TRAILBLAZER 1 9 6 •• THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Edited by James D. Outzen , Ph . D. TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM EDITED BY JAMES D . OUTZEN, PH . D. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE AUGUST 2012 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE The Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) is an independent National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) research body reporting to the Director, Business Plans and Operations . The CSNR's primary mission is to advance and shape the Intelligence Community's understanding of the discipline , practice, and history of national reconnaissance through research and analysis. Our methodology is social science and history based . Our objective is to make available information that can provide NRO leadership with the analytic framework and historical context to make effective policy and programmatic decisions . The CSNR accomplishes its mission by chronic ling the past , analyzing the present , searching for lessons for the future, and identifying models of excellence that are timeless. Copyright Information: All rights reserved . Where there may be copyrighted material , you may not reproduce it without permission of the copyright owner. Contact Information: To contact the CSNR , please phone us at 703-488-4733 or e-mail us at csnr@nro.mil To Obtain Copies: Government personnel can obtain additional printed copies directly from CSNR. Other requestors can purchase printed copies by contacting : Government Printing Office 732 North Capitol Street , NW Washington , DC 20401 -0001 http ://www.gpo .gov Published by National Reconnaissance Office Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance 14675 Lee Road Chantilly, Virginia 20151-1715 Printed in the United States of America ISBN : 978-1-937219-10-9 CONTENTS Foreword .. ... ........ ......... .. ....... ..... ........... ... ........ .. .... .............. ..... ...... .... .... ..... ..... ..... .. ..... ... .. ... ..... ...... ......... ......... ..... viii Preface ... ... ........ .......... ... ........ .... ... .......... ................................. .... ... ..... ..... .. o·............... 0 •••••• •• •• • • •••• • oo.. ..... ........ .. 0 ••• • •• xii lntroduction ... .... ... ....... o········ o·················o ..... .... o ........o.......o................................... o·· ·· ··· ····· ·············o ········ o ..o.o..........xvi Section 1: Quill Histories ..... 1 0 ..... . .... . ... . . 0 . . ........ . .......... . . . .. . . . ... . . .... . . ...... . . . ... . 0 • • ••••• • 0 •• ••••••••••••••• 0 ................ .. 0 . 0 ........ . . ... 0 Quill : Radar in Orbit ......................... ... ... ................................... o........o............................... ... o ..... ............. ..... o ...2 Quill : The First Imag ing Radar Satellite ................................................ ... .... ...... .... ........ .. ........... .. .................. 25 Section II: Quill Documentation Overview .................... .... o.. ............ o ........ o .................. o .......................................... 58 Section Ill : Quill Program Development , Management, and Security Documents ...... ..... ... ...... .... .. ........ .. ... ...... .... 60 Document 1 -Memorandum from Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to The Director of Central Intelligence concerning status of current national reconnaissance satellite programs , 14 December 1962 ....... .... .... ...... ... .. ..... .. ....... .. .. ..... ... ...... ... .... .... ....... ... .. ....... .................. ..... ............ .... ........ ... 65 Document 2 -Secure Cable concerning open and covert procurement for the Quill program , 06 March 1963 ............................................ .. ........ .. ....... ...... .. ......... ... ... ...... ..... ..... ...... ...... ............................. .. 71 Document 3-Security Memorandum concerning request for support from the Corona program, 1 April 1963 .... .... ....... .... 77 0 . . . . ... ....... . ............ . . . ........ . .. . ........ .. . . .. ..... ...... . . . ... . .... . ...... . ................ .. ...... .. ..... ... .......... Document 4-Security Memorandum in preparation for meeting with the Quill program manager, 21 March 1963 ....... ... .......... .......................................... .. ................ .... .............. ....... .. ..... .. ........ ... ...... .... ....... ... 85 Document 5-Security Memorandum summarizing security officer meeting with the Quill program manager, 29 March 1963 .... ................................................ .. ............ .................. ... .. .. .. .. .. ... ..... .. .. ................ .. .. 91 Document 6 -Security Cable providing guidance on Quill security, 9 April 1963 .. .. ...... .. .. ............... .. .. .. .. ..... 93 Document 7-NRO Programs ' Status Paper supporting the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office 's Briefing to the United States Intelligence Board , 13 November 1963 ........................................ .. ... .. .. 97 Document 8-Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office identifying questions and concerns about the National Reconnaissance Program Budget , 23 July 1964 .................. .. .......... ...... .. ..... .... ..................... ................. .... .... ...... ... ....... .. ....... 107 Document 9 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissa nce Office to the Deputy Secretary of Defense addressing Director of Central Intelligence 's concerns about the National Reconna issance Program Budget , 29 July 1964 .................. ......... .. ... ... .... .. .... ... .. .... ....... . 0 . ............... .. .. ... ..... TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPEND IUM Document 10-Security Memorandum concerning handling of future imagery from the Quill program , 22 October 1964 .............................. ... ..... ...... ...... ... .................... ............ ...... ............... ...... ...... ...... ................ 125 Document 11 -Security Memorandum on security protection of Quill imagery, 22 October 1964 .. .. .......... 127 Document 12-Security Memorandum on need for special security controls for the Quill pr gram , 23 October 1964 ...... ... .... .. ... ................ .. ...... .... ......... ...... .. ..... ...... .. .. ..... ...... ....... ... ...... ..... ........ ....... ... ..... ... ... . 129 Document 13-Security Memorandum on use of Byeman security controls for the Quill program, 7 December 1964 ............ .. ................... .................................... .... ....... .. ........................................ ..... ... .. ..... 131 Section IV: Quill Flight Vehicle Assessment Documents .. .......... .......... .... .... .... .... ........ .... ........ .. .... .. .................... 138 Document 14-Quill Vehicle System Report , Volume One , 31 March 1965 (Excerpts) .............................. 141 Document 15-Quill Vehicle System Report , Volume Two , 31 March 1965 (Excerpts) .. .. .............. .... .. .. .. .. 189 Document 16 -Quill Vehicle System Report, Volume Three , 31 March 1965 (Excerpts) .. .. ...... .... .. .... .. .. ... 241 Document 17-Quill Program Report , Volume One , 1 April1965 (Excerpts) ...................... ...... .... .............. 253 Document 18 -Quill Program Report , Volume Two , 1 April 1965 (Excerpts) ................................ .... .... ...... 273 Section V: Evaluation Documents of the Quill Radar Imagery Products .............................................. ................ 296 Document 19-Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Secretary of Defense concerning increasing responsiveness of reconnaissance satellites, 11 January 1965 .................................................................. .. ...... .. ......... .. ...... .. .............................. ......... ...... 299 Document 20-Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, requesting assistance in evaluating of Quill imagery products, 3 February 1965 ..... .. ........ .. .............................................................................................. 311 Document 21 -Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency o the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office in response to a request for assistance in evaluating of Quill imagery, 8 February 1965 ...... .. .......... ...... .. ...... ...... .. ...... ...... ...... .... ........ .. .. .. .... .. ...... ............ .... .... .. .... 313 Document 22-Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center requesting an evaluation of Quill Products , undated ...... ...... ....... ... ........ ........ ...... ...... .......... ..................... .......... ..... ......................................... ..... ..... ....... 315 Document 23 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to t e NRO Staff Director requesting a study of the use of radar imagery in analysis of military targets , 14April1965..... ..... ... ... ..... ...... ..... ...... .... ...... .... ........ .. ... ....... .... .... ....... ... .. .. ... ..... ... ...... .. ... .. .. ... ....... .. ... ..... ..... 317 CONTENTS Document 24 -Project Quill Exploitation and Evaluation Report by the National Photographic Interpretation Center, 1 August 1965 (Excerpts) .............................. ..... ........ .... ........ ............................ ... ...... 319 Document 25 -Semi-Annual Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on the Activities of the National Reconnaissance Program, 1 November 1965 to 30 April 1966 (Excerpts) ............ 331 Section VI: Quill Program Closeout Documents ................................................ ................................................ .. . 338 Document 26-Memorandum for the Record concerning dropping Quill from Byeman controls, 28 May 1968 .................................................................................................................................................. 341 Document 27 -Letter from the Central Intelligence Agency 's Deputy Director for Science and Technology to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office regarding dropping Quill from Byeman Controls , 6 February 1969 .......................................................................... .. ..... .. ...... .... ... .... ..... ...... 343 Document 28 -Security Cable notification of removal of Quill from Byeman Controls , 10 February 1969 .. ......................................................................... ... .. ............ .. ......... .... .. ............................. 345 Section VII : Chronology... ..................................................... .... ....... .... ..... ....... ....... .. ............. .. ............ ............. .... 348 FOREWORD In 1964, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)in the secret world of its then highly classified Byeman Security Control System-conducted what has become known as the Quill experiment. This experiment resulted in another first for the NRO-the collection of radar imagery from space . This took place fourteen years before the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducted its 1978 short-term Seasat mission as a proof-of-concept for the use of radar remote sensing for ocean studies . The Quill experiment also took place almost 30 years before the emergence of regularized space borne radar imaging for the remote sensing community with missions such as the European Space Agency 's ERS-1 in 1991 and the Canad ian Space Agency 's RADARSAT-1 in 1995. In 1964 Quill was highly classified and remained so until programmatic declassification in 2012 . Since the Secretary of Defense approved the declassification of the fact of the NRO in 1992 , the NRO has initiated a growing number of programmatic declassifications . The first wave was during the ten-year period between 1995 and 2005 with the 1995 declassification of the Corona program , the 1998 declassification of the Grab Sigint satellite information , and the 2004 declassification of Poppy Sigint satellite information. The declassification of the Qu ill experiment will mark the NRO 's greatest declassification efforts , and one of the largest such efforts among U.S. intelligence agencies . In mid-2011 , during the NRO 's 50th anniversary commemoration , DNRO Carlson , significantly expanded the NRO 's earlier declassification record . In June of 2011 he approved the comprehensive declassification of the Gambit-1 , Gambit-3 , and Hexagon film-return satellite reconnaissance programs . That decision included not only the declassification of documents , but also the declassification and transfer of program artifacts to the National Museum of the United States Air Force for public display. This 2012 declassification and release of Quill program documentation concludes that record 13-month period when the NRO conducted its single greatest declassification of what had been the most sensitive technical intelligence collection information of the Cold War and beyond . This compendium gives you an opportunity to read some of the leading edge of that formerly most sensitive national reconnaissance documentation in its original form . The NRO 's Quill project was a remarkable experiment for its time . It was an early trailblazer in the nation 's national reconnaissance program . It was the first effort by the then newly formed NRO to obtain space imagery from a new type of sensor, the radar sensor. At the same time as it was undertaking the Qu ill effort , the NRO was improving the Corona photoreconnaissance satellites inherited from a joint collaboration between the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Air Force , and developing a new high resolution photoreconnaissance satellite known as Gambit. These systems , along with early Sigint satellite systems would prove important to establishing the National Reconnaissance Office 's reputation as a so urce of intelligence that could not be obta ined by other intelligence collection means . Quill, itself, is important to the NRO for a least five reasons . First , it demonstrated that radar imagery could be obtained from space , setting the foundation for future radar imagery satellite programs at the NRO . Second, Quill built upon the NRO 's experiences with the Corona program , setting a precedent for the NRO to leverage its resources and technology across multiple programs. Third , Quill contributed to an early culture of success at the NRO where technological savvy was a prized asset , favoring timely and well-informed decisions rather than dependence on cumbersome bureaucratic processes . Fourth , Quill was an important developmental assignment for Major David Bradburn who would become an Air Force Majo r General , serve as staff director of the NRO headquarters staff, and lead the Air Force 's program at the NRO known as Program A . Finally, Quill was a trailblazing program for inviting cooperation from intelligence organizations outside the NRO to assist in assessing and improving NRO programs . The NRO Historian and Chief of the Historical Documentation and Research (HDR) Section of the Center for the Study of National Reconna issance (CSNR), Dr. James Outzen , has assembled all of the available Quill documents and published them in this compendium, Trailblazer 1964 : The Quill Experimental Radar Imagery Satellite Compendium. Dr. Outzen organized the compendium into six topical sections that help the reader understand not only the historical details of the program , but also the historical significance of the program . He begins the compendium with a comprehensive int roduction that puts Quill into the geopolitical context of the time and its relationship to the NRO 's development of early satellite reconnaissance programs. My expectation is that readers of this compendium will gain insight into this early experimental program. For those involved in experimental technology efforts , the Quill histories and documents in this compendium should reveal how determination , good technology development skills , and significant cooperation between several government organizations were all instrumental in carrying out a highly successful satellite experiment. For those with an interest in developing space radar TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELL I TE COMPENDIUM imaging capabilities , this compendium can serve as a basic reference volume on the earliest effort to obtain and process radar returns into useable imagery intelligence . For those interested in how government organizations can succeed , the documents in this compendium can be used as a case study that demonstrates the importance of good personal relationships , a focus on using government processes to buttress innovation , and the essentialness of strong leadership in managing a program . Finally, for those interested in the history of the NRO , the material in this compendi um reveals the early origins of several hallmarks of later NRO success including a strong program manager, both cooperation and tensions between the CIA and the Air Force , attentiveness to leveraging space technology to offer a new intelligence collection , and determination to overcome obstacles and minimize risks of program failure . As you read this compendium , I challenge you to learn how the Quill experiment and the NRO opened the door for the U.S . Intelligence Community to obtain radar imagery from space. Robert A. McDonald , Ph.D. Director, Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance National Reconnaissance Office PREFACE The United States has declassified four major photo reconnaissance programs-Corona, Gambit, Gambit-3 , and Hexagon, as well as the smaller Argon and Lanyard programs. For the major programs , the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) have issued compendiums of key documentation . We have chosen to continue this practice with the Quill experimental radar imagery satellite launched successfully in 1964. In this compendium , Trailblazer 1964: The Quill Experimental Radar Imagery Satellite Compendium , you will find all the documentation that currently exists relating to the Quill program , including two histories and 28 other documents . Unlike the larger photoreconnaissance programs thatthe NRO previously declassified , Quill was an experimental program. The NRO only launched one Quill satellite vehicle , for a short duration mission . Consequently, the documentary base is significantly smaller than the other declassified programs. It also appears that much of the documentation associated with Quill has been destroyed as the program receded into the historical background and the NRO's radar imagery capability emerged as regular sources of classified intelligence . I have grouped the documents thematically for this publication . The first grouping consists of two histories completed on Quill. Mr. Robert L. Perry wrote the first history. Perry was the first historian to carefully document early NRO satellite reconnaissance programs as well as the management of the organization. Perry's Quill history is important for keeping Quill from being forgotten as the NRO later developed new, sustained radar imagery capabilities . Perry carefully documented the Quill program and , like his other historical work , his history of Quill is well-written and demonstrates strong historical tradecraft. Dr. Robert L. Butterworth would later produce a Quill history that draws heavily from Perry 's Quill history, but also includes more historical context, examples of Quill imagery, drawings and figures , and additional historical facts . I have edited these histories, removing redacted items and substituting new language to make the histories easier to read. I have grouped the first set of Quill documents to include those related to the development of the program . In that grouping I include documents that address the reason for developing the Quill experiment , security questions surrounding Quill and other national reconnaissance programs underway at the time, the program management approach for Quill , and other details on Quill's development. In the next grouping I placed documents produced as part of the main contractors'-Lockheed Missile and Space Company as well as Goodyear Aerospace Corporation-efforts to conduct eng ineering and program assessments. These five volumes constitute the largest number of pages in the docum ent col lection . They contain not only engineering and programmatic details, but also historical summaries of the program. The volumes provide other historically interesting details such as photographs, engineering drawings, and data tables . Although Quill was originally proposed as an "offensive" collection system for assessing bomb damage after the use of U.S. military assets, by the time the NRO launched the satellite , program managers and intelligence community officials were curious about other potential intelligence uses. Consequently, the then Director of the NRO , Dr. Brockway McMillan, worked with the CIA to produce an assessment of Quill imagery and radar technology for expanded intelligence uses . I have grouped evaluation documentation that explores potential uses of radar imagery technology beyond bomb damage assessment. The final documentation grouping addresses the question of whether or not to maintain Quill security under the "Byeman Control System," which was then the primary security control system to restrict need-to-know about the NRO and its operations . With the decision to retire Quill from Byeman controls came the retirement of Quill , while at the same time the potential for new intelligence from radar imagery became a more debated issue in the intelligence community. I have only included printed excerpts of the long engineering and perfo rmance analysis reports , as well as two longer evaluation reports . The full versions of these documents are contained in a disk located at the back of this book . I have also included the redacted versions of the Perry and Butterworth histories for those interested in where material was redacted . Like any project , the development of this compendium would not have happened without the good work of several organizations and people. Those include the NRO 's Information Review and Release Team headed by Mr. Steve Glenn . Steve and his team members found , reviewed, and prepared for release the 28 documents found in this volume. Dr. Robert A. McD onald , Director of the Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) provided significant support for this project, TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM as well as his usual wisdom and insight. The CSN R is fortunate to have a staff of publication special ists whose talents are manifest in this publication . Many hands support a project such as this , and I am grateful for them all. James D. Outzen , Ph.D. Editor and Chief of Historical Documentation and Research Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance INTRODUCTION After the Iron Curtain descended between Eastern Europe and the West immediately after World War II , western allies were faced with finding ways to peer over that curtain and determine the intents and capabilities of their adversaries on the other side . The Soviet Union , China , and other communist states were mostly closed to observation. Citizens in those countries were restricted from traveling , and hence sharing insight into conditions in their daily lives with outsiders . Formal government communications were difficult to intercept and decode . Even common information sources in the West , like telephone directories , were uncommon in these denied areas , making intelligence collection difficult. At the same time , the Soviet Union was demonstrating seemingly remarkable technological capabilities such as the successful testing of nuclear weapons , the development of strategic military systems that could potentially deliver nuclear weapons to the United States, and the ability to leverage space as a platform for aiding the communist cause . Amid this environment, there was a growing imperative to gain insight into the Soviet Union and other denied areas . EARLY COLD WAR RECONNAISSANCE Following World War II , the United States had an available or in development arsenal of air, ground , and sea based weapons systems. Some of these were turned into platforms for gaining intelligence from the expanded denied areas under control of eastern bloc adversaries . For example, variations of the P-2 and F-80 were modified for overflight reconnaissance missions that flew near the borders of the Soviet Union and other denied countries to gain intelligence . Later the RB-47 would serve as a platform for many overflights. This platform proved vulnerable to being shot down by U.S. adversaries , limiting its use to missions mostly along the periphery, but not over borders of countries closed to western allies . The United States would also attempt unique experimental platforms, like a high-altitude balloon know as Genetrix that carried a camera for taking pictures over denied areas. President Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized the need for gaining better intelligence on U.S. adversaries to prevent surprises like the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that initiated the U.S. entry into World War II. Eisenhower authorized the development of a plane that would fly at 70,000 feet , well above the anti-aircraft capabilities of adversaries at the time , and carry a specially designed camera for gaining good quality photographs of the denied areas . The plane was known as the U-2 , developed under the direction of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation . The U-2 would provide useful intelligence , especially settling the question of whether or not the Soviets had an advantage in the number of long-range strategic bombers, by providing imagery that confirmed earlier estimates were overstated . Eisenhower feared that , from the time that he approved the U-2 , the plane would eventually be shot down as Soviet anti-aircraft capabilities improved. On May 1, 1960 , Eisenhower 's fears were confirmed with the downing of a U-2 piloted by Gary Powers over the Soviet Union. Anticipating this day, and the end of U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union , Eisenhower had approved the development of a photoreconnaissance satellite two years earlier, code-named Corona . By this time , the United States was trying to assess whether or not Soviet abilities to produce Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) exceeded those of the United States. CORONA AND THE BEGINNING OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE The CIA and Air Force designed the Corona satellite to carry a camera for capturing imagery of broad areas of the Soviet Union and other denied areas . The image quality was to be good enough to determine the true Soviet capabilities for developing weapons like ICBMs. It would carry film , which after exposure, would be spooled into a capsule for safe return to the earth. The return capsule would be caught mid-air by Air Force recovery teams and returned to the United States for development, processing, and interpretation by intelligence analysts. The first twelve Corona missions failed for over an 18 month period for various reasons including failures of the launch vehicle , camera system, and space control vehicle. With miss ion 13, came success. Although this was a test mission, the launch , orbit control , and return capsule all functioned properly. With mission 14 , Corona delivered the first imagery from space , and in a single mission surpassed the imaging capability of all previous U-2 missions combined. Corona would be launched a total of 145 times , ending service in 1972 . Although Corona proved to be a reliable source of imagery, it was designed to provide imagery of broad areas . This limited Corona's ability to provide highly detailed imagery that would reveal not only the location of targets , but also the details of those targets. In September, 1961 , the Kennedy administration established the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPEND IUM to take charge of the Corona program as well as all reconnaissance satellite programs under development. One of those programs, run by the U.S. Air Force , was known as Samos. The Samos program included a number of variations of photoreconnaissance satellites including one like Corona that would return film but with high resolution of specific targets, and an~ther that would read film on-orbit and electronical ly tran smit high resolution imagery back to the earth . From this foundation emerged a high resolution system known as Gambit that would dramatically increase the U.S. spacebased imagery capabilities. THE GAMBIT PHOTORECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE The NRO launched the first Gambit satellite in July, 1963. The launch was successful , as was the recovery of film from space containing higher resolution imagery than Corona provided. Gambit would face a few early difficulties with space vehicle and camera system operation, but it would prove to be a highly reliable source of imagery over the length of the program . A second generation of the Gambit system would be launched three years later, known as Gambit-3 or Gambit-cubed . Eventually, the newer Gambit system would produce very high resolution imagery from space and carry two film return capsules to increase the time that the Gambit system could image from space. The Gambit satell ites would prove an essential resource in understanding advances in Soviet nuclear capabilities, as well as other military capabilities of the Soviets and other adversaries. THE NEED TO GO BEYOND CORONA AND GAMBIT Despite the successes of the Corona and Gambit programs, they suffered some significant limitations . They could not obtain imagery at night or in poor weather conditions. Because both Corona and Gambit imagery was obtained via capsule returned from space, ima gery from the systems could not be obtained quickly. The NRO was searching for solutions to those limitations. One of those was data transfer from orbit, which had proven successful with Sigint satellites such as Grab. The other was the use of radar returns for manipulation into imagery, which the Army and Air Force had proven as a successful imagery approach using airborne platforms. Radar returns could travel through bad weather and night. Joined with data downlinks from space, a radar imagery program could address some of the limitations of the Corona and Gambit systems. QUILL Quill was born under these cond itions in 1962. The NRO originally developed Quill to test the concept of using a satellite to capture radar returns to create imagery of targets bombed by the Air Force as a result of military action . It was characterized by the Air Force as an "offensive" system to assess the effectiveness of military operations, rather than an intelligence system to gain insight into denied areas or the capabilities of U.S. adversaries . The Air Force element at the NRO , known as Program A , developed the Quill program. Major David Bradburn was assigned as the program's director. Bradburn turned to Goodyear Aerospace and another associate contractor, who were already working with Air Force on airborne radar imagery, to develop radar sensor and subsystems for the Quill satellite . Bradburn also turned to Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, which was already supporting the successful Corona program to manage the integration of the radar components onto a space vehicle and rocket system. Bradburn proposed Quill as an experimental satellite that would simply test the potential for deriving radar imagery from space. Program A eventually procured two complete systems, the first would be launched, and if successful, the second system would not. Bradburn worked diligently with the companies on contract to develop the Quill system. They were able to modify a number of existing radar and space vehicle components to integrate the system , saving time and money. They encountered little bu eaucratic resistance with the only major issue requiring resolution was how to protect the secrecy of Corona while drawing heavily on Corona system components for the program . Despite original hopes to launch Quill in the spring of 1964 , the NRO did not launch it until December 21 , 1964 . The lau nch was highly successful. All the systems worked as planned . Quill was unique in that imagery would be derived from both film de-orbited from the space veh icle using a Corona return film return system, and a radar data downlink that would be processed to create imagery on the ground. The two sources would then be compared for effectiveness . The first launch and operation of the satellite was so successful , that a INTRODUCTION second launch was deferred indefinitely until the results of the Quill experiment could be fully evaluated. RESULTS OF THE QUILL EXPERIMENT The evaluations of the space vehicle, ground components, and other elements of the Quill experiment were completed by Lockheed, Goodyear, and the associate contractor by the spring of 1965 . The companies provided rich details on the success of their efforts in their reports . A team led by the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) completed evaluation of the imagery obtained from Quill in the fall of 1965. The Quill imagery evaluation team concluded that radar imagery from space was a promising source of intelligence that could supplement imagery gained from Corona and Gambit. The team also noted that the resolution of the imagery would likely remain low and would not replace the other photoreconnaissance systems operated by the NRO. The single launch of Quill satisfied the objective of determining whether or not radar imagery from space was possible. Consequently, no additional launches were undertaken. Eventually the unused hardware procured for Quill was used in other national reconnaissance programs. By 1968, the question of whether to maintain Quill in the strict security control system for national reconnaissance satellites, known as Byeman, was addressed by CIA who maintained the control system. By 1969, the CIA , in consultation with the NRO, determined that Quill no longer needed to be maintained in the Byeman system because of its experimental nature. For all intents and purposes, the notification of this decision served as the final closeout of the Quill program . AFTER QUILL After the Quill experiment, the NRO continued efforts to develop radar capabilities from space. Little can be written about those follow-on systems because they remain classified. In 2008, the NRO declassified the fact that the organization developed radar reconnaissance systems. These systems owe their heritage of success to the trailblazing path of the Quill experimental radar satellite. As the NRO matured as an organization so did the uses of national reconnaissance systems. Rather than trying to only verify the number of strategic nuclear weapons systems such as long range bombers or ICBMs that were the focus of NRO systems in the 1960s, the Intelligence Community used those systems to verify nuclear arms limitation treaties in the 1970s, '80s, and '90s. The nation also used those systems for other purposes to sustain the national defense including better understanding military capabilities of adversaries beyond the major nuclear powers. The NRO built new and impressive reconnaissance systems such as the follow-on to the U-2 , the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft, and the amazing Hexagon satellite, which replaced Corona with significantly greater capacity. The shift in national security priorities brought about two major changes that led to more openness about the nation's national reconnaissance systems. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter acknowledged for the first time that the United States used satellites for photoreconnaissance purposes in order to affirm abilities to verify future arms agreements with the Soviet Union. In 1992 , the Cold War was won and the United States acknowledged for the first time that the NRO existed and was responsible for developing, launching, and operating the nation 's reconnaissance satellites. QUILL AS A TRAILBLAZER At first glance it might seem odd to characterize Quill as a National Reconnaissance Trailblazer. The Quill program was an experimental program with a very short planned lifespan. Quill 's program manager, Air Force Major David Bradburn planned only two launches-and only a second if the first failed . As it turned out, the first launch was successful by every measure and a second launch was therefore never undertaken. The question still lingers though , how could Quill be considered a trailblazer among the many national reconnaissance programs with long term sustained success? Quill was a trailblazer. The program demonstrated that the NRO could take existing sensor technology, modify it for use in space, marry it with other specialized hardware for national reconnaissance programs, and demonstrate the potential for new intelligence collection . Quill blazed the trail in technologies that could collect images day or night and through cloud cover. Quill was also run by then Major David Bradburn, who would go on to become a senior leader of the NRO and major contributor to other successful program efforts at the NRO. The then young NRO needed a program that could be turned quickly from concept to operation and Quill blazed that trail , TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM leaving a stronger, more confident NRO. It helped firm up many elements that would become the foundation of the NRO 's culture of success. Quill set an early standard of success for future program development that established the NRO as one of the nation's premier acquisition organizations and critical source of one of a kind intelligence . James D. Outzen , Ph.D . Editor and Chief of Historical Documentation and Research Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM In the first 20 years of reconnaissance satellite prog ram activity in the United States , Quill was the only prog ram that substantially conformed to initial cost , schedule, and performance estimates , and the only satellite prog ram of any nature to proceed from start to finish with perfect records in launch, orbital operations , readout , and recovery. Quill had its immediate ongm in a proposal jointly concocted by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company and the Goodyear Aerospace Corporation early in 1962 . Stimulated by rising interest in post-strike reconnaissance capabilities , those contractors suggested that synthetic aperture side-looking radar be installed in an Agena spacecraft for assessment of weapons effects in a post-nuclear-strike setting . The radar set was to be a modified version of one being built for the RF-11 0 (which subsequently reverted to its original RF-4 nomenclature) . A Lockheed briefing team that included Goodyear representatives exposed the notion to a variety of interested audiences in the middle months of 1962 . Air Force Undersecretary Joseph V. Charyk , who also headed the still-secret Nati onal Reconnaissance Office (NRO) , was one of those who listened . Major General Robert E. Greer 's Directorate of Special Projects (the West Coast element of the NRO) provided another audience. The idea of using orbiting radar for bomb damage assessment was scarcely novel in 1962 . It had first been mentioned as part of Rand 's initial studies of satellite feasibility and applications between 1948 and 1952 , and had reappeared periodically during the next deca de. Strategic Air Command (SAC ) interest in satellite-based , post-strike reconnaissance pronounced for several years , was heightened by the 1961-1962 cancellation of the original photo-readout Samos satellite program (E-1 and E-2) , which until that time had been somew hat unrealistically counted on to provide retargeting data . In 1960 there was a brief flurry of interest in the idea of a combination bomb-damage-assessment and weather reconnaissance radar satellite , but like other ambitious proposals of the time it expired of funds starvation and technology shortcomings . Nevertheless , such discussion encouraged Lockheed to propose the nearterm development of a radar-carrying , reconnaissa nce satellite that used on-the-shelf components .1 Quill: Radar in Orbit Greer, with Charyk's support , as ked his Plans Chief, Captain Frank Gorman (USN) to examine capabilities and needs . Concurrently, a colo el on Greer 's staff established a working relationship with the SAC 's requiremen ts group in the hope of clarifying SAC 's post-strike reconnaissance requirements. He learned little that was new : SAC wanted a satellite-borne , post-strike , all-weather assessment capability in nearreal-time. Gorman , after surveying the entire spectrum of requirements and capabilities , reached the initial conclusion that any system " ... re uiring reflected light cannot be considered a good soluti on to a problem where reaction time is paramount as is the situation for 'initial assessment."' In Gorman's, judgment , the only effective technique would be one providing "all weather/light conditions " sensitivity. His recommendation to Greer: "A high-resolution radar development should be initiated immediately if an effective post-strike reconnaissance capability is to exist. " And he concluded that readout was essential ; physical recovery of payload , he argued , had been "a means of circumventing the bandwidth problem."2 All of which was true , but in the absence of adaptable technology was also largely irrelevant. Nevertheless, the several eleme ts necessary to the establishmentofafunded research and development effort that could lead by one route or another to an operational radar-in-orbit system were in being by the late summer of 1962 . A requirement of sorts had een acknowledged , though no formal statement of national need for radar reconnaissance from orbit had yet emerged. The approach defined by Lockheed and Goodyear; if it could be accepted at face value , represented a technologically achievable capability that could be acquired at a relatively modest cost. The ingredients of a system existed in the form of in-development items if not in operationally ready equipment. In June 1962 , Charyk directed that Greer 's organization evaluate the possibility of adding special sensors "such as infrared and radar" to the payload of the heavy-lift Titan-Ill veh icle then being considered as a successor to the Atlas booster used for most space launches. The slight prospect that the Titan-Ill would actually be used in the satellite reconnaissance program for several years O the r contractors had sim ilar proposals , but all required som e ex tended period of ve hicle or se nsor deve lopment. SECTION I -QUILL: RADAR IN ORBIT prompted Greer to suggest consideration of a more direct approach . In October Charyk accepted Greer 's views and formally authorized an evaluation of the LockheedGoodyear proposal based on use of a Thor booster and readily available Agena hardware . 3 What began in the summer of 1962 as an evaluation became a source selection process. It had two aspects, one involving a normal competition for the development of a radar set, boosters , and readout equipment suited to extended operations , and the other an experiment using the Lockheed-Goodyear proposal as its base . Major David D. Bradburn , a member of the six-man study groupt, suggested that the most direct and effective way of satisfying Charyk's request for an early demonstration of radar-in-orbit feasibility was to buy a few sets of onthe-shelf equipment, modify the hardware sufficiently to permit its operation under orbital conditions, and test the result in a real operation . The group 's head , Colonel William G. King , Jr., was wholly in favor of that approach, but having recent and painful experience with optimistic contractor predictions that could not be translated into operational performancei decided to verify the alleged performance capabilities of the proposed system by checking with Air Force radar reconnaissance experts at Wright Field . The entire six-man study team visited the Reconnaissance Laboratory, an element of the Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base , early in October. The project officer for the AN/APS-73 radar assured his visitors that the set could do what had been promised for it and that no other item of available equipment could realistically be substituted. The question of what resolution could be expected was not as readily resolvable. The Laboratory's chief told Colonel King that if suitable "requirements " could be issued it would be possible to obtain comparison radar and photographic imagery of existing bomb craters at Frenchman 's Flats (the Nevada test site) in four to six months. King, who planned to write his final report later that month, said mildly that he had a better idea . One of his team members knew the problem intimately, King said . His team member could adequately represent the study group in superintending an immediate effort, say in three or four days . He would fly aboard the photo airplane . t The study group , headed by Colonel W. G. King , Jr. , included Lieutenant Colonel John Cop ley , Major Bradburn , Major Charles Redwine . and two others , all of Greer's staff. Three "advisors " also signed the final report , including Greer's legal specialist and Lieutenant Colo nel Victor M. Genez of the SP Plans staff. + King had managed the Samos E-1 and E-2 programs, had been involved with satellite reconnaissance work since 1955, and was the final program manager for the wholly inadequate Snark missile. The Reconnaissance Laboratory's chief, after a moment's reflection , agreed that the test exercise could indeed be completed in three or four days . It was , and comparison photographs were being examined in Los Angeles the following week. They demonstrated that radar imagery could readily distinguish the principal features of bomb craters of various kinds , although the limitations of the test photography excluded any firm conclusions about the ground resolution obtainable from space by side-looking radar. "However," King 's group eventually concluded , "it is obvious that craters and surface differences of the sizes identified in the accompanying photographs can easily be seen with a radar that has a ground resolution poorer than 50 feet. "§ Having confirmed their preliminary judgment that radar in orbit could adequately perform bomb damage assessment (if it could be made to operate while in space), the study group had to confront the question of what to recommend to General Greer and ultimately to Undersecretary Charyk. Several contractors had provided copies of earlier unsolicited proposals and had briefed group members. In the end the study group settled on a recommended approach , which was characterized as "... not ... the only feasible or best concept ; ... [but] merely ... one concept having some plausibility-a basis from which the Board may proceed ." The members were agreed that they would have satisfied the requirements of their charter if they provided (a) a conceptual foundation and operative recommendations for proceeding with a radar feasibility demonstration and (b) guidance for the conduct of further studies and analyses . The final report said candidly, "we have assumed that our instructions limit us to showing the feasibility of developing satellite-borne radar capable of sensing information of sufficient intelligence value to allow some damage assessment. The more subtle problem of showing the feasibility of an overall post strike reconnaissance system must be fully analyzed concurrently with any radar demonstration. " The study program was intended to analyze the operational applications of high-resolution radar for bomb damage assessment in a post strike environment, assuming quick-reaction , all-weather capability for § The craters photographed ranged in diameter from a minimum of 80 feet to a maximum of 850 feet. Photog raph s were taken using a six-i nch focal length T-Il ae rial camera loaded with Plu x-X film, the combination providing a 20-lines-per-millimeter resolution at the film plane . The radar was an AN/APQ 55 , with a six-foot , slotted roll , side-looking antenna , 45 kilowatts of power, and a frequency of 34 .86 kilomeg acyc les. An electro-optical photo multiplier tube , an indium antimony infrared detector, and the radar ope rated as part of a development system being investigated by the Reconnaissance Laboratory . They were flown 2200 feet above the crate rs in a C-131 aircraft. TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPEND IUM acquiring "the relatively coarse detail " obtai nable from satellite-carried radar.ll The feasibility demonstration was seen as a process that should be conducted quickly and with the minimum outlay of funds needed to assure success. Following the lines of Bradburn 's suggestion the group urg ed testing off-the-shelf radar " .. . capable of providing info rmation , wh ich can be extrapolated (at minimum risk) into des ign information required for an operational radar .. . " The object of the demonstration would be to estab lish that ".. . phys ical phenomena do not exist wh ich would preclude development of high resolution ." To those ends , the study group recommended that an APS 73 model radar be integrated with a Thor booster, an Agena-D orbiting veh icle , a Corona recovery caps ule, a readout system chosen from existing hardware : · an available ground processor, and the orbital control and communications net then being used by the National Reconnaissance Program . It was a somewhat less ambitious variant of the Lockheed-Goodyear approach , but devoid of operational objectives . Concluding that only the equipment comb inatio n proposed by Lockheed and Goodyear could be made available for a timely demonstration , the stud y gro up recommended an immediate start of work using a soleso urce procurement approach. tt The evaluation group concluded that a three -flight demonstration effort could 11 Although the study group report did not explicitly so state , g roup members were convinced that the analys is should be performed outside the Special Projects directorate, preferably by the SAC . The participation of Rand Corporation specialists was exp lici tly proposed , however. In the eve nt, the "studies and ana lysis " aspect of the total Quill prog ram did not develop as the study group had proposed . Charyk never directed Greer's organization to do the analysis . Rand did perform some relevant research , but SAC continued to submit advocacy recommendations which , generally, were con sidered by senio r defe nse officials to be insuffi ciently supported by objective analysis . The feasibi lity demonstra tion aspect of Quill became , by a process of inaction elsewhere , the dominant element of the program . Rela tively little was said about readout in the fina l report , which , however, included a general discussion of principles and techn iques and an assessme nt of reado ut time req uirements. As for feasibi lity, something of the group's views could be judged from the provision of a recovery capsule , an accessory that presumably wou ld not find a place in any operational system . A brie f but eloquent comment on the readout problem appeared toward the middle of the report: "Airborne and ground equipment to provide bandwidths of six megacycles (u nreadab le text in ava ilab le copy) technically feasible . Their reliability leaves some thing to be desired." And , after a discussion which ended with the observation , "Our prob lem is not in sensing in detail, but ... is retrieval of th e information ," the report suggested the "broad assumption" that .. information of a modest detail level which can be handled may be useful for an 'initial assessment."' (Unde rli ning in the origi nal text.) tt That somewhat unusual course-selecting contractors during an eva luation of program feasibility-was justified by Charyk 's requirement for the quickest possib le demonstration , which meant use of off-the-shelf equipment. The Agena-D was the only available orbi tal vehicle , the Thor the only appropriate booste r previously rnated to an Agena , and the APS-73 was "the nearest thing to an off-the-shelf item that could be used in the feasi bility demonstration ..." In the forma l opinion of Greer' s legal specia list, because on ly Goodyear made that radar "... it wou ld be a gross waste of time and money to start another manufacturer building it in lieu of having Goodyear make the necessary minimum modifications in its existing product."' be cond ucted at a spe cified cost, but that a ten percent contingency fee should be provided to protect against unforeseen development problems . (Should a five-flight progra m be approved , required funds would be more .) Finally, the group recommended that an existing office house the feasib ili ty demonstration and that Major Bradb urn, "probably the most knowledgeable radar specialist at SAFSP," be named program manager.tt In a statement t hat Bradburn was to emphasize frequently thereafter, the grou p observed that the orbital test program was ".. . the simplest and quickest approach to demonstrating the feas ibility of the radar sensor," that quick comple tion of the test would make possible a decision on a later operational system , but that " . . . the lau nch vehi cle and rada r configuration proposed for orbital test are not considered adaptable for operational test. " In so many words , the fea sibility demonstration was to be that and noth ing more ; no consideration would be given to mak ing the demonstrati on equipment the basis of an operational syste m.§§ The report of the study group , the eafter known as the "King Repo rt," wen t to Ge neral G eer on 30 October. Its one-word title , "Quill ," became the program 's code name.l111 5 Greer app roved the findings and recommended that Major Bradburn , the board 's nominee fo r project leader, present them to Charyk for review. Three days afte r Bradburn 's 7 November 1962 presentation , Charyk aut hori zed him to beg in work . Fund ing levels , as first approve d , re flected t h e premises of the LockheedGoodyear proposal. Bradburn's plans called for five flight-qual ified payloads , of which three were actually to be launched. Lockheed was to be assigned system engineering and techni cal direction responsib ilities and responsib ility for orb ital veh icles , sy stem integration and launch servic es . Goodyear Aircraft was to develop the :j::j: Quill , which was promised to be a short-term prog ram of high technica l interest , would be an attractive project to manage . Bradburn told King he was bored with his current assignment and asked , "'Nhy don 't you make me the project officer reporting to you. Then I will be able to do it quickly and cheaply and you can protect it from all the colonels wro might want the job ." King thought we ll of the idea . §§ A post strike bomb damage assessment system as conceived then and later was assumed to invo lve requiremen ts for multiple launches from hardened sites . The use of a Minuteman booster was generally believed to be a pre-requisite for operational utility that being the principal land-based ballistic missile in the U.S. inventory. The October 1962 study postulated five nearsimultaneous launches , with five orbital radar systems making parallel -path passes over the principal Soviet targets . Obviously, a soft , liquid-fuel Thor was wholly inappropriate for such an opera tion , Agena could not be accommodated in a Minuteman silo and the APS-73 radar promised to have definition and resolution inapprop riate for an ope rationa l app lication. 1111 Quill was suggested by Colonel Joseph W. Ruebel. At West Point, the term "Quill Lisr was used to identify the weekly hsting of cadet demerits-the discipline lis t. To be "on Qu ill" was , there fore , a highly undesirable assignment. That was not the way the eventual Quill participa nts viewed their assignment , of course . SECTION I -QUILL: RADAR IN ORBIT radar payloads:·· Another organization had agreed to provide engineering consulting services for the radar experiment and to develop an optical correlator for final processing of radar data. General Electric Company was to build the reentry vehicle and Douglas Aircraft the thrust-augmented Thor boosters. The project goals included physical recovery and electronic data readout at a ground resolution of 1 00 feet or better. Real-time electronic readout over one United States station would be acceptable. The project-white name "P-40 "-was to operate with a minimum of modification to all off-theshelf systems, including the Goodyear radar, and was to be concluded as rapidly as possible. Time on orbit and data quantities were not considered critical items. However, Charyk wanted to be informed immediately if there was any question of meeting the 1 00-foot resolution requirement. He also insisted that contractors be clearly informed that the demonstration was of an experimental nature only and was not a device for acquiring operational radars or for starting the development of an operational system. As Greer had suggested , Charyk directed that the demonstration project be conducted under a "black" cover. He authorized the notification of chosen contractors and the release of fiscal 1963 funds to cover initial costs. Additional funding would be provided for fiscal 1964. Charyk also approved the conduct of more refined experimental work in advanced radar techniques. Designated "Phase Alpha ," that aspect of the total project was to be separately classified "white" but with strict "need to know" security. Under Special Projects Office auspices, competitive proposals were to be issued , asking for design studies looking toward orbital tests and demonstration of the feasibility of radar sensors with electronic readout and storage capabilities (recovery was not an excluded option, however). Acceptable ground resolution was to be specified at 20 to 50 feet. All concerned expected Phase Alpha to take longer than the P-40 demonstration. 6 On 14 November 1962, Bradburn advised the selected contractors that the Air Force proposed to accept their unsolicited proposal to test a radar satellite. Bradburn Lockheed was to perform system integration, engineering and fabrication of structural modification for three orbital vehicles; antenna design and fabrication ; provide special batteries and other payload peculiar vehicle equipment; and do test planning , in-p lans , and launch base checkout services. Goodyear was to be responsible for engineering , fabri cation , qua lifi catio n, and delivery of fiv e fiight-qualified satellite radars , one qualification test radar substantially identical to a fiight article , one thermal equivalent test model , one mock-up, air-to-ground equipment for checkout at Goodyear and for sys tem checks at Lockheed, and pad checkout equipment at Vandenberg AFB , including test beacons and apparatus for blockhouse checks of radar operation during countdown. and others from the Special Projects directorate met with Lockheed, Goodyear, and another organization's representatives at Sunnyvale.ttt A Lockheed representative had been asked to be ready to present again the proposal he had earlier made to King 's group and to bring cognizant Goodyear people with him . Bradburn informed the contractors that the Air Force was going to proceed with a minimum satellite radar demonstration, generally along the lines of the LockheedGoodyear proposal , but on an associate-contractor basis. Although Lockheed had favored a primary contractor-subcontractor framework, the Air Force had decided that direct access to the major contractors involved would limit schedule and cost overruns, and thereby enhance the probability of an early first flight. Lockheed, Goodyear and another organization would all have direct communication lines to Bradburn. Bradburn explained that he wanted to exploit existing contracts as much as possible, not only for administrative ease but also for purposes of maintaining security. The project framework, as laid out by Bradburn , included procurement of five flight-qualified payloads to support three flights at two-month intervals with the first flight targeted for January 1964. The goal would be to obtain a high-resolution radar picture from a satellite (ground resolution of 100 feet or better with minimum time and with minimum modification of existing hardware. An employee of the Aerophysics Division of Goodyear briefed the meeting on the radar system then being developed by Goodyear for the RF-11 0 aircraft. Capable of producing 50-foot ground resolution , the basic radar covered two 30-m ile swaths, one on either side of the airplane. The inflight recorder and display equipment permitted display of two ten-mile swaths, which could be selected as desired within the coverage limits. The all -up weight of the radar was 450 pounds (including antenna, recorder, transmitter and receiver). The Goodyear employee foresaw the need for three principal changes to adapt the existing APS-73 radar for satellite use. The pulse repetition frequency (prf) and the average power would have to be increased, the transmitter-modulator (and perhaps other components), which used refrigeration cooling, would have to be repackaged to provide for conduction or radiation cooling , and the recorder would have to be modified to accommodate a large film supply and to provide for satellite-derived data inputs . ttt Attendees included Colo nel Robert W. Yundt , who had succeeded W. G. King as Bradburn's immediate superior for Quill. TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Existing development schedules called for initial bench testing of the first complete RF-11 0 radar in April 1963 and delivery of the first flight test item to Edwards Air Force Base in July. However, there was already some indication of slippage and a Goodyear employee cautioned that flight tests might not begin until September or October. A representative from another organization described the operating principles of the optical correlator. The organization could achieve an azimuth compression ratio of 1000 to 1 with available production-type processors. (The azimuth resolution in the final picture wou ld be 1000 times finer than the physical dimensions of beam wi dth.) With laboratory-type demonstration equipment, the best obtainable azimuth compression ratio was about 5000 to 1. In the proposed satellite experiment, azimuth resolution would be lim ited primarily by ionospheric distortions . If all worked well , the overall system might produce azimuth resolution of 15 feet or better. At any rate , the optical processor would not be the limiting factor. During the engineering discussions that afternoon, Bradburn specified that the payload configurations would be identical from flight to flight-there would be no growth changes. He emphasized the "minimum modification, asshort-a-time-span-as-possible" philosophy, wh ich was to gu ide Quill. He also restated his determ ination to adhere closely to the primary goal of showing feasibility, not developing operational prototypes. One consequence was that the radar antenna would not be steerable. Concerned with acquiring a good picture at acceptable ground resolution and not with viewing specific targets , Bradburn foresaw no need to develop aiming capabi lity ; the swath would be wholly dependent on the orb ital path of the vehicle. Although recovery of the exposed film would be the primary data retrieval method , simultaneous readout of the radar data would provide a comparison in picture quality and reveal what data deterioration was caused by the transmission link. Readout would also provide a backup system in case the recovery system fa iled . Lockheed agreed to provide within 24 hours an initial cost figure so funds could be added at once to an ongoing Air Force contract. A work statement was to be ready by 21 November and a full cost proposal within the month . Contract negotiations , to begin in January 1963, were scheduled to lead to a definitive contract by 25 January 1963 . Bradburn scheduled a meeting with Goodyear for the week of 18 November, in Phoenix, to discuss a draft work statement , proposed contract arrangements, and procurement schedules. Meetings with another organization were set for early December.t:u Bradburn emphasized the need for tight security. Each employee working on the project would have to be approved by the Air Force , sign a security agreement , and have a fi nal secret clearance. Bradburn requested that he approve these names in advance, an arrangement he later changed to allow for after-the-fact notification to the limits of a q ota for each company. Bradburn also stressed the need to hold documentation to a minimum, both for security reasons and to lessen paperwork. Each company would deal directly with his office, so a multiplicity of reports would be a waste of time as well as a potential security risk . He emphasized that he intended to participate in most of the monthly engineering and technical review meetings and that he expected all program participants to use them as a primary means of inform ing all concerned parties of technical, cost , and scheduling details .7 To that point all had gone rather smoothly. But between Charyk and the Secretary of Defense there intervened one major review echelon , and on 15 November Bradburn learned that a potentially troublesome objection to Quill had surfaced during the final project review and approval process in the Pentagon . Dr. Eugene Fubini, then serving as senior technical advisor to Defe se Secretary, Robert McNamara, had held up the release of program funds on the grounds that "we , [the NRO] intend to pay too much for the radar." Lieutenant Colonel E. J . Istvan , Bradburn 's chief contact on the NRO staff, reported Fubini 's protest that "APS-73 costs [only] a few hundred K. " Fubini asked that the APS-73 project officer be solicited for a "more realistic" cost estimate . From Fubini 's viewpoint , concern seemed warranted. The program cost estimate that reached Fubini included a provision for funding to buy five radar sets , about five times as much as for APS-73 radar sets then on procurement schedules. But, as Bradburn pointed out, APS-73 was not being bought per se ; although modifications were to be held to the minimum needed to qualify the equipment for space flight , they would nonetheless be comparatively expensive. The cost :j::j::j: The principal contractors were in a state of financial near shock when Bradb urn told the m that Greer's orga niza tion had acce pted thei r premises and promises and proposed to proceed with the prog ram pretty much as they had briefed it-and at about the price they had proposed . As later became plain , and as everyone conce rned privately acknowledged at the start , the financia l estimates originally attached to the Lockheed-Goodyea r proposal were sales figures , unde rsta ted by about half. In the usual way of th ings , the co ntractors wou ld have "recovered" their understated costs by cha rging for redesign and refinement needed to satisfy specifications and requi rements that varied substa ntially from those assumed for the proposal. Bradburn's "accep tance" of the main elemen ts of the origina l proposa l meant that there was littl e occasion for such maneuvering, and that in a "less cos t" direction, fo r the most part . SECTION I -QUILL: RADAR IN ORBIT estimates Fubini had objected to , Bradburn observed mildly, had in fact been both prepared and validated by an APS-73 project officer, and although the funding was charged as "radar payload" costs, it actually included engineering, fabrication , checkout, and launch services associated with the payload . Until firm bids became available, probably in January 1963, no better estimate could be composed.8 The response satisfied Fubini's objections ; no more was heard from that quarter, and funds were released on schedule. That problem disposed of, Bradburn met with Goodyear people at Phoenix on 20 November. Although the company had no satellite experience, virtually all its contracts were with the USAF or the Navy's Air arm . Organizationally, the head of the Goodyear Arizona Division reported directly to T. A. Knowles, president of the Goodyear Aircraft Company (home based in Akron, Ohio), a subsidiary of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. The Navy was responsible for industrial security and quality assurance at Phoenix and the Air Force Procurement Office at Sky Harbor Airport in Phoenix handled auditing and accounting requirements. Unlike Lockheed , Goodyear had very limited experience with the special security arrangements that characterized work on satellite reconnaissance. Bradburn noted at the onset of the Phoenix discussions that three aspects of the program were extremely sensitive: 1.) a version of the RF-4C radar was being packaged for satellite use , 2.) Goodyear and Lockheed were working together on a satellite radar project with Air Force funding , and 3.) Goodyear had an Air Force contract to build a satellite radar. Initially, only 50 people in Phoenix could be briefed . In hopes of keeping exposure minimal, Bradburn decided that the naval representative in Phoenix should not be informed of this new activity. (As events later dictated, his assistance became necessary and he had to be briefed .) Document control and visit requests would receive exceptional handling. Mail was to be sent to post office boxes and picked up by briefed individuals. Unless other business provided a sufficient cover, visits to Phoenix by the Air Force and Lockheed people would be arranged through direct contact with Goodyear's Administrative Engineer. Visible project activity was to be covered by the story that it involved proprietary work called KP 11-Knowles Project Number Two. (Goodyear had somewhat earlier performed work under a sensitive contract covered by the proprietary description, "KP 1"). Such a cover would also ease procurement problems-radar components could be purchased "white" as commercial items-or so it was initially assumed , although there too problems were to develop subsequently. Goodyear's draft work statement indicated a need for additional detailed technical specifications from the Air Force and Lockheed before manpower and cost estimates could be refined. For the moment, an estimate of expenditures for the first 60-day period was the best that could be provided. 