BISON FM 0-16 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL us IJ to/. :zo: 3o-1~!9'b en ..,_ ~ ~ ~ ~ fl TECHNICAL Cl 0 "" 0"' > .... • ~-) I TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY CO HQ SPT PLT EVAL & ANAL PLT PLT HQ COMM·ELECT PHOTO SEC PLT HQ WPNS·MUN SEC SEC REC & SHIP GEN SUPPLY MOBILITY TRANSL SEC SEC & EQUIP SEC SEC MED SEC Figure 1. TOE 30-114, Technical Intelligence Company. CD Ml BN, FLO ARMY I I ... J-I I I Ml CO, INTG I Ml CO, Cl MICO,COLLHQ AND HQ CO II TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE co III r----------~--+--------------, ,--~--. r--~--, r--i--, I I Ml DET ARMD I! Mi DET I I I I Ml DET DIV I I CAV REGT, SEP I I CORPS, ORI ABN CORPS I I I I INF BDE I L-----~ L-----~ L-----~ > C)0 "'~ Figure _2, TOE 30-25, Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army. (\ • • c. At reduced strength, the unit is adaptable tion, the unit is capable of supporting an indeto lesser capabilities during prolonged combat pendent corps for a limited period of time. periods for a limited period of time. In addi- Section II. FUNCTtONS AND ORGANIZATION 11 . Functions tions of elements of the support platoon are asfollows: This company performs all technical intelli gence functions utilizing combat service sup(1) Platoon headquarters. The headquarters is responsible for supervising and port personnel operating as functional ele ments. For example, the company-directing the activities of the platoonand providing drafting and illustrat a. Assists in the technical intelligence planing support to the unit.ning being conducted concurrently by the mili(2) Photography sec,tion. This sectiontary intelligence battalion headquarters and the provides both still and motion picturefield army G2 staff. photographic services for the company. Developing, printing, enlarging, b. Coordinates directives for the collection oftechnical intelligence source materiel. This maand other processing support is re quired from the Army Signal Bat teriel normally will be evacuated through the talion (TOE 11-95), although fre tactical unit support channels to the technical intelligence company, field army. quently the military intelligencebattalion can directly provide limited • c. Provides centralized control of all techsupport.nical intelligence activities in the field army (3) Receiving and shipping section. Thisarea. (Engineer topographic, terrain intellisection receives and unpacks equipgence, and signal communications intelligence ment and materiel. It also packs andare not included within the scope of technical crates small items of materiel forintelligence.) evacuation as required. The section d. Is organized to function as the command has within it the necessary expertise in the handling of explosive, chemical,and control center for the receipt, evaluation, reporting, and shipment of all technical intellibiological, and radiological materiel. gence materiel received in the field army. ( 4) Translating section. This section translates foreign language documents concerning foreign technical intelli 12. Unit Operations gence materiel into English or other a. Company Headquarters. Personnel and languages as required. It also transequipment are provided in the company headlates identification plates, nomenclaquarters for the supervision, coordination, and ture markings, and instructions accontrol of the activities of organic platoons. companying foreign materiel.Also, unit supply, mess, maintenance, com c. Evaluation and Analysis Platoon. munication, and general administration areprovided. ( 1) This platoon performs the detailed analysis of documents and materiel b. Support Platoon. This platoon provides for information pertinent to technicaltechnical support to the evaluation and analysis intelligence. It evaluates this informasections of the company such as drafting; tion in conjunction with reports andillustrating; packing, crating, and shipping mainformation from other intelligenceterial; translating; and photographic services. sources, and prepares reports for disThis allows full utilization of critical skills tribution as prescribed.within the various sections and improves sup-(2) Each of the sections in this platoon~, port to all elements of the program. The func-has certain common functions and AGO 5590A 9 responsibilities. In the production of technical intelligence, each section, under the supervision of the platoon leader ( a) Assists in planning the collection effort. (b) Provides guidance to the corps collection teams in the collection of technical information and materiel. (c) Evaluates and processes the collected materiel for technical intelligence information. (d) Disseminates the resulting technical intelligence. (e) Assists in interrogation of prisoners of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and escapees for information of interest to technical intelligence. (3) The functions of elements of the evalnation and analysis platoon are as follows: (a) Platoon headquarrters. This headquarters is responsible for initial analysis of materiel, coordination of evaluation between the various sections of the platoon, and participation in the preparation, development, and dissemination of reports through prescribed command and intelligence channels. The platoon headquarters provides the control, assignment for evaluation, and recording of disposition of technical intelligence items. When an item of materiel is received, the platoon headquarters assigns the item to the section which has primary interest, and informs other sections having secondary interest. (b) Cornrnunications-electronics section. This section performs technical evaluation and analysis of fixed plant communications, signal equipment, and signal information. It supervises storage, issue, and processing of collected foreign communications materiel. It analyzes electronic warfare, automatic data processing, combat surveillance, radar, radiac, and meteorological materiel. /~ \ (c) Weapons and munitions section. This section performs the technical intelligence evaluation and analysis of free rockets, guided missiles, and associated equipment including internal guidance and launching equipment; weapons and combat vehicles to include tanks, towed and self-prqpelled guns, howitzers and armored personnel carriers; nuclear and nonnuclear ammunition; rocket and missile warhead sections (nuclear and nonnuclear) ; chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, munitions and ammunitions, and propellants; explosives and pyrotechnics ; meteorological and propellant-activated devices; and mines. (d) General supply and equiprnent section. This section performs technical intelligence analysis and evaluation of general supplies; petroleum; clothing and textiles; subsistence; chemical, biological, and radiological equipment; and photographic equipment. (e) Mability section. This section per forms technical intelligence analy sis and evaluation of aeronautical, aerial delivery, surface transporta tion (marine and land), power generation, construction, barrier, and bridging equipment; general purpose vehicles such as amphibian vehicles to include cargo and utility vehicles and self-propelled, tracked, and bridging vehicles ; and general support equipment and supplies. (f) Medical section. This section analyzes and evaluates foreign health problems and the organization, training, techniques, facilities, and materiel used by foreign medical services. In conjunction with chemical personnel in the weapons and munitions section and the miscellaneous supply and equipment section, it assists in evaluating CBR AGO 6690A weapons effects information and advises on how they may affect operations. It also arranges for evacuation of captured foreign medical materiel for further analysis or exploitation. (See paragraphs 24-27 for the scope of medical technical intelligence.) • ·~! AGO III90A CHAPTER 3 TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONALIZATION Section I. 13. Overall Concept a. The technical intelligence company contains quartermaster, signal, transportation, chemical, medical, engineer, and ordnance combat service support personnel. These specialists provide the overall technical intelligence analysis and evaluation capabilities of the unit through their extensive training, background, and experience. When employed as functional teams, technical analysis and evaluation is accomplished more effectively. This chapter discusses the functionalization concept as it applies to technical intelligence, covers the scope of the broad areas of technical intelligence, and discusses additional capabilities. b. The proper organization and employment of the combat service support specialists is critical to mission accomplishment. The company must operate within clearly defined objectives, goals, and priorities prescribed by the field army commander. Personnel must not be given analysis tasks which can be more efficiently performed by other field army or theater assets. GENERAL c. Each functionally organized technical intelligence team must be tailored to perform its required mission. Teams must be flexible in their operations since personnel of the unit will be required to perform extensive coordination and liaison internally for mission success. Teams should be "tailored" to perfonn a specific technical intelligence function with consideration given to the training and capabilities of the combat service support specialists. Sections must assist other sections in keeping abreast of trends and developments which have an impact on mutually related areas of interest. d. The functionalized areas of interest of technical specialists will frequently overlap. For example, transportation, engineer, com-\ munication-electronics, and ordnance specialists may need to work together when a new tank is being analyzed. Also, medical and chemical specialists may overlap in CBR analysis missions. When possible, functional teams should be composed of personnel having related functional qualifications. They can be "tailored" to form a working team in order to perform a specific technical examination and/or analysis mission. Section II. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE 14. Scope a. The scope and/or primary objectives of communication-electronics equipment are to- (1) Provide communication-electronics equipment intelligence concerning the capabilities and limitations of foreign communication systems, both civilian and military. (2) Provide the field army with intelli gence on captured communications equipment and systems. (3) Provide data for possible application in developing new US electronic equipment and devices. (4) Provide communications-electronk equipment intelligence for strategic and tactical planning. ( 5) Assist in providing tactical and strategic estimates on enemy communication capabilities. AGO 6690A b. In meeting the above objectives, there is a continuous need to examine, analyze, and test communications-electronic equipment and de __ __/ vices and to analyze enemy communication diagrams and schematics. Recent communication trends and developments necessitate that the scope of communications-electronic equipment intelligence be broadened to include wire, radio, television, satellites, telemetering devices, electronic instruments, photography, computers, radar, facsimile, crypto, and laser communication equipment or devices. c. Communications-electronics specialists must maintain extensive liaison with other intelligence elements to include the U.S. Army Security Agency. They evaluate and interpret information concerning enemy electronic-com munications research and must keep abreast of civilian and industrial communication developments. In addition, they must exploit any technical data derived from other intelligence activities such as the U.S. Army Security Agency. Therefore, the technical library must have communications and electronics information concerning details and performance data on a wide variety of items. ~ b. Specifically, communications-electronics -~_.J_/' specialists can perform the following: ( 1) Exploit intelligence from captured communication materiel. (2) Assist in the exploitation of foreign scientific communications-electronics information. (3) Prepare enemy communications-electronics intelligence studies. (4) Evaluate enemy communications-electronics equipment information as received on a day-to-day basis. ( 5) Supervise the collection and evacuation of enemy communications-electronics equipment. ( 6) Provide limited assistance as may be required to other intelligence activities such as U.S. Army Security Agency and strategic intelligence elements. (7) Maintain, evaluate, and interpret information concerning military and civilian research and development. {8) Assist in the exploitation of foreign AGO 6690A communication complexes and facilities by United States forces. e. Communications-electronics personnel may need to accompany combat elements whose missions include the capture of special communication bases or targets for prompt analysis and exploitation. They assist in photographing significant items of captured materiel; however, the section is dependent on signal units for photographic processing support. f. Other general areas of interest to com munications-electronics equipment intelligence are ( 1) Acoustic equipment. (2) Missile guidance devices. (3) Power equipment. ( 4) Meteorological equipment. ( 5) Electronic countermeasures equipment. (6) Guided missile control systems. g. Data in the following areas are of primary interest to communications-electronics equipment intelligence production: (1) Output power. (2) Frequency range. (3) Bandwidth. ( 4) Modes of operation. (5) Circuitry design. (6) Antenna design. (7) Anti-jamming features. (8) Tube structure. (9) Transistors. (10) Equipment ruggedness. (11) Major modifications. 15. Additional Capabilities Signal personnel, in addition to their normal technical intelligence functions can a. Provide recommendations on the disposition of fixed and special communication installations and/or equipment. b. Provide limited analyses concerning radiac equipment and meters as well as electronic, chemical and/or biological warning devices, and instruments. Section Ill. WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS INTELLIGENCE 16. Scope a. Ballistics deals with the motion of projectiles and the forces governing that motion. In practice, this subject is of interest to the weapons and munitions analyst in analysis of smallarms ammunitions, artillery shells, bombs, missiles, and' projectiles. Of particular importance to the tactical commander are their penetrating and fragmentation effects. The following items of intelligence interest can be analyzed by the weapons/munitions analysts : (1) Type of driving/rotating band (type of metal encircling projectile at the base). (2) Direction of weapon rifling. ( 3) Combustion rate of the powder or repellant. ( 4) Chemical composition of powder. ( 5) Layering structure of grains in charge. (6) Grain perforation. (7) Size and shape of projectile. (8) Firing tables (if present). ( 9) Missiles. (10) The use made of substitute materials. b. The weapons and munitions technical analysts contribute to the knowledge of interior and exterior ballistics through their use of continually revised handbooks, their knowledge of equations and formulas, energy motion and burning rules, and firing tables. The integration of this data establishes the relations between powder pressure, projectile travel, and velocity. All of these factors can contribute to meeting the overall needs of the tactical commander; namely, analysis of enemy technical capabilities and how the tactical commander can best counter the enemy threat. c. Trajectories can be computed from a particular muzzle velocity, angle of departure, and ballistic coefficient using standard temperature, density, and no wind. Any variations from these conditions would be nonstandard. In ground fire, one of the most important elements is the determination of variations in range and displacement of the point of fall from all possible causes. Changes in muzzle velocity, angle of departure, and powder granules will cause ,----sue~ variat~ons. F~ring tables ~n ~sist ~n pro-( ducmg a wide variety of techmcal mtelhgence. -· Such tables are valuable since they include range elevations or tables for a particular gun. Also, they provide a series of tables of differential effects each of which gives the effect on range of some particular departure from standard conditions. Therefore, firing tables, when available, should always accompany the weapon to which applicable and be handled in accordance with normal technical intelligence evacuation procedures. 