SCHOOLS AND POLITICS.
THE KAUM MUDA MOVEMENT IN WEST SUMATRA
(1927-1933)
by
Taufik Abdullah
MONOGRAPH SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1971
Price: $6.00SCHOOLS AND POLITICS: THE KAUM MUDA MOVEMENT
IN WEST SUMATRA (1927-1933)
Taufik Abdullah
MONOGRAPH SERIES
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
March 1971© Cornell Modern Indonesia Project 1971TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ............................................ 1
Chapter
I.	THE MINANGKABAU WORLD: ALAM AND RANTAU .....	3
II.	OPPOSITION AND REBELLION......................... 23
III.	THE GRADUATES OF THE KAUM MUDA SCHOOLS AND
THEIR LEADERS...................................... 45
IV.	MUHAMMADIJAH AND LOCAL POLITICS.....................  70
V.	SCHOOLS AND THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES .	110
VI.	POLITICIANS AND EDUCATORS........................... 139
VII.	THE SEARCH FOR AN IDEOLOGY.......................... 155
VIII.	THE POLITICS OF RADICALISM.......................... 174
IX.	PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND POLITICS ....................... 207
IN RETROSPECT............................................... 226
GLOSSARY.................................................... 233
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
243INTRODUCTION
The continuing process of Islamization and the introduction
of new ideas by Minangkabau people returning from abroad form
two paramount themes in the history of West Sumatra. The desire
to maintain the validity of existing values and assumptions and
the need to cope with the new elements resulted in social con-
flict and in an incessant effort to reformulate the concept of
the Minangkabau world. The traditional world view, as expressed
in numerous adat-sayings and illustrated in historical traditions
[tambo') and epics (kaba) , stresses the continuing worth of
ancient wisdom, but, at the same time, it recognizes the import-
ance of change. Both are thought necessary for the attainment
of a perfect society, one in which social and cosmic harmony
prevail. The strength of this traditional view is reflected
both in the conservatism of the Minangkabau social system and
in the dynamic attitude often displayed by its individual mem-
bers .
The driving force of Minangkabau history arises from the
struggle to build a balanced social order on a convergence of
seemingly contradictory social and cultural aspects. From the
time when Islam was conceived as a pillar of the Minangkabau
world, the history of Minangkabau has been dominated by an
effort to attain an acceptable equilibrium between the doctrine
of a universal religion and the wisdom and ideals of the pre-
existing pillar, the indigenous element or adat. The idea that
Islam is an inseparable part of Minangkabau has generated con-
stant internal struggle. A traditional notion that ideas which
came from the outside world (the rantau) might endanger the
foundation of Minangkabau or stimulate disturbing potentialities
already inherent in it resulted in ambivalence toward Western-
oriented modernization.
In the beginning of the 1900's, the Islamic modernist move-
ment began spreading its influence in West Sumatra. Launched by
religious scholars (ulema) who had been influenced by new intel-
lectual trends in the Middle East, the movement was directed at
the purification of prevailing religious practices and also at
using Islam as a basis for social change. In the process, the
movement generated religious and social conflicts which lasted
for almost two decades. The Islamic modernist scholars, known
as the Kaum Muda ulama, eventually dominated Minangkabau social
and political movements. The religious and educational activi-
ties of the Kaum Muda ulama and their students and followers
brought about an expansion and modernization of religious schools
By using Islam as the basis of their programs, the Islamic mod-
ernists could claim religious sanction for their activities.
12
The purposes of the study which follows are to trace the
development of the Kaum Muda movement and to inquire into its
intellectual and social impact on Minangkabau. The principal
actors were actually from the second generation of Islamic mod-
ernists, the students of the Kaum Muda ulama. We will examine
the way they confronted their social and political environment;
the path they followed in carrying out their various programs;
their encounter with the Dutch government; and their relation-
ship with the adat authorities. We will seek to determine the
impact of the activities and intellectual development of these
young Islamic modernists upon their own group and upon their
relationship with their former mentors, the Kaum Muda ulama.
For this reason, the study concentrates on the period beginning
in early 1927 and ending with the third quarter of 1933.
On New Year's Eve of 1927, a rebellion broke out in Silung-
kang, a village in West Sumatra. It precipitated extensive and
repressive government action throughout the Residency. This so-
called "communist" rebellion delivered a major psychological
shock to the Minangkabau. The post-rebellion period witnessed
continuous attempts by the Islamic modernists, whose followers
were some of the most important promoters of the Islamic-commu-
nist movement, to recover from this traumatic event and to find
new channels for their activities. Though rejecting rebellion
as a suitable means for achieving their political goals, the
second generation of the Islamic modernists continued their
anti-government political activities, emphasizing the importance
of an enlarged concept of unity. They wanted the Minangkabau
people to view their own traditional ideas about legitimate
power, thought to be based on popular consensus, in the light
of the actual political situation. With the cooperation of the
Western-educated intellectuals and under the leadership of re-
cent returnees from Cairo, they developed new private schools
and intensified the modernization process in existing religious
schools. In August 1933, provoked by the renewed political
radicalism on the part of Islamic parties, the government insti-
tuted regulations which paralyzed political activity. This was
followed by the arrest of several important leaders of the Is-
lamic movement. Many Kaum Muda educators were forbidden to
teach and some of their schools were closed down.
The six years from 1927 to 1933 comprised a period in which
various political and social aspects of Minangkabau life were
intensified and erupted into open conflict. It was a time when
the Islamic modernists politicized Minangkabau and extensively
spread the new ideas of "progress" and "modernization."CHAPTER I
THE MINANGKABAU WORLD: ALAM AND RANTAU
In the beginning, according to Minangkabau historical
tradition, there was only Nur Muhammad (The Light of Mohammad)
through which God created the universe and the first human
being.1 Within this transcendental and universal unity existed
the Minangkabau world, one of three known worlds (the other two
are China and "Ruhum"). The Minangkabau world, or alam Minang-
kabau , began with the landing of the first ancestors on Mount
Merapi, which was then surrounded by water. The history of
Minangkabau thus began before the water subsided, before the
face of the earth increased in extent, before its inhabitants
multiplied. As the water receded, new settlements were estab-
lished, and finally the "region of the three luhak,''2 which
were to become the heartland of Minangkabau, was populated.
The Minangkabau people continued their geographical explor-
ations and established new settlements beyond the heartland.
These new territories were called rantau. Geographically, there-
fore, the rantau was constantly extended in accordance with the
expansion of the Minangkabau people. Both the static heartland
and the ever-expanding rantau, however, belonged to the alam
Minangkabau.
Though a world in itself, the alam Minangkabau is at the
same time a conglomeration of smaller worlds, the nagari, each
forming an "independent" political community with its council
hall (balai) , mosque, roads and public bathing place. In
Minangkabau adat theory, a nagari is considered the most devel-
oped type of settlement; it has a definite boundary and its own
recognized satellite territories.3 All nagari share common adat
ideals and adat assumptions, but, at the same time, a nagari is
a smaller alam and regards its neighbors as its rantau, and
1.	One example of a Minangkabau traditional history is Datuk
Sangguno Diradjo, Mustiko Adat Alam Minangkabau (Djakarta:
Kementerian P.P. §K~ 1955) .
2.	The three luhak referred to in the text are the three major
regions of the heartland: Tanah Datar, Agam and the Lima
Puluh Kota, called collectively the luhak nan tigo.
3.	A. M. Dt. Maruhum Batuah and Dt. Bagindo Tanameh, Hukum
Adat dan Adat Minangkabau (Djakarta: Pus aka Aseli, 1956),
pp. 58-60 .
34
hence regions to be explored. Within this context, merantau,
going to the rantau, can simply mean leaving one’s own nagari.
The Minangkabau world view includes an indigenous political
tradition of penghulu and of kings.4 The penghulu acts as the
head of several matrilineal families, and his position is based
on the consensus of his own people. The king provided a sacral
mediating influence among the ’’independent” nagari. This di-
chotomy in the political system was bridged by the co-existence
in the heartland of the Koto Piliang and Bodi Tjaniago tradi-
tions. The former recognized a hierarchical ranking of the
penghulu whereas the latter considered all penghulu as equal.
Unlike the heartland, the rantau nagari were ruled by radja,
representatives of the king who himself lived in the heartland.
The rantau’s most important function however was not as a de-
pendency for the royal family but as a gate to and from the
outside world.
Minangkabau history constantly demonstrates the role of the
rantau as the provider of outside influences which are incor-
porated into the existing alam. Such influences, however, were
most significant when they coincided with potentials already
contained in the alam itself. The incorporation of kingship
into an indigenous world which was based on penghuluship was
facilitated by a pre-existing tradition of hierarchy in certain
political structures; thus the new element could easily meld
with the existing system. The absorption of Islam into the
Minangkabau system of belief and social structure did not dis-
place the adat but rather enriched the alam Minangkabau. Through
continuing exploration, the alam’s potentialities unfolded, and
outside elements were incorporated. But original elements re-
mained identifiable; it was not a featureless synthesis in which
the old ways were completely submerged.
Within the context of tradition, a new element can only be
accepted after it has met certain requirements. It must be
introduced through the established pattern of social hierarchy,
which culminates in the mufakat (consensus) of the penghulu.5
This will ensure that the new element will not cause a change in
the basic adat foundation. The innovation moreover should be
logically possible (mungkin) and morally proper (patut) .6 If
4.	P. E. de Josselin de Jong, Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan:
Socio-Political Structure in Indonesia (Djakarta: Bhratara,
1960), pp. 97-116.
5.	Datuk Sangguno, Mustiko Adat, Chapters 1-4.
6.	For example: It is possible to make a ricefield in someone
else’s yard, but is it proper (patut)? It is proper to make
a ricefield on top of a mountain, but is it possible
(mungkin)?5
it cannot meet these qualifications, the new element might dis-
rupt social harmony and the alam might deviate from its correct
course of development.
The acceptance of Islam is an illustration of the absorp-
tion of new elements, for the alam Minangkabau has come to be
seen as a harmonious world containing both Islam and adat. This
harmony was expressed in the concept of the three kings of
Minangkabau--the King of Adat, the King of Religion, and the
King of the World. On the nagari level as well, religious func-
tionaries were included in the adat hierarchy. This harmony is
usually characterized by the adat aphorism (pepatah adat) that
"adat is based on sjarak (religious law), sjarak is based on
adat." Adat should maintain the harmony of society, while
sjarak works to achieve harmony between self and the cosmic
order. The unity of the nagari is symbolized by the existence
of one balai and one mosque. The former represents adat, the
latter religion.7
Nineteenth-Century Crises in Minangkabau
The traditional conception of alam as a harmony among con-
tradictions faced a major challenge at the turn of the nineteenth
century from an orthodox religious reform movement, the Padri.
Launched by three Minangkabau hadjt, who had been influenced by
the Wahabists in Arabia, the movement rejected the idea of a
balance between adat and Islam. Rather than "purity of heart,"
the Padri stressed the outward manifestation of religiously
correct behavior. Instead of harmony, the Padri aimed at the
predominance of religious law (sjarak) over other rules and
standards. This militant, religious movement condemned tradi-
tional practices as against the sjarak. It thereby threatened
the whole concept of alam and caused a major civil war. The
fierce struggle was not just a conflict between fanatical reli-
gious believers and the custodians of the old order; it was also
one between a totalistic and a relative view of the world.
In spite of the social polarization which existed during
the fierce conflict, Minangkabau gradually recovered from this
crisis. The increase in the Padri’s following resulted in a
dilution of its earlier elan and a willingness to seek accommo-
dation.8 This process was accelerated in 1821 by Dutch inter-
7.	See my article, "Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict
in Minangkabau," Indonesia, No. 2 (October 1966), pp. 1-14.
8.	Sophia Raffles, Memoirs of the Life and Public Services,
with Some of the Correspondence, of Sir Thomas Stamford6
vention. In the meantime, the external stimulus was waning be-
cause the Wahabists in Arabia had lost the offensive and had
begun to retreat.
When the war ended in 1837, it was clear that the Padri
had not substantially changed Minangkabau political and social
structure, though the movement had strengthened the force of
religion and enlarged its scope throughout the social system.
A new adat formulation was introduced which emphasized the con-
trast between adat djahilijah, syncretic and unenlightened adat,
and adat islamijah, adat in accord with religious law. The
highest adat category, "adat which is truly adat," was now inter-
preted as the Quran and the Hadith (Prophetic Tradition). A
new aphorism on the relation between adat and religion was also
introduced:	"adat is based on sjarak; sjarak is based on
Kitabullah [The Book of God]." The subordination of adat to
religious law was expressed as "sjarak designs, adat applies."
Ideally, then, adat was the correct manifestation of the reli-
gious law. In addition to this new formulation, which was still
to be contested, another consequence of the Padri war was the
strengthened position of religious teachers and an expanded net-
work of religious schools.
The end of the internal war, however, had resulted from the
conquest of the alam Minangkabau by the Dutch. The sacral royal
ty, formerly the mediating influence among the nagari, was re-
placed by a powerful Dutch governor, and a functional supra-
nagari organization was introduced. The nagari council theoret-
ically remained the power center in the individual nagari, but
above it was placed the office of the tuanku lavas, who acted
as the adat and administrative head of a nagari federation. In-
stead of the balai, it was now the tuanku laras who made binding
decisions in adat as well as administrative matters.* * * 9 In the
1870’s, a further encroachment on the penghulu tradition oc-
curred; the introduction of Western criminal law deprived the
balai of its punitive powers as the upholder of nagari law.
The erosion of the balai’s authority and the decline of the
penghulu*s prestige were intensified by the unprecedented duties
imposed on the penghulu as the supervisors of the vodl kompeni
(government corvee).
The conquest of Minangkabau weakened the traditional polit-
ical system and led to a crisis of self-confidence. The decline
Raffles (London: John Murray, 1830), pp. 347-350; Ph. S. van
Ronkel, "Inlandsche Getuigenissen Aangaande de Padri-Oorlog,**
IG, 17 (NS), No. 2 (1915), p. 1259.
9. L. C. Westenenk, "De Inlandsche Bestuurshoofden ter Sumatra*
Westkust," KT, 2 (1913), pp. 673-693.7
of penghuluship was seen as a reflection of weakening social
ties and deviations from the Minangkabau paradigm, from the alam.
The Dutch coffee purchase monopoly and the corvee system, both
of which were introduced soon after the end of the Padri war,
served as symbols of the intolerable situation. Minangkabau
referred to the time as a period in which rodi not adat pre-
vailed .
In this period, another pillar of alam, religion, also ex-
perienced a crisis. In the 1850's, an orthodoxly-oriented mys-
tical brotherhood {tarekat}, the Naqsjabandijah,10 began denounc-
ing older tarekat, particularly the Sjatariah, as heretical.
Naqsjabandijah belief was based on the notion of cognitive unity
with God, in contrast to the existential unity preached by other
schools, and on the prime importance of outward religious beha-
vior. At the turn of the twentieth century, another religious
movement began. Sjech Achmad Chatib,* 11 a Minangkabau ulama and
an imam ("head") of the Shafiite school in the Mosque of Haram
(Mecca), attacked the prevalent religious doctrines and the adat
matrilineal inheritance law. The attack on the inheritance law,
which he considered in contradiction with religious law, has
remained until today at the heart of an unending social and
legal issue.12 Achmad Chatib’s denunciation of the mystical
brotherhoods,13 particularly the Naqsjabandijah, as unorthodox
10.	The first ulama to bring the Naqsjabandijah ideas to Minang-
kabau was presumably Sjech Ismail of Simabur. B. Schrieke,
"Bijdrage tot de Bibliografie van Huidige Godsdienstige
Beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust," TBG, 59 (1920), pp. 262-
269.
11.	Achmad Chatib (1860-1916) was born in Kota Gedang (near
Bukittinggi). A son of Abdul Latif Chatib, the first
"Malay" teacher at the teachers’ training school in Bukit-
tinggi, he went to Mecca while still young. He studied
and taught there and married into the family of an influen-
tial, rich Arab merchant. Through his father-in-law’s
influence, Achmad Chatib was appointed imam. He was one
of the most influential teachers among the Indonesian and
Malayan community (the Jawah) in Mecca. He wrote some
forty-nine books. "Sjech Achmad Chatib bin Abdul Latif
Al-Minangkabawi," Pedoman Masjarakat (1941), pp. 307-323.
12.	Jan Prins, "Rondom de Oude Strijdvraag van Minangkabau,"
Indonesie, 7 (1960-1961), pp. 117-129.
13.	Sjech Achmad Chatib bin Abdul Latif, Fatwa. Tentang Tharikat
Naqsj abandij ah, translated by A. Mn. Arief (Medan: Islami-
jah,1965). On the debates over the tarekat schools, see
Schrieke, "Bijdrage," pp. 249-325.8
signalled the beginning of more than two decades of religious
conflict in Minangkabau.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the foundation
of the Minangkabau world was being attacked from all sides.
Externally, it faced the strengthening grip of Dutch political
and economic power and internally the onslaught of a new reli-
gious reform movement. People began to question the capability
of alam assumptions to deal with the new and complicated forces.
The period was dominated by a feeling that the old order had
been disrupted.
During this critical situation, the government introduced
a new, monetary tax, in 1908. A decrease in coffee production
dating from the last quarter of the nineteenth century caused
the government to abolish the coffee monopoly and replace it
with revenue from taxation.1* From a purely economic point of
view, the new policy was advantageous to the people, because
they could now sell their coffee on the open market for consid-
erably higher prices. But this proved irrelevant, for the
people felt that they were being cheated and humiliated by the
new regulation. In their eyes, the Dutch government had now
bluntly proclaimed itself the "ruler," not just the "protector"
of Minangkabau. The provisions of the Plakat Pandjang (Long
Declaration), issued by the Dutch during the Padri war, had
promised that no direct tax would ever be levied on the Minang-
kabau.15 Led by the penghulu, who were irritated by the en-
croachment on their power, and by the tarekat leaders, who were
angered by the attack on religious doctrine, an initially passive
resistance to the new regulations erupted into rural revolt.
The tarekat teachers provided a religious foundation for the
scattered uprisings. The government’s legitimacy was questioned
because it was not based on the consensus of the people (sakato
alam). The government itself was condemned as a kafir (infidel)
institution which humiliated religion.
The scattered rural uprisings, however, were mostly a de-
fensive reaction meant to prevent any further breakdown of the
14.	The tax system was part of a new aggressive policy in the
so-called Outer Possessions (Buitenbezittingen) which began
after the Dutch-Atjeh War. F. Heckler, "Memorie van Over-
gave Betreffend den Toestand van het Gouvernement Sumatra's
Westkust (1905-1910)," Mailrapport 387/'10 and Verbaal
April 21, 1911, No. 8.
15.	For the full text of the Plakat Pandjang (Lange Verklaring),
see H. J. J. L. Ridder de Stuers, De Vestiging en Uitbreid-
ing der Nederlanders ter Westkust van Sumatra (Amsterdam:
P. N. van Kampen, 1849/1850), II, pp. 8-14.9
old order. They were directed against the unintelligible forces
that increasingly dominated people’s lives. By employing strong
repressive measures the government suppressed the unrest and
imposed the taxation program.16
The Idea of Kemadjuan
The tragic events of 1908 marked the beginning of a new era
in Minangkabau, a period of economic change and of the increas-
ing predominance of urban influences in the nagari. The rapid
penetration of the money economy into the nagari began to break
down the traditional notion of the nagari as a more or less
self-sufficient community. Following the introduction of the
monetary tax system, the government removed some of the obstacles
to economic growth by abolishing the ban on rice export and other
controls over rice production. At the same time, the traditional
eastern outlet via the Straits of Malacca was reopened.17 In
1911, the government introduced the People's Credit System, a
network of village banks under the jurisdiction of adat author-
ities; by 1916 banks were located throughout the greater part
of Minangkabau.18
The positive response of the Minangkabau to the new economic
opportunities was facilitated by the rotating market system.
Since the end of the nineteenth century, in every subdistrict a
nagari held its own market days once or twice a week. On its
market day, the nagari became the economic center for the sur-
rounding area. This rotating market system was repeated on the
district level, so that each district administrative center once
a week became the focal point where people from the several sub-
districts conducted their business.19
Unlike the nagari, which resulted from gradual expansion
of an old settlement, interior towns, such as Padang Pandjang,
Bukittinggi (Fort de Kock), Batu Sangkar (Fort van der Capellen),
16.	Heckler, "Memorie van Overgave," p. 7.
17.	B. Schrieke, "The Causes and Effects of Communism on the
Westcoast of Sumatra," in his Indonesian Sociological
Studies (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955), I, pp. 95-106.
18.	J. Ballot, "Memorie van Overgave," Verbaal April 5, 1916,
No. 15, pp. 83-87.
19.	Ibid., pp. 98-100. On the markets, see H. W. Stap, "De
Nagari-Ordonnantie ter Sumatra's Westkust," TBB, 53 (1917),
pp. 754-760.10
and Pajakumbuh, were created by the Dutch to serve specific pur-
poses. Established originally as military fortresses during the
Padri war, these towns later became depots for coffee deliveries
and general administrative and economic centers of the districts
The towns in the interior could be considered as a rantau in
terms of the people from surrounding nagari who were attracted
to them. Town dwellers who were not natives of the town itself
were called perantau and were under the jurisdiction of the
pen.gh.ulu. dagang (literally, the penghulu for foreigners) who
served as a temporary head for their quasi-adat community. The
perantau were traditionally people who left their home nagari
and traveled to the rantau. But unlike the case in the past,
they now commonly settled in the rantau and established house-
holds there. In spite of the powerful pull of the matrilineal
family, based on its communal house and lands, a trend placing
greater importance on the nuclear family developed among the
urban perantau. This process tended to weaken the matrilineal
uncle-to-nephew relationship and was an important aspect of
Minangkabau social development in the twentieth century. In
the rantau nuclear family, the father gradually began to assume
many of the functions formerly exercised by his wife’s brother
(the mamak'), who was the traditional guardian of the children.20
It was also in these towns that the first slow progress
toward accommodation with the new situation began. Since the
second half of the nineteenth century, the Dutch government had
operated a school system designed to train lower government
officials and, to a lesser extent, to combat illiteracy. In
the district capitals, the government established five year
vernacular schools, the so-called second class schools. In
Padang and Bukittinggi, the two largest towns, "European
schools" were founded. A kweeksehool, a teachers’ training
institute, had opened in Bukittinggi in the mid-1850's. By the
end of the nineteenth century, this school, popularly referred
to as Sekolah Radja (School of the Kings) was the most important
educational institution in the territory. Many of the early
Minangkabau modernizers graduated from it. Throughout the
latter part of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twen-
tieth century, the government school system in the rural areas
developed very slowly. Popular suspicions about the intention
20. This is somewhat exaggerated. In spite of the stronger
authority which the father now has over his children, the
mamak is still highly respected, and he remains a person
to be consulted. In this, I agree with Umar Junus' criti-
cism ["Some Remarks on Minangkabau Social Structure," BKI,
120, No. 3 (1964), pp. 293-320] of Maretin’s models of the
Minangkabau family system ["Disappearance of Matriclan Sur-
vivals in Minangkabau Family and Marriage Relations,” BKI,
117 (1961), pp. 168-196].11
of the kafir government plus the fact that establishment of
schools was entirely dependent upon the initiative of nagari
heads and the tuanku laras combined to hinder early development
in education. But in the early 1910’s, the educational system
expanded rapidly after the introduction of the so-called
volkssahool (people’s schools). These were three year elemen-
tary schools directly under government control but financed by
the nagari community. By 1913, there were 111 such volksschool
and by 1915 the number had increased to 358.21 Some nagari,
particularly Kota Gedang (near Bukittinggi), produced large num-
bers of school teachers and government officials. In 1911,
Kota Gedang through its own locally-financed Study Fund managed
to send two students to Holland for advanced education, and by
1914 the nagari had its own Dutch-Native School (Hollandsch-
Inlandsche School, HIS).22
The conscious drive to create new conditions in West Suma-
tra originated in Padang, the capital of the province. In the
latter part of the nineteenth century, the coastal aristocrats
and the native officials had* begun adopting a new style of life,
characterized by Dutch-style clubs and newspapers.23 They
propagated notions of kemadjuan (progress and modernity).
InsoeUnde, which began publication in 1901 as a journal for
teachers and native officials, represented the first important
mouthpiece of the drive for kemadjuan. It had correspondents
throughout the archipelago, and it contained articles urging
the "Indies" as a whole to become progressive (mendj add madju~) .
"Look at Japan," one writer stated, "for thirty years the nation
has been rapidly developing, the country is now rich and the
people are well educated."2U The early generation of Western-
educated teachers, who formed the principal writers for the
journal, believed that the way to achieve progress was through
development of a modern school system. They insisted that edu-
cation should no longer be based on the outdated religious
schools and that teachers should not be misled by the still-
influential religious teachers.25
21.	Ballot, "Memorie van Overgave," pp. 81-82.
22.	K. A. James, "De Nagari Kota Gedang," TBB, 49 (1915), p.
185.
23.	Insoelinde, 1, No. 1 (1902), p. 13.
24.	Bagindo tan Emas, "Pengharapan pada Kota Padang," Insulinde,
2, No. 2 (1903), pp. 518-519. Japan was the most popular
example cited by the writers in Insoelinde. The victory of
Japan over Russia in 1905 confirmed Japan's role as a model
to be emulated.
25.	One writer put it: "We should not follow [the guidance]
of the Quranic teachers [guru mengadji] because their12
The notion of kemadjuan was reinterpreted beginning in
1904, after Abdul Rivai, a Minangkabau medical student in Hol-
land, became the Malay editor of Bintang Hindia (The Star of
the Indies), the journal most influential among educated Indone-
sians. He suggested that a sense of ’’national pride" should
form the basic driving force toward kemadjuan. He stressed the
need for a "catch-up" psychology, so that the "Indies" would be
able to participate in the modern world.26 Joining the world
of progress, Rivai argued, should not be seen as the elimination
of one’s own identity or nation. Because the modern world in-
volved an incessant competition between nations, "The Indies
would remain the Indies, no matter how developed or how high
their status might become."27 Rivai's interests were perhaps
politically rather than culturally oriented, but his appeal
raised an important question which became the central issue for
future debates over the course of progress.
In Minangkabau the idea of kemadjuan was at the heart of
intellectual conflicts on such diverse subjects as adat and re-
ligion. The rhetoric of the first two decades of the twentieth
century contrasted "young" {muda'} , defined as the symbol of
progress, with "old" (twa), seen as backward and conservative.
"Young" was also used to mean "rootless" while "old" was exalted
as the representative of "the glory {kernegahan} of Mount Merapi,"
the nexus of the Minangkabau world. In secular terms the con-
flict was defined as that between progressive and conservative
groups. In religious terms, it was the struggle between modern-
ist and traditionalist ulama.
The first overt response to the problems of progress and
modernity arose in 1906 among the so-called "Young Malay" group
under the leadership of Datuk Sutan Maharadja. It began in
Padang as a political-cultural movement of perantau in opposi-
tion to the coastal aristocratic class and particularly the
office of the Regent. They argued that progress should be the
elaboration and articulation of ideas and ideals inherent in
the genuine Minangkabau adat, and they denounced existing coastal
political institutions as deviations from the alam Minangkabau.28
objectives are different from that of the school teachers.
Their objectives are to make the children believe in them
and to follow their orders." Insoelinde, 1, No. 2 (1901),
pp. 22-23.
26.	Bintang Hindia, 4, No. 3 (1904), p. 38.
27.	Bintang Hindia, 4, No. 12 (1904), pp. 153-155.
28.	G. de Wal van Anckeveen, "Maleische Democratie en Padangsche
Toestanden," Adatrechtbundels, 1 (1911), pp. 114-128.13
According to its leader, the movement was intended to return
Padang to the fold of the alam and to eliminate the gulf between
the rulers (the so-called "first class human beings") and the
ruled.29 Influenced by the "Young Turks" movement in the Middle
East, he called his group the Kaum Muda (Group of the Young, or
Progressives) and labeled his opponents the Kaum Kuno (Group of
the Old, or Conservatives).
Datuk Sutan Maharadja also championed the cause of women's
education. In 1909 he established the first weaving school in
Padang; by 1912 there were about twelve such schools in the town.
His program was based on the idea that progress and "women's
welfare" could be attained by reviving the Minangkabau legacy.
Education for girls was a means for realizing the high status
of women prescribed in the adat. As part of his campaign, in
1911 Datuk Sutan Maharadja organized the first feminist news-
paper, Soenti-ng Melaju (Malay Ornament). Edited by his daughter,
Ratna Djuita, then by Rohana Kudus, often called "the Kartini of
Sumatra,"30 the newspaper provided the first public forum for
educated Minangkabau women.
By the mid-1910's, the adat oriented kemadjuan movement
had to face an increasing challenge from the Islamic modernists.
Students of Sjech Achmad Chatib had returned to propagate his
ideas on orthodox reform in their home districts. Prominent
among these were Sjech M. Djamil Djambek in Bukittinggi, Hadji
Abdullah Ahmad in Padang and Padang Pandjang, Hadji Rasul (also
known as Sjech Abdul Karim Amrullah) in 4fanindjau and Padang
Pandjang, and Sjech Thaib Umar in Batu Sangkar. They attacked
the heterodoxy of the tarekat and opposed unauthorized innova-
tion (bid'ah} in religious practices. Their purification move-
ment was greatly influenced by phe nineteenth-century Egyptian
reformer, Sjech Muhammad Abduh. By the second decade of the
twentieth century, these young religious scholars, also referred
to as the Kaum Muda, had begun to denounce traditional religious
experts for basing their own religious judgments solely on naql,
that is to say, on the established authorities. The reformers
argued that belief [iman} if based on taqlid (uncritical accept-
ance of textual authorities) was wrong, because the real sources
of religious law were the Quran and the Hadith. Scholars should
return to the original sources, according to the Kaum Muda
ulama, and strive to attain truth by using their akal (reasoning),
29.	Datuk Sutan Maharadja, "Kaoem Moeda Tahoen 1906," Oetoesan
Melajoe, December 22, 1917.
30.	Rohana Kudus was a sister of Sutan Sjahrir, the Indonesian
nationalist leader and prime minister (1945-1947). On her
life, see "Kartini Ketjil dari Minangkabau: Sitti Rohana,"
Pandji Islam (1940), pp. 9054-9080.14
a process known as -idjtihad.
Man who does not use his akal is an inferior human
being. ... He can be considered as one whose objec-
tive in life is only motivated by his desire to satis-
fy his appetites. . . .31
Appeals for a rational attitude toward religion and for a
return to Islamic orthodoxy would not only liberate Muslims from
inhibiting traditions but also would recall Islam’s inherent
greatness for them. Kaum Muda ulama denounced the tarekat for
their essentially escapist orientation. They refuted the notion
prevalent in religious circles that religious knowledge for its
own sake was the only thing of importance in the world. ’’Islam,
one Kaum Muda spokesman stated, "is not just a religion for the
world hereafter, but rather the guide for life in this world."32
He criticized, in this regard, the attempts of the older genera-
tion of religious teachers to prevent pupils from pursuing
sciences based on reasoning (akalijah') .
In the past our people were trapped in the valley of
suffering and destruction because of the corrupt
teachers and traders of religion, who persuaded and
tied our people to the religion of ignorance.33
The purification of religion and the rejection of taqlid
were considered the first steps toward the rediscovery of the
true ethics of Islam, which in the past had brought Muslims to
the peak of civilization and temporal power. The reformers
were not motivated by a desire to transform the theological
foundations of Islam but rather by a wish to prepare the ground
for social change which would create a religiously-based,
31.	Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, Pemboeka Pintoe Sjoerga (Padang: Al-
Moenir, 1914/1915), p. 47.
32.	Ibid. In one of his books, Sjech Muhammad Abduh asserted
that in "Islam, life takes precedence over religion" and
that "the health of the body takes precedence over the
health of the religion." Instead of drawing a sharp dis-
tinction between material progress and spiritual growth,
Abduh stressed the complementary nature of the two. In his
words, "God reminds us that the Hereafter can be achieved
while enjoying God's blessing in this world." Cited in
Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal
Theories of Muhamma.d 'Abduh and Rashid Rida (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1966) , pp. 117-118.
33.	Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, Ilmoe Sedjati (Padang: Sjarikat
Ilmoe, 1916), I, p. 75.15
rational society. Kemadjuan was regarded as a renaissance of
Islam rather than as a transformation of it.
As part of the conflict with the traditionalist, Kaum Tua
religious scholars, the modernists began to attack traditional
religious practices, such as the way to celebrate the Prophet’s
birthday. In denouncing the prevailing practice, the Kaum Muda
ulama attacked the dogmatic mentality of the Kaum Tua and at the
same time undermined the position of adat religious function-
aries, who officiated at religious rites incorporated into adat.
A consequence of these controversies was a temporary polariza-
tion among the Muslims. For some years, for example, the cen-
tral mosque of Padang, which was under adat jurisdiction,
employed two imam, representing the Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda
respectively. The end of the fasting month (idulfitri') , theo-
retically a time for forgetting and forgiving past mistakes,
was celebrated separately by the two groups. In the Minangkabau
interior, where adat authorities were more powerful, religious
conflict was even more intense. Religious issues often caused
estrangements between father and son, husband and wife. The
religious reformers however believed that aqidah (religious
doctrine) was worth the risks of such polarization.
While facing the challenge of successive religious reform
movements, from the Padri through the Naqsjabandijah to the
Islamic modernists, adat changed from a collection of commonly
accepted forms and traditions into a statement of
regulations and philosophy. In response to the activities of
the Islamic modernists, however, adat began to assume the status
of an ideology. Its ideas and institutions were being crystal-
lized into a universal system. The social network characterized
by the uncle-and-nephew relationship, for example, was inter-
preted as demonstrating the "socialist" character of Minangkabau
adat, as opposed to a father-and-son relationship which would
be "natural."34 Adat proponents argued that religion came from
God and adat came from the recognition of truth, but, in the
last analysis, truth could not be separated from God. The
correct kemadjuan, they said, was not simply a response to un-
avoidable circumstances but something imperative in the adat
itself. Adat's ability to survive depended on its ability to
maintain its form while gradually enlarging its content.35 In
34.	The writings of Datuk Sutan Maharadja in Oetoesan Melajoe
and Soenting Melajoe are contained in "Artikelen van Datoek
S o e tan Maharadj a in d e Oetoesan Melajoe, 1911-1915,"
Adatrechtbundels, 27 (19 28) , pp. 291 ff.
35.	Most Minangkabau adat theoreticians subscribe to this view.
For example, M. Nasroen, Dasar Falsafah Adat Minangkabau
(Djakarta: Pasaman, 1957).16
the face of continuing attack by the Kaum Muda ulama, and often
by the Western-educated intellectuals, the adat-oriented kema-
djuan protagonists, such as Datuk Sutan Maharadja, had begun to
call themselves Kaum Kuno by the end of the 1910's.
The suitability of adat for the changing times was seriously
questioned by the Western-educated generation on the rantau.
In 1918, a group of young Minangkabau intellectuals on Java
formed their own organization, the Jong Sumatranen Bond (Young
Sumatran's Union). They came mostly from the upper levels of
colonial Minangkabau society and had grown up in the period of
religious conflict and the debate over kemadjuan. They pro-
fessed the desire to create a fatherland "whose population re-
spects adat custom highly, but [which respect is based on]
Western civilization and knowledge."36 The "fatherland" was
Sumatra, not Minangkabau, because they believed that a single
ethnic group could not carry out the task of elevating the people
from "their ignorance and indifference" by itself. Picturing
themselves as "the builders of a new nation," these young intel-
lectuals were convinced that progress could not be achieved
simply by a new attitude toward the adat. Modernity was possible
only by an incorporation of the "Western mind" into the adat.37
Although in the early stages of their movement these young
intellectuals worked closely with the older generation of the
religious and secular Kaum Muda, later they became increasingly
separated from their own alam. Rather than return to Minangka-
bau, as was expected by their society and tradition, a large
number of them were absorbed into the rantau society permanently.
The secular and religious controversies between the Kaum
Muda and Kaum Tua groups were discussed in their numerous publi-
cations and debated publicly. They formed the basis for a
proliferation of voluntary associations. Every faction had its
own organ and spokesmen. The second decade of the twentieth
century,especially,was a time when voluntary associations sprang
up like mushrooms all over Minangkabau.38 In 1912, with the
cooperation of traders and civil servants, the religious Kaum
Muda of Padang established the Sarekat Usaha (Association of
Endeavor), which in turn founded the first private Dutch-Native
School (HIS) offering a religious education. They also formed
36.	Jong Soematra, 1, NO. 6/7/8 (June/July/August 1918), pp.
120-121.
37.	Soeara Perempoean, 1, No. 5 (September 1918), pp. 114 ff.
38.	See my "Minangkabau 1900-1927: Preliminary Studies in
Social Development" (M.A. Thesis, Cornell University,
1967), pp. 98-120.17
the Sarekat Ilmu (Association for Knowledge), which published
Kaum Muda-oriented religious texts. In 1920, the Minangkabau
Kaum Muda ulama organized the Persatuan Guru Agama Islam (PGAI,
Association of Islamic Religious Teachers). In 1921, the Kaum
Tua ulama, who had refused to join the PGAI, established their
own organization, the Ittihadul Ulama (Association of Ulama).
In 1916, Datuk Sutan Maharadja, in an effort to counteract the
Kaum Muda education and political movements, established the
Sarekat Adat Alam Minangkabau (SAAM, Adat Association of the
Minangkabau World).
The voluntary association was now seen as the best method
for achieving economic and educational progress. "Organization
or association," as a writer of the Kaum Muda journal, Al-Moenir,
put it,
is an institution for channeling the spirit of reform
.	. . , to encourage enterprising vigor and to enhance
the nobility of knowledge [kemuliaan ilmu]. It is a
place to cultivate [brotherhood] among mankind and
nations.39
The voluntary association was idealized as the best instru-
ment through which the objectives of its members could be ad-
vanced, and the success of organizations such as the Sarekat
Usaha of Padang and the Study Fund of Kota Gedang provided sup-
porting evidence for such views.
At the same time such organizations helped reduce contro-
versy and conflict. Sometimes a conscious effort was made as
in the case of the Kaum Tua organization which said that its
members should abandon controversy and should only maintain
their loyalties to the teachings of the Shafiite school of law
(mazhab}.*° But more important, such organizations formed a
kind of community, a place where the members could feel secure
in their opinions; one might say that it functioned as a kind of
"internal rantau" for its members. Whether formed within or
outside the adat community, the organization had its own rules
and assumptions which were not necessarily identical with those
of the adat world. Some organizations were designed to support
the existing order in the adat community and others to change
it from within by developing the organization into a counter-
institution.
39.	Al-Moenir, 2, No. 1 (May 1912).
40.	Oetoesan Melajoe, August 20 and September 1, 1921.18
The Role of the Rantau
The Minangkabau chronicles (tambo) demonstrate the essen-
tial part played by the rantau in the development of the alam.
The institution of kingship and the Islamic religion are the
two most important elements which came from the rantau but were
subsequently incorporated into the alam. The successive series
of religious reform movements, from the Padri to the modernists,
were started by persons who had been to Islamic centers beyond
Minangkabau. The drive toward Western concepts of progress re-
ceived its major support from traders, civil servants and school
teachers who had lived in the newly emerging towns. Educational
and political development in twentieth-century Minangkabau were
deeply influenced by perantau intellectuals, both Islamic- and
Western-educated.
The important role of the rantau can be explained by exam-
ining its place in the Minangkabau conception of the world and
in Minangkabau social structure. It was not just a gate through
which new elements could enter the alam but also one through
which dissatisfied persons in the alam community could find an
outlet. The rantau acted as a means for easing the internal
tensions which arose from discrepancies between the Minangkabau
conception of the relationship between the individual and soci-
ety, on the one hand, and the demands of its matrilineal social
structure, on the other.
The individual and society, according to adat ideals,
though two entities, are yet inseparable. The relationship
between them is determined by the cycles of authority and obli-
gation, in which the object and the ultimate source of authority
reside within the same locus. The kemenakan (nephew), who sym-
bolizes the individual, should acknowledge the authority of his
mamak (uncle), who in his turn relies on the penghulu. The
latter should base his judgment on the mufakat which expresses
society's wishes and communal wisdom. According to this hier-
archical order of authority, the individual comes under the
full control of his society. But the pepatah adat state that
in fact the kemenakan is not merely the object, he is also the
ultimate source of authority. Outwardly the penghulu is the
master but in essence he acts only as a servant of his kemenakan
The penghulu's power is not based on his personal attributes but
on the legitimacy invested in him by his nephews. A penghulu
"is great [because] he is made great [by his kemenakan]." His
authority is based on sakato alam, the consensus of his small
world, his people.4*1
41. For a discussion of this philosophical idea, see Nasroen,
Dasar Falsafah, pp. 128-136.19
The foundations of the Minangkabau social system rest on
a matrilineal uncle-and-nephew (mamak-kemenakan) network. It
centers on the figure of the mother, who is the most important
person with regard to the inherited communal house and the in-
alienable landed properties. As head of the family, the mamak,
usually the oldest male, is responsible for the maintenance of
the inherited property and for the welfare of his kemenakan; he
also serves as the family’s representative in suku (lineage)
affairs. The kemenakan, in turn, must consider the mamak as
his "king" (baradjo kamamak); he must "ask [his mamak] for per-
mission whenever he leaves and inform him when he returns." In
inter-lineage relationships a kemenakan relies on the mamak of
the whole suku, that is, the penghulu.42 A penghulu serves as the
chief mamak for his own lineage and a recognized leader of the
entire matrilineal political unit. He symbolizes the glory
(kemegahan) and the harmony of the adat community under his
jurisdiction.43
The Minangkabau have always been fascinated by their adat
ideals, and their lives are dominated by elaborate adat social
networks and complex adat regulations. The adat functionaries
act both as the holders of power and as the legitimate custodi-
ans of adat ideals.
In this adat-intensive situation, then, the concept of the
rantau provides a philosophical outlet for tolerance of periph-
eral values. The nagari tacitly recognizes its own "internal
rantau," that is, places where peripheral and deviant sets of
values can be openly expressed. A typical example from Minang-
kabau is the lapau, the village coffee house, which traditionally
has been a place where people may discuss and criticize the
members of the balai and the ideas they represent. At its best,
the lapau, which is also frequented by people from other nagari,
can serve as a source for change within the nagari. At its
worst, it is an arena where the Minangkabau can give free rein
to their delight in sarcasm. The lapau thus provides a place
where both cynics and advocates of active change find a common
internal rantau. The various kinds of internal rantau sometimes
were transformed into counter-institutions challenging the en-
tire system. Counter-institutions could develop from a new
42.	For a fuller description of the obligations of the kemena-
kan, see, Adatrechtbundels, 11 (Sumatra, 1915), pp. 115-129.
43.	A penghulu is usually selected from among the male members
of the lineages of urang usali (original settlers). It
sometimes happens that the newly-elected penghulu is still
a minor in which case an adult pemangku (lit. "holder") is
chosen to act in his stead. A pemangku may also be needed
if the penghulu is residing outside the nagari.20
madrasah, or other religious school, in the case of a religious
reform movement or, in the modern period, from a voluntary asso-
ciation. Voluntary associations, in which adat assumptions and
status were irrelevant, offered alternative institutions for
advancing individual ideas and wishes. Membership and position
depended not upon adat status but personal choice and actions.
Voluntary associations provided their members with a sense of
participation and satisfaction which they might not be able to
find in the existing adat organization and its hierarchy. In
the course of modern history voluntary associations often under-
mined the traditional nagari council’s power and sometimes cap-
tured the initiative from it.
"Going to the rantau," called merantau, is, according to
adat philosophy, one way to fulfill that Principal Law which
charges the individual to "subject himself to the largeness of
the world.By leaving the nagari, or the Minangkabau world,
the youth learns about his own place in the alam and his rela-
tionship with other people. The urang siak (religious student)
provides a typical and traditional example of a youth who goes
to the rantau in search of knowledge. He would travel from one
religious school to another seeking to perfect his studies. The
urang siak maintained the ties between a madrasah and the nagari
which surrounded it. The student and the community at large
were bound to each other by mutual needs and obligations. The
madrasah members distributed elementary religious knowledge and
performed religious rites for the nagari people, but at the same
time, by their travels, they also served as channels for inter-
nagari communication. The community for its part generally sup-
ported the urang siak with food and other necessities. When he
considered his religious training to be complete, an urang siak
was expected to become a religious teacher in his home nagari.
Economic changes and improvements in the religious school
system at the turn of the twentieth century also transformed
the nature of the urang siak. He was no longer a peripatetic
religious scholar living on community charity; he had become a
student attached to a particular "modern" madrasah, and his
study was financed by his family. The ideal of leaving the
nagari in the search for knowledge persisted, however. The
establishment of new kinds of schools abroad, such as secular
government schools on Java, combined with the increased oppor-
tunity to go to the distant rantau, such as the Middle East,
meant that the role of rantau as an educational center for the
youth remained substantially unchanged.
Rantau is regarded as a strange land with which a Minang-
kabau young man must familiarize himself. Awareness of the
44. Adatrechtbundels, 27 (1928), pp. 291 ff.21
outside world benefits the youth in his personal development as
a mature member of the alam, but, at the same time, he is ex-
pected to act as an informant and teacher enabling his community
to "adopt what is good [from the rantau] and discard what is
bad [in the alam]." One reason for the uneven development be-
tween Minangkabau nagari resulted from the number of perantau
commuting between a given nagari and the rantau. Economic
factors were important determinants for the number of perantau.
The more economically self-sufficient nagari had fewer perantau
and were thus generally less affected by the money economy or by
ideas which developed in the rantau. These nagari were thus
relatively successful in maintaining traditional adat patterns
of land ownership and social classification. The nagari which
were economically more dependent on the rantau were often the
first to be affected by new ideas brought by returning perantau,
both by participants in Islamic modernist movements and through
the increased numbers of children enrolled in the Western
schools. Aside from problems associated with a money economy,
economic influence could undermine the penghulu’s power, by
enlarging the numbers of the village elite.
In spite of its place in the Minangkabau world view, "going
to the rantau" also represented some personal hardship. A youth
often went to the rantau because he felt, or was made to feel,
that he had as yet no place in his community, and he hoped that
on return he would occupy a proper place in society. Responsi-
bilities to his matrilineal family and to his wife and children
might force an adult male to go to the rantau to earn a living.
When he returned, he was expected to pay off the family's debts
and to increase the family's kemegahan. Alam Minangkabau and
the smaller world of the nagari should ideally benefit from the
rantau. Money from the rantau would increase the prestige as
well as the property of the nagari; perantau ideas would stimu-
late its philosophical growth. Thus the perantau should make
sure the alam is the chief beneficiary of his experiences in
the rantau. This accords with the historic tradition, for,
according to the tambo, one of the legendary adat-givers gave
Minangkabau its adat foundation after his return from adventures
abroad.
Successive religious movements which forced a review of
the cultural assumptions of the alam were launched by perantau
who had been trained in the centers of the Islamic world. The
notion of the superiority of Western models for progress prompted
the actions of Western-educated perantau in their drive for
kemadjuan in Minangkabau. Experience abroad and awareness of
ideas developing there helped the perantau to formulate new and
enlarged meanings for traditional conceptions about the alam
Minangkabau. The perantau introduced the notion of a unity of
ideas and faith and a unity of destiny with people outside
Minangkabau. Despite differences in emphasis, successive22
Islamic reform movements, political parties and educational
organizations stressed the importance of realizing a greater
Islamic brotherhood. By these conceptions of a greater unity,
the perantau threatened to eliminate existing adat ideas about
an ever-expanding alam in geographic terms and at the same time
to weaken the traditionally centripetal nature of the alam
Mmangkabau.CHAPTER II
OPPOSITION AND REBELLION
Concern about progress and the rise of Islamic modernism
coincided with a period of economic change in Minangkabau.
Though originating from different sources, both the intellectual
and economic changes were urban phenomena and both had a pro-
found influence on Minangkabau as a whole. During this period,
the towns began to assume the leadership in conceptualizing
nagari grievances about the corvde and taxes. The tax rebel-
lion of 1908 had shown that traditional kinds of anti-government
actions were not adequate for coping with the new situation.
Scattered rebellions fed by a belief in the invulnerability of
those who fought against a kafir government clearly could end
only in death or exile for the participants.
The emergence of the towns as leaders in political life
was precipitated by the introduction of several government regu-
lations. In 1914, the office of tuanku laras, the government-
installed adat and administrative head of a nagari federation,
was abolished, and the office of demang, a purely administrative
position covering a larger territorial unit, was instituted.
The nagari head, according to the Nagari Ordinance of 1914, had
to be elected from among the so-called "core penghulu," those
whose adat positions were recognized by the government; all
other penghulu were ineligible. The government thus nullified
the traditional right of every penghulu to assume membership in
the nagari council.1 The Agrarian Regulation of 1915 declared
that all unoccupied lands fell under government jurisdiction,
thereby repudiating the adat concept of tanah ulajat, or reserved
communal land. The Agrarian Regulation, according to Governor
Ballot, proved "a bitter pill for the people."2 The new statutes
1.	H. W. Stap, "De Nagari-Ordonnantie," pp. 699-765. Governor
Ballot believed this was the best way to establish an or-
ganic political structure in the nagari and at the same time
to secure a good relationship between the government and the
people. Gov. Ballot, "Memorie van Overgave," Verbaal April
5,	1916, No. 15. Resident LeFebvre later changed the ordi-
nance to allow village notables (the urang patuik) to par-
ticipate in the nagari council if necessary. Ordinance of
1918, Staatsblad 1918, no. 677. Res. LeFebvre, "Memorie van
Overgave," Mailrapport 2904/'19.
2.	Mailrapport 640/'17.
2324
exacerbated the persisting antagonisms toward the government.
Unlike the anti-tax rebellion, however, now the opposition was
guided by urban leaders.
Into this situation was introduced an increasing influence
from political activities in Java, particularly the formation
of parties. The Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Association) soon
emerged as the first political party in Minangkabau, largely as
a result of its activities in other parts of Sumatra.* * 3 4 At the
suggestion of a Minangkabau perantau, who had been an SI leader
in Atjeh, Hadji Achmad, a Padang trader-ulama, and Sjech Chatib
Ali, a Kaum Tua leader, founded the first branch of the party
in Padang. The members were mainly the students and followers
of the two men, most of whom worked as petty traders and farmers
in the neighborhood of Padang.* Some Kaum Muda followers also
joined. They were generally better-educated and had a more
secure economic base as school teachers and government employees.
As a result, the Kaum Muda group soon dominated the party’s
local board.
The first important activity of the Padang SI was its par-
ticipation in the first national congress of the Central Sarekat
Islam (CSI) in Bandung in 1916. At this congress Abdul Muis,5
himself a Minangkabau perantau intellectual and vice-president
of CSI, criticized the local administration and the government's
policies for the West Coast of Sumatra. In his speech, Muis
described the situation after the anti-tax rebellion, recounting
a story of death, destruction and the unjust enforcement of the
3
In 1914 and 1915, most newspaper articles
were strongly anti-SI, particularly after
volvement in a rural rebellion in Djambi.
"Minangkabau 1900-1927," pp. 114-115.
in Minangkabau
alleged SI in-
Abdullah,
4.	Mailrapport 29/ ' 17 .
5.	Abdul Muis (1878-1956) was the son of the tuanku laras of
Sungai Puar (Agam). He dropped out of the Indies Medical
School (STOVIA) in 1903 and went to work as a clerk in the
Department of Education in Batavia, leaving in 1905 when he
became an assistant editor of Bintang Hindia. From 1907 un-
til 1912, he worked in several government offices. In 1912,
he became an editor of the Preanger Bode and in 1915 editor-
in-chief of Kaoem Moeda. He joined the Sarekat Islam in
1915 and occupied several positions in the party before his
election as vice-president. For a discussion of his politi-
cal activities, see Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the
Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1960) , pp.
107 ff.; also Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), esp. p. 23^25
hated tax. This speech marked the first time that Minangkabau
grievances had been expressed this way in an open forum, and the
results demonstrated the usefulness of public protest. Muis'
address led to the passage of a resolution by the SI urging the
government to inquire into the problems of tax collection in
Minangkabau.6 The central government responded by sending a
special commission to investigate the situation in Minangkabau
and Tapanuli at the end of 1916.7
The Padang SI, however, soon suffered an internal crisis,
because, although the majority of the members were loyal follow-
ers of the two Kaum Tua founders, most of the board members were
Kaum Muda. The conflict was exacerbated by a general lack of
organizational and financial skills on the part of the founders.
The newly established SI divided into two factions after a crisis
which began three months after its founding. In August 1916,
the Kaum Muda faction formed its own SI, most of whose members
also belonged to the Kaum Muda organization, Sarekat Usaha.8
The Kaum Muda SI was referred to as the White Card SI, while
the Kaum Tua faction became the Red Card SI. The former was led
by a teacher of a government Dutch-Native School and the latter
remained under the leadership of Hadji Achmad and Sjech Chatib
Ali.9
The party split also reflected different attitudes toward
the government and toward kemadjuan. The Kaum Muda Sarekat
Usaha had established in Padang a highly successful HIS-Adabijah
which received a subsidy from the government. It was the first
Kaum Muda secular school which used Dutch as its medium of in-
struction. Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, the most aggressively "modern"
Kaum Muda ulama, and several Western-educated intellectuals and
important Minangkabau traders, such as Abdullah Basa Bandaro,
led the Kaum Muda group, and maintained good relations with
Dutch officials in Padang. Kaum Tua leaders Sjech Chatib Ali
and Hadji Achmad, however, were distrusted by the Resident and
his subordinates.10 In addition to their opposition to Islamic
6.	Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken, Sarekat Islam Congres (le
Nationaal Congres), 17-24 Juni 1916 te Bandoeng (Behoort
bij de geheime missieve vanWd. Adviseur voor Iniandsche
Zaken, dd. 29 September 1916, No. 226) (Batavia: Landsdruk-
kerij, 1916-1919), pp. 55-57.
7.	Abdullah, "Minangkabau 1900-1927," pp. 148-149.
8.	Mailrapport 2357/'16.
9.	Oetoesan Melajoe, August 14 and 15, 1915.
10.	Letter of Resident LeFebvre to the Governor-General, October
11, 1916 (secret), No. 175 in Mailrapport 2357/'16. W. A. C.26
modernism, the Kaum Tua SI also distrusted the secular drive
toward kemadjuan. The Kaum Tua had their power base in the
nagari, and they acted as the urban counterparts of disgruntled
rural tarekat leaders. The SI of the Kaum Tua ulama represented
a first step toward a new means for opposing the government.
They remained the spiritual leaders of anti-government
sentiments.* 11
Soon after the SI split, Hadji Achmad requested and received
recognition from the Central SI in Java for his faction as a
separate SI branch.12 Hadji Achmad successfully exploited this
new status in his competition with the Kaum Muda, establishing
several branches of the Kaum Tua SI in the interior. The SI
presented itself as a new and more effective means for dealing
with popular grievances. In some places its leaders even an-
nounced that those who joined would no longer be obliged to pay
taxes.13 Though effective, this approach also had its risks.
Taxation had always been the most politically sensitive and
potentially explosive issue, and consequently the spread of the
Kaum Tua SI generated considerable concern in provincial govern-
ment circles. In September 1916, the Resident forbade Kaum Tua
SI leaders from propagandizing the party outside their respec-
tive districts without the permission of local authorities.1u
In Suliki, the Assistant Resident actively participated in a
nagari council meeting called to discuss whether permission
should be granted for the formation of an SI branch in the
nagari. In Solok, Sjech Chatib Ali was confronted by the local
Dutch authority in the nagari council. At such meetings, Dutch
officials posed all but unanswerable challenges for the SI pro-
moters. "Is Minangkabau adat already so decayed that it needs
Whitlaw, LeFebvre's successor, stated in his own "Memorie
van Overgave" that Sjech Chatib Ali was an unreliable per-
son and full of intrigues, Mailrapport 2488/’26.
11.	Mailrapport 291/’17 and 2357/'17.
12.	The recognition was granted on September 21, 1916. In
October, Hadji Achmad and Sjech Chatib Ali were already
busy propagating the SI in Padang, Painan, Manindjau and
Ampat Angkat. Telegram of the Resident on October 7, 1916,
in Mailrapport 2 3 5 7 / ' 16 .
The central government refused to acknowledge the legal
right of the SI as a whole, but it did grant legal recogni-
tion to individual branches. Van Niel, Emergence of the
Modern Elite, pp.117-118.
13.	Oetoesan Melajoe, September 2, 1916.
14.	Koloniaal Verslag, September 1916, Mailrapport 2355/'16.27
the Si’s support?" or "Are the existing religious institutions
no longer able to cope with the situation?"15 These questions
were intended to undercut the SI by implying that it had no
legitimate role to play. Adat was already under the jurisdic-
tion of local penghulu; religion could be protected by adat
religious functionaries, the Friday Council of the nagari
mosque, and the numerous religious teachers.
Nevertheless, the Kaum Tua SI, supported by tarekat lead-
ers, continued to expand into several nagari. The development
of the Kaum Tua SI was indirectly assisted by the central govern-
ment’s policy guidelines concerning the party. In accordance
with the recommendation of its team investigating SI activities
in the Outer Islands, the government decided in principle to
award legal rights (recht-persoon) to each SI branch which
sought such recognition.16 Thus local Dutch authorities could
only stop the party indirectly by preventing its initial devel-
opment in their area. The Kaum Muda SI received recognition
from neither the Central SI nor the government, but even so it
made progress in several nagari already influenced by the Kaum
Muda religious movement.
Alongside SI expansion in Minangkabau was the development
of an "Indies" nationalist party, Insulinde. In 1916 under the
influence of the Minangkabau educator and writer Marah Sutan,
who was at that time chairman of the party branch in Batavia,
several units of Insulinde were created in West Sumatra. Gov-
ernment school teachers, many of whom were former students of
Marah Sutan, and urban penghulu formed the core of Insulinde
support. After two years, they were granted autonomy by the
Batavia branch. Several groups, such as Padang and Solok, had
grown into full-fledged branches. As with the Kaum Tua SI,
Insulinde’s development depended to a large extent upon the per-
sonal influence of its promoters, and it drew upon the desire
to participate in a new kind of "internal rantau." The Padang
branch, led by Sulaiman Effendi, a radical coastal aristocrat,
and Radj a Ibrahim, a former civil servant, became the first
15.	Oetoesan Melajoe, January 27 and 29, 1917.
16.	Frijling and Cligneet, "De Sarekat Islam in Zuid Sumatra
(Lampung, Palembang, Bengkulen en Djambi)," in Verbaal
November 27, 1915, No. 13. In its decision of September 9,
1915, the Council of the Indies recommended that the above-
mentioned report be sent to all Governors and Residents in
the Outer Possessions (see Mailrapport 2010/’15). Some of
the report’s suggestions were: legal recognition of local
SI; granting facilities for local branches; establishing
good relations with party leaders; and strengthening native
officials. Verbaal November 27, 1915, No. 13.28
group to introduce the notion of political unity for the
"Indies.”
Many penghulu and "native" civil servants viewed the emerg-
ent political parties as a nuisance to the government and as
basically detrimental to the adat-supported authority. Datuk
Sutan Maharadja, the leader of the so-called "adat revolution
of 1906," reacted by seeking an alliance with his former ene-
mies, the adat-oriented Padang aristocrats. In September 1916,
under his leadership, several penghulu from the interior joined
coastal aristocrats in establishing the Sarekat Adat Alam Minang-
kabau (SAAM, Adat Association of the Minangkabau World). Short-
ly afterward, branches were organized in the interior.
Most SAAM members were adat functionaries or native offi-
cials. According to its statutes, the SAAM was designed to
guard the alam Minangkabau, its adat and its religion against
allegedly harmful activities by a number of intellectual and
political movements. The party declared its desire to develop
the Minangkabau people in accordance with the inherited values
of their alam. Politically, the emergence of the SAAM and some
of the later adat parties created a faction committed to the
support of the government. The generally loyal stance taken by
the adat parties created the popular belief that, despite their
frequent criticism of government policies, they were no more
than government parties whose ideology represented Minangkabau-
centered cultural nationalism.17
The spread of the SI, the Insulinde (later called the
Nationaal Indische Partij, NIP) and the SAAM, reflected the in-
ability of adat institutions to deal with the contemporary situ-
ation. The parties offered institutions outside the adat
through which individuals could advance their own ideas and
even challenge the existing nagari council. In 1917, for exam-
ple, a penghulu in Kamang, near Bukittinggi, was summoned by
the nagari council of which he was a member. However, he pre-
ferred to discuss his case first with the president of his
party, the Nationaal Indische Partij, rather than immediately
obey the nagari council.18 Apparently he no longer regarded
the nagari council as the ultimate authority over a penghulu.
In 1918, some shifts began to occur within the political
parties. The moderate anti-government leaders of the Kaum Tua
17.	Abdullah, "Minangkabau 1900-1927," pp. 132-136. Hendrik
B o urn an, Enige Beschouwingen over de Ontwikkeling van het
Indonesisch Nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust (Groningen:
J\ B. Wolters, 1949), pp. 40-41.
18.	Koloniaal Verslag, June 1917, Mailrapport 1712/’17.29
SI became close allies of the loyalist SAAM. Sjech Chatib Ali
and Hadji Achmad had lost their influence among the numerous SI
branches in the interior, and they now became advisors to the
central board of the SAAM. The Kaum Muda SI, which had recently
been recognized as an independent branch by the Central SI,
developed into a moderate opposition party, forming an anti-
government alliance with the vociferous NIP.
Several factors lay behind these shifts. The intensifica-
tion of religious conflict between the Kaum Muda and the Kaum
Tua ulama had caused a polarization in several communities.
Through public preaching, especially at religious gatherings
(tabligh'), the Kaum Muda ulama attacked anything which they con-
sidered religiously unlawful. This served to cement cooperation
between the Kaum Tua ulama and the adat-oriented leaders. In
1917 Abdul Muis stopped in Padang on his way to Europe.19 He
tried to reunite the two SI factions, but he failed and so
aligned himself with the Kaum Muda side.20 By so doing, he in-
curred the enmity of the Kaum Tua SI leaders, the early promot-
ers of the SI in West Sumatra. His action also brought the
Kaum Muda SI into the arena of political activism. In 1919
Resident LeFebvre, who had had friendly relations with the Kaum
Muda group in Padang, was replaced by one of his Assistant Resi-
dents, Whitlaw. The new Resident had a reputation for distrust-
ing anything connected with Islam. Whitlaw believed that the
only way to rule Minangkabau was through its adat institutions
and the penghulu.21
19.	Abdul Muis was on his way to Holland as the SI delegate to
a conference with metropolitan government representatives
on the question of home defense for the Indies (Indie
Weerbaar). On the early reaction to the defense question
m West Sumatra, see K. A. James, "Indie Weerbaar, te Fort
de Kock in 1914," KT, 2 (1916), pp. 1599-1603. Through
1916 and early 1917, the defense question formed the focus
of political debates in Minangkabau newspapers. Datuk Sutan
Maharadja, the editor of Oetoesan Melajoe and the leader
of the adat party, strongly supported the idea that the
Indies should defend themselves in cooperation with the
Dutch government. He was challenged by Marah Sutan, a
leader of the NIP, and by Noerdin Rassat, a leader of the
Kaum Muda SI, who argued that the formation of a militia
should be accompanied by greater participation of the people
in the administration; this position was in accord with the
position taken by the Java SI.
20.	Oetoesan Melajoe, February 10, 1917.
21.	In an article, Datuk Sutan Maharadja stated that Resident
LeFebvre had been "a student of the hadji [Hadji Abdullah30
From 1918 until 1923, the major concern of the Kaum Muda
political parties was to achieve political cooperation among
themselves and to establish a means for dealing with popular
grievances. Together with the loyalist adat parties, they de-
manded greater popular participation in the government apparatus
through the establishment of a genuine Minangkabau council
(Minangkabau Raad) entrusted with considerable power.
In June 1918, about thirty Kaum Muda political and educa-
tional organizations held a general meeting in Bukittinggi.
They decided to form a Sumatran federation of organizations
which could coordinate the activities of their numerous associa-
tions. Shortly after its establishment, the headquarters of the
federation, which was called Budi Baik (Good Character), were
transferred to Batavia. The transfer occurred at the instiga-
tion of several perantau intellectuals, in particular two Volks -
raad members, Abdul Rivai and Abdul Muis. They argued that such
a Sumatran political party should have its headquarters in
Batavia where it could function as a pressure group for "elect-
ing" suitable representatives from Sumatra to the Volksraad.22
Now known as the Sarekat Sumatera or the Sumatranen Bond (Suma-
tran Union), this party served as the major link between politi-
cal movements in Java and in Minangkabau, and as the spokesman
for the local Sumatran parties in the capital. It had, however,
lost its original character as a coordinating body for associa-
tions in Sumatra.
The scope of the Sarekat Sumatera was not limited to West
Sumatra, and as a result, a need was felt for a body which could
deal with purely Minangkabau problems. This feeling was intensi
fied by the desire to formulate suggestions for a newly-consti-
tuted Herziening Commissie (Reform Commission) of the govern-
ment.23 In April 1919, Bagindo Djamaluddin Rassad, a graduate
Ahmad] who is an enemy of the adat party." Resident Whit-
law, on the other hand, "is a tuan, a gentleman who likes
Minangkabau adat." Oetoesan Melajoe, May 4, 1920. Resi-
dent Whitlaw shared Ballot's opinion that the ideal admin-
istration for Minangkabau featured cooperation between adat
institutions and the government's administrative machinery.
"A penghulu, however old and conservative he might be,"
according to Whitlaw, "is a man of distinction, whose in-
fluence should be used by the government." "Memorie van
Overgave," Mailrapport 2488/'26, p. 14.
22.	Neratj a, September 21, 1918.
23.	On this Reform Commission, see Van Niel, The Emergence of
the Modern Elite, pp. 184 ff.; E. Moresco, "The New Consti-
tution of the Netherlands Indies," Asiatic Review, 23
(1927), pp. 216-224.31
of the Agricultural College in Wageningen, Holland, took the
initiative in organizing the Sarekat Combinatie Minangkabau
(SCM, Federation of Minangkabau Associations). The members of
the SCM were mostly Kaum Muda oriented organizations. Although
at first it took a cooperative stance vis-a-vis the government,
under the leadership of B. Djamaluddin Rassad and Sulaiman
Effendi it soon developed as a spokesman for the radical fac-
tions of Minangkabau political and educational organizations.