9 Security rules for Lockheed were defined the following day. Lockheed's white contract would not mention "radar" or "Goodyear;" the black version would be correlated by paragraph numbers to the white contract and would be specific.§§§ Inasmuch as Lockheed had been doing "black" work of one sort or another for a decade , few new problems were like ly to appear. Another radar associate contractor's work on another contract, due for routine contractual extension in March 1963, appeared easily exploitable to cover new activity. Funds could be readily transferred from the program office with no need for separate financial accountability. The contract would be white, though with a vague work statement, but to insure that priority would be given to the new paperwork, the contract's technical project officer and possibly the responsible procurement officer would have to be briefed. The radar associate contractor's proposed work included the design of the synthetic-array radar experiment, considering in detail what radar parameters were required to obtain a successful demonstration, and preparing specifications for critical radar components.The other organization was to be responsible for determining what azimuth resolution actually was obtained on the radar maps generated by the system and for analyzing factors affecting resolution . The organization was also to develop and construct a breadboard optical processor capable of achieving "the largest attainable compression ratio ." If the theoretically predicted azimuth compression ratio anticipated in the experiment were not attainable, the largest technically attainable (probably 2000 to 1) would be the key factor in the design. ~~~ The processor was also to be designed to process data, which might §§§ The first security problem of Quill arose in the circumstance that Lock heed 's original radar satellite notion had been "briefed" widely , before it "went black." In mid-November, the Strategic Air Command asked Lockheed to provide additional information regarding the Lockheed-Goodyear radar proposal. Bradburn vetoed the trip and got word to a witting SAC officer to "lay off. " •• 111m According to a radar associate contractor emp loyee, an ea rl y object iv e of the program was to place emphasis on obtaining fine azimuth resolution to the greatest possible extent-optimally ten feet-while aiming for a more readily predictable 50 feet in range resolution. As factors determining range resolution were generally well understood , it was desirable to the experiment and potential future projects to determine whether adequate compression of azimuth-phase histories of targets co uld be realized 11 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM be obtained under conditions that were departures from the planned experiment, as might occur during actual orbit. Primarily, those discrepancies were to include departures from the intended orbit of the vehicle and from the intended orientation of the physical beam. In addition to processing the radar data, the radar associate contractor proposed to link the groun d recording system to the optical display converters. The associate contractor also suggested developing and procu ring microwave beacons to observe and record emission histories. Lastly, the organization proposed designing a test to determine the limitation on compression ratio imposed by the camera drives in the radar system . The associate contractor's representative agreed to send to Bradburn by mid-December two work statement drafts to be approved for content and security. One would be complete; the second would be "sanitized ," omitting any reference to actual satellite operations or satellite derived data, any reference to Goodyear, Lockheed , Special Projects Office, or the delivery of reports on "Design of Experiment." The problem of conducting covert work in the associate contractor's setting was not as easy as with Goodyear and Lockheed , but the basic procedures were much the same. As with Baird in Phoenix, the associate contractor's security officer was not to be briefed unless it became unavoidable at some later time :··· Uncleared personnel were not to be aware of the existence of an orbital radar experiment,tttt or that satellite derived data had been or would be processed by the organization, or that the organization had created a working relationship with Lockheed , Goodyear, Spa ce Systems Division, or SAFSP. 13 In mid-December, Bradburn learned that the organization on the existing contract would be able to revise its contract with the associate contractor to include Quill work before the contract expired in March . A few days later, Goodyear's draft work statement, specifications summary, and delivery schedule appeared. Not surprisingly, Apri l 1964 rather than Jan uary 1964 had become the target for first flight. A formal Goodyear price proposal still was lacking, but Bradburn privately expected that it too would depart from the estimates earlier forwarded. When Quill had first been app roved , It did . Indignant that he'd been left out of the loop, the associate contractor's security officer ignored strong hints to drop inquiries into security clearances at the organization for Quill work . He finally was briefed in April 1964. 12 . tttt Best laid plans had a way of being stepped on by idiots. The associate con tractor's represen tative's secure phone system , essential to his operations , was installed virtually in the dead of night and in a manner that was designed to be wholly unremarkable . On the following day the local telephone people asked how they wanted to be billed for all the special work , thus enlightening several administrative people to the fact that the representative had a special phone and was a consu ltant to the Air Force for some spooky ope ration . four months earlier, Major Bradbum had very informally observed to Major John Pietz, with whom he then shared an office, that he expected the formal cost proposals to exceed preliminary estimates by a factor of two or more, and that his past experience with the several aspects of Samos led him to conclude that schedule revision would immediately follow the opening of negotiations for firm contracts. Shortly after being named project manager, Bradburn discussed those cost proposal expectations with General Greer. General Greer responded with an ironic smile and gave full support to the suggestion that Bradburn's cost estimate be used in requesting program approval from Charyk, rather than some modest variation on the proposal estimates first received from Lockheed and Goodyear. Lockheed's proposal of mid-1962 had postulated a cost of several million for a five-mission program; Bradburn calculated probable costs for three launches, but only if he could keep program objectives substantially unchanged from those approved by Charyk in November. There was no other way of preventing the cost growth that had characterized so many venturesome Air Force programs of the past decade. Concern for costs largely explained Bradburn's continued reiteration of primary program goals in discussions with contractors. He wanted all concerned to understand that in no circumstances would he consider incorporating either wo rk additional to or technology newer than that originally contemplated.t:t:t:t: In accepting the schedule revision, Bradburn pressed Goodyear to agree to build the transmitter modulator unit in Phoenix rather than Akron as originally planned. Aside from tightening security, that move would enhance engineering control over the significantly critical unit, which was going to require extensive redesign for radiation cooling . Although protesting that key personnel would have to be moved from Akron, Goodyear agreed Y By early January 1963, the status of the Quill budget was becoming clearer. Cost proposals from contractors at this point in time were slightly under-running the tentative budget approved by the NRO comptroller the HH In early 1963, General Greer's organization was battling a series of cost growth problerrs, virtually all of them having originated in faulty initia l estimates by contractors and uncritical acceptance of optimistic projections by va rious program managers. Bradburn, who had by then spent nearly two years in Greer's plans and policy group, was fully aware of existing cost con1rol problems and their origins. Colonel King, under whose guidance the Quill program had progressed from proposa l to initial appro\·al, was another whose skepticism about the validity of contractor proposals was pronounced and who shared with Bradburn th e conviction that high-technical-risk programs entrusted to large management groups with complex reporting channels were sure to overrun. Quill and the P-35 (Project 417) weather satellite prograMs were the first SAFSP undertakings which conformed to the GreerKing philosophy_ although Gambit was reconfigured to that model in 1963 after King became Gambit program manager. The archetype of small-staff, direct-management, risk minimization was Corona, as originally organized. The most successful commercial practitioner was C. L. Johnson, Lockheed's leading aircraft design manager, whose products included the original F-80, the U-2, and the A-11. SECTION I -QUILL: RADAR IN ORBI T previous November. Goodyear was estimating costs for fiscal 1963 , 1964 , and 1965 in black funds . White monies to Lockheed's BOO-contract were estimated for 1963, 1964, and 1965. White funds transferred were expected to total the same in fiscal year 1963 and 1964 , and less in fiscal year 1965. Proposed total costs for the Quill contracts for fiscal years 1963 and 1964 were less than the approved budget and reduced in 1965 . Total costs for all three contracts were estimated to be less than November's approved budget. In November, working with his own figures, Bradburn had estimated total program costs to be less than the approved budget plus costs for boosters , launches, and orbital operations. The three TAT/Agena D's with modifications, launch services, and three reentry capsules were additional costs to be funded , rather than as bas ic NRO costs . Additional costs included: Agena D plus launch , TAT plus launch , telemetry, tracking , and command (vehicle), and operations. Together, these doubled the price of the program .15 Meeting with those involved in the associate contractor's other contract in January, Bradburn approved the white and black versions of the contracts, but deleted some of the tasks the associate contractor had earl ier proposed . He had decided that the raw radar film should be developed by the Satellite Photographic Processing Laboratory at Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts , rather than by the associate contractor, although they would provide engineering liaison services. The groundbased photo recorders (for use with the readout mode of data retrieval) would be applied by Goodyear rather than the associate contractor. Lastly, Lockheed rather than the associate contractor would build the microwave beacons. Under the circumstances , Bradburn decided that no formal black contract need be written for the associate contractor, since most of the very sensitive work had been assigned elsewhere. The white contract would therefore become the only bind ing agreement. Bradburn felt the motivation was so high at the associate contractor and his contacts with them so frequent that any black statement assigning deadlines for the reports that comprised most of the remaining black effort there would be extraneous. It appeared that the associate contractor's effort would include costs for system design and analysis of parameters; data analysis and final report; design and build , and operate the optical correlator; collection and analysis of radar and beacon signals; design and operation of the camera drive evaluator. Of the total , about one-third would be spent in fiscal year 1963 and the remaining two thirds in fiscal year 1964.16 Basic arrangements having been made, Major Bradburn briefed Dr. Brockway McMillan in March and again in May 1963 (McMillan had replaced Charyk as Director, NRO early in March) describing the refined parameters for the Quill experiment as then designed and bringing him up to date on the status of Quill contracts, budget , and technology. It was Bradburn's first opportunity for describing fully the content of the program he had just created . As defined in May 1963, the radar payload components of Quill consisted of (1) a transmitter-modulator, which was basically a high-power radar frequency (RF) pulse amplifier; (2) an RF-intermediate frequency (IF) unit, which generated a low-power RF pulse for the transmitter and received and compressed the reflected radar pulse; (3) a reference computer, which generated timing and control signals (and transmission pulses) and synchronously demodulated the received intermediate frequency to provide video data; (4) a power control unit, which controlled and switched power and generated regulated voltages necessary for the radar; and (5) a recorder, which recorded the received video from the reference computer on film by exposure from the face of a cathode ray tube . Goodyear had estimated that in its operating mode the radar system would consume 2700 watts of power. (Radiated effective peak power was 450 kilowatts, actual peak transmitter power 30 kilowatts, and average transmitter power 250 watts.) The length of the transmitter pulse was 0.9 microseconds . By the use of pulse compression techniques, this was reduced to an effective pulse width of .06 microseconds. Pulse repetition frequency (PRF) had a 16-step variable range from 8216 to 8736 megacycles. The radar operated on a frequency of 9500 megacycles per second . Given such parameters, Bradburn estimated that slant-range resolution would be 50 feet and azimuth resolution 50 feet or better. The Agena was to be injected into a near-circular orbit of 130 nautical miles (plus or minus 13 miles) at an inclination of 70 degrees. Precise attitude stabilization of the vehicle would orient the radar antenna so that the main lobe of the radar beam would be at a fixed depression of 55 degrees from the horizontal. In that att itude, the radar would map a slant-range interval of 5.95 nautical miles , or about ten miles along the ground . Active radar operation was to be confined within the limits of the continental United States-and within the TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM limits of control of the Vandenberg (California) and New Boston (New Hampshire) tracking stations.§§§§ The data obtained from the payload would be in the form of target echoes, which would be synchronously demodulated to preserve both phase and amplitude aspects of the signals. The resulting raw radar map data (a Doppler history of the illuminated terrain), would be recorded photographically on film in the recoverable capsule aboard the satellite. Simultaneously, the data signals would be transmitted over the wide-band data link to tracking stations, where they would be recorded both on photographic film and on wide-band magnetic tape recorders. After mission completion, the film record in the satellite would be recovered near Hawaii by air catch of the reentry capsule. The radar antenna, being built by Lockheed , was a two dimensional slotted-waveguide array, 15 feet long and 1.8 feet in height, uniformly illuminated in both directions. The high-power output pulse of the radar was transmi tted through the flat , phased-array antenna mounted on the side of the Agena , with the beam oriented perpendicular to the vehicle's longitudinal axis but depressed 55 degrees below horizontal. The beam was 36 degrees wide in the azimuth direction and 2.9 degrees wide in the vertical direction at the half-power points.17 Some of the early premises had to be altered early in the development program. The associate contractor's researchers learned, for instance, that bias errors generated by the Agena 's attitude changes during flight were too large to be accommodated by the radar beamwidth . To ensure that "zero Doppler" direction in azimuth would result, a clutterlock or electronic beam steerer had to be designed within the reference computer. Although the clutterlock oscillator output could conceivably degrade date returns, the associate contractor's group predicted that no serious degradation would occur except at initial lock-on. McMillan was concerned about the ass urance of obtaining qualitative data to support evaluation of radar performance. He therefore directed that ground resolution targets be provided so that a direct meas ure of radar resolution could be obtained from analysis of a finished radar map. He also suggested incorporation, of an altitude rate change recorder in the vehicle . (Changes in altitude rates would degrade the azimuth resolution; §§§§ One of the principal doctrinal problems of conducting a radar-inorbit experiment was uncertainty about the reaction of the Soviet Union. Although there were various justifications for using radar sensors for overflight reconnaissance-all-weather, all-season , all-sun posi tion capa bility encompassing most of them-and no wholly rational reason for concluding that active radar in orbit would be more objectionable to a target state than photography, the sensitivities caused by the U-2 affair of May 1960 still were evident in 1963. (For entire text of footnote , please see end of chapter, p. 20.) if accurate rate data were available during evaluation, degradation from that source could be more readily identified.)18 Bradburn made the associate contractor responsible for resolution meas rements and asked Lockheed to evaluate the feasibility of incorporating a rate reco rder. Bradburn also asked Lockheed to reverify reference computer specifications. Electronically, the most complicated component of Quill, the computer, was experiencing severe vibration problems, which, in the RF-4C program, were causing some structural redesign . Quill program specifications required testing at 7.5 Gs; the original computer, designed for aircraft use, had failed at 3 Gs. Less threatening but equally troublesome problems appeared in the procurement area in April. Goodyear began experiencing difficulty in buying governmentinspected parts under commercial auspices. A tentative solution had been initially worked out by having the local Air Force procurement specialist verbally approve as "Contracting Officer" Goodyear's requests for the delivery of high-reliability components. The rationale "we might sell it to the government" was used to justify the implied use of government-approved items in what was represented to be an "in-house" company-sponsored program. That tenuous network collapsed in early May when a government inspector, who had been "officially" asked to release parts from a bonded warehouse for which he was responsible, called Goodyear's security officer to confirm that the commercial purchase order he had received actually supported a government contract. Routinely attempting to confirm that the listed parts would be used in work for the government, the security fell into the local cover story-that they were needed to support a proprietary contract. Convinced that he had stumbled into something unsavory, the security officer immediately blocked the purchase. An alarmed Goodyear executive hurriedly notified the procurement specialist who called the security officer to verify that the work was indeed Air Force sponsored. The security officer, still sensing something highly irregular, said stiffly that he was obliged to notify his superiors in the Navy procurement chain. Seeing visions of a total collapse of security, the procurement specialist hurriedly alerted Bradburn, who instructed him to use some excuse-any excuse-to stall the security officer until program office personnel could get to Phoenix. The security officer grudgingly acceded to the procurement specialist's plea to postpone any action until the following Monday. (It was then Friday afternoon, and Bradburn appreciated that a delay until Pentagon closing time would represent two days of grace.) SECTION I -QUILL: RADAR IN ORBIT Colonel Ruebel and Major Bradburn flew to Phoenix on Sunday and enrolled the security officer who agreed to support the project. They agreed that all future requests for verification of government interest in commercial purchase orders would be referred to that security officer directly and he would confirm their validity. The security officer also agreed to assume the function of acting as cognizant security officer over the closed areas of the plant. No other Naval personnel were to be briefed or made cognizant of any special requirements .19 The potentially more troublesome problem of arranging , through the CIA , for General Electric to build and deliver three Corona-configured recovery capsules for use in the Quill experiment was resolved in the early Spring also . As with Lanyard and Gambit, CIA personnel were apprehensive about a security leak. Discussions between SAFSP and CIA security specialists in a series of meetings led to the agreement on 9 April 1963 that the procurement could proceed. The three capsules would be handled under Corona security procedures until their delivery to Sunnyvale and would thereafter be handled under Quill procedures.ml~~ Once that hurdle had been passed , the contracting and funding arrangements were quickly resolved .20 The first serious threat to scheduling expectations and Quill success occurred in early June 1963. Dr. McMillan had earlier expressed concern to Bradburn that arcing in high-voltage power supplies might become a problem. The original Goodyear specification , approved by Lockheed had established a level of .001 millimeters of mercury as the highest pressure in which the payload would operate . High-voltage arcing would not occur if that assessment were correct. Bradburn , nudged by McMillan , decided to insist on verification of Goodyear 's estimate and asked the project manager for Lockheed to cover that item during the next monthly program review in late June . Although he did not fully share McMillan 's concern , Bradburn asked for a complete review of design considerations , parts qualifications history, and qualification testing for Lockheed and Goodyearfurnished high -voltage suppl ies and any circuit points where high voltage existed . Not until 17 July was the Lockheed team able to present its initial report , but the partial study was enough to indicate that a serious problem existed . Actual measurement revealed that pressures in and around the payload boxes could possibly be 1 0 to 1 00 times higher than anticipated . The greater molecular density thus suggested made it highly probable that high-voltage arcing would occur. 11111111 Th e differences we re ent irely academic . During the next several weeks Lockheed employees eva luated redesign alternatives , considered testing difficulties , and weight penalties , and estimated the effect of the unforeseen rework on launch schedules. There were , fundamentally, three feasible responses to the arcing problem : pressurization , to drive molecular densities above the critical level ; venting, to help pressures remain sufficiently low ; and insulation by the use of a potting compound . Goodyear strongly recommended that the transmitter be pressurized (as had been done in the RF-4C version) and maintained so that a pressure vessel could be designed and tested on the same time scale as a potting program , favored by Lockheed . Concerned by the conflict of opinions , Bradburn pressed the Lockheed investigators for more details and learned that Lockheed too would have recommended pressurization if the problem had been recognized at the outset of the program . He immediately ordered that preparations be made to pressurize the transmitter and any other modules that looked critical. By the end of August it had been decided to pot and pressurize the transmitter, to use only potting compound in the recorder, and to provide for a backup pressurization system that could be re-evaluated for need by mid-September. All concerned conceded that the transmitter-modulator and the recorder would present the most complex insulating problems ; but that the high-voltage power supply being developed by Lear Siegler for Lockheed and the RF-IF unit might also be troublesome . Arcing problems in the control unit and the reference computer seemed to be controllable through the application of a void-free insulating conformal coating .21 But it appeared that redesign and rework would cause a program slippage. An associated difficulty appeared during the late summer of 1963 . Colonel John Martin , head of the NRO Washington staff advised General Greer that fiscal 1964 funds might be insufficient to cover currently projected Quill costs . He directed that the third Quill flight be deleted from the launch schedule and consigned as a payload spare. Requesting program re-casting by 10 August , Martin advised that although Quill was authorized to spend at previously approved rates through the first quarter of the new fiscal year, the program office should be prepared for a possible ten percent cutback thereafter. Martin assured Greer that he was proceeding "through OSD channels " to overcome the deficiency, and that should those measures fail, he would be notified immediately.22 At the end of August it was clear that Goodyear was eight weeks beh ind its original schedule and that official launch dates should be slipped by two months. TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Bradburn attributed one month of the slip to Goodyear's engineering and parts delivery problems and one month to the high-voltage redesign requirements. He estimated that the delay would cause costs at Goodyear to go up somewhat:···· On the whole, Bradburn informed Greer on 30 August , Goodyear appeared to be doing a good job and Lockheed, although somewhat sloppy in systems engineering , was improving .23 By late September, the launch slippage had been officially confirmed and a new date for first fligh t-5 August 1964-had been targeted . Negotiations for the deletion of the third Quill flight were completed that month : the third Agena D vehicle and the Thor were cancelled, as were all Lockheed efforts on the third payload beyond the installation of the radar components in the payload-supporting structure. The third Quill was now treated as a spare payload that could be readied for launch within five to six months after the first Quill flight. Bradburn recommended that any further action on number three be deferred until the results of the first Quill flight could be evaluated. 24 Early October 1963 saw a new design problem. Goodyear, attempting to meet the stringent vibration requirements of the program , concluded that the rigid payload rack mountings originally called for could cause payload performance degradation and called on Lockheed to provide vibration-resistant shock mounts. The initial approach, a simple substitution of mountings proved inadequate. Payload racks in manufacture were stopped for redesign, a process that promised to take a month or more. A new interior distribution plan for the component equipment was called for, plus modification of the secondary barrel structure to provide the required structural stiffness. Lockheed's program manager anticipated the racks could be delivered by early December. Although that schedule would be tight, overall program scheduling should not be affected. Goodyear and the special Lockheed high-voltage team were not enjoying similar success. Tests of the potting design in September and October had been disappointing. Poor surface preparation and improper cleaning and primer application techniques were blamed. But even after potting compound adhesion problems were disposed of, altitude testing disclosed the appearance of corona around potted components and cables. Lockheed recommended the use of lightweight closed-cell polyurethane foam as a countermeasure to corona generation in the RF-IF box. Extensively used to insulate and support high-frequency components, ••••• It will be recalled that Bradburn 's schedu le and cost estimates were less optimistic than those proposed by the con tra ctors and formally incorpo rat ed in co ntractor program plans. several such foam systems had been used by Lockheed on varactor multipliers similar to that Goodyear was building. The expedient worked, eliminating corona and breakdown in the unit. Elsewhere, however, foam as a corona suppressant was not successful owing to the lack of a primer that would act as an adhesive between the foam and the siliconeinsulated lead wires and high voltage components. External corona problems could also be eliminated by potting high-voltage components in metal cans, and eventually Goodyear decided to combine that expedient with the use of braid-shielded high-voltage cables and a conductive epoxy to interconnect the components. For a time it appeared that the solution was working. Then one of the cylindrical cans containing the thyratron component burst at the seam because of potting expansion caused by the heat of component operation. Goodyear adopted a square can configuration to allow for bulging during thermal expansion and began to experiment with expandable-top cans. Such measures, when supplemented by the addition of an aluminum sling in the anode area (to reduce the bulk of the potting), proved successful. No further problems were experienced with thyratron potting, although repeated failures were to occur in later testing from other causes. As a further precaution against high-voltage breakdown and corona, Lockheed resorted to venting of the payload boxes, one-inch diameter screened vent holes being cut on three sides on each box.25 By January 1964, Bradburn was able to assure Dr. McMillan that the high-voltage problem was under control. Arcing and corona phenomena in the transmitter-modulator had been eliminated . The backup pressurization vessel could be cancelled . The RF-IF unit, reference computer, control unit , and recorder had all been successfully potted. Tests on the antenna model had indicated it would not need pressurizing. Payload qualification testing was scheduled to commence in Sunnyvale in January and Goodyear was to deliver the first flight payload for acceptance testing in February. Payload final assembly and checkout would continue through April ; full-scale system tests would begin in April and continue through June. A 5 August launch date still seemed to be achievable.26 The uncertainties of funding that had appeared several months earlier continued to be irritating but did not yet represent serious problems. Lockheed's Quill work still was being funded under supplemental agreement to another contract and Bradburn anticipated no change in SECTION I -QUILL : RADAR IN ORBIT that situation for the near term. As expected , Goodyear's need for additional money had to be acknowledged in February, and funds for the associate contractors were sufficient only to support work through Septemberif expenditures were continued at the rate originally contemplated . Bradburn advised the associate contractor representative that in all likelihood no more than limited additional funding could be made available through the end of the year, which meant that the associate contractor would have to stretch six months of contract dollars to cover nine months of work. No major technical problems were immediately apparent, although corona effects had again occurred in the high-voltage power supply and there were minor but troublesome difficulties with transmitter power and transmitter-modulator units in February and March . For the most part the response of program managers was to increase the tempo of testing . All of the radar units were scheduled to emerge from the manufacturing process in March and other principal elements of the payload were on schedule. A still-minor conflict of launch-pad scheduling caused Bradburn some concern in March , but he did not anticipate that it would become serious. (He planned to use a NASA gantry to mate payload and booster elements of Quill , and NASA had informally indicated a possible need for the equipment at about the time Quill was due to go into orbit. )27 From the time of program approval through March 1964 , only five months short of the scheduled first flight date , Quill had been managed almost entirely by Bradburn , for the Air Force , and the three principal contractor project leaders at Lockheed , Goodyear, and another associate contractor. Although he had reported frequently to Greer, and periodically to McMillan , Bradburn had for practical purposes exercised complete and near exclusive control of the program . In March, Greer decided , as he told Bradburn , to call in some nonparticipating experts for a detailed overview of the work and of the operational readiness of Quill. In advising his contractor associates of the prospect, Major Bradburn emphasized that the review was "not an inquisition" and did not indicate dissatisfaction with any aspect of the effort thus far. But he observed that they could expect a "thorough scrubbing ."28 The review had some undercurrents of interest that escaped the notice of those who merely read the eventual review report. It had begun , as Bradburn recalled, with Greer's usual report to McMillan, "Brad 's doing fine, " followed by, "wait a minute . How do I know he's doing fine. He's the one who 's telling me." The 'Tiger Team" to review Quill was Greer 's rejoinder to his self reminder. That the review would be thorough was guaranteed by the composition of the review team . Headed by Colonel Paul Heran one of General Greer's most capable senior managers, it was composed largely of Aerospace Corporation specialists in reconnaissance radar. Unhappily for their state of temper, they had become "specialists" mostly through involvement in the "P-22 " project-the "white " program conducted in part to provide a screen of cover for Quill. P-22 participants had generally believed , until being suddenly briefed on Quill, that what they were doing was an extremely important prelude to what might eventually become a radar-onorbit system . At the time of the briefing they learned that the radar-on-orbit system was not an abstraction but was in being-actually only about five months short of scheduled launch. They were , in Bradburn 's recollection, "somewhat upset to learn there was a real radar experiment going on ." They developed what Bradburn described as "an intense interest in the quality of Quill. "29 The specially appointed Aerospace team (which included several Air Force people) had instructions to look at payload and vehicle system designs; at qualification test history on new components; at power ground equipment design, availability, and placement; at preflight checkout philosophy and the adequacy of test planning ; at operational effects of recovery system changes; at competence of tracking stations and Satellite Test Center (STC) personnel to support the mission ; and at tracking station equipment readiness. Briefed first by Bradburn , the team studied project documentation generated by the contractors before beginning meetings with Lockheed , Goodyear, and another associate contractor's personnel in early April 1964. The briefings concluded on 7 May and the report was forwarded to Greer shortly after. Overall the Aerospace group was optimistic that Quill would accomplish its main objective: obtain a highresolution radar terrain map from an orbiting satellite within the designated short span of time. Nevertheless; they were less sure the experiment would contribute significantly to secondary objectives encouraging an operational future for an orbiting radar satellite. Secondary objectives had been stated as (1) evaluate the resolution potential and limitations of satellite-borne , ground-mapping radar; (2) evaluate the capability to retrieve the mapping information in real time by readout over a wide-band data link ; (3) evaluate the feasibility of using satellite-borne radar for terrain reconnaissance; (4) obtain sufficient engineering information to determine the cause of a failure to achieve the primary mission, or portions thereof; and (5) improve future system design. Acknowledging that useful information would probably be TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPEND IUM obtained to support evaluation of the "resolution potential and limitations " of orbital radars , the team anticipated that the flights would not produce findings of greater significance. The tenor of the report was to recommend for the second and third flights a restructuring of mission objectives and emphasis . Inherent in these criticisms was distaste for the design philosophy that had guided Quill from its onset: use as many off-the-shelf components and as little modification as absolutely required . Perhaps no less could be expected of a group that until a few weeks earlier had considered itself to be leading the way to the first orbiting radar system . The review group argued that "the use of a wide-band link for the retrieval of synthetic array radar data cannot be fully evaluated from the Quill experiment. Negative results will not be conclusive since the link was not engineered for this application . Positive results will not be conclusive since the quality of the Quill data is not representative of a high-quality radar." And elsewhere : "Since much better mapping performance than the Quill radar will provide is technically possible, this program will not fully evaluate the potential of orbital rada r for highquality terrain mapping ." The group conclu ded rather tepidly, that at its least the experiment would determine the cause of "catastrophic failures."30 The first two recommendations of the report concerned work by the associate contractor supporting the project intended to define the sources of final image degradation. The reviewers urged that data be continually updated throughout the program with equal consideration for data retrieval from the capsule and via the wide-band data link, and to post-flight analysis of the final map product. Bradburn agreed that the researchers should devise both analysis and evaluation plans to satisfy the recommendations. But he did not accept uncritically a recommendation focused on the secondary objectives of the mission . The Aerospace team felt that consideration should be given to flying Quill in a lower orbit (which would nominally improve the signal-to-noise ratio) and in a synchronous orbit (which would permit Quill to overfly the same target on successive days). While the planned orbit seemed to satisfy the primary objective of the experiment the team felt it "marginal for the purposes of the secondary objectives." Pointing out that a lower orbit would decrease the swath width and the payload operating times and thereby decrease the probability of seeing the resolution targets , Bradburn's people argued that "marginal enhancement" was not a sufficient justification for changing vehicle altitude. If the first flight were successful , lower flight altitude would be considered for follow-on flights . Synchronous orbits had been considered early in the program, but the necessary orbit adjust capability had been discarded because it ran counter to Quill 's "minimum modifications" policy. Bradburn felt that gains from overflying selected targets on successive days were not worth the extra effort-and cost-of incorporating orbit adjust capability in the Agena . The committee 's report took note of several problem areas already well known to Bradbu nand the contractors as a result of qualification and acceptance testing. They included , among others , "thumping" in the transmittermodulator, continued cracking of the potting compound after repeated temperature cycli g , and cathode ray tube spot sensitivity to vibration el'ects. The reviewers also expressed concern that antenna testing had not been sufficiently intensive, urging comprehensive tests to verify the characteristics of an antenna they characterized as an advance in the state-of-the-art (because of its size and its required precision). On the whole however, the acceptance and qualification testing program received approbation. Th e review team noted that system testers "appeared to e capable of giving the subsystems a thorough che ckout ; the schedule of retesti ng after major environmental tests was very good ." But program reviewers also recommended that the associate contractor supporting the project prepare a system error budget to insure that tolerance margins did not become excessive , with a resulting degradation in payload performance . In the end , the review team concluded that "no individual factor was uncovered w ich can be expected to prevent accomplishment of the primary objective of the Quill program." There were the usual injunctions urging continued diligent system engineering, analysis , and testing . The only significant remark in that category proposed "closer control of overall performance criteria to eliminate the possibility of either over-specifying or under-specifying subsystem requirements." The committee also felt that the three principal contractors insufficiently appreciated the problems of interfacing such subsystems as attitude control , data link, and the antenna. But on the whole the review had to be considered approbatory of program conduct."1 Comprising some 33 recommendations attended by lengthy comments , the report was submitted to General Greer, after which the program office and the main contractors spent much of May and June in responding by both comment and action . In the meantime , Bradburn was more concerned with troublesome failures of the transmitter-modulator boxes in temperature-altitude simulation tests. During late SECTION I -QUILL : RADAR IN ORBIT March and early April , the first such complete test had been interrupted by power supply failure-blamed on a faulty capacitor-and transmitter-modulator breakdown in altitude tests (charged to poor circuit design ). After circuit redesign , a second alt itude -temperature test of the complete payload , began on 6 May. Results were reversed . The transmitter passed altitude testing but during the sea-level run the klystron failed . After reviewing test status , Bradburn concluded late in May that 29 August 1964 was the earl iest possible launch date and that the next series of environmental tests was likely to uncover more difficulties . He recommended that 29 August become the new launch date target , but that the program office be prepared to accept further delays .32 In June the potting problem drew new attention . Lockheed had reported to Bradburn in late May that Goodyear had no written procedures or quality control for potting procedures . Bradburn 's response was to notify Goodyear that he wanted standards written and also to instruct the radar contractor to build eight of each potted item , to test all eight , dissect three , and if all three were good , to pass the remaining five . Although the remaining difficulties seemed relatively small , the schedule of manufacturing and acceptance testing had been irreparably affected ; in July it was necessary to specify an additional two-week delay in the scheduled first launch. Goodyear 's hardware del ivery problems were the principal cause of the slippage .33 One of the important residual uncertainties of component interface compatibil ity was resolved by late July. In a series of tests at its Santa Cruz facility, Lockheed ran comparison tests of a parabol ic antenna and the flight antenna , both aimed at a corner reflector four and a half miles distant. Test criteria was to compare pulse transm itted and received thro ugh the horn or parabola with the pulse through array in order to measure distortion of radar pulse caused by the flight antenna. The third objective was to measure system range resolution. Results demonstrated that the flight antenna was compat ible with the basic radar generator, the antenna did not cause pulse distortion , and range resolution (with a corner reflector as a target ) was better than 25 feet. For all that reassuring news , the program incurred another schedule slip . Pulse-forming network redesign problems and klystron and plate choke potting failu res in the transmitter-modulator forced a rescheduling of first launch to 24 October.34 Then on 8 September, one of the klystrons in the transmitter-modulator failed during an altitude-temperature simulation checkout experiment. After replacement of the damaged elements , testing was resumed . Further component failures in the transmittermodulator elements early in October forced Bradburn (now a Lieutenant Colonel) to postpone the scheduled first launch once again , this time to mid-November. In order to verify confidence in the reliability of the first flight-qualified pay load , he insisted on exposing the complete unit to five hours of simulated operations at the temperatures and pressures that would be encountered during the mission . That represented about ten times as much operation as the equipment would be required to produce during its initial flight , but Bradburn was convinced that nothing less than a "thoroughly run-in but not worn-out " approach would satisfactorily demonstrate the reliability of the troublesome components .35 Goodyear was unable to promise delivery of a testqualified transmitter-modulator unit before the last week of November, unexpected problems developed in final tests of the film drive unit of an orbital recording camera , and confidence in the design validity of the potted , shielded boxes earlier adopted to prevent high-voltage arcing was rapidly diminishing . (In November, Goodyear began the devel opment of a backup design which discarded the shielding.) Although none of the problems were basic, all contributed to delay of delivery and testing schedules . A December first launch seemed achievable if technical readiness was the only criterion , but the classic problem of seasonal holidays introduced new scheduling complications . By mid-November, Bradburn was juggling holiday schedules , environmental test schedules, and launch pad (and satellite operations capability) availability in an effort to decide when a launch should be attempted . If Goodyear successfully completed altitudetemperature tests of the critical transmitter-modulator unit on 28 November as prom ised , launch could be attempted by 19 December-the last possible date for starting the mission without encountering holiday workload problems that might not succumb to a mere program manager 's determination . After confirming his judgment in a meeting with Greer, Bradburn decided to push for a mid-December launch-which meant pressing Goodyear to comp lete the last of the environmental tests on or as close as possible to the critical 28 November deadline .36 And he had another problem : although the essential valid ity of program funding remained intact, the recurrent delays in initial launch meant that both Goodyear and Lockheed were spending money that had originally been allocated to post-first-launch development and testing activities. (Lockheed calculated the amount expended in unprogrammed work in the period between the originally scheduled March 1964 launch date and the end of November 1964 . )37 Late November and early December were thoroughly cluttered with technical and administrative problems TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM that ranged from the absurd to the critical. Many months earlier, Bradburn had arranged matters so that no sudden influx of Goodyear people at Sunnyvale , Vandenberg , and the tracking stations would alert unwitting people to the imminence of an orbiting radar experiment , and in the event matters proceeded more or less as planned .ttt tt But there was late pressure to put Quill products in the Talent-Keyhole category, which meant making them available to a great many people who had been excluded from any knowledge of the NRO 's plan to fly a radar satellite, and Bradburn had to divert his atte ntion from technical to security matters , at least briefly, to prevent a breakdown of the original scheme.38 The transmitter-modulator tests finally were completed successfully on 2 December, resolving the chief remaining uncertainty of Quill qualification. Delayed delivery of Philco-produced data-link equipment to the Vandenberg tracking station briefly threatened postponement of launch pad system checkout , but by 5 December that too was settled happily. (Actually, several items of critical equipment were delayed in delivery, but Goodyear's transmitter-modulator was the pacing item through the last three months of pre-launch testing .) The last really troublesome issue revolved around the preposterous question of the high-temperature behavior of that common household item called Mystic tape-and for a time it threatened to delay the launch once aga in. "The Mystic Tape Problem " had its origin in the temperature sensitivities of the main batteries in the Agena . In the wake of several battery fai lures and real failures in Agena flights earlier in 1964, Lockheed engineers had narrowed the allowable launch window for Agena-payload missions (thus changin g the sun exposure characteristics of standard missions) and had redesigned the external paint pattern of the spacecraft . Black paint was applied to those portions of the veh icle where heat absorbance was desired, and reflective material elsewhere. The reflective material selected was adhesive-backed aluminum tape-Mystic tape . It covered 104 of the 255 square feet of the outer surface of the Agena 's forward equipment compartment. Two weeks before the now-scheduled 21 December launch of Quill , a Vandenberg technician placed one of the ttttt The arrangement was that Goodyear people visi ting Sunnyvale would wear Lock heed ident ification badges and describe themselves as self-employed consu ltants to Lockheed if questioned about thei r status . At Vandenberg and the tracking stations they were given credentials identifying them as consultants to the Air Force , no corporate affiliatio n being specified . Because friends and fa milies we re not permitted to know that ai rborne rada r specialists we re involved with space programs, various cover plans had to be devised that would co nceal the whe reabouts of engineers who while actually visi ting one of the space stations was nomi nally somewhere else. It wou ld be interesting to learn how success ful Goodyea r peop le were in convincing spouses that the ir freque nt out-of-touch trips we re as innoce nt as represented to be . Mystic-taped removable panels of the Agena under a heat lamp. It blistered . Although the manufacturer guaranteed that the tape would adhere to external areas where tem peratures would not exceed 750 degrees (Fahrenheit), materials specialists at Vandenberg quickly determined that molecular outgassing in a lowpressure environment would cause blisters to form on the unders ide of a tape at temperatures of only 300 degrees. When blisters became large enough to extend to the edge of a piece of tape , the trapped gas escaped and the tape collapsed , reattaching itself to the surfaceunless the blister reached the forward edge of the tape while there was a forceful airflow along that edge . In that case , it could conceivably fold back and tear away in the airstream . If enough tape broke away, battery overheating could result and mission success would be imperiled . It was a classic horseshoe nail phenomenon . Happily, the vulnerability came to light before launch rather than in a post mortem. Launch base personnel were instructed to tuck the tape over the leading edges of all removable panels and to cover with stainless steel strap all those edges where there were no removable panels. Extensive tests confirmed that the reflectance properties of the thermal control surfaces would remain within required tolerances if that precaution were taken .39 Simulated launch and flight tests and other compatibility tests at Vandenberg during the first half of December uncovered only a few minor glitches-a defective bearing in the film supply spool in the recorder, transients in one of the power supply units among them-but these we re readily fixed and no significant malfunctions were detected in the integrated satellite system . The completion of the countdown , lau ch-minus-three-days checks, and the horizontal simulated flight operation completely revalidated flight vehicles and payload . The only exception to a complete functional check was radar transmission through the flight antenna , which had been validated in earlier testing . Every o her payload function was exercised in the final fl ight con figuration . On 19 December the gantry was removed , and because rain was falling , a protective polyethylene cover was placed over the forward (payload) sections of the Agena. High winds during that nigh t caused the cover to repeatedly slap against the newly-taped surfaces. When the gantry was repositioned the day before scheduled launch and the "protective covering " removed , launch personnel discovered that most of the normally shiny aluminum tape surface had been degraded to a dull , and in some areas, almost black finish . Additionally, finely divided aluminum had been tra sferred to adjacent painted surfaces. Happily, Lockheed's optical surface comparator was still in the gantry, so new measurements SECTION I -QUILL : RADAR IN ORBI T could be taken at once. Less happily, the measurements indicated that the solar absorptivity of Mystic tape surfaces on the cylindrical sections of the vehicle had been increased by as much as 300 percent! Tape on the conical section had not been unacceptably degraded . But clearly large sections of tape would have to be replaced and painted surfaces cleaned . Beginning with the surfaces most critical to battery temperatures, technicians replaced approximately 75 percent of the tape earlier installed on removable panels and cleaned the painted surfaces with distilled water and a mild abrasive soap . Ten hours before scheduled launch , the rework was completed and the gantry was removed . All but about 15 square feet of the degraded tape had been replaced , but as a further insurance measure the normal two-to-four-hour launch window was reduced to 48 minutes at midday, thus lessening the time during which the reflective sections were exposed to direct solar radiation .40 On 21 December 1964 at 11 :09 Pacific time , Quill vehicle 2355 was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base and injected into an orbit of 70 .1 degrees inclination with an 89.4 minute period . All subsystems functioned properly. Tracking station personnel verified the operability of the data-link equipment during Quill 's seventh orbit and on the next passes over New Hampshire and Vandenberg radar mapping was attempted. All were successful. Diagnostic telemetry returns indicated correct functioning of all payload components . Both stations recorded video information . Operator's displays showed the expected patterns . Ground recording equipment operated by project scientists showed the radar transmission to be radiating strong signals. The lead research scientist reported to Bradburn that a quick look at readout data from pass eight on a projector showed successful ground painting . A reconnaissance aircraft scheduled to photograph the "painted " ground swath was unable to fly because of poor weather in New England, but otherwise all went perfectly. Recovery was planned for 22 or 23 December, the final decision hinging on the higher priority of a Corona capsule also scheduled for recovery on one of those days . Reports from the Quill command post at Sunnyvale on 22 December indicated continued mission success . The lead research scientist reported that data read out from pass eight , which at first seemed to be severely degraded , were susceptible of improvement if the correlator were refocused by hand. He also told Bradburn that the receivers had captured a successful wide -band recording of transmitted radar pulses confirming proper phase and amplitude characteristics and that a mobile narrow-band recorder positioned at the research facility had verified the correct functioning of the antenna .41 The payload continued to operate nominally through orb it 25 , using 316 feet of film . Reporting to Greer on subsystem activities , Bradburn indicated that radar frequency power output and high voltage were well within predicted limits . Minor engine chamber pressure fluctuations during boost thus far represented the onlymission anomaly, although heavy cloud cover was causing some slightly out-of-specification roll excursions when the horizon sensors were turned on . (The horizon sensors , providing lo ng-term pitch and roll stabilization fo r the vehicle , were not used during radar operation. Their response to cold clouds could conceivably cause instabilities which could lead to serious degradation of azimuth resolution.) A second attempt to photograph terrain as it was being viewed by radar ended in another weatherinduced flight abort of the assigned aircraft , but satellite operations continued to be flawless. When Corona flight controllers decided to continue their change in orbit until 23 December, Bradburn ordered Quill recovery to be conducted one day earlier.42 As with the balance of the mission, capsule recovery was routine . After retrieval and despooling , the film was dispatched to the special processing laboratory at Westover, arriving du ri ng the morning of 24 December 1964 . Quill's radar system was operated for a total of 14 passes over the continental United States between 22 December and 26 December. Thereafter electrical power and stabilization gas exhaustion prevented further experimentation and the Agena was deliberately destabilized for destructive reentry. It reentered over the South Atlantic on the morning of 11 January.43 As General Greer later wrote, 'The flight of the satellite when it came in December 1964 was almost anticlimatic. So close was the system performance to that determined in tests , so nominal was the operation , so professional was the handling of the satellite by the Satellite Control Facility, (that) a participant had to remind himself that this was not just another rehearsal ... The result was a 100 percent successful mission in quality and duration ."44 What remained was to evaluate the Quill take and to determine the immediate future of satelliteborne radar systems. On 5 January 1965, Bradburn and the chief contractor project managers presented a P-40 "Quick Look " TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPEND IUM briefing in Washington .tttH The primary obj ectives of the mission had been fully satisfied . Initial evaluation of final map quality, using recovered data film revealed az imuth resolution at 10 to 15 feet and ground range at 60 feet , far exceeded the project's resolution requirement of 100 feet or better. There had been no vehicle or payload system malfunctions of any significance . Bradburn proposed postponing the launch of the second Quill vehicle until the several contractors could complete an intensive engineering evaluation, a process that would take almost six weeks . Decisions on whether or how to operate the second and third flight systems could be made on the strength of the initial analysis although a comprehensive engineering analysis would last for three months . McMillan promptly app roved both proposals . Final reports on the first Quill mission involved a quantity of material available for analysis in addition to the radar maps: telemetry records indicating vehicle attitude and radar performance, engineering specifications and preflight test results on equipment, computer best-fit orbit and attitude history, weathe r data , ground measurement of azimuth beam pattern , one-way pulse recordings , results from the corner reflector layout at the post-flight aerial photographs of target area , and radar maps of target areas taken with the airborne radar equipment. One of the most critical post-flight evaluation reports was that prepared by the associate contractor supporting the project , indicating the extent to which Quill 's primary and secondary goals had been met. Responsible for preparing "the highest possible " final radar maps from both recovery and readout data , the organization's researchers measured range and azimuth resolutions and estimated system dynamic ranges . That analysis revealed the relationship of measured results to the radar design and performance parameters of Quill , propagation cond itions, vehicle behavior, and data link performance. The audience in the Pentagon on 5 January was able to view samples of the Quill output maps in the form of photographic prints and negative transparencies. Three different sets of maps were displayed. First, were maps made from the recovered data film , then maps reconstituted from tracking station photographs of the signals from a wide band data link , and finally maps made by playback of magnetic tapes of the data link signals. The recovered film provided the highest quality maps , and the magnetic tape playback data the poorestbecause both data link and tape recorder signal losses :t:++:t:+ With Bradburn were represe ntatives from Lockheed , Goodyear, and the associate contractor sup port ing the project. were involved . But all were "good ."§§§§§ Bradburn was voluble in his praise of the rapidi y and excellence of processing of recorded and recove ed materials. Although there was little explicit discussion of when , or if, another Quill mission would be flown , neither Greer nor Bradburn saw any need for one . Results had so thoroughly exceeded reasonable expectations that there seemed no justification for collecting additional data .44 Nevertheless, until a decision was announced the program office continued to study modifications that might improve the quality of returns from a later Quill mission . Quill contractors urged that a second experimental flight carrying modified equipment be attempted in September 1965. Bradburn thought the probable gain too slight to justify the cost-and so advised Greer. On 11 February, Greer told McMillan that the feasibility of radar reconnaissance had been "amply demonstrated " and that additional launches shou ld not be scheduled until there was agreement on "desi red operational use." He endorsed Bradburn 's recommendation that Quill be closed out with the final reports due in April and that hardware be put in storage to include the vehicle equipment at Lockheed and all black radar hardware and ground equipment at Goodyear. Any decision to reactivate equipment for a second launch would require a minimum of nine months lead time, but Greer felt this break in the continuity of the project was justified in view of the "thorough evaluation " that would be given to the first Quill's returns in the meantime. Greer carefully refrained from advocating the termination of satellite radar studies , but he argued that Quill data made it feasible to proceed using aircraft and ground tests, laboratory experiments, and other non-specialized satellites. "We have provided a good basis for further exploration of an operational system . This work should proceed when the conclusions of your evaluation committee are available ," he told McMillan , who agreed . Although Quill hardware was destined for storage , either permanently or temporarily, and plans for additional launches of the original Quill-configuration satellites had all but been cancelled , there still remained the original issue of whether radar satellite bomb-damage assessment or crisis management systems should be developed and deployed. And still to be formally assessed by intelligence specialists was what the Quill experiment had contributed to a better §§§§§ All radar imagery was impressive , pictures of Phoenix, Chicago , and Richmond (Virginia) being particula rly interesting for the detail they co ntained. Barges , ships , and railroad t rains were readily ide ntifiab le throug h clou d cove r, fog , and rai nstorms. So we re fine geographica l details: hill s, dams , strea ms, highways , islands . SECTION I -QUILL : RADAR IN ORBI T understanding of both requirements and technology. Brigadier General James T. Stewart, who succeeded Brigadier General John L. Martin as chief of the NRO staff, had suggested in October 1964 that a formal evaluation team be immediately organized to determine means of "maximizing the knowledge gained from the Quill feasibility demonstration ." At that point Bradburn and Greer were much more concerned with resolving equipment qualification problems than with planning for the evaluation of results that might or might not be returned by the first-or the second or third-Quill mission. Stewart wanted to schedule-and organize-a full-scale operational utility analysis . Greer, in the circumstances, urged that "we should avoid fanfare over this effort," that Quill as a system had absolutely no known operational utility or adaptability and should continue to be treated as an R&D project , and that the NRO should wait ".. . until after we have recovered and reconstituted something worth evaluating from an intelligence viewpoint ..." before setting afoot any elaborate evaluation effort. It was all consistent with his position on Gambit and reflected the pragmatism of experience with the wholly unsuccessful Samos E-5 and Samos E-6 systems, only recently cancelled. Greer convinced Stewart, and the matter dropped from sight for several months . 