cr 1 ‘ fact Boeeti areca attarcs ears! _ Cela teh tite acts ees Bane are aa aloes Dien niet ist ea ea Tear Paheeanonanns rae Sa S pale eaters ae A ea mie neoar rae 1 Sebo a ere Seas 4 aT Se aot ae ae ne Brel a : x easter ean anu eae acini me eet at ean iia Sep AGAHG rs Dat th ce ees a ie o ia any ak eee : aa ees ce eee of ite Ari He Bis is An e beady) ney KG 60] May NOY CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY THIS BOOK IS ONE OF A | COLLECTION MADE BY BENNO LOEWY 1854-1919 AND BEQUEATHED TO CORNELL UNIVERSITY Sie as inka ee catk: Cornell University Library RC 601.M44 1868 ‘ hysiology and pathology of mind / il ll | 3 1924 012 218 610 an DATE DUE GAYLORD THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF MIND. THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF MIND. BY HENRY MAUDSLEY, M.D. Lonp. PHYSICIAN TO THE WEST LONDON HOSPITAL 5 LECTURER ON INSANITY AT ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL MEDICAL SCHOOL; FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON; HONORARY MEMBER OF THE MEDIOO-PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF PARIS, AND OF THE IMPERJAL SOCIETY OF PHYSICIANS OF VIENNA; FORMERLY RESIDENT PHYSICIAN OF THE MANCHESTER ROYAL LUNATIC HOSPITAL, ETC. SECOND EDITION, REVISED. London : MACMILLAN AND CO. 1868. Ath [The Right of Translation and Reproduction is reserved. ] RC CO! mad L¥ GY a OLLALY j. LONDON: R, CLAY, SON, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS, BREAD STREET HILL. yee yi iesia yin 2 oyiga RL Vee Pa PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. (PRERE are only two observations which it seems necessary to make by way of preface to this edition. The first is, that it has not been my conscious desire or aim throughout the work to discard entirely the psychological method of inquiry into mental phenomena, although the earnest advocacy of the physiological method has, naturally perhaps, led some readers to assume such a design. Hitherto, it must be remembered, the latter has hardly had any place, the former having been exclusively employed, in the study of mind. Now it is obviously impossible to set forth the fruitfulness and the rich promise of the physio- logical method, and to elevate it to its rightful position, without exposing the shortcomings and the barrenness of the psycho- logical method, and degrading it to a lower rank than that which it has unjustly usurped. The second observation is, that this work may, by virtue of its plan and mode of execution, rightly claim to be judged, not in parts, but as a whole. Statements which in one place may appear too absolute, or entirely unwarranted, will have their justification, or the show of it, at any rate, in other parts of the book. It may not be amiss, then; to allege that an adequate criticism of the First Part cannot be made without some consideration of the Second Part; and that in like manner the study of the Second or Pathological Part cannot be undertaken to the best advantage without a previous study of the First or Physiological Part. This edition has been carefully revised, with the view of removing some inaccuracies, and contains additional matter, for the purpose of elucidating certain obscurities, which occurred in the first edition. An index has also been added for con- venience of reference. Hanwe tt, W. March 16:h, 1868. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. HE aim which I have had in view throughout this work has been twofold: first, to treat of mental phenomena from a physiological rather than from a metaphysical point of view ; and, secondly, to bring the manifold instructive in- stances presented by the unsound mind to bear upon the interpretation of the obscure problems of mental science. Indeed it has been my desire to do what I could in order to put a happy end to the “inauspicious divorce” between the Physiology and Pathology of Mind, and to effect a reconciliation between these two branches of the same science. When I first applied myself, upwards of ten years since, to the practical study of insanity, having laid up before- hand some store of metaphysical philosophy, it was no small surprise and discouragement to find, on the one hand, that the theoretical knowledge acquired had no bearing whatever on, no discoverable relation to, the facts that daily came under observation, and, on the other hand, that writers on mental diseases, while giving the fullest information concern- ing them, treated their subject as if it belonged to a science entirely distinct from that which was concerned with the sound mind. This state of things could not fail to produce an immediate mental disquietude, and ultimately to give rise to the endeavour on my part to arrive at sume definite conviction with regard to the physical conditions of mental function, and the relation of the phenomena of the sound and unsound mind. Of that endeavour the present work is the result. It can claim no more authority than what is due to a-sincere purpose faithfully pursued, and to such truth as may be contained in it. The First Part, resting as it does mainly on the physiological method of inquiry into mental phenomena, will certainly not command the assent of those PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. vii who put entire faith in the psychological method of interro- gating self-consciousness; it must appeal rather to those who have made themselves acquainted with the latest advances in physiology, and with the present state of physiological psychology in Germany, and who are familiar with the writ- ings of such as Professor Bain, Mr. Herbert Spencer, Dr. Laycock, and Dr. Carpenter, in this country. The Second Part of the book may stand on its own account as a treatise on the causes, varieties, pathology, and treatment of mental diseases, apart from all question of the proper method to be pursued in the investigation of mental phenomena, Even those who advocate the psychological method of interrogating self-consciousness do not insist on the application of it to the scientific study of the madman’s mind. In laying down the plan of this work, and in thus entering upon a task not before systematically attempted, I could not fail to experience the serious disadvantage, not only of having no guide to follow, but of being compelled by the scope of the work to deviate from the paths already made in metaphysics, physiology, and pathology respectively. In order to bring the results of the cultivation of these different branches of science into any sort of harmony, it was plainly necessary not to travel too far on paths which diverged more and more with every step forward. For this reason I have passed by many interesting questions which have long occupied a large space in metaphysics, and have deliberately omitted many discussions which were at one time intended to form a part ‘of the book. In like manner, it seemed desirable, when treat- ing of the physiology of mental action, to omit anatomical description of the nervous system, leaving the knowledge of it to be obtained in a more complete and satisfactory form from books specially dealing with the subject. Lastly, the pathology of diseases of the nervous system generally, although throwing much light on the pathology of mental diseases, could not find fitting place, and was after some hesitation sacrificed, in order to preserve the harmony of design, and to prevent the book growing to an immoderate bulk. Indeed, as may be easily conceived, it has been throughout far more difficult to determine what to leave out than