OF AN EOC -Lesson Plan No. 22 1.5 Introduction; basic concepts of emergency operating centers; the EOC layout, including displays -their purpose and use, principal s£aff positions in the_EOC and their functions, and communications in the EOC; the role of the Disaster Analysis Group in the EOC (Chief, Hazard Evaluator, RADEF Officer, and Damage Assessor); direction and control exercise; and conclusion. • COURSE EXAMINATION -Lesson Plan No. 23 l.O Written multiple-choice questions covering material presented in the course; problem-solving questions designed to test the participant's ability to apply the techniques learned in the course. EXAMINATION REVIEW -Lesson Plan No. 24 .5 Discussion of the examination questions and the school solution. COURSE SUMMARY AND GRADUATION -Lesson Plan No. 25 Written evaluations, oral evaluations, awarding of certificates. 4 INFORMATION FOR THE INSTRUCTOR The purpose of the Basic Radiological Defense Officer course is to quali~y selected individuals to serve as Radiological Defense Officers • in nuclear attack emergencies. It provides the basic knowledge anf. skills necessary to perform the fUnctions required of a Radiological Defense Officer at the local level of government. The objectives of the course are to enable the participant to : 1. Serve as Radiological Defense Officer for his jurisdiction. 2. Prepare a radiological defense plan for his jurisdiction. 3· Develop a radiological defense capability for his jurisdiction. 4. Provide counsel to government officials for applying appropriate countermeasures in a radiation affected area. • 5. Plan and direct monitoring operations consistent with prescribed operational regulations and procedures • 6. Develop an understanding of the fundamental concepts, techniques and procedures needed in providing technical radiological guidance. 7. Develop an understanding of radiological defense and its relationship to other elements of civil defense. Prerequisi te for attendance at the course is that participants should have an assignment or potential assignment for the r~diological defense of a State, county, local jurisdiction or facility . Participants must be qualified Radiological Monitors through success~ completion of: (1) Radiological Monitoring (RM-16 Hour) or (2) Introduction to Radiological Monitoring (HS-3) and eight 18) additional hours of classroom instruction or (3) equivalent training. The previously listed prerequisites provide the basic essentials in • radiological defense necessary for attendance at this course . Experience indicates that persons without this minimal training will have difficulty in completing the course • • 5 INSTRUCTOR PREPARATION This instructor guide is designed as an aid to the instructor. He should not read the lesson text verbatim to his students. He should add pertinent information about the State radiological defense procedures which will not be included in the guide. Before beginning each training course, the instructor should study this instructor guide as well as the reference and resource material supplied to him while attending the radiological sequence of courses. Special attention should be given to ,the material received during the RADEF Instructor Workshop since this course is designed to prepare future instructors in the RADEF program. The instructor should also be thoroughly familiar with his State's radiological defepse organization and operations plan. In general, all exercises and other course materials do not identify specific cities, States, time zones, or other types of information which would relate them to specific areas within the United States. Therefore, they should be applicable for teaching general concepts, principles, and techniques in all States. Undoubtedly, some student learning value is lost when using a nondescriptive piece of geography. For this reason, the instructor should make every effort to relate the prepared materials to his State. SCHEDULING This instructor guide consists of twenty-five lesson plans. Since each instructor will approach the teaching of each lesson plan in a slightly different fashion, no attempt has been made to combine the lesson plans into blocks of instruction. It is felt that this approach will permit the instructor a greater amount of freedom in scheduling the various sessions in his RADEF training program. Generally, the units shculd be taught in the order listed in the "Lesson Plan Titles and Scopes" section since several of the lesson plans expand on the concepts, techniques, and skills presented in an earlier lesson. The lesson plans in this guide include the mlnnnum concepts, techniques, skills, and procedures required by a RADEF Officer. Students are expected to attend all sessions. There are several units that, if missed, would destroy the continuity and understanding of the remaining portions of the course. Recognizing that some absences are unavoidable, the instructor should make provision for makeup sessions. 6 • FACILITY RE~UIREMENTS The following is a list of criteria which should be helpful to the instructor in selecting a location for the training course if it is conducted in the field. This list represents an ideal classroom and should be used as a guide only. It is recognized that effective instruction can be presented under less than ideal conditions • • A. Tables and chairs: l. Tables and chairs are preferred to armchairs. 2. Minimum tabletop working area per student: 36" x 30". 3. Chairs should be comfortable and not contribute distracting noises. B. Room arrangement: l. A 4' aisle should be provided down the center of the room. This path is utilized to assist students, for issuing and collecting materials, and for visual aid projection. 2. Four feet (4') side aisles should be provided for student and instructor access. 3· Three and one-half feet (3~') should be provided between the rows of student tables for student and instructor access. 4. It is desirable to have additional tables and chairs for small group work, such as in the exercise on monitoring operations. This minimizes distractions caused by frequent room rearrangements. C. Room lighting and acoustics: l. Lighting should be adequate. 2. Provisions should be made for darkening the room while showing films or filmstrips. However, low level perimeter lighting is desirable to allow students to take notes. 3. Acoustics should be checked for clear voice transmission. D. Personnel comfort: l. Temperature and fresh air should be controlled for instructor • and student comfort. 2. Restrooms should be convenient to the classrooTI. PRECOURSE CHECKLIST A. Thirty-five millimeter (35 mrn.) slide projector. B. Sixteen millimeter (l6 mm.) film projector. C. Projection screen. 7 D. E. F. G. H. . Chalkboard, chalk and erasers . Lectern. • Radiological equipment per instructor and group of two students (minimum): l. One CD V-700 2. One CD V-715 • 3· One CD V-717 4. One CD V-138 5. One CD V-742 6 . One CD V-750 7. Batteries for the above instruments. Student References: • l. "Radiological Defense Textbook," SM-ll. 22-2 2 . "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual," SM-ll.25 3. "DCPA Attack Environment Manual,'' Chapters l through 6, CPG 2-lAl through CPG 2-lA6 4. "Handbook for Radiological Monitors," FG-E-5.9 5. "Handbook for Aerial Radiological Monitors," FG-E-5.9 .l 6 . "User's Manual, Meteorological Data for Radiological Defense," FG-E-5.6/l 7. "Radiological Factors Affecting Decision Making in a Nuclear Attack," NCRP Report No. 42 8 . Current DCPA Annual Report. The primary mode of visual support for this course is 35 mm. (2" x 2") slides. Packets of' slides should be requested through normal civil preparedness supply channels to your Regional Headquarters. Once received, it will be necessary to rearrange the slides in the sequence shown in each lesson plan indicated below: Le sson Plan Lesson Plan Number Titles 1 Introduction and Role of RADEF in Civil Preparedness (A-01 -A-04) 2 Basic Concepts of Nuclear Radiation (A-61 -A-95) 3 Effects of Nuclear Weapons (A-27 -A-60) •4 Radioactive Fallout (A-96 -A-134) 5 Civil Preparedness Radiological Instruments (A-135 A-163) 7 Biological Effects (A-164 -A-196) 8 Fallout Forecasting (A-281 -A-289) 10 Monitoring Techn~ques and Operations (A-214 -A-280) 12 Fallout History Curves (A-290 -A-309) 13 Development of a RADEF Capability (B-02 -B-15) 15 Source Handling Techniques (C-16 -C-40) 1 6 Planning and Directing Monitoring Operations (B-81 B-100) 8 Lesson Plan Lesson Plan Number Title l7 Reporting Requirements and Procedures (B-30 -B-48)l8 Radiation Exposure Countermeasures ·(A-3l0 -A-325 )l9 RADEF Emergency Operations Planning (B-72 -B-80)20 The National Civil Preparedness Program (A-05 -A-25) I. The following l6 mm. films and videotape have been selected for use in the appropriate lesson plans as indicated. Requests for these visual aids should be made through normal civil preparedness supply channels to the State civil preparedness agency well in advance of the course to assure that they will be available when needed. Lesson Plan Number Film/Videotape Title 3 Videotape -Electromagnetic Pulse (EMF) 3 Nuclear Detonations -The First Sixty Seconds, DOD CD 3-2ll 4 About Fallout, DDCP 3-220 7 Radiation Effects on Farm Animals • lO Radiological Monitoring Techniques, Part II, Area Monitoring, DOD CD 3-2l2 22 Emergency Operating Centers -The Basic Conce,Pts J. Quizzes and Examination: l. Quiz No. l 5 . Student Answer Sheets 2. Quiz No. 2 6. Answers for Quizzes and 3 · Quiz No. 3 Examination 4. Course Examination K. Miscellaneous: As appropriate, straightedge, pi n, fallout forecasting template, hairline, compass, protractor, log-log graph paper, etc . Student and Instructor references may be obtained through normal civil preparedness supply channels or as shown in the 11 DCPA Publications Catalog, 11 MP-20 . CONDUCTING THE COURSE At the beginning of each class period, the instructor should br iefl y review the material presented in the previous period. At the conclusion, he should summarize the material presented during the period and give a brief preview of the next period. Students should be given opportunities to participate in the course as much as possible . They should have a chance to ask questions, express ideas, and relate appropriate e>~e • r i ences . Periodical ly, quest ions should be asked of students to determine if they understand what is being taught. Convenient breaks should be allowed; generally, after every hour of instruction. The time indicated on each lesson plan does not provide for such breaks . Each student should be assigned a number at the time of registration. This "student number" should be used when posting the results of the quizzes and examination, and when making student assignments . When recording the results of the quizzes and examination, it is suggested that t he i nstructor prepare: (1) a grade sheet for his files to include the name and number of each student, (2) identical grade sheets for the State and the DCPA Region, and (3) a fourth grade sheet to include student numbers only, for posting the results of the quizzes and examination. See the sample grade sheet at the end of this section. All students (1) must complete each quiz and the course examination, (2) must make a final score of 60 or above, and (3) must attend all periods of instruction (or attend "makeup" sessions)inorder to-successfully complete the course . Students who do not meet the above criteria will not be issued certificates of successful completioL. 10 GRADE SHEET Basic Radiological _Defense Officer Course Date ---------------- Student No. Name MAXIMUM SCORE: l lO 2 20 _3_ l5 4 55 5 lOO • r' l. 2. 3. Quiz No. Quiz No. Quiz No. l 2 3 4. 5. Course Examination Final Score ll • LESSON PLAJT NO. 1 COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: Introduction and Role of RADEF in Civil Preparedness TIME: 1.0 Hour OBJECTIVES : At the conclusion of this unit the participant will be better able to: 1. Relate the purpose and objectives of the course to his own particular needs. 2. Identify the role of radiological defense in civil preparedness. 3. Give a resume of the forthcoming activity and areas of instruction. SCOPE: Welcome and afuninistrative announcement; the threat; concept of organization; examination of course schedule. REFERENCES: Instructor and Participant: "Radiological Defense Textbook," SM-ll.22-2 "Handbook for Radiological Monitors," FG-E-5. 9 REQUIREMENTS: l. Instructor: a. Projection equipment 2 11 b. Set of 2" x slides (A-01 -A-04) c. Course Schedule d. Class Roster 2. Participant: Course notebook as appropriate • 1-1 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS A . WELCOME AND l. Officially open the course by announcing the ADMINISTRATIVE title. Welcome the course participants . ANNOUNCEMENTS 2 . Provide administrative details : restroom locations; expected time of coffee breaks; ® WELCOME TO luncheon plans ; procedure for taking incomingThe calls; class requirements; etc. Basic Radiological Defense Officer Cour se VISUAL A-01 B. THREAT 1 . The nature of nuclear weapons and the available means of delivering them preclude complete military protection. All sectio~s of the Nation are vulnerable . Any industrial or population center, or military area is a potential target and could be destrojred. VISUAL A-02 2. It is assumed that a nuclear weapon attack would produce a serious radioactive fallout hazard. The high exposure rates would severely limit most types of surface opers. t ions and would threaten the survival of • unprotected persons. 3. The contamination of large areas and the potentially lethal radiation exposures establish the need ~or a means of evaluating and controlling the radiation hazard. 4. Within certain radii, severe structural damage of buildings will occur. Multiple f .:..res can be ignited by the intense heat of a weapon burst. A reporting of these weapons effects should be made . 5. The system which measures, observes, reports, and analyzes t he above conditions to be used for evaluation and control is called radiological defense . C • CONCEPT OF 1. In the event of a nuclear attack, radiological ORGANIZATION defense is an indispensable service ~o all civil preparedness organizations and their operations . Trained radiological defense 1-2 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS (RADEF) personnel will furnish weapons effects and related information to facilities called Emergency Operating Centers (facilities designed to permit essential personnel to continue operating under adverse (i.e., nuclear attack) conditions). VISUAL A-03 This will be discussed in detail later on. Their services will be required before, during, and after an attack until the radiological hazard diminishes to the point where normal activities may be resumed without s i gnificant danger to the population of a community. • 2. DCPA continues to emphasize the importance of an effective radiological monitoring and reporting system. Each State and local community is encouraged to develop its own system to provide for its own operational requirements. A "hard core" type radiological defense (RADEF) system should be developed for each "local operating zone." A "local operating zone," defined, is the level of organization at which action to protect life and property could be directed and controlled. All radiological monitoring involving reporting and direction and control would be centered in the local Emergency Operating Center (EOC). Each EOC, as a mlnlffiunl, should have a trained RADEF Officer assigned to the staff. 3. Monitoring and reporting stations are selected for their geographical dispersion, communications capability, operational_ feasibility and physical protection. It is expected that monitors in these stations will receive technical direction and supervision from their organizational RADEF Officer. 4. During the early postattack period when people are in shelter, most monitoring will be performed from monitoring and reporting • st ations and shelters. The radiological information needed by shelter occupants, and 1-3 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS by the Federal, State and local goverr_ments for survival activities will require mon itoring of areas-in-shelter and possibly out of-shelter. Surface and aerial monitoring ma:y be r equired for transportation routes or large metropolitan or geographical areas . The outside monitoring activities can only take pl ace when radiation exposure rates have decreased to the extent that limited outside activities are possible. 5. To provide the necessary RADEF information in event of a nuclear attack,* nationwide, approximately 40,000 operational monitoring and reporting stations must be established. In addition, fallout shelter space should ~e located for the U. S. population, which in 1976 is almost 215 m~llion. If the shelters averaged 1,000 spaces per facility, this would require about 215,000 facilities . Trained monitors with radiological equipment would be needed at the above facilities . 6. Each course participant should have a concept • of the RDO ' s duties . The Radiological Defense Officer courses stress the nature of these duties and help the participant relate the subject matter to his particular needs . Examination of the course schedule will provide an overview of the subject areas and relative time devoted to each. The Basic Radiol ogical Defense Officer course D. COURSE SCHEDULE: l. is designed to prepare participants to serve BASIC RADIOLOGICAL as Radiological Defense Officers in nuclear DEFENSE OFFICER attack emergencies . This course provides the •ASIC IIIA~OGIC!lliKr[f'U MnC.:II basic knowl edge and skills necessary to perform the functions r equired of a Radiological Defense COUIISt:OUTLl/'01: • ==:. ~~ :w==:.. ::.: ;:._ Officer at the l ocal l evel of government . This --=--=-==-= =...-=- --=-:=--course is a prerequisite for attending the :-:::-:-...::...=-= =-=-Advanced Radiol ogical Defense Officer course or the Radiol ogical Defense Instructor Wor~shop. VISUAL A-04 2 . As we will discuss in a later session. radiological defense is only one of marry programs to increase the tota_ civil preparedness capability. The "National Civil Preparedness Program" session will give the course partic ipant a better understanding of the relationship of radiologi cal defense with other civil preparedness activities . *Add or substitute State/local requirements if availabl e . l -4 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 3. "Basic Concepts of Nuclear Radiation" covers theory of atomic structure; symbols; terminology; characteristics of nuclear radiation; isotopes and units of measurement. 4. "Effects of Nuclear Weapons" discusses the characteristics of direct effects; blast, thermal radiation, electromagnetic pulse, and initial nuclear radiation. 5. Another effect of nuclear weapons that deserves close scrutiny is residual fallout. The session "Radioactive Fallout" covers in detail how fallout is formed. Physical factors that affect the distribution of fallout with different levels of radiation intensity are illustrated on maps. 6. Principles of nuclear radiation detection and types of DCPA instruments are detailed in the "Civil Preparedness Radiological Instruments" session. The theory of instrument operation and operational checkout is illustrated by the instructor and the student performs the operational checkout. 7. "Protection from Nuclear Radiation" involves student participation in measuring radiation exposure by applying the principles of time, distance, and shielding. Students compare the shielding effectiveness of common building materials in a laboratory exercise. 8. "Biological Effects" relates the effects of radiation exposure on whole body, skin tissues, and living cells. Also discussed are somatic and genetic effects; radiation sickness syndrome; brief and long-term exposures; biological repair and recovery; care of radiation casualties; effects of radiation on farm animals, plants, seeds, and food. 9. "Fallout Forecasting" involves the need for and uses of a fallout forecast plot. The l-5 MAJN TOPICS TEACHJNG POJNTS participant learns how to construct a plot using weather information and how to forecast areas of fallout and fallout arrival time. 10. "Monitoring Techniq_ues and Operations" depicts techniq_ues, methods, and procedures for radiological monitoring stations, shelters, aerial and surface monitoring. ll. In "Exposure and Exposure Rate Calculations" a nomogram is used to q_uickly estimate exposure of individuals or groups of individuals in certain radiological conditions. Class participants solve hypothetical problems of exposure, exposure rate, entry and stay time. 12. "Fallout History Curves" is a brief study of fission products; decay characteristics; fractionation; weathering effects; plotting of fallout curves for single and multiple weapons; calculating fallout decay exponent; computing exposure and exposure rate from • history curves. 13. The session "Development of a RADEF Capability" includes monitoring station criteria; monitoring req_uirements; training req_uirements; and Federal assistance available for RADEF development. 14. "Planning and Directing Monitoring Opera~ions" relates to the req_uirements, limitations and techniq_ues of fixed, mobile or aerial mon itoring; direction and control of monitoring activities; a review of operations performed by a monitor under fallout conditions. 15. "Reporting Req_uirements and Procedures" includes a discussion of communication for collection, analysis and dissemination of radiological data; system req_uirements and procedures; reporting freq_uency; message format and preparation. l-6 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 16. "Radiation Exposure Countermeasures" discusses ways of reducing exposure in populated areas through the employment of shielding, di king, remedial movement, exposure control, decontamination and contamination control. 17. Determining operational requirements, identi~ying and utilizing resources, plan writing and format are the topics for discussion during "RADEF Emergency Operations Planning. " 18. "The National Civil Preparedness Program" includes the historical background of civil preparedness; program elements (shelter, warning and communications, RADEF, emergency operations and control, public information, training and education, financial assistance); civil preparedness program objectives, assumptions and precepts . 19. "Basic Concepts of an EOC" discusses the rat ionale underlying the EOC concept of operations; EOC procedures and method of operations; EOC requirements. 20. As indicated on the course schedule, quizzes ar.e scheduled throughout the course . A final examination is scheduled for the final period. 21. The session on "Source Handling Techniques" is included in this course since it is felt to be essential to the job of the RDO . However, if some students will be taking the Radiological Defense Instructor Workshop after this course, it may be an optional session for them. l-7 LIST OF VISUALS Visual No. Visual Title A-Ol Course Title A-02 The Threat A-03 Radiological Defense A-04 Course Outline l-8 LESSON PLAN NO. 2 COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: Basic Concepts of Nuclear Radiation TJNE: 2 Hours OBJEC·.riVES : At the conclusion of this unit the student will be able to: 1. Explain the basic mechanisms of nature that produceradiation. 2. Identify the three major types of radiation, theirorigin, and describe the characteristics of each. 3. Define basic nuclear science terms and explain thebasic units of radioactivity and radiation measurement. SCOPE: Introduction; definition, classification, and basic concepts of matter; atomic structure --the three basic particles;isotopes of the elements; the source and nature of radio activity; modes of deca:y; ionization; units of radioactivityand radiation measurement; instructor reference tables • REFERENCES: 1. Instructor: a. "Nuclear Radiation Physics," Lapp, Ralph E., and Andrews, Howard L., New York: Prentice-Hall,Inc., 1972. b. "Sourcebook on Atomic Energy," Glasstone, Samuel,Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1967. c. "Elementary Radiation Physics," Hurst, G. S., andTurner, J. E. , New York: John .wiley & Sons, 1970. d. "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," Glasstone, Samuel,Revised 1964. e. "Atomic Age Physics," Semat, Henry & White, Harvey E.,New York: Rinehart & Company, 1959. 2. Participant : a. "Radiological Defense Textbook," Defense CivilPreparedness Agency , SM-11.22-2. b. "Int roduction to Radiological Monitoring," HS-3,a programmed learning home study course. REQUIREMENTS : Instructor :Projection equipment .Set of 2" x 2" slides (A-61 -A-95). 2-l MAIN TOPICS A. INTRODUCTION B. MATTER VISUAL A-61 VISUAL A-62 TEACHING POINTS l. The purpose of this session is to review a minimum of the basic nuclear science concepts and vocabulary in order to develop an under standing of radiological defense. 2. It is not the intent of this session to make nuclear physicists of any of the students. ~ NOTE: Clear and accurate definitions and the precise use of terms is an important outcome of this period. A few liberties have been taken with some concepts for the sake of clarity and ease of under standing. Guard against being drawn into highly technical discussions by the "academic purist." Reserve such discussions until after the class. l. Matter is defined as anything which occupies space and has weight. It can be classified according to physical and chemical pro~erties. 2. Since so many different kinds of matter exist in the universe, an important part of nuclear science is the classification of matter. 2-2 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS C. CLASSIFICATION 1. A MIXTURE is a physical combination of two orOF MATTER more substances characterized by having nodefinite combination ratio. Each substance inthe mixture retains its individual identity. 2. A COMPOUND is a chemical combination of two ormore different substances characterized by adefinite ratio of the combining substances .Regardless of where the compound, water, i sfound in the universe, it always contains two VISUAL A-63 parts hydrogen to one part oxygen. 3. An ELEMENT is a substance which cannot beseparated into substances different from itselfby ordinary chemical means . It is one of theover 100 different substances which containonly atoms of the same chemical property.Substances such as hydrogen, oxygen, iron,mercury, tin and gold are el ements . 4 . An ATOM is the smallest conceivable part ofan element which retains all the characteristicsof the element . It is also the smallest portion of an element that can enter into chemical combination. VISUAL A-64 5. A MOLECULE is the smallest part of a compoundthat can exist and still retain the chemical properties of the compound. A molecule contains two or more atoms . 6 . In summary, an atom is the smallest part of theelements hydrogen and oxyg·en. If two atoms of hydrogen and on·e atom of ·oxygen combine chemically, they form one molecule of the compoundwater. VISUAL A-65 D. CONCEPTS OF 1 . The early Greeks theorized that all matter was THE ATOM composed of tiny uniform spheres, which theycalled atoms --from the Greek words "a"meaning not, and "tomos" meaning cut. Thus,atom means "u_cuttable" or indivisible. 2-3 VISUAL A-66 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 2. At about the turn of this century, physicists discovered that the atom was not a uniform sphere. They recognized that the atom consisted of a strong positive charge at the center of the sphere and a corresponding negative charge distributed about it. The dimensions of the center charge, or nucleus , were small by compariVISUAL A-67 son t o the atom as a vrhole, about 1 to 10,000. 3 . As physicists continued to explore the structure of the atom, they found it to be similar to our solar system. The positive charge or nucle·~s assuming the role of the sun, while the negative charges moved arouna the nucleus like the planets around the sun. The negative charges, however, are not in the same orbital plane as the planets. 4. The boundaries of the negative charges are not well defined, but it is convenient for us to conceive of them as small spheres of negative electrical charges revolving about the nucleus in well defined orbits. • VISUAL A-68 5. If the nucleus were increased to the size of a marble, it would weigh about 36,000,000 tons and the closest negative charge would revolve slightly over 200 feet away . This example illustrates that most of the weight of an atom is located in the nucleus, and much of the atom is empty space. E. ATOMIC 1 . Atoms are made up of three basic subatomic STRUCTURE particles. There are: a. Protons. b . Electrons. c . Neutrons VISUAL A-69 2. The PROTON is a subatomic particle found in the nucleus of an atom, which carries. one unit charge of positive e~2qtricity. The weight of a proton is 1.6 X 10 gm . Since this is a very inconvenient number to work with, a relati weight scale is usually used to express the VISUAL A-70 weight of the proton. The approximate weight 2-4 MAIN TOPICS VISUAL A-71 VISUAL A-72 TEACHING POINTS is 1 atomic mass unit or 1 amu. The symbol "p" is used to represent the proton. NOTE: No distinction is made between mass and weight in this lesson plan. 3. The ELECTRON is an extremely light particlecarrying one unit charge of negative electricity.It is only about 1/1840 as heavy as the proton, and it is found in the orbits surrounding the nucleus. The symbol "e" is used to represent the electron. 4. The NEUTRON weighs the same as a proton (1 amu), but it carries no electrical charge. Its symbolis "n" and it is found in the nucleus. 5. The simplest element known is hydrogen, and it consists of one proton in the nucleus and one electron in orbit. The net electrical charge on the atom is zero. The second simplest element is helium with 2 protons, 2 neutrons in the nucleus, and 2 electrons in orbit. 6. As the elements increase in complexity from hydrogen through element No. 100 and greater, an additional proton is added to the nucleus with each new element. An electron is added to an orbit each time to maintain the elec trical neutrality of the atom. The neutrons added to the nucleus increase the mass of the atom but they do not change its chemical prop erties. Such properties are determined by the number of protons in the nucleus. NOTE: The instructor should point out for the first time the differences between the number of protons and neutrons in the more complex atoms --this becomes important later on. 7. The properties of each element are periodicfunctions of the number of protons in the nucleus. Therefore, the Periodic Table of the • Elements arranges them in order according to the number of protons each atom contains • Elements with similar properties will be VISUAL A-73 grouped together in columns. 2-5 MAII\T TOPICS TEACHING POINTS F. ISOTOPES l. Most of the hydrogen found in nature contains one proton in the nucleus and one orbi tal electron. A small percentage of the hydrogen atoms contains an additional neutron i n the nucleus and an even smaller percentage contains two neutrons. The chemical properties of all three types of hydrogen are identical sinceVISUAL A-74 they all contain one proton. 2 . These different forms of the same element are (' " ~ .. .. ' .... called ISOTOPES. They are like brothers v.rho have the same last name but different first ISOTOPES names. Each of the isotopes 1 "last name·" is .' ..... . "' .. hydrogen and their "first name" depends on their weight.VISUAL A-75 A simple system has been devised to distir_guish 3· between the isotopes. Each element has a one or two letter symbol. For example, "H" stands for hydrogen, "He" for helium, "U" for Urc..nium and "Fe'' for iron. VISUAL A-76 4. Each element is assigned an ATOMIC NUMBER (or Z number) which is equal to the number of protons in the nucl eus of its atoms. The atomic number is written as a subscript to the left of the el ement symbol. VISUAL A-77 5. Each of the different forms, or isotopes, of an element is assigne~-a MASS NUMBER (or A number), which is equal to the number of neutrons and protons in the nucleus of its atoms. The mass number is ~itten as a superscript to the left of the element symbol. VISUAL A-78 NOTE: Slide shows the mass (A) number as a superscript to the RIGHT of the element s·ymbol --instructor should point out this recent change to the participants. 2-6 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 6. This symbol notation will distinguish bitweenthe three isotopes of hydrogen. Thus, 1H standsfor the isotope which has only one proton, whilefH represents the isotope with one proton and oneneutron. The other isotope is written iH. 7. Most elements have two or more isotopes. Some, VISUAL A-79 like tin (element 50) have as many as 25 isotopes.There are more than 1,000 known isotopes of theelements in nature and only about 200 of theseare stable. The remainder are radioactive. NOTE: VisuiJ:l A-79 contains the symbol notation for several other isotopes. Have the students identify the element and the number of neutrons, protons, and electrons in each atom. The number of protons and electrons is equal to the atomic number, while the number of neutrons is equal to the difference between the mass number and the atomic number. G. RADIOACTIVITY l. RADIOACTIVITY is the spontaneous disintegrationof stable nuclei with the resulting emissionof nuclear radiation. 2. According to the definition, the terms radioactivity and nuclear radiation are not interchangeable. Radioactivity is a process whileVISUAL A-80 nuclear radiation is the product of this process. 3. Radioactivity is a result of the instabilityof atomic nuclei. NUclear stability is controlled by the balance that exists between twonuclear forces. The positive charge of theprotons provides a repulsive force which tendsto disrupt the nucleus. At the same time, VISUAL A-81 2-7 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS short-range attractive nuclear forces bind the neutrons and protons together. The n-n, n-p, and p-p nuclear forces are about equal. NOTE: Take time to be sure the participants understand this point. 4. If the number of neutrons is plotted against t he number of protons, a smooth curve res·.llts ~.~'lffl'ff• which lies close to a line representing aneutron to proton ratio of l and gradually increases to about 1.6. The additional neutrons ~ are necessary to overcame the extra coulo~bic " ~ ;.;.:.cA.'t~ repulsion due to the increased number of' VISUAL A-82 protons ln the heavier nuclei. NOTE: This is the first time this term has been used. Take time to explain its meaning. 5. The number of stable ratios of neutrons toprotons is limited. If the ratio lies close to the stability curve, the attractive and repulsive nuclear forces are such that the nucleus is stable. If the ratio does not lie close to the stability curve, the nucleus willbe radioactive and will emit a form of radia tion that will place the product nucleus closer to the curve. 6. There are three common types of nuclear radiation emitted from radioactive (unstable) TTPUOF nuclei. NUCUAIIIADIATlON AlPHA a. ALPHA PARTICLES (Symbol 0(, ) are identical lETA They con to the nucleus of helium atums. GAMMA tain two protons and two neutrons, and VISUAL A-83 travel about 20,000 miles per second for a distance of a few inches in air. They also carry two units of positive charge and have an approximate mass number of four. ALPHA a +2 BETA .PARTICLES (Symbol II ) are ide:'1tical b . lETA 11 -1 1/1140 They carry one to high speed electrons. GAMMA Y unit of negative charge and have a mass of VISUAL A-84 l/1840 that of a proton. They travel at speeds of 60,000 to 180,000 miles p~r second for a distance of a few meters in air. 2-8 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS c. GAMMA RAYS (Symbol r )are electro magnetic in nature and travel at the speedof light, 186,000 miles per second for great distances in air. Gamma rays have no mass and no electrical charge. They are pure energy similar to X-rays. 7. Gamma rays and X-rays, like visible, infrared and ultraviolet light, are part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Gamma rays differ from X-rays only in their origin. Gamma rays originate in the nucleus and X-rays originate in the electron fields surrounding the nucleus. VISUAL A-85 H. MODES OF DECAY NOTE: Try to go slowly on this topic to avoid unnecessary confusion of the participants. 1. In moving from the light to the heavier elements, a nucleus gets more and more positively WHiM fill QfCTIOS!AfiC I£PtltS40M M ~OTOIS IKOI.B CO&PUiiU charged. Finally, a point is reached where TO Tttl ArrtAChYl MIKllU fOtQS, the repulsive strength of the coulombic forces ,. AlrttA Punru IS £MmlD is comparable to the attractiYe nuclear forces. 11l•21' -• tilt' 'MPHA; , ....m At this point, alpha decay occurs. Generally,alpha emitters are the heavier nuclei. VISUAL A-86 ~-----~ 2. If an alpha particle is emitted from a radium 226 nucleus, the radium will 'transmute" to radon 222, which is also radioactiYe. The total number of neutrons and protons are accounted for as follows: 226R ---74He++(Alpha) + 222Rn 88 a · 2 86 3. When the neutron to proton ratio in the nucleus is too high, a beta particle may be emitted. Beta decay is characterized by a conversion inside the nucleus of a neutron into a proton and an electron. The proton remains in the nucleus while the e~ectron is called a beta particle. With the conversion of a neutron VISUAL A-87 into a proton (electron emitted) the nucleus reduces its neutron to proton ratio and assumes a new position closer to the stability curve. 2-9 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 4. If a beta particle is emitted from a phosphorous-32 nucleus, the atomic number of the product nucleus will be increased by one because of the additional proton. The total number of neutrons and protons remains the same and are accounted for as follows: + 5. When a product nucleus is left with extra energy (in an excited state) after the emission of an alpha or beta particle, gamma radiation is emi tted to carry away the extra energy. 6. If a beta particle is emitted from a cobalt 60 VISUAL A-88 nucleus the nickel 60 product nucleus is left with extra energy. This energy is emitted as gamma radiation as follows: ~~Co ) -~e (beta) + ~gNi + 2 gammas I. IONIZATION 1. IONIZATION is a process which results in the formation of electrically charged particles (ions) from neutral atoms or molecules. tONtZATION }~ 1'10~1>1 ""( H u..~( '', ,. '1111: ~ouuno• _,, 2. Ionization is the process, and the positive ill li ~4. ' ,.l' -: ~~~* ' ~"--- VISUAL A-105 ,r.o-.,, '".. -· ~~~~· . alllt!IIJIIH, VISUAL A-106 VISUAL A-107 which is designed to yield less radioactive materials than a normal weapon, while a "dirty" weapon is designed to yield more. l. The first thing that appears after the detonation of a nuclear weapon is a roughly spherical, highly luminous ball of gases called the fireball. Because of the extremely high tem. peratures, approaching that of the sun, everything in the immediate vicinity is vaporized: the fission products, the uranium or plutonium which has escaped fission, the bomb casing and other weapon parts. 2. For a surface burst, a considerable amount of rock; soil and other material located in the area will be vaporized because of the intense heat and taken into the fireball. It has been estimated that, if only one percent of the energy o:f a one megaton weapon is spent in this manner, • something l i ke 4,000 tons of vaporized soil material wil l be added to the normal constituents of the fireball. 3. Immediately after its formation, the fireball begins to grow in size, engulfing the surrounding air. At the same time the fireball rises, like a hot air balloon. 4. As the fireball increases in size and cools, the vapors condense to form a cloud containing solid particles of the weapon debris, as well as small drops of water derived from the air sucked into the rising fireball. As the cloud develops, the spherical fireball now becomes doughnut shaped with a violent internal circulatory mot ion. 5. Depending on the height of the nuclear burst and the nature of the terrain below, a strong updraft with inflowing winds, called "afterwinds," is produced in the immediate vicinity. These 4-6 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS VISUAL A-108 VISUAL A-109 -~:&;........ ~ I II II 'I TYP!{Al OOUO Hi'vHH VISUAL A-110 afterwinds can cause varying amounts of dirt and debris to be sucked up from the earth' s surface into the radioactive cloud. 6. In an air burst with a moderate ( or small) amount of dirt and debris drawn into the cloud, only a relatively small proportion of the dirt particles will become contaminated with radioactive bomb residues. This is because the particles do not mix intimately with the weapon residues in the cloud at the time when the fission products are still vaporized and about to condense. 7. In the case of a surface burst, large quantities of dirt and other debris are drawn into the cloud at early times . Mixing then occurs during the initial phases of cloud formation and growth. When sufficient cooling has occurred, the fission products and other radioactive residues become incorporated with the earth particles as a result of condensation. A small proportion of the solid particles formed upon further cooling are contaminated fairly uniformly throughout with the radioactive residues, but in the majority, the contamination is found mainly in a thin shell near the surface. 8. The cloud continues to rise as long a s it is buoyant. The eventual height depends upon the heat energy of the weapon and atmospheric conditions. The greater the heat, the higher the cloud ascends. The maximum height attained by the cloud is strongly influenced by the troposphere below it and the stratosphere above. 9. When the cloud reaches the tropopause there is a tendency for it to spread laterally, but if sufficient energy remains in the cloud at this height, a portion of it will penetrate the tropopause and ascend into the more stable air of the stratosphere . 10. The cloud attains its maximum height after about 10 minutes which is called the "time of stabilization." The dimensions of t he stabilized 4-7 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS cloud depend on the existing meteorological conditions. Approximate heights are: 100 KT -45,000 feet, l MT -70,000 feet, 10 MT -100,000 feet, 20 MT -125,000 feet. VISUAL A-lll ll. Radioactive f ission products are not uniformly distributed within the cloud. About 90% of the activity is associated with the cloud and 10% with the stem. Most of the activity is localized at the base of the mushroom cloud. Most of the radioactive material from megaton weapons which contribute to the early fal}out will be concentrated between 40,000 to 80,000 feet. VISUAL A~U2 12. As the violent disturbance due to the explosion subsides the mushroom cloud is distorted by the winds and the contaminated particles gradually fallback (or "fall out" ) to earth. The extent and nature of fallout will vary between wide extremes. E. TYPES OF FALLOUT 1. It is convenient to consider fallout in two parts, namely early and delayed. -DUA'ftb fAllOUT Yf.UtOIIT UIL'f VS DILAHO fAllOUT VISUAL A-ll3 2. Early fallout is defined as that which reaches the ground during the first 24 hours following a nuclear explosion. It i s early fallout from surface, subsurface, or low air bursts 'that is capable of producing radioactive contamination over large areas with exposure rates high enough to represent an immediate biological hazard, possibly a survival hazard. 3. Delayed fallout, which is that arr~v~ng after the first day, consists of very fine, invisible particles which settle in low concentrations over a considerable portion of the earth's surface. The exposure rates from the radioactive 4-8 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS materials are greatly reduced as a result of radioactive decay during the relatively long time (years) the .delayed fallout remains in the stratosphere. While in the stratosphere, the delayed fallout generally poses no immediate danger to health, although there may be a longterm hazard. F. EARLY FALLOUT 1. The distribution on the ground of the activity DISTRIBUTION from the early fallout, even for weapon bursts of similar size, shows great variability. Winds, particle size and particle height all influence the actual fallout deposition. 2. Larger particles fall more rapidly and carry ~~~·""' 4 ~· more activity, so that a high portion of such V"'""""' """"" -particles will lead to greater contamination w.uruna.u .......... ~ near ground zero, and less at greater distances . 'U•I~Jfllft ___..,.. • A greater portion of the smaller particles will lfi!CT 01 PARTKU SIZE require longer to fall and will land at greater distances from ground zero. VISUAL A-114 ' 1\ wntrun:m !AHL~t IJJCOI.ullltl , tOMtnfll(lf\ . -.... ~~· 'l"Ul lfiiCI 01 HIIGHT VISUAL A-ll5 3 . The wind from the ground up to the top of the radioactive cloud affects fallout distribution. The direction and speed of the wind at the cloud level will influence the motion and extent of the cloud itself. In addition, the winds at lower altitudes, which may change both in time VISUAL A-ll6 and space, will cause the fallout particles to drift one way or another while they descend to -;a~ ~,;~;u~-5~~·~' -~""'"'~· earth. Turbulence may mix the cloud debris with -----' bnrlSimllf ;;;?_ ~"room the surrounding air and break it into an irregular pattern. After several hours, the cloud -.--~ as a whole might appear as a drawn out irregular IIIICT 01 A YA111AIIll WIND ribbon with particles steadily sifting out into VISUAL A-ll1 the lower levels from each part. 4-9 MAIN TOPICS VISUAL A-ll8 VISUAL A-ll9 VISUAL A-120 VISUAL A-121 TEACHING POINTS 4. The situation may be furt her complicated by the effect of rain and of irregularities in the terrain. Precipitation t ends to clean the atmosphere and can be expected to increase the amount of fallout. It brings down particles that might otherwise float in the atmosphere for a long time. All of these variables will contribute to irregularities in the fallout patterns and to "hot spots," which are areas of much higher exposure rates than in the immediate surroundings . 5. Information concerning fallout distribution has been obtained from observations made during nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site and the Pacific Proving Grounds . Fallout patterns from these tests, based on actual monitored readings, illustrate the irregu arities in the radiation fields . • 6. Idealized fallout patterns have been devel oped which represent the average fallout field for a given yield and wind condition. Although, not attempting to account for irregularities, the idealized patterns are useful in estimating the over all effect from a single weapon detonation or a large-scale nuclear attack. 4-10 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS G. SINGLE WEAPON 1. Assume a hypothetical 20 MT surface detonation BURST on the city of St. Louis. Further, assume the existence of typical wintertime meteorological conditions. 2. At one hour the fallout pattern would be about 70 miles downwind. The exposure rates would be in excess of 3000 R/hr close to ground zero. ll•lD~UIIUm VISUAL A-122 3. By H + 7 the isochrone, or time line, marking the arrival of fallout, would be about 185 miles downwind. The pattern would be about 90 miles across. At a point 50 miles downwind from St. Louis the exposure rate would have decreased from over 3,000 R/hr at H + 1 to maybe 350 400 R/hr by H + 7. At a point 150 miles downwind the exposure rate varied from 0 at H + 1 to in excess of 50 R/hr at H + 7. These variations are due to the additional deposition of fallout material and to its decay. 4. By H + 24 the fallout pattern would extend about 470 miles downwind; just entering into eastern Pennsylvania. Exposure rates have generally decreased by H + 7 because decay has been predominate over additional deposition. 5. The cumulative unsheltered exposures for the .. first two weeks would vary from about 35,000 R close to ground zero t o about 120 R in western Ohio . ' " ' ,;; . *~• .. ;.w ::"' • '~~ "~"" ..... '·"' NOTE: Assume various shelter protection factors u auu,nn W'OWln ~ll·l ii'HU VISUAL A-125 and determine the two-week exposure in several areas for people in such shelters. • 4-11 MAJN TOPICS TEACHING POJNTS .-r I 1":.\~.J~ ' VISUAL A-126 6. Same generalizations can be made from the hypothetical detonation over St. Louis . At a given distance downwind from ground zero, some time will elapse between the detonation and the arrival of fallout . This time will depend on the distance from ground zero and the wind velocity. When the fallout first arrives, the exposure rate i s small, but it increases as more and more fallout descends . After fallout is compl ete, radioactive decay will produce a steady decrease in the exposure rate . 