47 Owing in part to the increasing acrimony of CIA-NRO relationships in the early months of 1965 ,llllllllll evaluation of Quill findings remained somewhat fragmented until April , being mostly confined to participating contractors and to informal review by various intelligence community personnel specified by the USIB 's Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance. Bradburn , briefing senior CIA reconnaissance people early in March , explained the limited circulation of Quill 's radar imagery (the National Photographic Interpretation Center had not yet been authorized to view the product) in terms of constraints imposed from USIB . He was advised by Dr. A. D. Wheelan , the CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology, that " ... earlier CIA reservations were mainly procedural , and [that] there had been no intent to delay the evaluation ," -following which an Ad Hoc Quill Intelligence Evaluation Team actually was formed . It met first in April , including representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the several military services as well as CIA, NRO , and NPIC (which provided the chairman) .48 Between April and June 1965 there was deta iled consideration of a proposal for " .. . modifying the existing Quill system in storage to provide range resolution comparable to azimuth resolution ... for a Quill mission 'llml'll'll See Volume V pages 180 et seq in original. over the USSR using the capsule recovery technique only," but like the several similar proposals of the early 1960s, it eventually fizzled into nothingness . Goodyear was convinced that Quill equipment could be modified to produce a slant-range resolution of about 25 feet but nobody in authority seemed to be much interested. 49 The SAC was the chief prospective customer and all the earlier reasons for avoiding the use of satellite radar over the Soviet Union weighed against SAC urgings . A special USIB committee that looked into requirements in 1967 emphasized again that quite apart from rather demanding technology,". .. possibly an even more critical disadvantage of side-looking radar is that it actively transmits electroni c pulses which will be detected and which might well become the basis for diplomatic protests of such serious nature that U.S. policy makers would deny permission to employ the system in peacetime." Given that the acquisition of basic radar data needed for the long-term support of post-strike, bomb-damage assessment operations "would require many missions and much activity .. . " there seemed little doubt that "protests would probably not be long in coming. "50 T he prospective costs of creating a radar satellite network for possible use in crisis management operations served as a deterrent to the approval of a formal operational requirement for such a system. It was impossible to evade the real ization that a large complex of interlinked ground stations supporting a veritable fleet of satell ites was necessary to perform the sort of daily coverage , near-real-time readout that crisis management required . Further, if crisis reconnaissance were to be an assignment of a radar satellite contingent , a comprehensive data base on "relevant installations" would have to be prepared and maintained "on a current basis," in the words of a COMOR (Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance) report assembled only months after Quill results first became available. That , of course , implied a requirement for peacetime overflight of den ied areas by active radar satellites , and the fundamental policy objections to that sort of operation changed little during the 1960s. 51 The bas ic attribute of side-looking radar that made it attractive was its synthetic aperture mode-but that also represented its principal shortcoming . Side-looking radar had a limited ground swath which could not be effectively broadened without compromising weight , power, and antenna-size factors . The system had limited fore and aft view ing capability and an inevitable blind spot directly below the carrier vehicle , the consequence of having to "look" at an oblique angle in order to obtain range resolution . In its 1967 study (published in 1968), USIB estimated that continuous coverage from an TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM altitude of 200 nautical miles would require "in excess of 32 ,000 vehicles . . . on orbit simultaneously"-which also suggested that rather a large number of readout installations might be needed to exploit the potenti al of 32 ,000 satellites . Raising operating altitudes reduced the numbers needed to about 6500 but imposed requirements from 10 to 1000 times the radiated power required for reconnaissance from 200 miles , power being dependent on the physical aperture of the ante nna system. Because synthetic aperture radar rel ied wholly on antenna motion for its azimuth effectiveness , sidelooking radar could not be adapted to operate from synchronous-orbit vehicles Y Quill had worked , and worked almost precisely as planned . But that radar could be effectively operated from orbit remained only one aspect of a complex problem that involved requireme nts , applications , technology, international politics , and needs for vast funds . It was particularly interesting that the feasibility demonstration finally cost roughly less than half what Bradburn had estimated when first confro nted with the project , but that an operational system would surely have cost billions. (The difference would have been expended had two more missions been flown of course.) It was also interesting that the "Phase Alpha " research and development project conducted in concert with Quill tended , by 1965 , to look more and more like a sophisticated Quill. When taxed with the NRO 's apparent lack of interest in exploiting the capabilities of orbi ting radar, Dr. A. H. Flax , McMillan 's successor as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office , was wont first to cite the "Phase Alpha " work and its follow-on as evidence of a continuing NRO investment in radar satellite rese arch and development , and then-if the issue were pressedto point at Quill as evidence that the fundame ntal feasibility work had been very successfully condu cted and to suggest that requirements , technology, funds , and politics were problems that should be effectively addressed before new experiments were undertaken. 53 The Quill program had been designed to provide data that would permit evaluation of the technical feasibility of employing what Greer called "this valuable new military instrument for the furtherance of nationa l poli cy. " Although initial plans had assumed that the relevant data could be obtained by 1965, they had also assumed that three to five missions would be needed to provide the information . In the event , the first mission was delayed by seven months , but no additional missions were needed and the derived data were "of even better qua lity than had been expected from the most optimistic estimates ." The best estimate of the cost of obtaining those data was estimated ; the result was obtained for about two thirds of the estimate , and should further flights have proved advisable for any reason , fully flight qualified hardware was available. (Some of the findings were passed to NASA for use in lunar exploration programs and the hardware was as readily convertible to NASA applications as was the much heralded lunar survey camera sys em derived from the Samos E-1 experience .) In Bradbu rn' s view, the spectacular success of the effort was in considerable part a result of the special circumstances under wh ich it had been conductedtight security being a principal element of those circumstances . Pressures for info rmation , advice, and participat ion by the many agencies interested in radar satellites would have incredibly complicated what had been a very difficult development program. In a final meeting with several of the project participants , Bradburn also attributed program success to "individual efforts by individual people , each ... a specialist in his area. " And he skirted the treacherous path that stemmed from the all-too-common misapprehension that a successful development team and a successful development approach could be channeled fundamentally unchanged , into some new and different problem . Proposals for program continuance and for new experiments with modified Quill equipment still were current when Bradburn closed out the last of the Quill tasks , the final reports. Neither he nor Greer-nor Greer 's successorsever gave them serious consideration .54 Notwithstanding , the general reluctance of senior American officials to approve the development of operational radar satell ites and the continuing premise that active radar surveillance might be politically unacceptab le to the Soviet Union , that nation in 1968 began its own radar satellite development program and by 1971 had operational vehicles in orbit. They were generally similar to Quill in con "iguration employing synthetic-aperture radar and relying on readout for data retrieval. (They entered semi-equatorial rather than polar orbits , however.) But the Soviet satellites were-at least ostensibly-designed and used for ocean surveillance, for spotting and tracking ships and fl eet movements . The radar seemed to be low resolution in character. Thus they did not violate the principles honored by American policy makers ; operation over non-Soviet-bloc landmasses was not attempted. Nonetheless , the apparent capability of the Soviet ocean surveillance satellites to perform some level of bomb damage assessment , or even for low-grade crisis management assignments , could not be disguised . It was real enough . ...(footnote continued fro m p. 1 0) The arguments against active radar survei llance cf the Sov iet Un ion fell into two ca tego ri es. One had to do with the premise that nobod y cou ld object to surveillance if there we re no demon strab le evidence of it. Because photog raohy was wholly passi ve, there was (in theory) no way of providi ng incontrovert ble evidence that survei llance was in prog ress-unless , of cou rse, the owne r of the recon naissance vehicle ack nowledged what he was doing , or somehow physica l eviden ce of the SECTION I -QUILL: RADAR IN ORBIT 2 1 activity fell into unfriendly hands . Putting the entire reconnaissance satellite program behind dense security barriers late in 1960 effectively precluded the first of those circumstances ; the United States neither denied nor confirmed that it was ftying reconnaissance satellites over Russia , although that intention had been loudly proclaimed on several occasions between 1958 and 1960 . The possibility that the Russians might somehow recover a camera-equipped U.S. satellite or enough of one to prove that it was a reconnaissance vehicle , had worried program managers since the first Corona launch in June 1959. Precautions against inadvertent descent of either capsules or camera sections within reach of Soviet recovery forces were extensive , and for several years they were believed to be effective . At least once in Corona experience , however, a largely intact capsule left a decay orbit and survived random reentry , and late in the 1960s sizeable shards of a Gambit mirror plus various bits and pieces of its electronic subsystems survived atmospheric reentry and were recovered in England . Enough capsules and orbital vehicles went astray in the 1960s to support reasonable speculation that some could have fallen into Russian hands-but nothing was ever said by the Soviets to suggest that had happened . By its very nature , however, a radar satellite radiated recordable evidence of its purpose . That evidence might be sufficient to support a demand for a cessation of satellite overflight operations should the Soviet Unionor any other nation-make an issue of the matter: thus the reluctance to consider use of radar reconnaissance in satellite overflight of denied areas . But there was another reason for such caution . Photographic satellites of the early 1960s were incapable of providing near-real-time information . They were superb instruments for doing targeting for technical intelligence , for force structure evaluation, and for various other tasks with military significance. But only a radar satellite could conceivably do wide-swath bomb damage assessment without concern for season , cloud cover, or time of day . As no radar satellite could provide the detail of photography , it followed , then , that one substantial justification for operating a radar satellite of 1963 vintage (limited in definition and resolution) could be to have something in position for immediate bomb damage assessment-which (according to the reasoning then current) could be interpreted to mean that a surprise nuclear strike was imminent. It was highly unlikely that any American president would order a preemptive nuclear attack solely on the strength of information that the Soviets were operating a radar satellite , but there was no such confidence in Soviet reactions were the United States to do as much . There were other reasons for restricting on-orbit radar operations to the limits of the continental United States , the desire to keep the capability secret being one , but in the councils of Washington , uncertainty about Soviet reaction was the principal cause of caution . TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NOTES ON SOURCES (ENDNOTES)****** 1. Ltr, R. H. Shatz, Chm , WS-117-M Special Studies Com, to Col W.G. King , Jr., Dir WS-117 Prgm , 10 Oct 60 , subj : Recommendations of the WSCC ; interview, Maj J. Pietz , SAFSP staff, by R. Perry, 15 Mar 63. See also Vol I, Ch I, this mss . 2. Study, "Post Strike Reconnaissance -Technical and Equipment Considerations and Requirements, " prep by Capt F. Gorman , USN , 5 Oct 62, in Dir/SP files (italics in original); Pietz interview, 15 Mar 63. 3. Ltr, Col J. W. Ruebel , Spec Asst to Dir/SP to (redacted), CIA, 22 Jun 62 , no subj; TWX . SAFSSDIR-M-2096, DNRO to Dir/ISP, 3 Oct 62 . 4. Memo, LtCol (redacted) Legal Asst (SP) , to MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 1 Nov 62 , subj: Legal Sufficiency, Atchmt 2 to King Rpt. 5. Rpt, QUILL, Col W.G . King , et al to MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 30 Oct 62, subj : Initial Report; Bradburn interview by R. Perry, 10 May 74 . 6. TWX, SAFSS-1-M-2114 , SAFSS to SAFSP (MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP) , 10 Nov 62 ; subj : Satellite Radar Experiments; TWX, SAFSP-F-16-11-417, SAFSP to SAFSS , 16 Nov 62. 7 . MFR, prep by Maj D. D. Bradburn , 27 Nov 62, subj : Meeting at LMSC on 14 Nov 62. Bradburn 's notebook, 14 Nov 62 , an informal project record book maintained by Maj (LtCol) D. D. Bradburn , entry for 14 Nov 62 . Hereafter cited as "Bradburn 's notebook, " with date of entry, that source was a primary reference for the Quill history. It is more nearly a project diary than a "project record," consisting of longhand entries made at the time of, or immediately after the events it records. 8. Bradburn's notebook, 15 Nov 62 ; TWX , SAFSP-F-16-11-417, SAFSP to SAFSS , 16 Nov 62. 9 . MFR, prep by Maj D.D. Bradburn , 27 Nov 62 , subj : Meeting at GAC on 20 Nov 62. 10 . Bradburn 's notebook, 15 Nov 62 . 11. Rpt (redacted), Vol I, prep by (redacted), Aug 65 . 12. Bradburn's notebooks , 18-20 Feb 64 ; 17 Apr 64. 13. MFR, prep by Maj D. D. Bradburn, 10 Dec 62 , subj: Meeting of (redacted), 6-7 Dec 62 . ****** With minor exceptions , mostly noted , the primary sources for documents cited in these notes were files stored within SAFSP , at the request of then Lieutenant Colonel D. D. Bradburn , in 1965. 14. MFR , prep by Maj D. D. Bradburn, 7 Jan 63, subj: Trip to GAC , 18-19 Dec 62; interviews Maj J. Pietz, SP3, by R. Perry, 15 Mar 63 ; LtCol D. D. Bradburn, SAFSP, by Perry, 24 Jan 64 ; BGen D. D. Bradburn by Perry, 10 May 74. 15. Bradburn's notebook, 7 Jan 63; Bradburn interview, 7 Jan 74 , 10 May 74 . 16. MFR , prep by Maj D. D. Bradburn, 29 Jan 63, subj: Trip To (redacted), 22-24 Jan 63 (negotiations with [redacted]). 17. Rpt, "Vehicle 2355 System Report," Vol I -Summary, prep by LMSC , 31 Mar 65; briefing records, pres by Maj D. D. Bradburn to Dr. B. McMillan, D/NRO, 29 Mar 63 , 22 May 63 ; interview, MGen R. E. Greer by R. Perry, 14 Nov 63 . 18. MFR, prep by Maj D. D. Bradburn , 3 Apr 63, subj: P-40 Briefing to Dr. McMillan, 29 Mar 63. Briefing records, pres by Maj D. D. Bradburn to Dr. B. McMillan, D/ NRO, 29 Mar 63, 22 May 63. 19. MFR , prep by Maj D. D. Bradburn, 5 Apr 63, subj: Trip to GAC, 4 Apr 63 ; MFR , prep by Bradburn, 20 May 63 , subj : Briefing of BuWeps Representative at GAC . 20. Bradburn's notebook, 17-18 un 63 . 21. MFR, prep by Maj D.D . Bradburn , 6 Sep 63, subj: Hi-Voltage Problem; Bradburn's notebook, 10 Jun 63, 17 Jul 63 ; Rpt, "Vehicle 2355 System Report ," Vol II -Engineering, prep by LMSC, 31 Ma r 65 . 22. TWX, SAFSS-6-M-0166 , SAFSS (Col J. Martin) to SAFSP (MGen R. E. Greer) , 22 Jul 63 , no subj. 23. Bradburn 's notebook , 30 Aug 63 . 24. TWX, SAFSP-F 30-9-954, SAFSP (Col R. W. Yundt) to SAFSS (Col [redacted]) , 30 Sept 63 , subj : QUILL (P-40). 25 . Rpt , "Vehicle 2355 System Report," Vol II -Engineering , prep by LMSC, 31 Ma r 65. 26. Briefing record , pres by Maj D. D. Bradburn, Dr. (redacted) to Dr. B. McMillan, D/NRO, 21 Jan 64 , subj : Status Report P-40. 27. Bradburn 's notebook, 5 Feb 64. 28. Bradburn 's notebook, 7 Apr 64 . 29. Bradb rn interview, 7 Jan 64. SECTION I -QUILL: RADAR IN ORBIT 30. Rpt , "Pre-Launch Review, " Col Paul Heran , SP-7 to MGen R. E. Greer, 15 May 64. 31. Ibid . 32. Briefing record , pres by Maj D. D. Bradburn to MGen R.E . Greer, 28 May 64 , subj : P-40 Status Report . 33 . Msg , (redacted ), LtCol D. D. Bradburn to (redacted) , 17 Jul 64 , subj : Daily AC TWX Status Report ; msg , (redacted) , LtCol D.O. Bradburn to (redacted ), 30 Jul64, subj : Trans/Mod Accident on 24 Jul 64 . 34 . Briefing record , pres by LtCol D. D. Bradburn to MGen R.E . Greer, 11 Aug 64 , subj : P-40 . 35 . Briefing record , pres by LtCol D. D. Bradburn to Dr. B. McMillan , 0/NRO , 7 Oct 64 . 36 . Briefing record , pres by LtCol D. D. Bradburn to MGen R. E. Greer, 13 Nov 64 . subj: Progress Report P-40 . 37 . Bradburn 's notebook , 30 Oct 64. 38. MFR, prep by Maj D. D. Bradburn , 19 Dec 63 , subj : Security Procedures for GAC Personnel at Sunnyvale , VAFB , VTS , and NHS ; Bradburn 's notebook , 22 Oct 64 . 39 . Rpt , "Vehicle 2355 System Report," Vol II -Engineering , prep by LMSC , 31 Mar 65 . 40. Ibid . 41. Msgs , (redacted) , 21 Dec 64 ; (redacted ), 22 Dec 64 ; (redacted ), 22 Dec 64 ; (redacted ), 22 Dec 64 ; (redacted) , 23 Dec 64 ; all msgs from Sat Ops Cen to DNRO and SAFSP. 42 . Msgs , (redacted) , 23 Dec 64 ; (redacted ), 23 Dec 64 , both STC to D/NRO and SAFSP. 43 . Msg , (redacted ), 24 Dec 64 , STC to DNRO and SAFSP ; TWX , TWOP-5, 6594th Aerospace Test Wing to SAFSP (LtCol D. D. Bradburn) , 12 Jan 65 . 44 . Recommendation for Decoration , MGen R.E . Greer (Dir, SAFSP) to USAF Mil Pers Gp, 26 May 65 , subj: Legion of Merit for LtCol D.O . Bradburn . 45 . MFR , prep by LtCol D. D. Bradburn , 12 Jan 65 , subj : QuickLook Briefings on P-40 Results ; Bradburn interview, 7 Jan 74 . 46 . Msg , (redacted ), MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP to Dr. B.McMillan , 0 /NRO , 11 Feb 65 , subj : Disposi tion of Quill Hardware ; msg , (redacted ), BGen J T. Stewart , Dir/NRO Staff, to MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 16 Feb 65, no subj . 47 . Msg , (redacted ), BGen J. T. Stewart, Dir/NRO Staff , to MGen R.E. Greer, Dir/SP, 1 Oct 64 ; msg, (redacted) , MGen Greer to BGen Stewart , 5 Oct 64 ; msg , (redacted) , BGen Stewart to MGen Greer, 12 Oct 64 . 48 . Msg , (redacted ), BGen J.T. Stewart , Dir/NRO Staff to MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 24 Dec 64 , MFR , prep by LtCol D. D. Bradburn , 15 Mar 65 , subj : QUILL Presentations to SAC , SAFSL , CIA , DDR&E , and NASA. 49 . Msg , (redacted) , BGen J. T. Stewart to MGen R. E. Greer, 21 Apr 65 ; msg , (redacted) to LtCol D.D.Bradburn , 11 May 65 , subj : Performance Estimates of Modified KP11 Equipment; msg , (redacted) BGen Stewart to MGen Greer, 9 Jun 65 . 50 . Rpt , USIB/Comirex Rpt USIB-D-46.4 .3 (COMIREX-D-13 .74) , "Requirements for Image Forming Satellite Reconnaissance Responsive to Warning/ Indications Needs ," 5 Jan 68. 51 . Memo , (redacted) , ExSec, COMOR , to COMOR , 24 Jan 66 , subj: Draft of Subject Paper Looking into Suggestions Made at Special COMOR Meeting of 24 January 1966 . 52 . Rpt , USIB-D-46 .4 .5, 5 Jan 68. 53 . Bradburn interview, 7 Jan 74; Recommendation for Decoration , MGen R. E. Greer to USAF Mil Pers Gp, 26 May 65 . 54 . Bradburn 's notebooks , 10 Mar, 28 May, 8 Jun 65 . TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Robert L. Perry (May 10 , 1925-September 7, 1990) majored in journalism at Marshall University, graduating in 1947. He went on to a master's degree in history at The Ohio State University. From 1951 to 1964, Bob Perry worked for the Air Force-first at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, then as chief of the History Office at Air Force Systems Command, El Segundo. He was a retired USAF reserve officer who also taught or lectured at Ohio State , Wittenberg University, the University of Dayton , the Air Force Academy, the Air University, California Institute of Tech ology, and the Rand Graduate Institute. He also wrote extensively on Air Force system development programs, chiefly aircraft and missiles. In October 1964, Bob Perry joined the Economics Department of the Rand Corporation , where his list of publications includes more than 25 technological case histories, studies of Research and Development (R&D) policy, analyses of system cost trends, examinations of test program structures, and comparisons of U.S. and fore ign technologies and R&D institutions. He also served on numerous outside panels and gave testimony to several congressional committees. SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE Quill: The First Imaging Radar Satellite INTRODUCTION In December 1964, the NRO launched a satellite called "Quill" that successfully demonstrated electonic imaging of the Earth using a synthetic aperture radar in outer space. How this test demonstration came about, its novel results, and what became of the work are ably described in the pages that follow. Dr. Robert Butterworth has incorporated the findings of extensive documentary research with interviews and oral histories. The result is a highly readable account of how SAR revolutionary technology first came to operate in space. TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPEND IUM PREFACE Quill was the world 's first imaging radar satellite, launched by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) as an experiment in 1964. The NRO was young then-only three years old , in fact, when Quill's development got under way. But several dominant traits were already apparent: dedication to developing very advanced technology, aversion to bureaucratic management, and irresolution in the face of competing military and national intelligence needs . I found pieces of this story while working for the NRO's former History Office and the I MINT directorate-a project that was aided by scores of people and dozens of organizations . Particularly important information about Quill came from interviews with its Air Force program manager, Maj. Gen . David D. Bradburn USAF (Ret), the program manager who bu ilt the radar system at Goodyear Aerospace Corporation , and an expert in Doppler data processing. I could not have completed this work without superb research assistance and incomparable administrative support including the review of the manuscript in draft and the design and copyediting of several versions of the manuscript. This work began under the direction of R. Cargill Hall , NRO Historian and contractor during 1998-2003. Hall proved a rare , steady helmsman in the temperament-tossed seas of research and writing. With th is monograph he very nearly had a piece of NRO program history coming out of work commissioned and published on his watch. We were too slow for that , and must settle instead for being printed as part of his significant legacy. Robert L. Butterworth Chantilly, Virginia December 2004 SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE RADAR EYES Military satellite work in the U.S. sputtered through the 1950s until the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in October 1957. Soon thereafter, articles in the trade press talked about an Air Force contract with Lockheed for "WS 117L, " Earth reconnaissance satellites (some called "Pied Piper") that "would carry television , photograph ic cameras , [and] infra -red spotter or radar scanner systems."1 A later article made further reference to payloads : "probably no single Pied Piper reconnaissance vehicle will incorporate more than one type of sensor for mapping-optical, infrared, or radar-because of payload restrictions and complexity of multiple scanning systems."2 A 1958 advertisement (Figure 1) predicted that these satellites would "see " in various ways and that some would have "radar eyes ."3 Those eyes would see using a focused synthetic aperture radar (SAR) , which hit public attention on 20 April 1960, when the U.S. Army unveiled pictures of American cities taken at night and through clouds (Figure 2) with its new SAR system mounted in a small airplane.4 This new technology made it feasible that radar could be used for reconnaissance from satellites , because unlike rea l-aperture side-looking airborne radar (S LAR) , smaller antennas actually improved resolution , and distance from the target was effectively irrelevant.5 At the same time , satellites appealed to SAR engineers as excellent platforms for their sensor. 6 Unlike aircraftwhose bumps, slides , and twists through the air had to be measured and subtracted from the Doppler returnssatellites offered almost perfect stability. By the late 1950s, several research teams were studying the prospects for SAR imaging from very high or orbital altitudes. In 1959-60 the Air Force DynaSoar program funded two research teams to study how SAR might be used from a high-altitude stable platform ; one team included employees from the Litchfield , Arizona facility of the Goodyear Aerospace Corporation , working together with engineers from the Glenn L. Martin company of Baltimore, Maryland . 7 The Air Force continued its long- Figure 1. Aviation Week advertisement, 8 September 1958, pp . 100-101. TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM standing interest in radar technology with contracts in 1960 for the "Higasser" program, a classified effort to determine whether SAR images could be generated from very high orbits. Goodyear won a Higasser contract with one of their employees as project engineer; another research group did not win on Higasser, but a year later won a $1 million study in the "Logasser" program , which looked at SAR imaging at ranges of ten to 300 miles. This proposal , and the research, was led by the research group's employee. The research team included the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Sunnyvale, California, as the antenna subcontractor. Altogether they began to work on defining and resolving the technical issues in obtaining fine SAR resolution at the Earth 's surface . A summer exchange program in 1961 took the research group's employee to Sunnyvale to work with Lockheed on the early Sames satellite programs. While there, the employee gave some lectures on radar, was hired as a consultant to Lockheed, and became involved in exploring a business development idea for using Lockheed's launcher and satellite technology and the research group's radar imaging technology to build a SAR satellite. To build the radar itself, he recommended Goodyear as the best company. The employee had built an optical correlator used by one of Goodyear's earlier SAR products, the APS/AP-73,8 and had come to know the Litchfield Park engineers, who were even then working on design paramete s for a space-based SAR, such as the relationships among pulse repetition frequency, antenna length , power requirements, and coverage. A radar expert became Goodyear's project engineer for the effort, and in the summer of 1961 he and another engineer visited Sunnyvale, learned about the project, and began planning how to build the radar. At that time Col. William G. King was deputy director of the new Special Projects (SP) staff in Los Angeles, which shortly would be constituted as Program A in the newly established National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Program A worked close y with Lockheed on both satellites and launchers, and King headed a study group looking for new ways to use satellites for national Figure 2. The Washington Post on 20 April1960 displayed an earl)' SAR image on its front page. SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE Figure 3. Left: Brig. Gen. William G. King, USAF.; right: Maj. Gen. David D. Bradburn , USAF. reconnaissance . Sometime in the late fall of 1961 , Goodyear 's project engineer remembered , King 's study group took up the possibility of launching a proof-ofconcept SAR satellite. 9 One of the group 's members was Major David D. Bradburn . A West Point graduate in electrical engineering , Bradburn had joined the Air Force and spent most of the 1950s serving in the Air Research and Development Command , where he became aware of the ongoing work on side-looking and SAR systems .10 He entered the satellite world in 1957, when he transferred to Los Angeles to work on the WS-117L program, and in 1961 he was serving in Program A's SP-3 office , developing security plans and procedures. To assess the merits of a SAR satellite demonstration , Bradburn looked into the potential utility of a fully operational SAR satellite . After talking with officers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) , he concluded that a radar with about a 1 0-foot resolution would be useful for poststrike bomb damage assessment , particularly because it could respond quickly and not have to wait for clear skies and sunshine. Meanwhile , in January 1962 , Goodyear began preliminary SAR design work under a contract with Program A. After several months this project had matured enough for King to propose the experiment to NRO Director Joseph V. Charyk, who approved it in midNovember 1962 .11 Bradburn , chosen to direct the effort, 12 summoned Goodyear 's project engineer, Lockheed 's satellite bus expert and antenna expert , the research group 's employee , and a few others to a meeting in Los Angeles before Thanksgiving, without telling them the subject. It turned out to be the official start for the SA R satellite demonstration , now known by the classified name "P-40 ." The satellite itself received the codeword name "Quill. " DESIGNING THE EXPERIMENT Proposals from industry were solicited and received in short order, and contracts structuring a tripartite industrial team (Figure 4) were awarded in November 1962. Lockheed's group at the Agena facilities in Sunnyvale was responsible for overall systems engineering and technical direction , together with the upper stage/satellite body and associated subsystems .13 The research group became an associate contractor responsible for design and evaluation of the experiment and for the optical correlator that would process radar data and produce images. Goodyear was responsible for the radar payload and for working with the associate contractor in the design , test , and operation of the expe riment. The contract called for launching two identical vehicles , designated 2355 and 2356 , the first to go in Apri l 1964 . The payload for a third vehicle was to be prepared as well , but a booster was not identified for it. Bradburn designed Quill as an experimenttightlyfocused on the question of orbital functionality. As Lockheed emphasized , "the primary objective of the orbital flight was to demonstrate that a fine-resolution radar strip map of a portion of the earth 's surface can be generated through use of a satellite-borne synthetic aperture radar system. For the purpose of this demonstration a resolution goal of 50 feet in azimuth and in slant range was established ."14 Secondary mission objectives included quantitative evaluations of the radar system performance (especially azimuth-direction behavior) ; determination of the limits imposed by payload design parameters , payload in-flight performance , veh icle attitude behavior, atmospheric conditions , and data link design and performance ; and data collection on target field reflectivity, engineering parameters for aerospace radar system designs , and the capability of the ground recordin g equipment. Quill would not seek to develop new •echnologyorbecome the basis for an operational program .15 In Bradburn 's view, the orbital experiment intended to answer only two questions : whether the system could really integrate Doppler-shifted radar returns over a sufficiently long path in orbit to obtain the desired azimuthal resolution , and whether there was anything abou the behavior of the atmosphere that might create noise in the system . He was determined to keep the experiment focused , so he sought to minimize technology development and to use proven equ ipment and procedures wherever possible. 16 Even so , significant errors could be introduced in several ways . There could be jitter in the transmitter 's oscillator, for example , or erratic vehicle motion and errors in pitch , roll , or yaw as well as problems arising from incorrect beamwid th, atmospheric turbulence , receiver noise , and mechanical and chemical shortcomings in the data recording system Y COMM '1;.~------~- 0-fA.t>JN LS -W~I ~---EilLlCI< ,. I FUDS f1.l ,iOKNA _ El • KP-I[u ( IMllrl} II BlAQk' I IFACJS Figure 4. QuiIproject organization. Source : Lockheed, System Report 1, p. 14 SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE The radar itself, designated KP-11 : was an AN/UPQ102 pulsed-Doppler system that Goodyear was then producing for RF-4C aircraft .18 The contract with Program A called for producing five KP-11 radars , enough to provide replacements in case of launch or test failures , because the ways in which the space environment might affect the SAR were still unknown . For example, what was the barometric pressure inside the Agena launch vehicle-1 0-3 millimeters of mercury, or 1 o-5 , or 10-1 because of out-gassing? The differences could be significant to the operation of power-generating devices . The radar was stripped of unnecessary aerial subsystems (such as lateral motion compensation devices) and subjected to extensive reliab ility engi neering , including testing and potting to control electrical discharge ,t refinishing for environmental considerations , and x-ray examination of components. All the component box es were instrumented with pressure sensors and mounted on special rubberized shock isolation mounts. Special wire was used with an insulating covering that promised little out-gassing , about which little was known in general. In keeping with the primary objective of the experiment-obtaining a terrain image from a SAR satell ite-the overall system was simplified considerably and did not include capabilities that would be needed for operational systems. For example , there was no ability to select the terrain swath being imaged or to extend the length of the swath .19 As a Doppler system, the radar had to transmit pulses often enough to reduce azimuthal ambiguities while all owing a proper interval between pulses to record the returned signals . The timing of the pause depended on range to the target , and this distance could not be known precisely. The Goodyear engineers knew that the antenna was to look down at a 55-degree angle , but they could not know the exact altitude of the satellite . Their solution was a specially designed circuit that continually monitored the pulse repetition frequency and adjusted it slightly. Had it been important for the mission , other solutions to the range issue surely could have been applied; but Bradburn said he really did not care about range resolution for Quill because it could be readily changed by shortening the pulses or other tinkering . "With Quill we just wanted enough energy on the target, we didn 't care how long the pulse was , range resolution was not a parameter we cared about , we just cared about being able to do the processing trick to produce Goodyea r desig nated its classified projects using the initial of the su rna me of its curren t president, who then was T om Knowles . The o rbital radar project thu s became the "KP-11. " t Goodyear employees had to experimen t w ith potting techniques as a way to keep the tra nsmitte r ope rating in the unk nown space environme nt. E sse nti ally , the e lectrica l component was placed in a cocoon of elastic rubbe r insid e a meta l container. A vacuum was created in an effort to let the rubber set withou t ai r pockets . Al l leads we re grounded and had wire shielding . 3 1 synthetic aperture with [useful azimuthal resolution] ."20 Base frequencies for the system would be 9600 MHz for the transmitter carrier with a puls e repet ition f requency of 8215 to 8735 Hz and an intermed iate frequ ency of 70 MHz . Another engineerin g challenge was thermal control , particularly for the kly stron, the devi ce that generated the high peak power needed to operate the rada r. t Most of the klystrons that Goodyear use d for aircraft radars were air-cooled ; for Quill , the engineers designed a heat sink . It was an aluminum pl ate about ten inches long and five inches high and painted with a special thermally conductive whi te paint. Several copper fingers were braised to its back . The plate bolted to the anode of the klystron , and heat wa s conducted th rough the copper fingers to anot her metal hea t sink , which was placed next to the satell ite skin so the heat could then be radiated into space. The mission was intended to last only 96 hours, with the radar operating no longer than five minutes per orbit , for no more than three orbits in succession , and fo r no more than 80 minutes altogeth er. Power was provided by three silver-zinc batte ries , wh ich determined the duration of the experiment ; the re was no provision for recharging them . The KP-11 would be instal led in the same Agena upper stage used as a satellite body fo r Corona (Figure 5). The Agena wou ld be launched with an augmented Thor missile , constituting a flight-p roven package of booster and upper stage that offered tolerabl e laun c h environments (thermal, sinusoida l vibration , random vibration , shock , acceleration , and pressure ). TheAgena also was expected to provide sufficient stability for the SAR on orb it (±0.4 degrees of att itude uncertainty and ±.25 degrees limit cyc le in pitch , yaw, and roll , with rates of change not grea ter than .002 degrees/second in pitch , .005 degrees/second in yaw, and .003 in roll ). The radar wou ld transmit and receive through an antenna that was flush-mou nte d on the Agena body, thereby avoiding the risk s associate d with a design that would require unfolding or unfurl ing a structure on orbit. Based on calculat ions that dete rmined dimensions for maximizing the portion of the slant range interval that could be mapped , con sis te nt wit h the Agena vehicle dimensions , the antenna was made 15 feet long and two feet high (Figure 6) . It was manufact ured by Lockheed ; the company 's Antenna Laboratory had cons iderable experience with problems posed by constructing this type + "Kl ystro ns a re a fa m ily of microwa ve vac uum tubes that depend upon the conversio n of a ve locity-modu lated bea m into a va rying current by the process of electron bu nching ." A . E. Harriso n, K lys tro n Tubes (New Yo rk : McGraw-Hi ll, 1947) . p . 1. TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM EJECT ABLE FAIRING q_"'"'"'"''~' Figure 5. Agena Dfor Quill. Source : Lockheed, System Report 2, p. 1-3. Figure 6. Quill Antenna. Source: Lockheed, System Report 2, p. 1-143. SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE Figure 7. Antenna fairing. Source: Lockheed, System Report 2, p. 1-44. of antenna using the available stock , and its machining was done in the Agena D facility.21 The antenna was mounted along the right side of the Agena body, occupying nearly its entire length and , when covered by protective fairing, protruding about two and a half inches from the surface (Figure 7) . The fairing was designed to detach after the Thor booster engine cut off, thereby reducing the load to be lifted by the Agena motor (Figure 8) . To protect the antenna from deformations that might result from thermal loads on the orbiting Agena body, three of its four mountings allowed the antenna to slide along fixed points, while the fourth was fixed to the vehicle .22 After being injected into orbit , the Agena would rotate 180 degrees , so that it would fly tail first (facilitating film recovery and terrestrial coverage) ; the antenna would thus be located with the main lobe of the radar looking down at 55 degrees from the horizontal at a strip that would be 93 miles to the left of the satellite 's ground track and 10 nautical miles wide (Figure 9).§ Figure 9 also displays the two directions in which the fineness of the rada r's measurements was assessed : along-track (in the direction of flight) and across-track (or azimuthal , normal to the direction of flight). The figure also displays the two surfaces on which resolution is commonly measured: the slant plane (the deeply shadowed side of the prism on the ground, 5.95 nm wide for Quill), and the ground plane, labeled "imaged swath (map plane) ," 10.1 nm wide for Quill . The reflections from each radar pulse traced a line on the display of a cathode ray tube that varied according to the intensity of the return . An image of the display was recorded on photographic film , which essentially meant that the varying intensity of the returns then corresponded to vary ing densities on the film (Figure 10). The film moved across the display to record successive § These are Lock heed 's numbers , which are slightly inconsistent with those in the associate contractor's depiction in Figure 9. Lockheed , System Report 1, p. 18. TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM A(;[NA / , Vftu~ SATELLITE VElOCil'l ./~ANTENNA 4 . 12 NAUT Mt/SEC / r · ~fllAOtUS PRIOR TO S EPARATIOII -[~ RAMP 3 PLACES E ACH SIDE VUliCAl SEPARATIOII COMPLETE SEPARATIOII STARTS Figure 8. Fairing Separation. Figure 9. Imaging Geometry. Source : Lockheed, System Report 2, p. 1-14. Source: Associate contractor, Evalua tion 1, p. 18. Figure 10. Signal film. Source: Lockheed , System Report 1, p. 144. SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE Figure 11 . Film transport system. Source : Goodyear, Engineering Analysis, p. 6-50. intensity trace displays as adjacent positions on the film. Looking across the film from one edge to the other thus corresponded to the (slant) range dimension of the radar, and the ratio of the slant range imaged to the width of the film was called the range scale factor. Movement along the film reflected the azimuth direction and hence the along-track distance , with the ratio of the actual along-track distance to the length of film being called the azimuth scale factor. The ratio of these two factors , range scale to azimuth scale, was called the aspect ratio ; with the KP-11 setup , the aspect ratio was anticipated to be about 6.9. 23 To make the recorder, Goodyear ordered from Westinghouse a special five-inch cathode ray tube with an electron gun that could withstand the anticipated shocks of launch. It had a single trace running across it, and the recorder imaged that trace down to about one inch on the data film. To keep the film drive uniform , free of variations in tension and slipping , Goodyear engineers coated the master metering drum with silicone rubber in a specific angle of wrap . The recorder was custom-made for Quill from a special mold , nickel-plated and radiofrequency protected . Radar data would be conveyed to the ground in two ways . One method was film , which was handled in two assemblies totaling 99 pounds (Figure 11). The recorder compartment housed the cathode ray tube and associated subsystems that allowed the film to record the images on the tube . The film itself was contained in a film-supply cassette. Exposed film went into an ltek take-up cassette in a General Electric re-entry vehicle (Figure 12) to be recovered by special C-130 teams (Figure 13) . This approach to data recovery, incidentally, had also been mentioned in the earlier 1958 article in Aviation Week .24 Data would also be transmitted to the ground using an UHF wideband data link , and recorded at the Vandenberg, California , and New Boston, New Hampshire, tracking stations. The preflight engineering analysis seemed to conside r this task simple and stra ightforward: "it is only necessary to provide a KP-11 Recorder and a means of triggering it so that the telemetered video can be recorded ."25 Each location thus had a recorder identical to the one on board, together with control systems for estab lishing synchronized reception from the satellite . In either case the product would be a film transparency. This film-the "signal film"-essentially recorded Doppler-coded data about ground reflectivity. Once on the ground , this information was converted into visual imagery using the "Precision Optical Processor" developed by the associate contractor especially for Quill data. This processor derived from the original optical correlator developed in the early 1950s by the associate contractor to solve the huge data-processing chore required for the quintessential SAR task of integrating the Doppler returns. Those returns, after all , bore no relation whatsoever to visual images. Indeed, to the human eye even the earliest plan position indicator displays on cathode ray tubes more closely resembled a picture than what appeared on the SAR scope. Captured on film for subsequent processing, the returns on the scope at any particular instant resembled a collection of thousands, perhaps tens of thousands , of tiny shapes , mostly rectilinear, each a solid shade of gray-some lighter, some darker-some of them sharing perhaps some variation TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM in coloring and thus forming striata across some areas , or band-like colorations somewhat reminiscent of alluvial deposits in the vertical face of a sandstone bank. Think not of the Gaussian snow filling an untuned television screen but of some densely intricate but visually uninterpretable mosaic. The SAR processing challenge was to find ways to wring visual meaning from these returns. Another research group had tried to do the job electronically, Figure 12. but the computers of that day simply were not up to the task , requiring weeks of processing to render a few crude images. The genius of the associate contractor 's approach was to recognize that optical lenses performed fast fourier transforms at , of course , the speed of light. The associate contractor 's processor used a laser to generate a beam of coherent light that was diffracted by the signal film into three emerging waves , two of which produced images at focal lengths that varied with (slant) range . In essence , the coherent light produced FILM PATH Film recovery system. Source: Goodyear, Engineering Analysis, p. 6-50. Figure 13. Capsule recovery process. Source: Lockheed, Project Report 2, p. 3-50. 2 WAITR BA llAS T ~YSITM 3 SINKVAtV£ASSf',\IHY 4 EAilASf ~·.EIGHT 5 RE COVERY B.AITtRY 6 R£CO VERY PROG!' !\', l.i:R THW£TtRSEr COLUCTOR ASSW9 t Y WAIIR S£Al 10 Afl COViR ll FlA SHING UTE 12 PARA CHUTE 13 fli[Rio\M COVER lll STUBf.NIHmA 15 SPI'> 10£SPI NGAS SUPPl'r 16 SPIN!OESP IN VAiVES ll fHRU STCO-.:£ 18 RETRO·ROCKET 19 CAPSULE 20 THRU~ fCO',(Pyqos 21 fii[RI.' \lC'JVER. iC.flf~flii'f? t R( , 22 S£PARI.!I(!'j PY?.OS 21 DI SCfJ~.·.ECl PYROS SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE Figure 14. Focal plane relationships. Source: Associate contractor, Evalustion II, p. 259. SPECIAL HANDLING 1"I r I I I r-:)j 1 ~ Figure 15. Anamorphic telescope processor. Source: Associate contractor, Eva/ustion II, p. 261. Figure 16. Agena nose assembly for Quill. Source: Goodyear, Engineering Analysis, p. 4-4. images on planes that were tipped relative to the signal film (Figure 14), or in other words a plane of images that was focused in azimuthal direction and that was tilted with respect to the plane of images that were focused in range direction (which was the signal film itself). The processor used an anamorphic telescope (meaning different magnifications in range and azimuth directions) to image both planes, apply the proper magnification, and produce an image sharply focused in both range and azimuth and with the correct aspect ratio . The fine-resolution image produced by the image processor system 26 (Figure 15 is a schematic diagram) was recorded by a tracking camera , so radar data could be converted quickly and steadily to fully focused , fineresolution optical imagery. Figure 16 is a sketch of the Quill final layout. As indicated in that diagram , there are three sections .to the Agena : barrel , conical , and nose . The KP-11 radar system , weighing 370 pounds, was mounted in the barrel section , which was five feet across with structure rings 15 inches apart and a .06-inch skin. The recorder system, including the recorder and the film-supply cassette, weighed approximately 99 pounds and was mounted in the conical section , which tapered 15 degrees from a five-foot diameter at its base , where it joined the barrel section , to its height of 32 .95 inches . The film containing TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM the raw data was stored in the nose cone , w hich incorporated the reentry capsule for recovery_27 MANAGING THE DEVELOPMENT Set up in this way, the Quill experiment could take advantage of the equipment and procedures for on-board photography and film recovery developed for the Corona program . In particular, Bradburn needed film cassettes , film recovery vehicles, and support for assembly, test , and checkout. In March 1963 these relationships came under the purview of Colonel Jack C. Ledford , an Air Force officer serving as assistant director of the CIA's Office of Special Activities (OSA).~ Ledford recommended to his boss, CIA's deputy director for research, Herbert "Pete " Scoville , Jr., that the CIA provide contract support and security procedures for Quill. "Under the proposed plan , CIA would procure three (3) Corona Recovery Vehicles from General Electric, Corona Triple Prime Cassett es from ltek, and system assembly, test, and checkout by the LMSC [Lockheed Missiles and Space Company] NP [Advanced Payload] facility [in Palo Alto, California]. The completed system would then be sent by covert means to LMSC, Sunnyvale , where it would be mated and checked out with the Goodyear Radar System ."28 Scoville approved the recommendation , and OSA expended funds to acquire three film return vehicles from General Electric, take-up film cassettes from ltek, and services for checkout and assembly from Lockheed .29 In addition to the procurement actions , the CIA had to develop procedures to keep information about Corona and Quill as separate ("compartmented ") as possi ble. Not all the government or contractor personnel working on Quill needed to know about the Corona program, nor did most Corona people need to know about Quill. There were also different degrees of "knowing": Those who worked with particular pieces of classified hardware might not need to know anything about the overall system or its mission, while several who needed that information did not need to know about specific subsystem capabilities or technical specifications. By the end of March 1963 Corona security officers had developed a plan for keeping each program 's secrets.30 The key difficulty was in finding a way to get hardware developed for Corona into the Quill program without directly associating the two . The plan called for establishing a payload laboratory for Quil l, under ~ OSA had been transferred to the Directorate for Research , and in March 1963 Scovi lle was head of that directorate. He was held responsible for CIA activities in support of the NRO , although he delegated the Prog ram B job to a deputy and ca lled him self the senior rep resentative to the NRO . He left later in 1963 , and his successo r, Bud Wheelan , refused the Program B j ob entirely , leaving the title to the deputy DNRO , Gene Kiefer. Kiefer might certa inl y have called on Ledford's office for suppo rt . compartmented security procedures , at the Lockheed facility where Corona space vehic les were processed. Integratio n of the Quil l spacecraft componentsincluding film cassettes , recovery systems, buckets , and waterseals-as well as any additional special tests that might be required for the Quill payload would take place in this facility. Normal weight and balance tests and pyrotechnics installation would be conducted in the same facility used for such tests on Corona satellites , and a third facility also would also be available for other integratio n and test procedures . The Quill program would be directed to obtain its recovery system from a group at Lockheed that had already been identified as specialists . The Lockheed manager for this effort would assemble a group of engineers to work in the Quill laboratory area ostensibly to develop designs for cassettes and waterseals ; after a suitable period of time , the ir "plans"-actually drawings of the existing Corona subsystems-would be presented and Bradburn would direct ltek to manufacture the desired items . The intended effect was to establish the cassettes and waterseals as hardware developed strictly and exclusively for Quill, and to disassociate Lockheed employees in the area from this sort of activity.31 The Quill contracts originally called for launching the first system in April 1964, but even Bradburn's tight focus and insistence on minimal technology development could not prevent delays . Bureaucracy was not the problem : Bradburn had few reporting requirements, good relations with Program B, a d no awareness of any headquarters turmoil in Washington . The additional time was needed instead to reso lve difficult technical and engineering issues. Like many program directors to follow him , Bradburn believed it was better to launch late with a successful satellite than on schedule with a failure , and so he determined that "emphasis will continue to be placed on thorough testing to insure a good probability of success on the first flight. "32 At the end of May 1964 there was still considerable work left to be done. Environmental qualification testing had been completed for all radar components except the recorder. Several transmitter problems were identified during system-level Temperature-Altitude Simulation Chamber (TASC) tests, for which remedies had been designed but not verified . The flig ht vehicle was in an anechoic chamber for radiation and emissions testing. Film recorders and signal simulators were on site at the Vandenberg and New Boston ground stations (known as "Cook" and "Bos "), and this equipment had been installed in T-29 and T-39 aircraft for conducting fly-by tests . The optical correlator was nearly completed by the associate contractor and analysis of test films from the Goodyear SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE recorders indicated that the design resolution was being achieved. A program review had been conducted by an ad hoc committee of Air Force and Aerospace Corporation people drawn largely from a concurrent Hughes radar program (P-22) being conducted outside the NRO. The review found the program to be generally on track and suggested some changes in the wiring harness, lowering the operating altitude , and altering the approach to setting the pulse repetition frequency. The launch date at this time had been 5 August 1964; it was changed to 29 August , subject to success in TASC and anechoic chamber tests .33 Steady progress was made over the summer of 1964. The anechoic chamber tests were completed , including all ascent and orbital sequences and fullpower transmissions through the antenna , without signs of problems from electrical interference or interaction . Tests at the antenna range at Lockheed 's Santa Cruz Test Base showed that the radar and the antenna were compatible , that the antenna did not distort the pulse , and that the slant range resolution of the system was better than 35 feet for the worst case (in-phase targets) and better than 25 feet for the best case (targets with 90 degrees of phase difference). Installation and testing of equipment at the tracking stations had been completed ; the optical correlator was complete and had been used to verify proper adjustment of the recorders by using test films processed by the Air Force Satellite Photographic Processing Laboratory (SPPL) at Westover Air Force Base , Massachusetts. The associate contractor had also completed a performance evaluation plan for the mission. The Agena D upper stage had passed acceptance testing and was at Vandenberg, awaiting the payload. But transmitter/modulator problems continued to surface in system-level tests at altitude , and the launch date was delayed once again , to 2 November.34 That date also passed as the radar transmitter failed yet again. The troublesome component was redesigned and , at last, showed no problems during TASC testing of the entire planned orbital operating time . It was shipped to Vandenberg in keeping with Bradburn 's security procedure (Table 1) , and by mid-December Quill was ready for launch (Figure 17)-eight months later than originally planned , but only 25 months after initial contract award .35 ORBITING THE SYSTEM With Bradburn in command as launch control officer, on 21 December 1964 the world 's first satellite-borne SAR was ready for launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base. Engineers had calculated a specific period during which Table 1. Quill security procedures (payload equipment flow) 1. Goodyear Aerospace Corp. fabricates and assembles radar payload, test equipment, and ground data handling equipment. 2. Shipped to LMSC by military air as arranged by SAFSP; departs Litchfield Park NAS, Arizona , and arrives Moffett NAS , California, adjacent to LMSC ; USAF or LMSC Quill-cleared courier accompanies shipment. 3. Arrives Moffett NAS; transferred to Navy van and driven to Quill approved area. Courier accompanies equipment until it is secured. 4. In covert area, equipment undergoes component, circuitry, and bench checks; performance tests, acceptance tests, and necessary modifi cations accomplished . 5. Transferred in LMSC van to Complex C-12,Area 40 undergoes systems test with Agena vehicle, USAF acceptance procedures accomplished (00250). 6. Shipped separately from Agena vehicle to a Quill-approved area in Vandenberg AFB; transferred by LMSC van with Quill-cleared courier; mated with Agena vehicle and undergoes final systems run . 7. Transferred to launch pad for R-Oay checks, countdown, and launch. Source: "Quill Supplement: Covert Program Security Plan ," 2 March 196 4. Figure 17. Quill awaits launch in the rare USAF photo. TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM December Zl, 1%4 Sate.llile Orbited Figure 18. Newspaper report. Courtesy Goodyear project engineer. the satellite should be launched (the "launch window") in order to minimize the amount of heat it would encou nter on orbit. As time approached to within 10 minutes of the launch window, all systems were brought to readiness so that launch could occur within 30 seconds of command. Only official personnel were permitted within a defined area of the base during launches, but a civilian railroad track cut through the restricted zone, and , with only a few minutes to go until the launch window opened, range safety officers reported that a train was approaching. If it entered the exclusion area, safety regulations would prohibit the launch from continuing until the train was gone. The delay might be so long that the launch window would close, forcing the launch team to "unready" the Thor/Agena (which might involve several complex processes, such as removing propellants, preserving environmental conditioning, and recharging batteries, depending on when the next window opened) and await the next opportunity. Bradburn thus found himself assailed by demands that he launch immediately, ahead of the planned schedule, before the train came closer. He refused , not wanting to execute a contingency plan that was being made up on the fly, and continued to wait for the appointed time. As it turned out, the tra in stopped while still outside the safety exclusion area, and the launch at 11:08 a.m. Pacific Standard Time proceeded according to plan:· Knowing that the booster had worked, Bradburn headed north to the satellite control facility in Sunnyvale and soon learned that the Agena (international satellite Bradburn , interview, and SAFSP Director's Quarterly Report , 30 December 1964. NRO headquarters in Washington , DC , was kept informed of major developments by secure teletype , a relatively slow and limited form of communication . When Bradburn decided not to launch early, a short message was cabled to NRO headquarters from Vandenberg saying "holdi ng for passenger train ." Then the launch window opened , range safety reported that the train had stopped outside the c lo sed area , Bradburn gave the command to launch , and the Thor/Agena lifted off. The next cable to the NRO reported that Qu ill was in orbit, giving rise to initial concern in Washington-and continuing folklore-that Bradburn had disregarded safety and launched over the train . Bradburn recounted this event, with out revealing the purpose of the launch , in "The Evolution of Military Space Systems ," in R . Cargill Hall and Jacob Neufeld , ed s., The US Air Force in Space (Andrew s Air Force Base, MD : Air Force Historical Found ation , 1995), pp . 61-65 . 1.6 Sysi;<;m Par!'OI'II'..!IllCB -The ey$t0111 perto~ce """ ! au1t.l.eaa tru-augllout t.ho arl>it:ll Jd.eoion1 unt.U ba1>t.ary ilapl.oUCtl 011 Orlnt 12 -1dth the axcapt.ion o£ rn1nor unaxplainad 'I'Ol.\&&!1 &.atubano.., an Orbi1:4 8 • d 9 . :This ~pr~efl!1ta the lijpli.f1¢Mt pqload oparat.ing in!o:rmatlon, radar i.mapry satOplillll amd discwudon11 ot t.be pa,ylo&Cl pou·!ct'IIWIQ>il• pt'C"Oded by a brlot ·~ot oystam parautera mad ~ Period (l!!Dl) 89.44 89 .66 Per1-(II.M.) uo lJ5,82 Apope (tl,JI,) lSl! 157 ~Uan(dec.) 10.0 70.ll Bccmdrloit7 oOOJ . ooJ6 Active Orlr.1t.a 6S 73 IWOC>V'oK'T 65 )} l'lr,y'load Opolr&tlOM 13 lh Figure 19. Summary mission data. Source: Lockheed, System Report 1, p. 23. designation 1964 87A) had been placed in a useful orbit (Figure 18) and was responding properly to commands. Word about the mission itself-whether the radar worked-would take several hours longer. The ground station at Vandenberg that had been set up to receive wideband data from the payload included a video display (cathode ray tube, or CRT, monitor) that would show the characteristic shapes of radar pulses being received and decoded if the Quill system were operating and transmitting. This equipment was operated by Goodyear, which for security purposes was referred to as the "Program Associate Contractor" (PAC). Later that day, at Sunnyvale, Bradburn received the message "PAC Room reports Code One"-radar returns from Quill were showing up on the Vandenberg CRT. The mission, summarized in Figure 19, lasted only four days, as planned , before the unrechargeable batteries ran out of power during orbits 72-73 .36 The radar operated 14 times in orbit ,tt between 0644 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) 22 December 1964 and 0618 UTC 26 December 1964, imaging the swaths of the northeastern and western United States indicated in Figure 20 (also tt The ori•~inal mission design had called for 16 radar passes; available documents do not address the reduction . Goodyear, Engineering Analysis , p. 1-4. SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE Figure 20. Ground traces for Quill imaging operations. Source: Associate contractor, Eva luation I, p. 13. TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM 42 see sidebar) . Data collected from the 14 radar passes were transmitted over a wideband (UHF) data link as they were obtained ("real time") by the Vandenberg or New Boston ground station in view. In addition , during the first seven radar passes data was recorded on film on board the satellite , and on 23 December during the 33rd orbit the reentry capsule was jettisoned and recovered . The film was flown to Westover to be developed and the developed film then flown to another loca tion where an associate contractor 's employee ran it through the specially made "Precision Optical Processor" (known as POP-1) and developed the image films . T hey were dried , bundled , and given to another associate contractor employee to deliver to Los Angeles. The only delay in the process came when the employee 's fl ight was cancelled , but the key question had already been answered . Associate contractor employees measured the azimuthal resolution to be 7.5 feet-the theoretical maximum from the 15-foot antenna-which immediately settled the question of whether there was a fundamental natural limit on SAR resolution from space . 