Under the leadership of Sulaiman Effendi, the SCM was much
influenced by Douwes Dekker’s NIP in its political orientation.
In June 1921, the SCM began to take part in political develop-
ments on Java; it participated in the autonomy movement designed
to increase the participation of indigenous people in the admin-
istration. This movement was initiated by several Indonesian
members in the Volksraad, but it failed because of central
government hostility.24 For the SCM, however, participation
was a first step toward cooperation with political movements in
Java. In June 1922, the SCM took part in the NIP-sponsored All-
Indies Congress.
In July 1922, the SCM and its member organizations, partic-
ularly the local NIP and the Kaum Muda SI, hosted the first and
only Congress of Sumatran Unity (Congres Persatuan Sumatra).
Held in Padang, the congress was attended by several representa-
tives from political parties in North and South Tapanuli, Atjeh,
and the East and West Coasts of Sumatra.25 It was presided
over by Manullang, the chairman of a Batak Christian party.
The congress proved a great success, for the notion of Sumatra
as the island of the future and the call for unity among all
the island’s ethnic groups had a wide appeal. A stirring call
was made for unity in the cause of independence and the develop-
ment of Sumatra, a crusade which if possible should be carried
to other parts of the Indies as well. The congress decided to
form a central council for all Sumatra with its headquarters in
one of the island’s big cities, still to be selected.26 The
radical tone of the congress and the political activities of
its leaders, however, directly caused the decline of the Persa-
tuan Sumatra movement, for, shortly after the congress, several
of its leaders were arrested. The cooperationist Sumatran lead-
ers active in the Sarekat Sumatera,men like Sutan Muhammad Zein
and Sutan Pamuntjak, were alarmed by the radicalism of the con-
gress. Moreover local problems soon distracted the Minangkabau
from the Persatuan Sumatra program.
24.	Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Elite, pp. 197 ff.
25.	Abdullah, "Minangkabau 1900-1927," pp. 165-169.
26.	Report of the Persatuan Sumatra Congress, Padang, July 1
and 2, Mailrapport 889/’22.32
The Activities of Abdul Muis
Abdul Muis played a crucial role in the efforts by the
political parties to become channels for popular grievances.
This was particularly so after his extended visit to West Suma-
tra in 1918. A born orator, Abdul Muis not only put felt dis-
satisfactions into words, but, more important, he introduced
the growing political public to a new way of viewing their prob-
lems. Instead of simply returning to an analysis based on the
Plakaat Pandjang, a political myth that had never died out,
Abdul Muis discussed the real meaning of colonialism and all
its consequences.27 As a member of the Volksraad and vice-
president of the important SI, his speeches carried great weight
in future decisions concerning the new politics of opposition.
After he left, his activities were continued by SCM leaders,
such as Djamaluddin Rassad, Sulaiman Effendi and Said Ali.
Opposition to government policies, as expressed in numerous
public meetings and publications, took a more radical turn in
1920 as a direct reaction to a sharp increase in rice prices.28
A minor economic slump began and lasted until 1924. Political
activity intensified in 1922 in the wake of a government-
announced plan to introduce a land tax. All parties, including
the adat ones, voiced objections to the tax, to a government
forest preservation policy, and to proposed taxes on communal
adat houses (rumah gadang). The government’s actions were taken
as direct insults to Minangkabau concepts of property and to
their sense of justice. The popular mood of 1908 seemed to be
returning.
During this time of increasing political action, Abdul
Muis, in his capacity as representative for the SI in the Outer
Islands, came to Minangkabau.29 He planned to stay permanently;
he wanted to revive the dying SI and also to guide local politi-
cal activities. He soon moved to the fore in the campaign
27.	Official correspondence on Abdul Muis' visit is contained
in Verbaal January 30, 1919, No. 45. Muis' own account is
in Neratj a, September 23-28, 1918.
28.	G. A. W. de Haze Winkelman, "Rijstcultuur en Overheids
Bemoeinis ter Sumatra's Westkust," De Locomotief, 1925
(Sumatra issue).
29.	In 1923, after an internal power struggle, Muis had lost
his position as vice-president and was replaced by Hadji
Agus Salim. Deliar Noer, "The Rise and Development of the
Modernist Movement in Indonesia During the Dutch Colonial
Period (1900-1942)" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University,
1962) , pp. 212-213.33
against the government, and, under his leadership, local politi-
cal organizations organized a series of protest meetings, cli-
maxing in a big meeting on November 4, 1923, in Padang Pandjang.
The November meeting was attended by representatives from the
political parties and other organizations and also by penghulu
from many nagari in Minangkabau. They adopted a resolution
rejecting the proposed land tax, the regulations concerning
forest preservation and the adat house tax. The meeting also
decided to form a Minangkabau Council (Kerapatan Minangkabau)
to coordinate political activities. In general, however, the
participants favored a cooperationist stance vis-a-vis the
government, for most of them thought that cooperation was essen-
tial in order to solve the issues raised. Along these lines,
the meeting urged the central government to establish the long-
promised Minangkabau Raad as soon as possible.
The big November meeting proved the climax of Abdul Muis'
political leadership in Minangkabau. When he had arrived in
Padang in early 1923, Abdul Muis had been challenged by the
newly-formed communist Sarekat Rakjat, whose leaders were fol-
lowers of his political enemies, namely the communists who had
been expelled from the SI.30 Muis faced other opposition in
his attempt to capture political leadership in West Sumatra,
particularly from B. Djamaluddin Rassad, the chairman of the
SCM. Using the support of the SI, Sulaiman Effendi’s NIP, the
Sumatran correspondents’ association, and a newly organized
adat party, the Bodi Tjaniago, Abdul Muis managed to out-
maneuver the Sarekat Rakjat and at the same time to discredit
B. Djamaluddin Rassad. The latter had rapidly declined in pub-
lic esteem after his expulsion from the correspondents’ associa-
tion and removal as the director of the Bodi Tjaniago’s Dutch-
Native School, but the immediate cause of his fall was exposure
of his mismanagement of the first big Minangkabau copra enter-
prise.
The success of Abdul Muis, however, proved a short-lived
victory. Local officials regarded him as a stumbling-block
hindering the implementation of government policies. His influ-
ence was considered detrimental to the government’s prestige.
Early in 1924, Abdul Muis was expelled from Minangkabau and for-
bidden to live anywhere in the Outer Islands. His expulsion
deprived Minangkabau of its most influential Western-educated
leader. Sulaiman Effendi also soon left, going to Java perma-
nently.31
30.	Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey (eds.), The Communist
Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents (Ithaca:
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960), pp. 99-100.
31.	According to Rustam Effendi, a Minangkabau perantau intel-
lectual and member of the Dutch parliament before World34
Abdul Muis' exile also meant the removal of a strong oppo-
nent to the nascent communist movement; after his departure,
the communists quickly radicalized the issues Muis had helped
to formulate. The movement had already permeated the first
"modern" madrasah, the Sumatra Thawalib of Padang Pandjang,
which served as its intellectual center. Through the activities
of the school graduates, the radical movement penetrated the
Minangkabau nagari and laid the groundwork for "revolution."
The Growth of the Sumatra Thawalib
The Sumatra Thawalib of Padang Pandjang grew out of an
ordinary traditional-style madrasah, which emphasized law and
theology and was dominated by a single teacher.32 In 1912 Hadji
Rasul (Sjech H. A. Karim Amrullah), a pioneer of the Kaum Muda
religious movement, became the teacher at the Padang Pandjang
madrasah known as the Surau Djembatan Besi. He succeeded his
friend, Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, the man who had made Padang a
center of Islamic modernism. In 1918, Hadji Rasul introduced a
graded class system into the school. He had been inspired by
the experiments of one of his assistants, Zainuddin Labai el
Junusi,33 who had established the first modern elementary reli-
gious school. Slowly, the methods of instruction, the curricu-
lum, and the textbooks were "modernized" so that the madrasah
became a model for other Kaum Muda schools. But, unlike most
War II, his father left for Java in a great hurry and it
was widely rumored that he had been expelled by the Dutch.
Sulaiman died in 1966. Interview with Rustam Effendi,
Djakarta, October 1968.
32.	All religious schools were traditionally called surau.
These can be subdivided into Quranic recitation schools and
madrasah, where students also studied religious texts.
Surau in this study refers to elementary religious schools
and madrasah to advanced schools. This distinction is also
used by Mahmud Junus in his study of religious schools in
Indonesia, Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia (Djakarta
Pustaka Mahmudi.ah, I960) .
33.	Zainuddin Labai el Junusi (1890-1924) was born in Padang
Pandjang, the son of an influential local ulama. When he
was young, he lived the life of an urang siak, traveling
from one madrasah to another. For some years he studied
and assisted Sjech Abbas of Padang Djapang. A self-edu-
cated man and a versatile writer, Zainuddin was one of the
ablest Minangkabau religious scholars.35
other Kaum Muda institutions, Hadji Rasul’s school was very much
under the control of its student organization and school board.
The origin of the madrasah student organization dated to a
small reading club founded by Zainuddin Labai in 1913.3* It
had no direct connection with the Surau Djembatan Besi but many
students joined the club. Zainuddin was not just a good reli-
gious teacher; he was also interested in secular subjects. His
club therefore received newspapers and other publications from
Java and from abroad, mainly Egypt. In 1916, when voluntary
associations and political parties were generally on the upsurge,
Hadji Habib, then a student at the Surau Djembatan Besi, initi-
ated action to establish a student cooperative society.35 Its
main function was to supply the students' daily needs, such as
soap and books. Its great success was a result of the lavish
attention which Hadji Habib devoted to it.36
In 1918, inspired by the Jong Sumatranen Bond, which had
branches in Bukittinggi and Padang, Zainuddin Labai and Djala-
luddin Thaib changed the cooperative society into an organiza-
tion with a wider scope of activities. The new organization
was called Sumatra Thuwailib (Students of Sumatra). The school
was reorganized under the same name and placed under the admin-
istrative control of a school board consisting mainly of gradu-
ates, junior teachers and local traders. The establishment of
such a school board meant that the madrasah could no longer be
considered the personal preserve of its master teacher. This
represented a new era in the history of Minangkabau religious
schools.
At about the same time, a student organization was estab-
lished at the madrasah in Parabek (near Bukittinggi) of Sjech
Ibrahim Musa, a moderate Kaum Muda ulama. On February 15, 1919,
the students of Padang Pandjang and Parabek formed a federation
known as the Sumatra Thawalib (General Organization of Students
of Sumatra).37 In 1921, Sjech Ibrahim Musa introduced the
graded system and renamed his madrasah Sumatra Thawalib. Fol-
lowing the example of Padang Pandjang and Parabek, the Kaum
Muda madrasah in Padang Djapang, Manindjau and Batu Sangkar
34.	M. D. Dt. Palimo Kajo, Speech at the Reopening of the Suma-
tra Thawalib of Padang Pandjang in 1968 (typescript).
35.	Roesad, "Nota over de Godsdienstig-Politieke Beweging ter
Sumatra's Westkust" (June 3, 1929), Mailrapport 1518x/'33.
36.	Tjaja Soematra, August 22, 1922.
37.	Tamar Djaja, "Pusaka Indonesia: Orang-Orang Besar Tanah
Air," III (Manuscript).36
were also renamed Sumatra Thawalib. A move was soon made to
combine the students of these five schools into one organiza-
tion.
On January 22, 1922, at the invitation of the students of
the Padang Pandjang Thawalib, a general meeting of student rep-
resentatives was held. The meeting decided to form a united
Sumatra Thawalib student organization under a central board.
One of its main goals would be the improvement of instruction
and textbooks in the schools. Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib, who
played an important role in the post-1927 period, was elected
as the first chairman, and one of the advisers was Hadji Datuk
Batuah, later the spiritual father of the communist movement in
Minangkabau. All members of the board were senior students who
also usually acted as junior teachers in their respective
schools.38
The united Sumatra Thawalib student organization joined
the SCM, which also had its headquarters in Padang Pandjang.
The Sumatra Thawalib was the largest member organization of
the SCM. B. Djamaluddin Rassad, in an effort to weaken the
power the Sumatra Thawalib could wield, suggested changing its
organizational structure to give more strength to the local
branches, specifically by making them autonomous. He expected
that such action would make the Thawalib branches dependent on
ties to the SCM for unity, weakening their own central board.
He argued that since the students belonged to the same school
system, communication between branches could still be carried
out. As part of the total effort to assert his influence, B.
Djamaluddin Rassad suggested that the Thawalib organizations
should not confine their activities merely to educational issues
but should participate in economic and political movements.39
In a meeting on April 16, 1922, the Sumatra Thawalib ac-
cepted the proposal that its branches should have their own
boards. The suggestion to expand activities beyond education
issues gave rise to considerable debate. A representative from
Padang Pandjang urged the participation of the Sumatra Thawalib
in political activities, but he was strongly opposed by a junior
teacher from Parabek. This reflected a fundamental difference
which existed between the two institutions --Padang Pandjang had
already become a center of anti-government political activities
but Parabek remained a secluded religious school compound. The
meeting at last decided that the organization should become
directly involved in political activities but that the students
should study the issues very carefully.40
38.	Tjaja Soematra, January 26, 1922.
39.	Ibid., February 22, 1922.
40.	Ibid., May 4, 1922.37
The 1922 meeting was the first expression of an interest
by the religious students in politics. After the April meeting,
students of the Padang Pandjang Thawalib became more interested
in political matters, a tendency which was encouraged by the
nature of their religious training and by the increasingly radi-
cal trend among Minangkabau political parties. Hadji Datuk
Batuah, one of the Thawalib’s junior teachers and an adviser to
the student organization, had already been influenced by commu-
nist doctrines, and, by early 1923, he began to introduce his
students to this new ideology.
Hadji Datuk Batuah was born in 1895 in Kota Lawas, a nagari
near Padang Pandjang. After graduation from a government second
class school, he studied in Mecca, from 1909 until 1915. On
his return to Padang Pandjang, he studied with and assisted
Hadji Rasul, and, in 1922, he was elected an adviser of the
Sumatra Thawalib student organization. In early 1923, he went
to Sigli in Atjeh, where he met Natar Zainuddin, a Minangkabau
streetcar conductor, who had received communist indoctrination
in Java.41 The meeting represented a turning point in Datuk
Batuah’s life, for his incipient anti-Dutch feeling could now
be formulated in ideological terms. After his return to Padang
Pandjang,he began propagandizing communism among his students.
The climate in West Sumatra was right for the new doctrine,
for political campaigns against the government were mounting
and the Sumatra Thawalib students were already determined to
study "politics." Datuk Batuah, understandably, became one of
the most popular junior teachers, and soon exercised great in-
fluence over Thawalib students. Datuk Batuah was a penghulu
and a religious teacher in his own nagari of Kota Lawas which
allowed him to expand his influence there as well. He converted
the younger members of the nagari council in Kota Lawas to his
views by recalling to them how their nagari had risen against
the Dutch in 1915 protesting the tax levies.42
41.	Office of the Attorney General, No. 1442 A.P., Weltevreden,
May 3, 1924, Mailrapport 390x/'24. Natar Zainuddin was
born in Padang and he graduated from a private second class
school there. In 1903, he went to Atjeh where he worked
as a streetcar conductor. In 1920 he attended the Congress
of the Vereeniging van Spoor- en Tramwegpersonel (VSTP) in
Semarang. He was the chairman of this leftwing union in
Atjeh and, during the congress, he met with several Dutch
communists such as Bergsma. In 1922, he joined the newly-
established Communist Party. In 1923, as a member of the
VSTP central board for the Outer Islands, he came again to
Semarang for a congress. On his return to Atjeh he began
to propagate communist ideology actively.
42.	Letter of the Resident of the West Coast of Sumatra to the
Governor-General, No. 108, Padang, February 20, 1924,38
The government meanwhile had expelled Natar Zainuddin from
Atjeh for his political activities, and in mid-1923 he joined
Datuk Batuah in Padang Pandjang,making it a center for "Islamic
communism." The Sarekat Rakjat branch of Padang, which had been
established in March shortly after the arrival of Abdul Muis,
was now following the lead of Padang Pandjang. Hadji Datuk
Batuah and Natar Zainuddin founded the International Debating
Club and published Pemandangan Islam, a theoretical journal on
Islamic-communism, and Djago-Djago, a fiery political organ. A
large number of Thawalib students and junior teachers joined the
debating club; they studied and discussed an ideology which
could combine Islamic anti-kafir sentiment with Marxist doc-
trines on poverty. The extent of Datuk Batuah’s influence among
the students of the Sumatra Thawalib school was shown during a
large protest meeting in November 1923, when some 200 students
demonstrated outside the meeting hall, expressing their opposi-
tion to Abdul Muis for his actions in isolating the communist
leaders.43 On that date, November 4, a Partai Komunis Indonesia
(PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) section was officially estab-
lished in Padang Pandjang.44
Datuk Batuah's influence in the Sumatra Thawalib directly
challenged Hadji Rasul, the school's master teacher who not only
opposed the participation of students in political activity but
also condemned the new ideology as a deviation from Islamic
orthodoxy. Hadji Rasul's attempts to influence Hadji Datuk
Batuah and his colleagues only worsened relations between them.
On August 2, 1923, a meeting was held between the two sides at
the house of Datuk Batuah in Kota Lawas. Hadji Rasul was sup-
ported by several Kaum Muda ulama including Sjech Thaher Djala-
luddin, a leader of Islamic modernism in Malaya who was currently
visited his home nagari. The meeting ended in complete failure.45
Subsequent meetings only widened the gulf between Hadji Rasul
and Datuk Batuah.46 Hadji Rasul realized that his traditional
Mailrapport 390x/'24. On the rebellion, see C. P., "Eene
Beschouwing over den in den Nacht van 21 op 22 December
1915 Plaats Gehad Hebbenden Overval van Padang Pandjang,"
KT, 5, No. 2 (1916), pp. 1209-1213.
43.	Datuk Tumenggung, "Geheim Nota voor de Adviseur voor In-
landsche Zaken over het Communisme ter Westkust van Sumatra
(July 30, 1925)," Kern Collection, #46.
44.	Benda and McVey, Communist Uprisings, p. 106.
45.	Mailrapport 581x/'24; Verbaal January 15, 1925, No. V.
46.	In his biography of Hadji Rasul, Hamka recollects one such
encounter. "One evening I saw Hadji Datuk Batuah, Djama-
luddin Tamin and others come to his [Hadji Rasul's] house39
authority as a religious teacher to whom students owed respect
and loyalty was being undermined, and he resigned from the
Sumatra Thawalib. He was succeeded by one of his oldest and
ablest students, Abdul Hamid Angku Mudo,*7 who managed to remain
aloof from the controversy.
The resignation of Hadji Rasul resulted in open enmity be-
tween the Kaum Muda ulama and Datuk Batuah's group. When the
government arrested Datuk Batuah and Natar Zainuddin on November
11, 1923, the younger generation of the religious Kaum Muda,
who had been influenced by communism, accused Hadji Rasul of
instigating the arrest. Datuk Batuah, despite his outspokenness,
had still honored the traditional norms concerning the relation-
ship between teacher and students in the madrasah. After his
arrest, the Islamic communists no longer restrained their attacks
on the Kaum Muda ulama.
The religious Kaum Muda movement had always stressed the
need for religious and social reforms, but it now faced a major
crisis. The Kaum Muda ulama feared that their movement was in
danger of disintegrating. In Bukittinggi, Sjech Djambek, a
persuasive ulama, expelled several students from his school upon
discovering that they were attracted by Batuah's ideas. In
Parabek, the moderate Sjech Ibrahim Musa did likewise and also
forbade his students from involvement in politics. In early
1924, the organization of the Kaum Muda ulama, the PGAI, de-
clared itself opposed to communism because communism could not
be brought into accord with Islam. The communist followers,
for their part, quickly denounced the ulama.*8
The arrest of H. Datuk Batuah removed the spiritual leader
of communism from the Padang Pandjang Thawalib. Even though
its graduates continued to spread communist ideas in the rural
areas, at the school itself the influence of the party declined.
As a result of the conflict between Hadji Rasul and Datuk Batuah
in Gatangan. They debated about communist doctrine. Their
voices were equally high and loud; Hadji Datuk Batuah spoke
with full enthusiasm." H. A. Malik Karim Amrullah, Ajahku:
Riwajat Hidup H. Abd. Karim Amrullah dan Perdjuangan Kaum
Agama di Sumatra (Djakarta: Djajamurni, 1967) , p. 132.
47.	Abdul Hamid Angku Mudo (late 188O's-1959) came from a Sum-
pur merchant family. His first teacher was Sjech Thaib
Umar of Sungajang. In 1910, he began to study under Hadji
Rasul. He wrote several books on religious questions,
mostly in Arabic. Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 252-253 .
48.	Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, pp. 153-154;
Hamka, Aj ahku, pp. 133-134.40
and the consequent resignation of Hadji Rasul, the school's en-
rollment began to decrease. Under the guidance of Hamid Angku
Mudo the quality of education remained high, but the buildings
had fallen into disrepair. The big earthquake of 1926 completely
destroyed them. After this crisis, the school board recovered
full control and began a rebuilding program. The communist
leaders were gradually purged,49 and the Sumatra Thawalib re-
emerged as an intellectual center for anti-government political
activities in Minangkabau.
The Communist Uprising
The arrests of the communist leaders did not halt the
spread of the party’s appeal, especially among petty traders
suffering from the economic slump, and among the tarekat lead-
ers. In Silungkang, where adat class consciousness was still
strong,50 communist leaders emphasized the notion of class
struggle. They considered themselves the representatives of
the "middle class," in opposition to traditional adat aristoc-
racy.51 In Kota Lawas, the nagari of Datuk Batuah, the party
was led by penghulu who could influence the rest of the inhabi-
tants. In 1925, the communist party members in Dangung-Dangung,
a nagari in the Suliki district, proudly called their nagari
"the second Moscow." In 1926 communist strength in the Batu
Sangkar district was based in three nagari, referred to respec-
tively as the "treasury," the "brain," and the "labor" centers.52
49.	In 1926 the Sumatra Thawdlib school board circulated a list
for contributions to its former graduates and donors. The
Resident did not really believe that the sole intention of
this action was to gain funds for a new building, but, ac-
cording to him, "The political direction of the members of
the Sumatra Thawalib board is not clear. They are not mem-
bers of the communist party, although they might have been
sympathetic to the extremist idea." Letter to the Governor-
General, July 23, 1926, No. 448, Mailrapport 1044x/’22.
50.	A. W. P. Verkerk Pistorius, "lets over de Slaven en Afstam-
melingen van Slaven in de Padangsche Bovenlanden," TNI, 2
(3rd S) , No. 1 (1868), pp. 434-443. Most of the people
that belonged to this lowest adat class were descendants
of former prisoners from the Padri War. Though freed in
the 1860's, they had remained in Silungkang.
51.	Benda and McVey, The Communist Uprisings, p. 102.
52.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 1927, Mailrapport 741x/’28.41
In Agam Tuo, however, Sjech Djambek was influential and the adat
authorities were still powerful; here the communists could hardly
expand their movement at all.
The graduates of the Sumatra Thawalib school successfully
propagandized a philosophy popularly known as ilmu kominih
(communist knowledge), which combined a religious argument with
Marxist anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideas. Such com-
munist promoters were described by the people as "the persons
who have been to other places and who have visited big towns,
where they had the opportunity to study communist knowledge and
communist works."53 Thawalib graduates were regarded as a new-
style urang siak, people who had come from the rantau where they
had studied a new ilmu (knowledge). Because of grievances accu-
mulated from the various kinds of taxation and the government's
forest policy, this new knowledge {ilmu baru) appeared to offer
a promise for a better future. The social and economic ills
allegedly caused by capitalist exploitation could only be cured
through kemerdekaan, independence, which meant freedom both from
the kafir government and from "adat feudalism."
In many ways, the spread of the communist movement reflected
a growing awareness of the general rather than the particular
character of popular grievances. Unlike the adat parties, which
stressed the prime importance of Minangkabau, and unlike the
previous Kaum Muda organizations, which took Sumatra as the sym-
bol of their political struggle, the communist movement empha-
sized the notion of "The Indies." The movement, therefore, can-
not be separated from the early development of Indonesian anti-
colonial nationalism.54
Throughout 1924, according to Dutch reports, the Communist
Party was preoccupied with numerous public meetings. In 1925,
it concentrated its activities on a lecture series about commu-
nism.55 Under the leadership of Said Ali, a former leader of
the SCM, the party established a close tie with its headquarters
in Java and worked to consolidate itself in the face of mounting
government pressure. By the end of 1925, however, adat authori-
ties, with support from government and religious leaders, had
successfully undermined the position of the party in many parts
of Minangkabau. From the middle of 1925 until the middle of
1926, the Communist Party had to move its regional committee
from Padang Pandjang to Padang and then back to Padang Pandjang
again. In several places, it was forced to go underground.
53.	L. Dt. Tumenggung, "Nota over de Toestanden ter Westkust
van Sumatra, August 16, 1926," Mailrapport 934x/'26.
54.	Bouman, Enige Beschouwingen, pp. 94-95.
55.	Benda and McVey, The Communist Uprisings, pp. 108-115.42
During this period of uncertainty, when a reaction was set-
ting in against the party in Java as well as in Minangkabau, the
central committee convened a secret meeting at Prambanan, near
Jogjakarta. At the meeting, held in December 1925, the party
decided to prepare for a revolution in Sumatra and Java; though
many party leaders disapproved, preparations were made.56 Said
Ali, who had represented the Minangkabau branches, instructed
his followers to start collecting arms and to draw up a revolu-
tionary strategy. In mid-1926, however, he was arrested and by
the end of the year other party leaders had also been detained.
Miscalculations in planning, disunity among the leaders and
Dutch alertness reduced the intended revolution to no more than
a series of desperate uprisings. In December 1926, scattered
uprisings occurred in the outskirts of Batavia and in the resi-
dency of Banten, but in a very short time they were all crushed
by government troops. In the Minangkabau region, whose revolt
was supposed to signal the coming revolution, the rebellion did
not break out until New Year’s Eve. Though planned for Padang
or the coal-mining town of Sawah Lunto, the rebellion in fact
erupted in Silungkang, killing several people, including a Dutch
official.57 The rebellion was quickly put down and the govern-
ment began an intensive campaign of repression throughout Minang
kabau.
The rebellion had erupted in spite of, rather than because
of, the communists’ blueprint for revolt. It was a direct out-
come of complex social phenomena. Schrieke, the chairman of the
Investigation Commission on the Rebellion, pointed to the un-
evenness of social development, the weakening of adat institu-
tions, the divisive effects of government administrative poli-
cies in the nagari, the disruption caused by economic change,
and the inherent conservatism of the Minangkabau social system
when faced with the growing importance of individualism as some
of the chief contributing factors to the rebellion.58 Since the
beginning of the century, Minangkabau had been the scene of so-
cial turmoil, including several rural uprisings, among others in
1904, 1908 and 1915. It had also experienced social and intel-
lectual conflict, between the secular Kaum Muda and Kaum Kuno
and between the religious Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua. Moreover,
local administrators, from the residency to the district level,
never properly learned the art of ruling the Minangkabau. In-
stead of pursuing a forward looking policy, the government pre-
ferred to maintain a status quo by supporting the adat authori-
ties in their opposition to religious and secular movements.
56.	McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, p. 309.
57.	Benda and McVey, The Communist Uprisings, pp. 158-177.
58.	Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, pp. 95-159.43
Ironically, instead of keeping the nagari political structure
intact, successive Dutch Governors and Residents had often
undermined it. The government had failed to respect the Minang-
kabau sense of justice and pride, sentiments which all social
groups and factions shared and to which they appealed in times
of crisis. Schrieke and his commission were perhaps correct in
their contention that the rebellion was a reflection of "the
crisis phenomenon," but its cause was rooted in the increasing
hostility toward the government.
In several respects, the rebellion can be seen as a tragic
result of Minangkabau’s uneven social development. The earlier,
rural uprising had demonstrated that desperate attempts at
liberation from taxation and corvee only ended in death or exile
For more than ten years after the establishment of the SI, new
interpretations of the colonial situation had penetrated to the
nagari. The perantau and the urban intellectuals who led Minang
kabau organizations had all participated in or observed politi-
cal activities in Java and other regions. The increasing radi-
calism of the political parties and the persistence of Dutch
conservative policies revived the militant spirit of 1908, but
with important differences. The issues had been considerably
enlarged; the inspiration came from outside; and the idea of
returning to the traditional order (e.g., where taxes were un-
known) had been replaced by the promise of a bright future.
Now the government was labeled not just as "kafir" but also as
"capitalist" and "imperialist," though often the driving force
remained a belief in the ultimate "miracle" by which the strong
and unjust ruler would be defeated.
The rebellion and its subsequent harsh suppression adminis-
tered a profound psychological shock to the Minangkabau, for
they saw that the accumulated resentment against the government
had exploded in vain. The dream of kemerdekaan had turned into
a nightmare. In this time of crisis, the people turned to adat
and religion. Shortly after the rebellion was crushed, several
nagari which had been influenced by the communist movement held
traditional adat ceremonies to express remorse.59 The nagari
in the Solok district convened an adat conference to explore
ways for strengthening adat institutions and adat bonds.60 The
leaders of the adat parties again voiced the need for a powerful
Minangkabau Raad through which the people's representatives
could directly participate in the administration. They demanded
59. Datuk Tumenggung, "Dagboek," Mailrapport 718x/'27. After
the anti-tax rebellions in 1908, several nagari also held
such adat ceremonies. Ahmad Datuk Batuah, Tambo Minangka-
bau (Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1956), pp. 117-118.
60. Tjaja Soematra, July 4, 1927.44
a change in the administrative system in order to improve the
relationship between the penghulu and the people and between
the government and the inhabitants (anak negeri}. They wanted
to restore what they regarded as the true adat political struc-
ture, that based on the nagari council.61
Outside the government sphere, the Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua
ulama regained their leadership. The Kaum Muda ulama, whose
authority had been gravely undermined by their former students,
now regained the initiative from the Kaum Muda younger genera-
tion. The Muhammadijah, an organization which had its head-
quarters in Java, soon emerged as the only organization working
to unite the splintered elements of the religious Kaum Muda.
At the same time, it was the Muhammadijah that gave the younger
Kaum Muda a chance to recapture the leadership from the Kaum
Muda ulama.
61. Ibid., February 9 and 10, and July 2, 1927.CHAPTER III
THE GRADUATES OF THE KAUM MUDA RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
AND THEIR LEADERS
The emergence of Hadji Datuk Batuah and of the Sumatra
Thawalib were significant events in Minangkabau. Both showed
the extent of the influence exercised by the reform movement
initiated by the religious Kaum Muda. They finally disproved
the notion that religious reformation could continue without
serious attention to political issues, such as the presence of
an "infidel" government. Even though the Kaum Muda ulama had
not hesitated to speak about the need to return to the true
orthodoxy of Islam, they had consistently refused to relate the
Islamic concept of political power to the political reality.
The politicization of the Sumatra Thawalib, however, could also
be interpreted as evidence that it was following the traditional
role of religious schools as challengers of existing authority.
These political factors have already been discussed, but the
Thawalib's part in the religious movement has yet to be con-
sidered.
The main objectives of the movement were to promote ortho-
doxy, to change attitudes toward religious law and to create
enthusiasm for modernity. These interrelated programs led the
Kaum Muda ulama into open confrontation with heterodox tarekat
leaders, traditionalist religious teachers, and adat function-
aries. Religious developments since the Padri war included not
only a deepening penetration of Islamic elements into the adat
system but also a growing split between the tarekat leaders,
experts on mysticism, and the religious teachers, experts on
scriptural knowledge. According to Islamic doctrine, fikh (law),
tauhid (doctrine on the oneness of God) and tasauf (mysticism)
are all parts of religious knowledge, but divisions among ex-
perts had on occasion led to doctrinal conflict. The conflict
in Minangkabau was intensified because the existing tarekat
doctrines tended to emphasize traditionalism at the expense of
the sjariah (religious regulations). At the beginning of the
twentieth century, the tarekat were still very influential1 but
1. Snouck Hurgronje believed the mystical brotherhoods would
remain popular: "Because the tariqahs give to the individual
inclination of the spirit of the true direction instead of
simple teaching in general terms (like professors of Holy
Science) what all should do and believe, it is obvious that
these societies work much more powerfully towards the fur-
therance and vivication of political ideas than study, not
4546
the number of other religious experts was increasing as more
and more Minangkabau began studying religion in Mecca. When
Sjech Achmad Chatib began his orthodox movement in the 1890's,
he directed his appeals to this growing number of Mecca-trained
religious scholars.
In 1906, some pioneers among the Kaum Muda ulama, including
former students of Sjech Achmad Chatib, began to combine the
drive for orthodoxy with a strong appeal for the use of akal
(reason) and a consequent repudiation of taqlid attitudes, which
meant blind obedience to established textual authorities. In
emphasizing the need for a re-examination of the traditionally-
accepted laws, the Kaum Muda ulama soon determined that they
should no longer be bound by any one school of law (mazhab).
Instead of simply following the precepts of the Shafiite school
of law, to which the majority of Indonesian and Malayan Muslims
belonged, the Kaum Muda ulama now formulated their religious
judgments (fatwa) after examining the legal doctrines of other
orthodox schools of law. The publications of this Kaum Muda
group followed a similar practice, representing a departure from
the type of religious arguments contained in the earlier Kaum
Muda organ (Al-Moenir, 1911-1915).2 The Kaum Muda ulama were
thus abandoning the teachings of their own highly respected
teacher, Sjech Achmad Chatib, an imam of the Shafiite school in
Mecca. Sjech Achmad Chatib had in fact been highly critical of
Islamic modernism as propagated at the turn of the century by
the Pan-Islamist, Sjech Jamal ad-Din A1 Afghani and his disciple,
the Egyptian ulama, Sjech Muhammad Abduh. Though the Kaum Muda
ulama continued to respect Sjech Achmad Chatib, they had more
in common with his cousin, Sjech Thaher Djalaluddin, who had
studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and subsequently edited
the first Islamic modernist journal in the Malay World--At Imam,
published in Singapore in 1906.
The appeals to abandon taqlid, to purify religion from syn-
cretic practices, and to use akal in matters pertaining to reli-
gious law, divided orthodox religious teachers into two con-
flicting groups, the reformists and the traditionalists. The
to mention the much wider circles which they influence. . . .
In the tariqahs the practical consequences are drawn from
such doctrines, and the glance of expectation is turned to-
wards the sheikh of the Order. Among the ignorant masses
however these consequences are expressed in all kinds of
fanaticism." C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part
of the Nineteenth Century, trans1at ed by J. FT Monahan
(London: Luzac, 1931) , p7 281.
2. Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan, pp. 73-74; Hamka, Ajahku, pp.
106-108.47
traditionalists, some of whom were also former students of Sjech
Achmad Chatib, refused to acknowledge the right of an individual
ulama to conduct idjtihad. They strongly restated their own
loyalty to the Shafiite school of law. The conflict moreover
caused the traditionalist, orthodox ulama to seek common ground
with the mystical leaders in the face of the new enemy, the
Kaum Muda ulama. Though Achmad Chatib had condemned the
Naqsjabandijah order as a deviation from the correct path of
Islamic orthodoxy, the traditionalist, orthodox ulama acknowl-
edged it as a legitimate doctrine according to the mazhab of
Shafei. The Kaum Tua ulama thus included the tarekat leaders
and the traditionalist, orthodox religious teachers.
Adat authorities opposed any religious movement whatever
because it would threaten their own role as the upholders of
the status quo and social harmony.3 Their commitment to the
existing religious establishment was strengthened after the
Kaum Muda ulama attacked particular religious rituals which had
already been incorporated in adat ceremonies. Kaum Muda appeals
for the abolition, revision, or simplification of various adat
religious ceremonies, such as certain marriage and funeral rites
or the traditional way of celebrating holy days, were inter-
preted by adat functionaries as direct attacks upon their own
authority and hence threats to the stability of the adat. The
adat authorities therefore allied themselves with the Kaum Tua
ulama against the new religious threat.
Despite the apparent strength of the opposition, a number
of factors combined to further the advance of the Islamic mod-
ernist movement. In the first place, of course, religious
reformation was not a new phenomenon in Minangkabau. The Kaum
Muda ulama, however, did not limit their activities to doctrinal
matters; they also promoted broadly-based programs for the
general improvement of society. They emphasized activism, indi-
vidual independence and frugality as means to overcome the dis-
advantages of contemporary economic changes. The deeper pene-
tration of the money economy and the increasing importance of
towns provided an appropriate background for the teachings of
the Kaum Muda.
The status and function of religious teachers in the Minang
kabau social system and the ambiguity of Dutch Islamic policies
aided the Kaum Muda ulama. Two characteristics of the tradi-
tional Minangkabau nagari must be taken into account in order
to understand the development of the religious reform movements.
Each nagari was responsible for its own affairs. There was no
functional adat organization above the nagari to enforce or
hinder the introduction of any change in the nagari. There was
3. Diradio, Mustiko Adat, pp. 16-55.48
no religious head or council which could give the final binding
word on important religious issues. The main functions of the
adat religious functionaries--such as the imam, ohatib and biZaZ
--were to perform religious ceremonies, to administer religious
dues and to take care of the nagari mosque.* They were not
necessarily religious experts, for their positions were inherited
in accordance with the adat, through the uncle-and-nephew net-
work. They presided over the Friday Council (Sidang Djumat),
but this dealt only with minor religious matters. Non-adat re-
ligious experts gave the final judgment on important religious
issues. Although outside the adat hierarchy, such experts did
play an important role in the nagari, and, through their schools,
they could expand their influence beyond nagari boundaries.
Given the separation between religious expertise and ascriptive
adat positions, nagari often recognized their most respected
ulama as the nagari sjech. Although he remained outside the
official hierarchy, the sjech’s judgment on religious matters
was considered binding on the nagari. Some pioneers of the Is-
lamic modernist movement, such as Hadji Rasul of Sungai Batang
and Sjech Thaib Umar of Sungajang, were recognized as sjech in
their respective nagari.
Taking advantage of these aspects of society, the Kaum Muda
ulama could claim religious superiority over adat religious
functionaries in their own nagari. In the supra-nagari sphere,
they challenged the Kaum Tua ulama to face them in public de-
bates. Laymen followed individual ulama who attracted them,
thus intensifying the social polarization. Furthermore, no adat
sanction existed which could force conformity with the religious
views held by adat authorities. Until 1919, when the government
decided to mediate the religious conflict,4 5 the Kaum Muda ulama
also had a favorable political climate. By their multiple pro-
grams and their insistence on the separation of religion from
politics, the Kaum Muda ulama could take advantage of the loop-
holes in Dutch Islamic policy. Government officials were less
suspicious of Kaum Muda activities also because they were cen-
tered in urban areas rather than villages.
Nineteenth-century Dutch administrative policy in Minangka-
bau tended to be anti-Muslim. First, the government tried to
4.	A. W. P. Verkerk Pistorius, "De Priester en Zijn Invloed op
de Samenleving in de Padangsche Bovenlanden," TNI, 3 (3rd
S), No. 2 (1869), pp. 423-452.
5.	Schrieke presided over a debate between the Kaum Muda and
the Kaum Tua in 1919. He took the case to Java and asked
the opinion of the Javanese ulama; they unanimously condemned
the Kaum Muda position. Schrieke, "Bijdrage tot de Biblio-
grafie," pp. 249-325.49
exclude religious teachers, labeled the "independent spiritual
leaders," and hadji from holding adat and administrative
offices;6 thus, it tried to prevent a hadji's election as a
penghulu. Although Dutch administrative and economic actions
had weakened adat institutions, particularly the balai and the
office of the penghulu, the government defended these institu-
tions in the face of threats by religious teachers. Officials
had confused adat with a purely secular authority, separated
from religion. In 1893, the government of the West Coast pro-
posed that adat law should be codified in order to guard against
the allegedly undermining influence of the religious movements.
The proposal was rejected on the grounds that codification of
adat law might imply a repudiation of the applicability of
Western law. The Sumatra Regulation of 1899 was designed to
strengthen the position of the penghulu by giving them more
power to deal with religious teachers.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Snouck Hurgronje,
Adviser for Arab and Native Affairs, suggested a more positive
policy. He advised the central government to reject the pro-
posal for the codification of adat laws; he argued that no
single authority existed who could decide adat law for all areas
of Minangkabau and the laws themselves did not derive from any
one source. Rather than strengthen adat, Snouck thought that
codification would lead to its petrification by destroying its
flexibility and thus its ability to adapt to changing situa-
tions. Snouck declared it an illusion to believe that adat
codification would protect adat from the encroachment of Islamic
fanaticism:	"The population of the West Coast of Sumatra and
their chiefs are by heart Muslim believers, and there lies the
future development of the 'Malay' family."7 If the government
tried to protect adat by combatting Islamic propaganda, he be-
lieved, it would merely provide religious teachers with an
opportunity to accuse the government of being anti-Muslim, thus
giving them an additional weapon. Snouck suggested an Islamic
policy based on the assumption that Islam could be divided into
a political and a dogmatic aspect. For dealing with political
matters, Snouck recommended a strong-handed policy. In dealing
with its purely religious concerns, in their social and indivi-
dual forms, he urged the government to adopt a benevolent policy
toward the former and a neutral one toward the latter.8
6.	L. C. Westenenk, "De Inlandsche Bestuurshoofden ter Sumatra's
Westkust," KT, 2 (1913), pp. 673-693.
7.	Adatrechtbundels, 1 (1913), pp. 31 and 21-44.
8.	C. Snouck Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1915) , pp. 53-77 .50
The first part of Snouck's recommendation was in fact a
continuation of existing Dutch Islamic policy. Religious teach-
ers had always posed a potential threat to the government. The
religious schools and particularly the tarekat had often served
as centers for rural rebellions. Snouck noted that religious
and adat tracts written by these ulama always referred to the
Dutch as Ulando Setan (Satanic Dutch).9 An iron-handed policy
had already been successfully employed to suppress various rural
uprisings. Van Ronkel's report on the religious situation in
Minangkabau in 1916 also recommended that the government should
establish strict control over the rural religious schools, par-
ticularly those operated by tarekat leaders. He urged continu-
ation of a repressive policy against the traditionalist and
conservative religious teachers. In agreement with Snouck's
recommendation, van Ronkel reaffirmed the wisdom of taking a
neutral stand in dealing with the religious controversy between
the Kaum Muda and the Kaum Tua groups. But he cautioned the
government to observe carefully the activities of the Kaum Muda
ulama.10
Snouck insisted that religious neutrality should not mean
official inactivity, for, in order to weaken Islam, he thought
the government must pursue an "association policy" as part of
an extensive educational program. A leading proponent of the
"ethical policy," Snouck believed that educational programs,
accompanied by a gradual process toward the "Indonesianization"
of the administrative apparatus, would show the Indies people
how Western civilization could benefit them. Such an "associa-
tion policy" furthermore would create a class of progressive
Western-oriented Indonesians loyal to the Netherlands.* 11 Van
Ronkel, although he did not share Snouck's optimism, supported
the idea of expanding the Dutch school system. Although, ac-
cording to van Ronkel, Western education could not be expected
to alienate the youth from Islam, it might create liberal and
less militant Muslims.12
9.	Adatrechtbundels, 1 (1913), p. 34.
10.	Ph. D. S. van Ronkel, "Rapport Betreffende de Godsdienstige
Verschijnselen ter Sumatra's Westkust," Verbaal April 4,
1916, No. 54.
11.	A Dutch observer of mid-nineteenth century West Sumatra
also urged the government to introduce Western education
because otherwise, "There is no middle power against the
Mohammedans." A. Pruys van der Hoven (ed.), Een Woord over
Sumatra in Brieven Verzameld (Rotterdam: H. Nijgh, 1864),
II, pp. 36-37.
12.	Van Ronkel, "Rapport," p. 33. His recommendation was ap-
proved by the Director of Administrative Affairs, Carpentier
Alting, see Mailrapport 1351/'16.51
Resident LeFebvre used these recommendations as policy-
guidelines during his tenure on the West Coast from 1916 till
1919. He severely crushed the uprisings which had begun in
1915, and he tried to curtail the spread of the Kaum Tua SI.
LaFebvre shared van Ronkel's belief that the Kaum Muda ulama
were neither anti-government nor interested in politics. The
leader of the Kaum Muda ulama in Padang, Hadji Abdullah Ahmad,
was apparently aiding the "association policy" idea with his
successful HIS-Adabijah. The school received a financial subsidy
from the government and also had a Dutch headmaster and two
other Dutch-trained teachers.
Though LeFebvre1s tenure was short, it was important. Dur-
ing his term, the adat authorities began to challenge the Kaum
Muda ulama openly, and, by the time LeFebvre left, Kaum Tua
ulama were allying themselves with the adat-party SAAM. In
terms of conventional Dutch Islamic policy, the Kaum Muda group
should be considered as the potential enemy. But LeFebvre was
perhaps the only high Dutch official who did not believe in the
policy of supporting the adat authorities. In his view, the
penghulu were nothing but "stupid and backward" adat chiefs,
and he believed the future of Minangkabau development rested
with the secular and religious Kaum Muda.13
Ironically, Dutch policy toward religious conflict in
Minangkabau actually resulted in a further spread of Islamic in-
fluence, for Snouck's policy guidelines had not included the
eventuality of a conflict between traditionalist and modernist
or reformist Islam. In the face of Kaum Muda religious and
secular programs, the government had to make a number of tempo-
rary adjustments, especially in its conceptions about the divi-
sion of Islam into a dogmatic and a political aspect.14 Islamic
doctrine does not recognize a clear distinction between temporal
and spiritual powers, and Snouck's policy guidelines contributed
to the spread of the Kaum Muda reform movement, because the
ulama did not see Islam as separate aspects. But in their ac-
tivities, the Kaum Muda ulama did draw a sharp distinction be-
tween "religion" for its own sake and "politics" which dealt
with questions of secular power. Some leaders of the Islamic
modernist movement, such as Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, regarded the
Dutch government as an ally in their modernization program.
Others maintained a good relation with Dutch officials; for
13.	J. D. L. LeFebvre, "Memorie van Overgave, July 22, 1919,"
Mailrapport 2904/'19, pp. 28-29.
14.	Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian
Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 (The Hague:
van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 20-31. Benda calls Snouck’s division
"unrealistic" (p. 21).52
example,Sjech Djambek's children were enrolled in prestigious
government schools. Even Hadji Rasul, an outspoken and aggres-
sive ulama whom van Ronkel had labeled "the fanatic," refused
to question openly the existence of the Dutch political power.
This attitude on the part of the Kaum Muda ulama helps explain
why they were to some extent free from government suspicion,
and why the government at first remained neutral in the reli-
gious conflict.
After 1919, however, government attitudes shifted and the
Kaum Muda ulama came under increasing scrutiny. Beginning in
1923, according to Schrieke, local administrators began to use
the adat apparatus against the Kaum Muda.15 But by this time,
the Kaum Muda religious movement had already entered a critical
stage. Unlike their teachers, the students of the Kaum Muda
ulama could not limit themselves to scholarly discussions about
the Islamic teachings on temporal power. They began to cherish
the idea of putting these teachings into practice.
No less important than these factors in the spread of the
Islamic reform movement were the social and economic backgrounds
of the pioneers and the methods they used to promote their
ideas. Most of the prominent Kaum Muda ulama belonged to highly
respected ulama and well-to-do families. Hadji Rasul was the
son of Sjech Kisai, a greatly respected ulama and holy man from
the Manindjau sub-district. On his mother's side, Hadji Rasul
belonged to the adat upper class of Sungai Batang. Both the
parents of Sjech Thaib Umar of Sungajang belonged to the uvang
babangso, the original settlers of the nagari. Sjech Djamil
Djambek was a son of the Tuanku Laras of Kurai, Bukittinggi.
Sjech Djambek is an extraordinary example of the transformation
of a ruthless "independent young man" (parewa) into a persuasive
and knowledgeable religious teacher. Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, the
leader of the Kaum Muda in Padang, like Sjech Djambek, was not
a "full-blooded" Minangkabau. His mother came from Bengkulen,
on the southwest coast'of Sumatra, but she had been acknowledged
by adat as a Minangkabau.16 On his father's side, he belonged
to an ulama and trading family from Kota Lawas, near Padang
Pandjang. His father was a rich merchant and an influential
15.	Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, p. 159.
16.	An outsider who is accepted as a member of the adat commu-
nity is termed "a nephew according to adat." Such newcom-
ers are usually accorded second class status, and, in gener
al, their descendants can not establish their own penghulu-
ships. Rather, they remain under the "protection" of their
host lineage. This regulation can be waived in some in-
stances if all penghulu in the nagari approve. Adatrecht-
bundels, 11 (1915), pp. 109-114.53
religious teacher. His uncle, Sjech Gapuk, served as the imam
of the central mosque of Padang; this mosque was under the
jurisdiction of Padang adat authorities. When Sjech Gapuk died
in 1911, Hadji Abdullah Ahmad was appointed as his successor.
Through this position, which he held for three years, Hadji
Abdullah Ahmad began to gain influence in Padang. Almost all
the less prominent Kaum Muda ulama also belonged to prestigious
ulama families.
Some of the Kaum Muda ulama inherited religious schools
operated by their fathers or uncles. Sjech Abbas and his
brother, Sjech Mustafa, succeeded to the leadership of a school
in Padang Djapang which their grandfather had established during
the Padri war. The Kaum Muda ulama usually began their careers
as traditional religious teachers, reluctantly accepting the
involved adat decorum which was accorded to a religious teacher.
Only after they had established themselves as respected teachers
in their own right could they begin to propagate their reform
ideas.
The reformers used several methods in promoting their ideas
They issued numerous publications, established new schools,
and held public debates with the Kaum Tua ulama, but their
most effective medium was the tabligh, public religious lecture,
which allowed more personal and intimate communications between
the religious experts and the laymen. The Kaum Muda ulama would
discuss religious problems in language which the people could
understand; this represented a revolutionary change from tradi-
tional religious gatherings at which experts only read and ex-
plained religious texts. Instead of texts, the Kaum Muda ulama
examined problems of daily life. No less important was their
use of Malay or Minangkabau instead of Arabic in the Friday
sermons. They adopted a slogan that "religion is only for those
who can understand" and this proved important in the rapid
spread of the reform movement.17
A close personal relationship which existed among the pio-
neers of the Kaum Muda reform also contributed to the movement’s
success. The prominent Kaum Muda ulama were able to complement
each other's strengths or weaknesses. Hadji Rasul with his zest
and aggressiveness sometimes enraged the nagari authorities and
offended local administrators by denouncing anything which in
his view constituted unlawful innovation. But Sjech Djambek
with his well-known tact usually managed to ease the tension
and turn the situation to the advantage of the Kaum Muda ulama.
Hadji Abdullah Ahmad remained the most congenial ulama in the
eyes of the Dutch officials. Commonly regarded as "the father
of Islamic journalism in Sumatra," he worked actively among the
17. Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan, pp. 76-79.54
educated and the trading groups in Padang. Sjech Djambek and
Sjech Thaib Umar were able to win favor with the penghulu in
their respective nagari.18
The progress of religious reform was clearly reflected by
the increase in public debates, the proliferation of religious
publications and the mushrooming of religious schools. During
this period of economic change when the idea of kemadjuan spread
out to the nagari, the presence of a religious school gradually
came to be regarded as an additional source of prestige for the
nagari and an indication of the religious devotion of its in-
habitants. As a result, Minangkabau became the center of Muslim
education in Sumatra and an important source for the Islamic
modernist movement elsewhere in Indonesia. But Minangkabau also
had to pay for these developments with a temporary but poignant
polarization between the reformers and their opponents.
By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century,
religious controversies had reached the high water mark. The
public debates had shown that the two groups of ulama could not
find a common ground for their religious judgments. Having
failed to convince the opposition, each side gradually abandoned
discussion of the most divisive issues. They turned from debate
on trivial doctrinal (ohilafig ah) matters and began to pay more
attention to the spread of their school networks. The emphasis
on education reflected the fact that many of the leading Kaum
Muda and Kaum Tua ulama were former students of Sjech Achmad
Chatib. In spite of their conflicts, these ulama still adhered
to traditional ideas on the proper relationship among the disci-
ples of the same guru (teacher). In the early 1920’s, some Kaum
Tua ulama began to copy Kaum Muda methods of disseminating reli-
gious instruction to the general populace through the tabligh.
By the end of the 1920's, they had also begun to imitate the
Kaum Muda educational system.
The New Madrasah and the
Kaum Muda Educated Group
The madrasah, or religious school, has always been the
focus of Muslim religious life. It was either under the guardi-
anship of a fukaha (expert on religious law) or a mysticism
teacher. Because Islam lacks social institutions for maintain-
ing and elaborating legal and scriptural knowledge and for dis-
tributing these to the general populace, it has had to rely
heavily on its religious schools. Not surprisingly, therefore,
religious movements in Minangkabau usually identified the exist-
18. Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 231-245.55
ing madrasah as their first target, and the first challenge was
the founding of a new madrasah. In the long run, the most im-
portant aspect of the Islamic modernist movement was its school
reform which formed the foundation for a rapid increase of its
followers and for continuity in the movement. The reforms re-
leased students from complete obedience to their teachers and
allowed them to elaborate their own knowledge.
The early Kaum Muda schools employed the traditional
"circle" (halaqah) system; the teacher explained religious
tracts to his students, who sat around him with their books and
notes. The students included all ages and levels of knowledge;
they were supposed to listen and to participate in the discus-
sion. The best students were designated as the helpers. The
halaqah method, according to Sjech Thaib, who was never able to
change the system satisfactorily, could produce but one fine
ulama out of a hundred students.19
The first substantial changes introduced by the Kaum Muda
ulama in their schools were confined to the content of instruc-
tion. Although the Kaum Muda ulama had been fighting the hetero-
dox tarekat schools and the taqlid attitude of the orthodox re-
ligious teachers since the beginning of the century, reform in
the religious schools themselves only began in 1915. Zainuddin
Labai, one of the ablest young ulama and a student of Hadji
Rasul, began by taking the government schools as the model for
his own elementary religious school. This school, the Dinijah,
introduced the graded system in religious education, and, unlike
the old schools, it also admitted girls as pupils. In 1918,
the Surau Djembatan Besi in Padang Pandjang, where Hadji Rasul
was the teacher and Zainuddin a junior teacher, also began to
use the graded system. It proved relatively easy to modernize
the Dinijah school. The children were divided into seven classes
according to age and level of education. At the elementary
levels, the pupils used books which were especially written by
Zainuddin and by his colleagues. The upper classes used new
textbooks from Egypt. From the early 1920’s, the number of
Dinijah schools continued to increase. Although the various
schools were not administratively connected with each other,
they were generally founded by former colleagues of Zainuddin,
who took his Dinijah as their model. In 1923, a sister of
Zainuddin, Rahmad el-Junusiah, founded the Dinijah Putri (Dinijah
for Girls) in Padang Pandjang. The establishment of this school
and its subsequent success not only made its founder one of the
most important female pioneers in modern Indonesian history,20
19.	Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan, p. 50.
20.	Jeanne Cuisinier, "Les Madrasah Feminines de Minangkabau,"
Revue des Etudes Islamiques, 23 (1955), pp. 107-120.56
but also led to the formation of the energetic female Kaum Muda
educated group, which played an important role in the wider
Minangkabau social and political movement. Girls' schools were
founded in many parts of Minangkabau and also in other areas of
Sumatra and in Batavia.
The Sumatra Thawalib (the former Surau Djembatan Besi),
following the example of the Dinijah, was divided into seven
classes, but, unlike the Dinijah, the change proved very diffi-
cult to accomplish because the students varied greatly in age
and training. Some of them were already well-trained in Arabic,
while others could hardly read. Some of them were already
adults, while others were still in their early teens.21 For
some years, the Sumatra Thawalib still had to use old textbooks.
The change in the school, however, resulted in a rapid in-
crease in the number of "graduates," because religious studies
were no longer considered as a process which ended only when
the thirst for knowledge had been appeased or the teachers had
been satisfied. The new madrasah unlike the traditional ones
did not specialize in only one or two branches of religious
knowledge. The Sumatra Thawalib offered instruction in all im-
portant religious subjects, and its students received a certifi-
cate (fdjazah.') allowing them to become teachers. The Sumatra
Thawalib of Padang Pandjang was the model for other Kaum Muda°
schools, for example, those of Parabek, Padang Djapang, Manin-
djau and Batu Sangkar. After the mid-1920's, the number of
Kaum Muda schools rapidly increased, partly as a result of the
spread of Kaum Muda influence and the improvement in the eco-
nomic situation, but also because of the ambiguous educational
policy of the government. Though promoting education, the
government failed to meet the increasing demand for schools.
Its policy was to encourage private schools, but, as far as pos-
sible, to avoid accepting any additional financial responsibil-
ity. In such a situation, religious schools, the dominant edu-
cational institutions of Minangkabau, presented the obvious
solution to the people's needs.
The educational policy of the Dutch government put more
emphasis on the sprea.d of elementary vernacular schools, the
three-year volksschool. These schools, popularly called sekolah
desa (village schools), were supported by the respective nagari
communities but under the control of the Dutch government, from
which they also received meager subsidies. The main function
of these schools was to teach the basics of reading, penmanship
and simple mathematics. After three years, the children were
expected to return to ordinary village life. But after the
21. Hamka, Kenang-Kenangan Hidup (Djakarta: Gapura, 1952), I,
p. 41.57
1910’s, it became clear that such minimum schooling was far from
sufficient. In order to accommodate children who wanted to con-
tinue their studies, two-year vervolgschool, or "continuation"
schools, were established, but these also were few in number.
In 1925, for example, there were 548 volksschool with an enroll-
ment of about 33,440--about 40% girls--but there were only 55
vervolgschool plus eight schools for girls (meisj esschooV) .22
As a result, the great majority of the children had to return
to the village, although some enrolled in the new religious
schools, particularly the Dinijah. After 1927, private secular
schools also began to increase in numbers.
The graduates of the volksschool did not represent a prob-
lem because they could be easily absorbed into the community.
Graduates of the vervolgschool and the vernacular five-year
school program, the so-called second class school, did create
difficulties because these schools had originally been estab-
lished on the assumption that their graduates would become minor
government officials.23 Consequently, the graduates had been
prepared to enter a new world, one somewhat detached from their
own. The government, however, failed to furnish enough jobs,
nor could it provide adequate higher education.24 These short-
comings became more noticeable in the 1920's. In 1925, for
example, the number of second class schools and vervolgschool
reached 65, with an enrollment of about 13,850.25 But there
were only two schakeIschooI (connection schools) available to
the graduates. The connection schools, introduced in the early
1920's, gave graduates from the vernacular schools the chance
to continue their education and earn diplomas equal to those
from the seven-year Hollandsch-Inlandsche School (HIS). Dutch
was used as the language of instruction, and a diploma from a
HIS was required for admission to higher educational institu-
tions and also for appointment to high status, high salary jobs.
The graduates of the second class schools and vervolgschool
in West Sumatra pressed to enter the two teachers’ training
22.	A. I. Spits, "Memorie van Overgave, March 1937," Mailrapport
504/'37.
23.	S. L. van der Wal (ed.), Het Onderwijsbeleid in Nederlands-
Indie 1900-1940 (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1963), pp. 142-
tst:
24.	A 1915 second class school graduate who knew Dutch reported
that many of his friends could not find jobs in positions
which formerly had been open to them. Soematera Tengah,
15, 30, 33 (March and April 1915).
25.	Whitlaw, "Memorie," p. 112.58
schools in Padang Pandjang. Though supplemented by three voca-
tional schools, the available advanced education could not ac-
commodate all who sought entry. Each second class school and
vervolgschool could send only four or five of its best students
to take the entrance examinations for the advanced schools, and
only a handful of these would be admitted. As of 1916, the
Bukittinggi Teachers' College, called locally the Sekolah Radja,
only admitted graduates from a HIS or schakelschool. Only the
children of a few select individuals, usually government offi-
cials, penghulu and rich persons, were admitted to the Dutch-
language elementary schools. The number of both vervolgschool
and second class schools did continue to increase prior to 1931,
and quantitatively they were the most successful of the govern-
ment schools.
In addition to the still limited number of private secular
schools established by local educational organizations, the
other important educational institutions available to the gradu-
ates of the second class schools were the new religious schools,
particularly the Sumatra Thawalib. In 1928, the great majority
of students at the Sumatra Thawalib had graduated from a second
class school.26 By the middle of the 1920's, the Sumatra Thawa-
lib of Padang Pandjang and, to a lesser extent, the other Thawa-
lib schools had succeeded in transforming themselves into
"modern" religious schools. But, despite improvement in teach-
ing methods and a continued emphasis on the need for ilmu
ashriah (science suitable for the changing times), the Thawalib
schools generally devoted most of their attention to theoretical
religious studies.27 This situation persisted until 1931, when
a new phase in religious school reformation began. By 1928,
according to van der Plas, instruction in the Thawalib schools
was "of very high quality, and, contrary to the old system of
education, it is not based on learning by heart, but rather on
thinking and comprehension."28 Because Thawalib teachers in-
sisted on a high quality of religious learning, many students
in Padang Pandjang had to attend the Dinijah school in the after
noon to catch up on their religious studies.29 Twelve years of
study in the Al-Azhar school system were required, according to
26.	C. van der Plas, "Gegevens Betreffende de Godsdienstige
Stroomingen in het Gewest Sumatra's Westkust," Mailrapport
527x/'29.
27.	Hamka, Kenang-Kenangan Hidup, p. 43; Kadiman, "Peroebahan
dalam Sekolah Agama/1 Berita, April 11 and 12, 1933; and
Pewarta, May 4, 1933.
28.	van der Plas, "Gegevens," pp. 8-9.
29.	Ibid., p. 9.59
Mahmud Junus, a graduate of Al-Azhar, to finish what was com-
pleted in seven years in the Sumatra Thawalib.30
In the mid-1920’s, the Thawalib schools began to use some
important new textbooks. The students of the lower classes had,
in addition to the old textbooks, new books written by their
own teachers, Hadji Rasul and his associates. Students in the
two highest grades studied from books written by great Islamic
theologians and philosophers, such as Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rusjd,
and Ibn Sina. In Quranic exegesis, the Thawalib schools used
the work of the pioneer of the Islamic modernist movement in
Egypt, Sjech Muhammad Abduh.31 The teachings of the revolution-
ary Pan-Islamist ulama, Al-Afghani, were also available and
known to Thawalib students. The literature used in the Thawalib
schools belonged unquestionably to a "golden age" of Muslim
theology and philosophy as well as a period of Islamic modernist
thought.
In spite of the one-sided emphasis on theological problems,
the Kaum Muda schools energetically cultivated the idea of indi-
vidual rationality (idjtihad) and the spirit of reform. The
gradual decrease in doctrinal conflict between the Kaum Muda
and the Kaum Tua ulama saved the new generation from the kind
of unproductive debates common in the 1910's.
The second generation of the Kaum Muda oriented students
were influenced by numerous Islamic journals. Since the early
1920's, almost every important madrasah had its own journal. A
few of them were colored by a particular political orientation,
such as the "communist" Pemandangan Islam (Islamic View) pub-
lished in 1923 and the radical Doenia Aehirat (The World Here-
after) issued between 1922 and 1925. In general, however, the
journals were purely educational and non-political; without ex-
ception, they emphasized the inherent greatness of Islam.
The concept of the inherent greatness of Islam gave gradu-
ates of the new religious schools a great psychological advan-
tage, for it helped free them from the dilemma of the Western-
educated intellectual, who must reconcile modernity with the
desire to preserve his own culture. The modernist Islamic
literature taught the new generation of the religious Kaum Muda
that the West had risen to its position of power and technologi-
cal development after receiving an initial stimulus from Islamic
civilization. According to this position, the Western world
began to develop independently after abandoning its own reli-
gion, Christianity, and accepting the new, materialist ethic.
30.	Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan, p. 66.
31.	Ibid., p. 65.60
Islam, on the other hand, had fallen into obscurity because its
adherents abandoned the true ethics of Islam and its rulers be-
came increasingly interested in power for its own sake. The
ulama, rather than nurturing the true spirit of rationality
within the context of iman (belief), had entrapped their follow-
ers in blind obedience to a medieval obscurantism. The ulama
had served as tools of the rulers instead of the guardians of
the people.32
This dismissal of the "dark age of Islam" as a deviation
from its legitimate history and the confidence in an eventual
renaissance of Islam were clearly reflected in the speeches and
writings of the Kaum Muda educated leaders. Typical of this
genre was a booklet written in 1929 by Saalah Sutan Mangkuto,
entitled Soeloeh Moeballigh Islam Indonesia. The author starts
by explaining how a backward Arab nation was elevated to great-
ness in a relatively short time under the leadership of the
Prophet, and how, under the banner of Islam, Arab civilization
flourished for some centuries. But, in time, he writes, Islam's
power and its dlan declined.
When the ummat Islam was at the peak of its greatness,
it began to ignore [the true ethics of] Islam and be-
gan to move step by step toward decline. It eventually
fell into the lowest possible state of humiliation and
debasement.
The world fell to the mercy of the Western powers, who inces-
santly cultivated the sciences, but they also made many blunders
and terrible wars. Thus men began to realize that the world
could not be ruled by intelligence alone, and that divine regu-
lations were also necessary.
Now Islam and its ummat are climbing upward .	.	. ;
from day to day they are approaching their peak. The
non-Muslims, Alhamdullillah [thanks be to God] have
been continuously disclosing their falsehood; .	.	.
every day they are approaching the deep valley of
humiliation and debasement. Darkness will be replaced
by light, the truth of Islam will become clearly visi-
ble.33
32.	These ideas were clearly expressed in the first Islamic
modernist journal, A1 Urwat al-Wuthqa, edited by Al-Afghani
and Muhammad Abduh and published in Paris in 1884. Charles
Adams, Islam dan Dunia Modern di Mesir, translated by
Ismail Djamil (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1947), pp. 48-57.
33.	Saalah Sutan Mangkuto, Soeloeh Moeballigh Islam Indonesia
(Padang Pandjang: Boekhandel M. Thaib, 1929), pp. 30-44.61
Despite this new trend, Saalah and the Islamic apologists
stressed, the final outcome depended upon Muslims themselves.
