BREAKING THE CHAINS OF OPPRESSION
OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE
Defense Statement at His Trial on Charges
of Insulting the Head of State
by
Heri Akhmadi
General Chairman of the Students* Council
of the Bandung Institute of Technology
Bandung, June 7, 8, 9, 10, 1979
TRANSLATION SERIES
(Publication No. 59)
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1981
Price: $8.75BREAKING THE CHAINS OF OPPRESSION OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE
Defense Statement at His Trial on Charges
of Insulting the Head of State
by
Heri Akhmadi
General Chairman of the Students’ Council
of the Bandung Institute of Technology
Bandung, June 7, 8, 9, 10, 1979
TRANSLATION SERIES
(Publication No. 59)
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1981
Price:	$8.75© 1981, Cornell Modern Indonesia ProjectPREFACE
From its establishment in 1954 part of the mandate of Cornell's Modern Indonesia
Project has been the translation and publication in English of important documents
that would otherwise have been unavailable to many of those interested in Indone-
sia's social and political history. These have included the writings of Hatta, A. K.
T’ringgodigdo, Simatupang, Sjahrir, Sudjatmoko, Sukarno, Supomo, Widjojo, and
Wilopo. Also included in this coverage of the Translation Series have been documents
unavailable even in the original Dutch or Indonesian, such as the long suppressed
report by the Netherlands East Indies Government's Coolie Budget Commission,
Living Conditions of Plantation Workers and Peasants on Java, which we published
twenty-five years ago.
The translation here presented of Heri Akhmadi's defense statement at his trial
is of a similar genre; for despite its intrinsic significance and its relevance to an
appreciation of how the leaders of a new generation of educated Indonesians view
their country's government and its major social, economic, and political problems,
it too has been suppressed. To prevent this important insight into the current
Indonesian situation becoming buried and unavailable, we are pleased to help pro-
vide for the dissemination it deserves. I would predict that a quarter of a century
from now, Heri Akhmadi's statement may well be regarded as having at least as
much importance to understanding present-day Indonesia as the Coolie Budget Com-
mission report had for an earlier period in the country's history.
Heri Akhmadi was elected by the student body of the Bandung Institute of
Technology--one of the most prestigious institutions of higher learning in the
country--as Chairman of their Student Council and their principal representative.
Since his views are close to those of the elected student leaders from more than
two dozen other universities and colleges who were arrested at the same time, his
statement can be regarded as representative of the ideas of the intellectual van-
guard of the contemporary generation of Indonesian students, which--despite
ongoing efforts to suppress them--are likely to have a significant effect on their
country's history.
Heri Akhmadi and these other student leaders were arrested and jailed in 1978
following widespread student protest at Suharto's unopposed election for another
term as President. As a consequence, they were charged with having insulted the
head of state, and it is because of the nature of this charge that Heri Akhmadi's
defense statement takes the form it does. What the government considers as an
insult to the head of state is what the students see as valid criticism of its policies.
It is to these criticisms that Heri Akhmadi addresses his defense statement that we
have here published.
George McT. Kahin
Ithaca, January 1981
iiiNote:	In this translation the style adheres as closely as possible
to the Indonesian original, including its idiosyncracies of italiciza-
tion and capitalization. The Indonesian footnotes which Heri in-
cluded in his defense statement were clearly prepared in haste
and are not always clear or complete. We have made only minimal
changes to these, and they appear immediately under the text,
being indicated by the symbols *, t, etc. They are followed by
the editorial and explanatory footnotes which we have added and
which are numbered consecutively throughout each chapter.
ivGLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
(The numbers which usually follow the translation refer to the chapter and footnote
at which the abbreviations are first explained.)
ABF = Asal Bapak Senang (So long as the Boss is happy), VIII, 4
\spri = Asisten Pribadi [Presiden] (Personal Assistants to the President), III, 23
Bakin = Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Body), I, 9
Balak-Intel = Badan Pelaksana Intelijen (Intelligence Implementation Body) ,1,9
Baperki = Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Consultative Body
on Indonesian Citizenship), III, 6
Bappenas - Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional (National Planning and
Upbuilding Body), V, 7
Berdikari = Ber^'d Diatas Kaki Sendiri (Standing on one's own feet), III, 11
Bimas = Bimbingan Masai Swa Sembada Bahanan Makanan (Mass Guidance for Self-
sufficiency in Food), VII, 6
BKK = Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan (Student Coordinating Body), IV, 68
BKPMA = Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Asing (Coordinating Body for Foreign
Investments), V, 12
BPS = Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Statistical Body), III, 26
Bulog = Badan Urusan Logistik ([State] Logistics Body), I, 15
BUUD = Badan Usaha Unit Desa (Village-Level Enterprise Body), VII, 9
CDB = Comite Besar Daerah (Big Region Committee), IV, 50
CPM = Corps Polisi Militer (Military Police Corps), II, 27
CSIS = Center for Strategic and International Studies, IV, 76
DKI = Daerah Kotapraja Istimewa (Special Metropolitan District), VI, 32
Dolog = Depot Logistik (Logistics Depot), I, 15
DPA = Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Supreme Advisory Council), III, 13
DPC = Dewan Pimpinan Cabang (Branch Leadership Council), IV, 53
DPP = Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Leadership Council), IV, 38
DPRD-GR = Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Gotong-Royong (Mutual Cooperation
Regional Legislature), X, 25
Dwifungsi = Twin Function, IV, 60
Dwikora = Dwi Komando Rakyat (People's Twin Command), III, 12
Ekuin = Ekonomi-Keuangan-Industri (Economics-Finance-Industry), IV, 22
FBSI = Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesia Workers' Federation),
IV, 66
GBHN = Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outline[s] of State Policy), II, 24
Gestapu = Gerakan Tiga Puluh September (September 30th Movement), III, 3
Golkar = Golongan Karya (Functional Groups), IV, 31
HKTI = Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Farmers' Cooperative Asso-
ciation), IV, 66
vHNSI = Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesia Fishermen's Associa-
tion), IV, 66
HO = hongeroedeem, III, 25
IGGI = Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, V, 14
IKIP = Institut Perguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (Teachers' Training Institute) , II, 5
Inmas = Intensifikasi Masai Swa Sembada Bahanan Makanan (Mass Intensification for
Self-sufficiency in Food), VII, 6
Inpres = Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction), IX, 2
Intel = [orang or petugas] intelijen (state spy or informer), I, 24
IPA = Ilmu2 Pasti dan Alam (Physical and Natural Sciences), VIII, 23
IPB = Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Agricultural Institute), VIII, 9
Ipeda = Iuran Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Upbuilding Levy), VII, 7
IPS = Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial (Social Sciences), VIII, 23
ITB = Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology), II, 3
ITS = Institut Teknik Surabaya (Surabaya Technical Institute), II, 6
Jabar = Jawa Barat (West Java), II, 38
Kadapol = Kepala Daerah Kepolisian (Chief of Police Territory), I, 25
KAMI = Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Students' Action Front),
IV, 87
KAPI = Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Indonesia (Indonesian High-School Students' Action
Front), IX, 24
KASI = Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia (Indonesian Academics' Action Front),
IX, 22
Kenop 15 = Kebijaksanaan 15 Nopember [1978] (Policy of November 15), IV, 80
KIK = Kredit Industri Kecil (Small Industry Credit), IX, 1
KMKP = Kredit Modal Keperluan Pribumi (Credit for Native Capital Needs), IX, 5
KNK = Konsep Normalisasi Kampus (Campus Normalization Concept), IV, 67
KNPI = Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (National Committee of Indonesian Youth),
IV, 66
Kodam = Komando Daerah Militer (Military Territory Command) ,1,5
Kodim = Komando Distrik Militer (District Military Command) ,1,5
Kopas[s]andha = Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha ("Secret War" Units Command),
II,	27
Kopkamtib = Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for the
Restoration of Security and Order) ,1,7
Koramil = Komando Rayon Militer (Military Subdistrict Command), IV, 27
Korem = Komando Ressort Militer (Resort Military Command), I, 5
Korpri = Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Corps of Officials of the Republic of
Indonesia), I, 11
Kostrad = Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Command), II, 27
Koti = Komando Operasi Tertinggi (Supreme Operations Command), III, 21
Kotip = Kota Administratip (Administrative Township), VII, 29
Kotoe = Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi (Supreme Economic Operations Com-
mand) , III, 21
KUD = Koperasi Unit Desa (Village-Level Cooperative), VII, 9
Laksusda = Pelaksana Khusus Daerah (Special Territorial Administrator) ,1,5
LPU = Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (General Election Institute), IV, 33
Mahmilub Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Extraordinary Military Tribunal!s]),
III,	3
viMalari = Malapetaka 15 January (Calamity of January 15), VIII, 16
Manipol-USDEK = Political Manifesto of August 17, 1959; U = 1945 Constitution; S =
Indonesian Socialism; D = Guided Democracy; E = Guided Economy; K = Indone-
sian Individuality, III, 11
MPM = Majelis Permusyawaratan Mahasiswa (Students' Consultative Council)
MPR = Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly), I, 22
Nasakom = Nasionalisme-Agama-Kommunisme (Nationalism-Religion-Communism),
III,	9
Nekolim = Neokolonialisme-Kolonialisme-Imperialisme, III, 15
NU = Nahdlatul Ulama (Islamic Scholars' Party), IV, 56
Dpstib = Operasi Tertib (Operation Discipline), II, 18
Opsus = Operasi Khusus (Special Operations), I, 16
Pangab = Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata (Panglima of the Armed Forces), IV, 34
Pangdam = Panglima Daerah Militer (Military Territory Commander), IV, 32
Parmusi = Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Party of Indonesian Muslims), IV, 63
PDI = Partai Demokrat Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party), IV, 44
Pelita = Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five Year Upbuilding [Plan]), V, 18
Pemda = Pemerh ah Daerah (Regional Government)
Penpres (PNPS) = Penetapan Presiden (Presidential Decree), I, 21
PGRI = Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia (Teachers' Union of the Republic of
Indonesia), IV, 66
PHK = Pemutusan Hubungan Kerja (Severance of Work Relationships), VII, 30
PKI = Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia), III, 2
PMA = Penanaman Modal Asing (Foreign Capital Investment), VII, 24
PMDN = Penanaman Modal Dalam Negeri (Domestic Capital Investment), VII, 24
PNI = Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party), IV, 59
Pomad = Polisi Angkatan Darat (Army Police), II, 27
Porseni = Pekan Olahraga dan Seni (Sport and Arts Festival), VIII, 21
Porwil = Pekan Olahraga Wilayah (Zonal Sports Festival), VIII, 21
PPP = Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Upbuilding Unity Party), IV, 42
P4D = Panitia Penyelesai Perselisihan Perburuhan Daerah (Provincial Committee for
Settling Labor Disputes), VII, 31
P4P = Panitia Penyelesai Perselisihan Perburuhan Pusat (Central Committee for
Settling Labor Disputes), VII, 31
Pramuka = Praja Muda Karana [Indonesian Scouts], VIII, 21
PSSI = Persatuan Sepakbola Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesia Football Union),
IV,	63
PWI = Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (Indonesian Journalists' Union), IV, 61
Seskoad = Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat (Army Staff and Command College)
STOVIA = School Tot Opleiding Van Inlandsehe Artsen (School for the Training of
Native Doctors), X, 5
Supersemar = Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Order of March 11 [, 1966]), II, 22
Tavip = Tahun Vivere Pericoloso (The Year of Living Dangerously), III, 11
Teperda = Team Pemeriksa Daerah (Regional Interrogation Team), I, 8
Teperpu = Team Pemeriksa Pusat (Central Interrogation Team), I, 8
TP = Tentara Pelajar (Student Army), X, 8
Trikora = Tri Komando Rakyat (People's Triple Command), III, 12
TRIP = Tentara Republik Indonesia--Pelajar (Student Army of the Republic of
Indonesia) , X, 8
viiTritura = Tri Tuntutan Rakyat (People's Three Demands), III, 22
UI = Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia), II, 4
USU = Universitas Sumatera Utara (University of North Sumatra), II, 7
UUD '45 = Undang-Undang Dasar, 1945 (1945 Constitution)
Wanhankamnas = Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional (National Defense and
Security Council), IV, 76TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter	Page
I.	Justice under the Law in Indonesia is like the Simalakama Fruit..	3
II.	The Charges against the Students and the Sentencing
Recommendations Express the Small-Minded Arrogance
of Those-in-Power................................................ 15
III.	The Fading of the New Order's Ideals............................. 39
IV.	The New Order Government Has the Characteristics of:
A Bureaucratic Dictatorship...................................... 50
V.	The New Order's Upbuilding Strategy is a Strategy of
Beggars and Embezzlers .......................................... 85
VI.	The Conspiracy of the Cukong—Government Officials—Foreign
Investors: Drainers of the National Wealth...................... 102
VII.	The People Have Become the Sacrificial Victim of Upbuilding...... 118
VIII.	The Hollow Identity and Cultural Stagnation of the
People of Indonesia............................................. 138
IX.	Disaster Lies in Wait for the Indonesian Nation.................. 152
X.	The Students Rise up to Break the Chains of Oppression
of the Indonesian People........................................ 158
XI.	History is on the Students' Side................................. 172
1BREAKING THE CHAINS1 OF OPPRESSION OF THE
INDONESIAN PEOPLE 2
We are all witnesses
that the clique of men who hold power
the gang of those-in-power in our country
have treated the people as the object of their power
the people of Indonesia live under the oppression no longer
of the Dutch colonialists, but of their own countrymen
I am part of the people of Indonesia
together with other Indonesian students
together with the entire Indonesian people
who feel the bitterness of living under oppression
who see the power-hunger of those in power
who have witnessed their cruelty
and are trying to fight their oppression
for it is the natural instinct of all human beings to:
LIVE IN FREEDOM AND FIGHT THEIR OPPRESSORS! !
what the students have done all along arises from their deepest instincts
TO BREAK THE CHAINS OF OPPRESSION OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE
1.	The title of Heri's defense speech already poses problems for the translator.
Mendobrak usually means "to break down" (e.g., a door), or "to smash through,"
and fits a bit oddly with belenggu (chains). In ordinary usage one would have ex-
pected mematahkan (break) or memecahkan (shatter). The translation offered
here is thus somewhat milder than the Indonesian original.
2.	There are difficulties in conveying in English the differing connotations of the
words rakyat Indonesia (as here) and bangsa Indonesia, both of which are often
translated as "the Indonesian people," or "the people of Indonesia." Bangsa
images Indonesians horizontally, in their national totality, and can sometimes be
translated as "nation," in the sense of "folk" rather than "state." Rakyat images
them vertically, as "the ordinary people," counterposed to leaders, elites, or ex-
ploiters .
2CHAPTER I
JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW IN INDONESIA IS LIKE
THE SIMALAKAMA FRUIT1
A Farcical Trial
Judges of the Court,
I would like to open my defense by quoting a play about a trial contained in
the book Max Havelaar, written by Multatuli, heroic champion and defender of the
Indonesian people. 2
Policeman:	Your Honor, this is the man who murdered Barbertje.
Judge:	He must be hanged. How did he do it?
Policeman:	Ue chopped her in pieces and then poured salt in the wounds.3
Judge:	These are serious crimes. ... He must be hanged.
Lothario:	Your Honor, I have not murdered Barbertje. I have fed and clothed and taken good care of her. ... I have witnesses who can state that I am a good man and not a murderer. . . .
Judge:	You must be hanged. Your arrogance makes your crime that much worse. It's unseemly in a person accused of crimes to consider himself a good man.
Lothario:	But Your Honor, there are witnesses who can prove it; and since I am charged with murder. . . .
Judge:	You must hang. You have chopped Barbertje up, poured salt on her wounds, and you're self-satisfied . . . three serious crimes. You, woman, who are you?
Woman:	I'm Barbertje. . . .
Lothario:	Thank God. . . . Your Honor, you can see, sir, I have not murdered her! . . .
Judge:	Hmm . . . , yes .... that's so . . . but what about pouring salt ?
1. A proverbial phrase meaning "every choice is equally bad." As explained be low, according to legend, if a man eats the simalakama fruit his father dies; but if he does not eat it, his mother dies.	
2.	In the process of translation into Indonesian, this famous ironic vignette from
Max Havelaar has undergone a few sea-changes.
3.	It appears that Heri has not understood the grim humor of Multatuli, whose
imagery of "chopping up" and "pickling" is drawn from Dutch kitchens. Instead,
he has drawn on a traditional Indonesian trope for execution with extreme cruelty.
34
Barbertje:	No, Your Honor, he never poured any salt; on the contrary,
he has been most kind to me. . . . He's an honorable man!
Lothario:	You hear, Hour Honor, she says I'm a good man.
Judge:	Hmm . . . that means the third crime still stands. Police,
take that man away; he must be hanged. He's guilty of arro-
gance. Clerk, cite in the premises [of the sentencing] the
jurisprudence of Lessing's patriarch. **
--Multatuli*
This farce shows how a court lost all meaningful capacity to seek truth or pro-
vide justice. The court in this farce has become a tool of despotic authorities to
contrive crimes for the accused under various pretexts. Even more distressing is
the judge's involvement in setting traps for the accused through the use of proce-
dures and articles from the jurisprudence of Lessing's patriarch, all of which date
from the age of absolutism.
The court in this farce gives a picture of a complete absence of justice and
legal certainty! The accused is completely in the dark, because no matter what he
does, the court's strategy for throwing him into prison always succeeds!
I have borrowed from Multatuli's work in an effort to find a standard against
which to compare the condition of the law and the courts in Indonesia today. Have
there been any major changes in our courts since that story was written, 120 years
ago? Are our courts now able to provide justice and legal certainty, or are they
still, as in the colonial era, simply tools of a Colonial government? I will consider
all of these questions in the following analysis!
The Law in Indonesia:
120 Years after Max Havelaar
Judges of the Court,
Before being brought to trial I was subjected to a process which had no rhyme
or reason. First I was arrested. Then I was released, but with the requirement
that I report in regularly. Then I was arrested and detained again. When I was
released from prison, I was saddled with the designation: "suspended arrest." All
of this took place over a period of more than a year.
Initially I was arrested on orders from Laksusda, * * 4 5 but after several months
in prison I was served a warrant from the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
♦Multatuli, Max Havelaar atau lelang kopi Maskapai dagang Belanda, Jakarta,
Jambatan, 1973.
4.	Multatuli's reference is to Gotthold Lessing's famous poetic drama Nathan Der
Wiese (Nathan The Wise), completed in 1779. The villain of the play, which is set
in Palestine under the rule of Saladin (1187-93), is the Christian Patriarch of Jeru-
salem , who is arrogant and authoritarian to the Christians under his charge, and
cruel and fanatical towards the Jews. The "jurisprudence" of the Patriarch is an
allusion to his judgment on receiving a report that Nathan has brought up a Chris-
tian girl in his household. Despite all evidence that Nathan has treated her as his
own daughter and never sought to convert her to Judaism, the prelate repeatedly
insists "It matters not: the Jew goes to the stake!"
5.	Laksusda = Pelaksana Khusus Daerah (Special Territorial Administrator). This5
[OPP] ,* * * * * 6 which I was required to sign. Then I was released by the OPP, but be-
fore a week was up a letter came from Kopkamtib7 stating that I was "under city
arrest" and required to report in regularly. And when I was arrested again, the
only explanation given by the OPP was "on orders from the Attorney-General"!
It was while I was going through this capricious process of involvement with
Indonesian law that the picture of the farcical trial in Max Havelaar became more
distinct. The terrifying picture Multatuli presented of a trial in which all the le-
gal procedures are unjust and full of uncertainty became clear to me, just as it
has become clear to other Indonesians who are involved with Indonesian law at
this time.
Everything which has happened to me has reinforced the conclusion to which
- bad already come: that justice and legal certainty still do not exist in Indonesia,
and that the condition of the law in Indonesia today is just as deplorable as it was
in the Dutch colonial era 120 years ago when Max Havelaar was written.
Is there sufficient justification for the conclusion that justice and legal certain-
ty do not yet exist in Indonesia? What forms do injustice and legal uncertainty
take? And what are their causes? We will consider these questions one by one.
The Authorities ' -e Running Their
Dirty Fingers All over the Law
Judges of the Court,
The experiences I went through in my dealings with the law are indicative of
the extent to which those-in-power are meddling with it. Even more distressing
is the fact that the apparatus for upholding the law is itself helpless against the
dirty fingerings of those-in-power.
During my preliminary investigation, I was interrogated by all kinds of differ-
ent agents of those-in-power. First I was questioned by Teperda,8 then interro-
title empowers its holder to exercise the sweeping authority of Kopkamtib in matters
relating to "security" within a particular territorial jurisdiction. In the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases the Laksusda are army commanders of the three highest levels
of regional military administration, viz. , the Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer, Mili-
tary Territory Command), Korem (Komando Ressort Militer, Resort Military Com-
mand), and Kodim (Komando Distrik Militer, District Military Command). In other
words, the Laksusda jurisdictions follow the boundaries of military commands rather
than those of the civil administration.
6.	A rather unsatisfactory translation of Kejaksaan Tinggi, the intermediate level
in the public prosecution hierarchy between the Attorney-General and local prose-
cutors. There is one Jaksa Tinggi for each province in Indonesia's civilian terri-
torial administrative system.
7.	Kopkamtib = Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for the
Restoration of Security and Order). It was originally established after the Octo-
ber 1, 1965 "coup" both to crush the communists and their allies and undermine
Sukarno's power base. It quickly evolved into a seemingly permanent (military)
secret police apparatus with virtually unlimited powers.
8.	Teperda = Team Pemeriksa Daerah (Regional Interrogation Team). The Teperda
are roving teams of interrogators and intelligence officers sent out on provincial
assignments by Teperpu (Team Pemeriksa Pusat, Central Interrogation Team), an6
gated by Balak-Intel; 9 then the Provincial Public Prosecutor took over, to be fol-
lowed by a team from the central office of Kopkamtib. All of this took more than
10 months.
Not only that, apparently quite a crowd was involved even with my arrest. I
was served with two warrants, one from Laksusda, the other from the OPP. When
I was released the OPP went so far as to mention receipt of a telegram from Lak-
susda. And when a telegram arrived from Kopkamtib, putting me under city arrest
and requiring me to report in regularly, the OPP was just like a messenger-boy
delivering it to me!
Is there such a concept as "city arrest" in true Indonesian law? Even the
people in the OPP once said that in fact there isn't! Yes . . . but since it was a
request from Kopkamtib, who could object!
In practice, the OPP is obviously just an errand-boy for Kopkamtib. The OPP
cannot stand uprightly as an apparatus for upholding the law, with its own convic-
tions and its own stance! Though it always says, "For the sake of justice," in
reality the OPP is nothing but a tool of those-in-power! What exactly is Kopkam-
tib? Kopkamtib is an institution which is unknown to our Constitution of 1945!
Judges of the Court,
Nowadays even the courts cannot escape the fingerings of those-in-power.
Why? This court is like a person whose head may move freely, but whose stomach
is bound! Can he act freely in that condition?
Not only does the executive monopolize judicial appointments and dismissals in
Indonesia, even matters of judicial bellies are under the control of those-in-power!
The Department of Justice regulates Judicial salaries, Judicial allowances, Judicial
housing, Judicial Conduct,10 and Judicial promotions. Judges are even chained to
other government officials, officials of the executive, in Korpri.* 11
It is not at all surprising, then, that, when a judge is about to decide a case in
which those-in-power are involved, he is haunted by the fear that he will be fired,
that his pay raises will be delayed, that his promotions will be blocked. A system
in which the Judiciary and the Executive are thus intertwined guarantees that,
whether they want to or not, Judges will pay attention to the interests of those-
in-power.
institution set up after October 1, 1965 to ferret out communists, but which now
has a general mandate to hunt down "subversives" of any kind.
9.	Balak-Intel = Badan Pelaksana Intelijen (Intelligence Implementation Body).
These Balak-Intel are units assigned to provincial missions by Bakin (Badan In-
telijen Negara, State Intelligence Body), the central national intelligence-gathering
agency, directly responsible to the president. The Balak-Intel are directly con-
trolled by Bakin and operate completely outside the usual hierarchies of civilian
and military territorial administration.
10.	Konduite, from the Dutch conduite, means satisfactory judicial behavior, and
is one of the criteria in promotion recommendations.
11.	Korpri = Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Corps of Officials of the Republic
of Indonesia), a sort of company-union to which all civil servants are obliged to
belong, under the control of the Minister of the Interior. Formed after the elec-
tions of 1971, it was designed to ensure monoloyalitas (monolithic loyalty) to the
president on the part of the bureaucracy.7
To speak as an Easterner: 12 Can someone with keen sensibilities or tepo-
sliro,13 someone who considers the expression of gratitude an ethical ideal of the
highest order, someone who is deeply respectful towards those who have helped
him, can such a person be oblivious to or cause harm to those who have taken
care of all his daily needs?
As a matter of common sense: of course not!
Thus it is clear that, from a structural point of view, Indonesian courts are in
an exceedingly weak position to conduct impartial trials!
The executive intervention in Judicial institutions is far too powerful!
biased Application of the Law
Justice under.the law still does not exist in Indonesia because to this day the
Law clearly makes distinctions in its treatment of members of society. The Law is
still biased! The strong can escape legal sanctions even when they are guilty. The
weak, however, are punished even when they are innocent.
Take cases of corruption, for example. It is clear that only the little fish can
be dragged into )urt, while the big fish stay comfortably entrenched in their seats
of power. 14 Manipulations and corruption in Bulog cannot be exposed above the level
of a Budiaji, who was only a Dolog head. 15 The efforts of members of Parliament
to delve more deeply into the problem, by providing a list of names of people who
"got a share of the loot" to the OPP, simply evaporated. Via the Attorney-General
the government boasted that the Budiaji case was only the beginning of [a cam-
paign] to expose manipulations in Bulog. But the fact of the matter is that to this
day there have been no further legal efforts to delve into the problem.*
Why? Because if all of the manipulations in Bulog were exposed, then the dirty
linen of the "strong" in positions of power would be aired. It would be discovered
that it is precisely they themselves who are the big fish.
Many other trials could be cited which demonstrate that the strong, those peo-
ple in positions of power, can easily evade the punishment they deserve. Take,
* Tempo, December 18, 1976; January 29, April 16, June 11, June 25, and Septem-
ber 17, 1977.
12.	Orang timur: the survival of this terminology, orang timur vs. orang barat
(Westerners), among Indonesia's younger generation, 35 years after independence,
is instructive. But perhaps 'Easterner' now serves as a better translation than
'Oriental'?
13.	Tepo-sliro, a popular Javanese phrase for sensitivity in interpersonal rela-
tions. It means, more or less, being able to put oneself in one's interlocutor's
shoes.
14.	Kakap (literally, a "sole") is a long-standing favorite in Indonesian political
parlance for a big-shot; it is usually contrasted with teri ("anchovy") for "the
little man," or "the man in the street."
15.	Budiaji, a provincial official (in East Kalimantan) of the giant state staples
monopoly Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik, [State] Logistics Body), was convicted
in 1977 of embezzling Rp. 7,600,000,000, or about $18,300,000 at the then prevail-
ing rate of exchange. Dolog = Depot Logistik (Logistics Depot), Bulog's province-
level units.8
for example, the trial of the son of Ali Murtopo, a very powerful government offi-
cial, who was acquitted, even though he had committed homicide.16 Even if the
charge of deliberate murder could not be proven, still everybody knows that using
a firearm without a license is in itself a serious crime.* Even more oddly, like a
farce of which the script has been determined in advance, the Public Prosecutor
did not even file an appeal in the case. In fact, even before the Judge handed
down his decision, the Prosecutors withdrew the murder charges initially brought
against Haris Bin Ali Murtopo.
Take, for example, the trial of Sawito,17 in which the judge foreclosed the
possibility of exposing the rottenness of those in power before the court.
I happened to have the opportunity to observe the proceedings of the Student
Trials in Jakarta, Surabaya, Jogya and Bandung. It was obvious that these trials
were conducted in a similar atmosphere, that is, an atmosphere in which opportuni-
ties for the Students to present information concerning the bankruptcy of the State
and its present leadership were sharply restricted. Meanwhile, at many of the
trials, the Judges even went so far as to read aloud statements from those-in-
power which discredited the Student movement. Even in this Student trial the
court is clearly biased. On the one hand it provides inappropriate openings to
those-in-power, while on the other it cuts short the rights of the Students.
We can find plenty of other examples. They all point in the same direction:
whoever is strong and powerful is invulnerable to the law.
At the same time, we have seen many court rulings against ordinary people
who were punished arbitrarily with no consideration for what is just.
The fate of Wasdri, a setengah gelandangan18 from Central Java who was
accused of extorting 50 rupiah from a Prosecutor in Jakarta's Senen Market, is
still fresh in our minds. The upshot of the case was that Wasdri was convicted
and sentenced to three months in prison by the Central Jakarta District Court at
the end of June 1977. + All at once the tale of "Wasdri and the Prosecutor" became
a standard of reference for how easily the power of the law can in fact be used to
oppress the little people, when not wielded by a wise and humane Judge. From a
technical legal point of view, it was certainly not difficult to prove that Wasdri
had committed extortion, or at least had attempted to commit extortion--especially
in view of the fact that a Prosecutor was involved. But clearly justice is much
more than just a matter of legal technicalities. It must also be a value grounded
* Tempo, December 3 and 17, 1977.
t Tempo, July 16, 1977.
16.	Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo is, inter alia, a long-standing presidential confidant,
and head of the vast Opsus (Operasi Khusus, Special Operations) political intelli-
gence empire. In late 1977, his son Haris was waylaid by a member of a teenage
gang from an elite Jakarta high school; in the ensuing scuffle Haris killed the
other boy with a gun he was carrying.
17.	The mystically-inclined Sawito, an obscure official who managed to persuade
a number of distinguished religious leaders and elder statesmen to sign a document
calling for President Suharto's removal, was put on trial in October 1977. The
trial became a cause celebre because of Sawito's bold allegations in court about
misdeeds in high places. He was eventually sentenced to a long prison term.
18.	A gelandangan is a homeless vagrant. Setengah-gelandangan is thus a "half-
homeless vagrant."9
in society's sense of what is just. Wasdri's case, which later provoked widespread
scrutiny and reaction in Indonesian society, is just one example of how court rul-
ings are often inhumane and do not fulfill society's sense of what is just. It is not
difficult to discern how far Indonesian law still is from fulfilling society's sense of
what is just, and how often it is used to oppress the people instead.
Not to mention that we now read the news19 about the small farmers who were
punished for "destroying crops," when in fact the crops belonged to a Chinese
who had destroyed the livelihood of small farmers in that district by cultivating
state land.
To produce justice under the Law, a court must not be biased in favor of one
of the parties involved in the case! When the courts are biased, then what we get
from court rulings is simply: Injustice under the Law.
The Standards of Justice Float But Are Also Managed
Judges of the Court,
Injustice under the law results in legal uncertainty. This means that the law
floats, and standards of truth and falsity are no longer clear, because they are
not determined oy legal norms themselves. Even though from a legal perspective
it floats, in fact "justice" today is firmly managed--by a controlling will. Stan-
dards of justice are determined by the whims of those-in-power.
These whims of those-in-power are accommodated by the "elastic" clauses in Law
No. 11 on Subversion or in other PNPS, 20 including Law No. 5/PNPS/1959, which
those-in-power are using today as a lethal weapon to restrict students in the court-
room. By using these laws those-in-power can arrest on the spot anyone they re-
gard as harming their interests, detain him for up to a year without taking him to
court, and then release him without any explanation of how his case was resolved.
We have all witnessed how many cases settled outside the courts by those-in-
power end up in curtailment of the rights of the person being prosecuted, intimi-
dation and other [forms of] repression. One of my lawyers, Sdr. Adnan Buyung
Nasution, was once confined in the suffocating darkness of a prison cell for 22
months, after which his case was considered settled without ever having been
taken to court.21 Yet to this day he is continuously shadowed by government
agents and is subject to restrictions; he has also been put on a blacklist of people
who are not allowed to participate in discussions at Universities.
Hundreds of Indonesian university and high school students suffered a similar
fate when they were arrested on the eve of the March 1978 General Session of the
MPR22 and were locked up for months in barracks or prison cells without the status
19.	A reference to the well-known Jenggawa (Jember, East Java) Affair of August -
September, 1979. In response to the resulting uproar in the press, Parliament
sent a team to East Java to investigate. Nothing, however, came of the investiga-
tion.
20.	PNPS, or, more usually, Penpres, are Presidential Decrees (Penetapan2
Presiden).
21.	The well-known lawyer and human rights advocate Adnan Buyung Nasution SH
was detained after the January 15, 1974 riots in Jakarta. The government hinted
that he was under suspicion of having encouraged, or even masterminded, them.
22.	MPR = Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly), the10
of their cases being clear. What is clear is that many of them now are under "City
Arrest" and are required to report in regularly. All of this basically constitutes
curtailment of the rights which every citizen should have.
At the present time, justice and legal certainty do not yet exist in Indonesia!
The Simalakama Fruit: Two Equally Evil Choices
Judges of the Court,
If the law cannot fulfill society's sense of what is just, then why are we, the
Students of Indonesia, demanding that our cases be settled in the courts? Why
have we chosen to take the legal route, even though we know that the legal situa-
tion is so bad?
Judges of the Court,
Facing the legal situation in Indonesia right now is much like facing the Simala-
kama fruit: Eat the fruit, and father will die; don't eat, and mother will die in-
stead.
Not settling our cases via the law would have been the same as putting an end
to the role of law in Indonesian public life. But settling our cases via the law
means confronting the reality of how bad the legal system is, as I have explained
earlier. Because we had to choose, we chose the lesser of two evils, the one least
damaging to the ideal of Indonesia as a state based on law. In the end we chose
the legal route and demanded that our cases be settled in the courts. Even though
the legal route is still dark, we realize that faith in the importance of law in public
life and faith in the power of law to prevail against arbitrary power must be kindled
and steadily fostered, until the principle of Indonesia being a state based on law
can truly take hold in Indonesia. In the context of these trials this means that we
must struggle to make the courts truly free of influence from outside powers. By
means of these trials, we also want to confront the despotism of those-in-power,
and show them that settling cases on the basis of their power will not work against
us. In other words, we want to show that the present arbitrary exercise of power
still has some limits, and will continue to have limits if only enough people have
the courage to keep challenging it, for the power which those-in-power possess in
truth comes from the people and can be reclaimed by them.
A Choice for the Judges: Share Responsibility for the Sins of
Those-in-Power Whom They Protect or Help Smash Arbitrary Power
Judges of the Court,
Presumably it is clear to the court that for us this courtroom is an arena for
the struggle to smash arbitrary power, an arena in which to struggle to establish
a more respected position for the law in a more civilized society. The Judges of
the Court are in a crucial position to determine whether or not that struggle is
ultimate source of authority under the 1945 Constitution. Composed of the members
of Parliament, as well as representatives of the regions and of 'functional groups,'
it has the tasks of electing the president and determining the Broad Outlines of
State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara). The president acts as the mandatory
of the MPR and is, in theory, fully responsible to it.11
successful. This means that they also have a great responsibility, a responsibility
for justice and legal certainty in Indonesia. This responsibility is all the greater
because the legal system in Indonesia is based on the Oneness of God. 23 The pre-
amble to every judicial decision always includes the phrase:	"For the Sake of Jus-
tice Based on the Oneness of God." That phrase is not just decorative or orna-
mental. Every judge about to decide a case should take this to heart, that he will
some day answer to the Only One God for his decision.
Judges of the Court,
To illustrate how great a judge's responsibility is, I would like to tell a well-
known story from Persian mythology, which goes as follows:
It is said that in the old days there was a religious scholar [ulama] who also
served as a judge in the capital city of Persia. This judge was well-known for
decisions which always vindicated his exceedingly tyrannical king. When the judge
and the king died and went to live in the hereafter, how surprised the judge was
to see that the king, who during his lifetime had always been pleasure-loving and
tyrannical, suffered no terrible torments. Whereas he himself was doomed to ex-
cruciating torture. Seeing this, the Judge asked the guardian of hell:
"O guardian angel of hell, why did Allah condemn his servant, who was pious
and greatly praised His power, to excruciating torture, while our power-hungry
and tyrannical King goes scot free?"
The guardian angel of hell answered:
"Truly, learned one, do you not remember that during your former life you
used your knowledge and wisdom to vindicate the actions of that power-hungry
and tyrannical King? It was you who thus blinded his conscience and therefore
you must also bear the burden of his sins."
This myth illustrates the magnitude of a judge's responsibility! Not only do
the sages teach us about the magnitude and gravity of judicial responsibility, in-
deed this is clearly outlined by every holy book and religion.
Of course, a Judge's task is not a simple one, whereas his responsibility is
great, especially in a country like Indonesia which embraces the concept of "a
state based on Law." This concept very clearly places the Judiciary in a key
position to maintain the integrity of the state. It puts a heavy burden of respon-
sibility on every Indonesian Judge, because he must constantly be capable of de-
fending his independence and freeing himself from the influence of those-in-power.
Truly honorable are those Indonesian judges who are able to carry out their
duties sincerely on the basis of their own belief in what has become our national
ideal, the ideal of establishing and maintaining a unitary Republic of Indonesia as
a state based on Law.
And truly degraded and pernicious are those Indonesian judges who turn out
not to have carried out their duties on the basis of their own convictions, but
instead have simply gone along with the wishes of those-in-power or with their
personal desire to protect and advance their careers.
Judges who betray their professional oath are the most despicable Indonesians
of all.
23. A reference to KeTuhanan Yang Maha Esa, the pandenominational first "prin-
ciple" of the Pancasila (Five Principles), the Indonesian national philosophy/ideol-
ogy originally formulated by Sukarno in June 1945.12
The Student Trials: A Farce with Which
to Paint the Faces of Those-in-Power
Judges of the Court,
Now that these trials have been in progress for several months, it has become
obvious that the Judges have not accepted our invitation to join us in the struggle
to establish a position for the law free from outside power.
I would like to remind the Court of several events which have taken place in
connection with these trials which do not reflect the principles of freedom, open-
ness, and impartiality.
The atmosphere in which the student trials opened in every city was made
tense by the swarming about of various security organizations: police, riot control
squads, soldiers, and especially intel2h types. Would-be spectators were not
allowed to enter the court premises, while many of the seats in the courtroom were
monopolized by government agents. Indeed, even students and relatives of the
accused couldn’t get places. This meddling by those-in-power has not been con-
ducive to creating the atmosphere of a free courtroom. Psychologically, one felt one
was already in the grip of an atmosphere as if a riot was about to break out, to
such a degree that the accused, the lawyers, and even the members of the public
following the court proceedings felt the lack of tranquillity! Tranquillity is essen-
tial for people to be able to think honestly and thus discover the truth of a case.
Outside the courtroom the grubby fingers of those-in-power have also been
busily suppressing the disclosure of facts and data about their own bankruptcy.
The press has been forbidden to carry full coverage of the Student trials.
These actions by those-in-power have made it clear once again that they were
trampling on the integrity of the courts, by violating the principle that the trial
sessions would be "open to the public." Even in this courtroom it is obvious that
the Judges have taken actions no less terrifying than those of those-in-power
outside!
As the accused in this murky case, I was initially given the opportunity to
submit questions in connection with the incoherent charges of those-in-power. I
submitted 28 questions. It turns out that the Judges and the public prosecutor
considered those questions as nothing more than farts, dissipating into the air
without any response! With the result that at the end of these sessions I still
do not know the exact thrust of the charges against me!
Is it possible to carry out an investigation when the accused does not even
understand the nature of the charges against him? It is obvious, of course, that
the nature of the charges is not important to this trial, since the judges themselves
have never felt the need to prove the substance of those charges! The judges
have never allowed either the witnesses or the accused an opportunity for a de-
tailed analysis of the substance of the charges brought against me! It has yet to
be revealed in this trial whether the alleged insulting statements were ever actually
made, or whether those statements merely expressed actual facts. "Yes" and "no"
are the only answers the judges and the public prosecutor want to hear. And if I
or a student witness start presenting the background and facts about the dishon-
esty and failures of those-in-power, the judge's gavel nimbly raps the table in
24. Intel--a contemptuous abbreviation of [orang or petugas] intelijen--is current
political parlance for "spy," "informer," "agent provocateur" employed by the
state.13
accompaniment to his words:	"Enough . . . enough ... no need to continue!
Irrelevant!!!!!"
Not only that! It turns out even the judges feel no need to carry out their
duty to question the accused. The judges have never asked about anything con-
nected with the substance of the charges against me! The defense witnesses and
expert witnesses whose names I submitted were also rejected without any explana-
tion whatsoever!
It is evident that the Court is so certain what shape the final decision on these
proceedings will take that there is no need to go to the trouble of granting the
accused the proper rights to defend himself! I feel that I have been pushed into a
corner, and that my rights to defend myself and prove my innocence have been
trampled on.
And I felt the noose tightening further when the Court generously approved
the reading aloud of statements from the Provincial Government of West Java,
Kadapol Langlangbuana, 25 and the West Java Laksusda which discredited the Stu-
dent movement by claiming that it disrupted security in West Java.
Judges of the Court,
After observing these court proceedings, my lawyer, Haryono Citro Subono
SH, an experienced defense lawyer who has practiced for more than 20 years, said,
"This is the most bitter experience of my career--never before in a case in which
I acted for the defense have I seen trial proceedings as appalling as these! This
trial is a complete farce!"
He is not the only one who says this trial is nothing but a farce! Many people
have said so! They may be wrong, but the strong impression these trial proceed-
ings have made on them has led them to this conclusion. Of course, those who
know the truth are the Judges of the Court themselves.
If this trial is indeed a farce, what is it for? The purpose of this farce is to
paint the faces of those-in-power, so that the running sores caused by their dis-
honesty and arbitrary actions can be covered up. They can then proclaim loudly:
The law has been upheld in this country and the exercise of the people's
basic rights has been assured! Ill!
This lie will be useful to those-in-power when they beg for foreign aid! Because
only countries which guarantee the people's basic rights get money from western
countries.
The truth has been suppressed!
A Challenge to Uphold Justice under the Law
Judges of the Court,
Although in previous trial sessions I have never yet seen a Judge who was
truly independent of outside power, I see one more opportunity for the Court to
demonstrate that it takes seriously its responsibility to improve Indonesian law;
the Court has one more opportunity to commit itself, together with us, to smashing
25. Kadapol Langlangbuana = Kepala Daerah Kepolisian VIII/Langlangbuana (Chief
of the Eighth ["Langlangbuana"] Police Territory), i.e., the head of the West Java
provincial police.14
the arbitrary power which wants to meddle in these proceedings. This opportunity
lies in the decision which the Court will hand down in this case.
That decision will show whether the Court can truly free itself from the influ-
ence of the power outside the courtroom.CHAPTER II
THE CHARGES AGAINST THE STUDENTS AND THE
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS EXPRESS THE
SMALL-MINDED ARROGANCE OF THOSE-IN-POWER
The Thinking of Those-in-Power is Muddled
Judges of the Court,
After studying the charges and sentencing recommendations read aloud by the
public prosecutor in his capacity as the mouthpiece in this courtroom for those-in-
power, I unconsciously shook my head, rubbed my chest [in astonishment] and
let these words softly escape: "how muddled the thinking of those-in-power is
. . . how reckless they are . . . how narrow-minded and naive . . . !"
The first thing I came across in the prosecutor’s summation* 1 was a sentence
which read:
"... that the case presently before us is not the case of the Indonesian
Students, but is rather the case of the accused, Heri Akhmadi, who has
committed criminal acts."*
This statement is precisely what we so often hear from the mouths of those-in-
power when these cases are brought to court. This assertion is not new, it is
merely a refrain. And the public Prosecutor has now become a mouthpiece for it.
Why do those-in-power keep repeating this assertion? Because, so far, their
efforts to corner the student leaders currently on trial and to isolate them from
their friends on campus have yet to succeed. Since that is the point of making
the above-mentioned assertion, until they are successful those-in-power will con-
tinue to trumpet it.
We have seen that, all along, the students have always felt that it is they [the
students] who are really on trial. Likewise, the public has provided support by
paying close attention to the current Indonesian Student trials. But apparently it
is just this public support that has frightened those-in-power, to the point that
they have tried to conceal it by saying:
". . .we see the crowds of spectators in the courtroom as well as outside.
This is an indication of how great an interest is being taken by a certain
group within society." +
Those-in-power refer to the people of all classes who flood the Student trials
in every major city throughout Indonesia as a certain group! Evidently, the
* Rekwfsftor [Prosecutor's Summation], p. 1.
t Rekwisitor, p. 1.
1. The technical term used in the text--rekwisitor--derives from the Dutch legal
term requisitoir, which means the prosecutor's summation of the evidence and rec-
ommendations for sentencing.
1516
stunted condition of their hearts has also blinded their eyes, so they cannot see
existing realities in society.
Those-in-power try to stress that the students do not really have any public
support. And they pull wool over the eyes of the public by making out that only
a certain group takes any interest in the Student trials. If the public prosecutor
persists in the opinion that "only a certain group" is taking an interest in this
Student trial, I challenge him to prove it this minute! We will go out of the court-
room into the yard and street in front of the court, and wo will take a close look at
exactly who is following these proceedings.
Is it true that they are only the Students? Or "only officials"? Or only pedi-
cab drivers? Are they really only a certain social group?
I dare to state with complete certainty that the public prosecutor will not have
the courage to go out and prove the accuracy of his remarks, because they are
merely pretexts for discrediting the students and the people who take an interest
in the Student trials. Those-in-power have attempted to terrorize the spectators
at the Student trials by referring to them as only "a certain social group" of no
significance!
Fine, if the Public Prosecutor blinds himself [to them], I will give an account
of just who is following these proceedings. Among them are: students, pedicab
drivers, the unemployed, high school students, women, and various other social
groups.
I once sat among them, so I know exactly who they are! Furthermore, I did not
just see, I also felt their dissatisfaction when the judges began to "cut the Stu-
dents off." I also heard their yells of indignation at the public prosecutor's bully-
ing manner. And I also perceived their discontent with the course of these pro-
ceedings: some have even interjected: "This is no trial, this is a slaughterhouse!
The prosecutor doesn't bring charges [against the accused], he herds [him] into
the trap!"2 Not only that, many others are also of the opinion that this trial is
nothing but a farce to demonstrate that the students are in the wrong and those-
in-power are the ones in the right!
That is what I have seen and felt for myself!
The public and the students obviously have not been taken in; they still believe
that these are trials of the Students. If those-in-power were to be frank and if
their thoughts were not muddled, even they would surely say just what the public
says: that these trials are trials of the Students' cases!
Why do I dare say this?
Those-in-power are certainly aware that the people currently on trial are stu-
dent leaders who were democratically elected by the students to run the organiza-
tions which represent their interests. Thus, those individual student leaders have
been legitimately charged with the task of representing student interests.
As general chairman of the ITB 3 Student Council, I am the legitimate repre-
sentative of all the students of the ITB. Lukman Hakim is the legitimate represen-
tative of the UI students. 4 Hudori Hamid legitimately represents all the students
2.	The image is of the abattoir, where animals are driven through a series of care-
fully arranged pens to their place of execution.
3.	ITB = Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology).
4.	UI = Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia).17
of IKIP Jakarta! 5 Harun A1 Rasy the ITS students,6 Jose Rizal USU,7 and so
forth. . . . The 30 student leaders from throughout Indonesia who are now on
trial are in fact the legitimate representatives of students throughout Indonesia!
And this conclusion of mine has been convincingly proved by the fact that not
a single piece of evidence or testimony in this trial has pointed to actions taken by
me in a personal capacity. We have seen such evidence as: the Indonesian Stu-
dents' Manifesto, the White Book, the Students' Declaration of Position,8 and so
forth . . . clearly none of which are personal actions, but are rather actions taken
by institutions. Furthermore, these pieces of evidence were simply confiscated,
and were not specifically designated for the personal case of Heri Akhmadi.
The witnesses produced by the public prosecutor did not mention any actions
taken by Heri Akhmadi. The student witnesses mentioned actions taken by the
General Chairman of the ITB Student Council, Heri Akhmadi, while, in their testi-
mony , the oknum9 witnesses Mukardanu and Akip Renatin only mentioned student
aksi,10 Student Council/Student Senate meetings, street aksi by the students,
and so forth, without once bringing up my name. Likewise, none of the statements
from the West Java Laksusda, Kodam Langlangbuana and Pemda11 ever made any
mention of Heri Akhmadi.
By referring to the trials of approximately 30 students now in progress as
Trials of Student Elements who have committed criminal acts, those-in-power have
simply demonstrated how muddled their thinking is.
These stunted men in power, personified in this room by the public prosecu-
tor, because they are afraid to look at the reflection of their evil faces, have cho-
sen to blind their eyes and deafen their ears. They [may] escape that reflection
through fear, but they will not escape God's wrath and curse,because they have
betrayed truth and the people's trust in them. Even though those-in-power put
on a fierce face, their hearts are full of doubt because they are constantly haunted
by the demon of greed, and their consciences are constantly whispering: "Choose
the truth . . . choose the truth, painful though it may be for you!! !"
Conscience-Awakening Advice for the Public Prosecutor
Judges of the Court,
Before discussing the prosecutor's summation further, I would first like to ex-
plain why I always refer to the public prosecutor as the personification of those-
5.	IKIP = Institut Perguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (Teachers' Training Institute).
6.	ITS = Institut Teknik Surabaya (Surabaya Technical Institute).
7.	USU = Universitas Sumatera Utara (University of North Sumatra).
8.	For translations into English of these texts, see Indonesia, 25 (April 1978),
pp. 151-82.
9.	Oknum (lit. element) has acquired the political connotations of "hireling" or
"agent."
10.	Aksi (from the Dutch actie) is the historic term, dating from the periods of
the nationalist movement and the Revolution, for popular demonstrations or mass
political manifestations.
11.	Kodam Langlangbuana is an error for Kadapol Langlangbuana. See above at
Ch. 1, n. 25.18
in-power in this trial. The attitudes and actions of the public prosecutor himself
are the reasons.
When we read the statements of charges submitted by public prosecutors in stu-
dent trials throughout Indonesia it is apparent that: these statements of charges
have been mass produced! The laws and articles cited (in them) are, in general,
exactly the same! Those-in-power decided in Jakarta the format of the charges,
as well as the laws and articles they wanted cited, without paying any particular
attention to the evidence or even the actions taken. In this trial, therefore, the
public prosecutor is in fact only carrying out wishes of those-in-power which
have been specified from the top. The same thing has happened with the evidence.
Pieces of evidence have been treated like wholesale goods; no specific connection
can be shown between the evidence and the individuals accused.
The prosecutor's summation was also obviously mass-produced! ! I have already
matched the contents of the charges against me with [those of] the charges against
others involved in student cases in Bandung, it turns out that the format and basic
legal citations are identical, including the empty space marked by rows of dots in
the list of sentencing recommendations.
I have my own story about these blanks in the list of sentencing recommenda-
tions, based on the confession of one of the prosecutors themselves. When the
Prosecutors are not convinced that the existing results of an investigation have
shown the accused to be guilty but the "boss" [sic--in English] has already said
that the accused must be sentenced they leave the list of sentencing recommenda-
tions blank and hand it over to the "boss" [sic] to fill in. That way it is as though
they are free of their responsibilities as public prosecutors. But I am certain that
in reality they will not escape their responsibilities; indeed, they must bear an ex-
tra burden of sin for having betrayed the basic meaning of their task as upholders
of the law.
Thus, the public prosecutor has in fact not acted as an "upholder of the law"
who properly bases his work solely on his convictions and his sense of what is just.
The public prosecutor has acted not on the basis of his own convictions and his
sense of what is just, but instead has simply obeyed the orders of his superiors;
[he] has just obeyed the orders of those in power! Therefore, outsiders can come
to no other conclusion than this: the public prosecutor is nothing but a henchman
of those-in-power. The public prosecutor is merely the personification in this
courtroom of those in power! The public prosecutor is nothing more than an ema-
nation of those in power!
Judges of the Court,
Permit me to give the public prosecutor some advice before the dark mist com-
pletely blinds his conscience. Permit me to make some remarks which may be able
to arouse his consciousness before a cruel calamity hurls him into the eternal suf-
fering of bitter regret, so that he will have a chance to become aware of the wrong-
ness of his attitudes and actions.
Mr. Public Prosecutor,
Loyalty to superiors and to those-in-power is not the highest loyalty we must
render, since as an upholder of the law you have a duty first and foremost to be
loyal both to your convictions and to a sense of what is just, for their own sakes.
Loyalty to those-in-power comes after loyalty to your own convictions regarding
justice under the law. If at some point your superiors or those-in-power demand
loyalty beyond your convictions and your sense of what is just, do not think twice
about choosing loyalty to your convictions and your sense of what is just.19
Of course, opposing the wishes of superiors or of those-in-power is not done
lightly, because promotions, "judicial conduct," and opportunities to obtain "juicy"
positions or other obyekan12 which in the end will determine your livelihood are
involved. Nevertheless, keep in mind, man does not live by bread alone, and still
less does he do so by ignoring ethical concerns and human integrity. Goats are
the same as human beings in their need for food, but they are different in the
manner in which they obtain it. Goats have no sense of ethics or integrity. That is
what distinguishes human beings from goats! The task of upholders of the law is
clearly based on an ethos, reflected in the oath of office, in moral integrity, as
reflected in the Nation's ideals, convictions, and sense of what is just, especially
since the task involves matters of life and death. Therefore, the task of the up-
holders of the law has to be safeguarded by [a] strict professional [code of] ethics
and must be carried out with unimpeachable integrity.
The task of the upholders of the law clearly cannot be regarded as just another
way to make a living. This task carries with it a great responsibility both to soci-
ety and to God. Therefore, I advise you, difficult though it may be, to oppose the
wishes of your superiors and those-in-power when their wishes conflict with your
convictions and your sense of what is just. If in so doing you are dismissed from
the OPP, there are many other jobs you could find and that way you will be safe
from society's revenge and God's punishment. Surely you do not want society to
say: "upholders of the law who trade in justice are worse than a goat!"
Mr. Public Prosecutor,
Now is the time for you to reconsider and reflect on whether you feel that, all
along, when you formulated the charges, conducted the investigation, and made
your sentencing recommendations, it was all based purely on your convictions and
your sense of what is just. Are you certain there is sufficient evidence and testi-
mony to justify recommending a sentence of 9 years--just think, 9 years! Nine
years is not a short period of time. Measured in terms of human age, a 9-year-old
child is already in the third grade, and 9 years is approximately 1/5 of the average
Indonesian lifespan! Mr. Public Prosecutor, imagine how much suffering will accu-
mulate during that time as a result of your recommendation! The cost will be far
too high if you have made that recommendation not on the basis of conviction, but
only because you want a good "judicial conduct" [record] or a continuing livelihood
for your family! The cost of the benefits you receive will be too high in compari-
son with the suffering of the person who is sentenced and of his family while he is
in prison, in addition to God's later retribution--torment in the world hereafter.
Imagining myself in prison for 9 years naturally is not pleasant. But imagining
the torment God inflicts on people who buy and sell, prostitute, and betray their
convictions and their sense of what is just is far more terrifying to me!
Don't think that by following all the wishes of superiors and those-in-power
you have served the State.
It is still not too late, you can still withdraw the sentencing recommendation
after I have read this defense! With that in mind, in this defense I will explain
where you have made mistakes as well as present the real facts; in this way I hope
I can open your heart and mind.