37 After less than two weeks of orbital decay the sate ll ite re-entered the atmosphere at 1 027 UTC 11 January 1965, on orbit 333. Several days earlier, Brad burn and his Program A superiors had already de clared the mission a success . In his 30 December 1964 Quarterly Report, the Program A director said that "vehicle and payload performance were within acceptable limits on all parameters. ... The radar maps . . . cover about 80 ,000 square miles . The resolution is better than 15 feet in azimuth and approximately 80 feet in ground range ... . The volume of data is greater than had been antic ipated . Technical evaluation has begun and will be completed in 90 to 120 days. " In the meantime , "The second payl oad and Agena D booster are complete and are being held at [Lockheed] . The second flight has been removed from the launch schedule pending detailed analysis of the first mission. The third payload , which consists of forward structure, radar components , and recovery subsystem, is near completion at [Lockheed]. There is no boo ster for this payload ... . Recommendations for disposition of the remaining Quill hardware will be made in 30 to 45 days. "38 EVALUATING THE OUTCOME The Quill team had wanted answers to several questions. Whether the satellite-based SAR would work was the main one , followed closely by others of practical engineering-how to make it work best. For example , it was helpful to experiment with the timing coordina tion among the functions of transmitting , rece1vmg , and displaying the returns on the cathode ray tube : The sequence of events was as follows : the radar t ransmitted a pulse, the receiver and recorder waited 25 microseconds , and the CRT was then swept for 73 microseconds ; the system then repeated the cycle after an additional wc:.i t of 16 to 24 microseconds (deper.ding on the choice of prf) . On certain occasions , the sweep started a few microseconds before the return from the near-range arrived; the imagery corresponding to these occasions lacks contrast and [a good signal to-noise ratio] at the near edge , but is better at the far-edge . Conversely, the opposite occurred when the sweep was late in starting . On still other occasions , the sweep was begun as the return from the far edge was arriving, continued while the instantaneous return power level passed through its minimum, and was almost completed by the time return from the near-edge began to arrive ; under these conditions, the CRT was inoperative for the major portion of the return . 39 Engineers also wanted to describe the SAR 's performance quantitatively, partic ularly with respect to its azim uth-direction behavior, and to determine how it had been limited by design parameters and in-flight performance of the payload , attitude behavior of the satellite vehicle, atmospheric conditions , and design and performance of the wideband data link . They were interested in describing and diagnosing any anomalous system performance, in collecting data on the reflectivity characteristics of target fields, in demonstrating the capability of ground equipment to record useful data through the wideband data link, and in developing engineering data that would be useful in designing future aerospace radars . And they were most interested in seeing whether the analytic models derived from aircraft-borne SAR experiments, which had been used to prescribe and test satellite design , proved valid for operations in space. 40 The associate contractor 's engi eers had designed ground-based tests to provide data for calibrating the SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE Could Our Adversaries Detect Radar? Years later (see, e.g., Perry, pp . 35-37) a rumor began that Quill did not image territory outside the U.S. because the NRO feared international repercussions resulting from the radar emanations of its active imaging system. After the fact, DNRO McMillan said it was important: he wrote to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) on 12 May 1965 that "radar operation during this mission was limited to Continental United States to insure availability of ground truth data, to obtain maximum quantity of all three types of products , and-since a radar sensor is an active device-to prevent possible complaints from foreign nations." There are, however, several inaccuracies in his presentation. (Notably, he stated that "the mission plan provided for simultaneous photography along the mission track by an RB-47," which would have required a truly remarkable aircraft.) Brockway McMillan, "Semi-Annual Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on Activities of the National Reconnaissance Office," 12 May 1965 (TS/BYE), in ARC Job 200200001 Box 7 Folder 24. Quill was an engineering proof of concept , and so it was operated where engineering test data could be obtained-where there were devices on the ground to check the far field antenna pattern, pulse repetition frequency, etc., and reflector arrays to check impulse response. In addition, there were only seven active passes during which data could be collected on film, and they were conducted where data could be simultaneously transmitted by wideband relay to ground stations at New Boston or Vandenberg. Bradburn told this story quite straightforwardly, and I [Butterworth) probed him on the question. Furthermore, how might have "in ternational repercussions" been imagined to arise? Who would be able to detect the signa l and classify it and reach the right conclusions about its source and the country responsible for it? The radar could be operated for no more than five minutes at any one time and for no more than three orbits consecutively without courting catastrophic failure . It operated at an average power level of 230 watts, from an altitude of 130 nautical miles and hence a slant range of about 160 nautical miles . It traveled at a velocity of 25,500 feet per second (about four nautical miles per second ground track velocity). It illuminated a swath about ten miles wide. True, sidelobes could be detected as well as mainbeam signals (though not backlobes), but even so the chance of detecting the signal and capturing enough of it to reach accurate conclusions is vanishingly small. The USSR would have had no ephemeris data on the satellite adequate to do ground measurements of any possible emanations. SAR 's performance . There were measurements at the earth's surface to check the operation of the antenna after launch,tt the transmitter pulse, §§ and ground surface and weather conditions . Complexes of radar corner reflectors were laid out in near the associate contractor; their known cross sections and spacings could be used to calibrate estimates of the radar 's range and azimuth resolution, sensitivity, and dynamic range . Because Quill's radar antenna was fixed, the associate contractor's engineers had to wait until they had obtained good ephemeris data and then scramble to move some of the corner reflectors to keep them in the satellite 's field of view. 41 :j::j: These were measurements of the azimuth beam pattern for the purpose of confirming that the antenna 's far-field pattern remained correct after launch . §§ "It was possible to detect and record the transmitter pulse , after it had propagated one-way from the satellite to the earth 's surface , by detecting emissions via the sidelobes of the radar antenna pattern and recording these emissions on photographic film. This was done on several passes when the satellite was within line-of-sight of the airport near the associate contractor ." Associate contractor, Evaluation I, p. 9. These evaluations used visual images produced from the recorded data in the sequence outlined in Figure 21 . First, the film ofthe video data was developed by the SPPL, using an approach aimed at maximizing the dynamic range of the recorder.nn The associate contractor team then used their precision optical processor to convert the data on the film into visual images . The highest resolution (and the best dynamic range) was obtained directly at the processor output, on photographic transparencies. The original output transparencies were then magnified 2.6 times and recorded as either paper prints or positive transparencies, neither of which was suitable for detailed analysis: 1111 "The flight system employed a [cathode ray tube] with a P-1 1 phosphor and a transfer lens which imaged the line trace of the tube at a 2:1 demagnification onto Kodak S0-266 blue-sensitive film . The film was developed in D-76 deve loper by SPPL. The dynamic range of the reco rding system in the flight vehicle was measured from test films generated prior to flight. ... The value of the dynamic range of the flight recorder was about 19.5 db." Associate contractor , Evaluation II , p. 256 . But cf. Lockheed , System Report 2, p. 4-11: 'The video data recorded in the sate llite and in the ground based recorders was recorded on 70 millimeter Eastman Kodak film , S. 0 . 119. The recorder CRT sweep covered a width of approximate ly 27.5 millimeters ." TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM I VTS I ~------~~-----~--~ I 'I : SPPtL L~~---------- 10MM r----- ORIG~M.Al 1 P-~--~~ R{PORT 1 L SC r-----~--~~~------~1 PREPARATION I I___ _ DOPPlER I~ILM -PRINT R PO Figure 21 . Image processing sequence. Source: Lockheed, System Report 2, p. 4-2. The paper prints .. . have a resolution capability of perhaps 6 lines per mrn ; at the scale factors corresponding to the 2 . 6 : 1 enlargements , this poor resolution completely dominates the quality of the imagery . The resulting ground-range resolution is of the order of 90 to 100 feet . The degradations in the posi tive transparencies are not as severe . In either case , imagery to the scale of the 2 .6:1 enlargements is useful primarily for orientation and descriptive purposes only, and not for detailed study of the target complexes . Detailed examinations require the use of enlargements of greater magnification , the use of the original output transparencies, O!: in special instances the observation of the optical output of the processor prior to recording . 4 2 The results showed the experiment to have been a great success. The radar worked and met the goal of 10foot azimuthal43 resolution :·· It had illuminated somewhat more than 100 ,000 square miles of terrain , almost 80 percent of which yielded usable images . Three-fifths of the images were of the best quality that the system could produce; the rest were degraded for testing or by slight errors in setting the pulse repetitio n frequency. Only four percent were lost unintentionally. 44 As expected , the smooth trajectory of the satellite allowed it to provide relatively fine detail without the complex systems needed on aircraft to compensate for platform motion. In effect, "satellite borne systems are not subject to the resolution limitations normally imposed by platform instability in aircraft."45 Slant-range resolution (which was not a design goal) was 45 feet, which at the Agena's depression angle provided a ground-range resolution of about 75 feet.ttt The imagery showed several terrain and cultural features that held promise Referring to the performance of a SAR in terms of "resolution " is a conventional solecism; usage today tends more often to the technically accurate "i mpulse response," or "IPR ." ttt "Range resolution ... was limited by the bandwidth of the electronics, which had been patterned after the AN/UPQ-1 02 radar system for reasons dictated by expediency; the most optimistic estimate of achievable slant-range resolution was of the order of 36 feet, which in turn imp lied a ground-range resolution of 60 feet at the design depression angle . Improvemen t of the range resolution to make it comparab le with the expected azimuth resolution was not warranted , since it would not have affected the demonstration of the syntheticape rture feasibility , and would have entailed considera ble expense and delay." Lockheed , System Report 1, p. 33. SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE for strategic reconnaissance . Weather conditions did not seem to have affected the quality of the system 's images except for a brief area of intense rainstorms , and even then the imagery revealed the underlying structure . Quill answered dozens of technical and engineering questions . It showed that analytic models based on aircraft operations worked well for satellites . It showed that imagery processed from the transmitted data was only slightly degraded compared with pictures made using the recovered film . It showed that images obtained from orbit could fairly well match those from aircraft radars using similar technical parameters. It proved that ambiguous target indications could be minimized and that the slight inaccuracy and instability in the satellite platform could be compensated electronically. It also sampled the average radar reflectivities of several different types of terrain . Altogether, in the words of the associate contractor 's assessment , "the orbital flight satisfied the primary program objective by demonstrating that a satellite-borne SAR system could generate a fine-resolution image of a portion of the earth 's surface; all secondary objectives also were met. "4 6 The Lockheed assessment added that the system proved its expected ability to produce radar imagery of a consistently high quality by day, by night , and through a variety of weather conditions ; it also observed that the conditions that prevailed in most of the swath areas would have prevented successful photographic or infrared imaging (Figures 22-26) . Furthermore , the experiment did not produce any evidence of phenomena that would prevent future systems from realizing azimuth and ground-range resolutions on the order of 10 feet Y The evaluation reports from the associate contractor, Lockheed, and Goodyear all exuded optimism and expectancy : Quill had been highly successful and the path to doing mare-a further experiment , even an operational system-seemed clear. The associate contractor 's report recommended that "designs of future systems be based on the type of analytic model used successfully for this design ," that "proper use be made of radar equipment in manned aircraft for the purpose of collecting further data and testing configurations which are applicable to future satellite systems ," and that various engineering adjustments be made to "future orbiting systems ."48 The Lockheed report agreed and recommended further that "future experimental orbiting systems incorporate power sources which are adequate for extended-duration missions , as required for operational applications."49 Goodyear engineers undertook additional test work , demonstrating the value of improved potting techniques for the transmitter and modulator components of the radar as well as the ability to improve significantly the dynamic range of the recorded data by reducing film base density and reducing the recorder lens stop. 50 A PAUSE Yet Quill 's seed fell on stony ground . Bradburn asked another officer, "What do you do when you come up to bat , and , the first time, you knock a ball out of the ballpark , what do you do then?" The reply was, "Well, Dave, I think you go down and sit on the bench ."51 On 5 January 1965 Bradburn gave NRO Director McMillan a "quick-look" briefing on the P-40 mission and got agreement that the second vehicle would be removed from the launch schedule, pending further recommendations to be made in February. On 11 February, several weeks before contractor evaluations of Quill's product and performance we re completed, Major General Robert Greer, director of Program A, cabled McMillan that the Quill contractors recommended flying the second mission later that fall, but that he , Greer, did not agree . "In my opinion there is no need for more flights to show feasibility as such . We should have a definition of the desired operational use before we schedule any more launches . . .. The factors which need to be examined now do not require satellite flights ." McMillan agreed , and the remaining hardware was placed in storage pending completion of the report of an evaluation committee commissioned by NRO headquarters .SZ In his Program A Quarterly Report for June 1965-his last as director-Greer reported that further funding had been provided to the associate contractor to complete its studies , but that otherwise SP considered the Quill program completed .53 At the end of the year Greer's successor, Brigadier General John L. Martin, reported that the DNRO had approved further funding for radar and associated tape recorder work. The RCA and Ampex tape recorder studies showed that the state of the art did not provide adequate bandwidth for existing radar applications ; Goodyear completed a 1 00-hour life te st of the Quill radar ; Hughes produced and tested a space-qualified antenna, and also expanded the radar system design to a dual mode capability (high and low resolution); and Airborne Instrument Laboratory's research provided a feasible new radar system design as well as ongoing study of radar target signatures. 54 Apparently none of this work went any further, and references to follow-on studies, operations , and plans disappear from the SP Quarterly Reports for several years after 1966. Three years later, in 1969, the NRO reported to its Executive Committee (ExCom) that "NPIC [National Photographic Interpretation Center] evaluated the [Quill] imagery, stated it was capable of providing TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Figure 22. City/rural contrast. (BIF-555-DP-12782-89) Courtesy associate contractor. Figure 23. Phoenix,Arizona. Image taken on pass 9, northbound, at night (1:12 a.m. Mountain Standard Time, 22 December 1964). Weather: clear,temperature 46 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 43 degrees, visibility 15 miles. "The route of a major expressway (1) can be followed from the lower left around the most built-up portion of the city and up to the airport (2), the large return-free area at the upper right. Because the radar [pulse repetition frequency] was not matched to the beam illumination at the time, the airport edge of the swath fell in a poorly illuminated area near the edge of the beam. The railroad paralleling the left side of the airport does not stand out as do tracks across rural areas, but its course toward the lower right corner is marked by types of construction (3) that give strong returns. Similar returns accompany a diagonal branch line (4) ending at the lower center.The dark lines (5) that go irregularly up the cent~r and along the base of the hills are canals."Associate contractor, Evaluation I, p. 30. SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE Figure 24. Richmond, Virginia. Imagetaken on pass 14, southbound,during daytime (11 :06 a.m. Eastern Standard Time) on 22 December 1964. Weather was overcast with tops of clouds at 2,500 to 4,500 feet. "Several road and railroad bridges cross the James River (1) and a mile-long elevated section of railroad (2) parallels the river near the center of the radial system. Again , the association of strong-return systems with railroad routes can be seen (especially [3]). Street, cultivation, and drainage patterns are recognizable ." Associate contractor, Evalu ation I, p. 33. Figure 25. Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan. Image takenon pass 30, southbound, during daytime (10:57 a.m. Eastern Standard Time) on 23 December 1964. Ground is covered by snowat least two inches deep;area is in fog , sky obscured, wind calm, one-mile visibility cloud tops at 9,000-10 ,000 feet. "Th is SAC facility stands out unmistakably from its wooded surroundings between Michigan's Van Etten Lake and the Au Sable River. Parked aircraft are likely to be responsible for the eight or more bright returns located on the rectangular paved area (1 ), but the rapid-egress parking spur (2) contains only one or two aircraft-like returns. Many roads, including some little-traveled ones, are seen as narrow gaps in he tree cover, although some such gaps are power-line clearings. Two large areas of cleared land (3) show where the forest has given way to farmland . ... Two dams (4) and the reservoirs they form are readily detected and identified. No power lines are seen emanating from the hydroelectric plants here .. . . " Associate contractor, Evaluation I, p. 37 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUI LL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Figure 26. Point Reyes, California. Image taken on pass 16, southbound, during daytime (11 :05 a.m.Pacific Standard Time) on 22 December 1964.Weather conditions: heavy rain , scattered clouds 700-1000 feet. heavy overcast 1400-2500 feet, clouds in layers to 35,000 feet. "Intense rainfall was occurring locally in the area . . .. While the clouds themselves are generally not imaged, the occasional regions of dense rain (see arrow) scatter considerable signal back to the radar, causing cloud-like forms in the image. Inspection of the film shows that the ocean wave-structure patterns can be observed even in the densest parts of the rain-returns. Furthermore, although the raindrops both backscatter and attenuate the radar waves, hence reducing the illumination at some greater slant range, no shadows of these rain cells have been noticed in the imagery. Of interest is the alteration of the wave pattern in the shallow water off the beach, and its diffraction around the point and into Drake's Bay." Associate contractor, Evaluation /, p. 77. useful intelligence, and recommended further research and development."55 And in 1972 an "NRO Position Paper on the NRO Satellite Program" stated that after Quill's flight, "it was concluded that no further satellite experiments as such should be conducted; instead efforts should be made to define precisely the system application desired, and then the development of the actual system should proceed. The system application studies, intended to be conducted in parallel with the engineering demonstration, were not decisively concluded. Thus by 1965 the NRO had completed an orbital demonstration, but no agreement had been reached that the proposed application, bomb damage assessment, or any other application , was sufficiently attractive to proceed."56 Bradburn helped where he could . Through his efforts, the associate contractor got new aircraft for further research and development, and in spring 1965 he took the associate contractor's employee to the NPIC to educate and help the photointerpreters make use of radar images. (The employee met with little success : the photointerpreters generally picked up the radar images only to throw them away.57 ) In the summer of 1965, Bradburn left Program A to attend war college; he returned a year later at t he request of Program A's director Bill King, but had little opportunity to work on radar.58 The Quarterly Report for 30 June 1966 advised that in July project responsibility for Quill would be transferred from the sigint office to Lt. Col. Bradburn, working in the applied research and advanced technology office (SP-6) under Colonel Lew Allen .59 The next Quarterly Report noted that SP-6 had a deficit of one officer: "Lt. Col. Bradburn transferred to sigint on 2 August. SP-6 not now manned to accomplish work in radar and elint technology. "60 SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE Reflecting on the question of Qu ill's singu larity, Bradb urn reiterated his object ive : to show that satellite-based SAR imagery could help provide post-strike reconnaissance (bomb damage assessment ) for SAC . That objective was accomplished and briefed to SAC . When SAC officials asked Program A's director, John Martin , "What's next?" Martin said: "Send money. "61 Cancellation of further Quill flights gave SP a big boost in its annual "cost reduction " report-more than twothirds of the total claimed for FY1965 and earlier. "We are pleased ," stated SP Director Brig . Gen . Martin , "to report that these reductions have been made without adverse impact on mission performance. "62 The NRO had demonstrated the technical feasibility of an all -wea ther, day-night imaging system that coul d meet an important SAC need ; if SAC wanted one , then SAC would have to create a program to develop it. Director Charyk had been emphat ic in his cable of authorization : "The effort is to be strictly experimental in nature and is not to be considered in any sense as an operational prototype or the initial step of an operational system development. ... The request for proposals should make clear the experimental , rather than the operational prototype or system nature of this effort."63 The director of intelligence for SAC offered to help evaluate the Quill imagery and the NRO staff responded affirmatively, not ing that an engineering evaluation was under way by contractors , that an intelligence evaluation was being established , and that "a separate analysis of the Quill product from the SAC operational viewpoint would be of great value to us in the overall evaluation of the system ."64 Some of SAC 's intel ligence officers favored go ing ahead with a procurement, 55 and during 1965-66 they continued to visit Program A to stay up to date on the continuing analyses of Quill and imaging radar technology. The SP Quarterly Report for 30 June 1966 reported tersely that "on 26 May SAC briefed SAFSP (Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Special Projects) on their des ired radar system for post attack reconnaissance . No requirement for this system has yet been established ."66 Perhaps SAC delayed in the hope that some other budget would support the desired development ; perhaps its officers did not get Martin 's message as clearly as Bradburn did ; perhaps they thought the mission was well ensured by the new SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft ; or perhaps something entirely different accounts for the command 's lack of initiative for further program development at that time .67 Or perhaps the command had in fact pressed for an imaging radar satellite through different channels . Dr. Alexander Flax , who became director of the NRO on 1 October 1965 , recalled seeing a statement of need to this effect coming through non-NRO channels when he was serving as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. He passed it forward, without comment , to the Joint Chiefs , and did not hear about it again .68 Perhaps the NRO should have done more as well; it was responsible for developing intelligence collection satellites, and Quill had already demonstrated a resolution almost three times better than the early Corona cameras. Why was there no second, improved version of Quill? In part, even some officers in Program A thought there were good a priori reasons to discount the value of an imaging radar satellite , regardless of Quill 's success. Pointing to its "small area coverage , narrow bandwidth , and low resolution ," they argued that it could not serve either search or indicator monitoring purposes. "Only in the area of Post Strike Assessment can radar be expected to be satisfactory ... whether a radar PSA system is practica l as an operational system remains to be seen. There are practical difficulties and there exists doubts [sic) as to whether such a system is the best way to learn , quickly and surely and inexpensively where the bombs hit. "69 According to Bradburn , the NRO saw no point in conducting further demonstration missions. In Flax 's view, the relationships among radar parameters and image interpretation needed to be explored and understood more systematically, and he insisted that Program A establ ish a program of experiments. 70 The NRO together with the Air Force and CIA continued to fund ground-based research at a low level , but none of those efforts involved orbital tests. Reflecting on the effort later, Flax said that the real difficulty was opposition from the intelligence community.71 There was strong support from defense leaders for proceeding with a radar satellite program: SAC was favorably impressed by Quill, and the new director of defense research and engineering , John S. Foster, Jr., urged Flax (and Flax's successor, John Mclucas) to build another satellite .72 Flax also thought it would be a good idea , but some in the CIA were resistant. m Quill had shown that satellite-borne SAR imagery was fea sible, but the intelligence community thought and worked in terms of optical imagery, and in those terms a radar satellite would not be useful until it attained much finer resolution . A system that was worthwhile for tactical bomb damage assessment was not justifiable as a national intelligence asset. Officers in CIA's science and technology directorate declared that other technolog ies might be developed that could :j::j::j: CIA 's deputy di rector for science and tec hnology, A lbert D. "Bud" Whee lan, was not among them. He appl auded the experiment and criticized Bradb urn only for not go ing ahead to do more . (Interviews w ith both , Ma y 2000 , Los Ange les and Mo ntecito CA.) TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM 50 provide better images ; yes , Flax replied , but SAR is a technology that we know how to do now. Still, Flax did not believe he should press the matter in the absence of agreement, in the form of requirements , from the intelligence community. Mindful of the programmatic strife under his predecessor, Brockway McM illa n, and working under a new NRO charter intended to repair that damage and prevent its recurrence, 73 Flax paid attent ion to bureaucratic diplomacy, taking care to base his decisions and recommendations on solid technological ground.74 In doing so, Flax proved far more th an a mere barometer of consensus ; he successfully opposed the strong preferences of Program B, for example , in canceling the CIA's independent efforts to build a launch vehicle, in dividing program management responsibility for a new photo-reconnaissance system (Hexagon) , and in choosing the molniya orbit recommended by Program A for a new program . The SAR satellite proposal , however, was not a question of how to do something but whether something was worth doing in terms of intelligence . And Flax believed that the NRO director should not under these circumstances unilaterally overrule the nat ion's premier intelligence agency. That action would have to be taken by the higher governing body that oversaw NRO programs , the executive committee (ExCom), and to that end Flax raised the issue with Deputy Secreta ry of Defense Cyrus Vance, the ExCom 's chairman . Vance would also have heard from Foster, whose job as Dep uty Director, Research and Engineering (DDR&E) inclu ded monitoring NRO programs and providing advice directly to the deputy secretary of defense. Flax though t Vance was impressed somewhat with the SAR technology but evidently did not feel strongly enough to press the issue with the new director of central intelligence (DCI) , Richard Helms. Helms, in turn, came from a backgro und in traditional intelligence , was not personally attuned to space technologies and satellite reconnaissance , and in this matter followed the recommendations of Program B. Flax was left with pursuing a technology development program in an effort to persuade the intelligence community that there really was information valuable for intelligence purposes in radar data. The prospects , he thought , were not without hope . In practice, the standard to be met was radar imagery on a par with imagery obtained from optical systems-an order-ofmagnitude improvement. A major advance was need ed; evolutionary improvements in film emulsions, platform stability, signal timing, recorder dynamic range, and the like would not be enough to bring a 10:1 improvem ent in resolution. Bradburn predicted that such a gai n would take considerable time, perhaps ten years. CONCLUSION No physical artifacts and few documents remain from the Quill experiment. The Thor/Agena launch vehicles were recycled into the Corona program, and the remaining radar equ ipment was broken up and destroyed. "It was heartbreaking, " Goodyear 's project engineer said . "One time ," he went on, "someone came [to Litchfield Park] and had the right kind of credentials , and wanted to know if any hardware existed from the KP-11 program. I said no , all had been destroyed. What did you want to do with it? He said they wanted to put it into the Smithsonian museum . Sorry, all gone. Unfortunate that the program has remai ned so highly classified. But that's the way it is. I'd like to be able to tell my son what I had accomplished and what I was a part of, but I can't and 1 won 't."77 Gone , too , was a time of exploration and innovation that today see ms as remote as John F. Kennedy's Camelot. Outside the Washington NRO headquarters, there was close and willing cooperation between Program A , the Air Force component of the NRO , and the CIA component, Program B. Government authority was vested in a project officer, Major Bradburn , who possessed both the relevant technical expertise and development experience. Only one management layer, Bill King, separated Bradburn from the director of the NRO , w o became involved only to approve the project (and receive King's quarterly reports) . Being himself knowledgeable in the technical field, Bra dburn used informed peer review to select the contractor team , which worked intimately together and with him to ensure that vehicle , payload , and processing worked smoothly. Somehow, despite the absence of lengthy requirements studies, analyses of alternatives, volumino us proposals, large program offices, acquisition approvals , and extensive oversight, this risky experiment was completed in less than 30 months. It was in all respects a "sparkling success ."78 It generated a wealth of technical data, and it ended with money left over. SECTION I -QU ILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE ENDNOTES Note on sources: Documents and interviews cited in the references are filed in the Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) Reference Collection, unless identified as being held in the NRO Archive Records Center (ARC) or the Army Archive Records Center (AARC). 1. "USAF Pushes Pied Piper Space Vehicle ," Aviation Week (14 October 1957), p. 26 . 2. "Test Firings for Pied Piper Due Soon ," Aviation Week (16 June 1958), p. 19. 3. In Aviation Week and Space Technology 69:10 (8 September 1958), pp . 100-101. 4 . Redacted. 5. Radar tantalized aerial navigators through World War II and into the Korean War with the hope of being able to see the ground despite darkness , cloud , or dust, but radar mappers and bombsights of the day never offered sufficient precision . The goal was pursued during the 1950s using two very different technologies . Greater emphasis was given to side-looking radar (SLAR), which concentrated on World War II real-aperture technology and could only find increased precision in larger antennas. Installed in wing pods, under the belly, or along the fuselage, the larger antennas looked to the side of the flight path and produced a range-delimited silhouette on the radar scope . The scope could be recorded by movie camera and played back to help navigators and pilots become familiar with what they might see on their radar screens during actual operations. The needed precision finally came from a very different approach. During 1951-52 a handful of radar engineers in different organizations thought of using information contained in the phase of radar returns to construct images . Described in the early days as a kind of filtering or Doppler "beam-sharpening " before the term "synthetic aperture" was generally adopted , this approach was pursued most intensively by the associate contractor and at the Goodyear Aerospace Corporation SAR systems point to the side of an aircraft's flight path but they are profoundly different from the realaperture (SLAR) systems. "With the real array, the return from each range increment is received simultaneously by all array elements every time a pulse is transmitted; whereas , with the synthetic array, the return is collected by the individual elements serially over the period of time the radar takes to traverse the array." [George W. Stimson , Introduction to Airborne Radar (EI Segundo , California: Hughes Aircraft Company, 1983), p. 528 .] Pointing the antenna in a SLAR system , for example, changes the geometry of the scene obtained; in a SAR system it changes the signal-to-noise ratio . 6. Information about Goodyear's research into space-based SARs is drawn largely from an interview with the company's project engineer for the Quill radar, 10 May 2001, Litchfield Park, Arizona . 7. The Air Force funded several study teams in this effort. Goodyear and the Glenn L. Martin company were one study team, and Goodyear's project engineer and another employee spent time in Baltimore participating in the study program and writing a proposal to use SAR in the DynaSoar program . 8. Interview with the associate contractor 's employee, 13 June 2001 , Chantilly, Virginia. 9. Goodyear's project engineer thought that Lockheed and Goodyear developed the concept and that Lockheed got King 's group interested in it during late fall 1961 . 10. Maj . Gen . David D. Bradburn (USAF, ret.), interview, 2-3 May 2000, Los Angeles, California. 11 . "Subject is satellite radar experiment, " began a 21 November 1962 cable from NRO headquarters to Maj. Gen . Greer, head of the Air Force Special Projects activities on the West Coast. "SAFUS [Charyk] directs the establishment of a separate classified project under SAFSP management leading toward actual orbital tests a nd demonstration of the feasibility of radar sensors, including electronic data readout. " Secret , ARC Job 199880073 Box 1 Folder 1 00 . Charyk had been briefed on the potential · advantages of radar imaging on 18 September 1962 by Captain Gorman , USN ("SAFSP Historical Chronology CY 62, " Secret, ARC Job 199800072 Box 3 Folder 11 ). In December 1962 Charyk told DCI McCone briefly that "Project Quill is research toward an experimental radar payload for bomb damage assessment." Charyk to McCone, memorandum, 14 December 1962 , "Memorandum for Mr. McCone," (TS/ BYE) , ARC Job 199700046 Box 4 Folder 14. 12. The Quill program Office had consisted of three people including Bradburn. 13. Information about the contractual arrangements fo r Quill is drawn from the Bradburn interview and from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Vehicle 2355 System Report: Volume 1: Summary (Sunnyvale, California: TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Lockheed Missile and Space Co., 31 March 1965), pp. 8ff., S/BYE (BIF003/2-195008-80). 14 . Lockheed , Vehicle 2355 System Report 1, p. 15. The description of mission objectives following in the text is from the same place. 15. Charyk wrote to DCI John McCone that "Project QUILL is research toward an experimental radar payload for bomb damage assessment" (Joseph V. Charyk , Director, National Reconnaissance Office, to Mr. McCone , memorandum , 14 December 1962, p. 4, TS/BYE , ARC Job 199700046 Box 4 Folder 14 ). Officers from Program A had been discussing the Strate gic Air Command's need for reconnaissance data to assess bomb damage inflicted by nuclear strikes . A year later, the new director of the NRO , Brockway McM illa n, told the United States Intelligence Board and the 5412 Group that "the Quill experiment is being conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of high resolution radar for terrain reconnaissance from a satellite ," and that it was expected to achieve "about a 1 00-foot resolution over a swath width of 10 miles" ("Status of Satel lite Reconnaissance Programs," 13 November 1963, p. 7, TS/BYE , ARC Job 199700046 Box 4 Folder 14). A Program A staff paper prepared during summer 1963 (but not released) reported that "20 ft. resolution is the very best we can expect from present know-how and resolutions of 40-50 feet are more likely. 20-50 feet resolution is considered adequate for the Post Strike Assessment mission where all we need to know is where the bomb hit, but whether a radar PSA syste m is practical as an operational system remains to be seen . . .. Further effort in this field should be held up until we are able to get some answers from the Q [Quill] tests . Only then can we assess the future capabilities of radar in satellite reconnaissance and only then can we know the feasibility of a practical operational PSA satellite" ("Satellite Reconnaissance," July 1963, p. 20 , TS/BYE , ARC Job 199700046 Box 46 Folder 14 ). 16 . Bradburn 's approach to managing the project evidently embodied the precepts of the "King Doctrine ," attributed to Bill King when he was head of a program. They admonished managers to keep the program office small, hand-pick their people , control contractors by direct personal contact, stress that program success is the raison d'etre for the program office , and "keep it simple." The latter meant using proven components whenever possible, trimming non-essential engineering, buying fewer spares , sticking to a single checkout, abbreviating documentation, and simplifying tests. Briefing attached to note from J . C. Fitzpatrick, annotated "given 28 Sept 1989 at LA," in file, "Jim Fitzpatrick 19 Jun 90, " Bradburn papers on sigint history study, unaccessioned, NRO History Office files . In Perry's view, Bradburn "emphasized those qualities of incrementalism and low-risk technology espoused by King , [Col. C. Lee] Battle , [Col. Paul E.] Worthman , and Greer," and the project itself "seemed another proof of the validity of a policy of incremental acquisition ." Robert L. Perry, "Reece Satellite R&D : Capabilities in Readout, Crisis Reconnaissance and Very High Resolution ," final draft of Chapter XVII in his NRO History, pp. 10-11 , S/BYE in ARC Job 199600096 Box 6 Folder 1 0. 17. Associate contractor, Evaluation of a Satellite Radar Experiment I (August 1965), pp. 115-117, SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING. 18. Information about the payload is drawn from Goodyear Aerospace Corporation , Engineering Analysis Report No. 1, KP-11 Radar System (Litchfield Park , Arizona: Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, 25 July 1964), SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING. 19 . Associate contractor, Evaluation I, p. 5 . 20. Bradburn , interview. 21 . Lockheed , System Report 2, p. 1-139. 22. Lockheed, System Report 2 , pp . 1-133-1-154. 23 . Associate contractor, Evaluation II , pp. 251ft. 24 . "In its recent annual report , Lockheed referred to a statement by Maj . Gen . Bernard A . Schriever, commander of Air Research and Development Command's Ballistic Missile Division, that the reconnaissance satellite system will include a recoverable capsule." "Test Firings," Aviation Week (16 June 1958), p. 20 . 25. Goodyear, Engineering Analysis , p. 9-1 . 26. "A light source is collimated by lens Lc to illuminate the film with a coherent wave of light. The lenses L1 and L2 are set as a telescope and have the primary purpose of imaging the tilted recording plane . The three cylindrical optical elements are also telescopic and , in conjunction with the spherical telescope, image the tilted azimuth plane so that it is coincident with the imaged range plane at the recording surface . A three-element cylindrical telescope is used so that the azimuth magnification of the optical system can be continuously adjusted . This allows the processor to easily accommodate various azimuth scale factors . The filter plane aperture, between the two spherical lenses , serves the purpose of removing two of the three waves formed in the diffraction process, as only one of the waves (either the convergent or divergent) is SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE necessary to make the fine-resolution map." Associate contractor, Evaluation II, pp. 259-260 . 27. Goodyear, Engineering Analysis, pp. 4-1-4-12. 28 . Col. Jack Ledford , to Deputy Director (Research) , memorandum , S/BYE (BYE-2453-63); AARC Job 80B00251A Box 1 Folder 3. Scoville did not long remain as deputy director for research ; he had been frustra ted for months in his attempts to create the research organization by acquiring elements of othe r CIA organ izat ions , and in June 1963 he resigned . Director McCone chose Albert D. "Bud " Wheelan to replace him . 29. As of 24 July 1963 SAFSP funding (cable dated 1643Z 24 Jul 63, S/BYE , AARC Job 80B00251A Box 1 Folder 65). This cable also identified May 1964 as the intended launch date , and identified September 1964 as the date for having a second ready (payload only ). The following month (August 1963) OSA estimated that its support to Qu ill would cost about the same ; see memorandum dated 21 August 1963 concerning FY64 status of black funds , SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING, AARC Job 80B00251A Box 1 Folder 65 . Contractor requirements at that time were identified , leaving a balance in the CIA's Quill account. 30. Bradburn , "Security Plan-Action Items," memorandum, 19 December 1963, S-Special Handl ing, and enclosure 1, "Quill Supplement, Covert Programs Security Plan ," 2 March 1964 , S-Special Handling . 31. Cable dated 26 Mar 63 to OSA , SECRET, AARC Job 80B00251A Box 1 Folder 3. 32. SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 31 May 1964 , TS/BYE . 33 . SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 31 May 1964 . 34. SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 September 1964 , TS/BYE . 35 . SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 December 1964, TS/BYE . 36. Cf. the Quarterly Report for 30 December 1964: "the batteries were depleted by Rev 79, which agrees with predicted battery life." Subsequent testing on the KP-11 indicated that the mission would not have lasted much longer in any event. Small potting vo ids in two high-voltage modules grew in size with repeated temperature cycling and provided a high-voltage corona discharge path that eventually led to catastrophic failure. Once identified, the problem was readily addressed and the corrective action proven with an extended life test. See Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, KP-11 Final Report: Experimental Laboratory Investigations BKP11-16 (Litchfield Park, Arizona : Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, 31 March 1966) , pp. 5-6 , SECRETSPECIAL HANDLING . 37. Such a limit had been contended in some contemporary technical papers , including some from the Aerospace Corporation, according to the associate contractor's employee (interview) . 38. SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 December 1964 . 39. Lockheed , System Report 1, pp. 37-38 . 40. Secondary objectives are described in Lockheed , System Report 1, pp. 15-17 ; and associate contractor, Evaluation I, pp. 3-4. 41 . Associate contractor employee, interview. 42. Lockheed , System Report 2, pp . 4-14-4-15 . 43. "Two independent measures of achieved resolution are available. The first of these is obtained from the imagery of Pass No. 8 itself-a test array of radar corner reflectors fell within the mapped swath . The image of this array showed that azimuth resolution of roughly 10 feet , and ground-range reso lution of roughly 75 feet , were achieved. The second determination was made via a measureme nt of the two-dimensional response of the system to a strong isolated target which was imaged near the southern end of Pass 30. The system impulse response determined directly at the output of the optical processor, had a half-power width of 1 0 feet in azimuth and 72 feet in gro und range." Lockheed , System Report 1, pp . 34-35. 44 . 'The usable imagery obtained represents 88 ,000 square miles or 79 percent of the illuminated terrain ; of the total , 63 percent is substantially as good as the system was designed to produce, while 16 percent suffered only from uneven illumination caused by slightly incorrect pulse repetition frequency (prf) setting. Another 17 percent of the attempted coverage was sacrificed during various tes t sequences in which the prf and/or the attenuation level were intentionally mis-set. Of the 4 percent that was unintentionally lost, the major portion was the victim of occasional failures of the groundrecorder to resynchronize its sweep promptly when prf was switched , duri ng those times when the system was dependent on the data-link output. An easily correctible fogging of the onboard film between active passes also accounts for some loss of imagery. " Associate contractor, Evaluation I, p. 15. TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUI LL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM 45 . Lockheed , System Report 1, p. 146 . 46. Associate contractor, Evaluation I, p. 89. 47 . Lockheed , System Report 1, p. 146. 48. Associate contractor, Evaluation I, pp . 91-92. 49 . Lockheed , System Report 1, pp. 146-148 . 50 . Goodyear, KP-11 Final Report, pp . 151-154 . 51 . Goodyear 's project engineer, interview. 52. Greer 's cable , 11 Feb 65 , subject: Disposition of Quill Hardware (ARC Job 199800073 Box 1 Folder 1 06) . In 15 Feb 65 NRO headquarters approved placing the remaining Quill hardware in storage pending receip t of the report of the evaluation committee in Washington. 53 . SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 June 1965 , TS/BYE . 54. SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 June 1966 , TS/BYE. 55 . Memorandum for the Record , "List of Topics for Discussion with ExCom ," TS/BYE (BYE 12941 /69) , 13 June 1969 , in ARC Job 199700046 Box 4 Folder 8. 56. "NRO Position Paper on the NRO Satel lite Radar Program," attachment to John L. Mclucas to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and Director, Defense Research and Engineering, memorandum, "Synthetic Aperture Radar Surveillance Satellite System," 10 October 1972 , TS/BYE (BYE-13130-72), in ARC Job 199900005 Box 2 Folder 19. 57 . Associate contractor employee, interview. 58. Bradburn had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel by the time of the launch , and in the summer of 1965 left Los Angeles to attend the Air War College . He planned his next tour to be in Washington, D.C., but returned to Program A at the request of Brig . Gen. King . In June 1966 SP was planning to transfer the Quill proj ect from the sigint office to the advanced technology office , headed by then-Colonel Lew Allen , Jr. Bradburn was promoted to Colonel during his year at the War College and returned to SP to head the sigint office. Bradburn , interview. 59. SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 June 1966. 60 . SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 September 1966 , TS/BYE . 61 . Bradburn , interview. 62 . Brig . Gen . John L. Martin, USAF, to Director, NRO (Dr. Flax) , memorandum, "Survey and Audit of Cost Reduction Items ," S/BYE (BYE-66289-66) , in ARC Job 199800073 Box 1 Folder 125 . 63 . Chary k to Greer, 21 November 1962 . 64. "We greatly appreciate yourofferofSAC assistance in evaluating the Quill system ; specifically, its application to the BOA [bomb damage assess ment] problem ." Brig . Gen . James T. Stewart , director, NRO staff, to Maj. Gen . Robert N. Smith, director, intelligence headquarters , SAC, memorandum , "Evaluation of Radar Imagery," 9 February 1965, TS/BYE (ARC Job 199800073 Box 1 Folder 1 06). 65 . USAF Office , interview, January 2000 , Waterton , Colorado. 66 . SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 June 1966 . 67 . An imaging radar satellite , even with better resolution than Quill , might in fact have been irrelevant to SAC 's operations. At the time , the declared nuclear strategy of the United States was an oxymoron , emphasizing both "damage limitation " and "assured destruction." Damage limitation called for building offensive forces that could destroy enemy offensive forces and so , together with antiballistic missiles and civil defense , make it more difficult for Soviet forces to damage the United States . Soviet leaders were presumed to see from these forces that they would not be able to achieve any reasonable war aims and so would be deterred from striking the United States first. Assured destruction, on the other hand , argued that deterrence was based more safely on the assured ability to punish a Soviet first strike by destroying Soviet cities and industries in significant amounts; Soviet leaders were presumed to see that by attacking the United States first they would lose far more than they could hope to gain and so would be deterred from doing so . The contradiction between these themes arose because efforts to improve a damage limitation capability undercut the assured destruction philosophy, as John Newhouse explained, "because it may degrade your adversary's ability to destroy your own cities in a second strike . His confidence undermined , he might then be tempted in a crisis to strike pre-emptively; in short , knowing you are effectively protected from his secondstrike assault and fearing your inten tions , he may choose to strike first. " John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York : Holt, Rinehart , and Winston, 1973), pp . 9-10. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara argued for the primacy of damage limitation in 1962 ("the principle [si c] military objective in the event of nuclear war shou ld be the destruction of the enemy 's forces [not SECTION I -QUILL: THE FIRST IMAGING RADAR SATELLITE his population]) ," and for assured destruction in 1967 ("I think we could all agree that if they struck first we are going to target our weapons against their society and destroy 120 million of them ." Newhouse , Cold Dawn , p. 11 ). 68. Dr. Ale xander Flax , interview, 5 February 2003 , Chantilly, Virg ini a. 69. Draft manuscript, "Satellite Reconnaissance," marked "Colonel Study, Not Released ," July 1963 , TS / BYE , pp . 20-21 , ARC Job 199700046 Box 4 Folder 14. 70. Office of the Historian, National Reconnaissance Office , "Former NRO Directors Series : Interview with Dr. Alexander Flax ," 22 May 1997 , LIB# 01881 , S/BYE . 71 . Dr. Alexander Flax , interview, 2 1 November 2002, Potomac , Maryland . 72. "Proposing the radar satellite just seemed so obvious . You could go to where they had the fil m [NPIC] and see lots and lots of clouds , week after week , nothing but clouds , and we needed timely information ." John S. Foster, Jr., interview, 4 December 2002, Washington, D.C. In his budget review in November 1966 , Foster wrote that funding for "direct read-out" for imagery should be reduced and "emphasis placed on an all weather capab ility and in advanced development for overhead sig int." Foster to Flax , memorandum, 22 November 1966, "Special Support Activities RDT&E FY 1968 Budget ," TS/BYE (BYE-5662-66 ; ARC Job 199800073 Box1 Folder118 ). 73. Perry, Management, pp. 1 06ff. 74. McMillan was less careful and cost himself technical credibility. He concluded fantastically that the NRO would accomplish the intercepts by building "a covert , and relatively inexpensive, element of a satellite openly developed for other purposes , purposes which in themselves come close to justifying the costs involved ." Such purposes , he went on to say, might be weather observation or communication relay. McMillan to deputy director, science and technology, CIA , memorandum , "Studies of Synchronous Satellites," 5 November 1964, TS/BYE (BYE-23486-49) , ARC Job 199800066 Box 3 Folder 2. 75. Paragraph redacted . 76. Paragraph redacted . 77 . Goodyear project engineer, interview. 78. Perry, "Reece Satellite R&D ," p. 11. TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPEND IUM ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Robert L. Butterworth has written classified histories for the NRO . He is the author of several contributions to basic and applied research in national security affairs, is a former college professor, and has held staff pos itions in the Defense Department, the U.S. Senate, and the White House. His graduate degrees are from the University of California at Berkeley. SECTION II -QUILL DOCUMENTATION OVERVIEW QUILL DOCUMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE On 21 December 1964 , the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) launched its first radar imagery satellite , known as Quill. The Quill program was purely experimental , designed to test the proof of concept of whether or not imagery derived from radar could be captured from space. The experiment proved highly successful and was an important first step on the long path that led to regular radar imagery from space. In the summer of 2012, the NRO announced the declassification of all documents found in the NRO records holdings related to Quil l. NRO declassification officials located only 28 documents related to Quill and they are contained in either printed or electronic formats in this compendium . The documents can be divided into four groups . The first group of documents contains details of the efforts to develop and launch the Quill experimental satellite. These documents identify the purpose of the Quill experiment , the security necessary for the experiment , the program management, and the coordination between government agencies necessary to build a successful program. The second group consists of flight vehicle assessments of the Quill program. This group includes a three volume assessment from the prime contractor, Lockheed Missi les and Space Company as well as a two volume assessment from Goodyear Aircraft , the primary developer of the radar imagery sensor. The third group of documents consists of evaluations of the Quill radar produ ct s including reports from the NRO and the National Photographic Interpretation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency. The final group includes three documents on the final security closeout of the Quill program , which essentially brought the experiment to an end , slightly more than five years after its single highly successful launch in 1964 . SECTION Ill -QUILL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND SECURITY DOCU MENTS SUMMARY As might be expected, a number of organizational challenges arise in trying to successfully carry out a new technology development. Such is the case with the Quill program . The documents in this section prov ide glimpses into the development of the program . Clearly the program was developed mostly to test radar imagery from space as a means to assess post-attack bombing damage . Only later would the Intelligence Community evaluate radar imagery from space for broader intell igence applications. These documents also revea l deta ils about the program management of the Qu ill experiment with particular emphasis on the experimental nature of the program . Perhaps the largest organizational issue associated with the program was security. Because Quill was incorporating hardware components developed for other programs , it crossed security boundaries established to protect those programs, especially Corona . These documents illustrate the pragmatic approach and cooperation extended to fac ilitate Quill's acqu isition of necessary components while still preserving the security of other programs . Document 1 -Memorandum from Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to The Director of Central Intelligence concerning status of current national reconnaissance satellite programs , 14 December 1962 : The Air Force program at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) proposed Quill as an experimental study of the effectiveness of imagery derived from radar returns for assessing bomb damage after military attacks . The first document is a memorandum from Dr. Joseph Charyk to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI ) Mr. John McCone . At the date of this memorandum , 14 December 1962 , the Director of the NRO (DNRO ) answered to both the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. DNRO Charyk prepared the memorandum in response to a request conveyed from CIA's Deputy Director for Research , Dr. Herbert Scoville , for a summary of the NRO 's national reconnaissance programs under development. Charyk makes a passing reference to Quill in the concluding paragraph of the memorandum, describing Quill as an experimental program for assessing bomb damage by using imagery derived from space based radar. Document 2 -Secure Cable concerning open and covert procurement for the Quill program , 06 March 1963: Like all national reconnaissance programs , Quill program managers had to determine how to develop and launch a satellite in an open society without revealing the true purpose of the satellite . In a 6 March 196 3 secure cable , program managers outline which elements of the Quill program will be described in the context of "white " or overt programs , and which elements of the program will be managed in "black" or covert procurements. Also , like most early national reconnaissance satellite programs , Quill incorporated components from the Corona program . The challenge was always to protect the Corona program 's security. The cable demonstrates how the program managers did that by limiting insight into Corona by Quill program participants. Finally, funding is the lifeblood of any project. Although the actual dollar figures are redacted in this document, the document does provide insight into how funding was managed in both a covert program and in a program that relied on another covert program for essential hardware components . Document 3 -Security Memorandum concerning request for support from the Corona program, 1 April 1963: The Quill experiment's success depended on obtaining components used in the CIA's Corona satellite program. On 22 March 1963 , Major David Bradburn , Quill 's Program Manager, convened a meeting of Air Force and CIA representatives to resolve CIA security concerns about using components from the then highly classified Corona program . ln a 1 April1963 memorandum summarizing that meeting, a security officer described accommodations that Bradburn agreed to in order to receive Corona components . At the meeting , CIA and Air Force representatives agreed that few people would need to be cleared into the Corona program . They also agreed to use an Air Force security officer, who had previously worked on the Corona program , to address security concerns . The security officer describes the Quill program in detail including technical requirements, program objectives , and post-flight processing of data to be obtained from space. Document 4 -Security Memorandum in preparation for meeting with the Quill program manager, 21 March 1963: In late March 1963 , Quill Program Manager, Major David Bradburn planned to travel to Washington , DC and brief the DNRO on the Quill program. In a 20 March 1963 meeting , security officers assigned to the NRO met to discuss security concerns with the Quill program. They discussed concerns about possible exposure of the highly classified Corona program because of the use of Corona components . Bradburn was procuring Quill under another satellite program that was being procured overtly, but carryi ng a classified payload. The meeting attendees also discussed the possibility that Soviet trawlers navigating the coastal waters of the United States might obtain radar returns , and identify Quill as radar satellite when it reached orbit and operational status . The meeting attendees agreed to discuss these security concerns with Major Bradburn during his meetings the following week . 6 2 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL Document 5 -Security Memorandum summanzmg security officer meeting with the Quill program manager, 29 March 1963 : On 28 March 1963 , Quill Program Manager, Major David Bradburn met with securi ty officers supporting NRO satellite programs . The memorandum summanzmg the meeting includes Bradburn 's description of the mission , objectives , and technical approach for the Quill program. The memorandum also includes Bradburn 's management structure for the program including how Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) , Goodyear Aerospace , and an associate contractor would participate in the program . The memorandum includes a hand-drawn summary of organizational management structure as well as security approaches developed within the structure . Document 6 -Security Cable providing guidance on Quill security, 9 April1963: In a 9 April1963 security cable , a NRO assigned security officer identifies the cover story and overall approach for maintaining the secrecy of the highly classified Corona photoreconnaissance satellite while using components from that program for Quill. At a key meeting , Quill Program Manager, Major David Bradburn and representatives of the CIA , Air Force , and LMSC (including future DNRO James Plummer) , agree to incorporate Quill 's film cutter and casse tte into the Corona -based recovery vehicle before sh ipment to Program A for use in the Quill program . The cable also indicates that few if any additional personnel will need Corona clearances because the Quill program will use individuals who were already cleared into the Corona program. Document 7-NRO Programs ' Status Paper supporting the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office 's Briefing to the United States Intelligence Board , 13 November 1963 : On 14 November 1963 , the then DNRO Dr. Brockway McMillan provided the United States Intelligence Board and the National Security Council 's special committee on covert operations updates on the NRO 's satellite programs . The NRO staff provided a 13 November 1963 status paper to support Dr. McMillan 's briefing . Regarding Quill , Dr. McMillan was prepared to report that the program was expected to launch two experimental radar imagery satellites , each with 100 foot resolution covering a ground swath 10 miles wide . Dr. McMillan also reported the satellite would have both film readout and film recovery capabilities . The first flig ht was then scheduled for April 1964 . EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Document 8 -Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office identifying questions and concerns about the National Reconnaissance Program Budget , 23 July 1964 : In a 23 July 1964 memorandum , DCI Mr. John McCone responds to material that Dr. Brockway McMillan had provided concerning the NRO budget. McMillan provided the information in advance of a meeting on NRO resources . In his memorandum , McCone comments extensively on many of the NRO programs. With respect to Quill , McCone declares a lack of familiarity with the program and asks for additional details . McCone and McMillan would have a very conten ious relationship over differing viewpoints on national reconnaissance satellite programs and management responsibility for the programs . Document 9 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Deputy Secretary ofDefense addressing the DirectorofCentrallntelligence 's concerns about the National Reconnaissance Program Budget , 29 July 1964 : On 23 July 1964, DCI Mr. John McCone sent a memorandum to the DNRO Dr. Brockway McMillan in response to the proposed Fiscal Year (FY) 1965 budget for the National Reconnaissance Program. In that memorandum , McCone raised concerns , asked questions , and made requests for more information concerning the budget proposal. McMillan prepared a 29 July 1964 memorandum to Deputy Defense Secretary, Cyrus Vance , commenting on McCone's questions and concerns . In that memorandum , McMillan agreed to brief McCone on Quill , but noted Quill had little effect on the FY 1995 budget since most of the required Quill funding was included in the FY 1964 budge . Document 10 -Security Memorandum concerning handling of future imagery from the Quill program , 22 October 1964 : In a 22 October 1964 memorandum , a security offi cer addresses the question of how to handle future imagery from the Quill experimental satellite . This request came from the Program A staff. Quill was developed to assess whether or not radar imagery could be used for bomb damage assessment , and therefore viewed as military rather than intelligence imagery asset. The use of Quill imagery for intelligence purposes remained unclear. The security officer indicates that Quill products should remain under security controls established for national reconnaissance satellites until the poten tial uses of Quill imagery were better defined . SECTION Ill -QUILL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND SECURITY DOCUMENTS SUMMARY Document 11 -Security Memorandum on security protection of Quill imagery, 22 October 1964 : The viewpoints of the NRO Staff's Chief Security Officer, Louis Mazza , on security protection of Quill imagery products are recorded in a 22 October 1964 Security Memorandum . Mr. Mazza indicated that he thought it was premature to establish special controls for the Quill product until the uses of the product were fully evaluated . He recommended keeping the Quill product under existing security controls until evaluation occurred and further justified unique security controls . Document 12 -Security Memorandum on need for special security controls for the Quill program , 23 October 1964: In a 23 October 1964 memorandum , a security officer summarizes the views of several officials and security officers on the question of whether or not to develop special security controls for Quill. The officer recommends the consensus view, that Quill remain under the main security control system , the Byeman control system , established for national reconnaissance satellites . Document 13 -Security Memorandum on use of Byeman security controls for the Quill program , 7 December 1964: The NRO Staff's Chief Se curity Officer prepared a memorandum on 7 December 1964 as a cover for conveying two documents concerning security controls for the Quill program. The first attachment is a 1964 memorandum from the CIA's Director of Security that affirms the decision to keep Quill products with in the Byeman control system , established as the main control system for national reconnaissance satellites . The second attachment is a memorandum with the Quill security plan prepared by the U.S. Air Force . The security plan addresses secure processing of Quill products as well as how Quill products will be securely couriered. The plan also summari zes planned efforts to secure data at the two tracking stations used for the Qu ill experimental program . TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM LIST OF QUILL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND SECURITY DOCUMENTS Document 1 -Memorandum from Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to The Director of Central Intelligence concerning status of current national reconnaissance satellite programs , 14 Decem be 1962 .. .. ... ...... . 