what to put in, viii PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. the proportion of material collected for the, purposes of the project, but not directly used, exceeding that which has been actually used in its execution. I am fully sensible of the disadvantages resulting from these omissions: an amount of knowledge on the reader’s part is taken for granted which he may not have, and without which many things may appear obscure to him, and many assertions unwarrantable. It may well be, too, that either the metaphysician, or the physiologist, or the pathologist, looking at the work from his particular standpoint, will see reason to pronounce it defective. Whoso- ever will, however, be at the pains to compare the discordant results of metaphysical, physiological, and pathological studies of mind, remembering that they are actually concerned with the same subject-matter, cannot fail to recognise and con- fess the uselessness of an exclusive method, and the pressing need of combined action and of a more philosophical mode of proceeding. If the work now offered to the public be successful in its aim, it will make evident how indispensable is the method advocated, and how full it is of promise of the most fruitful results. In conclusion, I am glad to add a sincere expression of thanks to my friend Dr. Blandford, for his advice and assistance during the passage of the book through the press. Ture Lawn, Hanwe.t, W. Feb. 5th, 1867. CONTENTS. PART I. THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND. CHAPTER I. ON THE METHOD OF THE STUDY OF MIND. spects of nature terrible to man in the infancy of thought ; whence supersti- tious feelings and fancies regarding nature. As these disappear metaphysical entities are assigned as natural causes, and man deems himself the “ measure of the universe.” Finally, the interrogation and interpretation of nature, after the inductive method, begin ; fruitful results of this method. Is the- inductive method, objectively applied, available for the study of Mind? Difficulties in the way of such application. Development of biography, and. absence of any progress in metaphysics, are evidences of its value. Psychological method of interrogating self-consciousness palpably inadequate ; contradictory results of its use, and impossibility of applying it inductively. Self-conscious- ness unreliable in the information which it does give, and incompetent to give any account of a large part of mental activity: gives no account of the mental phenomena of the infant, of the uncultivated adult, and of the insane ; no account of the bodily conditions which underlie every mental manifestation ; no account of the large field of unconscious mental action exhibited, not only in the unconscious assimilation of impressions, but in the registration of ideas and their associations, in their latent existence and influence when not active, and in their recall into activity ; and no account of the influence organically exerted upon the brain by other organs of the body. Incompetency of self- consciousness further displayed by examination of its real nature. Physiology cannot any longer be ignored ; henceforth necessary to associate the Physiolo- gical with the Psychological method ; the former being really the more im- portant and fruitful method. The study of the plan of development of Mind, the study of its forms of degeneration, the study of its progress and regress, as exhibited in history, and the study of biography, should not be neglected. The union of empirical and rational faculties, really advocated by Bacon as - his method, is strictly applicable to the investigation of mental as of other natural phenomena. The question of relative value of inductive or deductive reasoning often a question of the capacity of him who uses it; difference between genius and mediocrity—Conclusion . . . . . . . Page 1—40 CHAPTER II. MIND AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. he term “ Mind” used in different senses : in its scientific sense as a natural force ; and in its popular sense as an abstraction made into a metaphysical entity. The brain certainly the organ of the Mind, and the nervous cells the immediate agents of mental function. Mental power an organized result: in the proper centres—a mental organization. No nerve in lowest animal forms; perception of stimulus being the direct physical effect in a homogeneous sub- stance. The differentiation of tissues in higher animals demands special means of intercommunication: the nervous system, at first very simple, sub- x CONTENTS. serving this function. With increasing complexity of organization, a corre- sponding complexity of the nervous system. Organs of special senses appear in very rudimentary form at first; corresponding central nervous ganglia constitute entire brain in Invertebrata. Rudiments of cerebral hemispheres and rudimentary ideation in fishes. Convolution of the grey matter of the hemispheres in the higher mammals, and corresponding increase of intelli- gence in them. Differences in the size of the brain, and in the complexity of its convolutions, in different races of men, and in different individuals of the same race ; corresponding differences in intellectual development. Human embryonic development conforms with general plan of development of Verte- brata. Discrimination of nervous centres: (a) primary, or Ideational ; (0) secondary, or Sensorial ; (c) tertiary, or Reflex; (d) quaternary, or Organic. The evidence of the different functions of these centres is anatomical, physio- logical, experimental, and pathological. Lockhart Clarke on the structure of the convolutions in man. Discriminating observation of mental phe- nomena necessary, and metaphysical conception of Mind no longer tenable. Mind the most dependent of all the natural forces ; relations of mental force in nature. Concluding remarks . . .... . . =. . Page 41—70 CHAPTER III. THE SPINAL CORD AND REFLEX ACTION. Spinal cord contains the nervous centres of many reflex or automatic movements. Earliest movements of infant are reflex ; automatic acts of anencephalic infant and of decapitated frog. Analysis of Pfitiger’s experiments on the frog. So- called design of an act not necessarily evidence of consciousness. Spinal cord the centre of many acquired or secondary automatic movements; illustrations. The motor faculties mostly acquired in man by education and exercise, but innate in many animals. Bearing of instances of acquired adaptation of means to end on the doctrine of final causes. Motor faculties are exhausted by exer- cise, and require periodical rest for restoration of power by nutrition. Quan- titative and qualitative relation of reaction to the impression. Hereditary transmission of acquired faculties implants the germ of innate endowment. Pitiiger’s laws of reflex movements. Causes of disorder of function of spinal cord : (a) original differences of constitution ; (b) excessive action ; (c) quantity and quality of the blood ; (d) eccentric irritation ; (¢) interruption of its con- nexion with the brain. Close sympathy between different parts of the nervous system. Clear conceptions of the functions of spinal centres indispensable to the study of the functions of the higher nervous centres . . . Page 71—98 CHAPTER IV. THE SENSORY CENTRES AND SENSATION. Collections of grey matter constituting the sensory ganglia intervene between the spinal centres and the supreme hemispherical ganglia. Anatomical relations of different grey nuclei yet uncertain, but nerve-fibres certainly