7. Until the fallout commences, the total exposure will be zero~ but after its arrival the total (accumulated) exposure will increase continuously, rapidly at first and then somewhat more slowly over a long period of time . 8. One method of predicting the decay of fallout after it has been deposited on the ground is by the seventen rule, whereby a sever_fold increase in time decreases the exposure rate by a factor of ten. Thus, if the rate at H + 1 is 3,000 R/hr, it would decay to 300 R/ hr at H + 7 and to 30 R/hr at H + 49 . • H. MULTIPLE WEAPON BURSTS 1. To illustrate the magnitude of the fallout situation that would exist if the entire nation should be attacked, assume the detonation of 250 weapons detonated on 144 different target areas . These areas include military, industrial and population objectives . Although other attacks may be war gamed nn the basis of more or less weapon detonati~ns , this illustration shows the essential point that most areas in the U. S. will be subjected to fall out in any l argescal e attack on ~he U. S. VISUAL A-127 2. 3. In this visual the red circles represent 50 twenty megaton surface explosions, the yellow squares represent 100 ten megaton surface bursts and the green triangles represent 100 five megaton surface bursts . Total e~ergy yiel d is 2500 megatons . At H + 1 the fallout areas would be 30 to 50 miles long, depending on wind speed. In the center of these areas the exposure rates could be greater than 3000 R7hr . VISUAL A-128 4-12 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 4. At H + 6, fallout would have spread over about 35 -40% of the national land area. However, exposure rates would have decreased considerably varying from 1 R/hr at the border to about 300 R/hr in the center of the fallout areas. VISUAL A-129 5. At H + 24 hours, approximately 70% of the country's total area would be covered by fallout exposure rates greater than .2 R/hr. VISUAL A-130 6. After one day, deca;y would predominate over fUrther deposition of fallout and the boundaries of the fallout areas w·ould start to recede. At H + 1 week about one-third of the nation 1 s area would be covered by fallout VISUAL A-131 levels exceeding .2. R/hr. 7. The reduction in exposure rates would continue until at H + 2 months only isolated elongated areas would exist where the exposure rate would exceed .2 R/hr. VISUAL A-132 8. This situation represents only one attack pattern applied to the winds a:nd weather of one da:y. If a different attack pattern, possibly 1000 weapons, or the weather for another da:y had been selected, the fallout situation would have developed quite differently. 9. Assume another hypothetical attack of 156 weapons w~th a total yield of 384 megatons • • 10. This visual shows the maximum fallout areas which might have developed using the weather ~ on a particular summer da:y in June. •• NITICIUI suaa .., • - VISUAL A-133 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS ll. Using the same ground zeros and the same weapon yields, but based on the weather of a day two weeks later, the fallout patterns in sane locations would have shifted by more than 120 degrees. On another day, the wind could change and turn safe areas in the VISUAL A-134 above situation into areas of serious fallout contamination. I. SUMMARY 1. Fission products are the most important source of radioactive material in fallout. Neutron induced activity may be important during the first two to thre.e weeks. 2. Fallout is formed by the condensation of vaporized radioacti ve bomb residues on dirt and debris particles drawn into the fireball of a nuclear surface burst. Air bursts produce negligible fallout. Early fallout deposits in the first 24 hours after detonation and constitutes an immediate • threat while delayed fallout is deposited over long periods of time and wide areas of the earth. 4. Particle size, height, winds, and precipitation determine the distribution of f allout. Fallout patterns are irregular in shape and exposure rates vary considerably. To simplif'y illustrations, idealized patterns ar e frequently used. 5. With multiple weapon detonations ser ious fallout conditions can exist over much of the nation. 4-14 • Visual No. A-96 A-97 A-98 A-99 A-100 A-101 A-102 A-103 A-105 A-106 A-107 A-108 A-109 A-llO A-lll A-112 A-ll3 A-114 A-ll5 A-ll6 A-ll7 A-118 A-ll9 A-120 A-121 A-122 A-123 A-124 A-125 A-126 A-127 A-128 A-129 A-130 A-131 A-132 A-133 A-134 LIST OF VISUALS Visual Title Fission Products are the Primary Source of Radioactive Material in Fallout Fusion Products are not an Important Source of Radioactive Material in Fallout Small .Amounts of Unfissioned U or Pu Will Be Present in Fallout Neutron-Induced Radioactive Materials Can Be Important in Fallout Some Important Neutron-Induced Radioactive Isotopes and Their Half-Lives Radioactivity of Fission Products Exposure Rate From a 1 MT Fission Weapon Assuming Uniform Fallout Distribution "Clean" vs. "Dirty" Weapons The Fireball Cutaway of Nuclear Cloud In an Airburst, Only a Small .Amount of the Dirt Particles Become Contaminated Developed Nuclear Cloud The Tropopause Influences Cloud Development Typical Cloud Heights Distributio~ of Radioactive Debris Fallout Cloud After Stabilization Early vs. Delayed Fallout Effects of Particle Size Effect of Height Effect of Wind Effect of a Variable Wind Actual Fallout Pattern Actual Fallout Pattern Actual Fallout Pattern Fallout Patterns H + 1 Exposure Rates H + 7 Exposure Rates H + 24 Exposure Rates Cumulative Exposures Through H + 2 Weeks Exposure Rate vs. Exposure Operation Sentinal Fallout Conditions at 1 Hour After Detonation Fallout Conditions at 6 Hours After Detonation Fallout Conditions 24 Hours After Detonation Fallout Conditions One Week After Detonation Fallout Conditions Two Months After Detonation Fallout Patterns on a Particular Summer Day in June Fallout Pattern for Winds Two Weeks Later 4-15 • • COURSE TITLE: LESSON TITLE: OBJECTIVES: • • SCOPE : REFERENCES: REQUIREMENTS: REMARKS: LESSON PLAN NO. 5 Basic Radiological Defense Officer Civil Preparedness Radiological TIME: 1.0 Hour Instruments Upon the conclusion of this unit the participant should be able to: 1. Explain the enclosed gas volume principles of nuclear radiation detection. 2. Enumerate the types of civil preparedness instruments, their uses and limitations. 3· Explain in general terms the theory of operation of each type of instrument . 4. Demonstrate the correct procedure for preparing instruments for operational use. Principles of radiation detection; types of instruments; theory of operation for dosimeters and survey meters; operational check and use of instruments . 1. Instructor: a. "Radiological Defense Textbook," SM-11. 22-2 . b. Appropriate instrument manuals . 2. Participant: "Radiological Defense Textbook," SM-11. 22-2. 1. Instructor: a. Projection equipment . b. Set of 2" x 2" slides (A-135 -A-163) "Radiological Instruments." c. Set of demonstration instruments (CD V-777-1). 2. Participant: One set of instruments per two students (CD V-777-1) Students can work in pairs in exam1n1ng and operationally checking the instruments . Instructors will find it helpful to have an assistant work with the students in case they have difficulty in getting the instruments to check out properly. 5-l MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS • A. INTRODUCTION 1. The purpose of this session i s t o teach t he student the pr inciples of radiation detection, the theory of operation, and the use of civil preparedness radiologi cal instruments . 2. Man is aware of his environment through his five senses . He can see, smell, taste, hear and feel . Yet none of these senses will make him aware of the presence of nuclear radiation. • VISUAL A-135 3. Since man cannot rely on his senses to det ect nuclear radiation, he must rely on some secondary means such as instrumentation. VISUAL A-136 B. PRINCIPLES OF DETECTION l . Radiological i nstruments detect the i nteraction of radiat ion with matter. Different principles are involved, depending on the nature of the interaction of the radiation with the detecting or sensing element. VISUAL A-137 2. Enclosed Gas Volume --When radiation passes through a gas , it may cause the formation of an ion pair (one positive and one negative charge ). The negative el ectron produced may cause more ioni zation in the gas until its energy is expended. The amount of radiation exposure can be determined by collecting and measuring the i on pairs on oppositely charged electrodes . 3. Other methods may be used to detect radiation such as the use of phot ographic film, chemical changes in material, or scintillation. 4. All ci vil preparedness instruments use t he same principle of radiation detection -t he encl osed gas volume . 5-2 MAIN TOPICS TEACHlNG POlNTS C. DETECTION 1. In the development of radiological instru REQUIREMENTS ments, the type of information required by the user is an important factor • • 2. Nuclear weapons tests and other types of experiments make it possible to relate radiation conditions to biological effects on man and, thus, establish equipment requirements. • 3. Weapons tests have also established that alpha, beta and gamma emitters may be present in fallout. The beta and gamma are emitted from the fission products and the alpha from the uranium or plutonium which has escaped fission. Gamma radiation is an external hazard and beta may be under certain conditions. In addition, all three types of radiation may be internal hazards • 4. Because alpha emitters will not present a significant hazard in relation to/the beta and gamma hazard immediately following a nuclear attack, and for some time thereafter, most civil preparedness instruments do not detect alpha. (A small number of CD V-700 instruments have been modified to detect alpha.) As shown in this visual, alpha radiation travels a relatively short distance in air. Its penetrating power is negligible and is very difficult to detect. Alpha emitters are principally an internal hazard. VISUAL A-138 5. Since the biological effects of beta and gamma radiation differ, instruments should discriminate between them. Measurement of beta is complicated by a very wide range of energies of these particles. Some civil preparedness instruments are designed to detect the beta contribut ion to the total radiation exposure. The units of measurement • (roentgens) on civil preparedness radiological instruments are chosen for the measurement of gamma, and these units cannot be used to measure beta. Thus civil preparedness 5-3 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS instruments only detect the presence of beta, and a meter indication of beta can be interpreted only in a general way. .. 6. All civil preparedness instruments are designed to detect ~Dd measure gamma radiation. D. I TYPES OF INSTRUMENTS •1, "Rlt!-. ..If 1 ,. ..,........ - 1. Instruments must provide two kinds of information needed for the evaluation and control of the radiological hazard from fallout. The first of these is the intensity of the radiation field whic~ is more appropriately called the exposure rate. The second is the total exposure • VISUAL A-139 2 . Exposure rate information is essential to a Radiological Defense Officer in providing guidance for emergency operations. For example, it permits the calculation of permissible entry and stay times for personnel in contaminated areas and provides an objective means for withdrawing personnel who may be nearing a serious or critical exposure to nuclear radiation. It is also useful in anticipating the severity cf radiation sickness. • 3. No single instrument has been designed to provide the two kinds of information required for civil preparedness, therefore, the information must be collected by separate instruments. Those designed to measure exposure rates are called survey meters. Those designed to measure total exposure are called dosimeters. 4. Since survey meters measure exposure rate, they are calibrated in roentgens per hour (R/hr), or milliroentgens per hour (mR/hr). Dosimeters which measure total exposure are calibrated in roentgens (R) or milliroentgens (mR). 5-4 MAJN TOPICS TEACHJNG POlliTS NOTE: During the course, continue to emphasize the difference between survey meters and dosimeters and the units of measurement. Whenever the wrong units are used, such as • "This survey meter reads 50 mR." correct the student immediately. Use of the correct units is of utmost importance . 5. The dosimeter and survey meter may be campared to an automobile speedometer . The ·~ '~ o-'-···..~........ . ' survey meter measures the radiation exposure rate in roentgens per hour and is like the ~-,..:~.., speed indicator which records the speed of . the automobile in miles per hour. The dosimeter measures the radiation exposure in VISUAL A-14o roentgens and is like the mileage indicator which records the total miles traveled. E. THEORY OF 1. The operation of dosimeters is very similar OPERATION FOR to the operation of a foil leaf electroELECTROSCOPES scope. An electroscope consists of an outside shell in which is mounted an externally projecting electrode insulated from the shell. .. 2. Two narrow strips of thin foil are attached to the enclosed stem of the electrode to form the moving part of the electroscope. VISUAL A-l4l If an electric charge is applied to the 3· externally projecting electrode, it is transferred through the electrode to the foil leaves. Because of the mutual repulsion of like charges, the leaves will immediately repel each other• • 5-5 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 4. If the air in the "enclosed gas volume" is ionized by radiation, it becomes an electrical conductor which permits the charge on the leaves to leak away. 5. Since the el ectrical charge is reduced, the mutual repulsion of the leaves is reduced and they assume a position closer together. The change in the position of the foil leaves is proportional to the radiation exposure. NOTE: Visual A-142 may be used by the .. instructor to show the similarity of dosimeter operation to that of an nn' electroscope. VISUAL A-142 F. CONSTRUCTION NOTE: Have the students examine the CD V-138 OF DOSIMETERS dosimeter prior to explaining its opera tion. l. A dosimeter has three basic elements . These are: a. Ionization chamber. b. Charging switch. VISUAL A-143 c. Microscope. 2. Ionization chamber. a. A quartz fiber electrometer suspension is mounted inside an ionization chamber. The electrometer suspension is sufPorted by means of a highly insulated material inside an electrically conducting cylinder. The enclosed air volume surrounding the electrometer suspension is the ionization chamber or the radiation detecting component of the instrument. 5-6 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS b . The indicating element is a five micron (l/5000 in.) quartz fiber which is part of the electrometer suspension. The • quartz fiber has an electrically conducting coating evaporat ed on its surface, and has the same form (horseshoe shaped) as the metal frame of the electrometer. c. The dosimeter contains an electrical capacitor in parallel with the electrometer suspension and the chamber wall. The function of the capacitor is to change the range of the dosimeter . However, for a particular type dosimeter, the range will be fixed by the selection of the capacitor at the time of its manufacture. 3. Charging switch. a. The charging switch assembly consists of a bellows and a contact rod, which is normally isolated from the electrometer suspension. b . Only when the dosimeter is placed on a charger and the bellows extended can contact be made between the rod and the electrometer suspension. c . This arrangement provides a very high electrical resistance, and the hermetic sealing allowed by such construction makes the dosimeter readings essentially independent of humidity and temperature changes . ' • 4. Microscope. • a. The lens is focused upon the quartz fiber indicating mechanism which is a 75 to l25 power microscope. The magnifying system magnifies the image of the quartz fiber so that it is visible to the human eye • 5-7 • MAJN TOPICS TEACHJNG POJJilTS VISUAL A-144 G. PREPARATION FOR EXPOSURE H. OPERATION DURJNG EXPOSURE b. The microscope consists of one ob: ective lens, one eyepiece lens, and contains a scale or reticle at the real image of the quartz fiber . c . The scale is graduated in roentgens, or milliroentgens, depending on the range of the instrument . 1. In preparation for exposure to radiation, the dosimeter is charged to about 160 to 175 volts to bring the image of the quartz fiber to zero on the scale . The dosimeter is then said to be "zeroed. 11 2. In charging the dosimeter with· a dosimeter charger, the ionization chamber is held at ground potential and the metal frame and fiber of the electrometer assume the other extreme of the voltage difference. 3. When charged, the fiber is repelled from the frame since both are at the same pote tial. The posit ion of the fiber will vary with the potential difference. l . As a monitor performs his task in a radiation area, gamma radiation will penetrate is body and penet rate the dosimeter he wears . The gamma radiation will interact with the wall of the ionization chamber and eject electrons from it. These electrons enter the sensitive volume of the dosimeter and ionize the air molecules . 2 . Under the influence of the electrical field in the chamber, the ion pairs migrate to the • electrode of opposite charge. This causes a proportionate discharge of the capacitor system and decreases the potential difference between t he electrometer and the chamter wall. 3. The quartz fiber now assumes a new position corresponding to the new potential difference. This is reflected by an upscale movement of the quartz fiber . 5-8 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 4. The movement of the fiber is a measure of the total amount of radiation to which the dosimeter has been exposed, regardless of • the rate of exposure . However, if a monitor wears the dosimeter during the exposure period, it is assumed that the monitor's exposure is the same as that measured by the dosimeter. I. DOSIMETER NOTE: Dosimeters to be worn by students should TEST EXERCISE be tested prior to entering a radiation area. The objective of this exercise is to assure participants that the dosimeters will respond to nuclear radiation• • A dosimeter test circle can be constructed on a piece of cardboard about fifteen inches square. The circle should be VISUAL A-145 twelve inches in diameter with the center marked so that the radioactive sources can be equidistant from all dosimeters . The sketch on the following page and Visual A-145 illustrate the dosimeter test circle. The dosimeter test circle should be placed in an adjoining area where there will be no exposure to participants. After the 5-9 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS dosimeters have been placed on the outer circle, the radioactive sources should be placed in the center. Then, after an exposure of about ten to fifteen minutes the radioactive sources should be removed. The dosimeters can be picked up and the exposures read. ~11 ---~>1j(----15- Dosimeters are placed on outer circle Radioactive sources are placed in center DOSIMETER TEST CIRCLE 5-10 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS J. OPERATION OF DOSJNETER CHARGERS • K. CHARGING AND READING DOSIMETERS VISUAL A-146 1. The design of dosimeter chargers has progressed to the point that the later models of civil preparedness chargers all use transistorized circuits to provide the required charging voltage. 2. When a dosimeter is placed on the charging contact and pressure is applied, the light switch closes and the bulb lights. However, in this position the dosimeter cannot be charged since the dosimeter charging switch is still open. Additional pressure must be applied to close this switch. 3. In the charger, a transistor converts the direct current from the single 1. 5 volt battery to alternating current so that the transformer can "step up" the battery voltage to the voltage required to charge the dosimeter. The current is then rectified by a diode and a potential of 220 volts maximum is available at the charging contact. 4. A voltage control is used to adjust the output voltage to the exact value required to bring the dosimeter to zero. 1. To charge a dosimeter, remove the dust cover on the charging receptacle, press the dosimeter completely to the bottom of the receptacle and rotate the control knob until the dosimeter reads zero. 2. All civil preparedness dosimeters are read by holding them about one-half inch from the eye and pointing them toward any light source sufficient to see the hairline . The zero mark should be at the left of the field of vision. 3. If an adequate light source is not available, a dosimeter charger may be used to read the dosimeter. Press it gently on the charging 5-ll MAIN TOPICS L . INITIAL CHECK FOR DOSIMETERS M. USES OF DOSIMETERS TEACHING POINTS receptacle until the l ight turns on. If the dosimeter is pressed down too far, it may make contact with the charging circuit and the reading may be changed or completely lost. • 4 . A dosimeter need not read exactly zero for it to measure a person's exposure. It is possible to determine the exposure for any selected period of time by subtracting the reading at the beginning of the exposure period from the reading at the end o: the period. Thus, if a dosimeter read 20 R at the beginning of a mission and 50 R at the end, the monitor's exposure was 30 R. A dosimeter should be recharged after each use if it reads more than 5o% of full scale . l . When dosimeters are received, a moni0or should zero them and check their electrical leakage characteristics . 2 . The leakage characteristics may be checked by zeroing the dosLmeters and placing them in a radiation free area for 4 days. If the leakage rate exceeds 5% of full scale per 4 days, the dosimeters should not be used provided other dosL~eters are available. 3 . If no other dosimeters are available, the leakage rate should be determined and the contribution from el ectrical leakage subtracted from the exposure as measured by the leaking dosimeter . For example, a dosimeter reads 75 R after 7 days of exposure in a shelter. If the leakage rate is 5 R/day, what was the exposure during the 7 days? ANSWER: 75 -(7 x 5) = 75 -35 = 40 R. l . The CD V-l38 is used for training purposes . 2. The CD V-730, CD V-740 and CD V-742 are used for emergency operational purposes. The CD V-742 is considered the "general operational" dosimeter and has a range from zero to 200 roentgens. 5-l2 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS N. DOSIMETER DIFFICULTIES 1. The hairline may not move as the control knob is rotated. This may be caused by lack of proper electrical contact between dosimeter and charger. To correct this, depress the dosimeter completely to the bottom of the charging receptacle and rotate the dosimeter. VISUAL A-147 2 . The hairline on the CD V-138 may shift when removing it from the charger. If desired, this can be corrected by setting the hairline to the left of zero a distance equivalent to the shift. VISUAL A-148 DOSIIUTU DIFIICUlliiS • 3· The hairline may appear to shift ~ the dosimeter is rotated around its hor~ontal axis. To eliminate this, always read the dosimeter with the zero mark on the left. VISUAL A-149 UltUIIt .onsW1UU•.,.....,..nWffliOIT..,.... ........ , • ., ...l!lKlJKM IIU.IIN.•. idfflll..,._tll Ollflfl0011lll...n1U U1 ..A!Ual VISUAL A-150 • 4. The hairline may move upscale over a period of a few days even though it is not exposed to radiation. This is caused by electrical leakage. If the l eaking is in excess of 5% of full scale in 4 days, and if no other dosimeter is available, the leaking rate should be determined and the contribution from leakage subtracted from t he exposure recorded by the leaking dosimeter . VISUAL A-151 5. The hairline may disappear within minutes after charging a dosimeter which has been stored in an uncharged condition. Most dosimeters require a nsoak inn charge if they remain uncharged for a considerable time . Such dosimeters should be charged and the reading observed for a few hours before using them . A second charging may be required before t he dosimeters are ready for use. 5-13 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 0. DOSIMETER CARE 1. Prevent radiological contamination of dosiAND PREVENTIVE meters. However, if dosimeters do became MAINTENANCE contaminated, they can be cleaned with a cloth dampened in a mild soap solution. • JOSaa(T(I f.ll WISI:I CAll IJII PltYIITJJI •tOIUNJ.IKI NOTE : Discuss several means by which dosi t. tarnwt tol'fdluJ• .. ,.._.&Ui.... J.P-IIeb... CM..,_ meters may become contaminated, such f.. II9K1UJTII._.f n11•1W. s. -.,wnnu..,.. S.:iif as dropping them in contaminated VISUAL A-152 areas or handling them with contami nated gloves; and discuss means of preventing such contamination. 2 . Avoid unnecessary rough handling of dosimeters. Although designed for rugged use, dosimeters could be •iamaged if grossly misused. 3. Charge dosimeters before storing, and store • in a dry place . When performing scheduled checks of instruments, dosimeters should be read. Recharge them to zero, if they indicate more than one-half of full s cale . 4. Remove batteries monthly from dosimeter chargers in frequent use and inspect battery contacts for dirt and corrosion. Dirty contacts should be cleaned. If the charger is to be stcred for more than four weeks, remove the batteries from the charger and store both in a cool, dry place. P. SURVEY METERS 1. Civil preparedness survey meters are either Geiger counters or ionization chamber instruments . 2 . All of them are designed to measure gamma radiation, and some are able to detect the presence of beta. VISUAL A-153 5-14 MAIN TOPICS .. Q,. OPERATIONAL THEORY OF GEIGER COUNTERS VISUAL A-154 ~~~II~IIUU a;.. _~~ iit~ -· ~ ·.; .>. ·. ·, ~. VISUAL A-155 TEACHING POINTS NOTE: The above items should be emphasized. The students should understand the difference between measuring gamma and detecting beta. l. The Geiger tube serves as the sensing element for a Geiger counter type survey meter . The Geiger tube consists of a thin cylindrical shell with a fine wire suspended along the longitudinal axis of the shell. 2. The tube is filled with an inert gas such as argon or neon, and a small percentage of a quenching gas such as chlorine or bromine . In civil preparedness Geiger counters, a voltage of about 900 volts is applied between the positively charged center wire and the negatively charged shell. 3· When a sufficiently energetic beta particle impinges upon the tube, it ionized some of the gas in the tube. The electrons resulting from this ionization are accelerated toward the center wire by the electrical field. They cause additional ion pairs , called usecondary ion pairs" to be formed. 4. Similarly, gamma rays impinging on the wall of the tube will cause electrons to be ejected, which in turn became the ionizing event. 5. Because of the high accelerating voltage, the creation of additional ions is very rapid, thus producing a discharge or ''electron avalanche" in the gas. A small amount of quenching gas in the tube serves to stop the discharge and restores the tube to its original condition. 5-15 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 6. The discharge results in a pulse in the external circuit. The frequency of the pulses is proportional to the intensity of t h e radiation field. " 7. The pulse output from the Geiger tube is amplified by conventional means and then measured by a sensitive meter which sums up the radiation effects in the form of a reading. In the case of gamma rays, this reading is in milliroentgens or roentgens per hour. 8. Civil preparedness Geiger counters are provided with headphones which detect the pulses from the Geiger tube and produce an audible click. R. OPERATIONAL l. Battery installation for the CD V-700. CHECKS OF THE CD V-700 a. Follow battery installation instructions in the manufacturer's instruction manual . • b. Stress the importance of correct battery polarity --plus to plus and minus to minus. The center terminal on the standard flashlight battery is plus. 2. Operational check of the CD V-700. CO Y-700 OPfUHONAl CHE'•1 of radiation injury than are adults. The younger and more active reproducing cells in the body tissues of the growing child are very sensitive to radiation impact, VISUAL A-171 a:nd toxic substances are produced. Therefore, total cell damage is greater than with adults. This would also apply to unborn children• U"""IO(lfo .. n;u.a.'""'*' VISUAL A-179 3. 4. 5. 6. VISUAL A-180 7. J . CARE OF RADIATION 1. CASUALTIES TEACHING POINTS Any very small particles reaching the alveolar spaces ma:y be retained there or they may be removed either by physical means , e . g. , by coughing, or by t he lymphatic drainage to the lymph nodes in the middle chest ar ea, where they may accumulate . In addition to radiation sickness duri ng the emergency period, other signs of radiation injury can occur marry months or years after exposure . None of these conditions are caused solely by radiation. Radiation increases the probability of these effects over the standard rate for peopl e of an:y given age • Sterility occurs but is temporary in most· people. Chromosome damage is permanent . Leukemia has occurred in some of the Japanese, with most cases within the first ten years . The incidence was about 50 times the standard rate (1. 5% instead of .03%) of unexposed Japanese . Most pregnant Japanese women who suffered radiation sickness had a miscarriage as a consequence . It has been estimated that, as an upper limit, the United States would experience about 20,000 additional cases of l eukemi a and an equal number of cases of miscellaneous cancer during the 15-20 year period foll owing a nuclear attack. Estimates have been made based on a 200 R exposure that birth defects might incr ease to 5% from the present 4%. If a person becomes ill from exposure to radiation, he should be placed under the care of a physician or medical techni ci an, 7-9 MA.IN TOPICS TEACHING PODITS CAR£ OF RADIATION CASUALTIES VISUAL A-181 2. if possible. In the postattack situation, medical care will probably be very limited. For this reason, it is necessary for individuals to understand the principles of basic care that will improve the patient's probability of survival. Individuals suffering from radiation injury are not radioactive. Unless they have radioact ive fallout on their bodies, they will not be a hazard to other people who work wit h them or are near them. VISUAL A-182 3. When professional medical care is not available, the following care is recommended for radiation casualties. a. Give the patient the best available protection to limit further exposure. VISUAL A-183 b. Keep the patient comfortable and in bed. VISUAL A-184 ~.,-·-··---("*~ VISUAL A-185 c. d. Keep the patient's bedding and surroundings clean. Isolate the patient from communicable disease (example: colds, measles, and scarlet fever) • .VISUAL A-186 7-10 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS VISUAL A-187 VISUAL A-188 --' · ~.. • ""'1111NJBI- fMf w .... 101 J'KO¥In VISUAL A-189 . . I I rmt InA ntws 11 111 sur .ldtO Uklltt.S...,_IIMIIlAf VISUAL A-190 e. Treat and cover any wounds , cuts, or other breaks in the skin to prevent infection. f. Give the patient liquids to replace the body fluids lost as a result of vo~iting and diarrhea. g . Give the patient nourishing foods. 4. The following care is recommended for beta burn casualties. a. Decontaminate the patient if he is contaminated. b. Soak beta burned areas in cold water until the burning stops, apply calamine lotion to prevent infection, and cover with a steril e bandage . c. Protect the patient from further contamination. d. Keep open sores clean to prevent infection. e . Allow a physician or medical technician to treat the beta burns, if ·possible. 7-ll MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS K. EFFECTS OF FALLOUT l. Meristem tissue; tips of stems; tips of ON PLANTS roots and the cambium layer just under the bark is the most radiation sensitive tissue of plants. VISUAL A-l9l 2. Radiation impairs cell division of the rapidly dividing growth cells of the meristem tissue. 3. If the peak gamma exposure rate exceeds 10 R/hr, the growth rate of young food crop plants could be impaired by the associated beta radiation. 4. The radiosensitivity of plants varies by VISUAL A-192 100 fold among species and by about 50 fold within a species exposed at different stages of growth. • .. 5. In areas where crops are destroyed by beta ~....,., radiation, the land can be replanted as soon as it is safe to work in the field. 6. Mature crops are less sensitive to radiation injury and can be harvested whe~ it VISUAL A-193 is safe to work in the fields. L. EFFECTS OF FALLOUT l. A short-term exposure of 180 R may c~use ON LIVESTOCK death to 50 percent of cattle grazing on -· fallout contaminated pastures because of the added gastrointestinal damage by beta radiation. 2. Short-term whole body gamma radiation exposure of livestock (cattle, sheep, and swine) varying from 500 to 600 roentgens VISUAL A-194 is the midlethal exposure that will kill 50 percent of the animals within 30 days. Poultry are more resistant, having a midlethal exposure of about 900 roentgens. 7-12 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POJNTS However, tolerance varies among species of animals as well as among animals within the same species . 3. All danestic animals have a similar response to total body irradiation. Few, if any, die after exposure to 250 roentgens . And few, if any, survive an acute exposure as high as 1,000 roentgens . Smaller exposures or lower exposure rates are tolerated better than faster delivered VISUAL A-195 large exposures . 4. Swine have a much faster recovery rate than other domestic animals, although there is little difference in response of the species to acute exposure . • 5. The body size of the animal has littl e to do with survival, although the very young or the very old may be more radiosensitive. 6. It is fair to say that livestock are gen erally on pasture and few farmers and ranchers have housing for sheep, cattle or hogs . Even in heavy snow areas, housing is generally limited to open sheds and wind breaks with suppl emental feeding in open troughs . The water supply for most livestock ~omes fram ponds and streams . Fallout sinks t o the bott om in a few minutes and is only a : minor hazard in drinking 1vater . 8. As a nat ion we are heavily dependent on livestock for nutrients and for conversion of grass into nutrients . About 5o% of the u. S. diet comes from livestock products . 9. Meat fram animals exposed to radiation can be used until the animal shows signs of bacteremia as evidenced by an elevated temperature• • VISUAL A-196 7-13 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 10. In those areas where 90 percent of the cattle are killed by radiation, about 11 years would be required to replenish the herd to the preattack level. , NOTE: Show film "Radiation Effects on Farm Animals" if time is available. M. SUMMARY 1. The gastrointestinal tract of animals is very sensitive to radiation damage from beta radiation. 2. About 90% of the sublethal damage due to radiation exposure is repairable. 3. The harmful effects of nuclear radiation are caused by ionization of cells in living tissue . 4. The fetus and young :;Jlants and animals are more susceptibl e to radiation injury. 5. In areas where crops are destroyed by beta radiation, the land can be replanted when it is safe to work in the field. 6. Enough crops and livestock would survive a nuclear war to feed the surviving population, but food distribution would be a problem. : 7-14 • Visual No. A-164 A-165 A-166 A-167 A-168 A-169 A-170 A-171 A-172 A-173 A-174 A-175 A-176 A-177 A-178 A-179 A-l80 A-18l A-182 : A-183 A-184 A-185 A-186 A-187 A-188 A-189 A-190 LIST OF VISUALS Visual Title Short-Term and Long-Term Exposure Short-Term Exposure Hazard is Greatest During the First Few Days After Fallout Arrival Effects of a Brief Gamma Exposure Estimated Single Radiation Exposures that will Cause 50 Percent Incidence of Symptoms Summary of Relationship Between Exposure and Level of Radiation Sickness Living Cells Exposed to Nuclear Radiation May Radiation Injury Causes Temporary Decrease in Blood Cells Fetuses, Children and Young Adults May be 5 to 10 Times More Sensitive to Some Radiation Effects Beta Burns Result When Fallout Remains on the Skin Loss of Hair in a Seven Year Old Marshallese Girl 46 Days After Exposure Seven Year Old Marshallese Girl 6 Months After Exposure Beta Burns on 13 Year Old Marshallese Boy 45 DaysAfter Exposure Thirteen Year Old Marshallese Bay 6 Months After Exposure Ingestion of Seriously Contaminated Food and Water Over Long Periods Can Cause InjuryThe Amount of Radioactive Material Absorbed from Early Fallout by Inhalation is Relatively Small Late Effects General Predictions Care of Radiation Casualties Patients Suffering from Radiation Injury are Not Radioactive. They will not Danger Others. Give the Patient the Best Available Protection to Limit Further Exposure Keep the Patient Comfortable and in Bed Keep the Patient, His Bedding, and His Surroundings Clean Isolate the Patient from Communicable Diseases Treat and Cover arry Wounds to Prevent Infection Give the Patient Liquids to Replace the Body Fluids Give the Patient Nourishing Foods that are Needed for Recovery Treat Beta Burns in the Same Manner as Burns Resulting from Heat 7-15 Visual No. A-191 A-192 A-193 A-194 A-195 A-196 Visual Title Meristem Tissue • • • If the Peak Exposure Rate Exceeds 10 R/hr the Meristem of Small Plants may be Seriously Damaged by Beta Radiation If Crops are Destroyed by Beta Radiation, the Land May be Replanted An Exposure of 180 R May Cause Death to Cattle Grazing on Fallout Contaminated Pastures Due to Beta Radiat ion from Ingested Radioactive Material Few Domestic Animals Die from Whole Body Exposure to 250 R While Few Survive an Exposure Above 1,000 R Meat from Animals Exposed to Radiation can be Used until they Develop a Fever 7-16 • LESSON PLAN NO. 8 COURSE TITLE: LESSON TITLE: OBJECTIVES : SCOPE: REFERENCES: REQUIREMENTS : REMARKS: Basic Radiological Defense Officer Fallout Forecasting TDvlE : 2.0 Hours Upon completion of this unit the student should be able to: l. Recognize, select, decode, and use DF messages in preparation of area fallout forecasts and estimates of fallout arrival time. 2. Determine the most probable direction and extent of fallout distribution for the purpose of preattack planning or warnings for local areas postattack. Introduction; purpose of DF messages; use and limitations of fallout forecasts; basic data requirements; weapon yield and cloud dimensions; transmission of DF data; decoding DF messages; selecting correct DF time group; identifying DF data points; plotting DF vector indicators; streamline analysis; fallout forecast template; initial fallout forecast plotting procedures; update fallout warnings; plotting exercises. Instructor and Participant: a. "Users' Manual, Meteorological Data for Radiological Defense," FG-E-5.6/l b. "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual," SM-ll. 25 l. Instructor: · Set of 2" x 2" slides (A-28l -A-289) 2. Participant: a. Sample exercises (in Student Manual) b. Fallout forecast template c. Straightedges, pencils, compass and protractor as appropriate to exercise materials Instructors should reproduce the template in Appendix D to this lesson plan for classroom use. However, it may be more desirable to make a fallout forecast plotting template to suit the geography of the area and the scale of the map suitable for operat ional use by students. Information to construct such templates is provided in the Users' Manual, FG-E-5.6/l. Q , MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS A. INTRODUCTION l. Radioactive fallout is the process of the fallback to the earth's surface of particles contaminated with radioactive materials created in a nuclear detonation (NUDET). 2. Fallout from a single weapon burst can cover marry thousands of square miles. Direction and speed of upper air winds are significant factors in predicting fallout areas. The National .Weather Service is responsible for routine issuance of wind data for use in preparat ion offllllout area forecasts. 3. The data (DF) are based upon observations made at oooo and l200 Greenwich time (ooooz and l200Z) and are processed by computer at Suitland, Maryland into messages that are available to Federa_, State, and local governments. In sane cases the messages received by users of the DF data will be in local time so that no conversion from Zulu t ime will be necessary. If conversion is required, a chart can be prepared for local use. B. PURPOSE OF DF MESSAGES Fallout forecast plots provide graphic estimates of fallout areas likely to result from nuclear attack. Current fallout plots will be helpful to civil preparedness officials in carryi ng out ·emergency actions before and immediately after at tack by showing areas likely to receive fallout, and the estimated time of fallout arrival. : C. USE AND LIMITATIONS OF FALLOUT FORECASTS l. DF messages can be used in two ways: (a) to assist in the analysis of attack effects over broad areas such as a State, a DCPA Region, or the Nation, and (b) to forecast at Statearea levels and local jurisdictions those areas likely to receive fallout, and the expected time of arrival. 2. The responsibility for forecasting fallout, and warning other jurisdictions likely to be affected, is usually assigned to the State or State-area EOC. Any jurisdictions 8-2 MAJN TOPICS TEACHJNG POJNTS expecting to prepare their own forecasts should arrange for receipt of DF messages on a routine basis and should practice the procedures frequently. D. BASIC DATA REQUIREMENTS l. In the preparation of area fallout forecasts and estimates of fallout arrival time, the approximate ground zero (GZ) location and time of detonation must be known or assumed. 2. National Weather Service DF reports must be available for the desired time period of use. 3. Weapon yield or the dimensions of the nuclear cloud at the time of stabilization is needed for accurate plotting. If weapon yield is not available, an assumed yield or 3 megatons is used. E• WEAPON YIELD AND CLOUD DIMENSIONS l. The nuclear cloud from a surface burst will reach stabilization within about 10 minutes after detonation. At this time, when vertical development of the cloud ceases, the dimensions of the cloud will vary with the size of the weapon and atmospheric conditions . ' ,,....... J ' --w •• VISUAL A-281 2. The chart shown in Visual A-281 indicates the approximate dimensions of nuclear clouds as a function of total yield. This information can be used in the construction of fallout forecast templates for various weapon sizes . For example, the template described later assumes a 3 MT yield so that a vertical line from that yield on the horizontal scale intercepts the dotted curve at 15 miles, which is read on the right vertical scale· That is the radius of the mushroom cloud at the time of stabilization and is the basis for constructing a template for a weapon of that size. Any other assumed or known weapon yield would require a t emplate with a different radius. 8-3 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHTIJG POJNTS F. TRANSMISSION OF DF DATA VISUAL A-282 l. The National Weather Service maintains a network of "RAWIN" observatories which measure electronically the direction and speed of the wind from the earth's surface to high altitudes above the surface. 2. The observed data are processed by computer at Suitland, Maryland, into forecasts of the integrated effects of the wind layers from the 100 millibar (mb) level (about 53,000 ft.) to the earth's surface. The integrated effects would be for idealized particles which would fall from that level to the surface in three hours. 3. Data are prepared for about 100 locations in the Continental United States, and about 30 locations in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Southern Canada. These locations are shown on the map, Visual A-282, form in Appendix A. and listed in tabular • 4. "DF" data are transmitted over Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) serice "C" teletypewriter to most Weather Service Offices, FAA Offices, and to other government offices and private subscribers. The data are also relayed to Alaska, Hawaii and ?uerto Rico. 5. Transmission of DF messages is arranged in a convenient plotting sequence for six areas of the United States (see Appendix A). These six areas are: : a. b. c. d. e. f. Northeastern (NERN). Southeastern (SERN). North Central (N CNTRL). South Central (s CNTRL). Northwestern (NWRN). Southwestern (SWRN). The Canadian stations are reported separately. DCPA Regional Offices retransmit to State offices only those sections that would be of interest to the State. Upon transmission the Region may change the observed time f rom Greenwich to local time. 8-4 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS G. DECODING DF 1. DF messages will contain information on the :MESSAGES date and time of observation as well as the basic DF data. This basic data will consist of a location designator and three fourdigit groups. Each four-digit group is for use over a six-hour per iod centered on the observation time plus 12, 18, and 24 hours. 2. Note that the forecast times (observation time plus 12, 18, and 24 hours) provide for overlap of the forecasts from one observation time to the next. This is to provide forecasts into the early postattack period, when new meteorological data might not be available. 3. The first two digits of each four-digit group indicates the direction towards which fallout particles will fall. The direction is in ten's of degrees from true north. The last two digits of each group represent distance in ten's of statute miles which fallout from the 100 mb l evel is expected to reach 3 hours after detonation. See example below: EXAMPLE: DFUS KWBC 251900 •••BUF 0712 0710 0609 T----------Day of observation : -------Time of observation (EST) I III I II I DFUS KWBC 25 1900 1--------------------------DF data point location ------12 hrs. after observation 1 T---------------------Forecast data : : -------------Forecast data ------18 hrs. after observation I I I1 r-----Forecast dat a ------24 hrs. after observation 1 1 I I I I I I I I BUF 07 12 0710 0609---, -r------------------3 hour distance in l01 s of miles, i.e. 120 miles from true north, i.e. 070 degrees ~---------------------lO's of degrees NOTE: Chalkboard explanat ion of the above is probably best• 8-5 MAIN TOPICS H. SELECTING CORRECT DF TIME GROUP TEACHING POINTS l. The most dif ficult part of the fallout forecast procedures is selecting the correct four-digit group. The key to selecting and using the correct group is the time of observation. In the DF message example above, 25 indicates the twenty-fifth day of the month and the time of observed data is 1900 local time. (In this example it is EST.) NOTE: If the DF message is in some other time than local, such as Z (Zulu) or GMT (Greenwich mean time) it should be converted for use with the geograph ical area involved. 2. Continuing with the DF message proper, BUF locat es the observed data of the forecast in the Buffalo, New York area. 3. The 0712 group is for use during a six-hour period centered on a time 12 hours after observation; in this case 12 hours after 1900 (7:00p.m.) on the 25th or 0700 (7:00a.m.) on the 26th. The time period over which this 0712 data would be used, therefore, is three hours before and three hours after 0700 on the 26th or 0400 through 1000 on the 26th. 4. In a similar manner, the time for use of the 0710 data group in the sample message is a six-hour period centered 18 hours after the time of observation or from 1000 to 1600 on the 26th. The third data group, 0609, can be used from 1600 to 2200 (4 to 10 p.m.) on the 26th. Thus the coverage on the 26th day of the month from the DF message applicable to the Buffalo, New York area is from 0400 to 2200 or eight een hours. : 5. Since observations OOOOZ and l200Z, a are taken twice daily, at deliberate overlap of six MAJJiJ" TOPICS TEACHJJiJ"G POJJiJ"TS hours is provided for any possible delays in transmission time. VISUAL A-283 6. Visual A-283 shows how three separate observations -"a," "b," and "c11 taken at OlOOOOZ, 011200Z and 020000Z respectively, can be used over the time interval from Ol0900Z to 0303002. Thus continuous coverage is provided and a plot can be maintained of the potential fallout distribution for arry given time of a nuclear detonation at an assumed ground zero. NOTE: The instructor should give the class some sample messages, using local time, to make sure they can choose the correct group of digits within each DF message to use at arry given time. I. IDENTIFYING DF DATA POJJiJ"TS l. The map and scale selected for use in plotting fallout forecasts depend upon geographical requirements. If the forecast were to be prepared at the State-area level, the map should not only depict the State-area but a surrounding area that permits the plotting of forecasts without exceeding the map boundaries. If the forecast is being prepared b'y a local jurisdiction, the map should contain an area within a radius of 500 miles of that locality. 