,_ \.')$ J) 1oi·1.,{1L: L.&.e~ AIR FORCE ROTC AIR UNIVERSITY T-1403 I. \ { I r. Concepts of Air Force Leadership MA.JOR DEWEY E. JOHNSON, PhD ;_ . ·.. .,' ,, AIR FORCE ROTC AIR UNIVERSITY 1970 This publication includes copyrighted materiaL Views or op1n1ons expressed or implied in this publication ore not to be construed os carrying official sandion of the Air University or the Department of the Air Force• • This publication has been reviewed and approved by competent personnel of the preparing command in accordance with current diredives on dodrine, policy, essentiality, propriety, and quality• • The copyrighted material contained in this volume has been reproduced by special arrangement with the copyright owner in each case. Such material is fully proteded by the copyright laws of the United States, and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission of the copyright owner. Preface LEADERSHIP, because it involves the complexities of man himself, al most defies description and understanding. While the evidences of leadership are well known, the process is almost unknown. The ante cedents of the United States Air Force are replete with examples of courageous men. and women who have provided the catalytic spark to make things happen in difficult situations. But even after decades of investigation, we are unable to identify with certainty the causal factors that determine leadership success at a given time. We can describe some of the behaviors that take place, but we are frequently unable to explain why. The objective of this text is to examine leadership in a systematic · manner with the hope of achieving a better understanding of the process and gaining, thereby, an improvement in leadership effective ness. Our approach is more analytical than descriptive; it is certainly not prescriptive. Leadership is still very much an art. To aid in this search for understanding, this text has been divided into five sections or phases with a pair of chapters in each. The first chapter in each pair introduces some basic leadership concepts or ideas relating to that phase ·and refers the reader to source materials printed in the second chapter. We suggest the applicable selection be read at the time it is initially cited. Reading selections have been included in order to present a wide ranging group of diverse views from heterogeneous sources, both military and civilian. In almost every instance, they have been reprinted in their original form so the author's views can be read and evaluated in as complete a context as possible. The Air Force deeply appreciates the generous cooperation of the many authors and their publishers who so willingly gave their per mission to reprint or who developed special materials for this text. A list of contributors may be found on page iv. A book of this scope requires the efforts of many people in the writing-editing-publishing phases. The author is indebted to the several university faculty members who read and offered comments on all or part of the manuscript. In addition, special appreciation is expressed to Robert T. Finney, Mrs. Virginia Mickey, Lt Col Duane Tway, and Dr. Ray Maize. iii List of Contributors Adair, John E. Janowitz, MorrisArgyris, Chris Jennings, Eugene E.Bass, Bernard M. Johnson, Maj Dewey E.Bavelas, Alex Knowles, Henry P.Beishline, John R. Korman, Abraham K.Biven, Col Verne Likert, RensisBlake, Robert R. MacArthur, Gen DouglasBlanchard, Kenneth H. McConnell, Gen John P.Bowers, David C. McGregor, DouglasBradford, Leland P. McGuckin, Maj JosephBradford, Lt Col Zeb B., Jr. Maier, Ayesha A.Brown, Harold Maier, Norman R.F.Bryson, Col E: Dale Markowitz, Maj Harold, Jr.Catton, Gen Jack J. Mosel, JamesCelick, Lt Col Arnold J. Mouton, Jane S.Cleland, David I. Murphy, Maj James R.Combs, Brig Gen Cecil E. Newman, Maj Gen A.S.Dellinger, David C. Ofiesh, Gabriel D.Drumm, Lt Col Robert H. Olmstad, Joseph A.Farwell, Maj Herman W. Ridgway, Gen Matthew B.Fiedler, Fred E. Sales, Stephen M.Geier, John G. Saxberg, Borje 0.George, Claude S., Jr. Schmidt, Warren H.Golembiewski, Robert T. Seashore, Stanley E.Goode, Cecil E. Solem, Allen R.Hackett, Lt Gen Sir John Winthop Spotts, James V.Heckman, I.L. Stephens, Lt Col Dallas K.Hersey, Paul Stogdill, Ralph M.Herzberg, Frederick I. Strauss, George ·· Huneryager, S.G. Tannenbaum, RobertHuntington, Samuel P. Terry, George R. iv Contents iii Preface iv List of Contributors Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l Chapter 2 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . 13 READING A -Some Problems in the Education of the Military Leader, Maj Herman W. Farwell . . . . . . . . , . . 13 READING B -New Trends in Leadership and Management Training, Dr. John E. Adair . . . . 20 READING C-Communication, Dr. S.G. Huneryager and Dr. I.L. Heckman . . . . . . 31 READING D -Air Force Staff Writing Practices, Maj Harold Markowitz, Jr. . . . . . 41 READING E -Preparation of the Written· Case Analysis, USAF Academy . . . . . . 49 READING F-The Role of the Discussion Leader, USAF Academy . . . . . . 51 READING G -The Integration of Role Playing and Case Studies, Dr. Norman R.F. Maier, Dr. Allen R. Solem, and Ayesha A. Maier . 54 Chapter ] THE CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER .......... . 59 Chapter 4 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 READING A-We live In Fame, Lt Col Dallas K. Stephens . . . . . . . . 75 READING B -Read Your Commission, Col Verne Biven . . . . . . • . • 77 READING C -'Loyalty: the Military Touchstone Brig Gen Cecil E. Combs . . . . . . . . 80 v READING D-The Military Profession, Air ForceManual 53-1 . . . . . . . 84 READING E -Officership as a Profession, Samuel P.Huntington . . . . . . . . 86 READING F -A New Look at the Military Profession, Lt Col Zeb B. Bradford, Jr and Maj James R. Murphy . . . . . . ·. 93 READING G-Real World Professionalism, Gen John P: McConnell . . . . . . . . 101 READING H-The Military Profession as a Career, Dr. Harold Brown . . . . . 105 READING I-The Changing Nature of the Military Ethic, Li Col Arnold I. Celick . . . . . . 110 READING J-Duty, Honor, Country, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur . . . . . . . 116 READING K-Duty, Honor, Country vs. Moral Conviction,Lt Col Zeb B. Bradford, Jr. . . . . 119 READING L -The Profession of Arms, Lt Gen Sir JohnWinthrop Hackett . . . . . . . 123 READING M-Technology and Decision-Making, MorrisJanowitz . . . . . . . . . . 163 READING N _:.The Beginning of Management, Claude S.George, Jr. . . . . . . . . . 173 READING 0-Early Military Contributions to Management,Claude S. George, Jr. . . . . . 183 · READING P -Essential Characteristics of Military Man~gement and Organization Until1900, John R. Beishline, Ph.D. . 186 READING Q ---:-Early Development of ManagementThought, George R. Terry, Ph.D. 191 READING R-Changing Patterns in Management Theory,David I. Cleland, Ph.D. and David C.Dellinger, Ph.D. . . . . 193 Chapter 5 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCELEADERSHIP .......... . . 203 Chapter 6 READINGS AND CASES-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCEAND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ........ 233 READING A-Human Relations and the Nature of Man, Henry P. Knowles, Ph.D. and Borje 0. Saxberg, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . 233 vi READING B -The Human Side of Enterprise, Dr. Douglas M. McGregor. . . . . . . . . 246 READING C-The Air Force Man and the Cultural Value Gap, Lt Col Robert H. Drumm . . 253 READING D.::__ The Motivation-Hygiene Concept and Problems of Manpower, Frederick I. Herzberg, Ph.D. . . . . . . . 257 READING E -The Personality of Leadership, Col (USAF Retired) Gabriel D. Ofiesh . . . . 263 Chapter 7 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . 281 Chapter 8 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL.APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . · . 305 READING A-Leadership, Dr. S. G. Huneryager and Dr. I. L. Heckman . . . . . . . . 305 READING B-The Problem of Leadership: A Look at Some Recent Findings of Behavioral Science Research, James V. Spotts, Ph.D. . . 310 READING C - Significant Research on Leadership, Cecil E. Goode . . . . . . . . . 322 READING D-Leadership, Gen Matthew B. Ridgway . 330 READING E -The Anatomy of Leadership, Eugene E. Jennings . . . . . . . . . 337 READING F -A Trait Approach to the Study of Leadership in Small Groups, John G. 'Grier, Ph.D. 348 READING G-Leadership: Man and Function, Alex Bavelas, Ph.D. . . . . . . 354 READING H -Leadership, Membership and Organization, Ralph M. Stogdill, Ph.D. . . . 359 READING I-The Skills of Leadership, Joseph A. Olmstead, Ph.D. . . . . . . 368 READING J-A Personal Concept of Command, Gen Jack J. Catton . . . . . . . . . . . 374 READING K-What Are Generals Made Of? Maj Gen A.S. Newman . . . . . . . . . . 380 READING L-Leadership and the Navigator, Maj Joseph McGuckin . . . . . . . 391 READING M -Interpersonal Dynamics, Leland P. Bradford, Ph.D. . . . . . 394 vii READING N -Assets and Liabilities in Group ProblemSolving: The Need for an IntegrativeFunction, Dr. Norman R. F. Maier.·· 403 READING 0-In Conclusion, Dr. Bernard M. l}ass . 411 Chapter 9 STYLES OF LEADERSHIP . 421 Chapter 10 READINGS AND CASES-STYLES OFLEADERSHIP . 447 READING A -Predicting Organizational Effectiveness witha Four-Factor Theory of Leadership, David G. Bowers, Ph.D. and Stanley E. Seashore, Ph.D. . 447 READING B -Combat Crew Leadership, USAFAcademy . 462 READING C - "Consideration," "Initiating Structure," and Organizational Criteria-A Review, Abraham K. Korman, Ph.D. . 468 READING D-Research Trends in Executive Behavior, Chris Argyris, Ph.D. 477 READING E -How to Choose a Leadership Pattern, RobertTannenbaum, Ph.D. and Warren H.Schmidt, Ph.D. 483 READING F -Three Styles of Leadership and Their Uses,Robert T. Golembiewski, Ph.D. . 492 READING G -Group Relationships and ParticipativeManagement, Dr. James N. Mosel . 501 ... READING H-Participative Management: A Critique,George Strauss, Ph.D. . 512 READING I-Supervisory Style and Productivity: Review and Theory, Stephen M. Sales, Ph.D. . 518 READiNG J -Human Asset Accounting for Air Force Organizations, Rensis Likert, Ph.D. and Maj Dewey E. Johnson, Ph.D. . . . 524 READING K-The Military Leadership Grid, Robert R.Blake, Ph.D., Jane S. Mouton, Ph.D.and Col E. Dale Bryson . 535 READING L-3-D Leadership Effectiveness, Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Ph.D. . 547 READING M-Organization Engineering-A New Approach to Leadership, Fred E. Fiedler, Ph.b. 562 In Conclusion . 579 viii Chapter 1 Introduction to the Concepts of Air Force Leadership C HALLENGE and opportunity characterize the role of the officer as an Air Force leader. He is challenged by the scope and complexity of his assignments, and finds continuing opportunity to apply his specialized knowledge and skill to worthwhile jobs. Furthermore, the officer finds an urgent need to use all of his personal resources, his courage and intellect, in perhaps the most demanding of all tasksthe leadership of men. Ours is an age of advancement, of exploration, and of discovery. One needs only compare the recent past with the present to see how rapidly change is taking place.Officers retiring now after a thirty-year career began active duty in a much different environment than that of today. The newly commissioned lieutenant in the ArmyAir Corps flew the B-17 nonstop over 2,000 miles at speeds in excess of 200 knots. He may have worked on the research and development of jet aircraft or with follow-on tests of Robert Goddard's pioneering investigations of liquid-fueled rockets. His, too, was a challenging career, but it is no criticism of his foresight to say that he probably had little conception of the Air Force of the 1970s and beyond-the Air Force that awaits today's leader. The newly commissioned officer joins the dedicated professional airmen from whose ranks have come men who now walk on the moon and reach for the planets. Other airmen, equally dedicated and courageous, are flying aircraft that have a wing span twice as long as the distance traveled in the initial flight of the Wright brothers or an hourly speed greater than the total range of the B-17. Still other airmen put a like amount of personal commitment and self-sacrifice into their work in laboratories, offices, and missile silos. In highly publicized and in unsung ways, airmen are .defending and contributing to the technologica1, social, and cultural progress that has made the United States the leader of the free world. Any organization so large and so varied and one making such rapid advancement in so many fields needs leaders with specialized knowledge and skill to maintain its high rate of progress. Earlier education programs have helped develop some of the leader's knowledge and skill-his professional leadership competence--needed on active duty. This text continues that development in the area of leadership. Why do we repeatedly use the term, "challenging"? It is because the Air Force leader is primarily concerned with the men and the mission, and it is an ever-present challenge to lead men toward accomplishment of a group mission. Under skillful leadership, the men drawn from the panorama of American life have a seemingly infinite ability to get the job 'done. Stories of their past deeds are legend. Yet, in the future, with the social, technological, and economic changes that pervade our culture, there will be even greater demands upon the leader. He will need to influence men who are better educated, economically more self-sufficient, far healthier, in 1 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP creasingly willing to question and dissent; and much more mobile and inquisitive than military men have ever been. Thus the men and the mission offer challenging opportunities to the individual who is eager for competition, admires success, and has the per:sonal courage to stake his reputation on his actions. Because the Air Force leader's role is so broad and so complex, our approach to ·the study of Air Force leadership is necessarily eclectic. After careful review and discussion, we have selected various theories, concepts, and techniques, drawn from business, education, military, and government sources. This selection is interdisciplinary; that is, it crosses academic lines to bring together ideas from such separate disciplines as psychology, sociology, history, economics, mathematics, political science, and business management. Dr. Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University, a widely recognized authority on the military, refers to the need for such abroad approach to officer education. When he describes the required academic background of a military officer in his book, The Soldier and the State, he writes: The military skill requires a broad background of general culture for its mastery. • . • Just as law at its borders merges into history, politics, economics, sociology, and psychology, so also does the milit!lry skill. Even more, military knowledge also bas frontiers on the natural ,sciences of chemistry, physics, and biology. To understand his trade properly, the officer must have some idea of its relation to these other fields and the ways in which these other areas of knowledge may contribute to his own purposes. In addition, he cannot really develop his analytical skill, inSight, imagination and judgment if he is trained simply in vocational duties. The !lbilities and habits of mind which he requires within his professional field can in large part be acquired only through the broader avenues of learning outside his profession. The fact that, like the lawyer and the physician, he is Continuously dealing with human beings requires him to have the deeper understanding of human attitudes, motivations, and behavior which a liberal education stimulates.' The purpose of this text is not to duplicate courses in psychology, sociology, or history, but to examine leadership-as practiced in the Air Force. While studying Air Force leadership, the reader will learn certain aspects of related disciplines, broaden his knowledge, and increase his skills, thus developing himself to meet the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities awaiting him as an Air Force leader. To the extent that valid and reliable information concerning a discipline helps one to understand and use it more effectiv.ely, the leadership concepts presented here will make him a more effective officer. Military leadership education is not, however, without its difficulties, as Maj Herman W. Farwell points out in his reading, "Some Problems in the Education of the Military Leader."* Major Farwell joins Professor Huntington in urging a "broad program of education, building toward our objeetive of ethical leadership and technicql experience. " SOME LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS Although leadership is rather nebulous, there are some central concepts, some generally held ideas, that serve_ to give the study of leadership definition and structure. Discussion of a few:of these concepts at this point may aid the reader's understanding of subsequent chapters. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 19S7), p. 14. • See pp. 13-19. 2 lNTRODUCTlON TO THE CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Leadership-A Personal Concept This text is titled Concepts of Air Force Leadership because it presents some of the basic concepts or ideas which may be of use to any pers9n in formulating his own concepts. In discussing leadership, we are dealing both with tangibles and intan gibles that can be perceived only through the mind and. the emotions. Concepts; however, once formulated, can serve as guidelines for leadership action. A personal concept of leadership is necessary for the Air Force officer because he has an exten sive area of freedom or sphere of discretion in which to exercise his personal judg ment. Contrary to popular belief, format. rul~s and regulations govern only a small part of a leader's decision spectrum, leaving wide areas open to his initiative. The leader, therefore, needs a problem-solving framework to guide his decisions. He may be well versed in leadership kiwwledge and highly proficient in leadership skill-and these are important-but how he uses this knowledge and skill, how he applies the rules and regulations, depends on his concept of leadership. Since this book suggests possible ways of building a framework for understanding some.fundifinental concepts of leadership, we must define the meaning of certain key terms and explain the rationale behind our definitions. As the reader becomes familiar with these terms and as his understanding of the subject matter increases, he can construct his own definitions, build his own concepts, ·and possibly develop ones which are better than those we present here. Leadership Defined We define leadership as the process of influencing people, irldividtially and in groups, to effectively accomplish organizational missions. There are ·a number of key points in this definition which merit further elaboration. Lea,dership is a behavioral process, a series of interconnected and mterrelated behavior~ which involve people, individually and in groups. This suggests that a study of the leadership process should properly include the study of individual and group behavior. But tpis is not enough. The definition also requires effective behavior and an understanding of what is meant by "effective." Further, the definition demands that leadership be examined within the context of a formal organization and its missions. In this book, the study of leadership is specifically related to the Air Force. Leadership and Management . How does leadership relate to management? Leading and managing are behaviors. When a person is engaged in the process of planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling, he is managing. That is, he is influencing not only people, but also resources s:uch as materiel, time, and money to accomplish the ·organizational mission;-If we say that managers influence people and use nonhuman resources, then we can use leader and manager interchangeably. If, however, we say that managers influence people and other resources, then leading must be included as a managerial function because leading involves only one of the resources, people. Either of these definitions is valid and the reader may find. the terms used interchangeably in the reading selections in this book. We prefer the second definition because an officer does more than use resources; he plans, organizes, controls, coordinates, and directs them. He is an influencer of his environment, not just a user. The statement is sometimes made thaf an officer is a leader. A more exact statement is that an officer is a potential leader. He _was selected for a commission because he demonstrated the potential for leadership. However, since leadership is a 3 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP specific behavior, an officer cannot be a leader until he performs leadership behaviors. In like manner, an officer is riot a manager until he performs managerial behaviors. Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, authors of Military Sociology, support the distinction between leadership and management when they state: In the literature, a manager has usually been defined as a person who makes things happen through the activities of other people while management has usually been defined as the process of planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling their activities. Certainly these definitions are markedly similar to the definitions of a leader and leadership we have offered earlier. In the literature there also seems to be a general agreement that leadership is part and parcel of managership. Like leadership, managership is tfous viewed as a dynamic process-a process involving the interactive coordination of organizational behavior.• Technical and Managerial Activities Another reason why it is difficult to describe and analyze leadership is that an officer performs both technical and managerial activities and is evaluated on both. When the officer is performing specialized duties by himself, these are termed technical activities. When he is interacting with people and other resources, he is performing managerial activities. This makes the spectrum of his activities very broad, and, because the spectrum is broad, one must be careful not to ascribe poor performance in one area of this spectrum to poor performance in another. For example, an officer's poor performance in nonmanagerial technical activities should not be confused with poor leadership. Technical activities and leadership activities are dissimilar. A course in missile engineering, for example, is designed to improve technical skills, not leadership skills. In brief, if we wish to improve leadership by establishing programs in leadership development, we must define leadership. Leadership and Organizational Missions The Air Force leader accomplishes organizational missions. This is an explicit and mandatory aspect of leadership. There will be times when higher or lateral organiza tional echelons deter~ine missions. At other times, the leader will determine or help determine these missions depending upon his role in a particular organization. Re gardless of whether missions are self-determined or determined by an outside agency, at the moment of decision, the missions come first. In our discussion of leadership effectiveness, getting the job done comes first, be: fore personal desires. This is not because we disregard the importance of personal goals, but because individual goals in this pluralistic society are often best satisfied through the accomplishment of organizational missions. This concept does not mean, however, that every time an organizational mission is accomplished, all of the per sonal goals of the team members are satisfied. There may be times when a person must perform a particular task in which personal goals may have to go unsatisfied because they are subordinate to the mission. Under normal operational conditions, however, the most desirable solution to a leadership problem is one that satisfied both personal goals and the organ!zational mission. • (University Park, Maryland: The Social Science Press, 1965), p. 191. 4 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP What Leadership Style? Leadership within this text is discussed with the explicit assumption that a givenstyle of leadership is a pattern of behaviors initially undertaken to achieve high performance goals as evaluated by high performance standards. In other words, all AirForce leaders hope to do a good job--some do and some do not. How then can aleader decide on an appropriate leadership style?A possible answer to this question, based on the representative leadership studiespresented here, is that a leader.has a primary style and a series of secondary styles.The concept is that a leader comes to a situation with certain predispositions, attitudes, and experiences. He has been successful or unsuccessful in the past with certain behaviors and he will be most likely to try those behaviors that worked for himbefore. If it seems to him that he is accomplishing results, he will probably continuethese behaviors until he receives adverse feedback or perceives a better way. His primary style may be autocratic, participative, or some style in between.Further, based on the widely held view that there is no one best leadership styleequally applicable to all situations, most leaders have a number of secondary styleswhich depart to some degree from their primary style. The extent of this variationmay be moderate. For example, an officer may use participative leadership as hisprimary style. He delegates authority to his men, shares information and promotesopen communication, and builds confidence and trust in his work teams. However,one day on his way home from his office, he encounters two boys squaring off tofight. To stop the altercation, he uses autocratic leadership, which for him is a secondary style, but one appropriate to the situation. But the question remains, "what leadership style?" The desirability of employingboth primary and secondary styles is substantiated by current leadership researchwhich confirms an Air Force leader's need for flexibility in the wide variety of situations he must face. Analysis of the factors influencing the appropriate leadershipstyle is one of the principal tasks of this book. The implications of the foregoing discussion are that the Air Force leader must bea highly knowledgeable and skilled person, able to perform both technical and managerial functions. In many situations, the most important function will be the leadership of men-a function that presents continuing challenges. The leader not onlymust perceive the leadership style that is the most appropriate in a given situation,he must be able to use this style. He must motivate, communicate, and teach; and hemust have an ethical system that will guide him in evaluating the impact of his leadership on the men and the mission. DESIGN OF THIS BOOK Concepts of Air Force Leadership has been organized into topic areas which arebriefly summarized below. The first four chapters describe the Air Force leadershipenvironment, while the remaining six chapters identify and analyze significant leadership variables. Each main topic, such as "Behavioral Science and Air Force Leadership," is discussed in paired chapters. The first chapter of each pair contains introductory material designed to acquaint the reader with some basic concepts, stimulate his thinking,and construct a framework. This narrative chapter is followed by a chapter of selected readings and, where applicable, case studies, role playing exercises, and problem-situation studies. Questions for reflection and discussion have been includedwith each reading. s CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP The reason for including selected readings is simple. There are many diverse views of leadership. It is important to present these views in the author's own words in order to retain his shades of emphasis and exposition. It is more meaningful to read Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard's "Life Cycle" theory of leadership as they express it in their article, "3-D Leader Effectiveness' rather than a paraphrased version. All of the readings should be examined c'ritically. Since these readings have differing objectives and. are addressed to a variety of audiences, they should be considered within their proper contexts. Some of the articles discuss new research findings or report the application of previous scientific inquiries. Other articles survey important concepts.· Both the narrative and the readings chapters reflect our assumption that leadership is a subject fully suitable for a college or university educational program. There are fundamental concepts that a person can identify, study, and learn to make him a more effective ieader. In this text, we place more emphasis on the concepts than on descriptions of leaders in action. Cause and effect are basic to our study. Yet the learning of concepts is not complete without opportunities to apply them. John E. Adair's article, "New Trends in Leadership and Management Training,"* illustrates this approach and gives the interaction between leadership knowledge and skill the special emphasis that it deserves. The need to apply knowledge forces a leader to analyze situations, determine which concepts are most applicable, and develop skill in the proper application of this knowledge in terms of the relevant situations. For example, a person can read and memorize the causes and cures for frustrated behavior; but until he can put his knowledge into ·practice by working directly with a frustrated person, he will not develop the leadership skills he needs in order to apply the proper concept to a specific case. Therefore, case studies and problem-situation exercises have been included when appropriate, in this text. · The first two chapters introduce some of the Air Force leadership concepts which are amplified in the remaining chapters. A brief summary of the other topic areas follows. The Challenge to the Air Force Officer An Air Force officer is commissioned by the President of the United States and serves as a representative of the American people with special authority and responsibility_. To meet this challenge, the Air Force officer must understand the serious nature of his obligations and the environment in which he is to lead. The two-chapter section, "Challenge to the Air Force Officer," discusses the na ture of the military profession with its distinguished heritage of loyalty and dedica tion to American principles and examines the special characteristics of the Air Force environment that distinguish it from other leadership climates. We emphasize Air Force leadership because there are unique organiiational patterns, traditions, tech nologies, and other factors that make the Air Force leadership environment different from other leadership environments. These factors definitely influence how officers apply Air Force-related leadership. Fundamental concepts of behavioral science are largely applicable to all leadership environments, but the way they are applied in the Air Force depends upon special factors peculiar to that environment. For example, · some special factors which make personnel management in the Air Force different • See pp: 20-31. 6 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP from that in civilian life are the Uniform Code of Mititary Justice, Air Force regulations, and military customs and courtesies. The difference is not in the basic concepts, but in the operating policies and procedures used and the specific tasks performed. The objective, therefore, is to study leadership within the context of the AirForce. Behavioral Science and Air Force Leadership The keynote of leadership in the Air Force is recognition of the importance ofpeople. The principle of the worth and dignity of the individual is set forth in the"Human Goals" credo proclaimed by Secretary Qf Defense Melvin R. Laird (seeFigure 1-1) and subscribed to by all the armed services.People are the lifeblood of the Air Force. Without them all the sophisticatedweapon systems and other material resources would be useless. In his preoccupationwith group effort for mission accomplishment, the leader must never lose sight of theneeds, capabilities, and aspirations of the individual. Rather, he must concentrate onthe development, satisfaction, and creative potential of each group member. To doso requires that the leader b.e skilled in human relations and in maintaining effective two-way communication. The goals of the "Credo;' as applied to leadership will". . . attract to the defense service people with ability, dedication, and a capacity for growth.'' ··Therefore, it is fundamental to the study of Air Force leadership that an understanding of the concepts of behavioral science-the concepts of human needs, motivation, frustration, and learning-be acquired. The leader who understands these concepts is better prepared to select the leadership behaviors most appropriate to any given situation. A Multidimensional Approach to Leadership "I heard four lectures on leadership in the last week," said an .officer attendingAir University's Air Command and Staff College, "and no two speakers were inagreement. It just confirms what I have contended all along. Leadership is just toocomplex to define." A careful examination of the lectures revealed that the officerhad been entirely correct in his statement that no two lecturers approached leadership in the same manner. In fact, except for an occasional mention of the word "leadership," a listener would hardly have known that the four men were talkingabout the same subject.Was the officer correct in his statement that leadership is too complex to be defined? Obviously, we think not. But there is much more to the study of leadershipthan case histories of well-known leaders and recollections of heroic deeds. Theseare important for they add perspective and realism, but an understanding of leadership requires a detailed analysis of cause and effect. What are the key leadershipvariables and how do they interact in Air Force leadership situations?Chapter 7 examines historically some views of leadership and traces their emergence mto modern theory. It also looks at leader, group; and situational factors asthey affect the leadership process. Throughout the discussion, the primary focus willbe on the identification and analysis of significant leadership variables. Styles of Leadership Behavior The concluding section, "Styles of Leadership Behavior," examines the interrelationships of leader, group, and situational variables as t~ey interact in patterns orstyles of leadership behavior. 7 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSIDP ~..!,;'~~ '12.}.,... c )......__ _(,,. MClfl.ltT/"-fCJ tlf~,A.IIt.J""P Figure 1-1. 8 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS OF Am FORCE LEADERSHIP Style is a general term that is used to describe a particular pattern of leadership behaviors. A leader has personal.impact as he involves himself in an organization to get the job done. Style is more than what a leader does; it is also the manner in which he does it.After looking at the advantages and disadvantages of the participative and authoritarian leadership styles, the chapter discusses some of the best known models of leadership behavior. It is our view that there is no single best leadership style and that the effective leader must be able to apply a variety of leadership behaviors. We place special emphasis on these leadership variables as they relate to building the kind of work team that is strongest when faced with adversity and stress, is dedicated to the mission, and is characterized by mutual trust and confidence. Crisis leadership is inherent in the Air Force not only because of combat situations, but because of the recurring need to respond to dynamic requirements. We must add one warning to our discussion of Air Force leadership styles. The reader should be aware of the underlying assumptions authors make when they outline their leadership theories. These assumptions normally include high standards, demanding organizational goals, development of personnel skills, etc., which frequently are not readily apparent in the author's presentation. Consequently, participative leadership, for example, is criticized as being "soft" when, in fact, proponents of participative leadership have in mind a "no nonsense" leadership environment requiring the highest performance and standards. LEADERSHIP AND THE COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS* Communication, the process of transmitting and receiving information, is so fundamental to the practice of management that without it an organization could not exist. The reason for this is very apparent. If we could not communicate with employees, we could not inform them of the work we want done, how we want it done, when we want it done, who we want to do it, and so on. We could not in any way practice human relations, motivate people, or exercise the functions of leadership. In short, we could get nothingabsolutely nothing--done.• Communication is essential to leadership. The Air Force stresses communication skills-speaking, writing, and problem-solving through logical thinking-in all its educational programs. · The broad goal of learning communication techniques is to increase one's ability to think, listen, learn, speak, and write. No Air Force activity could be operated efficiently by leaders who do not understand and apply the communicative skills to their daily tasks.Furthermore, most leadership development programs stress active participation by the students in case studies, problem-situation exercises, written case analyses, briefings, role playing exercises, and other educational methods which require knowledge of and skill in applying the communicative process. For this reason, a brief section on t~e process and some of the methods has been included in this chapter. The Communicative Process What is communication and how does it operate? Communication is a process that has three components. The first is a communicator, someone with a meaning to • Portions of this section are adapted from AU-1, Communication Techniques, Vol. I, Individual and Group Communications. • S. G. Huneryager and I. L. Heckmann, Human Relations In Management. 2d ed. (Chicago: South-Westem Publishing Co., 1967), p. SOS. 9 ) CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP transmit. The second is a symbol to transmit the meaning. The third is a receiver, someone to receive the symbol and translate it into meaning. Although these basic elements are simple, the process can be complex. It is not a one-way process, but one that can best be described as an "exchange of responses." Each communicator not only "receives" but also "sends" various signs and symbols. Words, of course, are not the only symbols of communication. Signs, such as those made with our hands and faces, carry meaning. Perhaps more than we realize, people communicate with gestures and facial expressions. Nevertheless, we rely even more on language, the most highly developed and complicated form of symbolism. Using language as the main medium of communication presents some problems. Words must be used in such a way that listeners and readers easily understand the meanings. This is difficult to do, because no word ever conveys precisely the same meaning to the communicator and the receiver. To understand why this is true, we must look at the way we learn words. To each individual a certain word symbolizes the sum of all his experiences in which it has played a part. Because no two people ever have the same set of experiences, we have difficulty in communicating exact meanings with words. An approximate meaning is about all a communicator can hope to transfer to a receiver. To say it another way, before a word can communicate meaning to an individual, he must have had experience with the objects or concepts that the word symbolizes. The meaning is in his mind, not in the word. Consequently, the meaning in any act of communication is gained from the nucleus of experience existing between the communicants. Experience, then, is the core of communication. How can one solve the problems of using language to communicate successfully? First, consider the communicator's problem. What can the speakers and writers do to awa~en in their receiver's minds the meanings they wish to evoke? Here are some practiclll suggestions. USE WORDS THAT ARE WITffiN THE RECEIVER'S CIRCLE OF EXPERIENCE.-Talk the other man's language. This is particularly important in the Air Force, where the range of experience is wide. We have all seen letters, directives, and orders written in gobbledy:-gook. The busy reader should not be made to spend valuable time trying to wring intended meanings from such language. An Air Force officer who says, "I'm afraid these airmen lack the perception that would permit them to comprehend my hypothesis," is the guilty party in any communication breakdown between him and the airmen. USE CONCRETE AND SPECIFIC WORDS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.-By using words that call forth clearly defined images, the communicator can narrow and control the meanings awaken in the minds of receivers. Sometimes abstract words are necessary. Statements of policy, for example, must be general enough to apply to all the organizations they concern. In many cases, however, specific words are more economical and efficient. USE WORDS IN THEIR CONVENTIONAL SENSES.~If communicators and receivers have different ideas about the "correct" use of a word, the difference in interpretation can cause a breakdown in communication. For example, in preparing a performance report, one officer called the job performance of a subordinate "generally good." When asked what he meant by "generally," he answered, "Not particularly." By assigning our own meanings to words, we block the channel of communication, cause misunderstandings, and waste time. DEFINE ANY WORDS THAT THE RECEIVER MIGHT NOT UNDERSTAND.-Try to discover the extent of a reader's or listener's experience in the area being discussed. It 10 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP is always possible that he may lack the experience necessary for clear communication. A brief explanation, description, or illustration may be all he needs to keep him from struggling with abstractions that are far removed from his field of experience. Now, let's look at some ways the individual may be able to improve communication when he is the receiver rather than the communicator. As a reader or a listener, his main aid in interpreting meanings is the context. He must study the sentence or paragraph that contains the difficult word or passage and analyze the context to find the meaning the writer intends. Even when a writer has selected his words poorly, one can usually discover an intended meaning by making a keen examination of the context. The listener has an additional aid to understanding: he can ask questions. By using this aid judiciously, he can frequently dispel his own confusion and, sometimes, incidentally, the confusion of other listeners also. He may need a definition, a more specific term, or an example to help him grasp the speaker's meaning. If he needs it, he should ask for it. Remember that even though words are imperfect symbols, they are our chief means of communicating with each other. To use words effectively, we must solve a two-sided problem. As communicators, we must learn to use words as efficiently as possible. As receivers, we must learn to interpret words as accurately as possible. Furthermore, in meeting this twofold challenge, we must be cooperative. The communicator who does not cooperate with the receiver cannot expect to convey meanings successfully. Similarly, no matter how proficient the .communicator may be, the process breaks down if the receiver fails to cooperate. Successful communication never occurs without cooperation between writer and reader or between speaker and listener. Since leadership effectiveness is directly related to communicative effectiveness, understanding the communication process is important. Communicating effectively, in common with most human endeavors, is complex, variable, and, at times, uncertain. Nevertheless, examining the process of communication by analyzing its cardinal elements and the significant relationships between them, leads to a more precise and clearer understanding of the process. Improvement in communication rests, in large measure, on a broader understanding of the process. Because the communication process is so important to the Air Force leader, a reading selection by S. G. Huneryager and I. L. Heckmann in Chapter 6 titled "Communication" has been included. The authors summarize many of the elements of the communication process just considered and relate them to leadership and management. LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT TOOLS The leadership development tools used in a given course depend upon a number of factors including the objectives, participants, length of time, and resources availa ble. Since the methods selected depend upon these constraints, discussion of specific methods has been placed in Chapter 2. Here the reader will find "Preparation of the Written Case Analysis," "Role of the Discussion Leader," and "The Integration of Role Playing and Case Studies." Further, throughout this course and in his career, the leader will need to be famil iar with some of the formats used in reporting solved problems. Maj Harold Mar kowitz, Jr., former Course Director, Air Force Leadership and Management, Air Force ROTC, has drawn upon a wide variety of staff and teaching assignments for 11 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP his article, "Air Force Staff Writing Practices."* This reading will be useful as a handy reference on format and as a simple checklist to evaluate staff writing. A CONCLUDING CAVEAT The many dimensions of Air Force leadership discussed in this text confirm that leadership is a complex process-as complex as man himself. This complexity makes it impossible to assure anyone that he will be an effective leader. He may or he may not be, depending on the interaction of leader, group, and situational influences at a given time. There are no magic elixirs or instant prescriptions that will guarantee leadership success. Neither this text nor any other publication or leadership development program can offer a "cookbook" approach to leadership. There are no simple recipes for success in the complex task of leading men. Effective leadership is and will continue to be the end product of understanding the causes of human behavior, analyzing the critical factors in a situation, and knowing how to use the potential of individuals and of groups-all to accomplish the organization's mission. Therefore, this chapter must close with the brief but important caveat that this text offers no easy short-cuts, nor does it even claim to be an all-inclusive discussion of the subject. It does offer the fundamentals of an analytical approach to leadership. If the reader's understanding of the leadership process has been increased and his present and future ability to apply this process has been improved, the objectives of this discussion have been well served. BIBLIOGRAPHY AFM 25-1, USAF Management Process. Washington: Dept of the Air Force, 1964. AFM 50-3, Air Force Leadership. Washington: Dept of the Air Force, 1966. HAYNES, WARREN W. and MASSIE, JosEPH L., Management: Analyses, Concepts and Cases. Second Edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969. HAYS, SAMUEL H., CoL, and THoMAS, WILLIAM M.·, LT CoL. Taking Command. Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1967. HuNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge, Mass. The Belknap Press, 1964. KooNTZ, HAROLD and O'DONNELL, CYRIL. Principles of Management. 4th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969. NEWMAN, WILLIAM H., SUMMER, CHARLES E., and WARREN, E. KIRBY. The Process of Management. Second Edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967. • See pp. 41-49. 12 Chapter 2 Readings-Introduction to Concepts of Air Force Leadership READING A Some Problems in the Education of the Military Leader By Maj Herman W. Farwell. Reprinted by permission from the USAF Instructor's Journal . (October, 1964). Maj. Herman W. Farwell, A.B. Columbia University, M.A. Pennsylvania State University, is an officer with over 25 years active military service. He is a former AFROTC instructor at Pennsylvania State University. 0 NE of the most persistent problems in the systematic education of military leaders is the enormous difficulty experienced in defining the objective of such an education: What is a professional military leader? There can be no disagreement with an educational doctrine which states that through training, qualities of leadership may be enhanced. The investigator, however, is met by a multiplicity of interpretations when he attempts to identify these qualities of leadership. Thus the intangibility of his goal presents a problem of magnitude to any educator attempting to establish a program which might be used as a standard in the professional education of future military leaders. As if an undefinable objective were not a sufficient problem in itself, educators are faced with other and allied difficulties. What qualifications must a potential military leader possess? How best may we apply an educational program to such an individual, and what kind of a program should it be? In this essay, I want to touch first upon the basic problem, the question of what makes a good military leader. Then, in sequence, I shall examine problems concerning the type of prerequisites upon which we should insist in order to make our educational program as compact and practical as possible. The institutions utilized in producing our military leaders next concerns us, followed by an examination of the education program itself. In conclusion, I want to evaluate the continuing efforts being made towards improving both the program and its product-the military leader. THE BASIC PROBLEM If the objective of our study is "professional military leadership," we must do all that we can to define this term. Morris Janowitz, in his portrait of The Professional Soldier, tells us that: "The professional, as a result of prolonged training acquires a skill which enables him to render specialized service ... A professional group develops a sense of group identity and a system of internal administration. Self 13 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP administration-often supported by state inrepresent objectives of the military profestervention-implies the growth of a body of sional. No program of education can hope to ethics and standards of performance."' do much more than to refine and magnifythese qualities; certainly devising any curricThus, accepting this implication, it apulum to teach them would tax even the mostpears that the military profession is as much skilled and experienced educator. bound by standards and ethics as is any civil ian profession, even medicine and law. What, then, of "leadership"? Must weconsider this an intangible which can neither For ethics and standards, the Honor Code,symbolized by the motto of the Military be taught nor developed through an educa Academy at West Point, "Duty, Honor, tional program? Not at all. A usable definition of leadership states that it is: Country," and so dramatically eulogized byGeneral Douglas MacArthur in his famous "the process through which the leader inspires Thayer Award speech of May 1962,2 repre effective individual achievement in a group sents the concept of gentlemanly conduct, effort to reach an assigned mission. Thisclosely allied to the Galahad chivalry of the process rests upon a sound knowledge offeudal ages. In an attempt to make clear, human relations, which in the leadership situ ation, may be defined .as the continuing proc even to younger and less experienced offi ess of achieving the mission through satisfyingcers, what this concept embodies, The Air individual needs as part of a coordinatedOfficer's Guide describes it as: group effort to attain a goal."~ ". . . a set of principles at which all officers ·With this background, it appears that weaim, both in their official duties and in their have at least erected a fence around thepersonal concerns, in actions seen and known loosely defined area of "professional military by the world, and in the deepest privacy of leadership." It seems logical to assume that their minds. These things, these ideals, are notto be found in regulations. There is no check our objective is to identify and then, throughlist, no approved solution for each individual's a proper program of education, to developevery situation. Rather, the code . . . is an those ethical standards linked in the concept attitude of the spirit, rarely arrived at con sciously, but strongly governing the reactions of the Honor Code in any individuals with of all officers to life ... The code ... cannot suitable potential. Simultaneously, we must.be captured in its entirety in the narrow lifeprovide educational experience and instruc lessness of the printed word, for this code is tion in the field of human relations in order a living reality that must b11 experienced to be fully known. Yet, some of the deep foundato enable our trainee to grasp the principles tions upon which our code rests can be of leadership. identified. Is it this simple? If it were, our objective, These are criteria by which we have lived and while complex, would be as attainable as that fought and some of us have died."' of the training program for a plumber or aradar technician. Unfortunately, with theThese criteria are then discussed by the Guide. As listed in the text, they are identipost-World War II rise in technology, and fied as Patriotism, Honor, Courage, Loyalty, the increased specialization of the techniques Discipline, Readiness, Frugality, Caution, of modern warfare, it is no longer sufficient Responsibility, Teamwork, Ambition, Adaptto be a military professional with a dedicaability, and Respect. tion to "mission" and an understanding of These criteria, even in so blunt a form, human relations. "•.. the' job which must be accomplished by 1 1anowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier, (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1960): p. 6. our officers today is one which would stagger • This speech, given by General of the Army Douglas the imagination of the average individual. It MacArthur in May 1962 at West Point, N. Y., has beenreproduced in many publications. As an excellent example requires officers who know the business fromof sentimental oratory, as well as an emotional appeal to the traditions of patriotism, it is well worth reading. • Principles of Leadership and Management, Maxwell 3 The Air Officer's Guide, (Harrisburg, Pa.: The StackAir Force Base, Ala.: Headquarters, Air University, pole Company, 14th Edition, 1963) p. 245. ~~~L . 14 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP the ground up-men who are specialists and general practitioners at the same time. A military professional's basic knowledge of the purpose, capability, and requirements of this particular field must now be backed up with an ability to work in exact details on hundreds of complicated subjects. He must not only be technically qualified in his primary field of endeavor, but he must be equally qualified in related fields, plus !raving a thorough working knowledge in still many other areas. . . . Beyond this, an officer must be part engineer, part lawyer, part businessman, part preacher, and wholly a leader-both in peacetime and in combat."' Because of this, "it is clear that the armed forces must secure and retain officers of tire highest caliber. These men must, of course, possess the traditional military attributes and skills and tire expected qualities of character, loyalty, dedication, and patriotism. But as large complex organizations, involving intimate association with almost every aspect of our national political, economic, and social life, tire Army, Navy, and Air Force must have officers who transcend these fundamental soldierly qualities. Broadly defined, there appear to be two kinds of additional capabilities called for. Tire first relates to technical competence; the second to breadth of outlook, judgment, and wisdom."" If we agree on the essential characteristic ()f technical competence, and surely we need look no further than the astronauts of our space program, we recognize that the pilot, the missile guidance officer, the submarine commander, the radar-intercept officer, are all technicians of a high order; we then may turn to the other aspect of our potential mili tary leader. "These men must understand the role of the military establishment in a democratic society and be sensitive to political, economic, and social development at home and abroad. They must have tire executive talent to manage large operations. They must have analytical skill and good judgment of high order. ·· • LeMay, Curtis B., General, USAF, The Wright Memorial Lecture, The U. S. Air Force Academy, 1958, cited in The Air Force Officer (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, 1964) p. 5. 0 Lyons, Gene M. and Masland, John W. Education and Military Leadership, (Princeton, N. 1.: The Princeton University Press (1959) p. 11. Perhaps of greater importance is the need for wisdom and a broad perspective not only among officers who advance to higher levels of responsibility but among officers at all levels, in peace time and in war."' Thus we have arrived at the conundrum which has perplexed educators since the days of Plato. We have fenced in the concept of the professional military leader, we have limited and restricted our potential program of education in order to focus upon our target. This is now clearly revealed as the age-old problem of producing a man with a broad, general education who is at the same time, a highly specialized technician.8 SOURCE MATERIAL If we assume that it is possible to establish a program of education which will enable an individual to develop his potential as a leader, we must also assume that we can provide students for such a program. Where would we find them? What standards would be used in selecting them? Since the discussion of the basic problem has shown us that we are interested in individuals with a broad understanding of human relations as well as knowledge in depth of a more specialized subject, it is difficult for us to find qualified students. They must be interested in military service and with a broad yet specialized background. In the Armed Forces, so many different technical specialties are utilized that any effort to provide this type of training would be impossible. Not only would it tax to capacity the physical capabilities of our educational facilities, it would be monstrous in cost and organization. It is also too much to try to superimpose a complete general educational prograin over a technical one in order to provide potential military leaders, for not only would the cost multiply, but the time required would be too long; the average student would rebel long before completion. It appears, then, that some kind of compromise must be accepted. The Armed • Ibid., p. 13. s An interesting analysis of this problem may be read In C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures: And A Second Look, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964). 15 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Forces, entirely dependent upon federal laws of supply and demand. Insofar as possifunds, are in no position to subsidize the deble, however, all efforts should be made tosired educational background, neither broad limit potential students to those possessing asand general nor highly specialized, of the many of the desirable qualities of a commisyoung men and women needed as junior offisioned officer as possible. Certainly morality,cers. We must, therefore, turn to the new flexibility, loyalty and the other attributesgraduates from our colleges and universities listed earlier are more valuable assets of ato find our potential leaders. Of these, some leader than is his technical ability alone. It iswill be technicians, trained in a curriculum in this respect, of character and the personaldesigned to produce engineers, chemists, attributes which form the ethics of the prophysicians, etc., while others, graduating fessional military leader, that the selectionfrom Liberal Arts schools, will possess a criteria for potential military leaders must behighly desirable broad, general education but most rigid, for while standards of health, exwill require additional training to qualify as perience, age, and even education may bespecialists. But by insisting upon a college permitted to decline, those of character mustdegree, of almost any nature, the Armed be retained at a high level or the militaryForces can safely assume that the potential profession, as a profession, would disappear.military leader possesses some element ofgeneral education, a proven ability to learn TilE INSTITUTION in terms of higher education, and, desirably, We are interested in establishing a prosome training in a technical field. gram which will provide the number ofBy insisting on a college degree as a miniyoung commissioned officers required by themum standard for eligibility, the Armed military services each year. To realize anyForces can design a program, in the nature thing as tremendous as this, the total producof. "postgraduate" training, which could protion of all institutions of higher education invide: the United States must be screened to iden a. For the Liberal Arts graduates, a protify those who meet the criteria of health,gram of training in the principles and appliage, and education, and, even more to thecation of leadership, coupled with some type point, are interested in service in the Unitedof training in a specialty for which the stuStates Armed Forces as commissioned offi-, dent has an aptitude and in which he can be cers.trained. Some time must be spent in discussing the b. For the specialized education gradubest ways in which these thousands of youngates, an identical program of training in prinmen and women can be reached after beciples and application of leadership, coupled ing identified, screened, and selected. Thewith some training in the hroader aspects of Armed Forces must either be prepared togeneral education. bring them together in central areas, or go tothem at their campuses across the land. SinceIn either circumstance, the services can only a few students from each of the manycount on the students' familiarity with the colleges and universities would be involvedenvironment of a higher education and in the program, it would be highly unecoadaptability to systemized learning. nomical to provide our proposed course illAs a requirement for entering the profesleadership on each campus. Also, since eachsion of military leadership, then, we can inof the services would desire to train incomsist upon a basic criterion of a college degree. ing p~rsonnel on their own terms, with theSecondly, we can easily see, since our interadvantage of an environment of uniformedest lies in potential junior officers, that the tradition, it appears logical to suggest thatrecent college graduate is most desirable. the new officers destined for the Air ForceOther standards for eligibility consideration would be trained by the Air Force, that thewould be based upon circumstances and the Navy would train its complement, and that 16 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP the Army would be responsible for its indi~ viduals. In each case, however, the level of instruction would be similar, for all the students would be at the same level, even though their undergraduate instruction might well have differed widely. Faculties would be made up of career officers of the highest caliber since the examples they could set would provide one of the best means of instruction available. Some of these instructors might well be specialists in technical fields while others had more general training. All, however, would be skilled instructors in the principles of leadership and management. Physically, these institutions might be on one or more of the military installations of each of the three services. Since technical subjects would not be taught; little equipment would be required other than classrooms, dormitories, and dining halls. As. all students at any of these schools would be in a "cadet" status, administrative problems would be at a minimum. With a similar type of student body and an identical instructional objective, some attention might be addressed to unified curriculums, presented jointly by the three services. In terms of leadership development and application, no advantage would be gained by separate service schools. In terms of military technology and basic doctrine, peculiarities of each service could best be handled within their own environment. In summary, our discussion of the institutions involved in this program of professional leadership training revolves mostly around the faculty and the philosophy with which they approach their mission, for the problems of physical layout, cost, locations, etc., are relatively insignificant. Far more important are the problems relative to the program itself. THE PROGRAM As we have seen, the prospective student in our program of education for the professional military leader, the Armed Forces commissioned officer, is best drawn from the ranks of recent college graduates. Regardless of the nature of their degree and philosophy of their college,. we may safely assume that these individuals have to some extent, mastered the habits of learning and study; that they have been exposed to some facets of "general education"; and that they may possibly have had some specialized technical training. It is clear that an inverse ratio exists between the factors of "general education" and specialized technical training, for generally, the more of one in the experience and training of an individual, the less he possesses of the other. We have also been able to get a glimpse of the desired product of our projected program of instruction-a highly ethical individual with a broad spectrum of education to enhance his wisdom and inherent knowledge of human relations. He is also a highly trained technical specialist. Above all else, he is a dedicated individual to whom words such as "Duty, Honor, Country," have a rare ·and very personal meaning. Given the rather heterogeneous group of college graduates attracted by the promise of a military commission, we are confronted by the problem of developing a program whereby we can blend the varied characteristics of these students to produce the desired product. If this is possible, the means of attaining it seem best realized by asking our~ selves these questions: a. Can we provide training in the areas of human relations in which many of these students have had little or no educational experience? b. Can we provide training in the broader aspects of human culture, his politics, his philosophy, his language, to students who at best possess a 4-year Liberal Arts background and at worst, have had a brief "survey" course in the humanities? c. Can we provide specialized technical training for those students who have had none while in college? d. Do we have time available to accomplish any of this training? Quite simply, then, the matter of designing a program of education is a complex prob-. 17 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP lem dealing not only with time, but with the dichotomy of our educational system. An additional factor of confusion lies in the fact that the military forces need both the technical specialist and the nontechnical specialist. Our program can be designed to provide, within a limited period of time, practical training in leadership and management. It is also possible to provide intensive practical training in the operation and maintenance of weapon-systems, even those so complex as to require extremely skilled technical ability in the design stage. This can easily be demonstrated by the successful training of Air Force personnel in the launch techniques of the Atlas and Minuteman ICBM's. These technicians are not trained engineers; they would never be able to design such a weapon, but once designed, men can be trained to use them. A simpler example can be seen in the fact that of those properly licensed and fully competent to drive an automobile, few possess the special knowledge required to design one. So we must grant that we can teach some specialized skills and we can educate men to a point where they are more effective leaders through a better understanding of what makes a man act. But our problem is not yet solved. "If, in the future, total war means total annihilation, it follows axiomatically that any officer corps that manages to survive will do so only because war has been avoided or because it has been severely limited in purpose and scope. To limit the purpose and scope of war requires the closest cooperation between military and diplomatic personnel. To attain national security objectives without resort to war requires a national strategy in which the disposition of military forces is integrated with political bargaining, policy statements, alliances, foreign economic policy, propaganda, and any and all measures that may foster the growth of friendly factions within foreign governments."' Our problem has become infinitely more complex. We concede that certain training programs can teach leadership. Others can teach special skills. But to provide the train 0 Janowitz, op cit., p. 26. ing in economics, politics, propaganda, diplomacy, and other fields that our potential military leader should possess seems too vast an obstacle to be overcome. By examination of the factors involved, it appears that several sets of experiences may be involved. Certain skills and knowledge are peculiar to the military profession. Termed military competence, it includes: "the distinctive knowledge and skills traditionally expected of a member of the military profession and also the special knowledge' and skills that can properly be expected of a". particular officer by virtue of the type of career he has followed in the service. It includes technical knowledge about military functions, organization, doctrine, and equipment. It also includes a knowledge of the interests and policies of the organization that an officer may represent to the outer world."10 A second formal set of qualifications for the professional military leader arises because he must be an executive, a manager, and an administrator. As such, he shares with all executive personnel certain qualities: he must be able to grasp large, complicated situations, and he· must be adaptable to changing situations. In the criteria we established earlier, we raised the question of time. It is now obvious that our contemplated program of education for military leaders cannot be a short-term institution. We are developing a system of education which is not going to produce World War 11-type "90-day wonders" but a mature professional, capable of directing the complexities of national security. If we use the framework of conventional education as a basis for comparison, we may s~ more clearly the complex facets of our problem. Let us assume that the raw material for our program is the young college gtaduate, his degree still fresh in his hands, with .either specialized technical training, or b~oad, general training, and little experience in either case. Our first step would be the easy one, to provide him with the practical 1 10 Masland, John W. and Radway, Laurence I., Soldiers and Scholars. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957) p. 30. 18 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP knowledge of military leadership and weap onry which he needs to exist at the lower lev els of command. If he leaves the service after his obligated tour of four years, he would have been able to to what was expected of him. But if he stays for a career in the mili tary and wants to move upward to more re sponsible positions where he will need that special executive training, where will he go? His undergraduate training equipped him for basic command. By turning towards a career, towards professionalism, he has cre ated the opportunity for "post-graduate" training in which he can gain higher "de grees." Let us return to the' dual problems of pro viding the technician with a broad general education, the non-technician with the gen eral education with a specialized training. It appeared that only through such a process could we achieve the full, three-dimensional figure of a military leader technically compe tent with wisdom, breadth of outlook, and judgment. Yet surely we cannot hope to fmd many men who can play both roles well. It is equally apparent that we cannot hope to de velop men who are skilled combat com manders and simultaneously gifted planners and policy makers. Men like Eisenhower are rare. As a diplomat, George Patton was a failure, but few of our combat commanders have been endowed with his skill with fight ing inen. Is there an answer, actual or implied, to ·this dilemma? Must we try to produce, through any kind of education, a "universal military man," capable of playing any role? Or, are the military forces sufficiently diver sified that they can profit from careful analy sis of the differences between men? CONCLUSION This has placed before you some of the problems facing the Armed Forces of the United States in their quest for Eisenhowers, MacArthurs, Norstads, and Marshalls of the future. The ultimate necessity for having such men ready to perform their function at the appropriate time needs no further comment, yet the difficult task of identifying, training, and placing them cannot wait for the future. Perhaps we can hope that in time of crisis, they will reveal themselves, but this is at best wishful thinking. The solution, of course, is to have a maximum number of trained men scattered throughout our entire military establishment. Obviously, few, if any, of these will possess the vast, all inclusive educational background which is so highly desired. But if all of them have the basic training in executive leadership, some "military competence" as previously defined, coupled with a college education which has granted them some familiarity with the humanities and social sciences, we will have made a beginning. If we can make it possible, indeed, mandatory, that these potential leaders continue in a broad program of education, building towards our objective of ethical leadership and technical experience, we may develop the complete professional military leader.* * * Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. In the absence of a precise definition of military leadership, how can we intentionally develop skill in leadership? 2. Why does the author insist on a mixture of generalized and specialized education? 3. Why is the possession of a college degree valuable for.an officer? 4. Why is an officer's leadership education never complete? 19 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING B New Trends in Leadership and Management Training By John E. Adair. Reprinted by permission from the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. CXII, No. 648 (Nov. 1967). Copyright 1967. Dr. John E. Adair is an historian by profession. Nevertheless, he has been fruitfully engaged in research on leadership and related topics since 1962. He is presently an advisor on leadership training at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, England. He published an excellent study of leadership training titled Training for Leadership in 1967. T HE subject of my talk is "New Trends in Leadership and Management Training" and I will start by outlining the main lines of research over the last 20 or 30 years into leadership, which forms the background to the new methods of training I shall be talking about later. The question of why one person emerges as a leader in a group rather than another has for many years received a traditional answer, namely that the person who emerges as a leader possesses a set pattern of inborn leadership qualities or traits--courage, endurance, patience, and so oh. When objective academic research started in the field of leadership in the early 1930s, students began to look at lists of these qualities to select from them the common pattern-the qualities present in every list. The results of this research were a little disappointmg. For example, Professor Bird in 1940 looked at 22 experimental studies on leadership and he found that only five per cent·of the qualities appeared in four or more of the' studies.1 In fact there is remarkably little agreement amongst the scholars in this field on what this pattern of qualities or traits is. l could show you today the lists of qualities offered in all the military academies of the military world, and from these 12 or 13 lists it 'can be seen that there is little or no consensus among them. "Courage" appears in almost all of these lists and "initiative" in nearly all. But 1 C. Bird, Social Psychology (D. Appleton-Century, London, 1940), pp. 378-9. "courage" does not tell us much about leadership, because all soldiers need courage and, indeed, in conditions of modem warfare all soldiers need initiative. Besides this lack of agreement on what the traits are there is a second drawback to the qualities approach, namely the relative inadequacy of it as a basis for training. If you say that a person's destiny as a leader is fixed at birth, then the emphasis obviously falls on selection, and you try to devise a method of chqosing a man with the silver spoon of leadership in his mouth. What happens when you have people who have not got the inborn qualities, which you believe to be there, to the' degree that you want? A company commander wrote on one officer cadet's report "Smith is not a born leader yet." What can Smith do about it? In fact, one cadet at Eaton Hall, issued w~th a list of 32 qualities of leadership, took this very seriously and on Monday morning he: practised one to five of the qualities on th~ list...:_patience, endurance, courage, and s<;> ·on-,on Tuesday he moved on to pers~ vrrance, initiative, sense of humour, looking at Punch before supper in order to try to see th~ point of the jokes! Trying to develop the qp~lities iJ1_ this way, by the time Friday c~¢e he had completely forgotten Monday's qubta. So really this assumption about leaderJhip does not help much in developing the qu~lities required, though this does not mean to Isay that there is nothing in the qualities a,pproved. Leaders should at least possess the 20 READINGs-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP qualities prized in their organization and group. We see this par excellence in Churchill who, in the war years, personified the qualities required by the British nation in order to survive. The second line of research into leadership stemmed from this failure to discover a common pattern of qualities. If we call the first the qualities approach, let us call the second the situational understanding of leadership. This answers our question as to why one person emerges as a leader of a group rather than another by declaring that it all depends on the given situation of who will emerge as the leader in that group. If you take a group on a desert island, for example, then in one situation the soldier might emerge to protect the settlement, the builder might take over command to build it, the farmer to plant fields, and so on. The emphasis in this approach ·is on technical knowledge as the key; the man who knows his stuff would be the leader in the group and this would change with the situation. To give you the flavour of this understanding of leadership we might quote a few sentences from a study by Professor W. 0. Jenkins in 1947, who looked at 74 books, articles, and studies on leadership and came to this conclusion: "Leadership is specific to the ·particular situation under investigation. Who becomes the leader of a particular group engaging in a particular activity and what the leadership characteristics are in the given case are a function of the specified situation . . . [There are] wide variations of the characteristics of individuals who become leaders in similar situations and even greater divergence.in leadership behavior in different situations. . . The only common factor appeared to be that leaders in a particular field need and tend to possess superior general or technical competence or knowledge in that area. General intelligence did not seem to be the answer·. . . " 2• Now the drawbacks to this approach are as follows. First, it is unsatisfactory in the •w. 0. Jenkins, 'A Review of Leadership Studies with particular reference to Military Problems,' Psychological Bulletin. Vol. 44 (1947), pp. 54-79. Services to have leadership changing hands in a group from person to person like a Rugby football. Secondly, a little more research into the field unearthed a kind of general competence which some people possessed in a variety of situations in the leadership field which could not be equated with technical competence or specialist knowledge. So work moved on to a third approach and concentrated on the group. Now in any leadership question there are always three variables; the leader, the situation in which he leads (including the task which has to be done), and the followers, the people who respond to his leadership. Now research into the latter has yielded some most significant conclusions. To understand the light which they throw on leadership it is perhaps worth while to draw out the main conclusions of social psychology as far as working groups are concerned. There are present in the life of working groups three areas of need at any given time. There is the need to achieve the common task or purpose, and this is the reason why groups come together. A working group usually exists to do a task which one person cannot do on his own. If you have a task to do which is not achieved-for instance, if you take some people to climb a mountain and forget to bring the guidebook, pitons, and ropes, and get halfway up the mountain before this fact is discovered, the group will evince various signs of frustration, which will be vented on the leader. These are symptoms of a need present all the time in the group to achieve the common purpose. Secondly, and related to the task, there is a need which we call in the Services "team maintenance"; i.e. a need for the group to be held together as a working team so that it can achieve its purposes. This the social psychologists have called "group cohesiveness." Thirdly, individuals bring into the group their own needs; not just the physical ones for food and shelter, which are largely catered for by the payment of wages these d~ys, but also their psychological needs; recognition, a sense of doing something worth 21 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP while, status; the deeper needs to give to and receive from other people in a working situation. These personal needs are perhaps more profound than we sometimes realize. Now these areas affect each other. To look at it negatively, if you have a group which does not achieve its task, then this will affect the team maintenance area; disruptive tendencies may increase, morale will go down, and individual work satisfaction will also be affected. If the personal relationships within a group are bad, this affects the performance of the task, and again it will affect the individual members. Conversely, if a group achieves its task, then the team maintenance goes up, morale rises, and so on. What has this to do with leadership? In order that the task shall be achieved, the group held together as a working team, and that individuals should feel that their own personal needs are met, the leader has to perform certain functions. In relation to the task, for example, he has to define it clearly, make a plan, allocate work to individuals, control activity on the job, and evaluate the performance. These are all functions which have to be performed in and for that group if it is to achieve its common aim. In the team maintenance area he has to set and maintain standards of discipline. Discipline in this sense can be best understood as the invisible bo~ds which bind a group together. He has to encourage. He has to reconcile any differences which may threaten to diminish the harmony and the working efficiency of that group as a team. In the individual area he has to be aware of any particular problems which may affect the performance of a mem ber on the common task and in relationships with others in the group. The degree to which the leader shares these functions with members of his group varies according to the organization and its purposes. The critical factor which influences, for example, how far he shares decision-making with members of his group is the time available in the situation in which he has to work. In situatidns where swift decisions are a matter of life and death, then organizations usually place in the hands of the leader the bulk of the decision-making function. Industrial leaders, by contrast with military ones, do not usually operate in such lifeand-death situations and therefore it is often possible for a manager to share decisions much more readily with members of his group. To summarize this research into leadership, we have looked first at the individual leader himself, the qualities of leadership. Secondly we have noted the situational approach with its stress on the importance of the technical knowledge possessed by the ·leader. Thirdly, we have examined the needs in a group to which the leader himself must respond with appropriate functions. Taking the best points out of those three approaches and leaving out the less useful ones, we can arrive not at a definition, because this would be foolish, but at least at an understanding of leadership which is sufficiently specific and concrete to allow us to base training upon it. That understanding would include the following points: the leader must have the personality and the appropriate technical knowledge to guide a group to the achievement of its task and to hold it together as a working team. How can this concept be applied to the problems of leadership training? As long ago as 1942 this approach was applied to the problems of officer selection. In 1942 the then, Adjutant-General found that the interview method, whereby a selector tried to spot the leadership qualities in candidates, was resulting sometimes in a 50 per cent failure rate at OCTUs, and as a consequence he brought together a highly gifted team to evolve a better method of selection. The· results of this experiment, recorded in Dr. Henry Harris's book The Group Approach to Leadership Testing3, show that the best method of selection is that in which the candidate is put in a group with a task to perform, and selected on the basis of his ability to provide the functions necessary to achieve that aim and to hold the group together as a • Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1949. 22 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP working team. This method was adopted not only in all the Services of this country and many abroad, but also widely in industry. It is one which has produced good results consistently for over 20 years. Now why was this same concept of leadership not applied to the problems of training, as it had proved itself so useful in the selection centres? I shall not delve into the historical reasons for this curious delay. Let us move on to consider the progress we have made in this training field at Sandhurst and elsewhere in the last six years. In 1960 the Sandhurst leadership syllabus, in its formal sense of the periods devoted to leadership instruction, numbered 19 of 45 minutes each, and these were spread over two years. In them the company commanders stood up and talked to cadets about the leadership qualities, courage and so on. Now we did some careful evaluation of this type of training with Intake 30. One hundred and fifty cadets took part in this survey and we found that in terms of figures, 14 per cent found it "useful," 36 per cent found it "of some use," 25 percent found it "of little use" and 25 per cent found it to be "useless." So out of those figures we could deduce that all but 14 per cent were not really getting very much out of the leadership instruction in this form, and the 14 per cent who did were those in least need of it-the under-officers. As a result of this survey, and other factors which I have no time to go into, the Commandant at Sandhurst set up a leadership committee to initiate research into this whole field, and as a member of that committee I studied leadership training in all Services in America, Canada, West Germany, and France before working out my own approach. Let me outline briefly the first steps that we took to change the syllabus. We concentrated 12 of these periods together into a two-day course. At the first session of this we divided the cadets into small syndicates of five (this is out of a company intake of 22 or 23) and we posed to them the question, what is leadership? They then discussed this among themselves and came back with their own findings, which the instructor did not comment on himself but wrote out on large sheets of paper and stuck them on the wall. This allowed the cadets in effect to compare their own experience and knowledge of leadership with those of other cadets in their intake. At the second session of this concentrated course the instructor gave a brief five to 10 minutes talk along the lines I have just covered. He said something about the different approaches to leadership and the functional understanding of it. Then, taking the cadets out into the open, he would give one of the syndicates a task to do, appoint a leader, and let the other three syndicates observe, giving them observation sheets with the functions of leadership required in that particular situation-planning, evaluating, encouraging, etc. So that for the first time, instead of receiving lectures on this subject, which is always unsatisfactory, the officer cadets were allowed to work it out for themselves by observing what leaders actually do in order to lead. After they have observed two or three of these syndicates in action in this way, cadets begin to grasp the functional nature of leadership. Thus, besides putting across a new concept of leadership, it is necessary to get away from monologue, from one person lecturing to an audience-which means very often that people are not having to think themselves-to a method of education whereby the cadet has to work it out for himself. At this level this means giving the officer cadets a chance to talk, discuss, think, test their ideas against each other, and then giving them a chance to do something, to observe and learn from action. After this observation exercise the officer cadets then gathered together to discuss the differences between military and industrial leadership. Here one would want the officer cadets in their syndicate and plenary discussions to appreciate the differences between the characteristic working situations of military and civilian organizations. 1 We would also hope that they would have to work out for themselves, and not need to be ~old, some 23 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP of the key functions required of a platoon or troop commander in the field. This is followed up by the fourth session in the evening in which we give the officer cadets a film to observe. The film we have used so far is Twelve O'Clock High, which shows first of all a leader of an American Air Force bomber group who fails because he concentrates too much on the individual needs of his followers at the expense of the other two areas I mentioned earlier, namely, the task and team maintenance, the necessity of holding a group together in order to achieve its task. This leader is replaced by Gregory Peck after about 30 minutes, and although he does not produce perfect leadership, he does tackle it in a different way. In fact he concentrates much more on the other two areas and not so much on individual welfare. Now the point of this film is that it gives officer cadets a chance to observe for themselves and pick out more evidence about leadership and its effects. We stop the film after the first leader has been dismissed and then we give cadets a chance to evaluate the · first leader and say what they would do if they were going to take over this bomber group. Then we show them the Gregory Peck part. So far the course has dealt mainly with leadership on active service and, as we all know well, perhaps 90 per cent, if not more, of an officer's time is spent in less exciting fields; the barracks and the training areas, where he must still exercise his leadership. So the next session presents the cadets with a case study of a unit which has returned from overseas service with the symptoms of low morale and we get them to diagnose for themselves what is wrong, using the knowledge which they have so far 'worked out for themselves on the course. Then we get the officer cadets to suggest in a playlet with a company commander, in which they take the part of the second lieutenants, what they would do in the situation. In the sixth session the company commander asks the officer cadets to report back on what they have learned, what rpore they still want to learn in this field, and how they think they·can apply what they have learned already at Sandhurst and afterwards. Now so far six whole intakes at Sandhurst, some 1,700 cadets or more, have passed through the course. The evaluations of the course have been going up steadily. We use a scale of 0-100, 0 being "poor" and 100 being "excellent." The evaluation started off around 65 per cent and is now up to about 75 per cent in the last three, and this is due to a variety of factors-probably the company commanders are now much more experienced in this rather informal kind of instruction. Thus officer cadets have had an interesting and unusual two days of thought-provoking discussion. The next step in leadership training is to take this up in the field, and at Sandhurst, as many of you know, the officer cadets spend two weeks on field training at the end of their first year as the "Indians" and two weeks at the end of their second year as the "Chiefs," and numerous other exercises in between. During these exercises, besides the tactical lessons which are learned, it is essential that the leadership lessons should be brought out as well. The officer cadets in command of their platoons, sections, or patrols, are exercising the functions of leadership and they need to know how effective they have been in this leadership role. Therefore the directing staff must be trained not only to bring out the tactical lessons of exercises but also the de gree to which the leader has performed his functions effectively. Again we have done some evaluation on field leadership training. In 1962, for example, before the changes that I have described were made in the lead ership syllabus, we found that 36 per cent of the officer cadets on overseas training in Cy prus reported later that they learned little or nothing of value from the leadership point of view out of their two weeks in the field. Now this, of course, was a much smaller propor tion than those who said they got little or nothing out of the formal leadership syllabus, one of the factors which led us to concen trate first on getting the two-day course right. But even so, it is a large percentage 24 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP and although we could rely on cadets to benefit from practical experience in command in some measure, it had become clear that they would get much more out of it if there followed a thorough de-briefing or evaluation of the leadership aspect at the end of it. As a result of our changes the cadet evaluation of the practical leadership training in the field has been going up steadily. The essential principle, therefore, in all leadership training is to forge links between theory or indoor training, whatever you call it, where the principles are discussed and practised in embryo at observation exercises, and the bulk of the officer cadet's leadership training, which is in the field, where he really learns the lessons. Our objectives in this training are threefold. The first step is to make each officer cadet aware of what is happening in groups in working situations. Secondly to give him an understanding of the functions which are required at any given time in any given situation-and these may be widely different, which is why you cannot offer a list of guiding rules for all occasions. Thirdly, to develop in him the skill to provide those functions of leadership effectively. Let me now turn away from Sandhurst and talk a little more widely on the Services position generally. The first full intake at Sandhurst to complete this concentrated course did so in 1964 and although we remained at Sandhurst very much in an experimental phase, the then Commandant-now Lieut.-General Sir John Mogg-decided to accept applications from people who had heard about the course and wanted to come and look at it. As a result a number of teams came to look at our leadership training to see if they could adapt and apply it to their own situations. Since 1964, the Royal Air Force College at Cranwell have successfully adapted this course and have obtained equally good results from it in their own sphere. This success at Cranwell sparked off a great deal of interest, and Henlow, which trains technical officers for the Royal Air Force, has also taken over the two-day course and the idea of relating it to practical exercises in the field, again achieving equally good results. I have had the privilege of lecturing to the staffs of both those colleges and have also seen the instructor teams putting the course into practice. Also the Air Officer Training School at South Cerney have decided to make use of this course for their own special requirements. ·· Further afield, the Royal Norwegian Military Academy sent some cadets to Sandhurst last year and as a result of their reactions the Norwegian Army held a conference on leadership training at Oslo, at which I had the honour of speaking. Both the Royal Norwegian Military Academy and the Norwegian Staff College have now decided that this is the approach that they would like to follow. The Swedish Army, whose Commandant came to Sandhurst last year, sent a delegation to that conference and they, too, look as if they will adopt these concepts and methods. I have not said too much about the Royal Navy in my lecture. In fact the Navy is showing a great deal of interest in leadership at the present time. It produced last year a new pamphlet, Principles of Leadership for the Guidance of Naval Officers. We have also had recently the interesting book by Captain Roskill The Art of Leadership4 , commissioned by the Royal Navy to give guidance to its officers. There are also some signs that both Dartmouth and the Royal Naval College at Greenwich are interested in an approach to leadership training which places more emphasis on people thinking it out for themselves rather than being lectured at. I will conclude by looking at the present situation and also ahead to the next five or 1 0 years. The great secret of leadership is that you cannot teach it, it can only be learned, and we have to help people to learn leadership for themselves. The most pressing need at present in this whole field is for coordination. There are many experiments in all Services going on at the moment in social and management studies, in training for • Collins, London, 1964. 25 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP more effective communication and leddership. These I have stumbled across because I have been invited to go round and talk to the staffs of Service colleges and schools. These experiments are not widely known. Much · that is achieved is therefore wasted because unwittingly it remains the property of one Service rather than all. So we must solve the problem of co-ordination in the field of leadership and management development at all levels of the Service, not just the first level of ~· the newly joined officer, but also at the Staff ,., College level, and so on. This is particularly true in management studies. I have not spoken so far explicitly about the management side of my title but let me now say this: the corporate leadership in any large organization goes by different names but the heart of it is always a response to the task, the team maintenance, and the individual needs of the organization. In the Services this corporate leadership goes by the name of "command." In industry it is called "management." Now the first step in training for both command and management lies in this leadership of the small group. The functional approach is common to both areas, the differences come later on in the degree to which one can share functions between leader and members. The foundation for both command and management training lies in this vivid introduction to the functional idea of leadership. This is one of the reasons for the very great interest which industry and management have shown during the last three years and are showing very much more at the present' time in the new training methods which the Services have introduced at Sandhurst, Cranwell, and other places. Once one has laid the foundation it is neces~ary to build on it later, and it is here that we need to know so much more about what has happened in the area of advanced management studies. As I said earlier, much is being done by individuals on their own initiative and by individual colleges, schools, staff colleges, and so on, but is piecemeal, not co-ordinated, and this means that we do not harvest the full benefit from this work. A second need, related to this, is the need for more research. Now research in this context has a variety of meanings. It means among other things more evaluation of the sort of training you are doing at present, more assessment of its effectiveness in officers' careers later on. It means finding out much more about what is going on in other armies, in industry, and in management training schools, both in the content which is being put across and also in the methods of education and training. It means initiating research into some of the fields which are being so rapidly developed at great expense in the department of universities in this country and elsewhere. And I think the records of these researches must be kept at some co-ordinating centre which will combine advanced teaching at university level in the fields of management, leadership, and social studies with the promotion of research as I have outlined it, and also with the essential work of co-ordinating what is already going on in other related areas in the Services. I would suggest to you that the natural place for this centre will be at the newly envisaged Royal Defense Academy. And it is vital that such a centre should maintain living relations with officer cadet training schools, staff colleges, and with the Services as a whole, so that it can act not only as an educational centre but also as a consultative body for those commanders of units who wish to devise training days for their officers and soldiers. Only, I feel, if some such step is taken will the foundation of the functional approach to leadership training, which I have outlined to you, serve as the basis for a truly effective method of officer development in these areas during the next 10 years. DISCUSSION COLONEL E. R. A. SEWELL: I am responsible for management training at R.M.C.S. Shrivenham. Unfortunately this word "management" covers practically everything you can think of, from the modern, bright name for staff training down to man-management, which is a polite form of the word "discipline." One of the troubles about the coordination issue mentioned by Dr. Adair is 26 READING5-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP that at the moment there are numerous institutions teaching management under one guise or another. A lot of people go to these institutions expecting to be taught something quite different · from what the institutions are talking about. The system described by the lecturer appears to rely on the students having a fairly good idea before they start of what is wanted, at least inherently, and therefore if you give them the opportunity they will work it out. This is very suitable for a Sandhurst cadet, who has been selected by the system which feeds in this kind of training. One of the problems today is to get good young N .C.Os to come forward for commissions. They get turned down as not having the qualities which Sandhurst can use and tum into an officer. This is not surprising since a typical student is .. a boy who has risen rapidly to the rank of sergeant in a semi-technical trade. I believe this type of man can be trained but I am not sure that this method is suitable in the initial staBes. Has Dr. Adair any comments to make on these points? THE LECTURER: The first point I found very interesting and. largely agree with it. I have spoken to ·quite a large number of audiences of managers and they resist very much the idea that leadership is essential to their job and, as suggested earlier, they would prefer to think of management as the industrial form of leadership above a certain level in the organization. This is all right as long as your understanding of leadership is big enough, so that it includes not only human relations but also getting the job done. One of the facets of management we need to study is the great development in technical methods of getting jobs done, e.g., the aid which computers have brought to solving the problems of planning, which I mentioned as a key leadership function. When you are talking about the corporate leadership of the great organization, planning may be the work of a department and may require all the technical assistance and methods which are coming to the fore now, so we need to know all about these. But I would not accept the idea that leadership is to be identified with welfare personnel work. I think this is a defective understanding of leadership. On your second point, the application of this approach to the N.C.O., training and development is not something of which I have any first-hand experience. A nu~ber of officers have expressed the view that this 'could play a decisive part in developing N.C.O. leadership and the one experiment I have seen with the N.C.Os at Sandhurst leads me to believe that to some extent this is · true. I was rather impressed at Henlow, when I sat in on a leadership course just before Christmas, with the verdict expressed by one of the fairly senior N.C.Os who was going to be commissioned. He said in the final session: "Had I known the contents of this course 20 years ago, I would 1 have made far fewer mistakes." This, I think, 1 suggests that we can be much more imaginative in developing training for N.C.Os than we have been up to now. MR. COSMO RUSSELL: I would like to ask a supplementary to that interesting question on N.C.Os and to Dr. Adair's reply. I wonder if he would agree that in this connection of bringing N.C.Os forward, the training at Mons is perhaps more applicable than that at Sandhurst, because Sandhurst is a longer and rather more academic course, whereas I find from personal experience of running into some of these young N.C.Os at Mons who are technically minded, that they seem to derive a great deal of benefit from the course. My second point is connected with courage. I do not think Dr. Adair mentioned what one always needs, the quick reaction. Of course, in a factory or in management, or even on a staff, you do not need quite the same degree of quick reaction, but as a platoon .commander in any circumstances one can imagine-whether in the use of atomic weapons or in a military situation-it would seem to me that the capacity to act quickly would always be a great asset and characteristic of leadership. THE LECTURER: It is true that the sort of person one requires in a military organization is a man who can make decisions quickly, and it is one of the merits that the selectors at War Office Selection Boards saw this from the start and therefore built in a kind of simulated stress element into their testing procedures. They gave a group a small task to do with observers present, which added to the stress, in order to see if each member of that group was the sort of person :who could enable it to complete its task in stress conditions and make the required quick decisions. So I agree that is necessary. Going one step further, we also need to improve our method of training the officer to think more clearly, and this means thinking both analytically and creatively. Again a lot of research is going into the subject that we need to know of and to adapt and apply. So there is the quick thinking, the quick response,! the quick decisions, and there is also the necessity to improve the officer's ability to think more clearly, analytically, and creatively. BRIGADIER B. G. RAWLINS: Perhaps Dr. Adair could give some indication of how research will go on to find out whether in the end we will get better leaders. How can you assess whether, if you and I had been given this training, we would have been better leaders now than we are, not having had it? THE LECTURER: That is a key question. How do you evaluate leadership training? How can you say one method is better than another? The short answer to this is that there is no simple infallible means of measuring the success or fail 27 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ure of methods on a scale, and one must therefore rely on a selection of less accurate instruments because this is the only way to do it. The sort of criteria which one would want to look at are as follows. First, the reactions of students. In many areas of training it does not matter at all what the reactions of the students are--for instance, there is one way to fly !m aeroplane and that is it-and in such technical matters one does not want necessarily to find out what the student thinks about it. In this field it is different. If the student at any level thinks that the material which he has just heard or looked at, or the course he has just gone through, is a complete and utter waste of time; if this is his reaction at the end of the training, then clearly it is a great act of faith for anyone to believe that he will benefit from it too far ahead. I have tried to give you some idea of how we assess this immediate reaction at Sandhurst and of course the important thing is not so much the average percentage rating given by the 300 cadets in 12 companies, it is the remarks that they have written about the training which show how far they have made it their own. A second criterion on which I place very great value is the opinions of experienced officers in this field. I think that if the majority of directing staff officers, when they have seen this sort of training, did not feel it was of any value from their experience of what was coming on later in the cadet's career, then I would be very doubtful if we were on the right lines. Of course at Sandhurst-indeed, in all Service schools-we are lucky because we have a great turnover of officers coming in and out all the time, so the training is continually exposed to testing and therefore to improvement. A third criterion I would mention is the opinion of people outside the organization who are faced with the same general area of problems. Again I would be very suspicious of putting forward projects from this field which had been abandoned by people in other armies because they did not work. Therefore one needs to get the opinions of the officers in other armies, other Services, other disciplines, as much as you can, and the judgment of these people is one criterion on which we must work. A fourth criterion is, what do people think about it later on? After the excitement of the course and the practical field training have receded into the distance and one has . six months or a year under one's belt as a platoon commander or the equivalent in other Services, what do the ex-students think about it then? Now because we only started in 1964 it has not re.ally been possible until this year to do any senous research on this question such as I· was advocating earlier. We have not been able to do this because the young officers have not been out in their units long enough. But two weeks ago we started on this by sending out a questionnaire to 120 officers who were in Intakes 35 and 36, which were the first two experimental courses, to find out their present reactions, having had some experience. Now of those 120 in two weeks so far 87 have replied. I cannot therefore give you a statistical answer to your question but, if it would interest you, I will read out one or two comments which our officers have made, and these are fairly representative. For example, a young Infantry officer who had served with the United Nations in Cyprus, makes, I think, some very perceptive comments: "Whilst I was at the R.M.A. the actual teaching of leadership was in a new experimental stage. However, having been introduced to the latest philosophies on the subject, as opposed to a list of qualities against which one could assess oneself, it is now possible on occasions to make a 'leadership appreciation,' in particular, in terms of the task needs, team maintenance, and the individual needs." He gives an example: "Lately, a considerable amount of my time has been spent in instructing soldiers of different grades, from the recruit to the N.C.O., and by the simple application of the above (task needs, etc.) in the form of a question to myself, both indoor and outdoor lessons and exercises have been improved.': This, I think, is a significant remark: "After some time one is no longer making a conscious effort to adhere to these principles, as they become a part of the subconscious logical thought-processes." Another young officer, who served mainly in Libya and B.A.O.R., writes: "This approach is relevant in that it provides one with a view of the guiding principles and some practical experience, i.e., it teaches one what to expect of the. men under command-and what they expect of you." An officer in the R.A.O.C., Intake 36, writes: "I believe that leadership training is terribly important, especially today, and that all the leadership training I did was not wasted-the difficulty is convincing an over-confident cadet just how important (and difficult) good leadership and manmanagement is!" All officer in the Parachute Regiment, who served in the Middle East and is now reading for a degree, writes: "I found, however, during my time in the Middle East that the basic ground ing in leadership received at the Royal Military Academy was invaluable." An officer at present serving in Aden with the Fifth Fusiliers writes: "It is everything here." He goes on to give chapter and verse. An officer in the Royal Engineers writes: "The functional approach to leadership helped me to have a general form to my leadership. As a re sult of the course I had a general picture of the relationship I should aim at with my soldiers. 28 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP The course gives you a general pattern to work to." I would not like to suggest to you that all the replies were as sympathetic to the training as those. One officer, whom I happened to know quite well, sent back some very radical suggestions for a change in the R.M.A. and made the rather charming remark: "I hope you will not take my rather radical views as being highly critical of yourself. On the contrary, I must admire you for your persistence in such a difficult subject." I am afraid that is a rather long-winded answer to a question which was an important one to ask. MAJOR 0. R. NICHOLAS: Dr. Adair mentioned during his lecture that industry had taken a great deal of interest in the work he has been doing at Sandhurst, and in answer to a question he also said something of the increase in management technology over the last few years. He mentioned A.D.P. as a case in point. I have been working now for a year with the Ministry of Defence and it seems to me-l may be wrongthat we have got quite a lot to learn from industry in terms of management techniques. I wonder if he could comment on this and, if he agrees, say how we might do it? THE LECTURER: Yes, I agree with you. I think you are right in saying that we have a lot to learn from industry arid I am always slightly wary of some officers who seem to think that we have everything to give to industry in terms of leadership, management, and so on, and nothing to learn. What we need is a dialogue with industry whereby we are giving to industry a lot of what we have learned and we are picking their brains on some of the techniques which are being evolved to perform the functions of leadership more effectively in big organizations. This is one of the reasons why I think the attempt "in several industries already to start applying the sort of approach in the course I have outlined in practical terms to their management, supervisors, and foremen training is valuable from our Services point of view, because if this is the relationship, it means we are in a much better position to learn from the more specialized forms of management expertise. You ask how we are going to do it? I have to come back to my suggestion that we should not go on too long relying on the individual efforts of particular persons in the Services and on particular units and on people like yourself working on your own. There should be some method of getting people in this field together, learning from them, and selecting the lines into which we want to go at greater depth. MAJOR-GENERAL N. CROOKENDEN: Perhaps I may make a few rather disjointed comments. Carrying on from Dr. Adair's last point, and speaking with some diffidence about Shrivenham, because I do not join there until the week after next, many of us feel that a tri-Service Defence Academy must become a place which other parts of the Services can use for the research and development he has described. I hope that in the arts degree which the boys from the three cadet colleges are going to do at the Royal Defence College, management and leadership will form a large part. Just as Shrivenham now is a place where anybody in the Army can go for technological and scientific advice, many of us hope that in the future the Joint Service Defence Academy will become very much a centre for this sort of study, and I for one will strongly support that. I believe that the university is a natural place for leadership in all its forms to be studied, and could well be a centre of advice not only for the Services but for industry also. Changing the subject, may I comment on the question of testing leadership. Surely in industry leadership is tested by whether or not the firm makes a profit without too many labour troubles, but coming back to the point of the task to be achieved, in the Services we do not get tested unless there is a war. Minor wars help, but in peacetime our means for analysis and testing do not consist in writing to the victims themselves for solicited testimonials but in looking at their confidential reports. You will only get the effect of the new methods of training if you look at the results at company level from another person's point of view, becaus'! the man himself cannot give you a fair answer. If he could, we should all write our own confidential reports. A third point on leadership training which worries me slightly is this. You can build up at Sandhurst a technique of studying leadership and we can build up at Shrivenham a study of the aids to management and the technological side of it. But where and how do we build up the spirit of the leader so that the cynicism which is prevalent today in secondary schools of all types is replaced by the leader's interest in his own job? Ought we not at Cranwell, Dartmouth, Sandhurst, and other Service schools to have more serious discussion of what motivates the leader, rather. than the technique he uses to exercise leadership? Some brigades do have officers' days on national, religious, and spiritual problems. I wonder whether we ought not to spend more time on the basic motivation of leaders at cadet and staff colleges, as well as on their techniques and methods of leadership? THE CHAIRMAN: May I answet your first comment'! My present appointment took me into the heart of the launching of the Royal Defence College. In that College there is every intention to have a School of Management and Economics as part of the various schools to be established there. There will be a master appointed to be responsible for the Royal Defence College and he, together with the deans of the other colleges 29 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP which will make up the Royal Defence Academy, will form with the Directors of Training in the Ministry of Defence Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, and various other educational authorities, both inside and outside the Services, an advisory board to the Defence Council on what should be taught in those colleges and what should be co-ordinated. Although this is only a skeleton as yet, I think it is sufficiently clear for us to say that the point has been met and has been taken, and in due course Shrivenham will be pushing for this, as will all the other organizations which will form the Royal Defence Acad emy. As an aside, I absolutely agree that we must get together. We must try to pool our resources, not only at the secondary but also at the tertiary level of education, and whatever you call the topping-up procedure. Although this is not envisaged at the present moment in the Advisory Council, I am certain this will come. Having said that, may I hand over to Dr. Adair to answer your other two comments? THE LECTURER: Your second point covered the matter of research and how far is it valuable to get solicited testimonials from people. The difficulty here is that you cannot compare a person who has done the old course and a person who has done the new one, because you do not know what difference it has made. It may be that you get different natural levels of ability in leadership as in everything else. It may be that one person will improve significantly, but you do not know whether this is due to the course as such or whether it is due to the natural processes of growing up, and so on. So you have to fall back on trying to compare in some way different cadets who have done different courses, because you cannot compare one who has done both. This is the difficulty. General impressions matter here. About f.:mr or five years ago there was quite widespread concern in the Services about the level of junior leadership. Hence the then C.I.G.S. ordered all units to have study days on leadership, at several of which I have spoken. It is difficult to estimate this but I think the general impression at the p10ment is quite favorable about the standard of junior leadership in the Army. The third point you raised was the importance of research into motivation. Here again I could not agree with you more. I noted that a number of officers responding to the questionnaire com mented on the need to know more about moti vation, especially in situations like the British Army of the Rhine, where there are comments on the lack of enthusiasm of soldiers, and so on. A few weeks ago when I was at an Institute of Personnel Management conference, one of the most expert lectures I have ever heard on moti vation was given by an American professor. Here is a person who has been hired at great expense by I.C.I. to advise them on this very subject, so there is a great deal of work going on in industry in the field of motivation and in university departments also. But ·in the Services it has been largely left to the private enterprise of individuals to go into this question, instead of setting up a focal point for all these studies. BRIGADIER J. F. M. MELLOR: There is of course the great NATO gathering in this country in August, where NATO scientists will be discussing the whole field of personnel management for a week in London. I know some of the speakers from countries as far apart as Holland and the United States, and in both those countries, one large and one small, there has been so much going on in this field in the last three years that it should be a great privilege to . attend the gathering. THE LECTURER: Again this illustrates my point. For example,. in 1961 there was a NATO conference on defence psychology but as far as I know no one from the officer cadet training side or even from the staff college level in this country attended it. You were not in on this and the few people who went from this country were isolated from the "nuts and bolts" of leadership and training. And at this 1961 conference the American Army sent a team from Fort Benning and the George Washington University and read their first paper on "Leadership in Small Basic Military Units." That paper gave for the first time publicly the results of five or six years' research' work, involving many hundreds of thousands of dollars. Had we known. the contents of that paper, and also had we had the benefit of the critique of it by the St. Cyr expert who was there and who put his finger on a number of weak spots in American research, particularly their failure to marry \lp the indoor theory of functional approach with field training, it would have saved us perhaps two years. So I can only say how right you are. There is a great deal of research going on in all countries of NATO and we want same method of garnering the fruits of that research and seeing how applicable it is to our actual training. So I agree with you and I only hope we can do this. BRIGADIER MELLOR: I know no focus for this except the NATO conference we had two years ago in Brussels and the one which is coming in August. They publish very full proceedings but it is about nine months before they come out. THE LECTURER: There was in fact a conference in Naples last year about which I heard from the Commandant of the Royal Norwegian Military Academy, who went to it and said he had gained innumerable valuable hints and lessons which re sulted in significant improvements in their syl labus. · I would like to see research being done internationally as well as in this country. THE CHAIRMAN: You will certainly wish me to thank Dr. Adair very much indeed for coming 30 READINGS-INTRODUCTJON TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP here today and giving us an extremely stimulating presentation. From the questions that have been asked it is obvious that much of what he said has struck home. Dr. Adair is hoping to publish a book on leadership training by the end of the year and I for one will certainly be getting a copy. I would make one comment: that the Services are now well on the way to understanding modern methods of leadership training and management. In my view we must take note of the advice given by Major-General Crookenden to produce some sensible central organization in which all this information can be co-ordinated and used for the benefit of everyone. Dr. Adair, thank you very much indeed. Questions for Reflection and Discussion J. Why should leadership education comprise both skill and knowledge development? 2. Identify and describe the differences between your present leadership program and the one described at Sandhurst? 3. Why do you suppose there are differences between the leadership program you are. exc periencing and that described at Sandhurst? 4. Why i3 there little agreement among researchers in the trait approach to leadership? READING C Communication By S. G. Huneryager and I. L. Heckman. Reprinted by permission from Human Relations , in Management, Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1967., Copyright 1967. Dr. S. G. Huneryager and Dr. I. L. Heckmann are Professors of Management at the University of Illinois, Chicago campus. Dr. Huneryager also serves as Coordinator of the Management area; Dr. Heckmann is Dean of the College of Business Administration. In addition to their combined work, both men are noted for their individual publications. Dr. Hunetyager is the author of Manpower Management and Dr. Heckman wrote Personnel Administration in a Changing Society. C OMMUNICATION, the process of transmitting and receiving information, is so fundamental to the practice of management that without it an organization could not exist The reason for this is very apparent. If we could not communicate with employees, we could not inform them of the work we want done, how we want it done, when we want it done, who we want to do it, and so on2. We could not in any way possible practice human relations, motivate people, or exercise the functions of leadership. In short, we could get nothing-absolutely nothingdone. From a very basic viewpoint the absence of communication would also result in the denial of existence to the human being, for every aspect of human behavior is related in some manner or form to the process of sending and receiving information. Our physiological needs, for example, have the ability to motivate our behavior because they possess the power to send to us, primarily via neurological pathways, the information we need to satisfy our primitive motives. Thus we know we are hungry when we experience pangs of hunger in the stomach. Or we know we are thirsty or need warmth and shelter 31 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP when we "feel" the dryness in our mouth or the coldness of our skin. On a considerably more complex and emotional level,. the same concept is true of our reaction to sociological and psychological needs. We know we "belong," for example, when something has communicated to us that we have been accepted as a member of a group or organization. Or our desire for recognition is satisfied when our responses lead someone or something to convey to us in some manner or form that we have performed our work well. Whatever our needs be, therefore, our reaction to their motivational force is completely dependent upon the transmission and reception of some type or kind of information. In the employment situation, consequently, employee performance is directly correlated with the efficiency of the communication process. Evidence to prove the importance of communication to the existence of an organiZation or a human being is not difficult to find. In almost any firm there can be found examples of inefficiency, waste and spoilage, misunderstandings, and so forth, all of which can be traced to some form of communication. One then need only to extrapolate these particular incidents to "see" their effect on the organization as a whole. And as far as the impact of communication on the human being is concerned, almost every hospital in the world contains an abundance of evidence. Perhaps the reader has seen or heard of the effect of a damaged or destroyed neurological system, or the result of the loss of hearing, sight, and speech: In fact, recent research has proved that man, when denied (to the extent that he can be denied in a controlled laboratory experiment) use of his communicative faculties (sight, touch, hearing, and so on) at the same time, can tolerate this condition for only a short length of time. Beyond a certain point, contin~ed deprivation of his senses will result in psychological damage or even death. Because the process of communication is so important to human relations and motivation, it is unfortunate that many managers, that is, people in leadership positions, are extremely poor communicators. In fact, of all the abilities required for successful management and leadership, the ability to communicate is undoubtedly the one ability that most managers are commonly deficient in. It is not surprising to find, therefore, so many subordinates in business today who do not clearly understand what they are doing, why they are doing it, how they should do it, and so on. Nor is it surprising to find, as a consequence, so many people who are dissatisfied with their work environment in general because they have not found the means to satisfy their basic motivational forces, especially their sociological and psychological needs. This situation is all the more unfortunate because many managers quite frequently think they are properly communicating to their subordinates when in reality they are not. Communication, as we shall see in the following paragraphs and . articles, consists of far more than merely telling people things. Until managers learn this-in fact, until they learn, understand, and become skilled in the basic process of transmitting and receiving information-they cannot possibly lead and motivate people in the manner required to get work done efficiently. WHY WE COMMUNICATE The basic reason for any kind or type of communication, whether it be in the form of a nerve sending impulses to the brain or a foreman instructing a subordinate on how to do a job, is to get some manner or form of action (behavior). In the context of a business enterprise, the action desired is usually related, either directly or indirectly, to the efficient performance of duties and responsibilities. This does not mean, incidentally, that the action wanted must necessarily be only in the form of concrete physical behavior, such as a worker operating a machine after receiving instruction on how to do so. On the contrary, action resulting from communication frequently can be and is in the form of an attitudinal response, the accepting 32 READING5-INTRODUCI'ION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP of an idea, or a willingness not to behave in a particular way. This latter point, it should be noted, is especially true in counseling, partiCularly when it is disciplinary in nature. Because some form of behavioral response will ultimately result from communication, it should not be inferred that overt or covert action will take place immediately or that it will always be observable to the eyes of men. Quite frequently behavior resulting from the receiving of information may not take place for many years. This is particularly true of formal education, of course. What the student learns in college may not actually influence his behavior until years later. The same is also . true of present-day management development programs and other forms of executive development. Anything the young excutive may learn about the subjects communicated to him during the course of such programs may not become manifested in his actions until considerably later in his career. And even then we may notice no apparent change in his behavior, especially if only an attitudinal response has occurred. Although some manner or form of response is the basic objective of communica-· tion, especially in the context of a business organization, it must also be recognized that the type or kind of response desired by man agement of its suborflinates, whether they be vice-presidents or operative employees, may not always materiali;ze. Undoubtedly, one of the fundamental reasons why pe()ple sometimes fail to respond properly is because of various barriers to effective communication, a subject that will 'be considered in detail later in this part. Whatever the reasons why people fail to respond properly to communication, however, it should always be remembered that some manner or form of behavior (response) is going to result whenever we communicate. It is imperative, therefore, that every effort be 111ade to prevent the various barriers to effective communication from operating. Unless this is done, it is very possible that employee response to communication may be unacceptable to management. HOW WE COMMUNICATE How we transmit information Perhaps the two most frequently used methods of communicating to people are the spoken and the written word. Oral communi-;. cation, of course, takes place primarily in a face-to-face situation. It is, generally speak ing, the most preferred method of transmit ting information, principally because it is more personal in nature and because it more conveniently allows the transmitter to deter mine if the receiver understands and accepts what has been communicated to him. In ad dition, it possesses the advantages of being the fastest form of communication and of al lowing both parties to participate in the situ ation and to share their opinions and feel ings, advantages which are most important to motivation and the practice of human rela tions. Written communication, although con siderably less personal and participative in nature than oral transmission, is an essential part of any organization. Whenever informa tion concerns many people, is very complex and extremely important, or has long-term significance, written media must almost al ways be used. However, because writing lacks the advantages of onil communication, skill is required to design properly the var ious forms used to convey the written word. But even when forms such as letters, man uals, handbooks, posters, and other media have been properly constructed, it is fre quently necessary to explain orally and to clarify written information. Other ways of communicating information to people include signs and symbols, pictures, facial expressions, gestures, what people do (the actions of others), silence, and so on. Although almost all of us utilize these means of communication every day of our lives, few of us recognize how powerful and significant these media are. And yet evidence of their impact and motivational force is not . difficult to find. One need only to recall his reaction to a friend's facial expression or gesture, or how he was influenced by some one's action, or the purposeful silence of an 33 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP acquaintance to understand the inherent naUpward communication ture of these forms of information transmission. Inanimate and inarticulate as they are, they most certainly speak "louder than words." As such, they play, along with oral and written communication, an extremely important part in the process of transmitting information. How we receive information Because we tend to use oral and written communication more than other forms of transmitting information in the business en-. terprise, we must of necessity receive information more by listening and seeing than by any other means of reception. This does not mean that other ways of receiving information are less important or useful to the communication process. On the contrary, if the transmitting media discussed in the preceding paragraph are important to communication, then the receptors required to receive the information transmitted by them are equally important. Accordingly, our senses of touch, smell, and taste also play important roles in the process of receiving information. But it should be emphasized that hearing and seeing, especially the hearing of spoken words and the seeing of written words, actions, gestures, and facial expressions, are by far our most relied upon means of receiving communication. THE DIMENSIONS OF COMMUNICATION Downward communication In every business organization the most frequently used and relied upon dimension of communication is the downward direction. This refers, of course, to the process of transmitting information from the top of the organization (management) down through various levels to the bottom of the organization (workers). It is an essential dimension of transmission because without it a firm would cease to function. Accordingly, it is the direction used by management to communicate to employees infonnation on company objectives, policy, procedure, and so on. A second but equally important dimension of information transmission is that of upward communication. This direction-of communication is predicated on the fact that employees not only possess the ability to receive communication, but also possess and must be allowed to use the capacity to transmit information. It is the only dimension of communication via which employees can convey to their superiors their actions, attitudes, and opinions about a multitude of subjects of vital concern to the efficient operation of a business enterprise. As such, it is the only means by which management can determine if the information it has transmitted has been received, understood, and accepted and if proper action has been taken or is being taken to accomplish the objectives of the company. Most important of all is the fact that this direction of information flow is the only way management can discover if the needs of subordinates are being satisfied. In other words, whether it be evidenced through records, reports, grievances, attitude surveys, interviews, suggestion systems, and so on, it is the only dimension that can communicate to superiors whether or not employees are being properly motivated. It is therefore unfortunate that it has only been in the past decade or so that management has recognized the inherent importance of facilitating the flow of information from the bottom to the top of the organization. But even today there are many managers who believe that the process of transmitting and receiving information means that they, the managers, transmit and that their subordinates, the employees, receive. What makes this situation all the more worse is, as we said before, the fact that many of the managers who think this way are, in the first place, extremely poor transmitters. Until such people recognize that, ne matter what direction it takes, communication is inherently two-way in nature, they cannot possibly hope to practice human relations effectively. Evidence that proves the importance of upward communication can be found in any efficiently managed firm. Successful sugges 34 READINGs-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP tion systems, for example, have long been demonstrating their effectiveness as an upward communication medium by saving numerous organizations millions of dollars as a result of employees contributing their ideas. Encouraging workers to bring their grievances out into the open has resulted in the prevention of many major problems. And so on. But it should be emphasized that these examples materialize only when management, first, recognizes the importance of employees' communicating information to them and, second, facilitates the flow of such information. Unless recognition and facilitation exist, along with proper action by management with respect to the nature of the information transmitted, the inherent desire of people to communicate will be thwarted, and frustration, with all its dire implications to a firm, will result. In this respect it should be noted that some people believe that a basic reason for the formation of unions and the willingness of employees to join them is the lack of an effective upward communication system in the organization concerned. The theory here is that the union becomes the medium by which employees can convey their attitudes, opinions, wants, and needs to management. Horizontal communication A third dimension of communication nec essary for the efficient operation of any business is called horizontal communication. This term refers to the flow-transmitting and receiving-of information between departments or people on the same level in an organization. It is a direction of communication that is absolutely essential to the sucCess of any firm, for without it the activities of various functions, such as production, sales, personnel, purchasing, and finance, could not possibly be coordinated. An example that effectively illustrates this point occurred in a large manufacturing organization several years ago. The vice-president of sales of the company concerned, being disappointed over the sales volume of his organization, encouraged his sales personnel to do everything they could to improve conditions. He so thoroughly motivated his subordinates that within days orders began to flow in. Unfortunately, because this vice-president had not informed-horizontally communicated to-the manufacturing department of the nature of his plans, production quickly became bogged down by a load it was not geared to carry. The net result was that buyers, who had geared their own production to receipt of their orders within a certain period of time, canceled their orders and switched their business to other firms. This fiasco, it was estimated, cost this company approximately three hundred thousand dollars in business-sales lost to competitors. And all because of an absenc~ of horizontal communication. FORMAL AND INFORMAL COMMUNICATION Formal communication The directions of information transmission that were discussed above, particularly downward and upward communication, represent what is frequently termed formal com munication within an organization. The reason for this is that they are directions of communication that result from the delegation of authority and responsibility in the creation of a formal organization structure. In other words, when an individual has been given the authority and the responsibility to get work done, there is immediately created an upward line of communication that he should use to transmit information to and receive information from his superiors, and a downward line of communication that he should use to transmit information to and receive information from his subordinates. In many cases, especially in well-run organizations, these transmitting and receiving "lines" ·are clearly indicated on organization charts and in job descriptions. This is particularly true of horizontal communication, primarily because this dimension of information flow does not follow normal lines of authority and responsibility; consequently, because of its importance to overall organizational efficiency, many managers formally determine its path. 35 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Although there are inherent disadvantages in all forms of formal communication,. primarily because of the authoritarian and superior-subordinate relationships established by them, there are several advantages of this type of communication that deserve mention. For example, horizontal communication, as was mentioned earlier, allows management to coordinate the various functions necessary to the organization. Formal downward communication allows management directly and immediately to send to or give employees information important to the operation of a company. And formal upward communication possesses the advantage of allowing management to establish lines that subordinates can use to convey information, such as suggestions and grievances, to superiors who have been delegated the authority and the responsibility to act upon it. This latter point illustrates, incidentally, a common misunderstanding of what is frequently called an open-door policy. If the chief executive of an organization, especially a large organization, literally left his door open to every conceivable type and kind of upward communication, he would have little time to devote to the top management aspects of running the .business. What the term "open-door" really means is that communication from employees, if exceptional enough in nature to prohibit lower level managers and supervisors from acting on it, will be received personally by the chief executive. To allow otherwise would mean inefficient utilization of the executive's time and under-utilization of the time of lowerlevel managers. This does not mean to imply, however, that there should be no exceptions to this rule. On the contrary, in every organization there will occur times when: employees, because of the personal natur~ of their information, should be allowed to see the "big boss." Unfortunately, it is always diffi • I cult to determme whether or not the nature of the information is personal enough to warrant consideration by the top man, especially when the employee, because of personality or other reasons, refuses to reveal what he wants to communicate. In addition, psychological and sociological barriers quite frequently make people reluctant just to "walk in." Informal communication As the section on organization pointed out, there also exists in every company a system of informal communication. This type of communication is a result of the natural desire of people to communicate with each other and arises from the social interaction of individuals. It is multidimensional in nature and is as flexible, dynamic, and varied as are the people who communicate along its paths. As a system 'of communication it is limited in direction and degree only to the extent that limits are self-imposed by members of an organization. As such, it contrasts sharply with the formal communication system because it frequently ignores or trespasses upon formally delegated lines of authority and responsibility. It is usually, but sometimes mistakenly, called the grapevine. Although some people consider informal communication undesirable, undoubtedly because they do not understand it and utilize it properly, this system of transmitting and receiving information has several important characteristics that should be mentioned here. Perhaps one of its most important functions, if it is properly utilized, is to help disseminate and clarify management's formal communication. In this way it helps to improve 'overall communication or, more frequently, to overcome management's failure to transmit information properly in the first place. Another important quality is that it allows ~mployees to express their emotions orally to other people without fear of repercussion. This safety-valve feature plays an important role in human relations, because the cathartic value of "blowing-off steam" frequently alleviates employee problems or prevents them from growing larger. One of the most important disadvantages of informal communication is that it fre quently spreads rumor, untruth, and dis torted information with an alarming rate of speed. Perhaps the basic reason for this is lack of proper formal communication. Con 36 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP sequently when employees do not understand or are "left-in-the-dark" about something, they immediately interpret actions and procedures as they want to see them. The net result is rumor and untruth. It should be noted, however, that many times the transmitter is unaware that he is transmitting such items of information. As a receiver he frequently assumes that the information he sees or hears is reliable and truthful and that he is passing it on exactly as he received it. Unfortunately there are also people who purposefully concoct misinformation. Perhaps the best way to deal with such individuals-in fact, the best way to deal with all rumors and untruths-is to establish a rumor board or some similar medium of communication. The basic purpose of such a device is to answer the rumor or untruth immediately and thereby to stop it before it becomes serious. This means that management must constantly listen to the grapevine and act immediately when necessary. Another undesirable characteristic of informal communication, so ·some managers think and fear, is that unlike formal communication it is very difficult to control. In other words, it is believed that management has little to say about what will be communicated, when it will be transmitted, who will receive it, and so forth. Although this quality exists to some degree, its manifestation actually depends upon the ability of the managers involved. If people ignore the grapevine and make no attempt to listen to it and combat the misinformation being transmitted, then, of course, it cannot be controlled. If, on the other hand, managers study the grapevine by listening to it and by determining who its leaders are and what information it transmits, they can take intelligent actions that will ultimately lead to an integration of informal communication with the formal communication system. BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION In a previous part of this section it was pointed out that some manner or form of action is the basic objective of all communication. It was also stated that the type or kind of response desired by management may not always result, primarily because of various barriers that thwart proper behavior. The purpose of this section is to consider briefly the nature of some of the more important obstacles to efficient communication. Semantics The meaning of words is undoubtedly one of the more important barriers to effective communication. Altogether too frequently we feel that because we understand the meaning of the terms we use, our subordinates will likewise understand them. Unfortunately, what we fail to recognize is that words mean different things to different people. The level of our education, the part of the country we come from, the ethnic group to which we belong-these and many other factors determine what words mean to us. Managers must consequently take this fact into consideration when they communicate. In other words, they must in the first place carefully choose the words-fr~quently simple, single-syllable words-that they wish to transmit to people. When the nature of the communication is such that it is impossible to use universally understandable terms, then every effort must be made to interpret tl-.e meaning of the message to the various individuals or groups concerned. If this is not done, people will automatically interpret the communication in accordance with their understanding of the words used. The net result is usually misinterpretation and undesired action. Too many words In addition to using complex and difficult-to-understand words and terms, many managers also clutter up their communications with too many words. Consider, for example, the following illustration. In a wellknown organization, the office manager recently sent this memo to employees: Employees of the XYZ Company whJ are desirous of receiving additional copies of the form which accompanies this memo should 37 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP inform the receptionist of this office of the nature of their request in order to obtain without delay the extra copies they should like to have. Although the nature of this communication may not be too difficult to understand, think how much simpler it would have been had the office manager simply written: If you want additional copies of this form, ask the receptionist. When we fail to condense our communication, we leave the door wide open to timeconsuming misunderstanding and improper response. This is especially true of communication requiring immediate action of employees. Physical distance Another important barrier to effective communication, particularly in the larger or ganization, is physical distance between people. When we are far away from the persons to whom we wish to communicate, it becomes very difficult for us to determine if they receive, understand, accept, and properly react to what we have transmitted. We must also rely more and more on written media, which means that we encounter additional problems of construction and interpretation. To overcome the disadvantage of distance, we must utilize, where possible, physical devices such as telephones and intercommunication systems, and we must make sure that the people on the various levels through which our information is sent understand, accept, and pass on our message up or down the line. In particular we must make sure that the people on these levels communicate intact the nature of our information. That is to say, we must make sure that 'i>ur information is not misinterpreted, distorted, or stopped by the people ~ho are responsible for passing it on to and interpreting it for other people. As difficult as this is to do, we must do it if we want proper employee behavior. People In addition to being the ·basic cause of many of the barriers to effective communication, it should be noted that people per se are an important obstacle to information transmission. This type of barrier occurs when information that must be transmitted through other people is stopped before it reaches its final objective. Included among reasons why people hinder the flow of communication are factors such as misunderstanding of the original message (poor communication in the first place) and fear of passing on information because it might indicate ineffiCiency or inability to handle certain situations. This latter point is extremely relevant to upward communication. Altogether too frequently foremen and supervisors hesitate or fail completely to pass important information, such as employee attitudes, opinions, grievances, and suggestions, on to their superiors because they believe such information will impair their status or prestige or reflect on their supervisory ability. When such stoppages occur, problems that could have been prevented usually develop into situations that ultimately require drastic remedial action. It is important, therefore, for people to recognize that the stopping of information, rather than the content of the message stopped, is an indication of poor leadership ability. An,other very common way people serve as barriers to effective communication, that is, communication designed to elicit proper response from employees, concerns the way some :people behave on the job. A fr~quently occurring illustration of this is the supervisor who consistently breaks many rules and regulations that have been established for safety or other reasons. When employees see such a person smoking in a no-smoking area or being frequently late to or absent from work, it is extremely difficult to obtain proper response from them no matter how well we communicate the rules themselves and the reasons for them. When such actions occur on the supervisory level, they are, of course, indicative of extremely poor leadership abil 38 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ity. But they serve as very effective barriers to communication. ·- Interest As several of the following articles point out, one of the most fundamental obstacles to communication is that we do not pay as much attention as we should to the interests of the people to whom we communicate. This concept is based on the fact that we listen (or look) more attentively to communications that are geared to our interests and our basic needs. When we listen in this manner, we facilitate understanding and acceptance of the information transmitted and usually respond with the proper type of behavior. Until management recognizes this important aspect of communication and keys its information transmission to it, it will seldom achieve the benefits desired from training, cost reduction programs, quality improvement programs, suggestion systems, and so forth. It is fortunate, therefore, that the simple ·explanation of the "why" of· a particular communication is frequently sufficient to relate the response desired to employee interests. COMMUNICATION: THE BASIC PROCESS Although the achievement of some manner or form of human behavior is the basic objective of all communication, especially in the context of a business enterprise, it should be apparent by now that the accomplishment of this goal requires more than telling, writing, or indicating something to people. In fact, it should be obvious that the basic process of conimunication, if it is to achieve proper employee response, must of necessity give attention to three important and sequentially related concepts. In the first place, it must begin with the proper transmission of information. In the second place, the receiver must understand this information. And in the third place, the receiver must accept the information transmitted to him. Unless these three conditions exist in the order stated, the fourth part of the process of communication, namely, action, will be seriously thwarted or left completely to chance. Let us briefly consider the nature of these facets of communication. Transmitting information The transmitting of information to people, particularly if it is done with written media, requires considerable planning on the part of · the transmitter. Detailed attention must be given to the nature of the communication per se, the best medium to use, the people who should receive it, the interests and the needs of the people who will receive it, and the various barriers that could impede its effectiveness. In other words, every effort should be made to insure that what people are to receive is receivable. If this is not done-and it frequently isn't-it is senseless to expect understanding, acceptance, and proper action. Understanding information It is obvious that the understanding of communication is dependent to an infinite degree on how well the communication was planned and transmitted in the first place. Not so obvious, however, is the fact that we frequently assume that the receiver understands what has been communicated to him. Because sound communication does not rest upon a structure of assumptions, primarily because even the best communication is sometimes misunderstood, it is therefore necessary that the transmitter determine whether or not the receiver comprehends his message. In essence, this requires the transmitter now to become the receiver and the receiver to become the transmitter. In other words, after communicating information to an employee, we must do everything possible to encourage that person to indicate to us the degree of his understanding. We must facilitate the trans. mission of this information and, most important of ·an, listen attentively to it. This is why most people prefer oral communication. In a face-to-face situation it is considerably easier to determine whether or not the receiver un derstands us. It is also easier, of course, for the receiver to transmit to us. No matter what dimension or medium of communica tion is used, however, it is imperative that we 39 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP recognize that understanding can be determined only if we utilize the inherent two-way nature of the process of communication. That is to say, we must be both transmitters and receivers. Unless we accept this dual role, it is impossible to commtinicate effectively with and hence to motivate people. Accepting information Many people fail to recognize that in addition to proper transmission and understanding of communication, action is also dependent to a great degree upon acceptance of the information received. Perhaps the basic reason for this is the assumption that people accept what they understand. Unfortunately for the manager, however, this assumption is not always true, especially when consideration is given to the nature and the degree of the understanding involved. Consider, for example, the case of the older worker who was given detailed and explicit instructions on how to operate a new machine. According to tests and demonstrations there was no doubt that this individual understood· how to run the machine and had the ability to do so. Yet the quality and the quantity of his production were disappointingly low. Why? Although he understood how to operate the new machine, he did not understand why the machine was necessary, how it would affect his status, or what influ ence the potential increase in productivity would have on his pay. As a consequence, he covertly refused to accept the machine and accordingly produced at a lower level than his ability warranted. In this case and thousands similar to it the only answer is to explore thoroughly via two-way communication the nature and the degree of the em-· ployee's understanding. Where voids in his information exist, he must have communicated to him the information he needs to satisfy his interests. Difficult as this is to do, it must be done if action based on acceptance, rather than behavior based on rejection, is to result. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. How is the main purpose of the communication process described 7 2. Why is the complexity of the communication process changing? 3. How is an Air Force officer's leadership effectiveness influenced by his skill in written communications? 4. Why is an Air Force officer's effectiveness as a leader a function of his skill in oral communications? 5. Which communications media are most frequently used? 6. Why should there be a difference in one's approach in communication with his superiors, peers, and subordinates? 40 READINGs-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING D Air Force Staff Writing Practices By Maj. Harold Markowitz, Jr., USAF Maj Harold Markowitz, Jr. was formerly course director for Aerospace Studies 400, Air Force ROTC Leadership and Management, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He holds M.A. an degree in education from Florida State University and is presently working toward a Ph.D. degree in education at Columbia University under the Air University doctoral program. 10 percent, 50 percent, or 90 percent certainty-but it can be done in words. The posi P ROBLEM solving is a basic function of a the Air Force leader. To be effective, how tion may be described as almost certain, prob ever, the problem solver must be able to able, or a best guess. communicate his solutions well enough to 4. Make clear what assumptions he has used bring about action on them. The process of and what technical or nontechnical factors have problem solving is discussed elsewhere. This been excluded. The decision maker needs to article suggests effective ways of communiknow what additional considerations he may have to add. cating in an effort to help the Air Force leader apply the problem-solving process and UNDOCUMENTED SOLUTIONS bring it to fruition. More likely than not, in his. day-to-day HOW TO ADVISE DECISION MAKERS work, the Air Force staff officer will reach a solution, immediately apply it, and go on to A former Secretary of the Air Force, Harnew problems. Here is a case in point: Theold Brown, laid down some rules of thumb staff officer is working on the plans for hisfor the technical expert to follow in advising base's Armed Forces Day exhibits. Thedecision makers, who have to be more generproblem is to arrange the planes for the bestalist than specialist. Air Force staff officers visual impact, and he decides the first disare technical experts in the actions they hanplays encountered should be the aircraft indle, even though these actions frequently are battle paint. The project officer may notenot technical in an engineering sense. Dr. this decision in his own records, but a formalBrown's rules help the person who has to recommendation to someone on somethingmake a decision in evaluating the advice so trifling would be useless. given him orally or in writing. The adviser Another type of problem solution thatshould: may be immediately converted to action is 1. Organize his presentation logically and, the solution growing out of a discussion or a where possible, quantitatively. staff meeting. In working with other officers 2. Distinguish technical opinions from general to solve problems, tlie officer may have light opinions. In the former, the adviser is presumed conversations or intense ones. The conversa to be an expert. In related general areas, he may not be, though his general opinions may be usetional group may resolve mild disagreement ful. The person receiving the briefing should or hold heated debate. At some point, there expert ends general or know where advice and is enlightenment, compromise, capitula ~owledge begins. tion, and the problem is solved. Typically, 3. State the degree of confidence he places in some action is then taken and little or no his conclusions and recommendations. This is not always possible to do numerically-as being staff writing is involved 41 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE RESERVE OFFICW lRAINING CORPS MAXWELl AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112 REPLY TO ATTN OF: ARTO-E (Date) SUBJECT: (Only long enough for identification) TO: (Normally this caption is left blank on the staff study report.) PROBLEM 1. (Clear, but brief, statement of the problem.) FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2. Facts. (Pertinent facts, assumptions (if necessary), criteria, and definitions (if necessary)used to solve the problem.) 3. Assumptions. 4. Criteria. 5. Definitions. DISCUSSION 6: (Briefly state background of problem,) 7. (List possible solut:l,ons that are most probabJe'; test each possible solution, using criteria listed undet "FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM"; compare all solution&; and select the bes~ possible solution, giving reasons for choice. No set number of paragraphs is prescribed.) CONCLUSIONS 8. (Restate the best possible solution to the problem, using only ohe paragraph.) ACTION RECOMMENDED 9. (Indicate clearly the action necessary to implement the solution.) Strength Through Knowledge Figure 1. 42 READINGs---INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP DOCUMENTED SOLUTIONS which is supposed to be clear writing on This article focuses on the second cateproblems. gory of solved problems, those that are docuWriting an adequate staff study usually takes a lot of time. Since few staff officers mented. A lot can go awry here. Words fail to communicate; logic as clear as the sunfind themselves with an abundance of time, there tend to be very few staff studies writshiny day it was written is lost in the fog of a ten. In 1965, an Air University group visitedlater month; somebody doesn't get the point. There are many documents whose funcUSAF Headquarters, the six largest Air tion is to report on solved problems. In the Force commands, and several other organiAir Force, these include electrical messages, zations to study Air Force staff writing prac tices. They found that "though the tradistaff summary sheets, talking papers, and tional staff study report is remembered andseveral other reporting methods. A brief dis cussion of these follows. · respected, it is seldom used in its conven tional form." Those staff studies that are The Staff Study written have something in common with modern architecture: form follows function. The most time-honored aspect of staffAnd if the forin of a staff study does notwriting training for junior officers is the staff seem appropriate to the function to bestudy. The staff study format offers many served in reporting the solved problem, weadvantages. It is an excellent means of rego on to other devices. porting on a solved problem. Also, its organization is easily understood, flowing The Air Force Letter smoothly from problem to be solved to probThe Air Force letter is useful for reportinglem solution. As is shown in Figure 1, the five sections of the report exactly parallel the on some solved problems. For example, if the cost of inventory taking is starting to ex generally accepted steps in problem solving. ceed the value of the items inventoried, theThis makes it easy to follow the logic of the staff officer may solve this problem, thensolution. Or, in a long study,· a commander may go directly to the solution without going write to his headquarters telling them how he through any of the involved rationale, thus has changed procedures for the better. After saving valuable time. Additionally, it proall, someone else may want to use the idea. Unless the problem solver is proposing man vides a record of recommended action which shows approval or disapproval. datory conformity to his procedure, anyone in the headquarters would be astounded to The merits of the staff study and the details of its construction are discussed in Air see this report come in as a staff study in stead of as a letter. Force Pamphlet 10-1, Guide for Air Force Letters are very commonly used to reportWriting, pages 191-200. The internal logic of the staff study is in large measure derived on solved problems. In a typical organization, junior officers will compose many, if from John Dewey's classic work, How We not most, of the letters and memos that are Think. Chapter 7 of that work gives some in sight into the staff study format. . written on solved problems. Figure 2 shows the format of a letter, and Air Force ManualThe Air Force ROTC and other Air Uni10-1 explains it in detail. versity schools have carried the staff study in Military letters rarely exceed one pagetheir curriculum for many years. There is and are. kept as brief as clarity will permit. less concentration on it now than there was once, but it remains in the curricula. The When brevity is impossible, the summary sheet may be more suitable than the letter. primary reason for this inclusion, aside from the values already mentioned, is that consid Staff Summary Sheets eration of the staff study helps teach the "scientific'' problem-solving method. It is The staff summary sheet, shown in Figure also good for practicing military writing, 3, is more common at higher levels of com 43 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE All FORCE RESERVE OFFICW TRAINING CORPS MAXWEU AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112 REPLY TO ATTN Ofo ARTO-E 1 February 1971 SUBJECT• Format for the Air Force Letter TOo Aerospace Studies 400 .Cadets 1. The Air Force letter is a simple and efficient way to communicate. Its appearance immediately tells you what it is. It includes captions to show from where it came and to whom to reply, what it is about, and for whom it is intended. The date tells when it was sent. The body of the letter is the why and how, and ,the signature element shows who sent it. 2. AFM 10-1, Preparing and Processing Written Communications, and AFP 10-1, Guide for Air Force Writing are important reading for every potential couunander and •staff officer as they discuss the principles of effective letter writing. On active duty you will find this knowledge is highly important to career progression. 3. The Aerospace Studies 400 course goals intend that you practice effective writing on significant subjects in the lengths and formats normally encountered in junior officer positions. However, what you gain from your work: will be directly proportionate to the effort you put into it. FOR THE COMMANDANT ~~~ WILLIS~~ Lt Col, USAF 1 Atch Chief, Education Division AS 400 Course Goals Directorate of Operations Cy to: AFA Strentth Throuth Knowledte Figure 2. 44 READING5-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP STAFF SUMMARY SHEET TO ACTION 81GNATURK (S---_, TO ACTION IIGNATUIIlK (S__... •ttd Ontclo) I AU/DA Coord • z AU/CS Coord 7 8 I AU/CC Sign· 4 • 10 I IU8P..Ne& DAT& IURNAMIE OP' ACTION OFP'ICaR ANO GRADS Anderson, Colonel 1·::~fEDCC r~~~1 15 June 1971 DAT&IUDJATSubject in Agreement with that of the Topic Paper 5 June 1971 I ....MARY· 1. When the staff summary sheet is lengthy or complex, start the summation with a general statement of what action is proposed, for example, "On 3 June, General Jones recommended in his letter at TAB B tHat AU develop a Planners Course. This paper proposes a favorable reply for General Smith's signature." 2. Write the staff summary sheet so that it provides a synopsis of the background and a brief aiscussion of the salient points of the subject paper, not merely a chronological development of the problem. Limit the summary to one page and submit only one copy. 3. Use tabs and list them if two or more references are attached. If the Commander's signature is required on a proposed letter, that letter will follow immediately after the staff summary sheet. RECOMMENDATION: 4. Briefly describe the recommended course of action and tell what specific action is proposed, for example, "That General Smith sign the letter to AF/PDC at TAB A" or "That the Chief of Staff approve the study at TAB A and return to AU/ED." Do not make alternate recommendations. Signature(of the Commander, Director or TAB A -Proposed Ltr to AF/PDC Chief of Staff Agency) TAB B-Ltr from Gen Jones TAB C-Curriculum Outline PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBIDLETE, Figure 3. CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP TAUlRG PAPEll Cit PBBPABATIOR OF TAUtiBG PAPEllS --Define problem in one or two abort sentences. -Diacuaaion --A talldDS paper 1a a concise document which provides succinct comments for use duriQS a meetiQS. Prepared by the action officer, but used by hie superior. •-Primary purpose ia to serve as a quick reference outline. Rormally prepared in outline form, using key words and abbreviated phrases, rather than complete sentences. Style depends on user's knowledge of subject and hie personal desires. Format also varies, but this example illustrates the moat popular. (Double-spaced, telegraphic vordiQS.) Diacusaion sst be accurate, brief, and clear. -Conclusion/Recommendation Possibly the conclusion is readily apparent. If not, State conclusion. State recommendation simply. OPB.: AllTO-IC Action Officer : Lt Clouaherty Date : 2 Jan 68 figure4. 46 READING5-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP mand. This is a one-page summary of the Other Reporting MethodS problem, showing also, coordination and preThis article concerns writing practices but senting a recommended solution. it is reasonable to keep problem reporting in A major project, such as an engineering perspective. A report need not be written; study on a problem in F-111 landing gears, it can also be oral. For instance, the military may generate ·a volume of data and discusbriefing can easily be used to report on a sion. The completed record of this project is problem. accompanied by a staff summary sheet, Like every form of reporting, the briefwhich itself becomes a problem-solving docing's form depends on what the briefing offiument. cer wants to do with it. An informative briefing may simply convey the facts of the case. Talking Papers It says, "This is what we have to do and this Another widely used format is the talking is how we plan to do it." Or an advocacy paper. In the last few years, the talking briefing may be used. This briefmg says, paper has been used extensively as a "mem"This is what has to be done, and this is the ory tickler," as an outline from which to way we think it ought to be done." The adspeak, or as a background information piece vocacy briefing is usually reserved for posifor a senior officer. The format varies tion statements or controversial solutions widely, but a typical format is shown as Figthat are being reported. ure 4. HOW STAFF WRITING GOES WRONG It is obvious that talking papers, like letters and memos, are not restricted to reportThus far, we have talked only about the ing on solved problems, but this is the most kinds and uses of problem-solving reports. common use. A staff officer almost always Let us go one step further and look at the prepares a talking paper for a senior officer way they are written, to consider how staff or a commander. writing goes wrong and what we should do to set it right again. Electrical Messages Every officer wants his writing to be effecWhen faster communication is needed tive, a fact no less true fifty years ago than than a letter can provide, the electrical mestoday. But years of concentration on clear sage is available. The format for the electriwriting have produced no sure-fire formula. cal message is found on DD Form 173. The We can only conclude that effective writing Air Force moves a large volume of electrical is an elusive goal. message traffic 'through· the "TWX" (from We publish reams of advice on this subteletypewriter exchange, and pronounced ject; adyice is not hard to find. But reading "twix"). about writing is an imperfect tool for imFigure 5 shows the message form for elecprovement, and no vaccine has yet been trical messages. Continuation sheets are used found to immunize against ineffective writwhen the message length exceeds the space ing. The only satisfactory approach to learnavailable on the form. If there is more than ing staff writing techniques is through study one recipient of the message, all addressees and practice, based on a desire to improve. are listed on the original form. It is not necessary to use an individual form for each ad.:. Problems of Clarity dressee. Oassified messages have certain Lack of clarity is the biggest problem in additional instructions that apply to ·their staff writing. The prime causes of this are preparation, but they must also meet the reloose wording and poor organization. Loose quirements shown in Figure 5. Air Force wording is simply a matter of dealing with Manual10-2 contains further details on the broad generalities instead of specific meaning. For instance, does the term "rated per preparation of electrical messages. 47 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP sonnel'' refer to flying officers only, or to pilots only, or to all people whose job is in an aircraft? When confusion mounts, we should clarify our abstractions. Poor organization results when main ideas are buried in paragraphs, and when a logical pattern is not selected and followed. We can sometimes see this lack of organization when an officer writes like he talks-backtracking, digressing, repeating, and modifying earlier statements. Providing communicative feedback and emphasizing main ideas can improve clarity. While not every letter or report will draw a reply that indicates the success of communication, feedback in some form is always possible. For instance, the writer may ask a friend to read his report and comment. Or, he may look for the recurrence of problems once solved. If the problems keep recurring, the writer may not have communicated about their solutions. As loose as our spoken language is, feedback is the reason it communicates so much better than most written reports. As for emphasizing main ideas, a good practice is to put the main points at the beginning or the end of the paragraphs, where they are more likely to be noticed. The writer who chooses a pattern of organization and sticks to it will be better understood. Other methods of emphasizing main points include underlining, indenting subordinate ideas, and adding titles to sections of a report to stress the main ideas. Further advice on emphasizing main ideas may be found in Air Force Pamphlet 10-1. There are many other means of improving clarity, such as writing with the probable reader in mind. But obtaining feedback and emphasizing main ideas are excellent places to start. Problems of Readability Readable writing employs correct usage and direct construction. Faulty grammar or spelling can ruin the flow of a report by encouraging the reader to discount what the writer says. Virtually every. junior officer in the Air Force has a college degree, yet a sur prising number have difficulty in spotting simple errors in grammar and spelling. Advice on grammar is found in Air Force Pamphlet 10-1. One way to improve spelling is to look up words in question and keep a list of words most often misspelled. The blank pages of a pocket dictionary are useful for this purpose. Many dictionaries contain general advice on spelling. In Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, for instance, spelling rules are explained on pages 1187-1191. Comparison of these rules with the individual's list of misspelled words may reveal a relationship. A second problem of readability. occurs when·writing lacks directness. Wordiness obscures any message. For instance, this item appeared in a base daily bulletin: "All personnel, civilians, and dependents who are on base, out-of-doors or in an automobile, will take the appropriate action at the daily retreat." Rewording would certainly improve communication in this case. Similarly, the use of the passive voice and the third person in military writing is thought by some to add dignity to a communication. In fact, it sometimes adds obscurity. Indirectness can stem from a desire to be exact. The man who gave his letter the title "Extended Military Curricular Reorganization Study Program" was only trying to be helpful. In this case, along noun group obscures the issue and creates indirectness. If the issue is buried under layers of modifying clauses, in an attempt to include everything in one sentence, the result is also indirectness. Problems of Appropriateness The course goal which states each student must "be able to . . . speak and write with accuracy, clarity, and appropriate style," applies to both years of the AFROTC Professional Officer Course. Such a goal leads us to ask, "What is appropriate style for a junior officer?" The answer will vary with what is written, but it certainly involves an active concern with tone, vocabulary, and sentence construction. Appropriateness requires a shifting 48 READING5-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP of stylistic gears: a breezy report on a solved problem, a stem letter of commendation, or a warm and friendly office instruction would be examples of ineffective communications due to inappropriate style. Appropriate style may be difficult to achieve. Accumulated experience and increased maturity may change one's concept of appropriate style. For help in this area now, the entirety of the little book, The Elements of Style,* will be useful. Additionally, Air Force Pamphlet 10-1 advises on the use of words to achieve appropriateness. SUMMARY Our goal has been to review briefly Air Force staff writing practices with emphasis on the ways of reporting on solved problems. We have seen that the staff study is useful both as a report and as a teaching device, • The Elements of Styie, W. Strullk, Jr, and B. B. White. New York: MacMillan Paperbacks, 19S9. and perhaps more honored in the latter role. Letters and memos are widely used to report briefly on solved problems. Complex studies and recommendations may be condensed in a staff summary sheet. Other complex issues may be summarized in the talking paper, which can aid in makin~a comprehensive oral report on short notice. In making their reports, staff officers commonly encounter problems of clarity, readability, and appropriateness. For these problems we recommend the references shown. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. How do the steps of the scientific method of problem solving relate to the parts of a staff study? 2. Explain the appropriateness of using a staff study to document a decision that has already been made. 3. How much flexibility in · format are we permitted in using the documents shown in this section? READING E Preparation of the Written Case Analysis Reprinted by permission from USAF Academy, Human Relations and Leadership, 1968. 1. Reading: Before starting the rough draft of the written case analysis, the analyst should read the case several times and make notes. 2. Organization: a. The analyst should organize the analysis mentally before starting to wri~e. He should decide what the main points are; what direction the analysis should take; and how to get there. b. Some cases might be organized using the staff study format outlined in Reading D, "Air Force Staff Writing Practices." c. Other analyses may fall more easily into the following format: ( 1) Problem-Define the problem in an objective manner; do not merely describe the circumstances. (2) Facts-Give an accurate account of those critical facts upon which the analysis is based: names, places, relationships, and consequences (see paragraph 3a). 49 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP (3) Alternatives-List the several alconsiders the case at hand without being ab solute or dogmatic.) · ternative courses of action which best fit the situation and, where applicable, consider the b. Using high-flown and imprecise phrases having little to do with the specificfollowing: (a) Time case being analyzed and expressing pious (b) Manpower aims without saying how these are to be met. (c) Resources Example: "The flight commander should es (d) Concepts of management tablish his position and get the inen to realize (4) Relationship-Where appropriate, their importance in relation to the overall relate the principles, concepts, theories, etc., mission." Fine, but how should he do this? of behavioral science and/or management c. Giving a literal and unqualified acceptwhich apply to the case. ance to all of the statements in the case. Ac (5) Decision-After considering all cepting opinions given in the case as facts. the evidence and circumstances, select the d. Making assumptions not warranted by case facts. And, worse, building an entirebest alternative course of action and be pre pared to defend that selection. analysis on one or two assumptions that d. The organization to be used will demade little sense in the first place. pend, of course, on the case, the analysis, e. Refusing to accept case facts, or, refusand personal preferences. The two formats ing to attach any importance to opinions outlined above are suggestions and can be alstated in the case on the grounds that only tered in any way, or other organizations may good, solid, objective facts are needed for coping effectively with problem situations. be more convenient. 3. Facts and Assumptions: Case facts will 5. Critique: The "ABC's" of good written have to be used in the analysis, but some ascommunication are accuracy, brevity, and sumptions must be made in order to deal clarity. Don't abuse the reader with excess verbiage, unwarranted assumptions, and unwith the case. Two important points: a. Do not paraphrase the case. Get all the clear phraseology. facts on paper without adding any personal a. Have all the facts been considered and . thinking. Assume that the reader has read outlined? b. Are there any unwarranted assump the case and is familiar with the case data. Restating the case facts before starting the tions? c. Has the problem(s) been accurately analysis is a waste of time. Use case facts in the analysis to keep the analysis specifically perceived and stated? d. Have the recommendations been preapplicable to the case at hand. sented in a clear, concise manner? b. Make ·assumptions that can be de fended through reference to the case itself. e. Do the recommendations meet the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, and applica 4. Mistakes which should be avoided in bility? f. Is the case well-developed and logiwritten case analysis: a. Using absolute terms not justified by cally concluded? case facts: "always," "never," "certainly," Questions for Reflection and Discussion "obviously," "invariably." (Qualify state ments, where necessary, but avoid going all 1. What specific benefits might be gained in the way toward taking no stand at all on the making a written case analysis? case. "The group probably feels some resent2. How does careful reading of a c~se compare ment toward its leader in this situation; if so, to making a case study in terms of the benefits I feel that ...." This sort of statement to be desired? 50 READING5-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING F The Role of the Discussion Leader Reprinted by permission from USAF Academy, Human Relations and Leadership, 1968. Y OU will be a discussion leader in presenting both case studies and role-playing exercises. Your. main function will be to stimulate, guide, and summarize a productive and, above all, a practical discussion. This discussion and the thinking behind it on the part of the participants is a chief ingredient in this course. Your class members are expected, in large part to teach themselves by suggesting their own interpretations of the case, by trading among themselves the experience they draw from as they speak, and by thinking out, expressing and defending against criticism of their own plans of action. It should be emphasized, above all, that the discussion must not tum into an examination, must not appear to be the "recitation" of the conventional classroom type, and must not be devoted to criticism of the cadets who speak in class. Furthermore, there is frequently no one correct answer to the problems raised by the cases. Even when a problem has been successfully solved, you may suggest points _where improvement is possible. In the areas of leadership and management from which these cases come, there is not a "book answer" or an "approved solution." It is appropriate, then, that you as the discussion leader should refrain throughout the class from interposing your own judgment, asserting or suggesting that some view is clearly wrong, and from asking leading questions designed to get a particular response. Your main effort should be to get the comments of various individuals understood and fully explored, especially when they bear on the issues ~hich the case most specifically raises. The class members should arrive at a common approximate solution without being pushed toward it by you. . This is not to say that you may not express your ideas or give your opinions. You can do these things if you wish, but you must do them after, rather than before, the members of the class have expressed themselves. If you do not wait, you may silence persons who do not agree . .with you or precipitate a hot argument about topics which should be considered rationally from all sides. In summarizing the discussion, you should reflect primarily what the class has arrived at, but you can say at the end whether that corresponds with your ideas or whether in your opinion the discussion has omitted vital considerations. Earlier, your direction is always toward consideration of issues rather than suggestions about how the issues should be resolved. If you have not been placed in the role of a discussion leader before, it may be helpful to state that the assignment is not so formidable as it may appear. Discussion will occur, for the urge to assert one's own views about interesting and controversial issues is usually present in any group. If you do not press too hard at the beginning with detailed questions, the discussion will begin quickly and gather momentum very rapidly. At least during the first few minutes of any discussion period, you should give the group its head until it is clear to you which issues have priority for a thorough exploration by the class. There is no fixed technique for such discussion, but a few hints may suggest the circumstances under which men learn under the case method. Keep the talk informal. A void criticism of ideas and of the individual ex.: pressing them. Leave that to the class. Do not insist that the discussion follow the sug 51 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP DO'S AND DON'TS FOR DISCUSSION LEADERS DON'T DO • Force your own opinion • Ask thought-provoking questions • Be a good listener • Argue • Quibble • Be open-minded , Secure uniform participation • Use sarcasm • Lead by skillful questions • Ridicule • Grasp what lies behind the words • Talk too much of the speaker • Use distracting mannerisms • Think ahead of the group • Become excited • Encourage the group to do its own • Lose your temperthinking • Be late for meetings • Acquaint members with one another • Run overtime • Establish an attitude of common helpfulness • Be pompous • Be sensitive to group actions and • Be too seriousreactions • Try to understand why individuals • Talk personalities behave as they do • Use words the group does not • Develop skillful behavior in group understand procedures to help the group achieve • Give adviceits purposes • Be honest about what you don't know • Be friendly Figure 1. 52 READING5-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP gested questions. Do not try to cover what there is not time for; for a question not considered in one case will come to focus during another class. Give credit for ideas as you summarize when you can remember who first suggested them. When conferees ask you for the answer to a question, take the position that they are to tell you, you are not to tell them. Do not pretend to be an expert in these matters. Restate important contributions made by individuals without twisting the contents or expressing your own accept .. ance or rejection of them. You will observe that most of these comments are concerned with the discussion leader keeping out of the way of the discussion and assisting in its free development in its own terms rather than making specific injunctions about positive steps to take. Have confidence in the material and in the individuals who are discussing it. Your job will be easy if you have and display that confidence. Be yourself and do not be afraid of impromptu violation of these instructions; for even if you wanted to, you would find it very difficult to prevent any group of individuals from considering the issues which these cases pose. Two hazards of case discussion should be mentioned. Sometimes an individual will begin a long speech on his own experience, and sometimes the group will head toward a speculative bull session on general topics outside the case. Your check on these teq.dencies is identical in both instances. Do not tell the speaker he is off base. Ask him to apply what he is saying to the facts of this case. If he cannot do so, he will subside. Until the case problems have been adequately dealt with, keep raising the key questions until the problems have been fully considered. When the case has been dealt with and the action problems have been settled, make a final summary, with the help of the group if desired. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Describe the role of the discussion leader. 2. How can the discussion leader promote meaningful discussion? 3. How can a discussion leader inhibit worthwhile discussion? 53 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING G The Integration of Role Playing and Case Studies IJy Norman R. F. Maier, Allen R. Solem, and Ayesha A. Maier. Reprinted by permission from Supervisory & Executive Development, A Manual for Role Playing. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1964. Copyright 1964. Norman R. F. Maier is Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan. He is noted for his research in reasoning, frustration, human relations, group problem ·solving, and industrial psychology. Among Dr. Maier's publications are Principles .of Human Relations (1950); Creative Management (1962); Leadership Methods and Skills (1963); and Psychology in Industry (1965). Allen R. Solem is Professor of Management Psychology, School of Business Administration, University of Minnesota. He has taught psychology at the University of Michigan, North Carolina State University, and the University of Maryland. Dr. Solem. has recently published Role Playing in Management Education (1968). Ayesha A. Maier assisted in writing the text from which this article is taken. soon becomes apparent that there is a big T HE case study approach to human relagap between practical and theoretical think tions was initiated at Harvard,1 and it made a unique contrib\ltion to the educaing. tional process. Cases force one to think in The more important contributions of the terms of particulars. Whether a theory or case method to training iflclude the followbroad generalization is sound can only be ing: determined by applying it to a specific set of facts. When placed in an institutionalized 1. It discourages the making of snap judgsetting, the facts must be considered in relaments about people and behavior. tion to power structure,_ given personalities, 2. It discourages believing in, or looking and time pressures. for, the "correct" answer.The case-study approach assumes group 3. It graphically illustrates how the same .discussion and the cases are sufficiently inset of events can be perceived differently. volved and detailed to produce a wide range 4. It destroys any smug generalizations in opinion concerning (a) who was to blame, one might have about right vs. wrong an(b) what caused a person to behave as he swers, management prerogatives, the attitudedid, and (c) what is the best corrective acof labor, best methods of discipline, thetion to take. younger generation, the place of women inThe fact that a group of persons with simimanagement, and many other issues. lar backgrounds and aspirations should disa5. It trains one to discuss with others, andgree in simple behavior matters often comes experience the broadening value of interactas a surprise to participants. Since a case ing with one's equals. merely contains a description of a series of 6. It keeps the thinking in a practical setsamples of events, each stating what some one said or did and how others reacted, it ting, so that such considerations as costs, convenience, deadlines, attitudes of top man 1 H. Cabot and J. A. Kahl, Human Relations: Concepts and Cases in Concrete Social Science. Vol. II, Cases. agement, and the morale of other persons inHarvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953. volved prevent solutions from taking on an J. D. Glover and R. M. Hower, The Administrator: Cases on Human Relations in Business (2nd ed.), R. D. idealistic character. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Dl., 1952. 54 READINGS-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 7. It causes doubt as to whether there really are basic human relations principles.2 Although human relations principles may exist, it is well not to come into a program with pat conclusions. If a program is well handled, some general principles should de velop in the process of training. The technique of role playing is an outgrowth of the work of Moreno3 who initially developed the method in connection with his work With the mentally disturbed. The purpose of the technique was to give thepatient insight into some of his relationships with others by having him play the role of these other persons. Thus a patient might be asked to act out his father's behavior while the clinical assistant plays the part of the patient. The scene portrayed might be that of the son asking the father for the use of the family car. The technique is becoming recognized and accepted as a training method in interpersonal relationships, and it is being modified and extended in a variety of ways to suit many specific purposes. The unique values of role playing include the followitig: 1. It requires the person to carry out a thought or decision he may have reached. For example, a conferee may conclude from a case study that Mr. A should apologize to Mr. B. In role playing, A would be asked to go to B and apologize. Role playing experience soon demonstrates the gap between thinking and doing. 2. It permits the practice of carrying out an action and makes it clear that good human relations require skill in the same sense that playing golf requires skill. 3. Attitude changes are effectively accomplished by placing persons in specified roles. It becomes apparent that a person's behavior is not only a function of his personality, but also of the situation in which he finds himself. • F. 1. Roethlisberger emphasized the need for more skill and less talk about verbal principles in his article, Human Relations: Rare, Medium or Well Done, Harvard Business R•wiew, Jan. 1948, 107. • 1. L. Moreno, Who Shall Survive?, Beacon House, Inc.,Beacon, N.Y., 19S3. 4. It trains a person to be aware of, and sensitive to, the feelings of others. This information serves as a feedback of the effect his behavior has on other people. 5. A fuller appreciation of the important part played by feelings in determining behavior in social situations is developed. 6. Each person is able to discover his own personal faults. For example, the person who" enjoys making wisecracks may discover how these often hurt others. 7. It permits training in the control of feelings and emotions. For example, a person can be given practice in not becoming irritated by complaints since he can be· repeatedly placed in the role of a supervisor. In combining role playing with the case method one goes beyond giving practice in a segment of behavior. Instead, a situation is created that contains practical considerations beyond those involved in the interpersonal relationship. For instance, the question of whether or not a foreman can take time off to listen to an employee under a given set of conditions involves not only the matter of how to deal with an employee's request, but also other demands that the situation makes on the supervisor at the time. In this way practical considerations and good human relations skills must be integrated. It is the hope that the integration of role playing and the case method will yield the combined advantages of the two • methods. There is no reason to believe that any of them must be sacrificed by this merger. Rather, it is probable that new insights will be achieved because of the new relationships that are created. Certainly the values of •. the discussion of how something was said or done in role playing can lead to insights into skill requirements as well as to better planning on what should or should not be done. Discussions of case studies, at best, remaitJ at the intellectual level and this is the great deficiency that role playing can correct. In using different types of role playing and by placing persons in new and strange situations, further training values are achieved. One learns not to act the role of another, but 55 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP to act one's own part in varied situations and leadership functions can determine whether or not a group will work together, accept im under inany conditions. In this manner the role playing of cases comes very Close to provements, and try to develop better ways practicing actual industrial problems. of doing a job.The cases concerned with problems and TYPES OF ROLE PLAYING PROBLEMS dealings with individuals focus attention on the practice and outcomes of various interGenerally speaking, it is possible to divide personal relations procedures and skills. human relations problems into two general These include ways for creating an atmostypes, those having to do with individuals phere in which an individual feels his superand those having to do with a group. Giving visor is a willing helper rather than a judge;a job assignment, correcting an individual, procedures for discovering an individual'sinterviewing a person, dealing with a com plaint, and calming an emotionally upset emneeds, aspirations, and attitudes; opportunities to practice avoiding defensive behavior; ployee are examples of face-to-face relationtraining in responding to feelings rather thanships with. individuals. These require skills in facts; and ways to improve the effectivenessinterpersonal relations on the part of the suof interviews. pervisor. It is not within the scope of this volume toWhen more than one person reports to a present an adequate discussion of the princisupervisor, he not only has multiplied his · ples in group leadership and interpersonal face-to-face relationships but he must deal with an additional problem: the relationships relationships with individuals. Those who de sire to explore further into these areas andthat each employee has with the others. other aspects of human relations are referrt>d Problems of favoritism, discriminatory practices, face saving, fairness of assignments, to related publications.5 and regimentation fall in this category. InsoHOW TO ROLE PLAYfar as the supervisor is in charge of a group he is a leader and certain leadership skills All people are good actors when they make are demanded of him. up their own lines. This is one of the most im pressive facts one experiences in working withIn some cases it is difficult for the superrole playing. One can completely dispensevisor to know whether he is dealing with a group or an individual problem. Problems in with any consideration of training participants safety may reflect group attitudes4 so that an in voice intonation and gestures. The role player remains himself and must merely be individual's violation of a rule may actually have in the situation described. Ifhe is placedinvolve the entire group. One of the skills of in the role of a union steward, he should cona supervisor is his ability to make the correct sider himself to be the steward for the group diagnosis of the type of problem that con fronts him; It is also important that he be specified and not act the way he thinks a union steward behaves. In addition to finding himready to change his diagnQsis if new and relself in a specific position, the role player mayevant factors are disclosed . . . be expected to accept certain facts about hisThe cases that contain group problems are length of service, sex, family ties, friends,primarily aimed toward training in various and previous experiences. He should adoptconference leadership skills. There is conthese as his own and let his feelings and atti siderable research evidence that indicates the tude change as these imagined events or faceffectiveness of certain leadership attitudes tors seem to require.and participation techniques. Important All of us conduct ourselves differently de • In a large power plant the safety department had great pending on the situation in which we find difficulty in getting electricians to wear hard hats for protection. Finally, it was discovered that electricians re sisted because hard hats made. them look like construction • N. R. F. Maier, Principles of Human Relations: Ap workers. Thus the underlying ·difficulty was a c:lass status plications to Management, .John Wiley & Cons, New York, problem. The simple solution was to provide different hard 1952; Psycholagy in Industry (2nd ed.), Houghton Mifflin hats for the various groups of workers. Co., Boston, 1955. 56 READING5-INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ourselves. As a supervisor on the job, one's conduct is likely to be very different than when at home with the family. Similarly, appropriate ·behavior at a party is quite unlike accepted conduct at the movies. This does not imply that personality changes, but rather that behavior is altered in response to the situation while the person remains himself. The role playing instructions describe the setting in which a particular frame of mind will be formulated. Because they set up a state of mind that serves as a point of departure, the roles should not be reexamined by the players once the interaction has begun. It is important to realize that the initial attitude adopted by a role player need not remain static. Subsequent events or experiences, as they occur in the process of role playing, may alter these attitudes and create pleasant or unpleasant feelings. As a result, the persons involved may have some of the same emotional experiences that occur in real life situations. This emotional arousal is one of the most important ·values of role playing and makes it a form of rehearsal for practical problems. With experience in role playing situations, persons learn to feel the part; to the extent that this occurs, role playing behavior becomes more and more authentic. The fact that role playing can simulate real life situations makes ~t possible for one to try new ways of handling problems without suffering any serious consequences if the methods fail. In the process of role playing, questions may be raised in the discussion that are not covered by the instructions to the participants. When this occurs the person questioned should feel free to make up facts or experiences that are appropriate to the circumstances. For example, if the foreman i~a case asks a worker a question about the health of his children, he may answer it in any one of several ways without altering the spirit of the case. However, the player should not go out of his way to make up experiences or facts that are inconsistent with his role. In conclusion it is perhaps worthwhile to repeat points that have already been stated in order to warn against two common mistakes in role playing. 1. Do not consult your role while playing a part .. This practice tends to make an attitude a static condition and not subject to alteration. Real attitudes are dynamic forces and are subject to change in direction as well as in intensity. 2. Do not behave the way you feel a person in the position described in your role should behave. This ability to play the part of another person is perhaps a requirement for acting in a play, but it is a distinct disadvantage in successful role playing. A good role player need' not be an accomplished actor. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Why would you use role playing rather than case studies and vice versa? 2. What are the key elements in successful role playing? 3. How did role playing develop as a leadership training method? 51 Chapter 3 The Challenge to the Air Force Officer • • . The tasks of military leadership in the future will be more complex and difficult and the talent required to perform those tasks successfully will be of a higher order and greater variety than ever before. Once it was enough that the military leader excel in strength and stamina and courage. XQday the range of talents required is infinitely broader, and the emphasis is on brainpower and character. ... We need military leaders who understand this complex world in which we live, the philosophies men live by, the leaders and people of other nations, their history, their customs, their aspirations, their problems. We need military leaders who understand the scientific revolution of recent years, the physics and mathematics and other sciences that have given us the power to relieve human misery or to destroy each other. We need military leaders who understand the techniques of managing bafflingly complex organizations! S INCE the purpose of this volume is to help the reader formulate a basis from which he can develop a personal concept of leadership, this chapter will cover some of the factors which go into a leader's formation. The reader should ask himself how he would react in a situation requiring an important decision. Would he be, as Col. D. K. Stephans recommends in the companion reading, "We Live in Fame,'~* a tomcat who hones his skills carefully and takes pride in being part of a disciplined professional fighting team? Or would he be one of Stephans' irresponsible tigers or self-protecting pussycats? These characterizations are equally applicable in operational or administrative jobs. A person can pussyfoot out of a challenging assignment or roar into it like a tiger, fearless, but uninformed, regardless of whether he is flying an F-4 or managing a personnel shop. On the other hand, a person's behavior can reflect a responsible, trained professional attitude concerned with doing a winning job by the rules in whatever career.field he may enter. Every professional person continually faces questions or problems requiring decisions, large and small. A person's reaction to a given situation, in fact his behavior in general, is influenced not only by his perception of the moment, but also by the many complex variables that comprise his total experience. In later chapters, some of these variables are examined as they relate to the group, the situation, and the leader. The present chapter is directly concerned with some aspects of the role of the Air Force leader-its challenges and opportunities. AUTHORITY OF AN AIR FORCE OFFICER Regardless of the role the officer plays in the Air Force.and his academic back ground, when he goes on active duty, he has at least two things in common with 1 Scaetary of DefeDSe Melvin R. Laird as quoted iD MIUtttTY ReviA-, May 1970, page 93. • See pp. 7S-76. . S9 THE QJinitrb ~tatrs Air Jforrr UnlftUJ•t c;...mL USAF IMJt•13 Cld., of Stafl, hno11nel DD • ::-. 1AF Figure 3-1. 60 THE CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER every other officer: an oath of office and a commission granted by the President. The oath of office reads: I, ______________________________________ (First name-middle name-last name) (AFSN) having been appointed a , United States Air Force, do solemnly swear (or (Grade) affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD. The commission (see Figure 3-1 ) contains a great deal of valuable information in its few brief paragraphs. Every officer should examine it closely. He will learn, for example, that in accepting a commission, he gained a position of "special trust and confidence" in the eyes of the President--trust and confidence in his "patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities." By virtue of his commission, he is placed in a position of authority over "personnel of lesser rank." Also, he is charged with obeying the lawful order of those who are appointed over him. Before he can function as an offi cer, he must take the oath of office in which he swears to "support and defend the Constitution," to "bear true faith and allegiance to the same,"' and to ''well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office"* upon which he enters. The Air Force officer is more than a job holder assigned to a particular duty. He is more than a pilot, a missile maintenance officer, an engineer, a lawyer, a doctor, an or an administrator. As emphasized by President John F. Kennedy, there is ever-increasing need for all officers to expand their education, training, and skills so that they can complement U.S. diplomacy in both military and nonmilitary roles. These are but some of the obligations and responsibilities required of every Air Force officer. If he is to discharge these responsibilities, he must have commensurate authority. SOURCES OF OFFICER AUTHORITY Authority is the power of a commander to command those subordinate to him, or to take action within the scope of his command. By extension, this power, or a part thereof, is delegated and used in the name of a commander. Every officer with any degree of responsibility for the actions of others must have delegated to him suffi cient authority to eontrol and direct his subordinates. The authority possessed by a commissioned officer in the Armed Forces stems from the Constitution. But officer authority is not specifically spelled out in the Constitution. It is derived from the powers given to the Congress and to the President of the United States. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution provides that insofar as the Armed Forces are concerned, "Congress shall have the power . . . to declare war . . . to raise and support armies ... to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces"; and to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers." Congress, pursuant to this authority, enacts legislation pertaining to the Armed Forces, to include the law establishing the Uniform Code of Military Justice; laws • For a more detailed discussion of the reasons for reading the commission, see Col Verne Biven's article, "Read Your Commission," pp. 77-79. 61 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP authorizing medical care for dependents; and laws concerning the grade structure, pay, and leave for personnel in the military services. Article II of the Constitution provides that the President of the United States "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . (Sec. 3). It also states: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States ..." (Sec. 2), and he "shall commission all the officers of the United States" (Sec. 3). In exercising this power to commission, he gives a direct grant of authority to each officer commensurate with that officer's rank. Recall the words in the commission, "I do strictly charge and require those officers and other personnel of lower rank to render such obedience as is due an officer of this grade and position." Each person who enters the military service is made aware of the authority of appointed officers when he begins active duty. In effect, he agrees to obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of officers appointed over him according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He is also warned of the penalties that his commander may impose under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice if he does not comply with orders. The President, through his commissioning power, is the direct source of authorityfor Air Force officers. He also acts as a source of authority when he orders the Sec retary of Defense to implement the acts of the Congress. This authority, passed from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Air Force, and down to the lowest levels of command, is clearly expressed in hundreds of regulations, manuals, and other directives which spell out authority and responsibility to act in specific matters. Some administrative directives are not, of course, based directly on acts of Congress, but all stem from authority set in motion by the President and delegated through his subordinates to implement the programs authorized by the Congress. The specific authority that an Air Force officer has depends on his job. It varies according to whether he is in pilot training, in a laboratory, or in one of the other more than 200 career fields and 1,000 occupational specialties in the Air Force available to him and assigned in accordance with his academic background and ex perience. Whatever the assignment· and the specific authority that comes with it, there are other kinds of authority created by the job situation-authority that is not based on established policies or procedures. There are times when an officer must decide. on a course of action without the help of specific guidelines. In such situations, the officer's source of authority is solely his ability to judge what is right. ·This is moral authority. Another kind of unspecified authority is that which comes to the officer who has become a recognized expert in some particular field. Finally, there is the authority which some leaders are able to exercise because of their personal magnetism or "charisma." This is known as referrent authority. The real meaning of authority, then, is the amount of discretion, or freedom to act, that is granted to an officer. The junior officer is given a great deal of freedom to act, and his authority increases as he gains experience and becomes more familiar with his job environment. CoiDmensurate with the officer's authority, whether expressed or implied, comes responsibility. The officer is responsible for exercising his authority to accomplishthe mission in the best possible manner. How, one may ask, will he be able to exercise this responsibility and authority with only limited guidelines? The answer lies in the broad discretionary area where experience and personal judgement must take over. 62 THE CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Brig. Gen. Cecil E. Combs, in his reading "Loyalty: the Military Touchstone,''* ascribes the ability of the officer to assume the heavy responsibilities of his profession to his loyalty to a cause bigger than himself. General Combs says, ''Those officers who command our instant and continuing respect are invariably those who, whatever their abilities in whatever position of responsibility, put their responsibility first and foremost in all that they do." In short, authority and responsibility are the hallmarks of the Air Force officerthey make it possible for him to meet his challenge. This challenge is demanding, complex, and frequently dangerous. It requires him to be a "real-world" professional in every respect. The challenge is demanding because he receives his commission as a representative of the American people with special authority and responsibility, complex because he must have specialiZed technical skills and generalized leadership skills, and dangerous because he must prepare for combat. ''The mission of the United States Air Force is to fly and to fight-don't you ever forget itt" reminds the fighter squadron motto. · As Lt. Gen. Seth J. McKee, then Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, remarked to a graduating class of the Squadron Officers School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Whatever your own type of leadership may be, there are two attitudes you should never tolerate in your organization. The first is 'Don't rock the boat'; and the other, 'Don't stick your neck out.' There wouldn't be an Air Force as we know it today--or maybe even a country-if it weren't for some of your predecessors who were willing to pay a price for constructive change. Every one of us has to be prepared at some time to lay his career-or at least his BR--on the line for what he believes to be right. This is not something to be done frivolously or impulsively""-Certainly not to the prejudice of discipline. Knowing when the end justifies a risk of great personal sacrifico-either in combat or in management is the mark of a true professional. In chapter 1, the definition of leadership includes the words "to effectively accom-: plish the organizational Inission." The key word here is "accomplish." Accomplishing the mission can be a formidable task. It may involve overcoming unforeseen obstacles, not only physical obstacles, but obstacles stemming from conflict and resistance within the organization. There may be struggle, discouragement, hardship, and danger. The demands on the officer are great because the challenges ate great, but the satisfactions of accomplishment are comparably rewarding. PROFESSIONALISM AND THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Why is the Air Force officer vested with the authority and responsibility to make important decisions? There are many reasons, of course, but the primary reason is that his professional competence is respected. As noted earlier, some of the articles in the following chapter are concerned with the general subject of military duty as a profession. An examination of these selections will lead to a better understanding of what it means to be a professional Air Force officer with the accompanying priviledges and obligations. Before looking at these selections, we suggest a review of the readfug, ''The Mili tary Profession,"** which is the opening chapter of Air Force Manual53-1, United States Officer Professional Military Education System. This chapter covers what a professional is, what he does, and how he achieves and maintains his status. The • See pp. 80-83. • • See pp. 84-85. 63 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP reader may wish to compare this description of a professional to the articles by Professor Huntington and others which are cited in the following paragraphs. Additionally, you may wish to contrast the prosaic style of AFM 53-1 and the eloquent oratory of General MacArthur** as they each describe the ideal of professional service. The first article to be examined is the selection by Samuel P. Huntington "Officership as a Profession."*** Huntington feels that military officership is an established profession. He argues this by listing the characteristics of any profession, then describing how military officers fit these characteristics. While Professor Huntington writes of professionalism in general terms, the purpose of this volume is to consider professionalism in terms of the individual in his efforts to build the foundation of a professional career. Therefore, a reading of Huntington's article should lead to a consideration of what the role of a professional officer means to each individual. Two students in professional military schools, Lt. Col. Zeb B. Bradford of the Command and General Staff College and Maj. James R. Murphy of the Air Command and Staff College, differ with Huntington in their article "A New Look at the Military Profession."* The expertise of the military professional, write the authors, is not simply the management of violence as Huntington asserts. The military man does many things that are not in the least connected with violence. For this reason, Bradford and Murphy suggest a new interpretation of what the military profession is"a profession of unconditional service to the nation, engaged in a multitude of tasks." The Air Force is indeed engaged in a "multitude of tasks." Over 200 specialties are now available, and this number does not include the hundreds of subcategories (known as "shredouts") within these specialties. In fact, we can safely say that for every job in civilian aerospace industry, there is a parallel job in the United States Air Force; and the Air Force offers addition~} categories that have no counterpart in industry. Not all these specialties are directly concerned with aerospace, of course, for included among them are medical, legal, religious, information, intelligence, education, and training, food services, vehicle maintenance, and a host of other specialties which were required by military forces long before the aerospace age. Even so, these age-old specialties must meet the challenges of the new age. There is one significant difference between jobs in the Air Force and jobs in industry. That difference lies primarily in the degree of respon~ibility granted to Air Force personnel early in their careers. Air Force Lt. Jerry E. White pointed out this difference between the Air Force and industry when he noted: One of the main incentives for a junior officer to make a career of the Air Force is responsibility. Where in industry or private business can a man under age of twenty-five be charged with the sole responsibility for so, great an investment in men, money, or machines that he finds in the Air Force? He may be a lead pilot responsible for key targets and key defense assignments in time of war and peace, upon whom thousands of American lives may depend. He may be responsible for communications systems, for finances, for maintenance. of counterforce weapons, and for assisting in the planning for future Air Force programs. Practically every junior officer finds himself having to make decisions that are normally delegated to higher management in industry. These comparable managerial and technical positions-:-using every aspect of man's education and background-would require five to ten years to reach in industry. . . . •• See pp. 116-119. • • • See pp. 86-92. • See pp. 93-100. 64 THE CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER PROFESSIONAL CONCEPT OF MILITARY DUTY The previous section was concerned with officership as a profession. In this section, we want to develop the professional concept of military duty as it relates to career-oriented officers. To best illustrate this concept, reading selections by several career military men and by a former Secretary of the Air Force have been included. Gen. John P. McConnell, former Air Force Chief of Staff, says that an important task of the Air Force professional officer is to formulate a basic concept of his role in the military service. In his article, "Real-World Professionalism,"* General McConnell notes that the way to develop this concept of a professional role is for the individual to examine recent Air Force trends, lifelong American values, and himself as a person; then weld all three together to determine how he is carrying out his country's ideals in the modern Air Force. "The Military Profession as a Career"** was a graduation address presented at the Air Force Academy by Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of the Air Force and now president of California Institute of Technology. In his address, Dr. Brown described the "essentials for a satisfying profession," relating them to a military career. He listed as these essentials a constructive purpose, involvement .with higher values, depth of commitment, genuine challenge, demand for contin,Ual growth, breadth of view that extends beyond the formal limits of the profession, identification with others showing similar interests, and public recognition. All of these reflect characteristics exhibited by today's Air Force officers. They are far removed from the ancient stereotype of a military officer. The influence of technology on the military has brought forth a new professional concept as stated by Lt. Col. Arnold J. Celick in his article, "The Changing Nature of the Military Ethic."* Colonel Celick believes that there is a new sense of military honor-a new sense of professionalism-emerging among skilled military technicians. Not only are there the heroic soldiers, but also there are the "technical" soldiers. Their professional concept, says Colonel Celick, "stems from mutual respectfrom knowing they represent the highest competence available to the co\intry, and that they have reserved this professionalism for a truly worthwhile purpose." The professional values of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur have probably influenced more young officers than those of any other individual. MacArthur presented his thoughts on his role in the military to a group of cadets at the United States Military Academy on the night he received the Thayer Award for service to the United States. His "Duty, Honor, Country" speech is now one of the most famous military addresses of our time.* To the junior officer, it is particularly inspiring since it eloquently summarized a timeless code of officer service. Finally, Lt. Col. Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., co-author of an earlier reading selection, writes of military professionalism as it relates to an individual's. personal convictions to himself and his nation in the article, "Duty, Honor and Country Vs. Moral Conviction.'' Bradford makes interesting reference to the "moral dilemma" which is inherent in the nature of the military profession. The dilemma comes about when a person's moral convictions come in conflict with his duty to the state he has sworn to defend. As Bradford writes: Military professionalism does not require the abdication of moral respopsibility. It does require as a practical matter that a person's moral judgments be reconciled with • See pp. 101-105. •• See pp. 105-109. • See pp. 110-115. • See pp. 116-119. 65 CONCEPTS OF Am FORCE LEADERSHIP service to the state if he is to serve it in a professional capacity. This can be determined only by the person himself. The profession itself, as a creature of the state, is a legal abstraction, and as such cannot take a moral stand. The individual. cannot avoid it. He is a human being first, aprofessional second. The moral dilemma is minimal when the individual's moral conscience and the morals of the country he serves are in accord. But when personal and national morals do not coincide, a decision must be made. The final decision in such a case can be only partially satisfying to one or both of the parties involved. Bradford closes: "Fortunate is he whose principles and interests coincide. Fortunate especially is the soldier who serves a government which has moral integrity." It should be clear to you after reading these articles that the professional values of military officers are not identical. To General MacArthur, duty, honor, and country reverently dictate what every officer "ought to be." General McConnell sees "The disciplined but creative thinkers and innovators who have always been the main spring of Air Force progress." To each person, military officership means something different. This is why we are asking the reader to think about his concept of professionalism as it relates to military duty with the expectation that he will come up with his own ideas equal to any we could present. IDSTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TilE MILITARY PROFESSION No study of the professional Air Force officer would be complete without some review of the history of the American military profession. Our ideas of professionalism, our military uniforms, customs and courtesies, and current military tradition come from the past. For this reason, it is well to examine the roots of the American military profession. In its origins, the U.S. military organization not only was influenced by but was actually patterned after the military organizations of Europe. The beginnings of the European military structures go back, of course, to feudal Europe and antedate the national states. A military organization normally reflects the society from which it springs. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the early armies of western Europe were feudal in organizational structure. Armies were composed basically of noblemen and their serfs. By about the beginning of the modem period-around 1500-the military establishment had begun to change. The evolution of warfare from the fourteenth through the'eighteenth centuries saw the gradual replacement of these loosely knit aggregations of feudal nobles and their retainers by professional armies that served the king and the slowly emerging nation states. By the eighteenth centui-y, feudalism had given way to a new aristocracy consisting of men elevated to the nobility by their kings. While the aristocrats exercised no political power independent of their rulers, they remained the privileged class, pro!." prietors of the great estatis, and leaders of the national armies. Absolute monarchy was the prevailing form of government in virtually every European country or principality (with the exception of England, where the Parliament had attained a measure of constitutional power). Kings began to consolidate their power by relying on their noblemen to serve as leaders of military forces in national military establishments. By the start of the eighteenth century, ~e aristocrats had become the dominant source of officers in European armies. This was especially the case in the branches of infantry and cavalry. In the armies led by aristocrats, the basis for recruiting officers was birth and wealth. Only aristocrats were thought to possess the honor, loyalty, and courage 66 THE CHALLENGE TO THE Affi FORCE OFFICER needed to serve in ·the officer corps. Military authority was derived from tradition, custom, and social position. Persons were born into the officer class and were awarded commissions by the crown, or they were allowed to purchase commissions .. as vacancies occurred in the officer corps. · · Some of the elements of military organization that have persisted down to the twentieth century were present in the feudal and aristocratic armies. Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to speak of a formally organized and fully integrated professional corps before the nineteenth century. The Napoleonic wars are generally considered to be a turning point in the development of professional military forces. Napoleon instituted the levee en masse; and in his armies, much of the leadership began to be furnished by the "commoner." Some authorities argue that the military profession began in August 1808, when the Prussian Army issued a decree on the appointment of officers. The decree stated that the only title to an officer's commission was education and professional knowl edge in time of peace and distinguished valor and perception in time of war. It also stated that commissioils were to be open to all who had the necessary qualifications without regard to class. Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Prussian chief of staff in the wars against Napoleon, and those who directly succeeded him gave expression to the ideals and established the institutions that were to guide the officer corps of other Western nations. In the early days of professional armies, the technology of war was developing, and it was necessary to have technically competent officers for artillery and engineering corps. These posts were staffed mainly by middle-class officers who were prepared to concern themselves with technical training. By the middle of the nineteenth century, it was no longer possible to be an "amateur" officer. An upper-class education failed to provide the mathematical and engineering background that the occupation required. Also, the nobility could no longer supply a sufficient number of officers. Thus officership in Europe developed into a middle-class occupation as the specialized branches of artillery and engineering expanded. Simple military organizations soon gave way to complex specialization; the number of ranks increased; and the staff officer emerged as a specialist in planning, coordinating, and training. The military became a profession in the employ of the state, separated by training from other professions and dependent upon the state for equipment. War was no longer an adjunct to the aristocratic way of life. Educational standards developed as a basis for recruiting officers, and once an officer entered the profession, he was expected to continue his education and technical training. As modem technology developed, the professional military establishments in Western Europe required larger numbers of troops, and peacetime conscription was the result. With mass armies, it was more necessary than ever to have professional officers give directions. Having a professional army meant having full-time, careeroriented officers, as well as cadres of trained reservists who could be called to active duty during wartime. In summarizing the history of professionalism in European ar.mies, it is possible to speak about the transformation of the aristocratic officer to a professional in terms of three dimensions: ( 1) elimination of the aristocratic background as a prerequisite for entrance into the officer corps, (2) introduction of higher levels of professional training and competence, and (3) requirement of a minimum general education for all officers. The history of the development of the military profession in the United States differs in some important respects from that of Western Europe as follows: ( 1) since 67 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP aristocratic traditions were never strong in the United States, the officer corps was never dominated by these traditions; (2) the officer corps in the United States was very small throughout the nineteenth century except when it was rapidly augmented by citizen soldiers; and (3) the Federal Constitution provided that the states could organize their own militia, and these state organizations served to counteract the demand for a larger professional military establishment at the national level. As a result, the military profession developed more slowly in the United States than it did in Western Europe. We suggest that this brief survey of the development of the military profession be amplified through study of "The Profession of Arms," a series of lectures by Lt Gen Sir John Winthrop Hackett which is reprinted in chapter 4.* This comprehensive examination of the military profession is considered to be the classic statement of the antecedents of today's military. The following chapter also contains a reading from Morris Janowitz's noted book, The Professional Soldier.** Janowitz, a professor at the University of Chicago, differentiates among the types of leaders in this selection titled "Technology and Decision-Making." He states that the modern military needs a balance of three main types: heroic leader, military manager, and military technician. Understanding this concept, so clearly stated by Janowitz, will greatly aid the reader's perception of his role as a leader in the Air Force. THE CHALLENGE OF AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT Technological innovation has brought about changes in almost every modern organization. The Air Force is no exception. Increasing requirements for research and development, continuous innovations in weapon systems, and spiraling defense budgets add up to make the military the largest "industry" in America. This rapidly growing military structure has placed new demands on professional officers and other persons in positions of authority. No. longer is the challenge solely a matter of command and leadership; the Air Force must additionally meet the challenge of scientifically managing its scarce resources in an efficient and effective manner. Regardless of his eventual specialty classification and active duty assignment, the Air Force officer must meet the challenge of being an Air Force manager, in which role he will have to practice the five management functions-planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling. A preliminary examination of management within the Air Force will ser\'e to establish the framework for a better understanding of the role of the officer as a manager. Since a companion volume, Concepts of Air Force Management, makes a detailed study of the subject, only a brief discussion of the history and development of management and schools of management thought is necessary here. Introduction to Management The history of management goes back to prehistoric times when man was concerned primarily with his own survival. Each man, living in a small family unit, was foi,ced to hunt, build his own shelter, and make his own weapons. There were not eno~gh surplus resources to permit one person to govern, another to make weapons, and; another to build shelters while the remainder hunted and fought. In short, specialization was nonexistent. • See pp. 123-163. •• See pp. 163-173. 68 THE CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Professor Claude S. George, Jr., in the article "The Beginning of Management."* notes, however, that early forms of management were evident even in these unspecialized family units. These groups probably maintained business codes, rules concerning parental roles, punishments for wrongs committed, rites for worship, manners, etc. "Young men of the tribe," George adds, "surely grew up with a veneration and a fear of the 'old man' or leader-and with just cause: he was alive and old because of his cunning and wisdom." As families joined together and settled down to a more sedentary way of life, the need for some means to manage group affairs became evident. The need to organize human endeavors came in four vital areas-government, religion,. commerce, and military. Managers came to be those men who were wise and respected in a village. As civilization grew, so did the responsibilities of its managers until priests, kings, and other powerful officials actually took charge of society. They managed problems of taxation, labor, trade, war, land use, and religion. Regardless of whether or not it was called by its modem name, management was an integral part of early civilizations. The five management functions of planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling were in practice in dynastic Egypt thousands of years B.C. The construction of the great pyramid of Cheops probably took 100,000 men 20 years to build-a feat similar to managing a city of 100,000 for 20 years. Ancient Greece and Rome both practiced fairly sophisticated forms of management. Athens showed its appreciation of managerial functions in its popular courts, councils, boards of generals, and administrative officials. Similarly, Rome used managerial techniques in its well-organized bureaucratic structures. Indeed, some say that the key to the Romans' success was in their uncanny ability to organize. From the time of the decline of the Roman Empire until the mid-eighteenth century when a series of inventions began to completely revolutionize industrial processes, two organizations, church and military, established many forerunning principles of modem management. One of the earliest efficient organizations was the Roman Catholic Church. The Church developed a hierarchy of authority, territorial organizations, specialization of activities, and use of the staff. In fact, it is strange that no other organization patterned itself after the Church's staff principle until the nineteenth century. Introduction to Military Management Throughout the years, the military has been required to manage large groups of people and develop organization principles. Professor George in another reading selection notes some "Early Military Contributions to Management."* Cyrus, king of Persia in the sixth century B.C., was far ahead of his time in management practice. Cyrus planned his actions, made specific assignments, made motion studies, realized the importance of unity of command, and saw the need for coordination. Alexander the Great was another military innovator. He was probably the first military man to put to use the staff principle. Dr. John R. Beishline, a retired colonel and professor of management at Columbia University, continues from George's reading selection in his article, "Essential Characteristics of Military Management and Organization Until 1900."* Beishline reports that much of the military structure in the Middle Ages was patterned after • See pp. 173-183. • See pp. 183-185. • See pp. 186-190. 69 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP principles developed by Alexander, Julius Caesar, and Belisarius of the Byzantine Empire. In fact, it was not until the Industrial Revolution, when weapons began to improve and state structures became more complex, that the need for specialists and corresponding functional differentiation among military leaders significantly altered the makeup of armies. Beginning with the principles and practices of Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden (1611-1632) and continuing through those of Frederick the Great of Prussia, Pierre de Bourcet of France, Napoleon I, Scharnhorst, and Karl von Clausewitz, such innovations as the supply function, principle of decentralization, refined functional differentiation, and the general staff brought more efficient management to the military. It is impossible to say that a specific leader personally developed any one military function. As Dr. Beishline says: " ... modem military management is the result of many contributions passed down and improved with the passage of time." What can be said, however, is that management innovations in the military have been successfully adopted by business and industry of the world today. Current Management Thought For the history of modem management thought we need to go back little more than half a century. While the roots of management principles can be found in early writings, it was not until late in the nineteenth century that man began significant efforts to study management as a separate discipline. Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell in their standard work, Principles of Management,! give the simple explanation of the relatively late blooming of the study of management as follows: "As in other fields of knowledge, the principles of scientific management were discovered as the occasion for their use arose, necessity being the mother of invention." George R. Terry in his article, "Early Development of Management Thought,"* reprinted in the following chapter, names Frederick W. Taylor and Henri Fayol as two of the main contributors to our basic concepts of management. Generally acknowledged as the father of scientific management, Taylor strove for higher industrial efficiency. His greatest contribution to the study of management is probably his insistence upon the application by managers of scientific methods. Fayol oriented his work toward the higher levels of organization. He realized that of the six functions of business-technical, production, financial, security, accounting, and managerial-the first five were well known; the sixth, managerial, virtually unexplored. Fayol astutely observed that while the worker's most important ability is technical, the managerial ability becomes increasingly important to an individual as he moves up in an organization. To executives in a company, managerial ability is the most important ability. Fayol's principles proved basic to those interested in the study of management. As Terry says about the Frenchman: He was a vital management pioneer in that he made universal generalizations about · management based on his keen insight and practical management experience. He pro vided a broad and inclusive perspective of management and supplied a framework about which management thought could be developed.* Terry continues to trace the history of management thought through Taylor and Fayol, to the 1930s, when leadership and human relations were regarded as the mainsprings of management. More recently, new ideas have gained favor. Since 1950, increased emphasis has been placed on quantitative approaches to manage • (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1968). • See pp. 191-193. • Seep. 192. 70 THE CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER ment, the decision-making process, the systems approach to management, and several other new ideas. These ideas have increasingly gained proponents and have since become the foundations for several modern-day patterns of management. Patterns of Management Noted management authorities classify the patterns of management thought in various ways. George R. Terry, in his book Principles of Management,2 refers to approaches to management as schools of management thought, i.e., custom, scientific management, human behavior, social system, systems management, decisional management, quantitative management, and management process (which he espouses). Ernest Dale, author of The Great Organizers,8 lists as the three mainstreams of management thought today: the mathematical, the behavioral, and the administrative science approaches. The article "The Management Theory Jungle" by Harold Koontz** introduced another classification method by dividing management theory into six approaches: management process (operational), empirical, human behavior, social system, decision theory, and mathematical. We will use Koontz' classification method to review briefly some of the schools or patterns of management thought. It is particularly instructive for us to examine these various patterns because our eclectic approach to leadership and management will bring us in contact with the proponents of each viewpoint. MANAGEMENT PROCESS (OPERATIONAL) SCHOOL.-The management process or, as it is frequently termed, the operational school, examines the management process and related functions which in the Air Force are called planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling. From this examination of. organizational functions and activities, basic concepts, ideas, p:rinciples, and guides to action are formulated with particular attention to identifying the relevant variables and causeeffect relationships among these variables. The intent is to develop predictive statements. In essence, this school tries to determine what managers do, why they do it, what guides for action they use, how these guides can be applied in other situations, and when applied, under what considerations and constraints? The management process school has also been referred to as the traditional, or universalist, school because its antecedent is Fayol's concept of universal principles. These principles are generally believed to apply universally among various kinds of organizations and from top to bottom within organizations. They must, of course, be modified in their application because of environmental factors unique to specific situations. Figure 3-2 represents management·process or, as it is called here, operational management theory in relation to other disciplines. THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL.-The empirical, or experience, school relies on studies of cases, histories of successful managers, and other media reflecting past triumphs and failures as guideposts to effective future performance. To be genuinely meaningful, this study must draw concepts, principles, and ideas showing cause and effect relationships. Just because a student knows that a manager was successful under one set of conditions does not help him very much unless he knows why. The more the reason why is examined, the closer this school comes to the management process school. • (Homewood, Dllnois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Fifth Edition, 1969), pp. 92-128. • (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.) •• Journal of the academy o/ Management, Vol. IV, No. 3. pp. 174-188. 71 .• CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP VIEWS OF OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT THEORY * Mathematics Operations Research Decision Theory Systematic Rational Rei ationships Choice Operational Management Individual GroupTheoryBehavior BehaviorThe ManagementProcess Psychology Distilled · Managerial Psychology Experience Clinical Experiences of Practition~rs • Presented at the :Air University's Air Convnand and Staff College. October 1968. Reprinted with permission from Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, and described as "Management theory as a System Drawing on other Areas of Organized Knowledge... The 'operational' or 'mSI'!agement process' school of management represents an organized body of knowledQe and theoiy, but it also draws techniques and theoretical knowledge from other disciplines. This diagram shows the major areas which make contributions. The area of,management theory not only includes the central discipi ine, but also is eclectic in th'at it draws on other disciplines. The area of the diagram shown in white is the area ~f management theory." Figure 3-2. We use case studies as a vehicle for applying principles and techniques to practical situations. Usually tllere is some informative background material in each case. We, therefore, use cases not to distill basic concepts, but as means to analyze and to test concepts that have been developed through other media. THE HUMAN BEHAVIdR SCHOOL-Proponents of this pattern suggest that since people are absolutely es'sential to organizational accomplishments, "people should understand people" and management study should focus on human interactions and behavior. The primary concern is with the individual as a psycho-social being and with what motivates him. 72 THE CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Those who subscribe to the behavioral approach contend that people will put forth their best efforts when their psychological needs are understood and satisfied. Members of this school vary in their views from seeing the behavioral approach as simply a tool of management to seeing it as the total of management and equating management with leadership. THE SOCIAL SYSTEM SCHOOL.-The social system school, like the human behavior school, adopts a sociological approach to management. Proponents of the social system theory regard management as a system of human relationships comprising a formal organization. As applied to management, formal organization is equated with organized enterprise. The formal organization can be any system in which people, or groups of people, are able to communicate and to work together to achieve a common goal. This cooperative system is considered as a social entity which is affected in its behavior by the pressures and conflicts of its environment. Adherents of the social system school, therefore, emphasize the concepts of social behavior and the study of group behavior in the management process. THE DECISION THEORY SCHOOL.-The decision approach is based on the belief that decision making is the primary function of management. The focus is on the rational approach to decisions, that is, evaluating alternatives and selecting from among them. The decision theory school has broadened its application from economic problems, which were its original concern, to the entire field of organizational activity. Since problem solving and its included area, decision making, involve so much of a manager's time, it is not an unreasonable view to make a detailed examination of the processes. This we do. But although we look at economic analysis and other ap proaches to decision theory, we will respect them as aspects of management theory, not as management itself. THE MATHEMATICAL SCHOOL-Quantitative approaches to management, using mathematical modes and other quantitative techniques, are receiving increased at tention in the study of management. This school's advocates, through their stress on the identification of and interrelation among variables, have made an increas ingly valuable contribution to management. We have attempted to recognize this by including an extensive section on quantitative approaches to management, or opera tions research as it is frequently termed, in the planning function chapters in Con cepts of Air Force Management. Topics such as methods, probability theory, mathe matical models, and linear programming are briefly introduced and related to Air Force management. But these again are tools for the manager, not the core of man agement theory. Hence, we shall treat them as such. The background article in the following chapter, "Changing Patterns in Manage ment Theory,"* written by David I. Cleland and David D. Dellinger, retired Air Force lieutenant colonels and university professors, will be helpful in understanding the complexities of management thought patterns and management itself. The reading gives an excellent analysis of the functions of a manager, and tells of some current tech niques employed to accomplish these functions. It will be seen that techniques have matured greatly since the introduction of the earliest management concepts. Of par ticular interest is the emphasis placed on human relations by the "quantitative school," and on the synthesis of values by the interdisciplinary approach. • See p. 193. 73 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP SUMMARY All officers have at least two things in common when they start on active duty:the oath of office by which the officer is pledged to support and defend his country ~and its government, and the commission granted him by the President which placeshim in a position of authority over those of lesser rank and charges him with obeyingthe lawful orders of those above him.The United States Constitution, his commissioning document, his commanding officer, and his position in the Air Force give the officer general and specific authority'to perform his duties. There are also other forms of authority for which there are nospecific guidelines, policies, or procedures. These are moral authority, expertise authority, and referent authority. With all authority comes the responsibility to accomplish a specific mission. Thus, we can say that authority and responsibility present both a challenge to the officer and a means by which the officer can meet thischallenge. It is by meeting this challenge that the Air Force officer accomplishes the mission. The challenge to the Air Force officer takes many forms. Positions of responsibility exist in every career field in the Air Force. Whatever his specialty and his re sponsibilities, the Air Force officer plays a major role in the overall accomplishmentof the Air Force mission.In any profession, the individual must look inward to examine his own values. We ·have presented the statements of several career military persons concerning theirideas of military professionalism in the belief that the thinking of these outstandingmen will be helpful to the reader in crystallizing his own ideas of professionalism.Military professionalism in the United States has its roots in the professionalarmies that developed iii Europe. Until the nineteenth century, officer rank in European armies was the exclusive prerogative of the nobility. As military technology advanced and armies grew larger and more complex, however, the need arose for technically trained, career-oriented specialists whom the aristocracy could not supply.Education rather than social class became the standard for recruiting officers, and the aristocracy was replaced by qualified members of the middle class.Finally, no view of the current challenge to the Air Force officer would be complete without mention of the officer's role as a manager. In an organization as complex and diversified as the Air Force, the men who lead the organization must beable to effectively and efficiently manage all Air Force programs with a minimum ofsupervision. Without efficient management, the Air Force would be unable to accomplish its coordinated mission. BIBLIOGRAPHY AFM 50-3, Air Force Leadership. Washington: Department of the Air Force;''1966.DALE, ERNEST. Management: Theory and Practice. Second Edition New York: McGraw-HillBook Company, 1969.GEORGE, CLAUDE S., Jr. The History of Management Thought. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968.HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. The Soldier and the State. New York: Vantage Books, 1957.JANOWITZ, MORRIS. The Professional Soldier. New York: The Free Press, 1960.KAzMIER, LEONARD J. Principles of Management. Second Edition. New York: McGraw-HillBook Company, 1969.MARSHALL, GENERAL S. L. A. The Officer as a Leader, Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books,1966.TERRY, GEORGE R. Principles of Management. Fifth Edition. Homewood, Ill: Richard D.Irwin, Inc., 1968. 74 Chapter 4 Readings-Challenge to the Air Force Officer READING A We Live In Fame By Lt Col Dallas K. Stephens. Reprinted by penpission from Aerospace Safety, Vol. 25, No.4 (April, 1969). Lt Col Dallas K. Stephens has held various assignments in Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command since his graduation from the University of Colorado in 1947 and subsequent attendance at Harvard Law School. His combat record includes 163 combat hours in the B-26 during the Korean war and duty as Chief of Operations Plans, 35th Tactical Fighter Wing and B-27 line pilot at Pllan Rang, Viet Nam. He was stationed at Phan Rang when he wrote "We Live In Fame." He has completed Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Academic Instructor Course, and the USAF Counterinsurgency Course. Colonel Stephens is the Professor of Aerospace Studies, Detachment 658, Otterbein University, Westerville, Ohio. O N March 10, 1966, Major Bernard Stability? These are not central to our proFisher, with complete disregard for his fession. Courage is. Hear it again in the Air personal safety, landed his A-lE on a tiny Force song: "We live in fame or go down in dirt strip in the Ashau valley while under flame, nothing can stop the U.S. Air Force." heavy fire from 2000 enemy soldiers and This is the spirit, the legend celebrated at rescued Major "Jump" Myers. So reads the dining-in, parade, O'Club bar; wherever "eacitation awarding the Medal of Honor to gles" have gathered since the misty days of Major Fisher. The phrase "with complete aviation's youth when the Mitchells, Foudisregard for his personal safety" captures loises and Rickenbachers were learning their the essence of the military ideal. Past generatrade. It is expressed well in verse from the tions have thrilled to, "Sir, we have not yet "Ghosts of the Eighth Attack" written to imbegun to fight!" "Damn the torpedoes; full mortalize the achievement of strong men who flew with the Eighth at Saint-Mihiel and speed ahead!" All these cries of defiance have expressed Chateau-Thierry in World War 1: for their own time the spirit of the soldier Kingsland turned to spin and bum who, undaunted by personal peril, still Red and Gallagher diedpresses aggressively at the enemy. They repIn battle flame on the fields of fame resent the unique value of indomitable courWith Mitchell by their side From death unveiled they never quailed age which has attracted most of us to the Nor brake upon the rack military ):1rofession. Indeed, what else could But rose we ken, to fight again, it have been? Wealth? Security? Scholarship? The Ghosts of the Eighth Attack! 75 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 'Tis a proud heritage that is ours! But we cannot live in the glorious past. Each morning you and I awake in Vietnam, 1969. Here, rather than "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead," we daily hear "Stay out of the ground fire," "don't press; no target is worth the loss of aircraft and crew;" "minimum altitude is . . ." Reinforcing this calculating approach to war are command responses to bomb damage achieved versus battle damage incurred. An exceptionally good air strike is recognized and celebrated at crew and squadron level, seldom higher. But non-battle damage incurred to aerospace vehicle or crew is investigated with a fervor born of the axiom that if a plane is damaged, somebody goofed! This seeming inconsistency between legend and today's reality is confusing to most and frustrating to many. To the man who has steeled himself stateside for his "moment of truth" in Vietnam it is disconcerting to not be immediately ordered at full speed "into the valley of death." But the problem is not new: we encountered it in the later stages of the Korean police action when the violence of the first year's fighting had stabilized into a war of attrition. There, our crews were soon categorized under the labels Pussy-Cat, Tom-Cat and Tiger. The Pussy-Cat response to restrictions in ordnance delivery was "O.K., I'll take your minimums and double 'em; I'll be very, very safe while you play your silly numbers game and the mission be damned!" At the other extreme, the Tiger proved ut terly incapable of shifting gears. His response was to continue to sniff through the trees at 300 knots, always searching for his elusive "Ploesti" but too often finding more flame than fame. Fortunately, the majority of the crews were Tom-Cats. Their attitude was "You make the rules, Chief, and we'll show you the best results achievable within those parameters!" Today as in those days we see the variety of responses. The timid betray the mission while using delivery limitations as a crutch for their consciences. The Tigers still bull their way through the treetops, ever re-proving to their own satisfaction that they are fearless. But the majority still are the TomCats, the real pros. They hone their skills carefully and take pride in being part of a disciplined professional fighting team. In every war there will be moments and places where men are called upon to Live in Fame or Go Down in Flame and we will always glory in the selfless courage of those who answer this call. But the strength of the Air Force for the long haul will always be the steady, disciplined Tom-Cat who can take orders, live by them and still do a professional job. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. How can you differentiate between the roles of "Pussy-Cat, Tom-Cat and Tiger?'' 2. Why does the role of Tom-Cat best exemplify the military professional? 3. How are phrases like "Damn the torpedoes; full speed ahead!" inconsistent with today's reality? 'l• • 4 76 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER READING B Read Your Commission By Col Verne Biven. Reprinted by permission from Airman, Vol V., No.6 (June, 1961). Col Verne Biven, USAF Retired, was Deputy Commander for Air Transport Wing Training at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, when he gave this address to the graduating cadets of Class 61-E advanced pilot training, Vance AFB, Oklahoma, in 1961. Engaged in troop transport operations throughout a considerable amount of his Air Force career, Colonel Bevin became wing commander at Greenville AFB, South Carolina, before his retirement. While this document probably had its origin at Kelly Field, a theater much the same in early Anglo-Saxon history, it is said by as this, for the same reasons and with the some to have been rewritten by Thomas Jefsame hopes, anxieties, and reliefs that beset ferson. This may have been true in order to B ECAUSE 20 years ago I sat in a theater you on this day, I wiJJ be brief. I know that apply it to our new armies at that time. It you have your orders, or will have shortly; sounds like him.Folklore asserts that it .originally con that you are anxious to get on your way. I recaJI that some gray-haired colonel made a tained the word "prudence" and remained presentation to us on our graduation day unchanged until the days of the Civil War also, but I cannot recaJI his name or what he when Mr. Lincoln deleted the word. Other said. So it must be apparent to you that I am folklore has it that his reasons were purely sympathetic. speculative but it was presumed that he did There are, however, a couple of thoughts so because of trouble with some of his genwhich my 20 years of military flying experierals. The National Archivist in Washingence have left with me and which I would ton tells me that a spot-check examination like to pass on for your use. On that day 20 of various commissioning certificates for the years ago I received the documents com1775-1910 period indicates that many memorating the ceremony and my commischanges occurred in the wording of the preambles of these certificates. The preamble sioning certificate; hurriedly glanced at them and never gave them another thought until usually stated that " . . . reposing special 18 years later. I was in too much of a hurry. trust and confidence in the patriotism . . . " Had I studied one of these particular docand then such words as "conduct," "fidelity," "valor," and "abilities" were used to uments carefully, I am confident that the ap complete the statement. preciation of the trust placed upon me would A search of General Washington's com have been greater, and my efforts to do what was expected of me would have been exmissioning certificate as Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States dated pended with greater energy and more accurate direction. I am referring to the commisPhiladelphia, June 19, 1775; as Commander in Chief of all the Armies raised or to be sioning certificate. About two years ago I became fascinated raised dated July 4, 1798; and of John Paul with the unusual turn of phrases and have Jones as Captain of the United States Navy gone so far as to do considerable research dated October 10, 1776, failed to reveal the into the background of the document. First use of the word "prudence." Also, a search let me read the opening sentences. I ask you of the Archives failed to disclose that Presi the words chosen. dent Lincoln tampered with the document. to carefully consider 77 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP As far as I can determine, the document which you receive today is almost identical to that received by General Washington in 1775. I believe that the words chosen have strong meaning. I believe that you have demonstrated valor and ability and loyalty. Without . this our President could not repose special trust and confidence upon you. Relatively few have the ability to earn this document. The basic source of the authority vested in the commissioned officer is the Constitution, which states that Congress has the power to provide for the common defense of the United States. In exercise of this power, Congress enacts whatever laws are necessary to establish military forces and defend the nation. Also in the Constitution is the provision that the President be the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; that he see that all laws are faithfully executed; and that he com01ission all officers of the United States. In commissioning an officer, therefore; the President .is making a direct grant of authority that is necessary to fulfill his responsibilities. This is evidenced by that part of the commission which states: " ... and I do strictly charge and require those officers and other personnel of lesser rank to render such obedience as is due an officer of this grade and position." Such broad authority must be tempered by sound judgment, which can be expected of those who have been commissfoned because of their valor, fidelity, and abilities. As a safeguard, however, the Constitution and directives place certain restrictions on what an officer can order a subordinate to do and upon other actions that he can take. The Fifth Amendment, for example, provides that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness without due process of law. As a general rule, only such authority is vested in the commissioned officer as wiii give him direct support in carrying out his assigned duties and in fulfilling his mission which includes maintaining the efficienc; and morale of those he supervises. His ac tions must not, in themselves, be illegal. In addition to direct authority, each com missioned officer also has certain moral au thority. This evolves from the discretion ex pected of him by virtue of the fact that he is commissioned. In other words, the officer is expected to do what is right, proper, and necessary. When he has no directive or prec edent to follow, he must be prepared to giVe whatever orders are required by the circum stances. With direct and moral authority comes the responsibility inherent in the profession. Upon being commissioned in the Air Force, an officer incurs a lasting obligation to cher ish and protect his country, and to develop within himself that capacity and reserve strength which will enable him to serve its arms and the welfare of its citizens with in creasing wisdom, diligence, and patriotic conviction. -This is the meaning of his com mission. It is not modified by reason of any assignment while in the service, nor is the obligation lessened on the day an officer puts the uniform aside and returns to civil life. Having ·..been specially chosen by the United States to sustain the dignity and integrity of its sovereign power, an officer is expected, for as long as he may live, to maintain himself and to exert his influence so that he will be recognized as a worthy symbol of all that is best in the national character. In this sense the trust imposed upon the highest military commander in the land is not more than that placed upon the newest second lieutenant. Nor is it less. It is the fact of commission which gives special distinction to the man and in turn requires that the measure of his devotion to the service of his country be greater than other citizens. Sometimes I think that the words of the officers' c9mmissioning certificate should perhaps be applied to the people of all the free nations. As world conditions have culminated over the ages to a period in time that the civilian populace at large throughout the world is in perhaps as much, or more, danger than the military force, then it would 78 READINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER seem to me that the civilian populace of the asm and demonstrate that enthusiasm in a world must strive to deserve having such manner that those around you will catch the disease, so to speak, I will guarantee thatwords applied to them. But that is beyond your span of control and mine. whatever task is at hand will become easier. On the other hand, if you do not attack your You and I, as airmen, must assume the sometimes awful responsibilities that are the task with enthusiasm, you may not get it done correctly or on time. inherent lot of airmen by putting to work our I am a replica of the gray-headed colonelintegrity, abilitie:;, valor, and fidelities in of 20 years ago, now dead or retired. I hopeorder that our peoples who are unable to that I have done a better job than he did. I protect themselves may be protected. That is your charge. I strongly advise you to take hope you will remember that you have been this document before the next few days have especially selected because you are good passed, read it in a quiet corner where you quality and that it is your job to lead and di rect those who lack the quality that you posmay not be interrupted, thoroughly digest the words, and if you understand and appreciate sess. I wish that I could rewrite your commissioning certificate, adding the word the trust reposed upon you by having done so, you will have become a better officer at "enthusiasm." I cannot do that. However, for that moment. the aggrandizement of yourself as an individAs to my promise to be brief, other than ual and humanity in general I also ·charge you to apply enthusiasm to all your actions. enjoining you to maintain always the deepest sense of personal responsibility. I have Thank you and good luck. searched my mind and my 20 years for one Questions for Reflection and Discussion word which will help you in doing the job before you. You will find that flying the air1. What are some meanings for the word "commission?" craft, which you are now able to do, will be come merely a part of your responsibilities 2. What parallels to the Air Force commission as an officer. You will find yourself assigned are there in civilian life? tasks for which you have had no training but 3. Why isn't the commissioning obligation set which you will be expected to accomplish aside whert an officer retires or resigns his correctly and immediately. You will wish commission? ' that you had had legal training, management 4. Why does the author say the commissioning training, medical training, financial training, trust is no more or less for a second lieutenant and there ,are times when you will even than, for example, the Air Force Chief of Staff? search the Bible to come up with the an swers. So that one word that I have chosen5. How do you differentiate between trust and responsibility? · the meaning of which I believe will aid you more, if you apply it, than any other in 6. Why do you think the author would add any language-is enthusiasm. "enthusiasm" to the commission? I .tell you that it does not matter what the 7. What would you add or delete to the comassignment is, if you attack it with enthusi-mission? 79 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER READING C Loyalty: the Military Touchstone By Brig Gen. Cecil E. Combs. Reprinted by permission from Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. VII. No.4 (Spring 1955). Brig Gen Cecil. E. Combs, USAF Retired, a native of Texas, graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1936 and received his wings at Kelly Field, Texas, the following year. His long and distinguished career with the Air Force includes numerous command assignments during and after World War II. In 1957, he was made Commandant of the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, where he served until his retirement in 1965. General Combs is presently Associate Provost of Special Programs at the University of Rochester, New York. S OME people assume that the versatility and effectiveness of modern machines have reduced the importance of the individual in warfare. The opposite is true, particularly in today's Air Force. When technical equipments enable one man to do what was formerly the work of many men, the responsibility which once fell on the leader of many men then rests on the shoulders of the one man who controls the machine. The destructive force of a large flight of heavy bombers in World War II was entrusted only to a senior, proven commander. Nowadays an even greater force may be put in the hands of a single crew or a single individual who becomes ultimately responsible for the disposition of this force. In short, the greater the complexity of the machine and the greater the military value of the weapon, the greater the responsible leadership required of the individual officer. Consider the nature of the responsibility which the individual officer will have to assume in a combat role in the future. One young officer alone and unsupervised may be responsible for executing an extremely difficult and hazardous mission which may destroy a vital segment of an enemy's strength. One officer may have the responsibility for stopping an enemy aircraft which is capable of wrecking one of our cities. The rated officers of the Air Force must be men to whom responsibilities such as these can be entrusted with complete confidence. Just what are the qualities in a man that enable us to give to him with confidence responsibilities such as these? The words duty, honor, country spring to mind. But what are the qualities in a man that make these terms meaningful? When we think of such men, we think of courage and endurance and integrity and all that is included in the term "leadership." These traits are somewhat descriptive of what we are trying to determine but they do not add up to the whole man. The element of purposeful meaning must be in .eluded. Courage for what? Endurance in what service? Integrity with respect to what ideals? What purpose in life must a man have that will permit these human qualities to appear before us in action as the performance of duty? For the answers to these questions we must look into the things officers live by and for. And it would seem logical that we should seek to identify these things within ourselves. When we look within ourselves, we find what our experience has put there. We find the scars of our own past failures as well as monuments of worthy examples. One thing I think we all find-that we have neither the strength nor the will to live alone. We have need for a purpose; for a cause bigger than ourselves; something that requires us to take strenuous action, if necessary, to face dan 80 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER ger, if necessary, against the opposition of instinctive impulses to avoid such discomfort or danger. We also find a need for some sort of measuring stick by which we can evaluate the multiple choices for decision and action which life puts in front of us. Each of us making such an inquiry will come up with somewhat similar findings. When I look at the officers in the Air Force whom I know and respect, I feel sure that I can detect things they hold in common. One of these common denominators is this need of which I have been speaking. Those officers who command our instant and continuing respect are invariably those who, whatever their abilities in whatever position of responsibility, put their responsibility first and foremost in all that they do. This common attribute may best be described as loyalty. If I am right in this assumption, these men have shared the common human experience of needing a goal in life and have found that goal in their loyalty to the cause they serve-a loyalty that serves them both as an incentive and as a guide, and sometimes as a very hard taskmaster. IT IS NOT SURPRISING that we should instinctively focus our attention upon loyalty. Loyalty has always been considered a warrior's virtue. Throughout history a legion of men have been true to their colors and died for their causes, and some were pretty small causes, and many were lost causes. The one noble thing that shines forth from all the bloody pages of history is this capacity of man for loyalty. Perhaps this is proof enough that we are talking about one of man's greatest needs as well as on~ of his attributes of greatness. If loyalty is a compelling human need, then our problem may, in part at least, be one of precisely defining the objective of our loyalty. The cause we seek must be tangible enough and concrete enough to be a specific guide for decision and for action. It must be a cause that we can comprehend, that we can make our own in a personal way, and to which out own personal contribution, how ever small, will be of some significance. Do we not have such a common cause-we who have taken the Oath of Office as commissioned officers in the United States Air Force? In that Oath we swear faith and allegiance to a· cause which does command our loyalty and our lives. Let us examine this cause for a moment. I believe that a study of the Constitution will show that it proceeds from several fundamental ideas. One is the conviction that man amounts to something as an individual, that the individual is good and can become better and stronger and wiser. It is a belief that this American people can build a nation that can endure and that can offer to each of its citizens an abundant life, personal liberty, and the fellowship of free men. Despite the many changes in economic theory and in international relations, this marvelously flexible instrument still stands for the enduring ideals and aspirations of the American people. Perhaps some day these ideals will be those of a world federation of governments to which we can all give wholehearted support. That time is not yet. At the moment it seems clear we can serve humanity best only by serving our own country well. For these American ideas and ideals cannot be ·considered as accomplishments even here in America. They are goals that we Americans are still trying to achieve. They are difficult objectives which may never be achieved but which will certainly demand our best efforts and should command our entire devotion. This cause has been well and truly served by loyal men throughout the history of our country. Such progress as we have made toward our goals can be attributed to the sacrifices and the service of these loyal men. Today the country and particularly the Air Force has need of such men in greater numbers than ever before. To meet this need, we must direct our training toward the development of loyalty in its deepest sense. There are many obstacles to be overcome. Recent years have seen the growth of many things that are destructive of loyalty. Mere gro~th 81 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP itself is such an obstacle. Communities of School of Education, Dr. Henry W. Holmes, said a few years ago, "In one vital field--ed people can inspire loyalty, but if a community becomes so large that the identity of the ucation for character, through the development of the power of moral discrimination individual is lost, then the common purpose will be weakened and loyalty will diminish. and an affirmative grasp of ideals-we have When fanrlly ties are weakened another made hardly a beginning." Recently Dr. source of strong loyalties is weakened. As a John A. Hannah, in testifying for an Air government grows in size and complexity, its academy before Congress, said that he had capacity for attracting loyalty decreases. The not earlier been in favor of an Air academy because he felt that the civilian colleges result of all this is that many men have confused loyalties. Many are loyal to small or could meet the need, but that he had since unworthy causes which are in conflict with become convinced that they cannot because those of other loyal men. Some people have they do not attempt to develop the ideal of taken refuge in denying all loyalties save devotion to the service of the country nor to their own self-interests. develop the qualities of character and integ rity required for that service. While this The greatest obstacle of all seems to be statement would seem to confirm our objec the materialistic philosophy that has domi tives, it does not imply that we can do what nated the teaching of our young people. The others have not attempted. average cadet entering preflight training has Here again it may be true that the diffi all too frequently been taught at home and in culty of the problem should not be overesti school that material prosperity is the only valid measure of success in life and that permated. It may be true that a clear undersonal and financial . security are the only standing of our objectives will in itself shed worthwhile goals. These may be superficial light on the paths we must follow toward the goal. It is not that we are entirely lacking in attitudes but they take time to change. The first step seems to be one of inducing a precedent. The service academies and similar searching criticism of such preconceived institutions have for a long time by tradi tional methods produced great leaders-not ideas. The next is to get a young man to think for himself. The practical aspects of a always many and not always soon but military career must be realistically preenough loyal men to lead us through the great emergencies. Effectiveness of tradi sented. These cannot be evaded by philo tional methods and of precedent would ap sophic generalities. An officer is entitled to a pear to be historically demonstrated. The decent standard of living-a way of life problem is to keep tradition and precedent in which, while not offering luxury, does permit dignity and respect. Once this minimum is tune with changing requirements and situations. This may in turn only require that we assured, it is possible to present the real challenge of the service. keep our objectives clearly in front of us and realistically in tune with the problem. Similarly our country must realistically face the WE HAVE still much to learn about the probchallenge that democracy faces as a prerelem of developing in the young men who quisite to the job of producing men who canenter our officer-training programs a willing serve its cause without reservation. If our naacceptance of these ideals of loyalty and tional purposes are clear, the emotional andservice. Educational theory and methods intellectual appeal of the challenge of service have improved greatly in technical fields, to these ideals is equally clear. Then it be and we have been able to adapt these methods directly to many training problems. In comes necessary merely to instruct in the the field of character development there is need that the country bas in order to find no similar basis of organized experience many who are willing to devote their lives to available. As the Dean of Harvard Graduate that need. 82 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Fortunately most of us need to tie our loy alties not only to a cause but to an organiza tion. Morally and intellectually our objec tives may be clear, but practically and personally speaking we need a team to which we can belong. While our feelings toward the Constitution of the United States may be sol emnly reverent, we love the Air Force. Perhaps this intense identification with an organization is a human weakness. Certainly it is also a source of our strength. In the unit .pride and esprit de corps of any good combat organization is to be found perhaps the greatest expression of human genius for loy~ alty. it may also be true that one reason we have so much difficulty in achieving interservice cooperation at the top is the fact that it is a rare individual who can ever place himself entirely above and beyond his organization. There. is as yet no supraservice in which all separ·ate associations and loyalties can be combined. Similarly conflicts of loyalty occur even within services, as between major commands. These conflicts of loyalties are a good thing in that they force us to consider larger purposes in a critical fashion. The cause we serve would not be loyally served if ours was a blind, unquestioning· obedience. The great danger and tragedy of the Communist movement is the fact that it has become a perfect instrument for a fanatical and insensitive loyalty..Our loyalty requires that we be critical of ourselves, of one another, and of our service and country, while at the same time it must ensure a discipline based not on fear but on willing obedience derived from confidence in the moral integrity of our leaders and in the essential soundness of our cause. I BELIEVE our objective of building a stronger loyalty can be accomplished by traditional means. I include in these traditional means the intellectual problem of establishing the need of the country for loyal officers. I include moral problems which can best be solved by the power of example. I include disciplinary training based on a man's pride in his powers, his unit, and his country. We cannot make officers in any training pro gram. All we can do is present the challenge, point out those obstacles in the way that must be overcome, and give the help and guidance to the individual in overcoming them. In this way, and subject always to the power of example, the young men in this country who have the potential, will make themselves into the officers the Air Force needs. This is a continuous process which does not stop when a man is commissioned a second lieutenant. This objective must be pursued steadfastly by all of us all the way through in the face of all manner of temptations and distractions which tend to divert us from our goal. We are all shot through with human imperfections and Wl< shall all fall short of our highest ideals; but if in this loyal brotherhood we find helpful understanding, human sympathy, and affection, then the strong will help make the weakest of us stronger, and together we will find our powers multiplied many times over. Finally there is needed the sympathetic understanding of the country at large. The profession of an officer of the Air Force must be recognized for what it actually is, a profession in which the officer is a man of honor and integrity who puts his loyalty to the service of his country above all else: In his person he must exemplify American ideals. This means that the officer corps must deserve this reputation. It also means that the country must deserve the loyalty of the people who serve it. It is inconceivable that any democracy 'Could survive whose existence depended on the devoted loyalty of a few while the many lived by other standards in pursuit of other aims. I for one arp as confident that the officers of the Air Force can earn and hold the complete trust of the nation as I am that this nation will forever deserve their loyalty. Questions for Reflection and Discussion l. Why does modem society tend to weaken loyalty? 2. How can the Air Force officer prevent the destruction of loyalty? 3. How can the author's suggestions for building stronger loyalty be effective? 83 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING D The Military Profession Reprinted from Air Force Manual 53-1, United States Air Force Officer Professional Military Education System, 15 May 1969. WHAT IS A PROFESSION? aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States . . . The term "profession" signifies a vocation These fundamental responsibilities are recharacterized by dedication and service. It flected in the oath of office. When a peralso indicates the group of persons engaged son is elected or appointed to an office ofin a particular field of endeavor. The term is honor and trust under the Government of thegenerally considered to identify a calling that United States, he is required to take and subrequires ethical behavior, public service, spescribe to the prescribed oath. An officer'scialized knowledge and long and intensive oath has a long and honorable history. The preparation. This includes instruction in formal and official entry to the military proskills and methods, as well as in the underlyfession as an officer is effected upon assuming scientific, historical or scholarly concepts ing the obligations contained in the oath forand principles of the particular field. A promilitary personnel. An examination of thisfession attempts to maintain high standards oath provides further understanding of theof achievement and conduct, and commits its nature of the military profession: members to continued study and work for the purpose of rendering public service. The I, ... do solemnly swear (or affirm) thatmost distinctive characteristic of a profession I will support and defend the Constitution of is that its members are devoted primarily to the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith anda concept of service to society rather than to allegiance to the same; that I take this obli the pursuit of personal achievement. . gation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and NATURE OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter, SO HELP METhe fundamental responsibilities of the GOD. profession of arms are contained in the specific provisions of the United States law Thus, in taking the oath, an officer pledges his total ability-even his life-towhich provides for the Armed Forces. These his country. It is an obligation and the sacredare established, as applied to the Air Force, trust of a military professional. in Section 8062, Title 10, US Code, which Broadly, the responsibilities of the milistates, in part, that the Armed Forces must tary profession include:be capable of: ( 1) Understanding and supporting national policies and implementing national( 1) Preserving the peace and security, objectives.·and providing for the defense of the United (2) Phinning related military operationsStates; and their support. (2) Supporting national policies; ( 3) Organizing, equipping and training ( 3) Implementing national objectives; military forces. and (4) Directing these forces in peace and in (4) Overcoming nations responsible for all levels of war; and 84 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER (5) Accomplishing related research and development. These responsibilities involve managerial, leadership, and specialized duties to varying degrees. The keynotes of the military professional are: dedication to national security, organizational identity and esprit de corps, ethical behavior and skill and knowledge. EDUCATION OF A PROFESSIONAL The education of any professional should contain the following five distinguishable features: ( 1) The necessary general education to fulfill his civic duties as a citizen and to live a constructive and informed life. (2) The broad theoretical base required for his professional practice. (3) Mastery of the specialized knowledge and technical skills which characterize his profession. ( 4) Preparation for a significant contribution to the knowledge of his profession through study and research; and ( 5) Professional development which he actively pursues throughout his career by means of formal and ·informal education. Two broad roles are implied: ( 1 ) the role of the professional with a unique body of knowledge, and (2) the role of the responsible citizen with a unique duty to society. The officer is expected to accept the responsibilities of American citizenship to the degree that they are compatible with his military rote. For example, he is expected to vote, but because he is a public servant he must be non-partisan in ·his behavior. The national interests served by his professional knowledge and skills are his first obligation. Because of the magnitude and variety of its operations and resources, the Air Force requires military specialists with comnP.tPnr,e in nearly all .the academic disciplines. A military professional develops as he acquires extensive knowledge, training and experience. However, professional military education is the foundation of military professionalism. DIE PROFESSIONAL AIR FORCE OFFICER The ideals of the professional Air Force officer are based on the essential elements of professionalism. The professional Air Force officer is the aerospace expert of the nation's fighting forces. He understands the nature of war and is proficient in the art of waging it at any level of conflict. He is a leader of men in both peace and war, and he is accomplished in using his knowledge and skills to organize and manage resources. He combines military bearing and selfconfidence with loyalty, integrity, self-discipline, versatility and adaptability. His ethics and conduct are based upon the concept of service above self. He communicates effectively and works efficiently with people at all levels from all walks of life. He participates in specialized education as well as specialized training, and he used the knowledge gained in conjunction with professional military education, to discharge greater responsibilities as he progresses in his military career. The professional Air Force officer recognizes that he must continually expand his knowledge and understanding of the art of war. He recognizes his responsibilities to the Nation, both as a citizen and a military officer and maintains the high intellectual, ethical and physical standards required to hold the trust and respect of the society he serves. The professional officer never forgets that in a democratic society his role is always that of a subordinate to legally constituted political authority. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Describe, in your own words, the meaning of the term "professional officer." (Base your answer on all that you understand the term to mean, not just on what you find in this reading.) 2. Why is there merit in an ethical code for cadets? 3. How can the special obligations implied in officer service be described? 4. Why should every officer be a professional? S. How do the terms "professional officer" and "career officer" relate to each other? 