connected with their cells. Sensory ganglia with connected motor nuclei the centres of inde- pendent reaction—of sensori-motor movements: examples. Sensations not innate in man, but acquired by gradual formation; difference between him and the animals in this regard. The idea of organization necessary to the just interpretation of sensation; assimilation and differentiation. Association of sensations. Sensori-motor acts both irregular and co-ordinate; of co- ordinate acts, some are primary automatic, others secondary automatic. Persistence of sensori-motor acts in animals after the removal of their cerebral hemispheres. Acquired sensori-motor acts constitute a great part of the daily action of life; illustrations. Psychological view of sensation at variance with physiological facts. Subordination of the sensory centres to the cerebral ganglia. Causes of disorder of the sensory ganglia: (a) original defects ; (6) excessive stimulation ; (c) quantity and quality of blood ; (d) reflex irrita> tion ; (e) influence of cerebral hemispheres (?). Concluding remarks on the analogy between the functions of the sensory centres and of the spinal centres . . . . «+ 2 . . Page 99—-122 CONTENTS. xi CHAPTER V. THE SUPREME CEREBRAL CENTRES AND IDEATION. Cortical cells of the hemispheres the centres of Ideation. No certain knowledge of the functions of different convolutions. Cortical cells the centres of inde- pendent reaction ; of ideomotor movements, which may take place without will and without consciousness: illustrations. Notion of innate idea unten- able. Idea a gradual organization. Different signification of an idea according to. different states of culture. The so-called fundamental or universal in- tuitions. Different modes of action of idea: (a) on movements, voluntary and involuntary, conscious and unconscious; (2) on the sensory ganglia,— physiologically, as a regular part of mental function ; pathologieally, in the production of hallucinations ; (c) on the functions of nutrition and secretion : illustrations; (@) on other ideas: reflection or deliberation. Relation of consciousness to Ideational activity. Comparison of ideas with movements in regard to their association, their relation to consciousness, and the limited power which the mind has over them. The character of the particular asso- ciation of Ideas determined by (w) the individual nature, (6) special life- experience. Need of an individual psychology. General laws of association of ideas. Concluding remarks on the illustration of Von Baer’s law of progress, from the general to the special in development, afforded by the development oLidéas «+ = F & e BB oe oe we we ORS . . Page 123—147 CHAPTER VI. ON EMOTION. Relation of emotion to idea. Influence of the state of nerve-element on emotion. Idea favourable to self-expansion is agreeable ; an idea opposed to self-expan- sion disagreeable. Appetite or desire for agreeable stimulus, and repulsion or avoidance of a painful one, as motives of action. Equilibrium between indi- vidual and his surroundings not accompanied with desire. Intellectual life does not furnish the impulses to action, but the desires do, Character of emotion determined by the nature of external stimulus, and by the condition of nerve-element, original, or as modified by culture. Ccenesthesis. Nervous centres of ideas and emotions the same: emotions as many and various as ideas. Psychical tone ; how determined? The conception of the ego and the moral sense. Intimate connexion of emotion with the organic life ; illustra- tion of their reciprocal influence. Action of disordered emotion. Primitive passions, according to Spinoza. Difficulties of the psychological method of studying emotion. Hereditary action in the improvement of human feeling. Law of progress from the general to the special, exhibited in the development of the emotions . . 2 eS Re ee Page 147—167 CHAPTER VII. ON VOLITION. The will not a single, undecomposable faculty of uniform power, but varies as its cause varies: differs in quantity and quality, according to the preceding reflec- tion. According to the common view of it, an abstraction is made into a metaphysical entity. Self-consciousness reveals the particular state of mind of the moment, but not the long series of causes on which it depends; hence the opinion of free-will, Examples from madman, drunkard, &c. The design in the particular volition is a result of a gradually effected mental organization : a physical necessity, not transcending or anticipating, but con- forming with, experience. Erroneous notions as to the autocratic power of will. Its actual power considered (1) over movements, and (2) over the mental operations. 1. Over movements: (@) no power over the involuntary movements essential to life; (6) no power to effect voluntary movements’ until they have been acquired by practice ; (c) cannot control the means, can only will the event. 2. Over mental operations: (a) the formation of ideas, and of their associations independent of it ; (b) its impotency in the early stages of mental development—in the young child and in the savage ; (c) cannot call up a particular train of thought, or dismiss a train of thought, except through xii CONTENTS. associations of ideas that are beyond its control, and sometimes not at all. As many centres of volitional reaction in the brain as there are centres of ideas. Volition built up from residua of previous volitions of a like kind. To the freest action of the will there are necessary an unimpeded association of ideas and a strong personality. Character not determined by the will, but deter- inining it in the particular act. Relation of emotion to volition. Differences in the quality and energy of the will. Will the highest force in nature ; its highest function creative—initiating a new development of nature. Page 168—190 CHAPTER VIII. ON ACTUATION. Movements leave behind them residua in the motor centres, whence a repository of latent or abstract movements. Motor residua or intuitions intervene be- tween motive and act, and are related to conception on the reactive side as sensation is on the receptive side. Actuation proposed for the psychological designation of this department. Motor intuitions mostly innate in animals, acquired in man. Tlustrations from vision, speech, the phenomena of hypno- tism, paralysis, insanity, &c. Aphasia in its bearings on motor intuitions. Muscular hallucinations. Co-ordinate convulsions. The muscular sense ; its ‘relation to the motor intuitions, and the necessary part which it plays in mental function. The will acts upon muscles indirectly through the motor nervous centres. Orderly subordination of nervous centres in the expression of the will in action. Natural differences between different persons, in the power of expression, by speech or otherwise . . . . . Page 191—208 CHAPTER IX. ON MEMORY AND IMAGINATION. Memory exists in every organic element of the body—an organic registration of impressions. No memory of what we have not had experience, and no expe- rience ever entirely forgotten. Physiological ideas of assimilation and differentiation necessary to the interpretation of its phenomena. Power of imagination built up by the assimilation not only of the like in ideas, but also of the relations of ideas. Its productive or creative power is, in its highest display, involuntary aud unconscious : it is the supreme manifestation of organic evolution. Relation of memory to imagination. The action of imagination. Differences in the character of memory in different persons. Manifold