2 . DF data points and their three-letter designators can be graphically shown on an operational map as solid black dots about 1/16 inch size. These data points may be selected fran the location list, Appendix A, or from the data point map in the "Users' Manual, Meteorological Data for Radiological Defense. 11 3. After the data points have been plotted, the map surface can be covered with clear acetate to permit construction of plots with grease pencil. The forecast plots can then be erased or changed without interfering with the data points. 8-7 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS J. STREAMLINE ANALYSIS 1. Before constructing a fallout forecast plot at an assumed or actual NUDET l ocation, it may be desir abl e to construct a streamline analysis for the area of the country under consideration. An exampl e plot is shown in Visual · A-284 . VISUAL A-284 2 . To construct such a are recommended: plot, the following steps a . Label each DF data point on the ~ap with its identifying symbol, i.e., STL; ATL; PIT; etc. b . Through each such data point draw a vector indicator, which is simply a line about an inch long in the direction given in the DF message at that location for use during the time under cons i deration. For example, in Visual A-284 a one-inch arrow is constr ue. ted toward 230° at STL (St . Louis, Missour and toward 050° at ATL (Atlanta, Georgia). NOTE : Vector indicators are used in place of actual vectors because the variability in the length of the arrows would be very unwieldy to plot. c . At t he point of each arrow show t he second two digits of the DF message at that locat ion. Thus STL 06 indicates that at St. Louis fallout would travel 60 mil es in a three-hour peri od and at Atlanta i t would be 190 miles in 3 hours. : NOTE : The four-digit data group for STL would be 2306 and for ATL -0519. d . A series of smoothed lines is then drawn to show the curvature of the wind streams 8-S • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS that are moving across the area. The number and distance between lines is optional. They do not pass through the data points except by chance. 3· With the streamline analysis it is possible to extrapolate to other locations on the map . If an assumed or actual NUDET is at a location other than a data point, it may be desirable to estimate data at the other location. This can be illustrated by the DF data for Lexington, Kentucky shown in Visual A-284. For nearby locations the directions of the DF vectors are nearly the same, but note that speeds increase with distance to the southeast from data location LOU. The speed at 111111 • Lexington is estimated to be (110 miles in 3 hours). For a location in northcentral Arkansas, the direction of DF vectors in SGF, LIT and MEM varies more than the speed. An estimate for that locat ion would assume a direction more toward t he east rather than the southerly dotted line drawn from SGF. K. FALLOUT FORECAST 1. Visual A-285 illustrat es the construction TEMPLATE of a template which may be used to simplify the task of plotting areas likely to be affected by fallout. The scale is such that the circle around the point of detonation (GZ) is about the size of the nuclear cloud from a 3 MT weapon at the time of stabilization. Its radius represents 15 miles on the scale of the map used. The scale of the centerline VISUAL A-285 KL is also the same as the scale of the map. Note that the 0 point on KL starts at the outer edge of the 15 mile circle around GZ . Th~ sides of the template, AE and F J, make 20 angles with the 11 hot line11 (KL) . 2. The template may be made of any material but transparent plastic is probably best. Scales made on typewriter correction tape may be applied along the edges and midline of the template. • 8~9 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 3. The template in this visual represents a basic plotter. More elaborate templates may be made by the addition of a compass rose, a slot along the centerline and/or permanent ~arkings. 4. As mentioned previously in Part E, paragraph 2, the size of the template can be adjusted for various weapon yields. The scale must be the same as the map used. L. PROCEDURES FOR NOTE: For this section the instructor may wish INITIAL FALLOUT FORECAST PLOTTING to use local maps and a template suitable for use with that map. 1. For an assumed or actual NUDET time, select the DF data valid for that time. 2. Plot the DF vector indicators at the DF points in the area of interest. 3. Plot the location of the assumed or actual NUDET on the map. • 4. If the NUDET l ocation is a DF data point, the plotted vector is used directly. If not, a new vector i s constructed at the NUDET location as described in Section J. 5. As shown in Visual A-286 and using the four U'SIHG" fAllOUT FOfltCA!il TUII'\..ll[ digit group 0809, apply the ~emplate to the ' map with the center of the cloud stabilizatioh circle at GZ. The DF vector (not vector indicator) then falls along a line of 080° for : a 90 mile distance as shown hy the heavy arrow VISUAL A-286 in this visual. Locate that same 90 miles on the template as measured from the zero scale point (not the center of the circle or GZ), and mark the map on the centerline and the edges of the template. Using GZ as the center, draw an arc through the three points to show the three-hour isochrone line dotted lines in visual). Fallout is expected to arrive at all locations along this line three hours after a nuclear detonation at Roanoke, Virginia. 8-10 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS • M. PLOTTING EXERCISES VISUAL A-287 6. Starting at one of t he 90 mile points on the edge of the templ ate, draw a line around the GZ circle and to the corresponding point on the other edge as illustr ated by the heavy black "U" shaped line in t he visual. This line, together with the three-hour isochrone arc encloses the t otal area where fallout is expected during the first three hours after the time of detonation. A one and two-hour isochrone line should t hen be drawn as illustrated using 90 mil es and 3 hours as the basic data. Since fallout in this case would travel 30 miles in one hour, the l-hour isochrone line would be at 30 mil es and the 2hour line at 60 miles. 7 . Fallout arrival time for a given location is then estimated from the map . In the example, fallout would be expected at Lynchburg in about one hour; at Appomattox in a l ittle over one and one-half hours; at Scottsville, Dillwyn and Farmville in about two and onehalf hours , and at Charlottesville in a l ittl e less than three hours. 8 . Initial fallout warnings to the potentially affected areas can be issued based on the above data. l. The sample fallout forecast template in Appendix D and Visual A-287 was developed for use vdth the sample probl ems . Note the use of slots to draw the area of fallout deposition and the inverted compass rose t o facil itat' orientation of the area along the wind '\rector. This is only one of many variations possible to the method suggested in the Users' Manual. 2. Have the students work the relatively simpl e problem contained in Appendix B or one with a local message and map . 8-ll MAIN TOPICS VISUAL A-288 VISUAL A-289 N. UPDATE FALLOUT WARNINGS TEACHING POINTS 3. If time permits or same students finish quickly, pass out the more comprehensive problem in Appendix C-1 and Visual A-288 . 4. The solution to the Fallout Forecast Exercise No. 2 is shown in Appendix C-3 and Visual A-289. .. NOTE: The map in Appendix C-2 and C-3 have been modified from that shown in Visuals A-288 and A-289. l. Updated fallout forecasts and associated warnings are based on radiological monitoring reports and are not as dependent upon the less reliable input data available for making the initial forecast. The procedures for • preparing update forecasts and warnings follow. 2. As the fallout cloud develops and travels downwind, the incoming fallout reports from reporting stations provide a basis for modifying and amplifying the initial fallout warning. If there are no reports of significant fallout radiation in the expected area within one hour of a detonation, it must have been an air burst, and the initial warning should be cancelled. If the initial fallout warning did not accurately forecast the direction of fallout movement, a cancellation of the initial warning is issued to those local governments no longer considered in the path of fallout, and other local governments are warned as appropriate. Similarly, if the forecast of time of fallout 3· arrival >vas significantly in error, a revised set of forecast arrival times is developed. In addition, estimates of the probable severity of fallout radiation; i.e., whether or not meter readings in excess of 50 R/hr can be expected, is included in the Update Fallout 8-12 • • MAIN TOPICS • 0. SUMMARY • • TEACHING POINTS Warning message. If the Update Fallout Warning includes localities outside the Statearea developing the message, the Update Fallout Warning is also transmitted to the State EOC for relay to potentially affected downwind State-areas and States as a basis for the warning of local governments within their jurisdictions . 4. The plotting of (l) locations and times of "50 R/hr and Rising" reports, and (2 ) Peak Exposure Rate (above 50 R/hr) reports provide a basis for forecasting more precisely where there is likely to be severe fallout radiation. The plotted points of fallout arrival will indicate the rate of speed and lateral spread of the fallout cloud, while the plotted locations of severe fallout permit the projection of the area of heavy fallout yet to occur• 5. Detailed procedures for preparing Update Fallout Warnings are given in the ''Users' Manual -Meteorological Data for Radiological Defense," FG-E-5 .6/l. 1. Availability of DF data. 2. Purpose of DF messages . 3· Use and limitations. 4. Basic data requirements. 5. Weapon yield and cloud dimensions . 6. Transmission of DF data. 7. Decoding messages . 8. Selecting time group . 9. Identifying data points. 10. Streamline analysis. 8-13 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS ll. Fallout forecast template . 12. Procedures for plotting. 13. Plotting exercises. 14. Update fallout warnings . • 8-14 • • APPENDIX A Identification Code NERN US JFK BOS AUG CAR PLB ALB BUF IPT PIT BAL CRW LOU SERN US RIC HAT RDU TRI BNA JAN BHM ATL CAE ILM JAX. . -TLH TPA MIA MOB • MSY S CNTRL US HOU SAT CRP BRO LRD DRT LOCATIONS OF DF DATA POINTS dentification Location Code NORTHEASTERN U. s. HOB Brooklyn, NY PJi!A Boston, MA ABI Augusta, ME DAL Carabou, ME SIN Plattsburg, NY MEM Albany, NY LIT Buffalo, NY OKC Williamsport, PA ALS Pittsburgh, PA DEN Baltimore, MD GCK Charleston, WV HLC Louisville, KY ICT MKC SOUTHEASTERN U. s. SGF Richmond, VA STL Cape Hatteras, NC Raleigh, NC NCNTRL US Bristol, TN IND Nashville, TN ORD Jackson, MS CLE Birmingham, AL FNT Atlanta, GA SSM Columbia, SC GRB Wilmington, NC DBQ. Jacksonville, FL DSM Tallahassee, FL ONL Tampa, FL RAP Miami, FL ABR Mobile, AL MSP New Orleans, LA INL SOUTH CENTRAL U. s. N us Houston, TX GFK San Antonio, TX DIK Corpus Christi, TX GGW Brownsville, TX BIL Laredo, TX GTF Del Rio, TX DLN 8-l5 Location Hobbs, NM Amarillo, TX Abilene, TX Dallas, TX Shreveport, LA Memphis, TN Little Rock, AR Oklahoma City, OK Alamosa, CO Denver, CO Garden City, KS Hill City, KS Wichita, KS Kansas City, MO Springfield, MO St • Louis , MO NORTH CENTRAL U. s. Indianapolis, IN Chicago, IL Cleveland, OH Flint, MI Sault Ste, Marie, MI Green Bay, WI Dubuque, IA Des Moines, IA O'Neill, NB Rapid City, SD Aberdeen, SD Minneapolis, MN International Falls, MN NORTHWESTERN U. S. Grand Forks, ND Dickins.on, ND Glasgow, MT Billings , MT Great Falls, MT Dillon, MT APPENDIX A (Continued) Identification Identification Code Location Code Location FCA Kall ispel, MT 7l4 QuebecGEG Spokane, WA 73l North BaySEA Seattle, WA 749 Ft. William .. PDX Portland, OR 852 Winnepe g OTH North Bend, OR 863 Regina RBL Red Bluff, CA 872 Medicine Hat LKV Lakeview, OR 882 Revelstoke JTIA John Day, OR 892 Vancouver BOI Boise, ID CPR Casper, WY DFAK ALASKA BFF Scottsbluff, NB BRW Barrow, AK BTI Barter Island, AK SWRN US SOUTHWESTERN U. S. OTZ Kotzebue, AK SLC Salt Lake City, UT BTT Bettles, AK PIH Pocatello, ID 01'-lli Nome, AK RKS Rock Spring, WY BET Bethel, AK GJ'I' Grand Junction, co MCG McGrath, AK FMN Farmington, NM FAI Fairbanks, AK ABQ Albuquerque, NM ANC Anchorage, A."f\. BCE Bryce Canyon, UT ORT Northway, AK LAS Las Vegas, NV SNP St . Paul, AK. ELY Ely, NV CDB Cold Bay, AK EKO Elko, NV AKN King Salmon, AK. TPH Tonapah, NV MDO Middleton Island, AK RNO Reno, NV NHB Kodiak, AK SFO San Francisco, CA YAK Yakutat, AK FAT Fresno, CA Jl'IU Juneau, AK SBA Santa Barbara, CA ANN Annette Island, AK . SAN San Die go , CA SYA Shemya, AK - DAG Barstow-Daggett, CA ADK Adak, AK YUM Yuma, AZ PRC Prescott, AZ DFHW HA.WAII TUS Tucson, AZ ITO Hilo .. ELP El Paso, TX LIH Liheu CANADA DFCA CARIBBEAN 609 St . John 526 San Juan, Puerto Rico 8-16 • APPENDIX B FALLOUT FORECAST EXERCISE NO . l PROBLEM: Assume a 3 MT surface NUDET (nuclear detonation) on Batavia, New York at 260800. Identify the location of the assumed NUDET (GZ) on the illustrated map and plot the fallout forecast . l. Select the DF data valid for the time and underscore with pencil, pen, or colored pencil. DFUS KWBC 251900 BUF 0712 0710 0609 2. Include the one and two hour isochrone in the fallout forecast plot. 3. Would Rochester be in a likely fallout area and, if so, what would be the expected time of fallout arrival? N I LAKE I ONTARIO • 1 SYRACUSE ~ GZ ~~ BATAVIA Scale : 1"= 40 Miles 8-17 APPENDIX B-l FALLOUT FORECAST EXERCISE #l SOLUTION N 1 I LAKE I ONTARIO SYRACUSE cu I 1 \._GZOHOO ~~ BATAVIA BUFFALO ( Scale: 1"::: 40 Miles • 8-l8 APPENDJX C-l FALLOUT FORECAST EXERCISE NO. 2 The attached comprehensive problem illustrates the steps an individual would take in preparing a fallout advisory for the city of Waterloo, Iowa. It involves: l. Correct selection of the time group to be used for MSP, DBQ., and DSM• .. 2. Proper orientation and placement of vector indicators at MSP, DBQ., DSM and Mason City. 3. Use of streamlines to estimate the vector indicator at Mason City. 4. Accurate plot construction of fallout areas downwind from Mason City. 5. Estimate of fallout arrival time a~ Waterloo• • • 8-19 APPENDIX C-2 FALLOUT FORECAST PROBLEM I , ) I DF Data observed at 0600 CST I / DBQ 1607 1507 1207 (I DSM 1606 1406 1106 MSP 1307 1009 0911 ' ' ) Requirements: I { I 1. Vector indicators at DBQ, DSM, and MSP. MINNEAPOLIS 2. Streamline analysis. I\ 4. MSP ' 3. Fallout forecast plot for Mason City. Arrival time of fallout at Waterloo. ' ... ""' '' ""' ,, ~ -------\ ------·· --- ------)' -, MASON CITY } \'' DUBUQUE DBQ \ • DES MOINES DSM ISCALE 1 in .= 40 miles I 8 -2 0 APPENPJ?' C-3 FALLOUT FORECAST PROBLEM . / I .' / ( ISOLUTION I MINNEAPOLIS MSP "\ -· _1 ' ' --· -l --' ) ' ~~DES MOINES ' DSM 8-21 APPENDIX D Vl () l> r w Ill 3: ~ - :: " ::. 0 3: r Ill Vl "TI )> • r r 0 c ~ "TI 0 :;o m n )> V'l ~ ~ m 3: -u r )> ~ m . ~ , • 8 -2 2 .. • • Visual No . A-281 A-282 A-283 A-284 A-285 A-286 A-287 A-288 A-289 APPENDIX A APPENDIX B APPENDIX C APPENDIX D LIST OF VISUALS Visual Title Approximate Nuclear Cloud Dimensions DF Data Points Time Periods for Use of DF Data Example Streamline Analysis Fallout Forecast Template Using a Fallout Forecast Template Sample Fallout Forecast Template Sample Problem Solution to Sample Problem LIST OF APPENDICES Locations of DF Data Points Fallout Forecast Exercise No . l Fallout Forecast Exercise No . 2 Fallout Forecast Template 8-23 .. • • • LESSON PLAN NO. 9 COURSE TITLE: LESSON TITLE: .' OBJECTIVE: ... SCOPE: REQUIREMENTS: • REMARKS: • Basic Radiological Defense Officer Quiz No. l TJME: .50 Hour To test and reinforce the participant's knowledge of the subject matter covered in the scope below • Ten multiple-choice questions on selected points in lesson plans Nos. 1 through 8. 1. Instructor: A copy of Quiz No. 1 and the answers thereto. 2. Participant: One copy of Quiz No. 1 and one answer sheet for each student • 1. A copy of the quiz, an answer sheet and an instructor solution sheet are included in this instructor guide. 2 . A blank answer sheet for each student is included in the "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual," SM-11. 25. 3. The instructor should reproduce sufficient quantities of the quiz for his classes• 9-1 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS A. INTRODUCTION 1. Have the students remove the quiz answer sheet from their Student Manual. ~ . 2. Issue a copy of the quiz to each student. 3. Read the instructions on the front of the quiz WITH the student s. ... 4. Advise the students that they have 30 minutes to complete the quiz including a review. 5. At the instructor ' s discretion he may advi se the students that the results of the quiz will be posted and the solutions will be reviewed. B. CONCLUSION Collect a quiz and an answer sheet from each student. • 9-2 • ... BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER "' • QUIZ NO. 1 Type of Quiz: Multiple-Choice -BEST ANSWER Quiz Value: Ten points. Time: 30 minutes (including review) Materials Required: Quiz No. 1 Answer Sheet Pencil NOTE: DO NOT WRITE ON THAT PURPOSE. THIS QUIZ. AN ANSWER SHEET IS PROVIDED FOR DO NOT OPEN THIS QUIZ UNTIL DIRECTED. 9-3 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER Q,UIZ NO. 1 1. The primary role of the Radiological Defense Officer in civil preparedness is to: a. Monitor fallout radiation and report i nstrument measurements to the EOC. ... b. Provide information and technical advice situation. on the radiologi al .c c. Predict the radiological fallout pattern within the local area and provide fallout warnings. d. Provide monitoring, reporting and decontamination in the event of a peacetime radiation incident•. 2. The reaction best describing the process of nuclear fusion is: a. Heavier elements are formed from lighter ones. b . Heavier elements are split to form lighter ones. c. Light nuclei are fissioned to form still lighter ones. d. Light nuclei are fissioned to form heavier ones. 3. The two identities always present in equal number in an neutral atom are: electrically a. Electrons and neutrons. b . Electrons and protons. c. Electrons and beta particles. d. Neutrons and protons. 4. The chronological order of events accompanying are: a nuclear detonation a. Fireball, fallout, thermal wave, blast. b. Fireball, thermal wave, blast, fallout. c. Fireball, blast, thermal wave, fallout . d. Blast, fireball, thermal wave, fallout. 9-4 5. The control knob of the CD V-7l5 must be turned to the zero position before zeroing: a. To reduce the voltage on the ion chamber, permitting the balance circuit to align the needle. b. To engage the shorting potentiometer so that residual high voltage can be removed from the ion chamber • .' c. To remove the ion chamber from the circuit so any radiation in the vicinity will not affect the reading. d. To make available the full voltage of the "D" battery to swing the needle to the "zero" area. 6. The most important hazard from fallout is: a . Inhalation of fallout. b. Skin contamination. c. External radiation exposure. d. Ingestion of fallout. 7. Isotopes are: a. Different forms of the same element. b. Elements with different proton numbers. c. Subatomic particles. d. Elements with different proton numbers but the same mass numbers . 8. A monitor located in a basement monitoring station is actively using which two measures to reduce his exposure? a. Time and distance. b. Time and shielding• .. c. Shielding and distance. d. None of the above. 9-5 9. Contaminated fruits and vegetables: a. Should not be used. b. Should be stored in an area with a high protection factor. c. Should be decontaminated and used as needed. . . d. Should be protected from beta radiation exposure. lO. In a surface burst, the nuclear weapons effect that will end~~ger life over the largest area is: a. Thermal radiation. b. Radioactive fallout. c. Blast and electromagnetic radiation. d. Initial nuclear radiation. • 9-6 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER ANSWER SHEET -QUIZ NO. 1 Name .. Ten multiple-choice questions: Maximum score = 10 All answers should be on this answer sheet. .. DO NOT WRITE ON THE QUIZ. a b c d 1. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3· ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 5. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 6. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 7. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 8. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 9· ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 10. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .. Score ----- 9-7 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OF~ICER • INSTRUCTOR SOLUTION SHEET QUIZ NO. 1 . . a b c d 1. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) .. 2. (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3· ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 4. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 5. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 6. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 7. (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) 8. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 9. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) • 10. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) . . .. 9-8 .. • .. • LESSON PLAN NO. lO COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: Monitoring Techniques and Operations TIME: l.5 Hours OBJECTIVES: At the end of this unit the participant should be able to: l. Describe the monitoring operations and techniquesto be performed by a monitor in a community shelteror a monitoring and reporting station. 2. Perform or supervise the monitoring activities andresponsibilities in support of emergency operations. 3. Conduct or supervise area monitoring personnelexposure activities . 4. Calculate sheltered vs. unsheltered exposure ratesand outside/inside ratio using the CD V-7l5, CD V-7l7survey meters or the CD V-742 dosimeter• 5. Calculate and control mission exposures. 6. Initiate the necessary contamination/radiationsafeguards. SCOPE: Shelter area monitoring; unsheltered exposure rates;unsheltered exposures; personnel exposures; area monitoring; exposure rate readings from dosimeters; monitoringoperations; peacetime operations; shelter operations;monitoring and reporting station operations; supportingemergency operations; guidance for independent operations. REFERENCES: l. Instructor: a. "Radiological Defense Textbook," SM-ll.22-2,Chapter 9 b . "Handbook for Radiological Monitors," FG-E-5.9 c. "Introduction to Radiological Monitoring," (AProgrammed Home Study Course), HS-3 2. Participant: a. "Radiological Defense Textbook," SM-ll.22-2,Chapter 9 b. "Handbook for Radiological Monitors," FG-E-5.9 lO-l REQUIREMENTS : Instructor:Projection equipment. Set of 2" x 2" slides (A-2l4 -A-280) less A-257. One CD V-700.One CD V-750.One CD V-138.One CD V-715.FiJm: "Radiological Monitoring Techniques." REMARKS: Synopsis of fiJm: "Radiological Monitoring Techniques." Part II -Area Monitoring -On an operational mission, a monitor is sent by the RADEF Officer in an emergency operating center. The narration calls attention to the important points of his mission instructions, and outlines the proper choice and checking of equipment, the necessity for keeping up-to-date radiation exposure records, and dress for an outside mission. The monitor performs his mission and returns to shelter. 10-2 ' . MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS INTRODUCTION l. This instructional unit provides the essent ial techni ques and procedures for conducting each type of radiological monitoring activity. The radiological information gained thr ough monitoring is used as a basis for making operational decisions that can save the maximum number of lives. It becomes imperative, t herefore, that monitoring data be VISUAL A-21 4 as complete and reliable as possibl e . 2 . Each instructor should keep in mind that the lives of many peopl e will depend on how well t he monitor carr ies out his responsibilities. Each monitor must, therefore, became highly skilled in each of the techniques discussed in this session. 3 . The techniques used by the community shelter monitor provide a basis for establishing radiological p r otection for the shel ter community. 4 . The techniques used by the fallout station monitor provide for t he collection and transmission of r eliable exposure and exposure rate data. At the same time they allow him to keep his personal radiation exposure as low as possi bl e . SHELTER AREA l . A survey should be made inside of a community MONI TORING shelter or a fallout monitoring stati on soon after the arrival of fallout to determine the • best shiel ded portions of the shelter and its SHElTER .,... immediate adjoining areas . Based on t h e survey MONITORING information, decisions can be made for contracting or expanding the areas used for shelter occupancy. VISUAL A-215 2 . Procedures for this survey are : a . Use the CD V-715. b . Check the operability of the instrument . VISUAL A-216 10-3 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS • c. Hold the i nstrument at belt height (3 feet above the ground) . . . VISUAL A-217 d. Take readings at selected locations ' . throughout the shelter and adjoining areas and record these on a sketch of the area. VISUAL A-218 NOTE : While discussing Visual A-218 emphasize that exposure rate readings will not be uniform inside of the shelter area. The reason • for the difference in readings is that some portions of the shelter offer better protection than others . Exposure rate readings taken through out the shelter will determine the best protected areas . The following question could be asked of the class : Question: What is the best protected area in the shelter illustrated on this slide? 10-4 • MAIN TOPICS C. UNSHELTERED .. EXPOSURE RATE MEASUREMENTS I UNSHELTERED EXPOSURE RATE MEASUREMENTS VISUAL A-2l9 VISUAL A-220 VISUAL A-22l I I Q VISUAL A-222 TEACHING POINTS Answer: The area or areas showing the lowest exposure rate readings . l. Monitoring and reporting stations report unsheltered exposure rate readings . During the early period of operations, the outside radiation levels may be very high. The monitor must employ techniques at this time that will keep his excursions outside the shelter to a minimum. 2 . Procedures for measuring unsheltered exposure rates are: a. Use the CD V-7l5. b . Check the operability of the instrument. c. Take an exposure rate reading at a specific location in the fallout monitoring station. This should be done as soon as the exposure rate is high enough for an inside reading to be taken. d. Go outside immediately t o a preplanned location in a clear, flat area, at least 25 feet away from buildings, and take an outside reading. The outside reading should be taken within 3 minutes of the inside reading. Return to the shelter after the reading has been taken. e . Calculate t he outside/inside ratio of the fallout monitoring station by dividing the outside exposure rate by the inside exposure rate. The outside/inside ratio ~ l0-5 • MAIN TOPICS VISUAL A-223 VISUAL A-224 VISUAL A-225 VISUAL A-226 VISUAL A-227 TEACHING POINTS may vary from location to location within the station. The outside/inside ratio referred to here is appropriate only for the location where the inside exposure rate measurement is observed. f. Multiply future inside exposure rate readings by the outside/inside ratio at the selected location to obt~in the outside exposure rate. For example: If the inside reading is l R/hr and the outside reading is l50 R/hr, the outside/ inside ratio can be found by dividing the outside reading by the inside reading. Thus, l50 ~l = an outside/inside ratio of l50. If a later inside reading at the same location in the fallout monitoring station is 4 R/hr, the outside exposure rate can be calculated by multiplying the outside/inside ratio by the inside reading. Thus, l50 X 4 = 600 R/hr. NOTE: Haye the students work the practice problem on Visuals A-226 and A-227. If time permits, provide additional practice problems. < .. g. When the outside exposure rate is less than an estimated lOO R/hr, recalculate l0-6 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS ... VISUAL A-228 HCOitllfl -n • IIPOliJIIIAIIS ' h. at least once every 24 hours during the first few days postattack. This is necessary because the effective energy of gamma radiation is changing, thus changing the outside/inside ratio of the fall out monitoring station. Record and report the exposure rate measurement in accordance with the organization SOP. VISUAL A-229 , -,~.-;sures have been recorded as two entries. Q~ June 8 and 9, the dosi meter reading inside the shelter was so low it could not be read. On June lO, a reading of 5 R was measurable. In order to account for the 3 days, a 5 R entry was made on June lO.) *Data not shown on visual. lO-lO MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS G. AREA Area monitoring is used to locate zones of MONITORING contamination and determine the exposure rates within these zones . This is necessary to the .. planning and execution of recovery oper ations . Every mission and activity outside of the shelter must be evaluated in terms of the radiological hazard invol ved. The monitor should be informed concerning routes to be followed, VISUAL A-245 locations where readings are needed, the mission exposure, and the estimated time needed to accomplish the mi ssion. 1. Plan to keep exposure as low as possibl e . a. Know the specific objective, extent, and importance of each monitoring mission. ' •• : ...: --lil!'lljj :::r=~~*:--~ . ~ ,..~ ' ' . ~ • VISUAL A-246 b . Know the allowable exposure for each mission and the expected exposure rates to be encountered. Exposure criteria should be furnished by the Radiol ogical Defense Officer. VISUAL A-247 c . Make allowances for the exposure to be received traveling to and from the monitoring area. Obtain information about the condition of roads, bridges, etc. , that might interfere 1vith the mission and lengthen exposure time . VISUAL A-248 2 . Clothing needed for the mission -No special clothing i s envisioned for protection from fallout contamination when monitoring an area. Clothing appropriate for prevailing weather conditions is adequate providing that skin areas which could come in contact 10-11 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS with fallout are covered. In certain situations, such as dusty conditions, other appropriate clothing may be desirable. .. . 3. Equipment needed for the mission. a. Use the CD V-7l5. b. Wear a CD V-742. c. If areas are to be marked, carry VISUAL A-250 contamination signs and other appro priate equipment. d. Carry a pencil, paper, and a map with monitoring points marked. NOTE: If the film is available, show Part II "Area Monitoring," a:::ter Visual A-250. If the film, • 11Radiological Monitoring Techniques," is not available, Visuals A-25l to A-255 can be used to support a discussion of the procedures for area monitoring. 4. Procedures for area monitoring are: a. Zero the dosimeter before leaving shelter and place it in a pocket to protect it from possible contam~nation. b. Check the operability of the CD V-7l5. VISUAL A-25l c. Use vehicles such as autos, trucks, bicycles, or motorcycles when d~stances are too great t o cover quickly on foot. Keep auto and truck cab windows and vents closed when traveling under extremely dusty conditions. The use l0-l2 MA1N TOPICS .. VISUAL A-252 S UCOIO 1~! [1,.,, Ot H . Tllf &I!C l()(All(}loi ' ~ UCKIUOIIIG . ot···~ ' -.....~ ,;w vtsuAL A-253 VISUAL A-254 ~- :: ~ "' ~" )k'ff~ .-.w~~-A:""''" VISUAL A-255 TEACHING POINTS of a bicycle or motorcycle may be more practical if roadways are blocked. d. Take readings at about three feet (belt high) above the ground. If readings are taken from a moving vehicle, the instrument should be positioned on the seat beside the driver. If readings are to be taken outside a vehicle, the monitor should move several feet away from the vehicle to take the reading. e. Record the exposure rate, the time and location for each reading. If readings are taken within a vehicle, this should be noted in the report. f. Post markers, if required by the mission. The marker should face away from the restricted area. Write the date, time, and exposure rate on the back of the marker . NOTE: Do not give instruction on posting markers unless provisions are being made for their use by the local civil preparedness organization. g. Read the pocket dosimeter at frequent intervals to determine when return to shelter should begin. Allowance should be made for the exposure to be received during return to the shelter. h. Upon completion of mission, observe all personnel for contamination. Decontaminate by brushing and shaking clothing or other appropriate means . i. Report result s of the survey . 10-13 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS j. Record radiation exposure. H. EXPOSURE RATE Survey instruments should always be used to READINGS FROM measure exposure rates. However, if no .. . DOSIMETERS operable survey instruments are available, dosimeters can be used to calculate exposure rates as follows: NOTE: Ask the class to devise a way to use the dosimeter to measure an exposure rate. When they have made their suggestions, work a few problems on the blackboard with their assistance. The procedure is as follows: l. Zero a CD V-742. 2. Place the zeroed dosimeter at a selected location. 3. Expose the dosimeter for a measured interval of time. This interval should be sufficient to allow the dosimeter to read at least lO R. It may take one or two trials before the proper interval can be selected. 4. Read the dosimeter. 5. Divide sixty minutes by the measured length of time the dosimeter was exposed. Multiply this number by the measured exposure. Example: If the exposure is lO R f or a measured interval of five minutes, the exposure rate can be calculated as follows: ~ = 6o X lO l2 X lO = l20 RIhr lO-l4 • MAIN TOPICS I. RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING OPERATIONS .- VISUAL A-256 J. PEACETIME OPERATIONS VISUAL A-258 VISUAL A-259 TEACHING POINTS 1. Radiological monitors, whether assigned to community shelters or monitoring and reporting stations, perform essentially similar operations. Any departure from the operations described in this section will be the result of decisions by the State and local civil preparedness organizations and will be reflected in their operating procedures. 2. Monitoring and reporting stations provide the primary information for conducting radiological defense operations. It is expected that monitors in these stations will receive technical direction and supervision from their organizational Radiological Defense Officer. 3· Community shelter monitors provide at each shelter an independent means of limiting the radiation exposure of shelterees. 4. Some shelters will serve as monitoring and reporting stations. Both types of monitors may be required to support recovery operations. During peacetime, all assigned monitors should perform the following tasks. These tasks should be provided for in your Local Emergency Operations Plan. l. Periodically check the operation of all instruments in accordance with your local standing operating procedures. 10-15 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 2. Participate in refresher training exercises PUfiClPAH IM · IURl~tl and tests as scheduled to maintain a moni · '/ lliiHl MG \ . toring capability. .. i ~.... VISUAL A-260 3. Prepare copies of a sketch of the assigned shelter and adjoining areas of the structure for use during shelter occupancy. VISUAL A-261 4. Plan a location in the shelter, in coordination with the shelter manager, to serve as the center of monitoring operaticns • VISUAL A-262 5. Make radiological instrument sets available to maintenance shops for inspection and calibration according to schedule. • K. SHELTER l. Upon attack or warning of an attack, a shel OPERATIONS ter monitor reports to the shelter rr_anager in his assigned shelter and performs the following operations in order. Again, your Local Emergency Operations Plan should assign these tasks, through its Standard Qrerating Procedures, to the monitor. VISUAL A-263 a . Perform an operational check on all ••t'o>• II '~Ut'•t!!l• t" •11 •• A survey meters. ~ .... .. .. • • I • •'' • Till 0~ • " \ •• "' ' change in the exposure rate, repeat at ...\llhll'wl''I I least once every six hours. VISUAL A-272 lO-l8 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS k. Inform the shelter manager to notify the appropriate emergency operating center and request guidance if: (l) At arry time during the shelter period the inside exposure rate reaches or exceeds 10 R/hr, or VISUAL A-273 (2) Within arry two-da:y period of shelter the exposure is 75 R or more. l. Issue each shelteree a Radiation Exposure Record. As approved by the shel &t'fU ,. • 'l!tiii[IU\ .,.c ter manager, advise shelterees once t!Mfll daily of their exposure during the •11 v ClU~ ""'"'"( 1 H 'IVlt :., previous 24 hours. ltr~sHI! \ VISUAL A-274 2. During the l atter part of the shelter period, when there i s a less frequent need for inshelter monitoring, some of the shelter monitors ma:y be required to provide monitoring services in support of other civil preparedness operations. A monitoring capability should always be retained in the -shelter until the end of the shelter period. 3. At the conclusion of the shelter period, all shelter monitors, except those regularly assigned to emergency services, ma:y expect reassignment . L. MONITORING AND l. For his own protection and the protection of other occupants of a monitoring station, REPORTING STATION the monit or should perform the sa:me shelter OPERATIONS operations as a shelter monitor. But, in addition, this station monitor will measure, record, and report unsheltered exposures and FALLOUT MONITORING STATION OPERATIONS exposure rates to the appropriate emergency operating center as directed by his local emergency operations plan. Re gardless of the local reporting sequence established by the plan, VISUAL A-275 l0-19 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS the monitor should keep an accurate, complete, '' . an~ up-to-date Radiological Reporting Log, , • ~ S ~UltOII , , '"'' rf11'1f)lll) showing the history of exposure, exposure ' ' .. ~ .~ ~ rates, flash reports, and other events ..occurring or observed at his monitoring ·station.VISUAL A-276 2. Unless otherwise specified by the local SOP,the monitor will: a. Make a flash report when the outsideexposure rate reaches or exceeds .5 R/hr. VISUAL A-277 b. Record and report exposure rates inaccordance with local reporting requirements. M. MONITORING IN l. As soon as radiation levels decrease suffi-SUPPORT OF ciently to permit high priority operations • EMERGENCY and, later, as operational recovery activities,OPERATIONS including decontamination of vital areas andstructures, are begun, all fallout s t ationmonitors and most community shelter monitorsare required to provide radiological monitoring support to these operations. Radiological Defense Officers will direct thesystematic monitoring of areas, routes,VISUAL A-278 equipment and facilities to determine theextent of contamination. This informationwill help the civil preparedness officialsdetermine when people may leave shelt er,what areas may be occupied, what routes maybe used, and what areas and facilities mustbe decontaminated. 2. Many government services personnel, such asfire, police, health, and welfare personnel,will serve as shelter monitors or falloutst a t ion monitors during the shelter period.However, as operational recovery acti vitiesare begun, they will have primary responsibility in their own fields, with secondaryresponsibilities in radiological defense • l0-20 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS Most services will provide for a radiological monitoring capability for the protection of their operational crews • • performing emergency activities. The capability is provided until the Radiological Defense Officer determines that it is not required. Services provide this capability from t heir own ranks, to the extent practical, supported by shelter monitors and monitoring and reporting station monitors. 3. When a service is directed to perform a mission, the emergency operating center furnishes the following information: a. The time when the service may leave shelter to perform its mission. , b. The allowable exposure for the complete mission; that is, from time of departure until return to shelter. c. The exposure rate to be expected in the area of the mission. 4. The monitor supporting emergency operations will: a. Read his instruments frequently during each operation and advise the individual in charge of the mission on necessary VISUAL A-279 radiological protective measures and when t he crew must leave the area and return to shelter. b. Determine the effectiveness of decontamination measures, if supporting decontamination operations . c. Monitor equipment on return to shelter to determine if it is contaminated. If so, direct decontamination of that equipment. l0-2l • MAIN TOPICS N. GUIDANCE FOR INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS VISUAL A-280 TEACHING POINTS d. Advise the crew on personnel decontami nation if necessary. l. fl~ monitors receive technical direction .. and guidance from the RADEF Officer or other qualified civil preparedness person nel. However, under the conditions of nuclear attack, communications with the emergency operating center could be disrupted. At any time during the shelter period that communications with the assigned emergency operating center are disrupted, an effort should be made to contact a neighboring shelter or fallout monitoring station through which RADEF advice and guidance could be relayed. 2. If efforts to contact other shelters or fallout monitoring stations are unsuccessful, the monitor may have to provide guidance to the shelter manager on which to take critical actions. This guidance includes: a. Permissible activities. b. Recognition and care of radiation casualties. c . Exposure criteria. d. Exposure and exposure rate calculations. NOTE: Emphasize t hat it is anticipat ed a monitor will have direction and guidance from a Radiological Defense Officer. The monitor will be required to furnish this type of guidance only as a LAST RESORT. l0-22 Visual No. A-214 A-215 A-216 .. A-217 A-218 A-219 A-220 A-221 A-222 A-223 A-224 A-225 A-226 A-227 A-228 A-229 A-230 A-231 A-232 A-233 A-234 A-235 A-236 A-237 A-238 A-239 A-240 A-241 A-242 A-243 A-244 A-245 A-246 A-247 A-248 A-249 A-250 • LIST OF VISUALS Visual Title Radiological Monitoring Techniques Shelter Area Monitoring Use the CD V-715 and Check Its Operability Hold the Instrument at BeJ.t Height Take Readings at Selected Locations Unsheltered Exposure Rate Measurements Use the CD V-715 and Check Its Operability Take an Exposure Rate Reading at a Specific Location in the Shelter Take an Outside Exposure Rate Reading Outside/Inside Ratio Calculation of OI Example: or Problem ••• Solution to the Practice Problem Recalculate the Outside/Inside Ratio Record and Report Exposure Rates Take Exposure Rate Measurements Outside When Using the CD V-717 Place the Instrument Inside • • • Unsheltered Exposure Measurements Zero a CD V-742 Dosimeter Select an Inside Location Using Outside/Inside Ratio of 10 to 20 Position the CD V-742 Calculate the Outside/Inside Ratio at the Location Determine the Unsheltered Exposure Daily Record the Outside Exposure and Rezero the CD V-742 Personal Exposure Measurements Zero All Available CD V-742 Dosimeters Position the Dosimeters to Measure Typical Shelter Exposures Read the Dosimeter Each Day and Average the Total Exposures Issue Card to Each Shelteree Keep Exposure Records Up To Date Area Monitoring Know the Specific Assignment Extent and Importance of Each Mission Know the Allowable Exposure • • • Allow for the Exposure Traveling Wear Clothing Needed for the Mission Prepare Equipment Needed for the Mission 10-23 Visual No. A-251 A-252 A-253 A-254 A-255 A-256 A-258 A-259 A-260 A-261 A-262 A-263 A-264 A-265 A-266 A-267 A-268 A-269 A-270 A-271 A-272 A-273 A-274 A-275 A-276 A-277 A-278 A-279 A-280 Visual Title Procedures for Area Monitoring Checking Exposure Rate Inside a Vehicle Record the Exposure Rate, Time and location for Each Reading Read the Dosimeter at Frequent Intervals While on a Mission .. Upon Return f rom the Mission: ••• Monitors at Public Shelters Provide Guidance for the Protection of Shelterees Peacetime Operations Check Operation of all Instruments Participate in Refresher Training Prepare Sketches of Shelter Area Select a Location in a Shelter for Monitoring Operations Shelter Operations Perform an Operational Check on all Survey Meters Charge Dosimeters Position Dosimeters Report OperationalReadiness Assure that all Doors and Windows are Closed Begin Monitoring Outside Record Exposure Rates on Sketch of Shelter Area Furnish Sketches to Shelter Manager Make a New Survey of the Shelter and Record Exposure Rates on a Sketch at Least Once a Day Inform the Shelter Manager • Advise Shelterees Once Daily of their Previous 24-Hour Exposure Fallout Monitoring Station Operations A Monitor at a Fallout Monitoring Station Performs the Same Operations as a Shelter Monitor • • • A Monitor Maintains a Reporting Log .•• Shelter Monitors and Fallout Station Monitors Will Support Emergency Operations Monitors Supporting Emergency Operations Will If Shelters are Isolated, Monitor Must Provide Guidance on • • • 10-24 • • • • LESSON PLAN NO. ll COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: Exposure and Exposure Rate Calculations TD1E: 2 . 0 Hours OBJECTIVES : At the conclusion of this session, the participants will be able to: l. Use the Exposure Rate Nomogram to forecast future exposure rates. 2. Use of the Entry Time -Stay Time -Total Exposure Nomogram to compute exposures, entry times and stay times. SCOPE: Introduction; multiple decay; use of nomograms; exposure rate nomogram; exposure rate problems; entry time stay time -total exposure nomogram; exposure problems; entry time problems; stay time problems • REFERENCES: Instructor and Participant: a. 11 Radiological Defense Textbook," SM-ll. 22-2, Chapter 8 b. "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual, 'r SM-ll.25 REQUIREMENTS : Instructor and Participant: a. Nomograms and Problems from the Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual b, Straightedge and pin. REMARKS: The instructor may wish to prepare and use visuals to demonstrate the use of nomograms. Two suggestions are (l) 30" x 50" sketches of each nomogram with an appropriate straightedge; (2) vugraphs and a clear plastic rule with an inscribed hairline• He may also wish to produce one or more vugraphs of the information contained in Figure l, page ll-6, to show the relationship between exposure rate and t ime after burst• il-l MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS A. INTRODUCTION The primary purpose of this session is to develop in each student the ability to compute exposure, exposure rates, entry times, and stay times using devices called nomograms. . . NOTE: Many students will learn the techniques of using the nomograms much faster than others. If possible, have each of the faster students sit next to a slower one to assist him. B. MULTIPLE DECAY 1. Each radioactive i s otope has a characteristic half-life. These range from a few millionths of a second to millions of years. However, when many elements -in this case the fission products of a bomb -are present, no one half-life applies for the composite. • 2. With fission products there is a predominance of short-lived radioisotopes in the period immediately following the burst; hence the radiation level peaks and falls off very rapidly. As these short-lived isotopes expend themselves, the longer halflife isotopes became more dominant and the decay rate of the fission products decreases . 