85 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING E Officership ~s a Profession By Samuel P. Huntington. Reprinted by permission of the publishers from Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Copyright 1957, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, a noted authority on the military, is Frank G. Thomson Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Harvard Uni. versity. Besides The Soldier and the State, one of the basic works on military professionalism and national security, Dr.. Huntington has written The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics and numerous other scholarly publications relating to the military. T HE ~ODERNofficer corps is a profesown professional status. When the term sional body and the modem military "professional'' has been used in connection officer a professional man. This is, perhaps, with the military, it normally has been in the the most fundamental thesis of this book. A sense of "professional" as contrasted with profession is a peculiar type of functional "amateur" rather than in the sense of "progroup with highly specialized characteristics. fession" as contrasted with "trade" or Sculptors, stenographers, entrepreneurs, and "craft." The phrases "professional army" advertising copywriters · all have distinct and "profession'al soldier" have obscured the functions but no one of the functions is prodifference between the career enlisted man fessional in nature. Professionalism, howwho is professional in the sense of one who ever, is characteristic of the modern officer works for monetary gain and the career offiin the same sense in which it is characteristic cer who is professional in the very different of the physician or lawyer. Professionalism sense of one who pursues a "higher calling" distinguishes the military officer of today in the service of society. from the warriors of previous ages. The existence of the officer corps' :as ·a professional THE CONCEPT OF PROFESSION body gives a unique cast to the modern probI The first step in analyzing the professional lem of civil-military relations. character of the modern officer corps is to The nature and history of other profesdefine professionalism. The distinguishing sions as professions have been th0roughly characteristics of a profession as a special discussed. Yet the professional character of type of ypcation are its expertise, responsibilthe modern officer corps has been. neglected. ity, and corporateness. In our society, the businessman may comExperrise. The professional man is an exmand more income; the politician may compert with specialized knowledge and skill in a mand more power; but the.professional man significant field of human endeavor. His ex pertise is acquired only by prolonged educa~ commands more respect. Yet the public, as well as the scholar, hardly conceives of the tion and: experience. It is the basis of objective staitdards of professional competence for officer in the same way that it does the law yer or doctor, and it certainly does not acseparatirlg the profession from laymen and cord to the officer the deference which it measurirlg the relative competence of memgives to the civilian prof~ssionak Even the bers of 1the profession. Such standards are universaL They inhere in the knowledge and military themselves are influenced by their skill arid are capable of general application 86 READINGS--CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER skill or craft exists only in the present and is mastered by learning an existing technique without reference to what has gone before. Professional knowledge, however, is intellectual in nature and capable of preservation in writing. Professional knowledge has a history, and some knowledge of that history is essential to professional competence. Institutions of research and education are required for the extension and transmission of professional knowledge and skill. Contact is maintained between the academic and practical sides of a profession through journals, conferences, and the circulation of personnel between practice and teaching. Professional expertise also has a dimension in breadth which is lacking in the normal trade. It is a segment of the total cultural tradition of society. The professional man can successfully apply his skill only when he is aware of this broader tradition of which he is a part. Learned professions are "learned" simply because they are an integral part of the total body of learning of society. Consequently professional education consists of two phases: the first imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background, and the second imparting the specialized skills and knowledge of the profession. The liberal education of the professional man is normally handled by the general educational institutions of society devoted to this purpose. The second or technical phase of professional education, on the other hand, is given in special institutions operated by or affiliated with the profession itself. Responsibility. The professional man is a practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of health, education, or justice, which is essential to the functioning of society. The client of every profession is society, individually or collectively. A research chemist, for instance, is not a professional man because the service he renders, while beneficial to society, is not essential to its immediate existence and functioning: only Du Pont and the Bureau of Standards have a direct and immediate interest in what he has to offer. The essential and general character of his service and his monopoly of his skill impose upon the professional man the responsibility to perform the service when required by society. This social responsibility distinguishes the professional man from other experts with only intellectual skills. The research chemist, for instance, is still a research chemist if he uses his skills in. a manner harmful to society. But the professional man can no longer practice if he refuses to accept his social responsibility: a physician ceases to be a physiCian if he uses his skills for antisocial purposes. The responsibility to serve and devotion to his skill furnish the professional motive. Financial remuneration cannot be the primary aim of the professional man qua professional man. Consequently, professional compensation normally is only partly determined by bargaining on the open market and is regulated by professional custom and law. The performance of an essential service not regulated by the normal expectation of financial rewards requires some statement governing the relations of the profession to the rest of society. Conflicts between the professional man and his clients, or among members of the profession, normally furnish the immediate impetus to the formulation of such a statement. The profession thus becomes a moral unit posting certain values and ideas which guide its members in their dealings with laymen. This guide may be a set of unwritten norms transmitted through the professional educational system or it may be codified into written canons of professional ethics. Corporateness. The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline a~d training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility. The sense of unity manifests itself in a professional organization which formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility. Membership in the 87 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP professional organization, along with the possession of special expertise and the acceptance of special responsibility, thus becomes a criterion of professional status, publicly distinguishing the professional man from the layman. The interest of the profession requires it to bar its members from capitalizing upon professional competence in areas where that competence has no relevance and likewise to protect itself against outsiders who would claim professional competence because of achievements or attributes in other fields. Professional organizations are generally either associations or bureaucracies. In the associational professions such as medicine and law, the practitioner typically functions independently and has a direct personal relationship with his client. The bureaucratic professions, such as the diplomatic service, possess a high degree of specialization of labor and responsibilities within the profession, and the profession as a whole renders a collective service to society as a whole. These two categories are not mutually exclusive: bureaucratic elements exist in most associational professions, and associations frequently supplement the formal structure of bureaucratic professions. The associational professions usually possess written codes of ethics since each practitioner is individually confronted with the problem of proper conduct toward clients and colleagues. The bureaucratic professions, on the other hand, tend to develop a more general sense of collective professional responsibility and the proper role of the profession in society. mE MILITARY PROFESSION The vocation of officership meets the principal criteria of professionalism. In practice, no vocation, not even medicine or law, has all the characteristics of the ideal profes . sional type. Officership probably falls somewhat further short of the ideal than either of these. Yet its fundamental character as a profession is undeniable. In practice, officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal. The Expertise of Officership. What is the specialized expertise of the military officer? Is there any skill common to all military officers and yet not shared with any civilian groups? At first glance this hardly seems to be the case. The officer corps appears to contain many varieties of specialists, including large numbers which have their counterparts in civilian life. Engineers, doctors, pilots, ordnance experts, personnel experts, intelligence experts, communications expertsall of these are found both within and without the modern officer corps. Even ignoring these technical specialists, each absorbed in his own branch of knowledge, just the broad division of the corps into land, sea, and air officers appears to create vast differences in the functions performed and the skills required. The captain of a cruiser and the commander of an infantry division appear to be faced with highly different problems requiring highly different abilities. Yet a distinct sphere of military competence does exist which is common to all, or almost all, officers and which distinguishes them from 'all, or almost all, civilians. This central skill is perhaps best summed up in Harold Lasswell's phrase "the management of violence." The function of a military force is successful armed combat. The duties of the military officer include: ( 1 ) the organizing, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat. The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer. It is common to the activities of the air, land, and sea officers. It distinguishes the military officer qua military officer from the other specialists which exist in the modern armed services. The skills of these experts may be necessary to the achievement of the objectives of the military force. But they are basically auxiliary vocations, having the same relation to the expertise of the officer as the skills of the nurse, chemist, laboratory technician, dietician, 88 READINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER pharmacist, and X-ray technician have to the expertise of the doctor. None of the auxiliary specialists contained within or serving the military profession is capable of the "management of violence," just as none of the specialists aiding the medical profession is capable of the diagnosis and treatment of illness. The essence of officership is embodied in the traditional admonition to Annapolis men that their duty will be to "fight the fleet." Individuals, such as doctors, who are not competent to manage violence but who are members of the officer corps are normally distinguished by special titles and insignia and are excluded from positions of military command. They belong to the officer corps in its capacity as an administrative organization of the state, but not in its capacity as a professional body. Within the profession itself there are specialists in the management of violence on sea, on land, and in the air, just as there are heart, stomach, and eye specialists within medicine. A military specialist is an officer who is peculiarly expert at directing the application of violence under certain prescribed conditions. The variety of conditions under which violence may be employed and the different forms in which it may be applied form the basis for subprofessional specialization. They also form the basis for evaluating relative technical competence. The larger and more complex the organizations of violence which an officer is capable of directing, and the greater the number of situations and conditions under which he can be employed, the higher is his professional competence. A man who is capable of directing only the activities of an infantry squad has such a low level of professional ability as to be almost on the border line. A man who can manage the operations of an airborne division or a carrier task force is a highly competent professional. The offi!;::er who can direct the complex activit~es of a combined operation involving large-scale sea, air, and land forces is at the top of his vocation. It is readily apparent that the military function requires a high order of expertise. No individual, whatever his inherent intellec tual ability and qualities of character and leadership, could perform these functions efficiently without considerable training and experience. In emergencies an untrained civilian may be capable of acting as a military officer at a low level for a brief period of time, just as in emergencies the intelligent layman may fill in until the doctor arrives. Before the management of violence became the extremely complex task that it is in modern civilization, it was possible for someone without specialized training to practice officership. Now, however, only the person who completely devotes his working hours to this task can hope to develop a reasonable level of professional competence. The skill of the officer is neither a craft (which is primarily mechanical) nor an art (which requires unique and nontransferable talent). It is instead an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training. It must be remembered that the peculiar skill of the officer is the management of violence not the act of violence itself. Firing a rifle, for instance, is basically a mechanical craft; directing the operations of a rifle company requires an entirely different type of ability which may in part be learned from books and in part from practice and experience. The intellectual content of the military profession requires the modern officer to devote about one-third of his profes sional life to formal schooling, probably a higher ratio of educational time to practice time than in any other. profession. In part this reflects the limited opportunities of the officer to acquire practical experience at the most important elements of his vocation. But to a large degree it also reflects the extreme complexity of the military expertise. The peculiar skill of the military officer is universal in the sense that its essence is not affected by changes in time or location. Just as the qualifications of a good surgeon are the same in Zurich as they are in New York, the same standards of professional military competence apply in Russia as in America and in the nineteenth century as in the twentieth. The possession of a common professional skill is a bond among military officers 89 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE-LEADERSHIP cutting across other differences. The vocation of the officer also possesses a history. The management of violence is not a skill which can be mastered simply ·by learning existing techniques. It is in a continuous process of development, and it is necessary for the officer to understand this development and to be aware of its main tendencies and trends. Only if he is aware of the historical development of the techniques of organizing and directing military forces can the officer expect to stay on the top of his profession. The importance of the history of war and military affairs receives sustained emphasis throughout military writings and military education. The military skill requires a broad background of general culture for its mastery. The methods of organizing and applying violence at any one stage in history are intimately related to the entire cultural pattern of society. Just as law at its borders merges into history, politics, economics, sociology, and psychology, so also does the military skill. Even more, military knowledge also has frontiers on the natural sciences of chemistry, physics, and biology. To understand his trade properly, the officer must have some idea of its relation to these other fields and the ways in which these other areas of knowledge may contribute to his own purposes. In addition, he cannot reaiJy develop his analytical skill, insight, imagination, and judgment if he is trained simply in vocational duties. The abilities and habits of mind which he requires within his professional field can in large part be acquired only through the broader avenues of learning outside his profession. The fact that, like the lawyer and the physician, he is continuously dealing with human beings requires him to have the deeper understanding of human attitudes, motivations, and behavior which a liberal education stimulates. Just as a general education has become the prerequisite for entry into the professions of law and medicine, it is now also almost universally recognized as a desirable qualification for the professional officer. The Responsibility of Officership. The expertise of the officer imposes upon him a special social responsibility. The employment of his expertise promiscuously for his own advantage would wreck the fabric of society. As with the practice of medicine, society insists that the management of violence be utilized only for socially approved purposes. Society has a direct, continuing, and general interest in the employment of this skill for the enhancement of its own military security. While all professions are to some extent regulated by the state, the military profession is monopolized by the state. The skill of the physician is diagnosis and treatment; his responsibility is the health of his clients. The skill of the officer is the management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client, society. The discharge of the responsibility requires mastery of the skill; mastery of the skill entails acceptance of the responsibility. Both responsibility and skill distinguish the officer from other social types. All members of society have an interest in its security; the state has a direct concern for the achievement of this along with other social values; but the officer corps alone is responsible for military security to the exclusion of all other ends. Does the officer have a professional motivation? Clearly he does not act primarily from economic incentives. In western society the vocation of officership is not welJ rewarded monetarily. Nor is his behavior within his profession governed by economic reward~ and punishments. The officer is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen-soldier inspired by intense momentary patriotism and duty but with no steadying and permanent desire to perfect himself in the management of violence. The motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society. The combination of these drives constitutes pfofessional motivation. Society, on the other hand, can only assure this motivation if it offers its officers continuing and 90 READING~HALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER sufficient pay both while on active duty and when retired. The officer possesses intellectualized skill, mastery of which requires intense study. But like the lawyer and doctor he is not primarily a man of the closet; he deals continuously with people. The test of his professional ability is the application of technical knowledge in a human context. Since this application is not regulated by economic means, however, the officer requires positive guides spelling out his responsibilities to his fellow officers, his subordinates, his superiors, and the state which he serves. His behavior within the military structure is governed by a complex mass of regulations, customs, and traditions. His behavior in relation to society is guided by an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state. While the primary responsibility of the physician is to his patient, and the lawyer to this client, the principal responsibility of the military officer is to the state. His responsibility to the state is the responsibility of the expert adviser. Like the lawyer and physician, he is concerned with only one segment of the activities of his client. Consequently, he cannot impose decisions upon his client which have implications beyond his field or special competence. He can only explain to his client his needs in this area, advise him as to how to meet these needs, and then, when the client has made his decisions, aid him in implementing them. To some extent the officer's behavior towards the state is guided by an explicit code expressed in law and comparable to the canons of professional ethics of the physician and lawyer. To a larger extent, the officer's code is expressed in custom, tradition, and the continuing spirit of the profession. The Corporate Character. of Officership. Officership is a public bureaucratized profession. The legal right to practice the profession is limited to members of a carefully defined body. His commission is to the officer what his license is to a doctor. Organically, however, the officer corps is much more than simply a creature of the state. The functional imperatives of security give rise to complex vocational institutions which mold the officer corps into an autonomous social unit. Entrance into this unit is restricted to those with the requisite education and training and is usually permitted only at the lowest level of professional competence. The corporate structure of the officer corps includes not just the official bureaucracy but also societies, associations, schools, journals, customs, and traditions. The professional world of the officer tends to encompass an unusually high proportion of his activities. He normally lives and works apart from the rest of society; physically and socially he probably has fewer nonprofessional contacts than most other professional men. The line between him and the layman or civilian is publicly symbolized by uniforms and insignia of rank. The officer corps is both a bureaucratic profession and a bureaucratic organization. Within the profession, levels of competence are distinguished by a hierarchy of ranks; within the organization, duties are distinguished by a hierarchy of office. Rank inheres in the individual and reflects his professional achievement measured in terms of experience, seniority, education, and ability. Appointments to rank are normally made by the officer corps itself applying general principles established by the state. Assignments to office are normally somewhat more subject to outside influence. In all bureaucracies authority derives from office; in a professional bureaucracy eligibility for office derives from rank. An officer is permitted to perform certain types of duties and functions by virtue of his rank; he does not receive rank because he has been assigned to an office. Although in practice there are exceptions to this principle, the professional character of the officer corps rests upon the priority of the hierarchy of rank over the hierarchy of office. The officer corps normally includes a number of nonprofessional "reservists." This is due to the fluctuating need for officers and the impossibility of the state maintaining continuously an officer corps of the size required in emergencies. The reservists are a 91 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP temporary supplement to the officer corps and qualify for military rank by education and training. While members of the corps, they normally possess all the prerogatives and responsibilities of the professional in the same rank. The legal distinction between them and the professional is preserved, however, and entrance into the permanent corps of officers is much more restricted than entrance into the reserve corps. The reservists seldom achieve the level of professional skill open to the career officers; consequently, the bulk of the reservists are in the lower ranks of the professional bureaucracy while the higher ranks are monopolized by the career professionals. The latter, as the continuing element in the military structure and because of their superior professional competence as a body, are normally charged with the education and indoctrination of the reservists in the skills and the traditions of the vocation. The reservist only temporarily assumes professional responsibility. His principal functions in society lie elsewhere. As a result, his motivations, values, and behavior frequently differ greatly from those of the career professional. The enlisted men subordinate to the officer corps are a part of the organizational bureaucracy but not of the professional bureaucracy. The enlisted personnel have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer. They are specialists in the application of violence not the management of violence. Their vocation is a trade not a profession. This fundamental difference between the officer corps and the enlisted corps is reflected in the sharp line which is universally drawn between the two in all the military forces of the world. If there were not this cleavage, there could be a single military hierarchy extending from the lowest enlisted man to the highest officer. But the differing character of the two vocations makes the organizational hierarchy discontinuous. The ranks which exist in the enlisted corps do not constitute a professional hierarchy. They reflect varying aptitudes, abilities, and offices within the trade of soldier, and movement up and down them is much more fluid than in the officer corps. The difference between the officer and enlisted vocations precludes any general progression from one to the other. Individual enlisted men do become officers but this is the exception rather than the rule. The education and training necessary for officership are normally incompatible with prolonged service as an enlisted man. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. How does Professor Huntington view the professional status of the enlisted man? 2. What curricula would the characteristic of expertise suggest for the professional schools of Air University? 3. How is officer professionalism consistent with civilian control of the US military? 4. Compare and contrast officership and the professions of law, medicine, and the clergy. 5. How is dual-professionalism possible? . \ \ \ 92 ~ READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER READING F A New Look at the Military Profession By Lt Col Zeb B. Bradford, Jr. and Maj James R. Murphy. From Army magazine Vol. 19, No.2 (February 1969). Copyright 1969 by Association of the US Army, and reproduced by permission. Lt Col Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., United States Army, attended the Command and General Staff College; Major James R. Murphy, United States Air Force, is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College. The article was written when Colonel Bradford and Major Murphy were assistant professors of the Department of Social Science, United States Military Academy. · T HE MILITARY establishment today our career officers, and fails to provide a occupies a very prominent and controbasis from which American society can gain versial place in American national life. The a rational understanding of its military estabprominence is readily understandable-$84 lishment. billion of the federal budget, more than three The officer corps must accept most of the · million Americans in the armed forces, an responsibility for these faulty . conceptions extensive draft, world-wide defense committhat dominate the thinking about its basic ments and a large-scale war in Vietnam. character, for it has failed to question its These facts, of course, generate considerable own assumptions or to state its . own case.. public controversy over national policies, The military has been too willing to leave priorities, costs and alternatives. But more theorizing about the profession of arms to cifundamentally, there is a controversy in the vilian intellectuals who, although· often tal minds of many soldiers and the thoughtful ented, have failed to grasp its essentials simpublic over the very nature and purpose of ply because their viewpoint from outside the their profession in America. Is there some military prevents sufficient insight. The re truth in the emotion-charged allegation of "a sult is an artificial conceptualization in terms huge, powerful and somewhat autonomous of conventional social theory which distorts military establishment whose influence the perspective of both the military and the reaches into almost every aspect of our napublic, creating confusion and obstruction. tional life?" What is the military profession's Many Americans find it difficult to exreason for existing? What is the character of plain a large professional military establishpersonal military professionalism? ment in a democratic society. Most social Most of the general assumptions and contheory asserts an anomaly created by a group cepts which define the role of the soldier in specializing in the techniques of violence our society are inaccurate and misleading. serving an essentially liberal society which Simply stated, our prevailing notions condeplores force as an affort to man's assumed cerning the military profession rest upon a rational nature. The American· historical exnarrow concept of specialized function. A perience of long periods of refraining from unique expertise is asserted as the distininvolvement in international power politics, guishing characteristic which justifies a place interrupted only by sporadic forays, has rein for the professional officer in the councils of forced the assumption that the military is at government, and gives him a claim to the best a necessary but unnatural evil. Indeed, support and respect of our society. This exthe standing army of yesteryear was a cadre, planation tends to narrow the perspective of and postwar demobilizations insured that it 93 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP remained out of sight and mind. This condition helps to explain an unending search on the part of the American military for selfjustification and willingness to embrace theses of legitimacy advanced by civilian intellectuals in terms of a highly specialized and unique purpose. This quest for meaning involves establishing a respectable conceptual basis for making claims upon society, in part for resources but primarily for acceptance. To DEAL with the military as an institution, we may start with the definition of the profession by Samuel P. Huntington in The Soldier and the State-perhaps the best known, most widely accepted, and certainly the most methodically developed conceptualization. Dr. Huntington states that the military is a profession because it possesses three characteristics common to all generally acknowledged professions and essential to professional status:. expertise, responsibility and corporateness. For the unique expertise of the military, he adopts from Harold Lasswell "management of violence." This is distinct from mere application of violence, such as physically firing weapons, for this ability gives only technical competence or tradesman status. All activities conducted within the military establishment, Dr. Huntington says, ar,e related to this unique expertise: manageilient of violence. This peculiar expertise ts the hallmark of the profession as a whole and distinguishes the professional officer. Furthermore, the military holds a monopoly on this particular expertise. No one else may both possess arid apply it. The second characteristic Dr. Huntington cites is social responsibility. The nature of military expertise imposes ah obligation upon the military to execute its i function not for selfish ends but only in the service of society. The military profession does not exist for self-interest, ·profit or personal motives. CORPORATENESS, the final characteristic, means that there is a shared sense of organic unity and group consciousness which manifests itself in a particular professional organization. The organization formalizes, applies and enforces the standards of professional competence. For the individual, membership in the organization ·is a criterion of professional status; laymen are excluded. In the case of the military, Dr. Huntington designates the officer corps as the professional organization. Not all officers are considered professionals in his view, however, since some lack functional competence in the peculiar military expertise of management of violence. Those only temporarily serving, with no thvught of a military career, are only amateurs. Enlisted men, as a group, are considered tradesmen and are outside the professional corps, although many career soldiers may qualify for the higher status-most frequently those in the upper noncommissioned ranks. Dr. Huntington's model is attractive in its consistency and logic, and it is true that the military does share in some measure characteristics of other professional groups such as law and medicine. But the analogy is insufficient to describe the military as a profession. The error is due to the attempt to find characteristics in the military which allow it to fall within a conventional definition of profession better fitted to other recognized groups. Rather than defining the military by its own distinguishing characteristics, it is interpreted in accordance with a socially standardized definition. This approach leads to the search for a particular expertise upon which the military can . peg its professional status. There are two basic objections to this approach. First, "management of violence" (or similar formulations for the same thing such as "the ordered application of force to the resolution of a social problem") is insufficient to describe what is actually required of the American military establishment in our contemporary global security commitments. Second, the military profession cannot be defined sufficiently in terms of any functional expertise. 94 READING5-SHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Military expertise is not a constant; it is ble or socially productive-employment of contingent and relative. Military expertise the military establishment. Indeed, a military will vary according to whatever is required created or existing solely for the purpose of of the profession to support the policies of war may be dangerous to the values and the state. The range of possibilities includes goals of a democracy. Furthermore, the facts "management of violence," "peacekeeping," simply contradict such a narrow concept of "deterrence," "nation-building," "revolutionthe function of the military profession. In ary development," "civic action" or "pacifitimes of national security crises, the historication." There are many examples of milical American approach has been to augment tary establishments being required to do all a small permanent military cadre with a vast sorts of "non-military" tasks. To name only mobilization of "citizen soldiers." The resulta few in the American experience, we can ing successful management of violence has point to the construction of the Panama not seemed to depend upon qualities or exCanal, the building of ~ailroads to the West, pertise exclusive to the "military professionthe rehabilitation of domestic social groups, als." conservation of natural resources, work projects for the unemployed and even polar and As MoRRIS JANOWITZ points out in Thespace exploration. Professional Soldier, there is a narrowing We may look at our current experience in skill differential between military and civilianVietnam for further examples. The "pacifielites. No particular skill, to include managecation" effort requires a whole range of skills ment of violence, is restricted to the militarywhich are not related to "management of profession. To take an extreme case, are notviolence." Should that conflict end, it is conthe secretary of defense and his top aidsceivable that a major portion of our military "managers of violence?" Of course they are;there would turn to tasks more related to indeed, these civilian leaders brought theeconomics and social psychology than to the managerial revolution to the Pentagon, butemployment of arms. Professional "experthat does not make them a part of the militise" might then be something as unheroic as tary profession, as they themselves would becrop irrigation, village development or vocathe first to insist. We could say that thosetional education. · outside the uniformed officer corps fail toWithin our defense establishment, the past qualify as professionals, but this reduces prodecade has seen a great transformation in the fessionalism simply to being a member of askills required of the military. The widegroup. Yet there are officers who are notspread use of systems analysis and our mushconsidered professionals, and there are thoserooming technology have created whole new in uniform who are considered professionalsdimensions of military expertise necessary but contribute only indirectly to "managingfor national security. Quite obviously, any violence." The military profession is more ·attempt to decide who is a professional, than a uniformed structure incorporating .a based upon the relationship of his. occupafunctional expertise. tional skill to management of violence or combat role, is arbitrary and too restricted. The other two characteristics which HunIt also can be self-denying in terms of doing tington cites-responsibility and corporatewhat is required by the country, if the miliness-do exist in the military, and are imtary does not comprehend a broader role and portant. But they lack real meaning in the develop the necessary skills as part of profesway he relates them to an expertise. In exsional expertise. Combat expertise, of course, plaining the responsibility of officership, Dr. is the single most vital skill of the soldier, Huntington says that, "The expertise of the and one uniquely his to develop and use. officer imposes upon him a special social reHopefully, however, this would not be to the sponsibility." Here again we see the crucial exclusion of all other-perhaps more desira-importance placed upon an expertise as the 95 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP essential qualification of the profession. Responsibility is said to be a function of the peculiar military expertise. This is putting the cart before the horse, for responsibility must come first. A more accurate wording would turn the phrase around. "The special social responsibility of the officer requires of him an expertise." As explained earlier, the varying demands of state service may prescribe that the officer possess skills unrelated to "management of violence." Responsibility is more than a means of insuring that the military exercises its expertise in the service of the state. Far more essential to military professionalism is an internalized sense of responsibility, of allegiance to duly constituted authority. The third characteristic--corporatenessis, as Dr. Huntington states, a mark of the military profession and helps to describe. it. Yet the significance of corporateness is missed, due to two errors. One is a faulty interpretation of the role of management of violence in defining the rank structure. The other is a failure to emphasize the primary role of the professional organization as institutionalizing essential values and formalizing these legally. The first point is expressed in this way by Dr. Huntington: "The larger and more complex the organization of violence which an officer is capable of directing . . . the higher is his professional competence." We come full circle and are contradicted once more with the example of the secretary of defense, who is not a member of the military profession. More disturbing is the focus on the size and complexity of the organization directed as the measure of professional competence. Degrees of competence, of course, are reflected and rewarded by rank; and the higher the rank the higher the position in any corporate hierarchy. But the forms of competence are so diverse that the corporate structure becomes a way of organizing large numbers of people with many different functions for a common purpose, like any other bureaucracy. Beyond certain mm1mum standards of competence, in the military service seniority and career development patterns largely determine the rise through echelons of command. Certainly, the size of the organization does not define personal professional competence .. It is evident that the concept of the military profession described by Dr. Huntington rests fundamentally upon the attribution of a particular expertise, and that the other characteristics such as responsibility and corporateness are defined in terms of this expertise. Without a unique skill the edifice falls The narrow concept of the profession described by Dr. Huntington ... fails to encourage the career officer to develop his knowledge in fields such as economics and politics which give meaning and purpose to the use of military power. This restricted approach is illustrated by the statement of retired Brig. Gen. Lynn D. Smith in Army Digest: As a professional soldier, you must understand the difference between national strategy and military strategy. Military strategy is defined in the Dictionary for Joint Usage as: "The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force." If you master this art and science, you will earn all the stars and decorations your country can bestow. You will be so occupied that you will not have time to concern yourself with the debates on the fine points of the political, economic, and psychological aspects of national strategy. If the military's own conception of the profession leads to the kind of narrowness evident above, we will forfeit our responsibility. National security policy is directed at protecting the essential values of our nation. If the U :s. military is to contribute fully to that purpose it must have the ability and the inclination to relate the objectives of military power and alternative means of achieving these objectives to other aspects of public policy. 96 READING~HALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER IF THE ANALYSIS is correct thus far, it is clear that Dr. Huntington has failed to describe the truly unique and distinguishing characteristics of the military profession. The military is not a profession in the way that certain other groups are, such as law or medicine. The term has to mean something different in the military case. Expertise, corporateness, responsibility-all are applicable in describing the functioning and organization of the military institution, but they do not of themselves define the distinctive quality of professionalism in the military context. We may continue to refer to the military as a profession only if it can be established that the military is a unique social group, and that its uniqueness gives content to the meaning of "profession." The military profession can be properly defined only in terms of both its purpose and the conditions placed upon the fulfillment of that purpose. The military exists only for the service of the state, regardless of the skills required or functions performed. As a profession, the military does not condition this commitment, for in the words of Lt. Gen. Sir John Hackett, a distinguished British soldier-scholar, the contract for service includes an "unlimited liability clause." The military's obligation of unconditional service to the lawful authority of the state is unique. There are, from time to time, changes in the nature of expertise required for this service. There may even be changes in the meaning of national security itself when viewed in terms of policies and pro grams. But these do not alter the basic char acter of the military profession. Many people outside the profession may have a self-im posed commitment to unconditional service to the state, but only the military possesses the obligation collectively as a defining char acteristic. Certainly, in this respect, it is far different from any other profession. A military establishment cannot confer upon itself professional status. This is the prerogative of the state. The status of the profession is bound irrevocabTy to that of the governing authority which it serves. When, for any reason, a military group challenges the governing authority of the state, it loses its professional character and then becomes an armed political force. As history illustrates through numerous examples, a professional military organization goes through a severe crisis when, for one reason or another, it cannot identify either an effective governing authority or one to which it can concede legitimacy. Crucial to the character of a professional military group is the existence of a lawful and effective state authority to which the military owes allegiance. A professional military is impossible without such authority. It is pointless to attempt to define abstractly the conditions under which a military group should renounce its professional status. One's own values will determine how the legitimacy of authority should be judged. As a profession, however, if that term is to be grounded in reality, a national military establishment must share the destiny and moral stature of its governing master. No state can deny the morality of its own policies or its own legitimacy. The military profession is a creature of the state. The military's status as a profession, therefore, can be defined only in terms of its unique, unconditional obligation to serve the lawful authority of the state. It will develop whatever expertise is required to fulfill its unlimited contract for public service. UP TO THIS POINT our analysis has dealt with the meaning of the military establishment as a profession, and has deferred a discussion of the meaning of professionalism in individ ual terms. Obviously, the line between the two is not distinct. The nature of the profes sion dictates the basis of personal profession alism. If the profession is to survive on the basis defined above, it will do so because of the personal commitment of. the professional soldiers. The basis for this commitment must now be studied. What is military professionalism? Unfor tunately, here also a substantial mass of un dergrowth must be cleared away before the forest becomes visible. It is common but in 97 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP :~. accurate to conceive military professionalism in terms of beliefs which a person must hold in order to be a professional soldier. Dr. Huntington offers an example of this tendency. In his view, the "military ethic" is "a constant standard by which it is possible to judge the professionalization of any officer corps anywhere, any .time." Even if a particular ethic is not a prerequisite to professional status, it is nevertheless assumed that the typical officer will have a predictable set of social and political concepts, thus stereotyping the "military man." The professional ethic, according to Dr. Huntington, "emphasizes the permanence, irrationality, weakness and evil in human nature . . . is pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power oriented, nationalistic, pacifistic and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is in brief, realistic and conservative." This sort of standard ideology is incorrect at best and can be dangerous in its support of stereotyped thinking by and about the military. Yet the possession of this view of man and society is widely assumed to be both true and necessary. The root of the problem here lies in setting down as reality what would seem in the abstract to be a compatible outlook for a warrior, and one which would theoretically support the role of a fighting group as a social organism. This error is in part caused by the incorrect explanation of the profession as resting on functons of violence. But neither careful study nor a walk through the Pentagon supports an argument that this set of norms is required for military professionalism. In the first place, this set of beliefs simply does not pervade the officer corps with anything resembling universality. Morris Janowitz, in his sociological study, The i~Professional Soldier, concludes that, actually, "the political beliefs of the military are hot distinct from those that operate in 'civilian society." This reflects the diverse origins and representative nature of the officer corps. The U.S. officer corps has neither social class nor dynastic origins. Coming randomly from across the range of a pluralistic society, it has a pluralism in attitudes within its ranks. Even if the argument against a "professional ethic" is accepted, it is generally assumed that the military professional must be unique on one point at least: his acceptance of the use of force in the pursuit of national objectives makes him an inherently different type of person from his average fellow citizen. This is incorrect. If the soldier is apparently willing to solve problems by military means, it is only when so ordered by competent authority. He has been taught to see the military implications of problems and is charged with the responsibility of providing a military instrument to civilian policy-makers. But even given this, there is no sharp line dividing the soldier from society at large. There are "hawks" and "doves" on all branches of the social tree. As history and contemporary affairs amply illustrate, both the soldier and his civilian fellow share a willingness, although sometimes reluctantly, to bear and use arms in common cause. There are higher values which even the dedicated liberal holds which justify to him the use of force. Civilians and professional soldiers alike have found themselves in the service of the state in all of our wars. While the soldier may find it easier to resort to force than some of his civilian fellows, in most cases it is only a matter of degree. It is not a matter of values, only one of acquired and required perspective. As a product and dedicated servant of his society, the professional officer shares the core values of the nation. He is not a mercenary. It must be realized that one can be a professional officer while holding any number of political and social beliefs, some in contradiction to "conservative realism." As the tasks of the profession are dictated by the state, so are the imperatives of professionalism. The officer may believe what he likes and may view the world as he chooses, so long as he can find it within himself to serve the state on its terms. And there are many diverse motivations. One may serve because he wants glory, loves patriotism, seeks social 98 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER advancement or needs the work. One. may fight the enemy with bloodthirsty joy or sadness in his heart. All that matters is that he do it well enough to fulfill his obligations. Liberal and conservative, idealist and realist, can and do share the profession of arms. A fixed and elaborate set of social beliefs is a false basis upon which to define professionalism. Archetypes are abstractions, soldiers are not. MucH EFFORT has been expended thus far in attempting to demolish false notions about a military ethic. There is a hard core of truth . however, which does serve as a common de~ nominator. If a particular ethic is not basic· to professionalism, there must be something else. What is basic is related to the unlimited obli~ation of the military as a corporate pro f~sswnal community and functional orga msm. What is it? In individual terms it has often been termed personal commitment. But a better way of phrasing it is a "sense of duty." · Commitm,ent implies less than duty. Whereas commitment may indicate what one must do in terms of a consciously made obligation, duty has persoQal moral value content. A sense of duty is a feeling ofwhat one ought to do and must do in terms of one's values. Robert E. Lee called duty "th~ sublimest word in the English language." Here we come again to a point made earlier, concerning the nature of a profession: that a sense of belonging and a professional organization are required. It was argued that a corporate unconditional obligation distinguishes the military. In more subjective terms, itcan be called a "collective sense of duty." S?me officers .may feel the denial of a pro fessiOnal expertise akin to that of law or medicine is a self-inflicted wound. We would urge, on the contrary, that the acceptance of what we have tried to argue as the real meaning of professionalism will enable offi cers to accept a more demanding role in na tional security policy. As a profession of un limited service, no considerations are taboo in formulating military advice, and no skill which is necessary to the nation conflicts with the professional status of the officer. This analysis should not be misinterpreted as a suggestion for an expanded mandate for the military. What is suggested is that we recognize the profession for what it is-a profession of unconditional service to the nation, engaged· in a multitude of tasks. For more than two decades the military has been required to participate in the formulation of national security policy and to assist in executing it; This has required broad knowledge and competence in many diverse branches of public affairs. False notions concerning the meaning of military professionalism must not be allowed to prevent the officer corps from equipping itself mentally for its required duty. The military professional has no vested interest save that of the health and security of the nation itself. We must not forfeit this trust by adopting a self-conception which unwittingly betrays our duty. The officer cannot be a respected member of his profession without subscribing. to the operating norms of his professional community. These norms are in fact a necessity for the success of the group in fulfilling its tasks. Without. a collective sense of duty the military could not function and certainly could not be trusted. Military professionals must sha~e a sens~ of duty to the nation. The professiOnal officer must be an unconditional servant. of state policy; he must have a deep normative sense of duty to do this. The rigor?us demands made upon the profession by this sense of duty, and the tasks required of it, explain the premium placed upon other "soldierly" qualities. One cannot do his duty unless he has courage, selflessness and integrity. The military profession must have these group values as a functional necessity. A sense of duty i~ necessary, but not sufficient, for professional status. The person must have competence to perform the service required to fulfill his obligations as well. As described earlier, this may require one or more of a number of skills. Finally, he must be a member of the offic~r corps of the armed forces. By joining the officer corps he 99 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP makes his professional commitment and adopts the community values as his own. Apart from belonging to the officer corps, professionalism is, then, a status determined jointly by the officer and his government. Neither the state nor the officer corps will grant professional standing to the inan who lacks the necessary competence or who will not agree to make a commitme~ to duty which on the part of the state is assumed to be unconditional. The unconditional quality of this commitment is signified by the career length and life of selfless sacrifice, ranging from Melville Goodwin's "genteel poverty" to the Gettysburg "last full measure of devotion." <' Professionalism thus has both objective and subjective content. It is objective in that professional status is granted by the state if certain performance criteria are met by the officer. It is subjective in that the officer must feel a sense of duty to serve the lawful government "for the full distance," even at the risk of his life. Mentally, he does not condition this obligation. THIS ANALYSIS has attempted to deal with the difficult problems of the ideas which provide a frame of reference for the military professional in our society. Narrow concepts of the meaniqg of professionalism, especially those dependent on an exclusive expertise, have been rejected as inadequate to describe the uniqueness of the· U.S. military profession. We have merely stated what should be obvious: that the military profession is an unconditional servant of lawful state authority and that its collective sense of duty makes the .role possible. A particular skill is not basic. ·Also rejected is any rigid pattern of social and political beliefs as being necessary for a professional ethic for the individual. Only a sense of duty which somehow justifies his sacrifice ~o the officer himself is required. QUestion!! for Reflection and Discussion 1. Why do the authors find Dr. Huntington's term "management of violence" a faulty description of the professional military role? 2. Why do the authors say that expertise is relative and oontingent? 3. Wh~t new skills have military professionals ~--· recently had to acquire? 4. What expertise does only the military professional possess? S. Provide your own definition of the military profession. 6. How does your definition of the military profession differ from your definition of other professions? 100 READINGs--f our corps-have master's degrees in a wide range of disciplines. Among our line officers, almost none of whom had advanced to the doctorate level before 1945, we now have 565 who have earned their Ph.D.s. 102 READINGS--CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER I always take special pleasure in seeing evidence of this scholarship reflected in Air Force studies and in the numerous applications of computer technology that we are using more and more to support research and development, space activities, and a wide variety of planning and operational functions. In one recent experience of this type, I recall asking a very young captain to describe his background in a highly technical subject that be bad briefed. He then gave me the surprising but entirely satisfactory explanation that be bad acquired part of his background on the way to his master's and the remainder in gaining his Ph.D. As one further indication of the pace at which the academic preparation of our people is advancing, I will point out that in a recent twelve-month period our full-time education programs for officers and airmen produced 512 bachelor's degrees, 1,167 master's, and 100 doctorates. In part-time education programs, more than 11,000 Air Force men and women earned high school degrees or the equivalent, 870 received bachelor's degrees, 580 received master's, and three were awarded their doctorates. During this same twelve-month period, more than 3,400 officers improved their qualification for broader responsibilities by undergoing professional military education at the Air University, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces Staff College, and at other schools through war college level that are operated by . the Army and Navy.... Our emphasis on academic and professional training can meet only a part of the requirements for a modern Air Force that is operating a varied range of new and complex equipment. To create the skills that are needed for more than a thousand specialties involved in this effort, our Air Training Command has refined to a high degree its methods and techniques of technical and flight instruction. I am confident that the fixed and mobile training facilities of this command, in providing instruction to over 550,000 Air Force personnel each year, will continue to support our advance toward a higher order of professionalism. In terms of experience, we have a professional resource th~t from several standpoints is unmatched by any military force in history. To a large extent, this resource is compounded of the knowledge and insights acquired by thousands of our career people who have served in World War II, Korea, and Southeast Asia, plus the numerous crises that intervened. Another important boost in their experience level has resulted from their participation in the various categories of rigorous development testing for all aircraft and in the operational readiness inspections of units under simulated combat conditions. To the extent possible within the more severe constraints of essential safety m~asures, we have taken the same approach in· proving out the effectiveness of our crews and equipment in the ICBM force. We have realized a further upgrading of experience by taking part in extensive joint and combined defense exercises. By enabling 'us to operate in a close team relationship 'Yith the ground and naval forces of this country, and with the armed forces of friendly nations, these maneuvers afforded realistic workouts in operational and logistic planning. In all aspects of our operations in Southeast Asia-reconnaissance, strike missions, airlift, and others-I have seen the experience factor emerge time and again as the key ingredient of success. This is borne out by the ability of our people to operate effectively in the most challenging conflict environment yet encountered and to do so through modification rather than drastic overhaul of tactics and procedures. By far the most important points to recognize in this look at our professional assets are the critical tendencies for better or worse that are produced by our basic outlook toward military service~ Despite the wide variation in circumstances that determine that outlook, the common denominators that deserve our attention can be examined under three headings: the requisite attributes of an Air Force professional; his adaptation to the 103 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP defense system; and his preconceptions about entitlement to prestige and public esteem. Taking these in order, I have always had the firm conviction that no member of the Air Force or any other military service is on his way to professional status unless he fully understands and reveres the national values and institutions that he is sworn to protect. Beyond that he must have those personal standards of excellence that will see him through long periods of concentration on tasks that demand the utmost in courage, stamina, skill, and precision. One of the most rewarding aspects of my career has been the frequent opportunity to observe these characteristics in Air Force professionals who are filling operational, technical, and administrative assignments. Only when applied to such people can some of the more abstract terms like dedication, sense of duty, and pride of service convey their proper meaning. In a professional's adaptation to the defense system he will usually benefit, and so will the service, if he can strike a balance between two extremes. At one extreme, the "lie down and play dead" reaction to criticism can keep him on the sidelines, and, at the other extreme, an irresponsible maverick reaction to the system's authoritarian structure can also put him on the sidelines via the headlines. The several notable exceptions to this rule do not, in my opinion, eliminate its value as a guide. On a more positive note, the main idea that I want to project concerns the type of professional the Air Force likes most of all to see in action. I am referring here to the disciplined but creative thinkers and innova tors who have always been the mainspring of Air Force progress. These are professionals who have been operating throughout their careers in a climate of transition to new and better weapons and to new and better con cepts. I have never seen their energies and initiatives more fully employed than at this time. This is why I give little credence to pe riodic claims that the motivation and enthu siasm of our people have been smothered by a civilian invasion of prerogatives formerly reserved to the military. At all levels of the defense establishment, we in the military have every opportunity to speak out loud and clear in defending a particular point of view on problems that are under study and discussion. In this process, the demand for objectivity and accuracy in stating our proposals is greater now than ever before, primarily because of their more serious cost and policy implications. With each of these problems, however, the time for decision has to come; and that is the point at which the military professional should recognize his obligation to . give wholehearted support to the selected course of action. n By operating within the system, instead of shortcutting or obstructing it, he can retain the opportunity to gain ultimate support for essential measures within acceptable time limits. When changing conditions and new facts compel the restudy of an old problem on which a professional has been overruled, he will find that his ideas on that subject are again in great demand. I think it is significant that we can learn from the writings of Billy Mitchell, whose difficulties with the system resulted from circumstances not likely to be repeated, one of the most valuable guidelines for the professional's over-all outlook toward a military career. In one of his comments on that subject, he reminded us that: "The bodies and organizations which the people created for the purpose of protecting them are merely agencies to put their word into execution." It seems to me the military professional should feel both challenged and rewarded by the opportunity to support a system that places into execution the purposes and ideals of this country. Those who share this view probably have experienced no great degree of misgiving about their entitlement to prestige and public esteem. Most of the people who are troubled by that misgiving have started out with the mistaken idea that merely by putting on a uniform they automatically have gained per manent title to adulation and respect as 104 READINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER members of a professional aristocracy. It is also possible that this assumption has accounted for some of the undue concern over the so-called erosion of military prestige. On that score, let me emphasize that the Air Force is preeminently afunctional, rather than a ceremonial, entity. Prestige for our service and its members, therefore, derives solely from our record of mission achievement and could be eroded only by nonachievement. Our mastery of the complex art of aerospace operations at this point is unsurpassed; and the hard core of our professionalism is the knowledge, experience, and skill we contribute in maintaining and applying that mastery in the cause of national progress and survival. In fulfilling that role, the Air Force professional must continue to merit public trust through demonstrated integrity of thought and action. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Why does the Air Force require a bachelor's degree or higher before commissioning? 2. How· can a college degree help a young man become a better pilot than a person with no degree? 3. Why is it important for the military professional to understand and revere national values and institutions? 4. How can a person be both a "disciplined, but creative" thinker? 5. How do you explain the phrase, "integrity of thought and action?" READING H The Military Profession as a Career By Harold Brown. Reprinted from Air Force Policy Letter For Commanders {June 1966). Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of the Air Force, has been a leader in defense research and engineering for many years. He is now President of the California Institute of Technology. Dr. Brown presented "The Military Profession as a Career" in an address at graduation ceremonies at the United States Air Force Academy in June 1966. I N 1945, we appeared t are trained to fight. gers. On the contrary, the soldier above all other people prays_ for peace, for he must THE PROFESSION OF ARMS suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars Yours is the profession of arms, the will to of war. But always in our ears ring the omiwin, the sure knowledge that in war there is nous words of Plato, that wisest of all philosno substitute for victory, that if you lose, the ophers: "Only the dead have seen the end of nation will be destroyed, that the very obses-war." 118 READINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER The shadows are lengthening for me. The to West Point. Always there echoes and ;etwilight is here. My days of old have vanechoes: Duty, honor, country.ished-tone and tint. They have gone glimToday marks my final roll call with you.mering through the dreams of things that But I want you to know that when I crosswere. Their memory is one of wondrous the river, my last conscious thoughts will bebeauty, watered by tears and coaxed and caof the corps, and the corps, and the corps.I bid you farewell. ressed by the smiles of yesterday. I listen vainly, but with thirsty ear, for the witching Questions for Reflection and Discussion melody of faint bugles blowing reveille, of 1. Why do General MacArthur's words applyfar drums beating the long roll. only to· the military profession rather thanto all professions? In my dreams I hear again the crash ofguns, the rattle of musketry, the strange, 2. Why does the General stress an officer's con cern with ethical value systems? mournful mutter of the battlefield. But in the evening of my memory always I come back 3. Prepare an argument for or against the wordorder; "Duty, Honor, Country." READING K Duty, Honor, Country vs. Moral Conviction By Lt Col Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., USA. From Army magazine (Sept 1968). Copyright 1968by Association of the U.S. Army and reproduced by permission. Colonel Bradford of the Infantry in Vietnam was aide to Gen Creighton B. Abrams. Thisessay resulted from his studies while teaching a seminar on national security problems in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy. He has also attended theCommand and General Staff College. When a nation's military force defies the do his duty in the service of the state is un policy of the state it serves, it loses its pro· fessional status and becomes an armed politi· compromising and has no reservations. His cal body, as did the Praetorian Guard of the honor is the moral measure of duty faithfullyRomans. So, too, the soldier loses his properformed, even at the risk of death, in the fessional status when, on personal moral service of his country. T grounds, he defies the policy of the nation heis sworn to serve. This meaning of military professionalismappears simple to fulfill, until the full impliHE West Point motto, "Duty, Honor, cations are examined.Country," succinctly states the essential An obligation to serve the state to thecharacteristics of military professionalism. "last full measure of devotion" has beenThe soldier's first loyalty is to his country, stated as an absolute. Absolutes are rarelywhose values and purposes he has solemnly realizable as goals in human affai.rs and oftensworn to uphold. The soldier's obligation to create conflicts between values. For the sol 119 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP moral claim of state policy upon their milidier, the concept of professionalism can in volve great moral choices which are implicit tary duty, they in fact challenged the system of government itself, which was also a value in his functions and cannot be evaded by in its own right. The danger of praetorianism claiming an unlimited obligation to obey in is that it imperils the very values it seeks to the execution of his duty. An honest analysis of military professionalism must at least try protect. The paradox is due to a false divi sion between the abstract idealization of theto face the possible moral dilemma inherent state and the operative realities of politicalin the nature of the profession. What is the government. moral responsibility of the professional sol dier when he is called upon to execute a A passage from one of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's speeches illustrates the point:state policy to which he has a moral objec"I find in existence a new and heretofore un tion? What are the limits of professional ob ligation when duty is confronted with a conknown and dangerous concept that the mem bers of our armed forces owe primary alleflicting moral imperative? giance or loyalty to those who temporarilyIn terms of personal morality, the problem the authority of the executive is quite simple, at least theoretically. The solexercise dier, like all men, is an autonomous moral branch of Government rather than to the country and its constitution which they arebeing. He cannot abdicate his moral respon sibility and still retain his human integrity. sworn to defend. No proposition could be No one can deny this principle. The issue is more dangerous." even broader, however, and involves another ON THE CONTRARY, the duty of a profesprinciple equally important. sional officer, in practical terms, must be toThe broader issue concerns the commithis nation through its lawful government. ment to the political system itself which the The "nation" is a subjective abstraction, and professional serves. The nation can survive is really what one thinks the national com with dissent and, indeed, a healthy democ racy needs the dissent of private citizens. munity should be in terms of his own values relative to the core values of his society. ButThe state can also thrive in the face of indithe only legitimate manifestation of the navidual military dissenters. But enough people tion with which we can deal objectively is its can add up to an establishment. Can a nation afford to have a military establishment which duly constituted government. reserves to itself the right to determine the Thus, in our political system, the military officer must realize that he plays social andmorality of governmental policy? No; it can not and remain a democracy. The morality institutional parts which are vital to government of the people. His mission itself serves of public policy in a democracy .must be dea legitimate moral purpose: the right of the termined by those chosen by the people to state to protect itself against all enemies, formake policy, not by those charged with exe eign and domestic. But the government, ascuting it. A group of guardians, 'like those in the state's lawfully constituted authority, is Plato's Republic, that determine the norms by which society is to be organized, would sues the marching orders. impose an unbearable burden upon our sysThe professional soldier cannot wear the uniform while challenging the moral validity tem of representative ,government. of a state policy which involves the performThere have been many examples of the ance of military duty. Refusing to supportconsequences of military officers and estabthat policy would betray the trust of his prolishments which have perceived: their role as fessionalism. Just as the profession becomes"defenders of the faith" or as guardians of an armed political force if it defies state polthe nation's "true" objectives. We may cite icy, an officer loses his professional statusthe example of French Gen. Raoul Salan and when as an individual he defies state policy. certain of his fellow officers in Algeria. By If, as an individual moral being, he cannotreserving to themselves the right to judge the 120 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER accept as morally valid the policies of the nason's moral judgments be reconciled with tion he serves, and cannot support them with service to the state if he is to serve it in a his actions, he must leave the military and professional capacity. This can be determined only by the person himself. The pro seek to. influence his government as a civil ian. This is his right; indeed, his moral oblifession itself, as a creature of the state, is a gation. But he ceases to be a military profeslegal abstraction, and as such cannot take a moral stand. The individual cannot avoid it. sional when he no longer feels a sense of duty to obey the orders of the lawful governHe is a human being first, a professional sec ment, regardless of his personal moral feelond. This fundamental fact was seen and ex ings. pressed clearly by a soldier who paid dearly Part of the predicament has thus far been for maintaining his moral integrity and hon obscured and must be clarified. What if the esty: Gen. Ludwig Beck, chief of staff of the officer does choose to obey? Where is justice German Army until purged by Chancellor then? Does the government have a right to Adolf Hitler. Gen. Beck wrote in 1938: impose its will upon him? "History will indict the highest leaders of the In fact, the government does have the law Wehrmacht with blood-guilt if they do not ful right to coerce him under the terms of the act in accordance with expert and statesman "unlimited liability contract" which the offilike knowledge and assurance. Their duty ofcer accepted as an implicit condition of his soldierly obedience finds its limit when theircommission. If the government does proceed knowledge, conscience and responsibility for to coerce him, the officer still has the right, if bid the execution of an order." he so chooses, to sacrifice himself and his It has been the world's tragedy that, un freedom, even his life, for his principles. It like Gen. Beck, the majority of his fellow of may seem to be a Hobson's choice: obey or ficers could feel justified in living up to a go to jail. But that is his choice. We live in concept of professionalism which excusedan imperfect world and cannot demand easy the soldier from moral responsibility. Theychoices. If he chooses to obey, in spite of his rationalized their duty as basically to the moral dissent, he is placing his personal army itself. The German officer corps' con well-being above his principles. And, if he cept of professionalism led it to abdicate per loses his war, he may be hanged by his ene sona~ moral responsibility and to shift themies for putting his soldier's duty above the burden of moral choice to the profession itvictor's moral ideals. self ris a corporate body. But the corporate military institution itself cannot make moral MucH of the discussion thus far has been judgments of state policy. Rather, the milicentered on rather abstract considerations, tary is both the creation and the instrument far removed from the normal routine of miliof state policy, and subject to the state's autary service. For most of~icers, a moral dithority. lemma rarely arises. In any policymaking esThus, at the Nuremberg trials, the Gertablishment there is constant debate which is man Army as an institution was not held reaccepted as normal and desirable, but this sponsible, but individual members of it takes place legitimately within the processes were. Indeed, if a corporate body can exerof decisionmaking and makes the system cise moral choice for its members, then these work. The morality of the goals of policy members forfeit their basic human responsinormally is accepted as given, and most polbility. This concept of their professional coricy alternatives rarely demand a moral porate morality allowed the German officers choice. to ignore the moral bankruptcy of the Nazi Military professionalism does not require regime, and indeed serve it as their duty. the abdication of moral responsibility. It Alan Bullock summed it up in Hitler: A does require as a practical matter that a per-Study in Tyranny ( 1953): "The officer 121 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP corps, intent only on preserving the privihis moral claim would be much stronger. leged position of the Army and indifferent to If he were a civilian protesting against thewhat happened in Germany so long as Nazidraft on grounds of conscience, his situationwould also be different. fication stopped short of the military institu tions of the country, could see no further Not even the most liberal government canabdicate the responsibility of defending itself than the ends of their own noses." to the private judgment of its citizens. Anda fortiori no armed force could function inTHE U.S. commissioning oath is an unlimited this way. If the claims of individual conscienceliability contract that obliges the officer to have no recognizable limit, the political redefend the constitution against all enemies. sult is anarchy. No member of the armed forces may pick and choose among the orders There is no escape clause, since the military he will obey. professionalism advocated here denies the officer the right as a soldier to determine Certainly, as a practical matter, "no memwho the enemy is or what the constitution is. ber of the armed forces may pick and chooseThese decisions are left to the civil institu among the orders he will obey." But to assert tions. The soldier does not even have the this as an absolute denies the humanity ofright to be consulted. He may be asked to the man in uniform. This humanity is the abadvise-it is his function, but he must con solute, not the uniform. The German officers sent-it is his professional duty. Any deparwho were convicted as war criminals at Nuture from this discipline is a denial of the remberg were judged, correctly, not as proprofessional trust. fessionals but as men who were morally auThe officer cannot, simultaneously in his tonomous.capacity as a military professional, act as a The claims of moral conscience cannot beprivate citizen freely exercising U.S. constidenied, even if silenced by rationalization;tutional rights and also exercise personal and personal moral responsibility is inescapmoral choice with regard to national policy able in civilized society, regardless of therequiring military execution. Yet his basic consequences. In the ethics of military prohumanity and humane society both forbid fessionalism, devotion to duty is paramount,the officer to evade personal moral responsithe core of honorable service to the country.bility for his acts. Thus, there is a dilemma But the human being who wears the uniformand a risk in being a military professional. must live within his conscience's moral uniThe demands of duty and moraHty are both verse. Hopefully, the demands of duty andbased on absolutes. No formula can solve conscience can be reconciled; if not, then this inherent conflict, because to the military choices must be made. However, in cases of conflict, a choice in favor of either duty orprofessional, duty itself must be one of his morality will not excuse a person from themoral values. consequences of offending against the reThe contemporary relevance of this prob sponsibilities of the other alternative. Thelem is illustrated by an editorial in The New dilemma is uncompromising. Fortunate is heYork Times for 13 Apri11967: whose principles and interests coincide. For tunate especially is the soldier who serves a No military unit could operate effectively government which has moral integrity. if its officers and men reserved to themselvesthe right of private judgment as to whetherforce was politically justified in each parQuestions for Reflection and Discussionticular circumstance. In a free society officials are elected to make political decisions, 1. How can there be a dilemma between conincluding such vital ones as the declaration science and demands of duty?of-or, in the present case, entrance into-awar. If [an officer] lived in a totalitarian 2. How could a person resolve this dilemma between conscience and demands of duty? state like Nazi Germany, his situation would, as a practical matter, be much worse, but 3. Why is it important that no membe:-of the 122 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER 5. What is meant by a "Hobson's choice"? armed forces may "pick and choose among the · orders he will obey"? 6. What are the limits of dissent for an Air 4. Describe a situation where it would be perForce officer? missible to disobey an order. READING L The Profession of Arms By Lt Gen Sir John Winthrop Hackett. Reprinted from the 1962 Lees Knowles Lectures, by permission of the Times Newspaper, Limited. Lt Gen Sir John Winthrop Hackett, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., was born in Perth, Western Australia, and was graduated from New College, Oxford University. Commissioned in 1931 in the 8th K.R.I. Hussars, General Hackett has a distinguished record of military service. During World War 11, he served in the Middle East, the Western Desert, Italy, and Germany. Following the war, he was Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, and later Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of Defence. Since 1968, General Hackett has been principal of King's College in London. lution of a social problem. Harold Lasswell2 ·Lecture 1 describes it as the management of violence, which is rather less precjse. The bearing of I-ORIGINS OF A PROFESSION F arms among men for the purpose of fighting ROM the beginning of man's recorded other men is found as far back as we can see. history physical force, or the threat of it, It has become at some times and in some has been freely and incessantly applied to the places a calling resembling the priesthood in resolution of social problems. It persists as its dedication. It has never ceased to display an essential element in the social pattern. a strong element of the vocationalHistory suggests that as a society of men It has also become a profession, not only grows more orderly the application of force in the wider sense of what is professed, buttends to become better ordered. The requirein the narrower sense of an occupation with ment for it has shown no sign of disappeara distinguishable corpus of specific technical ing. A completely biataxic society1 is probaknowledge and doctrine, a more or less exbly no more than a social abstraction. It may clusive group of coherence, a complex of ineven be a contradiction in terms. On the stitutions peculiar to itself, an educationother hand a society of men in which no re pattern adapted to its own needs, a careersort to force is possible, either for the comstructure of its own and a distinct place in themon good or against it, either for individual society which has brought it forth. In all theseadvantage or against it, is inconceivable, so respects it has strong points of resemblance long as man remains what he is. The function of the profession of arms is to medicine and the law, as well as to holy the ordered application of force in the reso-orders. 123 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP What forms has service under arms asily in frugal fashion from an allotment probsumed in western societies in the past and ably cultivated by, on the average, sevenwhat has been their relation to the parent soMessenian serf families, adscripti glebae. Atciety? Who joined armed forces and why? the battle of Plataea each Spartan hoplite inWhere does the man at arms stand today? the Lacedaemonian contingent was attendedWhat can we conjecture about his place in by seven light-armed helots. Hoplites insociety in the future? To questions such as other contingents were each attended bythese I shall attempt to suggest some answers one.4 Spartiate birth, for boy or girl alike,in these three lectures. I shall first glance at was no more than a sentence to the ordeal ofan example or two of earlier forms of milia Spartan education. Even their breedingtary institutions in western Europe, say was regulated for the purpose of producingsomething of feudal soldiering and then look more and better fighting men. The Spartans,at the regularization of military service according to Plutarch5 , thought it odd thatwithin the framework of national standing other people should put mares and bitches toarmies. In the second lecture I shall speak of the best sires they could hire or borrow but military developments in the late eighteenth rely upon the sacred right of husbands, evencentury, the Napoleonic wars and the profeswhen these were feeble-minded, senile or sionalization of the profession of arms which diseased, to produce the community's crop offollowed them. In the third I shall take a human offspring.look at the military profession in the twenIf a select body of elders decided the childtieth century. was worth rearing, and should not be got ridI want to say something to begin with of by exposure, it was left with its motherabout Sparta, which offers an interesting exuntil the seventh year. Thereafter a Spartan ample of a society dominated by the threat boy's education was conducted for 13 yearsof war and given over in effect to warlike in such a way as to fit him best for the compractice. In the precarious economic situapulsory military service which would occupytion which poor soil and growing population him from his twenty-first year to his sixtieth.thrust upon the communities of post-Minoan His training, though he learnt to read andGreece, Sparta made very little attempt to write, was almost entirely moral and physisolve her problem by colonization or marical. Even the athletic. sports which took sotime adventure, or both, as others did. She prominent a place in Hellas were largely forchose to rely, instead, on the conquest on bidden the young Spartiate, as distractingland of immediate neighbours. This led her, him from more professional exercises. Spartaafter the second and decisive Messenian war produced the best heavy infantry in the Helin ~he seventh century B.C., into the position lenic world, as much feared by her neighof a garrison state. The Spartans came to the bours .as the heavy infantry of the Swiss wasconclusion that their survival was dependent feared by theirs nearly 2,000 years later. Heron the subordination of pretty well all other victories over the armies of other Greek cityconsiderations to military efficiency, a constates ,were the victories of whole-time reguclusion which was reflected in what was lar forces over citizen militias, the victoriescalled the reforms of Lycurgus. Whoever or of a state organized primarily for war overwhatever Lycurgus was, earlier Spartan instiothers which were not.tutions were now radically adapted to meet Sparta achieved outstanding military dis new needs. tinction. The penalty, however, as is alwaysThe details of the reforms are obscure, likely to be the case where uniquely militarysince Plutarch,3 our chief witness, is unreliasolutions are sought to political and socialble, but the centre of the post-Lycurgan sysproblems, was a heavy one. The arts, oncetem was a corps d' elite of heavily armed inflourishing in Sparta, declined. The restless,fantrymen drawn from the whole body of the turbtilent flood of creative effort which cameSpartiates. Each of these supported his fam-out of,;Greece surged past Sparta on her mili 124 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER taristic island and left her high and .dry. In call colonels, were elected each in his tribe to ~ny event, victory over Athens in the Pelocommand its infantry, assisted by 10 Aoxayot ponnesian war forced her to spread the Sparor captains. The elective principle for the appointment tiate elite too thinly over subjugated areas. Her defeat by the Theban Epaminondas at of officers appears again in the armies of the Leuctra in 371 (largely through a novel obearly Roman republic, and vestiges of it surlique tactical approach, of immense future vive into imperial times. It was to be tried significance) left her no. more than an out centuries later in the American, French archaic relic fading into obscurity. and Russian revolutionary armies, and was In the city states of Hellas which had not to be quickly abandoned in each. It only chosen a military solution to their population seems to have worked satisfactorily in the problems, war was a tragic interruption in forces of relatively small political units using the life of the ordinary citizen.6 It swept him simple techniques of war, and even then only if what Aristotle would have recognized as into military service as a heavily armed in fantryman if he were a man of substance, as democratic processes were characteristic of a more lightly armed infantryman (a bowthe parent society, which is not, of course, man perhaps, or a slinger) of less military true of any sovereign nation state in the significance if he were not. The obligation to world today. serve under arms at need (and usually to Military discipline among the lively and furnish them) was an essential element in a argumentative Athenians was none too good by any standard. It is characteristic that man's standing as a free citizen, and it was grosser breaches were only punished on thenot uncommon, as for instance in Athens return of the expedition, after court cases with the epheboi, for young men to be re quired to establish their ·capacity to bear which I imagine were usually widely en arms as a condition of full citizenship. .joyed. The typical Athenian hoplite, though paid a small wage and a subsistence allow"The qualities of its courts of law and its ance with another allowance for his attendarmies," said Goethe, "give the most minute ant, and though he continued to be liable forinsight into the essence of an empire."7 The military service from the time he was passedorganization of these two fundamental types off as an ephebus at 20 until he was 60, reof social institution inevitably reflects the mained essentially and always a civilian. structure and outlook of the society they One of my early commanding officers said serve. Thus arrangements for military com mand in the armed forces of the 7Ta)u<; in sadly to me, shortly after I went down from three or four years spent beside the infant war largely reflect the approach to the distri bution of poHtical power in peace. In AthThames with polemarchs, hoplites and such, ens, for example, at the beginning of the fifth "you'll never be a soldier: you'll never be much more than an armed civilian." I felt, Icentury B.C., the time of the battle of Mara thon, there were 10 generals, elected by a must confess, rather chastened, but it did show of hands in the assembly of the whole seem that I was in quite distinguished com citizen body, the ecclesia. Unless this assempany. With the Roman army it was different,bly also nominated one of them as comand most strikingly so after the reforms ofmander-in-chief, at the start of a campaign, Marius in the early first century B.C.8the 10 fTTPCXT'YJYOt divided their functions. Under the kings every citizen had been liableThey presided each in tum for one day over to serve in the army with such weapons astheir committee while they were in Athens. In the field, if more than one were present, each the grading of his property suggested he took it in tum to be commander-in-chief for could afford. The richest class served as cav alry, the next as heavy infantry. The helmet, a day*. The 10 rabapxot, whom we might breastplate, greaves, metal shield and lance, • This at any rate is Herodotus' account of the arrange~ furnished by the soldier himself, were costly. ment. Modern scholars tend to doubt his version. 125 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP The four next lower classes in consequence since ceased to take an oath to the generalserved as more lightly armed infantry and on enrollment and had from the time of Marthe members of the lowest and poorest were ius taken an oath to the republic instead,often not required to serve at all. The introwhich was later replaced by an oath to theduction of pay resolved many of the objecemperor. Legions developed an identity oftions to service from the poorer men, and their own, helped by their being stationed forMarius removed all property qualifications long periods in the same districts with perfor service whatsoever. manent quarters, the castra stativa, underBy the middle of the second century B.C. praefecti castrorum. The XVII, XVIII and(the time of Polybius), the legions were still XIX legions, destroyed under Varus in Gerraised, as required, from a general levy. many in A.D. 9, were never raised again.Tribes were chosen by lot in turn and drafNor was the IX Hispana, annihilated neartees from each tribe were nominated until Colchester by Britons under Boudicca inthe required number of legions was filled. A.D. 61. The legion evoked some at least ofThere were even then old sweats known as the emotional associations of the modem regievocati who regularly joined up without ment. Its solidity as a group strengthenedbothering to attend the drafting assembly. even further, in battle, a soldiery who wereThey were useful men and often became already by temperament obdurate and toughcenturions. and in whom the habit of obedience hadMarius introduced a long service regular been developed by a stem code of discipline.army in which men enlisted for 20 years. He Even those who love the Romans most,also reorganized the legion, now some 6,000 like Michael Grant, distinguished product ofstrong, into a more flexible arrangement of the ancient House which has invited me to10 cohorts, each of something like battalion give these lectures, would not describe themsize and containing six centuries. The legion as kindly folk. They were cruel and expectednow received a standard-the eagle-and cruelty. The punishments inflicted on the solwas soon, in Caesar's time, to be given a disdier included death for desertion, mutiny ortinguishing number as well. This endowed it insubordination, and beating for stealing,with a persistence as an entity which was false witness or culpable physical weakness.previously lacking. Marshal Saxe was to proPublic degradation was not unknown and thepose in the mid-eighteenth century that regigrimmer penalties were sometimes visited onments should be given a number, and no whole units, decimated by the execution oflonger be known by the names of their coloone in 10 (chosen by lot), or even killed offnels, with the same purpose. completely. In the palisade or turf wall of aBefore long names were added to legion-. legionary camp the front gate, the praeary numbers. When Augustus amalgamated torian, was in the vicinity of the general'shis own and Anthony's armies after the batquarter and nearest the enemy. Half a miletle of Actium in 31 B.C., there were someor so behind it in the middle of the oppositetimes two and in some instances even three side of the square was the porta decumana.legions with the same number. Those that "Through this," says Vegetius mournfully,were not disbanded were then distinguished "guilty soldiers are conducted to theirby names: III Augusta, III Cyrenaica, ,III punishment. . . .9 Punishment and fearGallica. When new legions were raised later thereof are necessary to keep soldiers inthey too were given names. order in quarters; but in the field," he says,The legion was now more than ever a conreflecting the sensible attitude of the Romantinuing and coherent entity. The promotion military in general; "they are more influof the centurion was largely within it, though enced by hope and rewards."10cross posting on promotion was not uncomIn peacetime, however, the regime was semon. The loyalty of the soldier was at least vere. Tacitus11 recounts a story of how Corin part engaged to it, though ·he had long bulo, in his efforts to strengthen discipline in 126 READINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER the time of Claudius, had a soldier execute<;! the first line. As head of the legion he had for working on field fortification without appointments of great honour and profit."13 wearing his sword, as the order prescribed, The Roman legionary soldier of the late and another man because he had only a dagrepublic and the early empire was not a pure ger. In the mutiny after the death of mercenary, if there is such a thing. He Augustus12 the soldiers sought out and slew served for pay but though this was small he was rarely led astray by hope of plunder. a centurion, old "Cedo Alteram" or "GiveBooty was divided out and was augmentedme-Another," who was called this because when he had broken his cane of office on a by donatives. Caesar doubled the soldier's pay. It was then, according to my calcula soldier's back he did not desist but de manded a replacerr,ient. The paternal relations, about the value of £20 a year. But this tionship which sometimes existed between is really meaningless. What seems to be the officer and man even in Frederick the case is that though he had to buy his food Great's army, with its brutal and arbitrary (the Roman soldier was almost entirely veg discipline, can be sought in the imperial etarian) he could live on his pay and even save, putting money by in the legionary sav Roman army in vain. The centurion, who acted as company commander and company ings bank, described by Vegetius,14 for such purposes as the dignified funeral every good sergeant-major in one, was a hard master from the same level in society as his men. Roman citizen aimed at. · Under the empire, while the practice that But apart from the financial rewards he seemed to like the strictly ordered life. Dedi only Roman citizens should serve in the lecation to the pursuit of arms came naturally gions was continued, the disadvantages were realized of confining recruiting to Italians. to him. "Their trade was war," wrote the Earl of Orrery in his Treatise of the Art ofNon-Italians were enrolled, therefore, and War in 1677,u; adding, "I thank God oursgiven the citizenship. Before long most le gionary recruits came from the provinces. is not." A French parachutist officer said re The praetorian and urban guard, however, cently, "We like war and we are tooled up for it."16 It could have been a Roman lecontinued tp be found only among Italians. gionary soldier speaking. The method of a centurion's promotion through the 60 centuries of the legion is still The legionary machine was complex and highly articulated. The number and varietyuncertain. The cohorts were numbered one of titles of its junior officers is impressive.17 to 10, and in each the six centuries followed a set order of precedence, with the same desIts weapons were primarily helmet, breast plate and shield, with a throwing spearignation in each cohort. It is possible that the (pilum), a sword of the Spanish type (gladius)steady old file who would never get far wasto. another and a dagger (pugio), but it also could call onpromoted from one century through each of the 10 cohorts in order, and some fairly sophisticated siege weapons. Recruits under the late republic and the if he started at the bottom would become primus pilus, if he ever did, on his fifty-ninth early empire were usually adequate in num ber and, because of the respectable social promotion. More promising candidates (such as the young men of equestrian birth who standing of asoldier's calling, of good aver age quality. Marriage was forbidden the solhad insufficient means to follow an eques train public cursus) might be promoted up dier but allowed among officers. What very through the 10 cohorts in one century, often happened was that the soldier lived with a woman and the marriage was recog and on arrival in the first cohort go along through its six grades to the senior century of nized and children legitimized when he got the legion. The primus pilus, the senior cenhis discharge.Training was tough, realistic and rational. turion (in the words of Vegetius), "was not The Romans of the republic and the earlyonly entrusted with the eagle but comempire took their army seriously. Men of edmanded four centuries, that is, 400 men in 127 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ucation and position found in appointments 2--KNIGHTS AND MERCENARIES as officers in it, especially those of tribune, a T HE military structure of medieval Eupath to political advancement of which many rope was dominated by the castle andof the abler and more ambitious took advanthe heavily armoured mounted man at arms. tage. It is impossible not to be struck by the It was essentially defensive. Feudal militaryexactitude with which the Romans matched service was highly regulated. The obligationtheir personal characteristics, their social to serve was to a person under a contractstructure and their political organization with clearly understood on both sides. A benefitmilitary institutions which so faithfully rewas conferred (tenancy of land was by farflected them. the most common form of it) in return forWhen Vegetius wrote his account of the which service in arms of a fairly restrictedmilitary institutions of the Romans18 he was nature was promised. The period of serviceattempting to recall the citizens of the fourth and the distance from home a man might century A.D. to the grim virtues and military have to travel on service were both small. Inskills of their ancestors. But the book, consequence extensive aggression was diffi though perhaps the most influential of any cult to sustain. In the Hundred Years Warmilitary treatise between Roman times and England was only able to conquer a largethe nineteenth century, and well worth readpart of France because the English king hading today, had little influence in its own time. feudal claims there. Crusading expeditions toThe decay which Vegetius laments in the the Near East demanded the invocation ofmilitary institutions of fourth century Rome quite exceptional sanctions. was not confined to them and was itself only Not only the castle but the knight too repthe symptom of a disease. The collapse of resented a heavy investment in labour andthe Roman system during the following three capital. The arms and equipment (includingcenturies, under external pressures which in the horse) of an armoured mounted soldierternal tensions made it impossible to resist, in twelfth-century France or England might carried the legionary system down along with represent the entire income for several yearsit. Before anything remotely resembling a leof a considerable little rural community.1 gion was seen in Europe again, as a result of The military resources of a mediaevalthe military reforms of Maurice of Nassau monarch were determined by his position as1,000 years later, feudalism was to develop a land holder. The forces he could summon,and decline. even for the limited time permitted in theyear by feudal custom, were often exceeded REFERENCES by those available to men who were his sub 1. Andrzejewski, (Military Organizatio~ and s.ociet?', 1954, p. 127) uses this term to descnbe a soctety m jects, as for example those of the early Capetwhich the distribution of what are believed to be bene fits is determined by naked force. kin'gs in France were by those of the Duke of 2. H. D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour, Normandy. 1947, p. 152. The permanent forces upon 3. Plutarch, Lycurgus, passim. which he could count were never more than 4. Herodotus, IX, 28, 8. 5. Op. cit., 15. modest. 6. A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucy dides, 1945, vol. I, p. 14 f. The feuual mounted man-at-arms fol 7. Cit. A. Vagts, A History of Militarism, 1938, p. 35. 8. H. M. D. Parker, The Roman Legions, 1928, p. 235 ff. lowed his calling for the maintenance or imI rely generally on Parker for what follows. provement of the economic and social posi 9. Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris, I, 23. Extensive extracts are quoted in translation by Major T. R. Philtion of his family as a land holding unit. lips, Roots of Strategy, 1943. 10. Ibid., III, 26. Military service was one of the only two ways 11. Tacitus, Annals, XI, 18. 12. Ibid., I, 23. which were in practice open to him (the 13. Vegetius, op. cit., II, 8. other being holy orders) for the acquisition 14. Ibid., II, 20. 15. P. 22. of further wealth and prestige. Rank, dignity, 16. C. Dufresnoy, Des Officiers Parlent, cit. Survival (Institute for Strategic Studies), 4, 1, 24. administrative responsibility and the rewards 17. Von Domaszewski, Die Rangordnung des romischen thereof, were all closely related to the extentHeeres, Bonn, 1908, p. 48, cit. Parker, op. cit., p. 206. 18. Epltoma Rei Militarls, or De Re Militarl. of land held in fief. More extensive benefices 128 READINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER could be expected to accrue to the distinguished performer in battle. Plunder and ransom also came his way. The advantages, finally, of physical strength and skill at arms in the time of diminished public security which followed the collapse of Roman institutions need no emphasis. The son of a knightly family, which held land in return for military service, was natu~ally br?ught up in the use of weapons and m huntmg and robust physical sports more or less closely related to the practice of war. It would be less usual for him to learn to read and write. His principal weapons were the horse, the lance and a heavy sword (sometimes two-handed) with choice of a variety of other minor cutting and stabbing weapons such as daggers and short swords, and of bruising and crushing weapons such as the club or mace. He wore a covering of armour later partially extended to his horse. His dominance would have been impossible without the stirrup2 whose effect on European civilization ever since its introduction into Europe by Eurasian nomads has been enormous-possibly no less than that of printing or gunpowder. Armour continued to be worn long after massed infantry and musketry had reduced th~ knight at arms to a figure of fantasy, a qmxotic creature on an emaciated horse tilting at windmills. By the mid-sixteenth century it was worn, if at all, more by princes than common soldiers, and not always by the most warlike princes at that. To judge by the museums few princes had more suits of armour than Philip II of Spain ( 1556-98). But unlike his father Charles V he was rarely in battle.3 Before long armour became rather like the scarlet tunics and bearskins of the Guards: invaluable for ceremonial but offering fatal disadvantages in battle. Missile weapons, such as the crossbow, were scarcely used by the medieval knight at all in war, though he. frequently used them for hunting. The second Lateran Council in 1139 forbade the warlike use of the crossbow as a barbarous device, but its neglect by the mounted warrior sprang more from the real practical difficulty of using it from a horse. The knight of this period fought as an individual. A twelfth-century battle developed almost as soon as it was joined into a number of individual engagements. Group skills found little place in feudal tactics. Field forces, too, were not large. From the eleventh century to the end of the fifteenth no reliable evidence exists of an army of more than 10-12,000 men. Henry V's army at Agincourt in 1415 was scarcely 6,000, the size of one Roman legion or the 1st British Airborne Division at Amhem. The French army at Agincourt, contrary to a common belief, was smaller.4 Embodied with the twelfth-century knight in a French or English feudal array were foot soldiers less well protected and in general more crudely armed (though using some missile weapons), who were themselves also discharging a personal obligation to give military service. Such interruptions to normal life were unwelcome but of short duration. The forces thus produced were usually cumbrous, ill-armed, and of low military value, though a sharp distinction must be made between these and foot soldiers found from free yeomen like the English archers armed with the long bow, whose use had been learned in the Welsh wars. ' Where land was scarce and offspring many, military expeditions might originate which were not entirely dominated by the concept of liege service. Such were the crusades. Spirited adventurers also sought their fortune with their swords, singly or in groups, with no pretence of service to anything but their own interests, as several of the 12 sons of Tancred de Hauteville did when they descended on southern Italy from Normandy. Individual free enterprise, relate~ to but outside the framework of liege service, becomes more important as time goes by. The western European mercenary emerges. The treaty of Bretigny between England and France in 1360 left hosts of soldiers unemployed, of whom many found their way down into Italy. The scourge of marauding 129 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP armed bands under an elected leader was Venice and publicly executed. Sforza surknown elsewhere in Europe. It was only in vived the attacks of the Venetians to become Italy that the companies of fortune played an sole master of Milan and its new duke. important political role. 5 The search for security through purely The city states of northern Italy in the mercenary troops, owing no political loyalty fourteenth century were seeking a form of and without personal ties to the city they military organization appropriate to their served often brought greater evils in its train needs, in circumstances of almost continuous than those it avoided. The system was to be conflict, in which the feudal contract of milipassionately attacked by Machiavelli, as we tary service for land tenure had largely shall see. It is not surprising that occasional ceased to function. The form they settled on efforts were made by the cities to tie the capwas the use of hired professionals. These tains more closely to them. Hawkwood was we.re raised under a contract, or condotta, by offered in Florence something like a permaa military contractor, who was paid by the nent condotta, a contract for life. The same state which hired him and was responsible on city later offered Count Conrad von Eichelhis side for the production of an adequately berg the same sort of thing. Milan too was equipped and trained force and, as a rule, its feeling its way towards some more enduring command in the field. Gian Galeazzo Vissystem of contract. All the cities found that conti, for instance, first hereditary Duke of troops recruited locally by a native condotMilan, depended for his military successes tiere were likely to be more reliable than forupon the mercenary army led by Facino eign mercenaries under foreign captains. Cane. With it he took Vicenza and Padua The problem of how to establish effectivefrom Venice · and threatened the safety of control by the body politic over its ownFlorence, defended by the famous English armed forces was not solved. Even the execondottiere Sir John Hawkwood. cution of Carmagnola by the Venetians didReady cash was plentiful in the Italian no more than emphasize the difficulty of cities of the Trecento, where the development finding a solution. It was still unsolved when of a money economy was far advanced. northern Italy ceased to be an arena for the There was·plenty of human material as well. rivalries of Italian city states and became in Landless nien, incapable of craftsmanship or stead a battleground for foreign powers. unwilling to work as craftsmen, abounded. The Swiss cantons allowed recruiting and The motives of the condottieri and their even sold recruits. From Germany a feromen seem obvious enough; but whatever the cious and disorderly soldiery, both infantry reasons are for which a man will allow himand cavalry, the Landsknechts and the Reiself to be killed, or to be put in serious risk ters, were readily enrolled. of it, money is low among them. A man will The first 50 years of the fifteenth century suffer great inconvenience and hardship for in Italy, even more than the closing decades pay, and inflict a great deal more of it on of the fourteenth, throw an interesting light other people. Men have often been known to on purely mercenary warfare. By 1421 kill others for money, but the cases where Milan, under the Visconti, had acquired with they will sell their own lives for cash alone the aid of the mercenary general Carmagnola are, I imagine, exceedingly rare. A soldier a dominant position in the north. Venice who stands by his contract and thinks he is brought Carmagnola away. He was replaced nothing but a mercenary may find his moin Milan by an even more able and famous tives, if he examines them, more complisoldier of fortune, Francesco Sforza, son of a cated. The good fighting man who honestly believes himself to be a pure mercenary in condottiere from the Romagna and a person of huge vigour and high ability. Carmagnola arms, doing it all for the money, may have to was no match for Sforza. The Venetian flee.t guard his convictions as vigilantly as any was destroyed. Carmagnola was recalled to atheist. 130 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Certainly the cash inducement was found should be applied to it and the only criterionto be insufficient to cause men freely to give of warlike methods should be their effective up their lives in the Quattrocento. Machianess. A decision could only come from battlevelli wrote savagely of mercenary companies "which is the end for which all armies areof horse. "They are disunited, ambitious, raised." The aim was victory and subjugawithout discipline, faithless, bold amongst tion. Machiavelli was in some important refriends, cowardly amongst enemies, they spects aforerunner of Clausewitz, who adhave no fear of God, and keep no faith with mired him greatly.men."6 The soldiers were the condottiere's Before long there were indeed to be miliworking capital and he did not want to waste tary developments which would give a new them. As for the soldiers: "they have no love direction to human affairs. But though theor other motive to keep them in the field bemilitary revolution which now followed owedyond a trifling wage, which is not enough to something to the inspiration of the Romanmake them ready to die for you." legion, it led in quite a different directionBattles in fifteenth-century Italy might be from any indicated by Machiavelli. It beganprotracted but they were often almost bloodwith the introduction of firearms.less as well. In the battle of Zagonara, a vicThe first significant effect of firearms wastory "famous throughout all Italy," says not to increase firepower on the battlefield Machiavelli, "none were killed excepting Lo but to destroy the immunity of fortresses, asdovico degli Obizzi, and he together with Charles VIII showed in his invasion of Italytw9 of his men was thrown from his horse in 1494. Independently of the introductionand suffocated in the mud." of firearms, however, another and at theMachiavelli attacked the mercenaries betime no less important change took place:cause he saw that the Italian cities had made the replacement of the decisive effect ofa serious error, an error which was in fact to massed heavy cavalry by that of massedprove fatal. He realized the intimate connecheavy infantry. The pikemei1 of the Swisstion between military techniques and politisquares, already long feared; shattered thecal methods, between military organizations chivalry of Burgundy at Nancy in 1477,and political institution. He saw that the where Charles the Bold died, 17 years beforecities, whose competitive development was the expedition of Charles VIII into Italyfound to lead to conflict, had completely which first brought mobile artillery effecfailed to evolve military forms appropriate to tively into action against fortification.their political structure. He went even furA highly effective combination of missilether and indicted them for failing to regard effect and mobility in the joint action ofthe political and military spheres as one or longbowman and mounted man-at-arms,ganic whole, in which political institutions which had seen perhaps its most strikingcannot be shaped in disregard of their milidemonstration at Agincourt, had now disaptary implications without disastrous results. peared. Cavalry could not easily be broughtMachiavelli dreamed of an Italy united to charge a porcupine of pikes.7 Armed withunder Florence, and in looking for a suitable wheel-lock pistols in the eady sixteenth cenmilitary form it was almost inevitable that he tury they were little better off. Sixteen feet-should turn to Rome. was thought a suitable length, for the pike.The invincibility of the citizen army of "Few ordinary ammunition pistols," saidthe Roman republic was proof to MachiaLord Orrery, as late as 1677, "do certain exvelli of the rational nature of its organizaecution much farther off."8 _tion. In his study.of it he followed Vegetius. Hand firearms were in use at least as earlyHe probably went further than any predecesas 1364,9 but they were little more than sor, however, in his analysis of the general tubes on sticks. They were far less efficientnature of war. He saw war as total and all than crossbow or longbow and were oftenembracing. The whole resources of the· state only effective at close quarters (as is sug 131 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP gested, for instance, in some tapestries) Gustavus Adolphus. A strategy of extensive when used as clubs. operations was now possible. Armies grew in The longbow, in rapidity of fire, range size. Military administration made new deand accuracy was so much superior to any mands upon governments. The nature of the hand firearm that a plea was raised as soldier's contract soon came under review. late as the mid-seventeenth century for its The armies of the wars of religion were reintroduction.10 The firearm had come to largely made up of part-time mercenaries. It stay, however, if only because it was so inacwas not necessarily the case that only a mercurate that it was a waste of time to try to cenary army was capable of operating under train marksmen with it. Bowmen were the Maurician system, though it had advanskilled men. Arquebus men were not. Untages for the purpose. The mercenary soldier skilled soldiery were the easiest to raise. But minded little how far he campaigned from firearms were also very frightening and their home or for how long. Recruiting through moral effect alone would have been quite captains saved governments a good deal of sufficient to ensure their development. trouble. The required standard of discipline The effort to find a tactical organization and training was more easily produced. in which fire power and infantry shock tacThe great victories of Gustavus. Adolphus tics could be combined led to the major inof Sweden were won by a conscript national novations of Maurice of Nassau at the beginmilitia, it is true, but in Sweden the social ning of the seventeenth century. He, too, pattern was unusual. Sweden had never been turned back to the Roman legion, away from completely feudalized and had never known the mass of the Swiss square or the scarcely the domination of the mounted man-at-arms. less massive Spanish tercio, to a linear forSerfdom was non-existent and peasant promation, in two or three lines, articulated into prietors were plentiful. The military strength units of about battalion size. of the country lay in its infantry: a conscript This time it came off. Gustavus Adolphus militia was both a political and a military developed and applied these methods sucpossibility. In other parts of Europe it wascessfully in war, and the system he evolved thought that only a mercenary system wouldpersisted in essentials well into the twentieth work, and in these a mercenary army becentury. Units were smaller. Tactical deploy came by the early seventeenth century the ment and adjustment was easier. A new re normal type of land force. quirement began to develop for the initiative But even before the end of the sixteenth of junior leaders, of whom more were now needed. Cavalry were released from the profcentury the disbandment of regiments at the itless pursuit of the caracole, advancing to the end of one campaigning season and their reraising at the start of the next, hitherto the enemy at a trot and discharging their pistols. general practice, was seen to be an inefficient They could now develop true shock action. and costly way of furnishing the state with Drill and exercise for the infantry ceased to be merely a means to physical ~md moral soldiers. The practice spread of retaining health and became the basis of tactics. Precitroops in service throughout the year. Regusion in movement demanded marching in lar standing armies were before long to be the rule. But as Professor Roberts points out step. The group subordination of a living or ganism which was neither the immobile mass the permanent embodiment of armies which of heavy infantry nor the collection of bellideveloped in this time was the result of mili tary rather than political considerations.11 A cose individuals of the feudal array de standing army developed not because grow manded better discipline and a more closely ing royal absolutism depended upon it, nor coherent whole. Uniforms were not long in because kings had to· find employment for coming. privileged or troublesome upper classes. It New possibilities for the use of armies was the result of a military requirement. were opened up by the restless genius of 132 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Now that armies were permanently embodied it was not long before they came directly under a sovereign's control, raised, paid, in some respects equipped, and in part housed directly by him. "Once the armies became royal (as the navies already were)" says Professor Roberts, "the way was open for their eventually becoming national." REFERENCES 1. Lynn White Jr., Medieval technology and social change, 1962, p. 29. 2. A useful examination of the evidence on the introduction of the stirrup into western Europe can befound in Lynn White, op. cit., chap. 1. Perhaps the first mention of it in literature is in the Strategikon of the emperor Maurice (182-602). 3. J. U. Nef, War and Human Progress, 1950, p. 32. 4. F. Lot, L'Art Militaire et les Arm.Ses au Moyen Age,1946, vol. II, p. 442. 5. D. M. Bueno de Mesquita, Some Condottieri of the Trecento, Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. XXXII, 1946, p. 219. 6. Cit. E. M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton, 1944, p. 12, to whom I am Indebted for much of what follows. 7. M. Roberts, The Military Revolution 1560-1660 (Inaugural Lecture, Queen's University, Belfast), p. 8. 8. Op. cit., pp. 27-8. 9. Nef, op. cit., p. 28. 10. Sir J. Turner, Pallas Armata, 1670, p. 174. 11. Roberts, op. cit., p. 21. 3-ARMIES OF THE NATION STATE T HE development of armies as longservice, whole-time, regular forces under the sole control of the national authority, what I have called their regularization, was a feature of the stabilization of the pattern of kingdom states in western Europe. It can be seen very clearly in France between the time of Charles VII, when a nation in arms under royal leadership ejected the English, and the French Revolution, when a regular royal army proved quite incapable of saving the monarchy from the nation. From the time of Conde's victory over the Spanish army at Rocroi in 1643 the French army led the fashion in European standing armies for a century. Let me look at developments in France a little more closely. Very noticeable is the rise in numbers.1 Henry IV at the beginning of the seventeenth century had an army of some 15,000, of whom 3,000 were Swiss. The Thirty Years War saw a large increase. In the French army of 1678 there were 280,000. The wars of Louis XIV increased numbers further. There were 440,000 men on the strength in 1690, in a population of little more than 20 million. This represents a very high MPR. * After each peace numbers naturally de clined. In the peaceful decades after 1713 they fell below 130,000. The general trend is upward. It became common to keep 160 to 200,000 men under arms in peace-12 times as many as at the end of the sixteenth cen tury. Babeau2 sees, perhaps not too fancifully, an image of the French people in the structure of the mid-seventeenth century French army. At the bottom are the lowest orders, the valets, carters in the field and labourers for the engineers, who were not allowed to enlist as soldiers. Then came the mass of infantry soldiers, the main body of the nation; then the junior officers, the bourgeoisie; then the higher commanders, the nobility; at the top, the king. Chivalry ceases finally to be a source of military force in France with the disappearance of the arriere ban, the feudal array of the lesser nobility. From 1695, by which time military rank had become distinct from social, the French noble plays a part in the army only as an officer in a regiment. It is cudous that even in a time of almost total absolutism, under Louis XIV, the French regular army was raised by voluntary enlistment. It continued to be raised thus until the revolution. Louvois established a forced militia service in 1689 which was regarded with profound and enduring repulsion among the peasantry. Militia service was considered degrading: professional armed service was not. Even an army of 300,000 in a population of 20 million could still ·be raised by voluntary enlistment and though not only prestige and promises but even ruses and force were sometimes used to bring them in, general conscription was not. It needed a revolution under the watchwords of liberty, equality, and fraternity, threatened by foreign arms and internal sedition, to bring back forced general military service in the levee en masse of 1793, and to ensure •Military Participation Ratio: another term of Andrze jewski's. \., ... 133 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP the pitiless repression of all opposition to it most universal in France from the sixteenth in the massacres in La Vendee. century to the Revolution. Beauvisage, BelThe fact was that a large reservoir of homme, Belamy, Joli-Coeur, could be found rough and restless manpower existed in in many regiments. There were also La JeuFrance after the peace of Westphalia. The nesse, Bon-Vivant and Belle-Humeur, with idle and the ne'er-do-well abounded. PauVive l'Amour, Pret-a-Boire and names of pers were plentiful. The captains were permartial air like Sans-Quartier, Pied-Ferme or sonally responsible for keeping up the Frappe d'Abord. Napoleon's Marshal Victor, strength of their companies and the initial Duke of Belluno, got his name of Beau-Sosum ·paid to a man on enrolment was their leil this way. A soldier only lost his nom de chief instrument of persuasion. Bigger reguerre if he were disgraced, when his comcruits cost more and cavalrymen were dearer rades would not use it any more. When the than foot soldiers. You could get a man for Free French took on noms de guerre in the the infantry, not much above the minimum last war, usually to avoid inconvenience to height of 5 ft. to 5 ft. 3 ins. for a hundred families still in France, many of us were surlivres in the mid-seventeenth century. In prised at the ease with which their compan1731 you tnight pay twice as much and a ions accepted and used them. This was, fine big fellow of 5 ft. 7 ins. was known to however, a custom rooted in the pre-Revolucost 600. There were, as you might expect, tionary French military tradition and recomplaints that rich cavalry officers spoilt flected in our own time in the Foreign Legion. the market by paying too much. The French soldier of the ancien regime The average age of recruits was 20 to 30 was not badly paid and he was reasonably years and 16 the lowest at which they were fed. The daily ration of one-and-a-half generally accepted. In the time of Louis XIII pounds of munitio11 bread which the French the engagement appears to have been for at soldier was drawing at the end of the nine least six months. As the military advantages teenth century was established nearly 200 of longer service became clearer the term inyears before. The regulation prescribed a pound of meat a day and the soldier some creased. It was three years under Louis XIV, then four. Under Louis XV it increased to times got it. He fed better than the peasant, six and then eight. As gentler manners bewho ate less meat. This was a very important came more widespread in the eighteenth cenelement in a system of voluntary recruiting. tury many real recruiting abuses dropped Up to the late seventeenth century soldiers away, but as times grew more settled and the were mostly lodged, in garrison towns, in general standard of living rose recruits were pairs among civilian households. They were harder to find. Not all soldiers were released usually idle, often drunk and nearly always a on completion of their contract. An engagenuisance in a small dwelling where there ment for six years could easily let a man in might be daughters. Barracks were built, for 12. Abuses such as these lessened as the usually in frontier districts to begin with, tocentury wore on. The ordinances of 1788 rewards the end of the seventeenth century. moved many of the last. Institutions often The burghers were relieved but the soldier approach their best when they are about to lost his freedom. After his days work he was disappear. no longer his own master, until (if he were Before 1788 there was no medical examinot on guard) the appel du tambour. Cav nation, which made it easier for women to alry units were known to hav~ been com join. There had never, in fact, been much pelled to pay· for improvements to their unicuriosity about a recruit's past and until the form on the threat of being removed from village billets if they did not. In barracks, mid-eighteenth century only perfunctory en quiry as to _his identity. He would nearly alill-lit and unhygienic, three beqs occupied 20 ways take another name on joining, anyway, sq. ft. Each was 4 ft. wide and three men a nom de guerre, according to a practice al-slept in it. 134 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Until the mid-seventeenth century the only clothing the king provided was shoes. For eign troops in French service were the first to be completely uniformed. Louvois wanted to introduce uniform for French troops in 1668 but the captains protested they could not afford it. By the end of the century, how ever, as was also the case by then in Eng land, uniform was general: white for the French infantry, blue for the German regi ments in French service, red for the Irish and Swiss. The cockade was worn from 1710, but was only white from 1767. Discipline was generally strict but its level of severity varied greatly. So long as the captains were responsible for the recruiting and maintenance the men were treated on the whole gently. In 1762 Choiseuil took away the ownership of companies. The soldier was given a more august authority to which he might appeal, but it was more distant and less personal. Discipline became stricter, more uniform, less paternal. The reign of Louis XV ( 1715-7 4) saw reforms which increased the efficiency of the army but were often harmful to the soldier's condition. Before them the men were less well exercised but more contented. In the early eighteenth century it took several hours to form a line of cavalry and no general dared set a large number of squadrons in motion. After the reforms of Louis XV it was said that cavalry exercises were more exactly performed but the horses broke down more frequently. On the whole, however, morale remained high and understanding between officers and men was good, as a Dr. Moore reported in A View of Society and Manners in France, published in London in 1786. Everywhere it became more strained as the Revolution approached. Women followed the armies in considerable numbers. Under Louis XIII a provision of four trollops per 100 men was thought to be a prudent way of protecting the womenfolk of the countryside. Wives and children also moved around. In 1718 it was reported that though there were no married men in some companies, others had 40 or 50. In 1772 it was said that the women gave more trouble than four times the same number of soldiers. Permission to marry was often re fused, though occasionally senior officers thought a small number of wives were useful. They did some cooking, washing and nurs ing. Whatever efforts were made to keep them away there were always a few wives around a regiment, and some dogs. The French soldier was volatile, resilient, gay. He ran away readily in battle but also attacked with a fierce elan, going to his death, it was said in Italy in Louis XIII's time, as though he expected resurrection on the morrow. H.e was often, until the eigh teenth century brought in milder ways, savage to the defeated. Prisoners, if there was little chance of getting them ransomeq according to recognized scales and they would not change sides (which they often 'did), were sometimes killed. Violent pillage, though common up to the seventeenth century, was rare after the time of Louis XIV. It remained common practice, however, to strip the dead of clothing and jewellery. "My friends," said a colonel, showing the well-dressed enemy to his regiment in rags, "go and clothe yourselves." · At the end of the seventeenth century billeting was the rule and quartering in barracks the exception. At the end of the eighteenth the reverse was true. Until the time of Louis XIV the soldier wore on his person, except for the shoes he had from the king, only the clothing he brought with him. Thereafter he wore a uniform furnished by his employer. These two developments, barrack life and the wearing of uniform, have probably don~ more to set the soldier apart in society than anything else. · Probably the special nature of the soldier's contact and the importance of group identifications in armed forces suggest that a threshold between the civil and military ways of life is inevitable. How much of this now remains? Will the military life lose something important if we try to bring about its total disappearance? The Spartiate might sleep at home where his wife lived, but never dine there. He had always to eat in the common mess. At the 135 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP other extreme is the concept of an army as disturbance by the Napoleonic wars and the just anothe_r industrial group. An undergradprofessionalization of the profession of arms uate perhaps had something of the sort in which followed I shall speak in my next lec mind recently, when he.wrote that he now ture. saw he bad been mistaken about the army: REFERENCES he realized that it was in fact "a competitive 1. Nef, op. cit., p. 202. nine-to-five industry." He meant, of course, 2. A. Babeau, La vie militaire sous !'ancien regime, 1889, vol. I, p. 20. Babeau is my principal authority competing for him, but even theri he was for this period.mistaken. An army is not an industry and its members cannot be regarded as industrial Lecture 2 workers.Some of the big military operators in the 4-PRUSSIA AND NAPOLEONUnited States in the Second World War T HE peace of Westphalia in 1648 at thethought that the invasion of Europe was no end of the Thirty Years War broughtmore than just another large-scale engineermore or less to an end a period in which fering project and declared their intention to treat it as :such. They ignored what I shall vent Christians were prepared to hang, bum, speak of later as the unlimited liability clause torture, shoot or poison other fervent Christians with whom they disagreed upon the in a soldier's contract. When men are unpre pared for this, and it is invoked, the results correct approach to eternal life. The next 80 years, up to the mid-eighteenth century, sawcan be disturbing. The nature of his contract a marked decline in the severity of warfaresets the man-at-arms apart. But how far in Europe. The pitiless cruelty of the wars ofapart? That is an important question today. religion seemed almost to have produced a What I have to say in my third and last lee-~ revulsion. Nation states were already stabi ture will bear upon it. lizing but nationalism had not yet become aI .leave the French soldier of the midsupreme ideal. There was nothing yet to takeeighteenth century with regret, some whi~the place of the sectarian fanatic's impulse tokered musketeer inappropriately named La destroy. Violette, perhaps, or Perce Neige, sitting in National ambitions were on the wholehis insanitary barracks-that "honourable modest and nowhere envisaged the completeprison"-wondering possibly what to do with his time. With seven hours for sleep, one for subjugation of a national adversary. A spirit meals, two for rest and four for exercises he of European community seemed to be develhas 10 hours of free time and must spend most oping. Rational speculation was increasing of it in barracks. Perhaps he is reflecting on and with growing confidence in the future of how to prolong the life of his uniform, for it man there was a tendency in human affairs to greater balance and restraint. is expected to last three years and in order to do so must be kept two-thirds of the time unIn. a much-quoted passage Edward Gibused. Perhaps he is doing another man's hair bon,1 reviewing developments in the decfor him, using some of the cleaning and toilet ades before 1770, wrote that Europe was bekit which takes up so much of his carrying coming one great republic. "The balance of capacity in the field. Perhaps he is brooding power will fluctuate," he said, "but these over the growing severity of the exercise and partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness." He was con the strictness of a discipline which has come in, like the new military hair fashions, from vinced that resort to fighting as a means of destroying the independence of other civi Prussia. Of the Prussian military system and its inlized peoples was at an end. The armed forces of Europe were now only exercised in fluence in Europe in the second half of the "temperate and undecisive conflicts." The eighteenth century, of the nature of warfare in the age of the Enlightenment, of its rude contenders, in fact, aimed at winning a mod 136 READING5-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER est purse on points, not a world title by a that the emergence of the standing army as an institution can best be studied and in my knockout.Levels of technology were rising, and with last lecture we looked at it there. From the 1740s until the French Revolution the Eurothem standards of living, but materials were still too scarce to sustain heavy fighting with pean military scene is dominated by Prussia. King Frederick William I of Prussia improving techniques. War became a matter, (1713-40) set up a conscript army under anin Defoe's words, of "less blood and more iron code of discipline. His beheading of vonmoney."2 Several factors in the make up of Katte, the friend of his son Frederick, before eighteenth-century national standing armies helped to humanize war. Aristocratic officers the prince's own eyes, for trying to help the found it difficult to hate men of the same future Frederick the Great to escape from his father's tutelage, was typical of him. Von sort as themselves merely because they were on the other side. National enthusiasms were Katte had been condemned by the court to rarely high. The quality of men in the ranks perpetual imprisonment. The king ordered was generally low. Discipline was strict. otherwise. In contemporary western European armiesWhen decisive battles were fought they were often bloody. At Malplaquet the losses severe punishments were not unknown_:. flogging, running the gauntlet, death by the of the allies were 20 or 30 per cent.3 But dehangman's halter or the firing squad-butcisive battles were rare. Marshal Saxe ad vised that battle should be avoided when the heaver penalties were rare and the adpossible because its outcome is uncertain and ministration of punishment generally rather there are many advantages to be gained over haphazard. In the French army, indeed, flog ging had never been customary. Under Fredthe enemy without it. When it cannot be erick William I in Prussia discipline becameavoided, it must be won at all costs and vastly more severe.6 The death penalty forwhere possible the enemy's retreat turned into utter rout.4 minor infractions was not uncommon and No longer did armies, as in the wars of reflogging was regarded more or less as amat ter of daily military administration. Theligion, subsist almost entirely on the country. dominant element in the management of solThey now depended more on supply from diers was fear. Men wellton into battle withmagazines. This restricted their freedom of at least a chance of survival. If they withstrategic movement. At the same time the drew from it without orders it was into cerunreliability of the troops inhibited diffusion tain death. Frederick II, the Great, who suc of command responsibility and put flexibility of tactics out of the question. ceeded his ferocious father in 1740, was a cultivated man, well educated and fond of Weapon techniques had improved but mamusic, tolerant in religious matters, once aterials, including those required for shot and friend of Voltaire and in some ways a typicalgunpowder, were scarce. For the saltpetre supplies essential to powder manufacture anproduct of the Enlightenment. But when he took on the military machine his father had imal sources were relied upon almost en tirely. The saltpetre men pursued an active developed he applied it in war with no relax ation of its brutal discipline*. search for suitable nitrogenous substances in "The life the private soldier led," Thackthe stables, the birdhouses and even, in most eray makes Barry Lyndon say,7 "was a scandalous fashion, the bedchambers of the frightful one to any but men of iron courage citizen.5 But even then there was still never enough powder to justify anything but careand endurance." It was not then thought, however, that satisfactory results could be ful use. From the end of the period of military • One of his commands, quoted in voL viii of The New Cambridge Modern History (p. 181) was ~~;s follows: "if a revolution, in the mid-seventeenth century, soldier during an action looks about as 1f to fly, or so much as sets foot outside the_ line, the non-commis.sioneduntil the 1740s, France led the way in westofficer standing behind him w1ll run him through Wlth his ern European military affairs. It is in France bayonet and kill him on the spot." 137 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP secured by any other sort of treatment. The The bayonet helped to keep armies apartquality of the private soldier has rarely been and thus contributed to those tendencies of lower than in the armies of mid-eighteenth the time which encouraged wars of position.century Europe. In the contemporary Euro Desertion from the armies in the age ofpean outlook there was no heroic view of the Enlightenment was inevitably high. Fredwar as an ennobling national experience. No especial esteem attached to a warrior class. erick the Great gave his generals instructionsThe common soldier shared with the worker at some length on how to prevent it-by rwtin some heavy industries, such as coal mincamping too near woods, by avoiding nighting or iron founding, a position in society marches where possible, by patrols and guards around night dispositions less to keep thewhich was almost that of an outcast. No one enlisted unless he was nearly at the end of enemy out (the enemy had similar prob lems) than to keep his own men in, and sohis tether. on. "Our regiments," says Frederick theThe Comte de Guibert observed in a nota Great in his Instruction for his Generals, ble book written in 1772 that the profession "are composed half of citizens and half ofof soldier has been abandoned "to the most mercenaries. The latter, not attached to thevile and miserable class of citizen."8 St.-Ger state by any bond of interest, become desert main, as French Minister of War in 1775, was attracted by the Prussian system of coners at the first occasion."11 "What cared I for their quarrels?" says Barry Lyndon, "orscript service, but rejected it because an whether the eagle under which I marched army should "consist of those for whom society has no use."9 had one head or two?"12 Recruiting into the armies of Europe in Even in the American revolutionary wars,the mid-eighteenth century was often by when the military calling was already rising somewhat in the esteem of the common man, force or fraud. To deaden the reluctance ofall but the most wretched to endure the the two sides were said to be largely comhardship of a private soldier's life, the two posed of each other's deserters.13 commonest anaesthetics of the age of the In battle the eighteenth-century mercenEnlightenment, the bottle and the club, were rary had even more compelling reasons tofreely used. run away than usual. Thus evolutions inThe unwillingness of soldiery to be killed close order, inflexible and slow, carried outin a cause which did not greatly stir them itunder the close supervision of the officers,self contributed to milder warfare,· particu., were all that was possible. The armies ofFrederick the Great were large single units larly when they were armed with betterweapons. The bayonet, for example, which moving into action with the general, whose was originally developed for the protection · business it was to lead them to the enemyof a hunter with an empty firearm against a and then set a good example. In an armywounded beast, was issued to troops as a whose total strength rarely exceeded 50,000weapon of war in the 1680s.10 It was at first men, in the Seven Years War 31 Prussianplugged into the musket. Some time after generals were killed. 1690 the ring and socket was developed. By Officers in the eighteenth-century armies the early eighteenth century the bayonet had were not· less exclusively aristocratic thanvirtually eliminated the difference between they had been before the regular type ofthe pikeman and the musketeer. It was in the army stabilized; they were more so. Officersarmies of Frederick the Great that it was from the bourgeoisie were not rare in the arfirst much used west of the Oder. But soldiers mies of Louis XIV. Frederick the Great used it with little enthusiasm and were not combed them out of his. He was convincedeasy to bring to close enough quarters for its that only aristocrats were sufficiently en use. Frightfulness is much more readily ac dowed with honour, courage and loyalty toceptable when it is contrived at a distance. make good officers and he was determined at 138 READINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER the same time to bind the Junkers to his own limit upon international ambitions; and by becoming the first state in Europe to make ainterests. serious business of war with explosives. The aristocratic officer of the Enlighten ment was usually brave and sometimes able, The military instrument of the Prussian but he was rarely more than an amateur. Up experiment, the harshly disciplined and rig idly controlled force of unenthusiastic merce to the eve of the revolution in France pro motion was by purchase, as it remained in naries, became the model for the armies of England for another 100 years, although in Europe, armies in which, as the Great Fred erick himself said, "obedience . . . is soboth countries the highest military positions exact that . . . however little a general continued to be reserved to the highest nobilknows how to make himself obeyed, he isity. The Comte de Guibert was the eigh teenth century author who perhaps came bound to be."17 The European system of standing armies nearest to suggesting that warfare was an was destroyed by the French Revolution. area of professional activity. His Essai General de Tactique14 was almost prophetic The destruction in France of barriers within the nation, the rejection of caste exclusive in demanding a national citizen army and a ness in national administration, the removal war of movement. But he too insisted that command in war should be reserved to those of the deadweight of absolutist forms of gov ernment too rigid to be easily modified, allwhose birth and upbringing ensured that helped to release in France a flood of nathey possessed the necessary intuitive capactional feeling, Freedom was everywhere, in ity. Even Henry Lloyd, the eighteenth-centhe negative but none the less real sense of tury Englishman whose approach to war was the removal of restraints. Like any other cain some ways more sophisticated still, main tained that command in war was the product reer a military career was now to be open to the talents. The elective principle was· intro of natural genius. He divided warlike prac tice into two parts. The lower was mechaniduced for the promotion of N.C.O.s and officers, in spite of its recent failure in the cal and could be taught. The upper lay American revolutionary armies. Recruitingamong the arts and excellence in it could be at first remained voluntary.18 no more readily learned or transmitted than Under the growing threat of invasion,in sculpture or music.l5 however, conscription was .introduced into The situation of Prussia under Frederick the Great brings a passing reminder of that the French Army in the levee en masse of 1793. The elective principle of promotionof Sparta. Mirabeau said of it: "la Prusse n'est pas un pays qui a une armee, c'est une was soon forgotten. It was true that careers remained open to the talents, but military armee qui a un pays."16 The population of Prussia was only a small fraction of that of talents were predominantly disclosed where they might have been expected to occur, that any of the neighbouring kingdom states is, among the officers and men already servFrance, England, Austria, Russia. With ing under arms at the time of the Revolution. hardly one tenth of the population of France Six of Napoleon's 25 future marshals ofPrussia increased its army from 28,500 under France were at this time civilians. But theFrederick William Hohenzollern the Great other 19 were already serving. Nine of them Elector (1640-88), to 83,000 in 1739, the last year of the reign of King Frederick Wilwere already officers and every one of these was noble (though mostly of the lower or liam I. In that year Prussia still had less than ders), while only 10 of the 25 were common two million iiihabitants. Its industrial produc tion was proportionately low. None the less, soldiers. What was new in a Europe in which war Prussia was a major power in western Europe. had recently been little more than the sport This was achieved in three ways: by subordiof kings was the enthusiasm of a revolutionnating almost all other considerations in the ary nation in arms. In this the impulse to destate to military strength; by setting a rational 139 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP fend the Revolution was fused with a passion living off the country cut down impedimentato defend the country. and reduced the dependence of field forcesThe nature of the French armies which on supply depots. were now raised largely dictated their methThe technical prerequisites for the operaods. Masses of ill-trained men could not tions of mass armies in war already existedhope to operate in the closely disciplined lin by the close of the eighteenth century. Theear formations of Frederician mercenaries. Revolutionary government was able to exThe inclination of French revolutionary ploit them. A national army, raised under atroops was to attack. This they did in mobs universal obligation to serve, harmonizedthey called columns, surrounded by skirwith the new society. Higher cohesion within mishing infantry, the tirailleurs. The reguthe army permitted a greater spread of comlated musketry of the Prussian platoons, with mand responsibility in the field. Desertion, volley fire and evolutions like the counter though not uncommon in Napoleon's latermarch, were quite beyond them. Instead, the years (it was particularly noticeable in the tirailleurs acted as individual marksmen, opRussian campaign of 1812), never exercisederating with great freedom and making good a formative influence on tactics as it did with use of cover. Their adversaries, using cover Frederick the Great. scarcely at all, stood, fired and fell in close In the French revolutionary armies a new order. The main body of the French infantry looseness and freedom now developed, withwas assembled in large irregular groups of a predominantly offensive spirit. The combimen whose general direction of advance nation of increases in mass, flexibility, offen could be more readily controlled than if they sive outlook and firepower resulted in a revwere dressed in horizontal lines. When the olution in tactics. French columns charged with the bayonet Better gunnery methods soon led to conthey carried with them something of the centrated fire. The practice developed byblood lust of a revolutionary mob. Their aim Napoleon, himself a gunner, was to directwas the total destruction of the enemy and concentrated artillery fire against a chosen humanitarian scruples were few. The age of infantry ta~get until it began to weaken andlimited war was over. then to assault at that point with the bayoWorking beside social processes towards nets of his own infantry. Plentiful munitionsthe evolution of new forms of war were techand higher mobility made it possible to re nical ones. The mobilization of the whole peat the process. Cavalry kept for shock acmanpower of a nation would not have been tion at speed could now turn defeat into dis possible without the great expansion of proaster and retreat into rout. Thus it was, for duction which took place in the late eight example, that a French army 65,000 strongeenth century. A marked increase in the outdestroyed an army of 83,000 Russians andput of metals was one notable result of it. Austrians at Austerlitz in 1805. This is theThis lead to increased use of artillery. Accumethod used in most of Napoleon's classicracy and rapidity of fire were the result of victories, a method admirably suited to Na improved methods, as France took the lead poleon's opportunist approach, impossible toin applying mathematics to military pur apply 100 years before but still the basis ofposes. Monge, Minister of Marine, was said battlefield tactics 100 years later.to be the inventory of descriptive geometry. The development of an enthusiasm forCamot, Minister of War, whom Napoleon military exploits in the masses, almost undescribed as the architect of victory, was an known in the previous century, together with other distinguished mathematician.19 material progress of many kinds and inReductions in weight of artillery pieces re creased administrative skills, made it possisulted from better design. This in tum led to ble in the early nineteenth century to keep inhigher mobility. Better road surfaces made the field armies of four or five times the sizemovement easier. A return to the practice of of those maintained in the religious wars two 140 . . ~ .. READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER no such thing as a professional officer corps centuries before. Casualties also rose. When the Duke of Brunswick's well-drilled Prusanywhere. · After 1900 no world power of sians were routed on September 20, 1792, by any significance was without one. The timing at and manner of this development was differ the citizen battalions of Champagne ent in different countries. It happened earliValmy, a battle had been fought which was est and most completely in Germany. of critical importance. Goethe, who was pres A current of opinion already flowing inent, said to his companions: "From here and from today begins a new epoch in world Prussia during the last years of the old century became a torrent in the early years of history, and you can say that you were there the new. It burst its banks in 1806 afterwhen it opened."20 But at Valmy no more than a few hundred men were killed. At Jena. Prussia's problem was to find a defence against the almost irresistible national Austerlitz 13 years later the casualties num bered 25,000. The Moscow campaign of armies of Napoleon. To many officers it 1812 cost France in dead, wounded, prisonseemed that the only way of doing this was to tap the same sort of resources. Gneisenauers, missing and deserters, half a million pleaded that the Germans should mobilize men. All other considerations apart, exhaus tion of manpower and to a considerable exthe whole strength of the people as the French had done. The old rigid formulae betent exhaustion of materials (particularly queathed by Frederick the Great, governingmetals) helped to ensure that peace would the use of relatively small formations offollow the final disappearance of Napoleon. heavily disciplined mercenaries, were not ., REFERENCES enough. "Get us a national army," said t. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Blticher, urging that the Prussians forget Empire, ed. Smith, 1854, vol. IV, p. 405 ff. their "useless pedantries."1 2. An Essay upon Projects, in H. Morley, The Earlier Life ... of Daniel Defoe, 1889, p. 135. General conscription was not easily intro 3. For a lower estimate (14%) cf. Lt.-Col. G. F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, 1902, p. 499. duced in Prussia. Not until March 1813, 4. Les Reveries . . . de Maurice Comte de Saxe, The Hague, 1756, p, 215. See also in Phillips, op. cit., p. when Prussia in alliance with Russia de 161. clared war on France, did the Landwehr 5. Nef, op. cit., p. 237. 6. Cambridge Modern History, vol. VI, p. 215. edict set up an embodied militia. Only in The Luck of Barry Lyndon, Esq., 1892, p. 44 f. 7.8. Essai General de Tactique (most accessible in vots. I September 1814 was military service made and II of his Oeuvres Militaires, 1803), vol. I, p. 13. Earle translates the main passages, op. cit., pp. 6~. obligatory without exemption on every able 9. Nef, op. cit., p. 306. bodied male. The system then introduced of 10. Ibid., p. 251. Die Instruktion Freidrichs des Grossen fUr seine Gen 11. erale von 1747, Berlin, 1936, p. 2. A French translafive years service in the regular army foltion is opposite the German. See also Phillips, op. cit., lowed by 14 in the Landwehr remained in p. 167. 12. Thackeray, op. cit., p. 45. force with little change until World War I. 13. Vide Nef, op. cit., p. 234. 14. Vide note 8 of this chapter. Meanwhile the restrictions which confined H. Lloyd, History of the late War in Germany, 1781,15. part II, preface, p. 7, cit. S. P. Huntington, The entry into the Prussian officer corps almost Soldier and the State, Cambridge (Mass.), 1957, p. 30. 16. Cit. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, exclusively to aristocrats had been modified. New York; 1953, Introduction, p. vii. A decree of the Prussian government of AuDie Instruktion, etc., p, 5. See also Phillips op. cit. 17. gust 6, 1808, bluntly declared, "All pre 18. Vagts, op. cit., p. 112 f., on whom much of what fol 19. lows is based. viously existing class preference in the mili Nef, op. cit., p. 318 f. 20. Goethe, Die Campagne in Frankreich 1792, Paris, tary establishment is abolished, and every 1868, p. 77. An English translation by R. Farie, Lon don, 1849, p. 81. The passage from the 19th to 22nd man, without regard to his origins, has equal September is of high significance and well worth duties and equal rights."2 reading in extenso. T The principle thus enunciated was only 5-THE NINETEENTH CENTURY OFFICER imperfectly observed, even in Prussia, and to HE eighteenth century had seen the rega varying degree at different periods in dif ferent countries. But its explicit formulationularization of armed service in western an abrupt end to the hitherto Europe. In the nineteenth true professionalmarked ism emerges. Before 1800 there was virtually scarcely questioned assumption that only by 141 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP noble birth was a man entitled to claim miliby changes in command. Of the 143 Pros tary command, or endowed with the intuitive sian general officers on active duty in 1803 capacity to exercise it. At the same time inonly eight remained in 1812. Of these onlynovations were made in operational practice. two (one of them Bliicher) held commands Linear tactics, platoon fire, close formations at the time of Napoleon's overthrow.4began to be replaced by the dispersed apA thoroughgoing revision of the composi proach and individual marksmanship of the French. tion and preparation of the officer establishment was as important as the creation of a Neither the inroads on the aristocratic monopoly of the officer's career nor these tactimass army. The victory which Germany wascal innovations found much favour with the to win over France in 1870 was not simply the victory of what had by then become aPrussian old guard. Tirailleur tactics were "suspicious in political respects and super nation in arms over what had then become a professional army. It was the victory of a nafluous in military." Dispersed fighting might tion which had taken professionalism in thebe good enough for the French-"a viva cious race"-but it was entirely unsuited to profession of arms more seriously. Class barriers on officer entry had now the Prussian. It was dishonouring, in fact, to been lowered. What was wanted next was athe national characterto substitute organized liberally educated body of officers (ein gebildisorder for the famous Prussian platoon musketry.8 detes Offizierkorps), then a professionallyThere was an unusual feature of the reeducated body of officers (ein berufsgebil detes Offizierkorps) and finally a structure forms of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, BlOcher, of promotion in which criteria of competence Grolman and the Prussian Military Commis should predominate. The integration of the sion, reforms which were the real basis of the profession into the society it had grown up togrowth of military professionalism in the serve was to remain a problem, and still western world. Modifications in civil institudoes. tions are often the cause of military reforms. In Prussia under the reforms of 1806-12It is rare to find civil reforms springing from officer candidates had to graduate from the a requirement to modify military practice. gymnasia with a certificate of fitness to enterThis, however, is what happened in Prussia. a university, or pass a rigorous six-day genIt wou1d have been of absorbing interest to eral examination designed to test mental ca Machiavelli. pacity The national enthusiasm which rather than factual knowledge. alone Scharnhorst introduced examinations as acould enable a German mass army to defeat condition for promotion. He also raised offi the French was unlikely to develop amongserfs. Emancipation was inevitable. At the cers' pay to reduce reliance on outside sources. More important still, perhaps, he essame time agrarian reform, some rationaliztablished in 1810 the Kriegsakademie in ing of taxation, a lightening of vestigial feuBerlin, which was for a long time the onlydal burdens on trade and other acts of recog institution in Europe for the advanced studynition of the importance of the individual of war and the higher education of officers inseem to have done much to encourage supnon-warlike disciplines. 40 officers were se port throughout Germany, both of peasantsand bourgeoisie, for the effort to withstand lected anmially by rigorous examinationthe Napoleonic armies in the field. These soafter a minimum of five years service. At tendance at the academy became before longcial reforms were radical but not revolution ary. It is very doubtful. if they would have almost a condition of high advancement. The occurred when they did without the pressure effect of what was in fact already a well-de veloped military educational system is sugof a military requirement. gested by an estimate that in 1859 about 50The completeness of the change from the per cent of the military Jiterature in Europe system of Frederick the Great is suggested was produced in Germany. 25 per cent in 142 ~.~. ' . . . :''-~· ,• READINGS-CHALLENGE TO .JHE AIR FORCE OFFICER that year came from France. One per cent the Duke of Wellington resisted reform. They opposed the substitution of what they came from England.5 In France, though several specialist milicalled a mercenary army for one whose offitary schools grew up in the early nineteenth cers were men of substance, with a real century, the only one attempting to do anyinterest in the preservation of the existing social order. Only the demonstration of Prus thing similar was the staff school (Ecole sian military efficiency offered by the Frenchd'Etat Major) set up by St. Cyr in 1818. debacle of 1870 enabled Lord Cardwell to The French military attache in Berlin observed in 1860, however, that all French milabolish purchase in 1871.9 But as late as itary educational institutions were only agri1890 it was possible for a British general to cultural schools by comparison with the say that England was still split between those who adhered to the tradition of Wellington Kriegsakademie. It was not till after the disaster of 1870 that the French made a real efand those who wished to make the army a fort to develop the education of their offiprofession.10 cers. The foundation of the Ecole Militaire Wellington's organization and use of his army has been described as marking in manySuperieure in 1878 was to open a new chapways the high water mark of eighteenth cen ter.France continued to lag behind Germany. tury warfare. He had no great regard for solEngland, though the beginnings of true prodiers. He was determined to defend his coun try and at the same time a social system offessionalism had manifested themselves in which an officer .class drawn exclusivelyher navy, was in her army further behind from its top levels and a body of soldiery still. A school opened in 1799 by the Duke of York to educate officers for the staff was drawn almost entirely from its lowest were characteristic. Sir John Fortescuesaid of him reorganized in 1802 as the Royal Military that "he believed in the England that proCollege, with a staff course as its senior duced such gentlemen and was resolved todepartment.6 Only in 1857, however, when save her and them. He took over his army asthe senior department was detached as the nucleus of the Staff College, did this country an instrument to that end ... but, when his purpose was fulfilled he threW the instrument begin to make any real headway in profes sional military education. Progress was not aside without compunction, having no further use for it and little or no sentiment fast. An English observer noted in 1859 that the devotion of the Prussian officer to educaabout it."11 tion, no less than the certainty of promotion England, busy with her industrial develop through merit and not from caprice, set the ment, was.safe behind a sea barrier at home while abroad she pursued a policy of colonial whole of the Prussian officers far above those found in the English army. 7 expansion and of foreign trade based on her That part of the English public school outnaval supremacy. The value of a navy to her material interests was much more readily ap put which went into the army was not notaparent than any her army could offer. Inble for its educational attainment. What was consequence, though the professional standwanted was the sort of men of whom Wel lington had said that he could go straight ing of naval officers was developing, she from school with two N.C.O.s and 15 priwas very slow to recognize the need for provates and get a shipload of convicts to Ausfessionalism in the officers of her army. For almost exactly 100 years after Waterloo tralia without trouble.8 England did not have to meet anything apSo long as purchase existed in the British proaching an equal on the battlefield, witharmy a true system of professional advancethe exception of the grossly mismanaged warment was impossible. By 1856 a captaincy in the Crimea against the Russians, in allicost some £2,400, a lieutenant-colonelcy ance with French and Turks, in 1854. Her£7,000. Officers' pay stood at the same level wars were otherwise the wars of expandingas 150 years before. Those who thought with 143 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP empire. Her army officers were gentlemen its place. Each officer was expected to be exfirst, landed gentry almost always, profespert in some speciality which he shared withsionals almost never. Her common soldiers civilians, while the body of military expert were the restless, the misfits, the unhappy. ness which he shared only with other officersFor most of the nineteenth century they remained small. At the same time Jefferson'sachieved little more than the standing of secconcept prevailed of a militia nation, in ond class citizens.12 which a standing army all but disappeared. The Royal Navy, although the elimination This contributed to a state of affairs in whichof patronage proceeded no faster than the professional military institutions, in so far aselimination of purchase in the army, develthey were military, were very little developedoped much earlier an adequate system of proby the time of the civil war. Even Westfessional education. The navy, however, had Point, which Jefferson founded in 1802, andnever suffered to anything like the same dewhich exercised a formative influence overgree as the British army under the burden of technical education in America, taught littleclass restriction on entry. It was in reference of the liberal arts and almost nothing of milito the army that the Duke of Cambridge said tary science. "It produced," in Huntington'sin the 1850s: "The British officer should be a words, "more railroad presidents than genergentleman first and an officer second."18 The als." very circumstances of a naval officer's occu The Jacksonian period of liberal indifferpation set a high premium upon competence ence to military affairs which followed enin his career. This was not entirely free from sured that while there should be no effectivethe effect of social origins and connection, standing army there should be no efficienteven after the introduction of limited compemilitia either. Promotion was only by seniortition in 1820, and the reduction of the capity. In the army there was no retirement systain's powers of nomination in 1848. But the tem until the civil war. Army officers servednaval officer's career was never dominated till they dropped. There were only three by influence to the same extent as that of an ranks in the navy with only two promotionsofficer in the army. The professional compein a lifetime. It is scarcely surprising thattence of the R~al Navy was rated the world even the British system of promotion by purover as very htgh and its prestige was enorchase was felt by some to be preferable. mous. The American civil war, of far-reachingThe growth of professionalism in the army importance for the development of warfare,in America was also retarded, even more so left the profession of arms in the United in fact than in England. The framers of the constitution were opposed to it. "I am not States at even lower ebb. The only signifi cant support American military professional acquainted with the military profession," ism had ever received, that from the South,said one of them.14 The constitution reprenow dried up. Business pacifism reduced thesented a liberal outlook to which the accept army to a body of frontier police. This was ance of a requirement for armed force was actively enough engaged it is true (thererepugnant. Washington in his farewell ad were 943 engagements with Indians betweendress at Fraunces' Tavern advised that the the civil war and the end of the century), butnation should be able to "choose peace or the American army as a professional bodywar as our interest guided by justice shall was isolated, reduced and rejected. counsel." But the last change of the developParadoxically enough, the isolation of thement of any significant degree of military military was the chief prerequisite to the deprofessionalism in America for many years velopment of professionalism. Withdrawndisappeared with the failure of the conservafrom civilian society and turning inwardtive federalism of Hamilton. upon themselves the armed forces cameSomething that the American sociologist under the influence of creative reformers likeHuntington calls military technicism15 took Sherman, Upton and Luce, followed by 144 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER Bliss, Young, Carter and others in the army, ruling caste. In one important respect, how Mahan, Taylor, Fiske in the navy. They ever, it was Britain that led the field. No looked abroad for most of their ideas: Genwhere else had civilian control over the eral Upton's report on the organization, tacarmed forces been so effectively and easily tics and discipline of the armies of Europe established. and Asia made for General Sherman and A further important development in the Secretary Belknap in 1875, with especial ref ordered application of force as a requirement erence to Germany, is a valuable mirror of of government had also taken place in thethe state of the military profession ~utside nineteenth century. This was the clear recogthe United States. · nition of the function of the police forces asThe years between 1860 and World War I distinct from the military, and their increasesaw the emergence of a distinctive American and reorganization to meet the newly formuprofessional military ethic, with the Ameri lated 'demands upon them. This happenedcan officer regarding himself as a member no very clearly in England with Sir Robertlonger of a fighting profession only, to which Peel's creation of a police force in 1829.anybody might belong, but as a member of a It is the function of police to exerciselearned profession whose students are stu force, or to threaten it, in the execution ofdents for life. With this view went the acthe state's purpose, internally and under norceptance of the inevitability of conflict, arismal conditions. It is the function of armeding out of the unchanging nature of man, forces to exercise force, or the threat of it,and the consequent certainty of war. Norexternally in normal times and internallyman Angell's view in The Great Illusion only in times which are abnormal. "Law," that, because war no longer paid, it was un- says Pascal, "without force, is impotent."16likely that any nation would go to war met The London policeman is unarmed and sharp criticism. It treated man only as an usually urbane; the New York cop carries aeconomic animal and disregarded other gun; but the degree of force which the statecauses of conflict. is prepared to apply in the execution of its As the nineteenth century drew to a close purpose is little different in England and theprofessionalism in the armed services was United States. It is as much as the governeverywhere to a greater or less degree appar ment of the day considers it necessary or exent. Germany led the field. Prussian military pedient to use to avoid a breakdown in its efficiency was the path to national unity, function and a surrender of its responsibili through the unsuccessful war of 1848 in ties. Denmark, the successful expansion of 1864, When individuals or small groups act in a the victory of 1866 over Austria and the manner which the community has previouslyoverthrow of France in 1870-71. France, identified as intolerable they are restrained, shocked out of her post-Napoleonic apathy or seized and made answerable .if it has notand even out of an antipathy to the military been possible to restrain them. "The existwhich sprang from a bourgeois uneasiness ence of civilized communities," says Ber that standing armies could defeat or modify trand Russell, "is impossible without somecivil purposes, set about putting her profeselement of force. When force is unavoidablesional military institutions in order. it should be exercised by the constituted au The United States, as I have said, had thority and in accordance with the will of theevolved with remarkable speed a coherent community:"17system of military professionalism. England As larger political units develop by thepursued a path of her own with a profes coming together of national groups, once po sional navy and a small regular army whose tentially hostile, violence· could still be. usedofficers contained a high proportion of what by one. group against another. The businessby any criteria could only be described as of the constituted authority would then be, as amateurs drawn almost exclusively from a before, to apply force to restrain the parties, 145 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP just as police are now used to restrain gang ism in the country emerged. The army still warfare. I quote Bertrand Russell again; had a long way to go.The British army was still dominated by "There are issues as to which men will fight and when they arise no form of government the principle that officers were gentlemen can prevent civil war." and non-officers were not, a principle which did no more than project the pattern of the Let me return to the nation state. It is not parent society. Remember the legend of thesurprising to find that the rate of advance in gallant captain whose visiting card had writthe professionalizing of armed forces has deten on it, below his name, the legend "The pended in each country on the degree to which national security is threatened or is celebrated coward." He had been a junior officer in the South African War. His supethought to be. The impulse in Prussia which rior had given him in battle an order so ablefollowed Jena weakened after the collapse of that success in the operation was certain. the Napoleonic threat. It quickened after the This would have meant his superior's promofailure of Prussia against Denmark in 1848. tion. But the captain strongly believed thatIn France the humiliation of 1815 was fol-· the British army should be officered only by lower by acceleration in the development · of · professional military institutions, even gentlemen. His superior wasn't one. There fore the captain ran away. He was cashieredthough this was to slacken in an army from of course, but he had ensured the failure :of which conscription was temporarily removed by Louis XVIII and to which class restricthe operation and prevented forever the ad his superior. When thistion on entry into the officer establishment vancement of triumph of principle over self-interest wasnow returned. The French army remained _ made known the captain was at once madenone the lt?SS a professional body in the sense an honorary member of a score of London in which the army of Louis XV 100 years before had never been. Its performance in clubs. Though military professionalism develthe Crimea was not particularly distinguished oped at different rates iii the western worldbut that was a war which represented no real conditions in the nineteenth century werethreat to national security. The French nagenerally favourable to its growth. They in tion was n9t on the whole dissatisfied with its cluded a great increase in the complexity ofmilitary forces in the mid-nineteenth century military skills, the growing competitivenessand did not greatly desire anything more efof nation states, the growth of the power of ficient. the middle class at the expense of landed arThe disaster of 1870 shocked the whole istocracy, and the development of demonation into an urgent demand for reform. A cratic political institutions which demanded a wave of military professionalism followed, more responsive articulation in armed forces. upon which France was to travel up to the How far conscript service contributed to proFirst World War. In England the startling infessionalism is obscure. He competence shown in the Crimea, and events Huntington suggests a close link.18 about the same time in India, stimulated proargues that nationalism and democracy led fessionalism somewhat after 1856. Tb'e Prosto the concept of a nation in arms and thus sian victory over France in 1870 was too to an army of conscript citizens. "The shift sudden, too brutal and too close not to enin the officer corps from amateurism to progender feelings of national insecurity in Engfessionalism," he says, "was virtually always land with a further stimulus to professionalassociated with the shift in the rank and file ism as a consequence. The course an,d from career soldiers to citizen soldiers." Exconduct of the South African War had a simiperience in his own country does not bear lar effect after 1902. But it was rather in the this out, nor does it in Great Britain. The navy, upon which Britain's national security shift to professionalism in the United States chiefly depended, that military professional-in the late nineteenth and early twentiety 146 READINGS--CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER centuries preceded by a handsome margin both groups were not opposed. They were,the introduction of conscript service in or should be, the same. National service ofWorld War I. In the British army there was fered a vast field for social action. The offia significant development of professionalism cer should see himself as the educator of the in the 1930s. This preceded by only a few nation.years the introduction of conscription in I ask myself whether any nation has yetWorld War II, but it cannot be linked with taken full advantage of the opportunities for it. As national service fades out in Britain social service offered by a system of univerprofessionalism in the services looks like in sal military service. I used to feel that increasing rather than the reverse. Britain, though the moral and physical beneThe fact seems to be, to one who has fits of national service to very many youngserved both in a conscript army in peace and men were undoubted, we regular members of war and in a voluntary army (which had its the service were not on the whole equal toshare of warfare) in peace, that in one imthe demands it made upon us. This was inportant respect universal national service inpart because we had been formed in a servhibits professionalism. Junior and middleice whose function had been only that of derank officers spend so much time and effort fense. It was also because our masters in thein the training of conscripts in elementary state did not encourage us to find any othermilitary skills that attention is to some extent function in a national service army. Thewithdrawn from the study of more advanced suggestion has been made in extenuation thattechniques. there was little response to those officersConscription nowadays produces good solwho took their social duty to the men more dier material, but only for a short time. It seriously. The difficulty of working in stone, probably reduces volunteer potential in the however, carries little weight when judgment general community. It also probably makes it is being passed upon a sculptor. The arguharder to build up the cadre of non-commisments for a long service professional army sioned officers in the service. For the parent are strong. But, setting aside military consid society conscript service is of high social sigerations, we in this country h?ve thrownnificance. It is unfortunate when party politiaway a great opportunity for social service tocal interests confuse this issue. To avoid the nation. Whether we should ever havecomment on those of our own country I shall used it, even if we had kept it, is another look at this question for a moment through matter. Let us at least make the best use ofFrench eyes. the very considerable opportunities which reMarshal Lyautey wrote an article in a main open to us, even in regular armed servFrench journal in 1891,19 when universal ices.military service had already been reintro I have one last question to raise. It isduced in France, on the social role of the offidoubtful whether the unwritten clause of uncer. National service gave the nation a limited liability in the contract under whichunique opportunity and the officer corps a the man at arms engages to serve can easilyheavy responsibility to society which was be reconciled with conscript service. Of this now no less moral than military. The officontract I shall have a little more to say, ascer's opportunity for service to society was well as something of developments in warnow greater than any hitherto furnished by fare and their impact on the profession ofrare and fortuitous appearance on the battle-· arms in the twentieth century, in my last lecfield. The young men of the nation were all ture. being introduced at .an impressionable age toan orderly life under the care of older men REFERENCESwho, unlike the body of private industrial 1. BlUcher, Briefe, Stuttgart, 1913, p. 8S, letter of 3rdemployers, did not draw financial profit from August, 1807, to Gneisenau. 2. Cit. Huntington, op. cit., p. 31.the labour of their workmen. The interests of 3. M. Lehmann, Scharnhorst, Leipzig, vol. I, p. 323, andvol. II, pp. 110 and 197, cit. Vagts, op. cit., p. 142. 147 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 4. Vagts, op. cit., p. 145. have anything to eat?"1 This question arises S. Deutsche Vlerteljahrschrlft, 1859, No. 2, p. 69, cit. today in somewhat different forms; it is the Vagts, op. elL, p. 242. 6. Huntington, op. cit., p. 52. same question. 1. L. Wraxall, The Armies of the Great Powers, 1859, pp. 99-100, cit. Huntlngton, op. cit., p. 53. So long as sovereign states exist, however, 8. G. M. Young, Victorian Ensland, 1953, p. 98 (Dr. Kitson Clark showed me this). the constituted authority of any one of them 9. Huntington, op. cit., p. 47. 10. Viscount Wolseley, The Standing Army of Great would be unwilling and unwise to abandon Britain, Harper's, New York, LXXX (Feb. 1890), pp. all power to direct the application of force in 331-347, cit. Huntington, op. cit., p. 53. 11. Sir J. Fortescue, History of the British Army, 1899, vol. X, p. 225, cit. Vagts, op. cit., p. 156. any situation where conflict between groups 12. Huntington, op. cit., p. 43. of men has resulted, or is likely to result, in 13. Cit. R. Lewis and A. Maude, Professional People, 1952, p. 31. violence. It must decide for itself how much it 14. George Mason, cit. Huntington, op. cit., p. 165. 15. Huntington, op. cit., p. 195 f. I follow Hlllltlnston will spend, that is, how many options it will closely for this period. 16. Pascal, Pens6es, 169-298. In Oeuvres Compl~tes, 1931, pay for. p. 102. Now man normally lives in a group. He 17. Power, 1938, p. 277. 18. Op. cit., 'P· 37. is a social animal, a 1TO~tTtKov twov2• The 19. Revue des Deux Mondes, 15th March, 1891, p. 443 ff. Republished as Du R61e Social de J'offlcer, JulUard, phrase is Aristotle's and the argument can be 1946. developed on something approaching Aristotelian lines. Anything can be called better orLecture 3 worse if it discharges a specific and distinguishing function more or less well. A good 6-SOCIETY AND THE SOLDIER: 1914-18 knife cuts well. A less good knife· cuts less I COME now in these lectures to the twenwell. It is a distinguishing function of man, tieth century, in which reflection upon the the 1TO~£TtKOV twov, to live in a society. The profession of arms soon compels us to face better able he is to do this, other things critical issues of our time. I do not wish at being equal, the better he is as a man. The once to dwell upon the very grave dilemma better he is able to live in a city the more created by the introduction into war of civilized he is, the better adapted to living in weapons of mass destruction, for this, though a polity, if you like, the politer. But living in important, should not be allowed to obscure a group demands some subordination of the everything else. Before coming to it there is interests of self to the interests of the group. one thing l wish to say about the purpose of The military contract demands th~ total and armed forces, the characteristics of armed almost unconditional subordination of the inservice and of those who embrace it as a terests of the individual if the interests of the calling, and the relation of these institutions group should require it. This can lead to the and men to their parent societies. surrender of life itself. It not infrequently It is the business of armed services to furdoes. Thus in an important respect the milinish to a constituted authority, a governtary would appear to be one of the more adment, in situations where force is, or might vanced forms of social institution. be, used the greatest possible number of opThis argument may appeal little to the average young officer. Since I am suggesting, tions. A government can have as many options as it will pay for. The greater the however, that it is not only now more imporstrength and variety, the better the equiptant then ever before for intelligent men to ment and training of its .armed forces, the join the military, but that it is the act of a rahigher will be the number of options which tional man to do so, I think I am bound to will be open to it. set the argument out. There are, of course, always limits to the The military life is lived in order that an authority properly constituted over a signifi amount any government will spend on de cant group of men (such as a tribe, city, na fence. "How great can the number of stand tion, state or federation) may be furnished ing soldiers become," asked a German critic of the 'eighties, "in comparison with the with professional armed forces. If th~se bearing arms act in ways not consonant With number of working subjects, before neither 148 READINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER the interests of the constituted authority, if fessional group where the existence of thesethey usurp its powers or dominate, or in im qualities is desirable but not functionally es portant ways put their own interests first, we sential, where their presence will make lifehave militarism. The proposition that milita for the members of the group more agreeablerism is suicidal has been described as "albut will not necessarily make the group func most a truism."3 tionally more efficient. This is one reason But although militarism may be a suicidal why officers do not always find it easy atperversion, though war may be bad, fighting first to settle down and earn a living in civilmay be bad, application of physical force ian life, where the functional aspects ofamong men may be bad (none of which is moral obligation are less apparent and the self-evidently true, but assuming it to be so), ex-officer is distressed to find, for reasons hethe military life, which would disappear if cannot always comprehend, a moral tone violence vanished among men, is in many lower in some important respects than that toimportant respects good. which he is accustomed.* Why this should be so is not difficult to Mussolini said in the early 1930s: "Warsee if we look at what have been called the alone brings all human energies to theirmilitary virtues. These, to quote an impartial highest tension, and sets a seal of,nobility on witness in Toynbee, "confront us as a monu the peoples who have the virtue to face it."4 mental fact which cannot be whittled down This is rubbish, and dangerous rubbish at or' explained away." But the military virtues that. War does not ennoble. Kant's view thatare not in a class apart; "they are virtues war has made more bad people than it haswhich are virtues in every walk of life . . . destroyed is probably nearer the mark.5 Butnone the less virtues for being jewels set in the interesting thing is that although war alblood and iron." They include such qualities most certainly does not ennoble, the preparaas courage, fortitude and loyalty. tion of men to fight in it almost certainly can What is important about such qualities as and very often does. these in the present argument is that they ac Men have joined armed forces at differentquire in the military context, in addition to times for different reasons.6 I do not see . their moral significance, a functional signifimany young men joining for the philosophicance as well. The essential function of an cal reasons I have suggested earlier, though Iarmed force is to fight in battle. Given believe that reflections of the sort outlined equally advanced military techniques a force then may help officers to realize the naturein which the qualities I have mentioned are and the value of the life they lead. Almostmore highly developed will usually defeat a always the desire for an active life has beenstronger force in which they are less. Thus prominent among reasons for taking up the while you may indeed hope to meet these profession of arms, but there have usually virtues in every walk of life and a good deal been contributory motives. These have oftenof educational effort is spent on developing been ephemeral in value, and in kind accithem as being generally desirable, in the prodental rather than essential. Sometimes the fession of arms they are functionally indisterms of reference have changed and disappensable. The training, the group organiza pointment has resulted. tions, the whole pattern of life of the Young Frenchmen of good family joinedprofessional man at arms is designed in a dethe armies of the ancien regime often beliberate effort to foster them, not just because cause they had nothing else to do, or because they are morally desirable in themselves, but they were expected to do so, but very oftenbecause they contribute to military effi • It Is going too far to suggest, as Evelyn Waugh does inciency. A digest of Cicero's de Officiis might Men at Arms, that where there are gentlemen in c~arge well figure as a military training manual. of military operations conducted under stress there will beorder and where there are not there will be none. To In consequence the moral tone in a milimaintain this Is to adhere to the eighteenth century notion that the qualities essential In the good officer will only be tary group tends to be higher than in a pro- found in "gentlemen," using the term, as Waugh seems to, In Its eighteenth-century connotation. 149 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP there was also a real attachment to the conthough wounded now and then iii World War II, is very much alive (and still serving) cept of monarchy and some desire for distinction in the service of the king. today. Young Prussian Junkers might be simiThe military institution, however, is a perlarly motivated in entering the service of sistent social form. The essential reasons Frederick the Great. Frenchmen joined the which induce rational men to devote their revolutionary and Napoleonic armies on a adult lives to it, with its well-understood desurge of national spirit. Young Englishmen mands and accepted risks, are unlikely to be took commissions as Britain's empire grew discreditable. Our difficulty here lies in identhinking that it was worthwhile doing sometifying reasons of constant validity and sepathing for the empire, and hoping to have an rating them from others of temporary and exciting life into the bargain. often, it seems to me, ·dubious worth: any ofBut the scene can change. Alfred de ficer who honestly tries to do this will not, I Vigny, of royalist family though he was, think, be disillusioned. joined for gloire in Napoleon's time. NapoI want to take up the thread again now at leon vanished into exile and gloire faded. De the point I reached in my last lecture in givVigny was-left seeking a more enduring ing an account of the rise of professionalism cause for the real satisfaction he and others in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth about him derived from the soldier's life and century.finding it in abnegation. The British empire On the ground in Europe the chief powers has dwindled too, and some who joined the had four million men under arms, eight times British armed forces when the sun still had the number in the early eighteenth century. not set on government house found little Before long they would mobilize nearly 10 comfort in the rising Commonwealth. times as many.I suppose there are some, in western Now wars are not started by military com countries, who have become professional manders. De Tocqueville said more than a fighting men to fight communism, though I century ago, "in a political democracy the hope not. I suppose there are some, in east most peaceful of all people are the ern countries, who have become professional generals."7 Events since then suggest that fighting men to fight capitalism, though I · this may be true under other forms of gov hope that this is not so either. Certainly ernment as well. The advice given by theeast-west divisions are likely to persist and if German general staff to the Kaiser before a· young man has reasons such as these for World War I, for example, was on the cau joining armed forces today they are unlikely tious side. Hitler's generals received the to go cold on him, like poor de Vigny's Filher's proposals for a war against France, gloire. a quarter of a century later, with no enthusi Are reasons such as these valid, however, asm and his willingness to accept a war on · or do they suggest a faulty distribution of two fronts with dismay. In no country are ·· emphasis ·between essence and accident? I the professional men at arms less likely than cannot.help thinking that they do. Officers in in Britain, where civilian control has become the British service do not always fully under by evolution pretty well complete, to push us stand their own reasons for taking the shill into war. ing, and are happily reluctant to discuss the Even when a war has begun, it is still the more important ones. I know one undergrad uate who went on record in 1932 as saying politicians who play the biggest part in conducting it. But whatever responsibilities the that since a second world war was inevitable _ _he wc;mld take a regular commission because politicians may have to bear, the social consequences of intellectual inadequacy in high he found it tidier to be killed as a profes military command have in this century al sional than as an amateur. I hope you will be glad to hear that this logically-minded man, ready been appalling. 150 READiNGs-<::HALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER While the French were ordering national a minute to 16, the range of guns from one defence with the urgency born of their recent thousand yards to five or six. Of artillery one humiliation by Prussia, a new and visionary responsible French officer said, "we havetrend in military thinking began to appear in rather too much of .it."11 Arrangement forFrance. There were protests against a materammunition even for what there was failedialistic view of war. Nietzsche had already to take into account "the appetites of quickraised them in Germany. Writers like Ardant firing guns." In spite of the experiences of du Picq echoed and developed them in the American civil war Foch argued that aFrance, and evoked wide response when they greater volume of small-arms fire favoured spoke of the spirituality of war. Clausewitz the attack. Of aviation and "all that sport," had already urged the sovereign virtues of he said, "it's zero."12 the will to conquer and the unique value of After the war was over Foch was to say, the offensive, delivered with unlimited vio "we then believed morale alone counted; lence. A military voluntarism began to dewhich is an infantile notion." Before it, thevelop in France. When General Colin emelderly theorist who had never been in a phasized the importance of material factors major battle taught that victory is won by a he was laughed at. The business of the intelsingle supreme stroke at one point. Later,lect was to overcome and rule out all consid when he had himself risen to supreme comeration of losses, to bring about a disregard mand of the allied armies on the westernof all material obstacles to the offensive. front and contributed more than any other Engels was one of those who knew better single man to allied victory, Foc.h was to saythan to underrate material factors: "force is that "victory is won by bits and scraps." "Ino mere act of will but calls for . . . tools . . . have only one merit," he said quite early onthe producer of more perfect tools, vulgo in the war, "I have forgotten what I taught,arms, beats the producer of more imperfect and what I learned."13 ··ones."8 From the very outset, however, in 1914,Already by 1894 the basis of all French the French were totally committed to a poltactics was once more the mass attack. Foch, icy of attack. General Joffre, the Commanderwho became head of the Ecole de Guerre in in-chief, pressed on under what was known1908, taught that the tactical fact of battle is as Plan XVII with an aU-out offensive the only argument in war and that battle eastwards in Lorraine. He had plenty of demands, above all, offensive action a evidence that the Germans were doing exoutrance.9 The French army, said Grand actly what the general he had replaced wasmaison in 1912, more extreme even than dismissed for saying they would do, that is,F~ch and (in Liddell Hart's words) the preenveloping the French northern flank. Hecipitator of disaster in 1914, no longer disregarded this and pressed on to the east.knows any other law than the offensive, The offensive in Lorraine failed. Withinwhich can only be carried through at the ex three weeks the French had been thrown pense of bloody sacrifice.to back everywhere with the loss ·of 300,000Napoleon had said in 1805, "all my care men and the Germans were threatening will be to gain victory with the least shedding Paris. Plan XVII was in ruins and with it theof blood." How far he may have meant what French prewar army. Very soon and for thehe said is doubtful. But Napoleon was only rest of the war the western front was domiquoted by the French military in the ninenated, as the Russo-Japanese war had alteen hundreds when he was useful and this ready indicated would probably happen, by observation was ignored. entrenchment, barbed wire and bullets fromThe impact of modern techniques was automatic weapons14•misunderstood or disregarded. In the 80 As the war dragged on, French devotionyears between Clausewitz and 1911 the rate to the all-out offensive died hard. Many menof rifle fire had increased from three rounds died with it, often fighting only to gain 151 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP fantry success, even when conditions on theground in accordance with the sterile doctrine that ground, simply in and for itself, gave an Western Front had · long condemned mounted troops, used as such, either to idle advantage. The French dead in World War I ness, in a phrase of Michael Howard's, or amounted to nearly one and a half million. Four and a half million were wounded. suicide. Ian Hamilton had reported from the Three-quarters of the eight million men moRusso-Japanese war, when bullet, wire and bilized in France were casualties. They were trench became dominant, that the only use mostly young men. The memorial tablet in for cavalry there had been to cook rice for the chapel of the French officer-cadet school the infantry, but he was thought by some to be insane. Haig had said earlier on that artilat St. Cyr, destroyed in World War II, conlery was only effective against demoralized tained one single entry for "The Class of 1914."15 The population of France had not troops. He had written in a minute to the Army Council in April 1915 that the ma doubled between Valmy and the Marne16 but the number of lives lost in defending the chine gun was a much overrated weapon, and two per battalion were more than Ile-de-France had been increased one hunsufficient18; a number fortunately increaseddredfold. The social results to the nation of a little later on to eight and then, largely on these losses, which make themselves more civilian pressure, to 16. powerfully Jelt as time goes by, are still inExamples could be multiplied of the failcalculable. ·They cannot fail in the aggregate ure of the professionals to realize the "territo be enormous. Very many of these deaths were the direct ble transformation in the character of War which," says Toynbee, " ... took our gen consequence not only of failures in manage ment and faults of technique but also of eration by surprise in 1914."19 The sad tale of what took place on theerror in the formulation of general princisecond day of the battle of Loos has recentlyples. The French came into World War I the been written again. It is probably worth slaves of an abstract military concept which was totally invalid but from which they only choosing here as an example of what could painfully struggled free. happen. Two new infantry divisions were commit The British also made costly errors, not so much of abstract thought as of practical apted on the morning of September 26, 1915, plications. The commander-in-chief in 1914, to the continuation of a mass attack on GerField Marshal French, was a cavalryman like man positions, of which the front lines had many other senior commanders in World been penetrated the day before. The barbed wire of the reserve positions was heavy andWar I, including Douglas Haig, who was first intact. For the British attack there was notha corps commander and then the Field Maring that could be called artillery preparation. shal's successor as commander-in-chief. Both French and Haig had shown marked ability Twenty minutes of desultory shell fire, which appears to have caused the Germans no cas as administrators, trainers and commanders of troops, with distinguished records in the ualties, was followed by a pause of about South African War. Neither had the intellechalf an hour. Then 12 battalions, 10,000 men, on a clear morning, in columns, ad tual capacity to evaluate the importance of vanced up a gentle slope towards the ene new techniques, or the imagination to break the bonds of his own experience. my's trenches. The wire behind which they French was often quite plainly out of his lay was still unbroken. depth, besides being a little suspicious of his The British advance met with a storm of machine-gun fire. Incredulous, shouting inallies. "Au fond, they are a low lot," he triumph, the Germans mowed the attackerswrote, "one always has to remember the down until, three and a half hours later, theclass these French generals mostly come Both he and Haig planned to use remnants staggered away from the "Leichenfrom."'7 feld von Loos," having lost 384 officers andlarge masses of cavalry in exploitation of in 152 READING5-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR. FORCE OFFICER . 7,861 men. The Gentians, as they watched their handling was faulty. Sometimes, as in the survivors leave, stopped firing in comFoch's case, they found they had to modify passion. Their casualties in the same time radically in practice what they once had had been nil. preached. Whatever their many good qualities they were often unequal to their task, "Good-morning; good-morning!" the General and when they made mistakes the results said were often appalling, with the most serious When we met him last week on our way to consequences for western society. the line. Now the soldiers he smiled at are most of'em What thought in our own society in Brit dead, · ain, was given in the late nineteenth and And we're cursing his staff for incompetent early twentieth century to preventing these swine. mistakes? The army was left largely where it "He's a cheery old card," grunted Harry to Jack · was. Its other:-rank personnel was improving As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and with a rising standard of living; but its officerpack. · corps was still the preserve of young men of good social standing who had the outlook of But he did for them both with his plan of attack20• amateurs and usually were. They were ill paid, with "half a day's ·pay for half a day's It is not only the battle of Loos which work," and so had to be of independent these lines of Siegfried Sassoon written in ·means. This meant that most were hard to 1917, call to mind. The lives at Loos were teach and many were unteachable. They thrown away. Nothing was gained at all exwere not well trained and were expected to cept a painful lesson we could do without. be neither industrious nor particularly intelli But there are many other occasions in four gent. From men such as these came the com years of war which included Neuve Chapelle, manders of World War I. As a foreign ob the Somme, the battles around Ypres, Passerver had put it, among the officers of the schendaele, when inadequacy in command British army bravery had often to compen caused grievous loss of life for no return. sate for lack of ability.21 The total of British dead was around the milWhat a society gets in its armed services is lion mark. Casualties were about half those exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. in France where the productive and creative What it asks for tends to be a reflection of capacity of a whole generation was pretty what it is. When a country looks at its fight well taken clean out. The social historian of ing forces it is looking in a mirror: if the the future, however, is likely to find their remirror is a true one the face that it sees there sults significant. will be its own. Let us not minimize the responsibilities of REFERENCES others besides the military commanders, but these have much to bear. In the examples I 1. w. Wenck, Deutschland vor Hundert J'ahren, 1887, vol. I, p. 61, quoting a writer of 1785. have chosen the French and the British each 2. Aristotle, Politics, bk. 1, chap. 2. and bk. 3, chap. 6. An English translation by Jowett, Oxford, 1905. made cardinal errors in spheres which were 3. A. Toynbee, A Study of· History, .1939, vol. IV, p. 640. pecularily their own, the French in their fail.'4. Cit. ibid., p. 644. S. Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden, Koningsberg, 1795, p. 57, ure to evolve a valid concept, the British in quoting an unnamed Greek. An English translation by-their failure to evaluate current techniques. M. Campbell Smith, London, 1903. 6. CF; M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, Free Press Now these generals were not all wicked of Glencoe, 1960, pp. 1,08-121. 7. Cit. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 223.men nor always stupid men and they were ·8. G. Mayer, Friedrich Engels, The Hague, 1934, vot. 11, p. 436, cit. Vagts, op. cit., p. 227. An English transla very rarely cowards themselves. Their errors tion by G & H. Highet, London, 1936. were more those of blindness than malignity. 9. B. H. Liddell Hart, Foch, 1931, p. 474. 10. Ibid., 67. Where they failed was in understanding the 11. J'. Monteilhet, Les Institutions Militaires de Ia France, techniques of their time. In consequence they 1932, p. 262. 12. Vide Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 47. could not formulate sound principles and 13. Monteilhet, op. cit., p. 321. 153 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 14. Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, 1961, p. 142. . 15. Tuchman, B. W., August 1914, 1962, p. 425. 16. Nef, op. cit., p. 367. 17. Tuchman, op. cit., p. 241. 18. Cit. Alan Clark, The Donkeys, 1961, p. 163. The minute is dated 14th AprU, 1915. 19. Toynbee, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 153. 20. S. Sassoon, Collected Poems, 1947, p. 75. 21. Vide note 5, chapter 5. 7-TODAY AND TOMORROW AFfER World War I, in England, we did Fl.better. A conscious effort was made in the 1930s to build up a more professional and modern army and there was progress, A · more professional outlook developed, with better pay and brighter promotion prospects leading to harder work and higher efficiency. . The British commanders of the second German war were in consequence generally much better at their jobs than those in the first, even if they were not better, braver, finer men, which on the whole they were possibly not. Most knew their business, not as of yesterday, like some of the senior commanders in the first war, but as of today. It has, in our time, been customary to think of war and peace as though one . must be at war if one is not at peace and vice versa. This is nearly always wrong, and certainly so at any time when war is not total, · as it was not in the mid-eighteenth ~entury. When Sterne set out from England ob · his Sentimental Journey in 1762 he had forgotten that England was at war with France. He had no passport and was given one iat Versailles by, it was said, the foreign ~inister himself, who was then actively pr~secuting the Seven Years War against England. "Un homme qui rit," said the minister, ','ne sera jamais dangereux."1 When England and . • I France. were. in a state of war mosf people continued to be unaffected, and very many would never even have heard about it at alL All that changed with the French !Revolution and Napoleon's unmannerly intrusion into a world of limited war2 • Through the nineteenth century, even in times of deceptive peace, forms of political thought and of professional military practice continued to develop along lines leading straight 'towards total national war. We owe a great deal here to the Germans. The response to the Napoleonic challenge, which had led to the collapse at Jena, was the overhaul of German military institutions and the development at the same time of a national frame in which to house them. The movement towards national unity and sovereignty gathered strength as the Prussian army became more formidable. A military philosophy, that of Clausewitz, appeared just when it was most wanted. The Germany of our time was founded in war in the nineteenth century and tested in war as the century progressed. Bismarck's three wars of Prussian aggression established the German state as we came to know it in our time. The two great world catastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century revolved around Germany as the central figure. Just as the last of these two world wars ended the missing piece dropped into place and the pattern was complete; the concept of total war between sovereign national states was now matched . with a technique of total destruction. As a result, if by war we still mean total war, as Clausewitz did, war can no longer be what Clausewitz called it-the continuation of policy by other means. It is difficult to argue, though I know some do (e.g. Herman Kahn in On Thermonuclear War), that unrestricted war between powers of. high and roughly equal nuclear capability can possibly be brought about by a rational act of deliberate policy. General war can result, it seems to me from miscalculation, or aberration or misch;nce. It just possibly might come back into play as a rational act of policy, for a short time, in the very unlikely event of a radical technical advaQce which gives one power an overwhelming, if temporary, superiority over the rest. War in the sense of general unrestricted war, however, can no longer be regarded as a normal continuation of foreign policy or an alternative to peace. Unfortunately we are often the prisoners of terms, like "war" and "peace". Forms of national organization are still closely related to this outworn dichotomy. In Great Britain, as elsewhere in western Europe and in the 154 RJ;:ADINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER United States, much legislation and many administrative arrangements (particularly those relating to the armed forces) are only comprehensible in terms of it. Confusion and inefficiency readily result. What is required (in addition to whatever preparations may be thought necessary for total war) is the ability to deploy that degree of warlike effort which the circumstances demand, in gentle gradation from something very smaii to something which, though pretty large, is still short of general mobilization. This is more easily contrived in the United States than in Britain. Here we are still bur4ened with a system distinguishing between war and peace, on the assumption that each is an identifiable and uniform state excluding the other. To this we have made a few makeshift adjustments. But we are still far from a smoothly working concept of partial war and partial peace in varying degrees of either. Even if it were universaiiy accepted, how ever, that total war had disappeared entirely as a valid act of deliberate national policy, this would stiii have done nothing to lessen tensions between men or the causes of con flict between sovereign states. War, total war, we have to avoid. Warfare, acts of or-' ganized violence between groups of men which in sum amount to less than total war, which we are unlikely to be able entirely to prevent, we must do something about. How do we avoid total war? One widely supported suggestion is that general war could ·not take place if we ail agreed to do away with the means to wage it. General and complete disarmament is therefore put for ward as the answer, perhaps with nuclear disarmament first. Others argue that, so long as sovereign states exist, no such agreements, even with far better guarantees than the great powers are at present likely to agree upon, can be foolproof. The argument goes as follows: there is now a high degree of transferability between civil and military skiiis. Since techniques cannot be abolished, an attempt to lock the weapons up is not a very sensible way of trying to prevent con flict. An agreement for general and complete disarmament would probably raise more problems than it would solve. The prevention of total war, therefore, can best be approached through arms control. I mention these arguments not to take sides but to make a rather obvious point. In the prevention of total war, whatever means are chosen, the state wiii rely heavily upon professional agencies in the military sphere. Neither a working system of arms control nor an effective state of general disarmament is possible without the military agent. Still less can you dispense with the military if some discriminate form of nuclear warfare emerges. The search for. it, the study of it, its conduct if it were to take place, would make heavy demands on the capacity of military professionals. It must be admitted that warfare of some sort cannot be seen as anything but quite in evitable. No one can say in advance when or how armed conflict between groups of men will emerge. What goes on at this moment speaking in November, 1962? An armed force of a Commonwealth country, India, is fighting Chinese. A United Nations force is fighting in the Congo. There is . civil war in the Yemen. United States Federal troops have recently intervened to enforce at the point of the bayonet the enrolment of an un welcome undergraduate in the state of Mis sissippi. Praetorian states · exist in many places and have their own troubles. Kashmir, Berlin,. Indonesia, Angola, Quemoy-to name only a few-are among many places lying under the threat of force if not suffer ing its immediate impact. Who could have predicted all this a year or two ago, when there was already fighting in the Trucial States, in Algeria, in Cyprus, in Malaya, in Kenya, or a year or two before that when there was already fighting or soon would be in Hungary, in eastern Germany, in the Suez Canal zone, and coups d'~tat had taken place or were about to in Syria, Paki stan, Iraq, the Sudan and Burma? Who will predict with any confidence what the pattern of violence may be in the next few years, or the next half-century? The mathematical re sources of the social scientist may be of help here in the long run, but they are not yet suf 155 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ficiently reliable to furnish much guidance to makers of policy. It is difficult to say how conflict will emerge or what form it will take. All we can say with confidence is that it will occur. Edward Gibbon in the late eighteenth century predicted the early disappearance of warfare between nations.8 He was wrong. World War I was "the war to end war." It was followed by World War II. World War III cannot be allowed, but its prevention will make little if any difference to the tendency to minor outbreaks of violence, except perhaps to increase their frequency. For if you can take a club to your neighbour without bringing down a thunderbolt you will club him the more readily. Now, since fighting is bound to take place, situations are easily conceivable in which the only hope of avoiding something worse may lie in taking a hand in it. We may well be working towards a position in which the main purpose of the profession of arms is not to win wars but to avoid them; that is to say, by timely warfare to lessen the risk of general war. In my opinion we are there already. If this is so the chief function of the armed forces maintained by properly . constituted authorities, whether these are nation states or something else, now becomes the containment of violence. We· may thus be moving towards what Janowitz calls a constabulary concept. Within such a concept the function arid duty of the military professional remain the saine. His function is the orderly application of armed force. His duty is to develop his skill in the management of violence to the utmost and to act as the true subordinate of the properly constituted authority, whatever this may turn out to be.* .• It would be idle to pretend that a dilemma cannot anse here. The . French forces in Syria and Lebanon, the Troupes Fran~a1ses du Levant after the fall of France fought the B,ritish, their former 'allies, who were prosecuting the war ag:unst Germany. They did this on the orders of a . metropolitan government: it had capitulated but their dut,Y. as professionals still lay to a governnient whose legitimacy they could not question. On the other hand many German professional officers who detested Nazism were unable to de'!y that legitimate authority in Germany lay. With the .N~s. They t/lerefore continued to fight agamst the allies, m whose victory lay the only hope for Germany, as many knew. They were, of course, much Engels drew attention to the close reflection of the dominant political characteristics of nineteenth-century states in their military establishments.4 This correspondence has not been confined to the nineteenth century, as I have suggested in these lectures, and it is not only the political structure of a society but its social characteristics as well, which are reflected in the pattern of its armed forces. The pattern of society in Great Britain is evolving and the pattern of her armed forces will evolve in conformity with it, whether we in this country like it or not. Some of an older generaton possibly do not. They may like it as little as the Duke of Wellington liked the proposals to abolish purchase. But it is the business of those in responsible positions in our armed forces today to see that modification of structure to correspond to a changing pattern in society is facilitated, while careful attention is paid to the preservation of what is worth preserving. Where does the "gentleman" stand in the officer establishment today? I have no time to pursue this far. A view set out in the U.S.A. in 1950 in an official publication seems reasonable: "the military officer is considered a gentleman . . . because nothing less . . . is truly suited for his particular set of responsibilities. "5 In relations between young officers and. men, when consistency, firmness and sincerity are important and warmth of personal feeling must be tempered with some degree of detachment, the implications of what is said here are just. They are above all important where disciplinary questions arise, as happens inevitably under the terms of the military contract. These make heavy demands on the young officer, who has to be made to remember that only a person of liberal mind is entitled to exercise coercion over others in a society of free men. It is worth remarking here that as an officer rises higher in his profession the demands made upon him in the administration helped in their confusion by the insistence of the allies that the German nation was their enemy, and not ollly the German government. 156 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER of justice increase. The machine is efficient N.C.O. and to liberate the junior officer but must be most jealously watched. A senfrom some of the duties which make few deior officer who confirms punishments often mands on the mental qualities expected in has the power to modify or lessen them. He him. This tendency is likely to continue. If it will not do so without most careful inquiry, results in further significant adjustment of to which he will also bring compassion and areas of responsibility it could bring about a common sense. This can tax a whole mind modification of the numerical relationship of and it brings its own rewards. officers to non-commissioned officers as well Whatever may be thought now about "ofas of patterns of promotion and-discipline. ficers" and "gentlemen," a change of critical On the officer side an interesting distincimportance in our time is in the rejection of tion is emerging in the British army between the assumption that the qualities required of those who are likely to become competitors an officer are to be found only in one strafor the higher posts and those who are not. tum of society. Criteria of social standing in A double career structure is being set up to deciding a man's suitability for officership, take account of it. 8 which have been applied for close on 2,000 A distinction is worth pointing out here years in western soceity, with only rare and between professional education in the professhort-lived challenge, are now being sion of arms and that in some others, such as modified. 6 medicine or the law. In these emphasis is The vestiges of the eighteenth-century displaced on a single long and concentrated tinction between gentle and simple, as redose, after which the practitioner, though he flected in relationships between officers and has very much to learn, is recognized as nonofficers, are vanishing. An article in a qualified. In armies and to a lesser degree in popular weekly paper7 pointed out recently navies and air forces the initial professional that the disappearance of what it calls the educational dose is only enough for the earliold feudal relationship, "typical of the preest stages. Thereafter the officer who gets on war professional," is not without disadvanin the service frequently goes back to school. tages. "Many officers today," says The PeoIn specialist courses, in staff and command ple, "are nine-to-five types." The problem is schools, in advanced courses he spends not to retain group coherences and a rational less than one fifth of his professional life on pattern of discipline and command without studies intended to prepare him for an extenrelying on moribund features in the social sion of his experience or for greater responstructure. This is a problem which the British sibilities. This is vastly greater than the army, as the paper points out with considera-· amount of time spent in this way in the law ble penetration, is trying to solve. and rather more than in medicine. The distinction between officer and The pattern of professional education in N.C.O. is unlikely to disappear. There is, the armed services is progressive. There is however, much to be said for a reexaminaconsequently no intolerable waste of prepartion of the pattern of distribution of responatory effort in the policy announced by the sibilities between officers and N.C.Os. It War Office in 1960 under which those who are unlikely to rise high in their profession or probably still takes too little account of the results of rising standards in living, education are unwilling to stay in it long may leave and general information amongst people alearly in order to reestablish themselves else where while they are still young enough to most everywhere in the western world. The better and maturer minds required among do so. It is hoped to make their sojourn in officers in armed service today, moreover, the service attractive and to bring them out will not be so readily attracted to it if the deof it not less well placed to start somewhere mands made upon the junior officer are too else than if they had never joined. low. A consequent tendency has been eviWhether we have yet succeeded in the dent to increase the responsibilities of the British army in a policy which has admit 157 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP tedly only lately been introduced has reWe struggle to escape from· this situation.cently been questioned by a Cambridge Opinion tends to move between two absolutsociologist. Dr. Abrams9 says with some justiist extremes. At one end are those who arefication that the resettlement both of the officonvinced that total war must come; that itcers who leave in their 30s and those who should be prepared for as a matter of theserve on to 55 years of age "remains the outhighest priority; that a favourable opportun standing challenge to those who would create ity for it should be welcomed and even a modern military profession in Britain."* sought. Such unlikely companions as theThe military profession in Britain is pure Marxist-Leninist and the champion ofchanging in pattern as the parent · society unrestricted capitalist free enterprise (bothchanges. Officer qualities are now sought in rather old-fashioned types) can easily finda deeper section of society than they were. themselves together here. At the other exEducational standards at entry and at vartreme are all those who see no hope for manious stages thereafter are rising. Command kind except in the rejection and suppressionby domination has in significant degree given of all means of war, starting with the mostway to command by management. Profesdestructive and making a brave and despersionalism is more respected. In the army, the ate gesture of voluntary surrender, if needleast technical (in a non-military sense) of be, in the hope that others will follow.the three services in Britain, the requireSomewhere between these two positionsments for technical awareness in ambitious you will find most of the more intelligentofficers have risen steeply in the last few professional officers. They are more pessiyears and are still rising. Material rewards mist than optimist in that they see little causeare not unsatisfactory during an officer's to suppose that man has morally so far ad service and although pillage now plays no vanced as to be able to refrain from violence. part in his expectations he can look forward They tend to be more pragmatist than absoto a pension when he retires which compares lutist in that they reject the inevitability ofvery favourably with what he could put by in total war at one end as totally intolerable, other professions. Career prospects in terms while they regard the notions of the total disof promotions are rational and the criteria armers at the other as scarcely practicable. for advancement are sensible. They do not, in sum, see why man, in spiteImprovements such as these have long of his ineradicable tendency to violence,been urgent. I hope, and believe, they have should be unable to manage the affairs of thebeen made in time. Others must follow. The world without blowing it up, even though hesocial results of inadequacy in the manage now knows how to do it and cannot bement of violence in two world wars have forced to forget; but they realize that the soalready been enormous and remain incalculalution of these problems demands more. goodble. Since war became total we have acminds in the profession of arms thim havequired weapons which in total war can debeen found there in the past. stroy mankind. The penalty of inadequacywas high before. It could now be final. The regularization of the profession was accompanied by a marked rise in the thresh • Dr. Abrams has offered an interesting and valuable old between the military and civilian areas of comment on the new pattern of retirement of the British officer; he suggests that the sort of occupations found for activity. Barrack life, uniforms, increased the admittedly impressive numbers of officers already respecialization in military skills, the growth in settled is unlikely to attract young men to join the armed forces, and draws the conclusion "that there is no better extent and complexity of formal military ad way to get to the top of English society than to start there." But useful though this analysis is, it has omitted ministration were among the factors contribto emphasize that the policy has been in operation fora very short time, and the material for resettlement is uting to set the soldier more apart from the pretty well exclusively the product of an earlier period, civilian. The distinction between the special when less thought was given to resettlement. He has gone, as it were, for evidence on animal behaviour more to the ist in warfare on land and at sea also grewdead animal than the living, more to South Kensington than Whipsnade. · more marked. 158 READING5-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER As the profession grew more professional, The movement of the military away from first at sea and then on land, the sailor and the civil has now in general been reversed. the soldier moved further apart from each They have come closer together. Military other and the functional area in which both skills are less exclusively specialist. The milioperated, the military, grew ever more tary community lives less apart. Uniforms sharply distinct from the non-military. The are less worn in civilian society. The working development of aerial warfare in the early clothes of a general in the field are very like twentieth century led to the specialization of those of a machine minder, though he still a third type of armed service whose relation has something rather more grand put by for ·to the other two has varied from time to time special occasions. All soldiers like to put on and country to country and whose future pretty clothes now and then, but I should locus and function are at present obscure. prefer not to pursue the topic of dressing up All that can be said is that they are likely to too far, here, where I am a guest in an anbe largely determined. by technical developcient university. How far will this tendency to reintegrationments. go? Not, I am sure, as far as a complete As professionalization proceeded the pro..: fessional was allowed more of a prescriptive merger. The special ·nature of the military right to authoritative 'judgment in his own calling will persist, and although the threshsphere. Not unnaturaily this was most noticeold between civil and military has in recent able where the rate of advance in professionyears got lower, and may get lower still, it is alism was highest, that is, in nineteenth-cenunlikely in my opinion to disappear. It is the tury Germany. Here the success of the task of those in charge to determine its optimilitary in ordering their own affairs and the mum height, or, to put it another way, to see obvious national advantages which resulted how close the military can be brought to the led to a widespread belief in a capacity in the · civilian without destroying the value of the military for successful organization in nonsoldier to society. One thing is recognized as military areas. They claimed the expertness · particularly important: to minimize the diffiof the initiate and were accorded as well a culty of reintegration when the soldier wishes discretionary right of judgment in other to cross the threshold and become a civilian. spheres than their own. In mid-twentieth · I have mentioned this before and do so century Germany the area of activity within . again only to emphasize its importance, which the military establishment is encourwhich has risen sharply in the last two decaged to operate has been sharply curtailed. ades. Probably in no country has the requireConversely, in other states of which all too ment yet been fully met, but in every one the many instances will come to mind, the effeceffort is being made. A civilian qualification tiveness of the military in maintaining an orfor every military professional, or at least derly structure when civil political constituskills saleable in civil life is the ideal. In this tions prove too frail to do so has resulted in country where currently more than 200 assumption by the military of civil functions. young officers out of a small army are read Praetorianism is widespread: its growth must ing for university degrees in the army's time, be watched with deep misgiving. on the army's payroll, and the other services It is worth saying here that the degree of are certainly doing in other ways no less, we recognition of what might be called purely have at least made a start. military factors seems to vary roughly as the How then does the military calling look to degree of freedom of the military from civil~ one who has all his adult life followed it? It ian control. It remained high in Germany is one of the fundamental pursuits. There are until World War II. It was higher in France · occupations in which what is demanded of in 1912 than it is now 50 years later. It is those. who pursue them cannot be entirely higher now in the United States than it was regulated by contracts between men. The in 1912. It has never been high in Britain. compulsions exerted in these occupations 159 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP arise mainly from the nature of the task itfession of arms is a constant reminder thatself. They include those of the priest, the this is so and the rancour it sometimeshealer, the iawgiver, the craftsman, the arouses in the radical breast is easily underteacher, the scholar, the seaman and the .· stood.farmer. They are not merely mechanical pur~ The man at arms is different things at difsuits*. The profession ofarms is prominent ferent times to the same people. "Our Godamong them. and soldiers we alike adore!ev'n at the brinkThe essential basis of the military life is of danger; not before."11 He can be lookedthe ordered application of force under an unat in a thousand different ways, for he is anlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability inevitable phenomenon in human society.which sets the man who embraces this life More poetry has been written about him andsomewhat apart. He will be (or should be) his doings than about anything else on earth.always a citizen. So long as he serves he will In his professional environment he livesnever be a civilian. an ordered life. It is the sort of life which OcThere are many ways of looking at a solero admired, lived ordine et modo.18 Its ordier. He can be regarded as no more than a derliness is liberating rather than oppressive.military mechanic~ a military operation can ltis far from incompatible with Christianity.be considered as just another engineering The record of the actions of Jesus Christ inproject. This is a mistake. It can lead to unthe gospels show him forebearing to soldiers,fortunate results when the unlimited liability even kind. He was rough with politicians,clause in the unwritten contract is invoked as lawyers, financiers, professors and divines.the operation. unfolds. There is a satisfaction in service, there is a He can be . regarded, rather emotionally satisfaction in an ordered life, there is satisand too simply, as a hired assassin. Only those faction in the progressive mastery of comwho do not know many soldiers can mainplex skills, and there is satisfaction in profestain this view with confidence. If soldiers sional association with men of a high average were only paid killers their calling would ievel of integrity. But the service has to be have done something to them which you can service to what is worthwhile, and the orlook for in vain. dered life has to lead somewhere. The proThe soldier can be thought of as one of de fessional skills must be interesting andaround them must be a wide area of choice Vigny's great shaggy dogs of grenadiers, in other pursuits. It is upon these points that mournful, sweet-tempered and doomed. He the young man considering armed service has been romanticized; reviled, esteemed, must satisfy himself. I do not think he will be derided. disappointed. He has been the target of some of the The primary function of an armed force is best invective, Voltaire's10 for example or to fight in battle. This is nowadays impossi Shaw's. I particularly recommend the pref~ ble without a highly complex system of sup ace to John Bull's Other Island (Down with porting activities. Among these a man may the soldier) as sane and refreshing reading find not only the chance of self-fulfilment in for the regular officer. To see how far Shaw a closely coherent group of human beings, is wrong today is as important as to see how where confidence is generally high and far he is still right, and to make sure we con everyone receives from others what he is tinue to steer the profession of arms away prepared to give. He will also be offered an from his picture of it. Shaw is as angry as opportunity for pretty nearly every pursuit Voltaire and for the same reason: man obsti that appeals tothe rational man. nately remains what he is and declines to be I only know one general now serving on come what the radical reformer thinks he the Army Council who has had a picture ought to be. The very existence of the pro hung in the Academy, but there are many • I should be IDclllled to desCribe them as abanauslc. generals who paint. I do not know any gen 160 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER erals wh-o are first class interpreters in Russian, Arabic or classical Cantonese, but almost any young officer able and willing to do so may study a language for two or three years and will often spend some of this time abroad at his employer's expense. If he is of unusual capacity as, a scientist he might find himself, after a first at Cambridge or London, reading for a doctorate. The young officer can paint, sail boats, play a musical instrument, join an expedition, learn mathematics, bundle down the Cresta-help himself in short to a variety of pursuits active or reflective, not as things he has to struggle to do but as things which the system in which he has made his life encourages and sometimes even helps to pay for. Make no mistake about it: the military establishment is not a philanthropic body. It has good reason to encourage these things .. First, there are skills (and a very wide range of them) whose availability in armed forces is deemed important. Secondly, there are activities which develop the mental, moral and physical qualities required in the efficient fighting man. Thirdly, the life must be attractive to the right young men if the function of armed forces is to be efficiently discharged. The things I speak of as examples fall under one or more of these heads, most under all three. Some men are dissatisfied if they are too far separated from the earth upon which they live and what happens on and round it. I realized myself as a young officer that I should not have been content doing anything for a living in which it was never important to me what time the sun rose. Dawn, dusk, moonrise and moonset, what the wind does, the shape and size of woodland, marsh and hill, currents and tides, the flow of rivers and the form of clouds, whether the leaf is on the tree or the branches are bare, the seasons, the weather and the stars-these are matters of compelling importance in the lives of sailors, soldiers, airmen, some of more importance to one, some to another; and so, too, at all times and above all, are people. In measuring the worth of any way of life a study of its average products will not tell you what you want to know. Those who display its essential characteristics in exceptional degree are more informative, a Colonel Newcome, let us say, or a Jos. Sedley. Perhaps even more misleading than to regard the average is to look only at the worst. To see how bad men can be in any profession is to learn little about it worth knowing. Ask instead what opportunities it gives the /LE'ya()v p.ot. • The profession of arms is an essential social institution offering an orderly way of life, set a little apart, not without elegance. "The performance of public duty is not the whole of what makes a good life," said Bertrand Russell, in language that would have pleased Cicero; "there is also the pursuit of private excellence" .13 Both are to be found in the military life. It gives much and takes more, enriching freely anyone prepared to give more than he gets. It will remain with us for as long as man continues to be what he is, too clever and not good enough. This looks like being a long time yet. · REFERENCES 1. Sterne, A Sentimental Journey, 1768, p. 120 ff. 2. "It was reserved to the genius of Napoleon to make unmanerly war." Billow, cit. Vagts, op. cit., p. 91. 3. See note I on chapter 4. 4. Putnam's Monthly, New York, vol. VI, 1855, pp. 193-206 and 306-31. Cit. Rapoport, A comparativetheory of military and political types, In Changing Patterns of Military Politics, ed. S. P. Huntington, Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, p. 71. 5. The Armed Forces Officer, Department of Defense, Washington, 1950, p. 4, cit. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 219. 6. J anowltz. ( op. cit., p. 79) is interesting on this point. 7. The People, 1st July, 1962, p. 10. 8. Defense White Paper, 1960. 9. Democracy, Technology, and the retired British of· ficer, in Huntington, Changing Patterns etc., p. 150. 10. Vide Candide, passim. II. Francis Quarles, Epigram. 12. Cicero, De Officiis, bk. I, chap. 5, secc. 15-17. 13. Authority and the Individual (Reith Lectures, 1948-9), 1949, p. 111. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE These three lectures have been set down pretty faithfully as they were given, with a few short passages, omitted in order to shorten them for delivery, now restored. If they had been written in the first place for publication they would have been put together differently, and might then have been without some of the rough patches of which I am aware and towards which I ask in· dulgence. Source material has been used very freely-too freely perhaps. Phrases inadvertently borrowed have certainly slipped in, but there has not been 161 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP time or opportunity for the rewriting which alone could prune these out, and I can only ask to be forgiven for them. I r~lied a good deal in parts on those two basic works, Delbrlick's Geschichte der Kriegskunst and the Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften of Max Jiihns. · I acknowledge a debt to Bertrand Russell's Power and an even greater one to Andrzejewski's Military Organization and Society. Anyone who knows Michael Parker's Roman Legions, Liddell Hart's Foch and J. U. Nef's War and Human Progress will see how greatly I am in their debt, and the same is true of the collection of essays edited by Edward Meade Earle under the title Makers.of Modern Strategy. I used Babeau's Vie Militaire sous /'Ancien Regime freely and gratefully in the passages on seventeenth anJames Mellaart, Earliest Civilizations of the Near East method to manage the common affairs of the (London: Thames and Hudson, 196S), p. 11. group. And, as one would expect, this bit of 174 READINGS---CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER priests through their vast tax system col management developed to the cunning; ··the alert, the wise, and the shrewd. As these lected and managed tremendous amounts of small villages grew and civilization evolved, worldly goods, including flocks, herds, reve nues, and estates. Being mortal, these priests the managers, too, grew and evolved. They became the priests, the kings, and the apwere required to give an account of their pointed ministers holding powers and wealth stewardship to the chief priest-a managerial control practice. Because of the magnitude in their societies even before highly orga and variety of wealth amassed, however, the nized social, political, and military structures had been devised. Taxation, effective utilizapriests encountered a job with problems untion of resources, division of labor, trade arprecedented in human history. For this account of their stewardship, memory could rangement and agreements, and the making of war and peace were surely typical probnot be trusted to recollect dues paid, transac lems to these managers of the first full-scale tions consummated, and the like. Nor could they rely on crude devices such as a notch in primitive civilization. a stick, commonly used by private individu ANCIENT CIVILiZATIONS als to indicate that their dues had been paid. The origins of a number of so-called mod~ The Sumerian priests thus found them ern concepts and practices of management selves managing the wealth and operations of are easily traceable to the ancients. Solomon, a religious organization or business that was the famed biblical ruler, directed the estabimmortal but using the ways of mortal man. lishment of elaborate trade agreements, manThis mortal facet of man added to the con aged construction projects, and molded fusion because when a priest died some sys peace agreements in the tenth century B.C. tem of managerial control had to be estab lished to assure, for example, that a loan Prior to the existence of such rulers as would be repaid and that the repayment Solomon, however, there arose the need for would be exacted by the controlling priest's some way, some system, to govern and ~anage the people. Many ancient rulers used successor. To do this, the Sumerian priests developed a system of writing or recording their trusted servants to carry out . their data to account for all the transactions en wishes, giving such servants the necessary tered into by the many priests in tQe vast authority to act for the ruler. These servants holdings of the religious "corporation." Be collectively then became the council or advi cause these Sumerian people recognized this sory board for the chiefs. As their power and need for managerial control, it is no wonder reputation grew, many of these chiefs as that virtualiy the eadiest written documents sumed theocratic positions in their tribes. in the world are the 5,000 year old accounts They were both earthly and spiritual leaders of the people. To manage, they developed of their inventories. In fact, it is highly probrules and taboos of conduct. Through their able that the managerial needs of this early civilization prompted the invention of the spiritual position they used fear of the super natural as well as fear of earthly ridicule to Sumerian script.3 The impetus, of course, was economic; and although developed by insure adherence to their rules. It is in this light that we first view the ancient civilizathe priests, the script's first use was for man agerial control purposes and not for liturgical tions. ends.Somer Hard on the heels of the Sumerian develSome of the earliest written documents in opment came the rise of Egypt, with its arthe world, found in the Sumerian civilization chitectural structures, its government, and its of 5,000 years ago, are evidences of managewritings to give further evidences of manage rial control practices.2 The Sumerian temple rial development. • V. G. Cbllde, Man Makes Himself (New York: The 8 Ibid., p. 145. New American Library, 1951), p. 143. 175 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Egypt hundreds of men and animals to accomplish Structures. The building of the pyramids the work and transport provisions for thewith a technology that would be considered workers.4 primitive by modern standards, affords us During the New Empire under the reignmute testimony of the managerial and orgaof Ramses IV, one expedition to quarrynizational abilities of ancient Egypt from stone at. Hammamat was carried out in quite5,000 to 525 B.C. The great pyramid of a regal style. The expedition was under theCheops, for example, covers thirteen acres titular leadership of the high priest of Amonand contains 2,300,000 stone blocks each (because the monuments were for a god)weighing an average of two and one-half and other attendants of the king, none of tons. whom made any consequential contribution.Construction is estimated to have taken The men who, in effect, were in charge werethe labor of over 100,000 men for twenty military officers inasmuch as work of this nayears. In today's terms, this would mean ture usually fell on the army. On this expedimanaging and directing the efforts of a city tion one hundred ten officers of each rank,of 100,000 over a twenty-year period-truly fifty civil officials and ecclesiastics, onea managerial task of massive proportions! hundred thirty stone masons, two painters,When we consider the planning, organizing, and four engravers furnished the leadership.and control that had to be exercised in this The work of transport was done by fiveundertaking, it is clear that the managerial thousand common soldiers, two hundredconcepts and techniques that we know were members of the king's court, eight hundrednot born of the twentieth century. The incibarbarians, and two thousand bondservantsdental problems of feeding, transporting, and of the temple. Altogether, the expeditionhousing such a multitude stagger the imagiconsisted of 8,368 men.5nation. By using masses of organized labor theThe managerial planning of where the Egyptians were able to accomplish tasks thatstones were to be quarried, when, what size, astonish us. While their system of organizaand how they were to be transported retion may appear unwieldly, cumbersome,quired the practice of what today might well and even wasteful, they actually had no rea?e called long-range planning. The quarryson to economize on labor since more peasmg. for example, took place during the winants, mercenaries, and slaves were alwayster and spring with each stone marked when available simply for the asking. That theyit was ready for removal to the site of the were able to do the job with the available reroyal tomb, and the top side of the stone sources is to their credit, and their remainingclearly marked. Transportation took place edifices clearly indicate their managerialeffectiveness and sophistication. during the annual flood season to minimize land transport. And finally, all blocks were Writings. In addition to their architecture, cut to shape and numbered on the site before many instances are found in Egyptian litera being put into position. In fact, the mining' of ture of m::. tagement thought, frequentlyposed as advice from a father to his sen. The quarries and movement of blocks for such book of instruction of Ptah-hotep is sup tombs affords us an excellent illustration of posed to have been composed by a vizier of the Egyptian system of organization. King Issi about 2,700 B.C., but the validity Quarries were usually chosen for .their of this claim is doubtful. It is, however, aproximity to the Nile because it furnished very ancient work and had already been reconvenient transportation. Nevertheless, edited in 2,000 B.C., and as late as 1,500Hammamat, one of the most-used quarries,lay two to three day's journey from the Nile, • Adolf Erman, Life In Andent Egypt, trans. from theGerman by Helen M. Tlrard (London: MacMillan and and mining expeditions there required Company, 1894), p. 472. a Ibid., p. 47S. 176 "' :,..,..,.,_~ .... .·.. :~···... READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER B.C. was used in schools.6 As an example of ing counsel, neglect it not. . . . [The use ofwhat the book contains, the instruction of staff by managers.]" Ptah-hotep to his son reads: We find also that the Egyptians wereIf thou art a leader commanding the affairs aware of sound managerial practices andof the multitude, seek out for thyself every principles. They understood and appreciated, beneficial deed, until the business be free for example, managerial authority and re from wrong. Maat (translated as order or sponsibility, and they recognized the value of truth) is great, and its effectiveness is lasting. . . . Wrongdoing has never brought its spelling out job descriptions in detail. Theseundertaking to port. are illustrated, for example, by the followinginstructions which were delivered at the ap If thou art one to whom petition is made, becalm as thou listenest to what the petitioner pointment of every vizier or manager:has to say. Do not rebuff him before he hasswept out his body or before he has said that It is an abomination of the god to show parfor which he came.... It is not (necessary) tiality. This is the teaching: thou shalt dothat everything about which he has petitioned the like, shalt regard him who is known to should come to pass, (but) a good hearing is thee like him who is unknown to thee, and soothing to the heart.7 him who is near like him who is far . . .an official who does like this, then, shallCompare this ancient advice to that found flourish greatly in the place. in a contemporary personnel book: Be not enraged toward a man unjustly, butbe thou enraged concerning that about which Listening can be valuable to both parties. one should be enraged.Whatever other benefit a disturbed workerderives from the interview, he cannot fail to The going out of all that goes out of theexperience a therapeutic value if he is alking's house shall be reported to him; and thelowed to get the problem "off his chest" to a coming in of all that comes into the king'ssympathetic and intelligent listener.• house shall be reported to him. The overseers of hundreds and overseers ofThe Egyptian managers, too, recognized (word not translated) shall report to himthe value of planning and the use of staff adtheir affairs.vice as indicated by the following from a Furthermore, he shall go in to take counsel manuscript entitled aboyet . (instruction) on the affairs of the king, and there shall befrom a father to his son: reported to him the affairs of the two landsin his house every day.Proclaim thy business without concealment. . . . One ought to say plainly what one It is he who brings in the officials of thedistrict; it is he who sends them out; they knoweth and what one knoweth not. [A call for honesty in managerial dealings.] report (to) him the affairs of their district. ' The leader ought to have in mind the days One shall put every petition in writing, not that are yet to come. [The need for planning.] permitting that he petition orally. Every petitioner to the king shall be reported to him, Great is a great one whose cocnselors are after he puts (it) in writing. great. [The value of staff advice to a man ager.] They shall report to him all that happensamong them on the first day of every fourWrite with thine hand, read with thy mouth, month season; they shall bring him the writ and ask counsel of them that have moreknowledge than thou. . . . Persevere in ask-ing thereof, . in their hands together withtheir local council. ' • Adolf Erman, The Literature of the Ancient Egyptilms, Let every office, from the first to th~ last, pro trans. Aylward M. Blackman (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1927), pp. 55-60. ceed to the hall of the vizier to take counsel7 John A. Wilson, The Culture of Ancient Egypt (Chiwith him. cago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p, 84.8 Paul Pigors and Charles A. Myers, Personnel Admin istration (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), p, 84. • Adapted from Erman, The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians, pp. 59, 76, 195, and 242. (Italics are mine.) 177 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Inspection of every craft (untranslated word), ter who actually took part in administering in order to cause every man to know his duty the state, making frequent inspections of theaccording to the stipulati.>n of every affair.'0 territories.13 Thus the Egyptians apparently recognized (after nearly a thousand years!) These are operative, managerial rules or that dispersed holdings requiring a decentralprinciples used by the Egyptians in their ized government was an effective form ofearly civilization. Advisory in nature, these · managerial organization only if effective cenprinciples could easily be applied to many tral controls were established. governmental uses today. Later during the New Empire ( 1530-1050Government. The study of the Egyptian B.C.) the provincial governments of the Oldgovernment through the periods of the Old Empire completely disappeared, and the royalKingdom, Middle Kingdom, and the New power became real as well as titular. TheEmpire provides us with illustrations of their centralization of the government was accomrecognition of the principle of control of an plished during the rule of the Hyksos, whoextended operation through a centralized ordrove out the foreign invaders in the provincesganization. and assumed complete control.14 The kingThey first established in their empire a thereby came to own all the property in Egyptloosely decentralized form of government. In and to exact an annual rental payment fromfact, from 2160 to 1788 B.C. the governthe country, usually twenty per cent, and inment was so highly decentralized that the tax the form of grain. commission was the only real tie between the central government and the sub-states. The If control via. records and paper work is head of each of these states, of course, owed the hallmark of an advanced civilization, the his loyalty to the Pharaoh. However, control Egyptians of the New Empire would have to was so remote that these states could easily be considered civilized indeed. Their scribes were kept busy maintaining detailed records. be compared to the feudal estates of middle In their business and governmental affairs,European history.11 they kept documents to show exactly howRecognizing that this loose control re sulted in a loss in revenue and loyalty, the much was received, from whom, when it rulers of the New Empire period, beginning came in, and the details of how it was used. around 1600 B.C., began recentralizing by Nothing in the government was done without means of a military take-over.12 Since it was supporting documents. In fact, the following excerpt from a business letter suggests the a military take-over, the officers of the army stepped into administrative positions and reancient Egyptian's penchant for this docu organized the central government. This cenmentation: tralization placed all the land into the hands I write this to you, that it may serve as a of the royal officials with the Pharaoh at the witness between us, and you must keep this head. Authority was centralized in the Pharletter, that in the future it may serve as a aoh who delegated local authority to the terwitness.'" ritories through governors or mayors appointed by the central government. The new The Egyptians also recognized the imporgovernors did not .operate independently as tance of specialization in total organization did the governors of the Old·Kingdom, but as is indicated by their passing laws stating merely carried out the directives of the Pharthat no tradesman could pursue any trade aoh. The -army was maintained by the central save that handed down by his parents. Each government and taxes were collected by it. trade was thus continually competing to perTo aid him, the Pharaoh had a prime minis-fect its own type. By the same token, tradesmen were barred from participating in politi •. 10 J. H. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906), pp. 269, 274, 277-8, ,. Ibid., pp. 231-45. and 291. " Erman, Ute In Ancient Egypt, p. 102. u Ibid., p. 157. "Ibid., pp. 112-13. "Ibid., p. 233. 178 READINGS-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER cal affairs inasmuch as this might tend ·to laborer, he shall pay him 8 gus of graindistract them, proving detrimental to their per year.18 primary endeavors.16 On control: If a man give to another silver,The Nile region, however, was not alone gold, or anything on deposit, whatever he in its development of high levels of civilizagives he shall show to witness and he shall arrange the contracts and then he shall make tion during this period. The Babylonian em· the deposit.'" pire developing along the Tigris and Eu If a merchant give to an agent grain, wool, phrates also affords us many examples of oil, or gqods of any kind which to trade, theearly managerial practices. agent shall write down the value and returnthe money to the merchant. The. agent shallBabylonia take a sealed receipt for the money which he.gives to the merchant. If the agent be careUnder Hammurabi, King of Babylonia, less and do not take a receipt for the moneythe cities along the valley were forced to which he has given to the merchant, themoney not receipted for shall not be placed unite to keep peace, with laws being devel in his account.20 oped to cover personal property, real estate, trade and business, the family, and labor. In On responsibility: The mason who builds a fact, virtually all the laws coming to us from bouse which falls down and kills the inmate shall be put to death.21 . the Babylonian civilization are of a business nature dealing with such items as sales, If a wine merchant allows riotous men to as semble in his house and does not expel them, loans, contracts, partnerships, agreements, he shall be killed... and promissory notes. If a man's child has died under the care of As one would expect from such an ad the nurse, and the nurse has substituted an vanced civilization, Babylonian business other (nurse) without consent of his father transactions were highly documented on taband the mother, the breasts of that nurse shall be cut off.23 lets as a means of control. Fortunately, thesetablets also provide us with one of the first If a doctor operates on a wound with arecognitions of the principle that responsibilcopper lancet, and the patient dies, or on the eye of a gentleman who loses his eye in ity cannot be delegated. This is illustrated in consequence, his hands shall be cut off!' a letter from the king ordering ten men to work at constructing a canal. In the letter it Nebuchadnezzar. After over one thousandwas noted that if the.work were not accom years of weakness following the reign ofplished properly, it was the supervisor of the Hammurabi, Nebuchadenezzar became kingmen, and not the men, who would be in 604 B.C. and raised Babylonia to anotherpunished.17 epoch of brilliance. From the textile mills ofHammurabi. Probably the most significant this period we find examples of productioncontribution of the Babylonians to managecontrol and incentive wage payment. Color,for example, was used as a control means for ment thought was the Code of Hammurabi, yarn entering the mill each week. Thus, the ruler for some period between 2000 and1700 B.C. This is one of the oldest known yarn for this week might be color tagged with a red tag, next w~ek with a blue tag, codes of law in the world and affords us real and so on, thereby affording management insight into their thinking on management. with a clear control device to determine how The following excerpts are illustrative. On minimum ·wages: If a man hire a field ,. Robert F. Harper, The Coih of Hammurabl, Klng of Babylon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904), p. 157.,. Ibid., p. 122. 10 Sir Gardner Wilkinson, Manners and Customs oj Aru:ient Egyptians, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1842), 20 Ibid., pp. 104-5. p. 8. "'E. A. Wallis Budge, Babylonian Life and History,2nd ed., (London: Religious Tract Society, 1925), p. 130. 17 Georges Contenau, Everyday Uje In Babylon and .. Ibid., p. 126.Assyria (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, Ltd., 1954), OS Ibid., p. 128. p. 86. "'Ibid., p. 218. 179 CONCEPTS 01-' AIR fORCE. LEADERSHIP long the raw material for a particular lot had China been in the mill. The same type of system The Chinese have long been known for was used in Nebuchadnezzar's granaries. their wisdom, but little if any real research When the grain was harvested it was stored has been undertaken to understand their in large earthenware jars and a colored reed feelings toward management. The ancient was placed in the seal of each jar. Each year records of Mencius and Chow (1100 to had its own color so that it was immediately about 500 B.C.) do, however, indicate that evident how long the grain in a particular jar the Chinese were aware of certain principles had been in the storehouse. And, finally, bearing on organizing, planning, directing, wages were paid the women engaged in spinand controlling.ning and weaving operations in the form of Chow. The constitution of Chow, probafood, the amount depending on the individbly written about 1100 B.C., is a directory of ual production of each worker.25 Truly a all civil servants to the Emperor, from the basic and highly motivating incentive. prime minister down to household servants, with their jobs and duties carefully listed. In Hebrews speaking of the powers of the prime minister, It has .been said of the Hebrews that no for example, itrecords the following: other people in history so few in number and Eight things he holds to help the king handle so weak politically, with the possible excep his numerous officers: The first is rank that tion of the Greeks, have so greatly influcontrols their distinction. The second is enced civilization. emolument that controls their wealth. The third is favor that controls their fortune. One of the great Hebrews was Moses, a The fourth is ~pointment that controls theirleader and manager whose ability in governconduct. The fafth is attention that controlsment, law making, and human relations their blessing. The sixth is confiscation that makes him worthy of some note. His prepacontrols their poverty. The seventh is removal that controls their failings. The eighth ration, organization, and execution of the ex is death that controls their excessiveness. odus of the Hebrews from the bondage of the Egyptians was a tremendous managerial Eight regulations he holds to govern the different departments of government. The first undertaking, and following the advice of his pertains to their organization so tha~ thefather-in-law, Moses did a magnificent job of government of the state may be established.personnel selection, training, and organizaThe second pertains to their functions so that tion. The entire account is found in chapter the government of the state m.ty be clarified. The third pertains to their relationships so that 18 of Exodus and clearly illustrates the prin-. the government of the state may be coopera ciple of delegation as well as the exception tive. The fourth pertains to their procedure principle: "Every small matter they shall so that the government of the state may be efficient. The fifth pertains to their formalities judge, but every great matter they shall bring so that the government of the state may ap to thee." pear permanent. The sixth pertains to their .This scriptural account affords us one of control so that the government of the state the earliest and most commonly available·· • may be complete. The seventh pertains to their punishments so that the government of records of a philosophy and plan for organi-• the state may be corrected. The eighth perzation. The advice of Jethro, Moses' fathertains to their reckoning so that the governin-law, indicates a recognition of the need ment of the state may be audited. for delegation of authority based on the job Eight methods he holds to govern the country.assignment; as well as the effectiveness of the The first is ritual and worship, so as to conexception principle. Here for all to study is a trol its spirit. The second is statutes and regsimple record of a fundamental managerial ulations, so as to control its great officers. The third is removal and appointment, so asconcept. to control its petty officers. The fourth is emolument and rank, so as to control its ""L. P. Alford, Laws of Managem~nl (New York: 'lbe scholars. The fifth is taxes and tributes, soRonald Press Co., 1928), p. 37. 180 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO HIE AIR FORCE OFFICER as to co:ttrol its resources. The sixth is ceremonies and customs, so as to control its people. The seventh is· punishment and reward, so as to control its strength. The eighth is farming and other employments, so as to control its multitude."' Thus over three thousand years ago we find in China concepts which have a contem porary managerial ring: organization, func tions, cooperation, procedures to bring effi ciency, and various control techniques. Mencius. Turning now to the writings of Mencius, we find that he believed that laws alone were insufficient for business--that every going concern should adhere to a standard of operation which was ordained by the law of God, and used as a model for gov ernment. Writing about 500 B.C., Mencius clearly indicated the need for system, methodology, and models in effective management when he said: Whoever pursues a business in this world must have a system. A business which has attained success without a system does not exist. From ministers and generals down to the hundreds of craftsmen, everyone of them has a system. The craftsmen employ the ruler to make a square and the compass to make a circle. All of them, both skilled and unskilled, use this system. The skilled may at times accomplish a circle and a square by their own dexterity. But with a system, even the unskilled may achieve the same result, though dexterity they have none. Hence, every craftsman possesses a system as a model. Now, if we govern the empire, or a large state, without a system as a model, are we not even tess intelligent than a com mon craftsman?'" Specialization was also emphasized by the ancient Chinese in that each of the crafts was hereditary and an artisan was committed to his industry for a lifetime. In fact, the artisans lived together in special districts, separate from the remainder of the citizens such that they could easily learn their trade in the absence of distraction. 28 Mencius also ad 00 Kuo-Cheng Wu, Ancient Chinese Political Theorl11 (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1928), pp. 40-41. .., Ibid., p. 226. "" Chen Huan..Chang. The Economic Principle• o/ Co,._ lucius and His School, Vols. I and U (New York, Co lumbia University, 1911), pp. 408-9. dressed himself to this topic when he asked: But why does not Hsii himself act as potter and blacksmith, supplying h:s needs with articles made on his own premises? Why this multifarious dealing with all sorts of craftsmen? Mencius answered: •.• men of high and low station alike have their own proper busine~s and any one man has to be supplied with the products of other men's industry. If he had to manufacture them all for his own use, everybody in the empire would be turned out upon the roads."' Sun Tzu. Written about 500 B.C., The Art of War by Sun Tzu is the oldest military treatise in the world. And today, even though the chariot is gone and weapons have changed, this ancient master holds his own because he dealt with fundamentals. To those military leaders and modern managers who would care to study his treatise it is still a valuable guide as indicated by the following excerpts. · On planning: Now the general who wins a battle ma!tes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes few calculations before hand. It is by attention to this point that I can see who is likely to win or lose."" On directing: If the words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders arc clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers. 31 Finally, over two thousand years ago when speaking on organization, Sun Tzu warned: "When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct; where there are not fixed duties assigned to officers and men; the result is utter disorganization." 32 The scientific selection of workmen via examinations was started by the Chinese "'Ibid., p. 59. ao Thomas P. Phillips, Rants o/ Strategy (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 19SS), p. 23. 31 Ibid .. p. 7S. "" Ibid.• p. 73. JSI CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP of that process which in management wegovernment .about 120 B.C. Because the clerks and officers were unable to read the refer to as consultation or consultative edicts and laws of the government, the Prime supervision.84 Minister Kung-Sun Hung established a sysPrinciples of management. The Greeks tem of examinations and those who scored early recognized the principle that maximum highest on the exams were given the govern output is achieved through the use of uni ment positions. In 219 A.D., this system was form methods at stipulated tempos. This was further expanded by classifying men into especially true for hard, monotonous, repetitive work where time was set by music. The nine different grades, dependent upon a man's ability, knowledge, experience, and flute and the · pipe governed the motions, character. The classification was undertaken with songs for each task and for each opera tion in it.85 Thus they introduced rhythm, by an impartial judge. However, the judge was not quite so impartial and the system standard motions, and work tempos by work was replaced in 606 A.D. (after trying it for ing harmony with music. When to these ad four hundred years!) by a governmental vantages we add the positive psychological effect of music, we can understand why the examination.sa result was an increase in output and a deGreece crease in wasted effort and fatigue. As in other civilizations, trades were he The Greeks, Phoenicians, and Minoans, reditary in Greece and specialization was therising to power somewhat later than the order of the day. In fact, specialization wasChinese, Babylonians, and Egyptians, exhibcarried so far that stone masons did not evenited a real skill and capacity for management sharpen their own tools, and Plato evenin the operation of trading compaines, and in stated in this laws that no man should workthe case of Greece, in the development of a in both wood and iron at the same time bedemocratic government with all the necescause of his inability to excei.S6 sary managerial complications that such a Indeed, in his Republic Plato gave to thegovernment entails. In the Grecian civilizaeconomic sciences their first .theory of spetion we find the origin of the scientific cializatiOii or the division of labor when hemethod. History, in fact, became the Greek stated: word meaning search for true knowledge. By questioning all kinds of knowledge and ideas, Which would be better-that each shouldthe Greeks discovered the research point of ply several trades, or that he should confine view, and introduced scholarship and science himself to his own? He should confine him self to his own. More is done, and done in many spheres. The influence of the scien better and more easily when one man do_es tific method on management is obvious. This one thing according to bis capacity and atobjective type of inquiry was later to become the right moment. We must not be surprised the ultimate goal of such men as Frederick to find that articles are made better in big W. Taylor, Henri Fayol, Frank B. Gilbreth, cities than in small. In small cities the same workman makes a bed, a door, a plough, a· and a host of other leaders in the manage table, and often he builds a house too. ·-· . · ment field. Now it is impossible that a workman who does so many things should be equally suc The Greeks developed a new invention in cessful in all. In the big cities, on the other city government, the polis, which encouraged hand . . . a man can live by one single trade.a free exchange of ideas. The polis provided Sometimes he practices only a special branch practice and. experience in open discussion, of a trade. One makes men's shoes, another women's, one lives entirely by the stitching of and through it the Greeks furnished positive examples and ample evidence of the values •• Curtis H. Gager, "Management Throughout History," Top Management Handbook, ed. H. B. Maynard (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), p. 58. 33 Hu Shish, "Historical Foundations for a Democratic China," Edmund 1. James Lectures on Government, 2nd 35 Gustave Glotz, Ancient Greece at Work (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), pp. 272-75. · Series (University of lllinois Press, 1941) as quoted by .. Jules Toutain, The Economic Life of the Ancient Albert Lepawsky, Administration (New York: Alfred A. World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), pp. 133-34.Knopf, 1949), p. 428. 182 READING~HALLENGE TO THE AfR FORCE OFFICER . the shoe, another by cutting the leather. ager for a soap company would work equally. . . A man whose work is confined to such well as the head of an automobile concern or a limited task must necessarily excel at it.37 as Secretary of Defense. . . . ) One of the first accounts of the principleof the universality of management is found Questions for Reflection and Discussion in a Socratic discourse as recorded (or imag1. What is a principle of management? ined) by Xenophon, one of Socrates' disci2. How widely applicable is a principle of ples. It clearly indicates that even in the fifth management? century B.C. men were aware of or begin 3. How does a principle of leadership differ ning to be aware of the fact that a good man-from a principle of management? :r. Francis Comford, The RepubUc of Plato (New York: 4. State some modem· counterparts .of the Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 16~7. management principles discussed in this article. READING 0 Early Military Contributions to Management By Claude S. George, Jr. Reprinted by permission from The History of Management Thought. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968. Copyright 1968. CYRUS the value in good personnel or human relaFrom the military come many examples of tions. These points are illustrated by the folearly management thought. In fact, the life lowing discourse: of Cyrus both as a military leader and as aruler affords us several illustrations of the They (the commanders) went off to their tents, and, on their way, observed among advanced state of thinking about manage themselves how retentive a memory Cyrusment at that time. His father, for example, had, and how, as he gave his orders toadvised Cyru:; "not to adopt such plans only those to whom he assigned their places, headdressed each of them by name. This as you have been taught, but to be yourself a Cyrus was enabled to do by giving his at contriver of stratagems. . . . "40 Likewise tention to it; for he tho:Ight it very strange,on planning we might well remember his if, while artificers know the names .of their"Consider at night what your men shall do tools, each in his own art, and a physician when it is day; and consider in the day how knows the names of all the instruments andmedicines that he uses, a general should bematters may be best settled for the night."41 so foolish and not to know the names of theCyrus was also aware of the need for specommanders under him, whom he must necescificity in work assignment as well as clarity sarily use as his instruments whenever hewishes to seize on any post, to keep on guard, of instructions. In addition, he recognized to encourage his meri, or to strike terror intothe enemy; and when he desired to do '" 1. S. Watson and Henry Date, trans. Xenophon's Cyropaedia and the Hellenlcs (London: George Bell & honour to any one, he thought it becameSons, 1898), p. 41. him to address him by name. He was of" Ibid., p. 42. opinion, too, that those who thought them 183 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP selves known to their commander, would When war was over, Cyrus turned his atthus be ' more eager to be seen performing tention to the management of his empire. some honourable action, and more anxious And here, too, by recognizing that managing to abstain from doing anything that was dis an army and managing an empire are in graceful. He thought it very foolish also, when a person wished anything to be done, most respects the same, he illustrated the for him to give orders as some masters give principle of universality of management. theirs ... "let somebody go for water, let somebody cleave the wood;" for when or ders were given in such a manner, all the UNIFORM MEmODS ~ servants seemed to him to look one at anAnother illustration of the prevalence of other, and no one to execute what was or motion study is found in an anonymous trea dered; and while all appeared to be in fault, yet no one was ashamed or afraid on account tise on the art of war as recounted in Spauld of his culpability, because he shared the ing's Pen and Sword in Greece and Rome. blame equally with several others. For tl:ese Written in the sixth century, this treatise reasons, he named every one when he gave shows that the writer recognized the advan his orders.'" tages to be gained by using uniform methods In addition to the foregoing, Cyrus recogof performing tasks, indicating in detail how nized the need for order, placement, and unisquads are assigned to tents, and exactly and formity of actions. He was one of the first precise!~ how the men should arrange all the articles of their equipment and clothing at practitioners on record of motion study, lay out, and materials handling, as illustrated by night, so that in case of alarm they may dress the following: and arm themselves in the least amount of time and without confusion. Rations and . . . he paid the utmost attention to propriety mess equipment are placed in the middle of of arrangement. . . . The other parts of the the tent; pikes upright in the ground, witp army were so disposed, that each knew its shields leaning against them, concave side toown ground both as to dimension and posi ward the men; clothing and equipment at tion. When they are to prepare for march ing, each man packs up such baggage as each man's left in a prearranged order as he he is appointed to use, while others place it sleeps. The men are trained, in dressing and upon the beasts of burden; so that all the arming, to begin at the feet and work upbaggage carriers come up, at the same time, "... so that no piece of equipment, already to the baggage appointed to them to carry, and all, at the same time, place it, severally, put on, shall interfere with the adjustment of upon their beasts. So that the same time a later piece."44 sufficies for one and for all the tents tu The special interest of military history toremove. . . . The case is the same with re gard to the pitching of the tents. In order, the student of management, of course, does too, that everything necessary may be done not lie in the character of its objectives, at its proper time, it is appointed to each which have no parallel in other fields, butman, in like manner, what he is to do· and rather in the efficiencies that have grown out by this means, the same time suffices f~r do~ ing things in one part and in all . . . [Italics of the nature of this objective. Many of these are mine.]"' have direct management applications. Of particular interest is the development of the He was also cognizant of the principles of staff system of organization. division of work, unity of direction or command, order (a place for everything and evSTAFF PRINCIPLE erything in its place) , and recognized the The staff principle in military organization need for teamwork, coordination, and unity is as old as war itself. Great individual comof purpose in his organizations. In fact, he manders attained outstanding victories, but placed greatest emphasis upon this principle. their success was largely dependent upon the ••Ibid., p. 1S3. "0. Spaulding, Pen and Sword In Greece and Rome "' Ibid., p. 267. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1937), pp. 102-3. 184 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER thinking done by them before battle-staff enced the ideas of Hannibal, Caesar, Frederplanning. Where major forces were involved, ick, and Napoleon. In fact, by the time of not even martial geniuses were endowed with Caesar the military mind was able to differ sufficient physical and mental capability to entiate between intelligence and operational attend to all the details incident to the orgafunctions, a significant development in the evolution of the concept of staff in organizingnization, administration, maintenance, and During the early seven field operations of an army. Instead, the military forces. teenth century Gustavus Adolphus took commander's staff helped in formulating plans, putting them in writing, and coordithese contributions and added some touches of his own, with the result that many histori nating the subordinates in their activities. ans date modern warfare from his period.48The first significant indication of the use If we compare the management of inof the staff system occurred during the reign dustrial organizations with that of war maof Alexander the Great (336-323 B.C.). Alchines we shall find the conditions vital toexander commanded one of the greatest mili tary machines in all history through thirteen managerial success markedly similar. There is the same man with his needs, motivations, years of continuous campaigns that extended over all the then known world. Genius that and feelings; the same protection is required he was, not even Alexander would contend against carelessness, laziness, jealousy, fear, that his pageant of conquest was a one-man and selfishness; and the·· same reliance is placed upon intelligence, initiative, energy, show. Although his command was a highly and loyalty. For success in management apersonalized one, the basis of his organizaplan is essential and the preparation of ation was a group of officers who were under his personal direction. Today we would call completely coordinated plan requires collective and coordinated staff effort. Discipline, them chiefs of staff, adjutants, and aides-de camp. Although we have no clear-cut dedelegation of authority, and recognition of line and staff distinctions-all important in scription of their duties, evidence clearly indicates that each was entrusted with a spemanagement-have been borrowed in many cific function. Hephaestion, for example, was instances from the military. In fact, the mili often charged with the matters of supply; tary's contribution to the science of organiza Diades was the engineer; and Laomendon tion is its greatest single legacy to manage served as provost marshal. As Tarn puts it ment. ". . . Alexander had about him a body of Question for Reflection and Discussion men of high position . . . , these men acted as an informal council."45 1. How did Cyrus use the phrase, ''use as his instruments"? Alexander's military methods and his or ganization and management of his men influ .. J. D. Hittle, The Military Stall (Harrisburg: Mllltary.. W.W. Tam, Alexander the Great (Cambridge Univer sity Press, 19S7), p. 12. • Service Co., 1949), p. 36. 185 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING P Essential Characteristics of Military Management and Organization Until 1900 By John R. Beishline. Reprinted by permission from Military Management for National Defense. New York: Prentice-Han, Inc., 1950. Copyright 1950 by Prentice-Hall, Inc. John R. Beishline, Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1949, is chairman of the Department of Management at Washington Square College of New York University. A graduate of the US Military Academy in 1931, Dr. Beishline served in the US Army from 1931-1955. Among other positions in the Army, he served as Special Assistant and Military Advisor to the Supreme Commander of NATO in 1952-53 and as Commanding General of Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1954-55. B ACK in the primitive beginnings of human life on this planet such things as military management had no place in the scheme of things. There were no armies. Any conflict that did develop among men was of the bodily contact type-individual against individual-and the crudest of weapons were employed. However, when tribal life developed and grew out of these misty beginnings the first signs of management and organization began to appear. Tribe fought tribe for supremacy, and with this group action in combat came the more fundamental and basic problems of management. As warfare passed from the tribe and leader to more complex types, these basic problems began to clarify and assert themselves. Some writers maintain that the first" armies to exist as organizations were those of the Egyptian Pharaohs at approximately 3,000 B.C. There is some doubt of the veracity of this statement, and it is probable that these so-called armies actually were no more than defending groups for combating the raids on the fertile lands of the Nile valley. However, with the growth and civilization of their Empire, the Egyptians turned to conquest and expansion. Thus, the first organized national army came into existence about 1600 B.C. and was used by Thothmes I as an instrument of national policy in conquering Palestine and Syria. The most notable managerial achievement of this and subsequent Egyptian armies was the introduction of logistical agencies. As an innovation, what came to be known as "scribes of the army" were added. Such scribes were officers of senior rank who were assigned to both troops and to headquarters. Their primary duties were as specialists in the fields of supply and transportation. The declining years of the Egyptian Empire were marked by the rise of Assyria, which was an aggressive and ambitious nation. The Assyrian military prowess reached its highest level under Sargon II (772-705 B.C.) and his son Sennacherib (705-681 B.C.). The organizational contribution of the Assyrian armies was their development of specialist groups. From a military point of view, the horse was just coming into use about this time, and the Assyrians developed the use of cavalry to be employed separately from the foot troops. They also differentiated separate groups of heavy andJight archers, and mounted bowmen. Their siege tactics reveal the use of siege artillery and groups of certain other specialists, such as engineers and demolition experts. The Assyrians also utilized logistical planning and extended it to include the use of supply dumps, storehouses, and arsenals. The Persians were the next people to ascend to power, and again, their position was 186 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER due to their military strength. The greatest of equipment with specialists to handle it and the Persian rulers was Darius I (521-485 the use of artillery to cover the crossing. B.C.). It was with the armies of Darius that There were no appreciable advances in the field of military management between the planning and coordination began to take a prominent spot. His coordinated land and death of Alexander the Great and the rise to power of Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.). Caesea operations required careful planning and sar employed a great many of the managerial coordination. The germ of operational plan ning as a staff agency was thus sown. This practices developed by Alexander and his father Philip. However, under Caesar the in innovation was at variance with previous thought, which considered planning and telligence function emerged as a distinct staff function in the person of "speculatores" whocommand to be a single entity located only were charged with gathering information. in the mind of the commander. There were ten of these officers assigned to The military power of Darius I was checked by the Greeks at Marathon in 490 each Roman legion. Caesar's military organiB.C., and the Persian r&ilitary might was fization supplied one further point of interest nally reduced by the Grecian states at Salin the person of the "quaestors." These offiamis in 480 B.C. This victory gave rise to cers performed the supply function in Caethe great Macedonian rulers, Philip II sar's legions and it is from them that the (382-336 B.C.) and his son, Alexander the current military term of "quartermaster" Great (356-323 B.C.). Whereas Alexanoriginated. der's fame as a military genius outshone that Caesar's organizational efficiency seemed to decline in other military organization until of his father Philip II, it is in Philip that the the end of the Middle Ages. One exceptionstudent of military management will have the came in the person of the great Byzantine greater interest. Philip constructed the mili tary machine that Alexander later employed general Belisarius (505-565 A.D.). Al with such brilliance. In this machine, Philip though Belisarius continued to practice and perfect the organizational principles of Caeincorporated much from the earlier armies of the Grecian states which, in turn, had sar in the utilization of large armies, his adopted a great deal from the Persian arpractices were restricted to the Byzantine Empire and were not generally reflected mies. However, Philip improved these earlier organizational concepts. He is perhaps best throughout Europe in which feudalism was known for his improved staff organization, the prevailing way of life. Consequently which Alexander later enlarged upon with there were no organizational developments such efficiency. Philip introduced a hospital of any significance until about the fourteenth organization as a regular part of the military century. forces, as well as a provost marshal charged At that time there began to appear in with over-all maintenance of discipline. He Italy groups of professional armies known brought the organization of the engineers to as "the Campagnies di ventura," each of which was commanded by a "condottiere." a higher state of effectiveness and improved the supply and transportation areas. As a reThe constant wars between the Italian cities of the day created a continual demand for sult, when Alexander assumed charge of the military forces created by his father, a staff, these groups. Since these armies fought for which handled most of the duties charged to the highest bidder it was necessary that they a modern staff, was provided him. He elabomaintain a high state of efficiency. With this in mind, they tried to pattern their organiza rated on his father's organization by introtion after Caesar and other Roman military ducing the personnel function, through utilization of a Promotion Board for' officers, leaders as revealed by the writings of Roman and by providing for a Signal Officer on his historians. The development of these military staff. Numbered among Alexander's further groups is very important from' an organizacontributions was his portable river-crossing tional point of view because it signified the 187 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP end of feudalism and a reversion to the use of large, well-organized armies. Following in the footsteps of the Italians, the German states developed similar professional, organized armies about the fifteenth century. These were known as "Landsknechts." Many writers believe that these Landsknechts marked the beginning of modern military organization and operation. They certainly did mark the end of the feudal system in so far as military organization is concerned, and ushered in again the rule of the well-organized professional army, the thread of which continues down to the present day. The Landsknechts' organization provided for practically all of the functions of a modern army. For the first time a staff organization was provided for the regiment. This organization was very similar to the modem regimental staff. One interesting aspect of the staffs of the Landsknechts was the position of the Quartermaster. He occupied a much more prominent staff position than does the modern Quartermaster because he was not only charged with supply ·but also with billeting, troop movements, and intelli gence. Toward the end of the sixteenth century the French professional armies reached a high state of efficiency. However, these "Companies d'Ordonnance" differed from their German counterparts in that organizational and staff duties were differentiated to a far greater extent. For example, under the French system, the Quartermaster did not occupy the prominent position that he did under the German system. In fact, the· function of intelligence was established as a separate agency as in the days of the Roman staff. With the close of the sixteenth century it became apparent that changes in the operation and organization of the fighting forces must be forthcoming because of the increased use of artillery and firearms in warfare. The first to recognize the new problems was Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625) of the Netherlands who was the son of William of Orange. Maurice introduced the specialization required in each arm, such as artillery, in order to obtain the greatest value, and he brought siegecraft to a new. state of perfec tion. Because he realized that the new kind of warfare required a much higher degree of flexibility in organization and methods of op eration, he made necessary changes in these areas. Since he was a great student of the Roman military organization, much credit must be given this source for his inspiration. However, the greatest military figure of the time was Gustavus Adolphus ( 15941632), King of Sweden from 1611 to 1632. A great many authorities date modern warfare from his time, but he was greatly influenced in his thinking by the old German Landsknechts and by his immediate contemporary, Maurice of Nassau. Gustavus Adolphus used a highly disciplined national standing army, divided into small closely coordinated and mobile units equipped with greatly improved firearms, against the mer cenary forces of Europe and was universally victorious. He is famous not alone for his tactical brillance, but also for his managerial methods and organizational genius. He employed the basic regimental organization of the Landsknechts, mentioned earlier, with a few embellishments, and more or less standardized this organization throughout his forces. However, at his own headquarters he included certain special staff officers, in addition to those possessed by the regiments. For example, he utilized his chiefs of artillery and engineers as his staff officers in addition to their duties as chiefs of their respective branches. He established Intelligence as a separate staff function at his headquarters but not at the lower echelons. He also insisted on adequate logistical planning and developed a supply organization that was very similar to those current in the army of today. In fact, many of his greatest victories were directly attributable to his logistical talents. Much of .our modem system of courtsmartial can be traced to the courts-martial system that Gustavus Adolphus put into effect at Riga in 1621. Since most of Gustavus' campaigns were conducted on the basis of religious crusades it follows that religious du 188 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER delegated authority in military organization ties would occupy a prominent spot in his military organization. Thus, he was the first has been lengthened by increases in the num to introduce the office of Chaplain as an inber of subordinate units. tegral part of the military forces. Following Following the French Revolution, Napoleon I (1769-1821) brought the principle of the death of Gustavus Adolphus in 1632, his managerial methods permeated the Eurodecentralization to a highly perfected state and adopted it as one of his military princi pean armies for the ensuing 300 years. From the preceding discussion, it is eviples. This principle played a large paf! in dedent that no one individual developed the feating the Prussians at Jena in 1806. The highly trained and disciplined Prussian Armysupply function, the staff, or any other milioperated strictly within the established mili tary function. Rather, modem military man agement is the result of many contributons tary principles, which definitely dampened passed down and improved with the passage their initiative, whereas Napoleon's army op of time. One common thread appears to link erated under the principle of maximum de history together: A military commander centnilization and delegation of authority. must be assisted by certain specialists in the When Napoleon assigned a mission to his performance of his duties. Thus the comsubordinate commanders, he always dele mand and staff relationship became more gated sufficient authority to enable them to clear with the passage of time down through accomplish it with a maximum of efficiency the ages. Because modem armies are chiefly and initiative. This principle has been singu the result of an elaboration and refinement larly effective since the era when it was pos sible for a military commander to observeof the principles of Gustavus Adolphus, an effort will now be made to trace only the depersonally the entire field of battle. Military beginnings of functional differen velopment of current specific military mantiation. The principle of functional differenagement principles as they were unfolded in tiation is one of great importance to military the years subsequent to Gustavus. Early use of the principle of decentralizamanagement. A function may be described tion. The principle of decentralization and as an activity thatis necessary for the contin uance of an organization and that can bedelegation of authority made its first appear ance during the French Revolution in 1789. clearly distinguished from other activities. Briefly, this principle means that· responsibilFunctional differentiation is the process of ity for actions and the necessary authority classifying functions according to their separate activities. Perhaps the first functional are decentralized to the commanders and units responsible for the actual performance differentiation was made by the Assyrians when they mounted a soldier on a horse and of the actions to the maximum extent conthus gave birth to the cavalry. The differen sistent with the retention of control necessary by the higher headquarters. For example, a tiation of the function of the mounted soldier from that of the foot soldier was, in fact,great amount of the responsibility and au thority of a regimental headquarters is defunctional differentiation. Alexander the Great recognized artillery as a separate func centralized and delegated to each of its battion, particularly in his river-crossing operatalions. tions. As pointed out earlier in this chapter,Divisions and brigades, together with their subsequent armies have differentiated spesupporting units, were definitely and clearly cialist groups of combat troops until finallyestablished as such. It is pointed out that the the staff has become differentiated into itsdivision of that day was not so large as the current division. The army corps of that era various specialist phases. In 1796, Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff in Italy, published corresponded more closely to the division of an important paper on the functional differtoday. The principle of decentralization· is entiation and operation of Napoleon's staff. sometimes described as the Military Scalar This was followed in 1801 by The MemoirsChain, which simply means that the chain of 189 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP of Baron Thiebault by Paul Thiebault, one cline. Even though the General Staff concepof Napoleon's adjutants. Thiebault covered tion originated with Frederick, its ascenthe operation and functioning of Napoleon's dency to a key position commenced with thestaff in detail. The organization and operalessons learned from the French during thetion of many current armies are undoubtedly Napoleonic Wars, which resulted in thegreatly influenced by the above publications. crushing defeat of the Prussian Army at JenaThe development of the General Staff. in 1806.When the term, "General Staff," first came In 1807 Scharnhorst began rebuilding theinto existence in the seventeenth century it German General Staff. He instituted periodsreferred to the general officers of the army. of staff training for officers . destined for staffSubsequently, however, it came to mean staff duty and also formulated the rule that staffadvisers and planners of a military com officers were required to return to troop dutymander. This modern conception of the Genperiodically. This latter rule prohibited theeral Staff was developed almost simultaneformulation of a permanent staff officer ously by two great military minds following clique and insured the perspective of thethe close of the Seven Years' War troop officer in the planning and considera(1756-1763). Curiously enough, Frederick tions of the general staff. Scharnhorst'sthe Great of Prussia, who was one of them, protege, General von Clausewitz ( 1780and Pierre de Bourcet of France, who was 1831 ) , did much to implement ·the Scharnthe other, were enemies in this conflict. But horst principles and also preserved them both appreciated the worth of a General for posterity through his military masterStaff in its modern meaning and it is debatapiece, On War. Clausewitz conceived thatble who was the actual father; Frederick in "the General Staff is intended to convert thehis history of the Seven Years' War, or ideas of the commanding general into orders, Bourcet in his Prinicipes de Ia guerre de not only conveying the former to the troops, montagnes. but also working out all matters of detail,Napoleon undoubtedly made use of Bourthus relieving the general from a greatcet's military wisdom, but because he was amount of trouble." This embodies the prinsuch a great military genius, the General ciple that the General Staff is the commandStaff concept did not agree very well with his er's alter ego and performs a service of faciliconception of the conduct of war. He pretation. But it remained for Count vonferred to depend almost entirely upon his Moltke, as the Prussian Chief of the Generalown plans and judgment, and hence, was inStaff in the· Franco-Prussian War, to give clined to operate without utilizing his staff tothe maximum. Thus, practically all advisory practical application to the principles ofstaff service in the French Army disappeared Scharnhorst and von Clausewitz. Thus theunder Napoleon, and the French General General Staff concept as it exists in modernStaff went into a period of recession. The inmilitary organization came into permanentfirm condition of the General Staff was unbeing....doubtedly greatly responsible for the poorshowing of the French armies in the FranQuestions for Reflection and Discussionco-Prussian War of 1870. I. Describe the main contributing factor to theThe German General Staff began to asdevelopment of military staffs. sume a potent position about the same time 2. Why would a military commander want toas the French staff went into a period of de-delegate his authority? 190 ",'-' "<'•••• READINGs-cHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER READING Q· Ea~ly Development of Management Thought By George R. Terry. Reprinted by permission from Principles of Management.. Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968. Copyright 1968 by Richard D. Irwin, Inc. George R. Terry, PhD., author of the recently published a nd well-received Principles of Management (1968), has been Professor of Management in the Northwestern University School of Business and Management Consultant at the University of Chicago for over twenty years. His long list of publications include Case Problems in Business and Industrial Management (1952); Introduction to Business (1962); Management Office Services (1966); Office Automation (1966); Office Management and Control (1966); and Office Systems Procedures (1966). E ARLY CIVILIZATIONS west of Mesoprovements in management could be atpotamia and the writings of the Egyptained. A number of men contributed to this tians extending back to around 1200 B.C. indicate knowledge and use of :q~anagement for movement. For example, Charles Babbage, a guiding political affairs. Likewise, the history professor of mathematics at Cambridge University in England, advocated as early as the of ancient Greece and that of the Roman first half of the 19th century that accurateEmpire gives much evidence of managerial data obtained from rigid investigation be utiknowledge, especially in the area of courts, lized in the managing of an enterprise. Heoperation of government practices, army orwanted work measurement, cost determinaganization, unity of group efforts, and estab -lishing authority. In addition, throughout the tion, and wage incentives. The following history of Western civilization the church has quotation is of interest: contributed to the knowledge of management Babbage found, by visiting many factoriesby means of developing a worldwide, classiin England and France, that manufacturerscal organization structure and by the effecwere wholly unscientific-that most 'of their tive use of authority in managerial work. work was guesswork. He found, to his great Until about the middle of the 18th censurprise, that factories were run by tradi tional methods. He discovered that manufac tury, the people of western Europe used basturers made little use of science or mathe ically the. same methods and implements of matics, and that they relied upon old opinions production that had been used for nearly instead of investigations and accurate knowl twenty centuries. Then, within a few decades edge.' a series of inventions was discovered, and BASIC CONCEPTS OF MANAGEMENT the whole picture of industrial activity was enormously altered. This new period, comFrederick W. Taylor, who lived during the monly referred to as the Industrial Revolulast half of the 19th century and the first part tion, brought about the greater utilization of of the 20th century, contributed enormously machines, · the centralization of production to the fund of management knowledge. He activities, the establishment of new embelieved a major difficulty was the lack of an ployer-employee relationships, and the sepaexpression by managers of what they exration of consumers from producers. Under pected and of the employees knowing and these new condition~, the customary means of understanding what this expectancy was. The establishing and achieving objectives were not 1 Herbert N. Casson, Creative Thinkers (New York:entirely satisfactory. The belief grew that im-B. C. Forbes Publlsblng Co., 1929), p. 180. 191 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP answer to this question was needed: What constitutes an honest day's work? If this could be determined, it would serve as a basis of mutual understanding and form a center around which better management could be built. Hence, Taylor conducted extensive studies of all components of production: observing, measuring when possible, and relating the contributions of each component. His was a precise analytic approach of proving or disproving definite hypotheses or assumptions by means of controlled experimentation. For the most part, Taylor and his followers emphasized the mechanical and physiological character of management, a view which was destined to be challenged as management thought developed. Henri Fayol, a French contemporary of Taylor, also contributed significantly to management thought and development. Fayol, frequently referred to as a "traditionist," was a successful industrialist of a steel and coal combine. He was a vital management pioneer in that he made universal generalizations about management based on his keen insight and practical management experience. He provided a broad and inclusive perspective of management and supplied a framework about which management thought could be developed. Unfortunately, his significant contributions were somewhat beclouded until1949, when the English translaof his book became widely available. CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT mOUGHT During the early 1930's, increasing stress was being given to the idea that people are the important consideration in management, that objectives are established and achieved with and through people. Hence, the important concept in the study of management should be human beings, their work environment, and interpersonal relations. These considerations were stressed in the famous Hawthorne studies in the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric and are generally considered the classical initiation of a new development in management thought. The importance of leadership and of human relations was emphasized, and the strong belief developed that the contributions of the behavioral sciences such as psychology and sociology were essential in manoagement study. Since about 1950, finother approach to management has won favor. It is the use in management of mathematics or the emphasis given to quantitative methods of analysis. Numerical data had long been used in management, but the application of mathematics and statistics represented a new approach to the subject. These quantitative approaches take many different forms.. For example, mathematical symbo's and relationships, as exemplified by algeoraic equations, can be employed to represent basic relationships of factors bearing on ~ problem and to solve this problem in terms of selective objectives. In addition, the sau piing theory of statistics can be extremely helpful in solving certain types of management problems. Likewise, the theory of probability can be used advantageously in reaching certain managerial decisions. Another broad classification of management thought is that characterized by concentration on the making of decision. Advocates with this point of view stress analysis of the decision-making process, the persons involved in the decision, the environment· in which the decision must be made, and the implementation bf the decision recommended or to be .followed. In other words, the decision provides the nucleus around which management revolves and can be studied. Still other students of management believe that the most us~ful means for management study is the systems approach. Briefly, according to this line of thought, all activities are interrelated. For example, quality control of production affects sales, machinery selection influences product determination, and inventory· is related to purchasing. The true meaning and directing of various work activities can best he comprehended and the effect of any Olle upon another or any one upon the rema.ming group of activities are best handled b~~ identifying the systems, analyzing them, a?justing and improving them 192 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER toward stated objective attainment. The network of various systems is in essence the pattern for the direction of management thought. From these various developments have emerged several major "schools of management thought" or management theories. Some are directly related to the development of a particular core of management thought while others are a modification of one or a fusion of several different managerial views. In a ba'sic study of management, it is helpful to have ac·::tuaintance with each school. Questionsfor Reflection and Discussion 1. Why does the great majority of managemr.nt literature come from the twentieth century? 2. Why did people use about the same methodsand implements of production for twenty centuries? READING R Changing Patterns in Management Theory By. David I. Cleland & David C. Dellinger. Reprinted by permission from Aerospace Management (Spring, 1966), published by General Electri~'s Aerospace Group. Copyright 1966 byGeneral Electric Company, Missile & Space Division. Dr. David I. Cleland, Ph.D., Ohio State University, is on the faculty of the Graduate School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania. Previously as a faculty member of the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, he served as a project manager in the development and acquisition of weapons systems. He pioneered a series of courses in systems managemeni for the Air Force. Dr. Cleland has written articles in Business Horizons, Harvard Business Review, and other professional business periodicals. David C. Dellinger, Ph.D., earned his B.S. degree in mechanical engineering at Duke University in 1951. In 1958 he was awarded his M.S. in industrial engineering at Stanford University. Dellinger took his Ph.D. at Stanford in 1961, majoring in the area of operations research. He is currently on the faculty of the Business Department at Duke University WEEPING technological advances since SWorld War II have wrought radical innovations in the theory and practice of management. These new concepts have profoundly affected organizational structure in industry and government, and have changed the very nature of this partnership. This article will critically analyze the socalled "qualitative"-"quantitative" dichotomy that has evolved in management thought and theory in recent years. The analysis will be performed in the context of the management roles involved in the development, acquisition and employment of weaponry.1 1 Weaponry has an identifiable life cycle, viz., four phases: conceptual, definition, acquisition and operations. This life cycle begins with an idea or concept, pro~sses through definition and production and ends when tbe weapon or system is retired from tbe operational inventoryof the Military Department. 193 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP EVOLUTION OF A DISCIPLINE • Decision-making is pervasive in the management process.Within· this century there has developed in the United States a thriving economy, fosAnalysis of these elements indicates that tered by a dynamic. revolution in technology considerable agreement exists concerning the and management thought. The professional functions and nature of the managementmanager qas influenced all sectors of our soprocess. This indicates a sense of maturing in ciety by providing skill in the management of the discipline, with promise of the develophuman and non-human resources. ment of a scientifically-based philosophy of Techniques of management have existed management. The disquieting force in mansince the beginning of man's efforts to form agement theory today is the variety of aporganized groups for attaining mutual objecproaches which are appearing from parochial tives. The systematic examination of manareas. There are tendencies to formulate disagement thought, and the development of a tinct approaches to management, therebydiscipline devoted to codifying principles and neglecting the inter-disciplinary nature of the developing a theory has been for the most management process. The various appart, a product of the twentieth century. proaches to management theory include at least four schools.11 MEANING OF MANAGEMENT Traditional School Management is a distinct process or activity concerned with the achievement of objecFounded by Henri Fayol, this approach tives. It may be expressed in a number of highlights the management process of getting different ways, viz., " ... the task of crethings done through people in organizedating the internal environment for organized groups. Management is viewed as a universal effort to accomplish group goals. In coordiactivity by this group, with the principles nating group activity, the manager plans, orthereof holding true whether the group be a ganizes, staffs, directs and controls."2 Ralph business, government, military, or other or C. Davis of the Ohio State University defines ganization. Scholars in this field have somemanagement as " . . . the function of execdisagreement concerning the various organ~cutive leadership anywhere."3 The USAF defunctions of the manager; however, there IS fines management as the process of organiznearly complete agreement that planning, oring and using resources to accomplish predeganizing and controlling are the priuJ.arytermined objectives.4 Other definitions of functions of the manager. The traditionalmanagement express fundamentally the same school centers around these ideas:thought as reflected above. Throughout most definitions of management, however, one • Organizations function as an integrated enfinds certain universal elements, viz. : tity on a vertical basis. • A strong superior-subordinate relationship is required to preserve unity of command • Management is a distinct process dealing and to ensure unanimity of objective. with group activity. • An objective is involved. • Individual functional managers are pa • The objectives are achieved through estabrochial (and rightly so). lishing salient relationships between hu• Functional managers maintain lateral staff man and non-human resources. coordination to obtain integrated staff ac • Management necessitates that the manager tion.relinquish the tendency to perform things • Organizational groups have a basic dichot for himself, and accomplish objectives omy, viz., line and staff. through working with others in the group situation. • Several authors have described the schools of manage ment theory. The article, "Making Sense of Management • Koontz, Harold and O'Donnell, Cyril, "Principles of Theory " by Harold Koontz, Harvard Business Review Management," (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 1. (July-August 1962), is a primary source of material for the ensuing discussion of the "schools" of management. a Davis Ralph C., "The Fundamentals of Top Manage ment," (Harper & Bros., Publishers, New York, 1951), p. 6. However, responsibility for the addition of the systems school in the present article belongs to the authors. • Air Force Manual 25-1, OcL lS, 1964, p. 2. 194 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER • A scaler chain of authority relationships exists within the organization, ranging from the ultimate authority to the lowest rank, with the line of authority following every link in the chain. • An employee should receive orders from one superior only. • Work progresses among relatively autonomous functional units of _an organization. Human Behavior School During the early days of the founding of the management discipline, primary emphasis centered around scientific management at the shop level. The employee was viewed as an instrument of employment to be utilized as efficiently as possible in production. The scientific selection and training of workmen, the establishment of optimum work quotas, and the neglect of the human element of management caused a revisionist movement in the period following the 1929 depression. This movement revolutionized.. management thinking by focusing attention on the elements of job and work satisfaction as related to the human-relations part of employment. The human behavioral view of management places heavy emphasis on the interpersonal relations that exist in the management situation, and is heavily oriented in the theories presented by the psychologists and sociologists. Perhaps more so than the traditional school, this approach is based on the thesis that managing is getting things done through people, with the primary focus resting in the motivating function of management. Mathematicai School (so~etimes called "quantitative" management) This school includes those theorists who emphasize the use of mathematical models in managerial decision-making. The best known group comprising this school include the operations researchers· and management scientists who emphasize quantitative analysis in decision-making. This group supports the idea that the essence of management· is decision making, a process which can be expressed in terms of mathematical symbols and relationships. Mathematics then logically has a place in management, through the requirement for objectivity and abstract reasoning. To label this school mathematical, however, is actually a misnomer. Systems Approach ( This most recent school opines that traditional management philosophy is pervaded with vertical flow of authority and responsibility relationships and emphasizes parts and segments of the organization. According to the systems school, the traditional approach does not place sufficient import on the inter-relationships and integration of activities involved in the total management system. The systems concept provides a .way of thinking about the management process. It presents a theoretical framework for viewing the internal and external environmental factors as integrated into the whole. Explicit in this concept is the interdependency of decisions between all parts of components of the management problem. Such awareness of the system interdependency discourages provincial decisions. Each of these schools has its place in any management situation, with varying emphasis, depending on the environment. Possibly one of the greatest management challenges encountered today is in the development of weapon systems. In this complex environment we find a most unique function-that of the Project Manager (or Systems Manager). He is confronted with an unusual set of circumstances and forces that channel his thought and behavior into somewhat singular patterns of resi>onse. Today's project manager is facing an interlaced sequential managerial activity encompassing broad spectrums of authority and responsibility. The complexity of management relationships causes vast resources to be exhausted before retrenchment or redirection can be effected. Change has become a normal way of life, and the increase in the tate of change has vastly complicated the manager's decision problems. The number of alternatives which are open for consideration in the selection of weaponry has increased at a phenomenal 195 CONCEPTS Of AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP rate, and the consequences of error have become profoundly serious. Experience alone has proven inadequate for coping with these rapid changes; managers have been forced to develop better methods for making and executing decisions. The developmeht of electronic computers has made it possible to rapidly process and manipulate large quantities of data, and has made it feasible to conduct quantitative analysis heretofore impractical. The introduction of quantitative analysis into management process has manifestly changed the way we think about the management task. Managers in industry and government are beginning to recognize the tremendous potential of the computer and the quantitative tools of Operations Research as aids in the decision process. There is some evidence to indicate that a cleavage has developed between those who belong to the earlier mentioned Mathematical School and the other schools of management, primarily the Traditional School. The terms qualitative and quantitative managements have been used to indicate these two schools. It is the thesis of this article that a view of management which does not combine the contributions of these two schools in the management process is erroneous. One does not have the simple alternative of being either a qualitative manager or a quantitative manager. To formulate a philosophy of management on this basis can easily lead to the unfortunate impression that the question is one of utilizing either quantitative analysis or qualitative analysis in the management function. Such is not the case. The difference which should be emphasized is neither one of methodology nor point of view, but rather the particular aspects of the managerial problems and the degree of analysis essential to the management task. DECISION AND EXECUTION The manager's job can be viewed as a two-step process; (1) deciding what should be done, and (2) assuring that actions are taken to effect the decision. For conven ~. ience, these steps can be designated the decision process and the execution process respectively. It is quite clear that the manager must assume responsibility for both these processes. To perform only one would accomplish something less than the total management job required. The portion of the total management job comprising each of these processes varies with the job. In large highly centralized organizations, lower level managers are not given authority to make major decisions; their jobs are primarily concerned with execution. Their decisions are likely to be such that little analysis is . required; experience and policy direction provide an adequate guide to decision making. Conversely, higher level executives in large organizations depend upon an administrative apparatus for the execution process, and concentrate their attention on long-range planning and on critical and comprehensive decisions. Experience itself is often an inadequate basis for decision-making on this level; the process must be supplemented with anal ysis. Perhaps a better way of saying it is that experience and judgment must be integrated into an analytical framework, to complement the decision-making process. DIFFERENCES IN TECHNIQUES Advocates of the Mathematical School, or quantitative managers, concern themselves with analysis for decision-making, almost en tirely. They emphasize the use of a formal analysis and the use of computer technology, mathematical models and related techniques in hte decision-making process. Members of the traditional or qualitative school address themselves to the entire management prob lem, i.e., both the decision process and the execution process, but emphasize the execu tion process, possibly to the neglect of the decision process. Traditional theory has, in the main, ap proached decision making from the basis of five distinct phases: • Defining the problem. • Analyzing the problem. • Developing alternate solutions. 196 READING~HALLENGB TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER • Deciding on the best solutions. • Converting the decision into effective action. Each phase of the foregoing has several steps. What traditional theory has failed to do is provide a rigorous definition or framework for analysis, to establish criteria to assess unknowns and to require the logic and methodology of mathematics. A philosophy of management which considers quantitative and qualitative as two separate and distinct forms of management not only is erroneous and misleading but indicates a serious misunderstanding of the management process. To say that the quantitative manager considers only the quantitative aspects of management problems and that the qualitative manager evaluates just qualitative aspects of management is illogical. Management problems just don't come with their salient issues neatly divided in this manner; any aspect can be treated (perhaps inadequately) from either quantitative or qualitative methodology. The very essence of the managerial decision process is that of determining how to treat the various aspects of the problem and finding what interrelations exist between them. If there is a meaningful issue between these schools, it is the question of the depth of analysis and methodology required for adequate decision making. Traditional management theory has not emphasized analysis to the depth which can be realized through the use of mathematical logic. While traditional theory does advocate analysis, it is an analysis which is based largely on experience gained in similar situations. This is quite different from the view of analysis which a quantitative manager would take. He would advocate a tailored analytical , structure for each decision and the use of any of a number of techniques as applicable to the particular problem. Traditional management theory has its roots in a time period when the rate of change in the environment was relatively low compared to contemporary and recent past times, when it was not practical to emphasize analysis in depth for decision-making. The theory of analysis was not developed to the extent that non-mathematicians could apply it; nor were computers available to economically process the immense amount of data sometimes required to make analysis in depth feasible. Moreover, the decision problems did not generally require the depth of analysis. Experience alone did provide an adequate basis for more discussion. This is not the case today and the industrial-defense manager must develop a philosophy to keep pace with the challenge of contemporary management problems. COMBINATION OF ART AND SCIENCE Looking at the traditional framework of management, one finds that what the manager does is fundamental and universal in its application regardless of the type of organization involved-be it military, ecclesiastical, industrial, or even illegal. All managers, regardless of their level in an organization, pedorm certain basic functions directed toward the accomplishment of a predetermined goal or objective. Management has both the elements of an art and a science. As an art it requires skill in pedormance acquired through experience. As a science, management is furthered by knowledge which has been systematized and formulated through the discovery of general truths or principles. Management is a distinct field of knowledge and skills apart from technical skills such as engineering, accounting, production, procurement and the many other skills found in complex organizations. FUNCTIONS OF THE MANAGER While some disagreement exists among current academicians and practitioners, abundant evidence reflects that a manager accomplishes the planning, organizing and controlling of human and non-human resources. Planning, the most abstract of these functions, involves the determination in advance of what should be done, by whom and when the pedormance should be accomplished. Organization has to do with the procurement of human and non-human factors, the grouping and alignment of personnel and equipment and the delegation of authority 197 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP DECISIONS IN WEAPONRY SEtECTION and responsibility within the organizational structure. In the development and acquisition of Study of the organizing process includes weaponry, critical decisions must be made by recognition of the more complex system of government and industrial leaders. The deciinformal relationships which exist in any sion by the Secretary of Defe~se to begin degroup activity. Informal organization is that velopment and subsequent production of a network of personal and inter-social relationmajor weapon system, e.g., a ballistic missile, ships existing along with the formal organiinvolves forces and factors of extraordinary zatiotfal structure, but not required or proportions. Involved in the acquisition of a identified in the unit's documentation. The inweapon system are a host of divergent activiformal organization emphasizes people and ties such as research, engineering, test, prothe roles they have as granted by their peers; duction, operational support, etc., all of whereas formal organization emphasizes which are time-phased over the life of the functions, positions and specific grants of ausystem. The result is a managerial activity inthority and responsibility.6 volving the utilization of human and nonhuControlling has to do with making events man resources extending over several years. conform to plans, i.e., coordinating the acThe protracted development time on our tion of all parts of the organization according modern weapon systems and the huge comto the plan which has been established for mitment of resources involved compoun<,i.s the attainment of the objective. The manager the responsibility of the decision maker. performs all these functions somewhat conSelection of a particular weapon system today tinuously. determines to a large degree the battlefield strategy that will be employed in a future AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY war and, to some extent, our national secuPATTERNS rity. Decision making in the development of A discussion of management theory is not weapons encompasses manifold factors, of complete without an examination of the recost, technology, master-scheduling, producisponsibility and authority patterns involved bility, maintainability, reliability, as well as in the management relationship. Authority operational suitability in the intended operaand responsibility constitute the legal frametional environment. Moreover, there is a work of management. Authority is defined as critical interdependence between the inthe right derived from some legitimate dustrial and defense participants involved in • · source to direct the efforts of others in a such decisions. common endeavor. It is the power to act. In this complex management problem ~!e In the long-range effort, however, a manthe roots of the two major innovations in or ager must have that authority which comes extensions of traditional management theory from the acceptance and respect which his discussed here, i.e., project management and subordinates have for him. Only formal authe extensive use of quantitative analysis for thority can be delegated; one cannot delegate decision-making. A project management influence. All that can be done is to assure structure is superimposed upon the functhat the manager has those environmental tional organization of the parent unit, to proconditions which encourage the acceptance vide a focal point for the decision and execuof authority by subordinate personnel. Aution phases of management. The nature of thority is more meaningful when it relates to the management job in weapons acquisitionthe individual's ability to build alliances has forced the integration of project managewithin his environment and to resolve conment innovations and quantitative analysis in flicts within the organization. a framework of traditional management • See ''Human Relations at Work," by Keith Davis (Mctheory. Organizational theory and manage Graw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1962) for an excellentdiscussion on the phenomenon of the informal organizament principles provide a basic guide to tion. 198 READINGS-CHALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER planning, organizing and controlling human and nonhuman resources; while analysis and the accompanying use of quantitative methods provide for objectivity and the systematic and rigorous examination of the alternatives from which the manager has to choose. The truly significant result of this relationship has been the recognition that the execution aspects of management cannot be separated from analysis. A new breed of manager . has been created to meet the challenge of this unique problem of total management, one who combines the talents of the traditional manager with those of the analyst. It is superficial to view the schools of management introduced earlier as separate approaches to the management problem, or as several types of management. If they must be discussed separately at all, they should be viewed as segments of the integrated whole, segments which complement each other to fulfill that comprehensive management phi losophy required of today's manager. QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF MANAGEMENT The central theme of the quantitative segment of management is the use of a formal analytical framework in the decision-making process, usually involving the use of quantitative methods. The strongest proponents of quantitative analysis for management decisions are asso ciated with organizations which carry a num ber of different titles. The most popular are Operations Research, Management Science and Systems Analysis. What these various approaches have in common, and what is most relevent to man agement decision-making, is: (1) a sensible approach to decision problems; (2) the use of a formal analytical framework; (3) the explicit statement of the criterion of choice or goals involved; and (4) a systematic com parison of the alternatives and a methodol ogy for dealing with the risks and uncertain ties always involved in such problems. The use of a formal analytical structure requires that one look very carefully at the nature of the decision problem. Explicit statements must be made about the relationships which exist (or are believed to exist) among the variables involved. One must differentiate between those variables over which he has control and those which are functions of forces external to his control. One of the most useful results of such structuring is that it not only requires the decision-maker to state what is known about the problem, but it also requires him to recognize what he does not know about it. ,' EXAMPLE OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS Consider, for example, the problem of deciding whether the Air Force should go ahead with plans for the development and production of a new transport aircraft, one which offers a distinct advantage over the presently used aircraft in terms of speed, payload or some other operating advantage. To arrive at a sensible answer to this problem, the decision-maker must obtain information about a multitude of relevant factors and determine their proper bearing on the decision. Several significant questions are posed: How will the transport be utilized? What would be the added transport capability resulting from the addition of such an aircraft to the transport fleet? What will be the impact on costs in the long run of the alternatives of developing or not developing the proposed aircraft? When· Will this proposed aircraft be available, and what is the expected airlift requirement for the same period? These and many other pertinent factors which .have a bearing on the problem are obviously not independent of one another, nor do they deserve equal consideration. The variables over which the decisioru-maker has control, the specification for the pircraft design, the operating and maintenance policies, the number to be purchased, etc., all must be considered in their many combinations simultaneously with the possible values over which the decision-maker has neither control nor exact knowledge. The actual requirements for airlift which will exist in the future, the technological bottlenecks or break 199 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP throughs which may occur, the costs which to the decision-maker. It is apparent that will accrue and many other considerations when used in this way computers and mathecomplicate the decision-maker's task. Obmatical techniques are only tools of the trade, not the major portion of the decision viously, the relationship among these varia bles and the goals or objectives sought by the process. The really significant portion of the addition of the proposed transport aircraft to decision process is that of selecting the varia the fleet must be determined or estimated. bles and relationships involved, and the structuring of the problem, the selection of a WEIGIDNG ALTERNATIVES criterion and, of most importance, the han dling of the risks and uncertainties involved. The goals or criteria utilized by the Air This approach to decision-making would Force in its decision-making process must be hardly be feasible without the availability of compatible with, and support the goals of the computers and mathematical techniques Department of Defense and the entire gov which allow for the detailed comparison of ernment. In other words, the criteria for de many alternatives. cision must be such that they measure the contribution of the alternatives to our na ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY tional goals; this is indeed a most difficult task. Involved are questions of utility, subopProbably the most important aspect of this timization, measures of effectiveness and approach to decision-making is that it emcost. Explicit treatment of this aspect of the phasizes the careful consideration of the unproblem is essential to rational decisioncertainties and unknowns involved in the making. problem, uncertainties which are inherent in The question of criteria in our transport any decision problem. By the very nature of decisions, the decision-maker is trying to aircraft example is relatively simple when control or manipulate the future, and his de compared with the same aspect of decisioQ cision is based on predictions about the fu problems relating to tactical aircraft or infan ture consequences of several courses of ac try weapons. The1 contribution made by tion, To fail to recognize this fact and to act transport aircraft can be measured in terms as if one could predict the future with accu of quantity of payload and rate of delivery. racy would be foolish. On the other hand, Fortunately, these quantities can be related one can point out that the use of analysis de to a military ·requirement, and comparisons pends entirely upon assumptions about the can be made between a complete delivery future and the results of the analysis can be system (ships, aircraft, prepositioned stocks) no better than the set of assumptions upon which contain this transport aircraft, and the which it is based. This, too, is true and it complete delivery systems which do not con tain this aircraft. If we expect to accomplish leaves the decision-maker in a quandary. He needs to make a set of assumptions in order the same mission in either case, an obvious to apply this approach; yet he can't possibly criterion is the delivery system which costs make the correct ones. It is in this regard the least. (It should be emphasized that this that the use of the analytical approach is so choice o( criterion does not imply that we are lookiil.g for the least-cost delivery system; valuable. we are looking for the least-cost delivery sysBecause he is working with an analytical tem which will perform the mission asstructure, the decision-maker can test the signed.) sensitivity of his decision to changes in assumption. It should be noted, in view of some of the criticisms of quantitative management, that it INSIGHT THROUGH ANALYSIS is in this area of comparing multiple alternatives that mathematical methods and comAnalysis provides a great deal of insight puters make their greatest direct' contribution into the nature of the decision problem. It 200 READING~HALLENGE TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICER focuses attention on the important variables and identifies the areas where subjective judgment is required. It avoids the mixing of relevant and irrelevant information and tends to reduce the amount of emotionalism involved in such decisions. Subjective judgments must still be made, but this approach pinpoints the factors to be judged and clearly states what judgments were utilized in the analysis-leaving them to be challenged and defended if need be. The structure of the problem allows an individual who is not an expert in all aspects of the problem to inject his judgment in those areas where his expertise is valid, without attempting to relate to the other factors about which his knowledge is limited. It allows a specialist, for example, to make judgments based on this background in his specialty without becoming involved in questions of technology, cost, or· politics. He is not required to make recommendations as to whether a certain weapon should be bought or not (which implies a decision on his part) but to forecast the operational consequences of the use of such a weapon. Q'(JANTITATIVE ANALYSIS MISUNDERSTOOD Invariably in a discussion of this approach to the decision-making process of management a number of criticisms arise. This technique, like any other, has its shortcomings b~t many of these criticisms are based on misconceptions. Among the aspects of quantitative analysis for decision-making which appears to be generally misunderstood is the use of Cost Effectiveness studies in the Department of Defense. There is a tendency to equate Cost · Effectiveness with a decision procedure which selects the cheapest system. The truth of the matter is that Cost Effectiveness studies, a particular form of quantitative analysis used throughout the Department of Defense, does not mean that at all. It means taking the least-cost 1\J.temative of those alternatives which· are equally effective. There is quite a difference in the two. statements, and one would have great difficulty in arguing against the latter. This should not be interpreted as an over emphasis on cost, or as assigning first priority to cost, and second to effectiveness, but of balancing cost with effectiveness, at least conceptually. Itmerely says what our military and civilian leaders have said all along, "Let's do our job, but let's do it at the lowest cost." The difference is that quantitative analysis allows us to attempt to find the lowest cost way of doing the job. Without such analysis, these words are without meaning. DEMANDS ON THE TOTAL MANAGER The job that we have outlined here for the total manager is not an easy one. We are insisting that he not only be an expert in traditional management practices, but also that he have some competency in quantitative analy-:sis. He cannot afford to view qualitative vs. quantitative as two distinct types of management but must accept them as segments of the whole which complement each other. Only a management philosophy developed on the basis is adequate for today's defense-industrial management task. REFERENCES Koontz, Harold and Cyril O'Donnell, "Principles of Man· agement" (McGraw-Hill Book Co.), 1964. Davis, Ralph C., "The Fundamentals of Top Management" (New York, Harper & Bros.), 19Sl. Air Force Manual 2S-1, Oct. 1S, 1964. Koontz, Harold, "Making Sense of Management Theory" Harvard Business Review (July-August 1962). Davis, Keith, "Human Relations at Work" (McGraw-Hill Book Co.), 1962. Cleland, David 1., "The Project Manager-Manager Extraordinary," Defense Industry Bulletin (May 1965). Drucker, Peter F., "The Practice of Management," (New York. Harper & Bros.), 19S4. Quade, E. S., "Analysis for Military Decisions," R-387-PR, Nov. 1964. The Rand Corporation. Bnthoven, Alain, "Systems Analysis and the Navy," Naval Review, 1965. This article Is a condensation of a paper which appeand in the January 1966 Issue of the Defense Industry Bulletin. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Compare the definition of management offered by Cleland and Dellinger with that stated in Chapter 1. 2. State the proper cause-and-effect relationship between technology and management. 201 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 3. How can an officer be both a quantitative discipline when it draws upon psychology, soand qualitative manager? ciology, mathematics, history, etc? 4. How can management be called a separate S. If you were to place the authors in a management "school," which one would you select? 202 Chapter 5 Behavioral Science and Air Force Leadership AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP is the process of influencing people, individuatty .l"l.. and in groups, to effectively accomplish organizational missions. Consequently, knowledge of behavioral science-the study of how people aCt as they do-and skill in applying the concepts of behavioral science are fundamental requisites of an Air Forceleader. · This chapter provides only an introduction to behavioral science as it relates to the Air Force. Thorough comprehension requires an in-depth study of the research which underlies the simplified version of concepts presented here. Chapter 1 suggested that a personal concept of leadership is very important because it influences how one leads. Every leader, therefore, should examine his views on leadership. The first reading selection in chapter 6 has been included to stimulate such thinking and self-examination. . . Professors Henry P. Knowles and Borje 0. Saxberg, in the article "Human Relations and the Nature of Man,"* concern themselves with the influence that some common assumptions about human nature have on our society. They recognize that this influence exists not only in organizations, but also across a wide range of institutions and forms of social control. They suggest that perhaps no other variable weighs more heavily on the ultimate form and quality of organizational and interpersonal relations. Therefore, leaders must know more about the fundamental relation between how they value men and their own organizational lives than they have known up to now. · · · · Being alert to the possible bias in our individual perceptions of human behavior helps us build a concept of human activity based on behavioral science. We.do this by looking at such topics as causation in behavior, human motivation, and the psychology of learning. CAUSATION IN BEHAVIOR The cause-and-effect relationship is a fundamental concept in human behavior. Norman R. F. Maier notes: Behavior is always the product of two things, the nature of the individual or organism that behaves and the nature of the situation in wbich the individual finds himself. The situation is a source of stimulation, and behavior is always the organism's response to stimulation from the environment. O(ten we are not aware that we have been stimulated and assume behavior is spontaneous, yet spontaneous. responses arc· more likely to be the exception rather than tbe rule.' · · · The Air Force officer must understand causation in human behavior if he is to be successful in dealing with leadership problems which arise. First he must identify the leadership problem. Once this is done, he must determine the factors which are re • See pp. 233-246. • Pqchology In Industry. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin ComPIIIIY, 1!16S), p. 2l. 203 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Figure 5-1. Perception model. lated to the problem. Two ways in which a problem solver can go about solving leadership problems require elaboration at this point. First of all, the problem can be examined in terms of what is wrong, what the symptoms of the problem are, or what appears to be the major indication that there is a problem. This approach is referred to as a symptom oriented position. Secondly, the problem can be examined from the position of looking for likely causes or antecedents to the current situation. The second approach is one which relies heavily on an understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship in human behavior. Case studies illustrating these concepts are included in the following chapter.* While a problem-solving approach is fundamentally sound and probably has the best chance of leading to valid solutions, it has at least one drawback. The problem solvers are human, and, as humans, tend to make value judgments. That is, problem solvers make judgments on the basis of their own value systems, right or wrong. Unfortunately, value judging is a very common activity which we do regularly. The person who has watched a golfer slice a ball out of bounds or into a hazard and remarked, "He is a terrible golfer," ,has made a value judgment. Or if he has become exasperated with a friend while trying to teach him something and has expressed the thought that his friend is too dumb to learn, he has made a value judgment. Judging on the basis of one's values or reacting to symptoms can create serious interpersonal behavior problems. In the reference frame that we have used to define leadership, a leader must influence people to accomplish organizational missions. When a leader reacts to symptoms, 1rather than seeking causation in behavior, he is performing his leadership role in a negative manner and inhibiting mission accomplishment. PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR Cause identification and analysis is difficult enough without distorting factors which interfere with the process. Nevertheless, distorting factors exist in nearly all problem-solving situations. One of these factors is perception-the way a person sees a given situation. Look at Figure 5-1. What does it appear to be? A vase? Two faces? A goblet? A • See pp. 273-280. 204 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Figure 5-2. Perception model. candlestick? Two boys? Two girls? Additional information is probably needed to reach an accurate conclusion. Ernest R. Hilgard and Richard C. Atkinson have defined perception as "the process of becoming aware of objects, qualities, or relations by way of the sense organs." They note that "while sensory content is always present in perception, what is perceived is influenced by set and prior experience, so that perception is more than a passive registration of stimuli impinging on the sense organs."2 Perception also has been defined as the stimulus of the moment plus experience of a lifetime. Prior experience may help the reader identify the pattern in Figure 5-2. Our purpose here is not to examine the many complex influences on perception, but to make the reader more aware of the need to be oriented to cause, rather than symptom. Once one understands the distorting effects of his perceptions, he will realize the need to use a scientific or problem-solving approach to interpersonal problems. Among the topics that might be explored further are the influences on the accuracy of interpersonal perception which, as suggested by D. Krech, R. S. Crutchfield, and E. L. Ballachey, include: (1) type of behavior, (2) low validity of value judging, (3) ease of judging some persons over others, (4) effect of friendship, (5) influence of the order in which information is received, and (6) the fact that some attributes are easier to judge than others.3 The selected bibliography at the end of this chapter suggests some additional references. PROCEDURES, DECISIONS, AND PROBLEMS If, as the previous section suggests, a leader cannot rely solely upon his perceptions to solve interpersonal difficulties, what alternatives are available? One alternative is the problem-solving approach based upon scientific analysis which has many advantages. However, to examine these advantages properly, it is necessary to define what is meant by a problem in behavioral science terms and differentiate problems from administrative procedures and normal decision making. Air Force officers have a variety of ways of getting work done. Normally, there are work methods, procedures, and routines for accomplishing tasks. There are established ways of getting things done that have the benefit of being stable, well known, efficient for large volumes of work, and simple. • Introduction to Psychology. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967.) p. 132. 8 IndlvldUDl in Society. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962.) p. 65. 205 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP N~DSOFP~N----------------~ GOAL (INCENTIVE) Figure 5-3. Motivated behavior. An Air Force officer is a decision maker. Decision making is simply the act of making a choice among existing alternatives. If the officer has some experience in a task, decision making will be relatively easy because he has probably faced most.decision situations before. In fact, if these situations recur frequently enough, decision making soon becomes a routine procedure. But what is to be done in a situation where there are no established alternatives? In some instances the decision maker will have to form alternatives himself, then select the best from among them. Forming alternatives and selecting from them is called problem solving. Problem solving also has other characteristics. In the psychological context that concerns us, a problem situation has three distinguishing characteristics: the person, the obstacle, and the goal. A problem involves a motivating situation. What does this mean? What do we suggest when we say that behavior is goal oriented, that a person's actions are motivated by his desire to reach some goal? HUMAN NEEDS People have varied and complex needs that are essentially physical and "basic." Needs for food, water, and warmth are basic. There are others. These basic needs are physiological. In short, they are internal, a part of a person's original inborn equipment. A second set of needs, more identifiable with human beings, are the re- OBSTACLE NEEDS OF PERSON GOAL (INCENTIVE) Figure 5-4. Obstacle interposed. 206. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP sul.t of learning. Needs for achievement, status, self-esteem, and sense of belonging are included in this latter category.. In addition. to having internal needs, people and other classes of animals have ex-· ternal goals. The need for food (hunger) establishes the goal of obtaining food. In human beings, these goals; incentives, rewards, or solutions may be tangible (food, money, a car) or intangible (praise, words of appreciation, sense of achievement, etc.). Needs and goals can be positive or negative. A need may be a desire to do goodwork or a fear of failure. A goal may be a word of praise or the desire to avoid condemnation. It is thought that needs and goals are the initiating and sustaining forces of behavior. In the following discussion we call all internal forces needs and . all external forces goals or incentives. Motivated behavior is goal-directed behavior. It is the interdependent, interacting relationship between needs and goals. This relationship is diagramed in Figure 5-3. A problem develops when there is an obstacle between the person and the goal, as illustrated in Figure 5-4. Initially, the obstacle forms a barrier between the person and his goal. To overcome the obstacle, a person may try a variety of behavior patterns and may succeed in finding one which circumvents or eliminates the obstacle and enables him to reach his goal. This variability is one of the dominant characteristics of problem-solving behavior. Since the structure and intensity of a person's needs are critical elements in a problem situation, it is vital that we pause to consider some general behavioral science concepts regarding these needs. Time and space permit only a cursory look at this complex subject, but the brief discussion presented here may give the reader a better understanding of human needs and their influence in behavior. No two people have exactly the same needs. Even in the same person, needs may vary in intensity.at different times. Needs are continuously developing and changing as shown in Figure 5-5, which shows one person's theoretical need for food. Since a person has a variety of needs, at a given time any one need may have dominance over others. The person may be hungry, thirsty, and. tired at the same time; however, the dominance of one of the needs would probably determine what he would do. For example, he may eat, drink, and sleep in that order. (See Figure 5-6) There have been many attempts to classify or establish a framework for under-· standing the relationship among needs. Probably the one most often cited is Abra ham Maslow's hierarchy of needs.4 In Maslow's hierarchy, human needs develop from lower to higher needs, the lower needs having to be satisfied before higher. needs develop. Thus there is a changing pattern of need dominance with certain needs more dominant at a given time. See Figure 5-7. This hierarchy includes: 1. Physiological needs, e.g. food, shelter, water. 2. Safety needs, e.g. security, law and order. 3. Belongingness and love (social) needs, e.g. affiliation, acceptance. 4. Esteem (ego) needs, e.g. recognition, respect, appreciation. S. Self-actualization needs, e.g. self-fulfillment, achieve full potential. Douglas M. McGregor, in his reading selection ''The Human Side of Enter prise,''* describes this hierarchy of needs in greater detail and relates it to the work environment. He also outlines his propositions, "TheOry X" and "Theory Y," and. explains why he believes "Theory X" to be based on erroneous assumptions. The • A. ll. Maalow, MotlvatiDn and Pn6Dnallty. (Ne\V York: Harper, 1964.) • See pp. 24lr2S2. 207 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ., 0 .e .. .e l Time Figure 5-5. Variable need for food. balance of the reading introduces some topics, such as leadership styles and the variables affecting leadership that will be considered in greater detail in subsequent chapters. Another discussion of human needs in terms of a hierarchical approach is provided by Lt Col Bob Drumm,** in the following chapter. Colonel Drumm, after discussing Maslow's approach, suggests an alternative way of viewing the needs of human beings. We should be wary of such a simplistic approach to human needs because there is great difficulty in determining which needs other people are apparently satisfying. In analyzing why a person joins a soci;2l group, we may erroneously attribute his behavior to a desire to fulfill a security need or a self-actualization need. Lest a false impression be obtained from the foregoing outline of Maslow's classification of needs, it should be made clear that he did intend for his need hierarchy to be a universal pattern typical of most people, most of the time. There may be some persons who disregard physiological and safety needs and progress to higher needs, but these are exceptions. · Another pertinent warning should be added to this discussion. As shown in Figure 5-1, Maslow did not intend to imply that any particular class of needs, e.g., security needs had to be satisfied before going to a higher level. He did believe, however, • • See pp. 2S3-2S6. 208 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Hunger t 'iii s c · 'a I z 0 Time Figure 5-6. Multiple needs. that one level of needs had to be partially satisfied before a person would attempt the next higher level. The re.ader should note that the amount of need satisfaction in Figure 5-7 is merely illustrative and may vary widely from person to person. One approach to the need theory and its relation to the Air Force is discussed in Air Force Manual 35-16, Career Motivation Program for Officers and Airmen. This manual summarizes a great many books, articles, and other writings which have attempted to relate the importance of needs to employee-job attitudes. One author suggests that man works because he must in order to survive; because he should, as an obligation to himself or to others; or simply because he wants to. This author maintains that people are moving away from the necessity of work for survival or even for a higher standard of living free from the threat of starvation. People are also moving away from the obligation approach to work because this is not a very rewarding concept. Therefore, the investigator concludes that people work because they want to-thatis; because work has meaning for them. Other social critics agree with the view that work must be meaningful or have personal relevance to the individual-it must be responsible directly or indirectly for the satisfaction of human needs. Scholars have done considerable research, both within and outside the Air Force, in the area of the personal relevance of work. Most of this research has identified factors influencing job attitudes or the effects of job attitudes on productivity, career intentions, and turnover. Generally, such research has attempted to identify factors .that either satisfy or dissatisfy the individual on the assumption that satisfaction and dissatisfaction with a job or career ate on a continuum. Researchers regarded satisfaction as the opposite of dissatisfaction, with the same factors influencing both. Figure 5-8 illustrates the application of this relationship within the Air Force. 209 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP en c:: - (0 31: 0 - ~ ..... (0 i u a; Cl en 0 CD 0 > ·u; ·.;::: (0 i~ Q) ... -a c:: (0 > CD - ·o::: ~ ~ CD .Q E ::I z Psychological development Figure 5-7. Schematic portrayal of the progressive changes in relative ialiency, number, and variety of wants as described by Maslow. Note that the peak of an earlier main class of wants must be passed before the next "higher" want can begin to assume a dominant role. Note also that as psychological development takes place the number and variety of wants increase. CAREER ATTITUDE ON A CONTINUUM (PAY, FRINGE BENEFITS INSECURITY, WORKING CONDITIONS, FAMILY SEPARATION) DISSATISFACTION <\1:~-D·E•C•R-EA•S•E-----'-NC•R•E•A•S•E-rtJ>SATISFACTION 0 0 LEAVE REMAIN IN AIR FORCE AIR FORCE Figure 5-8. 210 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP SCHEMA OF PARALLa JOB AniTUDES, FACTORS~ AND EFFECTS NOT DISSATISFIED HYGIENE FACTORS ( Deficient hygiene factors lead to dissatisfaction. Correction of deficiencies leads to no dissatisfaction.) • Pay • Policy & Administration • Supervision • Personal Life • Interpersonal Relations • Security • Working Conditions MOTIVATED (PRODUCTIVE. POSITIVE OUTLOOK TOWARD JOB AND CAREER) NEUTRAL STATE DISSATISFIED (UNPR:>DUCTIVE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK TOWARD JOB AND CAREER) figure 5-9. MOTIVATORS (Insufficient motivators result in no motivation. Increased motivators lead to motivation.) • .A:chi evement • Recognition • Work Itself • Responsibi 1ity • Advancement • Growth · ' NOT MOTIVATED Professor Frederick I. Herzberg of Case Western Reserve University provides another point of view in his reading, "The Motivation-Hygiene Concept and Problems of Manpower."* The basic theme of Herzberg's theory is that job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction are two separate and distinct attitudes, each with a different and separate set of goals and needs. The factors affecting job satisfaction differ from those primarily affecting job dissatisfaction; although both sets of factors serve as goals and both meet needs. Factors that lead to job satisfaction reward the person's need for psychological growth. Herzberg designates these factors as "motivators." Factors that prevent job dissatisfaction are called "hygiene" factors. Figure 5-9 illustrates these factors. • The selection by Dr. Herzberg should be read at this point. See pp. 257-262. 211 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP · The "hygiene" factors are conditions that surround the performance of the job. They cannot give a person the basic satisfaction he needs from his work; they do not have this potential. A person can obtain the rewards that will reinforce his aspira tions only by doing the job and performing the task. In Herzberg's theory, man's need to avoid dissatisfaction corresponds to Maslow's lower order needs of survival, security, and affiliation-his need to avoid restriction of biological and social fulfillment. His need to seek satisfaction corresponds to Maslow's higher order needs of self-esteem and self-actualization-the need for psychological growth. Instead of viewing these need~ as a hierarchy, Herzberg regards them as being parallel. The avoidance needs do not have to be satisfied for the growth needs to be active. Psychological growth is as inexorable a need in man as are biological and social growth. A man's need to get satisfaction out of what he is doing is as basic as the need to be paid well and to be treated nicely. For a man to achieve psychological growth, he must derive a maximum satisfaction from his work. For work to motivate him, it must. have personal relevance for him. Meaningful work motivates; that which is not meaningful does not motivate. The conceptual scheme formulated by Professor Herzberg is one means of diag nosing a man's relationship to his work and to his work environment. The Air Force tested the scheme in an intensive study called New View, which explored the job and career attitudes of a sample of junior officers to determine the factors leading to job and career satisfaction and dissatisfaction. This study showed that at times the Air Force has been overly preoccupied with things that decrease dissatisfaction, on the assumption that decreased dissatisfaction results in increased satisfaction. As a consequence, it has paid too little attention to factors that lead to sustained satisfaction. All of us require the motivators to meet our needs for professional development and personal growth. We have a corresponding need to avoid dissatisfaction by receiving fair treatment in compensation, supervision, working conditions, and administrative policies and practices. · The Herzberg theory provides a convenient framework on which to base a con cept of the relationship between needs, attitudes, and motivation. Once such a rela tionship is determined, appropriate action can be initiated to enhance factors that motivate and to minimize factors that dissatisfy. For example, the motivator-hy giene approach is useful for classifying and evaluating command policies and prac tices, enriching jobs, providing greater opportunity for responsibility, achievement, recognition, etc. The following paragraphs list the major motivators and hygiene fac tors relevant to the Air Force, as determined by the New View study and reported by AFM 35-16. The challenge before the Air Force leader is to stimulate maximum contributions from whose who have the most to offer. It is one of the most potentially rewarding challenges confronting him. Modvators Motivators are those factors that promote job and career satisfaction, enhance performance and personal adjustment, and result in favorable career desires. Insufficient motivators lead to ineffective and incomplete motivation. 1. AcHIEVEMENT.-A specific success or feeling of success such as: successful accomplishment of work; making a worthwhile contribution; seeing positive results of one's efforts; becoming proficient in a specialized area; attaining leadership in one's field. 212 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 2. ADVANCEMENT.-A change or improvement in status or position, progress or furtherance of one's career, such as job progression; movement into a more advanced career field; promotion in rank, completion of an Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) or service school program. 3. GROWTH.-Changes in one's situation which show evidence that the individual has enhanced his possibilities for growth; opportunity to develop one's potential to the fullest-for example, promotion to higher rank which permits attendance at senior service schools; opportunity for gaining broadening experience in one's career field or in command staff functions. 4. PATRIOTISM.-Feeling of loyalty and love for country; pride in being a .member of Air Force; esprit de corps. 5. RECOGNITION FOR ACHIEVEMENT.-An act of acknowledgement and approval for demonstrated ability or performance; praise or notice from a supervisor, higher management, a peer, general public, or any other source. Could be in form of officer effectiveness reports (OERs), written or oral communications of commendation, or medals. 6. RESPONSIBILITY.-Full charge of a job, or situation; opportunity to exercise initiative in carrying out assigned work; active opportunity to participate in command staff activities-for example, participation in a Junior Officer Council to assist the commander. 7. WoRK ITSELF.-The actual doing of the job or the tasks of the job. Involves work that is interesting, varied, challenging, adventurous, or exciting; entails work that is important or meaningful to the individual, work that corresponds to one's ability and background. Hygiene Factors Hygiene factors relate to job and career dissatisfaction; if inadequate or lacking they have a negative impact on performance, personal adjustment, and career growth. 1. INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS.-Jnteraction with peers, subordinates, or SUperiors both on and off the job; esprit of service life; work with a particular class of persons; feeling of belonging to and acceptance by service assoeiates. 2. PERSONAL LIFE.-Effect of job or career on some aspect of personal tile such as family life, standard of living, acceptance by community; providing for family's comfort, education and welfare; personal opportunities of Air Force life, such as travel and housing. 3. POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION.-That aspect of the Air Force at all organizational levels involving the adequacy or inadequacy of organization and management; harmful or beneficial effects of personnel and operational policies, procedures, and practices; presence or lack of consistent and fair policies involving assignment preferences; proper utilization of abilities and placement in job related to interests, back ground and training. 4. SALARY.-All forms of direct or indirect monetary compensation such as base pay, hazardous duty pay, and collateral benefits accruing from medical care, commissary and exchange privileges, and recreational opportunities (hobby shops, clubs, rest-recreational areas, etc.). 5. STATUS.-A sign or appurtenance associated with a job or assignment such as privileges for key personnel, missile badges, rated badges; prestige associated with being in the Air Force or with a particular rank or position within the Air Force. 213 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 6. SUPERVISION.-One's relations with those in direct or indirect control over his job or career behavior; entails technical or managerial competence or incompetence; concern or indifference; fairness or unfairness; coercion or consideration. 7. WORKING CONDITIONS.-The physical conditions of work, the amount of work, or the facilities for doing the work-for example: locale of tours, quality of equipment, working hours. Other researchers have conducted studies in the theory of human needs. One of the most comprehensive investigations bas been under the direction of Dr. Ray C. Hackman of the Psychological Service of Pittsburgh and reported in his bpok, The Motivated Working Adult.6 While Hackman concurs with Herzberg that " . . . things producing satisfaction on the job are qualitatively different from those producing dissatisfaction," he differs in his interpretation of the causes of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Specifically, Hackman suggests: The feelings reported in association · with unpleasant emotional tension, are unpleasant in tone. and generally describe frustration, aggression, or anxiety reactions. The fact that any one job condition can generate a variety of emotional responses suggests individual differences in the tendency to be generally threatened or irritated by work rather than to respond to the specific frustrations of a job. Men responding in this fashion to their work may be described as emotional in temperamental makeup rather than as hygiene seekers. These people are not seekers; they are responders. Herzberg describes men who derive satisfaction from their work as motivation seekers. The bulk of modem neurophysiological evidence on the functioning of the human central nervous system suggests that they may be described more appropriately as stimulation seekers and that their stimulation comes from either ( 1) the exercise of particular perceptual, motor, and probem-solving skills or (2) interaction with other people. Money furnishes an intermediate device through which extra work stimulation of either type can be obtained. It is reasonable to assume that the emotional tension produced in a man by his work environment is mediated by a different neurophysiological system, is essentially disruptive in character, and interferes with the stimulation-seeking activity. As far as motivating people on the job is concerned, the basic problem appears to be one of discovering how to channel a man's energy in the direction of useful work. The clues to solving this problem may very well be contained in the data collected by HerP>erg.• In his later discussion, Hackman concludes that the motivation for work either comes from the stimulation of the work itself or using work as a means of achieving rewards· unrelated to the work. 1 He also supports the existence of some hierarchy of needs of the type Abraham Maslow suggests. This is a complex subject and the reader is referred to The Motivated Working Adult for an extended discussion. Hackman concludes by saying: ' With respect to prevailing concepts, however, the findings clearly indicate that a multidimensional concept is necessary to comprehend the work motivation of men and women. No single motive or motivational pattern is central to, or sufficient to account for, the work of men and women in modem industry.•. FRUSTRATION We have seen that motivated behavior is the interaction between needs and goals, both positive and negative. This interaction can be extremely intense-there are • (New York: American Management Aasoc:latlon, 1969.) 8 Ibid. pp. ~29• • lhltl. p. 137. •Ibtd. p. 15. 214 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP OBSTACLE PERSON GOAL (INCENTIVE) (NEEDS) Figure 5-1 0. Obstacle blocks. many instances of persons under stress performing unbelievable tasks against uncountable odds. · A problem arises when there is a barrier or obstacle between the person (need) and the goal (incentive). If a person can display problem-solving or adaptive behav ior, be can overcome the obstacle by going around it, through it, or selectiQg a sub stitute goal. But what happens when these alternatives are blocked? This concept is illustrated by Figure 5-10. · Assume that a student is trying to .solve a calculus problem that is due at his .first class in the morning. To add to his difficulties, his roommate is demanding that he tum off the light and go to bed. Since there is no other place to work and the room mate wil! be equally irate if he gets up early in the morning, the student's alterna tives are blocked. As he struggles with the problem to the accompaniment of his roommate's continuing complaints, the student's frustration grows until his impulse . may be to slam the book on the floor and "deck" his roommate. ' This is an example of what frequently occurs as a symptom of frustration-aggression. Other responses to frustration may occur first, and aggression is not always the result~ but it is a typical symptom. Hostility, striking out, smashing objects, and other forms of nonconstructive behavior characterize aggression. Another .characteristic of frustration-induced aggression is displaced· hostility, often called "scapegoating." A person may be· in a position where he canilot attack the cause ofhis frustration directly-the person or object may be bigger than he is- but· be may want to, nevertheleSs. ·.If his feelings are sufficiently aroused, he may attack irrespective of the consequences, but be often takes out such frustration on another person or another object having nothing to do with the original cause of his frustration. All too often people direct their hostility at their peers or subordinates· who, in tum, may vent their aggression on their work groups. Frustration is such a common behavior problem and bas such detrimental effects in work groups that we should further examine its causes and possible cures. J. M. Sawrey has suggested three representative stimulus situations that are said to be frus trating orlead to frustration behavior. He has titled them. frustration by delay, frus tration by blocking, and frustration by conflict.9 The first two categories will be con sidered together since one isa more intensified version of the other. • J.D. Sawrey. Frrutralfon and Con/Uct. (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown PubUshers, 1969.) p. 5. 215 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Level of Aspiration Level of Performance Figure 5-11. Disparity between level of performance and level of aspiration. The upslope of the level of performance indicates improvement with practice. Fmstration by Delay or Blocking An expression often attributed to the military, but certainly not limited to it, is "hurry up and wait." Waiting can be an aggnivating and often a frustrating experience. We are accustomed to scheduling daily activities on a time basis which allows for normal delays, such as rush-hour traffic.or bad weather. We have learned to expect such delays and they affect us only as minor irritations rather than as a source of frustration. It is the unforseen delays_.:._the flat tire on the way to work, the failure of someone to keep an appointment on a matter that needed to be settled todaythat create frustration. The more complex our lives and the tighter our schedule, the more potentially frustrating delays become. A more acute form of frustration is likely to occur when some obstacle prevents us from attaining a desired goal. The obstacle may be something minor, such as the necessity to get a job done when there is a more attractive prospect in the offing, in which case, the frustration also will be minor. However, when we are blocked from a desired goal which exceeds our intellectual or physical ability to attain, the resulting frustration can become severe. The limiting condition may be a physical or mental handicap that is beyond our control, or it may be a self-imposed limitation-a lack of self-confidence that prevents us from attempting an achievable goal. In any case the level of performance is markedly lower than the level of aspiration (Figure 5-11). Sawrey suggests: Some physical characteristics may become seriously thwarting of behavior, not because of actual physical limitation imposed but because of personal or social value placed on the possession of that characteristic. (Telford and Sawrey, 1967) ... Although physical unattractiveness may be a deterrent to effective social interaction, it is certainly not preventive of it. The person's evaluation of himself as a person possessing unattractive characteristics probably operates as a more effective barrier to socialization than does the actual characteristic itself. Acceptance and realistic evaluation of one's own charac teristics may be a prerequisite to acceptance by others.10 There are many sources of frustration in our complex organizations. The very routines and procedures that are intended to facilitate efficient administration constantly loom as potentially frustrating factors. Fmstration by ConOict Frustration by conflict results when the individual must choose between two alternatives that offer competing or conflicting stimuli. Kurt Lewin presents three varia ••Ibid. p. 5. 216 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP POSITIVE POSITIVE G PERSON G (NEEDS) GOAL GOAL (INCENTIVE) (INCENTIVE) Figure 5-12. Approach-approach. t~ons of the conflict situation and a fourth has been added by C. I. Hovland and R. R.. Sears. The first of Lewin's situations (see Figure 5-12) is commonly called approach-approach. In this situation, a person must choose between two attractive alternatives. He will probably select the goal that appears to be the most need satisfying; and unless his judgment turns out to be faulty, the necessity to choose will not be overly frustrating. , The second type of conflict situation is termed avoidance-avoidance. (See Figure 5-13.) In this situation, the choice is between two unattractive or disagreeable alternatives. Here the dilemma is to select the lesser of two evils, neither of which will re sult in any need satisfaction. An added frustration in the avoidance-avoidance situation is that the closer one gets to either alternative, the more repugnant it becomes, while in an approach-approach situation, the opposite is true. A third conflict situation is the approach-avoidance model (see Figure 5-14). In approach-avoidance situations, a person can have what he wants, but will have to pay the price. For example, he can eat fattening foods, but must exercise to meet commissioning weight limitations. Frequently, there is the conflict between positive financial incentives and negative nonfinanial incentives. A person may be offered a part-time job: the pay is great, but it means working the graveyard shift. A variation on the approach-avoidance situation is double approach-avoidance (Hovland and Sears) which may better characterize our complex lives (Figure 5-15). In this situation we are faced with a choice between two goals both of which have normal advantages and disadvantages. There are positive and negative incentives associated with each goal. There are inherent conflicts, delays, or frustrationproducing, thwarting factors in all facets of our lives. Ifleaders are to do an effective job, they must be able to identify possible frustration-producing situations and frustrated behavior and take appropriate action. This • NEGATIVE NEGATIVE G G •PERSON (NEEDS) GOAL GOAL (INCENTIVE) (INCENTIVE) Figure 5-13. Avoidance-avoidance. 217 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE -LEADERSHIP NEGATIVE POSITIVE PERSON + INCENTIVE .. ~ INCENTIVE .;, Figure 5-14. Approach-avoidance. requires a deeper understanding "Of the forms of frustration and skill in taking remedial action. Fonns of Frustration One of the most serious forms of frustration-aggression was discussed earlier. But aggression is ollly one of the ways in whi~h frustration can be manifest. If pressures continue and increase,"one.·or more of several forms of frustrated behavior may develop, including rationidization, regression, fixation, and resignation. Rationalization is a type of behavior where the frustrated person blames someone else for his inability to achieve some goal or talks himself out of the desirability of a goal, e.g. "I really didn't want to go to the game any way." Frequently the overt evidence of this form of frustration is blaming a supervisor for the person's inability to get a raise or a promotion. Regression is simply the failure to act one's age. The person who is unable to deal constructively with reality and retreats to an earlier age that seems more satisfying is showing symptoms of regression. In 1941, Barker, Dembo, and Lewin conducted one of the best known studies of regressive behavior. Although this was performed three decades ago, the underlying concepts are still current. Using children 2 to 5 years of age as subjects,11 they took favored toys away from these children and placed the toys behind a wire screen it' ~ NEGATIVE POSITIVE PERSON -- ++ INCENTIVES INCENTIVES ~ .-, .;If ~ ~~-~ Figure 5-15. Double approach-avoidance. 218 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP replacing them with less attractive toys. The children could still see the toys that they had previously enjoyed, but were now unable to play with them. Play behavior patterns showed regression from former levels ranging from 5 months at the 2 and ~ year level to about 22 months at the 4 and ~ year level. As in other forms of frustration, the amount of frustration-producing elements influenced the degree of regression. Fixation is another form of severe frustration. Compulsive, stereotyped, repetitive behavior characterizes fixation. A person may continue to exhibit the same behavior pattern over and over again-so called "one-track mindedness"-with seemingly no attempt to adapt. Resignation, or apathy, is characterized by lpss of hope, escape from reality, withdrawal, and retreat from the source of frustration. For example, a college student is trying to complete a course in calculus to qualify for entrance into business school. His work in other subjects is very satisfactory and it appears that he can easily qualify. However, he begins to experience anxiety and apprehension. He has never done particularly well in math and the calculus problems seem especially difficult. He receives a few "D's" and "Fs" on his weekly assignments and fails the first examination. As his frustration increases, the qualifying "C" appears more remote. His level of performance falls further below his level of aspiration. He begins to skip calculus classes, then other classes, and finally just stays in his room. He is now in trouble in every course and no longer talks of his future plans. He has become completely apathetic and resigned to failure. The five forms of frustration examined here-aggression, rationalization, regression, fixation, and resignation-are symptom& for which the leader should be constantly alert so that he can take remedial action. However, he must avoid taking a simplistic approach to the problem of frustration. There is no clearly defined hierarchy of frustrated behavior in which a person proceeds down a well-marked path, level by level; first being aggressive, then regressive, etc. It is equally true that there is a wide range of frustration tolerance. What may be a stressful situation for one person may be stimulating for another and what may induce frustration at one time may not at another time. What implications can be drawn for the study of leadership behavior? Norman R. F. Maier offers a series of concepts that, while not universally endorsed by all human behaviorists, prove useful in leadership education. Maier's concepts demonstrate the differences between behavior produced by frustration and that produced by motivation: 12 "When we assemble all the behavior properties associated with frustration and consider them to be descriptive of the frustration process, we find that they are quite different from those found in motivated problem solving and learning. At present a number of basic differences can be described. 1. A problem situation produces stereotyped behavior in the frustrated individual, whereas it prQ • Insure thorough, high-order learning. The mom thorou~hly the Ieamer understands the material, the more likely he is to see its relationship to new situations. A void rote learning, for it does not foster transfer. • Provide meaningful learning experiences that build confidence in ability to transfer learning. This suggests activities that challenge the Ieamer to el(ercise his imaginationand ingenuity in applying his knowledge and skills. • Use instructional materials that help form valid concepts and genemliz:\tions. Use materials that make relationships clear. • Educate the Ieamer to use discrimination and judgment in the application of his generalizations. SUMMARY Knowledge of the basic concepts of behavioral science and skill in applying these concepts is absolutely essential to the Air Force leader since the leader's primary task is mission accomplishment through the influencing of people. While there are many behavioral concepts which should be familiar to the leader, it has not been the purpose of this chapter to treat them all or examine the concepts presente4 in the detailed manner that their importance deserves. We have, however, wished to introduce the following significant ideas. ' Human behavior is caused. The interaction between person and situation results in behavior leading to accomplishment. Frequently the causal clements of a problem are found in the situation. This is fortunate because situations often arc easier to change than people. Because behavior is caused, the leader should use a scientifi~ cally oriented problem-solving approach which searches for causes rather than reacts to symptoms. In other words, the leader should·look beyond overt accomplishments in problem situations to find lasting solutions. In the constant interaction between a person and his environment, the way a per~ son sees or perceives his environment is subject to many distorting influences. Objects, people, any phenomenon frequently appear differently than they are. These distortions suggest that the leader must be particularly careful to avoid jumping to hasty conclusions, especially on the basis of visual evidence. Problem situations have three distinguishing characteristics: the person, the obsta· cle, and the goal. Motivated behavior results from the interaction between a person's internal needs and his external goals or incentives. A problem develops when something interposes an obstacle between the person and the desired goal. Whether the person can solve the problem depends on his ability, with or without assistance, to develop alternative courses of action to circumvent, penetrate, or remove the obstacle. This variable behavior is characteristic of active problem solving. The structure and intensity of human needs influence the problem situation. If, for example, a person has an intense thirst, depriving him of water will create a problem. On the other hand, if a person's thirst is satiated, depriving him of water for a brief period will probably cause no difficulties. The study of human needs poses a particularly complex challenge to the Air Force leader because of the wide variability among people in their needs. A motivating act for one person such as a pay increase may have little or no impact on another. Of special interest to Air Force leaders is the research design developed by Frederick Herzberg and used in the New View study. Perhaps one of the most common problems faced by Air Force leaders is that of reducing interpersonal frustration. There are inherent causes of potential frustration 229 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP in the complex society in which we live with the internal and external pressures of our own or of others making. Since frustration is such an inhibiting influence on mission accomplishment, it is incumbent on the Air Force leader to understand the causes and corrections of frustration. Again, this human behavior problem is complicated by the fact that what might be zestful to one person may be frustrating to another. The leader also has the very important responsibility of developing his men. Motivation alone is insufficient to insure that people effectively accomplish the mission; the men must have the necessary skills to perform assigned tasks. The Air Force leader is, therefore, constantly faced with the challenge of developing his men. He must, as a consequence, understand and be able to apply the learning process. Learning is a change in behavior as a result of experience. Learning is purposeful and comes only through experience. Learning is multifaced; the learner's full set of learning equipment is always involved. Learning is an active process. In planning for teaching, the instructor should use methods which reflect the na ture of what is to be learned. There are definite principles involved in the learning of skills; nine of them are described. The learning of concepts and generalizations depends on a broad range of student experience and careful guidance by the teacher. The laws of learning provide useful insights into the learning process. The law of effect is especially significant-it states that learning is strengtherted when accompa nied by satisfying or pleasurable conditions. A knowledge of the laws of learning helps the instructor to understand and to take advantage of three factors that affect learning: motivation, participation, and indi vidual differences. The learner must have a need to know, to understand, to believe, to act, or to acquire a skill. All of these needs, which make up motivation, are insep arable from the personal-social needs of the learner. A person learns best when he is active-when he participates. When purposeful activity is associated with learning, it makes the learning more permanent. Because of differences in experience, back ground, intelligence, interests, desire to learn, and psychological, emotional, and physical factors, people learn at different rates. The instructor must recognize these individual differences and gear his teaching to reach all learners whatever their capa bilities. The central questions in education deal with retention of learning and transfer of learning. Disuse, interference, and repression may account for forgetting. Transfer of learning is involved either when the learning of one task affects the learning of an other, or when the learner adapts what he learns for use in new situations. The key to both is thorough learning of a relatively few really important concepts and gener alizations. This leads to meaningful learning, anchored in the learner's experience. Behavioral science, then, enters every facet of an Air Force leader's role. It is fun damental to his successfully attaining his mission-a principal facet of which is as suring that others attain their missions. BIBLIOGRAPHY 0UNNETTE, MARVIN and KIRCHNER, WAYNE !{.. Psychology Applied to Industry. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965. GELLERMAN, SAUL W. Motivation and Productivity. New York: American Management Association, 1963. ---· The Management of Human Relations. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965. HACKMAN, RAY C. The Motivated Working Adult. New York: American Management Associ.llion, 1969. 230 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP HERZBERG, F., MAUSNER, B., and SNYDERMAN, B. The Motivation to Work. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959. ·· ;1 HILGARD, ERNEsT R. and ATKINSON, RICHARD C. Introduction to Psychology, Fourth Edition. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967. HuNERYAGER, S. C. and HECKMAN, I. L. Human Relations in Management. Second Edition. Chicago: South-Western Publishing Company; 1967. KREcH, D., CRUTCHFIELD, R. S., and BALLACHEY, E. L. Individual in Society. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962. LEAVITT, HAROLD J. Managerial Psychology. Second Edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964. MAIER, NORMAN R. F. Psychology in Industry. Third Edition. Boston: Houghtoa Mifflin Company, 1965. ----Frustration. Ann Arbor, Mich: The University of Michigan Press, 1961. MASLOW, ABRAHAM. Eupsychian Management. Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irvin, Inc., 1965. ~---Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964. McGREGOR, DoUGLAS. The Professional Manager. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1967. SAWREY, J. D. Frustration and Conflict. Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Publishers, 1969. SWIFT, PoRTER W. General Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1969. 231 Chapter 6 Readings and Cases-Behavioral Science and Air Force Leadership READING A Human Relations and the Nature of Man By Henry P. Knowles and Borje 0. Saxberg. Reprinted from the original source, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1967. Copyright 1967 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College; all rights reserved. Henry P. Knowles, Ph.D. Stanford University, 1961, is Associate Professor of Organization Behavior in the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Washington, in Seattle. He has published articles on human relations. Borje 0. Saxberg, Ph.D., University of lllinois, 1958, is Professor of Organization Behavior and Associate Dean of Graduate Programs, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Washington, in Seattle. He has conducted studies relating to human values, organizational structures, and leisure. "We all know bow little boys love fighting. They get their beads punched. But they have the satisfaction of having punched the other fellow's bead."' "The principle of co-operation is the most dominant and biologically the most important."2 T HE POINT is constantly made that traditional organizations work on the assumption that people are essentially opposed to work and lack the capacity for self-direction and personal responsibility. Modem theories of organization take the opposite view, i.e., people do have the capacity to become psychologically involved in cooperative activity and, under certain conditions, to be virtually self-motivated and self-controlled. Douglas McGregor, among others, has noted how these implicit assumptions about 1 Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company,Inc., Anchor Book edition, 1935), p. 284. 2 Ashley Montagu, Man In Process (New York,· New American Library, Mentor edition, 1962), p. SO. the nature of man influence organization and leadership in his now classic discussion of Theory X and Theory Y. The former assumes that man is innately lazy and unreliable, and leads to organization and control based on external or imposed authority. The latter assumes that man can be basically self -directed and creative at work if properly motivated; this assumption is said to lead toward an integrative organizational strategy. However, neither McGregor nor other writers in this field have undertaken to reveal how deeply the roots of these assumptions about man penetrate our culture and thus how powerfully they influence human relations in our society. Not only are these assumptions important in theories of human organization, but they are also crucial in every system of thought involved with human and social control. Whether concerned with organizational strategy, the ancient social order of the Zuni, or the political 233 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP theories of a Machiavelli or a Locke, one cannot escape the underlying relatedness and importance of what is assumed about man himself. Managers need to know more about the nature, sources, and effects of one assumption or the other in order ( 1 ) to sort out and understand their own ideas about the nature of humanity, and (2) to evaluate the fundamental influence of these ideas· on managerial decisions. It may be asserted that no other variable weighs more heavily on the ultimate form and quality of organizational and interpersonal relations. The question of the basic nature of man is, of course, as old as history and probably as old as society itself. The argument, in its many forms, stems from the ancient philosophical debate as to whether man is an end or a means. Reducing the argument to its simplest terms, and considering only the extremities of the spectrum, we treat a person as an end when we permit him to establish his own purposes and to choose and decide for himself. Contrariwise, we treat a person as a means when we limit his choices and utilize him primarily as an instrument for our own ends and purposes. Implicit in these values are central assumptions concerning (a) whether man is "good" or "evil," (b) whether he has the ability to cooperate voluntarily or must be forced to cooperate, (c) whether he is a "pilot" capable of choosing or a "robot" imprisoned by circumstances and incapable of choice.3 Values such as these lie at the very core of philosophies of religion, politics, education, organization, and human relations. It is our intention in this article to describe how the choice of one or the other of these sets of values has influenced a number of systems of thought concerned with questions of human regulation and control. We do not intend to emphasize the growing body of empirical evidence which indicates that the quality of individual and group performance • The terms "pilot" and "robot" have been borrowed from Donald H. Ford and Hugh B. Urban, Systems of Psychotherapy (New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965). pp. 595 ff. varies from one kind of assumption and system to the other. This. area is adequately covered in the writings of such men as Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert, and, of course, McGregor. Rather, we shall explore some of the cultural roots and branches of optimistic-pessimistic assumptions about human nature in order to show that an underlying unity exists along this dimension in a variety of humansocial control systems. MAN: PESSIMISTIC VIEW In their polar aspects, attitudes about human nature range from pessimism to optimism-from assumptions that evilness, predatory competition, and aggression on the one hand, to goodness, cooperation, and virtue on the other, constitute the central predispositions of men and, therefore, of the social order. Let us begin our discussion by examining how certain ideas about human-social control have been affected by the pessimistic or "means" view of man. This is the attitude that man is essentially evil and driven by aggressive and uncooperative mqtives and drives. Fear Versus Love. As early giants in the history of Western idea makers, Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes-a pair of political scientists-provide us with a suitable starting points. It will be recalled· that Machiavelli in The Prince (1515) urged that, because of man's rebellious and uncooperative behavior, he must be strictly and ruthlessly controlled by anyone who aspires to gain or maintain a position of power. A ruler; in his view, must put aside any question of morality and must achieve control at any price and by whatever means he can find: "It is much safer to be feared than loved. . . . For it may be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid dangers, and covetous of gain."' • Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New York, Random House; Modem Library edition, 1950), p. 61. 234 READINGS AND CASES-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP In all fairness, however, it must be made clear that he did not advocate his "end justifies the means" philosophy to benefit the prince or the ruler but to benefit the people. He assumed that only the ruler is competent to judge what the necessary ends are and must be. In furtherance of these ends, then, the ruler must resort to means which appear ruthless and deceitful. Hobbes in the Leviathan ( 1651) outlined a theory of social relationships which makes him a direct intellectual descendant of Machiavelli. According to Hobbes, since men covet prestige, material goods, and power and expect to_ attain these at their discretion, they live in perpetual fear of their neighbors: "And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies."" Law must therefore define what is honest and virtuous. But, in order for law to be applicable, a common authority must exist to enforce it. Man recognizes this need out of fear of loss of life and property. As a consequence, he enters into a social contract in which he gives up to a central authority whatever rights he has had in nature. In this way, he brings about the creation of a commonwealth ruled by a sovereign. Each man is individually bound to this authority, or Leviathan, and the latter's powers are irrevocable. The sovereign is a despot; whatever he wills becomes the people's will. As the Leviathan, he represents the supremacy of law, absolute authority and power, and the bureaucracy of the state. Survival of the Fittest. Both Machiavelli and Hobbes viewed human nature primarily as a product of experience. They perceived in mankind a predominance of aggressive and selfish motives as a result of socialization rather than biological inheritance, aild they designed political systems in order to constrain and control human behavior and thus create order in society. • J"!lomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (Indianapolis, The BobbsJI:femll Company, Inc., The L1brary of Liberal Arts edi tion, 1958), p. 105. Such orderliness in nature as a whole was also evident to Charles Darwin, who, through his research into the causes of variations in species and the contribution of these variations to the survival of species in nature, became convinced that survival was assured through a process of natural selection. Darwin thought that survival was guaranteed only to those who were the best representatives of the species and best adapted to the conditions of the environment. The survivors were those who through physical prowess and mental agility were able to win in the competition for food and mate. The suggestion here is clear, that nature is a neverending struggle-a competition-and that a permanent state of war exists among and between all species and the natural environment. Darwin's interpreters suggested that as with animals so with man. Herbert Spencer, who was quick to find social implications in Darwin's biological theory, argued that among men the fittest survive; indeed, they are the only ones entitled to survive. In this, the process of natural selection in man's world favors the aggressive and the strong. Man, in this scheme, is a predatory creature. Spencer's interpretations of Darwinian theory underlie much of the creed of many nineteenth century U.S. industrialists and their philosophy of the "stewardship" of the rich and the "gospel of wealth." (It is to be noted that Darwin himself was not willing to accept Spencer's theory that the law of natural selection applied-to the human race. Actually, he turned the argument around. Man's weakness, Darwin thought, becomes his greatest strength; it forces man to establish cooperative relationships with others for protection and maintenance. In addition, Darwin attributed to man a moral feeling-one of sympathy and compassion-rather than indifference toward the weak and defective. Unhappily, it has been his fate to become associated with "survival of the fittest" as a scientific theory which is applied to man as well as other natural species.) 235 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP The Invisible Hand. Often associated with Darwin as a supporter of the idea of self-regulation in human society is Adam Smith. A century earlier, he placed his special emphasis on the automaticity of economic affairs. Under his doctrine of the invisible hand, there is a just allocation of a nation's scarce resources through the price mechanism which reflects supply and demand conditions of the market. By pursuing his self-interest, each individual can further not only his own fortune but also that of society as a whole. It is this idea of self-interest as prime mover which has led many to assume that Smith considered man to possess a basically selfish, rather than a virtuous, nature. The economic doctrine of laissez-faire which Smith originated has meant "permission to do or make what you choose"; hence, noninterference with personal indulgence. This, when combined with self-interest as motivator, would seem, ergo, to support the notion that man is by nature self-seeking, predatory, and interested only in his own good at the expense of his weaker and less fortunate fellows. For example: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard c,f their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantage."" Though there is ample evidence to indicate that Smith, like Darwin, recognized that morality and government must and do govern the actions of men, he has nevertheless become, with Darwin, a symbol of individualism. (Smith, at one time, occupied a professorial chair in moral philosophy and in The Theory of Moral Sentiment (1759) made it clear that he relied on natural law and, as a reflection of that, on a natural morality which prescribed three cardinal virtues: jus tice, prudence, and benevolence. Though he 6 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York, Random House,Modern Library edition, 1937), p. 14. recognized some truth in the aphorism that private vices become public virtues, he clearly assumed that, as a reflection of a natural state of equality, men in pursuit of enlightened self-interest are characterized by adherence to justice--"a scrupulous refusal ever to hurt or injure anyone else, in the pursuit of one's own interest or advantage." Smith was not concerned with production and the accumulation of goods per se, but rather with the ends served thereby. In effect, the welfare of the ordinary man was on his mind to such an extent that he implicitly took the side of the underdog, which he perceived the ordinary laboring man to be.) Sex and Aggression. Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis and the first to explore man's unconscious mind, took a clearer position on human nature than did Machiavelli, Hobbes, Darwin, or Smith. According to Freud, man is motivated by innate instincts and drives that he constantly struggles to pacify in ways which are antithetical to the norms of society. (These instincts and drives have been identified with sex and aggression but were really intended by Freud to refer to nature's and man's hankering to stay alive.) To the extent that society succeeds in curbing these animal forces, man becomes civilized and his energies can be turned toward socially acceptable goals. But, said Freud pessimistically: · "Psychoanalysis has concluded . . . that the primitive, savage, and evil impulses of mankind have not vanished in any individual, but continue their existence, although in repressed state . . . and . . . they wait for opportunities to display their activity."7 Freud further observed, in his Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), that society, itself, is perpetually threatened by the underlying hostilities which exist between human beings. Periodically, these feelings explode into open aggression which persists until the • Letter from Freud to Dr. van Eeden, quoted in Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. II (New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1957), p. 368. 236 READINGS AND CASEs-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP "Man is a predator with an instinct to kill participants can once more be brought under and a genetic cultural affinity for the control. However, society's attempts to neu weapon." 10 tralize destructive impulses through a "cul tural superego," which defines for man what In this view the urge to aggression, the de is "good" and what is "bad," create feelings sire to dominate others, is an instinct or of guilt. This, Freud said, is man's most urdrive transmitted from generation to genera gent and important problem.8 The anxieties tion through the genes. generated by this constant clash between The predisposition of men toward aggresman's basic nature and the demands and sion has also been noted by one of the mostneeds of society increase human unhappiness renowned philosophers of our own time,and lead to mental illness. Thus, Freud Henri Bergson, who wrote:seems to suggest, man is essentially doomed:. "But no matter the thing taken, the motive "~rom his [Freud's] point of view society, adduced: the origin of war is ownership indiby Its very nature, forces man to repr~ss his vidual or collective, and since huma~ity isinborn aggression more and more. The outpredestined to ownership by its structure look for the future is that the more civilized war is natural. So strong, indeed, is the wa;he becomes, the more potentially destructive instinct, that it is the first to appear whenhe becomes."" we scratch below the surface of civilization in search of nature. We all know how little Warrior and W eaponmaker. Recent eviboys love fighting. They get their heads punched. But they have the satisfaction of dence has been uncovered which seems to having punched the other fellow's head." 11 support the idea that man has been an aggressor and warrior since the beginning of Bergson clearly joins with those who takehis existence. Under the direction of L. S. B. ~ pessimistic view of man. By assuming thatLeakey, excavations conducted in South Afmnate, predatory, and selfish instincts are rica-among what now appear to be the first causes, he cannot conceive of a humanearliest remnants of man's ancestors-have society-with its dependence on materialuncovered man's earliest tools and have espossessions-as capable of avoiding conflicttablished that among them weapons occuthrough the processes of reason and self-conpied the most important place. The indica trol. tions are that these were used not only for killing in the acquisition of food but also . Manager and Managed. The underlyingagainst man-for protection, in the defense Ideas about human nature which have been of mate or of territory, and in the conduct of previously outlined will also be found among war. While the evidence is mixed, it has led some thinkers whose work focuses on the resome to theorize that a warlike, aggressive lationship between the manager and the nature is a part of every man's inheritance. managed in business and industry. These are the writers who are generally associated with As a consequence, it can be argued that the scientific management movement andDarwin's law of nature, survival of the fitwho date from about 1900. test, also applies to man. Such an emphasis At this time, Frederick W. Taylor,.who pion aggression over a span of hundreds of oneered this movement in the United States,thousands of years, Robert Ardrey has saw a need for management to exert closeargued, must have had a permanent effect on control over the indifferent behavior ofhis hereditary structure: workmen in order to ensure their adherence to the objectives and goals of business enter 8 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and lt8 Discontents trans lated by James Strachey (New York, W. w. No'rton & Company, Inc., 1961), p. 81. to Robert Ardrey, African Genesis (New York, Dell °Clara Thompson, Psychoanalysis: Its Evolution and Publishing Co., Inc., 1961), p. 166. De•·e/op"!e_nt (New York, Grove Press, Inc., first Ever u Henri BerSSQn, op. clt., p. 284. green edllion, 1957), p. 151. 237 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP prise. In spite of all the human values which have been inputed to his writings, it seems clear that Taylor and his followers made these six basic assumptions about human nature: 1. The employee is a "constant" in the production equation. The implication here is that man has a fixed nature. 2. The employee is an inert adjunct of the machine, prone to inefficiency and waste unless properly programmed. 3. The employee is by nature lazy; only managers honor the "hard work" creed of the Protestant Ethic. 4. The employee's main concern is selfinterest. At work, this is always expressed in economic values. 5. Given appropriate expression, these values will make man fiercely competitive among his peers as an accumulator of financial rewards. 6. Man (at least the working man) must therefore be tightly controlled and externally motivated in order to overcome his natural desire to avoid work unless the material gains available to him are worth his effort. In accordance with these assumptions, Taylor thought that management must assume the responsibility for specifying in detail the method to be followed by the employee in order to gain an approximation of his full output potential. In addition, a piece-rate plan would have to be included as a financial incentive to ensure maximum performance. At about the same time, a contemporary of Taylor was developing a similar pattern of thought in Europe regarding the relationship between manager and managed. While Taylor concerned himself mainly with the shop environment, Max Weber designed· the features of his ideal bureaucracy viewing :the organization from the top downward. Again, in the elements of Weber's bureaucracy-specialization of personnel, impersonality, a hierarchy of authority relationships, entry and advancement by competitive examination, written policies, rules and procedures, and others-we find the Weberian image of man as a reluctant cog in an orga nizational machine. Thus the great majority of employees are confined to tightly con trolled and dependent relationships with their superiors. The pervasiveness of the Taylor-Weber approach to organization and management is evident throughout industrial organization today. Management scholars such as Urwick, Mooney, and Brown, as well as important business executives like Cordiner of General Electric, Greenwalt of DuPont, and Kappel of AT&T, have generally adhered to this model of managerial control and the underlying values which emphasize the need to minimize employee resistance to work--:-to support the Protestant Ethic-and a consequent need for autocratic rule and the traditional bureaucratic hierarchy. MAN: OPTIMISTIC VIEW Now let us tum from the foregoing cynical view of the nature of man to the view which emphasizes . man's strength as a potentially creative, social being. As in dealing with the opposite view discussed earlier, we shall examine how an assumption that human beings have worth and goodness influences a wideranging sample of systems of social control. The examples used are not intended to be other than illustrative, straddling such divergent systems of human thought· as political government, psychoanalysis, sociology, and business organization. Social Instinct and Reason. Although separated in time by sixteen centuries, Marcus Tullius Cicero and John Locke shared remarkably similar ideas about the governing of men. Cicero in On the Commonwealth (51 B.C.) argued that men by nature believe in goodness and well-doing, and abhor savagery and baseness. On the assumption of mutual advantage, they come together in obedience to a social instinct and where enough individuals are involved form a democratic association or commonwealth for the benefit of all. Out of this emerges a leader who governs voluntary subjects 238 READINGS AND CASEs-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP through a moral claim to their allegiance They have argued that nature, from a biolograther than through regulation based on ical standpoint, supports the concept of surforce. vival through cooperation rather than comLocke, in The Second Treatise of Governpetition. ment, contended that men of reason are in~ Allee reported in his Cooperation Among herently disposed toward mutual support and Animals the results of a wealth of research cooperation: which provides evidence that cooperative, social relationships increase the probability "The state of nature has a law of nature of survival for any single individual as wellto govern it, which obliges everyone; and as for a species as a whole. One of his simple reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal experiments showed that it takes proportionand independent, no one ought to harm anately less toxic colloidal silver to kill a single other in his life, health, liberty, or possesgoldfish in an aquarium than if the aquariumsions."12 holds a number of goldfish. He .suggested that the ability of the group of goldfish to In other words, Locke argued that man's neutralize a poison appears to increase faster fundamental potential is reason and reason than that of a single goldfish. He concludeditself establishes cooperation as the basis for his discussion of complex animal life in this human relationships. way: Under Locke's concept of the social con tract, agreement is reached between free men "The conclusion seems ir.escapable that theto entrust to the community the authority to more closely knit societies arose from some protect the common welfare. This custodiansort of simple aggregation . . . such an evolution could come about most readily with ship is continued through tacit consent and is the existence of an underlying pervasive ele subject to the rule of majority. For Locke, ment of unconscious proto-coopen\tion, or man is naturally disposed toward doing automatic tendency toward mutual aid among good, and government is essentially a conanimals."'" venience. The sovereign is assumed to will what the people will. Locke believed that As Allee explored further evidences of co man's mind at birth is a tabula rasa, a blank operation in-higher animals, he came to this sheet of paper and, therefore, that man beconclusion: comes a person through sense impressions, "All through the animal kingdom -from mediated by reason, which he derives from amoeba to insects, or to man -animals show social experience. automatic unconscious proto-cooperation or Thus the human mind and character are even true cooperation. There is much evi shaped by interaction with the world; whatdence that the drift toward natural coopera ever man becomes is a function of reason tion is som_ewhat stronger than the opposing tendency toward disoperation [among crowded and social interaction. The function of govanimals]." "ernment, therefore, is not to create its own laws as a controlling force but to discover However, in spite of his argument that awhat natural forces bring man to a state of cooperative-social instinct is readily found inreason in which he can control himself. nature, Allee also recognized a counter-prinCooperation and Survival. Two men of ciple. This principle was that threat or force science, W. C. Alee, a biologist, and Ashley will be employed on the part of individuals,Montagu, a cultural anthropologist, have adanimal or man, to dominate others in a vanced ideas from their own fields about group in order to establish a hierarchy orhuman nature which correspond in imporpecking order. And he felt impelled to addtant respects with those of Cicero and Locke. 111 W. C. Allee, Cooperation Among Animals (New York, "'John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government Henry Schuman, 19St), p. 29. (New York, The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 19S2), p. S. " Ibid., p. 203. 239 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP that "much can be said for an established order of dominance and subordination."15 Allee pointed to evidences from the ani mal world which seem to reveal that any sin gle individual thrives better where the peck ing order is firmly established than where constant reorganization is in progress. He also saw evidence for this on the world scene. However, in all cases, Allee believed there will finally appear a subordinate to challenge the existing order. Thus he con cluded that a pecking order brings peace and stability for the short run, but that an inte grated unit characterized by natural coopera tion promises stability for the long run. Montagu agreed in all essential respects with Allee. He argued that from a biological point of view men prefer to survive through cooperation rather than competition: "The principle of co-operation is the most dominant and biologically the most important."'" Montagu, of course, was particularly concerned with man rather than with the an imal world. He believed that man from infancy on must rely on others for the satisfaction of his needs, and therefore affinity for interdependence is a fundamental reflection of the social state: "All of man's natural inclinations are toward the development of goodness, toward the continuance of states of goodness and the discontinuance of unpleasant states." 17 Thus warfare is considered by Montagu, as it was by Allee, as a human invention derived from economic or materialistic, rather than biological, considerations. 'Blank Page' Concept. On the basis of their more sanguine views of man's nature, these men, from Cicero through Montagu, have set forth behavioral concepts which support the idea of cooperation over aggression in human relationships and the need for strengthening these relationships through a 1ll Ibid., p. 204. 10 Ashley Mootagu, op. clL, p. 50. •• Ibid., p. 57. constructive process of learning. Much of modern thought in psychoanalysis and psy chotherapy, in sociology and social psychol ogy, and in the field of organizational studies is also based on an optimistic view of man's nature. It resists Descartes' assumption that men are born with innate ideas and a more or less given nature. Thus many modern behavioral scientists tend, like Locke, to think of man as entering life with a mind like a blank page on which experience is then impressed, and out of which the form and content of his personality are molded. To this way of thought, man's behavior is acquired in life and changes with experience. It is not solely predetermined by the genes, nor is it fixed and irrevocable. Out of these views have emerged new ways of perceiving man as an individual and as a member of a group. Earlier, we outlined the pessimistic view of man on which Freud based his psychoanalytic theory. Freud's assumption about man's innate nature affected his theories in the same way as Hobbes's assumptions about man influenced his theories of government and society-man, left to his own devices, will prey on other men to satisfy his desires and must, in the interests of all, be restrained by forces in society. The psychoanalysts who followed Freud have made distinctive contributions to modern views of the nature of man. From among them has emerged a group which broke with Freud on the issue of the basic nature of man, the so-called neo-Freudians, represented in this discussion by Harry Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm, and Karen Horney. The neo-Freudians base their theories of human behavior on the assumption that the development of personality is influenced primarily by external societal forces and events rather than by biogenetically determined, innate instincts or drives. Freud, of course, assumed that man and society are basically divided-on the one hand, a set of drives in man (sex and aggression) which are at the root of man's evil and, on the other, a set of rules in the human culture which inhibit ,and control the individual. 240 READINGS AND CASEs-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP The neo-Freudians argue that there is no dichotomy between man and society. According to Fromm: "The most beautiful as well as the most ugly inclinations of man are not a part of a fixed and biologically given human nature but result from the social process." '8 Necessarily then, if man is to be understood, major attention must be given to those forces in his environment which influence the molding of his personality. J. A. C. Brown in The Social Psychology of Industry has described the difference between Freudian and neo-Freudian ideas about the nature of man as the difference between thinking of man as being "pushed from behind" or "drawn from in front." This, in a rough way, is the difference between psychological determinism or behaviorist psychology-with its focus on drives, instincts, or the conditioned reflex as a source of behavior-and subjectivist theories of psychology, which perceive psychic energy as being derived from personal goals and personal perceptions of reality. Sullivan's theory of personality development, like those of Fromm and Horney, belongs in this latter category. According to Sullivan, the individual begins life with certain potentials and two basic goals: satisfaction and security. The extent to which he realizes his potential and achieves his goals depends on his experiences with other people. The pursuit of "satisfaction" has to do with satisfying physical needs like sleep, hunger, and sex. However, the manner in which such needs are satisfied does not depend on the innate characteristics of an individual but reflects behavior patterns which are the product of interpersonal relations. It is in relation to other people that an individual seeks "security"-that is, in the avoidance of anxiety caused by feelings of disapproval or inadequacy in a social situation. Thus the matter of psychological security is culture-bound, 18 Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1941), p. 12. and the form and content of the human personality is a product of specific cultural forces. Sullivan defines the anxiety-free condition of "euphoria" as a tensionless state similar to that experienced by a new-born and sleeping child who has yet to discover that he has arrived in a threatening environment. Such an infant is at peace with the world or, in Rousseau's terms, in a state of oneness and harmony with nature. Only exposure to the anxieties which arise out of human relationships can change this profound sense of well-being into a state of tension. This state of tension then promotes education and learning through which the self-system of an individual finally emerges. The self-system, as Sullivan defines it, represents that portion of an individual's potential which is realized, while the "true self" contains the maximum potentialities which could have, under ideal conditions of experience, been developed. Since it is an unfortunate fact of life in our culture that interpersonal experience is far from ideal, Sullivan felt that most people are "inferior caricatures of what they might have been."'9 Cultural Determination. Fromm does not accept the "blank page" concept of Locke but, nevertheless, strongly rejects the idea that instincts are the primary source of human behavior. Fromm concedes that man comes into existence with a set of drives and instincts. However, he argues that their particular patterns of development and their manifestation in the behavior of individuals are culturally determined: "Any given social order does not create these fundamental strivings but it d!llermines which of the limited number of potential passions are to become manifest or dominant." 20 From this, it is clear that Fromm considers that human potentialities depend to a very large extent on the will to productive 19 J. A. C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudlans (Baltl· more, Penguin Books, Inc., 1961), p. 167. 20 Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1955), p. 14. 241 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ness which society succeeds in bringing to man. The individual is shaped by society. The environment in which the individual exists, therefore, becomes a primary factor in the way he responds to life and work. Fromm emphasizes in his theory that man is faced with a desire to be part of nature. Animals, through their instinctual equipment, seem able to accommodate themselves to the external environment through what appears to be an automatic process and, therefore, to achieve close ties with nature. Man, in contrast, through self-awareness and reason is alienated from nature. In fact, in industrial society he is often alienated from himself, from meaningful human relationships, and from his work. In this process man is caught in a tug-of-war between self-reliance, power, control over nature, independence, and escape from isolation, competition, hostility, and insecurity. He must find his path by relating to things and to people. Ideally, he should succeed in establishing a productive relationship in which he is able to feel and act in accordance with his potential for contributing to constructive human life. Pilot or Robot? As our final example of modem psychoanalytic thought, we consider Karen Homey. In her writings Homey agrees with Sullivan and Fromm in the view that Freud gave biological and genetic factors an excessive role in character formation. Taking the position that man's nature is not instinctive but learned, she was one of the · first analysts to emphasize the importance of interpersonal relations in behavior development. What an individual learns-that is, how he reacts to life with others-is influenced most by the way he is treated by others. It was Homey's view that all individuals in their natural development seek sentiinents · of liking and approval from others. Where interpersonal relationships do not have support, anxiety develops and begins to interfere with the growth of a healthy personality. In such cases people respond to others in :three basic ways: ( 1) by· "moving toward ' people"-feeling inadequate, they become attached and dependent; (2) by "moving against people"-rejected, they become rebellious and aggressive; or (3) by "moving away from people" -they seek comfort for rejection in symbolic substitutes and fantasy. Neurotic behavior occurs when there is conflict over which response pattern to adopt in a given situation. Various defense mechanisms help solve such conflicts but at the expense of genuineness in human relationships and of needed problem-solving behavior. Because of her emphasis on the importance of situational factors in personality development, Homey tended to look to a person's present interpersonal involvements for the causes and solutions to neurotic problems. She did not deny that a connection exists between an individual's current responses and his early life-a connnection which was so important a part of Freud's thinking-but she argued that one must look to the present situation for clues as to what triggered these responses. Man is not, therefore, doomed by a set of prenatally determined instincts, nor are his patterns of behavior eternally established by early life experience. Homey's concept of man is cheerful and optimistic, not gloomy and pessimistic. Man is born neither a devil nor a saint; he simply reflects in his behavior the nature of relationships develop~ ~ince the time of his birth with people who were important to him. The insights into human nature which have been outlined above and which summarize the thinking of an important school of modem psychotherapy are based on the confident viewpoint that man is not doomed by a fixed and evil nature from which he cannot escape. Rather, they would seem to suggest just the opposite: man has within himself the potential to grow and develop significantly in cooperation with others. Man is a pilot not a robot. What is needed is not a method of controlling innately selfish or even predatory drives toward war with other men, but a means of tapping man's potential for joining in productive relationships with others. 242 READINGS. AND CASES-BEHAVIORAL SCiENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Individual or Environment? One ·of the first social scientists to apply this concept of man to analysis of industrial organizations was Elton Mayo of Harvard University. Mayo's view of human nature was optimistic and anti-Freudian. To illustrate: "The concealed assumption of the doctrine of original sin invalidates the psychoanalytic findings. The theory that life is a strenuous fight to subdue perversion, that the human mind is by nature "pathogenic" (i.e., predisposed to the pathological) is not a starting point for biological observation." 21 In other words, the concept that life on earth is an atonement for original transgressions of God's laws, and that man is cursed with a set of evil instincts which must be curbed by society, is inadequate as a base for observing and understanding man's behavior in daily life. Mayo argued that too much attention was being given in industrial settings to individuals as the source of noncooperative and unproductive relationships between the leadership of the organization and those who are employed to accomplish the work. He pointed out that developments in sociology and in social anthropology had already opened to serious question whether a merely psychological study of individuals in an organization is a logical approach to a comprehension of their behavior as workers. On the contrary, Mayo said, such individuals constitute a group which develops responses to the total organizational environment. On the basis of this, the research interview program at the Hawthorne Works, originally consisting of isolated interviews, was restructQred so that interviewers were assigned to study individuals over extended perjods in relation to their jobs, the informal social organization in which they worked, and company policy. The original isolated interviewing method was based on the premise that personal behavior or misbehavior was a result of personal rationality or irrationality; the second • 21 Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New: York, The Viking Press, 1960), p. 152. method assumed that the individual was only one of a number of interdependent variables · relating to behavior. These other variables· were part of the working environment and included such factors as leadership, working conditions, and working group membership. Science, inspired by the work of early sociologists and anthropologists, was at last beginning to show, contrary to Hobbesian theory, that man was more victim than antagonist in his environment. Behavioral Science Man. While the initial thrust toward change in managerial philosophy and practice can be traced back to the origin of the human relations movement in the 1930's, it has continued through the present time in two somewhat divergent directions: ( 1 ) toward the fusion of the scientific organizational behavior approach with a new, more humanistic management philosophy, and (2) toward organizational reeducation and change through sensitivity or laboratory training. In both cases the importance of the roles played by behavioral and other social scientists in. defining the relationship between the manager and the managed is becoming more and more evident. While Mayo's work resulted in increasing the emphasis on human relations mainly in normative terms, much of the subsequent direction of this work is based on the research and findings of the behavioral sciences of sociology, psychology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology. Research workers such as Argyris, McGregor, and Likert have identified themselves with A. H. Maslow's theory of the need hierarchy as an aspect of human nature. Given the assumption that a satisfied need does not motivate, man is seen as satisfying in ascending order the needs of hunger in an extended sense, safety, social affection, esteem, arid finally self-actualization or self-fulfillment. The challenge for management today is seen by these authors as one of providing man at work with the opportunity to grow and mature continually into a human being who, because of a favorable working climate, is able to realize his own goals best by work 243 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ing for the success of the organization of which he is a member. Implicit in their assumptions is the idea that man has an essential nature which is defined by the broad spectrum of his needs, capacities, and tendencies. These needs, as expressed by Maslow, "are on their face good or neutral rather than evil."22 In a continuing reflection of the neoFreudian view of man, we find McGregor stating, "If employees are lazy, indifferent, unwilling to take responsibility, intransigent, uncreative, uncooperative,"28 this is due to the traditional bureaucratic assumptions and methods of organization and control. Argyris, in a similar vein suggests, "Mutual understanding, trust, self-esteem, openness, internal commitment, fully functioning human beings who aspire to excellence . . . these values can not only be protected, but indeed increased, in an industrial setting."2~ In the world of work, therefore, man is seen by the behavioral scientists as responding to the influences of his organizational environment. Given the opportunity, he will participate creatively in furthering the objectives of the organization. If frustrated, his behavior will characteristically revert to the basic need level of hunger; he will turn apathetic, slovenly, and totally alienated from an orientation toward work as a central life interest. Such a basic underlying belief in man as a creative human being oriented toward constructive rather than destructive activities is even more clearly represented in the sensitivity training movement. Through this process of reeducation and skill development, Warren G. Bennis and his collaborators see the way to democratization of management-a·. condition which they view as essential in the' face of accelerating technological change, the increasing proportion of professionals in the • work force, and the consequent necessity of 22 A. H. Maslow, Motivation and PnstJrulltty (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954), p, 340. ""Douglas McGregor, The Human Side ol Enterprise (New York, McGraw-Hill Book CoinpBDY, lnc.;" 1960), p. 48. "' Chris Argyrls, lnterpersorull Competence and OrtrantUlllonal E/lecttveness (Homewood, Dllnols, Dorsey Press, Inc., and Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), p. S. the organization to accept the values of science and scientific inquiry in order to survive in the future. ("Democracy" is here defined not as permissiveness or laissez-faire but as a system of values by which people in organizations are assumed to feel "internally compelled" to live. These include free communication, the consensus principle, influence base_d on competence rather than position, acceptance of emotion as fact, and a "basically human bias" in dealing with conflict.)211 In Bennis' terms, the "organization man" becomes a signpost on the road pointing the way to the kinds of flexibility and adaptability which are essential if the democratic environment in which science and scientists can flourish is to be realized. Whether one agrees or not, it is well known among men of science that personalities are only of passing interest compared to the contribution they hope to make to the accumulation of new knowledge. WHERE DO YOU STAND? We have confined the discussion to the pessimistic-optimistic views for the sake of simplicity and clarity, although it is, of course, a matter of common observation that all of the possible social processes are located along a continuum whose polar extremities are mutual cooperation and predatory competition. As opposite ends of a spectrum, coopera.., tion and competition are closely related to love and hate, friendship and enmity, harmony and discord, collaboration and opposition. They may therefore be used to describe a person's basic or characteristic propensity toward his fellowman. In terms of his attitudes toward others, every man will find himself at some point on this spectrum depending on the particular situation in which he is involved. However, each man is drawn by the force of his own history and experience toward some primary tendency, some central quality of being, which determines the general pat .. See Philip E. Slater and Warren G. Bennis, "Democracy Is Inevitable," HBR March-April 1964, p. 51. 244 READINGS AND CASEs-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP tern of his social behavior. Peripheral changes occur in this pattern to accommodate the demands of the various roles he plays, but there would seem to be a core pattern which represents his basic beliefs concerning the nature of man. Man is evil or man is good, depending on man's experience with mankind. The examples from the history of human thought that we have cited illustrate this concept of the primary tendency in the kind of view one man takes of another. They also clearly indicate that cooperation and competition, or goodness and evilness, as human characteristics are not discrete activities or qualities but rather exist in various mixtures in human nature. Hobbes's primary tendency, for example, was to view man as evil. Nevertheless, his idea of the "social contract" contains the implicit assumption of cooperative activity among men by which they give up their rights to a ruling Leviathan to gain protection from one another. Bergson said that war in a materialistic society is natural, but he · noted that collective ownership leads to cooperation within groups to protect members from outsiders. Even Freud, who comes closest to a concept of innately evil men straining against societal constraints to satisfy their needs, conceded that man may become "good" because of his dependency on others; he will, in short, cooperate when he finds helping behavior in other men. Among those whose primary tendency is to view man as good, we find similar ambivalences: ~ Locke argued that reason evoked cooperation among men. However, he implied that the "social contract" exists between ruler and ruled to control man's acquired competitive, aggressive nature. 1] The neo-Freudians believed that man's goodness or evilness was a product of experience-that is, competitive (hating) experiences lead to malfunctioning by societal standards, but cooperative (loving) experiences lead to satisfaction and to development. The psychoanalytic assumptions and clinical findings of the neo-Freudians to the effect that man has basic worth and is capable of constructive psychic responses in an environment of understanding and encouragement have received scientific support among modem experimenters. Behavioral Science Man, whether the setting has been in the laboratory or in the field-in a business, education, or government organization-is a "good" man whose potential for productive growth and self-actualization has too often been stunted by his superiors' outmoded assumptions that he is "bad." Therefore, for their purposes, he must be manipulated like a puppet on a string. CONCLUSION The quality of human relations in any organization, from the political state to the business enterprise, reflects first of all its members', and particularly its leaders', views of the essential character of humanity itself. It makes a great deal of difference in systems of social control whether those involved tend to view man, in general, as good or evil. If we assume that man is good, we can believe that misbehavior is a reactive response rather than a manifestation of character. This will lead to a search for causes in his experience rather than in his nature. If we are to find a cause for behavioral failure, we are more apt to look outside the offender than inside and thus consider a whole new range of variables and contributory circumstances. If, on the other hand, we assume that man himself is bad, a priori, then we are prone to assume that misbehavior is caused by something within him which we cannot alter directly. Accordingly, our attention...will focus on limiting his freedom to choose and to act through external curbs or controls. In limiting the causes of behavior, we exclude ourselves from powerful internal sources of control. Thus the underlying human value which predominates is readily perceived in (a) the way social relationships are structured, (b) 24S CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP the kinds of rewards and penalities that are used, (c) the character of the communication process which links people together, and (d) the other elements of social control that characterize a relationship or an organization. Questio::ts for Reflection and Discussion 1. How do you stand in terms of assumptions regarding the nature of man? 2. Which of the people identified in this reading most closely approximates your own views? 3. How could your assumptions regarding people influence your leadership behavior? 4. Assuming the views of the authors, how could a scientific approach to human behavior influence the development of leadership concepts? 5. Examine the leadership behavior of someone you know. What assumptions do you believe · he holds regarding people and why do ·you believe he holds these assumptions? READING B The Human Side of Enterprise By Douglas M. McGregor. Reprinted by permission of the publisher frqm Management Review, November 1957. Copyright 1957 by the American Management Association, Inc. Until hi~ death in October 1964, Douglas M. McGregor was Sloan Professor of Managementat the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The famous proponent of the human side of management in his "Theory Y" management system, Dr. McGregor put his ideas into a classic book, The Human Side of Enterprise (1960). He wrote several other important books, amongwhich are The Professional Manager (1967), and Leadership and Motivation: The Essays of Douglas McGregor (1966). I T HAS BECOME true to say that indusWe cannot tell industrial management try has the fundamental know-how to utihow to apply this new knowledge in simple,lize physicai :science and technology for the economic ways. We know it will requirematerial benefit of mankind, and that we years of exploration, much costly developmust now learn how to utilize the social sciment research, and a substantial amount of ences to make our human organizations truly creative imagination on the part of manageeffective. ment to discover how to apply this growing To a degree, the social sciences today are knowledge to the organization of human efin a position like that of the physical sciences fort in industry. with respect to atomic energy in the thirties. We know that past conceptions of the nature MANAGEMENT'S TASK: THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW of man are inadequate and, in many ways, incorrect. We are becoming quite certain The conventional conception of manage that, under proper conditions, unimagined ment's task in harnessing human energy to resources of creative human energy could organizational requirements can be stated become available within. the organizational broadly in terms of three propositions. In setting. order to avoid the complications· introduced 246 READINGS AND CASES-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AtjJL~IR FORCE LEADERSHIP ~. .>:...:_. ___ ,.....,!·1' by a label, let us call this set of propositions "Theory X": 1. Management is responsible for organizing the elements of productive enterprisemoney, materials, equipment, people-in the interest of economic ends. 2. With respect to people, this is a process of directing their efforts, motivating them, controlling their actions, modifying their behavior to fit the needs of the organization. 3. Without this active intervention by management, people would be passive-even resistant-to organizational needs. They must therefore be persuaded, rewarded, punished, controlled-their activities must be directed. This is management's task. We often sum it up by saying that management consists of getting things done through other people. Behind this conventional theory there are several additional beliefs-less explicit, but widespread: 4. The average man is by nature indolent-he works as little as possible. 5. He lacks ambition, dislikes responsibility, prefers to be led. 6. He is inherently self-centered, indifferent to organizational needs. 7. He is by nature resistant to change. 8. He is gullible, not very bright, the ready dupe of the charlatan and the demagogue. The human side of ec.onomic enterprise today is fashioned fro~ propositions and beliefs such as these. Conventional organiza·tion structures and managerial policies, practices, and programs reflect these assumptions. In accomplishing its task-with these assumptions as guides-management has conceived of a range of possibilities. At one extreme, management can be "hard" or "strong." The methods for directing behavior involve coercion and threat (usually disguised), close supervision, tight controls over behavior. At the other extreme, management can be "soft" or "weak." The methods for directing behavior involve being permissive, satisfying people's demands, achieving harmony. Then they will be tractable, accept direction. This range has been fairly completely explored during the past half century, and management has learned some things from the exploration. There are difficulties in the "hard" approach. Force breeds counterforces: restriction of output, antagonism, militant unionism, subtle but effective sabotage of management objectives. This "hard" approach is especially difficult during times of full employment. There are also difficulties in tlie "soft" approach. It leads frequently to the abdication of management-'-to harmony, perhaps, but to indifferent performance. People take advantage of the soft approach. They continually expect more, but they give less and less. Currently, the popular theme is "firm but fair." This is an attempt to gain the advantages of both the hard and. the soft approaches. It is reminiscent of Teddy Roosevelt's "speak softly and carry a big stick." t IS THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW CORRECT? The findings which are beginning to emerge from the social sciences challenge this whole set of beliefs about man and human nature and about the task of management. The evidence is far from conclusive, certainly, but it is suggestive. It comes from the laboratory, the clinic, the' schoolroom, the home, and even to a limited extent from industry itself. The social scientist does not deny that human behavior in industrial organization · today is approximately what management perceives it to be. He has, in fact, observed it and studied it fairly extensively. But he is pretty sure that this behavior is not a consequence of man's inherent nature. It is a consequence rather .of the nature of .industrial organizations, of management philosophy, policy, and practice. The conventional approach to Theory X is based on mistaken notions of what is cause and what is effect. Perhaps the best way to indicate why the conventional approach of management is in 247 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP adequate is to consider the subject of motivation. PHYSIOLOGICAL NEEDS Man is a wanting animal-as soon as one of his needs is satisfied, another appears in its place. This process is unending. It continues from birth to death. Man's needs are organized in a series of levels-a hierarchy of importance. At the lowest level, but preeminent in importance when they are thwarted, are his physiological needs. Man lives for bread alone, when there is no bread. Unless the circumstances are unusual, his needs for love, for status, for recognition are inoperative when his stomach has been empty for a while. But when he eats regularly and adequately, hunger ceases to be an important motivation. The same is true of the other physiological needs of man for rest, exercise, shelter, protection from the elements. A satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior! This is a fact of profound significance that is regularly ignored in the conventional approach to the management of people. Consider your own need for air: Except as you are deprived of it, it has no appreciable motivating effect upon your behavior. SAFETY NEEDS When the physiological needs are reasonably satisfied, needs at the next higher level begin to dominate man's behavior-to motivate him. These are called safety needs. They are needs for protection against danger, threat, deprivation. Some people mistakenly refer to these as needs for security. However, unless man is in a dependent relationship where he fears arbitrary deprivation, he does not demand security. The need is for the "fairest possible break." When he is confident of this, he is more than willing to take risks. But when he feels threatened or dependent, his greatest need is for guarantees, for protection, for security. The fact needs little emphasis that, since every industrial employee is in a dependent relationship, safety needs may assume considerable importance. Arbitrary management actions, behavior which arouses uncertainty with respect to continued employment or which reflects favoritism or discrimination, unpredictable administration of policythese can be powerful motivators of the safety needs in the employment relationship at every level, from worker to vice _president. SOCIAL NEEDS When man's physiological needs are satisfied and he is no longer fearful about his physical welfare, his social needs become important motivators of his behavior-needs for belonging, for association, for acceptance by his fellows, for giving and receiving friendship and love. Management knows today of the existence of these needs, but it often assumes quite wrongly that they represent a threat to the organization. Many studies have demonstrated that the tightly knit, cohesive work group may, under proper conditions, be far more effective than an equal number of separate individuals in achieving organizational goals. Yet management, fearing group hostility to its own objectives, often goes to considerable lengths to control and direct human efforts in ways that are inimical to the natural "groupiness" of human beings. \\'hen man's social needs-and perhaps his safety needs, too--are thus thwarted, he behaves in ways which tend to defeat organizational objectives. He becomes resistant, antagonistic, uncooperative. But this behavior is a consequence, not a cause. EGO NEEDS Above the social needs-in the sense that they do not become motivators until lower needs are reasonably satisfied-are the needs of greatest significance to management and to man himself. They are the egoistic needs, and they are of two kinds: 1. Those needs that relate to one's self-esteem-needs for self-confidence, for independence, for achievement, for competence, for knowledge. 