disorders to which memory is liable. The memory of early youth and of old age. No exact memory of pain: why? . . . Page 209-222 PART II. THE PATHOLOGY OF MIND. CHAPTER I. ON THE CAUSES OF INSANITY, Concurrence of causes in the production of Insanity. Moral and physical causes cannot be exactly discriminated. Predisposing causes: the influence of civili- zation ; over-population and the struggle for existence ; over-crowding and insanitary conditions; eager pursuit of wealth, and deterioration of the moral nature ; sex; education ; religion ; condition of life ; age and period of life ; hereditary predisposition. Proximate causes of disorder of the ideational centres :—(1) Original differences in constitution—(«) imperfectly developed brains of the microcephalic type, (b) cretinism, (c) arrest of development by disease, (2) the insane temperament, or neurosis spasmodica ; (2) Quantity and quality of the blood—anzmia and congestion ; alcohol, opium, and other medi- cinal substances, organic poison introduced from without or bred in the body, and defective development of the blood itself; (8) Reflex irritation or patholo- gical sympathy—illustrations ; (4) Excessive functional activity—overwork, CONTENTS. xiii emotional agitation, depressing passions, physical exhaustion, &c. ; (5) Injury and disease of the brain—abscess, tumour, tubercle, syphilis. Concluding remarks on the special causation of the different forms of insanity. Mental derangement a matter of degree. Appendix of cases, illustrating the causation ofinsanity . . 1... Gt Gr eis ar ae as Page 2283—297: » CHAPTER II. ON THE INSANITY OF EARLY LITE. Insanity of young children must be of a simple kind, the mental organization being imperfect. Convulsions prove fatal at the earliest age: more or less sensorial insanity associated with them in some cases. Comparison of infantile insanity with the insanity of animals, and with epileptic fury. The organiza- tion of sensory residua, and hallucinations of the senses: hallucinations not uncommon in infancy; examples. Choreie insanity and the phenomena of somnambulism. Organization of idea. Incoherent conversation and fallacious memory of children. Delusions. Resemblance between mania of children and the delirium of adults. Hallucinations produced by morbid ideas. The difference between fancy and imagination corresponds with the difference between deliriwm and mania. Forms of insanity met with in children grouped :—(1) Monomania, when there is a powerful impulse to some act of violence ; (2) Choreic mania—examples ; (3) Cataleptoid insanity—illustra- tions ; (4) Epileptic insanity, preceding, taking the place of, or following, the usual convulsions—examples ; (5) Mania; (6) Melancholia ; (7) Affective insanity—(a) Instinctive or impulsive ; perversions of the instinct of self- conservation and the instinct for propagation, (b) Moral insanity—examples. The insane child is a degenerate variety or morbid kind—never reverts to the type of any animal : theroid degenerations of mankind are pathological speci- mens. Concluding remarks upon the seeming precocity of vice in some insane children! 2 2 = 6 « oo & woe we & & x Page 298—334 CHAPTER III. THE VARIETIES OF INSANITY. 1. The insane temperament—its characteristics. Eccentricity and insanity. The relation of certain kinds of talent to insanity displayed ; also the wide differ- ence between the highest genius and any kind of madness. The bodily and mental characters of a.strong hereditary predisposition. The different varieties ‘of mental disease fall into two great divisions—Affective and Jdeational. 2. Affective Insanity: (a) Jmpulsive—the nature of it described and illus- trated by examples ; enumeration of its causes and exposition of its frequent connexion with epilepsy ; (6) Moral Insanity—precedes the outbreak of other forms of insanity sometimes, and persists for a time after disappearance of intellectual disorder ; displayed chiefly in the degeneration of the social senti- ments: examples. Vicious actt not proof of moral insanity ; its connexion with other forms of mental derangement and with epilepsy. 3. Ideational Insanity: (a) Partial, including monpmania and chronic melancholia ; (6) General, including mania and melancholia, chronic and acute. Modified classification of mental diseases. The nature, varieties, symptoms, and course of partial ideational insanity discussed and illustrated by examples. The nature, varieties, symptoms, and course of general ideational insanity. 4, Dementia, acute and chronic. Causes of acute dementia, and examples. Chronic dementia ; three groups of cases according to the degree of mental degeneration, 5. General Paralysis—its causes, symptoms, and course. Note on the classification of insanity. Note on the temperature in insanity. Page 335—427 CHAPTER IV. THE PATHOLOGY OF INSANITY. Absence of morbid appearances after death no proof of the absence of morbid changes: illustrations of abolition of nervous function without recognisable changes of structure. 1. Summary of latest physiological researches into nervous function: time-rate of conduction ; electro-motor properties of nerve, xiv CONTENTS. and the changes produced by the electrotonic state ; Katelectrotonus and Ane- lectrotonus ; chemical changes produced by functional activity. 2. Indivi- duality of nerve element considered : functional relation between the individual element and its supply of blood; state of the cerebral circulation during sleep ; results of the extreme exhaustion of nerve element, and of the effects of poisons upon it; its modification by the habit of exercise through the residua of previous activity. 3. Reflex pathological action or pathological sympathy—illustrations. Morbid anatomy of insanity : (1) Morbid products, such as Tumour, Abscess, Cysticercus, &c.; intermittence of mental symptoms, and extreme incoherence of them when they occur in such cases. (2) Morbid appearances in the Brain and Membranes -in_ acute insanity 3 in chronic in- sanity; in general paralysis; in syphilitic dementia. Weight and specific gravity of the brain in insanity. Microscopical researches, and interpretation of the results of them. Summary of the kinds of degeneration met with in the brain after insanity : (a) Inflammatory degeneration ; (b) Connective tissue degeneration ; (c) Fatty degeneration ; (d) Amyloid and colloid degeneration ; (e) Pigmentary degeneration ; (f) Calcareous degeneration. (3) Morbid con- ditions of other organs of the body—of the lungs, the heart, the abdominal organs, and the sexual organs. Concluding observations . . Page 428—471 CHAPTER V. THE DIAGNOSIS OF INSANITY. The difficulty of the diagnosis in some cases. Acute mania: diagnosis from meningitis ; the difference between acute mania caused by intemperance, and delirium tremens. Chronic mania and feigned insanity. Hysteria and mania. The mode of detecting partial ideational insanity, monomaniacal or melan- cholic. Hypochondria and melancholia. Eccentricity and insanity—the important differences between them. The diagnosis of moral insanity and of irresistible homicidal impulse. The detection of general paralysis in its earliest stages. On the mode of conducting the examination of an insane patient . ae ee ee ae . Page 472—484 CHAPTER VI. THE PROGNOSIS OF INSANITY. Insanity reduces the mean duration of life. The indications of a fatal termination. The probability of recovery depends on the form, the duration, and the cause of the disease. Melancholia the most curable, acute mania coming next. The indications of