12. Obyek(an) means, more or less, "side-line business." It has neutral conno-
tations when applied to private businessmen, but negative ones when applied to
officials, as here, since they are not supposed to use their offices to make profits
on the side.20
The Basis for Charges by Those-in-Power
Is: A Difference of Opinion
Judges of the Court,
Those-in-power have posed a confusing riddle with their charges and sentenc-
ing recommendations against the students, a riddle which many people have no
idea how to solve!
Those-in-power have accused the students of insulting the Head of State and
the Public power,13 with the aggravating charge that these actions have also ob-
structed the government's security program to so great an extent that the students
could receive the Death Penalty.
Why are those-in-power seeing red like this?
As they were doing their insulting, were the students also plotting to replace
the 1945 Constitution or a legitimate government?
Were the students plotting with 1,000 battalions of soldiers to overthrow the
Suharto regime???
Were the students purchasing a million guns and a thousand tons of grenades
[in order] to storm Jakarta and topple Suharto from his Presidential seat?
Not at all!! Not at all!!
The idea of forming a conspiracy to overthrow Suharto by force of arms never
occurred to the students! Even less did it occur to them to insult Suharto, who
happens to be the president.
Not, not only were they not being insulting, on the contrary, the students
desire a public life truly inspired by the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.
The people who think the only objective of the student movement is to insult
the President, the Vice-President or the assemblies of public power14 are too petty-
minded! Such a charge is much too degrading to the students!
Then why are the students on trial?
If we examine the contents of the charges and sentencing recommendation read
aloud by the public prosecutor before this court, we will come to one conclusion,
that this trial is a trial of a difference of opinion. That is, a trial of the differ-
ence between the students' point of view and that of the New Order Regime which
happens to be in power.
Let us look at the history of this case.
This trial came about because the students carried out "aksi-aksi" and various
other efforts in order to demand improvement in public life today! The students
composed the Students' Manifesto, which stated that public life must be inspired
by the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and requested that the People's Consul-
tative Assembly call a special session to ask for an accounting from the President.
Next, the students also composed the Declaration of Position and the White Book,
which stated that the upbuilding strategy is wrong and that the national leader-
ship has failed.
13.	The exact meaning of kekuasaan Umum (so capitalized) is not clear.
14.	Here kekuasaan umum appears lower case.21
If we look at them carefully, we will see that all of these sprang from a per-
spective based on the students' consideration and examination of existing condi-
tions. If the students state that we are now in a state of collapse, that their
government is corrupt and the people are increasingly poverty-stricken, that
statement springs from careful examination of the social conditions they see.
Judges of the Court,
Through the half-muzzled newspapers, through the government-owned televi-
sion network, and through the [government-controlled] Radio, the government
announces as loudly as possible--that upbuilding oriented towards economic growth
is close to success. The people have gotten access to cheap housing, to transistor
radios, the people have been able to buy motorcycles, multi-storied buildings have
gone up everywhere, Parliament has been transformed into a building with wall-to-
wall carpeting, the President's office has acquired color television, and so forth.
It declares that, after 15 years of upbuilding carried out by the New Order, it
has been possible to lift the Indonesian people from the abyss of poverty, leaving
only 3 out of 10 Indonesians impoverished.
The government always trumpets that foreigners' trust in us has increased,
that this is proven by the amount of aid flowing into our country and by the for-
eign leaders' great desire to invest in Indonesia.
The people should not fear starvation, our rice supplies are adequate and we
have successfully exported our domestically-produced goods in order to meet the
people's basic needs. And if some of our brothers and sisters die, it is not due to
starvation, but instead is thought to be due to not having enough to eat, or
thought to be due to a lack of vitamins and a million upbuilding slogans which re-
sound like a dangdut song!! 15
Hearing such things, the students, who have some knowledge and who do hot
want to see our society intoxicated by upbuilding incantations which only give rise
to illusions, have begun to speak out. We speak about the way things are, we
speak about what we feel, what we see, what we witness. We do all this because
we want all of the people to know what the nation really faces, so they can be
awakened from pleasant dreams, awakened from the lulling of pleasant dreams, to
see life's true countenance.
We have only stated that there is restlessness today.
We have only stated that the available data show that changes in income dis-
tribution are increasingly badly skewed! The top social stratum receives twice
its share of income, while the bottom 20% receives only half of its share. In the
major cities incomes are skewed, and a yawning chasm separates the rich and the
poor.
We have only pointed out to the people that there is a lot of data indicating
that the nation is on the brink of destruction!
We have only stated that after 13 years of the New Order being in power we
cannot deny the existence of conditions which are intolerable.
Among other things, we cannot deny [the fact] that, for too long now, ele-
ments in power have treated Indonesia, the nation's wealth, our country's re-
sources, as their own personal possessions.
15. Dangdut is the onomatopoeic name for a loud, rhythmically-insistent style of
popular music created in the 1970s. In many ways, it is simply a jazzed-up adap-
tation of the old "Batavian" (Jakartan) orkes Melayu.22
Budiaji in Bulog, Ibnu Sutowo in Pertamina,16 police elements who have si-
phoned off as much as 6 billion rupiah17 from the police budget, illegal levies
large and small, all of these are realities which no one can deny, as indeed is
attested to by the very existence of opstibl! 18
We have only stated that to this day the face of our law is not as it should be,
it is still smeared and dirtied, and the law for those-in-power is not the same as
the law to which the weak are subject.
We have only stated that today Parliament is paralyzed, since it never controls
the powers-that-be.
The Political Parties' primary concern is not genuine political representation,
they are more afraid of those-in-power than they are of the people. They cannot
provide a channel for political aspirations, they are nothing more than instruments
of those-in-power.
We have only cried out, hunt down........prosecute.. .lay bare the wealth of
officials!
And we say we have one demand, namely, improved administration, which can
only be achieved through an open presidential election.
We only want a wise national leader, one who will not pursue his own interests
and those of his clique.
Is this wrong?
Is such a difference of opinion not permitted in this supposedly democratic
country?
Thus, the New Order Regime has posed a riddle in this trial by presenting a
difference of opinion as a criminal act.
Can this court try a difference of opinion, which is a basic right of every
citizen in a democratic country?
That is the same as asking: can this court make a criminal of a person who
exercises his rights?
Of course not!
The Judges' and Public Prosecutor's Way of
Thinking Threatens the Survival of the State
Judges of the Court,
Not only can the sentence demanded by the New Order regime read out by the
Public Prosecutor not be justified on the basis of our political way of life, but the
16.	Lt. Gen. Dr. Ibnu Sutowo, the notorious long-term head of the state oil and
gas corporation Pertamina, finally fell from a position of untrammelled power and
corruption when Pertamina went bankrupt in 1975 with approximately $10,500,000,000
in debts.
17.	The reference is to the case of Police General Siswadji. Prior to the devalua-
tion of November 15, 1978, Rp. 6,000,000,000 was worth about $14,460,000; there-
after, about $9,630,000.
18.	Opstib = Operasi Tertib (Operation Discipline), a highly publicized, scatter-
shot anti-corruption campaign launched by Kopkamtib after the 1977 elections.23
manner in which it was drawn up in this trial does not comply with standing legal
regulations. In other words, it cannot be justified from a juridical point of view.
The charges are not only a confused jumble (obscure libel),19 they also have
no basis of legitimacy grounded in our society's convictions and sense of what is
just.
If we study the matter it becomes clear that the judges and the Public Prose-
cutor all embrace legal positivism, 20 meaning that they all cling to positive law,
which they claim is still operative. The judges and the Public Prosecutor are
wedded to a rigid view of the positive law [currently] in force.
They do not want to know whether the spirit of the articles they cite are in
conflict with the spirit of the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila, and with our semangat
of freedom21 as a nation. They don't care whether the spirit of the standing posi-
tive law used against us is no longer in keeping with the spirit of these times,
now that Indonesia is independent and no longer the colony of a white nation (The
Netherlands)...
Judges of the Court,
Nevertheless, as a human being, as a citizen of a democratic country, the
Republic of Indonesia, and as a student, I must have a democratic attitude, which
means I must respect and defend the right of others to hold differing opinions and
beliefs in keeping with their capacities and convictions.
Likewise, I am obliged to respect and, if necessary, fight for the right of the
Court and the Public Prosecutor to embrace legal positivism, for whatever reason
they do so. But I just want to show them that [adherence to] the positivist school
of thought obliges them to abide by the consequences.
If the positive law is rigidly adhered to, with no consideration of its relevance
to the spirit of the times, then we must dare to state that the 1945 Constitution is
no longer operative in this country. The People's Consultative Assembly is not
legitimate and is inconstitutional. Parliament is not legitimate and is inconstitu-
tional. The Public Prosecutor is not a legitimate official, and neither are the
Judges. Why?
How do I dare to come to this conclusion??
Simply by following the Public Prosecutor's and the Judges' logic and convic-
tions. Simply by following their logic and tying it to an historic event which took
place in our beloved republic.
On July 5, 1959, an Indonesian citizen named Sukarno, who happened to occu-
py the office of President of the Republic of Indonesia at the time, reimposed the
1945 Constitution by decree.
19.	The English words obscure libel appear in parentheses in the Indonesian text
as a gloss on kacau (confused).
20.	Here "positivism" should be understood in the narrow sense of a legal philoso-
phy holding that law originates in man-made custom or the will of the community,
as opposed to philosophies which see law as ultimately of divine provenance.
21.	These are the great symbols of the Revolution: (1) the Constitution adopted
in August 1945; (2) Sukarno's epochal formulation of the new state's philosophy
(Belief in One God, Nationalism, Humanitarianism, Popular Sovereignty, and Social
Justice) in June 1945; and the semangat (fiery spirit) which inspired the indepen-
dence movement.24
Yet the source of the positive law in force at that time was the provisional
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The 1950 Constitution was the positive
law which all citizens of the Republic of Indonesia had to obey, including Sukarno.
Not a single article in the 1950 Constitution entitled anyone, including Sukar-
no, even though he was President at the time, to issue that decree. Sukarno was
not entitled high-handedly to abolish the positive law which was then in force,
whatever the justification offered.
Therefore, in keeping with the positivist school of thought, in keeping with
the Prosecutor's and the Judges' logic, in keeping with positive law, Sukarno's
action was illegal and unconstitutional, which means it was legally null and void.
And this means that, according to jurisprudence, all legal consequences of actions
which are not themselves valid are also legally null and void.
Therefore all laws, all regulations, in short all actions based on the Decree of
July 5, 1959, are invalid.
The government formed [on the basis of] the Decree of July 5, 1959 was not
legitimate, so the administration which Sukarno formed was not legitimate, and if
the Public Prosecutor was appointed by Sukarno's government in 1959, then that
appointment was not legitimate. The same applies to the judges' appointments.
And therefore up till now, according to positive law, it is the 1950 Constitu-
tion which is legally operative and must be obeyed, and not the 1945 Constitution.
Thus we are now in a situation where, according to positive law, we should be
taken to court as violating positive law!!
The People's Consultative Assembly is not legitimate, Parliament is not legiti-
mate, Supersemar22 is not legitimate, the decisions of the People's Consultative
Assembly have no legal basis, and this means that Suharto is not legitimately
President of the Republic of Indonesia.
If we follow and believe in the Public Prosecutor's and the Judges' logic, we
must drag a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia named Suharto into court, since
his actions are not legitimate according to positive law, in that he claims to be
President of the Republic of Indonesia.
If we accept the Public Prosecutor's and the Judges' logic, it follows that the
present government is not legitimate, the People's Consultative Assembly is not
legitimate, Parliament is not legitimate, the elections are not legitimate; and the
question arises as to whom the Public Prosecutor represents.
He represents a government which is not legitimate, which means he is plotting
with Suharto in a conspiracy against the legitimate government, that is, a govern-
ment based on the 1950 Constitution...
The same applies to the Judges who are trying my case. The basic law on
judicial authority came into being after the Decree of July 5, and so is not legiti-
mate, with the result that the courts of the Republic of Indonesia are not legiti-
mate, including this District Court of Bandung!!!
Judges of the Court,
And yet what do we see in day-to-day life???
22. Supersemar is an acronym for Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Order of March
11 [, 1966]), the document President Sukarno was forced to sign on that date
effectively transferring supreme power to General Suharto.25
Obviously what has actually happened is nothing of the kind. The adherents
of positive law, including the Public Prosecutor and the Judges themselves, have
not contested the Decree of July 5, 1959. Why not???
Simply because that decree was not in conflict with the intent and spirit of the
Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia, for which thousands
of Indonesia's best sons and daughters gave up their lives.
This proves that the Public Prosecutor and the Judges do not behave consis-
tently with their own standpoints.
This proves that positive law cannot be rigidly followed, with no regard for
the spirit of the times and for society's wishes.
This proves that the spirit of independence is one fountainhead of law in this
country. It is the Proclamation of August 17, 1945 which is the source of the law
that animates the spirit of the times, not the rigid views of the adherents of legal
positivism! !!
My question now is whether the court will continue to maintain its rigid and
narrow-minded positivism?
Is the court still bound and determined to uphold the positive law which came
into being as a product of colonialism and which the Public Prosecutor is using to
recommend a 9-year sentence for me--all of which is in conflict with the spirit of
our independence?
Only the Court itself knows the answer!
Yet I am certain that even the judges once, as youngsters, listened to stories
about how the entire Indonesian people made sacrifices for the Proclamation of
August 17 [1945]. Therefore, the judges should be sons of Indonesia with Indo-
nesian souls, with a spirit to remain always free, not sons of Indonesia with a
colonial spirit who want colonialism to be resurrected from its grave...
And I also believe the judges have consciences!!!
Therefore they should sit before this baize-topped table, beneath the symbol
of justice's shelter, 23 with the purpose of discovering the truth, not of seeking
pretexts to punish me as severely as possible, and not of searching for all [pos-
sible] pretexts and means to throw me into prison for 9 years!!
The Suppression of Differences of Opinion is
a Characteristic of Dictatorial Governments
Judges of the Court,
In a democratic society the expression of differences of opinion is a normal
phenomenon and indeed constitutes the true blessing of a democracy.
In fact, long ago the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia acted on their aware-
ness [of the importance of] maintaining a climate in which people can hold differing
opinions without provoking physical conflict. In a declaration from the government
23. Pengayoman literally means "shelter," and reflects an old image of kingly
benevolence. In ancient times, Javanese kings were supposed to dispense per-
sonal justice to their subjects under the shade of the majestic banyan trees plant-
ed in front of royal palaces.26
of the Republic of Indonesia to the entire People dated October 27, 1945, Sukarno
and Hatta proclaimed:
a.	Unity will be reinforced by respect for differences in outlook among our-
selves , and accordingly we will strengthen the spirit of Popular Sover-
eignty .
b.	Differences in outlook may not give cause for one group to arrest and
detain its opponents in an unknown location, because this could cause
dissension among us and might provoke civil war.*
The democratic road is a road full of struggles arising from the variety of
differing opinions, but it is the road that will be able to protect all of us from
violence and physical conflict. In the history of human culture, this route has
been considered the best means of establishing a system of power and government
while leaving armed violence and the high-handedness of those-in-power far behind.
Among more civilized peoples, the use of physical means to prevail in political
competition has been abandoned. The use of tribal warfare to seize leadership,
[common] among primitive peoples, has been left behind. The use of weapons to
seize a political victory, typical among fascists, is now considered uncivilized.
Maintaining political power by detaining and imprisoning opponents is likewise
now considered uncivilized!
Democratic life is always characterized by the presence of differences of opin-
ion and by the avoidance of violence and physical conflict. It is marked by the use
of reason to resolve differences in perspective and by the shunning of violence
and physical coercion. According to Sumiskum, former Vice-Chairman of the MPR/
Parliament, a satisfactory political atmosphere in a democratic society is character-
ized by:
.. .people daring to express differences of opinion without relying on physical
force, because, if that is the only basis on which differences are expressed,
then those with physical strength will decide everything. And if [those with]
physical strength clash with one another, anarchy is the only possible result!
.. .If we want to create a healthy democratic life in a Pancasila nation, we must
aim toward that goal.. .aim toward that goal which is having the courage to ex-
press differences of opinion. +
The presence of differences of opinion between those-in-power and the stu-
dents over the condition of our country and our state life as a result of the up-
building which has been promoted for the last 10 years must be regarded as a
natural phenomenon in a democratic society.
When those-in-power turn out to be making arrests willy-nilly, beating people
up and prosecuting people in the courts [because of] these differences of opinion,
they clearly will merely be unmasking themselves by claiming to be democratic when
in fact they are acting like authoritarian dictators!!
Why is it wrong for the students to hold the opinion that:
"So far the upbuilding strategy has failed to bring prosperity to the
masses, and instead has caused many imbalances and much restlessness in
* Makloemat Pemerintah Repoeblik Indonesia kepada Seloeroeh Rakjat, October 27,
1945.
t Sumiskum, "Pembangunan Demokrasi Memang agak jauh tertinggal," Kompas,
May 18, 1979.27
society. This has happened because the upbuilding strategy is in fact
wrong!"
Why is it wrong for the students to hold the opinion that:
"The national leadership has failed to carry out the GBHN21* in the
framework of national upbuilding?"
This is not out of line with the norms of democratic life, because these opin-
ions are all adequately backed up with facts and have been formulated with con-
sistent reasoning on the basis of belief in our national ideals as contained in the
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In a democratic environment, differing eval-
uations and opinions obviously cannot be 'criminalized' as: insults! It would be
another matter in the context of a colonial society.
Judges of the Court,
There is something seriously amiss in the way those-in-power see themselves
as the wielders of State Administrative power in the manner laid down in the 1945
Constitution. *
A colonial perspective and way of thinking shape their conception of adminis-
trative power in a free, democratic state in such a way that what they really see
and think of is simply: the image of the Dutch colonialist who could order Indone-
sia's inhabitants around in any way he liked, without having to bear any moral
responsibility for their sufferings.
Those-in-power don't feel any need to guarantee the exercise of democratic
rights in order to conduct the affairs of Government. They only feel the need to
give orders. And unfortunately, because they think along the same lines as [the
authorities of] a colonial government, their actions are quite similar as well.
The actions of the New Order Regime are like those of the colonialists, or of
fascist regimes, or of authoritarian dictators or of communists, who always oppress
people with opinions different from their own. Fascist regimes arrest those of the
people who criticize them, lock them up in prison cells, and if necessary banish
them to forced labor camps. Communists do the same; in fact, communists do not
hesitate to kill political opponents they consider dangerous!
What befell the Indonesian students in early 1978 is one example of the sup-
pression of differences of opinion!
The way the New Order Regime has resolved its differences of opinion with
the students is truly shameful and degrading to the nation. Instead of exhibiting
the openmindedness of someone wise, instead of displaying the tolerance of some-
one with integrity, the power-hungry authorities have displayed brutality and
blackheartedness. 25
On January 20, 1978, a massive roundup of student leaders was conducted
throughout Indonesia. During the First Roundup more than 100 leaders from Stu-
dent Councils and Student Senates across the country were arrested.
* UUD [Undang-undang Dasar] 7945, Bab pasal . [Blanks in the original. ]
24.	GBHN = Garis Besar Haluan Negara, Broad Outline(s) of State Policy.
25.	This old-fashioned word seems best to fit the Indonesian keangkaramurkaan,
which is also a bit old-fashioned, and covers the whole range of evil desires--
anger, greed, hatred, envy, lust, and so forth.28
They were confined in prison "cages" in army barracks! Several of them had
the pleasure of experiencing vicious beatings at the hands of intel types and to
electric shocks which were used as instruments of torture during interrogation!!
On January 20, 1978, almost all of the leading newspapers in the capital were
muzzled as well!! These newspapers, like all Indonesians who still love this coun-
try , had been very sympathetic to the student movement. This was because the
issues to which the students were calling attention naturally concerned the entire
Indonesian people, and because the students were actually only one group [of
many] in Indonesian society who were restless over the deterioration in the condi-
tion of the country and in state life!
Newspapers which try honestly to present the facts about social conditions will
undoubtedly discover the truth: that our beloved Indonesia is on the threshhold of
destruction!!! But as far as the New Order Regime was concerned, newspapers
which attempted such honesty were provoking unrest and were therefore muzzled!!
Suppressed or shut down on the spot!!
January 20, 1978 was a dark day for our democracy!! A day which symbolized
the gradual fading of the hopes and ideals of independence written 33 years ago
with the blood of the nation's finest sons!! ■! An ill-fated day for the people because
of the betrayal of their independence!! A day darkened by the brutality of Those-
in-Power! A day which reawakened the people's memories of their harsh oppres-
sion under the Dutch colonialists!! A day which made Indonesians feel they had
returned to the dark world of colonialism--no longer the colonialism of foreigners
but, instead, that of a small group of their own people!!
And the brutality of those-in-power didn't stop there!! Instead it raged more
and more wildly in the following days, with the single aim of ensuring Suharto's
reelection as President!!
In February 1979 almost all of the major campuses throughout Indonesia were
occupied by army units. In Jakarta, in Bandung, in Medan, Jogyakarta, Sura-
baya, Palembang. ..not only was violence used during the Occupation of the Cam-
puses but hundreds of Students were arrested as well.
The occupation of the campuses, something which the Old Order Regime never
did even once, has deeply hurt the members of campus society, and not just be-
cause they feel that "academic freedom," which is one of the strongholds of democ-
racy, has been trampled on by those-in-power.
The Occupation of the Campuses—
A Tragedy for Our Democracy
Judges of the Court,
To give you an idea of how cruelly and ruthlessly the New Order Regime occu-
pied the Campuses in early 1978, simply to silence differing opinions held on the
campuses on the leadership of Suharto and his cronies, I will describe an incident
which took place nearby, namely, the occupation of the ITB campus. The ITB
campus is just one out of dozens of campuses throughout Indonesia which suffered
a similar fate.
On February 9, 1978, one day after the ITB students and other Bandung stu-
dents held a "night of reflection" during which they tried to assess the purity of
their hearts and minds, the ITB campus was suddenly reoccupied by army units.
This attack to occupy the campus for the second time was conducted, in contrast29
to the first, in a brutal fashion, with the troops shouting abuse as they entered
the campus. In contrast to the first one, this attack claimed casualties--students
who were wounded and had to be taken to the hospital after being trampled on and
beaten with rifle butts.
The way they entered the ITB campus was not the way members of the govern-
ment apparatus are supposed to treat their citizens. It was not the way a civilized
nation is supposed to respect its citizens' rights! Indeed, it more closely resem-
bled a Mafia-style smash-and-grab raid!! It was more like the actions of the Dutch
when they destroyed the crops of the Moluccan people during the Hongi expedi-
tions! ! 26
Professor Dr. Iskandar Alisyahbana, the Rector of ITB and thus the highest-
ranking person in authority, was not informed of the attack; indeed he was
"trapped" in the Kodam Headquarters so he would not know what was going on.
Later they even claimed that the attack on and occupation of the ITB Campus, or,
in their words, "the physical support for the ITB rector," was carried out at his
request. At around 2:00 p.m. , while the Rector was at the Kodam Headquarters,
the ITB Campus was surrounded and attacked from various directions by approxi-
mately 12 truckloads of armed troops from a variety of army units, including Ku-
jang I, Kostrad, Kopasandha, CPM, Infanteri AD and so on.27 These troops were
lined up in rows 10 meters in front of the students, who had been herded together
on the basketball court, with their rifles pointed at them. They moved in on the
students, who were sitting in a group, with firm strides, closer and closer...and
trampled on the women students in the front row with their jackboots, beat them
with rifle butts, and dragged several of them along by the hair. The same thing
happened to the men students. So chaotic and tumultuous was the atmosphere!
More than a few ITB students were wounded that day, and several even had
to stay in the Hospital for some time. Some of them had broken wrists, cheeks
slashed by bayonets, and other wounds. The two who were in the Hospital longest
were Sdr. Budi Santoso and Peter Simanjuntak.
After things had calmed down for a moment, the teaching staff and function-
aries28 who had previously been herded together on the soccer field were allowed
26.	A reference to the infamous hongitochten of the seventeenth century: naval
expeditions launched by the Dutch and their native allies to destroy all those clove
and nutmeg trees in the areas of the Moluccas which were not under Dutch East
India Company monopoly control. These raids, aimed at keeping spice prices high
by restricting their supply, caused immense suffering and impoverishment to the
Moluccans.
27.	A rather confused and confusing list. Kujang I is an elite airborne battalion
which is administratively part of the Siliwangi Division of West Java, but controlled
operationally by Kostrad (Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat, Army Strategic Com-
mand), the army's strategic strike force. Kopasandha--usually Kopassandha--is
the Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha ("Secret War" Units Command), the army's
crack paratroop command, operationally controlled by Kostrad. CPM (Corps Polisi
Militer, Military Police Corps) is a now obsolete term for Pomad (Polisi Angkatan
Darat, Army Police). Infanteri AD simply means Army Infantry. In effect, the
list is a rather random jumble of military units of differing sizes, training, and
responsibilities.
28.	Karyawan is a term whose connotations are difficult to convey. It was popu-
larized by rightwing military elements running Indonesia's state enterprises in the30
to go home. Several faculty members who had been able to see the cruel treatment
of their students wept, and there were even some soldiers who wept as well. We
are fully aware that they were simply rank-and-file soldiers who had to carry out
their superiors' orders, without realizing that several small, power-hungry cliques
of their leaders in the upper ranks were exploiting them.
After that came the sound of glass being broken. The rooms in the Student
Center29 were smashed up and ransacked. Documents, papers, typewriters,
radios, photocopy equipment, telephones and lots of other things were carried
off. Later, following that incident, dozens of students were arrested.
Judges of the Court,
No matter what justification is offered, incidents like this cannot possibly be
sanctioned by common sense and existing law. This is the first time such incidents
have occurred in Indonesia, at the same time demonstrating to us the extent to
which citizens' rights have been trampled on in this country. The only explana-
tion of these events which makes sense is that all were carried out by those-in-
power, among whom President Suharto is the highest-ranking person responsible,
in order to safeguard their power by exploiting the instruments of state. The
rank-and-file soldiers of the Armed Forces, who traditionally are born and brought
up as children of the people,30 have been sent to confront other children of the
people, namely, students and faculty members. These actions taken at that time
by the government and Armed Forces leadership (General Panggabean31) are truly
heartbreaking, not just for the students and faculty members but also for the rank-
and-file soldiers of the Armed Forces, who love the people. The new Armed Forces
leadership 32 has since acknowledged these errors by proclaiming that "the Armed
Forces are one with the People."
early 1960s in an attempt to counter communist propaganda on class struggle.
Karyawan ("functionary") was supposed to cover everyone, from the poorest work-
er to the topmost executives, and implied that no essential conflicts existed between
them: all shared common goals and loyalties. After 1965, the karyawan concept
became state doctrine. Like so many other official euphemisms, karyawan has be-
come subject to Boyle's Law. One can be fairly certain here that karyawan refers
to typists and janitors, not least because "karyawan" are distinguished from--and
placed after--"teaching staff."
29.	The American words "Student Center" appear untranslated in the Indonesian
text, a small but telling sign of American influence in contemporary Indonesian
universities.
30.	Here anak rakyat has two referents. First, it recalls the historical reality
that the rank-and-file of the huge variety of military and paramilitary formations
of the Revolution were recruited from the "masses." Second, it refers to a long-
standing theme of Indonesian military propaganda: that the military (all of them)
were "born of the people" and were their prime representatives during the Revolu-
tion and after. So powerful is this ideological legacy that even today the many
senior Indonesian officers who actually come from "feudal" families never boast of
it in public, indeed even cloak themselves in the guise of being "anak rakyat,"
for purposes of political legitimacy.
31.	General Maradean Panggabean, Protestant Batak and confidant of Suharto,
was then Minister of Defense and Security.
32.	The reference is to the appointment of the Islamic Buginese General Andi
Mohammad Yusuf as Panggabean's replacement on April 17, 1978. During his early31
Thus, the student movement, as the force of the younger generation with
knowledge and common sense, was crushed in a terrifying manner at the beginning
of 1978. Their leaders were arrested, their organizations were frozen and their
campuses were occupied!
These events have been calamitous for democratic life in our country!
It is the students who should really be dragging those-in-power into court,
for committing criminal acts of violence, torture, looting and trampling on the
rights of the people!
Looting of and Tampering with the Evidence
Judges of the Court,
During the attack on and occupation of the ITB Campus, the henchmen of those-
in-power "looted" the evidence which was later presented during these proceed-
ings. I say "looted" because, of course, this evidence was taken from its owners
in an illegal manner, one which could more appropriately be termed looting than
confiscation!
Usually confiscation is conducted in front of the person who owns the things
[in question], but not the one carried out this time by the henchmen of those-in-
power! On the contrary, the owners of these things were driven away, the place
was turned upside down, and only then were the things taken. Then they just
went ahead and made up what they called a "Confiscation Inventory" without any
signatures or validation from the owners of the things. Is this what is known as
confiscation?! Does the law actually provide for such a method of confiscation?
No!
Obtaining evidence in such a manner is clearly against the law! For that
reason this same evidence must be declared invalid!
What really took place was Looting!
So what the Public Prosecutor should do is just change the "Confiscation In-
ventories" dated February 9 and 14, 1979 which have been submitted during this
trial, to "Looting Inventories." That would be more accurate and more honest!
Not only that, Judges of the Court,
It turns out that not all of the things looted are accounted for in what they
call the "Confiscation Inventories"; the vast majority of things belonging to the fam-
ily of ITB students which vanished during the attack on and occupation of the ITB
Campus are actually not included in the list and no one knows where they have gone!
Most of the things taken from the ITB Campus simply disappeared and whether
they have been swallowed up by demons or cockroaches or whether they have been
stolen by the henchmen of those-in-power, who can say? It is still a mystery to
the students!
But do demons really gobble up guitars, telephones, typewriters or radio-
cassette players?! I'm certain that the demons who are interested in such things
days in office, Yusuf made a number of pointed efforts to disassociate himself from
his predecessor; so much so that Panggabean felt humiliated enough to write in
protest to the Jakarta press.32
are fake demons, in other words, demons with black hair! 33
Or are there cockroaches who have use for raincoats, jackets, amplifiers, mat-
tresses and camp beds, stencil machines or cameras? Masya Allah31*...cockroaches
who are interested in these things are not just any old cockroaches! At the very
least they are cockroaches who have had some acquaintance with money and school-
ing!
Then, where did that much loot disappear to?
Judges of the Court,
During the court session of April 12, 1979 I turned over a list of the things
which "vanished" from the ITB Campus during the attack and occupation, at the
time when the Public Prosecutor obtained what he calls evidence--evidence such
as has been submitted during this session. All together, the things on that list
are worth several million rupiah. However, it is not their value in rupiah that con-
cerns me so much as clarification of their present "fate."
If this court is really trying to seek out the facts about all the events which
took place, then the Court must reinvestigate the means by which the Public Prose-
cutor obtained the evidence, rechecking the accuracy of its description in terms
of kind and quantity and then examining legal procedural requirements as well.
The Court should also seek clarification from the Public Prosecutor about the dis-
crepancy between the things which "vanished" from the campus at the time when
what the Public Prosecutor calls the evidence was taken and what has been sub-
mitted during this trial.
Judges of the Court,
I do not understand the connection between the formal charges [against me]
and much of the evidence which the Public Prosecutor has submitted during this
session. The posters and various pamphlets, printed statements, tapes and lec-
ture notes.. .1 do not understand the connection between almost any of them and
the formal charges.
I have been chairman of the Student Council since November 29, 1977, but
much of the evidence dates back to October 28 and November 10, 1977. It is ob-
vious that the evidence is simply anything they laid their hands on.
I have come to the conclusion that the Public Prosecutor's sole purpose in all
of this is to throw me into the darkness of prison cells for as long as possible,
obliterating my future and making my family suffer!
And that is not all the Public Prosecutor is doing to make my life miserable!
The Public Prosecutor Has Tampered with the Testimony
It turns out that the Public Prosecutor has also even tampered with the testi-
mony in the summation which he himself drew up. Much of the testimony has
been excerpted in bits and pieces or the excerpts have been taken out of context
so that their true intent has been misrepresented.
33.	setan yang berambut kepala hitam, i.e. , Indonesian human beings.
34.	Literally, "The Will of Allah!" used in the sense of "Good Lord!"33
The Public Prosecutor included various excerpts from the testimony of Yusman
SD in his summation, among them:
.. .true, the witness explained that the accused was responsible for the
roll-call alert35 of ITB Students on January 16, 1978.*
. ..it is true that the person responsible for the publication of the "White
Book" was the accused in his role as chairman of the ITB Student Council. ^
However, the witness’s actual testimony at that time was:
.. .Yusman SD said it was true that the responsibility for holding the Roll-
Call Alert of ITB Students, for publication of the "White Book of the 1978
Students' Struggle" and for other student activities on the premises of the
ITB was in the hands of the Chairman of the Student Council, an office
which at that time happened to be held by Heri Akhmadi as Mandatary of
the Students' Consultative Council (MPM) or Representative of the ITB
students.
The witness Yusman SD, providing additional information in response to my
questions, emphasized once more that of course the General Chairman of the ITB
Student Council must bear this reponsibility because it cannot be shared until the
General Chairman gives a formal accounting to the MPM and returns his or her
mandate!
Once that accounting has been delivered to and then accepted by the MPM, it
signifies that the ITB students have agreed to and approved all the actions and
policies taken by the General Chairman. It further signifies that responsibility
[for these actions] is thenceforth borne collectively by all ITB students!
Then, in order to stress this point, Yusman SD stated that as a consequence
of this collective responsibility, the ITB students carried out a "strike against
Academy activities" for two months. Even the degree candidates declared their
unwillingness to take their examinations as an expression of their joint responsi-
bility.
And Yusman SD himself stated before the court that he was prepared to take
part in bearing this responsibility...........
This example clearly illustrates how the Public Prosecutor has tampered with
the witnesses' statements so much that all the testimony has lost its real meaning.
The Public Prosecutor, driven by a keen desire to plunge me into lifelong misery,
has tampered with testimony which he felt weakened the charges he was making!
That is truly an immoral thing to do!
The Public Prosecutor has also, it turns out, tampered with the statement of
the witness Irzadi Mirwan, as follows:
* Rekwisitor, p. 23.
+ Ibid. , p. 24.
35. "Roll-call alert" is a rather unsatisfactory translation of apel siaga. An apel
siaga means the mobilization in a public place of the membership of a defined organ-
ization or social group. Everyone belonging to that group is supposed to show up,
even though no actual roll-call is ever taken. The term is usually used in contrast
to rapat raksasa, a mass meeting to which the general public is invited, even if it
is sponsored by a particular organization or public functionary.34
.. .That the witness stated that he attended the Roll-Call conducted by the
Chairman of the ITB Student Council as part of a campaign for the release
of the accused, Heri Akhmadi, before he was arrested/turned over by the
West Java Laksus.*36
Well! .. .what logic is the Public Prosecutor using! Who does he mean when he
says "Chairman of the ITB Student Council" and who does he mean when he says
"Heri Akhmadi"?
Even before that the public prosecutor wrote:
.. .that the person who instructed the White Book Team was the Chairman
of the ITB Student Council, the accused, Heri Akhmadi, that the witness
in compiling the White Book through the process and already outlined by
the Student Council, 3 7
The witness's statement has become scrambled at the hands of the Public
Prosecutor, with the result that it is unintelligible! The babbling of the Public
Prosecutor is already quite apparent in these two excerpts from the statement of
the witness Irzadi Mirwan.
According to the Public Prosecutor's confused logic, I became two people at
the same time:	Heri Akhmadi the Chairman of the ITB Student Council conducted
a Roll-Call for Heri Akhmadi the accused.
This Public Prosecutor does whatever he pleases!
In his cunning, the Public Prosecutor also tampered with the statements of
three government agencies which were illegally introduced as evidence in this
trial. The Public Prosecutor wrote in his Prosecutor's Summation:
That in their Written Statements, the West Java Laksusda, Kadapol VIII/
LLB, Direktorat Politik Pemerintah Propinsi Jabar38 plainly indicated that
security and order were disrupted by the actions of the accused. +
I am sure that the Court still remembers that not a single one of these three
agencies mentioned my name or my actions in their statements.
Judges of the Court,
The Public Prosecutor has prepared his summation in such a way that it can
be guaranteed that the conclusion he draws is not an opinion based on facts. It
is simply his own fabrication!
For this reason the usefulness of the summation which the Public Prosecutor
has prepared as a legal tool with which to demonstrate my guilt is quite dubious.
* Rekwisitor, p. 26.
+ Ibid. , p. 25.
+ Ibid. , p. 52.
36.	The translation here attempts to mirror the illogicality and muddle of the orig-
inal document, which Heri immediately criticizes.
37.	Again, the original Indonesian is almost unintelligible, and is used by Heri to
show the slipshod, confused character of the prosecutor's language.
38.	Direktorat Politik Pemerintah Propinsi Jabar = Political Directorate of the West
Java Provincial Government, i.e., the Governor's political staff.35
And in order to protect yourselves from making a complete mistake when you make
your decision, I recommend that the court simply disregard the prosecutor's sum-
mation.
Throwing it in the trash basket would be fine too!
The Public Prosecutor Has Yet to
Prove the Truth of the Charges
There is yet another reason reinforcing my recommendation that the Court
simply disregard the summation which the Public Prosecutor has hatched, namely:
that the Public Prosecutor has obviously completely failed to prove the substance
of the charges brought against me.
I will explain this by offering the following parable.
The faces of the King and Queen of Colenak39 became pockmarked as a result
of an accident. Due to the people's fear of the King, who was cruel and enjoyed
putting people in prison, not a single person dared to say the King's and Queen's
faces were pockmarked.
The story goes that one day the King and Queen attended a party held in honor
of Children's Day which was exceedingly merry. At the party it so happened that
an "intel" agent overheard a small child, who did not yet know fear and who only
saw things as they were, said: "Look! The King's face is pockmarked." The child
was immediately arrested and the "intel" agent ordered the prosecutor to take the
kid1*0 to court on charges of "insulting the King and causing a disturbance"!
The Prosecutor never proved to the court whether it was true or not that the
child's words contained insulting elements; or whether it was true or not that the
child caused a disturbance by saying "Look! The King's face is pockmarked"! He
then recommended that the child be given the death penalty!
This is analogous to what the Public Prosecutor is doing in this trial!
In his explanation of insulting elements the Public Prosecutor has only dis-
cussed the "doctrine" on insulting, with no obvious connection to any of the mate-
rial on which the charges are based. For the Public Prosecutor himself has never
proved whether this material truly contained insulting elements. With his witnesses
and evidence the Public Prosecutor has merely proved:
--that it is true that the accused held a meeting to draw up the 'Declara-
tion of Position of the ITB Students.'
--that it is true that the accused commissioned the preparation of the
"WHITE BOOK."
--that it is true that the accused was responsible for the publication of
the DECLARATION OF POSITION OF THE ITB STUDENTS and the
WHITE BOOK in his role as Chairman of the ITB Student Council.
--and so forth.....
39.	It seems that this name is contemptuously drawn from the brand-name dessert
Colenak.
40.	Heri uses the Javanese bocah, rather than the Indonesian anak, to give an
extra nuance of childlike innocence.36
These actions clearly cannot be considered "insulting" until it is first proved
that the DECLARATION OF POSITION and the WHITE BOOK include sentences
which contain insulting elements!
An insult is a question of feelings, the measure of which is also determined by
feelings, but certainly not the feelings of the Public Prosecutor or those of the
Judges of the Court themselves. If I am accused of having insulted the President,
then certainly he himself must feel insulted or, at the very least, he must indicate
under oath that he feels insulted.
Of the witnesses who have testified during this session, not a single one has
said that what is written in the DECLARATION OF POSITION OF THE ITB STU-
DENTS and the WHITE BOOK could give rise to a feeling of having been insulted!
Therefore, it is clear that the Public Prosecutor's claim that part or all of the
contents of the DECLARATION OF POSITION and the WHITE BOOK contain insults
has not been proven at all!
Likewise, the Public Prosecutor has never been able to reveal the students'
motives, supposing it were true that they had committed a crime.
In fact, the motive of the person who is accused of criminal acts determines
whether what he has done is actually a crime or not. A person who has killed
[someone] is not considered to have committed a crime if his motive is self-defense!
The same is true of insulting and other actions.
The Public Prosecutor's disregard for motives also means that he regards me
as having an innate criminal tendency to be insulting. And since my actions have
obviously been supported and endorsed by all the ITB students, then all the ITB
students likewise have a tendency toward criminal behavior!
If the Public Prosecutor's point of view were extended to its logical conclusion
and applied to all the Indonesian student leaders currently on trial, we would come
to [only] one conclusion: evidently all Indonesian students have a tendency toward
criminal behavior.
The fate of the Indonesian nation is truly sad--all of its prospective educated
leaders have criminal psyches!
Judges of the Court,
Furthermore, it is clear that the Public Prosecutor himself does not understand
what is meant by the charge: "obstructing implementation of the government pro-
gram to assure the security of the people and the state."
Logically, if there is still a program for this purpose, this means that the se-
curity of the people and the state is itself not yet fully assured.
Yet the Public Prosecutor says my actions disrupted security and order. I do
not understand the Public Prosecutor's logic--if security and order have already
been assured, then what is this government program for!
In fact, the verb "to obstruct" [menghalang-halangi], which derives from the
root-word "obstruct" [halting] , means putting something in the way so that it cannot
be bypassed; something which is obstructed cannot get by or continue at all. This
is different from the word "to hinder," which only retards or slows down something
which keeps on going.
Is our security apparatus so feeble that the actions of just one person are now
able to bring its security programs to a halt? Is it true that these programs came37
to a standstill just because of the Students' Vow, or just because of the Declaration
of Position of the ITB Students and the WHITE BOOK?
Of course not!
Pak Jaksa1,1 is really going to exorbitant lengths in his efforts to throw me
into prison! Probably it is the strong pressure from the "boss" 1,2 which is making
him see red!
Be sure to keep in mind, pak Jaksa, that in the world hereafter there is still
a supremely just God who will examine our individual deceptions and dishonesties!
The Legal Framework for the Students' Actions
Judges of the Court,
The accusation that the Students have insulted the President and his Vice-
President and the Assemblies of Public Power truly took me by surprise. Never-
theless , because the Public Prosecutor himself has obviously not specified his
charges clearly enough, I will just offer a general defense.
First, I will discuss the background of the ideas and the facts which sustained
all the actions and materials alleged to be criminally insulting. I will explain it
because, from the students' point of view, what the Student Movement has been
doing all this time is nothing other than struggling to uphold and honor the Pan-
casila and the 1945 Constitution.
The students have seen that so many aspects of the lives of Indonesians today
are still far from what was hoped for when Indonesia's independence was proclaimed.
Instead the image of independence as a golden bridge1+3 leading to the creation of
a prosperous and well-educated society has increasingly faded.
The bright hopes which the New Order initially offered, when it determined
to carry out the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila in a pure and consistent man-
ner, have patently faded with the passage of time. Indeed, we can now see Old
Order Regime practices which the New Order leaders once "condemned" sprouting
up all over like mushrooms.
Second, prompted by the desire to safeguard the nation's survival and spurred
by the wish to protect the public interest, the students have set out all their ob-
servations and ideas.
Actually, too many things have been covered up by those-in-power. Too many
restrictions have been imposed on the People's right to obtain adequate information
about the condition of their country. The news carried by the mass media has
been censored, various books have been banned, and many of the reports broad-
cast by the government radio and television stations are doctored.
The students can no longer bear to see the cruel strait jacketing1'1' of the peo-
ple. All fields have been equipped with "censors." There is a list of people who
41.	Literally, "Father Prosecutor."
42.	The English word boss is used here, without Indonesian gloss, but in single
quotation marks.
43.	This imagery is indelibly associated with the speeches of Sukarno, and is con-
sciously employed here to make the allusion.
44.	The text has the word pemasungan, in single quotation marks. It means38
are forbidden to speak in public. There are prohibitions on holding meetings.
There are requirements to join the organizations designated by those-in-power...
and so on....
This straitjacketing of the people must end!!
This is why the students are shattering the straitjacket.
Third, the students feel it is necessary to shatter the people's straitjacket
for the sake of Indonesia's national life in the future. As the younger generation
which will inherit the future leadership of the nation, we have the duty to draw
attention to the existence of a number of current conditions that will lead to the
nation's destruction. The draining off and squandering of our natural wealth has
reached a level which can no longer be tolerated. The draining off of that wealth
has ruined the environment, as a result of which floods occur frequently and there
is pollution everywhere. The squandering of natural wealth has killed our capacity
to develop, because what should be saved up as provisions for the future is now
being frittered away.
The future of this country belongs to us, Indonesia's younger generation.
Those-in-power today will already be in their graves when the forests which
are now being stripped become deserts and the [oil] 45 fields which are now being
drained go dry.
Those-in-power today will by then be enthroned in opulent, palatial mausolea
continually scented with perfume when tens of millions of impoverished people are
living in misery amidst the luxurious debris they have left behind.
Every human being has the instinct to defend himself!
Before anyone destroys the future of Indonesia's younger generation, we will
destroy them first!!
These are the three things I will discuss in the following sections of my de-
fense. It would not be necessary for me to go on at length if I had been given an
opportunity to discuss them during the investigation. 46 But since that opportu-
nity was not provided, this is the only one remaining to me.
If it is true that the Judges of the Court will decide this case on the basis of
truth, and only on that basis, my defense will be very helpful. For that reason,
I request not to be interrupted!
putting someone (usually a violent lunatic or criminal) in a sort of straitjacket,
chained or tied to a wooden post.
45.	The inference that oil-fields are being referred to here comes from the use
of almost identical language a few pages later on where, however, the word minyak
(oil) is included.
46.	This refers to the Continental-style court-room interrogation of witnesses and
the accused by the panel of judges.CHAPTER III
THE FADING OF THE NEW ORDER'S IDEALS
The Overthrow of the Old Order Regime
Judges of the Court,
Late 1965 and early 1966 were marked by major events in Indonesia's history,
as the people began to oppose those-in-power after having to live in oppression
and economic chaos for such a long time. In the major Cities the university stu-
dents, high-school students [and] pemuda1 demonstrated, carrying posters list-
ing their demands. The people's demands included:
--Hang Aidit! Dissolve the PKI! 2
--Reduce prices! Retool the Cabinet! Dissolve the PKI!
--Try Sukarno, Chief of Gestapu, before the Mahmilub! 3 4
--Step aside, Dictator Sukarno!
--Sukarno, Peking's Stooge! h
There were hundreds of posters like that, carried by thousands of people in
processions around the main streets of the Cities. Their faces were angry and
fierce, [full of] vengeance and hatred. Chinese5 shops and the houses of PKI
1.	Originally meaning simply "youth," the word pemuda acquired its modern sense
of "young militant" in the course of the nationalist movement and the Revolution.
2.	Dipa Nusantara Aidit was secretary-general of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indone-
sia, Communist Party of Indonesia) at the time of the October 1, 1965 "coup," and
was blamed by the party's enemies for masterminding it. He was executed secretly
in Central Java, probably late in October 1965.
3.	Gestapu, an acronym for Gerakan September Tiga Puluh (September 30th Move-
ment). In this term, applied by New Order propagandists to the perpetrators of
the October 1, 1965 "coup" normal Indonesian word order was deliberately altered
to echo the word "Gestapo." (The coup group called themselves Gerakan Tiga
Puluh September.) Many of the younger proponents of the New Order believed
at the time that the "coup" was a plot by President Sukarno to help his political
allies and putative heirs, the PKI. Mahmilub = Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Ex-
traordinary Military Tribunals) were courts set up outside the normal hierarchy
of civil and military courts of law to try persons allegedly involved in the "coup."
4.	Sukarno's proclamation in 1965 of a Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyong-
yang diplomatic axis, and his close relations with CPR leaders in 1963-65, aroused
considerable anger and fear among various sectors of Indonesian society.
5.	Here, as throughout the text of Heri's defense (but not always in his foot-
notes) , the word Cina is used to refer to Chinese. This word in Indonesian (not
necessarily in various regional Indonesian languages) has clear racist connotations,
3940
bigshots were often occupied; Baperki* * * * * 6 offices, Chinese schools and the offices
of organizations sympathetic to or affiliated with7 the PKI suffered the same fate.
The people were expressing their outrage following the murder of high-ranking
Armed Forces officers by the September 30th Movement/PKI.
One incident took place after another, ushering in major changes in Indonesia's
national life. Bung Karno, who had previously always been warmly welcomed, sud-
denly became a clown to be ridiculed at almost every public meeting or demonstra-
tion. Panzers and other armored vehicles carrying troops in combat uniforms
prowled the streets.
The coup d'etat launched by the PKI failed. With that failure the true state
of Indonesian politics was revealed. The rottenness of the government was ex-
posed. The complicity of the highest national leadership in financially supporting
the PKI was uncovered. Manipulations and corruption in various government
bureaucracies were made public. Mismanagement of state enterprises and agencies
was likewise brought to light by the mass media. The situation developed like a
snowball which gets larger the farther it travels. Not only was the PKI blamed
but also the entire system of government which made rebellion possible. And in
the end the people demanded an accounting regarding all these matters from Bung
Karno as the Head of State. The Provisional MPR8 formally requested an account-
ing from the President, but Bung Karno was unwilling to give one, so he had to
withdraw from the political stage.
These are my first memories of the changes which subsequently took place
around me, which I later came to know as: the New Order Era. All of a sudden
people were no longer allowed to discuss Nasakom,9 sing the song "Gen/er-
and was made the "official" term for the Chinese by the Suharto government in 1966
at the height of its anticommunist and anti-Chinese campaign. It thus replaced the
normal, and neutral, term "Tionghoa," acceptable to persons of Chinese descent,
and ordinary usage during the nationalist movement, the Revolution, and on up to
1965. It has the same derogatory overtones as such words as "nigger," "kike,"
"greaser," etc., and the closest approximation in English would probably be
"Chink." As its matter-of-fact use by Heri is clearly not racist, however, and
as he was only a little boy in 1966, the neutral English term "Chinese" has been
used throughout as its translation.
6.	Baperki = Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Consultative
Body on Indonesian Citizenship) was the leading spokesman-organization for Indo-
nesian citizens of Chinese descent in the 1950s and early 1960s. Its political alli-
ance with Sukarno and the PKI left it naked to its enemies after the October 1,
1965 "coup." It was forcibly dissolved in 1966, and most of its leaders were killed
or imprisoned.
7.	The text has "Underbow" (sic), a corruption of the Dutch word onderbouw
("substructure").
8.	On July 5, 1959, President Sukarno by decree swept aside the existing "liberal"
constitution of 1950 and reimposed the "revolutionary" constitution of 1945. The
terms of the 1945 Constitution required the election of an MPR (for which see Ch. 1,
n. 22). No elections for such a body were ever held under Guided Democracy;
instead a so-called MPR-Sementara (Provisional MPR) was appointed by Sukarno
in September 1960, in theory pending elections later on.
9.	Nasakom was a Sukarno-era acronym for Nasionalisme (Nationalism)-Agama
(Religion)-Komunisme (Communism), and symbolized the political cooperation41
grenjer" 10 or memorize "The Five Talismans of the Revolution."* 11 In the same way,
civics lessons in school which had previously been devoted to memorization of Pres-
ident Sukarno's speeches, Trikora, Dwikora12 and the Revolution had now com-
pletely changed.
The Rise of the New Order
4:
/
I first heard about the meaning and purpose of the New Order from a civics
teacher in junior high school. The new order, he said, is the new mental outlook
that Indonesians have, now that the errors and deviations from the 1945 Constitu-
tion and the Pancasila committed by the Old Order, with Sukarno as its ringleader,
have been totally rectified. The New Order has a constitutional basis in the 1945
Constitution and an operational basis in the Resolutions of the Provisional MPR.
The total rectification launched by the New Order against the irregularities in
state life in the old order era covered a variety of fields, including:
Irregularities in political-constitutional life;
Bankruptcy of the national economy, as a result of runaway inflation and
chaotic, dishonest upbuilding-planning;
Degeneration of the national morality;
Neglect of the welfare of the people, neglect of education; and
Political arrests, muzzling of the press and restrictions on the right to
speak out.
The leaders of the New Order at that time criticized "guided democracy" a la
Bung Karno, which really was just another way of saying "Sukarno's Dictatorship."
All existing political and state institutions were systematically "guided" by the
power exercised single-handedly by Sukarno. Bung Karno appointed the members
of the Provisional MPR and the Gotong-Royong Parliament, and even chaired his
between the three major religio-cultural streams of the Indonesian political tradi-
tion by which Sukarno set such store.
10.	Genjer-genier [a kind of vegetable] is the title of a popular East Javanese
folk-song which was adopted as a sort of informal signature-tune by the Indone-
sian left in the 1960s.
11.	The Five Talismans of the Revolution, as formulated by Sukarno towards the
end of the Guided Democracy era, were: Pancasila; Nasakom; Manipol-USDEK (i.e.,
the Political Manifesto of August 17, 1959) plus U [the 1945 Constitution]-S [Indo-
nesian Socialism]-D [Guided Democracy]-E [Guided Economy]-K [Indonesian Indi-
viduality]); Berdikari (Berdiri Diatas Kaki Sendiri--standing on one's own feet);
and Trisakti-Tavip (The Three Powers--The Year of Living Dangerously), i.e.,
the three main themes of Sukarno's August 17, 1964 speech "A Year of Living
Dangerously," which were political sovereignty, economic self-reliance, and na-
tional identity.
12.	Trikora and Dwikora were acronyms for Tri Komando Rakyat (People's Triple
Command) and Dwi Komando Rakyat (People's Twin Command), the big speeches
with which Sukarno launched his mobilization campaigns for the liberation of West
Irian (December 19, 1961), and the crushing of Malaysia (May 3, 1964).42
own Supreme Advisory Council (DPA).13 As the Great Leader of the Revolution
and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces,11* he was really and truly sub-
ject to no one’s control. One of Bung Karno’s speeches, entitled "Political Mani-
festo," was even adopted as the GBHN. Political life was completely focused on
Sukarno himself, while mass mobilizations in the form of public meetings and
demonstrations to "crush Malaysia," Nekolim,15 and the like were turned into
frenzies of anger and frustration for the entire nation so that little attention
would be paid to the topsy-turvy domestic situation. Government debts mounted
up continuously--especially those called "defered payment,"16 which reached
US$270 million--even though a lot of noise was made about "standing on one's own
feet." A lot of money was squandered on the Mandatory's17 projects, a sum which
in the final year of the Old Order came to more than three times the official bud-
get. The budgetary deficit reached 3000% at one point, due to the runaway infla-
tion. Sukarno always acted so much like a cult figure that his words [were re-
garded] as mantras with magic powers which could prevail over the disorder.
Meanwhile in reality the situation was continually deteriorating. *
Thus the leaders of the New Order had no other choice at that time but to
carry out a total rectification of the failures of state life of the Old Order period.
Because it had been distorted by the autocratic use of power, state life had to be
returned to the rails of the 1945 Constitution in order to be based on the "Rule of
Law" or to be a state founded on law.18 At that time people began to discuss all
* Laporan Pimpinan MPRS, 1966-1972 [Jakarta], MPRS, 1972.
13.	In March 1960, following his July 5, 1959 reimposition of the 1945 Constitution,
Sukarno dissolved the democratically-elected parliament of 1955 and in June per-
sonally appointed what he called a Gotong-Royong (Mutual Cooperation) parliament
in its place. This new parliament was supposed to be more in keeping with Indo-
nesian tradition than its predecessor in that it did not operate by majority rule,
but by discussion leading to consensus. In effect, it was largely powerless.
