THE NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA DONALD E. WILLMOTT INTERIM REPORTS SERIES MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT Southeast Asia Program Department of Far Eastern Studies Cornell University Ithaca, New YorkTHE NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA Donald E. Willmott INTERIM REPORTS SERIES Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Department of Far Eastern Studies Cornell University Ithaca, N. Y. 1956FOREWORD (A note concerning the Interim Reports Series) One of the distressing aspects of contemporary scholarship is the substantial Interval that often intervenes between the completion of field research and the first appearance of writings descriptive of its findings. American scholarship relating to Indonesia has been no exception, and here this delay has been particularly regrettable inasmuch as the extent of research being undertaken is so limited. With respect to much of the research carried out in post-revolutionary Indonesia there has. been a lag of two to three or more years between the termination of field work and the first publication describing the results of this work. From this situation stem a number of un- fortunate consequences. Scholars and others having a serious interest in the country, Indonesian as well as Americans, are sometimes obliged to wait so long before seeing the results of such research that when finally available its Importance to them has appreciably diminished. Moreover, because they are kept for so long in the dark as to the course and character of this earlier but as yet unreported work, they frequently are obliged to spend time in unnecessarily laying founda- tions their predecessors have laid but not yet divulged and in under- taking analysis of data similar to that already collected and analyzed or largely analyzed. Thus all too often contemporary students of Indonesia waste much precious time and effort in duplicating or roughly duplicating what has already been done or is in the process of being completed, instead of utilizing such materials, building on them, and possibly refining them. Parenthetically it might be observed that some of those perfectionists who insist that their name appear in print only when attached to a body of material wherein each word has been given its final polish are deprived of what might well have been a healthy and useful criticism by those who would have been Interested in reading their work at some earlier stage of its processing. Also this reluctance to publish findings sooner sometimes puzzles Indonesians because frequently for several years they look in vain for some pub- lished account of research results. Consequently some of them tend to doubt the usefulness of American scholars undertaking research in their country. The object of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project's Interim Reports Series is to avoid Insofar as possible the situation described above. Wherever feasible those undertaking research in connection With our project will prepare preliminary reports concerning salient aspects of their research well before publication of their relatively finished monographs or articles. Our object, then, is to make avail- able in provisional form what we believe to be some of the more im- portant of our findings soon enough to be of maximum usefulness to others engaging in studies relating to Indonesia or having a serious Interest in the topics with which our research is concerned. It is our hope that by doing so we will be of help both to Interested Indonesians and to students of Indonesia in the United States and other countries. In thus submitting Interim Reports for early pub- lication the members of our group will generally be doing so prior to command of all relevant data or before this data has been completely analyzed. Certainly they will be submitting them without having had an opportunity for casting them in finished written form. It should therefore be emphasized that these preliminary reports are to beconsidered as explicitly tentative and provisional in character. It is our expectation that most of them will be followed by later publications bearing on the same subject of a less tentative and more solid character. We hope that our Interim Reports will elicit candid and open criticism from interested persons reading them. For we believe that thereby we will benefit, and that in many cases such criticisms will point the way to better analysis of the data in hand and/or to further research on facets of the subject so far not adequately covered. Thus we cordially invite and welcome such criticism. We would appreciate it if those Inclined to offer it would write to the author in question, c/o Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. George McT. Kahln DirectorPREFACE Mr. Donald Willmott’s introductory and yet tentative study of the national status of the Indonesian-domiciled Chinese is the first in the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project’s Interim Reports Series. He addresses himself to a problem generally regarded as of outstanding importance in contemporary Indonesia but which has received very little scholarly attention. Mr. Willmott’s research is based upon a long study of Indonesian society, a knowledge of the Indonesian and Chinese languages, and sixteen months of research in Indonesia during 1954 and 1955. Since his field work related primarily to the problem of cultural assimilation of the resident Chinese to Indonesian society, he is well-qualified to write this report. Mr. Willmott was born in China, a British subject, in 1925. In 1946 he came to the United States and enrolled at Oberlin College, from which he received his B.A. in 1950. Prior to his stay in Indonesia he spent four years of resident graduate study at the University of Michigan and at Cornell University, working primarily in the fields of Sociology, Social Psychology, and Far Eastern Studies. In the fall of 1956 he will join the faculty of the Memorial University of Newfoundland. He is expected to receive his Ph.D. degree from Cornell in 1957. Additional reports by Mr. Willmott concerning other aspects of the problem of assimilation will appear in the future. Further research relating to the Chinese minority in Indonesia is at present being carried on in behalf of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project by Dr. G. William Skinner, previously Field Director of the Cornell Southeast Asia Program and author of two recent studies on the Chinese in Thailand. G. McT. Kahinii TABLE OF CONTENTS page PREFACE i INTRODUCTION v CHAPTER I, THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES, 1900-1941 1 1. Traditional Dutch Policy as a Stimulus to Chinese Nationalism 1 2. Influences from China and the Rise of Nationalism among the Indies Chinese 3 3. New Dutch Policy and Chinese Reactions 6 4. Relations between Chinese and Indonesians under Dutch Rule 3 CHAPTER II, NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE UNDER DUTCH RULE, 1850-1949 11 1. Early Nationality Laws 11 2. Preparations for Consular Negotiations and Conflicting Citizenship Acts 11 3. The Consular Convention of 1911 13 4. Ambiguities Concerning the Position of Peranakans 14 CHAPTER III, NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE UNDER THE REPUBLIC, 1945-1955 16 1. The Japanese Occupation 16 2. Chinese Reactions to the Revolutionary War 16 3. Actions Taken by the Chinese Government 19 4. Actions Taken by the Indonesian Republic 20 5. The Citizenship Act of 1946 21 6. Developments in Dutch-held Territory 23 7. The Round Table Agreement on Citizenship 