recovery. The prognosis very bad in chronic mania, mono- mania, and moral insanity, but good in acute dementia. The prognosis in puerperal, climacteric, metastatic, epileptic, hysterical, syphilitic and senile insanity. - The causes of the disease influencing the prognosis. The age most favourable to recovery. The proportion of recoveries, relapses, and deaths. Evil effects of injudicious interference . . . . . . . Page 485—491 CHAPTER VII. THE TREATMENT OF INSANITY. The difficulties in the way of treatment; the working of the Lunacy Acts; the INDEX . public horror of insanity, and the social prejudices regarding it. The practice of indiscriminate sequestration unjustifiable. The true principle to have in view: argument in favour of it. The treatment of the insane in private dwellings. Condition of the Chancery patients. The evils of monstrous asylums. Necessity of early treatment. Moral treatment of insanity ; change of residence, occupation, amusements, &c. Medical treatment: warm and cold baths; blood-letting ; counter-irritants; diet; stimulants: the use of opium ; digitalis ; hyoscyamus, hydrocyanie acid and bromide of potassium ; tonics, Concluding remarks upon the treatment of chronic insanity. Page 492—516 iow ee O1F PART L. THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND. CHAPTER I, ON THE METHOD oF THE StuDY oF MIND. IJ. Minp anp THE Nervous System. ” » IIIf. Tae Sprnau Corp, or Tertiary Nervous CenTRESs; on NERVOUS CENTRES OF REFLEX ACTION. IV. SEconDARY NERVOUS CENTRES, OR SENSORY GANGLIA; SENSORIUM ComMMUNE. V. HEMISPHERICAL GANGLIA; CoRTICAL CELLS OF THE CEREBRAL HEMISPHERES ; IDEATIONAL NERVous CENTRES; PRIMARY NeERvovus CENTRES; INTELLECTORIUM COMMUNE. » VI. Emorton. VII. Vonirion. VIII. Moron Nervous Centres on Motortum CoMMUNE, AND ACTU- ATION OR EFFECTION. ” IX. Mrmory AND IMAGINATION, ” THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF MIND. CHAPTER I. ON THE METHOD OF THE STUDY OF MIND. “Ich sag’ es dir: ein Kerl, der speculirt, Ist wie ein Thier, auf diirrer Heide Von einem bisen Geist im Kreis herum gefiihrt, Und rings umher liegt schone griine Weide.” Faust. ee right estimate of his relations to external nature has ever been to man a matter of extreme difficulty and uncer- tainty, In the savage state of his infancy he feels himself so little in the presence of nature’s vastness, so helpless in conflict with its resistless forces, that he falls down in abject prostration before its various powers. The earth of a sudden heaves beneath his trembling feet, and his shattered dwellings bury him in their ruins ; the swelling waters overpass their accustomed boundaries and indifferently sweep away his property or his life; the furious hurricane ruthlessly destroys the labour of years; and famine or pestilence, regardless of his streaming eyes and piteous prayers, stalks in desolating march through a horror-stricken people. In the deep consciousness of his individual powerlessness he falls down in an agony of terror and worships the causes of his sufferings: he deifies the powers of nature, builds altars to pro- pitiate the angry Neptune, and, by offering sacrifices of that which is most dear to him, even his own flesh and blood, hopes to mitigate the fury of Phoebus Apollo and to stay the dreadful .clang of his silver how. Everything appears supernatural because he knows nothing of the natural; palsied with fear, he cannot * B 2 ON THR METHOD OF [cHaP. observe and investigate; himself he feels to be insignificant and helpless, while to nature he looks up with reverential awe as mighty and all-powerful. Reflect on the fearful feelings which any apparent exception to the regular course of nature even now produces, on the superstitious dread which of a certainty follows such unfamiliar event, and it will not be difficult to realize the extreme mental prostration of primitive mankind. ‘Through familiarity, however, consternation after a while sub- sides, and the spirit of inquiry follows upon that of reverence ; the prostrate being rises from his knees to examine into the causes of events, Experience, sooner or later, reveals the uni- formity with which they come to pass; he discovers more or less of the laws of their occurrence, and perceives that he can by applying his knowledge avoid much of the damage which he has hitherto suffered—that he can, by attending to their laws, even turn to his profit those once dreaded physical forces. Now it is that man begins to feel that he has a much higher position in nature than in his infancy he had imagined ; for a time he looks upon himself as belonging to the same order as the things around him; and he emancipates himself in great part from the dominion of the priests in whom he had hitherto believed as the sacred propitiators of the gods whom his fears had fashioned. When his creeds are seen to spring from an imperfection of the intellect, the prayers founded on them are abandoned as marking an imperfection of the will. Thales of Miletus is said to have been the first who, in this advance amongst the Greeks, laid aside the priestly character and stood forth as a pure philosopher; and those who imme- diately followed him, and constituted the Ionian school of philo- sophy, having an instinctive feeling of the unity between man and nature, did seek objectively for a first principle of things— the dpxn—common to him and the rest of nature. This slow and tedious method was soon, however, abandoned for the easier and quicker method of deduction from consciousness: abstractions were made from the concrete by the active mind; and the abstractions, being then projected out of the mind and converted into objective realities, were looked upon and applied as actual entities in nature. Anaximander, diving into his own mind and finding something inconceivable there, gave to it the name of | THE STUDY OF MIND. 3 1e Infinite, and, transferring it outwards, was thenceforth quite mtent to pronounce it to be the true origin of all things; whilst ythagoras, going perhaps still further into the unmeaning, pro- aimed numbers, which are mere arbitrary symbols, to be actual sistences and the essences of things. Thus it was that man, mgetful of his early humility, rose by degrees to the creation f the laws of an external world after the pattern of his own 1oughts: such motives as he felt to influence his own actions rere held also to be the principles governing the relations of xternal objects: and natural phenomena were explained by ympathies, loves, discords, hates. As the child attributes life » the dead objects around it, speaking to them and thinking ) receive answers from them, so mankind, in the childhood of iought, assigns its subjective feelings to objective nature, en- rely subordinating the physical to the metaphysical: it is but nother form of that anthropomorphism by which the Dryad ras placed in the tree, the Naiad in the fountain, Atropos rith her scissors near the running life-thread, and a Sun-god nthroned in the place of a law of gravitation. As was natural, 1an, who thus imposed his laws upon nature, soon lost all his omer humility, and from one erroneous extreme passed to the pposite: as he once fell abjectly down in an agony of fear, so ow he rose proudly up in an ecstasy of conceit. The assertion that man is the measure of the universe was the efinite expression of this metaphysical stage of human develop- rent. But it was a state that must plainly be fruitless of real nowledge; there could be no general agreement among men then each one looked into his own mind, and, arbitrarily