THE FOUNDATION OF
THE PARTAI MUSLIMIN INDONESIA
by
K. E. WARD
INTERIM REPORT SERIES
Modem Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1970THE FOUNDATION OF THE PARTAI MUSLIMIN INDONESIA
by
K. E. Ward
INTERIM REPORT SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1970©	1970 Cornell Modern Indonesia ProjectPREFACE
Cornell's interest in Indonesian Islam goes back many years
and was given an early stimulus by the lectures of the late Hadji
Agus Salim, who served as visiting professor at the university
in 1953. One of the points which he made in his lectures was
that, as a political force in his country, Islam had not assumed
an importance at all commensurate with the fact that Indonesia
was the largest predominantly Islamic country in the world.
Hadji Salim was speaking at a time when Indonesia's principal
Islamic party, the Masjumi, was yielding cabinet leadership to
the first of many cabinets dominated by secular nationalists.
Today, seventeen years later, Islamic political power in Indone-
sia has become considerably weaker, and the influential Modernist
Islamic elements who previously led the Masjumi are without
political focus and organization.
Despite the fact that Modernist Islamic thinking is still
inchoate and insufficiently articulated for political effective-
ness, in the judgment of the present army leadership (as was the
case with Sukarno) it is perceived as having latent power which
if effectively channeled might threaten the present political
balance. Attempts in 1966 to revive the Masjumi, which had been
outlawed by President Sukarno in 1960, were thus banned by the
army-dominated government of President Suharto; for it too re-
garded a Modernist-led Islamic party as a potential danger, and
its prospects something to be circumscribed and undercut.
Finally, in 1968, the Suharto government permitted the estab-
lishment of a Modernist-oriented party, the Partai Muslimin
Indonesia, but it forbade the men of stature, who had earlier
guided Masjumi thinking, to assume leadership of the new party.
In describing and analyzing these developments, Mr. K. E.
Ward of Monash University has made a significant contribution to
our understanding of Modernist Islam's political failure in
Indonesia. He has helped clarify why it has been impossible to
build a consensus among Indonesia's Islamic leaders as to how
Islamic doctrine is to be applied to Indonesia's political and
socio-economic development. Mr. Ward's study thus helps one
understand why Islam has not become a political force commen-
surate with the size of Indonesia's Muslim population.
George McT. Kahin
Ithaca, New York
September 15, 1970
inTABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction ............................... .............. 1
Chapter
I.	Masjumi, 1945-1960 .............................. .	9
II.	The Struggle for Rehabilitation...................... 17
III.	The Movement Towards a New Party..................... 29
IV.	The Party's Development Since Foundation ............ 40
V.	The Government and the Party......................... 57
Appendix
I.	Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin ...................... 69
II.	Political Parties and Miscellaneous	Organizations 71
Bibliography .............................................. 73
vINTRODUCTION
Harry Benda remarked several years ago that Javanese Islam
". . . has usually been studied in the elite context, with the
peasantry relegated to a more or less stereotyped background.
The result has been that most have tended to take a basically
Muslim orientation of the Javanese peasantry for granted."1
Although the following discussion of the foundation of the
Partai Muslimin Indonesia is largely restricted to an examina-
tion of events taking place within this elite context, some
preliminary comments are necessary on the nature of Indonesian
Islam, particularly as it exists in Central and East Java.
The pioneering research of the Harvard group of anthropolo-
gists introduced, or at least emphasized, the distinction in
Javanese Islam between abangan (nominal Muslims) and santri
(devout Muslims). Describing the inhabitants of Modjokuto, the
town where his research was centered, Clifford Geertz wrote:
"The great majority . . . pronounce themselves to be Muslims.
Within this more general category, however, they make a clear
distinction between the santri, the pious Muslim who takes his
Islam seriously and attempts to keep it free of local adultera-
tions, and the abangan, whose main adherence is to . . . the
’Javanese religion'."2 This latter abangan matrix of religious
beliefs is an integration of the three major sources of spiri-
tual tradition, animism, Hindu-Buddhism and Islam. Abangans
show a lack of concern for correctness of religious doctrine,
and consequently an unwillingness to condemn the religious be-
liefs of others. The abangans have a detached, relativistic
attitude towards their own which has been likened to that of
the "dilettante ethnologist collecting quaint customs among the
heathen."3 4 The abangan religious outlook is a syncretistic,
accommodating one which seeks '"truth' but not 'the truth' in
all religions.''1*
1.	See his introduction to R. R. Jay, Religion and Politics in
Rural Central Java (New Haven:	Yale University, Cultural
Report Series No. 12, 1963), p. iv.
2.	Clifford Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in
a Central Javanese Town:	Some Preliminary Observations,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 4, No. 2 (January
1956), p. 136.
3.	Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York:	Free Press
of Glencoe, 1960) , p. T27T
4.	Benedict Anderson, Mythology and the Tolerance of the Java-
nese (Ithaca:	Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1965), p. 3.
12
Among the santris (which originally meant students of reli-
gion) , there is overwhelming conviction of "the truth" of Islam,
of its unique superiority as the religion chosen by God. There
is general belief among the santris that, however necessary are
the prescribed ritual acts such as performance of the daily
prayers, it is doctrine that is crucial in Islam:	"It is not
the knowledge of ritual detail or spiritual discipline which is
important, but the application of Islamic doctrine to life."5
Santri attitudes towards the abangans are a mixture of exaspera-
tion at their failure to follow the simple path necessary to
obtain salvation and at their apparent inability to understand
the simple, logical truths of Islam which show the error of
abangan heterodoxy. This is combined with openly-expressed con-
tempt for abangan laxity and ignorance. At the same time, how-
ever, there persists the conviction that there is not much that
divides abangans from santris. Thus several decades ago, "It
was the naive belief of the orthodox Muslim leaders that all
Indonesians, other than those under the deep influence of the
kaum feodal (feudal elements) or of the West, were as a matter
of course basically loyal to Islam and needed only sound in-
struction, for which they would be duly grateful, to become good
orthodox Muslims."6 There has long existed an over-riding con-
fidence in the ability of the santris to convert abangans, that
is, to induce abangans to discard heterodox practices; yet little
has been achieved so far to justify such self-confidence.
The abangan population of Java is scarcely fond of the
santri community with its contempt for their beliefs, its in-
tolerance of syncretistic tendencies and insistence that abangans
will end up in hell if the santri example is not followed.7
Nevertheless, the extent of the Islamness of the abangans is
important in considering the size of the Islamic community, the
ummat Islam, in Indonesia. Abangans still regard themselves as
Muslims, and, until recently, there was no tendency for large
numbers of them to abandon their, if only nominal, adherence to
Islam and embrace another religion, such as Christianity.8
5.	Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 127. This discussion of the
abangan/santri dichotomy has been deliberately kept very
brief. For a full analysis, see Geertz, Religion of Java.
6.	Jay, Religion and Politics, p. 22.
7.	"Fanaticism" is an accusation frequently made of the santris,
and an abangan asked what his religion is will often reply
"Islam," followed by the quick, almost apologetic reassur-
ance, "but not fanatic."
8. Anderson noted, "There has been an inescapable loss of caste
involved in a Javanese becoming a Christian. . . . Like
strongly Islamic santris, Christians are felt to threaten3
Before considering the ummat Islam question, attention must be
paid to an important dichotomy within the santri community it-
self, that between conservatives and modernists.
The conflict between these two groups originated in the
trends toward Islamic renewal apparent in Indonesia from the
middle of the nineteenth century. Closer contact with the Middle
East and its centers of Muslim civilization produced an aware-
ness of the extent of the compromise Islam had made in adapting
itself to local conditions in Indonesia where, especially in
areas that had been more thoroughly exposed to Hindu civiliza-
tion, pre-Islamic practices and superstitions survived, virtually
unchallenged. But it was especially after the teachings of
Middle Eastern reformers such as Muhammad Abduh and A1 Afghani
spread to Indonesia that a clear split could be observed between
those content with the somewhat diluted Islam of East and Cen-
tral Java in particular, and those who wished to purify the
religion of heterodox elements.* * * 9 Abduh wished to strip contempo-
rary Islam of alien influences and return to the pristine cor-
rectness of the Quran and the Hadiths, which were to become the
sole authorities for thought and action. But he also wanted to
modernize Islamic education by introducing Western subjects such
as science and European history to make Islam better able to
accept the challenges of the modern world. However, the funda-
mentalist, purist approach tended to act in a restrictive capa-
city on Islam’s ability to modernize and made Islamic modernism
seem unattractively intolerant. Geertz remarked, "This tense
intermixture of radical fundamentalism and determined modernism
the stability of the traditional order by making claims to
social honor which cannot be justified within that order."
Mythology and Tolerance, p. 3.
9. See Hamka, Pengaruh Muhammad Abduh di Indonesia (Djakarta:
Tintamas, 1958), for a description by a modernist of Islamic
conservatism in Indonesia at the end of the last century.
Paradoxically, a more tolerant attitude to syncretistic
practices such as the communal feast (slametan) is coupled,
among the conservatives, with a view on religion and its
role in human life generally termed "totalistic," which con-
trasts with the modernists’ willingness to grant secular
institutions a more considerable significance. Moreover,
in contrast with the modernists' attempt to infuse a prag-
matic rationalism into their attitude towards Islam, con-
servatives have in general a scholastic approach, an ap-
proach that emphasizes the role played in life by fate
(takdir), rather than human will. For a full analysis of
such ideological differences, see Geertz, Religion of Java,
pp. 150-159; also Howard Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic
Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern
Indonesia Project, 1970), pp. 4b-68,et passim.4
is what has made the culminating phases of the scripturalist
movement so puzzling to Western observers. . . . Stepping back-
ward in order better to leap is an established principle in
cultural change. But in the Islamic case the stepping backward
seems often to have been taken for the leap itself, and what
began as a rediscovery of the scriptures ended as a kind of
deification of them. 'The Declaration of the Rights of Man,
the secret of atomic power, and the principles of scientific
medicine', an advanced kijaji (Islamic teacher) once informed
me, 'are all to be found in the Koran'. . . . Islam, in this
way, becomes a justification for modernity, without itself actu-
ally becoming modern."10
Nevertheless, attacks made by the Indonesian followers of
Abduh, anxious both to purify Islamic practice and thought and
disseminate secular knowledge as well, were sharp enough to
rouse the opposition of the conservatives who, a decade or so
after the formation of the modernist socio-educational organiza-
tion Muhammadijah, made sufficient compromise with modernist
ideas of organization to found their own, the Nahdatul Ulama
(NU), to combat modernism. The two major divisions in the body
of Indonesians embracing Islam should not be seen as nation-wide
dichotomies (the santri-abangan dichotomy, for example, has been
thoroughly investigated only in Java). However, consciousness
of such divisions has caused, among the santris, a persisting
search for unity, for a unified ummat Islam.
An ummat is a community of adherents of a certain religion.
Thus in Indonesian there is an ummat Kristen (Christian commun-
ity) and an ummat Hindu (Hindu community) as well as the ummat
Islam. If contemporary Muslim politicians and the Muslim press
are heeded, the impression arises that the ummat Islam has
played a most significant role in Indonesia's history. Yet
rarely is a definition given of what the ummat Islam comprises.
The common claim that the Islamic community constitutes over
90% of the Indonesian people suggests that all Muslims, santri
and abangan, are included in the concept of an ummat Islam.* 11
In another context, however, the assertion is made that the
Islamic community made the greatest contribution to the struggle
against the Dutch, which implies a comparison not with the tiny
8-9% of non-Muslims in Indonesia but with, for instance, the
secularist parties such as the PNI (Nationalist Party). If it
is more realistic to restrict the term ummat Islam to the sup-
porters of the Muslim parties and mass organizations (which
10.	Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven:	Yale University, 1968),
p. 69.
11.	For a criticism of this claim, see the statement by Mohammad
Hatta in Sinar Harapan, November 19, 1968.5
received 45% of the vote in the 1955 general elections), it is
clear that much dissatisfaction exists over the position accorded
to Islam in post-independence Indonesia.12
A village santri may feel himself to be part of an Islamic
community which . . is seen as a set of concentric circles,
wider and wider communities . . . spreading away from the indi-
vidual santri where he stands:	a great society of equal be-
lievers constantly repeating the name of the Prophet, going
through the prayers, chanting the Koran."13 But it was long
thought that the desire to have the ummat Islam seen as co-
terminous with the nation would be achieved by the establishment
of an Islamic State in independent Indonesia. There have been
two principal arguments presented since 1945 to justify the con-
version of the Pantjasila-based Indonesia to one founded on
Islam. The first emphasizes that Islam is the religion of the
majority of Indonesians. Thus Mohammad Natsir reasoned that,
"The constitution of our country must place the state in the
closest possible relationship to the living society within our
state. That is, the state constitution must be deeply-rooted
in the heart, the thought patterns . . . the feelings, beliefs
and philosophy of the people." A democratic country should,
Natsir continued, "... Above all reflect what is genuinely
vital among the people, especially the philosophy of the . . .
majority of its people."11* And Islam was, according to Natsir,
obviously the philosophy of life of the majority of Indonesians.
He continued that if it was true that Indonesia’s religious
minorities should not have to accept Islam, as this was alien
to them (which was an argument offered by the opponents of an
Islamic State), it was also true that the Islamic majority
should not have to accept the alternative, a state founded on
the secular Pantjasila, for this was alien to them. Closely
allied to the belief in the Islamic identity of the mass of
Indonesians was the wish to have this identity institutionalized
12.	It is not feasible to include all the santri population of
Indonesia within the ummat Islam, although this would be
the most accurate definition for the village level Islamic
community. Examination of Muslim sources reveals that the
two commonest connotations of ummat Islam are religious,
which includes all adherents of Islam even if only nominal,
and political, which excludes, for example, santri members
of the army.
13.	Geertz, The Religion of Java, p. 128.
14.	Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante
(Djakarta: np, 1958) , Vol. 1, pp. 113-114. Natsir was
speaking in the Constituent Assembly debates on a new con-
stitution for Indonesia.6
in the state. A Dutch Islamologist wrote that, in Muslim eyes,
’’The state cannot be merely an administrative apparatus that has
little connection with spiritual, cultural and religious life.
It retains its characteristic of comprehensive unity. Thus, in
the general Indonesian view, the state . . . has not achieved
its proper status, nor can it do so, until it becomes the focus,
not only of political administration and activity, but of cul-
tural, spiritual and even religious life as well."15
The second argument for an Islamic State was based on a
conviction of Islam’s supremacy as a foundation for a democratic
state. It was asserted that Islam provided for "a system of
democracy and the rule of law in national life, freedom of the
judiciary and the sovereignty of law in the courts. . . . Islam
has regulations on all problems concerning art and science, even
on the status of non-Muslims."16 What was considered the spiri-
tual emptiness of the Pantjasila would offer no protection
against the mounting waves of secularism reaching Indonesia from
the West and of communism from the East. Neither of these two
arguments, however, has given any indication of what an Islamic
Indonesia would be like.
Geertz discovered two major interpretations on this ques-
tion. The first was one that envisaged a theocratic state, a
state where kijajis would dominate. But there was much diverg-
ence of opinion on how such a theocratic state would operate,
for, as he noted, "Even here the exact methods which can bring
about such a domination in the absence of a church organization
within Islam is not clear, although people suggest such notions
as having a special parliament of kijajis to check on secular
legislation passed by the regular parliament to make sure it is
orthodox, placing kijajis in high government positions or ap-
pointing the most learned one as Head of State. . . ,"17 The
alternative was a kind of general proclamation of an Islamic
State, with provisions that the Head of State had to be a Muslim,
that no laws could be passed that were in conflict with the Is-
lamic Law (sjari'at Islam) and with an emphasis on the teaching
of religion in government schools.18 Since independence, there
15.	C. A. 0. van Nieuwenhuize, Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial
Indonesia (The Hague and Bandung:	van Hoeve, 1958), p. 163.
16.	Abadi, February 26, 1969. No hesitation need be shown in
quoting sources very recent, as ideas on this problem have
a timeless constancy about them.
17.
18.
Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 211.
Ibid. , p. 212.7
have been both legitimate and constitutional as well as illegal
and violent attempts to establish an Islamic State, which have
served to discredit the ummat Islam in the eyes of the support-
ers of a Pantjasila-based state.
The Darul Islam (House of Islam) movement in West Java con-
formed to the theocratic state ideal, and its support derived
largely from traditional leaders and religious teachers. Early
in 1948, an Islamic State was set up in West Java with Kartosu-
wirjo as Imam and President of a Madjelis Ummat Islam (Islamic
Community Council), with an army, a parliament, a council on
fatwa (decisions on canon law) and a loosely-disciplined armed
organization called Pahlawan Darul Islam (Heroes of the House
of Islam).19 The movement was characterized by its willingness
to resort to brutal terrorism, by declarations of Holy War
against the Dutch and an attitude of contempt for the Republican
Government which was considered both too compromising toward the
Dutch and toward Islam. Terrorism became almost synonymous
with the Darul Islam, and, "So great was the fear of the Darul
Islam movement in West Java that whatever violence occurred was
automatically ascribed to its supporters."20 Darul Islam activ-
ities persisted throughout the fifties, and Daud Beureueh in
Atjeh and Kahar Muzakkar in Makassar extended the movement to
those traditional areas of Islamic strength.
The Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), formed after elec-
tions in December 1955, had been established to promulgate a
new constitution for the Republic of Indonesia. It was impos-
sible for either Islamic organizations or secular ones to obtain
the two-thirds majority that was necessary for their respective
proposals to be accepted; deadlock was inevitable if no com-
promise solution were found. However, the Konstituante gave
advocates of an Islamic State a legal forum from which to pro-
pound their unchanging ideas on the perfection of Islam, on the
unique position of Islam as the religion of the vast majority
of Indonesians, and on the guarantee of religious freedom which
would be given to minorities. Yet these arguments were no more
compelling to proponents of Pantjasila in the mid-fifties than
they had been two decades earlier, at the time of the famous
dialogue between Sukarno and Natsir, or when discussions took
place in 1945 over the constitution for independent Indonesia,
or indeed today.21 Coupled with the fear of fanatic Islam that
19.	van Nieuwenhuize, Aspects of Islam, p. 173.
20.	Ibid., p. 174. For a view emphasizing the traditionalist,
anti-modern nature of the Darul Islam, see W. F. Wertheim,
Indonesian Society in Transition (The Hague:	van Hoeve,
1964') , p. 228.-----------------
21.	For Natsir's case in the 1930's disagreement on the role to
be played by Islam in Indonesia, see M. Natsir versus
Soekarno (Padang:	Jajasan Pendidikan Islam, 1968).8
was widespread in Central and East Java among the abangan popu-
lation was the belief that "Islam did not have anything to con-
tribute to a modern Indonesian state."22 When Sukarno dissolved
the Konstituante in 1959 it ". . . symbolized the last stand of
Islam as an organized political force in independent Indonesia
against the triumphant forces of nationalist secularism."23 But
it did not mean that those who had advocated an Islamic State
now realized the advantages of having Pantjasila as the state
ideology. Rather it has become necessary to institute features
of an Islamic State within the framework of a Pantjasila-based
Indonesia. It is still necessary for Islam, the religion of
the majority, to be given some form of official recognition.
Any attempt to achieve a more significant role for Islam, how-
ever, is generally seen by the self-named Pantjasilaists as an
effort to establish an Islamic State. It is apparent that many
feel that the Partai Muslimin Indonesia may try to achieve this.
22. Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy:	Indonesian
Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca:	Cornell Modern Indonesia Pro-
ject , 1966) , p. 125. For a discussion of nationalists'
views on Islam and the Pantjasila, see Herbert Feith, The
Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca:
Cornell University, 1962), p. 356.
23. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 234.CHAPTER I
MASJUMI, 1945-1960
It is the proud claim of leaders of Indonesia's Islamic
community that the banner of Islam provided the inspiration for
the Indonesian struggle for independence. In the nineteenth
century, for example, the Padri and Bone Wars, the war led by
Diponegoro and the thirty-year long Atjeh War are referred to
in support of the assertion of the prime importance of Islam in
awakening the desire among Indonesians for freedom from foreign
rule. In the twentieth century, the conventional practice of
regarding the Budi Utomo as the precursor of the nationalist
movement is condemned by Muslim writers who see the Sarekat
Islam as the first nationalist organization.1 After the decline
of the Sarekat Islam in the 1920's, however, not only did lead-
ership of the nationalist movement definitely lie with non-
Islamic organizations such as the Partai Nasional Indonesia of
Sukarno, but also the forces of Islam lost the unity that had
been indicated, if only superficially, by the Sarekat Islam's
existence. Thus in 1933 the Partai Sarekat Islam (PSII), the
successor to the Sarekat Islam, was rent by internal dissension
which resulted in the formation by former PSII members of the
Partai Islam Indonesia. The two rival social organizations
Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadijah were united in a body called
Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia (MIAI), which was later dominated
by the PSII. It was later reorganized by the Japanese during
their occupation of Indonesia and replaced in 1943 by yet an-
other federation, the Masjumi.
In November 1945, a new political party was founded to
represent the interests of the Islamic community in independent
Indonesia, and all the organizations that had joined the Japa-
nese-sponsored Masjumi, such as Muhammadijah and NU, took part.
The Masjumi, as it was called, did not survive long as the sole
representative of a seemingly-united Islamic community. It was
unique among Indonesian political parties in having both indi-
vidual and corporate extraordinary members, the latter being
considered necessary to attract and retain the support of the
mass organizations without compelling them to sacrifice their
interests in social or educational activities.2 The first major
1.	For the most recent instance of this, see the article, "The
Islamic Community and the Oath of Youth," Abadi, October 27,
1969.
2.	Deliar Noer, "Masjumi, Its Organization, Ideology and Politi-
cal Role in Indonesia" (M.A. Thesis, Cornell University,
1960), p. 54.
910
split in Masjumi was the exit of the PSII in 1948, which was
followed by the NU in 1952. A recent analysis explaining this
disintegration has been offered by a Muhammadijah leader,
Mintaredja. After recalling that the left-wing cabinet of Amir
Sjarifuddin had proffered seats to the leaders of the PSII in
an attempt to sow disunity in the Islamic community, Mintaredja
referred to the "arrogant attitude of several leaders of the
ruling-class, namely those who because of their knowledge or
university degrees feel that they have a monopoly over general
knowledge (secular) and political knowledge, and therefore main-
tained that the santris and kijajis who by chance came mostly
from the NU or PSII should only operate in suraus [religious
training center] . . . and confine themselves to religious
duties."3 4 What he was criticizing was the apparent unwilling-
ness of the mainly intellectual-led modernists within Masjumi
to give positions of power to the kijaji-led NU, or to the PSII,
whose leaders felt their ambitions sooner achieved if they con-
stituted their own party in its own right. Several years after
its foundation, it was clear that Masjumi was coming under the
domination of its modernist wing. Kahin suggested that the
modernist followers of Dr. Sukiman and Mohammad Natsir had by
the end of 1948 "... come to exercise more influence over
Masjumi's policy than the remainder of the [leadership] Coun-
cil's members combined."1*
After the defection of the PSII, there were three main
groups within the Masjumi:	the Religious Socialists, that is,
the generally Western-educated intellectuals such as Sukiman,
Natsir, Rum and Jusuf Wibisono, who were often connected with
one of the modernist social or educational organizations, such
as Muhammadijah or the Djamiatul Al-Washlijah; the NU group,
consisting mainly of kijajis, led by Wachid Hasjim; a smaller
group of "radical fundamentalists" which has been described as
". . . having its origins in the antitraditionalist 'Protestant'
movement of which the Muhammadijah was the main channel, [and
which] represented another more militant, illiberal, and anti-
secularist current."5 The last group was marked by its most
outspoken advocation of an Islamic State, as well as by a tend-
ency to instantly label any opposition to Islamic aspirations
as communist. In the two or three years before the formation
of the Wilopo Cabinet in April 1952, cabinet seats offered to
Masjumi were generally given to Masjumi members from the first
3.	Mintaredja, Perdjuangan Ummat Islam Mengalami Setback 25
Tahun (Djakarta:	n.p., 1968), p. 6.
4.	George McT. Kahin, Nationalist and Revolution in Indonesia
(Ithaca:	Cornell University, 1952), p. 306.
5.	Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 136.11
of these three groups alone, who received three seats to the
NU's one in the Hatta Cabinet, three to one in the Natsir Cabinet
and four to one in the Sukiman Cabinet.6 In each case, the NU
held only the portfolio of Religious Affairs. The NU's main
source of influence in Masjumi derived from its domination of
the Religious Council, but, in 1949, this had become a purely
advisory body, thus subordinating religion to politics, as NU
leaders alleged. When the Wilopo Cabinet's choice of Religious
Affairs Minister was the Muhammadijah figure Faqih Usman, it
seemed to the NU that nothing was to be gained from remaining
within Masjumi, and, in 1952, the NU was reconstituted as an
independent political party. The unity of the ummat Islam which
had been achieved during the revolution was finally destroyed.7
The attitude that Mintaredja condemned seems to reveal a
tendency among many party leaders from one particular group to
regard themselves as being the most representative, and the most
capable, leaders of the ummat Islam. This may be, too, a re-
flection of the attitude which Geertz found in Modjokuto where,
". . . Each group--abangan, santri and prijaji--sees the politi-
cal struggle not so much as a process of mutual adjustment be-
tween separate interests as parts of a larger society but as a
naked struggle for power in which one group wins and the others
lose."8 Masjumi was not free from this attitude after NU's
departure, for, faction-ridden until 1960, the party saw the
eventual unhappy triumph of one faction, and the defection to
the PSII of the leaders of another. The chief differences be-
tween the principal factions, followers of Natsir and Sukiman
respectively, were, according to Feith, closer relations enjoyed
by Sukiman with the President, and the PNI and NU, contrasted
with the links that Natsir had with the radical fundamentalists
such as Isa Ansjary, as well as a greater community of interest
with the PSI (Socialist Party). Furthermore, the Sukiman wing
was more commonly identified with Javanese interests; whereas
Natsir's group was thought to be more representative of the
Outer Islands, and in greater sympathy with regionalist demands.
However, there were many Javanese leaders of Masjumi usually
associated with Natsir, such as Prawoto Mangkusasmito and Moham-
mad Rum, while there were some Sumatrans, for example Firdaus,
who were at times highly critical of Natsir.9
6 . Ibid., p. 234.
7.	Ibid., pp. 233-237, for a full analysis of the reasons for
NU's withdrawal.
8.	Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 213.
9.	See Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 234 ff.
for an analysis of the factions within Masjumi. During the
early fifties, the Sukiman faction was disturbed at the12
The Masjumi declined from its position as the largest party
in 1950 through one of second-largest in the 1955 general elec-
tions, when Masjumi triumph had been predicted, to a situation
in the late fifties when, "The dominant mood in Masjumi approached
defeatism. Government action to abolish the party . . . would
not have been a surprise. . . ."10 There has so far been no
full explanation offered to account for the startling decline
of this party, except within the framework of the decline in the
party system in general. However, it is clear that, apart from
the lack of unanimity in Masjumi over the question of how to
face the growing power of Sukarno and how to avert a semi-alli-
ance between the PNI and PKI (Communist Party), Masjumi was con-
siderably weakened by its inability to control the radical
utterances of its fundamentalist wing.11 Lev observed, "Although
many of Masjumi's national leaders were intellectual moderates
who questioned the utility of Islamic doctrine in the modern
state, yet in the heat of ideological debate they were often
drawn towards the extreme positions of the party's religious
fanatics."12 More particularly, after the famous Amuntai speech
of Sukarno, when he warned against the dangers of setting up an
Islamic State, the ideological battle was fought in Indonesia,
and charges of heathen and communist were hurled at Masjumi's
opponents.
However, the fall of Masjumi was more directly caused by
its growing identification with the regionalist demands that
were voiced loudly in the middle of the decade. Although Masjumi
derived some 251 of its support from Central and East Java, half
possibility of the PNI's seeking communist support, or vice-
versa, and at the dangers of alienating the NU and losing
its support. Thus whereas Natsir had formed a cabinet with-
out the PNI in 1950, Sukiman restored a PNI-Masjumi coali-
tion the following year. Similarly, Sukiman protested at
the way the NU was almost driven from Masjumi.
10.	Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 136.
11.	Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca:
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957) , p. 777 Naturally
Masjumi's strong emphasis on Islam, by no means restricted
to the fundamentalists, repelled what Castles called "the
vitally important class of Western-educated officials and
white-collar workers." See Lance Castles, Religion, Poli-
tics, and Economic Behavior in Java:	The Kudus Cigarette1
Industry (New Haven:	Yale University Cultural Report
Series, No. 15, 1967), p. 13.
12.	Daniel Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," Journal of
Southeast Asian History, 8, No. 1 (March 1967), p. 57.13
of its support came from the Outer Islands, which meant that on
the one hand Masjumi was the only truly national party, but on
the other:	"The distribution of Masjumi's support was unfavor-
ably out of proportion to the distribution of Indonesia's popu-
lation, and when the conflict between Java and the Outer Islands
came to a head . . . , Masjumi suffered the same decline as the
regions.”13 The regional crisis of 1957-1959 was caused by the
anomalous economic position of the Outer Islands vis-a-vis Java.
Through an unreal exchange rate, the importers of Java were
treated favorably and the exporters, mainly from the Outer
Islands, were discriminated against; moreover, the foreign ex-
change earnings of the Outer Islands seemed to be used chiefly
on Java, where, for example, the nation's principal educational
institutions were located. In parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi,
there was widespread dislike and distrust of President Sukarno
and his toleration of the communists, and, in areas of Islamic
"fanaticism," such as Atjeh, there was distrust of and contempt
for the attitude of the Javanese towards Islam. But there was
a more profound aspect to center-region relations, for, as Lev
perceived, "The Javanese elite saw in independence an opportuni-
ty ... to fulfill the ambitions and promises of Javanese
civilization in the new national state, while the smaller and
more particularistic societies of the rest of Indonesia recoiled
before the vision of their eventual subordination or assimila-
tion in a Javanese-dominated nation."1**
That Masjumi was sympathetic to regional demands for greater
autonomy was understandable given the base of non-Javanese sup-
port on which Masjumi's strength lay, but other issues were in-
volved in the decision of three national leaders of Masjumi to
join the Sumatran army officers who threatened to rebel against
the central government. First was the fear that Sukarno's idea
of Guided Democracy was inimical to constitutional democracy,
and, more seriously, constituted an open invitation to the PKI
to increase its strength and influence. Among the Sumatrans
were men like Simbolon, whose participation in the October 17
Affair of 1952 had indicated his, to put it mildly, ambivalence
to democracy.15 The ideal of an Islamic-inspired resistance to
communist-dominated Java, of a holy war against atheism, may
have been of considerable importance, and once they had joined
the rebellion (in December 1957 Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara
and Burhanuddin Harahap left Djakarta for Padang), they tended
to cooperate with the Atjeh-based Darul Islam movement in North
13.	Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 136.
14.	Ibid., p. 3.
15.	On the October 17 Affair, see Feith, Decline of Constitu-
tional Democracy, pp. 246 ff.14
Sumatra. The hope of achieving a federal system of states which
were free to proclaim themselves Islamic was realized during the
PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) rebellion,
when a Republik Persatuan government was set up in 1960, with
ten constituent states, including the Islamic State of Atjeh.16
It may well be, however, that the action of Natsir and his
colleagues in fleeing to Padang was more a response to unbear-
able conditions in Djakarta than a long-planned decision which
took into consideration the direct political interests of Masju-
mi. There seems to have been no prior consultation with other
Masjumi leaders in Djakarta before Natsir left. Furthermore,
these three Masjumi leaders had been for some time subjected to
harassment by youths connected with the pro-Sukarno newspaper,
Pemuda, partly as a reaction to the condemnation made by Natsir
of the takeovers of Dutch enterprises in December 1957. 7
Whatever the factors motivating the participation of the
three senior Masjumi leaders, Natsir, Sjafruddin and Burhanuddin
Harahap, in the PRRI rebellion, the consequences were very
serious for Masjumi. On this issue as on others, the Sukiman
wing clashed with the supporters of Mohammad Natsir. Jusuf
Wibisono, for example, although he desired a compromise between
the central government and the rebels, nevertheless demanded
that Masjumi condemn Natsir for his extreme action, and he
argued, "Any other posture was inconsistent; to refuse to de-
nounce the rebellion and yet to continue to participate in legal
politics was two-faced and debilitating. The inevitable outcome
of such a course would be that Masjumi's power would disappear
altogether, imperilling the entire Islamic cause in Indonesia."18
A further source of dissension within Masjumi was the refusal of
the Natsir group, now led by Prawoto, to replace Natsir as
General Chairman of the party, which tended to heighten Masjumi's
embarrassment in Djakarta politics. It was not until April 1959
that Prawoto was elected to succeed Natsir, but even then no
decision was taken to condemn the leaders involved in the rebel-
lion. Prawoto and his supporters preferred to compete in the
Djakarta political arena shackled by the Masjumi's connection
with the PRRI, and the party was dubbed "the party of separation
and rebellion."19
16.	Herbert Feith and Daniel Lev, "The End of the Indonesian
Rebellion," Pacific Affairs, 34, No. 1 (Spring 1963), p. 38.
17.	Interview with Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Djakarta, May 1968.
18.	Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 136.
19.	Allan Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," Asian Survey,
8, No. 13 (December 1968), p. 1001.15
Prawoto's unwillingness to criticize the participation of
Natsir and the others in the rebellion was caused first by loyal-
ty to his comrade, and by a hope that the rebellion might just
succeed.20 Prawoto, Rum, Kasman Singodimedjo and others were
convinced that the present trends in political life in Indonesia
were completely opposed to Masjumi's interests as they saw them,
interests which could only be furthered by a thorough reversal
of Sukarno's actions. Moreover, Prawoto thought that Masjumi's
future strength lay outside Java, and that condemnation of the
spirations of Masjumi supporters in Atjeh and other areas would
alienate Masjumi's sources of support.21 A third factor was
suggested by Mohammad Rum, who maintained that by refusing to
condemn the role played by Natsir and the Masjumi branches in
the regions involved in the PRRI, "The unity of the ummat Islam
was preserved intact."22 At the conclusion of the rebellion,
the return of Natsir arid his colleagues would not signify a
split within the Islamic community, but a joyful restoration of
unity.
However, the result of the rebellion and the other issues
pressing in the last years of the decade was precisely the dis-
integration of Masjumi, which owed as much to a deep conflict
within the party over how to confront these problems as to the
actions of Masjumi's opponents. The return to the 1945 Consti-
tution provided the final test of the party's ability to face
Djakarta’s political demands on a united stand, and Masjumi
failed. In February 1959, Sukiman was reported to have said
that the 1945 Constitution was consistent with what Masjumi had
sought during the post-independence era and that a return to
that constitution was the only way out of the deadlock in the
Constituent Assembly. He added that he could not express his
party's opinion on Guided Democracy, "because he had to seek
further explanations from Sukarno and Djuanda."23 Such an atti-
tude towards Guided Democracy was wholly unthinkable to Prawoto,
who found abhorrent Sukarno's violation of the constitution.2*
20.	For a full discussion of Prawoto's position, see Lev,
Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 136, and Feith and Lev,
"End ofthe Indonesian Rebellion," p. 37.
21.	Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 252-253.
22.	Interview with Mohammad Rum, Djakarta, February 1969.
23.	Merdeka, February 25, 1959.
24.	The best statement of Prawoto's views may be found in his
pamphlet, Tempat Hukum dalam Alam Revolusi (Djakarta:
Abadi, 1960j. It is a moot point, of course, how concerned
Masjumi's leadership was at the prospect of constitutional
democracy being overthrown, and how alarmed at the likely
concomitant decline in Masjumi's influence.16
Realizing the futility of the ideological conflict with the
secularists, Jusuf Wibisono proposed that a democratic front be
formed with the secular and Christian parties to combat commu-
nism on the basis of the Pantjasila. "Meanwhile," he argued,
"Islamic groups should study the conditions of society and ad-
just themselves to the national stage of development."25 This
highly pragmatic approach was, however, unacceptable to much of
Masjumi's leadership, and might have conceivably alienated large
sections of the party’s regional supporters. Early in 1960,
Jusuf Wibisono left Masjumi and joined the PSII, to be followed
several months later by Sukiman. At the same time, Masjumi's
constituent organizations were restless and anxious lest their
interests be sacrificed to those of the party. Before the dis-
solution of Masjumi in August, the Muhammadijah declared itself
no longer a special member of the party, and so it survived
Masjumi's demise.26
Sukarno introduced in January 1960 a resolution on party
life which gave him authority to ban and dissolve parties whose
bases conflicted with that of the state, whose members were
carrying out rebellion or which refused to condemn those party
members participating in rebellion. A party violating the con-
ditions of Presidential Decision No. 7 would have to be dissolved
by the party leadership within thirty days of issuance of a dis-
solution decree.27 Although the other main party of rebellion,
the PSI, attempted to ban its members from participation in re-
bellion and announced that such involvement meant automatic ex-
pulsion from the PSI,28 on August 17, 1960, Sukarno was able to
reveal that his earlier demand that the PSI and Masjumi denounce
their rebel members had not been satisfactorily executed, and
that consequently both parties had been dissolved. With the
Masjumi and PSI effectively removed from the arena of legitimate
politics, the remaining Islamic parties no longer rested in the
center of the Indonesian political spectrum, but rather consti-
tuted the most right wing parties and thus were forced to play
cautious roles in a nation that seemed to have swung markedly to
the left.29 Islam, it appeared, was destined to enjoy a muted
share in the political future of Indonesia.
25.	Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 229.
26.	Mintaredja, Perdjuangan Ummat Islam, p. 3.
27.	Merdeka, January 13, 1960.
28.	Interview with Subadio Sastrosatomo, Djakarta, May 1968.
29.	The Muslim parties surviving the introduction of Guided
Democracy were the NU, PSII and the small, Sumatra-based
Perti (Partai Tarbijah Islamijah).CHAPTER II
THE STRUGGLE FOR REHABILITATION
There has so far been, unfortunately, no analysis of the
role played by Islamic organizations during the years of Guided
Democracy. This is scarcely surprising, however, as attention
was focused on the three main participants in Djakarta politics
in that period, the President, the Army, and the PKI. After the
dissolution of Masjumi, the constituent organizations that sur-
vived independently restricted their activities to non-political
fields, although the Muhammadijah, for example, at times held
cabinet portfolios.1 In 1963, the Masjumi youth movement, GPU
(Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia), was banned because of its
opposition to Manipol-Usdek and its suspected involvement in
the 1957 attempt on Sukarno's life. But other Islamic student
or youth organizations, notably the NU-affiliated Pemuda Ansor
and the independent HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), survived,
although the latter movement was subjected to a long campaign
waged by the PKI which tried to link HMI with Masjumi and have
it banned also. The HMI was supported by NU and other religious
parties, as well as by elements within the Armed Forces. By
April 1965, Sukarno had announced that the HMI was not in danger
of dissolution.2 Generally, however, Islamic organizations were
compelled to adopt passive postures, in the period 1963-1965
especially, when the PKI ". . . had come to monopolize the in-
terpretation and marketing of symbols, acronyms and national
objectives expounded by President Sukarno. ... No group ob-
jected to the wholesale expulsion by the Nationalist Party of
1.	Even as late as October 1965, the Muhammadijah held the post
of People's Welfare (Coordinating Minister) which was in the
hands of Muljadi Djojomartono (who had defected from Masjumi
when he accepted a seat in the Kabinet Karya, appointed by
Sukarno in April 1957), and the post of Hadj Affairs.