65 Document 2-Secure Cable concerning open and covert procurement for the Quill program , 06 March 1963 ...... 71 Document 3-Security Memorandum concerning request for support from the Corona program , 1 April 1963 ...... 77 Document 4 -Security Memorandum in preparation for meeting with the Quill program manager, 21 March 1963 ..... ........... .... ...... ... ............ ................. ..... .. ............ ........ ..... ............. ... .. ....... ....... ... ...... ... ....... ......... ...... 85 Document 5-Security Memorandum summarizing security officer meeting with the Quill program manager, 29 March 1963 ...... .... ............................ .... .. ..................... .......... .... ...... ...... .. .. .. .... ...... ...... ............. ..... .......... ... ........... . 91 Document 6 -Security Cable providing guidance on Quill security, 9 April 1963 ..... ... .. ...... ... .......... ... ... ... .... ....... .... 93 Document 7-NRO Programs ' Status Paper supporting the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office 's Briefing to the United States Intelligence Board , 13 November 1963 ...... ..... .. ..................... ......................... 97 Document 8-Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office identifying questions and concerns about the National Reconnaissance Program Budget , 23 July 1964 ................. ......... ........ ..... .. ........ ................ .. .. ...... .......... ......... ................... ... ....... ..................... 107 Document 9 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Deputy Secretary of Defense addressing Director of Central Intelligence's concerns about the National Reconnaissance Program Budget , 29 July 1964 ................................. ........ ......... .... ............................ ..... ..... ......... 113 Document 10-Security Memorandum concerning handling of future imagery from the Quill program, 22 October 1964 ..... .............. ..... ... ............ .... ... ....... .... .... .. .......... .......... ....... .. ... ....... ... ............................. ........ ......... 125 Document 11 -Security Memorandum on security protection of Quill imagery, 22 October 1964 ........... .. ............ 127 Document 12 -Security Memorandum on need for special security controls for the Quill program , 23 October 1964 .... ..... ..... .... ....... .... ...... .... ................. .... .. ... ... ............ ... ........ ... ... .. ... ........ ... .. ...................... ..... ......... 129 Document 13-Security Memorandum on use of Byeman security controls for the Quill program , 7 December 1964 .................................................. ... .......... ..... ... .. ....... ..... ......................... ... ..................... ... .. .......... 131 en m n ·;~~-----1 ~ll~ p.. aJ. it 6 z ~ il. m~ t::l~ g ;?. :. 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Jt Ja aa.o to tbe 8lltlr'e 1M II.t.t!plt ciiHIIIDd efti'J .U.r 8lllbl Uiel'elbl' we Jlaw Pncllawallt a COilOJIA-J fthiei. to be nai.1llbM w!ddl 1ri1lIMil IIHM ...ur• anataa..JDC~~~tbL nw ~a.to prorille • ~ _.,.....e_..., wbicll will a1knr rec..,.iiPace Otpta to be -..etUd ......., ill Nan e~UrpDCJ' aMaat•-. o.. aa..:&l.-wW, -...., ftlltnla-fnm ••,••tnb~ • Aatlbled ~-.,....tua tlar ::.1 ~ z ::3 _.., ~ a. ...... - .... I::) Cl:' iD _.. ~ c:~ ._..;. LAUNCH SCHEDULE 0 ...... ~· t....c: ,.~ AS OF 12 Dec 62 0 tJCI Z .;: ;11 ~ (") mm::a ·, 1-1 m 1!:'0 c nno ; ~ i'3 ~ 3: ,~ ,. . r :::1'<"' m ·; ~ i.OrocmPHIC 1963 1964 1965 fR fn"G z -f ~ fR fn"G ..... ~ u ... .... .n. .... "" u .. -" ... u "' .... .J; .L .n. , .... n v v n u "' ~-,.... n. ...., --::a ~ " " :!!::!!o P I ~1."1 (:\ ... l"i ~ ;. ~ I"'-i : '"' ,' ~-:-"t ' "" · ·. 1~ 1 ~ I I · ~ I t WEATHER i \ 1 t : ~ ~ ~~ ~....... vv•• -vn -u•unu u JASON DJF l~AH JJ :>t-(I< ':> "':1::: a. ,.•. "-~ ~l Ill Il II l I I r. ~ 0 · C)> -~ tn (j) <0 SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 2 . ;•:. -i NRO ~PPROVED FOR RELbSE ,' :~~.f: : DECLASSIFIED BY: C/I~RT --· Cl.AS..c:rFJED MESSAGE ~:~~"':"~·~ DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 GoP ~~ z~''z ee ~AR 63 I I 0 R It iO • DIRECTOR FU&a j .. ;, # . . · Aer!OI!: OSA ( t•2•3•.t•5•S•~8-9-lil) PRIOR ttY !~ ' SIC (IJ) TORr 1141Z 17 MAR 63 I!C Slell PRITYem ;.. REF'Sr A. 21 FEB S~ c. 'MAR Q t. THIS IS THE DETAILED PLA~ REQUESTED IN YOUR •••• PART I • QUILL (BYII"'A~n SEC~ITY POLICYI TK! QUIU ftROIRM CONSISTS OF ~ TAT /AGE~A LAtr.'tCNES IN !IIAY, S!PT, AID '!tOY 1t64e THESE LAllfCHES ARE Ami!NISTRATIYILY PART OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN QUILL -ARE ANALOGOUS TO THE RELAT• IONSHIP BETWEEN PAYLOAD VH!R!AS ONLY QUILL IRIIP!D PERSO~S ARE AWARE OF THE WORD •QUIU. • OR OF THE FACT THAT THE PAYLOAD IS A RADAR. OTHI:R PERSO!fS ARE GIVEN THE COVER SI'OJIY ;:.; IN KEEPING WITH THIS SECURITY F'RAilVORI ONLY THE RADAit PAY• LOAD IS "BLACK"'. NOST OF TKE: PROJECt IS •vHITE, tfl9HLY cLASSIP'ItD• THE \!KITE FAct'S INCLUDE TAT/AB!NA D, SATELLITE, VlDE•RAID DATA ' I Pll : R ~ : If;;tj;.."I f:::PRODUCTON BY OTH£E. THAN THE !:.;SUING OFFIC£ IS PlOHIIITfD. C. NIL ., -· · ----· ··~··--- . . TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ·-:_:,; .;-;:,:;:4 NRQ APPROVED FOR RELEASE~-.. . ·:.-:· ~-:.:• DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART· ?~'fi;{j DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 f I P I I I R • f -RONA AND VICE VERSA. TilE RECOVERY StltSYSJ'D IS DEFINED AS TH£ RECOVERY SliSSYSJ'!II VIU REIIAIM UMDER CORONA SECURITY. PART II • QUIU. PROJECT SECURITY PROC!DUR!Sa 'tHE QUill PROGRA!t OPERAT£S PERSONS WHO f>IUSJ' KNO~ THAT THE PAYLOAD IS A RADAR ARE CLEARED MD BRIU'ED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BYEIIAN CRITERIA. CORRESPOIDENCI CONTAtlfiWG ANY REFERENCE TO RADAR OR ANY SENSITIVE ASPECT OF THE QUILL PROGRAM TME TRANSLATION IS AS FOLLOVSI UJg: REPEAT UISCt CVHlTE CONTRACT VUTK SAFSP> 1 SEITD, AGENA VEHICLE, SPECIAL ANTENNA, LAUNCH AMD TRACKING SERVICES. I CONSULTANT FOR RADAR, ALS 0 OnlCAL PROCESSING OF RAV RADAR DATA TO PRODUCE FINAL RADAR NAP. DAC REPEAT DACt a TAT BOOSTER, LAUNCH SERVICES. GOODYEAR AIRCRAFT COMPANY REPEAT GOODYEAR AIRCRAFT COMPANYa CBLACX SAFSP CONTRACT> 1 RADAR PAYLOAD. B. FOR THE 3 REQUIRED, COMPLETE RECOVERY SUBSYSTDS, TH! . CORONA CONTRACTUAL ARRA~DIENT VIU. BE US!D Vn)I)Uf ANY CHAMS!. S!»EC lFICALLY, THE FOUOV ING PROCURDENTS VILL BE I ADEI (1) LMSC WILL PROVIDE HARDWARE AS FOUOVSI AP'T CAPSULE COVER, MODIFIED VATER SEAL, BLOSSOM TELEitETRY1 BALLAS!' SYSTEM, DRAIN AND SINK Pl.UJS, AND PARACHUI'E. · LIISC GE WILL PROVIDE THREE MARK VA SPACE VEHICLES, GE PART NUMBER l96R388G12, MODIFIED SO THAT THI CASSETTE MOUMTIM8 .... . R~ILS ~ILL ACCOMMODATE THE IDENTICAL 781tM CASSETTE USED IM THE MARK IV CONfiGURATION, DELIVERY DATES TO LMSCI FIRST SYSUII TO ', T 8 P 8 I I ft ! T ' ' TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM . -· -'...RO·APPROVED FOR RELEASE ~"·;~:'>;~j)ECLASSIFIED BY! C/IART · .· ;-,-,' :.jDECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 Y e r e e 1 ft 1 ' CIN 68218> PAll FOUR UISC 1 SEPT ~. SECOND AND THIRD AT ON!•MONTH INTERVALS DISIREDt TVO•"ONTH INTERVALS ACCEPTABLE • . Cl) ITEK VILL PROVIDE THREE TAXI-UP CASSITTES, ITEK PART MlJIIIBER .39178. REQUIRED DATE AT U·SC SANE AS FOR "ARK VA SYST~S ABOVE. CCASSEnES !AY BE AVAILABLE AS RESIDUE TO PRIOR WORK.> C~) ENGINEERING COORDIRATIOI VILL BE ACCORPLISHED THROUGH L!SC SEnD. C5> BUDGET ESTIMATESI FY&.s FYU TOTAL UISC GE trEK TOTAL PART V • HARDWARE HANDLING AND CHECKOUT PROCEDURESI THE QUILL RADAR PAYLOAD WILL BE FABRICATED IN PHOENIX, SKIPPED TO SUNNYVALE J'OR INstALLATION AHD CHECKOUT IN TKE AaEIIIA, AID THEM SHIPPED IN THE AGENA TO VAF8 FOR LAUNCH. VHEIIEV!R TN!RE WILL 8E EVIDENCE THAT THE PAn.OAD IS A RADAR, QUILL SECURITY WILL BE ·..•;.:~c ENFORCED. THE RECOVERY SliiSYST!! WILL BE USEIIBLED AND CHECKED OUT BY LRSC UNDER CORONA SECURITY • . FliiCTlONAL TES!'lNG VITK THE RADAR PAYLOAD Will BC ACCOMPLISHED IN -'USC, AN -·CLEARED AREA. THEN THE PAYL.0AD AND REOOvtRY SIISSYSTEMS MOVE TO -·L"SC, FOR SYSTEMS TESTS AID ENVIROMIIDTAL CHAfiiBER TESTS. RECOVERY SUBSYSTEiot THEN SHIPS TO V_lFB FOR FINAL .. ~.. ·., _ ...., ... T.. I _P. Jt.!I.JL.A,.· -f SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 2 . · '. ·· :NRO,APPROVED FOR RELEASE ·· . ;_,_. : .' ! DEC~SSIFIED BY: C/IART · .. .· ~::;:.:. . _: ! DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 · ! 8 P 8 I I R I ! -.· UN 682Ul> I ... . PREPARATION Ill •t• BLDG. RECOVERY StBSYSt'DI MATES VITH MJDA AND PAYLOAD IN AT YAPB PRIOR TO LAUICNe CIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL RECOVERY SUBSYS!'!M HANDLlt18 AWD SECURITY. IN THIS VAY INTERACTION B!TVEEtl CORONA AND QUILL VD.L BE Mill•. MIZED • ~ . . . PART VI • LAUNCH AND .RECOVERY RESPONSIBILITIISt TKE LAUNCH VILL BE CONDUCTED AS OPERATION. THI RECOVIRY VILL BE FUNCTIONALLY REPEAT FUNCTIONALLY SIMILAR TO PRESEMT 162 OPERATIONS, BUT VILL BE IDENTIFIED WITHIN THE RECOVERY FORCE AI THE PRIMARY RECORD lULL BE TRANSMITTED TO HILLER FOR DE-SPOOLING, TO SPPL FOR PROCESSING, AND THIN TO FOR OPTICAL TRANSLATION TO FINAL rORIAT. AS IN 1'KZ CASE OF PRE•LAIJNCH .ACTIVITIES, CORONA SECURITY VILL DICTATE THE RECOVERY SECURnY CONTROLS. 2. CONSI$TENT VITH THE ABOVE PLAN VE · WILL COORDIIUTI THE PROCUREMENT AMD SECURITY I'IATTERS. PERTAIMIN8 TO THE RECOVERY SUBSYSTEM ON A CONTINUING BAStS THROUGH LOCAL REPRESEMTATIV!S, !IIESSFfS 3. FOR COL tiARTlN: ¥! CONSIDER THE FOLLOVI!IG TO BE MOS1' IJIIPORTANT ACT ION ITE.,SI A. TRANSFE'ol OF FUNDS TO CIA CREF PARA l, PART IV, B>. B. AUTli»RIZATlON FOR LT COL MURPHY AND MESSRS-AND -TO PARTICIPATE ASSSET FORTH ABO~. END OF "ESSAG! T I P 8 B I AB T SECTION Ill • DOCUMENT 3 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE -'SEfJIT DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART -DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 . i' CHIEF D/ CHIEF t-1'---ll \ SE81T l .j ·. ·.·.· .. :·. TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE '9£6RET DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 .....-· ·I i / SE8RHJ . , ·;·.·. SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 3 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART ·sE8RET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 ~· . j . ; SE8RET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .,ULY 2012 I I I I I I i I SEBRET .. ~ ·~· ./ .~· ' : -SE8RH SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 3 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIEI) BY: C/IART SE8RET DECLASSIFIED ~N: 9 JULY 2012 \ i ! SE8RET -~ ..~ ~-~ '· TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART -8f6fifT DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 ,. ---- I I I I I l I I I I ' J,._ · ; !. 1 tSE9RC SECTION Ill • DOCUMENT 3 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 l5o laiC I JDiatioa8J A. It le no d·t t11at the NOCmiJ' .,._ be ~ to tM · C~JI~,.L JI'CICNi ~ue.--..d ..,uf1tl _, .... UIIG'ieDOed JIOPle at till AP IUWv• . Ctl• ~a*'•!!! loft ~1A et&UJII tat tlaU ~Y1ll .... the -.n'JllllGllfDWv ot thel61 ftODfti"J .-. M tt u the ,..ntv•• "Plaioo ~-W. 1e tile 'ben JI'QOIIuN tcwi.Uu1'1111J till nUMlUV ot 1-M .... u JU'U .... ~--.,... ~-GIA...... ncmA~ ( / OIOU tiOplltiJ' tbl)"laJ' wl1 ... .,_.., UJeD &lft'WIIl.8t tale~U.• '· ~or vllri.btr tM7 ... ,.,...., tbl7 ,._,. liPiD ._,. w • . ' .~,,.,.... • ,.... wl~ leN ..,.nno. tiiiG .....tbe -,., tul11t)'o %\ 18 ,..,,... tllat .111Jl'IW7 of the...-... tpta t.e '(_ 1 / cu.Y.W. ..-Ga~DM ., ~-..-.. an tt .-be;w 5;'•~"' :~~ tiM tM-. JIIOJo].e ••••••U.s ._...t .-&1 o/WE --~~~~ __ ~· &1'8 CIJIUo 111rUtec!o It 18· 111ft ...bDWIIIiij liiiJe ftlllle--a,Ditlo%t ta felt tat ~ot tMae JIIIJ).e wUl..be 111~IIIIUwt 'bt a ,..-du1p. C'tort Ul a 1DI1aat1ea tat tt. 811U11Uft ,.U wn teUwnct • CNU1.. ......... ~to tile 1.68 ,..... Bo ~ot tbe •.,...,. 8111 ditd.Qpft OD ~wU1 DOt 'be deoelwt b7 We............. %t 1e I'll hi tllln ~~ ... ~toteo1te llblob ot !WI~~~.~~ •••• or • tate~ ntUi~or ....nv ~....... M4 -.s.t ~nator c:'GCIIl ~.. .,_ Bn~CurD tee1a •t -..... Rtw.rilal ~o1euaea v1U be ,... tJiu twd7· o. It 1a noll_... tlat, Wire teuible, ...JNPle BOt lMt Cl'Nil a tu11 cr-. ~. !!117 lbDul4 DOt lMt toll. tile ldftol7 ot tJill CI*M JII"CCC'& ... llllal4 lie Clftll DO 11141..U.. tM't atelllta ,...._..-, 1e beiJII ~I'MONMo Do It 1a ... nW tM1I u tw qnlZ. JIIIC9le -naa~ i JOUl'ble ... )lefti"-4 ...... to till u tu111t7, .,.. tllluP GilT ... I oaa brS.etM. Jx1ataDoe et t11e A1l fM111't7 IMul4 be ... --.. to* tw emu.~.-be~to .... ~~· I· It 1a nm Ill tlat *Jor,or ...u.zo · ..ttMiei..MIIiMIIl1iae AU ..,_ Ctitezo1 be llfta tile NIJ M41l1Ui't7 ~r ~ I ~ot (fJlU/018a .....S't7 at ~. lid.-W1U llW lira-~ .I • .._ ~IU IMIII'i\7 ~to tlllt 4IIJDI, ,...._, lI JU"Uftl.Arq * -"s. **.u.r. JICllfle an to be llii'WeA. l l 1 l ~. ~ \ - TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 St8M:T r. rt u neo-DII4 tlat DO AP tloWt7 ~be ftll\d.Ncl to "OJW ohietl' tbe NOII9U'J buoUte at ~or un, walaa 1t 1a ....~'tiDI!IIINtoo4 tM7 41M1&1a ~upD'UM ~tile t1la CNt., .to. o. n u ,...a r11W taat the noofV¥ ~• be NtU1'DI4 to tile D tu111'Q' .ttu it U ddal1ftl'e4 to tile ~ JHCN& at~. n a1D&14 be~rr. ~~ to TAn att.r lUI e.D4 ....:a: t.utiDI• B. tt 11 w ••• tef tllat U. ftOO\IU7 ~1D to tblt . "J/ .JnUAhl at. 'fiD ~tw tbe JWtt. wspt u4 belnoe te~UD~., hi' tMD l'ftUrul4 1 I u.at.eq to • ... !btl vUl el jll1.... ta. DM4 tor oc.M ~JMp1At at tbe •'II' BI&UUIII to be ~lznolftll . Yl~ -~Jll'fCNM• . I· n u n=1 1 114 t11at a .nus be M14 at till AP fao:111t7 ~tile.... .t 8 Appll.lJ63 to fift111y tllit MOID'lt)r .l'lM~11114 tllat . flft•G/OIA/D. ...BN4bm:'D, Ill'•-·Col. --'Jlr. aDI •· ~ratwa~. 11-. f1MJ. wzoviil. ot the plaD ...n. ws.taa ~.D/~lt u .....W tat OllalitP'at1ao w1ll ..,. to be liWD b7 .., alte,_. pJ'OSIMill .U.S.ttecl b7 JU'\1os,aata. M Jlu been ....ftecl 'b)-Ill'. ~.~~beable to n zuvate.u1 .....-1.Uv ~.r tile ~~U tbe MD11t1w )U'tl are 6111'ftn4 ~·I euaen, -.....,, tat ewn -.w. :r'Gilte ,. v1ll ba'ft to ca..l elAar ...,..,,.,... to ao tM Job. ~of tile 41ttueDJe of apialoD at tile ~Dtu., it 11 felt bt a ~ 4S.acNN1ao -.tllil 1114iaat.! :people Y1ll J."eMlft tile MCNI'i"J ~ &114. z..... tbe ~.,,.~barr1DI tbe ~ot tlla CIJlU, ~ '\ \ ·· ~ J \ ., '· · ~ I ..;.-~ SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 4 rSE8RET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 Zl March 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Discussion regarding Project Quill 1. A meeting was chaired by Mr. -on 20 March 1963 in his Office, regarding the security aspects of Project Quill. Those in attendance were Mr. -Mr. Mazza, Mr. Mr. -and Mr. - Z. The gist of the matter discussed at the meeting is as follows: Mr. Mazza: The NRO has received a message from the West Coast regarding "0" which indicates that Major Bradburn will be coming to Headquarters some time next week to discuss the status of "0" with the DNRO. I have suggested to the NRO Staff that preliminary meetings involving the NRO Staff and the SSC be held before DNRO makes a decision regarding the future of Project "0". Mr. -Program "B" has very little to offer in this respect since Project "0" definitely is under the authority of Program A. How close is "0" to becoming operational? Mr. Mazza: I do not have the exact date. It is currently regarded as in the research and de:111elopmental stages. Mr. -~ The first firing of "0" is scheduled to take place in the middle of 1963. Mr. Mazza: The unique aspect of "0" is that it uses radar. The radar messages are "spit out" at the appropriate signal from the ground control station. If this radar capability was used over a denied area it could trigger an international crisis. ~3f6RET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE [SE6RET DECLASSIFIED BY~ C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 Mr. Mazza: The current plans are for the radar to be used over the United States only. The question at this time concerns the best cover for "0". At the current time -isexpected to be the cover mechanism. M!.:...-What do you think is the best cover arrangement? Mr. Mazza: As it standa at this time CORONA cleared people know .of "0". "0" cleared people know that QUILL is a research developmental project which uses radar. (The radar aspects are regarded as d people think that QUILL is just anothe a recoverable package. The -people will not see the film. I believe that the proper cover for "0"·is not essentially a security problem but more of a management problem. I don't believe the DNRO has completely thought through the working aspects as to the risks involved with "0". Since there are risks we must realize that there will be security problems. Mr. --I think the concept of "Q" is splendid. We would support it completely. I have been advised that General Greer expects to watch the first LANYARD shot. This concerns me inasmuch as his presence in the area might blow our "skunk works" and focus attention on our CORONA and DISCOVERER people there. (150 people) suggests it might be better if "0" were handled on a black basis and not in the-· .!':!!:.:.-Why not leave "0" as part of the DISCOVERER program since it involves the Thor-Agena combination? Mr. Mazza: The Soviets who track our satellites will know that this one has radar on it. The Soviet trawlers that patrol our coast should be able to monitor the radar izrpij.Ua without any difficulty. We must keep in mind that radar in this nature is a war indicator. Mr. Mazza: was under the impression that "Q" could best remain in the DlSCOVERm.Program. SEeREf SECTION Ill • DOCUMENT 4 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIII;D ON: 9 JULY 2012 M.!.:... .Both Colonel Ruebel and Colonel Ford seem to be horrified at this suggestion of Rod's. I understand that the recovery package designed by Lockheed should be used for QUILL. ~How well known is I have been reading about in the press? Mr. Mazza: The lid has been put on-regarding any release of payload data. Security in this respect has been very effective. Mr. -· If QUILL is not to be under-but should be under DISCOVERER what will the problems be? Mr. L QUILL is a black program at this time• • is a Department of.Defense SECRET Project. "Q" contains radar and this will be generally known as soon as it goes into operation. For this reason it has been suggested that an Overt Program such as -would provide the better cover then the black program. (At this point.in the discussion Mr. -entered the room) Mr. -· Mr. -· Would.you give us some general ba.ckground information regarding -as the result of your inspection of this Project last month. Mr. --is classified SECRET and is being developed under a ~ntof Defense White CoDtract. Since the hold down is only a SECRET classification it is known an number of people on the West Coast as a The basic difference between-and our other programs with respect .to CORONA approximately . persons have access to information because of their proximity to the launching pad. There are also approximately-persons with access to-on the launching pad but the difference is that anyone with a SECRET clearance can be told of . . CORONA is held down much more seve The mating of the doh at in Sunnyvale, TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEAS;=tBEB/18 - DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 Mr. --I have asked for a paper on the CORONA Program, with respect to early conditions under which it operated versus the current conditions. What is especially im.portant to us is a determination as to what is the secret that is being protected. It appears to me that if3QUILL to3w under-cover it will be one more thing that could ''water down" the security we have built around CORONA. In what specific areas will QUILL be associated with ch . people will be aware of QUILL? Mr. Mazza: The QUILL Project i s using . cover to order boost for their program. Mr. -· With respect to the recoverable package of QUILL the Intelligence Community must protect this, Security should consider a modified security plan so that-could be utilized for the boost for QUILL under a White Contract but that the " skunk works" and the 'launching ·pad facilities could be utilized under a black contract basis to afford better protection to the recoverable package. Mr. Mazza: If the arguement regarding the proper cover for QUILL goes to the DNRO for the final solution the DNRO should be aware of all the riSk factors. Should QUILL be a separate clearance or a part of CORONA. this is a political question. M.!.:.__ _QUILL is not a piSBive Program. It is an offensive system. ~-Mr. -indicates that our concern with QUILL must not result in a compromise in CORONA. Mr. Mazza: Colonel Martin has indicated he would like the technicians affiliated with QUILL to meet with security representatives to discuss the matter in depth. Mr. -· Mr. -should be back from his trip by Monday. I think it necessary that additional discussions be held prior to any position statements made by the Agency to the NRO with respect to "Q". tiBRET SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 4 -''EQ\\S.- NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE l DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 Mr. -From a policy point of view I have been giving some consideration to a plan wherein all satellite programs would be under General Greer. This would mean that CIA would pull all of its security people out of the " skunk works'V'in similar installations if CIA accepts total security responsibility for projects regarding which we lack complete in{~_5n1ation. There is an excellent opportunity that security ~ations might occur because of changes with which we are not in agreement. (t\t this point Mr. -leftthe meeting) Mr. There are definite political ramifications regarding QUlLL. If the USSR would say they have proof that the U. s. is painting the USSR with radar, would we have a definitive position to counteract this charge? The major question for our office is whether the radar cajability of QUILL can be utilized without the USSR knowing~ are doing it. If the-area should be used to "read out" this radar there is no doubt but that the USSR will be aware of the radar capability of this satellite. The question then is whether Security has an obligation to advise the Special Group of the security risks in QUILL because of this political question. Mr. --Who has made the determination that radar pictures are war-like actions? Mr. Mazza: The Pentagon thinks so. They regard radar utilized in this manner as a military weapon and as a war time capability. Mr. -This coun~. may be asked by the USSR why the satellite is · utilizing a~south orbit if it is not intended to paint the USSR with radar. I believe that the Special Group should be advised of the QUILL Project. Mr. Mazza: I do not think that there is the serious political issue involved here as you have indicated. Mr. Could the radar capability of QUILL be "read out" elsewhere than on the East Coast? If this is not the case it would appear that the NKO Staff should be advised of our security concern:'.1'o!;garding the political ramifications inherent on the QUILL radar being read out by Soviet trawlers. Lou, Do you believe it advi~e to tSEeRfF TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM tS£9RET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 advise the NRO of this concern on a verbal basis. Mr. Mazza: No, I think it would be most appropriate if a formal memorandwn was forwarded to NRO. Mr.-It is my opinion that the use of QUILL definitely involves a security problem inasmuch as there may be a serious political issue arising from the results of the program. Mr. Mazza: I would recommend that your position in this matter be discussed with Major Bradburn prior to a formal position statement being forwarded to the NRO. The meeting was terminated with Mr. -requesting Mr. -tofollow developments regarding the discussions of the representatives from Program A with the NRO Staff• .SE6RET SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 5 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE .. DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART L~8Pl1 DI:CLASSIFIII:D ON: 9 .JULY 2012 Z9 .March 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Discuuion Reg&rding Project QUILL 1. A meeting was held in the office of Mr. -Oil28 March regarding the security aapecta of Project QUILL. Thou in atteadance were~. Lt. Col. David Bradburn, :Wr.-. Wr . M.asaa, Mr.-. and:Mr.-. Z. Lt. Col. Bradburn indicated that he would be briefiJ1& the NR.O Staff reg&rding QUILL the following day arid wowd be happy to pre..nt the gist of hia proposed briefing to the group . 3. He then indicated wha.t General Greer conaidered to be the miuion of P-.fO (Project QUILL) . MISSION: a.. Ionoaphere effect on resolution. b . Radar tecbnolpgy in satellite environment. OBJECTIVES: a . 100 feet resolution. b. Read out and recovery c. Minimum modification to existing radar. d . As soon as po1sible. APPROACH: a. With TAT (thnat RF.fC radar on corollator . b. With exiating facilities (launch, track, recovery). c. ~five payloada, fly three. SE9RET \ \ -=----- ----- -- - --- .. ·- TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 4 . Bradburn indicated that this would primarily be handled on a secret--special handling basi s with respect to communications . He added that QUILL would not be used to look at Russia at this time . He also indicated that one of the bad features of QUILL was that it would radiate and that Soviet monitoring equipment might be able to determine the nature and extent o~ our use of radar from a satellite. 5 . Bradburn also indicated that the radar equipment should be able to photograph a track of land approximately 10 miles wide and up to 1500 miles in length . He indicated that the satellite would be orbiting at about 125 miles above the earth. He said that receiving stations would be reading out the radar at············· -Vandenburg Air Force Base . He said that QUILL would probably be programmed for a 4-day orbit with the recovery of the data filrn . .l . Bradburn indicated that the management structure for QUILL would be as follows : A . SE/TD, system integration and untenna-LMSC . B. Radar payloads, AGE, field support--Goodyear Aircraft, Phoenix. C . Radar 7 . Bradburn briefed the group from a chart with respect to the type of contract funding, and cover stories which were under consideration. A:n approximation of h i s chart i s as follows: SAI"-S P l -Wlof1tC ·"1~ -.- -----'-- ' j.. MSC. ..,,.,Tf' ll~ r,.4 Ao.~wel Ell • ~14rt,_- Si.W<. II P·~l. H ~P-Ir (N•Ila.~o." r~.. -~rs ....c-...Tio..c 1»1 ?l"trt.T) I . , ~S£8PIT1 SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 6 '· NRO -APPROVED FOR RELEASE _. DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART , .. ' . DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JU 2012 ! F. 8 F. i T D!RECTOR ._.·-. -~ -~ -~---. ·.· _._ -~--:~-~ · ·-----·--... - ROUTINE IN 71774 .. --. ;: ..•.. :· _. ~.-. -;:::-~·----...•. -··· ·-·· .:-=:.. :. :· ~--=-.:. :-~ --·--- R:rF Ao R. c.. ln NEE!ING REF A HTENDED SY C:Ol. 11URPHY MAJOR BRADBUR~P MSSRS PLUNMER, 3 , 1·lAR'K ·,··rl RE GQ \i'ERY SY~"iEMS~ ? Il.~· i CI.J"i'TERS AND CASSETTES VILL BE i ~~ ·, ;;;l!:D BY ..CO~'TRP.CTS mmEft EXl~1'Itm CONTRACTUAL ARR/\NGEMEN! .. :=:; DELIIJ:!:RED 70 i~ /F' FAGIU:TY FOR A5SE!t!Bi.. Y Al'lD CY.ECK•OUT EY CORONA/162 · F'lO ;->i..f.. Tl-!E SYSTEI·1~ liiTn CLIT~' EI: AND GASS:!TTE INSlALLEO, _,7.I..L BE u:~ l.P.'ERE!J TO QUILL ~T SUNNYVAL E AS 1\ C0t1~LETE UNlT IN1 APPROXIIIIAT!LY1 ~~Oi!E11BER 1SIS3o 3.. TO ~CCO:JN'T l~Olf THE i!i;YSTAi~CE OF TH: FILH CARRYI~G CAPABILITY D'J 'tHE 162 BUCKET MR -~U!SC QUILL PROGRA:-1 MGR 1 WILL PREPARE A E~EUi'i WARY Dl:SIGI~ OF THE CUTTER A~D CASSEi.'U FOF: PRESENTATION AT A .... --_ __..,._. .... , . ·.::·:·:;·: ~ ~-~-.-:~;; :;~~:~~~~,~~-:~· ; r i s A s r ... : ~: -... : :7.:.-::: •• ...._ .•• ' -· • • -· -· ----• I •' , .,., ·--· --• : ~... . ;· __ ~ -:.··.. . :,;-.~:-t · : :-~'~ '" .... ,·· .. ::· :~ \: . : ,:-::,-. .. .. ;-: ... TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUI LL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM .NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 _, ._. , Rr ~ __ r r ·;· 1n ': PAGE n~o ll ·.... ~ •Lf ~~.... F0 0G " "\t'o~k'..i ;._:; ·-.. ~ _.L ~JIUiH, NC~ ON FILE .~T AI?, wi LL BE l.•l::Uv~:;;r.:r !0 QUI!..L Ai·.JD SURFACr::D AfTER · A REASONABLE TIM~f APPROXIMATELY ! J I...'L'i l ~E:3 . Di-l l\!;; n;es FOR Ctrrr:!:R WILL .APPEAR ON ITEY. TITLED PAPER. 4. COL r1 tmP!ff ';I IL!~ APPr: IS!!: r.m I!Jj:_LT LEVISml, ITEI<, TH A.T THE f:DDITI!ll>!AL HMmi!ARE I S GO::: ~G TO BE USED !N NO QU ILL BRIEfiNGS AT IT EK ARE ANTICIPATED. 5., n ;r.: COV ER WILL GIVE AlP ?ER SOm1EL LOGICAL REASON FOR. ASSOCIATION ~ In: T.!f2 F: J:COV~RY EiJCKET ~~T SU~H~YVALE I F NEED ARISES. HOWEVER, r o 8Rll: rifJJO l·J:IJS Afn: r~T!CIP..!~ TED p_·f SV AS THE RECOV £RY SYSTEM WILL ii:c:T BE :C:XDiCI SED THEREo THERE :~ !LL B~ NO REQUIREMENT FOR TRAINING CF flU !Li.. 7l!CHN I CI ANS Or~ CC·?.:JNS:l I!A1W~I ARE AT A/P F ACILITY . IT IS E. :~PEcn:D 'n:AT THERE !'fiLL BE NEilD FCR VERY F'E h' ADDIT I ONAl CORONA C-LE AP.MICES DUE TO El'lGIN EER I NG IWfERFA CE. 6.. HM':D WARE FLOisi \:.! ILL BE AS f.'OLLO wS: COMPLETE RECOVERY SYSTEM WITH CA~SETTE f.J ND FILM CurTER ~i'l S! r.!LLED \H LL BE DELIV~RED TO f"ROi~i .~/P. ,~ll'TER PAYLO AD C0~1PATIBILrTY CHECK S IN -AND SYSTDIS TESTS P.ND OTHER SPECIAL TESTS I ~ -· TH£ ENTIRE VEHICLE ~:~c~!_ tl~) :U: G RECOVER~ SYSTE~ WILl . BE SH I·PPED TO MAB, VANDENBERG. ;::~~COV~W: SYSTE~i ~; Ii.l. LEAVE TH!C NAB ONl. Y 1'0 GO THROUGH NORMAL ! ( " ft I!! T SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 6 NRO APPROVED 'FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 .... ., . ~.., . .!. N , ! 'I at = -~;'EIGHT "':ND i1 Al.t1 NCE CHECKS AHD RE CO VER Y SYS!'EM FINAL INSPECT!C!\1 IN "L'' l='L i'{'i'ICI?i',TEll THAT NO QUILL PERSONNEL WILL REQUIF.i!: CORONA 7. THE TIN REA DOU1 of· CASSETTE FUN CTIONS "ILL NC•T COMPROMISE J. THX~ PLAN S~TISFIES THE OBJECTIONS INDICATED REF c. IT I£ i~'E QUESTED Tlt".T COt~TR.l\ CTS PROCEED IMIYiEDIATELY WITH PROCtJRE~!ENTS REF D, END OF MESSAGE i4 E 8 A i T SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 7 .7~~~~~~~:"~///~{/{~/////////#///~//////~ ' DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART tnASSIFIC4TIONI r_._<>-/I' (). J: ~ DECLASSIFIED ON : 9 JULY 2012 ('~, , .• ' / _.,) . ~ _.~ -r~ 0 ~ j ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ . ~ ~ ~ Hoodle v;o lod;N: . ·-.)!9~~. . .QUILL ~ ~ .. . ~ ~~#///////////////////)~~;;////////////////////j TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM -------·· -----···---··- l6P SF.eRFT NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 II••snalur &Ill Tile coaaKA Prtll'• Ill Jll&lll ._ tft..,.......,...ra Ur z. lie bMIII.....,_nrJU•J Mlnlu r..-.u.Gllwa laiiU, .........·---at~~At ..........., .................... .. ..dllll......, ll 'WI ...... Tille _.....alllnl 'p._ (11.14) ..II rW a I .., >• JillRt IIUTII._ ..W,...• la-'IIM ••'? ...,_ Ia ~~~~~......., t•o--IIIISwHds•-•••••tttle_. ............ fteri' ..,. ...........lalld ............ llltft ..,.. olrallW1111 •••1111 ._.If......._..,..._ ,, -nlll ...U. 'fM 'l'BDa-MJ.IIIU ME It' I (IN..eI II b.fi'IU.. ..UIA. Of tlltl •IIPiMatr, Jl'ftll• TBOit. •ft J.F _. drrtn ....._-•'I'IIOit...,.twa,.._,..._.-Ja ,.., 1111. •-If-,.......WET et•••• Ullt lll...llllrr ...,..... (II•·--·u...............................1'1108 fdldia,..,_..,JIU_ .....I.Ir IF IIOWtlaJIIIte_ .. ......811Ma1111a.) Kanllle u8~ta.AM Ccp·. __...]__of___J__-,:l . Page___{__of__S(__p~3~~: UDEn FROMAUTO:UTIC R".::G1\DI~G; :Contnl Sy$tell DIB . 5200.10 DOES NOT APP~:_I T9f.SESRET (''"rt'!'tJ l 'IJ, ,.PJ.tf_ff.!'f-: J,) SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 7 r -· l8P SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 Tatal TIIOit8 IJ•t.......(rW'Ia 1811 IMIJW.)-•IIA. Qa .... TIIOBa ..........., ...........,be,........... .,........a I Jilltrill~ (a»I ... _.,...._,.. TIIOII/.Oa.u). CQitCIU l'a wiD be_.,_,..,.......fllltiiN IIIIIft • ••••••rt....U.llblnl•trl'w ..,.......1_., _. ~ .........._.... Tw COliOitA J ' '-line.._•..,...._ oa .....ell .._., u.antMit rt l'a _.no...., (....._• a f.a&lllnl statm) ....1•1111111, 1111111 ... IliAd Mit Wll -llllltflll. Oil tile ant, a ..,.,.. faUin jie I lTd rata OUIIH ............. u..e~a........................... ....,..., • rtl'w ........._lilt._..,..Miu'ai..,IIMI Ia t11111 ea.t....wlllleiJI.III... Ibi.I6DatMJ~ 'I'M ..-.,J ..,....prtlllw Ia • IfJJJat-._. pnper ...,.Ia U. Handi!v1·a ~[;... ~;, ~ r.nntrl Svs f'?. m I l8FSE6RET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 ciMa • u.. ~~~~~Qat nrtt 'n..tillllllan ......_.... lllllllht' •11..,. 'a. Aller _ _...,. ........, alJiflutwlllllle .......,.... .......... ··-· ..........~ ..... will laellftll*h ... a..-.....JODIII11hlf. lltllll• r"ee, ... ......:.,.....,-... ...bad.,.......... ~ ......... Tile tiUd G.&Jal'l' •'art• -ltMt'led a II Oltlt1r IIA _. Velllole tMd ..tt. AGD'A, wtl' Pit nllt!llll 'VIr) ...,......... • J!Oa&l*ar. Dvmc•allt, •enwoeaaHdJIIU._,t.._ ....., .. pc ..M ....Ult hG I II tl I IIIII 1111111 a a.lliltra-l'lll ....... .................Ute .................,....... 'ftlt 111-.1 Aae.l .... ......, Ill ........ tL41 11.11 ...., ...... ...ft (I&) . llll!lrtlee ILN(tlll.) -.u I Handle ~ia H~WAN "·-""-. Control Sy~~em l8P SECRET SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 7 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEAS&== tO"' ~((';R[T - DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 ~-·n< .....,. ,...........................-till aIf Gf _..........at• ••••..,11111 ,.,....._annee. u-·..• wrtlnlJIIIIIIIII-.,, ..............tlllla.........IMUII .... ••ttenttnnl•ts#n.._l&....,t.eewau•••llftMII'IIlll .._ ,....,.,,, IIIII OCV ...ltf&rlllllll "-tillACDII.A al ...... -111 hi. fllldiiNaflllla.tefiMI'Oila:IIMIIIlJ, tlll.nu.l ...OQifi'IMJ, ...... II..Jilt~• ....,, ........Mllll...lo ell ai!M tlllt OCV ..,_ IMIIIIIA ....._ llDie J'rt wDl'r,_tMa rlvtM, tM wllldll lib&litre e1 '1'1111 ...Ullin •'r111nII •flitlet llr .._..a&I DU hr.. ................wDMl...ocv...,......... nil.........,.......,.,.......,.,........n18&1 pi 0CV I LII•'r' • "1Jit11 IM"' -· Jl ., IIUIIIJ IIJII• .. tf '):i ....~ ~; ',. ~ ~::~:.; !. '• ~-t. ,~ ' "'; '\ : lBP SESRET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ------------------·-····--···· ·- . NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE TOP rrRREl DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 ..,..... Mllwlll-lllllllt ...... IIJ1rl8 ElSE llal'llll"lt. ••It112110'* ...,. LOJ.AD LAJn'AIIJ) .,.. telt!rta• ....., • a..._...e.UMBI'l'. wD 1111 ...., .........._ ..Nit..........,........... CQIQWj ... Ill& • ..... • UMal'l'. a ....,...Un* lilt LAIIT.AJtD 18 Mt ,...._.... IMa JWJ••• 'l'lllt LAIIDaD a..lll....Mou I 1'1111',.. •••IW _. U.T.AT/AOD.A uai:•W Ill ..... -. J'lw ,_,l•dl ............................... .... ne.AJtGOK a-la Ia o.lrl'la~ lflrriEII • Awllll..,. • .........1a11 I, '" ruua... JWr tMSIKII.AilOCif ........ ........ ·--laCYIMf.tf.......... n.& .....aa POPPI' Jllrl•'ll h HIW liltDIU bD' 1•1 I .............diiQr. ftiJ Mw..Ill IIIII PI lit .............liM• .,.. '"• \ r.nlltrO! Sv~tt\'71 I l8P SESRET SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 7 .........---·--------·-· ·· ··---------· · .. · -.. ( NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 ,...._,.....,••••• coiiDI ......, • .,. •• ••~ .............uz~IIM. ,.......,.., ......................"........--......... .. II..Jiaild .......JIM..tiUtllll ...... TIIMII 'll'filf"**, ~Wllkllllltutlllla nnlrtz'•IM PIII•Jt- ••111117 .................,. 'I'M lMt a-4ft £rca DCI, SD 4.>88-64 !be -bMdiaiP aro UMd u in the nt.nac.d ..-..aac~wD. Ptlnp"apb 1. l1o c~t. '!be budpt f« ~ccr-A tor: 1965 •• 4eV.loped aaai81C a cSetaiW laUDCh 8dwhal.e ad 1ta~t of JtiD ~jecti~ 11lbidl wa ~tt:ed by-(&}~ to Dtrec:t«, Prop"• A, ... hu pd"-'"t. Ria bud&et .. aua.itted by ta.. cteMUDe -· . ,... napaaaive co tbe pictvc:e p ""-, .-d w• 8Uppclll:t:8d .., w.y detailed Melt-up 1DfoaatiClG. Couecau-tly, it baa beea ·· poeal.ble to review the budpt upeditioualy ad arrive ;nis•ll at _,. c1ecu1ca~. ·· ra ~-to su1AIIace s1Y8Q, t:be Dinctc~:. Prosr.-.:&.:.. u.ittled..a~~lltei:'Miite ~ta. Ilia to-at altlei:MP f~.,.,.. • • 'DUa ... rOilb:ed by -(&) 1*10 MUGD tQ of 12111 nducdAms were -.de bJ explicit aJ.Swf • activittaa IJC'OPOMd by tbe D~.rr..-•• ode • ........tially ubitn:ry. .. will _be DOC:acJ letar. Ia tbe ca.u of t:bMe ubit~:Uy reciQQtitma, 1t yet ~iDa fer -. -(&} 1-.o ..S the Dfzector, ProF• A, co develop tba dat.aU.a of tba ~tolN acca.pli8bed uacS.r tbe ~ce... IJ4ga. !be c.atatiw budpt of Prosr• A aa ..S tbe DCl OD JUlJ 16th &ppe£1 U a tom.l fiSIIl'e, buGd «:a tbe ...~lt:.U:m NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE HJ., DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART .wd VIa 8riMt'f Ccp~ . __ _.2_of___;~--C<> ·· DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 ' · · ·-;.; <'•~fPIT! Fat;tt---L-ot_i_?::_r... ·. ~CL:JDED FRO!l AUTOMATIC rc:; .;,u. . i j; DOD DIR. 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY I C·~•T· r;J:-h._l2_(. tf, _2..)!.)-8',/'f TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM GAMBIT DO.RL\N CORONA AftGOif QUILL LANYARD FULCRUM OXC.ART IDULIIT .AIJNDLB -r~O&J' 1d late in rr 64, will bo applied to dre dew~t of G3. lA Ma01 A ia rr 1965 i a .re tblo dae Pruldat iacr... already be.a .-tiaaed; tlw other will covu ·'black" etudi.M to be doae 1n C"'WMCtiOO wid\ the ..,... onit:al laboat:Gcy 8ftd wi.lt be offHt 1D the total Air FOZ'Ce f1Jwlei.a1 p:S.. by a traufe.r of frc. Air For:oe aOIIIrC*J• oa. ...i.alion of the Direct«. Prop-• 1. we 4eveloped qa1Ut Gilly &...Ul au1AI•11•• ere. -ESt ~.ral.atiaa 110atly to fonat ..S t1aiJlt. tba Diroctor, ftogn. I, aat.tbllabed ct. detailed prop• and ••tee aQ&iMt wbiclh bia bucl&tt-. f~. Ilia Jaie:tal l:'M: u'lltioU r..eched • "" a .runa. thne weelal later tbaa the deedltna aat in t:M «iaiMl lnacructt-.. tiDce tbe «1&1M1 IUI:aiati• of the Director, ft'~ 1, ~be&"• bile t>e.a • ~eubal..s.a noeiwd about .hal, 9dl ..S two brieffaal, not f\~ 111 aon.stn•t wi tb each ether. Dudaa t:be period aiace reco.•pt of ttw hoar• I rec--1xat1cma. tba -(St ~Calptrolla:r baa ~1D repl.ar canault:at i.Oa vitb tba Prop• • nau .., aetabli.ta detailAd ~far _. juatUioatioa of the DU.tor'• ncr. MCioU. 'Z'ba •eert.al aMd for cU.acuniClD • 20 July ran.ceed., recr• Me~baNd • tbl Cbala our:z.at 1tate of., UIICiel'ac..dilll of daa ~Toan-• neal.vCicaa. ~have ai.Dcl-.. ~ :UIIft..... to tbe ~tc...., cCM~t¥~: tneuraa aoeouata. a111:...s ~2. Ito c._t •rw;u CDta J. '!be fuDda r~ rW far CtWIIA J moluda all of tboM Cbat an requind for tbe COD4uct of t:M prosna, ...Cber OGDt•Mt;fstc 1• daM diEou&b Cl'A c:c AU l'ana rt !61.a. 1b1a 1a 1M ......tiJJI ~tbat .... foll.--.1 1D 1'18ca1 1964. 2 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE .... \ . ;~ ~· ·.f DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART .3__v l .• _? --· ..:.;• ··. DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 Fu~Q--~-ot-L~--P~ggs. 1ur &toht' CC'~•:rol No.J'r'f_.p__J Ofrt ~ SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 9 ISP SESRET At the pnaeat tiM, t.ct. hiaw bela rel-Nd to CIA to cove cunat ....a. of all ~ecta pnNatly in force; 11110 f\ahl haw 0.. b~1:ed for tubMq~Hnt c011trac:ca thAt will 'required co CCIIIplde the progre ia l'i.Kal 1965. 'l'be DC1 Oi'W nnt8 tbat he has gi,_ ..r tous thcuJtlt to tbe ilstl:oduotion of Aer~C«poratiOI'l toto tbe ~F08J:• 8D1i 'bu Cc.18Cluded tb&t IIUCil • .ma would be "moet t.edeeinbla!.. 1!bu ia aot quite OOM.iacet with hu sta~t to • on 28 )lay 1964 u roc.ar..:61 1.1\., Kwaz:IUdua of Record of tbat date. In ft'1 c.a., the iOcluaiCIIl of ~CO&"po:"&t!QD u aye~ "'&bIll' ...S MUrCe of tec:baioal dinctioG CD tho ex.-. pcosria • to~~t of tba -..ole iaN~~ of c.acnlbed .-....-t of thl.l ~..-..-. l 4o aot intADJ to acc..s. to tt..a Daacc:«'e requeat co cent.i.at.;e ~tlythe prMeat anaqnsat wi thout explicit cli&'ectioD tz:c. ~or the Sec:htuy of Det.,.., to do aao. tXBaM OCV. 'lhe appecifta 1A tbe bud&ot qaU.t: thU 1~ u t;o 6.D:S dle ~a:Dd labr.i.catiGD of f~ C~GDVC"aioa kita to ....pt tt. .JIC .-e:t.1y ~·1.a thia OCIIIflalsrae:lCID dg&-1_.. me ,_riod ~co tabc'i.oato twtt.c -~•i.ao kiu. 1 oaaai.clc dMIC dli.a e&paility, rac:t.r fMPq•ti.,.q &c'flind• baa MNral 'Ml.uea. I'Uat, ae ar:J..;iDllly JCOPQIM, it p!'OV1.4u ._. .tep• of CQII(letitioa to LOcW...S. Sec:oarl, ...S p:roa..bly 1ll tba lGal5 cUll ~iapOctMt. it gi DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 l'abe--...ft.ot-.1-~-P. -:. \U,-. SLCHET l' e,..t,.oll4o• .Jd~-~_l!).g ,1:, Y ooz mm::a nno ~~~. (R(R"''I !!!!::a :!!:!!o mm< oom om 0 Z-<"1'1 .... 0 CGn::a C.;:;;::a c,.m ,.~,. -< £! 1\) (II ~ m 1\) t -· ·". -::-:»==-~-- .. ... = . .... e.. ji fti .. 7-2 ~...J ~ c:c ..., ~ 3~ ;a: :-:. "' n '") 0.' -:-J I (f' · e~ <+ "' ·.. , "1 I e. I l .. ~~~ k.... 0 I I • 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t-i'vJ :1, :P: :0 to 6 t v.., t:' 0 ....._ (r. 't) \.J "' • .. ~ :, 1 '" \ ....... "'<:: ~~llt(tllfil~tt•·lntrtefr;ni•trr ii r1t!a~f~itflif(~!~li!);~,f!!li1!! :1 i!j~!;!Jiri~ii!!~i~~(ifJi!il~~ii· rt~ •ifiJ~Iiirlf!;i!I~!Jitl1li1~:1 1~ .. -Rt .. -ift:: g.=-]~ ~~~ilJil~i:wl. f!~gJJl~ift!ierfl i · i1 i"· i[ft SVa_~fl,.. .1ul8.s • .aa ,... ti t!tt r.. il ::1,~~-.. "'.-.:.. 1"11-"ll!""a ..'llsl... " ~rs ~t~l·~b f l·c~ ~~~!"~ir "~ "I E ~£ f b ~ iEI ~ rJf4ttl~i~i~l~if!~'!(rrl!tl(i!1tl . ftii2Jf:.ih(.. ~i"::r~l prH1rif 1.. ,. Jc·l ~f~~~~~~ i~ ~~~~sri1 !!r1llB ~~ r. .f ~ ~ !.r( " i .-... ~ ~. It B " . p i f f( • en m (") -1 0 z c (") c 3: m z -1 Ii 0 ' 10 1 ~ 1 s: 1 _... _... ..... ..... ·-~ ~---.--------~------~------~------~------,---T---,--.~--,---~---r---r---r--~---r--~--~---T--~--~----r-~~--r---r---~~ CICIZ mm::a nno G'l 1-3 ~~,. Jw•a Jrl~ll'l ~~~~l!;ii•cl•~~Eti•; ~~, ~ ~~, H •1~ '( l.ttE ~~ l~ti fi ir ~-l& Ii --::a :!!:!!o fi: mm< CICim NomCI 1:'.1 ·~~~~ J1lt!irtl ~r,f!ieif!ir;f,~= ,1 z-<.,.. ~ .... 0 Ul~;:a \0 c..-;:a 0'1 -~,~. ~ir:. 'rt~5 1 1 1 1 II i~ritE iJJ&!E':''~''. ~ cJiom r-::ar ~· · ... f r i 1 t i~ J . • "'" o(-1~ 1-3 N ~ :X: 1:'.1 1111 ;!i!rigrl ~r[(r,! li·!~iJ!ir'l. ~ I 1-' H ~ m i ~~ ~~~~~~~~R l~'f11 "·~f~~~~~~:lli t"' t"' N ~~~~~ ~ '•la!!J; ~~~~~tf!: !ici~tr:K.~ I '8 1:'.1 ~ I'd 1:'.1 ~ H t~l I 1111lli~ l'Ji!'i~;'f•fi!J!il!l ! ~ ~ 0 >U !af . (.t-f,. i! 1ft l-1 ~iliirlr.i."ls-~ '") !); 1 o•. c+ (ll '1 I 0 I .~~-r i'~11 hi if'l(;i1 1filr f!' r~~i I ~ ..... I ~ I"' ~J" H 0 I I f~ui !·!~s'~: f.,J.Lt... ~:~~r11!wles a • 0 f' f; r:; .. ~ ~ tl)tt h . l,',}v, ~ ' 1~1 !\..> 1, ~ ' (/) ......., l .g r1~~~ tt~r:(i~ ·1 1JI2 iilf.JJ8 clj· . 1:'.1 v :; ~ t"' t"' """ . "' f ~ . H ' II ~ 1-3 "<;: " 1:'.1 .·? !f () ~ i H SECTION Ill • DOCUMENT 9 l8P SESRET GAMBIT CORONA DORIAN ARGON QUILL LANYARD FUlCRUM OXCART IDEALIST AKINDLE .._ tM:Y en avail.tlbl4. 1be Direct« apia uu ~"full jwtUioad.cla'1 1 em pleu.,. to giw him 1Dfo:Lwatiaa, buc • 1 dU..ak ... aould be tt. Jucl&e .. to atbllr' tt. WGCMtiGD CCIDIItitutee ju.Uficat ioG a.r not. AJ'SSI'L. 1be Df.rec~ quot~U a opi.Ai.cm Cba-. the Baa~ J:od&k t.aciUt:J £• W..J..op..t of fila u DOt beiDa uwd pcoductiwly widl the n.ult that • "vcy cou1clc&bl.a -...t of laa...•a i:Dalwledp iD tbe field of fila ~i.Ag 1a beila& Mc:dfi oed.,.. "' ., jWI nt, ~1a DO a~tof IU.._'a ~offila FOC68SUaa tbat 1a 1D..,.,., be.111& 1.pond or iced. ODe c-. rai• tbe queac:iClD wbether pereoaDel, eqW.s-at ...S f.acilittea. eidw: at But:IMA ~or at ct. An8IL at \lea~ Ul ce be.~lll effici.etly uNCI. Mau&l ua1•ttclue of dLla quut:icm bave beea .aa 10 far tbair nwlta b&w a~ed iDoaacl1111i...,.. l baw ac.e 1aopN t:bat a eun•t i.Dveatiptiao of tba •t"te will ~to eceol•ioae· tbe budpt f:!.pn'e ~t ia ..r.uu.-..s for .AiU& sa ac buda-t f« trosr• A, .-ttae bud..t fi~Un ill ~a, • tablhbed for lu-ladak'a fila JiC\JUaaiJia ectivitte., nfl.Mt c:aacW.i au a1nedy ..._ trc. t:be -.l.JSU aow Pilla cm. I will be altld to .,CIII tC tile l'e8Ulta of tlaue -lpM botb to ,ou ad die DCl-.. t.t.q co awilAble. the ••••tul pnb~ 11 • alllple oae. A bJ.&bly tni.Md war iaat:iaa •tata at ...._ .._..k, balutifull~iPfed fort Chi W/1:1 ftaut p:ooeuiJII of fUa IMt.. bow to do. 'lbia faciliey 11 ale.Mtal.J tailed to the ....t .... ~Llyidle .... •• tat." b'1a ~nocawtiaa•.,;e .U.S.. o.M 1a far pcOCM•ial· De d 1.,.. of ct. iate11~ a• •1ty foe W1rf npid pntMiias of ta. ta1at oaoe it il .,.Ualtl.e, ed ~vide di• 'Mt:iGD of hiP p.liq dDpl.ice~ oopUI, .aka it V'1C7 dW1.oult tQ •U~taia • ~flaw of 1IIICIC'k 0&" •fatal» tile appeRaDOe of eff1d.et ue of tbitl pciM ....t. A .. r Mt. • '•tar oapabilicy •r .S by llil!.tal7 peraGaDel ex.Uta at WeatoNI:' M'l.. W1ctaout cla'lllt,.; far thla faoiU~ ei1:b~K die lld.ll • tbl oaptlbillty Cba~ w r.:nc.w exiata at r.u-JCodak. 1 ..••• ta.t it 1a a911ilable IDd i.a UNCI to ... clear.. lor IIC"'CJU•illl of iDteJlt..,. tale. lt i.e not: UMd to capiC1ty NRo bPRovED FoR RELEAsE Handla via iiYUIM DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 ""'~"frnl Sv~P.m · · ,,.. n"~ · crr :v i ~..vi TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDI UM l8P SESRET OXCART mULJIT aad ita a.~Uity could bo cb:'&\lil\ upon to :illpl:'ow tae li.\ffic.i-.3 willin$ to •truat to AliSI'L ~, of tbc hf.8he•t quality pl'OCOIIiag toM, 1-DOt ,.at pcoplftCJ to •l~ • fiDI reconaeDIIAtioo as to how 1:h1a dil 811Guld be resolved. I cSo not Chink tbat ita ruolut1cm vUl miliJeDC:O tho budpt of the AISIPL l»ooaUM &:bee -. no aal.ariea '*' owrtillo f:tauNa iD tM.a budpt. 'Jhe ruol.utiGD IMY influence the bPdpt for tbe Eaacaa JC.odak proausf.na activity •ich ia canied \lll4er Progr• 1. 'l'bia prusr-:la nauwly cr:ttic:1.~ 'Dl'. m fh 'flrf OCIC&&ioa t:My can find to -tloll i t, I t'biak that 1011e of the c:riticda 11 d.....-vect. but I take i t fully upca ~•lf l>ecauM l '-U.ew ~s;neceat VMimeH of, tbe progr• 1a t:Mt i t it not cobeaiw a'* firlal.y d ~ect:IM tcNRd c~lY atated obj ecti'IJU _, pcicrritiee. !ba bullpt ftaun of -propoaed fw f:Uoal 1961 u 3~ 1.ove1-tt.a that apeot 111 r1eca1 1964 ad 1oaa tha •• balf of cbat pi:OpOMd :lla c:be l'ruidat'• ludpt a no• 1 wW bJ the JU.rect«• rr~-A. thia l"eductiOD 1.a D ubiCAry C1118 eDCI .t.p1iee oaly Chat 1 f..l that the FOP'-..-. DetCGr dU.Odoa 4IDd m:iat:st1CJD. 1 -not F•plnd at tbe -.t to n~»«t in 4etail OD ukt pcolftlll will be aooa.pliabed foe the -·1 have !Ia 111M, •• ac.c.d e~K11c, Cbllt pedlapa eta. .oat illpoctat ctw:.a w ca c1o f= me -=• ~uca ~ctiola ,of our ccaCIIl ayec. it to pt:Ovi4e tlw p:Mt Gll'bital -.aver ca,U1Uty tbat vould raault ~putCiDS t:be OOiaM OMa"a iaco tbe OCV. fuhbiM of ld.ta .. propoed ..:11er would ptmllt thie kiDd of. rMGticiD eplnet lw:lac attack ia • U.80Ubl4 tiM• tc:.st:hiDS lhort of iu~CUIMP.JII, after a atceck •• axpert.cecl. We ooulcl delete tbe • 1c:. labeled COimll OCV' ad iacr.... thl-llCOF• to -U tbi.• S.. "-at 1a required to ..t ~1ffiC --~ CCidiA CWJ%18 lato tbe OCV. 3 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECTION Ill • DOCUMENT 9 TOP SEBRET MJ:SCBLUJIII)US. ApiD the tU.rectol: ••u tor ''full juatific:ation". !base are it.u IUch fiJ:1t cl..t.tutiCIIl traupol'tation, n4 a Firat parqrapll. Vbile tbe Progr• I rr 1965 'budget au~J.GD totaled , there vera a ..._l' of atri.. which could not be 8Ubttant!.ate4 by epeci.fic PI'OJ••da• aad wee daletad for the Praeict.:lt• • budget. Par: ~la, --. ncCBMDIW by Director B fa ua UDkllc:Ml covert Mtellite and f~ a ~-~ airea:."&ft. lD the April 1964 inlltructicu foe tbe ft 196.S r.c• •ded pz'OII'Ul, Director I was p .vera the oppol'tua1ty to rec• rod 1A u ~budset Utf r8(flir-.t lltl!cb he couiclel'ed to be aecea~Uy 80oft dle betic budsat. nated to be • Bia JUDe 1964 eulaieaion ftflected a -bute ad add.,._ nquat, cOIIplnCI with a S.ptiiiiNir 1963 eua.i88iaa of tba .,_ acco.mtt, a nductiaa of -· !he •• later rr 196' n.-u f« , etc. !be Wlat1fied witll DUeotar' I ia CGIIP'tible with tbe prop.-•, witb cbe d.Ufenace beiag solely related to UDUM% _._. Dinctor D. OXCAJrr. lecluc:.t!ca. to date in ttlia progr• have be.a ac:Mpted by Dtne~ 1. '!be only r' fnt"l area foe reeolutic. ia A1rbona Bl.ect:raDic lqui.-t, ~cb 1a expected to t.oaneM Move the t:eahtlvo ~-· WUh Nepee~ ~o a pouible ,.._ eDd defici~, expu':leDce 1D lr 1964 WIOUld iBdioaea that dli.a 18 UD11kal1. !bla Wttal DJ.nctor I rr 1964 nccar .S.Uoa tor OlCAa' -.-. 'ftlia ,.. ~1D datailecl nview co-· widl t:t.e Ul'lder•ta&I!Qa tbat ovtAia ...,_a 'WUld be on • expncliture bu1•. Oa 22 WOVllllber 1963, w received a........._ t:Mt f.Ddicated a aiga1fs.:.tt u:pected deficJAD:y. Ill OCIDtl'allt, tbe final ft 1964 data iaclioate cbat DOt c.J.y tiM tbe tuAd~te, but tbat over of abUiJiltiGM above the itun• could be eWKecl 011 Cbl MZVioe CGDCZ.OU alalia, alloviQa ttu.. ecoos.t to •tac n 196S OD • obU,.ti.~ NRO A,PROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART HandJa via Brt~t•.., Copy ___}_ot__,::.___copte:; DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 Centnd System Pabe---~-Ot-~~-_page~. r.~~+:.,.,1 N~.llf-f:..).3pt /E r f8P SECf~ET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM tOP SECRET buia. Accc:ld111&17, 'tb8n would .._ to be ao aeed to ~~..,..........,. 6Dia to nat:GN die OI.Cdl f\Dtiatg ~U,reel W by cbe Dino~, IT.-I . JDUI Jft. tbiC'e f.a DO ~U.ill • a1ad tbllt ...,., ..... -0.2 ~tcaD be •t fc ct. MXt .....1 ,...• ., CGDWHiclll of axiatiaC u-2 a.t'plaDM co. OGIIfi&W&t:t... 4Mind by tbe CIA. 8uob a ooewrced aiqlaDe daM DO& twve all t:be t.tul'U tbat c-. wauU pt iD a ndeaiSDed u-zr.. 'lbl oaet of pills to a u-21. ...s.r c:twa ....-t11 fanout Died would be OGIIIh....,ly ..-c. t1.-dl&t tavolwd ia ~ siatiDS ...u. U.. i.e., qu~Ntia dlllt tM -t eo«an1a.l -:1 to~die aift:l'aft 11 to ..SU, u.tivi.dual ainaft U tbeJ p t:lll'oulb eM JIAII ~l.e. I ... DO ..... to cit.....,, f.Wdalc w CO''nMb a dec1aiad' • I bel:Lew we ..._ld 8aply atate tbat ainnft will be _. 4WiilMIA u j1Mt.Ut.ed ~ta11 1. 'lba rr 1965 '-•t cw·l'l'osna 1 iacludM ........ ..., f« .odi.Uaattc. of --&Ucrnft .._ ct. ,._• ar•£1 u an alned)r beiDa _.. to baw t:bue akonft ...Sifiacl. CXDII ..-a. AU ot die QU'Aif eo-eau...t "eupac •lie~' pccca:• 1a 1M'Il...., la tM fwllla al.nMJ •daa&'i.Md CO tbe Aer U7 uadec Cba O..IIM ,_... liMe 1be C niDhl8 ~ tiGD liM aot-. tully noei¥ed _. Cbe ....c •t -..caa.iud. -· •~c- ~.11118 1a a DCI -...rae nt. o. e.atauve ~---all••• ••~•t ou.cac 1'• I'M Mletia of -·811111 w a.-ef.Doe ~··• co·---c. ADVMCID ltft»W l!li»DI. Ill tba budpt 41101•ttc. of ~hl.7, .-• ..._&a. .-tll4 tbat au Gf hi8 n4f~U..ta f• .....,_... 178~ lt:udiM bM M.a ....-.u.~ co ua. .S. di8D .. foe atudt.& Gf-, -liM tbat Ida ~ta II&CII:IM, _. Jldeed, hie .._. ~caBP 'ba)GIWI "atuti•'' 8d iaco dea1p ad ..,.1 I 5 wt. lillco l clo .ot .., iD...... eD -~CO CIA ~111M die --.ta NRO ~ROVEDFOR RELEASE oEcLBsiFIED aY: ctiART Har.dla via dn .. DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 t-.' ~t;r.! SV~:o -~ fOP GECRET ·--··---~---.---. ~ ccz ~~~ ff ! ! ;g ".. OIJIC ~i ~ ~ ~ I r. ~~~ ~~H -< £: r ·" C"S ~ ' c:::» 5 , -~e ~ e. .. fr ? .!q ~ en~~ !f =-~ ~ .. ~ ~) • ""'"" =~ I 0. '<' . + Q '--:::' --1 I 0 I I ~ 1........_ 1 2S 1-.. :\.N ~ I I • 0 0 L >11 ..~ ~I I ~I: fl ~ 1}:;: 'vJ y '-t. ~l \...1~0 ....... . ~ \.1 tL ID ~ • II t"'" ~ "' \ · ;-~ ·--~-.. . ~rl (&~! "lr f r1 ~ r tlf I I rtf ~ ; . J/ .. 0 p..I ~lf ~,ra r-l~ ~. .. "' " I iiJ ~~~~if!i; a.~ lr u ....1 ~i: .r.::n~ tr"_ ~~~~~~~al " ~ =t ~~~ c 'a "' rt .a4 • .• J 0 t.fi ;I~HHI lli H~·Ji (/) m () -1 0 ------z ' c 8 e 0 () m z ltnH-~ · ~~~ ·i= e I 3: c CD ( 1 . 1 ,. [ ~ -1 :f . • .... ~f... . . jir;~j Ia § .s1tr ~ f >ffl". I 1. • " :: !~f ~ · r1i~~~ I t .. f lf..!f... t :11 1· n·iH ! !qrif 1'-ff•= rrt j :: g. .I" ~~~a=:t a ~''i s_ r~t:r .1: I I ~ I if I I! · _ ::· .-:--c... __ _. N w _. N -"" .---~--------------~--~----~--------~--------------------------------------~--~---vc :. ~ ICICZ mm::a t ano 8 ~~,.. •]! 11 lf "I tl "sf=-~c...J• I! t 1 I el ~ iiUt"a H 1 -. -•. '-1~£~~~~~~ ~~1~.-. -.a = EBU»"" m:;;::a &; 1-0m< ~ em N 'a me tzl ::a Z-<"1'1 •... 0 t-' 10 U)r?::a 0'1 c..-;:a .... c:l>m ,.::a,. -< ,~: 1 :X: N~ tzl liLa:. '8 H t"' ~!i!, :11 ~~~ J1!~i~~g~~~~!t,g t1 ~8 t"' tzl ~911 ,;·~ ~if ~ t ' ri•xtPi •Jr·l ~ 1 >< ttl uiE h I!• ltlut;ria.. 1f l" • H ::a ,..iJ e•:j ie~ (f ~~ctif!U· t: ~ f 1B e tzl ,., ~ t-1 ·ri': ~IJ" ,•r lwi ~1"ilw!(lt~!~=~ ~ ! I ~·I till ~~~ .,r rf{' .. , l')ilfi i ~ i lljI!j:ft ~~if h~~~~ ifcl·t2 ~~~i r f~ ~ Ii i r ~ • "!' o... e f • I 1-~ ,_, H t: I 1 ... o "' I I .... ~ It lv E ~ i£ 1f.. ne. ~~!L.~ t~ IJ.-u ~ ~~~ • I 8. n ... o =:::l g. f~... t-g.g. , v Ul ~ : ... ~ l rea11.. ~~~~~ ~ ~~ tzl 111 '\: • f l ·t f , .n.... 4 • .,.. t"' • • "C~ • • ~ Ult~ : = • ' ~ ~ H t"' ~ ~ 8 tzl '<:' i () ~ ~ H SECTION Ill-DOCUMENT 10 tSEBREl NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY~ C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 22 October 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Security Center SUBJECT Status of QUILL Project 1. As the Special Security Center had been requested to furnish an opinion concerning the protection of the QUILL product, Lt. Col. John Pietz of General Greer's Staff was questioned about the QUILL status on ZO October 1964 during his visit to the Headquarters Building. z. According to Colonel Pietz the QUILL Program was generated by a DNRO request of General Greer to orbi t a radar satellite quickly in order to test the validity of certain claims. The plan was not for an operational intelligence system, and the end product was not to associate itself with any intelligence function. The orbiting satellite was to look only at a narrow 10 milet beam over the U. S. Although not clandestine in nature Pietz believed that its operation would not be obvious to those on the ground. 3. 1£ the first flight is not successful then a second QUILL shot will be made, However if the first flight is deemed to accomplish the task set out then a DNRO decision must be made on the future of the program. 4. Pietz also advised that approximately three weeks ago General Stewart of the NRO TWX1d General Greer and suggested that an intelli• gence evaluation team examine the QUILL product. However, General Greer did not look favorably upon the idea a.nd so advised General Stewart that it was too early to bring the intelligence personn_el into the picture, The first group of QUILL end-products will not contain intelligence, and he reasoned that if a decision was later reached to conduct an intelligence mission there would be time enough to form an evaluation team. SEBR[l TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ~ SE8H£T - NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 5. Pietz stated that QUILL is a side looking radar satellite that will take radar pictures of the U. S. The film in the satellite will result in the synthetic putting together of signal intensities. In the meantime these signals will also be relayed to tracking stations at VAFB or New Boston. The film will be recovered similarly to the CORONA System. Hopefully both :films, the one returned to ear th and the one received at the tracking station, will be duplicates. After the film is processedU>robably at EK) it will be sent to the······ -where it will be put through an optical correlator, The product of this operation will then be used to make a radar map, The radar map will then be sent to SAFSP and then to the DNRO where the decision will be made as to the future of the QUILL Program. 6, If the DNR01s decision is to continue the QUILL Program as a post attacl( radar system, he probably will turn over the operation of the program to SAC. The question then arises as to whether the program will be ublack11 or DOD Secret. If intelligence is involved the "black" operation will probably prevail. However, if bomb damage assessment is the primary mission, the R&D may be black, but tillllt since it will be SAC1s decision as to when the operation will be launched, it will then be turned over to the white community. According to Pietz they {Pr ogram A) hatlnot given these possibilities much thought. If it is decided that the QUILL has any potentiality as to either intelligence or post attack surveillance then a new set of circumstances will be present at that time and a decision rendered as to the control of the product. 7. Pietz also stated that-has a contract with the •••••• Program A is the QUILL product L.. i~::..lly recove::.:ed f ron1 the satellit:e recov0:..· y vc:'lic l c ( :)RV) at the e:nd of the ~1 -c-'z..y missio:l. Each Cr...t~ fi~J.. ~s t:z.:ed a s "the i:.:!pa·._ to an optical corrclator loca~cd a1 t~c ~~e ou-.:put of the correl~t·o1:· is ~taother fi l:n to be calleci a :'r::C.::..r map". T~e r~dar map wi ll s~ow i~agery (idec~i~iab le ob~e c~s on t~e ground) . Dt: r ing; -;;~"'' QUILL missio:1 , data f iln;s wi i.1 co generated f ro:n 3 source:s: (l) Ne w :1~11pshirc Tr::..c~ing Station (:rms); (2) V~dcnbcrg rf...'"~~ :;l~in.g St~tion (V':'S); {3) recovered sa-ccl ..... i t.e film. III. P~CC.::::SSLZG . ~ll the cata AFSPPL and f orwarded to the ...... . rod~ct resulting fro~ the correl a t or at ~ will bo exposed b-..l·t: U:ldevclo!)cd f ilm • adn.;: l:~aps.: The u..:dcvelope~.J : :.:.... r:tC.::.l'" maps will be sc:1t t v -~h~ AFSP?L for processing, ci \....pl;,.."·"'·., ing .. U:ld C:istributio:~. iJ..."'l o:weptio:: to tc:.o:: wi ll be P .. ss ,,..._ x1C:/or ;,-s . P::..ss # S d:o:.ta fi lm will be ])ic:;:ed up .:.:.t th0 l\:iS by an ;;?S?PL courier. processed at .fSSP?L, UJ.:.d couriereC. t o the ;..iter correlating tl".is data file to produce the rad::.::.· t./e ·_ 1 3 ;, Jl.• • .• .:. QUILL ----~~ -~ ~-~ '""----.. ·~--......--.... -...... ~.--~ 4 7· BYE-23508-64 ... . 1 . .. . ~ ... .... ._ -·--·-· ·· ~ · ~ ... ~ Attachment • "', • ; 11·:> _ ~----- SECTION Ill -DOCUMENT 13 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART -----DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 nap , t~c -'--... -' which ha~ limi~ed ~n-ho~so film proccss1ng capau111~y, w1 ~i procc~s this r~dar ma p for ic~:cd1a~c cngincaring analysis. Tho purpose of tiis is : o cv:.lu:ttc fo r ec;.uipmmn adjus.:..-:at. , if ncedcc, in t;lC satullite , a-.: the tr::.c~in:; stations or in ti:e O!)ticr..l co:.rclr.tor. If Pa~s #S docs not sat1sfy this rcquireQent, they wi ll repeat this process with Pass #9 , ~~ic~ will be couriered from the VTS. Processin;; !:t t:1e AFS?:)r., \:ill be dc)::c by 'fKa cle::..::cd ir:div idu::ls. The out icn.l corrc1 ::. t :i..or; ::.nd lin'i~e.: processing pcrior~ad at tho ~ill be by QUILL i::doctrinaxcd personnel. T:w ,\;?SPPL vnll :1-ff:i.x the .:!lassifica t: ::..o:1 "Secret" 0:1 thv 1-:~:t~ anC: t: ai~ o...: t!1e z-oll of .film . A control nu!,lbel' , prcfb:ed uy "!5CS", will r.ppear oa tho ;·w::.ci end of i:b) .film, the 'spco:, o.r:C: 1:h..: fil::l cn.n. Alti10ug:1 a c o dl3 P\lnc~1vd at th-.; bcgi:".ninr; a:: ·chc 1'il1,1 r cll '.·: .:11 iden't~.f~' it as r e lated to project QUILL, the :1-ctu::..l word QU2'LL will not appear t l1ereon. T:~:.s will provide fo1· greater f l e;,ibility in the event i t is subsequently decided th:tt tho ::..ssistance o f ',':-::a only cleared e l ements are re(luircd to -~he performance evaluation. IV. COURHRS. ear-f..ero~p;...c'-' CG:r.~o..:ly . C.J·J.;·:..ors i'ro!:~. ~--0 · ~.:m ::c (I'a.s s ;:;8 o::: ;r9) v:ill b~ f u 1•nished by Couric:... ~ :f .co~r. Hic k a:.. .7l. eld to : bu sup)liod ty ~he G59't~ Aeros~ace Test \~:.ng" T:· ~l~ r.-ill be vi:l col?.ti~e:·cial airlincG /. Comm~d Post will be e:st.~;Jlished at. ~!:e Sa l: cllitc Test Cente r, Suanyv~lc, fol"' pur,oso o.: :;~nito::::i. D~ :.ll cou1·icr activit:ies f~om !1i cka.TI1 ~o 1.:offen :.."ld t:1c '!TS to ". he ;,}'S2?L. The couriers will be either B ':{i::.'.:;iS or ?K:I clea~· ed individuals. Civilian c ..--.~riers will b~ Q~~~~ ia~octrin3~c,. At tie V::1ndenberg ar;d Kow Humps:.ire tn:.ck ir:J s tat::.o n.s , the r e cc.rders will bo located within ~i1 c ~OCilra •••• area :md will b e moni1:orcd by QUILL cleareC: person:-~ol w!1o h::wc l'let c:O.e arance iis·--~aiiicor.1ple ted T::c ;~:~ t·andirldlsll~-hl· ough a BI. Ii i..:. the······· ~ will be no.."ldlcd exclusivel-y and in a.~ n.pproved Q~! LL sec~r~ ~rca by Q~~LL cleared p~r3v~~cl . :~ ll classi.fied QU!LL administrz.-:::.vc ma t ters cond;.;.~~cC.: r, .... -_:1 ;;.-:.e lly tl:c .r'.FSPPL , SAFSP, ::r:d Goodyear registered mall . c 3 QU ILL 2 ....... .. :' :. ~ BYE~2350S-6 4 "' " '-.'', ,, Attachment ·-- TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 At the time o~ thi s meetin~, there had been no prov~sions made for dis<:ributic:. of tl1e filrr. 1·::-dar mans other t:.-.:·.:-;;. -::he copies f or the c..nd ;_ copy for the -f£7;mo . It was di s cussed and a greed to, that any further dis·~ribution of the f i lm radar r.1ap by the AFSPPL would have to be approved ~•d coordinated with the~ XRO. ::,;:_· y' 6 :-:.~-. 3 _, --) 3 -. -. BYE-23508-64 ... .· -"' ~-.... ... .~ .. ~'; ••• ~ _ , t •"\ ': ··-. ----· ,_· .·.~ ....·.:_ •.:y~ .·• •• .., ,J ;. ,_y Atta chment SECTION IV -QUILL FLIGHT VEHICLE DOCUMENTS SUMMARY By every measure , Quill was a highly successful satellite experiment. Five volumes of evaluation and assessment reports were issued concerning the program . Together the volumes descri be the extensive testing that occurred in advance of the Quill program to assure program success . The volumes also describe the operation of the experimental satellite once it was launched , and the care taken to assure program success . Finally the assessment volumes suggest a future for radar imagery from space including recommendations for additional steps following the Quill experiment. Document 14-Quill Vehicle System Report , Volume I, 31 March 1965 : Approximately three months after the highly successful single flight of the Quill experimental radar imagery satellite , Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) delivered a three volume assessment of the experiment. Volume I is the overall summary of the program . LMSC first identifies the organization instituted to develop the Quill program. The program was established at the request of NRO 's Program Athe Air Force element at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). LMSC served as the primary contractor providing systems engineering and technical direction . Goodyear Aerospace Corporation was an associate contractor responsible for the development of the radar subsystem . Another associate contractor provided guidance on processing and interpretation of the radar imagery. LMCS 's volume I also includes a description of the mission , which was to obtain high resolution terrain mapping imagery using a side-looking radar sensor. The system was to operate in both near-real-time and provide film return images for a comparative basis . This volume also includes a brief evaluation of the imagery obtained from the system and summary of the system performance . Document 15 -Quill Vehicle System Report , Volume II , 31 March 1965: Approximately three months after the highly successful single flight of the Quill experimental radar imagery satellite , LMSC delivered a three volume assessment of the experiment. Volume II is the engineering assessment of the program . The volume provides engineering details and performance summaries of all major Quill subsystems including electrical power, altitude control , command and control , and structural elements . The report also provides engineering analysis of the radar payload and radar antenna , two critical components for the system . The volume discusses basic Doppler theory in relation to space-based radar imagery, the thermodynamics associated with the space vehicle , and the testing approach for the program . Finally, the report discusses the handling and processing of the radar data obtained from the experiment for processing into radar imagery. This volume contains a number of engineering drawings of various subsystems and components as we ll as photographs of some of those items. The volume also has a rich store of data tables and information related to the program. Document 16 -Quill Vehicle System Report , Volume Ill , 31 March 1965 : Approximately three months after the highly successful single flight of the Quill experimental radar imagery satellite , LMSC delivered a three volume assessment of the experiment. Volume Ill is the flight perfo rmance assessment of the program. The report was developed to describe orbital performance data for the Quill spacecraft. The volume also includes assessments of the subsystems , thermodynamic conditions , vacuum gage responses , and the Satellite Control Facility. LMSC notes that the satellite radar payload operated for a total of 32.91 minutes during 14 orbits . Like the other two volumes from LMSC evaluating the Quill experiment, volume Ill contains engineering drawings and a significant amount of test data for evaluating the system 's performance . Doc ument 17 -Qu ill Program Report, Volume I, 1 April 1965: The Goodyear Aerospace Corporation was respons ible for developing the radar payload for the Quill expe rimental radar imagery satellite. On 1 April 1965, a little mo re than three months after the highly successful single test flight of Quill , Goodyear released a two volume program assessment. The first volume describes the desi gn process and development of the radar payload, and testing of the payload , while the second volume describes the actual flight testing of the radar payload . Volume l's introduction includes a general overview of the program along with the program 's design philosophy, basic vehicle configuration , system parameters , and an operational summary. The introduction also includes a chronology related to the radar payload development. This volume includes the important description of Doppler theory in relation to the radar imaging mission of Quill. Goodyear included a lengthy systems analysis including integration of the antenna design , power requirements, mapping coverage , and resolution capabilities . Space is a harsh environment and the section on environmental system analysis recognizes this by summarizing efforts to analyze thermal factors, component stress limits, vibration effects , and shock effects on the Quill system . The report also contains very detailed information on the rada r subsystem's design , mechanical elements, and compo nent integra tion . TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Document 18 -Quill Program Report, Volume II , 1 April 1965: The Goodyear Aerospace Corporation was responsible for developing the radar payload for the Quill experimental radar imagery satellite. On 1 April 1965, a little more than three months after the highly successful single test flight of Quill , Goodyear released a two volume program assessment. The fi rst volume describes the design process and development of the radar payload , and testing of the payload, while the second volume describes the actual flight testing of the radar payload . Volume II includes a very important review of the ground infrastructure that was built to receive data downloads from the Quill satellite as well as control the test flight. Like all complicated technical programs, Quill program personnel encountered problems and undertook corrective actions to address those problems. Goodyear's volume II provides insight into this important dynamic. Goodyear 's volume II also includes detailed analysis of the radar subsystem as well as the entire system during the flight of the satellite. Goodyear includes in this volume a summary of program results, recommendations for the future of radar imagery in space, possible future applications of the technology, and a chronology of Goodyear 's involvement in the radar imagery experiment. LIST OF QUILL FLIGHT VEHICLE ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTS Document 14 -Quill Vehicle System Report, Volume One , 31 March 1965 (Excerpts) ......... .... ..... ..... ..... .. ...... .. ... 