making that he thought he found there the laws and principles of ex- srnal nature, constructed the laws of the world out of the depths f his own consciousness. Disputes must continually arise about rords when words have not definite meanings; and the unavoid- ble issue must be Sophistry and Pyrrhonism. This has been so; ae history of the human mind shows that systems of scepticism ave regularly alternated with systems of philosophy. Fruitful f empty ideas and wild fancies, philosophy has not been unlike iose barren women who would fain have the rumbling of wind » be the motion of offspring. Convinced of the vanity of its mbitious attempts, Socrates endeavoured to bring philosophy 4 ON THE METHOD OF [cHat. down from the clouds, introduced it into the cities, and applied it to the conduct. of human life; while Plato and Aristotle, opposite as were their professed methods, were both alive to the vagueness of the common disputations, and both laboured hard to fix definitely the meanings of words. But words cannot attain to definiteness save as living outgrowths of realities, as the exact expressions of the phenomena of life in the increasing speciality of human adaptation to external nature. As it is with life objectively, and as it is with cognition or subjective life, so is it with the language in which the phenomena are embodied: in the organic growth of a language there is a continuous differen- tiation, first of nouns into substantives and adjectives, then of the latter into adjectives proper and nouns abstract ; synonymes again disappear, each getting its special appropriation, and super- fluous words are taken up by new developments and combi- nations of thought. How, then, was it possible that a one-sided method, which entirely ignored the examination of nature, should do more than repeat the same things over and over again in words which, though they might be different, were yet not less indefinite? The results have answered to the absurdity of the method ; for, after being in fashion for more than two thousand years, nothing has been established by it; “not only what was asserted once is asserted still, but what was a question once is a question still, and instead of being resolved by discussion is only fixed and fed.” (+) Perhaps if men had always lived in the sunny climes of the south, where the luxuriance of nature allowed of human indo- lence, they might have continued vainly to speculate; but when they were brought face to face with Nature in the rugged north, and were driven to force by persevering labour the means of subsistence from her sterile bosom, then there arose the necessity to observe her processes and investigate her secret ways. There was an unavoidable intending of the mind to the realities of nature; and this practice, which the exigencies of living first enforced, became in the fulness of time with those who had leisure and opportunity the disposition consciously to interrogate and interpret Nature. In Roger Bacon, we see the human mind striving unconsciously, as it were, after the true method of (1) See Notes at the end of the Chapters. J THE STUDY OF MIND. 5 levelopment ; while in the Chancellor Bacon, who ‘systematized he principles and laid down the rules of the inductive philo- ophy, we observe it doing with design and method that which t had hitherto been blindly aiming at. But as it is with the nfant, so was it with humanity ; action preceded consciousness, nd Bacon himself was the efflux of a spirit which prevailed and .ot the creator of it. By thus humbling himself to obey, man ‘as conquered nature; and those plenteous “fruits and invented vorks” which Bacon confidently anticipated as “sponsors and ureties” for the truth of his method, have been reaped in the ichest abundance. It seems strange enough now to us that men should not have ooner hit upon the excellent and profitable method of induction. Tow came it to pass that when they surveyed organic nature, as iristotle notably did, they failed to perceive the progress in evelopment. from the general and simple to the special and omplex, which is evident throughout it? Had they but formu- arized this law of increasing speciality and complexity in organic daptation to external nature, then they had scarcely failed to pply it to conscious human development; and that would have een to establish deductively the necessity of the inductive 1ethod. Unfortunately, Aristotle stood alone; and it remains is particular merit to have foreseen in some sort the value of ae inductive method. Had he also consistently followed it in ractice, which he did not, there was an impassable hindrance ) its general adoption, in the moral errors engendered by the ietaphysical or subjective method, of which Plato was so owerful a representative and so influential an exponent. Man, 3 the measure of the universe, esteemed himself far too highly ) descend to be the servant and interpreter of nature; and this ‘roneous conceit not only affected his conception of his rela- on to the rest of nature, but permeated his social nature, and itiated his whole habit of thought: the superstitious reverence *the Greek who would put to death a victorious general because 2 had left his dead unburied on the field of battle, must have revented Aristotle from anatomical examination of the structure ‘the human body. The same errors are continually reappearing | human history: what happened in the Middle Ages may illus- ate for us the habit of Greek thought; for at that time mistaken 6 ON THE METHOD OF (car. religious prejudice allied itself most closely with the metaphy- sical method which exalted man so much over the rest of nature, opposing most virulently the birth of positive science, which seemed to threaten to degrade him; and for a time it was almost doubtful which would win. Can we wonder, then, that the erroneous method was triumphant in Greece in the fourth cen- tury before Christ, when it is only recently in England, in the nineteenth century after Christ, that the ‘barbarian’s reverence for a dead body has permitted anatomical dissection, and when the finger-bone of a saint, or a rag of his clothing, is still trea- sured up, in some parts of the world, as a most precious relic endued with miraculous virtues! The evil of the metaphysical method was not intellectual deficiency only, but a corresponding baneful moral error. The adoption of the inductive method, which makes man the servant and interpreter of Nature, is in reality the systematic pursuance of the law of progress in organic development; it is the conscious intending of the mind to external realities, the submitting of the understanding to things—in other words, the increasing speciality of internal adjustment to external impres- sions; and the result is a victory by obedience, an individual increase through adaptation to outward relations, in accordance with the so-called principle of natural selection. The mental capacity of one who is deprived of any one of his senses, which are the inlets to impressions from without, or the gateways of knowledge, is less than that of one who is in the full posses- sion of all his senses; and the great advances in science have uniformly corresponded with the invention of some instrument by which the power of the senses has been increased, or their range of action extended. Astronomy is that which the eye has been enabled to see by the aid of the telescope; the revelations of the inmost processes of nature have been due to the increased power of vision which the. microscope has conferred; the