In order to attain glory now, and happiness in the world here-
after, believers had to cultivate seriously the true ethics of
Islam as well as the modern sciences.
This conception of the nature of Islamic and Western civili
zations permeated the political and educational movements among
graduates of the Kaum Muda schools. They could find no place
in the colonial system, for religious education was irrelevant
to the government and their ideas abhorrent to the Dutch. The
Western-educated persons because of their training could claim
an appropriate status and function in the colonial system, but
the younger generation of Islamic modernists could not aspire
to participate even if they had wished to do so. Consequently,
their relationship with the Dutch was not simply one of politi-
cal confrontation but also of cultural estrangement. Dutch
officials held the religious modernists in contempt, and they
knew that the young Islamic intellectuals were inspired by
genuinely anti-Western sentiments. Such anti-Western feelings
became a source of weakness, however, because they prevented
the young modernists from studying and applying modern politi-
cal strategies and methods. On the other hand, such sentiments
enabled the modernists to identify more completely with the
population at large.
Until 1930, the most important educational institutions of
the Kaum Muda were the Dinijah and the Thawalib schools. By
1928, there were 39 Thawalib schools with an enrollment of about
17,000 students. The biggest schools were the Thawalib of
Padang Pandjang, Parabek, and Padang Djapang, which had about
750, 800, and 500 students, respectively. It was estimated
that, from the mid-1920’s until 1928, the Thawalib schools pro-
duced about 1,000 graduates.34 This was important after 1927,
when Minangkabau was recovering from its abortive rebellion,
for it meant there already existed a large educated Kaum Muda
group to provide leadership. The number is even larger if the
graduates of the Dinijah schools are included.
Although such educated people represented only a very small
percentage of the almost two million Minangkabau inhabitants of
West Sumatra, the Kaum Muda enjoyed certain advantages. The in-
tensity of religious conflict had subsided, and Kaum Muda reli-
gious ideas had spread throughout Minangkabau. Unlike the Kaum
Muda ulama, whose legitimacy as religious teachers depended
largely upon social recognition, the graduates of the Kaum Muda
schools could claim recognition on the basis of their graduation
certificates. In politics, the activities of Abdul Muis and the
34. van der Plas, "Gegevens," p. 9.62
Islamic communist movement had paved the way for the activities
of the Islamic modernists. Moreover, they did not have to face
serious opposition from the Western-educated group, for in a
religiously oriented society which admires rhetorical skill,
the graduates of the religious schools were almost unbeatable
opponents for the Western-educated persons. The latter were
numerically weak but,more important,they had been trained to
become government officials not religious preachers. Their
skills were those of administration not of debate.
The Western-educated persons generally came from the higher
strata of colonial Minangkabau society; their social status was
based on position in the adat hierarchy and on relationship with
the government. The older ulama generally came from ulama-fami-
lies. But the graduates of the Kaum Muda schools came from many
different social classes and occupational groups: some were
from ulama families, others from trading backgrounds; some were
the sons of school teachers, others were the offspring of civil
servants. Within the community some were urang datang (new
settlers) in their nagari, and others were from the urang usali
(original settlers) and thus members of the adat aristocracy.
In fact, some of the most important leaders of the Kaum Muda
educated group were themselves penghulu.
The educated Kaum Muda group also benefited from the scat-
tered geographical origins of its members. The Kaum Muda ulama
had generally come from one of the religious centers in Minang-
kabau, such as Bukittinggi, Padang Pandjang, Batu Sangkar and
Manindjau. The greater part of the Western-educated group came from
the Bukittinggi region. The members of the Kaum Muda educated
group, however, came from nearly all parts of Minangkabau. They
also came from all class levels. In the coastal areas, for
example, where the traditional class system remained stronger
than in the interior, one finds that the graduates of the Kaum
Muda schools cannot be identified with any particular social
class.35 At a time when adat authorities were struggling to
maintain their status against outside competitors, the young
Islamic modernists could operate within the nagari as internal
forces for change. This role could also be played in the towns
which were really conglomerations of satellite communities from
the nagari. For example,the 1930 census showed that about 65% of
the population of Pajakumbuh and 54% of Padang came from other
nagari.36
35.	The Kaum Muda educated group intensified the process whereby
the importance of adat class declined within Minangkabau
society. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, pp.
114-130.
36.	Volkstelling 1930, Vol. IV Inheemsche Bevolking van Sumatra
(Batavia: Dep. Landbouw, Nijverheid § Handel, 1935), p. 38.63
The emergence of a group of Islamic modernists interested
also in non-religious matters did not challenge the traditional
Minangkabau concepts of leadership. There had always been an
important role for tjerdik pandai , or intelligentsia, alongside
that of the penghulu and the ulama. Instead of becoming a
counter-elite, the educated Islamic modernists could find their
place within the traditional pattern. Their expertise in reli-
gious matters gave them the qualifications of an ulama, and, at
the same time, their broad background in general affairs gained
them recognition as part of the tjerdik pandai. Some prominent
leaders of the Kaum Muda educated group, such as Hadji Djala-
luddin Thaib, were able to combine their religious expertise
with the ascriptive qualities of penghuluship.
Graduates from the Kaum Muda institutions could enter many
different kinds of jobs. Some became writers, newspaper corre-
spondents and editors for the numerous Islamic journals. A
great number, however, made their living as traders in the towns
or farmers in the villages, and they often served as religious
teachers as well. A small percentage, usually those from well-
to-do families, went to Mecca and particularly to Cairo to con-
tinue their studies. When this group began returning in the
1930’s, they initiated a new phase in religious school reform.
Despite a common training as religious teachers, the Kaum Muda
graduates found the community was unable to provide enough jobs
for them as religious teachers or muballigh (religious preachers),
and thus they needed to seek outside employment to sustain them.
An important difference between the older ulama and the
younger generation of religious teachers was that the latter
generally did not have the same independent personal status.
Religious schools were no longer considered the personal proper-
ty of the master teacher. Most of the new teachers had to seek
employment in schools operated by others rather than establish
their own institution. The withdrawal of Hadji Rasul from the
Sumatra Thawalib in 1923 proved unprecedented in the history of
religious schools in Minangkabau because the school continued
despite loss of its founder-teacher. The traditional personal
schools began to lose strength as they became more and more
dependent on organizations of educational promoters. After the
1920’s, a large number of religious schools were established
and financed by local organizations rather than by individual
teachers. Young religious teachers found that they could only
join an existing school, or, if they wished to establish a new
one, they needed the cooperation of others.
Many leaders of the Kaum Muda organizations were also
teachers in the new schools. The organization for them did not
represent simply a medium for propagating their ideas and ide-
ologies; it was also an economic necessity.64
Leaders of the Kaum Muda Educated Group
In 1918, shortly after its establishment, the Sumatra
Thawalib sent one of its junior teachers to Tapak Tuan on the
southwest coast of Atjeh. Many Minangkabau had lived in this
area for generations and the Thawalib directors wished to intro-
duce the new system of religious education there. The junior
teacher was Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib, who was a penghulu in his
home nagari, Balingka (near Bukittinggi).37 His maternal family
included many ulama, and his maternal uncles, Sjech Latif and
Sjech Daud Rasjidi, were the most influential ulama in the
nagari. Sjech Daud played a leading role in the spread of the
Kaum Muda movement and was a junior partner of Hadji Rasul.
Djalaluddin was born in 1895. After graduating from a
second class school, he went to Mecca in 1914, where he studied
religion and Arabic until 1916. On his return, he continued
his religious study first with Sjech Thaib Umar in Sungajang
and later at the Surau Djembatan Besi with Hadji Rasul; he also
served as a junior teacher in the latter school, remaining there
until he was sent to Tapak Tuan. After a year, he was succeeded
at Tapak Tuan by one of his colleagues from the Sumatra Thawa-
lib. In 1920, Djalaluddin founded a Dinijah school in his nagari,
but he remained active in matters connected with the Sumatra
Thawalib. In 1922, he was elected chairman of the newly united
Thawalib. Soon afterwards, this unity dissolved and the Thawa-
lib of Padang Pandjang fell under the influence of Hadji Datuk
Batuah's Islamic communist movement. Disappointed with this
development, Djalaluddin abandoned the Thawalib,38 and in 1925
he founded the Persatuan Guru Sekolah Agama (PGSA, Association
of Teachers at Religious Schools), an organization of Dinijah
school teachers. Until 1927, when he went to Kuala Lumpur as a
religious teacher, Djalaluddin served as the chairman of the
PGSA. On returning from Kuala Lumpur in 1928, Djalaluddin re-
sumed the leadership.
He was one of the pioneers in the modernization of the
school system, and he wrote several new textbooks for elementary
religious schools. His Arabic textbook was used by all Dinijah
schools and was thought to be the best of its time.39 According
to van der Plas, Djalaluddin was "a conciliatory figure," whose
37.	Aziz Thaib, Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib Dt. Penghulu Besar
(Fort de Kockl n.p. , 1934) ; Mailrapport 861x/'34.
38.	Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib's opposition to communism was based
on Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani’s Arradu 'ala Dahriyin, which
exposed the "fallacies of extreme materialism."
39.	Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan, pp. 58-59.65
tactfulness was matched only by his organizational skill.*0
These qualifications later earned him wide respect as a "strong
man" in Permi.
Another able and influential student of Hadji Rasul was
Abdul Rasjid Sutan Mansjur, who played an important role although
he rarely involved himself in politics. Born in 1895 in Manin-
djau, Sutan Mansjur came from an ulama family.*1 After he gradu-
ated from the district second class school, the Dutch controleur
nominated him as a candidate for the prestigious Sekolah Radja
in Bukittinggi, but he turned it down because he preferred to
attend the surau of Hadji Rasul.*2 When Hadji Rasul moved to
Padang Pandjang in 1912, Sutan Mansjur followed him and became
one of his most trusted students. In 1917, Sutan Mansjur mar-
ried Hadji Rasul's daughter.
In 1918, Sutan Mansjur was sent by the Sumatra Thawalib to
Kuala Simpang, a small town in Atjeh, as a religious teacher.
He was disappointed in his role because he felt that teaching
was not a suitable job for him. During this time, Abdul Muis
came to Kuala Simpang to promote the SI, and Sutan Mansjur began
to ponder the possibility of joining this party as a remedy for
his dissatisfaction. But membership in the SI required taking
an oath to refrain from doing anything which was forbidden
(haram) by Islam. Sutan Mansjur believed that by so doing the
SI implied that God's sanction was insufficient and thus re-
quired supplementary sanctions. Such a dubious practice on the
part of the SI was repugnant to Sutan Mansjur, an orthodox, re-
formist ulama.
He stayed two years in Kuala Simpang and then returned to
become an assistant to his father-in-law in the Sumatra Thawalib
at Padang Pandjang. In 1922, determined to give up teaching
and become a trader instead, Sutan Mansjur took his family to
Pekalongan in Central Java; many batik traders from Minangkabau
and particularly from the Manindjau sub-district had businesses
there. In late 1922, on one of his visits to Jogjakarta, he
met Kiai Hadji Achmad Dahlan, the founder of the rapidly expand-
ing Muhammadijah. Attracted by Dahlan's organization, Sutan
Mansjur helped to form a branch in Pekalongan, and in 1923 he
became its chairman. In the same year, he also founded a Minang-
kabau perantau organization, the Nurul Islam (Light of Islam),
which became the backbone of the Muhammadijah in Pekalongan.
In 1925, when Hadji Rasul visited the family of Sutan Mansjur,
40.	van der Plas, "Gegevens," p. 15.
41.	Hamka, Aj ahku, pp. 257-260.
42.	Interview, A. R. St. Mansjur, Djakarta, October 1968.66
he was attracted by the organization and on his return home to
Sungai Batang, Hadji Rasul founded a branch of the Muhammadijah
there. The perantau traders of Pekalongan became the driving
force behind this effort.
Shortly after the establishment of the Muhammadijah branch
in Sungai Batang, Sutan Mansjur was appointed by the central
board in Java as a propagandist-at-large. He took his family
back to Sungai Batang and began to travel throughout Sumatra
and Sulawesi. In 1927, he and Hadji Fachruddin, the most popu-
lar Javanese leader of Muhammadijah, managed to organize several
branches, including some in Atjeh. Sutan Mansjur took over the
leadership of the Muhammadijah in Minangkabau in 1930, and he
built it into a strong organization despite the increasing popu-
larity of radical political parties. Under his leadership, the
Muhammadijah emerged as the organization doing the most to pro-
mote education.
Before Sutan Mansjur assumed leadership, the most influen-
tial Muhammadijah leader in Minangkabau was Saalah Jusuf Sutan
Mangkuto. Unlike most leaders of the Kaum Muda educated group,
Saalah had never studied formally with any Kaum Muda ulama. A
self-made man, he was more of a politician than a teacher. Born
in 1901, Saalah was a son of a respected Naqsjabandijah leader.
On his maternal side, he was descended from an original settler
of his nagari, Pitalah, near Padang Pandjang. After finishing
his education in the second class school in 1917, he became a
parewa, the traditional Minangkabau "freedom loving-youth,"43
but he still continued his religious education. In 1918, a
nephew of his father took him to Padang, for, as he put it, it
was not proper for a young man to remain living "under the roof
of his mother’s house." In Padang he worked as an apprentice
in several jobs, but he was usually fired. As a former parewa
and skilled in the Minangkabau art of self-defense {si/lat') ,
Saalah saw no need to restrain his quarrelsome nature. In 1921,
under the guardianship of a neighbor who was a retired public
prosecutor (djufcsu), he studied law and six months later he be-
came a pokrol bambu (unlicensed attorney).44 He left this job
in 1923 because very strong and harsh criticism had been voiced
against this occupation in the Volksraad. His legal experience,
however, influenced his style of leadership in Muhammadijah.
When Abdul Muis began publishing a newspaper in Padang in
1923, Saalah went to work for him, and the SI leader served as
43. A somewhat idealized picture of the parewa life is given
in Hamka's novel, Tenggelamnja Kapal van der Wijck (Medan:
Pedoman Masjarakat^ 1938).
44. Interview, Saalah Sutan Mangkuto, Djakarta, November 1968.67
his first mentor in politics. After the expulsion of Abdul Muis
from Minangkabau in 1924, Saalah returned to Pitalah, where he
established an adat organization, Berlian Minangkabau (The Jewel
of Minangkabau). This organization was intended to unite all
the penghulu and adat functionaries in Pitalah and serve as a
first step toward a greater adat organization which would in-
clude other nagari. But he was a non-penghulu and his attempt
to organize the penghulu aroused enmity among the adat authori-
ties of Pitalah. Rejected by the penghulu, he went first to
Padang Pandjang, and, in early 1925, along with his friend, a
rich penghulu called Datuk Sati, Saalah went to Java to study
the pergevakan (political movement). In Batavia, they met Agus
Salim, the only Minangkabau perantau leader in that city whom
they knew. He explained aspects of political life in Java. In
August 1925, with a letter of introduction from Hadji Agus
Salim, Saalah and Datuk Sati traveled to Jogjakarta to attend
the Al-Islam Congress. There they met the most famous political
leader of that time, Tjokroaminoto, the president of the SI.*5
The organization of the congress and his meetings with the Muslim
leaders in Java left a deep impression on Saalah. A turning
point in his life occurred when he was introduced to Hadji
Fachruddin, from whom he learned about the Muhammadijah and its
goals. Saalah and his friend remained about a month in Jogja-
karta, the center of Muhammadijah activities, before returning
to Padang Pandjang in early 1926.
Here, they were snubbed as part of the kaum h-Ldgau (green
group) from Batavia. Their former friends had already joined
the communist kaum merah (red group). Soon afterwards Saalah
went to Djambi, but it was not easy for a Minangkabau to cross
the Residency boundary. Since he did not have a pass, he
was arrested and imprisoned for two months after which he was
expelled from Djambi. On his return to Pitalah, he established
a Muhammadijah group.
The different styles of leadership shown by Sutan Mansjur
and Saalah can to some extent be explained in terms of their
individual backgrounds. Sutan Mansjur was an ulama who looked
to Muhammadijah as a means for reforming the ummat. Saalah,
although he shared Sutan Mansjur’s ideal, was more a politician
than an ulama. Sutan Mansjur represented the urang siak at its
best; Saalah was by temperament a parewa who loved action.
45. The Al-Islam Congress in Jogjakarta, August 21-27, 1925,
was the third. Its main objectives,as initiated by the SI
and the Muhammadijah, were to achieve Muslim unity in Indo-
nesia and closer ties with Muslims abroad. It was strongly
influenced by political Pan-Islam. J. Th. Petrus Blum-
berger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie
(Haar1em: Tjeenk Willink, 1931) , ppT 77, 84-90.68
Hadji Uddin Rahmany, like Hadji Djalaluddin, was a reli-
gious teacher who later turned to politics. Born in 1901 in
Lubuk Basung, he failed to finish his secular education in the
second class school because of illness, but he did continue his
religious training. From 1914 till 1920, he studied in the
madrasah which later became the Sumatra Thawalib of Manindjau.
When the teacher of the school, one of his maternal uncles,
died, Uddin's older brother took over. After Uddin finished
his education in 1920, he became a junior teacher in the school
and when his brother went to Mecca in 1926, Uddin succeeded him.
In late 1927,after returning from a pilgrimage, Uddin founded a
Dinijah school in Manindjau. He gave up teaching and busied
himself with the direction of the Manindjau Thawalib and Dinijah
schools.
While still a junior teacher, Uddin had already begun to
educate himself in secular knowledge. Like many of his friends,
he was initially attracted to the communist movement, and he
joined the party. In 1925, during the fasting month vacation,
he went to Padang Pandjang to study the party and its ideology,
but he found himself in heated disagreements with the party
leaders. He wanted to know how communism could be in accord
with Islam, if, as maintained by some party leaders, "religion
is a poison to the people"? On his return to Manindjau, Uddin
was expelled from the party, and he soon joined the adat author-
ities and the older ulama in combating local communist influ-
ence.46 In spite of his preoccupation with his two schools and
his unhappy experience with the communist party, Uddin retained
an interest in politics. He put this interest to work after
Hadji Abdul Madjid and Datuk Singo Mangkuto established a branch
of the Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI) in Manindjau in 1928. Until
his arrest in 1933, Uddin was one of the most influential lead-
ers of the PSI in Minangkabau.
Hadji Abdul Madjid and Datuk Singo Mangkuto perhaps should
not be included among the Kaum Muda educated group, but they
played an important role in the activities of this group. Hadji
Abdul Madjid was a moderate leader of the Kaum Tua ulama in the
Manindjau sub-district, and, in 1921, he was the vice-president
of the Ittihadul Ulama, the first organization of Kaum Tua ulama
and one which challenged the Kaum Muda ulama's PGAI. His par-
ticipation in the movement of the Kaum Muda ulama and their
students began when he, as leader of the Kaum Tua group, took
an active part in opposing the proposed Guru Ordinance. There-
after, he always joined the political activities of the Kaum
Muda educated group, although he disagreed with them in reli-
gious matters. When the PSI branch was established in 1928,
Hadji Abdul Madjid became its adviser. In 1930, when the
46. Statement of Hadji Uddin Rahmany, Mailrapport 861x/'34.69
Sumatra Thawalib was transformed into the Persatuan Muslimin
Indonesia (commonly known as Permi, though until 1932 abbrevi-
ated as PMI), he was its first chairman.
Hasanuddin Datuk Singo Mangkuto was born in the 1890's. He
was a penghulu of Sungai Batang, in the sub-district of Manin-
djau. For some time he was a perantau trader in Atjeh, and
during the early 1920's he was active in the SI movement there.
In 1925, he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for his
political activities.47 Upon his release from prison, he re-
turned to Sungai Batang and was soon active in nagari politics.
Like Hadji Abdul Madjid, he first became important in the polit-
ical movement of the Kaum Muda educated group when his newly
established party, the Persatuan Adat (Adat Association), took
an active part in the opposition to the Guru Ordinance. He
served as the first chairman of the PSII branch in Minangkabau.
These six persons were important leaders in the period be-
tween 1927 and 1933. But, after 1930, they were forced to share
their leadership with new returnees from the Middle East, par-
ticularly Cairo. In spite of the rapid ascendancy of the better
educated and more cosmopolitan newcomers, the above six persons
and their colleagues were important, for they laid the founda-
tion for the later predominance of the political and educational
organizations of the young Islamic modernist intellectuals.
The post-1927 leaders shared a common experience in the
rantau--Mecca, Java and elsewhere. Although the particular
rantau did not necessarily determine the course of action they
took later, their rantau experiences influenced their activities
on return to Minangkabau. An example of this is seen in the
difference between Sutan Mansjur and Datuk Singo Mangkuto, both
of whom came from Manindjau and both of whom went to the same
rantau, Atjeh. Aggressiveness in public debate, skills in
organization, expertise in religious knowledge and a broad
knowledge of general affairs contributed to the prominent posi-
tions which these men assumed vis-a-vis their colleagues.
Wealth helped in the careers of some, such as Hadji Djalaluddin
Thaib, but this was not the case with Saalah and Sutan Mansjur.
While striving to reform society, these leaders could not avoid
dissension. Moreover different personal inclinations, family
backgrounds and experiences led to the establishment of com-
peting organizations. The first organization to develop rapidly
after the 1927 rebellion was the Muhammadijah, but it was soon
followed by others.
47. "Report of the Assistant Resident of Agam, Fort de Kock,
September 3, 1928, no. 98," Mailrapport 966x/'28.CHAPTER IV
MUHAMMADIJAH AND LOCAL POLITICS
In April 1927,a Minangkabau journalist warned his readers
not to be influenced too readily by the new organization from
Java, the Muhammadijah. He claimed that the Minangkabau people
were always very susceptible to any organization whose ideology
or propaganda was based on Islam. In 1916, for example, many
Minangkabau joined the SI although they knew little about it.
Later many were influenced by the communist party, which claimed
an Islamic basis. The Muhammadijah maintained that it was a
religious organization, but the journalist reminded his audience
"The communists also used religion, . . . the consequence was
disaster." He warned that the spread of Muhammadijah might re-
awaken religious controversy between the Kaum Muda and the Kaum
Tua groups, because the Muhammadijah was clearly a Kaum Muda
organization.1
His reaction was typical of those who were concerned about
the maintenance of social order in the wake of the rebellion of
three months earlier. But, seem from another perspective, the
Muhammadijah might in fact be an effective means for attaining
social harmony and development. If so, the possibility of re-
surgent religious conflict was a risk worth taking. The pro-
moter of Muhammadijah in Minangkabau, Hadji Rasul, said in May
1927, that a religiously based organization was important in
terms of the three basic spiritual needs of human beings. Man,
he believed, was destined to depend on "three friends." The
first was God the Merciful without Whom there was no life.
Man's second friend was nafsu, or natural desire, without which
he could not live. Nafsu was like fire, because if man did not
control it, it could destroy life itself. The third friend
was man's fellow human being, for man could not live by himself.
Those who failed to live with these friends would regret it
"in this world and the world hereafter."2 Hadji Rasul asserted
that Muhammadijah's goal was to guide its members in their rela-
tionships with these three friends. A religiously based organi-
zation would remind one of his obligation to God and to society
and would direct his natural desires toward good ends. Hadji
Rasul saw Muhammadijah as a community of believers, one which
emphasized social activity in order to create a religiously
perfect society.
1.	Tjaja Soematra, April 16, 1927.
2.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 1927, Mailrapport 849x/'27.
7071
Hadji Rasul introduced the Muhammadijah to his nagari,
Sungai Batang, and to Minangkabau, in June 1925, after returning
from a visit to Java. He had been greatly attracted by the
activities of the organization on Java. It had been founded,
in 1912, by Kiai Hadji Achmad Dahlan, a Javanese reformist
ulama. Not only did Muhammadijah embody Hadji Rasul's own
ideals, but also he believed it could serve as a tool for com-
bating the activities of his former students, now active in the
communist party. And, in fact, Muhammadijah soon provided an
alternative for the non-communist graduates of the Kaum Muda
schools. It was also an organization in which Kaum Muda ulama
and their students could find a common ground. The PGAI, founded
in 1919, was an organization of teachers only; the Sumatra Tha-
walib was specifically a student organization. But Muhammadijah
included both, and, moreover, it was neither a professionally
nor a geographically limited organization. Like the SI, it
directed its appeals at the ummat as a whole, rather than any
particular segment of it. After the rebellion, Muhammadijah
became the major organization for graduates of the Kaum Muda
schools, one in which they could pursue their different objec-
tives. Muhammadijah acted not only as an educational organization
working to establish religious and secular schools, but also it
served as a political party questioning the political situation
and the legitimacy of current holders of political power.
The history of Muhammadijah at this time reflects both the
nature of political activities among the Kaum Muda educated
group and also the operation of Dutch Islamic policies. The
growth of the organization demonstrates certain aspects of
Minangkabau political behavior at the village level. Muhamma-
dijah first spread in the nagari rather than in the towns, and
its success depended on its ability to influence adat authori-
ties as well as perantau traders and religious teachers. One
could view the development of Muhammadijah in terms of the con-
frontation between adat-based authority and pecuniary prestige.
The expansion of Muhammadijah also reveals the growing influence
of the idea of kemadjuan and the declining role of the religious
element in nagari conflict. Early in the twentieth century,
when the Naqsjabandijah was in conflict with the other tarekat
and the religious Kaum Muda was first developing, competition
centered on control of the mosque, one of the pillars of the
nagari according to adat. The victory of one party over its
rival was symbolized by its ability to control the nagari
mosque. If a stalemate occurred, one side might build a new
mosque or the old mosque might be divided into two "congrega-
tions." For Muhammadijah, however, the control of the school
rather than the mosque was considered the symbol of a group's
influence in the nagari.72
Sungai Batang: The First
Stronghold of Muhammadijah
In 1907, Hadji Rasul’s father, Sjech Kisai, died. Since
he was the most revered ulama in the nagari, the people of
Sungai Batang wanted to hold an elaborate adat funeral ceremony.
But Hadji Rasul, who had just returned from Mecca, thought that
such a ceremony, with its extravagant feasts, was haram (for-
bidden) according to Islamic law. Because of this opposition,
Hadji Rasul was accused of having sinned against his father and
of obstructing adat. The tuanku laras, the nagari chief, and
the majority of the penghulu supported the traditionalist reli-
gious teachers in the view that Sjech Kisai deserved the highest
adat honors. As a result, Hadji Rasul was rejected as a reli-
gious teacher, but nonetheless, a few months later a group of
penghulu from Kubu, part of Sungai Batang, invited him to teach
in their surau.3 It was at the Kubu surau that Hadji Rasul
really began his career as a religious reformer.
In 1923, after his religious views had already been widely
accepted, Hadji Rasul withdrew from the Sumatra Thawalib in
Padang Pandjang because his stands on communism and on student
participation in politics had cost him the loyalty of his stu-
dents and assistants. Hadji Rasul therefore returned to Sungai
Batang, and, in October 1924, he encouraged his brother Hadji
Jusuf Amrullah, the highest adat religious functionary in Sungai
Batang, and Datuk Penghulu Besar, a retired government official,
to establish an educational organization, the Sandi Aman (Foun-
dation of Peace). In spite of its leaders' prestige, the Sandi
Aman failed to attract people, and by 1925, it had only fifteen
members.4 One major reason for its weakness was the use of
Hadji Rasul’s Sandi Aman Hang Selamat (Foundation of Peace,
Pillar of Happiness) as an ideological guide. This work, pub-
lished in 1922, was considered an anti-adat and anti-penghulu
treatise.
The book was written at a time when Hadj i Rasul was engaged
in a legal dispute with an adat expert5 and it was intended as
a document on religious ethics. But it not only showed how to
lead an ethical social and individual life but also attacked
some aspects of adat. These attacks openly revealed Hadji
Rasul's orthodox Islamic concept of secular power. He also re-
newed the attack, begun by his teacher Sjech Achmad Chatib, on
3.	Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 80-83.
4.	Report of van Dam, the controleur of Manindjau, November 14,
1925, no. 1747, Mailrapport 1453x/'27.
5.	Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 119-122.73
adat inheritance law. He sharply criticized what he regarded
as the penghulu's arbitrariness in dealing with their people.
Hadji Rasul also questioned the government’s right to impose
taxation. Because the legitimate holder of power was God the
Creator, all laws and regulations made by man should be based
on His laws. Thus, he said, the secular administration should
always consult the ulama, the experts on religious law, other-
wise God’s law and man’s law would conflict. If this occurred,
Hadji Rasul warned, "it is better to die than to live." One
who obeyed laws which were not in accord with God's law was in
effect no less than a kafir.6
Given this background, the name Sandi Aman alone was suffi-
cient to arouse suspicion that the organization was anti-adat,
even though its chairman was a penghulu. Hadji Rasul's failure
to influence people in 1907 and again in 1925 is significant.
On the first occasion, he was snubbed by his community despite
his position as an heir of Sjech Kisai. In 1925, although his
religious views were widely accepted, his Sandi Aman project
was not. Personal status, apparently, could not guarantee the
success of a venture which attacked existing values and prac-
tices. After Hadji Rasul reorganized the Sandi Aman into
Muhammadijah, in June 1925, it quickly developed into a major
force in Sungai Batang, and the nagari became Muhammadijah's
first base in Sumatra. The Muhammadijah differed from earlier
projects because it was built on the existing social system and
economic situation of the nagari.
The inhabitants of Sungai Batang believed it was the oldest
nagari in the Manindjau sub-district. According to local tradi-
tions, Sungai Batang and nine other nagari in the area had been
settled by the same group of early explorers. The people of
the ten nagari considered themselves bound to each other by
adat ties (setali adat), and almost every suku in each nagari
could identify a belahan (presumed blood relationship) in other
nagari in the sub-district. The consciousness of belahan was
particularly strong between nagari which were thought to have
split in the recent past, as for example Sungai Batang and
Tandjung Sani, which in adat matters functioned as a double
nagari. Notions of belahan helped preserve peace between the
6. Quoted by van Dam in his report of November 14, 1925,
Mailrapport 1453x/'27. Ibn Chaldun, a fourteenth-century
North African social philosopher, explained this as a con-
flict between law made by men and that made by God. Hadji
Rasul thought that the ideal state was one in which reli-
gious law was dominant. But he recognized the political
reality and sought at least to create a situation in which
religious opinion would have a place in the execution of
temporal political power.74
nagari, but, more important, they made an excellent channel for
inter-nagari communication. A new development in one nagari
could easily be initiated in another by clever manipulation of
the belahan system. A member of the suku Tjaniago in Sungai
Batang, for example, could theoretically exploit his belahan in
the same suku in other nagari.7
In terms of the traditional political system, the Manindjau
sub-district belonged to the Bodi Tjaniago tradition, which
recognized the equality of all penghulu. But unlike most other
nagari which belonged to this tradition, Manindjau nagari had
rather liberal provisions concerning the selection of penghulu.
A new penghulu could be elected or appointed if the old penghulu
had died or was too old to function properly. A new penghulu-
ship might be instituted if the original matrilineal family had
become too large, and new families from other regions could
establish their own penghuluships. Such newcomers were thus
not only recognized as belonging to the adat community of the
nagari but were also given an opportunity for upward mobility
in the local adat hierarchy.8 Such provisions resulted in a
rapid increase of the number of penghulu in Manindjau in con-
trast to other parts of Minangkabau.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the appointment of
new penghulu became part of wider village politics. In order
to strengthen his own position, a tuanku laras would work to
appoint new penghulu.9 In 1914, the office of tuanku laras was
7.	Noer Sutan Iskandar, a novelist who came from the Manindjau
region, tells in his autobiography that, after he completed
his education in the elementary teachers' school, he estab-
lished a volksschool in the nagari. His father was an in-
fluential former nagari head, so many people from the area
sent their children. Many came from nagari across the lake;
while at school, "They had to live with their relatives,
their fellow suku or belahan in my village. The fellow suku
took care of the children gladly. ... I realized at that
time what a good thing the custom of my nagari was. ... I
did not have to concern myself with building dormitories
for the children from other nagari because the 'adat dormi-
tory' would take care of them." Noer Sutan Iskandar, Penga-
laman Masa Ketjil (Djakarta: J. B. Wolters, 1949), pp. 238-
239.
8.	"Nota van de Controleur der Danau-district en Matoer van 15
November 1888 omtrent Penghulu Andiko Verheffingen in de
Onderdistrict," Adatrechtbundels, 11 (1915), pp. 109-114.
9.	Hamka, Aj ahku, pp. 68-71. Noer Sutan Iskandar, himself the
grandnephew of a tuanku laras, confirms Hamka's story.
Pengalaman, pp. 194-222.75
abolished, but the social consequences of the increased number
of the penghulu persisted. The Nagari Ordinance of 1914 was
intended to reactivate the traditional nagari council (balai),
and it therefore established guidelines which limited council
membership to the supposedly original penghulu. But the law
was strongly opposed by the penghulu, whose positions were equal
according to adat.1° The ordinance was based on the logical
assumption that too many members would decrease council effi-
ciency, but it created divisions among the penghulu. Although
all had equal prestige according to adat, those whom the govern-
ment recognized as original penghulu now had greater authority.
This awkward mixture of government-recognized authority and
adat-created prestige resulted in rivalry between the two groups
of penghulu when those who were not balai members became aware
of the consequences of their loss of power. Deprived of their
seats in the nagari council, the penghulu now sought to increase
their status in other ways, for example by participating in the
new voluntary associations. But they rejected the Sandi Aman
because it did not offer an appropriate channel for penghulu;
it was considered too inimical towards adat and adat’s assump-
tions .
The sub-district of Manindjau was geographically isolated
from the main roads. It was one of the most sparsely populated
regions, having only 71.1 persons per square kilometer; it was
also the least prosperous in natural resources. Sungai Batang,
the largest and most densely populated nagari in the sub-district,
had less arable land than its much smaller neighbors.11 Rice
cultivation provided only 6.46% of the income for the population
of the sub-district; other agricultural products, such as cinna-
mon and coffee, provided only another 10.30%. The biggest
sources of income were non-agricultural, from fishing, cottage
industries and, especially, commerce. More than many other
parts of Minangkabau, this area was heavily dependent on the
perantau traders. The number of perantau fluctuated greatly,
increasing when business in the rantau was good. Every year,
however, new adults always went to the rantau to become appren-
tices of relatives who had preceded them. According to the cen-
sus of 1930, about one-fifth of the persons born in the area
lived outside it. In the district of Manindjau, about 23.5% of
the heads of families were women.12
10.	Report of the COntroleur of Manindjau, Spits, April 6, 1917,
no. 379/13, Verbaal March 4, 1919, No. 23.
11.	Sutan Maaruf, Riwajat X Koto Manindjau (Bukittinggi: Pem-
bela Negeri, 1931); Volkstelling 1930, IV, pp. 11, 132.
12.	Volkstelling 1930, IV, p. 65.76
This dependence on the perantau combined with the insignif-
icant role of agricultural production meant that despite its
geographical isolation the region was sensitive to economic
fluctuations and political developments which occurred far be-
yond its boundaries. In the absence of strong leadership from
their penghulu, the inhabitants were more receptive to outside
influences introduced by the perantau. It was to these presti-
gious perantau traders that Hadji Rasul finally turned after the
failure of the Sandi Aman.
When he went to the batik center of Pekalongan in Central
Java, Hadji Rasul found the Minangkabau perantau active not only
in their own organization, the Nurul Islam, but also, under the
leadership of his son-in-law Sutan Mansjur, they were important
in the local Muhammadijah. Hadji Rasul was supported by this
perantau community in his efforts to establish a religious
school in Sungai Batang and to introduce the Muhammadijah there.
On his return to Sungai Batang, he proposed the dissolution of
the Sandi Aman and the formation of a Muhammadijah group. With
financial support from the perantau traders, Hadji Rasul was
able to build a Muhammadijah elementary religious school. The
school employed graduates from the Thawalib schools of Padang
Pandjang and Manindjau, and it soon attracted many pupils --having
250 by the end of 1925. The early success of the school con-
tributed to a further expansion of Muhammadijah.13
The financial support of the perantau traders was a major
factor in the early success of Muhammadijah, for it did not need to
be dependent on popular contributions. Muhammadijah made its
appearance on the scene through the establishment of the first
"modern" religious school in Sungai Batang. Rather than launch-
ing an ideological attack, it began by making a positive contri-
bution to the community. The fact that the organization was
founded under the auspices of the perantau gave it a great ad-
vantage in a nagari so dependent on its perantau. This was
further strengthened by the return of three influential traders
from the community in Pekalongan. They were, respectively,
Djafar Datuk Madjo Lelo (a younger half-brother of Hadji Rasul),
Datuk Nan Bareno and Sutan Maradjo. Joining with former leaders
of the Sandi Aman, they endowed the Muhammadijah leadership with
high adat status as well as assurance of continued financial
support from the rantau. Datuk Madjo Lelo was a penghulu of
the suku Tandjung, the suku of the current nagari chief. Datuk
Nan Bareno was a penghulu of the suku Melaju, and Datuk Penghulu
Besar was the most respected penghulu of the suku Piliang. Tan-
djung and Melaju were two of the four biggest suku in Sungai
Batang.14 Inter-suku marriage proved an important channel
13.	van Dam's report, Mailrapport 1453x/'27.
14.	Hamka, Ajahku, p. 42.77
facilitating the spread of Muhammadijah. All Hadji Rasul’s
brothers and half-brothers were promoters of the organization.
Under the leadership of Datuk Penghulu Besar, the chairman, and
Hadji Jusuf Amrullah, the secretary, the organization expanded
to Tandjung Sani.
Unlike previous organizations in Sungai Batang, Muhammadi-
jah did not directly challenge existing adat authority. It pro-
vided instead a new means for gaining position in the community,
and its penghulu promoters used the adat system to spread their
movement. As a member of the nagari council of Sungai Batang,
Datuk Madjo Lelo sought its agreement for the establishment of
a second class school offering a religious education. The ini-
tial financing would come from the rantau. There was only one
government second class school in the sub-district, at Manindjau,
and so the proposal was accepted. In September 1925, the Muham-
madij ah second class school was opened under the auspices of
the nagari council. The school proved so popular in Sungai
Batang and the neighboring nagari that, by late 1926, it was
competing for students with the government school in Manindjau.
In spite of its allegedly unqualified teaching staff, many
parents preferred to send their children to the Muhammadijah
school. As a result, enrollment at the government school
dropped to 68, while the Muhammadijah school had no less than
165 students.15 The next year enrollment in the government
school regained its former maximum of 165 pupils, but the
Muhammadijah school was already successfully established.
Through wise manipulation of the existing system, the Muhamma-
dij ah in Sungai Batang was able to mobilize not only the edu-
cated segment of the population, the former students of the
Kaum Muda schools, but also the numerous penghulu.
The Muhammadijah had two subsidiary organizations which
also played an important part in its development, the boy scouts,
called Hizbul Wathan (The Party of the Fatherland), and the
women's association, the Aisjiah. The Aisjiah was established
in Sungai Batang in early 1926, and its first members were wives
and female relatives of the Muhammadijah promoters. Originally
the Aisjiah was under the direct guidance of the Muhammadijah
leaders; members of the Muhammadijah local board presided over
its meetings. With the return of Hadji Rasul's daughter (the
wife of Sutan Mansjur) from Pekalongan in mid-1927, the Aisjiah
began to stand by itself. The contribution of the women's sec-
tion to the success of the movement as a whole can hardly be
exaggerated. The women also provided important financial sup-
15. This infuriated Wilminck, the new inspector of education.
See his letter of January 4, 1927 in Mailrapport 214x/'27;
also Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, April 1927, Mailrap-
port 71lx/'28.78
port for several Muhammadijah ventures. The Hizbul Wathan was
established in Sungai Batang in early 1927. It was intended:
To promote the education of children and youths out-
side the school walls and at home, and also to teach
and to educate them so that they will become honorable
persons, respectable and useful to society, and heal-
thy and strong. These [qualities] must be based on
Islam.16
The Hizbul Wathan acted as an effective propaganda instrument
for Muhammadijah. According to its statutes, members should be
under eighteen, but, until the end of 1928, the majority of
Hizbul Wathan members in Sungai Batang were adults.
In April 1927, it was estimated that about 600 men and 512
women were registered as members of Muhammadijah in Sungai
Batang-Tandjung Sani.17 By November, the number had more than
doubled, totaling about 2,440 persons, of whom half were women.18
This amounted to almost one-fifth of the whole population of
Sungai Batang-Tandjung Sani. One cause of this rapid develop-
ment was the visit of Hadji Fachruddin, the Javanese vice-presi-
dent of the Muhammadijah Central Board. His stay in Sungai
Batang though short enhanced the prestige of the Muhammadijah
and his speeches rekindled Minangkabau pride. He explained the
ideas and activities of Muhammadijah but, more than that, he
asserted that Islam in Java was now more progressive than in
Minangkabau. In several Aisjiah meetings, Hadji Fachruddin ex-
plained the reformist concept of equality between men and women
and the importance of organization for women. His speeches were
enthusiastically received by audiences in Sungai Batang and
elsewhere. During his visit, the Sungai Batang branch founded
the Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum (PKU--Helpers of Public Suffering)
to organize social work and public health programs. A plan for
establishing a Muhammadijah HIS was also drawn up. By the end
of 1927, the Muhammadijah in the Manindjau area already had two
religious schools and two second class schools.
Muhammadijah had developed into the most powerful organiza-
tion in Sungai Batang. Already in April 1927, the Dutch Assis-
tant Resident of Agam complained that Sungai Batang was con-
trolled by religious teachers and that they had effectively
16.	Aqidah Moehammadijah Bahagian Hizboel Wathan (Jogjakarta:
n.p . , 1927) , p . Zt
17.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, April 1927, Mailrapport
711x/'27.
18.	Ibid., Mailrapport 74lx/'28.79
undermined the nagari council, the official intermediary between
the government and the population. The religious teachers could
now say, according to this Dutch official, "L 'etat, o 'est moi.'"9
The regency administration now began to see a potential coun-
tervailing force against Muhammadijah in Datuk Singo Mangkuto,
who had recently returned to Sungai Batang after a long absence
in Atjeh.20
Because Muhammadijah was already the major force in Sungai
Batang, Datuk Singo Mangkuto had first joined that organization,
becoming one of its second echelon leaders. But he continued
to look for ways to enlarge the scope of his own activities. A
penghulu of his suku, he organized a consumer cooperative under
the leadership of the other penghulu. The others tentatively
agreed, on April 24, 1927, to found a cooperative "for the bene-
fit of the people in the nagari." It was announced at a public
meeting on May 12, 1927, and a board of thirteen executives
headed by Datuk Singo Mangkuto was elected. Seven of the board
members were penghulu of Sungai Batang. Two of these were also
leaders of Muhammadijah, and Hadji Jusuf Amrullah, the secretary
of Muhammadijah, was appointed as adviser. The cooperative
represented the first attempt by the adat functionaries to im-
prove the people's welfare by means other than the official
nagari council.
In addition to this penghulu enterprise, on May 14, Datuk
Singo Mangkuto founded an adat-based organization, the Sarekat
Adat (Adat Association) of Djorong Labuh, a section of Sungai
Batang. The purpose of the association was "to seek consensus
(mufakat) for the sake of nagari welfare." In order to achieve
this goal, the association intended to regain popular confidence
by activities in agriculture, education, adat and religion.21
The association later changed its name to the Persatuan Adat
(Adat Union) as it expanded to other sections of Sungai Batang
and Tandjung Sani. By the end of 1928, there were six units of
the Persatuan Adat in the double nagari, having a total member-
ship of about 300 persons. Like the Muhammadijah, it also had
a women's subsidiary. Although membership in the association
was open to anyone, the board of executives had to consist of
adat functionaries. The association represented an attempt by
Datuk Singo Mangkuto to mobilize adat functionaries on the basis
of their adat positions and responsibilities. Some leaders of
the Persatuan Adat were also members of Muhammadijah. Until
19. Report of the Assistant Resident of Agam in April 1927,
Mailrapport 847x/'27.
2°. Ibid.
21. Report of the Demang of Manindjau, Mailrapport 847x/'27.80
August 1927, Datuk Singo Mangkuto himself was still one of
Muhammadijah's propagandists,22 but then a split began to de-
velop between him and the Muhammadijah leadership. The plan to
establish the consumer cooperative proved stillborn, for the
Muhammadijah leaders, who were also members of the proposed
cooperative, were not really enthusiastic about it. In addi-
tion, Datuk Singo Mangkuto was involved in a political struggle
for the position of nagari head of Sungai Batang; this created
a major crisis.
The crisis had originated after a rigged election for nagari
head in 1926. It was always difficult to find a man who was re-
spected by the people, particularly by his penghulu colleagues,
and also trusted by the government. In 1926, the government was
concerned about the communist movement and took an immediate
interest in all local affairs. Thus the demang (district head)
exerted direct "gentle pressure" to gain.election of a particu-
lar candidate though the man was unpopular.23 The constantly
growing influence of Muhammadijah, combined with an improvement
in the political climate after the suppression of the 1927 re-
bellion, led to an accelerating movement to oust the nagari
head. By exerting its influence among the members of the nagari
council, the Muhammadi)ah was able to isolate the nagari head
and finally force him to retire at the end of July. Competition
soon began among the penghulu over his successor. In early
August, on behalf of the Persatuan Adat, Datuk Singo Mangkuto
saw the Assistant Resident, seeking support for his own candi-
dacy.24 But by this time the government had decided that Datuk
Singo Mangkuto himself was politically unreliable because he
was a former SI leader in Atjeh and had been imprisoned there
for poli-tical activities. In the meantime, the Muhammadi j ah
had decided to support the candidacy of its vice-president,
Datuk Siri Bandaro. After the failure of Datuk Singo Mangkuto's
bid for government support, the Muhammadijah candidate won the
election in September. The competition over the post of nagari
head, however, had weakened the cooperation between the leaders
of the Muhammadijah and the Persatuan Adat. This gave rise to
a new type of political bickering in the villages. The Persa-
tuan Adat, the party of the penghulu, emerged as the self-styled
opposition party against the nagari council, which was dominated
by the Muhammadijah.
22.	On July 2, 1927, for example, Datuk Singo Mangkuto presided
over an important Muhammadijah meeting. See Politieke
Politioneel Overzicht, 1927, Mailrapport 741x/'28.
23.	Hamka, Aj ahku, pp. 178-179.
24.	van der Plas, "Gegevens," p. 24.81
The first half of 1928 was not a good time for either
Muhammadijah or the Persatuan Adat in Sungai Batang. The eco-
nomic boom which had been developing since 1925 reached a peak
in 1928.25 Economic activities in the rantau became more im-
portant, and, ironically, the economic boom tended to deflect
interest from Muhammadijah. At the same time Hadji Rasul criti-
cized the leaders of Muhammadijah for their lack of religious
knowledge, and he sharply rebuked the young leaders who blindly
followed directions from Java. He said Muhammadijah leaders
had become taqlid to the Central Board on matters of religion
instead of attempting to find solutions through their own
rational efforts (idjtihad). He denounced the religious per-
formance of the Muhammadijah on such matters as the collection
and distribution of alms. He also criticized Aisjiah activities
as deviations from the correct religious path.26 Hadji Rasul was,
of course, the most fundamentalist of the Kaum Muda ulama.
At the same time, a conflict was brewing between Datuk
Singo Mangkuto and the nagari head. In accordance with its own
program, the Persatuan Adat wanted to establish a new school
and set up a communal farm. But the new school would need
money. The Muhammadijah was building a permanent HIS, so the
nagari head was opposed to the idea of another locally-financed
school. The communal farm would have been beneficial economi-
cally but would create serious adat problems. In Minangkabau,
family land is inalienable and to use the communal nagari land
(tanah ulajat) requires the approval of all penghulu, including
those on the rantau. The resulting controversy became so in-
tense that the nagari head refused to hold further discussions
and furthermore he arbitrarily forbade the Persatuan Adat to
open an office near the market of Sungai Batang. On February
23, 1928, the Persatuan Adat invited several leaders of Muhamma-
di j ah from Sungai Batang and Padang Pandjang to a protest meet-
ing. Datuk Singo Mangkuto wanted the approval of the Muhamma-
di j ah for his plan to oust the nagari head. When the move
failed, the Persatuan Adat elected one of its members to act as
a "shadow nagari head." Datuk Singo Mangkuto said that his
organization would submit protests against the nagari head to
the Resident, the Governor-General, the Volksraad, and, if
necessary, the Dutch parliament.27
25.	A. I. Spits, "Memorie van Overgave, March 1937," Mailrap-
port 504/’37. The peak years in Minangkabau economic
development were 1928 and 1929.
26.	Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 64-65.
27.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, lste Kwartaal, 1928,
Mailrapport 88lx/'28.82
The protest was ineffective but it demonstrated the overtly
political character of the Persatuan Adat. Meanwhile, beginning
in early 1928, Datuk Singo Mangkuto had worked actively to ex-
pand the Persatuan Adat to other nagari. He wanted to mold the
association into a forum for all the penghulu throughout Minang-
kabau, but he was hampered because he was still unknown outside
the Danau region. At association meetings, he gradually intro-
duced the notion of a national struggle against the colonial
regime. The adat party no longer confined itself to the problem
of reviving the bond between the penghulu and their people; it
began to promote ideas of Sumatran unity and nationalism as the
first step toward a larger unity, Indonesia. In his attempt to
make the Persatuan Adat a more effective organization, Datuk
Singo Mangkuto realized he could not compete with Muhammadijah,
and thus he introduced a secular ideology and appealed to an
extended sense of loyalty.28
In the second half of 1928, Datuk Singo Mangkuto and the
Muhammadijah leaders made a common cause from their opposition
to the Guru Ordonnantie (Teachers’ Ordinance). Under the
leadership of Hadji Rasul, Sungai Batang and other nagari in
the Danau sub-district led the fight against the ordinance. The
campaign gave Datuk Singo Mangkuto an opportunity to extend his
leadership outside the nagari boundaries of Sungai Batang.
Muhammadijah was able to use the campaign to strengthen its own
position in the Danau region and to expand rapidly in other
parts of Minangkabau.
The Growth of Muhammadijah
The success of Muhammadijah in Sungai Batang and Tandjung Sani
proved that an organization which had been imported from outside
could become a part of the nagari. In other places in West
Sumatra, however, Muhammadijah sometimes encountered prejudice
28. The Dutch police suspected that the Persatuan Adat was in-
fluenced by Sukarno, who had just established his National-
ist Party. Ibid.
Among other things, Datuk Singo Mangkuto tried to popu-
larize a Sumatran anthem written by Muhammad Sjafei (founder
of the INS) and based on a popular song from the komedi
bangsawan. One stanza from the song read:
"We sincerely love you
Every day; every night
Sumatra is always in our minds
Your soil is fertile
From North to South
Sumatra, we will never forget you."83
and indifference. The first Muhammadijah group outside the
Danau region was established in Padang Pandjang.
On June 20, 1925, several students at the Sumatra Thawalib
who came from the Danau region founded a debating club called
the Tabligh Muhammadijah. The students studied and practiced
the techniques of preaching, tabligh. The speeches were later
collected and published in the first journal of Muhammadijah,
the Chat-ibul Ummah.29 Though at first membership in the Tabligh
Muhammadijah was exclusively Danau area students, gradually it
became seen as an alternative for Thawalib students who did not
want to join the Communist Party. As a result, the club soon
became the target of attack for Thawalib students in the Commu-
nist Party; they opposed it because it was under the guardian-
ship of Hadji Rasul and also was affiliated with a Javanese
Muslim organization which received a Dutch subsidy.30 But in
fact the Tabligh Muhammadijah was even more distrusted by the
government, which was concerned about Hadji Rasul’s obvious im-
portance in the organization.31 The aggressive frankness of
Hadji Rasul in attacking everything he considered contrary to
religious law made him one of the most distrusted ulama in the
eyes of Dutch officials, notwithstanding his strong anti-commu-
nist stand.32 Given the unfavorable climate, the Tabligh
29.	Report of the Assistant Resident for Batipuh/Pariaman, no.
322, December 30, 1925, Mailrapport 1453x/’27. Hamka de-
scribes the early days of this club in Kenang-Kenangan
Hidup, I, pp. 77-78.
30.	"Hate and suspicion toward Muhammadijah as a tool of 'imper-
ialism and capitalism' which received a subsidy from the
Dutch, had deeply influenced the attitude of the Sumatra
Thawalib students who were under the communist spell. After
they failed to block the establishment of the first Muham-
madijah, several Thawalib students, who were members of the
Sarekat Rakjat, were instructed to join the new organiza-
tion. [Their intentions were] to investigate and to influ-
ence [the Muhammadijah]." Hamka, Ajahku, p. 136.
31.	Letter of the Resident of the West Coast of Sumatra,
Whitlaw, to the Office for Native Affairs, January 1, 1926,
no. 9, Mailrapport 1453x/'27.
32.	Resident Whitlaw's contempt for Hadji Rasul pervaded his
final report upon leaving the residency. "I think he [Hadji
Rasul] has two faces; that is why he belongs to neither
party. Neither the communists nor the government trust
him." Whitlaw further quotes from an anonymous letter which
he received: "In appearance he [Hadji Rasul] sides with
the government, but in his heart he belongs to the commu-
nists. You can see by yourself, Your Excellency, that84
Muhammadijah remained a debating club unable to expand. A stu-
dent from Sitjintjin tried unsuccessfully to form a similar
organization there. Nagari authorities were then under strong
attack from the Communist Party, and they would not tolerate
the activities of yet another outside organization.
A more formidable Muhammadijah unit was assembled by Saalah
Sutan Mangkuto in Pitalah, near Padang Pandjang, in August 1925.
Unlike the Tabligh Muhammadijah, it was composed of adults and
had a subsidiary, the Perkumpulan Tani (Farmers’ Association).
Pitalah, however, was also one of the strongest bases of the
Communist Party, and the authorities identified the Muhammadijah
as another threat to the nagari.33 Furthermore, Saalah himself
was not popular among the penghulu.
Reacting to the unfavorable situation in Pitalah and the
stagnation of the Tabligh Muhammadijah, Hadji Jusuf Amrullah,
Muhammadijah secretary in Sungai Batang, took the initiative in
December 1926. He dissolved the debating club and established
a branch of Muhammadijah in Padang Pandjang, making the Pitalah
unit a subordinate. Shortly afterward, Sjech Muhammad Djamil
of Djaho, the most influential Kaum Tua ulama in Padang Pandjang
and head of one of the biggest madrasah in Minangkabau, joined
with Saalah’s group. His participation was motivated, among
other things, by his belief that Muhammadijah could become a
bulwark against communist influence.3* He was elected the first
chairman of the new branch, and, under his guidance, Muhammadijah
made an important break-through in Padang Pandjang. Another
Kaum Tua ulama, Sjech Muhammad Zain, a Simabur tarekat leader,
also joined the Muhammadijah and influenced many penghulu of the
nagari to join as well. In a relatively short time the group
expanded to more than 400 registered members.35
Nagari authorities forced the Pitalah Muhammadijah to act
within or through existing adat institutions. They ruled that
because Muhammadijah claimed to be a religious organization, it
should hold its meetings in the nagari mosque rather than in
private houses, but to do this, the Muhammadijah first needed
almost all of his students are leftists." W. A. C. Whitlaw,
"Memorie van Overgave, April 1926," Mailrapport 2488/'26,
pp. 51-52.
33.	Letter of the Controleur of Fort van der Capellen to the
Assistant Resident of Tanah Datar, March 29, 1927, no. 172,
secret, Mailrapport 523x/'27.
34.	Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, p. 154.
35.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 1927, Mailrapport 741x/’28.85
the approval of the nagari penghulu and religious teachers. In
November 1926, the nagari authorities' resolution was accepted
by the district head (demang) of Padang Pandjang.36 The Muham-
madijah leadership saw this statement as an indication that the
adat authorities were determined to obstruct its activities,
because the statement was designed to put the organization under
the direct control of the nagari head and the nagari council.
Ignoring the nagari head's statement, the Muhammadijah continued
its activities and even joined the newly established branch in
Padang Pandjang. The nagari council of Pitalah reacted on
December 2, 1926, with a kebulatan (resolution) stating:
The Perkumpulan Tani and Muhammadijah are [now] dis-
solved. Religious tabligh can be held at any time in
the mosque, provided consent is given by the sidang
Djumat and the ulama.
But the kebulatan was only made public on January 28, 1927,
while the government was still engaged in suppressing the rem-
nants of the Silungkang rebellion.37
In the meantime, Saalah, always an energetic Muhammadijah
promoter, had been involved in a confrontation with a Dutch
controleur. Shortly after the January rebellion, Saalah went
to Labuh, a nagari near Batu Sangkar and a place where he had
many friends,to promote the Muhammadijah. The local controleur,
however, was conducting a vigorous campaign against "communist
rebels." He forbade Saalah from carrying out his propaganda
campaign on the grounds that he had not gotten a license from
the nagari council. The controleur was doubly concerned because
Saalah came from Pitalah, a most infamous nagari in official
eyes. This implied identification of the Muhammadijah with the
Communist Party provided Saalah with a sufficient reason to
protest to the Office for Native Affairs in Batavia. The con-
troleur, however, wisely washed his hands of the affair and
turned it over to the nagari council of Labuh.38
Dutch officials objected to the political character of
Muhammadijah. Muhammadijah leaders had not refuted the anti-
36.	Statement of the Demang, November 15, 1926, no. 2428/8,
Mailrapport 5 2 4x/'2 7.
37.	Resolution of January 28, 1927, no. 20, Mailrapport
524x/'27.
38.	Report of Controleur Veen to the Assistant Resident of
Tanah Datar, March 29, 1927, no. 172,secret, and Saalah's
complaint to the Office for Native Affairs, March 2, 1927,
both in Mailrapport 524x/'27.86
government statements of communist leaders but rather had used
to their own advantage the anti-government sentiments aroused
by the communists. Moreover, the fact that the spread of the
communist movement had benefited from the participation of former
students of the Kaum Muda schools, such as Sumatra Thawalib,
made the local administration suspicious of anything in which
this group was involved. Because Resident Arndt had failed to
foresee the earlier rebellion, he was now overly cautious to the
point of intolerance in dealing with Muhammadijah. His attitude
was widely shared among the assistant residents and controleur,
who believed that the government should refuse to recognize
Muhammadijah as a legal corporate body in the Residency. Assis-
tant Resident Winkelman of Batipuh/Pariaman, for example, warned
against the possible danger of a "Muhammadijah terror" since
this organization was holding secret meetings. In his view:
"Who can guarantee to me that extremist elements in the nagari
do not hide themselves behind the banner of Muhammadijah?"
Assistant Resident Karsen of Tanah Datar agreed that Muhammadijah
members "should not be treated differently" from other extrem-
ists.39
The events in Pitalah and Labuh caused considerable concern
in the Office for Native Affairs in Batavia. Saalah took his
case to the Batavia authorities. He also requested assistance
from the Central Board of Muhammadijah in Jogjakarta, and its
strong support of his case made a great impression on the Office,
which did not wish to alienate the Muslim organization. In
Java, the rapidly growing Muhammadijah had retained a social and
educational character and as far as possible had remained aloof
from politics. Consequently, it was on good terms with the
government and received a small subsidy for its schools. At
this time, the Muhammadijah was estranged from its onetime part-
ner, the Partai Sarekat Islam (the former SI), which now fol-
lowed a non-cooperative policy.uo It was feared that the hos-
tile attitude of local administrators in West Sumatra might
39.	Letter of Resident Arndt, April 11, 1927 , no. 1103, secret,
in ibid.
40.	Among the various causes of conflict between the two Muslim
organizations were: friction between their leaders; SI
"envy" of Muhammadijah's rapid development while it itself
was in decline; and difference in political attitude.
Muhammadijah's view of the conflict is discussed in Bintang
Islam, 7, 8, 9 (June-July 1927), contained in Kantoor voor
de Volkslectuur, Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-
Chineesche Pers, 29, 33, 34 (1927). For more detail on
the conflict itself, see Alfian, "Islamic Modernism in Indo-
nesian Politics: The Muhammadijah during the Colonial
Period, 1912-1940" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin,
1969), pp. 385-387.87
adversely influence the Central Board of Muhammadijah, which
was "a very loyal organization." Within the circle of the
Office for Native Affairs, generally, the idea of combating
radical movements by counter-propaganda rather than repressive
action had great currency.41 The Office believed the govern-
ment would have a formidable means of combating the remnants of
the communist movement if Muhammadijah in Minangkabau were
under the direct control of the Central Board.
The Office initiated action shortly after being informed
by the Central Board of Muhammadijah that Hadji Fachruddin, the
vice-president, was about to make a propaganda trip to Minang-
kabau. On April 15, 1927, van der Plas, an adviser to the
Office, appealed to the Governor-General to instruct the Resi-
dent of the West Coast to end his hostile attitude toward
Muhammadijah, for in Java, the Muhammadijah was not only loyal
but also could be considered "the representative of Islam."42
On behalf of the Office, van der Plas also sent an urgent letter
to the Resident urging him "to demonstrate a more sympathetic
attitude toward the organization" during the visit of Hadji
Fachruddin.43 The Governor-General proved receptive to the
argument and instructed the Resident to change the attitude of
the local administration because the central government did not
want Hadji Fachruddin to gain a bad impression during his
visit.44
41.	In 1924, the Resident of West Sumatra, supported by the
Attorney-General, proposed that H. Datuk Batuah and Natar
Zainuddin be exiled. R. Kern, Adviser in the Office for
Native Affairs,objected on the grounds it would only make
the two communist pioneers "martyrs"; he reminded the
government that "the blood of martyrs is the seed of the
church." Instead, he thought, communism should be coun-
tered "by arousing anti-communist trends among the people
themselves." Mailrapport 581x/'24. Van der Plas shared
this outlook for dealing with radical political movements.
"Neutraliseering en Bestrijding van Revolutionnaire Propa-
ganda onder de Inheemsche Bevolking, in het Bijzonder van
Java en Madoera," Verbaal May 1, 1929, C 9.
42.	Letter of van der Plas to the Governor-General, April 15,
1927, no. 264, Mailrapport 524x/’27; Letter of van der Plas
to the Governor-General, April 20, 1927 , no. 135, secret,
Mailrapport 5 2 7x/12 7.
43.	Letter of van der Plas to the Resident of the West Coast
of Sumatra, April 14, 1927, Mailrapport 524x/'27.
44.	Secret Telegram no. 84x, Buitenzorg, April 21, 1927,
Mailrapport 524x/'27.88
Hadji Fachruddin was indeed one of the best leaders ever
to serve on the Central Board of Muhammadijah.45 When he
visited Minangkabau, he immediately made a good impression on
the local authorities. If Hadji Fachruddin was disturbed about
the local administration’s treatment of Muhammadijah he did not
express it in his reports. He ignored the Pitalah incident,
even though his host was Saalah, the man behind the incident.46
His visit cemented the understanding between the Office for
Native Affairs and the Central Board of Muhammadijah concerning
the latter's activities in Minangkabau and initiated a period
of paternal guardianship by the Central Board over the Minang-
kabau branches. The Office approved this step, and the under-
standing continued to govern Muhammadijah to some extent until
1930.
Hadji Fachruddin*s visit was a major propaganda triumph
for Muhammadijah in Sungai Batang and Padang Pandjang. At every
religious gathering attended by the Javanese visitor, numerous
contributions were collected which enabled the establishment of
several Muhammadijah religious schools. During the visit, a
plan was worked out to open a Muhammadijah HIS in Padang Pan-
dj ang.
Despite this success, however,the Muhammadijah suffered a
setback shortly after Hadji Fachruddin’s visit. Sjech Djamil
Djaho and Sjech Muhammad Zain, who had contributed much to the
early development of the organization, gradually lost their
interest in Muhammadijah. In early 1927, they attended its
Sixteenth Congress in Pekalongan, at which it was decided to
create a "Council of Opinions" (Madjelis Tardjih) to pass judg-
ment on religious issues.47 By so doing, the Muhammadijah
45.	In a 1934 lecture, van der Plas said: "Since the death of
Hadji Fachruddin in February 1929, the Muhammadijah no
longer has a religious leader with such great authority."
Ch. 0. van der Plas, "Mededeelingen over de Stroomingen in
de Moslimsche Gemeenschap in Nederlandsch-Indie in der
Nederlandsche Islam-Politiek," Verslagen der Vergadering
van het Indisch Genootschap (February 16, 1934) , p. 260~
46.	Bintang Islam, 7-14 in Overzicht van de Inlandsche Pers,
29, 33, 34, 40 (1927). On the basis of the articles, G. F.
Pijper, an assistant adviser in the Office for Native
Affairs, reported favorably to the Governor-General on
December 7, 1927. Mailrapport 1453x/’27.
47.	The Madjelis Tardjih was also envisioned as a counterpart
of the SI Madjelis Ulama. Noer, "The Rise and Development,
pp. 127-129.89
clearly announced that it would not follow blindly the estab-
lished textual authorities. This issue had been at the heart
of the controversy which had caused the split in Minangkabau
between the Kaum Muda and the Kaum Tua ulama two decades earlier
Sjech Djaho and Sjech Zain, both prominent Kaum Tua ulama,
realized that they had joined the wrong organization. The
gradual withdrawal of Sjech Djaho was a serious loss for the
Padang Pandjang branch, for it left the organization under the
leadership of younger men.48
Except for the opening of the HIS in July 1928, the Padang
Pandjang branch failed to expand any further. In other places,
however, local leaders founded branches independently, without
the promotion of Padang Pandjang leaders. Bukittinggi is a
case in point. After the outbreak of rebellion, little activity
occurred in Bukittinggi, much to the annoyance of local gradu-
ates from the Sumatra Thawalib who wanted to establish a boy
scout organization for religious school pupils. None of them
had experience in boy scouting, but when they asked the Assis-
tant Resident to suggest someone in the administration who could
help them, he replied that the Thawalib graduates should help
themselves. They therefore decided to affiliate with another
organization which already had a boy scout program. On Septem-
ber 11, 1927, a meeting was held at Sjech Djambek’s surau.