24 8. Ambiguities and Clarifications Concerning Citizenship 25 9. Draft Citizenship Act of 1954 and Its Opponents 26CHAPTER IV, THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP TREATY WITH CHINA 1. Preparations for the Treaty 2. Provisions of the Treaty on Dual Citizenship 3. Reactions of Various Parties to the Treaty 4. Reactions of Indonesian Chinese to the Treaty 5. Exchange of Notes Concerning the Treaty 6. Conclusions about the Dual Citizenship Treaty CHAPTER V, DEMOGRAPHY OF CHINESE CITIZENSHIP 1. Inmigration and Population 2. Options for Chinese Citizenship CHAPTER VI, GOVERNMENT MEASURES AFFECTING THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CHINESE IN INDONESIA 1. Allen Control Measures 2. Restrictions on the Economic Activities of Alien Chinese CHAPTER VII, THE POSITION OF INDONESIAN CITIZENS OF CHINESE DESCENT 1. Government Policy Towards Chinese- descent Citizens 2. Legal Position of Indonesian Citizens of Chinese Descent 3. Education of Citizens of Chinese Descent 4. Economic Measures Concerning Citizens of Chinese Descent 5. Political Parties and the Minority Question CHAPTER VIII, INDONESIAN CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS CITIZENSHIP 1. Government Expectations 2. Chinese Motives in Choosing Indonesian Citizenship 3. The Question of Good Citizenship page 32 32 35 36 37 41 44 48 48 49 51 51 53 55 55 55 58 60 62 65 65 65 66page 4. The Question of Loyalty 67 5. Trends in Citizenship Attitudes of the Chinese Minority 70 6. Loyalties of the Foreign Chinese 72 CHAPTER IX, CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS 74 1. Future National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia 74 2. Position of the Foreign Chinese 75 3. Position of Citizens of Chinese Descent 75 APPENDICES: I. Summary of the main provisions of the Indonesian Citizenship Act of 1946 (Act No.3/1946). 78 II. Excerpts from the Round Table Agreement concerning the Assignment of Citizens < (November, 1949). 79 III. Excerpt from the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Act No. 7, Gazette No. 37, August, 1950). 80 IV. Excerpt from the Draft Citizenship Act of 1954 81 V. Text of the Agreement of the Issue of Dual Nationality Between the Republic of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China 82 VI. Speeches Delivered at the Signing of the Treaty of Dual Nationality Between the Republic of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China 87V INTRODUCTION IXirlng the period from May, 1954, to August, 1955, the present writer was engaged in sociological research on Chinese community life in Central Java. Among other things, he was Interested in culture change and assimilation in this minority group. It was apparent that an understanding of assimilation would require a prior knowledge of the national status and the national orientations of the Chinese, and materials were gathered with this in mind. In writing up this report, however, the author was aware that historians, economists, and other social scientists may also be interested in aspects of this problem, and he has therefore endeavored to provide as broad a treatment of the subject as his abilities and sources permit. With fellowships from the American and the Canadian Social Science Research Councils, the writer went to Indonesia to gather materials for a doctoral dissertation. The present report, however, was made possible by the financial support of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, during both the field research and the write-up periods. Much of the present report is based on interviews and observa- tions made by the writer during his stay in Indonesia, or at least colored by impressions arising from these. The majority of the material, however, comes from books, documents, and periodicals available in Indonesia, mostly in the Indonesian language. Unfor- tunately, materials originating in China Itself were not available to the author. English and Dutch as well as Indonesian sources were used in the preparation of chapters covering the historical back- ground, but the contemporary materials were mostly Indonesian. And as may be expected in a field so highly charged with emotion as that of minority problems, all reports and materials are subject to serious error arising out of the particular biases of the sources. Statistics are no exception in this respect. Although the writer has attempted to evaluate and cross-check materials wherever possible, most items of information were found in only one or two sources. Therefore, many errors have no doubt been included. These various deficiencies and shortcomings should be kept in mind while reading this report. In cases where the writer had reason to doubt the complete reliability of a statement, he has used such warning expressions as "probably" and "it would seem that". But since it would be tedious to put every stateaent of fact in tentative form, the reader is invited to be his own skeptic and judge throughout. The romanization of Chinese names in this report follows the general usage in Indonesia. Most Indonesian Chinese persons and groups have adopted a Dutch romanization of their names as pronounced in one of the South Chinese dialects; for example, the Member of Parliament "Siauw Giok Tjhan", and the early Kuomintang organization "Soe Po Sla". On the other hand, a Wade-Giles romanization of the Kuo Yu, or mandarin pronunciation, is used by some; for example, the “Chung Hua Hui"—an organization which is quite distinct from the "Tlong Hoa Hwe Koan", although the corresponding Chinese characters are Identical.Indonesian place names are spelled according to general usage in modern English-language publications; for example, "Surabaya", rather than "Soerabaja". The city of Djakarta is called by its former Dutch name, Batavia, wherever it is referred to in the period before its name was officially changed. One other problem of terminology should be mentioned here. Many members of the Chinese minority group maintain that such terms as "Indonesian", "native Indonesian", or "indigenous population" should not be used to exclude inhabitants who are of Chinese descent. They point out that the majority group itself is not descended from the original inhabitants of the archipelago, and that many Chinese families have been "Indonesians" for hundreds of years. Thus the use of such terms to apply to a group not including persons of Chi- nese descent may be considered to be discriminatory or offensive. While the present writer sympathizes with this point of view and disapproves of all invidious distinctions, he has found it impos- sible to find a suitable alternative terminology. He can only say that in using such terms in their exclusive sense, he does not in- tend to imply that Indonesian citizens of Chinese extraction are any less Indonesian than others. In fact, the writer hopes that this report will be a contribu- tion, not only to knowledge of the minority problem in Indonesia, but also to its solution. Donald E. Willmott April, 19561 CHAPTER I THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES, 1900-1941 In 1908, the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan, a leading Chinese organization of Batavia, was busying itself with a Most unusual task. Its presi- dent had received a letter from a certain L. H. W. van Sandick, who had been a district officer in West Borneo and was now in Holland pre- paring a book on government policy towards the Chinese in the Nether- lands East Indies. Van Sandick requested information and opinions from the Chinese notables of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan on fourteen points. A- mong them was the following: "Do Chinese who have become Dutch nation- als by naturalization thereby lose their former citizenship? or does the Chinese government continue to consider them as Chinese citizens?" The officers of the Tlong Hoa Hwe Koan were no doubt Impressed by the generally pro-Chinese outlook expressed in van Sandick's letter, and glad of an opportunity to publicize the aspirations of the Indies Chinese. To draft a reply, they appointed a special committee, in- cluding their own president, four eminent businessmen, and two gran- dees of the Dutch-appointed Chinese hierarchy. A month later the work of the committee was accepted at an extraordinary meeting of the Board of Directors and officers of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan. Questions about their organization and its affiliated schools, about legal restric- tions on Chinese residents in the Indies, and about government policy towards the Chinese were answered at length. In each case a general "answer" wassupplemented by "further information". On the question of citizenship, however, the reply was brief: Answer: Concerning this situation we are unable to give a reply, because we do not know the existing law in China. Further information: We cannot give any additional information. All we can say is: Whether a Chinese who has been naturalized loses his former citizenship or not, depends upon the opinion of the man himself. (1) While this reply was perhaps somewhat less than completely can- did, no one could have given a definite answer at that time. And as we trace the history of the national status of the ladies Chinese, we shall see it move from ambiguity to ambiguity, ending today at a point where it is still uncertain and still seems to depend upon "the opin- ion of the man himself". Traditional Dutch Policy as a Stimulus io Chinese Nationalism The Chinese overseas, like their ancestors in China, had always been sharply divided by provincialism. In spite of their much greater residential proximity in overseas communities, barriers of dialect. (1) Van Sandick's letter and the answers given to it are found in the following source: Nio Joe Lan, RiwaJ^at 40 Taen dari Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan-Batavia (1900^1939>, Batavia'; 1940,' pp; 1'33-T4¥ and 22F T:2 custom, prejudice, and suspicion separated the Chinese into more or less exclusive groupings based on the district or even the village which was considered "home" in China proper. In the Indies there was a further division between the "Totoks", or recent Immigrants, and the "Peranakans", who were local-born Chinese, most of whose parents were also local-born. The great majority of Peranakans had Indonesian grandmothers or great-grandmothers, and spoke Malay or a native Indies language in their homes. Then-too, the overseas Chinese had never received any help froi the Imperial Government of China, and were officially considered as outlaws until 1894, as emigration had been forbidden by law. No wonder, then, that the feeling of belonging to China as a nation had been almost non-existent among the Chinese throughout the sev- eral centuries of their life in the Indies. The fact that the spirit of national solidarity spread quite rapidly among the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies after the turn of the century, Buiy be explained by the combined effects of two major factors: a common dissatisfaction with the restrictions placed upon them by the Dutch Government, and a sudden Influx of modernist and nationalist Influences from China Itself. In comparison with the indigenous population, the Chinese en- joyed a generally privileged position in the colonial society of the Indies. Their grievances were none-the-less keenly felt. They were confined by law to the well-defined Chinese quarter in each town or city, and could not trade in the countryside or travel to another locality without requesting a pass from the authorities on each occasion. As the Chinese quarters became more and more crowd- ed, they became increasingly intolerable, and were compared, with some justice, to the ghettos of Europe. Although the Chinese were placed under the civil and commer- cial law applied to Europeans, they were subject to the criminal law and court system provided for the indigenous population. Among other disadvantages which this Involved, they especially resented the politle rol, a police court in which it was difficult to se- cure Justice because of the wide and arbitrary powers of the judges. Their resentment was magnified when, in 1899, the Japanese were given full legal equality with Europeans. Another grievance was the lack of government provision for the education of Chinese children. Both the 1854 regulations setting up a limited school system for the indigenous population, and the wider educational provisions introduced with the new "ethical policy" at the turn of the century were interpreted to exclude the Chinese. They were admitted to European or "native" schools only in rare cases, and were even then charged higher school fees. Chinese schools received no subsidies. Yet the Chinese were paying as high taxes, or, in their opinion, even higher taxes than Europeans, for whom a separate school system was provided. (2) (2) Fuller accounts of these and other grievances of the Indies Chinese may be found in the following sources: P.H.Fromberg,"De Chineesche Beweging op Java", Verspreide Geschriften, Leiden, 1926, pp. 405-446. Victor J>urcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London, 1951, pp. 507 f., ----------------- V.de Veer,Chlneezen Onder Hollandsche Vlag,Amsterdam,1908, pp. 1-66. ----------------------------------There was an even mere inportant economic stlaulut tn national solldaritji JuweTer, in 1908 the goTernaent ended Its policy ef fara- ing out the oplua trade to Chinese aerehants, and instituted instead a goYornaent aonopoly ot oplua sales and restrictions on its use. In the saae year it was decided to extend the gorernasnt aonspoly pawnshops throughout the Indies, and to establish agrieultwral credit banhs to provide loans to laraers at aero reasonable rates than the private aoney-lenders, chiefly Chinese, had claiaed. *^110 meant the loss of an lapartant source of revenue for the wealthy aerehants, and the threat of serious competition in the money-lending sphere for a large section of the Chinese population down to the small shopkeepers. These measures stimulated unity in ths Chinese connun- ity vis-a-vis the government, and, as we shall see, encouraged them to turn to the Chinese Imperial Government for svqpport and protection. Inf luences from China and the Biae of iHj^timutiisbi amisng the indies (Ihiiseflb With the factor of common dissatisfaction latent in the Chinese community, nationalism found fertile soil when its first seeds were brought from China Just before the turn of the century. The humilia- tion of defeats and encroachments, first by the European powers, and then by Japan in the Sines-Japanese War of 1895, bad inspired modern- ist and reformist movements among the intelligentsia in China, and contributed to anti-foreign mass movements naong the poasantry. In 1898 the youx^; Ekq^cror Euang gsu, guided by the rbfoxmists, decreed a series of sweeping changes intended to strengthen and modernize the military, administrative, and educational systeiBB. These wmre cut short by a ceup d*4tat by the aqirmis Dowager, but after the Boxer Rebellion of Iwd,’ even she was forced to carry out many similar reforms. Meanwhile, Sun Tat-sen was preaching nationalism and organ- izing revolution both