3. Exposure rates from t he multiple radioactive decay of fission products may be calculated by using the following formula: R1 = R~ where Rl R T n exposure r ate one hour after detonation (H + 1) = exposure rate at a specific time (T) = time (hours) after burst = fallout decay exponent (standard decay 1.2) = • 4. The value of the fallout decay exponent (n) is not fixed. It vdll vary with: • 11-2 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS a. Bomb design. b. Amount and· type of neutron induced activity. c. Weathering. d. Decontamination. 5. For planning and training exercise purposes, a value of l.2 for the fallout decay exponent is satisfactory. However, accurate information on the radiation levels and rate of decay must depend on radiological monitoring. 6. In calculating t he exposure from fallout, the rapid decay in radiation levels must be taken int o account. The exposure may be calculated by using the following formula: l-n l-n) E = Rl (tl -where t 2 n-l E = Exposure from tl to t 2 Rl Exposure rate at H + l tl = Entry time = Exit time t2 n = l.2 = Fallout decay exponent NOTE: It is desirable to discuss the formulas "as the basis for" the nomograms which will actually be used for the calcula tions. Experience indicates that they are the easiest and most useful of the various methods for exposure and exposure • ll-3 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS rate calculations. The formula method, calculators or tabula~or methods are generally more difficult for students to use. Some sample problems and a table of tl. 2 and t 0•2 are included at the end of this lesson plan for use at the discretion of the instructor. As a minimum, all students should KnOW C. USE OF NOMOGRAMS 1. how to use the nomograms. In the absence of communications between shelters and an emergency operating center, monitors may have the responsibility for exposure and exposure rate calculations. • 2 . The nomograms, based on theoretical fallout radiati on decay characteristics, may be used for rough estimates of future exposure rates and exposures that might be expected in performing necessary tasks in radioactive areas. However, when fallout from several nuclear weapons detonated more than 24 hours apart is deposited in an area, the actual decay rate may differ markedly from the calculated decay rate. 3· Since a monitor will have survey meters available, he will be able to determine the current exposure rate at any time. If his calculations using t he nomograms are then limited to short periods of time into the future, they should not be grossly in error. For short-term predictions, a standard decay exponent of 1.2 is assumed to be satisfactory. For longer term predictions, as a radiological defense 11-4 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS staff at an emergency operating center would be required to make, the use of such nomograms might not be feasible • .. 4. Calculations using the nomograms limited as follows: should be a. The time of detonation must be known with a reasonable degree of accuracy plus or minus one hour for forecasts made within the first twelve hours, and plus or minus 2 -3 hours for later forecasts. b. If nuclear detonat ions occur more than 24 hours apart, forecast exposure rates may be considerably in error. In this case, use the H hour of the last detonation to compute "time after burst. " c. At the time of calculation, exposure rates must have been decreasing for at least 2 -3 hours, and forecasts should be made for periods no farther in the future than the length of time the radiation levels have been observed to decrease. 5. For unsheltered emergency missions, the effects of the mission exposure must be weighed against the benefit to be derived and the importance of early mission performance. The longer the task can be delayed without undue penalty, the greater the radioactive decay of the fallout and the less the radiation exposure. Generally, outside missions should be short and not started until monitoring indicates that forecast conditions actually prevail. At least one dosimeter should be carried and periodically read to assure limiting the exposure to the established value. ll-5 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS D. EXPOSURE RATE NOTE: (l) Explai n the meanings of the three NOMOGRAM columns on the Exposure Rate Nomogram . . before working any sample problems . Have students practice finding exposure r~tes in the proper column so they can recognize and read the various subdivisions between numbers on the three columns . (2) Explain that a "typical" fallout curve from a singl e weapon Qetonation might look like the following : • i'~ I ',c.__ H + 1 E x posure rate I ' I ' ' ' Time after burst (hours ) Figure 1 -Exposure rate curve Thus, the exposure rate probably never reaches the H + l value . I t is a theoreti cal rate indicating 11-6 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS what it would have been if fallout E. EXPOSURE RATE PROBLEMS NOTE: had been complete hy H + 1. To use the Exposure Rate Nomogram, connect a known exposure rate in the "Exposure Rate at H + t" column with the correspond ing time in the "Time After Burst" column . Note the reading on the "Exposure Rate at H + 1" column. Connect this reading with the time of the unknown exposure rate on the "Time After Burst" column and read the answer from the "Exposure Rate at H + t" column. Demonstrate for the class the procedure for solving the simple problem illustrated in No. 1 below. Then have the class work No. 2 and No. 3. The numbers of these and succeeding problems correspond to those in the Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual. Answers are also on t he last 1. 2. page of this lesson. If the exposure rate at one hour after burst is 40 R/hr, what will be the exposure rate at 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 hours? ANSWER: 18,7.6, 4.7, 3.4 and 2.6 R/hr. If the exposure rate at H + 1 is 100 R/hr,what will be the rate at 2, 4, and 10 hours? ANSWER: 44, 19, and 6.5 Rjhr. ll-7 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 3. If the exposure rate at H + 1 is 350 R/hr, what will be the rate at 5, 8, and 12 hours? ANSWER: 51, 30, and 18 R/hr. .. NOTE: Demonstrate the process for solving problem No. 4; then have the class work together to solve two or three problems selected from No. 5 thrOUgh No. 10. Give them the answers after a reasonable period of time. If anyone has difficulty at this point, he will probably have more difficulty later, so try to pair him with one of the "brighter" students. • 4. If the exposure rate at H + 6 was 45 R/hr, what would be the rate at 1, 9, 12, and 15 hours? ANSWER: 380, 28, 20, and 15 R/hr. 5. If the exposure rate at H + 12 was 80 R/hr, what would be the rate at 1, 16, and 24 hours? ANSWER: 1600, 58, and 35 R/hr. 6. If the exposure rate at H + 20 was 10 R/hr, what would be the rate at 1, 20, 25, and 32 hours? ANSWER: 370, 10, 8, and 6 R/hr. 7. If the exposure rate at H + 30 is 10 R/hr, when would the exposure rate be 7 R/hr? ANSWER: H + 40. ~ 8. At H + 20 days the exposure rate in an area is 3 R/hr. What will be the rate at H + 25 days? ANSWER: 2.5 Rjhr. ll-8 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 9. In a sheltered area with a protection factor of 100, the expos·ure rate is 10 R/hr at H + 10. What will be t he unsheltered expo -. sure rate at H + 18? ANSWER: 500 R/hr. 10. In a shelter with a protection factor of 1,000, the exposure rate at H + 24 is 15 R/hr. What will be the rate in the shelter at H + 40? ANSWER: 8 R/hr. F. ENTRY TJME -NOTE: Explain the meanings of the five columns STAY TJME -TOTAL EXPOSURE on the Entry Time -Stay Time -Total NOMOGRAM Exposure Nomogram before working any problems. Indicate that three columns, and on1y three columns, are used together. Thus, use the Total Exposure, Exposure Rate (1 hour) and D/R1 columns together, or use the D/R1 , Stay Time and Entry Time columns together. l. Set up problems in the following six column form. The first five columns are identical to those on the nomogram and the sixth is an additional column that may be required in specific problems. D s E Rt TOTAL EXPOSURE RATE TRANSFER STAY TIME ENTRY TJME EXPOSURE RA.TE EXPOSURE AT H + 1 LINE (HOURS) (HOURS/DAYS) AT H + t 11-9 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS NOTE: Have the students identi~y the infor mation given in the problem and the question asked. If the format above is used to set up the problem, they can fill in the columns with the known quantities. This forces the student to continually reread the problem as he works it. 2. To use the Entry Time -Stay Time -Total Exposure Nomogram, connect two known quantities with a straightedge and locate the point on the transfer line where the straightedge crosses it. Connect this point with a third known quantity and read the answer from the appropriate column. The transfer line is simply a pivot point to go f rom the col~s on the left of it to those on the right or vice versa. 3 . A compl ication may arise where only one quantit y is given for the two columr:s on the right or left of the transfer line. In that case an exposure rate at time "t" will be given and the rate at H + l can be calculated from the Exposure Rate Nomogram. NOTE: Work problem No. l on the folloW:.ng page for the whole class, preferably using one of the training aids suggested in the REMARKS on page il-l. Then have students work Nos . 2 and 3. ll-lO -- ___J MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS G. EXPOSURE PROBLEMS l . If the exposure rate at H + l was 200 R/hr, what would be the exposure of a monitor if he entered the area at H + 12 and stayed -. 4 hours? ANSWER: 35 R. 2. If the exposure rate at H + l was 50 R/hr, what would be the exposure of a monitor if he stayed in this area from H + 5 to H + 8? ANSWER : 15 R. 3 . If the exposure rate at H + l was 500 R/hr, what would be the total exposure of a monitor who remained in this area for a 1.5 hour period beginning at H + 12? ANSWER: 36 R. NOTE: Demonstrate the process for solving probl em No. 4, then have the class do additi onal problems until all have mastered the technique . It is neces- sary in this case to compute the expo sure rate at H + l using the Exposure Rate Nomogr am. 4. What would be a monitor ' s exposure if he entered an area at H + 6 and left at H + 8? At the time of entry, the exposure rate was 15 R/hr . ANSWER : 25 R. 5. Firemen must put out a fire in an area where t he exposure rate was 50 R/hr at H + 7. What will be their mission exposure if it takes 6 hours to fight the fire and they start their mission at H + 12? ANSWER: 120 R. 6 . Vital medical supplies must be moved to a shelter area. The task will require 30 • minutes . If the worker enters the area at H + 6 when the exposure rate is 200 R/hr, what exposure will he receive? ANSWER: 90 R. ll-ll MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 7. An individual left a shelter at H + 6 on a mission to a nearby shelter but never arrived at the other shelter. At H + 30 a rescue team found him unconscious in the contaminated area outside the original shelter. At that time the exposure rate was 14 R/hr. What exposure was received by the unconscious individual? ANSHER: 800 R. 8. A rescue team entered a contaminated area at H + 12 and accomplished a task in 4 hours . What was their exposure if the expos1ire rate at time of exit was 12 R/hr? ANSWER: 60 R. 9. No water is available in a shelter. There is a safe supply nearby. It is a 45 minute walk to the water and the mission will begin at H + 10. If the exposure rate at H + 7 was 30 R/hr, what exposure will be received in obtaining the water for the shelter? ANSWER: 27 R. • 10. What is the exposure received in a shelter from H + l8 to H + 24 if the unshelt ered exposure rate at H + 16 is 120 R/hr and the shelter protection factor is 200? ANSWER: 2.7 R. H. ENTRY TD1E NOTE: Demonstrate the solution of problem PROBLEMS No. l below for the class and have them work additional problems at their desks until you feel the class can move on to the next type of problem. l. If the exposure rate in an area was 300 R/hr at H + 1, when can a monitor enter the area for a 3 hour stay and receive less than 50 R? ANSWER: H + ll. ll-12 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 2. A monitor must stay in an area for 1 hour. The exposure rate in this area at H + 1 was 150 R/hr. He must limit his exposure to 15 R. When can he enter? ANSWER: H + 6. 3. In order to keep a monitor's exposure below 20 R for a stay time of 2 hours, what is the earliest possible entry time into an area where the exposure rate was 120 R/hr at H + 1? ANSWER: H + 7. 4. If the exposure rate in an area is 5 R/hr at H + 20 and an individual must stay there three hours, what is the earliest time he can enter and not exceed an exposure of 10 R2 ANSWER: H + 27. 5. A mission exposure is set at 35 R. The exposlire rate in an area was 18 R/hr at H + 15. When can workers enter this area for a 3 hour period? ANSWER: H + 21. 6. The task of removing equipment which is located in a contaminated area will require 3 hours. The mission exposure is set at 50 R and the exposure rate at H + 9 was 50 R/hr. When can the salvage crew enter the area? ANSWER: H + 22. 7. A monitor must make a survey of an area which will require 2 hours. The mission exposure is set at 35 R and the exposure rate in the area was 18 R/hr at H + 1 day. When will the monitor be able to enter the area? ANSWER: H + 23. 8. People want to move from an improvised shelter to a community shelter. At H + 6 the route to be traveled had an average exposure rate of 85 R/hr. The trip will take 2 hours and the mission exposure is 50 R. When can they leave? ANSWER: H + 17. 11-13 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 9. A supply of drugs must be delivered as soon as possible to a shelter. The drive takes 3 hours. The average exposure rate along t he route to be followed was l25 R/hr at H + 4. The mission exposure is 75 R. What is the earliest time that the drugs can arrive at the shel~er? ANSWER: H + l8. lO. A shelter with a protection factor of 500 is running low on food. The nearest supply would require l hour round trip to obtain it. The average exposure rate over the route to be traveled was 60 R/hr at H + 7. The mission exposure is set at 50 R. When can the mission be started to obtain the food? ANSWER: H + 8. I. STAY TIME PROBLEMS NOTE: Demonstrate No. l below and then proceed as in "H. ENTRY TIME. PROBLEMS." l. A mission exposure is set at 25 R and the mission will begin at H + l2. What stay • time is permitted, if the exposure rate at H + l was 500 R/hr? ANSWER: l Hour. 2. At H + l the exposure rate was 200 Rjhr. If entry into the area is made at H + 6 and the mission exposure is set at 50 R, what is the allowable stay time? ANSWER: 2.7 hours. 3. A family entered a contaminated area at H + 5. Their exposure should not exceed 35 R. How long can they stay in this area if the exposure rate at time of entry was 20 R/hr? ANSWER: 2.2 hours. 4. At H + l2 a monitor must start an emergency mission outside his assigned shelter. At H + 6 the outside exposure rate was 75 R/hr. If his mission exposure is not to exceed 20 R, how long can he take for the task? ANSWER: • 6 hour • ll-14 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 5. At H + 3 the exposure rate in an area was 40 R/hr. A rescue squad entered the area at H + 5 . How long can they stay in the .. area if their exposure is not to exceed 25 R? ANSWER : l . 5 hours . 6. Personnel working in a warehouse in a contaminated area received an exposure of l50 R. At H + l the exposure rate was l,300 R/hr and they entered the working area at H + 8 . How long were they in the area? ANSWER : l . 6 hours. 7. A message must be hand carried to another shel ter. What i s the maximum time for the mission if the average exposure rate between the shelters was 90 R/hr at H + 2? The mission exposure is set at 35 R and the messenger is to leave shelter at H + 6 . ANSWER: l . 8 hours . 8. At H + l5 a RADEF Officer must move to another EOC 75 miles away . The average e~osure rate over the area of travel was 75 R/hr at H + 6 . How fast wil l he have to travel in order not to exceed an exposure of 50 R? ANSWER : 28 m. p . h . 9· An individual travels at a speed of 35 m.p . h . through a contaminated area where the average exposure rate was lOO R/hr at H + 5 . How far will he be able to t r avel before seeking shelter if he entered the area at H + l3 and must limit his exposure to 80 R? ANSWER: 95 mil es. lO. Due to crowded shelter conditions some people will be moved at H + 9 to another shelter. The outside exposure rate was 250 R/hr at H + 3 . Their exposure is not to exceed 35 R. How long do they have to transfer shelters? ANSWER: . 5 hour. ll-l5 • EXPOSURE EXPOSURE RATE RATE at H+t at H+l .. EXPOSURE RATE NOMOGRAM TIM E AFTER BURST 10 8 2 800 6 3 1000 4 10 4 6 Cl.. 1:>0 8 3 10 -"' 2000 12 2 16 20 3 0 00 28 36 5000 ll-16 t (.. • .. • ENTRY TIME -STAY TIME ENTRY TIME TOTAL EXPOSURE NOMOGRAM EXPOSURE RATETOTAL at H+l TRANSFER LINEEXPOSURE 2 STAY TIME [hours] ~ ~ 2 TEST QUESTIONS SAMPLE EXPOSURE AND EXPOSURE RATE PROBLEMS FORMULA METHOD Exposure Rate Problem .- If the exposure rate at a given location one hour after detonation was 30 R/hr, what would the exposure rat e be at this location l2 hours after detonation? Solution Substitute values in the above formula. R = ? 2 30 = R (l2)l. t = l2 hours 2 (l2)l. = l9.73 Therefore: 30 = R (l9.73) R = 30 = l.52 R/hr l9.73 Exposure Problem What exposure would a civil preparedness monitoring team receive in a radioactive contaminated area if the team entered the area 5 hours after a nuclear burst and stayed for a period of l6 hours? The exposure rate at H + l was 50 R/hr. Solution E = Rl (Tll-n -T2l-n) E = ? n-1 Substitute values in the above formula. E = 50 (5l-l.2 _ 2ll-l.2) Tl = 5 hours l.2-l E = 50 (5-0.2 -2l-0.2) = 5 + l6 = 2l hours T2 . 2 5-0 •2 = 0.725 and 2l-0•2 = 0.544 n = l.2 Therefore: E = 250 (0.725 -0.544) E = (250) (O.l8l) E = 45 R • ll-18 t = Time In Hours . ~ 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0 30.0 32.0 34.0 36.0 38.0 4o.o 50 .0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 120.0 140.0 144.0 160.0 168.0 (1 week) 200.0 250.0 300.0 336.0 (2 weeks) 504.0 (3 weeks) 672.0 (4 weeks) VALUES OF t1.2 AND t-0.2 tl.2 t-0.2 1..000 1.000 1~627 0.921 2.300 0.871 3.003 0.826 3.737 0.803 5.278 0.756 6.899 0.725 8.586 0.697 10.33 0.679 12.13 o.66o 13.96 0.644 15.85 0.631 19:73 o.6o8 23.74 0.590 27.86 0.574 32.09 0.560 36.41 0.550 40.82 0.539 45.31 0.530 49.89 0.521 54.52 0.514 59.23 0.505 64.00 o.5oo 68.83 0 .494 73.72 0.488 78.66 0.483 83.67 0.478 109.3 0.457 136.1 0.441 163.7 0.427 192.2 0.417 226.5 0.407 251.2 0.399 312.6 0.384 376.2 0.372 389.1 0.370 442.5 0.362 468.1 0.360 577.1 0.347 754.3 0.333 938.7 0.319 1075.0 0.313 1745.0 0.288 2471.0 0.272 ll-19 SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO PROBLEMS • Exposure Rate Problems l. l8, 7.6, 4.7, 3.4, 2.6 R/hr 2. 44, l9, 6.5 R/hr 3· 5l, 30, l8 R/hr 4. 380, 28, 20, l5 R/hr 5. l600, 58, 35 R/hr 6. 370, lO, 8, 6 R/hr 7. H + 40 8. 2.5 R/hr 9. 500 R/hr lO. 8 R/hr Exposure Problems l. 35 R 2. l5 R 3· 36 R 4. 25 R 5. l20 R 6. 90 R 7. 800 R 8. 60 R 9. 27 R lO. 2.7 R Entrl Problems l. H + ll 2. H + 6 3· H + 7 4. H + 27 5. H + 2l 6. H + 22 7. H + 23 8. H + l7 H + l8 9· lO. H + 8 Stay Time Problems l. l hour 2. 2.7 hours 2.2 hours 3· 4. .6 hour 5. l.5 hours 6. l.6 hours 7. l.8 hours 8. 38 m.p.h. 9· 95 miles lO. .5 hour t ll-20 • COURSE TITLE: LESSON TITLE: OBJECTIVES : .- SCOPE: REFERENCES : REQUIREMENTS: LESSON PLAN NO. 12 Basic Radiological Defense Officer Fallout History Curves TIME: 2.0 Hours At the concluston of t his unit the participant should be able to: l. Enumerate factors tics of fall out • influencing the decay characteris 2 . Develop and gr aph fallout history toring data . curves from moni 3 . Compute exposure and exposure rates from fallout history curves . 4. Use fallout history curves to analyze the r adiological situation. 5 . Provide operational guidance . Fission products half-life; decay characteristics; fractionation; weathering effects ; plotting of fallout curves for single and multiple weapon detonations; determining decay exponent; computing exposure and exposure rates from representative history curves. l. Instructor : a . "Radiological Defense Textbook, 11 SM-11. 22-2 b . "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 11 Glasstone, Samuel, Revised 1964 2 . Participant: 11 Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual, 11 SM-11. 25 l. Instructor: a . Projection equipment b . Set of 211 x slides (A-290 -A-309 ) 2 11 2 . Participant: a. "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual, 11 SM-11. 25 b . Ruler c . Log-log graph paper • REMARKS: Attachments 1, 2, 3, and 4 contain solut i ons to t he Requirements in the Fallout History Curves section of the "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual." 12-l MAIN TOPICS A. INTRODUCTION B. FORECASTING EXPOSURE RATES VISUAL A-29 0 TEACHING POINTS 1. As a member of the civil preparedness staff, the RADEF Officer is responsible for providing technical support and guidance to the head of government and to other members of the staff, including the chiefs of emergency operating services. 2. To provide this technical support and guidance, the RADEF Officer needs several techniques or skills which can be used as "operational tools" in analyzing and evaluating radiological intelligence . 3. These "tools" include the ability to: a. Forecast exposure rates under nonstandard decay conditions. b . Compute exposure from fallout history curves. c. Estimate entry-stay times in radiation areas. 4. These techniques are described as "operational tools" to emphasize that they are not ends in themselves, but merely a means for analyzing and evaluating radiological intelligence. The interpretation of the numbers provided by these "tools" is the crucial test of a RADEF Officer's ability. 1. Each radioactive isotope has a characteristic half-life. These range from a few millionths of a second to millions of years. However, when many radioisotopes contribute to the radiation exposure rate, as in the case of the fission products from a nuclear weapon, no one half-life applies for the composite. 2 . With fission products, there is a predominance of short-lived radioisotopes in the 12-2 • -. • MAIN TOPICS TEACHJNG POJNTS period immediately following the burst ; hence the radiation exposure rate decreases very rapidly. As these short-lived radioisotopes expend themselves, the longer half-life isotopes become dominant and the decay rate of the ~ission products decreases. 3. Multiple radioactive decay of the fission products can be estimated using the general equation: R = Rlt-n, where R equals the exposure rate at any time (t) measured from the time of burst, R1 equals the exposure rate one hour after detonat ion, and n is the fallout decay exponent. 4. For this function, a linear plot of exposure rate versus time after detonation yields a curved line which is difficult to reproduce and is of little value in forecasting rates. However, this same function plotted on log-log graph paper VISUAL A-291 yields a straight line when n is constant. Conversely, the log-log plot is a curved line when n is not constant. 5. This straight line (constant value of n) indicates an orderly and predictable decay of the radioactive fallout. This fact serves as the basis for the forecasting technique recommended for the RADEF Officer. 6. The decay of reactor-produced fission R • At I" products from the slow fission of u235 i>~~·· follows a t-1 •2 curve for about the first .'>'. ·:_ ~ -~ 100 days • This 1.2 value of n is usually used in research work, in training, and in planning when an estimate of the decrease VISUAL A-292 in fallout radiation levels with time is required. "t-1. 2 decay11 is so frequently used that it is referred to as "standard decay." 12-3 MAIN TOPICS VISUAL A-293 TEACHING POINTS 7. For planning purposes, the value of n = l . 2 is quite sat isfactory. It also has limited operational use in that the exposures and exposure rates calculated by radiological monitors will be based on standard decay conditions . Since monitors will have survey meters available, they will be able to determine the current exposure rate at any time . If their calculations, using the nomograms in FG-E-5 . 9, "Handbook for Radiological Monitors," are then limited to short periods of time into the future, their calculations should not be grossly in error. 8. Thus, for short-term forecasting by the monitor, the standard decay conditions used in the nomograms are assumed to be satisfactory. However, for longer term predictions, such as a Radiological Defense Officer • would be required to make, other techniques which account for nonstandard decay conditions must be used. 9. This is supported by the decay characteris tics of actual fallout from weapons tests . Attempts to fit observed decay of the fallout with a general equation of the form R = Rlt-n have required values nf "n" ranging from about 0. 9 to 2. 2 . There fore, attempts to forecast the decay of actual fallout fields on the basis of any particular value of "n" are almost certain to be grossly inaccurate. lO. The fallout decay exponent will vary with bomb design, the amount and type of neutroninduced activity, fractionation and, in a particular area , with weathering, decontamination, and the age of the fission products from multipl e bursts . Since decay charact eristics will be determined from measured exposure rates, anything which affects the rate or its measurement will affect the computed value of "n" and, thus, the forecasted exposure rate . 12-4 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS ll. To illustrate how some of these factors affect the decay characteristics of fallout, consider the influence of induced activity, fractionation, weathering, different agefission products, and decontamination. 12. Neutron-induced activity is highly variable slnce lt lS greatlY dependent upon the design of the weapons a:nd/or the concentra ... tion of certain elements in the surface at Ground Zero. Isoto~es induced in the we~pon debris, such as u23'f, u239, Np23f and Np 59 may contribute up to 40% of the total activity in the period from 20 hours to VISUAL A-294 two weeks after the burst. At other times, their activity is negligible compared to the fission products. A second important,but again highly variable contribution to the exposure rate can arise from the activity induced in certain elements ins_he 256 earth ~d in sea water, such as Na , Mn and Si~~. In both cases, these induced radioisotopes become incorporated with the fallout a:nd are deposited downwind from Ground Zero. 13. In a surface burst, fractionation causes the large fallout particles found close to Ground Zero to have different properties than the smaller particles which are deposited some f f ~ • ., '• distance downwind. There are two reasons for this. First, the gaseous ancestors of a ... number of fission products form early in the .... fireball while the stem and cloud are close to the earth. At this time, the large heavyparticles fall-back to the earth and a:re VISUAL A-295 close-in. As the stem a:nd cloud continue to rise, the daughter products then provide the maj or makeup of the smaller particles.Secondly, there is selective condensation of the higher boiling point refractory elements on the larger particles during the early period of stem and cloud formation. Conversely there is condensation of the more volatile elements on the smaller particles at a later time when the stem a:nd cloud reach high altitudes. The visual depicts a nuclear burst in three different stages; low, medium, a:nd high altitudes. The first stage is only seconds after detonation. The cloud is rich in MO 99 and I 137. The second s t age shows the stem and cloud rising to a much higher level at a later time and the product concentrations are now MO 99 and XE 137. Finally, when the 12-5 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS VISUAL A-296 VISUAL A-297 VISUAL A-298 VISUAL A-299 VISUAL A-300 14. cloud has reached great heights, minut es later, the makeup has changed to MO 99 and CS 137. Thus, fractionation and wind shear at different levels will produce fallout that varies in composition at different locations on the ground even though the fallout is from the same weapon and the decay exponent will vary with the composition of the fallout. The effect of weathering on exposure _ate at a location ~s tlie result of fallout particles migrating primarily due to wind and rain. Relative flat, hard, smooth, welldrained surfaces permit more movement of fallout particles t han do rough surfaces such as grassy areas or unplowed fields. Generally the bulk of fallout will remain within the confines of the immediate area, but its redistribut ion may either reduce or increase exposure rates. For example, where the surface is flat, wind may sweep the area clean reducing the exposure rate to a very low level. On the other hand, the wind may pile the fallout in gutters, trenches, or in drifts on the leeward sides of buildings, thus increasing the exposure rate. .. 15. If fallout from different weapons deposited at a part~cUiar Iocat~on ~s tlie same age ~same burst times), and if decay rates are ldentical, then the slope of the composite curve is the same as any of the individual curves. However, if fallout from different weapons is not the same a'e (differentburst times and a~stances and, regardless of the decay rate of each set of fission products, the slope of the composite decay curve wi ll not be the same as any of the individual curves. Even if n = 1.2 for each set of fission products, "n" will not equal 1.2 for the composite curve regardless of which burst time is used as a reference. 16. Recovery operations, such as decontarr_ination, may remove from 80 to 99% of tlie contam~ate on some surfaces. Unless all contrituting surfaces are decreased by these percentages,the exposure rate at a particular location -vrill not decrease by 80 to 99%, but it will be reduced significantly. 17. Qol{lparison of a star_dard decay curve with \l) a normalized average of a number of actual curves, and (2} an actual curve developed from the Castle Bravo shot illustrates t he failure of standard decay to adequately reflect the changing radiation 12-6 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS levels . At six months there is a significantly abrupt c~~2e in s~ope corresponding to the t • relatlon. .. VI SUAL A-301 18. Since the decay characteristics of fallout are significantly affected by the above factors and others not mentioned, the most practical method of forecasting exposure rates under these conditions is based upon the technique of plotting observed exposure rates versus time after detonation on loglog graph paper and extrapolating the plotted curve. Plots of this type for two or three representative points across a community will generally be adequate . VISUAL A-302 VISUAL A-303 19 . The procedure for plotting observed exposure rates is as follows . From NUDET reports or simply from observations of the flash, the blast wave, or the cloud of the detonation, the time of burst of most weapons within a radius of 100 to 200 miles will be known. Thus, the RADEF Officer will know the time of formation of most of the fission products in his immediate area and from the current "DF" report he will generally know which specific detonation is causing the major fallout problem in his community. 20. The RADEF Officer can then plot or direct the plotting of observed exposure rates against time on log-l og paper. Future exposure rates can be estimated by projecting the curve to future times of concern. VISUAL A-304 21. However, as a practical limit, forecasts of future exposure rates generally should not exceed the time period for which decreasing exposure rate records are available. For example, if exposure rate observations have been decreasing for the preceding 12 hours, they will be plotted and, provided the plot for the last few hours approximates a 12-7 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHJNG POINTS straight line, the curve can be extr apolated for 12 additional hours to forecast the rates during that time period. Cau0ion must be exercised in extrapolating t he curve during periods of fluctuation. 22. If the exposure rate is observed to materially increase after a period during which .. the logarithmic decay is approximately a straight line, this indicates the arrival of significant additional fallout . If the rate appears to be equal to or less than the maximum exposure rate from earlier fallout, continue the original plot based on the "H hour" of the original fallout . However, if considerable time has elapsed since arrival of the first fallout and the increase in exposure rate equals or exceeds the maximum exposure rate from earlier fallout, plot a new graph using the estimated H hour of t he latest fallout as the reference time . After the plot indicates an orderly decrease (nearly a straight line log plot), extrapolation of the curve can again provide a reasonable basis for estimating exposure r ates f'or future per iods . 23 . It should be emphasized that the act ual exposure rate may vary considerably from the forecast rate . Thus , operations likely to require high r adiation exposures should be carried out on the basis of obser ved exposure rates, not forecast rates . The forecast is simply a guide to aid the civil preparedness coordinator in planning his forthcoming survival and recovery o~erations . . 24. A forecast exposure rate could be considerably in error if additional fallout occurred after the forecast was made, or if the rate of decay changed materially from that indicated by the plots on the log-log graph. The latest fallout analysis , based upon current exposure rate reports, should be the basis f or current 12-8 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS operations. Plans for future operations should be based upon the current fallout analysis, modified according to the forecast from a log-log plot. NOTE: Have the students complete Require ment No . 1 in the "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual." (See Attacnment 1.) 25. If a log-log plot for two or three locations within a community is not adequate, it may be advantageous to compute the value of the fallout decay exponent "n" and use . -n the general equation R = R1t to predict future exposure rates in areas where the decay characteristics are the same . 26. The fallout decay exponent "n" may be computed directly from the plotted curve. "n" is numerically equal to the slope of the curve and is, therefore, constant only when the plotted line is straight. Determine "nn from the graph by dividing the measured distance ~Y by the measured VISUAL A-305 distance ~X as indicated. ~Y and ~X are measured in inches and NOT the values on the horizontal and verticle scales of the plot. -]~--i n=~y ~X ___ j__ -J---------- I I I I :+-~X-......,.•:I I I : I ty 12-9 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS C. COMPUTATION OF EXPOSURE ',~-.,~.. .. =::-;1> ... ru.- • .. ..~~A'¥.!' •. ~. ·~ !dk ' i'"'' . ~~~· ;. i ~ '. : • ; t !nd-ah~~~•u, -.•.'.i.~~""""*'" J J-,J• VISUAL A-306 '. .. .. ;;! :: VISUAL A-307 NOTE: Have students compute a value f (n) hy completing Requirement No. 2 in the "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual." Requirement :Jo . 3 is an optional problem. l. Dosimeters integrat e exposures over a period of time and account directly for variations in exposure rates due to decay or to movement into areas of higher or lower radiation levels. Dosimeters thus provide the simplest and most direct method of measuring personnel exposure. 2. However, there may be instances when t he RADEF Officer must estimate exposures based on a series of rate measurements. 3. In these instances, it is relatively simple to forecast exposure rates and, consequently, t he total exposure of individuals when the fallout decay exponent remains constant over long periods of time. However, if we are concerned with estimating the total exposure for the periods (l) of fallout deposi~ion, (2) when the value of the fallout decay exponent is changing rapidly, or (3) when fallout from several detonations contr ibutes to the exposure rate, calculation of ~hese est imates becomes more complex. 4. A sat isfactor y estimate of total exposure can be obtained hy plotting exposure rate versus time after detonation and deter . mining t he exposures from the graph. To . do this, divide the exposure period into increments. When the slope of the curve is changing rapidly, the increments should be small. When the slope is relatively st raight over the exposure period, the increments may be larger. The increments need not be equal in size. l2-l0 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 5. As a general rule, an increment should not exceed one-half of the t ime from detonation to the beginning of the increment, for example, if t he increment begins at H + 10, it should not be l arger than 5 hours. However, if the slope of the curve changes appreciably during this time, it may be necessary t o use even smaller increments. During the init ial periods of fallout deposition, the increment s should be no larger than l hour. This technique for computing the exposure under the curve is applicable to linear graph paper and not to log-log paper. Within the limitations mentioned above , a log-log plot provides a sufficiently close approximation. 6. Determine the average exposure r ate within each increment and multiply this by the elapsed time . Total the exposures in each increment t o find the estimated exposure between the times of interest. VISUAL A-308 100 80 I I t -I t+---A~. I I I ---·----1 ---- I -·---- I ·~a ... I I I 1 . 20 Time After Burst (Hours) 12-ll MAIN TOPICS . ' • 1 ' ' ~ ,, ... ~· .......- VISUAL A-309 D. SUMMARY TEACHING POINTS Increment Avg. exposure rate X elapsed time = exposure A (100 + So). 90 X 2 = 180 ( 2 ) ' B ( 80 + 50). 65 X 3 = 195 ( 2 ) ' c ( 50 + 30). · ~ 40 X 5 = 200 ( 2 ) ' Total 575 R NOTE: Have students complete Requirement No . 4 in the "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual." 7. Marry t imes personnel will occupy more than one shelter, or will spend part-time in shelter and part-time outside, or they may move from a low-grade shelter to a better shelter. Using the techniques of exposure calculation, total exposure can be graphically represented on the fallout history curve as shown on Visual A-309. l. At the conclusion of this session, each student should be able to forecast exposure and exposure rates under nonstandard decay conditions and be able to determine a nonstandard decay exponent. 2. Students should remember that the operational tools developed in t his session are not an end in themselves. The real test of a RADEF Officer's ability is the judgment he uses in applying the "numbers" from these tech.11iques. .. 3. Students should have an opportunity to practice the skills developed in this session and to gain experience in using judgment in their application during RADEF exercises. 12-12 ATTACHMENT 1 EXERCISE SOLUTIONS Requirement 1 (See Attachment 2) a. N/A (Not applicable) b. N/A c. Extrapolate as far as observed time after peak of fallout. (From H+10 to H+44, approximately 30 hours beyond H+44 hours). d • (H+60) 12 R/hr; (H+80) 8 R/hr .. e. N/A f. H+10 to H+122 (112 hours); extrapolate to H+230 hours. g. H+200 h. Yes -but define limitations. i. Keep plotting exposure rates on history curve but do not make any forecasts until fallout has again peaked and decay stablized. j • Draw a line parallel to the initial history curve . Begin the line at intersection of 15 R/hr and H+30. Exposure rate at H+50 would be 7 R/hr. Requirement 2 (See Attachment 2) • a. There is no difference in the decay exponent which reflects the same fallout composition throughout the curve. b. Delta Y over delta X computes n = 1.45 c. Distances should be as large as appropriate for convenient ruler measurement. Requirement 3 (See Attachment 3) a. 8.5 R/hr b. N/A c. H+l80 d. n = 1.00 (Based upon H+80 thru H+150) Requirement 4 (See Attachment 4) a. H+6 to H+10 0 + llO = 55 R/hr average 2 55 x 4 hours (H+6 to H+10) = 220 R H+10 to H+20 110 + 70 = 90 R/hr average 2 90 x 10 hours = 900 R Total Exposure = 220 R + 900 R = 1120 R 12-13 Requirement 4 (Continued) b. H+20 to H+30 70 + 200 = 135 R/hr average 2 135 x 10 hours = 1350 R c. Using time increments of' 10 hours each for time period H+30 to H+100: .. 200 + 130 330= = 165 X 10 = 1650 2 2 130 + 80 210 = = 105 X 10 = 1050 2 2 80 + 54 = 134 = 67 X 10 = 670 2 2 54+ 40 94 = = 47 X 10 = 470 2 2 40 + 30 70 = = 35 X 10 = 350 2 2 30 + 24 54 27 X lO = 270 2 2 24 + 20 44= 22 X 10 = 220 2 2 4bBQ R d. Using the following time increments of 10 hours each from H+100 to H+200: 20 + 15 35 .• = = 17.5 x 10 hrs = 175 2 2 15 + 12.5 27 . 5 = = 13 . 75 x 10 hrs = 137.5 2 2 12.5 + 11 23.5 = = 11. 75 x 10 hrs = 117.5 2 2 12-14 • .. .' Reg,uirement 4 (Continued) 11 + 10 21 = = 2 2 10 + 9.5 19.5 = = 2 2 9.5 + 8 .6 18.1 = = 2 2 8.6 + 8 16.6 = = 2 2 8 + 7.4 15.4 = = 2 2 7.4 + 7 14.4 = 2 2 10.5 x 10 hrs 105 9.75 x 10 hrs = 97.5 9.05 x 10 hrs = 90 .5 8.3 x 10 hrs = 83 7.7 x 10 hrs = 77 7.2 x 10 hrs = 72 955 R 12-15 ATTACHMENT 2 800 '~" TIMEMONITORING :::: 600 400 300 200 .. 100 80 60 . ~ ' Cl:l [;a;l E-< < 40 Cl:l [;a;l !5 30 ~ 0.. :>< [;a;l 20 • 15 12 10 8 7 6 4 3 2 < . 1 2 3 6 8 10 20 30 40 50 60 80 100 2001 T i me after burst (hours) 12-16 • ATTACHMENT 3 1,000 800 : EXPOSURE EXPOSURE TIME RATE TIME RATE 600 !:::: F MONITORING DO NOT plot this H+2 1 Station P 2 data until items =r;:.. 1-:.i H+3 20 a to d of Require 400 . i ·; H+4 80 +'-li-'r: t:p1 ~;H1 -I Ii ... ment No . 1 areH+5 70 completed. 300 H+6 60 H+54 12H+7 65 H+57 13 H-1-8 70 200 H+60 15 H+9 65 18 H+10 60 .. H+66 19 H+ll 54 H+69 20 H+12 50 H+72 20 H+13 46 H+75 19100 38 H+81 18 ~ 31 80 H+87 17 ' ~ 28 H+93 15 r.l 24 E-o 60 H+99 14 19 < ~ H+120 11 15 r.l ~ 13 H+144 9.0 40 i3i 0 0.. ~ 30 r.l 20 10 8.5 8 11 ,~~ ~~ '=FI'QIIlS r1110• IIQIUTOMHC; SUTlOftS 1-. • ·--~;;;; ... ....--- VISUAL B-03 TEACHING POINTS 1. Radiological information is needed at each level of government as a basis for planning and directing survival, rescue and recovery operations following a nuclear attack. AvailabiliLy of radiological information is dependent upon a network of appropriately dispersed monitoring stations. 2. Three categories of radiological monitoring are required. a . A network of monitoring and reporting stations that would routinely report radiation levels to the jurisdiction's emergency operating center. b . Selected emergency services and vital facilities that are essential to the jurisdiction (e.g., police, fire, telephone , water, etc.) nust have a monitoring capability to enable them to function. This is called self-support monitoring . c . Shelters must have a monitoring capability in order to minimize the radiation exposure of the shelterees. It is possible for a monitoring location to be part of all three monitoring categories. 3. Emergency operations depend on reports from monitoring and reporting stations . The nationwide monitoring and reporting coverage will provide radiological reports to three levels of government --Federal, State and local. The local networks are, to a significant degree, the key to an effective nation wide monitoring system since reports from t hese local networks would be condensed into larger geographical reports upon which key decisions will be made • 13-3 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS C • CRITERIA FOR l. Monitoring and reporting stations are SELECTION OF selected for their communications capability MONITORING AND first and their geographical distribution REPORTING STATIONS second. ~~' Monitoring and reporting stations should -~:" ~· '"' {t ',-.: "' .~ ~ also be selected for the protection they will \_,..,.~,...-.... provide the personnel from exposure to nuclear · radiation. ~~j VISUAL B-04 2 . Generally, monitoring and reporting stations should be located every two to three miles in urban areas and every seven to ten miles in rural areas. The actual distribution will depend upon local requirements. Distribution should provide representative coverage of the area in relation to both population and VISUAL B-05 geography. If a jurisdiction is a host area, this must also be considered. 3· Monitoring and reporting stations mus~ have _,._ T' a means of communication in order to report their radiation exposure measurements to the .-;, . EOC. It is recommended that they also have a second means of communication to serve as backup that does not rely on commercial power. In most jurisdictions the primary VISUAL B-06 means of communicat ion will be the telephone, with CB or RACES providing alternate communications. 4. An attempt should be made to locate monitoring and reporting stations in facilities with a protection factor of at least 40 or in facilities where crisis action can improve the protection to PF 40 or better. •' 5. Each monitoring and reporting station should be issued a kit of radiological instruments to be used to detect and measure the radiation exposure. These instruments will be maintained and recalibrated in accordance with the State radiological instrument maintenance and calibration program. 13-4 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 6. At least four radiological monitors (RM's) will be trained and assigned to each monitoring and reporting station. This will provide monitors for 24-hour operation and backup as necessary. 7. Monitoring and reporting stations should be located in government facilities preferably at fire, police, welfare, highway patrol, highway maintenance, forestry, agricultural, health, or other State and local government facilities because of better operational VISUAL B-07 control. They may also be situated at radio transmitter sites, industrial or ~L::rr.::-·-~·., "'• ' commercial facilities, at local and county '· - airports, or in other private facilities if ' I rt :. '• the above qualifications are met. Where 1 ~ ~ . ~ .. , • ., I community shelters provide for the proper geographic dispersion, they may also be VISUAL B-08 designated as monitoring stations • 8. To develop a network for monitoring and •n "" • ' .\ ~«'P.'A •P ·~-.. reporting stations, the local RADEF Officer "" ~ . ' should plot potential locations of (l) . ' . ' ' existing monitoring and reporting stations, , • ' \) ~.i " • I (2) community shelters, (3) suitable buildings••...:.Jif~l..JI with a high degree of protection from radia VISUAL B-ll tion, and (4) key governmental and industrial facilities. 9. If the map does not indicate a good geographi cal coverage of monitoring and reporting stations in the area, or if the number of locations is significantly less than the number of monitoring and reporting stations required, the RADEF Officer must make a more thorough survey to locate proper facilities for moni VISUAL B-l2 toring and reporting stations. In some instances, homes may have to be used for monitoring and reporting stations. However, where possible, the use of homes for moni toring and reporting stations should be limited to those homes that have shelters, root cellars, tornado cellars or other suitable shielded area. l3-5 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS • D. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF SELF -SUPPORT MONITORING LOCATIONS 10. The county RADEF Officer must similarly develop an appropriately dispersed moni toringand reporting station network for his county. 11. The State Radiological Defense Officer must establish monitoring capability at State facilities, particula~ly those remote from municipalities, such as highway patrol and maintenance stations, conservation stations, forest and game preserve stations, State inst i t utions, etc. 12. A fallout monitoring capability has alreadybeen developed at marry field locations of Federal agencies and departments . 13. The RADEF Officer should contact those State and Federal installations that are in or near his area of responsib:.lity, and establish procedure for incorporating their monitoring capabi lity into his monitoring and reporting network. • 14. Federal monitoring stations (civil and military)should report fallout information to local government in time of emergency. Also, some Federal installations will need fallout information from local government . Procedures must be worked out between Federal installations and local authorities to accomplish mutually agreeable objectives . 1. Sel f -support monitoring locations are those vital facilities and installations of E!llergency services t hat would be needed by the juris diction during the early postattack period to carry out essential services. These would include police, fire, radio transmitter sites, telephone exchanges, power companies, water and sewage treatment facilities, etc. 2. These locations require a capability to perform independent radiological monitoring in order to control the radiation exposure of their personnel. 