2.	See K. D. Thomas, "Political and Economic Instability:	The
Gestapu and Its Aftermath," in T. K. Tan, ed., Sukarno's
Guided Democracy (Brisbane:	Jacaranda, 1967), p"l 117.
Thomas (p"! 126, n. 5) erroneously suggests that the HMI was
not banned in 1960 along with Masjumi because it tradition-
ally contained both Masjumi and NU sympathizers. It is not
clear why the HMI should (or should not) have been banned
in 1960, but the fact that GPII, which was much more closely
identified with Masjumi,lasted until 1963 is ignored by
the explanation Thomas offers.
1718
the liberal half of its leadership or protested the banning of
the Murba Party. . . . Every group, however modestly, picked up
the clamorous PKI campaign for the ouster of capitalist-bureau-
crat . . . officials from the highest levels of government."3 4
In the regions, particularly Central and East Java, the
agitation launched by the communist peasant front, BTI (Barisan
Tani Indonesia), to have the land reform legislation of 1960
implemented through the so-called aksi sepihak (unilateral ac-
tion) movement provoked violent reaction from the NU and PNI
land-owning class. Clashes occurred throughout 1964 and 1965
and formed a prelude to the later massacres. "Islamic schools,"
one commentator noted, "not only were hotbeds of agitation
against 'communism* and 'atheism' but were also strongly influ-
enced by the richer peasants as an interest-group."** In Java
there developed what Castles described as a "new tendency among
young Muslims which rejects both the NU (on account of its
opportunism and religious traditionalism) and the Masjumi (on
account of its excessively Westernized leadership). Their main
concern is not politics, but da’wah (propagation of the faith).
They eschew formal organization which . . . means submitting to
government surveillance and leadership. . . . These intense
young men . . . probably stand behind some at least of the vari-
ous outbreaks ... of united Islamic sentiment against the left
in the past two years."5
. Despite what seemed to be substantial increases in commu-
nist strength in the last years of Guided Democracy, the PKI
was comparatively easily routed when the murders of six generals,
on October 1, 1965, were used by the army to make the communists
the chief target in its counter-offensive against the Untung
forces. Onto the anti-communist bandwagon set careering forth
by the army, clambered many elements of the Djakarta political
scene, with demands for the PKI's dissolution and promises of
support to army leaders. Until January, however, the initiative
in political maneuvering lay with Suharto and his allies, or
with the President, and the parties were compelled to proceed
cautiously, partly owing to old and feeble leadership, as in
the PNI, or perennial disunity, so that:	"The army could not
depend on public party affirmations to reflect the strength of
3.	Roger Paget, "The Military in Politics in Indonesia:	The
Burden of Power," Pacific Affairs, 34, Nos. 1-2 (Spring
1966), p. 121.
4.	W. F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup,"
Pacific Affairs, 40, Nos. 3-4 (Fall 1967-1968), p. 296.
5.	Lance Castles, "Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor,"
Indonesia, 1 (April 1966), p. 44.19
party leadership."6 Nevertheless, the NU did at least continue
to function as a party. The former supporters of Masjumi were
forced to operate through a variety of organizations, until a
front was set up in December called the Badan Koordinasi Amal
Muslimin. But the principal role played by Islam was increas-
ingly dominated by youth and student movements such as Pemuda
Ansor and HMI, which were involved throughout most of Central
and East Java in the systematic massacre of communists and their
alleged sympathizers.
During this period, and well into the new year, most na-
tional leaders of Masjumi were ensconced in prison. The arrests
of "opposition" politicians in 1962 had been preceded by the
placing of the PRRI rebels in "political quarantine."7 At the
time of the attempted coup, Natsir, Prawoto and other detainees
were in a Madiun jail. It was perhaps a special misfortune to
these Masjumi figures, and a circumstance of considerable irony,
that initial steps taken against their old opponents, the commu-
nists and Sukarno, were made while they were still in prison.
Thus they were not comparable to men like Suharto, Sarwo Edhie
and the students, who unquestionably enjoyed the distinction of
belonging to the New Order by physical participation in its
struggles. It is indeed possible that the political detainees
of the anoien regime provided inspiration to the demonstrating
youths of the Action Fronts. The remarkable public display of
emotion at the funeral of former PSI leader Sjahrir in April
may be a gauge of the respect with which Masjumi leaders also
were held.8 Nevertheless it is still true that the old Masjumi
leadership was unable to play an active part in the hectic events
of the transition from the Old Order to the New. This may have
increased a tendency among HMI leaders, for example, to feel
independent of their Masjumi elders and, at times, even skepti-
cal of the latters* grasp of political realities. At the same
time, the absence of Masjumi leaders from the battlefield, how-
ever undesired by themselves, may have strengthened an inclina-
tion among elements within the army, to whom Masjumi aspirations
were either irrelevant or dangerous, to consider Natsir and
6.	Paget, "Military in Politics," p. 300.
7.	Masjumi leaders jailed during 1962-1964 included Mohammad
Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara,
Burhanuddin Harahap, Mohammad Rum, Yunan Nasution, Kasman
Singodimedjo, Anwar Harjono, Hamka and Isa Ansjary. There
were also a number of GPU figures arrested, including E. Z.
Muttaqien, Soemarsono and Achmad Buchori (or Buchari).
8.	See the detailed account of Sjahrir’s funeral in Rosihan
Anwar, Perdjalanan Terachir Pahlawan Nasional Sutan Sjahrir
(Djakarta:	Pembangunan, 1966} .20
other detainees as the jetsam of the old government rather than
as heroes who deserved a place in the new one.9 Anyway, it was
not until May or June 1966, that Natsir and the other, largely
PSI and Masjumi, detainees were released from their confinement
in Djakarta.10 The long delay in releasing these men seems to
have been caused by two closely interconnected factors. First,
the preoccupation of Suharto and the central leadership of the
army with eliminating the PKI and then cautiously edging the
compromised Sukarno out of real power probably prevented serious
consideration of what to do with the political prisoners of
Sukarno’s government. Second, the concomitant desire for a
state of aman (peace, security), for public security was needed
while the latter objective of confronting Sukarno was being can-
vassed. The Action Fronts, which after January 1966 became in-
creasingly independent of, and often in conflict with, the imme-
diate objectives of Suharto, were a sufficient nuisance for the
army to contend with.11
It should be recalled that the Masjumi which emerged from
the prisons of Java and Djakarta comprised a leadership that
came mainly from the Natsir group, with the fundamentalists such
as Isa Ansjary. Sukiman and Jusuf Wibisono had remained in the
PSII, so that for some time it seemed that Masjumi, though still
lacking the right to exist as a party, was rid of the chronic
disunity that had led to its downfall. However, the endeavors
launched throughout 1966 to achieve restoration of the party’s
right to participate in Indonesian politics were not fully con-
certed. Two committees, or fronts, were formed to struggle for
the rehabilitation of Masjumi neither of which was destined to
receive an official reply from the government.
9.	For a discussion of conflicting attitudes within the army
towards the Masjumi and PSI, which found sympathy with
various regionally-based officers and hostility from others
who disapproved of their pro-Western orientation or role in
the PRRI, see Herbert Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democ-
racy," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven:	HRAF,
1963), p. 343. It seems unobjectionable to assume that
four years afterwards the same differences were to be found,
in a greater or lesser degree.
10.	The funeral of Sutan Sjahrir saw most of his fellow prison-
ers let out during the ceremony and then rather pathetically
returned to their place of detention. Several days later,
the Catholic newspaper, Kompas (April 12, 1966) asked:
"What is the fate of the political prisoners still in jail,
who like Sjahrir once served their country as ministers?
Are they to suffer further?"
11.	See Paget, "Military in Politics," for the best account of
this period.21
Apparently, senior officers in Djakarta suspected that stu-
dent demonstrations launched in early 1966 were being manipu-
lated by GPU and Masjumi figures. At a meeting between Major-
General Amir Machmud, Commander of the Greater Djakarta Area,
and a delegation of nine Masjumi or GPU representatives led by
Faqih Usman held on May 9, Amir suggested that those two organi-
zations had been behind current student demonstrations.12 From
the Masjumi/GPII side, this encounter with Amir Machmud had
taken some time to arrange, and it constituted the first effort
to get off the ground the campaign for the rehabilitation of
both organizations. Two GPU leaders, Buchori and Hasan Suraat-
madja, began in February to contact Amir’s younger brother, an
old school friend of the latter, and it took three months for
Amir himself to agree to meet representatives of the GPU and
Masjumi. During the following years, attempts to achieve first
rehabilitation of Masjumi and then legalization of a new party
were continuously made through a pattern of informal contacts
with friends or acquaintances of Masjumi men within the army.
The May meeting was significant in so far as it revealed
the first presentation of the Masjumi's case for rehabilitation.
Both the GPU and Masjumi, in fact, surrendered documents to
Amir expounding the reasons why rehabilitation was justified.13
Encouraged, perhaps, by the current slogans of upholding justice
and democracy then popular among the Action Fronts, the first
outline of the Masjumi case was based on historical arguments
and legal questions surrounding the role of the party in the
19S8 rebellion. The main defense against the charge of not
having condemned their leaders involved in the PRRI was a speech
made by Prime Minister Djuanda in parliament late in February
1958. Djuanda had declared:	"The government is of the opinion
that although men involved in the rebellion may be leaders of a
political party, nevertheless it is not the party but its mem-
bers who have broken the law."1** Moreover, ran the Masjumi
12.	Interview with Achmad Buchori, Djakarta, March 1969. Bu-
chori denied the general’s charge, and said that the student
outbreaks had been "spontaneous."
13.	See S. U. Bajasut, Fakta Documenta (n.p., n.d.), Vol. VI,
p. 14. This is the last volume in a series of six booklets
on Masjumi and the development of the new party. The other
main account of the Partai Muslimin in Indonesian is Soli-
chin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Djakarta:
Jajasan Kesedjanteraan dan Perbendaharaan Islam, 1968).
14.	Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, p. 36. It may be noted that this
was not Djuanda's final statement on this issue. In August
of the same year, he admonished all groups in parliament to
take a firm stand in condemning their members who had joined
the PRRI. See Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 139,
n. 13.22
argument, since 1962, those who had rebelled had received am-
nesty, and so should Masjumi. The dissolution of that party
could not be divorced from the maneuvering of the PKI, and refer-
ence was made to the attempt of Prawoto to sue the government
in 1960 for the dissolution of Masjumi. Finally, while it was
admitted that there would always be slander, the document given
to Amir refuted the common slander against Masjumi, that it
opposed Pantjasila.15
It may be useful to compare the Masjumi's posture on its
rehabilitation in 1966 with the tactics adopted by the PKI in a
not dissimilar situation fifteen years earlier. Hindley re-
corded that, after 1951:	"The Aidit leadership directed much
of the party's propaganda and activities to building a favorable
image of the PKI as a nationalist, anti-colonial party, as a
party sympathetic to religion, as a responsible party opposed
to the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives,
and as a resolute defender of democracy. That the PKI lacked
this image at the beginning of 1951 was partly the result of the
Madiun rebellion, in which the communists had attacked the cen-
tral government during the war against the Dutch, and in which
they had murdered many santris. In short, without this favor-
able image, it would have been very difficult, probably impos-
sible, to win mass support."16 Masjumi in 1966 did not have
the problem of winning mass support, at least its leaders were
confident their policies would invariably be endorsed by their
supporters, should they be given the opportunity to demonstrate
approval. But Masjumi was still on the periphery of the Indone-
sian political scene, in the sense that it lacked legitimacy and
until it gained rehabilitation it could not play a satisfying
role in national politics, a role that offered the party a
future.
Unlike the PKI, however, Masjumi saw no need, apparently,
to change its justification for past errors, denying that any
errors had been committed. Quite the contrary, following the
15.	Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, p. 36.
16.	Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963
(Berkeley:	University of California, 1964) , p. 121. This
comparison with the PKI would of course be highly offensive
to any Masjumi member (or to any communist, for that matter)
and it should not be taken too far. But the distinction is
not always kept in mind by elements of the army; for exam-
ple, a local military command in South Djakarta recently
instructed all lurahs (village headmen) to provide lists
of all inhabitants who were former members of either PKI
or Masjumi. See Mertju Suar, June 10, 196823
course of Guided Democracy and the 1965 coup d'etat, Masjumi
leaders felt their previous actions of opposition to Sukarno
and even rebellion against his government had been justified by
history. They argued that if the PRRI had won wider support
(presumably from those who now attacked Sukarno willingly), the
authoritarian Sukarno and the PKI would have been restrained,
and the tragedy of Crocodile Hole averted.17 Now that the PKI
had been so conclusively discredited as treacherous and unpatri-
otic, it was up to the rest of the political elite and the gov-
ernment to accord Masjumi the recognition it so singularly
deserved as the earliest champion of anti-communism and anti-
Guided Democracy.18
Masjumi's opponents, however, saw no need to grant recogni-
tion to that party, a former rebel party whose leaders had
"revolted against the state."19 It was widely considered that
the government of 1958 was not yet the evil government later
dubbed the Old Order, and at that time, Sukarno was quite dif-
ferent from the dictatorial leader he later became. Thus there
could be no justification for rebellion. The PRRI's motives
were seen in terms of Islamic ideals and federalist intentions,
and the men who had in 1958 been stamped "anti-nationalist, pro-
Western and accomplices of colonialism and imperialism,"20 found
that these and other labels, such as "fanatical Muslims," stuck
even after the fall of Sukarno. It has been stressed suffi-
ciently by Western observers that it was the army under General
Nasution that was instrumental in the introduction of Guided
Democracy.21 The army leadership in 1966 was unlikely to make
17.	It is common to see the murders of the six generals (whose
bodies were found at Crocodile Hole) as the logical out-
come of Guided Democracy, which views seems to ignore the
army's role in the introduction of Guided Democracy. See,
e.g., Amura's article in Operasi, October 24, 1968.
18.	Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1005.
19.	That they had rebelled not only against the central govern-
ment but also against the unitary state of Indonesia would
probably be denied by the PRRI rebels, yet the Federal Re-
public of Indonesia government they set up in 1960 was
enough to convince Djakarta of the federalist threat.
20.	Jan Pluvier, Confrontations (Kuala Lumpur:	Oxford Univer-
sity, 1965), p. 53.
21.	For the best account of the army's role in Guided Democra-
cy's introduction, see Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy.24
public admission of Masjumi's correctness in opposing Guided
Democracy, but this notwithstanding, old Masjumi leaders such
as Prawoto almost inevitably adopted a position, at times bor-
dering on self-righteousness, which others found either com-
pletely unjustified or containing an inherent threat to their
own positions or reputations. The NU, for example, would have
been seriously embarrassed had Masjumi's right to rebel against
Guided Democracy been conceded.22 To put it bluntly, large sec-
tions of the modernists entered the New Order with a chip on
their shoulder, and the refusal of most other political forces
to acknowledge their martyrdom increased the frustration they
felt.23 Some observers who considered Natsir and Sjafruddin
rash in joining the PRRI even believed that after their sur-
render and imprisonment these Masjumi leaders became more
fanatic than ever before.21*
After the release of Prawoto, Natsir, Rum and other leaders
in May, a committee was set up to seek formally the restoration
of Masjumi's legitimacy. Named the Committee for the Rehabili-
tation of Masjumi, this was chaired by a former Sumatran leader
of Masjumi, Sjarif Usman, who had participated in the PRRI in
Padang. There is unfortunately little record of this committee's
activities, and its membership has not been published. But it
is safe to assume that it was largely under the guidance of
Faqih Usman, and through him, of Prawoto.25 Throughout the
latter half of 1966, representatives of this committee continued
the informal contact established with Amir Machmud and other key
generals, such as Kemal Idris, Sutjipto and Alamsjah, as well as
with Colonel Ali Murtopo.26 During this period, which lasted
until December, a variety of organizations came out in support
22.	See Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1004. This
section is almost wholly based on interviews with senior
officers (Colonels and Brigadier-Generals) in Djakarta, but
very similar opinions have been expressed by a variety of
civilian politicians, from the Christian parties, the PNI,
NU and PSII.
23.	The term "modernist" is admittedly very vague. The organi-
zations most conscious of the injustice done to Masjumi
seemed to have been the PI I and the GPU.
24.	General Simatupang was particularly emphatic on this point
in an interview in Djakarta in March 1969.
25.	Faqih Usman's prominence seems to have come largely from
his position as the most senior Masjumi leader not impris-
oned during Guided Democracy.
26.	Interview, Muttaqien, Djakarta, February 1969.25
of Masjumi's demand for rehabilitation. Although, not surpris-
ingly, most declarations of support were from former constituent
member organizations, such as Muhammadijah, or ones closely
identified with Masjumi, such as Peladjar Islam Indonesia (PII),
there were also several independent associations that issued
statements favorable to the party or called for justice to be
done to banned parties. In August, for instance, a symposium
held in Djakarta to discuss the forthcoming general elections
issued a declaration endorsing rehabilitation of Masjumi and the
PSI in order to "guarantee that democracy is not merely accorded
lip-service," and it was hoped that all formerly-banned organi-
zations such as Murba might be able to participate in the elec-
tions .2 7
Seemingly of greater significance, the Second Army Seminar
in Bandung, while not espousing the cause of Masjumi's rehabili-
tation, nevertheless recommended that members of disbanded
political parties such as Masjumi should be allowed to take an
active part in political life. Several months later, a national
conference of the Lawyers' Association (Persahi) declared in
Djakarta that the dissolution of Masjumi and the PSI had been
illegal and unconstitutional. Furthermore, the rehabilitation
of the two parties would serve to consolidate the New Order.28
Thus it was that supporters of Masjumi were optimistic about
their party's rehabilitation:	"By December 1966, it was antici-
pated that Masjumi's rehabilitation would occur very shortly."29
But in this atmosphere of hopeful expectation, the regional com-
manders of the Armed Forces issued a statement on December 21
in which Masjumi was coupled with the PKI in having once devi-
ated from the 1945 Constitution. This offensive reference in-
duced the former General Chairman of Masjumi, Prawoto, to publish
an immediate denial, and, in a press-release, he noted that it
was "a great irony that Masjumi, which always invoked us to re-
main loyal to the Constitution, has now been grouped with those
who have deviated from it."30
Prawoto was sufficiently jolted by the December statement
to write to Suharto and request a meeting with him to discuss
Masjumi's rehabilitation. In his quite brief letter, Prawoto
argued that for him, "As the first man responsible in Masjumi
27.	Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, p. 15. The symposium was spon-
sored by the University of Indonesia, the Graduates' Front
and the National Cultural Research Institute.