in China and among the overoeas Chinese. These developments were bound to effect the Chines© in the Nether- lands East Indies, as many of thm were in constant eemmunlcatien with their relatives in China and other Asian eeuntriem, and there was a good deal of travelling .fback and'forth. JSf turn of the century, newspagp^rs, periodicals and books were already being published by Chinese in the Indies, mostly in the Malay language^ and this activity increased rapidly in thb first tWe decadcm of the Twentieth Century. A large proportion of the ChinMO press was dedicated to reviving the interest of Peranaksns in Chinese eustomst, Chlxtese bistort' and culture, and a CRiineso point of 'vievr. As China itself deveieped towards a modem national state, the Chinese press in the Indies added more and aero political nationaliom to its cultural nationalism. Paralleling the development of the nationalist press^ was the rapid growth of Chinese nationalist education in the Indios. Thia began with the founding of the Tlong Bea Bwe Eean in Batavia in 1980. This organizatisai set out to promote Chinese nationalism on the basis of Confucianism, and to break down the barriers which separated4 Peranakans fro* Totoks, and the various speech groups one fro* another. Within a few years at least a dozen Tiong Boa Owe Koan organizations were established in different parts of Java, and by 1911 there were 93 of thes scattered throughout the archipelago. Their wain function was to operate Chinese schools, and from the first these schools used Mandarin, er the national dialect, as the lai^uage of instruction, and ewployed teachers directly from China. They also served as wedding and funeral societies, and generally endeavored to proaote adherence to Chinese custoes, culture and religion. Like the press, however, their orientation gradually shifted from cultural to political nationallaw, and by 1923 they were ready to eliwinate the prowotion of Confuclanisw frow their stateRBont of purpose. (3) The Chinese nationalist wovewent in the Indies was greatly stiwulated by a series of visitors and eaissarles frow China. The first of these was K’ang Tu-wei, the leadiiq: reforwist who escaped the Btpress Dowager's purge in 1898, and thenceforth travelled awong the overseas Chinese cowwunlties preaching natlonallsw and refers. His visit to Java in 1933 gave great Iapetus to Chinese cooBunity solidarity and a nationalist outlook in trade, education, and culture. In particular, he encouraged the eatabllshwent of schools, aiul set in wotlon a wovaoeent to eliwinate the wearing of Javanese dress, the chewing of sirih, and other local custows a- song Peranakan women. Mo doubt the success of exiled refoiwlsts and revolutionaries awong overseas (%inese awoke the Manchu Ctovernwent to the potential- ities of these coaannltles as rich sources of political and econo- wlc support. In about 1905 the Manchu Governwent initiated an active cawpalgn to win the loyalty and tap the wealth of the Chi- nese in Southeast Asia. The first Manchu ewlssary to arrive in Java was Lauw Soe Kle, an official of the Education Ministry. In 1906 he presented hiw- self to Dutch authorities in the uniforw of a Naval Adwiral, and then proceeded to wake a survey of Chinese schools in Java. Be called together a coxiference of delegates frow various Tlowg Boa Hee Kean branches, and gave Iapetus to plans for a federation which would standardize and supervise Chinese education in the Indies/ When the federation was established in the following year, an official arrivalfrow China to take up the post of Inspector of Schools, a post created by the federation but paid for by the Manchu Government. (4) At the same time, the Tiong Bea Hwe Koan schools were invited to send their graduates to the Chi Man Bnxeh T'ang, a governwent school in Nanking, for secondary schooling. Up to the tiwe of the 1911 revolution, about 239 Chinese frow the Indies studied there, with all expenses paid by the Imperial Governwent. (8) (3) Mio Joe Lan, op. cit., passla. (4) I^. , pp. 80-32. (5) Ibid., pp. 191-137.5 More dramatic, however, were the visits of two Chinese naval vessels to Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaja, in 1907, 1909, and 1911. While Peranakans and Totoks cane frcan far and wide to glory in the Sight of modern warships manned entirely by smartly uniformed Chinese, the emissaries frcnn China were creating closer political and commer- cial ties with local Chinese leaders. Referring to their first visit, a Peranakan newspaperman and local historian wrote: ...fr<»a the day that that mission arrived, the feelings of the Chinese inhabitants of the South Seas towards their fatherla^ became more ardent. The name of the Emperor Euang Hsu became ever more illustrious: he was considered as the first Emperor who genuinely loved his people, for no previous Qaperor had paid any attention to the overseas Chinese. (6) These and numerous other missions from China gave great encour- agement to the Boreaent of leading Chinese merchants to establish Chambers of Commerce in major cities throughout the Indies between 1902 and 1911. Although the Chinese name of these organization^, "Sianghwee", literally means "ccHiimerclal association**, they were by no means confined to ccmuaerclal affairs only. In addition to local social and welfare work, and the championing of Chinese business and ccmmunity interests be- fore Dutch government authorities, they formed the major link between the Chinese communities in the Indies and the governments of China, both Manchu and Republican. The Sianghwee of Semarang may be taken as an example, in the ten-year period frcm 1907 to 1917, it collected sub- stantial contributions fr(»i its aeabers ten times for flood relief in China, and six times for direct support of the Chinese national treas- ury. It helped to sell either Chinese government bonds or shares for private enterprises in China fifteen times Ih the same period. Further- more, the Semarang Sianghwee delegated its director to attend the 1913 conference in Peking, which chose a number Of overseas Chinese repre- sentatives to sit in the new parliament. And on several occasions it requested the Chinese Government to intercede wirth the 'Butch Government on behalf of the Indies Chinese. (7) In 1908, Siu Yat-sen’s revolutionary movment was reflected in the Indies by the founding of "Soe Po Sia" organizations in various cities. Beginning as study clubs, with evening courses on national and international affairs, these groups became the benter of Kuomin- tang organization and Influence among Indies Chinese after the 1911 Revolution. In addition, a number of radical and secret national- ist organizations became active, such as the Ten Men League, the "&>ng Tong” labor federation, the Blood and Iron Union, and the National Salvation Brigade. These organizations w«?e considered dangerous by the Netherlands Indies Government, and in 1920 they were suppressed or outlawed, after a series of violent disorders amoi^ the Chinese. Some of the leaders were deported, and the Chinese press in general was more closely supervised. (8) (6) Boekoe Peringetan 1907-1937 Tiong Hwa Slang Hwee Smsarang, BSiarang, IfSTfpT ff.