BISON

))J.\ Jlil)J !J(j()•21Ll 'rltf)f)11 'I,f) 111f.,S
u.s .... ..: 
'J);r;;. ;L:l: 
3"o ,.t:!l./~ 
1n 

OCTOBER 1964 

f~f)IIIIIJNIS'I' f~IIIN1.\ 
NORTH 
VIET-NAM 

Hanoi e Hoi:/w~ 
~:h·r <J.fl .r :J~ 

COMMUNIST 
SUPPLY ROUTE 

~17th PARALLEL 
THAILAND 

,.,.. -.......... -.......'"'-.. 

•
,' 
,-/  Siem•Reap  
' I  
I..  
\ ·...,  CAMBODIA 

. 
.•
. 

One Day of Combat 
On a single day in mid-1964, reports of combat operations in South Vietnam* included the follow
ing: • Friendly forces engaged Viet Cong forces northwest of Doc Hoa. Friendly casualties: 2 killed, 1 wounded. Viet Cong casualties: unknown . • Friendly unit killed 2 Viet Cong northwest of Long Dien. No friendly casualties.• Friendly forces engaged Viet Cong northwest of My Tho. Friendly casualties: 2 killed. Viet Cong casualties: unknown.• Friendly unit engaged Viet Cong south of Bien Tranh. Three Viet Cong killed; no friendly casualties .• Friendly unit captured 1 Viet Cong and arrested 69 suspected Viet Cong southeast of Go Gong.• Friendly unit on patrol in support of engineer detachment killed 1 Viet Cong northeast of True Giang. No friendly casualties . • U. S. Army helicopter shot down while on air evacuation mission southwest of Vinh Long. Pilot killed, two crewmen wounded. 
Small War for .Big Stakes 
Of the friendly casualties reported for that day, one of the five killed and two of the three wounded were U. S. Army men. The others were regulars or militiamen of the Vietnamese armed forces. • 
There have been quieter days than this in the long struggle, just as there have been days when the actions were more numerous and on a bigger scale. The war in Vietnam is not being fought by massive forces facing each other in sustained, open combat. It is a war of squads and platoons more than of brigades and divisions. In that sense only is it a "small" war. In terms of the issues at stake, the war in Vietnam is as critically important as any in history. 
\ • VietNam and Viet-Nam are other forms of this name in current usage . 
f)(Jll IIISSif)N 
IN 
l7II~'I'Nilll 

WHY 
ARE WE 

IN 
VIETNAM? 
Why are several thousand American Servicemen in Vietnam? What is their mission? What does the United States seek to accomplish by our military and other assistance to South Vietnam? What 

• is at stake in the bitter struggle going on there? Why, exactly, are we in Vietiiam? Our military, economic, and other help to the government and people of Vietnam is based on three main facts: 
First, South Vietnam is trying to remain free of communist tyranny and has asked us to help them. It has long been a basic principle of American foreign policy that we will respond to any free nation's call for help when its freedom is in peril from external aggression or subversion. 
Second, we believe that the more free nations there are in the world, the better the chances for world peace and individual freedom. In the other direction, whenever a free nation is in danger of passing under communist control, the chances for peace and indiyidual freedom are reduced. This belief is based on the historical fact that self-governing people rarely invade their neighbor's territory or otherwise disturb the international peace, while communist and other dictatorships usually resort to aggression and expansion ultimately. A threat to freedom and peace anywhere in the world is a potential or actual threat to all free men. Thus, the United States has a vested interest in the maintenance of peace and the preservation of freedom. 

'f . ' 
2 ' 


Third, South Vietnam has clearly become a major testing ground for a comparatively new communist strategy. Early in 1961 Nikita Khrushchev told a Communist Party congress that in a world of nuclear weapons, "world wars" and "local wars" had become too dangerous for purposes of conquest. Then he described another kind of warthe "war of liberation" (which is really a war of subversion and covert aggression) and referred to the struggle in Vietnam as such a war. "It is a sacred war. We recognize such wars ..." he said. 
As they have in many other parts of the world, the communists may try to disguise their action in Vietnam by calling it a "war of liberation." But the disguise has worn thin; it never was much of a disguise anyhow. If the communist strategy of subversion and guerrilla insurgency were allowed to succeed in Vietnam, communism would be encouraged to exert similar efforts in other countries of Southeast Asia and eventually in other parts of the world. 
By our unflinching support of South Vietnam, the United States is demonstrating, to the Communist and Free World~ alike, that we do not intend to stand aside and let freedom die in Southeast Asia or anywhere else. 
In summary, our objective is to help the people and the Government of South Vietnam defeat the communist insurgency in that country, which is directed and supported by the communist regime in Hanoi. 
\ 3 
THE SCENE OF THE STRUGGLE 