28.	Ibid., pp. 16-17.
29.	Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1004.
30.	Karya Bhakti, December 28, 1966.26
when it was dissolved, the Ampera Cabinet constitutes the only
hope of a return to a democratic legal system in our country.
... I am fearful [he continued] lest the Armed Forces' Decem-
ber statement be misused by elements who wish to fish in troubled
waters and thereby seriously endanger the consolidation of the
New Order."31 Although the contents of Prawoto's letter mainly
comprised a reiteration of the case earlier presented by Faqih
Usman at the May meeting, it was significant in that it elicited
a succinct exposition of Suharto's stand on this issue.32 In
his reply of January 6, Suharto made it clear that he would not
countenance rehabilitation of Masjumi. He said that he still
had to observe Presidential Decision No. 7/1959, and he reminded
Prawoto that Masjumi had in fact failed to castigate those of
its members who joined the PRRI. Suharto trusted that Prawoto
would understand his position, for a rebellion could not be
tolerated, and action had to be taken against it. He explained
that the Armed Forces as a whole, and soldiers' families in par-
ticular, who had suffered greatly in the campaign to quell the
PRRI and the Darul Islam, were completely unprepared to accept
restoration of Masjumi. "Juridical, constitutional and psycho-
logical considerations have brought the Armed Forces to one
view-point, that is, that the party cannot be rehabilitated."
Suharto finally added insult to injury by disclaiming that the
special mention of Masjumi in the December statement had any
significance, for what was meant was merely that the Armed
Forces were resolved to put down any attempt at deviation from
Pantjasila and the 1945 Constitution. Suharto hoped that
Prawoto could see the problem in the right perspective and thus
avoid any abuse of the December statement.33
It appears that Suharto was quite unimpressed with the case
for Masjumi's rehabilitation, and we may surmise that any fur-
ther attempts to open the door that he had thus slammed shut
would not be appreciated. Nevertheless, after waiting two
months Prawoto wrote again and elaborated in some detail the
reasons for his party's revival. In this second and much longer
31.	Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, p. 55.
32.	At the time, General Suharto was chairman of the ruling
Presidium. It seems that Prawoto was unwilling to publicly
lead the rehabilitation campaign owing to his belief that
Suharto was too preoccupied to give serious thought to the
problem. Interview with Prawoto, Djakarta, May 1968.
33.	Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, pp. 53-55. Al-
though marked urgent, Suharto's letter took over two weeks
to reach Prawoto's house, by which time copies had been
distributed to regional military commanders. Prawoto
interview, May 1968.27
letter, Prawoto capitalized on the prevailing anti-Sukarno atmos-
phere by reminding Suharto of Masjumi's strong opposition to the
President ten years earlier. He suggested that the Presidential
Decision quoted by Suharto was unconstitutional, as it contra-
vened Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, which guaranteed
freedom of association. Masjumi had in fact, maintained Prawoto,
declared the PRRI to be unconstitutional, and he asked how the
party could have condemned those members who had participated
in the rebellion, since in the regions such as West Sumatra
where rebellion occurred, the party had been banned, so that
local Masjumi men were no longer party members. Just as Suharto
believed any form of revolt intolerable, so Masjumi had opposed
the revolt (i.e., the unconstitutional actions) of President
Sukarno. Prawoto ended with a bold challenge: "Would it not be
more responsible of the Armed Forces which are resolved on hold-
ing high law and constitution if they changed their standpoint
and . . . declared that Masjumi must be rehabilitated?"3^
Suharto’s reaction to this second appeal is not known. He
neither replied nor granted Prawoto’s request for an interview.
It may be appropriate at this time to observe that Prawoto's
apologia for Masjumi was just as much a justification of its
opposition to Guided Democracy as a claim to rehabilitation.
But the party never seems to have rebutted the accusation for
which it was, at least ostensibly, banned, that it refused to
denounce its rebel members. In recounting his party's opposi-
tion to the authoritarianism of Sukarno, Prawoto apparently
attributes to the army and Suharto a love of constitutional
democracy and even a love of political parties which is scarcely
indicated by Indonesian history of the last decade. It is pos-
sible that Prawoto was deceived by the reverberating calls for
the rule of law and democracy which replaced the slogans of the
immediate past. Yet it is difficult to see how any of Prawoto's
eloquently-argued reasons could have had much weight with Suharto
who was at that time finishing his long endeavor-to remove
Sukarno from office and contemporaneously prevent disturbances
in Central and East Java.
The last attempt to secure Masjumi's rehabilitation was at
once a more clandestine and more unorthodox one. Indeed, it is
not completely certain that Masjumi's rehabilitation was the
immediate aim of the movement that now warrants discussion, the
Holy War Command (Komando Djihad). This was officially founded
34. Ibid., pp. 55, 58. The audacity of Prawoto probably angered
Suharto, for in mid-1968 a rumor was circulating among
Masjumi sympathizers that Suharto had once threatened to
return Prawoto and other leaders to their former place of
detention, if they were determined to press for rehabilita-
tion against his stated policy.28
early in 1967 to provide additional strength to the forces of
the New Order in their anti-communist struggle. It was asserted,
actually, that the Holy War Command and the New Order were in-
separable. The strength of the Indonesian people was held to
lie in the Islamic community, which could not be suppressed by
either the Dutch or the PKI. The Command had two purposes, safe-
guarding the nation from total, economic, political and moral
destruction and ending the continual slander of the Islamic com-
munity by the communists and secret supporters of Sukarno.35
Essentially, the Command was a front of Islamic youth or-
ganizations whose aim was to restore the name of the Islamic
community, constantly under attack during Guided Democracy, and
thus, apparently, to lay the ground for the rehabilitation of
Masjumi, perhaps thought of initially more in terms of Islam's
rightful resumption of its role as the major force in Indonesian
politics.36 After several months of issuing fiery declarations,
with Sukarno as a principal target, the Command's activities
were banned in Djakarta by Amir Machmud. The chairman of the
Command, Abdul Qadir Djaelani, appealed against the ban in an
encounter with Brigadier General Sutopo Juwono, Chief of Staff
of the Djakarta Military Command. Sutopo Juwono advised the
delegation from the Command that:	"We must ensure that fighting
does not break out between fellow New Order forces. To prevent
this, the Armed Forces take steps to control the masses. If
society has become a mass inflamed by 'issues,' it will become
a snowball that grows bigger and bigger." The Armed Forces, he
emphasized, had "the right to level a ban on the basis of secur-
ity."37 The ban on the Command's activities was not lifted, and
subsequently the Command was dissolved. What was of special
significance in this short-lived movement, which suggests nothing
so much as a youthful attempt to carry on the tradition of the
radical fundamentalists such as Isa Ansjary, was that its disso-
lution was ordered on much the same grounds as the government
was to invoke in support of its policy towards the Partai Mus-
limin Indonesia. It may be unwise to stress the Command's in-
terest in Masjumi's rehabilitation, but by the time of the Com-
mand's dissolution in April 1967, it had become obvious that
Suharto was resolute in his decision not to sanction rehabilita-
tion. Thereafter the energies of many former Masjumi supporters
were channelled into a long campaign aimed at founding a new
Muslim party.
35.	This account is based on Documenta Selecta Komando Djihad
(Djakarta:	n.p., 1967).
36.	Soemarsono (Interview, Djakarta, March 1969) suggested that
the Command failed to consult the Masjumi leaders before
organizing a program of objectives.
37.	Documenta Selecta Komando Djihad, p. 7.CHAPTER III
THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A NEW PARTY
To trace the foundation of the Partai Muslimin, it will be
necessary to turn back to the formation of the Badan Koordinasi
Amal Muslimin, set up in December 1965 to unite a variety of Is-
lamic social and educational groups, of which many had formerly
been constituent members of Masjumi.1 This front originally had
both socio-cultural and political aims, but, by early 1966, it
was increasingly interested in the rehabilitation of Masjumi.2
During that year, discussions were held between representatives
of the Badan Koordinasi and Sjarif Usman’s Rehabilitation Com-
mittee. At the same time, however, alternatives to rehabilita-
tion were considered and contact was made with ex-Vice President
Mohammad Hatta, who was known to be planning a new Muslim party.
By October 1966, however, no cooperation had been agreed upon
with Hatta, and two months later, the December Armed Forces'
statement followed by Suharto's enunciation of government policy
on rehabilitation indicated the need for Badan Koordinasi or-
ganizations toset up their own party to act as a wadah for their
political interests.3 4 At the end of March 1967, Prawoto spoke
of much misunderstanding as the cause of the failure of the
rehabilitation campaign, and he asserted that if the struggle
was continued with patience and wisdom, success would inevitably
come.1* But in April, representatives of the Badan Koordinasi
Amal Muslimin fixed a dead-line for rehabilitation, after which
energies would be turned towards the formation of a new politi-
cal party.
1.	For a list of the organizations represented in the front,
see appendix.
2.	Samson suggested that the front was set up solely as a tran-
sitional step toward Masjumi's rehabilitation ("Islam in
Indonesian Politics," p. 1004).
3.	For a discussion of the term wadah (which literally means
"receptacle"), see Samson, ibid.
4.	Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, p. 4. For an out-
line of the program and structure of Hatta's projected
party, see Rentjana Dasar, Program, dan Struktur Partai
Demokrasi Islam Indonesia (Bandung; Angkasa, 196?). This
party failed to gain Suharto's approval in April 1967, and
Hatta discontinued his efforts.
2930
The outcome of final deliberations with Masjumi leaders
held in April was the historic meeting of May 7, 1967, where
Masjumi supporters and delegates from the Badan Koordinasi Amal
Muslimin decided to set up a committee to prepare for the birth
of a party that was "to form a political wadah for that section
of the Islamic community whose political aspirations are not yet
channelled into an existing wadah."5 The committee comprised
seven members and was referred to simply as the Committee of
Seven. Its chairman was the Masjumi figure Faqih Usman, vice-
chairman Anwar Harjono, secretary Agus Sudono and the other mem-
bers were Mrs. Sjamsuridzal, Hasan Basri, Muttaqien and Marzuki
Jatim. So began the long process leading to the formation of
the Partai Muslimin.6 On May 11, the committee met to discuss
the problems concerning the party’s leadership, its constitution
and program. On June 20, Faqih Usman and Agus Sudono sent a
communication to Suharto informing him of the formation of the
Committee of Seven, of the organizations that it represented,
and of their ambition to found a political party.7
In his January letter to Prawoto, Suharto had moderated his
rejection of rehabilitation by affirming that former members of
Masjumi has full rights as citizens according to the law. This
was taken by Masjumi supporters to mean that Masjumi leaders
would be free to lead the new party. However, by mid-1967,
Rosihan Anwar had noted in his Kompas column that army circles
objected to the election of either Mohammad Rum or Faqih Usman
to the party’s leadership council. He commented that objections
based on personal reasons if not backed by legal arguments would
constitute a return to the days of Guided Democracy, where
"like" and "dislike" policies were supreme.8 The opposition of
senior army officers, and of Suharto himself, was one of the
main obstacles faced by the founders of the Partai Muslimin, and
5.	Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, p. 6.
6.	The meeting of May 7 unanimously adopted a resolution that
the new party should be called Partai Muslimin Indonesia.
7.	No reply was received from Suharto, and another letter was
sent on July 20. On July 25, a meeting was held between the
Committee of Seven and three representatives of the govern-
ment, Lieutenant General Basuki Rachmat, Major General Alam-
sjah and Brigadier General Sunarso. A series of such meet-
ings, where the committee reported on progress towards the
party’s formation, occurred throughout the whole of 1967.
See Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, pp. 7-8.
Kompas, July 11, 1967, quoted in Bajasut, Fakta Documenta,
p. 23.
8.31
they were not united on how to face it or on what attitude to
adopt toward the demands of the government.9
Samson has described this lack of unity as a "split between
Muhammadijah and those supporting Masjumi figures," but he ob-
served that:	"In a way this dichotomy is misleading, for every-
one supported the Masjumi figures and wanted to see them in
positions of leadership; rather, a matter of emphasis was in-
volved. Muhammadijah was less inclined to struggle against ABRI
[Armed Forces]-imposed limitations on party composition because
its own leadership would be relatively unaffected by limitations
in Masjumi's participation. What Muhammadijah wanted was to
play the most important role in party formation, reasoning that
this role was merited by its strength. Masjumi loyalists were
more intense in their determination to guard against an ABRI
attempt to limit or exclude Masjumi figures from active roles.
No strict split was involved. Many supporters of the Masjumi
faction were members of Muhammadijah, many members of mass
organizations other than Muhammadijah supported its position
and many lower-level Muhammadijah members were bitter at their
leaders' actions."10 It might be more accurate to separate the
two issues involved in this disagreement, that is the question
of attitude towards the imposition of conditions on the party's
birth, and the role to be played by Muhammadijah in the party.
The former of these in particular has plagued the party even
after its formation.* 11
Samson has himself offered a useful distinction between
"realists" and "idealists" within the body of PMI supporters
confronted by army determination not to permit Masjumi leader-
ship of the future party. The idealists were those who empha-
9.	It is not clear whether this opposition to leadership by
Masjumi men constituted a change in policy by Suharto, or
elaboration of a policy which Suharto had been unwilling
to clarify fully lest Masjumi supporters become completely
alienated from his government. The history of the Partai
Muslimin shows a series of government demands or refusals
gradually more "hardline" in nature.
10.	Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1008.
11.	It is interesting to note a divergence between the two
chroniclers of the Partai Muslimin, Bajasut and Solichin
Salam, of whom the latter restricts his discussion gener-
ally to the lack of unanimity on the problem of how to con-
front officially-imposed limitations (see Sedjarah Partai
Muslimin, p. 13), whereas Bajasut (Fakta Documenta, pp.
26-27) evinces more concern with the ambitions of Muhamma-
dijah.32
sized the principle involved in the demand for rehabilitation
of Masjumi, that is that justice had to be done to the former
leaders, and the party whose dissolution had been illegal. The
advocates of rehabilitation who were reconciled to the idea of
a new party were adamant that anti-Masjumi prejudices were not
to prevent Masjumi leaders from ruling the party, which would
thus be able to "carry on the spirit of Masjumi's struggle," or
in other words become a neo-Masjumi.12 The idealists counselled
opposition to army demands and maintained that it would be
better to have no party at all rather than support a policy of
appeasement towards the government.13 The realists held that
the most important requirement was for the interests of Masjumi
and mass organizations of the Amal Muslimin to be represented
in the New Order, and that a political wadah had to be found as
soon as possible, whether or not it satisfied all the hopes of
former members of Masjumi. Later, it was thought, reconstruc-
tion of the party could take place, after legitimacy had been
obtained, and then Masjumi leaders could take their rightful
place.1 **
By August 1967, the Committee of Seven had drawn up a draft
charter for membership in the Partai Muslimin, one clause of
12.	A clear exposition of the "idealist" outlook was provided
by the PII in a statement read at the May 7 meeting. En-
titled "The Islamic Community Answers the Challenge," the
declaration defended that movement's refusal to support
the PMI. It was asserted that:	"Masjumi is willing to be
martyred rather than parrot the government ; this is the
quality that has not disappeared from the fathers of Masju-
mi, and indeed has been inherited by its younger genera-
tion. It would be truly amazing if the witness of history
which has valued highly Masjumi's character should be ob-
literated by the leaders of Masjumi itself and not be-
queathed to its younger generation."
13.	Among the idealists can be grouped the leaders of the GPU
(who had failed in their efforts to gain permission to re-
store their movement), the PII, the peasants' front, STII
(Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia) and the senior leaders of
Masjumi, of whom the most notable was Prawoto.
14.	Such a view was given by Agus Sudono (interview in Djakarta,
May 1968). The realists included the leaders of Gasbiindo,
HMI, Muhammadijah and in general the mass organizations of
the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin, but Muhammadijah, for
example, included idealists such as Hamka. On the other
hand, among the Masjumi leaders there were some, such as
Kasman, who were closer to a realist position, so that the
above classifications should not be considered to be with-
out exceptions.33
which read:	"We in the name of the Islamic organizations sign-
ing hereunder without releasing our functions in our respective
fields, declare that we support and affiliate [our organizations]
within the Partai Muslimin Indonesia."15 This wording was con-
sidered to be objectionable by the Muhammadijah leadership be-
cause insufficient emphasis was placed on the independence of
the mass organizations in their own particular fields. Conse-
quently the Muhammadijah refused to sign the charter. In Sep-
tember, however, Muhammadijah did sign, after the clause had
been rewritten as follows:	"We declare we support and affiliate
the political activities [of our organizations] with the Partai
Muslimin," which implied that in non-political fields, the
organizations would be autonpmous.16 The eventual signing of
the charter did not assuage feelings outside Muhammadijah that
its ambition to dominate the Partai Muslimin would endanger
intra-party unity. Mintaredja indicated frankly that Muhamma-
dijah, "together with the other supporting organizations, wants
to draw up the leadership [of the party] on the basis of
musjawarah [consultation] and mufakat [consensus] according to
religious teachings and democratic values in force, without any
external interference." Warming to his subject, he continued:
"According to certain members of the Amal Muslimin Presidium,
interference has indeed been felt from outside the Committee of
Seven, and, if this has really happened, Muhammadijah strongly
resents it."17 What Mintaredja meant was that Masjumi leaders
such as Prawoto were overly influential in the committee.
Mintaredja also maintained that the Committee of Seven itself
was unrepresentative in that a majority of its members were
Masjumi figures rather than leaders of the Amal Muslimin organi-
zations.18 The various conflicts within the PMI circles were
15.	Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, p. 26.
16.	Ibid., p. 27.
17.	Ibid., p. 29. The italics are Bajasut's. Mintaredja con-
cluded these remarks by calling for a perfecting of the
committee, "so that it would truly reflect the vital con-
stellations of the supporting organizations." This implied
that only those Masjumi leaders connected with a mass or-
ganization would be eligible:	"Those sitting on the Com-
mittee of Seven must be selected by the supporting organi-
zations." An alternative interpretation would be that he
simply meant that the organizations would have the right to
elect the committee members, although the nominees need
not be from the supporting organizations. However, no
change was made in the composition of the Committee of Seven.
18.	Both the chairman and vice-chairman were from Masjumi, but
three of the members (Sjamsuridzal, Marzuki Jatim and
Sudono) came from Amal Muslimin organizations.34
highlighted on October 24, when, at a meeting at his house,
Mohammad Natsir told Muhammadijah and Masjumi supporters that
they should submerge their differences for the sake of party
unity.19
Negotiations continued between the Committee of Seven and
the representatives of Suharto. On September 15, a draft list
of members of the party leadership council was sent to Suharto,
but did not meet government approval, and a revised list was
drawn up on October 31. The two lists are as follows:20
September 15	October 31
General Chairman
Faqih Usman (Masjumi)	Faqih Usman (Muhammadijah)
A. D. Sjahruddin (Masjumi)
Anwar Harjono (Masjumi)
Djarnawi Hadikusuma (
(Muhammadijah)
Hasan Basri (Masjumi)
E. Z. Muttaqien (Masjumi)
Chairmen
Anwar Harjono (Masjumi)
H. M. Sanusi (Muhammadijah)
A. D. Sjahruddin (Masjumi)
Hasan Basri (Masjumi)
Agus Sudono (Gasbiindo)
Djarnawi Hadikusuma
(Muhammadij ah)
E. Z. Muttaqien (Masjumi)
Secretary-General
M. Sulaiman (Muhammadijah)	M. Sulaiman (Muhammadijah)
Secretaries
Chadidjah Razak (Wanita Islam)
Hasbullah (Muhammadijah)
Lukman Harun (Muhammadijah)
Umaruddin (?)