17. Functions Weapons and munitions specialists contribute to the following: a. Locating, identifying, examining, and submitting reports on tactical capabilities of foreign materiel and equipment. b. Providing technical guidance to corps technical collection teams. c. Evaluating technical information that flows in from the corps collection teams. d. Assisting in the breakdown and assembly of equipment. e. Assisting in testing of vehicles, equipment, and accessories. f. Inspecting vehicles to determine major modifications and changes. g. Assisting in analysis of parts, assemblies, engines, power trains, and chassis for collation, updating, or incorporation of data for technical intelligence manuals or handbooks. h. Performing analysis on missiles and asso ciated equipment. i. Assisting in the production of technical intelligence from factory markings. 18. Additional Capabilities The weapons and munitions section includes chemical equipment analyst for the identification and evaluation of flamethrowers, smoke generators, and other chemical weapons and munitions. AGO 66IIOA Section IV. GENERAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE • 19. Scope a. Supply and equipment technical intelligence personnel play a primary role in supply and maintenance technical intelligence and contribute to the tactical mission through analysis and evaluation of enemy supplies and/or resources. Specific areas of interest are subsistence, individual equipment, clothing, general supplies, petroleum, maintenance, and such services such as graves registration, laundry, and bath. b. In the preparation of a technical intelligence analysis of enemy combat service support, supply and equipment technical specialists must take into account enemy economic factors (e.g., food, agriculture, and industrial production), the enemy labor force, and enemy technological capabilities. In this regard, close coordination with strategic intelligence elements at field army level is imperative. • c. Exploitation of enemy materiel begins as soon as its existence is discovered in order to determine the immediate tactical usefulness and significance of the materiel. Exploitation of materiel in the field is performed to the extent that field conditions and facilities permit. Exploitation in the field does not replace the need for exploitation in CONUS. Materiel that cannot be used or exploited in the field or theater of operations must be evacuated to the United States for complete detailed analysis and exploitation. 20. Functions a. An increase, decrease, or other change in the enemy's supplies gives an indication of change in enemy combat service support capabilities. The examination of captured items must, of necessity, involve a continuous study of the items themselves in conjunction with the applied sciences which made the development of these items possible. All analyses need to be evaluated in terms of the social and cultural environment of the enemy. b. In assembling supply and equipment intelligence information, supply and maintenance _ specialists analyze and evaluate foreign activ~\ ities to include the following: AGO 6690A (1) Determining the design, performance, source and methods of manufacture, and methods of storing items. (2) Examining supply and maintenance organizations, installations, and storage depots. (3) Determining characteristics, limitations, vulnerabilities, and military potential of military and civilian facilities. (4) Processing and abstracting information from foreign commodities and equipment acquired in a field army area of responsibility. (5) Preparing technical intelligence reports and studies concerning such items as petroleum, food, clothing, and equipment. (6) Assisting in the training of field army personnel in supply and equipment intelligence. (7) Producing and mai~taining information and intelligence concerning foreign materiel and commodities. ( 8) Assisting in the analyses of enemy storage, packing, and preparation of food and equipment. 21. Additional Capabilities a. In conjunction with other technical intelligence specialists, supply and equipment specialists provide a capability to the field army for supervising battlefield collection of a wide variety of items. For example, through the use of mobile laboratories available at theater level, the analysis, evaluation, and identification of captured foreign petroleum products and facilities for U.S. tactical uses are facilitated. b. Other areas of technical intelligence to which supply and maintenance specialists can contribute through analysis are (1) Troop subsistence supplies. (2) Commodity items. (3) Food spoilage and contamination. (4) Packaging and marking. (5) Acquisition of data concerning draft animals and protective clothing. c. Supply and maintenance technical intelli d. The section also includes highly trained gence personnel can perform the following for chemical personnel for the operation of the ;-CBR agent sampling and analyzing kit. The \ order of battle intelligence: operation of this kit is under the supervision of ( 1) Identifications based upon enemy unia chemical officer who is an organic chemist. forms, insignia, and decorations. Chemical personnel assigned to the general supply and equipment section evaluate chemical (2) Maintain supply and equipment intel defense equipment, including individual and ligence files as they pertain to logiscollective protection equipment, and decontamitics. nation eq).lipment and supplies. Section V. MOBILITY INTELLIGENCE 22. Scope 23. Functions a. The scope of mobility intelligence is com a. Engineer mobility specialists contribute to prehensive. It covers most aspects of engineer limited analyses and evaluation of technical and transportation a·ctivity at all echelons of intelligence concerning the following: the enemy's military organization. Engineer (1) Foreign engineer equipment to include and transportation support is of a greater its capabilities. variety today and has become increasingly more (2) Enemy construction operations, tech important in all types of military operations. niques, and resources. Also, there has been an increasing use of all (3) Lines of communication (roads, types of engineer and transportation equipment bridges, waterways, etc.}. by supply and transport agencies of all armies. (4) Public utilities. b. The mobility technical intelligence specialists will usually be involved in both strategic and tactical technical intelligence. The field army technical intelligence company will have to meet the needs of the theater and lower levels. Frequently, the same items of mobility intelligence may be needed by numerous levels within the field army and the theater. For example, the condition and capacity of highway and railroad facilities in a contiguous geographical area may influence the decision to launch a certain military operation. Therefore, mobility intelligence will play an important part in the overall strategic and tactical planning for field (5) Materiel quality and shortages. (6) Enemy depots, dumps, and supply points. (7) Defenses and fortifications. ( 8) Town plan analysis and urban area studies. (9) Water-crossing equipment and techniques. (10) Maintenance of a bibliography of foreign military and civilian engineer specialists and engineer order of battle. ( 11) Airborne drop zones. (12) Underground facilities and tunnels. • army and theater forces. b. Transportation mobility specialists in the c1. Mobility specialists can contribute to CBR intelligence in a variety of ways. Because of their training, the engineers can assist in studies to evaluate the destructive effects of nuclear weapons on the terrain, aboveground and underground structures, installations, equipment, and stored supplies. Mobility specialists contribute intelligence reports and studies on such items as soils, structures, facilities, and man-made objects such as roads, railroads, bridges, airfields, ports, utilities, urban areas, mobility section can contribute primarily to the production of mobility intelligence concerning all foreign air, land, and water transportation systems of immediate or potential military importance. This intelligence concerns characteristics, conditions, development, organization, materiel, operation, maintenance, construction, performance, capabilities, and limiting factors of enemy and/or selected foreign transportation systems and facilities (e.g., highways, railways, waterways, ports, harbors, industrial, and military installations. and scientific installations and transportation 16 AGO 6690A supplies). Mobility intelligence is necessary for ( 4) Assistance in the interrogation of contingency planning and emergency operacivilian and military personnel having ] tions. Therefore, transportation &pecialists transportation intelligence informa/ will need to produce intelligence on adjacent tion.friendly countries for use by technical and (5) Assistance in strategic transportationstrategic planners and combat service support planning. elements. Frequently, the United States may (6) Evaluation of new transportationuse another nation's transportation system. modes, systerns, and related equipment. c. Mobility specialists can contribute to the (7) Assistance in determining an estimatefollowing: of enemy capabilities to transport{1) Integration and coordination of the missiles and nuclear weapons.transportation collection effort. (8) Evaluation of economic and technical (2) Evaluation, interpretation, processing, aspects of foreign transportation sysand dissemination of transportation tems.information and data. (9) Compilation of data on enemy and/or (3) Assistance in the preparation of foreign transportation modes, sys transportation estimates. tems, facilities, and equipment. Section VI. MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE 24. Scope of Medical Intelligence units as appropriate. The theater surgeon and a. Medical intelligence is a functional entity staff can assist the field army G2 in determin and should not be fragmented. Medical techniing potential tactical and strategic applications cal intelligence is not primarily materiel oriof fully evaluated medical intelligence produced ented. Examination, evaluation, and classifica-by field army technical intelligence elements. ~tion of medical materiel are only segments of 25. Medical Intelligence Functions ) the total medical technical intelligence effort./ If possible, medical intelligence must retain The following specific technical intelligenceintegrity so that the end product will include functions are performed by medical specialists:all available information affecting the health a. Collect, examine, classify, and evaluateand welfare of men and animals in actual or raw information concerning non-US healthpossible areas of military operation which is problems, training, and materiel used by forimmediately or potentially significant. Such eign medical services. information is vital in both strategic and tactical planning and may influence military operb. Provide medical intelligence informationations. to the field army surgeon through G2 for professional evaluation prior to dissemination. b. The field army surgeon can assist inproviding requirements for medical informac. Assist in the interrogation of prisoners oftion/intelligence to the command G2. The inwar, refugees, deflectors, and escapees to obtaintelligence produced should be coordinated and medical information. evaluated by the field army surgeon and staff d. Assist in the investigation of medical asprior to dissemination. pects of incidents involving diseases or enemyCBR operations. c. The theater command can provide valuableassistance and guidance to the field army medie. Accomplish initial examination and evacucal technical intelligence effort. The theater ation of captured foreign medical materiel tosurgeon can coordinate the employment of medinclude escort of live cultures to CONUS.ical units in support of medical intelligence f. Assist in the compilation of environmentalactivities and arrange for support of field army data pertinent to health aspects of militarymedical intelligence activities by theater level operations. AGO 6690A I 17 g. Provide technical staff advice on medical f. Civil affairs public health teams who obintelligence to include the scope of medical tain information on the public health services • subjects to be incorporated into medical unit and facilities in an area of operation. training programs. h. Provide limited analysis on drugs, serums, 27. Additional Capabilities and antibiotics. In addition to their normal technical responsibilities, medical technical intelligence person 26. Sources nel can perform the following: The principal sources of medical information a. Assist in the identification of CBR agents. of potential intelligence value include b. Assist in the evaluation of CBR weapons. a. Direct observation of patients and medical service operations, both military and civilian. c. Provide information and data on medical aspects of enemy combat operations. b. Discussions with personnel involved di rectly or indirectly with medical service operad. Assist as required in the preparation of tions (enemy, allied, or civilian). " medical studies and reports of tactical signifi cance. c. Study of military and civilian reports and publications of a medical or technical nature. e. Collect data regarding enemy military and civilian medical facilities. d. Prisoners of war, refugees, evacuees, dis placed persons, and friendly escapees. f. Provide advice on communicable diseases. e. Examination of enemy medical materiel, g. Provide limited analysis of drugs and facilities, and personnel prQtective devices. serums. Section VII. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) ~·-' TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ~. c. The determination and dissemination of 28. Scope information pertaining to enemy techniquesFor purposes of this manual, chemical, and procedures of decontamination; individual biological, and radiological ( CBR) technical inand collective protection; CBR agent detection , telligence includes the following tasks and and identification procedures, fallout predicfunctions: tions and procedures for CBR attack warning; a. The collection, examination, evaluation, radiological monitoring and survey operations; identification, and dissemination of information impregnation and reimpregnation of clothing; on equipment, materiel, and documents perfield laboratory services; and assistance in de taining to chemical, biological, and radiological termination of enemy organization and operaoperations under conditions of nuclear or nontional effectiveness in chemical, biological, .and nuclear warfare. radiological operations under conditions of nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. b. The collection of samples of chemical, biological, and radiological agents employed d. The collection and dissemination of inforagainst friendly forces; the identification of mation about foreign chemical and biological chemical agents and/or transmittal of samples production and storage installations, facilities, to a supporting general chemical laboratory for capabilities, and stockpiles. analysis; the transmittal of biological samples e. Assistance, within the technical intellito a supporting medical laboratory for analysis; gence comp2ny capabilities, in developing field and the collection and forwarding of radiologi cal samples to a supporting general chemical countermeasures against chemical, biological, laboratory for determination of radio isotopic and radiological operations under conditions of composition. nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. The use of AGO 5690A • chemical and biological munitions introduces new factors into technical intelligence operations. In this area, the most critical function of the technical analyst lies in determining the effectiveness of such munitions, technical char acteristics, detection, unique modifications, and the need to develop rapidly effective countermeasures. Close coordination with the theater general chemical laboratory, with army medical service laboratories, and with staff chemical officers is essential because of the constantly developing and changing state of the art. 29. Nature of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Technical Intelligence • a. Chemical, biological, and radiological technical intelligence is an integral part of the total military intelligence effort and is essential to military operations. The possibility or probability NOTICE 0 C) THIS EQUIPMENT IS BEING "' HELD FOR: w ... ... ANALYSIS "' "' Q UTILIZATION w SALVAGE ... DESTRUCTION % ::;) BY AUTHORITY OF JOINT I w 2: UNIF lED/THEATRE/FIELD ... ARMY COMMANDER: u.. 0 > ... llli: w II. (Signature) 0 llli: II. (Unit) DO NOT DISTURB (DO NOT DISTURB) (In language af area af operations) Figure 4. Equipment marking tag. a. Equipment tags accompany the materiel to its final destination. Article 103, Uniform Code of Military Justice, is printed on the reverse side of the tag to forestall tampering (fig. 5). b. In addition to the establishment of proper safeguards, all military personnel should receive training in equipment tagging responsibility in conjunction with other intelligence training and in the consequences of failure to 0 ARTICLE 103, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE a. All persons subject to this code shall secure all public property taken from the enemy for the service of the United States, and shall give notice and turn over to the proper authority, without delay, all captured or abandoned property in their poss~ssion, custody or control. b. Any person subject to this code who: (l) fails to carry out the duties prescrihed in subdivision (a) of this article; (2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another directly or indirectly connected with him; or (3) engages in looting or pillaging; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Figure 5. Reverse side of equipment marking tag-Article 103. execute this responsibility. Also, troops must sponsibility of the recovery and shipping section of the technical intelligence company in be indoctrinated not to deface original markaccordance with field army and theater policies. ings on materiel at the time of its capture. However, the section must depend upon field c. Tagging, marking, crating, and preparaarmy support command elements for the prepation for shipment to CONUS is the major re-ration and shipment of bulky items. AGO 5590A 28 48. Evacuation Guidance general plans normally are based upon DA andDIA policies and guidance. Each command The general plans, policies, and procedures echelon within the field army must insure thatfor evacuation of all foreign equipment and its plans are in accordance with field army materiel are prescribed by the joint/unified/ directives and the overall field army technicaltheater and field army headquarters. These intelligence plan. ) / AGO 6690A 29 CHAPTER 6 PROCESSING OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION Section I. PROCESSING semination of technical intelligence reports and 49. Technical Information Processing makes subsequent interp,retation and evluation a. At times, the wide range of technical exeasier. Commonly used combat intelligence aids,pertise necessary for mission accomplishment such as the intelligence worksheet and intelliwill not be found within the technical intelli gence journals, can be adapted for technicalgence company. Normally, the broad range of intelligence needs. When the need is urgent, thetechnical equipment/materiel will necessitate recording step can be omitted to permit morethe highest degree of functional coordination rapid evaluation, interpretation, and immediatewithin the technical intelligence company in the dissemination to tactical units. utilization of varied experience, technical training, and background. 51. Evaluation b. Processing is the first step in the intelliEvaluation determines the pertinence of ingence cycle whereby technical information be formation. It consists of the critical appraisalcomes intelligence. The tqree phases of techof data for its subsequent interpretation. It innical intelligence processing are-cludes determining the reliability of the source (1) Recording. and agency and the accuracy or credibility of (2) Evaluation. the information. The system applicable to (3) Interpretation. evaluation is described in FM 30-5 and has been standardized for use by NATO Forces and c. In urgent situations, technical information other allies. can be processed as received without waiting to collect additional supporting information if a. Evaluation involves systematically arbackground files and an adequate data base ranging all pieces of information and comparhave been accumulated and kept current. The ing known data with the current state of the intelligence produced in such a situation may be art. This process must be carried on continually crucial, if, for example, the intelligence derived at all appropriate echelons. As technical inforcontains data on missiles capable of carrying mation flows to the technical intelligence comnuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. pany, it must be associated with all related data including previous technical reports. 50. Recording b. Evaluation requires a comprehensive tech Recording is the first step in processing. nical knowledge which rarely is possessed by Technical information and data are recorded in one individual. Evaluation, therefore, will re journals and workbooks and in intelligence files quire close coordination witliin the technical to aid technical analyst in grouping related intelligence company.items of information and to facilitate evaluation and interpretation. Recording involves rec. Technical evaluation must take into conducing information and data to written or sideration the industrial and scientific base and graphic form and grouping together related capability of the enemy. Evaluation estimates data to facilitate evaluation and interpretation. based solely on United States standards must Recording facilitates the preparation and dis-be avoided. Foreign equipment and materiel AGO 6690A 30 • may appear wholly inferior when judged by American standards; however, when judged by the standards of the specific army and area in which they were developed, the items of equip ment may be superior and considered to be highly effective. d. Evaluation ratings should be made at the technical intelligence company. The evaluation step of processing is never omitted. 52. Interpretation • This step is the result of critical judgment evolving from evaluation and subsequent analysis, integration, and deduction. It is the mental process of determining the importance of information, integration of this with other technical data, and deduction. The analysis function is centralized in the evaluation and analysis platoon of the technical intelligence company, since frequent coordination within the company is necessary to fully exploit the wide variety of equipment and materiel. The field army G2 staff element integrates the analyzed technical information with intelligence produced by all other intelligence elements to arrive at an estimate of the capabilities and limitations of foreign military armed forces. a. Analysis. Analysis requires a thorough knowledge of enemy equipment and materiel to include past technological trends, developments, and tactical doctrine on equipment use. Analysis involves detailed research when the volume of technical data increases. b. Integration. (1) This step is lengthy and consists of combining numerous isolated elements of technical information with other technical data to form a logical conclusion. More than one technical conclusion may be formulated based upon other existing and finished intelligence. Technical intelligence conclusions are made with primary emphasis upon the tactical mission. This phase requires good judgment, experience, a varied background knowledge, and a knowledge of scientific methods. When formulated, all technical hypotheses, if possible, should be tested for validity and reliability. (2) The technical intelligence company must integrate the technical information provided by all intelligence collection agencies in order to construct an objective assessment of enemy capabilities. Technical intelligence is by nature a complex task requiring extensive coordination and collation by highly competent specialists capable of using their technical back;ground, training, and expert opinions of technical reports in relation to available combat and strategic intelligence. Extensive integration must be performed by the field army intelligence staff in collating finished technical intelligence from other military intelligence battalion elements prior to the final dissemination of technical intelligence. c. Deduction. Deduction is the last step in interpretation. This step consists of deriving meaning from the hypotheses that have been developed and tested. Deduction provides answers as to the meaning of technical intelligence and data in relation to the tactical situation and area of operation. Section II. ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 53. Considerations a. The producers of technical intelligence must constantly keep in mind that actual and potential enemy capabilities, limitations, and probable courses of action are being developed at the field army, theater, and national levels. Based upon the technical intelligence produced, new requirements for U.S. equipment are developed. Any pertinent intelligence that will AGO lili90A assist in the preparation of new U.S. military equipment and/or countermeasures must be considered by the technical intelligence producer during the entire technical intelligence production cycle. For this reason, technical intelligence should be coordinated with all intelligence elements. b. Factors which must be regularly considered by technical intelligence producers include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Effects of terrain and weather. (2) Characteristics, performance, and effectiveness of enemy equipment and materiel. (3) Countermeasures that are effective against enemy equipment. (4) New design features and modifications of old and/or new equipment. ( 5) Overall combat intelligence requirements. 54. Technical-Military Reference Library a. Technical intelligence production, research, analysis, and evaluation cannot be conducted without a current data base. The need for specific data requirements, performance characteristics, equipment descriptions, operational limitations of materiel, and the extensive need for integration and collation of technical information covering wide areas necessitate the provision of a technical intelligence reference library. This library will prove to be one of the most useful working tools for the technical intelligence company. As a minimum the technical library should include ( 1) Technical Bulletins. (2) Foreign Equipment Handbooks (by country). (3) Catalog of Foreign Material. ( 4) DIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence Registers. ( 5) Organizational and Logistical Data Handbooks. (6) Enemy tactics and operational concept studies. (7) Technical equipment documents and studies. (8) Order of battle handbooks. (9) Enemy Tables of Organization and Equipment. (10) Appraisals of enemy equipment. (11) Equipment vulnerability studies. (12) Threat studies and assessments. b. Library technical publications not only provide accurate and timely technical information and intelligence references, but in the interest of field army consumers they provide limited and selective technical intelligence support, thereby reducing the need for direct unit support. Library technical publications must be oriented toward the needs of combat, combat support, and combat service support users and field army requirements. 