ex- tremely delicate balance has supplied to science a numerical exactness; the spectrum has furnished a means of analysing the constitution of the heavenly bodies; and the galvanometer already gives the most hopeful presage of important discoveries in nervous function. Through the senses has knowledge entered. and the intellect has in turn devised means for extending the 4 THE STUDY OF MIND. 1 ction and increasing the discriminating exactness of the senses: here have been action and reaction and progressive specialization nd complication thereof. The two aspects of this relation we esignate, in their highest manifestations, as cognition and. ction, or science and art. Thus much concerning the historical evolution of the induc-, ive method. But now comes the important question, whether t is available for the study of the whole of nature. Can we ipply the true inductive and objective method to the investiga- ion of psychical as well as of physical nature? In the latter. ase, it has long received universal sanction ; but in the study of t man’s mind it is still a question what mabthiod should rightly. xe employed. Plainly, it is not possible by simple observation of others to form true inductions as to their mental phenomena ; the defect of an observation which reaches only to the visible results of invisible operations, exposes us without protection to ihe hypocrisy, conscious or unconscious, of the individual; and ihe positive tendency, which no one can avoid, to interpret the iction of another mind according to the measure of one’s own, to see not what is in the object, but what is in the subject, fre- yuently vitiates an assumed penetration into motives. If we call ‘o our aid the principles of the received system of psychology, matters are not mended; for its ill-defined terms and vague waditions, injuriously affecting our perceptions, and overruling she understanding, do not fail to confuse and falsify inferences, [t must unfortunately be added that, in the present state of dhysiological science, it is quite impossible to ascertain, by »bservation and experiment, the nature of those organic pro- xesses which are the bodily conditions of mental phenomena. [here would appear, then, to be no help for it but to have entire -ecourse to the psychological method—that method of interro- sating self-consciousness which has found so much favour at all imes. Before making any such admission, let this reflection be weighed: that the instinctive nisus of mankind commonly pre- xedes the recognition of systematic method ; that men, without snowing why, do follow a course which there exist very good ‘easons for. Nay more: the practical instincts of mankind often work beneficially in an actual contradiction to their professed loctrines. When in the Middle Ages faith was put in the 8 ON THE METHOD OF [cHap. philosophy of the schools, the interrogation of nature by experi- ment was going on in many places; and the superstitious people that believe in the direct interference of spirits or of gods, still adopt such means of self-protection as a simple experience of nature teaches. Man does not consciously determine his method and then enter upon it; he enters blindly upon it, and at a certain stage awakes to consciousness. In the onward flowing stream of nature’s organic evolution, life first becomes self- conscious in man: in the slumbering mental development of mankind, it is the genius who at due time awakens to active con- sciousness the sleeping century. It would indeed go hard with mankind if they must act wittingly before they acted at all. Two facts come out very distinctly from a candid observation of the state of thought at the present day. One of these is the little favour in which metaphysics is held, and the very general conviction that there is no profit in it: the consequence of which firmly fixed belief is, that it is cultivated as a science only by those whose particular business it is to do so, who are engaged not in action, wherein the true balance of life is maintained, but in dreaming in professorial chairs; or if by any others, by the ambitious youth who goes through an attack of metaphysics as a child goes through an attack of measles, getting haply an immunity from a similar affection for the rest of his life; or lastly, by the untrained and immature intellects of those meta- physical dabblers who continue youths for life. A second fact, which has scarcely yet been sufficiently weighed, is the extreme favour in which biography is held at the present time, and the large development which it is receiving. Let us look first at the import of biography. As the business of a man in the world is action of some kind, and as his action undoubtedly results from the relations between him and his surroundings, it is plain that biography, which estimates both the individual and his circumstances, and displays their re- actions, can alone give an adequate account of the man. What was the mortal’s force of character, whut was the force of circum- stances, how he struggled with them, and how he was affected by them,—what was the life-product under the particular conditions of its evolution :—these are the questions which a good biography aspires to answer. It regards men as concrete beings, acknow- THE STUDY OF MIND. 9. iges the differences between them in characters and capabilities, cognises the helpful or baneful influence of surroundings, and tiently unfolds the texture of life as the inevitable result of e elements out of which, and the conditions under which, it is been worked. It is, in fact, the application of positive ience to human life, and the necessary consequence of the ‘ogress of the inductive philosophy. No marvel, then, that ography forms so large a part of the literature of the day, and at novels, its more or less faithful mirrors, are in so great quest. The instincts of mankind are here, as heretofore, in lvance of systematic knowledge or method. On the other hand, the metaphysician deals with man as an ystract or ideal being, postulates him as a certain constant uantity, and thereupon confidently enunciates empty propo- tions. The consequence is, that metaphysics has never made ry advance, but has only appeared in new garb; nor can it in uth advance, unless some great addition is made to the inborn ower of the human mind. It surely argues no little conceit in ay one to believe that what Plato and Descartes have not done, 2, following the same method, will do.* Plato interrogated his wn mind, and set forth its answers with a clearness, subtlety, ad elegance of style that is unsurpassed and unsurpassable ; ntil then the very unlikely event of a better mind than his aking its appearance, his system may well remain as the Jequate representative of what the metaphysical method can scomplish. Superseded by a mure fruitful method, it is prac- cally obsolete; and its rare advocate, when such an one is yund, may be said, like the Aturian parrot of which Humboldt alls, to speak in the language of an extinct tribe to a people ‘hich understand him not.t But the method of interrogating self-consciousness may be mployed, and is largely employed, without carrying it to a ietaphysical extreme. Empirical psychology, founded on direct x “Jt would be an unsound fancy and self-contradictory, to expect that things hich have never yet been done can be done, except by means which have never et been tried.” —Nov. Org. Aphorism vi. + © There still lives, and it is a singular fact, an old parrot in Maypures which annot be understood, because, as the natives assert, it speaks the language of the ‘tures—an extinct tribe of Indians, whose last refuge was the rocks of the vaming cataract of the Orinoco.”