141 Document 15 -Quill Vehicle System Report, Volume Two , 31 March 1965 (Excerpts) ..... .. ... .. ... .. ... ... ... .... ........... 189 Document 16 -Quill Vehicle System Report, Volume Three, 31 March 1965 (Excerpts) ............................ .......... 241 Document 17-Quill Program Report, Volume One, 1 April 1965 (Excerpts) ...... ... .... .... .... ... ... ................. ... ... ....... 253 Document 18 -Quill Program Report, Volume Two , 1 April 1965 (Excerpts) ..................... .. ......... ..... .......... ...... .. .. 273 SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 14 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 PROGRAM VEHICLE 2355 SYSTEM REPORT (U) VOLUM E I -S UM MARY AC -04 306 VOLUME I 31 Marc h 1965 Co py No . - ----, Q?~~J ~47:JA~ '· . ~ \ .,.., / SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE C OMPA NY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM AC-04:106 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING Volume 1 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART Co~y No. DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 -5hee• , ~lil~!l~~~Uiillll lllllllllllllll lllll l fl~lfilltItll l!lll lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll ll~ 1111 11111 1111~1111111111 1111111111 1111 111 1 Prepared: Chi ••f ()p(•r:lt i; I 1"1 1"1 0 ~ ~ ;~ Q> N (/) 11 ~ C/.) 1"1 -cJ () rr1 0 ~ ~ 11 :::t:: ~ r -< :::c :x> :z 0 c:: :z G'> GOODYEAR AEROSPACe CORP ASSOCIATE CONTRACTOR AfR FORCE SPACE SYSTEMS COMMAND SAFSP, •• LOCKHEED MISSILES~ SPACE CO. SYSTEM ENGINEE~fNG t TECHNICAL DIRECTION LOCKHEED MISSILES 4 SPACE CO. SYSTEM ASSOCIATE (EASTERN) ASSOCIATE CONTRACTOR CONTI?ACTOR Figure 1. 2.1.1 Program Mana gemen t CICZ mm::a nno ~!;:. U~CII"'II U~C."'II --::a ~~0 mm< ~:~em OIIICI z-<"' ..•. 0 on ::a 1-;;;;;:a :Jiom r-::111. <-t~ ~ ell ~ m ~ ~ (/) -o rn ('""') :::t;::. r . :I: :t> :z 0~ r-b -ro z~ GJ O' C/) m C') -t 0 z < ' c 0 C') c s:: m z -t ....,. ..... ,. ....., TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM AC-OLJ06 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART SECRET SPECIAL HANDUNG DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .IULY 201 2 coordinating all activities of t he t~ree As~ociate Contractors to i nsure a technically compatible program t o meet planned objectives. Resnonsibilities assumed by Lockheed to integrate all activities as necessary to achieve all flight objectives i ncluded, but were not l imited to, t he following: o Perform technical direction and engineering managel'lent wi thin the paraMeters as es t ablished by SAFSP. o Determine system requirements and establish system performance through a coo!'dinated study and analysis endeavor. o Recommend to SAFSP, the required research, development and experimentation t o achieve progr;m objP-cti vcs. o Preoare t he r equirements for, and evaluate the Desi gn Cont rol Soecifications, Accentance Tes t Soecifications, Engineeri~g Analysis Reno rts, Test Procedures, nnd Srecific (/) "'0 ~(,I') 1"1-o n iT"1 0~ ~- COMM CHANNELS --WHITE -----BLACK CONTRACT FUNDS $ { CoNTRACT ... ~H::_ WHITE W/ANI-JEX 0 W~ITE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE SAFSP I ,-,--7:/-"'~..0... I?E v£ ' ~IT"Ai;: j4.'AJG', ,...ES.,=-pf:_ ~~!0---',""1.-.t:-I 0~~~ At.L 1IHFO < ~ :;1:1 H ~ ~ "'0 :::x::::~ r-< NICKNAME (W>IITE) "P-·w· "KP-IT" "LO·GASSER" :t> r ~ ::r: :::J::::::2 ..BLACk'II FACTS I?ADAR G-ACA SATELLITE LMSC OJ?B ITAL EX'PE'J?IM ENT J?EA L. DATA LMSC GACA :I: :t> z H ~ 0 r-::z C') Figure 1.2. 3.1 Security Concept SAFSP/ SSD 0 > r-n-· zc GJ~ ~ ~ l':l ~ H ~ l':l n i ~ H fi SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 AC04J06 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON! 9 .JULY 2012 SECRETSPECIAL HANDLING 1.3 Program Objectives Primary Mission Objective The nrim;:~ry obJective of the orbital flight w~s to demonstrat e that a fine-resolution radllr strip map of a nortion of the earth 1 s surface c.s n be generated thrcugh use of a satellite-bome syntheticaperture radar system. Fer the purpose of thi s demonstration a resolution goal of SO feet in azimuth Rnd in slant range was e5tablished. Secondary ~ission Objectives A number of secondary objectives of scientific and/or engineering si~nificance were also established. Among these are the following: o Quantitatively evaluate the performance of the radar system, with emphasis on azimuth-dimension behavi or: o Determine the oerformance limits imposed by: Paylo11d design parameters Paylo~d in-night nerformance Vehicle attitude behavior Atmospheric conditions • WBDL design and performance o Determine the reasons for any observed anomalous performance of the system: o Collect data on target-field reflectivity. o Develop engineering data useful for aerospace radar system designs. o Demonstrate the capability of the ground recording equipment to record useful data received via the \-fdDL. 3-1 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM AC0u306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON; 9 .JULY 2012 SECR ET SPECIAL HANDLING PriMarY Vehicle Objectives The launch nh1cture foruard of the standard Agena vehicle interface housed and supylorted the guidance system coraponents, the radar payload and associated po-.rer equipment and the recovery capsule. The radar payload was developed for satellite application by Goodyear Aerospace Cor!)Oration from the AN/UPQ-102 side looking doppler radar utilized in the RF-4C aircraft. The radar components include: (1) a Transr.d.tter-Hodulator, which is basically a high power R.F. pulse amplifier; (2) an RF-IF unit, which generat:ls a lo1; power RF pulse S-1 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKH E ED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, AC01!306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSI FIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 for the transmitter and recei ve s ar1d Col.~pres:F~s t he reflected radar pulse; (J \ a a eference Computer which generates timi ng and control signals, ~ pulses for transmission, synchronously demodulates the received intermediate frequency to pro.ontal. The beam 1vi.dtl: Has ,Jh6 degrees in the azb mt!1 direction and 2,9 degrees in the vertical direction at t he half power points, The satellite was rotated 180 de~ees aftel' injectirm into orbit ( positioned for recovery pitch down) and was stabilized in a horizontal plane, During the payload opera t i ng passes the horizon sensors were disconnected and the satellite was precisely stabilizad under fine attitude control by t he inertial reference packaee gyros. The system was supplied electrical power by 5-2 SEC RET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE C O M P ANY i' TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM AC04)06 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON• D JULY 2012 three silver-zinc batteries, t he output of which was converted and regulated as required. The electrical capacity of the catteries lirnited the duration of the mission. The vehicle was corn.":~anded through an S-13and beacon and returned data through two VHF telemetry links and the wide band UHF data link. After separation of the recovery capsule the vehicle was re-stabilized in the horizontal plane and the payload was operated through the data link until poi<~er depletion on orbits 72 -73. The orbit decayed and the vehicle re-entered on orbit 333 at 1027Z, 11 January 1965. 5-3 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART SECRET SPECIAL HA1'ftlriNG DECLASSIFIED ON! 0 JULY 2012 1.6 System Performance -The system performance was faultless throughout the orbital mission, until battery depletion on Orbit 72 -with the exception of minor unexplained voltage disturbances on Orbi~ 8 81 d 9. This section presents the significant payload operating info:nnation1 radar imagery samples and discussions of the payload performance, preceded by a brief summary of system parameters and performance. Launch Date: 21 December 1.964 Time: 1908:56Z Locatiom Launch ComplEDC 75-1-11 Vandenberg AFB Vehicle: LV-2A #425 SS-QlA /12355 ~ Predicted Actual Period (MIN) 89.44 89.66 Perigee (N.M.) 130 135.32 Apogee (N.M.) 154 157 Inclination (deg.) 70.0 70.ll Eccentricity o003 .0036 Active Orbits 65 73 Recovery 6.5 33 Payload Operations 13 14 Area recorded as fine r~so1ution radar imagery: apprax:iJn.atel.y 701000 square miles (nautical). 6-l SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM AC04306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON; 9 .JULY 2012 1.6.1 Evaluation of Radar Imagery General Corr.rrtents -An extensive amount of recorded video data NaS generated by the flight of vehicle 2355; t his dat.a has been proce3sed to generate fine-resolution radar imagery. Examples of this iJnagery have been selected f:~ent which culminated in the 2355 flight is being prepared under separate cover by The the results presented in this volume are of a preli.'lli nary nature and therefore sorrewhat incomplete. In exarnini ng the incorporated imagery, the reader !!lUSt keep i n :!lind t he .fact that the photographic prints i n t his repo:-t do not permit the full azi.TJJ uth resolution and dynamic range capabilities of the systP-m to be preserved; these are cons iderably better preserved in the high~uality photographic transparencies which have been generated during the progra.'1l, and ar e at tbeir very best at the output of the optical data processor prior to photographic recording. The processor output may be viewed by the user-of the radar imagery, without recording, in situations where the full resolution and dynamic range must be prese'!'ved. 6-2 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 14 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE AC04306 DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING The firs t eleven examples of radar imagery, Fi gures 1.6.1 through 1.6.11, hav': been selected to show a reasonably wide variety of cultural and terrain features. Their image quality is typical of the entire rr.ission; these sanples have been selected because their content is representative of area.s of potential military interest. Trese first eleven images were al l generated from the physically-recovered video data, Corresponding u. S. Geological S~rvey maps are present ed with the radar imagery in instances ~ere this is useful. Figure 1.6.12 is generated from video data transmitted via the WBDL coinci dent in t i me with the generation of the data film used to generate Figure l.c.llj this comparison permits the effects of the data link on image quality to be observed, Figure l . b.l3 was generated from the same video data whi ch had been stored, upon reception via the WBDL, using the AMIE t ape recorder, am then pla;yed back onto tre same grounibased photographic recorder used in the generation of the Figure 1.6.12 data, The comparison of Fi gure 1.6.12 and 1.6.13 permits an evaluation of the effects of the Al1IE to be made. Figures 1.6.1.4 through 1.6.20 illustrates effects which are primarily of engineering interest in providing data for the 6-3 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ~-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, AG04306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART SfCRE'F-SPECIAL HANDUNG DEC LASSII=IED ON, 0 J U L V eff i cient design of future sy3ta~s. One of these also s hows the effects of severe •mar,her on t he radar pe:rformanc e . A br ief discussion of the effects of certain system behavior on i n:a ge qualit .v is necessary, pr ior t o presen 1.aticn of t he i mnc;e samples . 6-4 SECRET-SPECIAL HANDUNG LOCKHEED MISSILES Be SPACE COMPANY I' I' SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 AC04)06 NRO APPROVED FOR REL~ DECLASSIFIED BY; C/IARl' RET.SPECIAL HANDUNG DECLASSIFIED ON; 9 .IULY P~·load dehavior -The radar payload itself performed within nomin<~l specification liJT.its duri nc t he ger.eration of the in~gery presented in t his section. The payload variables which were t he key factors in detem.ining image quality were : o TimP. coinci dence of the CnT sweep with the returns from the mos t s tronGly i l luminated portion of the te~ain; that is, from the terrain lying between t he upper and lower ) db directions of the illuminating beam. Adjustment of the prf is used to effect this coincidence; o 3cllavior of the clutterlock oscillator in response t o initial atti t ude of the vehicl e at turn-on, and to subsequent angular rotation s and accelerations of t he vehicle; and o Behavior of the AGC circuit i n response to various target distributions. ImaGe quality is of course also dependent upon local terrain reflectivity and atmospheric conditions, but these are not controlled payload variables. 6-5 SECRET-SPECIAL HANDUNC LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE C O M PANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ACO!J306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON1 9 JULY 2012 SE CRETSPECIAL HANDLING Vehicle At titude Behavior -The at t itude orientation of the vehicle at the time of payload turn-on and its s ubs equent behavi or during t.he payload operatinc time affect image q uality , par t of the effect !:Jeinf!' s ome·wllat irr.ir~ct. Roll hehavior manifests itself 1n a diff er ent runnor than do pitch a.!'IJ ya propriate to the r •,sultin:: slan~. r an ge from ve hicle to swath center, i_n OT· ·Ier to b.ave return video coincidence with the range gate o.f tl~ receiver a.:1d recorder. Roll excursi ons 11!1ich are SP1all compared with the elevation bea.~midth are o.f little consequence once the cor~ect ::;rf is established , and larger roll excursions can be tolerated if one is 1-r.i.lli ng t o make a prf-ad j us t ment. The pr i'-settiug problem •rill be c overed i n i'u~ther detail in a l Rter paragrapb . The pitch a nd yaw attitudes of the vehicle at payl oad turn-on determine t he position of t h e: doppl er spectrU!l\ of the video ret urn . It t s necessar y t o control the p ositi on of the 3pectrum center in order to guarante~ prop8r sampling of the 6-6 SECRETSPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & S P ACE COM P A NY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 ACdJ306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING doppler-shifted video while minimizing the generation of ambiguous target responses; this is effected through use of a voltage-conLrollea oscillator driven by the output of the clutterlock inte;yator, At tctrn-o:. , '!"J:c :r·u-.r1·r: : -a1·1 an:J pitch biases in general cause the doppler ~ectrum to be misaligned ;nth r espect to its proper locat~ on, and the voltage-controlled oscillator responds to OO!"rect the error. S:i.;dlarly, this oscHlator also responds to pitch and yaw ve locit i.e a and acceleratj ons subseqlEnt to t urn-<>n. Because the electrical phase center of the antenna is close to tre vehicle 1s mass center, the angular motions of the vehicle do not directly inject phase errors into the video return; therefore no direct degradation of rssolutior. or image signal-to-noise ratio r esults from the veh~. cle rotations. Tre degradati ons appe<:!r as a consequence of the steering of the voltage-controlled oscillatorj thi s is discussed in the next paragraph , The vehicle attitude c ontrol i s analjozed in detail in Pa..-t II, Par. 3.3. 6-7 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ACoU306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON• D JUL V 2012 SECRETSPECIAL HANDLING Clutterlock Behavior -The out put of a voltEge -controllerl oscillator uco) , whos e fre(}uency is deter..ired by t he instantaneou!l output of the clutterl oc k integrator, is injected i nto a Singl e sideba"ld (SSB) mo::!ulator in tht: receive~ along :litr. the video ' we ssa output-::-then being a:'plied to a s ynchrono4S de ma:b.lator . The I'Ul"POile of the cl.1;.t terlock and VCO l s t o keep the doppler spectrum of t.he (corrected) v.:deo centered about a predete1•;nined offset · frequency. :·!hen the i nstant aneo us pitch and yaw orientations of t h e vehicle are such that the doprler frequency is toe large, tre VCO is co!Til11anded to reduce its frequency to compensate t h e data, and vice versa. In doing so, it injects a pha:Je error into the target returns while' correcting the spectrum position . If t he VCO output f reque ncy iS constant or changing linearly over the pa ss l enr;th , no deleterious effect on resol'Jt.ion is observed. The outy1ut of the cl utt.erlock is constrained frorn va!"Jil16 rapidly, t hrou£41. use of an i ntegr:2tor •r.i.t h a t imc cost ant of tte or·ier of a few second s . The time constant cJ the integrator i s determined on the t·asi.s of expe cted veh i cle rotation an d an gular accelerati on rates, t.he 1v Ldtl:s of t he 3-axis l imi t c:,'cles , and tbe radar parameters; the two values avaHable i n 2355 were 2.5 and 5 seconds, the forme r-being used in t.he primary ~:·the upper sideband being empl oyed. 6-8 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE AC043 DECLASSIF IED BY; C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JU LY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ope:r-ating mode, At pa:rload turn-on the initial misalignment of the ~tenna beam with the zero-doprler direction causes the VCO to be driven to,~ard the correct compensating frequency, at a rate detert ~ined by the integrator circuitry as ~rell as the magnitude of the initial error. If the rate of change of frequency is approximately linear at t his time then the following occurs: o The doppler spectrum is gradually translated, at a constant rate, to its proper position, and unambiguous imager y develops; and o The VCO i njects a quadratic phase error into the t arget histories; a processor adjU!Ited for optimum processing on t he basis of the video data being collected at this t i me is then impr operlr adjusted for later t i mes f or which the rate has changed, .pl ai ned above , the behavior of the clutterlock, olhich i n ~ -urn responds Lo veh i cle at titude motions and initi al corrlitions, may necessitate repeated readj ustments of the processor. In situations where the processor was focused only onc e near the start of the pass, overall az:L'1!$h resolution is typically of the order of 15 to 30 feet. The resolution figures quoted here are applic able t o the imagery as recorded, directly at the processor out put, on photographic t ransparency material. The phot ographic prints shewn i n t.his report ar e li.mited by the C'.haracteristi cs of the paper to a resoluti on of tl1e order of 6 lines per m!n; at the scales chosen f or most of the figures, ground-range resoluti .on i s degracied to about 150 feet, and azimut h resoluti.on is degraded to 90 to 100 :fe et.·::· Two independent measures of acl;i eved resolution are availabl~ The first of these i s obtained f rO!:! t he ima1;ery of Pass No. 8 itself--a test array o f rada!" corner reflectors at f ell withi n the mapped swath. The image of this array sho~1ed that azimuth resolution of roughly 10 feet, and groum-range resolution of roughly 75 f eet, were *The two i'ieures are different because Of the difference in the azimuth and ground-range scale factors in the print. 6-12 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE AC04306 DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING achieved. The second determination was made via a neasurement of the two-dimen sional -:-esponse of the system to a strong isolated target which was imaged near the southern end of Pass 30 . The system impulse response determined directly at t he output of the optical processor, had a half-power width of 10 f eet in azimuth and 72 f eet in gro1md range. The test-array measurement will be discussed further in Par. l.t .2 below. 6-13 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES Be SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ACOuJ06 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART SEC RET SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFII!!D ON; 9 JULY 201 2 Positioning of' the Renected ~P.rgy in the itange Gate • In order to preserve ft:ll azimuth r esoluti on arrl avoid the superposition of undesired azirr.uth-ambiguous iw~gery on the desir ed radar image, it was necessary t o employ a radar-repeti tion rate of the order of 8500 pps, to within a tolerarice of perhaps 5 per c ent. A pulse was there:ore transmitted once every 120 microseconds, to 1-· ithin a few microsecon:ls depending upon the precise value of the prf. At the instant of transmission of any pulse, the previous one had travelled only about 20 nautical rr iles fro:n the radar e n route t o t he target field, l.Jhich was t:n;ically at a one-•1ay slant ra..,ge of 170 nautical niles f~om the ve h:.cle. Unri er t he s e corrlitions, about 16 or 17 pulses \Jere rn ak.'. ng the round-trip betwee n radar and target f i eld at any i nst ant of t ime; the precise nUITiber was dependent upon the precise values of prf and slant range. In a properly designed non-ambiguous system, the return r e aching the radar at any instant can only have originated from one particular pulse, net two; t his is guaranteed throu~ a proper r estriction en the elevati on-beamwidth of the radar antenna. Through a slight adjustrrent of the i nter-pulse pericxi (hence the prf) one may arran ge to have the "dead-ti~re" betw een the arrival of return from two consecutive pulses coincide ;nth t h e tirne of transmission of a (later ) pulse. In tre 2355 systemJ t his was done by ch oosi.nr. one of the 16 available prf 6-111 SECRETSPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE ACOu30':> DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON! 9 J U LY 2 0 12 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING steps, which essentially provided a vern ier adjustrrent on the inter-pulse period. It was furtllermore cor,venient to trigger the CR':' sweep in the r e corder from the sane s ource 'lolhict: controlled the transmitter timing. The sequence of events vras as follows: tile rat:: a~ trans rr.itt ed a pul se, the receiver and recorder waited 25 n j croseconds , and the CP.T rras then SHept for 73 nicroseconds; t he s ystem t hen repeated the cycle after an additional wait of 16 to 24 microseconds (deperxiing on the choice of prf). vlhen tbe prf was at its optimum value, sienal return from the slant range corresponding to the lmier half-power point of the elevati on be11n (the nearedge of the swath) started aJTivi.ng as the C~1T-sweep started, and video from the upper hall-power point (the far-edge of the swath ) had completed its arrival 73 microseconds later as the sweep was about to be completed. On certain occasions1 the sweep started a fe1~ microseco rrls before t he return frorr. the near-range arrived; the imagery correspondin,; t ,., these occasions lacks contrast and 3NP. at the near edee, but is better at the far-edge, Conversely, the or:posite occured when the sweep was l ate in starting, On still other occasions , the swe~ ••as be gun as the retc:rn from t he far-edge was arriving, continl.J3d 'While the instantaneous return poHer level passed through its minimum, and was almost 6-15 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8: SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM AC0/.306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON! 9 JULV 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING completed by the time ret·.rrn f ro!:! the near-edge began t o a,.rive; under these con:lition.s , tho CRT 1{35 inoperative f or t he major portion of t he r ···turn, and t1~o s trips , inver ted •·rit:1 respect to each other, were imaged by the syste:r.. E:xam[.·l es of thes e t.,ro clanses of situati CllS are shown later. I n either event, a slight readjust:lent of the i nter puls e t ime (hence pr f) sufficed to re-establish the proper synchronization between t he time of arrival of reflected r adar energy am the ti;ne of initiation of the CRT sweep . Too pulse positioning is described pictorially, with additional di scussion in Part III, Par, 3.4.4. 6-16 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES Br SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV· DOCUMENT 14 AC0)-!306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEAS E DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 SECRETSPECIAL HANDLING AGC Effects -The radar reflectivit)r of patches of terrain, which vary in chSl"acter arxl may CJr may not irx:lude collections of cultural targets, varies over a wide range of vall.E s . The spread from the strongest to the weakest reflectivity depends upon t he size of the patch one wishes to consider; a typical spread might be of the order of 70 db (i.e., seven orders of magnitude) , This 70 db "dynamic range" of the target-field reflectivity distribution exceeds the dynarnic range of currently available co~ponents in the receive~ and r ecorder ~~ain by some 40 to 50 db, A simple fixed-gain rec'9iver having a necessarily-insufficient dynamic range can be adjusted to operate some1vhere between two limitinr. situations , ooo in which 11 strong" targets are handled linearly but "weak" targets and ground-painting are lost, and one in which ground-painting is preserved at the expense of overdriving the circuitr y when strong targets are present, this ove~driVing in turn leading t o such undesirable effects as false-target generaticn and SNR degradation, An ACl: provision permits ore to adjust gain to match local reflectivity conditions, thereby recapturing some of the advantages of a larger-dynanic r cnge fixed-gain system. The perf ormance of the AGe-equipped radar falls short of that of the latter, however , when very strong and very weak targets are in close azi"luth-proximity to each other; the return from the strong targets induces a receiver gain 6-17 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM AC04306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON: 8 .JULY 2012 reduction, and grourrl-painting an:i ~~eak targets at nearby azimuth locations are lost. Examples of this effect will be seen later in radar imagery of shorelines. 'i'he lack of sufficient dynanic range will a1s o be evident in imagery which contains agrici.lltural areas close to a s t rong industrial target comple~. 6-18 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPAC E COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 ACouJ06 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED O N; 9 JULY 2012 sECR ET SPECIAL HANDLING \-leather -Radar imagery was ge nerated under a wide var iet y of atMospheric and ground-surface conditions d ~ing the 2355 f light. Generally speaking, the northesatern part of the u.s. was experiencing rain, snow, s orne freezing rain, ll:!avy over:::asts and some high clouds during the operation. The ground was we t or snow covered in many areas. Frontal act ivity was gene~ally weak where presentj some imaging through turbulent clouds occurred on Pass 25. In the central Atlantic states the ground was generally drier , al thouW~ f og and haze were frequently present. HeaV'J rainfalls were in progress dtring Pass 16 in Nort hern California, arxi had been for several days previously; the ground was flooded in some areas along this pass. In the Southv1estern portion of the country, the air was generally cl ear with the ground in its usual dry state. As a consequence of this synoptic weather s i tuation, a s ampling was obtained of most of the lower-atmosphere phenomena which t end to degrade radar performance. In particular, the pr esenc e of widespread light precipitation goes largely undetected in the imagery, and the heavy precipitat ion along the California coast does not severely obsc~e underlying struct~e. The reduction of terrai n reflectivity resulting from the wet and sn ow-covered surfaces was not sufi'iciem. to cause obscuration of surface details, althoueh the ground-painting signal 6-19 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED M I SSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ACOll306 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY; C/IART SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 to-noise ratio was undoubtedly r aduced as a result of these conditi ons. One notable omission in the samplin~ of weather conditi ons stems from the fact that no strong f r ontal activity or unstable air t~asses were present alone the f light paths; effects which might be associated 1nth ~umiTJe'l" storms liere there fore not observed . A more det a iled analysis of tte weather situation will be ?r esented in t he final evaluati on report to be released oy 6-20 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE C OM PA NY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 181 AC04J06 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE :~~~:::~:~: :!~~~~~~~SECRET SPECIAL HAN0LlNG 1.6.1.1 Typical Ima5ery -The following e.xa'llples of imagery were generated fror.1 physically-recovered video data, and are typical of the recovery results obtained on the first seven operattnc; passes. The processor was optir~:'. zed for each ima.:;e to the extent possible. The remarks made earlier with respect to resolution and dynamic range must be repeated here: the paper prints degrade resolution in both di.Jnensi ons for the scale factors appropriate to this report, and cannot preserve, at any scale factors, the dynamic range available in the optical image at t he processor output prior to recording, or in the photographic transparencies generated by this optical image. The irlagery presented in this section is intended for vierrl.ng with orientation shorm in Fi6'tll'e 1.6.0; it can easily be seen through an examinatior.. of Figure 1.6.6 that this ul 'ient.ation preserves a natural appearance of relief in mountainous regions. Increasing system time correspond-s to motion from right to left along the image*. The times of various events have been established to o-d.thin 0.1 second relative to the system time. *'l'he increase of system time from right to left is a necessary consequence of illuminating a swath to the l eft of the vehicle's ground track, if we also wish to preserve the usual cloclovi.se sequence of the North, ~ast, South and '1-iest cardinal dir ections . A system which looked to the right and preserved the clockwise sequence would generate imagery with increasing time from left to right. 6-21 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE C OMPAN Y L__________________________ _______________ _ ________________________________ TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM AC04J< E-< ~ ] e,i ! ~ tl) ~ ~ i1 2 () '"' ~ +> :E 5 ~ 0 M < M Q) ~ 'a !:: 0 +l 0 Q) .!:1 p .. ~ 'Cil 0• '-0. M Q) ~ ..... rz. 6-22 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 AC04Jo6 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON1 9 .JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING As had been stated and is erident from the imagery, the aspect ratio of ground-range to azimuth scale factors is not 1:1; instead, the azimuth dimension appears to have been 11 stretched11 by roughly 66 per cent. This is a consequence of the preservation of a 1:1 aspect ratio of slant range to azimuth scale factors at the system depression angle. Several of the images are accompanied by U.S. Geological Survey ~taps bearing an arrow designating true North. The swath between the inner edges of the shaded l.illes matches the swath imaged by the radar. Each image is also accompanied by a summary of pertinent events and highli!'ttts of the imagery itself. The combination of the u.s.a.s. map and the radar imagery constitutes the figure as numbered under the radar image. It is to be r ecalled that the motion of the satellite is frr.JTl the rlf.bt to the left of the radar image-as viEII'ted 'ey the reader. 6-23 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8: SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RE~ DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IARCREf SPECIAL DECLASSIFIED ON; 9 .JUL HANDLING Figure 1.6.1 S=ar-t Richmond, Virginia: Pass 14 System Time: 57968.6(0N) -57973.0(H.V. al) sees ZT, 22 December 1964 Local Time and Date: 11:16 A.M . EST, 22 December 196L Local Surface and Weather Conditions: Cr o,md damp to dry. Overcast, tops of clouds at 2500 to w50C ft. No frontal activity. Vehicle Attitude .9ehavior: Pitch: Slowly n~gative-going near center of deadband. Roll: Holding constant at center of deadband. Yaw: Has just conmleted anproach to negative edge of deadband, holding constant at edge. Clutterlock I:1tegrator Behavior _(F-60): On the basis of BMlor, data only, the clutterlock output held roughly constant over this time interval. RF Signal-to-~loise Ratio (Conn:uted from F-5.3): The P.F SNR was ll• to 15 db during generation of the image. PrtF Adjustment Status: The radar prf ~as 84L9 pps durine generation of this . inage (P/L Step 8). On the basis of the image intensity SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 14 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART ACD4306 DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING 1.7 Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions The major conclusions that have been drawn from the flight of Vehicle 2355 are StU!JTlarized as follows: o The orbital flight satisfied the primary program objective by demonstratin~ t hat a satellite-borne s ynthetic-aperture radar system could generate a fine-resolution ima ge of a portion of tl:e earth's surface. All the program secondary objectives were also satisfied. o The radar-imaGe characteri-stics were vory close t c those predicted from the inserti0n of orbital-system parameter values into ii< •... z ..J l "' ... ...... ... ... ...0 w u w.., !!: "' ...I ,... • r-1. r-1 N• ..,_ ... ;:1 )( ::;) ..J "' ... =>.. w ... u ... z u ... ,_ 0 3 ..J w <> ... "' > ii< u 0 u 0 z "' ::; i, _ ,_ tY u ,.... ; r l-3 '-- SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ' . · LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART ~ DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 2.1.1.2 Coo.ti8Uration -Basic Concepts Reco!el7 Capsule. This capeule in ite entirety was anllable u an. It bouaed the storage container for the raw data film and served as the nose cone dur1ns: ucent. Since this recoveey capeule had been used 1n other applications, its characteristica vare knom quantities requ1r1ng only incorporation into the 2~S System. J. prognn peculiar installatiao had been made to acCClliiiiiOdate the f ilm takeup mecbanin. Conical Pyload Rack. This structure V&ll located just att ot the recoverable capsule and included mountiJ:Ii provisions tor the capsule. The structure V&ll a straightforward design cCJDprising seven rings and a magnesium skin rbeted together 1n the !Ol'lll of a tl'uncated cone. The space insi.de this rack wu allocated to Pyload BeD: 17. Radiation protection !or the raw data filJl feeding frolll Box #7 to the reconrabl.e capsule vas provided in the form of a tbemal-tape-ccmsred shield standing ott .trca the inside of the forward pcrtion of the rack. (See Figure 2.1.1.2). Cyl.indr1cal Pyload Rack . The third structure item vas designed to mount to the !arvard face of the Guidance J.ux1ll.ary Rack, to prorlda maunting tor the Conical Payload Rack, and to acc~te Pa.yload BoDs 11 2, 31 4, S, and 6. The structure caraprised three r1Dga1 eight laogercoa1 two torque boxes1 eight doora1 and eight access boles. Tbe noore of tbe two torque boxu, em vtd.ch tbe pq1oed boDe ~ SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 81 SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JUSftRET SPECIAL HANDLING I!IOX NO. 7 MOUNTING STRUCTURE l..S s~ReD·~r£~1A&LSP~~~PM~t~~ TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE ~ DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SE£REl SPECIAL HANDLING mounted, were located langitudi.nall.Jr between two longerona and rYYf!lr a third, wi.th a web running fr0111. this lliddl.e longeron to the lli.ddl.e o.f the noor base. The magneaiua 8ld.n connect.ing the three lonpll"ons oClllpleted eaoh torque box. To offer access to the pqload lllOUDting deVices, !our acceu holes were located in suitable positions in the u.gneai.UIIl akin. The rf11!81n1ng space vas enclosed by four doors on each side o! the rack providing access to all pa,yloada IIOilftted in the rack. (See Figure 2.1.1.3) Ejectable Fairing !or the a.:c Antsma. The or1g1nal desi&D concept called !or the 'l'ype 7 CltC Antenna to be mounted on tbe surface or the alcin covering the Cylindrical Pa,yload Rack. Proteot.i.on for the antenna in this location vonl.d have been provided by a fa1r1ng IIOUilted r1Y8r it, secured to the outside o! the vehiole b:r tension bolts md pinpullf!lr aaa-bliea. At a suitabl.e time this fairing would have been ejected, permitting proper operation o! the antenna. The launch configuration of Vehicle 2355 did not c.,rr:r the ejectable !airing. Reaaona !or this deoision are crtYered in the Delli.gn Dneloplellt aection o! this report. Guidanoe Aux1.11arz Raclc. The Guidance Awd.liar;r Rack structure O C&cC Antenna Fairing Ejection Mechanism. The fairing covering the C&C anteana was to be secured to the outer s\cin of the vebicle I I <. . b;r two tension bolts in pinpuller aasamblies, one located at the art and or the fairing, and one located at the forward end. To provide for longitudinal and transverse shear1 pins mounted to r1 L the rack protruded through holes in the fairing. r I' . 1-U SE£RET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 6 SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C,ART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING PAYLOAD ..0. 7 Figure 2.l.l.S Box t7 Installat1on SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING L.OCKHEEO MISSILES 6 SPACE COMPANY iii SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING Motive farce for ejection of the !airing was provided by two compression spring assemblies between the vehicle skin and the fairing. One spring was located approxi.mately ten inches art o! the leading edge of the !airing, and the other incorporated the att pinpuller bolt. Upon receipt o! the proper signal the pinpullers would have retracted and the fairing would have been jettisoned, exposing the C&:C antenna. Vehicle Fairing Ejection Mechanism. Upon receipt of the caamand to eject this !airing, the pinpuller retracted. 'l'his perm1tted tour canpresaion spring assemblies IIIOUnted between the ejectable and fixed portioruJ of the fairing to thrust the ejactable portiaa art. As soon as the retaining pin cleared their sockets a radial thrust vector waa imparted to the fairing by six ramps (three on each side of the fairing) riding on six needle-bearing rollers attached to the vehicle. The resultant separation was in a +I-Y direction wit.h the fairing remaining essentially parallel to the vehicle {See Figure 2.1.1.6) ,. ' r ' ... l_ 2.1.1.4 Design· Development Follovi.Dg the orig:Lnal concepts discussed above, design prooeeded in a normal 118Dller. Despit(l the fact that sane of these concepts were relatively new, structures and equiJDent inatallation enginearing was normal in relation to state-of-the-art techniques. Problems with 1-13 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES a SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIEDON: 9JULY2012 SECRET SPEClAL HANDLING PIN PULLER ASSY (1 PLACE) PRIOR TO SEPARATION RAMP 3 PLACES EACH SIDE SEPARATION STARTS S!PARATIOH COMPUTE Figure 2.1.1.6 Vehicle Fairing Separation SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING components or changes to orig1.nal design ocCUl'l'ed in the follovinc areas: o Pqload Mowlting Vibl-ation Difticrul.t.t... o Corona in the Transm1.tter/Modul.ator o Wave Quide Beating (Ground ConditioniDg) o Thermod1namic RequiriEflllts Changes o Film Recorder Mounting o Instal.l.ation o! Pressure Tr.uscmcera o CBcC Antenna Cbmge-8jectable Fairing Deletion Pa,yload Mounting Vibration Di!ticultiee. In accordance vitb the initial design approach the cy11ndrical rack was tailored to mount the payload boxes and to provide acceaa to them in such a manner that the atructure would be the listltest possible consistent 'With stress reqaireents. Upon ccmpl.ticn, this deeign vu passed to Manufacturing for fabrication and a copy o! the engineering doculllentation was furnished to Oood,year Aerospace Corporation. Good;year1 however1 in condo.cting oon.!icia'lce teste en pqload caq>onants discovered that the hard mountinp ori~planoed could result in ~gradation o! pqload pertOl'UDCe, partioularl.T in llstlt of the stringent vibration reqmr.mts called out 1n ,· \ IMSC Spec 6U71 Revisicn nD". ~.in order to inonue (" [ i the confidence l&Yel 1n pa1load survinl, dictated tbat ahock mounts be util.iBed to isolate the critical items !rom vibl-atiao. The vibration isolaticn IDOunts ,.... installed on the paJloada bT r- L 1 1-15 r SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING L LOCKHEED MISSILES a SPACE COMPANY 210 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE ~ DECLASSIFIED BY: cnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDUNG 1n the rack. The poeoiaion t&il.or1ng of the arillD&l dlillip~ precluct.d the use o! theee aouDtl Oft a aillple ftbetitut.i.OD buia. Ae a couequ.IDC81 the oylindrioal. rack wnt tbrou.llb a redaa1sn vhich aaw a 0011plete rediatribution of equi~t in the rack, eel auitable IIOdi.tioatiODa -.de to the aeoondaey' structure to pro'Yict. the required structural. Subeequent. t.eeting of the ~gnecl rack 1lith the ~loads rutraineclin tbe MV ahock JIOWlta 1hond that the requirecl cODtidenoe lnel. h&cl ~att.ainecl. Corona in the 'lrulat.tt.er/ModuJ.atar. Cclacurrct. with the rtbrat.i.OD ditftoul.tiu outllned above, c uzuoel.at.ed probl• wu carona effect vu oba.-..d i.naiCS. the unit. Variou. poasib1li.t1.. tor correction ware conaict.red; 111d, Qooc\rear'• proposed aolution of enoap.W..t.i.ng the trcwmtt.er in a preuve ftiHl vu started u an alternatin to potting. Tbia preuun Teasel in turn vu to be IIOUJlted in the o;rlindrical rack. 'lbe nentual. aolut.ion to the ooroaa probl• praTed to lie in the pottini teobniquu tor oa.poDenta in the tranmt.ter rather than in pl"elllllZ'isation o! the oc.plate unu. !hia entailed aal:r r.crral ot the pl"eiiiQl'e vuMl 1n the ti.Dal 1Ut.all.ation since the w.6 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 6 SPACE COMptANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE J.OO!U06 DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING JI.OUnting provisions remained the same. Wave Ouide Heating (Ground Conditicains:). A modification to the orig1.nal. design arose in connection w1. th the wave guide installa tion. A Progr11111 Office directive vas received which required the add::ltion o! a device for heating the wave guide during the pre-launch phase of operation. 'l'bis requirement was fullilled b:y laying heater strips on the wave guide, wrapping these strips to the guide w1. th insulation., and providing power to the heater strips !rom the electrical UJibilical which was di.scomected at launch. 'lbe vave s;uide heating f'acilitated the outgaaaing of' the wave guide during ascent, sinCe the· vave ~ide was warmed at lif'tof!. 'lbel'IIIOd;yn!!ic Requirements Chanps. As the design progreised and the thermoct,ynamic characteristics of the vehicle could be aore accuratel.y' predicted, changes vere initiated to assure the correct thermal. enviroment for all ocmponents. In response to these developing requir8118Ilts Subsyat. "A" revised the mounting of Payload Unit 11. (battery) b:y changing the insulating strips which were located between the mounting pads and the battery i teel.f'. .A.clditionall7, a radiation ahielcl was installed over the battaey'J however, as therm~o . analysis continued, it vas determined that this shield aboulcl be deleted tran Vehicle 2355. ,... i I \... ~-17 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES a SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE AOOk306 DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING Film Recorder Mounting. As outlined above, it was planned that this unit would be bard-mounted at the forward end and secured by a pinpullar to spider-legs at the aft end, the plan being to release th18 pinpullar after orbit injection to pendt the a!t end or the recorder to be unrestricted. Subsequent anaJ.¥sis, bOllaftl'' indicated that the firing or the pinpuller w1tb i te attendmt shock vas more lik~ to result in recorder malfunction than would the sli~t torsion affect resulting traa a:panai.OD of the unequal spider-legs. Aa a consequence, the final duign called for bard-mounting both forward and art ends or the recorder. Installation or Pressure Transducers. At the direction of the ProgrBIIl Office, vaCUUI1 measuring instruments ware inatal1ed in the cy11.ndr1cal and conical racks. A total. or five ware installed, one transducer located on the recorder, one on the tr~tter, one between the tranam:l.ttar and the RF-IF1 in the hi~ power van guide, one on a structural ring at the -Y ax18, and one on the S8118 ring at the +I axis. Installation of the transdaloers was in accordance w1th current st.ate-of-the-art t.cbniques, and vas problfll tree. 0&0 Ant.Dna Cbane=Ejeotable FairiDg Deletion. The ejeotable fairing to cOTer the C&C Antenna vas designed as outlined abOTe. Hovavor, difticultin ware arising in connection with the pattern l.-1.8 SEGREl SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 81 SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CAART lOOJU06 DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING of the Type 7 Ant enna which had been planned for installation on Vehicl e 23$5. These difficulties were such that a substitution of antennas was required. The Type 4 C&C Antenna was selected and was installed. Since the Type 4 Antenna i s flush-mounted with the skin of the vehicle, the requirement for ejection of a fairing was obviated. ; :· l . I 1.. . ,-· i \... . r L ~19 r I SE£REJ SPECIAL HANDLING \.. LOCKHEED MISSILES 6 SPACE COMptANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART 1001006 DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 2.2 Radar Pay1oad Introduction The radar payload furnished by the Goo~ Aeroapace Corporation consisted of five components& Transmi.tter-1-lodulator R.F.-I.F. Unit Reference Computer Control Unit Recorder This section of the report discusses the radar payload to a limited degt"ee., to pamit general understanding of the fundamentale of dopplsr side loolcing radar by the reader. As indicated elsewhere in this report, Goo~ear maintained full responsibility !or the radar when not inatalled in the system. Accordingly, the complete engineering details of the radar are to be found in the Goo~ear report., entitled Progra Report, KP-II Orbital Doppler Radar, Thor/Asena Satellite Program, Control Number AKP·II-596, dated 1 March 1965. The contents of this section are generaJ..:Qr excerpts fran that report, included in the interests of completeness of the S)"Stem report, and the permission for the use of this materials is gratefully aclalowledpd. The reader is referred to the above Gooeyear Aerospace Corporation report for further infomation pertaining to the radar payload utilized in this mission. 2.2.1 Baaic Doppler Theory General Concept The beam-sharpening proceu used in a doppler1 2-1 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV· DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CRART ACOI&306 DECLASSIFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING high resolution, side-looking radar may be described by means of a physical antenna analog. Aa the vehicle travels ita orbital path a series of pulses is transmitted. Successive pulse tranalld.ssions are identi.t'ied with the elements of an array of dipoles. 'lbe spacing betweeo el1111ents is the distance traveled by the vehicle between pulses. Each transdssion is made with a controlled phase. The amplitude and phase o! the renected enera from the terrain at all ranges and anB].os within the physical be• width of the antenna is recorded on the data fibl. The length of the antenna synthetically generated is basically li.Jn1ted to the distance instantaneously illuminated on the gJ"OUnd by the physical antenna. By the technique o! optical proceBsing, the amplitude and phase of the returns from the sucoeasive pulses are vectorially' added to create the narrow synthetic bee. 'l'he results of these data are then recorded on a final film. Tbua, the resolution equivalent to that of an antenna hundreds of teet in leogth ia acbiewd w1th a amal.l phyaioal antenna. 'l'he basic equations of a hit;h-reaolution radar are most easily developed if the analyaia is restricted to the slant-range plane of a isingl.e-point target. Figure 2.2.1.1 ahowa the gecmetry involved. R is the distance to the target troa the antenna at time t. At time t • 01 ~ ia the distance to the target. The angle Qis measured in the slant-range plane to the canter ot 0 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY 21 6 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE A004306 DECLASSIFIED BY: CJIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET -SPECIAL HANDLING " ~-------------------------------------r FIGUaE 2.2.1.1 -GeOI"'..et.ry of a Point Target in the Slant Range Plane 2-) SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE A.004306 DECLASSIFIED BY; CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 SECRET ·SPECiAL HANDLINE the antenna beam at slant range ~. Several combinations of pitch and yaw will yield the same angle Q• From the geor.tetry of 0 Figure 2.2.1.1 the instantaneous range R to the target is R = lnl + (vt)l-lR1vt sin e] l/Z (l) 10 As the beam width of the physical antenna is small, the ran~e durin~ the period when the target is illuminated may be closel.)r approximated by taking the first few terms of the binanial expaneion of Equation {l)l R =R1 (1 -vt sin eo + 1/Z (~tt cosz eo} • (2) R1 1 The range dependence on tiiae is reflected in a phase dependence on ti.Jile of the return signal. The dependence of phase 0 of the return signal on tiJne is "' = Ztrf t -i!!!!. + + (3) 'I' 0 >.. 0 where • the transmitted !'requency ! 0 ).. • the wave length of the carrier ~0 • the phase change caused by refiection. Equations (2) and (3) may be developed into = Z1rf t 4 1f t i -~COBZ. + +1 (4) + o +Tv s n +o R1 >.. o 2ooq SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES a SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE A004306 DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECiP\L [it\i~DLING where The return signal is synchronously dem9<.1ul.ated with respect to SOllie reference frequency to remove the carrior. It is desirable for the reference frequency to be the frequency of the return si;;nal when the target is at the center of the beam. The phase of the return signal when the target is at the center of the been and at range R1 is gl.ven by y = 21Tf L 41TR1 () -~ + .0 (S) The frequency will be (6) From Figure 2.2.1.1, however, (7) Therefore, fr0111 Equation (2) (8) r . i I Then, substituting into Equation (6), ' i '-·· (9) 2-S SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECif\L HANDLING Therefore, fr is the frequency that will be used for synchronous demodulation. The synchronous democl:ulated signal will have the form (10) (ll) where A(t) denotes the amplitude of the return which is a function of the ref'lectivity of the target and its position in the antenna beam. \\'hen tf! 1 =n(l1T) and A(t) = K Equation (12) reduces to the familiar expression Z'IT(yt)z) S(t) = K cos (~ R . • (12) m The si~al. recorded on film at ran~ Rm will be of the form (13) SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART ACOh306 DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAl HANDLING where Tb • the transmissivity of the film K• • some constant times K. From Equation (9) it is seen that all scatterers at an an&le ~0 and with velocity v will have the same frequency. It folloliS that the locus of all possible soatterers whose returns have the same frequency is one nappe of a right circular cone with semiapex co-angle ~0 whose axis contains the velocity vector. The locus o! points on the earth can be visualized if the inter section of the above doppler cone with a plane tangent to the earth at mianapping ranlie is considered. Since the range interval mapped is small, the mathematical model so described 1a a good approximation near tho point of tangency. Ambiguities Two types of ambigpities -range and azimuth are inherent in a coherent high-resolution radar and provisiona must be made to avoid them. The range-ambiguity problem is common to all pul.aed radar and is usually avoided by lowering the prf so that the so-called "second-time-around" targets are not seen by the radar. Ho•1ever, the oonaideration of asi.JIIuth ambigui.ties yields another set of constraints on the choice of pr£. For a processor operating about zero doppler the inforJIAtion apa.ced at t '( fran zero doppler ia ambiguous. This angular spacing is f ' 2-7 SECRET SPECIAl HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8: SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE J.OOIU06 DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING given by (14) where n • a positive integer, 1, 21 J, ••• ~ • carrier wave length F • prf' v • radar velocity. The focused processor used w1th this system operates abont an ot.fset or prf/4 and is unable to distinguish between positiveand negative-going frequencies so that the ambiguity spacing is given by (15) For most high perfomance radars it is desirable to choose a prf such that the first azimuth ambiguity is placed in the vicinity of the first null of the physical antenna uimutb pattern. This choice of prf places an upper bound on the size of the mapped interval. This constraint in turn dictates the antenna height, since from the ran&e-ambiguity standpoint the vertical antenna pattern is employed to avoid range ambiguities. It is readily deduced that ambi~;-uity constraints are a determi.ning factor in choosing antenna dimensions for a satellite radar. These considerations will be discussed further in Para. 2.2.3. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANfiLJNG 2.3 ~ 2.3.J; 'l'eat Ph11a.C!Pl5r 2.3.1.1 'l'be 11lCOJ:t)oration or • radar qatea into • eatelllte ftbf.cle, vbile not iDV'olving urr tundaaentalJT MV tenets or a good teat pbilo.opby, did neoeaaitate a caretu.llT planned teat eeqae110e, pided b7 certain baaic c0Daiderat10D8 which are an integral part of a proper teatiJ:Ig l(»proach. It ie the parpo.. of thia dlacuaion to collld.der, 1n retrospect, the teat philoaopq par.metere which were ilq)liclt 1n the bandlinl, teet and .tl1cht treparatioo ot vehicle 23SS, aDd 1n eo dclq, to att-.pt to br!Dg to tocu aad to record the el-.:ate of an etrectin teat pb1loeopq. 'l'he la11110h and orbital pertOl'IUDCe or thla vehicle, or urr vehicle, are the reeult ot the deeign, li&DilfactariJ:ls, qineerlJJg, teat, Mndlh.r and pre-la11110h checkout ettone of l.arp DIUII»ara of pel'80Dilel. 'l'he reeulti!lg qaa11t;r or performance of the vehicle 1e therefore detend.aed, incraeutall;r, b7 each ot thue endenore. 2.3.1.2 'l'be rolee ot the tetltiiiC 0J11ud.sat1one in the prepiiNtioc ot a eatell1te vehlele are to rot1ll. HV'eral. VC7 epec1!1e req~Dta, DOI:W tdd.ch area a) Pron b7 de.ooatratioo that the bardnre, •• deeigned, wUl. b) lnablieh, b;r eott1ciellt OfeN\1011 in the correet Mit 81191roDUDt, bt the hardware w.lU IQl"\'ive and bu adecpate rel1abl11y, 11ben operatiJ:Ig u a ..,ne., to •\iafactorl]¥ 3-l SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANMING e) !Rablieb the fiiiJCtioD&l CCIIIP.tibilit.r of all ~ud eabqReu 1n all fO!!ible operatlJIIIOdea, 1Dcladlqr d) Oolld110t a ld.uLCIIl AlmlaUon 1d.th the cCIIIPlete laaDoh Q'ftea 1n the laaooh emrCIIWit. e) P1Dallse the night preparat1oaa ud ocad110t the couxtd01m. 'fbe farego1.J:V ba:lld1qr block epproacb to teatiqr, it :lt :la \o be tborolllfLb' objec\b'e, can accept DO pr:lor coaclaa:lOD8 u to 1Dberent qaaJJ.v. !heM coDClu:looa u to quliv ur be the prodact of a IIQIIber of identical or lllld.lar q.ta. operat:lou, renlt1qr1n ecae 110dit1cat1one to the te1rt IPfroaGh on later Teb:lclea, u oppoeed to the ut.o.t ricOV on the t1nt Teh:lcle. fhe •queDCe, de8Crlbed abon 1n geDeral t411'U ot tbe reqa:lr.enta to the t..t orgaD1sat1oll8, :I.e 110re «Qlic:lt~ defiDed b)" the" reapect1Te exupldt a) ~thedealgn illvolna prlDC~cCIIIPOQellt or IID:lt wata to euroi• «!!7 de!ip hDCtioo to the .!!!!E tolC"amea. 1'h1a va• aocCIIIPlillhed on «err Oooct,rear Oozopoat1oc pi~J2.Nd IID:lt, u a tint article. feata on each aaooHIUJic am.t at.il:lsed the dea:lgn appl'O'ral telrt p~to tbe uri.. extot r.Jin:lcalJT p011alble. 3-2 SECRET SPECIAl HANDLING L OCKHEE D MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY .------------- TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM 224 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 SECREt SPECIAL HA'RfiliNG :rellabUitz lmladee vibration, tbenl&l. ad TaCUIDI ca.pGDeDt; teatlJw. fhie ne do.De on the pqload aaU; lwel in acOOl'daoe vith IMSC 6117D -Emboraental ~cU'1cation. It allo tandaMD~ im'olne exttm81Te, repeated operation in accordal3ce 1d.th the 1111181on prot1le. 1'b1e vu done at abient u a atelllte qat• &Dd 1n a themal-"f&Cawa eDVil"oment 1d.th the pqlo.t vebl.cle. c) Eetabllllhillc the lltlb81Wtea &Dd QWtea tlmctlonal CC!f&tib111y in all IIIOdee lmrolTea the operation ot .,._,. poelllble electrical and Mehaalcal t'lmctlon in all GOl'llal &Dd tailU'e .ode cCIIIb1Dationa. rbia vaa done on a pQioecl 'ftbicle ballla in tb! teet l.aboratol7', &Dd on a eatelllte Tebicle baeie in tbe tint~teet, in the jnecbal.c Cbuber, 1n the ..aOIId 8;18telle teet and 1n the l.aanoh cc.pla: a.atated tl111Jt. d) '!'he Jaiee:!.on alallatl011 in the l.allDOh eadroaast proYidN a croea check qa1.net all preri.oaa tut.illc, 'tlhe:rein a detic1encT mq haTe been cbecared bT drtue ot a d11'tel"8Dt ten eam.roza.. aent, b11t IIIOl"e b.po:rtantl,y, it CC!I!fletel.l:revalldatee tbe eatellite ~Pte. at a late point prior to l.aaDch and ..t.Ullehee a llMf buchaark ot coatidence 1n bel.qr re.cf7 to enter the launch coiiDtdoa. 'fbia teat -the pad eiaalated tUcbt - lllUt prodace pertol'IIUCe •!d.ch 18 ca.pletel.T b81QIId qaeetlo.u .. ! I or COIII()1UI1ae before tbe nhicle cao be ccmaldered l'elllt,r to · enter the launch colllltdc:.l. r 3-3 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: cnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HMmriNG e) The latmch coiiDWan eetabliahel the night coat1pration (prcpellaDtl, pHI, power aDd pldaDce Htt.iJicl aDd propoaa peoaliar co.ua:d aDd cont;rol/pQ'l.cMid conf1&aratio.oa), rechecke the pertorullCe 11 en.blilhecl dar.l.J:c pre-laallch ~elY, aDd re~alu in li..t't-otf of a flilht !'!!djr !Zfte!• 2.3.1•.3 The applicatloa of tbll tat pld.l08opb;r therefore prodoee. tvo p1"iJJ&rT relalt11 a) .1 rigorou proot 'b,r d.oDStration that the deat.gn 11 cOl'ftet &Dd COIIP&tible for the oper&tiODI of tobe uclped id.u!.ac, that tbe llllllllf.atared aDd ulellbled ..,.tea 11 in.ltrict accOJ'd&Dce 14th the dedp, that the delip aDd hardnre together are o~tible with aDd correct for the operatt.qr endrozaeat, aDd that the ![!!;• re11abU1tz 1a adegaate tor the lll..S.oo. b) !be lallDCh of a q8tea w!d.ch 11 dete:nd.Ded to be flllht re!d{ u a reaalt ot all prt:or telt1Jlc aDd u a n1alt of a 0011p1et;e am carreot •'-operratioa in the lalaDch .m.romaat. Bach of tbe abcwe !'NIIltl ant D8CeUU7' 1t a Atellite .,.tea 11 to be realiltioal:q cODid.dered tllpt ~. .l good teet phUoeop~ doee DOt ohalleJIIe the d..S.p -the tuk 11 to TalJ.date tbe dee!p. IA 110 do:I.JIS, 1t ..t be able to :NV"eal aDd 1denttt;r deal.p we!me11 or hDctiODal. iJ:IcCIIIPitlbilitiea. 'l'he teat aeq~aeDCe 11 DOt inteaded to ..t.lbl.ieh 3-h SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8r SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAl HARMING bat it a.t be able to eetabllah qst.a :rel1ald.l1Q' -ill a 8IID8l" 'ldd.ch 1a DOt poulble on a ca.waoeut; bu:la. 2.3.1.4 'lhe teet aeqneme on Vehicle 23SS ia d18caued -ealDBt the pidelinea ot the prniou PU'&Il"'IPha -in teru of parU.calar eu~~Pl• where QP11cable. !he te.t ph11o110pb;r att.pted to p:reclllde Ul7 pq.l.o.d cCIIIl)ODellt ozo Q81;ea fa1larea bT reqalring e.ah p¢oad cOIIPOMilf; to , ... an Jcceptaace !eat Proceda:re baediat~ prior to 1natal.lat1on. lach ite ot UISC fan:d.ahed power coJWenion eqal}aent (invertera, comertera, jllDCtion boxet~, etc.) •• in.talled after a deteftd.Dation that the ite. had 8Qecaatlll.l7 paned the required acceptuoe teeta. !he vlr!.qr vu checked, pi.n· to pill ap.1nat the w1r1.rc drawiDga, daring which IUDQfacta:r.IJ:Ig errore vere corrected. !be p~•• a ~ waa thu broqht to a palnt of readineu for powr appl1cat1011.. Povar loada vere applied aDd lleUared 1.n incNMDt;a, ud 87ftea hllctiGDal atiliv wae deteNined -ite b7 it• -u farther deacribed 1.n aacceed:IJ:Ig paracrapha. 'lhia qproach to enabliabizlc col"l"8Ct Q"8teel operat.lon on a aablp\ea bT allbqwtea bu:la wu aalntaiDed tbNaghoat the tNt apan, 1lbeN1n the IIYBf;ea weald be a:arc11ed t.lnt ill aeqaenoe of teatiqr aad recordizw the ea:JgiDeel'tllg pu.etera ill all .odea, the proceediJIIlDto the oterrational ccmf11u'ation tor opmat1011 ill all .odea. 'the 8lpl.t1caat ditferenoea b.-en theN tne• ot teata are telllated ill the follOid.JII 3-S SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES & SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANIING !eat :It. 1'.!11Deer1!!11'Nte ~atlOD&l 'teste (a) Pouer am Loade Sbllllt bee - BNakout n1&ht CoDn.prat.t.on Boxee 8lld !en CablJJic GDlT· allowed. (b) ~tedVoltqeRatw• , ..tire Eleotl'o111o Power Sapp31' atllised. n1lbt Batteriee 1: ll1ght Oabliqr GDlT • Mlu:I.O.D .S..alaticm. (o) Tel.,t17 er 'feet Collft.gQ!'!t.lGD (23SS Uld 23.56) Flight Batteriee !beee two Tehiclee, o.t :Radar .latenu 1D8talled identical oo.at1&Vat10D, J'liebt Cabll~ nre tasted 1D the .Aue'feet Prcer• m:1 nt. Prcgr• (~tal Ppa'.) cholc CbDber. Veblcle Rl" Air LUlie Canuncte 23.56 vu \eeted prior to Rl" Jir L1J:Ik Data the 23SS tllght. ll.1cht PJro 81aalaton Jlo 'le.t; Pl.ac llllb1llcalll lo Main Umillcal; l 0u Supp:Q' • 0u ValTe ~eration Beeulta r l 8;Jatem cCJIIPatibility ·vae diiiiODBtrated operatiz:IK iD liD orbital coDt1guratlou. 3-7 r l SECRET SPECIAl HANDliNG LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV· DOCUMENT 15 ,I NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAl HAmliNG CoDftcaratton 'f'b1e tMt operated the pqlotlcl nbl.cle 1n an orbital embo~ ot fhe ,q.J.oed nbl.cle •• in an Ol'b1tal coaft.pratlon forward of Sta. 228, film epti.llg tor PJJ'OII UJd filaht batt..,.. ta~Peratare Uld altitude propwuaed in accordance Re11alta 1d.th the milAOil. !be t~tare altltade telltS.Jle prod110ed repeated t.uare. ot the pQioed c~OD.t.J vb1oh are hrther dilloueed in PU.a. 2.).2.). 'l'he11e tallare itwere Nded£1*1 accord ~. The pqio.d whlcle, alter lllll.t1,ple cCJIIIPC)D8Dt rededpa and c~reteete, operated throasb the pro~Jllai.OD wlthollt tailare. !be pii,J'].oM Yebl.cle wu 11abjected to t~EteD81Ye, repetitive tNt111s -through a td.lare rec1u IUlt1l repeated 11110ceuhl opention wu achlft'ed. (c) B-.3 lAUDOh Stand Pql.OIId Vehicle 'l'ellt Coof11!J'!t101l '1'h1a te.t tollolred the pad dJI&lated .tJ..1Cbt. Calplete tlight co.D!1pratlon, iJlcl.adine battel'!ee and PJI'OII, bat prlOI" to f1Dal attacblleut of the radar antem:aa. Renl.tll 'fb18 tMt •ucce~ e:xerciMd werr interface fiUICtlOD, power, groand, data c11-ca1t UJd cOIIIIIIII:Id circuit betnen the Pll11oed Yeb1cle and tM Jgeoa. It ....Udatecl tbe ttm1 tligbt coDt1prat1on ot tlJ.aht batter.l.••· In the ooiU'M of pertond.qr «err PQ'l.o8d tancti.Oil, the eutire 1111tell1te vehlcle wu ·~ validated in the laiUICh oOIIf1pNt1on. 2.3.1•.5 !be .&8aoc1ate OoaU.ctOI" (OoodTear Aeroepaoe Car'poratiOD) pertonud a vital role 1n the ten lleriH em th1• Tehlcle. a 1Dlt1al procedtare wu ..t.ablillhed tor acceptance ot pqloadll trca ~ar vbicb involnd the part1oipat1on ot IHSO per11omJel 1n the .tbal 3-8 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: cnART DECLASSIFED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL .HANDliNG Acceptance 'l'eet Procedare on each s;ratem. 'l'be data vaa then reviared joint~, together vith the !1nal. dellverable hardware statu. Ba•d upon theee reeulte, the S;retaa Aeaoeiate Contractor :recC~M~ended bardvare acceptance to the Air Force, or aa circlllll8tatlcea dictated, rec011too mended furtlwr action and another pql.oad s,yatem teet prior to acceptance. Atter receipt ot tbe PQ"load at umc, a unt.t .Acceptance Teat Procedare vae cozxlacted on each pqload unt.t aa a f1na1. validation on the box le'l'el prior to installation in the pqload vehicle. Jal.nt reapona1b1lltiea vere de!1Jled aDi dociJIIlented, briefly aa follovea a) Goodyear llld.ntained reapoMibillt;r tor all pqload anita when not U.talled 1n the pa;yioad vehicle, and eatabl1abed an acceptable teat atatna juat prior to 1n8tallat1on. b) Gooc:t;year part.1c1pated in all teata which iJIVolved aey operation ot the pqload, during which veto power wu in force u to continuance o! each test. c) Ooody'ear and UfSC jointl)' car.ducted teet data evalaat1on and reached a joint determination on teat acceptabilltT• d) lockheed maintained reaporud.billty !or all 8,78taa operat10ll, incl.Dding the operation of the ~em teet equipment . e) S)-atem log booka vere Daintai.ned b7 lockheed and 1nd1v.ldaal pql.oad unit log books vere maintained b7 Goodyear. Lockbeed Qualley J.aearance wee responaible for both pql.oad and e;retea while at Lockheed .tac111 tiea. 3-9 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8r SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSFIED BY: CJIART A004306 DECLASSFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAl HANDLING !) Lockheed provided &11 neoeaeary 1111pport !or the Gooqear !ield operation. s) Naither qetelll testing nor UJd.t testing were to be conducted unlass both contractors were present. 