13-6 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 3· Self-support monitoring locations do not require a communications capability with the jurisdiction1 s EOC since they do not routinely report radiation intensities. They may require some communications capability with a central dispatcher in order to receive assignments (e.g. , police, fire) . They may require a communications capability between the base location and personnel in the field. 4. The distribution of self-support stations will depend upon their geographical location in the community. 5. Self-support locations should have the best available protection against radiation (PF) since the personnel will be required to function outside the shelter as soon as radiation intensities permit. If the base facility itself does not provide adequate protection, the emergency services and vital facility personnel should be relocated before fallout arrival to nearby shelters providing better protection. 6. Self-support locations should be provided sufficient radiological monitoring equipment to enable the personnel to adequately conduct radiological monitoring of their environment during the performance of their duties. The equipment may include several kits of RADEF instruments and a supply of dosimeters and chargers for use by emergency personnel. 7. The number of radiological monitors trained and assigned to emergency services and vital facilities for self-support monitoring is ' determined by the operational requirements specified in the jurisdiction's emergency operations plan. 8. The Radiological Defense Officer, together with the director/coordinator or his staff 13-7 MAIN TOPICS E. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF MONITORS TEACHING POINTS should determine where emergency services and vital facilities are located in his jurisdiction and which would require a self support capability. l. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency recommends that at least four monitors be trained and assigned to each monitoring station. This provides a high probatility of having the stations manned and operational during an emergency, and provides a broad base for monitoring in support of recovery activities. 2. The number of radiological monitors trained and assigned to emergency services ar:.d vital facilities for self-support monitoriLg is determined by the operational requirements specified in the jurisdiction's emergency plan. 3. Radiological monitors for shelters need not be trained and assigned provided the jurisdiction has detailed (who, what, where, how) increased readiness plans for accelerated training of shelter radiological monitors during a crisis. 4. Update/refresher training should be provided for radiological monitors at least every two years and they should actively participate in tests or exercises every year. 5. Duties of the monitor include the measuring, recording , and, in a monitoring and reporting station, reporting of radiation exposures and exposure rates. During the operational ~ recovery phase, the monitor ma:y be required to provide limit ed field guidance on radiation hazards associated with the oper ations to which he is assigned. Before and during the emergency, he will perform routine inspection of radiological instrument s. 13-8 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 6. Qualifications of the monitor should include completion of high school or the equivalent, and completion of the home study course, "Introduction to Radiological Monitoring" (HS-3) plus eight hours of classroom instruction (RM -Practical) or the 16-hour Radiological Monitor course (RM-16 Hour). 7. Monitors should be selected primarily from State and local government employees . This will provide better unity and more effective span of control. It is suggested that to the extent practicable all firemen, policemen, State highway patrolmen, highway maintenance personnel, their augmenting forces and their VISUAL B-13 reserves be selected for monitor training . Further, radiation monitoring should be included as a part of the basic training for • all new recruits in these services, and refresher monitor training should be routinely scheduled. 8. To supplement this initial cadre of monitors, high school and college science teachers; selected State, county and municipal employees in the engineering, sanitation, welfare and health services; as well as other State and local employees as appropriate; should also be selected for monitor training . 9. In areas where monitoring and reporting stations or self-support locations have been established in industrial plants, hospitals, commercial buildings and other facilities, appropriate personnel who are normally employed at ·these facilities should also be selected for monitor training. The planning ' for this will have to be properly staffed and coordinated in advance with the management staffs of these private concerns . 10. In rural and suburban areas where a home shelter may have been designated as a part of the monitoring and reporting system, members of the family who will occupy the shelter should be selected for monitor training. 13-9 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 11. Since a large number of monitors will be required , the selection of personnel for training should be fairly broad. 12. Monitors should be assigned to a specific shelter or monitoring and reporting station or self-support location before or during their training. Training should never be conducted for training's sake nor to increase academic knowledge. Training has real value only when directed toward accomplishing VISUAL B-14 specific job assignments. 13. Generally, monitors should be assigned to facilities which are near where they normally work or reside. In an emergency, each monitor should be directed to report to his assigned shelter or monitoring station . 14. Radiological monitors can be trained by either of the two methods outlined below. a. Completion of the home study course "Introduction to Radiological Monitoring" (HS-3) and completion of eight hours of clas sroom time as outlined in HS-3· VISUAL B-15 b. Completion of the 16-hour Radiological Monitoring course described in the "Radiological Monitoring Instructor's Guide," IG-11.21. 15. Before completion of his training, each monitor should receive a duty assignment and be furnished a copy of the "Handbook for Radi ological Monitors." _ This handbook contains the detailed instructions for monitoring and reporting operations as well as special instructions concerning the monitors responsibilities and procedures for dealing with routine and emergency radiation conditions "inside" and "outside" of shelter. F. DEVELOPMENT OF 1. The State RADEF Officer is responsible for OTHER MONITORING developi ng a Statewide aerial monitoring ACTIVITIES capabili ty. Generally , this will be 13-10 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS accomplished through an existing organization or group of aircraft owners, such as the Civil Air Patrol. 2. Local RADEF Officers may be required to coordinate aerial monitoring activities in his area postattack. 3· State and local RADEF Officers are responsible for developing surface mobile monitoring capabilities . G. DEVELOPMENT OF A 1. Certain vital facilities, such as communicaDECONTAMINATION tion centers, emergency government facilities, CAPABILITY essential public utilities, and essential equipment could require early decontamination. • 2. While having a RADEF staff member who has specialized in decontamination would be ideal, the RADEF Officer may be required to supervise this function in most jurisdictions . 3. The individual in charge of decontamination should be responsible for planning and imple menting decontamination activities . He could be a city engineer, public works engineer, industrial safety supervisor, or other tech nically qualified person having some admin istrative capability. 4. Field supervisors should be selected for the on-site supervision of decontaminati on activities. These should, generally, be people skilled in the supervlslon of earthmoving and firehosing operations . 5. Decontamination workers, such as firemen, • • sanitation and construct ion workers, and their augmenting forces should be assigned to perform the basic decontamination functions. Persons having special skills appl icable to decontamination procedures (bulldozer and heavy equipment operators, firemen, etc.) should be assigned to decontamination operations • 13-11 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 6. Decontamination workers should be given a brief orientation on weapon effects and fallout distribution, radiation hazards and general protection methods. They should be drilled in the application of their specific skills to decontamination operations. H. DUTIES AND 1. The RADEF Officer will need a supporting RESPONSIBILITIES staff to assist him in the emergency OF RADEF STAFF operating center. The staff should be PERSONNEL large enough to provide 24-hour operation of the EOC. To the extent possible, he should make use of qualified local or State government employees who do not have conflicting emergency assignments. 2. This RADEF EOC staff will be needed for receiving, recording, and plotting the exposure rate reports from monitoring and reporting stations. They will also prepare fallout forecasts and radiological analyses, and provide technical guidance to the EOC staff. In addition t o the RADEF Officer, • EOC staff positions include an Assistant RADEF Officer, and specialists in decontami nat ion, analyzing and plotting radiological data. 3. Dut ies of the RADEF Officer include the planning and implementing of programs to minimize the effects of radiation resulting from a nuclear attack on the United States. These plans should be developed preattack for implementation during increased readiness, attack, and postattack periods. He recommends actions and coordinates emergency radiological service activities in his area, including monitoring, reporti ng, analyzing, evaluating radiological data, preparation of summary reports and warning messages, and ini~iation of appropriate countermeasures. His formal education should include college-level training in the physical sciences or experience which gives a like background. He should also have experience in an administrative or 13-12 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS planning capacity. Special knowledge should include an understanding of nuclear radiation and its effects on living tissue, a general knowledge of civil defense operations, and a thorough understanding of radiological defense operational plans --Federal, State and local. 4. Preattack duties of the RADEF Training Officer/ Assistant RADEF Officer are to work under the general supervision of the RADEF Officer. He should conduct, or help conduct, indoctrination courses for administrative personnel; plan and direct training and refresher courses for monitors; prepare and assist in the administration and evaluation of tests and exercises; and assist in the training of the EOC radiological staff. His postattack duties are to work under the general supervision of the RADEF Officer in directing the EOC radiological staff and monitoring operations. Formal educational qualifications should include college-level training in the physical sciences, or experience which gives a like background. Experience in teaching or training is desirable. 5. A specialist in decontamination is a RADEF staff member who works under the general direction of the RADEF Officer to develop plans for radiological deco~tamination of vital facilities and areas. He coordinates field training of fire services, engineering and public works services, and private contractors, for performing those postattack decontamination functions for which they have potential capabilities. He also recom ' mends, coordinates and provides technical direction of decontamination activities. Formal educational qualifications should include engineering or other appropriate technical training. 6. Duties of the analyst i nclude the preparation of monitored radiological data in l3-l3 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS analyzed form for use in the area served and for reporting to other levels of government. He evaluates tne radiation decay patterns as a basis f or estimates of future exposure rates and radiation exposures associated with shelter occupancy, emergency operations and post-shelter living. His qualifications should include competence in algebraic computation and the ability to present information graphically and to use charts and graphs efficient ly. 7. Duties of the plotter include recordi_g incoming data in appropriate tabular form on maps and performing routine computations under direction of the RADEF Officer. His qualifications should include a familiarity with the area and maps of the area served, and an ability to make simple accurate computations. 8. The RADEF Staffing Guide below is an attempt to recommend an approximate number of people for each identifiable radiological staff operation during an emergency. Any single individual may function in more than one of these categories. The job of decontamination, for example, is not listed as a titled position. This function is included in the A$sistant RADEF Officer column. RADEF Staffing Guide -Urban (Two-Shift Coverage) Assrt. RDO RADEF (RADEF Train-Population Officer ing Officerl Analysts Plotters 250,000 -2 4 3 6 l,OOO,OOO 25,000 -2 2 2 4 250,000 Up to 25,000 2 0 l l l3-l4 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS I. SELECTION AND l. The duties of RADEF Officers at both local TRAINING OF THE and State levels m~y be quite complex. For RADEF STAFF a State or large city, the Officer should be a full-time paid professional employee. For a small community, a qualified volunteer or government employee can probably develop the required capability on a part-time basis. However, during an emergency, the duties of this position will require full-time activities. 2. When qualified employees of State and local governments are not, or cannot be made available to serve as RADEF Officers, high school and college science teachers, industrial scientists, engineers, and retired civilian or military personnel meeting the technical qualifications may be considered for filling the position. 3. The minimum training of an RDO is completion of the Basic Radiological Defense Officer course, which has as a prerequisite for attendance completion of monitor training. Additional training may be attained by completing the Advanced Radiological Defense Officer course, the Radiological Science and Protection for the RDO course or the Radiological Defense Instructor Workshop. 4. The Assistant RADEF Officer should have the same general qualifications and training as the RADEF Officer, although his position m~y not require as much administrative and planning skills. 5. Analysts and plotters do not need to be fulltime RADEF personnel preattack. They may be employees of other government services or other personnel having the requisite capabilities but not having priority assignments for the postattack period. They should be prepared for their positions through inservice training programs and exercises. l3-l5 MAIN TOPICS J. FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FROM DCPA TEACHING POINTS 6. The staffing guidance presented previously is m~nimal and allows little reserve capability to compensate for the absence of one or more st aff members. Therefore, it is important that the staff members be trained to perform several functions in order that effi cient operation can be realized through adjustment of assignments. 7. Consideration should also be given to the appointment and training of understudies for the various staff positions. They might be assigned, subject to recall, to assist with RADEF functions at centers of operation for other emergency services. 1. Under authority contained in Public Law 920, Blst Congress, as amended by Public Law 85606, DCPA m~y assist the State and local governments in developing their radiological defense capability provided specified standards are met. The assist ance to State and local governments includes, but is not limited to: a. The grant of RADEF instruments and equipment needed for training personnel and for carrying out emergency opera tions. b. The grant of spare parts, tools, test equipment and batteries needed to maintain the monitoring instruments . c. The loan of radioactive byproduct mate rials required to calibrate monitoring instruments and training. d. The training of monitor instructors, • Radiological Defense Officers (RADEF Officers), instrument maintenance technicians and monitors. e. The provision of up to 50 percent of the necessary costs for personnel and administrative expenses associated with the planning, development, implementation 13-16 • • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS and operation of the RADEF program and the salaries of the RADEF Officer and his staff. f. Contracts with individual States provide for maintenance and calibration of instruments, development and improvement of RADEF plans, and technical training of RADEF personnel. 2. Additional RADEF assistance is provided to State and local governments in the form of technical assistance and guidance for: a. Planning and developing a monitoring, reporting and evaluation capability. • b. Developing a capability for applying protective measures and decontamination procedures • c. Dnplementing and carrying out standardized emergency operating procedures. d. Limiting radiation exposure of emergency personnel and the general public. K. DELEGATED 1. All Federal agencies are responsible for RESPONSIBILITIES the continuity of their own function postOF OTHER FEDERAL attack. In addition to this, certain AGENCIES selected agencies have additional civil defense responsibilities which include RADEF responsibilities. 2. The U. S. Department of Agriculture is directed to develop plans for a national program; direct Federal activities; and furnish technical guidance to State and local authorities concerning protective measures, treatment and handling of livestock, including poultry, agricultural commodities on farms or ranches, agricultural lands, forest lands, and water for agricultural purposes, any of which have • been exposed to or affected by radiation or fallout contamination. 13-17 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 3· The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has the responsibility for developing and coordinating programs of radiation measurement and assessment as may be necessary to carry out the responsibilities involved in the provisions of preventive and curative care related to human exposure to radiation including rehabilitation and related services for disabled survivors. 4. The National Oceanic Atmospheric Admin ~s tration has the responsibility for preparing and issuing routinely, as well as in an emergency, DF wind forecasts to be used by State and local jurisdictions to estimate areas likely to be covered -oy fallout in event of attack . 5. The Federal Aviation Administration has the responsibility for :ormulating plans for the development, utilization, expansion and emergency management of the Nation's civil airports, facilities and equipment required • for essential civil air operations. L. TESTS AND 1. After the development of an operat ional EXERCISES capability is underway, the RADEF Officer should prepare and conduct annually exer cises to provide his monitors and EOC personnel with an opportunity to practice and test operating procedures. 2. For inservice training of the EOC RADEF staff, the RADEF Officer can develop a fallout situation for his specific area of responsibility. He should select a possible target, or targets, that could produce fallout in his area. The maps, logs, monitoring s t ations, and the reporting pr cedures used should be consistent with the State and local operations plans for his area. He can then develop the exposure rates, situations, and problems or requi rements for his geographical area. 13-18 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 3. Plotters and analysts should practice fallout forecasting and logging, plotting, and recording of data• 4. A monitoring exercise should require monitors to operationally check their instruments, make an operational readiness report to the EOC of simulated radiation exposure rates, and perform simulated postattack monitoring operations . 5. The RADEF Officer should supply the monitors with diagrams showing a survey meter dial and control knob positions. The monitors can then read these to determine the progressive exposure rates and report these values consistent with local communications procedures. M. STANDARDS 1. RADEF Officers of local jurisdictions must work closely with local directors/coordinators in developing their RADEF system. The "Standards for Local Civil Preparedness," CPG 1-5, provides guidelines for local directors in establishing all of the elements of a local program. "Minimum-level" and "fullyqualified" standards are established for each civil defense program element, including radiological defense. 2. The most important standards that pertain to the RADEF Officer are those dealing with plans and annexes, facilities and equipment, and trained personnel. In the standards the RADEF Officer will find information on the RADEF plans required, t he radiological equipment needed for minimum-level and fullyqualified standards, and the training of Radiological Defense Officers and monitors. 3. A companion publication to the above standards is the "Program Evaluation Handbook," CPG l-5A, that contains information to permit a local coordinator to fill out his annual program paper. On this annual submission, 13-19 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS radiological defense is evaluated in threecategories: facilities/equipment; trained personnel; and annexes/SOP's. Five evaluation levels are used: From "E,11 which is little or no advanced preparat ion, to "A, 11 which means f'ull.y-qualified. The local RADEF Officer should be familiar with this publication and advise the local coordi nator on the appropriate evaluation levels for RADEF in his jurisdiction. He should also be aware that other emergency services have requirements to provide a monitori ng capability to support their emergency opera tions. N. SUMMARY l. DCPA has provided criteria for the minimumnumber of monitoring and reporting stat ionsrequired for each community. 2. Monitoring and reporting stations should begeographically dispersed, and must have adequat e protection against nuclear radiat ion,two-way communications and at least fourtrained.monitors. 3. A radiological self-support capability shouldbe developed for those emergency services andvital facilities that would be required postattack. 4. Training of shelter monitors will be doneprincipally by accel erated training duringa period of increased readiness. 5. Monitors should be selected from governmentemployees to the extent practicable or frompersons who work or live near a monitoringstation. Each should be given a speci~icassignment and should complete a monitortraining course. 6. The RDO's responsibilities are to plan andimplement a RADEF program for the collection,analysis and evaluation of radiological 13-20 MAJJif TOPICS TEACHJNG POJNTS intelligence, and for providing technical guidance in the conduct of emergency operations • .. 7. To assist with the emergency activities at an EOC, the RDO should recruit, assign and train a RADEF staff. 8. DCPA and other Federal agencies provide assistance in the development of a RADEF capability including training, technical guidance, . program guidance, and grant or loan of equipment. 9. The RDO should test his operational capability annually. • 10. The RDO should assist the civil defense director with his preparation of a program paper. ll. The local emergency operations plan should include procedures for coping with peacetime nuclear incidents. 12. Refresher or update training should be conducted in accordance with the "Standards for Local Civil Preparedness," CPG l-5. 13-21 Visual No. B-03 B-04 B-05 B-06 B-07 B-08 B-11 B-12 B-13 B-14 B-15 LIST OF VISUALS Visual Title Radiological Information is Needed at Each Level of Government Emergency Operations Depend on Reports . , Monitoring Stations Are Selected for Their Communications Capability First and Their Geographical Location Second Monitoring Stations Must Be Geographically Distributed Monitoring Stations Must Provide Communications and Protecti on Locate Monitoring Stations in Facilities Having a Protection Factor of 100 Monitoring Stations Should Be Located in Gcvernment Facilities To Develop a Network, Plot Potential Locations Select Stations Monitors Should Be Selected Assign Monitors Train Monitors 13-22 .. • , • LESSON PLAN NO. l4 COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: Q.uiz No. 2 TIME: .50 Hour OBJECTIVE: To test and reinforce the participant's knowledge of the subject matter covered in the scope below. SCOPE: Q.uestions and problems on selected points in lesson plans Nos. lO through l3. REQ.UIREMENTS : l. Instructor: A copy of Q.uiz No. 2 and the answers thereto. 2. Participant: a. One copy of Quiz No. 2 and one answer sheet for each student. b. Straightedge. c • Pin. A copy of the quiz, an answer sheet and an instructor REMARKS: l. solution sheet are included in this instructor guide. 2. A blank answer sheet, nomograms and the exposure rate history curve are included in the "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual, 11 SM-ll.25 . 3. The instructor should reproduce sufficient quantities of the quiz for his classes. 4. The instructor should provide a straightedge and pin for each student. l4-l MAJN TOPICS TEACHJNG FOJNTS A. JNTRODUCTION l. Have the students remove the quiz answer sheet from their Student Manual. 2. Issue a copy of the quiz to each student. 3· Read the instructions on the front of the quiz WITH the students. 4. Advise the students that they have 30 minutes to complete the quiz including a review. ... 5. At the instructor's discretion he may advise the students that the results of the quiz will be posted and the solutions will be reviewed. B. CONCLUSION Collect a student. quiz and an answer sheet from each 14-2 • BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER QUIZ NO. 2 .. Type of Quiz: Multiple-Choice and Problems -BEST ANSWER Quiz Value: Twenty points. Time: 30 minutes (including review) Materials Required: l. The followi~g items in Student Manual SM-ll.25: a. Quiz No. 2 Answer Sheet b. Exposure Rate Nomogram/Entry Time -Stay Time Total Exposure Nomogram c. Exposure Rate History Curve (Monitoring Station X) 2. Straightedge 3· Pin NOTE: DO NOT WRITE ON THIS QUIZ. AN ANSWER . SHEET IS PROVIDED FOR THAT PURPOSE. DO NOT OPEN THIS QUIZ UNTIL DIRECTED 14-3 1. 2. 3· 4. 5. BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER QUIZ NO. 2 PART I: Multiple-Choice (12 Points) The normal height for taking a reading with the CD V-715 is: -. a. 1 foot. c. .Any convenient height. b. 3 feet. d. Ground level. A monitor measured the out side exposure rate and found it to be 160 R/hr. We irrnnediately went inside the shelter area and measured 4 R/hr. The outside/inside ratio of the shelter is: a. 60. c. 40. b. 20. d. 30. Several hours later t he monit or in the above question determinesthe inside exposure rate to be 6 R/hr.· What is the approximate outside exposure rate? a. 24 R/hr. c. 180 R/hr. • b. 120 R/hr. d. 240 R/hr. A dosimeter was exposed outside f or 20 minutes and showed an i ncreaseof 25 R. During this period what was the average exposure rate? a. 24o R/hr. c. 75 R/hr. b. 500 R/hr. d. 100 Rjhr. An exposure rate hist ory curve plotted on log-log paper can be usedto: a. Forecast exposure rates. b. Calculate the rate of f allout decay. c. Estimate the exposure that will be received on an outside missionof given duration. d. All of the above. 14-4 6. When the slope of a fallout decay curve is straight, this indicates: a. The value of the fallout decay exponent is constant and can be used for predicting future exposure rates within specified time l:imits • b. The value of the fallout decay exponent is changing and cannot be used for predicting future exposure rates. .. c. d. That fallout is complete and future exposure rates can be predicted using l.2 as the value of the fallout decay exponent • That fallout is still depositing and future exposure rates should not be predicted until it is complete. 7. The fallout decay exponent (n) will vary with: a. Bomb design. b. Neutron-induced activity. • 8. c • Weathering • d. All of the above. The value of n =-l.2 (standard fallout decay exponent): a. Has l:imited operational use. b. Is quite satisfactory for planning purposes. e. Could be the actual decay exponent. d. All of the above. 9. Decay characteristics of n (fallout decay exponent) range from about -.9 to-2.2. The higher the number the: a. Flatter the slope. b. Steeper the slope. c. Higher the exposure rate. d. Lower the exposure rate. l4-5 10. The RADEF Officer's primary duty after developing an operational capability is to: a. Prepare and conduct exercises for monitors and RADEF staff. b. Prepare and conduct exercises for emergency operating center personnel. c. Provide refresher training for monitors and RADEF staff. d. Select targets that could produce fallout in his area. 11. The most important duty of a monitor is: a. Weapon effects reporting. b. Measuring, recording, and reporting of radiation exposure rates . c. Providing limited guidance. d. Monitoring personnel, food, and water. 12. If exposure rate observations have been decreasing for the preceding 12 hours, the exposure rate history curve can be reasonably extended for: • a. 1 hour. b. 12 hours. c. 6 hours. d. 24 hours. PART II CONTINUED ON PAGE 14-7 ' 14-6 PART II: Problems (8 Points ) • DIRECTIONS: Show calculations and answers in the space provided on the answer sheet. Use the attached exposure rate history curve for problems l and 2 ONLY. Work 3 and 4 using nomograms. l. On the attached exposure rate history curve, when will the exposure rate reach 4 R/hr? 2. What is the value of the fallout decay exponent (n) at H + 50? 3. If the exposure rate at H + 30 is lO R/hr, when would the exposure rate be 7 R/hr? 4. At H + l the exposure rate was 200 R/hr. If entry into the area is made at H + 6 and the mission exposure is set at 50 R, what is the allowable stay time? l4-7 • EXPOSURE EXPOSURE RATE RATE at H+t at H+1 5000 3000 EXPOSURE RATE 2000 NOMOGRAM 1000 BOO 600 400 300 200 40 100 TIME AFTER BURST 60 BO 60 • 2 40 3 4 30 :::r C> 6 = 20 f;; B 300 400 10 B 2 BOO 6 3 1000 4 4 6 Cl. Q> B 10 "' 3 '< 2000 • 12 2 16 20 3000 2B 36 5000 14-8 • ., . • ENTRY TIME -STAY TIME ENTRY TIME TOTAL EXPOSURE NOMOGRAM TOTAL EXPOSURE EXPOSURE RATE at H+l TRANSFER 2 2 3 4 6 I-' .;::! \D LINE 6 STAY TIME [hours) 2 . 5 EXPOSURE RATE HISTORY CURVE FOR _______ • MONITORING STATION X 1000 .3 700 .. .2 500 400 300 . I 100 200 300 500 700 200 100 : 70 50 40 30 0 • 10 ' ' 5 3 2 I i 2 10 20 30 40 50 70 100 200 300 500 700 i TIME .AFTER BURST (HOURS) Exposure Rate (R/hr) 14-10 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER ANSWER SHEET -QUIZ NO. 2 Name "· PART I PART II Multiple-Choice(l2 Points) Problems ( 8 Points) ~ a b c d l. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Problem l 2. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3· ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Problem 2 5 • ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) • 6. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 7. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Problem 3 8. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 9· ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) lO. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Problem 4 ll. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) l2. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Score • l4-ll BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER • INSTRUCTOR SOLUTION SHEET QUIZ NO. 2 ·' PART I PART II Multiple-Choice (12 Points) Problems ( 8 Points) b a b c d l. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) Problem l H + l50 ~Allow H + l4o 2. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) to H + l 0) 3· ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 4. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) Problem 2 n =A l = -4.5 = -l.5 5. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) Ax 3 6. (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) • 7. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) Problem 3 H + 40 tAllow H + 36 8. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) to H + 4) 9-( ) (X) ( ) ( ) lO. {X) \ ) ( ) ( ) Pl>obl:em 4 2.7 Hours (Allow 2.4 ll. ( ) 3.0} l2. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) j l4-l2 • LESSON PLAN NO. 1 5 COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: Source Handling Techniques TIME: l.5 Hours OBJECTIVES: At the conclusion of this session the par ticipant should .... be able to : l. Safely use the DCPA training source set and perform a wipe test for contamination. 2 . Follow DCPA, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and appl icable State procedures and rules and regulations for handling and storing t he source set. SCOPE : Equipment in the DCPA training source set; source pr epar ation; initial check of t he set; l eak testing demonstr ation; replacement of rings and tags; source handling procedures and precautions; source handling exercise; DCPA regulations; NRC rules and regulations; State licenses. REFERENCES : l. Instructor: a . "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," 10-CFR-20* b . "Licensing of Bypr oduct Material," 10-CFR-30* c . "Procedures and Regulations for the Care and Use of the DCPA CD V-778 Radiation Training Source Set"* 2 . Participant : "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual," SM-11. 25 *These items are included in the Student Manual, SM-11.25. REQUIREMENTS : Instructor: One DCPA training source set CD V-778 Set of 2" x 2" slides (C-16 -C-40) Projection equi pment Wipe test materials and extra CD V-700 ' s 15-l REMARKS: 1. Reading assignment should be made of applicable material in the Student Manual on the first day of • the course. 2. Instructor should wear a CD V-138 dosimeter during this entire session. 3· Each student should also wear a CD V-138 dosimeter during this entire session. If this is not possible, w. the available dosimeters should be rotated among the participants while they are handling or are near the sources. 4. Have students make an exposure entry into their exposure records after this session. 5. USNRC rules and regulations have been codified and issued as Federal regulations under Title 10, Chapter 1, "Code of Federal Regulations -Energy." The most appropriate parts, namely 20 and 30, have been included in SM-11.25. Approximately half of the States have taken over the licensing and regulation of byproduct material in their State under section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. These Agreement States have issued their own rules and regulations which must • be at least as strict as the Federal regulations issued by the USNRC. If the participants in a course are from an Agreement State, the State's regulations should be used in place of the Federal regulations. 6. Each participant taking this course should perform a wipe test for contamination on at least three of the six capsules from a source set. If available, initial practice should be conducted using the blue plastic OCD-Y-102 dummy capsules. 7. State maintenance and calibration facilities are respon sible for replacement of rings and tags; therefore secti on F should be covered briefly or omitteQ, if necessary. No student practice for replacing rings and tags should be attempted. 15-2 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS A. INTRODUCTION 1. The purpose of this period is to develop a familiarization with the DCPA training source set ; to know and understand the rules and regulations governing the use of the set; and have each participant perform a wipe test for contamination. 2. Source handling techniques discussed will be concerned with only those rules, regulations and techniques which are directly related to the specifiG handling of the DCPA training source set which contains tagged sealed sources. 3. The period will include information on the equipment in the set, CFR's issued by NRC, and DCPA rules and regulations governing the receipt, use, storage, and transfer of the sets, with emphasis on the handling of and leak testing of the sealed sources and the records that must be maintained. NOTE: Limit the discussion in this period to the DCPA training source set. Time will not permit a discussion of the use of other radioactive materials . The word "set" in this lesson plan means the DCPA training source set . B. EQUIPMENT IN THE SET 1. Each DCPA training source following equipment: set includes the .. a. Six 5.0 mCi cobalt 60 sealed sources (CD V-784), totaling 30 mCi when manufactured. VISUAL C-16 b. One lead container, small (CD V-791) . This container is one-inch thick and is used to carry the sources from the 15-3 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS storage area to the exercise It cannot be locked. area. c. One lead container, large (CD V-792). This container is two-inches thick and is used as a storage and shipping (or transfer) container. It has a steel jacket around the outside designed to contain molten lead during a fire. It can be locked to secure the small container with the sealed sources i~side. The two lead containers weigh about 250 pounds. d. Two locks for the CD V-792 lead container. e. One pair of long-handled tongs (CD V-788). NOTE: Demonstrate the use of the tongs. Emphasize why the sources should be held with the tongs, and why the tongs should be held so the source is away from the body as far as possible most of the time. For example, the exposure rate e.t lO" from a source is l/lOO of the expo sure rate at l"; and at 20" the exposure rate is l/400 of the expo sure rate at l". f. Eight "radiation area" signs. r:::'b.ese signs are provided for marking the storage area and the exercise area. l5-4 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS g. Two 0-200 mR dosimeters (CD V-138) . h. One dosimeter charger (CD V-750). i. One survey meter (CD v~700) . The dosimeters, charger, and survey meter are provided so that a minimum amonnt of personnel monitoring equipment is always .· available with each set. These instruments are an integral part of the set and should always be transferred with it. NOTE: The earliest procurement of civil defense training source sets included 12 sealed sources (CD V-786) totaling • 30 mCi when manufactured rather than 6 sources . These older sets in the field have been replaced. 2. The set has been designed specifically for use in training exercises and has not been accurately measured for use as a calibration source. 3. All sets issued to a State civil defense VISUAL C-17 office are on an indefinite loan basis and in turn can be provided by the State to an authorized custodian. 4. The sets are normally shipped to an authorized custodian by motor freight or rail, with the auxiliary equipment being packed separately from the lead containers . The keys to the set are sent to the custodian by registered mail, return receipt required. 5. A byproduct material license requires the licensee to be responsible for the proper care, handling, and storage of the set in his custody as well as reporting any loss, 15-5 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS C. SOURCE PREPARATION VISUAL C-18 damage, or accident resulting from violations of radiation standards. The acceptance of the license binds the licensee (not DCPA) to the conditions set forth therein. The Federal regulations, which will be discussed later, are contained in 10-CFR-20. 6. In addition to the CFR requirements, DCPA requires each custodian possessing a set loaned to him through the State Civil Defense Office to comply with additional regulations. This means the custodian is responsible for compliance with 10-CFR radiation standards for the proper care, use, and storage of the set but is responsible to the State which, in turn, is responsible to DCPA for the property accountability of the set. The DCPA regulations will be discussed later also. 1. Any radioactive material that is encased in, and is to be used in a container in a manner intended to prevent leakage of the radioactive material or arry of its daughter product s, is referred to as a sealed source. The sources in the DCPA set are of such a nature. The radioactive material is cobalt 60 which was prepared by the neutror: irradiation of cobalt 59 in a nuclear reactor as follows: Co59 + Onl ---------~ Co60 27 27 2. The cobalt 60 dec~ys with a 5.3 year halflife by beta and gamma emissions to nickel 60 as follows: 60 c 27Co ----~ 28Ni + .32 MeV beta60 + 1.17 MeV gammas 1.33 15-6 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 3. The cobalt 60 is gold or nickel plated and is encapsulated in a standard sealed capsule. The capsules have a non-magnetic, noncorrosive, stainless steel base with a magnetic stainless steel cap. The cap is sealed to the base of each capsule, and each capsule has a one-inch square yellow warning VISUAL C-19 .. tag attached to it• 4. Each of the six sealed sources was 5 millicuries plus 20% or minus 10% when manufactured. This date and activity is marked on the tag attached to each source. 5. The activity of each capsule can be estimated at arry time by using the table of decay correction factors for cobalt 60. See'~ocedures and Regulations for the Care and Use of DCPA CD V-778 Radiation Training Source Sets" in the Student Manual, SM-ll.25. D. INITIAL CHECK 1. The following procedures should be followed OF THE SET when a set is received from DCPA, or received on permanent transfer from another custodian. A CD V-138 dosimeter must be worn at all times when the set is being used, checked, or repaired. Remember to keep radiation exposures to a minimum. VISUAL C-20 2. Check to see that each of t he lead containers bears a label including the following information: radioisotope, number of sealed sources, total activity of the sources and the date of encapsulation or date of last calibration. 3. Count the number of sealed sources, compare • it with the record noted above, and place them on disposable paper. If the set is issued directly from the DCPA Federal depot, any discrepancy should be noted on the Shipping Document/Receiving Report. If the set is permanently transferred, the new custodian should note any discrepancies and 15-7 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS advise DCPA immediately by phone . In both cases, the custodi an shoul d advise the State and DCPA of arry discrepancy. 4. Leak test each sealed source . Procedures will be discussed later in this period. 5. Check the rings or tags on each sealed source for legibility. If repl acement is needed, contact the State maintenance and calibration facility for correction. 6. Return all sources to the lead containers and place the set in the authorized storage area. NOTE : The nature and criteria for the location of this storage area should be reviewed. E. LEAK TESTING 1. Immediately upon receipt and thereafter at • DEMONSTRATION intervals not to exceed every six months, each custodian of a set, in accordan e with a condition on the byproduct material ~ - license, is responsible for performing the following test for external leakage and/or contamination of the individual sources . IH TfS Ill !Ov fill Oj Records of leak test results must be maintained VISUAL C-21 by the custodian and licensee . 2 . Equipment used includes : a . Long-nosed pliers. b . Long-handled tongs . c . CD V-700 survey meter . d. CD V-138 dosimeter, to be worn by t he individual while performing the tests . e . High wet-strength paper, such as fil ter paper or paper toweling. f. Alcohol (70"1. Isopropyl) . 15-8 • MA.JN TOPICS .. VISUAL C-22 ...... f -• . ~ .~:.. MONITOR THf PA I' fl VISUAL C-23 • • ,..~':"'~~·:~•·~ i "' "'tWfJ; ·>~:_ , !:· <\* .,_ TEACHJNG POINTS 3. Remove the small lead container from the large one . Moisten a piece of paper, which has a high wet-strength, and wipe the inside of the large container• 4. Using a CD V-700 survey meter with the shield open, the earphones attached, the range switch set at the most sensitive scale (Xl), and the window as close as possible to but not in contact with the paper, tho~oughly monitor the paper. Since gamma radiation is of primary interest, the paper can be measured while wet. A careful check of the background radiation should be made prior to monitoring the paper and care should be taken that the sealed sources do not affect the CD V-700 readings during the. monitoring operation• NOTE: Measurements should be made far enough away from the sources or the sources should be adequately shielded to mini mize their contribution to the average background radiation in the area. 5. Any average reading of the CD V-700 above the average background reading must be attributed to contamination. Do not be concerned with an apparent momentary slight increase in the counting rate of the paper as the variation in normal background and meter deflections m~y cause this • 6. If the test reveals arry removable radioactive material, the individuai performi~g the test must take immediate action to prevent its spread. The sources must be .T ~~ • "" 1'~:~~, {;~ returned to the lead container. The tongs, pliers, and contaminated wipes should be VISUAL C-24 placed in separate storage pending further 15-9 MAIN TOPICS ~A· WIPE U.(H , ursuu · .._lh VISUAL C-25 VISUAL C-26 TEACHING POINTS disposal instructions . Wash your hands with detergent and water and have yoursel f monitored thoroughly for contamination. Repeat washing and scr ubbing until you have . no readings above background. The individual must immediately notif'y the Radiological Defense Officer in his State and the DCPA Region by phone . The entire set must be kept secure and locked pending disposition instructions . In accordance with the leak test provisions of the l icense, the licensee must also make written notification to his licensing authority of capsules leaking in excess of . 05 micrccuries within 30 days after the completicn of the test. 7 . If the wipe test on the large container shows no evidence of radioactive contamination, continue the leak test by removing one of the sealed sources fro~ the small container, using the long-handled tongs . First, cover the working area with several thicknesses of paper. Use the tongs and pliers so that the individual's hands will not come close to, or in contact with the source . Wrap and wipe each individual source with a piece of the high wet-strength paper which has been moistened with alcohol. Suffici ent pressure should be applied to effect a thorough removal of arry removable contaminati on . A separate paper should be used for wiping each source. Remove the sealed source from the paper and place t he source in the large container. 8. Using t he CD V-700, thoroughly monitor the paper wipe to determine if the source is leaking or contaminated. Arry average reading of the CD V-700 above normal background must be attributed to leakage and/or contamination. 9. As the test for each capsule is completed, place that capsule in the large container until all capsules have been tested. This will further reduce exposures . 15-10 • • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS , . .. i ,-·-.... UTliiiST,IIQIIIOIIAIU.IWIJSlEOIIrtlllfl VISUAL C-27 • 10. After leak testing each source, wipe test the small container in t he same manner as the large one. 11. If the leak test results are negative (no average reading greater than twice the background), return all sources to the small container and return the set to its normal storage locat ion. 12. Collect the wipe test papers, each in an individual plastic bag, and mail to your State maintenance and calibration facility for more accurate measurement of the contamination. They may also furnish you 6" cotton swabs to be used in place of high wet-strength paper. 13. Collect the paper used to cover the test area, and any other waste material that has accumulated (such as the wipes if not furnished to the State maintenance and calibration facility) and dispose of it in the normal trash if it is not contaminated. 