248 READINGS AND CASE8-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 2. Those needs that relate to one's reputation-needs for status, for recognition, for appreciation, for the deserved respect of one's fellows. · Unlike the lower needs, these are rarely satisfied; man seeks indefinitely for more satisfaction of these needs once they have become important to him. But they do not appear in any significant way until physiological, safety, and social needs are all reasonably satisfied. The typical industrial organization offers few opportunities for the satisfaction of these egoistic needs to people at lower levels in the hierarchy. The conventional methods of organizing work, particularly in mass-production industries, give little heed to these aspects of human motivation. If the practices of scientific management were deliberately calculated to thwart these needs, they could hardly accomplish this purpose better than they do. SELF-FULFILLMENT NEEDS Finally-a capstone, as it were, on the hierarchy of man's needs-there are what we may call the needs for self-fulfillment. These are the needs for realizing one's own potentialities, for continued self-development, for being creative in the broadest sense of that term. It is clear that the conditions of modern life give only limited opportunity for these relatively weak needs to obtain expression. The deprivation most people experience with respect to other lower-level needs diverts their energies into the struggle to satisfy those needs, and the needs for self-fulfillment remain dormant. MANAGEMENT AND MOTIVATION We recognize readily enough that a man suffering from a severe dietary deficiency is sick. The deprivation of physiological needs has behavioral consequences. The same is true-although less well recognized-of deprivation of higher-level needs. The man whose needs for safety, association, independence, or status are thwarted is sick just as surely as the man who has rickets. And his sickness will have behavioral consequences. We will be mistaken if we attribute his resultant passivity, his hostility, his refusal to accept responsibility to his inherent "human nature." These forms of behavior are symptoms of illness-of deprivation of his social and egoistic needs. The man whose lower level needs are satisfied is not motivated to satisfy those needs any longer. For practical purposes they exist no longer. Management often asks, "Why aren't people more productive? We pay good wages, provide good working conditions, have excellent fringe benefits and steady employment. Yet people do not seem to be willing to put forth more than minimum effort." The fact that management has provided for these physiological and safety needs has shifted the motivational emphasis to the social and perhaps to the egoistic needs. Unless there are opportunities at work to satisfy these higher level needs, people will be deprived; and their behavior will reflect this deprivation. Under such conditions, if management continues to focus its attention on physiological needs, its efforts are bound to be ineffective. People will make insistent demands for more money under these conditions. It becomes more important than ever to buy the material goods and services which can provide limited satisfaction of the. thwarted needs. Although money has only limited value in satisfying many higher-level needs, it can become the focus of interest if it is the only means available. THE CARROT-AND-STICK APPROACH The carrot-and-stick theory of motivation (like Newtonian physical theory1 works reasonably well under certain circumstances. The means for satisfying man's physiological and (within limits) his safety needs can be provided or withheld by management. Employment itself is such a means, and so are wages, working conditions, and benefits. By these means the individual can be controlled so long as he is struggling for subsistence. 249 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP But the carrot-and-stick theory does not work at all once man has reached an adequate subsistence level and is motivated primarily by higher needs. Management cannot provide a man with self-respect, or with the respect of his fellows, or with the satisfaction of needs for self-fulfillment. It can create such conditions that he is encouraged and enabled to seek such satisfactions for himself, or it can thwart him by failing to create those conditions. But this creation of conditions is not "control." It is not a good device for directing behavior. And so management finds itself in an odd position. The high standard of living created by our modern technological knowhow provides quite adequately for the satisfaction of physiological and safety needs. The only significant exception is where management practices have not created confidence in a "fair break"-and thus where safety needs are thwarted. But by making possible the satisfaction of low-level needs, management has deprived itself of the ability to use as motivators the devices on which conventional theory has taught it to rely-rewards, promises, incentives, or threats and other coercive devices. The philosophy of management by direction and control-regardless of whether it is hard or soft-is inadequate to motivate be cause the human needs on which this approach relies are today unimportant motivators of behavior. Direction and control are essentially useless in motivating people whose important needs are social and egoistic. Both the hard and the soft approach fail today because they are simply irrelevant to the situation. People, deprived of opportunities to satisfy at work the needs which are now important to them, behave eJlactly as we might predict-with indolence, passivity, resistance to change, lack:-of responsibility, willingness to follow the demagogue, unreasonable de:.. mands for economic benefits. It would seem that we are caught in a web of our own weaving. A NEW THEORY OF MANAGEMENT For these and many other reasons, we require a different theory of the task of managing people based on more adequate assumi: tions about human nature and human motivation. I am going to be so bold as to suggest the broad dimensions of such a theory. Call it "Theory Y," if you will. 1. Management is responsible for organizing the elements of productive enterprise-money, materials, equipment, people--in the interest of economic ends. 2. People are not by nature passive or resistant to organizational needs. They have become so as a result of experience in organizations. 3. The motivation, the potential for development, the capacity for assuming responsibility, the readiness to direct behavior t?ward organizational goals are all present m people. Management does not put them there. It is a responsibility of management to make it possible for people to recognize and develop these human characteristics for themselves. 4. The essential task of management is to arrange organizational conditions and m~thods of operation so that people can achieve their own goals best by directing their own efforts toward organizational objectives. This is a process primarily of creating opportunities, releasing potential, removing obstacles, encouraging growth, providing guidance. It is what Peter Drucker has called "management by objectives" in contrast to "management by contrrl." It does not involve the abdication of management, the absence of leadership, the lowering of standards, or the other characteristics usually associated with the "soft" approach under Theory X. SOME DIFFICULTIES It is no more possible to create an organi-, zation today . which will be a full, effective application of this theory than it was to build an atomic power plant in 1945. There are many formidable osbtacles to overcome. 250 READINGS AND CASEs-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP The conditions imposed by conventional organization theory and by the approach of scientific management for the past half century have tied men to limited jobs which do not utilize their capabilities, have discouraged the acceptance of responsibility, have encouraged passivity, have eliminated meaning from work. Man's habits, attitudes, expectations-his whole conception of membership is an industrial organization-have been conditioned by his experience under these circumstances. People today are accustomed to being directed, manipulated, controlled in industrial organizations and to finding satisfaction for their social, egoistic, and self-fulfillment rt~eds away from the job. This is true of much of management as well as of workers. Genuine "industrial citizenship"-to borrow again a term from Drucker-is a remote and unrealistic idea, the meaning of which has not even been considered by most members of industrial organizations. Another way of saying this is that Theory X places exclusive reliance upon external control of human behavior, while Theory Y relies heavily on self-control and self-direction. It is worth noting that this difference is the difference between treating people as children and treating them as mature adults. After generations of the former, we cannot expect to shift to the latter overnight. STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION Before we are overwhelmed by the obstacles, let us remember that the application of theory is always slow. Progress is usually achieved in small steps. Some innovative ideas which are entirely consistent with Theory Y are today being applied with some success. Decentralization and delegation These are ways of freeing people from the too-close control of conventional organization, giving them a degree of freedom to direct their own activities, to assume responsibility, and, importantly, to satisfy their egoistic needs. In this connection, the flat organization of Sears, Roebuck and Company provides an interesting example. It forces "management by objectives," since it enlarges the number of people reporting to a manager until he cannot direct and control them in the conventional manner. Job enlargement This concept, pioneered by I.B.M. and Detroit Edison, is quite consistent with Theory Y. It encourages the acceptance of responsibility at the bottom of the organization; it provides opportunities for satisfying social and egoistic needs. In fact, the reorganization of work at the factory level offers one of the more challenging opportunities for innovation consistent with Theory Y. Participation and consultative management Under proper conditions, participation and consultative management provide encouragement to people to direct their creative energies toward organizational objectives, give them some voice in decisions that affect them, provide significant opportunities for the satisfaction of social .and egoistic needs. The Scanlon Plan is the outstanding embodiment of these ideas in practice. Performance appraisal Even a cursory examination of conventional programs of performance appraisal within the ranks of management will reveal how completely consistent they are with Theory X. In fact, most such programs tend to treat the individual as though he were a product under inspection on the assembly line. A few companies-among them General Mills, Ansul Chemical, and General Electric-have been experimenting with approaches which involve the individual in setting "targets" or objectives for himself and in a self-evaluation of performance semiannually or annually. Of course, the superior plays an important leadership role in this processone, in fact, which demands substantially more competence than the conventional approach. The role is, however, considerably 251 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP more congenial to many managers than the role of "judge" or "inspector" which is usually forced upon them. Above all, the individual is encouraged to take a greater responsibility for planning and appraising his own contribution to organizational objectives; and the accompanying effects on egoistic and self-fulfillment needs are substantial. APPLYING THE IDEAS The not infrequent failure of such ideas as these to work as well as expected is often attributable to the fact that a management has "bought the idea" but applied it within the framework of Theory X and its assumptions. Delegation is not an effective way of exercising management by control. Participation becomes a farce when it is applied as a sales gimmick or a device for kidding people into thinking they are important. Only the management that has confidence in human capacities and is itself directed toward organizational objectives rather than toward the preservation of personal power can grasp the implications of this emerging theory. Such management will find and apply successfully other innovative ideas as we move slowly toward the full implementation of a theory like Y. THE HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE It is quite possible for us to realize substantial improvements in the effectiveness of industrial organizations during the next decade or two. The social sciences can contribute much to such developments; we are only beginning to grasp the implications of the growing body of knowledge in these fields. But if this conviction is to become a reality instead of a pious hope, we will need to view the process much as we view the process of releasing the energy of the atom for constructive human ends-as a slow, costly, sometimes discouraging approach towards a goal which would seem to many to be quite unrealistic. The ingenuity and the perseverance of industrial management in the pursuit of economic ends have changed many scientific and technological dreams into commonplace realities. It is now becoming clear that the application of these same talents to the human side of enterprise will not only enhance substantially these materialistic achievements, but will bring us one step closer to "the good society." Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. How does McGregor use the term "conventional view" in relation to the organization of human effort in industry? 2. Why do you agree or disagree with the beliefs behind this "conventional view"? 3. What does McGregor mean by the "carrotand-stick approach" of motivation? 4. What is management's responsibility and task in managing people? 252 READINGS AND CASE8-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSillP READING C The Air Force Man and the Cultural Value Gap By Lt Col Robert H. Drumm. Reprinted by permission from Air University Review, May June, 1968 Vol. XIX, No. 4. Lt Col Robert H. Drumm is Chief, Behavioral Science in Management Division, Professional Personnel Management Course, Air University Institute for Professional Development. He has graduated from the Defense Management Systems Course of the Naval Postgraduate School and the Air War College Seminar Program. Col Drumm served in Korea, Guam, Headquarters, Air Training Command, The Aerospace Medical Division at Brooks AFB, Texas, and the USAF Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, Cal:fornia. }\IR FORCE personnel left over from the capacity of any individual to comprehend fl.World War II and the Korean War it a11."2 view with alarm the values and attitudes of This acceleration has provided technical younger officers and airmen of the Vietnam breakthroughs resulting in more and better era. This article attempts to provide insight production of higher-quality goods at a lower which may assist the reader to gain undercost. The production output and its resulting standing of this "emerging generation." profits are distributed to more and more The current cultural value gap between people older and younger Air Force men is not new Just what does this have to do with the and is not restricted to the military. Similar dramatically shifting personal values of offigaps have been occurring for centuries. cers and airmen in the late 1960s? A partial However, past military generations did not answer may be seen in the genesis of our culencounter the sharp technological and cultural value system in the United States. The tural change, in a short period of time, expevalues dominant during the first century and rienced by the current younger generation of a half of American history were formed officers and airmen. Because of the slow within an agricultural economy based on a technological and cultural maturation from demand for more goods than could be supone generation to another, past changes were plied. The population was largely made up difficult to perceive. Traditionally any disof pioneers and immigrants. It was widely parity in values, if recognized at all, was atscattered in small communities. In those days tributed to a struggle between generations for the military man lived from payday to payinfluence and independence.1 day, looking forward to minimum comforts If this condition has been around since and basic necessities. early civilization, why is it so remarkable These conditions, which to a large extent today? I do not believe it is a matter of no longer exist, formed group perceptual whether change has or has not occurred; it is patterns and values which were ..considered more of an accelerated change during a short acceptable behavior of the day. Civil, militime frame compared to the rather slow tary, and moral law were based upon this acchange of the past. ceptable behavior. The majority of the popuAccelerating knowledge and technology lation supported these laws, and they became are major contributing factors. As one authe cultural guide for a given period. thor so aptly put it, "It is small wonder that Today, material goods are supplied in the world's information, which is doubling such large quantities that our economic sys-. with each generation, has grown far beyond tern basically no longer supports the scarcity 253 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP theory.3 A military man's pay, like that of his civilian counterpart, is determined by the pressures of an affluent society. The problem of developing an individual identity under such conditions is overwhelming. An insidious kind of value gap has developed between those values which the younger man can identify with and measure himself by and the opportunities and challenges available to him for achieving this identity. This disparity has generated large numbers of individuals who struggle to develop a feeling of commitment to something worthwhile and to the achievement of selfworth.4 In this contemporary mode, competition for the basic necessities of life is deemphasized. For centuries the achievement motive driving the military and civilian man was to gain sufficient wealth, power, or position to secure desirable material goods that historically were in short supply. The higher the achievement, the more an individual could accumulate scarce items that were not readily available to everyone. Values based on this concept generated perceptual sets and thought patterns such as "To work is good and to work even harder is better."-The Protestant Ethic.5 In today's social/cultural environment, two distinct sets of values appear to be operating: traditional values and emergent values. Traditional values, those which are subscribed to by older officers and Nco's and which developed during the scarce-commodityI scattered-population era, are "Puritan morality," "work success ethic," "achievement orientation," and "rugged individuality." In contrast, the younger officers and airmen lean toward emergent values, which appear to be "moral relativism," "sociability," "immediate gratification," and "group conformity."6 When conflicting views are held by older and younger military men, their ability to communicate is greatly restricted. In addition, their desire to cooperate toward a common purpose is sidetracked by the communication conflict. Figure 1. Psychosocial needs hierarchy format indicating degree of importance (value} to older generation. This gap between today's older and younger military generations appears to be greater than at any other time in civilized history. One set of factors causing this condition is the changing emphasis on the personal/social needs of the contemporary military man. These needs, as set forth by Maslow and others, are: 1. Physiological (thirst, hunger, sex, etc.) 2. Safety (security, health, etc.) 3. Social (identification, affection, etc.) 4. Egoistic (prestige, success, self-respect, etc.) 5. Self-fulfillment (desire for personal growth, self-actualization, etc.)• Traditionally these needs are presented in a hierarchy. Figure 1 depicts this hierarchy and indicates the relative importance (value) of these needs. 8 Under this concept, physiological needs are basic, and self-fulfillment needs (which are never completely satisfied) are the highest and not important until lower needs are satisfied. According to McGregor, "Man is a wanting animal-as soon as one of his needs is satisfied, another takes its place in an unending process from birth to death." He also says, "A satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior."9 With the cultural change. from scarcity of goods to plenty and sociological advances which provide the same relative availability 254 READINGS AND CASEs-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Figure 2. Psychosocial needs hierarchy format when the lower needs are satisfied, depicting needs that are possibly important to middle or transitional generation. of goods to nonachievers and achievers alike to satisfy lower needs (i.e., welfare programs to provide food, clothing, medical care, and other basic needs), this pattern of psychoso cial needs may change structurally. (Figure 2) If the apparent value gap continues to expand, the hierarchy of needs influencing the future military man may eventually form a pattern of diminishing lower needs and expanding higher needs. (Figure 3) Under this hypothesis, man would devote more and more energy to ego satisfaction and self-ful- Figure 3. Psychosocial needs hierarchy format when the satisfaction of lower needs is guaranteed for the most part by the social structure to the emerging generation. fillment: the emerging ethic. If overwhelming emphasis is placed on higher needs and they are then thwarted, the new crop of young officers and airmen may revert to behavior that is irrational compared to the military standard of the day. External need compensations would then emerge similar to such civilian compensations as the "hippy" movement, drugs, and bizarre dress (at least when viewed from the norm). Although the younger military generation may be heading toward the upper level of the needs configuration, the factors causing this change may also have an effect upon the older military generation. The older generation (people over 35 years of age), because of strides made toward the good life, may be receiving needs satisfaction approximating the configu ration shown in Figure 4.10 Figure 4. Psychosocial needs hierarchy modification of older generation due to gains made toward the good life. The cultural value gap is also reflected in current philosophical systems. Emerging ex istentialistic philosophy, similar to the emerging change in contemporary military man's needs hierarchy, is also saturated with the individual's intense awareness of his egoistic and self-fulfillment needs. It is loaded with the individual's subjective view of reality. 11 _ Some contemporary writers interpret emerging existentialism in the form of as sumptions, which may be useful in under 255 CONCEPTS Q~ AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP standing the emerging military man's views. These assumptions are: 1. The individual is responsible for his own actions. 2. Man must regard his fellow men as objects of value and as part of his own concern. 3. Man exists in a world of reality. 4. A meaningful life must remove as much threat from reality as possible, both physical and psychological. 5. Every person has his own heredity and has had experience unique to himself. 6. Man behaves in terms of his own subjective views of reality, not according to some externally defined objective reality. 7. Man cannot be classified as "good" or "evil" by nature. 8. Man reacts as a total organism to any situation.12 Where does all this discussion lead? It appears that the current upheaval is generating a new culture that is evolving ahead of its time. Before 1970 over fifty percent of the U.S. population will be under twenty-five years of age. This fact indicates that our young Air Force will get even younger. The attitudes, perceptual sets, morals, and commitments of this younger majority demand to be understood. A bridge of understanding across the generation and cultural value gap is imperative to our future military posture. The older military generation's needs and attitudes contrast with those of a younger military generation who know only an affluent society, a growing welfare state, and a rapidly accelerating technology. Whether we like it or not, this younger group will inherit the Air Force. The main effort to reconcile this value gap is the responsibility of the older Air Force generation who form today's leaders. This older generation must realize that emancipation from tradition requires additional foresight on their part to anticipate the consequences likely to flow from change. It is the responsibility of this leadership to encourage creativity and at the same time maintain restraints on immature, short-term desires to the extent necessary to assure the rights of others and to conduct the important day-today tasks of the functional military establishment. This is not a hopeless or unreasonable task for Air Force senior officers and noncommissioned officers. After all, the younger generation when· faced with today's overwhelming situation, like their forefathers, appear to be just as frightened as they were by life itself-or inebriated by its sudden discovery. NOTES 1. Donald H. Blocher, Development ColliJSeUng (NewYork: The Ronald Press Co., 1966), p. 117. 2. Robert W. Sarnoff, "Commun'!Cations. The KnowledgeIndustry," Commencement Address delivered at Washburn University of Topeka, 5 June 1966, Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXII, 21 (15 August 1966), 671. 3. Blocher, p. 118. 4. John R. Seely, Jr., "Guidance and the Youth Culture,"Personal Guidance Journal, 1962, No. 41, pp. 302-10. 5. Luther structured this as: the valuation of the fulflllment of duty In wordly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of the individual could assume. From Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of CapItalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (3d impression; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 80. Cf. Ecclesiastes 3:22,The Jerusalem Bible (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. 982. 6. George D. Spindler, "Education in the Transforming American Culture," in Blocher, p. 119. 7. Norman R. F. Maier, PsYchology In Industry (3d edition; Boston: Houghton Mifflln Company, 1965), p. 418. 8. Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and PersonaUty(New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 80-106. Cf. Charles D. McDennid, "How Money Motivates Men," from Busi ness Horizons, Winter 1960, pp. 94-100, in Max D. Richards and William A. Nlelander, Readings In Management(2d edition; Globe, Arizona: Southwestern Monuments Assn., 1963), pp. 409-10. 9. Douglas M. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc 1960) p. 36. , ., , 10. Officer Motivation Study-New View Hq United States Air Force, Assistant Chief of Staff' Studies and Analysis, Vol. II, reprint, 1 April 1967, p. A~2. 11. Blocher, p. 21. 12. C. E. Beck, Philosophical Foundation of Guidance (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), The author draws assumptions from existential philosophy of what he calls developmental counseling. Blocher, p. 20. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Why do you agree or disagree with Drumm's "cultural value gap"? 2. What specific elements do you see in the "cultural value gap" which apply between your generation and the next older generation? 3. What elements might comprise the "cultural value gap" between your generation and the next youngest generation in ten years? 4. Prepare a need hierarchy reflecting the dimensions of your personal needs as you see them. 2S6 READINGS AND CASES-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING D The Motivation-Hygiene Concept and Problems of Manpower By Frederick I. Herzberg. Reprinted by permission from Personnel Administration, JanuaryFebruary, 1964 issue. Copyright 1964, Society for Personnel Administration, 485-87 National Press Building, 14th and F Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004. Frederick I. Herzberg, Ph.D., Pittsburgh University, 1950, is Professor of Psychology and Chairman of the Department of Psychology at Case Western Reserve University. He has written some of the best received studies on work and motivation. His impressive list of publications includes The Motivation to Work (1959), written in conjunction with Bernard Mausner and B. Snyderman; Work and the Nature of Man (1966); and Job Attitudes: Review of Research and Opinion (1957), written with Bernard Mausner, Richard 0. Peterson, and Dora F. Capwell. I WISH to preface my remarks in this article with a disclaimer of competence in the field of manpower. My research and contemplative efforts are more directly related to an equally large and protean problem, that of industrial mental health. From my investigations in the latter area, I have formulated a general theory of mental health, and a specific application to job attitudes that may have bearing on certain aspects of "manpower" questions. I apologize to the reader who already has familiarity with the Motivation-Hygiene theory of job attitudes for occupying the next few pages with a repetition of data and comments which have appeared a number of times elsewhere. I must lay the groundwork for my thoughts on "manpower" by first presenting my theory of job attitudes, without which I have very little excuse for accepting the invitation to contribute to this issue. The Motivation-Hygiene theory of job attitudes began with a depth interview study of over 200 engineers and accountants representing Pittsburgh industry. These interviews probed sequences of events in the work lives of the respondents to determine the factors that were involved in their feeling exceptionally happy and, conversely, exceptionally unhappy with their jobs. From areview and an analysis of previous publications in the general area of job attitudes, a twofactor hypothesis was formulated to guide the original investigation. This hypothesis suggested that the factors involved in producing job satisfaction were separate and distinct from the factors that led to job dissatisfaction. Since separate factors needed to be considered depending on whether job satisfaction or job dissatisfaction was involved, it followed that these two feelings were not the obverse of each other. The opposite of job satisfaction would not be job dissatisfaction, but rather no job satisfaction; and similarly the opposite of job dissatisfaction is no job dissatisfaction-not job satisfaction. The statement of the concept is awkward and may appear at first to be a semantic ruse, but there is more than a play with words when it comes to understanding the behavior of people on jobs. The fact that job satisfaction is made up of two unipolar traits is not a unique occurrence. The difficulty of establishing a zero point in psychology with the procedural necessity of using instead a bench mark (mean of a population) from which to start our measurement has led to the conception that psychological traits are bipolar. Empirical investigations, however, have cast some shadows on the assumptions of bipolarity; one timely example is a study of conformity and nonconformity, where they were 257 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP shown not to be opposites, but rather two separate unipolar traits. 1 MElliODOLOGY Before proceeding to the major results of the original study, three comments on methodology are in order. The investigation of attitudes is plagued with many problems, least of which is the measurement phase; although, it is measurement to which psychologists have hitched their scientific integrity. First of all, if I ain to assess i person's feeling about something, how qo I know he has a feeling? Too often we rely on his say so, even though opinion polling is replete with instances in which respondents gladly respond with all shades of feeling when in reality they have never thought of the issue and are devoid etter thantant to us than ourselves and our self-conour own families know us. Again, I remindcept. There is no such thing as complete selfyou of our four personalities and point outlessness where human beings are concerned. that, as a leader, how you are perceived byAmoebas, not humans, are selfless. Now, as others probably should be one of the mostwould-be leaders and managers of men, we important factors in your consideration. Tommust keep in mind that when we are overly Sims puts it rather well when he says, "Iconcerned with maintaining our self-concept wonder if the mirror isn't the world's worstwe cannot relate well to others. A healthy invention. The optimist looks into a mirrorself-concept is one that does not lead to an and becomes too optimistic; and the pessiinordinate amount of preoccupation with mist, too pessimistic. Thus mirrors increaseself. One of the things that the leader must conceit and destroy confidence. Far better isremember is that he is the most sensitive seeing ourselves as reflected in the expressource of cues to everyone around him. He is sions on the faces of people we meet duringbeing watched more carefully than anybody the day. The way you look to others is apt toelse in the whole organization. His people be nearer the truth than the way you mayknow more about him than he will ever look to yourself."know about them, because he is a very imAny organization, institution, or group ofportant person to them. He is their primary people with a common effort in mind, acsource of reward and punishment. They may quires a sort of "personality." You walk intohate him, but they will never ignore him; and an office and you can feel the climate. Youit is when he ignores them that they despise immediately note whether the people in thehim the most. They may think of him either organization are warm, contented, aggresas the primary barrier standing between sive, tense, or hostile. For example, you imthem and their goals or as the primary means mediately know, when you approach peopleof realizing these goals. For these reasons, in an organization designed to provide servthe leader is being perceived by all of his ice, whether such service is offered willinglypeople much more than he is perceiving or reluctantly. You can talk about the perthem. But, the leader is restricted in his personality of an institution and the personalityception by the degree of his emotional inof the management of an institution. A famvolvement with self. In other words, I, as a ily has a personality. A school has a personcommander, am worried about how I appear ality. A class has a personality. There is ato my people; about whether they respect me psychological climate which permeates theenough or not. atmosphere. You can feel it. You visit someIf this is my main concern, then I will families and you know immediately that youspend my time and energy trying to get my must be extremely careful not to spot the rugpeople to bolster my self-concept rather than or scratch the furniture or express yourselftrying to get them to function effectively as too freely. You visit other families and youproductive human beings. The individual immediately relax. You feel at home.who is psychologically similar to this is the The personality of any group is usuallyone who is always conscious about the created by the leaders of that group. It is theproper signs of authority being extended to personality of the manager that is the prime 268 READINGS AND CASES-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP force in creating the personality of managepeople. Therefore, he worked hard at trying ment. If anyone needs therapy in an organito make his people believe that he was the fine fellow that he almost thought he waszation, it is the manager and not the worker. himself. The only difficulty was that heThe personality problems of the manager worked too hard to create this impression, as have a greater impact on many more people than do those of the workers. Managers can though to imply that he almost did not be afford to tolerate the personality maladjustlieve it himself. One of his officers became seriously ill. ments of their people, but they cannot afford to tolerate their own personality problems. His wife, in desperation, appealed to the In order to manage effectively, the manager boss, the colonel, for help. He pulled heaven must associate closely with his people-thus and hell--:Jiterally heaven and hell-to cut red tape and to provide an airplane to air he must be a healthy man emotionally. He evac the officer to Walter Reed Hospital ill cannot "practice" human relations; he must live them. Washington. The wife was overjoyed, threw Let me give you one example. Once upon her arms around him, hugged him, told him a time, in a large barracks-type office, there he was a wonderful guy. Everyone thought was a colonel with fifteen other officers he was tremendous. He didn't let a thing stand in his way! He was admired by all of under his supervision. He was an exuberant, hail and hearty type. His staff meetings were his people. He basked in their glowing com a glorification at the altar of his ego. He pliments. Then, in a truly neurotic manner, he took all this fine effort and threw it right prided himself on how well he thought his out the window. For the next three weeks, people thought of him and how much he worked for them. His basic motivation, howeveryone coming into the office heard nothever, was not really doing good for people, ing but the complete story from the good colonel as to what a wonderful guy he was or even accomplishing the mission. He had a and what he did for his officers. How fortuntremendous need for self-esteem. His basic ate they were to have him, etc.-ad naumotivation was satisfying an insatiable ego. seum. So insecure was he that he couldn't letThis was the unconscious motive underlying his actions speak for themselves, as theyall of his actions. He wanted to be well would have done. thought of. He wanted to be liked, loved, adored! Respected! Idolized! Admired! I repeat, the people who work with you and for you know you better than your own But-andhere's the rub-youcould never ac cuse him of these motives. Defense mechafamilies do, because they're with you longer than you are with your families. The average nisms operate unconsciously. The person using them is unaware of what he is doing. American father spends maybe four solid You can't tell a person that he is rationalizhours a week with his family. Your people ing. People don't deliberately rationalize. know you-often better than you know They rationalize to protect their egos from yourself. They can keep secrets from you, but you can't keep secrets from them. Theysomething unpleasant they feel about themknow your frailties and your strengths. They selves. They know that they "ought not" to feel the way they do about themselves. So know the roles you play and the roles you they refuse to admit to themselves how they can't maintain too long. The officers who worked for the colonel knew him, but hereally feel. To deliberately and consciously didn't know himself. When a real problem rationalize would be like cheating at solitaire. When people know they are rationalizdeveloped for him, he fully expected the loyalty of all of his people, but not a single offi ing, rationalization will not be effective as a cer stepped forward to support him. He wasdefense mechanism. bewildered, bitter, and disillusioned, unable So our colonel had to somehow feel altruistic. He had an image of himself as a to understand this tum of events. There were a few of his officers who exploited their rela wonderful leader who worked hard for his 269 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP tionship with him, who fed on his ego needs to go to work. I ought to go to work." Nowby constantly flattering him. Even these were here's the problem. How can you considernot around to support him when he needed yourself a worthy person of character and their loyalty. They were like rats leaving the still not go to work? Well, really you've beensinking ship. Why? Because he was never working hard and deserve a day of rest. Incommitted to his people. He was committed fact, you can be more productive at the of to one thing-the almighty ego of Colonel X! fice for the next few days if you get a little As leaders, we often abuse the use of aurest. Before you're through, you've conthority to satisfy our thunder need. As offi vinced yourself that the most intelligent, cers, authority is given to us by the President moral thing you can do is to stay in that bed.of the United States to accomplish a mission. You've satisfied your self-concept; you'veWhen we use it to satisfy our ego needs, we satisfied your desires-guilt comes later.are not acting much differently than if we Compensation, another defense mechawere misusing Government funds for pernism, like any defense mechanism, to worksonal reasons. Authority, intelligently haneffectively must operate unconsciously. dled, can be effective; it will not be effective Many well-known leaders have used comif it is used to satisfy someone's self-concept. pensation.In order to protect our self-concept, the Franklin Delano Roosevelt, for exampleego defense mechanism must operate without was a paralytic; Teddy Roosevelt was anthe person who is using it being aware of asthmatic and a weakling; Demosthenes waswhat he is doing. If he knows that he is using a stutterer, although I think Demosthenes defense mechanisms, they are not going to was more of a conscious compensator thanfunction effectively to protect his ego or an unconscious one; Glenn Cunningham,self-concept. They are called ego defense burnt as a child, was physically very weak; mechanisms because they defend the ego. It Napoleon was very short; Hitler and Mussois a person's own self-concept that he wants lini-who knows what they were compensatto protect. So he must convince himself that ing for, we can only speculate.what he is doing is correct. Another defense mechanism is denial ofNow, let's talk very briefly about some of reality. This too is very common in leaderthe defense mechanisms which we use to ship. We tend to distort the cues. You ask aprotect our self-concept. Two fishermen pass manager or leader how his outfit is doing.each other, one having a good day's catch, Fine, their morale is high. You ask the guysand the other having nothing! One says, and 50 percent want to transfer. They don't"Poor old Ralph! He couldn't catch a thing! tell him, of course. They're not going to tellThe other says, "Poor old Joe! He has to him. It's very hard for a commander to getclean all those fish." We all do it. to know the facts with respect to his people's You are asleep. Your bed is warm and feelings. A commander must be close to hiscomfortable. The radio has awakened you people; he must get to know them. He getswith very soft music. It's cold and raining to know them by perceiving their world as outside. "I want to stay in bed." The little they perceive it-not as he would like to per voice says, "You'd better get up and go to ceive it. work." "Well, so I don't shower this mornIdentification is another common defense ing; so I'll stay another fifteen minutes. Bemechanism. Sometimes we over-identify. sides, I showered yesterday. I don't have There are people in the Air Force today who B.O. like so-and-so anyway." So you stay so identify with the airplane and with flyinganother fifteen minutes, then the announcer that the requirements of the Air Force in thecomes on with the news and you know it's next two decades are going to leave them farnow 7: 15. You should have been up and behind unless they're flexible enough to shifthaving your orange juice by 7:15. But, really this identification. The days of the glamouryou have been working hard. "I don't want boy are over. The days of the crushed hat 270 READINGS AND CASES--BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP and the adolescent pilot are finished. You honey, and put out the fire in the can no longer look upon your office help as stove."Now that's empathy; that's listening. Em-· furniture. They are human beings, not cogs in a machine that you manipulate. You can pathy is understanding. It involves putting no longer live in the world of fantasy; we aside your personal problems and your emomust start living in a world of reality. The tional involvements to the point that you can days of the mature, intelligent, imaginative, imagine the nature of another person's and yet practical leader are here. world. We must learn to deal with reality di We need people capable of empathy-not pity or sympathy. When you feel sorry for rectly. Many of us are afraid to do this. No matter how courageous we are on the battle someone, you are really looking down on field or on a combat mission or in other re them. We don't want sympathy, because spects, many of us fail to have the courage to sympathy never really projects you into an meet the human relations problems head on. other person's world. We do want and need How many of us, for example, have the empathy in our leaders-that ability to see sheer courage to discuss a ma6;s rating with another person's world from his point of view. This involves doing something we him and tell him frankly where we think he stands and where he can improve. How rarely do as commanders and leaders, or as many of you have ever had your supervisor supervisors, or as parents-listenting to an do that for you? And yet, our basic task is other person, listening for the signs that tell the fullest possible development of our us something about him, shutting up for a human resources. The goal ahead of us is to while and listening. get our people to function at the highest level When you lead a conference, once in a of their imaginative, intellectual, and emo while stop for a moment and ask, "Is this tional capacity. what you mean?" Often someone will say, Let's face it. Clarence Furnace, Chairman "No, that isn't what I meant." Let's talk of General Foods, has a very pertinent point, about what the other individual meant to "You can buy a man's time; you can buy a say-not what you thought he meant. When a man's physical presence at a given place; you child comes up to you and says, "Can I go can even buy a measured number of skilled out to the movies?" and you're reading the muscular motions per day; but you cannot newspaper, don't just nod your head unless buy enthusiasm; you cannot buy initiative;you know what it is you're nodding to. You you cannot buy loyalty; you cannot buy the might get rid of the child momentarily, but devotion of hearts, minds and souls-you he will inevitably return after dinner and say, have to earn these things." And you cannot "Where's my 25 cents?" earn them unless you deserve them."What for?" My strong personal convictions are that "Well, you said I could go to the movies." we cannot legislate loyalty; we cannot com"I did not say you could go to the mov-mand enthusiasm; we cannot order high ies." morale; we cannot purchase respect; we canEmpathy! Like the little girl who came to not compel coordination; and, yet, we must her father while he was stretched out on the somehow elicit these qualities from our subcouch reading the paper and said, "Do you ordinates. This is the real challenge of leadknow mother's standing on her head in the ership.To be able to meet this challenge, the kitchen?" He nodded his head. "Do you know that the stove is on fire?" He nodded leader must first have solved the equation of his head. "Can I go to the movies tonight?" self. Until he does this, he cannot develop "No." the empathy he needs to develop those things "I can go to the movies tonight?" that can't be ordered. You can buy a set of "No, go help your mother get on her feet, movements in a certain place in a certain 271 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP time. You can order the outward forms of A leader is not so good when people obey"Yes, sir," and "No, sir," but a man's reand acclaim him, worse when they despisespect.for another man is something that is his him. Fail to honor your people, they will fail inalienable right to put wherever he chooses to honor you. But of a good leader who talksto put it. You can order action, but you can little, when his work is done, his aim fulnever order motivation. The teacher can filled, they will all say, 'We did this ourshow the student how to go through a series selves.'"of exercises, but she can't order him to learn. It takes an unusually self-sufficient, maYou can't order people to feel better. You ture person to be this kind of leader. Maturecan't order people to create. In the Air people take life's disappointments in theirForce, we need the services of thousands of stride. The fact that they didn't make thatspecialists and professionals, and we can't promotion isn't the end of the world; the factbully them into creative production. This is a that the project did not get through does notdifficult task, and it's a real challenge; it's mean that they are failures. They are tolerthe main challenge. I don't care what else ant of others. They are easygoing in their atyou've heard; the real challenge is getting titude toward themselves, as well as others.loyalty. How do you get enthusiasm, which They know and can accept their short-comyou cannot command? How do you develop ings. They have self·respect more than selfhigh morale in an organization? How do you liking. They feel capable of dealing withprovide people with a sense of belonging? most situations that come tlieir way. TheyHow can you get the respect you can't buy? get satisfaction from the simple, everydayYou don't have to be well liked. How can pleasures. Above all, they can laugh at tht:myou get respect-that's more important than selves. If you can laugh at yourself at times,being well liked. How can you get the coopit means that you look at yourself objectivelyeration that you cannot compel? And, how once in a while. Mature people are peoplecan you get initiative you cannot order? who have solved the equation of self and areErich Fromm, in his book, Escape from on their way to solving the equation of othFreedom, points out that, unless a person ers, because they now have the time, emofeels that he belongs somewhere, unless "his tion, and energy to devote to others. life has some meaning and direction, he A good leader will never make extensivewould feel like a particle of dust and be use of ego defense mechanisms. Some peopleovercome by his insignificance." In order for say that defense mechanisms are necessaryand healthy. They say we all use them; we a person to feel that he belongs somewhere,he must be working for a man who will acall indulge in them. But there is nothinghealthy about them; there is nothing healthy cept him and who is capable of accepting about doing things which we are unaware of him because he has already accepted himself. and which cripple us in our behavior and inour effective functioning as human beings. CONCLUSION None of us will ever get rid of them comIn summary, the first requirement for milpletely, but we can lessen, with critical selfitary leadership is maturity of personality. analysis, the degree to which we use theseWhat about mature people? What kind of defense mechanisms. We must deal realistipeople are they? They feel comfortable cally with life just as we must deal realistiabout themselves. They are not bowled over cally with our potential enemy if we areby their own emotions-by their fear, or going to survive.anger, or love, or jealousy, or guilt, or worIn everyone's life there comes a time whenries. They do not have a neurotic need to he must take stock of his assets and liabilihog all the glory and recognition. Lao Tzu, ties. If you do not, as General Walter Krugerthe Chinese philosopher, said, "A leader is says, "You will soon find yourself on a tobest when people barely know that he exists. boggan." Periodical self-analysis, critical and 272 READINGS AND CASES-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP impartial, is beneficial and illuminating. If you are going to fill a challenging position of leadership and fill it well, then you must realize that affection, trust, and belief in the potentialities of others calls into existence not only what is waiting to bud, but what never could otherwise. And, in turn, the response of others to you can lift you to a plane that you could never have achieved alone. As a leader you must realize that we're all in this together. I'm bound to you and you're bound to me, as long as we wear the same uniform. I cannot be anything without you; you cannot be anything without me. Your achievement supports me, the leader says, and my achievement supports you. As John Donne, the poet, says, "No man is an island entire unto itself . . . Every man's death diminishes me." One minister often uses the phrase, "A closed hand cannot receive." He points out that it is no accident that in a totalitarian country the symbol of dictatorship is a clenched fist. You can't shake hands with a clenched fist. To let things grow, you need an open hand to plant the seeds. To receive respect, you first have to offer it. The primary distinction between the Communist and the Judea-Christian democratic way of life is not in the free enterprise system; it is not military strength, economic production, nor education. The primary distinction is a different attitude toward the human being. If you really believe that every human being has certain rights and a sacred quality as an individual, this will be reflected in your attitude and in your actions. You will then demonstrate clearly that in order to receive love, you've got to give it; that in order to receive respect, you've got to offer it. A closed hand cannot receive because it is closed and nothing can get in; but, more than that, a closed hand is empty and has nothing to offer. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Why is empathy important in any leadership or management role? 2. Explain Colonel Ofiesh's statement: "The psychological barriers in life are often largely of your own making," using examples from your own life. 3. In what ways are each of us really four people? 4. Name, explain, and give examples of three common defense mechanisms? 5. How can you apply the phrase, "A closed hand cannot receive," to a leadership situation? Case Problems Case A: Ainnan Whiz An airman in your section came to you one day with this complaint: "You see, I have been here a month now and I hardly do anything. I'm not hard to satisfy, but I like to keep busy. Do you have a different job for me?" As this airman's supervisor, what should be your course of action? Case B: OversuppUed Lieutenant Don, Squadron Administrative Officer, walked into the supply building to see 2nd Lieutenant Birk, the unit supply officer. Just as he was about to enter Lieutenant Birk's office he overheard the following conversation coming from the office. Lieutenant Birk: "Airman Ball, that's the third time you've screwed up this week. 273 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP How am I going to explain to the old man why we've got 216,000 rolls of toilet paper on hand? Do you realize that's 20 years supply for this squadron? Airman Ball: "I'm sorry sir, but I thought I was ordering 2000 rolls, -not 2000 cases." Lieutenant Birk: "You're sorry all right. You were sorry about those tires we got yesterday too. What does a radar squadron do with thirty F-111 tires? If division finds out about that I'll be supplying refrigerators for the Eskimos at Thule next week." Airman Ball: "That was an honest mistake sir." Lieutenant Birk: "You've got to learn to be more careful, Ball. To impress you, I'm giving you 60 hours of extra duty. You work it off on nights and week-ends. Sergeant Jones will assign you some jobs." Lieutenant Don walks into the office. What should he say to Lieutenant Birk? Case C: Jerry, the Supervisor If you were Jerry's supervisor, how would you advise him after observing the following scene? Woody: "Hello, Jerry. Can I see you a minute?" Jerry: "Yeah, sit down, Woody." Woody: (Sitting by Jerry's desk) "Jerry, we've got to do something about the parking problem. The fellows are complaining about it. (Jerry turns his back slowly and looks reflective. He takes up a pad and pencil and jots down notes as Woody speaks) (Woody, continuing) "They really do have a rough time. It's almost a mile if they come around on the walk. On good days it's not so bad. They can come through that open field, but on rainy days it's just a sea of mud. Now I've got an idea. The instrument shQp has a lot just a block from here and their shop is almost next door to our parking lot. If we could trade with them-see what I mean Jerry-if we could just trade lots with the instrument shop. We've got to do something about it. Jerry:-(Obviously hasn't been listening, but has been writing a grocery list, comes to with a start) "Yeah, Woody, that's right we should. Now, do you have any ideas about it?" Woody: (Looking incredulously at Jerry) "Do I have any ideas?" (Gets up angrily. Turning on his heel, stalks out, slamming door.) Jerry: (Looking after Woody) "Now what's the matter with him? What's he got to get so huffy about?" (Looking on his desk for his grocery list) "Now where is that grocery list?" (Picks it up, tears it off the pad, and puts it in his pocket; he then busies himself with paper work about his desk, mumbling) "What did he want me to do-roll out the red carpet?" Jerry: (Finding production records) "Let's see now-units per day 15, 18, 21, 17. That doesn't sound right. What is this? These are last week's figures. Why the devil does that girl have to pick a time like this to make that kind of mistake?" (Stomps to door, puts head out, and bellows angrily) "Mildred! Come into my office." Mildred: (Mildred enters door, twisting her hankerchief in both hands and looking very nervous.) Jerry: (Gruffly) "Sit down." (Pushes production chart in front of Mildred.) Mildred: (Mildred starts to sniff and puts hankerchief to eyes.) Jerry: "Well what's the matter?" Mildred: (Mildred starts to cry, jumps up from chair, and runs out.) Jerry: "Oh, what's the use!" (Slams papers down on desk). What's the use? With all these prima donnas you have to work with, you might as well go home." (Jerry stomps out of office, slamming the door.) 274 READINGS AND CASE5-BE:F{AVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Case D: The Resignation Cy Evans is a recent addition to the instrumentation section run by Hal Winters. Cy proves to be a quiet, shy, but competent e?g~neer. He is thoroughly "wound up" in his JOb and spends hours in his room brushing up on new techniques. He tells no one about this. While he is not looked down on by the rest of the section, he is more or less ignored. He has some reason to feel that this is partly due to the fact that his degree was not from a "name school." He knows that he has been dubbed "The Farmer" by the section's funnymen. Cy is anxious to get ahead but his retiring nature makes him appear to others as being satisfied to stay where he is. Hal is pleased with Cy's progress and ~ork and. tells Cy this. He plans to move Cy mto the firSt branch chief spot that opens up but has not yet told this to Cy. He feels it will awaken Cy and develop his initiative. One morning when Cy" comes to work, the rest of the section is gathered in a group discussing something of general interest. As Cy nears the group, he notices several of the men glance sidewise at him. Just as he passes them, the room is filled with raucous laughter. Cy blushes furiously, hurries to his desk, and buries his face in his work. An hour later Hal is faced by a red-faced, nervous Cy who blurts out "I am resigning effective a week from Friday." Hal Winters has been "in the business" for six years. He is a graduate of Massachusettes lnstitute of Technology and is a highly competent engineer. He has completed most of the necessary work for his master's in electrical engineering through the Graduate Central. Hal is married and has two children. His h~me life is relatively smooth, although his wife sometimes complains that he doesn't spend enough time with the children. Most of his spare time is spent at a work bench in his basement. !Jal didn't really want the job of section chief but felt he had to take it to advance. f!e had no real difficulty with his crew, partially because of the crew and partially because his assistant section chief had acted as a buffer between him and personnel problems. As Cy is standing in front of him, Hal is probably thinking: 1. "Why do I always gefthe'prima donnas?" 2. "What is Cy after? I don't think he really wants to quit." 3. "He sure is unhappy." 4. "Isn't he acting a little childish though?" 5. "What have I done or failed to do?" . 0' J?vans grew up in a rural community in VIrgm~a. He had always been a studious but shy youngster. An only child, he had made his parents very proud when he became the first Evans to get a college education. Cy had worked for the telephone company but had changed jobs because this present job appeared to offer more opportunity and a chance to work in a situation requiring less personal contacts. Cy likes his job and his ambition is to become a top scientist. This, of course, he keeps to himself. He knows he must improve his ability to work with others but doesn't know how to go about it. The attitude of his co-workers has been bothering him and he has been interpreting their "knowing grins" and easy good humor as ridicule. As Cy is standing in front of Hal he is probably feeling (but not saying): 1. "I really don't want to resign." 2. '~I wish someone understood how feel." 3. "I can't stay with this job as long as these fellows keep making fun of me." 4. "Hal has been a pretty good supervisor." 5. "I'm sure the next job will be better than this." SCENE CONTINUES: Hal: "What's the idea Cy? Why do you want to quit?" Cy: "Well, I just don't think I can do my best work here." 275 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Hal: "What do you mean? Haven't we pile off his desk into the wastebasket, and given you all the support and equipstalks out of the room. ment you need?" How would you, as Maj. Bob Watson, Cy: "Yes, it isn't that-." handle this problem? Hal: "Well, what is it then? Aren't you satisfied .with your salary?" Case F: Clerical Error Cy: "Yes, but that's not the point" Airman Dill, a clerk in your section, hasHal: "What is your problem, Cy? Haven't I been making several rather costly clerical eralways treated you right?" rors. These necessitate so much extra workAfter a considerable amount of searching on the part of others that you have arrangedaround, Cy finally blurted out he wouldn't to have someone check everything that the stand for any more treatment like he was erring airman does. In the past, you havegetting from the crew. This resulted in a talked to Dill several times in a vain effort to great deal of embarrassment for both Cy and find out what his trouble is.Hal. One morning you are called by your supeHal: "Well Cy, this sounds pretty childish rior and "chewed out" because of a serious to me. It is not going to help you any to error that he has discovered in a form that quit. The thing to do is to go back there Dill prepared. The checker maintains that and face up to it like a man." this particular form was not even seen by him and accuses Dill of "short circuiting" FINALE: him. You call Dill into your office and reprimand him severely. The next day you learn The next day Cy turned in his resignation. that another airman in the section had preHow would you have handled this situation? pared the report while Dill was ill. This news renders your reprimand very untimely, if not Case E: Too Much Paper unjust. What should you do in this situation? Lt. Joe Henderson and Lt. Hal John son work in the same office under the 1. Call Dill in and apologize, admitting section chief, Maj. Bob Watson. Both Hendyour mistake. erson and Johnson are electronic engineers 2. Call in Dill and acknowledge your with laboratory experience. At present, their error, but let the reprimand stand because of job is to monitor contracts and this requires his generally poor performance. a large amount of paper work. Both accepted 3. Correct the man who prepared there the job because of temporary personnel port and determine ifhe had adequate instruc shortages although they would prefer to have tion for that job. 4. Get Dill, the checker, and the third air remained at "bench" jobs. man together, and point out that you are Lately, the paperwork has been on the in held responsible for the work they do; there crease. With turnover and replacements l-grrd fore, it is important that everything be cor to find, the work piles up on Joe and :A:al. rect. By pushing themselves, they barely manage 5. Concern yourself less with placing the to keep up with it. Today, however, themes blame and more with the elimination of the senger arrives with a new batch of papers errors. Enlisting the aid of all concerned, try adding about six inches each to the piles on to set up a system of checks that will elimi Joe's and Hal's desks. nate these errors. Hal observes all this quietly, takes a deep breath, and attacks the pile in front of him. Case G: The EightbaO Joe comes in, and looks at the pile incredously. He paces around the desk nervously. Sometimes it is hard to tell whether a man Suddenly, he lets out a shout, sweeps the is an eightball because of inability or lack of 276 READINGS AND CASES-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP motivation. If it is merely a problem of moti vation, there is usudly a solution. The squadron had an eightball-he was Airman Wakefield. Everyone said Wakefield had gotten off to a poor start. A "personality clash," they called it, between him and Ser geant Bishop. Though he showed flashes of talent, Wakefield's performance was gener ally poor and he saw the squadron com mander on a number of unhappy occasions. First Lieutenant Hayes got Wakefield transferred to another section, but things there went from bad to worse. Wakefield had been assigned to Sergeant Johnson and John son had a reputation for "squaring away" deviant and recalcitrant airmen. What is more, Johnson was a friend of Sergeant Bishop. By the end of his first week in John son's section, Wakefield was AWOL. A day later, when Wakefield returned from his first AWOL, he was given an Article 15, and was subjected to even more intensive "shaping up" efforts by Sergeant Johnson and the rest of the noncommissioned officers. Wakefield soon went AWOL again. This time he was picked up three weeks later 1,700 miles away. For this he went to the confinement facility. When Wakefield left the confinement facility, he was sent right back to Johnson's section in spite of his request to be moved. None of the other sections wanted him. Sergeant Johnson continued to work at shaping him up and Wakefield continued to get into trouble. This brought on further punishment and finally a decision to put him before an administrative board. Before this action was completed, however, a new squadron commander took over and decided to try again to rehabilitate Wakefield. What are some courses of action open to the new commander? Where does the problem appear to lie? Is it a question of ability or motivation? Case H: The Inspection The Wing was notified on July 30 that an inspection was scheduled to be conducted during the period August 1-15 by a team of inspectors. Colonel Smith, commander of the Wing, called a meeting of his staff and group and squadron commanders to alert them for this inspection. He gave everyone specific instructions as to what he wanted in the way of preparation. When he came to the instructions for the maintenance squadron, he noticed that Major White, the squadron commander, was not present. He asked Colonel Jones, the maintenance group commander, where Major White was and received the reply that the major was on leave and would not be back until August 8. The maintenance group commander asked Colonel Smith if he wanted to give him any instructions for the maintenance squadron as this squadron was part of his group. Colonel Smith replied, "No, I'll take care of it myself." During the interim period everyone was busy preparing for the inspection, especially Colonel Smith, who in the rush of things, forgot all about the maintenance squadron. The inspectors arrived on schedule and began their inspection. As the inspection progressed through the first week, Colonel Smith got the impression that things were not going too well, and he was not in a very good mood. On 8 August Major White returned from leave and on 9 August the inspectors visited his squadron. Colonel Smith was in the habit of accompanying the inspectors to introduce the commanders and to keep in close touch with things. When he entered the maintenance squadron area he noticed that it had not been properly policed; he looked outside the shops and noticed two airplanes parked there and he wanted all aircraft parked on the line. In the orderly room, , he noticed some men wearing blouses and some men wearing shirts. He had wanted all men to wear blouses. Colonel Smith was ready to blow his top, and when he went into Major White's office with the inspectors, he did. He said, "Damn it, White, why didn't you carry out my instructions? Your area looks like a pig pen; 277 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP you've got airplanes parked by your shops and half of your men are out of uniform." Major White was taken so by surprise that he barely managed to stutter some noncommital remark. Colonel Smith, still glowering, stomped out of the office, leaving everyone silent and uncomfortable. After he returned to headquarters, Colonel Smith called Colonel Jones, the maintenance ·group commander, and wanted to know why his instructions had not been carried out by Major White and the maintenance squadron. Colonel Jones reminded the wing commander that he had informed them at the staff meeting held prior to the inspection that he would take care of the mainte nance squadron himself. Colonel Smith recalled that this was so and he dismissed Colonel Jones. After the inspection was completed, the inspection team held a critique at which all staff officers and unit commanders of the wing were present. The wing and its units re ceived a satisfactory rating with the excep tion of the maintenance squadron which had been rated unsatisfactory. In replying to the critique, Colonel Smith thanked the team for their report and stated that if the maintenance squadron commander had carried out his orders as the other com manders had, all of the units would have re ceived a satisfactory rating. After the inspection team had left the base, Colonel Smith noticed a growing cool ness and aloofness in his officers. Within a week Colonel Smith received a request for transfer from Major White. It was apparent to Colonel Smith that an embarrassing situa tion was developing. Which of the following actions was mainly responsible forthe situation in which Colo nel Smith presently fmds himself? 1. Losing his temper and bawling out a subordinate officer in front of the inspectors. 2. Failure to delegate authority and responsibility. 3. Blaming someone else for his own mistakes. 4. Following the inspectors around instead of staying in his office. 5. In view of his long service and experience, failure to recognize and correct the ~ituation. Case 1: The Form Error I am a first lieutenant. At 1655 today, I received a squadron monthly report from one of my clerks, an airman, who is one of my best administrative men. I checked his report and noticed a form error. It could not be corrected without retyping the entire report. This would take at least three more hours. Another way to handle this would be to mail out the report and run a correction on the following day indicating the error. My clerk very ~.:arely makes mistakes. This error might not have occurred, except for the fact that at present we are undergoing a terrific turnover of personnel and meeting all kinds of deadlines. Many times in the past the airman has volunteered to work at night to keep our records up to date. I took this report into the squadron com mander's office for his signature and brought the error to his attention. The commander is very "GI" and particular about any work which leaves the office. He ordered me to have my clerk go to chow, but to come right back and retype the report as a corrective measure so that this would not happen again in the future. I was to make sure that it went out in tonight's mail. The airman got "teed off" and said he thought it was "stuff for the birds," and that the report would not bounce back if we had sent it out as he first submitted it. · Described below are four possible courses of action. 1. In a diplomatic way, order the airman to retype the report. Make him understand that his past performance has been excellent but that he has to take orders and carry them out. Explain to him that no military organization can operate any other way, and some day he will give orders and expect them to be carried out. 2. Firmly order the airman to retype the report. Make him understand his responsibility to carry out the commander's orders to the best of his ability. 278 READINGS AND CASES-BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 3. Ask him to retype the report. The airman once more insists that he is swamped with work. Let him take off and tell him that you will take care of it. After he leaves, you retype the report and then mail it out. 4. Let the airman mail the report out as it is. In the morning have the airman follow it up by sending through a correction indicating the error. Case .J: Ainnan .Jensen As Airman Jensen hurried past the orderly room, he was stopped by Sergeant Means, "Jensen, will you come into the office a minute? I would like to talk to you alone." Jensen entered the office, obviously agitated and fidgety. The sergeant started out in a kindly tone. "Jensen, I noticed your bunk wasn't made up this morning. Now you've been a good airman up to now and I don't want to have to get harsh. Why don't you make your bunk and do good work from here on in?" Jensen started to say, "But Sarge " "No buts, Jensen. There's no excuse for letting a thing like that go." With that he gave Jensen a friendly shove out of the office and Jensen hurried on his way. Later in the day Sergeant Means remarked to the commanding ·officer, "I guess I will have put the screws to Jensen. I told him in a proper manner to make up his bunk and he still hasn't done it." "Come into my office a minute," said the commanding officer, "I want to talk to you." Sergeant Means reacted to a symptom, the unmade bunk, and extrapolated from the bunk the conclusion that Airman Jensen was doing an unsatisfactory job and needed some shaping-up. But did he? Here is what would have happened if Sergeant Means had taken a problem-solving approach. As Airman Jensen hurried past the orderly room he was stopped by Sergeant Means, "Jensen, I would like to see you in the office a moment." Jensen entered the office, obviously agi tated and fidgety. "You seem to be upset, Jensen. Is any thing wrong?" "Yes, Sergeant. I received word this morning that my father is very ill and I am trying to get away-on emergency leave." "I see. I guess that explains why your bunk was unmade this morning." "Well, yes. I was called up to the Red Cross before reveille, but Jackson said he would make my bunk up. I guess he forgot. I'm sorry it didn't get made." "That's O.K., Jensen. I don't want to hold you up under the circumstances. You've been a fine airman and I was worried about the bunk. What can we do to clear the way for you?" "I guess everything is taken care of, Sergeant. The CO, himself, took care of all the arrangements. I have to hurry now and get to the flight line. They're holding a plane for me." "You'd better get along then. We'll take care of your bunk. I sure hope your father has a quick recovery." "Thanks, Sergeant, I really appreciate what all of you have done for me!" Case K: The Missing Tapes A new method for filing computer tapes has been approved and a standard operating procedure formally established. The method is simply to file the tapes in chronological order according to date within each subject. Each Friday Master Sergeant Frazer spot checks the tape cabinets to determine their condition and other points. Last week he found four tapes in Airman Terry's group which ha~ not been rearranged.( When they had discussed the matter initiaJ]y, Airman Terry did not have an acceptable answer. In today's spot check, he found seven tapes in Airman Terry's group of cabinets that were out of place and had not been rearranged. Sergeant Frazer decided to again discuss the situation with Airman Terry. Sergeant Frazer: "Airman Terry, when it's convenient for you, I'd like to see you at my desk for a minute." 279 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP find seven other tapes out of place, Airman Terry: "AU right, Sergeant Frazer, I'll be right over." (Airman Terry none of which have been rearranged, in walks over to Sergeant Frazer's desk.) one of your cabinets during my spot check this morning?" Sergeant Frazer: "Well, if you look in cabi Sergeant Frazer: "Airman Terry, I'd like to net 10 you will find them. T.erry, I aptalk with you about your progress in preciate your hard, steady work and the rearranging the cabinets. You know we volume you handle, but we can't have forwarded a report that the project had such carelessness. You know what hap been completed, yet I still find active pens when filing is not properly accom tapes that haven't been rearranged. plished. It messes up everything and be What is the status of your files?" sides the Captain gets quite disturbed Airman Terry: "I've completed all in my about it. Now, Terry, what can yougroup, except some few that have been suggest to prevent such recurrences?"charged out for some time. As they are Airman Terry: "Why, Sergeant Frazer, I returned, I complete the rearrangement just don't know. I can't understand howbefore replacing them in the file." it happened. I'm being as careful as ISergeant Frazer: "Do you always complete can now and still be able to keep upthe rearrangement of returned tapes bewith the work." fore filling them?" Sergeant Frazer: "Well, Terry, try to be Airman Terry: "Yes, Sergeant. I examine more careful. The efficiency of manythem as they are returned and place all workers depends on how complete and t~e ones to be rearranged on my desk. up to date our files are." When I've caught up, I rearrange Airman Terry: "Yes, Sergeant, I'll do my them." best." (As Airman Terry arises and Sergeant Frazer: "I see, but at least four got starts to leave, Airman James, a cothrough to the files last week. Is that worker, walks up and hands Terry a right, Terry?" sheet of paper.) Airman Terry: "Well, yes, but " Airman James: "Terry, here's a list of tapes Sergeant Frazer: "Never mind about them that were transferred to us yesterday. I now. You said Monday they had been put the tapes for your group in cabinet fixed up. The thing I'm wondering 10. about now is, how does it happen that I Airman Terry: "Thanks, James." 280 Chapter 7 A Multidimensional Approach to Leadership T EADERSHIP has many measurable aspects or dimensions, yet there are numerL ous other factors in the leadership process, that have not yet been measured or subjected to scientific inquiry. This chapter will examine some of the factors of both . types. In the definition of leadership as the process of influencing people, individually and in groups, to effectively accomplish organizational missions, the key term is "influencing." "Influencing" is a very broad term and includes all the many known and unknown factors which, in interacting, achieve results without the overt use of power. For example, there are some situations where the most appropriate leadership act might be to issue a direct order. However, this is not the usual means of achieving a desired response. Most truly effective leaders get things done by estab lishing an environment that is conducive to follower behavior. Invariably, when leaders establish such an environment, they interrelate three critical variables-the leader, the group, and the situation. Formal leaders derive authority or power from the position they hold. The special authority and responsibility granted to a commander is an example of position power. The mere fact that an officer is a designated commander, however, does not make him an effective leader. Some commanders are highly effective leaders; others are totally ineffective: there is a broad spectrum in between. We place special emphasis on this point because there seems to be a rather common misapprehension among junior officers that position power is highly correlated with effective leadership. This may or may not be true, as we will see when we examine the leader variable in this chapter. The leader is only one of the three critical variables in the leadership process. Another is the group. Lt Gen Albert P. Clark in his introductory remarks to the Symposium on Organizational Behavior in the Air Force, USAF Academy, 11 August 1969, noted: ... in our highly complex and technical military service today, the traditional form of personal leadership (sometimes referred to as "heroic"), is changing markedly to a managerial form. This is certainly true in the Air Force-the wide range of skills required in our typical team effort demands group consensus and team member inputs of judgment and thinking participation in decision making. The "charge of the light brigade" approach is being replaced by one which puts greater emphasis on human relations and group motivation to achieve effective performance. Ours is a pluralistic society which demands interrelationships and interdependences of the kind normally associated with the managerial function. The "lone wolf'' leader is, by necessity, a vanishing phenomenon. Today's leader must understand group behavior and be able to work with groups if he is to be effective. 281 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP The third principal variable is the situation-the environment in which the leadership process takes place. Some situational influences are clear-cut; others are obscure. For example, the leadership demanded of a professional quarterback during acrucial game requires specialized expertise, long experience, and unique physical attributes. A different type of work might require other leadership capabilities and characteristics or the same ones in a different degree. Few men can be all things in all situations. A retired officer, who may have been an effective military leader, may or may not be a leader in a civilian pursuit, because his abilities may or may not match group and situational needs.We suggest reading selections A and B in chapter 8 at this time. "Leadership" by S. G. Huneryager and I. L. Heckmann* is an introductory discussion of leadership intheir text, Human Relations in Management. It summarizes their approach to leadership and emphasizes those concepts that they find important.Both Huneryager and Heckmann and James V. Spotts, author of "The Problemof Leadership: A Look at Some Recent Findings of Behavioral Science Research,"*examine some of the differing approaches to leadership theory. A better understanding of these varying views can be achieved by comparing the underlying assumptions of the supporters of each approach and the conditions under which varying leadership behaviors appear to be most effective. A look at the research methodology the authors used to collect their data also will be helpful. Their conclusionsappear to support the view that there is no single best approach to the study of leadership behavior, but rather that leadership is a complex, multidimensional processthat has yet to be fully explored. EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP This text makes the fundamental assumption that Air Force leadership takes placewithin organized groups whose members have the technical competence to perform their tasks, adequate organization to carry out their tasks, and high goals which theystrive to meet. It is a leadership environment in which the critical missions of the AirForce are recognized and in which the best possible way of achieving high performance goals in an effective manner is of vital concern.Equally important is the concept that inappropriate leadership behavior can reduce the effective performance of organized groups and result in lower organizational cohesiveness, deterioration of technical skills, and adoption of lower or substitute performance goals. Three terms frequently used in leadership study deserve special comment. Theleadership expressed in Figure 7-11 is attempted leadership. As an example, if A isattempting to change B's behavior in any way, A is exhibiting attempted leadership.If, as shown in Figure 7-2, B's behavior does change in response to A's attempted leadership, A's leadership has been successful. Any resultant behavior of B couldrange over a continuum from very successful to very unsuccessful depending on A----------.... B Figure 7-1. AHempted leadership. • See pp. 305-309. • See pp. 310-322. 1 Suggested by Bernard M. Bass in Leadership, Psychology, and Organtwlo1UZI Behavior. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960). 282 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP Attempted Leadership B A--------< Unsuccessfu I Figure 7-2. Successful leadership. whether or not B was able to do the task that A influenced him to attempt. Whenever B performs the required task, it is A's leadership that is successful. There is an aspect of this seemingly simple model that is easily overlooked. We want to be sure that besides simply performing a task B performs it willingly and cooperatively. Thus, a task should not only be performed, it should be performed as a result of A's winning B's "confidence, respect, and loyal coorperation." Adding willing and cooperative behavior to the initial model gives another continuum that denotes the effectiveness factor. Therefore, as seen in Figure 7-3, A's leadership is termed effective if B not only performs the task but if he also satisfied his personal needs in doing so. If leadership is effective, B will look for ways to improve work procedures and, in turn, influence other group members to improve their performance. Ineffective leadership, on the other hand, occurs when B does the task unwillingly and only performs it because A has the power of reward and punishment over him. If leadership is ineffective, B will loaf when A is not around and will have to be coerced to work. This would require A's close supervision, detailed instructions, or other forms of specific guidance to keep B productive. Figure 7-3 shows a wide range of possible behaviors along the continuums which probably result from the interplay of leader, group, and situational variables. Consideration of this interplay is commonly called the interactional approach in the study of the leadership process. But it is not the only approach that has been given serious consideration. Trait and situational approaches have had their supporters; we shall consider them in the order of their chronological development. THE TRAIT APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP Historically, the trait approach is the oldest approach to leadership study. The history of military leadership demonstrates that the military usually has been a mirror image of its parent culture. The military acquires its value systems from the culture in which it exists and assumes both the strengths and weaknesses of the culture. A society based primarily on privilege customarily trained its talented and fortunate members to be responsible for the welfare of the less fortunate. The underlying concept was that men were born to be either leaders or followers. Because noblemen 283 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Effective Successful Attempted Leadership B Ineffective A------~ Unsuccessful Figure 7-3. Successful and effective leadership. were well born, it was assumed that they possessed leadership qualities and that all others were necessarily followers. The military structure of such societies was com posed of officer-noblemen and soldier-serfs. Since leaders came almost solely from those of noble birth, the trait approach was a logical theory. Eugene E. Jennings, in his An Anatomy of Leadership,2 suggests that the "great man" theory is the forerunner of modem leadership theory. He says, in part: Our modern concept of leadership is most difficult to entertain for any great lengthof time. Inevitably we become bogged down in such interminable questions as what constitutes leadership, is leadership personality or fate, what constitutes social change and progress? If we consider only the empirical studies, leadership turns out to be an omnibus term indiscriminately applied to such varied activities as playground leader,committee chairman, club president, business executive, or politician. However, if one believes that word meani~gs have a history, then we begin to see that leadership seems to represent a set of ideas which cannot be empirically described or operationally studied with ease. We see then that leadership is represented mainly by an emotional and even an unconscious attitude rather than an intellectual or rational attitude. This may be one reason why the attempt to study leadership scientificallyhas not provided a widely accepted body of knowledge as to what leadership is and does. The parent of our modern approach to leadership is the great man theory. The word leadership itself can be traced at least as far back as early Greek and Latin and is derived from the verb to act. Arendt shows that the two Greek verbs archein (to begin, to lead, and finally, to rule) and prattein (to pass through, to achieve, to finish)correspond to the two Latin verbs agere (to set into motion, to lead) and gerere (theoriginal meaning of which was to bear.)" It was believed that each action is divided into • (New York: Harper Brothers, Publishers, 1960.) pp. 2-4, 8. • Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19S8,) pp. 188 ff. 284 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP two parts, the beginning, made by a single person, and the achievement, performed by others who, "bearing" and "finishing" the enterprise, see it through. We see that the two words designating the verb to act are closely related in both Greek and Latin. The beginner or leader depends upon others for help; the followers are dependent upon him for an occasion to act. In time, suggests Arendt, the original interdependence of action between leader and follower became split into two different functions: the function of giving commands, which became the prerogative of the leader, and the function of executing them, which became the duty of his followers. Thus the act of initiating or beginning isolates an individual from others before he finds others to join him. "Yet the strength of the beginner or leader shows itself only in his initiative and the risk he takes, not in the actual achievement." Contrary to what many social scientists believe, leadership, as far back as the early Greek and Latin, did not necessarily mean that followers were completely dependent upon leaders. There was a degree of interdependence between the leader and the follower, much as is the case today. The successful leader then may have claimed for himself what actually was the achievement of many, and perhaps through this claim, the leader monopolized the strength of those without whose help be would not have achieved anything. It is probably in this way that the delusion of extraordinary strength arose and with it the fallacy of the strong man who is powerful because he is alone. . . . To summarize, leaders exist so that there may be better organization, better adapta tion, or greater individuals. They are viewed as essential in that they formulate theories, policies, and ideals that give direction and character to an age, and their presence and character help to define the character of society. The quality of their contribution is such that history is substantially changed. Many authorities, including Eugene Jennings, cite Thomas Carlyle4 as the most widely-read exponent of the "great man" theory. His concept is summed up in his statement "the history of the world is the biography of great men." In other words, great men are creators rather than creatures of their age. These men of superior insight, courage, and charisma are the most important influences on the history of mankind. Scholars have attempted consistently to isolate some of the personal trruts which have been attributed historically to great leaders. Some investigators have suggested such characteristics as superior intelligence, perseverance, endurance, and so forth, as marking men for military, industrial, or governmental leadership. And, over the years, other traits such as integrity, humaneness, technical competence, communications facility, and human relations skill, have been added, The list of leadership traits seems to be virtually endless, and the trait approach to leadership necessarily encompasses both innate and acquired characteristics. Despite all of the personal traits that can be listed, however, scientific research has failed to uncover any generalized cause and effect relationships of predictive value. The reading selection by Cecil E. Goode, "Significant Research on Leadership,"* presents one of the first comprehensive reviews of the published literature on leadership. And, although many studies have been made since this 1951 article, Goode's general conclusions have not been challenged. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway discusses his concept of the three chief ingredients of leadership--character, courage, and competence in his article "Leadership."** Of particular interest is the emphasis he places on character, which he describes as "the bedrock on which the whole edifice of leadership rests." While we have included this reading in our discussion of the trait approach to leadership, we do not mean to infer • On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic In History. Lecture 1 (London: 1. M. Dent and Sons Ltd. 1948.) • See pp. 322-329. • • See pp. 330-336. 285 CONCEPTS OF Affi FORCE LEADERSHIP that General Ridgway is an advocate of the classic trait theory. On the contrary, hisconcluding suggestions for leadership development clearly show that he views leadership as multidimensional, a view fully compatible with his emphasis on leadership asan art more than a science.Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird expressed much the same view as that ofGeneral Ridgway in a speech to the graduating class of Armed Forces Staff College,June 1969, when he noted: Once it was enough that the military leader excel in strength and stamina and courage.Today, the range of talents required is infinitly broader, and the emphasis is on brainpower and character. . . . We need military leaders who understand this complex worldin which we live, the philosophies men live by, the leaders and people of other nations,their history, their customs, their aspirations, their problems. We need military leaderswho understand the scientific revolution of recent years, the physics and mathematics or other sciences that have given us the power to relieve human misery or to destroy eachother. We need military leaders who understand the techniques of managing bafflingly com plex organizations. But no intellectual brilliance and no technical capacity will be enough to qualify one for military leadership unless it is combined with qualities of character that inspire other men to give forth their best efforts in a common cause. The third reading selection is Eugene E. Jennings' "The Anatomy of Leadership."* Professor Jennings places particular importance on the constraining influences of modern organizational structures and life as they inhibit and modify theleadership process. Social, cultural, and economic changes have placed difficult bar riers between men of action and the action. However, as Jennings points out, if aman has a sense of purpose, power, and self-confidence, he can overcome these difficulties. He notes, "In numerous studies of contemporary and historical figures, thesethree qualities stand out as essential to fulfilling the role of leadership. When anyone of these qualities is lacking, leadership suffers."Research related to the trait approach to leadership has focused primarily ontraits which appear to contribute to a leader's success. The reading selection by John G. Geier, "A Trait Approach to the Study of Leadership in Small·Groups"** takes a different perspective by examining factors which seem to eliminate persons fromleadership roles in the judgment of other group members. Several outcomes of thisstudy are particularly noteworthy. First, the pattern of leadership emergence wasabout the same in each group. Members possessing what the group considered negative leadership characteristics were eliminated in the first stage followed by a secondstage characterized by intense competition for the leadership role among the survivors. Since Air Force leadership normally involves groups, the characteristics whichGeier found to elicit a negative response should be of special interest. In the firststage, members who were uninformed, did not participate, or were extremely rigidwere rejected as leadership candidates by their peers. In the second stage, leadercandidates who were able to solicit "right hand" men, were more democratic, andwere able to express themself in a manner which was not offensive to the group weremore likely to emerge as group leaders. Thus, in this academically oriented, nonstructured situation, the traits of leadership candidates could either help or hinderthem become leaders. The conclusion of this study notes, however, that" . . . leadership resides not exclusively in the individual, but in his functional relationship with fellow members and the goal accomplishment." • See pp. 337-348••• See pp. 348-353. 286 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP Based on our brief discussion of the classic trait approach to leadership and consideration of the four related reading selections, we can draw the following general conclusions: Successful leaders individually demonstrate some innate characteristics, but these characteristics or traits do not explain the total reason for their success nor do these traits appear in such frequency that we can legitimately make cause and effect judgments. Leadership roles differ and these differences require a variety of leadership qualities in the men who are to assume the roles successfully. Certain traits, such as intelligence, breadth of interest, verbal ability, maturity, drive, communicative ability, and physical attributes, seem to be related to leaders more than to followers. While they do not make a leader, they assist him in the complex process of becoming one. THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP One of the initial breaks from the trait approach to leadership study came from a group of scholars who felt that factors inherent in the leadership situation were the most important forces affecting leadership. While there may be many similarities among leadership situations, each situation has its own unique characteristics which, according to adherents of the situational approach, dictate the type of leadership that the situation needs. What are some of the situational variables which may influence leadership behavior? The reader should note that this section examines the theory that situational factors alone determine leaders. The subsequent section on the interactional approach considers situational variables in combination with other variables. This is an important distinction. There is a vast difference between theorizing that leadership is solely a product of the situation and theorizing that situational variables are important, but not controlling. The principal point made by the supporters of the situational approach is that leadership is specific to the situation. A given situation, therefore, calls forth a spe cific kind of leader who has the requisite characteristics or traits. Two examples that illustrate situation variables are given below; more detailed discussion will be pre sented later in the chapter in connection with the aspects of the interactional ap proach to leadership. For example, let us suppose that a recurring malfunction in the fire-control systems of a new type of aircraft has significantly reduced the number of these aircraft available for combat operations, thereby preventing the squadron from performing its primary mission. Since the maintenance squadron has failed to find the trouble, anew maintenance officer, experienced in trouble-shooting similar sys tems, is temporarily assigned to the squadron to locate and correct the malfunction. During the time the new officer is working on the problem, he directs the mainte nance squadron, and all of its facilities are at his disposal. When he has successfully solved the problem, normal operations resume under the original leadership. In this example, did the situation call forth leadership or was it a combination of situation, leader, and perhaps even group factors that operated to get the job done? The problem inherent in strict adherence to the situational concept is that a person supposedly could lead only under certain well-defined situational constraints. These constraints would dictate the proper leader who would emerge to take the helm and guide the organization successfully through troubled waters. One of the classic case studies illustrating the situational approach is the one titled "Major Gannett's Lecture." After reading this case, the reader should ask himself what enabled Stubb to become a leader. 287 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP MAJOR GANNETI"S LECTURE People still talk about Major Gannett's lecture on leadership. Some say that Gannett was talking to hear himself talk, that no one was the wiser when he was done. Others will tell you that Gannett tackled the subject in a way so that when he was done youfound yourself thinking. They all admit that Gannett wound up with a question that has never been answered. Gannett began his lecture in a rather negative way. There was, momentarily, the feeling that here was the same old stuff all over again. We officers settled back to listen, if not with respect for his words, then for the DSC on his chest. Gendemen (Gannett began), so much has been said about leadership that one who ventures to lecture on it takes the chance of being repetitious. Not that a subject as important as leadership won't bear repetition. However (he continued), at the risk of merely entertaining you, I am going to give you a story, and not a lecture, on the subject. Forgive me if the word "I" appears too frequendy for modesty's sake, although I assure you that it is not my story, but that of Lieutenant Stubb. It is an acconnt of Stubb's success and failure as a leader. His success came under one set of conditions, his failure under another. Late in 1944, gendemen, my rifle company had been fighting continuously for five weeks near Colmar, France. At the end of that time I found myself without officers;they had been killed or wounded, and similar attrition had affected most of my noncommissioned officers. This situation was hardly normal, and I doubt if I myself was more than fifty percent effective. I needed men and I needed officers. I got some men,and I got an officer-Lieutenant Stubb. We are often swayed by first impressions. When Stubb reported at my CP [commandpost]-a hole in the side of a hiii-I gave him one look and with difficulty refrained from exclaiming, "Oh God!" He was something to look at. He was a young man of %3 or %4, and he was fat and sloppy as no young man should be. He had a round, chubby face, and it was covered with a light, blond fuzz. Except at the poiut of his chin; here, apparently, he had elected to grow a beard, for about a dozen blond whiskers formed the beginning of a goatee, and they were longer and darker than others on his face. He had round, babyblue eyes, and a small, weak mouth. He was armed to the teeth. Slung over one fat shoulder was a burp gun, over another a carbine. At each hip was a pistol-a Luger and our own .45 Colt. Beneath his pile jacket I could see the oudine of a holster-he later told me that it contained a Beretta pistol. That was not all. Dangling like grapes from his harness were about ten grenades of all types--fragmentation and chemical. He was a walking arsenal. He informed me in a thin, undeveloped voice that he had just come from the States in the replacement pipeline, that he was anxious to get into combat, and what did I want him to do? He ended up by saying that I looked all in and should get some sleep.He would, he said, look over the company dispositions while I rested. I remember cussing battalion for sending me such an apparation. And I remember wondering by what strange process the Army had commissioned him. At any rate, he was my baby now, and I lent him my mnner and he went on a tour of the platoon areas. We were in a temporary defensive situation and the company was dug in generally around a bald hill. It was about UOO hours. Around midnight they hit us without warning, I was an immediate casualty-a bullet crease across the forehead, not deep, not serious, but enough to knock me out. Stubb led the company. The fire fight lasted about forty minutes. Stubb organized a counter-attack with the support platoon. Led it himself. My mnner told me that Stubb was in the middle of everything-firing, throwing his grenades, and hollering.The men followed him. The next morning, my head bandaged like a hero, I counted sixty enemy dead. I looked at Stubb with new eyes, gentlemen. He was a leader. I put him in for the Silver Star, but they cut it to the Bronze Star. Said that was what an officer was supposed to do. The next night we had a combat patrol; battalion wanted us to raid a farmhouse where they figured the enemy had an observation post. We knew it might be a tough job.Stubb volunteered to take the patrol and I watched him getting it ready-fat, sloppy, tbin-voiced, and armed to the teeth as usual. It was a grotesque sight, to see him waddling off into the darkness at the head of that patrol. But there was something 288 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP about him-something intangible-and you could see that the men followed him confidently, even cockily. The patrol was gone a long time. It seemed they ran afoul of that nasty enemy habit-mines. Stubb, leading the patrol, picked his way ponderously through the minefield and at the same time whispered back to the men to follow exactly in his footsteps. The patrol sergeant told me later that he was more scared of Stubb than he was of the mines. He thought Stubb would surely step on one, and with all that arsenal on him the 'patrol would go up in a blaze of glory. But Stubb got them through and they approached the farmhouse and surrounded it. There wasn't much left of the bouse, but the cellar was still intact. Stubb went forward alone, knifed-yes, he carried a knife too-a sentry at the cellar entrance, and broke in on eight of the enemy including an artillery captain. Battalion was pleased with the prisoners and the whole operation, particularly since Stubb blew up that cozy CP with a satchel charge. Gentlemen, that man was a leader. A week later we pushed off for the final phase of the Colmar battle. I got some metal through my right leg in the first hour of advance, and Stubb took over the company. He led it brilliantly through that and other campaigns. I heard about it in my hospital bed, and got a note from Stubb saying he'd been promoted to captain and that the company was doing fine and that he hoped I was. I'll give you just one more of his combat exploits and then I'll go into his failure. It seemed that the battalion was held up-seriously held up--by some anti-aircraft guns. The Germans had depressed the guns, were firing direct at our infantry. It was pretty murderous. The situation called for something special in the way of leadership, and Stubb didn't let the situation down. He got up out of his ditch and started toward those guns at the head of 2d Platoon, and the 1st and 3d acting as a base of fire. The rest is history. Stubb reached the guns, blazing away with his private arsenal, and instead of destroying their breeches, he had them swiveled around and turned on the retreating enemy. "Stubb's Artillery," it came to be known. He got the DSC for that. So there you have him, gentlemen. An extraordinary combat leader. A man whom men would follow. A man who could fight. And incidentally, a fat, sloppy, comical officer. Certainly not the usual concept of the officer-leader •••• Now I want to tell you about his failure. You remember that I told you he failed under a different set of conditions. After the war, in 1946, I found myself commanding a battalion in the States, and one day Captain Stubb walked into my headquarters and reported for duty. I was glad to see him. At that time the officer situation was in a state of flux-we had them one day, they were gone the next. And we had a job to do. So I was glad to have a combat man like Stubb. He was, I noted, as fat as ever, as sloppy as ever, as rumpled as ever. His suntan uniform was stained and his shoes were dirty. The blond fuzz on· his face would be a week old in three days. His belt buckle was covered with verdigris and his tie (the wrong shade) was askew. He wasn't drunk; he was just Stubb. I could remember that by look· ing at the DSC with cluster on his unpressed shirt. He wanted to know what I wanted him to do, and I gave him Company A and a lot of talk on the training program and the administrative program, and so on. The housekeeping in Company A, I said, was not what it ought to be. The administration, frankly, stank. The training was little better. Get it straightened out, I told him. I suppose, gentlemen, that by now you are beginning to guess what happened. You're right. Stubb was a complete failure in peacetime. He settled into the damnedest, •most comfortable rut you ever saw, and nothing I could do seemed to get him out of it. If Company A's administration smelled when Stubb took over, it became unbearably odoriferous after he had been in command awhile. The same went for the training. It was terrible. Stubb wouldn't seem to take the trouble, although I think that is probably unfair. It was just that he couldn't get the inspiration to do a good job in the daily routine of garrison life. I had many private talks with Stubb. Such a man is entitled to a lot of consideration, and I gave him plenty. In the end, it was no use, and I bad to relieve him. He was transferred quietly somewhere. 289 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Supposing Stubb applied for a commission in the Regular Army, what would the evaluating officer decide? Should Stubb be retained in some type of organizational limbo until another combat situation arose? Can the military services afford specialists whose unique talents are only applicable under very limited conditions? In this day of multiple demands for all of our resources, the Air Force must have officers who have both specialized and generalized leadership abilities; who can perform a number of operational, technical, and administrative jobs; and who have the potential to advance into senior command and staff positions. This view is supported by the many scientific studies which report that situational factors are important, but are not the sole determinants in making a leader. They must be considered in concert with leader and group variables-the topic of our next section. In his article, "Leadership: Man and Function,"* Alex Bavelas, Professor of Psychology at Stanford University, discusses both the trait and situational approaches. His remarks provide a comprehensive summary of the two views just discussed. THE INTERACTIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP The fundamental assumption of the interactional approach to leadership is that leadership should not be studied through an examination of specific leadership variables, such as personal characteristics or traits, but rather as the product of complex interaction among several variables-the leader, group, and situation. A study of trait and situational theories helps an understanding of leadership theory, for it shows how current leadership theories developed, but it does not fully explain the leadership process. At this point, we refer the reader to "Leadership, Membership, and Organization." by Ralph M. Stogdill, of Ohio State University.* Professor Stogdill is one of the pioneers in the scientific investigation of leadership theory and has made many valuable contributions to the study of this subject. The article has been included because it provides an historical perspective on leadership research performed more than two decades ago. We also recommend reading "The Skills of Leadership," by Joseph A. Olmstead.** Dr. Olmstead discusses interpersonal influence in some detail, with particular emphasis on the group, situational, and leader influences as they interact. The Leader Variable To understand properly the leader variable within the Air Force, a knowledge of the responsibility, author!ty, and functions of the Air Force commander and his staff is necessary, because Air Force leadership is generally exercised within the context of such a formal organization. Air Force leaders are officially assigned or appointed to organizational positions where their superiors expect them to provide leadership. If a person is assigned to a potential leadership position, such as executive staff officer, and does not try to influence anyone, he is not a leader. He must do more than occupy; he must activate. THE ~OMMANDER.-The,most important single role in the Air Force is that of the commander because he has the ultimate responsibility to accomplish the organizational mission. Actually, of course, all members of the organization share the dif • See pp. 354-358. • See pp. 359-367. • • See pp. 368-373. 290 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP fused obligation to accomplish the mission, but the commander has the ultimate responsibility in that he will be held accountable for any failure. As described in Air Force regulation 35-54, Rank, Precedence, Command, command is: . . • exercised by virtue of office and the special assignment of officers and warrant officers holding military grades who are eligible by law to exercise command. In addition to the normal operation of the command function as specified by custom and regulation, a basic responsibility exists for all officers to assume command temporarily when essential to good order and discipline or in an emergency. While junior officers generally will be assigned to staff positions, all officers are potential commanders and, therefore, must be prepared to assume command if ap pointed by law or situation. The assignment to command includes ( 1) legal authority to give and enforce orders and commands, (2) legal authority to punish for refusal to obey lawful orders, and (3) sole responsibility for accomplishment of organizational mission. Because command is so important in the Air Force, the following portions of Air Force regulation 35-54 have been included: Command of an Air Force Installation, Unit, and/or Activity. The Air Force mission and force structure require the best use of command capabilities of all officers eligiblefor command, whether rated or nonrated. Therefore, all officers must be permitted to exercise command responsibilities, commensurate with eligibility and demonstrated qualifications. a.... the command of an Air Force installation, unit, and/or activity devolves uponthe senior eligible officer present unless another officer has been designated by a higher headquarters. . . . b. Eligibility for command depends on the following: ( 1) Line of the Air Force officers command flying units and organizations havingclearance authority for manned aircraft. These officers must hold aeronautical ratings as pilot, senior pilot, or command pilot and must be on flying status (Flying Status Code 1, 3, or 6). Officers are not eligible if they have been suspended from flying status under AFM 35-13, paragraph 2-29. (a) Flying units are defined as units whose primary mission is flying manned aircraft and/or planning for and directing the employment of manned aircraft. (b) Certain types of organizations, such as air base wings or groups, have multiple missions which include responsibility for controlling and directing flying activities, or clearing aircraft for flight. Such organizations may be considered nonflyingunits; therefore, they may be commanded by nonrated officers provided that: · 1. Responsibility for the flying portion of the mission has been' assignedto the commander of a subordinate flying unit (such as a base operations squadron) or to a director of operations and training, he must be a rated pilot, senior pilot, or command pilot, on unrestricted flying status category I, and this authority must be delegatedto him by special orders. ' ' 2. Clearance authority has been delegated in accordance with AFM 60-16. (2) Medical officers command medical installations and activities whose primarymission is to provide medical care or other services designed to maintain health or to further physical and mental recovery of sick and injured personnel. Unless otherwise directed, the commander is the senior medical officer who is assigned and presept at such installation, unit, or activity. An officer of the service concerned commands other medical service units, such as dental, veterinary, or medical material, when they are organized separately. Unless otherwise directed, the commander is the senior officer of the service concerned, who is assigned and present at the unit. (3) Either rated .or nonrated Line of the Air Force officers may command any other installation, unit or activity, including missile units and units where the employ ment of aircraft is a support function or corollary to the unit's primary mission. When such units are commanded by nonrated officers, flying activities will be consolidated 291 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSIUP under the supervision of an officer who meets the eligibility requirements for command of a flying unit. Command and Staff. The principles of command and staff must be fully recognized and followed. Control is exercised by a commander through his subordinate commanders. Staffs possess no command functions. Their authority is limited to assisting the commander through planning, investigating, and recommending. All directives are issued in the commander's name. The commander designates those subordinates, including civilians, who are authorized to sign or otherwise act in his name (AFR 11-17). Except for certain positions, nonrated officers may be assigned .to staff positions at all organizational levels. The exceptions are the positions directly concerned with the operation of manned aircraft or those in which flying is a necessary additional duty. Delegation of Duties. Except as provided . . . commanders should delegate administrative duties or authority to the maximum extent possible to members of their staff or subordinate commanders. However, delegation of . duties incident to the discharge of his responsibilities does not relieve the commander of the responsibility imposed upon him or of the requirement to exercise command supervision. Duties Not To Be Delegated: a. Duties imposed specifically upon commanders by law, such as those in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Appropriations Acts, and other statutory provisions. b. Duties which, because of their evident importance or because of special existing local conditions, may not be delegated. Posse Comitatus Act. Except as expressly authorized by the Constitution 8r Congress, use of any part of the Air Force of the United States to execute the civil laws is prohibited (18 U.S.C.l385). Death, Disability, or Absence of Commander. a. In the event of death, prolonged disability, or absence of the commander in a nonduty status, the next senior officer present for duty within the organization or unit and eligible, according to this regulation, will assume command until relieved by proper authority. Assumption of command under these conditions is announced by administrative orders citing this regulation as authority. The use of the terminology "Acting Commander" is not authorized and will not be used. Absence of the commander in a temporary duty status does not relieve him from discharging the functions of command and, except under unusual circumstances, another officer will not assume command during such absence. In the temporary duty absence of the commander, his designated representative will continue to act for and in his name, as is routinely done when the commander is present. b. At the discretion of th~ next higher echelon, a commander may continue to discharge the functions of command of an activity while he is in a nonduty status, such as hospitalization or formal leave. . · c. Except in urgent cases, an officer in temporary command will not alter or annul the standing orders of the regular commander without authority from the next higher commander. · d. An officer who succeeds to any command assumes responsibility for all orders in force at the time and all public property and funds pertaining to his command or duty. ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS.-The preceding discussion has been concerned primarly with aspects of command. The concept of command warrants further explanation, however, and this section briefly introduces the responsibility, authority, and functions of both the Air Foree commander and his staff. As represented in Figure :7-4, the line organization is characterized by direct man-to-man authority relationships arranged in a scalar pattern. The number of organizational members normally increases at each lower echelon. Notice that it is possible to trace a direct hierardhal'line from the squadron commander to the flight commanders to the mission pilots. The authority line is direct and there are no deviations. 292 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP Squadron Commander ' Flight Commanders Pilots Figure 7-4. Line organization. In the line-staff pattern shown in Figure 7-5, some persons perform duties in the command line (represented by solid lines) while other persons perform staff or advisory tasks (represented by dotted lines). AFR 35-54 describes such command-staff relationships as follows: The principles of command and staff must be fully recognized and followed. Control is exercised by a commander through his subordinate commanders. Staffs possess no command functions. Their authority is limited to assisting the commander through planning, investigating and recommending. All directives are issued in the commanders's name. The commander designates those subordinates, including civilians, who are authorized to sign or otherwise act in his name. (AFR 11-17) Notice also that while the line relationship between the squadron commanders and the flight commanders is direct, the administrative officer could assume either a staff or a line role. His primary duty is to assist the commander in performing administrative tasks such as preparing routine correspondence, safeguarding classified material, and maintaining records. In this role, he is a staff officer and may not issue orders to the flight commanders or mission pilots. Orders that he does publish must be issued, "For the Commander" and with the express authority given him by the commander. The administrative officer may also be a pilot and perform mission assignments under the direction of a flight commander and be part of the line organization. Furthermore, as the supervisor of administrative specialists within his own office, he may issue orders in a manner similar to an officer in a line organization. Staff officers act very much like commanders in their own staff organizations, but without the special legal authority of commanders. The third general organizational pattern is the functional pattern shown in Figure 7-6. In this pattern, formal authority is vested in both command and functional staff positions. A squadron commander in a functional organization could receive orders 293 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Squadron Cornman der 1 Administrative Officer I I I I ---I Flight Cornman der Figure 7-5. The line-staff structure. Group Commander I AUTHORITY Line: Functional:-.-- ' ' ' ' ' ' ' Functional Staff Office (Personnel) Squadron Commander -.. Figure 7-6. Functional organization. 294 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP not only through the normal chain of command commonly associated with the line organization, but also from higher echelon staff officers in very carefully defined areas. For example, a personnel staff officer could be given the functional authority by his commander to specify personnel procedures for subordinate units and work directly with them on these procedures. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 7-7 by the dotted line. KINDS OF AUTHORITY.-There must be authority with associated responsibility throughout a given organization for the organization to accomplish its mission. Cer tain individuals must be responsible-that is, they must assume an obligation to per form specified tasks. Formal authority, emanating from the Constitution of the United States, the com missioning document, and APR 35-34 (to name only a few sources), is the comer-, stone of command. However, formal authority is only one type of authority giving a person a power or right to direct the actions or thoughts of others. Other types of authority are present in both command and staff roles. To illustrate this important concept, assume that the commander of a fighter squadron has the mission to provide air cover for two flights of fighter-bombers. This mission probably means that he will face combat with enemy aircraft over hostile territory, come under attack by missiles, and require aerial refueling. Responsibility for this mission does not mean that he is to perform it by himself, but it does mean that his organization is to perform the mission, with necessary support, under his leadership. As the commander, his task is to translate the available resources into viable mission performance. Inherent in the officer's command position is the responsibility to insure that the mission is accomplished. This means that he has the authority to take certain actions and to commit certain resources to get the job done. Since he cannot perform the mission by himself, he has authority over other men and organizations who can lend their abilities and resources to assist the squadron. Such interrelations of tasks and interdependencies of mission are characteristic of all complex organizations. Terms such as authority, power, obligation, and responsibility have multiple meanings. When we use the term authority, we do not mean that there exists a "do or you will be court-martialed" attitude in the Air Force. Air Force personnel do not work simply because someone has the authority to force them to work and to punishthem if they do not. The Air Force is composed of volunteers-volunteers who usually do not need the threat of force to produce effective results. Of course, in a very heterogeneous organization such as the Air Force there are some individuals who fail to respond to leadership, no matter how capably performed, and who fail to improve their performance after their superiors apply preventive and corrective discipline. Thus in some instances, punitive measures are required. Much of the work that men accomplish is a result of the work environment and the leadership provided. Let us be more specific. What kind of work environment provides the greatest satisfaction? Research has found that, in the majority of instances, the most personally satisfying work environment is one in which each person is helping each and every other person to. the mutual benefit of himself and the organization. Effective leadership, therefore, must include both mission accomplishment and satisfaction of individual goals within the framework of the organizational mission. The dual nature of these leadership objectives is critical. 295 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP SoURCES OF AUTHORITY.-Leadership was defined earlier as the process of influencing people, individually and in groups, to effectively accomplish organizational missions. The leader has a variety of sources for his authority, or power, to influence others. He has, first of all, position, or legal power, granted to him by his appointment to a position circumscribed by law. In addition to the legally specified powers, there are other sources of power which emanate from the leader's special abilities, experience, or personality. Three of these other types of power or authority, expert, referent, and moral authority, have been discussed in Chapter 3. Before concluding our discussion, however, a fourth type, coercive power, should be mentioned. This is the power to compel desired behavior by the threat of punishment. Needless to say, except in special cases where all other methods have failed, the effective leader does not rely on coercive power. Authority may also be viewed as having its source in acceptance. When we suggest that authority is multifaceted and that individual behavior is influenced by many forces besides legal or formal power, we are presenting the acceptance view of authority. This theory states that a leader is not truly a leader until he is a leader in fact as well as in name. From another point of view, until his subordinates, peers, and even superiors accept him as a leader-an influencer of their behavior-he is not really a leader. He can coerce others to do his will under threat of reward and punishment, but what we are considering here is the leadership environment in which the men perform the mission successfully and in a manner satisfying to their personal goals. When we are influenced by expert or referent power, we are endorsing the acceptance theory of authority implicitly because we are responding to another person's expertise or to our admiration for what he has to say. We are identifying with another person's ideas and acting as if they were our own. Simply because authority has been classified in discrete categories, however, does not mean that there are mutually exclusive classifications. Any person may possess several kinds of power at a given time. He may have the legitimate power derived from his legal appointment as commander, the special personal charisma that attracts followers and gives him referent power, and the expert power of long experience and technical background. All of these powers may be operating for an individual commander at the same time. If several members of a group were asked which power source each responds to in a given situation, they might give several different answers depending upon each person's perception of the forces which influenced him the most. For one it may have been the legitimate authority of the command position; for another it might have been the commander's expertise; for yet another, the commander's personal magnetism. The existence of these multiple forces operating at a given time makes analysis of leadership behavior extremely difficult. If, for example, a person responds to the personal characteristics of a leader, he may be most inclined to support the trait approach to leadership study. If expertise influences another person suggesting that the special requirements of a given situation are the controlling factors, he is probably inclinded to follow the situational approach. Authority, then, is a complex variable which transcends the normal boundaries of position, or legal authority. A leader's authority may be either expressed or implied. He may have an ability to influence others through his legitimate power or an inabil ity if the men should refuse to accept his orders. If the latter happens, he is not exer cising effective leadership as we define the term. AUTHORITY IN THE INFORMAL ORGANIZATION.-The previous discussion has been within the context of a formal organizational structure in which leadership behavior 296 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP occurs along hierarchical lines, formally planned and published. It is the informal organization, however, which influences much of our behavior and through which we, in turn, influence the behavior of others. The informal organization is the one that does not appear as a neat series of lines and boxes on a wall chart. If a person wishes to talk to another flight commander, does he usually go through the squadron commander as the chart shows or does he just walk over and speak to him at his desk? These informal, unwritten, flexible communication channels make organizations responsive to changing needs. We can talk very directly and quickly to people who have the information we require. Ifone person is an expert in solving a particular problem, the news spreads rapidly and his influence extends far beyond his position, or legitimate authority. The fact may be, however, that in terms of the organization the person may not have any legitimate authority at all. In addition to the concepts of authority so far presented, there is one other approach to the subject that may give further insight into leader variables. AUTHORITY AS FREEDOM.-ln his book, Management Organization, Dr. Albert K. Wickesberg has suggested that authority is the "freedom to perform whatever tasks are necessary to achieve organizational, group, and individual goals." Instead of looking at authority as a limiting force pressing inward and restricting behavior, this concept shows authority as a positive force giving expression to individual and group goals. As Dr. Wickesberg explains: It is on this emphasis on freedom that the concept of managerial decentralization is based. The individual is stimulated to perform assigned and other tasks because he has the freedom to act in doing those things that need to be done but that aren't specifically prescribed as falling within his jurisdiction. At the same time, the individual is encouraged to the extent he is able to command authority, power, or influence to assume whatever authority is necessary to get the job done. Considering authority in the context of freedom rather than of restrictions therefore gives recognition to the fact that authority grants are not only explicit, but implicit as well. And the implicit portion may be far m~re important in getting the task acIn fact, there are undoubtedly broad ranges complished than the explicit portion. and areas of any person's assignment in which the authority involved is basically implicit in nature.5 Concepts of the informal organization, authority as freedom; acceptance view of authority, referent power, and others have been introduced here to show the many facets of the leader variable. Leadership in command and staff roles is not the sole product of position, or legitimate authority; it encompasses many dimensions. Three readings have been selected to amplify some of the concepts discussed in this section. First, Lt Gen Jack J. Catton, the Commander of Fifteenth Air Force, Strategic Air Command, told students at Air University's Air Command and Staff College of his "Personal Concept of Command."* In a straightforward ID8Illler, General Catton defines command and leadership; and after determining that the two are inseparable, he lists the five "musts," or traits, of leadership: 1) strength of character; 2) a deep sense of responsibility; 3) courage; 4) knowledge; and 5) the ability to understand and apply human engineering. As General Catton says, the leader is a catalyst who makes things happen, but he does not work in isolation. He must interact with group and situational variables. • (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1966), p. 39. • See pp. 374-380. 297 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP In the second reading, "What are Generals Made of?"* Maj Gen A. S. Newman,USA, Ret, discusses the highlights of some general officers' careers from cadet togeneral officer. As General Newman notes, "There is paradox along the pathway tothe stars: boldness, imagination, vitality-the hallmarks of the combat leader-canthemselves become the roots of failure. The fire must be tempered by ice-humanunderstanding, judgment, and a sense of perspective." The last reading, "Leadership and the Navigator,"** by Maj. Joseph McGuckinillustrates the important concept that leadership is not necessarily the function of aformal position. In a crew, the command pilot is the formally designated leader, butother crew members have important leadership roles and responsibilities. Major McGuckin examines these responsibilities as they apply to the navigator. The Group Variable The paradox of modern man is that only as the individual joins with his fellows in groups and organizations can he hope to control the political, economic, and socialforces which threaten his individual freedom. This is especially true now that massivesocial groupings--in nations and combinations of nations--are the order of the day. Only as the individual in society struggles to preserve his individuality in common causewith his fellows can he hope to remain an individual." We have already implied the increasing importance of the group in the leadership process. The pluralistic decision making, which seems to be a growing aspect of today's complex technological and social environment, means that one must understand the group variable to become an effective leader. It is not enough, however, tostate that because of this growing importance, the leader should understand that thegroup variable exists and should be recognized. Rather, he must understand thecause and effect of group influences.A group is two or more persons who share common beliefs and who are interdependent. This definition separates a group from a collection of people selected atrandom on a busy street. The primary distinctive feature of groups is the concept ofcommitment, of loyalty to a cause. There has to be some reason for these individualsto be together, some structure of mutual needs and wants to influence these personsto associate together in this particular form rather than being some other· place ordoing some other thing.In the discussion of human motivation and needs theory, the range of humanneeds, including the needs for belonging, security, self-esteem, and several others,were examined. These same needs are evidenced in groups, for groups exist to meetthe need requirements of their members. If a member does not have his needs satis fied, he will be disposed to leave the group. Through group membership, a personcan satisfy his needs (if he has such needs) for belonging, self-actualization, and self-esteem, and thus expand his personal well-being. Once these needs are satisfied, the individual group members may want to gain additional satisfaction, by expanding group activities, recruiting more members, publicizing group goals, and doing the other things that make the group a dynamic force. In fact, many scholars have 11sedthe term group dynamics as the descriptive ~erm for the study of group behavior because of these changing forces within groups. Once a group has formed and there is close identification with and acceptance ofgroup goals by its members, there is strong resistance to change. This phenomenon • See pp. 380-391. •• See pp. 391-394. • D. Krech, R.S. Crutchfield, and E. BaUachey. Individual In Society. (New York: McGraw-Hfll, 1962.) p. S29. 298 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP is also true of individuals. If a person has a position he believes in and is committed to, he will resist any pressure for change. Furthermore, attack from the outside may intensify group cohesiveness and make the group even more resistant to change. Members who are less committed to the group goals are pressured by other group members to accept the common beliefs in an effort to achieve even greater conformity. There are numerous illustrations from the world of sports which verify these concepts. In fact, the expression, "Let's make work more like play" is far more than an idle remark. Team sports demand the kind of dedication and interdependence that we would like to transfer to the work environment. When a team is losing in the closing minutes of a game, team members often will exhort each other to give just a little more in the hope that if everyone pulls together, their opponents can be overcome and victory achieved. Group cohesiveness also can be seen in the way the veteran players band together and harass the "rookies." Furthermore, leadership seems to be concentrated in the more experienced players who have been together longer, have faced more battles together, and have developed a special feeling of unity. These are evidences of group behavior that make groups a potent force in the leadership environment. Groups also have structure-the set of differentiating relationships that comprise a group hierarchy. In this hierarchy, individuals have tasks to perform which are . connected by a chain of command. In the earlier discussion of the formal and in formal organization, it was noted that informal organizations, or groups, may emerge when individual goals are not congruent with organizational goals. We do not mean to suggest, however, that this is the only reason the informal organization emerges. Informal organizations of various kinds-social, problem solving, and others-may be present in any organization whose members' goais are generally compatible with those of the organization. Considering the complex needs, innate and acquired, of modem man, it is probable that no formal organization is capable of meeting all of its members' relevant needs. The interaction of leaders and groups routinely occurs because leaders are ap pointed as formal heads of groups, or leaders emerge in so-called "headless" groups. Our reference frame of possible leadership behaviors covers both of these eventualities because we recognize both formal and informal sources of influence. A charismatic leader may emerge from a .group or may be appointed to a group; an appointed leader may or may not be able to influence as effectively as an informal leader, In any event, as the group develops increasingly complex needs and more definitive structure, the need for leadership also increases. What are the bases for this need? Groups exist to achieve group goals and must perform certain functions to attain these goals. Further, there must be a feeling of belonging on the part of the group members if they are going to continue to be viable group members. Many researchers have found these two basic functions, task and maintenance, to be rather common in both structured and unstructured groups. The task and maintenance functions may be designated as concern for the mission and concern for people, or mission orientation and consideration, or in various other ways. Regardless of the precise words used, there seems to be a widely accepted belief that concern for mission and concern for people form a duality that is fundamental to the leadership function. The group will not long exist if it does not accomplish its goals, nor will people be attracted to the group for very long if it does not satisfy their personal 299 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP needs. A leader will not continue to be accepted by a group if he does not continueto perform one or both of these functions.Itis not uncommon for a formal leader to perform the task function and an informal leader to perform the maintenance function, or vice versa. As we will see inchapter 9, the most effective leader is the one who has the ability to perform both functions and to modify his leadership behavior to meet the specific requirements of the group and the situation.Researchers also have found that certain other characteristics, such as communication patterns, size, status, and heterogeneous or homogeneous membership characteristics, influence group performance. These topics need more detailed consideration than is allotted here, but a more complete discussion of them can be found inappropriate references listed in the selected biblography at the end of this chapter. Two readings have been included as an aid in understanding the group variable.Dr. Leland P. Bradford, in his "Interpersonal Dynamics,"* discusses the dynamicrelationship that exists between the individual and the group. In reading this selection, the reader should consider Dr. Bradford's discussion of the "Johari window,"which is a model of how people perceive themselves and are perceived by others.The ability to work in and with groups is rather strongly influenced by these percep tual relationships. The second reading, "Assets and Liabilities in Group Problem Solving: the Needfor an Integrative Function," by Dr. Norman R. F. Maier,* is an important state ment of group problem solving and the leader's facilitating role. Since the leader must accomplish the mission, he should be fully aware of the most effective use ofgroup problem solving, particularly when the problems require the expertise provided by group members, involve their acceptance, and are generally amenable tothe group approach. The Situational Variable The third significant variable to be considered in the interactional approach to leadership is the situation-the environment in which the leadership process takesplace. The leader is often portrayed as the molder and shaper of his environment,but this statement is not necessarily true. There are many situational elements beyond his control. He may, for example, be able to modify his leadership style, someof the physical conditions of work, time pressures, resources available, and other situational factors. Some resources, however, are always scarce: people are normallyresistant to change; organizational structures are generally static; public laws appearimmutable; and all of these factors inhibit rapid environmental change. Because ofthese factors, there may be some justification for trying to fit men to situationsrather than situations to men. The discussion of the situational approach to leadership pointed out that the proponents of this view assume that the situation would call forth men who would takecharge according to the specific needs of a given situation. This view has persistedbecause there are certain elements of truth in the contention. A leader typically hasto perform some specialized tasks which require certain koowledges and skills.One of our problems in studying leadership is the apparent confusion over generalized and specialized skills. We tend to classify men as operations officers, person. nel managers, or in other categories. We give them specialty codes and use these • See pp. 394-402. • See pp. 403-410. 300 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP codes as a major determining factor in job assignments. But jobs normally do not consist exclusively of technical functions. The personnel manager must know certain personnel policies, procedures, terms, and operating methods. He must also know the more generalized management skills. Further, the emphasis that he gives to any one of these functions in the management process depends upon the specific job requirements. A personnel manager at major command or Air Staff level may do far more planning and coordinating than directing and controlling. Most jobs, therefore, have both specialized and generalized components requiring some mix of technical and administrative abilities. In particular, the Air Force mission, which dictates that its personnel interchange among commands, work at various organizational levels, and gain experience in both operational and support functions, can only be served through the flexibility and mobility of its personnel. The same observation seems to be true in complex educational, business, religious, and government organizations. In addition to the situation constraints already mentioned, there are others. For example, the policies, procedures, and routines of formal organizations and the structured relationships which comprise their framework restrict change. In many ways, of course, such constraints are a disadvantage, but, at the same time, they promote stability, which is an advantage. No one would put his money into a bank that was not going to be there tomorrow, nor would the United States trust its de fense to an Air Force that did not have the stability required to perform long-range planning, establish responsive command and control procedures, and be constantly prepared to execute its mission on short notice. Stability promotes conformity because people are not able to change their environment as rapidly as they might like and, therefore, must be adaptive and flexible. Some people can adapt; others can not. Some people thrive on the high pressure environment that is characteristic of some organizations; others do not. And, as we noted before, what may be zestful for one person may be frustrating for another. There are specific and relative factors in each situation which tend to dictate the type of leader who will probably enjoy the most success. Fortunately, for most Air Force situations, the range of acceptable variability is sufficiently broad to permit interchange of assignments, yet still achieve effective performance.Technology is a very powerful situational force. The technical processes in weapon systems, computer systems, or administrative systems may require that very careful step-by-step procedures be followed. Pilots must fly aircraft "by the book." Missiles have a precise launch sequence. Computer programs demand logical relationships. In these situations, the area or amount of freedom a leader has is constrained by these technical considerations and is, therefore, influenced by them. Still another aspect of the situation is the nature of the task being performed. Some jobs in research and development, for example, are unstructured if the researcher has substantial latitude in selecting the approach he will use. The same is true of jobs in. education. Other jobs, such as those we have mentioned in aircraft and missile operations, are, by their nature, highly structured. In such jobs the leaders must follow definite procedures and methods. Even here, however, there are job segments where the nature of the work permits more discretion. In other words, there are few jobs where the entire operation is rigidly defined. Although a pilot must follow certain specific procedures while he is flying, he does have flexibility in deciding (when other operational factors permit) when he is to fly, where he is going, and the route he will take. In this modem, complex, and highly technical age, however, it appears that the number of constraining influences is constantly increasing. It also appears that if we are going to enjoy the economic, social, and cultural 301 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP benefits that can be the products of this age, we will have to fmd some better way ofsynthesizing leader, group, and situational variables. This may be the essence of the leadership challenge and may afford us the greatest opportunity for both organiza tional and personal success.The reading selection "In Conclusion," by Dr. Bernard M. Bass,* is the conclud ing chapter of his well-known and frequently cited book, Leadership, Psychology, and Organizational Behavior. Dr. Bass has made several important contributions to leadership theory in his investigations of the interrelating influences of the leader,group, and situation. SUMMARY Leadership is a multidimensional process involving interaction between three criti cal variables: the leader, the group, and the situation. . An effective leader not only influences the behavior of others, but does it in sucha way that those being influenced perform their tasks willingly as well as successfully. If the leader obtains desired behavior solely because of his power to reward orpunish, his leadership is not effective. The oldest approach to the study of leadership is the trait approach. The basicconcept of this approach is that leaders have certain inborn qualities of personality, character, and intellect that set them above their fellow men. The forerunner of thisconcept is the "great man" theory as expressed by Thomas Carlyle in Heroes and Hero Worship. Adherents of the trait approach list many traits that are characteristic of successful leaders; but while possession of these traits undoubtedly contributes to effective leadership, this does not supply the whole answer. The situational approach to leadership emphasizes the characteristics peculiar to a given situation as the determining factor in leadership. A specific situation calls fortha specific kind of leader who has the requisite abilities. The limitation to the situation approach is that it regards the leader as a specialist who can function effectivelyonly in those situations where his particular expertise is applicable. The interactional approach recognizes the importance of traits and situational factors but views leadership as complex interaction among three variables: the leader,the group, and the situation.To understand the leadership variable in the Air Force, it is necessary to have aknowledge of the responsibilities, authority, and functions of the Air Force commander and his staff. Leadership in the Air Force is exercised within the context ofthe formal organization where leaders are officially assigned to their positions. The Air Force commander has the single most important leadership role because he has the ultimate responsibility to accomplish the organizational mission and is held accountable for any failure. Assignment to command includes legal authority to issueorders and commands and to reward and punish.In the line organizational pattern, there is a direct, man-to-man chain of author ity. In the line-staff pattern, the command functions follow a direct line of authority,but the staff authority is limited to assisting the commander in an advisory capacity.Staff possesses no command functions. Any orders issued by staff officers are issued in the name of the commander. In the functional pattern of organization, formal authority is vested both in command and in functional staff positions. • Sec pp. 411-420. 