----------------------------------- (7) Ibid., pp. 6-13. (8) Liem Thlan Joe, Rlwajat Semarang, Semarang, c. 1933, pp. 247-249.6 The growth of the nationalist spirit was also evidenced in the anti-Japanese feelings and activities of Indies Chinese communities. Disturbances and boycotts against Japan began in 1912, and becawe More and More severe with each new Japanese InfrlngeMent on Chinese sovereignty: the Twenty-one Deoaands of 1915, the occupation of Man- churia in 1931, and the Sino-Japanese War beginning in 1937. The Netherlands Indies GovernMent, not wanting to offend Japan, took vigorous action to prevent such activities, even to the extent of forbidding the flying of the Chinese flag at half east on the anni- versary of the Twenty-one DSMands. Thus we have seen the successive rise of three Manifestations of the nationalist movement: educational and cultural natlenallSM in the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan organizations, cosMerclal natlonallsM in the Sianghwee organizations, and political nationalisM in the Soe Po Sia and the organizations which followed it. All of these, with the siqpport of the local Chinese press, continually urged and pe- titioned the Netherlands Indies GovernMent to iMprove the position of the Chinese. (9) New Dutch Policy and Chinese Reactions ...1. .. ■ 1 ■■ The Netherlands Indies GovernMent set up a Bureau of Chinese Affairs in 1900. Officers of this Bureau, as well as such public champions of the Chinese as van gandick, de Veer, and especially FroMberg, had been quick to sense that the interests of the Dutch GovernMent lay in winning the allegiance of the Chinese. StiMu- lated by the counsels of these Men, by fears of the growing influ- ence of the Manchu GovernMent, and by pressures froM the CSilnese coMMunity itself, the GovernMent esbarked upon a long-range policy of attraction. The pass systeM, which so liMited the Chinese in their Movements, was relaxed slightly in 1904, further slackened in 1910, and completely abolished in 1916. After 1916, the crowded Chinese quarters of Many cities were permitted to extend their boundaries, and in 1919 in Java and 1926 in the Outer Prevliuses all restriction on residence case to an end. In 1914 the hated politle rel courts were abolished. In 1917 a new Measure allowed certain Individual Chinese or Indonesian subjects to '’assimilate" them- selves to Dutch legal status and participate in its privileges, but with so Many qbailflcatlons that it did not satisfy Chinese de- mands for legal equality. Probably Most important in the long run was the establishment of the ’’H.C.S.’’, or Dutch-Chinese schools, beginning in 1908. Un- like most of the schools provided for the indigenous population, the language of instruction in these schools was Dutch, and the currlcu- lum was the same as in the European elementary schools. By 1914 there were 27 Dutch-Chinese schools, and their numbers continued to (9) A coaprehensive analysis of the rise of nationalism among the Indies Chinese may be found in the following source: Lee E. Williams, The Rise of Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Nether- lands iB^a, 1990-1916, (doctoral dissertation!. Harvard University," T956;----------7 expand throughout the period of Dutch rule. Many of the graduates of these schools were able to continue their education in Dutch- language secondary schools, and an Increasing number went to Holland for a university training. A few Chinese had been appointed to Municipal Advisory Councils ever since their establishaent during the first decade of the century, and after 1909 the Chinese cowBunlty was allowed to select Sose of their own representatives. In 1917 the Government announced that it was ready to establish a national advisory council, the Volksraad, and that Chinese would be given at least three of the sixty-one seats. This proved to be a touchstone for Chinese orientations. On the initiative oi H. H. Ean, a member of the Batavia Muni ai- pal Council, a conference of Chinese was called together in Semarang in raid-November, 1917, to discuss the' question of Chinese represen- tation in the Volksraad. With almost 700 delegates from more than 36 Chinese organizations throughout Java, Including numerous officials and other notables, this was one of the biggest and most significant meetings ever held by the Chinese in the Indies. The debate was long and heated. It was clear that government policies had convinced a certain lunaber of the delegates that by accepting their status as Dutch citizens and working through the advisory councils, the Chinese community could gradually achieve a satisfactory position in the col- onial society. Opposed to this were the more ardent converts to Chi- nese nationalism, who believed that it was hopeless to expect conces- sions from the Dutch except through the struggle of the Chinese c(»a- munity itself, with the protect:ion and, when necessary, the interces- sion of the Chinese Government. These were opposed to participation in the Volksraad, and preferred to consider themselves as foreigners. The conference finally decided, by majority vote, that the Chi- nese community should not send representatives into the Volksraad. This was the position which almost the entire Chinese press had taken in advance. It was a measure of the success of the CSilnese national- ist movement to date. (10) Throughout the twenties and thirties, the nationalist movement continued to thrive. This was in part due to the failure of ths Indies Government to rehove certain grievances still strongly felt by the Chinese. Peranakans resented the fact that although they were officially considered as Dutch subjects, most departments of the Government continued to class them as "foreign orientals*'. Be cause of the disabilities of the legal system provided for the na- tive population, the Chinese community continued to demand total group assimilation to European legal status. The bitterness of this grievance was intensified by the fact that the Cksvemment once promised such assimilation, but later announced that it would be impossible. Furthermore, Siamese were granted full legal assimi- lation in 1938, while the Japanese had enjoyed it since 1899. The Chinese continued to be dissatisfied also with the amount of Govern- ment education provided for their children, and were convinced that (10) Boekoe Perlngetan 1907-1937 Tiong Hwa Slang Hwee Semarang, 17; and Liem Thian Joe, op. cit., pp. 235 f.8 their taxes were being assessed at discrimatory rates. (11) While the Chinese nationalist moveeent was thus nourished by grievances provided by the Dutch, it was also nurtured by support and direction supplied fron China. Local Kuomintang associations throughout the Indies, headed by the Chinese Consul General in Batavia, formed the leading element in the movement. In addition to maintaining pressure on the Indies Government to improve the po- sition of the Chinese, these organizations constantly encouraged closer ties with China. In 1932 the Chinese Government established an Overseas Affairs Commission to serve as a link with the Chinese abroad, and the official solicitation of relief funds and contribu- tions to the national treasury continued unabated. There was even an attempt to organize among the Indies Chinese an election of repre- sentatives to the Chinese National Congress, but this was suppressed by the Government. The majority of Chinese newspapers in the colony were in the Malay language, but even these were predominantly nation- alistic. This was an indication that the Chinese nationalist move- ment In the Indies Included not only the great majority of politic- ally conscious Totoks, but a large proportion of the articulate Peranakans as well. (12) Nevertheless, in spite of the opposition of the China-oriented group, individual Chinese continued to accept appointments to the municipal and provincial councils, and to the Volksraad after Its opening In 1918. And thrm^hout the twenties, support for this po- sition grew steadily. The Increasing number of Chinese who receiv- ed a