55. Use of Experts and/or Organizations a. The technical intelligence company will sometimes require assistance from military and/or civilian personnel or organizations to assist in the technical analysis. of materials to fulfill a special tactical or strategic mission. This may occur when the expertise needed to solve a highly technical and complex problem is not available within the technical intelligence company. Therefore, maintaining an up-to-date "Technical Expert File" (of names) will prove invaluable. When utilized, these "experts" should work directly with the technical intelligence company, and must possess the proper security clearance; they should be used as consultants/advisors for a short period of time. The most important criterion governing the use of these individuals is that such service should normally be voluntary. b. Military and/or civilian personnel whose training could be of specia,l interest to technical intelligence units for analysis. and production services include ( 1) Ammunition maintenance technicians. (2) Guided missile maintenance personnel. (3) Nuclear weapons specialists. (4) Guided missile and special weapons personnel. (5) Ammunition supply specialists. ( 6) Data processing personnel. ( 7) Electronic countermeasures personnel. (8) Cryptographic personnel. (9) Communication security analysts.. (1 0) Optical specialists. ( 11) Explosive ordnance specialists. ( 12) Petroleum product analysts. ( 13) Guided missile propellant and explosive specialists. (14) Geographers, geologists, and/or construction specialists. (15) Photograph experts. (16) Communication specialists. ( 17) Weapons systems analysts. (18) Chemists, physicists, and biologists. ( 19) Radar specialists. (20) Indigenous surgeons and medical specialists. AGO 55.90A • 56. Photography propriate written descriptions prior to further a. Photographs are a valuable source of detailed evaluation and dissemination. The permanent information for technical analysis data available from a photograph may be high advantageous to the analyst; however, skill andand evaluation. Frequently, technical intelli gence analysts supplement their finished re training of the analyst are very important in exploitation of photographs. Photographs per ports with photographs, diagrams, and charts.Equipment and materiel will often be captured mit a vast quantity of data base information to or confiscated by fast-moving tactical units; be rapidly analyzed, collated, and filed. Once photographs of this materiel can be sent to the photographs of equipment are taken, equipment rear by technical intelligence collection teams should be rapidly evacuated. All photographs prior to the receipt of the actual equipment. must contain a ruler, scale, or other measuring comparison to assist the analyst and other usersIn a fast moving tactical situation, the photoof the information. graph will be the only item available to the analyst if the equipment becomes lost, damaged, c. Long range patrols, special forces oper destroyed, or recaptured. For this reason, tech ational detachments, and other intelligence colnical intelligence collection teams at corps must lection elements can provide photographs ofbe cognizant that one of their first specific acts special items of intelligence interest when opershould be to photograph in place all items of inating behind enemy lines. However, their usetelligence value from as many different angles must be coordinated at the appropriate echelonas required. and they must be thoroughly briefed on tech b. Photographs must be analyzed, evaluated, nical intelligence requirements prior to dispatchand compared, and must be accompanied by ap-on these missions. Section Ill. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 57. Classification must be precise, yet flexible, and should followthe following minimum guidelines: Technical intelligence reports from the tech( 1) Requirements for sensitive technicalnical intelligence company are produced in acintelligence materiel in support of as cordance with appropriate army regulations inthe 380-series. When equipment is acquired signed missions must be carefully planned and should be revised periodthrough a friendly foreign government, the speically. cific security classification assigned by that (2) Information and materiel should begovernment must be adhered to and given disseminated on a need-to-know basisequivalent protection by being assigned to in accordance with specific securityGroup I in accordance with AR 380-6. Otherregulations. wise, classified technical intelligence reports will be assigned to Group 3 as stated in AR (3) Care must be taken not to overclassify. 380-6. (Paragraph 59 discusses the various b. At times, indigenous personnel may betypes of reports.) required for a specific mission. Because of thesensitive nature of many areas of technical in 58. Security Policies telligence, information should be released onlyafter: a. At times, technical intelligence involves (1) An explicit need-to-know has beensensitive security equipment/materiel and established.therefore will require stringent security con (2) Care has been taken to furnish onlytrols by the technical intelligence unit. A unit those portions for which need-to-knowtechnical intelligence SOP covering security is has definitely been established. mandatory in order to provide an adequate (3) The security requirements imposed by security framework to support operational resecurity regulations have been comquirements. The technical intelligence SOP plied with. --,\,1 AGO 5590A 33 (4) It has been determined that rele~sed (USASA) elements as soon as practicable. information is in the best interests of Some components of intelligence interest are as ( ___ -__ r the United States. follows: (1) Speech security devices. c. Special provisions must be prescribed by (2) Teletype security devices. technical intelligence units for handling critical (3) Data security devices. captured enemy equipment such as communica(4) Off-line encryption devices. tion security equipment. This equipment must (5) Key lists. be classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher and (6) Code books. designated "crypto,'' and tagged and evacuated (7) Documents, manuals, circuitry diato the nearest U.S. Army Security Agency grams, and all ancillary equipment. Section IV. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS d. Detailed Technical Report. This report is 59. Reports (see STANAG 2084 app IV) the responsiLility of the field army technicalSix types of technical intelligence reports are intelligence company and is prepared by generally used in the exploitation of captured various combat service support specialists inmateriel. These are a coordinated effort. No format is specified be a. Spot Report. This or written report is cause of the wide variety of materiel usually prepared by the capturing units and/or intercontained therein. mediate command echelons .to rapidly report by e. Technical Document Report. This report electrical or other means the acquisition of cap is written on all captured enemy technical docutured or abandoned foreign materiel through ments such as maintenance handbooks, operatheir next higher headquarters to the technical tion manuals, drawings, and sketches. intelligence company. The basic items of this report should normally include as a minimum: f. Special Technical Report. Special technical ( (1) Who is reporting (unit) ? reports are prepared as required by field army (2) What is being reported? G2 staff elements and higher echelons (3) Where and when (coordinates)? primarily as input to studies, plans, and con (4) How much materiel? tingency planning requirements. These reports (5) Whom to contact. contain special information on items of signifi (6) Condition of materiel. cant intelligence interest. No format is prescribed for these reports, and content is gov b. Preliminary Technical Report. This report erned by the nature of the technical intelligence is prepared and disseminated through intel desired. ligence channels on all captured foreign mate riel. It is prepared by corps technical intel ligence collection teams or the capturing unit. 60. Combined Operations Reports The preliminary report places emphasis on Appendix V outlines current NATO alerting other tactical units to significant new standardized nomenclature as prescribed by tactical capabilities. It is prepared in the STANAG 2097. When possible, all technical format as shown in Annex B of STANAG 2084. intelligence report nomenclature should be c. Complementary Technical Report. This NATO-standardized and should be in conson report is prepared by technical intelligence colance with overall unified/joint/theater policies lection teams operating throughout a corps and guidance. The reports that can be used by area in support of corps elements. Itis a limited technical intelligence elements in all combined report for the use of the technical intelligence operations are: company and such other intelligence elements a. Spot Report (SPOTREP). as the military intelligence battalion or field (PRE army G2 staff elements. It supplements inforb. Preliminary Technical Report TECHREP). mation in the PRETECHREP. AGO 5590A 34 • c. Complementary Technical Report (COMTECHREP) . d. Detailed Technical Report (DETECHREP). e. Technical Document Report (TECHDOC). 61. Using Instructions Captured materiel which is later put into service and used by United States or Allied • Section V. DISSEMINATION 62. General The timely dissemination of technical intelligence reports is of maximum importance to tactic:tl, combat support, and combat service support commanders. The field army intelligence staff uses technical intelligence reports as a basis for estimates, recommendations, and interpretation of information received. 63. Methods Used a. The methods used to disseminate technical intelligence depends upon the detail and urgency of the intelligence and upon who the intended users are. Primary consideration must be given to the needs of the tactical users. The most common means of dissemination are : (1) Detailed technical reports (app IV, STANAG 2084). (2) Technical intelligence bulletins. (3) Technical reviews and summaries. ( 4) Special technical reports. AGO 6690A forces requires using instructions. Technical intelligence company personnel involved in detailed analysis at F ASCOM are responsible for preparing and distributing using instructions. Such instructions, when published, should always be a part of the final detailed report (DETECHREP) prepared by the company. Reports should always be annotated to indicate they are official field army technical intelligence reports. (5) Special technical studies and estimates. ( 6) Handbooks. (7) Technical pamphlets. (8) Briefings. ( 9) Liaison visits. b. Before technical intelligence is transmitted to intelligence staffs for the normal processing and conversion into intelligence, the data must be- (1) Screened for elimination of nonessential information. (2) Translated into a nontechnical lan guage to permit general understanding. (3) Interpreted, analyzed, and coordinated among all other combat service support specialists serving on functional technical intelligence teams. ( 4) Collated with other related intelligence and data as appropriate. ( CHAPTER 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Section I. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL {EOD) SUPPORT 64. General a. Combat service support for technical intelligence encompasses EOD, military police, and civil affairs support. b. Experience shows that about five to ten percent of ammunition employed will fail to function as originally intended. Compounding this problem are the use of missiles and delayed-action and influence-type fuzes on many types of ammunition and the introduction of "home made" explosive devices. The term "explosive ordnance" includes conventional ammunition as well as chemical, biological and nuclear ammunition. c. Recovery and evacuation operations are often complicated by the presence of ammunition items in or on equipment. In addition, the possibility that abandoned items have been boobytrapped must always be considered. It is necessary, therefore, that personnel engaged in recovery and evacuation operations be constantly on the alert for such items. Extreme care must be taken to prevent explosions, fires, radiation burns, and accidental functioning. Accordingly, assistance of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel should be requested to provide explosive disposal support. The potential represented by modern chemical bio . ' logiCal, and nuclear ammunition has placed increased emphasis upon this requirement. 65. Technical Intelligence Value a. Foreign ammunition encountered in the field may be of considerable intelligence value. There are many intelligence, research, and development agencies in the Army and in other departments of the government that may benefit from prompt information concerning new items of foreign ammunition or the modification of old. b. Information on foreign ammunition assists in determining order of battle intelligence; evaluating probable enemy courses of action, capabilities, and vulnerabilities; and developing countermeasures. The markings on a bomb, missile, or shell; the materials used or substituted; or the mere fact that the item exists may be of great strategic value. Identification of the filler may establish requirements for special protective or retaliatory measures against conventional, nuclear, chemical, or biological attack. c. Knowledge of employment, effectiveness, and possible countermeasures are of immediate concern tactically. The type and caliber of enemy supporting weapons can be determined from captured enemy ammunition, duds, components, and fragments. Sabotage devices being introduced by clandestine means can provide valuable indkators of probable enemy courses of action. d. Manufacturing methods and details of design may be of value to research and development agencies of the Army. The development of effective EOD render-safe procedures and tools for first-seen enemy ammunition is of particular importance to the safety of EOD personnel and to the accomplishment of their mission. 66. Information Desired Technical intelligence information desired on ammunition includes: a. New items of enemy ammunition, together with complete technical data on construction, markings, and functioning. AGO lili90A • b. Design or change in design of known authority should be recovered whenever posammunition. sible, even at the expense of considerable risk.Recovery of components and fragments of such c'. Changes in manufacturing techniques. items may be equally important. Such recovery d. Quality and type of material and/or exis of value to technical intelligence and CONUS plosive content. based DA research elements in the development e. Packing, storing, and maintenance techof disposal methods and tools. The following minimum guidelines apply:niques. (1) New or unknown types of foreign amf. Data concerning place and date of manumunition recovered by EOD personfacture. nel must be turned over to technical g. Documents pertaining to the above, inintelligence units for disposition. Secluding sources of information. curity classification of the items andtheir components will not be lowerthan SECRET. 67. EOD Team Operations The EOD unit commander is solely respon(2) Foreign nuclear weapons or comsible for determining the proper procedure to ponents, to include sabotage devices,use in accomplishing the disposal operation for are evacuated through technical intelligence channels. Security classifi each project assigned to his team. Technicalintelligence specialists provide technical advice cation of such items will not be lowerto the team as required. Selection of the best than SECRET RESTRICTED DATA.method of disposal depends on a number of (3) In addition to security escorts, techfactors including the location, amount, and nanical escorts are required to provideture of the explosive involved, proximity to safety control for shipments of nu structures and facilities; accessibility; condiclear, chemical, biological, and othertion; and personnel safety. Tasks to be per hazardous items of ammunition. With formed include in the field army, technical intelli a. Identification. All ammunition is first gence personnel will coordinate withidentified to determine the disposal procedure appropriate staff officers to determineto be used. First-encountered foreign ammunithe need and arrange for technicaltion and markings must be photographed for escorts. For shipment of such ammutechnical intelligence and EOD purposes. Spenition to CONUS, the theater intellicial procedures required by technical intelligence officer determines the need andgence for photographing various types of markarranges for technical escorts.ings are followed by EOD personnel. A written (4) Collection of technical intelligencememorandum is prepared on the spot to include data will, in many instances, entail a concise description of the item, sketches, and dismantling the ammunition and stripdetails of location. ping fuzes and other dangerous com b. Destruction in Place. Nondestructive ponents for analysis and evaluation.render-safe procedures should be used on firstThese operations should be conductedseen foreign ordnance. If it cannot be rendered only by experienced EOD personnel.safe or removed, the item should be destroyed In many cases, complete dismantlingin place in such a manner as to minimize damand stripping may be beyond the capa age. Samples of chemical or biological agent bility of small units in the field. Unlessfillers are extracted from chemical or biological the urgency requires the acceptance of ammunition and preserved for laboratory anal a high degree of risk, the item is evac ysis by technical intelligence personnel. uated. Dismantling and stripping isconducted only in response to a valid • c. Recovery. Unrecognized items and those requirement placed through technicalfor which search has been directed by higher intelligence or EOD staffs. AGO 111180A 37 (5) Captured mines and boobytraps The reports are used to alert technical intellishould be analyzed and/or tested only gence teams so that they may be dispatched CJ by trained weapons/munitions spe('ialists who are thoroughly familiar with their construction, techniques, and use. Extreme caution must be exercised when such things as taut wires and pull releases are encountered, since any explosive item can be used as a boobytrap. Unusual mechanisms used as boobytraps should be immediately reported to the technical intelligence company through use of the spot report. Any countermeasures must be coordinated with explosive ordnance demolition personnel. Final disposal of explosive components or hazardous materials associated with such devices and with recovered ammunition is the responsibility of EOD personnel. 