Hitarn Sutan Mudo, later an important Muhammadijah leader, led
the meeting, which decided to organize a Muhammadijah branch in
Bukittinggi with a women's section (Aisjiah) and a boy scout
group (Hizbul Wathan).49 As finally organized, the total mem-
bership was 138 persons, including women. In the first year
and a half, the number of members increased more than five times
Sjech Djambek was to the expanding Muhammadijah in Bukittinggi
what Hadji Rasul had been to the Sungai Batang branch. Sjech
Djambek's surau served as the headquarters for the organization,
and his sons and daughters joined its leadership. His sons,
Abdul Gafar and Muhammad Zen, became two of the most energetic
Muhammadijah leaders, and Muhammad Saleh led the Hizbul Wathan.
Like Hadji Rasul, Sjech Djambek also was not a registered member
of Muhammadijah. Both remained loyal members of the PGAI, the
first organization established among the Kaum Muda ulama.
48. "After he returned from Pekalongan, he gradually withdrew
from the organization. As a great ulama he did not say
anything, he neither criticized nor slandered [the Muhamma-
dijah]. He no longer fulfilled his obligation as the chair
man of Muhammadijah, thereby I, the writer of this book,
as the vice-chairman, had to take his position. But before
he withdrew, I had the opportunity to work closely with
him." Hamka, Aj ahku, p. 249.
49. van der Plas, "Gegevens," pp. 25-26.90
No further Muhammadijah branches were established until
the campaign against the Guru Ordinance in the second part of
1928 gave Muhammadijah and other organizations a rallying issue.
The Muhammadijah was then still engaged in the difficult process
of developing its own schools, so far including only four reli-
gious and four vernacular schools.
During and after the campaign against the Guru Ordinance,
Muhammadijah branches were established by local traders and
religious teachers in Padang (September 12), Batu Sangkar (Decem-
ber 13) and Pajakumbuh (December 21). Although all were direct-
ly under the Central Board in Jogjakarta, their composition and
activities reflected very much the views of the local leaders.
The financial basis of the branches also varied according to
place. Regular financial contributions from the members played
a lesser role than occasional gifts marked for definite purposes,
such as the establishment of schools or the conduct of religious
celebrations. Religious gatherings, or tabligh, were one of
the most important means of collecting such gifts. Not unlike
traditional adat gatherings, tabligh were used to stimulate and
exploit the sense of Minangkabau pride. Articulate speakers
(muballigh) played on traditional Minangkabau sentiments by re-
minding audiences not only of their obligations to God and soci-
ety but also their pride as devout Muslims and worthy Minangka-
bau.50 The visit of Hadji Fachruddin had demonstrated how reli-
gious gatherings could be manipulated. Moreover, it was shown
that the size of contributions reflected the fame of the speak-
er. The Muhammadijah branches therefore frequently cooperated
to gain speakers who attracted large audiences; among the most
popular were Hadji Rasul and Sjech Djambek. Because the method
of collecting contributions through tabligh proved successful,
the Muhammadijah never developed a more permanent fund-raising
mechanism, and this proved to be an important handicap.
A major step towards unification of the Muhammadijah
branches was taken at the Fourth Regional Conference, held in
Simabur on May 18-21, 1929. The conference decided that all
branches and groups on the West Coast of Sumatra should join a
Persatuan Muhammadijah Minangkabau (PMM, Union of Muhammadijah
in Minangkabau) under a regional executive board. This could
act as the intermediary between branches in Minangkabau and the
Central Board in Jogjakarta as well as between the organization
as a whole and the local authorities. Saalah Sutan Mangkuto was
elected chairman of the regional executive board,51 and Padang
50.	Hamka, Aj ahku, pp. 155-156.
51.	Members of the Regional Board were: Chairman, Saalah Sutan
Mangkuto; Secretary, Hadji A. Kamil; Treasurer, Sutan Mah-
mud; Members, A. Malik Karim Amrullah Dt. Indomo (Hamka)
and Hitam Sutan Mudo. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht,
lste Halfjaar, 1929, Mailrapport 793x/’29.91
Pandjang became its unofficial headquarters. The first active
step taken by the PMM was to send promoters to various parts of
Minangkabau, Atjeh and Benkulen.
The PMM provided the Central Board in Java with a more
direct channel for exercising its control over the activities
of the Minangkabau branches. Government officials believed
that such control would facilitate efforts by the Central Board
to "cleanse" Minangkabau branches of their politically-oriented
leaders. Resident Gonggrijp warned that the Muhammadijah in
Minangkabau was run by organizationally experienced leaders who
had come of age during the communist movement.52 The Central
Board was already under pressure from the Governor of Jogjakarta
to sever its relationship with these "suspect" branches in
Minangkabau. At a conference of Residents from the Outer Is-
lands, held in Bogor on January 28, 1929, Resident Gonggrijp
broached the subject, but van der Plas disclosed that the Cen-
tral Board had already begun consolidating and purifying the
branches.53
After the Bogor conference, van der Plas made an official
visit to Minangkabau in order to study the Muhammadijah.54 In
his report delivered in May, van der Plas criticized the local
authorities for painting a bleaker picture than the situation
warranted, and he accused them of arbitrariness in their deal-
ings with the Muhammadijah. He said that the Resident did not
conceal his animosity toward the organization, and, as a result,
junior officials did not hesitate to obstruct its activities.
One assistant resident had rebuked the penghulu of a particular
nagari because they had been unable to block a Muhammadijah cam-
paign. Another assistant resident boasted of his success in
undermining the position of Muhammadijah in his region. Muham-
mad Saleh, a son of Sjech Djambek, had been dismissed from his
job in the telephone office because of his leading position in
the Hizbul Wathan.55 Van der Plas argued that Muhammadijah
should not be considered a dangerous organization and the
Governor-General agreed with him.56 Consequently, in the middle
52.	G. F. E. Gonggrijp, "Memorie van Overgave, January 2, 1932,
Mailrapport 360/’32, p. 2.
53.	Extracts from a Report of the Conference with Heads of
Regional Administrations, Buitenzorg, January 28-29, 1929,
Mailrapport 538x/'30.
54.	Van der Plas left for Padang two weeks after the Governor-
General approved his proposal. Mailrapport 321x/'29.
55.	van der Plas, "Gegevens," pp. 41-42.
56.	Governor-General de Graeff was widely known for his pater-
nalistic, liberal policies. It was ironic that the commu-92
of June, Resident Gonggrijp sent a secret circular to all Dutch
officials instructing them to assume a neutral position in deal-
ing with Muhammadijah affairs. This new policy was aided by
local developments. The numerous schools of Sumatra Thawalib
and their graduates were seeking a new unity, and many young
Muhammadijah leaders who were Thawalib graduates found this new
organization more attractive. Local authorities were encour-
aged; they thought it would be easier to handle such a separate
radical organization as it was not affiliated with any "large,
very loyal organization on Java."57
The progress of Muhammadijah, the establishment of the PMM,
and the change of attitude on the part of the local administra-
tion influenced the decision of the Central Board to hold the
Nineteenth Congress in Minangkabau. This was the first congress
ever held outside Java. Shortly after the decision was made, a
special regional conference was held in Bukittinggi, from August
14 to 17, 1929, at which Saalah Sutan Mangkuto was elected
chairman of the preparatory committee. A new local board was
also elected for Bukittinggi. Beginning in mid-August, an ex-
tensive campaign on behalf of the forthcoming congress was con-
ducted throughout Minangkabau, for the local Muhammadijah was
determined to make the congress a magnificent success. Every
nagari in the regencies of Agam and Batipuh/Pariaman was propa-
gandized by Muhammadijah leaders. Bukittinggi, site of the
upcoming meeting, was dominated by a congress mood.58
The congress was held on March 14 to 21, 1930 and was a
great success. President Hadji Ibrahim led the Central Board
delegation. Two hundred and forty representatives, from 99
chapters in Java, one in Kalimantan, and one in Sulawesi,
nist rebellions broke out during his tenure. The Dutch
socialist historian Koch described de Graeff as "an aristo-
crat of blood and of mind. ... He would be willing to
give in to the demands of the Indonesian nationalists pro-
vided these did not threaten the position of the Nether-
lands. .	.	." Koch said that de Graeff, however, could not
avoid the tragedy of a man of good intentions who had to
guard the colonial position; he could not find a way which
would satisfy both sides. D. M. G. Koch, Menudju Kemerde-
kaan: Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia Sampai 1942,
translated by Abdul Muis (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan,
1951) , pp. 116-117.
57. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 3de Kwartaal, 1929, Mail-
rapport 1099x/'29.
58. Peringatan Congres Moehammadijah Minangkabau ke-XIX di
Boekittinggi, 14-21 Maart 1930 (Jogjakarta: n.p., 1931).93
attended. The fifteen branches and groups of Muhammadijah in
Minangkabau sent delegates. And 158 delegates from 30 sections
of Aisjiah also came. Almost all local organizations in Minang-
kabau sent observers.59 The many meetings of the Aisjiah,
Muhammadijah and Hizbul Wathan were well attended. On March
15, a big rally was held. It was attended by 15,000 to 20,000
persons, even though admission was charged.60 The congress
differed from previous ones held on Java more in style than
magnitude, though it was in fact much bigger. Speakers from
Java concentrated upon the role of Muhammadijah in social wel-
fare and educational development under the banner of Islam, but
Minangkabau speakers used the congress as a forum for criticiz-
ing the government. Saalah Sutan Mangkuto spoke about the use
of power which made the people suffer, and Hadji Rasul, with his
usual forthrightness, lectured on the past glory of Islam.61
One illustration of the different character of the delegates
was a debate between the famous Muhammadijah ulama from Java,
Kiai Hadji Mansjur, and Hadji Rasul on the subject of female
speakers in a mixed audience. Hadji Rasul, who had also criti-
cized the activities of the Aisjiah in one of his books, be-
lieved that it was forbidden (haram) for a woman to speak to a
mixed audience. Kiai Hadji Mansjur, who was supported by
younger Muhammadijah leaders, questioned the validity of this
judgment. Finally, the ulama agreed that a better judgment
should be that it was mubah, not recommended. Since it was
judged inappropriate for women to address a mixed audience at
this particular congress, a leader of Aisjiah from Padang Pan-
djang lost the chance to speak at the biggest rally ever held
in Minangkabau.62
Nevertheless, the most important event at the congress was
the struggle behind the scenes between the young Minangkabau
leaders and the Central Board. The leaders from Java were
59.	Petrus Blumberger, Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 344-345.
60.	Report of de Vries, April 2, 1930, no. 57/M, Mailrapport
431x/'3O. The largest Muhammadijah rally on Java was held
at the time of the XVI Congress in Pekalongan, but it was
attended by only about 2,000 persons. Bintang Islam
(April 1927), Overzicht van de Inlandsche Pers, 26/1, 1927,
pp. 408-409.
61.	Concerning the speeches given, see Petrus Blumberger,
Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 345-347 and Alfian, "Islamic
Modernism," pp. 451-454.
62.	"Kaoem Moeda di Minangkabau," Pandji Islam, 9 (March 3,
1941), p. 8875; Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 165-168.94
attacked by Saalah and Zain Djambek, who opposed the acceptance
of government subsidies.63 The young leaders also demanded that
the Muhammadijah in Minangkabau should be allowed to establish
a closer relationship with the Sumatra Thawalib. Saalah, in
speeches prior to the congress, had stressed the importance of
cooperation between these two organizations of Kaum Muda edu-
cated people. He himself was also a member of the executive
board of the Sumatra Thawalib. At the congress, however, Saalah
and his colleagues were severely rebuked by Sjech Djambek and
other Kaum Muda ulama who feared that closer ties with the Suma-
tra Thawalib would adversely affect Muhammadijah’s relations
with the local authorities. For its part, the Central Board
insisted that its branches maintain a good relationship with
adat and local authorities.6* The congress, at the insistence
of the Central Board, agreed to restrict the activities of the
politically oriented leaders; this would show that Muhammadijah
in Minangkabau was intended solely as an educational and reli-
gious organization.
In order to guarantee the success of this directive, the
congress decided to establish in each residency a "Consulate"
which could act as the representative of the Central Board.
The "Consul" (Konsol) would be appointed by the Central Board
itself and be directly responsible to it. As a result of this
decision, the newly-organized PMM was replaced by the Muhamma-
dijah "Consulate" in Minangkabau.
The congress decisions represented a victory for the Cen-
tral Board and the moderate elements in Muhammadijah. The
Minangkabau young leaders had used the forum of the congress to
deliver their political speeches, but now they were given the
alternative of divorcing themselves from politics or withdrawing
from active membership in Muhammadijah. Although Saalah and
Zain Djambek, the two most outspoken leaders, remained active
leaders of Muhammadijah, many of their friends left and joined
the Sumatra Thawalib. The institution of consulates provided a
good solution for coping with the problems that arose as Muham-
madijah spread to regions outside Java. But before the decision
could be implemented in Minangkabau, Muhammadijah had to fight
the local authorities.
Dutch officials thought that the congress was influenced
by the Sumatra Thawalib. They were angered by the anti-govern-
ment speeches and by the way in which the local congress commit-
tee had treated government representatives. Assistant Resident
Groeneveldt of Agam felt that the local administration had con-
tributed much to the success of the congress He had provided
63.	de Vries Report, Mailrapport 431x/'3O.
64.	Gonggrijp, "Memorie," pp. 6-7.95
the congress with many facilities out of respect for Sjech
Djambek, who had been awarded a silver star for his assistance
in combating the communist movement.65
A few days after the congress, Groeneveldt summoned Sjech
Djambek to his office and berated the old ulama, blaming him
for not restraining the political speakers. The Assistant Resi-
dent was especially annoyed because Sjech Djambek’s sons, Gafar
and Zain, had been two of the most outspoken members of the
Congress Committee. He told the ulama that, from that date,
the close relationship between the regency administration and
the Muhammadijah was ended, and, in a drastic move, he prohibited
the Muhammadijah from holding its regular religious meeting in
Parit Rantang, a nagari in the vicinity of Bukittinggi. The
nagari council tried to avoid this issue by declaring the tabligh
a nagari affair. But the Assistant Resident suspected that the
nagari council had been infiltrated by Muhammadijah and reim-
posed his decision. The nagari mosque was guarded by the police,
and the district chief was instructed to dissuade the people
from attending. In other nagari, such as Sarik, similar inci-
dents occurred. The Assistant Resident proudly announced that
"from now on the holding of tabligh will be decided by the
Assistant Resident not by Muhammadijah."66
Resident Gonggrijp actively supported the actions taken by
his subordinate. In his report to the Governor-General on
April 16, the Resident described the Muhammadijah as "a disloyal
and anti-Western organization" which was "not a purely religious
but rather a political organization which used religion as an
overcoat." For this reason, he said, "The Muhammadijah on the
West Coast of Sumatra can no longer be considered merely a
branch of the same organization on Java." Resident Gonggrijp
reiterated his proposal that the Central Board should cut its
ties with the Muhammadijah in his residency.67 From the time
he took office in late 1927, Resident Gonggrijp said, he had
believed that the Muhammadijah was an organization of "so-called
modernists, who formed a small revolutionary minority."68 They
65.	Letter of the Assistant Resident to the Resident, March 29,
1930, no. 168, secret, Mailrapport 431x/'3O. An appropriate
place at public meetings for government representatives was
required by law.
66.	The correspondence and reports relating to this issue are
contained in Mailrapport 431x/’3O and 712x/’3O.
67.	Ibid.
68.	Letter of the Resident to the Governor-General, April 16,
1930, no. 354, secret, Mailrapport 431x/’31.96
deliberately "used the sometimes outward religious fanaticism
of the Minangkabau."69
This highly unfavorable assessment of Muhammadijah was dis-
puted by Gobde, an adviser in the Office for Native Affairs.
He criticized Gonggrijp’s "unbalanced judgment" and pointed out
that labeling the modernists as "revolutionaries" was unjusti-
fied. They could be called revolutionaries only in the sense
that they "strive toward the rejuvenation of religion." In
Minangkabau, there were several modernist ulama, such as Dr.
Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, who were loyal to the government. Fur-
thermore, Gobde pointed out that there were no statistical data
to prove Gonggrijp’s contention that the modernists formed only
a minority; in any event, he said, they "are more than a small
minority, and, in the foreseeable future, there is no doubt that
they will become the majority."70
In the course of the government debate, the Fifth Annual
Regional Conference of Muhammadijah was held in Pajakumbuh at
the end of May. The executive board of the Union of Muhammadijah
in Minangkabau (PMM) announced that the Central Board would
gradually assume control over the local branches and groups.
Sutan Mansjur was nominated as the first "Consul" in Minangkabau.
This was subsequently approved by the Central Board.71 Shortly
after the conference, representatives of the Central Board went
to Batavia to protest the harassment of the Muhammadijah in
Bukittinggi and elsewhere. They also reassured the central
government that the Central Board was taking over the Minangka-
bau branches.72 Gobee’s sharp rebuttal of the West Coast ad-
ministration, combined with developments in Muhammadijah, influ-
enced the Governor-General, and he instructed Resident Gonggrijp
to study Gobde's criticism carefully.73 Finally, on August 14,
1930, the Attorney-General informed the Governor-General that
no action would be taken against Muhammadijah. By that time,
the Central Board has already taken over the local branches, and
69.	Gonggrijp, "Memorie," p. 2.
70.	Gobee, letter to the Governor-General, July 15, 1930, no.
K 67, secret, Mailrapport 712x/'3O.
71.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 2de Kwartaal, 1930,
Mailrapport 812x/'30.
72.	Soeara Moehammadijah, June 29, 1930 in Overzicht van de
Inlandsche Pers, 27/1930, p. 2.
73.	Letter from the First Government Secretary, W. G. Stroband,
to Resident Gonggrijp, July 27, 1930, no. 193x, Mailrapport
712x/'3O.97
the newly established Perhimpunan Muslimin Indonesia (PMI, Asso-
ciation of the Indonesian Muslims) was providing an alternative
forum for the politically oriented elements from Muhammadijah.74
Under Sutan Mansjur, the Muhammadijah carried out a plan
for consolidation and "purification." At this time, however, a
new force in Minangkabau political life was beginning to develop
and, by the beginning of 1931, it had forced the Muhammadijah
into the background. A new dynamic force swept the nagari and
challenged the nagari authorities; it took the shape of two new
radical parties, Permi and the PSII.
The Muhammadijah and the Adat Authorities
From its early development until the end of the Dutch colo-
nial period, Muhammadijah constantly had to overcome opposition
from adat authorities. A close look at this conflict explains
the characteristics of Muhammadijah as well as the nature of
Minangkabau political and social movements at the nagari level.
The Muhammadijah campaign to improve and reform social
conditions by definition implied that the existing situation was
far from satisfactory. On this basis alone, conflict between
Muhammadijah, an organization outside the adat system, and the
adat authorities, the traditional protectors and leaders of the
people, was inevitable. According to adat, the penghulu were
responsible for the welfare and the development of their people.
Social criticism, inherent in Muhammadijah's program, would
necessarily be seen as a direct challenge to the penghulu’s
leadership. The identification of certain social conditions as
unsatisfactory suggested that the penghulu had by and large
failed in their adat functions. Resentment against this criti-
cism was intensified by a tendency among Muhammadijah promoters
to view their organization as the only channel for social im-
provement. Moreover, Muhammadijah reinforced its position by
asserting that the reforms it sought comprised a religious obli-
gation. In a bitter article, one penghulu wrote:
If [Muhammadijah] wants to develop Islam, it should
do so tactfully. Particularly, since it wants to
spread its Muslim organization in a region which had
been Islamized for hundreds of years.75
74.	Attorney-General's Office, August 14, 1930, no. 1707/A.P.,
secret, Mailrapport 841x/'3O.
75.	Warta Hindia, January 5, 1929.98
Ideology, however, was not the main point of contention
with the adat authorities. By their very existence, the Muham-
madijah and similar associations challenged the nagari authori-
ties. They not only provided new channels for people who were
dissatisfied with the existing adat institution, but they also
decreased the influence of the adat authorities. Balai Selasa
provides a case in point. In August 1928, a leader of Muhamma-
dijah from Padang Pandjang founded a branch in Balai Selasa, a
small coastal town in the south. For two years, the organiza-
tion developed and expanded without friction with the adat
authorities. In 1930, however, it began to grow rapidly and
friction soon developed, necessitating the intervention of the
district administration. At the time of its founding, only
seven of the 55 branch members came from Balai Selasa. The
rest were perantau traders from the Danau region.76 Local adat
authorities regarded the organization as their "guests" (urang
datang), but the moment it began attracting the local popula-
tion, it was considered to be encroaching upon the jurisdiction
of the adat authorities.
The early success of Muhammadijah in rural areas had de-
pended largely on its ability to infiltrate the nagari council,
the most obvious examples being Sungai Batang and Tandjung Sani.
But in Sulit Air, in 1929, a penghulu was dismissed from the
nagari council for promoting Muhammadijah over the opposition of
other council members. According to the council, the penghulu
had committed serious mistakes. He had considered Muhammadijah
as the representative of religion, and he had ignored the tradi-
tional function of the penghulu to maintain harmony between
adat and religion.
In general, there was a tendency among the penghulu to use
adat machinery to obstruct the spread of Muhammadijah in their
nagari. A typical case was Pasar Ambatjang, a nagari in the
vicinity of Padang. In December 1928, a local notable, one Mat
Dahlan, who was a trader and religious teacher, decided to
introduce the organization in his nagari. For this purpose, he
planned to hold a big religious gathering in the nagari mosque,
and he invited Hadji Rasul and Sjech Djambek to be the principal
speakers. He asked the permission of the nagari council to use
the mosque, but the request was rejected on the grounds that the
nagari mosque could not be used for promoting an outside organi-
zation. Mat Dahlan later asked the nagari council’s approval
for holding the tabligh in his own surau. At the council meet-
ing, a debate developed concerning the jurisdiction of the peng-
hulu over a privately owned surau. The penghulu contended that,
even though the surau belonged to Mat Dahlan's family, it should
76. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 3de Kwartaal,1928, Mail-
rapport 1173x/'28.99
be treated as public property because it existed to serve the
community. Therefore, the penghulu could legitimately determine
its use. Mat Dahlan argued that the surau served the community
not because it belonged to the community but because of the
surau owner's generosity. A privately funded surau reflected
one's duty to God and to the community at large, both local
people and travelers who needed accommodation.
Though failing to get approval, Mat Dahlan decided to carry
out his plan anyway. Pretending illness, Hadji Rasul and Sjech
Djambek sent their apologies and said they would be unable to
attend. Several young Muhammadijah leaders from Padang Pandjang
did come, as did many people from surrounding nagari. Before
the meeting began some penghulu stood up and challenged Mat
Dahlan and his colleagues. A heated debate took place until
the representatives from Padang Pandjang finally had to calm
down their supporters in Pasar Ambatjang. The debate ended
only because both factions realized that they had reached the
point at which social harmony was endangered. Muhammadijah
thus had to wait another year before it succeeded in expanding
to neighboring nagari.77
The preventive action against Muhammadijah proved the best
policy for nagari authorities, especially as it was encouraged
by the local administration, and it could prevent the conflict
between adat and government laws. According to government regu-
lations [Staatsblad 1919, no. 27), a voluntary association
whether a political party or a social and educational organiza-
tion, could be established without the authorization of the
government. So long as the organization did not transgress
government laws, the local administration had to allow it to
carry out its activities. In other words, it was the adminis-
tration not the adat authorities which had final authority over
the voluntary associations. A conflict between an organization
and the adat authorities might expose differences in criteria
used by the administration and adat authorities. This legal
dualism explains the problems which the local administration
faced in dealing with the Muhammadijah. The so-called "Kubang
affair," which embarrassed even the central government, illus-
trates these problems and also how Muhammadijah attempted to
infiltrate nagari institutions.
77. Somewhat pro-Muhammadijah accounts of the incident are con-
tained in Tjaja Soematra, December 27 and 28, 1928; pro-
penghulu accounts m Warta Hindia, January 5, 1929. A
Tjaja Soematra correspondent accused district authorities
of siding with adat leaders (January 14, 1929).100
The Kubang Affair
On April 30, 1930, the Governor-General cabled Resident
Gonggrijp asking him to report on an "incident" which had alleg-
edly occurred in Kubang. On May 3, the Resident replied that
the problem concerned an order by the nagari head of Kubang,
with the full agreement of the nagari council, that the Muhamma-
dij ah close its adult courses and orphan school.78 The incident
had started, in the words of a Dutch controleur, as "a storm in
a glass of water,"79 but it soon became a public issue about
which the government had to report to the Volksraad.80 What
really happened in Kubang? In order to understand the incident
a discussion of some aspects of the Kubang community is neces-
sary .
Kubang is a nagari in the sub-district of Guguk, district
of Suliki, about twenty kilometers from the regency capital,
Pajakumbuh. Kubang is one of the most prosperous nagari in the
regency of Lima Puluh Kota. In addition to rice, an important
source of income comes from a cottage textile industry. The
nearest market for manufactured products is Pajakumbuh, to which
Kubang is connected by a very good communication system. Al-
though in earlier times the producer and the seller were usually
the same person, by the early 1920*s the textile producers began
to sell to intermediaries, also usually Kubang people. The
more successful businessmen began to live in Pajakumbuh, dealing
in textiles woven by their relatives back home, but both middle-
men and producer-dealers frequently visited Kubang. As a conse-
quence of the new situation matriarchal authority over indi-
viduals began to slacken. This process was accelerated by the
growing trend toward individually-owned houses, as many well-to-
do traders and their families moved out of their matrilineal
communal houses.81
Kubang belonged to the Koto Piliang political tradition
with its recognized difference of rank among the penghulu and
78.	Mailrapport 45lx/'30.
79.	J. B. F. Sartorius (controleur of Suliki), Partijstrijd te
Koebang (onderafdeeling Soeliki), May 7, 1930, Mailrapport
538x/'3O.
80.	Question of Volksraad member T. Njak Arief about the atti-
tude of the West Coast administration towards Muhammadijah,
Mailrapport 1233x/'3O.
81.	Only 49.93% of the dwellings were communal, matrilineal
houses (rumah gadang) while 34.46% were individually-owned.
Volkstelling 1930, IV, pp. 64-67.101
its vertical distribution of power. But the authority of the
upper level political units rested on the support of the lower
ones. The nagari was divided into several koto, each koto con-
sisted of four suku and each suku was a conglomerate of several
lineages. The lowest level of political organization was the
extended kinship group. Each level of political organization
was led by a penghulu.82 All penghulu, regardless of rank, were
members of the nagari council. But the Nagari Ordonnantie of
1914 allowed only the so-called core-penghulu, those who headed
the two highest political levels, to serve as members of the
council; lower penghulu were stripped of power over nagari
affairs. This artificially sharpened the distinction between
the core and the lower penghulu and had an important psychologi-
cal effect. Now that the lower penghulu were detached from
responsibility for village affairs, they had little to lose in
any attack against the nagari council.83 The lower penghulu
thus became the promoters of Muhammadijah in Kubang and inten-
tionally used it to challenge the nagari council.84
The Muhammadijah issue arose from competition between the
core and lower penghulu (supported by traders and religious
teachers) over the control of an orphan school founded in the
last quarter of 1928.85 The school was begun by several lower
penghulu aided by non-penghulu traders in Pajakumbuh and reli-
gious teachers. The nagari council had approved establishment
of the school and the building itself belonged to the nagari.
The struggle between the school's promoters and the nagari
council began when Muhammadijah was intensifying its activities
after its successful anti-Guru Ordinance campaign. A Muhammadi-
jah branch was formed in Pajakumbuh and most of the Kubang
leaders joined. Fearing a possible expansion of the organiza-
tion to Kubang, the nagari council issued a resolution, on
January 9, 1929, which forbade holding religious gatherings
having outside speakers or activities by outside organizations
without the prior approval of the nagari authorities. From the
82.	More detailed information on the penghulu ranks is contained
in a report by the controleur of Suliki, H. J. D. Veen of
March 1918, Verbaal March 4, 1919, no. 23.
83.	Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, pp. 132-133.
84.	Communist sympathizers had boasted earlier that the sub-
district of Guguk was a "second Moscow." On the participa-
tion of lower penghulu in the movement, see Sartorius' re-
port in Mailrapport 538x/'3O.
85.	Except as otherwise noted, the sources for the Kubang
Affair are the reports and official correspondence con-
tained in: Mailrapport 451x/'3O, 538x/’3O, 558x/'3O,
841x/'3O and 1232x/'3O.102
point of view of other nagari authorities and the local adminis-
tration in the regency, the resolution appeared to be a good
preventive measure, and other nagari in the regency later fol-
lowed suit. The issue of the orphan school remained unsettled,
although the school continued to expand. It followed the system
of the Dinijah schools and had twenty pupils under a well-
trained teacher.
A one-sided solution for the uneasy relationship between
the school promoters and the nagari council was apparently
reached by chance. In March, several Kubang families whose sons
were studying at the Thawalib school in Parabek decided to build
a surau for students in the Parabek compound. Others joined
these families in the project. In June, the three highest
grades of the Thawalib school were moved to Bukittinggi and
this included the majority of the Kubang students. Thus a new
surau was no longer necessary. Some school promoters suggested
that the materials which had already been collected should be
used for a permanent building for the orphan school. The sug-
gestion was warmly approved and penghulu Datuk Manggung Padang
donated a piece of his family's land as a religious gift {wakaf}
for the proposed building. Most members of the nagari council,
however, strongly opposed this plan. According to adat, only
the council had the right to initiate such action. The school
promoters viewed the matter as a koto level issue instead of a
nagari one. Since the school was to be built in Koto Baru,
however, the issue had to be settled first by the penghulu
there. Datuk Manggung Padang and his penghulu colleagues in
that koto were quite influential.
In January 1930, the school building was completed, and
the promoters decided to hold an opening ceremony with village
festivities on January 13 and 16. The heads of families through-
out Kubang and from some neighboring nagari were invited. Not
one core-penghulu was honored as host. The ceremony demonstrated
the school promoters' victory and it publicly snubbed the core-
penghulu. Reacting to the humiliation, nineteen core-penghulu
saw the controleur of Suliki on January 19 and complained that
the promoters of the orphan school had been collecting contribu-
tions of rice, coconuts and money from the people without the
consultation, let alone approval, of the nagari council. This
represented a grave offense against the traditional rights of
the core-penghulu, and they urged the Dutch official to close
down the school. The controleur, no matter what his personal
opinion of the affair, thought this request was an overreaction.
As an official, he had to maintain the Resident's secret in-
struction that the Dutch administration should take, as far as
possible, a neutral stand. The school was not closed but its
promoters wisely discontinued collecting contributions. Fur-
thermore it was now the fasting month. To celebrate the end of
the holy month (idulfitri), the school promoters held a communal103
festivity in Dangung-Dangung, a neighboring nagari and the capi-
tal of the sub-district. On this occasion, they received many
contributions. In the meantime, the Muhammadijah branch in
Pajakumbuh also held a donation-evening on behalf of the Kubang
orphan school. Thus, though not directly encroaching on the
nagari council’s authority, the school promoters could still
collect contributions.
On March 28, 1930, a week after the successful Nineteenth
Congress of Muhammadijah in Bukittinggi, the school promoters
decided to dissolve their own organization and form a Muhamma-
dijah group. They planned to use the new school building for
adult and Aisjiah courses. The establishment of Muhammadijah
was a direct repudiation of the resolution of the nagari coun-
cil, and the nagari head reacted quickly by informing the newly
elected executive board of the Muhammadijah group that he was
strongly opposed. But he did not force the executive board to
dissolve the new group, and this precipitated a confrontation
with the nagari council. In the meantime, various political
intrigues were going on within the council itself. A certain
Datuk Perisai, half-brother of the nagari head and known for
his strong ambition to become a nagari head himself, exploited
the Muhammadijah case as a means for exercising his own influ-
ence. He persuaded the council to hold a special meeting which
resulted in a resolution on April 10, 1930 that reinforced the
resolution of January 9 and forbade outsiders from holding reli-
gious gatherings. It restated the vital importance of gaining
prior agreement from the penghulu. An infringement against this
resolution could result in exclusion from the adat community.
Since the Muhammadijah and its subsidiaries had been founded
without approval from the nagari council, the promoters had in
fact committed a serious adat offense.
Shortly after the meeting, the nagari head requested that
the Muhammadijah submit a complete list of its members. The
next day he tried to force the two religious officials who were
members of the Muhammadijah executive board to resign from the
organization. When they refused, he dismissed them from their
nagari positions. Since Muhammadijah refused to dissolve itself
voluntarily, the nagari head issued a statement which declared
that the Muhammadijah should be dissolved and its schools closed
down because the organization had not yet been "recognized by
the penghulu or members of the nagari council of Kubang."86
Unknown to the nagari head, however, four days before he issued
the statement, on April 12, the Muhammadijah branch in Pajakumbuh
had officially recognized the Kubang group. Dissolution of the
group was therefore no longer simply an internal nagari affair.
86. Resolution of the Kubang nagari council, no. 19, April 10,
1930, Mailrapport 538x/'30.104
On April 18, branch representatives visited the sub-district
chief and protested the nagari head's actions. This posed a
dilemma for the official. On the one hand, the nagari council
was right according to adat; it had not been consulted by the
Muhammadijah promoters. On the other hand, the transfer of the
orphan school to Muhammadijah was only reasonable; almost all of
its promoters were members of that organization in Pajakumbuh.
Moreover, Muhammadijah was also a legally recognized body.
According to law, the organization had not committed any offense.
The assistent demang, being a minor native official, transferred
the problem to the Dutch controleur, who subsequently ordered
the nagari head to reopen the orphan school. But the controleur
used the opportunity to "lecture" the representatives of the
Muhammadijah branch, when they saw him on April 24, on the im-
portant role of the penghulu in maintaining law and order in
the nagari.
The "lecture" of the controleur on Minangkabau adat and
other matters convinced the Muhammadijah leaders that the offi-
cial in fact favored the nagari council. He had treated them
as though they did not understand their own adat. The reopening
of the orphan school was ordered only for the sake of the chil-
dren. The Muhammadijah's adult courses were still closed, and
no decision was made concerning the legality of the Muhammadijah
itself in Kubang. Dissatisfied with this temporary solution,
the secretary of the Kubang group went to Padang Pandjang to
solicit aid from Saalah Sutan Mangkuto, a former unlicensed law-
yer and an astute local politician. He took advantage of this
last opportunity before he was succeeded by a Consul of Muhamma-
dijah to embarrass the provincial administration which had al-
ways been at odds with him. In a meeting in Pajakumbuh on
April 27, he told the audience that, according to law, the
nagari council had no right to dissolve Muhammadijah because it
was a legally recognized organization. He said the Kubang group
should leave the school closed but replace its signboards which
the nagari authorities had removed. In this way, Saalah hoped to
show that the Muhammadijah itself was still in operation but that
its schools were forced to close down by the nagari authorities.
He also sent an urgent cable to the Central Board in Jogjakarta,
informing it of the incident and asking the Central Board to
discuss it with the Office for Native Affairs.
The next day, the orphan school was closed again. On April
29, the nagari head and the members of the nagari council,
realizing that they played an ill-advised game, summoned the
secretary of Muhammadijah and informed him that he could reopen
the orphan school. But when the secretary also inquired about
the adult and Aisjiah courses, the nagari council did not reply.
The Muhammadijah leader knew that he had the upper hand and re-
fused to accept a temporary solution; the meeting ended in
failure. The nagari council statement had indeed been ill-105
considered and the sanction of exclusion from adat had been un-
warranted. But, on the other hand, for the sake of its own
prestige, it could not accede easily the Muhammadijah leader's
demand.
In the meantime, the cable sent to the Central Board had
begun to have far-reaching effects. The Central Board had pro-
tested immediately to the Office for Native Affairs. Gobee like
van der Plas had been very critical of the local administration's
handling of Muhammadijah matters, and he brought the case
directly to the Governor-General. In December, after some de-
bate among the high officials, the Governor-General instructed
Gonggrijp to change his policy and commanded that the Kubang
Affair be satisfactorily resolved.87 The Muhammadijah and its
schools were reopened; the organization in Kubang had won a
victory.
The "Kubang Affair" stimulated public debate throughout
Minangkabau. Why did the penghulu obstruct the development of
Muhammadijah, an organization which worked for the sake of edu-
cation and religion? What were the limits of the penghulu's
authority? Could they exclude people arbitrarily from adat?
The penghulu's supporters argued that there was nothing inher-
ently wrong in Muhammadijah, but that it should not ignore the
traditional responsibilities of the penghulu. It was the duty
of the penghulu to guard the nagari against any undesirable
influence. The experience during the communist movement had
shown that, if the penghulu were not on guard, disaster was
sure to come.88 There was nothing new in these arguments, but
they were to be repeated again and again. The debates only
demonstrated once more the uneven social situation. The changing
attitudes toward traditional power had to confront a strengthened
nagari council supported by the government.
The opposition of the adat authorities to the Muhammadijah
was in some cases prompted by provocative attitudes taken by
Muhammadijah followers. In some parts of Agam, for example,
the penghulu and village elders were annoyed by the activities
of the Hizbul Wathan. In August 1929, the Agam adat party SAAM
officially protested the Hizbul Wathan's activities in its
district.89 Quasi-military pretensions were a common phenomenon
in the early growth of the boy scouts, and the Hizbul Wathan
87.	Government Secretary Kiveron to the Governor of Sumatra's
West Coast, December 4, 1930, 388x, Mailrapport 1232x/'3O.
88.	Tjaja Soematra, May 22, 30 and August 20, 1930.
89.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, August 1930, Mailrapport
316x/'29.106
proudly called itself "the soldiers of Muhammadijah." The mili-
tary tendency in the Hizbul Wathan was perhaps typical of the
early boy scout movement in a colonial society. Uniforms and
quasi-military drill annoyed the penghulu, but they had a posi-
tive psychological effect on the youth.90
Conclusion
The main objectives of Kiai Hadji Achmad Dahlan when he
established Muhammadijah were religious purification, betterment
of social life and modernization of religious schools. He
shared the ideals of the Minangkabau Kaum Muda ulama, and he
was thought to be a loyal subscriber to the first Kaum Muda
journal, Al-Moenir. Both Dahlan and the Minangkabau Kaum Muda
ulama were influenced by the Egyptian religious reformer,
Muhammad Abduh. But while the Kaum Muda ulama were still pre-
occupied with their conflict with the Kaum Tua, Kiai Dahlan and
his Muhammadi j ah were slowly mobilizing the santri- Muslim commun-
ity in the heartland of Javanese court culture. Dahlan and his
colleagues had to advance their programs among the prevailing
traditionalist attitudes of a santri community surrounded by the
abangan element of Javanese society. They also had to compete
with increasingly active Protestant and Catholic missionaries
receiving financial support from the government. The Kaum Muda
ulama in Minangkabau, on the other hand, worked in the midst of
a basically homogeneous religious society and did not face a
major challenge from outside. In comparison with the early
struggle of Muhammadijah in Java, the Kaum Muda ulama in Minang-
kabau had a much more favorable social situation. They did not
need a strong organization for their followers. They were
satisfied with an organization of their own peers, the PGAI.
They did not have adverse local circumstances which necessitated
an organization such as Muhammadijah with a strong ideological
foundation. But the emergence of the communist Sarekat Rakjat,
which to a large extent recruited its cadres from among the
Kaum Muda students and followers, destroyed the latter’s early
and somewhat unorganized, attempts to reform society.
After its initial establishment in Sungai Batang and Padang
Pandjang in 1925, the Muhammadijah benefited from three import-
ant developments. In Padang Pandjang, the organization bene-
fited from the general frustration following the communist
rebellion,because it could provide a forum for people who had
been disappointed with both the communist movement and the
government. Its initial character was best defined by Resident
van Heuven, who called it "a combined organization for very
90. Ibid., 1928, Mailrapport 1173x/'28.107
heterogeneous political or religio-political elements and
aspirations."91 The campaign against the Guru Ordinance, which
gained momentum in August 1928, and the Nineteenth Congress of
Muhammadijah in March 1930, were the two events that promoted
the expansion of Muhammadijah and the spread of its school net-
work. Opposition against the Guru Ordinance provided an oppor-
tunity for the Muhammadijah to propagandize and for the Congress
to show its strength. Although by the beginning of 1931 the
Muhammadijah was forced into the background in Minangkabau, it
continued as the biggest organization backed by a rapidly ex-
panding school network.
From the government’s point of view the most obvious dif-
ference between the Muhammadijah in Java and in Minangkabau was
the latter's involvement in politics. These political tenden-
cies resulted from the nature of the Minangkabau political
tradition on the nagari level, the timing of the Muhammadijah
activities, which began to accelerate significantly after the
communist rebellion, and the personal inclinations of the lead-
ers, who had been exposed to nationalist political activities
in Java. No less important was the hostile attitude displayed
by the local administration. Since 1923, when some Kaum Muda
oriented organizations began to participate in the opposition
against certain government policies, particularly the land tax
and forest preservation programs, the Kaum Muda educated group
had become the object of government suspicion. The rebellion
of 1927 increased the government's hostility. The attitude of
the Dutch officials on the West Coast of Sumatra became a source
of friction between themselves and the advisers of the Office
for Native Affairs. The function of the Office was more "aca-
demic" in nature and it tended to seek solutions through under-
standing the local situation rather than through repressive
policies. In dealing with Muhammadijah, the Office subscribed
to the idea that radical tendencies in society could be combated
by supporting counter-elements. Given direct guidance from the
Central Board, the Muhammadijah could be expected to combat the
still existing radical elements in Minangkabau.
In the final analysis, however, the determining factor
that caused friction between the Office and local officials was
their differing view of what was politically expedient. The
local officials were particularly concerned with political ques-
tions in their regions; whereas the main interest of the Office
for Native Affairs, as a part of the central government, was
the political and social stability of the Netherlands Indies as
a whole. Given this scope of interest, the position of Java was
91. B. H. F. van Heuven, "Memorie van Overgave, December 31,
1934," Mailrapport 254/'35, p. 2. Interview with Saalah
Sutan Mangkuto, Djakarta, November 1968.108
Table 1
The Development of Muhammadijah from
August 1928 till the end of 1930
	August 1928*	December 1930
I. Branches/Groups		
1. Branches	4	26
2. Groups	?	75
II. Schools
A. "Secular" schools		
1. HIS	3	3
2. Schakelschool	-	2
3. Second class/standard	1	2
4. Volksschool	-	1
B. Religious schools		
1. Elementary	3	7
2. Secondary	1	1
3. Tabligh	-	1
C. Special schools		
1. Orphan	-	2
*
Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 1925-1928; van der Plas,
"Gegevens," Islam, September 20, 1930, in Overzicht van de
Inlandsche Pers , 43/1930.
crucial, for it was the focal point from which the real chal-
lenge to colonial government might arise. This concept explains
the policies of the Office, which were supported by the Governor
General, concerning the Muhammadijah. A hostile stand against
Muhammadijah in Minangkabau could alienate the "loyal organiza-
tion" in Java, thereby strengthening greatly the non-cooperative
political parties. The adamant attitude taken by the Central
Board in defending its branches in Minangkabau forced the cen-
tral government to restrain the local administration.
In retrospect, the Muhammadijah episode in West Sumatra
represents one of the last important chances for the Office for
Native Affairs to influence the decision-making process with re-
gard to Indonesian political movements. Under the liberal
Governor-General de Graeff, the Office still acted as the "con-
science" of the government. But, thereafter, the Office's in-
fluence rapidly declined. It became no more than a "bureau for109
complaints" [Klaehteribureau') , and its officials lacked adequate
power to redress the complaints.92 The time soon came when a
Dutch controleur, a former student of Snouck Hurgronje lamented:
"What a long time since Snouck Hurgronje left us."93
92. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, pp. 68-82.
93. D. van der Meulen, Ik Stond er Bij: Het Einde van ons
Koloniale Rijk (Baarn: Bosch 8 Keuning, [196?]), p. 106.CHAPTER V
SCHOOLS AND THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The Kaum Muda considered the central government plan to
introduce the Guru Ordinance throughout the Netherlands Indies
as a direct challenge to their school network and reformist
zeal. The Kaum Muda educators were in the process of expanding
their schools and modernizing the curriculum and method of in-
struction. The ordinance would in effect put religious teachers
and religious propagandists under government control. The Kaum
Muda believed it was a government attempt to hinder their ef-
forts to recover from the internal crisis stemming from commu-
nist actions. The formulation of the ordinance was somewhat
vague, and it appeared that it might also affect the numerous
surau mengadji. These Quranic recital schools were the most
important part of the Minangkabau educational system, because
all Minangkabau children were expected to spend some time study-
ing there. The Kaum Muda feared the ordinance might result in
the subjection of Islam itself to government control. Opposi-
tion to the plan was based not only on the fact that it affected
the major occupation of the Kaum Muda leaders but, more import-
antly, that religious schools had always occupied a key position
in Islamic life. Hostility to the plan soon led to concerted
action among the numerous religious and educational organiza-
tions. It provided an opportunity for the intensification of
the Muhammadijah's expansion drive. Political parties re-emerged
as active elements in the ferment occasioned by the proposed
ordinance. Organizing for the anti-Guru Ordinance campaign,
the scattered Sumatra Thawalib schools were gradually unified
under one leadership. By the end of 1930, this education organ-
ization had been transformed into a strong, politically-oriented,
socio-economic organization, Permi. Shortly after the campaign,
a branch of the Java-based radical Islamic party, the Partai
Sarekat Islam (PSI), was established in Minangkabau.
From early 1927 until the middle of 1928, the Muhammadijah
and other minor Islamic organizations were engaged in consoli-
dating their position. During this process, the older ulama
occupied prominent positions and their participation and support
were essential for the success of the numerous activities under-
taken by the Kaum Muda educated group. These organizations
directed their attention toward their own districts or Minang-
kabau as a whole. After the campaign against the Guru Ordinance,
new trends began to develop. Muhammadijah was no longer the
only alternative for the Kaum Muda educated group, and their
main concern was no longer restricted to the expansion of school
networks. Their scope of interest had continually enlarged in
110Ill
step with the growing popularity of the still vague notion of
Islamic nationalism. Non-cooperative political views were be-
coming more influential, and the increasing activities of the
Kaum Muda educated group threatened to renew religious contro-
versy. In the middle of 1928, several important Kaum Tua ulama
began to organize themselves and their schools into one common
association.
The period from the middle of 1928 until the end of 1930
represented a transitional phase in the educational and politi-
cal movement of the Kaum Muda educated group. Their activities
and programs were to some degree influenced by developments in
Java, such as the increasing popularity of political parties,
the intensification of conflict between the Muhammadijah and
the PSII, and the deepening division between the Islamic reform-
ists and traditionalist organizations. By the end of 1930, the
Kaum Muda educated group was also being affected by the return
of students from the Middle East and of several perantau who
had been active in politics in Java. These people radicalized
Minangkabau political parties, engaged in a search for a suit-
able ideology and laid the groundwork for the reformation of
religious schools.
Opposition to the Guru Ordinance
The Guru Ordinance was a new version of a similar regula-
tion first issued in 1905 and applied in Java and Madura.
According to the 1905 statute, "any native non-Christian priest"
must have a teaching license from the "native chiefs" before he
could give religious instruction. Religious teachers must keep
lists of their pupils and the regent, or other chief, could con-
trol the religious schools.1 The government hoped thereby to
supervise the activities of the independent religious teachers
(kiai}, who in the past had been the major challengers of secu-
lar authority. This infringement upon the activities of reli-
gious schools faced a crucial test when the Muhammadijah and
the SI began to expand in the mid-1910's. Both organizations
continuously demanded that the government repeal the 1905 Guru
Ordinance. Nevertheless, the government felt that the ordinance
had proved effective in Java, and, therefore, in 1920, it pre-
pared to extend the regulation to the Outer Islands.
After the 1915 uprisings in Minangkabau, local authorities
pressed for extension of the Guru Ordinance to West Sumatra.
Without such control, they believed, the fanatic religious
1. Staatsblad 1915, no. 550.112
teachers could, continue to manipulate people's grievances.2 Van
Ronkel, who arrived several months after the uprising, also
recommended the implementation of a teachers' ordinance in
Minangkabau.3
The new ordinance was finally passed in 1925. It stipu-
lated that: "Anyone wishing to give instruction on the Moham-
medan religion to persons other than his immediate family should
inform the regent, or patih, in Java or the district chief in
the Outer Regions." The notice should be submitted on a special
form supplied by the district office. Although official permis-
sion was no longer required, the prospective teacher should have
a letter of registration from the district office.4
From the outset, the Islamic organizations viewed the new
ordinance as one more infringement upon Islamic prerogatives.
There was in fact no real difference between "a license" and "a
letter of registration." Both were issued by the district of-
fice or the regent's office. The new Guru Ordinance, more im-
portantly, did not differentiate between "education" and "preach-
ing." The expression "anyone wishing to give instruction on
Mohammedan religion" could include the Quranic recitation teacher
(guru mengadji) as well as the religious preacher (muballigh).
In effect, the ordinance could encompass the whole process of
disseminating religious knowledge and religious propaganda,
making it subject to government control. The ordinance further
stipulated that a religious teacher should keep complete data
on his pupils and the curriculum of his school; this imposed a
large burden on him. In December 1926, the Bogor Al-Islam Con-
gress called by the PSI rejected the new Guru Ordinance. At
Muhammadijah's Seventeenth Congress in February 1928, members
re-emphasized their opposition to the ordinance. Rejecting the
government's argument that Muslims would also benefit from the
measure because it would improve the quality of religious teach-
ing, the Muhammadijah Congress argued that the regulation ob-
structed the spread of Islamic knowledge and, moreover, it im-
peded the development of Islam itself. According to a congress
resolution, Muslims in the Indies should be granted "a consider-
able measure of freedom in spreading Islamic teachings."5
2.	Note from the Assistant Resident of Batipuh/Pariaman included
in Resident LeFebvre's letter to the Governor-General, Pa-
dang, January 27, 1916, no. 1186, Verbaal June 15, 1916,
no. 41.
3.	van Ronkel, "Rapport," Verbaal April 4, 1916, no. 4.
4.	Staatsblad 1925, no. 219.
5.	Resolution of the Muhammadijah Congress, Jogjakarta, Febru-
ary 1928, Mailrapport 1003x/'28.113
According to the central government plan, the timing and
method of implementation of the ordinance in the Outer Islands
should be determined by particular local conditions. In January
1927, for example, the Guru Ordinance was implemented in Atjeh,
East Sumatra, Riau, Palembang, Tapanuli, Minahasa and Lombok.
In Minangkabau, local opposition to the ordinance had begun
after 1926, when the central government first announced its in-
tentions. Opposition had intensified after the Muhammadijah
Congress of 1928. When Sutan Mansjur visited Minangkabau after
attending the conference, he told his father-in-law Hadji Rasul
about the expected consequences of any attempt to introduce the
Guru Ordinance in West Sumatra. He said it would deprive reli-
gious teachers of their freedom to propagate their faith.6 The
need for urgency in mounting a concerted opposition increased
after the representative of the Office for Native Affairs in
Sumatra, Dr. de Vries, began a campaign to persuade religious
teachers to accept the ordinance.
On June 14, 1928, Hadji Rasul invited some twenty Kaum Muda
ulama and their former students to a closed meeting in the surau
of Sjech Djambek in Bukittinggi. After examining the possible
implications of the ordinance, they decided to organize opposi-
tion to it.7 The younger participants would visit all parts of
Minangkabau in order to contact religious teachers and invite
them to a general meeting planned for August.
From mid-June, the Kaum Muda ulama and their assistants
contested with de Vries for the support of local religious
teachers. In his report, de Vries stated that in June he had
initially gained the support of religious teachers in Lubuk
Sikaping, Sawah Lunto, Muara Labuh, Balai Selasa and Kerintji.
But in the Padang area and in heartland regions, such as Paja-
kumbuh, Padang Pandjang and Batu Sangkar, the Kaum Muda ulama
had great influence. In these areas, neither religious teachers
nor nagari heads would give a definite answer. They asked de
Vries for three months in which to think it over. In early
July, several important religious teachers in Bukittinggi seemed
to have accepted the proposed Guru Ordinance, but, by the
6.	Hamka, Aj ahku, pp. 150-151.
7.	Peringatan (Verslag) dari "Madj elis Permoesjawaratan Oelama
Minangkabau" Membitjarakan "Goeroe Ordonnantie" pada Tanggal
T9~ Agoestoes 1928 dan ^Madjelis Permoesjawaratan Oelama0 pada
Tanggal 4 Nopember 1928 Menerima Verslag Perdjalanan Oetoe^
san Menghadap Toean Gouverneur Generaal [A. Emran Djamil §
H. A. Karim Amrullah, eds.J (Fort de Kock: n.p., 1928),
pp. 1-2. On the preparations see Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 151-
152.114
end of the month, they had begun to waver again.8
At the end of July, the opposition gained new momentum
after the visit of a Javanese Muhammadijah leader. He spoke
widely about the ill effects of the 1905 ordinance and the even
more serious consequences that might result from the new Guru
Ordinance.9 On July 19, the Committee for a Conference of Ulama
in Minangkabau (Comite Permusjawaratan Ulama Minangkabau) was
formed under the chairmanship of Hadji Abdul Madjid. He also
established a local religious council consisting of the Kaum
Muda and Kaum Tua ulama in Manindjau.10
The Conference of Ulama in Minangkabau was held on August
19, 1928, in the surau of Sjech Djambek. About 800 Kaum Muda
and Kaum Tua religious teachers from all parts of Minangkabau
attended, representing some 115 religious and local organiza-
tions.11 Dr. de Vries, several high Dutch officials and other
government representatives also attended the conference. The
big attendance at the conference enabled Hadji Rasul and its
other promoters to overcome the initial setback they had re-
ceived when Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, the chairman of the PGAI, and
other influential ulama had announced their support for the
Guru Ordinance.
The speeches delivered at the conference were highly emo-
tional and attacked several ulama who were still wavering about
their stand on the ordinance. Some influential Kaum Tua ulama,
such as Sjech Djamil of Djaho and Sjech Arrasuli of Tjandung,
who reportedly leaned towards approval of the ordinance, left
the conference in dismay. A certain Chatib Maharadja, one of
the earliest opponents of the religious Kaum Muda in Padang in
the early 1910's, was shouted down when he suggested that the
8.	Dr. de Vries' report to the Resident and to the Office for
Native Affairs, Fort de Kock, September 5, 1928, no. 41/
secret, Mailrapport 966x/'28.
9.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 2de kwartaal, 1928, Mail-
rapport 1173x/'28.
10.	In August 1927, Hadji Abdul Madjid and Hadji Muhammad Siddik
(a Muhammadijah leader from Bukittinggi) formed a provi-
sional committee to work for the establishment of a Minang-
kabau religious council (raad agama) in Bukittinggi. Tjaja
Soematra, August 23, 1927.
The chairman of the Manindjau council was Hadji Hasan
Basri, with Hadji Abdul Madjid as vice-chairman. Tj aj a
Soematra, August 10, 1928.
11.	Peringatan "Madjelis Permoesjawaratan," p. 4.115
ordinance should be accepted temporarily. Hadji Rasul made a
strong emotional speech which discussed the dangers of disunity
among the ulama and warned of the threat against Islam. As a
result, the Conference finally accepted a resolution which re-
jected the ordinance.12
The resolution (kebulatan) stated that it was obligatory
for all Muslims to offer religious instruction and that there
was no way of avoiding this obligation. It warned that the
Guru Ordinance might undermine the relationship between the
government and the Muslim community. "The kind of Islam of the
ummat Islam in the West Coast of Sumatra does not disturb public
order," and even if a disturbance occurred, many measures al-
ready existed in the penal code which could be applied. The
statement concluded: "It is obvious and clear that the Guru
Ordinance will eventually weaken the freedom of the Islamic
religion."13
Since the ordinance was seen not merely as a question of
the freedom of religious schools but also as a threat to Islam
as a whole, the conference decided that a delegation of reli-
gious and adat leaders should be sent to Batavia. Hadji Abdul
Madjid, the chairman of the conference, and Datuk Singo Mangkuto,
the chairman of the small adat party in the Danau sub-district,
were elected as delegates. On the day he was selected, Datuk
Singo Mangkuto wrote to the Governor-General requesting an
audience. Writing as a penghulu rather than a religious scholar,
he explained that the Minangkabau people were by nature easily
upset whenever the central government introduced new decrees,
particularly if they sensed these might be to their disadvan-
tage. He reminded the Governor-General of the scattered anti-
tax rebellions in 1908 and of the cruel "pacification campaign
which wounded the hearts of the people" after the 1927 rebellion.
For a hundred years the ummat Islam in Minangkabau
has had no freedom in its home country. It has had
to endure different kinds of suffering because of the
numerous burdens put upon its shoulders by the central
government.
Protesting against the very presence of a colonial government,
Datuk Singo Mangkuto asserted:
The Islamic religion is the religion of Allah. For
this reason, no single temporal power can dominate it.
12.	The meeting is described fully in Alfian, "Islamic Modern-
ism," pp. 429-441.
13.	The text of the resolution is contained in an appendix to
Peringatan "Madjelis Permoesjawaratan."116
He repudiated government policy which he said tried to divide
the penghulu from the ulama, a policy based on the fallacy that
adat and religion were separable.
The Islamic religion is the soul of adat; adat is
only the body. So it must be clear to Your Excellency
that body and soul cannot be separated.14
Datuk Singo Mangkuto had in effect expanded the scope of the
opposition by representing it as a protest against the presence
of the colonial regime itself. The opposition to the Guru
Ordinance had become, as a commentator put it with a little
exaggeration, a kind of "small-scale holy war {perang sabil)
for the Minangkabau."15 This was the prevailing mood as the
delegation left for Batavia in September 1928.
An intense suspicion about the government's true intentions
was a major contributing factor to the opposition against the
Guru Ordinance. "The only desire of a kafir government," a
young Muhammadijah leader bluntly told de Vries, "is the repres-
sion of Islam."16 This suspicion spread, fired by the personal
influence of Hadji Rasul and channeled through the network of
Kaum Muda schools. From the day he had learned about the Guru
Ordinance, Hadji Rasul was determined to oppose it at any cost.
He was, indeed, the "spiritual father" of the opposition move-
ment, and through him, the Danau sub-district became the hard
core of the movement.17 The conference was clearly dominated
by ulama from this region, and, significantly, both Hadji Abdul
Madjid and Datuk Singo Mangkuto came from there. The numerous
Thawalib and Dinijah schools along with the expanding Muhamma-
dijah school system provided the instrument for spreading the
opposition movement. On the other hand, in the district of
Bukittinggi, where the penghulu were very powerful, religious
14.	Letter of Datuk Singo Mangkuto to the Governor-General,
Fort de Kock, August 19, 1928, Mailrapport 1001x/'28. The
Assistant Resident sent a letter suggesting that theoreti-
cally Datuk Singo Mangkuto could not represent the "adat
group" as he had not been elected by either representatives
of the adat councils or the adat parties. Letter of
September 3, 1928, no. 98/secret, Mailrapport 966x/'28.
15.	Fadjar Asia, September 27, 1928 in Overzicht van de
Inlandsche Pers, 39/1928, pp. 14-15.
16.	Report of de Vries, Mailrapport 966x/'28.
17.	Ibid.; Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 3de kwartaal, 1928,
Mailrapport 117 3x/'28.117
schools schools had been under the direction of the adat coun-
cils since the early 1920’s. Here the Guru Ordinance provision
that religious teachers must register at the district office
was seen by the penghulu as an encroachment upon their own
newly-acquired power.
The appointment of de Vries and the manner in which he con-
ducted his "investigation" also damaged the government cause.
Before his arrival, a local newspaper reported that he was an
investigator "whose work is to spy on religious and political
trends on the West Coast of Sumatra."18 De Vries was never
able to overcome this initial image or establish good communi-
cations with Minangkabau ulama. Any serious effort to win the
cooperation of the ulama also backfired, because then he was
accused of ignoring the penghulu.19 Though a good Arabist and
an honest administrator, de Vries was handicapped by his ambigu-
ous position; despite his position in Djakarta at the liberal
Office for Native Affairs, in West Sumatra he was attached to
the office of the Resident, a man who had always been suspicious
of the Kaum Muda group.
The Conference of the Ulama demonstrated that de Vries had
lost the contest with Hadji Rasul for influence over the reli-
gious teachers. Realizing that under the circumstances the Guru
Ordinance could not be imposed, Resident Gonggrijp acted immedi-
ately, because he did not want the Kaum Muda religious teachers,
the initiators of the conference, to benefit from any delay.
Three days after the conference, he sent a circular letter to
all assistant residents, controleur and district chiefs, in
which he instructed them to inform the people that the postpone-
ment of the ordinance had nothing to do with the protest meeting
of the Kaum Muda ulama. "According to my mind," Resident
Gonggrijp wrote, "it is better to explain [to the people] through
the nagari heads that the government has no intention of with-
drawing from [eventual] introduction of the Guru Ordinance."20
The Resident’s circular was unexpected, because implemen-
tation of the Guru Ordinance depended entirely on the Governor-
General. How could the Resident anticipate postponement while
emphatically stressing its eventual introduction? In an article
in December 1925, Schrieke warned the government that it should
consider carefully the difficulties that might arise from the
18.	Quoted by van der Plas, "Gegevens," p. 49.
19.	Peringatan "Madjelis Permoesjawaratan," pp. 23-24.
20.	Circular of the Resident, Fort de Kock, August 22, 1928,
no. 6244/17, Mailrapport 64x/'28.118
application of the Guru Ordinance to Minangkabau.21 Later,
while chairman of the investigation commission examining the
rebellion of 1927, Schrieke criticized the fact that in several
places--apparently in the Bukittingi district--it was decreed
that a prospective teacher should ask the permission of the
penghulu before opening his school. Schrieke again cautioned
that tactless introduction of the Guru Ordinance might lead to
disaffection among the religious teachers.22 To inquire into
the possibilities of promulgating the regulation in Minangkabau,
Gobde of the Office for Native Affairs visited there in February
1928. His visit convinced him that the ordinance could create
serious problems. In his report to the Governor-General, he
stated that there were twelve regions in which the Guru Ordi-
nance was still not in force: the West Coast of Sumatra, Bangka,
Billiton, Djambi, Bengkulen, Lampung, Southeast and Southwest
Borneo, Bali, Celebes, Maluku and Timor. Information from these
areas was not complete. Gobee proposed, however, that Djambi,
Bengkulen and West Sumatra should be temporarily exempted. In
Djambi, the authority of the chief religious functionaries still
needed to be assessed, as did the extent of the influence exer-
cized by religious teachers. The religious situation in Beng-
kulen was unstudied. Echoing the warnings of Schrieke, Gobee
suggested that West Sumatra needed further investigation and
deliberation.23 The suggestion was approved by the Director of
Education, and the Governor-General also seemed to agree with
it. On June 11, through the First Government Secretary, the
Governor-General instructed the Resident of the West Coast of
Sumatra to inquire about the "possibilities and advantages" of
implementing the ordinance in his region. The Secretary warned
that no mention should be made that the ordinance might be
introduced on the West Coast.24 The resulting de Vries investi-
gation, as we have noted earlier, intensified the opposition
movement.
The opposition movement started before the central govern-
ment had arrived at a decision. The Office for Native Affairs
was itself divided on the issue. Gobee, in spite of his warning
against hasty introduction of the ordinance, in principle,
21.	B. Schrieke, "De Islam op Sumatra," Koloniaal Weekblad, 25,
No. 53 (December 31, 1925), pp. 4-6.
22.	Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, pp. 158-159.
23.	"Letter of Gobee, Weltevreden, May 19, 1928, no. J/162
secret" and "Approval of the Director of Education, May 31,
1928, no. Ax 21/1/8 secret," Mailrapport 1001x/’28.
24.	"First Government Secretary H. A. Helb, Weltevreden, June
11, 1928, no. 237 secret," Mailrapport 608x/'28.119
favored it. Another adviser, van der Plas, strongly argued
against the ordinance.25 Because of this indecisiveness on the
part of the central government, the opposition movement won the
battle. The movement lived up to the predictions that the Guru
Ordinance would encounter strong objection. In October 1928,
when Hadji Abdul Madjid and Datuk Singo Mangkuto had their audi-
ence with Governor-General de Graeff, they were told their trip
had not been necessary.
The government has not made a decision and it is also
in no hurry to decide whether or not the Guru Ordi-
nance should be introduced on the West Coast of Suma-
tra.
The Governor-General explained that de Vries' task was only to
discover the opinions of the Minangkabau people.26
From the point of view of the central government, the
Governor-General was telling the delegates the truth. But the
way in which de Vries handled his task, combined with the circu-
lar sent by Resident Gonggrijp, convinced the opposition leaders
that the government was indeed preparing the way for introduc-
tion of the ordinance. The Governor-General’s remarks were
interpreted as signs that the opposition had achieved a complete
victory. Overnight, the issue of the Guru Ordinance developed
as a new "political myth" in Minangkabau history, a myth in
which, under the guidance of the Kaum Muda ulama, the Minangka-
bau people had scored a great victory.27 This "myth" influenced
25.	In a report to the Governor-General, van der Plas stated
that the Guru Ordinance was practically "worthless" (waar-
deloos). Mailrapport 205x/'31. In a later lecture to the
Indisch Genootschap, he said that: "The overburdened civil
servants know that the ordinance is worthless, that no in-
flammatory nor dangerous propaganda can be detected by using
the ordinance." van der Plas, "Mededeelingen," p. 268.
26.	First Government Secretary H. A. Helb's letter to the Resi-
dent of the West Coast of Sumatra, October 15, 1928, no.
407 secret, Mailrapport 1001x/'28; Peringatan "Madjelis
Permoesj awaratan," pp. 24-25.
27.	Two examples of this interpretation are: Hamka, Aj ahku, p.
153 and Thaib, Hadji Djalaluddin, p. 22. Influenced by
Hamka's evaluation, Benda writes, "The reformist agitation
finally succeeded in forcing the authorities to suspend the
ordinance on the West Coast of Sumatra." The Crescent and
the Rising Sun, p. 76. Deliar Noer is more cautious, say-
ing only, "The Government indeed withdrew its plan for the
promulgation of the ordinance in the Minangkabau area."
"Rise and Development," p. 290. Bouman mentions only that120
the later course of the Minangkabau political movement. The
psychological effect of the opposition movement was intensified
by other government actions which were considered direct af-
fronts to Islam. During this period, the local administration
arrested Sjech Thaher Djalaluddin, one of the earliest pioneers
of Islamic modernism in the Malay World, and confiscated several
books written by Sjech Thantawi Jauhari, a reformist Egyptian
ulama.