DPA = Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Supreme Advisory Council), a body prescribed
by the 1945 Constitution with the function of offering the president advice on mat-
ters where he requests it. Typically manned by "elder statesmen," it had some
prestige in its early days, but never any real power.
14.	Pemimpin Besar Revolusi and Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersenjata--two of
Sukarno's favorite titles.
15.	Nekolim was an acronym for Neokolonialisme-Kolonialisme—Imperialisme coined
by Sukarno in 1961.
16.	The text has "defered payment" (sic), unglossed. Towards the end of Guided
Democracy, the Bank of Indonesia, under Jusuf Muda Dalam, instituted a system
whereby politically-favored importers could borrow scarce foreign exchange from
the bank, with payment being "deferred" to an indeterminate future. Such a sys-
tem was obviously open to abuse, and indeed led to sizable corruption and malver-
sation of funds.
17.	"The Mandatory" means the mandatory of the MPR(S), i.e., the president.
In effect, these were top-priority personal prestige projects of Sukarno.
18.	Negara Hukum is a direct Indonesian translation of the Dutch (and German)
politico-legal concept of Rechtsstaat. Both Dutch and German have a single word
(recht) which combines the senses of "law" and "moral correctness," where English
lacks such a term. "State founded on law" is thus an unsatisfactory translation of
negara hukum.43
citizens' basic rights which had been disregarded until then. They began to try
to rehabilitate state institutions, which until then had been "hermaphrodized."19
And they began to take steps to rebuild the chaotic national economy on the basis
of new ideas which were more free and open.
The New Order's Ideals
Judges of the Court,
After the PKI was dissolved, the rehabilitation of political life began with the
Fourth General Session of the Provisional MPR, which produced [new] resolutions
and a reassessment of [earlier] resolutions which deviated fromtthe 1945 Constitution.
Later, seminars were also held to formulate New Order concepts. On the New
Order the second Army Seminar declared:
The New Order calls for a way of thinking which is more realistic and prag-
matic, without abandoning the idealism of struggle. It calls for putting
national interests foremost, without abandoning an ideological commitment
to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The New Order desires a structure
which is more stable, more institutionalized, and less influenced by elements
who could inspire personality cults. However, it does not reject firmness
of leadership or strength in government; indeed, it requires such charac-
teristics during the period of upbuilding. The New Order calls for truly
putting the methods of political and economic democracy into practice. It
is a political order and an economic order based on the Pancasila/1945 Con-
stitution. Its ideals and methods of operation are spelled out in the tap-
tap20 of the Fourth [Session of the] Provisional MPR.*
The Fourth General Session of the Provisional MPR was held to rectify all the
Old Order's deviations and to devise a "grand transition Strategy" toward national
stability for the sake of establishing justice/prosperity for the entire Indonesian
people on the basis of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.
During this session rectifications in the political-constitutional field were for-
mulated for the purpose of genuinely implementing the 1945 Constitution and the
Pancasila. Among other things it was resolved at that time that:
1. All institutions must function in compliance with the 1945 Constitution
and unconstitutional institutions must be dissolved. State bodies like
the Provisional MPR, the Gotong-Royong Parliament, the State Account-
ing Office and so on may no longer be Bung Karno's playthings. They
must function in the manner laid down in the 1945 Constitution. Uncon-
stitutional institutions like the National Front, KOTI, KOTOE and so on
are hereby dissolved.+21
* Hasil Seminar Angkatan Darat ke II, 1966.
t Ketetapan MPRS No. X/MPRS/1966 and No. XIV/MPRS/1966.
19.	Dibancikan is hard to render precisely. A band may be, variously, a trans-
vestite male, an effeminate homosexual, any homosexual, a hermaphrodite, and, by
extension, an indecisive, weak-kneed creature.
20.	Tap-tap is a colloquialism for ketetapan-ketetapan, i.e., determinations, reso-
lutions, decisions.
21.	Koti = Komando Operasi Tertinggi (Supreme Operations Command), combined
top-level civil and military personnel in a sort of supra-cabinet political executive44
2. In order to restore the people's sovereignty, their representative /consul-
tative institutions must be established as quickly as possible on the basis
of the results of a General Election. The Provisional MPR and the Gotong-
Royong Parliament will operate only on a provisional basis, pending forma-
tion of an MPR and a Parliament through a General Election. * *
3.
4.
The laws will be codified and major legal issues, such as those involving
fundamental human rights, will be resolved. Many laws, Presidential de-
crees and other regulations [issued] during the Old Order are considered
to be in violation of basic principles of existing law. This codification is
expected to help uphold legal certainty. ^
Regulations will be established for parties, functional groups and mass
organizations. +
The development of ideas for the purpose of more genuinely implementing the
1945 Constitution was based on the fundamental concept that Indonesia is a state
based on law.
Methods of bringing the decline of the national economy under control were
also formulated at that time. The leaders of the New Order agreed that upbuilding
of the national economy must take priority in order to prevent further bankruptcy
of our state life. In this regard, the Provisional MPR declared:
Tackling the economic decline and further upbuilding [our] economic potential
must be based on the Indonesian people's own capacities and abilities. Then,
on this basis, we can make use of the capital, technology and skills available
from abroad to complement [our] potential, as long as all of this aid truly
serves the people's economic interests and doesn't lead to dependence on
foreign countries. §
Next, the economic experts who were participating in seminars at the Univer-
sity of Indonesia drafted a variety of economic upbuilding guidelines for counter-
acting the prevailing decline and for further developing the national economy.
The problems considered most urgently needing solution at that time were: infla-
tion , food, infrastructure, clothing, and exports, as well as assessing the use of
foreign credit and capital.
The History of the People's Suffering Repeats Itself
Thus the start of the New Order was characterized by optimistic hopes that a
sound state life would be rebuilt, based on the provisions of the 1945 Constitution,
and by proclamations that national economic upbuilding would be aimed at creating
prosperity for the people.
*	Ketetapan MPRS No. XI/MPRS/1966.
t Ketetapan MPRS No. XIV, XIX, XX/MPRS/1966.
*	Ketetapan MPRS No. XXII/MPRS/1966.
§ Laporan Pimpinan MPRS 1966-1972, Jakarta, MPRS, 1972.
under Sukarno's chairmanship late in Guided Democracy. Kotoe = Komando Ter-
tinggi Operasi Ekonomi (Supreme Economic Operations Command) was a later,
weaker equivalent of Koti set up to cope with late Guided Democracy's severe
economic difficulties.45
Today, after 13 years of the New Order, how have the New Order's noble
ideals fared?
They have obviously faded with the passage of time. Indeed, it is as though
all those who once conceived them, expressed them, and vowed to put them into
practice are today silent or pretend not to be aware of them anymore. General
Dharsono, one of the New Order's leading exponents, was pretty much right when
he said during the 1978 commemoration of Tritura22 that: the New Order is getting
farther and farther away from the ideals which it [originally] intended to realize.*
After 13 years of the New Order, Indonesia's state life is not making progress
in protecting [our] homeland, improving the public welfare and raising the cultural
level of the nation + in accord with the ideals of independence. The lives of the
Indonesian People at present are still far removed from the ideals of Independence
which formed the basis for the founding of the Republic of Indonesia. + The hopes
which once blossomed along with the birth of the New Order have been buried by
the realities of the present condition of our country. A condition which is deteri-
orating! A condition which breeds unrest! A condition which does not inspire
hope!
If we look at the conditions which have flourished in the New Order era, we
will discover that the New Order's practices are obviously identical to those of
the Old Order.
Judges of the Court,
At the start of its struggle the New Order proclaimed that it would restructure
political-Constitutional life on the basis of a genuine and consistent implementation
of the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila, but today such voices are no longer
heard. Two objectives were set at that time: first, dissolution of institutions not
in accord with the 1945 Constitution, and second, establishment of effective state
institutions on the basis of the results of a General Election. Of course it is true
that in the early years of the New Order, institutions such as the National Front,
KOTI, KOTOE and so forth were dissolved. However, it turned out that not long
afterwards new institutions appeared whose status in regard to the 1945 Constitu-
tion was equally nebulous--institutions such as KOPKAMTIB, ASPRI, OPSUS...23
and the like. These institutions play important roles and answer directly to
* Pikiran Rakyat, January 14, 1978.
t Preamble to the UUD '45 [Undang-Undang Dasar 1945].
$ Pernyataan Sikap Mahasiswa 1TB, January 14, 1978.
22.	Tritura = Tri Tuntutan Rakyat (People's Three Demands). These demands--
for a ban on the communist party, a purge of pro-communist elements in the cabi-
net, and a lowering of prices--were the slogans of the student-led protest move-
ment of late 1965 and early 1966, which paved the way for Suharto's "silent coup"
of March 11, 1966.
23.	Kopkamtib and Opsus have been described above, Ch. 1, notes 7 and 16.
Aspri = Asisten Pribadi [Presiden] (Personal Assistants to the President). Prior
to the January 15, 1974 riots in Jakarta a number of key military confidants of
Suharto (men like Ali Murtopo, Surjo, Sudjono Humardani, Alamsjah, etc.) held
this official title. As a concession to criticism of the Aspri's wheeler-dealing
Suharto abolished the office in the spring of 1974. But the same men continued
to carry on the same functions under other rubrics.46
Suharto, but their relationship to the framework of the 1945 Constitution itself is
obscure. In fact, many legal experts claim that KOPKAMTIB is an unconstitutional
institution.* * * §
KOPKAMTIB, which was created to restore security and order as a result of
the G30S/PKI rebellion, has in the event been kept intact up to the present. Its
powers have been greatly expanded: besides handling the business of PKI politi-
cal prisoners, it also handles almost every "breath" Indonesians take: price in-
creases, school registration, muzzling of the press, banning meetings, occupying
campuses, corruption,and so forth. Simply put: KOPKAMTIB is the New Order
regime's jago2tt in confronting the people.
Similarly, the ideal of creating state institutions established on the basis of
the results of a General Election has become nothing but a farce, because appoint-
ed MPR members have come to outnumber elected MPR members. Likewise, the
appointment of members of Parliament contradicts the principle of popular repre-
sentation in Parliament. Everyone has the same status before the law, and the
President is no exception. +
Judges of the Court,
In the economic field, the New Order's methods of reversing the economic de-
cline have proven to have had consequences which have actually jeopardized the
survival of the nation. We cannot deny that the government has been successful
in reducing inflation to a level low enough to allow for normal economic activities.
But neither can we deny that something once denounced by the New Order leader-
ship--that the Old Order had mortgaged the nation by incurring billion-dollar
debts--is practiced today on a scale more than 10 times greater. In their speeches
New Order leaders once drummed away about the decline in rice production, but
today Indonesia has actually become the world's No. 1 rice importer! + Not only
that! Though they once fiercely criticized the fact that the Old Order Regime's
failure to provide enough food for the people had resulted in starvation and mal-
nutrition, 25 right now, after 13 years of the New Order, people are still starving
and malnutrition is still rife as well.§
Furthermore, the New Order Regime's new economic policies, which turned on
the tap of foreign aid and capital, has proved to have had a fatal impact. The
"running wild" of foreign investment due to the lack of government supervision
has killed off all kinds of domestic enterprises which once provided livelihoods for
millions of Indonesians! The people's textile mills have gone bankrupt, canned
milk factories have closed down, shoe factories have folded, [people in] food and
drink factories have been forced to "shove off and find a new line of work".. .and
so on. Many other examples could be given. And the upshot of all of this,
* Tempo [no date given],
t UUD '45, Article 27.
+ Tempo, November 5, 1977.
§ Kompas, May 12, 1978, Tempo, January 22, October 8, 1977.
24.	Jago (literally, fighting-cock) is old and common parlance for "champion,"
"bouncer," "tough-guy," and so forth.
25.	The Indonesian simply has the initials HO (Honger Odem, from the Dutch
hongeroedeem), signifying the morbid distension of the belly that occurs with
acute malnutrition, especially in the case of children.47
according to the available statistical data, is that the number of jobs created by
foreign investment has proved to be far smaller than the number of jobs which
have been lost because the people's enterprises have gone bankrupt.* The people
are becoming more and more impoverished!!! Fifty percent of Indonesia's popula-
tion was poor in 1971, but by 1976 that figure had risen to 60%, based on calcula-
tions using BPS 26 data!!! +
The Chasm between the Rich and the Poor is Yawning Ever More Widely!
The entry of foreign capital has also led to the exploitation of our natural
wealth. The forests have been stripped bare for the sake of increasing exports;
as a result, the environment has been ruined and floods are occurring everywhere.
Who is responsible for this? Everyone washes their hands! The oil fields are
sucked dry, while the foreign exchange earnings are squandered by Pertamina's
"ndoro-ndoro minyak" 27 on building hotels, golf courses, airplanes.. .and so on.
Not only that, these ''ndoro-ndoro minyak" still had to run up a debt of more than
$12 billion in order to satisfy their greed!! Ultimately it is the people once again
who will have to pay for it!!!
The masses must bear the heavy burden of an upbuilding which only produces
an accumulation of debts and depletes the nation's riches. The masses are sacri-
ficed for the pleasures of the tiny group of people who are currently benefiting
from upbuilding!
Judges of the Court,
The opportunity to exercise fundamental human rights has similarly proven to
be no better assured in the New Order period than it was under the Old Order.
Harrowing arrests still take place regularly. Political opponents of "bigfish"
caliber are not the only ones arrested; little people whose land has been seized
and who seek redress from Parliament are arrested too!!! Hundreds of students
who protested the policies of those-in-power--who have lured the nation to the
brink of ruin--have been arrested and put in barracks cells or in prison!! The
press has been muzzled; those newspapers still allowed to publish only carry
the dregs of government-produced propaganda! The people are gripped by fear,
because one can so easily be arrested, detained or beaten while the legal appara-
tus, including the courts, just "remains silent in a thousand tongues"!!
Things are truly getting worse!!
And history is repeating itself; it is still the people who must be sacrificed!! !
The New Order leaders who once were looked to as heroes who would step for-
ward to defend the People from the oppression of the Old Order regime have proved
to have stepped forward as the People's oppressors. They are suffering from the
typical psychological complex of someone in power, i.e., they want to hold on to
their power and, in order to do so, are willing to become oppressors. "The struc-
ture of their thinking has been conditioned by the contradictions of the hard,
present-oriented situation by which they were shaped. Their highest ideal is to
* Ir. Slamet Bratanata on Beberapa Tantangan Kita, LSP, 1978.
t Sritua Arief, Disparitas Pendapatan & Kemiskinan Massal, LSP, 1978.
26.	BPS = Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Statistical Body).
27.	Ndoro is feudal Javanese for "master" or "mistress." Its biting combination
with minyak (oil) sufficiently expresses Heri's view of the Pertamina satraps'
morals and social pretensions.48
become ’someone’; but for them, to become ’someone’ is to become an 'oppressor.'
For those currently in power, this is their model of humanity. This phenomenon
derives from the fact that the oppressed, at a certain moment of their cultural
experience, adopt an attitude similar to that of the ’oppressor.’"*28
Thus, as a consequence of feeling that they have taken part in the struggles
to oppose the oppression of the Dutch, then the Japanese, and most recently the
Old Order regime, those presently in power have also inherited the oppressive
methods of the Dutch, the Japanese and the Old Order. And exaggeration of
their role in opposing those oppressions has led them to become ever more con-
scious of it, naturally reinforcing their tendency to become oppressors. Nowadays
we often hear those-in-power dredge up their exploits just to cover up how dis-
graceful their behavior is!
Anyone who exaggerates his feeling of having rendered valuable service in
opposing oppression will inherit the characteristics of the oppressors!!!
Judges of the Court,
I have chosen to begin this defense by describing the history, the ideals, and
the present condition of the New Order. My purpose is to set up a framework
within which comparisons can be made between what the Suharto Regime has accom-
plished since it has been in power and what it promised and committed itself to at
the beginning of the New Order era. What the students have called the failures
of the present government can then be easily pursued. The New Order was an
all-encompassing movement, and therefore a new life more closely approaching the
ideals of Independence should already be reflected in the planning as well as the
implementation of government programs. All of these ideals should already be re-
flected in the character of the national leadership and in the New Order upbuild-
ing strategy.
Based on the students' observations of the present condition of our country,
these ideals clearly have not been realized.
The style of the New Order leadership does not reflect a sincere desire to
establish the political order in harmony with democratic principles to which we
have collectively aspired.
Nor does the New Order upbuilding strategy reflect the right approach to
realizing the ideals of Indonesian independence. By focusing on efforts to accel-
erate economic growth it has claimed too great a sacrifice from the people of Indo-
nesia.
That is how things stand!
In the next section I will analyze in greater depth the background, history,
and facts which underlie the students' opinion that the National Condition appar-
ent today is the result of two central factors, namely:
* Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Penguin Books, 1972.
28. The English translation by Myra Bergman Ramos of this passage from The
Pedagogy of the Oppressed goes as follows:	"The very structure of their thought
has been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation
by which they were shaped. Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is
to be oppressors. This is their model of humanity. This phenomenon derives from
the fact that the oppressed, at a certain moment of their existential experience,
adopt an attitude of 'adhesion' to the oppressor." (New York: Herder & Herder,
1968), p. 30.49
1.	the National Leadership, and
2.	the Upbuilding Strategy.
The style of a National Leadership that has concentrated all power in its own
hands has crippled the official constitutional political forces. The upbuilding
strategy stresses economic growth, and in the process everything outside that
goal is forgotten. The principles of Social Justice,'National Order, self-respect,
National Culture, and so forth are forgotten.*
First, I will analyze the political system produced by the leadership style of
the Suharto Regime.
* Buku Putih Perjuangan Mahasiswa 1978.CHAPTER IV
THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT HAS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF:
A BUREAUCRATIC DICTATORSHIP
The Manipulation of Javanese Culture
in Order to Revive Feudalism
Judges of the Court,
Many experts and observers of Indonesian politics have commented that the
political system which has been established in Indonesia today and the prevailing
political behavior reflect a concept of power which springs from Javanese political
culture. From the Javanese cultural perspective, power is something concrete,
homogeneous, constant in quality* 1 and without inherent moral implications as such.*
Power is concrete like an ordinary object, so one acquires it when it is handed down
from "above," in the same way that someone passes along an object; the term for
this is diwahyukan. Those who receive the "wahyu"2 of power are said to have re-
ceived the "wahyu cokroningrat." According to this conception, power is free of
moral social values, because it is [an expression of] the will of what is higher up.
Those-in-power likewise do not feel any need to seek popular support to consolidate
their power, because they only feel responsible to the source of power himself.
Such a perspective defines the role of those-in-power, or government officials
within the power structure, such that they act more like servants of those who hold
power than like servants of society, or public servant3 4 5 as that term is understood
in the modern governments of advanced democratic countries. In former times
these officials or members of the pamongprajaserved the colonial Dutch Masters;
now they serve "the bapak.115 Before independence they served the colonial mas-
ters while oppressing the people; now, after independence, they serve "the bapak"
and the people's lot remains the same. Their inclination to serve those who are
more powerful has not seriously changed and therefore it is unreasonable to expect
them to be capable of understanding society's real interests. +
* Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire
Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
1972.
t The view of [Donald] Emmerson, as quoted in Alfian, Pemikiran dan Perubahan
Politik Indonesia, Jakarta, PT Gramedia, 1978, p. 284.
1.	In fact, the original English has quantity, not quality.
2.	Wahyu, as described in traditional Javanese literature, are mysterious radiances
which descend on those destined for greatness. The wahyu of kingship is called
the wahyu cakraningrat.
3.	The text has public servant (sic) in English, as a gloss on pengabdi masyarakat.
4.	The pamongpraja is essentially the [civilian] territorial administrative bureau-
cracy, the oldest and highest-status component of the Indonesian civil service.
5.	Bapak, literally "father(s)," i.e., one's administrative or political superior(s).
5051
Ultimately such a perspective gives birth to a feudalistic social order, that is,
one which compels people to bow and scrape before their superiors, while the su-
periors themselves feel no need to pay attention to their subordinates. After all,
if they do look after the welfare of their subordinates, it is strictly on the basis
of "kersane-bapak,"6 or benevolence. In a feudal order, those who hold power
and occupy positions as pamongpraja are generally called priyayi. 7 They take on
titles corresponding to the level of their "priyayi-ness," ranging from Raden,
Raden Mas.. .on up to the highest titles like Gusti Pangeran Haryo, Kanjeng Pang-
eran or Sinuhun Pangeran. 8 The higher the priyayi title, the more deeply we must
bow our heads. One must also speak to these people in "kromo-inggil." 9
Deeper study reveals no evidence of such a feudal order in the literature and
archaeological remains of older Javanese kingdoms. In such literary works as the
Pararaton, Negara Kertagama10 and others of the same period, no linguistic dis-
tinction is made between halus and kasar,11 and "kromo-inggil" and "ngoko"12 do not
exist; instead, all are equal. Even in temple reliefs one frequently comes across
representations of kings meeting with their people on a rolled-out mat in an atmo-
sphere of equality. We [can] still find many other indications of such democracy
in the social life of rural East Java. There the distinction between "kromo-inggil"
and "ngoko" language doesn't exist, and even the "pamong-desa1,13 are democrati-
cally elected.
Feudalism is also unknown in the indigenous culture of other ethnic groups in
Indonesia. The indigenous lifestyle of the Bataks is extremely democratic, as is
that of the people of Padang,14 the Bugis, no less than the Banjarese. The same
is true of other groups! Thus feudalism is obviously not the indigenous culture
of Indonesia!
6.	Kersane bapak--"low" Javanese for "it's what father [the boss] wants." It is
likely that this Javanese phrase is deliberately used here to imply both that the
Suharto regime is dominated by Javanese, and that the Javanese who serve in it
are peculiarly servile and feudal-minded.
7.	Priyayi, derived from the Javanese para yayi (literally, "younger brothers" [of
the ruler]) originally meant the non-royal, and especially provincial, aristocracies
of Java. With the incorporation of these aristocracies into the Dutch colonial bureau-
cracy, the word shifted meaning in the direction of "officials," though with contin-
uing high-status connotations.
8.	In fact, these titles are not really "of a kind." Raden and Raden Mas are titles
acquired automatically at birth and simply designate genealogical distance from a
putative royal ancestor. The others are conferred court or royal titles.
9.	Kromo inggil--the most elaborately deferential ("high") level of the Javanese
language.
10.	The Nagarakrtagama and the Pararaton, two of the oldest surviving texts in
the Javanese literary tradition, date respectively from the fourteenth and fifteenth
century, and contain (very different) accounts of Old Javanese court life and poli-
tics.
11.	Halus = refined, exquisite, controlled; kasar = coarse, rough, unrestrained.
12.	Ngoko is the "lowest" level of Javanese, used among intimates, but also by
the socially superior to those they feel are beneath them.
13.	Pamongdesa = village officialdom.
14.	I.e., the Minangkabau of West Sumatra.52
Feudalism was promoted and spread by the Dutch as a device for colonizing
Indonesia. By means of the feudal order the Dutch could easily and effectively
colonize the country through the "kings" they appointed and through the priyayi
who were their henchmen. This period of Dutch colonialism also produced a vari-
ety of priyayi titles which even took root in society outside the "palace."
The Dutch colonized Indonesia for 350 years by exploiting the feudal order
which they had created. Indonesia's traditional kingdoms were never abolished;
instead, the Dutch revitalized them to serve as tools for colonialism. The kings
were appointed, given high rank, and later supported financially by the Dutch.
Of course there were one or two traditional kings who were unwilling to cooperate,
but the Dutch were able to entice the majority of them to serve as their henchmen.*
Judges of the Court,
Apparently those-in-power now, the government officials--most of whom come
from the same socio-cultural group, the priyayi, which embraces abangan15 cul-
ture^--are fully aware of this situation. Their efforts to revive feudalism in Indo-
nesian society can be discerned directly or indirectly. Under the pretext of
revitalizing national cultural values bequeathed by [our] ancestors, those-in-power
have reinstated practices which foster a feudal perspective. Let us look at examples
of practices which are currently flourishing among government officials:
--It has become common practice, when an official goes to the provinces, to hold
a welcoming reception, with lavish, wasteful and excessive displays of re-
spect. The reception--which takes place on a grand scale, costs hundreds
of millions of rupiah, presses the people into service without pay, prepares
a glamorous "security fence"16 and puts on welcoming dances--is for no
other purpose than satisfying the feudal-mindedness of the visiting official.
Yet they always claim that it is our national tradition of friendliness that is
being fostered. The official is happy, but at great cost to the people, who
have had to provide voluntary labor/forced labor.17
* Cf. Clifford Geertz, Involusi Pertanian, Jakarta, Obor, 1976.
+ Donald K. Emmerson, Indonesia's [Elite], Political Culture and Culture [Cultural]
Politics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1976.
15.	Abangan refers to that stream of Javanese culture in which strong pre-Islamic
mystical beliefs underlie a veneer of Islam. Used in opposition to santri, meaning
"strongly committed to Islam."
16.	Pagar betis ayu, a sarcastic oxymoron which has become popular under the
New Order, refers to touring high officials' habit of expecting both a public wel-
come by a phalanx of pretty girls, and the supply of night-time bed-partners by
local officials. Pagar betis, literally "fence of shins" (as opposed to "fence of
stakes") was a term coined by the military in the long counterinsurgency struggle
against the Darul Islam movement in West and Central Java (1950-62). It denoted
army-sponsored village self-defense forces--serried ranks of shins symbolizing
the utmost in vigilance, loyalty, and solidarity. The addition of the Javanism ayu
("cute," "sexy") turns the whole phrase into a sardonic mockery of Javanese feu-
dalism and solemn military argot.
17.	The slash dividing kerja bakti ("labor of devoted service")--a contemporary
official euphemism for compulsory unpaid labor--from kerja paksa ("forced labor")
is an off-hand sardonic recognition of their actual identity.53
--If you want to see an official, even one at a middle level, much less a high-
ranking one, it is incredibly difficult. You have to register with the secur-
ity department, fill out forms for the secretary and explain what you want
to discuss; then you wait for hours until the official "is pleased to" receive
you. Incredible! If you are actually "received" you must be grateful even
for that, because often, after you have waited for hours, the secretary calmly
says: "Oh dear, it seems that the Boss has to go out!! He has an appoint-
ment18 with Mr. So-and-so, the director of the Abracadabra Co." Even
then you must not grumble because, in the eyes of the officials, the people
are only "hamba."18
--With my own eyes I once saw a bupati speaking with his regional secretary
in Javanese, even though they were discussing official business. What was
even more distressing: the regent was speaking "ngoko" (kasar), while
the secretary was speaking "kromo"20 (halus). Isn't such behavior only
appropriate to the past, during the Mataram21 era or the colonial period?
The three practices described above, readily encountered if we visit officials,
clearly illustrate the revival of feudal values which we should have eliminated.
Those-in-power claim: these grand and luxurious receptions are to revitalize tradi-
tional culture; the complicated formalities for seeing officials preserve their "author-
ity" so that people cannot just barge in on them; the use of "kromo-inggil" demon-
strates our great respect for each other.. .and so forth. All kinds of rationaliza-
tions can be concocted but the essence of these phenomena is still the same, namely:
those-in-power have manipulated traditional culture, especially Javanese culture,
in order to revive feudalism!
Why is feudalism being revived?
History has proven that the values of a feudal social order serve as an effec-
tive means for preserving an oppressive government, whether a colonial govern-
ment, an authoritarian dictatorship or an absolute monarchy... they are all the same!
Anyone who wants to exercise authoritarian power has an interest in reviving
feudalism!!
Building a Dictatorship upon a Feudal Order
Judges of the Court,
This process of cultural manipulation has been going on for long enough that
apparently it is already beginning to bear fruit. And the ones who can readily
benefit from and exploit this situation are, of course, those-in-power or the offi-
cials themselves. Nowadays, if their attitudes or actions are exposed to criticism,
18.	The fashion for (often poorly understood) English terms and phrases among
the Jakarta elite is here satirized by the unglossed English word appointment.
19.	Hamba is an old feudal-Malay word for "servant" or "slave."
20.	Kromo is the everyday "polite" level of the Javanese language.
21.	"Mataram era" seems to be used here loosely for the heyday of the Central
Javanese dynasty effectively founded by Panembahan Senapati at the end of the
sixteenth century, which originally had its center at Mataram, close to today's
Yogyakarta. Technically, in some sense, the "Mataram era" has yet to close, as
the contemporary princelings of Central Java still regard themselves as part of
the Mataram line.54
these gentlemen always easily evade it by saying: "We have a political philosophy
and political conventions rooted in our own culture, don't we? Why should we imi-
tate the liberal customs you've mentioned?" Officials are certainly more "daring"
in their dealings with the people nowadays, probably because they regard the
people as no longer "dangerous," since they have been force-fed feudal concoctions.
Let us look at the following examples of their behavior:
--Even if a senior official, a minister or the President himself fails or makes a
mistake, he is never willing to admit it and then resign. There is no such
thing as resignation according to the political conventions of Javanese cul-
ture. We still have not forgotten the Minister of Agriculture, Professor
Thoyib Hadiwijaya--who should have accepted full responsibility for the
total failure to increase food production, as a result of which Indonesia had
to import 2.4 million tons of rice at a cost of more than US$700 million in
1977-78--glibly saying, "Don't worry, after all, we still have foreign ex-
change." Such a minister has no feeling of having moral ties with the peo-
ple; as long as the boss isn't upset his position is secure.
--An even clearer [example was provided] when the Ekuin22 ministers an-
nounced an increase in fuel prices in March 1979; cheerfully they reported
the higher prices which made millions of Indonesians scream with pain,
laughing as though pleasant words were tumbling from their lips. Accord-
ing to the conventions of Javanese culture, of course, their offices have no
moral implications; they are only servants of those-in-power. As long as
the boss is happy, they are safe.*
--In jovial spirits the ministers declared that: there's no famine, there's only
a: food shortage! Meanwhile some of the people who were starving had al-
ready died or at the very least were suffering from severe hunger-oedema. ^
All of this demonstrates the extent to which the officials regard their duties
and offices as though they had no moral ties whatsoever with the people. The
only thing they have to do is comply with the demands of their superiors, because
in reality it is of course impossible for the people to make any demands on minis-
ters or officials, from the highest to the lowest in rank. The political system today
is organized in such a way that the voices of the people no longer determine the
course of government. Everything is determined from "up" above, with the result
that the people have been removed, little by little, from political life, because they
are never given any opportunities to take part in it. Political life, as in the age of
the traditional kings, is strictly circumscribed by the "keraton" or palace walls.
Politics have become the exclusive domain of the "nobility" or the officials. Those
of the people who want to participate in political life can easily be suppressed under
all sorts of pretexts, like subversion, or provoking disorder and mayhem. Harsh
prison sentences have been established for them as well.
As a result, the people no longer have any enthusiasm for political life. Why,
it is better just to try to make a living than to go to jail simply because of politics.
Thus, according to Dr. Matullada, for the last 10 years "Political Upbuilding" has
gradually been aimed at quenching enthusiasm for political life.+ It is acknowledged
* Kompas, April 1, 1979.
t Kompas, April 12, 1979.
+ Matullada to the Seminar Pengembangan Kebudayaan Nasional, Jakarta, June 17,
1976.
22. Ekuin is an acronym for Ekonomi-Keuangan-Industri (Economics-Finance-
Industry) .55
even by members of Parliament themselves that Parliament has proved incapable of
functioning the way it is supposed to.
--Why have Politics been isolated from the lives of the People?
--Why has enthusiasm for political life been quenched?
--Why doesn't Parliament function the way it is supposed to?
This is what is at the heart of the New Order Regime's machinations!
Politics have been isolated from the people so that "those" who are currently
in power are no longer inconvenienced by the people's demands for improvement
in their lot, which deteriorates further with each passing day.
Politics have been isolated from the people so that they cannot control the
wicked behavior of the government officials who nibble away millions of rupiah
from state funds.
Politics have been isolated from the lives of the people so that they can be
organized like slaves to carry out what those-in-power call "upbuilding."
Enthusiasm for political life has been quenched so that the people will be so apa-
thetic about their miserable conditions that those-in-power can behavior even more
tyrannically.
Enthusiasm for political life has been quenched so that existing socio-political
forces languish and are no longer capable of exercising social control over the dila-
tory and corrupt way the government is run.
Enthusiasm for political life has been quenched so that no new leaders will ap-
pear to challenge the "respected" status of those-in-power who currently are
ensconced at the core of the national government.
Parliament cannot function the way it is supposed to because in reality it has been
"fixed" 23 ever since the representatives of the people were elected in the general
election or appointed by the President.
All these contemptible political conspiracies are aimed at isolating or banishing
the people from the real political process so that later there will be no force what-
soever that is capable of controlling the New Order Regime's power. This regime
wants to hold the entire political process in its own clenched fist. It wants to "fix"
this country by shutting the eyes, ears, and hearts of the People and by spurring
them to pursue the national upbuilding-program targets which it has set without
listening to what the People want!
The government officials, feeling that they have the most power, decide what
is best for society and ignore both public opinion and public criticism. Public
criticism is considered a hindrance to government programs, a disturber of national
security and is even alleged to be subversive as well. For this reason people who
dare to criticize or correct the government must face illegal arrest and detention
and be silenced in suffocating prison cells. Those who dare to criticize [the gov-
ernment] will be confronted with the icy hands of the government apparatus,
which will herd them into court and bring all kinds of charges against them which
make no sense to anyone of sound mind--as is the case in the current student
trials.
23. The word translated here as "fixed" is diatur, a term that has acquired some
ambiguous celebrity from its habitual use by, among others, leading operatives of
General Ali Murtopo's Opsus intelligence apparatus.56
Since [the] officials hold the most power in this country it is not surprising
that a Political Science Scholar has described our nation today as a bureaucratic
polity. 2I+ Officials are allowed to participate in politics while the people must avoid
them. The officials are the ones who hold real power, not the people. The offi-
cials are the ones who possess state sovereignty, not the people. The officials
are not public servants; instead, those-in-power must be served by the public.
In the language of political science, a government which places all power in
its own hands, as described above, is called: a dictatorial government.
A Bureaucratic Dictatorship
The word dictatorship derives from the Latin word "dictator," meaning the
absolute rule of a person or group without the necessity of ratification by the
people. Modern dictatorship can be either personal or that of a group or class
(party, army, proletariat), but even in the latter case it is reflected in an indi-
vidual who is regarded as its leader.*25
We have often heard about the dictatorial government of Mussolini, Hitler, and
Franco; the kind of government these men headed constitutes the general under-
standing of what a dictatorship is. They were forceful people who had the capacity
to govern through their own strength, without involving wider society in national
political decision-making. There are other kinds of dictatorships, like that found
in the PRC, namely: a dictatorship of the proletariat, a dictatorship by the prole-
tarians who won the revolution. There are dictatorships by Military groups, which
are often called Military Juntas. There are party dictatorships and so on.
Judges of the Court,
However, the dictatorship found in Indonesia today is: a Bureaucratic Dicta-
torship. This is a dictatorship by officials who occupy positions in the government.
It derives from a bureaucratic style of government, that is, a political system in
which power and participation in national decision making are limited entirely to
officials. Thus only a small group of those-in-power are involved in the decision-
making process. There is no role in decision making for individuals, groups, or
social groups outside those circles. The potential of other groups has been stifled
to such an extent that it can be ignored. But in order to put on a democratic face,
both domestically and abroad, groups outside the circles of power are given oppor-
tunities to participate in formal institutions which no longer have any real say.t
Why is this called a bureaucratic dictatorship?
* Florence Elliot, A Dictionary of Politics, Penguin Book, 1974.
+ Karl D. Jackson, "Bureaucratic Polity in Indonesia," in Karl D. Jackson (ed.),
[Political] Power and Communication in Indonesia, University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1978.
24.	Negara pejabat literally means a state belonging to and controlled by its offi-
cials. But since it is clearly used here in anticipatory reference to Karl Jackson's
essay on the "bureaucratic polity" cited below, Jackson's terminology has been
adopted for the translation.
25.	The original English goes as follows: "the absolute rule of a person or group
without the necessity of the consent of the governed. Modern dictatorship is
either personal or that of a group or class (party, army, proletariat), but even
in the latter case it is usually embodied in the person of a leader."57
Why, because it is the government bureaucrats, those high as well as low in
rank, who now jointly and systematically control politics in Indonesia. They make
all political decisions without having to take popular opinion into account. They
carry out upbuilding programs without having to take popular opinion into con-
sideration. They can take any action whatsoever and the people cannot control
them, because the officials hold all the keys to the political system!
In a dictatorial system of government political forces outside the government
are paralyzed so that those-in-power can exercise their power in tranquillity.
Other social forces are also domesticated or castrated via umbrella organizations
sponsored by those-in-power. Even though the government often holds general
elections, the system has been set up in such a way that those-in-power cannot be
defeated. Moreover, the general elections are merely a device by which to seek
legitimization for their regime.
This leaves the question: Is there adequate reason to describe the present
New Order government as a Bureaucratic Dictatorship?
Let us look at the following facts!
General Elections: An Expensive Parody of Democracy
The New Order leaders regularly pat themselves on the back26 nowadays over
the fact that: in 13 years under the New Order they have managed to hold a General
Election twice. This is a measure, they say, of the increasing stability of our dem-
ocratic life. *
Thus it is as though, after a General Election is held, our democratic life is
complete. No further inquiry is made as to what kind of General Election it was
and for what reason it was held. Was it truly held to establish representative/
consultative institutions in the manner laid down in the 1945 Constitution and
clarified in the enactments of the MPR? Or was it held just for the sake of holding
a General Election? Was it an orderly, clean General Election which satisfied the
criteria of directness, freedom,and secrecy? Or was it a General Election during
which [people were] intimidated by Koramil27 or fired from their jobs? Apparently
these questions have never been raised by those-in-power!
Judges of the Court,
If it is merely a matter of having to hold a General Election, that is something
that fascist, dictatorial and communist regimes already do as well. General Elec-
tions are, of course, no longer the monopoly of nations which embrace a system of
popular sovereignty or democracy. They have also become devices for legitimizing
the rule of fascist, dictatorial, and communist regimes. There is not one country
in the world--whether large or small, kingdom or republic, western or eastern--
which does not hold General Elections. Only the type and what they are used for
varies. I will point out [some of] the differences between General Elections in
fascist, dictatorial, and communist nations, as well as in the western democracies.
* Speech of President Suharto at the Installation of the Members of Parliament,
October 1, 1971.
26.	Menepuk dada literally means ’’thump their chests.”
27.	Koramil = Komando Rayon Militer (Military Subdistrict Command), the lowest
jurisdiction in the hierarchy of military territorial commands, more or less equiva-
lent to the subdistrict of the civilian administration.58
The governments of fascist and dictatorial regimes hold elections strictly in
order to legitimize their rule and to avoid international criticism of their human
rights violations.
With general elections there will at least be an image of a freer political life.
The General Elections are conducted in the following manner:
--Those-in-power themselves designate and rank the candidates. The nomi-
nation process is monopolized by those-in-power.
--There is no relationship between the voters and the candidates, either be-
fore or after the election. For that reason the candidates need not feel
tied to the voters.
--The role of the electorate is only to "success" 28 [the election], meaning the
more people who vote, the more "successful" [the election is]. In fact, the
people are often forced to go to the polls.
--The only purpose which an election serves for fascist and dictatorial regimes
is that it allows them to say:	"Our government was elected by the people"!
Nothing more, nothing less, that is the only point of having an election under
fascist and dictatorial regimes.
In Communist nations, which generally embrace a single-party system, elec-
tions are stages with a single director and a single actor, namely, the party.
--The party designates and ranks the candidates.
--The elected candidates automatically become the leaders of the party, from
among whom the top party leadership is later chosen.
--The top party leadership automatically becomes the top national leadership.
--All state life is managed by the party.
In general, the highest-level party or national elections sire conducted during
a people's congress attended by representatives of the people from all the regions.
Many different kinds of General Elections are held in western countries. I will
just give two examples here, from The Netherlands and America.
According to the political philosophy of the Dutch, an election is an occasion
when the people elect "their finest sons," to whom the nation's future will later be
entrusted. It is conducted in this manner:
--A party or individuals designate and rank the candidates, who usually con-
sist of prominent figures who are well loved by the people.
--The people come to the polls out of their own free choice, not because of
coercion.
--It is the representatives of the people who elect the prime minister.
28. Mensukseskan is an inimitable New Order-ism meaning "to insure that a gov-
ernment target or policy is achieved as planned," for example, elections, fusions
of parties, or whatever. The fact that its form defies the normal rule in Indo-
nesian whereby an initial 's' in a verbal root becomes 'ny' after the prefix me-
(i.e., one would expect menyukseskan) has its own significance. As with Tan
Malaka's insistence in 1946 that the verb for confiscating foreign property be
mensita, not menyita, so with mensukseskan: the Power of the verb-root comes
from its violent resistance to any softening linguistic rules.59
We can find similar arrangements in other Western European countries.
In the United States, the people elect the President and members of congress
directly through a general election. Although historically the Americans have em-
braced a "two-Party" system, in reality the constitution does not rule out indepen-
dent candidacies or those of insignificant29 parties. America's highly competitive
elections are conducted in the following way:
--The parties designate and rank the candidates, after each party has first
held internal elections to select its candidates.
--The American People hold the view that general elections, representation,
and accountability must go hand-in-hand.
--Because each elected candidate regards himself as the servant of those who
elect him, i.e., as a "constituency agent,"30 he continuously maintains com-
munication with his constituents and answers to them.
In an electoral system like the American a pattern of reciprocal communication
develops. If, during his previous term of office, a member of congress is seen to
be incapable of channeling his constituents' opinions, he will lose votes in the next
election.
Judges of the Court,
Thus it is clear to us that holding a general election does not in itself prove
that a country is democratic. To [get a] complete [picture,] we have to examine
the real reason the election was held and how it was held.
What is the real reason our general elections are held?
The state of the Republic of Indonesia was founded on the concept of popular
sovereignty, commonly called democracy.* The essential meaning of democracy is
that the people are sovereign and therefore the running of the government is based
on the popular will. It is given concrete form through the establishment of state
institutions on the basis of the popular will [as expressed in] a general election;
for it is these institutions which will run the government. So in fact we hold gen-
eral elections in order to establish state institutions, t
The state institutions formed on the basis of the results of a general election
include Parliament and, because members of Parliament double as members of the
MPR, the MPR is also considered a manifestation of the popular will. The MPR then
wields supreme state power in Indonesia's system of national government.
In regard to this system of national government, the Elucidation of the 1945
Constitution stresses:
Popular sovereignty is held by a body called the People's Consultative Assem-
bly (MPR), as a manifestation of the entire Indonesian people.
It is this assembly that wields supreme state power.
* UUD '45, Article 1, clause 2.
t See Ketetapan-ketetapan MPRS, Nos. XX and XI/MPRS/1966.
29.	Gurem literally means "chicken-flea."
30.	This English phrase constituency agent, in single quotation marks, is used
to explain the neologism pelayan pemilih.60
The MPR, as the supreme state executor, is considered a manifestation of
the people who hold national sovereignty. *
Thus general elections are supposed to be held in order to establish the body
which holds national sovereignty. The 1945 Constitution explicitly states that this
body is entitled to the full exercise of national sovereignty, which is actually in
the hands of the people. Through general elections, the people mandate their
sovereign right to rule the country to their representatives in the MPR.
Nonetheless, in order to ensure that the MPR is a genuine manifestation of the
people, the 1945 Constitution adds:
The [membership of the] MPR consists of the members of Parliament plus re-
gional and group delegates.
The Elucidation of the 1945 Constitution explains:
It is thereby intended that the entire people, from all groups and all regions,
will have representatives in this assembly so that it can truly be considered
a manifestation of the people.
Finally, general elections are held in order to elect the members of Parliament,
who make up the prime portion of the MPR [membership].
Is it true that general elections as they are currently held have given shape
to the popular will in the MPR, the institution which wields supreme state power,
in such a way that it can be said that it is the people who hold national sovereignty?
Let us look closely at the following calculations:
The people's consultative assembly has 920 members, that is, twice as many as
Parliament, which has 460 members. The members of the MPR consist of: t
1. Members of Parliament:
--Elected.................................................. 360 = 39.13%
--Appointed Golkar31 representatives....................... 100 = 10.87%
2.	Additional members in the form of regional delegates; the
core of this group includes the Governors, the Pangdam,32
the Speakers of the Regional Legislatures, and so forth .... 135 = 14.67%
3.	Additional members in the form of delegates from the
Political Parties and Golkar, who are designated propor-
tionally in accord with the election results.................. 118 = 12.83%
4. Additional members in the form of appointed Golkar
delegates..................................................... 207 = 22.50%
* Elucidation UUD '45 .
t Membership of the MPR is regulated by Law No. 16/1969 and Law No. 5/1975,
"On the Organization and Status of the MPR, DPR, and DPRD," as well as the
regulation on their implementation, Presidential Decree No. 2, 1976.
31.	Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) is the New Order regime's elec-
toral machine, nominally not a party, but in effect the party of the bureaucracy,
especially the military. The 100 appointive seats specified here are those reserved
for members of the Armed Forces.
32.	Pangdam = Panglima Daerah Militer (Military Territory Commander), i.e.,
commander of one of Indonesia's 16 Kodam (see above at Ch. 1, n. 5).61
We can easily calculate that a mere 39% of the members of the MPR are directly
elected in a general election, while the remaining 61% are in principle designated
or appointed by the president. Thus it is understandable if the MPR manifests
the president's will more than it does the popular will. The result is that national
sovereignty is no longer in the hands of the people, but rather in the President's.
For that reason the present MPR can be said to be unconstitutional, because it is
not in line with the intent of our 1945 Constitution.
Is there adequate reason for saying that the present MPR is unconstitutional?
Doesn't the President designate the regional delegates on the basis of elections
within the provincial legislatures, which in turn are constituted on the basis of
the results of the general elections?
Doesn't the President designate the additional members from the Political Par-
ties and Golkar proportionally, in accord with the general election results, rather
than simply as he pleases?
It's true, the regional delegates who serve as additional members are desig-
nated on the basis of elections within the provincial legislatures! But let us look
at the status of the provincial legislatures in the Elucidation of the basic law on
regional government. It says:
Article 15:
(1) Regional Government consists of the Regional Head and the Regional
Legislature.
Article 22:
(1) The Regional Head exercises the Rights, the authority, and the leadership
duties of the Regional Government.
Thus it is clear that the Provincial Legislature is only a subdivision of the
Regional Government, whose position is subject to management by the Regional
Head--the Governor, or the Bupati. The weak position of the Regional Legisla-
ture is more plainly revealed in the Basic Law on Regional Government, Law No.
5/1974, where Article 35, Paragraph 1, goes as follows:
If it becomes clear that the Regional Legislature, Level I, is neglecting or for
some reason is unable to carry out its functions and duties, to the point of
inflicting harm on the province or the Nation, the Minister of Home Affairs,
after hearing the assessment of the Governor/Provincial Head, will decide the
means by which the rights, the authority, and the duties of the Regional
Legislature will be carried out.
Obviously the Regional Legislature is only a subdivision of the Regional Govern-
ment, and so it is not difficult for the President c/q [i.e., cum quo] the Minister
of Home Affairs to intervene because they are, of course, authorized to do so.
It is true, the additional members from the Political Parties and Golkar are
designated proportionally on the basis of the results of the general election. But
because they are designated, those who do the designating can choose which candi-
dates will be appointed as members of the MPR. In practice they are selected, or
screened, by the general election institute,33 the Police, Bakin and kopkamtib.
The result is that the Political Parties and Golkar are never completely free to de-
cide who they want to serve as additional members of the MPR.
Judges of the Court, Because some members of Parliament and the MPR are appoint-
ed under our system of representation, the New Order regime has acquired an
33. I.e., Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. For Bakin, see above at Ch. 1, n. 9.62
efficacious means of keeping itself firmly ensconced at the pinnacle of power. This
system allows it to appoint its supporters, so that it can completely guarantee the
preservation of its power. Even if the current New Order Regime suffered total
defeat in the general election, meaning that Golkar did not obtain a single vote, it
still would not be dislodged.
Let us look at the calculations below!
Even if they met with total defeat, those-in-power would still appoint 100
representatives to Parliament. In the MPR they would still have these supporters:
--Appointed members	of Parliament..................................... 100
--Additional members	appointed from	Golkar............................. 207
--Regional delegates; at the core of this group are the Governors,
Pangdam, Speakers of the Regional Legislatures, and so forth.......... 135
--Guaranteed compensation for total defeat in the General Election...... ..5
Total............. 447
Thus, even if Golkar suffered total defeat in the General Elections, those-in-
power could still seat 447 supporters in the MPR, leaving them only 14 short of a
majority. In view of the methods they use, those-in-power would.not have much
difficulty fixing things so that, with this near-majority, they could dictate the
MPR's decisions.
Therefore, even if Golkar met with total defeat in the general elections, it
would still be the "winner" in the MPR! And will be until doomsday, perhaps, if
the present laws are not changed!
Now what would happen if one party gained a total victory, meaning that it
received every vote cast? Could it come out the winner in the MPR?
Let us look at the figures below!
If one Political Party gained a total victory, it would obtain 360 seats in Parlia-
ment. In the MPR it would acquire these seats:
--Members of Parliament................................................... 360
--Additional members in proportion with the General Election results,
minus 10 to compensate Golkar and the Political Party which suffered
total defeat..............................................................  108
Total.............. 468
Even if one party gained total victory in the general elections, it would obtain
only 468 seats in the MPR, a slim majority, with only a 7-vote margin.
These theoretical scenarios make it plain to everyone:	general elections in
Indonesia today are not true political competitions! They are held because they
have to be, as part of the rituals of a country which calls itself a democracy. For
that reason the general elections are meaningless as an institution for channeling
the popular will and as an authentic democratic institution. General Elections are
clearly not held for the purpose of establishing representative and consultative
institutions which genuinely manifest the popular will, for the very reason that
the President designates the majority of its members by appointing members of the
MPR. If that is the case, why are General Elections held?
A General Election is simply a device for legitimizing the rule of the New Order
Regime, which has been ensconced at the pinnacle of the government all this time!63
Judges of the Court,
Now we will look at how the General Elections are conducted. Are the princi-
ples of directness, freedom, and secrecy upheld? Who runs the general elections?
Who are the players and who are the referees? What sort of incidents accompany
the general elections? We will examine these questions one by one!
Who conducts general elections in our country?
The General Elections are conducted by the Government under Presidential
guidance.* * * § The President sets up a General Elections Institute (LPU), chaired by
the minister of home affairs, to administer the General Elections. + Those serving
on the Leadership Council of the General Elections Institute are also members of
the government, namely, these ministers:
1.	The Minister of Home Affairs sits as a member and doubles as chairman.
2.	The	Minister	of Justice sits as a member and doubles	as	Vice-Chairman.
3.	The	Minister	of Information sits as a member and doubles as	Vice-Chairman.
4.	The	Minister	of Finance sits as a member.
5.	The Minister of Defense and Security/Panglima of the Armed Forces31* sits
as a member.
6.	The	Minister	of Communications sits as a member.
7.	The	Minister	of Foreign Affairs sits as a member.t
Apparently those presently in power feel that even Seven ministers aren't
enough, making it necessary to issue the following regulation:
By virtue of their offices, the Minister of Home Affairs, the Governors,
Bupati or Mayors, the Camat, and the Kepala Desa35 are respectively members,
doubling as Chairmen, of the Indonesian General Election Committees; the Re-
gional General Election Committees, Level I; the Regional General Election Com-
mittees, Level II; the Ballot Committees; and the Voter Registration Committees. §
Thus a general election is completely a government festivity, from the highest
levels to the remotest villages.
What makes this festivity even more jolly is the fact that those who conduct
the general elections are themselves busily joining in the game. In practice the
President also holds the office of Principal Former36 of GOLKAR. The Ministers
* Law No. 15/1978, Article 8, clause 1.
t Ibid., Article 8, clause 3.
+ Presidential Decree No. 1/1970, Article 5, clause 1.
§ Law No. 15	[1969] , Article 8, clause 5.
34.	Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata [Pangab], the pinnacle of the Armed Forces
hierarchy. Panglima is that rarity, an ancient Malay military title incorporated
into a contemporary military nomenclature wholly Western in character. It was
adopted by the armed forces during the Revolution as a symbol of national iden-
tity and has distinctly "heroic warrior" connotations.
35.	Camat = subdistrict officer; kepala desa = village headman.
36.	The term pembina, a special favorite of the military, is difficult to render pre-
cisely: it covers the meanings "former," "shaper," "molder," as well as "founder,"
with strongly authoritarian overtones.64
of Home Affairs, of Defense and Security and so on are members of the Formative
Council of Golkar.* * And the complicity of government officials, both civilians and
members of the Armed Forces, in securing victory for GOLKAR is common knowl-
edge. In a game like this, when one can no longer distinguish those who are con-
ducting the elections, and must occasionally be able to serve as referees, from the
players, the likelihood of dirty play37 is enormous. But then.. .it’s human nature,
isn't it, if a chance comes along.. .immediately to make a grab for it. Even more so
when power is involved.
If indeed the President himself once referred to politics as a sport, then a
general election is surely one of the "oddest" sporting events in the world. Why
odd? Where in the world is there a sport in which the referees join the game, ex-
cept in an Indonesian General Election? This is just one of our nation's illustrious
achievements.
Indeed, no less a body than the DPP 38 GOLKAR itself acknowledged that
GOLKAR was able to secure victory primarily through the services and full sup-
port of the Armed Forces and the government apparatus in general, t If GOLKAR
itself, as the victor in the general elections, admits that it engaged in fraudulent
practices in order to win, I think it only remains for us to mention the other de-
ceptions and nonsensical aspects of the way that general elections are conducted.
For instance, in regard to the way nominations are made!
The nomination process begins, of course, when the Political Parties and
GOLKAR submit a list of candidates to the General Election Institute. But evi-
dently it does not stop there. After being screened for fulfillment of the statutory
conditions by the General Elections Institute, the list of candidates must still first
be turned over to KOPKAMTIB Here's the rub. .at this stage, what is really
going on becomes "taboo" 39 for public discussion. It is a question of "security,"1*0
after all... so only the people at the top level may know about it. Security can
have a variety of meanings. It is not impossible that in this case it means security
for the continuing rule of those presently in power. Thus their actions can be
oriented toward that end, for example, expelling bright but "disobedient" people
and people who are considered a potential threat to their power. Now! The way
things are in our country today, who dares to oppose KOPKAMTIB?
In the end the leaders of the Political Parties and GOLKAR end up accepting
KOPKAMTIB's scratchings-out on their lists of candidates! Ultimately, it's
KOPKAMTIB which decides who may go on to stand as a candidate and who must
be dropped!
*	Hasil Munas [Musyawarah Nasional] I, GOLKAR, Surabaya, 1973.
t "Pengantar Materi Munas II Golkar, tentang penataan Organisasi" (stencilled,
for limited circulation), DPP GOLKAR, 1978.
*	Presidential Decree No. 1/1970, Article 49.
37.	Main kayu ("wood play") is a slang term for brutal, violent behavior.
38.	DPP = Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Leadership Council).
39.	The English word occurs in the text in single quotation marks, without an
Indonesian gloss.