14. Monitor the area, hands, and equipment at the conclusion of the tests . No readings above background should be found . However, when you are through with the test, thoroughly wash your hands and forearms with detergent soap and water in accordance with good health physics practice. 15. Record your w·ipe test results in a permanent log or record book . List the date, source set identification number (or number on the CD V-792 lead container), name of the individual conducting the wipe test, number of capsules in the set, and the meter reading on each wipe taken. If no significant reading above background was measured, then also record as "less than .05 microcuries . " (The average CD V-700 will give a reading of 15 cpm over background for .005 microcuries and 150 cpm over background for . 05 microcuries; 15-ll MAIN TOPICS F. REPLACEMENT OF RINGS AND TAGS* VISUAL C-28 TEACHING POINTS therefore .05 microcuries can easily be distinguished above normal background.) If your State requires measurement of removable contamination levels of less than .05 microcuries, then all wipes should be checked for gross contamination by the individual and mailed t o the State maintenance and calibra tion facility for more accurate measurement. 1. A second condition on byproduct material licenses issued for civil preparedness sources requires t he replacement of the one-inch yellow warning tag and/or ring attached to each source should they become detached through usage or accident. It is the responsibility of the licensee to replace rings and tags in accordance with DCPA instructions prepared for this purpose. The maintenance and calibration personnel for your State will normally make replacements when necessary. However, new tags and rings and new radiation area signs m~y be obtained from your State maintenance and calibration shop and should be replaced when necessary. 2. Equipmen~ needed for the replacement of rings or tags includes: a. Long-nosed pliers. b. Long-handled tongs . c. Screwdriver. d. CD V-700 survey meter. e. CD V-138 dosimeter, to be worn by the individual making the replacements. f. Large lead cont ainer --this container is equipped wit h special holes for the replacement of tags and rings. •·. ' VISUAL C-29 *Except for the information in item 1, section F m~y be omitted or covered briefly if time is available. If this section is to include student practice, only the blue plastic OCD-Y-102 dummy capsules should be used. l5-l2 , ' .· • MAIN TOPICS ,, POSITION 1HI (OMU.IMU AND EQUIPMENT VISUAL C-30 VISUAL C-31 VISUAL C-32 'I I t. 1 I 'I~ • 1~1 •••;. VISUAL C-33 . ' ,,_~ •. I . I \ \ . I ,;trl.l.\1 ' TAG .U ~ .1.1111. tl\llH(I I VISUAL C-34 TEACHING POINTS 3· Tags should be replaced as follows: a. Place the large lead container on a table strong enough to support it. b. Place the screwdriver, long-nosed pliers, and new tag on the table where they can be easily and quickly reached when needed• c. Place the untagged source in the proper hole with the aid of the handling tongs. Make certain that the separation portion of the ring is at the top. Make no attempt to remove arry portion of the old tag from the sealed source. d. With the source and ring in position, insert the blade of the screwdriver into one end of the separation portion of the ring. e. Place the new tag on the ring with the aid of the long-nosed pliers. f. Remove the screwdriver and with the long-nosed pliers carefully slide the tag along the separation portion until it is permanently attached to the ring. VISUAL C-35 4. Rings should be replaced as follows: a. Place the large lead container on a table strong enough to support it. b. Place the screwdriver, long-nosed pliers, • tag, and ring on the table where they can be easily and quickly reached when they are needed. 15-13 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POmTS c . Using the handling tongs, place the.' I source without the ring into the proper ' ' hole in the lead container. -1 llr\.ltl II"(,~ PQ)IIIO~ iOUI(I VISUAL C-36 d. Place the one-inch yellow warning ~ag on the new ring. t~· ' ' ' .I e. Insert the blade of the screwdriver into one end of the separation portion PUCf flG 01 IlliG of the ring. VISUAL C-37 f . Insert the ring through the hole in the source . VISUAL C-38 g. Remove the screwdriver and with the long-nosed pliers carefully slide the fOliiNGTOTHISOUtl ~~ ..::-'-'\1 ring through the hole until it is .,..,. _, ._ .....__~r l permanently attached to the source. ~-.) ~ .... ·..,..........::--.;.--· VISUAL C-39 5. The replacement of rings and tags should be --. ... completed as quickly as possible to keep ' radiation exposures to a minimum. As much as possible, perform the operations at arm ' s . ' length. VISUAL C-40 6. Onl y individuals authorized as a user or custodian of a byproduct material license should replace either the rings or tags on the sealed sources . G. SOURCE HANDLING l. Never touch a sealed source with the ~ingers . PROCEDURES AND If it must be moved and you do not ha're the PRECAUTIONS 18" tongs, use a pair of pliers, a wire, a piece of cardboard as a scoop, etc. 15-14 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 2. Maintain as much distance as is practical between the midsection of your body and the nearest source. Remember that the inverse , .. square law is most effective at provi di ng a reduction in exposure rate . 3. When conducting an operation involving the sealed sources, plan to use the 18" tongs • .. Also plan what you intend to do and dry run as much of the procedure as you can before actually using the sources . Practice will perfect what you plan on doing and reduce the time required to accomplish it. 4. When handling the sources, do what has to be done in a timely manner . Haste may increase the total time but work as fast as pract ical. • 5. Complete the operation before getting involved with something else, such as answering a question, getting into a discussion, etc. 6. When possible, use shielding to your advantage . For example, when carrying one or more sources, place them in the small CD V-791 lead container and put the cover on . Leave the cover off only when taking a source out or putting one in the container . The oneinch of lead is very effective at reducing the exposure rate you will receive. 7. Keep the sources in a locked container. After unlocking, immediately count the number of sources that you have . If you count too few or too marry, recount them • immediately to confirm the correct number • 8. Always wear a CD V-138 dosimeter which has been rezeroed or the initial reading recorded. • 15-15 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 9. Use the radiation area signs to warn others that there is radiation in the area. Do not leave the area unattended. Put the sources back in the lead containers and lock immediately. Count them as they are returned t o the container. 10. Always survey the area with a CD V-700 after the sources have been returned t o the CD V-791 and 792 containers to ass~re that none have been missed. 11. Never try to disassemble a capsule or otherwise remove the radioactive material. This could result in a hazard to you and will result in your being prohibited from further use of radioactive materials in civil preparedness training. The capsule should not be pounded, stepped on, or otherwise roughly handled. Also, do not immerse the capsules in any liquid since this will accelerate rust and • deterioration. H. SOURCE HANDLING 1. Ask participants to gather around the source EXERCISE set. 2 . Point out each item in the set. 3. Call attention to radiation signs on the container. 4. Unlock set showing t he two locks and shipping bolts. 5. Have one participant measure exposure rate with CD V-700 above and around the CD V-792. 6. Remove CD V-791 from CD V-792 and carry ' CD V-791 about 30 feet and set it on the floor. 7. Remove l i d and count the number of sources in the pig. Return the capsules to the pig. Have each participant pick up and carry one source and place it in the other pig. Give each student the opportunity to carry at least one capsule. 15-16 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 8. Emphasize keeping the source at arm ' s length to reduce whole body exposure . 9. When all participants have handled a source, the instructor should again demonstrate counting the sources as they are replaced in the pig and survey with a CD V-700 for assurance that all sources are in the container. 10. Lock up the source set unless you are ready to immediately proceed to leak testing. I. STUDENTS I 1. Demonstrate by doing a wipe test on the PRACTICE OF inside of the CD V-792 and on at least one actual capsule with the class watching. LEAK TEST PROCEDURES 2 . Have each student practice doing a wipe test on a dummy capsule if available. When he has perfected this, have him perf orm a wipe test on at least one of the lead containers and three of the six capsules . (By working in pairs, each two student s should accomplish the wipe test on a complete set. Make sure they each wear CD V-138 dosimeters while doing this . ) 3. Count all capsules to be sure they are returned to the lead containers . Lock them up and perform a quick area survey with a CD V-700 . 4. Discuss the students ' results and have them record their exposure and wipe test results in microcuries . J. LICENSING NOTE: Discuss licensing and user permits PROCEDURES as applicable to the State where the participants reside . K. DCPA REGULATIONS l. Ask participants to open their Student Manuals, SM-11.25, to the "Procedures and 15-17 MA.I!il" TOPICS TEACHI!il"G POI!il"TS Regulations for the Care and Use of DCPACD V-778 Radiation Training Source Sets." 2. Direct participants to each item in theregulations: a . Equipment. b. Preparation of sealed sources . c . Activity of sources . d. Procedures for initial check. e. Leak testing. f. Replacement of rings and tags . g . Regulations on use and storage . h. Records of exposure and transfer. L. NRC RULES AND l. Each authorized user and custodian isREGULATIONS required to be familiar with the applicableCode of Federal Regulations. State regulations are at least as restrictive as Federalregulations . Each individual should readand study as a minimum the copy of 10-CFR-20and 10-CFR-30 in SM-11 . 25 which deal withstandards for protection against radiationand the licensing of byproduct material. NOTE: The instructor should make arrarge ments to get the latest copies of 10-CFR-20 and 10-CFR-30 for eac~ participant before each course due to the frequency of revisions of these regulations. 15-18 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 2. Discuss Parts 20 and 30 and have participants mark these parts : a. General Provisions . b . Scope . c. Units of Radiation Exposure. d. Exposure in Restricted Areas. e. Storage. f. Accumulated Exposure. g . Personnel Monitoring. h. Caution Signs. i. Licensing of Byproduct Material. 1. Most States now have a single license for M. STATEWIDELICENSES the possession and use of all civil defense source sets for monitor training. Under their license, they issue a user 1 s permit to selected individuals for use of the source set for monitor training. Usually, each State that has this procedure also has developed a Manual of Procedures . (If the participants are all from a State where this procedure is used, a copy of the State's manual should be made available to each participant.) 2 . A procedure, similar to that of applying for an NRC byproduct material license has generally been established by each State. N. SUMMARY 1. Review equipment in DCPA source sets. 2. Review check of source set. 3. Review source handling procedures and precautions. 15-19 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 4. Review State licensing requirements and channels appropriate to where the participants are from. 5. Ask class to read thoroughly 10-CFR-20 and 10-CFR-30 in SM-11.25, or the equivalent State regulations, if more appropriate. • • 15-20 • t Visual No. C-l6 C-l7 C-l8 C-l9 C-20 C-2l C-22 C-23 C-24 C-25 C-26 C-27 C-28 C-29 C-30 C-3l C-32 C-33 C-34 C-35 C-36 C-37 C-38 C-39 C-40 LIST OF VISUALS Visual Title DCPA Training Source Set DCPA Training Source Set Cobalt 60 Preparation CD V-784 Sealed Sources Initial Check of Set Leak Testing Equipment Wipe the Large Container Monitor the Paper If Results are Negative Wipe Each Capsule Monitor the Paper After Test, Monitor Area, Hands and Equipment Equipment for Replacement of Rings and Tags Holes for the Replacement of Rings and Tags Position the Container and Equipment To Replace Tags Position Source Insert the Screwdriver and Start Tag Fix the Tag to the Ring Replace Tag at Arm's Distance Retagged Source To Replace Rings, Position Source Place Tag on Ring Start Ring on Source Fix Ring to the Source Reringed Source l5-21 • - .. t LESSON PLAlif NO . 16 COURSE TITLE : Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TI TLE : Planning and Directing Monitoring Operations TIME : 2. 0 Hours OBJECTIVES : At the conclusion of this unit the part icipant should be able to: l. List three types of monitoring activities that may be required in event of a nuclear attack. 2. Cite operations to be performed by the radiological monitor during the postattack period and peacetime preparations required. 3. Demonstrate or describe procedures specifically for mobile monitoring (including aerial monitoring). 4. Identify areas of monitoring operations that should be included in the radiological plan. 5 . Direct monitoring operations, pre-and postattack. SCOPE: Review of monitoring operations; mobile monitoring (including aerial monitoring); areas of monitoring operations; practical exercise on planning and directing monitoring operations . REFERENCES: Instructor and Participant : a. 11 Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual, 11 SM-11. 25 b. 11 Radiological Defense Textbook, 11 SM-11.22-2 c . "Handbook for Radiological Monitors," FG-E-5 . 9 d. "Handbook for Aerial Radiological Monitors, " FG-E-5.9 .1 ' REQUIREMElifTS : Instructor: 2 11 Set of 211 x slides (B-81 -B-100) Tables and chairs should be arranged for a workgroup REMARKS: • exercise . Each workgroup is to consist of three or four participants, depending upon class size • 16-l • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS A. INTRODUCTION l. In general, all monitors should be trained to perform the same functions. Monitors are not trained specifically to man monitoring stations or shelters, or to support emergency operations. Their training should allow them to be assigned to any of these activities, ~~d monitors should expect varied assignments. 2. One exception to the above is the training of aerial monitors. They must receive additional specialized instruction to enable them to support aerial monitoring activities. 3. This session will include a review of the types of monitoring activities required -both preattack and postattack. Special attention will be focused on mobile monitoring, including aerial monitoring. 4. Emphasis will be placed on developing the ability to plan, direct and coordinate monitoring activities. • B. REVIEW OF l. During peacetime, monitors will perform the MONITORING following readiness operations: OPERATIONS a. Make instruments available for calibration and provide batteries as required. b. Participate in refresher training exercises and tests as required. c. Other activities as required. VISUAL B-8l Readiness Operations ICOnHnuech t VISUAL B-82 2. Upon attack or warning of attack, shelter monitors will report to their assigned shelter and perform the following list of operations in order: VISUAL B-83 l6-2 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS a . Perform an operational check on all Sh•ltt>r ()per•tiOtiS cont1nultd• survey meters. I b. Charge dosimeters. c. Position dosimeters at predesignated locations in the shelter. VISUAL B-84 d. Report to the shelter manager on the condition of the instruments and the positioning of dosimeters. e. Check to see that doors, windows, and other openings are closed during fallout deposition. f. Begin radiological monitoring to determine the time of fallout arrival. • g. Take periodic readings at selected locations throughout the shelter and record these on the shelter sketch. h. Furnish all radiological information to the shelter manager and recommend courses of action to reduce exposure. i. Issue radiation exposure records to the shelter occupants and advise them once daily of their exposures. 3. Monitors assigned to fallout monitoring stations perform marry of the same operations as the shelter monitors. In addition, they are responsible for reporting to the EOC flash reports of fallout arrival and exposure and exposure rate reports. ' VISUAL B-85 IIOif(I'Qfll .:OCEM Ttcwnt.U 4. All monitors will receive technical direction Oll(CTKNto\MOCUitw'ICi'IIOil TH! AAOU' Orflctlt and guidance from the RADEF Officer or other " c qualified civil preparedness personnel. ·~ L-" However, under the conditions of nuclear attack, communications with the EOC could be --=-~~ disrupted. At arry time that communications VISUAL B-86 with the assigned ,EOC are disrupted, an effort 16-3 • MAJJf TOPICS TEACHING POINTS should be made to cont act a neighboring shelter or fallout monitoring station through which RADEF advice and guidance .,. could be relayed. If this effort is unsuccessful, the monitor will be expected to provide guidance o~: VISUAL B-87 a. Permissible activities. b. Care of radiation casualties. c. Exposure criteria. d. Exposure and exposure rate calculations. e. Weapons effects if applicable. 5. After radiation levels have decreased sufficiently to perform limited unsheltered operations, monitors should expect to be r eassigned to provide monitoring services in support of civil preparedness Oferations. • VISUAL B-88 6. When monitors are directed to support emergency operations or perform a mission, the RADEF Officer should furnish the following information: a. The time when the monitor may leave shelter to perform the mission. b. The allowable exposure for the complete mission; that is, from time of departure until return to shelter. c. The exposure rate to be expected in the area of the mission. ' 7. Monitors supporting emergency operations will: _.and THE'f WILL • •fASUM UPOIUIII .uttl U'OIU'tl IIIATU • IICOIYMHO NOfiCTrf[ •tAWI'tS a. Read their instruments frequently during ' ' each operation and advise the ind~vidual . "' ' ) ' in charge of the mission on necessary ...... radiological protective measures. VISUAL B-89 l6-4 MAIN" TOPICS TEACHIN"G POIN"TS b. Determine the effectiveness of decontamination measures, if supporting decontamination operations. c. If feasible, check all personnel and equipment on return to shelter, or base of operations, to determine if they are contaminated• .· C. MOBILE l. During the early period of high radiation MONITORIN"G levels, monitors must be in shelter like everyone else. During this period, monitoring must be confined to monitoring stations and community shelters. 2. As the radiation levels decrease sufficiently to permit short-term, high priority, unshielded VISUAL B-90 operations, the need for accurate radiological information continues to be critical. However, the nature of this information will change. 3. Existing exposure and exposure rate observations coupled with analyzed fallout decay characteristics should provide a rather definitive identification of the radiological situation at each community shelter and monitoring station, and also provide a broad picture of the radiological situation throughout the community. 4. As the operational objectives of the community change from "survival" to "sustaining survival," more detailed information on the radiation levels in specific areas or facilities will be required to properly reflect the radiological situation at locations of interest. Such detailed information cannot be furnished by monitoring from fixed locations . Thus, the focus of monitoring activity will change to mobile monitoring. 5. One of the reasons for geographically dispersing monitoring stations, in addition to providing a representati ve sampling of the ~ l6-5 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS fallout conditions in a community, is to provide dispersed centers for the mobile monitoring activity. 6. Mobile monitoring includes both surface and aerial monitoring. Each community must plan for a surface mobile monitoring capability. However, in general, the responsibility for development of an aerial monitoring capability rests with the State government. D. SURFACE 1. Surface mobile monitoring is intended to MOBILE provide specific detailed radiological MONITORING information for a specific area or facility important to the recovery effort. It is not intended to provide data solely for the purpose of preparing a more comprehensive analysis of the fallout situation. 2. The specific mission objectives of mobile VISUAL B-91 monitoring are likely to be quite varied. Consequently, the development of such a capability does not lend itself to a step • one, step two, step three procedure. Generally, it is a matter of identifying the elements common to most all mobile monitoring activities, providing for these, and then coordinating their use postattack. 3. The three elements common to most surface mobile monitoring are monitors, instruments, and transportation. 4. Monitors are reassigned fram monitoring stations and shelters. It is primarily a reassignment of monitors rather than a requirement for additional manpower. 5. To the extent practicable, it is important to establish a mobile monitoring capability by utilizing moni-oring personnel other than those from government services which are already assigned postattack emergency func tions. This is necessary to minimize the 16-6 • • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS exposure of specialized emergency personnel so that maximum performance of their services may be retained. 6. The radiological instruments needed by the mobile monitor will be taken from those .. available at the monitoring stations and/or community shelters where the monitor is assigned. 7. Transportation vehicles may be important only in transporting the monitor to the specific monitoring site, or they may be important in the actual monitoring activity; e . g ., rapid coverage of large areas to be monitored. Vehicles may not always be necessary, if the monitoring can be accomplished on foot. In most cases, vehicles will not be assigned specifically for mobile monitoring activities, but will be obtained from most any available source. Two-way communications are desirable, but not mandatory. 8. In developing the mobile monitoring capability, the RADEF Officer must coordinate his plans with all participating government departments and agencies. He must emphasize the responsibilities of each. He should conduct periodic tests and exercises to develop and maintain operational proficiency. E. AERIAL MONITORING 1. The radiological fallout information obtained by monitoring stations supplemented by surface mobile monitoring will, in most areas, give adequate information in planning for survival, remedial movement, and recovery of fixed facilities. VISUAL B-92 2. Aerial radiological survey can be of great value when monitoring stations are inoperative or incapable of supplying necessary information; or when high radiation contamination precludes mobile teams from operating. 16-7 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 3. Aerial radiological survey allows flexibility for operating from areas of low contamination to areas of high exposure rates, and allows f or survey from a height of several hundred f eet with low exposure to the monitoring personnel. This method of monitoring is of particular value in the survey of large areas, such as agricultural lands, survey of transportation routes, and early monitoring of areas surrounding essential facilities. 4. Aerial monitoring performed in conjunction with early aerial damage assessment missions may also be of significant value for indicating general fallout conditions. 5. Aerial radiological survey can supplement surface monitoring by employing its capability to: a . Obtain radiological information in areas • where such information cannot be obtained from monitoring stations due to the destruction of the stations, failure of communications, inoperable instruments, or absence of trained monitors ~o man the stations. b . Monitor areas of high radiation intensities where surface mobile monitoring would result in excessive exposure of monitors. c. Accomplish early rapid survey of broad areas and transportation routes for planning remedial movement of personnel and high priority transport of equipment, supplies, and emergency workers. d. Accomplish early monitoring at, and in the vicinity of, essential facilities as a basis for planning early recovery. l6-8 • LESSON PLAN NO. 17 COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE : Reporting Requirements and Procedures TJNE: 1.5 Hours .- OBJECTIVES: At the conclusion of the lesson the student should be able to: 1. Identify requirements and/or limitations for defense emergency reporting . civil 2 . List the general reports required during a emergency . nuclear 3 . Know the Weapons Effects Reporting System and his input to it as a RADEF Officer. 4. Establish a RADEF reporting system in his community. SCOPE: Introduction; information requirements; reporting criteria; reporting channels; types of reports; Weapons Effects Reporting System; State and local systems ; reporting time; reporting frequency; summary. REFERENCES: 1. Instructor: a . "Civil Defense Emergency Oper ati ons Reporting," FCDG-E-2.3 and Annexes 1 t hrough 4 b . "Regional Emergency Operations Plan, " DCPA/ REOP4, August 1975, or other DCPA Regional Plans c. "Handbook for Radiological Monitors," FG-E-5. 9 d . "Basic Radiological Defense Offi cer Student Manual," SM-11. 25 • 2 . Participant : a . 11 Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual," SN.:-11.25 b. 11 Handbook for Radiological Moni tors, 11 FG-E-5. 9 REQUIREMENTS: Instructor Set of 2" x 211 slides (B30 -B-48, except B-44) REMARKS: If local or State policy, guidance or procedures should differ from those outlined in this session, then the policies of the State or local area should take precedence. 17-1 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS A. INTRODUCTION l . Decisionmakers at every level of government, when faced by an emergency or disaster, need to be able to use t he manpower and other resources they have to save as marry lives as possible and limit damage to property. They also need to be able to ask for specific hel p that may be available from higher levels . To do these things, they need to know the conditions that threaten their people, and what is being done to counter these threats . -. 2 . One of the principal lessons of major disasters is that emergency operations are usually most effective where the chief executive and VISUAL B-30 his key officials operate in a single protected sit e -the Emergency Operating Center, or EOC . This is because all key officials need the same information on the situations and on act ions being taken by other departments so rapid decisions can be made on the large number of problems caused by the disaster. 3· On occasions where individual departments or services gathered t he information for their own operations in major disasters and did not exchange information, operations have been impaired. For effective coordination and good decisionmaking, all pertinent information should be available to the decisionma: ers . 4. Civil preparedness emergency reporting systems must thus be designed to provide for maximum sharing of essential information by emergency services at each level, and for exchange of information between levels -both upward and down -as well as laterally between jurisdictions at the same level. These reporting systems should provide information for use both in increased readiness ' periods and during and after nuclear attack. B. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 1. DCPA must receive specific information both as a basis for assisting State and local authorities and for providing the information that national civil and military leaders re~uir. 17-2 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS .- A Presidential Executive Order (Executive Order 10952 ) makes DCPA responsible to provide a nationwide assessment of the damage resulting from enemy attack, and to monitor and report hazards, such as fallout, resulting from the use of nuclear weapons. 2 . Reports needed by DCPA to meet these responsibilities include: (See Appendix l) VISUAL B-31 a. Increased Readiness Reports --To summarize actions taken by local and State governments to increase readiness during periods of increased international tension, as well as public response to the crisis. b. Weapons Effects Reports --To indicate the location and severity of weapons effects (blast, fire, and fallout radiation). c. Operational Situation Reports --To briefly outline significant operational situations, status, and requirements for aid. 3. As a basis for decisionmaking during periods of increased tension, it would be vitally important for key national leaders to know what increased readiness actions had been taken by States and by local governments throughout the country, and what level of civil defense readiness had thereby been attained -as well as to know of significant public response or activities during the crisis period. Local, State and Regional officials would also require the same information, as a basis for decisions and action. 4. The weapons effects and operational situation reports enable DCPA to inform national leaders of the effects of enemy attack, • including fallout radiation hazards nation wide. Additionally, they would show what localities and States needed help, the types of help, and how much. 17-3 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 5. ·Analysis of weapons effects and other reports allows DCPA to give critical operational information to the States, such as, that a nuclear surface burst in one State is expected -. to result in fallout in a neighboring State. DCPA also receives information from the mil itary that is essenti al to State and local operations; for example, that the United States is being attacked, or (later) that fUrther nuclear attack is unlikely. 6. Executives at State and State-area EOC's would need similar information, but in more detail, as a basis for decisionmaking and for advice to local governments . Thus, local governments would need and expect warnings from State authorities on the approach of fallout from upwind surface bursts within their own State or in neighboring St ates . State authorities would need information on attack effects within the State, and on operations underway, as a basis for providing effective support to • local jurisdictions . And during a period of int ernational crisis that would likel·y precede nuclear attack, local authorities would need information from the State on civil defense increased readiness actions being taken by other localities within the St ate , and in other States. C • REPORTING 1. Reporting systems must provide the informa CRITERIA tion that is essential at each level, but - in the interest of conserving staff time and comrmmications capacity --no mor e thc.n what is essent ial. 2. Exercises and disaster experience has shown that communications systems can quickly become overloaded, with the r esult that critical information is delayed or received too late. Communications overloading may be remedied by the following actions: 17-4 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS a. Reporting limited but necessary information. I - b. Reporting appropriate information as as possible after the event occurs. soon VISUAL B-32 c. Use of standardized reporting formats. 3. The reporting format may vary depending on individual State requirements. Visual B-33 shows a city-county-State-Federal relationship. VISUAL B-33 VISUAL B-34 4. Even in the best information reporting systems, reports are sometimes incomplete, garbled, or do not arrive at all. Thus, interrogation is an essential and useful tool for all those who receive or need emergency operational information. Interrogation should be used to: a. Acquire information not received. b. Resolve conflicting information. c. Clear up garbled messages. d. Request additional required information. e. Establish that a reporting source or a circuit is actually inoperative, and to obtain as much needed information as possible from surrounding areas via other circuits. 5. If certain events do not occur logically within the developing pattern, or unexpected events are noted, analysts at EOC's should make special queries. The situation will be constantly changing and the analysts will have to apply their skills. l7-5 MAIN TOPICS D. REPORTING CHANNELS ~~ -. , . ~-~ ~t ~ 'i VISUAL B-35 E. TYPES OF REPORTS VI SUAL B-36 F . WEAPONS EFFECTS REPORTING SYSTEM TEACHING POINTS 1. The Radiological Defense Officer is principally concerned with the monitoring and reporting network in his political jurisdiction. The radiological data needed to -. provide guidance to his community may be more detailed than t~at needed by higher levels of government . In general, the Radiological Defense Officer will need specific exposure rates and exposures as contrasted to the general radiation levels used in the reporting system to be described lat er. 2. The radiological reporting channel will, of course, start at the individual monitoring stations throughout the U. S • From there, data is reported to a local emergency operating center. Visual B-35 shows them reporting to a city EOC and, in turn, relaying the data to a county, substate and State EOC . From there selected data is transmitted to DCPA regional and national offices . The Radiological Defense Officer may be required to provide input to the various increased readiness, weapons effects and operational situation reports as shown in Visual E-36 . Appendix 1 is a detailed schedule of the reports required in this system. 1. The Radiological Defense Officer should know the weapons effects reporting system that States use in reporting to the DCPA Region. In some States, data is required from local jurisdictions in compatible form for use in that system. In others, local data is converted at State level to the required format. 2. The following definitions will be used: a. Report: A message containing information • on observed weapons effects or measured 17-6 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS data. Messages containing other information will be called forecasts, warnings, projections, or summaries • .- VISUAL B-43 b. Report area: A geographical area for which weapons effects are summarized by the States for reporting to the Region. The report area is usually a county or similar jurisdiction but geographically large counties ma:y be divided into several report areas and very small counties ma:y be grouped into a single area solel y for reporting purposes. Visual B-43 shows the reporting areas for the State of Iowa. c. Damage report: A report of the approximate radius of significant damage from nuclear detonations within the State boundaries. d. Fallout report: A report of the most severe radiological condition in a report area, using the basic operating situation (BOS) reporting system described on the following page. e. Sighting report: A report of evidence of a nuclear detonation (brilliant flash of light, nuclear cloud) outside the boundaries of a State. ill f. Burst-type report: A report of the type of detonation (air or surface) related to a previously submitted damage report . Evaluation as a surface burst will be based on reports of fallout arrival immediately downwind of the detonation. Air burst evaluation will be based on confirmation of no significant fallout resulting from a detonation. g. Fallout forecast: A message indicating the probable path of fallout from a nuclear detonation based on National Weather Service fallout wind forecast. l7-7 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS h. Fallout warning: A message based on radiological monitoring reports providing revised forecasts of fallout arrival times, if necessary, plus estimates of the probable severity of fallout radiation (i.e., whether or not exposure rates of 50 R/hr can be expected). i. Damaged area summary: A message sum marizing information from damage reports and ot her information available at the Region. j. Basic Operating Situation (BOS): A method by which the most severe fallout and fire condit ions can be reported from an area. Nine basic operating situations are shown on Visual B-45. VISUAL B-45 3. The weapons effects reports discussed below are in standardized formats to facilitate rapid and accurate transmission. A standard form (DCPA Form 725-F, Appendix 2) has been desi gned f or use by State and regional person nel. Stat e personnel may use the form as a basi s for transmitting reports (usually by voice) as well as to maintain a record of the weapons effects information sent to the Regi ons. Regional personnel will use the same form to record the information as it is received. 4. Damage report: The example message shown in Vi sual B-37 above provides the following information: (a) A detonation has occurred in vli sconsin Report Area 43; (b) the place name (city, county, m~litary installation, etc.) associated with the detonation is VISUAL B-37 Camp McCoy; (c) the approximate latitude longi tude coordinates of ground zero are as shown; (d) the radius of damage from ground zero i s approximately 9 miles; and (e) one detonation occurred at 0830 ZULU. (If there had been more than one detonation, two or more times would be reported, e.g., "0830 and 0840. " ) 17-8 • -. • MAIN .TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 5. Fallout report: Visual B-38 shows a sample fallout report from Texas to ~egion Five stating that area 9 in Texas has a severe fallout situation BOS-3 at 1020 ZULU and that the exposure rate peaked at 75 R/hr at 0600 ZULU. VISUAL B-38 6 . BOS report: A BOS report differs from a fallout report only in that it can contain information on the fire hazards in an operational area as well as the fallout situation. Visual B-46 is an example that describes the BOS conditions in various VISUAL B-46 areas of Missouri . 7. Sighting report: This report is flashed to the Region as soon as available. Generally it is used for out-of-State sightings whereas damage reports are used intrastate. VISUAL B-39 8. Burst-ty;pe report: This report is flashed by voice to the Region as soon as the State EOC has fallout information to evaluate a detonation as an air or surface burst. The general format and an example are shown in Visual B-40. The report indicates that the detonation which occurred in Philadelphia VISUAL B-40 (PA Area 58) was a surface burst and occurred at 1430 ZULU. 9. Fallout forecasts: DCPA Regions will evaluate weapons effects reports received from States and will issue fallout forecasts of interstate fallout based upon National Weather Service fallout wind forecasts. The forecasts may only confirm information already transmitted laterally between States, VISUAL B-41 & or may provide new information as the Region encompasses a greater geographical area. Fallout forecasts based upon national weather data will not give estimated exposure rate levels. An example of a forecast that could be transmitted by DCPA Region One to two of of its States is shown in Visual B-41. 17-9 MAJN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS VISUAL B-42 10. Fallout warning: As fallout reports are received, revised estimates of arrival times and estimates of severity (i.e., whether or not exposure rates over 50 R/hr can be ex:pected), may be flashed between Region and States based on measured fallout data from monitoring stations . An example of. a fallout warning is shown on Visual B-42. G. STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL REPORTING SYSTEMS 1. The "Handbook for Radiological Monitors," FG-E-5 .9, April 1963, contains a Radiological Reporting Log and system of reporting that was adopted in the past by many State and local governments . Since the advent of the BOS system from State to Region, some States have adopted that procedure for use within the State. Other States have designed reporting systems to better suit their needs . 2 . As an RDO you should be familiar with and use the method of gathering and reporting radiological data used in your State. NOTE: If the class composition is al from one State, you should teach here the system used in your State. H. REPORTllfG FREQUENCY 1 . Generally the radiological data needed at the local level will be more detail ed than that needed at State and Region. Specific exposures and rates will be needed to determine the effects on people and to maintain radiological control of futuze exposures to personnel who are required to conduct emergency operations . Specific readings are also needed if exposure rate history curves are to be constructed at fixed geographical locations. 2. At the local level it is recommended ~hat the radiological monitor, during the early per iod of fallout, keep a log of obser vations 17-10 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS VISUAL B-48 I. REPORTING TIME ':t'li:i~'l!~:r'· " ~./f" '· v , ~ ' r, VISUAL B-47 J. SUMMARY ' hourly on the hour. After the exposure rate has peaked and has been observed to definitely be on the decline, the monitor may take less frequent readings ; for example, he may record measurements only every three hours for the first 24 hours. From the 24th through the 48th hour a reading for each 6-hour period should be sufficient. After 48 hours, only a daily measurement should be necessary. Another suggested method for use at the 3· local level that is a nodification of the reporting log in the handbook is as follows: a. All monitoring and reporting stations report fallout arrival and for six hours thereafter. b. Selected stations report every three hours from H + 6 to H + 24. c. After H + 24 reports are made every 12 hours or on call of the EOC Since GMT or ZULU time is necessary only at State, Regional or National level, it is recommended that local time be used in a city or county monitoring system. A 24-hour clock is preferred. If it is necessary to convert to GMT or vice-versa, Appendix 3 contains a Time Conversion Chart. 1. Because of the magnitude of the postattack fallout problem, there must be a capability at all levels of government to rapidly detect, measure, report, plot, and analyze weapons effects in order to furnish information to authorities at all levels of government as a basis for making decisions. 2. Clear channels of reporting must be iden tified as well as procedures and frequency of reports to enable the proper information to reach the decisionmaking level in time to be of value . 17-11 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 3. The use of standard formats for speed, clarity, brevity, and reliability is a must in the reporting system. 4. The RADEF Officer should know the purpose for the following reports, the format, and when they should be submitted. The reports are: a. Damage or update damage. b. Fallout. c. BOS. d. Sighting. e. Burst-type. f. Fallout forecasts. g. Fallout warnings. l7-l2 .. SCHED ULE OF REPORT S Incoming Data or Type of Reports Source of inJormation Frequency Outgoing--Information Sent To: Frequency Increased Readiness ~IRIS2: IRIS Local, State and From States (using Daily Relayed to DCPA .National Headquarters D<.i ly Hajor City Status, and teletypewriter format) narrative IRIS Regional Status and DCPA National Headquarrers /Fed Agencie ,; ::>ili 1yeedeLal Agencv Status Deve loped by FRC Daily I RI S Na tional Summarv From DCPA Headquarters Daily States/Federa l Agencies Da ily WeaEons Effe cts Rcportin~· On Damage Repor ts From States(Form 725F) Occurre nce DC PA by voice (Form 725F) l / On DCPA, other FRC's , States, REGHQ- Fa llout Reports From States(Form 725F) Occurrence Ontario by voice/TTY '2 / On Pass t o affec ted States and /or When Sigh ting Repo rts From S.tates (Form 725F) Occurrence other FRC 1 s . 3/ Determined I-' Pass to affected downwind States ano;or When --..;) On I I-' Burst-Type Reports From States(Form 725F) Occurrence other FRC's, REGHQ-Ontario 3/ De termined w As Each State to confirm data. (Send to As Damage Area Summary Developed by FRC Necessary DCPA only if requested) 1/ Necessary 0Eerational Si tuation ReEorts : . When DCPA a s deemed necessary by FRC When Reques t for Aid From States/Fed Agencies Necessary Direc t or, i . e., is beyond FRC/FAFE Necessary Wh en capability to provide guidance or When Population Sta tus (POPSTAT ) From States/Fed Agencies DP~PrminPd ass i s tance, or c onsidered important Necessar y When When for National information need s . Necessary Government Sta tu s (GOVSTAT) From States/Fed Agencies Determined When When Requested DCPA Requested Facili ty Status (FACSTAT) From States/Fed Agencies on. Fire Situation Repor ts On (FIRESIT) From S tates Occurrence DCPA Occu r rence When When FRC S r atus (:RCSTAT) ':._/ Developed by FRC Nece ssary Necessary DCPA 1/ When requested (normal ly for specific loca tions) . Entire listing of Dama ge Reports may be i -requ es ted to ver ify nationally compiled NUDETs . t;;! 2/ Init ially provided a lmos t con tinually, then reduced to hourly, daily, etc . , as conditions warrant. 3; Norma lly not sen t to DC Re ques t s may be mad e for por tions of this information . I-' "§.! De v eloped and submitted Ol11 ) when unusual conditions occur considered importan t to irorm DCPA APPENDIX 2 WEAPONS EFF ECTS REPORTING STATE _________________________ DATE ____________ DAMAGE REPORT (or) UPDATE DAMAGE REPORT : AREP. __ PLACE ________COORD.-1-NORTH __/ _ WEST: RADIUS(Mites)AT(Time of Oetonation(s) z FALLOUT REPORT(S) : REPORT AREA __ CONDITION REPORT AREA __ CONDITION REPORT AREA __ CONDITION SIGHTING REPORT : GENERAL VICINITY -------;-;::-::-==::.--;-;;;:-;:-;;;-;;-;------ BURST-TYPE REPORT(S;: PLACE ___________ REPORT AREA REPORT AREA ____ PLACE ------------ END OF MESSAGE ----,.--ZULU. (Ti:ne) OCD Form 725-F, May 1971 REVERSE OF OCD FORM 725-F INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF WEAPONS EFFECTS REPORTING FORM This form may be used for one or mor e reports on weapons effects . Most oft en , the form wou l d be used to transmit from a State (or receive at an OCD Regional office) information on a single event. For examp le, if information was t o be sent on fallout rising to over 50 R/hr, in one of the Report Areas withi n a State, onl y one of the lines for a Fallout Report would be filled out, and the voice-flashed message migh t be , "REGION_, THIS J;S (State) . FLASH MESSAGE FOLLOWS ...