In March 1928, Sjech Thaher, a Minangkabau ulama who had
been living in Malaya, returned home to visit his family and to
take his wife back with him. On arrival in Bukittinggi, how-
ever, he was immediately arrested and charged with having once
been a communist conspirator.28 Resident Gonggrijp proposed
that the old ulama be exiled to Digul in New Guinea. Sjech
Thaher’s arrest created a legal problem because he was a British
protected subject. It also particularly offended the majority
of Minangkabau religious teachers. Although he had never con-
cealed his distaste for the Dutch government, Sjech Thaher
strongly opposed the communist movement. The ulama saw Thaher’s
arrest as proof positive that the government was out to perse-
cute Islam. After the Office for Native Affairs refuted the
charges against Sjech Thaher, the Attorney-General ordered his
release on August 22, three days after the ulama conference.
But he had to leave Minangkabau immediately. It was his last
visit to his birthplace.
While the movement against the Guru Ordinance was rapidly
gaining strength, the local administration confiscated the
Quranic commentary written by Sjech Thantawi Jauhari (AZ Jawahir
fi Tafsir Al Quran At Karim) and his book on the Quran and mod-
ern science (AZ Quran wa’l’ulm Asjryiah) . According to de
Vries, these books, particularly the first one, were very
nationalistic and anti-Western in tone. Since the Guru Ordi-
nance was not yet in force, continued circulation of these books
might cause an unchecked growth of anti-Western feeling among
the people. The seizure instantly caused an uproar among the
Kaum Muda followers. Although the books were in fact not used
the ordinance encountered strong opposition. Enige
Beschouwingen, p. 82.
28. The legal basis for the arrest was a file left by the for-
mer Assistant Resident of Agam which listed Sjech Thaher
as one of the "communist conspirators." Verbaal September
14, 1927, X 14. The fact that Sjech Thaher had helped any
Minangkabau who came to Malaya, even if they were political
fugitives, heightened government suspicions of him. The
correspondence on his case is contained in: Mailrapport
573x/’28, 674x/’28 and 906x/'28.121
as texts in religious schools, their confiscation brought accu-
sations that the government wanted to "poison the ummat Islam."29
Again the central government had to intervene. Van der Plas
argued that the confiscation was unwarranted and even tarnished
the Dutch image in the Middle East. The central government in-
structed the local administration to cease confiscations.
Against the background of Sjech Thaher's arrest and the
confiscation of religious books, it is no wonder that news about
the victory over the Guru Ordinance caused a sensation. But a
feeling of anxiety that Islam might still be in danger persisted
and was clearly expressed in a meeting on November 4, 1928, in
Sjech Djambek’s surau. Attended by more than 1,500 persons,
the meeting was under the chairmanship of Saalah Sutan Mangkuto,
the Muhammadijah leader. The anti-Guru Ordinance movement had
shown those present that, in the face of the anti-Islamic poli-
cies of the government, Minangkabau unity could be a major force.
Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib, a leader of the Sumatra Thawalib, warned
the audience that "the real intention of the government," no
matter what its form, worked always "to the detriment of Muslims.
Unity among religious teachers, Western-educated persons and
"the custodians of original adat" was therefore essential. The
meeting decided to form a federation embracing all social groups
and organizations in Minangkabau.30
The idea of unity was based on a realization that the
Minangkabau scene was characterized by an unhealthy competition
among the numerous organizations. In order to achieve a con-
certed effort in the fields of "religion, adat, education and
social welfare," the delegates decided to form a strong unified
body. The attempt to create this unified body, however, proved
anti-climactic after the mood of unity which had prevailed in
the latter half of 1928.31 Neither the campaign against the
29.	Kemaoean Zaman, September 1928.
30.	Peringatan "Madjelis Permoesjawaratan," p. 31; Politieke
Politioneel Overzicht, 1928 , Mailrapport 316x/’29.
31.	Between November 1928 and March 1929, three attempts were
made to organize a federation. The first was the Persatuan
Ummat Islam, followed by the Persatuan Minangkabau. In
January the name was changed to Persatuan Kebangsaan Minang-
kabau. This last change weakened the organization by giving
rise to the accusation that it was looking backward toward
regionalism rather than forward to an emerging "Indonesian
unity." Tjaja Soematra, March 25, 1929; Radio, March 6 and
16, 1929; Politieke Politioneel Overzicht"^ lste kwartaal,
Mailrapport 570x/'29; and (particularly on Persatuan Ke-
bangsaan) Hamka, Sedjarah Minangkabau, p. 45.122
Guru Ordinance nor the rising feeling that Islam was being
threatened could end the fragmentation of organizational life.
On the contrary, they encouraged the radical tendencies in the
Islamic nationalist movement. The Guru Ordinance and other re-
ligious issues contributed to the expansion of Muhammadijah, to
the emergence of the PSII branch, and the reunification of the
Sumatra Thawalib.
The Establishment of the PSII
The opposition to the Guru Ordinance released the hitherto
suppressed anti-government feelings created by government perse-
cution of the remnants of the communist movement. On their
visit to Java, Hadji Abdul Madjid and Datuk Singo Mangkuto ob-
served the growing success of the non-cooperative parties in
the popular movement. The Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indo-
nesian Nationalist Party), which was formed in July 1927, had
just held its successful first congress under Sukarno. With a
declared prime objective to "end the Netherlands government in
Indonesia," the PNI was growing into a mass party. The Partai
Sarekat Islam (PSI) represented a continuation of the first
Indonesian mass party, the Sarekat Islam, which had competed
with Muhammadijah to become the leader of the Islamic movement. The
PSI was now a radical political party. After the failure of
the Islamic World Congress, planned for Mecca in 1927, the PSI
rapidly abandoned its political pan-Islamist direction and began
to emphasize an Indonesian unity based on Islam. In October
1928, Minangkabau delegates attended a PSI-sponsored ulama con-
gress in Kediri. Although the congress itself failed to achieve
its goal of establishing a unified forum for religious teachers
throughout Indonesia, Datuk Singo Mangkuto and Hadji Abdul
Madjid had an opportunity to study the PSI. Soon after their
return to Minangkabau, they began planning for the establishment
of party branches there.
Datuk Singo Mangkuto was chairman of the Persatuan Adat of
Sungai Batang, and he used this party as his first forum. He
began to introduce the PSI’s political views to the adat party
in his reports of December 2nd and 3rd. In these sessions,
Datuk Singo Mangkuto discussed the vices of colonialism and im-
perialism and proclaimed that Indonesia could not attain progress
until it was liberated from the Dutch.32 The meetings were only
a first step. On December 22, Datuk Singo Mangkuto and Hadji
Abdul Madjid organized the first PSI branch in Sungai Batang.
Its members were mostly former students of the Sumatra Thawalib
32. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 1928, Mailrapport 316x/’28.123
schools in Padang Pandjang and Manindjau. Datuk Singo Mangkuto
became the chairman and Hadji Abdul Madjid was elected as the
adviser.33 On the same day, Hadji Uddin Rahmany, director of
the Sumatra Thawalib in Manindjau, formed a boy scout section
of the party, called the Sarekat Islam Afdeling Pandu (SIAP).
The emergence of the PSI branch in Sungai Batang, however,
resulted in the demise of the Persatuan Adat. Datuk Singo Mang-
kuto, the founder of the adat party, lost interest in it because
he had more freedom for his political activities through the
PSI than through the adat party, which gave priority to social
harmony. Even though the PSI tried to recruit its cadres from
the same social group to which the Muhammadijah appealed for
support, that is, the Kaum Muda educated group, the relationship
between the two organizations was initially very good. The in-
clusion of Datuk Singo Mangkuto as a member of the Muhammadijah
delegation to Java and the organization’s effort to form a
federation of Minangkabau organizations had healed the wounds
caused by the conflict over the election of the nagari chief of
Sungai Batang. This good relationship enabled the two groups
to remain aloof from the controversies between the Muhammadijah
and the PSI central boards which occurred in Java.34 The cor-
diality, however, began to deteriorate with the worsening of
relations between the organizations on Java. In January 1929,
Datuk Singo Mangkuto and the secretary of Muhammadijah in Sungai
Batang went together to Java to attend the national congresses
of their respective organizations. The PSI Congress, held in
late January in Batavia, decided among other things to change
the name of the party to Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII)
in order to indicate its fuller commitment to the Indonesian
33. Members of the executive
Chairman:
Vice-Chairman:
Secretary I:
Secretary II:
Commissioner:
Adviser:
Tjaja Soematra, January
23, 1929.------
board were:
Datuk Singo Mangkuto
H. Uddin Rahmany
Datuk Putih
Darwis Thaib
Sutan Bagindo
Habladin Sutan Maaruf
Sutan Sulaiman
Hadj i Abdul Madj id
16, 1929, and Warta Hindia, January
34. The cordial relationship between the Muhammadijah and the
PSI in Sungai Batang caused Saalah Sutan Mangkuto, the
Muhammadijah leader in Padang Pandjang, to warn the Sungai
Batang branch to avoid further joint activities. Politieke
Politioneel Overzicht, 1st halfjaar, 1929, Mailrapport
793x/’29.124
struggle. The Congress also determined to enforce ’’party disci-
pline"; this forbade PSII members from membership in the Muham-
madijah. This measure ended the chance for resolving disputes
between the Muhammadijah and the PSII amiably. In Sungai Batang,
it not only ended the double membership which some members of
the PSII had enjoyed, but it also reopened direct competition
between the two organizations.35
In order to expand the PSII, Datuk Singo Mangkuto effec-
tively manipulated the anti-government feelings held by the
Manindjau people. His fiery nationalist speeches attracted wide
audiences, and, at the same time, also provoked the authorities.
In June 1929 he was indicted for sedition and subsequently sen-
tenced to two years imprisonment. Shortly after his arrest,
five penghulu from Sungai Batang who were members of the PSII
were also arrested.36 These arrests paralyzed the PSII, then
only in its initial stage of expansion. Hadji Abdul Madjid,
recently elected adviser to the newly reunited Sumatra Thawalib,
shifted his attention to Thawalib activities. Other PSII lead-
ers also joined the Sumatra Thawalib, leaving the PSII under the
leadership of Hadji Uddin Rahmany.
Despite these blows, the PSII in Sungai Batang was not com-
pletely crippled and it remained a forum for political activi-
ties. On May 19, 1929, Duski Samad, a Thawalib graduate, took
the initiative in organizing the Danau perantau in Lampung.37
By the time of the arrests of the PSII leaders, the Lampung
group was dominated by the members of that party. In January
1930, branches of the perantau organization, the Pembela Negeri
(PN, Protectors of the Country), were formed in Padang and
Bukittinggi.
PSII influence in the PN was manifested at the first PN
Congress held in Manindjau, in March 1930, the same time as the
Muhammadijah National Congress. Hadji Abdul Madjid presided
over the PN Congress, which designed an economic program and
discussed the causes of "retarded social development." One
speaker compared the PN's objectives with those of Gandhi's
swadeshi movement in India. Another lectured on the politics
35.	van der Plas, "Gegevens," p. 34.
36.	Warta Hindia, September 7, 1929, and Tjaja Soematra, Septem-
ber 4, 1929. Datuk Singo Mangkuto was convicted for sedi-
tion and accused of violating Articles 154 and 156 of the
Wetboek van Strafrecht. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht,
3de kwartaal, 1929, Mailrapport 1099x/'29.
37.	Sutan Maaruf, Riwajat X Koto Manindjau, p. 1.125
of non-cooperation, while others discussed the possibilities of
boycotting European imports.38
Until the end of 1930, when it began to concentrate its
activities on purely economic matters, the PN served as a channel
for the political activities of PSII members. By the beginning
of 1931, the PN had developed weaving and cooking oil industries,
and its leadership was no longer dominated by PSII members.
With the advent of the economic depression, the PN was forced
to concentrate its efforts on the economic situation. In the
meantime, the PSII had overcome its internal crisis and Permi
also was rapidly expanding its influence.
The Emergence of Permi
The existence of Thawalib schools in various parts of
Minangkabau was a major factor behind the success of Hadji Rasul
and his associates in organizing the religious teachers into a
unified opposition to the Guru Ordinance. Some early proponents
of the anti-ordinance movement, for example, Hadji Djalaluddin
Thaib and Ali Emran Djamil, were teachers or former students of
the Thawalib schools. During the campaign against the Guru
Ordinance, these leaders had the opportunity to intensify their
drive to unify the Thawalib organizations. In January 1928,in
a preparatory meeting, several leaders of the Thawalib of
Padang Pandjang and Parabek agreed to unite the Sumatra Thawalib
schools in one organization. As in 1922, when five Sumatra
Thawalib schools had temporarily united their student organiza-
tions, the new unification plan was motivated by the desire for
a uniform school system and a drastically revised curriculum.
The Sumatra Thawalib Union (Persatuan Sumatra Thawalib) was
formed at a conference held on November 17-19, 1928, in Padang
Pandjang. According to its provisional statutes, the new asso-
ciation would strive "for the expansion of Islamic learning in
order to nurture and vitalize the Islamic soul and spirit." In
addition to standardization of curriculum and textbooks, its
programs were directed toward "establishment and aid to schools
offering Islamic subjects, and advice on subjects useful for
[economic] welfare to be included in the curriculum."39 The
38.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, lste kwartaal, 1930,
Mailrapport 477x/’30.
39.	Perdamaian, 1, No. 1 (January 10, 1929). Conference
speeches contained many appeals for unity among the three
Minangkabau "elites," namely, the Western-educated intel-
lectuals, the religious leaders and the guardians of adat.
Perdamaian, 1, No. 4-5 (February 20, 1929).126
conference decided to study the possibility of including prac-
tical subjects, such as agriculture, commerce and carpentry, as
well as other secular subjects, such as health education, geogra
phy and world history, in the curriculum.
The recognition that such a program required a broad base
of support was clearly reflected in the composition of the
Union’s board of advisers. It consisted of some prominent
Western-educated intellectuals, Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua ulama,
and Basa Bandaro, the leader of the Minangkabau trading communi-
ty in Padang.40 One of its advisers was Abdul Aziz Sutan Kenai-
kan, the director of the Kweekschool Islamijah, a modern teach-
ers' training school in Bukittinggi, whose students included
graduates from Thawalib, Dinijah and Dutch-Native Schools. A
former government agricultural inspector, Aziz was the first
Western-educated intellectual who acted to correct the weakness
of the existing religious school curricula with their over-
emphasis on theological and legal literature. His students
received not just religious and secular instruction but also
practical agricultural training.41 Aziz hoped that, through
this program, he would produce not only teachers but also pro-
moters of economic independence.42 Another Western-educated
40.	The conference elected: Dr. Achmad Saleh, a government
physician; Muhammad Sjafei, founder-director of the INS;
Abdul Aziz Sutan Kenaikan, founder-director of the Kweek-
school Islamijah; Sjech Djamil of Djaho, a Kaum Tua ulama;
and Sjech Ibrahim Musa of Parabek, a Kaum Muda ulama. Most
were unable to accept appointment, however, and in early
1929, a new board was selected, consisting of: Sjech
Ibrahim Musa; Sjech M. Djamil Djambek; Sjech Abbas of
Padang Djapang; Hadji Abdul Madjid; Abdul Aziz Sutan Kenai-
kan; and Basa Bandaro. It is noteworthy that the young
leaders chose Hadji Abdul Madjid, a moderate Kaum Tua ulama
rather than his longtime opponent Hadji Rasul.
41.	In 1925, the school was located in Lubuk Sikaping, in the
northern part of West Sumatra. "Het Moehammedansch Lyceum
te Loeboek Sikaping," Koloniaal Weekblad, 4 (1926), p. 8,
and Parada Harahap, Dari Pantai Kepantai: Perdjalanan ke
Soematra (We1tevredenj n.p., 1926), pp. 110 ff. In 1927
the school was moved to Bukittinggi. Van der Plas termed
Aziz a very promising "young idealist, who should be sup-
ported by the government." "Gegevens," pp. 51-53 and 55.
42.	Aziz wrote that economic dependency had been a factor in
the spread of communism in Minangkabau. It was the duty
of Islamic leaders, therefore, to realize that "in addition
to improving the spiritual life of the Islamic community,
we must also work for the betterment of their economic
life." Tjaja Soematra, November 1928.127
intellectual who worked closely with the Thawalib, though he
preferred to stay outside the organization, was Muhammad Sjafei,
founder of the Indonesisch Nederlandsch School (INS) in Kaju
Tanam.43 Convinced that the existing educational system was
basically uncreative, Sjafei emphasized the harmony of intelli-
gence, skill and art, a harmony which would encourage self-
confidence and instill a strong sense of purpose in the chil-
dren.44 Using their relationship with Westernized educators,
such as Aziz and Sjafei, the Sumatra Thawalib leaders worked to
modernize their own school system and at the same time to bridge
the gap between the young Islamic modernists and Western-edu-
cated intellectuals.
The executive board included Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib as
chairman, Ali Emran Djamil as vice-chairman, and representatives
from the various Thawalib schools, the Dinijah school associa-
tion and the Muhammadijah.45 In general, these leaders, according
to van der Plas, represented the moderate elements. The board
43.	Muhammad Sjafei (1897-1969) was born in West Kalimantan.
He was the adopted son of Marah Sutan. He attended Sekolah
Radja in Bukittinggi from 1908 until his graduation in
1914, and later served as the first teacher at the Batavia
Kartini School. Along with his father, he participated
actively in the Budi Utomo and later the nationalist In-
dische Partij. The two men were the chief promoters of
that party in the Outer Islands. In 1922, he used the
royalties gained from his various books and translations
to travel to Holland. He and his father believed that
their political aspirations could best be gained through
education. On his return from Holland in 1926, Sjafei put
his ideas on education into practice and opened a school
in Kaju Tanam. The speech he gave on this occasion, out-
lining his thoughts on the role of education, is contained
in Soeara Boemipoetera, 2, No. 21 (November 7, 1926).
44.	Sjafei, Arah Aktif (Djakarta: J. B. Wolters, 1953), and
Ag. Sujono, Aliran Baru dalam Pendidikan dan Pengadjaran
(Dj akarta: Harapan Masa, 1965), pp. 142-152.
The first executive board of the Sumatra Thawalib Union was:
Chairman:
Vice-Chairman
Secretary:
Treasurer:
Commissioners
Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib (PGSA)
Ali Emran Djamil (Thawalib of Parabek)
Hadji Sjoeib (Thawalib of Padang
Pandj ang)
Thaher Bey (Dinijah School)
H. Alauddin (Thawalib of Manindjau)
Saalah Sutan Mangkuto (Muhammadijah)
Duski Samad (PSI of Manindjau)
45128
planned to seek government recognition as soon as the statutes
of the Union had been completed, and some favored asking for a
government subsidy.46 Van der Plas' impression of the early
development of the Sumatra Thawalib Union was that it:
.	. . Represents the Islamic-Arabic orientation. It
forms a spiritual power, which must be taken into ac-
count. Its educational quality is very high. It is
predominantly a thinking education [denkonderwijs].
Its leaders feel the need for a formation of a more
orthodox society. . . . The Sumatra Thawalib Union is
under a moderate leadership.47
While working to expand the school network, however, leaders of
the new Union became increasingly involved in a far larger pro-
gram of social reformation based on Islam. This widening scope
of interest was a logical development, because the Union was
partially influenced by PSII and Muhammadijah leaders.
The second Union conference, held in Batu Sangkar on May
20-21, 1929, demonstrated the new, enlarged interests. Specific
plans were made for the improvement of the religious school sys-
tem and the subjects to be included in the new curriculum. The
conference also explored the proper place of the Union in
Minangkabau and in Indonesia as a whole. In assessing the pos-
sibilities for transforming Minangkabau society, the young lead-
ers of Sumatra Thawalib realized that they would face opposition
from adat elements. In closed meetings, the "social reformers"
began to discuss the problems of a colonial government which
supported the adat authorities.48
These deliberations were reflected in the speeches given
subsequently at a mass rally held on May 22. Basing his claim
on the prime function of the penghulu as the protector of reli-
gion, Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib, a penghulu himself, urged adat
guardians to join with the Sumatra Thawalib Union. He reminded
them of the ongoing threats to Islam in Minangkabau. Another
speaker, Duski Samad, stated openly that the goal of the Union
was to become an organization for the whole Indonesian people.
Although the Sumatra Thawalib would not be involved in politics,
it strove toward a unity based on race and religion. Further-
more, according to Samad, the Thawalib schools intended to edu-
cate the youngsters in a spirit of friendship and nationality.
46. van der Plas, "Gegevens," p. 17.
47 . Ibid., p. 54.
48. Roesad, "Nota over de Godsdienstig-Politieke Beweging."129
Ali Emran Djamil elaborated the economic plan of the Sumatra
Thawalib and its effort to improve the people’s welfare.49
In retrospect, it can be seen that the ambivalent nature
of the Sumatra Thawalib Union dated from its first conference.
Conference speeches demonstrated the growing strength of the
notion of Indonesian unity, but, at the same time, they also re-
flected a deep concern for Minangkabau matrilineal society.
These overlapping ideological problems continued to characterize
the activities of the Sumatra Thawalib and its successor, Permi.
The expanding scope of its interests forced the Sumatra
Thawalib to change its organizational structure. At the first
conference, twenty of the existing 39 Thawalib schools became
provisional branches of the organization. By the time of the
second conference, only fifteen branches remained. In some
places, such as Pajakumbuh, the branch was established before
there was a school. In other places, such as Batu Sangkar, the
promoters of the organization were teachers at the Dinijah
schools.50 The core of the organization was formed by the
Thawalib of Padang Pandjang and Parabek, from which many of the
leaders had graduated. In Padang Pandjang, the majority of the
local leaders were also teachers at the school.
In spite of the enlarged program, until early 1930, the
main activities of the Sumatra Thawalib association were directed
toward education.51 It worked closely with the Muhammadijah and
the organization of the Dinijah schools. The Thawalib school in
Bukittinggi, under the leadership of Ali Emran Djamil, began to
introduce practical subjects, such as agriculture and economics,
into its curriculum. Abdul Aziz, the director of the Kweek-
school Islamijah, was also a part-time teacher at the Thawalib
school. In the meantime, the Thawalib leaders continued their
attempts to gain support from the penghulu.52 New forces,
49.	de Vries’ report on the public meeting of the Sumatra Tha-
walib, Fort van der Capellen, Wednesday May 22, 1929, Mail-
rapport 5 8 2x/'29.
50.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 3de kwartaal, 1929, Mail-
rapport 1099x/'29, and ibid., lste halfjaar, 1929, Mail-
rapport 7 9 3x/'2 9.
51.	The government remained suspicious of the Union's true
intentions, and in August 1929, the Assistant Resident of
Lima Puluh Kota and the controleur of Suliki investigated
the madrasah in Pandang Djapang. They found nothing to
substantiate their suspicions. Sinar Soematra, August 9,
1929.
52.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 3de kwartaal, 1929, Mail-
rapport 1099x/’29 .130
however, were beginning to affect the Union.
At the end of 1929, Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib (a "concilia-
tory figure") went to Java for medical treatment, leaving the
Thawalib Union to the leadership of the more aggressive Ali
Emran Djamil.53 Also in this period, a Minangkabau perantau
ulama, Pakih Hasjim, returned home. He had been active in the
famous Indonesische Studieclub in Surabaja, and he came as the
personal emissary of Dr. Sutomo, founder of the club. He wanted
to promote the establishment of a national bank and a national
fund. Although his efforts failed to attract the individualistic
Minangkabau merchants, Pakih Hasjim did achieve a close coopera-
tion with the Thawalib leaders. By the end of 1929, several
Minangkabau student activists from Cairo and Mecca had arrived,
and they also joined the Sumatra Thawalib. In February 1930,
Iljas Jacub, whose activities in the Middle East will be dis-
cussed later, arrived in Padang. Meanwhile, the Sumatra Thawa-
lib had supposedly been purified by the Muhammadijah,which it-
self was experiencing increasing hostility by the local adminis-
tration. In the same period too some Minangkabau perantau
traders who were members of Sukarno’s Nationalist Party attempted
to establish local branches of that party.54
Internal developments in the Sumatra Thawalib Union reached
a climax at the third conference of May 20-21, 1930. It was the
biggest and also the last conference of the Sumatra Thawalib.
Its major decision was the transformation of the Persatuan
Sumatra Thawalib into the Persatuan Muslim Indonesia (initially
abbreviated as PMI, but better known as Permi, Association of
Indonesian Muslims). Membership was open to the public, and a
women’s section was established. Unlike previous Thawalib con-
ferences, this one (later called the First Permi Congress) de-
cided not to seek government recognition.55
53.	Ali Emran Djamil had just broken with his former mentor,
Sjech Ibrahim Musa of the Parabek Thawalib. Djamil had
been a graduate of and then a junior teacher at the Thawa-
lib, but, in early 1929, he had proposed that the three
highest classes be transferred to Bukittinggi in order to
add more secular subjects to the curriculum. Sjech Ibrahim
and some other junior teachers objected, believing it might
lead to a decline of the Parabek school. Ali Emran Djamil
left along with several of his students and established a
new independent Thawalib in Bukittinggi. Tamar Djaja,
"Islam di Indonesia," unpublished manuscript; Politieke
Politioneel Overzicht, 3de kwartaal 1929, Mailrapport
1099x/’29.
54.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, lste kwartaal, 1930, Mail-
rapport 477x/’3O.
55.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 2de kwartaal, 1930, Mail-
rapport 812x/’3 0.131
The influence which the newcomers from Java and the Middle
East exerted on the congress was clearly shown in the major
themes of its platform and their emphasis on the people's eco-
nomic and spiritual development. Pakih Hasjim, for example,
popularized the idea of economic self-help and the formation of
a national bank. An Al-Azhar graduate spoke about the different
kinds of cooperatives. Duski Samad, a PSII leader, focused on
the direct connection between the people's economic backwardness
and the existence of a colonial power. But it was Iljas Jacub,
a newcomer from Cairo, who first formulated the ideological
foundation of Permi. He stated that the progress of life
(kemadjuan kehidupan') could be fully attained only by simultane-
ous economic, spiritual and moral development. He believed
these paralleled the three essential aspects of man's social
life--as an adherent of a religion, a member of a nation, and a
son of a tanah adv (homeland).56 Grounded in this awareness of
the direct relationship between the goal, the progress of life
and the inseparable aspects of social life, Permi based its
struggle on the slogan "Islam and kebangsaan [nationality]."
At its first conference, held on August 5-9 in Pajakumbuh
and attended by six branches, Permi formulated its final sta-
tutes. The preamble to these declared the membership's deter-
mination to "catch up" with the Western World and to participate
in the renaissance of the Eastern World.
Indonesia, which consists of many islands, with its
eighty per cent Muslim population, is a part of the
Eastern World. Basing their struggle on the principle
of Islam and their nationality, they [the Indonesian
Muslims] are striving for progress in order to fight
for [their] human rights [which] are expressed in their
social order and welfare and ddgndty.57
In order to implement its programs, Permi formed departments
for education, enterprises, Islamic propagation and the boy
scouts. It was decided to establish branches throughout Indo-
nesia.
Under the chairmanship of Hadji Abdul Madjid, the Kaum Tua
ulama and adviser to the PSII, the first Permi central board
consisted of persons from different backgrounds. Three of them,
Iljas Jacub, Mansur Daud and Hadji Rasul Hamidy, were new
arrivals from the Middle East; two had already been active in
56.	Pompai, 11 (May/June 1930).
57.	Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Tetangga dari Persatoean Moeslim
Indonesia (Padang: PMI^ 1930) . Tne emphasis is in the
original.132
the PSII; and one was a member of a nationalist party in Java.
The rest were teachers at Thawalib schools. Except for Hadji
Abdul Madjid and Pakih Hasjim, all belonged to the Kaum Muda
educated group and were young men in their late twenties and
early thirties.58
One direct consequence of the dissolution of the Sumatra
Thawalib Union and the formation of Permi was a break with the
leaders of the Muhammadijah and the Dinijah associations.
Whereas the Muhammadijah was striving to eliminate its politi-
cally oriented leaders, Permi was on its way to becoming a
political party. The Dinijah maintained its original course as
a purely educational and school organization. Some of the
Thawalib’s influential advisers also opposed the transformation
to Permi. Basa Bandaro, a financial backer and key adviser of
the Thawalib, initially opposed its dissolution. Some Kaum Muda
ulama, such as Sjech Ibrahim Musa of Parabek, threatened to cut
their ties with the new organization. Nevertheless, in spite
of their generally negative response, the Kaum Muda ulama did
not openly criticize Permi until the middle of 1931. Even Hadji
Rasul, who was known to be very critical about its ideology of
"Islam and kebangsaan," considered it one of "three major Is-
lamic organizations, which are striving as best they can to
attain progress in accordance with the times."59 The neutral
attitude of the Kaum Muda ulama proved a great advantage for
Permi, for it permitted the organization to pursue its plans.
Criticism from the widely respected ulama would have been a
major hindrance.
58
The first executive board of Permi consisted of:
Chairman:
Vice-Chairman:
Secretary:
Treasurer:
Department of
Education:
Department of
Enterprise:
Department of
Islamic Propaganda:
Department of
Boy Scouts:
Hadji Abdul Madjid (PSI of Manindjau)
Iljas Jacub (from Cairo)
Mansur Daud (from Turkey)
Darwis Thaib (PSI of Manindjau)
Hadji Sjuib el Jutusy (Thawalib of
Padang Pandj ang)
Ali Emran Djamil (Thawalib of Bukit-
tinggi)
Pakih Hasjim (Indonesische Studieclub-
Surabaj a)
Hadji Rasul Hamidy (a former activist
in Mecca)
A. Gaffar Ismail (Thawalib of Parabek)
59. The other two were Muhammadijah and the PGAI. From his
book Pedoman Goeroe (1930) as quoted in "Kaoem Moeda di
Minangkabau," Pandji Islam, 11 (March 1941), p. 8896.133
In its expansion drive into the rural areas, Permi often
confronted problems similar to those faced by the Muhammadijah.
Its success in the nagari depended upon its local promoters,
most of whom belonged to the Kaum Muda educated group. Unlike
the Muhammadijah, Permi could use the scattered Sumatra Thawalib
schools as a base of operations. In the towns of the interior,
its influence was spread through public meetings, tabligh, par-
ticipation in various social activities, and infiltration of
the locally based mutual assistance organizations. Similar
methods were also used in towns where the Thawalib did not have
schools.
Dating from its first congress, Permi determined to make
Padang, the Residency capital, the seat of its own headquarters.
This was in line with party desires to achieve a national,
rather than merely local, status. By establishing headquarters
in Padang, the party would also transfer the center of Minang-
kabau political activities from the interior to the coast. As
a first step in this direction, Permi participated in the activ-
ities of existing Padang organizations. In June 1930, for
example, Permi joined in a protest meeting initiated by the
government teachers’ association (PGHB) against a plan to halt
expansion of the HIS.60 Permi's next move was to promote coop-
eration in the activities of the several trade unions, reli-
gious organizations and merchant associations in Padang. In
September, therefore, Permi sponsored the establishment of a
Committee for the Creation of Unity, with the immediate goal of
building a permanent national meeting hall. This failed because
the Padang traders proved uninterested given the deepening im-
pact of the economic depression. Permi tried another approach
through individual efforts by its leaders. In the same month,
Chairman Hadji Abdul Madjid tried to build a surau for the non-
Padang settlers. But because he started collecting contribu-
tions without first getting the necessary government approval,
he was forced to abandon the plan and pay a fine. Another
60. In 1927, Governor-General de Graeff had established a
Hollandsch-Inlandsche Onderwijs Commissie under the chair-
manship of Prof. Schrieke. Their report, submitted in 1930
recommended the suspension of plans to expand the HIS sys-
tem. The PGHB viewed this as an obstacle to further educa-
tional development and also saw that in practice the freeze
would hamper job and promotion opportunities for its own
members. Muhammadijah, on the other hand, supported the
commission's recommendations because it believed they would
benefit the organization's own "secular" school system.
The Taman Siswa likewise favored the suspension, believing
it would stop the "denationalization process" of Indonesian
youth carried out in the HIS. Politieke Politioneel Over-
zicht, 2de kwartaal, 1930, Mailrapport 812x/'3O.134
unsuccessful individual approach was that of Iljas Jacub and
Pakih Hasjim who attempted to form a cooperative.
At first Permi could only indirectly influence the Padang
Western-educated youth, who were organized into the Jong
Islamieten Bond (Young Muslims' Union). At the end of September,
however, Permi announced the establishment of a Padang branch
and it began a massive effort to assert its influence by holding
a series of mass rallies and issuing publications. Major fig-
ures of Permi addressed almost every rally. The effort culmi-
nated in the formation of a Committee for Islamic Celebrations
under Permi domination. In December 1930, before the celebra-
tion of the Prophet’s Ascension, Permi seized the initiative
and organized a permanent committee for religious celebrations.
By so doing, Permi managed to surpass Muhammadijah, the biggest
Kaum Muda organization. The Muhammadijah did not have a repre-
sentative on the Committee, but, as a Kaum Muda organization,
it could not keep aloof from it. The domination of Permi over
the Committee enabled that organization to have the decisive
word in the selection of speakers, design of the agenda, etc.,
for the approaching celebrations. Permi had taken its first im-
portant step toward leadership of the Kaum Muda in Padang.
This success was reinforced by Permi's ability to win the
support of the important Minangkabau merchants in the Pasar
Gadang, Padang. Through Basa Bandaro, the most influential
figure in the trading community, Permi was able to forge a close
relationship with the leadership of the Himpunan Saudagar Indo-
nesia (HSI, Indonesian Merchants' Association). This enabled
Permi to fund its educational program, particularly the estab-
lishment of a modern Islamic college.
By the beginning of 1931, Permi's development had passed
the critical stage. It had successfully established itself in
Padang, and,meanwhile, in the interior it benefited from the
"purification process" in the Muhammadijah. In Pariaman, a
northern coastal town, Permi managed to infiltrate the Kaum Tua.
Administratively and financially, the Thawalib schools re-
mained independent units, but their school programs and their
extra-curricular activities came under the direct control of
the Permi department of education. These numerous Thawalib
schools provided Permi with local leaders and new cadres. In
his annual political report for 1930, the Resident concluded
that: "Permi has become more and more predominant."61 At the
same time, by its slogan "Islam and kebangsaan," Permi had en-
larged its split with the Kaum Muda ulama. Its attempt to
61. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 4de kwartaal, 1930, Mail-
rapport 2 2 8x/'31.135
reconcile the two different ideologies, Islam and nationalism,
was to make it a target for attacks by other Indonesian Muslim
organizations.
The Regrouping of the Kaum Tua Schools
On May 20, 1930, a week before the Persatuan Sumatra Thawa-
lib was transformed into Permi, the prominent Kaum Tua ulama
finally succeeded in uniting their schools or madrasah under a
single organization, the Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah (PTI,
Association of Islamic Schools). This represented the climax
of a two-year effort to unify the school system and establish a
common front against the increasingly active Kaum Muda organiza-
tions. Through the formation of the PTI, the Kaum Tua ulama
managed to revive their old organization, the Ittihadul Ulama,
which had rapidly declined since the slackening of the religious
conflict.
On May 5, 1928, five months after the promoters of the
Sumatra Thawalib unification held their conference in Parabek,
Sjech Sulaiman Arrasuli of Tjandung, a prominent Kaum Tua ulama,
took the first step toward the reformation of Kaum Tua religious
schools by copying the Kaum Muda system. He introduced a
"modern" graded school system into his traditional madrasah and
changed the name to Tarbijah Islamijah (Islamic Education). At
the same time, he made the first move toward a unification of
the Kaum Tua schools. In the face of the expanding Muhammadijah
school network and the unification of the Sumatra Thawalib
schools, Sjech Arrasuli believed the Kaum Tua schools needed a
common system and curriculum. His attempts toward the unifica-
tion of the Kaum Tua schools received strong endorsement from
the local administration.62 The effort was intensified after
the campaign against the Guru Ordinance and the emergence of
the Persatuan Sumatra Thawalib. In January 1929, Sjech Djamil
of Djaho, the former leader of Muhammadijah, also renamed his
school Tarbijah Islamijah. From that time on, Sjech Djamil and
Sjech Arrasuli worked closely together. Their cooperation
finally resulted in the convocation of a Kaum Tua conference
and the formation of the PTI.
62. Abdul Rusli A. Wahid (son of a prominent Kaum Tua ulama of
Suliki and himself current chairman of the Kaum Tua party,
Perti) told me that in 1928, he, Sjech Arrasuli and Sjech
Djamil of Djaho were summoned by Assistant Resident Groene-
veldt,who urged them to organize the Kaum Tua and check
the spread of the Kaum Muda activities, particularly the
Thawalib. But the official warned them about involvement
in politics. (Interview, Djakarta, November 1968.)136
At the Kaum Tua conference, held in Tjandung (near Bukit-
tinggi), the Kaum Tua ulama declared a determination to continue
their struggle on behalf of the Shafiite school of law. They
would base their educational program on the preservation and
the strengthening of harmony between "the eternal adat and the
obligatory religious law" {adat nan kawi, sjarak nan Zazirri) .
The promoters of the PTI comprised the last generation of "the
grand tradition" of the Minangkabau madrasah. Each was the per-
sonification of his respective school and the most prominent
Kaum Tua ulama in his region. Because of their prestige, their
close cooperation with the adat authorities, the friendly atti-
tude of the local administration, and the already numerous Kaum
Tua oriented schools, the PTI already included 36 schools by
the end of 1930. By early 1931, it had 30 branches and about
4,000 members.63
The Muhammadijah and Permi leaders were former students of
the Kaum Muda ulama, that is, the second generation of modern-
ists, but the PTI leaders were prominent Kaum Tua ulama them-
selves. The personal influence of an ulama in his respective
region determined the success of the PTI in that area. The
character of the PTI as an organization, therefore, was largely
personal and parochial. In his own sphere of influence, the
ulama had remained a key figure to whom minor Kaum Tua religious
teachers and local tarekat leaders owed deference. This per-
sonal and rather authoritarian character of the PTI, however,
weakened its ability to compete with the Kaum Muda organizations
and eventually led to its downfall.
Conclusion
The determination which the Kaum Muda ulama and their asso-
ciates and students displayed in their opposition to the Guru
Ordinance reveals the central position of religious schools in
their lives and activities. The Guru Ordinance issue contributed
to the expansion of the Kaum Muda school network and to the
process of modernization of the religious schools. The cam-
paigns against the Guru Ordinance provided the Muhammadijah with
a good opportunity to expand its own organization and increase
the number of its schools. The Thawalib leaders used the cam-
paign to establish an effective unity of their schools. The
opposition movement accentuated the political side of the Kaum
Muda schools and resulted in a re-emergence of nationalist
political parties in Minangkabau.
63. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 4de kwartaal, 1930, Mail-
rapport , 228x/’31; Gonggrijp, "Memorie," p. 19.137
The Guru Ordinance campaign, however, divided the hereto-
fore united pioneers of the Kaum Muda movement and threatened
to revive the conflict between the Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua ulama.
Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, the most modernist Kaum Muda ulama, be-
lieved in the government’s good intentions because he had had a
close relationship with the authorities since the 1910's. He,
therefore, approved the Guru Ordinance. His acceptance separated
him from his closest friend, Hadji Rasul, the spiritual leader
of the opposition movement, and particularly from the politi-
cally oriented Islamic modernists. The erosion of Hadji Abdul-
lah Ahmad's influence among the graduates of the Kaum Muda
schools became obvious when the latter began preparations for
their Islamic College. Hadji Abdullah Ahmad had collaborated
with the Dutch in establishing his Normal Islam, but the young
Islamic modernists, particularly those who belonged to Permi,
preferred to set up their own school without government help.
The political and divisive character of the Guru Ordinance
was an important factor precipitating the separation. Hadji
Abdullah Ahmad and the "loyal” Kaum Tua ulama believed that the
ordinance would in no way hamper their activities. But Hadji
Rasul and his colleagues along with the young Islamic modernists
did not and could not trust the government, and, in their view,
the ordinance could mean nothing less than a direct assault on
their schools and on their profession as religious teachers and
preachers. They perceived the ordinance as a means to obstruct
them in the pursuit of their religious and social obligations.
Their distrust of government intentions was intensified by
various government actions which were interpreted as signs that
the Dutch were, indeed, trying to persecute Islam.
After the Guru Ordinance campaign, the Kaum Muda organiza-
tions continued to follow similar educational programs, but
each organization displayed its own particular political activi-
ties and views. By the end of 1930, these could be divided into
three categories. First was the PGAI, under the leadership of
Hadji Abdullah Ahmad. It was not involved in politics and it
was considered by the government to be a "loyal organization."
As far as the government was concerned, the PTI of the Kaum Tua
ulama also belonged to this group. Second was the increasingly
moderate Muhammadijah. Supervised by the Central Board in Java
and led by Sutan Mansjur, the organization concentrated its
efforts on "purely" educational and religious matters. Third
was Permi, which rapidly expanded from an educational to a
politically oriented socio-economic organization. Also in this
group was the non-cooperative PSII.
The next period, that between 1931 and the middle of 1933,
includes a continuing search for suitable ideological bases for
struggle among the Kaum Muda educated group as well as a time
of increasing fundamentalist attitudes among the Kaum Muda138
ulama. The period is characterized by a proliferation of types
of political activities, an expansion of private schools and
the modernization of religious schools. In this period, Western
educated intellectuals who had been active in the nationalist
political movement in Java tried to extend their influence in
Minangkabau. Permi meanwhile spread its influence to other
parts of Sumatra and to Java. In Minangkabau, the two and one-
half year period was a time when the newcomers from the Middle
East, particularly from Cairo, became leaders in the nationalist
struggle and in educational development.CHAPTER VI
POLITICIANS AND EDUCATORS
The close relationship between schools and politics, both
conceived as means to national independence, stemmed from the
nature of orthodox Islamic modernism. The drive for a return
to the original sources of religion and the appeal for rational-
ity in religious belief led the students to question their own
social and political environment. The Kaum Muda religious
schools became the mechanism for establishing direct contact
with the population at large. The success of an organization
was very often dependent upon the number and quality of its
schools. This mutual dependence between the schools and the
social, religious or political reformers explains the easy trans
formation of a school organization into a political party and
conversely the need for organizations to have their own schools.
Dissension among the Kaum Muda educated group was deter-
mined more by different senses of urgency rather than any doc-
trinal disagreements, by personal inclinations rather than con-
flicts of loyalties. The "purification" of Muhammadijah and
the increasing politicization of Permi clearly illustrate the
vague border separating the political and the educational activ-
ities of the Kaum Muda educated group. Similar characteristics
marked the extra-curricular activities of the Indonesian and
Malayan students (called Jawah by the Arabs) in Cairo in the
1920's. While pursuing their studies at the various educational
institutions, particularly Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the
students became involved in the politics of national independ-
ence. Most of the group, led by Mahmud Junus, a Minangkabau,
and Faturrahman, a Javanese, prepared to return home as teachers
and religious reformers. Muchtar Lutfi and Iljas Jacub were
leaders of a group which planned to join the political national-
ist struggle at home. They took part in the Egyptian independ-
ence movement as students in Cairo.
The interaction and competition between these two groups
of students was influential in the course of Minangkabau politi-
cal and educational development in the early 1930's.
Minangkabau Student Activities in Cairo
Iljas Jacub arrived in Cairo late in 1923. He was born in
1902, the son of a trader from Asam Kumbang, in the Painan dis-
trict, on the southern coast of Minangkabau. He graduated from
139140
the second class school in 1916. For about a year, Iljas worked
as an apprentice clerk at the Ombilin coal mine in Sawah Lunto.
For three years afterward, he studied religion in a madrasah in
Koto Merapak. In 1921, he went to Mecca where he studied for
two years. He then continued his education at Al-Azhar. Iljas
arrived in Cairo just after Djanan Thaib,1 a Minangkabau student
at the university, had organized the Indonesian-Malayan students
into their own organization, the Djamiah el Chairijah el Djawah
(Welfare Society of Jawah Students).2 Iljas was elected as its
secretary.
The Welfare Society was a mutual assistance organization
designed to improve the living conditions of the students and
to help them in their studies. Its establishment had been
motivated by the poor conditions which prevailed at the riwak
at Jawah (compound of Jawah students). Al-Azhar had allotted
the compound to them but it proved unsanitary, dirty and gener-
ally unsuitable for study. Food was also far from adequate.3
1.	Djanan Thaib was the first Jawah student to receive the
highest degree offered by Al-Azhar. He was born in Sarik
(near Bukittinggi) in 1891. He graduated from the second
class school in 1904 and lived as a traveling urang siak
until 1911 when he went to Mecca to study. In 1919, he was
admitted to the seventh grade of Al-Azhar and he graduated
in June 1924.
2.	The Jawah compound established its first student organiza-
tion, the Djamiah Setia Peladjar (Students’ Association) in
1913. It was headed by Sjech Ismail, a Minangkabau ulama
from Padang and the head of the student compound. Sjech
Ismail (1870-1930) had been in Cairo since 1894. Verbaal
January 5, 1915, no. 7, and February 1, 1915, no. 38.
The other members of the executive board included stu-
dents from North Sumatra, Palembang, Sambas, Banten, Solo,
Surabaja, Singapore and Patani. The Djamiah was shortlived.
It suffered a profound crisis in January 1916 after a stu-
dent from Palembang killed two others, from Minangkabau and
Bandjarmasin. Verbaal May 12, 1926, and February 25, 1926.
3.	In early 1900, Al-Azhar assigned a compound, called a riwak,
to the Jawah students, where they could live and study under
the guidance of a university-appointed supervisor. An
Egyptian observer reported in a December 1924 issue of the
Arabic journal Hadramaut (published in Surabaja) that condi-
tions in the riwak werepoor. Quoted by R. Kern, Adviser
for Native Affairs, in a letter to the Governor-General,
Weltevreden, June 20, 1925, no. 597, Mailrapport 76x/’25.141
The activities of the Society were greatly intensified in 1925
when a number of new students arrived, bringing the total mem-
bership to about two hundred.* * * 4 The boom in rubber in Malaya
and coffee in Sumatra plus a general economic improvement in
the Indies undoubtedly enabled more students to come to Cairo.
One of the new arrivals was Mahmud Junus; unlike the major-
ity of the Jawah students, he was already an experienced teacher
and writer. Mahmud was born in 1900 in Sungajang (Batu Sangkar)
the son of an adat religious functionary, imam adat. He studied
religion as a child under the guidance of Sjech Thaib Umar, a
pioneer of the Islamic modernist movement. His secular educa-
tion was limited to attendance at the volksschool. In 1915, he
had become an assistant to the teacher. After Sjech Thaib Umar
died in 1920, Mahmud was one of three teachers appointed by the
nagari. In 1922, he began to translate the Quran into Malay;
he then published it in serial form. He wrote several elemen-
tary school textbooks, among them the Hikagat Nabi Muhammad
(History of the Prophet Muhammad), and a guidebook for prayer.
In the meantime, he served as an editor of Al-Basgiv, a journal
published by his madrasah. At the insistence of his maternal
uncle, a rich merchant, Mahmud eventually continued his study
abroad. He went to Cairo because his late teacher had told him
that there was nothing new he could study in Mecca.5 He en-
rolled in Al-Azhar, and a year later he received the alamiyah
degree, conferred on foreign students who fulfilled all the re-
quirements except Arabic. In 1926 he was admitted to the Arabic
Department of the Darul Ulum in Cairo, the first college to
combine secular and religious subjects.
Soon after his arrival in Cairo, Mahmud Junus was elected
one of the first editors of the Welfare Society publication,
Seroean Azhar (The Call of Azhar), first issued in September
1925. The director of the journal was Raden Faturrahman, vice-
president of the Society. The editor-in-chief was Djanan Thaib,
the president of the Society. Other members of the editorial
board included Iljas Jacub, founder of the journal, and two
Malay students, Abdul Wahab Abdullah and M. Idris al-Marbawi.
The real brain behind the journal was Iljas Jacub, for after
publication of the first issue, Djanan Thaib became only a
figurehead. He left Cairo for Europe in order to contact the
4. In 1925, another 27 Malay students came to Cairo, which
brought the total to about 80. William R. Roff, The Origins
of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Ilmu, 1967), p~-
88. The total number of Indonesian students registered at
the Dutch consulate was about 150. R. Kern letter, Welte-
vreden, November 23, 1925, Mailrapport 1134x/’25.
5
Interview with Prof. Mahmud Junus, March 1968, Djakarta.142
Indonesian students in Holland. Although he temporarily returned
to Cairo, he soon moved to Mecca. He had been the first Jawah
student to obtain the highest degree granted by Al-Azhar. In
Mecca he founded the Sekolah Indonesia (Indonesian School).
Iljas Jacub led Seroean Azhar until he resigned in 1927 .
The objective of SeroeanAzhar was "to promote knowledge,
progress and unity among Indonesian [and Malayan] students in
Egypt." Its contents clearly reflected the mood of the students
at that time. It appealed for progress, and displayed an anti-
colonial nationalism. The incipient nationalist feeling was
present already in the first editorial. Written by Mahmud
Junus, it urged the students to concentrate on their studies
for the benefit of the fatherland and to lay a solid foundation
for unity among the people of Sumatra, Java, Borneo and Malaya.6
This same attitude was also reflected in the students’ activ
ities. Dutch consular reports indicate that almost all student
gatherings from 1926 until 1929 were demonstrations of anti-
Dutch sentiments combined to some extent with criticism of
British colonial power.7 At a lebaran (end of the fasting month)
celebration on April 8, 1929, the Indonesian students used the
occasion to introduce the newly approved national anthem.
Mahmud Junus had translated the anthem, "Indonesia Raja," into
Arabic and distributed it to the Cairo student community.8 The
meeting exuded a spirit of wathan and wathanlah (nation and
nationalism). Like any other student gathering, it had a full
complement of speeches. Some students even discussed the even-
tual independence of Indonesia. The Dutch consul reported that
they acted like "the leaders of the [Egyptian nationalist] Wafd
party."9
Several factors influenced the attitude of the students.
First of all, the Dutch consul took little interest in their
6.	William R. Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in
the 1920's," Indonesia, 9 (April 1970), pp. 73-88.
7.	van der Plas Report, Cairo, February 4, 1929, Mailrapport
142x/'29. In his memoirs, van der Meulen, a former vice-
consul, recounts his first experience with the Indonesian
students in Cairo. In 1926, he attended a lecture on Indo-
nesian history by an Arab scholar. Though the lecture was
moderate in tone, during the question period, van der Meulen
was heavily attacked by the Indonesian students as a repre-
sentative of the Dutch government. Ik Stond er Bij, pp. 83-
87.
8.	Report of the Dutch consul in Cairo, Verbaal May 24, 1929,
X 10.
9.	Radio, April 13, 1929.143
welfare. Since the 1910’s, Snouck Hurgronje had been arguing
that a Dutch orientalist should be attached to the Consulate,
because he could maintain a close relationship with the student
community. But this proposal was considered too expensive by
both the Ministries of Foreign and Colonial Affairs.10 Study
in Cairo was relatively expensive by Indonesian standards and
also very difficult for those whose mother tongue was not Arabic.
Only a handful of Indonesian and Malayan students could obtain
the much coveted Al-Azhar diploma. So difficult were the exam-
ination procedures that non-Egyptian students were usually
"protected" by their respective national representatives during
the examination period. For years, the Indonesian students had
been asking for such "protection" without result. Only after a
famous Egyptian ulama, Sjech Thantawi Jauhari, established a
committee to "protect" these students did the Dutch government
take action. In August 1925, the Governor-General instructed
the Consul in Cairo to act as the "protector" of the Indonesian
students during the examination period.* 11 The decision was
finally made because the Dutch suspected Sjech Thantawi, a known
radical, and they were concerned about the consequences of the
students’ obvious indignation at the Consul’s indifference.12
The Welfare Society to some extent also owed its initial estab-
lishment to the problem of the lack of communication between
the students and the Consulate.
The political situation in Indonesia exerted an important
influence over the Cairo students. Since the appearance in 1914
of the first Jawah journal, Al-ittihad, the Indonesians in Cairo
had in general been sympathetic towards popular movements in
Indonesia. The journal, for example, expressed its approval of
the organizations being established in the Indies, including
such different ones as Sarekat Islam and Budi Utomo.13 The com-
munist rebellions of 1926-1927 also had their impact on the
minds of the students, particularly those from Minangkabau.
The student community kept in touch with developments through
its subscriptions to Indonesian nationalist newspapers.11* The
10.	Mailrapport 113x/’29; van der Meulen, Ik Stond er Bij, p. 84
11.	Extract from the Governor-General's decision, no. 2X August
1925, Mailrapport 746x/’25.
12.	Report from the Dutch Consulate, Cairo, October 9, 1925,
Mailrapport 1040x/'25.
13.	Snouck Hurgronje, letters, Verbaal January 5, 1915, no. 7
and February 5, 1915, no. 48.
14.	Nawawi, a student from Palembang, was a correspondent of the
nationalist paper Pertja Selatan, and Talut Mustafa, a
Minangkabau, was a regular contributor to Noeroeljaqin,
published in Batu Sangkar.144
activities of the students in Cairo also received wide coverage
in some Indonesian newspapers. No less important an influence
on the Cairo students was that exercised by the Perhimpunan
Indonesia (PI, Indonesian Association), the radical nationalist
student organization based in Holland. In 1925, the PI intro-
duced new radical principles emphasizing national mass action,
and it began to point out the contradictions in the colonial
situation. About this time, Djanan Thaib, the president of the
Cairo Welfare Society, established direct contact with the PI.15
In 1926, the PI under Hatta, a former leader of the JSB, was
acknowledged by several political parties in Indonesia as a
forerunner of the revolutionary nationalist movement. The Indo-
nesian students in Cairo maintained a close relationship with
the PI until 1929;16 after that, the politically oriented stu-
dents left Cairo and the PI in Holland fell into the hands of
the leftist faction.
The political climate in the Middle East, particularly in
Egypt, strengthened the students' nationalist feelings and in-
spired them with an ideology based on the slogan "Islam and
nationality." The popular Egyptian Wafd party, which combined
the religious fervor of Muhammad Abduh and the nationalist
appeals of Mustafa Kamil, deeply influenced the students. The
Egyptian students themselves had been active in politics begin-
ning in 1909.17 Even the most detached student could not fail
to be attracted by the nationalist fervor in the air.
In spite of the unmistakable impact of nationalism, the
Jawah students had a crucial problem. What would be the correct
attitude for them to adopt? Should they get involved in poli-
tics or remain aloof? The students were forced to define their
priorities and to conceptualize their future roles. The major-
ity, under the leadership of Mahmud Junus and Faturrahman,
thought that the first obligation of the students was the comple
tion of their studies so that they could return to their country
as educators and social reformers. Though not repudiating the
majority's opinion, others, led by Iljas Jacub, insisted that
students had an immediate obligation to liberate their country.
For this reason, they should involve themselves directly in the
15.	Seroean Azhar, 1, No. 1 (September 1925); Letter of R. Kern
Weltevreden, January 6, 1926, no. H/3, Mailrapport 59x/'26.
16.	Report by van der Meulen, Mailrapport 113x/'29.
17.	Jamal Mohammad Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian
Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, I960), pp.
116-117; CKristina Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in
Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood (The Hague:
Mouton, 1964), pp. 71-79 .145
politics of independence and prepare to become future political
leaders as well as educators. The division within the student
community was deepened by differences in personality, experi-
ence, family background and local origin.
An actual split did not occur until 1928, but the seed was
planted with the arrival of Muchtar Lutfi in 1926. Born in
Balingka (near Bukittinggi) in 1901, Muchtar was a son of Sjech
Abdul Latif, a maternal uncle of Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib. His
father died when Muchtar was still very young, and he was raised
and educated by the younger brother of his father, Sjech Daud
Rasjidi. In 1911, Muchtar followed Sjech Daud to Mecca and
studied there for three years. After returning from Mecca, he
became a student of Hadji Rasul. From 1916 until 1919, while
continuing his studies, he taught at the newly established
Dinijah School in Padang Pandjang. In 1919, he began his adven-
turous career as a traveling religious teacher in Minangkabau
and South Tapanuli. In 1922, after he had just settled down,
Sjech Djambek, a friend of his late father, persuaded him to
come to the Dinijah school in Bukittinggi. During the communist
movement Muchtar, although not a communist himself, displayed
increasingly anti-government sentiments. In 1925, using the
pen-name Tarfish, he wrote an anti-government treatise, Hikmatul
Muchtar (The Chosen Wisdom), in Arabic. The book was subse-
quently banned, but aided by relatives and his teacher, Muchtar
escaped to Kuala Lumpur.18 There he was assisted by Sjech
Thaher Djalaluddin. Using a British passport,19 Muchtar went
to India, where he was joined by his cousin, Mansur Daud, a son
of Sjech Daud.20 They traveled to Mecca; Mansur then continued
on to Turkey, while Muchtar went to Cairo.
After he arrived in Cairo, in early 1926, Muchtar became a
close companion of Iljas Jacub, the secretary of the Welfare
18.	Provincial Bureau of Investigation, Sumatra's Westkust,
July 17, 1933, Mailrapport 934x/'33. Interview with Datuk
Palimo Kajo (Mansur Daud), Bukittinggi, July 13, 1968. On
Muchtar Lutfi's escape, see Hamka, Aj ahku, pp. 132-133.
19.	Am Am, "Kiai jang djadi Perkakas," Pembela Islam, 54 (1932)
pp. 33-36 .
20.	Mansur Daud was born on March 10, 1909, in Balingka. He
graduated from the second class school in 1917 and then
studied religion at the Surau Djembatan Besi until 1923.
Afterward he visited India, spending six months in Lahore
and Qadian, centers of Ahmadyah factions. He then moved
to Hyderabad where he studied Urdu and improved his knowl-
edge of Arabic and English on a grant from the government.146
Society. Because the Society was non-political and also had
Malay members, Muchtar and Iljas founded a new group to work
for political goals. This organization, the Perhimpunan Pendjaga
Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Defenders) was established
on April 12, 1926 with Muchtar as chairman and Iljas as adviser.21
Its members were all Indonesians, predominantly Minangkabau. Of
the six members on the executive board, only one was not a
Minangkabau. The total number of the Minangkabau students in
Cairo, it should be noted, was no more than twenty.22 The or-
ganization was not very active and it functioned as little more
than a political discussion club.
Muchtar meanwhile gained a much wider exposure to the
political movement in the Middle East when the Caliphate Con-
gress (Mu'tamar al-khilafah) was held in Cairo from May 13 to
19, 1926. The congress had been called to discuss the feasi-
bility of reviving the caliphate, and it was attended by Hadji
Abdullah Ahmad and Hadji Rasul. Muchtar was elected the offi-
cial representative of the Welfare Society and also served as
private secretary to Hadji Abdullah Ahmad during the congress.
Participation in the congress gave Muchtar opportunities to
meet with many important Egyptian ulama. He himself was instru-
mental in persuading the Islamic World Congress to confer on
the two Minangkabau ulama an honorary degree (doktor al-fiddiri)
in religion.23 The congress itself was a failure. It took
note of the already known fact that there were many colonized
Muslim countries and that theoretically the caliph had no direct
religious authority. But for Muchtar and his friends, the con-
gress confirmed their view that political Pan-Islamism was im-
possible. In retrospect, the failure of this and a later
caliphate congress, held in June of that same year in Mecca,
21.	Other members of the executive board were: Rasul Telur,
Abdullah al-Indonesia and Raden Faturrahman. Bandera
Islam, August 5, 1926, cited in Overzicht van de Inlandsche
Pers, 31/1926, p. 406.
22.	No exact figure is available, for the Consulate reported
only the number of students using Dutch passports. Accord-
ing to a Minangkabau student, in 1928 there were thirteen
Minangkabau students in Cairo. Tjaja Soematra, August 14,
1928.	In early 1929, there were fifteen at Al-Azhar and
other institutions. Netherlands Legation Report, Cairo,
March 1929, no. 342, Mailrapport 244x/’29. But at the end
of 1929, it was reported that only thirteen were left out
of the total of 300 Jawah students. Noeroelj aqin, 25,
1929.	Most of the students arrived in 1924. By 1930 there
were sixteen. Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam, p. 88.
23.	Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 144-145.147
did make an important contribution to the notion of nationalism
with a Muslim soul, which the Cairo students later introduced
in Minangkabau.
Iljas Jacub had been able to separate his political activ-
ism from his position as the secretary of the Welfare Society,
but he proved unable to restrain himself as the editor-in-chief
of Seroean Azhar. Articles in the journal became increasingly
political in tone, until it had in effect become a nationalist
political organ instead of simply a forum for student debates.2U
The Dutch government still subscribed to the official myth of
Pan-Islamism and thus viewed Seroean Azhar as a potential danger.
On the advice of the Dutch Consul in Cairo, the Governor-General
banned SeroeanAzhar from the Netherlands Indies. Economically,
the ban was not serious because the journal had only 300 sub-
scribers in Indonesia, as compared with the 700 copies sent
regularly to Malaya.25 The ban, however, did shock the student
community, because it suggested that the Dutch considered their
school activities as part of a larger political effort. Such
official opinions about their activities might prejudice the
Cairo students' chances to continue their education. Fear of
reprisal by the colonial government in Indonesia (or by the
Sultans, in Malaya) could cause their parents to recall them.
Consequently, in July 1927, Iljas Jacub was forced to resign
fromSeroean Azhar. Three months later, he and Muchtar began
publication of Pilihan Timoer (Eastern Choice), which was inde-
pendent of the Welfare Society.
In September 1927, the Welfare Society celebrated the
second anniversary ofSeroean Azhar, and Mahmud Junus was elected
its editor. In his acceptance speech, Mahmud declared that he
would not tolerate any political writing in the journal. But
certainly drawing a clear distinction between political and
non-political writing was not easy. The major factor which
divided the student community was their sense of urgency and
expedience rather than any conflict of ideology. Seroean Azhar
remained banned in Indonesia. Mahmud's tenure, furthermore,
was very short. In January he went to the Consulate to protest
against continuation of the ban. In February he informed the
Consul that he was resigning from the journal because he was
overburdened by work.26 He was succeeded by Raden Faturrahman,
who was also the director of the journal. In April, the Egyp-
tian government delivered a strong warning to Seroean Azhar. The
24.	Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Students."
25.	Netherlands Legation Report, Cairo, January 28, 1928, no.
181, Mailrapport 562x/'28.
26.	Ibid. and February 1928, Mailrapport 562x/'28.148
new editor agreed to let the Dutch Consul censor manuscripts
before publication. The journal, however, also suffered from a
lack of funds, and it soon ceased operations.27
Pilihan Timoer, unlike Seroean Azhar, was, from its incep-
tion in October 1927, clearly political in content. The jour-
nal, whose motto was "for the land and the people of Indonesia
and Malaya," covered many areas. Besides Quranic commentaries
and religious subjects, it also contained sections on history,
women, and more general problems of civilization, for example,
questions of the relationship between East and West or the back-
wardness of nations. But its editorials caused the journal to
be banned from Indonesia. The editorial of December, written
by Iljas Jacub and entitled "A way toward progress," was a bold
political treatise. It began with criticism of the so-called
rust (tranquility) policy pursued by the Dutch government in
the wake of the tumultuous political activities of the 1920’s.
"Tranquility," according to Iljas, did not always mean peace,
for it could also be found in the jungle:
where everything is quiet. There is neither farmer nor
wood-collector around; not even a deer can be found.
There, wild beasts rampage ferociously; little animals
and men are forced to run for their lives.
The analogy referred to the unjust relationship between ruler
and ruled. The editorial complained about the gulf that existed
between the intellectuals, who were supposed to be the leaders,
and the mass of the population. As a result, an intolerable
impasse had been reached in the movement toward progress. A
way to break up this impasse was to build a people’s organiza-
tion, holding regular congresses for representatives of the
people. The congress would be a forum where the voice of the
people could be heard. Every district should have its own chap-
ter of the people’s organization, as the representative of the
central board. The members of the executive board of the
people's organization and of the congress would represent all
indigenous organizations. In the congresses and other meetings,
either at the local or national levels, other leaders and intel-
lectuals should be invited to participate. By working through
such congresses, an overall plan of action for Indonesia could
be designed. The congress could also act as the representative
of Indonesia in any world congress.28
"The way toward progress" suggested in this editorial was
a challenge to the Dutch-instituted Volksraad and represented
27.	Ibid., and April 13, 1928, no. 500, Mailrapport 562x/'28.
28.	Pilihan Timoer, 3 (December 1927).149
in effect a proposal to establish a "shadow government." Pilihan
Timoev was soon banned in Indonesia. The Dutch Consul in Cairo
warned the British High Commissioner in Egypt about "the revolu-
tionary character" of the journal and advised that it should
also be banned in Egypt and Malaya.29 In April 1928, at the
suggestion of the British High Commissioner, the Egyptian govern-
ment banned the publication of Pilihan Timoev.30 The journal had
lasted only six months. But the political views of its editor-
publishers, Iljas and Muchtar, including the idea of a people’s
organization, the notion that a political movement should be
carried out on a national basis and the need for participation
of the intellectuals in a popular movement were later adopted
by Permi.
Iljas and Muchtar were under the spell of the nationalist
movement in Egypt. They not only observed it but also had per-
sonal contact with its leaders. "Their activities," according
to van der Meulen, the former Dutch vice-consul, "brought ex-
citement not only within the walls of the Muslim university
[Al-Azhar] but also outside, in the Egyptian press and in the
anti-British organizations."31 According to several dispatches
from the Dutch consulate, after Pilihan Timoer ceased, Iljas be-
came a close companion of Dr. Abdul Hamid Bey, the president of
the radical Islamic Youth Congress and an influential Egyptian
parliamentarian. Iljas was reportedly also good friends with
Sjech Mahmud Abouel Ayoum, the inspector of Al-Azhar and an im-
portant leader of a radical non-communist Egyptian organization.32
Throughout the latter part of 1928 and early 1929, both Iljas
and Muchtar were frequent visitors at the "House of the Nation,"
the headquarters of the Wafd, the Egyptian nationalist party.33
Their political activities generally and their participation in
the Egyptian nationalist movement annoyed the Cairo government,
and, according to van der Meulen, it asked the Dutch consulate
29.	Netherlands Legation, Report to the Foreign Minister,
Cairo, March 30, 1928, no. 503/185, Verbaal April 18, 1928,
Kabinet Letter S6.