Vietnam is one of several countries located on a peninsula of the Asiatic land mass. The peninsula is part of a vast mainland and island area known as Southeast Asia. Mainland Southeast Asia consists of Vietnam (now divided into North and South Vietnam), Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and part of Malaysia. Offshore to the east and south are the Philippines, the remainder of Malaysia, and Indonesia. To the north is Communist China, headquarters and instigator of subversion and aggression throughout Southeast Asia. 
4 , 

A LOOK AT THE PAST 

This pamphlet is mainly about the present struggle of South Vietnam to remain free. But in Vietnam, as in all countries, what occurs today is connected with past events. Certain facts are essential to our understanding of the struggle there. 
European Colonies 
Beginning about one hundred years ago several European nations established colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. Only Thailand remained independent throughout the period of colonial development. The other seven nations in present-day Southeast Asia have all achieved their independence since World War II. During that war the Japanese Army invaded and occupied the whole area. 

Postwar Changes 
Allied victory and the end of Japanese influence 
in Southeast Asia did not bring peace to that part of the world. Changes brought on by World War II made it impossible for the "old order" to return. One by one, the colonial powers surrendered their claims, either voluntarily or in response to the demands of nationalist movements. 
Three of the new postwar nations in Southeast Asia emerged from the former French Indochina. They were the Kingdom of Laos, the Kingdom of Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam. 
In 1954, after trying for eight years to regain effective control of Indochina, the French forces in Vietnam were defeated by Vietnamese rebel forces which had fallen under communist control. All during those eight years the French government had looked forward to eventual independence for Vietnam and the other French possessions in the area. In Vietnam, especially, efforts toward self-government included increasing the numbers and responsibilities of non-Communist Vietnamese in local government affairs. But after the French military defeat at Dienbienphu, it seemed likely that all of Indochina would soon fall into communist hands. 

' 

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 

This was the situation that led to the Geneva agreements of 1954, after a conference that lasted several months. Present at the conference were the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Communist China, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and the communist Viet Minh regime of North Vietnam. The United States delegation did not take part in drafting the Geneva agreements, and did not sign them. U. S. representation at the conference was for the purpose of showing our concern for the future of Southeast Asia. In addition, the United States issued a separate declaration that we would abide by the agreements just as if we had signed them, and would regard any violation by other parties as a serious threat to international peace and security. 
In common with the other free nations represented at the conference, the United States desired a settlement that would halt future communist encroachment in Southeast Asia. The communists were equally anxious for the armed conflict to end, but as in so many other international conferences before and since, they tried to set the stage for further communist gains. 
The Geneva agreements of 1954 ended French rule in Indochina, and brought the eight-year struggle to a close. Several of the points agreed upon have particular bearing on the present situation in Southeast Asia. 
Under the Armistice arrangements, Vietnam was divided near the 17th parallel into two roughly equal-sized zones. For several years, the area north of this dividing line had been under the domination of communist forces led by the veteran Communist revolutionary and guerrilla fighter Ho Chi Minh. 
The division of Vietnam was intended to be a temporary measure to make it easier to disengage the French and Vietnamese military forces and to enforce other terms of the armistice. The agreements provided that at a suitable time general elections to establish a united government would be held throughout Vietnam. These elections have never been held. The communists refused to hold any elections that they could not control, and they controlled only the northern zone. To them, the partition of Vietnam became a political fact rather than a temporary administrative measure. They have continued to treat the 17th parallel as a political boundary between two countries. 
Ever since 1954 the term South Vietnam has referred to that part of Vietnam governed by the_ Republic of Vietnam. The term North Vietnam has meant the area controlled by the communist regime of Ho Chi Minh. 
The Geneva agreements provided that everyone in Vietnam would be free to decide in which of the two zones he wished to live. Within a few weeks, more than 900,000 people left their homes in the north to escape from communist tyranny and seek freedom south of the 17th parallel. Eventually the figure passed the million mark. 
South Vietnam Asks for Help 
The Free World hoped that South Vietnam would now have a chance to build a free nation in peace. But the prospects were not bright. The new government was critically short of trained and experienced officials. The economy was crippled after eight years of war. The thousands of refugees from Communist North Vietnam would some day be a source of national strength, but for the time being they were add!tional mouths to feed . Communist guerrillas had begun immediately after the Geneva agreements were signed to look for ways to harass the new government. In the autumn of 1954 South Vietnam asked the United States for economic assistance. 
The re ulting United States assistance program was designed, as President Eisenhower said at the time, "to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military m~ans." 
6 , 