68. Reports All information gathered by EOD personnel on first-seen foreign ammunition must be reported immediately through EOD control centers to EOD staff officers. At staff level, such reports will be placed in intelligence channels in accordance with intelligence regulations. Two types of EOD reports are required in the field : preliminary technical reports and complementary technical reports. a. Prelimi-nary Technical Reports (PRETECHREP). These reports are prepared by EOD personnel upon recognition of the ammunition as an item of technical intelligence value. to the site. In addition to the information prescribed in Annex B, STANAG 2084, a recommended tentative render-safe procedure should be indicated by the EOD unit commander. b. Complementalry Technical Reports (COMTECHREP). These reports are prepared by technical intelligence teams as prescribed in Annex D, STANAG No. 2084. In the absence of technical intelligence personnel, the report will be prepared by the EOD unit. This report contains complete and detailed information not found in the PRETECHREP. It will be submitted by tha fastest available means to the technical intelligence company. 69. Dissemination Technical intelligence on ammunition and missile warheads may be disseminated from any level. Information in reports being transmitted to higher echelons, or received from other sources, which may be of value to disposal personnel of a lower command should be extracted and published at once. The Foreign Science and Technology Center, U. S. Army Materiel Command, m~kes available foreign ammunition items, reports, and evaluations required for study and use in the development of EOD tools and render-safe procedures. The need for the strictest secrecy in explosive ordnance render-safe procedures is extremely important in order that the enemy does not learn when effective measures for disarming his ammunition have been developed. Section II. MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT 70. General Military police can often contribute significantly to the command's technical intelligence effort. Military police characteristically perform duties on an area-wide basis; they are trained observers; and their close association with numerous law enforcement and other civilian agencies during the course of normal duties can be effectively utilized in certain aspects of the development of technical intelligence. This effort should not, however, be exploited to the detriment of their primary duties of providing police or investigative services to the command. 71. Collection As collection agencies, military police units and personnel, particularly criminal investigators, are well suited to assist in such functions as: a. Collecting and reporting items of foreign material on the "Items Wanted List." AGO 5590A • b. Locating specific technical items of equipment. c. Locating personalities and activities within a specialized technical field. d. Reporting items of potential technical intelligence value determined from prisoner of war (PW) and civilian internee sources. e. Reporting items of potential value confiscated or captured in raids. 72. Security and Escort Items of materiel captured or received by U. S. military forces and determined to be of technical intelligence value will often require safeguarding not only during storage but also during evacuation. Military police normally provide physical security at storage depots and during movement to the rear when the materiel is determined to be "sensitive." Military police escorts are provided for safeguarding classified information. 73. Using Agency a. Military police have a continuing interest in technological changes and developments of foreign nations in the following general categories for possible adaptations to U. S. military police use: (1) Physical security devices, including protective alarms and all types of intrusion-detection devices. (2) Traffic control devices, including electronic speed and surveillance devices. (3) Police and investigative equipment, such as identific8.tion systems and photography. (4) Automation of police records on offenders, criminala, and prisoners; and on traffic, and law enforcement files and systems. ( 5) Riot control munitions, devices, and techniques. (6) Industrial defense equipment and techniques. (7) Boobytraps. b. The senior military police representative at each command closely coordinates with the technical intelligence staff officers of the appropriate headquarters to insure that items in the above-listed categories are included on the "Items Wanted List" and that potentially usable technical information is mutually exchanged. 74. Materiel Obtained by Military Police The different items of foreign materiel subject to confiscation from prisoners of war include arms; ammunition; military equipment (except mess equipment, metal helmets, and protective masks) ; military documents, such as military codes and ciphers; pictures and maps or sketches of military installations or implements of war; and signal devices. All other property taken from prisoners is grouped in the category of retained or impounded property and must be accounted for or ultimately returned to the prisoner if the capturing forces assume custody. 75. Marking of PW Materiel a. Procedures for marking foreign materiel of potential technical intelligence value that is taken from PW should include means of positively identifying the materiel with the PW. This is necessary because prisoners and materiel will often by evacuated through separate channels, and accurate identification of the PW will facilitate future location.-This would also facilitate the identification of certain property which must eventually be returned to the PW by regulations. (STANAG 2084, app IV.) b. Capturing troops are authorized to obtain nothing more than the name, rank, and service number of the prisoner. Military police detachments assigned to the lowest level of command should, therefore, provide as much as possible for a positive means of identification such as a photograph or fingerprints of the PW to be affixed to the materiel tag. Section Ill. CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT 76. General quires its personnel to develop and maintain The nature of civil affairs operations re close relationship with the civilian population. AGO 6690A As previously 8tated, this puts civil affairs personnel in a favorable position to collect intelligence information as well as to obtain foreign materiel/equipment and technical information which may be of significant value to the technical intelligence effort of the command. 77. Collection Potential Civil affairs personnel, in the conduct of their day-to-day operations, may encounter persons with potentially valuable technical knowledge, materiel/equipment, and technical documents. These persons may be sources of technical intelligence and may include a. Civilian technicians among refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons. b. Military personnel with technical backgrounds impersonating civilians. c. Civilian technicians and scientists associated with the hostile government or forces. d. Governmental technical_ documents, specialized libraries, and archives. e. Industrial and scientific records. f. Technical blueprints, plans, manuals, or other information pertaining to technical intelligence in the mobility, communications-electronics, weapons and munitions, chemical, and medical fields. 78. Procurement and Identification a. Direct support to technical intelligence units may be provided by civil affairs units in the possible procurement of technical materiel/ equipment, identification of technical personnel, and recruitment or hiring of civilian technicians or scientists. • b. Aside from the normal procurement of civilian real property, civil affairs personnel may procure (1) Civilian equipment such as recording devices, radios, weapons, or other items which may be found as personal possessions. (2) Medical instruments, drugs, and other medical supplies. (3) Civilian motor vehicles, construction equipment, and materials. ( 4) Fuels, lubricants, greases, and propellants. c. Through contacts with civil organizations, leaders, political enemies of the hostile regime, and various other segments of the population, civil affairs personnel can provide valuable assistance in the identification of individuals having technicaJ knowledge such as (1) Civilian technicians-engineers, architects, chemists, and physicists. (2) Professional personnel-doctors, surgeons, dentists, nurses, lawyers, and university professors. • (3) Skilled craftsmen/laborers-mechanics, gunsmiths, electricians, draftsmen, and allied personnel engaged in the production of weapons, vehicles, missiles, tracked vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment. 40 AGO 5590A CHAPTER 8 INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS Sedion I. 79. Characteristics I a. Technical intelligence emphasis, goals, and priorities in internal defense development a~sistance operations will differ from those m limited and general conflict. While some procedures may vary, the principles of technical intelligence remain unchanged. However, additional considerations will be necessary in applying these principles. Military units, for example, may be dispersed for independent! decentralized operations. Movement of techmcal intelligence personnel must be by the fastest means available. Likewise, evacuation of enemy equipment and materiel must be performed by the most secure means available, usually by air, to prevent recapture or loss. The technical sophistication of the insurgent's equipment and materiel normally is not as extensive as that of a conventional enemy. Enemy materiel consists primarily of small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars obtained from friendly, neutral, and hostile nations. Such equipment is often augmented by primitive but nevertheless effective weapons such as crossbows, mantraps, sharpened stakes, and the like. b. Technical intelligence specialists must be thoroughly familiar with the characteristics, capabilities, and performance of the small arms and weapons from a variety of friendly and non-friendly nations. The insurgent usually has a limited capability to perform modifications to weapons and materiel. If these modifications are not carefully analyzed and evaluated, their significance and the conclusions drawn can be misleading. Often, technical intelligence derived during internal defense operations has serious national and political consequences; it must therefore he accurate. I GENERAL c. Arms caches and weapons-smuggling are frequently resorted to by the insurgent. Arms caches can be of major significance politically and tactically. Arms caches and logistical stores should be carefully analyzed and evaluated for technical intelligence usually in a combined effort with the host country. The discovery of arms caches, when carefully exploited by functionally integrated technical teams, can lead to valuable intelligence about the overall insurgent tactical situation. Normally, all captured equipment and materiel becomes the property of the host country, and for this reason combined operations, liaison, and coordination are important to insure full exploitation. The disposition of foreign materiel may be governed by status of forces or other agreements, thus complicating the collection and analysis problems. Close coordination by technical intelligence personnel with tactical units, civil affairs units, and all U.S. government departments and agencies engaged in collection is important. Combined (U.S.-Host Country) technical intelligence operations are a particularly effective means of improving collection capability by using the language and area knowledge of native military personnel. d. The scope of insurgent warfare can encompass the elite and professionally trained military forces as well as local guerrillas or part-time fighters and noncombatants. However, substantial differences exist in armament, organization, training, equipment, and overall effectiveness. Technical intelligence collectors and analysts must be cognizant of these differences in all analyses. Familiarity will insurgent tactics, doctrine, and organization will greatly enhance the technical analysis and evaluation capabilities of the technical intelligence unit. AGO 6590A 80. Cold War Operations a. In cold war operations, prior to initial deployment of combat forces, the early detection and identification of equipment and materiel used by hostile forces assume paramount importance. The establishment of identities of outside logistical sources of supply is imperative and assists in the determination of diplomatic action, overall strategy, force structure, and military equipment which should be deployed for successful mission accomplishment. b. Should Military Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, or Military Missions be present in a foreign country experiencing insurgency, their capabilities and background information data can be used to supplement the initial technical intelligence data base in order to begin technical intelligence collection and analysis. Section II. RESPONSIBILITIES 81. Technical Intelligence Emphasis During internal defense operations, technical intelligence personnel perform normal duties as described for conventional operations; however, particular emphasis must be placed on the following: a. Training host country combat personnel, as nec.essary, in technical intelligence collection and evacuation procedures. b. Coordinating technical intelligence mat~ ters with other services having a technical intelligence interest a,nd with the host country. c. Assisting in the organization and develop ment of a. host country technical intelligence capability if required. d. Performing more on-the-spot technical inteHigence analysis and evaluation of enemy equipment and materiel. e. Providing technical advice and assistance to host country military technical intelligence personnel as required. f. Assisting in adapting ideas and techniques of insurgents for use by US forces as feasible. 