'lhe foregoing operating procecb'es were defined 1n a letter dated 8 Novamber 19631 Subject, •Operatinc Procedures and Respaoaibillt.ies !or the Conduct ot P-21 Cheolcout and Test.ing". The GoodJ'Ml" personnel were included, as a norul. funoticm, in all SJBt• Aeaoa1ate Ccmtractor-technic&l. rev1Mn~1 stat! ...t.i.np and routine testing pliiUling and status Metinp. The r..W.t ot the Nl'l,r plaming &!.f'orts and or the inte&rat.ion teohniques evolved between Lockheed ad Goocfluz'1 were VW'f &!teot.in and caapatible vorldng rel.&t.ionsbi.pa. It is oonsidarec:l tbat the GoodJ'ear part.ic1pat1cm in the testing, md the O'*J)lete support ot the teat pb.llosopbT deacribed herain, were easential elemente in ruching a tll(llt-reaq statu and 1n the sucoeeatul ocmcluct or t:U lll.saion. 'lhe prior discwud.on outllnea the applicable teat philosophy. 'lhe iJipl~t&t.ioo ot a proper test philoaopb7 involTM the intmglble aspeot ot Ill underatmding of the pbilollopb;y1 and amt&l. acceptance ot the objectives, by the peraoDDel aooe~~pllsbing the teats. A~te test plmnjng and test axecmtJ..cm require strinpat diecipllnes to aTOid the aooept.anoe ot queationabl.e ozo un'Nl'itiec:l relllllts, and the SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE ACOJU()6 DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAl HANDLING necessit.y to be sufficiently thorough and 111athod1cal to guarantee canpleteneas. In short, testing requires experts in the field, properll' trained, experienced and 111otivated. Cert.ain parameters are considered significant eoougb to warrant specific idantificationz a) Detailed, documented plann1Ds;, expressed in COIIIpletely unambi gu01111 tenus. b) Thorough Wld.c-standing ot the technical aspects o! tbe systems involved -tenned Fo!essiaaal. CCII!p!teftoe. c ) A thorougtl and direct understanding o! that status which 1a correctlY termed launchread{ for a aatelllt.e aystea. d) The mandatory requiremtmts that each syst.m be operated in the orbital configuration -through representative U... and cycles - in the orbital enviroDIIlant -as realisticall,r as 1a possible. a) A step by step suba)'Btem to II)'Btern validation prooua (build ing block approach ) 'Wherein the thorough engineering teats involving the damanstrated and recorded per!ol'IUDCe ot ~ design parameter are followed by progressi.Tel7110re complete and realistic operational conf'igw:ation testa. f) Rigid oonf'iguration control of the coapcnents, subsystau md ~~as proSl'!!siveJ.y validated. The planned and actual teat sequences on Vehicle 2355 are further d18. cussed in the rema1ning aecti0118 of Para. 2.3 together with the reaul.ta. [ '!he planned test sequencea ! or SunnJvale and Vandenberg AFB are pictured r · l in sequential block diagl"am form in s..aary Figures A and B respect1't'81Y, paps 3-12 and 3-13. 9unlar7 Figure C1 page 3-14, ahon the actual. teet sequence irulofar as it differed from the pl.&Dned aequeoce. r l . 3-11 r l LOCKHEED SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ~ISSILES 8r SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 15 . ~ z: ::J ~ W N ~ Cl) .. ~ ~ __, ~ ..... >-< wa::-' a::~~ c....;) a:: u ... LLJ 0 ...• c... ! : ~ .~ bi ill ! &J t ·l i ,B eil ! >ww ~ -CI') ••t ~ ~ .h--~· ~Ill, I ~n . ~~~ a::~~ a,. en en a,.CI)CI) !iUI .~~ ., .. ... .,., 18 1•1 ~:s:s ~he L o--Ill i1 ii ouu ..: "' .. "' ~ a::ww zoo TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIEDON: 9JULY2012SECRH SPECIAL HANDLING AGI!MA (SAM! AS PLANNED) IIAGENA[O -"LDEV LAB I'UHCTIONAL FILM TRANSPORT CHECK TEST (HATS) ~ ,--- D D I I AGENA CHECKS-MAB I~--r---___, I~__.__________, I ALIGNMENT AND FIT CHECKS !PiL-AGENA)-MAB I o I- CAPSULE VENDOR WEIGHT ANO I I,,AGENAID BALANCE AND FUNCTIONAL I TEST-PAD TEST PREPS I PIL{I:J 1.---------"'-------'1 ..,______-f TEMPERATURE AND ALTITUDE CHA,_ER PILC[:> (TASC) I'INAL T!STS SUMURJ FIOURE C 3-14 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING L.OCKHEED MISSIL.ES 6 SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPeCIAL HANDLING 2.).2 Payload Vehicle Testing SUIIIII!rl The payload tests defined 1n tne Planned Test Sequence (Para. 2.).) of this Section) were ccrapleted and the primary objectives met. Tile scope of testing vas enlarged to include a special test of the film traaspart system 1n a vaculll environment (Hl'l'S). Test iDB order vas altared to pend.t downstre.a testing to continue, wllere practical, during periods when a complete set of flight components were not available. Maltunct.ions ot payload components in the temperature and altitude ohalli>er (TA.SC) during the Quali!'ication payload tests and Vehicle 23$5 payload teats caused the TASC tests to be altered, repeated and the start and com:pletion to be delayod. (Refer to Para. 2.3.3 of this Sectl.on). The final TASC run was a ccmplete and continuous test vbich verified system CCJ11Pllance to all of the initial objectives. Payload compliance to speci!'ications vaa demonstrated 1n the following configurationsz a) Pa;yload Vehicls System (Non-eiNironmental) o Power supply simulating flight batteries. o Test console slmulat1ng Agena COIIIII&nds md radar targets. o Vehicle telemeter simllator monitoring telemeter signals. o Transmitter terminated 1n a dummy load. b) Pa;yload Vehicle Systelll (EnviroDIBltal) o Ba.dc equlJRI!Int used same as Item a) above with the pa;rload ln a siJaulated orbit preaaure and tempera 3-15 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 6 SPACE COM ..ANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SEeRET SPECIAl HANbTING · ture enviromsent. c) Agena -Payload Integrated Syat.. Teate (lon-enrlro:mDeDtal) o Payload electrically1 but not 118Cbanicall.T uted to the o Power auppl,y silllllating !light batteries. o Co11Mnd8 !roll the Agen~~ (ba~ line :troa teat COIIlplex). o Telueter and "hardlilu!l• data uaed to evaluate 1J111tea pertorunce. o Tranadtter te:nllinated 1D a duJav lead. d) !gena -Payload S)'IJtea (Anechoic) o Payload el ectricall,y and mecbanica~ mted to the Agena. o Payload radar antenna installed and transaittizls• . o Power supplled by night type batteries. o Cc.~anda :troa the Agena (air link trca teat coaplex). o TU.eter (air link) data used to evaluate ayat• pertonunce. o Payload data by air l1nk: to ground receiver and recorder. o P.~~ercency control and .,nitoring •intained vitb a w1n1•• DlJiber of electricall.T iaolated hardlinea. e) Ageua -Payload Syate. (Launeb Pad Horisontal) o P¢oad electr1oall.7 but not .MObanical.J1' ..ted to tbe Agena. o Power auppl,y ailmlating tU.pt batteriee. o Co-.nda boa the Ageaa (air link :troa tracking station). o Tel-ter (air link to gl"'WWd station) aDd bardline data .3-J.6 SE£RET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES a SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL H~ING uaed to naluate the per!onnanee. (Telemet!7 and payload video data). o RecoveJ7 capeule energised and evaluated. o · TraMIIIitter terminated in a duaay load. !) Booater -!gena -Payload Syaten (Launch Pad Vertical) o Payload-Agena-Booater Adapter-Ilooster mated. o Flight batteriea inatalled. o COIIIII8nd8 1'ral the Agena (air link frc:a t~cld.ng station} o Tel-ter (air link to ground station) used to evaluate system performance. o Silllll.ated targete evaluateci vith the vide band data link only. o Tranlllllitter te:minated in a d~load. At the conclw:ion or payload testing the following iteme vere out of limite as epecitied by the Test Procedurest a) 'i'TBnslllitter power was o.7 db low. b) The sensitivity time control (STC) video vaverom vas 2.2:1 I'!IIIXimwn to llinilll.ul and should have been a liiAXiD.ull or 2.0 :1. e) Delay fran "ON GATE" to the start of STC wu 35 llicroseconds and should have been 31 llicroaeconda JII8Xillwn. d) The accelel'Cllfteter in the Tranalllitter-Modulator unit vas inoperative. During the TASC t.esta unexplained tranaienta vere ob8erved on the -2XV and +4.$1\V power supply Jllonitore. Instruaentation indicated6 and anal,yab 3-17 r · SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ' L-OCKHEED MISSIL-ES 8c SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 15 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HA!mtiNG verified that the transients on the iJio pawer supplies were net rel.al;ed. The 2KV pr'Oblems W'88 localized to 'the RF-lF Unit. ThiS unit wu remo-ved afttr the TASC test was canpleted and operated through a specxi.al test at Goodyear. The spildng was determined to be occurr~ in an output filter c~citor in the -2KV supply and waa not or a potential failure nature. The -2lOl pr'Oblan md the four (4) out-of-limits iter~~~ listed in thU section were all acceptable to Goodyear to Lockheed ani to the Air b'oroe as fiiSlt 'WOl'thy' conditions. Tie +4.S.KV transients appeared·in the i'irst .f'o\1' (4) o.f' the thirteen s:lJnulated crbits in the TASC test. T'ney did not swear in the l.aBt nine simulated orbits in TASC or in any or the subsequent testing. Reier to Par 2.1.2 and Par. 3.1 of thUI report far n more detailed discussion. >-1.8 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8c SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANbTING 2.3.2.1 -Payload Develop:ll!lnt ::: lb, LocJcheed a) l.leneral The payload sy-stem was assembled and checked oul; in thepayload development lab at Lockbeed..S~. Compoumta ot the payload syst m were oi>tained from Lockheed-Goai;pa~ m1 the Recowey System Vendor. Oood;pa.. supplied f1. w ($) .t~ radar canponents with mounting hardware and the AGE required to check each coraponent individuall.y' and intet-oonnectad as a e,.,t.. A system for recording the wide band data link t>'lBDL) video vas also supplied by Goodyear, termed a grouul based reocrder. Loclcheerl proVided the pay-load air!rare, fli&ht. antenna llld waveguide, power conversion equipment 1 pyro .syetem1 oampensatioo ma111ets md equiplll!lllt necessary to interco!UIIIct, mon1tcr 8Dd control the pqload syetem. Lockheed al.ao supplied the AGE required to handle the capsule and payload, a batter:r· simulator, a vehicle telemeter simu.latcr, and payload test aids. The Recowr:r S7Bt1111 Venda:-aupplied the recowrlble nose section inclm~ all of 1he flight equiplllllllt contained w:tt.hin the c.pllllle. b) Acceptance Tests of Good~.. C0111p0mnts Goodyear personnel performed acceptmce U!sts on tha radar night components. These components were, 1) Tran91litter Mcd ulato.,. (Bal: 113), 2) RF-n' Unit (Bolt 14)1 Reference Ce~~~puter (B3 ~ 6-1 7-1 6-1 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIEDBY: CnART DECLASSIFIEDON: 9JULY 2012 SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING PARt ni (Cont.) Table o£ Ccntcta Partqaph Ho. 'l'itlA- .!:!e. ).8.1 lntroduot.icm 8-1 ).8.2 Wide Band Data Link 8-1 ).8.) AMI& (AdnDcecl MaFet4.c Intora&t4.Clll Equipaa1t) 8-6 ).8.4 L1ttJ.e APE (A.Dalog Photo Equipaeat) 8-6 3.8.S Q1l'l Reocrdc' aDd Record£ Controller 8-8 ).8.6 '1'K D1ap1.&7 PIMl 8-9 ).8.7 Pareonnel· Perfor.ance 8-1.0 ).8.8 s-Look Proil'• 6-l2 w. SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 6 ...ACE COM..ANY SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 16 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 _SECRET SPEC:Al HANDLING AC-o4)06 PART In System Performance During Orbital Operatiane Introduction Thie eection ot the report -Part III -is designed to contain a IIAXimuln of orbital per!onnance data. The subsystems, the thermodynamic conditione which prevalled, the vacuum gage responses and the perfonnance of the Satellite Control Facility are each diacuesed. The payload subsystem operation, as recorded 1n Para. .3.4, wu naluated by Engineering persormel relat/ ively in8lq>erialeed in evaluation or photographs or of radar imagery. The basis ot the evaluat.1011 wu: o All telemetry data coneidered pertJ.nent. o The recorded video. data transparency. o The correlated radar imagery for the full length ot a11 operating passes. (An unreflned copy) r. The resulti.ng observations and coJIIIIents provide a total evaluation of the l . payload data and radar imagery accumulated in 32<91 minutes or operation r i throughout the 14 orbits or payl.oad operat.ian -with the quallticationa '- indicated above. r L The entries made for each pass may tom a basis for further evaluation -it required -without recourse to exteneiw research through retired data recCl'ds. I' . 1-1 I,, - SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING l - LOCKHEED MISSILES 6 SPACE COM~ANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM [ NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CJIART ~ DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING Tba aatell1te ftbicle vu prosr-cl b;r •ms o! the arbital. progr__. to operate for 80 orbS.ta. 'lbe p&11oad vu Pl'OII'~ to operate tbrouab a WU'IIJp and a preopc'ate ~llbenanr the aatel.l1te vu 1n sight o! the Vmdlnberg .AFB or the lw ~retraclcini art.ationa, md 'llben the ground •~~JPinl avath vaa vith1D the Ccmtineat.al. UDi.ted Statu. 'l'he reoovflrT vu or.l.pn•llT planned fat' bY 6S. Ibe to 1nterfer.ace vith other operationa a deciaic:m vas Jl&de to etteot rec0ft17 on BeY .ll. 'the NftD pa,yload operating puaea prior to Rev 33 ware utU.becl to acquire a .rn.,. ot reoovved tUa data ot higb..t qaal:it:y. J.ocordlnslT1 the only pqload control wbich vaa condacteci during theM Operate perioda ccrud.ated ot acijuting the PRF. J.utc.atic pin 0011trol vu uaed for all pueea prior to recoTU'J', u we Clutt.rl.oolt Intesratar (In) &Del 'liM Oaaatant 11. ~ a:perlMDta u incli.oated here1n, wre OCildacted daring tile ll8ftD pu... foll.owing reooftl7'• 'l'he objeotift ot tb11 aeot1.cm ot the perfOlWIIICe J*'..tera 11bich '110\lld pend.t aubaeqdat end IIOl'e detail..ecl 8val.uatica of the 8JIIt.-aa du1recl. '1'hia aeotica oonaiat. o! the follow1na; p&r&&l"lphat r ).4.1 Pua Paz7 Lo1 (Verbal Reports to STC Dur1.q Opcation) [ L 'nd8 log ocataiDa a quick retC"812Ce aouroe of all L pQ1.oacl operati0118 during tb1Jr lliaaion, b;r pua, vith operating tUBe. per .._t ancl cuaU.atiTe. (Hot c~lete.) Retc to Para. ).4.2 tor apeci.f1c n.nt deta118. r 4-1 L SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING [ LOCKHEED MISSILES 81 SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 16 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 AOOJuo6 SECRET SPECIAl HANDLING ).4.2 Pua .ADaln:L! Dl!a parql"aph CODtaina the buic data tak:m traa tel..8etzT recorda, doppler data til.a aDd correlated radar illagery, arrmged in a tiae Mqllmcecl toxsat tor each of the fourteen active pat.l.oad pauu. ).ZJ•.3 Te:t.et.ry Schechlle Tbia parql"apb contain~! a baaio W...try ll•tinc• ).4.4 Tel-t.rz Data Tbia parBiJ!aph oontaina buic tel-try data. ).4.s Pold.tiODins of the a.tum Pul.8e in the l!ge Gate. 3.4.6 TarraiD ieneoti'f'1tr. ).~.7 Direct Mca1toring ot Py1o.t Radlat.iaD. 4-2 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE ACQIU06 DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ).7 RECOVERY SUBS!ST!K ).7.1 'the :recoTery eube~, ae cleecribed 1n Para. 2.3.2.10 aboTe, pez-f'onaecl tbe peyloacl on~J1)1t flmctione of •inteining ti.111 tendon dllr1ng nooopente periocl81 t.ek1ng fila up into the :recoTerable c ..eette, with a cCMtant tension, during operate periods, cutting the fila prior to IIIIP8,. In eddit.ion, the ~tebllp ..ebeniaa uinteined t1la tenaion during uoent. Tbe telcellll .ator par clriTe vae pNYeatecl tJoc:. UDrindinc b7 a ratchet. During uc1111t the ratchet (anti-backup) vu held by aoleaoid action in the diaencaged position to prennt ratChet ~1• froa aacent Tibration. Tbe oapiNle statue on orbit vee enluated by the foll0111n& tel-tl7 point.er F-91 Footap Potenttc.eter (C.e11ett.e iUb Di.IIMter) F-9.3 Vater Seal Poeition aDd CODtinuity Loop F-97 caaaett.e '!'-.perature P'-99 Takeup Idler/Cauette Ca.utetor .The other capsula tel~~~~etry pointe were taaperature 110D1ton ard NCOT8f7 ~ttery eignal .aonitorar P'-92 !Wtro '!'aperature (Rocket) ( ~ P'-94 'l'hruet Cone T8111p8rature F•9S RecoYery Battery 12 Signal (VoH) I l I -F-96 RecoTeJ7 Battery 11 Sipal 1•98 Forebody Ta.perature 7-1 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ' l _ LOCKHEED M I SSILES 81 SPA!=E COMPANY SECTION IV -DOCUM ENT 16 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE ACCMl,306 DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SE£RET SPECIAL HANDLING The capeul.e statws telemetry palnt displ.a;ys tar P'-91. and F-99 are sholm in Para. ).4. These indicated ncmnal !ilD. tranaport operation. The ountte temperature vae controlled by' two lo-vatt heaters in series1 y1eld1Dg S watts power d1aa1pat1an, vith a thermostat setting ot 82°. The ouaette temperature, monitared by F-97, wu 73°F em Rev. 8 and decreased to 44~ }.7.2 Weights The capeul.e vaight vas ·increased to 1.20 pounds parachute a1111pended veigb,t, as described iD Para. 1.6. The cll)sule weights nrer Separation Weight )o6.8S lbs. Arter Retro Weight 22,3.2$ lbs. Weight OD Parachute 120.00 l.bs. The correspc:lllding descent rates on the parachute nres llt.1.tude (Feet) Descent Rate (FtlSec.) $4,.300 Parachute Depl.CJ1118Dt 3S,ooo 32.S )0,000 29.5 25,000 Z7.0 20,000 24.9 15,000 2).0 10,000 21.2 5,000 19.6 Surface 18.0 7-2 SEeRET SPECIAL HANDLING LOCKHEED MISSILES 8: SPACE COMPANY TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART AC~)~ DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SEeRET SPECIAL HANDLING J. 7.3 Recovery The reccmsry eventa and pertonnance are given below in Table n. The predicted impact point waa 24ot. and 14.3° )8• w. The actual air catch wu '!IWie at 23° 38' N and 143° 4S' w, approziJiatel.y 23 nautical miles SouthSouthwest of the predicted illlpact point. The recov817 area plot, and two Viws or the reco'Y81'7 poeit.ione, predicted VVIIWI actual for vien up ranee and looldJic &01'088 ranee are given in figures ).7.1, ).7.2 end ).7.) reepectively. '!'be varilltiou 1roa actul prior to entering the ataoephere are dl&e to llinor veri.atione in alicalent !r~ optiaul during :retrorocket ttuuat &Dd to Jd.Dor d1tterencee in total tbJouat value. r · I l . r l. l _ r \ 7-3 L·-SE£RET SPECIAL HANDLING L r LOCKHEED MISSILES 81 SPACE COMPANY SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 17 ~VIA•amMJtl QQ1'41"~11 STSTEM OI'CL.Y "•t ( NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 ~~DIill PROGRAM REPORT t:J 'tn ft11TA ENT£R£D DATE tJ rttcROF:fC:H=Eo=------~ OAT£ -----~---...•. AKP-U-596 j Ifoff 1 APRIL 196S· TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING COP~· NO. 17 f ~~DIDl PROGRAM REPORT • KP-11 ORBITAL DOPPLER RADAR THOR/ A GENA SATELLITE PROGRAM VOLUME I -DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT AKP-n-596 1 AP•II lOA~ s lhll aocumenr contaiN 1110 page~ CICIIIItled Cll :,tt;Kth 51'tt;IAL HA.xl;l DOD Oil 5200. 10 DOES NOT APPlY ~ \ · EXCLUDED FIOM AUTOMATIC IEGIADING (fj)' ,~ .. UAN DL!r. .._, If.\ ;~,l~;:~·~.:"\N CONT!i::JL r;·;.~ ;!i;·l! C ;'>!l.Y OODVEAR ·AEROSPACE CORPORATION SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET LITCHFIELD PARk, ARIZONA SECTION IV· DOCUMENT 17 SECRET SPECIAL HANDLINC AKP-II-596 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART I' DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD •••••••• . . . . . . . . LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS LIST OF TABLES xiii Section Title I INTRODUCTION ••• 1. General • • • • • 2. Design Philosophy 3. Configuration • • • • • 2 4. System Parameters ·. z 5. Operational Summary • • • • • • 3 6. Chronology of Program History • • • • 4 II BASIC DOPPLER THEORY . .. . . . 5 1. General Concept 5 2. Basic Equations 5 3. Ambiguities • • 9 4. Data Processors • 10 III SYSTEM ANALYSIS 15 1. Antenna Length Relationships 15 2. Antenna Height Relationships 17 3. Mapping Interval • • • • Zl 4. Ambiguity Levels zz a. Azimuth Ambiguity zz ~· Range Ambiguity • Z3 5. Radar Power Requirements and Signal Levels • Z6 a. Radar Equation and Peak Power • 2.6 ~· Transmitter Average Power ••• 30 c. Effect of Pulse Compression 30 d. Receiver Gain and Automatic Gain Control Requirement • • • • • • • 30 ~· The Sensitivity Time Control Requirement 32 -vii SPECIAL HANDliNG SEC R~ e· t TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAl HANDliNG AKP-D-596 TABLE OF CONTENTS ... Section Title !!I! 6. Range Resolution • . . . . 3Z 7. Azimuth Resolution .-. . . . . . 34 8. Clutterlock Loop Analysis • . . . . 38 a. General Requirements of Clutterlock Loop . . . . . 38 Clutterlock Servo Loop . . . . . . . . . 39 ~· IV ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS. . . . . . 47 1. Thermal Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . 47 a. General • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 ~. Thermal Design Philosophy . . . .; . . . . . . 47 c. Method of Analysis • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 d. Ascent Heating Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 e. Equipment Thermal Analysis -Orbital Operation 56 1 Ground Operation • . 60 z.. Stress Analysis . . . . 6Z a. General • . . . . . . . . . 6Z. b. Stress Design Criteria . . . . 6Z Method of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 c. Transmitter Unit • . . . . . . 64 ~· e. R-F/I-F Unit . . . . . . . . 65 1 Reference Computer Unit . . . . . 65 K• Control Unit • . 66 ~ Recorder Unit . . . . . . . . . . 66 3. Vibration Analysis . . . . 67 a. General • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Design Philosophy . . . . . . . . 67 ~· c. Method of Analysis • . . . . 69 Development Testing: Recorder Unit • 69 ~· e. Development Testing: Other Units • . . 70 1 Isolator Design . . . . . . . . ' 71 Effect of Sustained Acceleration on Isolation &• Systems • . . . . . 73 4. Shock Analysis • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 a. General • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Iaolator Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 ~· Adequacy of Mounting and Attach Structure 76 £.• SYSTEM DESIGN DATA. . . . . . . . 79 v 1. Mechanical . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 a. Gneral • . . . . . . . . . 79 ~. Barrel Section • 79 c. CoDical Section 79 Nose Cone. . . . . . . . . . . . 80 !· -viii- SPeCIAL HANDUNG SEGRE' SECTION IV· DOCUMENT 17 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING AKP-11-596 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page e. Weight and Volume Limitation • • 80 1. Modular Construction • • • • • 83 z. Electrical • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 83 a . General • • • . . • • • • • • ••• 83 k· Electromagnetic Interference -Radio Frequency Interference • 83 c. Power .••••.•.•• 83 ~. Duty Cycle . • • • . . • . 84 VI SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION • 85 1. Basic Radar System • • •• 85 a. Frequency Requirements • • 85k· Time Pulses • • • • • • , , 88 Z. The Radar System Block Diagram • 94 .!.• Simplified Block Diagram of KP-11 Radar System • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 94~· Detailed Block Diagram of KP-n Radar System • • • • • • • • 96 3. Radar System Modes •• 96 VII COMPONENT DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 I. Transmitter-Modulator . . . . . 101 a. Mechanical Design . 101 k· Electrical Design. . . . . . 103 z. R-F/I-F Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 a. Mechanical Design . . . . . 107 b. Electrical Design . . . . 109 3. Reference Computer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 a. Mechanical Design . . . . . . 115 ~. Electrical Design . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 4. .Control Unit • . . . . . 124 a. Mechanical Design . . . . . IZ4 Electrical Design . . . . 124 k· 5. Recorder . . . . . . . . . . . 133 a. Mechanical Design . . . . . . 133 Electrical Design . . . . 145 k· VIU VOLTAGE BREAKDOWN, POTTING, AND PRESSURIZATION • • 149 1, General ••••• 149 2. Early Test Results 149 -ix- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CI1ART SEC RET SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 AKP-II-596 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Ti 3, Trans mUter-Modulator . . • • • . a. Potting versus Pressurization • ~· Initial Potting Investigation .Q.• Final Potting Configuration 4, R-F/I-F Unit • • • • • • . • • 5. Recorder Unit • • • • • • • • • 6. Reference Computer and Control Units IX RELIABILITY STUDIES • • • • • • • 1. General Approach . . . . . . . z. Reliability Program Functions • . . . a. Reliabili ty Analysis an d Prediction Component Part Engineer ~ o. Stress Analysis . . . . Failure Reporting . . ~- Program Control • . . . !!• 3, Reliability Performance a. System Operating Times b. Conclusions • • • • • • • APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT HISTORY • • • • • 151 151 151 151 156 157 157 159 . . . 159 . . . 159 159 161 . . . 163 . . . 164 164 164 165 168 • • • 169 -x- SPECIAl HANDLING S ECRET SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 17 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING AKP-D-596 SECTION I -INTRODUCTION I. GENERAL In January, 1963, Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, Arizona Division, was contracted by the Secretaey of the Air Force Special Projects Office ($AFBP) to participate in an Agena Vehicle Satellite Program. The primary objective of the program was to demonstrate the feasibility of obtaining doppler high resolution radar imageey of the earth's terrain from an orbiting satellite. To accomplish this objective, it was proposed to base the radar system, wherever practical, upon the existing designs of the Goodyear-produced AN/UPQ-1 OZ side-looking doppler radar. Initial studies and proposal efforts on this program had previously begun in the latter part of 196Z when a number of meetings were held between GOodyear Aerospace, Lockheed Missile and Space Company (LMSC), and the - -to discuss system parameters, design concepts, and vehicle configuration. Actual work on the radar portion of the program began at Goodyear Aerospace on January 15, 1963. Twenty-three months later on December Z.l, 1964, successful completion of the first orbital radar test was achieved. This program report is divided into two volumes. This volume -Volume I documents the initial system analysts, design, and developmmt of the Goodyear KP-n sid$-looking doppler radar system. Volume II describes the rroi&Dd tests to which the system was subjected, and presents the resulta of the orbital flt.cht test. z. DESIGN PHILOSOPHY To accomplish the program objective, extensive changes were required to the ex.isting designs of the AN/UPQ-10Z doppler radar. The KP-D radar was required to operate at ZO times the ground speed and 16 times the altitude of the AN/UPQ-lOZ radar. The KP-11 radar was required to soan one side onlY: tbe AN/UPQ-lOZ radar scanned on both sides and used two receiving and recording channels. In the AN/UPQ-1 OZ radar, the film speed and prf were slaved to -1- SPICIAL .HANDUNG SEC I liT TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE OECLASSFIED BY: C/IART SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING OECLASSFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 SECTION 1 AKP-U-596 ground speed; in the KP-U radar they would be constant. Additionally, the AN/UPQ-1 OZ radar incorporated ;many modes ofoperation, such as moving.tar.get indication and variable mapping intervals, which were not included in the requirements for the KP-U radar. Finally, the more difficult vibration and pressure requirements of the satellite environment would necessitate an extenaiv.e repackaging of the radar units.: It was decided that specialized parts, suo~ as klystrons, traveling wave tubes, cathode ray tubes. and frequency multipliers, would be procured from previously established vendors wherever possible. To ensure that these specialized parts would meet all requirements, new specification control drawing.&were made and the components procured to these specifications. It was also decided that the payload would be instrumented in auoh a manner that fiight performance and failure .;mode data could be obtained from narrow band telemetry information. 3. CONFIGURATION The KP-D radar payload equipment which was designed and ·built .by Goodyear Aerospace consists of the following units: Transmitter, RF-IF, Reference Computer, Control, and Recorder. The equipment, with the exception of the record ·er, is installed in the forward barrel section of a standard Agena D vehicle. The recorder is installed in the conical nose section directly behind the film recovery capsule. The radar antenna, built by LMSC, is attached to the side of the Agena vehicle and is a two-dimensional slotted wave guide array. The antenna ia 15 feet long, 1. 8 feet in height, and is uniformly illuminated in both directions. 4. SYSTEM PARAMETERS The radar payload is designed to operate at an altitude of 130 :&:13 nautical miles. The orbital inclination angle is 70 degrees. A fixed radar depression angle of 55 degrees is used. The radar maps a slant range interval of 5. 9.5 nautical miles which is independent of altitude variation. This slant range interval corresponds to a ground range interval of approximately 10 miles. -Z- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRiT SECTION IV ·DOCUMENT 17 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CJIART SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING SECTION I AKP-11-596 The design value for peak transmitter power is 30 kilowatts and the average transmitter power is 262 watts. The length of the transmitter pulse is I. 0 microsecond. By the use of pulse compression techniques this is reduced to an effective pulse width of 0. 06 microsec.ond. The minimum acceptable resolu tion for the system is 50 feet slant range resolution and 50 feet azimuth resolu tion. Actual system performance was found to be better than these minimum acceptable values. The pulse repetition frequency (prf) bas a 16-step variable range from 8215 to 8735. Changes in prf are accomplished via the payload command system. A grey code is used to allow a one-step change in prf to be accomplished by a single command. During flight, change of prf from its preprogrammed position was made on the basis of the radar data received at the tracking station. The total power consumed by the radar system in the operate mode is 2500 watts. The total weight of the five payload components is 348 pounds. 5. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY The payload was launched by a thrust-augmented Thor booster and had a useful orbital life of approximately four days. Radar radiation was confined (1) to the limits of the continental United States, and (2) to the limits of control of the Vandenburg and New Boston tracking stations. Doppler radar data were recorded simultaneously by the recorder unit contained in the vehicle and also by a ground-based recorder located at the tracking station. The data were transmitted to the controlling tracking station via a wide-band data link. There were a total of 14 mapping passes within the four-day period. The time interval for each pass varied from 1. 4 to 3. 7 minutes. The total mapping time was 32. 91 minutes. The unprocessed vehicle data film was returned to earth in the recovery capsule. The resulting high-resolution imagery from the data films confirms the feasibility of doppler high-resolution radar techniques for space application. -3- SPECfAL HANDLING 5 E C R'E T 262 TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING AKP-11-596 SECTION I 6. CHRONOLOGY OF PROGRAM HISTORY To give chronological perspective to the design and development phases of th e program, a summary of events on a monthly basis is included as Appendix I to this volume. -4- SPECIAL HANDLIN.G SECRET SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 17 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART . SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING AKP-U-596 SECTION II -BASIC DOPPLER THEORY 1. GENERAL CONCEPT The beam-sharpening process used in a doppler, high-resolution, side-lookiug radar may be described by means of a physical antenna analog. As the vehicle travels its orbital path a series of pulses is transmitted. Successive pulse transmissions are identified with the elements of an array of dipoles. The spacing between elements is the distance traveled by the vehicle between pulses• . Each transmission is made with a controlled phase. The amplitude and phase of the reflected energy from the terrain at all ranges and angles within the physical beam width of the antenna is recorded on the data film. The length of the antenna synthetically generated is basically limited to the dis tance instantaneously illuminated on the ground by the physical antenna. By the technique of optical processing, the amplitude and phase of the returns from the successive pulses are vectorially added to create the narrow synthe tic beam. The results of these data are then recorded on a final film. Thus, the resolution equivalent to that of an antenna hundreds of feet in length is achieved with a small physical antenna. Z. BASIC EQUATIONS The basic equations of a high-resolution radar are most easily developed if the analysis is restricted to the slant-range plane of a single-point target. Figure I shows the geometry involved. R is the distance to the target from the antenna at time t. At time t =o, R1 i s the distance to the target. The angle e0 is measured in the slant-range plane to the center of the antenna beam at slant range R1• Several combinations of pitch and yaw will yield the same angle e• 0 From the geometry of Figure 1 the instantaneous range R to the target is R =[a1 2 + (vt)2 -ZR1vt sin e] l/Z (1) 0 As the beam width of the physical antenna is small, the range during the period when the target is illuminated may be closely approXimated by tilldug the first few terms of the binomial expansion of Equation (1): -5-SPECIAl HANDLING SECRE .T TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSF IED BY: CIIART SECRET DECLASSFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING AKP-II-596 SECTION II Fi.ure 1 -Geometry o f a Poiilt Target in the Slant Raqe Plane -6 ,_ ,. SPECIAL HANDliNG SECRET SECTION IV • DOCUMENT 17 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnAAT 5 E CR E T DECLASSIFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING SECTION D AKP-D-596 (Z) The range dependence on time is reflected in a phase dependence on time of the return signal. The dependence of phase +of the return signal on time is (3) where f "' the transmitted frequency 0 >.. =the wave length of the carrier 41 =the phase change caused by reflection. 0 Equations (Z) and (3) may be developed into (4) where The return signal is synchronously demodulated with respect to some reference frequency to remove the carrier. It is desirable for the reference frequency to be the frequency of the return signal when the target is at the center of the beam. The phase of the return signal when the target is at the center of the beam and at range R1 is given by (5) The frequency will be (6) -7- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET , - TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING SECTION DAKP-II,...596 From Figure 1, however, dRI dRI (7) dt=dtt 0 • Therefore, from Equation (Z.) (8) Then. substituting into Equation (6), (9) Therefore, fr is the frequency that will be used for synchronous demodulation. The synchronous demodulated signal will have the form (10} = (11) where A(t) denotes the amplitude of the return which is a function of thereflectivity of the target and its position in the antenna beam. When . ~1 =n(Z.w-) and A(t) =K -8- SPECIAL 'HANDLING' ' SECRET SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 17 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY: CMRT SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 AKP-U-596 SECTION U Equation (12) reduces to the familiar expression ( 211'(vt)2) (12) S(t) = K cos X. R • m The signal recorded on film at range Rm will be of the form (13) S(x, R m ) = Tb + K1 cos (~11":2 ) m where Tb =the transmissivity of the film K 1 = some constant times K. From Equation (9) it is seen that all scatterers at an angle eand with velocity · 0 v will have the same frequency. It follows that the locu s of all possible scatterers whose returns have the same frequency is one nappe of a right circular cone with semi-apex co-angle e whose axis contains the velocity vector. 0 The locus of points on the earth can be visualized if the intersection of the above doppler cone with a plane tangent to the earth at midmapping range is considered Since the range interval mapped is small, the mathematical model so described is a good approximation near the point of tangency. 3. AMBIGUITIES Two types of ambiguities -range and azimuth -are inherent in a coherent highresolution radar and provisions must be ·made to avoid them. The range-ambi--guity problem is common to all pulsed radar and is usually avoided by lowering the prf so that the so-called •second-time-around• targets are not seen by the radar. However, the consideration of azimuth ,ambiguities yields anothe,r . set of constraintB on the choice of prf. -9-. SPECIAl HAMDUNG 5 E C R EJ TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CfiART SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAl-HANDLING ·AJ:E-U-596 SECTION D For a processor operating about zero doppler the information spaced at zY n from zero doppler is ambiguous~ This angular spacing is given by (14) where n • a positive Integer, 1. z. 3, ••• >.. z carrier wave length F = prf v = radar velocity. The "focused p~ocessor. used with this system operates about an offset of prf/4 . and is unable.to distlngu.ish:between positive-and negative-going frequencies so that the ambiguity spacing is given by n>..F (15) 'Yn "'Tv"" For most high performance radars it is desirable to choose a prf such that the first azimuth ambiguity is placed in the vicinity of the first null of the pb,ysical antenna azimuth pattern. This choice of prf places an upper bound on the size of the mapped interval. This constraint in turn dictates the antenna height, since from the range-ambiguity staDdpoint the vertical antenna pattern Is employed to avoid range ambiguities. It is readily deduced that ambiguity constraints are a determining factor In choosing antenna dimensions for a satellite radar. These considerations will be discussed further In Section UL 4. DATA PROCESSORS The most successful type of high-resolution processor thus far is the optical . . oorrelator. Considerable insight into the optical processor Is possible 1f . . These devices are commonly known as oorrelators because the original conception. developed at the· University of lllchigan. was an optical cross-correlator. -10-SPEOAl. HANDUNG SECRET SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 17 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING SECTION U AKP-II-596 the properties of a sine wave diffraction grating are considered. Figure 2 shows the three principal emergent rays from a sine-wave diffraction grating resulting from an incident plane wave of coherent light. The angle e is defined thus: sine = ~·f (16) where ~· = the wave length of the coherent light f =the spatial frequency of the sine-wave diffraction grating. Now consider a diffraction grating of the form cos (2~2/~1Rm). This is of the same form as the demodulated return signal from a point target (Equation (13), Assuming a one-to-one scale factor in recording the demodulated return, the spatial frequency is 2x/~1R • From Figure 3 the distance r to the crossing of . m the zero axis is given by X r =--(17) tane For small angles tan e =sin 9 =9 (18) Then, x~1R R x m m r = A1f = "1:iZX =-z-(19) which is to .say that the diffracted light focuses on the zero (doppler) axis at a distance Rm/z from the grating (data film). From Figure 2 it is recalled that there are three principal emergent waves. For z the cosine x grating the three waves are defined thus (see Figure 4): -11 - SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING AKP-ll-596 SECTION n SINE WAVE DlffltA.CTION GIATING NON-DIFfltA.CTED PLANE WAVE DlffltA.CTED PLANE WAVE Figure Z -Geometry niustratiug Fruenbofer Diffraction · -lZ .SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 17 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY: CMRT SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SECTION D AKP-U-596 2 cos~ INCIDENT PLANE WAVE cos Z1rxz Figure 3 -Diffracti on from X'R Grating m DIVERGING WAVE FIOtH PLANE WAVE FIONT CONVERGING WAVE FIONT Figure 4 -Three Wave Fronts of a Parabolic Phase History -13- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CnART SECRET DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SPECIAL HANDLING AICP-U-526 SECTION U 1. Converging wave front focused at a distance r on the axis Z. Diverging wave front with a virtual image at a distance -r on the axis 3. Plane wave front focused at infinity. The converging wave front focuses at that angle and at that distance away from the recorded phase history which corresponds to the same angle and the scaleddown distance (proportional to the ratio of light-to-radar wave lengths and aircraft motion-to-film-scale factors) of the radar space where the data were recorded. Unfortunately, in a practical case the ratio is not nearly hiah enough and a converging lens must be used to bring the desired spot into focus at a convenient distance. Of course the other two wave fronts also come to a focus then but since they lie at different angles they can be blocked off from the final film with an appropriate optical stop. However, from Equation (19) , the focal distance is a function of range; therefore, the lens must have a converging power which varies with range, giving rise to a conical shape. A cyllndrical lens is also required to maintain target separation in range. Thus , the basic elements of an optical processor are a coherent light source, optics to focus range and azimuth data onto a single plane, and fUm drives for· transporting both the data and image films. The optical processor for this system is being provided by the - -14- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 18 . ,~. t;,:\t• " • I f •• • ... . . 1 Hll'li' ":l4.. .:.. 'i'"' . ~'?; ._ ". !;v;.;.n.··· ~ NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 ~ ------~ ~---- ·--... -... ·-.______.. _ __... ~~Dmr PROGRAM REPORT 0 RT DATA ENTERED OAT £ ---··- D t.l\Cil::l!":CHED -.~ -------------- 1 APRIL 1965 AKP-ll-596 I(/ t-"1-11 TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM 5 E C~ R ET SPECIAL HANDLING HANDL l:: "/lA BYZ~.~!\:'l ccNir-oL svsTt;:M ci\:i.v; COPY NO. 17 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 ~[poIll PROGRAM REPORT KP-B ORBITAL DOPPLER RADAR THOR/ A GENA SATELLITE PROGRAM VOLUME II -TESTING , ...... 10.&.& s Hl\ ~;:\l.fl ·~· · ·;~ !1Y:~ ~-~~! CCt-'i ·~:.:;:... ~·.' ~T~.'f1 C i·: !...Y LITCHFIELD PARK , ARIZONA SPECIAL HANDLING SEC R·ET SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 18 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 AKP-11-596 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ix LIST OF TABLES xiU Section Title I INTRODUCTION .••• II GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 3 ' . l. General •••••• 3 2. Detailed Description 4 a. System Tester • • 4 ~· Transmitter-Modulator Maintenance Tester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 c. R-F/I-F Maintenance Tester 18 ~· Reference Computer Maintenance Tester • • 20 e. Control Unit Maintenance Tester • • • 25 1. Recorder Maintenance Tester • • • 28 III GROUND-BASED RECORDING EQUIPMENT. • 33 1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2. Ground-Based Recorder 33 3. Ground-Based Recorder Maintenance Tester 33 a. Time-Averaging Synchronizer • 34 ~. Video Sync-Pulse Generator • .. 36 4. Prf Selection Simulator • 37 a. Purpose. ; • , • , 37 Background Theory , , • • • 37 ~· Video Simulator . • • • • • 42.£· IV GROUND TEST PROGRAM 43 1. General • • • • • • • 43 2. Qualification Test Program • • 43 a. Unit Design Approval Tests • 43 ~. System Design Approval Tests. , 43 c. Unit Environmental Tests • • , • • • • • 45 d. System Temperature-Altitude Tests • • • • • 46 e. Santa Cruz Tests • • • • • • • • • • 47 ]. Repeat of System Temperature-Altitude Tests. 47 -v- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART ~~fjgDON: 9JULY 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title 3. Flight Equipment Test Program • . . . .. . . a. General • • • • • • • • • • ~. Unit Acceptance Tests • • • 0. • • c. System Acceptance Tests • • d. Payload Teats • • • • • • • v PROBLEMS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1. General • • • • • • • • z. Transmitter-Modulator • •••• a. Vibration Problems • • • • ~. Pressure Altitude Problems • c. Other Causes 3. RF-IF. • • • • • • • 4. Reference Computer 5. Control Unit • • • 6. Recorder • • • • • 7. System Problems. a. Timing • • • • ~. Line Filter • c. Clutterlock • • • • • ~· Crt Bias Setting and Video Gain 8. Problem Status at Launch • • • • • a. General • • • • • • • • • • • Transmitted Power Output • • • ~ c. Sensitivity Time Control Wave Form • Twt Output Interruptions ~- Accelerometer • ~- VI ORBITAL OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . I. Mapped Areas . . . z. Pre-Recovery Operating Modes . . . . . . . . 3. Post-Recovery Operating Modes . • . . . . . . . . vn ENVIRONMENTAL FLIGHT DATA . . . . . . . . 1. General • • • • • • • • z. Flight Temperature Data a. General • • • •· • • • ~· Ascent Heating • • • • • • c. Orbital Temperature Data • !!!I! 47 47 47 49 49 51 51 51 51 51 5Z 5Z 5Z 52 57 57 57 57 59 59 60 60 60 61 61 6Z 63 63 63 63 69 69 70 70 70 73 -vi SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 18 SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 'x'tt~1ijifbb'IHWrs AKP-D-596 Section Title 3. Flight Vibration and Shock Data . . . . 4. Flight Pressure Data • • • • vm UNIT FLIGHT TEST ANALYSIS 1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . z. Transmitter-Modulator • • • . . a. General • • . . . . . . • • • ~. Fl3 -Klystron Filament Voltage Fl4 -Transmitter-Modulator High-Voltage .£• Supply. . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • • • d. Transmitter-Modulator Average Input Power •••• e. F73 -Transmitter-Modulator Peak Output Power. 3. RF -IF . . . . . • • . . • . . . • . . • . a. General . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • • • ~. Fll -R-F/I-F High-Voltage Supply Monitor c. F74 -Twt Pulse Monitor • • • • • • • • • • F75 -100-Mc Oscillator Output Power Monitor ~· F7Z -R-f Power to Transmitter Monitor • !.· 4. Reference Coml»uter 5. Control Unit • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~. Power Supply Output Voltages Fl, F3, .and F4. c. Primary Voltage Inputs FS, F7, and F8 •• 6. Recorder • . . • • . . • . . . a. General . . . • . . . • . . ~. FlO -10-Kv Power Supply c. F 55 -Ramp Output ~. F71 -Crt Light Output • • e. F49 -Film Motion • • • • • • • • ]. Isolation Roller Position • • • • • • • • IX SYS'l;'EM FLIGHT TEST ANALYSIS •• 1. General . • • . . . . . . . . z. Typical Radar Pictures • • • 3. Automatic Gain Control (Age) a. General Operation of Age ~. Age Operation During Pass 34 .£• Age Operation During Pass 30 Page 80 83 85 85 85 85 87 87 87 88 90 90 90 9Z 9Z 9Z 93 94 94 96 96 99 99 100 100 100 100 103 105 105 105 111 111 111 Ill -vii SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET 278 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM S.ECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART Aif=tf!!flff ON: 9 JULY 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section --------------------~T~it~le~------------------------· Page 4. Attenuator Changes •. • • • • • • • • 117 a. Attenuator, General Operation • • 117 ~. Attenuator Step 0 • • • • • • 122 c.; Attenuator Steps 2 and 3. • • • 122 ~. Attenuator Steps 3 and 4. • • • • 122 !: Attenuator Steps 5, 6, and 7 • • 122 s. Changes of Pulse Repetition Frequency 127 !.-Effect on Mapping • • • • • • • • . ... . . 127 b. Operator Recognition Problems • • • 131£. Evaluation of Prf Selection Simulator • 132 6. Clutterlock • • • • • • • • • • 137 a. General • • • • • • • • • • 137 1). Clutterlock Correction Angle • • • • 137 c. Vehicle Motions • • • • ·• • • • • • • • • • 137 d. Clutterlock Commands • • • • • • • • • • • • 139 e. Clutterlook Response -Pass 14 • • • • • 139 J. C1utterlock Loop Qpen -Pass 56 • • • • • • • • • • 139 &• Clutter1ook Operation ov.er Water -Pass 16 • • • • • 140 C1utterlock Performance -·Other Passes • 140 !!.· 7. Azimuth Ambiguities • • • • • . • • • • • 146 a. .General • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 146 ~· Azimuth Ambiguities in Radar Map • • • • • • • • • 150 8. Range Ambiguity • • • • • • • • • • .• • • 151 a. ·General • • • • • • • • • • 151 ~· Ambiguous Interval • 151 9. Other Items of Interest • 151 a. General •••••• . ... 151 li· Target Swallowing . . . 151 c. Sticking • • • 152 ~· Film Fogging . . . · ~· 155 X C ONC LUSIONB 157 1. General •• 157 2. :Progri.m Results •. • • . . .. 157 3. Reoomaetadatlons 158 4. Future Applications • • • • • • • • • 159 APPENDIX I CHRONOLOGY OF PROGRAM HISTORY · 161 n ESTIMATE OF RADAR BACK-SCATTERING COEFFICIENTS ••••••••••••• 167 -vm SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 18 SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SPECIAL .HANDLING DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9JULY 2012 AKP-ll-596 SECTION I -INTRODUCTION The initial design and development phase of the KP-U doppler radar is documented in Volume I of this report. This volume -Volume U -documents the ground test and flight test phases. The sections on ground testing include a description of the specialized test equipment which was used, the tests that were performed on the equipment, the problems encountered, and the corrective actions that were taken. The sections on flight testing describe the operations which were carried out during the mission and present a detailed analysis of the radar system performance. A summary of testing events on a monthly basis is included as Appendix I. Estimates based on flight data of the radar back-scattering coefficient, u , are pre 0 sented in Appendix n. :' -1- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SECRET D~lliliM8:~R!LEASE SPECIAL HANDLING D~l~f~~)t-J012 DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 AICP-U-596 SECTION VI -ORBITAL OPERATIONS 1. MAPPED AREAS The areas mapped during the fiight test are shown in Figure 18. Each trace on the map represents a mapped interval which is approximately 10 nautical miles wide (5. 95 nautical miles in slant range) and several hundred miles long. Table X gives the approxi mate latitude and longitude (determined by examination of the map film in all but one pass) of the start and finish of each pass. z. PRE-RECOVERY OPERATING MODES For the first seven payload operate periods (passes 8, 9, 14, 16, Z4, ZS, and 30), no attempts were made to determine the radar system limits, as the primary purpos~ of the mission was to demonstrate the feasibili ty of operating a satelliteborne radar system and early experiments could have placed the primary goal in jeopardy. Immediately after pass 8 the data obtained from the wide band telemetr: link were sent by courier to be processed and correlated at the .. This step was taken to verify that the radar was operating properly. Durin& these first seven active passes only OPERATE, PRF a;11d OFF commands were sent to the radar system. The necessary prf commands were deter.mined from the A -scop.e presentation in the screen room at the tracking ·stations. 3. POST-RECOVERY OPERATING MODES On pass 33 the data·film from the satellite was recovered. On the ne:i:t active pass (40), the automatic gain control (age) circuitry in the radar was commanded off and fixed amounts of receiver (r-f/i-f) attenuation (step Z and step 3) were selected. Again , on pass 41, the radar was operated with several steps (0, 3, 4, 5) of fixed attenuation. No experimenta were conducted on pass 46 but on pass 47 the prf was stepped through all of its 16 positions. On pass 56 a command to short the integrator output (clutterlock circuitry) was sent. On pass 57 clutterlock time constant number Z was selected and on pass 7Z additional fixed attenuator settings were -63- SPECIAL HANDI.ING SECRET r SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 18 SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART A~~ON: 9JULY 2012 SECTION VI selected. Table XI shows the status of the various radar functions, which were subject to commanding from the tracking stations, during the active orbital Ufe of the vehicle. Table XII is a time analysis of the mission. TABLE X -ORBITAL PASS COORDINATES Start End Pass Pass North West North West no. direction latitude longitude latitude longitude 8 8-N 38° 56.0 1 86° 58. s• 45° 47.5 1 8Z0 5Z. 5' 3Z0 9 8-N Z8. 9' 11Z0 33. 5 1 39° 46. 5' 109° o6. z• I 14 N-8 42° 03. 0' 79° 51, 0 i 34° 46,Z' 76° IZ. 1i 16 N-8 41° Z7. 5 1 1Z4° 48.5' 35° 55. 1 1Z1° 49. 0' Z4 S-N 39° Z3. 5 1 88° 49. 0' 46° 51. 3 1 84° 19. 0' Z5 S-N 33° 11. 5 1 114° zz.5• 4Z0 00.9' 109° Z4. 6' 30 N-8 47° 23.5 1 85° Z9.8' 34° 09. 0' 78° 01. 5 1 40 8-N 40° 40. 1' 90° 08.0' 46° 54. 1' 86° 20. 5' 41 S-N 3Z0 4Z.2' 116° 46. 0' 41° Z4,Z' 11Z0 Z7. 0 1 46 N-8 45° 37.5 1 86° 21. 5' 34° 06. 5 1 80° 10. 0 1 440 47 N-S 47. 5' 108° Z3. 1' 33° 57. 5' IOZ0 4Z. 5' 56 S-N 41° 41. 8' 91° 37. 8' 47° 38.Z' 87° 58. 0 1 3Z0 57 S-N 51. 6' 118° Z8. 7 1 43° 34.Z' 113° zz. 5' 7Z S-N 46° 17. 5' 90° so. 0' 51° Ol.Z'* 87° 15. 6•* *S-Look data ·-64- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM l! . ... on ~-· SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 18 SEC R.E T NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART JlfHW1f'V:lN:9 JULv2012 AKP,.;.D-596 TABLE XI -STATUS OF RADAR FUNCTIONS Automatic Fixed Prf initial Prf Clutterlock Clutterlock Pass gain attenuator (at OPERATE on) changes time mtegrator no. control steps step step constant output 8 Yes None 14 13-12-TC No. 1 Normal 11-10 9 Yes None 10 5-6-7-8-9 TC No. 1 Normal 14 Yes None 10 9-8 TC No. 1 Normal 16 Yes None 10 None TC No. 1 Normal Z4 Yes None 11 10 TC No. 1 Normal zs Yes None 11 10-9 TC No. 1 Normal 30 Yes None 8 9-8 TC No. 1 Normal 33 Reeovery of Data Film 40 App. z. 3 . 8 None TC No. 1 Normal Ssec 41 No 4, 5, 4, 9 None TC No. 1 Normal 3, 0 46 Yes None 8 7-6 TC No. 1 Normal 47 Yes None 6 All TC No. 1 Normal 7-Is, o-6 56 Yes None 6 7-8 TC No. 1 Shorted (approx 7 sec 57 Yes None 9 8 TC No. z Normal 7Z App. 0, 7 8 7-6 TC No. z Normal 36sec • -67- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET r TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART AIQUI!I!'IB"": 9JULY 2012 SECTION VI TABLE XU -MISSION TIME ANALYSIS Payload pre-Total payload Payload warm-operate time Qperate (Tw +I~+T0 ) Tim~ to next Active pass up time (Tw) (T ) (time (TP) eye e active pass no. (min) (mPn) (min) (min) (hr) 8 5. 5 z. 5 z. 0 10. 0 1. 3 9 4. 5 3. B 2. 1 10. 4 7. 7 14 4. 5 3. 6 2. 1 1o. z 2. 8 16 4. 5 2. 4 1. 6 B. 5 11.4 2.4 4. 5 1. 4 z. 2 8. 1 1. 3 2.5· 4. 5 3. 4 z. B 10. 7 7. 7 30 4. 5 z. z 3. 7 10.4 14.4 40 4. 5 2.4 l.B B. 7 1. 3 4 1 4.5 4. 0 z. 4 10. 9 7. 7 46 4.5 z. 7 3. z 10.4 1. 3 4 7 5. 1 o. 2 3. 0 8. 3 12.9 56 4 . 5 2. 3 1. 7 8. 5 1. 3 57 ... 5 4. 1 2. 9 11.5 2.2.. 4 72. 4. 5 3. 3 1. 4 9. 2 Totals 64.6 38.3 32.. 9 135.8 93.5 Total payload cycle time (Tw + T p + T) = 2.. 3 hr 0 Time from launch to pass 8 = 11. 4 hr Pass time = 93.5 hr Total orbit time = 107. Z hr (from launch to end of pass 72.) . -68- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 18 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DfMEMjt~:f(WRfLEASE SECRET D~!Qj~Qt!A}t~012 SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 AKP-ll-596 SECTION IX -SYSTEM FLIGHT TEST 'ANALYSIS 1. GENERAL This section presents an analysi s of the radar system operation during the orbital flight test. The purpose of this analysis is to establish that the radar functioned properly throughout the test. No attempt is made to analyze the radar performance in ter ms of resolution or to discuss over-all picture quality. These results are presented in a separate report by In the following pages, a short subsection is presented showing some typical radar mapping results of the flight. Following this, various functions which are important from an over-all system standpoint are discussed by reference to the telemetry and radar map data. The radar pictures, unless otherwise noted, are enlarged 2. 6 to 1 from the original data film size. The map scale i s 3. 6 miles per inch in range and 2. 2 miles per inch in azimuth. 2. TYPICAL RADAR PICTURES Figure 32 shows a section of a 1953 topographic map of East Chicago, lllinois. Figure 33 is a picture of the same area made with the KP-n satellite-borne radar enlarged 4. 8 to 1 from the data film size. Several landmarks are identified by numbers on the topographic map and by corresponding numbers on the overlay to the radar map. Figure 34 shows other radar maps taken with the KP-n .radar. Figure 34(a) is the radar return from Richmond, Virginia, and Figure 34(b) the return from Wurtsmith Air Force Base on Saginaw Bay in Michigan. -lOS SPECIAL HANDLING SE.CRET r TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CAART SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING D~~~9JULY 2012 SECTION IX ,. ~~-:·,~: ·A~,~~~"'i~11~r,<.. ·'· ·.· . -~..:... .. .,". ~- Figure 32 -Topographical Map of East Chicago, Illinois -106- SPECIAL HANDLING --"-·'" ·','. '• ..,..,...-·--~--.......- .w& E"' ~ :::1 z ~ "' < Q ~ .. ... 2 ~ :; 1' . ..... .... 0 14 . E J ~ Q) ::s ~=:" bD e ..... \ ""' 1\ ' I Sl10A :>~V 3AilV13M -115- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET SECTION IV -DOCUMENT 18 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY: CAART SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 AKP-U-526 SECTION X -CONCLUSIONS 1. GENERAL This report bas documented the KP-11 doppler radar program from inception through completion of an orbital test in an Agena satellite. All of the program objectives were realized during the first flight. The success of the mission in large measure resulted from the extensive environmental testing and the associ ated corrective action program. 2. PROGRAM RESULTS The results of the KP-n radar program are summarized below: 1. The use of doppler high-resolution radar for mapping of the earth's terrain from an orbital satellite is feasible within the present state-of-the-art. 2. The performance of doppler radar systems at satellite altitudes compares favorably with the performance of lower altitude ai rcraft-type radar systems. In particular, satellite-borne systems are not subject to the limitation of resolution normally imposed by platform instability in a ircraft. 3. Satellite-borne radar systems, as expected, have the ability to map through all weather conditions and either by night or day, thereby overcoming the main limitations of photography. 4. Wide-band video links and ground-based photographic or tape recording provide practical methods of data recovery. 5. The design criteria used for the KP-11 radar have provided a firm basi s for design of future satellite radar systems. -157- SPECIAL HANDliNG SECRET 294 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SPECIAL HANDLING DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART Rf{~Jjff!J96>N: 9JULY 2012 SECTION X 6. The use of clutterlock for steering the synthetic beam was proved to be highly successful. 7. High altitude radar back-scattering coefficients were shown to be in close agreement with previous low altitude data (refer to Appendix U). 3. RECOKKENDATIONS A number of improvements could be developed for incorporation in the present equipment or in future systems. A partial list of these is given below: I. The present radar signal-to-noise ratio could easily be increased by the use of parametric amplifiers. Presently available units could improve the signal-to-noise ratio by 5 to 6 db . z. The range interval could be ext.ended by three methods: a. By eliminating the azimuth image ambiguity. This would extend the range interval by a factor of two. It could be accomplished by arranging the data processing method so as to eliminate the need for an azimuth offset reference. b. By the use of a longer antenna. However, the azimuth resolution i s theoretically limited to one-half.the physical antenna length. c. By the use of multiple channels. This can be done by using separate antennas, each operating at different frequencies, and illuminating different range intervals. Alternately, a single transmitter frequency can be used with multiple antenna sections being used for reception. -!58- SPECIAL. HANDLING SECRET SECTION IV-DOCUMENT 18 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART SPECIAL HANDLING B~1,LfltWD:,2N: 9JULY 2012 AKP-D-596 3. Range resolution could be improved to be more consistent with the present azimuth resolution. This can be readily accomplished by increasing the system band width and increasing the number of resolution elements of the recorder . 4. On-board magnetic or dielectric tape recorders could be used for delayed read out of doppler data. 5. Automatic circuits could be incorporated in the payload for control of prf selection independently of ground commands. The system could t hen be programmed for operation during any portion of the orbital period. 6. The system could be repackaged for decreased weight and volume. For a s ystem having the KP-ll performance a reduction of weight from 340 pounds to 250 pounds is feasible. 7. Real time electronic correlation and display of selected small areas are possible. 4~ FUTURE APPLICATIONS Satellite-borne radars have wide application to both military and civilian requirements. These include location of military targets, bomb damage assessment, and general surveillance over land and water. Radar data can be used to improve present maps of the Earth, particularly for polar or other remote areas. Detailed mapping of the moon and the planets by orbital satellites using doppler radar is a next logical step. -!59- SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET SECTION V-EVALUATION DOCUM ENTS OF THE QUI LL RADAR IMAGERY PRODUCTS SUMMARY The Quill experimental radar imagery satellite produced images for evaluation by intelligence analysts . The question of what organization would evaluate the imagery lingered right after the successful Quill mission . The documents in this section shed light on some of the tension that existed between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) over satellite programs . Eventually the CIA consented to allow its National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to lead an evaluation effort. The NPIC-Ied team concluded that based on the Quill results , radar imagery was a promising supplemental source of intelligence to the imagery obtained from the Corona and Gambit programs . The documents in this section also highlight the potential that some saw in radar imagery as a viable source of crisis or quick response satellite imagery. Quill provided imagery data via downlink to a ground station , establishing a much desired characteristic for future imagery programs . Document 19 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Secretary of Defense concerning increasing responsiveness of reconnaissance satellites, 11 January 1965: The Director of the NRO (DNRO) , Dr. Brockway McMillan , responded on 11 January 1965 in a memorandum to a request from Secretary of Defense , Mr. Robert McNamara , for quick reaction satellite surveillance capabilities . In his lengthy memorandum, Dr. McMillan reviewed a number of changes underway with the Corona and Gambit photoreconnaissance satellites that could potentially improve the timeliness of photoreconnaissance satellite imagery. He also highlighted a number of NRO initiatives to improve timeliness of satellite imagery as well as the ability to obtain imagery in differing conditions . One effort that Dr. McMillan highlighted was the Quill experiment in radar imagery. McMillan suggested that radar imagery may not reach the resolution requirement specified by the Secretary of Defense , but indicated he would fully explore the potential of radar imagery for quick responses given the results of the Quill experiment. Document 20 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Deputy Director of the Central Inte lligence Agency, requesting assistance in evaluating of Quill imagery products , 3 February 1965: After the test flight of the Quill radar imagery satellite, DNRO Dr. Brockway McMillan requested support from the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Lt . Gen. Marshall S. Carter, in evaluating Quill products. Dr. McMillan requested that Lt. Gen . Carter direct the NPIC chair of the evaluation panel to review the Quill program and evaluate imagery from the program. The NPIC chaired panel 's study efforts would parallel engineering analysis undertaken by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company as well as Goodyear Aerospace Corporation , the two primary contractors responsible for the Quill system. Document 21 -Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office in response to a request for assistance in evaluation of Quill imagery, 8 February 1965: On 3 February 1965, the DNRO Dr. Brockway McMillan requested assistance from the Deputy Director of the CIA, Lt . Gen . Marshall S. Carter, in assigning members of NPIC to cha ir an evaluation of the Quill rada r imagery program. Lt . Gen . Carter agreed that the pote ntial value of radar imagery for intelligence use should be evaluated . He deferred assigning NPIC until the CIA received a comprehensive briefing on the Quill experiment in radar imagery. Document 22 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center requesting an evaluation of Quill Products , undated : After the test flight of the Quill radar imagery satellite , DNRO Dr. Brockway McMillan prepared a request for assistance from NPIC in evaluating Quill products. Dr. McMillan asked the NPIC , after obtaining support from CIA leadership , to identify the extent to which radar imagery could be inte rpreted by photo-interpreters , techniques and approaches for radar imagery exploitation , and recommendat ions for future use of radar imagery systems. Dr. McMillan requested the formation of a study group to address these issues and any others that might be relevant. He requested a final report by 1 July 1965. Document 23 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the NRO Staff Director requesting a study of the use of radar imagery in analysis of military targets , 14 April 1965 : DNRO Dr. Brockway McMillan requested that the NRO Staff Director, Brig . Gen. James T. Stewart, prepare a study of the use of radar imagery in evaluating military targets . Dr. McMillan specifically suggested evaluating imagery use in determining changes in air and naval order of battle, changes in mi litary transport patterns , and the presence of large military equipment. Dr. McMi llan also directed that other studies of radar imagery by the Army, Navy, and Air Force be reviewed as part of this assessment of radar imagery based on the Quill experimental satellite . Document 24 -Project Quill Exploitation and Evaluation Report by the National Photographic Interpretation Center, 1 August 1965: In the winter and spring of 1965, DNRO Dr. Brockway McMillan requested a review of the Quill experimental radar imagery satellite TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM program and imagery products by the CIA's NPIC. NPIC responded with their Quill evaluation on 1 August 1965. In the report , they reviewed a number of aspects of the Quill program. They reviewed the interpretation value of the Quill products and found that large targets such as aircraft and vessel counts could be achieved . The imagery was limited in providing details about those targets. The NPIC-Ied evaluation team concluded that technica l evaluation of targets such as measurement of distance or of targets themselves was limited due to the lack of resolution in Quill radar imagery. The NPIC-Ied evaluation team concluded they could explo it the imagery with current equipment, but that their exploitation would be enhanced with radar imaging processing equipment. Finally, the team assessed the intelligence worth of radar imagery and concluded that it would be a very valua ble source of intelligence when used in conjunction with photo imagery. The NPIC-Ied evaluation team recommended an additional study of the facility requirements for radar imagery explo itation as well as a test program to optim ize radar imagery collect ion. Document 25 -Semi-Annual Report to the President's Foreign Intell igence Adv isory Board on the Activities of the Nationa l Reconnaissance Program , 1 November 1965 to 30 April 1966 : In its sem i-annual report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for activities from 1 November 1965 to 30 April 1966 , the NRO reported on the Quill experimental radar imagery satellite program and evaluations of the program . The NRO reported that the eval uations indicated that there were potential future uses for a radar imagery program . The NRO also indicated that cont inued evaluation of the Quill experiment was still underway in order to plan for future radar imagery satellites that would offer both high resolution/small swath and low resolution/wide swath radar imagery capabilities . The satellite stud ies would be supplemented by aircraft radar imagery stud ies . LIST OF EVALUATION DOCUMENTS OF THE QUILL RADAR IMAGERY PRODUCTS Document 19 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Secretary of Defense concerning increas ing responsiveness of reconnaissance satell ites , 11 January 1965 .. ..... .... ... ..... .. ....... 