Umaruddin (?)
Chadidjah Razak (Wanita Islam)
Lukman Harun (Muhammadijah)
Hasbullah (Muhammadijah)
Maizir Achmadyns (KBIM)
19.	Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1008.
20.	Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, pp. 71 and 73.
In comparing the two lists, several impressions are felt.
Although there are thirty names in each, they are not dis-
tributed in the same way; the second has a larger number of
chairmen and secretaries, suggesting that the government
wanted to give prominence to certain favored ones. The two
obvious examples are Sanusi and Agus Sudono who shot up
from ordinary membership positions to join the chairmen.
The fact that this was an attempt at compromise is clear
from the larger number of chairmen in the October list.
Even in the second list, however, in the upper level of the
leadership council, Masjumi domination is evident, and this
is the probable explanation for official disapproval.35
September 15	October 31
Members
Affandi Ridwan (PUI)
Agus Sudono (Gasbiindo)
Aisjah Aminy (HSBI)
A. Djuwaeni (Masjumi)
Amelz (Masjumi)
A. W. Sujoso (Masjumi)
Daris Tamin (Muhammadijah)
Djamaluddin (Masjumi)
E. Sar'an (Persatuan Islam)
Faisal (A1 Irsjad)
Ismail Hasan Metareum
(HMI Alumni)
Maftuch Jusuf (Muhammadijah)
Maizir Achmadyns (KBIM)
0. K. Azis (Djamiatul
Al-Washlijah)
H. M. Sanusi (Muhammadijah)
S. Buchari (?)
Sjarif Usman (Porbisi)
Omar Tusin (SNII)
Uwes Abubakar (Mathl'aul Anwar)
Affandi Ridwan (PUI)
Aisjah Aminy (HSBI)
A. Djuwaeni (Masjumi)
Amelz (Masjumi)
A. W. Sujoso (Masjumi)
Djamaluddin (Masjumi)
Djazman (Muhammadijah)
E. Sar'an (Persatuan Islam)
Faisal (A1 Irsjad)
Ismail Hasan Metareum (HMI
Alumni)
0. K. Azis (Djamiatul
Al-Washlijah)
Omar Tusin (SNII)
Rohana Ahmad (Muhammadijah)
Buchari (?)
Sjarif Usman (Porbisi)
Uwes Abubakar (Mathl'aul Anwar)
The rejection of what had been considered the maximum result
of the Committee of Seven's efforts to balance Masjumi interests
with the aspirations of the supporting organizations, or at
least the demands of the army to have fullest possible represen-
tation of Amal Muslimin elements,21 caused widespread disen-
chantment with the circle of PMI supporters. Deep concern was
felt whether the party would ever be able to get off the ground.
At the beginning of February, however, Anwar Harjono and Agus
Sudono of the Committee of Seven were summoned to the house of
General Alamsjah, Coordinator of Suharto's Personal Staff, and
told that on the evening of February 5, 1968, they would be re-
ceived by Suharto to discuss the formation of the party. The
agenda might consist of mere checking, Alamsjah said, but that
would be wholly up to Suharto.22 It has been known for some
time that legalization of the Partai Muslimin would follow such
an encounter with Suharto, to whom, it was thought, would be
introduced the Committee of Seven, representatives of the Amal
Muslimin, and the prospective leaders of the new party. But
official invitations received the next day were restricted to
all but representatives of the mass organizations. It was only
21.	Ibid., p. 8.
22.	Ibid. Previously, negotiations had been carried on with
Alamsjah, Sunarso and Basuki Rachmat, and this was to be
the first official meeting with Suharto.36
through the endeavors of Agus Sudono, who had better relations
with Suharto’s staff than had other committee members, that the
Committee of Seven was actually invited.23 Just before the
meeting, Agus Sudono was given a warning by Alamsjah that Suharto
had been persuaded by opponents of the Partai Muslimin to review
his policy and consequently might wish to discuss the leadership
of the party with the February 5 delegation. It could amount
to a request to put Sanusi's name directly below that of Faqih
Usman, according to Alamsjah.2^
At the February 5 meeting, the PMI delegates, consisting
of the Committee of Seven and of leaders of supporting organiza-
tions, were divided into two groups. The first to see Suharto
were the four supporter organizations represented in parliament,
Muhammadijah, KBIM, Gasbiindo and Djamiatul Al-Washlijah.25
Suharto told them that the matter of the rehabilitation of
Masjumi was closed, but ’’some people" were complaining that the
Partai Muslimin was simply Masjumi "in a new coat."26 Therefore,
as Suharto still endorsed the idea of a new Islamic party, the
PMI leadership should truly show that it was made up of a multi-
tude of organizations. This was to ensure that the MPRS Deci-
sion No. XXII, of the Fourth General Session in 1966, which
called for simplification of party life or the party system,
would not be violated. So that the PMI could be seen as imple-
mentation of that Decision rather than violation, and so that
the party would not be seen to be a neo-Masjumi, Suharto said
that for the time being no Masjumi leaders who had been promi-
nent either in Djakarta or in regional branches at the time of
Masjumi’s dissolution could assume leadership of the Partai Mus-
limin. He continued:	"They can lead from behind. In the
future, when you hold a congress and all the Masjumi leaders are
returned, that is an internal matter. That is a matter of the
sovereignty of the people. I would not be able to intervene
again. But now I am responsible."27
23.	Interview with Anwar Harjono, Djakarta, May 1968.
24.	It is not clear whether rejection of the October list led
to any change being made by the Committee of Seven, before
preparing to meet Suharto. Neither is it clear whether any
suggestions were made by Alamsjah in November on changes
that should be made, which would surely have included fur-
ther promotion of Sanusi.
25.	This first group comprised ten delegates, and the second
was addressed by Suharto together with these ten.
26.	Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, introduction, p. i.
27.	Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, p. 8.37
On being asked which Masjumi leaders were considered promi-
nent, Suharto replied, somewhat unwillingly, people like Faqih
Usman and Anwar Harjono. Then this first group rejoined the
others, and Suharto repeated his "advice” that prominent Masjumi
figures should not lead the party at its birth. When Anwar
Harjono remonstrated that Suharto's assistants had not laid down
such a condition during their discussions since mid-1967, Suharto
remarked that no matter what agreements had been reached with
his staff he alone was responsible for the nation's welfare and
political stability.28
Two days later, Sudono was again summoned by Alamsjah and
told that the cabinet had been informed of Suharto's decision
to recognize the Partai Muslimin, and Alamsjah hoped that the
supporter organizations would soon give their reactions to
Suharto's "suggestions." Sudono asked who was still objected
to by the government, and Alamsjah answered Faqih Usman.29 On
February 8, the Committee of Seven met leaders of supporting
organizations and offered to resign its mandate to form the
party in view of its apparent failure to unite Masjumi elements
and mass organizations in one wadah. But instead of disbanding
entirely, the committee was revamped, with Faqih Usman and Udin
Sjamsuddin as advisers, and Anwar Harjono, Sudono, Djarnawi,
Hasan Basri and Maizir Achmadyns as members. It was decided by
this committee (now chaired by Anwar Harjono) that Suharto's re-
quirements would have to be met, and a revised list of the party
leadership was sent to Alamsjah. But the only change was the
removal of Faqih Usman's name, and the consequent promotion of
everyone else by one position.30 On February 10, Alamsjah ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with this step, and recommended that
only representatives of mass organizations be appointed to posi-
tions within the central leadership, and Masjumi men be listed
only if they were also members of one of the Amal Muslimin
organizations.31 Thus it was no longer a question of the promi-
nent Masjumi leaders being withdrawn, but all.
28.	Ibid., p. 10.
29.	Ibid. Why Sudono felt it necessary to ask again which
leader had to be removed is not plain, given Suharto's
reference to both Faqih Usman and Anwar Harjono.
30.	Ibid., pp. 10-11. It is difficult to understand why it
was necessary to revamp the Committee of Seven, when only
this change was intended.
31.	Again it appeared that the substance of official objections
was only revealed gradually, so that PMI supporters had to
keep on retreating in the face of new demands.38
Before taking the next step, the committee elicited a list
of some ten men who were unwanted by the government, and on
February 14, in yet another meeting, it was recommended by the
committee that the following names be removed:	Faqih Usman,
Anwar Harjono, A. D. Sjahruddin, Hasan Basri, Muttaqien, Sulai-
man, Djamaluddin, Sujoso, Sjarif Usman and Amelz. Before finally
returning the mandate of the committee, Faqih Usman reminded
those present (once again Amal Muslimin organization leaders)
that they must obtain legality from the government, that the
party leadership would operate until the holding of the first
party congress. In any circumstances, he said, party unity
should be maintained. At this juncture, however, it was obvious
that no such unity existed. The STII walked out of the meeting
in protest, the PII was against any effort to found a compromise
party, and PUI thought the whole affair might as well be called
off.32
The final composition of the central leadership was pre-
sented to the government on February 16, and read as follows:
General Chairman
Chairmen
Secretary-General
Secretaries
Members
Djarnawi Hadikusuma (Muhammadijah)
Agus Sudono (Gasbiindo)
H. M. Sanusi (Muhammadijah)
J. Naro (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah)
Daud Badaruddin (KBIM)
Chadidjah Razak (Wanita Islam)
Omar Tusin (SNII)
Lukman Harun (Muhammadijah)
Amura (HSBI)
Imran Kadir (Al-Ittihadijah)
Siregar Pahu (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah)
Anwar Bey (PUI)
Said Suncar (Mathl'aul Anwar)
M. Sjariki (Nadlatul Wathan)
Rafilus Ishak (Porbisi)
Darussamin (PGAIRI)
Daris Tamin (Muhammadijah)
Djazman (Muhammadijah)
Rohana Ahmad (Muhammadijah)
0. K. Azis (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah)
Ibrahim Usman (Gasbiindo)
Maizir Achmadyns (KBIM)
Mrs. Latjuba (Wanita Islam)
Affandi Ridwan (PUI)
32. Solichin Salam,
Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, pp. 13-14.39
Aisjah Aminy (HSBI)
Faisal (A1 Irsjad)
Uwes Abubakar (Mathl’aul Anwar)
Ichsanuddin Iljas (Porbisi)
Abdul Karim (PITI)
Saleh Suaidy (Masbi)
Mohammad Said (Nadlatul Wathan)
Hasbullah (Muhammadijah)
Gazal (Al-Ittihadijah)
Ismail Hasan Metareum (HMI Alumni)
Alala (HMI Alumni)33
This was accepted by the government, and on February 19,
Mrs. Sjamsuridzal led a delegation consisting solely of repre-
sentatives from Amal Muslimin organizations to be received by
Acting President Suharto. The Partai Muslimin was legalized by
Presidential Decision No. 70, February 20, 1968, which stated
that the party constituted a uniting of Islamic social organiza-
tions not yet affiliated with a political party.3<t Thus the
Partai Muslimin was not, according to the government, "Masjumi
in a new coat."
33. Ibid., p. 15. That this final composition was radically
different from preceding ones is indicated by the number
of new names in the list. Djarnawi was the only chairman
of the original September list, when he was placed fourth
in rank under Faqih Usman, Sjahruddin.and Anwar (before
government demands became more explicit), to survive; he
was now promoted to the chief position. Two chairmen,
Naro and Badaruddin, were completely new to the leadership
council, as were all the secretaries. Eight of the nine-
teen ordinary members were also new, and the council’s
total membership was now thirty-five, an increase of five.
34.
Ibid., p. 16.CHAPTER IV
THE PARTY'S DEVELOPMENT SINCE FOUNDATION
The emergence of a legal Partai Muslimin was announced to
the public in the following terms:	"The birth of the Partai
Muslimin Indonesia, which has indeed long been awaited by the
Islamic community, is a concrete step in the creation of politi-
cal stability. ... In a short time, the first congress will
be held and it is this congress that has the highest authority
to fulfill all the wishes of its supporters.”1 It was perhaps
felt necessary to add this reassurance on the sovereignty of the
party congress, for although in general the announcement of the
party's formation had little impact in the Djakarta press, it
was soon obvious that many misgivings were held publicly about
the new party.2
The Bandung student weekly, Mimbar Demokrasi, published a
series of articles in the two months following PMI's birth com-
menting on the party's "independence." A West Java HMI leader,
Ahmaddan Martha, lamented the fact that the formation of a polit-
ical party had required promulgation of a Presidential Decision,
which he felt would produce a moral commitment between the party
and the government.3 4 Ajip Rosidi argued that the party had been
set up to serve the interests of the government rather than ful-
fill the needs of the Islamic community. Instead of forging
unity, a new split had been perpetrated between representatives
of mass organizations and the Masjumi elements, both of whom
had originally supported the foundation of the Partai Muslimin
Indonesia.1' Muttaqien used the occasion of the Partai Muslimin's
birth to attack the anti-Masjumi policy of the government, from
which he, as a potential leader of the party, had suffered
directly. He maintained that ex-members of Masjumi should be
1.	This statement was issued as a press-release by Mrs. Sjam-
suridzal.
2.	Most Djakarta newspapers reported the formation of the party
by quoting sections of the above press-release. At least
four referred to the fact that the party would hold a con-
gress at which the party leadership would be elected. See
Pelopor Baru, February 19; Operasi, February 20; Kompas,
February 20; Berita Yudha, February 20, 1968.
3.	Mimbar Demokrasi, No. 23, March (1st week), 1968.
4.	Ibid., No. 24, March (2nd week), 1968.
4041
accorded full democratic rights and asserted that the party’s
progress would serve as a gauge of the intentions of the New
Order regime to act democratically. Democratic life would best
be promoted, he reasoned, if pressure groups like KAMI and KAPPI
were replaced by strong political parties.5
A major source of dissatisfaction among critics of the
Partai Muslimin was its dearth of genuine leadership. The seven
chairmen of the party's central leadership were virtually un-
known outside their respective mass organizations. Although
Sanusi, for example, was a minor cabinet minister, he was in no
sense a national figure. The contrast apparent to all observers
was that between the Partai Muslimin's lackluster men and the
respected Masjumi leadership of Natsir, Sjafruddin and Rum, who
had played distinguished roles in the revolution and the liberal
democracy era. What the Partai Muslimin lacked was "orang-orang
jang berwibawa," men of great personal authority. The PMI pre-
sented another contast related to its leadership. The PNI or
NU were parties whose older generation of leaders had "collabo-
rated" with Sukarno, men such as Ali Sastroamidjojo and Wahib
Wahab, who had to be removed gradually, if the parties were to
be "New Ordered." Thus Subchan rose in the NU, and the Osa
Maliki faction re-emerged in the PNI. But Masjumi and the PMI
were different in that the former's older generation had not
collaborated with the Old Order and had indeed suffered imprison-
ment for their opposition to Sukarno. It was among younger
Masjumi figures that were found men who took what were considered
compromising stands towards Guided Democracy. Coming particu-
larly from the mass organizations that had been constituent mem-
bers of Masjumi before its dissolution, men such as Faried
Mar'uf and Muljadi Djojomartono even held cabinet posts during
the early sixties.
An analysis popular among present-day HMI and PII leaders
is to see the Masjumi/Partai Muslimin figures as representatives
of three generations. The first generation comprises the senior
Masjumi leaders, Natsir, Prawoto, Rum and others of the Natsir
faction, and is seen as a principled group able to struggle with
intrepidity for the promotion of the "interests of the Islamic
community." The second generation is harder to identify, but
is represented by former HMI leaders of the late forties and
early fifties, like Mintaredja, Deliar Noer and Sanusi, by
leaders of Islamic organizations who had been anxious to sur-
vive the Guided Democracy period, such as Maizir Achmadyns and
Marzuki Jatim, and by lower echelon Masjumi figures, such as
Anwar Harjono. This group, ill-defined as it is, is considered
incapable of continuing the noble Masjumi tradition, perhaps
because it matured during the fifties when Masjumi was a highly
5. Ibid.., No. 25, March (3rd week), 1968.42
significant and influential party. The third generation in this
analysis is that of the PII and present-day HMI which gained
its first major political experience in the hard years of Guided
Democracy when the HMI and PII were subjected to attack by the
PKI. Consequently, this last group is closer to the principled
outlook of the senior Masjumi leaders. The PII, for example,
has become well known for its outspoken defense of Muslim
interests and its idealist posture on Masjumi's rehabilitation.6
Whether or not three such generations did exist is not
clear, but it is true that many of the old Masjumi leaders had
immense influence within the Partai Muslimin, even though they
were not officially connected with it. This Masjumi family pro-
vided a legion of tokohs (leaders or figures) who were called
upon throughout 1968 to address meetings of the Partai Muslimin
in the regions. After the party's foundation, Natsir, Rum,
Kasman Singodimedjo, Burhanuddin Harahap, Yunan Nasution, Isa
Ansjary and other Masjumi leaders visited new PMI branches and
gave their public support to the new, unknown Partai Muslimin
leaders from Djakarta. One tokoh from Masjumi even suggested
that the PMI men only gained respect among erstwhile Masjumi
supporters if they were accompanied by one or two Masjumi lead-
ers.7 Even then disappointment was apparently widespread among
Masjumi sympathizers, one of whom Samson reported as saying:
"They [Masjumi supporters] look at the current leaders and then
they remember Natsir and Prawoto. How can they help but feel
cheated?"8
That the Partai Muslimin's appearance on the Djakarta
political scene did not attract much interest may have been
owing to the presence of other issues of major consequence, par-
ticularly the prospect of the imminent Fifth General Session of
the MPRS. Indeed it was principally in reference to the MPRS
that the Partai Muslimin's first political statement was issued.
In a declaration published in the last week of February, the
party endorsed early convocation of the MPRS so that the Acting
President could be promoted to full President and the decisions
of the Working Body of the MPRS be ratified. Furthermore, PMI
wanted general elections to be held within eighteen months of
6.	This analysis was suggested to me by several HMI and PII
leaders, including Ekki Sjahruddin, Nurcholish Madjid and
Hoesnie Thamrin, during interviews in Djakarta, January 1969.
One exception to the generalization on the more compromising
nature of the second group is the GPU, many of whose lead-
ers were jailed for opposition to Sukarno.
7.	Interview with Kasman Singodimedjo, Djakarta, March 1969.
8.	Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1009.43
the ratification of electoral legislation, which comprised bills
on the elections, on the composition of national parliament and
the regional assemblies, and on mass organizations and party
life.9 The strong interest of the Partai Muslimin in the early
holding of elections is understandable if the party's strength
in parliament is considered. Throughout Guided Democracy,
several mass organizations were represented in the appointed
parliament, the DPR-GR, as functional group elements. At the
beginning of 1968, Muhammadijah, Gasbiindo, KBIM and Djamiatul
Al-Washlijah had a combined total of eighteen representatives
in parliament, and in February these joined forces as the PMI
faction. Thus the Partai Muslimin, which often tended to see
itself as the successor to Masjumi, one of the two biggest pre-
Guided Democracy parties, had to content itself with a smaller
representation than the insignificant PSII, and with fifty less
seats than NU. Not surprisingly, the Partai Muslimin considered
itself grossly under-represented.10
But the Partai Muslimin's desire for early elections was
not simply motivated by the wish to achieve a more just repre-
sentation of the party. In discussing the 1955 general elec-
tions, Feith wrote that:	"Two main arguments had long been put
forward in favor of holding elections. The first was that of
democratic ideology:	Because Indonesia was now a democratic
country elections must be held. ... A second major argument
was the more pragmatic one that elections were necessary for
the attainment of political stability. ... Elections would
create a representative parliament and one with moral authority
and at the same time lessen the number of political parties.