During the next five years the South Vietnamese people made remarkable progress in many fields. For example: 
e  Under  a  land  reform  program  140,000  
peasants received tracts of farm land.  
e  Production  of  rice  and  rubber  rose  to  
higher than pre-war levels.  
e  School enrollments tripled, matched by a  
similar increase in the number of school 
teachers.  
e  3000 medical aid stations and maternity  
clinics  were  established  throughout  the  
country.  
e  A  National  Institute  of  Administration  
was  established  to  train  Vietnamese for  
public service careers.  
e  Several manufacturing plants  were  built,  
providing the start of a base for necessary  
industrial growth.  

During the same five-year period, Communist North Vietnam could not approach the progressive improvement of South Vietnam. Although the partition at the 17th parallel had left the North with a much greater share of Vietnam's industrial facilities, it was the South that achieved the greater economic advances. For example, in 1960 the gross national product of South Vietnam was about $110 per person, compared to about $70 in North Vietnam. In the same year food production in the North dropped 10 per cent; in the South it rose 20 per cent. 
The Communists Increase the Pressure 
These improvements in the economic and political health of South Vietnam were exactly the opposite of what communist theory said should happen in non-communist countries. The communists had predicted that the young free republic would soon collapse. When it failed to do so, and instead showed every indication of becoming stronger, the communists applied another basic 
•I 
tactic-when the "inevitable" collapse of a government or social system does not occur, communist subversion and other pressure must be used to make it occur. 
At a Communist Party congress in North Vietnam in 1960, Ho Chi Minh said, "The North is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification." The new task of the communists was said to be "to liberate the South from the atrocious rule of U. S. imperialists and their henchmen." 
These official public announcements, so typical of communist policy and propaganda utterances over the past 50 years, hinted broadly at the terror that was about to descend on South Vietnam. For in the communist language, words like "reunification" and "liberate" are used to camouflage the true intention. They serve as code words for informing communists everywhere that a campaign ol communist subversion and covert aggression is under way. 
During the remainder of 1960 and in 1961, communist guerrillas assassinated about 3000 Vietnamese civilians and kidnapped about 2500 more. The victims were mostly local government officials, public health workers, schoolteachers. The communists were concentrating their murderous assaults on everyone in the community who was contributing to the safety, health, and welfare of its people. Unable by its own resources to defeat this barbarous campaign of terror, assassination, and sabotage, South Vietnam once again turned to the United States for help. This time they needed the kind of help that would strengthen them militarily. 
When this request was made in October 1961, only a few hundred U. S. Army personnel were in Vietnam. President Kennedy promptly authorized substantial increases in the number of military advisors, in equipment, and in direct support of the Vietnamese armed forces. 
During 1962, 1963, and again in 1964, U. S. Army strength in Vietnam rose steadily. Of the total number, most are serving as trainers and advisors working directly with units of the Vietnamese Army, or are assigned to the U. S. Army Support Group, Vietnam. 
HOW OUR ARMY HELPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM 