40.	The English word is given in single quotation marks, without an Indonesian
gloss, probably in mimicry of the military hierarchy's fondness for English termi-
nology .65
Thus it is obvious that the problems to which the students drew attention in
the White Book were not humbug or insults, but were based strongly on existing
facts. Let us take another look at this excerpt from the "White Book":41
.. .of course,__.Parliament has been 'fixed' by the national executive leader-
ship to become so paralyzed. Even at the time when the official list of parlia-
mentary candidates from the Political Parties and from Golkar was being drawn
up for the General Elections, the individuals listed were picked by the govern-
ment. People thought to have too much courage, integrity, and principle were
considered dangerous and were scratched off the list. Those who remained on
the list of candidates "blessed" by the government consisted of people who
were either weak or, at best, moderates, ready to swing to the right or to
the left; but the majority, of course, were weak.
The issues which were brought up in the WHITE BOOK are everyday matters,
seen from the perspective of the real condition of our political life. Indeed, con-
ditions are much worse than those described in the "White Book"! Aren't the
fraudulent machinations of those-in-power during the 1971 and 1977 general elec-
tions common knowledge? And hasn't the DPP GOLKAR already admitted this it-
self? These are the realities about the two General Elections which the New Order
Regime has conducted.
Thus just what kind of general elections do we have?
If I may make a suggestion, in the interests of economizing and in order to
make it unnecessary to continue deceiving the people, how would it be if, in 1982,
only KOPKAMTIB were to submit a list of candidates for the general election. The
outcome would be the same, at greatly reduced cost and trouble!
Next we will examine whether or not the principles of directness, freedom,
and secrecy were really upheld during the 1977 General Election.
In order to avoid prolonging this defense, I will simply quote accounts of cases
which were reported by those involved in them and were covered by the mass media:
In its May 7, 1977 issue, Tempo reported:
--A number of little people have fled from villages in the vicinity of Karawang
and Subang. They are afraid to go home because of a kind of "threat" from
local authorities. In several areas, no fewer than 700 people have been de-
tained. But on the eve of the balloting on May 2, [1977,] they were promptly
released so that they could exercise their right to vote, just as the President
promised they would be last week. They were members of the Upbuilding
Unity Party (PPP). 42 And in late April 21 of 52 members of the PPP in Su-
bang who had fled to Bandung returned home to their respective villages
on orders from the West Java Laksusda. Meanwhile the other 31 refugees
are also to be sent home; as of last week a further 50 had still not returned
from their places of refuge in various parts of Jakarta.
--Even as late as the eve of the Week of Calm, 43 several PPP and Indonesian
41.	The translation here is taken word for word from the translation of the White
Book in Indonesia, 25, p. 156.
42.	The PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) is a regime-imposed fusion of vari-
ous older Islamic political parties which was brought into existence in 1973.
43.	Minggu tenang. Under the New Order's election rules, parties are not per-
mitted to campaign during the final week before election day. The justification66
Democratic Party (PDI)1*1* commissioners in the Banyuwangi area (Muncar,
Glenmore, Genteng, Jajag, Giri) were all prepared to flee. They were
afraid of being "scooped up"115 by Koramil1*6 the way they were in 1971....
In Jember in 1971 members of Hansip were assigned to serve as night and
dawn patrols. Night patrols guarded the security of the village while dawn
patrols--the morning of the polls--knocked on the inhabitants' doors and
ordered them to vote for so-and-so. It is hoped that this year there will
be no further such intimidation. But quite a few "headstrong" Political
Party leaders, especially from the PPP, have been "sleeping elsewhere."1'7
In its May 21, 1977 issue, Tempo reported:
--"It made me wonder whether the general election in 1977 wasn't rougher
than the one in 1971, since no PDI members died in 1971," he said. "It
made me wonder if General Elections in fact absolutely need to be carried
out when they claim so many victims," he remarked. The 60 billion1*8
rupiah cost of the General Election "isn't much, especially compared to the
mental price we pay." He was referring to changes in popular perceptions
of those-in-power, the law-enforcement apparatus, and the Armed Forces.
In its May 21, 1977 issue, Tempo stated:
--The DPP has recorded that, as of now, 3 PDI members have died--one in
Bali, one in North Sulawesi and one in Semarang. "There was another who
was shot in Cilacap, but he survived," Suryadi said.
--In Central Java, Suryadi said, a former political prisoner from the G30S/
PKI who had served a 6-year prison sentence led an attack on the PDI,
using trucks and buses. "The attackers were wearing the official jackets
of one of the [election] contestants.1,9 The former political prisoner,
Kisromi, is the son of the [ex-] Chairman of the PKI's Central Java CDB, 50
Pego Pranowo.
--In Brebes, Tegal, and Pekalongan, he said, many recidivists51 have also
for this rule (which does not in practice apply to officials) is that campaigning
may excite popular passions to dangerous levels, and a week of calm is needed to
insure orderly polling and mature voting decisions.
44.	The PDI (Partai Demokrat Indonesia) is a regime-imposed fusion of all pre-
existing non-Islamic parties (Nationalist, Protestant, Catholic, etc.), which was
brought into being in 1973 at the same as the PPP (see above).
45.	Diciduk--a sinister slang-officialese euphemism for a variety of severe puni-
tive actions by the authorities, from summary arrest to execution and "disappear-
ance." Its currency dates from the anticommunist pogroms of late 1965 and early
1966.
46.	On Koramil, see above at note 27. Hansip = Pertahanan Sipil (Civil Defense).
47.	"Pindah tidur" appears in quotation marks in the text. The meaning is that
these party leaders were so afraid of arrest, beatings, or even murder, that they
slept in different places every night.
48.	I.e., about $150,000,000 at 1977 rates of exchange.
49.	A cautious but clear reference to Golkar, the regime's electoral machine.
50.	CDB = Comite Besar Daerah (Big Region Committee), the highest level pro-
vincial leadership echelon of the Indonesian Communist Party.
51.	I.e., "repeaters," or hardened criminals.67
been "deliberately" used to disrupt the PDI masses. In East Nusa Tenggara,
not only was there "coercion," but it was reported that on the night of May
1, there were 10 imposters posing as "blind people" at every polling place.
These people were under orders to fake blindness, so there was an excuse
to guide them to the polling booth and have them insert a particular ballot. 52
--According to a report from the DPC53 of the PDI in Manggarai, the election
began at 5 in the morning in the village of Ndoso in the Kuwus subdistrict.
In Ranggu village it started even earlier. In Tengku Leda Village, where
Golkar was declared the winner with 100% of the vote, police officer
Daerang Lara and Hansip people were present in the polling booths.
--In the village of Arus there were poll officials who immediately opened the
ballots after they were cast. And in the hamlet of Menge, surat panggilan51*
had already been collected on April 30, [1977,] so there was no point in
the voters coming again on May 2, 1977.
In its February 26, 1977 issue, Tempo reported: 55
--In Situbondo, two members of the PPP required hospitalization after being
beaten up by the pamong desa. Three members of the NU (PPP) 56--Maudin,
P. Wini, and P. Rais--were beaten up by a local official named Jamal on
February 5, 1977. The three individuals in question have written and signed
a statement, and supplied photographs.
--A [kind of preliminary] Election was held in January in the village of Patuk,
in the Gunung Kidul Regency. Patuk has a population of 1,982. In January
all the inhabitants' homes were visited and they were presented with a form;
the people were asked to vote for one of the groups listed on the form in
the sequence Golkar, PPP,and PDI. The votes had to be signed or else
52.	This appears to mean that by arranging to have fake-blind people show up at
the polling-stations, officials were given an excuse to enter them under the guise
of "guiding" the sightless--and ensuring perhaps that they perforated the correct
ballots. The presence of officials inside the booths was one of the things the oppo-
sition parties protested most strongly about. It should be noted that the Indone-
sian here reads literally "a certain symbol was perforated." Since many Indonesian
voters are illiterate, ballotpapers are prominently marked with the visual emblems
of the parties and of Golkar, to make voting choices easier. In fact, in some re-
cent elections, candidates' names have not appeared on the ballots.
53.	DPC = Dewan Pimpinan Cabang (Branch Leadership Council).
54.	The meaning here seems to be as follows: voters intending to cast their votes
on election day are supposed to bring with them their surat panggilan (summons)
from the local Voter Registration Committee, instructing and entitling them to vote
at a particular polling-station. This document must be turned over to the Ballot
Committee before the voter is allowed into the booth. In this case, by forcibly
calling in the surat panggilan several days before the election, and telling their
owners to stay home on election day, unscrupulous officials were able to turn over
these legitimate summonses to their henchmen, permitting them to cast illegitimate
votes for Golkar.
55.	In the following quotations from Tempo the author has presented a synopsis
and summary rather than Tempo's original language.
56.	NU = Nahdatul Ulama (Islamic Scholars' Party). Formerly an independent
political party of conservative, rural Islam, it has been forcibly demoted to the
status of major component of the PPP (for which see above at note 42).68
marked with a thumb print. [The results were that, of the 120 people ques-
tioned, 102 voted for Golkar, 5 for the PPP, and 13 made no choice.] The
Lurah [Headman] of Patuk, Harjodiguno, told Tempo that "the survey was
conducted because an order was sent to the Golkar commissioners."57
An enormous number of cases have reflected the lack of directness, freedom,
and secrecy in the way the General Elections were conducted, and yet the odd
thing is that the Special Parliamentary Committee which deals with such incidents
has never been able to hold a session. This is because the meetings are regularly
"boycotted" by Golkar.
Thus the fraudulent practices of the New Order regime have pervaded every
aspect of the past General Elections. All the manipulations of the nomination [pro-
cess], the [election] regulations, the composition of the MPR/Parliament, the med-
dling of the government apparatus, the abuses in the technical administration of
the general elections which were never justly resolved, the procedural rules of
Parliament and the MPR and so on, ha’ve only favored preservation of their power
so that it cannot be undermined! And all of this is part of their strategy to concen-
trate power upward so that the people can no longer criticize or protest the cor-
ruption-ridden implementation of upbuilding!!!
Paralysis of Sociopolitical Forces Signals
the Continuation of Dictatorial Government
Judges of the Court,
The concentration of power, which is just one characteristic of a dictatorial
government, is reflected in the systematic involvement of those-in-power in efforts
to paralyze social and political forces which they consider capable of provoking
opposition and challenges to their ideas. They do this in a variety of ways, in-
cluding:
--Infiltrating and splintering targeted sociopolitical organizations.
--Sponsoring sociopolitical organizations by providing all kinds of facilities
and funding.
--Setting up "puppet" organizations designed to serve as the sole institutional
setting for [particular] social and professional activities; these are mono-
lithic organizations, affiliated with those-in-power.
--Hampering social and political activities by means of various regulations,
especially ones involving security.
The White Book terms these machinations by Those-in-Power in meddling in
the internal affairs of sociopolitical organizations "a-moral,"58 because they are
not in accord with the political rules and norms held in high esteem in this coun-
try. The official political norms guarantee the right of every citizen to form asso-
ciations and to express opinions. * Every citizen is free to associate with others
* UUD '45, Article 28.
57.	Komisaris (commissioner), evidently the lowest level functionary in the Golkar
hierarchy.
58.	The English word appears, spelled this way, in single quotation marks, in the
Indonesian text, without paraphrase.69
without having to be subjected to interference from the dirty hands of those-in-
power.
The following discussion will lay bare the facts which reveal the complicity of
those-in-power in various efforts to paralyze the existing sociopolitical organiza-
tions in Indonesia.
One of the scandals in which the "fingering" of the New Order Regime was
evident was the splintering of the Indonesian National Party (PNI). 59 This splin-
tering, which irritated and angered PNI supporters as well as the general public,
took place repeatedly and over such a long span of time that in the end the PNI
itself could scarcely do anything to carry out its function as a party in bearing
the aspirations of its electoral constituents.
The 12th congress of the PNI in Semarang in 1970 did not escape the meddling
of those-in-power. In fact, at the time the newspaper Sinar Harapan even re-
ported the presence of Opsus operatives. Suluh Marhaen, the PNI's official paper,
also voiced opposition to this interference by those-in-power, as did the Jakarta
press in general. * There was conflict at the time between Hadi Subeno and Hardi
SH. Hadi Subeno, who was championed by those-in-power, defended himself by
saying, "It’s logical, isn't it, if the leadership of the Armed Forces prefers to deal
with people who are ready to deal, who support the Dwi Fungsi... ." + 60
The splits that occurred during the 12th PNI congress have proved to have
had long-term consequences for the PDI, i.e., the party which was produced by
fusing the PNI with several other parties. PNI elements have continually sown
discord within the PDI, first between Sunawar and Isnaeni, then between Isnaeni
and Usep. Most recently Isnaeni has once again played the starring role in con-
fronting Sanusi. Thus it is no surprise that the PDI came in last in the 1977
GENERAL ELECTION, trailing far behind. It was possible to corrode the PDI
from within through its own members.t
Even PWI, the Journalists' Organization,61 has not escaped corrosion, thanks
to those-in-power. During the 14th PWI congress in October 1970, a split in the
organization produced the Rosihan-PWI and the Diah-PWI,62 which was championed
* Tempo, December 10, 1977.
t Ibid.
t Tempo, December 10, 1977.
59.	PNI = Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party). In the 1950s and
early 1960s it was one of the "Big Four" political parties and the major competitor
of the communists for the support of Java's abangan masses. In 1973, after re-
peated, blatant interventions by the Suharto regime (mainly via Ali Murtopo's
Opsus intelligence apparatus), it was forcibly merged into the regime-decreed PDI
(for which see above at note 44).
60.	Dwifungsi (Twin Function) is the military's self-proclaimed doctrine that Indo-
nesia's armed forces have both military and socio-political responsibilities/functions
in Indonesian society. The doctrine, formally approved by the MPR in 1973, pro-
vides the central justification for continued military rule.
61.	I.e., Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (Indonesian Journalists' Union).
62.	Abbreviated references to Rosihan Anwar and B[urhanudin] M. Diah, two
wily, rival veterans of Indonesia's turbulent newspaper wars. In this split Rosi-
han Anwar was the candidate of the "liberal opposition," while Diah, whose check-
ered career has periodically identified him with the PNI, was the candidate of the
regime in general, and Ali Murtopo's Opsus in particular.70
by those-in-power. Even though most newspapers and journalists vigorously de-
fended the Rosihan-PWI and criticized the interference of those-in-power, the fact
is that those-in-power persisted in recognizing only the Diah-PWI.*
We can see that the congresses of various sociopolitical organizations have ob-
viously provided those-in-power with convenient opportunities to carry out their
politics of expediency--to "divide et impera." This has been the case with Parmusi,
PSSI,63 and other organizations, as well as with the PDI and the PWI. t
The primary goal of those-in-power in intervening in the internal affairs of
these various sociopolitical organizations is nothing other than dividing and then
ruling them, exactly as the Dutch colonialists did long ago!! The Suharto Regime
controls these organizations, which have already been thrown into disarray, by
installing as puppet leaders people who have been "greased"61* with all kinds of
wealth and status. The ultimate result is that these organizations are paralyzed
and helpless.
Judges of the Court,
If we take just a passing glance at the social organizations which are able to
flourish at the national level nowadays, it will be apparent how limited they are in
diversity and number. Even the few which have managed to survive are usually
organizations whose survival is dependent on the will of those-in-power. The
obliteration of the principle of living together in a "bhineka tunggal ika" society65
and the suppression of grass-roots democracy has resulted in apathy. The sole
organizations which the New Order Regime sponsors are:66
For workers, FBSI (All-Indonesia Workers' Federation),
For farmers, HKTI (Indonesian Farmers' Cooperative Association),
For fisherman, HNSI (All-Indonesia Fishermen's Association),
For teachers, PGRI (Teachers' Union of the Republic of Indonesia),
For journalists, PWI (Indonesian Journalists' Union),
For the youth, KNPI (National Committee of Indonesian Youth),
And so forth.
* Ibid,
t Ibid.
63.	Parmusi is an acronym for Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Party of Indonesian Mus-
lims). This party, formed early in 1967, was a pale revival of Masyumi, the large
"modernist" Islamic party of the 1950s, which was banned by Sukarno in 1960 for
alleged involvement in the regional rebellions of 1958. Parmusi was kept under
tight regime surveillance and control until its forced merger into the PPP in 1973.
PSSI = Persatuan Sepakbola Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesia Football Union).
64.	The Indonesian text has the slang word disemir, in single quotation marks.
The word literally means "[shoe]polished."
65.	Bhineka (correctly Bhinneka) Tunggal Ika is the Sanskritic official motto of
the Republic of Indonesia, and means, roughly, "Diverse but United."
66.	The Indonesian names of these organizations are: Federasi Buruh Seluruh
Indonesia; Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia; Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indo-
nesia; Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia; Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia; Komite
Nasional Pemuda Indonesia. All but the PWI and PGRI are creations of the Suharto
regime.71
This simplification makes the game plan more and more easy to carry out! If
those-in-power are not successful in placing their "jago" in the leadership of these
organizations, they can effectively apply pressure or use divisive tactics like those
illustrated above. And if that still fails, those-in-power can easily set up rival
organizations.
The New Order Regime is so bound and determined to build the serried ranks
of these monolithic organizations that it has blinded itself to the natural tendency
of every society to exhibit diversity. There is an ecological law which says that:
The more diversified a life system is, the more stable it will be. Which, indeed,
is our national motto, Bhin[n]eka Tunggal Ika, unity in diversity!!
A striking case in this regard is one involving the KNPI which took place on
the eve of the 1978 General Session of the MPR. Those-in-power made every
effort to include the KNPI in the GBHN as the sole organized institution for youth.
Those-in-power wanted to herd the youth into a single organization formed in
accord with their ambitions, which later could easily be dominated to serve their
political ends. Protests against this plan came not only from student circles but
also from a variety of other social circles still capable of common sense. The All-
Indonesia Student Council and Student Senate was only one of the leading oppo-
nents of the idea of putting the youth in the stocks via the KNPI!
The students may have had a plan but those-in-power proved to have one of
their own as well. Not only did the New Order Regime not listen to the students'
demands; on the contrary, it put them in the stocks via the "normalization of Cam-
pus activity" [Policy]67 instead.
The Student Councils were forcibly disbanded, while new, upward-oriented
organizations were established, also under duress. The organizations which re-
placed the Student Councils were no longer headed by students; but by Rectors'
Assistants instead. The Rectors' Assistants in charge of Student Affairs auto-
matically took office as chairmen of the Student Coordinating Bodies (BKK)68 which
replaced the Student Councils. Once again the student's role is only that of an
"errand boy" or an obyek pembinaanl 69
State Institutions Which Have Become Ornaments
Judges of the Court,
We have already see how General Elections are used merely as a device for
legitimizing power. There is still one more method which the New Order Regime
uses to protect its power and its democratic image. The New Order Regime has
67.	This is a reference to the KNK (Konsep Normalisasi Kampus, Campus Normali-
zation Concept), a policy launched and doggedly pursued by Opsus Education
Minister Daud Yusuf in the wake of the mass student protests against Suharto's
unopposed re-election as president in the spring of 1978. The policy's central
aim has nothing to do with normalization and everything to do with tightening the
government's control of campus life and forcibly depoliticizing student activities.
68.	The translation does not do justice to the exemplary bureaucratese of Badan
Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan (Kemahasiswaan could perhaps be translated as "Student -
ness").
69.	Obyek pembinaan could perhaps be translated as "target for molding," but
such a translation does not do justice to the ominous connotations of both words.
For more on obyek and pembinaan, see above at Ch. 2, n. 5 and n. 36 above.72
decked itself out in such democratic ornaments as a Parliament, an MPR and a
variety of other higher institutions commonly found in countries which claim to be
democracies. However.. .their names alone already make them ornaments or deco-
rations , whose function is strictly to adorn, while their real functions as state
institutions are not fulfilled. The full story follows.
We know that Parliament has never made use of its right of interpellation (re-
questing information) or its right of enqu§te (investigating a case), despite the
fact that it is precisely these rights which constitute the mechanisms by which the
running of the government can be controlled. When the [way the] government is
run is not controlled it can act autocratically. Right or wrong will be of no con-
cern to the government, even if its actions or those of its officials seriously harm
the people. Because there are no controls it will just keep going. That is why
it is so dangerous when Parliament does not carry out its functions.
Parliament, which is supposed to exercise control, is obviously not carrying
out its duties the way it should. All this time Parliament has merely been pretend-
ing to control the government by holding government hearings. But that which
goes by the name "hearing" consists merely of the government giving information
about some matter before Parliament, followed by a question-and-answer session if
necessary. If something is not to the liking of "the people's representatives," they
can debate with the government a little but usually they are just helpless. This is
make-believe control, not genuine supervision!! Naturally the New Order Parlia-
ment must pretend to control the government, so that the New Order Regime will
appear democratic and its administration will appear to be supervised by the people.
Such tactics for pulling the wool over the eyes of the masses may indeed work for
a little while, but if they think they can get away with it forever they are just
dreaming!!! Eventually the people will still see the realities, and they will believe
them more than a thousand upgrading courses or lectures about how this govern-
ment is democratic and operates under the genuine supervision of Parliament. The
people will see that Parliament's supervisory function is not being carried out.
They will see that its function of voicing the people's wishes is not being carried
out either. And they will see that the functions which are being carried out are
those of pretending to supervise the government and pretending to voice the
people's wishes!!
In truth the people have never had a priori [feelings] 70 about the New Order
government. Long ago, in 1967-68, when the New Order Regime had just emerged,
the people held high hopes of thoroughgoing improvements in our state life. But
those hopes have faded because the reality has proven otherwise. The realities
which belie those hopes have grown more numerous with the passage of time, with
the result that the people's trust in the New Order Regime has faded as well.
Their faith in their Legislative Institutions, namely, Parliament and the MPR, has
faded too. There is ample data proving that Parliament's functions of supervising
the government and voicing the people's wishes are not being carried out. For
instance, let us examine the following facts:
Some time ago, at the beginning of the 1970s, Harian Indonesia Raya warned
about irregularities within Pertamina. The daily carried full reports with authen-
tic documentation, but the New Order Regime took no action whatsoever. And yet
we know that Pertamina managed enormous quantities of state funds, which meant
that if there were irregularities it would be very harmful to the nation. Evidently
70. The semi-official neologism berapriori developed from frequent regime pro-
nouncements that its critics and opponents are blindly (a priori) prejudiced against
it and its policies.73
the reports in Harian Indonesia Raya were regarded as trivial by "the people’s
representatives" in Parliament. They did not use their right of enquete to inves-
tigate the case. Who knows if it was because they did not dare, or were lazy, or
were indeed closing their eyes to it, but the fact of the matter is that they just
kept silent. Maybe they were too busy arranging installments on their allotted
Volkswagens. 71 But several years later all of Harian Indonesia Raya's warnings
turned out to be true.
The massive mismanagement and corruption that went on within Pertamina gen-
erated a debt of US$10 billion, or four times the size of the entire debt incurred
by the Old Order. With US$2.5 billion the Old Order Regime was able to seize
West Irian; with that US$10 billion, Pertamina was able to what?*
Once all this corruption was exposed, could we count on the members of Par-
liament to make use of their right of enquete to investigate the case further???
No!!!
Judges of the Court,
It has been clearly proven that the New Order Regime lacks the political will to
make Parliament genuinely carry out its functions of supervising the government
and channeling the people's voices! And yet it could do so. Do not its Armed
Forces-Golkar representatives and its non-Armed Forces-Golkar representatives
constitute a majority in Parliament? Through them it could change [Parliamentary]
procedures. It could pass Laws regulating the finances and facilities of Parliament,
enabling it to function in the manner laid down by the 1945 Constitution.
The Suharto Regime's supporters in Parliament, i.e., the Armed Forces-Golkar
representatives and the non-Armed Forces-Golkar representatives, do not want to
use their right of interpellation and their right of enquete. And even if represen-
tatives from one of the Political Parties wanted to make use of those rights, the
Golkar representatives could [always] thwart them, because they would have to
seek the approval of a Plenary Session of Parliament first. + Furthermore, a sepa-
rate Law specifically regulating the exercise of the right of enquete has deliberate-
ly never been established to this day, so that members of Parliament can always
contend that:	"The right of enquete has never been exercised because as yet
there is no law regulating its use."
That is why, since the New Order Regime has come to power, Parliament has
never once exercised these rights. No matter how glaring the corruption that
takes place in our country, e.g., [the cases of] Pertamina, Bulog, Palapa,72 the
* Adi Sasono, "Hutang Luar Negeri, Model Pembangunan dan Nasionalisme,"
Majalah Pustaka, III, 1 (February 1979), Perpustakaan Salman ITB, p. 24.
f Peraturan Tata-tertib DPR, Article 11 clause 30, Article 17, and Article 19
clause 1.
71.	One of the "perks" the Suharto regime has used to soften up members of Par-
liament has been permitting them to buy Volkswagens on favorable terms and in
well-spaced installments. Kostrad owns the Volkswagen agency through its Yaya-
san Dharma Putra business group in partnership with the Chinese businessmen
Sjarief Margetan and Sofyan Wanandi (Liem Bien Koen).
72.	On Pertamina and Bulog (Budiaji), see above at Ch. 2, no. 16 and Ch. 1, n. 15.
On January 25, 1977 the New York Times reported that General Soehardjono, a high
official in the Department of Communications, had demanded $30,000,000 in bribes
from General Telephone and Electronics Corp. in return for arranging a $330,000,00074
Rp200 billion in unrepaid credits at the Bank Bumi Daya, exorbitant ownership of
land by government officials and tens of thousands of other scandals, Parliament
will never make use of its right to request information from the President and its
right to investigate these cases.
Thus Parliament has already plainly deviated from the intent of the 1945 Con-
stitution, which states that Parliament will continuously supervise the President's
actions. *
This is the background behind the assertion in the White Book that:
To prevent Parliament from using this right, to prevent Parliament from be-
coming a nuisance, to prevent Parliament from making a fuss, to prevent
Parliament from being nasty enough to investigate such things as Pertamina,
Bulog, the Bank Bumi Daya credits, Tapos, Mangadeg,73 the wealth of cer-
tain officials, etc. , establishment of any law regulating the right of enquete
was aborted! +
Therefore. I would now like to ask the Public Prosecutor, can these comments
from the White Book be termed insulting if they correspond to the facts...?
Upon careful consideration we will see that the charge [that the contents of
the White Book] are insulting merely serves the purpose of silencing voices which
demand that the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila be implemented in a genuine
and consistent manner. Moreover, it is made with the intent of guaranteeing the
perpetuation of embezzlement of state funds, the seizure of the people’s land by
officials and bigwigs, and all kinds of other deviations, without any investigation
by Parliament.
Judges of the Court,
There are several lines in the White Book which were subsequently inserted
in the Public Prosecutor's statement of charges. They go as follows: 74
* UUD '45, General Elucidation Sub VII.
+ Buku Putih Perjuangan Mahasiswa [ITB], 1978, p. 4.
contract to set up Indonesia's "Palapa" satellite communications system. In the Bank
Bumi Daya scandal, a sum of about Rp. 200,000,000,000, or about $480,000,000 at
that time, was loaned to Liem Sioe Liong (Sadono Salim), the top financier of the
Suharto family's business empire. The terms for repayment were so vague and
elastic that the bank was unable to recall the loan in time to prevent bankruptcy,
at which point the whole business could no longer be concealed from public atten-
tion.
73.	This translation is borrowed word for word from the translation of the White
Book in Indonesia, 25, pp. 156-57. With regard to Tapos and Mangadeg: Tapos
refers to the 350-hectare ranch of Sigit Suharto, son of President Suharto (Tapos
is a township near the ranch). Not only is the size of this ranch in blatant viola-
tion of existing legal limits on landownership, but special bank credits were made
available to Sigit as a private individual to develop mixed farming there, contra-
vening established legal procedures. The Mangadeg Foundation was set up to coor-
dinate the construction and preservation of mausolea for the kin of Mangkunegaran
princely family, to which Mrs. Suharto claims to belong. It has been in charge of
the $1,000,000 tomb recently finished for President and Mrs. Suharto themselves.
74.	The translation here is taken directly from the translation in ibid., p. 158.75
--The 1977 MPR is unconstitutional! According to Article 1 Clause 2 of
the 1945 Constitution, Sovereignty is in the hands of the People, and is
fully exercised by the People's Consultative Assembly. [This means that
it is] an institution consisting of the representatives of the people that
holds sovereignty. But 61 percent of the members of the 1977 MPR are not
representatives of the people!! They are appointed! *
What the concept "Popular Sovereignty" means is that the people hold supreme
power, are the source of all power, are the source of law, are entitled to designate
people to serve in the government, and are then entitled to request an accounting
from those people, f If the government takes actions which deviate from the wishes
of its people, the people are entitled to replace it. Today, however, the age of
direct democracy is already over. For that reason the people elect representatives
to exercise Popular sovereignty. Those representatives are chosen in a General
Election, which must be conducted in a direct, public, free, and secret manner.
Thus the significance of an election is that the People designate people they trust
to act as their representatives in exercising the principle of Popular sovereignty.
Since the people are of course sovereign, it is they who have the right to give a
mandate to certain people as their representatives. No one else has that right.
So if someone claims to be a representative of the people but has not received a
mandate from the people, that means he is involved in manipulation.
The General Elections which we have held twice since the New Order Regime
has been in power have only elected 39% of all the members of the MPR, which is
the Institution which Exercises Popular Sovereignty, according to Article 1 Clause
2 of the 1945 Constitution. Thus the principle of Mandating the People's Power to
the MPR has clearly not been upheld.
Judges of the Court,
Distortion in the implementation of our state life can also be found in the prob-
lem of the MPR leadership. The Chairman of the 1977 MPR was a member of the
Armed Forces. According to the Sapta Marga, 75 which is supposed to become
second nature to the members of the Armed Forces, a subordinate must obey his
superior. No matter what happens. A subordinate who refuses an order from
his superior can be considered a deserter. And yet the President is the Command -
er-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. + So the Chairman of the MPR obviously must
defer to the President, since he is below him in the military hierarchy. How can
the MPR properly request an accounting from the President when its Chairman is
the President's subordinate?????
Is such a situation in line with the spirit and intent of the 1945 Constitution
and the Pancasila????? The same is true of the proceedings during MPR sessions.
As the highest State Institution, and as a manifestation of the will and power of
the people, [the MPR] is supposed to be fairly serious and responsible in prepar-
ing and passing its Determinations.
* Ibid., p. 5.
t G. S. Diponolo, llmu Negara,Vol. 1. PN Balai Pustaka 1975, pp. 183-87.
% UUD '45, Article 10.
75. Sapta Marga is the Soldier's [Seven-fold] Oath, officially adopted by the
Indonesian Armed Forces in the early 1950s.76
But what happened during the recent 1977 session of the MPR was: its draft
GBHN was drawn up by Wanhankamnas and Team 11,76 which received their man-
date from the President. Later, the 1977 MPR only edited this draft. Yet the
1945 Constitution explicitly states that the MPR's duties include drawing up the
Broad Outlines of State Policy.* Thus responsibility for formulating the GBHN
lies fully with the MPR, as a manifestation of the entire Indonesian people. If the
Draft of the GBHN were prepared entirely by the MPR, and the MPR were produced
by an honest General Election, it might then be expected that the results would
come close to the people's real wishes. But if it is drawn up by the executive,
the ambitions of the government will be the focal point of the GBHN. Besides
which, the MPR, which has already been elected with so much effort and at such
great expense, and has claimed victims as well, becomes an irresponsible Institu-
tion, since it does not carry out the tasks which are its responsibility.
Doesn't this situation deviate from the spirit and intent of the 1945 Constitu-
tion????????
The Press as a Vital Necessity of Democracy Has
Been Castrated by Censorship and Muzzling
Judges of the Court,
Now we will turn to look at the life of the press. The position of the press is
very important. Through it the government can not only offer information, recom-
mendations, and exhortations, disseminate government policies and so forth among
the public, but it can also read the thoughts of its people. In the days of King
Harun A1 Rashid's rule, the King traveled around to the homes of poor inhabitants
to listen to their grievances. Today it is no longer possible, for example, for the
President to go around to the homes of the poor to find out about their sufferings
and their aspirations, because his term of office would be up before he had fin-
ished making the rounds just of Jakarta alone. Of course it can be done once in
a while, but not on a continuing basis.
For that reason specific mechanisms are needed to enable the President and
his government to listen to the living aspirations of his people. These mechanisms
include the press as well as Parliament. Are the people restless over price in-
creases? Over difficulties in getting their children into school? Over expensive
hospital care? Over rice-brokers who control the peasants' lives? Over workers'
wages which are not raised while everything else goes up in price? Over fish-
brokers who dominate the lives of the fishermen? Over trawlers with giant drag-
nets which drive traditional fishermen to the wall? Over excessive and illegal
land-ownership by city people and government officials, while the peasants get
more and more impoverished as a result of losing their land? Over the son of a
high official who, after killing someone, is set free while his father is even pro-
moted to the rank of minister?77 Over the increases in the prices of fuel and
* UUD '45, Article 3.
76.	This means Team 11, an ad hoc team, formed by the Dewan Pertahanan Kea-
manan Nasional (National Defense and Security Council), a sort of think-tank
attached to the Department of Defense and Security and rival of Ali Murtopo's
better-known CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies).
77.	A reference to General Ali Murtopo and his son Haris; see above at Ch. 1,
n. 16.77
kerosene which were clearly going to cause great suffering among the little people,
yet Minister Subroto78 laughed uproariously when he announced them on TV as if
he were delighted--despite the fact that he has also repeatedly delivered lectures
to upgrading courses on The Guide to Embodying and Practicing the Pancasila.79
After Knop 1580 the salaries of low-level government workers, who were already at
their wits' end to survive, were not raised while the President issued a Decree
raising his own salary and those of the members of Parliament. The government
could find out about all of these things through the press. Furthermore, it could
also find out about the public's opinions, ideas, and views on national and social
issues. The people could likewise quickly and easily find out about developments
in State life and about the government's actions. This is why a free press is essen-
tial for a government which is honest and puts the welfare of its people foremost.
The converse is true for governments which aim solely at preserving their power
indefinitely; such governments are terrified of a free press, especially if they are
totalitarian-dictatorial or communist in character. They sharply restrict the free-
dom of the press in the belief that if the press criticizes them they will be toppled.
It was for these reasons that at the start of the New Order much harsh criticism
was leveled against the Old Order for having hobbled the press.
Judges of the Court,
This New Order verdict on hobbling the press now dates back 10 years. Today
the situation is reversed.
Once muzzling the press was considered a serious violation of an essential and
fundamental prerequisite for a democratic state based on law, but today those-in-
power can muzzle the press merely with a telephone call.*
The January 20, 1978 Affair, during which nearly all of the Capital's leading
newspapers were muzzled, was obviously a betrayal of the New Order's aspirations
to uphold what Professor Oemar Seno Adji81 described as "free opinion," "free ex-
pression," and "free press" 82 in a seminar called "Indonesia as a State Based on
Law." The architects of our Constitution, he said, characterized muzzling the
press as an unconstitutional act in conflict with freedom of the press, freedom to
hold and express opinions, and freedom of thought and speech, t
According to the explanation given by Kopkamtib Chief of Staff Sudomo, the
justifications for muzzling the press were: to preserve public order and to prevent
dissemination of news which would mislead the public.£ These justifications are
free-floating, subjective, and limitless since they are based [solely] on the judgment
* Tempo, February 11, 1978.
t Prof. Oemar Seno Adji to the seminar on 'Indonesia Negara Hukum,' 1966.
+ Tempo, February 11, 1978.
78.	I.e., Prof. Dr. Subroto, Minister of Mining and Energy.
79.	This is the Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, evidently a sort
of guide to the official New Order ideology.
80.	K[e]nop 15 is an acronym for Kebijaksanaan 15 Nopember [1978], i.e., Policy
of November 15, and refers to the devaluation of the rupiah announced on that
date from a rate of Rp. 415: $1 down to Rp. 623. 5: $1. The effect of the devaluation
was to drive many domestic prices sharply upward.
81.	Minister of Justice.
82.	These terms appear in English, unglossed, and in single quotation marks.78
of Kopkamtib itself. They obviously provide opportunities for autocratic actions,
because it is as though Kopkamtib has the authority to sit in judgment on the Indo-
nesian press. If we look at Kopkamtib’s actions from Professor Oemar Seno Adji's
perspective, they are blatantly unconstitutional. An unconstitutional institution
taking unconstitutional actions, that is KOPKAMTIB, the "team star" 83 of the
present New Order regime.
The inordinately stringent restrictions imposed on the press are even more
unreasonable. It is as though every opinion to be found in society constitutes so
great a potential threat to the New Order Regime's power that it must silence them
tall]. The present New Order Regime is terrified of its own black image. Let us
consider the following:
--In the middle of 1977 Kopkamtib banned press coverage of General Election
excesses, without providing any clear guidelines. "Use feeling"84 or check
directly with Kopkamtib, said Sudomo.* Thus, they are actually aware of
"the blackness of their own image," but because they are afraid, the people
are not supposed to know.
--After the press was muzzled on January 20, 1978, the newspapers were
allowed to resume publication on the condition that they would:
1.	Be willing to take responsibility for protecting national stability,
security, and order, and the public interest, and to help reduce
social tensions.
2.	Protect the reputation and the authority of the government and
the national leadership, and not make slanderous statements or
other types of insults aimed at national leaders or members of
their families.
3.	Declare their readiness to carry out introspection, self-correction,
and internal reform.
4.	Not be allowed to quote certain people on the blacklist, t
Again, all these conditions were drawn up by KOPKAMTIB, the jagoan85 of
the New Order Regime. Furthermore, Sudomo warned newspapers not to quote
radio news broadcasts from abroad, etc. After such screening, the only pieces
of news left were the utterly lamentable dregs of government propaganda. This
rampaging press censorship reached the height of ignominy when the press was
forbidden to cover the student trials.
At a meeting of managing editors from all over Indonesia held last February 9
in Jakarta, the government--in this case, Kopkamtib Commander Admiral Sudomo86--
requested and called on these leaders of the mass media not to report on the pro-
* Sinar Harapan, May 11, 1977.
+ Tempo, February 11, 1978.
83.	I.e., literally bintang lapangan.
84.	The Indonesian has 'pakai feeling.' Another example of officialdom's fondness
for Anglicisms.
85.	Literally, sijagoan. On jago, see Ch. 3, n. 24, above. The prefix si- and
the suffix -an serve to turn jago into a scornful diminutive.
86.	On April 17, 1978 Admiral Sudomo was promoted from Chief of Staff to full
Commander of Kopkamtib.79
ceedings of the current trials of student leaders from various cities in Java. *
Bulletins on the Indonesian Student trials, published by the ITB to guarantee the
maintenance of more open communication about the trials, especially among ITB
students themselves, were surreptitiously seized from the Post office on May 21,
1979.
This move by the Suharto regime was obviously a fundamental violation of the
principles of a free and open trial. It [also] violated the basic principles of demo-
cratic state life!
Those-in-power have curtailed an essential aspect of an open trial, for nowa-
days, in modern society, a [free] press must be regarded as an extension of an
open trial. The press in Indonesia today is no different from "a caged monkey"
which can only chatter without any possibility of breaking free of its shackles.
In reality, then, the Indonesian press at present is not the free press which the
New Order aspired [to establish].
The tale of the Suharto Regime’s viciousness in muzzling the mass media, which
it feels is undermining the permanence of its rule, has been a long one. This
regime has not even hesitated to muzzle the newspapers of its former comrades in
struggle from the days when the Old Order was brought down, including KAMI. 87
The KAMI newspaper was a leading daily and the backbone of the student move-
ment to topple the Old Order in 1966. Suharto and his cronies are certainly aware
of the services it rendered and of the role KAMI played at that time in shaping
public opinion toward the movements launched by the soldiers and the students to
restore [our] shattered state life.
But the services of those old comrades-in-arms have ended up being repaid
with the viciousness of someone with a heart of stone! During what was called a
"week of calm"88 on the eve of the election, on July 3, 1971, KAMI was suddenly
muzzled.
Duta Masyarakat,89 which had performed great services during the transfer
of power in 1966, was muzzled along with KAMI.
In order to win the General Elections, those-in-power proved to have the gall
to oppose and trample on their former comrades in the struggle. These comrades,
who experienced the bitterness of oppression under the Old Order, now must come
to terms with the fact that they are being oppressed and turned into puppets by
those who [once] stood beside them!
After the January 15, 1974 affair90 this ruthlessness was repeated. Offering
all kinds of corrupt pretexts, [the New Order regime] muzzled 11 more leading
publications in the Capital of a nation which claims to be independent and to prac-
tice Indonesian democracy! The newspapers which were shut down included
* Memorandum, February 25, 1979, Editorial.
87.	The newspaper of the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Students'
Action Front),edited by Nono Anwar Makarim and others.
88.	On the "Week of Calm," see above at n. 43.
89.	The newspaper of the NU.
90.	A reference to the violent riots in Jakarta on that date. Ostensibly protesting
the visit of Japanese Premier Tanaka, as a symbol of greedy Japanese business,
many of the young rioters were actually venting their dissatisfaction with the
Suharto government.80
Indonesia Raya, Pedoman, Abadi, Nusantara, KAMI, Mahasiswa Indonesia, Jakarta
Times, and Ekspres, with a combined circulation in the hundreds of thousands.
Those-in-power are so terrified of facing the fact that their upbuilding strat-
egy and policies and their leadership have caused serious dislocations in society
that they have chosen to go the route of the totalitarians and fascists by suppress-
ing people who dare to draw attention to it.
But the thick-skinnedness of those-in-power is truly impressive; it is probably
rivaled only by that of the rhinoceroses in Ujungkulon. 91 After muzzling the
press they still [had the nerve] to act as though they had saved the nation.
Through the "team star" of the New Order, Kopkamtib Commander Sudomo, those-
in-power declared:	"This action was carried out to preserve public order and to
prevent the dissemination of news which would mislead the public..."*
Who has really been misleading the public?
Newspapers which present the news as it is, or newspapers which carry the
dregs of propaganda produced by those-in-power?
[How about] when the newspapers covered Sudomo's visits to various markets
in Bandung a few weeks ago and reported that prices have gone up only 10% to
20% since kenop-15 and the increases in the prices of fuel and kerosene?
Judges of the Court, please check in the markets for yourselves. Are those
reports, which were carried on Sudomo's orders, true? Is it true that prices have
gone up only 10% to 20%?
This is precisely the sort of news which misleads the public. It misleads people
when they go shopping and can create tension between vendors and customers!
When someone tries to buy something at a price like that cited in the newspapers,
the vendor replies:	"OK......then buy it from the newspapers, nengr."92
Based on the results of a survey of 12 Bandung markets, the ITB Student
Council found that prices increased between 30% and 60% after kenop-15 and the
increases in fuel and kerosene prices.
Thus the people have actually been "stupidified" on a massive scale; since
those-in-power completely control the existing channels of information, they exer-
cise an information tyranny. These Restrictions on [the dissemination of] informa-
tion have stultified the people and blocked the development of their thinking....93
In a political system like the present one, in which the concentration of power
and preservation of the Suharto Regime are the foci of all political activities, those-
in-power have no alternative but to blind the people to the condition of the coun-
try, which is actually disintegrating and on the verge of collapse! Freedom of the
press is a democratic tool for generating communication and interaction between
state leaders and their people, so that autocratic actions can be avoided. The
press can serve as a channel for conveying public opinion to the decision-makers
* Tempo, January 28, 1978.
91.	The famous wildlife preserve at the extreme southwestern tip of Java, where
the last surviving Javanese rhinoceroses can be found.
92.	Neng--more or less "Miss."
93.	The Indonesian sentence ends with the words dan dengan demikian rakyat
akan mudah ("and in this way the people can easily be..."). Some words are
obviously missing, and so this phrase has not been translated.81
in the government. But because the press has been repressed with censorship
and muzzling, its functions as a vital instrument of democracy have been nullified.
The New Order Regime rules this country strictly on the basis of its own ambi-
tions and goals, without reflecting on or taking into account what the people think
or want!
The System of Concentrated Power and Its Consequences
Judges of the Court,
I have explained how the Suharto regime has fraudulently used general elec-
tions as a device to legitimize its power. The elections held have simply been polit-
ical sleight-of-hand, since the competition to win over voters has not been con-
ducted fairly. Even if one of the political parties swept the election, for example,
the [representatives] appointed by the President would still far outnumber those
elected. Suharto's errand-boys so greatly outnumber the democratically elected
people's representatives that it is predictable that the higher State institutions,
like Parliament and the MPR,will not be able to carry out their duties properly!
I have also analyzed how the Suharto Regime has disabled social and political
organizations. Those-in-power have taken over the [old] Dutch method of domi-
nating and colonizing this Nation, namely, "divide et impera"! Divide, then rule!
The congresses of various organizations have been turned into cockpits for con-
tests between the jago of those-in-power and prestigious leaders who have emerged
from below. Ultimately only one or two large, national-level organizations have
escaped the grubby fingering of the Suharto regime.
I have likewise analyzed how the national press, which is a key precondition
for democracy, has been silenced by censorship and muzzling. The channels of
mass communication for facilitating lively interaction between those-in-power and
the people have been closed off; all that is left are the indoctrination and propa-
ganda channels of those-in-power. The voices of the people no longer reach the
center of decision making in this country.
Is the goal of all the New Order Regime's efforts to dismantle and paralyze
virtually all the channels [which could convey] the people's aspirations upward?
All of these efforts are in fact simply the direct consequences of the ambition
of those-in-power to concentrate all power in their own hands, because that is the
only way the operations, activities, and the life of other institutions, organizations,
and forces in society can be "fixed" 94 in a coordinated way.
This power to "fix" things is now held by a small group of people, the small
group of those-in-power, which consists of government officials. This is what
has become the essence of the New Order regime.
Subsequently, through the government apparatus and its front organizations
from the center to the lowest regional level, i.e., the village, a network has been
constructed which has ended by being turned into a political machine to justify
and legitimize all of the Suharto regime's ambitions. The civil servants who form
the core of the government's strength have been bound together in an institution
given the name of KORPRI. Through something called "mono-loyalty," and san-
tiaji, 95 another word for intimidation, KORPRI has been slyly tied to GOLKAR!
94.	I.e., diatur, for which see above at n. 23.
95.	Santiaji--Sanskritic officialese for, more or less, "indoctrination."82
The group of officials-who-have-power can easily control this network, because
every civil servant within the government apparatus is dependent on them in re-
gard to salary, dismissal, promotion, and other administrative and financial affairs.
These civil servants are controlled through their dependence. If a civil servant
dares to protest, it means: he will be fired, he will not be promoted, or he will be
transferred to "the sticks." 96
In such a civil service system, those-in-power forcibly impose their will to
power. Every civil servant is required to join KORPRI, and KORPRI itself is only
one part of the "Big Family of Functional Groups," along with GOLKAR and the
Armed Forces. To make this even clearer, I will quote Golkar General Chairman
Amir Murtono's 97 statement that:
"We (GOLKAR) are the players on the field, while the Armed Forces and
KORPRI are the fans."
If KORPRI is a backer of GOLKAR, that obviously means that all KORPRI mem-
bers, namely, the civil servants, will try to make sure that GOLKAR wields enor-
mous political power.
The civil servants must help GOLKAR win in the general elections and must
strive to secure the largest possible number of seats for it in Parliament and the
MPR. This is how the Suharto regime has solidly dominated political and state in-
stitutions .
In view of this system, it is clear to all of us why those-in-power are so eager
to "civil servant-ize" 98 all elements in society. The Judges have been civil ser-
vant -ized, the [University] Rectors have been civil servant-ized....and now
those-in-power even want to turn the lurah and kepala Desa [village headmen]
into civil servants.
Judges of the Court,
It is clear to all of us how those-in-power have imposed their will so thorough-
ly, through state institutions as well as through political and social institutions,
that political and state life in Indonesia at present are actually determined by only
a small group of officials-who-have-the-power, whose numbers can be counted on
one's fingers.
This is the type of concentration of power which at the beginning of this sec-
tion I referred to as: a Bureaucratic Dictatorship.
Judges of the Court,
Now that I have proven that the New Order regime's style of government is
that of a bureaucratic dictatorship, I will discuss its consequences.
Having gained control of the operations, activities, and the life of other insti-
tutions, organizations, and forces in society, those-in-power can easily execute
their will.
96.	Unfortunately, "the sticks" does not convey the connotations of daerah
"kering" ("dry" zones). Kering is used derisively to refer to "limited opportuni-
ties for corruption and enrichment" and thus as a sort of antonym to empuk.
97.	I.e., Major-General Amir Murtono SH.
98.	A self-conscious coining in the Indonesian, i.e., mem 'pegawaikan'.83
If the New Order regime wants corruption to continue, Parliament can be fixed
so that its handling of cases of corruption never reaches a resolution. Even the
courts only try petty corruption cases involving some of [the regime's] people who
have to be sacrificed in order for it to maintain a clean image. Or the opportunity
is used to "punish" members of the regime who are no longer considered loyal. 99
If the New Order Regime wants increased military expenditures, that is easy
to arrange too. Parliament just needs to be fixed so that it will ratify the Budget
as rapidly as possible.
Likewise, if the officials-who-have-the-power still want Suharto to be Presi-
dent , in order to secure their interests, all they have to do is fix the votes in the
MPR and in existing social and political organizations, so that [everyone] will cry
out in unison:	"Reelect Pak Harto!"
With its absolute power the Suharto regime can make decisions and plans for
the lives of the people based mostly on its own whims. The masses have only to
say amen100 and carry out the orders or instructions. In these decisions or plans,
the [people's] interests are obviously relegated to second place. Naturally, the
interests of those-in-power come first, and only then the interests of the masses.
Whether for good or for ill, the people have only to acquiesce.
"Power tends to be corrupt,"101 said the world famous statesman, Lord Acton,
and continued, "absolute power will be absolutely corrupt." Absolute power which
is not subject to any controls,like that now wielded by the Suharto regime, enables
members of this regime and their families and friends to steal state money, and
therefore the people's money, at will. The uncontrolled actions of those-in-power
are not limited to enriching themselves, their families, and their friends; they also
directly oppress the people under all kinds of pretexts. Individual [personal]
errors can just be displaced in oppressive actions,102 victimizing the people. Such
autocratic behavior can also be based on the desire to preserve their power. In
order to make their power more stable, the Gang-in-Power are perfectly willing to
imprison, hunt down, and terrorize members of society who do not agree with them
and who are considered a potential threat to their interests.
Judges of the Court,
We know how large the leaks in the National Budget are, due to corruption
among government officials, just as we are also aware that corruption is indeed
difficult to deal with due to the weakness of our present governmental structure.
Nevertheless, in the next section I still intend to analyze one aspect of our national
economic life which is directly affected by the weakness of the political structure
described above.
99.	Loyal seems to have fully entered the Indonesian language.
100.	I.e., mengiyakan (say 'yes' to).
101.	An Indonesianized transformation of Acton's "power tends to corrupt and
absolute power corrupts absolutely." The text reads: Kekuasaan cenderung untuk
korup.. .kekuasaan absolut akan korup secara absolut juga.
102.	Kesalahan-kesalahan pribadi dapat saja ditumpahkan dalam tindakan-tindakan
penindasan.... is a rather obscure formulation. It appears to mean that those-in-
power have bad consciences about their mistakes and crimes and vent their feelings
of guilty fear by taking repressive measures not only against their critics but also
against the masses.84
In an upbuilding climate awash with all kinds of funds, both foreign and domes-
tic, opportunities for enrichment loom large for those with power. This ominous
development is attested to by the emergence of businessmen-officials,103 that is,
officials who plunge into the world of business. Because of their power, their
perquisites, and their offices, these businessmen-officials can make their businesses
boom in no time at all. As a result of the investment of foreign and domestic capi-
tal, which is generally dominated by cukong,10tf a strange working relationship has
developed between:	Government officials, cukong, and foreign investors, a rela-
tionship which could more appropriately be termed a conspiracy to drain off our
national wealth!
Before analyzing this conspiracy in more depth, I will first go into an analysis
of the upbuilding strategy mentioned earlier. [National] leadership and upbuilding
strategy are the twin factors which are responsible for the present rottenness in
the condition of our country. The two of them have interacted and reinforced
each other in bringing about the present situation.
103.	The text has pejabat-penguasa, the phrase translated above as "officials-who -
have-the-power." But this is evidently a printer's error for pejabat-pengusaha
("businessmen-officials" or "officials-who-are-also-businessmen"), as below, and
frequently in the following chapter, and is so translated here.
104.	Cukong, a word of Chinese origin, means today something like "shady finan-
cier" ; it refers specifically to a type of powerful tycoon whose business empire
depends on close ties with top political leaders and who provides these leaders with
their major financial resources. While in principle anyone can be a cukong--as sug-
gested by the text's frequent use of the phrase "Chinese cukong" below--most of
the well-known cukong are of Chinese origin. (Among the most celebrated non-
Chinese cukong are Probosutedjo and Sudwikatmono, President Suharto's brother
and foster-brother.)CHAPTER V
THE NEW ORDER’S UPBUILDING STRATEGY IS A
STRATEGY OF BEGGARS AND EMBEZZLERS
An Interpretation of Upbuilding that is Often Distorted
Judges of the Court,
During the 13 years the New Order has been in power, we have all too often
been force-fed phrases and terms which are connected with "upbuilding."
We have frequently been fed such phrases as "participation for the sake of up-
building," "the role of the press in upbuilding," and even "the role of IUDs and
condoms in upbuilding." The point is that efforts are always made to link every-
thing up with the magic word "upbuilding." However, Judges of the Court, the
people have not merely been force-fed the term "upbuilding." They have not mere-
ly been lulled to sleep with the phrase "upbuilding." The people have also been
forced to make sacrifices for upbuilding. Allegedly for the sake of upbuilding, for
example, they have been evicted from their lands--despite the fact that the land is
then used for the construction of luxury hotels, golf courses, or factories owned
by foreign businessmen!!
The people have likewise been forced to make sacrifices by paying higher prices
since the November 15th Policy* 1 was implemented, also allegedly for the sake of up-
building!! Higher prices for gasoline and kerosene, and bans on pay raises for
factory and clerical workers are allegedly for the sake of upbuilding as well!! * In
the political field, the people have also not been permitted to voice their aspirations,
nor have they been allowed to criticize the policies and actions of government offi-
cials . All of this is likewise for the sake of the political stability which is necessary
for upbuilding. The press, the students, and the intellectuals must "be responsi-
ble," another way of saying that they may not criticize the errors and the behavior
of the officials. All of this, too, is for the sake of the political stability needed for
upbuilding!
Since the New Order regime has been in power, the term and the slogan "up-
building" has clearly become a "god," a god who must be obeyed and feared. The
regime also uses this god to intimidate its people, to threaten anyone who digs in
his heels, and to demand sacrifices from the masses. Therefore it is only reason-
able and appropriate for all of us to raise the questions of what upbuilding really
is and will it genuinely benefit the masses??
Is it true that, [after] all the sacrifices we have made in terms of both economic
and political rights, the upbuilding being carried out by the Suharto regime will
actually improve the welfare of the masses?
* Kompas, February 22, 1979.
1. On this policy (Kenop 15), see above Ch. 4, n. 80.
85I
86
Judges of the Court,
The question naturally arises as to whether it is now appropriate for us to re-
examine and reassess what has been accomplished by the New Order regime in the
field of economic upbuilding. The answer is that not only is it appropriate, but
in fact, it is imperative--because the New Order has been in power for more than
13 years, an ample period of time for a reassessment of its capacities and sincerity
in carrying out its duties. As the Mandatary of the MPR, Suharto is responsible
for carrying out the duties entrusted to him by his people. It is only natural and
proper for the people to evaluate the capacities, failures, and successes of their
leaders--their right to do so is conferred and protected by the Laws of this coun-
try. The purpose of such an assessment is not just to "evaluate" the accomplish-
ments of any particular leader but also, even more importantly, to undertake
corrective measures for the future!!