They would put an end to political instability and thereby undo
most of the current political wrongs."* 11 The 1955 elections
failed to fulfill many of the hopes attached to them; most
notably, political stability was no closer to realization after
the elections--if anything, political dissension became more
rife and its effects more deleterious. But as Prawoto warned
recently:	"Does this mean that therefore it is not necessary
to hold elections? Of course the answer is that elections are
still necessary."12 The arguments quoted above are apparently
just as convincing today, although to a narrower group of people.
9.	Kompas, February 29, 1968.
10.	As of March 1, the PNI had 78 seats, NU had 75, PSII 20 and
the non-party groups had a total of approximately 165 repre-
sentatives in the DPR-GR. See Daftar Nama dan Alamat
Anggota-Anggota DPR-GR (Djakarta! n.p., 1968).
11.	Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 430-431.
12.
Mertju Suar (Jogjakarta), April 22, 1968.44
If there is perhaps greater wariness about the chances of polit-
ical stability emerging from the elections, there are few doubts
that the democratic nature of the New Order regime must be tested
by general elections.13 As countless editorials in Abadi ,
Mertju Suar (organ of Muhammadijah) and Duta Masjarakat (NU)
aver, without elections, the condition essential for democracy
has not yet been fulfilled. In fact, to some democracy means
elections.
The March 1968 session of the MPRS had to consider, inter
alia, the following issues:	Suharto’s promotion to full Presi-
dent, postponement of elections, endorsement of the Five-Year
Development Plan (Repelita), promulgation of Broad Outlines of
State Policy and framing a Charter of Basic Human Rights. The
supporters of the government focused their attention on Suharto's
promotion (with retention of the emergency powers provided for
in Sukarno's March 1966 delegation of power to him), maximum
postponement of elections for five years, and endorsement of
Repelita. Scant heed was taken of the Broad Outlines and the
Human Rights Charter. The aspirations of the Partai Muslimin,
and of the other Islamic parties, were in general opposed to the
government's aims. The Partai Muslimin wanted elections to be
held as soon as possible; it discounted the need for emergency
powers; and, in contrast to the government though not yet in
opposition to it, the Partai Muslimin wanted immediate ratifica-
tion of the draft Broad Outlines of State Policy and the Human
Rights Charter.11*
During the MPRS session, the Islamic parties (PMI, NU and
PSII) achieved something of a united front and managed to elicit
some concessions from the government, so that although Suharto
became full President:	"His emergency powers had been specified
and thus narrowed somewhat. And elections would have to be held
by July 1971, before the end of Suharto's five-year term."15
However, the two issues of Broad Outlines and Human Rights Char-
ter produced a deadlock in the Second and Third Committees of
the MPRS, a deadlock which all the Islamic parties blamed on
13.	This statement applies largely to the PNI, NU, Partai Mus-
limin and PSII. There is little enthusiasm for elections
among the Christian parties, the Armed Forces or the Devel-
opment Factions in parliament. That the political parties
now desirous of elections do not have a disinterested and
genuine love of democracy is demonstrated by the opposition
of Masjumi, PNI and NU to the holding of elections in 1959,
when they feared a victory by the PKI.
14.	See Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," p. 4.
15.	Ibid. , p. 5.45
the Christians. The introduction to the draft decision on Broad
Outlines of State Policy reached by the Working Body's Second
Committee referred to the fact that the constitution was based
on the Pantjasila and inspired by the Djakarta Charter. It
recommended that religion be compulsory in all schools, from
primary level to tertiary. Emphasis was generally placed on the
strengthening of religious belief and on the intensification of
religious instruction. In the Charter of Basic Human Rights,
the right to change one's religion was not included, although
this is one of the basic rights mentioned in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.16 All this is anathema to both
Christians and secularists in Indonesia (the Pantjasilaists of
the Konstituante debates). The Christians in particular believe
that since the successful quelling of the 1965 coup, Indonesia's
Muslims have launched a gradual campaign to change Pantjasila-
based Indonesia into an Islamic State.17
The uncertainty on what an Islamic State would be like has
produced a tendency among those opposed to it to see any example
of Islamic fanaticism as evidence of a plan to convert Indonesia
into an Islamic State. Thus the Djakarta Charter is seen by
many as highly threatening to the Pantjasila-based state. This
charter was drawn up in June 1945 as a draft preamble for Indo-
nesia's constitution. Its most significant discrepancy with
the preamble to the 1945 Constitution later adopted was its
clause making obligatory for Muslims adherence to the Islamic
law (sjari'at Islam'). This clause was rejected by Sukarno and
others because it was thought that unity would be impaired if
one religious community was given special consideration in the
constitution. In July 1959, however, Sukarno mentioned the
Djakarta Charter in his decree reintroducing the 1945 Constitu-
tion with the words, "We are convinced that the Djakarta Charter
of June 6, 1945 inspires the 1945 Constitution and is an inte-
gral link with it."18 The Muslim parties argue that the Dja-
karta Charter is now a source of law, and must be implemented.19
16.	This is an objection raised by Christians who wish to see
that right included in the Indonesian charter. The Muslim
answer is that Indonesia is not bound to accept all the
rights listed in the Universal Declaration, such as the
right to strike.
17.	Much of this section is based on private information and
comment, from Christians of both the Partai Kristen (Pro-
testant) and the Partai Katolik.
18. See Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 128 ff., for
an account of the significance of the Djakarta Charter.
19.	There is a complicated argument, which need not concern us
here, on whether the Djakarta Charter does constitute a46
But there is no unanimity on what implementation of the Djakarta
Charter would entail.
It is conceivable that as performance of daily prayers and
the other pillars of Islam is prescribed by Islamic law, all
Indonesian Muslims, santri or abangan, would be obliged by law
to carry out their daily prayers, to observe the fast strictly
and so on. Here Pantjasilaists envisage fanatical Muslim reli-
gious officials forcing unwilling abangan villagers to attend
mosque services and to refrain from eating during the fasting
hours. Yet Muslim leaders are quite divided on such a use of
force in Islamic matters, some suggesting that there is no jus-
tification for force at all in religion, while others maintain
that the "no force principle" only applies to conversion to
Islam. Once a man has converted, he may indeed be forced to
observe its requirements.20 In a sense, Muslim aspirations con-
cerning the Djakarta Charter are not dissimilar to the "Islamic
State by proclamation" referred to by Geertz. If the Djakarta
Charter were implemented, it is generally agreed that there
could be no legislation that contravened the sjari'at Islam, and
probably the charter would be used to justify intensified reli-
gious instruction in government schools.
The controversy surrounding the Djakarta Charter made it
inevitable that its mention in the Broad Outlines of State
Policy would create something of an uproar.21 Unable to under-
stand Christian fears of efforts to implement the Djakarta
Charter, Muslim representatives in the MPRS were furious at the
deadlock that occurred in the Second and Third Committees.
Immediately after the abandonment of committee discussions, all
the Islamic parties issued a joint statement blaming particularly
the Christians for the failure to ratify the decisions of the
source of law. For an exposition of the secularist case,
see Mahasiswa Indonesia, No. 98, April 1968.
20.	This discussion is based on interviews with a number of
Muslim leaders, including Natsir, Kasman, Soemarsono and
Nurcholish Madjid. It seems that secularist opposition to
the Djakarta Charter tends to ignore the purely emotive
.. aspect of Muslims’ advocation of its implementation. The
Djakarta Charter is widely seen as the greatest symbolic
achievement of the Islamic parties, and this may explain
why there is little consensus on how it should be imple-
mented.
21.	That it was not objected to earlier may have been owing to
a preoccupation of government supporters with what were
considered more immediately important issues, such as reten-
tion of Suharto’s emergency powers.47
two committees.22 The Partai Muslimin itself issued another
political statement in April 1968 that indicated an overriding
concern with religion and what was considered to be a Christian
threat. Among demands made by the Partai Muslimin were:	that
foreign aid for missionary activity in Indonesia should be care-
fully supervised by the government; that the dissemination of
one religion should not be directed towards adherents of another
that religion be made a compulsory subject at all levels of edu-
cation; and that the Department of Religion should be reorgan-
ized by restoring the Directorates-General of the various non-
Islamic religions to their earlier status of Directorates.23
These demands were a result of successful Christian mis-
sionary exploitation of Indonesia, especially marked in the
three years since the Untung coup. There have been claims that
over two million Muslims entered Christianity in the years 1965-
1968.2lf There are several explanations for Christian successes,
whether or not such a large number of conversions has taken
place. One writer suggested:	"Some come out of disillusionment
with their faiths . . . , some out of fear of being branded
atheist (communist), some out of an awareness that in a time of
revolutionary change some firm direction and lasting values are
essential, some out of recognition that for man on his own
(secularist or communist) there is no salvation, no hope, no
joy, no strength to go on in suffering and frustration; some be-
cause of what they see in Christians. . . . "2S The Partai Mus-
limin, however, is more inclined to see the startling success
of Christian missionaries as the direct result of material aid
that has flowed to Indonesia for use by Christian churches and
22.	Unable to realize Christians' concern for abangans whom
they place in a different group to the santris, Muslim
politicians fail to understand the motives of Christian
opposition to the Djakarta Charter, and they assert that
as the charter says nothing about non-Muslims, the freedom
of religious minorities will be protected. In June 1968,
the first attempt was made to celebrate the signing of the
Djakarta Charter, intensifying both Muslim advocation of
its implementation and Christian opposition to it.
23.	I am indebted to the Partai Muslimin secretariat for a copy
of this political statement, which was not, as far as I
know, published.
24.	Angkatan Baru, January 23, 1968, published a report that
two and a half million Muslims had entered Christianity
during the three-year period.
25.	Frank Cooley, Indonesia:	Church and Society (New York:
Friendship Press, 1968), p. 113.48
missionaries. This vast amount of food, clothing, books and
money is used, according to Muslim critics:	to build churches
in the midst of strongly Muslim areas; to purchase land at enor-
mous prices to be set aside for church construction; to distrib-
ute rice and grant loans to the poor on condition that the
debtor becomes Christian; to give help to the families of al-
leged communist prisoners, with the same condition; to take the
children of unmarried servants and bring them up as Christians;
and to use young Christian men and women to attract Muslims of
the opposite sex.26
It would be no exaggeration to say that the problem of how
to face the Christian challenge was (and still is) one of the
most pressing issues confronting the Partai Muslimin.27 Sig-
nificantly, Christian missionary activity, seen as Christianiza-
tion, was an issue on which all potential supporters of the
party were united. There appeared to be no marked distinction
between idealists and realists on the need to stop Christianiza-
tion, but little success has been achieved. In mid-1968, the
government made an unsatisfactory response to an interpellation
initiated by the PMI's Secretary-General, Lukman Harun, who
hoped to bring about government supervision of foreign aid to
26.	H. M. Rasjidi, Mengapa Aku Tetap Memeluk Agama Islam (Dja-
karta:	Budaja, 1968), pp. 15 ft. Perusal of Muslim news-
papers such as Mertju Suar and Abadi establishes that these
and other allegations on Christian methods are widely held
to be true.
27.	Even the catalogue of alleged Christian misdemeanors pro-
vided by Rasjidi fails to depict fully the disgust felt by
santris at Christian conversion of Muslims. To a santri,
to leave Islam, the chosen religion of God, for any other
religion or ideology is to be murtad, to be a renegade or
apostate, and the Christians are accused of memurtadkan
Indonesia's Muslims. The various similarities between
Christian and Islamic theology should not conceal the fact
that Muslims have a deep feeling of superority towards
what is considered the illogical religion of Christianity.
The Muslim press has become increasingly willing to attack
Christianity. For one example, see the letter published in
the magazine Kiblat by its editor, Musaffa Basjyr, who con-
gratulates a newly-converted Muslim: "God has rescued you
from the teachings of Catholicism, which are unacceptable
to a rational mind. . . . You are not in the hands of a
Pope or priest whose duties are only to order men to commit
sin, which need not be feared because there has been one
to redeem them." Kiblat, 16, No. 12 (November 1968).49
Christians.28 In the PMI's party council in August, its demands
on government supervision and the restoration of the Christian
religion’s lower status within the Department of Religion were
repeated. Response to Christian aggression did create a uni-
fying sentiment, both within the Partai Muslimin and among all
the Islamic parties, a sentiment sorely needed.
The achievement of party unity was the greatest internal
problem for the Partai Muslimin in 1968. In a sense, however,
this was not strictly an internal problem, for the disunity was
rather between those hitherto called realists, who supported
the Partai Muslimin, and the idealists, who withheld their sup-
port. After the party’s birth in February, the realists’ posi-
tion was that despite all the concessions that had to be made
the party was at least in existence. Moreover, in the party
congress to be held as soon as possible the Masjumi leaders
could assume positions of leadership in the Partai Muslimin.29
The standpoint of the idealists, of whom the most important was
Prawoto, was that public support could not be given to the party
as long as it showed discrimination between Masjumi and non-
Masjumi figures. The first successful attempt at forging unity
between the two groups was a large meeting of ex-Masjumi leaders
with the leadership of the Partai Muslimin, held in August at
Tjibulan. Among Masjumi men present were Natsir, Prawoto,
Burhanuddin Harahap, Djerman Prawiranegara, Anwar Harjono and
Achmad Buchori. At this meeting, it seems that the majority
of the idealists were reassured that the Partai Muslimin could
become a suitable vehicle for the preservation of the Masjumi
tradition. So cordial was this meeting that it was suggested
that the site be renamed Tji Bulan Bintang (after the emblem
of Masjumi).30 The most rigid idealist, Prawoto, explained in
the party council convened later in August that he was still un-
able to accept Suharto’s concept, that is, the latter's refusal
to tolerate Masjumi leadership of the Partai Muslimin, unless
the Masjumi figures were also connected with one of the supporter
organizations. His speech at the council, in which he declined
28.	See my "Some Comments on Islamic Reactions to Recent Devel-
opments in Indonesia," Review of Indonesian and Malaysian
Affairs, 2, No. 2 (April-June 1968) , p.	One can only
assume that the Religious Affairs Minister Dachlan was sub-
jected to pressure from other government officials in not
taking a stronger line against Christian missionaries, for
he is not known for his moderation on this issue.
29.	This is based largely on interviews with Agus Sudono and
Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Djakarta, May 1968.
30.	See Bulletin Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Year I, No. 4, pp.
1-2.50
to actively support the Partai Muslimin, was highly distressing
to those who had hoped that the Tjibulan meeting would lead to
full unity within the party, and Kasman Singodimedjo immediately
followed Prawoto with an appeal for support for the Partai Mus-
limin.31 But the fact remained that the idealists would only
be completely satisfied when the party congress returned at
least some senior Masjumi leaders to the party's central leader-
ship .3 2
The party council decided to hold the congress (muktamar)
in Malang in the first week of November. To gain some idea of
Suharto's reaction to the planned congress of the party, soon
after the party council,its proceedings were reported to the
President by a PMI delegation led by Djarnawi. At that time,
the last week in August, Suharto voiced no objection to the
holding of the congress, and Djarnawi was delighted.33 During
the following two months before November, it became increasingly
clear that the congress in Malang would see election of several
Masjumi leaders. One proof of this was the Muhammadijah congress
31.	Interview with Kasman Singodimedjo, Djakarta, March 1969.
That the idealist-realist dichotomy, admittedly difficult
to define precisely, is not necessarily related to atti-
tudes on other issues is indicated by the presence of Kas-
man, formerly considered a firebrand of Masjumi, in the
camp of supporters of the Partai Muslimin.
32.	The PMI's General Chairman, Djarnawi Hadikusuma, expressed
his awareness of the idealists' persisting dissatisfaction
when he said at the party council:	"Although the task of
consolidation of the Masjumi family within the Partai Mus-
limin is felt to be rather difficult, yet with the promise
of President Suharto enunciated in front of the leaders of
the supporting organizations and the Committee of Seven
(about forty people) at the Independence Palace on February
5, . . . the party feels optimistic and certain that after
the congress the task of consolidation will be carried out
as we hope." In the same report, Djarnawi said that the
four tasks to be performed by the party leadership were: to
lead the party until the congress, to hold the congress as
soon as possible, to "receive and develop" the party's
legality and spread the party throughout Indonesia. I am
indebted to Djarnawi for a copy of his speech.
33.	Interview with Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Djakarta, January 1969.
There is admittedly no public record of this meeting with
Suharto, and it is not clear that Suharto had no objections
to the principal purpose of the Partai Muslimin's congress,
that of electing some Masjumi figures to the leadership
council.51
at the end of September, at which Faqih Usman was appointed
General Chairman, and other chairmen were Rasjidi and Hamka,
both of Masjumi. If such endorsement of Masjumi figures could
occur in Muhammadijah, it was probable that Masjumi would have
even greater success in the Partai Muslimin. In September, how-
ever, Suharto conferred with the Minister for Government-Legis-
lature Liaison, Mintaredja, one week after the President had
seen a Muhammadijah delegation.3* He told Mintaredja that he
had ’’forgotten” to convey to Muhammadijah leaders a message
which he wanted them to carry to the Partai Muslimin, that is
that the PMI should hold elections for a new leadership council
only after Indonesia's general elections. After discussions
with several Muhammadijah leaders, including Hasjim, Daris Tamin
and Sanusi, Mintaredja sent a letter to the Muhammadijah in
Jogjakarta.35 But Muhammadijah leaders were unwilling to give
Suharto's message to the PMI, perhaps because this would be
seen as an attempt by Muhammadijah to increase its strength
within the party.36 The Partai Muslimin leaders eventually met
Suharto on October 28, and then he shocked them by saying that
it would be better not to have any change in the party leader-
ship.
Throughout October, however, speculation was rife in sec-
tions of the Djakarta press on what would take place in the
Partai Muslimin's congress. Operasi, for example, asked Kasman
the following questions in an interview:	Would the name of the
Partai Muslimin be changed to Masjumi in the congress? Would
all the ex-Masjumi supporters enter the Partai Muslimin at the
congress? Would the bapaks (lit. fathers) from Masjumi return
to lead their followers? Would the party adopt a firm stand in
relation to the government, which had failed to satisfy the
aspirations of the people?57 The same newspaper published
criticisms of the present PMI leadership, which was compared
unfavorably with Masjumi leaders.38
34.	Mintaredja was appointed to this portfolio in June 1968.
The Partai Muslimin gave some indication of feeling toward
Mintaredja in its circles when it stated in a declaration
issued after the formation of the new Development Cabinet
that the party did not consider itself represented.
35.	Operasi, November 15, 1968.
36.	This section is largely based on information provided by
Allan Samson.