• FALLOUT . AREA 24; (dose-rate)l/ AT 1020 ZULU; PEAK UNKNOWN . END OF MESSAGE , 1045 ZULU." Where the State has received ~nformation a t approximatel y the same time, on events in several d i fferen t Report Are a s, a message might be sent making us e of several different lines on the for m. For example, "REGION , THIS I S (State) . FLASH MESSAGE FOLLOWS .... FALLOUT. AREA 24 , (d~ rate)l/AT 1020 ZULU; PEAK 400 AT 1045 ZULU; AREA 23, (dose-rate)l/ AT 1015 ZULU . BURST-TYPE. AREA 43; PLACE, CAMP MCCOY; SURFACE BURST; AT 0955 ZULU . END OF MESSAGE, 11 23 ZULU." 1/ Insert appropriate indication of dose-rate condition, using the method agreed upon between the State and OCD Regi on. l7-l4 APPENDIX 3 TIME CONVERSION CHART Eastern Central Mountain Standard or Standard or Standard or Pacific Greenwich Eastern Central Mountain Pacific Standard Mean Time Daylight Dayli~ht Da;rlight Dayli~ht 0100 2100* 2000* 1900* 1800* 1700* 0200 2200* 2100* 2000* 1900* 1800* 0300 2300* 2200* 2100* 2000* 1900* 0400 2400* 2300* 2200* 2100* 2000* 0500 0100 2400* 2300* 2200* 2100* 0600 0200 0100 2400* 2300* 2200* 0700 0300 0200 0100 2400* 2300* 0800 0400 0300 0200 0100 2400* 0900 0500 0400 0300 0200 0100 1000 0600 0500 0400 0300 0200 1100 0700 0600 0500 0400 0300 1200 0800 0700 0600 0500 0400 0900 0800 0700 0600 0500 13001400 1000 0900 0800 0700 0600 1500 1100 1000 0900 0800 0700 1600 1200 1100 1000 0900 0800 1700 1300 1200 1100 1000 0900 1800 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 1400 1200 1100 1900 1500 1300 2000 1600 1500 1400 1300 1200 2100 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300 2200 1800 1700 1600 1500 1400 2300 1900 1800 1700 1600 1500 2400 2000 1900 1800 1700 1600 *Add l day to the local Calendar date for equivalent date in GMT. Ex;:unple : Observed Central Standard Time is 10:00 p .m. (2200 CST) on the 14th day of the month (142200 CST). Expressed as GMT , that time would be o4ooz on the 15th day of the month (l50400Z). ' 17-15 Visual No . B-30 B-31 B-32 B-33 B-34 B-35 B-36 B-43 B-45 B-37 B-38 B-46 B-39 B-4o B-41 B-42 B-48 B-47 LI ST OF VISUALS Visual Title Anal ys..:.s and Evaluation Capability DCPA Information Requirements Reporting Criteria Reporting Format Use of Interrogation Reporting Channels Report Types Iowa Operational Areas Basic Operating Situations Damage Report Fallout Report BOS Report Sighting Report Burst-Type Report Fallout Forecast Fallout Warning Reporti.."lg Frequency Reporting Time ' • 17-16 • COURSE TITLE: LESSON TITLE: OBJECTIVES: SCOPE: REFERENCES: REQUIREMENTS: REMARKS: ' LESSON PLAN NO. 18 Basic Radiological Defense Officer Radiation Exposure Countermeasures TIME: l . O Hour At the conclusion of this unit of instruction the participant will be able to: l. Identify five principal countermeasures that can be actively utilized to protect from, or minimize, the effects of radiation on people, and 2. Describe in his own words the basic elements of each countermeasure. Introduction; the basic countermeasures; time phasing of RADEF operations; hazards and goals of each phase of RADEF operations; radiological defense as a countermeasure system; basic elements of the countermeasure system; remedial movement; other peripheral countermeasures; applied shielding; diking or clearing; exposure sharing; mutual shielding of people; and summary. Instructor and Participant: "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual," SM-ll.25 Instructor a. Projection equipment b. Set of 2" x 2" slides (A-310 -A-325) The Student Manual contains sections on "Remedial Movement" and "Radiological Defense as a Countermeasures System." • 18-l MAIN TOPICS A. INTRODUCTION B. THE BASIC COUNTERMEASURES VISUAL A-310 TEACHING POINTS The underlying objective of this session is to acquaint the student witt those countermeasures that can be used actively (i.e., by choice as needed in a given situation and with knowledge of the relati ve effectiveness of a countermeasure) in providing protection against fallout radiation. The instructor may want to provide several examples to i llustrate the nature of a system. This will help the student to see the series of countermeasures as related to each other, both in time and effectiveness. l. If an effective and efficient radiological defense is to be achieved, it is important to approach it as though it were a system of interrelated countermeasures and not a series of mutually exclusive protective actions. This countermeasure system or radiological defense system is the total complex of equipment, materials, activities, and personnel required for the protection of people and resources against radioactive fallout. 2 . A radiological count ermeasure is defined as any protective measure against the fallout hazard that requires action on the part of individuals. 3. The Basic Countermeasures. There is a vast array of possible actions which could be considered as countermeasures but, generally, these actions fall into five basic categories. These are shelter, remedial movement, decontamination, contamination control, and exposure control. a. Shelter is the occupation of a habitable s t ructure which is stocked with provisions and is used to protect people from fallout radiation. This countermeasure is broad enough to include applied or improvised shielding, which is the use of shielding materials to improve the protection at selected locations within the structure. 18-2 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS b. Remedial movement is the postattack relocation of people from shelters through contaminated areas to secondary sites. This includes movement to better grade shelters, movement to equivalent shelter in less contaminated areas, and movement to radiation free areas. It does not include movement within the same shelter facility for the purpose of sharing the exposure among the occupants. c. Decontamination is the reduction or removal of contaminating radioactive material from a structure, area, object, or person. d. Contamination control is any method that is used to control the contaminated particles or access thereto. This includes marking of radiation areas, ventilation control, control of the waste from decontamination, and actions taken to minimize t he ingestion of radioactive fallout in food and water. e. Exposure control is any method other than the above four countermeasures that will reduce the amount of radiation that individuals receive. This includes rotation of workers in a contaminated area, application of the exposure sharing principle within a shel ter, and any changes in operational procedures that tend to reduce radiation exposures . NOTE: Emphasize that exposure control is defined exclusive of the first four countermeasures . 4. All of these countermeasures have as their objective the reduction or control of the 18-3 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS radiation exposure of individuals. There are other factors, such as the radioactive decay of fallout, which also tend to reduce exposures, but which are not considered as countermeasures since there is no choice i n their application. They do not require action on the part of individuals. C • TIME PHASING 1. For an appreciation of radiological defense OF RADEF as a general countermeasure system, it is OPERATIONS important and productive to different iate between the operational periods of interest; t hat is, to time phase the radiological defense problem. The reason that such phasing is useful is that the local objectives of these phases are quite different, and therefore, the countermeasures involved VISUAL A-3ll i n each phase and their measures of effectiveness are distinct. 2. Radiological defense appears to fall naturally • i nto three time phases, which may be designated as the Emergency Phase, the Qperational Recovery Phase, and the Final Recovery Phase. The time periods involved cannot be rigidly defined ~Dd, in some situations, the phases may not be sharply differentiated. It might be equally productive to name the opera~ional periods: (l) the period of high radiation hazard, (2) operational recovery period, and (3) transition to near~normal operations. D. HAZARD~ AND 1. The objective of the Emergency Phase is GOALS OF EACH survival. It begins with warning that RADEF OPERAattack is imminent. In duration, it may TIONS PHASE last from several days to two weeks after attack, or until radiation levels have decreased sufficiently to allow performance • of urgent short-term unshielded operations. 2. Tne objective of the Operational Recovery Phase is the reestablishment of essential functions t hat will sustain survival. This VISUAL A-312 phase begins at the earliest practicable 18-4 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS time after the emergency phase, or when early rapid decay has caused the levels of radiation to decrease sufficiently to allow limited performance of unshielded operations . Since the effective decay rate is slower than during the emergency phase, the length of the operational recovery phase may be VISUAL A-313 substantially longer, lasting for several months . This phase lasts until the decrease in exposure rates with time is no longer significant . 3. The objective of the final recovery phase is restoration of normal functions . This phase gradually begins after operational recovery is well enough established to permit t he use of personnel and equipment in restoring normal community living, or VISUAL A-314 when the prevalent exposure rates no longer materially hamper operations . In some areas, this phase may last for several years . 4. Radiological defense operations will continue until normal conditions are attained. At later times in most areas, the external gamma hazard will not be significant, but minimizing the ingesti on of radioactive materials may require continued attention. E . RADEF Af3 A l. The intent of the system approach to radio COUNTERMEASURE logical defense is to provide the framework SYSTEM for consideration of the interactions of the operational phases and the countermeasures of primary importance in each. The recogni tion of these interact ions is an essential step in dealing with r adiological defense as a coherent system rather than as a series of individual countermeasures. 2. The system framework will include t he phase, the objective, the hazard, the permissible operations, the central countermeasure, the peripheral countermeasures, and the type of monitoring required to support the system• VISUAL A-315 • 18-5 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS NOTE: Develop the system step-by-step with a complete explanation of each element in this item. A chart of the system is included at the end of this lesson plan and an explanation of each entry follows. F. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTERMEASURE SYSTEM 1. Phase -Emergency. This phase begins with a~tack warning (or evidence of attack) and last s t hrough the period of highest radiat i on hazard, until some unshielded operations are permitted. This phase wil vary in duration from area to area and may last from several hours to several da:ys or weeks, depending upon the degree of the hazard from fallout. a. Objective -Survival or Minimize Casualt ies. Most everyone will agree that radiation exposures should be kept to a minimum. However, such an objective would not be very useful for determining the most effective countermeasure during the early periods of high radiation exposure rates . Since the principal justification for civil preparedness is to ensure the survival of the United Stat es in a nuclear war, survival becomes paramount, for without it there is no need to be concerned about late somatic and genetic effects. Thus, the objective of t his phase is, first, to keep people alive and, secondly, to keep people_from becoming radiation casualties. b. Hazard -Gamma Radiation. Gamma radiation from fallout car_ penetrate materials and reach into areas where people might be located. On the other hand, beta radiation is a hazard. only when fallout is • allowed to remain in contact with the 18-6 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS skin for some time, or is ingested. Even then, simple precautions are effective. Consequently, the fallout beta hazard for humans is minor compared to that from gamma radiation. Exposure to gamma is, thus, the primary hazard in the Emergency Phase. The amount of alpha radiation is insignificant. • c. Permissible Operations -No Unshielded Operations unless casualties are acceptable • The high radiation levels will prevent outside activity unless a decision is made that circumstances werrant the acceptance of casualties (likely serious radiation sickness or death). This does not preclude a monitor from quickly taking an unshielded reading to determine the outside to inside ratio of the radiation levels for use in later measurements. d. Central Countermeasure -Shelter. When countermeasures are compared with respect to the objective of each radiological defense phase, it is found that in each phase one stands out from the rest in potential value. That is, it possesses characteristics of effectiveness and range of application that distinguish it from the other countermeasures. This countermeasure forms the keystone of the system. It is called the central countermeasure and the remaining countermeasures applicable to this phase are called peripheral countermeasures. (l) Since the objective of the Emergency Phase is survival, the appropriate measure of effectiveness of the central countermeasure in this phase is the number or proportion of survivors . The optimum counter • measure, then, is one that maximizes l8-7 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS survivors or, alternatively, one that minimizes casualties . The term "optimum" contains the idea of cost; that is, the balancing of effectiveness against cost . Conse quently, countermeasures in the Emergency Phase might be compared on the basis of reduction of casual ties for comparable costs, or on the basis of the least cost for an acceptable casualty level. (2) On the basis of such comparisons, the central countermeasure in the Emergency Phase must be adequate fallout shelter. Shelter offers a high degree of effectiveness and an adequate range of application at a reasonable cost. No other countermeasure can compete with shelter as t he central countermeasure during phase . Since people must survive before they can worry about recovery, the key element in the current civil preparedness program is adequate fallout shelter for everyone. e . Peripheral Countermeasures -Remedial Movement, Exposure Control, and Decontamination. When a countermeasure is labeled a peripheral countermeasure, it is not intended to convey the impressicn that such countermeasures are of miner importance . Any effective countermeasure syst~ will include a number of peripheral countermeasures in addition to the central countermeasure, but a peripheral countermeasure does not possess the characteristics necessary to form the hub or keystone of the system. (l) As a peripheral countermeasure in the Emergency Phase, remedial movement is technically feasible under a great number of operational and radiolo l8-8 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS conditions. It is not competitive with shelter in that it generally will not prevent fatalities in the absence of good fallout protection, but it is valuable in minimizing in marginal shelters . (2) Exposure control, which will involve the rotation of people within shelter from areas of l ow protection to areas of high protection, is also useful in reducing the average exposure of each shelter occupant. (3) Decontamination as a peripheral countermeasure in the Emergency Phase is generally limited to brushing and shaking the clothing of those persons who arrive at the shelter after fallout begins, and possibly sweeping shelter areas if considerable fallout is tracked into the shelter proper. In general, the decontamination of large areas is not feasible during this phase. f. Type of Monitoring -Operationally Ready Stations. Since no unshielded operations are permitted, all radiological monitoring must be performed from protected locations . During this phase, geographically dispersed stations will provide the basic radiological intelligence necessary to evaluate the hazard within a city or county. A monitoring capabilit y at each shelter will provide radiological information•needed to minimize the radiation exposure of shel ter occupants. 2. Phase -Operational Recovery. This phase begins when radiation levels have decreased sufficiently to allow urgent short-term unshielded operations. It lasts until • there is no longer a significant decrease in the exposure rate wit h time. l8-9 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS a. Objective -Reestablishment of Essential Functions. In order to sustain survival, it will be necessary to resume activities in vital facilities and industries as soon as possible. The objective of this phase is the initiation of recovery through reestablishment of essential functions. b. Hazard -Gamma Radiation. The gamma hazard continues to overshadow the beta contact hazard. c. Permissible Operations -Limited Operations. The resumption of activities must be scheduled so that the radiation exposures to the personnel engaged in the activities remain below some acceptable amount. The times permitted in contaminated areas will be limited by the radiation levels. ~ d. Central Countermeasure -Decontamination. The objective of the Operational Recovery Phase leads to a consideration of the delay time or denial time caused by the attack before essential functions are once more operable. To minimize the effects of the attack on operations, it is desired to minimize this delay in resumption of operations . Thus, a reduction of denial times becomes the general measure of effectiveness of countermeasures in this phase. Countermeasures can be compared on the basis of the lowest denial time for comparable cost or, alternatively, on the basis of the least cost for an acceptable denial time. Denial times decrease as radiation levels decrease. Therefore, because decontamination of vital facilities can effectively decrease the radiation level by a given factor, it can effectively decrease the denial time associated with the recovery of a facility. Decontaminatio_ is the MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS central countermeasure of the Operational Recovery Phase. e. Peripheral Countermeasures -Shelter, Remedial Movement, Exposure Control, and Contamination Control. Since radiation levels in many areas will still preclude unlimited operations, continued parttime use of shelter will be required to prevent radiation exposures from becoming excessive. (l) In order to m1n~1ze exposure of some people, they may be moved (remedial movement) from an area highly contaminated by fallout to one with less or no contamination, or they may be moved from a poor shelter to a better one. (2) Many types of exposure control measures will be instituted including rotation of operational crews, delayed entry times into contaminated areas, and scheduling of short work periods over several days rather than long work periods in a few days. (3) Contamination control measures, such as the marking of radiation areas and the controlled disposal of waste from decontamination operations, will be required. f. Type of Monitoring -Broad Area Survey, Detailed Survey. A$ the decrease in radiation levels permits outside operations to begin, the nature of the monitoring activity will change. The mobile monitoring of important areas to better define the extent and magnitude of the radiological hazard will be required, as will the detailed monitoring of specific vital faci lities which must be lB-ll MAIN TOPICS TEACHTIIJ"G POINTS reactivated as soon as possible. Aerial monitoring will be used when appropriate . 3. Phase -Final Recovery. This phase will begin gradually after operational recovery is well enough established to permi t the use of operational personnel and equipment to restore normal community living. The period will l ast as long as radiol ogical countermeasures are required. a . Objective -Normal Operations . The understanding of the Final Recovery Phase at the present time is considerably more vague than the understanding of the first two phases . Less attention has been given to this phase because of the greater importance of first solving the problems of the other two phases . Certainly, the major characteristic of the objecti ve for t his phase is 'normal ity. 11 It i s desi red to minimize over a long period the deviation from normal • operations . The long-term effects of radiation on humans --such as incidence of cancer, changes in the blood, short ening of the life span, and even genetic effects on future generations must be considered. These l ong-term effects must be minimized, and inevitably acceptabl e deviations from the normal must be established. b . Hazard -Beta. In most areas , the ext ernal radiation hazard will no l onger be significant , but the hazard due to i ngestion of radioactive materi al may constitute a public hazard. Evaluation and control of these hazards in rel ation to the land, crops, livestock , food and water will be continued throughout thi s phase . c . Permissible Operations -Unlim~ted Operat ions . During this period the prevailing radiation levels will not mat erially l 8-l2 MADr TOPICS TEACHING POINTS hamper operations and the decrease in exposure rate with time is no longer a significant factor. d. Central Countermeasure -Contamination Control. Contamination control is the central countermeasure of this phase. I t will include all of those activities designed to minimize the ingestion of specific radioisotopes evaluated as hazards. These activities will include reducing plant uptake of radioisotopes with soil amendments, changing the type of crop grown on some lands, dilution of contaminated foodstuffs, and alterations to manufacturing processes. e . Peripheral Countermeasure -Decontamination. In some well-defined instances, it may be desirable to decontaminate agricultural lands on a small scale by removing some of the surface soils or by deep plowing. Periodic detailed decontamination of equipment used in food manufacture or the removal of specific radioisotopes from water supplies may be required. These are only a few of the examples which are illustrative of the types of detailed decontamination that may be required. NOTE: Indicate that the RADEF Officer, in general, will probably not be qualified to direct the application of the countermeasures in this phase. It requires persons with specialized knowledge who will have to be recruited from the ranks 18-13 MAIN TOPICS TEACHlliJ"G POINTS of health PhySicists, radio chemists, etc. The RADEF Officer will still be needed to coordinate these activities for his community. f . Type of Monitoring -Laboratory Analysis . An evaluation of the hazard from specific radioisotopes will require standard laboratory analysis techniques and equipment. DCPA does not issue t his equipment, but there are large quantities of it in colleges, universities, industrial plants, research facilities, and in some Federal agency facilities . It is likely that an adequate supply of this equipment will be available for use during the Final Recovery Phase. 4. In summary, the effects of a contami nating nuclear attack on operations require a time~hased process of survival, early recovery of essential functions, and ultimate recovery of normal functions . In the first phase, primary dependence is placed on shelter; in the second phase, on decontamination; and in the third phase, on contamination control. 5. It is important to note that, in most cases, a given countermeasure may have value in more than one phase of radiological defense, or perhaps in all phases . This is particul arly t rue of the central countermeasure . It must be emphasized, however, that the principal utility of a countermeasure is associated with a single phase and its specific object ive. For example, decontamination is the central countermeasure in the Operat ional Recovery Phase, however, it is no more than a peripheral action in the other phases . In the same way, shelter is central in achieving survival, but is considered to be more limited 18-14 MAIN TOPICS G. REMEDIAL MOVEMENT Rem@do;~l moweml'llt lS the 'TIO~tment of ~plefrolfl ~ ,.,. "'"' "'' " ""'f VISUAL A-316 ~ . TEACHING POINTS in early recovery of essential functions in most instances. Not being a part of "normal operations," shelter has little value in final recovery. 6. The system approach to radiological defense should reduce much of the confusion caused by discussing a countermeasure in the wrong context, such as giving undue weight to decontamination in survival actions in the Emergency phase where such weight is not warranted. l. Remedial movement is defined as the movement of people (a) from an area highly contaminated by fallout to one with less or no contamination, or (b) from a poor shelter to a better one . 2 . Remedial movement is a useful peripheral countermeasure in the operational recovery phase to (a) limit the exposure which will be received in a given radiological situation, and (b) permit safe operation in a radiological environment which might otherwise be unsafe. 3. In general, people should not be moved from a shelter location because of high radiation levels in the first few hours, or the first d~y or so, following fallout arrival. 4. There are two important reasons for this : first, they might receive excessive exposures during the movement period; and second, some time m~y be required to identify the location of safer areas and whether or not the areas have space availabl e and are habitable. 5. For these reasons, it is expected that remedial movement would be used mostly during the period of d~ys to weeks postattack. 6. The RADEF Officer should recognize that the exposure will generally reach a maximum 18-15 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS during the first seven to ten days postattack. Thus, if peopl e cannot be m ved during this period, they mi ght just as well be kept in whatever shelters they have avail able until a more orderly movement can be carried out. If such people have not been exposed to an exposure causing sickness during the first seven to ten days, they will probably not be exposed to one thereafter as long as they remain in that shel ter . If a nuclear attack continues for several days the maximum exposure may not be reached for some time after the 11 first seven to ten day period. 11 7. The exposure of people to be moved consists of: a . The exposure shelter. r eceived in the initial b . The exposure received during transfer . VISUAL A-3l7 c . The exposure received at the final shelter. 8. Generally, the problems of transferring from one shelter to another is to choose time when the sum of these exposures is ~inimized. This is referred to as the optimum transfer time . a 9. It is a rather complex problem to identify the optimum transfer time under a variety of radiological conditions . But generally it is a matter of selecting an arbitrary transfer time based on an educated guess and calculating the separate exposures ,identif ied in 7 a to c . By repeating the calculations for two or three such times the opt imum transfer time can be bracketed. ,.• lO . There are two rules of thumb to provide a minimum of guidance to the RADEF Officer in l 8-l6. MAIN TOPICS Rule of thumb lor move to $Miter • w•th 10 t1mes batter PF VISUAL A-318 VISUAL A-319 Rulo olthumb for mo~<' to rad1at.on tr,. .. .llrP.. IP'~~ ~ f; ~~ .,~- VISUAL A-320 VISUAL A-321 TEACHING POINTS determining the optimum time to carry out postattack remedial movement operations. These rules of thumb should also serve as rough guides in making calculations for conditions other than those specified. ll. For movement requiring but a short time to move from low grade shelter to a shelter with at least ten times better protection and located in an area having about the same exposure rate, the rule of thumb is: THE OPTIMUM TRANSFER TIME (IN HOURS) IS EQUAL TO THE PROTECTION FACTOR OR THE OUTSIDE/ INSIDE RATIO OF THE INITIAL SHELTER TIMES THE NUMBER OF HOURS IT WILL TAKE TO GET TO THE BETTER SHELTER. 12. For example, if people are located in a heavy fallout area in a structure with an outside/inside ratio of lO and they could be moved to a shelter with an outside/inside ratio of 100 or better in one-half hour, the optimum time for moving would be l/2 x lO or 5 hours after detonation. 13. Movement of this type to better shelter would generally be advisable before fallout arrival. It should not be accomplished while significant amounts of fallout particles are still in the air. 14. There .is a similar rule of thumb for determining the optimum time to leave shelter for an area with little or no fallout. This is: THE OPTIMUM TRANSFER TIME (IN HOURS) IS EQUAL TO 3/5 OF THE SHELTER OUTSIDE/INSIDE RATIO TIMES THE NUMBER OF HOURS IT WILL TAKE TO GET TO THE RADIATION FREE AREA. 15. For example, if people were in a structure with an outside/inside ratio of 20 and they could move to an area relatively free of fallout in 6 hours, the optimum transfer time would be 3/5 x 20 x 6 or 72 hours after detonation. 18-17 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS VISUAL A-322 16. These rules of thumb predict optimum times to leave shelter, but they do not indicate how long the individual must sta:y in the improved shelter to more than offset the additional exposure he received during transfer over what he would have received had he never left his original shelter. 17. Generally, this time falls between 2. 5 and 3 times the optimum time to transfer shelters. Thus, if the optimum transfer time is D + 2 days, people will not realize any advantage (reduction in their total exposure) from the move until about D + 5 to D + 6 • days. 18. If the RADEF Officer is not sure of his estimate of the protection factor or the outside/inside ratio of either the initial or final shelter, or of his estimate of the • time required to transfer shelters, he should advise the civil preparedness director that the shelter occupants should sta:y later (up to a factor of 2) than the predicted optimum transfer time in order to keep the exposure as low as possible. 19. ft~ a peripheral countermeasure, remedial movement is technically feasible in a variety of radi ological situations. If it is initiated at or near optimum transfer time, it will result in a lower exposure than would be received by arbitrarily remaining in the initial shelter a given period. 20. In general, it appears that the maximum payoff is related to situations involving low protection factors, (i.e., less than 10) and to situations involving fallout arrival times earlier than 11 hours. ~ H. OTHER PERIPHERAL COUNTERMEASURES 1. There are several other countermeasures that are of secondary importance to decontamination and remedial movement but they can materially reduce radiation exposures when used in combination with other countermeasures. 18-18 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 2. These include: a. Applied shielding. b. Diking and/or clearing open areas. c. Exposure sharing. • d. Mutual shielding of people • NOTE: Continue to emphasize that it is unlikely any of these countermeasures in themselves will solve a radiation control problem. But their use in combination with other l esser counter measures or supportive to a major one may provide the operational payoff needed. Again, the philosophy is to teach the student fundamental concepts and rely on his individual judgment to apply these concepts to specific problems. I. APPLIED l. The use of sandbags or other dense material s SHIELDING to provide radiation shielding in doorways , windows and other apertures in heavy-walled ; structures is an effective me~s of improving the radiation protection in a shelter. If the work is preplanned and materials stock piled, the effort required to impl ement the countermeasure should be minimal and less VISUAL A-323 than most means of improving protection. l8-l9 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 2. Applied shielding can be used for improving r adiation protection in lightly constructed buildings. However, the required heavy masses of shielding material will prevent its use in some structures and may require additional bracing and shoring in others. The rather large efforts required for the operation tend to make other countermeasures competitive with it when mechanical equipment cannot be used. More specifically, the use of a horizontal layer of shielding material t o reduce radiation contribution from the roof is possible but, generally, appears more costly (in man-hours) than roof decontamination. , 3. The use of dirt or other loose materials to reduce wall contributions appears to be effective and competitive in cost with limited decontamination for: a. Exposed basement walls where the earth does not have to be piled too high, and mechanical equipment is available. b . First story walls when mechanical decontamination methods are not available. c. Ceilings over basement when mechanical earthmoving means can be used and only manual decontamination methods are available. 4. As a countermeasure, applied shielding generally is restricted to the operational recovery period although in a limited sense, such as sandbagging doors and windows, it may have application in the Emergency Phase. .• 5. One particular use of applied shielding in the operational recovery phase which may be highly competitive with decontamination is its use to provide protection to a relatively 18-20 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS small fraction of a structure. For instance, the main control console of a power plant might need more protection than afforded by the building. Since this is an area that must be manned continuously, sandbag shield ing around that area might be sufficient, involving less effort than decontamination. • 6. Another example of the effectiveness of applied shielding is as follows . The ground floor of a multistory structure is to be used as a secondary site. Radiation from fallout on the roof is not significant on this floor because of the intervening floors. The 8-inch concrete walls of the ground floor are pierced by two 8-ft. wide doors and three 3-ft. wide doors. 7. The outside/inside ratio at the center is about 22 . However, about 40 percent of the radiation reaching that point has entered through the unshielded doors. Sandbagging the doors increases the outside/inside ratio to about 35. Such improvement in radiation protection would, in some operational circum stances, permit use of a site several days earlier than would otherwise be the case . J. DIKING OR l. Closely related to applied shielding are CLEARING the use of diking and clearing of open areas to reduce radiation exposures . NOTE: Emphasize that it is equally as ~portant to recognize the limitations .• of countermeasures as it is to recognize their advantageous characteristics . 2 . The clearing of areas usually requires extensive efforts except in special cases . Whereas, more than 67% of all radiation 18 -21 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS received by a man comes from within 100ft., 75% of the skyshine (that scattered from the air) comes from points beyond t his distance. 3· The decrease in skyshine radiation is only gradual with cleared width because of the long, mean free path of gamma rays found in fallout contamination. Since the mean free • path i n air of the gamma rays is several hundred feet, the area affected by the scattered gamma rays is extremely large. A protection factor of approximately 10 could be obtained for the center of a large square cleared area of about 520 feet on a side. Protection factors larger than this value would probably be uneconomical (in terms of manpower, etc . ) to obtain. 4. The relationship between protection factor • and cl eared width is generally given by PF = .Ol8W + 1 (for width Win ft . ) . Because of ground roughness effects, these predicted PF' s vrill be lower than those actually realized. 5. The use of 6 foot high, thick dikes around small cleared areas is very beneficial since it is essentially a fallout shelter with the roof removed. Dikes can always be made to reduce the exposure rate to a level below that of the skyshine contribution for the equivalent cleared area. Furthermore, the exposure rate within such protected areas is fairly constant throughout the area, dropping off to one-half of the center value at points very near (within 2ft. ) to the side of the dike and to one-fourth in a corner . .• 6. Clearing a small area and placing a very thick, six foot high, flat-topped dike around the area will lead to a protection factor of 10 or more. This value of the protection factor is obtained because the 18-22 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS dike effectivel y reduces the radiation level inside the diked area to the skyshine level, which is about lO% of the total radiation level in a small cleared undiked area. The reduction in the skyshine, because of clearing and diking, is about half for 200 ft. and about 25% for 500 ft. • 7. For large cleared areas, dikes are of little merit at points far removed from the periphery of the cleared area, because most of the radiation at such points is due to skyshine. 8. Dikes of heights less than six feet would be less useful. Much greater areas will need to be cleared to obtain the same protection factors as found within a six foot high diked area, since points higher than the top of the dike will receive radiation essentially as in a cleared, undiked area• • K. EXPOSURE SHARING l. The exposure sharing principle involves the rotation of people in areas of varying radiation protection to minimize the expo sure any one individual receives. 2. This countermeasure is advantageous when the average exposure that a group will VISUAL A-324 receive is less than the mean value of the exposure required to cause radiation sickness. 3. It is not advantageous when the average exposure that a group will receive is greater than the mean value of the exposure required to cause death. . 4. When the average exposure that a group will , receive lies between these two values (between approximately 200 and 450 R), the use of the exposure sharing principle involves a trade off between the number of sicknesses and the number of deaths that will occur in the group. 18-23 • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 5. Thus, if the objective is to reduce the number of deaths in the group to a minimum, t he exposure sharing principle should always be empl oyed when the average expo sure the group will receive is less than the mean lethal exposure . L . MUTUAL SHIELDING l . Since people possess mass (are dense) and, since radiation protection is proportional • OF PEOPLE to the density, they offer some protection to others close to them. As the group size i ncreases the protection increases . 2 . This countermeasure is universal in its VISUAL A-325 application in that, either Wlth or without a protecting structure, a relatively large improvement in protection can be obt~ined for people exposed to fallout radiation 3· fields by grouping them closely together (about 15 inches apart) . The improvement in the average effective protection factor afforded to the group members at cl ose interval increases approxi • mately l inearl y with group size up to about twenty people and approximately logarithmically beyond that number. A PF of about 2 is real ized for 20 people, about 2. 5 for 40, about 3 for 60, and about 3. 5 for lOO. With a uniform distribution of peopl e in a shelter, rather than at close interval, the PF would be only about 2 for lOO people . 4. The universal ity of appl ication of this countermeasure permi ts its use both in shel ters and in open areas . The improvement in protecti on is independent of the outside/ ins i de r atio of a shel t er. . ~ 5. The use of a close pack formation (about 15 inches apart ) in marching over a contaminated area is very beneficial to a large group. A group of 20 people can realize an average protection factor of about 2. factor increases approximately This protection as the logar ithm (base l O) of the square of the number in the • group. 18-24 MAllif TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 6. Although the benefits of mutual shielding while marching in a standard interval formation (about 30 inches apart) are less pronounced than in the close interval case, they are still valuable. A group of 65 people using this format:on can realize a protection factor of approximately 2. This protection factor increases approximately • as the logarithm (base 10) of the group number raised to the 0.8 power, for group sizes of nine or more. M. SUMMARY 1. It is important to approach radiological defense as a system of interrelated countermeasures and not a series of mutually exclusive protective actions. 2 . The five basic categories of radiological defense countermeasures are: a. Shelter b. Remedial Movement c. Decontamination d. Contamination Control e. Exposure Control 3. It is helpful to time phase RADEF operations since the objectives of phases are different and thus the central and peripheral counter measures change in each phase. 4. Remedial movement is a peripheral counter measure that is useful whenever people are not adequately sheltered. It can be used to determine: a . Whether or not to move people to a better .• grade shelter or radiation free area• b . When the best (optimum) time to move is. c. What the penalty exposure will be and by what amount the overall exposure for the individual is reduced. 18-25 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 5. Other peripheral countermeasures that can be used to advantage are: a. Appli ed shielding. b. Diking or clearing open spaces. c. Exposure sharing. • d. Mutual shielding of people. • .• 18-26 • •· • • PHASE EMERGENCY 1--' ():) I 1\) --.;] OPERATIONAL RECOVERY FINAL RECOVERY OBJECTIVES Survival or Minimize Casualties Reestablishment of Essential Functions Normal Operations RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE AS A COUNTERMEASURE SYSTEM PERMISSIBLE CENTRAL PERIPHERAL HAZARD OPERATIONS COUNTERMEASURE COUNTERMEASURES No Remedial Movement Unshielded Gamma Shelter Operations Decontamination (unless casualties are Exposure Control acceptable) Shelter Remedial Movement Gamma Limited Decontamination Operations Exposure Control Contamination Control Beta Unlimited Contamination Decontamination Operations Control TYPE OF MONITORING Operationally Ready Monitoring Stations Broad Area Survey Detailed Surveys Laboratory Analysis Visual No. A-310 A-311 A-312 A-313 A-314 A-315 A-316 A-317 A-318 A-319 A-320 A-321 A-322 A-323 A-324 A-325 LIST OF VISUALS Visual Title Countermeasures Phasing RADEF is UsefUl • • • Phases of Operation (Emergency Phase) Phases of Operation (Operational Recovery Phase) Phases of Operation (Final Recovery Phase) Radiological Defense as a Countermeasures • System (a Chart) Remedial Movement (Definition) Remedial Movement Exposure Rule of Thumb (for Optimum Transfer Time) Optimum Transfer Time (Problem) Rule of Thumb (for Move to Radiation Free _4rea) Optimum Transfer Time (Problem) Penalty Exposure Applied Shielding Exposure Sharing Principle Mutual Shielding • • 18-28 LESSON PLAN NO. 19 COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: RADEF Emergency Operations Planning TIME: l.O Hour OBJECTIVES: At the conclusion of this session the student will be able to: l. Outline a logical sequence of steps in the planning process • 2 . Describe three different ways of organizing a local emergency operations plan. 3. Identify the essential parts of a local radiological service plan. 4. Recite verbally at least four realistic assumptions about human and organizational behavior that can serve as a basis for local emer gency operations planning. SCOPE: Introduction; the planning process sequence; organization of a local emergency operations plan; the radiological service plan: organization and contents, execution and operational responsibilities, standard operating proce dures, coordination functions; same basic planning assumptions ; conclusions . REFERENCES: l. Instructor: a. "Attack Environment Manual," CPG 2-lA (all chapters), Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. June 1972. b. "Disaster Operations, A Handbook for Local Governments," CPG l-6, Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. July 1972. c . "Improving Your Community's Emergency Response, An Introduction to Disaster Planning," Gay, William G. and Chenault, William W., Human Sciences Research Inc. for Defense Civil Preparedness Agency . May 1973. d. "A Perspective on Disaster Planning," TR-77, Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency . December 1972• 19-l e. "The Case for Civil Defense," Research ReportNo. 16, Greene, Jack C., Defense Civil • Preparedness Agency, Department of Defer:.se.Revised 1972. f. 11 Basic Radiol ogical Defense Officer StudentManual," SM-ll.25. 2. Participant: a. 11 Basic Radiol ogical Defense Officer StudentManual," SM-ll.25. b. "A Perspective on Disaster Planning, 11 TR-77,Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. December 1972. (Opt ional) • REQUIREMENTS: Instructor: a. Chalkboard, chalk and eraser b. 35 mm. projector c. Screen x 211 d. Set of 211 slides (B-72 -B-80) REJ.\ffi.RKS: During this session the instructor will only have ~imeto hit the highlights of RADEF emergency planning. Itis desirable to allow the student some time during thesession to look over TR-77, "A Perspective on DisasterPlanning," and to raise questions for the class or the • instructor. • 1 9-2 • -----------------------------------------------~ MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 1. as A. INTRODUCTION RADEF emergency operations planning, such, cannot be divorced from the context of local emergency operations planning within which it takes place. Thus, the RADEF Officer who carries out RADEF planning must also be familiar with the larger setting of which his efforts are a part • • 2. At the same time that the RADEF Officer is carrying out RADEF planning, his coun terparts in other departments of local government are doing planning that is • unique to their own organizations . In the final product, however, all of these separate plans must merge smoothly and be a compatible part of the whole community emergency operations plan. Thus, the framework for this session starts with a broad look at the planning process and the sequence it follows logically to ensure realistic plans. B. THE PLANNING 1. Realistic local emergency operations PROCESS SEQUENCE planning usually beg~ns with an analysis of the range of disasters that may cause a community emergency. Specifically, we will call each separate and distinct possibility an AGENT. An agent can be wind, rain, water, ice, or snow that may ensue from a tornado, hurricane, ~load, snowstorm or cold weather . 2. Each agent then, will cause damage in the environment, which we will call EFFECTS. Examples are houses blown away, carried away by flood waters, or burned down by fire caused by a primary agent, lightning. 3. If we analyzed any particular disaster, we could list its particular agents (e.g., a tornado has primary disaster agents of wind, rain and lightning). The effects might be falling timber, fire, and flooding. Thus, an analysis of the agents present will lead us to the effects of these agents. 19-3 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS 4. Once we have identified the basic effects of t he particular disaste~we have essent i ally begun to identify the emergency FUNCTIONS that must be performed to minimize injuries and loss of life, and to preserve resources in the community, such as rescuing people, preserving law and order, firefighting, directing traffic, sheltering people, providing public informat ion, radiol ogica_ countermeasures and information, etc . 5. Common sense in emergency operations planning would suggest that as we go about the business of assigning these functions to some organization to be carried out in an emergency, we assign primary responsibility for a function to someone wLo : a . Is under the direct control of local government . b . Controls resources to the task. that are appropriate c . Possesses personnel whose training and experience are rel evant to the task. This would seem to suggest that the regular departments of local government are the most appropriate organizations for this primary assignment. In some cases, a l ocal department may not have all the necessary resources or trained personnel to carry out the task. All departments of local government are responsive to the needs of local government, however, and this would seem to suggest that where they cannot directly perform an emergency function, they can certainly coordinate the execution of that task for local government. 6. Once a department of local government has a function assigned, planning for that 19-4 • • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POil\ITS function should proceed on the basis of time phasing for emergency operations . For example, at least three time phases would seem appropriate, such as: a. Increased Readiness Phase -Recognition of a developing hazard with emergency implications if the situation continues to deteriorate or develop. • b. Emergency Operations Phase -The disaster agents have struck, and may still be present in the environment but decreasing in effects . Critical human needs are obvious, such as rescue, shelter, medical attention, etc . c. Operational Recovery Phase -Disaster agents and effects are gone . Critical human needs have been met as far as possible. Emphasis now is on a return to normalcy. 7. Departmental planning must now proceed to analyze the EMERGENCY OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS for each of the above phases . For example, the requirement for firefighting is different during the Increased Readiness Phase than it is for the Emergency Operations Phase . The Fire Department planning then, must recognize these differing requirements in its plans for use of personnel and equipment . 