Judges of the Court,
Early in 1978 the students stated very simply and plainly that the imbalances
in our national life which have given rise to restlessness in the wider society have
been caused, among other things, by:	Errors in the upbuilding strategy being
carried out by the Suharto regime.* * * §
To give substance to this simple statement, the students tried to back it up
with facts about the failures of the New Order during its 13 years in power, like
those included in the "WHITE BOOK OF THE 1978 STUDENTS' STRUGGLE."
But of course we need a more thorough explanation of the meaning of "upbuild-
ing strategy" before we can fully grasp the errors and failures of the Suharto re-
gime during its 13 years in power. From the government's perspective, and accord-
ing to the propaganda it continually puts out, the upbuilding which is currently
being carried out is on the right track, t In line with the boasts it has made all
along, the government tries to prove that upbuilding has been successful by point-
ing out how much the Budget has increased each year, how many buildings and
highways have been constructed, and so forth....
With these increases in physical construction, the Suharto government attempts
to create the impression that the strategy and orientation of the upbuilding current-
ly being carried out are correct.
Yet one of the government's own officials, Minister of Education Daoed Jusuf,
has declared that "To this day, the New Order still has no upbuilding strategy.
How tragic it is that, while Suharto tries to justify his Upbuilding strategy,
one of his own ministers declares that the New Order still does not have one!!
Judges of the Court,
In all the literature on upbuilding and in the formal upbuilding objectives which
are set forth in the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) and in official govern-
ment statements,§ it is conceded that the ultimate goal of the upbuilding process is
prosperity for the masses, based as much as possible on the people's capacities to
* Buku Putih Perjuangan Mahasiswa [ITB], p. 11.
t Speech by President Suharto, August 16, 1976.
t Derap, 16 (early April 1978).
§ Speech by President Suharto, August 16, 1978.87
improve their own social and economic welfare. The essence of genuine upbuilding
is planned change directed toward whatever improvements are desired.* In other
words, the upbuilding process calls for the implementation of planned efforts to im-
prove the social and economic welfare of the masses.
A Strategy, on the other hand, is concerned with a method or a plan of opera-
tion for achieving a particular goal.
Thus, an Upbuilding Strategy can be understood as a method or plan of opera-
tion directed toward improvements in a planned and systematic manner. It is to be
hoped that, with an appropriate upbuilding strategy, the social and economic wel-
fare of the people will gradually and systematically improve, t
There are two terms which are frequently mixed up in connection with "upbuild-
ing," namely, growth and development. + 2 Upbuilding in the true sense of the word
incorporates both of these concepts. Upbuilding cannot be separated from the con-
cept of growth nor from that of development.
However, growth does not always involve development. If we were to compare
our nation to a young girl entering adolescence, then "growth" implies that she is
increasing in physical size, that her body is getting larger, that she is getting
taller and taller, and so forth. Whereas "development"* 2 3 implies that this adolescent
girl is becoming more intelligent, that her skills are improving and her personality
is maturing. A girl who is "growing" physically will not necessarily "develop" in
intelligence and character as well.
This is one example of the difference in meaning between "growth" and "devel-
opment."
Has Upbuilding during the New Order Been Successful?
Judges of the Court,
Like a girl entering adolescence, the Indonesian Nation is currently experienc-
ing and carrying out "economic growth," discernible in physical construction, such
* Kindleberger, "Economic Development."
t "Perspektif Pembangunan Jangka Panjang," Prisma, 5 (August 1972).
+ Sumitro [Djojohadikusumo], Indonesia dan Perkembangan Dunia [Kfni dan Masa
Datang, Jakarta] LP3ES, 1976 ; Mahbubul Haq, The Crisis in Development Strate-
gy, 1976; Jan Tinbergen, Development: State of the Debate, Berlin, October 1974.
2.	In the text the English words growth and development are included in paren-
theses after the Indonesian words pertumbuhan and perkembangan. The larger,
Sukarno-derived concept of pembangunan, combining these two subconcepts, is ren-
dered here, and everywhere else in this translation, as "upbuilding," to avoid the
confusions and distortions of sense involved in its common (mis-)translation as
"development." Both Sukarno and Heri, in their different ways, have taken pains
to indicate that their idea of Indonesia’s ideal future is precisely not "development"
in the World Bank-AID sense; for this reason it is essential to keep the rather ec-
centric word "upbuilding" for pembangunan--though the terminological situation
is complicated by the fact that the Suharto regime, while keeping the term pemba-
ngunan, has interpreted it as if it were identical with AID-style "development."
3.	Here the English word development occurs in parentheses after the Indonesian
word perkembangan.88
as the building of schools, the construction of highways, increases in national and
per capita income, and so forth. But while carrying out this upbuilding, currently
so highly-touted, which in reality is only economic growth, is the Indonesian
NATION experiencing "development," as a nation?? Have our capacities as a na-
tion, in terms of national productivity, moral values and work habits, changed or
developed during the 13 years the New Order has been in power? During that time
hasn't the Indonesian nation's ability to be self-reliant and to stand on its own feet
steadily deteriorated? Hasn't national productivity remained unchanged or possibly
even declined? During the 13 years the New Order has been in power haven't our
nation's moral values degenerated and our work habits become increasingly semra-
wut?1* Ask those of our parents who were educated during the Dutch era whether
Our society's work habits and moral values have improved since independence.*
Their answer will surely be: No! After decades of independence, it is obvious that
increasingly Indonesians lack discipline and despise honesty and truth, that the
sense of individual responsibility has been degenerating, and that their nationalist
fire* 4 5 has been fading in every aspect of national life!!
Indeed, such remarks as "everything can be bought" and "everything can be
arranged" have become social laws which hold absolute sway in our country.
Judges of the Court,
The upbuilding on which the New Order regime has prided itself all this time
is not upbuilding in the true sense of the word. The New Order regime has de-
ceived the people of Indonesia by trying to give them the impression that they are
currently carrying out upbuilding. In fact, what is currently being carried out is
only physical construction, which is a manifestation of "economic growth" and has
nothing whatsoever to do with our development as a nation. Indeed, from the per-
spective of national development, our moral values, work habits, and national pro-
ductivity have declined and deteriorated markedly during the 13 years the New
Order has been in power.
What the New Order regime has been effecting all this while is anything but
upbuilding in the comprehensive sense of the word!! This regime only plans and
carries out one aspect of upbuilding, namely, economic growth, forgetting and
neglecting the other aspect, that is, our development as a nation. The question
naturally arises as to why the New Order regime has chosen to base its government
programs primarily on economic growth?? What is the background to the Suharto
regime's choice of an economic strategy which is founded on an "economic growth"
approach?
In order to answer these questions, we need to look back--to the time when
power was transferred from Sukarno to Suharto, to the transition from the Old
Order to the New.
*Multatuli, Max Havelaar, Jakarta, Jambatan, 1973.
4.	Semrawut is a marvelous borrowing from Cirebonese, covering the meanings of
"sloppy," "chaotic," "inefficient," "hopeless," and "dishonest." A word of this
caliber deserves not to be translated.
5.	The exact sense of the Sanskrit-derived term citra is not altogether clear. It
can mean "fire," "shape," "figure," or "story."89
The History and Background of the New
Order's Economic Upbuilding Policies
During the Old Order Period, Indonesia could be said to have operated an al-
most completely closed economic system, in the sense that limits were imposed on
foreign trade, restrictions were imposed on the foreign investments permitted in
Indonesia, and foreign aid or foreign intervention in the economy were minimized.
These and other policies limited foreign Influence.
A small group of Indonesian academics, including Wijoyo Nitisastro, Subroto,
Emil Salim, Sadli, and so forth, who later came to be known as the "Berkeley
Mafia," received intensive education in economics at the University of California
at Berkeley several years before Bung Karno fell. As technocrats educated in
America at a time when the "cold war" was being incessantly propagandized, the
Wijoyo group was strongly influenced by a way of thinking which was ultra-con-
servative, 6 orthodox, and extremely pragmatic.
Soon after returning to Indonesia, the members of the Wijoyo group started
teaching at the University of Indonesia and at the Army Staff and Command School
(SESKOAD) in Bandung, where Suharto was among their students. Through their
lectures, economic concepts and an economic system very different from the prevail-
ing ones were disseminated widely among senior Army officers. On the eve of 1966,
the members of the Wijoyo group actively took advantage of their positions as facul-
ty members at the University of Indonesia to launch a continuous barrage of criti-
cism against the economic policies of the Old Order. Moreover, inflation was ram-
pant in Indonesia at that time and goods were in critically short domestic supply.
Through university forums, seminars, and discussions, Wijoyo and Co. disseminated
their ideas among students, Indonesian intellectuals, high-ranking Armed Forces
officers and the public at large.
Judges of the Court,
Immediately after Bung Karno fell, the Berkeley Mafia Group of Wijoyo and
friends surfaced as economic ministers in the Cabinet formed by Suharto, one of
their former students. They joined forces in Bappenas (The National Planning and
Upbuilding Body), 7 a supra-departmental institution within the Indonesian system
of government. This institution, as part of its everyday activities, devised the
framework and operational strategy for Indonesian upbuilding. It was this group
that determined operational programs and the gamut of upbuilding priorities. Sim-
ply put, this institution planned and determined the direction of Indonesia's up-
building strategy, with Wijoyo and friends as masterminds8 and prime actors.
As a result of their ultra-conservative, orthodox, and extremely pragmatic way
of thinking, Wijoyo and friends firmly believed that the economic growth approach
was the right answer for Indonesia after the Old Order was brought down. Due
to their extreme pragmatism, they believed that all the problems of welfare and
social justice could be overcome only through economic upbuilding and that there
6.	After the Indonesian words amat konserfatif (very conservative) the English
words Ultra-right conservatism are included in parentheses.
7.	I.e., Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional.
8.	Here and elsewhere the Indonesian and Javanese word dalang (puppeteer) is
translated as "mastermind" to approximate the negative connotations of sly manipu-
lativeness that dalang has acquired in Indonesian political parlance.90
was no need for mass participation in planning that upbuilding or in its supervi-
sion. In short, they considered the people's aspirations and politics as entirely
unnecessary in a developing nation like Indonesia. Politics was regarded as some-
thing taboo, 9 a hindrance to the upbuilding process, and always suspect as manip-
ulable by special interests. The upbuilding strategy which this way of thinking
produced was an anti-democratic strategy oriented toward economic growth: a
strategy which has clearly proved to have magnified the differences between rich
and poor, provided abundant opportunities for the growth of corruption and the
emergence of a stratum of Indonesian economic parasites, and fostered an anti-
popular style of consumption.
Furthermore, these masterminds of Indonesian economic upbuilding, Wijoyo and
his friends, did not adequately realize and appreciate the fact that the models and
theories of economic upbuilding are products of the experience of Western nations, *
and are not necessarily appropriate for the conditions Indonesia faces today.
On the advice of Wijoyo and his friends, the Suharto regime chose a strategy
oriented toward economic growth as the basis for Indonesia's upbuilding, in the be-
lief that economic upbuilding would spread prosperity throughout the nation. This
theory is well-known as the "trickling down"10 theory. It was hoped that, as a
result of successive stages of economic upbuilding, prosperity would trickle down
to the lower strata of society, t a hope which was in fact realized in the West early
in the 20th century, but which is yet to hold true in any developing nation.
It is indeed true that the Western nations once pursued economic growth, as a
result of which prosperity trickled down to their entire people early in the 20th
century.
But that success can not be considered in isolation from the characteristic on
which the cultural orientation of the people in the West is based, namely, the
Protestant ethic. It is this Protestant ethic that taught all strata of society in
European countries to be hard-working, thrifty,and productive. Even the upper
strata of European society, namely, the capitalists and the industrialists, were
hard-working, thrifty, and productive. Sustained by a spirit of innovation and
creativity, they consistently used the capital and resources at their disposal to
make productive investments. These investments in turn stimulated economic
growth and generated employment, ultimately causing prosperity and affluence to
trickle down to all of the people.
Judges of the Court,
So much for a sketch of economic upbuilding in the West. This is what has
produced the models and theories of economic development!! Are these models and
theories appropriate for developing countries like Indonesia? Obviously not, be-
cause the typical cultural characteristics of Indonesian society differ markedly from
those of the peoples in the West. We must first ask whether our society has the
cultural characteristics which are necessary for economic upbuilding. Is our soci-
ety hard-working, thrifty, and productive?
* Gerald M. Meier, ed., Leading Issues in Development, Oxford, 1972.
t Prijono Tjiptonerijanto, "Tentang Perataan Pendapatan," Tempo, May 13, 1978.
9.	The English word taboo is used here, in italics, rather than the Indonesian
tabu.
10.	The English words trickling down, in double quotation marks, are in the origi-
nal Indonesian text, without an Indonesian gloss.91
Most developing nations, including Indonesia, are currently carrying out top-
down economic upbuilding. The concepts, planning, and implementation of this up-
building originate with the upper strata. They are not generated by the majority
of the people, who are merely fed these concepts and plans and are sometimes
forced to participate in some small aspect of their implementation. In order for
economic upbuilding to be successful, in order for it to cause prosperity and wel-
fare to trickle down to the masses, it is absolutely essential that the upper strata
of society be hard-working, thrifty, productive, and creative, as they are, for
example, in Japan, Korea, and Singapore.
This is a prerequisite for the success of the economic upbuilding approach!
But what about Indonesia? Our society obviously does not have the kind of
upper strata which successful economic upbuilding requires. On the contrary, the
upper strata of Indonesian society are social groups which do not value hard work,
are very consumption-oriented, and are not the least bit productive. * What will
happen if we choose and implement an economic growth-oriented upbuilding strate-
gy under these circumstances?
Then economic upbuilding will only multiply the opportunities for the upper
strata of Indonesian society to enrich themselves, to heighten their anti-popular
taste for conspicuous consumption, and to destroy ethical values which do not fur-
ther their interests. This will happen because these are precisely the social groups
which can use, manipulate, and exploit the concepts, planning, and implementation
of economic upbuilding. Economic growth, which will increase the flow of goods
and capital, will only give them greater and more extensive opportunities to maxi-
mize their profits and advantages from that increase.
Small groups within Indonesia's upper strata may be making investments in the
economic sector, but clearly only in areas closely tied to the consumption needs of
Indonesia's economic elite. They set their production targets with only 10-15% of
the Indonesian people in mind.
The New Order Regime's Building Strategy: A Policy
of Begging for Foreign Loans and Capital
Judges of the Court,
That is an illustration of what is happening now in Indonesia. The upbuilding
strategy pursued by the Suharto regime has clearly only increased and expanded
the opportunities for Indonesia's upper strata to enrich themselves; this has re-
sulted, during the 13 years the New Order has been in power, in the development
of an economic pattern which is very capitalistic, consumption-oriented, and anti-
popular.
As a consequence of its growth-oriented economic strategy, Indonesia requires
enormous quantities of capital and funding to achieve the desired growth rate.
Rapid economic growth can only be achieved with a high growth rate. Where will
we get the huge quantity of capital needed to achieve it? Obviously domestic
sources cannot adequately finance programs to speed up economic growth. How-
ever, Indonesia is lucky enough to possess natural resources of great variety and
potential, such as oil, timber, tin, copper, and so forth. It is this hidden wealth
that has been used to finance the physical construction activities aimed at promot-
ing economic growth. Because the income derived from the export of raw (extrac-
* Koentjaraningrat, Kebudayaan Mentaliteit dan Pembangunan, Jakarta, Gramedia,
1974.92
tive) materials has not been sufficient, the New Order Regime has been forced to
undertake a "policy of begging" in order to obtain the Foreign capital assistance
necessary for financing economic upbuilding.
Judges of the Court,
While it cannot be denied that foreign capital assistance is indispensable for
financing upbuilding, the Suharto regime does not adequately understand or appre-
ciate the real motives behind foreign capital assistance activities in Indonesia. Su-
harto and his technocrats act as though they sincerely believe that foreign aid and
capital are given to Indonesia with genuine good intentions and without any ulterior
motives. But they are only pretending innocence! They know perfectly well, but
keep quiet because they profit from the influx of Foreign funds. Thus, Suharto
and the technocrats have become middlemen for the interests of the creditors as a
consequence of their ultra-orthodox way of thinking about economics and their con-
viction that foreign aid is given to Indonesia strictly with honorable intentions.
The members of the Berkeley Mafia are therefore an "easy bridge" for foreign in-
terests in Indonesia.
Is it possible that the big powers are giving Indonesia financial aid and funding
with no self-interest whatsoever? Is it possible that they are acting like "beneficent
Gods" with no ulterior economic or political motives? Obviously not! In political
terms, all economic aid given by the Western countries to developing nations like
Indonesia must be seen as part of the struggle between capitalist and communist
countries [to influence] the developing nations! The Western countries have a
long-range interest in seeing that Indonesia continues to maintain a pro-Western
political stance, and that it becomes a sort of "fortress of support" for their ideol-
ogy in the Southeast Asian region.*
Indonesia's militarily strategic location and America's very painful defeats in
Vietnam and Indochina have steadily enlarged Indonesia's role in the eyes of the
Western nations. That is why the World Bank and other Western countries* 11 do
not hesitate to give Indonesia loans worth tens of billions of dollars. That is the
thinking behind their desire to give Indonesia aid and loans. But they do not
realize that they are essentially propping up a corrupt, anti-democratic regime
whose programs benefit only a small segment of the Indonesian population. The
Western countries apparently have not yet learned the lesson from their experi-
ences in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Iran, and so forth. They once gave the same
type of aid to totalitarian, corrupt, and anti-popular regimes in developing coun-
tries, t such as those of Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam, General Phoumi
Nosavan in Laos, General Lon Nol in Cambodia, the Shah of Iran, and so forth.
History has clearly shown that regimes which are corrupt, anti-popular and so on,
and which receive financial aid and support from the Western nations, are hollow
and easily toppled. The fall of the totalitarian and corrupt regimes mentioned
above was followed by the destruction of the Western nations' interests in the Re-
gions involved. But the Western countries apparently have not yet learned their
lesson--that when they prop up a totalitarian, corrupt, and anti-popular regime
they are essentially supporting actions which make enemies of the people and which
will ultimately harm their own long-term interests.
* Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence,
Cornell University Press, 1976.
+ David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government, New York, 1964.
11. Sic. Only a casual, virtually unconscious identification of the World Bank with
the U.S. makes this formulation intelligible.93
Foreign Intervention
Judges of the Court,
The involvement of Western countries in giving Indonesia aid and loans began
on a large scale following the visit of World Bank President, "Robert McNamara,"
in June 1968,* only three months after Suharto was installed as President of Indo-
nesia. From that time on, the involvement of the World Bank and other Western
countries [sic] in determining the direction and design of Indonesia's upbuilding
policies rapidly increased. The size of the World Bank's staff of experts in Indo-
nesia is larger than in any other country, second only to that of its central office
in Washington.
This staff took an active part in designing Indonesia's upbuilding strategy.
Along with advisors from Japan, The Netherlands and the Harvard Development
Advisory Service, the World Bank staff helped draw up the national policies formu-
lated by Bappenas. In fact, during the initial stages, these foreign experts helped
write up the regulations governing foreign investment in Indonesia for the Coordi-
nating Body for Foreign Investment (BKPMA).12 How laughable it is that these
foreign experts helped determine a foreign investment policy for Indonesia when
they themselves were the investors, meaning that they obviously tried to establish
regulations from which they would benefit.
Their intimate involvement in Indonesia's economic planning convinced these
foreign experts that they could and would be able to control the direction of Indo-
nesia's upbuilding and the strategy by which it would be pursued, to the extent
that they did not hesitate to provide tens of billions of dollars in aid. Aid and
loans would certainly never been given on such a massive scale to small countries,
such as Bangla Desh. They must be given to countries with important economic
and political potential for the West. Economically and politically Indonesia is vital
to the Western world--as American President Richard Nixon observed when the
New Order was only a year old:
With its 100 million people [now 135 million]13 and its 3,000-mile arc of islands
containing the region's richest hoard of natural resources, Indonesia consti-
tutes the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area.t
The recent increase in the price of fuel is just one revealing example of how
extensively the Western nations influence and interfere in the Indonesian economy:
In the wake of the Pertamina scandal and the Suharto regime's failure to
generate new sources of income, the Western nations immediately mapped out
a new development strategy for Indonesia--a strategy based on export-oriented
industrialization and on the reduction of all budgetary subsidies.
By various means and pressures, this strategy was forced on the Suharto
regime. The Western nations which make up the IGGI11* consortium urged that
* Brian May, Indonesian Tragedy, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1978.
t Far Eastern Economic Review, April 27, 1979.
12.	I.e., Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Asing.
13.	The figure in parentheses was inserted by the FEER editors in the Nixon quo-
tation .
14. IGGI = Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, the sixteen-nation consortium94
all budgetary subsidies, for example the price subsidy for domestic fuel, be
quickly reduced. Because the Suharto regime was in desperate need of for-
eign funds and aid, as a declaration of "obedience and submission" to the
countries of the IGGI consortium it announced an increase in the price of
domestic fuel on the final day of the IGGI meeting this year (Amsterdam,
1979).*15
Such is one example of how aid-giving nations can impose their will on develop-
ing countries like Indonesia. Indonesia's creditors in the IGGI consortium have
been able to decide what strategy Indonesia must follow--they participate in making
decisions on the timing and the level of price increases for domestic fuel, and in
determining that Indonesia must establish export-oriented industries, and so forth.
This is just one example of how the modern colonial system works. In order to
control and dominate the economic, cultural, and political activities of a nation
"colonized" the modern way, they do not need an immediate physical presence in
Indonesia as the Dutch did during the old colonial Era. All they have to do is pro-
vide aid and loans, and Indonesia will be obliged and duty-bound to obey the wishes
of the aid-giving countries. Closer examination would reveal that the Suharto re-
gime listens to and implements many of the decisions made at IGGI conferences in
Amsterdam far more readily than it does the aspirations conveyed by the people's
representatives in Parliament itself!!!
Within an even larger system, the countries which give aid to Indonesia have
an enormous interest in seeing that Indonesia adopts a Capitalist economic system--
a system which is in radical opposition to the one outlined in the 1945 Constitution.
The reason for this is that, if Indonesia did not adopt a capitalist economic sys-
tem , if it were to establish a closed economy instead, then foreign entrepreneurs
and foreign countries would not be able to extract maximal profits from Indonesia's
soil.
As mentioned earlier, all of the economic aid given to Indonesia by the Western
countries cannot be separated from efforts to spread the ideological influence of the
aid-giving countries. It is only logical that the countries of the West would not
give economic aid to countries whose ideologies are not compatible with theirs. Is
there any chance that the Western countries would give aid to Cambodia16 or Viet-
nam and their people, for example? Obviously not, because those countries have a
different ideology than that of the Western countries, even though millions of their
people are poor and undereducated!!
* Ibid.
that has bankrolled the New Order's economic development programs since 1966.
The key members of IGGI are: the U.S., Japan, West Germany, Holland, France,
Australia, and the U.K. Other members include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy,
New Zealand, and Switzerland.
15.	This "quotation" is loosely based on several paragraphs of the cited article in
the Far Eastern Economic Review. In both instances where the word "reduction"
is here used, the FEER original has "abolition."
16.	It is perhaps of some interest that neither the Suharto regime nor its critics
have abandoned the old term Kamboja for something approximating Kampuchea.95
Consumerism Opens the Door to
Domination by Foreign Capital
Judges of the Court,
In order to obtain foreign aid and capital, Indonesia must first implement an
open-door economic policy, meaning that no significant restrictions are placed on
foreign trade, that foreign investors are at liberty to invest their capital as they
please, and that there are opportunities for foreign intervention in the Indonesian
economy.
This open-door policy will allow goods and capital to flow freely into Indonesia
from abroad. From the perspective of the economic interests of powers like Amer-
ica, Japan, England, The Netherlands, and so forth, such an open-door economic
policy is an essential prerequisite for them to market their manufactured goods.
On one hand, the industrialized countries require this policy as a precondition for
giving aid and investing capital in Indonesia. On the other hand, they use it as a
means for marketing their manufactured goods while simultaneously exploiting Indo-
nesia's wealth and natural resources.
One direct result of the open-door policy is that the industrialized nations must
first spread the philosophy of consumerism in Indonesia in order to heighten the
people's desire to consume. Foreign businesses continuously peddle an extravagant
and "prestigious" lifestyle to the public via advertisements in such mass media as
TV, radio, newspapers, and so forth, heightening the people's desire to consume
so that they will be easy targets of sales campaigns for the goods being peddled.
That is why commodities which the public does not really need circulate widely in
the open market, including imported cosmetics, color TVs, videotape recorders,
luxury cars, and so forth. The Suharto regime itself has never demonstrated any
firm political will to place restrictions on the goods which may be marketed domes-
tically, and has never made visible, concrete efforts to limit patterns of conspicu-
ous consumption, except through meaningless admonitions which merely smack of
propaganda. The New Order regime has never been willing to learn from countries
like Korea, whose people are more prosperous than the people of Indonesia many
times over. The Korean government does not permit the domestic sale of color TVs;
the color TVs which they manufacture are sold strictly as exports for foreign con-
sumption .
Judges of the Court,
The philosophy of consumerism is now slowly but surely taking root in our
society. Consumption goods which are unproductive and of limited use are contin-
uously forced on the Indonesian public. The pressures to consume then multiply,
encouraging government officials to engage in corruption and to abuse their posi-
tions because they cannot afford to buy the consumption goods circulating on the
open market by legal, honest means.
Indonesia Is Becoming More and More
Deeply Ensnared in Foreign Debts
Judges of the Court,
As a consequence of an upbuilding strategy oriented toward economic growth,17
17. After pertumbuhan, the English word growth is added in parentheses.96
the New Order regime requires enormous amounts of capital to finance economic
activities which will increase the growth rate. It was realized from the start that
domestic sources could not possibly provide all the funding necessary for upbuild-
ing, so the balance has been obtained by begging left and right for aid and loans.
The other source of funds which the Suharto regime has cultivated is the export of
raw (extractive) materials like oil, timber, tin, copper and so forth, the manage-
ment of which is almost entirely in the hands of foreign companies.
The Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) stipulate that the functions of for-
eign aid are strictly supplemental and that it must play a smaller and smaller role
over time so that we eventually will be able to take full responsibility for financing
upbuilding on our own. However, what has in fact happened after 13 years under
the New Order is just the opposite--the amount of foreign aid grows larger and
larger year after year, while the majority of domestic revenues derive from the ex-
port of raw materials like oil, timber, tin, and so forth. Oil contributes the largest
share of domestic revenues.
If we look at the size of the upbuilding budgets during both Pelita I18 and
Pelita II, it is glaringly apparent that the full upbuilding budget can be financed
only by foreign aid and oil revenues. The following table will clarify this point.
COMPARISON OF FOREIGN AID AND OIL REVENUES
WITH THE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
(in millions of rupiah)
Fiscal Year	A Development Budget (1)	B Foreign Aid (2)	C Oil Revenues (3)	D Total, Foreign Aid and Oil Revenues	E D as a Percentage of A
Pelita I:					
69/70	118.2	91.0	65.8	156.8	132.7
70/71	169.6	113.2	99.2	212.4	125.2
71/72	195.9	117.0	140.7	257.7	131.6
72/73	298.2	145.7	230.5	376.2	126.2
73/74	450.9	196.5	382.2	578.7	128.3
	1,232.8	663.4	918.4	1,581.8	128.3
Pelita II:					
74/75	961.8	224.2	957.2	1,181.4	122.8
75/76	1,397.7	488.4	1,248.0	1,736.4	124.2
76/77	2,054.5	778.3	1,635.3	2,413.6	117.5
77/78	2,156.8	770.3	1,929.1	2,699.4	125.2
78/79	2,454.7	856.3	2,067.4	2,923.7	119.1
	9,025.5	3,117.5	7,837.0	10,954.5	121.4
Sources
(1) & (2) Sumber Pembiayaan Pelita III, Table 15.
(3) Nota keuangan 1978/79.
18. Pelita [Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Five-Year Upbuilding] I and II are the
first and second Five-Year Plans.97
This table shows how hollow the New Order economy is; it is completely subsi-
dized by oil exports and foreign loans. It is also clear that economic upbuilding
would be impossible without oil exports and foreign loans, as can be seen from the
size of these two components in comparison with the upbuilding budget. The in-
come generated by oil and foreign loans comes, on the average, to more than 120%
of the development budget. This means that without oil exports and foreign loans
the Suharto regime would not be able to carry out upbuilding; indeed, it could not
even finance routine activities, like the ones included in the national budget, without
incurring a deficit!!
Therefore, the upbuilding on which the New Order regime has so much prided
itself all this while is clearly only hollow upbuilding because it is completely depen-
dent on oil exports and foreign loans. Accordingly, as can be seen from the above
table, the impression that the physical construction which has taken place during
the New Order is due to "Suharto's leadership" is completely false! The physical
construction we see today, after 13 years under the New Order, was produced by
a "Policy of begging for aid" from foreign countries and by "selling Indonesia's
raw materials" abroad. The roles of "beggar" and "peddler of raw materials" could
be filled by almost anyone; they do not require any special leadership qualities.
In fact, if all that is meant by upbuilding is physical construction for the sake of
pursuing economic growth, it is quite possible that Indonesia does not need to elect
a president to serve as national leader--a "manager" could just be appointed to
direct the exporting of raw materials (oil) and to beg left and right for loans which
would then be distributed among the physical construction sectors!!!
Obviously the role of "managerial leadership"19 in economic upbuilding which
Suharto has assumed during the 13 years of the New Order can be said to be utter-
ly meaningless. Foreign loans and the export of raw materials, especially oil, tim-
ber, tin, and so forth, are merely the logical consequences of the open-door eco-
nomic policy which Suharto has carried out. It is a policy which could be imple-
mented by anyone who takes only short-run interests into consideration; it does
not require statesmanlike insight or the consideration of long-range consequences.
Even Sukarno, if he had wanted to, could have invited foreign capital into Indone-
sia, could have begged for loans from foreign nations, and could have awarded
foreign entrepreneurs the right to manage the exporting of Indonesia's raw mate-
rials, provided he had been willing to carry out an open-door policy. No special
leadership qualities whatsoever are required. Leaders who fully understand and
take seriously the 1945 Constitution and the ideals of independence are not neces-
sary! !! A leader, any leader, will do!!
In view of the fact that oil exports and foreign loans account for more than
120% of the upbuilding budget, it should then be asked whether the funds gener-
ated by oil exports and foreign loans equal the total value of all physical construc-
tion carried out during the 13 years the New Order has been in power??? The
answer will certainly be no; in fact, the actual value of physical construction will
surely be much lower!! The facts show that almost 30% of the funds budgeted for
upbuilding have been diverted due to corruption and used for the personal benefit
of those charged with carrying out the upbuilding. Thus, the total value of the
physical construction carried out by the New Order regime is considerably lower
than it should be.
19. The English words managerial-leadership, in single quotation marks, are
glossed by kepemimpinan management in parentheses.98
Judges of the Court,
The GBHN stipulates that the functions of foreign aid are strictly supplemental
and that it must play a smaller and smaller role over time, but after 13 years under
the New Order, dependence on foreign aid and loans is obviously increasing, not
getting smaller and smaller. The following table shows how Indonesia's dependence
on foreign loans and capital will increase in the coming years.
COMPARISON OF FOREIGN AID AND THE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
(in billions of rupiah)
Fiscal Year	A Development Budget	B Foreign Aid	C B as a Percentage of A
Pelita II:			
74/75	961.8	224.2	23.3
75/76	1,397.7	488.4	34.9
76/77	2,054.5	778.3	37.9
77/78	2,156.8	770.3	35.7
78/79	2,454.7	856.3	34.9
	9,025.5	3,117.5	34.5
Pelita III:			
79/80	3,488.1	1,493.5	42.8
80/81	3,891.9	1,647.4	42.4
81/82	4,350.3	1,840.3	42.3
82/83	4,778.2	2,019.5	42.3
83/84	5,340.9	2,236.8	41.9
	21,849.4	9,237.5	42.3
Source:
1)	Sumber Pembiayaan Pelita III, Table 15.
2)	79/80 merupakan RAPBN.
This table shows that the percentage of foreign aid and loans will increase in
relation to the National Upbuilding Budget--from an average of 34.5% per year dur-
ing Pelita II to an average of 42.3% per year during Pelita III. These figures make
it clear that, as time passes, the grip of foreign capital and foreign influence on
the Indonesian economy is growing tighter and tighter, a development which is
glaringly in conflict with the Broad Outlines of State Policy formulated by the MPR!!
Proof of the Hollowness20 of the New Order Economy
Judges of the Court,
Although the New Order economy is propped up by the export of raw materials
like oil, timber, tin, and so forth, and by foreign aid and loans, in terms of staying
20. Keropos, the word translated here and earlier as "hollow," has the further
connotations of "rot," and "inward decay."99
power and strength it is extremely fragile. The New Order economy is quite hollow
and toothless--and, as time passes, more and more sacrifices are required of the
people in order to achieve the growth rate desired by the New Order regime. The
November 15th Policy (Kenop 15) recently issued by the New Order regime is an
example which illustrates how hollow the New Order economy is and how, ultimately,
the burden of errors in government policy is still shouldered by the masses.
In order to avoid the possibility of a budget deficit of about 20%, which would
have clearly revealed how much its capacity to continue carrying out upbuilding
has declined, the government was forced to resort to "devaluing" the rupiah by
50.6% (from Rp. 415 to Rp. 625 per American dollar). To hide the real situation
from the masses, Wijoyo used the term "controlled float" instead of "devaluation,"
in the hope that the people could be fooled!! But obviously they couldn't be, be-
cause they were personally affected by the price increases which Kenop 15 caused.
By way of giving a "superficially plausible" explanation for Kenop 15, Coordi-
nating Minister for Economics, Finance and Industry/Bappenas Chairman Wijoyo
and his friends offered the following reasons:*
--Kenop 15 was necessary in view of the continuous decline in the value of
the dollar on the world market, with the resulting drop in the absolute
value of Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves.
--Kenop 15 will stimulate an increase in exports, because Indonesia's exports
will cost less abroad. Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves will rise ac-
cordingly.
--It is expected that Kenop 15 will improve the competitiveness of domesti-
cally produced goods in relation to foreign goods and that, as a result,
national productivity will increase and the volume of imports will be re-
duced.
Whether or not these reasons are accurate, it must be borne in mind that
Wijoyo Nitisastro offered exactly the same reasons on August 23, 1971 to justify
devaluating the rupiah from Rp. 378 to Rp. 415 per American dollar, t It turned
out later that the August 23, 1971 policy did not significantly increase the volume
or alter the composition of Indonesian exports. The increase in Indonesia's for-
eign exchange reserves since that time has been due primarily to increases in the
price and the volume of oil sold on the world market as a result of the world
energy crisis, not as a result of Wijoyo's policy!!
Closer examination of the reasons why devaluation (read: Kenop 15) was
necessary leads to the following conclusions:
--With relatively small foreign exchange reserves (approximately $2.5 billion
in November 1978), the government's capacity to finance Indonesia's eco-
nomic activities in the coming months threatened to be drastically reduced.
Furthermore, as Pelita III drew nearer, the possibility of a budget defi-
cit and the anxiety which that caused continued to grow. A budget
deficit clearly would have diminished the Suharto regime's "image of suc-
cess" in the economic field, about which it has constantly boasted all
this time!! It also would have "confirmed" the criticisms of the errors in
the upbuilding strategy and in its implementation which the students and
the general public have made all along. Likewise, it would have been
* Merdeka, November 20, 1978.
t May, Indonesian Tragedy.100
obvious that the economic stability which has been bragged about all this
while is only a "bogus economic stability" due entirely to the "oil-boom" 21
and to foreign credit and capital!!
--Such a large devaluation, on the order of 50.6%--"possibly the largest de-
valuation a country has ever carried out"* * * §--is not a normal, everyday eco-
nomic measure. Indeed, in other countries such a large devaluation would
ordinarily lead to the downfall of the government involved. + The urgency
of this policy must have been rooted in the structure and foundations of
the Indonesian economy, which have been shaped by the accumulated eco-
nomic policies of the past. Aside from the Indonesian economy's vulnera-
bility22 to the instability of the international economy, Wijoyo Nitisastro him-
self has admitted the role played by the Pertamina crisis in making Kenop 15
necessary.+
Faced with the alternative of a deficit budget which could generate an "image
of failure" in economic upbuilding and which could ultimately endanger the perpetu-
ation of the Suharto regime, the government was forced to carry out a devaluation.
From the perspective of monetary theory, a measure like Kenop 15 can be consid-
ered a policy of "forced saving." Under such a policy, the government can siphon
off some of the money in general circulation by indirectly "forcing" the public to
save. As is now apparent, the absolute value of people's incomes dropped as a
result of the price increases which followed Kenop 15.
By means of this "forced saving," the government was able indirectly to siphon
off some of the public's money, while at the same time it tried to ensure that de-
mands for salary and wage increases were not met. (Telex no. 906/DP/C/11/78,
Minister of Manpower and Cooperatives, on the ban on pay raises for workers.)§
The government did this because, if wages and salaries had been increased to com-
pensate for the increased prices caused by Kenop 15, its efforts to siphon off funds
would have been thwarted. Moreover, there was the possibility that inflation would
race out of control, leading to economic chaos. Consequently, government officials,
workers, and people with fixed incomes were the social groups which bore the brunt
of Kenop 15. It was by such means that the Suharto regime was able to continue
financing development as Pelita III drew near.
From the above analysis it is clear that a macroeconomic policy has a direct im-
pact on the lives of the masses. Kenop 15 also proves that the consequences of
errors in the strategy and implementation of upbuilding which have been made in
the past will ultimately be shouldered by the masses, just as the students and the
public at large earlier predicted that they would! !
Further analysis of the impact and influence of Kenop 15 on Indonesian social
groups provides the following picture:
1. Social groups with money and access to information about this monetary
policy would make windfall profits by speculating in currency. It was
* Prisma, January 1, 1979.
+ Drs. Frans Seda [in] Kompas, February 20, 1979.
+ Merdeka, November 20, 1978.
§ Kompas, February 22, 1979.
21.	The English phrase oil-boom occurs in the text in double quotation marks and
unglossed.
22.	Vulnerableness appears in the text in parentheses after kerapuhan.101
quite "bizarre" that most of the stores owned by non-natives23 in Bandung
and Jakarta suspended commercial activities the morning of November 15,
1978,* even though the official communique of the cabinet session was not
made until that afternoon. If even the petty traders knew about it a day
in advance, it would not be strange if the heavy-weight businessmen knew
many days ahead and took advantage of "leaks of state information. "
(V. B. Da Costa, S.H., Vice-Chairman, Commission III,21* Parliament.)t
Could this possibly be an indication of the close collaboration among busi-
nessmen, and that perhaps the transactions amounted to billions of rupiah?
2.	The devaluation of the rupiah would affect middle-income social groups by
increasing their expenses approximately 50%, because in practice they con-
sume export commodities,or goods made from imported materials, in larger
quantities than social groups who are less well-off.
3.	For the less well-off social groups, who constitute the majority of the Indo-
nesian people, the devaluation of the rupiah would result in increases of
as much as 20-30% in expenses, reflecting the current increases in the
prices of all domestically produced goods. The percentage increase in
these expenses is relatively small in comparison with that experienced by
the middle-income groups, but due to the minimal purchasing power of
the less well-off, in absolute terms this group (read: "the majority of the
Indonesian nation") would bear the heaviest burden!!
This is just one glaring example of how hollow the New Order economic system
is, a system which depends primarily on oil export earnings and foreign loans. To
prop it up so that it does not look hollow, to show that the Suharto regime still
has the capacity to carry out economic upbuilding, the Suharto regime has been
forced to implement economic policies which inflict harm on the people—for example,
KENOP 15, which served as a means of forcing the people to "save" for the purpose
of financing economic upbuilding.
* Kompas and Pikiran Rakyat, November 16, 1978.
t Kompas, November 25, 1978.
23.	I.e., people of Chinese ancestry, citizens and alien residents alike.
24.	This standing parliamentary commission's area of responsibility is law.CHAPTER VI
THE CONSPIRACY OF THE CUKONG* 1—GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS—FOREIGN INVESTORS
DRAINERS OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH
Those Who Benefit from Development
Judges of the Court,
In the preceding section I explained how an upbuilding strategy oriented to-
ward economic growth has obliged the Suharto regime to implement an open-door
economic policy, in order to attract as much foreign credit and capital as possible
to compensate for severe shortages in domestic upbuilding funds. This growth-
oriented strategy has also forced the Suharto regime to set up an incentive system
capable of generating profits for both domestic and foreign investors.
The Suharto regime has done this by offering a variety of financial inducements
and tax breaks, and by promoting a free market Policy. As a consequence of such
measures, there has been a deluge of capital of all kinds both from within and out-
side the country, creating a climate of intense free competition. The law which
prevails in this climate created by the New Order regime is: survival of the fit-
test! !! *2
An [investment] climate like this only nurtures those who in fact are already
economically strong and kills off those in the lower strata of society who make a
living from small-scale enterprise or from working as laborers. Who is economically
strong in Indonesia?? The corrupt government officials and the Chinese3 cukong,
along with their accomplices, the foreign investors. The cukong—government offi-
cials— foreign investors are the ones who enjoy the benefits of economic growth
and who have the most to gain in profits and advantages from the upbuilding pro-
grams promoted by the New Order regime. Thanks to the present upbuilding
strategy, after 13 years under the New Order they have succeeded in concentrat-
ing economic power in their hands.
This was possible because the concepts, planning, and implementation of up-
building have been "dictated" from the top as a result of a system which concen-
trates power. The present upbuilding concepts and plans were not produced by
the lower strata of society; they are not the ideas and aspirations voiced by the
majority of the people. The concept of free economic competition could not possibly
come from the lower strata of society, because they are economically weak! It is
obviously an anti-popular concept originating from those in power, who think of
* Charles Darwin, The Origin of [the] Species, Mentor Book.
1.	On cukong, see above Ch. 4, n. 104.
2.	This phrase appears in English in the text.
3.	Throughout this section, as elsewhere in the text, people of Chinese ancestry
are referred to by the officially-decreed and racist word cina, rather than the neu-
tral Tionghoa. See above at Ch. 3, n. 5.
102103
the economy only in terms of production and do not pay any attention to human fac-
tors, or to distribution and benefits to society!
Judges of the Court,
The Chinese cukong and foreign investors can gain the greatest advantage
from Indonesia's upbuilding programs because they are able and ready to compete
freely within the present open economy. They have sufficient skills to engage in
large-scale production. Thanks to their vast financial resources, the Chinese
cukong and the foreign investors control the marketing networks and distribution
outlets in virtually every region. At the same time, the highly competitive climate
has encouraged them to use non-business methods in order to make the largest
possible profits. When it comes to enriching themselves, "illegal" has no meaning
for the Chinese cukong. Their commercial ethics sanction any means whatsoever
for making the largest possible profits; they are the ones who hand out bribes
left and right, who engage in various manipulations, and seek protection from gov-
ernment officials. This is what leads officials to get involved with the cukong and
the foreign investors in various dealings which eventually produce a kind of con-
spiracy, whether in the form of dummy corporations or the provision of "facilities." * 4
Many businesses are formally managed by relatives of government officials but
are actually run by cukong. Numerous timbering concessions and other enterprises
acquired through the channels of power have likewise been transferred into the
hands of the cukong. The New Order regime has produced a prototype Indonesian
human being frequently referred to as: government businessman-official. He's an
official but also a businessman; he's a businessman but also an official.* It is not
hard to imagine how depraved a person is who holds two such titles simultaneously!
His office gives him the authority and the power to take decisions or actions on
financial matters, while his entrepreneurial spirit whines with yearning to take ad-
vantage of every possible opportunity to make a profit. The result is: corruption!
Whether in the form of commercialization of government office, manipulations, or
commissions. By their nature these people are not really cut out to be business-
men; they are not hard-working, persevering, and thrifty, the way businessmen
should be. They act more like feudal lords who, because of their office, can put
their feet up 5 and wait for tribute or bribes from the cukong. These businessmen-
officials in fact simply wait around for cukong or foreign investors to show
up, and then they ask for company shares or "facilities" and a certain percentage
as a commission. But that is not the end of it! In fact, the stage in which the
officials just put their feet up amidst the luxuries bestowed on them by cukong in
exchange for all the protection and perquisites they have provided is over. In
the current stage, the relationships are reversed. It is not that the cukong need
* Jusuf Hasyim, "Dialog," Prisma, February 1977, LP3ES, 1977.
4.	Fasilitas is a political term covering more than either "facilities" or "perquisites."
It can mean the wide variety of emoluments (luxury goods, houses, stocks, etc.)
that businessmen make available to government officials in return for help, favors,
and protection. It can also mean the no less wide variety of services (licenses,
permits, concessions, credits) that officials can provide to favored businessmen.
5.	Ongkang-ongkang literally means to sit with one's feet dangling (as it were, on
a throne, dais, or high chair), and connotes loafing about while ordering other
people to work. The closest phrase in English to this is "to put one's feet up,"
but the phrase should be understood metaphorically, since in Indonesian society
actually putting one's feet up in someone else's presence is grossly offensive and
rarely done.104
protection and "facilities" so much as that officials are compelled to provide them
because of their addiction to the luxuries which the cukong have pressed upon
them for so long. The officials have become completely dependent on the cukong
for meeting the needs of their extravagant lifestyles. Meanwhile, the cukong and
foreign entrepreneurs have actually taken over our country's economic life.
The Chinese Control Our People's Bellies
Judges of the Court,
Although, according to current estimates, there are only 3.8 million Chinese
non-natives in Indonesia, or to be exact, only 3% of a population of 135 million,
astonishingly they are estimated to control no less than 70% of Indonesia's econom-
ic activity. *6 To illustrate the extent to which residents of Chinese descent domi-
nate the economy, it may be helpful to look at their activities in Indonesia's major
cities, such as Bandung and Medan. In Bandung: 83% of all commercial licenses
are in Chinese hands; 60% of the money held in current accounts belongs to Chi-
nese; and they dominate agriculture and animal husbandry in places like Lembang,
Andir, and Pangalengan through their capital and expertise. In Medan: Chinese
residents, who make up only 8% of the city's population of two million, control
30.7% of the large enterprises, 55.3% of the medium-scale enterprises, and 66.7%
of the small enterprises. In Jakarta: say no more! How can one begin to talk
about the amount of money circulating in Indonesia without mentioning how much
of it is in Pintu kecil and Kota. 7 As for credit, here too, most government-sup-
plied credit falls into Chinese hands. If we look closely, it is obvious that most
of the clients hanging around the credit department in every bank and most of the
debtors who happen to be investigated by the Bank of Indonesia are Chinese, t8
Although this is just a rough estimate, I think we would all get the same impres-
sion if we stood for a while in front of the credit windows at various banks. At
the national level, virtually all channels of trade can be said to be under the con-
trol of residents of Chinese descent. In fact there are several Chinese cukong
who effectively play a key role in almost every sector of economic life, from bank-
ing down to household necessities like cooking spices.
These cukong reign over banking, logging, the rice and sugar syndicates,
rubber, industry (flour milling, cement manufacturing, kretek9 cigarettes, tex-
tiles, batik, and so forth), assembling, wholesale trade,10 contracting, supplies,
* Far Eastern Economic Review, June 16, 1978.
t G. Y. Adicondro, "Kewiraswastaan Orang Cina," Prisma, October 1978; Tempo,
July 30, 1978; Sumantoro M, "Pribumi dan non-pribumi dalam perkreditan kita,"
Kompas, January 16, 1979.
6.	The FEER actually states that, according to one estimate, "Chinese control no
less than 70% of the local retail and distribution trade."
7.	Pintu Kecil, the long street in downtown Jakarta where Chinese import-export
firms and "informal banks" have traditionally clustered. Kota is the old Chinese
commercial and residential ghetto in north Jakarta.
8.	As Indonesia's bank of issuance, the Bank of Indonesia has the authority to
oversee, regulate, and investigate the affairs of other banks.
9.	Kretek--Indonesia's well-loved clove-flavored cigarettes.
10.	This seems to be what perdagangan umum means.105
export-import, distribution, real estate, movie theaters, hotels, and so on.** 11
The extent of Chinese domination of the economy is also evident from their nearly
complete control over commodity distribution throughout Indonesia.
The chains of distribution outlets controlled by Chinese traders cover almost
all the goods Indonesia produces, while native traders themselves usually only act
as petty retailers, the very lowest stratum of the distribution system.
Judges of the Court,
In order to provide a clear standard of comparison for the extent to which the
Chinese dominate the Indonesian economy, it may also be helpful to look at how
much of the economy in the ASEAN countries is controlled by inhabitants of Chi-
nese descent. In Malaysia, for example: the Chinese, who make up 34% of the 12.3
million population (1975 estimate), control a relatively small proportion of the econ-
omy as compared with their Chinese friends in Indonesia. This is primarily due to
a new economic policy aimed at increasing the Malaysian Malay (native) share in the
economy. The policy itself has these objectives:
1.	To restructure the social economy and the national economy by 1990,
with the goal of implementing a 30-40-30 formula. This means 30% capi-
tal ownership by native enterprises, 40% by other ethnic groups and
30% by foreigners.
2.	The workforce at every level and in every sector of the economy must
proportionately reflect Malaysia's racial composition, so that each racial
group will obtain the maximal share to which it is entitled and will be
prevented from grabbing what others are entitled to. t
This proves that the Malaysian government is committed to promoting the indige-
nous Malay inhabitants through its economic policies. Similar efforts can be seen
in the field of education: for example, the Mara Institute of Technology has been
specifically reserved for educating Malay young people in technology and science.12
Judges of the Court,
This comparison clearly shows that while the Chinese make up a much larger
percentage of the population in Malaysia than they do in Indonesia, their share of
and role in the Malaysian economy is proportionately much smaller than in the
Indonesian economy. Indeed, Chinese residents in Malaysia often complain about
the restrictions imposed on them by the Malaysian government in the economy and
in education, as well as in politics. The Malaysian government has the clear and
firm political will gradually to liquidate the Chinese domination of the Malaysian
economy, and systematically to help the Malays (Bumiputera13) to become masters
in their own country. The New Order regime completely lacks such a political
will. On the contrary, New Order elements collaborate closely with the Chinese
cukong so that they can enrich each other.
* "Cukong Sumber Malapetaka," Matahari, May 1979.
t Far Eastern Economic Review, June 16, 1978; Tempo, April 22, 1978.
11.	Contracting and real estate appear in the text as unglossed English words.
12.	It is interesting that the text here uses the Malaysian (English-derived) word
sains rather than ilmu or ilmu2 pasti dan alam.
13.	Bumiputera- - the Malaysian political code-word for ethnic Malays--means some-
thing like "sons of the soil."106
Judges of the Court,
People often feel nervous about being regarded as racist if they say that the
Chinese problem we now face is very urgent, or if they talk about the Chinese as
a separate group. But they forget that the development of the Chinese problem
has nothing whatsoever to do with their skin color, their slanted eyes, or other
racial characteristics; it is a social-economic problem, namely, that one social group
has accumulated capital and holds the lives of the masses in its hands.
It is only a coincidence that the group which dominates our economy is Chinese.
Referring to the Chinese as an economic group is not a question of racism. In the
same way, we once referred to the Dutch as colonialists, to be hated not because
they were Dutch, but because of their colonialism.
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the Chinese cukong and their accom-
plices have set up a system of business, a system of commercial organizations,
which has the livelihood of the Indonesian people by the throat. Because they are
exclusive and because they set up interrelated trade networks among themselves,
the Chinese cukong, one can say, have become an economic combine.1't And as an
economic combine they have built an economic empire which has played a major role
in political events as well.
Judges of the Court,
The Chinese cukong's control over almost all sectors of the economy is a real-
ity which we experience and feel personally in our daily lives; it exists, and its
existence must be acknowledged. Today this pattern of control is being trans-
formed into an oligopolistic and monopolistic economic system, putting the national
economy under the control and direction of a mere handful of conglomerates. Such
an economic system will obviously harm small enterprises, which are economically
weak and which are mostly owned by native Indonesians, and will eliminate their
maneuvering room. The development of these alarming monopolistic and oligopolis-
tic symptoms in the Indonesian economic system is due primarily to the intimate
ties which have been knotted between Chinese cukong and government officials,
both civilian and military. These ties have created a pattern of relationships be-
tween those-in-power and entrepreneurs, or entrepreneurs and those-in-power,
which are commonly called Ali-baba or baba-Ali relationships. The Chinese Baba
runs the company and provides 75% to 90% of its capital, while the Ali, who is an
official or a general, happily provides monopoly rights, licenses, concessions,
special dispensations, and protection for the business and for the Chinese cukong,
in return for satisfactory compensation. Below I will give several examples of the
conglomerates which are helping to create a monopolistic and oligopolistic economic
system, in which both civilian and military officials and members of their families
(including the family of Suharto himself) are conspicuously involved. Many of
them, for example, are shareholders or directors of the Salim Economic Develop-
ment Corporation, Inc. 15
This company belongs to a well-known Chinese cukong: Liem Sioe Liong (Sa-
dono Salim).16 Since 1945 this Liem has had considerable experience in helping
14.	The Indonesian word used here, kesatuan, is usually translated as "unit,"
but this does not seem to convey Heri's meaning adequately.
15.	This company's name is in fact English.
16.	For many years now Indonesians of Chinese descent have been under pressure107
the military. His ties of "friendship" with Suharto started forming when Suharto
was commander of the Diponegoro division,17 and have become increasingly close
since Suharto became President. Since 1965 Liem has had "a continuous run of
luck" in obtaining credit and licenses to establish businesses in banking, logging,
trade, crude rubber, flour milling, and cement.
One of its subsidiaries, Bogasari, Inc. , which he established together with
Sudwikatmono (Suharto's younger foster-brother) and others, obtained monopoly
rights over the production and distribution of wheat flour. With a 900,000-ton
capacity, Bogasari, Inc. can have an omzet [turnover] worth US$240,000,000.
In view of the fact that Bulog has fully guaranteed the marketing of its wheat,
it is often said that Bogasari, Inc. is "licensed to print money" at will.* *
Another one of Liem's companies, Mega, Inc. , which acquired monopoly rights
over clove imports (together with Mercu Buana, Inc., owned by Probosutedjo,
Suharto's younger brother), has been able to import up to 90% of the clove crop
in Zanzibar and Madagascar (which, together with Indonesia, are the world's only
clove producers). It supplies more than 70% of the cloves needed by Indonesia's
mammoth kretek industry.
Because importing cloves yields such enormous profits (more than Rp2,00018
per kilogram), awarding monopoly rights in that industry must be interpreted as
providing the company with a golden opportunity to amass extraordinary profits.
It has been estimated that in 1978 alone the accumulated profits reached
Rp50,000,000,000, +19 and if we estimate that roughly 15,000,000 kilograms of
cloves are imported annually, then profits of Rp30,000,000,000 are made each
year.20
One of Liem Sioe Liong's banks, the Bank Central Asia [sic], is the second-
largest private bank [in Indonesia], with total assets worth US$99,000,000.+ Listed
below are a few of the businesses owned by the Liem Sioe Liong gang, which has
used the Suharto family in order to establish a vast hegemony under the banner
of the Salim Economic Development Corporation (SEDC).