Dutch education were acquiring also a Western outlook which alienated them fron the Chinese nationalist Bu>vement. Those who were able to study In Holland were zealous Chinese nationalists while there, but on their return they usually found that Dutch society and culture were mofe congenial to them than was that of the nationalistic Totoks and their Peranakan supporters. There was also a good deal of rivalry between the students of the Chinese-language and Dutch-language schools, and this carried over into attitudes of mutual hostility later on. Reflecting these developments, the "Chung Bia Hui" came Into existence In 1927. This was organized and led by Dutch-educated Intellectuals—mostly well-to-do business and professional people. The Dutch language was used in their meetings and conferences. The organization advocated the acceptance of Dutch citizenship, and specifically excluded Chinese Totoks from membership. They pro- posed to work for the Interests of the Chinese community through political participation In the municipal and provincial councils and the Volksraad, and rejected any dependence upon the Chinese Government. Nevertheless, they took an Interest in the development of China, and remained enthusiastic advocates of cultural national- ism. For Instance, they demanded that Chinese history and geography (11) George HcT. Kahln, The Political Position of the Chinese in Indonesia, (thesis), Stanford University, 1946, pp. 87-9C1I. (12) Ibid., pp. 79-87.9 be taught In the Dutch-Chinese schools. In 1939, the Chung Hua Hui held two elected seats in the Volksraad. (13) The trend away from Chinese nationalism apparent in the Chung HUa Bui went one step further in the ’’Partai Tlonghoa Indonesia" (Chinese Party of Indonesia), which was established In 1932. To this group, Indonesia was the country of greatest importance for the Indies Chi- nese. Peranakans should invest all of their hopes in Indonesia, they said, and forget about China. They should work<^lde by side with the other groups in the population, Indonesians, Eurasians and all, on the basis of common Ideals. Thus the Partai Tlonghoa Indonesia was anti- Dutch, and sought connections with the Indonesian rather than the nationalist movement. It held one elected seat In the Volksraad from 1935 to 1939. (14) Thus the period of Dutch rule came to an end with three national outlooks represented in the Chinese community. The Partai Tlonghoa Indonesia, probably the smallest in numbers, centered all of its inter- est and hope in Indonesia alone. The Chung Hua Hui group was partici- pating politically in the colonial society, but looking to China In cultural matters. The Chinese nationalist movement, on the other hand, was entirely oriented towards China In Educational, cultural, and political matters. Yet is Is nevertheless probably true that the great majority of Chinese living in the Indies took active Interest in politics and did not follow any one of these three lines. Relations between Chinese and Indonesians under Dutch Rule Under Dutch rule the Chinese had come to dominate the internal trade and commerce of the entire archipelago. They gathered the pro- ducts of the land and sold them to big Dutch trading companies. Most of the small-scale manufacturing enterprises of the country were owned and managed by them. Except for the smallest shops and market stands, retailing was also largely in their hands. And Chinese shopkeepers, traders, and usurers remained the main source olE credit for the Indo- nesian people, in spite of their unconscloiiably high rates of Interest. This meant that the average Chinese was far better off than the average Indonesian, and that there were a conspicuous number of very wealthy Chinese, in contrast to the very few wealthy Indonesians. Furthermore, the advantageous economic position of the Chinese was accompanied by superiority attitudes and social exclusiveness. The policy of the government, also, had the effect of setting the two communities apart and sharpening the differences in their interests. When residential segregation was finally abolished, educational segre- gation took Its place. The whole series of concessions to the Chinese (13) Liem Thlan Joe, op. cit., pp. 277f; and Kahin, op. cit., pp. 93-95. (14) Souw Hong TJoen, "Kenang-Kenangan pada DJublllum Lima-Puluh Tahun dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Djakarta", Harl-Ulang Ke-50 Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Djakarta, Djakarta, c. 1950, p. TH] and Kahin, op. cit., pp. 9Sf.10 after 1900 amounted to preferential treatment, since Indonesians par- ticipated In very few of the new privileges. And until the last de- cade before World War II, the two communities were ruled under sep- arate administrative systems. While the Dutch idealistically claim- ed that this policy was a matter of regulating each community accord- ing to its own customs and habits, the system was In effect a very successful example of the colonial practice of "divide and rule". When the Volksraad was established^ the Chinese were Over- represented In comparison to their numbers in the total population. And Chinese members of this body, chiefly of the Dutch-oriented Chung Hua Hui group, often voted against the moderate Indonesian nationalists represented there. Except for a relatively sftall number of leftist Peranakans, and the supporters of the Partal Tlonghoa Indonesia, the Chinese showed little sympathy for the Indo- nesian nationalist movement, and were thus generally considered to be pro-Dutch. Thus, although relations between Chinese and Indonesians were generally quite smooth, there was a latent resentment against the Chinese which oewld flare into violence when stimulated by local Indonesian leaders. It was the small Indonesian middle class— educated and professional people, religious leaders, and a few businessmen—among whom the position and attitudes of the Chinese were most bitterly resented. The great Indonesian nationalist or- ganization, Sarekat Islam, was originally founded as an association of Javanese merchants whose purpose was to resist the competition of Chinese traders. The boycott movement which they launched in 1912 was accompanied by violent attacks on the Chinese quite beyond the policy of the leadership. Most serious of these were the antl-Chl- nese riots In Surakarta and Surabaja. At about the same time vio- lence broke out between members of the Sarekat Islam and Chinese in Tangerang, which was to be the scene of a large-^ale massacre of Chinese dxirlng the revolutionary war. In 1918 an antl-Chlnese in- cident involving looting, arson, and murder occurred In Kudus, where the rivalry between Indonesian and Chinese Kretek cigarette merchants and manufacturers was extremely bitter. (15) A similar Incident occurred in Pekalongan in 1931. (16) It should be emphasized that relations between the two commun- ities were generally smooth and undisturbed. Outside of the towns and cities they were often quite cordial. And everywhere there were a certain number of Chinese who maintained vfsltlng relationships with Indonesian friends. Nevertheless, the cause for conflect be- tween the two groups were deep, and when they came to the surface, hostility, anger, and even violence could result. It was not a propitious background for the day when Indonesians would win the right to rule themselves—and the Chinese. (15) Llem Thlan Joe, op. clt., p. 239. (16) Boekoe Perlngetan 1907-1937 Tlong Hwa Slang Hwee Semarang, ----------------------------11 CHAPTER II NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE UNDER DUTCH RULE, 1850-1949 Early iftrtionality Laws