Each Vietnamese Army corps has attached to it aU. S. Army advisory team of officers and noncommissioned officers. They advise and assist in such specialties as aviation, use of paramilitary forces, medical services, logistics, communications, transport, artillery, ordnance, engineer, and civic actions, as well as in the over-all planning and conduct of military operations. 
Each Vietnamese division, regiment, and battalion also has an advisory detachment or team of 
U. S. Army personnel. When these Vietnamese units go on combat missions, U. S. advisors accompany them. Experience has shown that there is simply no other way to teach the techniques of effective combat to an army at war. 
There are also advisors at the province and district level, as well as with the paramilitary forces. 
Members of the U.S. Army Support Group work with and support the Government of Vietnam in intelligence, communication, Army aviation, and logistic support activities. The aviation activity is the largest in terms of the numbers of U. S. Army personnel engaged. Their job is to move Vietnamese Army units and supplies rapidly to and from the constantly shifting battle areas. For this task the U. S. Army helicopters have proven extremely valuable. When necessary, the troop-carrying helicopters are protected against ground attack by armed escort helicopters which deliver defensive, suppressive fire. 
A number of U. S. Army Special Warfare detachments are serving in support of the Vietnamese Army. They are stationed mostly in the more primitive and rugged areas of the country, such as the mountain and highland areas that extend to the Laotian border. These areas are inhabited by primitive mountain tribes. Special Forces detachments train the tribal groups and teach them how to defend themselves against communist attack. Often our Special Forces personnel operate for extended periods in areas where Viet Cong influence and control are known to be especially strong. As experts in the tactics and techniques of counterinsurgency, our Special Forces detachments advise the Vietnamese on Special Warfare operations and the employment of Special Warfare units. 
The war in Vietnam is not the kind in which sizable combat units slug it out with each other along clearly drawn battle lines in a fight to win or hold ground. It is a war without front lines, in which the enemy's whereabouts is usually uncertain. It is a war that rages in one place one day, somewhere else the next. It is a war in which the enemy seldom stands and fights, but normally hits and runs. 
THE VIET CONG AND ITS SUPPORTERS 
The formal name of the enemy in South Vietnam is the Viet Cong, which is the communist guerrilla organization.. It is supported by the communist regime of North Vietnam and by Communist China. Many of its officers and experienced noncommissioned officers are furnished by the Viet Minh or the Army of North Vietnam. 
If support had to reach the Viet Cong by routes entirely within Vietnam, chances are that the communist guerrilla effort in South Vietnam would long ago have "withered on the vine." A glance at the map will show why. At the partition line near the 17th parallel, Vietnam narrows to little more than 30 miles wide. It would not be impossible to guard such a narrow corridor and prevent any sizable traffic in supplies and reinforcements from North Vietnam. 
But the communist supply lines bypass this narrow midriff of divided Vietnam. Viet Cong elements that operate east and north of Saigon ( capital o£ South Vietnam) are supported from North Vietnam over a system of roads and trails which go through southern Laos (and sometimes eastern Cambodia), thence into South Vietnam. Several areas of Laos and Cambodia near the Vietnamese border are sometimes used as hiding places by Viet Cong elements temporarily forced to leave their usual operating areas in Vietnam. 
The Viet Cong elements farthest away from their support bases in North Vietnam are also the least dependent upon that support. These are the Viet Cong forces operating in the Mekong River delta region southwest of Saigon. The fertile and heavily populated delta area enables guerrillas to "live off the land" to an extent not usually possible in the areas closer to North Vietnam. 
THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE 
The United States contribution to the defense of South Vietnam is neither an all-Army nor an allmilitary effort. Personnel of the U. S. Navy and 
U. S. Air Force are serving as advisors to the naval and air forces of South Vietnam. U. S. Marines are also serving in Vietnam. In addition, elements of the U. S. 7th Fleet maintain constant patrol of international waters in the vicinity of Southeast Asia. This is the military part of our contribution to the freed om of Vietnam. It is matched by a sizable non-military assistance program aimed at improving economic and other conditions essential to stable and effective government. 
The militar y effort aims at helping the Vietnamese defend their nation against aggression. The non-military effort aims at helping them translate the ideals of freedom into the realities of peace, prosperity, and self-government by responsible individual citizens. Both efforts are essential and mutually supporting. As President Johnson has said, "This country has no more important job right now than to get the very best man in every field for more effective service to our embattled friends in South Vietnam." 
The Army wholeheartedly shares this view of the importance of the job in South Vietnam; and of the quality of the Army men who are performing it. 

J)ISf~IJSSif)N ()(J'J,J.. INI~ 
One Day of Combat 
(See text for summary of one day's combat actions in mid-1964.) II Small War For Big Stakes 
1. 	War in Vietnam is fought by squads and platoons, more than brigades and divisions. 
2. But in the issues at stake it is a big war. Ill Why Are We in Vietnam? 
1. 	
Because South Vietnam is trying to remain free and asked us to help. 