37.	Operasi, November 2, 1968.
38.	See, e.g., the article ”Is the Present Leadership Dis-
appointing?” in Operasi, October 12, 1968.52
Meanwhile the Partai Muslimin faced the problem of whether
to yield on the eve of the long-awaited congress to Suharto's
latest demands, and thus risk an uproar within the party, or to
satisfy their supporters’ wishes and court the disapproval of
the government. A small group of Masjumi men, including Natsir,
Prawoto, Rum and Faqih Usman, decided in meetings during Septem-
ber and October that either of the latter two should lead the
Partai Muslimin, and as Faqih Usman was both seriously ill (in
fact he died in the first week of October) and closely involved
with Muhammadijah, Mohammad Rum became the choice for General
Chairman.39 Suharto's warning was highly distressing to Prawoto
and Rum who were aware of the intention of regional delegates
to the congress to have Masjumi represented in the central
leadership of the Partai Muslimin, and these delegates had al-
ready left Djakarta for Malang. Before the congress began on
November 2, Agus Sudono, well-known among the party leaders to
have the most cordial relations with key army officers such as
Ali Murtopo, Alamsjah and Sudjono Humardhani, was deputed to
try to soften the government's attitude towards the Partai Mus-
limin, and he obtained a letter from Ali Murtopo stating that an
acceptable new list of chairmen would be:	Djarnawi as General
Chairman; a Gasbiindo representative and Djamiatul Al-Washlijah
representative as first and second chairmen respectively; Anwar
Harjono and Hasan Basri as third and fourth; and Omar Tusin as
fifth chairman.1*0 In fact, however, the offer of these conces-
sions had little effect on the election at Malang. In Malang,
the election of a new General Chairman produced seven nominees:
Djarnawi, Kasman, Natsir, Prawoto, Sanusi, Sjarif Usman and Rum.
Five announced their withdrawal from the election, and a sixth,
Natsir, was overseas and had not authorized anyone to nominate
him. The seventh, Mohammad Rum, was elected by acclamation.
The new leadership council was as follows:
General Chairman	Mohammad Rum (Masjumi)
Chairmen	Anwar Harjono (Masjumi)
Hasan Basri (Masjumi
Djarnawi Hadikusuma (Muhammadijah)
Omar Tusin (SNII)
39. Interview with Rum, Djakarta, February 1969. It had been
considered, apparently, inadvisable to nominate Natsir or
Prawoto, to whom the government was thought to object
strongly. Other Masjumi leaders were involved in non-
political activities, and had not evinced interest in play-
ing active roles in the Partai Muslimin. Sjafruddin, for
instance, was the General Chairman of Husami (Himpunan Usa-
hawan Islam) and Burhanuddin Harahap was active in obtain-
ing the license to republish the daily Abadi.
40.
This again is based on information provided by Allan Samson.Hasbullah (Muhammadijah)
53
Secretary-General
Secretaries
Members
Lukman Harun
M. Sulaiman
(Muhammadij ah)
(Muhammadijah)
Aisjah Aminy (HSBI)
Abdul Mukti (Muhammadijah)
Alala (HMI Alumni)
A. R. Baswedan (Masjumi)
Chadidjah Razak (Wanita Islam)
Djamaluddin (Masjumi)
Gusti Abdul Muis (Masjumi)
Ismail Hasan Metareum (HMI Alumni)
Mrs. Latjuba (Wanita Islam)
Maizir Achmadyns (KBIM)
Misbach (Masjumi)
Andi Mapasala (Gasbiindo)
Sanusi (Muhammadijah)
Rohana Ahmad (Muhammadijah)
Siregar Pahu (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah)
Sjarif Usman (Masjumi/Porbisi)
Mrs. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito (Masjumi)1*1
The new leadership council was different in two ways from
the central leadership that had led the party from February 20,
1968. First, Masjumi figures were obviously a predominant ele-
ment, with the three top positions and half a dozen members;
notably absent were Agus Sudono, Naro and Sanusi who was returned
as an ordinary member. Second, there were ten less in the total,
which suggests that little need for compromise had been felt.
It is not clear why the party decided to completely ignore the
government's advice, although admittedly either way out of the
party's dilemma entailed on the one hand sacrifice of the support
of many of the ex-members of Masjumi, and on the other, possi-
ble action by the government to enforce its wishes.1,2
41.	Abadi, December 7, 1968, and Sinar Harapan, November 25,
1968. It is not clear why Sanusi was not placed strictly
in alphabetical order as the others. Sjarif Usman, who had
chaired the Masjumi Rehabilitation Committee and was a
former PRRI rebel was an interesting case of apparent gov-
ernment inconsistency. He was a Masjumi leader of some
distinction, and yet he had appeared in the February lead-
ership, perhaps acceptable as a Porbisi figure.
42.	There is no published record of the way voting was carried
out at the congress, but according to Prawoto (interview,
Djakarta, January 1969), the chairmen were nominated and
elected by the delegates, and the remainder appointed by
the General Chairmen and chairmen.54
The congress was attended by over 1,000 delegates from
every part of Indonesia with the exception of West Irian, and
the atmosphere was a very mixed one, particularly the final re-
ception at which the composition of the new leadership council
was read out.1*3 Decisions announced during the congress in-
cluded:	strong criticism of Israeli aggression and an appeal
to the government to aid in the liberation of Palestine; expres-
sion of gratitude to Major General Jasin of East Java for his
declaration that gambling was equivalent to PKI activities;
repetition of demands in regard to religion and Christianiza-
tion; an appeal to the government to draft a new land-reform
bill "that really guarantees the interests of the people."'*‘*
But it was undoubtedly the new leadership that was the focus of
interest. On November 7, the chairman of the congress prepara-
tory committee, Omar Tusin, announced to all the delegates the
result of the congress election; the election of Rum was appar-
ently greeted with great enthusiasm.^5 It had been intended
that at the final reception on the night of November 7, speeches
would be made by (or read out from) Suharto, Nasution (MPRS
Chairman), a representative from the Brawidjaja (East Java)
Military Command and the new party General Chairman. However,
on the last day of the congress, Alamsjah sent a radiogram to
Omar Tusin notifying the Partai Muslimin that the government
did not feel that it was time to change the party leadership,
and that such a change would be considered a violation of Presi-
dential Decision No. 70, which had legalized the party, and
would be unacceptable. **6 At the reception for the delegates,
Omar Tusin announced the new leadership, but said that the
transfer of office from the old to the new central leadership
43.	Sinar Harapan, November 25, 1968.
44.	Bulletin Partai Muslimin Indonesia, First Year, No. 6,
January 1969, p. T~. In contrast with the new central lead-
ership, these decisions attracted little attention in the
Djakarta press. Certainly there seemed to be nothing new
in this list, and the only resolution which distinguished
the Partai Muslimin from other Islamic parties (also call-
ing for Palestinian liberation and an end to gambling) was
the repeated demand for fairer representation of the party
in the state legislature.
45.	Sinar Harapan, November 25, 1968. Perhaps the belief that
Rum, generally considered a moderate and not involved in
PRRI, would be acceptable even after the October 28 meeting
prompted the decision to have him elected.
46.	This radiogram was a reply to one sent by Omar Tusin as
chairman of the congress preparatory committee, in which
he disclosed the composition of the new central leadership.55
would take place in Djakarta, where the party would await clear-
ance from the government. There was no message from either
Suharto or Nasution, MPRS Vice-Chairman Subchan spoke only in
his capacity as a leader of NU and there was no Brawidjaja repre-
sentative .
As the Partai Muslimin was unwilling to announce nullifica-
tion of the results of the election held by its sovereign con-
gress, ever since November 1968 the party has lacked clearance
from the government.1*7 Initially, press reactions were generally
unfavorable to the government (except for the army newspapers
Bevita Yudha and Angkatan Bersendjata), and the government's
attempt to limit the independence of the Partai Muslimin was
condemned as undemocratic intervention in a political party's
internal affairs.1*8 However, on November 10, 1968, Mintaredja
provided the rationale for the government's action. In a pam-
phlet he issued on that date, Mintaredja maintained that the
government had in fact made no change in policy towards the
Partai Muslimin. He said that in the February 5, 1968 meeting
with the Partai Muslimin delegation, Suharto had told represen-
tatives of Muhammadijah, KBIM, Djamiatul Al-Washlijah and Gasbi-
indo that the party would be free to elect its own leaders after
Indonesian general elections, for democracy would have been re-
flected in general elections and no group (golongan) in Indone-
sia would have the right to hinder the progress of another.1*9
Thus instead of Masjumi leaders being allowed to assume leader-
47.	Before accepting his position, Rum himself declared that
his acceptance was conditional on clearance being obtained
from the government. It is difficult to define what this
would constitute, for the party has not been appreciably
restricted in its activities since November. It was cus-
tomary for some eleven months after the congress for Islamic
newspapers to refer to Djarnawi, for example, as "General
Chairman (old leadership)" or to Hasbullah as "Secretary-
General (elected)." But, more recently, Djarnawi has been
called simply "General Chairman" and a recent Partai Mus-
limin delegation to the palace included Agus Sudono who
lost his position in the central leadership. Abadi,
October 17, 1969.
48.	See, e.g., Nusantara, November 12, 1968.
49.	Mintaredja, Pemerintah dan Pembentukan Partai Muslimin
Indonesia (Djakarta:	n.p. , 1968) , p. 7~. Those who were
present when Suharto gave these conditions on the party's
birth were, according to Mintaredja, Djarnawi, Daris Tamin,
Hasjim and Mintaredja (Muhammadijah), Agus Sudono and Usman
Ibrahim (Gasbiindo), Maizir Achmadyns and Daud Badaruddin
(KBIM) and Udin Sjamsuddin (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah).56
ship after the party congress, in fact only after general elec-
tions could the Partai Muslimin choose its own leaders. Minta-
redja suggested that perhaps the leaders of the party had been
so disappointed when they heard Suharto say this that they did
not pay close attention to the words "after the general elec-
tions," and consequently perhaps forgot.50
Mintaredja's apologia for the government has made it almost
impossible to get from official sources acknowledgment of other
motivating factors for the government's decision not to recog-
nize the new Partai Muslimin leadership, for it need only be
stated that such had been government policy since the party's
foundation in order to shift responsibility onto the Partai Mus-
limin itself. But it is very hard to give credence to Minta-
redja's account. In February 1968, it had already been apparent
that general elections would have to be postponed beyond the
original July 5 deadline, as no preparations had been made and
the electoral bills were still to be ratified. Thus if the
party leaders had agreed to wait until general elections, this
would have made the Partai Muslimin seemingly indefinitely sub-
ordinate to the government, which would surely have been unac-
ceptable even to the most pragmatic of the party's realists.
Also, it is hard to understand how Suharto could have forgotten
such a matter as reminding the party leaders of their commit-
ment, and why Mintaredja and the Muhammadijah leaders should
have hesitated in passing on to the Partai Muslimin Suharto's
advice in September, if the latter's instruction was simply a
reiteration of what Suharto had long ago made clear. The rea-
sons for the government's long-standing opposition to the
aspirations of the Partai Muslimin, and earlier to the rehabili-
tation, must now be considered in some detail.51
50 . Ibid., p. 3.
51. That Rum had insisted that government clearance be obtained
before he accepted the position as General Chairman does
not establish the truth of Mintaredja's case, for Suharto's
attitude, new or otherwise, was revealed to the Partai Mus-
limin on October 28. Nor does the fact that some Partai
Muslimin supporters may have sensed the possibility of
collision with the government before that date, perhaps
through information from Suharto's assistants, establish
that Suharto's conditions had been identical in February
1968. The press-release issued on February 20 (see above)
which indicated that the party congress was free to do as
it liked was not challenged by the government or the army
newspapers.CHAPTER V
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTY
The policy of the Suharto Government towards Masjumi and
then the Partai Muslimin has been one of consistent opposition,
the extent of which, however, has been revealed only gradually.
Thus in January 1967, at the same time he was refusing to coun-
tenance the rehabilitation of Masjumi, he affirmed the rights
of leaders of banned parties to take part in political life.1
Similarly, when in February 1968, Suharto insisted that the
Partai Muslimin leadership should not include leaders of Masju-
mi, he was willing for Masjumi figures to "lead from behind."
Even after the Malang congress, Suharto said that although no
change in the central leadership would be tolerated before
general elections, thereafter the party would be free to choose
its own leaders. This slowly-evolving policy, that gradually
became more hard-line, may have been the result merely of tact,
of Suharto's wish not to alienate the mass of Masjumi supporters
by denying them from the outset any prospect of having a vir-
tual neo-Masjumi. But this may have been influenced by changing
political circumstances during the years 1966-1968, and a lack
of sound advice received by Suharto on developments within the
Partai Muslimin. One can only assume, for instance, that
Suharto thought before the Malang congress that young leaders
would be elected to the central leadership and the Masjumi
figures not returned.2 But why was Suharto so opposed to the
aims of Masjumi supporters?
It is undeniable that much bitterness remains within the
Indonesian army against those suspected of involvement in both
the Darul Islam and PRRI rebellions. Although Masjumi dis-
approved of the Darul Islam's violent methods, as Feith noted,
there was a conflict between Muslim leaders and the army over
how to deal with Darul Islam:	"The issue was that the army
1.	At least this was the interpretation placed by Masjumi sup-
porters on Suharto's guarantee of "full rights as citizens"
to their leaders. In May 1967, Attorney-General Sugih Arto
reinforced this impression when he remarked in North Sumatra
that former rebels and PSI/Masjumi members were free to join
political parties and even assume senior positions in the
central leadership of a party. See Bajasut, Fakta Documenta,
p.	22.
2.	This was the assumption of several independent observers
interviewed in Djakarta.
5758
insisted that it should have a free hand in pressing a military
solution, whereas the political party leaders, and especially
the Masjumi leaders, argued that a political and religious ap-
proach was necessary to win away the rebels' popular support.
. . . Army leaders resented every attempt of political leaders
to intervene and particularly all attempts to negotiate with
the Darul Islam."3 In areas of West Java, some local Masjumi
leaders were arrested and jailed for alleged connections with
Darul Islam.1' There is no record of Suharto's involvement in
the quelling of Darul Islam, but when he was commander of Cen-
tral Java's Diponegoro Division in 1957, Suharto "... made it
clear that he regarded appeasement of the dissidents in Sumatra
and Sulawesi as perverse partiality. He pointed out that the
54 million people of Java would feel unjustly treated should
the Government relax its development efforts there in order to
permit the obstreperous regions to catch up."5 The PRRI was
seen by supporters of the central government as a challenge to
the unity of the state and by Javanese, especially, within the
army, from the Diponegoro Division, as a rejection of the at-
tempt "to fulfill the ambitions and promises of Javanese civili-
zation in the new national state."6
It seems reasonable to assume that bitterness still exists
against both former rebels, which includes men like Natsir and
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and the political parties (largely
the Masjumi in the case of Darul Islam and PSI and Masjumi in
the PRRI) suspected of being in sympathy with the aims of the
revolts. This motive, however, is sometimes pushed too far.
One general in Djakarta said that even the people in the regions
affected by the PRRI were still resentful against former rebels,
but although they would not put up with the rehabilitation of
an ex-rebel party, the same perspicacious people did not object
to the appointment of a senior PRRI leader, Sumitro, to the
Ministry of Trade.7 It seems, however, of much greater signifi-
cance that Masjumi has long been associated with Islamic fanati-
cism and opposition to Pantjasila, in a way that the essentially
5.	Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 211.
4.	Among those arrested were Isa Ansjary, Ridwan Affandi and
Buchori.
5.	Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 29.
6.	Ibid., p. 3.
7.	Interview with a senior officer from Kosgoro, Djakarta,
March 1969.59
Javanese Islamic party NU has not been.8
That Masjumi, along with all other Islamic parties, fought
in the Konstituante for the establishment of an Islamic State
should not, in fairness, be held against Masjumi leaders today,
but their dissatisfaction with Pantjasila is still openly shown.
Sjafruddin, for example, recently confessed:	"I do not under-
stand Pantjasila, although I see everywhere boards on which the
five principles of the Pantjasila are inscribed. I must admit
that I understand Islam better."9 Kasman Singodimedjo com-
plained in a speech that although the English, Dutch and Ital-
ians were not slow in proclaiming their nations Christian,
Indonesia, whose population was 901 Muslim, was reluctant to
call itself Islamic.10 If skepticism about Pantjasila is more
often expressed by Masjumi leaders in private, assertions of
Islam's superiority to Pantjasila are frequently made publicly.
Kasman, in a book of prison reminiscences, wrote that he was
confident that no one would object to his belief that, whereas
Pantjasila was the five principles, Islam was the All Principles.
He added that Muslims should remember that:	"To attain some-
thing more perfect than the Pantjasila is a matter for further
struggle, and this is, moreover, not forbidden by the Pantjasila
itself."11
Although the Muslims' casus belli is no longer the Islamic
State but rather the Djakarta Charter, it is undeniable that
ideological conflict has been revived since the coup. Although
the most obvious evidence of this was perhaps the Second and
Third Committees' deadlock in March 1968, it has become entangled
with Christian missionary activity to produce continuing reli-
gious bitterness erupting from time to time in the destruction
of churches on the one side and the persistent behind-the-scenes
campaigning by Christians against the dangers of an Islamic
State, on the other. The NU and PSII have also declared sup-
port for implementation of the Djakarta Charter and have moved
8. Lev (Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 77) wrote: "The
NU kijaj i [ i! . the PNl prijaji and the PKI peasant spoke
the same language and shared the same stereotypes of the
non-Javanese for whom Masjumi spoke. Social communications
between the three groups in Java flowed with more or less
traditional ease. ..."
9.	Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Merombak Pandangan Hidup dan
Struktur Politik (Djakarta! Bulan Bintang, 1968), p. 6.
10.	Abadi, August 30, 1969.
11.
Kasman Singodimedjo, Renungan dari Tahanan (Djakarta:
Tintamas, 1968), p. 57!60
towards Islamic unity, but it is with Masjumi, and a potential
neo-Masjumi, that Darul Islam and Atjehnese or Makassarese
fanaticism tend to be linked. The other two parties and the
insignificant Perti are considered ringan, or easy to control,
which judgment has been confirmed by, or derived from, the
opportunistic record of those parties during Guided Democracy.
The outbreaks of religious intolerance such as the Makassar
incident, the Meulaboh affair and the alleged evacuation of
Christians from Atjeh cannot fail to be a source of profound
embarrassment to Suharto. He attempted to mediate personally
between Muslims and Christians by promoting an (unsuccessful)
Inter-Religions Conference.12
Against such a background of religious conflict, with the
threat of a renewal of the ideological conflict between a basi-
cally secular Pantjasila and greater stress on religion inherent
in the Djakarta Charter, it is not surprising that serious ob-
jections were raised first against rehabilitation of Masjumi
and then against the creation of a neo-Masjumi. In some army
circles, it was thought sufficient that Masjumi leaders be
accorded liberty of movement and freedom to participate in
dakwah ("missionizing") activities. In particular, it was held
to be both unnecessary and unwise for Masjumi leaders to be
given the opportunity to lead a mass party.13 There seems to
be little sympathy for the understandable wish of Masjumi lead-
ers to be completely absolved of any misdeeds justifying their
imprisonment. In an alarmed tone, an editorial in Angkatan
Bevsendjata asked, following the Malang congress, "Why are we
not patient until general elections are held? Isn't it neces-
sary for us to absorb the teachings of Abu Thalib, who said
that 'patience is of two varieties:	patience in averting what
you do not like, and patience in seeking what you want'?"111
Similarly, a "certain General Staff officer" interviewed in the
same month, observed that whereas Sumitro's appointment was
understandable because he had something to contribute to the
improvement of the economy, Rum and the other Masjumi leaders
intended to organize mass force. Masjumi leadership of the
12.	Although the failure of this conference (held in Makassar
in November 1967) was at least partly owing to Christian
refusal to limit their missionary activity, it is the Mus-
lims that generally receive the lion's share of the blame
for religious disturbances, perhaps because of the dramatic
acts of destroying churches.