82. Role of the Unit Intelligence Advisor a. The intelligence advisor plays a basic role in technical intelligence collection by coordinating host country requests for technical intelligence support, providing technical intelligence Section Ill. 84. Analysis a. Technical intelligence collection and analysis becomes more complicated in internal de advice, and informing US intelligence staffs when significant discoveries of insurgent equipment, materiel, or arms caches are acquired. Technical intelligence collection/analyst personnel must keep the unit intelligence advisor informed of important guerrilla weaponry developments in addition to helping him maintain a technical intelligence "Item-Wanted List." b. Since the unit intelligence advisor is responsible for advising and training host country forces in all aspects of intelligence, to include technical intelligence, a mutual flow of technical information between the advisor and advisee is mandatory. Mutually defined goals and objectives between an advisor and advisee are essential. 83. Combat Service Support Role If an insurgency progresses into a war of movement, technical intelligence becomes important to the success of combat intelligence. Combat service support staffs expand their participation in the technical intelligence pro duction effort through advice at all command echelons. All technical intelligence must be processed through intelligence G2/S2 staff elements; however, close coordination with technical service staffs during the interpretation and evaluation phase is mandatory. The establishment of a combined US and host country technical intelligence center may become advisable. PROCEDURES fense operations since the combined political or military objective often is more than merely seizing and holding terrain. Information of the AGO 5590A c. Technical characteristics of a newly en • technical characteristics of insurgent weapons countered enemy weapon or item of equipment, must be continuously updated and expanded as the weapons appear. Otherwise, the tactics in addition to providing valuable combat intelli and efforts needed to isolate the insurgent cangence, can, when scientifically analyzed, be used not be adequately determined. When a blockade in strategic intelligence and as an aid in deteris used to stop the flow of arms and ammunition mining enemy technical, industrial, and manuto the insurgent, technical intelligence analysts facturing capabilities. In addition, it is possible by analysis of the marking of cartridge cases must be particularly thorough in collection, analysis, and evaluation. For example, supply to determine the plant and country where the cartridge was manufactured. shortages and small changes in the chemical composition of propellants and demolitions or d. In th~ event of capture of a large numbershortages might be indicators of the potential of like items of equipment or materiel, the techeffectiveness of a blockade. nical intelligence collection teams must examine b. It is imperative for political/military purthe materiel and obtain all available informaposes that technical intelligence personnel keep tion relative to lot numbers, date of manufacabreast of outside military assistance furnished ture, and factory markings that may assist in such as modern anti-aircraft missiles, guns, providing information on the item. A sufficient propellants, and petroleum products. For exnumber of items must be transmitted through ample, analysis of new missile propellants can technical intelligence channels to properly give vital indications of enemy tactical capaevaluate the item. The remaining items are bilities. then processed through normal evacuation and/ or salvage supply channels for use as needed by 85. Investigative Data friendly forces. a. The technical intelligence collection teams e. Information on the use of "primitive have a responsibility to conduct weapon and weapons" such as poisonous spikes, crossbows,ammunition cache investigations and make re and deadfalls must be widely disseminated toports thereon. Thousands of caches, depots, gether with appropriate instructions onsalvage points, and small factories may be discountermeasures. covered over a period of time and need to be fully exploited. Most of the weapons and amf. The technical intelligence personnel of the munition will be a mixture of those from other field collection teams coordinate operations with nations to include our own. Statistical data explosive ordnance disposal teams if dud rounds must be maintained on weapons, ammunition, of any type are suspected. and supplies that have been captured by our forces. Technical intelligence plays an impor86. Logistical Systemtant role in the maintenance of such data and Although the logistieal systen of the insurin determining its overall significance. gent may be rudimentary and primitive, the b. The discovery of arms caches may occur technical intelligence analysts may be requiredfrequently and may completely tie up technical to deal with a variety of commodity items for intelligence specialists. At times, on-the-spot intelligence purposes (e.g., salt rations, agriculanalyses may have to be performed by functural products, primitive drugs, and serums). tional teams. One of the most important probThe capability of the insurgent's logistical sys lems facing technical intelligence specialists tem to support sustained military operationswill be the planning for exploitation of these may well be determined through technical analarms caches. Priorities must be established ysis of commodity items. with primary consideration given to tactical needs. The entire analysis effort can be mate 87. Combined Operations rially assisted by proper troop orientation in all aspects of technical intelligence, close coa. A major problem of technical intelligence ordination with major tactical headquarters, is the acquisition of the necessary language and placement of proper emphasis on the skills and experiences to perform technical "Items-Wanted List." analysis and evaluation of technical equipment AGO 6690A 43 in a foreign country. Therefore, c?mbined wide variety of potential intelligence informa operations with the host country forces are tion that should be collected prior to their usually imperative. Host country military perdestruction. Time permitting, the following sonnel who possess some limited technical trainchecklist should be used by tactical units in ing are utilized to assist in analyses. Close submitting information reports on the destruc supervision is necessary. With additional traintion of all such facilitiesing, such personnel can assist in overcoming ( 1) Location (coordinates). language and operational problems. Also, civil (2) Evaluation of construction. affairs units, if available, may assist in the (3) Specialized underground areas (class acquisition of necessary linguistic personnel. room, training). (4) Installation of internal communicab. Indigenous technical intelligence persontion facilities. nel who are thoroughly familiar with the cul(a) Internal to internal. ture and environment of the insurgent are an (b) Internal to external. asset to the analysis, evaluation, and collation (c) Use of special antennas. of certain types of technical data and informa(5) Power available. tion. For example, the living habits of guer(6) Alternate/emergency power system. rillas living in underground tunnels can be use(7) Storage facilities (effect of weatherful in evaluating and updating important on). technical data. Classrooms, billets, hospitals, (8) Assessment of construction of inand stored materiel may be indicators which ternal operational facilities (shops,lead to valuable intelligence. tool-making, repairs). ( 9) General assessment of health facil 88. Search and Destroy Operation ities. (a) Waste disposal. a. An important characteristic of internal (b) Water facilities. defense operations is the extensive use of (c) Contamination. "search and destroy" tactical operations which (d) Care of sick and wounded. do not emphasize holding terrain. In addition (e) Assessment medical standards. c to the potential loss of valuable intelligence, (10) Assessment of training facilities (ifthese operations present a formidable problem applicable). for the technical intelligence collection teams ( 11) Measures taken against severeand analysts. Technical intelligence collection weather. teams coordinating with tactical units must (12) Assessment of political propagandaemphasize that such operations should attempt indoctrination (documents, newsto avoid the destruction of potentially valuable posters, magazines, printing presses). technical equipment/materiel and facilities. (13) Evaluation of use of environmentalTherefore, technical intelligence personnel must resources. brief tactical elements on current "Items( 14) Evaluation of local/commercial re-Wanted Lists" and other items of significant sources (lumber, cotton). intelligence interest. In this manner, sound de(15) Special items of interest. cisions can be made by tactical commanders (16) Recreation facilities. and staff officers in avoiding the destruction of (17) Assessment of defensive areas. potentially valuable intelligence. Proper plan(18) Internal security or warning devices. ning, implementation, and dissemination of the (19) Assessment of intelligence or intellioperations order can minimize the loss of potengence related activities. tial intelligence. (20) New field expedients (of major and b. Tunnels and excavations are frequently constant interest). used by the insurgent in order to provide pro89. Boobytraps and Minestection to personnel and supplies. When these a. Explosive mines and boobytraps are usedare discovered, they must be destroyed. How widely by the insurgent. Frequently mines,ever, tunnels and excavations may contain a boobytraps, and 'emplaced munitions are used 44 AGO 6690A c • for harassment of military operations; there91. Propaganda Equipmentfore, it is imperative that technical intelligence a. Psychological operations are widely usedspecialists keep abreast of these munition develin an insurgency and in a limited and generalopments. The employment of explosive ordwar environment. The discovery of insurgentnance materiel must be analyzed on a continual propaganda equipment requires analysis by abasis. For example, duds can easily be modified functional team consisting of supply, chemical, and used as boobytraps. and equipment personnel to analyze the print b. The weapons and munitions specialists, in ing presses, chemicals, inks, and paper beingcoordination with EOD personnel, can provide used. Such analysis is necessary to assessthe following principal information when such guerrilla methods and determine sources ofweapons and tactics are used. supply. Communications-electronics specialists ( 1) Fragmentation radii. can assist psychological operations personnel in (2) Modifications made to boobytraps and the analysis of loudspeakers and radio broadmines. casting equipment. (3) Construction of locally manufactured b. The technical intelligence aspects of opermines. able foreign radio and television stations and ( 4) Principal fuzing systems (pressure, printing facilities are important in furtheringpull, chemical). the field army psychological operations capa (5) Types of explosives (bomb, grenade, bility. Such installations and facilities shouldartillery, mortar). be turned over to civil affairs and psychological (6) Fuze ingredients and structures. operations units for maximum exploitation. (7) Modifications to mortar and artilleryfuzes. c. Radio broadcasting and printing facilities • (8) The use of "commercial devices" or can be used to further enhance the overall tech materiel. nical intelligence effort. Specific items of equip (9) Foreign manufactured items used in ment desired can be advertised, offering amines and boobytraps. monetary reward to potential defectees. How(10) Use of triggering devices (battery or ever, such a program must be strictly controlled blasting machines). and be approved at the highest echelon. (11) Use of chemical devices. (12) Use of large bombs. 92. Long Range Patrols c. Dissemination of technical intelligence a. The long range patrol (LRP) companyconcerning boobytraps and mines should be has a limited capability to acquire and exfiltratemade together with countermeasure training small portable items of enemy equipment ordata. materiel, and can be used under exceptional circumstances. However, it must be emphasized 90. Civilian Technicians that such missions should not interfere withDuring internal defense operations, it is posprimary patrol missions. The requirements forsible that civilians having technical knowledge the long range patrol requires coordination and will come under civil affairs control upon libapproval at higher headquarters. eration of an area from insurgent control. Their evacuation for interrogation purposes b. The long range patrol (LRP) companies may not be desirable because of the attitude of the corps or their equivalent command struc of the civil population at the time. However, ture will have an extensive need for technical the civil population will in all probability be intelligence. Frequently, special technical re screened by U.S. or host country civil affairs ports and data will have to be furnished forunits or police elements. When civilians having special missions. The nature of LRP missiontechnical skills are identified and they can conmay necessitate observation, identification, andtribute potential technical intelligence informareporting of enemy equipment and materieltion, they should be referred to technical intelliover periods of 3 to 5 days. Such special misgence elements. sions require the most current technical infor- AGO 6690A 45 mation and data. Prior to dispatch of the LRP materiel to the patrol to contribute to mission on certain special missions, technical intellisuccess by accurately identifying enemy equipgence personnel may be requested to provide a ment and materiel which may be observed or general technical briefing on equipment and used by the enemy to detect such patrols. AGO 6690A CHAPTER 9 THE STRATEGIC EFFORT Center (STIC) of the Department of 93. General the Navy. a. The overall military technical intelligence (5) Foreign Technology Division (FTD) effort plays a vital role in the U.S. strategic/ of the Air Force.national, scientific, and technical intelligence effort. Equipment, materiel, data, and infor94. Role of DA Agenciesmation are provided on a continual basis to the The Army Materiel Command, through its Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which acts as the central military technical intelligence subordinate agency known as the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC), is re coordinating office, and eventually to CONUS producing units where long-range technical/ sponsible for providing U.S. strategic planners, the military re~earch and development effort, scientific intelligence and equipment are devel Army technical intelligence support is and the military technical/scientific effort withoped. timely and appropriate technical intelligence. provided as close to the area of collection as The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligencepossible in order to accomplish this mission • (ACSI), Department of the Army, has general(fig. 6). staff responsibility for all scientific and techni~ cal intelligence activities in the Army. Specificb. The objectives of the strat-egic technical intelligence effort are to- ally, ACSI, DA, performs the following: (1) Determine capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of foreign techa; Formulates policies and procedures which nology, materiel, facilities, and: instal-. insure that scientific and: technical intelligence lations. activities are carried out in the most efficient (2) Exploit foreign technologies for the and, productive manner.. benefit of the US forces. b. Supervises the preparation anmmand. As: re,.. quirements: are satisfied, the information and/ or materiel are forwarded direct, or through major oversea command channels,. to CONUS. Unless specific instructions te the• contrary are given by a Department of the Army agency, all items for CONUS exploitation must be forwarded to the Foreign Technical Intelligence Office (FTIO), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in accordance with provisions of the theater command. This office makes the deci --~ I • 96. Strategic. Dissemination When the final technical intelligence. reports are produced, they are disseminated to various consumers in accordance with previously requested, statements. of intelligence interest (SII). A continual feedback of information from oversea producers to DIA and from DIA and CONUS-producing units to the oversea major commands is necessary if the entire technical intelligence cycle is to be effective. The distribution of technical information from CONUS-producing units is made by DIA to the oversea command to insure that military intelligence units are kept abreast of important enemy technical and scientific trends and developments. AGO 5590A AR 75-15 AR 320-5 AR 320-50 AR 350-25 AR 380-series AR 551-50 AR 755-14 FM 3-10 ~-= 3-10A FM 3-10B FM 5-30 FM 9-6 FM 9-30 FM 11-30 FM 17-1 FM 19-40 APPENDIX I REFERENCES Responsibilities and procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Dictionary of United States Army Terms. Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes. Civil Affairs Training. Military Security. Training of Foreign Personnel by the United States Army. Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents. Employment of Biological Agents. Employment of Chemical Agents. Engineer Intelligence. Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations. Maintenance Battalion: Division Support Command. Signal Corps Technical Intelligence. Armor Operations. Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees. FM 21-5 FM 21-6 FM 27-10 FM 29-22 FM 30-series FM 30-5 FM 30-15 FM 31-16 FM 32-5 (CM) FM 33-5 FM 41-5 FM 41-10 FM 55-8 FM 100-5 FM 100-10 FM 100-20 {C) FM 101-5 Military Training. Techniques of Military Instruction. The Law of Land Warfare. Maintenance Operations in the Field Army. Military Intelligence. Combat Intelligence. Intelligence Interrogations. Counterguerrilla Operations. Communications Security (U). Psychological Operations. Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government. Civil Affairs Operations. Transportation Intelligence. Field Service Regulations -Operations. Combat Service Support. Field Service Regulations -Counterinsurgency (U). Staff Officer's Field Manual; Staff Organization and Procedure. AGO 5590A FM 101-31-1 Staff Officer's Field Man-DA Pam 310-4 Index of Technical Man~\ ual ; Nuclear Weapons uals,·Technical ,I Employment. Regulations, Technical Bulletins, Supply JCS Pub 1 Dictionary of United Bulletins, Lubrication States Military Terms Orders, and Modificafor Joint Usage. tion Work Orders. JCS Pub 2 Unified Action Armed TOE 3-500E Chemical Service Organ-Forces (UNAAF). ization. DA Pam 27-1 Treaties Governing Land TOE 30-series Military Intelligence. Warfare. NATO Standardization Agreements DA Pam 27-161-2 International Law. STANAG 2084 and 2097. AGO 6690A 51 APPENDIX II MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE Major categories of technical intelligence interest used for planning purposes (1) Science and Technology. (a) Medical sciences. (b) Physical sciences. (c) Chemical sciences. (d) Research and development. (e) Materials. {f) Military equipment production. (g) Missiles and rockets. (2) Nuclear. (a) Nuclear materials. (b) Weapons and munitions. (c) Nuclear reactors. (d) Nuclear power systems. (e) Nuclear propulsion. (3) Electronics. {a) Radar. (b) Computers. (c) Communications. (d) Reconnaissance and surveillance equipment. (e) Electronic countermeasures. {f) Laser. (g) Telemetry. (h) Other. (4) CB. (a) CB agents. (b) Weapons and munitions. (c) CB defensive equipment. (5) Ground Systems. (a) Combat vehicles (wheeled and track). (b) Support/logistical vehicles. (c) Artillery. (d) Air defense equipment. (e) Infantry weapons. (/) Ammunition, munitions, fuzes. (g) Antitank equipment. (h) Individual equipment and/or sup plies. {i) Special warfare weapons. (j) Maintenance equipment. (k) Amphibious equipment. (l) Camouflage equipment. ( m) Wire support equipment. (n) Airborne equipment. ( o) Target acquisition equipment. ( 6) Aerodynamic Systems. (a) Bombers. (b) Fighters, (c) Drones. (d) Helicopters. (e) Reconnaissance aircraft. {f) Other. (7) Missiles. (a) Aircraft-launched missiles. (b) Ground-to-ground missiles. 1. Short-range missiles. 2. Intermediate range missiles. 3. Long-range missiles. • (c) Air defense missiles. (d) Anti-tank missiles. (e) Anti-missile missiles. {f) Space systems. (g) Submarine/ship-launched missiles. (8) Sensor Equipment (a) Optical. (b) Acoustic. (c) Radint. {d) Photographic. (e) Elint. {f) Telemetry (measuring devices) laser. (g) Other. (9) Information Storage and Retrieval. (a) Electronic data processing equipment. (b) Document processing equipment. (c) Manual equipment. (d) Machine translation equipment. (e) Real-time ADP equipment. (f) Telemetry support equipment. (g) Graphic display equipment. 52 AGO 51i90A CLASSIFICATION APPENDIX Ill EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN Copy No. Thirtieth Army HEIMERSHEIN, (595120) Germany 100930 July 10- Appendix ______ to Annex ______ (Intelligence) to Operation Order. 1. General a. References. b. Purpose and scope. c. Period covered. d. Subordinate elements required to support similar plans. e. Priorities. 2. Organization a. Intelligence Agencies (at each echelon). (1) Organization. (2) Functions. (8) Subordinate agencies functions. ( 4) Supporting agencies. ( 5) Liaison and coordination. b. A subparagraph for each combat service support technical intelli~nce section as it relates to paragraph 2c. (1) Weapons-munitions. (2) Communication~electronics. {3) Supp1y and equipment. ( 4) Chemical. (5) Mobility. (6) Medical c. Each combat service support element should know the .Lollowing: ( 1) Mission. (2) General organization. (3) Functional team structure. ( 4) Allotment of technical intelligence personnel. ( 5) Specific functions and responsibilities. (6) Location of collection points at each ·echelon. -~ CLASSIFICATION ', AGO 6690A '53 CLASSIFICATION (7) Availability of chemical and medical laboratories in the theater. 3. Personnel a. Military policies concerning: (1) Responsibilities of capturing unit. (2) Handling captured enemy materiel. (3) Handling abandoned equipment. ( 4) Handling technical facilities and installations. ( 5) Authority for destruction of captured materiel when necessary. ( 6) Taking custody of enemy materiel from capturing units. (7) Technical intelligence collection team operations in forward areas. ( 8) Preliminary examinations and analysis. (9) Reports to be rendered. (a) To tactical units. (b) To technical intelligence company. (10) Coordination and liaison with combat intelligence personnel. (11) Equipment evacuation. (12) Markings and tags. b. Civilian (1) Policies concerning civilians in an area of military operations having a technical knowledge. (2) Limitations on activities of individuals and groups. (3) Policies concerning evacuation of civilian personnel. (4) Interrogation of civilians having a technical knowledge. • 4. Direction a. Important policies governing overall technical intelligence collection and analysis (trophies, souvenirs, theater policies). b. Amplification of Items Wanted Lists. c. Special technical intelligence targets. d. Policies governing publishing requirements. e. Support to be provided by the field army and its subordinate support elements (i.e. F ASCOM, General and Direct Support Elements). f. Additional support requirements necessary and by whom rendered. g. Preparing EEI and other intelligence requirements. h. Host-country agreement (if applicable). 5. Collections a. Documents (1) Procedures for collecting technical documents. (2) Forwarding and handling of technical documents (see appendix IV, STANAG 2084, FM 30-16). (3) Responsibilities for translation of technical documents. CLASSIFICATION AGO 5590A CLASSIFICATION ( 4) Responsibilities for analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of technical data. (5) Handling of timely technical data. (6) Channels for forwarding. b. Prisoners (1) Procedures for selecting personnel with technical knowledge. (2) Responsibilities of IPW personnel. (3) Technical intelligence cooperation with IPW and combat intelligence personnel. ( 4) Handling of military personnel with technical knowledge. (5) Handling of civilian personnel with technical knowledge. (6) Channels for evacuation. ( 7) Ultimate disposition (civilians, defectees). ( 8) Reports to be rendered. c. Materiel (1) Specific unit responsibilities. (2) Examination policies. (3) Evacuation channels. (a) Primary. (b) Alternate. (4) Destruction policies (authority to determine whether a target should be destroyed). (5) Policies in regard to significant new equipment. (6) Sensitive or classified equipment. (7) Safeguarding. (8) Marking. (9) Ultimate disposition. d. Facilities and Installations. (1) Procedures for collecting, analyzing, and reporting information. (2) Areas of primary overall intelligence and technical intelligence interest. (3) Channels for forwarding facilities data. ( 4) Disposition and dissemination of facilities data. 6. Processing a. Records and/or files required to be maintained. b. General policies governing preparation of technical reports. (1) Preliminary reports (PRETECHREPS). (2) Detailed technical reports (DETECHREPS). c. Liaison and coordination between personnel of the technical intelligence company and other intelligence elements concerning evaluation and interpretation of technical information. 7. Dissemination a. Scope. b. Content. e. Editorial assistance. CLASSIFICATION AGO 6690A 55 CLASSIFICATION d. Types of reports. ( e. Special reports. f. Policies governing dissemination. 8. Functional and Task Force Operations. a. Theater and/or theater army policies. b. Scope and priorities. c. Effort that may be expended on missions. d. Additional support sources if needed. e. Procedures for collecting and reporting data. f. Responsibilities for direction of operations. g. Limitations on units and individuals. h. Security. i. Safeguarding components of intelligence value. j. Host-country agreement. JONES General Distribution: C OFFICIAL Is/ S.S.SMITH Smith G2 CLASSIFICATION AGO 6690A APPENDIX IV STANAG 2084-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (Editorial note: STANAG 2084-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT, dated 22 June 1962, also adopted as SOLOG 94, is a primary concern in this field manual. Normally, the Details of Agreement (DofA) which appear in this STANAG would have been reproduced in this appendix, and remain valid until such time as the STANAG is officially withdrawn or revised. However, this procedure has not been followed in this instance because the U. S. Armed Forces (and other NATO members) have developed and concurred in a revision of STANAG 2084 which has been recommended to the Army Board, Military Agency for Standardization, NATO, for promulgation as STANAG 2084 (Edition No. 2)-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS. It is anticipated that the revised STANAG will be promulgated approximately in April 1966; therefore, the DofA of the revised STANAG (subject to minor editorial changes which may appear in the published text of Edition No. 2) have been selected for the appendix of this field manual in lieu of the DofA which they will soon replace. It is also to be noted that the descriptive title of STANAG 2084 (Edition No. 2) has been changed to agree with the sequence followed in the DofA). STANAG 2084 (Edition No. 2) HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS (Adopted as SOLOG 94) DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA) HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS Enclosures: Annex A (DofA)-Types of Captured Enemy Equipment Annex B (DofA)-PRETECHREP Annex C(DofA)-COMTECHREP-TYPE A Annex D (DofA)-COMTECHREP-TYPE B Annex E (DofA)-COMTECHREP-TYPE C Annex F (DofA)-Technical Intelligence Teams AGREEMENT 1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will use the procedure detailed in Part I for the handling of captured enemy equipment and associated technical documents and in Part II for handling captured enemy documents. It is further agreed to use the item list of equipment and the description and procedure for these reports in Annexes A-F (DofA). Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice any national right on the equipment proper. DEFINITIONS 1. Document Any recorded information regardless of its physical form of characteristics includes, but is not limited to, the following: All written mate- AGO 5590A rial, whether handwritten or printed or typed; all painted, drawn or engraved material; all sound or voice recordings; all printed photographs and exposed or printed film, still or motion picture; and all reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process produced. PART I HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS GENERAL 2. Captured enemy equipment (CEE) and associated technical documents will be handled for exploitation with the minimum delay through the following processing channels: a. Preliminary screening and reporting for information of immediate tactical value by national units assigned to NATO. b. Secondary screening and complementary reporting by special intelligence support teams (Technical Intelligence Teams). c. Detailed exploitation by specialists in the rear areas. Note. A detailed list of the types of CEE to be processed is given in Annex A (DofA). 3. The technical intelligence reports and documents considered are: a .. Preliminary Technical Reports (PRETECHREP) (submitted by the capturing Unit). Annex B (DofA). b. Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP) (submitted by Technical Intelligence Teams). Annex B (DofA). c. Detailed Technical Reports (DETECHREP) (submitted by specialists as appropriate). d. Captured Enemy Technical Documents (TECHDOC) (Mainte • nance Handbooks, Operation Manuals, Drawings, etc.). 4. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams should be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment for the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists for a permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a position to: a. Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Technical Reports. b. Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical Reports. c. Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base or to the captured equipments depot (which are to be established at a minimum of one per Army Group). d. Liaison with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units. e. Insure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined as soon as interrogation units have finished with the items concerned. Full use should be made of voluntary information which the PW may give. (See STANAG 2033 (Edition No. 2).) Note. Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which, according to Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must be left with the PW, AGO 6690A 58 must be replaced by equivalent items serving the same purpose (See STANAG 2044 (Edition No. 2).) f. Receive from intelligence ,channels :all •copies of technical documents which may assist them in their examination. 5. Technical Intelligence T.eams should as far as possible be independent, or .organic to the units ·earmarked or :assigned to NA:TO .and be sufficiently flexible to cater f.or a variety and number of equipments. Th~y will need to be equipped with suitable tools, transport and facilities for compiling and sending their reports from the field. Suggested allocation for these teams is given at Annex F (DofA). 6. Specialist Teams are required to carry out the more detailed ·examination of captured enemy equipments to supplement the more superficial data which can be obtained in the field. Such teams should be in a position after their examination to render the Detailed Technical Report. No suggested allocation is given for these teams as they will depend on national resources available. HANDLING OF CEE BY CAPTURING UNIT • 7. Units locating enemy equipment of intelligence value will submit the Preliminary Technical Report given at Annex B (DofA). This report will be transmitted by the accelerated intelligence reporting procedures when it contains intelligence information which could have an immediate effect upon the current situation. Reports not containing such information will be transmitted by the quickest possible means with the precedence as determined by the commander initiating the report. These reports will contain a general description of the equipment and any technical information of immediate tactical importance. 8. Unit Commanders will be responsible for placing the captured enemy equipment under guard in order to prevent looting, misuse or destruction before the arrival of the Technical Intelligence Field Teams. 9. All technical documents will be clearly tagged or otherwise identified so as to avoid defacing and marked "TECHDOC" by the capturing unit or appropriate agency. In the normal exploitation of captured docu. ments the Command concerned can provide duplicate copies for the guidance of all Technical Intelligence and Specialist Teams in their examinations. All such copies should accompany captured equipment until technical exploitation is finalized. 10. The command concerned will notify the appropriate Technical Intelligence Team, which will arrange to examine the CEE, either on the spot or nearby where better field facilities may exist. (See Annex F(DofA).) 11. Having completed the field examination, the relevant parts of the Complementary Report will be completed and sent through normal staff channels. The description of such equipment and any additional information of tactical value as can be extracted will be sent directly to such headquarters as specified by NATO Authorities. The formats of these reports are given in Annexes C, D and E (DofA). AGO 6690A HANDLING OF CEE FOR SPECIALISTS 12. Arrangements should then be made for the speedy evacuation of the equipment to the rear areas where suitable facilities exist for a detailed examination of the equipment by specialists. 13. This will enable the completion of a Detailed Technical Report. No illustration is given of this type of report in view of the great variety of equipments involved. It should, however, follow the pattern already used by national technical exploitation agencies. Such reports will be submitted as soon as possible by specialists through the same channels as those laid down for Complementary Reports. If directed, national intel ligence agencies should also be informed after either the Complementary or the Detailed Technical Reports have been forwarded. 14. In the case where the capturing nation is not in a position to conduct an exhaustive field or rear area exploitation of the equipment, the appropriate NATO authority will advise the capturing nation as to further action. In these cases, the exploitation agency should inform the capturing nation of the results of that exploitation. PART II HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS GENERAL 15. Captured enemy documents (CED), except those belonging to CEE (TECHDOC) or reproductions thereof, will be forwarded for exploitation to the appropriate "Captured Document Center." These centers will be, as a rule, organic to Major NATO Commands. Captured documents will be sent with the minimum delay through the following processing channels: a. National units assigned to NATO for preliminary screening for information of immediate tactical value. b. Special Intelligence Support Teams for CED for secondary screening, reproductions and dissemination to ail concerned. c. USACDC for detailed exploitation and indexing. 16. Captured documents will be divided as follows: a. Category "A." Category "A" documents are those which contain information concerning significant intelligence subjects, such as enemy order of battle, the employment of new weapons and equipment by the enemy, his logistic situation, (Stock levels, shortage, supply systems, especially supply systems for mh;siles) his morale, his losses, etc. Such documents require immediate operational exploitation, and the originals or microfilm copies must reach appropriate operational intelligence staffs at the earliest possible moment. b. Category "B." Category "B" documents are cryptographic documents, all encrypted items and all documents relating to enemy radio systems. These documents must reach the appropriate intelligence staffs at the earliest possible moment. AGO 6690A c. Category "C." Category "C" documents are those of lesser intelligence value. d. Category "D." Category "D" documents are those which containno information of intelligence value. HANDLING OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS BY THE CAPTURING UNIT 17. Captured documents will be forwarded without delay by the capturing unit to the staff under which the unit is operating, with details ofthe date, time and place of capture (with map coordinates), together withthe name of the capturing unit and the circumstances under which thedocuments were found. 18. Documents will be clearly tagged, or otherwise identified so asto avoid defacing, by the capturing unit in the following way: a. Identification Letters. Documents will be tagged showing thenationality of the capturing force by the national identifying letters prescribed in STANAG 1059. b. Designation of Capturing Units. This will include the serviceto which the unit belongs. c. Serial Number. Units will give each document a serial numberand should record the dispatch of the document in a war diary. d. Date/Time of capture. e. Place of capture (with map coordinates). f. Summary of circumstances under which the document was found. 19. In cases, where documents are discovered by personnel of NATOstaffs and units, and not by national forces assigned to or earmarked forNATO, then the identification letters to be used will be "NA." Other instructions in paragraph 18, however, will apply. 20. Whenever intelligence derived from a captured document is included in a unit or information intelligence report, the identification letters and number of the document concerned will be quoted to avoid subsequent false confirmation. HANDLING OF CED BY INTELLIGENCE STAFFS ANDSPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS 21. All captured documents will be categorized and forwarded. Thedetailed procedures for handling captured documents will include the following main tasks: a. Screening. b. Recording c. Translation. d. Reproduction. e. Dissemination. 22. Intelligence staffs will insure that there is no delay in the exploitation of captured documents. If for any reason, qualified personnel ormicrofilming facilities are temporarily not available or are insufficientto handle the volume or type of documents concerned, the documents AGO 5590A 61 \ will be forwarded immediately to the next higher echelon and will not be retained by the staff in question. 23. The staff concerned will handle the documents in one of the following ways : a. Category "A." (1) Where microfilming facilities exist, they will photograph documents with attached comments, and forward original documents direct to either the national agency or the appropriate NATO Intelligence Support Unit for exploitation, by-passing intermediate headquarters. Where suitable linguists are available, microfilms will be examined for information of tactical value to local commanders. (2) Where microfilming facilities do not exist, but suitable lin guists are available, they will examine documents for information of tactical value to local commanders, attach appropriate comments, and forward without delay to the appropriate higher headquarters. (3) Where linguists are not available within the formation headquarters, the documents should go to the PW interrogators for evaluation. b. Category "rB:" These will be forwarded without delay to the Naval, Army, or Air Force headquarters which are primarily interested. The NATO international headquarters under which the capturing unit operates should be informed ,of the capture and disposition of important documents in this category as soon as possible. c. Category "C.'' ·The staff concerned will forward Category "C" documents direct to the appropriate NATO Intelligence Support Unit for exploitation. Exceptions to this procedure include: (1) Unmarked maps and charts of previously unknown types which will be forwarded to the nearest engineer unit or topographical section. (2) Personal mail and paybooks taken from a PW, which will be returned to the PW after exploitation by interrogation personnel or intelligence staffs. (3) Other documents acquired from a PW which, after they have served their purpose in interrogation, will be forwarded to the appropriate intelligence staff for further exploitation. (4) Documents specifically related to equipment which will, if of intelligence value, accompany the equipment to the intelligence agency responsible for exploitation and then will be sent without delay to the captured document center. d. Category "D.'' Captured documents will not become final as Category "D" until they have been thoroughly analyzed by document translation specialists at the highest command echelon interested, preferably at least two levels above division. Category "D" documents will be disposed of as directed by appropriate authority. 24. Documents of the Categories "A," "B," "C," and "D" captured from crashed enemy aircraft or, in particular, related to enemy antiaircraft defense or enemy control and reporting systems, will be transmitted to the nearest Air Force headquarters without delay. The same procedure applies to all captured maps and charts of enemy air forces. After evaluation by the responsible Air Force intelligence staff they will be transmitted to the topographical or other appropriate unit. Documents AGO 5590A // • taken from a ship, including Category "B" code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, etc., should be forwarded without delay to the nearest naval force headquarters. 25. As a general rule, Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals and drawings should accompany the captured equipment until the intelligence exploitation is completed. HANDLING OF CED BY THE CAPTURED DOCUMENT CENTER (CDC) 26. Lists of documents which have been exploited will be distributed to all intelligence staffs by the CDC to avoid duplication in translating and processing identical documents by different units. A master list of all captured documents which have be~n exploited in NATO commands will be maintained. 27. When action on captured documents at CDC has been completed, the original documents will be sent to the national staff whose forces captured them. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT 28. This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions putting the procedures detailed in this Agreement into effect have been issued to the forces concerned . AGO 5590A Annex A (DofA) STANAG 2084 (Edition No. 2) TYPES OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT • Types of enemy equipment to be collected and examined by Technical Intelligence Teams. (New equipment or equipment in the process of devel opment ("significant equipment") will be the main concern of these teams.) 1. Army Equipment. COMTECHREP a. Guided missiles. b. Ammunition, all types including mines, demolitions, pyrotechnics and chemical. c. Infantry weapons. d. Sabotage equipment. e. Armored fighting vehicles (AFV's) Type B f. Military vehicles excluding AFV's. See Annex g. Artillery, including anti-tank, anti-aircraft and field D(DofA) rocket weapons. h. Guided missile launching systems. i. Engineering, amphibious and river crossing j. Electronics, infra-red detection and communication equipment. J k. Airborne equipment. I. Special weapons, including nuclear, biological and chemical warfare equipment, flame and incendiary weapons, equipment for dispergion of chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective Type C devices. See Annex m. Miscellaneous equipments: r(DofA) (1) Camouflage equipment. (2) Clothing and personal equipment. (3) Medical equipment. (4) Rations. 2. Air Force Equipment. 1 a. Aircraft, airframe and power plant. b. Airborne, armament and ammunition, bomb sights, gun sights and photographic equipment. c. Airborne radio and electrical equipment. d. Miscellaneous airborne equipment, including instruments and controls, dinghies, parachute and other safety equipment. e. Ground equipment and installations. f. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants. g. Guided missiles and associated equipment. h. Equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents. i. Miscellaneous equipments: (1) Flying clothing equipment, including G-suits, pressure breathing equipment, etc. (2) Medical equipments and flying rations. J AGO 5590A 64 • 3. Navy E:quipment. a. Ships. b. Missiles and hmnehing systems. c.. Shipboard ordnance, including guns, fire control equipment, i.e., radars, range finders,. stable elements, range keepers. spotters'' telescopes, gun mounts and turrets, ammunition hoists,. rammers, fuzes, fuze setters, reco:Fl mechanisms, weapons of all types including Hedgehogs, Mousetraps, WeapenJ "A" equivalents, Lirnbo types,. depth charge racks and "Y" and: "K'•' gun. launchers;; torpedoes and torpedo tubes; induding ASW launchers.; rockets and rocket launchers. d. Sea mines of an types, including moored, bottom and floating ; contact and influence, e. Harbour defense equipment including nets,. booms, alerting devices, net tenders. f. Navy electronics, infra-red, detection and communication equipment, sonars, fathometers and. sonobuoys. g~. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants. h. Special weap