302 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP In both command and staff positions there are several sources of authority. First, there is the formal or legal authority that accompanies the position. Then there are other sources of authority that emanate from the leader's special abilities, experi ence, or personality such as moral, expert, and referent authority or power. There is also coercive power, the power to enforce desired behavior by threat of punishment. One school of thought views authority as a matter of acceptance. This theory states that to be a leader in fact as well as in name, the leader's authority must be accepted by those whom he is influencing. The organizational environment must be such that the men not only do the job successfully but derive satisfaction of their personal goals at the same time. These various categories of authority or power are not mutually exclusive. A leader may possess several kinds of authority at the same time. Furthermore, different meinbers of the organization may respond to different facets of the leader's authority.Leadership and its accompanying authority occurs in the informal as well as in the formal organization. A person possessing some special knowledge or skill may develop authority and influence that extends far beyond the legitimate authority of his position in the formal organization. While authority is usually regarded as a limiting force, it also can be viewed as a foilJ.l of freedom. In this sense, authority is the freedom to perform the tasks necessary to achieve organizational, group, and individual goals. The second major leadership variable is the group. Because of the growing impor tance of the group as a factor in the leadership process, the leader must understand the causes and effects of group influence. Groups exist to meet the needs of their members. Once the members have identi fied with and accepted group goals, the group tends to develop a strong resistance to change, and outside pressure only intensifies group cohesiveness. Groups also de velop structure based on a hierarchical chain of command. Informal groups occur frequently within formal organizations. Sometimes such groups are formed because the organizational and individual goals are not congruent. Informal groups also occur, however, for social or other reasons in organizations whose goals are compat ible with those of the individuals. In any group, the basic functions are task and maintenance; that is, concern Jor the mission and concern for the people. These functions must be performed if the group is to achieve its mission and satisfy the needs of its members; and the group leader will be accepted only so long as he is able to influence the performance of one or both of these functions. The third variable in the interactional approach to leadership is the situation or the environment in which leadership takes place. Leadership is influenced by situa tional factors because the leader cannot entirely control his environment. In any situation, there are some elements that are beyond the leader's power to modify or change. The leader, therefore must possess not only general managerial ability but the specific knowledge and skills required by situational constraints. Organizational policies, procedures, and routines constitute another form of con straint on leadership. Constraints of this kind have certain disadvantages, but they serve the purpose of promoting organizational stability and conformity. Other situational constraints may result from the nature of the job, particularly highly technical jobs, such as missile launching, which require precise, step-by-step operations. 303 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Although there still are many areas of flexibility in the leadership process, thenumber of constraining influences seems to be increasing with the growing complexity and technological advances of society. Finding ways of developing greater com patibility between the leader, the group, and the situational variables constitutes a challenge to leadership. BffiLIOGRAPHY BASS, BERNARD M. Leadership, Psychology, and OrganiZJltional Behavior. New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960.CuMMING, L. L. and Scorr, W. E. Readings in OrganiZJltional Behavior and Human Per formance. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969. HERSEY, PAUL and BLANCHARD, KENNETH H. Management of OrganiZJltional Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.HJLGARD, ERNEST R. and ATKINSON, RICHARD C. Introduction to Psychology. Fourth Edition. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967.HUNERYAGER, S. C. and HECKMANN, I. L. Human Relations in Management. Second Edition.Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Company, 1967.JENNINGS, EuGENE E. An Anatomy of Leadership. New York: Harper and Brothers, Pub lishers, 1960.KRECH, DAVID; CRUTCHFIELD, RICHARDS., and BALLACHEY, EGERTON L. Individual in Society.New York. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962. WIC.KESBERG, ALBERT K. Management OrganiZJltion. New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts, 1966. 304 Chapter 8 Readings-A Multidimensional Approach to Air Force Leadership READING A Leadership By S. G. Huneryager and I. L. Heckmann. Reprinted by permission from Human Relations in Management. Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1967. Copyright 1967. S. G. Huneryager and I. L. Heckmann are both Professors of Management at the University of lllinois, Chicago campus. Dr. Huneryager serves as Coordinator of the Management area; Dr. Heckmann is Dean of the College of Business Administration. In addition to their combined work, both men are noted for their individual publications. Huneryager is the author of Manpower Management and Heckmann wrote Personnel Administration in a Changing Society. E VEN though the subject of leadership has grown in recent years to the point where it can almost be considered a discipline in itself, it should be noted that our original contention still holds true, namely, that human relations in the context of the business environment is in great part the story of leadership. The reason for this is predicated on the fact that human relatibns, as a body of knowiedge, is concerned with the behavior of industrial man. Because the leader's fundamental responsibility in any form of organization is to get work done through people, and because he can achieve this only by successfully influencing the behavior of the human beings to whom work has been assigned, it follows that the leader must be thoroughly acquainted with the forces and factors that cause and influence human behavior. In other words, he must know and understand the basic principles, concepts, and techniques of human relations. As the format of this book indicates, therefore, leaders, whether they be foremen, supervisors, executives, or what have you, must, in their difficult and complex task of collecting and collating the efforts of others to achieve a common goal, effectively motivate their subordinates by communicating to them, training and developing them, preparing them for changes, counseling them, and so on. For unless they do these things, they cannot possibly hope to accomplish the objectives of the organization. Consequently, it seems clear that the key to effective leadership is human relations. Although human relations is an integral part of the leadership function, it is not, of course, the only responsibility a leader has or the only knowledge he needs. In fact, there are many things a leader must know and do long before contact with human beings becomes necessary. These "things" include, generally speaking, the basic managerial functions involved in all leadership positions, namely, planning, organizing, coordinating, 305 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Trait approach and controlling work. But to consider these functions here is beyond the scope of this One of the earliest approaches to the book. The serious student of leadership study of leadership is called the trait theory. must, therefore, direct his investigation toUtilizing an inductive procedure, researchersward additional fields of knowledge, particuand writers in this area have attempted to larly those of management, psychology, and explain leadership on the basis of personalitysociology if he wishes to perceive the totality traits and characteristics of successful leadof the leader's job. What is important to recers. Ordway Tead, for example, insists that ognize here, however, is that managerial there are ten qualities that are essential for functions such as planning, organizing, cooreffective leadership, namely, physical and dinating, and controlling all lead to the denervous energy, a sense of purpose and termination of work that must be performed direction, enthusiasm, friendliness and affecby human beings. If this were not true, there tion, integrity, technical mastery, decisivewould be no need for leaders_:_managers. To ness, intelligence, teaching skill, and faith.1 be a leader, therefore, requires that one have Chester I. Barnard, on the other hand, lists people to lead. And the purpose of leading such factors as physique, skill, technology,these people is to get done work that we perception, knowledge, memory, imaginahave determined must be done. This, as we tion, determination, persistence, endurance,said before, requires the practice of human and courage.2 relations. Examination of Tead's and Barnard's lists indicates immediately a basic difficulty withAPPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP the traitist approach, namely, that seldom, if ever, do any two lists agree on the essential It is axiomatic that a leader's success in getting work done through others depends to traits and characteristics of effective leadera great degree on his knowledge of the prinship. The net result is that of confusion, ciples, concepts, and techniques of human predicated on a foundation of generalities relations-and his ability to apply that and semantical problems. Because of these knowledge. Equally evident is the fact that difficulties and numerous other consideraknowledge of the process of leadership per se tions, such as size of sample, period of time · is critically related to the art of influencing covered, and so on, it is not surprising to human behavior. That is to say, simply find many other researchers who vehemently disagree with the traitist theory. · knowing what causes people to behave and how to influence human behavior ~ill not Type approach necessarily insure successful leadership. Con sequently, to understand the totality of the Another basic attempt to explain the na ture of leadership is that of the leadership nature of leadership, it is also necessary to type approach. Researchers following this investigate and understand the components route have concluded that there are essen and process of the function itself. tially four types of leaders: (1) the dicta Because many of the writings in this sec torial leader; (2) the autocratic leader; (3) tion explore the nature of leadership in de the democratic leader; and (4) the laisseztail, no attempt will be made here to defifaire leader.nitely analyze the many and diverse views of Dictatorial leadership, according to this the leadership process. Instead, it is hoped approach, is that type of leadership which that the following brief review of some of the gets work done through fear. The dictatorial approaches that have been used to investileader-or negative leader as he is fregate leadership and to explain its nature will 1 Ordway Tead, The Art of Leadership (New York:McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 193S), p. 83. help the reader organize and clarify his • Chester I. Baruard, The Functions of the EDcutlw (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard UDl.verslty Press, 1938), p. thoughts as he probes this area further. 260. 306 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP quently called-holds over the heads of his suffers, however, from the disadvantage ofsubordinates the threat of penalties and punrequiring a better quality of leader. ership as it is popularly called, exists when increases, and so on. The theory is that the the leader allows the group to establish its followers, in order not to lose the means of own goals and make its own decisions. satisfying some of their needs and wants, are Usually the only contact the leader has with motivated to do what the leader tells them to the group occurs when he provides it withdo. Although this type of leadership apparthe information it needs to get a job done. ently gets results, there is serious doubt that As such, he makes little contribution to over the quantity and the quality of the results all effort. The net result is frequently disor achieved can remain high over the long run, ganization or chaos, primarily because this particularly in view of the fact that the re type of leadership permits different individu sults obtained are frequently accompanied by als to proceed in different directions. the dissatisfaction of those led.Autocratic leadership is characterized by Situational approachcentralization of authority and decision making in the leader. Although this . type of A more recent and generally acceptable leader tends to emphasize neither negative approach to the study of leadership is that ofthe situationalists. According to these advo nor positive leadership, he.motivates his sub cates, leadership is specific and always rela ordinates by forcing them to rely upon him tive to the particular situation in which it oc for need satisfaction. As such, he takes full curs. Therefore, who becomes the leader or authority and responsibility for the work to who is the leader of a given group engaging be done. He permits no participation in thedecision-making process and tolerates no dein a particular activity is a function of the total situation, which includes not only the viations from what he has told his followers leader and the subordinates and other groups to do. This type of leatership also gets re to which the leader is related, but also myr sults. But it suffers from the serious disad vantage that it can be only as good as the iad other human, physical, organizational,and time variables as well. In essence, situa leader is. If the leader il. weak and ineffi tionists are more concerned with finding new cient, the followers will b~ weak and ineffi cient. ways of identifying leaders than they are Democratic leadership, unlike autocratic with developing a theory of leadership. leadership, is based on de-:entralization of A basic conclusion of the situationist apauthority and decision maki..tg. This type of proach is that the successful leader must beleader is characterized by the degree to adaptive and flexible. As the situationwhich he consults with his · .ubordinates on changes, whether it be from minute to minproblems, goals, and tasks that face him and ute or from day to day, so must the leaderthe group as a whole. The tht-ory behind this change his style of leadership. Consequently,type of leadership is that it !ncourages the at any one point in time he may display cerfollowers to function as a soc1 l unit and that tain traits and characteristics and follow theit makes full use of the taleL :; and abilities format of a particular type of leadership,of the members of the group. f.s a result, the whereas at another point in time he may dissubordinates achieve a great:-,r measure of play an entirely different set of traits and folbelonging and recognition, w:'tich motivates low another type of leadership. If this conthem to higher levels of effickncy. Although clusion is accepted, it does offer some logicalsome people do not agree wit'l this, there is, explanation for the confusion that exists innevertheless, general agreemt!nt that demoand between the traitist and the type apcratic leadership offers more promise to inproaches. However, much empirical workdustry than any other type cf leadership. It needs to be done before this conclusion can 307 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP be validated. And therein lies a problem for accordance with his conception of the leader ship role. It follows, therefore, that the more the situationists, for in this approach even the measuring instruments that are employed acquainted the leader is with himself, his become a part of the situation and thereby assumptions and beliefs regarding human behavior, his leadership style, and the relation influence it. ship of that style to the performance of sub Other approaches ordinates, the better able he will be to more effectively influence human behavior. This is Although space does not permit a detailed particularly clear in view of the fact that any examination of them, there are several other change in one's efforts to influence othersapproaches to the study of leadership that must of necessity demand and follow ashould be briefly mentioned here. One of change in the leader himself. Consequently, these approaches is to analyze leadership if the leader wishes to improve his ability tofrom the viewpoint of the group involved. change the behavior of others, he must first Advocates of this approach maintain that the and foremost change his own behavior. And success of the leader is determined in many ·to do this, he must not only be aware of howways by his subordinates. Accordingly, these he behaves as a leader, but also how his beresearchers investigate the makeup of groups havior affects the performance of others. and the actions and interactions of the memAlthough we have not yet established anbers within it. Another approach is that of objective yardstick that can be used to evalu organization. Followers of this approach ate leadership performance, it must be recogview leadership as a functional relationship nized that the boundaries of our knowledgebetween leader, followers, and organization. of the nature and function of the leader'sAlthough closely akin to the situationist aprole do permit some self-assessment of manproach, it is usually concerned, however, agerial behavior. For example, the ratheronly with the structure of leadership. generally accepted conclusion of the situaEven though much confusion and disationalists, namely, that leadership is always greement exists in our present state of relative to the situation and that, conseknowledge of leadership, there are signs that quently, the leader must be able to adapt and some day the various approaches to this imadjust to each situation, clearly provides the portant function will be combined into highly manager with at least two criteria against organized, interdisciplinary research. When which he can compare his own conception this occurs, our understanding of leadership and style of leadership. These criteria are, of will become clearer than ever before. As a course, sensitivity (that is, the ability to perresult, industry in particular and mankind in ceive and understand the needs of human general should benefit immeasurably. beings and the myriad situations with which the leader is faced every day) and the flexiLEADERSIDP STYLE bility to adapt and adjust to each situation so Before closing this introductory section, it that the style or approach to leadership that is demanded or warranted by the situation should be pointed out that anyone who is in a supervisory or managerial position should can be manifested. be cognizant of both his style of leadership Our knowledge regarding the various and the impact of that style on the behavior types of leadership and the effects of each of others. The reason for this is s,imple. The type on the behavior of subordinates should leader's efforts to influence the behavior of also serve as benchmarks for self-evaluation. people, which is his fundamental task, are Although such assessment undoubtedly re obviously related to his percepti(l)n and unquires a rather high degree of personal sensi derstanding of the nature and process of tivity to begin with, it should not be too diffi cult for the informed person to honestly andleadership. In other words, he will behave a.s a leader-or develop a leadership style--in objectively determine if he is predominantly 308 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP autocratic, dictatorial, laissez-faire, or democratic in nature. If he is willing to admit that he is more one of these than the others, he should also be willing to admit that there is J considerable room for improvement in his leadership style. This assumes, of course, that he accepts the fact that the world of work, composed as it is of diverse and complex human · situations, usually requires the leader to practice all known types of leadership. In fact, it is entirely possible that he may have to do so at various points of time with each of his subordinates. Armed with such information, however, he should be in a much better position to change his own bl:!havior and, hence, more effectively influence the behavior of others. Because space does not permit a more thorough analysis of the facets of our knowledge of the nature of leadership--facets that can be used to assess and develop one's own leadership style, the reader is of necessity charged with the responsibility of developing these benchmarks as he pursues his study of this area and of conscientiously measuring himself against them. Although this will admittedly be a difficult task, it is nevertheless a task that must be done, and can only be done, by the individual himself. Unless he is willing to accept and do this, he cannot possibly hope to improve his ability to get work done through others. This undeniable fact is predicated again on the simple truth that an attempt to change the behavior of a subordi nate requires and can only follow a change in the behavior of the leader. Knowing one's self, therefore, is an integral and critically important part of the nature and process of leadership. Although much research and writing have been done on the leadership function, it is surprising to discover how little we actually know about it and how much of what we know is subject to widespread disagreement. It is gratifying to note, however, that in recent years considerable organization and clarity of thought have been achieved in the study of this area. That is not to say, of course, that we have solidified our knowledge of this important process. On the contrary, it is obvious that much work remains to be done-that, in fact, we are only beginning to combine our efforts into highly organized, interdisciplinary research. But . . . the confusion and contradictions are beginning to disappear, and a new discipline is beginning to emerge. . . . Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Why do the authors regard leadership as being largely the story of human relations? 2. How do the trait approach and the type approach to leadership differ from each other? 3. What ~pecific effects can the situation have on leadership? 4. Why do the authors feel that all leaders should know what style of leadership they practice? 309 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING B The Problem of Leadership: A Look at Some Recent Findings of Behavioral Science Research By James V. Spotts. Reprinted by, permission from Kansas Business Review, Vol. 17, No. 6 (June 1964). James V. Spotts received the Ph.D. degree from the University of Kansas and continued to teach at that institution in the Department of Human Relations for over ten years. He left the University of Kansas in 1966 to join a psychological consultant firm in Kansas City. Dr. Spotts, who makes his home in Lawrence, Kansas, is considered an authority in the field of behavioral science. Although literally hundreds of leadership INTRODUCTION studies have been conducted during the last THE PROBLEM of leadership has been two decades, there is, at present, no univer one of man's major concerns since the days sally accepted theory of leadership. In fact, of antiquity. Leadership was a matter of con many divergent and contradictory theories cern in the days when Alexander set out with have been proposed. However, during the a small band of Greeks to conquer the last few years, research has reached a point world, when Caesar led his troops across the where some consistent findings· have begun Rubicon, and when Columbus set out with a to emerge. This paper will examine some of mutinous crew in leaky boats to discover a the past discoveries that are relevant for un "New World."1 derstanding leadership phenomena and will Early writers frequently wrote lengthy provide one assessment of the current statustreatises on problems of leadership. Plato in of research in this field. his Republic devoted considerable attention to the characteristics of the "philosopherDEFINITIONS OF LEADERSIDPking," the ideal and just ruler of men. Ma What do people mean when they talk chiavelli's The Prince presented detailed about leadership? What is a leader? If one strategies on how a leader could gain and were to ask any collection of people what maintain power over others. Some investiga they think about leaders and leadership, he tors assert that history itself is a poignant would receive ready answers. Everyone has record of the successes and failures of man's ideas and opinions about leadership, even leadership efforts. While interest in leadership has been a phenomena of long historical children.2 If a hypothetical investigator were concern, the problem of leadership has beto jot down what people say about leadercome one of crucial importance in our.modship, he would probably get a collection of ern era of rapid social change, escalating statements something like the following:crises, revolution, and nuclear stalemate. In view of this fact, it seems worthwhile to exA leader's job is to make decisions and e]f;amine what behavioral scientists have disercise authority. A leader's job is to develop responsibility covered about this aspect of interpersonal and initiative among his subordinates. behavior. • D. Cartwright and A. F. Zander (eds.), Group Dy1 B. Bass, Leadership, Psychology and Organlf;tlllorull namics: Research and Theory (Evanston, Ill.: Row, PeterBehavior (New York: Harper, 1960). son. 19S3), p. S3S. 310 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Most leaders are too bossy, or most leaders ceptable scientific definitions for terms like are not bossy enough. leader and leadership. For some investiga A group is only as strong as its leader. The trouble in most groups and organizators, leadership is viewed as a characteristictions is that a few people run everything. of the individual; for others, it is seen as aOnce a leader shows weakness he's dead. property of the group. Some workers defineTo be a leader you must be aggressive and leadership as anyone who performs leaderambitious and tell people what to do.If you want to be a leader you have to be ship acts; while others define it in terms ofsensitive to the needs of others and tell them prestige, status, or ability to influence others.what they want to hear anyway.• The complexity of the definitional problem isreflected by the fact that in a recent reviewThus, it would appear that people have all one investigator compiled a list of 130 differkinds of ideas about leadership. The general ent definitions of leadership in a sampling ofconclusion that one might draw is that there research literature prior to 1949.5is very little consensus about what leadershipis or what it should be. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO THEThe mixed and conflicting assumptions S:nJDY OF LEADERSIDP about leadership noted above are, frankly, Many of the scientist's conceptions aboutremarkably similar to ideas held, at one time man have their historical roots in philosophi or another, by investigators who have atcal assumptions arid ideas that have been atempted to study and understand leadership part of the cultural heritage for some time.from a scientific point of view. D. Cartwright These philosophical notions are sometimesand A. F. Zander4 assert that two major very valuable in that they sharpen the scienproblems seemed to have caused behavioral tist's conceptions of the phenomena underscientists the most trouble. The first is that it investigation and help him take into accounthas been extremely difficult for investigators factors that might otherwise be ignored.to separate and disentangle their assumptions However, such ideas can just as easily blindabout what leadership should be from the him to other scientific data.straightforward research on the question of During the eighteenth and nineteenth cen what consequences follow specific leadership turies, philosophers were engaged in heatedpractices. That is, the scientific investigation arguments as to the relative importance ofof problems like leadership is a difficult task; great men versus the situation these menparticularly, because it involves value judgfound themselves in. One group of philosoments or statements implying that something phers believed that the personal characteris is "good" or "bad." Scientists are notoriously tics of the great men-men of destiny, suchpoor at dealing with questions of value, and as Napoleon, Caesar, Churchill, and theit has been difficult for them to separate like-determined the course of history. Sometheir own armchair assumptions about what exponents of this view were Thomas Carlyle,constitutes "good" or "poor" leadership from Friedrich Nietzsche, Francis Galton, andthe variables they are attempting to study. It William James. For example, ' Carlyle6is only in recent years that investigators have argued vehemently that a true genius wouldbegun to deal with the value question in emcontribute no matter where he was found,pirical terms. Thus, leadership is increasingly and James7 asserted that the great men werebeing defined in operational terms such as the major forces behind the creative mutabehavior that increases production and emtions and innovations in society.ployee morale or decreases turnover, absenOpposed to this group were the environteeism, and so on. mentalists, a group of thinkers who boldly The second, and perhaps more complex, • V. J. Bentz, "Leadership: A Study of Social Inter problem has been that of trying to find ac-action" (an unpublished manuscript). • S. Hook, The Hero in History (New York: John Day, 1943). • Ibid., pp. S3S"-36. • Cartwright and Zander, op. cU. r "Great Men, Great Thought and Their Environment," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XLVI (1880), pp. 441-59. 311 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP asserted that it was the Zeitgeist or situation courage! Other investigators have asserted rather than the great man that determined that the "successful" leader has an above avthe course of history. These philosophers deerage education, is active in social organizaclared that the great man was nothing more tions, and has high moral and ethical than an expression of the needs of his time; standards.11 Characteristics such as adjustif one man did not fill this need, another ment, good appearance, need for achievewould step forward to do so. This group conment, assertiveness, and fear of failure have tended that no man could change society and also been reported as necessary leadership any changes wrought by a great man were iltraits.12 While these qualities woul? be delusory in that they were only another expressirable in a leader, none of them seem essension of the needs of the period. tial. In this context, B. Solomon aptly stated: There are concrete parallels to these two The world has seen numerous great leaders kinds of thinking and speculation in current who could hardly lay claim to any kind of leadership research. That is, much of the formal education. History is replete with early work aimed at discovering the traits of non-trained, non-academic Fords, Edisons the leader is a logical outgrowth and develand Carnegies who could not even claim a grammar school education yet managed to opment from the philosopher's great man become leaders whose influence was felt theme. Similarly, the modem exponents of around the globe. the environmentalist position may be reAs for appearance or robust health, need we mention more than the delicate Ghandi, flected in the work of the investigators who or George Washington Carver, the frail, have attempted to study the effects of situashriveled, insignificant little Negro who was tional factors upon leadership behavior. one of America's greatest scientists, and so many more like them. As for high ideals, The trait-oriented approacll fine character, etc., where would Hitler, Capone or Attila the Hun rate here? 13 One major "vein" of early research focused upon isolating the physical, intellecWhile Solomon characterized some of the tual, or personality traits that distinguished a exceptions to trait-oriented leadership releader from his followers. Such studies have search, a casual examination of the studies found that leaders tend to be somewhat bigcited above quickly reveals one of the major ger than their followers (but not much) and shortcomings of this kind of approach;somewhat brighter than the rest of the group namely, that rarely, if ever, do two lists agree (but not much). Well-accepted leaders also on the essential characteristics of the effecevidence somewhat better adjustment than tive leader. C. Bird14 and R. M. Stogdill111 do followers (but, again, not much).8 have surveyed well over one hundred studies In one early study, 0. Tead9 reported that in this area. The discouraging finding was the traits of the effective leader were nervous that less than five per cent of the traits reand physical energy, a sense of purpose and ported as characteristic of the effective direction, enthusiasm, friendliness, integrity, leader were common in four or more of the technical mastery, decisiveness, intelligence, studies surveyed. Secondly, there is some teaching skills, and faith! In another study evidence to suggest that the leaders, in fact, C. I. Bamard10 stated that the significant cannot be markedly different from their fol traits that distinguished leaders from their u R. M Wald and R. A. Doty, "The Top Executive: A Firsthand Profile," Harvard Business Review, Vol. XXXII followers were physique, technical skill,· per (1954), pp. 45-54. ,. W. E. Henry, "Executive Personality and Job Succ:eaa," ception, knowledge, memory, imagination, American Management Association, Personnel Series, DO. 120 (1948). determination, persistence, endurance, and 13 B. Solomon, Leadership of Youth (New York: Youth Services, 1954), p. 15. Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century, • Cartwright and Zander, op. dt., p. 536. "Social • The Art of Leadership (New York: McGraw-HID, 1940). 15 "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Sur 1935). •• The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.: vey of the Literature," Journal of Psychology, Vol. XXV Harvard University Press, 1948). (1948), pp. 35-71. 312 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP work situation. These investigators foundlowers. Thus, while the leader must be intelthat, when foremen failed to provide ade ligent, he cannot be-or appear to be--too much more intelligent than the other group quate leadership, informal leaders arose in members. Extremes in personality are not the work groups and provided the needed lisually associated with leadership, if for no functions. other reason than they make the person too Situation-oriented research has assumed different from the other members of his that it is unreasonable to expect one leader to always be able to do everything .better group. than anyone else. In our terms, the questionInvestigators appear to be generally commight be posed as follows: Is it reasonable toing to the conclusion that certain minimal expect a successful businessman to beabilities may be required of all leaders. How ever, these same traits will probably be equally as "effective" in other types of leadership, such as the president of General Mo widely distributed among the nonleaders as tors, a commander of a B-52, the presidentwell. Moreover, there seems to be an inof a local P.T.A., or a leader of a Specialcreasing recognition of wide variations in the Forces platoon in the jungles of VietNam? characteristics of individuals who become leaders in similar situations and of even Obviously, the situation has much to do with greater divergence in the traits of leaders determining what leadership skills will be re working in different situations.16 quired. Stogdill cogently stated the problem when he said: The situational approach It is not especially difficult to find persons General dissatisfaction with the failure to who are leaders. It is quite another thing to place these people in different situations isolate leadership traits led some investiga where they will be able to function as leaders. tors to focus their research efforts more upon Thus, any adequate analysis of leadership the problem of the situation in which leader involves not only a study of the leaders but ship occurs. These workers share the asalso of the situation in which leadership acts sumption that the traits and skills that charoccur.'" acterize a "good" leader will vary from group to group and from situation to situaThere are many studies in the literature .that support the notion of situational leader tion. Associated with this assumption is the notion of emergent leadership, which postuship. For example, F. M. Thrasher20 in a lates that temporary or situational leaders study of street gangs reported that the particwill arise in groups when necessary to meet ular activity of the group was a major factor the demands of new situations. in determining. who would be the gang The notion that "new" leaders will emerge leader. In a similar study, W. H. Whyte21 found that the leaders of these informalwhen groups are in periods of stress or crisis gangs actively manipulated their group's acis well documented. W. Crockett17 found tivities so as to maintain their leadership. that, when a designated leader failed to proThe leader tended to involve his group in acvide the leadership functions he was sup posed to perform, other members provided tivities where he knew he would excel and avoided those situations and activities where them, so there would be a minimal loss in his leadership might be threatened. group effectiveness. Similar results were reIn a study of the leadership patterns ofported by R. L~ Kahn and D. Katz18 in the navy enlisted men on ships during wartime 10 W. 0. Jenkins, "A Review of Leadership Studies with Particular Reference to Military Problems," Psychological discussed by R. Burke,22 it was found that Bulletin, Vol. XLIV (1947), pp. 54-79. 17 "Emergent Leadership in Small, Decision-Making to Stogdill, op. cit., pp. 64-65. Groups," Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology, Vol. 20 The Gang (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927). 21 Street Corner Society (Chicago: University of ChicagoLI (1955), pp. 378-83. 18 "Leadership Practices in Relation to Productivity and Press, 1943). Morale," Group Dynamics, eds. D. Cartwright and A. 22 "Approaches to Understanding Leadership" (an unpublished manuscript). Zander (Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1956), pp. 612-27. 313 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP three different patterns of leadership emerged depending upon the situation. In combat, the officers were the effeCtive leaders of the enlisted group. However, during the periods of rest and boredom between battles, it was the "jokesters" and entertainers who seemed to occupy major leadership roles. Finally, when the ships were returning to port the men with previous shore "contacts" emerged as leaders. Similarly, M. D. Dunkerly's study23 of leadership patterns among college women points to the significance of situational factors. Those girls chosen as intellectual leaders, such as house president and the like, were found to be superior to their peers in judgment, initiative, and intellectual ability. Those girls selected as social leaders were generally superior to others in dress and appearance. Finally, girls selected as religious leaders were reported as being less "neurotic" than the others. Surprisingly enough, or perhaps not so surprisingly, the social leaders were found to be most "neurotic." Bass24 reports that cross-cultural studies by anthropologists also support the importance of situational leadership factors. He notes that among the Samoans, where there was a highly developed sensitivity to position and social rank, quite different patterns of leadership were evidenced than were found in the individualistic Eskimo society where no man's importance was considered relative to another. Again, leadership among the Iroquois Indians was attained through acts of generosity, hospitality, and cooperation, but, among the Kwakiutls of the Northwest, leadership was established through one's ability to compete financially with others. Clearly then, there is a wealth of scientific evidence pointing to the significance of situational factors as determinants of leadership behavior. However, this has been found to be only one facet of the leadership problem. "'"A Statistical Study of Leadership Among CollegeWomen," Studies In Psychology and Psychiatry (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America), Vol. IV (1940), p. 6. "' Bass, op. cit. The functional approach A third approach to the study of leader ship developed from a functional orientation to the problem. This approach developed under the influence of Kurt Lewin,25 foun der of field-theory in social science, from subsequent theorizing and research in Group Dynamics and, to some extent, from the Human Relations Movement. With the Functional Approach, emphasis in research shifted from the study of the leader as a person to the study of the group. One major aim here has been to discover the kinds of behavior that are necessary for a group to survive and attain its goals. In this context, leadership is defined as all those member acts that aid in the development of the group and accomplishment of the group's task. Thus, leadership may be performed by one or many members of the group. It is viewed as a quality that a person may display in varying degrees rather than as something he possesses entirely or not at all. Consequently, leadership may be "possessed" to some degree by any member of a group, regardless of his formally designated office or position. The Functional Approach considers both the individual apd the situation in which leadership occurs. This approach assumes that groups (and leaders) are continually faced with two interrelated tasks. The first is that groups must find ways to deal with problems associated with attainment of agreed-upon goals, i.e., resolve Task Problems. Secondly, group members must find ways to improve and strengthen the group itself, i.e., resolve internal Maintenance Problems, to achieve its goals. K. D. Benne and P. Sheats,26 R. F. Bales,27 and others have attempted to isolate some of the major Task and Maintenance Behaviors that appear in well-functioning groups. Those member (or leader) os Field Theory in Social Sciences (New York: Harper, 1951). '" "Functional Roles of Group Members," loumal of Social Issues, Vol. IV (1948), pp. 41-49. 27 Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Studyof Smnll Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Addlson-Wesley Press, 1950). 314 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP trict medical officer; technical supervtstonfunctions that seem to be effective in moving groups toward resolution of Task Problems was most frequently observed with the elec include such acts as asking for clarification trical officer; and consultation was practiced most often by the legal officer. of issues at hand, summarizing the contribuTwo other "classic" studies are worthy oftions of others, proposing new ideas and courses of action, giving and receiving informention in this area. The first, by R. White and R. Lippitt,30 investigated the effects of mation, coordinating the ideas and suggesthree different styles of leadership, whichtions made by others, and so on. Members these workers designated as Democratic, Auor leader functions that seem to aid in the tocratic, and lAissez-Faire, on productivity resolution of internal problems and mainte nance of the group include giving minority and member morale. views a chance to be heard, mediating and Democratic leaders generally tended to encourage their members to ·participate in harmonizing conflict within the group, main taining open channels of communication, the decision making, did not give rigid rules as to how things were to be done, and gave ventilating feelings for the group, et cetera. There are a number of studies to suggest suggestions, information, and praise to the groups as a whole rather than to individuals. that the behavior of the leader varies conAutocratic leaders, on the other hand, madesiderably depending upon the task at hand. all final decisions for the groups, told themFor example, L. Carter and his associates28 how to do things, supervised members studied the activities of "leaders" on three closely, and praised and punished individual different tasks; namely, those involving rea members. The Laissez-Faire leaders gave nosoning, mechanical assembly, and group dissuggestions unless specifically requested to cussion. In the reasoning tasks, the leaders do so. They pedormed a minimum of leadermore frequently asked for information or functions and neither praised nor punishedfacts. When confronted with the mechanical group members. assembly task, the leader most frequently exThe results of this investigation show pressed the need for action and worked acclearly that the behavior of the group memtively with his men. Finally, in the group disbers differed markedly under the differentcussion situation, he was most likely to give patterns of leadership. The following was information and ask for expression of opin found in this study: ions. The results of the Carter study were based Democratic leadership resulted in greater upon data obtained with artificially created productivity (measured by the amount of work done) than did Laissez-Faire leadership. laboratory groups. However, similar results have been reported from studies of real-life On the other hand, Autocratic leadership led to greater productivity than did Democraticwork groups. R. M. Stogdill,20 in a study of leadership. However, the quality of work was leadership patterns of officers in 46 naval orconsistently better in the Democratic than Autocratic groups. ganizations, found that the relative emphasis There was more direct and indirect displaced upon particular leadership functions content expressed in the Autocratic groupswas highly influenced by the task situation. than in Democratic ones. When the AutoWhile all officers did some coordinating, this cratic leaders were absent, their group~ colfunction was most frequently stressed in the laps-.;d. In Democratic groups, there was only a slight drop in work involvement during work of the executive officer. The function "leader-out" periods. of exercising administrative control was Members of the Democratic groups exmost prominent in the activities of the dis-pressed greater cohesiveness and satisfaction with their group experience than did either "'L. Carter, Beatrice Haythom, and J. Lanzatta, "The the Autocratic or Laissez-Faire group mem- Behavior of Leaders and Other Members," Joumal ol Abnormal & Social Psychology, Vol. XLVI (1950), pp. 589-595. .. "Leadership Behavior and Member Reaction in Three Part II," Groups, 'Social Climates,'" Group Dyruzmlcs, eds. D. Cartwright """Studies in Naval Leadership, and A. Zander (New York: Row, Peterson, 1956) pp Leadership and Men, ed. H. Ruetzkow (Pittsburgh, Pa.: • • 585~11. Carnegie Press, 1951). ""-·. 315 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP hers. In this respect, the Autocratic groups were characterized by two patterns of mem ber behavior: either the greatest amount of hostility, aggressiveness, and scapegoating among members or the greatest apathy. Democratic groups showed the least ab senteeism and dropouts while Autocratic groups evidenced the most absenteeism and terminations. Group members evidenced more submissive and dependent behavior in the Autocratic groups than in the other two and showed unsurprisingly less "talking back" to leaders. While the findings reported in this study were based upon data gathered from youth groups, subsequent investigationsBl with a v:rri.ety of adult work groups yielded highly similar results. Taken together, these studies suggest that the "style" of the leader can have marked effects upon group member performance. The second "classic" leadership study is by L. Coch and J. French, Jr.82 In the factory studied, changes in products and methods of doing jobs were a necessary result of existing competitive conditions in the field. In addition, a marked increase in absenteeism and turnover in recent years had resulted in unbalanced production lines and had made frequent shifting of individuals from job to job necessary. Job changes were, therefore, . frequent and were nearly always accompamed by sharp drops ·in employee productivity. One serious problem that had developed out of this situation was an intense resistance by the production workers to the n~essary changes in methods and jobs. This resistance was expressed in frequent grievances to the union about the piece rates that accompanied the new methods and in high turnover, low efficiency, restriction of output, and marked hostility and aggression towards management. · 81 H. Baumgartel, "Leadershlp Style as a Variable Jn Research Administration," Administrative Science Quar!frly, Vol. 11 (1957), pp. 344-360. B. W. Bovard, Jr, Grou~ Structure and Perception," Journal of Abno,.,.;,l& Soc1al Psy~~ology, Vol. XLVI (1951), pp. 398-405. A. P.. Hare, Small Discussions with Participatory and ~uperv1sory Leadership," Journal of Abnormal & Social s~chology, VC!I. L':J-11 (1953), pp. 273-27S. M. G. Preston an R. K. Hem~z, Effects of Participatory Versus Su r visory Leadership on Group Judgment," Journal of ~bnormal & Social Psychology Vol. XLIV (1949) 345-3S5. ' ' pp. 80 "Overcoming Resistances to Change," Human Relations, Vol. I (1948), pp. S12-S32. After an initial survey, the experimenters felt that the reactions described above re sulted not from the objective difficulties of changing to a new job but from the difficulty of getting people to accept the need for change and to aid actively in creating change. The investigators, therefore, set up a study based upon the idea that participation in the planning and carrying out of change would be helpful. A total of four different work groups were set up; three, the experi mental groups, were allowed to participate in the change in different ways, and the fourth, the control group, was treated the same as the groups had been treated in the past. The control group went through the usual factory routine when jobs were changed. They were told that a change was necessary and that a new piece rate had been set. In this group, there was no participation by employees in planning the change though an explanation was given them. The first experimental group involved participation through representation in designing the changes to be made; that is, the group elected representatives who met with management to work out the new methods and piece rates. The third variation, used in the other two experimental groups, involved total participation by all of the workers in the designing of the new jobs and establishment of the new rates. Exhibit I shows rather clearly what happened. The control group showed the usual drop in productivity and did not return to its previous level during the period shown. This group continued to carry grievances to the union about the new rates and showed increased absenteeism, job terminations, deliberate restriction of work output, and hostility. towards the foremen and management. The first experimental group, with participation through representation, evidenced an initial drop with fairly rapid recovery. The last two experimental groups (combined in the exhibit), in which total participation was allowed, showed practically no drop and then went to a higher level of productivity than before the change. Two months after the original study, the control group was involved in a new job 316 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP transfer using the total participation method. group or concentrated in the hands of a few With the total participation procedure, this have generally been mixed. For example, A. found that concentrated leader group quickly recovered its previous effi Bavelas34 ciency rating and, like the other groups, conship resulted in both more efficient performance and lower morale. Similarly, Kahn and tinued on: to new production levels. There Katz,B5 in a study of a variety of high-andwas no aggression and turnover in the group for 19 days, a fact that contrasted sharply low-producing groups in business and induswith its previous behavior after the transfer. try, found that the supervisors of high-pro From the second experiment, the investiga ducing group units tended to take clear con trol of several leadership functions such astors concluded that the obtained results de pended upon the experimental procedures planning, coordinating, et cetera. However, rather than personality factors, such as skill these supervisors were also more inclined to or aggression, since the same individuals evidelegate responsibilities to others, encourage denced markedly different behavior in the subordinates to make decisions, and take initiative in many activities. no-participation treatment as contrasted with the total-participation one. Tbe interactionistic approach This particular study gives a striking picture of the effects that participatory leaderFinally, consideration should be given to ship may have upon productivity. Other data what may be defined, for lack of a better in this study indicated that the morale of the term, as an Interactionistic Approach to the study of leadership. In many respects, this experimental groups was better than that of the control group. Thus, high production apapproach is a logical outgrowth and exten parently was not obtained at the cost of emsion of the Functional Approach. However, ployee morale or satisfaction; in fact, quite there is value in distinguishing the two ap the contrary appeared to be true. proaches, if for no other reason than to exIt has been argued by some that research amine the interactionist's methodology. This approach also has a certain uniqueness in developing out of the Functional Approach that it stresses the quality of the leader-subfosters "group-think," group decision makordinate relationship as an important detering, and management methods that encourminant of productivity, morale, and otherage the supervisor or manager to give his degoals seen as "good" or desirable by organicision-making function to subordinates. For zations. example, W. H. Whyte in his book The OrOne basic assumption of this approach isganization Man88 asserts that the current focus upon groups only encourages in leadthat leadership cannot be studied in isolation, because it represents an interaction be ers a loss of individuality, conformity, and tween members of a group. One argumentmediocrity. However, it should be noted that this approach makes no value judgments as leveled at some of the functional studies was that the results were based upon experimen to whether a leader should or should not practice a particular leadership pattern. It tally constituted laboratory groups that were only asks the question of what consequences transitory and divorced from .the "real-life" are associated with different leadership beconditions in which leadership occurs. Such havior, and it then leaves the problem of decomplaints can hardly be leveled at interac tionistic research, since these investigations ciding what particular leadership practices will be most effective in a given situation to characteristically have been field studies in all kinds of work groups and organizations. the practitioner. A favorite methodology in this kind of reActually, results from studies that have atsearch is to select "high-productive" and tempted to answer the question of whether leadership should be widely distributed in a "' "Morale and Training of Leaden," ClviUan Morale, ed. G. Watson (Boston, Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin, 1942). 33 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956). 36 Kahn and Katz, op. cit. 317 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP "low-productive" or "effective" and "ineffec their subordinates for more responsibilities, tive" work groups doing the same tasks in an trying out new ideas with them, and, in genorganization and then study the leader-foleral, showing consideration for the follower lower interactions. In these studies "producand his needs. tive," "effective," and "good" groups are dis At the other extreme, the ineffective ortinguished not on a basis of armchair low-production leader frequently demands judgments, such as was observed in some of more from his subordinate than can be done, the earlier leadership research, but on the criticizes them in front of others, treats subbasis of empirical indices, such as produc ordinates without respect for their feelings, tivity per man, job satisfaction, turnover, rides them for making mistakes, initiates ac absenteeism, costs per man, and so on. tions without consulting them, and refuses toThe answer to the question-Are there accept their ideas and suggestions or even· significant differences in the superior-suborexplain the actions he has taken.dinate relationships of "productive" and High-and low-production leaders differ "nonproductive" work groups?-seems to be not only in their relationships with their subbasically "Yes." Evidence from field studies ordinates but also in their relationships withwith B-52 bomber crews, factory assembly their supervisors. D. C. PeJ.z88 found thatlines, public utility companies, infantry comhigh-production leaders tended to have muchbat squads, insurance companies, governgreater influence upon their own superiorsment agencies, petroleum companies, and so on matters relating to subordinates' pay,on would suggest that the leader-follower inworking conditions, promotions, etc., thanteraction may differ quite markedly in "prodid low-production leaders. In this study, itductive" and "nonproductive" groups.86 was also found that, when leaders who hadContrary to what one might suspect, the above average influence with their ownleaders or supervisors of highly productive bosses followed "good" supervisory pracunits--crews, departments, or divisions-do tices, the subordinates tended to react favornot appear to devote their greatest time and ably. However, when supervisors who wereefforts to technical or job-oriented functions below average in the amount of influencewith subordinates. Rather, supervisors or they had with their supervisors practicedleaders with the best records of performance these same desirable supervisory procedures,focus their primary attention upon the they usually failed to obtain a favorable rehuman aspects of their subordinate relationaction and not infrequently obtained adverseships and attempt to build effective work reactions from their . subordinates. Appargroups with high-performance goals.s7 ently, if the leader is to influence his followHigli-productive leaders-supervisors and ers effectively, he must also be able to influmanagers-tend to spend more time than ence his own supervisor as well. low-productive supervisors in motivating Interactionistic research findings consti their subordinates, providing structure, and tute perhaps the closest thing to what mightbe regarded as leadership "principles" in the keeping them informed as to what is going whole literature. Although the maxims are on, getting their ideas and suggestions on im fairly well documented bf research and ex portant matters before going ahead, training perience, they do not form any kind of com30 R. Liken, New Patterns of MQI~Qgement (New York: pact "cookbook" or guide to effective leader McGraw-Hill, 1961)."' Bass, op. tit. Liken, op. cU. R. Liken 1111d R. L ship. None of the findings is universally Kahn, "Planning for Effective Leadership," Planning and Training /or El/ectlve Leadership, ed. S. Seasbore (Ann applicable; in fact, one may sometimes ob Arbor, Mich.: Foundation for Research on Human Be havior, 1956), pp. 1-7. F. C. Mann 1111d 1. Dent, Appraisal tain similar results with almost opposite of Supervisors and Attitudes of Their Employees In an leadership Some practices. representative ·.\ Electric Power Company (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1954). D. Katz, N. Maccoby, G. Gurln, leadership "principles" that are frequently re 1111d L. o: Floor, ProductlvUy, Supervision and Morale Among Railroad Workers (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1951). .. "Leadership Within a IDerarcbical Organization," Journal of Social Issues, VoL VII (1951), pp. 49-55. 318 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP work groups, even though, from an outported in the research literature are as folsider's point of view, this seemed "ineffilows.89 cient."While the principle of utilization of group Supervisors of high-productive units spend a greater amount of time developing their factors such as loyalty and group cohesive work groups into "close," highly cohesive ness appears to be one of the most firmly es teams than do supervisors or managers of tablished findings in the literature, highlylow-productive units. cohesive groups are not always the most productive. In Seashore's study,42 high produc One assumption here is that a supervisor or leader cannot treat his subordinates with tivity among cohesive groups was found only if the group members saw the company as afull effectiveness unless he recognizes the work group as a source of morale and motisupportive and secure situation. Among crews who saw the company as threatening, vation. S. Seashore's40 study of high-and high cohesiveness was associated with lowlow-"cohesive" work groups in a large manproductivity. ufacturing company indicates clearly the powerful influences a small group can exert General rather than close supervtston is upon a member's behavior and adjustment. more often associated with a high rather This investigator found that members of than a low level of productivity. high-cohesive groups exhibited much less anxiety than low-cohesive groups when feelA number of investigators43 have found ing "jumpy" and nervous, feeling under presthat high-production supervisors and managsure to achieve higher productivity, and feelers supervise their employees less closely ing a lack of support from the company were than low-production supervisors. High-proused as measures of anxiety. Seashore conduction supervisors make clear to their subcluded that membership in a cohesive group ordinates what needs to be done then let provides the worker with effective support in these subordinates use their own ideas and his encounters with work-associated anxiety experience to do the job in the way they find and provides direct satisfactions that are best. Low-production supervisors frequently anxiety reducing. spend more time with their subordinates than Similarly, research by E. L. Trist and K. do high-production ones, but the time is bro W. Bamforth41 with English coal miners ken up into short periods because the supersupports the importance of the group as a visors give specific instructions such as "Do determinant of worker effectiveness and this," "Don't do that," et cetera.44 morale. As a part of a program of increasing An interesting parallel to this proposition the mechanization and "efficiency" of minis that leaders tend to supervise their suboring operations, management broke up the dinates as they themselves are supervised.45 miner's small, face-to-face work groups and Thus, if a department head utilizes general assigned the workers to more isolated tasks. or close supervision, his foremen tend to follow similar practices. Itwould appear rea The reorganization of the small work groups sonable to assume that low-production sub led to serious problems of absenteeism, turn over, and sickness (including psychosomatic ordinates might require more close supervi sion; however, on the other hand, there isdisorders). This problem became so acute some evidence to suggest that close supervithat it was necessary to alter attempts at insion may actually cause poor performance in creased mechanization and restore the small .. Seashore, op. cit. • Bass, op. cU. Likert, op. cit. Ukert and Kahn, op. cU. '" Cartwright and Zander, op. cit. Kahn and KaU, op. cit. Mann and Dent, op. cit. Likert, op. cit. Seashore, op. cit. '"Group Cohesiveness In '"J. M. Pfiffner, "The Effective Supervisor: AD Or· the Industrial Work Group " Likert, op. cit. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1954), p. 120. ganizational Research Study," Personnel, Vol. XXXI (1955), 01 "Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the pp. 539-40. E. S. Stanton, "Company Policies and Super Long-wall Method of Coal Getting," Human Relations, visors' Attitudes Toward Supervision," Journal of Applied Vol. IV (1951), pp. 3-38. Psychology, VoL XLIV (1960), pp. 22-26. 319 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP that it emphasizes precise rules and proce Even this finding must be tempered by sit dures, at the expense of long-range goals, uational factors; that is, increasing managesubordinate morale, and job satisfaction.46 ment pressures toward productivity may,While general rather than close supervihave different results depending upon the insion practices are often more characteristic itial level of pressure.49 At initially low levof high-producing managers than of low els of pressure, an increase in emphasis uponones, research findings do not show that all productivity by supervisors not only resultshigh-producing managers adhere to this patin higher productivity but also increases thetern. Some technically competent, job-censatisfaction of the men with their supervisor.tered, intensive, and tough managers have However, at higher levels of pressure, furtherachieved impressive levels of productivity. increases in emphasis upon productivity byHowever, the members of these work groups supervisors frequently tend to result in lowershowed unfavorable attitudes towards their productivity and adverse reactions towardwork and supervisors, hostility and · resentthe supervisor.ment towards management, a high numberof grievances that went to arbitration, freCONCLUSIONSquent slowdowns, work stoppages, waste, The studies surveyed represent a fair sam and high job turnover.47 pling of more than two decades of leadership Likert and Kahn48 reported a study that research, and, on the basis of these findings, attempted to evaluate the effects of (1 ) some general conclusions can be drawn. tighter controls and direction and (2) greater The available evidence seems to indicate employee autonomy and participation as al that there are probably no personality traitsternative ways to achieve high productivity or characteristics that consistently distinguish and employee satisfaction in the same the leader from his followers. There is some organization. In some sections of the com evidence, however, to suggest that the leader pany, results were sought through closer su probably cannot be markedly different frompervision, more detailed work procedures, his subordinates if he is to be followed. and other forms of tighter control and direc The results of a number of studies indicate tion. In other sections, a program of encour that leadership does not occur in a vacuum aging more autonomy and participation in but at a particular time and place and under decision making was followed. Responsibility a particular set of circumstances. Therefore, for decisions was pushed down to lower lev the situation determines to some degree the els of the organization and greater freedom kinds of leadership skills and behavior that was given employees. In both situations, may be required. One reassuring finding that productivity was increased about 15-20 per has emerged from these studies has been the cent. Thus, contradictory leadership prac "discovery" that, when formal or designated tices were effective in increasing productiv leadership fails to provide its required func ity; however, employee morale changed for tions, there is a tendency for other members the worse in units where tighter controls of the group to step in and perform the were imposed and changed for the better in "needed" functions so that there will be a those units where greater autonomy was in minimal loss in group effectiveness. stituted. Some workers have investigated the effectsof differing kinds of leadership styles and The greater the amount of unreasonable pressure toward production that men feel have begun the process of explicating whatfrom their supervisors, the lower the prokinds of leadership acts or behavior helpsductivity and the less confidence and trust groups "move forward" and function effecthey have in their supervisors. tively. Some of these studies suggest that .. Likert, op. ell. " Likert, op. ctt• there is a tendency for democratic or partici.. Likert and Kahn, op. cU. ,.Likert and Kahn, op. ell. 320 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP patory leadership behavior to be associated with productivity, increased worker morale, and a number of other factors. Directive leadership has been found to lead to equally high productivity but often results in low morale and commitment to work. However, the relationship between leadership styles and job performance is much too complex to be explained simply by "democratic" or "authoritarian" leadership practices. Different leadership practices seem appropriate for different situations. Thus, under certain conditions, participative leadership may be most effective. Under other conditions, a more directive leadership may be required. Again, the personality characteristics and expectations of subordinates will influence the kinds of leadership practices that are most effective. An increase in the degree of follower participation will often have favorable effects if the subordinates have relatively high needs for independence, a readiness to assume responsibility, the necessary knowledge and experience to deal with problems, . and an identification with the goals of the organization.50 However, the use of participatory practices with workers who lack these attributes might have highly adverse and undesirable effects. There is a growing body of research indicating rather clear differences between the behavior of high-and low-production workers in real-life work situations. These studies suggest that high-production supervisors tend to supervise their subordinates less closely, spend more time consulting with their workers, and give them more opportunities to participate in decisions that affect them than do low-production leaders. The quality of the leader-subordinate relationship-the degree of genuine respect and consideration that the leader shows for the follower's needs-appears to be a crucial factor here. This is perhaps another way of saying that employeecentered leadership tends to be more closely associated with subordinate productivity, ""R. Tannenbaum and W. H. Schmidt, "How to Choose a Leadership Pattern," Harvard Business Review, Vol. XXXVI \1958), pp. 95-101. morale, and job satisfaction than does production-centered leadership. On the basis of the research surveyed in this presentation, it would seem clear that leaders accomplish their work through other people and their success as leaders depends upon their ability to enlist and maintain follower commitment and collaboration for the attainment of group or organizational goals. In this respect, some of the research considered here may provide ideas that may be worth considering in the concrete work situation. However, at the present time, there is no straightforward set of supervisory practices that will always yield the best results. Research reported in this presentation suggests that a leader's objectives may be reached through multiple and sometimes even contradictory means. At this point, it would appear that the choice of alternative leadership practices for a given individual will depend upon a number of factors, such as the following: The leader's personal preference or "style." The leader's skill in applying various leader ship practices. The leader's confidence in his subordinates. The leader's value system or the importance that he attaches to organizational efficiency, personal growth of subordinates, company profits, et cetera, The leader's assessment of the "situation" of his subordinates. The leader's evaluation of possible un desirable side effects of a particular practice.61 . Viewed from a historical point of view, the studies considered indicate that behavioral scientists are making progress in understanding the phenomena of leadership. Research has come a long way from the early study of leadership traits, and investigators can now state with some certainty what they know and do not know. Moreover, they are in a position to begin to specify some of the conditions under which given leadership practices may be effective. However, while behavioral scientists may be able to provide managers and supervisors with some tenta 61Jbld. 321 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP tive "guidelines," leadership research can never specify the "proper" practices for all situations. In the concrete leadership situation, the final choice and responsibility for specific action must always fall back upon the judgmekt and good common sense of frail human beings, and, in all due respects to the "leader," this is as it should be. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Explain the two major problems that have caused behavioral scientists the most trouble in their attempts to understand leadership from a scientific point:Of view. ·: ~: <:'· 2. Briefly distinguish the various approaches to the study of leadership. 3. If you believe that any one approach to leadership has more merit than the others, explain why. 4. As a result of his study of the available research evidence, what were Spotts' conclusions regarding leadership? S. Why do the factors you have identified influence the choice of leadership? READING C Significant Research on Leadership By Cecil E. Goode. Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Personnel, March 1951, by the American Management Association, Inc. Copyright 1951. Cecil E. Goode is Deputy Director of Personnel of the Economic Stabilization Administration and President of the Society for Personnel Administration. He has been in personnel work since he received the M.S. degree from Purdue University in 1938. Before assuming his present position, he worked as Management Analyst with the US Bureau of the Budget and as Executive Director of the National Civil Service League. Mr. Goode has written extensively on the subject of personnel problems, including Special Personnel Problems in the Department of Defense; Federal Career Service, A Look Ahead; and Personnel Research · Frontiers. W HAT are the characteristics of the effective leader in working organizations? Why are some executives and supervisors able to inspire enthusiastic and efficient production while others have only trouble, gripes, and inefficiency? Perhaps some of the answers will be found in the really important research on leadership which is now being conducted. Are there any truths in the common stereotypes of executives? We are all familiar with the picture of the cigar-smoking, ulcerative executive who is barking orders over multiple telephones, is subject to outbursts of temper, and whose custom is to arrive late to work and to leave early for an afternoon of golf. We accept these stereotypes as a burlesque of the executive, but there are other questions which we may with more seriousness ask. Is the . successful executive or supervisor bigger and older than his followers? Is he superior technically in his line of work? Is he more intelligent than the average of those he leads? And is he a better executive or supervisor the more intelligent he is? 322 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Does the leader have more facility with language? Is he broad or narrow in his abilities_ and aptitudes? In other words, does he tend to be superior principally in the aptitudes associated with his work? We have come to expect the leader to be an extroverted individual. Is this necessarily true? We also expect him to be dominant-almost domineering-in all his actions. Is this true? Does he rule by intrigue and by building up a mystery surrounding his work, or are his dealings straightforward, simple and understandable? Finally, are there characteristic leadership traits which will make an executive in one activity probably a good executive in another? MORE FACTS ON LEADERSIDP NEEDED There is little question of the importance of good leadership to busine£s, government, and to all organized endeavor. As working organizations have become larger and more complex, the problem of providing suitable leadership has increased. Much has been said and written about leadership and its importance, but most of this has been based on speculation rather than scientific research. Realizing this, the author undertook to study many of the published reports of research on leadership. This article summarizes and draws conclusions from some of the more significant research in this area. As used in this paper, the word "leadership" is intended to apply to the leadership of executives and supervisors in government, industry, and other working organizations. For the purpose of this study, Ordway Tead's definition of leadership has been accepted: "Leadership is the activity of influencing people to cooperate toward some goal which they come to find desirable." (22)* SOME POPULAR NOTIONS ABOUT LEADERSIDP 1. Is leadership a general characteristic? It has generally been concluded by researchers that leadership is specific to the situation, that a given time and job to be done would • See the bibliography at the end of this article. call forth a different leader from that which another situation would demand. This has been the conclusion from studies of divergent leadership situations such as are found in military, criminal, and student gr_oups. (21) On the other hand, it is interesting that studies have shown a considerable relation between academic success and later vocational leadership. (21) A recent study at the University of Rochester suggests the possibility that there may be common leadership requirements within certain broad categories of endeavor. This study found that a leader on what might be termed an intellectual task tended to be a leader on other intellectual tasks. The same was found within a category of tasks which might be classed as "doing things with one's hands."(S) Many other studies have revealed that executive and leadership requirements are basically the same regardless of the enterprise or type of work in which the leader is engaged. A questionnaire study conducted by the Philadelphia Personnel Council among 874 supervisors in 52 different organizations found that the same·basic skills were considered essential for supervisors directing different types of work. They found a correlation (RHO) of .95 to .98 in the most important skills among the different types of work. (7) A Fortune magazine survey of executive opinion showed that the executives in general considered certain characteristics to be important for successful executive leadership.(8) While the author does not dispute the general conclusion that leadership in widely varying situations involves different skills, he does conclude that executive and supervisory positions are enough similar to require remarkably similar qualifications. Recent evidence indicates that there is a carry-over of leadership requirements and leadership skills from one executive and supervisory situation to another. 2. Must the leader be more skilled technically than his subordinates? A study conducted by the Philadelphia Personnel Council involving 874 supervisors, in which the supervisors listed the most important quali 323 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ties for successful supervision, found that the sique. Physique is not important unless a technical skills were far down the list. The marked disability or weakness exists. There supervisory and administrative skills which is much more significance in health and endo not depend on the character of the work ergy or vitality than there is in physique. were rated most important.(?) In a Fortune Stodgill reports an average correlation from magazine. survey of successful executives, a variety of studies of .30 between height technical and specialized knowledge was and leadership; for weight he finds an averlisted as of considerably less importance than age correlation of .23. (21) It is concluded ability to handle people and ability to make that height, weight, and physique are very decisions. (8) unreliable as indicators of leadership. In a study conducted by the University of WHAT MAKES A LEADER? Rochester, it was concluded that there is more relationship between leadership in me1. Mental ability. A wide range of scienchanical tasks and mechanical interest than tific studies indicates that there is a positive there is between leadership and mechanical relationship between mental ability and leadknowledge. (4) A review of the work of ership. There seems to be no support, howScott, Yoakum, Kenagy, Cowdery, Bingham, ever, for the thesis that the more intelligentand Moore leads to the conclusion that execthe leader the better he is as a leader. Ratherutive groups do not measure as high in tests it can be concluded that the leader is generof characteristic skills of workers in industry ally a shade more intelligent than the averand the common occupations as specialists in age of his followers; he is usually not excepthe respective fields. (16) tionally superior to the others of his group.It is believed, therefore, that technical skill This means that the leader to be successfulin the work supervised is not nearly so immust be able to convey his ideas to others.portant as interest in directing the work of The leader who is vastly superior intellecothers and ability to reach objectives through tually would have difficulty in making histheir organized effort. followers understand him. typical leader an extrovert? 3. Is the The average correlation between intelli Stodgill of Ohio State University in a very gence and leadership found in the studies re comprehensive study of research findings viewed by Stodgill was .28. This, of course,concludes that the relationship of either inindicates a positive relationship, but it is not troversion or extroversion to leadership is very marked.(21) Achard and Oarke inextremely doubtful. (21) In a study involving their review of studies on leadership con the Laird introversion-extroversion test, no cluded that successful supervisors have aversignificant relationship with successful leadage or better mental ability as measured byership was found. (2) Therefore, contrary to valid tests. ( 1 ) McCuen, studying leadershipthe popular notion, the effective .leader can among college students, found in general that not be characterized necessarily as an extroleaders slightly exceeded the average intellivert. gence of the groups led. ( 12) 4. Is the successful leader older and Studies of leadership among high school larger physically than his followers? Stodgill students assigned a variety oj work tasks concludes that studies of age as a factor in found that reasoning ability was related to leadership are contradictory. (21) However, leadership in all the tasks included in the ex other studies show that supervisory experi periment. The tasks involved intellectual, ence is related to skill in foremanship. (20) clerical, card sorting, and mechanical assem Experience is indirectly, of course, related to age. At best, age is not a very significant facbly work tasks. (4) tor. The research conducted by Stockford at Most studies conclude that there is little Lockheed Aircraft Corporation indicated relationship between leadership and phy-that 42 per cent of the foremen who were 324 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP classified in the lower two groups of supervisory ability had an I.Q. of less than 110, while only 20 per cent of those in the upper two leadership groups had an I.Q. of less than 110. This same study concluded that production under the more intelligent foremen was 17 per cent better than chance. (20) 2. Breadth of interests and aptitudes. The leader in government and industry must be a well-rounded individual. He must have a wide general knowledge, a large number of aptitudes and must be broadly interested not only in the work with which he is directly connected but in all of the affairs of the setting in which he is placed. Mason and Cleeton of the Carnegie Institute of Technology concluded that "Above average standing on a large number of qualities which can be rated or measured is the true criterion of executive ability." They go on to say that "the executive is a wellrounded individual who does not deviate outstandingly from the average shown by persons of general intellectual superiority."(16) Johnson O'Connor found that successful executives are superior in such widely varying aptitudes as tonal memory (memory of musical themes), engineering aptitude, clerical aptitude, tweezer dexterity, finger dexterity, and creative imagination. (17) Other studies have found the executive to be extremely curious-minded and an omnivorous reader. He is probably more interested in planning and directing the work of others than he is in doing the work directly. 3. Language facility. One of the most interesting findings of the research on leadership has to do with the ability of the leader to speak and write fluently. While scientific findings clearly demonstrate that language facility is a notable skill of the leader, students have long considered language facility a key factor in leadership. It was Disraeli who said, "With words we govern men." Abraham Lincoln has long been famous for his simple and effective speech. He was a genius at the written and spoken work even though he was relatively untutored. Of Abraham Lincoln, the Cambridge History of American Literature says, "Not his policies, not his course of action, had won for Lincoln his commanding position in his party in 1860, but his way of saying things. In every revolution there is a moment when the man who can phrase it can lead it." Virtually all studies of leadership have found linguistic skill to be one of the principal skills of the leader. After all, speech is the primary medium of communication, and communication is essential to the leader. Achard and Clarke in drawing conclusions from a body of research on leadership concluded that successful supervisors have greater vocabulary development than less successful supervisors. ( 1) O'Connor found that successful executives had larger vocabularies than any other group, including groups of college graduates and groups of college · professors. He found that even the unschooled executives averaged higher than well-educated persons who were not executives. He found that college background had little effect on vocabulary. However, he did find that more of the successful executives were college graduates. ( 17) The University of Chicago studies of executives have found successful executives to be assertive. ( 13) In Stodgill's review of research findings, he concludes that a leader is able to sum up the opinions of the group and to express them more sharply, decisively, and consistently than other members of the group. (21) The Lockheed. Aircraft Corporation study found that the more successful foremen were more persuasive than other foremen, and concluded that production under foremen who were relatively more persuasive was 35 per cent better than mere chance. ( 20) Another very interesting study of the effect of a leader's persuasion on a group is reported by Partridge. He studied a sample of 226 boy scouts. The boys' attitudes with respect to certain questions were measured, then group discussion of the questions was introduced with the leader in charge. Upon measuring the attitudes on the same questions after the group discussion, it was found that a significant number of boys had changed 325 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP their minds to reflect the opinions of the leader. ( 18) Speech facility is therefore one of the most significant factors bearing on leadership ability. This is understandable when you realize that speech is the means of communicating from the leader to the follower, and the more understandable he is, the more likely it is that the desired results will be obtained. More than mere ability to use words, the successful leader is eager to express himself and is persuasive. He expresses more clearly and reliably the attitudes of the group he leads than any other member of the group. 4. Maturity. Another significant result of scientific studies on leadership is that the effective leader is mentally and emotionally mature. He has grown up. The effective executive or supervisor shows a minimum of anti-social attitudes. He has had a healthy childhood which has resulted in human understanding and a respect for authority rather than arrogance in his dealings with subordinates. He is detached and objective in his thinking and actions. He can control his moods so that he does not float from one extreme to the other. He is relatively free from prejudice, is self-sufficient, and is well-adjusted to life and to his part in it. Burleigh Gardner, as a result of his University of Chicago studies, says that some of the principal reasons for the failure of executives include: a. Inability to make room for other people. b. Re~istance to authority. c. Arrogance. d. ·Prejudices which interfere with judgment. e. Gravitation toward self-destruction (subconscious urge for hilure). f. Existence of mental ailments. In another report of studies by the University of Chicago, it is found that the attitude of the executive toward his parents is a significant factor. The successful executive has been weaned emotionally from his mother and respects the authority represented by his father. This is easily translated to respect for superiors in the working environment. (9) (13) Shartle reports a clinical study of foremen which found psychological maturity to be of signal importance. A group of successful foremen and a group of workers with job skill equal to that of the foremen, but considered incapable of supervising others, were clinically studied. The case histories revealed that "the foremen showed a developmynt from early childhood involving less withdrawal from others, less indifference to the actions of others, and fewer antagonistic reactions toward others. In many · cases there was a close relationship between reported childhood behavior and present job behavior." Shartle went on to say that clinical information would seem to be valuable in selecting foremen and in matching workers with superiors in order to avoid conflict. ( 19) Stodgill found that self-assurance was significant in a large number of leadership findings. The coefficient of correlation between self-assurance and leadership in these studies ranges from .12 to .59.(21) A study at the Crosley Corporation concluded that "unboULded self-confidence''. is of prime importance in leadership. (10) A study of leadership as related to the Bernreuter personality measures finds that the chief difference between leaders and nonleaders is that the former group is better adjusted and that they are more dominant and more self -sufficient.(12) Johnson O'Connor reports that an extremely objective personality is a significant factor in leadership. He reports an experiment in which foremen were divided into an objective and a subjective group on the basis of free association tests. A committee was organized to review the grievances of employees under the foreman test groups. It was found that the foremen who were classed as subjective had twice as many complaints from employees as did the objective foremen. Seventy per cent of the objective foremen's actions resulting in employee complaints were confirmed by the committee, while 80 per cent of the actions resulting in complaints from employees under the subjective foremen were reversed. 326 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP The study previously mentioned which was conducted at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation -found a significant reiationship between successful foremanship and community stability. Community stability was measured on the basis of marital status, number of children, and whether or not the foremen owned their homes.(20) 5. Motivation. Most of the studies on leadership, particularly that of executives and supervisors in working organizations, have found the personal motivation of leaders to be a very significant factor. Inner drive or motive power is the important element which propels a leader. The leader has a strong will to accomplish; he likes his work; he has a strong urge to excel and to move up and onward. He has an impulsion to plan and to organize the work of others. He can see beyond himself. He can clearly visualize that his objectives will require the help of others if they are to be reached. The leader is a hard worker-he works long hours, and applies himself intensely. He is able to stick with what he sets out to do; to plan, organize and carry through his objectives. He has a marked inclination to be original and to use his own initiative. He is courageous. He does not shirk responsibility but rather seeks it out. He is self-confident enough to be able to take blame without passing the buck. He is secure enough in his own mind that he is not afraid to share responsibility with others; in other words, he is able to delegate. Charters has shown that the volitional traits of ambition, perseverance, courage, industry, forcefulness, and initiative are essential qualities in the leadership phases of executive talent. ( 16) Stodgill found that strength of will, desire to excel, application, and industry were positively related to leadership in most of the studies which he reviewed. In these studies he also found that originality correlated from .3 to . 70 with leadership. This was the highest relationship he found on any characteristic with the exception of popularity. ( 21) A Fortune magazine survey conducted in 1946 found that 94 per cent of the execu tives included in the study liked their present work. These executives reported "great ca pacity for work," "ability to see things through," and "imagination" as three of the six principal reasons for their success. (8) Hampton found these traits significant: dy namic impulsion to plan and organize the work of others; ability to plan, oricmize and carry through what he starts; tendency never to shirk responsibility but instead to seek it out; hard worker; no buckpassing; not afraid of losing power by delegating responsibil ity.(lO) - 6. Social orientation. Since the leader accomplishes things through others, he relies heavily on the social skills. To secure desired results, he must learn the secret of getting others to cooperate willingly with him. A study of research findings shows that the successful leader is aware of these skills and practices them; moreover, he is highly regarded by other people. Characteristically he is a social being; he is socially active--even his hobbies tend to be social in nature. To be socially active, the leader must be physically able to get around and must have almost boundless energy. Stodgill finds ~hat sociability correlates with leadership from .33 to .98 in the studies he covered. He finds considerable relationship between leadership and tact and courtesy. He also finds a strong relationship between leadership and popularity or prestige, the correlation ranging from .23 to .80 on this characteristic. On cooperativeness-the ability to enlist cooperation-he finds the correlation ranging from .44 to .69. Katz in reporting some of the findings of studies by the University of Michigan says that the supervisors of high production groups are more employee-centered than those of low production groups. They encourage employee participation in making decisions and make employees feel that they are partners in the undertaking. (14) Hampton, too, finds that successful executives rely heavily on teamwork. (10) Elton Mayo found that group production rises and falls 327 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP surprisingly in tune with the feelings and attiHampton reports that the successful exectude of the real leader. ( 6) Rensis Likert utive is a good judge and picker of men, has found that the morale of life insurance salesan uncanny way of anticipating changes and men .depended chiefly on the attitude of the developments affecting his organization, and manager toward his subordinates. ( 15) has faith in teamwork. (1 0) The executives Henry in describing the work of the Unicovered in the Fortune survey indicated imversity of Chicago on executive selection agination as one of the characteristics or finds what he calls "the social mobility qualities which they consider to have condrive" as a strong factor making for executributed to their success. (8) Gardner reports tive success. By "social mobility drive" is that a tendency to. deal too much in detail, meant interest in social status and in activiinability to see the larger issues, or the lack ties outside of the job. Related to this is what of vision contributes to the failure of execuHenry calls the "mobility drive," which is retives.(9) lated particularly to the social structure of The University of Chicago studies on the the working organization. ( 13) selection of executives have resulted in the Stodgill finds that leaders participate in conclusion that successful executives have a more group activities and exhibit a higher strong reality orientation-they have vision rate of social mobility than nonleaders. He and imagination, but they are still practifinds also that leaders participate in a greater cal. ( 13) Stodgill at Ohio State University variety and number of social groups. ( 21) A finds the following factors significant: recent study conducted by Brown finds that knowledge of how to get things done, comexecutive leadership is closely related to mon sense, speed of decisions, alertness to membership in: social and professional orgaenvironment, understanding of situations, nizations. He finds that the number of social and responsibility. He finds in the various and professional organizations to which the studies he reviewed that dependability, trustexecutive belongs increases with the level of worthiness, reliability, and conscientiousness position which he holds. (3) are related to leadership with a correlation of Stockford reports very interestingly that from .10 to .87.(21)the more successful foremen in his study at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation tend toward CONCLUSION hobbies involving social activity. Shartle con There is increased awareness of the im cludes from a study involving the use of in portance of good leadership in obtaining terest tests that foremen are more interested desired results through any org~ed en in activities which involve dealings with peodeavor. This awareness has led to consideraple. (19) ble research which many people are not 7. Administrative skills. The success of aware has been and is being conducted. It isthe executive or supervisor is determined believed that the results of many of these more by his ability to plan and organize the studies are breaking away the clouds which work of others, to inspire and to instruct surround the qualities of leadership and theirthem, than by his technical knowledge of the effect on group behavior and production.particular work at hand: Such administrative We have just about reached the stage in skills as insight, knowing how to get things our studies of executive and supervisory done, ability to make decisions, judgment of leadership to give earnest consideration to people, ability to assume responsibility, abil concrete means for improving the selection ity to inspire and to teach, orientation to of those who will lead others in organized ward the practical, and imagination are re work. We do not know the relative impor quired by executive and supervisory jobs. Studies of executives and supervisors have tance of the selection of leaders as against proved these to be important and to be the the development of leadership talent which mark of the successful leader. may already be available. It is really, though, 328 READING8-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP a matter of selection--either of proved leaders or of prospective leaders for training. It is concluded from this study of leadership research that the following represent the qualities which make for successful leadership in working organizations: 1. The leader is somewhat more intelligent than the average of his followers. However, he is not so superior that he cannot be readily understood by those who work with him. 2. The leader is a well-rounded individual from the standpoint of interests and aptitudes. He tends toward interests, aptitudes, and knowledge with respect to a wide variety of fields. 3. The leader has an unusual facility with language. He speaks and writes simply, persuasively and understandably. 4. The leader is mentally and emotionally mature. He has come of age mentally and emotionally as well as physically. S. The leader has a powerful inner drive or motivation which impels him to strive for accomplishment. 6. The leader is fully aware of the importance of cooperative effort in getting things done, and therefore understands and practices very effectively the so-called social skills. 7. The leader relies on his administrative skills to a much greater extent than he does on any of the technical skills which may be associated directly with his work. BmLIOGRAPHY (1) F. H. Achard and Florence H. Clarke, "You Can Measure the Probability of Sua:ess as a Supervisor." PI!RSONNEL, American Management Association, May 1945, pp. 353-373. (2) R. 0. Beckman and Michael Lcwlne, "Selecting Executives: An Evaluation of Tbnle Tests." Persormel Journal, April 1930, V 8, No. 6, pp. 415-20. (3) C. G. Browne, "Study of Executive Leadership in Business. II Social Group Patterns." Journal of Applied Psychology, February 1950, pp. 12-15. (4) Launor Carter and Mary Nixon, "Ability, Perceptual, Personality, and Interest Faclor Associated with Dif ferent Criteria of Leadership." Journal of Psychology, 1949, 27' pp. 377-388. (5) Launor Carter, Wllllam Haytbom and Margaret Howell, "A Further Investigation of the Criteria of Leadership." The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, April 1950, pp. 3S~3S8. (6) Stuart Chase, ''What Management Should Know about Teamwork." Factory Management and Maintenance, April 1945, pp. 101-103. (7) William J. Eisenberg, "Qualities Essential for Supervisors." Personnel Journal, December 1948, pp. 251-257. (8) "Tbe Fortune Forum of Executive Opinion on U. S. Executives Themselves." Tbe Management PoD, Fortune, October 1946, p. S. (9) Burleigh B. Gardner, "Twelve Character Traits Cause Executives to Fall." Tim MANAGBMBNT RI!VIBW, American Management Association, January 1949, pp. 5-7. (10) Peter J. Hampton, "Analyzing Executives for Leadership and Other Qualities." ManageiMnl Digest, Prudential Insurance Company, August 1947, pp. 7-15. (11) Nelson G. Hanawalt and Helen M. Richardson, "Leadership as Related to the Bemreuter Personality Measures: IV An Item Analysis of Response of Adult Leaders and Non-Leaders." Jo~~rt~~~l of AppUed Psychology 28 (5) October, 1944, pp. 397-411. (12) John K. Hemphill, "Situational Factors in Leadership." Leadership Studies No. 4, Personnel Research Board, Ohio State University, 1949. (13) William E. Henry, "Executive Personality and Job Success." Personnel Series No. 120, American Management Association, New York, 1948. (14) Daniel Katz, "Employee Groups: What Motivates Them and How Tbey Perform." Advanced Management, V. XIV, No. 3, September 1949, p. 120. (15) Rensis Likert, "Morale and Agency Management." Life Insurance Sales Research Bureau, Hartford, Connecticut, 1940. (16) Charles v. Mason and Glen U. Cleeton, "Measuring Executive Ability," Personnel Jollrtllll, V. 13, pp. 277-279, 1934-35. (17) Johnson O'Connor, "Characteristics of Successful Executives." Stevens Institute of Technology, 1932. (18) E. D. Partridge, "Leadership Among Adolescent Boys." Teachers College, Columbia· University Contribution to Education, No. 608, N. Y., 1934. (19) Carroll L. Shartle, "A Clinical Approach to Fore manship." Personnel Journal, V. 13, No. 3, 1934-1935. (20) Lee Stockford, "Selection of Supervisory Personnel." PERSONNEL, November 1947, pp. 186-199. (21) Ralph M. Stodgill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature." The Journal of Psychology, 1948, 25, pp. 35-71. (22) Ordway Tead, The Art of Leadership, McGraw-Hili Book Company, New York, 1935, p. 20. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. A proposal has been made that AFROTC scholarships be awarded to established campus leaders, such as class or fraternity presidents, since there will be a valuable carry-over to Air Force leadership. Do you think this proposal has merit? Why or why not? 2. What specific characteristics does military leadership demand? 3. Why would some individuals who are acknowledged failures as leaders also display the characteristics referred to ir. Question 2? 329 .. t CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING D Leadership By Gen Matthew B. Ridgway. Reprinted by permission from Military Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 10 (October 1966). Copyright 1966. Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, US Army, Retired, gained initial fame as commanding general of the 82nd Infantry Division, one of the first airborne units in the Army and a unit thathad a significant part in the Normandy invasion. Late in 1950 General Ridgway was sentto Korea. When President Truman relieved Gen Douglas MacArthur, in April, 1951, Ridgwaywas ranked as a full general and became Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forcesin Korea. Following the Korean war, General Ridgway served as Army Chief of Staffuntil his retirement in June, 1955. After his retirement, he became Chairman of the Boardof Trustees, Mellon Institute, and later Director of Apollo Industries. I N DISCUSSING the subject of leadership, principles, or the lack or failure to developI am struck by two diametrically opposite one or more of the qualities of good leaderconcepts. One conceives leadership as an ship. In any event, I want to speak now ofexact science capable of being understood the good type of military leadership withand practiced by anyone. This view is ably some specific reference later to combat leaddeveloped by Colonel Sherman L. Kiser, US ership of large units-the division, corps,Army, Retired, in his book, The American and army.Concept of Leadership. An opposite concept The chief ingredients of leadership, as Iholds that "no amount of learning will make have known it to be exercised by those a man a leader unless he has the natural whose careers I have studied, or underqualities of one." This latter view was that of whose command I was privileged to serve,General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, and is exare three. I call them the three C's--characpounded in his published lectures in Generter, courage, and competence.als and Generalship. One concept treats Character is the bedrock on which theleadership as a s~ience; the other as an art. whole edifice of leadership rests. It is theI incline strongly to the Wavell concept. prime element for which every profession,While recognizing that there are many prinevery corporation, every industry searches inciples, or truths, pertaining to the exercise of evaluating a member of its organization.leadership, and while firmly believing that With it, the full worth of an individual canpowers of leadership can be greatly increased be developed. Without it-particularly in thein any individual through knowledge of these military profession-failure in peace, disasprinciples and practice in their application, I ter in war, or, at best, mediocrity in both willstill think the variables of human nature result.combined with those of combat, and to alesser degree with those in peacetime trainTYPES OF CHARACTER ing, make the exercise of leadership far more We often use this word "character" care of an art than a science. lessly. There are those of notoriously evilThere is, of course, a great deal of bad character, as well as those of an exemplaryleadership as well as of good. It, too, deone. Yet in its usual acceptation' it stands forserves study so that its pitfalls may be those magnificent traits which placed Georgeavoided. But in general, I believe bad leaderWashington first among his countrymen and,ship is the result eii:her of violation of basic in fact, made him the Father of his Country 330 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP the unanimous choice for our first Presipursuing hostile Indians in subzero weather dency. It stands for the time-honored code of on our western plains, closing up at dark for the officer corps. It stands for self-discipline, a dawn attack, with no fires permitted and loyalty, readiness to accept responsibility, only cold rations, if any, before H-hourand willingness to admit mistakes. It stands much the same many times in Korea, I might for selflessness, modesty, humility, willingadd, and I am sure under equally arduous ness to sacrifice when necessary, and, in my conditions in Vietnam today; the young ship opinion, for faith in God. Let me illustrate. commander named Kennedy, his patrol torDuring a critical phase of the Battle of the pedo boat sunk in action, his crew safely on the beach, then swimming out in shark-in Bulge, when I commanded the 18th Airborne Corps, another corps commander just fested waters to try to intercept a ftiendly deentering the fight next to me remarked: "I'm stroyer and rescue his men. glad to have you on my flank. It's character The world's annals and our own are studded with the names of such men, of all serv that counts." I had long known him, and I knew what he meant. I replied: "That goes ices and all grades. Always ready to assume for me, too." There was no amplification. responsibilities, they could always assign None was necessary. Each knew the other them to others and know they would be will would stick however great the pressure; ingly accepted. True to themselves and to would extend help before it was asked, if he their conscience, their men sense they will be true to them, giving them full credit, and could; and would tell the truth, seek no self frankly admitting mistakes and accepting re glory, and everlastingly keep his word. Such feeling breeds confidence and success. sponsibility when they themselves are to blame. SELF-DISCIPLINE General Washington wrote to Congress from Valley Forge: Only those who have disciplined them selves can exact disciplined performance . . . without arrogance or the smallest from others. When the chips are down, when deviation from truth, it may be scid that no privation mounts and the casualty rate rises, history now extant, can furnish an· instance when the crisis is at hand, which comof an Army's suffering such uncommon mander, I ask, receives the better response? hardships as ours have done, and bearing them with the same patience and fortitude. Is it the one who has failed to share the To see men without clothes to clothe their rough going with his troops, who is rarely nakedness, without blankets to lie on, with seen in the zone of aimed fire, and who exout shoes, by which their marches might be pects much and gives little? Or is it the one traced by the blood from their feet, and al most as often without provisions as with; whose every thought is for the welfare of his marching through frost and snow, and at men, consistent with the accomplishment of Christmas taking up their winter quarters his mission; who does not ask them to do within a day's march of the enemy, without a house or hut to cover them till they could what he has not already done and stands be built, and submitting to it without a mur ready to do again when necessary; who with mur, is a mark of patience and obediencehis men has shared short rations, the physiwhich in my opinion can scarce be paralcal discomforts and rigors of campaign, and leled. -· will be found at the crises of action where the issues are to be decided? And what Washington did not say-a mark of his own unexcelled leadership. I know your answer: self-disciplined, self-controlled, and so in control of others, An eyewitness report of Lee after Pickett's no matter how tough the going-Washington failure stated: at the Battle of Long Island and at Valley His face did not show the slightest disForge; Grant at Shiloh; Mackenzie of the 4th appointment, care or annoyance, and he Cavalry in his epic raid; the junior officer addressed to every soldier he met a few words 331 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP of encouragement; 'All will come right in the end, we'll talk it over afterwards.' And to a Brigade Commander speaking angrily of the heavy losses of his men: 'Never mind, General, all this has been my fault. It is I who have lost this fight, and you must help ine out of it the best way you can.' For leadership through willingness to admit mistakes and instantly to accept responsibility, I think, history can offer few examples to surpass this. WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE Archibald Rutledge once wrote that there can be no real love without a willingness to sacrifice. Tuck this away in your inner minds. It may pay off in some crisis coming to you in the years now hidden beyond the horizon. Do you love your country and its flag? Do you love the branch in which you are serving, the men with whom you will be privileged to share service and to command? If you do, then you will be prepared to sacrifice for them, if your responsibilities or the situation so demands. The commander of Torpedo Squadron 8 at Midway; the four • Army chaplains on the torpedoed SS Dorch-' ester off Iceland in predawn darkness in • February 1942; the many aircraft commanders who have ordered "abandon ship," then . stuck overlong to the controls to insure that i their last man was out. Courage, the second "C," could well be· treated as a trait of character, as, indeed, it is. Yet it deserves, I believe, a separate category, for I know of not one recipient of his-· 1 tory's accolade for battle leadership of enduring fame who was not known for great 1 1 gallantry. PHYSICAL AND MORAL COURAGE There are two kinds of courage, physical ' and moral, and he who would be a true I 1 leader must have both. Both are products of l the character-forming process, of the development of self-control, self-discipline, physi-• cal endurance, of knowledge of one's job and, therefore, of confidence. These qualities • minimize fear and maximize sound judgment under pressure and-with some of that indis pensable stuff called luck--often bring suc cess from seemingly hopeless situations. Putting aside impulsive acts of reckless bravery, both kinds of courage bespeak an untroubled conscience, a mind at peace with God. An example is Colonel John H. Glenn who was asked after his first rocket flight if he had been worried, and who replied: "I am trying to live the best I can. My peace had been made with my Maker for a number of years, so I had no particular worries." Examples of physical courage are neither confined to combat nor limited to a stouthearted few, but are common throughout the world among men and women of every color, creed, race, and age, in peace as well as in war. However, examples of moral courage are less well known. They can be considered as proof of true greatness of soul. Where the individual has not measured up, he has generally failed fortune's bid to fame. To me such incidents most frequently found in war are those where the career of the leader is at stake, and where his actions or decisions will determine the saving or slaughter of many of his men. History is full of these cases. The lure of glory, the fear of being thought afraid, of losing personal power and prestige, the mistaken idea that blind obedience to orders has no alternativeall have been followed by tragic losses of lives with little or no gain. History often glosses over the countless thousands of lives which have been fruitlessly sacrificed to the pull of power, pres tige, and publicity. Haig's Flanders Campaign in 1917 is a conspicuous example. Here, 100,000 men were sacrificed for the gain of 1,000 yards of almost bottomless mo rass. It is easy to gamble with other peoples' money, and sometimes easier still with other men's lives, particularly when your own is in no great danger. You remember the commanders' conference prior to one of the big offensives of World War I, when a corps commander-whose . command post was miles behind the front-spoke out during a lull in the meeting, saying: "I'd give 10,000 332 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP men to take that hill." And a liaison officer do this, for this is when you lay your career, from a frontline infantry unit remarked to a perhaps your commission, on the line." brother officer standing beside him in the Twice in my personal experience as a diviback of the room: "Generous, isn't he?" sion commander I felt compelled to protest agajnst tactical decisions that were about to OPPOSITION TO ORDERS be assigned to my 82d Airborne Division. The military services deal harshly, as they The first occasion was the planned drop should, with failure to carry out orders in on Rome in September 1943. I have rebattle. The commander present on the scene counted the incident in some detail in my is entitled to full, instant, and enthusiastic book, Soldier. Recently, however, published execution by subordinates. Yet when faced memoirs of German generals then present in with different situations from those anticithe Rome area have confirmed my views. pated, as well as in the transition from plans One passage from the account of that incito orders, there sometimes comes the chaldent illustrates the point I wish to make: lenge to one's conscience, the compelling When the time comes that I must meet my urge to oppose foolhardy operations before it Maker, the source of most humble pride to is too late, before the orders are issued and me will not be accomplishments in battle, but lives are needlessly thrown away. the fact that I was guided to make the de Or the leader may be faced with the decicision to oppose this plan, at the risk of my career, right up to the Theater Commander. sion: Shall I take the responsibility of discarding the original mission? Shall I take the The drop was not ordered. initiative and strive for success along differ The second experience was a proposed at ent lines? He will have to put those questions tack by the 82d across the Voltumo River to his conscience. "Blind obedience," said where the Germans had brought the Allied Napoleon Bonaparte, "is due only to a supe advance to a halt. The sector chosen in rior present on the spot at the moment of ac volved getting across an unfordable rivertion." I concur. and, then, after an advance of roughly 1,000I still support a statement of mine of some yards across open flat terrain, the attack andyears ago: seizure of a line of hills, Curving away from the river on one flank, then like a bow curv It has long seemed to me that the hard ing back almost to the stream again on the decisions are not the ones you make in the other flank of the zone of attack, so that the heat of battle. Far harder to make are those involved in speaking your mind about some assaulting troops would be under concen hare-brained scheme which purposes to comtrated fire from the front and both flanks. mit troops to action under conditions where While the proposal to use the 82d was a failure seems almost certain, and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of pricehigh compliment-since it was the weakest less lives. When all is said and done, the numerically, and much the most lightly most precious assets any nation has is its armed of any of the divisions in the 5thyouth, and for a battle commander ever to Army-1 could only view the proposed opercondone the unnecessary sacrifice of his men is inexcusable. In any action you must ation as a suicide mission that would result balance the inevitable cost in lives against the in the loss of most of the assaulting troops objectives you seek to attain. Unless the reand, then, with small chance of success. Isults to be expected can reasonably justify the could not accept such a mission without pro estimated los[' of life the action involves, then for my part I want none of it. test. But first I decided to discuss the plan with General Lucien K. Truscott, CommandGeneral George C. Marshall, one of the ing General, US 3d Infantry Division, a field noblest men who has worn an American unicommander conspicuous for competence and form since Washington, once said of decigallantry, and an old friend. He said he sions of this kind: "It is hard to get men to wouldn't touch it with a 40-foot pole, even 333 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP with his heavier division. So I spoke my get in shape. You must be in shape all the mind, first to the corps commander, under time. whom the operation was to be mounted There is another element in battlefield and I recall I used the word "fantastic"leadership which I want to mention and illusand, finally, to the army commander. The trate. It is a cardinal responsibility of a complan was canceled. mander to foresee insofar as possible whereIn action and out, there is often a thin diand when crises affecting his command areviding line between recklessness, boldness, likely to occur. It starts with his initial estiand caution. Even later study of battle recmate of the situation-a continuing mentalords may fail to erase that line, for it is next process from the moment of entering the to impossible to reconstruct the exact picture combat zone until his unit is pulled out of as it was thrown on the screen of the comthe line. Ask yourself these questions. Whatmander's brain at any particular crisis of are the enemy capabilities? What shall I do, combat. Yet experience, your own and that or what could I do, if he should exercise thatof others which you have absorbed, together one of his capabilities which would be mostwith common sense, will be your best guides dangerous to me, or most likely to interfereand with good luck will see you through. with the accomplishment of my mission? PHYSICAL FITNESS PERSONAL PRESENCE Physical fitness comes under competence, As commander of a division or smallerthe third of my three basic ingredients of unit, there will rarely be more than one crileadership. It plays a great part. My own sis, one really critical situation facing you atearlier training at Fort Leavenworth, Fort any one time. The commander belongs rightBenning, Fort Sam Houston with the 2d Di at that spot, not at some rear command post. vision, with the 33d Infantry in the Panama He should be there before the crisis erupts, ifarea, and with the airborne paid off in batpossible. If it is not possible, then he shouldtle-first as a division, then as a corps, and, fi get there as soon as he can after it develops.nally, as an army commander. Because of Once there, then by personal observation of strenuous and unremitting physical training, terrain, enemy fires, reactions, and attitudesI was able to keep up with the best of my of his own commanders on the spot-by histroops in the hottest sectors and the toughest eyes, ears, brain, nose, and his sixth senseterrain and climate. he gets the best possible picture of what isLet me mention briefly what I think the happening and can best exercise his troopstandards should'be for commanders of large leadership and the full authority of his comunits. The division commander should have mand. He can start help of every kind to histhe pliysical endurance, stamina, and rehard-pressed subordinates. He can urgeserves of his best infantry battalion ·comhigher commanders to provide additional fire manders, because that is where he belongs-· support, artillery, air, other infantry weapwith them-a good part of the time; the ons, and, in the future, perhaps, nuclearstrikes. corps commander, those of his infantry regiNo other means will provide the com mental commanders; and the army !com mander with what his personal perceptionsmander just about the same. can provide, if he is present at the criticalAnd remember this, since no one can pre time and place. He can personally intervene,dict today when you may be thrown into if he thinks that necessary, but only to thecombat,. perhaps within hours of deplaning in extent that such intervention will be helpfulan overseas theater-as happened to thou and not interfere with his subordinates. He issands in Korea, and as I have no doubt to in a position to make instant decisions, to de many in Vietnam-you will have no time to fend, withdraw, attack, exploit, or pursue. 334 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP If, at this time, he is at some rear comdaily touch with every regimental and most mand post, he will have to rely on reports battalion commanders. Before acceding to from others, and time will be lost, perhaps . command of the division, and while I was just those precious moments which spell the General Omar N. Bradley's assistant division difference between success and failure. Notcommander, I had learned to call by name withstanding the console capabilities of fuevery infantry officer in the division. ture television in combat, I still believe what Later, by frequent exchange of views with I have said is true. In any event, keep this the infantry regimental commanders and the time factor ever in mind. It is the one irredivisional artillery commander, I knew in adtrievable, inextensible, priceless element in vance whom they had earmarked for battal ion command. I do not recall any instancewar. where I thought the regimental-commander RELIEF OF COMMANDERS had not picked the right man. The payoff came in Normandy. I went in with 12 infan The occasion for the relief of command~rs try battalion commanders-four regimentsmay regrettably arise. If it does, there are and I had 14 new ones when we came out,three points to consider: Is your decision for some battalions lost as many as threebased on personal knowledge and observacommanders during the 33 days we were intion, or on secondhand information? What that fight. will the effect be on the command conThe qualities of a leader are not limited tocerned? Are you relieving a commander commanders. The requirements for le!!$ler whose men think highly of him-even with ship are just as essential in the staff officer, affection-regardless of professional compeand in some respects more exacting, since he tence? And, finally, have you a better man does not have that ultimate authority whichavailable? can be used when necessary and must rely Every man is entitled to go into battle even more than his commander on his own with the best chance of survival your forestrength of character, his tact and persuasion thought as a leader can provide. What best in carrying out his duties. helps you discharge this responsibility? SharBetween the commander and his chief of ing things with your men; to be always in the staff in a division or larger unit there should toughest spots; always where the crisis is, or be thorough mutual respect, understanding, seems most likely to develop; always think and confidence with no official secrets be ing of what help you can give your comtween them. Together they form a single manders who are executip.g your orders; dual personality, and the instructions issuing doing your utmost to see that the best in rafrom the chief of staff must have the same tions, shelter, first aid, and evacuation facili weight and authority as those of the com ties are available; being generous with praise, mander himself. swift and fair with punishment when you But this does not mean that a commander have the facts, intolerant of demonstrated who delegates such authority to his chief of failure in leadership on which lives depend, staff can allow his chief to isolate him from yet making full allowances for human weakthe rest of his staff. If that happens, the com nesses and the stresses and strains of battle mander will soon find himself out of touch, on individuals. and the chief of staff will be running the unit. KNOW YOUR MEN There is a fine balance here. The chiefs of Know your men, and be constantly on the staff sections should know that they always alert for potential leaders-you never know have access to their commander. He should how soon you may need them. During my see them and visit their sections with suffi two years in command of the 82d Airborne cient frequency to understand their prob lems, to let them know. he appreciates their ·-.. ~Division in World War II, I was in close and 335 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP efforts, and that he stands ready to help where he can. INFORM SUBORDINATES Closely akin to the relationship with staff officers is keeping in close personal touch with your principal subordinate commanders--in the division, with your brigade and separate battalion commanders; in the corps, with your division commanders, their chiefs of staff, and as many of the commanders of attached corps units as you can; and in the army, with corps and division commanders and their chiefs of staff. There is always time for these visits; administrative work can be done at night. By day you belong with your troops. · Keep them informed of your thinking and plans. When you have the concept of an operation first in mind, consult your principal commanders without delay and get their reactions. No matter how sound a tactical plan may be, the chances of successful execution will be greatly increased if you have first secured the willing acceptance by commanders responsible for execution of the missions you plan to assign them. Insure that they receive notice of your decision and the principal de tails of your plan as approved in ample time to permit them and their subordinates to make their necessary reconnaissances and issue their orders. These are some of the reasons why I hold that leadership is not a science, but an art. It conceives an ideal, states it as an objective, and then seeks actively and earnestly to attain it, everlastingly persevering, because the records of war are full of successes coming to those leaders who stuck it out just a little longer than their opponents. Some suggestions for leadership are: • Read wid~ly and wisely all the history and biography possible. Soak up all the personal experiences you can of battle-tested brother officers. This broadens your understanding of an art of which you can n.;ver hope to know all. • Study thoughtfully the records of pastsuccessful leaders and adapt their methods to yours. • Work hard to keep fit. That little extr.\ stamina may some day pull you out of some deep holes. • Work hard, in your own way, at being tops at your job. • Keep the three C's--<:haracter, courage, and competence--always before your mind, and with faith in God, be yourself. • Remember there are many others on your team, and be inwardly humble. Everyman's life is equally precious, although all are at the disposa.l of lJUr country, and the contribution each makes in battle is of equal potential value. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Compare General Ridgway's three' C's of leadership--character, courage, and competence-with Samuel P. Huntington's three -characteristics of a professional--expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. 2. Why do you agree or disagree with General Ridgway's contention that leadership is an art rather than a scien.;e? 336 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING E The Anatomy of Leadership By Eugene E. Jennings. Reprinted by permission from Management of Personnel Quarterly, Vol. I, No.3 (Autumn, 1961). Copyright 1961. Eugene E. Jennings is Associate Professor of Business Administration in the Graduate School of Business Administration at Michigan State University. He is probably best noted for his studies of leadership executive behavior. His list of publications includes An Anatomy of Leadership: Princes, Heroes, and Supermen (1960), in which he contends that ours is a society without leaders; The Executive (1962); and The Executive in (;rises (1965). W E OFfEN HEAR that ours is an age without heroes and that business is without leaders. The towering personalities of the past seem, to some, to have considerably more specific gravity than their successors of today. This indictment, while containing some truth-more, in fact, than should leave us feeling comfortable-overlooks the rugged individualists still on the business stage; more than a handful of flamboyant entrepreneurs and, throughout the ranks of business, aggressive, assertive individuals who openly or secretly hunger for leadership roles. Nonetheless, the charge that we have allowed leadership to lapse as a necessary executive art deserves close examination. In too many companies the careful man has replaced the tycoon who was willing, in an earlier time, to take uncommon risks by boldly seizing initiative. Decision-making has become diffused, decentralized and impersonal in many organizations. Why this has happened is, to some extent, an inevitable result of social and economic change. The unrestrained, owner-managed enterprises of the late 19th and 20th centuries are no more. Ownership of our largest and even many of our smallest organizations is today dispersed, and direction flows not from an ownership caste but from cadres of professional managers who are responsible to boards of directors, to government regulators, to organized workers and to a fickle consuming public. But more important than why the climate of leadership has changed is that today's business organization, and tomorrow's, will require a new breed of restless men with imagination-men perhaps not cut from the same cloth as the old titans but nonetheless ready and able to break free of conventional procedure and move into untried fields. The problem, therefore, is: How can business encourage its managers and managerial aspirants to assume a more vigorous leadership role? TODA Y'S APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP The term "leadership" is indiscriminately applied to such varied activities as playground supervisor, committee chairman, club president, business executive, and politician. Furthermore, research has produced such a variegated list of traits presumably to describe leadership that, for all practical purposes, it describes nothing. Fifty years of study have failed to produce one personality trait or set of qualities that can be used to discriminate between leaders and non-leaders. This failure to identify leadership traits in individuals has led us to look elsewhere for the keys to leadership. If a person does not become a leader because he possesses a particular pattern of personality characteristics, maybe he becomes a leader because of something outside of him; that is, the situation determines which men will rise and be chosen to leadership. 337 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP The transfer from the personality to the situation has altered our whole approach to leadership. The situational approach appealed to our ideal of democracy, our belief in the impact of the environment on the individual and our need to do something quickly about our shortage of leaders. Because it denied that leaders are born and affirmed that leaders are made, this approach stimulated a deluge of executive training and leadership development programs. No doubt leaders often need propitious moments to rise. Without such occasions they might remain unknown. In this sense, the situation is indeed influential, but need not be determining. First, aggressive action can sometimes overcome a difficult situation. Second, initiative often helps determine what the situation actually is. The-individual manager can never know the exact situation unless he pits himself vigorously against it. It is in striving to overcome adversity that he finds his full capacity for leadership. This is a fact too often forgotten today. Admittedly, great events in history are always a marriage between the man and the circumstances, but what is crucial is which predominates. The fact is that the situation holds within it the distinct possibility of several different leaders rising to power. The "right man for the right situation" is a subtle but lethal kind of fatalistic thinking that must not be cultivated if business is to maintain its necessarily dynamic and creative nature. Wllat Leaders Do Where modern measurement fails to define leadership, history offers some suggestions. Plato, for example, conceived his ideal society as having three occupational classesworkers and slaves, guardians, and philosophers. In this society the king would draw up the plans and the philosophers would carry them out with the aid of the civil service and military officers comprising the guardian class. Here we have a specific distinction between leadership and execution. Leadership determines the overall plan and infuses the system with a character and direction that could not come by keeping close to ·the day-to-day stream of problems. Hence the leader is a beginner of plans carried out by an executive. Machiavelli, Carlyle, Nietzsche, William James, Woodrow Wilson, John Dewey, Lenin, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill all made similar distinctions. Few who have given thought to this distinction have failed to find merit in it. The leader's role is initiating, beginning. It is born of imagination and a sense of mission. It involves great personal risk. The executive may bring about changes too, but they are of the type warranted by the situation and appropriate to the organization. He operates more in terms of active needs than can be handled by immediate supervision. Consequently, he does not substantially change the character or direction of his organization. Although both types are needed, few leaders make good executives and few executives make good leaders. It is the rare man who excels at both. Who are today's leaders? If, in today's society, we are replacing dynamic men with efficient men, the next question is: What causes this imbalance? The answer may be provided by a closer look at the qualities of leaders. They are found in the sense of purpose, power and self-confidence. In numerous studies of both contemporary and historical figures~ these three qualities stand out as essential to fulfilling the role of leadership. When any one of these qualities is lacking, leadership suffers. BUREAUCRACY LIMITS LEADERSIDP Men who lead must have vision of real possibilities of the future and must articulate them to the people. This ability to raise one's sights, to get above the struggle, to see beyond triviality, is becoming increasingly rare. We may disparage the men who today see only dimly what tomorrow will clearly need to be done, but there is a condition which subsumes all of us. This condition is one of 338 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP bureaucratic stagnation. In a society such as ours, there is the strong tendency to develop a civil-service mentality. Our whole society is developing this bureaucratic mind in business, unions, church, school and government. The individual's role is largely identified by the position he occupies, and these positions, in turn, are systematically integrated to provide the highest degree of coordination and efficiency possible. Public distrust of the bureaucracy is not a reaction against inefficiency, however. The bureaucracy is quite efficient in most cases, due to its emphasis on coordination and efficiency to the exclusion of all other goals. It is a common characteristic of the bureaucratic individual that, while his singlemindedness brings specific events into sharper focus, he is blind to the periphery beyond which lies a different wotld. Bureaucratic society assigns each individual his functions, the area of his authority and the standards of proficiency. The worker is harnessed in to ensure the exact performance essential to keep the huge system under control. If any sort of decision is assigned to him or demanded of him, it is duly taken within the limited province of his function without his having to delve to the bottom of things. Duties and regulations laid down to guide him are applied meticulously in such a manner that risk is avoided. There is no semblance of a genuinely creative community of action, Jet alone sensitive insight into things above and beyond. Initiative is not possible to any great degree or the whole system would fall apart. Risk is eliminated by the sacred adoption of the system's rational rules and regulations, even though they appear irrational to the individual. Greatness or efficiency? In a society becoming heavily bureaucratic, as we are, great men are subordinated to efficient men. The executive type has dethroned the leader. Plato's "achievement" is without its antecedent "beginner." No one person really "begins." Man is enmeshed at all times in an intricate set of relationships that prohibits his seizing the helm and steering a course of his own choosing. Our community "leaders" of today rarely want to shoulder responsibility. They seldom want to decide anything without endorsement. Some committee, group or precedent must be represented in everything they do and upon which they can shift the onus if things go wrong. In the bureaucratic society, the ultimate court of appeals is a previous set of actions that have become a method or system held consecrate because at one time, when things were less complex, it more visibly promoted the general interest. The ends were more within assessment. Upon this method or system, in one of its multifarious forms, accrues the individual's final responsibility. Each individual is a tiny wheel with a fractional share in the decision, but no one effectively decides. But all of this is consciously realized by many people; many rebel, some silently and some openly. They feel so intimately interlocked in social processes that they do not know how much they rely upon others and their system. Leadership is not a conscious problem to people -today because they are not conscious of themselves as leaders. They wonder curiously about what people mean who refer to them as leaders. The bureaucratic mode of human existence destroys heroic vision. We are today a relatively unpurposeful society. So much is this the concern today that Eisenhower ordered a commission to look into national goals. Luce of Time-Life, Inc., ordered a series of articles on "What Is Our National Purpose?" It is interesting that neither endeavor created much of a national reaction. No great movements for change and reform have emerged. But yet, to speak intelligently today of our national purpose is beyond our ability, so long have we become accustomed to seeing the parts, not the whole, immediate aims rather than long-range goals. Bureaucracy and the civil-service mentality have contributed in the past to the destruction of the Roman and .British empires. They are presently engulfing the individual 339 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP in America, his ability to see and feel beyond can attach that drive, would, necessarily aphis role or commitment. pear more power-seeking than he might ac tually be. There is, of course, a lot to be said Organizations demand conservatism for the argument that his power drive may tend to increase in the absence of an objecThis lack of heroic vision makes individuals tive goal that will give it form and sanction. "all too executive." Today all too many exBut in either case, the very "nakedness" ofecutives merely add their dots to a series of his power-seeking would seem to promptdots reflecting the evolving histories of their him to inhibit it, which in turn brings on aorganizations. Under the ethic of finishing psychological condition whereby it becomesthe unfinished task started by his great predeven more difficult to develop heroic thrust. ecessors, this type of executive receives the Ifwe keep in mind, then, that the problem ofadvantages and benefits of power-seeking many executives today· is that they must apwithout incurring the risk of the leader's atpear to be thrusting and aggressive while attempt at major innovation. In short, he seeks the same time not appear to be too powersuccess and personal advantage but does not seeking, we have in capsule the essence ofhave a sense of purpose or historical opporwhat they are trying to do. In other words,tunity. how to extricate th~mselves from these paraThe illusive and masquerading feature of doxical demands is indeed the key to theirall of this is that the organization typically success today.continues to get bigger. Someone usually gets One reason why all too few executives credit for the growth partly because giving wish to have power to accomplish great andcredit is a strong habit carried over from our noble things is that the. power struggle inheroic past. The mania for bigness is, howvolves considerable personal risk. To removeever, a perfect example of how many executhe risk one must, of course, make his powertives today fit into the on-going direction and permanent. But in making his power permacharacter of their organizations in such a nent the executive cannot make it apparent,manner that they merely mid-wife the enterfor in doing so he necessarily makes enemiesprises through what are actually predeterof both those who are equally driven by the mined courses. There is no change from the same urge and those who abhor the evil efnormal or expected pattern of growth as a fects that power brings to both the organizaconsequence of his personal efforts, but tion and the personality of the individual.rather only a continued increase in size and Implementing the power drive subtly and si complexity under the illusion of heroic leadlently is a delicate skill that separates theership. It simply is not fair for the executive power elite from the more common contendunder these circumstances to be given the ers. It is extremely difficult to learn the rulestitle of a leader since change is really not of acquiring through subtle means the neceschange after all. sary power with which to control others. It is for this reason that many executives fail toTHE POWER STRUGGLE achieve the power necessary to effect major In other words, power is a disruptive and changes. reformative-a creative-tool in the care of We might note that the price of failure is, a leader. The power of one who acts as an often more than not, forfeiture of the gains executive is a sustaining and maintaining-a won by the attempt at leadership. This penconservative-tool. Many executives today alty often includes the loss of executive posido not have a strong creative opportunity or tion. So the accepted pattern of many execusense of purpose but have the same drive for tives has become to gain power and make it power as their predecessors. An individual permanent by not personally causing or who has a strong drive for power, but who sponsoring major innovations. For them it is does not have a strong purpose to which he safer to use power as a conservative force 340 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP than as a creative force. Consequently, this kind of executive is not only as interested in gaining power as was his predecessor, but he is today incomparably more skilled in gaining and maintaining his power than in knowing and using his power for creative purposes. The executive who makes the mistake of emerging into the fierce light of daring leadership is apt to become caught in dilemmas his talents are inadequate for resolving. Furthermore, a major innovation is something that requires time to work itself out. Even if the program goes on to achieve success in heroic proportions, the executive could be knocked off because of an errant move in the interim. Anyone who takes long chances will find that the averages are against him. This we found to be an axiom of political experience. Major changes set loose unknown forces that gather a momentum of their own and smash through to results unwanted by anyone, including the executive. Consequently, it is far wiser to sponsor many minor changes that only appear to be tests of ability although they must, of course, be beneficial to the organization, and many executives are becoming aware of this fact. Using group responsibility One favorite technique of many executives today is to place the responsibility for major changes in the hands of groups and thus shield themselves from the responsibility of complete failure. The idea here is to delegate to the "responsible group" those problems that are of major significance. By this means, the executive assumes more "individual responsibility" for the more numerous minor innovations with the thought that many minor innovations will give heroic stature more easily than one major change, especially one that hazards failure or is cushioned by group responsibility. In effect, the strategy is to become cumulatively heroic through acts that are so integrated as to compound themselves. It may be argued that this new conservatism is made possible partly by large bureau cratic organizations wherein decisions must be increasingly made by the group method. Since the group is generally more conserva tive than the individual, the executive natu rally becomes less radical and creative. Then too, the increasing use of group meetings, both formal and informal, has forced out into the open the good intentions of the ex ecutive. As long as the executive could per sonally and privately deal with his superiors, subordinates and peers, he did not have to reveal or fear to reveal his intentions toward power. He received ethical justification under the code of enlightened self-interest. But the convening of a group makes it imperative for the ambitious executive to manifest the most noble intentions simply because a group has a moral quality that is not found in the members taken separately. All good princes today know that in such quasipublic gatherings as conferences, committees and even informal meetings, one must never be anything less than noble and moral and, above all, never appear too eager or overtly ambitious. The revealed ambition of an executive is grossly magnified by the ratio of the number of group members who witness the accidental dropping of his disguise. This means that in group meetings the executive today must hide his apparent need and drive for power by not being radically different, or at least not standing pat on a radical program. He knows that sponsoring a terribly different idea automatically forces him to draw upon the total power resources available to him. This is never done today. Taking the limited offensive The third characteristic of a lxader is his strong inner will to resist forces that might move him away from his mission or purpose. He must be strong in character and use the full force of his personality. There is a growing tendency today in our society to assume a limited offensive. For many, the mark of the successful individual is that he never uses the full potential of his personality. Of course, no one ever uses the full potential of his personality, but we are concerned here 341 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP that many an executive uses increasingly less. This lack of self-directedness shows up in his interpersonal relations. He is calm but engaging, argumentative at times but not disagreeable, alert but not too trusting. He approaches people easily but also he is able to move out when he gets involved. The word is "heavy" when he talks about the conversations he seeks to avoid. When caught unavoidably in a "heavy," he has the skill to work problems through to a convenient and acceptable solution, but in those cases his personality is invariably engaged on behalf of calming the disturbances, restoring the equilibrium and thwarting accusations of being "difficult." In all cases, blows of lethal and total effectiveness must never swung, even in the form of words. It is far better to succeed a little bit than to destroy the opposition completely, which always brings trouble later because of bitterness and recrimination. Pleasantries can never remove the pain of a grievous offense. This kind of individual believes strictly in a limited offensive with maximum opportunity for numerous engage-disengage sequences that will persuade but not offend. Above all, he must not make apparent his resources as an individual apart from his position, because of the tendency to impute ambition to the individual who shows personal talents that are not directly identified with the accepted norms and practices of his function and position. In other words, there is a tendency to confuse the individual with his formal rank and function in the hierarchy. NO SENSE OF MISSION Many individuals generally have no grand design, no mission, no great plan calling for change and progress. It is the true leader who has a grand design, which is reflected by a chain-like sequence of relevant and integrated events that serve as stepping stones. Of course, the grand dt::sign may not be easily deciphered until it is completed. Contrariwise, the individual lets each situation dictate to him his special set of techniques and plans for action. He sees no overall strategy except that which reflects the on-going aild established interests of the various claimant groups involved in his organization. This allows him maximum flexibility without the personal risk of long-range programs. It is difficult for the typical individual to have a deep and disturbing sense of mission when he is so specialized and boxed in by bureaucratic formulas that he cannot rise above the trivia to see what is ahead, above and behind. But if he suffers from "administrivia," he more importantly suffers from annihilation of all privacy. Escape from thinking Heroic leadership requires not so much a determination to out-maneuver the other fellow, but an ability to anticipate the effects of action now in progress and to devise plans that will be essentially preventive rather than remedial. But who is doing the thinking? Telephone any executive during business hours and you will probably be told he is "at a meeting," for he spends most of his time "in conference." The executive has a genius for cluttering up his day, and many have somehow managed to persuade themselves that they are too busy to think, to read, to look back and to see into the future. Being busy is more than a national passion, as some believe, and it is more than an excuse-it is a means of escape. The real question concerning the opportunity -for leadership is not the time or lack of it that is provided for thought, but the value that is placed on thought. Our society has always been action oriented, but lately what little thought has existed has been largely sacrificed to meet ings where thinking is done in haste and geared to specific problems at hand, to say nothing of the power tactics that consume vast amounts of intellectual and emotional energy. The individual today has a passion for dis cussion. He may use grave and decisive words, may even adopt divergent attitudes at strategic moments, but never stands his 342 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ground, especially for a radical idea or program: The stance that he takes is commonly referred to as "a convenient point of reference," but this reference is subject to shifting. By this means he is able to transfer the discussion to a new plane, insisting upon complete objectivity when it is necessary to ensure avoiding any subjective or emotional involvement. The individual's true home is a kind of superficial intellectualism in which his thoughts appear to have a logical coherence, his word choices are for maximum effeet. He oozes with intuitions and hunches, or he reports on the latest research findings from scientific studies of elaborate detail, rigorous methodology and unimpeachable authorship. The use of anonymous authorities is itself an indication of how he has become abstracted from the reality about him. Executives fight a phantom battle Now what all of this amounts to is that the power struggle going on within these vast human systems found in business, government, education and union organization is without a fighting front. It is a phantom battle. The clever use of the "titles" of sophistry, the impersonalization of arguments, the resorting to anonymous authorities, and the appeal to the "powers that be!' (which somehow always remain nameless), make the development of a purposive life futile. The executive fights among the shadows and the noble myths are subject to momentary change. What appears at first to be-a united front becomes later divided against itself, where adversaries join forces and the man on the right or left of the large oval conference table stands ready to pose as a friendly "devil's advocate" or "his majesty's loyal supporter," depending upon what the situation warrants. The attempt to discover_ the true fighting front and unveil the nameless powers for even a brief moment is to destroy ambiguity and oddly enough to promote general resistance and unrest. Apparently a modem truth today is that to be safe one must never feel secure. Executives lack creativity In summary, and in preparation for the challenge and conclusion, the individual is rapidly becoming a kind of power-seeker who appears to be a leader because he is skillful in getting support, popularity and rapport with a minimum of "heavy" involve ment. He is trying hard to become skillful at working with people and using resources of committees and decision-ma~ing groups. He appears to be a good human relations practi tioner or social engineer, but actually con siders these huntan relations principles as means by which he may intelligently and subtly play the power game. But in playing this game he does not cause major innova tion. This is the new rule which makes the power game drastically different from that of his predecessors such as Carnegie and Rockefeller, Senior. Seeking only to fulfill the expectations of others and to live within the established imperatives of his organization, the executive finds it unnecessary to the pursuit of self-interest to champion radically new and great programs and to risk willingly the greater inner resources available to him as a unique individual. What at first glance appears to be a lack of self -direction due to a kind of cunning or strategy turns out, after a second look, to be a result of inner weakness. The executive today is not to be seen as a malicious power-seeker; he is not to be morally castigated. His problem is. not completely his fault. He is to be understood as one who lives in a high pressure system in which there are few opportunities available to him whereby he can attach his ambition and desire to succeed to the top to a great and noble purpose. In short, it is not out of choice that the executive wears the face that he does. Unfortunately this feature makes his problem incomparably more difficult. Although we do not know how many have taken to the anonymity of large-scale organization as their avenue of escape from the responsibilities of leadership, it seems plausible that this picture represents many ,of the top executives in our major large institutions, in .. \ 343 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP eluding business and government. We might that he is going to play an active aggressive role in it. It is only through active participa further believe that as the scale and complexity of these institutions increase, and the tion in molding events with a sense of direct pressures they necessarily generate become responsibility for their consequences that one more imperative and inhibiting, even the can achieve the personal strength necessary to live in harmony with the pressures of the strongest-willed executive will find it neces sary to operate without greatly engaging his organization without being absorbed by unique and effective personality. The inthem. And this is what the executive needs creasing pattern of half-hearted attempts at today. Rather than a social ethic with which to justify and give sanction to the enormous leadership is tending toward drastic consequences of which the annihilation of the inpower of the organization over him, the indidividual's productive or creative resources is vidual needs a stronger will with which to one of the more imminent possibilities. put his total productive resources to work for him and his organization. WHAT IS THE IDEAL LEADER? The concept of our ideal shows us that only through struggle, through meeting di With these possibilities besetting the aspir rectly the harshness and tyranny of the real ing leader today, what are the conditions of world, can a man come to his own self. Until ideal? What is an ideal type of leader? Our then he feels extremely abstracted from the superior man is necessarily a "free man," but stream of life, and he consumes vast amounts not free in the sense that he exists outside of of physical and psychological energy trying an organizational system. Our ideal is not a to overcome his feelings of powerlessness. hermit because a hermit is still a prey to the · But more importantly, he can never really world. While fighting against his world, a get the feel of the true character and direc hermit only escapes it in order to continue to tion of the organization if he does not be exist as a human being. He thus takes on a come totally involved in it. Without this kind of sincere falseness which negates his feeling and grasping kind of intellect, it is dif virtuous intentions. It is simply foolhardy, in ficult to become intimately involved in a crea a society as heavily populated and as mas tive plan to make over the character or re sively organized as ours is today, to believe chart the direction of the enterprise or some that one can escape physically. And it is un part thereof. One can only fall back on the heroic. drive for power-the common denominator The fact that the individual cannot escape among the alienated-when he does notplaces limitations on Clark Kerr's recomhave the inspiration to lead and accomplish amendation for coping with organizational sogreat and noble life purpose. But this purciety. Mr. Kerr rebelled at the current pracpose must of necessity be intimately tied to tice of human relations and recommended the character and direction of the organizathat the individual should give himself to tion in which the individual seeks his princimany organizations rather than to one and pal source of livelihood. No amount of leadreserve for himself the aspiration of limitlessing and accomplishing great and noble ness rather than project this quality into the purposes in extra-organizational endeavors, character df organization. This is precisely as seen in the current rage for charity, comwhat the contemporary person is doing tomunity and recreational activities, will overday, but he does not get in return this feeling come the psychological vacuity brought onof limitlessness. by the lack of purposeful involvement in an Only becoming half-involved in any one individual's major activity throughout the organization prevents the individual from reday. This fad of finding purpose in life outalizing his true and full powers within. He side of the business or government or union cannot come into meaningful grips with his organization is a prime example of the modhuge organization unless he firmly resolves ern individual's tendency today to distribute 344 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP himself among too many organizations. the necessary values, courage, and self-con• While the organization balloons to gigantic trol whereby he can successfully become proportions and the executive comes to find identified with, but not absorbed by, his orless and less personal involvement in it, he is, ganization. He disciplines himself to whole so to speak, busily passing the charity hat ness, and from this newly acquired inner around in his community to help the needy strength he dominates the pressures of his and the suffering. It is not fanciful to suggest organization and leads the people about him. In this way power over others comes to him that this ex:traorganizational effort is the ex because he is inwardly a superior person. ecutive's way of escaping from his primary leadership responsibilities. Nor is it disresThe emergence of this hero, who is admit pectful to suggest that this escape mechanism tedly a rare gift to any organization or sois a· desperate attempt to recapture his lost ciety, will by the changes he helps bring about prepare the way for other executives sense of personal worth. to become better leaders. For some executives, however, the extra There are many executives today who are organizational . activity is done merely be on "crusades" to restore the uncommon cause this is what a successful and well-ad man, bring back the independent spirit, de justed executive should do today. In this case stroy the organization man and revive the he cannot be classed as a leader for he is not Titan's inner-directed conscience. They write really sincere. But we must reaffirm that in books, give speeches, appear in only the many cases the executive becomes an ex most proper public gatherings and social cir traorganizational man not because of choice but rather because of a compulsive need to cles, associate with the elites of their choice, buy and in some cases read the best litera escape from an environment that offers less ture, and identify with the most sophisticated and less opportunity for personal thrust. The authors. If it were not for the fact that they . extraorganizational pattern is an important are so noisy and public about this build-up means whereby the executive who has a strong drive for power can more fully satisfy we would actually think of them as some what sincere. Contrarily, we cannot help but this need. It is not possible to relate this type believe that this. eagerness to appear to be of activity to virtue because it results from something akin to our superior person is compulsiveness, from inner weakness, rather really the attempt to assure themselves that than from inner strength. That is to say, the they are what they are not: It follows that executive becomes an extraorganizational only a few will be able to recapture the will man not because he is a superior person to lead. Of course, it never has been· abso whose vast reserve of energy cannot be ade lutely extinct, but the point is that these few quately used by any one organization, but promising executives need to be encouraged rather because he has a low reserve of en or they will find that their way back to conergy owing to a lack of both power and spicuous leadership will be too strenuous foropportunity to use whatever productive rethem. Some may believe that everything sources he has within his principal organizamust be done, every available resource must tion. be used to help develop the promising execuWe now arrive at the heart of the matter. tive into a superior type of person. The danThe leader of the future will be that individger of this advice is that the appearance of a ual with the great mission to overcome the leader with the hero's sense of historical purmass feeling of alienation and self-inadepose cannot be well planned and predicted. quacy. He will recognize that this struggle This, however, makes it all the more imperastarts not with his community, not even with tive that we should do certain things that are his principal organization, but rather it starts within our power to create a conducive atwith himself. He puts his own house in mosphere for the reappearance of the man of order; he gradually and diligently develops exceptional talent. 