The East Indian Government Act of 1854 defined the status of Chi- nese born in the Indies in two ways. On the one hand, Article 109 put them on a level with the indigenous population in legal and adminis- trative matters, in contrast to the more privileged position of Europ- eans. On the other hand, an article limiting government service to Dutch citizens referred to the existing Dutch law for a definition of citizenship. According to the civil law of the time, all persons born in the Netherlands or its colonies, of domiciled parfents were consider- ed Dutch citizens, including persons of Chinese descent. This meant that the Indies Chinese, and Indonesians hs well, could claim all of the prerogatives of Dutch citizenship while abroad, even though spe- cifically excluded from them while in the colony. In Holland they could sue in the courts as citizens, and in Siam they could avoid the special taxes levied against the Chinese. (17) By the citizenship law of 1892, however, the Indies Chinese were designated as "foreigners”. This did not affect thei]* position in the colony, but it made their status abroad very uapertain. (18) Preparations for Consular Negotiations and Conflicting Citizenship Acts With the rise of nationalism among the Chinese bo^h in the Indies and in their home country in the first decade of the Twentieth Century, official and unofficial proposals were made urging the Netherlands Government to permit the stationing of Chinese consuls in the colony. An agreement between Japan and Holland in 1908, which provided for the opening of Japanese consulates in the colony, gave additional Impetus to Chinese demands for consular representation. Although negotiations between the Chinese and Dutch Governments began in the same year, a consular agreement between them was not signed until 1911. The delay was due to differences over the crucial question ai the national status of the Peranakan Chinese. The Dutch made it clear from the beginning that they would not give China consular rights unless China conceded Dutch Jurisdiction over the Peranakan Chinese. The Manchu Government's first step, there- fore, was to assess the relative importance to itself of consular representation as against its claim to the allegiance of the Perana- kans. During the winter of 1908-1909, Wang Kang Ky, secretary to the Chinese Legation in Holland, toured the Indies for this purpose, and even held a semi-official census of the Chinese community in Surabaja. (17) Purcell, op. cit., p. 514. (18) Ibid.12 In Uarcb^-ldOd , the Sianghwee organizations of Semarang, Solo, and Jogjakarta undertook a census of the Chinese In Central Java, at the request of the Chinese legation at the Hague. The following month the Secretary of the Peking Department of Education, Wang Ta-chen, made a tour of Java, ostensibly to study commercial conditions, but actually, according to a Chinese source, ”to survey the situation of the Chinese commiulty". (19) At the same time the Manchu Government promulgated a law on citizenship, no doubt partly to raise Its bargaining power vls-a-vls Holland. This law, which was Issued on March 28, 1999, claimed as a Chinese citizen every legal or extra-legal child of a Chinese father or mother, regardless of birthplace. This was the first off iclaT~enactment of the principle of Jus sanguinis, which the Chinese had always taken for granted as the basis oT citizenship. Apparently the Chinese Legation at the Hague expected to com- plete the negotiations over the consular agreement In a short time, for In November of the same year, 1999, Lu Cheng Bslang, head of the Legation, wrote to the Sianghwee of Semarang requesting them to for ward to Peking a nomination for the post of Consul General. Accord- ing to his letter, the Dutch had already agreed to the opening of a Chinese consulate In the Indies. (20) The Dutch, on the other hand, had everything to gain post- poning the agreement as long as possible, for they were gradually carrying out a policy designed to gain the allegiance of as many Chinese as possible. The pass system, which had been relaxed slight ly in 1904, was further relaxed in 1910. Chinese were appointed to municipal councils, and beginning about 1909, each community could select Its own representatives. And the first Dutch-Chinese schools were Just beginning instruction. It was expected that this policy, which was continued in further concessions later on, would win at least the passive allegiance of the Peranakan community. On the other hand, the commercial, educational, and political activities of the few Chinese emissaries so far admitted to the Indies had had far-reaching effects In spreading the spirit of Chi- nese nationalism. The Dutch therefore had good reason to fear the consequences of allowing Jurisdiction over the entire Indies Chinese population to be transferred to the Chinese Government. Before making a consular agreement, then, the Netherlands Government had to establish clear legal claim to the Indies-born Chinese, In order to counteract the effect of the newly-promulgated Chinese citizenship law. This was accomplished In the Netherlands Citizenship Act S 296, of February 10, 1910. Instead of distinguishing only "citizens” and "foreigners", as In the law of 1892, -the "Inhabitants" of the Indies were now divided Into "citizens" and "subjects". And Article 1 of the new law declared that all persons born in the Indies of parents (19) See Nio Joe Lan, op. cit., p. 127; Purcell, op. cit., p. 513; and Boekoe PerIngetan, pp. 7 and 11. (20) BoekOe Peringetan, p. 7,13 domiciled there were Dutch subjects even If not IXitch citizens. (21) This was an enactment of the principle of Jus soil, In contradiction to the Chinese principle of jus sanguinis. It meant that the Indies- born Chinese, who had been assigned Chinese citizenship by Imperial decree just a year before, now acquired the status of Dutch subjects as well. The Consular Convention of 1911 Once the obstacle of dual nationality was thus firmly establish- ed on Its double foundation, the two sides took more than a year to come to an agreement about consular jurisdiction. Nationalist-minded Chinese in the Indies raised a cry against the ’’forced naturalization” position of the Dutch negotiators, and demanded the protection of Chinese consuls. At the last minute the Semarang Slanghwee joined the Batavia Slanghwee in urging the Manchu Government not to sign any agreemerrt requiring Chinese to become subjects of another nation. (22) Nevertheless, as the price for consular representation in the Indies, the Chinese Goveriment did rellngulsh its claim to jurisdiction over the Peranakans. Thus a Consular Convention was finally signed, and entered in the Dutch statute books as S.487, on May 8, 1911. The Convention it- sell merely delineated the rights and duties of Chinese consuls in the Indies. It was the attached notes which bore on the question of citi- zenship. There it was agreed that the expression ’’citizen of” should be Interpreted in each case according to the law of the country of domicile. Thus, in accordance with the Dutch law of 1910, the Peran- akan Chinese were to be considered Dutch subjects as long as they resided In the Netherlands Indies or Holland. For most practical purposes, this ended the problem of dual nationality. The Dutch, as well as a considerable section of the Indies Chinese, considered that Peranakans were no longer Chinese citizens at all. That the problem was not finally solved, however, is evident both from a close legal analysis of the agreement and from later developments. An eminent Chinese lawyer, Mr. Ko Tjay Sing, has pointed