*	Insight, May 1978.
t Matahari, May 1976.
*	Ibid.
to abandon their Chinese names for Indonesian-sounding ones. Many successful
Chinese Indonesians have found it expedient to have in effect two names, to be
used before different audiences and for different purposes. Sadono Salim is Liem
Sioe Liong's Indonesian a.k.a.
17.	Suharto was commander of Kodam VII/Diponegoro (Central Java), with head-
quarters in Semarang, from 1957 to 1959.
18.	Approximately $3.20 after the November 15, 1978 devaluation of the rupiah,
and approximately $4.80 before.
19. I.e., about $80,000,000 after the devaluation, and $120,500,000 before.
20. I.e., about $48,000,000 after the devaluation, and $72,000,000 before.108
DIVISION OF SEDC, INC.	COMPANY/TYPE OF ENTERPRISE	o o	Shares Owned by the Suharto Family and Friends
Trade	WARINGIN KENCANA, INC. (BNPT. No. 275, 1976) - Export-Import	15%	Sudwikatmono- -younger foster-brother Bambang Trimulyono--son
Usaha Patungan21	BOGASARI, INC. (BNPT. 258, 1976) - Flour Milling	4%	Sudwikatmono
	INDOCEMENT,INC. (BNPT. No. 273, 1974) - Cement Factory	5%	
Banking	BANK OF CENTRAL ASIA	5%	Sigit Harjoyudanto--son
Source: Lembaran dan Berita-berita Negara tambahan Perseroan terbatas (BNPT),
and Insight, May 1978.
The small percentage of shares owned by the Suharto family clearly shows that
it merely serves as a front for obtaining "facilities" and political protection for the
Liem Gang. How depressing that Suharto's "big" Family have turned out to be
merely pecundang for Chinese cukong! 22 The next example is:
ASTRA INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Controlled by the gang of Tjia Kian Liong (Willem Suryajaya) and his brothers,
who, with dozens of subsidiaries, have established themselves as stars in the field
of national private enterprise at a relatively young age. In 1976 alone Astra's sales
reached Rpll0,000,000,000. 23
The ASTRA Group Includes, Among Others:
--Gaya Motor, Inc. (share ownership: 30% Astra, 30% Multivest, 40% Govern-
ment; Enterprise: assembling plant) Toyota Cars.
--Federal Motor, Inc. (share ownership: 66% Astra, 1971; Enterprise: Honda
motorcycle assembling plant).
--Toyota Astra Motor, Inc. (share ownership: 36% Astra, 1971; Enterprise:
Toyota Distributor).
21.	Usaha Patungan means Joint Venture. This sector of the Salim Economic De-
velopment Corporation's activities covers all its cooperative ventures with foreign
companies.
22.	The translation offered here is based on the assumption that the Indonesian
text, which reads "Prosentasi kecil dari saham yang dimiliki keluarga Suharto jelas
memperlihatkan bahwa peranan keluarga Suharto hanyalah sebagai kedok untuk
memperoleh fasilitas-fasilitas dan perlindungan politik. Bagi Komplotan Liem, sung-
guh menyedihkan Keluarga Suharto yang "besar" ini, ternyata hanya menjadi pecun-
dang cukong cina" has been mis-punctuated; i.e., that the words "bagi Komplotan
Liem" conclude the first sentence, and that the second sentence begins "Sungguh
menyedihkan...." Pecundang is a contemptuous word meaning something like
"puppet," "front man," "errand-boy."
23.	I.e., about $176,000,000 at current rates of exchange.109
--Jaya Pirusa, Inc. (share ownership: 100% Astra, 1972; Enterprise: lubricat-
ing oil and office equipment).
--United Tractors, Inc. (share ownership: 50% Astra, 1973; Enterprise: dealer,
heavy machinery).
--Multi Astra, Inc. (share ownership: 50% Astra, 50% Multivest, 1974; Enter-
prise: assembling plant).
--Rama Surya International, Inc. (share ownership: 100% Astra, 1975; Enter-
prise: technical equipment).
--Astra Motor Sales, Inc. (share ownership: 100% Astra, 1976;. [Enterprise]:
Toyota dealer).
--Astra Graphia, Inc. (share ownership: 100% Astra; Enterprise: Fuji-Xerox
distributor).
[The owners of] Astra's network of mammoth companies obviously benefit in some
way from the protection and involvement of the several government officials who
are their accomplices.
Among the most important of these are Ibnu Sutowo, [ex-] Board Chairman of
Pertamina,* * * § and Ir. Suhartojo, Director-General for Metallurgical Industries.t2tt
Thanks to its close ties with Ibnu Sutowo, the Astra group won Pertamina hous-
ing-project contracts in Kuningan worth tens of billions of rupiah. Astra has 12
billion rupiah invested there.+25
Moreover, Astra can be considered a model for the convergence of interests of
cukong, government officials, and foreign capital. Astra is a henchman-salesman
for Japanese Toyota products. It simultaneously serves as a repository for govern-
ment officials' hot money, and nurtures the economic power of the Chinese cukong.
The interests of foreign capital are also accommodated through the influx of credit
to ASTRA from Foreign Banks, for example from: the Bank of Tokyo, the Union
Bank of Hong Kong, and so forth.§ Astra has joined the International trade net-
work.
By way of illustrating how powerful this agent of Japanese capitalists is and
how deeply it has sunk its claws into the economic system of Indonesia, indeed of
Asia, it may be helpful for us to recall the events which took place in Jakarta on
January 15, 1974, when the people's hatred became so intense that it exploded in
massive demonstrations. During those demonstrations, buildings owned by the
agents of Japanese capitalists were gutted. And yet, a short time later, Astra
returned to full operations, and the symbol of the hegemony of Japanese capital
in Indonesia, the TOYOTA symbol, was again displayed in all its glory from the
top floor of the nusantara building.
* Tempo, February 12, 1977.
t Adicondro, "Kewiraswastaan Orang Cina," p. 27.
+ Tempo, February 12, 1977, p. 52.
§ Ibid.
24.	The Director-General for Metallurgical Industries serves directly under the
Minister of Industry. Suhartojo is the longest-serving director-general in the
Indonesian bureaucracy.
25.	I.e., about $19,200,000 at current rates of exchange.110
Pak Hakim, through this trial I wish to express my deep sorrow to the heroes
who fell while driving the Japanese colonialists out of Indonesia:	Look, my heroes,
today the Japanese and their Henchmen have reoccupied our country!!!
The giant corporations mentioned above are only two examples out of the dozen
or more conglomerates controlled by Chinese Cukong which today are absolute mas-
ters of the Indonesian economy.
The Wanderings26 of the Chinese Cukong
Judges of the Court,
Seeing what insane influence the Chinese cukong exert on Indonesia's economy
naturally leads one to ask what the reasons for it are.
To answer this question it may be helpful to examine some of the history of
the wanderings of the Chinese in Indonesia.
The Chinese arrived on Indonesian soil several centuries ago. Although the
number who came at that time was not large, they immediately were able to dominate
trade to such an extent that within a relatively brief period they could conspicuous-
ly transform their fortunes and their standard of living, something the indigenous
inhabitants had difficulty achieving over a much longer period. Chinese tin-mine
coolies, peddlers, and petty traders were transformed into businessmen, planta-
tion owners, and extremely wealthy merchants.*
Many theories have been advanced, especially by government officials and ex-
perts, who naturally have a vested interest27 in the matter, which suggest that
the economic domination of the Chinese in Indonesia is primarily due to their per-
severance, diligence, thrift, industriousness, and a whole row of other superior
characteristics. These theories are not entirely correct. Many factors have pro-
moted the success of Chinese businessmen, and perseverance, diligence, thrift,
industriousness, and superior characteristics of the Chinese race are only some
of them. Another factor which powerfully promotes the success of Chinese busi-
nesses in every economic sector is a certain ethic among Chinese merchants which
strongly stresses solidarity and Group-consciousness. In regard to the "outside
world," however, this ethic sanctions any and all tactics, including graft, smug-
gling, ijon, 28 tax evasion, and tampering with quality and measurements [of goods],
in order to obtain material advantages and to protect the viability of their busi-
nesses, t
The myth that the success of the Chinese is due to superior racial characteris-
tics is not entirely accurate. According to Ong Hok Ham, the classic story of the
* Slamet Martosudiro, "Penyelesaian Masalah Cina Perantauan," Prisma, June 1973.
t Adicondro, "Kewiraswastaan Orang Cina."
26.	In fact "wanderings" fails to convey the malice of the Indonesian word petua-
langan, which has clearly been deliberately picked by Heri over such synonyms as
migrasi, perjalanan, and so forth, because of its secondary meaning of "opportu-
nism."
27.	This appears unglossed as vested-interest in the text.
28.	Ijon, from the Javanese root ijo (green), refers to the practice of forcing
cash-short or indebted peasants to pre-sell their rice-crop when it is still green
in the fields, and at very low prices.Ill
poor immigrant who, by working with might and main and by tightening his belt,
becomes a millionaire with wealth to last seven generations, is only a myth which
Chinese businessmen exploit to cover up their dishonest machinations. The eco-
nomic domination of the Chinese in Indonesia is a result of the colonial economic
system, in which the Chinese, as the intermediate stratum in colonial society,
served as middlemen for the economic interests of the Dutch colonialists. Besides
providing material economic benefits, this role also gave the Chinese a strategic
position in the economic life of the Netherlands Indies. By backing and guiding
the Chinese intermediate stratum, which dominated the country’s economy, the
Dutch colonial authorities were able effectively to block the growth of a strong
private native business group which might politically threaten the colonial authori-
ties’ position. In addition the Chinese, as an intermediate group dominating the
economy, could function as a ’’buffer"29 by providing a target for the native inhab-
itants' resentment against the Dutch. That is why the Dutch government isolated
the Chinese from native society, by permitting them to live only in one particular
locality (Pecinan),30 by prohibiting them from owning village land, by keeping
Chinese schools separate from the others, and so forth. In short, the growth of
an isolated Chinese community was in line with colonial interests.*
Judges of the Court,
Today, after Indonesia has been free of the shackles of Dutch colonialism for
almost 34 years, the pattern described above is recurring. The business ethic of
the Chinese merchant-cukong, which sanctions any and all practices--like graft,
bribery,and so on--in order to obtain material benefits, has encouraged the spread
of abuse of office, provision of "facilities," and the involvement of our government
officials in corruption, for their personal advantage and for the economic interests
of the Chinese. In other words, the Chinese business ethic strongly promotes
Indonesia's rampant corruption. The bribes which the Chinese pay New Order
government officials, both directly and indirectly, seriously impair their integrity
as Indonesian leaders, as shown by numerous scandals. For example, A. Tjai, a
Medan Chinese, made off with Rp23 billion31 in state funds through tax evasion.
In order to facilitate his business activities, he went so far as to put several im-
portant DKI32 officials on his personal payroll, who "proved their value" by award-
ing him planning and clearing rights over land belonging to the little people33 in
Muara Angke, Pluit, and Muara Karang, and even changing the urban development
* Ong Hok Ham, "Terbentuknya kapitalisme dikalangan peranakan Tionghoa di
Jawa," Tempo, February 18, 1978, and Matahari, May 1979.
29.	The English word appears in the text in single quotation marks and unglossed.
30.	Pecinan ("Chinatown[s]"> were the ghettoes in which the Dutch colonial regime
segregated Chinese up to the early years of the twentieth century.
31.	I.e., about $37,000,000 after the November 15, 1978 devaluation, and about
$55,000,000 before.
32.	DKI = Daerah Kotapraja Istimewa (Special Metropolitan District).
33.	The text here is a bit confusing. It reads: "memberikan fasilitas berupa hak
perencanaan, pembebasan pengosongan tanah rakyat kecil..." which, translated
literally, means "providing facilities in the form of rights to the planning, freeing,
and clearing of the land of the little people_" The idea seems to be that DKI
officials leaked details of Jakarta's urban development plans to A. Tjai, allowing
him to "target" choice pieces of land destined to increase rapidly in value under
the projected zoning regulations. They also helped him to "free" these lands of112
plan so that the people and poor fishermen could be bulldozed away in order to
make way for the construction of A. Tjai's luxurious houses.*
Several other cases of economic manipulation--for example, the corruption of
Siswadji and Co. in the State Police--have also been the result of conspiracies with
Chinese suppliers. Smuggling cases include those of Robby Tjahyadi, who smug-
gled luxury cars, costing the state more than Rp607 million; 34 Siauw Min Kong and
Siah A Ing, who smuggled textiles and wall tiles [sic], costing the state more than
Rp224 million;35 and Liem Keng Eng, who earned the title Phantom Director-General
of Customs due to his ability to arrange the transfer of officials who obstructed his
activities, defrauded the state of approximately Rp7.6 billion36 through smuggling
and falsifying 3001 import documents. There have been many other cases of eco-
nomic manipulation, almost all of them carried out or masterminded by Chinese.
Thus it would not be surprising, were an investigation of manipulators of the Indo-
nesian economy carried out at some point, if Chinese made up the majority of them. +
Judges of the Court,
The economic strength of the overseas Chinese has grown so rapidly that Chi-
nese economic domination has also become an exceedingly complex problem in the
ASEAN countries and in Southeast Asia [as a whole]. With their networks struc-
tured along ethnic lines and their own particular rules, the Chinese operate like a
giant multi-national corporation and have succeeded in becoming the second [most
powerful] economic force in Asia.
The assembling of about 700 Chinese businessmen from all the ASEAN countries,
held in the Philippines in May 1978 in the course of a business symposium conducted
in Mandarin, must be interpreted as one of the methods the Chinese are using to
consolidate and expand their networks.
The establishment of a ministry for overseas Chinese in the People's Republic
of China (PRC), especially in view of the political shifts in that country, is a mat-
ter which deserves serious consideration by the nations of Southeast Asia. The
recent PRC invasion of Vietnam can be regarded as an indication that the specter
of Chinese communism is again on the loose in Southeast Asia. This view is further
reinforced by PRC Vice-Premier Deng Xiao-ping's statement that: the PRC will con-
tinue to give sympathy and assistance to communist rebels. +
It is not at all impossible that the economic domination of the overseas Chinese
in the majority of Southeast Asian nations will be turned to political account by
communist China. This means that our nation, and also Southeast Asia, are en-
dangered by the threat of communism.
* Tempo, September 30, 1978; Kompas, October 25, 1978.
t Tempo, June 10, 1978, October 5, 1974, November 11, 1978.
+ Far Eastern Economic Review, June 16, 1978; Matahari, May 1979; Tempo, May
27, 1978.
existing liens and to "clear" them of their inhabitants pending the construction of
luxury housing.
34.	I.e., about $1,000,000 after the November 15,1978 devaluation, and about
$1,200,000 before.
35.	I.e., about $360,000 after the devaluation, and about $540,000 before.
36.	I.e., about $12,000,000 after the devaluation, and about $18,000,000 before.113
Judges of the Court,
I have described above the background and the role of Chinese economic domi-
nation, which is beginning to take the form of monopolistic and oligopolistic rela-
tionships as a result of their conspiracies with civilian and military officials of the
new Order regime. As a consequence of this pattern of conspiracy, the priority
and the special rights accorded Chinese cukong--in the form of monopolies, eco-
nomic concessions and protection, as well as inordinate trust--have turned them
into first-class citizens. This will further strengthen their position within the
Indonesian economy. The empty boasts of new order regime officials about
controlling economic domination through assimilation of native and non-native capi-
tal have only fostered the growth of conspiracies by official-businessmen or busi-
nessmen-officials in league with Chinese cukong. What is even more disastrous is
that, since the officials own so few shares [in each company] (10-25%), their role
is minimal as well, making it easy for the Chinese cukong to use these officials for
their own economic interests.
Officials who take part in these conspiracies are merely stooges or abdi dalem37
in the service of the Chinese cukong.
This means that every concept and plan, and most of the programs to do with
upbuilding,that originate from these officials are often [sic] simply designed to
accommodate the Chinese cukong's interests or their own, with no regard for the
aspirations and interests of the masses.
Judges of the Court,
A similar state of affairs occurred once before during the Dutch colonial period.
At that time the kings and the nobility possessed high status and great influence
in native society. From the colonialists’ point of view, the kings and the nobility
were potentially valuable allies because their power and influence could be used to
achieve the colonialists' goal of plundering spices. Accordingly, by pampering
these kings and aristocrats, and by inundating them with material pleasures, the
colonialists were able to influence them to: sacrifice their agricultural land, set
up trading companies, and so on.
It was this pattern which in fact gave rise to feudalism in Indonesian society.
The members of the feudal group which the Dutch deliberately created could make
enormous profits without having to work hard to exert themselves at all. This
situation inflicted great harm on the masses, who were forced, in the name of their
rulers, to work with all their might, and to push themselves to the limit without
any adequate compensation. They did not realize that the colonialists had succeed-
ed in draining off all their wealth. They did not realize that they were not enjoy-
ing the fruits of their own sweat, which in fact were going to the colonialists shel-
tered behind the crowns of their kings. They did not realize that they had been
reduced to pack-horses forced to bear the burden of the colonialists’ interests.
Meanwhile the kings and the nobility had simply become a "bridge" which the colo-
nialists could use to reach their goals; as a consequence of their ties to the colo-
nialists, they were forced to use their power to exploit the labor of the masses for
the benefit of the colonialists.
In this age of Independence the situation is not much different from that de-
scribed above: the officials of the new order regime have been exploited and even
made pecundang by the Chinese cukong.
37. Abdi dalem, Javanese for "courtier," sarcastic Indonesian for "flunkey."114
Judges of the Court,
These facts and analyses clearly prove the accuracy of the students' statement
in the "WHITE BOOK OF THE 1978 STUDENTS' STRUGGLE" that:38
.. .consciously or unconsciously the Suharto regime has given great oppor-
tunities to non-native businessmen to dominate the economic life of Indone-
sia. *
Indonesia's Riches Are Being Plundered by Foreign Investors
Judges of the Court,
Indonesia's riches include an abundance of natural resources of great variety
and potential, a circumstance which since early times has continuously led countries
which lack raw materials to seek to dominate it. This colonial pattern earlier mani-
fested itself in Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Today, the colonial appetite has
taken a form which is more refined but is extremely undermining and damaging for
Indonesia, namely, foreign aid. And this phenomenon has developed very rapidly
during the period of the New Order regime.
Judges of the Court,
As I explained in the preceding section, in order to compensate for the lack of
funds needed to pursue economic growth, the New Order regime has offered the
greatest possible opportunities for foreign countries to invest their capital in Indo-
nesia.
On one hand, foreign countries can use these opportunities very effectively to
drain off our natural wealth, as well as to market their manufactured goods in
Indonesia. This also explains why the large amount of capital these countries have
invested is concentrated most heavily in extractive industries like oil, logging,
mining, minerals, and so forth, and in highly capital-intensive consumer-goods in-
dustries.
On the other hand, foreign investment is indispensable for accelerating the
upbuilding process. As a result of a system which excessively centralizes power
within the government structure, the New Order regime can arbitrarily sacrifice
the "inheritance" of the Indonesian people to the interests of the foreign investors.
By spreading the philosophy of consumerism through consumer-goods industries,
foreign investors have slowly succeeded in creating a condition of extreme depen-
dence and consumption-oriented cultural patterns in certain strata of Indonesian
society, especially among the civilian and military officials of the New Order regime.
This has strongly promoted the growth of a new kind of conspiracy between offi-
cials--whose power gives them the authority to award concessions and licenses--
and foreign investors, who naturally need those licenses and concessions. As a
result, government officials have merely become conduits for draining off the
natural wealth.
Several examples are given below of the conspiracies which go on between for-
eign investors and government officials or their families, including, of course,
the Suharto family itself.
* Rekwisitor [Prosecutor's Summation], p. 7.
38. The translation here is taken word for word from the translation of the White
Book in Indonesia, 25, p. 173.115
COMPANY	CAPITAL in Millions of Rupiah	NAMES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THEIR FAMILIES	% of Shares Owned
Multi France Motors, Inc. BNPT No. 591, 1973	500	Probosutedjo /Suharto's younger brother	25%
KABEL METAL INC. BNPT No. 503, 1973	1,058	Bernard Ibnu Hardoyo (Tien Suharto's younger brother)	49%
SEMEN NU- SANTARA INC. BKPMA No. 273, 1974	20,000	Bernard Ibnu Hardoyo	30%
GERMAN MOTORS INC. BNPT No. 275, 1973	1,610	Sutowo Group	33.3%
KRAMA YUDHA INC. BNPT No. 408, 1972	1,600	Ibnu Sutowo	50%
STAR MOTORS INC. BNPT No. 935, 1971	567	Sutowo Group	51%
Source: Lembaran-lembaran negara & BNPT.
Such conspiracies are of course quite profitable from the perspective of
those-in-power and the investors, because they can just put their feet up and
amass great profits, but from the viewpoint of the public interest and Indonesia's
long-term national interests these conspiracies are disastrous.
Data released by the New Order regime reveal the overall picture: of the many
foreign-investment projects which have been approved, the vast majority are con-
centrated exclusively in extractive fields (logging, mining, minerals) and in con-
sumer-oriented fields (textiles, hotels, services, and so forth), amounting to
US$4, 896,600, 000 or 73. 9% of all investments. Meanwhile, agriculture, which has
received so much fanfare as the focal point of upbuilding, has received only a
sprinkling: 2.45%.*
Judges of the Court,
This analysis shows that the concentration of economic power in the hands of
a tiny group--namely, foreign investors, Chinese cukong, and businessmen-officials
or official-businessmen--has led, directly and indirectly, to the oppression of other
economic groups in Indonesian society, such as native entrepreneurs, the majority
of whom are weak businessmen, petty merchants, sidewalk peddlers, and so forth.
The notion that native entrepreneurs are less capable of developing because
they are not diligent enough, do not work hard enough,and so forth is not entirely
* "Laporan Pidato Kenegaraan" [of President Suharto], August [16], 1978, revised.116
accurate. The truth is that most of the economy's channels have been closed off
by foreign and Chinese businessmen who are protected by those-in-power under
the New Order regime.
The concentration of economic power in the hands of the Chinese cukong and
official-businessmen /businessmen-officials has also resulted in the accumulation and
concentration of capital in the hands of a tiny group of Indonesians. Having become
extremely wealthy, they wallow in the riches they have drained off from the majority
of the Indonesian people, who live in the depths of poverty.
The emergence of an elite, composed of Chinese cukong, government officials
and foreign investors, which is able to dominate the Indonesian economy despite
its minority status, is a development which conflicts sharply with the economic sys-
tem outlined in the 1945 Constitution. As explicitly set forth in Article 33 of the
1945 Constitution:
Paragraph 1. The economy is structured as a collective endeavor based on
the family principle.
Paragraph 2. Branches of production which are vital to the state and which
dominate the livelihood of the masses will be controlled by the
state.
Paragraph 3. The earth and water and the natural wealth they contain will
be controlled by the state and will be used as much as possible
[to enhance] the welfare of the people.
This means that the economic system embraced by the 1945 Constitution is one
which is based on the family spirit and mutual cooperation, in which the principles
of economic democracy and self-reliance are vital, a system which rejects the eco-
nomic domination of one group over the rest.
The utilization of Indonesia's natural wealth must guarantee that every citizen
can enjoy the fruits of his own efforts, both directly and indirectly, and must also
pay attention to ecological principles.
Judges of the Court,
In other words, it can be said that the current actions of the Suharto regime
deviate from the provisions of the 1945 Constitution. Specifically:
1.	The emergence of capitalist forces which subsequently formed the con-
glomerates which dominate almost every sector of the Indonesian economy
has blatantly violated the principles of an economy established as a col-
lective endeavor based on the family principle. Above all, it is obvious
that these conglomerates are exclusively controlled by a certain group of
Indonesians, to the detriment of society at large.
2.	It has been proven that many branches of production which are vital to
the state and the people, including nickel, iron, copper, wheat, and so
forth, are controlled by private foreign and domestic companies. As a
result the state and the people are quite dependent on these firms and
it is very difficult to exercise control over them.
3.	As a consequence of the Pertamina case, the stripping of the forests
for which concessionary rights have been awarded, and the appearance of
giant fishing-nets and various other forms of foreign capital, Indone-
sia's natural wealth has been exploited, leaving behind all kinds of
environmental damage. Meanwhile, the benefits for the welfare of the117
people have been quite inadequate. What has in fact happened is that
wealth has accumulated in the hands of a certain tiny group of citizens.
These circumstances formed the basis of the diagnoses which the students for-
mulated in the "WHITE BOOK" and the Students' Declaration of Position, and also
in the Students' Vow. 39
39. This is the Ikrar Mahasiswa of October 23, 1977, in which for the first time
the students stated they no longer had confidence in Suharto as president.CHAPTER VII
THE PEOPLE HAVE BECOME THE SACRIFICIAL VICTIM* 1
OF UPBUILDING
Upbuilding Which Does Not Solve the
Problems of Poverty and Unemployment
Judges of the Court,
One accomplishment which the New Order Regime has bragged about con-
tinuously is its success in curbing inflation and then creating a stable economic
life. This is, of course, in line with the Upbuilding Strategy outlined by the
New Order, namely, to promote the most rapid possible economic growth, as
measured by the speed with which the per capita GNP rises. The main* pre-
requisites for reaching this goal, according to New Order theory, are political
stability, which in practice means an impregnable upward concentration of power,
and economic stability.
Rapid economic growth can be achieved by a variety of means, and naturally
the New Order has chosen the easiest and laziest ways. They have included,
among other things, attracting as much foreign investment as possible, by set-
ting minimal requirements, by not restricting the types of enterprise which can
be established (until recently), and by disregarding whether or not the enter-
prises of the little people would be crushed. In addition, in order to achieve
economic stability, inflation has been held down as low as possible and the value
of the rupiah stabilized by tying it to the US dollar at a fixed rate of exchange.
It is clear now that we Indonesians have had to pay a high price to achieve
the New Order regime's goals. In order to maintain the value of the rupiah at a
constant level, it has been firmly tied to the US dollar since 1971. Even though
the inflation rate in Indonesia was considered to be reasonably low, it was still
higher than in the United States. As a result, there was disparity with the
real exchange value of the rupiah and the US dollar.
In order to protect the image of the stability of the Indonesian economy, the
New Order concealed this reality by patching up the difference in exchange
value with subsidies. The size of the subsidy per US dollar was:
* Biro Pusat Statistik, Survey Industri Kecil Dan Kerajinan Rumah Tangga, 1971-
1973.
1. "Sacrificial victim" is only an approximate translation of the word tumbal, a
term derived from the vocabulary of prophylactic magic. For example, the water
buffalo whose severed head is commonly buried beneath the foundation stone of a
building under construction, to ensure the prosperity of its owners, the tranquil-
lity of its occupants, and the safety of its builders, is a tumbal.
118119
Year
Real
Exchange
Value
Subsidy
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Rp 415
Rp 505
Rp 580
Rp 672
Rp 725
Rp 764
Rp 784
Rp 0
Rp 90
Rp 165
Rp 257
Rp 310
Rp 349
Rp 369
Source: Suharsono Sagir, Latar Belakang Dan Pengaruh
Kebijaksanaan Moneter 15 November 1978 (Working paper
proposed as discussion material for the Lecturers in Eco-
nomics at UNPAD, revised, December 14, 1978).
In the end it was the people who had to pay for all the New Order regime's
antics because, as a result of such policies, the import of foreign goods was
actually subsidized by the government. The price of these goods dropped accord-
ingly, and their ability to compete with domestically produced goods was truly
stunning!! The proof of this is the fact that a variety of domestic businesses went
bankrupt because they were not able to reduce their production costs below the
prices of the imported goods!! How can domestic producers possibly compete when
the government, which is supposed to protect them, instead squeezes them by
subsidizing imported goods?
Judges of the Court,
The way in which Indonesian entrepreneurs are currently being crushed in the
grip of the New Order is truly horrifying. Indonesian entrepreneurs, who in gen-
eral have only modest capital, skills, and technology, are being confronted by for-
eign giants who command very advanced technology and ample capital and skills.
It is as though the New Order regime is putting a jackal in a rabbit cage; the rab-
bits will surely be gobbled up by the jackal!! Not only that, the New Order regime
has even "armed" the jackal with subsidies.
Most of the foreign capital which enters Indonesia goes into import-substitution
enterprises--for example, the textile industry. Once we imported textiles, but to-
day we own textile mills which can meet Indonesia's textile needs. So we no longer
need to import textiles. But what has really happened? While it is true that we
do not import textiles, we import almost all the materials needed to make them.
The fiber, the spun thread, the dyes,and so forth, and even the trademarks are
still imported!!
Our country is actually only a station from which foreign factory owners can
seize and consolidate markets for their goods! While enjoying such benefits as
government subsidies for imported basic materials and cheap Indonesian labor,
foreign investors walk off with the wealth they have drained off from our beloved
Indonesia.
Judges of the Court,
It cannot be denied that by these means various fields of industry in Indonesia
have indeed made rapid progress, enabling the New Order regime regularly to an-
nounce increases in national production figures. But those increases are in fact120
due strictly to the penetration of foreign capital, along with the squeezing and sup-
pressing of Indonesia's own entrepreneurs.
As a result, hundreds of businesses have folded, and hundreds of thousands
of unemployed people roam about without jobs.
Between 1971 and 1973 alone, a total of 225,259 small factories closed down,
leaving 432,285 people without work! Imagine, Your Honor, a period of only two
years brought disaster for:
225,259 businesses owned by the Indonesian people and
432,285 people who lost their jobs.
Meanwhile, during the 10 years following 1967, foreign investment projects were
able to create jobs for only 410,897 people, some of which were filled by foreigners.*
The price that must be paid for the rampaging of foreign capital is enormous,
while the benefits are virtually nonexistent. The only ones who enjoy them are the
members of the upper strata of society, because foreign capital makes luxury goods
abundantly available at subsidized prices!! The people can do nothing! * 2
Simply put, it can be concluded that the upbuilding which the New Order
regime is currently implementing turns out to be an upbuilding which does not
solve the problems of poverty and unemployment. Combatting poverty has only
been a slogan during the implementation of the upbuilding programs, a slogan
which has never been fulfilled and consistently put into practice. After 13 years
in power, the New Order regime obviously still lacks a clear and comprehensive
strategy for solving the problems of poverty and unemployment in a systematic
series of stages. Quite the contrary, the upbuilding strategy being carried out
has proved to have a destructive impact on the little people and the lower strata
of Indonesian society! The influx of foreign capital has obviously also crushed
most small industry and the traditional sector of the Indonesian economy, causing
hundreds of thousands of Indonesians to lose their jobs.
In order to provide a closer look at the impact of the Suharto regime's policies,
in the following pages I will describe the typical daily life of the Indonesian people.
In general, the lives of the masses are heartrending because they are only the
sacrificial victims of upbuilding.
Farmers Have Been Made Mere Tools of Production
The People Too Live in Fear of Starvation
Judges of the Court,
The New Order Regime continuously boasts that the Agricultural sector has
the highest priority in "Upbuilding." This means that the greatest hopes are being
placed on the Agricultural sector to augment the food supply, to provide employ-
ment , and to increase the incomes of the people, especially those of the farmers,
who make up both the largest group in Indonesia and the group which is least well-
off. Agriculture is also expected to be a source of foreign exchange, t
* Laporan Pidato Kenegaraan [of President Suharto], August 16, 1978.
f Caris Besar Haluan Negara 1978-1983.
2. The idiom gigit jari ("bite their fingers") means staring helplessly at what is
happening.121
After sinking its powerful claws into this country for more than 13 years, what
has the New Order regime accomplished in the agricultural sector about which it
brags so much?
What we can most easily see is its "success" in keeping up the number of Indo-
nesians who live below the poverty line, so that the total never dropped from be-
tween 40% and 60% of the total population during the 10 years between 1969 and
1979. Regardless of how the poverty line is defined, whether in terms of an in-
come equivalent to the value of 240 kilograms of rice per year or in terms of an
annual income of US$50 (World Bank Standard), it cannot be denied that between
60 and 70 million people are still mired in the mud of poverty. And this is the total
the New Order regime has successfully maintained for 10 years without any signifi-
cant reduction.
Hunger is a direct consequence of poverty. During the time the New Order
regime has been in power starvation has haunted 85 million Indonesians. In July
1978 it was announced that "malnutrition" [would be defined as] consuming fewer
than 1743 calories a day, despite the fact that the normal level for an Indonesian
is 2100 calories a day.*
News of severe famines which devastate the Indonesian people has become rou-
tine for us. These famines have followed one after the other, starting with Kra-
wang (40,000 victims) in 1977, + Garut (8,000 victims)^ in January 1977; then Boyo-
lali, Sragen, Karang Anyar, Wonogiri, and Cilacap were simultaneously devastated
by Hongerodeem* * 3 4 in October 1977.§ These cases were followed by Paga (Flores)
in May 1978, || Sumbawa in February 1979,# and many more. Reports of disastrous
famines have become so routine that we have become accustomed to them and no
longer find them odd.
The real cause of these disasters was "crop failure." Obviously these crop
failures, which struck every part of Indonesia in turn, did not arrive out of the
blue as calamities visited on us by God. Surely every one of them had a cause!
Because the crop failures took place one after another, the errors which brought
about this epidemic were obviously rooted in the New Order regime's policies.
Thanks to our ancestors' skill in farming, the island on which we now live be-
came famous by the name Island of Java, which means Island of Rice. In the span
of only ten years, the New Order regime has succeeded in baptizing the Island of
Java with a new name. That New Name is Island of Werengl **
*	Dr. A. T. Birowo, General Chairman of the Central Leadership of the Agricul-
tural Economics Association of Indonesia (PERHEPI), at the PERHEPI conference
of July 1978.
t Tempo, October 8, 1977.
t Tempo, January 22, 1977.
§ Tempo, October 22, 1977.
|| Tempo, May 13, 1978.
#	Korn pas, February 20, 1979.
3.	For hongerodeem, or Honger Odem, see above at Ch. 3, n. 25.
4.	Wereng is the brown plant-hopper, a pest capable of inflicting devastating
damage on rice crops.122
Data collected through April 1979 indicate that almost all of the rice fields on
Java have been attacked by wereng.*
Agricultural methods and tools which were the products of centuries of farming
experience have been capriciously destroyed by the New Order regime without
careful consideration of the consequences. The New Order regime has forcibly
replaced the method of planting rice--then rice--then a secondary crop, in rota-
tion, with the method of planting rice--then rice--then rice and nothing but rice,
even up to three times a year if possible. Our farmers have also been forced to
buy as much fertilizer as possible, because the New Order regime has succeeded
in producing urea fertilizer. According to the experts, it is precisely the New
Order's planting methods and urea fertilizer which have caused the massive infes-
tation of wereng. t
It is plain, Judges of the Court, that the Agricultural Policy of the New Order
regime has helped spread and multiply the wereng plague in Indonesia.
The spread of wereng and the "New Cultuur Stelsel (Forced Cultivation)" Sys-
tem* * 5 are products of the New Order regime's most sadistic [sadis] policy, namely,
insisting on the greatest possible increase in food (read: rice) production in the
shortest possible time by treating the farmers and the land they work as rice-
production machines. The New Order regime had the illusion that, if the farmers
were given seed, fertilizer, and indoctrination, they would automatically produce
tons of rice all year long!!! If they had thought it through, they would certainly
have understood that these fantasies could not possibly be realized.
In Book II of Pelita II and in the Address of the President of the Republic of
Indonesia on August 16, 1978, we can see that the upbuilding targets which the
New Order regime dreamed up for the Agricultural Sector leaped higher and higher
with each passing year, while the actual results dropped farther and farther below
the targeted levels (see Graphs 1, 2, 3 and 4).
Graph, Rice Crop Hectarage, 1974-1977
(in thousands of hectares)
Targeted
Jjj Hectarage
□ Actual
Hectarage
Difference
* "Wereng, Bom yang bisa meledak sewaktu-waktu," Kompas, May 3, 1979.
t Ibid.
5. The Cultuurstelsel (Cultivation System) was the ruthlessly exploitative, monop-
olistic agrarian regimen imposed in the Indies by the Dutch Crown circa 1830-70,
characterized by compulsory deliveries of state-designated crops.123
This graph reveals the failure of the extensification program which has been
in operation all this time. Not only has the extensification actually achieved been
far below the designated target, but the total rice-crop hectarage was smaller in
1977 than it had been in 1974. In the period 1974-1977, the total rice-crop hec-
tarage shrank by: 271,000 hectares. In coming years the failure of the extensifi-
cation program will have fatal consequences for Indonesia’s food supply and will
boost food imports higher and higher. Because the intensification programs (BIMAS
and INMAS)6 have obviously nearly exhausted their potential, no matter how much
fertilizer, insecticide, and credit the government has poured in, the total crop per
hectare clearly has not shown any significant increase:
Graph, Rice Yield per Hectare, 1974-1977
(in tons /hectare)
2.03
1.96
1.83
1.89
11.80
1.79
M
1.89
1.90
'Tn [_nrr
-0.03
1974
-0.10
1975
1 -0.07	0.13
1976	1977
|. Targeted
Yield
r>
I_J Yi
Actual
Yield
Difference
This graph also shows the failure of the intensification program which has been
going on all this time. Due to the reduction in the total crop hectarage and to the
fact that the targets for increased production per hectare have not been met, the
total yield has also fallen further and further below the targets set by the Suharto
regime itself.
Graph, Hulled Rice Production, 1973-1977
(in thousands of tons)
m
oo
□
Targeted
Production
Actual
Production
Difference
6. Bimas (Bimbingan Masai Swa Sembada Bah an an Makanan, Mass Guidance for
Self-sufficiency in Food) and Inmas (Intensifikasi Masai Swa Sembada Bahanan
Makanan, Mass Intensification for Self-sufficiency in Food) are two long-standing
programs for persuading and/or compelling riceland peasants to increase their out-
put by using more modern and intensive cultivation methods.124
The New Order Regime has the nerve to set fine-sounding figures as targets
for the upbuilding it is promoting, but the actual results are always far below the
designated targets. Meanwhile, even the hectarage targets for the intensification
programs have never been met, despite the fact that they are among the programs
which have received the most fanfare.
Graph, "Area of Intensification,” 1973-1977
(in thousands of hectares)
CO
CO
o
CO
CM
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977 ^
CO
T" Targeted
]_ Hectarage
□ Actual
Hectarage
Difference
* Sic.
Even from these simple graphs one should be able to see that there must be
flaws in the New Order regime's policies to account for the fact that the actual
results of its programs continue to fall further and further below their targets.
Judges of the Court,
The New Order regime has made an enormous error in relegating the farmers
to the status of objects of its Agricultural Upbuilding programs. The New Order
regime has destroyed the farmers' will and ability to stand on their own feet.
Because it considers itself the cleverest in the world, this regime has willfully
forced the farmers to plant particular kinds of rice seed, has decreed how much
fertilizer should be applied, and has even decreed how many times the farmers
must plant rice each year. Participation in Bimas and Inmas, which originally was
voluntary, has evolved over time into an obligation which cannot be rejected.
The New Order regime has abused Bimas and Inmas, which were intended simply
to provide guidance for the farmers, by using these programs to force its will on
them. The regime has obliterated the educational value of the Bimas and Inmas
programs by imposing them through physical and psychological threats. This ulti-
mately has created an unhealthy atmosphere in the villages, an atmosphere which
has enveloped people in fear and self-doubt. The first symptoms of this appeared
when, for example, the farmers started to manipulate government policies by re-
selling the fertilizer they had acquired through the government's "generosity.”
Repayment of Bimas credits was deferred as long as possible,* and so forth. Such
an unhealthy atmosphere provided opportunities which were exploited by vicious
* Tempo, October 8, 1977.125
elements! As a result, people scrambled to embezzle fertilizer money, divert Bimas
credits and so on.*
Judges of the Court,
The value of delinquent payments climbed steadily from 10.3% of all Bimas
credit effectuated during the 1973-74 planting season to 68.3% during the 1976-77
planting season. The factors which were reported as responsible for this delin-
quency included: shortages of tillable land, as a result of which the increased
yield had been consumed [by the farmers themselves]; the heavier burden of the
village levies and Ipeda* * * * * 7 which had to be paid; the decline of the selling price for
unhulled rice below the baseline price set at harvest time; rampant pest epidemics;
negligence and naughtiness8 on the part of the farmers; abuses by local officials,
and so on. The countermeasures which the New Order regime took amounted to no
more than extending the credit repayment period, canceling credits, and even
arresting recalcitrants, t
Doesn't the New Order regime realize that, if it sought the fundamental factor
underlying all those reported above, that factor would turn out to be government
policy itself?? This policy in essence reduces the farmers to tools of production;
they have become objects of the food-supply programs targeted by the government.
They must produce the maximum amount possible for the sake of the national food-
supply program. They are "forced" to use this or that fertilizer, to plant the type
of rice decided on by the government, to sell their crop only to BUUD/KUD, 9 and
so on. This is all done for the sake of pursuing production targets, with no con-
sideration of the farmers' own interests.
Judges of the Court,
Why are the farmers "naughty" or "negligent" in the face of New Order regime
programs??? Has the New Order regime ever asked itself this question? Never!!!
It simply arrests the farmers or dismisses village officials. t The New Order regime
has never been willing to consider the idea that the farmers are "naughty" or
"negligent" because they are simply unable to put the regime's dreams into prac-
tice or that our farmers, who have had some experience, in fact have opinions
which differ from the regulations the regime has laid down. And all this time the
New Order regime has never given the farmers an opportunity to do anything other
than what it demanded of them! If in the end they have actually obeyed the wishes
* I Gusti Bagus Teken and Kuntjoro, "Kebijaksanaan pangan dewasa ini dan masa
datang," Mimbar Sosial Ekonomi, 1, 1 (February 1978).
t "Kontrol pemilih[k]an tanah saat ini kurang obyektif," Merdeka, December 12,
1978.
+ "58 pamong desa diskors," Pikiran Rakyat, January 22, 1979.
7.	Ipeda = Iuran Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Upbuilding Levy), a land tax
imposed by the New Order to finance regional development.
8.	"Naughtiness" is perhaps the most exact translation of kenakalan, not least be-
cause it reflects the patronizing attitudes of officialdom towards "stupid" and "child-
like" peasants.
9.	BUUD (Badan Usaha Unit Desa, Village-Level Enterprise Body) and KUD (Ko-
perasi Unit Desa, Village-Level Cooperative) are government-sponsored agencies
for organizing rural economic life. Nominally independent and local in character,
they operate in fact under tight state control.126
of their government, it is not because they have woken up to the usefulness or
the purposes of the government's regulations, not at all. They are just afraid of
the government's threats!!!
Judges of the Court,
The failure of the Increased Food Production [Program] will actually raise food
prices. However, the New Order regime seems to have learned a lesson from the
Affair of Sukarno's Downfall. One of the reasons Sukarno fell was a leap in food
prices; among the demands made by the 1966 Movement was "Reduce the Price of
Rice."10 That is why the New Order regime is making every effort to cover up
its failure to increase food /rice production, even though its efforts are clearly
bringing harm to the nation and suffering to the farmers.
The New Order regime has tried to cover up its failure by importing rice on a
massive scale and by setting standard prices for rice.* 11 For example, the failure
to increase rice production between 1973 and 1976 so panicked the New Order re-
gime that it was no longer ashamed to import rice in quantities far larger than
called for by its own Plan.
Actual rice imports jumped 300% above the planned level.
YEAR	PLANNED VOLUME (1)	ACTUAL VOLUME (2)	% SLIPPAGE
73/74	1.009 Million Tons	1.250 Million Tons	24%
74/75	1.050 Million Tons	1.137 Million Tons	8%
75/76	0. 967 Million Tons	0.670 Million Tons	31%
76/77	0. 809 Million Tons	1.509 Million Tons	87%
77/78	0.583 Million Tons	2.308 Million Tons	296%
Source:	1. Repelita II		
	2. LPK August 16, 1978		
The sums of	money spent on rice imports over the past five years		are as follows
YEAR	TOTAL VALUE OF IMPORTS
73/74	US$544.5 Million
74/75	US$439.5 Million
75/76	US$136.2 Million
76/77	US$386.4 Million
77/78	US$712.3 Million
73/78	US$2,223.5 Million
Source:	Lampiran Pidato Kenegaraan 78/79.
10.	On these demands, see above Ch. 3, n. 22. In fact, the third demand was
for a reduction in all prices, not just that of rice.
11.	Harga patokan: ceiling prices for rice which peasants are compelled to sell to
the government; also ceiling prices for rice sold through government channels in
urban areas. The effect of harga patokan is to subsidize urban consumers at the
expense of the peasantry.127
This amounts to almost 25% of the foreign debt incurred by the government
during the same period, that is:	US$10,983,000,000. This has made Indonesia the
largest rice importer in the world. * How tragic it is that, while the Suharto regime
has been rushing about, begging left and right for what it said was upbuilding,
evidently the resulting funds have had to be used just for eating. The New Order
regime has evidently chosen to beg rather than to try seriously to increase food
production!
The New Order's failures are vividly reflected in the following figures, which
show how much more money is spent on food imports than on development in the
Irrigation and Agricultural sector in order to increase food production:
Year	Cost of Food Imports	Funds Allocated for Development in the Irrigation and Agricultural Sector
73/74	Rp. 414.5 billions	Rp. 98.1 billions
74/75	Rp. 384.8 billions	Rp. 301.8 billions
75/76	Rp. 328.0 billions	Rp. 257.0 billions
76/77	Rp. 509.0 billions	Rp. 356.1 billions
77/78	Rp. 645.1 billions	Rp. 380.1 billions
Source:	Lampiran Pidato Kenegaraan President Rl, August 16, 1978
Table IV-9, III-9, and 11-10.
Much of this imported food could actually be produced by Indonesia's own
farmers. Statistics also indicate that production of non-rice food has declined so
much that the New Order regime has been forced to import non-rice food in order
to meet domestic needs, including even types of food which Indonesia once exported.
This is illustrated in the following table:
Type of Non-Rice Food	Year	Quantity	Value	Comments
Wheat	1976	965.137 tons		
Corn	1976	68,864 tons		
Soy beans	1976	171,000 tons	US$20 million	We used to export this!!
Sugar	1976	203,848 tons		
Tapioca	1976	59,483 tons		We used to export this!!
Source:	Tempo, November 5, 1978; Kompas, September 13 and 16, 1978.
This table shows quite clearly that tens of millions of dollars have been squan-
dered on importing food which Indonesians could produce themselves. This illus-
trates how, in pursuit of its short-term interests, the Suharto regime has ignored
the potential of its own people for active involvement in the upbuilding process.
Judges of the Court,
The New Order regime's Standard Rice Price Policy has not benefited Indone-
sian farmers. The graph below compares the percentage increase in the price of
* Tempo, March 14, 1978.128
dry unhulled rice purchased annually by BUUD/KUD with the percentage increase
in the cost of living which must be borne by the farmers:
1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
This graph clearly shows that the rise in farmers' incomes has completely
failed to cover the rise in the cost of living! Meanwhile, the farmers are, as it
were, snared in a web of injustice. According to the terms for BUUD/KUD credit,
the farmers cannot sell their unhulled rice to anyone except the BUUD/KUD.*
On February 1, 1978, the purchase price for dry milled rice was set at Rp58/
kilogram, t12 Since one kilogram of dry paddy yields 0.75 kg of rice, one kilogram
of the farmers' rice is worth only Rp82.85 (100/70 x Rp58.00).13 And yet the New
Order Regime has bought one million tons of foreign rice at a cost of US$415 million,+
meaning that, at the post-Kenop 15 exchange rate, it paid Rp295.45 per kilogram11*
(0.415 x Rp625). This means that the New Order Regime values the fruits of Indo-
nesian farmers labors only one-third as highly as those of farmers in Japan, South
Korea, Thailand, and other rice-exporting countries.
In the midst of a deluge of "upbuilding" propaganda and forced "participation
in Upbuilding," Indonesian farmers are confronted with equally bitter alternatives.
All of them have the same outcome, an increasing erosion of the farmers' ability to
support themselves. A person confronted with such a situation might choose just
to commit suicide, and suicide for a farmer is selling his land or, if not that, then
leasing it to cukong or government officials who are rolling in money. As a result,
the farmers are forced to become farm laborers who sell their labor on their own
land, or else they flee to the cities, where jobs are already scarce.
Judges of the Court,
Because the Basic Agrarian Law has not been implemented, the people's land
has been bought up at cheap prices under the protection of New Order Regime
* Interview with Dr. Dibyo Prabowo, in Progress (combination issue Nos. 139 and
140).
t Instruksi Presiden No. 11/1977.
t Tempo, November 5, 1978, and BPS data.
12.	At that time, roughly 12$.
13.	I.e., about 13$ after the November 15, 1978 devaluation, and about 20$ before.
14.	I.e., about 47$.129
elements. Under the pretext of "freeing" land for this or that project, certain
elements have used the people’s land to build factories, luxurious houses, golf
courses, palaces, and so forth.* * * § The people's efforts to contest thefts of their
land, for example in the cases of Angsana, Cengkareng, Cikopomayak, Jatiwa-
ringin, and so on, prove that they are indeed exceedingly hard-pressed as a re-
sult of the New Order regime's avaricious behavior in grabbing their land.
Thus it is not surprising that the total number of farmers who still manage to
keep ownership of their own land is shrinking. Five million of the 8.8 million farm-
ing families on Java do not own their own land; they work as farm laborers, t This
means that more than half of the farming families on Java make a living by working
their fingers to the bone on someone else’s land, and the tragic part of it is that
this land once belonged to them but they were forced to sell it!!!!!!!!
Meanwhile, the land belonging to the majority of the farmers who still own their
own land has shrunk in area. In 1963 43.6% of the farmers who owned land owned
less than 0.5 hectares.t By 1973, the percentage of land-owning farmers whose
holdings were meager (less than 0.5 hectares) had risen to 59%.§ Farmers who
own less than 0.5 hectares of land cannot earn a living by working their own
land. || This is why the number of farm laborers who have lost their land is grow-
ing larger and larger.
Because these laborers are vying with each other for work, the new landowners
can set wages at whatever level they please. The Farm Laborers themselves get no
protection whatsoever from such cruelty. To this day there are no safeguards for
Farm Laborers' Wages in the villages.# The results of the Agricultural Economic
Survey** show how much the farm laborers' real wages have declined in Java's vil-
lages. In the space of only four years (from 1968 to 1972) Real Wages declined an
average of 30%. The Real Wage level indicates the value of the wages a farm labor-
er receives when converted into kilograms of rice at the price prevailing in his
village. Hence the real wage level shows us how greatly the Farm Laborers' incomes
have declined.
Judges of the Court,
The vicious circle of poverty, the farmers' declining productivity, and the
equally bitter alternatives Indonesian farmers are faced with has destroyed the
lovely image:	"My beloved village, idol of my heart ..." which Indonesian
Farmers once sang about.
*	"Pemilik tanah luas seringkali terlindungi," Kompas, September 28, 1978.
t Sayogyo, "Kata Pengantar," to D. H. Penny and Masri Singarimbun, Penduduk
dan Kemiskinan: Kasus Sriharjo di Pedesaan Jawa, Jakarta, Bharata Karya Aksara,
1976.
$ Survey Pertanian 1963.
§ Survey Pertanian 1973.
|| Dawam Rahardjo, "Sensus Pertanian 1973," Tempo, December 18, 1976.
#	Makali and Sri Hartoyo, "Perkembangan Tingkat Upah," Prisma, 3, April 1978.
** Makali, Upah buruh tani pada tanaman padi dikaitkan dengan kenaikan produksi
dan harga padi selama lima tahun di duapuluh desa Sampel Intensifikasi pada sawah
di Jawa, Jakarta, Survey Agro Ekonomi, 1974.130
The Tragedy of the Indonesian Workers:
Underfed Pack-Horses for Upbuilding!
Judges of the Court,
If the Indonesian workers should be angry, then probably they should be
angry at members of the PKI [Indonesian Communist Party]. Why? Because dur-
ing its heyday the PKI always claimed to speak and act for them, and now they
have to live with the consequences. If an Indonesian Worker speaks out just a
little, people immediately point an accusing finger: Why.. .HE MUST BE A PKI
MEMBER! ! ! !
Being saddled with alleged membership in the PKI in Indonesia is like having
the life expectancy of a criminal threatened with capital punishment!! Being
accused of PKI membership is like being cursed as a demon and avoided like a
corpse! That is why, even though the lives of Indonesian workers today are
heart-wrenching, virtually no one dares to protest. It is better to be impover-
ished and not have enough to eat than to be cursed as a demon and avoided like
a corpse!!!!
Under these circumstances, with each passing day the Indonesian Workers be-
come more and more deeply mired in the foul mud of their tormented existence.
They have become the underfed pack-horses of increased production and the
"success" of upbuilding!
Indonesian Workers live in a vicious Circle of poverty, low wages, and low
status. They can all be easily oppressed by their bosses. They live in constant
fear of being fired and of physical intimidation by the bosses.
Of Indonesia's 54.5 million Workers, 61.4%,* meaning 33 million 463 thousand
people, still receive wages which average less than Rp400 a day.15 What can you
buy with wages like that? For minimum physical needs alone they are clearly inade-
quate, let alone for other necessities.
Take, for example, a Worker's family which has only two children, in accor-
dance with Family Planning recommendations.16 This means that the Father has to
feed the four mouths in the family on Rp400 a day--that is, RplOO per mouth each
day. If each mouth needs to eat only twice a day, then it must be fed for Rp50
(fifty rupiah) a meal. So what are they putting in their stomachs??? Does the
Court have even an inkling? Keep in mind that one bowl of mie bakso17 behind
this Courthouse costs Rpl50.18 This means those human beings, if they can still
be called that, eat only one-third of a bowl of ba[k]so twice a day. Can that still
be called human, Your Honor? Even though they have to toil with all their strength
to "Success Development" and to increase production? And human beings do not
only have to eat. Workers must also worry about housing, schooling for their chil-
dren, recreation......[If they get these things, it is only thanks to a] miracle and
gift from God.
* Agus Sudono, General Chairman of FBSI, in Asiaweek, April 27, 1979; and
Kompas, March 27, 1979.
15.	I.e., about 64$ after the devaluation, and about 96$ before.
16.	This refers to the official prescriptions of the government's family planning
program.
17.	A kind of cheap Chinese noodle dish.
18.	I.e., about 24$ after the devaluation, and about 36$ before.131
Your Honor is advised not to answer these questions, in order to avoid allega-
tions of having insulted the President or public authorities. What difference does
RplOO a day make when compared with the expense of keeping one of Pak Harto's
cucak rowo19 birds, for example? Or compared with the cost of keeping pedigree
dogs like German shepherds, poodles, collies [?],20 and the like, which are now
fashionable among extremely wealthy government officials?
If, indeed, they have been able to survive until now. This figure of Rp400/
day, announced by the General Chairman of FBSI, is a national average. In real-
ity it is clear that even more devastating conditions are frequently reported. Take,
for example, the fact that tens of thousands of textile workers and workers in
canned food and drink factories are only paid between Rp250 and Rp44121 a day.*
It is also a fact that approximately 8,000 workers who are employed by 71 compa-
nies in East Java receive wages of less than Rp250 a day. Of those 71 companies,
6 pay wages of RplOO/day, 28 pay wages of up to Rpl50/day, and the rest pay
wages of up to Rp200/day.+ Moreover, in Jakarta, with its very high standard of
living, there are still massive numbers of workers who are paid only Rpl50 a day; 22
they flounder in misery in the midst of the glitter of life in the capital.£
All of these things are not taking place in some ancient past. Unbelievably,
such insanity is still going on at this very moment!!!!