13.	The comments made by General Sutopo Juwono (see above) con-
cerning the Holy War Command seem to apply equally to the
possibility of a revived Masjumi.
14.	Angkatan Bersendjata, November 15, 1968.61
Partai Muslimin would, he implied, hinder the attainment of
political stability.1®
The achievement of political stability has been the keynote
of Suharto's domestic policy since he assumed power, and his
obsession with stability combined with his own caution produced
the successful policy he adopted of removing Sukarno from power
without causing a virtual civil war. He also refused to elimi-
nate the PNI from national politics and was opposed to the New
Order radicals who wished to have Indonesia's party system over-
thrown.16 The fact that Suharto was unwilling to ban the PNI,
despite the identification of its Ali-Surachman wing with
Sukarno's regime, helps in part to explain his opposition to
the Partai Muslimin. Whereas the PNI was a party "whose his-
tory, social composition and ideology give it something of the
flavor of a state party," the Partai Muslimin, at least to the
Javanese, remains Outer Island-dominated and to some extent
iconoclastic.17 The PNI's acceptance of Pantjasila was unques-
tioned, but not so that of a Masjumi-led Partai Muslimin, and
Masjumi leaders were thought to be less malleable than those of
the PNI.
It was mentioned above that the NU and PSII were considered
ringan, or easily manipulable by successive governments. The
Masjumi leaders, however, had a reputation for firm resolve (or
alternatively for trouble-making), which has several times been
demonstrated in the life of the Suharto Government, especially
over the question of democracy and elections. Whereas Achmad
Sjaichu, the NU leader and parliamentary speaker, declared in
January 1969, that elections could not be held in a situation
where economic conditions were still bad, Masjumi figures have
made strong attacks on the New Order's methods of operating
democracy. In June, for example, Prawoto Mangkusasmito criti-
cized the domination of the government by a minority that at-
tempts to impose its will by refusing to permit voting in the
sessions of the MPRS and threatens war if its opponents become
adamant, or alternatively carries out redressing of the legis-
lative bodies to replace old representatives with ones more sub-
missive.18 This is not to say that Suharto fears a challenge
to his government from democratic-minded Masjumi leaders intent
on restoring genuine democracy. Rather there seems to be a fear
15.	Sinar Harapan, November 14, 1968.
16.	See Feith* "Suharto's Search for a Political Format."
17.	Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," p. 65.
18.	Abadi, June 18, 1969.62
of Masjumi hard-headedness combined with Islamic fanaticism.19
Suharto may have been reinforced in his opposition to a re-
vived Masjumi by the opposition of other sections of the politi-
cal elite in Djakarta, which may be divided into three groups--
the Islamic parties, the secular parties and finally the army.
The NU felt threatened by a strong Partai Muslimin in two ways.
Since the introduction of Guided Democracy, the NU has held the
position of the major Islamic party, but its supremacy was
gained at the price of submission to Sukarno and his Nasakom
regime. Consequently, after the fall of Guided Democracy, the
NU became open to accusations of opportunism and of neglecting
Islam to the extent of cooperating with the PKI. The most
natural source of such charges is the Masjumi.20 If Masjumi
were rehabilitated, NU stands to lose its position as the lead-
ing Islamic party, with its stronghold in the Department of
Religious Affairs possibly slowly undermined, and to be sub-
jected to full-scale attack as the Islamic party that collabo-
rated with Sukarno and the communists. The existence of either
a rehabilitated Masjumi or a Masjumi-led Partai Muslimin would
probably attract to its banner many NU supporters, both those
who had joined NU on the dissolution of Masjumi in 1960 and,
more importantly, the younger generation, such as the Pemuda
Ansor, whose leaders have showed increasing disgust at the
alleged opportunism of NU leaders like Idham Chalid and Achmad
Sjaichu.21 Thus there are good reasons for the NU leadership
to oppose restoration of its former strong rival, Masjumi.22
It has been reported that, during 1966 and 1967, NU was active
in attempting to persuade the government not to tolerate revival
19.	The resurgence of Islamic fanaticism is also apparent in
the efforts in the last two years for strongly Islamic
areas to legislate for compulsory observation of Islamic
law. For an editorial giving support to such a move in
Bima, Sumbawa, see, Abadi, April 14, 1969.
20.	Thinly-veiled attacks on NU leaders such as Idham Chalid
regularly appear in Abadi. See, e.g., the March 6, 1969
editorial.
21.	In January 1969, Pemuda Ansor leaders Zamroni, Asnawi
Latief and Jahja Ubed attacked the statement by Achmad
Sjaichu on elections, which they said should be held as
soon as possible, regardless of economic conditions. See
Abadi, January 24, 1969. It is conceivable that the dis-
satisfaction expressed by young NU students in 1964 noted
by Castles ("Notes") may become more apparent as the
Partai Muslimin develops further.
22.	The PSII would also stand to lose Masjumi members who
joined it after 1960.63
of Masjumi; in August and September 1968, Idham Chalid and
Subchan allegedly approached Ali Murtopo, Alainsjah, Basuki
Rachmat and others entreating them not to accept the election
of Masjumi figures in the November Partai Muslimin congress.23
It has not been established that the two Christian parties
campaigned against the Partai Muslimin possibly under Masjumi
leadership. Fears of Islamic fanaticism being strengthened by
Masjumi's re-emergence may have been balanced by the considera-
tion, or the hope, that the Partai Muslimin would be more con-
cerned with modernization than the NU.21* But Christians within
the army have reputedly urged Suharto not to countenance a
strong modernist revival. Samson reported that:	"It was the
conjecture of several PMI figures that a conference of regional
military commanders led by General Panggabean [a Batak Chris-
tian] . . . had strongly urged Suharto not to legalize PMI."25
The attitude of the Armed Forces, principally the army, has been
admitted by Suharto himself to have had great influence on his
policy towards Masjumi, but it is necessary to distinguish
groups within the army with differing opinions on this issue.
Feith recently used a "centrists" versus "military radi-
cals" dichotomy. Of the former, Feith wrote that they "con-
tended that Islamic militancy was better crushed than concili-
ated, and opposed any tendency to remove the stigma which still
attached to those who had been involved in the rebellion of
1958. . . . "26 Among the centrists, Feith counted Suharto him-
self, Alamsjah and General Panggabean. Military radicals such
as Major General Dharsono hoped to replace the present multi-
party system with a system of program-oriented parties, which
they thought would help eradicate ideological conflict in Indo-
nesia's development era. Dharsono's two-party system has been
strongly opposed by all Muslim parties, and conversely, Feith
hinted that although Suharto was quite wary of giving support
to a policy of radical transformation of the political system,
he may have been influenced by the opposition to a strong Partai
Muslimin of the military radicals, who favored weakening of
present parties rather than a strengthening of ideology-based
23.	Interview with Hoesnie Thamrin, Djakarta, January 1969.
PNI leaders Osa Maliki and Hardi are also alleged to have
acted to dissuade military officers against return of
Masjumi leaders at Malang.
24.	See Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," p. 3.
Such a hope was not restricted to Christians.
25.	Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1008.
26.	Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," p. 3.64
ones such as the Partai Muslimin. In contradistinction to both
these groups we should perhaps see a difficultly-defined group
of officers, either from the Outer Islands, such as Nasution,
or from Brawidjaja Division, such as Muallim Effendi, Sarbini,
Sudirman and Muchlas Rowi. These officers have become connected
with Islamic social organizations (Sudirman played a not insig-
nificant role in the Presidium of the Badan Koordinasi Amal
Muslimin) or are generally considered sympathetic to Islamic
aspirations (Nasution spoke at the controversial celebration of
the Djakarta Charter anniversary in June 1968). Therefore, it
would not be surprising if this group was the one least opposed
to a strong Partai Muslimin. Yet in Nasution's position as a
potential rival to Suharto, any attempt from him to give succor
to the PMI would probably be seen as an effort to spread his
own power base.27 The Partai Muslimin seems to have stronger
foes in the army than friends.
Hence many elements operated against the Partai Muslimin.
Perhaps the only factors favorable to the party were the obvious
need to satisfy in some way the desire of Islamic mass organiza-
tions to possess their own party and the belief that Masjumi's
tradition had been one of working toward modernization and eco-
nomic development. Yet the circumstances of the post-coup era
have been detrimental to Masjumi's image (whether or not this
image was widely accepted) of iconoclastic modernization. The
imagined threat to Islam from efforts to Christianize the Indo-
nesian people, and the unconventional means used by Djakarta
Governor Ali Sadikin in accumulating finance for that city's
development have tended to force modernist leaders to adopt
reactionary and fundamentalist positions. Soedjatmoko remarked
that:	"Under pressure, or in times of danger, Islam tends to
respond in fundamentalist terms, falling back on the insepara-
bility of the State from the Faith, and the need for Islamic
forces to score a political victory before the ills of society
and the State can be cured."28 One senior officer believed
that Masjumi leaders had nothing to contribute to the develop-
ment of the economy, and would concern themselves, if given some
degree of power, mainly with irrelevant issues of Islamic faith,
with the danger, once again, of ideological conflict.29
Suharto realized that some form of concession would have
to be made to content the supporters of the mass organizations
27.	Suharto's supporters tend to attribute any move by Nasution
to his ambition to become President.
28.	Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia:	Problems and Opportunities,"
Australian Outlook, 21, No. 3 (December 1967), p. 270.
29.	Interview with Brigadier General Sugandhi, Djakarta, March
1969.65
which had formerly been constituent members of Masjumi and con-
sented to the formation of a political party as long as it
represented a union of the supporting organizations involved
and not a neo-Masjumi. Apparently, only by February 1968 was
it clear that his method of preventing the Partai Muslimin from
becoming a neo-Masjumi was to ensure that all members of the
central leadership would be easily recognizable as representa-
tives of mass organizations. Consequently, the results of the
November congress, no matter how predictable they should have
been, were unacceptable to him. For Malang was a round rejec-
tion of his concept, as no less than eight elected out of twenty-
five were Masjumi figures who were not also members of supporter
organizations.30 The conditions under which the Partai Muslimin
was born in February were conducive to the continuation of dis-
unity, and this was possibly one of Suharto's objectives. The
Malang congress, however, by removing men suspect to the major-
ity of PMI supporters, such as Naro and Imran Kadir,31 resulted
in a blurring of the dividing-line between realists and ideal-
ists. The latter, though rejoicing in victory, decided against
adopting a confrontative attitude towards the government, and
the only alternative for the realists would involve some kind
of surrender to government terms, obviously unacceptable to PMI
supporters.3 2
What is the future of the Partai Muslimin? In a sense,
the past of the Partai Muslimin is more attractive than its
fugure. It has been suggested already that the potential suc-
cessors to Masjumi are not comparable to its leaders. Partly
because of their youth during the revolution, the Natsir genera-
tion has remained the indisputable leaders of the Masjumi family
30.	The eight were:	Rum, Anwar Harjono, Hasan Basri, Baswedan,
Djamaluddin, Gusti Abdul Muis, Misbach and Mrs. Sunarjo
Mangunpuspito. The party congress also saw the demotion
of Agus Sudono and Sanusi who were, presumably, favored by
the government because of their moderate attitudes.
31. Naro was unpopular because he was originally a Murba mem-
ber, and in 1968 adopted what was considered a tolerant
view of pornography, which led Hamka to comment that Naro
had "entered the wrong party," i.e., had acted against the
Islamic spirit of the Partai Muslimin. Operasi, October
12, 1968. Imran Kadir declared in January 1969 that the
party had obtained clearance by agreeing to government con-
ditions, which was promptly denied by Djarnawi Hadikusuma.
See Abadi, February 1, 1969.
32.	But see above, page 55, footnote 47, for the tendency re-
cently to refer to Djarnawi and others in their pre-congress
positions, suggesting tacit acceptance of government condi-
tions, though no public admission was made.66
until the present-day; whereas other parties, such as the PNI
and NU, have had complete leadership changes.33 Despite the
claim of the Partai Muslimin to be a New Order party, its lead-
ers, or rather the Masjumi leaders, often give the impression
of desiring nothing so much as a return to the liberal democracy
of the fifties, when Masjumi was, of course, one of the two main
political parties, the rules of parliamentary democracy were
generally observed, and when the Armed Forces played a far less
significant role in politics.3** But the Partai Muslimin also
looks back to the period when Masjumi was the only Islamic party
in Indonesia, before the exit of the NU and PSII, and even to
the time of the pre-war Islamic federation, MIAI (Madjelis Islam
A'la Indonesia). In September 1968, for example, Isa Ansjary
called on the Islamic community to "reactivate the Madjelis
Islam A'la Indonesia" and argued that the weakness of Islamic
political movements in Indonesia was due to chronic disunity.35
The call for unity within the Islamic community has been made
more urgent by the project of an Islamic Community Congress,
which, it is hoped, will pave the way towards the recreation of
unity. Although the postponement of the Congress from January
to June 1969, and then its apparently indefinite postponement,
seem to have been caused more by government apprehension than
disagreements within the Islamic parties on what such a congress
would attempt, there are important differences between the
Partai Muslimin and other Islamic ones. Whereas the NU and
PSII gained their independence and greater opportunity to obtain
power through leaving Masjumi, the latter was decidedly the
loser, as it was deprived of the right to speak as the only
mouthpiece of the Islamic community. Not surprisingly, the
Partai Muslimin's domination of such an Islamic Congress, not
unlikely if Masjumi leaders were to lead the Partai Muslimin,
would deter NU or PSII leaders such as Idham Chalid or Anwar
Tjokroaminoto from seeking further Islamic unity.
Throughout its eighteen months' existence, the Partai Mus-
limin has emphasized its similarity to the other Muslim parties
rather than its differences. Thus in the MPRS, in joint attacks
on secularism and Christianization, in united stands against
Israeli aggression and in criticism of pornography and gambling,
the party, and the other Muslim parties, stressed its Islamness
and not its capacity to modernize.36 The preoccupation with
33.	The major change in Masjumi leadership was the exit of
Sukiman and Jusuf.
34.	See, e.g., Prawoto's articles in Mertju Suar, April 22-24,
1968.
35.	Kiblat, 16, No. 9 (September 1968), p. 32.
36.
The main exceptions to the statement that identity of in-
terests with other Muslim parties has been stressed are:67
setting up party branches throughout Indonesia and the concen-
tration on electing a new leadership and then obtaining clear-
ance for it perhaps prevented any attempt at a detailed analysis
of Indonesia's problems.37 When Jusuf Wibisono proposed ten
years ago that the Islamic parties should "study the conditions
of society and adjust themselves to the national stage of devel-
opment his advice fell on deaf ears.38 Clifford Geertz has
written of Islam that:	"Nothing has been done since Abduh,
nothing seems likely to be done, and scripturalism seems likely
to remain in the position of cheering on a modernism whose every
advance undermines its own position. Perhaps a reaction will
set in, and the powerful anti-modern forces which are also con-
tained in scripturalism, the fundamentalist side of it, come
to the fore." He continued, "For scripturalism to become a
living religious tradition rather than merely a collection of
strained apologies, its adherents would have to undertake a
serious theological rethinking of the scholastic tradition they
can, apparently, neither live with nor live without."39 The
Partai Muslimin, with or without Masjumi leaders, has inherited
the right to speak for Indonesian modernists. One is tempted
to say that, if the Partai Muslimin is to make a distinctive
contribution to Indonesian history, it also would have to under-
take serious rethinking, if not of the scholastic tradition,
certainly of the probably diminishing role that Islam will play
in the future of Indonesia.
first, the freedom with which PMI-linked figures attack
the Muslim leaders who were "soft" on Sukarno and the PKI;
second, the frankness with which men such as Prawoto criti-
cize current authoritarianism in Indonesia; and third, the
demands for increased representation of the Partai Muslimin
in legislative bodies. However, only the last emanates
from official Partai Muslimin sources.
37.	By the time of the Malang congress, branches of the Partai
Muslimin had been established in every province of Indone-
sia (the West Irian one was formed on November 4, 1968).
The development of the Partai Muslimin in the regions has
been very scantily documented, and is not within the scope
of the present work.
38.	Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 229.
39.
Geertz, Islam Observed, pp. 88, 115.APPENDIX I
BADAN KOORDINASI AMAL MUSLIMIN
The following organizations of the Badan Koordinasi Amal
Muslimin were supporter organizations of the Partai Muslimin
Indonesia:
Muhammadijah
Djamiatul Al-Washlijah
Gasbiindo (Gabungan Serikan2 Buruh Islam
Indonesia--Association of Indonesian
Islamic Trade Unions)
Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union)
Nahdatul Wathan
Mathl’aul Anwar
SNII (Serikat Nelajan Islam Indonesia--
Indonesian Islamic Fishermen’s Union)
KBIM (Kongres Buruh Islam Merdeka--Congress
of Independent Islamic Laborers)
PUI (Persatuan Ummat Islam--Islamic
Community Union)
Al-Ittihadij ah
Porbisi (Persatuan 0rganisasi2 Buruh
se-Indonesia--All-Indonesian Union of
Islamic Labor Organizations)
PGAIRI (Persatuan Guru Agama Islam Republik
Indonesia--Union of Islamic Teachers of
the Republic of Indonesia)
HSBI (Himpunan Seni Budaja Islam--Islamic
Art and Culture Association)
PITI (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia--
Indonesian Chinese Islamic Union)
Al-Irsj ad
Wanita Islam (Islamic Women)
socio-educational
socio-educational
trade union
educational
socio-educational
socio-educational
trade union
trade union
socio-educational
educational
trade union
trade union
cultural
educational
socio-educational
The above sixteen organizations all signed the charter of 1967
pledging support to the Partai Muslimin. Two other organiza-
tions that supported the Partai Muslimin, but whose names were
not mentioned as signatories of the charter were HMI (Himpunan
6970
Mahasiswa Islam--Islamic Students' Association) and MASBI
(Madjelis [?] Seni Budaja Islam--Islamic Council of Art and
Culture).APPENDIX II
POLITICAL PARTIES AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS
DPR-GR (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakjat-Gotong Rojong)
Kabinet Karya
KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa
Indonesia)
KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda
Peladjar Indonesia)
Madjelis Ummat Islam
MIAI (Madjelis Islam A'la
Indonesia)
Masjumi (Madjelis Sjuro
Muslimin Indonesia)
MPRS (Madjelis Permusjawaratan
Rakjat Sementara)
NU (Nahdatul Ulama)
Pahlawan Darul Islam
Partai Katolik
Parkindo (Partai Kristen
Indonesia
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
Partai Murba
PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia)
PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia)
PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam
Indonesia)
PII (Peladjar Islam Indonesia)
Perti (Pergerakan Tarbijah
Islamij ah)
PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner
Republik Indonesia)
RPI (Republik Persatuan
Indonesia)
Gotong Rojong Parliament
Working Cabinet
University Students’ Action
Front of Indonesia
High School Students' Action
Front of Indonesia
Council of the Islamic Community
Great Islamic Council of
Indonesia
Consultative Council of
Indonesian Moslems
Provisional People's Consulta-
tive Assembly
Islamic Scholars' (Party)
Heroes of the House of Islam
Catholic Party
Indonesian Christian Party
Indonesian Communist Party
Proletarian Party
Indonesian Nationalist Party
Indonesian Socialist Party
Indonesian Islamic Union Party
Muslim Students of Indonesia
Islamic Educational Movement
Revolutionary Government of
the Republic of Indonesia
Unitary Republic of Indonesia
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