out that the notes attached to the Convention of 1911 state that its only pur- pose is to define the rights and duties of Chinese consuls. It was not Intended, therefore, to define citizenship or solve the problem of dual nationality. According to Mr. Ko’s analysis, the Manchu Government did not concede Its claim to the citizenship of the Peran- akans , but merely agreed that the Jurisdiction of its consuls should not extend to those persons who were also Dutch subjects according to Dutch law. (23) (21) Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies, 2nd ed., Berkeley, 1941, pp. 356ff , as cited in Purcell, op. clt., p. 506. (22) Boekoe Peringetan, p. 16. (23) Ko Tjay Sing, ”De betekenis van de nota’s van 1911 met betrekking tot het onderdaanschap”, Medede?Ingen Bond van Chinese Juristen in Indonesle, Vol.Il, Nos.1/2,1949,pp.1-12.14 Ambiguities Concerning the Position of Peranakahs It Is Indeed doubtful whether Manchu-appointed consuls actual- ly would have United their activities to natters concerning the Totok Chinese only. But due to the revolution which occurred in China Just after the signing of the Convention, it fell to the new Republican Ciovernnent to appoint consuls to the Indies, and it is apparent that these consuls niever considered their duties to be so United. They continually showed a lively Interest in Chinese con- nerce and schools in the Indies, without regard to technicalities of legal Jurisdiction, and the Slanghwee organizations served as un- official consulates in cities where no official consul was posted.(24) Certainly the Republican Governnent under Chiang Kai-shek never conceded that the Peranakans had lost their Chinese citizenship, even while living in the colony. This was made clear by the passing of a new Chinese citizenship act in 1929, which reaffirmed the princi- ple of Jus sanguinis, and provided that a Chinese wishing to become a national of another country could only lose his Chinese citizen- ship with the permission of the Ulnistry of the Interior. It was also clearly indicated by China*a attitude towards the Hague Conven- tion on Citizenship, promulgated by a conference of more than forty nations in 1930. The Chinese Government refused to agree to Article 4, which prohibits any state from extending its diplomatic protec- tion to one of its subjects living in any other state of which that person is also a subject. (25) On the other hand, the Hague Convention did little to strengthen the Dutch claim. While it did affirm that every state has the sov- ereign right to determine who among its inhabitants shall be recog- nised as citizens, the Convention was not binding except upon its signatories; send even one of the great powers, the United States, refused to sign it. The position of the Nanking Government on the question of citi- zenship is also illuminated by the fact that its consuls in the In- dies repeatedly attempted to register all Chinese living there, both Totok and Peranakan. Each time the Netherlands Indies Government protested against the registration on the grounds that it violated the Consular Convention of 1911, the Chinese Government would apolo- getically- maintain that a mistake had been made, and that the regis- tration had been intended only for Totoks. (28) In faci the dual nationality impasse between Holland and China was never solved. In May, 1945, the Netherlands and China concluded a treaty abrogating Dutch extra-territorial rights in China and reg- ulating consular rights and duties. In Article 1 of that treaty. (24) Boekoe Iteriiigetan, pp. 19f., and Nio Joe Lan, op. cit. , pp. 128 and 143?'——“ ------- (25) Soenario, Masalah-Masalah Disekitar Seal Warganegara dan Orang Asing, Djakarta, c. 19d3, p. 10. (26) Purcell, op. cit., p. 545.15 we find the two contracting parties solemnly recognizing each other's citizenship law, but politely refraining from making any provision for the crucial cases in which the two laws are incompatible. What happened, then, when a Peranakan Chinese decided to visit his ancestral hcuae? He was Issued a passport by the Ekitch authori- ties, who, although carelul not to recognize any Chinese jurisdic- tion over him, did suggest that he should obtain clearance from Chinese authorities. Proceeding to the Chinese Consulate, then, he was issued a certificate in Chinese and English, which read; Certificate for Overseas Chinese of Dual Nationality Returning to China To Whom It May Concern; ~~ This is to certify that the Bearer, M................. (....*..............) in accordance with Chinese law, is still a Chinese National. However, he/she possesses a Netherlands Indies passport No............... due to his/her birth in that country. He/she is hereby permitted to return to China. (27) (27) Ko Tjay Sing, op. clt., p. 11.16 CHAPTER III NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE UNDER THE REPUBLIC, 1B45-1955 The Japanese Occupation Before dealing with the main topic of this chapter, It will be well to consider briefly the position of the Chinese during the Japanese occupation. Soon after their Invasion of the Indies In early 1942, the Japanese Interned hundreds of the leaders of the nationalist movement or of antl-Japanese activities among the Indies Chinese, and closed down all Chinese organizations. They then set up a single Chinese association In every locality, the **Haa Ch'iao Tsung Hui," with a central headquarters In Djakarta. Leaders of this organization were appointed by and responsible to the local Japa- nese commanders, and to the office of Chinese affairs In Djakarta, the "Kakklo Eton" (or. In Chinese, the **Etaa Ch'iao Pan"), which Issued regulations governing the Chinese community. Through these organizations, the Japanese restricted the movement and activities of the Oilnese, and taxed and extorted large contributions from them for the Imperial war treasury. They also encouraged the growth of Indoneslan^owned business at the expense of the Chinese, and re- moved Peranakan teachers and pupils from government schools. (28) Thus the Indies Chinese, whether Peranakan or Totok, were all considered merely as Hua Ch'iao, or "overseas Chinese", by the Jap- anese, and dealt with as a unified group separate from native Indo- nesians or Europeans. Their common opposition to and resentment towards the Japanese and their newly-constituted monolithic commun- ity organization created a high degree of unity among the Indies Chinese. After the Japanese surrender, the Hua Ch'iao Tsuxg Hui organ- izations were re-organlzed under the name "Chui^ Hua Tsung Hui". in small towns they often remained the only Important Chinese commun- ity organization, whereas In largo towns and cities they took the form of a central federation of mapy separate organizations. Chinese Reactions to the Revolutlgnary tfar ' In brief anarchic periods during the Japanese Invasion and later during the revolutionary war against the IXitch, the local people In many parts of Java made violent attacks on the Chinese. In some cases this took the form of looting, arising out of the economic needs of the masses, and the Jealousies of traders and small businessmen conqietlng with, the Chinese. In other cases orthodox religious leaders led gangs or mobs to attempt the (28) G. William Skinner, Report on the Chinese In Southeast Asia, Cornell University, 1960, p. 65; and Purcell, bp. clt., pp. 551-553.17 forcible conversion of the Chinese to Islam. SonetInes5 too, murder and arson were resorted to in retaliation for real or supposed co- operation with the Dutch counter-revolutionary forces. And no doubt in all cases the attacks were at least partly fired by the pr