2. 	
Because communist threats to peace and freedom anywhere threaten free men everywhere. 

3. 	
Because South Vietnam has become atesting ground for the relatively new communist strategy of conquest by subversion and guerrilla insurgency. 

4. 	
By supporting South Vietnam the US shows that we will not allow freedom to die anywhere. 


IV 	The Scene of the Struggle 
1. 	
Vietnam is part of Southeast Asia-a large mainland and island area. 

2. 	
Other countries in the area are Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. 


V A Look at the Past 
1. 	
Acentury ago several European nations established colonies in Southeast Asia. Only Thailand remained independent. 

2. 	
The other 7 nations in the area are newly independent-since World War II. 

3. 	
Former French Indochina became three new nations: the Kingdom of Laos, the Kingdom of Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam. 


VI 	The Geneva Agreements of 1954 
1. 	
After Vietnamese rebel forces defeated French forces in Vietnam in 1954, several free and communist nations conferred at Geneva. 

2. 	
The US, while sending a delegation, did not help draft the agreements and did not sign them. 

3. 	
The US issued a separate declaration supporting the agreements. 

4. 	
Under the agreements, Vietnam was divided near the 17th Parallel into 2 zones, with the northern zone remaining under communist control. 

5. 	
The agreement provided for elections and a united government, but the communists have never permitted these all-Vietnam elections. 

6. 	
More than 1 million people in North Vietnam sought freedom in South Vietnam. 


·-· 	11 

VII 	South Vietnam Asks For Help 
1. 	
After 8 years of war, South Vietnam was not a good prospect for success as afree nation. In the fall of 1954, the US responded to South Vietnam's request for economic assistance. 

2. 	
During the next 5years South Vietnam maderemarkable progress (See text for several examples). · 

3. 	
During the same period, North Vietnam fell behind economically. 


VIII The Communists Increase the Pressure 
1. 	
According to communist theory, South Vietnam should have collapsed. 

2. 	
When this didn't happen, the communists changed their tactics. 

3. 	
In 1960 and 1961 communist guerrillas assassinated about 3000 Vietnamese civilians and kidnapped about 2500 more. 

4. 	
The victims were mostly key people in their communities-local government officials, public health workers, teachers. 

5. 	
In October 1961, Pres. Kennedy responded to Vietnam's request for military aid by boosting the number of military 'advisors and stepping up delivery of equipment and other support of the Vietnamese armed forces. 


IX 	How Our Army Helps in South Vietnam 
1. 	
To each Vietnamese Army corps is attached a US Army advisory team. Advisory detachments serve with the Vietnamese divisions, regiments, and battalions. 

2. 	
US Advisors also serve at the province and district levels of the Vietnamese government, and with the paramilitary forces. 

3. 	
The US Army Support Group helps the Vietnamese government in intelligence, communication, Army aviation, and logistic support activities. 

4. 	
Several US Army Special Forces detachments are serving in support of similar elements of the Vietnamese Army. 


X 	The Viet Cong and its Supporters 
1. 	
Viet Cong is the communist guerrilla organization. Many of its officers and noncoms come from the Viet Minh or the Army of North Vietnam. Communist China also supports the Viet Cong. 

2. 	
Reinforcements and supplies from North Vietnam do not travel along the narrow neck of Vietnam near the 17th Parallel. Instead, they follow a system of roads and trails in southern Laos and sometimes eastern Cambodia. 

3. 	
Viet Cong forces operating in the Mekong Delta area southwest of Saigon require the least support from North Vietnam. 


XI 	The Ultimate Purpose 
1. 	
US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps pe rsonnel are also serving in South Vietnam. The US 7th Fleet constantly patrols international waters of Southeast Asia. This is the military side of the effort. 

2. 	
The nonmilitary side is also essential-and consists of economic and other aid aimed at encouraging stable and effective free government. 

3. 	
President Johnson has said, "This country has no more important job right now than to get the very best man in every field for more effective service to our embattled friends in South Vietnam." 


12 
U. S. GOVERNMENT PAINT I NG OfF IC E : 1964 0-?U-201