299 Document 20 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Recon naissance Office to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, requesting assistance in evaluating of Quill imagery products , 3 February 1965 ... .. ........ .... .. ......... .... .. .... ........ .. .... ... ... .... ...... ... .. .... .. .. .. ............... ........ ..... .... ...... ........ ....... ..... ... .. ..... 311 Document 21 -Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office in response to a request for ass istance in evaluating of Quill imagery, 8 February 1965 .... .... ................ ... ... ...... ...... ..... .. ............................................................... .... ....... .............. 313 Document 22-Memorandum from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center requesting an evaluation of Quill Products , undated .. ...... .. ..... 315 Document 23 -Memorandum from the Director of the National Recon naissance Office to the NRO Staff Director requesting a study of the use of radar imagery in analysis of military targets , 14 April 1965 .. ................... 317 Document 24 -Project Quill Exploitation and Evaluation Report by the National Photographic Interpretation Center, 1 August 1965 (Excerpts) ...... .. .......................................... ............................ .. .. .... ................ 319 Document 25 -Semi-Annual Report to the Pres iden t's Foreign Intell igence Adv isory Board on the Activities of the National Reconnaissance Program, 1 November 1965 to 30 April 1966 (Excerpts) .............. ...... ... 331 SECTION V -DOCUMENT 19 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DEPARTMENT OF TH.E AIR FORCE WASHI~>'GTON· January 11, 1965 :-<:::..'!O:Ui'iDLT}I FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENS St:BJ ECT: Quick Reaction Surveillance stems Refer ence is made to the followi t as k you recently gave "Propose a plan t o develop the apabil'ity f or instantaneous sat ellite recon issance with at :east G resolution for various uses (particularly in relation to TIT&~-III) sue as monitoring the arms control agreements, tact· al uses, etc." The stated requirement could be t by day and night photography i rom a synchronous satellite, re ree d back in real time cleccronically. As ~1ill be corr:menteti l a ter, this combination of technical capabilities is not likel t o be attaincble in the foreseeable future. As a means to approach the desir capabilities , I propose _t:1d indeed have underway -a fa i rly s p ific three-phase program: (i) i mprove existing systems, (ii) inco porate the desired characteristics to the maximum practi;:: le degree in the next generation of satellite systcw.s , (iii) ontinue s tudies and har dwar e investigations looking toward fur ther generation. Sane S?ecifics on each of these phases call ow af t er a brief general discuss~on. An attached chart summariz s t he situation now and at a S?ecific point in the first phase, and s e ts out for comparison the goals of the first and s econd phas Th.:: requirement implied ty your to me i s c l osely re l a t ed co .) :;e L·nunciated by the Cha.Lrr.~.:m , JCS, in a memor an dum to you of ~~r~~ 3~ , 1964. The attached chart sh s that , on missions for .::-:::..c:1 o::-bits and targe t progran;s are p epared i n advance, our .::'.:."mned improvements in r eacticn time 1 ill, during the f i rs t phase , ::1i:!c: t the desired performance in thi.s r <>ard as descri bed by t he Chairman ' s memorandum. ; L ' '7 ·~f _ ._ ~ BYE 36008-65 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ::g~~V~i~v?{;i\~~~~?.S·~·"M•· ;r~~~~~~~~~•. ; .,.., DECLASSIFIED.ON: 9 .JULY ~12~. " ' if' !:..'-· L ~~ ~ 7~;.;.... ....... ' •' I' General Discussion To approach the kind of resolution stated, we must look I to photographic systems operating at medium to low altitudes and limited to daylight photography. For such systems, the daily ·.r cycle of the sun limits the times at which desired targets can ~ be covered. The laws of orbital motion and the distribution of desired targets fix the orbit and the rate at which targets can \ be photographed on a given mission, and thus constrain the times and places at which film or information can be recovered. In addition, bad weather over the target area may preclude photog ~ • raphy at the time desired• } .: ~f In addition to these constraints, which are intrinsic in ! nature and introduce delays varying with the mission to be flownf and with the weather, there are other sources of delay introduced by har&1are and by procedures, some of which can never ~ ~-entirely be eliminated. Assuming that a mission is defined by .; a statement that a particular set of targets must be photographed, " [. a complex sequence of preparatory actions must take place converting } ~· this mission into pl ans for a flight, and then accomplishing the 1 flight. In general terms the actions are of the following kinds, ~ ~ although not necessarily conducted exactly sequentially: A. Determination of the orbit to be used and preparation of necessary instructions and documentation that are specific to a mission and orbit. These plans define a flight except that they may contain the date of launch a s an open parameter. ! ., · B. Establishing hardware i n a condition for use that is not specific to a particular flight. C. Preparation of hardtvare that is chosen specifically for a flight, into a condition specif ic to that flight but not necessarily specific to a date of launch. D. Determinat ion of a date of launch. E. Issuance t o the range (\fiR) and Facility (SCF) of instructions specific to date of launch, and preparation of the HTR 2 65 to the Satellite Control the flight and to the and the SCF accordingly. ( , .. / ""'_; SECTION V-DOCUMENT 19 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE-.,----- -\?~ ., DECLASSIFIED BY: c¥1l) ··~~i .. ) DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 F. Final countdown and launch, representing the completion of actions initiated in B, C, and E. An ideal mode of operation is one in which the planning operation, A, is accomplished in a few hours by COIJ1PUter, and steps B through F are then accomplished in a rapid countdown. In practice, I am sure 'Vle will always have to undertake B in advance, and depend upon a checked out system standing by in a reasonably ready condition. Step A, preparation of flight plans, will always have to be accomplished largely in advance of those other than B and D. It can be expedited by computer. Because of the many constraints imposed upon a flight plan by the mission itself, by the requirements of range safety, by the limitations of the booster, and by the characteristics of guidance systems, a great deal of computation and checking by people must be done in this step. l cannot visualize cutting it much below 24 hours even with the most sophisticated of systems. Fortunately, as with ballistic missiles, the likely missions can be anticipated and a library of flight plans prepared in advance. On a mission covered by the library, the time consumed by step A does not contribute to delay. Step C, commitment of the hardware to a specific flight, and step F, final countdowh, depend upon the hardware involved. In principle, at least, they can be cut to a few hours by proper design. In fact, on GAMBIT today they are not controlling; step C \vill be controlling on CORONA as long as the THOR is used as its booster. Step E, preparing the range and the Satellite Control Facilities for a specific flight on a specific date, is largely procedural. Many support activities are involved, people must b~ informed and perhaps even rehearsed, and potentially conflicting r equirements must be identified and resolved. Range safety is of major concern. In principle, procedures can be tightened sharply, but in practice it is probably this step and the requirement f or daylight over target that will ultimately control the ninimum delay between completion of A, tte determination of a flight plan, and launch. .i .i: ·-·. _ __/_~- 3 . BYE 36008-65 ~ : / I \w ., ' !<\ f ~ ! ' TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Another factor in connection with qu~e.k-reacrl.cn mbsih~~:Z:(:-_, that is of interest, although n.ot diract;-l.y connected wi.eh ~lai4~.:;; is efficiency. Short mi$sion:s nooessari;ly eover f.ewet' targmising quick return of< the ·'·:::::~;;f;i,_\t;. primary data. Obviously a multiple recovery system hel.ps grea~~y //:~;{': in this conne~tion. Also, any thing that allows a brp..ljlder or mo1:re · ·:, · · .·.· flexible selection of orbits le.ads to the possibility of more · · · efficient and more expeditious coverage of desired targets. There are many detailed changes over present sylitetns and practices that can serve to improve or shorten the p~;eparatory actions A through E discussed above, and can U!prove efficiency or flexibility of target coverage. Important improvements of degree or kind possible \-lithin the frcu:nework o.f CORONA and G.AMS'~3;;_ · . and of our present launch and recovery facilities, are: 1. Improve the ability of the hardw~e to stand in a rea4y· condition for long peri.ods, facilitating or economizing step B. · 2. Reduce the t~~ required to prepare new orbits and camera program~, facilitating step A. 3. Reduce the delay in configuring the hardware to match a desired orbit, facilitating step C. 4 . Recover in the present recovery area at night and on South-to-North passes, providing for earlier or more flexibly chosen recoveries. 5. Process recovered film while in flight from the recovery area. This attacks a significant source of delay in present operations. 6. Add alternate launch facilities or, alternatively, increased boost capabilities, t o permit orbits more efficiently covering areas such as Cuba, the Soviet t.lissile belt, etc. ' 4 ' -~'.!..---. -'_;,... . ···.; ~ ·.. : il; SECTION V-DOCUMENT 19 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE ( t ' DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IA~ f DECLASSIFIED ON; 9 JULY 2012 Furc:hc r improvement s ca·,l be considered which re'-!uire s ignificant to major new deveLopments. 'These are listed below roughly in an order of increas ing difficulty and decreasing incremental effectiveness : 7. Develop a multi ple rec overy system to maintain efficiency in total cove r age e ven if early recoveries are made, say after one day or after one pass. 8. Develop a land recovery system. The reduction in time-in-transit of recovered f ilm may not be particularly useful in the presence of (5), but in general, land recovery will increase the number of recovery opportunities per day. As a s impler step, one could consider deploying our present recovery forces to ne1v bases for special miss ions. The time required to do this, perhaps a few days, would have to be counted as a preparatory delay. The alternative of setting up permanent recovery forces in many areas would be expensive and inefficient. In fact, the present Hawaiian recovery base is very conveniently located relative to most of the orbits that can be launched from the U. s., and it provides uniformly good weather. Its principal drawback is its distance from Washington, and (5) attacks this problem. 9. Develop a maneuverable land recovery system, further extending the flexibility of selecting recovery times. 10. Add extensive fuel for orbit adjustments to allow somewhat f reer selection of targets and of recovery times and places. 11. Develop the capability11111111111111 This contributes to e ~ps not much to elapsed time. Consideration has several times been gi,en to developing an air-launched satellite system, one of its attractions being flexibility in selection of launch sites, and hence of orbits. Such systems have ah..-ays been disc~rded, however, because the payload available h~s been inad$quate to support adequate photographic resolution. 5 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ----------------·--·· -- ·-····- NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART ,. DE!CLASSIFII!D ON: 9 .JUi..Y 2012 One of the most troublesome problems, pr actically, in achieving any kind of qu i ck-reac tion capability is the reliability of the equipment. Our latest CORONA launch, for example, went through four countdowns be f ore it was finally -and successfully launched, five days late. I am afraid that a long and difficult period of evolution will be experienced before the theoretical possi bilities of any particular quick-reaction system will be regularly realizable in practice. There are no dramatic actions or inventions that can be expected to substitute for the meticulous continuing attention to detail that is required to design and maintain a complex system capable of a high state of readiness. Improvements to Present Systems Phase (i) applies to CORONA and GAMBIT, and concentrates on items (1) through (6) outline d in the preceding section. Specific information i£ given in the paragraphs below, correspondingly numbered. l. During February, we plan to launch a CORONA that has stood in the R-1 condition for 3t least 15 days. The criteria defining the limits of this hol d condition are not sharp, and we expect to be able to improve beyond this point. I wish to defer experiments with GAMBIT in this direction until actions now under way to improve its recently unreliable performance show results. L. Preparing flight plans for CORONA is, for accidental but unavoi:iable reasons, a very clumsy process. Fortunately, the variety of significantly different possible missions is low, so that a useful library of flight plans is practicable. Flight planning for GAMBIT is well automated, and can be done rapidly ab ~nitio, provided ont does not ask for optimized coverage of too large a list of targets. On the other hand, a comprehensive library of GAMBIT flight plans could be very extensive. 6 I .J j--~ --~; • ... . ,._.__ __(:: _t ~ ;_· _£_1_ · ··;'1 SECTION V-DOCUMENT 19 NRO APPROVED FOR R£LEASE • DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART '· DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .IUt;V ig12 \ We have a small library o£ CORONA flight plans now, and are \-;orking with the intelligence community to identify, in an ord'"r of priority , useful additions to it. In the case of GA.\.f..BIT, >ve plan to establish a library of critical missions, and then simply accept the fact that if a new missio'n must be plannej quickl y, v7e c.annot expect it to be optimized for anc:.llary coverage. Yle are working with the intelli;:;ence community to ide.1<:ify the missions most important for this library. By summer I think we can have a useful library for both CORONA and GAMBIT, and will have in operation a regl'.lar procedure for keeping it up to date. ., j 3. To configure a THOR for a particular launch trajectory 1 requires physical disassembly of part of the boos t er and physical change s to its autopilot. During this month, imp r ovements. to this process Hill be effective so that it can be done at day R-8; this is about the limit of improvement short of a major change in the launch vehicle. The ATLAS booster is not handicapped in this way, and is ready to fly on any launch trajectory within its capabilities down to the point that final countdown begins. 4. Recovery forces are training on night recoveries and on recoveries on South-to-North passes at the present time, using air-dropped training equipment. I may later recommend flying an extra CORONA J mission for an operational teat of these and other capabilities. Alternatively, we may find it acceptable to test them on a scheduled mission without great risk to the intelligence take. 5. Contractors are preparing bids now to develop a fUm processor that can fly in a C-135 and process satellite film wi:th satisfactory quality. Use of such equipment would remove about 14 hours of delay that now occurs in transporting film from the recovery area to the processing plant. It will probably be about a year in development, hence not ava i lable much before the end of FY 66. 6. Planning for an a.lt.ernat.e launch site at ETR is in process and will be reported to you soon, It appears that we ·may be able to achieve the same results more quiclcly and at :Less expense by certain payload and booster changes whi ch will allow a much wider selection of orbits from the present launch sites at WTR. I want to report on this alte~ative at the same time. ·~· ,. . 7 TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ---------- -···-· NRO_APPROVED FQR,I_ELEASE DECLASSIFIED a'f,J;C/jJRT ) ) DECLASSIFIED ON; 9 .JULY 2012 In connection with this last point, there is no question th~t i t is relatively easy to substitute an ATLAS for a THOR boos te~ on CORONA. This w.)Uld eli minate any real need for laur:ching CORONA from ETR. Equally important for this discussion i s the fact that it would permit other changes so that CORO~ could have the same pre-launch and on-orbit flexibility as GAMBIT. If this is done, then, CORONA could be expected finally tv &how the same flexibility as that shown for GAMBIT in the column on the attached chart labelled "GAMBIT Goals." I expect to report to you soon on this possible change of booster f or CORONA. Turning specifically to the chart: the first c.olumn shows CORONA as present procedures operate. The improvements. in going. to. the second column are largely procedural, but include an actual change to the THOR to facilitate step C. This column also shows, as a goal, the effects of introducing an airborne film processing plant. The differences between the two GAMBIT columns are ent,· -~~11V<"--' ~ procedural and somewhat conjectural, except for those due to the proposed airborne processing. The most difficult prob-lem is to tighten up the preparatory procedures on t±e: range without sacrifice of range safety (Step E). The 12-hour goal shown i.s simply a goal and should not be r-e.g;J.rded as certain o£ ae·cQJnp,~;J.:>-n•~·::,;" ment on a regular basis. It is IUvce likely of acbieveuten:t .on a · few highly prepared and stereotyped missions t.ban on an arbittary' ~ new and complex mission. ·_. The G3 goals differ ft'Ot!l those of GA!!fBIT only iu th~· lu:>p~-·· that the TITAN :urx booster may permit s:in!pl.er countdown · · and longer holding times. Examination of the chart shovrs ·thiil,t, even-.-~.).oiting •_· of the ilnpr·ovements (1) throq.gh (5), and using ·a p-~e~dle·1;eTatitie;a,. -_orbit, at best about 36 hours will. e.lapse ·between 't~ and the initial reading of a Vell as at night. Either of these possibilities would require a nuclear power source for reasonable lifetime on orbit. Both require, and are getting, further study. Exploratory Program There are some specific efforts in the NRO program to explore or to develop the capabilities that are critical to the several' kinds of capability discussed earlier. The more important activities are listed below. 10 ·-BYE 36008-65 SECTION V-DOCUMENT 19 NRO ~PPROVED FOif?fEJ~ASE ---:----DECLASSIFIED BY: c'YfAitf DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 The NRO budget for FY 66 conta.ins funds earmarked for initiating development of a new recovery system. It is ~e~teii that this development will provide fo-r multiple recover·ie:s, returning four to six separate packages of film f:rom a single mission. Requirements will be defined in detail as tne characteristics of the new general search/surveil.lal'l:c:e system are clarified. The objective is to have il multiple. recov-eTY system available during FY 1967 as an option on GAMBrT-.3 and on the new search/surveillance system. The START program, funded in the Air Force budget, u presently studying the long-term prospects for development of a highly maneuverable recovery system. Two kinds are under ~examination, one to return a large payload, and the other~ to return a small payload, as might b.e appropriate for a multiple recovery system. Emphasis is currently on the latter system. Any development that results will be several years in coming, and will require a further definition of requirements appropriate to the sensor systems expected then to be available. Under the classi fied code name QUILL, an experimental high resolution radar satellite has just successfully undergone a test in orbit. This i s one of the more dramatic milestones in a continuing program of study and development exploring the technology of satellite borne radar systems. Although it seems unlikely that such systems will ever achieve the three-foot resolution suggested in your statement of requirements, I plan, during the next several months, and using the results of the QUILL tests, to try to develop a definitive report on what on.e might expect to accomplish with a radar' satellite, and to relate this to various potential r equir ements . Electronic read-out has always been an attractive objective. The SAl.'10S project included t1.ro r ead-out systems, E..:l and E-2. E-1 flew and successfully r eturned results in January 1961, with pi ctures showing about 100 foot resolution. E-2 successfully transmitted pictures from ~he p~yload during countdown, but efforts toward flight were stopped after launch failures. The USSR is known to have a r ead-out system operating at an estimated resolution of about 75 feet. ). .. i ..lL_ _ ·. .L _:: .. . . ll ·.. -;_ : ~c-~~ } _6008-65 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM ., ·~ . . . . .. ...:~N?~·.;o\·:-,...:.~;:r.;:!',;'...:~i~~~~~~~~jl~.?.~tf:;;~!:.-;~.~2~'i:··~~.J...':~~e~k --~.,_qti:~~~~~ii:J·r.J.1.:~:;;J~~~-·~~e.,!}(..,;_~... 't£;·:.v~~:,~i~~;-~:xt··~--~ --~-~~~~~~;4j ::~' 'ff~;J,; . i;~~~ I · ;!-; ?!.~.•• ·:¥. 1?· i_~_:.;.• ;., < ~.: ~i. '{ 1~: ,. :~ ; NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DEtLASSIFIED BY: C/l.'f<;& DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .W.L¥'2012 "" •tiK!t ;i.:_ d-e'l!!~ The ""0 oonti_. ;<> ~f<>' .;:·1~~fib!lt?i in the technology o-f :re~ul•oU:t• · f>ys.ift~&~ -~ ~-"-'T '-'E•>L-c"''" factor has ahqays bee-n dre~-a~it:Q,a-i ~ll~''ou:t· . of picture$ at a speed hi..@-~tT.otlgn 'to -p;et'liii.t a 'U$~£ul during the time that the sat:el.tiie is-vi&-ibl~ ftotii .a station . Current t~chnol()g-y-l>~-ini.t-s ~ttansmitti:ng. :o'ttiy· one target per pass per l:"e4i~-out ·station, a:nd 1.-:bliits ·tb:ti covered by, or the resol.trti.on -of , th-at p-artict1la'r re.tUm. definitive results bea-ring on future poS$ibil.1t.ies are now coming out ~f our NRO s~tudie. s.. A:t:\. atte;n.t_p·t will be maQ.e· to summarize these and evalu-ate t.hei.r imp-lioations f<>-r s,ever:al · · potentially interesting applications, incl,uding the · 4PJ~i.L~~etl~fi11 co quick-reaction surveil -lance sys.ceros. . You have recently directed me to under-take harchv.are efforts relate-d to surveillan.ce systems synchronous altitudes. Although such syst.ems, as I noted earlier, cannot be expecte-d to s-upport image fonri.ng· s-enso.:r,s· with three-foot resolution, they may be expe;cted to ~ol.l.e·ct: important c.ollateral information for surveillance purposes. ~ /A,. . . ' .. . ay· M~n . . Dir·ector .....7"'"' National Rec;o.nnaissance Attachment cc -DepSe.:Def 12 SECTION V -DOCUMENT 20 ( (_ ~r.-· ..,_ --· : · JSP ou..t... NRO APPROVED ~OR RELEASE , p!SS . . . DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART. ';) . S.;\.FSS / R.;pt-Gen Stewart/29Jan65 DECLASSIFIED 0:9 JULY 2012 -.t.. l,L\ "~ r:r::<:l. .I ~ •<''(:. 'i c,v \J\J) ~-~~-~ ~~~ " . z~:alUctlc:! of c.~::~ ~.:!~.:.::t~:tl:!.ty D.~onStZ.a.t:iOil-""7 ·~~~·"---~- C:.:. :1 I:o~c.~-b~r 1::':!:. t::"":. ~..1 fi::~; -; (~"JI:J.~:!.. fa~ibil!ty. demon-· zt::~tio::1. t.i~h r~;~ol:1t:~·-::.: ::-~\!~::: ~-:~:_: t.~J.c.::c~3f-..J.lly orbited. ~otb. re~Ccut late.. m:d ~:.:;cc.ve;r~d J.::t~ ll~\i~ bcc.'""l ex~.Jli..'led. P~eli::d.!.;.ory e;.--:.a!.y.Ji:; i!i.dic.::.i.:(;:: !:!i..:::: .sll f.3 ru:ibili1:y d~on"'! str;:;.tion c:.,j~ctives ~:~1:c r.::ci:. A dctz.iled e~i.:.-;. ~..:;:i~:~ [::."..::.l;.r ~:!.z o£ t!!~ mission is c<.:r::eo~tly tmcler ~;tl..J by C':;nt:;::~c':.:vt":: . 1'hli;. ~.nlysis -.~1].1 do.al t:itlt c.o~1_i~ri~c. :1~ 1;::-.-:.::.~· ::::J. z:c:-.::i_:.:·:..:t :~Q ::~cov~r~d Cat.e, · . efl:cctc p f D~~c:ccl:olc3ic~1 cc::C.:!.tic~: , ~:.:::7:.iclo iuflcence on ~~dsr rjc::.Zoi.uarcC:~ =d ct:~.:;~" f~::.:;~~;:~ ~:!'i:!..cll1 f~cm ~ engin~a-r:!:.1~:3 ~-=!.:..:J.c , e::c z:cc~;:-c~::y· Zc:: ~ c:.:.~~~~:.~z:c~ l:..~rfcrZ:...~c~ cval\.Ultio:l•. i. f~~l t~1~t: ·c ?.::::~:11c1 c.·. :~::~2.~r.:; ~:.s .s::-c::l !l be c::Ce to d~t:.!4~:;i::.::: t:::.~ ~~~~luc of ~.:::·::c:l:.. t~-:.:.:;c_....:i:;~j rcir~r it~lz.£Cl:'Y .:.s an i:~t·~llizZ;r:ce sc,:.::_::.:;o. I f,.::~l t:::-.~ :·:}IC i s . \:h~ best \iU:;.llfi~H.l egc::..cy to cb.::.lir ~ t.:;~:.:. ;;:;·-:,.:; :=llls pm:pos.z.. If ycru. a$r~c# ~Y staff to.rill :·:o:rl~ c~\: tl!2 c:::..:c-:.ils "t::itn tiPIC. 1. 2 • . addressee ss-6 B:.·c~ c:.~....~~:r 'i?-'ir::ctc!: ~~cHillZ£1 ·. . '•· 3. t._. SS-1 ·P..F-1 Cf~ice RF-2 (:~ ~ SECTION V -DOCUMENT 21 .,...~ _, : · :~• . • NRO APP~OVED FOR RELEA~ _. .-... ...;-BY: C/IART --. """~....,.;.~~---....-.. -~ . DECLA~FIED ' '-•"F y· . ·. DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 i .·' C:::NT: ·,;L . !;,:TE::!...UGENCE AGENCY • ·-,-... I' \ •v•cul<;:,r· -·-., ......,..., D C ~_,.~ • :.j·;-.'; """¥......,_...,, • • Evaluation of QUILL Feasibility Demonstration ~-This. memorandum is in response to yours of 3 Fe~~ua~y 1935, subject as above. It is my understanding that we were to receive a ~ompr~hens~ve briefing on the QUILL sys·._::1 and ' i~: would seem timely now that this should be s~haduled. 2. : ~gree that ~nalysis of the potential value to i~talligence of this sour6e is an appr opriate com~lement to ~he engineering analysis which you advise is now u~der way. :atarmication of the precise auspices under which t~~3 analysis is conducted should awai t a fuller understanding on our part of the factors involved. Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director ..;,1 ' . BYE #008,~-65 · Copy c:;:;--P,f 9 SECTION V -DOCUMENT 22 NRO APPROVE·D FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART t DECLASSIFIED ON:-9 JULY 2012 .;: .• ,.: Pl: ~. :::.~-. --f{a~~~'. -~· c~j~~?i~:·' _'; ·: ·~ ;~_ $J'Jl!M:FQtt r~;pro~a~J;.....-...~,on· '_, ..... , . .~ . · .. ,_ . ·~ TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 I ~· t t ' SECTION V -DOCUMENT 23 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART r\ p l: i .L l ' ~"+ ' DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 :;FBJ C:CT: Study of Radar Imagery You ara requested to plau a study of the probloot of .i.n tcrpreting imagery fran synthetic-arr.1y (side looking) r,~durs. 1'he principal interest in thes~ studies is in .iJU,t g es having a resolutiou of 25 feet or bett:ar, .:ind in military targets .::; ppr.opriatc to tt1:1t resoiution. A:ri Lraportant intelligence objectlve is to sense ch.unges :Ln ..dr &'ld naval order of battle, cl-.anges in G)ilL,_t} :.l i.rac t or. :; •t .Lo n;;t l •'.ec mm a i ss« nce Office I I SECTION V -DOCUMENT 24 PROJECT QUILL EXPLOITATION .EVALUAliON REPORT BYE-41778/65 I AUGUST . 1965 ~~~ COPY ·_ , _ 128 PAGES - ~-- Handle m BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE control syste m) iD I" ti • Q~OUP 1 IE Jil CL.UDiiO FADM AUTO~A T I C DOWHGNAO ING A ND O&CI..AISt f'I' ICATION TIP SE8RET . . .. ' TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Handle Via BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly 'F8P SECRET RUFF QUILl PROJECT QUILL EXPLOITATION EVALUATION REPORT AUGUST 1965 ··-··-··· .. -· ----- BYE-41n8/ 65 ' . It. I,.· ' . i' :c; · I :c l[ LL 'L NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER 'IIIII NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 20¥eP SECRET RUFF QUILL 5 I Handle Via BYEMAN-TALEN T-KEYHOLE Control Syslems Jointly SECTION V-DOCUMENT 24 Handle Via BYE-41778/ 65 f8P SEERH RUFF BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL TABLE OF CON'IENTS AD HOC QUILL EVALUATION COMMITTEE •.•••••••••••••••••••••••• iii EV~UATION 'l'EAMS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , •••••••••••••• iv PR.EE'A~••• ,., •• , •••••••••••••••••••••••• , •••••• , •••••• ,.,... 1 EXPLOITATION EVALUATION REPORT•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX B. APPENDIX c. APPENDIX D. APPENDIX E. I I i \.... I [ I [ I :r '-- ' Interpretation Evaluation Team Report 1. Preliminary Report, Phase I ••• •••••.•..•••• l5 2. PreliminaryReport, Phase II•• • ••••.••••••• 23 3. Preliminary Report, Phase III• • ••••••••••.• 37 4. Final Report...•••••••.••••••. •••.•••.••••• 47 Technical Evaluation Team Report•••••.•••... •. . 67 Equipment Evaluation Team Report•..••••.•.••••. 81 Intelligence Evaluation Team Report •• •••..••••• 87 Collection System Evaluation Team Report•.•••• 109 )[ NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 -i lr f8P SECRET RUFF -··j QUILL f· !l'l Handle Via BYEMAN-TALENT·KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM 8YE4tnB/65 Handle Via 'f8P ·seERH .RUFF BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL I • PROJECT DESCRIPTION A. Purpose The purpose of the exploitation evaluation of Project QUILL is to determine the intelligence wort h of satellite side-looking radar imagery as an information collection system (BYE #36346-65 from Director, NRO, to Director, NPIC, and BYE #41652-65, NPIC Project QUILL Evaluat ion Plan). B. Objectives 1. "Assess the amenab1lity of the QUILL High Resolution Radar products to interpretation by trained PI's to include probl ems ass·ociated with exploitation techniques in target detection, recognit ion and i dentificat ion, t raining, and interpret ation aids ." j 2. "Assess the limitations, advantages, and special applications of this type of satellite-derived intelligence product as a supplement to current photographic reconnaissance sensors and as a separate satellit e reconnaissance sensor. " ,I__ / 3. "Assess the benef its to be derived f rom various swath widths , resolutions, and beam depression angles for those applicat ions unique r l to radar satellite sensors. " (It is emphasized that radar sensors were examined from the point of view of image utility only. Operational problems which may be inherent to this type of s·ensor were not considered . ) r ,_ C. Materials for Evaluation [ The QUILL evaluation materials were Mission 2355 made over the United States 21 December to 24 December 19€11. The mis was [ and engineering purposes and ndt for intelligence collection purposes. Consequently, some of the flight and system information and data that is required for complete interpretation was not obtained and some types of targets of current intelligence importance were not [ covered. \ L[ NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART Handle Via DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 -5 - BYEMAN·TALENT·KEYHOLE[ T8P.SECRH RUFF Control Systetns Jointly QUill L__ SECTION V -DOCUMENT 24 Handle Via BYE-41n8/65 T9P SECRET RUFF BYEMAN-TALENT·KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL In addition, a limited amount of material was collected employing an airborne high resolution radar to map some of the target complexes contained in the QUILL product. 'nlis material was used to su'Pplement the QUILL material employed only in the Intelligence Worth evaluation. 1. Radar Imagery Recorded The material for evaluation, obtained from the 14 passes, was recorded by 3 methods. a. Recovered Imagery Physically recovered from the vehicle in the form of a Doppler History Record and converted to human readable imagery in a correlator. This material was from the first 7 passes only. b. Transmitted Imagery Transmitted and recorded as a Doppler History Record and fed into a correlator. This coverage was from all 14 passes. c. Transmitted and Taped Imagery Transmitted by data-link, recorded on magnetic tape, and later transformed into a Doppler History Record and fed ·into ·the correlator. This coverage was from all 14 passes. 2. Reproductions Received for Evaluation Radar imagery was received in tvo forms: a. Contact print on 70 IIDD film. b. 2.6X enlargement on 9.5 inch film. 3. Imagery Evaluated a. The primary evaluations were made of Recovered imagery. b. A select sampling was made from all 3 methods of recording and was given a comparative evaluation to determine the relative losses of information. c. The 2.6x enlargement received a technical evaluation but was omitted from interpretation evaluation because of its degradation and poor quality. NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART _ 6 _ Handle Via DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 . .JULY 201~9P SECRET RUFF BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM t. [ [ [ [ [ '; [ ' :_[ Handle Via 8YE-41nB/65 t6P SECRET RUFF BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL II. DISCUSSION A. General This discussion is a summary of the results of the efforts of 5 teams charged with attaining the objectives of the QUILL evaluation. The detailed re~rts of the teams are included as a~ndixes A thru E, which also contain results and conclusions beyond the basic objectives of the project evaluation. B. Interpretation Evaluation (See Appendix A) The interpretation effort involved the overlapping functional categories of mission plotting and scanning, target indexing, preliminary analysis of significant targets, and the detailed analysis of selected targets. Mis.sion plotting and target indexing were accomplished without difficulty with the aid of charts and maps. The continuous-scan format, the lack of atmospheric i nterference, and the photo/map similarity of the QUILL imagery facilitated t he performance of these functions.. · Target descriptive information of a general nature was readily derived during both the preliminary and the detailed analyses without the use of collateral information. The information derived from the QUILL imagery included the determination of activity levels of ports ·and rail yards, the occupancy of vehicle parks, and the approximate. counts of aircraft at airfields. The use of collateral information and comparative vi sible spectrum imager;r, i.e., KEYHOLE, addec'! considerably to the r·eliability and the amount of detail d..:rivcd from the QUILL imagery. Although targets not indicated on maps or in collateral were detected in the QUILL imagery, the derivation of substantive descriptiv~ information was extremely difficult in many inst ances without the use of comparative visible spectrum imagery. The detailed analysis obtained from visible spectrum imagery was enhanced through its comparison with subsequent QUILL imagery to include target change detection. Significant t arget i nformation, such as aircraft and vessel counts, was derived from the QUILL imagery. Although this information is. inherently lees defined in nature than that obtained from visible spectrum i magery, this factor does not necessarily detract from. the significance of the information derived from QUILL imagery. NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART -7 -DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 Handle Via BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE l6P SECREl RUFF Control Systems Jointly QUilL SECTION V -DOCUMENT 24 Handle Via BYE-41n8/65 T8P SECRET RUFF BYENAN-TALENT·KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL Similar detail on most of the targets was derived from both the Recovery and Transmitted imagery. However, the degradation of the imagery from the Transmitted-tape format resulted in the loss of significant target detail. The variables involved in the radar return from a given targetand the relatively general nature of the information derived from QUILL imagery affect the accuracy of such information as aircraft and vehicle counts and functional determinations. However, reasonable estimates can be derived. Tbe accuracy of these estimates is improved considerably through comparison with visible spectrum imagery and the maximum use of collateral information. C. Technical Evaluation (See Appendix B) The evaluation of the technical aspects of the QUILL material included a study of its characteristics determined by an analysis of the film quality and study of problems associated wit h plotting,titling, ephemeris data, and general handling. The mensuration analysis included the determinat ion of scale, .the measurement of long distances, and the measurement of target dimensions. The QUILL mission was primarily a research and engineering test mission having no particular regard for target measurement requirements. In the majority of cases, precise measurements from QUILL imagery could not be obtained. This was partly due to the lack of reference data, such as normally received from a satellite reconnaissance mission,and partly due to the peculiarities of radar illllgery. 'nlis resulted in a technically incomplete mensuration analysis. Nevertheless, the evaluation indicated that the QUILL imagery can be measured with reasonable accuracy from point to point and that the de~~e of measurement accuracy increases in the longer distances. Accurate measurement of small targets is difficult because of the lack of sharpness of image edges and because of inaccuracy in establishing the image reference points of positive-return targetswhich are rarely imaged in their actual configuration. The absence in the film format of mission reference data similar to that provided in the KEYHOLE program was a serious handicap to mensuration, but it is subject to ready correction through the applica tion of techniques and equipments such as are used 1n other satellite systems. NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART -8 -DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 Handle Via BYEMAN·TALENT-KEYHOLE T8P SECRET RUFF I Control Systems Jointly L _ QUill TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Handle Via · BYE-41778/65 T6f SEfftET RUFF BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL D. Equipment Evaltl8tion (See Appendix C) The exploitation equipment currently on hand in interpretation facilities, such as the NPIC, is capable of handling QUILL mission material when it is exploited in a manner similar to a KEYHOLE read-out. The development and installation of an in-house o~tical data ~rocessor (correlator) capable of enhancing target imagery detail would considerably im~rove the exploitation capability with regard to ~roviding flexibility and timeliness to the detailed read-out. In the event that a requirement for near real-time exploitation capability is generated by the collection system's real-time image transmission capability, the addition of corr~lating, multiple mission viewing, and automatic information retrieval would be required in the exploitation center. 'llie nature, sophistication, and extent of such equipment would depend u~n the real-time requirements, the volume and nature of the imagery of Dop~ler History Record received, and the type of read-out. ,_ E. Intelliernce Worth Evaluation (See Appendix D) 1. The estimated intelligence worth of a radar sensor was established through an evaltl8tion of the following 4 major considerations. a. The potential inf ormation collecti on capability of such a sensor against selected Essential Elements of Information (EEI) under certain operating conditions. r I b. The advantages of the system which sup~lement ~hoto sensors. c. System limitations. : d. Special applications of such a system within selected internat ional environments. :.._' _ The collective evaltl8tion of these considerations indicated that radar r sensors could be extremely valuable as a supplemental imagery collection L system during Cold War and Crisis sittl8tions and would be almost completely satisfactory as a separate system. during a General War environment for the ~~se of Strike Effectiveness Assessment (SEA). r ! 2. The ~tential information collection capability was evalt18ted NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART _ _ 9 Handle Via ..[ DEcLAssiFIED oN: s JULY 201\eP SECRET RUFF BYEMAN·TALENT·KEYHOLE Control Sysle11s Jointly QUILL· ·.._____ SECTION V • DOCUMENT 24 Handle Via BYE-41778/65 TQP fiE€AET RUFF BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL for QUILL as well as QUILL-Improved (resolution approximately 10 feet in both range and azimuth) produc~s. Furthermore, each of the preceding was evaluated as separate and supplemental collection systems. It was estimated that QUILL products were, at most, marginal information-producing materials during Cold War and Crisis situations, particularly as a separate system. However, they were estimated to be most productive for SEA during a General War environment, even as a separate system. QUILL-Improved products were considered to have substantially more information potential when compared with QUILL, particularly as a separate collection system for SEA. As a separate system, even these materials have limited information potential during Cold War and Crises; however, when employed as a supplemental system, their potential is significantly enhanced. The evaluation relative to scientific and technical information potential revealed that even QUILL-Improved products held little promise of providing anything of significance. Consideration was also given to a Post Attack Reconnaissance (PAR) mission during General War, and i t was determined that the relative information potential would be almost identical to the Cr isis situation. 3. The major advantages of a radar system, as a supplement to photo sensors, were considered to be threefold. They would be: a. An essentially all-weather system. b. A day-night system. c. A potentially "quick response" system. ·All of these advantages make a radar sensor invaluable where short response time is a major consideration. 4. The evaluation indicated a major limitation as an intelligence collection system. A radar sensor is extremely limit ed in providing meaningful information on previously unknown targets. 5. There were significant special applications for a radar sensor in each of the 3 international environments considered. During Cold War, changes or new construction activity could be detected, although not identified, tn areas where weather or light condi tions precluded photo acquisition, thereby increasing the efficiency of the operation of photo sensors for search and surveillance purposes. During both Crisis and General War, the quick-response characteri stic makes i ts application most significant. NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 Handle Via -10 - BYEMAN·TALENT-KEYHOLE T8P SECRET RUFF Control Syste111s Jointly ' QUILL ·\...__ TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM BYE-41776/65 Handle Via T6f SECRET RUFF BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL F. Collection System Evaluation (See Appendix E) The objective of the Collection System Evaluation Team was to assess the limitations imposed upon the QUILL imagery as a result of collection equipment characteristics and to determine which characteristics might be improved in order to enhance the intelligence yield of the product. As a result of this study, a number of syst em characteristics have been isolated and analyzed with regard to t heir influence on imagery quality and· utility. To a large extent, these analyses have been subjective in nature since a sufficient quantity of QUILL data is not available. ':---It is clear that in order to proceed with the optimum design and development of an advanced radar system, a better quantitative under standing of the relationships between image util ity and the various system parameters must b~ achieved. The primary parameters which require quantitative, experimental investigation are: Range and azimuth resolution Signal-to-Noise Ratio Depression angle Dynamic range Radar frequency and polarization combinations j . ,.-- Although there are other characteristics which require study, it is considered essential that sufficient quantitative data be acquired on these 5 characteristics in order to design a system which would produce optimum imagery. III. CONCLUSIONS A. The QUILL High Resolution Radar products are amenable to interpretation by trained interpreters. Interpretation is enhanced by correla r tion of the QUILL products with collateral. L B. Previously known targets can be located, identified, and described, significant target changes and activities can be discerned, and pre r I viously unknown targets can be detected. "'-- C. The analysis of QUILL imagery is enhanced significantly by variable processing with an optical data processor (correlator). NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE '.._ DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART -11 - DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 Handle Via BYEMAN·TALENT·KEYHOLE T8P SECRET RUFF Control Systems Jointly QUILL SECTION V -DOCUMENT 24 Handle Via BYE-4tn8/65 'f6f SECRET RUFF BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly QUILL D. The exploitation of QUILL i~~~~ogery on a near real-time basis with simultaneous comparison of visible spectrum imagery of selected targets is feasible . E. In addition to the consideration of ground resolution u a separate and important factor influencing the information produced by radar imagery, the factors ot dynamic range, look-angle, and frequency spectrum should also be considered. F. A radar sensor would be of value in Bl.q)plementing visible spectrum sensors in Cold War for search and surveillance purposes. q. A radar sensor would be of definite value as a supplement to visible ~pectrum sensors for indications during a Crisis and for Post Attack Reconnaissance (PAR) during General War. H. A radar sensor would be of very high. value, even as a separate system, during General War for Strike Effectiveness Assessment (SEA). I. The collection system employed on this QUILL mission represented a significant technological achievemnt. It demOnstrated that very good quality radar imagery can be acquired from an orbital system during bad weather and darkness . It also demonstrated that near real-·time strategic intelligence acquisition i s feasible. J. Notwithstanding the success of the collection system on this mission, it is highly probable that it can be greatly 1J11Proved to produce IIIUCh better iuagery. K. A QUILL-Improved s;y~xem (10 feet in range and azimuth resolutions) seems justifiable. IV. RECO~IONS These recommendations are based on the assumption that satellite side-looking radar will be used operationally. · A. It is recommended that a thorough study be made of the requirements for the exploitation facility and exploitation procedures to include a near real-time capability. B. It is recommended that\! test program be initiated to inve~tigate various parameters of the collection system in order to optimize the quality and utility of the resultant lJDaiery). NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART -12 - DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 Handle Via BYEMAN·TALENT-KEYHOLE T8P SECRET RUFF Control Systems JoinUy QUill '---- SECTION V -DOCUMENT 25 NRO APPROVED FOR RI:LU$E CHESS .~TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED BYr ~/IART . Handle Via Indicated Controh ~·Alit f. DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2012 &YIMA~-f Al IH f .-l(ll MO (l-COM IJtol T R'Vft'· , , o je cl IOfALI S,T-OICAif-C~IONA-GAM.IT-. ·::~p&u~r QUilL -Hf:XAGON-:-DO~I AN .. ~ . 1 1~~11 111111!111 11 I I~ QIIUMIIIIM .. :;' 14 ()()0604220 ·, .._ -:'_,:·· ·.: :· .. -~ · .. •{ f . :: .• :~ :,). ...~ ~~ :~~~·!:~: ::--~ -~~ ---~-. C'i~iMI.. AN _Nl!:AL REPORT -: . .•1 ;:.....~~ .;: ~· ~':":: • • .t :' • • . ~-... ::._.:-J-:. '. ~: ,·\ ~~..--.· . ~ • ,I '-·~ • • • .,..... -•' 'THE .·, -~/ ,..":-:~~-~~:t'·:_ :: . '.. ;,. .,: ,, . :-:>t :~.·,j~ RE5fD ENT 5 .F:O.REIG N I N TELll G ENCt ; ~-i. :· ·. " }·~. ~••~-;. :~; . . :~ ADVIS0R_Y.B0ARD . .. ' ' • , : ,J ' ., -~-;: '.:• ,. .; · ··· .~ -~:~i~\~~:·''·}'s<·. ,·. l . • .,. ": •• ~ ---~-: ~ t' ,~ ...,.-. : · -· , · ... _, .. ·;.•-. ·''ON ,·. THE: ""'"' ·_:,A CTl V'ITt'E 5 :.0 F THE. . ·'·• . .. .,·,·. :·,-. I \. .. . .-. ·. '· ...·'. <' '::.· .: ./:~'>r:>... ., .... . ·:·.<. . . . . ·. . . . . ·.·· -r~• ~ ; , .,. ,',NATIONAL ·RECONNAI55ANCE PRO'GRAM ·.• :.· ...-;:. : _.._·. : ... -~ ' , ._ . · -~ . · ; • · r' ' . •. t •. • . -_ · :l· · ·~ ..· ........ ..;... -. . " ~ :>. ··;:'. )'··'" . .u -. ·. -..: •. "" ·" .._\. · ·.· .. -~ . . r •· =-·· I ... • . . . > ·.:.,._ , ' • ~ -· :~"·: ........ ..:· .''-.•1' l .::..~)~ ... : . "t ~ .. •. '· .i-::.-·;~_ ..:~ ~-~ . .. .. 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TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED•ON: 9 JULY 2012 TOP SECREl'i' CHESS -ZARF -RUFF CO MINT SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM 1 Nov 65 -30 Apr 66 HANDLE VIA JOINT BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE/COMINT CHANNELS ONLY IDEALIST/OXCART/ CORONA/GAMBIT /DORIAN HEXAGON/QUILL~IIIilllllllll BYE~52. 377-66 'fOP SEGHE'i' Copy . 8 SECTION V -DOCUMENT 25 TOP SEC RET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSifU~D ON: 9 .JULY 2 0 12 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page L Foreword••••••••....•.••••..•.....• , ..•.••.·• . • . • . . • 1 IL Budget. ••••••••••••••• • •••••..••.•••••••• ._.......... 2 m. Collection Operations·................................. 3 A. Satellite Photographic Reconnaissance. . • • • . • . • . 3 CORONA: Photographic Search. . • • • . • . . • • • • 3 GAMBIT: Photographic Spotting. • • • . . • . . • . . 8 B. Satellite SIGINT Reconnaissance................. 10· POPPY•••• I................................ 10 -...................·•••••••••••••••• 11 -·································· 12 ••••••••• ••. •.••••••• ~. . . . • • • • . • • • • • 14 -,.•••.•••.••••••••••.•••• • • ~ •••••• 14 ' • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16 -························· · ········ 17 -··························· · ········ 19 21 i Handle via BYEMAN Control System TOP SECREr -..........--....;.,_,______~--·· -· ·;. .,_...,. _... ~_,..;..---...;._~ -------'L-·----··· TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM TOP SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART ! DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 .JULY 2612 Page C. · Aircraft Reconnaissance.. .. ................... 23 IDEALIST•• , ••••••••.••••••• ,............ 23 OXCART• ••••• •• ••••• • •.••••••• •••••• • ,.. 25 TAGBOARD.................. ............ 27 BLUE SPRIN'GS•••••.• , •••• •• , • • • • • • • • • • • • 29 N. Research and D~velopment•• •.....•. .-..• ,. .... .... .... 31 1 A. _Satellite: HEXAGON Improved Search System. • • 31 33 CORONA Improvement............ .. .. 34 GAMBIT CUBED-G3••••••••••• •• •••• 35 QUILL Radar Feasibility. . • • • • • • • • • • • 36 MOL DORIAN Photo Payloa.ci.... . ... . 38 B. Aircraft: 40 ii Handle via SYEMAN Co~trol Sy1tem TOP SECRET ---······-------...-.- ... ~--·--------.. • ---· SECTION V -DOCUMENT 25 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 L FOREWORD The organization and functions of the National Reconnaissance Office remain essentially unchanged since the last Annual Report to the Board, in October 1965,. Additionally, there have been few significant changes in USIB intelligence requirements against which the efforts of the National Reconnaissance Program are directed. These items are not included in this Semi-Annual Report but will be covered in detail in the next ·Annual issue. Recent significant decisions of the NRP Executive Committee concerning the new general search system (HEXAGON) and the initiation of the -program are reflected in this reP<>rt. Handle via BYEMAN Control System TOP SECRET TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DI!CLA881FII!D ON: 9 .JULY 2012 QUILL -The successful QUILL feasibility demonstration in December 1964 established that there is nothing unique in the operation of a relatively high powered radar 1n a space environment. The subse quent evaluation by a National Photographic Interpretation Center team of the potential of a satellite radar for reconnaissance identified missions where such a system could be of definite value, both as a supplement to photographic coverage and as a separate sensor. These included use iri Crisis.Indications and Strike Effectiveness Assessment missions, During the period of this report, the National Reconnaissance Office has been conducting several studies related to further definition of possible operational satellite radars. Testing the remaining QUILL subsystems has been completed. The data obtained are expected to be of value in design and fabrication of any future radar systems. Related design studies for state-of-the-art spacecraft wide band magnetic tape recorders have been completed. Additional studies still underway and expected to be completed by September 1966 include: 1. Two system studies for long lifetime, variable mode (high resolution/small .swath and low resolution/wide swath) satellite radars. 36 Handle via BYEMAN Co"trol System TOP SEERET SECTION V • DOCUMENT 25 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 2. Testing of critical experimental subsystems and components. 3. Investigations for readout techniques to overcome some of the limitations in state-of-the-art spacecraft tape recorders. 4. Target signature studies. This summer, imagery typical of targets for Crisis Indications and Strike Effectiveness Assessment missions will be obtained by an aircraft. (The QUILL feasibility demonstration has shown that aircraft data should not differ from comparable quality imagery obtained from satellites.) This imagery will have various ground resolutions, look angles, signal to noise ratios and dynamic ranges and will be provided to NPIC for determination of the effects of the various parameters on image interpretability. This study activity will continue through September of this year. I I· Handle via BYEMAN Con.trol Sy5tem TOP SECRET ,!!: _ ··------··--• · --··· SECTION VI · QUI LL PROGRAM CLOS EOUT DOCUM ENTS SUMMARY Quill would gradually fade into the background as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) undertook new efforts to obtain imagery from space . The final documents contained in this compendium represent the closure of the program. By the late 1960s , the only question remaining with respect to Quill was whether or not to maintain strict controls over access to Quill related information. These documents show that those controls were not necessary. Quill was essentially retired with the decision to remove the program from the security controls that governed most other national reconnaissance programs. Document 26 -Memorandum for the Record concerning dropping Quill from Byeman controls, 28 May 1968: In a Memorandum for the Record dated 28 May 1968, the Chief of the Special Security Center, responsible for Byeman control , indicated that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Deputy Director for Science and Technology had no objections to dropping Quill from the Byeman control system. The Director noted that the Office of Special Programs at CIA also had no objections to dropping the control. Document 27 -Letter from the Central Intelligence Agency's Deputy Director for Science and Technology to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office regarding dropping Quill from Byeman Controls, 6 February 1969 : The CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Mr. Carl Duckett , wrote to Director of the NRO, Dr. Alexander Flax on 6 February 1969, confirming the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Richard Helm's, decision to drop Quill from the Byeman control system. Document 28 -Security Cable notification of removal of Quill from Byeman Controls, 10 February 1969: On 10 February 1969, the NRO released a cable with instructions that the Quill program was no longer controlled under Byeman security controls. Quill would be identified as a NRO study in future references. Quill imagery would only be released on a "must know" basis , as would be the case for its engineering data. The cable represents a clos ing chapter for the highly successful Quill experimental radar imagery satellite. The Quill program established a strong foundation for the national reconnaissance satellite development efforts that would follow in the NRO. TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR I MAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM LIST OF QUILL PROGRAM CLOSEOUT DOCUMENTS Document 26-Memorandum for the Record concerning dropping Quill from Byeman controls, 28 May 1968...... .. ..... ... .... ....... .... ...... ..... ..... ............ .......... .. .. ........................ ....................... ... ................ ........ .......... 341 Document 27-Letter from the Central Intelligence Agency's Deputy Director fo r Science and Technology to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office regarding dropping Quill from Byeman Controls, 6 February 1969 ..... ... ............. .. ... ....... ... ...... ... .......... ... .... ... ....... ... ........ ..... ............ .... ...... ..... ... ..... ... ....... ..... ... .. ..... ... 343 Document 28 -Security Cable notification of removal of Quill from Byeman Controls, 10 February 1969 ..... ... ... .... ........... ..... .. ....... ........... ....... .... ....... ..... ........... .............. ..... ............. .. ......... .. .......... ........ . 345 SECTION VI -DOCUMENT 26 SEBRET NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 SSC-0 189-68 28 May 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: QUILL On 28 May 1968, C/SMS/DD/S&.T called and stated that in c ct program, hie office hae no objection"" dropping the QUILL program. After checking with OSP Security, he learned that ~phad no objection to dropping the program. Chief, Distribution: Orig -QUILL File 1 -SSG Read file -/fr/28 May 1968 SE8RET SECTION VI -DOCUMENT 27 343 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 II ' The Honorable Alexander B. ~lax Director, National Beconnaiaaance Office Room · 4E968, Penta~on Dear Al: Jlr. Bel• aaked tbat I conve:r to :rou bia ap~roval ot :vour requeat to delete QUILL aa a BYEYAH proJect indicator. S1Dcerel:r, · Carl B. Duckett. Deput:r Director tor Science and TecllnoloaJ Distribution: Cy 1 -D/NRO 2 -0/DCI for info ..a--SJ.IS/DDS&T 4 -DD/S&T Registry 5 -DD/S&T Registry 0/DD/S&!r/ -1mad/7 Feb 69 HANDI.E V IA -• • ..: •.. <,~\ c:ONTROI. SYSt:::-.1 ONI.Y ~·-~ .. SECTION VI -DOCUMENT 28 (44) FORM 820 12 -61 ~ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE NRO APPROVED FOJt REI,EASE DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 0 DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2( 12 !lEIIt FILE INFO (When Filled In) REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED I 0 fEB 69 Z_Z Z_9~ i:)i:l\,; il&'l" ACTION 1 6 11 COR 16 2 7 ilil/_1)~.1:' 12 FILE 17 3 l:IB 8 13 D/OS Pie 4 9 XllXX HX 14 19 :SifiT .. " 5 1 ~ 15 211 IN 67137 CITE -~ PRIORITV" r?~' QUILL, CORONA, DORIAN, GAMBIT, HEXAGON ...-· SECUR EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE USE OF THE CODEWORD QUILL AS A SECURITY PROJECT INDICATOR UNDER THE BYEPIAN SECURITY CON· TROL SYSTEM WILL BE DISCONTINUED. THE SATELLITE RADAR FEASIBILITY DEMONSTRATION CONDUCTED AS PROJECT QUILL WILL HENCEFORTH BE IDENTIFIED AS NRO STUDY -:.,_ THOSE MATERIALS RELATED TO PRLJECT QUILL, PRESENTLY IN POSSESSION OF VARIOUS BYEMAN CONTROL CENTERS, WILL BE RESTRICTED ON A MUST KNOW BASIS TO INDIVIDUALS APPROVED FOR ACCESS TO EITHER CQRONA, DORIAN, ~'OR HEXAGON. THESE MATERIALS WILL CONTINUE TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE BYEMAN SECURITY CONTROL SYSTEM ALTHOUGH APPROVAL FOR QUILLACCESS WILL NO LONGER BE REQUIRED OR BILLETED. THE IMAGERY PRODUCED DURING THE QUILL FEASIBILITY DEPIONSTRATION CWHICH WAS LIMITED TO US ZONE OF INTERIOR> IS RELEASABLE ON A •f11UST KNOw-TO INDIVIDUALS HAVING ACCESS TO EITHER TALENT•KEYHOLE, OR BYEMAN PROJECTS CORONA, DORIAN GAMBIT, .OR HEXAGON. TALENT•KEYHOLE PERSONNEL MAY HAVE ACCESS TO SELECT ENGINEERING DATA UPON VALID REQUEST. •MuST KNow · ~. 1 346 TRAILBLAZER 1964: THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM FORM 1441 282012-61 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE DtCLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 0 DECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2(l~2 SEElEY FILE INFO (When Filled In) REPRODUCTION. PROHIBITED ACTION 1 6 11 16 2 7 12 17 3 8 13 18 4 9 14 19 5 1j!l 15 ~ fAGE TWO -T 8 P !I ! 8 ft ! T TALENT KEYHOLE DETERMINATIONS WILL BE "ADE BY THE SIO. ALL QUILL MATERIALS IN CUStODY OF BCD'S VlLL HAVE THE QUILL COMPARTMENT DELETED AND BE MARKED N~~ MATERIALS IN THE TALENT-KEYHOLE OR BYEMAN SYSTEM WILL USE THE TERM •RADAR FEASIBILITY STUDY• IN LIEU OF •pROJECT QUILL• IN CONTEXTUAL MATTERS. IMMEDIATE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO DEBRIEF ALL PERSONNEL CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED QUILL ACCESS. t Q P i i 8 A & T BT SECTION VII -CHRONOLOGY Date Early 1962 Early October 1962 30 October 1962 10 November 1962 14 November 1962 December/January 1963 Late January 1963 March and May 1963 May 1963 9 April1963 17 July 1963 Mid September 1963 Event Proposal for satellite carrying radar sensor for imagery developed by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company and Goodyear Aerospace who had previously demonstrated similar sensors on airborne platforms . National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Program A preliminary assessments affirm potential feasibility of Lockheed and Goodyear proposal for radar satellite. Director of the NRO (DNRO), Dr. Joseph Charyk , approves proceeding with additional review of the proposal. NRO Program A review team affirms feasibility of radar satellite. Review tea m recommends using hardware components already available from other projects . Review team also recommends one of its members , Major David Bradburn , to serve as program director, and names the new program Quill. Dr. Charyk authorizes Bradburn to proceed with the Quill program . Bradburn meets with Lockheed and Goodyear and indicates that the government will proceed with a contract for the proposed radar satellite on a non-competitive basis . Lockheed and Goodyear respond with draft proposals and initial cost estimates for the Quill program Bradburn meets with Lockheed and Goodyear representatives and approves classified and unclassified contracts for the Quill satellite . Bradburn provides status reports to new DNRO , Dr. Brockway McMillan , on Quill. Bradburn resolves issues with Goodyear purchasing government approved items for use in the Quill program. Bradburn meets with Corona program representatives and finalizes the agreement for purchasing Corona components for use in the Quill program including the film recovery vehicle . Lockheed reports high voltage arcing problem that threatens to delay Quill launch . Lockheed reports on resolution of high voltage arcing problem by pressurizing system components . TRAILBLAZER 1964 : THE QUILL EXPERIMENTAL RADAR IMAGERY SATELLITE COMPENDIUM Date Late September 1963 Early October 1963 January 1964 January to May 1964 March 1964 7 May 1964 Summer 1964 September 1964 2 December 1964 November/December 1964 21 December 1964 22 December 1964 24 December 1964 22-26 December 1964 5 January 1965 11 January 1965 Event Third Quill vehicle canceled and launch of first vehicle set for 5 August 1964 . Additional arcing problems identified by Lockheed . Arcing problems again resolved . Initial testing of Quill sub-systems undertaken . Program A Director orders read iness review of Quill vehicle. Readiness review team confirms Quill on course for fall launch . Lockheed and Goodyear carry out additional sub-system and integration testing Transmitter modulator tests reveal failings leading to launch delay. Additional transmitter modulator tests reveal reliability after component issues are resolved. Problem discovered with reflective materials on the Agena vehicle and efforts undertaken to reinforce reflective material. Quill , vehicle 2355 , launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. Quill film recovery vehicle recovered . Quill film delivered to processing facility. Quill completes 14 radar passes and transmits data to ground stations for processing. Bradburn provides first briefing of Quill expe rimental program results . Quill vehicle deorbited . SECTION VII -CHRONOLOGY Date 11 February 1965 31 March and 1 April 1965 April 1965 1 August 1965 10 February 1969 Event Rema ining Quill hardware placed in storage pending further analysis of program . Final reports completed by Lockheed and Goodyear on Quill program performance and eng inee ri ng assessments . NRO and the Central Intelligence Agency agree to establish review team , led by the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to evaluate potential intelligence value of radar imagery based on the Quill experiment. NPIC -Ied team recommends further study of radar as source of imagery and identifies potential contributions from future programs . Quill removed from Byeman controls , effectively closing the program .