345 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP How today's organizations kill leadership To this end there are certain specific practices within our society that warrant special criticism at this time. To begin with, the organization today has achieved a life of its own. It goes rambling on seemingly immune to the personal advances of any one executive. It has created a kind of social or impersonal system of leadership which is the product of many individuals acting expertly at their chosen tasks. Then, too, the reduction · of competition allows the oligopolistic or monopolistic firm to ramble on without apparent need for the great and personal mastery of the heroic monarch of the past. As Crawford Greenewalt has said, the "resportsible group" has replaced the "responsible individual" and the corporation's health and future is that much more assured. This, however, is questionable. But with the replacement of the responsible individual by the responsible group, the executive is merely given a more concrete and convenient unit whereby he can advance his own individual interests without any more opportunity for heroic thrust when the responsible group has replaced the responsible individual. The last thing that the executive needs today is to have this additional obstacle placed before him which he must hurdle in his attempt to be aggressive and creative. One does not place another obstacle before an individual who already feels alienated and powerless. Nothing has caused as much arrestment of his leadership opportunity as the responsible-group concept. We have previously suggested that it will make all the more the power artist and that much less the purposeful leader. There are few features of our society that show less faith in personal, conspicuous leadership than in this growing concept of the responsible group. It may be suggested at this time that the growth in acceptance and use of ~he responsible group portrays, in dramatic form, our growing loss of faith in conspicuous leadership and our feelings of inadequacy. The group might very well be used to keep the individual informed of what is going on, but he should not be allowed to use it as a chief tool for power-seeking. Executives should be encouraged to seek power that comes from a superior inner awareness and sensitivity to what the future character and direction of the firm should be, not power that comes from an ability to manipulate people and to use social techniques. The need for inner strength may indicate that the executive should be protected from groups by having conferences formally scheduled. At present many committees are called on an informal basis which often amounts to calling a conference whenever someone pushes the panic button. Since the panic button is pushed often in an alienated society, the executive is always in conference. By having conferences as infrequently as possible, the executive will not be at the mercy of the panic-button pusher. At least this might be tried until the promising executive has developed sufficient inner reserve to restrain from pushing the panic button or jumping mechanically to the alarm whenever he or some other executive gets into a little difficulty. He will then have to look within for the resources with which to work himself out of difficulty-an almost unheard of practice today in many organizations. This too may be too much of a struggle for him today so that care must be taken that he is not given too much freedom from the group without an adequate recovery of his individ ual resources. Who will be our leaders? It is impossible to determine who the future leaders will be. Any attempt at scientific selection will produce a contemptible arrogance resulting from a lack of awareness of the limitations of technical kinds of identification and selection. Attempts to determine exactly the traits of a leader have resulted in complete failure. In spite of this we all have a crude but amazingly efficient sensitivity to the essence of leadership and to the existence of great leaders. We can recognize them even though their characteristics cannot be scientifically measured. The tendency today is to 346 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP deny these rare men any psychological room, Each executive who shows promise of heroic ;"\ let alone social status and organizational leadership should be allowed ample opporprestige. We have tried to present some of tunity to think. Perhaps once every five or,·' seven years he should be given a . year offthe characteristics by which we can identify with pay so that he can read and study andleaders, but these traits were only roughly perhaps even write. When it is possible to ordescribed because words can only approxiand responsibilities, hemate the emotional quality with which we ganize his time should be given time off to think-to get identify our heroes. To be sure the actual worship of heroes today has acquired a groaway from his office, and become aware of tesque posture as seen in current biographithe broader possibilities found in studying cal literature. But the essential spark is still 1iterature, philosophy, art and the social there in the minds and hearts of many people sciences. Under proper and well-conceived and needs only to be rekindled. circumstances this effort will not be an escape from leadership responsibilities, al It other words, it is not that we cannot though this is a distinct danger. However,recognize our leaders, but rather that we no this program can be effective only with menlonger value them as highly as we once did. who are willing and able to make major inTherefore, scientific tests should definitely be novations and assume great responsibilitydiscouraged so that our eminently more suand risks and who will profit from gettingperior powers of observation and intuition out and seeing a broader or higher purposecan once again help us to find and to raise to to which their organizations and they mayour highest positions men of rare and excepbecome devoted. A vigorous emphasis on thetional leadership potential. In this way talent value of the thoughtful man will allow aand ability will be brought into line with poleadership to come forth that will be devotedsition, all of which will help, but of course to great and noble missions not out of comnot guarantee, a return to heroic leadership. pulsive needs but out of choice that comes Recommendations as to how to structure from inner wisdom. and reorganize for the rebirth of leadership Of course, finding ways to give the promcould become so demanding and pervasive ising executive this opportunity to develop that the tendency to rely too heavily upon his intellectual resources will require a organization to eliminate the organization change in present-day values. The direction man could move us one notch back rather and character of the typical business organi than one notch forward. All suggestions to zation will have to be changed since the man help bring about a superior man in our orgaof action has theretofore been its standard nization should be tempered by judicious breed. While we wait for some great innova concern for the extreme fallacy of organizing tor to show us the way toward the major in to return to independence. We must be carenovation, there are some small things we can ful to place our reliance upon the individual do ourselves. Most important among these is to reverse our tendency to walk into officesto find his way to psychological recovery and and homes, and backyards for that matter,not upon the forces inherent in the group because of an over-powering need to haveand organization. friends and acquaintances. We can afford to Time out to think be hard on ourselves and others who want not privacy but companionship. A good With this due caution, there is still another brother's keeper is one who helps the otherrecommendation reflected in our concept of person to suffer a little by leaving him alonethe superman. This recommendation con cerns the value we place upon thought that is and unengaged because this will in the long private deliberation resulting from a well-disrun help him to struggle and perhaps find . ciplined use of one's intellectual reserves. himself. 347 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP THE CHALLENGE to this end, but because the purpose of thisHuman progress occurs to a great extent article is to diagnose our problem today, wethrough the intellectual efforts of its great have highlighted only a few. They includemen. Leadership might well be viewed as denial of the value of extraorganizational efthought in command, while action and imfort, resistance to the responsible-groupplementation might be the limitations imtrend, respect for a man's privacy, faith inposed upon the individual who does .not have men of rare ability and giving highest valueor cannot use superior intellectual resources. to that talent reflected in thoughtful deliberaDisplacing or eliminating this great resource tion. will assuredly reduce our opportunity andpotentiality for change and progress. Questions for Reflection and DiscussionIn conclusion ours is a society whose chief 1. Which approach to leadership--trait or situcharacteristic is a lost sense of self-direction ational--doe~ Jennings follow? as seen in the tendency to escape from lead 2. How d.:Jes bureaucracy limit leadership? ership responsibility. The challenge is to revive the individual's unique powers of purpo3. How would you compare Jennings' ideal sive striving and his courage to assume and leader with your own idea of the ideal leader? sustain great risks. To be sure, there are 4. After reading this article, how would youmany recommendations that could be made compare leaders in the Air Force with leaders in civilian life? READING F A Trait Approach to the Study of Leadership in Small Groups By John G. Geier. Reprinted by permission from the Journal of Communications, December 1967. Copyright 1967, International Communication Association. John G. Geier completed his work for the Ph.D. at the University of Minnesota, concen trating on communication and political behavior. He has had eleven years of experience inteaching the psychology of communication at college level. He has also served as anassistant college president and as an assistant dean of the University of Minnesota summerschool. Doctor Geier is now director of communications .and behavioral sciences in theHealth Ecology Division of the University of Minnesota. In addition to his duties at the University of Minnesota, Doctor Geier is president of the Image Dynamics Institute, aconsulting firm to numerous national professional organizations. P RIOR to World War II, the emphasis in be related to leadership behavior, and whichleadership research by psychologists, edualso would "explain" why some persons werecators, and sociologists was on analyzing indi-"leaders" and others not. Several reviews \ . vidual personality traits and characteristics. have been made of the many' studies con'· Numerous attempts were made to isolate ducted in this search for an all-inclusive setvarious traits and characteristics thought to of leadership traits. 348 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP One of the earliest surveys on individual ceived as being intelligent by other persons. Focus is here aimed at describing individual · traits characterizing leaders was made by Bird in_1940. He found 79 traits mentioned traits as perceived by other group members-in 20 different studies, only five per cent of not traits as objectively measured. which were common to four or more investiThird, the methodology utilized in the gations. ( 1) In a comprehensive survey present study underscores the potential usemade by Stogdill in 1948, the most comfulness of unstructured measuring instrumonly identified so-called "leadership traits" ments. In order to measure group member are listed as: 1) physical and constitutional perceptions in relation to leadership behavfactors-height, weight, physique, and apior, it is necessary to observe not otUy an inpearance; 2) intelligence; 3) self-confidence; dividual in a group, but also to obtain infor4) sociability; 5) will-initiative, persistmation from others who have an opportunity ence, and ambition; 6) dominance; 7) surto perceive his behavior in relation to themselves and others in the group. Most pre gency-talkativeness, enthusiasm, alertness, vious small group research has made use of and originality.[2] highly formalized data collection techniques. Among all these studies, the only common However, findings reported here were ob conclusion that receives even fair. support is that leaders excel non-leaders in intelligence, tained through unstructured, introspective scholarship, responsibility, activity, and sotechniques-discussion and interviews with cial participation. group participants. -In a sense, it can be said that use of these more direct communication More recently, criticism has been aimed at this traditional approach to leadership retechniques has resulted in more accurate re search. This criticism is summarized by Jenporting of leadership functioning, through kins: the perceptions of group members themselves, rather than through perceptions of an " . . Progress has not been made in the "outside observer." development of criteria of leadership behavior, nor iri setting up an adequate defini PURPOSE OF THE STUDY tion of the concept to guide research' in isolating leadership traits." [31 -The purpose of this study, then, was to investigate factors affecting leadership emer~ As compared with earlier studies, both the gence in leaderless groups, through analysisobjectives and methods used in-this research of situational perceptions of both leader anddiffer from the "classic designs" of prior followers. More specifically, this objectiveleadership trait studies. First, previous reraises three primary questions:search concentrated primarily on ·positive factors contributing to leadership behavior. 1) Do perceptions of members of leaderless The present study focuses on those factors groups reveal consist-:n~ patterns that help explain the process of emergent leadership? which effectively eliminate an individual 2) As perceived by group members, are therefrom the leadership role, in a group which identifiable traits that will likely eliminatebegins without an assigned leader. Such negan individual as a contender for leader!!hip? ative factors have received little attention in 3) Can consistent and reliable data be collected through use of introspective techniques? prior studies. Second, earlier studies have primarily uti The participants lized direct observation only of the leader himself..The present study focuses on the Participants in the study were students enway in which the leader is perceived by other rolled in Speech 106, an upper level group members of the group. There is a great difdiscussion course offered at the University of ference between a person being· intelligent Minnesota. No attempt was made to ran(as measured objectively through aptitude domly or systematically sample a given pop~ tests) and appearing intelligent, or being pu-ulation. All participants were either· seniors 349 ·, CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP or graduate students who selected the course 6. Session three was conducted in the s;1meas an elective subject. Fifty-nine of the 80 manner as session two. subjects were men. 7. Session four was conducted in the samemanner as session three. The 80 participants were not all in one 8. After each group turned in itsgroup docuclass, but were studied over a two-year pement and received a rank in relation toriod. Each class contained no more than 25 each of the other grou·ps, i.;'ch participan~students and, at the most, only five groups was then interviewed through.us.e_ of thefocused interview. Responses from thewere studied during any one quarter. A total predictive sheets and the diaries were inof 16 groups are included in the study. corporated into the interview context.During the first two weeks of class, stu9. Several weeks following the interview, allparticipants completed an open-end ques dents were given sensitivity training and in tionnaire relating to group interaction. formation on group interaction. These early These responses were recorded in the sessions were conducted by the regular insame manner as were the predictive sheets, structor, who employed the lecture-discusdiaries, and interviews. sion method of instruction. Discussion of method The procedure A major concern in conducting this study Techniques used were those that would. was to discover a method permitting group stimulate group participants to probe and members to perceive their position in rela record their own perceptions of the leadertion to fellow members, particularly in re less group situation, including impressions of gard to the leadership role. There was a need leadership functioning. A summary of proceto find means to collect, classify, and evalu dures includes: ate group-member responses in order to pro vide a meaningful approach to studying the 1. The 80 participants received two weeks emergence of leadership in each of the 16of instruction on group interaction. groups observed. 2. The participants were given instructions concerning their group task. Each stuAnother task was to record group-member dent was then assigned to a group, the responses in such a way that accurate con main task of which was to discuss a probclusions might be drawn. Three primary lem and to prepare a group paper presteps were taken: senting suggested solutions. Sixteen groups were ·included. 1) A continuous collection was made of all 3. Group members entered the session with out assignt>.d roles. At the conclusion of written and tape-recorded respon~e3 as. the groups were in session. These proto the first hour-long session, each participant predicted the role(s) that each of the cols were placed in a file for each par / ticipant in a group. other group members would assume throughout the meetings. 2) Each participant's file was analyzed to This predictive sheet, along with a diary in which each determine the period of the discussion towhich the information related, personal student recorded his personal expressions characteristics discussed, and other asof the group activity, was to be turned in pects of the leadership role. at the start of the second session. Ob3) The focused interview described by Merservers were present periodically ouring ton, Fiske, and Kendall was employed. [4) the first session, although all group-membercomments were recorded on tape throughout this and all other sessions,., The preThrough these methods, the hypotheticallydictive sheet and diary responsell·.w-i:re read significant elements, processes, and totaland recorded. The speculaliol.g; and re structure of the observed social situation actions of group memb'we~ closelyobserved in the followin~~ns. were provisionally analyzed. Through this 5. The second session -~again taped and content or situational analysis, a set of stateviewed occasionally 'b,:~iVers. Again ments was derived concerning situational the participants wro: • twir/ reactions indiaries, which wer,. · J be turned in at the factors and outcomes. An interview guide.. beginning of the .1rd session. was developed which set forth the major 350 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP areas of inquiry. The interview was then foone technique alone would require refinecused on the subjective experiences of the ment before reliance could be placed on a participants exposed to the pre-analyzed sitsingle introspective data source. uation, in an effort to determine their perceptions of the situation. Results of the study The array· of reported responses to group The major objective of the study was to situations helped test conclusions and, to the determine if patterns might be revealed extent that it included unanticipated rethrough introspective data sources which sponses, gave rise to additional information would help explain the process .of emergent on group-member perceptions. For example, leadership. Analysis of the perceptions of all the "leader" of each group studied was iden80 subjects showed that the pattern of leadtified as that member who was perceived by ership emergence within each of the 16 a consensus of fellow members as having groups was almost the same. made the most successful attempts to influThe general pattern consisted of twoence the group, as exercised in the situation, stages. The first stage was characterized. by and directed, through the communication elimination of leader contenders who pos process, toward facilitating attainment of the sessed what the members perceived as negagroup goal. The word "success" is used in tive characteristics. This rapid and relatively defining the leader to distinguish between the painless elimination process was followed byways participants separated the group an intense struggle for leadership by the re"leader" from a "leader contender." maining contenders. This is referred to as the Numbers and percentages in the study second stage. During this stage those memwere arrived at by the response of group bers still in contention continued to make members to interview questions such as: leadership moves that were either supported"What roles were obviously filled by memor rejected by those eliminated during the bers of the group?" Because the respondent first stage. Throughout both stages, particimay have mentioned the roles earlier in the pants noted the types of leadership moves,interview, this question was not · always the manner or "style" of each contender inasked. Instead, whenever the interviewee ini relation to group goals, and their own prefer tially mentioned the role of "leader," he was ences of leadership style. then asked, "What attempts did the member Following are specific conclusions regard make in assuming the role of leader?" ing these two stages in emerging leadership: The technique of utilizing these three dif ferent sources of data to collect participant 1 It seems safe to conclude that early in theresponses proved fairly successful. The pro. first stage of leaderless group discussions,cedure permits a check on any one source of most group members show a desire to data. The method has a distinct advantage gain the role of leadership. Only two of 80 participants indicated that they over a single observational technique and the would not try for the leadership role. Uni may well be used to study not only aspects of versity students and graduate studentsleadership, but other group member roles as would naturally be more likely to make well. a bid for leadership than would the average person. However, this 'does not No marked difference existed between the detract from the fact that the leadershipevents as described through any on~ of the role is often sought, and that the result three sources. Instead, they generally tended ing competition usually results in extreme to corroborate one another. This consistency tension. of reporting among all three sources may 2. Group-member response also shows a process of elimination of leader contenders in suggest that a future study might employ initial sessions. The sources of data• indi only one of the measurements and reach cate the presence of certain negative factors similar conclusions. However, because this or traits that lead to rejection. These are study was only exploratory, the use of any defined as undesirable characteristics hin 351 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP dering group goal facHitation. Confronted tenders approached fellow member:; forwith a nonstructured situation, and where support. According to group members,the task is academically oriented, th~ these attempts were not particularly obgroup members tend to reject those who vious in their first stage, but became so are not adaptable to the environment. later. For example, during the secondThus, those who were uninformed, nonstage, leader contenders solicited lieuparticipants, or extremely rigid, tended to tenants for support. Eleven of the 16be eliminated in the early group sessions. groups perceived a lieutenant role as existThis first stage, then, may be either long or ing in their groups. Of significance is the short, depending upon the length of time point that each leader contender who wasit takes other members to perceive these perceived by other members as making this obvious negative traits. approach openly acknowledged the at 3. The negative trait tho..t eliminated th; tempt in his diary. In addition, seven ofgreatest number of leader contenders in the 11 lieutenants were actually leaderthe first stage was the perception of being contenders who had been eliminateduninformed. The data show that 38 earlier. This indicates that the lieutenant (47.5%) of the 80 participants were perrole is developed, generally after earlyceived to be in this category. None elimination, and as such gives increasedemerged as a group leader. Actually, only support to the concept of phasic developone of the 38 uninformed members ever ment of emerging leadership. advanced to the second · stage as a leader 8. The second stage, according to participantcontender. responses, showed further elimination of 4. A second negative factor contributing to contenders. As the stage progressed, 10 leader rejection was non-participation. of the 33 contenders were perceived as au Of the 80 participants, 17 (21.2%) were thoritative members. Of these 10 mem perceived to be in this category. Eleven bers, only two were eventually permitted of these 17 members were classified as nonto lead a group. With these eight rejec participants at the close of the first session; tions, it may be concluded that the auyet at that time, all members had apparent thoritative members, though not eliminatedequal information on the subject. It in the early stage, tend to be rejected in would appear that group members are favor of the more democratic contenders. quick to perceive nonparticipation as unThe authoritative member is permitted to desirable. Not one of these 17 persons was lead only in those groups which appear to included as a leader contender during the have extremely inferior members. second stage and, of course, not one was 9. Another factor accounting for eliminationan emerging leader. in the second stage is offensive verbalizaS. A third negative factor was extreme rition. Six of the 33 contenders were re gidity. Nine (11.2%) of the 80 participants jected during this stage because fellowwere perceived to be in this category. The members simply did not like the way inrigid member was seen as a person rewhich these contenders expressed them luctant to change either his methods or selves. The offense included such things his ideas, even when they clearly conflicted as incessant talking and stilted speaking.with group norms or standards. Four ofthese nine members were eliminated from GENERAL CONCLUSIONS. leadership contention in the first stage. The remaining five were eventually elimOn the basis of this study, it can be con inated in the second stage. cluded that ·leadership emergence in small 6. The second stage is viewed as an intense leaderless groups is a complex process, in struggle for the leadership role. Groupmembers perceived more explicit attempts volving many factors. Several of these conby leader contenders than during the first tributing factors that both affect and effectstage. With 42.5% of the participants still emerging leadership have been identified, in leadership contention, and with these contenders making overt attempts at leadbut additional determinants of the role have ership function, it is not difficult to identify yet to be discovered and reporteO. this period in leaderless groups. There is value in using a functional defini 7. The awareness of the stages is vividly tion of the leadership role, a definition in d'escribed'in the diaries of the group mem which the leader is perceived as that individ bers. For example, leader contender attempts were observed in the second stage ual member who most frequently assumesthrough the mannerisms which leader con-leadership function. This definition permits a 352 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP more constructive study than does that which regards a "leader'' as anymember who initiates, encourages, or faci~itates group ideas. At the same . time, this study recognizes that there is no single leadership type of personality. One member might achieve leadership status because he has superior intellectual endowments which, in turn, place him considerably above his fellow members and make them depend on him. Another member might achieve leadership because he takes an interest in his fellow members and has a helpful attitude. This research acknowledges that leadership resides not exclusively in the individual, but in his functioool relationship with fellow members and the goal accomplishment. This factor probably contributes to the discovery that members of small leaderless groups perceive both phasic development of leaders and negative factors. It is also important to note, however, that it was possible to classify certain factors that may be thought of as perceived traits that tend to result in leader rejection. In this sense, a trait approach to leadership may still have some merit in explaining the phenomenon of leader emergence in leaderless groups. For example, although a member may or may not have a relatively stable personality trait that can be labeled "rigid," he will tend to be eliminated in the early meetings if he is perceived by fellow members as possessing such a trait. REFERENCES 1. Bird, Charles. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1940, p. 27. 2. Stogdill, R. M. Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature. JOURNAL OP PSYCHOLOGY XXV (1948), pp. 35-36. 3. Jenkins, W. 0. A Review of Leadership Stndles with Particular Reference to Military Problems. PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN XXXXIIII (1947), p. 74. 4. Merton, R. F., M. Fiske, and P. Kendall. Tim FocusED INTERVIEW. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956, pp. 3-4. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. What is the difference between a trait and a behavior? 2. What are some advantages and disadvantages in using group members to measure leader behavior? 3. In what ways would the groups discussed in this study be similar to or different from groups in common active duty leadership situations? 4. What traits or characteristics do you think an "ideal" Air Force officer should have? 353 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING G Leadership: Man and Function By Alex Bavelas. Reprinted by permission from the Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1960. Copyright 1960. Alex Bavelas, Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1948, is Professor of Psychology in the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. He is also a Fellow of the National Council of Religious Higher Education and a consultant of the Institute of Defense Analysis. Formerly, he taught at Massachusetts .Institute of Technology and has done research work with the Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. T HERE is a useful distinction to be made between the idea of leadership as a personal quality and the idea of leadership as an organizational function. The first refers to a special combination of personal characteristics; the second refers to the distribution throughout an organization of decision-making powers. The first leads us to look at the qualities and ability of individuals; the second leads us to look at the patterns of power and authority in organizations. Both of these ideas or definitions of leadership are useful, but it is important to know which one is being talked about, and to know under what conditions the two must be considered together in order to understand a specific organizational situation. Early notions about leadership dealt with it almost entirely in terms of personal abilities. Leadership was explicitly associated with special powers. An outstanding leader was credited not only with extensions of the. normal abilities possessed by most men but with extraordinary powers such as the ability to read men's minds, to tell the future, to compel obedience hypnotically. These powers were often thought of as gifts from a god, as conditional loans from a devil, or as ... the result of some accidental supernatural \, circumstance attending conception, birth, or early childhood. Today, claims of supernatural powers are made more rarely, but they are not entirely unknown. Of course, milder claims-tirelessness, infallibility of intuition, lightning-quick powers of decision-are · made in one form or another by many outstandingly successful men. And when they do not make them for themselves, such claims are made for them by others who, for their own reasons, prefer such explanations of success to other more homely ones. Outright supernatural explanations of leadership have, in recent times, given way to more rational explanations. Leadership is still generally thought of in terms of personal abilities, but now the assumption is made that the abilities in question are the same as those possessed by all normal persons: individuals who become leaders are merely presumed to have them to a greater degree. For many years, attempts to define these abilities and to measure them failed. This was not only because the early techniques of measurement were primitive and unreliable but for a more important reason. The traits that were defined as important for leadership were often nothing more than purely verbal expressions of what the researcher felt leaders ought to be like. Few of the many lists of traits that were developed had very much in common. Typical of the items that frequently appeared on such lists were piety, honesty, courage, perseverance, ·intelligence, reliability, imagination, industriousness. This way of thinking about leadership is still very common. It persists, not because it is helpful in 354 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP analyzing and understanding the phenome:non of leadership, but because it expresses a deep and popular wish about what leaders should be like. Modern trait research proceeds in a very different way. Leadership traits are no longer selected arbitrarily. They are, instead, largely derived from the results of tests that are carefully designed, administered, and interpreted. And the techniques of measurement and analysis which are applied to the data that are gathered have been extensively developed and refined. Numerous trait studies have been made of the physical, intellectual, and social characteristics of leaders. On various tests, persons who are 'leaders tend to be brighter, tend to be better adjusted psychologically, and tend to display better judgment. Studies that have concentrated on the social behavior of leaders show that they "interact" more than nonleaders. They tend to give more information, ask for more information, and to take the lead in summing up or interpreting a situation. Despite these accomplishments, the trait approach has in recent years been subjected to increasing criticism. A common objection is that the results are obtained by a method that requires an initial separation of people into "leaders" and "nonleaders" or "good leaders" and "not-so-good leaders." The validity of the distinguishing traits that come out of such work, the argument goes, can only be as good as the validity of the preliminary grouping of the persons being studied. All of this leads to the question, "On what basis is the initial separation of subjects made, and how is it justified?" At first glance, this may appear· a trivial and carping question. In fact, however, it is one of the most serious obstacles in the way of all leadership research. It is obviously impossible to define "good leaders" without reference to a system of values. To say that a man is a "good leader" means that his behavior and its consequences are held to be of greater worth than other behaviors and results. What system of values shall the researcher adopt that is both scientifically acceptable and socially useful in distinguishing good or successful leaders from others? Many attempts have been made to find a suitable criterion, but the results have been generally unsatisfactory:._not that it is difficult to find standards which are desirable and inspiring, but that such standards tend to be based, just as the early lists of traits were, on qualities that are difficult or impossible to measure. And often they just do not seem to "work." For example, there have been attempts to distinguish leaders from nonleaders in terms that rest essentially on moral and ethical considerations. It may be a significant commentary on our society that there appears to be no particular correlation between a man's ethics and morals and his power to attract followers. It has been suggested that many of the philosophical difficulties that attend the definition of "good leader" can be avoided if one accepts the more limited task of defining "good executive." In business and industry, one would like to think, there should be practical, quantitative ways of making the distinction. Many attempts have been made in this direction. Reputation, financial success, hierarchical position, influence, and many other criteria have been tried without much satisfaction. The inadequacies of such standards are obvious to any experienced executive. There is a second and more interesting objection that has been made to the trait approach. It is based not on the question of · the accuracy or the validity of the assumptions that are made but upon the nature of the "traits" themselves. Traits are, after all, statements about personal characteristics. The objection to this is that the degree to which an individual exhibits leadership depends not only on his characteristics, but, also, on the characteristics of the situation in which he finds himself. For example, a man who shows all the signs of leadership when he acts as the officer ·Of a well-structured authoritarian organization may give no indication of leadership ability in a less-structured, democratic situation. A man may become influential in a situation requiring deliberation 355 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP and planning but show little evidence of leadership if the situation demands immediate action with no opportunity for weighing alternatives or thinking things out. Or, to take still another instance, a man may function effectively and comfortably in a group whose climate is friendly and co-operative but retreat and become ineffective if he perceives the atmosphere as hostile. The case for the situational approach to leadership derives its strength from this fact: while organizations in general may exhibit broad similarities of structure and function, they also, in particular, show strong elements of uniqueness. It is a matter of common observation that within any normal industrial organization, providing there has been a sufficient past, there will be found patterns of relationships and interaction that. are highly predictable and highly repetitive. Some of these reoccurring situations will be unique to that organization. It is this uniqueness that is referred to when one speaks of the "personality" of a company. This is what a management has in mind when its selects a new member with an eye to how he will "fit in." The argument of the researcher who stresses the situational aspects of leadership is that these unique characteristics of an organization are often crucial in determining which of two equally competent and gifted men will become a . "leader," and fur~her that in the very same organization these unique patterns may change significantly at different levels of the hierarchy. The very same "leadership abilities" that helped a man rise to the top may, once he is there, prove a positive detriment. The status of trait and situational leadership research can be summed up in this way: ( 1) the broad similarities which hold for a great number of organizations make it possible to say useful things about the kind of person who is likely to become a leader in any of those organizations, and (2) the unique characteristics of a particular organi·~ \ zation make it necessary to analyze the situa tional factors that determine who is likely to \ ·~\ become a leader in one particular organiza\ f tion. To put it another way, when specific situational patterns are different from organization to organization, one cannot say what personal traits will lead to acknowledged leadership. Instead, one must try to define the leadership functions that must be performed in those situations and regard as leadership those acts which perform them. This point of view suggests that almost any member of a group may become its leader under circumstances that enable him to perform the required functions of leadership and that different persons may contribute in different ways to the leadership of the group. In these termswe came close to the notion of leadership, not as a personal quality, but as an organizatio1Ull function. Under this concept it is not sensible to ask of an organi zation "who is the leader?" Rather we ask "how are the leadership functions distributed in this organization?" The distribution may be wide or narrow. It may be so narrow-so many of the leadership functions may be vested in a single person-that he is the leader in the popular sense. But in modern organizations this is becoming more and more rare. What are· these "leadership functions?" Many have been proposed: planning, giving information, evaluating, arbitrating, control ling, rewarding, punishing, and the like. All of these stem from the underlying idea that leadership acts are those which help the group achieve its objectives, or, as it is also put, to satisfy its "needs." In most face-to face groups, the emergence of a leader can ·well be accounted for on this basis. That person who can assist or facilitate the group most in reaching a satisfactory state is most likely to be regarded as the leader. If one looks closely at what constitutes assistance or facilitation in this sense, it turns out to be the making of choices or the helping of the group to make choices-"better" choices, of course. But can the function of leadership be reduced simply to decision making for the facilitation of decision making? The objection can be raised that such a definition is much too wide to be useful. Every action, even · every physical movement one makes, is after 356 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP all "chosen" out of a number of possible al ternatives. If when I am at my workbench I pick up a screwdriver in preference to a hammer, I am clearly making a choice; am I, by virtue of that choice, displaying leader ship? Something is obviously wrong with a definition of leadership which imputes it to any act that can be shown to have involved a choice. Common sense would argue that cus tomary, habitual, and "unconscious" actions, although they may logically contain elements of choice, should be separated from actions that are subjectively viewed by the person taking them as requiring a decision. Com mon sense would also argue that questions of choice that can be settled on the basis of complete information should be considered differently from questions of choice in which decisions must be taken in the face of uncer tainty. And common sense would argue that some distinction should be made between de cisions that, although made on equally un certain grounds, involve very different orders of risk. This is, of course, the implicit view of the practicing manager, and although it may contain very knotty problems of logic it is the view that will be taken here. Stated in general terms, the position that will be taken is that organizational leadership consists of uncertainty reduction. The actual behavior through which this reduction is accomplished is the making of choices. · We saw above that not all choices are equally difficult or equally important. Some choices are considered unimportant or irrelevant and are ignored, and of course whole areas may be seen as so peripheral to the interests of the organization that they are not perceived as areas of choice at all. Other choices that must be made are so well understood that they become habitual and automatic. Some of these are grouped into more or less coherent bundles and given a job name. The employee learns to make them correctly as he becomes skilled in the job. In most job evaluation plans, additional credit is given if the job requires judgment. This is a way of saying that there are choices remaining in the job that cannot be completely taken care of by instructions but must be made by the employee as they come along. There are other choices which, although they are equally clear and habitual, are of a more general nature and do not apply just to a specific job but apply to all. These are cus tomarily embodied in rules and procedures. Rules and procedures are, in this sense, deci sions made in advance of the events to which they are to be applied. Obviously, this is pos sible and practical only to the extent that the events to which the rules and procedures apply can be foreseen, and the practical limit of their completeness and specificity depends on how these future events can be predicted. Following this line of analysis, it is theo retically possible to arrange all the logically inherent choices that must be made in oper ating an industrial organization along scales of increasing uncertainty and importance. At some level in this hierarchy of choices, it is customary for management to draw a line, reserving for itself from that point on the duty and the privilege of making the re quired decisions. Precisely where a management draws this line defines its scope. The way in which a management distributes the responsibility for making the set of choices it has thus claimed to itself defines its structure. What organizational leadership is and what kinds of acts constitute it are questions that can be answered only within this framework of scope and structure. In these terms leadership consists of the continuous choice-making process that pennits the organization as a whole to proceed toward its objectives despite all sorts of internal and external perturbations. But as every practicing manager knows, problems occasionally arise that are not amenable to the available and customary methods of analysis and solution. Although uncertain about which choice to make, a management may nevertheless have to make a decision. It is in situations of this kind that many of the popular traits attributed to leaders find their justification: quickness of decision, the courage to take risks, coolness under stress, intuition, and, even, luck. There is no doubt that quick, effective, and 357 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP daring decisions are a highly prized commodity in a crisis, but just as precious a commodity is the art of planning and organizing so that such crises do not occur. The trend of management has been to remove as many of its decisions as possible from the area of hunch and intuition to that of rational calculation. More and more, organizations are choosing to depend less on the peculiar abilities of rare'individuals and to depend instead on the orderly processes of research and analysis. The occasions and opportunities for personal leadership in the old sense still exist, but they are becoming increasingly rare and circumscribed. This new emphasis has not eliminated the role of personal leadership, but it has signifi. cantly redefined it. Under normal conditions · of operation, leadership in the modern orga nization consists not so much in the making of decisions personally as it does of maintaining the operational effectiveness of the decision-making systems which comprise the management of the organization. The picture of the leader who keeps his own counsel and in the nick of time pulls the rabbit out of the hat is out of date. The popular stereotype now is the thoughtful executive discussing in committee the information supplied by a staff of experts. In fact it may be that the brilliant innovator, in the role of manager, is rapidly becoming as much an organizational embarrassment as he is an asset. This trend, reasonable tl,lough it may appear on the surface, conceals two serious dangers. First, we may be systematically giving up the opportunity of utilizing the highest expressions of personal leadership in favor of managerial arrangements which, although safer and more reliable, can yield at best only a high level of mediocrity. And second, having committed ourselves to a system that thrives on the ordinary, we may, in the interests of maintaining and improving its efficiency, tend to shun the extraordinary. It is no accident that daring and innovation wane as an organization grows large and successful. On different levels this appears to have been history of men, of industries, of nations, and even of societies and cultures. Success leads to "obligations"-not the least of which is the obligation to hold what has been won. Therefore, the energies of a man or administration may be absorbed in simply maintaining vested interests. Similarly, great size requires "system," and system, once established, may easily become an end in itself. This is a gloomy picture, because it is a picture of decay. It has been claimed, usually with appeals to biological analogies, that this is an inevitable cycle, but this view is, very probably, incorrect. Human organizations are not biological organisms; they are social inventions. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Select a successful leader who is known to your AFROTC classmates, and describe several characteristics of personality that you feel contribute to his success as a leader. 2. Describe a second successful leader whose dominant characteristics differ from those of the first man you chose. 358 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING H Leadership, Membership and Organization1 By Ralph M. Stogdill. Reprinted by permission from the Psychological Bulletin, Vol. XLVII, No. 1 (January 1950). Copyright 1950. Ralph M. Stogdill, Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1934, is Professor of Management Science in the College of Administrative Science, Ohio State University. He was Associate Director of the Ohio State Leadership Studies from 1946 to 1953 and was resident Social Scientist in the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University from 1953 unti( he assumed his present post in 1954. Among his list of publications are Leadership and Structures of Personal Interaction and Individual Behavior and Group Achievement. T HE PRESENT paper is concerned with a point of view regarding the relation of leadership to group organization. It represents one attempt within the Ohio State Leadership Studies2 staff to clarify and systematize certain aspects of the leadership problem. Such clarification appears to be necessary as a preliminary step toward the development of an integrated program of research on leadership problems in formal organizations. The pioneering work of Lewin (9), Moreno (10), and their followers has resulted in marked progress in the development of methods for studying leadership as a phenomenon of groups. However, comparable progress remains to be made in the development of methods for the study of leadership as an aspect of organization. Several factors appear to have operated as barriers to the development of scientific theory and method in this area. One is the lack of an adequate definition of leade~ship. A second is the fact that in much of the literature on leadership, the terms "group" and "organization" are 1 A cooperative contribution of tbe U. S. Navy, Office of Naval Research, and the Ohio State University Re search Foundation. The opinions presented are tbose of the author, and should not be regarded as having tbe endorsement of the Department of tbe Navy. The paper was presented in part before tbe Midwestern Psychological Association Chicago, Ill., April 29, 1949. • The Ohio State Leadership Studies are designed as a te!':Year pro!!ram '?f res-:arch on leadership problems in nulitary, bus1ness, mdustnal, educational and civilian governmental organizations. The staff includes C.L. Shartle,Director; Alvin E. Coons, Melvin Seeman and Ralph M. Stogdi_ll, Associate Directors; John Hemphill, Research Assoc1ate; Donald T. Campbell, Research Consultant· Richard T. Morris and Charles M. Westie, Research Assistants. used interchangeably or are defined in exactly the same terms. A third derives from two opposed theoretical" approaches represented, on the one hand, by those theories of organization in which the leader is conceived as a symbol of authority or as an embodiment of superior personal traits, and on the other hand, by a type of group-oriented theory in which leadership appears to be regarded as a manifestation of social pathology. A fourth, and related obstacle, results from a reaction of social scientists against the authoritarian principles advanced in many discussions of organization. Some social theorists appear to reject all concepts of organization as authoritarian; arid some researchers appear reluctant to deal experimentally with such concepts as responsibility, authority, stratification and similar phenomena related to organization. It is beyond the scope or purpose of this paper to portray the magnitude of the latter two difficulties. Nevertheless, it seems relevant to recognize the fact that they are present and act to the detriment of scientific work in the field. The Ohio State Leadership Studies are being conducted on the basis of these assumptions: (1) that group organization is a recognizable social phenomenon in our culture; (2) that as such it is a legitimate subject for scientific study; and (3) that the variables of organization can be isolated and defined so as to permit their scientific study. Itis the purpose of the present paper to exam 359 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ine various concepts relevant to leadership and organization, and to develop a formulation of the problem which will suggest hypotheses that can be subjected to experimental test. GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS Wilson ( 17) has reviewed the important sociological literature relating to concepts of the social group. He reports that in "current sociological literature one finds no consensus as to the meaning of the group," and concludes that much experimental work is yet to be done in order to delimit the group concept in any satisfactory manner. An important step in this direction has been made by Hemphill (5), who has devised scales for the measurement of such group dimensions as size, permeability, stability, viscidity, homogeneity of membership, and the like. The most satisfactory definition available at the present time appears to be that of Smith (15) who defines a social group as "a unit consisting of a plural number of organisms (agents) who have collective perception of their unity and who have the ability to act/or are acting in a unitary manner toward the environment." Krech and Crutchfield (8) present a similar view. They state that "the criteria for establishing whether or not a given set of individuals constitutes a psychological group are mainly two: (1) all the members must exist as a group in the psychological field of each individual, i.e. be perceived and reacted to as a group; (2) the various members must be in dynamic inter.action with one another." A special kind of group is the organization. An organization may be defined as a social group in which the members are differentiated as to their responsibilities for the task of achieving a common goal. Znaniecki ( 18) has reviewed the sociological literature relating to various concepts of organization. He stresses the fact that the terms group and organization are rather tenuous concepts, in that it is often difficult to determine whether a particular aggregate of persons constitutes a group, and that it may also be difficult at times to determine whether a particular group can be regarde~ as an organization. He points out that social organization . . . . can be realized only in a lasting "social group" or "association." Individuals belonging to such a group are aware that they will be regularly expected to perform certain actions, and some of them act as organizers, leaders, coordinators of the regu lar activities of others with reference to the common purpose. Not all of these individuals need be continuously active; indeed, in many groups a considerable proportion remain passive, acting only in reaction to the actions of others. The common purpose of the or ganized actions may be simple or complex. Some of the consequences of distinguishing between the terms "group" and "organization" are the following: First, there is nothing in the term "group" which gives any clue as to the nature of leadership. Second, there is nothing in the group definition which provides any foundation for integrating leadership with group phenomena, except at a superficial level of social perception or interaction. Third, the group orientation can suggest research methods relating to leadership only in so far as the social group is defined in terms of organization. The concept of organization, however, with its implications for the differentiation of responsibility roles, does permit the study of leadership as an aspect of the relationships between members who are coordinating their efforts for the achievement of common goals. A group may or may not have leaders. If it does have leaders, it is an organization, for at least some of the members are thereby differentiated from the others as to responsibility, or role expectation in relation to some common purpose. The members of a group may or may not have mutual responsibilities for a common task. If the members do have differentiated responsibilities in relation to common goals then the group is an organization-a particular kind of group. The continued presence of leaders and of responsibility differentiations in relation to group goals are indicative of organization. It may not always 360 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP . . . . development of organization struc be easy to determine the exact point at which ture is largely a problem in the division of a group emerges into an organization. important responsibility, and involves twoproblems: (1) the grouping of similar funcLEADERSHIP AS AN ASPECT OF tions to form the various organization eleORGANIZATION ments iri a manner that will promote effec tive cooperation, and (2) the determinationThe following definition of leadership may of the proper relationships between functional serve as a starting point for discussion. Leadgroups and organization elements, with a view to promoting both cooperation and ef ership may be considered as the process fective executive leadership. (act) of influencing the activities of an organized group in its efforts toward goal set The definition of leadership does not spec ting and goal achievement. The definition of ify how many leaders an organization shall leadership relates it directly to the organized have, nor whether the leadership influence of group and its goal. It would appear that the an individual is continuous or intermittent, minimal social conditions which permit the nor whether the influence of the leader shall existence of leadership are the following: be for the welfare or detriment of the organi 1. A group (of two or more persons). zation and its members. It merely specifies 2. A common task (or goal oriented acthat leaders may be differentiated from other tivities). members in terms of the extent to which they · 3. Differentiation of responsibility (some influence the activities of the organization in of the members have different duties). its efforts toward the achievement of goals. The definition of effective and ineffective There are innumerable other group and situleadership is an additional problem. ational factors which may influence leader ship in varying degrees, but these appear to ASPECTS OF RESPONSIBILITY be the minimal conditions which will permit Brown (2) in a challenging analysis of or the emergence of leadership. There must be ganization maintains that "An enterprise is a a group with a common task or objective, mosaic of its individual responsibilities. The and at least one member must have responsi sum of them must exactly equal the whole bilities which differ from those of the other requirement of administration." He contin members. If all members perform exactly the ues, "Responsibility is that part in adminis same duties in exactly the same way there is tration which ·is assigned to a particular no leadership. A leader then is a person who member of an enterprise. Its definition is an becomes differentiated from other members act of organization." in terms of the influence he exerts upon the Responsibility cannot be regarded as agoal setting and goal achievement activities simple or uncomplicated variable. Jucius (7) of the organization. writes,The foregoing discussion suggests that leadership cannot emerge unless the memBy responsibility is meant, first, the oblibers of a group assume different responsibiligation to do an assigned task, and, sec~nd, the obligation to someone for the asstgn ties. It has been suggested that group organiment. But what is meant by obligation and zation also is founded upon differentiation of how far does it extend? This implies a will responsibility. It would then appear that ingness to accept, for whatever rewards one may see in the situation, the burden of a leadership and organization are derived from given task and the risks which attend in the a common factor or, viewed from a different event of failure. Because of the rewards !lfid light, that leadership is an aspect of group penalties involved, it is highly essential to organization. This view has been expressed specify the limits of responsibility. in various forms by writers in the field of business organization. Davis (3), for examFormal organization can seldom define all. ple, states that the the possible variations of responsibility and • ~ 361 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP personal interaction to be expected of all organization an individual's work patterns members in all situations. Nevertheless, or(the tasks he actually performs) will corre ganization appears to be founded upon a spond fairly closely with his responsibility basic system of stable expectations regarding patterns (the tasks he is supposed to per differential responsibilities and relationships form). However, as the mission and activi among the members. This is not a one-way ties of the organization change there will be process. That is, it is not the organization found in many instances an increasing dis alone which sets up role expectations for its crepancy between the tasks being perfo~ed members. The members set up expectations and the responsibilities originally outlmed for each other and for the organization as a and defined. whole. Itis assumed for purposes of the pres ent discussion that this principle applies not ATTRIBUTES OF ORGANIZATION only to stratified organizations, such as mili The studies of Roethlisberger (12) andtary and industrial establishments. It applies others have directed attention to the factor ofas well to membership in any organized informal groups within formal organization. group, whether it be a business, political, edInformal organization, as usually defined, reucational, religious, fraternal, or social orgafers to the friendship groups and cliquesnization and regardless of size, stratification, based upon close association, mutual interpurpose, or member characteristics. The esests or antagonisms, and the like--whichsential relationship which makes possible the develop within formal organization. It hasconduct of organized group activities is a difbeen pointed out by Romans (6) that thisferentiation of responsibility roles among the conception is too narrow, since what is inmembers. Without this there is no possibility formal in a factory may be formal in a primiof coordination or of leadership toward goal tive society. Firey (4), who defines informalachievement. The very process of organizaorganization in terms of schism, presents ation defines . the responsibilities of the memmore useful approach to the problem. Hebers and thereby the formal leadership of the maintains that "if we regard behavioral congroup. It is true that in some organized formity, in which interactional processes aregroups, such as recreational groups, the rehighly repetitive and synchronized, as thesponsibilities of members may appear to be overt counterpart of a social system, then bevaguely defined. However, this is not equivahavioral nonconformity may be taken as thelent to saying that no responsibilities exist. overt counterpart of schism within a system." Responsibility, in its broadest scope, deAn organization in operation seldom corfines not only the duties for which a member responds exactly with the organization modelis accountable; it defines also the persons to as charted. The intervention of human socialwhom and for whom he is accountable in the factors and other influences result in thedischarge of his duties. In doing so, it also emergence of informal organization, that is,defines a member's formal status, or location in the development of work patterns and inin the organization hierarchy. Authority and teraction patterns which do not correspondformal status systems in organization are but with responsibility patterns. aspects of the division of responsibility. It would appear then that there are twoResponsibilities in a systematic organizafundamental sets of variables which definetion are determined by the assignment of the operations of an organized group. Thesepersons to particular positions, the duties of are: which are outlined in an organization manual or organization chart. In less systematic 1. Variables which define formal organization. organizations the responsibilities of a particThese are:ular job or position may be determined by a. Responsibility variables (the wori.t. one isexpected to do). · on-the-spot instructions, by general hints or b. Formal interaction variables (the persons by unverbalized assumptions. In a systematic with whom cne is expected to work). 362 READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 2. Variables which define informal organization. These are: ' a. Work performance variables (the tasks one actually performs). b. Informal interactio::t variables (the persons with whom one actually works). If we regard the variables listed above as basic variables of organization, we can also regard them as variables of membership and of leadership. In other words, an organization can be studied in terms of these four types of variables: responsibilities, work performances, formal interactions and informal interactions. Leadership can also be studied in terms of the same variables. Responsibility variables define the duties that the members are expected to perform. The responsibilities of a given position may remain the same, whether A or B occupies the position. Work performance variables are defined by the tasks performed and by the methods of their performance. Individual A may accept a position previously occupied by B. The responsibilities as defined by organization charts and manuals may remain the same, but the tasks actually performed by A may differ somewhat from those performed by B, and the methods of performance may vary markedly. Formal interaction variables define the persons to whom and for whom the members are accountable, as well as others with whom they are expected to cooperate, in the discharge of their responsibilities. Informal interaction variables are defined by the persons with whom the members actually work and cooperate in the performance of their tasks.' Informal organization comes about as a result of the development of discrepancies (a) between work performance ,and responsibilities as defined and (b) between informal interactions and formally defined interactions. Thus leadership is ever confronted with the task of reconciling discrepanciesdiscrepancies between what ought to be done and what is being done, between goals and achievements, between organizational needs and available resources, between the needs of individual members and the requirements of organization, between formal lines of cooperation and informal patterns of cooperation. An organization in action comprises a complex of many variables in interaction. In making a pictorial representation of a business organization, the usual procedure is to plot the division of formal responsibility on a two dimensional chart. The horizontal dimension of the chart shows the division of responsibility for various kinds of work. The vertical dimension of the chart shows the division of responsibility for different levels of decision-making, and indicates the persons to whom one is accountable and those for whose performance one is accountable in the discharge of duties. This dimension defines the formal authority and status systems of the organization. Level (position in the organization hierarchy) and function (kind of work performed) are not independent dimensions. Although functions tend to differ from level to level, there is considerable overlap. Results from the Ohio State Leadership Studies (13, 16) have shown that the functions of top leadership tend to be sup ported at each lower level in the leadership structure by increasingly more detailed and routine work in the same functions. Personal interaction can also be conceived as varying in both horizontal and vertical directions. The horizontal dimension is defined by the range (number) of members with whom an individual interacts. Some persons tend to work alone or with single individuals, while others are observed to work with large numbers of persons. The vertical aspect of personal interaction is defined by the number of strata (echelons) above and below his own in which a member works with others. Some persons may be observed to work only with others at the same level in the organization. Others tend to work only with subordinates, and still others tend to work only with superiors. These tendencies may or may not represent expression of individual differences in social interaction patterns. Results obtained thus far in the Ohio State Leadership Studies suggest that these patterns of interaction may be determined in 363 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP part by the functions served by various types the individual presents various barriers to theof positions. Technical consultants and staff influence of the organization upon his ownaides tend to spend more time with superibehavior and reactions. Some members mayors. Members in supervisory positions are · be limited in capacity to discharge their reobserved, as would be expected, to spend sponsibilities, while others who are highlymore of their time with assistants, and suborskilled in the techniques of their responsibilidinates. Members in coordinative positions ties are limited in capacity to interact withtend to spend time with superiors and suborothers. Each member carries into the organidinates, as well as with associates at the same zation his past experiences, his needs, ideals,level in the organization. A member's funcpersonal goals, and commitments to othertion or duties may determine to a consideraorganizations, which may reodify and deterble degree which persons in the organization mine his capacity for participation. It wouldhe may influence, as well as the nature of the appear that the extent to which the behaviorinfluence that he can exert. of different members is determined by thecharacteristics of the group represents a con GROUP ORGANIZATION DEFINES AND tinuum from little to great, and also, that theDELIMITS LEADERSHIP extent to which the behavior of the differentThe very process of defining responsibility individuals determines the behavior ofserves to structure and delimit the role that groups may be conceived as representing athe leader may play in the organization. He similar continuum.cannot perform all the duties of all the memIt becomes apparent that a study in leadbers. His own accomplishment is therefore ership represents a study of relationships, ofdependent upon the performance of others. variables in interaction. According to Pigors His responsibilities are circumscribed by the ( 11), a study of leadership must consider:outlined procedures and delegated responsi (1) the leader, (2) the members as individu bilities necessary for the achievement of als, (3) the group as a functioning organizastated goals. tion, and (4) the situation.Each member must work within the orgaAll organizations operate within a larger nizational framework which defines the limcultural and environmental framework. No its of his participation (how far he ought to organization can escape entirely the influgo and beyond which he ought not to go) in ence of the external situation. The organiza performance of duties. It also sets the re tion may be influenced by the availability of quirements for his cooperation with others resources, by changes in the social order ofand defines his relationships with his superiwhich it is a part, by competition of other orors and subordinates. This organizational ganizations for the participation, resources orstructuring is not viewed alike by all persons. loyalty of its members, and by innumerable To some it appears as a barrier to participaother factors outside the control of the orgation or recognition. To others it appears as a nization itself. These factors also influenceprod and stimulus to greater effort and parthe leadership of the group. ticipation. For still others it provides a se cure and comfortable sphere of activities and LEADERSHIP AND EFFECTIVENESS working relationships. Organization, thereOF ORGANIZATION fore, in defining the responsibilities and According to Barnard ( 1 ) the persistence working relationships of its members, sets up of cooperation depends upon two conditions: barriers to participation, as well as facilitat(a) effectiveness, the accomplishment of co ing it. operative purpose, and (b) efficiency, the Even as the org~ization sets boundaries satisfactiop of individual motives. Thus, by providing a u.amework within which although in many situations it may appear de members disch,~g\! their responsibilities, so sirable to effect a maximum of goal achieve 364 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP ment with a minimum of organizational ex its striving toward goal achievement he must penditure, such a procedure might jeopardize consider certain social values, not only in re the welfare or morale of the members. It lation to the members, but in relation to society as well. If he ignores the welfare of the then becomes evident that there are many members he is likely to lose their following. situations in which organization is con fronted by a complex of contradictory facIf he ignores the welfare of society he is likely to lead his group into difficulty. Thus tors which must be considered in arriving at leadership is subject to determination by fac a decision. It also becomes apparent that the tors which are external to the organization, effectiveness of an organization cannot al as well as by internal group factors. ways be evaluated in terms of the degree to which it has attained its objectives. It may be THE DEFINITION OF LEADERSIDP necessary first to evaluate the goals and objectives themselves or the cost of their atThe definition of leadership as a process tainment. A carefully thought out discussion of influencing the activities of an organized of factors to be considered in setting organigroup in its task of goal setting and goal zational goals, arriving at decisions, and achievement should perhaps be re-examined. evaluating the success of an organization has Does it define leadership? What are its implibeen presented by Simon (14). He states cations? Admittedly, it defines only at a high "The accomplishment by an administrative level of generality. Certainly it does not inprogram of its organizational goals can be clude all social acts and influences, but it is measured in terms of adequacy (the degree nevertheless, an inclusive rather than a reto which its goals have been reached) or of strictive definition of leadership. Even so, it efficiency (the degree to which the goals is more restrictive than most of those athave been reached relative to the available tempted in the recent literature. The definiresources)." Simon, in agreement with Bartion restricts leadership to influence within nard, maintains that the criterion of adethe organized group. It does not imply domiquacy alone is not valid as a measure of nation or direction of others, nor any techgroup accomplishment. He observes that nique of influence; nor does it specify any "the fundamental criterion. of administrative particular member who should be regarded decision must be a criterion of efficiency as a leader. The definition permits the study rather than a criterion of adequacy. The task of any member of an organization to deterof administration is to maximize social valmine the extent of his leadership influence,ues relative to limited resources." and permits consideration of the possibility If organizational goals are employed as that every member may contribute towardreference points in evaluating effectiveness, determining the leadership of the organiza then the goals themselves must be subject to tion. evaluation. In addition, the cost (human or The definition carries the implication that material) of goal attainment must be con sidered as a factor in evaluation. Both Barleadership may be not so much an attribute nard and Simon imply that organization canof individuals as an aspect of organization. not be regarded as a unit in isolation-or as In this respect it parallels the concept of aua law unto itself. The motive of organization thority. It is generally recognized that an ex ecutive in a business concern has authority in is the creation of social value or goods for its relation to his employees only during the members, and these values bear some signifi time they are working as members of the or cant relation to the values of society in general. ganization. His authority does not extend outward into the direction of their personal Since leadership is related to the determination of group goals, it becomes apparent or social lives. Nor does his position as an that the leader is seldom a free agent. In inexecutive give him authority over other perfluencing the activities of the organization in sons who are not members of his organiza 365 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP tion. In other words, authority is a relationgenerally understood to be an aspect of organ ship that exists between persons who are ization. However, it can be observed that mutually participating as members of an orsome members exercise more authority than ganized enterprise. Authority is not an attriothers. The judgment can also be made that bute of one or a few persons. Authority is an some persons have "too much" or "too little" interactional process by means of which the authority. Such observations indicate an organization defines for each individual the evaluation of conditions relative to various scope for action he has in making decisions, factors in the organization. In the same way carrying out responsibilities, and enlisting the it can be observed that member A exerts cooperation of others. The authority of any more leadership influence in some situations; single individual will be largely circumwhile members B, C, and D exert more in scribed and defined by the authority of othfluence in determining activities of the orga ers, and at the same time, his own degree of nization in other instances. It may be that authority will in part determine the authority .the leadership of A is circumscribed by the of others. leadership of B, C, and D who are in compe Leadership appears also to be determined tition with him; or it may be that the leader by a ·system of interrelationships. As such it ship of A is dependent upon the supporting must be regarded as an aspect of organizaleadership of B, C and D. In either event, tion, just as authority is a derivative of orgathe leadership influence of any one member nization. If leadership is determined by a is determined in part by the leadership ex system of interacting variables, then each of erted by others, and the balance may changethe several dimensions of responsibility and from time to time.personal interaction .might be conceived asrepresenting a gradient of influence. If so, SUMMARYthen it should be possible to measure leader An organization is composed of individuship influences in terms of these dimensions. als. Its existence is dependent upon the coopSome members may be regarded as rating eration and performance of individuals whohigher than others in leadership by virtue of play different roles. Measures of authority,the fact that they have responsibility for leadership, and the like, are but measures ofmaking decisions which exert a marked aspects of organization, even though theinfluence upon the activities of the organizameasurements are made in terms of memberstion. Some members may influence the activand the relationships among members. Leadities of the organization as a result of perership exists only in so far as individuals, assonal interaction with other members, even members of organization, are differentiatedthough they do not hold positions of high as to the influence they exert upon the orgalevel responsibility. Some members may rate nization; and the leadership influence of anyhigh in both types of influence. It would not one member will be determined to a largebe expected that any organization could be degree by the total leadership structure offound in which all influence is exerted by a the organization. It is for this reason thatsingle member. It would rather be expected leadership has been here defined in terms ofthat all the members of the organization influence upon the activities of the organizacould be ordered or ranked to some degree tion, rather than in terms of influence uponin terms of the influence they exert in var persons. ious dimensions. The proposal to measureleadership in terms of the influence exerted The advantages of this formulation of theby individuals may appear to contradict the leadership problem are as follows: First, itstatement that leadership is an aspect of orremoves leadership from the broad, vaguelyganization rather than an attribute of indidefined realm of social interaction in general,viduals. But this is not a necessary concluand integrates it with the basic variablession. It was pointed out that authority is which describe an organized group. Second, 366 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP and more important, is the fact that it suggests the development of methods for studying leadership as an aspect of work performance, work methods and working relationships. An attempt is being made to develop such methods for the Ohio State Leadership Studies. For example, the goals and str:.Jcture of organization and the responsibility patterns of members are determined by examining organization charts and manuals and by interviews with members of the organization. Work patterns are determined by modified job analysis procedures. Sociometric method3 are employed to determine working relationships between the members and to ·chart the informal organization. The social values and role concepts of leaders and members are studied by means of attitude scales. These methods are supplemented by various check lists and rating scales. In conclusion, a word of caution may be in order. The present paper has been concerned with a search for the minimal factors which will permit a functional integration of the concepts: leader, member and organization. In attempting to isolate these minimal common elements, many other important factors associated with leadership and group functioning have been excluded as not contributing to this central purpose. The present formulation represents merely one segment of a set of hypotheses to be subjected to experimental test. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. BARNARD, CHESTER I. The functions of the executive. Cambridge; Harvard UDiv. Press, 1938. 2. BROWN, ALVIN. Organization of Industry. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1947. 3. DAVIS, RALPH C. Industrial organization and manage ment. New York: Harper, 1940. 4. FIREV, WALTER. Informal organization and tbe tbeory of schism. Amer. sociol. Rev., 1948, 13, 15-24. 5. HEMPHILL, JoHN K. Situational factors In leadership. Ohio State Univ., Bur. Educ. Res. Monogr. 31, 1949. 6. HoMANS, G. C. A conceptual scheme for tbe study of social orgallizatlon. Amer. soclol. Rev., 1947, 12, 13-26. 7. Jucrus, MICHAEL J. Personnel management. New York: Irwin, 1947. 8. KREcH, DAVID, & CRUTCHFIELD, RICHARDS S. Theory and problems of social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948. 9. LEWIN, KURT, LrPPrrT, RONALD, & EsCALONA, SYBILLB K. Studies in topological and vector psychology I. Univ. Iowa Stud. Child Welf., 16(3), 1940. 10. MORENO, J. L. Who shall survive? Washington: Nervous and Mental Diseases PubL Co., 1934. 11. PIGORS, PAUL. Leadership or domination. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1935. 12. ROETHLISBERGER, F. J., & DICKSON, WILLIAM J. Man agement and the worker. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939. 13. SHARTLE, CARROLL L. Leadership and executive performance. Personnel, 1949, 25, 370-380. 14. SIMON, HERBERT A. Administrative behavior. New York: Macmillan, 1947. 15. SMITH, MAPHEus. Social situation, social behavior, social group. Psycho!. Rev., 1945, 52, 224-229. 16. STOGDILL, RALPH M., & SHARTLE, CARROLL L. Metbods for determining patterns of leadership behavior in relation to organization structure and objectives. J. appl. Psycho!., 1948, 32, 286-291. 17. WILSON, LoGAN. Sociography of groups. In G. Gurvltch and W. E. Moore (Eds.), Twentieth Century Sociology. New York: Philosophical Library, 1945. Pp. 139-171. 18. ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN. Social organization and institutions. In G. Gurvitch and W. E. Moore (Eds.), Twentieth Century Sociology. New York: Philosophical Library, 1945. Pp. 172-217. Questions for Reflection and Discussion I. What are some consequences of distinguish ing between the terms "group" and "organization"? 2. Compare Stogdill's definition of leadership with that given in Chapter I. 3. Why cannot responsibility be regarded as a simple variable? 4. Why must organizational goals be subject to evaluation? 367 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING I The Skills of Leadership By Joseph A. Olmstead. Reprinted by permission from Military Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 3 (March 1966). Joseph A. Olmstead is a Senior Scientist with the Human Resources Research Office,Division Number 4 (Infantry), George Washington University, Fort Benning, Georgia. During World War II, he served with the US Air Force. He holds M.A. and Ph.D. degreesin Psychology from the University of Texas, where he conducted research on leadership and group effectiveness for the US Air Force. He has been employed by industry to conduct management research and development. Doctor Olmstead has recently completed a research project concerned with leadership at senior levels of command. W HEN we think of military leadership, we frequently have in mind some type of highly personal, inspirational relationship between leader and followers. Leadership has its inspirational side, but emphasis upon this aspect tends to divert us from recogni tion of the actual skills required to elicit de sired performance from the complex organi zations characteristic of a modern army. The ultimate criterion of effective leadership can only be the quality of performance demonstrated by an organization's personnel, both individually and as a unit. This means that a commander has failed if he does not improve, or at least maintain, the performance capabilities of the organization entrusted to him. He has failed if he does not influence his personnel to perform the duties assigned to them. Performance remains, of necessity, both the aim and the proof of his leadership. Accordingly, each deliberation of leadership problems, each leadership decision, and each leadership act must have as a first consideration its effect upon performance. When viewed in this way, it is clear that leadership is the process of influencing individuals and organizations to obtain desired results. It is also apparent that the skills required to exercise such influence effectively become highly important. INFLUENCE EXAMINED For the commander, a critical question is: "How can I best exert the kind of influence that will result in the successful performance of my unit's mission?" The answer to this question is fairly complex-particularly at the higher levels of command. The problem is not so much whether the commander can influence his unit, but, rather, whether this influence will be exerted with positive rather than negative results. A military organization is built from the top down. It starts with the thinking, ideas, and behavior of the commander; it spreads out to include his staff and key subordinates. It is translated into a variety of specific actions and patterns of behavior throughout the unit. METHODS USED If the original ideas of the commander are not sound, the trends in thinking and action throughout the organization are also likely to be wrong. If, on the other hand,. the commander's basic thinking is sound, this will be reflected throughout the unit. Therefore, there can be no doubt that a commander influences his organization. Because of the po~ition he occupies, it is virtually impossible for him not to exert influence of some cype. The more important question is concerned with the kind of influence that is exercised. Influence is exercised in its most complete 368. READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP form when a decision made by one person governs every aspect of the behavior of an other person. For example, on the parade ground, the marching soldier is permitted no latitude whatsoever. His every step, his pos ture, and the length of his pace are all gov erned by authority. This is a case of almost total influence. However, the soldier on the parade ground is an unusual case. More often, authority can place only partial limits upon the individual's exercise of judgment. Accord. ingly, other methods of influence must also function if the actions of personnel are to be controlled. A close look at almost any action of a member of a military unit will show that he is responsive to a complex structure of in fluence. A combat operation provides an excellent illustration. In the modem Army, influence and authority are exercised through an intri cate system of command. Each level leaves a certain area of discretion to the level below. Even the lowest ranking soldier exercises some measure of judgment in determining his specific actions in a particular ·situation. Under these circumstances, a senior com mander faces the constant task of extending his authority and influence to the man in the ranks. Routinely, he exercises most of this influence by assigning the mission and objec tive of each unit at the next level below him, and by specifying such elements of time and place as are necessary to insure proper coor dination among the units. Accordingly, each subordinate commander may be limited only by the mission as signed to his unit, by its general schedule, and by any specific limiting restrictions which may be placed on him by his superior officer. He, in tum, further narrows the dis cretion of his own subordinates so far as he judges necessary to specify the part each subordinate unit is to play in accomplishing the mission. However, this does not mean that the dis cretion of the subordinate commander is lim ited only by his objective. His directive may not go beyond this point. It may specify only what he is to do. Nevertheless, he is also governed by doctrine, by standing operating procedures, and by other principles and concepts which provide guidance about how he should carry out missions. Therefore, when the lowest ranking soldier is considered, it is apparent that a great variety of influences operate to determine his actions. The decision that, as a member of a particular unit, he will participate in an operation may have been made at numerous levels above him. His precise geographical location in the operation will be determined more specifically by each lower level in the chain of command. Furthermore, his actions will also be determined by tactical doctrine and available intelligence relating to the disposition of the enemy. Finally, as he actually participates in the operation, he is influenced more and more by his training, motivation, morale, esprit de corps, and other such factors which are not easily controlled by on-thespot supervision. ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS Most of these influences have their source in some aspect of the organization of which the individual is a member. The kinds of training he has experienced, his relationships with other men and with his superiors, the morale in the command, the degree of esprit de corps, and the extent to which the organization functions smoothly and competentlyall of these organizational factors affect :Udividual performance. Since it is impossible 'for a higher level commander to influence each member of his command in a direct, personal way, he must be concerned with maximizing these organizational factors which can be influenced by him. He must insure that his subordinate commanders are as effective as possible so that his influence will eventually spread down through all levels of his command. This view of the commander raises a series of questions about the abilities he needs in order to function effectively as a leader. For example, how aware is the commander of the actual motivational conditions of the various units and individuals which he must 369 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP take into account in making his practical operational judgments? Is he able to obtain releva~t and accurate information about conditions within his command? How competent is he in observing, talking with, and listening to the people with and through whom he must work? Is he able to convert his ideas for leading his unit into actual behavior consistent with these ideas? How perceptive is he in deciding whether to intervene in the operations of subordinate units? Is he able to adapt his methods of intervention to changing conditions and situations? Is he skillful in providing guidance to subordinates in such a manner that motivation and performance are not damaged? How well can he pick out the essential elements in leadership problems, and then provide actions appropriate to the demands of the situation? ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL Many people hope for a simple set of rules that might equip a commander to cope consistently with the complex leadership problems he faces. Unfortunately, there are no specific rules which, if a commander follows them, will invariably result in effective performance by his personnel. Effectiveness is control over environment. An effective organization is a unified system equipped with the knowledge and skills . to control its· environment, while an ineffective organization, for the lack of such capabili ties, remains subject to forces over which it can exert little control. Similarly, an effective leader fs a man who understands his organi zation and the forces by which it is moved, while the ineffective leader is a plaything of arbitrary and capricious powers which act beyond the range of his limited understand ing. Successful commanders operate effec tively because of a knowledge both of orga nizational requirements and of how the human elements in their organizations may be combined, balanced, and directed toward ultimate objectives. This knowledge is accompanied by recog nition that the problems of leadership have · infinite variety and that no two can be solved by exactly the same approach. When the most effective commanders are studied, the factor which stands out above . all others is that almost every one of these men is charac-. terized by a highly flexible approach to the constantly shifting problems and situations that he faces as a leader. LEADERSHIP SKILLS Recognition of the uniqueness and shifting nature of leadership problems leads to several conclusions which have profound significance for effeetiveness as a leader: • ·There does not appear to be a single pattern of behavior which can be practiced so as to yield consistently the best organizational performance under all conditions. • Accordingly, leadership cannot be put in terms of any one predetermined, correct way to behave which is guaranteed to get results under all conditions. • It is more useful to view leadership as a process of adaptation to changing conditions which require the skills to assess situations and to provide appropriate actions based on the prediction of consequences. This view of leadership as an adaptive process has an important implication. Adaptation to changing conditions requires a realistic approach to life and to people, together with a wide repertoire of behaviors capable of coping with the variety of problems that may be encountered. A leader is most effective when he can ad dress the concrete needs of the situation in front of him. Therefore;· he should guide himself according to the "reality" of the situ ation. This means that, in any situation, there are certain facts which must be taken into account. There is a set of real, existing conditions within which one must operate. When a commander tries to act as if these conditions do riot exist, or as if they were different than they are, his actions are going to do nothing more than aggravate the prob lem rather than solve it. Usually, he just makes bigger problems out of little ones. Leadership based on reality is not a pre determined set of "best ways to influence people." The only predisposition that is 370 ··,... READINGS-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP needed is that the leader must first determine what is reality and then act in accordance with that determination. To be effective, therefore, a commander must be skillful at assessing events and providing appropriate courses of action. GENERAL CLASSES Skills required to perform in accordance with this concept fall logically into two general classes: • Diagnostic skills. These are skills of observation, listening, analysis, and assessment of sit"Gations, together with skills in the prediction of potentialities, trends, and valid directions which situations are likely to take. • Action skills. This class involves the skills of acting, or intervening, in situations as they are diagnosed. It includes such skills as planning leadership stra~egies, manipulation of organizational cond:tions, and behaving effectively in interpersonal situations. The essential requirement for effective action in any situation is accurate diagnosis of that situation. Accurate diagnosis depends upon ability to pinpoint critical elements that are operating, while stripping away and disregarding the many factors that may be present but not relevant to the major issues. This requires skill in recognizing symptoms of what is happening and in moving from symptoms to underlying causes. Accurate diagnosis is most likely to be accomplished when problems are approached from an attitude intended to understand them as they actually exist, rather than as the commander thinks they should be or as he wishes they were. Several specific aspects of a realistic attitude can be cited. First, such an attitude requires an approach which is free from unsubstantiated assumptions about people, groups, organizations, and the causes of observed events. A realistic attitude also requires a high degree of acceptance of people as they are. This does not suggest that it is necessary to condone irresponsible actions, sloppy performance, or laziness. It is difficult to respond realistically to concrete situations if a leader cannot distinguish between people as they are and people as they should be. Realism requires a commander to be aware of possible differences between his viewpoint and that of other people. The leader who cannot concede, even to himself, that others may have different values, aspirations, and reactions is not likely to predict the consequences of his actions with much accuracy. However, it is also necessary for a leader to maintain an independent point of view in the face of such differences. Another aspect of a realistic attitude involves the commander's understanding of himself and of the impact of his actions on other people. Complete self~understanding is, of course, impossible. However, the leader who can predict with some degree of accuracy the probable effects of his actions on subordinates is better able to diagnose situations which may have been partly created by those actions. ACCURATE ASSESSMENT Finally, a realistic attitude :requires awareness of both formal procedures and such informal practices as traditions and customs, communication "grapevines," and the views of personnel relative to the unit and its leaders. This awareness permits the commander to predict-within limits-how his organization may respond to his actions. Thus, the accurate assessment ,of leadership situations requires a realistic approach to life, people, and organizations. The essential element is an attitude which asks, "What is really happening here?'' and "if I take certain actions, what will happen?" rather than, "I believe things ought to be such and such a way. Other people surely see it the same way and will respond to my actions accordingly." It is one thing to know what should be done and another to get it done. Accurate diagnosis is essential, but influence can only be exerted through effective actions. Skillful leadership involves both diagnosis and action. For any leadership situation, a commander has available a range of actions which, singly or in combination, he may 371 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP bring into use in his efforts to exert influence. Since each leadership problem is somewhat unique, skill is required in selecting and executing those actions which are most appropriate for the specific situation. Therefore, effective performance as a leader requires flexibility of action. Such flexibility involves both a capacity for choosing among a range of alternatives without undue commitment to any one way of handling all problems and, even more important, ability in actually putting the selected alternative into effect according to the requirements of the situation. PROPER ALTERNATIVES This last skill-that of putting the proper alternative into effect-is probably the most significant single factor in effective leadership. It involves the commander's actual behavior as he participates in leadership situations. The ultimate value of both accurate diagnosis and correct selection of alternatives rests, finally, upon the commander's skill in actually carrying out the indicated actions. Action flexibility is related to the leader's personality, his experience, his competence, and his grasp of the situation. Personal rigid ity, lack of experience and training, and sim ilar impediments may restrict his capacity for behaving and thus his flexibility in leading. Consider, for example, a commander who is successful in conducting informal confer ences, in communicating, and in getting re sults through others. However, he is not es pecially effective in personal, direct action when it is needed. Consider, on the other hand, a com mander who is a driver, lacking a sense of organizational relationships, but effective in anything he personally undertakes. Both commanders are restricted in their available repertoire of actions and, accordingly, their potential for maximum effectiveness is im paired. The ability to shift behavior according to the demands of the situation is an essenti~ requisite for effective leadership. Through flexibility of action, the leader performs his functions as they are dictated by organizational requirements. · VALUE OF SKILLS Sound leadership is not just a matter of hunch or native ability; its fundamentals can be analyzed, organized systematically, and learned by most individuals with normal capacities. Anyone can improve his performance through the acquisition of organized knowledge about leadership. Yet, taken alone, no amount of knowledge will improve insight and judgment or increase ability to act wisely under conditions of responsibility. This is because there are no single, demonstrably right answers to most leadership problems. Each situation is a new situation, requiring imagination, understanding, and skillful action. What is needed is not a. set of rules or techniques, but good skills both in diagnosing situations and in acting appropriately within them. If, as a working guide, a commander does have a framework of knowledge about leadership, diagnosis will show him where the limits lie. He can then take the appropriate action. Diagnostic and action skills help a commander to cope with the multiplicity of elements which operate in most leadership situ ations. The first thing that a leader must recognize is that behavior in organizations is usually the result of many determinants op erating simultaneously. In approaching leadership situations, many people "see" only the leader, or the problem, or the subordinates. Yet, in reality, one is rarely confronted with the simple relation of a commander to a subordinate or a group of subordinates. Instead, a great many relations are usually joined in a network. To seize upon one or two factors as a basis for action while· neglecting the rest is normally a gross oversimplification. It can only cause the leader to misunderstand the problem and take the wrong action toward its resolution. CORRECT INTERPRETATION In this regard, leadership is no different from tactical planning or the interpretation 372 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP of intelligence data. The good leader will an alyze each specific situation calmly, pa tiently, and step by step. Most of all, he will not jump to conclusions. He understands that individual facts or actions cannot be in terpreted correctly except as components of a larger picture. Correct interpretation requires a leader to look at the event or action in relation to rele vant individuals, groups, their attitudes, and their codes of behavior. It requires examina tion of the total organizational situation-in cluding missions, objectives, morale, esprit de corps, and discipline-to learn, for exam ple, whether the organizational climate is in fluencing the behavior of individuals as well as the entire unit. It requires analysis of the operational situation to determine whether successes or failures, efficiencies or inepti tudes are exerting an influence upon the behavior of individuals and units. It also re quires taking into account previous experi ences and backgrounds of personnel. When all of the obtainable facts are viewed in relation to the total situation, their real significance will usually take more meaningful shape. Of course, it must be recognized that no one can reasonably expect to · get "all the facts" about most situations. The important thing is to do some hard thinking about the facts which are obtainable. The concept of leadership skills says noth ing about democratic, authoritarian, or any other style of leadership. Given the requisite skills, any style or c~mbination of styles may be useful, depending upon the individual commander, the problem, and the situation. Probably, the style used will not matter too much if the commander possesses the proper skills and attitude. Furthermore, the concept stresses leader ship as an organizational function rather than leadership as a personal quality. Lead ership as an organizational function empha sizes the requirements of organizations and of leadership situations. It leads to consider ation of the kinds of skills most needed to fill these requirements. On the other hand, leadership as a personal quality refers to a special combination of personal characteristics. It leads to consideration of the internal makeup of individuals. The problem with leadership as a personal quality is that, except for a consistently high level of motivation, successful leaders seem to differ widely in their characteristics. There has not been found a single seti of abilities and inborn traits consistent with all successful leaders. Although the particular characteristics of a leader seem to influence his success, those which are significant vary considerably depending upon the circumstances. Furthermore, leaders who differ widely in abilities and traits are sometimes equally successful in the same or similar situations. Therefore, although the personal characteristics of leaders are certainly important, it is not fruitful to consider leadership as a universal pattern of characteristics possessed by certain people. In fact, such a notion leads to a particularly pessimistic view of leadership training. If success as a leader depended solely upon an individual's personality, efforts to train for leadership would be a complete waste because it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to change deep-seated personal characteristics in this manner. It is more useful to recognize the importance of skills and attitudes which can be acquired by individuals who differ widely in their inborn traits and abilities. Fortunately, skills can be learned and attitudes can be cultivated if only the individual sees the need for them. Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1. Compare Olmstead's definition of leadership with the definition given in Chapter 1. 2: Explain the difference between diagnostic skills and action skills, and discuss how each class of skills can affect your ability to lead. 3. Why does Olmstead consider leadership to be an art or a science? 373 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP READING J A Personal Concept of Command By Gen Jack J. Catton. Reprinted from Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders: Supplement. March 1969. Gen lf!Ck J. Catton won his fourth star on 1 August 1969 when he became Commander of the Military Airlift Command. Before assuming this position, he ·was Commander bf the From 1964 to 1968 he served as Strategic Air Command (SAC) Fifteenth Air Force. Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Resources, Headquarters .USAF. He held several commands in SAC prior to his headquarters assignment. In 1959, when he was promoted to brigadier general at the age of 39, he was the youngest officer in that grade in the Air Force. This article is taken from a lecture that General Catton presented at Air University's Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, on 14 November 1968. A PERSONAL CONCEPT OF COMMAND controlling military forces to accomplish assigned, implied, or inherent missions, to I AM VERY PLEASED and flattered to gether with administrative responsibility forbe with you this afternoon. the supply, health, welfare, morale, disciPleased because I know that you represent pline, assignment and relief of personnel. the top leadership of the Air Force in the This to me is quite straightforward. It isnext 10 to 15 years. I am deeply concerned something we can all understand. The keywith the need for dynamic, enlightened and words are: authority and responsibility. Aueffective Air Force leadership in those critithority comes as a legal right of a comcal years, because our Nation is dependent mander to direct and to order. His responsiupon it. bility, on assuming that office, is to faithfully I'm flattered because my invitation to deand diligently discharge the authority he hasliver this lecture implies I have achieved legally been given by virtue of assignmentsome measure of success as a commander in and rank. A commander's effectiveness dithe years I have thus far served. minishes to the extent that he must use hisNow all of you know that command and authority to lead his men. leadership, are awfully hard to separate. You Leadership, on the other hand, is difficultcan be a ·commander without being a good to define. As a matter of fact, Lt. Gen. Lewisleader. You can be a leader without being a H. Brereton, (USAF retired) said: "He whocommander. But, I'll tell you one thing you attempts to define leadership puts a fencecan't be-you can't be a good commander around it, walls it in, and limits its scope. unless you're a good leader. There's just no way. It's been my experience that leadership Leadership is much too complex to be imis the single most important attribute a comprisoned.in words." mander must have to be successful. Nevertheless, we know leadership is demAs a way of getting started, let's define onstrated by a man's ability to influence others-to have them follow enthusiastically as what it is we're going to talk about. Command-The definition I prefer is, the well as instinctively. authority an individual in the military service It has been my experience that the success lawfully exercises over subordinates by virof our commanders · has been dependent, tue of his rank and assignment. It carries more than anything else, on their ability as with it responsibility for planning, organizleaders. ing, training, directing, coordinating, and The balance of our discussion, therefore, 374 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP will be on the subject of leadership, because I find it impossible to separate command from leadership. In my opinion there are five "musts" of leadership which are within your power to develop. They are these: 1. Strength of character 2. A deep sense of responsibility 3. Courage 4. Knowledge 5. The ability to understand and apply human engineering Let's now treat each of the five leadership musts separately. 1. Strength of Character Honesty in all things-with yourself and others. A. Honesty-Integrity. Be honest with yourself and be honest with the Air Force. When you say you will do something-do it! Remember that your word is your bond. Your NCOs and airmen are the first to recognize and respect this all-important quality. Remember.:_nothing tricky-just a straightforward approach to the problem. And remember too, if you don't keep faith with your men, no matter how ingenious or bril:liant you are, you'll never get the cooperationyou desire. For a leader, integrity is the fundamental requirement. Your . honesty must be unquestionable, your loyalty to the mission unchallengable, and your moral strength indisputable. B. The next one is Self-Discipline. You must at all times conduct yourself in a manner that promotes trust and confidence, in your superiors, in your contemporaries, in your subordinates. You can't be a very capable or effective commander if your boss doesn't believe in you. Conduct yourself in a manner that promotes trust and confidep.ce in your ability, in your reliability, and in your absolute loyalty. There's another group in which you must retain trust and confidence-the public-the citizens of our Nation--our employers. Think of it for a minute. They have placed _in our custody vast resources that can have impact that is beyond description. Let me give you an example of what I am talking about. When the first atomic bomb was delivered on Hiroshima, we had in that airplane a Navy captain who was the weaponeer, an Air Force crew that flew the airplane, Manhattan Engineering District civilians who put the bomb together and loaded it in the airplane. That's the way we started. The next step was to develop delivery systems in great numbers. But we qid not gain custody of the bombs. They were-maintained by another department in our Government. It was a long time before we got custody of the delivery system and the bombs that we were to deliver. It took a long time, something like 15 years. The only reason we gained custody, an absolute essential to proper military response, was because we developed public trust. It took a long, long time. I vividly remember, in order to carry out an emergency war plan, we used to have to fly to about four places in the United States to pick up our weapons before we could fly our mission. The time required to deliver a weapon was many days. Our adversary forced us to reduce the red tape. We had to · have our weapon systems capable of very early generation and response or we were useless. So in 1957 we went on alert. In order to go on alert we had to have a fullygenerated airplane. We went to the Congress and we got authority to do this. Later we sold the Positive Control Launch concept, first to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then the Department of Defense, and finally up the Hill to the President. For the first time, we really had a highly responsive strategic nuclear capability. Now when I say self-discipline, put yourself in the position of a highly spirited public citizen, who lives adjacent to a SAC base which has an alert force ready to respond within 15 minutes or whatever the warning time happens to be. And you go downtown and you recognize that guy as the wing commander, that fellow over there as the squadron commander, and perhaps this fellow here as the munitions maintenance expert. Now 375 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP how are you going to feel if these guys con2. Deep Sense of Responsibility duct themselves loosely. The Air Force simply can't afford a sloppy, careless image. I might add that we lost quite a few people in SAC because of their lack of self-discipline. They were not successful commanders; they were unsuccessful commanders and were fired. C. Be ¥;ourself. That's simple. There's no stereotype for a successful commander. Every conunander has a distinct personality. Don't try to imitate anybody. Don't be a phony. Be genuine, because I'll tell you the · bright people we have in our services detect a phony real quick. Use your capability to its maximum but don't try to overdo it. Sure we all admire other people. We all see certain things in other people that we want to assimilate. That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about trying to pattern yourselves after people whom you can't imitate. Learn from other people and follow their good lead, but be yourself. · D. Patriotism. Real important. What is patriotism? It's the willingness to work hard, sacrifice, fight, even die for your country. If you don't have a sincere love for your country, you have no business sitting here today. You have no business being an officer in our service. If you don't recognize the magnificent heritage which is ours, the things we cherish the mo8t-freedom, real freedom; the respect for the dignity of each and every individual; the challenges and the rewards of free enterprise-if you don't truly appreciate these things, you lack the basic requisite for command. Our real strength is not our weapons; it is our people. It is our love for Country, and a genuine devotion to duty that characterizes our military. I'm sure you recall the words spoken by a very great commander, the late Gen Douglas MacArthur, when he talked to the West Point cadets several yeats ago: "Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose the nation is destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, country." Patriotismabsolutely essential. A. Take Charge. If you're going to be a commander, move in-take charge-don't let anybody wonder who's the boss. Throughout your career, be looking for additional responsibility, all the time. Take on anything new. Shake it down. Make your decision. Move out. Just be aggressive. Or you're not going to succeed. B. Ambition-Enthusiasm. Kind of hard to separate. You've got to be ambitious in any walk of life, really. The creative, aggressive, enthusiastic man far outdistances his unsuccessful counterpart. Be enthusiastic. Want to produce a better product. Remember, enthusiasm is probably the most contagious thing in the world. C. Dedication. What is dedication? Maybe it's Michelangelo lying on his back painting the great expanses of the Sistine Chapel; Louis Pasteur slowly working out problems to the solutions of disease; George Washington holding the remnants of his army together; or Billy Mitchell preaching air power in spite of the hostile environment that opposed him. These things are dedication. In the military service dedication requires great sacrifice and is very demanding, but the rewards are enormous. Again, think of the great resources and the vast power that you as individuals have as an officer in your service; and they will grow as you demonstrate your ability to assume ,greater responsibility. Think of it. More than in any walk of life, the dedicated military officer, the military commander in particular, has a tremendous responsibility. He may control a squadron of ICBMs, a squadron of fighters, a wing of airlift aircraft, a nuclear carrier, a division of troops. To a large extent he is left on his own, often with wide powers over the actions of others and broad access to vast resources. True dedication will bring not only tangible rewards but the intangible reward of self-satisfaction. You must be as dedicated in your career as the best judges, ministers, and doctors are to theirs-a professional. I emphasize the word "professional" because we need professionals in the truest sense of the word, so that you may be ac 376 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP corded the same respect and prestige we acyou have otherwise failed. I hate people that are followers only. I like a man to stand up cord professionals in any other area. and be heard. The successful commanders, The task of maintaining the ·peace is not easy. It demands patience, sacrifice, and the successful leaders have stood up and been heard by their superiors. Believe me,hard work, although it may be less rewardyou have no business being a commander if ing, financially, than some other professions, you don't have the courage of your convicwith this service comes the satisfaction of knowing that we are playing an important tions. B. Be Adventurous. Speaks for itself. Ifrole in the preservation of peace and free you're not adventurous, you shouldn't bedom. here, because we move fast in the military. If D. Responsibility to Mission. Now many you're on this fast train and you're not adtimes you'll have several problems facing venturous, you're on the wrong one. If youryou and it will be difficult to ferret out which outfit is flying a different kind of a mission,of them should take priority. When this ocwhere do you think you ought to be? curs, a piece of advice-put them all in the The world is dynamic, always new. As Aircontext of the mission, the big job, the real job. If you do that, it will be quite obvious Force officers, you are among those on the move, with less chance of becoming en which ones come first, second, third. Dedication to the mission is tough, real tough. Just trenched in a daily routine that dulls the senses. You will have opportunity to live in an about everything you do is demanding in our business. Your dedication, your affection for era of rapid change. your own people, must be subordinate to C. Be Attuned to. Constructive Change. your dedication to the mission. Frequently This requires a certain brand of courage. this does not make you very popular. But You will hopefully spend your future in a your perseverance, your dedication to the fully integrated society where every man and woman is judged by ability, regardless ofmission, will be a clear measure of your race, color or creed. As a result of constantly character, and will in the long run gain you loyalty, respect and admiration. searching for better, more effective ways to get the job done, you should have developed 3. Courage a mental attitude attuned to constructive A. Conviction. Remember always that change.your basic profession is that of a military I think also that a fulier understanding of leader. In the final analysis, success or failthe issues that have created so much turbuure of our Air Force will depend upon raw, lence in American life will make you a betterdown-to-earth, courageous and forceful leadleader. The yoW1g men and women we take ership. The Air Force must have officers into the Air Force are products of contempowho have the courage of their convictions rary American life. Two of its dominantand the drive to carry those convictions to characteristics-extremely rapid change and their conclusion. The courage to defend your continued affluence-have not existed before position is an attribute that should stay with to the extent and degree that they do today.you throughout your entire career. It is perNo doubt too much has been made of the haps better known as "sticking your neck "generation gap," but there is one, and I out." Defending your convictions in the face think it's wider than between earlier generaof powerful opposition is a real test of chartions. Perhaps too much publicity also hasacter-and·character is fundamental to leadbeen given to a decline of moral and ethicalership. standards, lack of respect for authority, theWhen you think something, say so, say it cult of violence, and the real or imaginedloudly, articulately. Hang in there until one frustrations of urban and suburban life. Allof two things happens-a decision is made of them exist, but most are less widespreadthat does not encompass your conviction, or 377 CONCEPTS OF AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP and less virulent than they have been made to appear. The young people that are the products of contemporary America are, in the main, good, respectful, bright, persevering, deter mined people, the best-educated we ever had. And I'll tell you who will prevail. They will. So it's important that you develop an at titude, a state of mind that permits you to accept constructive change. In future years you're going to be asso ciated with a society totally integrated which actually does measure people by ability, re gardless of race, color and creed. That's new, even though the Constitution was written many years ago. If you're not attuned to changes like that, you'r(f not going to prop erly and effectively lead the young people who are the product of contemporary Amer ica. You must provide the kind of leadership these young people will follow willingly. I hope you will persuade the best of them that an Air Force career offers unlimited opportunities for constructive service. It has been said-and truthfully-that the greatest social service a nation can do for its people is to keep them alive and free. What's our business as military professionals? Freedom and protection. Enough said. D. Mental and Physical Energy. Both mental and physical energy are essential to courageous successful leadership. How many really good leaders have you known who were lazy, or weak, or who could not stand the strain? Creative thinking is a great attribute; a military organization is most suecessful when new ideas keep the pot boiling. The greatest contribution you can make to the Air Force-and to the Nation-is to keep your mind open and receptive to the need for change in doctrine, concepts and methods, as well as in equipment. Think through your ideas, then try them out mentally and experimentally. 4. Knowledge A. Participation. If you don't know your business, obviously you're no good as a leader. It's that simple. Now, if you're a commander of a fighter outfit, you're the. best fighter pilot in the outfit, or you try like hell to be. In an airlift outfit, you're an active participant in the operation of those airplanes. If you're operating a munitions maintenance squadron, you've got to know what· the munitions are, what their limitations are, what their capabilities are, how they're maintained, how they're stored, how they're loaded, and how they're operated. How. in the world are you going to know that unless you participate in each function of your organization? You're not. You have to find out, through a system which you devise yourself, what's going on in the outfit, where are the problems-not the ones that are here today which should have been found a few weeks ago. What are the future problems? You all know General Ryan, our Vice Chief of Staff, one of the greatest commanders I have ever seen, absolutely tremendous. He did all of these things I've been talking about, as have many others. If you were a wing commander and you didn't know where any one of your shops was-and some didn't-he didn't think you should be a commander. When we first had hydraulic problems with the B-52G, General Ryan on inspection visits would grab the wing commander and say', "Okay, let's go down to your hydraulic shop." A whisper: "Hydraulic shop--where the hell is that?" Some commanders didn't kno~ where the shop was. B. System to Get Details. The officer with only a vague grasp of the inner working of his unit or section will soon find himself without positive control. There's no way to run a top-notch combat crew, flight, squadron, or staff section without having a grasp of the details. Knowledge is power. Don't forget that the more you know about your hardware, your people, your base regulations, the better position you are in to lead and supervise. You can't delegate knowledge. Your people will look up to an officer who has taken his personal time to learn something about conditions in the shops, pertinent technical data, applicable niilitary forms, status of airmen housing, etc. Get out 378 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP among 'em. Be seen. The men disdain the the other. Those things are only rates of enleader who walls himself in and doesn't show forcement-management tools. The real personal interest in their work and their welmeasure of discipline is in terms of mission fare. accomplishment, mission capability. Morale is a consequence, isn't it? It's not a cause. A 5. Human Engineering commander who knows his job, who has Now this is a little lofty for my vocabugood judgment, who makes it very well lary-human engineering-but I believe in it, known to his unit what his measures of dis because all it really is is a fancy way of decipline are, will have a successful, discip scribing the guts of leadership. What is it? lined, reliable outfit. And what's the conse A. It's Human Understanding and Conquence? High morale!sideration, Then Action. Men are not robots, C. Communicate. Lookfor better ways to they require understanding and considera spread the word. Think of ways and oppor tion, and I don't mean coddling because they tunities to talk to the people that work for wouldn't accept it. you. Don't hesitate to tell them of yourMen are highly intelligent, complicated plans, policies, and intentions at any andbeings who will respond favorably to human every opportunity you can, be it a Comunderstanding and consideration. By this mander's Call, morning roll call, or a coffee means, their leader will get maximum effort break. In small conferences or larger group from each of them. He will also get loyalty, meetings, tell them what the ''big picture" is,and in this connection it is well to remember what's in store for them both personally andthat loyalty goes down as well as up. The professionally. Also, remember communicasincere leader will go to bat for his subordition is a two-way street. Ask your NCOs andnates when such action is indicated. airmen what their problems are. Solicit their General McConnell likes to say that the ideas. Some of the best advice I've received Air Force is more than a military departover the years has come from NCOs, junior ment; it's a family. We have to understand officers and even airmen. If you've got an each other, be considerate of each other. We outfit of 500 men, you've got 499 advisers if must treat our subordinates as we expect our you use them. It's up to you to draw them superiors to treat us. Human engineeringout. To be a top-flight leader, you must comabsolutely a must. municate. B. Discipline and Morale. That's an old D. Know Your People. You can't get the one. They've been saying that since they job done unless you know your people, can opened Maxwell Air Force Base here. Disyou? You need to know where they came cipline and morale-how many times have from. What's their background? Where are you heard discipline and morale since you've they working and living? What is their family been in the service? Forever. Well let me tell situation? You can't influence or lead withyou something about it because I've been . out knowing your men; working with it longer than you have. A milE. Junior Officers and NCOs. These areitary unit that is undisCiplined is useless. It's your first line supervisors, the guts of theunreliable if it can't b~ depended upon. An outfit. The young junior officers we haveundisciplined outfit has to be taken out of coming in to our Services now are the bestthe battle. The same goes for an individualwe've ever had. They're bright, they'rea man must be disciplined or he can't be eager, they're enthusiastic, they're embued depended upon. I'm not talking about abid with a desire to serve. So you're getting a ing by the Uniform Code of Military Justice; real valuable product. Ifyou don't treat them I'm talking about alot more than that. Don't right, you ought to be ashame4. I'm saying, get confused with rates of enforcement. Lots of people do. They say the AWOL rate is recognize this gent. Make sure he has a full this, the serious incident rate is this, that and time job doing what he's best trained to do. 379 CONCEPTS OF AfR FORCE LEADERSHIP Counsel him, advise him, help him plan his men of your calibre. I wonder if you knowcareer. how lucky you are to be a member of theNCOs are just a different degree of augreatest Air Force in the world, dedicated tothority. The unique thing about them is that the protection of the best educated, most afthey work so closely with their subordinates. fluent and tali:mted society the world has everIt gives them great power, great understandknoWn.ing. They need your understanding and sup You have a very great responsibility. Youport. You have to tell them what it is you have a very substantial opportunity. Youwant so they can understand it, then they'll have the greatest boss in the world-Uncleget it for you. Never direct without the supSam. I'm sure we can depend upon you. port. Listen to 'em and select them very carefully. The NCO is an absolutely essential Questions for Reflection and Discussion and extremely valuable part of the team. Souse them that way. 1. Why are "authority" and "responsibility"So much for leadership. I hope it is comkey words in Catton's definition of command? ing through to you loud and clear that lead2. Why is leadership more difficult to defineership is fundamental to command and, im·than command? plicitly, that any key job in your future in the 3. List Catton's five "musts" of leadership inAir Force will require leadership. So, alwhat you believe to be the order of their imthough my remarks on leadership were portance, and be prepared to defend yourexpressed in terms of that required for comranking. mand, believe me, in any responsible posi4. What is human engineering? tion-staff or command-these are the 5. How does human engineering relate to Gen musts you can and should further develop. eral McConnell's statement th.. t "the Air Force I know how lucky your country is to have is more than a military department; it's ayou, how lucky your Air Force is to have family"? READING K What Are Generals Made Of? By Maj Gen A. S. Newman. Reprinted from Army magazine July and August 1969. Copyright 1969 by Association of the US Army and reproduced by permission. Gen A. S. Newman graduated from the US Military Academy and was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant in 1925. He has attended Infantry School, Command and General Staff School, and the National War College. From the years 1925 to 1956 he advanced through all grades from 2nd Lieutenant to Major General. He was cited in Who's Who, 1961. A SHORT item in the March issue of alization: "Sugar and spice and everythingARMY concludes that "general officers nice--that's what little girls are made of."really know how to put a guy in his place." Which suggests the question, "What are genThis reminds me of another polarized gener-erals made of?" 380 READINGs-A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP Soon after pinning on my first star I vislas MacArthur and William C. Westmoreland, among others. ited Fort Benning and walked into the offi cers' club bar where several members were But these were exceptional men who "had sampling the merchandise. An older colonel everything," and they do not set the pattern for average general officer composition. Forintroduced me around and insisted on buying example, while cadet first captains alwaysthe first drink to "baptize that new star." He stand well academically, academic excellencethen told this story: Some years ago in London [the colonel is not necessary to be a general. Yet the popular myth that the last man in a class is as began] a famous British combat unit from likely to be a general as the top is not true, eiWorld War I held a reunion. Among those ther. In 35 classes (1907-38) 21 of the toppresent were two brigadiers and an old ser35 became generals compared to only two ofgeant major, all retired. After reliving their the last 35. battle days, when the brigadiers were subalThe superintendent during my first yearterns and the sergeant major a soldier in was Brig Gen MacArthur, who compiledranks, they got around to personal matters. the highest grades ever scored by a cadet: an "I married after the war," one brigadier unbelievable 98-plus average. He was folsaid, "and I'm proud of my son. He's a falowed as superintendent by Maj Gen Fred mous brain surgeon." W. Sladen, who required five years to gradu"I married after the war too," the other ate. Yet both had outstanding battle records brigadier said. "My son is a distinguished and each, in his way, was the personification lawyer. King's Counsel, you know." of a general. When they looked toward the old sergeant The great comedian and cowboy philosomajor he said, "I've got a son, a career milipher, Will Rogers, visited the US Military tary man. He's now a brigadier." Academy in the early 1920s and talked to After a pause one brigadier said, "Sercadets in the gymnasium one weekend. Also geant Major, remembering the old days, it's present were post officers and their wives, hard to think of you as a married man." including the distinguished and austere Gen Sladen. Mr. Rogers convulsed his audience, "Well," the sergeant major replied even drawing a wintry smile from Genblandly, "You're right. I've never been marSladen, when he said: "One thing I don't unried." derstand about West Point is why they send Maybe there's a thread of truth in this a man here to make you fellers do in fourparable about the sergeant major's son, but a years what it took Gen Sladen five to do."single thread is not a true sample of whole cloth. That "sugar and spice and everything nice" is not the whole story about what little IN WORLD WAR n in France, three great girls are made of, either. American armies lined up abreast in one of the climactic battles of world history: There are no established specifications for First Army, Third Army and Ninth Army.general officers, so we'll take the biblical apThey were commanded by Gen Courtney H. proach: "By their works ye shall know Hodges, who failed academically at West them." This translates into: What they d