These examples provide an adequate picture of what kind of lives Indonesian
workers lead with their meager wages. While the workers' energies are exploited
to the limit, they do not even have any social security23 because the vast majority
of them are mere day-laborers, who can be laid off at any time.
Why are they willing to endure such a life of "misery"? Why do they feel forced
to accept very minimal terms and conditions of work?
Judges of the Court,
The scarcity of jobs makes each individual worker a single drop in the tidal
wave of unemployed people which crashes down on every job opening. An over-
abundant work force, on one hand, and the limited availability of jobs, on the
other, have made the workers' bargaining position in relation to the bosses ex-
tremely weak.
Just imagine, 1.4 million people join the work force each year, while PMA and
* Pikiran Rakyat, March 27, 1979.
t Sinar Harapan, February 24, 1979.
+ Berita Buana, April 6, 1979.
19.	Cucak rowo (or rawa)--a highly prized singing-bird of the thrush family.
Prices for these birds run as high as Rp. 1,500,000, or almost $2,500 at current
rates of exchange.
20.	These are all extremely expensive breeds imported from Europe and the U.S.
21.	I.e., between 41$ and 70$ after the devaluation, and between 60$ and $1.06
before.
22.	At the time the text was written, this was about 24$.
23.	Jaminan sosial, though translated literally as "social security," means no more
in the Indonesian context than a few simple fringe benefits customarily provided to
low-level clerks and people in equivalent socio-economic positions.132
PMDN21* have created new jobs for only 1.4 million people during the last 10 years.
That adds up to 12.6 million people who have joined the ranks of the unemployed
over those 10 years!!! *
Why should a boss worry about firing a worker, when nine unemployed people,
dreaming of that job, are waiting in line. Faced with such a threat, the worker
has no alternative but to submit to the oppression of the boss.
Because they are in such a weak bargaining position, workers can easily be
subjected to arbitrary treatment by their bosses: extremely low wages, excessively
long working hours, no job-safety guarantees, and very bad health conditions.
Still less do the bosses ever worry about boarding facilities, recreation, or educa-
tion for the workers' children. All the bosses think about is how to exploit the
work force as much as possible, in order to reach their desired targets. And who
sets these targets, Your Honor? These targets are products of Indonesia's intense-
ly capitalistic upbuilding climate!
Why are the workers passive in the face of these realities?
In truth they are not passive. The workers have made great efforts to improve
their lot. But the fact is that they always get the worst of it because of the
strength of the bosses' position; they are always helpless in the face of dismissal,
lock-ups,25 and often even physical threats at the hands of "backing" or hired
goons.26
The majority of Indonesian workers are day-laborers, which puts them in a
very precarious position!
The disastrous experience of 34 workers at the Van Houten chocolate factory
in Bogor is still fresh in our memories. They were shut up from 11:45 a.m. to
7:30 p.m. in a locked room, were given no food or water, and were not even
allowed to use the bathroom; one woman worker even fainted. t And yet they were
only asking to be hired on a month-to-month basis. It is an open secret that most
companies like the Van Houten factory employ day-laborers. That way they avoid
having to guarantee health benefits, housing, and so forth; and, if the company
goes bankrupt or goes into a decline, they can just shrug their shoulders and lay
off their workers:	"after all, they are only day-laborers"'.
Bosses do not feel any obligation to worry about the fate of workers who are
laid off, much less to give them severance pay to tide them over until another boss
is willing to take them on. The bosses consider the workers far less valuable than
their pet dogs.
* Perspektif Perekonomian Indonesia 1975-1985, [Jakarta], LPEM-UI, 1975.
t Suara Karya, August 18, 1978.
24.	PMA (Penanaman Modal Asing, Foreign Capital Investment) and PMDN (Pena-
naman Modal Dalam Negeri, Domestic Capital Investment) are the two components
of the government's program for encouraging capital investment.
25.	Penyekapan, as can be inferred from the description that follows below, is
the common practice of physically locking up workers in their work-places as a
method of enforcing industrial "discipline."
26.	The unglossed English word backing is today common Indonesian political par-
lance, and seems to derive from the older Dutch dekking. Centeng, originally a
Javanese word for "guard," or "watchman," has recently taken on the connotation
of "hired thug" or "goon."133
How extraordinary it is that such things can happen in a state based on the
Pancasila!!!
Dismissal of a worker or, as it is officially called, "Severance of the work
Relationship," is as easy for the boss as snipping a thread, while for the worker
it means a catastrophe has struck. In a factory, a businessman must carefully
consider, by means of complicated calculations, whether or not to shut down one
unit of productive machinery. But as a boss he does not need to think twice about
firing umpteen dozen workers, especially if the market is slow or the company is
going bankrupt. By the logic of the jungle, 27 the businessman's thinking of course
makes sense: if a machine of his stops producing, its monetary value steadily de-
clines. But if workers are fired, it is no longer any concern of his. The company
will not suffer any loss at all. Replacing a machine requires careful consideration,
but replacing a worker is no problem whatsoever. The boss never feels any obli-
gation to think about the fate of the worker, his wife, his children, his future--
for, once again, "after all, they are only day-laborers"!!! Is this what they call
"Just and Civilized Humanitarianism"???28 Threatening to Fire people from their
jobs has become a standard weapon for the businessmen! !
One thousand workers in textile mills in Majalaya and Bandung municipality
were laid off with no notice simply because the textile market was sluggish.*
Several months later came the news that 40 workers at Indo Extrusions, Inc. in
Leuwi Gajah, Kotip29 Cimahi, were also fired without any clear cause, but the
word leaked out that the lay-offs were due to a sudden jump in the prices of im-
ported raw materials, f We also still remember the mass dismissal of 6,000 workers
at Grendel, Inc.; they were not given their severance pay until several months
later, and even then only after the national press made a fuss about it.
We only hear about the few cases which happen to make it into the newspapers
and there happen to catch our eye. These are only the tip of the iceberg. Ac-
cording to data from the Directorate-General for the Protection and Care of Man-
power, during the period 1974 to 1977/1978, 8,828 cases involving Severance of
Work Relationships (PHK) 30 were recorded as being settled by the Directorate-
General itself, 8,021 cases by the Provincial Committees for Settling Labor Dis-
putes (P4D) and 1,959 cases by the Central Committee for Settling Labor Disputes
(P4P).:t:3:L We do not know how many more thousands of PHK cases have been set-
tled by blood and tears and are hidden deep within the hearts and consciousnesses
of millions of Indonesian workers.
Meanwhile, Law No. 12/1964 is still grandly posted:	"Private businesses can
only terminate work relationships with their workers after holding hearings and
receiving permission from the P4D."
* Pikiran Rakyat, March 23, 1978.
t Pikiran Rakyat, November 23, 1978.
t Kompas, December 8, 1978.
27.	Literally, logika binatang--the logic of wild animals.
28.	An official regime slogan.
29.	Kotip is an acronym for Kota Administratip, Administrative Township, the
lowest level of legal municipalization.
30.	I.e., Pemutusan Hubungan Kerja.
31.	I.e. , Panitia Penyelesai Perselisihan Perburuhan Daerah; Panitia Penyelesai
Perselisihan Perburuhan Pusat.134
Noncompliance with this law carries a maximum fine of only Rp 10,00032 or a
maximum prison term of three months. But what difference does Rpl0,000 make to
a businessman?*
Judges of the Court,
Indonesian workers, living in desperate conditions anyway, are in addition
constantly subjected to rampant dictatorial and sadistic actions, as well as cruel
intimidation. Many bosses still arbitrarily make their workers work overtime, as
it happens to suit them, sometimes without any compensation; instead, physical
intimidation which no normal human being could bear serves as their "pay." The
savage supervision of "goons" or "backing" is sometimes far more vicious than that
of the mandor rodi in Daendels' time33 or the mandor romusha3‘* in the Japanese
period. Perhaps the rodi and romusha laborers were happier than the workers in
this age of Independence; at least oppression by another nation is less bitter than
oppression by one's own countrymen!
Perhaps the experience of the Van Houten Workers who were locked up for
hours, which I described earlier, is still not horrifying enough? The fact is, we
hear about treatment which is even more horrendous. In the Famatex Textile Mill,
no notice was taken of a worker who became completely blind in one eye until 18
months later, the death of a worker killed on the job was completely ignored, and
a woman worker was even sexually molested by one of the managers, leading her
to quit her job out of fear and shame.t
If the Judges of the Court have seen the film Mandingo, which is set in the era
of slavery in the United States, they will surely feel that working conditions in
this country, in this age of Independence, are no better than those of the slaves
in the United States a century ago. If Henriette35 Beecher Stowe, author of the
famous book "Uncle Tom's Cabin," returned from the grave today and saw the con-
ditions of the Indonesian workers, she would surely weep. Sumedang's Pangeran
Kornel36 should also see how today it is not Daendels who oppresses the little
people, but their own countrymen with the same brown skins!
* Kompas, May 25, 1979.
t Pikiran Rakyat, January 13, 1975.
32.	I.e., about $16 after the devaluation, and about $24 before.
33.	Mandor rodi--low-level official or agent in charge of forced labor for the state
or senior officials. Marshal Daendels, the legendary tyrant who ruled Java for the
Batavian Republic between 1808 and 1811, constructed the first trans-Java "high-
way" (postweg) by forced labor at an immense cost in human suffering (including
lives).
34.	Mandor romusha: romusha were the labor conscripts of the Japanese occupation
era (1942-45), and the mandor romusha their gang-bosses. The sufferings of these
conscripts were so great that the word romusha has become one of the very rare
Japanese words to have passed into the Indonesian language--with the meaning of
"brutally exploited labor."
35.	Sic--rather than the correct Harriet.
36.	Pangeran "Kornel" Surianegara, bupati of Sumedang from 1791 to 1828, strenu-
ously opposed Daendels' brutal use of forced labor to build the first trans-Java
post-road in 1808. For his later military services in blocking Diponegoro's forces
from moving into West Java, he was awarded the rank of Colonel, which with the
passage of time was indigenized to become the name "Kornel."135
The foreign companies invited by the Suharto Regime to invest their capital
in Indonesia have proved not only to drain off profits from the soil of our mother-
land; they also high-handedly harm and exploit Indonesia's workers. They have
violated the nationalization regulations. 37 They do not treat foreign workers and
native workers equally. They have broken the contractual terms established for
employing foreign labor. And even if they are fined it means nothing to them, be-
cause the fine they incur is insignificant compared to the money they are making
in Indonesia--money they are making because they have access to a work force
which is paid next to nothing.
Judges of the Court,
Since the one workers' organization permitted to exist in Indonesia is the All-
Indonesia Workers' Federation [FBSI], it is through the FBSI that the workers
have to struggle to improve their wretched lot.
The Indonesian workers' hopes of some improvement in their lot are in the
hands of the FBSI alone. But what has happened?
The government's suggestion that FBSI base-units38 be established in every
company remains just that: a suggestion. The fact of the matter is that in general
businessmen do not like FBSI base-units set up in their companies.
This dislike is reflected in various acts of provocation and intimidation, even
verging on subhuman terror, aimed at thwarting the establishment of these FBSI
base-units. Even supposing that an FBSI base-unit is finally set up in a particu-
lar company, the base-unit's organizers are continually haunted by blandishments,
threats, physical intimidation, slander, [and the likelihood of] arrest and dismis-
sal, so that the role which the FBSI is ideally expected to play and the functions
it is intended to perform are never realized. Understandably, of course! Imple-
mentation of the ideals of the FBSI would mean protection of the workers' rights,
and protection of the workers' rights would mean that the businessmen's pockets
would not be as full. Protection of the workers' rights would mean fewer oppor-
tunities for the businessman to give his greed free rein.
What is difficult to understand is why the New Order regime is unable, in fact
is unwilling, to try sincerely to tackle this problem. Why, Your Honor?
The FBSI base-unit in the Naintex II mill in Ujungberung was covertly sup-
pressed in a truly vicious manner. First the management formed an "Old-timers
Movement" 39 which it used to block the FBSI unit's activities within the company.
Then premiums were given to those workers who did not join the FBSI. * One odd
development was that, after the FBSI base-unit was established, a rule was made
* Pikiran Rakyat, July 26, 1978.
37.	This does not mean nationalization in the usual sense, but rather regulations
requiring foreign corporations to hire indigenous personnel, rather than foreigners,
in various categories of job and in various proportions.
38.	"Base-unit" is a somewhat unsatisfactory translation of the Indonesian word
basis, the technical term for the lowest level (i.e., factory floor level) of the hier-
archy of organized labor under the New Order.
39.	Literally, Gerakan Sesepuh. The idea here seems to be mobilizing loyalty in
terms of length of service to the company (seniority) against incoming, younger
"trouble-makers." The very honorific term sesepuh is employed to flatter the old-
timers for this purpose.136
docking the wages of workers who took time off from work for Friday prayers or
for regular daily prayers. 40 Various strategies were continually pursued to pre-
vent workers from joining the FBSI. * * * §
In the Famatex II textile mill, something even stranger happened! The manage-
ment deliberately hired thugs and silat41 experts to prevent the workers from set-
ting up a FBSI base-unit! t
Such symptoms of management's displeasure over the establishment of FBSI
base-units have not turned up in just one or two companies; they have reached
epidemic proportions. In the Municipality of Bandung alone, more than 80% of the
employers do not want FBSI base-units set up in their companies.£ By May 7,
1979, only 1,975 FBSI base-units had been established among the 10,000-plus com-
panies in East Java.§
Meanwhile, the terror continues even after a company gets an FBSI base-unit.
Several FBSI base-unit organizers who were democratically elected from among their
comrades-in-misfortune have been cruelly and sadistically terrorized.
Budiono, who was democratically elected by his coworkers as chairman of the
FBSI base-unit at SMWI, Inc.,42 was arbitrarily fired without severance pay. ||
The chairmen of the FBSI base-units in Star Metal Ware Industry, Inc.; Dan
Liris, Inc.; Sucaco, Inc.; the Horizon Hotel; the Sari Pasifik Hotel; Sandratex,
Inc.; and others,# along with most of the FBSI activists throughout Indonesia,**
have met the same fate. The businessmen continually practice despicable, cowardly
terror43 against individual worker militants or against their families, so that their
interests will be increasingly secure, high and dry above the floods of tears of
their workers and their workers' families! In the end, the businessmen succeed
in cunningly infiltrating their henchmen into the FBSI base-units, so that the
workers become divided, fragmented, and forget about their wretched lot. A hand-
ful of FBSI elements in Bandung regency calmly pocketed some of the annual vaca-
tion and Hari Raya44 funds as "consolidation money." They even had the heart to
dock the severance pay of workers being laid off by 10%. ft
*	Mandala, May 23, 1978.
t Berita Buana, August 24, 1977.
+ Gala, September 21, 1978.
§ Kompas, May 7, 1979.
|| Kompas, October 4, 1978.
#	Kompas, May 25, 1979.
** Kompas, May 7, 1979.
ft Gala, April 20, 1979.
40.	I.e., the five daily prayers required of pious Muslims.
41.	A traditional form of "martial arts."
42.	This appears to be the same as the Star Metal Ware Industry mentioned just
below.
43.	Teror-teror kampungan. Kampungan has the connotations of cheap and vulgar.
44.	Hari Raya Idulfitri--the great holiday that marks the end of the Muslim fasting
month. Traditionally, it is a time for the distribution of alms, and, in businesses
and government agencies, of bonuses.137
So what good is the FBSI? In many of the textile mills in Bandung the pres-
ence of the FBSI actually puts the workers in a worse and worse position, because
95% of the leaders and organizers of the FBSI base-units in those factories have
been "created" by the owners themselves. Thus they naturally fight for the own-
ers’ interests instead of those of the workers!!! *
These acts of high-handed oppression by our own people, by the strong against
the weak, in clear deviation from the Principle of Humanitarianism,45 go on under
the very nose of the government. And the government just lets them continue un-
checked, and is unable, or perhaps unwilling, to do anything about it. Indeed
the government does not merely let them continue; it even participates in the op-
pression. All these incidents take place because of the government's way of pam-
pering businessmen, especially foreign businessmen, who invest their capital in
Indonesia, for the sake of economic progress; [i.e.], to make commodities available
for the enjoyment of the rich or for the sake of production which ultimately will
force consumers to sell their possessions because they have been cajoled into buy-
ing by advertisements. The government cannot do anything about it. Indeed,
the government cannot impose any sanctions whatsoever on the businessmen who
obtain government credit, because these borrowers are not in a weak position.
They are in a position of strength because they know that much of their credit
was acquired through collusion with the credit-givers.
The weak bargaining position of workers is a result of the scarcity of jobs in
relation to the numbers of workers who need them. Investment policies have con-
tributed to the scarcity of jobs, because the investments which have been made
have gone into capital-intensive industries with modern equipment which do not
absorb much manpower. The 780 projects approved between 1967 and 1977, which
were capitalized at US$6,652,185,000, were evidently able to absorb only 405,654
people, and even of that number 7% were foreigners. The number of people ab-
sorbed was clearly insignificant in comparison with the number of people who
needed work.
And yet it turns out that these modern factories which do not require much
labor are the very ones which the new order regime worships. In its pursuit of
increases in production, the new order regime has completely forgotten the inter-
ests of umpteen million Indonesian workers who are forced to become its sacrificial
victims.
The New Regime's ambition to spur economic growth has taken a toll which will
never be forgiven by the little people involved--namely, the workers. The govern-
ment has forgotten about the workers, considering them simply as factors of pro-
duction who are to be permitted no share in enjoying the fruits of upbuilding.
The government has forgotten that workers are [part of] the Indonesian people
who joined in the struggle to establish this Republic and who are entitled to inde-
pendence and to its fruits.
* Gala, September 13, 1978.
45. I.e., the third principle of the Pancasila.CHAPTER VIII
THE HOLLOW IDENTITY AND CULTURAL STAGNATION
OF THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA
A Change in the Mentality
of the People of Indonesia
Judges of the Court,
We often come across unpleasant descriptions of Indonesians nowadays, some
of which are openly expressed in articles, lectures, and so forth, and some of
which we can hear in ordinary conversation in our own society.
Many people have characterized Indonesians as hypocritical, irresponsible and
Feudal-minded,* or as having an upward-oriented mentality, lacking self-confidence,
and undisciplined. + A variety of descriptions essentially portray the Indonesian
people as having become so stunted nowadays that they are incapable of meeting
the challenges of the times.
And yet we must ask: did the pernicious mentality or characteristics which the
Indonesian people have today appear out of thin air? Where did such a mentality
or such characteristics come from?
Judges of the Court,
A person's mentality, or that of a group of people, does not simply appear at
birth. It is a product of the daily life he actually experiences, of the ways in
which the way of life of his society is structured, of the economic life of that soci-
ety , and of other circumstances which people in that society directly experience
or are confronted with. A person does not create his own mental outlook; it re-
flects the characteristics of his culture and era.t To illustrate this more clearly,
I will explain how the Dutch Colonial System, which lasted 350 years, fostered a
pernicious mental outlook among the Indonesian people. For the sake of their eco-
nomic interests, the Dutch Colonialists tried to set up a social system or social
order which could effectively provide them with profits. The colonial Economic
order was structured so that raw materials could be channeled to port centers, to
be sent on to The Netherlands, with the lowest possible production costs. To do
this, the Dutch Colonialists also needed cheap labor, so they tried to collaborate
with the traditional Rulers in the Indonesian archipelago. These Rulers gave the
Dutch colonialists the opportunity to use their people's labor for very little com-
* Mochtar Lubis, Manusia Indonesia, sebuah Pertanggungan Jawab, Jakarta, Yaya-
san Idayu, 1978.
t Koentjaraningrat, Kebudayaan, Mentaliteit dan Pembangunan, Jakarta, Gramedia,
1974.
t Morris E. Opt[l?]er, "Developmental Change and the Nature of Man," in Art
Callaher, Jr., ed., Perspective in Developmental Change, Lexington, Ky, Univer-
sity of Kentucky Press, 1968, p. 19.
138139
pensation and to make off with raw materials at the same time. In return, the
Rulers were provided with various luxuries, status symbols such as titles, lavish
displays of respect for their rank, and so on. To promote Dutch Colonial interests,
a type of social order was created which was focused upward. Status was more
highly valued than the fruits of labor.
The Dutch Colonialists enhanced their position by creating all kinds of titles
with fine gradations in rank which they bestowed on the people who worked for
them. Each title went with a particular office, ranging from Carik, Lurah, and
Camat to Asisten Wedana, Sinder, Wedana, Patih, Mangkubumi, and so forth.1
Each office had a title which entitled the person who donned it to certain displays
of deference. Thus, each office was considered less in terms of its usefulness or
its functions than in terms of its social rank or status. As a result, even outside
working hours the people who held those positions still demanded displays of re-
spect for their rank or status.
This example only shows one facet of society during the Dutch Colonial period
and its impact on the development of a pernicious mentality, that is, Feudal-
mindedness, in Indonesian society. The Colonial System had many other facets,
all of which demonstrated that the economic order, the political order, and the
power structure, as well as other aspects of the social order, caused the develop-
ment of a certain mentality. From this we can also see that human development in
Indonesian society suffers when those-in-power have interests other than those of
the masses.
The goal of Indonesian Independence was to smash and completely demolish the
Colonial social order, because it made the Indonesian people uncreative, took away
their self-respect, and left them weak and stunted. We wanted to smash the Colo-
nial Social Order because it was destroying Indonesians' lives and ruining their
mentality. One of the goals of Indonesian Independence mentioned in the Preamble
to the 1945 Constitution is: to Raise the Cultural Level of the Nation. What raising
the cultural level means here is not just making people more clever intellectually,
or more highly skilled. What it means in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution is
an effort to change the mentality of the People of Indonesia so that they are capa-
ble of meeting the challenges blocking their path, both those arising from nature
and those coming from international society. And that requires change in the social
order, change in our economic life, change in the power structure, and so on.
Thus, if the GBHN clearly states that Indonesian Upbuilding means the upbuild-
ing of Indonesians as complete human beings, then this automatically includes mak-
ing changes in the social structure in order to improve Indonesians' mental outlook.
When it first came to power, the New Order [regime] itself declared that the
New Order meant more than just a change of power-holders. It also meant a change
in mental outlook, from an Old mental outlook which was considered pernicious to a
New one which it was hoped would be better.
1. This listing of colonial-era titles is a little odd. Carik = Village Secretary;
Lurah = Village Head; Camat (Subdistrict Officer) is the post-independence name
for the Asisten Wedana (Assistant Wedana) of the colonial period; Sinder = Inspec-
tor (opziener) of schools, a rank outside the upward territorial administrative
chain of command; Wedana = District Officer; Patih = Vice-Regent (or Prime Minis-
ter in the indirectly-ruled Central Java principalities); Bupati (Regent) is missing;
Mangkubumi = either Treasurer or Prime Minister in the principalities.140
But what has happened during the twelve years* 2 the New Order Regime has
been in power? Has the New Order Regime really changed the social order to make
possible an improvement in the mentality of the people of Indonesia?
Judges of the Court,
The Concentration of Power and the elimination of controls have also eliminated
dynamism and creativity in our society, as well as creating an atmosphere in which
people are too frightened and discouraged to express their opinions. Without con-
trols, members of the government apparatus can deal with the people in a high-
handed manner and can benefit personally from their positions. A power structure
which is not subject to controls cannot produce the genuine leaders which a society
needs.
The fact that the Upbuilding Strategy is oriented only toward achieving a high
rate of Economic growth has also nurtured a taste for consumption in society. The
policy of reliance on Foreign Loans will sooner or later give rise to an image of a
lack of self-confidence. This policy of depending on outside forces goes along with
a decline in the Indonesians' productive capacity. All of this has led to an erosion
of national self-respect.
Judges of the Court,
In this section I will discuss the background of the comments about Sociocul-
tural conditions in Indonesia contained in the "White Book of the Students' Strug-
gle." I will explain how Indonesian society has lost its creativity and self-respect,
to the point that it is no longer "Master in its own country." I will describe alarm-
ing symptoms which have appeared in society and their causes. Then we will also
be able to see how substantial the New Order Regime's share has been in developing
a pernicious mentality among the Indonesian people.
The Mentality of New Order Officials
Judges of the Court,
Corruption and the abuse of power among government officials is an open se-
cret. One of the experts from the [State] Financial Inspection Board itself has
admitted that the activities of government officials were responsible for "leakages"
of Rp960 billion, 3 or 30 percent of the Development Budget.* Of course, we still
remember the way the officials scrambled to embezzle those funds. Ibnu Sutowo
from Pertamina was followed by Budiaji from Bulog, and then Siswadji from the
State Police, and there have been many other cases of Corruption as well. In the
preceding section I have already described the arrogance of government officials,
especially the high officials, who practice nepotism and conspire with businessmen
to enrich themselves as much as possible by exploiting the prerogatives of their
offices. What the New Order regime calls campaigns to "Combat Corruption" have
always proven incapable of reducing the level of Corruption in Indonesia, from
1970, when the Team to Combat Corruption was formed, until 1974 and beyond.
* Pikiran Rakyat, May 27, 1978.
2.	Sic. Elsewhere the New Order's age is typically given as 13 years.
3.	I.e., about $15,000,000 after the devaluation of November 15, 1978, and about
$23,000,000 before.141
Such campaigns have been undertaken over and over again without producing any
tangible results.
It is not surprising that observing this reality led Bung Hatta to declare that:
"Corruption has become part of Indonesian culture." It has become part of the life
of the Indonesian people. Corruption has taken root in our society's way of life.
Clearly Bung Hatta did not mean that all Indonesians have a Corrupt mentality,
because, as we have seen for ourselves, it is the officials who engage in Corrup-
tion--the higher the office, the more it is abused. A Corrupt Mentality, or taking
advantage of one's position, naturally flourishes in places which provide opportuni-
ties for Corruption to take place.
And in a system of government with the characteristics of a bureaucratic dic-
tatorship, of course the greatest opportunities arise within the government itself.
By its nature a bureaucratic dictatorship, which concentrates power within the
tiny Elite of Those-in-Power at the summit of the government, simultaneously para-
lyzes control by other elements in society, for example, other state institutions
(Parliament, the [State] Financial Inspection Board, and so forth) as well as the
press, the campuses, and so on. Accordingly, the power to impose restrictions,
sanctions, or punishment on members of the government apparatus lies only with
the Elite of Those-in-Power. Society cannot place restrictions on members of the
government apparatus, cannot supervise them, and cannot even threaten sanctions
against those who engage in irregularities, because Those-in-Power have already
disabled the necessary channels.
Those-in-Power, who as a group have concentrated power in their own hands,
make the rules by themselves. However, they are primarily concerned with pre-
serving their power so that their interests will be continuously protected. As a
result, the abuse of authority or corruption and so forth will continue so long as
Those-in-Power do not feel that their interests or power is being undermined. In
essence, as long as the position of Those-in-Power is not disturbed, anyone may
do whatever he pleases, even if the public interest is affected.
The higher his office or position, the less the control which can be exercised
over an official's behavior, especially if he has already reached the topmost level
of leadership among Those-in-Power. There his freedom of action to engage in
irregularities expands even further. For that very reason the most serious Cor-
ruption and other forms of abuse are found among the topmost government leaders.
Because they behave in such a way, the standards which these leaders apply to
the behavior of their subordinates are not much different. Corruption, illegal
levies, and nepotism have all become normal phenomena in government circles.
Judges of the Court,
I commented earlier that, as a result of a System which Concentrates Power
upward, the only genuine supervision which effectively influences the behavior of
a member of the government apparatus is exercised by his superiors. This also
affects the manner in which he views his responsibilities. Responsibility, as a
government official understands it, is limited simply to his superiors, and even
that responsibility is understood in the narrowest sense as a responsibility to
please them in order to keep them convinced that their power is not being under-
mined. There are various ways of pleasing superiors, ranging from offering them
service, tribute, and so forth, to giving them only favorable reports. Not sur-
prisingly, this system of sham responsibility, which only calls for pleasing super-
iors, has fostered the growth of a sycophantic mind-set among members of the142
government apparatus, or, as the popular phrase goes, "[everything is OK] So
Long As the Boss is Happy."1*
Judges of the Court,
In a System which Concentrates Power upward, office has great significance.
It is not viewed in terms of its functions, its usefulness,or what it actually does,
but only in terms of its status. Moreover, such a system permits people to be
chosen on the basis of the "tastes" of the superiors rather than on the basis of
their job performance. So it is quite possible for someone who does not perform
well on the job to occupy a high office. In the last analysis people are measured/
evaluated less on the basis of their achievements than on the basis of their office
or status.
This situation closely resembles the situation during the Colonial period, as
described earlier. A new Feudalism has appeared, especially among government
officials, who demand lavish displays of deference purely on the basis of their
social status.
Judges of the Court,
A person who holds a government position holds an important position within
society. Accordingly, a government official should actually be able to serve as a
leader of society. But the people who now occupy government offices only display
the characteristics of bureaucrats or power-holders. The difference between a
bureaucrat, or someone who holds power, and a leader is enormous. A bureaucrat
or a power-holder is not necessarily a leader. A leader is someone who can serve
as an example for the people he leads, because of his abilities as well as his char-
acter. He becomes a leader because the society unanimously chooses him on that
basis.
But the New Order Regime, with its System of Concentrating Power at the cen-
ter, will never be able to produce leaders within the government apparatus. It is
easy enough for a person to be chosen on the basis of his ability to grovel to his
superiors rather than on the basis of his abilities. It is quite possible for someone
greedy and stupid to occupy the highest office in the government by means of
threats and other coercive measures. Through its system of concentrating power,
the New Order Regime can only produce bureaucratic robots which grovel to those
above them and trample those below.
An Unpleasant Picture of Indonesian Society
Judges of the Court,
The little people in Indonesia are often considered "fatalistic," 4 5 uncreative,
and upward-oriented. They are often described as lacking initiative and being
only followers. In reality, if we looked at the conditions of their lives, [we would
understand why] such attitudes develop. The little people can see quite clearly
that, even if they said what they thought, it would not improve their lot in any
way. They can also feel the pressures, direct as well as hidden, which are
brought to bear on those who try to protest the unjust treatment they receive.
4.	The popular term referred to here is ABS (Asal Bapak Senang).
5.	The text has the Javanese word nrimo ("accepting," "submissive," "resigned").143
Judges of the Court,
The New Order Regime has put a System of Authoritarian Government into
practice from the center down to the regions (as I explained in the preceding sec-
tion). The [first] result of this System is that: the People's real Desires or As-
pirations cannot influence national decision-making. The second result is that the
government officials who hold power can deal with the people at their whim, both
in order to preserve their power and for other purposes as well. Looking at the
[first] result of this system of authoritarian government, it is clear that, if the
people express their opinions, then those opinions must first be brought into line
with the wishes of those who hold power. If the people's opinions do not conform
to these wishes, then they cannot be accommodated in the decision-making process.
The deciding factor here is what those-in-power want or think. What is even more
disastrous in an authoritarian system like the present one is that the desires of
those-in-power are more often than not in conflict with those of the people. Thus
the people typically observe the simple fact that no attention is ever paid to their
opinions or aspirations.
When they see this happen over and over again, are the people wrong to con-
clude that it is better to keep quiet, apathetic, and indifferent than to raise a hue
and cry in vain? Those who see this happen over and over again during their
lives will come to the same conclusion. And ultimately they will also feel the same
despair.
Judges of the Court,
The government apparatus, which behaves in an autocratic manner due to the
paralysis of controls, has created a climate of fear in society. We all know that
during the 1977 General Election government elements carried out terroristic ac-
tions virtually everywhere. I have already brought up several incidents which
took place during the General Elections in my discussion of the activities by which
the New Order Regime consolidated its power. But the high-handed actions of mem-
bers of the government apparatus have not been limited to the 1977 General Elec-
tion.
In South Sumatra, six children died after being locked up in a room into which
diesel smoke was fed. We frequently hear of acts of violence perpetrated by the
security apparatus. People are often detained and tortured to force them to con-
fess to crimes they may well not have committed.
Such coercion is also carried out in the interests of achieving the targets which
Those-in-Power have unilaterally determined. The farmers are forced to do all
kinds of things in accordance with the wishes of those-in-power, to the point that
they feel they are living lives no longer their own, but rather the lives owned by
those-in-power...........what is most important to them is how quickest to finish
carrying out (the orders of those-in-power) so that they can return to their own
lives. That is why, in an atmosphere steeped in coercion and the authoritarian
zeal of those-in-power--who are interlinked from the very top all the way out to
the regions--the little people choose to keep quiet and to do whatever those-in-
power want without making a fuss.
Judges of the Court,
The little people are not the only ones who are afraid to express opinions.
The Intellectuals, who are supposed to be better informed about their rights and
responsibilities in society, are also affected by this climate of fear. We can detect
its influence in their choice of words. Many intellectuals prefer to use veiled and144
sometimes confusing language to describe certain realities, just because they are
afraid their remarks may offend those-in-power and have disastrous consequences
for them personally. They see the examples set by the many Indonesian Intellec-
tuals who have been forcibly incarcerated in prison because they openly expressed
their opinions about some situation which reflected badly on the New Order Regime.
In January 1974, for example, we saw several prominent Indonesian leaders
get arrested, imprisoned,and then abruptly released without any legal process.
The Fettering of Creativity
Judges of the Court,
The New Order Regime has demonstrated its eagerness to preserve its power
by devising a variety of ways to gag the Press, the Campuses, and the Intellec-
tuals. Its desire to preserve its power is so fierce that the New Order Regime is
no longer ashamed or hesitant to silence artistic life. Indonesian artists are forced
to obey the New Order Regime's wish that they not speak out about real social con-
ditions. The restrictions imposed by the government have been established by sec-
tions of the security apparatus like Kopkamtib or Bakin (Intelligence Coordinating
Body). These restrictions, based on considerations of security and order, clearly
restrict the artists' creative life as well.
The New Order Regime can simply announce that Artists may be creative just
so long as they do not provoke unrest or undermine security and order--and the
definition of security and order is decided by the New Order Regime's own secur-
ity apparatus. Rhoma Irama's songs were banned without explanation. 6 Kopkamtib
has kept many films like "Wasdri" 7 out of circulation under the pretext of main-
taining security and order.
Forcible restrictions on Creativity clearly hamper the development of creative
life in society, because artists should also be able to play a role in stimulating
social creativity.
The Deterioration of the Educational
System During the New Order Period
Judges of the Court,
I probably do not need to go on at length explaining the significance of Educa-
tion for developing the capacities of an individual and of a society. We already
know that a good Education can provide a person with the capacities and the knowl-
edge that will make it possible for him to develop himself through his own efforts.
A good education also makes a person aware of his rights and responsibilities so
that he can take his proper part in society, which also means that he can help im-
prove society.
Genuine Upbuilding should be able to enhance the people's capacity to develop
themselves, as explained earlier. And Upbuilding itself will succeed only if it is
6.	Rhoma Irama is the "stage name" (condensed from Raden Haji Oma Irama) of a
popular dangdut performer closely identified with the Muslim party PPP. Some of
his songs have openly satirical lyrics.
7.	On Wasdri, see above at p. 8.145
carried out by people who are well-educated, bright, honest, disciplined, and have
self-respect.* That is why, in order to achieve genuine Upbuilding, Education
must be given priority. In recognition of this, Article 31 of the 1945 Constitution
states that:	"Every Citizen is entitled to education."
Judges of the Court,
Since all along the New Order Regime has incessantly boasted to the Indonesian
people that it is carrying out Upbuilding in Indonesia, we can look at the amount of
attention it has paid to Education all this while as one way of judging the truth or
falseness of its claims.
*
Judges of the Court,
In one of his State Addresses, President Suharto cited rows of school buildings
and laboratories, stacks of books, and a series of teachers' upgrading courses as
indications of the improved quality of Education.f In this Address we can observe
the New Order Regime's confused thinking and its muddled conception of Educa-
tion. [To the New Order regime, providing a] good education means improving
the physical aspects of Education. Suharto completely failed to address the ques-
tion of Education itself. All he mentioned were quantitative gains, which say
nothing about the question of how Education is being handled. His speech
did not tell us anything about how the problems of increasing his people's capaci-
ties, and developing their creativity and productivity, [are being attacked] by the
present Educational System. The Programs he mentioned are Support Programs.
So what the New Order Regime has been carrying out all this time is just a series
of Support Programs. But what about the principal Program?
A State Address of this kind will reveal some of the government's political atti-
tudes. From this state address of Suharto's we can assess the New Order Regime's
attitude toward Education. [We can see] how Education is measured only in numbers
of buildings or upgrading courses, which are often carried out in such a short ,
period of time that they have no impact on Education itself.
Judges of the Court,
We can also see the government's confused thinking, as mentioned earlier, in
the way it has handled the question of Education. Various changes in Educational
policy during the time it has been in power have signaled changes in activities
without any change in the concept of education itself. Every time the Minister is
replaced, educational policy changes too.
Judges of the Court,
The New Order Regime has distorted the meaning of a good Education by play-
ing up the physical aspects of Education. In one of his State Addresses Suharto
painted a misleading picture of Education by citing rows of buildings and labora-
tories and stacks of books as indicators of the improved quality of Education.
Suharto* * * 8 completely failed to address the question of Education itself. All he
mentioned were quantitative gains which say nothing about how the question of
* Slamet Iman Santoso, "Pembangunan Tidak Akan Berhasil Bila Dilaksanakan oleh
Korupsi."
t Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden, August 16, 1978.
8. The paragraph starting here is a very slightly altered version of the passage
above, and may have been inserted by a printer's error.146
Education is being handled. His speech did not tell us anything about how the
problems of increasing his people's capacities, and developing their productivity
and creativity, [are being attacked] by education. The programs mentioned by
Suharto would more appropriately be termed support programs. Thus, what the
New Order Regime has been carrying out all this time is just a series of Support
Programs. But what about the principal program?
Judges of the Court,
As a result of a way of thinking which heavily stresses physical development
in Education, no attention has been paid to improving the quality of real education.
Schoolchildren's capacity to absorb their lessons has deteriorated so badly that
the entire society is aware of it. Indeed, even the New Order Regime has been
forced to acknowledge the fact that the quality of education has deteriorated and
has hastily made promises to improve it. * Only after 12 years in power has the
New Order Regime finally been forced to acknowledge that its mistakes have had
a disastrous impact on society. How many million people passed through a low-
grade educational system of poor quality during those 12 years? How many million
schoolchildren wasted those years without being able to achieve improved skills
commensurate with the time spent, merely because the New Order Regime obsti-
nately insisted on maintaining a low-grade Educational System?
As long as Upbuilding and education are still gauged in physical terms, im-
provement in the quality of schools will be impossible. How can Education be im-
proved if what is meant by improvement is adding rooms or buildings? Do they
think that adding rooms or buildings makes children smarter? Can crash courses
for upgrading teachers which are only one or two months in duration really so
much improve the teachers' ability to teach that education will thereby be im-
proved?
Judges of the Court,
The New Order Regime in general does not solve educational programs in a
thoroughgoing manner. Indeed, in several areas it has destroyed educational prin-
ciples which were already well established. For example, the New Order Regime
has destroyed the principle of Academic freedom in the realm of Higher Education
through its authoritarian attitudes and actions.
The Campus Normalization Concept (KNK),* * * 9 a product of the New Order, is
proof of this, both in terms of content and in the way in which the New Order has
carried it out. During the colonial period, education "provided instruction to Indo-
nesian children in accord with the interests of and to the extent needed by the
Colonialists."+ Education during the Dutch period was designed partly to create
an Elite which could be used as a tool to promote the Political and Economic Suprem-
acy of the Dutch Colonial Government in Indonesia and partly to meet Dutch needs
for second-class workers in the service of Dutch capitalists. + Daoed Yoesoef stated
in his KNK that Education in Indonesia is designed to produce a work force which
* "Sistem Pendidikan Dirubah Mulai Tahun Depan," Kompas, June 24, 1978.
t Mohammad Hatta, Kumpulan Karangan, 1954.
+ Pendidikan di Indonesia 1900-1974, [Jakarta,] Balai Pustaka, 1976.
9. On Education Minister Daud Yusuf's Campus Normalization Concept, see above
at Ch. 4, n. 67.147
can fill the "Technostructure,"10 that is, a bureaucratic network existing within
a network of organizations, regulations, and determinations, conjoined within the
social system. *13-
So what difference is there between the Dutch Colonial Educational System and
the New Order Educational System? The only difference lies in the words used to
describe them. They have both exploited an educated work force to further their
own economic and political interests. The Dutch Colonial Government and the New
Order Regime Government have both viewed educated workers as objects to be
placed in certain positions in accord with their ambitions. Thus the present Edu-
cational system is nothing more than a factory for punching out12 workers in re-
sponse to the demand for them.
This similarity is even more apparent if we look at the way the KNK has been
forcibly imposed. No one may even try to express an opinion different from that
of Daoed Yoesoef. His threats leave no room for doubt: Fire [him]! If a Rector
offers a different opinion, he will be dismissed by underhand means. Either his
replacement will be speeded up, as was the case with IPB13 Rector A. M. Satari,
or he will be summarily removed, as happened to ITB Rectors Iskandar Alisyahbana
and Sudjana Sapiie. If students try to express a different opinion, without any
direct dialogue with The-Man-in-Power, they are immediately threatened with aca-
demic sanctions via pressure on the Campus Leadership, as happened recently to
our friends at ITB. Such authoritarian coercion is quite similar to that of a Colo-
nial Government, like the former Dutch one.
It is clear that the New Order Regime has betrayed the goals of education by
killing creativity through its authoritarian actions.
Judges of the Court,
During the New Order regime's Administration alone, the Elementary School
curriculum has changed 3 (three) times, namely, in 1968, in 1971, and in 1975.
These changes have covered the number of hours per class, the number of course-
hours per subject, and the subjects. In addition, changes have repeatedly been
made in teaching methods, evaluation standards, examination systems and so forth.
High-sounding new ideas like Upbuilding Schools, Diagnostic Tests, Morning Gym-
nastics Programs, and all kinds of non-curricular programs like Scouting, Art,
Sports, Study Tours, and so on are crammed one after another into the tiny Ele-
mentary School buildings and then stuffed into the bodies and souls of Elementary
School children. + The New Order Regime has turned the Elementary school into a
laboratory. Our children have been turned into experimental rabbits for the sake
of satisfying fads which are semrawut,14 incoherent, aimless and are only pursued
in the interests of achieving popularity. The Elementary Schools are the victims
* Daoed Yusuf [sic], Konsep Normalisasi Kampus.
t S. Belen, "Orang-orang yang letih," Kompas, April 23, 1979.
10.	The text has the word Teknostruktur in double quotation marks--a favorite
buzzword of the Minister's.
11.	The obscure terminology and confused grammar here are not untypical of the
Minister's style.
12.	Mencetak literally means to "coin" or "reproduce from a mold."
13.	Institut Pertanian Bogor, Bogor Agricultural Institute.
14.	On semrawut, see above Ch. 5, n. 4.148
of the "experimental" methods15 promoted by the New Order Educational Policy.
These "experimental" methods have in fact become the New Order Regime's princi-
pal program, not only in Elementary Schools but throughout the entire State Educa-
tional System, from the kindergartens to the colleges. The budget allocation for
Education, already tiny, is also squandered in order to give these "experimental"
ideas free rein. All sorts of new upgrading courses, new curricular systems, and
new teaching methods roll out in endless succession from the brains of Indonesia's
Education Officials. Each newly installed Official is sure to have a new "concept,"
and to put it into immediate practice without a single glance at the preceding con-
cept, the implementation of which has only just begun to be attempted. Thus,
"concepts" of Education never last long in Indonesia. One or two months after
they have been announced, interminably debated, attacked, and praised from this
quarter and that, they vanish without a trace.
The New Order Regime also often uses the experimental policies which are being
formulated every other minute for its own political interests, to preserve its system
of power. Obvious examples include Decree 028, which was issued after the Malari
Affair,16 proved a failure and was then [replaced by] a Statute. Following the
events in early 1978,17 yet another new policy was quickly issued, the popular18
Campus Normalization Concept. And the [University] Statute, which all colleges
throughout Indonesia had just gone to great pains to implement, had to be adjusted
once again.
Aside from the KNK, when it comes to making a shambles of the Educational
System our Minister of Education, Daoed Yoesoef himself, has been no less agile
than his predecessors. His policies for "solving" educational problems have in-
cluded, among others: introducing Instruction in Pancasila Morality19 as a new sub-
ject. This means that teachers have again been faced with new upgrading courses
and parents have had to buy new books. After that, he pushed the start of the
school year back from January to the middle of the year. His reasons were very
bizarre indeed:	first, so that the vacation would not conflict with the rainy sea-
son; second, so that Indonesia's school vacation would coincide with the vacation
period in North America and Europe; third, so that the start of the. school year
would not conflict with the start of the fiscal year; and fourth (on the basis of
Diagnostic Test results which have leaked out everywhere) to improve [children's]
capacity to learn, which "is felt to be" inadequate.* These justifications are too
far-fetched!! !! !! What if the rainy season suddenly moves to the middle of the
year? Will the start of the school year have to be shifted again? Are all Indone-
* "Sistem Pendidikan Dirubah Mulai Tahun Depan," Kompas, June 24, 1978.
15.	Not a very satisfactory translation of metode coba-coba, which sarcastically
parodies the Education Ministry's vaunted interest in experimental educational pro-
grams by turning percobaan (experiment) into coba-coba (capricious and half-
baked) .
16.	Malari is an acronym of Malapetaka 15 Januari (Calamity of January 15), the
official term for the violent urban riots of January 15, 1974. See above at Ch. 4,
n. 90.
17.	The mass student protests against Suharto's unopposed renomination for an-
other presidential term.
18.	The word is, of course, intended ironically.
19.	The Pancasila has been described above at Ch. 2, n. 21. Pancasila Morality
is officialese for the current regime's "civics" ideology, such as it is.149
sian students going to be transferred to America and Europe, thus making it neces-
sary for their vacations to coincide? With no preparation, can 6 (six) months be
used to improve [children's] capacity to learn??? The fact of the matter is that
during even those 6 (six) months, the schools will only be in session half the day.
By these actions, Daoed Yoesoef has demonstrated that he certainly dares to
take "unpopular"* measures. Indeed, he dares to do more than that--he dares to
take measures which are completely reckless!!!!
The New Order Regime does not want to see how severely its patchwork, boon-
doggling20 policies burden the Indonesian people, who have had to finance this
educational system with the sweat of their brows. Just imagine, in addition to the
cost of the educational system, which is already very high, there are also the in-
visible charges for upgrading, endless new curricula, new textbooks which must
be bought, one after another, "modern" laboratory equipment and incidental pro-
grams like PORWIL, PORSENI, Reimuna Pramuka, 21 and so forth. These also pro-
vide opportunities for unscrupulous individuals to pilfer and loot the people's
money in order to enrich themselves. The New Order Regime itself has done all
these things!!!!
In the meantime, Professor Slamet Iman Santoso22 has declared that only 10
million out of 48 million children between the ages of 5 and 25 are accommodated in
formal educational institutions, t Schoolchildren, who, after all, are the most im-
portant elements in the educational system, clearly suffer grievously as a result
of these "experimental" methods. They are continually enveloped in a thick fog
of uncertainty and gloomy prospects. Our schoolchildren are constantly fed all
kinds of theories as the New Order Regime practices its experiments on them.
They have scarcely learned part of one new curriculum before they have to study
another even newer one. Arithmetic is replaced by Modern Mathematics, then by
IPS, by IPA23 and--most recent of all: Education in Pancasila Morality. What can
be expected later on from these schoolchildren once they leave an educational sys-
tem which is continuously and inconsistently changing direction? Children who at
the birth of the New Order had just entered the first grade by now have already
finished high school. During that time they have been educated by 3 different
methods. It is not hard to imagine how rudimentary the knowledge is that they
have acquired!
* "Saya Akan Berani Bertindak Tidak Populer," Tempo, April 8, 1978.
t "Bahan-bahan Untuk Komisi Pembaharuan Pendidikan," 1978.
20.	The Indonesian is gaji lobang, a typographical error for gali lobang (dig
holes). This is an idiom for digging one hole, then another while filling the first
with the dirt from the second--and so on.
21.	Porwil = Pekan Olahraga Wilayah (perhaps Zonal Sports Festival). These are
sub-national, but supra-provincial sports meetings, e.g., for East Indonesia,
Sumatra, etc. Porseni = Pekan Olahraga dan Seni (Sports and Art Festival), for
senior high-school students. Reimuna Pramuka may be Remaja Indonesia dalam
Pertemuan Nasional Praja Muda Karana, i.e., a gathering of the official scouting
movement Pramuka.
22.	Emeritus Professor of Psychology and former Acting Rector at the University
of Indonesia, one of the most respected senior academics in Indonesia.
23.	IPS and IPA are respectively Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial (Social Sciences) and
Ilmu2 Pasti dan Alam (Physical and Natural Sciences).150
Judges of the Court,
The one who suffers most as a result of the New Order Regime's semrawut
activities is the teacher, who is supposed to be, as Bung Karno said: more impor-
tant than the political leader, than the journalist, than the welvaartsambtenaar
[welfare officer], than the irrigation engineer, than the voorzitter [chairman] of
a vakbond [trade union] or a cooperatie [cooperative]... He is more important be-
cause he is an Apostle of Awakening for the formation of Upbuilding Man.. ."* * * §2It
But the New Order Regime has "elevated" Indonesia's teachers to the status of
second-class government officials, with second-class security to match. Teachers,
who are the primary factor in education, + who are expected to serve as examples
for their pupils and to Guide them, have simply been abandoned.
The noble task of an Elementary School Teacher is worth only Rp300 a day25
to the New Order Regime, and even that tiny sum does not take into account the
deductions of various official levies^ or the irresponsible delays like those in South
Sulawesi.§ Sometimes even Bupati interfere and fire a teacher, as happened in
Teluk Cendrawasih, Irian Jaya, simply because the Teacher demanded better treat-
ment. || Their already wretched lot is also "machine-gunned"26 by the New Order
Regime with endless upgrading courses and turned topsy-turvy by semrawut,
pointless changes of policy.
Teachers have become the perennially-neglected stepchildren
of the New Order Regime!!!
Judges of the Court,
It must be kept in mind that our children are not raw material for a production
line! They are the future inheritors of Independence, made of flesh and blood and
souls! We can always replace a component in a production system in order to ob-
tain the output27 that we want. But an educational system is not a production sys-
tem, nor is it a material system! ! An educational system is a human system.
Altering it capriciously, without even conducting a thorough evaluation, is truly
irresponsible.
The New Order Regime is only worried about how to create "educational pro-
jects" which can be tendered to funding sources like UNICEF, UNESCO, AFS, and
* Soekarno, Menjadi Guru df masa Pembangunan.
t "Guru Ternyata Masalah Terpenting Dalam Soal Pendidikan," Kompas, May 2,
1979.
+ Kompas, May 4, 1978.
§ Kompas, July 13, 1979.
|| Kompas, June [?], 1978.
24.	In this elaborate rhetorical flourish, the term Rasul deliberately echoes the
language of the Indonesian Bible, as well perhaps as Mohammad's "title" Rasulollah
(Messenger of Allah). Manusia Pembangunan should be read as parallel to the "New
Man" concepts of a number of socialist countries.
25.	I.e., about 48$ after the devaluation of November 15, 1978, and about 72$
before.
26.	Memberondong is to "fire a fusillade," usually of machine-gun bullets.
27.	The English word appears unglossed in the text.151
so forth. Its only concern is how to keep changing the way education is packaged
so that it will look magnificent. It never worries about how to give meaning to
education under Independence, something which was proclaimed early on, in the
Preamble to the 1945 Constitution and in Article 31 of that Constitution, as one of
the goals of founding the State of the Republic of Indonesia.
The schoolchildren in Indonesia's educational system are the country's future.
Educational problems are not problems of one or two months' duration nor are they
problems of one or two Five Year Plans; they are intergenerational problems. For
that reason they will never be solved by policies which are "sectoral," "revolution-
ary," or even "unpopular"--but reckless--like those which the New Order has
carried out! Educational policies must truly be conceived with care and planned
in a unified and comprehensive manner, in integrated and well-coordinated stages,
and with explicit objectives and provisions for thorough evaluation; unless the New
Order Regime actually wants to create Indonesians who are befuddled and confused,
without humanity, without a vision of the future, and who will doom Indonesia be-
fore its time.CHAPTER IX
DISASTER LIES IN WAIT FOR THE INDONESIAN NATION
To this day Indonesian society is still undergoing a process of enshacklement
as a continuation of a long-standing oppression. Apparently the New Order Regime
will carry on this enchainment. The entire Indonesian society is threatened by a
number of urgent problems, and all of the nation's capacities must be mobilized
and improved in order to surmount them. A government is supposed to prepare
its people to confront such problems collectively. If not properly tackled, any
problem will become more severe with time. In the future a group of problems will
stand in the way of our national survival.
The fact that society is in shackles means that it is hampered in its efforts to
confront its problems with the capacities it actually has. This fact, which has been
covered up, must be exposed so that all hidden capacities can emerge. Since no
other group has done this, it has been the students who have had to act. Spurred
by the desire to safeguard the nation's future, and by the aspiration to protect the
public interest, the students have had to expose all the critical problems which con-
stitute the challenges we will be facing together.
The Source of the Problems
Judges of the Court,
The principal problems that could destroy our national life are rooted in Indo-
nesia's population growth. Even if the Family Planning program is successful,
meaning that the population growth rate is reduced, Indonesia will still have a
population of more than 250 million by the year 2000.*
The projected growth of the population for Indonesia and for the islands of
Java and Madura up through the year 2000 is as follows:
	1971	1981	1991	2001
Indonesia	120.1 million	153.0 million	196.5 million	252.3 million
Jawa/Madura	76.1 million	94.4 million	117.9 million	146.0 million
Source:	Sumitro, berdasarkan perkiraan dan proyeksi Prof. Dr. N. Iskandar dari
Lembaga Demografi FE-UI, Laporan Kebijaksanaan Riset, dengan Asumsi
II.
These projections make it clear that not only will Indonesia's total population reach
immense proportions by the year 2000, but it will be unevenly distributed as well.
* Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Indonesia Dalam Perkembangan Dunia Kini dan Masa
Datang, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1975.
152153
Java and Madura, with only 7% of Indonesia's land area, contain 64% of its popula-
tion.
Campaigns to solve the problems of population size and distribution have not
helped the situation much so far. It has been estimated that the family planning
program which has been carried out all this time will only be able to reduce fertil-
ity 25% by the year 2000.* * Meanwhile, transmigration efforts have only moved
about i million people during the past eight years, while the population of Java
and Madura has grown by 12 million. This population increase will cause us a num-
ber of problems which must be regarded as of crucial importance. Two hundred
and fifty million people need food. Food has to be bought, and buying it requires
money which has been earned by working. In other words, every person must
have a decent income from a decent job. Successful upbuilding will create jobs;
however, it requires funding. The funds which have been used up till now have
been generated by the sale of natural resources and by borrowing abroad. In the
coming years, more and more upbuilding funding will be needed, judging from
present trends. But the natural resources which can be sold will be increasingly
depleted, and the debts which are already so immense must be paid off. We can
see, therefore, that the funds needed for upbuilding will be extremely hard to
obtain.
Problems, especially major ones, cannot be dealt with by means of inert objects
like money and physical facilities alone. Solving them requires certain capacities,
in this case national ones. But the students have observed that Indonesia's na-
tional capacities to solve these problems--even present-day problems--are already
dubious. How, then, are we going to face the even greater challenges which will
crop up in the future?