30.	Ibid.; and Legation Report, April 14, 1928, no. 57a, Verbaal
August 22, 1928, Kabinet Letter A14.
31.	van der Meulen, Ik Stond er Bij , p. 90.
32.	Sjech Ayoum strongly opposed the Egyptian student organiza-
tion which was being influenced by the leftist Berlin
League. Attorney-General’s office, April 2, 1928, no.
644/H, Verbaal August 22, 1928 A/14.
33.	Netherlands Legation, Cairo, April 13, 1929, Verbaal May
24, 1929 X/10.150
to send the two students back home or else they would be put in
an Egyptian prison. The Consul helped them to go to Mecca under
the pretext of continuing their studies, "so that they did not
have to be ashamed when they returned to the West Coast of
Sumatra" without an Al-Azhar diploma.34 Later in Minangkabau,
Muchtar used his acquaintance with important leaders in the
Muslim world as propaganda on behalf of Permi.
Muchtar and Iljas, though they left Cairo without complet-
ing their studies, were full of ideas about future activities.
At the time of their departure in April 1929, the unity among
the Jawah student community had greatly eroded. The resignation
of Iljas as the editor-in-chief of Seroean Azhar had been the
first outward sign of internal dissension in the student com-
munity. The subsequent publication of Pilihan Timoevexacerbated
the situation. The Welfare Society itself lacked money. The
decline in donations from Indonesia and Malaya was apparently
considered by some non-Minangkabau students a direct consequence
of the political activities of Muchtar and Iljas. The contro-
versy became so intense that on July 28, 1928, all the Minang-
kabau students, following the lead of Muchtar and Mahmud Junus
(who in fact opposed Muchtar),resigned en bloc from the Welfare
Society.35 The split did not long remain a purely ethnic one.
Mahmud intensified his appeal: "You come to Egypt to study and
while you are in this country you should refrain of all activi-
ties except seeking knowledge."36 Another Minangkabau student,
Talut Mustafa, the son of an important Kaum Muda ulama, echoed
Mahmud's warnings in student gatherings and urged his colleagues
to avoid politics. Although the departure of Iljas and Muchtar
reduced the anti-colonial activities of the students,37 the
Welfare Society by 1929 was already too divided by internal
34.	van der Meulen, Ik Stond er Bij, pp. 90-91. After his ar-
rest, Iljas told the police that he had left Cairo because
he wanted to go home. He stopped at Mecca because he wanted
to make the hadj. Mailrapport 861x/'34. Both Muchtar and
Lutfi were soon elected to the executive board of the Indo-
nesian organization in Mecca led by Djanan Thaib. The
Jeddah consulate reported that their transfer to Mecca
created some misgivings among the Indonesiam mukirn settlers
because it was feared that they might threaten the hitherto
cordial relations between this community and the Dutch
consulate.
35.	Tjaja Soematra, August 14, 1928.
36.	"Kaoem Moeda di Minangkabau, XV," Pandji Islam, 19 (May 12,
1941); and interview with Mahmud Junus, Djakarta, March 1968.
37.	Netherlands Legation, Cairo, October 18, 1929, no. 1190,
Mailrapport 110 7/’2 9.151
dissension to recover. Some students had already been recalled
by their parents, who feared reprisals by the authorities.
While Muchtar and Iljas were busy writing political trea-
tises, Mahmud was preoccupied with designing educational reforms
for Minangkabau. Inspired by his experience in Darul Ulum,
Mahmud proposed a tentative plan for a reformed religious
school. It divided religious schools into three levels--elemen-
tary, intermediary, and advanced. The advanced school would be
organized in several departments following the system used at
the Darul Ulum. Curricula in the elementary religious schools
would include secular subjects, such as world history and geog-
raphy. At the intermediary level, some branches of science,
such as physics, geology and botany, would be added.38 Mahmud
refined this plan later after he returned to Minangkabau, but
while still in Cairo he kept himself busy by writing the ele-
mentary textbooks which such a system would require. Together
with Kasim Bakri, he co-authored a book on pedagogy and an
Arabic-Malay dictionary, Kamus Keemasan (The Golden Dictionary).
Mahmud himself wrote several textbooks for elementary religious
schools on Quranic exegesis and fikh (law), and also produced
the first illustrated Arabic textbook. All were published in
Cairo. In early 1930, Mahmud also published a textbook on
chemistry and one on health education. These were the first
elementary books on modern sciences written by a religious
teacher for religious schools. In his introduction to the
chemistry book, Mahmud approvingly quoted an Egyptian ulama,
who stated: "The Muslims have committed a sin because they
ignore several religious obligations which were imposed on the
community as a whole (fardhu kifajah') . They let the Europeans
produce their necessities, although religion urged them to do
their utmost." This appeal was not new. It dated from the
early period of Islamic modernism and in Minangkabau itself a
similar appeal can be found in the writings of the Kaum Muda
ulama in Al-Moenir. But in religious schools, except for some
modernization in the teaching system, no substantial advances
had been made towards the incorporation of elementary science
subjects into the curriculum. Mahmud urged the religious teach-
ers in Minangkabau to catch up with the modern world.
[According to religion] no true Muslim should give up
hope, no matter how impossible the situation is. And
if we cannot make it in our generation, with God’s
blessings, we are doing it for our offspring. It is
then obligatory for us to provide our children with
the foundation of sciences ... so that our offspring
can expand and develop [the sciences] as high as pos-
sible.39
38.	Noeroelj aqin, 24 (1929).
39.	Quoted in "Kaoem Moeda di Minangkabau," pp. 9071-2.152
By this program, Mahmud hoped not only to bridge the gap between
the secular and religious schools but also to provide the reli-
giously educated youngsters with the tools for competing with
others. His program presented the Thawalib and the Dinijah
schools withvaluable suggestions for use in their efforts to
modernize their religious schools. Later, in 1931, Mahmud Junus
himself became directly involved in the modernization of reli-
gious schools.
In order to pursue this educational reform program, Mahmud
and his friends founded the Sidang Pengetahuan (Council of
Knowledge) in December 1929. Its purpose was to disseminate
knowledge by publishing books in Malay and Arabic for use in
religious schools throughout Indonesia and Malaya. The Council
also hoped to assist its members in their studies. Some of the
elementary textbooks written by Mahmud Junus were published by
this organization. It was quite a profitable business, and, by
the end of 1930, a few textbooks had already been reprinted
three times. Almost all Kaum Muda elementary religious schools
in Minangkabau used them as textbooks. Unlike prior student
organizations in Cairo, the Sidang Pengetahuan had exclusively
Minangkabau members. Mahmud himself served as its first chair-
man. Most of the members played an important role later during
the religious school reform of the thirties.
In July 1930, Mahmud became the first Jawah student to
obtain a degree from the Darul Ulum. Mahmud had also emerged
as one of the best students. It was a great moment for the
Sidang Pengetahuan. On August 23, the organization held a big
celebration to honor him. The celebration was attended by the
Jawah students along with several Egyptian professors and ulama,
such as Sjech Rasjid Ridha and Sjech Thantawi Jauhari, and
several political leaders. It was, indeed, a great moment for
Mahmud Junus, since most of the Egyptian ulama and professors
who praised his performances were highly respected among the
Kaum Muda circles in Minangkabau and in other parts of Indone-
sia. The Sidang Pengetahuan published a booklet, Haflah Takrim
(Glorious Celebration), written in Arabic, to commemorate the
occasion.40 In the meantime,in Padang, a special committee was
40. The highlight of the party came when the honored guests
gave their speeches. Haflah Takrim described the scene as
follows:
"The first opportunity was given to Mahdi Bey Allah,
an instructor of pedagogy at Darul Ulum and a private
tutor to the present King Farouk. After praising his
student Mahmud, he said enthusiastically, ’We should
not be sad, because it is your duty, Indonesians, to
send one Mahmud every year.' Sjech M. A. Muthalib, the
Arabic instructor, rose, followed by Sayyid Muhammad
Rasjid Ridha, the editor of the famous Al-Manaar. He153
organized to give Mahmud a hero’s welcome. But Mahmud took the
eastern route from Singapore via Pekan Baru. In October he
arrived in his nagari, Sungajang.41
Iljas Jacub,for his part, discovered on arrival that he
was considered an undesired person by the Dutch government.
When he arrived in early July from Mecca, the government had
already imposed a travel restriction and he was arrested.
Muchtar Lutfi, who was still on the government list as a "commu-
nist fugitive," had to wait for another year in Mecca, until
his name was cleared by the government. In July 1931, he ar-
rived in Bukittinggi as a free person.
Influence of the Middle East Perantau
Beginning in the early 1920’s, the Kaum Muda followers in
Minangkabau proudly called their schools "the gates to Egypt."
The schools were being designed not only to produce qualified
religious teachers but also to train candidates for higher edu-
cational institutions in Egypt, a center of Islamic modernism.
The prestige of Cairo stemmed from the influential Al-Azhar and
the fact that the famous modernist journal, Al-Manaar , was pub-
lished there. Edited by Sjech Rasjid Ridha, the journal had
been likened to "a beam in the darkness," which had enlightened
the Muslim world. "The call of Egypt" was, indeed, an important
said that he hoped Indonesia, a rich and prosperous
country, would be able to take care of itself and defend
itself from the incessant attacks by Christian mission-
aries. Sjech Thantawi Jauhari, author of a famous
Quranic commentary, announced his happiness, saying
Indonesia was already as a second fatherland for him
because of his love for the country and his correspond-
ence with Indonesians. Prof. Shaleh Bey Hasjim also
contributed valuable advice. And finally, Dr. A. Hamid
Said, president of Sjubhanul Muslimin and a member of
parliament, arose and enlivened the party with his
famous oratorical skill, full of zest and enthusiasm.
At the close of the party, Mahmud Junus replied to all
the speeches addressed to him."
The excerpt is contained in Pandji Islam, 21 (May 26,
1941), pp. 9096-9097.
41. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 4de kwartaal 1930, Mail-
rapport 2 2 8x/’31.154
incentive for the religiously educated Minangkabau youth to pur-
sue their studies.42
But few students could continue their education in Egypt.
Only those who belonged to well-to-do families and a few student
adventurers, such as Muchtar Lutfi, were able to go to Cairo.
This wider exposure to the outside world, combined with their ad-
vanced education, gave the Cairo returnees an advantage in the
contest for leadership among the Islamic modernists. Moreover,
the already influential position held by the Kaum Muda educated
group in various educational and political organizations provided
the Cairo returnees with a strong base of support for carrying
out their ideas.
Unlike most of the Western-educated perantau intellectuals,
the Islamic modernists came home. They went to the rantau,
Cairo or Mecca, in order to prepare themselves to succeed their
teachers as reformers and educators. On their return, they par-
ticipated and often led in the reform of the religious schools.
Mahmud Junus established a school which soon became a model for
the Dinijah and Thawalib schools. He was appointed director of
the newly founded modern teachers’ training school or college,
the Normal Islam. Iljas Jacub was active in developing Permi’s
Islamic College, and Muchtar Lutfi became the director of a
politically oriented teachers' training school for girls and an
intermediate religious school, the Tsanawijah. It was Mahmud
Junus and his "non-political" colleagues, however, who concen-
trated their full effort on educational programs, and his influ-
ence in Minangkabau religious and educational circles increased
after the exile of Iljas and Muchtar.
Iljas and Muchtar, who had been exposed to the Egyptian
nationalist struggle, joined Permi and became important leaders
of the rapidly growing radical party. Drawing on their Egyptian
experience, they guided the radicalization of political activi-
ties in Minangkabau and the search for a suitable political
ideology. Under their influence, Permi with its ideology "Islam
and kebangsaan" initiated an ideological controversy among the
Kaum Muda educated group. Desiring to influence the political
movement, Permi introduced a new aspect into the ideological
controversies between the Islamic and the kebangsaan ("secular"
nationalist) groups. The Permi version called for a new exam-
ination of the Minangkabau concept of its world, its alam.
42. "Kaoem Moeda di Minangkabau,XV."CHAPTER VII
THE SEARCH FOR AN IDEOLOGY
In the editorial of the first issue of Medan Rakjat
(People’s Forum), published in February 1931, Iljas Jacub la-
mented the crisis in the Indonesian popular movement. He par-
ticularly referred to the split between the Islamic and the
kebangsaan ("secular" nationalist) parties. The Islamic group
condemned the ideas propagated by the secular parties as "for-
bidden by religion" (haram). The kebangsaan group regarded
Islam as "worthless" in the nationalist movement. This, said
Iljas, was a "tragic situation."
In our opinion, there is no difference or conflict
between the goals of these two groups. Although they
base [their struggles] on two different principles,
they both want to lead and to direct our people toward
the achievement of progress and human dignity.
Iljas appealed for unity as a sign of maturity: "No one will
recognize your maturity unless you demonstrate it yourself."
In his view, the crisis could be solved by incorporating Permi's
slogan of "Islam and nationality" into the political movement.1
During 1930 a gradual breakdown occurred among the regional
nationalist parties, such as Budi Utomo and Sarekat Sumatra,
and many regional youth organizations were dissolved. It was a
time when the notion of political Pan-Islamism lost its signifi-
cance as a basis for the anti-colonial struggle. The idea of
Indonesia Raja as the basis for national unity and a political
entity had grown beyond either local nationalist or Pan-Islamist
aspirations. But at the same time, ideological differences
among the nationalist parties had come to the surface. The
Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (PPPKI,
Consensus of Nationalist Political Associations of Indonesia),
initiated by Sukarno in December 1927, had to some extent re-
duced the dissension between the cooperative and non-cooperative
political parties by emphasizing the need for unity. This loose
federation, however, had failed to tackle the basic differences
in political ideologies and strategies. Ideological issues
separated the Islamic from the "secular" nationalist groups;
questions of strategy and the tactics of struggle divided the
radical groups into "mass-oriented" and "social-pedagogic"
parties.
1. Medan Rakjat, 1, No. 1 (February 1931).
155156
Ideological conflict between the Islamic and the kebangsaan
groups was particularly intense after the secular nationalists,
led by Western-educated intellectuals, had gained more prominence
in the popular movement. The secular nationalists suffered
major setbacks, such as the temporary arrest of Sukarno in 1929
and the split among the radical leaders which followed the dis-
solution of the National Party, but the ability of the Western-
educated leaders to articulate political issues and employ mod-
ern methods for spreading their influence enabled them to seize
the initiative in the independence movement. The Dutch reaction
tended to magnify the potentialities of the Western-educated
intellectuals as anti-colonial leaders, and this too worked to
the advantage of the secular nationalists in their competition
with the Islamic group.
The Islamic political parties lost the initiative in the
middle 1920's following the break of the communists from the SI,
the first Indonesian mass party. The PSI, successor of the SI,
gradually declined in influence even among its Islamic clien-
tele. Its several attempts to unite all Muslim organizations
on the basis of political Pan-Islamism ended in failure. In its
effort to retain political leadership among Muslims, the PSI was
in competition with the rapidly growing but non-political Muham-
madijah. In 1930, certain factors helped minimize the open con-
flict among Muslim organizations. Mussolini's attack on Muslim
Tripoli awakened a feeling of Islamic solidarity. Criticism by
secular nationalists about the inadequacies of Islam as a basis
for nationality put all the Muslim parties in one category sepa-
rate from the "nationalists." Dr. Sutomo's criticism of the
pilgrimage to Mecca on the grounds that Digul, the place to
which political leaders were exiled, was a more honorable place
than the Holy City increased the Islamic distrust of the inten-
tion of kebangsaan leaders.
Both the Islamic and the kebangsaan groups agreed on the
need for supra-ethnic unity and for the liberation of Indonesia
from the colonial power. In their international orientation,
however, the secular nationalists, particularly those under
Sukarno's influence, looked to cooperation among Asian nations.
The Islamic group, on the other hand, insisted on the need to
realize the concept of "Islamic Brotherhood." The fundamental
issues centered around the nature of Islam as a perfect and all-
embracing religion, the basis for Indonesian unity, and the goal
and substance of independence. The orthodox Muslims assumed
that Islam should not only be concerned with the world hereafter
but also with guiding man in his earthly life. Since Islam was
not invented by man but rather given by God, it was by defini-
tion perfect. The purpose of life, therefore, should be to
realize the teachings of Islam. Nationalism, on the other hand,
originated from man's own mind and desires. As such, it was
inherently defective for use as a guide. Moreover, the idea of157
kebangsaan came from Europe where it had divided humanity into
hostile nations and had inspired nations to oppress each other.
From the Islamic point of view, nationalism as promoted by the
secular nationalists was a faulty and even forbidden basis for
struggle. An Islamic publicist pointed out:
A kebangsaan [person] who dies in the struggle for the
independence of Indonesia, dies "in the name of the
nation." The death of a Muslim in his fight to liber-
ate Islam is the death which is called in the Quran
"fi sabillillahi," "in the path of God."2
The attempt by Permi leaders to rationalize Islam and
nationalism stimulated a heated ideological conflict among the
Islamic modernists. The Permi leaders created a split within
the Kaum Muda educated group and widened the gap between them
and their former mentors, the Kaum Muda ulama. Educated in the
spirit of idjtihad which emphasized freedom of thought and the
need for reform, the Kaum Muda educated group saw themselves as
engaged in the search for a suitable ideology needed for their
role as social reformers. In addition to determining a philo-
sophical basis for struggle, the younger generation of Islamic
modernists were involved in controversies over strategy and tac-
tics. The controversies were intensified by the desire of
Minangkabau political leaders to expand their influence to other
parts of Indonesia and by the intrusion of secular nationalist
parties into the political movement in West Sumatra.
Islam and Kebangsaan
"The ideological bases of this organization," according to
the Permi constitution, "are Islam and nationality (kebangsaan)."3
When Iljas Jacub stated this slogan at the First Permi Congress
in October 1930, he introduced a new ideological issue in
Minangkabau. Still fascinated by his experience with the Egyp-
tian nationalist movement, Iljas wanted to formulate a more
definitive ideological basis for the Kaum Muda political
movement and to help solve the crisis in the Indonesian popular
movement. His experience in Egypt inspired him to seek a work-
able ideology which could accommodate both of the important
strands in the Indonesian independence movement. Iljas, sup-
ported by his colleagues who had just returned from Cairo,
managed to persuade the congress to accept his slogan for the
2.	"Nasionalisme tiada Bertentangan dengan Islam," Pembela
Islam, 60 (1932), pp. 3-4.
3.	Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Tetangga Permi, Article #3.158
new organization. In the middle of 1931, Muchtar Lutfi returned
and he soon became the most effective spokesman for "Islam and
kebangsaan" and Permi.
The new slogan was initially rationalized on the grounds
that religious feeling and the awareness of belonging to one
nation (bangsa) were both part of human life. One Permi publi-
cist wrote:
Men, no matter in whatever age or place they live, al-
ways have the feelings of religion and nationality.
Religion is a spiritual feeling in our heart. It is
called iman or belief. Nation is a group of people
who are bound together by various social and cultural
ties, such as language, morality, fate, destiny, etc.
4
Islam itself recognized the idea of nationality. The religion
stressed that its adherents should give priority to their rela-
tives before considering other people. In political terms,
"relatives" could be equated with "nation." In its relation
with people, a nation could be considered as one large family.
Dedication to one’s own nation, therefore, was also a religious
duty (ibadah) . In the words of the publicist:
Allah demands that we work as hard as possible for
the sake of Islam and for the spread of religion.
But [we] should do more for our kebangsaan.4 5
The early attempts of Permi to find a generally acceptable
ideology, however, aroused the suspicion of other parties. Some
secular nationalist leaders were emphatic in their belief that
religion should remain a purely individual matter, and they
voiced their pessimism concerning Permi's "inherently incon-
sistent ideology."6 Some Muslim leaders accused Permi leaders
of joining the kebangsaan group. These Muslims could not accept
the idea that religion and nationality were equal entities. As
orthodox Muslims, they believed that Islam was at once religion,
nationality and fatherland. They believed that Permi leaders,
though raised and educated in the Islamic tradition, had cor-
rupted the perfect nature of Islam and thereby weakened the
Islamic group in its ideological conflict with the secularists.
4.	Medan Rakjat, 1, No. 2 (February 15, 1931).
5.	Ibid.
6.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 2de kwartaal, 1930, Mail-
rapport 812x/'30 .159
In self-defense, Permi redefined its concept of Islam and
kebangsaan. Its first political brochure, published in July
1931, stated:
Permi is based on Islam and kebangsaan. These prin-
ciples, however, are based on one fundamental princi-
ple, that is, "the Benevolence of God." If we look
at the ideas that dominate the [popular] movement in
the present day, [Islam and nationalism] form two dis-
tinct principles with two different spirits. The
spirit of religion is very refined and pure, because
it is based on tauhid. Its refinement and purity can-
not be corrupted. No matter how harsh the suppression
and how bitter the suffering, iman can never be
changed. The spirit of nationalism is also refined
and pure, but, since it originates in human minds, it
can sometimes be influenced by hawa nafsu. Under
strong suppression, it can also be easily corrupted.7
Permi hoped that this explanation would prevent division within
the Indonesian independence movement and help it to work toward
the common ideals.
Muslim critics charged that this new formulation confused
ideology with practical objectives and implicitly conceded the
deficiency of Islam as the sole principle for national struggle.
Since Permi had acknowledged that the love of nation and the
urge for unity were recognized by Islam, why, then, should it
add kebangsaan to its ideology? Muhammad Natsir, a Minangkabau
perantau intellectual and a leader of the Persatuan Islam8 based
in Bandung, argued:
It seems that they [Permi leaders] are not satisfied
with their Islam. They seem to feel that Islam is
not enough, that they deem it necessary to add [some-
thing else] .
Islam, which they acknowledged as the essential foundation,
according to Natsir, in practice would be superseded by kebang-
saan, which was supposed to be merely a supporting idea.9
7.	Semangat, 1 (July 1931).
8.	For more about Persatuan Islam, see Howard M. Federspiel,
Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indo-
nesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).
9.	Is [pseud. M. Natsir], "Koerang Tegas jang Meragoekan,"
Pembela Islam, 35 (November 1931), pp. 2-7.160
By emphasizing Islam as the basic foundation of its ideol-
ogy, Permi wanted to condemn the secularist deification of the
nation, the tanah air (home country), the beautiful "Ibu Indone-
sia" (Mother Indonesia). In practice, however, by using kebang-
saan as a pillar of its ideology, Permi created misunderstandings
among its own group, the Islamic modernists. Within the Minang-
kabau adat system, moreover, bangsa had an additional meaning;
the bangso referred to the adat aristocracy, the original set-
tlers of the nagari. Islamic modernists feared kebangsaan could
thus be interpreted as the personification of traditional adat
glory. In this sense, promotion of kebangsaan could be an
attempt to intensify Minangkabau "group pride and narrow minded-
ness." Some Kaum Muda ulama argued that kebangsaan would even-
tually undermine the Islamic concepts of tolerance and open-
mindedness and its condemnation of group pride (ass jab {.ah') .1 °
In Java, Islamic leaders feared that the idea of kebangsaan
would be used to revive a pre-Islamic, Madjapahit type of unity.
The so-called cultural nationalists had been spreading this
myth, and the Islamic leaders feared they wanted to repudiate
the contribution of Islam in breaking up ethnic boundaries and
to revive the pre-Islamic way of life. Islamic leaders charged
that such nationalism was no more than a kind of "modern
dj ahiliah," an unenlightened idea in modern form. Islam had
been revealed to man in order to abolish djahiliah ideas and
practices, therefore, how could Permi hope to reconcile such
antagonistic ideologies?
The orthodox exposition of the basic contradictions between
Islam and kebangsaan forced Permi onto the defensive. At its
Second Congress, in November 1931, the party defined "national-
ism" as a "way of action," a strategy with specific goals and
not as "a state of mind." "Kebangsaan," said Muchtar Lutfi,
"is a way toward the achievement of Indonesian independence,"
and the meaning of Islam in Permi's slogan should be understood
as the determination to attain "Islam in Honor." Man’s respon-
sibility to his community is a religious duty and his willing-
ness to make sacrifices for the betterment of his nation is a
kind of religious merit (amal) .11 On other occasions, Muchtar
10. Noer, "The Rise and Development," pp. 433-436. Praising
Permi ideology, a young Kaum Tua leader of the PTI said:
"In Minangkabau we call a man berbangsa if he has lands
and forests, sawah and dry fields, and followers, but now
. . . , where is our kebangsaan?" Politieke Politioneel
Overzicht, February 1932, Mailrapport 415x/’32. In this
context, berbangsa means the adat aristocracy and kebang-
saan the symbol of traditional glory.
11
Tamar Djaja, "Islam di Indonesia."161
stressed that the struggle for national independence and for the
improvement of social conditions should not be seen as ends in
themselves. Although these efforts would benefit society, their
ultimate goal was service to God. The fight for independence
had to be carried out "in the name of Allah." Permi's idea of
kebangsaan should not be considered the basis of its struggle
but rather an expression of "the demand for human rights."12
In his debate with the Persatuan Islam, Muchtar called national-
ism an ideological blueprint for changing the nation’s destiny.
Had not Allah stated in His Book (surah 13:11) that "Allah
changes not the condition of a people until they change their
own conditions"?13
Muchtar and other Permi leaders argued that kebangsaan was
"a way of action" which worked externally to eliminate imperi-
alism and capitalism and internally to break down provincialism,
ethno-centrism and insularism. Kebangsaan "should be seen as
the desire to make our nation equal with other nations."
Nationalism as promoted by Permi implied the achievement of
democracy, the eradication of all remnants of feudalism, and a
declaration of war "against all suffering."14
In their desire to resolve the conflict between Islamic
and kebangsaan groups and to make their party into a kind of
"national catalyst," the Permi leaders failed to see that the
issues of the early 1930's were no longer confined to questions
of the proper philosophical basis for struggle. Permi leaders
emphasized the immediate goal, the independence of Indonesia,
and avoided involvement in the controversy about how an inde-
pendent Indonesian state would be constituted. By doing so,
they hoped to reduce the growing gulf between Islamic and
kebangsaan groups. Unfortunately for the Permi leaders, the
main themes of controversy had increasingly shifted to the very
issues which they wanted to ignore. A leader of the Persatuan
Islam wrote:
The kebangsaan movement works with Indonesian people
in the name of "Mother Indonesia" and for the sake of
the Indonesian marhaen [little people]. The Islamic
movement in this country works with the Indonesian
12.	Tjaja Soematra, October 22, 1932.
13.	Pembela Islam, 54 (1933), pp. 3-7.
14.	The speeches of the Permi leaders, such as Muchtar Lutfi,
Iljas Jacub and Ali Emran Djamil, are contained in: Tj aj a
Soematra, October 22, 1932; Politieke Politioneel Over-
zicht, February-August 1932, Mailrapport 415x/'32, 777x/'32
952x/’32, 1017x/’32.162
Muslims in the name of Allah and for the independence
of Islam.15
"The independence of Islam" meant nothing less than the creation
of an Islamic state which would protect and propagate the Is-
lamic religion. Though acknowledging the legal rights of non-
Muslims, the state would strive for the realization of Islamic
ideals. Its democratic system and its social justice would not
be copies of Western concepts but rather correct manifestations
of Islamic doctrine. The future state would apply Islamic laws
and maintain Islamic morality.16
The Permi leaders found themselves in an ideological dilem-
ma. Debates on the future of an independent Indonesia required
them to formulate the substance of their concept, "Islam in
Honor." But such a formulation might alienate the secular
nationalists, who constantly argued that Islam was an inadequate
foundation for a modern national state. The attempt by the
Permi leaders to avoid these issues was seen by some Muslim
leaders as a betrayal. They accused Permi leaders of compromis-
ing Islamic principles for the sake of political expediency.
Iljas Jacub, Muchtar Lutfi, as well as other Permi leaders,
such as Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib, had had sound credentials for
introducing the concept of "Islam and kebangsaan." They had
already proved themselves both as true patriots and as men edu-
cated in the Islamic tradition. Along with other Cairo return-
ees, they were convinced that an appeal for kebangsaan could
minimize the distrust existing between the Islamic and the
secular nationalists. They were not very successful in attract-
ing the Islamic modernists in Java, for these men had begun to
formulate their own conception of an Indonesian Islamic state.
Permi did, however, establish a close relationship with Sukarno
and his Partai Indonesia (Partindo). Sukarno, who had launched
the idea of a cooperation of Islam, Nationalism and Marxism,17
saw Permi as a step toward the realization of unity in the Indo-
nesian independence movement. Although Sukarno and the Permi
leaders defined the relationship between Islam and nationalism
in different ways, both desired unity between the Islamic and
the kebangsaan groups and both acknowledged the need for mass
political parties. Sukarno viewed cooperation between Islam
and Nationalism as that between two political ideologies; Permi
15.	"Marhaenisme dan Islam," Pembela Islam, 56 (1932), pp. 2-6.
16.	Arne1z, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto: Hidup dan Perdjuangannja (Dja-
karta: Bulan Bintang, [1952?]).
17.	Sukarno, Nationalism, Islam and Marxism (Ithaca: Cornell
Modern Indonesia Project, 1969) , pp. 3~5 - 6 2 .163
posited an all-embracing Islam in which nationalism had its
legitimate place. But the two had a common ground in their ob-
session with national unity.18
Permi’s failure as a "national catalyst" did not prevent
it from becoming the largest party in Sumatra. It was able to
mobilize young Minangkabau Islamic modernists. They were
attracted by the slogan "Islam in Honor," for they conceived of
Islam as a part of their own alam and a cultural treasure. The
Permi idea of kebangsaan defined Islam more specifically as a
nationalist political slogan. The appeal of kebangsaan based
on Islam masked a determination to oppose the colonial power.
At a time when opposition to the government was mounting, the
slogan of "Islam and kebangsaan" became an attractive call to
political action.
A consequence of Permi's attempts to rationalize a philo-
sophical foundation with political objectives was further dis-
sension among the Islamic modernist leaders in Minangkabau.
The Permi slogan was not only a political ideology but also a
strategy and a political program. Controversy over the strate-
gies and goals of struggle contributed to numerous conflicts
and on a scale that threatened to prevent cooperation even among
Kaum Muda organizations.
Conflict between Permi and Other Parties
At a conference in July 1932, Permi announced that it would
become "a radical, non-cooperative political organization working
for the independence of Indonesia."19 This decision was a
18.	Sukarno retained his close feelings for the Permi. In a
1953 speech on Islam and the national state, he said:
"The Permi, my brothers, clearly said that 'Islam rec-
ognizes nationality, Islam acknowledges nationalism.
It is true what Bung Karno has said. It is also true
when Bung Karno warned: Beware of chauvinist nation-
alism. Islam does not condone chauvinist nationalism.
This is assjabiah, which is haram according to Islam.
.	.	.' Bung Karno was right and his opinion was not
contrary to Islamic teaching, this was the opinion of
the Permi, as expressed by its spokesman, the late
Muchtar Lutfi."
Sukarno, Negara Nasional dan Tjita-Tjita Islam (Djakarta:
Pustaka Endang, 1954) , pp. 19-20.
19.	Indisch Verslag, 1933, p. 15.164
culmination of internal developments and increasing participa-
tion by Permi in national politics. Since early 1931, party
leaders had consistently cultivated the notion of "bravery."
Bravery (keberanian) was lauded as the only way to erase the
shame "etched on [our] foreheads" as the result of humiliation
inflicted by a foreign power. A traditional sense of communal
shame thus obliged every Minangkabau to defend the honor of his
world (alam). The obligation was imperative not only because
it was morally right but also because it was a religious duty
(ibadah) .
Allah has given us legs, hands and minds to enable
us to endeavor and to work for our lives, our security
and our prosperity, and for the benefit of our reli-
gion, our nation and our tanah air. All these [obli-
gations] cannot be carried out without bravery and
without willingness to sacrifice wealth and to maximize
one’s efforts.20
The traditional sense of shame and the code of bravery were
also diligently cultivated by the PSII, a small radical Islamic
party. The competition between Permi and PSII contributed much
to snowballing political radicalism in Minangkabau and to the
creation of a social climate in which bold speakers were idol-
ized. In spite of their competition and disagreements about
Islam and nationalism, Permi and the PSII shared the view that
active engagement in politics was the most effective way to
achieve the greatness of Islam and the independence of Indone-
sia. Muchtar Lutfi attacked Muhammadijah for becoming increas-
ingly anti-political, saying:
One should not forget the teachings of religion that
Islam not only recognizes politics but considers it
as an obligation [for Muslims]. The first step by
the Prophet was to take political power into his
hands.21
The Muhammadijah attitude of standing aloof from politics, he
said, demonstrated their misunderstanding of the character of
Islamic doctrine as well as a lack of persistence in belief and
in the determination to fulfill religious obligations.
20.	"Keberanian dalam Barisan Kebangsaan," Medan Rakjat, 1,
No. 10 (June 15, 1931) .
21.	From speeches given at the July conference. Politieke
Politioneel Overzicht, July 1932, Mailrapport 952x/’32.
See also, "Critiek dan Komentar: Kepada PSII, Pembela Is-
lam, Moehammadijah dan JIB," Pembela Islam, 46 (1932), pp.
30 - 34.165
Muhammadijah leaders realized that this interpretation was
designed to make the question of politicizing Islam a purely
religious issue. It was no longer simply a matter of the proper
strategy to achieve the common goal, that is, the realization
of Islamic ideals. Although in principle the Muhammadijah did
not object to participation by its members in politics, as an
organization it was determined to maintain a purely educational
and religious character. Muhammadijah leaders believed that
their activities could eliminate the present social ills and
backwardness and create a religiously based society. Its lead-
ers, such as Sutan Mansjur, thought that, as social and reli-
gious reformers, their main concerns were not in the political
field but rather in the area of moral reconstruction. They
therefore rejected political activities as being an inappropri-
ate method for dealing with these problems.22 Muhammadijah
would not give priority to the political solution, that is,
independence.
In one of his speeches, Saalah Sutan Mangkuto stated:
The Muhammadijah wants to bring Muslims to the true
teachings of Islam and to deepen the Islamic soul
among them. The Muhammadijah walks on a straight
path. It will never be diverted to the right or to
the left, as is the case with other organizations,
such as Permi, PSII and others.23
The "straight path" meant the continuing effort to create an
ideal society, beginning with the "conquest of one's self."
The irreligious social environment and immoral behavior, accord-
ing to this view, originated from the state of man's inner self,
rather than foreign political domination. "Our fate now," a
local Muhammadijah leader said, "can be compared with a tree
which is being attacked by parasites." The parasites are uncon-
trolled hawa nafsu (human desires) which weaken the ability of
akal (intelligence) to perceive the right path. The major ob-
jective of the Muhammadijah is "to eliminate these parasites."24
"Individual purification," then, was the immediate goal of the
Muhammadijah. Compared with this goal, the struggle to overcome
foreign domination, as advocated by the political parties, was
relatively easy because it meant fighting the enemy one already
22.	A1 [pseud.1, "Pentingnja Politiek bagi Pergerakan," Pembela
Islam, 42 (1932), pp. 6-8.
23.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, July 1932, Mailrapport
952x/'32.
24.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, May and June 1932, Mail-
rapport 774x/'32, 794x/'32.166
hated. One simply channeled one’s hawa nafsu against a readily
available object. But the Muhammadijah wanted to lead man to
the only real and true victory, that over his own self and his
own weakness.
In an angry attack on Permi, during the Regional Conference
of Muhammadijah in March 1932, Sutan Mansjur said:
Now everybody is demanding freedom. Everybody is say-
ing "Indonesia Raja." They are all avowing that they
believe in God. These [statements] are all frauds,
lies. Father is blind, mother is blind and children
cursed. These are now the inhabitants of Indonesia.
How easy and how nice to demand freedom and to say
that "Islam is great," "Islam is pure." These are
all complete lies.25
How, he asked, could Islamic leaders demand political independ-
ence while they were neglecting their more essential roles as
social and religious reformers? How could they say "Islam is
great," when in fact they did not work for the creation of a
true Islamic society? Prevailing social ills and moral degrada-
tion could be eradicated only by an intensification of religious
conviction leading to the creation of a right-guided society.
The Muhammadijah leader argued that through a complete affirma-
tion of the Faith (aqidah}, any ideal could be realized. Man
was not guided merely by his akal or motivated by his nafsu; he
was also directed by God. In line with this concept, the inde-
pendence of Indonesia should not be seen as the way toward
social reformation but rather a consequence of the realization
of aqidah.26 Given the creation of a right-guided society,
Permi ideals, such as Islamic greatness or a prosperous Indone-
sia, could easily be realized.
For the sake of the Islamic ummat and the realization of
aqidah, the Muhammadijah leaders stressed the importance of
social harmony. In practice, they believed, social harmony re-
quired personal subjection to religion, adat and governmental
laws. The study of leaders was to avoid potential clashes among
these three valid laws.27
25.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, March 1932, Mailrapport
492x/’32.
26.	Interview with A. R. Sutan Mansjur, Djakarta, September
1968; Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, April and July 1932,
Mailrapport 659x/’32, 952x/’32.
27.	A local Muhammadijah leader said in a speech: "We should
be loyal to the three valid systems of law, namely, religion,167
Permi and PSII leaders argued that the realization of
aqidah was impossible while the country was dominated by a colo-
nial power and subjected to kafir laws. They saw the problem
in a different perspective and used different logic. Conse-
quently, they believed that social ills and moral decadence did
not exist in a vacuum but were the direct results of an unhealthy
political and economic environment. In a colonial society,
they argued, there was no freedom to practice and develop reli-
gious morality. In a colonized country, religious leaders and
scholars were forced to become "the instruments of the coloniz-
ers" and abandon their roles as the guides of the people. Colo-
nial domination and suppression resulted in the weakening of
people's "minds and bodies." Moral solutions, therefore, were
far from sufficient, because there was no guarantee that the
Muhammadijah plan of creating an ideal society through the "con-
quest of one's self" could in fact be carried out. As a result,
political independence was "the only remedy for a country which
cannot raise its voice to the sky."28 Muchtar Lutfi argued:
Islam is truly a religion of independence. Therefore,
we, the Muslims, should not remain passive while Islam
is under the control of hypocrites [kaum munafik].29
The controversies between the leaders of Muhammadijah and
Permi became so heated that each even accused the other of being
kafir. In 1932, Hadji A. Malik Karim Amrullah, a son of Hadji
Rasul, returned from the National Congress of Muhammadijah in
Makasar and condemned the political activities of Permi and the
PSII as deviations from the correct religious path. He said
the Permi practice of singing the national anthem "Indonesia
Raja" after the Quranic recitation at the opening of its public
adat and government. In ordinary life, these three cannot
and should not be separated." Politieke Politioneel Over-
zicht, 3de kwartaal, 1931, Mailrapport 1200x/'31. On the
role of this concept in Minangkabau social relationships,
see Nancy Tanner, "Disputing and Dispute Settlement among
the Minangkabau of Indonesia," Indonesia, 8 (October 1969),
pp. 21-67.
28.	"Ke Indonesia Merdeka: Kewadjiban Bangsa dan Tanah Air,"
Medan Rakjat, 1, No. 13 (August 1931). In 1933, after its
top leaders had been arrested, Permi said that the imme-
diate objective for it and other radical parties was
"national reconstruction," which could be carried out
through political independence. Medan Rakjat, 3, No. 28
(October 1, 1933).
29.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, May 1934, Mailrapport
774x/'34.168
meetings was bid’ah.30
Although the Kaum Muda ulama supported Muhammadijah's posi-
tion, they denounced in general the way the younger generation
of Islamic leaders conducted their controversies. In late 1932,
Hadji Rasul, who had been highly critical of the Permi idea of
"Islam and kebangsaan," and Sjech Daud Rasjidi, whose son and
nephews were leaders of Permi, held a meeting with Sutan Mansjur
and Saalah Sutan Mangkuto (from Muhammadijah) and Muchtar Lutfi,
Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib and Mansur Daud (from Permi). Speaking
for the Kaum Muda ulama, they reproved the young leaders for
"their childish behavior." This reprimand curbed the intensity
of conflict and brought changes in the way the leaders conducted
their arguments. Nevertheless, dissension among the Kaum Muda
educated group was not completely healed until the early
1940's.31
Despite extensive divisions among the Kaum Muda educated
intellectuals, they did share certain basic ideological princi-
ples. They were all profoundly concerned with the present and
the future course of Islam. They saw themselves as leaders,
teachers and reformers of their society. Basing their social
philosophy on Islam, the young Islamic modernist leaders wanted
to eradicate social ills and establish social justice. The
Muhammadijah, for example, not only founded schools but also
organized the "Helpers of Public Suffering" which ran clinics
and orphanages. Permi leaders pictured their party as "the
champion of the common people," working "to attain a prosperous
Indonesia."32 Calling for "Islamic socialism," the PSII wanted
30.	Ibid., June 1932, Mailrapport 794x/’32. Hamka's views
about Islam and nationalism changed in the late 1930’s.
He said that if nationalism were not taken as exclusivism
and chauvinism, then it was not contradictory with Islam.
As a result of this new view, Hamka came under attack from
A. Hassan, leader of Persatuan Islam. At the time, Hamka
was the editor of an influential Islamic journal, the
Pedoman Masjarakat, published in Medan.
31.	Interview with Mansur Daud Dt. Palimo Kajo, Bukittinggi,
July 1968. Mansur Daud is the son of Sjech Daud. Both
Hadji Djalaluddin and Muchtar Lutfi were nephews of Sjech
Daud. All were students of Hadji Rasul, father-in-law of
Sutan Mansjur. Duski Samad, outspoken Permi leader, was a
younger brother of Sutan Mansjur. One could then see the
conflict between the Muhammadijah and the Permi leadership
as a "family tragedy."
32.	"Indonesia Sentosa dengan Djalan Indonesia Merdeka," Medan
Rakjat, 3, No. 28 (October 1933).169
to apply religious laws to economic activities, thus making
capitalist exploitation impossible and furthering development
of the national economy.
Ideas of socialism and social justice, whether based on
Islam, Marxism, or the conception of the indigenous Indonesian
village, were common denominators in the independence movement.
But divergent sources of inspiration and quarrels on the sub-
stance of socialism and social justice created controversies
in the nationalist movement. In the 1920's, these issues had
led to a split in the SI and to a polarization within the Kaum
Muda educated group in Minangkabau which prepared the way for
an emergent communist movement. In the early 1930’s, these
issues re-emerged when Mohammad Hatta introduced the Pendidikan
Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Education), known as
the PNI Baru (New PNI). The spread of this secular nationalist
party in Minangkabau posed a challenge to Permi and extended
into West Sumatra the conflict between the Hatta-Sjahrir PNI
Baru and Sukarno's Partindo, with which Permi had a very close
relationship.
In late 1932, Hatta, who had just returned from Holland,
came to West Sumatra to visit his relatives. He used this occa-
sion to promote his party. In the course of this he introduced
a new element into local political controversies. As part of
his fiery revolutionary speeches and writings, Hatta stressed
the urgent need for mature mental and organizational prepara-
tions. He said in one speech:
Freedom is sure to come, although we do not know when.
But our goal for freedom cannot be attained simply by
using our knives in the face of [Dutch] rifles and
guns.33
He appealed for a change in the style of social mobilization
from mass rallies to intensified cadre formation. Because he
had a reputation as a militant nationalist, this call had a pro-
found impact on the Minangkabau popular movement. It was espe-
cially attractive for Muhammadijah leaders who saw the PNI Baru
as a new and more acceptable forum for challenging Permi. Older
leaders of the PMDS youth organization and even some former
leaders of the Permi itself were attracted by Hatta's ideas.
They became promoters of the PNI Baru. Hatta, himself the son
of a prominent ulama, the sjech of Batu Hampar, recruited his
followers from among the Kaum Muda educated group.
33. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, November 1932, Mailrapport
115x/'33.170
Hatta was expelled from the West Coast of Sumatra in Novem-
ber 1932,34 but the PNI Baru remained and posed a new challenge
to Permi. In the ideological realm, the PNI Baru represented a
logical extension of the increasingly secular activities of
Permi. The PNI Baru had been introduced by Hatta, whose reli-
gious devotion was well-known, and it emphasized complete reli-
gious freedom. Though party policy remained neutral toward
religion, the leaders of the PNI Baru pointed out that individu-
al members of the party were not therefore unconcerned about
religion. But the obvious distinction between party policy and
its members’ views on religious matters became a major target
for Permi criticism. Permi was quick to attack for it had been
accused by others of having compromised its own religious be-
liefs for the sake of political expediency. On the question of
nationalism or kebangsaan, Permi attacks on the PNI Baru only
echoed the arguments of other Islamic parties. Concerning the
PNI Baru’s concept of democracy, Permi argued that such a state
system might eventually precipitate a clash between Islamic and
state law. A more basic ideological objection to the PNI Baru
centered on its concept of "collectivism." In the traditional
Indonesian "collective" system, there was a division between
property and labor. The PNI Baru, however, wanted to establish
a new society where property and labor belonged to the community
Unlike the traditional system, the new one was based on the
assumption that, in order to achieve the highest degree of pro-
ductivity and social justice, communal property should not be
divided among individuals. It should be exploited communally
"under the leadership of consensus (mufakat).”35 Collectivism
would eliminate capitalism and imperialism and put the means of
production into the hands of the state.
Collectivism as promoted by the PNI Baru was attacked by
Permi for several reasons. It was called an affront against
adat law and a repudiation of Islamic law, which recognized a
clear division between communal and individual property.36
Collectivism was hardly an attractive social program for Minang-
kabau traders who believed in the virtue of individual enter-
prise. More than anything else, the issue came the main ideological block preventing PNI Baru in Minangkabau.37		of collectivism be the spread of the
34.	Ibid.	
35.	Mohammad Hatta, "Collectivisme Tua dan Karangan (Djakarta: Balai Ilmu, 1953),	Baru," Kumpulan I, pp. 90-96.
36.	On the debates, see Berita, April 25, April 11, 1932.	1932, and Seng Po,
37.	Bouman, Enige Beschouwingen, pp. 86-87	•171
Another aspect of the conflict between the PNI Baru and
Permi was an extension to Sumatra of the debate between Hatta
and Sjahrir on the one hand, and Sukarno, on the other. This
debate centered particularly around questions of the tactics
needed to achieve success of specific social and political
strategies. Though agreeing on the strategic importance of
mass action, mass parties and non-cooperation, Hatta and
Sjahrir saw a more urgent need for social education and cadre
formation. They believed that without a sufficient number of
cadres and given a lack of political consciousness by the
masses, the independence movement would have to depend upon
only a few leaders. In this situation, they argued, how could
the spirit of modern democracy be effectively introduced to the
people?38
As part of an indirect attack on the PNI Baru, Permi empha-
sized its own democratic and revolutionary platform. Permi
called itself a "revolutionary party" not because it wanted to
"conduct illegal actions" but because "it wanted to see Indone-
sian independence as soon as possible." Permi based its strug-
gle on the principles of "self-confidence" and "self-help"
because it believed that "maohtsvormi-nc}' (formation of power)
and mass action were of prime importance. Since "mass action"
could be formed only with the support of the people's spirit
and the people's confidence, a major function of a political
party should be to magnify and to direct the "people's deter-
mination."39 The Permi organ, Medan Rakjat, stated:
The emergence of the [independence] movement was not
the result of the leaders' instigation, it originated
in the hearts of the people. In the beginning it was
only an evolution of mind, finally it became a tremen-
dous movement....
In this situation, the function of political leaders was only
"to direct the flow of emotions and sentiments" and "to design
the best and the shortest ways toward the realization of the
ideals." Referring to government oppression, Permi pointed out
that a movement which was organized by and from the people could
never die--especially if it based its struggle upon a strong
38.	On the controversies, see Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the
Struggle for Indonesian Independence, trans. by Mary Somers
Heidhues (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 127-
173; and Sutan Sjahrir, Pikiran dan Perdjoeangan (Djakarta:
Poestaka Rakjat, 1947), pp. 5-78.
39.	"Tjoekoep Tiga Tahoen Berdjoeang," Medan Rakjat, 3, No. 16
(June 1933) .172
belief in God.40
This was the last political appeal made by Permi, for the
same month, October 1933, its leaders were arrested. Shortly
after publication of this issue, Medan Rakjat was confiscated
and its operations suspended. Ideological controversies among
political leaders of the various parties and organizations and
their attempts to implement political strategies were temporarily
ended by government suppression.
Concluding Thoughts
The ideological controversies occurred during a period of
intense political activity, the expansion of private schools and
the modernization of religious schools. The visit and the re-
turn of perantau intellectuals from Java, Holland and Cairo,
started a more intensive search for a suitable ideology among
the Islamic modernists. This search was intensified by the
desire of the Cairo returnees to play an important role in the
national politics of independence and by the increasing flow of
political ideas brought by the perantau intellectuals from Java.
The two currents of ideas increased anti-government political
activities and at the same time deepened dissension among the
leaders of the Kaum Muda educated group.
Permi's Islamic nationalism, symbolized by the slogan
"Islam and kebangsaan," and the notion of political activism,
conceived as the way toward the attainment of Indonesian inde-
pendence, were the most crucial issues in the political debates.
Although the philosophical foundation of Permi's Islamic nation-
alism did not markedly differ from the ideas advanced by the
PSII or other Islamic organizations, Permi openly acknowledged
the importance of nationalist aspirations. In doing so, it com-
pletely rejected the feasibility and even the legitimacy of
Pan-Islamism, an ideal still cherished by orthodox Muslim lead-
ers. The opposition to Permi was partly a reaction against its
readiness to deal directly with political reality and abandon
the notions of a utopian society which had characterized the
early Islamic modernists. In Minangkabau itself, however, the
appeal for kebangsaan combined with Islam found followers among
the politically oriented Kaum Muda educated group. The appeal
for Indonesian unity in Minangkabau, which traditionally con-
ceived itself as an open yet clearly defined world, suggested
not only awareness of a common fate and destiny with other eth-
nic groups but also of the threat posed by the centripetal
40. "Revoloesi dan Gerakan Revoloetioner," Medan Rakjat, 3, No.
28 (October 1933) .173
character of the traditional alam. It was on the latter problem
that the Minangkabau character of the Permi can be clearly seen.
Permi leaders, and other political leaders as well, urged the
absorption of Minangkabau into Indonesia, but at the same time
they tried to demonstrate the central position of the alam
Minangkabau in this new and enlarged world. Permi ideology
tried to find a compromise with contesting ideas and to har-
monize a modern political appeal with the traditional concep-
tion of the Minangkabau world. This was partly responsible for
its failure to attract orthodox Muslim leaders and to become a
"national catalyst." But, on the other hand, these two factors
were responsible for Permi’s success in becoming the largest
party in Sumatra. The weaknesses in its ideological formulation
proved to be assets instead of obstacles in the party’s develop-
ment .
Controversy between Islamic political parties, such as the
Permi and the PSII, on the one hand, and the Muhammadijah, on
the other, were part of the more general tensions in Islamic
thought "between ideal and actuality, the spiritual and the
temporal, virtue and power."41 The Muhammadijah leaders and
the Kaum Muda ulama were more concerned with the creation of an
ideal religiously based society. Instead of dealing with the
question of immediate power, they worried about conceptualizing
Ultimate Power. Although Permi and the PSII leaders also be-
lieved that their struggles could not be separated from their
religious duties, they preferred to face the actuality instead
of the ideal, that is, power instead of virtue. In spite of
the commonly acknowledged idea that ultimate power resided in
the hands of God the Creator, the main concern of these politi-
cal leaders was to confront the immediate holder of power, the
colonial government. Tension between political (or temporal)
and moral solutions was also evident in the career and teaching
of the early protagonists of Islamic modernism. The Kaum Muda
intellectuals brought to the surface the inner tension of Is-
lamic modernist ideas.
In a time of crisis, this inherent ideological tension
could become an impressive force, in which utopian aspirations
and immediate political concerns found a common front. The con-
sequences of the inner tension became obvious when the crisis
had passed and Islamic leaders were forced to deal with the
problem of reconciling this dualism. But in the 1930's and
throughout the colonial period generally, anti-government
actions could still serve as the means of escape from the diffi-
cult task of solving such problems.
41. Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 1.CHAPTER VIII
THE POLITICS OF RADICALISM
The period from early 1931 until the middle of 1933 formed
the high watermark in the Indonesian independence movement.
Radical political parties dominated the popular movements, and
they influenced not only the non-cooperative but also the coop-
erative parties. Disillusionment with the government began to
appear in those circles which had once maintained a "good faith
in the colonial government."1 Indonesian members in the Volks-
raad became increasingly critical about the government’s han-
dling of the nationalist political parties.2
Anti-government activities intensified at the end of 1932
and in early 1933, as the divergent Indonesian political and
educational organizations mounted their opposition to the "Wild
Schools Ordinance," considered a direct assault on nationalist
educational development. The climax of anti-government action
was a mutiny by the Indonesian crew of the Dutch warship Zeven
Provineien. The government retaliated by sinking the ship.
This senseless punitive action exacerbated political tension in
Indonesia as well as in Holland, and the government was forced
to re-examine the ethical basis of its colonial policy. "It
has proved," said the leader of the nationalist group in the
Volksraad, "that the Christian government is godless."3
The worsening of relations between the government and the
nationalists was aggravated by the economic depression and the
growing influence of reactionary elements within the Dutch ad-
ministration. In September 1931, de Graeff, a liberal and
paternalistic Governor-General, was succeeded by de Jonge,
1.	Hatta, "Tudjuan dan Politik Pergerakan Kebangsaan di Indone
sia (1930)," Kumpulan Karangan, I, pp. 26-57.
2.	B. J. Brouwer, De Houding van Idenburg en Colijn Tegenover
de Indonesische Beweging (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1958), pp. 172
173.
3.	Handelingen van den Volksraad (Batavia: n.p., 1932-1933), p
2775. A leftist account of the mutiny is contained in, M.
S ap i j a, Sedjarah Pemberontakan di Kapal Tudjuh (Zeven Pro-
vincien) (Djakarta: n.p., 1960). The government account is
contained in, S. L. van der Wal (ed.), Herinneringen van
Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge: Met Brieven uit Zijn Nalatenschap
(Groningen: WoIters-Noordhoff, 1968) , pp. 16-170.
174175
formerly director of a Dutch oil company. Although unfamiliar
with Indonesian affairs, he was determined to use "practical
politics" in dealing with economic and political problems.
"Political make-believe," he stated in his inaugural speech,
"which can be applied in a time of prosperity, is useless now;
it is not what is desirable but rather what is possible that
must now prevail."* True to his words, the new Governor-General
instituted a retrenchment policy and liberally used his extra-
ordinary powers to prosecute nationalist leaders. His motto
was:	"Live first, politics later."4 5 De Jonge was a good choice
to work under Colijn, then Minister of Colonies and a man who
believed that Dutch power in the Netherlands Indies was as
"firmly rooted as Mont Blanc in the Alps."6 And he was deter-
mined to prove it. Before coming to power, Colijn had suggested
that educational programs should be reduced because they had
dangerous results. During his tenure of office, an important
aspect of the retrenchment policy was a reduction in the pro-
gram of government and subsidized school networks.
One of the most significant results of the change in
Governors-General was a decline in the influence exercized by
the Office for Native Affairs. The Attorney-General now had the
decisive voice, which gave local authorities a freer hand in
dealing with political problems. Central government sanctions
against the use of an "iron hand" policy were removed. The
Attorney-General, according to a former controleur, was always
"in agreement with the Resident."7 Under such circumstances,
relations between the local administration and the popular move-
ment in West Sumatra became increasingly difficult and strained.
Minangkabau continued as one of the most politicized re-
gions in Indonesia. Led by Kaum Muda educated intellectuals,
the political parties and social-educational organizations in-
tensified their activities. They fostered people's industries,
expanded private schools, both religious and secular, and mod-
ernized existing religious schools. It was characteristic of
the early 1930's that religio-political publications, such as
newspapers, journals and booklets, sprang up all over, public
gatherings were held everywhere, and youth organizations pro-
liferated. The spirit of independence was gaining momentum, and
Minangkabau political parties, particularly Permi, began trying
4.	van der Wal, Herinneringen, p. 91.
5.	Cited in Brouwer, Houding van Idenburg, p. 172.
6.	H. Colijn, Koloniale Vraagstukken van Heden en Morgen
(Amsterdam: Drukkerij de Standard, 1928) , p. 39.
7.	van der Meulen, Ik Stond er Bij , p. 111.176
to influence the direction of popular movements throughout Indo
nesia. This was the final stage in the process. In the 1920’s
the Communist Party in West Sumatra acted on the instruction of
its central board in Java. Next came the Muhammadijah whose
leaders had promoted their organization, which came from Java,
by claiming it had the tjap Minangkabau, "Minangkabau style."
Now Permi wanted to introduce its own version of the "Minangka-
bau style" into Java itself as well as other parts of Sumatra.
It hoped to solve the conflict between the Islamic and the
kebangsaan group everywhere.
During this period, however, the Kaum Muda educated group
also experienced its worst internal split since the earlier
communist crisis. Political activities and questions of Islam
and nationalism alienated the Kaum Muda ulama from their former
students, who saw themselves as social reformers. But the same
issues also caused a split between the Kaum Tua ulama and their
younger assistants and students, whose training had stressed
obedience to established religious authorities in general and
one’s teachers in particular.
During the economic depression, the numerous political and
educational organizations sought new ways to finance their
activities. Permi and the Muhammadijah ran small enterprises,
producing cigarettes, cooking oil and soap, as well as consumer
cooperatives. Both organizations strongly encouraged their
affiliated organizations to develop their own cooperatives and
schools.* * 8 A new method of collecting money was through sponsor
ship of soccer matches. Several private schools in Pajakumbuh
and Padang, for example, were partially financed this way.9
During the period from January 1931 to July 1932 Permi
changed rapidly from a politically oriented educational and eco
nomic organization to a radical nationalist political party.
After the so-called "political education" phase, from November
1931 until July 1932, Permi proclaimed itself a "radical and
non-cooperative" party. Prior to July, Permi had been actively
engaged in realizing the educational programs of the former
Sumatra Thawalib Union, such as establishing a standard school
curriculum and improving the religious schools. As part of its
extra-curricular activities, Permi had quickly developed its
boy scout organization, El-Hilaal, into the largest in West
Sumatra. After the official transformation of Permi into a
political party, the boy scouts became an independent organiza-
8* Berita, September 3, 1932; Politieke Politioneel Overzicht,
3de kwartaal, 1931, Mailrapport 1200x/’31; ibid., August
1932, Mailrapport 10l7x/'32.
9. Ibid., 4de kwartaal, 1930, Mailrapport 228x/'31.177
tion. From July 1932 to April 1933, Permi expanded into the
largest and the most radical political party in Sumatra. It
began preparations for expansion to Java after it already had
branches scattered throughout Minangkabau and other parts of
Sumatra. The extent of its influence was demonstrated in
November 1932, when the organization of Kaum Tua schools, the
PTI, changed its name to Pendidikan Islam Indonesia (Islamic
Indonesian Education) and adopted Permi's slogan "Islam and
kebangsaan" as its ideological foundation.
After the release of Datuk Singo Mangkuto from prison
in April 1931, the PSII staged a robust comeback. At first,
until November 1931, it attempted unsuccessfully to establish a
kind of federation with Permi, after which the two parties be-
came strong competitors. The PSII was particularly successful
in rural areas in the districts of Manindjau, Agam Tua and
Suliki. Manindjau was the site of its earliest branch and
acted as the center of activities of the party's most important
leaders, Datuk Singo Mangkuto, Hadji Uddin Rahmany and Sabilal
Rasad. In Agam Tua, the party had been organized by perantau
traders from Java. The PSII emerged as the first radical party
in Kamang, a nagari which had been consistently and strongly
anti-government since the anti-tax rebellion of 1908. In the
district of Suliki, one of the strongest bases of the communist
movement in the mid-1920's, the PSII branch was founded by
local graduates of Sumatra Thawalib at Padang Pandjang. In
November 1932, Minangkabau political life became even more com-
plicated when the PNI Baru established branches in several
towns, among them, Padang, Padang Pandjang, Bukittinggi and
Pajakumbuh. In June 1933, branches of Sukarno's Partindo were
formed with indirect Permi support. By this time, however, the
central government and the local administration were increasing
their repressive attitude toward local organizations.
By the end of 1933, several important leaders had already
suffered from the "extraordinary powers" of the Governor-General
A large number of the second echelon leaders were punished under
the terms of highly flexible provisions concerning seditious
speech or writing.
Participation in National Politics
In January 1931, Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib became first
vice-chairman of the newly-established Permi. An experienced
teacher, productive writer and owner of a small printing house,
Hadji Djalaluddin proved the best organizer Permi ever had. In
March, the organizational hierarchy was improved further by the
formation of a Daily Executive Board to direct and coordinate
its day-to-day activities. The leadership of this body con-
sisted of Hadji Abdul Madjid, Djalaluddin Thaib, Iljas Jacub,178
Mansur Daud and H. Sjuib el-Jutusi,10 and, under their direc-
tion, Permi was soon on its way toward becoming a radical party.
Except for Hadji Abdul Madjid, a moderate Kaum Tua ulama and
political leader, the members of the executive body were strong-
ly inclined toward political activism. Muchtar Lutfi returned
from Cairo in May, and after a time, he joined his cousins,
Mansur Daud and Djalaluddin, and his friend, Iljas Jacub, in
the leadership of Permi. By the middle of 1931, the so-called
"political trio" of Djalaluddin the organizer, Iljas the ideo-
logue and Muchtar the orator was complete.* 11 But, by this
time, the relationship between Permi and the Kaum Muda ulama
had been severed. Sjech Ibrahim Musa of Parabek prohibited his
students and assistants from joining Permi, and Sjech Abbas of
Padang Pandjang renamed his school the Darulfunun Abbasiah in
order to emphasize his distaste for the now "corrupted" Sumatra
Thawalib.12
Permi began the new year with a determination to circulate
its ideas about Islam and nationalism more extensively. It also
clearly displayed its anti-colonial attitudes in several minor
incidents. For example, Permi refused to hoist the Dutch flag
during a religious celebration, and on another occasion ignored
a government regulation to close its schools in honor of the
Dutch Queen’s birthday. It expressed an economic nationalism
by a fairly successful effort to mobilize a boycott among Padang
merchants against Italian imports after Mussolini’s invasion of
Libya.13
Of more immediate concern for Permi, and other organiza-
tions as well, was the depression, especially given the number
of petty traders in the party. The issue was the main item on
the agendy of the Second Permi Congress. Its goals were out-
lined as: "to save society from the effects of the depression
10.	H. Sjuib el-Jutusi was a leader of the Padang Pandjang
Thawalib. Already in 1922, he had strongly urged direct
participation by his students in anti-government political
action.
11.	After January 1932, Hadji Abdul Madjid, the chairman,
gradually lost his influence among the younger Permi lead-
ers. Although he continued as chairman, in practice Hadji
Djalaluddin Thaib functioned as the real director.
Gonggrijp, "Memorie van Overgave," p. 61.
12.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 2de kwartaal, 1931, Mail-
rapport 8 0 8x/'31.
13.	Moestika, October 1931; Pompai, August 1931.179
and to seek ways for progress and welfare."14 The congress was
held in Padang from October 24 to November 1, 1931, and attended
by representatives of the 50 Permi groups. It was extremely
nationalist in character. The meeting hall was decorated with
pictures of Indonesian and other Asian nationalist leaders.
Refreshments were advertised as "Made in Indonesia." The con-
gress participants wore national costume. The main theme of
the speeches was the appeal for the application in Indonesia of
the Gandhian swadeshi.15 The most important results of the
congress were a plan to expand Permi outside West Sumatra and a
decision to encourage "political education." Permi was still
officially an educational and economic organization.16 At the
suggestion of Muchtar Lutfi, the congress tabled the question
of a possible fusion with the PSII.17
In January 1932, Permi took its first step toward involve-
ment in the national independence movement; it sent a delegation
to the Indonesia Raja Congress sponsored by PPPKI in Surabaja.
The congress failed to achieve its main objectives--reunifica-
tion of Partindo and the PNI Baru and reconciliation of Islamic
and "secular" nationalist groups--but Permi delegates, Djala-
luddin Thaib and Basa Bandaro, used the opportunity to establish
cordial relations with Sukarno. They also managed to come to a
better understanding with Dr. Sutomo, the chairman of the con-
gress and the leader of the Nationalist Club of Surabaja, who
had been on generally bad terms with the Islamic parties.18
14.	Pompai, October 15, 1931.
15.	Gonggrijp, "Memorie van Overgave," pp. 60-61.
16.	Debate on the formal transformation to a purely political
party caused a heated exchange between the "moderates" and
the "radicals." The proposal was defeated 50 to 20, but
the radicals managed to achieve a compromise whereby the
congress appointed a committee to study the politicization
of Permi. Muchtar Lutfi and Iljas Jacub were members. In
the end, the committee proposed that Permi avoid direct in-
volvement but continue to observe and educate its members
in politics. Gonggrijp, "Memorie van Overgave," p. 62.
17.	Hadji Abdul Madjid was chairman of Permi and adviser of the
PSII. He tried very hard to achieve a fusion of the two
organizations, but his influence over Permi was waning.
Report of the Provincial Bureau of Investigation, July 17,
1933, Mailrapport 934x/'33.
18.	Noer, "Rise and Development," pp. 408-410. An attack by
Sutomo on Hadji Agus Salim aroused some apprehension in
non-Javanese secular nationalist circles, especially as it180
Although Permi did not join the federation, it used its partici-
pation in the Indonesia Raja Congress as a propaganda theme in
West Sumatra. Permi wanted to resolve the conflict between the
Islamic and the kebangsaan parties and feared that by joining
the PPPKI it would become suspect in the eyes of both the Is-
lamic parties and the radical secular parties.19 During the
congress, however, Permi delegates apparently reached an under-
standing with Partindo leaders whereby the former agreed not to
block the expansion of the latter to West Sumatra.20
In February 1932, two Minangkabau Partindo leaders from
Pekalongan came to West Sumatra to reinvigorate the party’s
effort to expand its influence in Minangkabau. It was the
second such attempt. In October 1931, shortly before the Permi
congress, several perantau from Java had tried to form Partindo
branches but had failed because of effective Permi counter-
propaganda. 21 Although Permi withheld its hand during the
second attempt, the Partindo promoters failed again. By this
time, the urban political movement was already under the influ-
ence of Permi and the rural areas were caught up in the competi-
tion between Permi and the PSII. The secular character of the
was supported by another Javanese leader. This and similar
incidents provoked Dr. Abdul Rivai, an early nationalist
leader, to announce: "There is no such thing as Indonesian
nationalism,’ for what is now being practiced is only
'Javanese nationalism.'" This statement from such a promi-
nent figure created an uproar in the nationalist movement.