8. The planning process will look something like Visual Nos . B-72 through B-76 . The activity of developing the list of disaster agents and t heir effects is known as HAZARDS ANALYSIS . The PLANNING PROCESS begins with the development of VISUAL B-72 the list of functions that must be performed in each type of disaster (or contingency) and continues through the assignment of primary responsibility for each function to some department of local government . It ends when that tasked department develops its emergency plan annex around the time VISUAL B-73 phases that you have elected to divide an emer gency operation into. Actually, the 19-5 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS planning process never ends formally. It is a continuous, cyclical process that begi ns anew every time you have discovered a need for change in your plan by testing and evaluating it. NOTE: The time phases used here are for VISUAL B-74 • £lanning purposes and should be contrasted to the phases for RADEF operations covered in the previous lesson plan. VISUAL B-75 • VISUAL B-76 C. ORGANIZATION OF 1. A local emergency operations plan car_ be A LOCAL EMERGENCY organized in basically three ways: OPERATIONS PLAN a. By Departments -Involves a basic plan with functional assignments by annexes attached for each tasked department. In essence, each annex is a departmental emergency operations plan. VISUAL B-77 b. By Functions -The basic plan sets :> . operating missions, assumptions, and makes functional assignments. Each annex is written around the function to be performed. ,..,.,.~.~~.;-'"'~' ~~. VISUAL B-78 19-6 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS c. By Contingency -The basic plan, with each annex directing itself to either a phase of the emergency planning, or to a particular contingency of the emergency plan. VISUAL B-79 2. The general structure of arry of these types of plans is as follows: • Basic Plan (functional assignments, general) Annexes (a little more specific) Appendices (more specific) Tabs (more specific yet) Attachments (very specific) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) (in great detail) D. THE RADIOLOGICAL NOTE: A typical "Radiological Service Plan" is • SERVICE PLAN included in the "Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual, 11 SM-11.25. If time permits, break the class into small groups and have them develop a Table of Organization that they feel would work in their own community. They then can present and discuss their Table of Organization within their own group to get a feeling for the requirements of their community. Have them look over and familiarize themselves with the brief. When they have completed these tasks • 19-7 MAIN TOPICS E . SOME BASIC PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS • "-ANNIHG ASSUMPTIONS VISUAL B-80 TEACHING POINTS you may want to reassemble as a class and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the Radiological Service Plan, its organization, and what may be missing • for a particular community radiological service plan. l . Remind the student that whatever beliefs or expectations the planner has about human and organizational behavior, he will consciously or unconsciously grind into the plan. For example, if the planner believes that looting is a big problem under certain circumstances, then he w~ll most probably allocate manpower and resources to counter it. If looting, in fact, does not materialize in the real situation, then he has wasted that much manpower and resources. 2 . Here are some pl~~~ng assumptions that research has shown, in the last fe1v years, are realistic and valid: a . Local Organizations Generally Do a Good Job . (l ) Organizations develop set patterns of operations . (2) They develop resources to fit their normal needs . (3 ) The greatest American disaster of this century was in l900 in which 5,000 casualties res~ted from the hurricane that hit the Gulf Coast. l9-8 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS (4) Organizations can mobilize to about three times their normal size with their off-duty personnel. b. Outside Resources Need Coordination. (l) Most outside resources are not needed• • (2) Categories of unneeded equipment may include volunteers, equipment, food, clothing, shoes, etc. (3) Arrival of VIP's create a demand on the local community that generates resentment and causes problems. • c. Most Resources Needed in a Disaster Are Available Locally. (l) Exceptions are usually very specific items such as water, water purifica tion units, special equipment (such as pontoon bridges, helicopters, heavy cranes, etc.). (2 ) Food supplies in households, retail stores and wholesale warehouses are generally sufficient for the local requirements "People often eat better in emergencies than during normal times," because frozen meats thaw, etc. (3) Clothing is generally not needed following a disast er. (4) Medical supplies are available at hospitals, wholesale warehouses, through the Hospit al Reserve Disaster Inventory (HRDI) Program, etc. (5) Normal medical staffs are generally adequate --in a 400 bed hospital • MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS during one disaster, there were 75 physicians and 20 interns to care for l87 victims of a tornado. This is a ratio of 2 patients for each doctor; a much better ratio than exists in the normal population. Q. People React Rationally. (l) Flight is a rational reaction under certain circumstances. For example, the France dance hall fire, caused what appeared to be panic. However, autopsies showed that the victims were suffocated by the noxious gases of the plastic decorations that were used. This is why they were in such a hurry to get out of the dance hall. (2) Studies showed that environmental warning announcements are generally reacted to with great thoroughness by the general public. _They tend • to want to check out many cues rather than a single announcement. Rarely do they panic. e. Coordination is a Social Process --Not a Legal Process. Action depends on mutual agreements, personal credibility, acquaintances, and in general, depends upon familiarity by the action parties. f. Disorganization/Reorganization is Typical in a Disaster. (l) A disaster is both disorganized in its effects and integrative as the community begins to respond to the new tasks created by the disaster. l9-l0 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS (2) This integrative effect generates a certain altruistic behavior on the part of the community members. (3) A community may have to be disorganized before it can develop a new structure capable of coping with the .. new and often overwhelming demands made upon it in a disaster. (4) Marry new tasks are created for organizations in a disaster. g. Flexibility/Adaptabil ity is a Basic Requirement for an Emergency Operations Plan. • (1) Seldom will you be able to antic ipate all of the tasks and require ments generated by a disaster. (2) People/organizations need to know what their basic responsibilities are. This is the "who," "what," "where," and "when" requirement. The "how" should be left up to the ingenuity of the responsible parties. This is what we mean by 11 flexibility." h. Some Observations on Disasters. (1) The greatest American disaster in this century had at most 5,000 fatalities. No other disaster has approached the magnitude of the 1900 Gulf Coast hurricane. Since then only 3 disasters have had more than 1,000 casualties. From mid-1966 through mid-1970 the Red Cross assisted a total of 779 American disaster casualties. (2) In the Flint-Beecher (Michigan) tornado there were 927 casualties. 19-11 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS Two-thirds to three-fourths of these victims were self-helped and less than 2o% had contact with any formal organization. (3) In the Indianapolis Coliseum Explosion, of 400 casualties, 74 were killed. Within 16 hours after the disaster the Coroner's office had identified all victims except 2 who were identified later. (4) In one of the three greatest relief undertakings in the 20th century by the Arr_erican National Red Cross, only 3,476 families of 178,548 affected families were helped or assisted in hurricane Betsy in 1965. NOTE: You may want to close the sessicn with a • discussion of some of these basic planning assumptions. The instructor may want to assign a portion or all of the publication, "A Perspective on Disaster Planr_ing," TR-77, for the student to study further. F. CONCLUSIONS l. The RADEF planner should be very familiar with the overall context in which his planning takes place, especially the provisions of the basic plan. 2. The planner should be consciously aware of the implications of the assumptions he is making when he develops a plan. He should be aware that to the degree he makes erroneous assumptions, to that degree he is diverting resources and manpowe_ from real needs. 19-12 Visual No. B-72 B-73 B-74 B-75 B-76 B-77 B-78 B-79 B-80 • LIST OF VISUALS Visual Title The Planning Process Sequence (Agents) The Planning Process Sequence (Effects) The Planning Process Sequence (Functions) The Planning Process Sequence (Department) The Planning Process Sequence (Emergency Operations Requirements) Emergency Operations Plans (By Departments) Emergency Operations Plans (By Functions) Emergency Operations Plans (By Contingency) Planning Assumptions 19-13 • LESSON PLAN NO. 20 COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: OBJECTIVES : SCOPE: REFERENCES: The National Civil Preparedness Program TIME: 1.0 Hour At the conclusion of this session the participants will be able to: 1. Define civil defense and state its three major objectives as set forth in Public Law 920 . 2 . Outline a brief history and evolution of the current National Civil Preparedness Program, to include its legal origins, budgeting and manpower levels. 3. Identify at least four major programs of continuing emphasis in the National Civil Preparedness Program. 4. Identify at least three major areas of current program emphasis. Introduction; definition of civil defense and civil preparedness; objectives of civil defense; responsibility for civil defense; history and organization of civil preparedness; the National Shelter Program; warning and communications systems; emergency operations system; radiological defense system; financial assistance ; training and education; information activities; additional support; research and development; traditional program ele ments; current program emphasis; summary. 1. Instructor: a. "DCPA Annual Report" (latest fiscal year) b . "Publications Catalog, 11 MP-20, June 1974. (Lists various DCPA publications that are available to instructors for reference or additional material on the many topics covered in this lesson; i.e., FCDG-B-1-1, "Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950," CPC 75-2, 11 Shelter Use Planning and Survey, 11 TR-82, "High Risk Areas," etc .) 2. Participant: "DCPA Annual Report" (latest fiscal year) 20-1 REQ.UIREMENTS: Instructor : Set of 2" x 2" slides (A-05 -A-25) • Projection equipment REMARKS: l. The instructor should keep in mind that this unit is intended as an overview of the national progr am and that there may not be suff icient time to go into the details of arry one program. Where possible, refer students t o other pertinent units of the RADEF sequence or appropriate DCPA publications. 2. This lesson plan was developed prior to the r ecent decision directing DCPA to reorient its progr am to support functions narrowly related to nuclear disaster preparedness. Instructors should make appropriate changes pending receipt o~ a revised lesson plan. 3. The instructor will have t o prepare material for the current program emphasis section of this lesson plan, page 20-19. 4. If this lesson is taught ~o a group from one State, appropriat e sections should be modified to reflect the status in that State. • 20-2 • MAIN TOPICS A. INTRODUCTION B. DEFINITION OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND CIVIL PREPAREDNESS VISUAL A-05 O'ft.f'IIIIWIUWII(R "QIJIIUIK: n• '""' ..a.uon,.unaIYITDI • 01 llltoUKII. .........ACnDNI.MII I"UINI tAU• At 'M u.:M.CMII'lft LIW:L TO DUl.wtl IMfIIUU..,.. Of DIIAST(. lJRCTS. VISUAL A-06 TEACHING POINTS During this session we will: discuss the definition of civil defense and civil preparedness; develop the history and objectives of the National Ci vil Preparedness Program; identify and discuss the major program elements and current program emphasis; and show the support role of the radiological defense system to civil preparedness. l. In the evolution of our national civil defense effort we have come to distinguish two distinct meanings of the term "civil defense." They are: a. Civil Defense. Now used in a national or international context as that system of passive defense measures required to protect the civil populace against the effects of an enemy attack. b. Civil Preparedness . Now used as a generic term to include the entire system of resources, measures, actions, and plans taken at the local or State level to deal with the effects of natural disasters, enemy attacks, and any other type of disaster agent whether manmade or natural. 2. Thus, civil defense is related more to national defense and enemy attack effects while civil preparedness is a comprehensive term for use at the State or local levels and includes all defensive measures taken at these levels against any disaster agent . 3. While the legal basis for civil defense is, and has alvra:ys been, centered around the safety and welfare of the populace during a nuclear attack, the character of the program varies considerably since most State and local jurisdictions have expanded the basic policy to include all hazards . 20-3 MAIN TOPICS VISUAL A-07 TEACHING POINTS 4. At the Federal level, PL 920 defines civil defense in such a way as to direct its efforts to preparation of the Nation for an "attack" caused e of Quiz: Multiple-Choice and Matching -BEST ANSWER Quiz Value: Fifteen points. Time: 30 minutes (including review) Materials Required: Quiz No. 3 Answer Sheet Pencil NOTE: DO NOT WRITE ON THIS QUIZ. AN ANSWER SHEET IS PROVIDED FOR THAT PURPOSE. DO NOT OPEN THIS QUIZ UNTIL DIRECTED. 21-3 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER Q.UIZ NO. 3 PART I: Multiple-Choice (10 Points) 1. A radiological flash report is made: a. Upon reporting for duty at a monitoring station. b. After observing a blinding light in the sky. c. When the radiation level reaches 0.5 Rjhr. d. When the radiation level reaches 5.0 Rjhr. 2. When an exploding weapon has been identified as nuclear, the reportin the RADEF system is called a: a. Fallout Warning Report. b. Nudet Report. c. Flash Report. d. Damage Estimation Report. 3. Reports on the effects following a nuclear detonation are called: a. DF Reports. b. Fallout Reports. c. Weapons Effects Reports. d. Flash Reports. 4. In general, transfer of persons from a shelter with limited protection to a better shelter should not be considered advisable unless the new shelter improves the outside/inside ratio by a factor of at least: a. 5. c. 20. b. 10. d. 100. 21-4 5. It is helpful to time phase RADEF operations because: a. Good planning requires it. b. It makes planning so much simpler. c. Each of the agencies involved needs to have this done for them . d. Phase objectives differ and the central and peripheral countermeasures change in each phase. 6. A Radiological Service Plan is essential since : a . It provides more specific procedures than the Basic Plan. b. It provides for the irrational reactions of people . c. It provides a legal basis for RADEF operations . d. All of the above. 7. The basic Federal statute governing and legitimizing civil defense activities in the U. S. is commonly known as : a . Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations. b . Public Law 920 . c. Public Law 91-606. d. Executive Order 10952. 8. An aerial monitoring capability should be developed in conjunction with: a . DCPA Region. b . State Civil Preparedness Agency. c. State National Guard. d. Local RADEF Officer. 9. Radiation exposure guidelines for emergency operations are designed to: a . Limit exposure to prescribed limits. • b. Insure survival• c. Predict what will happen if a person is exposed. d. None of the above. 21-5 10. AJ3 operational objectives of a community change from "survival" to "recovery": a • . More detailed information on radiation levels in specific areas will be needed. b. Less detailed information on radiation levels in specific areas will be needed. c. There should be no change in the requirements for inform~tion on radiation levels in specific areas. d. Information on radiation levels in specific areas will no longer be required at DCPA Regions. 21-6 • PART II: Matching (5 Points) DIRECTIONS: In the parenthesis ( ) provided on the answer sheet, write the letter from Column 2 that matches the statement in Column 1. Each item in Column 2 Column 1 1. is the central countermeasure during the emergency phase. 2. is the central countermeasure during the operational r ecovery phase . 3. is any method used to control fallout particles or access thereto. 4. reduces radiation exposures but is not considered to be a countermeasure. 5. has as its objective the reestablishment of essential fUnctions . can be used only once . Column 2 a . Contamination control b . Exposure control c. Remedial movement d. Radiological decay e . Operational recovery phase f . Unlimited operations g . Final recovery phase h. Emergency operations i. Decontamination j . Shelter • 21-7 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER ANSWER SHEET -QUIZ NO. 3 Name ---------------------- Ten multiple-choice questions : Maximum score= 10 Five matching questions : Maximum score = 5 All answer s should be on this answer sheet . DO NOT WRITE ON THE QUIZ. PART I : a b c d 1. ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 . ~ ~ ( ) ( ) ( ) 3· ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 5. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 6. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 7. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 8. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 9-( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) • 10. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) PART II: 1. ( ) 2 . ( .) 3· ( ) 4. ( ) 5. ( ) Scor e 21-8 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER INSTRUCTOR SOLUTION SHEET QUIZ NO. 3 PART I: l. 2. 3·4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9· lO. a ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (X)( ) ( ) (X)(X) b ( ) (X) ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) (X)(X)( ) ( ) c (X)( ) (X) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) d ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(X) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) PART II: l. 2. 3·4. 5 . (j) (i) (a) (d) (e) • 2l-9 LESSON PLAN NO. 22 COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: Basic Concepts of an Emergency Operating Center (EOC) TIME: 1.5 Hours OBJECTIVES : At the conclusion of this unit of instruction the participant will be able to: 1. Draw a diagram of a basic layout of an EOC and describe, in his own words: a. The function or purpose of the principal displays. b. List the positions of the principal staff and group positions and explain the basic role of each. c. Identify the two most basic message forms suggested for use in the EOC and indicate the routing that each might follow. • 2. Describe the purpose and functions of the Disaster Analysis Group in the EOC and: a. Name the four positions that make up the Disaster Analysis Group. b. Describe the duties of each. c. Describe, in his own words, the possible different roles of the Disaster Analysis Group in (1) nuclear attack, and (2) natural disaster. SCOPE: Introduction; basic concepts of emergency operating centers; the EOC layout, including displays --their purpose and use, principal staff positions in the EOC and their functions, and communications in the EOC; the role of the Disaster Analysis Group in the EOC (Chief, Hazard Evaluator, RADEF Officer, and Damage Assessor); direction and control exercise; and conclusion. REFERENCES: 1. Instructor: a. 11 Basic Radiological Defense Officer Student Manual, 11 SM-11.25 b. 11 Emergency Operat ions Simulation Training, Operations Manual," SM-4.1.1, Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, January 1967 22-1 c. "Emergency Operat ions Simulation Training Simulation Manual," SM-4.1.2 d. "Disaster Operations, A Handbook for Local Gover nments," CPG 1-6, Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, July 1972; and Change 1. 2. Parti cipant: a. "Basic Radiological Defense Officer StudeEt Manual," SM-11 . 25 b. !!Emergency Operations Simulation Training Operations Manual," SM-4.1.1 (Optional) REQUIREMENTS: Instructor: Film: "Emergency Operat..:.ng Centers -The Basic Concepts," 23 minutes, color 16 rom. projector Screen REMARKS : 1. You may want to have students read appropriate section( s ) of the Student Manual, SM-11.25, and the Operations Manual, SM-4 . 1 . 1, ahead of time so that they can be familiar wi th the EOC concept . If so, it is practical to assign r esponsibility for their presenting, in t heir own words, the duties of each position described in these manuals. 2 . It will be most helpful if you can conduct thi s session in a real Emergency Operating Center. If possible, have the EOC personnel explain the displays and organization of the EOC for the class . A-the conclusion of the tour you may want to discuss the differences in the EOC presented in this session and the one they have seen. I f this session cannot be conducted in an EOC, a tour of a nearby, funct ioning EOC would be beneficial. 22-2 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS A. INTRODUCTION l. Outline the objectives of this session to the participants and stress that achievement of these goals constitutes familiarity with the concept of an Emergency Operating Center (EOC). 2. The concept being presented in this session is only one way of arranging and operating an EOC; there are marry others. B. BASIC CONCEPTS l. Refer to the "EOC -The Basic Concepts" in OF EMERGENCY the Student Manual, SM-ll.25, and give the OPERATING students a moment to review them. Then CENTERS introduce and show the film, 11 Emergency Operating Centers -The Basic Concepts. 11 2. At the conclusion of the film, give the class time to answer the Study Questions in the Student Manual. Then take sufficient time to discuss the questions and answer any related questions that arise. C. THE EOC LAYOUT l. A very effective technique for presenting AND ORGANIZATION the basic information about the layout and organization of the Emergency Operating Center is to have the students read the Operations Manual, SM-4 .l.l, in advance. The class can then present, supplemented by instructor comments, the following basic information about the EOC : a . Physical layout of an EOC • .. b. The displays in the EOC and their purpose . c . The principal staff positions. d. The responsibilities of each staff position. The instructor may want to describe the basics of communications in the EOC (both written and telephone) and how communications take place between the Operations Room and the Communications Center. You may want to 22-3 MAIN TOPICS D. CONCLUSION TEACHING POINTS show the class examples of Emergency Reportand General Message forms and briefly explain their uses. 2. The student's understanding of the role of the Disaster Analysis Group in the EOC is one basic goal of this session. In addition, each student should understand clearly the duties of each posit ion within the DAG. The students can present these details if supplement ed by the instructor's observations. The instructor, in closing, should steer the group into discussing the differences in the functional roles of the DAG in a nuclear emergency as compared to a natural disaster.-Elicit st udent suggestions on the various ways the RADEF Officer can cont ribute to smooth EOC operations in the latt er type of emergency operation. In closing the session, you should remind -'-he class that the Emergency Operating Center t hey have studied represents one way of organizing and operating an EOC·. The names of the positions,the manner of internal communications, and the displays will vary from one EOC to another. There are marry ways of accomplishing the goals of creating a secure environment that enhances timely decisionmaking during civil preparedness emergencies . • • • 22-4 LESSON PLAN NO . 23 COURSE TITLE : Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE : Course Examination TIME : l.0 Hour OBJECTIVE : At the conclusion of this unit the participant should have: Demonstrated his grasp and under standi ng of the topics covered in the Basic Radiological Defense Officer course by working problems and answering questions i n a knowl edgeable manner. SCOPE: Written multiple-choice questions covering material presented in the course; problem-solving questions designed to test the participant ' s ability to apply the techniques learned in the course. REQUIREMENTS : l. Instructor: a. Copy of exam and school solution. b. Quick grading key. c. Examination roster with places for grades to be recorded. 2 . Participant: a . Copy of examination and student answer sheet. b . Pencil. c . Ruler. d. Scratch paper. e. Exposure and exposure rate nomogram . f . Bar (or T) pin (or appropriate substitute). REMARKS : l . The value of this examination is 55 points . 2 . The allotted time for this examination is 60 minutes, including introductory instructions . 3. A copy of the course examination, student answer sheet and answer key are provided in this Instructor Guide . 4. Instructors should have a sufficient number of copies of the course examination and student answer sheets prepared in advance of this session. 5. The instructor is accountable for the course examination and the quizzes. Care should be exercised so as not to compromise them. 23 -l 6. The instructor m~y want to prepare a punched answer key which can be placed over each student answer sheet for quick scoring. 1. This course examination and the preceding quizzes should be viewed as additional learning tools and a method of evaluating student comprehension of the topics discussed in this course. 23-2 • MAIN TOPICS A. INTRODUCTION • B. CONCLUSION TEACHING POINTS 1. Distribut e the examination and the student answer sheet. 2. Explain how to use the student answer sheet. 3· Request each participant to write his name on the st udent answer sheet. 4. Request that the participants DO NOT WRITE ON THEIR EXAMINATIONS. 5. Advise the students they will need the ruler and nomogram and pin to work exposure and exposure rate problems. 6. Indicate that one hour will be allowed to complete the examination and that it has a value of 55 points • 1. Collect score sheets. 2. Score examination with grading key. 3. Enter individual's score on examination roster. 23-3 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER Type of Examination : Value of Examination: Time of Examination : Materials Required: FINAL EXAMINATION Multiple-Choice -BEST ANSWER 55 Poi nts 60 Minutes Scratch Paper Nomograms Ruler or Hairline Pin Answer Sheet NOTE: DO NOT WRITE ON THIS EXAM BOOKLET . DO NOT BEGIN THIS EXAM UNTIL DIRECTED 23-4 • BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER Final Examinat ion 1. Which of t he following is the legal basi s for t he National Civil Defense Program? a . PL 81-875 , as amended. c . PL 81-920, as amended. b . PL 91-606, as amended. d . PL 88-335 . 2 . The purpose of the Radiological Defense System is to : a . Provide the Federal, State and l ocal gover nments with r adiologi cal i nformation in the event of nucl ear attack. b . Provide contr ol of technical guidance for r adiati on exposures in emer gency. c . Provide guidance to the fallout shel ter system to minimi ze t he effects of fallout radiation on peopl e . d . All of the above . 3· In a surface burst, the nuclear weapons effect that will endanger l ife over the largest area is : a . Thermal radiation• . b . Radioactive fallout. c . Bl ast and electromagnetic radiation. d . Initial nuclear radiation. 4. During and after deposition, radioactive fallout exists as : a . Gas . c . Particl es . b . Liquid. d . None of the above . 5. If two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen combine chemi cally, they form : a . One mol ecule of the el ement water . b . One atom of the element water . • c . One mol ecule of the compound water . d . One atom of the compound water. 23-5 6. The three basic subatomic particles are: a. Ions, isotopes, and neutrons. b. Neutrons, ions, and electrons. c. Atoms, ions, and electrons. d. Electrons, protons, and neutrons. 7. The number of protons contained in the nucleus of an atom is called its: • a. Element (X) number. c. Atomic (Z) number. b. Mass (A) number. d. Isotope. 8. The unit of radioactivity is defined as the quantity of radioactive material in which 3.7 x lol0 disintegrations occur per second. It is called the: a. Electron volt. c. Half life. b. ·Roentgen. d. Curie. 9. Three common types of nuclear radiation are alpha, beta and gamma rays. Which one of the following statements is false? • a. Alpha particles are rel atively slow particles and are identical to a helium nucleus. b. Beta particles are posi tive charged particles that travel at the speed of light . c. Gamma rays are electromagnetic in nature and travel at the speed of light . d. Gamma rays are pure energy similar to X-rays and are the most penetrating of the three types mentioned. lO. The energy unit of any radiation emission is the: a. Roentgen. c. Electron volt. b. Curie. d. Ion. ll. At the time of cloud stabilization for a nuclear weapon surface burst, the largest amount of radioactive material is located: a. In the stem. c. At the top of the cloud. b . At the base of the cloud. d. In the middle of the cloud. 23-6 12. The highest ranking hazard from fallout is: a. Inhalation of fallout. c. External radiation exposure . b. Skin contamination. d. Ingestion of fallout. 13. The least important source of radioactive material in the formation of fallout from the surface detonation of a thermonuclear weapon is : , a. Neutron-induced radioactive isotopes . b. Fusion products. ' c. Unfissioned U or Pu. d. Fission products. 14. How does fallout affect the air through which it has passed and the surface on which it has settled? a. The air and the surface are radioactive. b . The surface is radioactive bu~ not the air . • c . The surface is contaminated but the air is not • d. The air and the surface are contaminated. 15. Induced radioactivity from a nuclear detonation is due mainly to : a . b . Neutrons . Gamma r adiation. c . d. Fission products . Unfissioned material. 16 . The exposure rate indicated is : a . .15 mR/hr. b . 1.5 mR/hr. c. 15 mR/hr. d. 150 mR/hr . X1 X10 CD V-700 X100-o OFF 23-7 17. Who is in charge of an EOC during a real disaster? a. The Civil Preparedness Coordinator. b. The Operation Group Chief. c. The highest elected official of the jurisdiction. d. The controller. · 18. In the EOC, who determines what the response will be to a particular emergency situation? a. The Operations Group Chief. b. The Civil Preparedness Coordinator. c . The mayor. d. The assigned operations officer. 19. What is the role of the Disaster Analysis Group in the EOC? a. To provide advice and assistance to the Operations Room staff on disaster effects. b. To estimate damage. • c. To assess damage. d. To provide advice on radiological defense problems. 20. Monitors should be assigned: a. To facilities near where they work. b. To facilities near where they reside. c. On the basis of their commitment. d. To a facility where needed. 21. The CD V-700, 0-50 mR/hr survey meter will: a. Produce off-scale readings for exposure rates of 50 mR/hr to 1 R/hr. b. Jam and read zero at exposure rates in excess of 1 R/hr• c. Measure ga.mma exposure rates from 0-50 mR/hr. d. All of t he above. • 23-8 • 22. The CD V-700, 0-50 mR/hr survey meter will detect: a . Alpha and beta radiation. b. Beta radiation only. c. Beta and gamma radiation. d. Gamma radiation only. 23 . The instrument designed to measure exposure to gamma radiation is a: a . Dosimeter. c. Geiger counter. b . Survey meter. d. Charger. 24. If the initial recording of the monitor ' s dosimeter was 15 mR, what has been his exposure? • a . 70 roentgens. b • 60 milliroentgens . c. 55 milliroentgens. d. 50 rads. 25 . A dosimeter read 10 R when issued to a person in a fallout area. A reading three hours later indicated 20 R. What should the person wearing the dosimeter infer from this inf ormation? a. The dosimeter is leaking so rapidly that it should not be used. b . The amount of radiation to which this person was exposed was 10 R. c. The exposure rate at the time of exposure was 10 R/hr . d. The amount of radiation to which this person was exposed was 20 R. • 26. With fresh batteries a CD V-715 should operate intermittently for at least: a . l day. c. 6 days. b. 3 days. d . 14 days . 23-9 27. The basic measuring unit with which all civil defense instruments are marked is the: a. Curie. c. Rem. b. Rad. d. Roentgen. 28. The instrument designed to show the rate of exposure to nuclear radiation is a/an: a. CD V-742 dosimeter. c. CD V-750 dosimeter charger. b. CD V-7l5 survey meter. d. All of the above. 29 . The monitor delays going on an outside mission until the outside exposure rate decays to a safe level. By this delay he is using which of the following to reduce his exposure? a. Distance. c. Shielding. b . Time. d. Attenuation. 30. Four feet from a point radiation source you are being exposed at the rate of 20 mR/hr. What is your accumulated exposure after l5 minutes in this location? a. 5 mR. c. l5 mR. • b. lO mR. d. 20 mR. 3l. You are located in a radiation area where your dosimeter has accumulated l2 R in 20 minutes . By this you note that the average exposure rate during this time has been approximately: a . l2 R/hr. c. 240 R/hr. b. 24 R/hr. d. 36 R/hr. 32. Reports which tell where fallout may come down are called: a . Flash reports. c. DF reports. b. Fallout reports. d. Weapons effects reports. 33· The roentgen is a radiation measure of: a. Absorbed exposure to gamma rays . b. Absorbed exposure to gamma and X-rays. c. Exposure to gamma rays and neutrons. d. Exposure to gamma and X-ra:ys. 23-lO 34. When a radioactive isotope is taken into the body, the extent of damage is determined by: a. The type of radiation emitted and the half life of the isotope. b. The rate at which the isotope is excreted from the body. c. The place of deposition of the isotope in the body. d. All of the above. 35. The contamination of food, other than fresh milk, by fallout is: a. An unimportant problem. c. A short-term problem. b. A major problem. d. A long-term problem. 36. After a nuclear weapon attack, contaminated personnel with superficial flesh wounds should be: a. Decontaminated and then treated for radiation sickness. b. Decontaminated and then treated for the injuries received. c. Treated for radiation sickness and then decontaminated. d. Treated for the injuries received and for radiation sickness. 37. If a person has been exposed to 450 roentgens of radiation: a. His chances of survival are approximately 50-50. b. No valid conclusions can be drawn, since the duration of exposure and the extent to which the body has been irradiated are not known. c. He will be violently ill and w·ill have marry undesirable aftereffects. d . He has received a lethal exposure. 38. The severity of radiation sickness depends upon the : a. Total exposure. b . Total exposure and body area exposed. c . Duration of exposure and body area exposed. d. Duration of expos1rre, total exposure, and the body area exposed. 23-ll 39. From the monitoring station data below, the value of the decay exponent "n" is : a . (-) 0.9. c . ( -) 1.5 . b . ( -) 1.4 . d . ( -) 2.1. MONITORING STATION J Exposure Time Rate H + 5 3 H + 6 9 H + 7 17 H + 8 18 H + 9 15 H + 10 17 H + ll 1 5 H + 12 13 H + 13 1 2 H + 14 ll H + 1 5 10 1 4 5 7 10 20 30 40 50 70 100 EXPOSURE RATE (R/ hr) TIME AFTER BURST (hours) 23 -12 • •40. Using the DF data below, what group of digits would you use at MSP if Mason City received a 3 MT burst at 1600 CST? a. 0911. c. 1009. b. 1307. d. None of the above. DF Data observed at 0600 CST DBQ, 1607 1507 1207 DSM 1606 1406 ll06 MSP 1307 1009 09ll 41. The most likely ecological consequence of nuclear war would be: a. A new ice age. b. End of all life on the planet Earth. c. Melting of the polar ice caps. d. Outbreaks of disease-carrying insects and rodents in damaged urban areas. 42. On an outside mission, a monitor should: a. Follow procedures and techniques developed by the shelter manager. b. Follow procedures and techniques outlined in the local emergency plan. c. Follow instructions given by the Nuclear Regulatory Conunission. d. Develop and follow their own procedures and techniques. 43. A monitor measured the outside exposure rate and found it to be 175 R/hr. He immediately went inside the shelter area and measured 5 R/hr. The outside/inside ratio of the shelter is: a. 60. c. 35. b. 20. d. 30. 44. Several hours later the monitor of question 43 determines the inside exposure rate to be 6 R/hr. What is the approximate outside exposure rate? a. 24 R/hr. c. 180 Rjhr. b. 120 R/hr. d. 210 R/hr. 23-13 45. The CD V-717 survey meter differs from t he CD V-715 in that: • a. It is slower to respond. c. It runs longer on its battery. b. It is more accurate. d . The CD V-717 has remote reading capability. 46. Regarding shelter operations, which of the following is most nearly correct : a . People should not be overcrowded in shelters because of the danger of anoxia. b. During the early hours after fallout arrival, people should be crowded into the best available shelter to minimize exposures . c. Healthy individuals should be given the better protected areas in the shelter because sick people will die anyway. d. All persons who enter the shelter after fallout arrival should be decontaminated no matter how long it takes. 47 . For short-term forecasti ng by the monitor: a . The nomograms are assumed to be satisfactory. • b . Only survey meters should be used. c . The value of "n" (fallout decay exponent) must be computed. d. The neutron-induced activity must first be determined. 48. The "representative exposure rate" for a city is: a . The estimated average rate of exposure to shelter occupants . b. The average exposure rate from randomly selected monitoring stations. c . A single exposure rate which reflects the general radiological situation for the entire city. d . The single exposure rate that should be used for planning postrecovery operations . 49. The principal countermeasure during the Operational Recovery Phase is: a . Shelter. c . Contamination control. b . Decontamination. d. Remedial movement . 23-14 50. It is helpful to time-phase RADEF operations because: a. Each of the agencies involved needs to have this done for them. b . Phase objectives are different and thus the central and peripheral countermeasures change in each phase. c. Good planning requires it. d. It makes planning so rruch simpler. 5l. Which of the following is not a radiological countermeasure? .. a. Shelter. c. Exposure control. b. Decontamination. d. Time (radiation decay). 52. Three hours after a nuclear explosion the radiation exposure rate outside a civil preparedness warehouse was found to be 80 R/hr. What will the exposure rate be in this area at H + 4 da:ys? a. l.30 R/hr. c. l3 R/hr. • b. .l3 R/hr • d. l30 Rjhr. 53. A salvage crew must remain in a contaminated area 3 hours to accomplish their task. The eXfosure rate in this area l hour after the burst was 500 R/hr. The crew entered this area 9 hours after the burst. What radiation eXfosure will they receive while in this area? a. l6 R. c. lOO R/hr. b. l.6 R. d. lOO R. 54. The principal objective of the Emergency Phase i s: a. Minimize exposures. c. Survival. b. Restore normal functicns. d. Reestablish essential fUnctions . 55. Monitoring station locations are selected first for their: a. Communications capability. b. Geographical dispersion. c. Best available fallout protection. d. Four trained monitors. 23-l5 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER ANSWER SHEET -FINAL EXAMINATION Name ----------------- Fifty-five multiple-choice questions: Maximum score= 55 All answers should be on this answer sheet. DO NOT WRITE ON THE EXAMINATION. a b c d a b c d 1. ()()()() 28. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 29. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3· ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 30. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 31. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 5. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 32. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 6. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 33 · ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 7. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 34. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 8. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 35. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 9. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 36. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 10. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 37-( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 38. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 12. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 39. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) • 13. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 40. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 14. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 41. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 15. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 42. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 16 . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 43. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 17. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 44. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 18. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 45. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 19. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 46. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 20. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 47. ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21. ()()()() 48. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 22. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 49. ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 23. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 50. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 24. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 51. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 25. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 52. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 26. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 53. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 27. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 54. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 55. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Score 23-16 • BASIC RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER ANSWER SHEET -FINAL EXAMINATION Name ----------------- Fifty-five multiple-choice questions: Maximum score= 55 All answers should be on this answer sheet . DO NOT WRITE ON THE EXAMINATION. a b c d a b c d l. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 28 . ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 2. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 29 . ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 3· ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 30. (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 31. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 5. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 32. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 6. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 33 . ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 7. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 34 . ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 8. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 35 . ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) • g. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 36. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 10. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 37. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) ll. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 38 . ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 12. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 39. (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) 13. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 40. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 14. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 41. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 15. (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) 42. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 16. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 43. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 17. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 44. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 18. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 45. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 19 . (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) 46. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 20 . ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 47. (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 48 . ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 22 . ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 49. ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 23 . (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) 50 . ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 24 . ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 51 . ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 25 . ( ) (X) ( ) ( ) 52 . (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) 26 . ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 53 . ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 27. ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 54. ( ) ( ) (X) ( ) 55. (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) Score ---------- 23-17 • • LESSON PLAN NO. 24 COURSE TITLE : Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: Examination Review TJJvlE : 0. 5 Hour OBJECTIVE: To clarify or correct arry misunderstanding of the concepts tested by the course examinat ion. SCOPE: To review questions missed on the final exam. REQUIREMENTS : 1. Instructor: a. Master copy of final exam. b . Answer key. c. Chalkboard, chalk and eraser. 2. Participant: a. Copy of final exam. b . Scored answer sheet. • REMARKS: 1. Score student answer sheets before session. 2. If possible, the instructor should make an analysis of the results of the course examination. Those questions missed by more than 20% of the class should be identified and discussed first. 3. The instructor should recognize the value of this period as an additional instructional session. He should not consider it just a review of the course examination. 24-1 MAIN TOPICS TEACHING POINTS A. INTRODUCTION l. The purpose of this session is to ciarify any questions or concepts missed on the · exam. 2 . Ask each student to confirm his score on t he answer sheet . B. DISCUSSION l. There are several ways of reviewing the exam. One wa:y is to l imit discussion to the first ten questi ons; after discussi ng these questions, move to the next t en questions, etc. 2 . Explain any concepts missed by students on t he exam and if ther e is a probl em, show t he solution. 3. Note any errors on the exam or improvements that can be made to the exam . C . SUMMARY l. Take up test booklets and answer sheets . 2 . Check for additional comments or questions on any concepts taught in the course. 24-2 LESSON PLAN NO. 25 COURSE TITLE: Basic Radiological Defense Officer LESSON TITLE: Surrnnary and Graduation TD1E: 0.5 Hour OBJECTIVES : At the conclusion of this time period the partic~pant ll should have: 1. Submitted arry written or oral evaluations that couldbe useful i n improving future courses. 2. Received a certificate of satisfactory completionof the course. SCOPE: Written evaluati ons, oral evaluations, awarding ofcertificates. REFERENCES: Instructor: Course Schedule for Basic Radiological DefenseOfficer Course REQUIREMENTS: 1. Instructor: a. Course Schedule for Basic Radi ological DefenseOfficer Course b. Course evaluation sheet* c. Certificates* 2. Participant:Course evaluation sheet. '· *Prepared locally. 25-1 MAIN TOPICS A. INTRODUCTION B. EVALUATION FORMS C. SUMMARY D. CERTIFICATES TEACHING POINTS Review the course purpose and objectives as they appear on the course schedule. 1. Distribute evaluation forms. ,, 2. Encourage participants to make oral comments or recommendations. The instructor should give a brief summary of the major highlights covered during the conduct of t he course. Award certificates and officially close the course. 'ti-U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 0--215-348