The Food Problem
Judges of the Court,
Let us examine the first crucial problem and our capacity to deal with it. That
problem is food. Since the earliest times, Indonesians have generally consumed
rice as their staple food. Accordingly, the demand for rice will increasingly ex-
pand.
But what about the rice supply? An expert has declared that, with [agricul-
tural] methods and rice needs like those at present, Indonesia's population increase
will swallow up all of the world's rice exports, t The failure to increase production
capacity is revealed by the ever larger amounts of rice which must be imported.
Rice imports are climbing by 28% a year. The actual cost of importing rice is climb-
ing by 62% a year.*
While we are on the subject of the rice problem, we must not forget that the
primary capital for rice production is land. Most of the wet rice land is found on
Java, and on the average each farmer owns only 0.3 hectares. The decline in
sawah hectarage is of course not simply due to population increases but also the
result of a lack of legal protection for landowners. Land has a given [natural] fer-
tility; some land is quite fertile and some is barren. The government has launched
*	Ibid.
t "Tahun 1985 Indonesia akan Membutuhkan Seluruh Ekspor Besar [Beras?] Dunia,"
Kompas, May 9, 1979.
*	Slamet Bratanata, Beberapa Tantangan Kita, p. 15.154
a program to improve and maintain the fertility of the land, but this program can-
not catch up with the demand for rice because, like it or not, we are faced with
the fact that there is a limit to the number of sheaves a rice plant will produce.
A plant is not a machine, and even a machine has limits to its production capacity.
Moreover, the farmer is the most important factor. He is by no means a ma-
chine. It is a terrible shame that he is treated so poorly, as described in the pre-
ceding sections. The farmer is simply viewed as a tool of production. As long as
farming is held in low esteem, our agricultural capacity will continue to decline.
And the facts show that the annual growth rate in the agricultural sector between
1971 and 1976 has fluctuated around a mere 3.8%.
The Employment Problem
Judges of the Court,
By the year 2000 we will have a population of 250 million people who will need
jobs to support themselves. Those who do not have jobs we call the unemployed;
the number of people who are unemployed increases by 1.4 million every year.*
One of the efforts made [to deal with this problem] has been to build up industry
by opening up our country to investments of foreign capital. [However], the facts
show that after 10 years of operations, foreign capital has only been able to create
410,897 jobs.t This figure is clearly much too low in comparison with the number
of people who are unemployed--a number which reached 14 million in that same 10-
year period. In addition to new factories created by foreign investment, we must
not forget the factories which already existed, even though they have been wiped
out by the new ones. Between 1971 and 1973, 225,259 small manufacturing compa-
nies went out of business, which meant that 432,185 more people became unemployed. +
Meanwhile, the BIMAS, INMAS and KIK* 1 programs, along with thousands of
INPRES programs, 2 have not been able to create enough jobs in the villages. The
result has been an increase in urbanization or the migration of villagers to the
cities. It is obvious that our capacity to generate employment is currently very
low. The increase in unemployment cannot be prevented, and the ranks of the un-
employed will continue to swell. How can this problem be overcome in the future?
The Oil Problem
Judges of the Court,
Oil generates 70% of state revenues. Oil production is going to be limited to
*	Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, in Prisma, September 1976.
t Biro Pusat Statistik, Survey Industri Kecil dan Kerajinan Rumah Tangga, 1971-
1973.
*	Ibid.
1.	KIK = Kredit Industri Kecil (Small Industry Credit), a government program de-
signed to help small manufacturers. On Bimas and Inmas, see above at Ch. 7, n. 6.
2.	Inpres = Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction). The term refers to a
large variety of construction projects (schools, small bridges, etc.) funded directly
from the presidential palace; Inpres has always been conceived in political terms as
a means of building Suharto's personal popularity.155
700 million barrels a year while, [judging from present] trends, domestic fuel oil
consumption will reach 700 million barrels a year by 1992.* This means that, if we
want to conserve oil by limiting production to 700 million barrels a year, by 1992
oil will no longer generate any revenue for the state. Yet oil plays such a signifi-
cant role in producing revenue now; and replacing it will not be easy because the
facts show that non-oil exports have risen only slightly. How, then, are we going
to finance upbuilding in the future?
Loans have been quite a major source of funds as well. During Pelita II alone,
foreign aid came to a total of 3,117.5 billion rupiah, t* * 3 4 It is estimated that during
the present Pelita III 9,237.5 billion rupiah'* in loans will be needed. +
Data from 1972 through 1976 indicate that none of the sources contributing to
the gross domestic product rose, except electricity, gas, and water.§ How, then,
will we pay off those debts? Our debt-servicing obligations are increasing and so
are our funding needs, meaning that our capacity to finance upbuilding will be
quite limited in the future.
Judges of the Court,
We can see that the prospects for the coming years look more like a terrifying
nightmare than a bright future. Our capacity to deal directly with problems in the
present is obviously quite low. We cannot prevent famine even though we import
rice. We cannot reduce unemployment; indeed, unemployment is rising. We are
extremely dependent on the income from the sale of oil which we do not produce on
our own; we just market that which God has bestowed upon us. We are strangled
by debts which grow larger and larger. All of this indicates that our capacity as
a nation has deteriorated.
The Problem of National Unity
Judges of the Court,
We, the students, see other alarming things as well which will greatly diminish
[our] national capacity. Perhaps the old saying which goes, "united We Stand,
divided We Fall," lingers in our memory. Indonesia's unity as a great nation (at
least in terms of size) is threatened by fragmentation, meaning that the bonds of
nationalism are in jeopardy. Above all there is the threat that those who are well-
off will become isolated from those who are not. If one social group get wealthier
and wealtheir while another becomes increasingly impoverished, it is clear to those
who are poor that they are being treated unjustly. The cake of upbuilding is not
being divided up evenly. The poor feel they are being treated like stepchildren
and for that reason have no desire, for example, to get involved in mutual assistance
* Slamet Bratanata, Beberapa Tantangan Kfta, pp. 51-59.
t Nota Keuangan 1978/79.
+ Adi Sasono, "Hutang Luar Negeri, Model Pembangunan dan Nasionalisme,"
Pustaka, No. 1, Tahun III.
§ Slamet Bratanata, Beberapa Tantangan Kfta, p. 32.
3.	I.e., about $5,000,000,000 after the November 15, 1978 devaluation, and about
$7,510,000,000 before.
4.	I.e., about $15,000,000,000 at the post-devaluation rate of exchange.156
with those who are getting richer. The spirit of mutual cooperation which was one
of the foundations of Indonesian unity is evidently evaporating.
Those who live in the dreary villages are still living in an environment which
is dreary in every respect. This river and those clumps of greenery are all there
is, and that is only if the region is fertile. Meanwhile the cities glitter more and
more brightly, with lots of new things. Those who live in the cities do not face
the same old things all the time. They enjoy more variety and have more opportu-
nities for recreation. Everyone in the villages quickly finds out about this by word
of mouth. Is there anyone who does not like beauty and comfort?
At some point it will occur to those who live in the villages that an injustice is
being done. They have no opportunity to take part in enjoying the pleasures of
the cities. On the other hand, those who live in the cities never think about the
dreariness of the villages, or if they do they quickly forget it again. Why think
about dreariness more fitting in a nightmare? The finer the cities, and the more
insistent the Upbuilding Reports on Television, the more city residents become con-
vinced that the villagers are doing well. This means that they will feel that it is
only right for them to live still more luxuriously. And the villagers will feel even
more strongly that they are being treated like stepchildren. And the urban peo-
ple's fellow-feeling with the villagers will fade, further convincing the villagers
that they are being treated unjustly. If this explodes in total rage, the city peo-
ple will be faced with disaster. As for whether or not this is a situation we desire
as a nation, clearly it is not.
This vanishing unity means the obliteration of the bonds which enable rural
and urban people to work together.
Injustice produces fragmentation. Let me repeat:	united we stand, divided
we fall.
The Problem of Mental Outlook
Judges of the Court,
What is it that can make someone toil with might and main all day long, partici-
pating in Upbuilding? The first and most general thing is hope. Hope sustains
enthusiasm in all human beings. Without hope, people become despondent and dis-
couraged. For our simple people, a helping hand from the government offers hope.
The government's helping hand may take the form of setting up Inpres programs,
offering Bimas credit, and establishing KIK/KMKP* * 5 or other programs. If a
program fails for understandable reasons, the failure will not destroy hope; in
fact, it can teach a valuable lesson. But if a program fails as a result of corrup-
tion, that is precisely the sort of thing which crushes hope. When hope is crushed,
so is the enthusiasm which is the basis for the development of one's capacities. Yet,
if all we see is manipulation of the BUUD/KUD,* misappropriation of Bimas credit,t
Inpres Elementary Schools6 on the point of collapse because the construction mate-
* Tempo, December 31, 1977.
t Tempo, October 15, 1977.
5.	KMKP = Kredit Modal Keperluan Pribumi (Credit for Native Capital Needs), an-
other program to provide credit to small indigenous Indonesian businessmen.
6.	I.e., schools built on a crash basis under the Inpres program.157
rials have been embezzled,* or Inpres piers which are never completed, + what hope
will grow and what capacities will develop?
Judges of the Court,
The death of hope which has occurred throughout the country, to a greater or
lesser extent, is connected with the growth of a corrupt mentality in Indonesia.
Bung Hatta once went so far as to say that "corruption has become part of Indone-
sian culture." Mochtar Lubis later remarked that "Superiors shift responsibility
downwards, while subordinates claim they are under orders from their superiors."
This shows how the courage to assume responsibility has declined in Indonesian
society. What kind of upbuilding can be carried out with such a mentality?
Our capacities as a nation are increasingly deteriorating. Creative works are
an indication of the most advanced kind of capacity, especially works of art. But
what works of art have been created by Indonesians during the New Order period,
and do they reflect the character of a nation which relies on its own capacities?
For example, are there concerts which are performed with musical instruments of
Indonesian creation? The fact is that even Dangdut, which is considered a domes-
tic art form, has to be performed with foreign-made electric guitars, foreign-made
thousand-watt amplifiers, and a stage manner & la Jimmy Hendrick, ' which is also
foreign.
Judges of the Court,
We, the students, have of course been educated for the needs of the future,
but the future is shaped by what happens today. In other words, the present
does not belong only to those who are commonly called the older generation.
Neither are we, the students, the sole proprietors of the future. Everything be-
longs to us collectively! And if one group of people, whether officials who hold
power, followers of those-in-power, or karate champions, selfishly damage the
nation’s future and diminish its capacities, we will confront them, we will challenge
them, and we will destroy them.
What we have been seeing all this time are the chains of oppression: the
shackling of society through the crushing of the nation's capacities and the ruin
of the future. We will not allow these chains to remain. We will break them!!!!
* Tempo, February 25, 1978
t Tempo, January 13, 1979.
7. Sic--i.e. , Jimi Hendrix.CHAPTER X
THE STUDENTS RISE UP TO BREAK THE CHAINS
OF OPPRESSION OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE
The Background of the Situation
Judges of the Court,
In great detail, chapter by chapter, I have described the present conditions
of the Indonesian people's lives under the New Order regime government. Now
the time has come for me to summarize them and compare them with the ideals which
provide the formal framework of the New Order. Then I will offer some conclusions.
The constitutional political life which the New Order was supposed to uphold,
by enabling state institutions to carry out their functions, by establishing those
institutions on the basis of the results of a general election, and by abolishing
organizations not in line with the 1945 Constitution, has never come to pass. The
political system which has been built up during the 13 years the New Order has
been in power has instead increasingly revealed its true nature as a system which
concentrates power. It has taken the shape of a dictatorship, which has ulti-
mately had the following consequences:
1.	The people's spirit has come close to being destroyed.
2.	Channels for the people's aspirations have been closed off because all
the movements, day-to-day activities, and the life of sociopolitical insti-
tutions and organizations have been "fixed" or have been made dependent
on those-in-power, and because State institutions do not carry out their
functions.
3.	Official corruption and high-handedness have flourished because the sys-
tem of controls over the government does not function. This has ulti-
mately severely harmed the interests of the masses.
Political life is characterized by the machinations of a group from which the
society at large is excluded. Not a single sociopolitical force is capable of bringing
meaningful pressure to bear on the New Order regime, much less of altering its
decisions or policies.
The New Order regime has paralyzed the capacity of our people to survive on
the basis of their own capacities, and as a result has driven the nation to the brink
of destruction!!
All these things have diluted our spirit as an independent people, as a people
who are resolute, highly principled, and prepared to work hard to live and develop
on the basis of our own strength. Our people are once again enchained by oppres-
sion and have lost their independent souls! !
Judges of the Court,
The way in which the New Order regime has structured power and carried out
upbuilding has jeopardized the future of the Indonesian nation. Absolute power
158159
has given birth to a corrupt regime. The future holds a trap created by foreign
debts and disaster as a result of the squandering of our natural wealth.
Meanwhile, upbuilding activities which rely on foreign loans, capital, and per-
sonnel have paralyzed Indonesians' innate capacities and creativity. Our nation
has become dependent on the capacities of other nations, consigning us to a new
colonialism.
The New Order1 2 Regime has paralyzed the capacity of our people to survive on
the basis of their own capacities, and as a result has driven the nation to the brink
of destruction!!
All these things have diluted our spirit as an independent people, as a people
who are resolute, highly principled, and prepared to work hard to live and develop
on the basis of our own strength. Our people are once again enchained by oppres-
sion and have lost their independent souls!!!!
This grievous situation has led the students to rise up to break the chains
of the Indonesian people's oppression in whatever form they take.
Observing these realities, the students can no longer bear not to act!! We are
too horrified and disgusted by the oppressive practices which have been going on
all this time! We are too angered by the way in which the rapacity of those-in-
power now has dashed our hopes for a better future for Indonesia!!
This is why the students are fighting!! This is why the students are rising
up to smash all forms of oppression and violence against the Indonesian people!!
The Students Are Propelled by History
Judges of the Court,
Probably the question will arise as to why must it be the students who rise up
to smash the rotten New Order regime? Why not the politicos who are ensconced in
the Parliament, the MPR, the Political Parties, and Golkar? Why not the intellec-
tuals or the public figures who are active in social organizations? Why...?
The students, and young people in general, have been propelled by Indonesian
history to take up the roles of pioneers of popular movements. All Indonesian pe-
muda2 will be propelled by history! They cannot refuse it! There is so much evi-
dence which testifies to the presence of students during every phase of [our] his-
tory. The students were there when the bonds of nationalism were formulated;
they were there when the proclamation of independence was at hand; they were
there when independence was in danger of being swallowed up by the PKI; they
were there when the nation was developing.. .and the students will always be there
when the nation is gripped by crisis!!
The people of Indonesia have endured a long history of suffering and oppres-
sion under Dutch colonialism. The greedy desire of the Dutch to monopolize the
market in raw materials led them to perpetrate acts of violence, to divide et impera
and to force the "inlanders"3 to work as contract coolies or unskilled laborers at low
1.	This paragraph and the one following are virtually exact repetitions of the two
on the previous page and have probably been interpolated by a printer's error.
2.	On pemuda, see above at Ch. 3, n. 1.
3.	Inlanders--Dutch colonial parlance for "natives.”160
pay. The Dutch were only interested in making the largest possible profits. They
had no concern for the lot of the inlanders and crushed their human dignity to the
lowest possible level. In Parahyangan and various other areas, starving people
were so skeletal they looked like jailangkung,* 4 tottering along the roads. As a re-
ward [for their efforts], the workers were clubbed and whipped in the indigo
fields, without payment enough to keep them alive. *
These conditions made the Indonesian pemuda rise up to oppose colonialism and
to fight for independence. The pemuda who studied in STOVIA,5 together with
other pemuda, founded the nationalist movement, Budi Utomo.6 In various cities
and regions, pemuda organizations eager to fight for Indonesia's independence
sprang up. Among them were Jong Java, Jong Sumatra, Jong Islamiten Bond, Per-
kumpulan Indonesia, Algemene Studi Group, Menteng 31, Prapatan, and so on.7
All of them were vehicles through which the pemuda-students extended the bonds
of nationalism. These bonds later provided us with the resources to rise up and
oppose Dutch colonialism.
In 1928, the pemuda formulated the Youth Oath, which [declared], we acknowl-
edge only one nation, one language, and one homeland: Indonesia. This phase of
history had great significance for the later formation of the independent and sov-
ereign unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.
* Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp. 27, 29, and 39.
4.	Jailangkung is a sort of puppet, used especially by children in various parts of
Java, for divinatory games. The puppet's head is usually made of half a coconut-
shell and the body of crossed sticks, over which a "dress" of floppy, coarse cloth
is draped. Addressed with the correct incantatory songs, the jailangkung, sus-
pended from a string, works rather like a ouija-board--spelling out answers to
questions by pointing to different letters in sequence. The reason why jailangkung
is used here as a simile for the exploited coolies of the Cultuurstelsel era and after
is, of course, that its body--nothing but two sticks under a piece of cloth--resem-
bles their emaciated frames.
5.	STOVIA = School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (School for the Training
of Native Doctors).
6.	Budi Utomo, formed in 1908, is officially regarded as the pioneer of the nation-
alist movement, and its founding is celebrated annually on May 20 as National
Awakening Day.
7.	This list of Dutch colonial-era pemuda organizations has some odd features.
Jong Java, usually regarded as the first youth organization, was formed as an
affiliate of Budi Utomo in 1915. Jong Sumatra (i.e., Jong Sumatranen Bond,
League of Young Sumatrans) was formed in 1917. Jong Islamiten Bond (i.e., Jong
Islamieten Bond, League of Young Muslims) was formed in 1925 by a breakway fac-
tion of Jong Java. Perkumpulan Indonesia must be an error for Perhimpunan Indo-
nesia (Indonesian Association), the militantly nationalist organization of Indonesians
studying in Holland in the 1920s and 1930s. Algemene Studi Group is an odd Anglo-
Indonesianization of Algemeene Studieclub (General Study Club), a nationalist study-
club formed by Sukarno in Bandung in 1926. Menteng 31 refers to the location of
the Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia (Dormitory of the New Generation of Indonesia),
set up by the Japanese military authorities early in the occupation, some of whose
members played important roles at the time of the Proclamation of Independence on
August 17, 1945. Prapatan refers to Prapatan 10, location of the Medical Students'
dormitory in Jakarta, which also produced some prominent pemuda militants at the
time of the Proclamation.161
When the war of independence broke out in 1945, it was the pemuda who formed
the backbone [of the struggle]. Bound together within the Tentara Pelajar, Bri-
gade Pelajar, TRIP, and so forth,* * 8 they fell upon the Dutch colonialists and drove
them out. It is not surprising that the historians call the 1945 revolution the "Pe-
muda Revolution."*9
The pemuda have likewise never been absent during major events in our state
life. Nor were the students absent when the Old Order fell and the New Order
rose in 1966.
Judges of the Court,
It was the historical facts of student involvement in various significant and de-
cisive events in Indonesian national life which propelled our awareness and awakened
us! These facts also show all of us that student involvement in the political world
is nothing new. Student politics are a normal phenomenon within the Indonesian
political tradition.
Student politics have become an extra-parliamentary force which will always
exercise social control over the running of the government and over state life.
Student politics do not cloak ambitions for power. Rather, they are spurred
by a desire to create a government which is democratic, honest, and clean. For
that reason student politics are oriented toward change which will improve our
lives and our political system.
The Intellectual Restlessness and Academic
Responsibilities of the Students
Judges of the Court,
We have seen how history has propelled students into involvement in the politi-
cal life of their country. Now the question arises as to what is the basis of the
students' political stance in their struggle to create the conditions described above?
Many aspects could be offered to answer this question, but I will describe just
one which is a natural trait of students as people who seek knowledge and strive
after truth.
A person who seeks truth begins by questioning something from a critical per-
spective. The search is characterized by his perpetually restless efforts to find
evidence, to look for relationships, to consider carefully the nature of his problem
and to formulate objective judgments. Students are trained as a matter of course
* George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, N.Y.,
Cornell University Press, 1970.
8.	These student military or paramilitary organizations of the Revolutionary period
are listed rather confusingly. Tentara Pelajar (TP--Student Army) was the main
paramilitary student organization in Central Java in the early part of the Revolu-
tion, while TRIP (Tentara Republik Indonesia--Pelajar, Student Army of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia) was TP's equivalent in East Java. Brigade Pelajar (Student Bri-
gade) presumably refers to Brigade XVII, into which elements of the TP and TRIP
were incorporated, later in the Revolution, under the government's rationalization
program.
9.	In fact, Professor Kahin does not refer to the 1945 Revolution as the "Pemuda
Revolution."162
to be perpetually restless and to doubt everything, so that they can then use their
mental capacities to analyze each phenomenon logically, systematically, and objec-
tively .
This trait is reinforced by the student's nature as a young person. Whether
he likes it or not, willingly or otherwise, his soul is always haunted by dreams of
a soaring future. It is always filled with a desire to correct things which are not
right. And it is always set afire by a spontaneous enthusiasm, by hatred for
abuses, and by a tendency to be antagonistic toward the status quo. Young people
are always set afire by idealism to achieve glory, and often underestimate how use-
ful strategy can be. They are often set afire by their radical attitude to look at
life as a totality. The best way to put it is: a person who is not radical at age 20
has no heart, while a person who is radical at age 40 has no brains.
This trait, which is ingrained in every student, is what produces the various
stances which the students have taken in response to the condition of their coun-
try, which is increasingly deteriorating and approaching destruction!
The students' critical and restless nature [leads them] to question all existing
defects. Indeed, it is their duty to question everything, in order to attain the
heights of knowledge that they are striving for. For this purpose, moreover, the
students have been armed with a weapon called academic freedom. Scientific free-
dom and freedom of expression are recognized and guaranteed by valid laws in this
country.* With these freedoms, it is hoped that every member of the University
community will be able to lay bare all the secrets of scientific knowledge in order
to put them at the service of society.
Judges of the Court,
These rights are additionally confirmed in the ITB statute which serves as the
ITB's "Constitution." It states:
On the basis of the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila, and working within
the framework of the Three Duties10 of the Universities, and directed* 11 only
toward truth illuminated by conscience and toward the effort to advance the
thought and the well-being of the nation in harmony..........t
The ITB holds academic ethics in high esteem and always endeavors to create
an environment of scientific freedom and of academic freedom which is mature
and responsible.............!
The ITB makes every effort to discover and disseminate truth through accepted
scientific methods in education, research, and social service. +
This clearly describes the students' position in the universities. They have
the duty to investigate and explicate things strictly on the basis of truth.12 In
* Law No. 22/1961, on Higher Education,
t Statutes of ITB , Preamble.
+ Statutes of ITB, Article... [sic]
10.	The Three Duties (Tri Dharma) are teaching, research, and service to society.
11.	An unsatisfactory translation of berkiblat, which literally means "facing to-
wards Mecca."
12.	Kebenaran covers the meanings of both "truth" and "right" (in the moral
sense).163
short, all actions taken by the academic civitas13 meet [these criteria]:
1.	They are based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.
2.	They are directed only toward truth illuminated by conscience.
3.	They are aimed at improving national life or at serving the public interest.
4.	They are carried out in accord with accepted scientific methods, meaning
they must be systematic, logical, and objective.
In implementing this statute, the Rectors, who hold the highest position of re-
sponsibility within the ITB, take steps to ensure that the ITB academic civitas does
not deviate from its provisions. Rectors have the right and the duty to stop all
activities which they find to be in conflict with the statute.
Judges of the Court,
The Public Prosecutor's charges and allegations that the Declaration of Position
and the White Book contain insults are really ludicrous. As I have already clearly
explained, before the Declaration of Position and the White Book were circulated,
the ITB Student Council first submitted them to the ITB's Leadership Council,
which is directly headed by the Rector.
Thus the Public Prosecutor has insolently bypassed the academic authority of
the ITB Leaders to evaluate the Declaration of Position and the White Book.
Everything which was distilled from the students' observations and decanted
into [our] various declarations and other statements always satisfied the [criteria]
outlined above. Therefore it is quite incredible that they have become the basis
for prosecution.
All of this only illustrates how the Public Prosecutor, who has had a University
education, has in fact never grasped the meaning of scholarship. Scholarship is
characterized by firm adherence to convictions arrived at through use of scientific
methods. Scholars are not afraid to face the fact that their opinions turn out to be
unpopular with those-in-power or are even in conflict with the ambitions of those-
in-power. A true scholar, meaning one who has not come by his degree under
false pretenses or merely by attending lectures, does not need to hide his opinions
out of fear that he will be "dealt with"!
Those-in-power are naturally apt to suppress people whose opinions are at
odds with their ambitions. There are plenty of examples, ranging from Socrates,
who was forced to drink poison; Omar Kayyam, who was banished by his king;
Copernicus, who was denounced by the Church authorities.............down to
Mochtar Lubis, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Ismail Suny, and others in Indonesia
who have been imprisoned by the Suharto regime for expressing opinions in con-
flict with its ambitions!!
If people are not allowed to hold differing opinions, and if they are not allowed
to offer criticism, the resulting autocratic behavior [on the part of those-in-power]
will lead to the breakdown of civilization! Any government which does not harbor
sinister intentions of destroying its people must be willing to accept criticism, be-
cause in a society's life such "criticism" is like bitter medicine. It does not taste
good, but it is highly beneficial. The New Order regime, by being unwilling to
accept criticism, as is now the case, is calling its good intentions into doubt.
13. Civitas (perhaps "citizenry")--a curious residue, by no means unique, of the
antiquarian Latinisms of Dutch and Dutch-colonial university nomenclature.164
The New Order regime, which likes to make a big noise about how it is pre-
pared to accept criticism, in fact responds to criticism the same way other authori-
tarian regimes do. Those-in-power always say: criticism must be constructive,
but that statement in itself indicates that they do not understand what criticism is.
They claim that the criticism leveled by the students is not constructive because it
only sees the negative side of things. Students are then labeled as people who
have discredited the government and insulted the head of state and institutions of
public power because they have criticized them. What does it mean to be a critic?
Judges of the Court,
By definition, one who is a critic always calls attention to anomalies in a critical
manner and does not praise the positive side of things, because the primary func-
tion of a critic is to encourage people to notice things which are strange. By ex-
posing anomalies, the critic automatically has a constructive intent. * The objective
of someone who holds the opinion that a viewpoint or an action is inappropriate is
to make it possible for that viewpoint or action to be rectified. t
Thus the question, or allegation, of why the Students’ Vow, the Declaration of
Position and the White Book all contain only the anomalous or negative aspects of
the present condition of our country is already answered. The Declaration of Posi-
tion and the White Book were indeed intended as criticism, both of Suharto in his
role as head of the executive, and of the state apparatus and institutions which do
not work the way they are supposed to!
The Suharto regime should be grateful to the students, who have offered so
many criticisms free of charge! These criticisms can show the directions in which
improvements must be made. The Suharto regime will be destroyed if it is sur-
rounded solely by sycophantic cockroaches who are only interested in making sure
the boss is happy [ABS] and who always flatter him even when conditions are
wretched. Those who praise rottenness and who silence criticism are the ones who
should be dragged into court!
People like the Public Prosecutor, if they are not able to prove that the criti-
cism leveled by the students is not based on truth, or are not able to offer other
evidence to refute the evidence presented by the students, should be dragged
into court.
Judges of the Court,
The above discussion clearly shows that the students' political stance is based
on a perspective produced by a systematic, logical, and objective formulation of
the way things are. It is a political stance which springs from honesty and the
students' academic responsibilities. It is characterized by a firm moral resolve to
uphold truth and to try to eliminate pernicious values. The students have focused
on critically evaluating each situation and phenomenon as it develops, identifying
the problems involved, and then struggling [to solve] them, for the benefit of
society.
* "Dalam Setiap Masyarakat Kritik Mempunyai Tempat," Kompas, April 9, 1977.
tlbid.165
The Position of the Student Movement
Judges of the Court,
The Suharto regime has stunted the meaning of politics by claiming that in prac-
tical terms only Political Parties and Golkar have the right to engage in political
activity. Participation in politics is regarded merely as a mechanism within the
machine of power which has been assembled during the time the New Order regime
has been enthroned. Its purpose is strictly to channel restlessness, meaning that
the formal organizations for that participation act merely as safety valves within
the political machinery and have no influence on the running of the government it-
self. Thus, participation in politics is just like shitting,14 with the Political Par-
ties and Golkar serving as the W.C. and the Parliament and the MPR as the "septic
tank."15 It is regarded only as an activity for channeling opinions and conveying
restlessness. But as for paying any attention to these opinions or that restless-
ness, or allowing them then to influence decision making or the running of the
government, that is another matter. This is more or less how the logic of those-
in-power goes. According to this logic, all activity outside the mechanisms of the
political machine which has been set up is considered evil, and therefore must be
banned.
The New Order regime conceives of politics strictly in terms of formal organiza-
tions. Once Political Parties and Golkar exist, once the MPR and Parliament are
there, that is considered sufficient. Meanwhile, their essential purpose is ignored.
The question of whether the Political Parties-Golkar have fulfilled their essential
purpose as political organizations by unifying the power belonging to each citizen
for the purpose of governing the State, is never given a second thought.
Have the political organizations already fulfilled their essential purpose by
organizing power (machtvorming) in a democratic manner? The New Order regime
has not even touched on this question; indeed, efforts to organize power or mobil-
ize forces are always suspect as efforts to conspire or to seize power from the New
Order regime. To this day neither the Political Parties nor Golkar have fulfilled
their essential purpose as political organizations the way they should in a demo-
cratic country. Such a situation calls for the emergence of an alternative force
which is capable of voicing society's real wishes. In democratic countries, when
the "parlemen 'gedongan",1G breaks down, a "parliament of the streets" usually
appears. In essence this "parliament of the streets" satisfies the political criteria
of giving concrete expression to the people's will in a democratic way. When the
New Order rose in 1966, the popular will, then known by the name Tritura,17 was
channeled by just these means. So when the New Order regime today for all intents
and purposes bans extra-parliamentary forces from involvement in politics, it is in
fact betraying its own history. The New Order was brought into being by extra-
parliamentary forces in the form of demonstrations, delegations, and various decla-
rations calling for improvements in the situation. Only then did the Gotong-Royong
Parliament, which Sukarno had lulled into a sound sleep, come to its senses and
respond to the pressure exerted by those extra-parliamentary forces.
14.	Here Heri deliberately uses the coarse word berak.
15.	Septic-tank appears in single quotation marks in the text, unglossed.
16.	Gedongan is a Javanism, meaning (a house) built of brick or stone, as opposed
to wood, i.e. , an upper-class or institutional edifice.
17.	On Tritura, see above at Ch. 3, n. 22.166
In a normal situation, where all political institutions and organizations are able
to function the way they are supposed to, extra-parliamentary forces are, of course,
not necessary. But in a situation where the political institutions and organizations
are blocked, if alternative forces do not emerge, the result will be anarchy, because
the people's will, and their frustration, will be channeled into terrorism, turmoil,
and other forms of destructiveness.
Judges of the Court,
From this perspective we can readily see where the student movement, or stu-
dent aksi, has actually stood all this time. In short, it can be said that the students
go down into the political arena when society is suffering from acute anomie.* The
students' role in society is not limited strictly to offering criticism or exercising
social control; they can play an even more extensive role as a political force capable
of stimulating social change. +
The question of the students' involvement in the political life of their nation
comes up in almost every country, not just in Indonesia. For purposes of compari-
son, I will describe what took place in Thailand, our neighbor. The political situa-
tion in the Thai kingdom before the Thai students rose up on October 10, 1973
could be summarized as follows:
1.	The King was not carrying out the functions he was supposed to, in the
sense that he had no control over the government.
2.	The Kit[t]ikachorn regime controlled the economy through its system of
"saudara-relasi" 18 with Japanese support.
3.	Unemployment was high, especially among the educated work force. A
university graduate had little chance of obtaining work commensurate
with his education.
4.	Power was in the hands of the military.
5.	Corruption was rampant.
On October 10, 1973 the university and high-school student demonstrations
broke out. The students demanded:
1.	The release of 13 prominent figures (5 students, 2 professors, and 6
political leaders) who had been arrested by the police on October 6 on
charges of holding a "secret meeting" to organize mass demonstrations
against the government.
2.	The drafting of a new, permanent constitution as quickly as possible be-
cause the Kit[tjikachorn government already had been governing for
two years on the basis of a provisional constitution.
* Arbi Sanit, "Mahasiswa dan Angkatan Muda Indonesia: Kekuatan Politik Anomie,"
in Mochtar Mas'oed and Colin MacAndrews, ed., Perbandingan Sistem Politik, Yog-
yakarta, Gajah Mada University Press [??], 1978.
+ Dr. Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono, Perbedaan Antara Pemimpin Dan Aktivis Dalam
Gerakan Protes Mahasiswa, Jakarta, Bulan Bintang, 1978.
18. Saudara-relasi means something like "nepotism and personal connections/
cliques."167
The Relations of the Kittikachorn Government to the
Demonstrations and to the Demonstrators',Demands Were:
1.	In a meeting with an 11-person student delegation on October 11 (Thurs-
day), Vice-Premier Marshal Prapass Charusatiara promised a [new] con-
stitution within 20 months but refused to release the 13 leaders who had
been arrested.
2.	On Friday, October 12, 1973, the government gave in and offered to
release the 13 leaders who had been arrested, but the offer was rejected
and the demonstrations intensified.
3.	On Saturday, October 13, 1973, the government mobilized armed troops
using live bullets. The demonstrators put up resistance and were shot
down right and left (there were 400 casualties, according to "NEWSWEEK"),
but they succeeded in seizing some guns and occupying several police sta-
tions .
4.	The government announced a curfew, which the demonstrators ignored.
5.	On Sunday, October 14, 1973, the (Kittikachorn) government resigned.
After he came to power, the new Prime Minister, Professor Sanya Thamasak,
proceeded to form a new cabinet with only 2 military members and promised a new,
permanent constitution within 6 months. Soon after the new cabinet was formed
the demonstrations subsided, and the university and high-school students helped
direct traffic because the police had not yet resumed their normal functions.
This description of the "student revolution" in Thailand illustrates how an al-
ternative force--in this case it happened to be the students--comes into operation
when a system of government is regarded as not functioning or as no longer being
capable of fulfilling the wishes of its people. It also clearly shows that student
politics do not cloak political ambitions to seize power. When those-in-power them-
selves have the will to make changes to improve the situation, the students will
join them in the effort. But as soon as those-in-power begin to play dirty pool,
the students will sock it to them again!! 19
Judges of the Court,
If we reexamine the events in our own country and compare them with those in
Thailand, several similarities will be readily apparent. Take, for example, the way
the students rose up in 1966. At that time Sukarno was running wild, forcing all
state institutions and the lives of the people to be fully "guided," meaning guided
by Sukarno himself. The economy was in complete disarray. On top of that Sukar-
no turned out to have no clear stance with respect to the September 30th Movement
[G30S]/PKI revolt. For these reasons the students launched a series of demonstra-
tions to make these demands:
1.	Dissolve the PKI!
2.	Retool the hundred-minister cabinet!
3.	Reduce prices!
These demands were known as Tritura, or the people's three demands. In the
end Sukarno had to step down and answer for all the existing rottenness. Sukarno
19. The phrases main mata serong2an and menggenjotnya have a slangy flavor
which the translation has tried to capture.168
issued Super Semar (the March 11, 1966 Order) to Suharto, which subsequently
became a lethal weapon for dissolving the PKI, normalizing state life, and strength-
ening Suharto's own position. The students' aksi simultaneously subsided.
But later, toward the end of the 1960s, after Suharto had come to power and
it was obvious that corruption and violations of human rights were rampant, the
students resumed their aksi. These took the form of the Rene Conrad Affair, the
Anti-Corruption Movement20.. .and so forth. The students have never felt bound
to the New Order regime; they are only bound to the New Order's ideals.
The Indonesian Student Movement on the
Eve of the 1978 General Session of the MPR
Judges of the Court,
In a country which embraces democracy, the people have the right to take an
interest in all political events and to express their opinions and views. Basically
a political system is set up as a manifestation of the unified power which belongs
to the people. For that reason the people have a vital interest in who runs their
country's government and how it is run.
The 1978 General Session of the MPR was clearly a political event of enormous
importance to all Indonesians, because it was the culmination of a political process
which had been going on since the previous year, namely, when the General Elec-
tion was held. This General Session was also significant because it was to evaluate
the official accounting presented by the President, formulate the GBHN, and elect
a new President. In the context of evaluating how well the President had carried
out his duties, all of the Indonesian people had the right to speak out and express
their opinions. The MPR was supposed to listen to opinions from all strata of soci-
ety in order to take them into consideration when making its own evaluation, and
not base that evaluation solely on the official report which the President delivered
before the assembly. At such times, food [input] in the form of information, opin-
ions, and attitudes from all strata of society was naturally essential.
A description of a General Session of the MPR in this democratic country should
depict a representative /consultative institution which is within reach of the public.
The MPR should be an institution which specifically reserves attention and time for
opinions and attitudes of society, especially on such important matters. The ques-
tions of the GBHN and the President affect the well-being of the entire society.
It was in this context that the students, aroused by the sight of the wretched
condition of their country, launched their movement. Two key issues closely con-
nected to the upcoming 1978 General Session of the MPR figured prominently in the
student movement of late 1977 and early 1978, namely:
First:	the issue of National Leadership, which was closely connected with
the delivery of the Presidential Accounting and with the election of
a new President, and
20. Rene Conrad (i.e., Rene Louis Coenraad) was an ITB student killed by stu-
dents of the Sukabumi Police Academy on October 6, 1970, after a Police Academy-
ITB football match had been called off because of fights among the crowd. On his
way home on his motorcycle, Coenraad was taunted by students of the Police Acade-
my and, when he stopped, was shot in the back and later dumped at the police
station. His murder became a cause celebre. Gerakan Anti Korupsi (Anti-Corrup-
tion Movement) was a Jakarta and Bandung student campaign launched just prior
to the 1971 general elections.169
Second: the issue of National Upbuilding, which was closely connected with
the formulation of the GBHN.
The first theme was featured in the students' demands with regard to various de-
fects in the Suharto regime's actions and style of leadership. Among those brought
up during the proceedings of the Student Trials were:
1.	[That the students] do not trust and do not want Suharto to be President
of the Republic of Indonesia again;
2.	That the MPR call a special session to request the President/National
Leadership to answer for deviations from the 1945 Constitution and the
Pancasila.
The second theme was featured in [accounts of] the various consequences of the
upbuilding program and in sharp criticism of the upbuilding strategy. Among the
materials brought up during the proceedings of the Student Trials were:
1.	The formulations of the All-Indonesia assembly of Student Councils and
Student Senates, which contained various diagnoses of the Suharto Re-
gime's Deviations from the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila in the
political, economic, social, and cultural fields.
2.	The White Book of the 1978 students' struggle, which described various
kinds of rottenness and their causes in the political, economic, and cul-
tural fields, along with indicators of the failure of the Suharto regime.
Judges of the Court,
In view of the themes which were taken up by the student movement in 1978,
the New Order Regime's prosecution of the students truly makes no sense, because
such evaluations and declarations of position clearly fall within the bounds of pro-
priety. Up until the very moment before the students were arrested, the Chairman
of the MPR himself21 still regarded the plain and simple Declaration of Position by
the students of ITB as something proper.*
Indeed, anyone who has ever been involved in politics would certainly accept
the students' actions in late 1977 and early 1978 as something proper.
In order to provide the clearest possible standard of comparison, I will give
some examples of statements made by various student groups on the eve of the
1967 General Session of the MPR:
1.	KASI22--North Sumatra:
Demands that the Provisional MPR immediately call a session to dismiss
Ir. Sukarno from all state offices.
2.	KAMI23--Medan:
Demands that Bung Karno be Mahmilub-ed.
* Kompas, January 18, 1978.
21.	I.e., Adam Malik, now Indonesia's Vice-President.
22.	KASI = Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia (Indonesian Academics' Action
Front).
23.	KAMI--see Ch. 4, n. 87.170
3.	KAPI2lf--Greater Jakarta:
No longer has confidence in Bung Karno as President and urges the Provi-
sional MPR immediately to call an emergency Session to review its decisions
in regard to Bung Karno's position as president....
4.	Regional Legislature25--South Kalimantan:
Urges the Provisional MPR to remove President Sukarno from the Office
of President.
5.	Gotong-Royong [Regional] Legislature--Aceh:
Urges that the Provisional MPR immediately convene to remove Bung Karno
from the Presidency of the Republic of Indonesia.*
Even Suharto himself, who at that time was Commander of KOPKAMTIB /Executor of
MPRS Decision No. IX/1966, accused President Sukarno of criminal activity:
a.	With the motive or purpose of safeguarding the political line as explained
under [point] no. 1, the President, who, according to our sense of justice
and truth, should take legal action against the ringleaders of the G30S/PKI,
has allowed them to remain at liberty. He has even implemented a policy
which indirectly favors the G30S/PKI and protects the G30S/PKI leaders.
b.	This policy in point of fact indicates that a penal offense (strafbaar feit),
has been committed, even though it was aimed primarily at safeguarding
political policies rather than at aiding the G30S/PKI.
If we look closely, both the statements made by the Regional Legislatures and the
Aksi units and those made by Suharto himself at that time are far more "drastic" in
tone and language than anything the students said on the eve of the 1978 General
Session of the MPR.
Have the students today ever accused Suharto of criminal activity, the way
Suharto accused President Sukarno of criminal activity in 1967?
Have the students requested that the MPR drag Suharto before a Military Tri-
bunal because of his failures all this time?
Judges of the Court,
The students have been far more polite than Suharto or the Regional Legisla-
tures and the Aksi units were on the eve of the 1967 General Session of the Provi-
sional MPR. All this while the students have only requested a political accounting
for the various defects which have bred widespread restlessness in society. The
students have never requested that Suharto be dragged before a Mahmilub. In-
stead, the students have requested the MPR to ask for an accounting from the
President. Is it not in fact the MPR's duty to ask for an accounting from the
* Laporan MPRS 1967-1972, [Jakarta] MPRS, 1972.
24.	KAPI = Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Indonesia (Indonesian High-school Students'
Action Front).
25.	A translation of the text's DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah). Neither
this term, nor the one given below for another provincial legislature of the same
era (DPRGR, i.e., Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong-Royong, Mutual Cooperation
Parliament) is correct. Both should be DPRD-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah
Gotong-Royong, Mutual Cooperation Regional Legislature).171
President? And is it not the students' place as members of the general public to
make requests of their representative institutions, like Parliament or the MPR?
There is no adequate justification for accusing the students of being insulting.
If the public prosecutor were to make an honest assessment, the one who has ac-
tually been insulting is Suharto himself, namely, when he openly accused President
Sukarno of criminal activity. If the public prosecutor were honest, [he would say
that] it is not me or other students who should be dragged before this court, but
Suharto.
But is that what the Office of the Public Prosecutor has done? By taking the
students to court, the New Order Regime has actually repudiated its own history.
The Students’ Responsibilities
Judges of the Court,
The Student movement has passed through many eras. It is a movement which
is always present, flowing through our national history, constantly striving to raise
our state and national life to an ever more perfect level, without serving as a ve-
hicle for personal ambitions.
Today, before a court which represents the Law in our beloved Indonesia, I,
along with 30 other Student leaders throughout the country, stand to answer for
the thought and actions of the Students in their efforts to achieve a better state
life for Indonesia in the future. I have done all of these things with a sincere
heart, with pure thoughts and with my great love for my Indonesian homeland. I
have chosen Indonesia as the country where I have committed my life and which has
given my life its meaning. I have no words of regret for the love I have given to
[my] homeland.
The same is true for the Indonesian Students in general. This trial is a place
for us--the youth--who are growing up with fire in our hearts, to unburden them,
and to be constantly ready to assume our responsibilities.CHAPTER XI
HISTORY IS ON THE STUDENTS' SIDE! !
Judges of the Court,
For three days I have read my defense, stating what I firmly believe to be the
truth. I have also conveyed my hopes that the law will be upheld as a pengayom1
of society in this country!
I have studied history and I believe in history! History has fostered a strong
faith within me that truth will ultimately come out the victor! It has taught me to
consider life not only in terms of that which is visible right now, but to peer
through the walls of time which mark off each era. Therefore what we do today
will also be judged by the march of history!
I have stated what I firmly believe to be the truth, and history will ultimately
judge whether my convictions are correct or incorrect. Nor can the decision handed
down by the Court and the public prosecutor escape the same judgment.
I have stated my views before this court, and will continue to defend them until
there is proof or conflicting evidence which demolishes the basis for those views!
I will not change my opinions simply because of pressure or the threat of punish-
ment . I stand before this Court to prove the truth, to uncover it, together with
the public prosecutor, the defense lawyers, and especially the Judges of the Court.
I do not seek pity or a lighter sentence. What I seek is truth.
Judges of the Court,
This is where I stand! Now it is up to the Court to evaluate my views and to
indicate where the Court itself stands. Whether the Court stands where I do, or
takes an opposing position, is not my concern, since we will each answer for our
positions before the tribunal of history and in God's court in the hereafter! Though
our paths may diverge, we must bear in mind that our convictions as free and re-
sponsible individuals, with all their consequences, will always stay with us.
From history I have learned how truth carries consequences [with it] for those
who defend it. Truth is too sacred to be bought and sold or prostituted. It cannot
be traded away for suffering in a prison cell or even for our very lives! From his-
tory I have learned how it is the tradition of the intellectuals to defend the truth.
Even though the fire was lit, ready to consume him alive, and the stench of death
had spread its claws of terror, Galileo stood fast by his opinion:
"THE EARTH IS ROUND!!"2
Bandung, June 9, 1979
HERI AKHMADI
1.	On pengayom[an], see above Ch. 2, n. 23.
2.	Galileo was tried by the Inquisition in 1633 for his views on the Copernican
theory of the solar system. He was never put to the stake, but spent the last
years of his life under house arrest.
172APPENDIX I
A 'PARTIAL' LISTING OF THE WEALTH OF SUHARTO'S FAMILY
Mercu Buana, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 14, June 13, 1967.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 137/1968.
Capitalization:
Shareholders:
Chairman of the Board:
Executive:
Rp. 1,000,000.
Probosutedjo (full brother)
Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo [sister-in-law]
Probosutedjo
Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo
2.	Plastic Universal, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 38, January 11, 1967.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 140/1968.
Capitalization:
Shareholder:
Director:
Rp. 2,000,000.
Probosutedjo
Probosutedjo
3.	Teguh Sri Kurnia, Inc., established by Notary Deed on July 29, 1970.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 308/1970.
Capitalization:	Rp. 50,000,000.
Shareholders:	Probosutedjo
Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo
Managing Director:	Probosutedjo
Executive:	Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo
4.	Kondang Keutaran, Inc. , established by Notary Deed No. 8, July 2, 1971.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 436/1971.
Capitalization:	Rp. 10,000,000
Shareholders:	Probosutedjo
R. M. Soemoharmanto (father of Mrs. Tien Suharto)
Chairman of the Board:	R. M. Soemoharmanto
Chief Executive:	Ibnu Hartomo [younger brother of Mrs. Suharto]
Executive:	Probosutedjo
5.	Rejo Sari Bumi, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 41, November 25, 1971.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 97/1972.
Capitalization:
Shareholders:
Chairman of the Board:
Director:
Chief Executive:
Executive
Rp. 10,000,000.
Siti Hardiyanti (daughter of Suharto)
Sigit Harjoyudanto (son of Suharto)
Probosutedjo
R. M. Soemoharmanto
Sigit Harjoyudanto Suharto
R. M. Soemoharmanto
Probosutedjo
Siti Hardiyanti Suharto
6.	Multi France Motor, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 38, May 17, 1972.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 591/1973.
173174
Capitalization:	Rp. 500,000,000
Shareholder:	Probosutedjo
Executive President:	Probosutedjo
7. Kedawung Subur, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 22, April 6, 1973.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 103/1974.
Capitalization:	Rp. 2,000,000,000.
Shareholder:	Probosutedjo
Chairman of the Board:	Probosutedjo
8. Buana Estate, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 33, September 8, 1972.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 649/1973.
Capitalization:
Shareholders:
Chairman of the Board:
Director:
Chief Executive:
Executive:
Rp. 1,000,000,000
Probosutedjo
Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo
Sigit Harjoyudanto Suharto
Siti Hardiyanti Suharto
Bambang Trimulyono Suharto
Soemarsono
Soedharsono
Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo
Probosutedjo
Sigit [Harjoyudanto] Suharto
9.
Mercu Buana Chemical, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 44, September
25, 1972.
[Source] Berita Negara
Capitalization:
Shareholders:
Chairman of the Board:
Chief Executive:
No. 533/1973.
Rp. 1,000,000,000.
Probosutedjo
Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo
Probosutedjo
Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo
10.	Mercu Buana Contractors, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 65, Septem-
ber, 21, 1972.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 764/1973.
Capitalization:
Shareholders:
Chairman of the Board:
Chief Executive:
Rp. 500,000,000.
Probosutedjo
Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo
Probosutedjo
Mrs. Ratmani Probosutedjo
11.	Bank Ramayana, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 2, September 4, 1967.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 308/1970.
Chief Executive:	Probosutedjo
12.	Hanurata, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 9, October 3, 1972.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 320/1975.
Capitalization:	Rp. 100,000,000.
Executive President:	Probosutedjo
13.	Waringin, Inc., established by Notary Deed, March 7, 1968.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 189/1969.175
Capitalization:
Shareholders:
First Director:
Executive:
Rp. 30,000,000
Sudwikatmono (foster-brother)
Bambang Trimulyono Suharto (son)
Sudwikatmono
Bambang Trimulyono Suharto
14.	Bogasari, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 44, May 19, 1969.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 258/1970.
Capitalization:
Shareholder:
First Director:
Rp. 500,000,000.
Sudwikatmono (among others)
Sudwikatmono
15.	Waringin Kencana, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 33, December 21,
1969.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 275/1970.
Capitalization:
Shareholders:
First Director:
Executive:
Rp. 380,000,000.
Sudwikatmono
Bambang Trimulyono Suharto
Sudwikatmono
Bambang Trimulyono Suharto
16.	Ariomon, Inc., established by Notary Deed on June 26, 1973.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 768/1973.
Capitalization:
Shareholder:
Chairman of the Board:
Rp. 10,000,000
Sudwikatmono
Sudwikatmono
17.	RUMPUN, Inc. (Plantations, Trade, and Transport), established by Notary
Deed on June 9, 1967, controls the following plantations: Samudra Rubber,
Dharmokadonah Rubber, Kaliguntung Coffee, Kemuning Tea, Mediri Tea,
Cluak Aglayuti rubber and coconuts, Gondoroso rubber, Jatipablengan
coffee, Indonesia Tobacco, and Ketandan Tobacco.
[Source] Berita Negara no. 1/1968.
Shareholders:	Mrs. Winarni Soeromo [wife of Welfare Coordinating
Minister General Soerono]
Mrs. Isriati Munadi [wife of former Governor of
Central Java Maj. Gen. Munadi]
Mrs. Suhartinah ["Tien"] Suharto, and 18 others.
18.
19.
All these plantations are former Dutch plantations.
Hotel Kartika Chandra, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 7, February
13, 1970.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 87/1970.
Capitalization:
Shareholders:
Chairman of the Board:
Executive President:
Rp. 500,000,000
The Kartika Jaya Foundation
Sukamdani Gitosardjono
Mrs. Murtini Suryohadiputro [wife of General
Suryo]
Mrs. Suhartinah Suharto
Gunung Ngadeg Jaya, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 2, June 8, 1971.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 415/1971.Capitalization:
Shareholders:
Rp. 50,000,000
Bernard Ibnu Hardoyo (brother of Mrs. Suhartinah
Suharto)
the late [R. M.] Soemoharmanto
Chairman of the Board:	Bernard Ibnu Hardoyo
Kabelmetal Indonesia, Inc., established by Notary Deed No. 42 on January 19,
1972.
[Source] Berita Negara No. 505/1972.
Capitalization:	Rp. 1,058,400,000/US [sic] £2,800,000
[US$1,700,000]
Shareholders:	[Gunung] Ngadeg Jaya Inc.
Kabel and Metallwerke G.
Chairman of the Board:	Bernard Ibnu HardoyoAPPENDIX II
A COMPARISON OF FOREIGN DEBTS
"The	New Order"		"The	Old OrderTT*	
(through	December 1977)		(through December 1965)		
Country	Debt	O o	Country	Debt	o o
	[in dollars]			[in dollars]	
Communist:			Communist:		
USSR	769,990,000	4.87	USSR	990,000,000	41.
Yugoslavia	239,856,000	1.52	Yugoslavia	115,000,000	4.
Poland	97,073,000	0.61	Poland	100,000,000	4.
C zechoslovakia	69,110,000	0.44	C zechoslovakia	77,000,000	3.
East Germany	56,863,000	0.36	East Germany	72,000,000	3.
Hungary	17,239,000	0.11	Hungary	19,000,000	0.
China (PRC)	46,580,000	0.29	China (PRC)	13,000,000	0.
Bulgaria	2,073,000	0.01	Rumania	16,000,000	0.
Others			Others	2,000,000	0.
Total	1,312,676,000	8.30	Total	1,404,000,000	59.
America-West Europe:			America-West Europe:		
USA	3,326,555,000	21.04	USA	179,000,000	7.
West Germany	1,238,132,000	7.83	West Germany	122,000,000	5.
France	772,083,000	4.89	France	115,000,000	4.
Italy	83,043,000	0.53	Italy	91,000,000	3.
England	232,276,000	1.47	England/Hong Kong 42,000,000		1.
The Netherlands 945,248,000		5.98	The Netherlands	28,000,000	1.
Switzerland	15,316,000	0.10	Switzerland	3,000,000	0.
Austria	661,000	0.006			
Belgium	206,363,000	1.30	Others	7,000,000	0.
Canada	294,236,000	1.86			
Denmark	69,244,000	0.44			
New Zealand	3,570,000	0.02			
Australia	6,842,000	0.04			
Norway	95,729,000	0.06			
Total	7,289,299,000	46.09	Total	587,000,000	27.
Asia:			Asia:		
Japan	4,139,684,000	26.18	Japan	231,000,000	9.
Pakistan	12,056,000	0.08	Pakistan	20,000,000	0.
India	12,056,000	0.08	India	10,000,000	0.
Abu Dhabi	14,440,000	0.09			
Taiwan	9,867,000	0.06			
Iran	200,000,000	1.26			
Kuwait	31,419,000	0.20			
Saudi Arabia	120,856,000	0.76			
South Korea	45,740,000	0.29			
Singapore	42,182,000	0.27			
Total	4,722,420,000	29.86	Total	261,000,000	11.
98
87
24
26
05
80
55
87
08
50
46
17
87
85
78
18
12
29
72
79
84
42
05
177178
Africa:
Egypt	3,344,000	0.02
Tanzania	547,000	0.01
Total	3,891,000	0.03
International IMF	Bodies:	
IBRD	1,414,681,000	8.94
ADB	498,716,000	3.15
IDA	572,586,000	2.99
Total	2,485,983,000	15,72
Grand Total	15,814,269,000	100.00
Africa:
Egypt	4,000,000	0.16
Total	4,000,000	0.16
International IMF	Bodies: 102,000,000	4.32
Total	102,000,000	4.32
Grand Total	2,358,000,000	100.00
* Source: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic
Studies, No. 4, June 1966.