Parada Harahap, Riwajat Dr. A. Rivai (Medan: n.p., 1939),
pp. 144-157. An Islamic nationalist intellectual called
Rivai’s assessment "too frank." Is, "Indonesisch Nation-
alisme," Pembela Islam, 36 (October 1931), pp. 14-17.
19.	On his return, Thaib wrote a booklet entitled Peringatan
Nasional in which he said that the PPPKI would eventually
succeed in achieving its objective, that is, unification of
all nationalist parties. But he thought that Permi needed
time to expand and develop itself first and to study the
federation more closely. Cited in Politieke Politioneel
Overzicht, January 1932, Mailrapport 335x/'32. Thaib*s
caution was understandable since as yet no Islamic organi-
zation had joined the federation. Moreover the PSI left
it in December 1930. L. M. Sitorus, Sedjarah Pergerakan
Kebangsaan Indonesia (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1951), p.
kt:
20.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, July 1932, Mailrapport
952x/'32.	-----------
21.	Ibid., 4de kwartaal, 1931, Mailrapport 236x/'32.181
Partindo, moreover, proved a major stumbling block barring its
expansion in Minangkabau.
After a month of fruitless campaigning, the Partindo pro-
moters shifted their tactics and tried to attract Permi into a
merger. On March 25, in a meeting with the members of the Permi
executive board, the Partindo promoters pointed to ideological
similarities between the two parties. But, they argued that,
by using Islam as its ideological foundation, Permi excluded
the non-Muslim minorities. The Partindo promoters asserted that
religion was no longer a suitable ideology given the nature of
modern politics; they invited Permi to merge with the Partindo.22
Although the Permi leaders agreed to bring the problem before
their congress, the Partindo promoters realized that most of the
Permi leaders strongly opposed the proposal. Anticipating an
eventual rejection by Permi, the Partindo promoters offered
another proposal. In view of the fact that Permi was active in
social and educational fields as well as politics, they suggested
the organization be divided into two parts. The first part
could be a purely Islamic educational organization and the
second a secular nationalist political party which could either
merge or federate with Partindo. The Islamic part might then
join the Muhammadijah or the PSII if it too wanted to partici-
pate in politics.23 This proposal in effect meant nothing less
than the elimination of Permi, and it seriously threatened rela-
tions between Permi and Partindo. Muchtar Lutfi and other
leaders felt that the Partindo people were purposely ridiculing
the ideas propagated by Permi and its intention to act as a
"national catalyst." They considered the Partindo proposal
clear proof that the Java-based party had a low opinion of
Permi. As a reaction to the incident, Permi intensified its
campaign emphasizing the vital importance of religion in the
nationalist movement.
In an effort to end the friction, Permi adviser Basa
Bandaro decided to go to Java and meet with the Partindo central
executive board. He managed to convince Partindo leaders to
come to West Sumatra and campaign for Permi. Both sides agreed
that each party would refrain from campaigns in the other's
sphere of influence--Permi would not form branches in Java and
the Partindo would not open more branches in Sumatra.24 The
agreement was reaffirmed by two Partindo leaders at a special
Permi conference in July 1932. The agreement remained in effect
22.	Ibid., July 1932, Mailrapport 952x/'32.
23.	Ibid., August 1932, Mailrapport 659x/'32.
24.	van Heuven, "Memorie van Overgave," p. 24; Tamar Djaja,
"Islam di Indonesia."182
until June 1933, when three small branches of the Partindo were
organized with the approval of Djalaluddin Thaib after discus-
sions with Sukarno.25 Permi by then had begun preparations for
its own expansion to Java.
Shortly after the July 1932 conference, Permi organized
branches in several areas of Sumatra. In August, Duski Samad,
a member of the central board, assisted by local Minangkabau
traders,formed branches in Benkulen26 and in South Sumatra.27
In the same month, Mansur Daud and H. Sjuib el-Jutusi organized
Permi branches in Atjeh and in East Sumatra. Several branches
were also begun in South Tapanuli.
In order to strengthen its relationship with the national-
ist movement in Java, particularly with the PPPKI and the Par-
tindo (now led by Sukarno), Permi sent Muchtar Lutfi to Java in
September. For about a month, he was a guest of Partindo and
participated in various of its public meetings. His activities
and speeches on Islam and kebangsaan, though harshly attacked
by the Persatuan Islam and other Muslim organizations, made
Permi widely known in nationalist political circles on Java.28
In October, Permi appointed Abdul Gaffar Ismail as its represen
tative in Java and authorized him to participate in political
activities and establish contact with other nationalist parties
In its competition locally with the PSII and the Muhammadi
jah, Permi had an advantage because its central board was in
West Sumatra rather than Java. It could show the Minangkabau
people that it had the potential to make Minangkabau a leader
in the nationalist movement. The question of the role of
Minangkabau in the national sphere continued to be important.
Muhammadijah successfully began its activities in Minangkabau
before 1931 when it was still relatively free from the direct
control of its Central Board in Java. It was protected by
25.	Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib had gone to Java to discuss joint
opposition to the Wild Schools Ordinance. Politieke Poli-
tioneel Overzicht, February 1933, Mailrapport 590x/’33.
26.	Concerning the Permi in Bengkulen, see G. F. Pijper,
Fragmenta Islamica: Studien over het Islamisme in Neder-
landsch-Indie (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1934) , pp. 177-182 .
27.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, September 1932, Mailrap-
port 1159x/’32 .
28.	van Heuven, "Memorie van Overgave," p. 24; Report of the
Provincial Bureau of Investigation, July 17, 1933, Mail-
rapport 9 3 4x/'3 3.183
Central Board intervention on its behalf with the Office for
Native Affairs, but its real appeal in Minangkabau stemmed from
a claim that it was not a mere copy of some Javanese organiza-
tion .
The radical PSII relied heavily on the fiery anti-colonial
speeches of its leaders in its competition with Permi. But
party leaders realized that they needed more freedom from the
PSII central board because merely adopting a "Minangkabau style"
proved inadequate. As long as the PSII in West Sumatra served
only as a "regional representative" for the central board in
Java, the party leaders felt the urban Minangkabau would con-
sider it no more than a mouthpiece for Java. Shortly after the
party's regional conference in April 1932, a move began to
change this situation. Several local leaders urged the regional
chairman, Datuk Singo Mangkuto, to seek approval from the cen-
tral board for the transformation of the West Sumatra group into
a semi-autonomous organization. They wanted to reorganize the
local branches into a Perserikatan PSII Minangkabau (Union of
Minangkabau PSII). By so doing, they thought the PSII in Minang
kabau could design its own activities in accordance with the
local environment and its specific problems. The central board,
however, feared this would cause further dismemberment of the
party and rejected the proposal, though Datuk Singo Mangkuto
was reaffirmed as regional chairman.29 As a result of this re-
jection, however, Datuk Singo Mangkuto began to lose ground in
his competition for leadership with Hadji Uddin Rahmany and
Sabilal Rasad.
The PNI Baru in West Sumatra experienced a similar develop-
ment. Since the establishment of its branches in November 1932,
the party had been under attack by Permi, the PSII and other
Muslim organizations. Its concept of "collectivism" was de-
nounced as being anti-Islamic and its neutral stand on religion
was condemned as a threat to Islam. The local leaders of the
PNI Baru, mostly from the Kaum Muda educated group, found them-
selves in ideological difficulty. They wanted to lessen the
ideological control exercised by the central board in Java. In
June 1933, at the preparatory meeting for a forthcoming national
congress, the Minangkabau leaders decided to propose to the
congress that, in matters of religion and adat, the regional
board should be given complete authority. Furthermore, in ac-
cordance with the structure of other Minangkabau Islamic organi-
zations, they would propose the formation of a women's section
for the party.30 The national congress was never held, however,
29.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, December 1932, Mailrapport
227x/'33.
30.	Ibid., June 1933, Mailrapport 1011x/’33.184
because a few months later several party leaders, including
Hatta and Sjahrir, were arrested.
After the campaign against the Wild Schools Ordinance,
which reached its climax in December 1932, Permi began seeking
an opportunity to transfer its own central board to Java to
evade the increased pressure being exerted by the government in
West Sumatra. In July 1933, the Permi representative in Java,
A. Gaffar Ismail, and leaders of a new Islamic party, the Partai
Islam Indonesia (Parii, Indonesian Islamic Party), discussed
the possibility of a merger. The Parii was a splinter of the
PSII and was led by a former PSII leader. Its program stressed
the harmonious development and independence of Indonesia on the
basis of Islam.31 The First Parii Congress resolved to carry
out the merger.32 Some nationalist leaders hailed the move as
the beginning of a "new climate inpolitical life in Indonesia."33
The fusion of the two Islamic nationalist parties, it was hoped,
might eventually lead to a federation with the Partindo, a close
Permi associate. The prospect seemed bright for fulfilling
Permi’s objective of becoming a "national catalyst."
The dreams of a "new climate" in Indonesian political life
were soon shattered by government action. In August the govern-
ment cracked down on Permi and imposed severe restrictions on
party activities. This was soon followed by the arrest of its
top leaders. The Partindo experienced a similar fate with the
arrest of Sukarno.
Education in Politics
In January 1933, about 11,000 Minangkabau, 30% of whom were
women, were registered as active members of Permi, the PSII or
the PNI Baru. These parties had branches or groups in over 20%
of the 500 nagari and in every town. Permi alone had more than
160 groups. In the rural areas of Suliki, Manindjau and Agam
Tua, Permi had to compete with the PSII, which, despite continu-
ing internal dissension, had over 2,000 members.34 When the
31.	Oetoesan Indonesia, May 19, 1933 in Overzicht van de
Inlandsche Pers, 1933, pp. 327-328.
32.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, September 1932, Mailrapport
1369x/’33.
33.	Sikap, July 8, 1933 in Overzicht van de Inlandsche Pers,
28/1933, p. 442.
34.	van Heuven, "Memorie van Overgave"; Politieke Politioneel
Overzicht, January 1933, Mailrapport 351x/'33.185
government began to crack down on the activities of the politi-
cal parties in August 1933, there were more than 13,000 regis-
tered active members in the various parties. Permi had expanded
to over 200 groups in 180 nagari and claimed more than 10,000
members, 40% of whom were women. The party’s major strongholds
were the districts of Manindjau and Agam Tua where it had groups
in almost every nagari.
Table 2
Permi Groups in Rural Areas
Sub-Regencies	Number of Nagari	Number of Groups
Padang	3	4
Pariaman	20	29
Batu Sangkar	9	11
Padang Pandjang	15	25
Agam Tua	19	38
Manindj au	14	14
Ophir	1	1
Paj akumbuh	11	14
Suliki (only in the sub-		
district of Guguk)	3	13
Bangkinang	1	1
Solok	4	4
Muara Labuh	1	1
Painan	11	21
Kerintj i	4	5
Source:	van Heuven, "Memorie," p. 28.
In the same period, the PSII had about 2,800 registered members,
of whom 600 were women. The PNI Baru and the Partindo, which
were still in the early stages of their development, had about
250 and 100 respectively. Their branches were located only in
the towns.
The extent of the influence which political parties exer-
cised cannot be properly assessed through these figures. Most
of the local party leaders were respected members of their com-
munities. Large numbers of them had graduated from the Kaum
Muda schools and were muballigh or teachers in local religious
schools. Their superior education and respected positions
strengthened the influence of these leaders so that it extended
beyond the members of their respective parties. Furthermore,
the figures do not include the youth movements which were to a
large extent inseparable from the political parties. By January186
1933, the Kaum Tua organization had also been politicized and
the Kaum Muda Muhammadijah, despite its official strongly anti-
political attitude, was being increasingly infiltrated by the
radical elements.
The ability of political parties to create a social climate
which idolized radical, anti-government leaders and idealized
the notion of political independence contributed to a temporary
withdrawal by the adat authorities. Moreover, some of the top
leaders of the political parties were themselves penghulu.
Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib and Mansur Daud, the chairman and secre-
tary of Permi, were both penghulu of Balingka. Except for Hadji
Uddin Rahmany and a woman leader, the wife of Datuk Singo Mang-
kuto, all members of the PSII regional board were also penghulu.
The parties, particularly Permi, encouraged members who had the
right to become penghulu to retain their penghuluships. In
several nagari, the majority of the penghulu joined political
parties. By the end of 1932, for example, government reports
indicated that 50 out of the 63 penghulu in Aur Perumahan (Agam
Tua) were registered members or sympathizers of the PSII.35 In
Ampat Angkat, PSII outnumbered SAAM, the oldest adat party, not
only in terms of the general populace but in the number of peng-
hulu members. Adat parties had tended to decline generally.
In the face of rising government repression in several nagari,
such as Situdjuh and Batu Hampar (both in the Regency of Lima
Puluh Kota), penghulu who belonged to Permi began organizing
new adat associations. These politically oriented penghulu
wanted to extend party influence and also reduce the tension
between the adat authorities and the political parties generally.
Although the extent of penghulu participation in the nation-
alist political parties greatly varied from nagari to nagari, it
was a reflection of the continuing growth in the prestige of
leaders of modern organizations at the expense of the penghulu's
traditional position. It also showed the influence of political
and economic changes on the attitudes of the rural adat chiefs.
The involvement of the penghulu reflected their awareness of
the people’s needs, also shown in their active support of the
various village educational and mutual help organizations. This
explains why, in places such as Padang Djapang, the penghulu
tried to organize forums where they could discuss the social
and political problems they faced as the natural and traditional
leaders of the people.36 Such forums were intended to minimize
the gulf between the people, who were increasingly influenced
by the religious political parties, and the adat authorities,
who were the traditional maintainers of social order and harmony.
35.	Ibid., August 1933, Mailrapport 1017x/'33.
36.	Ibid., June 1932, Mailrapport 794x/’32.187
The consequences of the penghulu's participation in the
anti-government political movement became evident when the local
administration began to mobilize adat authorities against the
political parties. In some places a kind of "intra-elite" con-
flict broke out; in others hostility between the non-political
penghulu in one nagari and the nationalist penghulu from other
nagari was sharpened. The nationalist penghulu, however, helped
maintain political moderation in Minangkabau. In the beginning
of 1933, they established the Dewan Penghulu Minangkabau (Coun-
cil of Penghulu of Minangkabau) in Padang Pandjang. The Council
represented the first attempt since the communist rebellion to
unite the penghulu. The top leaders of the Council were with-
out exception already members of Permi, the PSII or Muhammadijah
The membership included penghulu from several districts. The
Council had been organized by urbanized and politically oriented
penghulu and became a temporary sanctuary for nationalist peng-
hulu during the government repression.37
As with the young, urbanized penghulu, the Kaum Tua group
was also influenced by the nationalist Islamic modernists. The
politicization of Minangkabau under the "Greater Indonesia" and
Islamic appeals brought with it the demise of the Kaum Tua
organization, the PTI. The PTI had been established with offi-
cial encouragement in an effort to unite the Kaum Tua schools
against the influence of the Kaum Muda organizations. Ironical-
ly, however, the PTI was captured by the Islamic nationalist
movement under Permi. Permi infiltration began in Manindjau,
the most radical district, with the Kaum Tua students' organiza-
tion. Competition between the Permi and the PSII, and the great
influence exercised by Hadji Rasul, had caused heightened anti-
government feeling in the area. As a result, Permi ideas easily
penetrated the Kaum Tua organization. Moreover, Hadji Abdul
Madjid, the first chairman of Permi, was an influential Kaum
Tua ulama from Manindjau. In March 1932, the PTI, under the
leadership of its founder, Sjech Sulaiman Arrasuli, held a con-
ference in Manindjau to make plans for the Second PTI Congress.
The Manindjau PTI leaders wanted the conference to add the word
"Indonesia" to the organization's name. The chairman of one
local branch urged cooperation with the PSII because, according
to him, there was no difference in the principles and the goals
of the two organizations. A vice-chairman of another local
branch began a speech with the Permi slogan "Islam and kebang-
saan."38
37.	Roesad, "Nota: Het Modernisme in Penghoeloe-Kringen," in
van Heuven, "Memorie van Overgave," pp. 73-88.
38.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, March 1932, Mailrapport
492x/'32. The Resident noted that the Kaum Tua organiza-
tion in the Danau and Pajakumbuh districts, as well as some
others, participated in the activities of Kaum Muda organi-
zations. Ibid., February 1932, Mailrapport 415x/'32.188
In September 1932, the Persatuan Murid-Murid Tarbijah
Islamijah (Union of Students of Tarbijah Islamijah Schools)
celebrated its first anniversary. At the celebration the stu-
dents decided that their organization should be based on four
principles:	"submission to Allah, love of tanah air, love of
the people, and dedication to religion and the nation."39 Thes
four principles were in fact a revised version of the ideologi-
cal foundation of a Permi-influenced Kaum Muda youth organiza-
tion.
The incipient "revolt" within the PTI came to the surface
at its second congress held in Pajakumbuh in November 1932.
For the first time, the PTI opened the meeting by singing the
national anthem, "Indonesia Raja." Iljas Jacub of Permi was
the guest speaker. During the meeting a young leader of the
PTI announced support for Iljas Jacub's appeals by boldly
stating:
The PTI stands in the middle of the people. It is
struggling toward the achievement of "the greatness
of Islam," "Islam in Honor" and a "Prosperous Indone-
sia" on the basis of "Islam and kebangsaan."
In defiance of its founders, the Kaum Tua ulama, the PTI Con-
gress, in an intensely nationalist mood, decided to alter the
name of the organization to Pendidikan Islam Indonesia (PH,
Islamic Indonesian Education) and to adopt Permi's "Islam and
kebangsaan" as its official ideology. The congress elected a
new central board consisting exclusively of young leaders. The
Kaum Tua ulama were elected to the prestigious but powerless
advisory board.40 The young PTI leaders had avoided the fate
which had befallen the Muhammadijah, whose older ulama with the
cooperation of the Central Board had overpowered the young and
politically oriented leaders. Under the influence of Permi,
the younger PTI leadership, all of whom were teachers in Kaum
Tua schools, managed to defeat their teachers, the PTI founders
Success at the congress, however, did not guarantee that
the membership would remain faithful to the new group. Promi-
nent Kaum Tua ulama, embittered by the betrayal of their assis-
tants and prodded by criticism from the Dutch local administra-
tion for their failure to maintain control,41 refused to accept
the changes or work for the new organization. The PII could
not continue without the support of the Kaum Tua ulama, whose
39.	Ibid., September 1932, Mailrapport 1159x/'32.
40.	Ibid., November 1932, Mailrapport 115x/'33.
41.	Interview with Rusli A. Wahid, Djakarta, November 1968.189
schools and personal influence formed the real base of the
organization. As a result it gradually dissolved, and the Kaum
Tua group was without an organization until 1936.
The politicization of Minangkabau and the success of polit-
ical parties were facilitated by the nagari political tradition
and the nature of Islamic doctrine. In the 1930’s, the
accumulation of anti-Dutch feeling was affected by the influence
of Indonesian nationalism, the independence movement and by the
social effects of the economic depression. By the third quarter
of 1931, no less than 60 perantau traders from Manindjau had
come home as the result of the depression. Since most of them
were also graduates of religious schools, they provided the
sparsely populated district with more energetic religious propa-
gators and political speakers.42
These factors, in different degrees, benefited all politi-
cal parties. The success of Permi was due to the numerous
Thawalib schools and graduates,combined with the compactness of
its central board. Under the leadership of Djalaluddin Thaib,
the Cairo returnees worked harmoniously with the Thawalib gradu-
ates. Under the supervision of Basa Bandaro, the commonly ac-
knowledged "local political genius," the young radical leaders
were able to maintain their comradeship. By July 1932, the
Permi central board included women, such as Rasuna Said (whose
arrest later made big news in Indonesian nationalist circles).
In December 1932, in the midst of the mounting opposition to
the Wild Schools Ordinance, Permi added five women leaders to
the central board. This caused a further expansion of the
party because it not only attracted more women followers but
also shamed many still uninvolved Minangkabau men.43
The growth of the political parties magnified their prob-
lems with internal consolidation. Since membership in a par-
ticular party was motivated more by a sense of individual
participation than by attachment to any one specific ideology,
overlapping membership commonly occurred. There were cases
where the local chairman of the Permi held the same position in
the PSII, while serving as an active leader of the Muhammadi-
jah.44 Some local leaders, assuming that increasing the number
42.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 3de kwartaal, 1931, Mail-
rapport 1200x/’31.
43.	Letter of the Attorney-General to the Governor-General,
Medan, July 1933, secret, Mailrapport 920x/’33.
44.	An example of the overlapping leadership is shown in the
Kubang Permi, formed in January 1932. Its chairman was
also the chairman of the PSII; its vice-chairman a Muhamma-
dijah leader; its secretary a member of PSII and Muhammadi-190
of organizations would increase popular participation, helped
establish new organizations.45 By the first quarter of 1932,
however, the trend reversed and the parties began to consoli-
date .
By the middle of 1932, Permi and the PSII, both of which
had consciously tried to make themselves mass parties, faced a
problem of maintaining control over their various regional
boards while continuing to expand. They also had problems main-
taining the loyalty of their respective members. The parties
had to guard themselves against infiltration by government in-
formers, especially as it became apparent that many political
arrests were made on the basis of speeches which had been de-
livered in closed sessions.
The drive toward internal consolidation was conducted under
the slogan, "One man for one party." It started when the compe-
tition and ideological conflict among the various organizations
became extreme. At its regional conference in March 1932, the
Muhammadijah, which had a principle of open membership that
allowed members to participate in other organizations, decided
to dissuade its members from involvement in political parties.46
Both Permi and the PSII began trying to impose "party disci-
pline" in April. Such attempts could be successful only if the
parties had strong centralized organizational structures, which
was not the case with Permi and even less with the PSII. The
application of party discipline was entirely dependent on the
local situation and local party leaders. In Padang Pandjang
and Ampat Angkat, where the triangular competition among the
Muhammadijah, Permi, and PSII was very intense, internal con-
solidation efforts went smoothly. In Manindjau, where the lead-
ers of the organizations maintained a relatively cordial rela-
tionship, party discipline did not work very well. More to the
point, neither Permi nor the PSII took the need for internal
consolidation very seriously. They were still too much wedded
to the desire to become big, mass parties.
An issue of great urgency to both Permi and the PSII, and
later also to the PNI Baru,was the preservation of their members
jah, a teacher at the Dinijah school and former teacher at
the Thawalib; its treasurer a member of Muhammadijah and
former member of the communist Sarekat Rakjat. Politieke
Politioneel Overzicht, January 1932, Mailrapport 335x/’32.
45.	The head of Permi’s Islamic Propaganda Department, Hadji
Rasul Hamidy, established a PSII branch in Pajakumbuh in
March 1932. Mailrapport 492x/'32.
46.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, March 1932, Mailrapport
492x/’32.191
loyalty. The criteria for judging loyalty ranged from regular
payment of dues to correct political attitudes. In September
1932, for example, the central board of Permi temporarily sus-
pended 530 of the 700 members of its Pariaman branch for failure
to pay regular party contributions. In Painan and Lubuk Baga-
lung, many members were purged because the central board sus-
pected their political loyalties.47 In early 1933, the problem
of government informers, locally known as tjoro ("creeps"), and
that of increased government pressure caused Iljas Jacub to
draw up a plan for drastic organizational changes in Permi. He
proposed that full members of the party should pass a discipline
test and also demonstrate their intellectual ability. Likewise
a new group could be approved only after it passed a group disci-
pline test and proved its loyalty to the central board. In
short, Iljas wanted to make Permi into a centralized and highly
disciplined party. His proposal, however, was rejected by the
majority of the central board’s members. They feared such struc-
tural changes might weaken the mass and revolutionary character
of the party, making it a pale imitation of the PNI Baru.
In early 1931, political leaders began working to strengthen
the ideological consciousness of the membership and also to form
party cadres among the youth. The most obvious medium for such
programs consisted of politically-oriented educational and reli-
gious journals and booklets. In addition to the official party
organ, published by the central or regional boards, some local
branches began their own publications. Permi, the PSII and
the PNI Baru strongly encouraged their respective branches to
establish their own libraries, where members would regularly
obtain political literature and nationalist newspapers.48 Regu-
lar party political courses became important in 1932. In Sep-
tember, in order to intensify its program of political courses,
Permi instituted special departments for external propaganda
and party political courses. Under the leadership of Iljas
Jacub and Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib, the department of political
courses expanded its operation "in order to enliven the national
independence spirit."49 The PNI Baru adopted a "social-peda
gogic" strategy which used the party courses as a requirement
for acceptance as a full member. In the middle of 1933, after
the government began restricting public activities, the parties
intensified these political courses. Both Permi and the PSII,
which had gained prominence through their ability to recruit
47.	Ibid., September 1932, Mailrapport 1227x/’32, and October
193 2, Mailrapport 1159x/'32.
48.	Berita, September 12, 1932.
49.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, October 1932, Mailrapport
1227x/'32.192
followers at mass rallies, had to shift their activities to
various types of political courses. These courses, known as
"the five minute individual course," "the peripatetic course"
and "the course in the rice-field," enabled them to survive as
radical parties until the middle of 1934.
In April 1932, a representative of the PSII Central Board,
a Minangkabau perantau leader, took three young men back with
him to Java to train at party headquarters as future PSII lead-
ers for their respective home districts. A general awareness of
the importance of cadre-formation caused the various political
and social organizations to pay more attention to youth. Some
of them, such as the PSII and the Muhammadijah, had their own
youth and boy scout subsidiaries, Pemuda Muslimin Indonesia
(PMI, Indonesian Muslim Youth) and Pemuda Muhammadijah respec-
tively. These organizations were used to expand the influence
of their respective mother-organizations and to serve as a
training ground for future leaders. The Muhammadijah and the
Association of the Dinijah Schools had formed youth and boy
scout organizations as a means for directing extra-curricular
activities of their pupils. The members of the Persatuan Murid
Dinijah School (PMDS, Association of the Students of Dinijah
Schools), the largest youth organization, and its affiliate,
the Kepanduan Indonesia Muslim (KIM, Indonesian Muslim Boy
Scouts), were exclusively students or former students of the
Dinijah schools. Permi had cut its organizational ties with
El-Hilaal, the second largest boy scout organization, and had
never formed its own youth organization, but the party was ideo-
logically very influential among the Kaum Muda youth. The
Himpunan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (HPII, Association of Indo-
nesian Muslim Youth), established by Permi in July 1931, was
more a youth section of the party than an independent youth
organization. It recruited members particularly from among the
students of the Sumatra Thawalib schools and the newly estab-
lished Permi schools, and, in a relatively short time, it
rivaled the PMDS in the number of its members and groups. The
HPII also contributed to the further expansion of Permi.
Given the intensely nationalist and anti-colonial activi-
ties and ideological controversies among the political leaders,
it is not surprising that the youth organizations also became
involved in the politics of the independence movement. In spite
of a government law which forbade youths under eighteen to
attend political meetings or discuss political problems, the
meetings of the HPII were full of anti-colonialist speeches.
As a result of this political character, which the government
said had been revealed during the first HPII congress in July
1932, the Attorney-General officially changed the legal status
of the youth organization to that of a "political party."50 In
50. Office of the Attorney-General, July 12, 1932, no. 3270/AP/
secret. "Every meeting of the Congress was dispersed by193
fact, one of the earliest victims of the Islamic-nationalist
movement was a leader of HPII, convicted in early 1932.51
By the middle of 1932, the youth movements began to gradu-
ate mature leaders for the political parties. The HPII provided
Permi with several local leaders, some of whom became members
of the central board. After the middle of 1933, they and some
women leaders were the only active leaders of the party. A
former chairman of the HPII later became the last chairman of
the Permi. The PMDS, although it denied that it had any outside
influence and insisted on maintaining its Islamic educational
character, nonetheless contributed its share of leaders to the
political parties. In the second part of 1932, several members
of the PMDS central board became local leaders of the PSII. In
the beginning of 1933, these young leaders challenged the posi-
tion of the older leaders of the party. Not unlike the former
leaders of the HPII, the young leaders of the PSII by the mid-
1930's had taken over the party from the older generation. In
November 1932, shortly after Hatta’s visit, PMDS adviser Chatib
Suleiman and chairman Leon Salim became the promoters of the
PNI Baru.
Youth organizations had always been inseparable parts of
the popular movement. Almost all Minangkabau political leaders
were themselves former members of youth organizations. These
younger leaders tended to idealize bravery in the pursuit of
independence and to make sacrifices for the benefit of the
people. They appealed for the participation of youth in reform-
ing the ummat. This attracted young men and women and helped
them to define their responsibilities and roles. A "pemuda
[young man]," according to the definition of the HPII, "is a
person with an independent spirit." The pemuda movement, there-
fore, should mean "a movement toward independence. ... It
should stand in the middle of the arena of the people's move-
ment."52 It is understandable therefore that the youth organi-
zations did not always follow the leadership of the political
parties. The Dutch records show that the PSII, not infrequently,
failed to control the activities of its youth section. The
Muhammadijah had always encountered difficulty in restraining
the police because the speakers discussed politics."
Indisch Verslag, 1933, p. 19.
51. The youth leader, A. F. Hadjat, had written a nationalist
poem in the Permi paper, Medan Rakjat. He was sentenced
to three years in prison. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht,
May 1932, Mailrapport 772x/’32.
52. "Toedjoean Pergerakan Pemoeda," Pahlawan Moeda, 1, Nos. 2,
3 (August and September 1933), pp^ 25,45.194
its Hizbul Wathan, whose members pictured themselves as the
"soldiers of Muhammadijah." The actions taken by leaders of the
PMDS clearly demonstrate the continuing search by young men to
find their own proper places and ideologies in the independence
movement. Despite their competition, the Islamic youth move-
ments shared some basic ideological similarities. These were
best expressed by the preamble to the statutes of the HPII:
We work for the nation but because of Allah. We work
for the benefit of the people but because of God.53
This formulation explains the idealism of the Islamic youth
movement, with its belief in social reformation guided by reli-
gious devotion and nationalist feeling.
The Kaum Muda schools also contributed to the political
education of the youth. The most obvious example was the Suma-
tra Thawalib of Padang Pandjang, which from its early history
had been an intellectual center of the anti-colonial political
movement. This school and other Kaum Muda schools, such as
Darulfunun Abbasiah in Padang Djapang and Permi’s Tsanawijah
and teachers' training school for girls in Bukittinggi, trained
future political teachers as well as future politicians. Stu-
dents in the lower grades belonged to the various boy scout and
youth organizations, but the upper classmen joined the political
parties. Some 150 of the 450 students in the two highest grades
of the Sumatra Thawalib in Padang Pandjang were members of
political parties--70% belonged to Permi, the rest to the PSII
or PNI Baru. Over 90% of the students at the teachers' training
school for girls joined political parties or politically orient-
ed youth organizations.5* Two of the most important women lead-
ers of Permi, Rasuna Said and Rasimah Ismail, later famous as
"the heroines" of the Indonesian independence movement, were
graduates of this school. The school was directed by Muchtar
Lutfi. Members of Permi's central board, such as Iljas Jacub,
Ali Emran Djamil and other Cairo returnees, often taught at
Permi schools.
Although the teachers' personal influence was an important
factor,55 the character of the Kaum Muda school itself led to
political action. Kaum Muda Islamic modernism taught the need
for reform and for the rediscovery of the true religious ethic.
These appeals induced not only a profound awareness of the
53.	Pahlawan Moeda, 2, Nos. 5, 6 (September 1935).
54.	Roesad, "Rapport," Mailrapport 1518x/'33.
55.	The local Permi leaders were teachers at the Padang Pan-
djang Thawalib. Mailrapport 1518x/'33.195
inherent antagonism between the kafir and the Muslim but also
that between the ruler and the ruled. In short, the religious
education provided by Kaum Muda teachers, consciously or uncon-
sciously, created an interest in politics among the students.
Several subjects, such as Islamic history (tarieh') , Quranic
exegesis, sociology and the study of the love of fatherland
(tarbijah wathaniah') , were easily turned to political purposes.
Even Arabic language studies, through the use of nationalist
poems and compositions, could introduce the students to a kind
of romantic nationalism and patriotism. The extent of these
political influences was not the same in all Kaum Muda schools,
but it was sufficient to guarantee continuity of leadership by
the Kaum Muda educated group until the early 1950’s. In spite
of ideological controversy, competition and political activi-
ties, expansion and modernization of religious schools remained
important parts of the Islamic modernists’ programs.
The extensive politicization of Minangkabau made it one of
the most dangerous regions in the eyes of the government. The
government vigorously applied the repressive measures which
characterized the policy of rust en orde. Minangkabau became
the test case for the government’s hard-line policies. ’’From
the West Coast [of Sumatra]," according to a famous colonial
theoretician, de Kat Angelino, "the victory begins."56
Action and Reaction
July 1932 was a month of mounting political activity. In
the middle of the month, Permi held its biggest conference ever
in Bukittinggi. Attended by Muhammad Yamin and Gatot Mangku-
pradja, Partindo leaders from Java, the conference voted to
declare Permi "a radical and non-cooperative political party."
The mood of the conference can be measured by the police action
used by the government to disperse the mass rallies and open
meetings. Muchtar Lutfi was interrupted in the middle of his
speech and forbidden by the local government to address any
more public meetings in Minangkabau. Muhammad Yamin, a perantau
leader, experienced a similar fate after he said, "Minangkabau,
the land of the three luhak, has been pledged and sold." He
and Gatot soon were forced to leave Minangkabau. During the
conference, the police found wall posters in several areas of
Padang which declared: "Indonesia should be freed from the
56. The remark was made during de Kat Angelino’s visit to the
area and is cited by van Heuven, "Memorie van Overgave,"
p. 14.196
Netherlands."57 "It seemed," as a participant of the conference
reminisced, "that Indonesia would be free tomorrow morning."58
In the same month, the youth organization HPII held its
congress in Padang Pandjang. But, according to a government
report, "all public meetings had to be closed by the police,
because the speeches had a political character which cannot be
tolerated in a youth movement."59 Not to be outdone by the
HPII, the organizations of the Dinijah schools’ students, PMDS
and the KIM, held their own first congress the same month. Al-
though the young leaders of the PMDS rejected what they termed
the "Sukarnoism" followed by the HPII, they discussed the advis-
ability of studying politics.60
At the same time that Permi was holding its special con-
ference, the PSII was using the occasion of the Prophet’s Birth-
day to conduct public meetings and religious gatherings. PSII
regional leaders traveled throughout the districts where the
party had followers in order to direct these activities, which
they referred to as "general actions." The main purpose of
holding the simultaneous public meetings was to intensify the
idea of independence based on Islam and to repudiate so-called
"Madjapahitism," the notion of a re-emergence of pre-Islamic
cultural imperialism.61 By stressing anti-"Madjapahitism," the
PSII followed the direction of its central board in Java, which
was engaged in an ideological controversy with the secular
nationalist parties. At the same time it attacked Permi’s
kebangsaan slogan, at least indirectly.
An important decision taken by the Permi July conference
was to exclude Muchtar Lutfi from the central board, because he
had been under police surveillance for some time. He was re-
placed by two of his students, Rasuna Said and Chasijah, both
57.	Sinar Soematra, July 21, 1932 in Overzicht van de Inlandsche
Pers 30/1932, p. 71; Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, July
1932, Mailrapport 952x/’32.
58.	Tamar Djaja, "Islam di Indonesia."
59.	Indisch Verslag, 1933, p. 19.
60.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, July 1932, Mailrapport
952x/’32.
61.	Sinar Soematra, July 14, 1933 in Overzicht van de Inlandsche
Pers, 30/1932.197
women.62 It was hoped that the changes would extend Permi's
influence among Minangkabau women and at the same time remove
Muchtar from direct involvement in the party's expansion drive.
At the end of 1932, Rasuna Said, who usually began her speech
with a salute to her "humiliated and oppressed brothers and
sisters," was convicted for sedition, thus becoming the first
woman "martyr" of the Indonesian nationalists.63 In December,
another woman leader, Rasimah Ismail, was also arrested.
In a letter to the Permi central board, nineteen-year-old
Rasimah dissuaded her party from providing a counsel for her
defense.
I am convinced that the struggle of the people, who
are aware of their dignity, will be victorious. .	. .
[The cost of] struggle to achieve honor and prosperity
is, indeed, very high.6*
Rasimah, like Rasuna Said, was accused of planting seeds of
hatred and hostility toward the government. Her trial brought
out the nationalist mood prevailing among the younger genera-
tion of the Kaum Muda educated group. It was attended by some
62
The new Permi central board consisted of:	
Chairman:	Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib
Vice-Chairman:	Hadji Abdul Madj id
Secretary:	Mansur Daud Dt. Palimo Kajo
Treasurer:	Asah Djaminuddin (a merchant)
Commissioners:	Iljas Jacub
Department of Education:	Duski Samad Tondeh Sutan Mangkuto Alam (a merchant) Iljas Jacub
Department of Enterprise:	Ali Emran Djamil
Department of Islamic Propaganda and Publication:	Hadj i Rasul Hamidy
Department of Finance:	Tondeh Sutan Mangkuto Alam
63. On the reactions in the press to this arrest see, Overzicht
van de Inlandsche Pers, 51/1932, pp. 390-391. A Javanese
nationalist in Surabaja called Rasuna Said the true "Sri-
kandi" of the independence movement. Soeara Oemoem, in
ibid., 7/1933, p. 95. In Tapanuli, a book was published
in her honor. Sinar Soematra, February 9, 1933.
64. Tjaja Soematra, February 10, 1932; Sinar Soematra, Febru-
ary 9‘, 1932.—	---------------198
2,000 spectators. The judge questioned Rasimah about her state-
ment that the Islamic nations were no longer equal with other
nations.
Rasimah: The Indonesian nation and the Islamic nations
in general are looked upon as inferior by other
nations.
Judge:	What is the meaning of merdeka [independence]?
Rasimah: Merdeka means to be free from foreign rule and
that the Dutch government should go home [to
Holland].
Judge:	What do you mean by saying that the fate of a
nation depends on the nation itself?
Rasimah: It is true that every nation should be developed
by itself. It has never occurred in history
that a nation was developed by other nations.
Judge:	What do you mean that the Indonesian people
have been butchered by foreign imperialism?
Rasimah: Imperialism is a foreign word which means greed,
avarice and acquisitiveness. The presence of
imperialism has resulted in the sufferings of
the Indonesian people.65
This exchange explains the actions of the youth movement. It is
in this mood of self-confidence that the motivating force behind
the independence movement can be found.
In his comments on the mounting political activities and
the prevailing anti-government feeling in Minangkabau, Resident
van Heuven stated:
The susceptibility of these people [the Minangkabau]
to fanaticism and militancy is far greater than their
political knowledge. They are, therefore, not fully
aware of political realities.66
"Political realities" meant the strength of Dutch power and the
government's determination to maintain rust en orde. Public
meetings featuring fiery nationalist speeches and publications
containing anti-colonial articles were regarded as leading to
the disruption of "public order," the maintenance of which,
according to Colijn, was one of the government's "moral respon-
sibilities" [zedeli-jk verpldekt-ingen) . It is understandable
that Zentgraff, the editor of Java Bode, concluded a report on
the West Coast of Sumatra with the proposal that "all meetings
65. Tjaja Soematra, February 16, 1933.
66. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, February 1932, Mailrapport
4lx/'32.199
in Minangkabau should be dispersed."67 But a liberal Dutch
member of the Volksraad argued that the difference between the
political movement in Java and on the West Coast of Sumatra was
that in the latter region the police was more oppressive.68 In
such a situation, where the government considered any national-
ist agitation as "destructive activity" and the nationalist
parties distrusted the government, antagonism between them
mounted steadily.
The period between early 1932 and the third quarter of
1933 saw a growing radicalism in political developments.
Each government action resulted in an intensification of nation-
alist activities. In the antagonistic climate, political par-
ties moved to minimize the consequences of government pressure
on their respective members. In April 1932, the PSII formed a
"victims' fund" (korban fonds) to help those of its members who
had been arrested. In January 1933, after the arrest of Rasuna
Said, a nationalist lawyer formed a committee to help political
detainees with legal procedures.69 Legal efforts, however,
proved fruitless. In dealing with the nationalist movement,
the government preferred to use its extraordinary powers, which
could not be contested in the courts. The most common govern-
ment weapon was a severe restriction on freedom of speech. In
April 1932, the Attorney-General, replying to an inquiry from
the Resident on how to handle mounting political activities,
urged an effective use of police power. The police, he said,
should interrupt speakers and, if necessary, disperse public
meetings.70 A few days before the Permi conference in July
1932, the Resident summoned Djalaluddin Thaib, Iljas Jacub and
Muchtar Lutfi and warned them that anti-government speeches
would not be tolerated. He advised that the party's guests,
the Partindo leaders, should be careful in their speeches.71
67.	Quoted by Husni Thamrin in his protest against the govern-
ment's suppressive policies. Handelingen van den Volksraad,
1933-1934, pp. 2015-2016. "The intensification of [govern-
ment] action, indeed, occurred; it was necessary because
agitation could not be tolerated in such a period of pre-
carious economic conditions." Governor-General de Jonge
in van der Wal, Herinneringen, p. 182.
68.	Handelingen van den Volksraad, 1933, p. 2009.
69.	Berita, January 31, 1933; Politieke Politioneel Overzicht,
January 1933, Mailrapport 357x/'33.
70.	Office of the Attorney-General, April 12, 1932, 1713/AP,
Mailrapport 12 0 2x/'3 2.
71.	Tjaja Soematra, July 14, 1932.200
Muchtar Lutfi chose to ignore the warning, and, as a result,
this conference proved to be the occasion of his last public
address .
Another measure used to curb political activity was the
application of reisvegelingen, travel restrictions, on allegedly
’’dangerous" leaders. This measure required them to obtain spe-
cial permission before leaving their respective districts or
visiting certain regions. Until 1932 travel restrictions were
usually only imposed on newcomers from rantau regions, especial-
ly from Cairo and Java. In 1933, after Permi and the PSII had
expanded to other parts of Sumatra, some of their leaders were
also subjected to restrictions.
The government’s use of an extensive informer network and
its attempt to mobilize the adat authorities had a more demoral-
izing effect on the political parties. The informer network
was employed not only to get information about the internal
activities of the parties but, more important, to create mutual
suspicion within the nationalist ranks. Political courses and
closed meetings often had to be cancelled because local leaders
could not trust their own colleagues. From March to May 1933,
the Dutch authorities reported that political activities in
Minangkabau seemed to have reached a standstill because the
parties could not cope with the suspected existence of informers
in their midst and because hostility by the adat authorities
had increased.
The attraction of penghulu in some nagari and in the towns
to the nationalist parties had aroused considerable concern in
the government. As in the past, the government turned to the
adat authorities, such as the nagari council and the nagari
head, to combat both the defecting penghulu and the political
parties. In addition to the conventional policy of urging the
adat authorities to take preventive action against political
parties, the local government played on the fears of rural peng-
hulu by warning them that the tragic events of 1927 might be
repeated. In early 1933, Permi faced strong opposition in Rao-
Rao, a nagari in the district of Batu Sangkar which had been a
"financial power" of the communist movement.72 The penghulu,
who continued to blame themselves for their failure to "protect"
their people from the communist party, were extremely sensitive
to the potentially negative effects resulting from the presence
of a political party in the nagari. The communist movement had
cost the nagari a large number of its religious teachers and
traders; they had been exiled to Digul.
In order to strengthen the adat authorities in combating
radical political parties, the local government tried to prevent
72. Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, 1927, Mailrapport 741x/'28201
any clash between adat and government laws; in the past these
had benefited the Muhammadijah. On many occasions, the local
administration tried to coordinate its actions with those of the
adat authorities, and it lent political and legal support to
actions taken by them. In late 1932, six local leaders of the
Permi in Sungai Penuh were convicted by the nagari council on
the grounds that in promoting their party’s cause they disrupted
peace in the nagari and undermined the authority of the peng-
hulu. The nagari council decided that the defendants should
choose between paying an adat fine or entering the government
prison for several weeks. Ironically,the nagari council had
been presided over by the controleur. This use of adat power
in combating political parties, according to the leader of the
Nationalist Fraction in the Volksraad, M. Husni Thamrin, resulted
in the arbitrary infringement of the people's rights. In early
1933, Permi and the PSII had to abandon their activities in many
nagari because of the cooperation between the district adminis-
tration and the adat authorities.73
In the face of this harassment, political parties had to
design new tactics for survival. In the beginning of 1933, a
representative of the PSII central board from Java advised
branches in Minangkabau to refrain from "irritating" the govern-
ment. In February 1932, Datuk Singo Mangkuto, chairman of the
PSII regional board, tried to revive his old adat-party, the
Persatuan Adat, for use as camouflage for his political activi-
ties; the attempt failed. A considerable number of the peng-
hulu in Mangkuto's nagari, Sungai Batang, had joined Permi or
Muhammadijah. The small secular party PNI Baru instructed its
members to avoid religious and adat discussions and to moderate
their anti-colonial speeches and writings. The party's platform
emphasized the need for education in politics through courses
and individual propaganda.74
Determined to continue its expansion drive in spite of the
government's hostility, Permi held an emergency conference on
December 15, 1932. At the conference the party designed a
"struggle program" (strigdprogra.m') which stressed opposition to
the Wild Schools Ordinance and maintenance of continuity in the
party leadership. It was decided to enlarge the party's central
board. Five male second echelon leaders and five young women
were added to the nine members of the central board as part of
an effort to train new leaders. They could become replacements
73.	Handelingen van den Volksraad, 1933-1934, pp. 153-154;
Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, January 1933, Mailrapport
351x/'33; ibid., February 1933, Mailrapport 590x/'33; ibid\
March 1933, Mailrapport 669x/'33.
74.	Ibid., May 1933, Mailrapport 848x/'33.202
for those who had been arrested. In January, one of the new
members was appointed as the reserve chairman. Several branches,
for example, Bukittinggi, Batu Sangkar and Painan, instituted
reserve local boards.75
In January and April, Permi issued guidelines for its local
leaders. They were instructed among other things to examine
carefully all those who attended the closed meetings and to
limit their activities outside the party. They were urged to
watch the activities of the members as well as those of their
colleagues on the boards. In order to avoid the trap of ’’sedi-
tion," local leaders were advised to prepare written drafts of
their speeches and to obtain proper translations of their quota-
tions from the Quran and the Hadith. Finally they were in-
structed to intensify their political courses.76
Permi’s determination to continue its activities even to
the extent of creating a kind of "counterespionage" network
within the party made collision between the party and the govern-
ment unavoidable. After a three-month stalemate, from March to
May, Permi renewed its activities. Its paper Medan Rakjat
praised this renewed vigor with a quote from an Indian national-
ist leader, which stated that, although repression was on the
increase, "our answer to it should be a greater intensification
of our movement for freedom."77 Permi began preparations for
its national congress, which was planned to promote the party’s
consolidation program and to further its elan. But the govern-
ment had decided to use its extraordinary powers and, in July,
the Resident imposed travel restrictions on several Permi and
HPII leaders, including Hadji Djalaluddin Thaib, Muchtar Lutfi
75.	Statements given by H. Djalaluddin Thaib and Iljas Jacub
in Mailrapport 861x/'34. The government’s suspicion is
documented byTamar Djaja in his "Islam di Indonesia."
The newly elected members of the central board were Darwis
Taram (an Al-Azhar graduate), Hadji Sjuib el-Jutusi (a
former member of the central board), Hadji Rasul Hamidy,
Achmad Nakib (a local leader from Manindjau), Tjut Saiman
(a leader in Atjeh), Chasijah (a teacher of the Dinijah
Putri), Ratna Sari (a student of the Islamic College),
Fatimah Hatta (a graduate of the Dinijah School), Tinur M.
Nur (a graduate of the Dinijah school), and Rasimah Ismail
(a graduate of the Dinijah Putri). Tjaja Soematra, Decem-
ber 19, 1932.
76.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, January 1933, Mailrapport
351x/’33; ibid., April 1933, Mailrapport 813x/’33.
77.	"Tegoehkan Barisan Kemerdekaan," Medan Rakjat, 3, No. 17
(June 18, 1933).203
and Iljas Jacub. They were forbidden to enter the Residency of
Tapanuli, an area where Permi had been rapidly gaining ground.
Travel restriction was the first important step in the
government’s campaign to paralyze Permi. The local government
had determined to settle the political problem in Minangkabau
as soon as possible. On April 1933, the Resident proposed that
the Attorney-General invoke the provision for limited prohibi-
tions on public meetings (beperkt vergaderverbod') against Permi
and the PSII.78 Under this clause, the parties could no longer
hold open public meetings and would need special permission to
hold closed sessions. The Resident thought this action would
demonstrate that, in the eyes of the government, Permi and the
PSII were legally discredited and politically disgraced. It
would in effect force the parties' followers to renounce their
membership. In pursuit of this proposal, the central government
sent a special commission, consisting of Prof. Schrieke, Direc-
tor of Education and an acknowledged expert on Minangkabau
affairs, and Dr. de Kat Angelino, former Director of Administra-
tive Affairs, to West Sumatra to investigate the political
situation. The special commission was accompanied by the
Attorney-General. In his report to these high officials, the
Resident cited the increased political activities and the
sharper criticism of the government on the part of the politi-
cal leaders. He reaffirmed his determination to curb the activ-
ities of the existing political parties.79 His proposal came
at the right moment, for the Minangkabau political leaders had
already lost their composure as the result of continued harass-
ment by the local administration. The central government more-
over had already decreed that Partindo and the PNI Baru were
forbidden parties for government employees.
Muchtar Lutfi, who had not addressed a public meeting since
July 1932, was enraged by the travel restriction and made a
bold speech to a closed meeting of party cadres on July 8.
After elaborating the difference between the evolutionary "cul-
tural nationalists," "who want to achieve independence as
politely as possible," and the revolutionaries, Muchtar claimed
that the immediate goal of Permi was to create a new Indonesia,
"to be ruled by the Dang Tuanku, as the President of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia." This reference to the legendary just and
wise ruler of Minangkabau made his statement the most quoted
political speech in Minangkabau. But in the opinion of the
78.	Resident's letter, April 1, 1933, no. 943/P/33, an appendix
in the Politieke Politioneel Overzicht of March 1933,
Mailrapport 669x/'33.
79.	Resident's letter, Padang, July 7, 1933, Mailrapport
920x/'33.204
Attorney-General, this statement was "intolerable."80 On July
13, the Attorney-General ordered Muchtar Lutfi’s arrest. In
spite of an appeal by the penghulu and religious teachers of
Balingka, who guaranteed that Muchtar would abandon politics,
his fate was already decided and on March 1934 he was exiled to
Digul.81
On the basis of his observations on the West Coast of Suma-
tra and in Tapanuli, the Attorney-General recommended to the
Governor-General that Permi, the PSII and the smaller parties,
the PNI Baru and the Partindo, be curbed. Although the two
smaller parties were not obviously anti-government, he believed
that:	"Their activities will become more successful if the
others [Permi and the PSII] are paralyzed."82 Shortly after
his arrival in Batavia, the Attorney-General proposed that the
Governor-General proclaim Permi and the PSII forbidden parties
for government officials throughout Indonesia and that he im-
pose the "limited prohibition" against their holding public
meetings in West Sumatra and Tapanuli. Without further delib-
eration, on August 4, the Governor-General decided to follow
the recommendations of the Attorney-General.83 On August 5,
the Governor-General further instructed the two Residents that,
if the new decree failed to curb political activities, the next
step would have to be "the elimination of the important lead-
ers . "8U
80.	Telegram of the Attorney-General to the Governor-General,
July 17, 1933, Mailrapport 849x/'33. Excerpts from Muchtar
Lutfi’s speech are attached to the Resident’s report to the
Governor-General, July 25, 1933, no. 1050/C/secret and
August 17, 1933, no. 1598/secret/"Eigenhandig," Mailrapport
938x/'33. Dang Tuanku is a major figure in the Minangkabau
epic Kaba Tjindua Mato. Taufik Abdullah, "Some Notes on
the Kaba Tjindua Mato: An Example of Minangkabau Tradition-
al Literature," Indonesia, 9 (April 1970), pp. 1-23.
81.	Correspondence on the Muchtar Lutfi case is contained in
Mailrapport 934x/’33, 1451x/'33, 327x/'34.
82.	Attorney-General's Report on the Political Situation in
West Sumatra, Medan, July 23, 1933, secret, Mailrapport
920x/'33.
84. Office of the Attorney-General, Weltevreden, August 3,
1933, no. 3823/AP and Extract from the Decision of the
Governor-General, August 4, 1933, no. lz, Verbaal January
9,1933, no.6.
84. Telegram of the Governor-General, August 1933, no. 653,
Verbaal January 9, 1933, no. 6.205
The repressive mood of the Governor-General, who had just
imposed the vergaderverbod on the PNI Baru and the Partindo
throughout Indonesia, is shown by his hasty decision concerning
the PSII. Although the party was strongly anti-government in
West Sumatra and Tapanuli, that was not the case in Java. In
spite of its consistent non-cooperative policy, the Java por-
tion of the party was at that time far more moderate than its
Minangkabau branches. The decision concerning the PSII was
soon amended by the Council of the Netherlands Indies, and the
legal position of the PSII outside West Sumatra and Tapanuli
remained unchanged.85
Legal obstacles to public meetings forced Permi and the
PSII to shift their activities to written political courses.
On September 5, 1933, Permi issued its first series of brochures
on popular political knowledge, mostly written by the director
of Permi’s Islamic College. Before it reached a wide audience,
however, it was confiscated by the police. On the pretext that
a one-page article (and its continuation which was still in
manuscript form) written by Iljas Jacub- was "disparaging and
incited the people against Dutch authority in all its historical
phases,"86 the writer and the publisher of the ill-fated series
were arrested. Through the arrests of Iljas Jacub and Djala-
luddin Thaib the Dutch government with one stroke had deprived
Permi of its most important leaders. Permi was left under the
leadership of Mansur Daud and his colleagues, who could not
match the arrested leaders in either organizational skill or
leadership.
In the same month a similar fate befell the PSII when Hadji
Uddin Rahmany and Sabilal Rasad were arrested. Datuk Singo
Mangkuto, who was in Java at the time, could not return to
Minangkabau because he was next on the list of persons to be
arrested. The local authorities were determined to suppress
the radical parties following central government guidelines.
Although the arrests of Permi and PSII leaders were made without
the approval of the central government, the Resident’s action
was, nevertheless, hailed by the Attorney-General.87 In October,
in order to sever relations between the remnants of Permi’s top
leadership and its followers, the central government approved
the Resident’s proposal for the confiscation and suspension of
85.	Decision of the Raad van Nederlandsch-Indie, August 4,
1933, no. 1, Mailrapport 934x/’33.
86.	Resident van Heuven’s letter, September 26, 1933, no. 2055/
secret, Mailrapport 861x/’34.
87.	Office of the Attorney-General, September 12, 1933, no.
4643/AP, Mailrapport 1108x/’33 (Luchtpost 20/9, 1933).206
the party newspaper Medan Rakjat.ee In early November, Datuk
Singo Radjo, a penghulu and a leader of the PSII in Manindjau,
was arrested after he tried to expel a penghulu-informer from
the nagari council of Sungai Batang. In early 1934 Permi lead-
ers Muchtar Lutfi, Iljas Jacub and Djalaluddin Thaib and PSII
leaders Hadji Uddin Rahmany, Sabilal Rasad and Datuk Singo Radjo
were sent to Digul.
From November 1932 until September 1933, Permi had lost no
less than 55 of its leaders (including ten women) in the strug-
gle to achieve "Islam in Honor" and a "Prosperous Indonesia."
Although not actually a rebellious party, Permi had paid a high
price for being a radical party. The arrests continued until
the middle of 1934 with the temporary detention of Mansur Daud
and other members of the central board. Imposition of the
vergaderverbod and liberal use of the "extraordinary powers"
paralyzed nationalist movements in Minangkabau and in other
parts of Indonesia. According to the memoirs of former con-
troleur (Pajakumbuh) van der Meulen, under Governor-General de
Jonge, the Dutch Indies government "became a police state."
The politics of suppression, he believed, caused the Dutch
great loss: "We missed a chance, a chance which we can never
have again."89
88. Office of the Attorney-General, October 27, 1933, no.
5791/AP. The Resident made his proposal on October 13,
and, in accordance with the recommendation of the Raad van
Nederlandsch-Indie, the Governor-General prohibited publi-
cation of Medan Rakj at. Decision; no. 18, November 22,
1933, Mailrapport 1400x/’33.
89. van der Meulen, Ik Stond er Bij, pp. 110-111.CHAPTER IX
PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND POLITICS
In early 1933, an editor of Peuarta Deli, a nationalist
newspaper published in Medan, concluded his report on a visit
to the West Coast of Sumatra with the following words:
It is very difficult to understand the political situ-
ation on the West Coast from the outside. This situa-
tion can be properly assessed only by listening to
people’s opinions in the villages. Basically it is
the morale of these little people, not that of the
[Western educated] intellectuals, that must be care-
fully watched. It can be said that the kaum intelek,
the Western and highly educated intellectuals, have
no influence on the people’s hearts. The upper class
persons do not understand what has entered the people’s
minds. .	.	. [In this situation], the government dis-
trusts the popular movement, while the radicals are
suspicious of the government and officials. The kaum
intelek do not understand the Eastern or Islamic edu-
cated people. In short what we find on the West Coast
is a kind of nervous strain (nerveus spanning) among
some social groups.1
Despite the political anxiety, private schools continued to
expand and religious schools continued to modernize their teach-
ing methods and curriculum. In spite of the almost complete
isolation of the kaum intelek from the mainstream of the polit-
ical movement in West Sumatra, they contributed much to the
progress of educational development.
The expansion of private schools and the modernization of
religious schools were direct consequences of the Kaum Muda
movement. The Islamic modernist group resulted from the changes
in the religious schools, and they were trained to continue im-
proving the new madrasah system. In spite of growing involve-
ment in the politics of national independence and in economic
enterprises, religious schools remained the common focus of the
Kaum Muda educated intellectuals. Schools not only provided
them a base for influence but also a channel through which the
Kaum Muda educated intellectuals could carry out their social
and religious reforms. As in the past, schools remained the
institutions through which the reformers endeavored to change
1. Reprinted in Berita, April 22, 1933.
207208
their social and religious environment and formulate new concep-
tions of the Minangkabau world. Changes and reforms in the re-
ligious schools helped spread the ideology of particular Kaum
Muda organizations and, more importantly, were an effective way
to introduce "modern" ideas into the nagari. Using Islam, which
along with adat formed an inseparable part of the alam Minangka-
bau, the Kaum Muda schools spread the idea of modernization and
its corollaries--nationalism and the awareness of the need for
secular knowledge. The continuing expansion of private schools
and the modernization of religious schools were the most perma-
nent concerns of the Kaum Muda educated group as well as its
most important achievements.
Several social and economic factors contributed to the ex-
pansion and dispersion of the private schools. The increased
number of graduates from the Kaum Muda religious schools and
competition among the various political and educational organi-
zations contributed much to the emergence of new religious
schools and to the establishment of the "combined" schools, in
which religious education was given as part of a predominantly
secular curriculum. The economic depression had caused a halt
in the expansion of the government's educational program, but
it precipitated the development of private schools. The econom-
ic depression produced unemployed Western educated persons,
many of whom established private "secular" and "combined"
schools or became teachers in the "modernized" religious schools.
The depression also made it difficult for people to send their
children to outside educational centers, which meant that the
local communities had to form their own schools.2 The estab-
lishment of a private school was often motivated by disillusion-
ment with the government school system (which was thought to
have corrupted the younger generation) and by the desire for an
ideologically more appropriate education. The nationalist Taman
Siswa school network, founded by Ki Hadjar Dewantara in Jogja-
karta, for example, was based on such motives. In 1933, the
Taman Siswa began to set up branches in Minangkabau. Using a
similar motive but different approach, Muhammad Sjafei founded
the INS in Kaju Tanam. Motivated by the desire to train dynamic
and independent Islamic intellectuals, Abdul Aziz established
the Kweekschool Islamijah, which won praise from Kaum Muda
political leaders as well as from Dutch officials. Permi founded
its Islamic College in 1931 in order to train qualified teachers
and nationalist political leaders. A government regulation
(Staatsblad 1923, no. 136) provided legal protection for the ex-
panding private schools. Although the government reserved the
right to inspect all schools, the promoter or teacher of a new
school only had to report his intentions to the district office.
With this proviso any organization or any person could found a
2. Roesad, "Rapport over het Onderwijs," Mailrapport 1518x/'33.209
private school. The government would intervene only if the
school began to follow what was considered an undesirable
political direction.3
Improvements in the system of instruction (replacing the
"circle" with the graded system) and changes in the character
of learning (by repudiating the tradition of complete dependence
on old textual authorities) freed the madrasah from its tradi-
tional past. These developments, which began in the 1910's,
paved the way for further changes. The religious schools began
working to make their programs more relevant to changing politi-
cal and economic situations, especially after the mid-1920's
when the economic slump had exposed the weaknesses of religious
schools and the communist movement had created a profound crisis
in the Kaum Muda movement. The second stage of religious re-
form, which gained momentum in the early 1930's, was character-
ized by concern about improving instruction and also a desire to
provide the graduates with more useful tools for their daily
needs. The Kaum Muda educators were also concerned with the
intellectual gulf between Islamic modernists and Western - educated
persons. The main features of modernization were the inclusion
of "secular" subjects in the curriculum of religious schools and
the establishment of higher teachers' training schools, usually
called "colleges." The colleges used Arabic and Indonesian as
media of instruction. Their aim was to produce new Islamic
intellectuals who were not only experts in religious knowledge
but who were also familiar with secular subjects. These trends
in the Kaum Muda religious schools contributed to the spread of
the "combined" elementary school and precipitated a "seculariza-
tion" tendency in the non-government school system.
During the period of expansion and modernization of private
schools, the central government promulgated the so-called Wild
Schools Ordinance which enabled it to halt the establishment of
new private schools and to close down old ones. Opposition to
this ordinance, which reached a climax in late 1932 and early
1933, sharpened the anti-government political campaign and pro-
vided a common forum for all political and educational organiza-
tions. The non-political Muhammadijah and the Kaum Muda ulama
3. Wilminck, Inspector of Education, flatly stated that Staats-
blad 1923,no. 136 was "an unjustified, unnecessary and ill-
advised assault on the village's right of sanction," because
it gave a legal right to anyone to establish a school with-
out permission from the penghulu. Most such schools, he
said, taught nothing but hatred against the government.
Wilminck, Fort de Kock, January 4, 1927, Mailrapport 214x/
'27. Officials of the Office for Native Affairs refuted
this viewpoint. January 27, 1927, no. I/51/secret, in
ibid.210
collaborated with the radical parties in opposition to the ordi-
nance. More than the earlier Guru Ordinance issue, the campaign
against the Wild Schools Ordinance reveals the close ties between
private schools and politics. The already extensive private
school network and the determination of nationalist organiza-
tions in Minangkabau and in Java resulted in a political defeat
for the government.
Expansion of Private Schools
A major consequence of the government’s retrenchment policy
was the suspension of educational development. In 1931, the
government stopped further expansion of its schools and raised
the financial burden on local communities. Several schools were
closed. In 1931, the government closed down the Bukittinggi
MOSVIA, a training school for civil servants.4 In the same
year, it refused to accept new students for the Sekolah Radja,
the teachers’ training school. In spite of the protest by the
penghulu and other "loyal" groups, the central government an-
nounced in 1933 that the Sekolah Radja would be closed perma-
nently.5 In order to ensure the success of its retrenchment
policy, in 1932, the government issued new regulations which
raised tuition at its secondary schools (MULO) and sharply re-
duced subsidies to qualified private schools. In early 1933,
the central government announced that village communities would
henceforth have to contribute a greater share to the upkeep of
local volksschool.6
From 1931 until 1933, no new volksschool were opened in
West Sumatra. In 1931 there were 669 volksschool with an en-
rollment of 65,950 pupils. In 1933 the number of schools re-
mained the same but enrollment had increased to 75,839, about
46% of all Minangkabau school children. The stagnancy of govern-
ment sponsored schools showed more obviously in the development
of the vernacular schools (the second class schools and the
vervolgschool) and the "Dutch-Native" schools (HIS and schakel-
school). In 1931 there were 197 of these schools. In 1933 the
total number had decreased to 189. Enrollment, on the other
hand, had increased from 22,663 to 32,286, about 16% of the
total number of school children. Private schools, religious or
otherwise, accommodated the remaining 44%.
4.	Indisch Verslag, 1932, p. 231.
5.	Ibid., 1934, p. 244.
6.	Ibid., p. 234.211
Table 3
Government and Subsidized Schools
Type of Sch001	Schc	1926		1931		1933	
	)ols	Students	Schools	Students	Schools	Students
HIS	8	2,148	13	3,152	13	3,435
Schakelschool	2	199	3	329	3	401
Second Class School (including vervolgschool) 124		14,974	171	25,417	163	26,866
Racially Mixed Schools Europeesche Lagere School	7	881	6	1,111	6	1,068
MULO	3	458	4	654	4	516
Source:	Spits, "Memorie van Overgave."
The above schools were generally located in the district
capitals; the isolated rural areas were served only by the volks-
school or private schools. The expansion of private schools
increased the school attendance to about 9% of the total popu-
lation of West Sumatra.
In 1931, after many schools of the Kaum Muda ulama had
severed their relationship with the Sumatra Thawalib, 30 Thawa-
lib schools remained. By 1933 the number had already increased
to 44. In the same year, there were 120 Dinijah schools. The
Muhammadijah, in spite of its weakening influence over the in-
creasingly radical popular movements, managed to expand its
school network rapidly. At the end of 1930, the Muhammadijah
had only nineteen schools. By 1933 it controlled 122 schools,
including several "combined” schools. Many branches of the
Muhammadijah and of other organizations also conducted adult
literacy courses.7 But the majority of private schools, par-
ticularly the secular and "combined" schools, were not affili-
ated with any major organizations. No less than 160 Kaum Muda
and 95 Kaum Tua religious schools were not affiliated with the
big organizations.
7. In 1930, 30% of the literate Minangkabau had received their
training outside the regular private or government schools.212
Table 4
Private Schools and School Organizations in 1933
Organization/School	Affiliation	Schools	Students
1. Muhammadijah		122	5,835
2. Permi		4	249
3. Dinijah		120	7,136
4. Thawalib		44	3,031
5. PII (Kaum Tua)		45	3,651
6. Non-affiliated	schools	878	50,082
Source:	Mailrapport 881x/'33.
In spite of this expansion in the private school network,
the geographical distribution pattern of the schools did not
change. The Padang and Pariaman sub-regencies on the coast
and the Manindjau and Again Tua sub-regencies in the interior re-
mained the chief centers of private schools. In these sub-
regencies there was one private school for every 5,000 inhabi-
tants. In the Ophir sub-regency, on the other hand, for a popu-
lation of 10,000 there was only one private school. In Manin-
djau, the most politicized sub-regency, private schools could
accommodate 8% of the population. In Bangkinang, private
schools accommodated less than 1.5% of the population.
A more important change was the "secularization" tendency
within the Minangkabau educational system. Although the number
of purely secular private schools was still very small, the num-
ber of "combined" schools offering religious education as well
as predominantly secular subjects rapidly increased. The
secularization trend began with the inclusion of several secular
subjects in the Kaum Muda schools. The Kaum Tua schools remained
purely religious in the traditional sense until the 1940's, but
by 1934 they were distinctly a minority, especially in terms of
their student enrollment.
The above trend does not mean a decline in the absolute
number of purely religious schools. The Kaum Tua school network
was also expanding. In 1933 the PII had only 45 schools. In
1938, the organization, under a new name, controlled about 200
schools, most of them newly founded. Moreover, traditional
sekolah and surau mengadji, Quranic recital schools, remained
important.213
Table 5
Types of Private Schools
	Type of School	Schools	Students
1.	Kaum Tua schools: purely religious education	589	9,285
2.	Kaum Muda schools: religious schools with secular subjects	452	25,292
3.	"Combined" schools: secular schools with religious education	132	44,577
4.	Secular schools	35	824
	Total	1,213	69,983
Source:	Mailrapport 881x/'33.
Emergence of Islamic Colleges
In the mid-1920’s, new attempts were made to stimulate the
process of modernization in the religious schools. Hadji
Abdullah Ahmad started preparations for a modern Normal Islam,
and the Sumatra Thawalib schools began to draw up plans for a
standardization of their school system and for the inclusion of
secular subjects in the curriculum. In the meantime, Mahmud
Junus, following up on his experience in Cairo, designed a plan
for religious school reform and began writing new textbooks.
A turning point in the modernization of the religious
schools came in 1931 when the Dinijah and Thawalib schools
adopted Mahmud Junus1 plan and Permi and the PGAI opened modern
teachers’ training schools. In late 1930, Mahmud Junus founded
a school, Al-Djamiah Islamijah, in Sungajang,which was divided
into elementary (ibtidaijah) and secondary (tsanawdjah') levels.
Each had a four year program. Students at the elementary level
were graduates of the volksschool or the second class school.
The secondary level only admitted students who had already
attended the Thawalib or Dinijah schools. The class time was
evenly divided among Arabic, religious and secular subjects.
The elementary level was modeled on the government schakelschool
Secular subjects in the secondary level followed the program
used in the government elementary teachers' training schools.8
8. Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan, pp. 89-90, 96-97.214
The Djamiah closed in 1933 for lack of qualified teachers,
but its system was adopted by the Dinijah and Thawalib schools.
In late 1931, the Dinijah school for girls (Dinijah Putri)
divided its seven-year program into a four-year ibtidaijah and
a three year tsanawijah. The school gradually introduced secu-
lar subjects, such as geography, English, botany, and others.
By 1933 the secular subjects formed 30 to 35% of the school’s
total teaching hours.9 Although varying in the arrangement of
the curricula, other Dinijah and Thawalib schools began to intro-
duce the new system in 1932. These trends became more pronounced
as graduates from the new teachers’ training schools began to
take positions in the schools.
The emergence of the new teachers' training schools was an
important achievement for the Kaum Muda educators. These col-
leges recruited their students from the graduates of the Kaum
Muda and the Kaum Tua religious schools and also from the HIS
and schakelschool. The earliest college was the Normal Islam,
which was financially supported by Minangkabau traders and a
government sponsored lottery. On July 7, 1930, almost five
years after he had begun his campaign, Hadji Abdullah Ahmad
opened a modern teachers’ training school, complete with a
library and student dormitories. The Padang-based school began
its program in early 1931 with Mahmud Junus as director. Since
the students were mostly graduates of the Thawalib, Dinijah and
the Kaum Tua Tarbijah schools, the four year program of the
Normal Islam put more emphasis on secular subjects and Arabic.
Mahmud held a degree in Arabic from the Darul Ulum in Cairo.
The Normal Islam was the first Islamic school to use Arabic as
its main medium of instruction, and some 20% of the teaching
hours were spent on Arabic. In spite of its name, the school
used only 15% of its teaching hours for religious subjects,
such as law, Quranic commentaries, Hadith and tauhid. Another
65% of class time was devoted to instruction in secular subjects,
such as mathematics, geography, history, and Western languages,
particularly English.
The establishment of the Islamic College on May 1, 1931 in
Padang was a result of the disenchantment among Permi leaders
with Hadji Abdullah Ahmad because of his relationship with the
Dutch. Also Permi desired to have its own modern school. The
new teachers' training school, called Al-Kulijat-ul Islamijah,
was founded, according to its promoters, in order to create
"perfect men with solid personalities." Trained in the spirit
of "Islam and nationalism," the students were expected to be
knowledgeable in both secular and religious subjects.10 Permi's
9. L. de Vries, Report, September 5, 1928, Mailrapport 966x/
' 28.
10. Tjaja Soematra, April 10, 1937.215
Islamic College, unlike the Normal Islam, was designed to train
not only future teachers but future political leaders as well.
Preparations for the founding of the Islamic College began
while Permi was still in the process of transferring its head-
quarters to Padang in late 1930. The school’s promoters, Iljas
Jacub and Basa Bandaro, managed to gain support from several
Western educated persons and traders in Padang. The "board of
advisers" of the school, the men responsible for designing the
school program and curriculum, consisted of Western educated
intellectuals. Some of them were high government officials.
The chairman of the board was Dr. Kusuma Atmadja, a Sundanese
judge, called by Permi "the father of the Islamic College."11
Chaired by Basa Bandaro, the permanent board of trustees con-
sisted of Padang merchants, two of whom were coastal aristocrats
and the other two penghulu from the interior. Djalaluddin Thaib
and Iljas Jacub were the prominent members of the school board,
which actually supervised the school. The school's promoters
and Permi wanted to install Mahmud Junus, Iljas’ opponent in
Cairo, as the director of the college. They failed, however,
because Mahmud had been committed to Hadji Abdullah Ahmad's
organization, the PGAI, since 1929. Also he wanted to remain
aloof from politics. Permi then tried to appoint Djanan Thaib,
the director of Sekolah Indonesia in Mecca. In spite of his
initial willingness to return to Minangkabau, Djanan Thaib
remained in Mecca, where he served as an inspector of education
under the new Arab government. Until 1938, the Islamic College
was under the directorship of Abdul Hakim, a lawyer. Teachers
at the school were recruited from graduates of Al-Azhar and of
the government AMS and HIK.
As far as curriculum was concerned, there was no major
difference between the Normal Islam and the Islamic College.
Both emphasized secular subjects and Arabic and both taught
English, rather than Dutch, as their second foreign language.
But, since the Islamic College also admitted the graduates of
the HIS and the schakelschool, its first grade was divided into
two programs. The graduates of the government secular schools
had to take a special class in order to make up for their lack
of religious training.
The Normal Islam and the Islamic College were the earliest
successful colleges in Minangkabau. By 1934, the Muhammadijah
and two other organizations also established their own colleges.
These colleges not only provided advanced and general training
for graduates of Thawalib and Dinijah schools but also, more
importantly, helped to minimize the gulf between the religious
11. Medan Rakj at, 1, No. 9 (June 1931); Politieke Politioneel
Overzicht, 2de kwartaal, 1931, Mailrapport 808x/'31.216
and Western educated persons. The college was an institution
where graduates of religious schools could study together with
those of the government schools and where the Islamic modernists
from Al-Azhar could work together with Western-educated intellec
tuals. With the increased number of Cairo returnees, the grow-
ing participation of the Western-educated persons in the Kaum
Muda educational movement, and the popularity of the colleges,
the number of these teachers’ training schools kept increasing.
By 1940 there were already thirteen such colleges in Minangkabau
In order to accommodate their graduates, the first Islamic uni-
versity was founded in Padang in 1940.
Into this situation of expansion of private schools, mod-
ernization of religious schools, emergence of Islamic colleges,
and intense anti-government political activity, the central
government introduced the Wild Schools Ordinance. Opposition
to the ordinance soon created a common front for most of Minang-
kabau, as well as for other Indonesian political and educa-
tional organizations and increased the anti-government activi-
ties still further.
Campaign Against the Wild Schools Ordinance
On September 19, 1932, a "supervision ordinance for private
schools" (toezioht or dormant ie partioulien onderwij s') , popularly
known as the Wild Schools Ordinance (Wilde Seholen Ordonnantie},
was promulgated. The ordinance stipulated that those who wanted
to teach in non-subsidized private schools should obtain written
permission from the district office. Applicants should have a
certificate from a government or subsidized school and should
be able to convince the district officer that they would not
violate colonial "rust en orde."12 The ordinance was issued
in order to protect the quality of the private schools, the so-
called "wild schools," and to maintain a standardized school
system. This ordinance was also designed to enable the govern-
ment to prevent political influence in the private schools. The
ordinance was felt to be necessary, because the existing ordi-
nance (Staatsblad 1923, no. 136) only gave the government repres-
sive powers; the new one was preventive and hopefully would
allow enforcement of stricter controls on nationalist private
schools.13
The ordinance soon aroused opposition from the majority of
Islamic and nationalist organizations throughout Java and
12.	Staatsblad 1932, no. 494, September 1932.
13.	Report of the Director of Education, B. J. 0. Schrieke, in
van der Wal, ed., Onderwijsbeleid, pp. 508-520 .217
Minangkabau. Radical parties, such as the PNI Baru and Partindo,
and loyal parties, such Budi Utomo, all opposed the ordinance.
In Minangkabau, the opposition sealed the cooperation among the
Kaum Muda organizations and created a common cause for Kaum Muda
and Kaum Tua ulama.
Several factors contributed to the opposition. In the
first place, the ordinance was issued at a time when the govern-
ment itself was pursuing a retrenchment policy which had re-
sulted in the suspension of school expansion. The Wild Schools
Ordinance would sharply decrease the number of private schools,
because many of their teachers had not graduated from a govern-
ment or subsidized school. It would also impair the future of
graduates from private schools whose diplomas were not recog-
nized by the government. The ordinance, therefore, was seen as
nothing less than a legal means to eliminate the rapidly expand-
ing nationalist private schools. Ki Hadjar Dewantara, who
emerged as the national leader of the opposition, predicted
that the Wild Schools Ordinance could mean "the defeat of the
national political movement" and "the death of the people’s
freedom."1* It was also suspected that the ordinance might
lead to arbitrary interpretation or misunderstanding by offi-
cials at the expense of the private schools. The ordinance’s
aim to achieve a standard school system was thought to fore-
shadow continuation of the "denationalizing process" of Indone-
sian youth.15 The desire to develop a new educational system
based on national culture had motivated the establishment of
Taman Siswa and other nationalist private schools.
On October 1, 1932, Ki Hadjar Dewantara sent a telegram to
the Governor-General, in which he stated that Taman Siswa re-
jected the ordinance and that it would, if necessary, "persist-
ently conduct passive resistance" {lijdeldjk verzet). In a very
short time, his firm stand was followed by other political and
educational organizations. They were determined to continue
their schools at any cost.16
By the end of the year, almost all important organizations
were participating in local opposition committees scattered
throughout Java and West Sumatra. At the end of December, a
national conference of the Committee to Help National Education
14.	Ibid., p. 553.
15.	In 1927, van der Plas wrote that there should be a "nation-
alizing process" in the government schools. See, ibid.,
pp. 437-444.
16.	On the reactions in various parts of Indonesia see Noer,
"Rise and Development," pp. 291-297.218
was held in Jogjakarta. At the conference, Marah Sutan, a
famous Minangkabau educator and the father of Sjafei, announced
that the Minangkabau people would work closely with Ki Hadjar
Dewantara in conducting "passive resistance." "There are more
than 10,000 teachers and students in Minangkabau," he claimed,
"who are determined to oppose the ordinance, even if they have
to go to jail." In a mood of opposition, the conference also
paid its respects to Rasuna Said, the first leader to be arrest-
ed as the result of the opposition movement.17
The Wild Schools Ordinance encountered the strongest oppo-
sition in Minangkabau. Every school organization, political
parties, and a large number of adat leaders opposed the ordi-
nance. Unlike the opposition to the Guru Ordinance in 1928,
opposition to the Wild Schools Ordinance was conducted by each
organization separately, although they participated in the joint
local committees. As in the case of the Guru Ordinance, the
paramount impulse behind the opposition was religious.18
The opposition began to gain momentum in November 1932.
Iljas Jacub, the head of Permi’s department of education, argued
that "the real origin of the Wild Schools Ordinance was the
great difference between the government and the people."19 He
considered the ordinance even worse than the Guru Ordinance be-
cause it would affect the future of graduates from existing
private schools.20 The Dinijah schools’organization issued a
resolution on November 19, 1932, stating that the Wild Schools
Ordinance was an obstacle hindering the struggle of the Indone-
sian people to achieve educational progress. The Dinijah,
therefore, was determined to work closely with other organiza-
tions in opposing the ordinance.21 Students at the Islamic
College announced that they were prepared to become substitute
teachers if the present teachers at the private schools were
arrested. The students secured the cooperation of their col-
leagues in the Normal Islam and other newly established Islamic
teachers' training schools.22 At the end of December, "10,000
17.	Oetoesan Indonesia, December 31 and January 3, 1933, in
Overzicht van de Inlandsch Pers, 1/1933, p. 31.
18.	van Heuven, "Memorie van Overgave," pp. 7-8.
19.	Tjaja Soematra, November 19, 1932.
20.	Medan Rakjat, October 1 and October 8, 1932, in Overzicht
van de Inlandsch Pers, 42/1932, p. 268.
21.	Berita, in ibid., 49/1932, p. 377.
22.	Radio, December 9, 1932.219
students from Thawalib schools" were ready to back their teach-
ers in opposition to the ordinance.23 The PII, the newly trans-
formed Kaum Tua organization, also joined the chorus of opposi-
tion. Not allowing themselves to be led by the Kaum Muda ulama,
however, the Kaum Tua ulama sent a letter of protest directly
to the government.24 On December 18, the PSII, in accordance
with the instruction of its central board, called simultaneous
meetings of its branches. All meetings, however, were dispersed
by the police. In order to dramatize its opposition, the party
urged its members and other Minangkabau people to hold midnight
prayers (tahadjud') individually or communally.25
In an emergency conference on December 15, Permi decided
to coordinate the opposition movement of the Thawalib and Permi
schools and to engage in concerted action with political parties
in Java. On December 26-27, Permi conducted "simultaneous ac-
tions." During the two days, according to a government report,
Permi held no less than 66 protest meetings throughout the West
Coast of Sumatra. The majority of the meetings, however, were
dispersed by the police. Some meetings were forced to adjourn
before they started. In many places, Permi could not hold a
meeting because the local authorities refused to grant permis-
sion. 26
The Resident of the West Coast stated that the Wild Schools
Ordinance provided "a practical front of political unity" and
gave "something worthwhile for public meetings."27 The ordi-
nance was seen not simply as a legal hindrance to the develop-
ment of secular private schools. The Permi statement of Decem-
ber 27 said that the ordinance would eventually "destroy the
Indonesians' cultural life at a time when they are struggling
to fulfill their obligations according to Islam and [the law of]
humanity."28 The ordinance was a direct assault on Islamic
23.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, December 1932, Mailrapport
227x/'33.
24.	Ibid., January 1933, Mailrapport 357x/'33.
25.	Ibid., December 1932, Mailrapport 227x/'33; Berita, January
5, 1933.
26.	According to the Permi statement, "Only 32 of the 74 protest
meetings planned could actually be held." The police re-
fused permission for the rest. Loetan Gani, "Rintangan-
Rintangan Pergerakan di Minangkabau," Berita, January 5,
1932.
27.	van Heuven, "Memorie van Overgave," pp. 51-54.
28.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, December 1932, Mailrapport
227x/'33.220
doctrine, which emphasized the need for a continuing effort in
search of knowledge. Kaum Muda ulama, under the leadership of
Hadji Rasul, founded a committee of opposition in early December
1932. The committee was supported by the Muhammadijah and other
Islamic organizations.29 Shortly after its establishment, it
urged the people to oppose the Wild Schools Ordinance and the
Guru Ordinance, which was in force in areas outside Minangkabau.
The committee appealed to the government to withdraw these ordi-
nances. The resolution emphasized that the search for and the
distribution of knowledge was a religious duty. The Prophet
had instructed his followers "to seek knowledge from the cradle
to the grave" and God had commanded mankind to discover "the
secret of the universe." The government ordinance in effect
tried to block Muslims from pursuing their religious obligations.
The Indonesian people, who have become the humblest
and the poorest nation in this world--because they are
poor in knowledge--have been trying as best as they
can to establish educational institutions, which are
in accordance with their ideologies. [They are doing
this] because it is a sacred right and a holy obliga-
tion that must be pursued by anyone of pure heart and
of high morality. This should also be the attitude
of the government if it really wants to improve the
life of its subjects.30
The appeal of the Kaum Muda ulama, who had led the opposi-
tion to the Guru Ordinance, gave moral support to the political
parties. Already by February 1933, 123 political and educational
organizations in Minangkabau had joined the "ulama committee."
In February, the committee held a conference in Padang Pandjang
29.	A permanent board was installed in January 1933. The com-
mittee, known as the Comite Perloetjoetan "Goeroe Ordon-
nantie" dan "Ordonnantie Toezicht Particulier Scholen," in-
cluded the following:
Chairman:	Dr. Hadji Abdul Karim Amrullah [Hadji Rasul]
Vice-Chairman: Sjech M. Djamil Djambek
Secretary:	Hadji	Abdul Malik
Treasurer:	Hadji	Ibrahim Musa
Commissioners: Sjech	Abbas Abdullah
Sjech Daud Rasjidi
Hadji Adjhuri
Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, January 1933, Mailrapport
357x/’33.
30.	"Makloemat Comite Perloetjoetan ’Goeroe Ordonnantie' dan
’Ordonnantie Toezicht Particulier Scholen,’" Pembela Islam,
57 (1933), pp. 42-43.221
at which it decided, among other things: to intensify its oppo-
sition to the ordinance, to establish closer cooperation with
all Indonesian organizations, and to establish a closer rela-
tionship with Islamic organizations abroad. On behalf of its
supporting organizations, the committee repeated its appeal to
the government for withdrawal of the Wild Schools Ordinance and
the Guru Ordinance. In its resolution, the committee stated
that it was prepared to obey government laws only if those laws
did not violate their own religious law.
After we have studied carefully our essential obliga-
tions to God, to Whom we must be responsible for our
deeds,[we realize] that it is impossible to accept the
two ordinances. If the government is determined to
enforce such ordinances, [it would force us] to commit
sin against our God. If we try to fulfill our obliga-
tion to God, we may have to betray the government.31
February, however, was the last month of the opposition
movement. At the order of the Attorney-General, all public
meetings for discussing the Wild Schools Ordinance were forbid-
den.32 Facing opposition from all major political parties, the
central government suspended the enforcement of the ordinance.33
The "passive resistance" of Ki Hadjar Dewantara and the reli-
gious appeal of the Kaum Muda ulama had ended in success. The
government abandoned its idea of using preventive legal means
to curb nationalist private schools. But the existing ordinance
(Staatsblad 1923, no. 136) could still be a useful weapon to
suppress undesirable influence in the private schools.
Government Campaign Against the Religious Schools
According to Resident van Heuven, there was a strong tend-
ency among the Minangkabau to regard the religious schools as
their special preserve and as a sphere where their "autonomy"
should be inviolate. They expected the government to respect
this privileged sphere, and they would not hesitate to act if
31.	Verbaal March 23, 1933.
32.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, February 1933, Mailrapport
590x/'33.
33.	The opinions of various high officials is contained in
van der Wal, ed., Herinneringen, pp. 151-153, and
Onderwijsbeleid, pp^ 549-5557222
the government encroached on it.34 A similar conclusion was
also reached by the Attorney-General during an investigation
visit to the West Coast in July 1933. He realized that a new
regulation concerning private schools was likely to incite
political turmoil.35 The best policy, therefore, was to imple-
ment effectively the legal sanctions already provided by the
1923 school ordinance.
In addition to suppressing radical political parties, the
government wanted to eliminate political influence from reli-
gious schools. In the second half of 1933, several Kaum Muda
schools were raided and a large amount of political literature
was confiscated. In December, on the basis of evidence found
during the raid, seven out of the twelve teachers at the Thawa-
lib school of Padang Pandjang were forbidden to teach for "an
unspecified time." This action was followed by the closing of
two Permi schools, the Tsanawijah and the teachers’ training
school for girls. These schools were considered strongly anti-
Dutch and their students thoroughly politicized.36 In early
1934, the government forced the Dinijah Putri to expel two of
its teachers who were former leaders of Permi. In Kerintji
and Pariaman the Dutch local officials supported the adat
authorities when they closed or took over schools established
by Permi. In the meantime, the government continued its policy
of preventing those who were former political leaders from
teaching.
In the face of government repression, in December 1933,
Permi dissolved its department of education and announced that
each school was now an independent unit. The decision would
weaken the party and the schools because it forced Permi leaders
to choose between remaining in the party or becoming full-
fledged teachers, but party leaders thought this was the only
way to protect the schools from government action. Permi also
reemphasized the independent character of its former boy scout
organization, El-Hilaal, which had been under government sur-
veillance .
It was feared, however, that dissolution of the department
of education would endanger the success of the modernization
34.	Resident van Heuven, Letter to the Director of Education,
Padang, April 12, 1933, no. 867x/P/secret, Mailrapport
357x/’33; Letter of the Attorney-General to the Governor-
General, Tarutung, July 17, 1933, Mailrapport 921x/’33.
35.	Politieke Politioneel Overzicht, December 1932, Mailrapport
227x/’33.
36.	Ibid., February 1934, Mailrapport 480x/’34.223
program for religious schools. In January 1934, several teach-
ers at the Thawalib schools who had had to resign from Permi
formed a Council of Education which tried to function along the
lines of Permi’s department of education. Although the council
could not successfully take the latter’s place, it managed to
consolidate the schools to some extent during the difficult
process of "depoliticization" and modernization.
After the government enforced the vergaderverbod in August
1933, the Resident reported a strong tendency to shift the focus
of activity from politics to schools. In spite of official sus-
picion, the modernization of religious schools continued. With-
out adequate organizational channels, however, the process was
not even. There was no uniformity in programs or textbooks.
This uneven development of religious schools continued until
1936, when a new milestone in the history of Minangkabau reli-
gious schools was reached. In that year a conference of all
school organizations resulted in the standardization of Kaum
Muda religious schools.
Conclusion
It took almost two decades for the religious schools to
initiate a program that had been advocated by the pioneers of
the Kaum Muda movement since the early 1910's. In the first
Islamic journal, Al-Moenir, the Kaum Muda ulama had appealed
for ilmu asjriah (knowledge which was in accordance with chang-
ing times), ilmu akaliah (knowledge which was based on intelli-
gence) and European languages, needed for an understanding of
new sciences. But these ulama, though they were modernists,
were also orthodox reformers, and they made no substantial
progress. They also could not make satisfactory improvements
in their own schools. In 1915 Hadji Abdullah Ahmad, Kaum Muda
leader in Padang, aided by several Western educated persons,
established the HIS Adabijah, a Dutch-Native school where chil-
dren were also given religious education. But soon after, the
school received a subsidy from the government, and it hired a
Dutch principal and Dutch-educated teachers. It was Zainuddin
Labai, an able and dedicated former student of Hadji Rasul, who
made a breakthrough in the madrasah tradition. In 1915 he
founded the Dinijah school, which took the government school
system as its model. The new graded system for religious
schools was soon adopted by Hadji Rasul in the Sumatra Thawalib
and by other Kaum Muda religious teachers. After 1915, the Kaum
Muda religious schools continued to change. The system of in-
struction, the character of learning, the use of textbooks and
the school organizations continued to change. The significance
of the early 1930’s is that it was a period when the majority
of the Kaum Muda schools, their teachers, and many of their224
graduates, were involved in reform programs. It was a time when
both Cairo returnees and Western-educated intellectuals were
actively engaged in the modernization of religious schools.
The expansion of Kaum Muda religious schools and Kaum Muda
sponsored ’^combined" schools contributed much to the group’s pre-
dominance in Minangkabau political movements. The schools laid
down a foundation for the spread and the continuity of the basic
teachings of orthodox Islamic modernism. In this way, the Kaum
Muda schools and preachers (muballigh) with their numerous
organizations and publications confirmed more strongly the
superiority of Islam over adat within the concept of alam Minang-
kabau. The Kaum Muda school system can be seen as the source
of a number of observable tendencies in Minangkabau modern his-
tory, particularly those which were politically Islamic-oriented
but intellectually open to Western influence.
The continuing process of modernization in the religious
schools sometimes resulted in a conflict of generations, such
as the conflict between the communist-oriented religious teach-
ers and graduates and the Kaum Muda ulama, and the tension be-
tween the latter and the Islamic-nationalist Permi leaders.
This process was also partly responsible for the internal dis-
sension among the Kaum Muda educated group demonstrated by the
conflict between the Muhammadijah and Permi. Since the early
1920’s, the Kaum Muda schools had not only been the intellectual
centers for the anti-colonial political movement but also had
been the major motive force behind the intensifying political
activities. Their close identification with the schools and
their own ideals and professions had led the Kaum Muda ulama
and their former students, despite differences on specific
political and social issues, to form a common front in their
opposition to the Guru Ordinance (1928) and the Wild Schools
Ordinance (1932). This opposition itself contributed to a pro-
liferation of religious and’tombined"schools and encouraged the
process of religious school modernization. Schools were also
the institutions to which Islamic modernist leaders returned
after political activities were suppressed and the political
parties were paralyzed.
In September 1933, the government dealt a deathblow to Permi
by arresting its important leaders and applying the vergader-
verbod regulation to party meetings. In the middle of 1934, the
party abandoned its political character and pledged to concen-
trate its activities solely in economic and educational fields.
Permi, however, could not operate under government suspicion.
It failed to revive its followers’ enthusiasm because the gov-
ernment continued to stress rust en orde. In 1936, Permi, once
the largest and most radical party in Sumatra, had to dissolve
itself. Nevertheless, its Islamic College and the numerous
Sumatra Thawalib schools it had helped to expand and modernize225
continued to develop. In 1936 a new major educational reform
was begun, and in 1940 the Kaum Muda educated group with the
cooperation of the Western educated intellectuals founded the
first Islamic university in Indonesia.IN RETROSPECT
Feelings of grievance, mounting anti-government sentiment,
and a desire to create a new world ’’free from capitalist and
kafir exploitation," contributed to the outbreak of rebellion
in January 1927. The notion that the act of opposition itself
was a kind of ibadah led some young Islamic modernists to par-
ticipate in the so-called communist rebellion. The idea that
rebellion was a way of purifying the social environment moti-
vated several tarekat sjech, who led the rebellious movement.
The daring attempt to gain independence, however, was harshly
suppressed. The rebellion ended in despair, death or exile.
During the post-rebellion period, the Minangkabau attempted
to recover from the psychological shock and tried to find new
forms and a more solid foundation for social development. The
ulama, whose prestige was gravely undermined in the three years
of communist activities, recaptured the leadership from their
former students, products of Kaum Muda schools. The Muhammadi-
jah emerged as the first Kaum Muda organization designed to
lead the ummat in the creation of a religiously based society
and at the same time to utilize prevailing anti-government
feelings in building its organization. The period from 1927
until the end of 1930, which included expansion of the Muhamma-
dijah, the campaign against the Guru Ordinance, and the emerg-
ence of Permi and the PSII, was a time when the Kaum Muda edu-
cated group gradually spread its influence, taking the lead in
the educational and political movements in West Sumatra. The
period from 1931 to 1933, however, also exposed the various
contradictory aspects in Minangkabau life. In this period,
adat, the symbol of Minangkabau continuity and the traditional
basis of legitimate political power, was put to the test.
Should adat tolerate the existing colonial power, which was
clearly not based on sakato alam (consensus of the people)? Or
should adat be used to support and to cultivate new ideas
brought by the Islamic modernists and Western educated intellec-
tuals from the rantau? Tolerance of the foreign power meant
nothing less than a betrayal of adat. On the other hand, com-
plete acceptance of new ideas and trends might reduce the polit-
ical power of the nagari authorities who represented adat. Both
alternatives posed a threat to the continuity of the alam Minang-
kabau itself. The response to these questions resulted, on the
one hand, in the' participation of many penghulu in the political
movement and, on the other, in a closer relationship between
other adat authorities and the Dutch government. Tension in-
herent in Islamic thinking also came to the surface. The ideal
of creating a right-guided society had to take into account the
need to liberate the ummat from a kafir government. Islam, "the
226227
all-embracing and perfect religion" and the proper basis of uni-
versal unity, had to cope with concepts of national unity based
on secular instead of transcendental considerations. Both Is-
lamic unity as well as kebangsaan unity challenged the idea of
the ever-expanding world of Minangkabau and the traditional
centripetal conception of its alam.
The period was one of political romanticism in Minangkabau,
a time when political action for its own sake was most important
and when a bold political speech might turn a leader into a hero.
In spite of various examples which demonstrate the existential
character of political activities, during this period there was
also an intensive effort to modernize Minangkabau and to awaken
the.people to a realization of the tension between primordial
attachments and the need for a new, enlarged conception of their
world. For Minangkabau, the early 1930’s were a period of
political anxiety and ideological confusion on the one hand,
and of the growing self-confidence in the ability to change the
society on the other.
The preceding chapters have traced the emergence and growth
of the influence of the second generation of the Islamic modern-
ists. The expansion of religious doctrines beginning with the
Kaum Muda ulama in the 1900’s, the slackening doctrinal reli-
gious conflict, the rising popularity of schools as part of the
consistent drive toward kemadjuan, and the growing anti-govern-
ment feeling provided a favorable background for the predomi-
nance of the Kaum Muda educated group. Their divergent geograph-
ical origins and different social backgrounds and occupations
helped this group dominate Minangkabau's social movements in
the post-rebellion period. They managed to organize the most
powerful pressure group, in spite of opposition from adat author-
ities, as represented by the nagari councils, and contempt from
the Kaum Tua ulama who persisted in their traditional religious
views of obedience to textual authorities and the Shafiite school
of law. The rapid increase in the number of the Islamic modern-
ists, as a result of the expansion of Kaum Muda schools, and
their close identification with the populace made then unbeat-
able competitors for leadership of the popular movement. The
Western educated persons, by contrast, were numerically weak
and professionally had closer ties to the government. The in-
fluence of the nationalist Western-educated intellectuals, most
of whom were perantau leaders, could only be effective through
cooperation with the Islamic modernists. After the early 1930's,
there was a trend toward minimizing the gap which existed be-
tween these two educated groups.
A common educational background and a similar outlook on
religious matters proved the most important common denominators
of the Kaum Muda educated group. Educated in the spirit of
reform and trained to become religious teachers and muballigh,228
these young Islamic modernists saw the schools as the focus for
their activities. The school was an institution which they used
to expand their influence and to which they could return after
their political activities were suppressed. As the focus of
Islamic life, the religious schools were also the most sensitive
political issue. Opposition to the Guru Ordinance and to the
Wild Schools Ordinance and their immediate sequels, expressed
through a proliferation of religious schools and the accelera-
tion of anti-government political activity, showed the determina
tion of the Kaum Muda ulama and their former students to protect
their schools from outside interference. As in the past when
the madrasah posed a potential challenge to the religious and
adat establishment, new religious schools were also intellectual
centers of the anti-government political movement. In the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, madrasah, particularly
the tarekat centers, provided the religious basis for the peo-
ple’s grievances. In the 1920’s and the 1930’s, new religious
schools helped to formulate the ideological foundation of the
independence movement.
The idea of returning to original Islamic doctrines, the
need for the liberation of Islam from centuries of deviation,
and the recognition of the inherent greatness of Islam brought
appeals for an Islamic cultural renaissance as well as for
political consciousness. In spite of the Kaum Muda ulama’s re-
jection of direct participation in politics or any direct attack
on the legitimacy of the present holders of power, their former
students and organizations became deeply immersed in the politi-
cal movement. The openly political character of the Kaum Muda
educated group provoked the Dutch government to take an intol-
erant attitude. In the face of the rapid politicization of
Islamic modernist followers, the government not only continued
its traditional policy of supporting the adat authorities but
also tried to incite the Kaum Tua ulama against the Kaum Muda
followers.
Islamic modernism, which believed in the compatibility of
religion with the modern world, provided a religious basis for
social change. Its idea of the inherent greatness of Islamic
civilization inspired self-confidence in meeting the outside
world and strengthened the independence movement. The apolo-
getic cultural appeal of Islamic modernism, however, also ini-
tiated the gradual trend toward the petrification of its doc-
trine. Islamic modernism, formulated at the turn of century
when modern imperialism had attained the peak of its development
and Islam was at the nadir of its history, laid the foundation
for a new Islamic conservatism.
As a political appeal, Islamic modernism presented its
followers with an ideological dilemma--the need to create a new
"utopian" society based on moral victory and the importance of229
liberation from the kafir government. The conflict between the
Muhammadijah, which was supported by the Kaum Muda ulama, and
the political parties, such as Permi and the PSII, had its roots
in this ideological ambiguity. Both the moral and political
sides might converge in their basic rejection of the colonial
government. Appeals for independence, which intensified the
politicization of Minangkabau, forced the government to repress
the Islamic political parties. The moral leadership of Hadji
Rasul, who persistently opposed political solutions and who,
according to the government, had rendered the administrative
system entirely ineffective in the Danau region, provoked the
central government to exile him in early 1940. Profound concern
over political and moral questions and a lack of success in com-
bining these two concerns became obvious after independence.
The political frustration and moral sensitivity of the Islamic
group can to some extent be seen as a reflection of the inner
tension of its ideology.
Islamic doctrine was, undoubtedly, the main motivating
force in the politicization of the Kaum Muda educated group.
This trend was magnified by the Minangkabau political tradition,
which also affected the political behavior of the Islamic modern-
ists. Lacking a centralized and hierarchical authority, politi-
cal life was focused in the nagari, where the political process was
based on the proper use of established precedents and of the
relevant hierarchy. The legitimacy of a decision which would
have social significance required the deliberate use of mufakat.
Failure to fulfill this requirement would result in a lack of
support and in the disruption of social harmony. As a political
institution, mufakat was also thought to symbolize the honor and
pride of the rightful participants in the process. Attachment
to this tradition, which was regarded as an essential part of
Minangkabau life, was a factor in the rural rebellions and the
spread of anti-government political movements.
Their attachment to the nagari political tradition caused
the nagari authorities to oppose the movement of the Islamic
modernists, who threatened their power, and made these authori-
ties the bastion of Minangkabau conservatism. Change which was
introduced by ignoring the established pattern would eventually
disrupt the stability ahd harmony of the small world of the
nagari. The adat authorities, after all, were traditionally not
only the holders of political power, whose legitimacy was based
on the sakato alam, but also the guardians of the ideals inher-
ent in alam.
The continuing flow of new ideas and trends and the social
conflict this caused were consequences of the Minangkabau con-
cept of its alam. It was a world which recognized the existence
of the rantau as a part of alam because it acknowledged the
importance of the outside world as an area from which alam might230
receive stimuli to realize its own potentials. Rantau, the
newly acquired or fringe territories, were of traditional polit-
ical importance to the king, who did not have jurisdiction in
the heartland. Economically, rantau was conceived as a region
in which the Minangkabau adults made their living and accumu-
lated money for the benefit of their matrilineal and nuclear
families. As a cultural concept, rantau was an outlet to ease
the internal tension in the small world of the nagari and a kind
of rite of passage for the youth. In the rantau a young man was
expected to prepare himself to become a full member of his com-
munity and to become a mature person. Experiences in the rantau
were expected to secure the continuity of alam Minangkabau and
to stimulate its historical goal of the attainment of a perfect
and harmonious society. Nevertheless, cultural stimuli brought
by the perantau, who had been influenced by their respective
rantau regions, might also threaten alam itself.
The attempt to maintain a balance between the need for the
elaboration of alam on the one hand and its continuity on the
other is a major theme of Minangkabau history. The ambiguity
of the rantau position in the Minangkabau world view is a factor
that leads to social and generational conflict. It is also a
basis of Minangkabau's dynamism as well as its conservatism.
The latter aspect becomes more evident at a time when the drive
toward change is strong. It is the time when rantau is thought
to threaten the foundation of the Minangkabau world. Without
rantau, however, alam is thought to be merely a potential, and
the greatness of adat, which "neither rots in the rain nor
cracks in the sun," cannot be tested.
The period from 1927 to 1933 was a time when ideas from
the rantau, either in the form of Islamic modernism or anti-
colonial nationalism, were expanding. The perantau, whether
trained in Cairo, Java or Holland, assisted the expansion of
private schools and the modernization of religious schools and
continued the process of social change. At the same time, how-
ever, they captured the initiative from the nagari authorities.
They exposed the incompatibility of the adat concept of the
sakato alam with the existence of the colonial government and
introduced and cultivated the idea of Indonesian unity based on
the absorption of all ethnic loyalties into a new and enlarged
world, the Indonesian nation. This idea of unity, however,
challenged the traditional centripetal conception of alam and
its notion of an ever expanding world. The conflicting yet com-
plementary concepts of unity have continued to influence politi-
cal development in West Sumatra before and after the independence
and to exert their impact on the views and behavior of its polit-
ical leaders.
By accepting Islam as an inseparable part of its world,
Minangkabau had not only given a transcendental basis to its231
cultural moorings but had also made itself the object for changes
originating far outside its geographical boundaries. Its ac-
knowledgment of rantau as a kind of rite of passage contributed
to the development of the Minangkabau social order largely by
forcing it to fight for its continuity. Fascination with the
ideals expressed in the adat sayings and the acceptance of the
goals prescribed by Islam remain to dominate Minangkabau think-
ing. But its life is conditioned by its actual social system
and by the recognition of political realities. These paradoxi-
cal forces and the inherent tensions in Islamic doctrine as
well as in adat assumptions continue to characterize Minangkabau
social behavior and historical development.GLOSSARY
Adat	Local custom and traditional law. In the Minangkabau world view, adat and Islam are considered the two pillars of society.
Adat Djahilijah	Syncretic and unenlightened adat, i.e., not in accord with Islamic law.
Adat Islamijah	Adat in accord with Islamic law.
Akal, Akalijah	Intelligence, the faculty of reasoning in general.
Alam, Alam Minangkabau	The universe or world of the Minangkabau people.
Alamij ah	Degree granted by the Al-Azhar Univer- sity in Cairo to foreign students.
Anak Buah	Followers or dependents.
Aqidah	Article of faith or doctrinal statement in Islam.
Anak Nagari	The natives of a particular district or nagari.
Balai	The nagari council hall, traditionally used to refer to the council itself.
Bangsa	Ethnic group and, more recently, "nation."
Belahan	Believed blood relationship between the people of two nagari.
Beperkt Vergaderverbod	Dutch police regulation which limited holding of public meetings.
Bid'ah	Innovation in religious practice or views which leads to heresy.
Bilal	Adat religious functionary.
Bodi Tjaniago	One of two Minangkabau political tradi- tions. It recognizes all penghulu in a nagari as equal.
233234
Chatib
Chilafij ah
Controleur
CSI
Datuk
Demang
Assistant Demang
Dj aksa
Exorbitante Rechten
Fatwa
Fikh
Friday Council
Fukaha
Guru
Guru Mengadj i
Hadith
Hadji
Halaqah
Haram
HIS
Adat religious functionary
Differences in matters of doctrinal im-
portance .
Sub-regency head in the Dutch administra-
tive hierarchy.
Central Sarekat Islam, Central Board of
Sarekat Islam.
Title of address for a penghulu.
Minangkabau head of a district in the
Dutch administrative hierarchy.
Head of a sub-district.
Minangkabau public prosecutor in the Dutch
administrative system.
Extraordinary powers exercised by the
Governor-General.
Religious judgments.
Religious law, jurisprudence.
Prayer council held after the Friday
service in the mosque.
Expert on religious law.
Teacher.
Quranic recitation teacher in a tradi-
tional surau.
The traditions of the Prophet Mohammad.
Title of address for a person who has com-
pleted the religious pilgrimage to Mecca.
"Circle," refers to the system of instruc-
tion in traditional religious schools
whereby the pupils sat around the teacher.
Forbidden according to Islamic religious
law.
Hollandsch-Inlandsche School, Dutch-
Native School, offering primary education
in Dutch.235
HPII	Himpunan Pemuda Islam Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Muslim Youth.
Ibadah	Ordinances of divine worship or religious duty.
Ibtidij ah	Elementary religious school.
Idj itihad	Process of arriving at new religious judg- ments using reason and investigation of the Quran and the Hadith.
Idulfitri	Muslim Holy Day celebrating the end of the fasting month.
Ilmu	Knowledge, science.
Imam	Leader of prayer. Also the title of the spiritual leader of a Muslim community.
Iman	Proper religious belief and faith.
INS	Indonesisch-Nederlandsche School, Indonesian- Netherlands School, founded by Moh. Sjafei in Kaju Tanam.
Insulinde	Indies Nationalist Party/
J aw ah	Indonesian/Malay community in the Middle East
JIB	Jong Islamieten Bond, Young Islamic Union.
JSB	Jong Sumatranen Bond, Young Sumatran Union.
Kaba	Minangkabau traditional epic.
Kafir	Infidel, i.e., non-Muslim.
Kampung	Neighborhood.
Kaum	Group.
Kaum Hidj au	"Green" group, i.e., Muslims.
Kaum Intelek	Western - educated group.
Kaum Merah	"Red" group, i.e., communists.
Kaum Muda	"Young" group, i.e., progressives.
Kaum Tua	"Old" group, i.e., conservatives.
Kebangsaan	Nationalism.236
Kebulatan
Kemadjuan
Mendjadi Madju
Kemegahan
Kemenakan (Kamanakan)
Kemerdekaan
Kiai
KIM
Koto
Koto Piliang
Kweekschool
Laras
Luhak
Luhak nan Tigo
Mamak
Madrasah
Mazhab
Meisj esschool
Resolution taken by the nagari council.
Progress and development, concept of
"modernity."
Become "progressive," "modern."
Glory.
Kinship term in Minangkabau meaning
nephew or niece. Also symbolizes the
relationship of a person to his leader.
Independence.
Religious teacher.
Kepanduan Indonesia Muslim, Indonesian
Muslim Boy Scouts.
In Minangkabau political terminology, a
settlement which has not yet evolved
into a nagari.
One of two Minangkabau political tradi-
tions. It recognizes the hierarchical
ranking of penghulu within a nagari.
Teachers’ training institute.
Traditionally refers to the two politi-
cal traditions in Minangkabau, Bodi
Tjaniago and Koto Piliang. During the
colonial period (up to 1914) , laras also
referred to the administrative unit above
the nagari level.
Traditional geographic division of the
Minangkabau heartland.
The three luhak: Tanah Datar, Agam,
Lima Puluh Kota.
A kinship term for maternal uncle. Also
refers to the relationship of a lineage
head to his followers.
Religious school.
School of jurisprudence in Islam.
Girls’ school.237
Merantau
Minangkabau Raad
Muballigh
Muda
Mufakat
MULO
Mungkin
Nafsu, Hawa Nafsu
Nagari
Naql
NIP
Parewa
Parii
Partindo
Patut
Pemangku
Penghulu
Penghulu Dagang
Going to the rantau.
Regional council for Minangkabau under the
Dutch.
Muslim propagandist or preacher.
Young, also progressive.
Consensus. In the Minangkabau adat context,
it refers to the consensus of the penghulu
in the nagari council.
Meer Uitgebreid Lagere Onderwijs, More
Extended Lower Education, school offering
advanced primary education in Dutch.
That which is logically possible.
Human natural desires.
In Minangkabau political terminology, the
most developed form of settlement, i.e., one
having its own mosque and balai.
Established religious authorities.
Nationaal Indische Partij Indies National
Party.
Secular oriented, "individualists" in
Minangkabau traditional society.
Partai Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic
Party.
Partai Indonesia, Indonesian Party.
That which is morally proper.
Literally, the "holder." In the Minangkabau
adat context, the person who represents the
penghulu if the latter is ill or away.
The head of a matrilineal political unit,
not to be confused with the penghulu in Java
who is a religious official.
Dutch-appointed Minangkabau leader of dwell-
ers in towns not native to them.
Perang Sabil
Holy War.238
Permi
Perantau
Pergerakan
PGAI
PGHB
PGSA
PI
PII
PKI
Plakat Pandjang
PMDS
PMM
PN
PNI
PNI Baru
Pokrol Bambu
PPPKI
Persatuan Muslim Indonesia, Association of
Indonesian Muslims, sometimes abbreviated
PMI.
One who leaves his nagari or the Minangkabau
world to go to the rantau
The political independence movement in
Indonesia.
Persatuan Guru Agama Islam, Association of
Islamic Teachers.
Perserikatan Guru Hindia Belanda, Union of
Dutch East Indies Teachers.
Persatuan Guru-Guru Sekolah Agama, Associa-
tion of Religious School Teachers.
Perhimpunan Indonesia, Indonesian Associa-
tion.
Pendidikan Islam Indonesia, Indonesian
Islamic Education.
Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Commu-
nist Party.
The so-called Long Declaration issued by the
Dutch in the early 1830’s; it guaranteed the
integrity of traditional Minangkabau society
Persatuan Murid-Murid Dinijah School, Asso-
ciation of Dinijah School Pupils.
Perhimpunan Muhammadijah Minangkabau, Union
of Muhammadijah in Minangkabau.
Pembela Negeri, Defenders of the Nation.
Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian
National Party.
New PNI, also known as Pendidikan Nasional
Indonesia, Indonesian National Education.
Unlicensed attorney.
Permufakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Kebang-
saan Indonesia, Congress of Indonesian
National Associations.239
PSII	Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union Party.
PTI	Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah, Union of Islamic Students.
Rad j a	Representatives of the Minangkabau ruler who governed in the rantau districts.
Rantau	Fringe territories of the Minangkabau king- dom, also the non-Minangkabau world generally.
Reisregeling	Travel restriction- imposed by the Dutch government on political leaders.
Riwak	Ethnic compound in the Al-Azhar University, Cairo.
Rodi, Rodi Kompeni	Corvee labor.
Rumah Gadang	Large Minangkabau family house.
Rust en Orde	Offical Dutch policy based on the mainte- nance of peace and order in the Indies.
SAAM	Sarekat Adat Alam Minangkabau, Adat Associ- ation of the Minangkabau World.
Sakato Alam	Consensus of the people, concept in Minang- kabau political and social philosophy.
Santri	In Java, a Muslim who strives to fulfill all religious obligations.
Schakelschool	’’Connecting" school, bridged the gap between the Indonesian vernacular schools and the European schools.
SCM	Sarekat Combinatie Minangkabau, Federation of Minangkabau Associations.
Sekolah Desa	Vernacular elementary school.
Setali Adat	Ties recognized by adat.
SI	Sarekat Islam, Islamic Union.
Sidang Djumat	Friday Council, prayer council held after the Friday service in the mosque.
Silat	Minangkabau art of unarmed combat.240
Sjarak, Sjariah
S j ech
Spreekdelict
STOVIA
Suku
Tabligh
Tambo
Tanah Air
Tanah Ulajat
Taqlid
Tarekat
Tasauf
Tauhid
Tjerdik Pandai
Tsanawijah
Tua
Tuanku Laras
Ulama
Ummat, Ummat Islam
Urang Asali
Urang Babangso
Urang Datang
Islamic law.
Honorific title for a religious scholar,
also leader of a tarekat brotherhood.
Sedition.
School tot Opleiding voor Indische Artsen,
School for Training Indonesian Doctors.
Social unit in Minangkabau consisting of
several matrilineal families.
Public religious gatherings.
Traditional Minangkabau historical accounts
Homeland, fatherland.
Reserved communal land of a nagari.
Uncritical acceptance of the decision of
textual authorities or teachers.
Literally, the "way" or "path," refers to
the mystical brotherhoods in Islam.
Mysticism.
Doctrine of the absolute oneness of God.
The "intelligentsia" of a nagari.
Secondary religious school.
Old, also conservative.
Adat and administrative head of a nagari
federation or laras, appointed by the Dutch
government.
Religious scholar.
The community of believers in Islam.
Original settlers of a nagari.
Original settlers of a nagari, also in the
sense of the aristocracy of a nagari.
New settlers in a nagari.241
Urang Siak
Vervolgschool
Volksschool
VSTP
Wakaf
Traveling religious student.
"Continuation” school, two-year program
for graduates of vernacular elementary
schools.
Three-year vernacular elementary school.
Vereeniging van Spoor- en Tramwegpersoneel,
Union of Railway and Tram Workers.
Religious endowment, usually land.
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I. Archives in the Ministry of the Interior
[*rhe Hague, Holland]
A. Reports of Outgoing Residents and
Governors [Memorie van Overgave]
Arends, P. C., September 2, 1927, Mailrapport 2592/’27.
Ballot, J., August 12, 1915, Verbaal April 5, 1916.
Gonggrijp, G. F. E., January 2, 1932, Mailrapport 360/*32.
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1916, no. 54.
Tumenggung, L. Datuk. "Geheim Nota voor de Adviseur voor
Inlandsche Zaken over het Communisme ter Westkust van
Sumatra, July 30, 1925," Kern Collection #46.
--------. "Nota over de Toestanden ter Westkust van Sumatra,
August 16, 1926," Mailrapport 934x/'26.245
Vries, L. de. "Nota over Islamische Reacties in Nederlandsch-
Indie Gedurende de Laatste Jaren, 1938," Verbaal September
30, 1938, no. 15.
II. Published Documents and Reports
Departement van Zaken Overzee. Indisch Verslag.	's-Gravenhage:
n.p., 1931, 1932, 1933, 193T:
Handelingen van den Volksraad. Batavia: n.p., 1931-1934.
Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken. Sarekat Islam Congres (le
Nationaal Congres), 17-24 Juni 1916 te Bandoeng (Behoort
bij de geheime missieve van Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche
Zaken, dd. 29 September 1916, No. 226). Batavia: Landsdruk
kerij, 1916-1919.
Volkstelling 1930, Vol. IV: Inheemsche Bevolking van Sumatra.
Batavia: Dep. Landbouw, Nijverheid § Handel, 1935.
Wal, S. L. van der (ed.). Het Onderwijsbeleid in Nederlands-
Indie, 1900-1940. Groningen:	EL Wolters, 1963.
--------. De Volksraad en de Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van
Neder1ands-Indie, Vol. TI 1891-1926° Groningen: JL B.
Wolters, 1964.
III. Periodicals
A. Press Surveys
De Indische Gids, Monthly press reviews. 1900-1928.
Kantoor voor de Volkslectuur. Overzicht van de Inlandsche en
Maleisch-Chineesche Pers.	1918-1928.
Koloniaal Tijdschrift, Press summaries. 1912-1919.
B. Newspapers
Berita dan Pewarta. Padang.	1933.
Bintang Tionghoa. Padang. 1914-1915.
Dagblad Radio. Padang. 1932-1935.246
Neratj a. Batavia. 1917-1924 .
Oetoesan Melajoe. Padang. 1914-1923.
Oetoesan Melajoe - Perobahan. Padang.
Pertja Barat. Padang. 1911-1912.
Pewarta. Padang. 1934.
Pompai. Padang. 1929-1931.
Seng Po. Bukittinggi. 1927-1928.
Sinar Soematra. Padang. 1914-1935.
Soematra Tengah. Padang.	1914-1915.
Soeara Rakjat. Padang. 1914.
Sri Soematra. Padang. 1915-1917.
Tjaja Soematra. Padang. 1914-1933.
Warta Hindia. Padang. 1914-1928.
1924
C. Journals
Al-Moenir. Padang. 1911-1915.
Al-Ittifaq Wal-iftiraq. Padang.	1919-1922.
Al-Ittiqan. Manindjau. 1920-1922.
Bintang Hindia. Bandung. 1904-1907.
Doenia Achirat. Bukittinggi. 1924-1926.
Insoelinde. Padang. 1901-1904.
Jong Soematra. Batavia. 1918-1927.
Jong Soematra. Padang.	1925.
Kemadjoean Zaman. Padang Pandjang. 1928.
Het Koloniaal Weekblad.	1925-1933.
Locomotief (Sumatra issue). Semarang. 1925.247
Medan Rakjat. Padang. 1931-1933.
Noeroelj aqin. Batu Sangkar. 192 8.
Pahlawan Moeda. Bukittinggi. 1932, 1935.
Pandji Islam. Medan. 1936-1942.
Pedoman Masjarakat. Medan. 1936-1941.
Pembela Islam. Bandung. 1930-1934.
Perdamaian. Padang Pandjang. 1926.
Sinar Merdeka. Padang Sidempuan. 1919.
Soeara Kota Gedang. Bukittinggi. 1919-1922.
Soeara Perempoean. Padang.	1918.
Soeloeh Melajoe. Padang. 1913.
Soematra Bergerak. Bukittinggi. 1923-1925.
Soenting Melajoe. Padang. 1912, 1917, 1919-1920.
IV. Books and Unpublished Manuscripts
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rr&yr—
Adams, Charles Clarence. Islam dan Dunia Modern di Mesir.
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1947.
Adatrechtbundels.	's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff. Vols. 1
(1911), 11 (1915), 27 (1928), 39 (1937).
Ahmad, Abdullah. Ilmoe Sedjati. 4 vols. Padang: Sjarikat
Ilmoe, 1916.
--------. Pemboeka Pintoe Sjoerga. 2 vols. Padang: Al-Moenir
1914/ inr248
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kat Ilmoe, 1916.
Ahmed, Jamal Mohammed. The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian
Nationalism. London: Oxford University Press, 1560.
Alfian. "Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics: The Muhamma-
dijah during the Colonial Period, 1912-1940." Ph.D. Thesis
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karta! Bulan Bintang, [1952?] .
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Perdjuangan Kaum Agama di Sumatra. Djakarta: Djajamurni,
1967.
--------. Kenang-Kenangan Hidup. 4 vols. Djakarta: Gapura,
1952/1953.
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--------. Sedjarah Islam di Sumatera. Medan: Pustaka Nasional,
1950.
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Batuah, A. M. Datuk Maruhum, and Dt. Bagindo Tanameh. Hukum
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Pandjang: Dinijah School, 1938.
Bouman, Hendrik. Enige Beschouwingen over de Ontwikkeling van
het Indonesisch Nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust.
Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1949.
Brouwer, B. J. De Houding van Idenburg en Colijn Tegenover de
Indonesische Beweging. Kampen: J 7 H. Kok, 19587
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dam : Drukkerij de Standard, 1928.
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karta: Kementerian P.P.§ K., 1955.
Djaja, Tamar. "Pusaka Indonesia: Orang-Orang Besar Tanah Air."
Vol. Ill, unpublished manuscript.
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Harahap, Parada. Dari Pantai Kepantai: Perdjalanan ke Soematra.
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--------. Riwajat Dr. A. Rivai. Medan: n.p., 1939.
Harris, Christina. Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The
Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Hague: Mouton § Co.,
1964.
Hatta, Mohammad. Kumpulan Karangan. Djakarta: Balai Ilmu,
1953.	4 vols.
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Josselin de Jong, P. E. de. Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan:
Socio-Political Structure in Indonesia. Djakarta: Bhratara,
1960.	:
Joustra, M. Minangkabau: Overzicht van het Land, Geschiedenis
en Volk.	's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1923.
Junus, Mahmud. Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia. Dja-
karta: Pustaka Mahmudiah, 1960.
Kerr, Malcolm H. Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal
Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida. Berkeley:
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Koch, D. M. G. Menudju Kemerdekaan: Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebang-
saan Indonesia sampai 1942~ Translated by Abdul Muis.
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Maaruf, M. N. Sutan. Riwajat X Koto, Manindjau. Bukittinggi:
Pembela Negeri, 1931.
McVey, Ruth T. The Rise of Indonesian Communism. Ithaca:
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Mangkuto, Saalah Sutan. Soeloeh Moeballigh Islam Indonesia.
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Nagazumi, Akira. "The Origin and the Earlier Years of the Budi
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1957 .
Noer, Deliar. "The Rise and Development of the Modernist Move-
ment in Indonesia during the Dutch Colonial Period (1900-
1942)." Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1962.
Peringatan Congres Moehammadijah Minangkabau ke-XIX di Boekit-
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Peringatan (Verslag) dari "Madjelis Permoesjawaratan Oelama
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T9 Agustus 1928 dan '^Madjelis Permoes j awaratan Oelama" pada
tanggal 4 Nopember 1928 menerima verslag perdjalanan
oetoesan menghadap Toean Gouverneur-Generaal (Ali Emran
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Petrus BIumberger, J. Th. De Communistische Beweging in
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H a a r1em) Tjeenk Willink, 1931.
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hage: W~ van Hoeve, 1953.
Pringgodigdo, A. Karim. Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia.
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Seorang Anak Minangkabau. Dj akarta: Balai Pustaka, 19 50 .
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Roff, William R. The Origins of Malay Nationalism. Kuala
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karta: Pus taka Rakjat, 1951.
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V. Articles
Abbreviations
BKI	Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Neder-
landsch-Indie
IG	De Indische Gids
JMBRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch
KS	Koloniale Studien
KT	Koloniaal Tijdschrift
TBG	Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap	[also	known
as Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-	en	Volken-
kunde ]	•
TBB	Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur
TNI	Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie
Abdullah, Taufik. "Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict
in Minangkabau," Indonesia, No. 2 (October 1966), 1-24.
---------. "Some Notes on the Kaba Tjindua Mato: An Example of
Minangkabau Traditional Literature," Indonesia, 9 (April
1970) , pp. 1-23.
A.M.B.M. "Pada Menjatakan Pengadjaran Orang Boemi Poeteri di
Padang Darat (Padangsche-Bovenlanden)," TBB, 9 (1894),
411-417 .
Archer, Raymond L. "Muhammedan Mysticism in Sumatra," JMBRAS,
15, No. 2 (September 1937), 1-126.
Benda, Harry J. "The Communist Rebellions of 1926-1927 in
Indonesia," Pacific Historical Review, 24 (February 1955),
139-152.254
C.P. "Eene Beschouwing over den in den Nacht van 21 op 22
December 1915 Plaats Gehad Hebbenden Overval van Padang
Pandjang," KT, 5, No. 2 (1916), 1209-1213.
Cuisinier, Jeanne. "La Guerre des Padri (1803-1838-1845),"
Archives de Sociologie des Religions, 4 (1959), 70-88.
--------. "Les Madrasah Feminines de Minangkabau," Revue des
Etudes Islamiques, 23 (1955), 107-120.
Djaja, Tamar. "Rohana Kudus: Srikandi Islam Sebelum Kartini,"
Hikmah, 9, No. 13 (April 7, 1956), 16-18.
"Godsdienstige Rechtspraak ter Sumatra’s Westkust: Penghulus en
Adatrechtspraak in het District Padang," Adatrechtbundels,
39 (1931), 212-228.
H., v. d. "Oorsprong der Padaries (Eene Sect op de Westkust
van Sumatra)," TNI, 1, No. 1 (1838), 113-132.
"De Inlandsche Beweging: Politieke Situatie, Onrust ter Sumatra’s
Westkust," Koloniaal Weekblad (1932), 607.
James, K. A. "Indie Weerbaar, te Fort de Kock in 1914," KT, 2
(1916), 1599-1603.
--------. "De Nagari Kota Gedang," TBB, 49 (1915), 185-195.
--------. "De Opleiding der Inlandsche Hoofden op de Buitenbe-
zittingen," IG, 30, No. 1 (1908), 16-21.
Junus, Umar. "Some Remarks on Minangkabau Social Structure,"
BKI, 120, No. 3 (1964), 293-326.
Kroesen, Th. A. L. "Het Inlandsch Bestuur ter Sumatra’s West-
kust," TNI, 2 (4th S), No. 2 (1873), 81-109, 208-230.
Kroon, W. J. "De Invoering van Belastingen op Sumatra's West-
kust," TBB, 51 (1917), 342-351; 52 (1917), 170-179.
"Legende van de Afkomst der Sumatranen en van Hunne Instellingen,
TNI, 30, No. 1 (1859), 378-389.
Lekkerkerker, C. "Meisjesonderwijs, Coeducatie en Meisjesscholen
voor de Inlandsche Bevolking in Nederlandsch-Indie," KT, 3
(1914), 865-884.
Leyds, J. W. J. "Larassen in Minangkabau," KS, 10, No. 1 (1926),
387-416.
Maretin, J. V. "Disappearance of Matriclan Survivals in Minang-
kabau Family and Marriage Relations," BKI, 117 (1961),
168-195.255
Mendelaar, J. J. "Bestuur en Besturen in de Menangkabau," IG,
62 (1940) , 529-549.
"Het Moehammedansch Lyceum te Loeboek Sikaping," Koloniaal
Weekblad, No. 4 (1926), 8.
Moresco, E. "The New Constitution of the Netherlands Indies,"
Asiatic Review, 23 (1927), pp. 216-224.
Nieuwenhuis, A. W. "De Onrust in Indie en Hare Oorzaken,"
Tropisch Nederland, 1 (1928/1929) .
"Organisatie van Volksonderwijs in Kerintji (Fragment uit een
Rapport van J. E. Edie)," TBB, 47 (1914), 342-344.
Plas, Ch. 0. van der. "Mededeelingen over de Stroomingen in de
Moslimsche Gemeenschap in Nederlandsch-Indie en der Neder-
landsche Islam-Politiek," Verslagen der Vergadering van het
Indisch Genootschap, February 16, 1934, pp. 253-272.
Prins, Jan. "Adat Law and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indo-
nesia: An Introduction," Die Welt des Islams, 1 (NS) (1951),
283-300 .
--------. "Rondom de Oude Strijdvraag van Minangkabau,"
Indonesie, 7 (1960-1961), 117-129.
R., W. W. van. "Midden-Sumatraansche Problemen,” Indische Post,
31 (June 28 and July 3, 5, 1924).
Roesad. "Minangkabausche Toestanden," Orgaan van den Neder-
landsch-Indischen Politiek-Ekonomischen Bond, 4 (1923) ,
587-590, 645-647.
Roff, William R. "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the
1920’s," Indonesia, 9 (April 1970), 73-87.
Ronkel, Ph. S. van. "Het Heiligdom te Oelakan," TBG, 56 (1914),
281-316.
--------. "Inlandsche Getuigenissen Aangaande de Padri-Oorlog,"
IG, 17 (NS), No. 2 (1915), 1099-1119.
--------. "Een Maleisch Getuigenis over den Weg des Islams in
Sumatra," BKI, 75 (1919), 363-378.
--------. "De Twee Moskeeen en de Adat," KT, 6, No. 2 (1917),
1589-1599 .
Rooij , J. F. A. de. "De Positie der Volkshoofden in een Ge-
deelte der Padangsche Bovenlanden; Hunne Ethnografische en
Hunne Politieke Beteekenis," IG, 12, No. 1 (1890), 634-681.256
Scheltema de Heere, G. A. N. "De Belastinginvoering op Sumatra’s
Westkust," IG, 45 (1923), 122-156.
Schrieke, B. "Bijdrage tot de Bibliografie van Huidige Godsdien-
stige Beweging ter Sumatra’s Westkust," TBG, 59 (1920),
249-325.
--------. "De Islam op Sumatra," Koloniaal Weekblad, 25, No.
53 (December 31, 1925), 4-6.
--------. "Het Probleem der Bestuursorganisatie ter Sumatra’s
Westkust," KS, 11, No. 1 (1927), 57-106.
Snouck Hurgronje, C. "Een en Ander over het Inlandsche Onderwijs
in de Padangsche Bovenlanden (1883)," in Snouck Hurgronje,
Verspreide Geschriften (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1924), Vol. 4,
pp. 49 ££.
Stap, H. W. "De Nagarie-Ordonnantie ter Sumatra’s Westkust,"
TBB, 53 (1917), 699-765.
--------. "Een Statistiek in de Onderafdeeling Oud Agam,
Afdeeling Agam, Sumatra’s Westkust," TBB, 52 (1917), 141-
169.
Stapel, F. W. "Een Verhandeling over het Ontstaan van het
Menangkabausche Rijk en Zijn Adat," BKI, 92 (1935), 459-
470.
Steijn Parve, H. A. "De Secte der Padaries (Padries) in de
Bovenlanden van Sumatra," TBG, 3 (1855), 249-278.
Tanner, Nancy. "Disputing and Dispute Settlement Among the
Minangkabau of Indonesia," Indonesia, 8 (October 1969),
pp. 21-67.
Verkerk Pistorius, A. W. P. "lets over de Slaven en Afstamme-
lingen van Slaven in de Padangsche Bovenlanden," TNI, 2
(3rd S), No. 1 (1868), 434-443.
--------. "De Priester en Zijn Invloed op de Samenleving in de
Padangsche Bovenlanden," TNI, (3rd S), No. 2 (1869), 423-
452 .
Wal van Anckeveen, G. de. "Maleische Democratic en Padangsche
Toestanden," Adatrechtbundels, 1 (1911), 114-128.
Wall, A. F. von de. "Kort Begrijp der Beteekenis van de Tarekat,
naar het Maleisch van Sajid Oesman Ibn Abdoellah Ibn Akil
Ibn Jahja," TBG, 35 (1893), 223-277.257
Westenenk, L. C. "De Inlandsche Bestuurshoofden ter Sumatra’s
Westkust," KT, 2 (1913), 673-693, 828-846.
X.Y. "Het Inlandsch Onderwijs ter Sumatra’s Westkust," KT, 2
(1913), 390-408.