—Humsoipr, Views of Nature, i, p. 172. 10 ON THE METHOD OF [cHapP, consciousness as distinguished from the transcendental conscious. ness on which metaphysics is based, claims to give a faithful record of our different states of mind and their mutual relations, and has been extravagantly lauded, by the Scotch school, as an inductive science. Its value as a science must plainly rest upon the sufficiency and reliability of consciousness as a witness of that which takes place in the mind. Is the foundation then sufficiently secure? It may well be doubted; and for the following reasons :— (a.) There are but few individuals who are capable of attending to the succession of phenomena in their own minds; such intro- spection demanding a particular cultivation, and being practised with any degree of, or pretence to, success by those only who have learned the terms, and been imbued with the theories, of the system of psychology supposed to be thereby established. And with what success ? (b.) There is no agreement between those who have acquired the power of introspection: and men of apparently equal culti- vation and capacity will, with the utmost sincerity and confi- dence, lay down directly contradictory propositions. It is not possible to convince either opponent of error, as it might be in a matter of objective science, because he appeals to a witness whose evidence can be taken by no one but himself, and whose veracity, therefore, cannot be tested. He brings forward the factitious deliverances of his individual consciousness, but no fact which is capable of being demonstrated to another mind. (c.) To direct consciousness inwardly to the observation of a particular state of mind is to isolate that activity for the time, to cut it off from its relations, and, therefore, to render it unnatural In order to observe its own action, it is necessary that the mind ‘pause from activity; and yet it is the train of activity that is to be observed. As long as you cannot effect the pause necessary -for self-contemplation, there can be no observation of the current of activity: if the pause is effected, then there can be nothing to observe. This cannot be accounted a vain and theoretical objection, for the results of introspection too surely confirm its validity: what was a question once is a question still, and instead of being resolved by introspective analysis is only fixed and fed. (7) THE STUDY OF MIND. li (d.) The madman’s delusion is of itself sufficient to excite ofound distrust, not only in the objective truth, but in the bjective worth, of the testimony of an individual’s self-con- iousness. Descartes laid down the test of a true belief to be at which the mind could clearly and distinctly conceive: if ere is one thing more clearly and distinctly conceived than iother, it is commonly the madman’s delusion. No marvel, ien, that psychologists, since the time of Descartes, have held iat the veracity of consciousness is to be relied upon only under rtain rules, from the violation of which, Sir W. Hamilton. rlieved, the contradictions of philosophy have arisen. On what ridence, then, do the rules rest? Either on the evidence of msciousness, whence it happens that each philosopher and each inatic has his own rules, and no advance is made; or upon the gservation and judgment of mankind, to confess which is very iach like throwing self-consciousness overboard—not otherwise lan aS was advantageously done by positive science when the gures on the thermometer, and not the subjective feelings of eat or cold, were recognised to be the true test of the indi- idual’s temperature. It is not merely a charge against self-consciousness that it is ot reliable in that of which it does give information ; but it is provable charge against it that it does not give any account f a large and important part of our mental activity: its light zaches only to states of consciousness, net to states of mind. ts evidence, then, is not only untrustworthy save under con- itions which it nowise helps us to fix, but it is of little value, ecause it has reference only to a small part of that for which its astimony is invoked. May we not then justly say that self- onsciousness is utterly incompetent to supply the facts for the uilding up of a truly inductive psychology? Let the following easons further warrant the assertion :— 1, It is the fundamental maxim of the inductive philosophy hat observation should begin with simple instances, ascent eing made gradually from them through appropriate generaliza- ions, and that no particulars should be neglected. How does be interrogation of self-consciousness fulfil this most just de- aand? It is a method which is applicable only to mind at a igh degree of development, so that it perforce begins with those 12 ON THE METHOD OF [cHaP. most complex instances which give the least certain information; while it passes completely by mind in its lower stages of develop- ment, so that it ignores those simpler instances which give the best or securest information. In this it resembles the philosopher who, while he gazed upon the stars, fell into the water ; “ for if,” as Bacon says, “he had looked down, he might have seen the stars in the water, but, looking aloft, he could not see the water in the stars.” (?) Where has the animal any place in the accepted system of psychology ? or the child, the direction of whose early mental development is commonly decisive of its future destiny? To speak of induction where so many important instances are neg- lected, and others are selected according to caprice or the ease of convenience, is to rob the word of all definite meaning, and most mischievously to misuse it. A psychology which is truly inductive must follow the order of nature, and begin where mind begins in the animal and infant, gradually rising thence to those higher and more complex mental phenomena which the intro- spective philosopher discerns or thinks he discerns. Certainly it may be said, and it has been said, that inferences as to the mental phenomena of the child can be correctly formed from the phenomena of the adult mind. But it is exactly because such erroneous inferences have been made, that the mental phenomena of the child have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, and that psychology has not received the benefit of the correction which a faithful observation of them would have furnished. It was the physiologist who by a careful observation of the lower animals, “ having entered firmly on the true road, and submitting his indorstending to things,” arrived at generalizations which were found to explain many of the mental phenomena of the child, and which have furthermore thrown so much light upon the mental life of the adult. The careful study of the genesis of mind is as necessary to a true knowledge of mental phenomena as the study of its plan of development confessedly is to an adequate conception of the bodily lite. Again, it might be thought a monstrous mistake of nature to have brought forth so many idiots and lunatics, seeing that the introspective psychologists, though making a profession of induction with their lips, take no notice whatever of the large collection of instances afforded by such unwelcome anomalies, THE STUDY OF MIND, 13 wtainly it may be said, and no doubt it has been said, that the ental phenomena of the idiot or lunatic are morbid, and do not, erefore, concern psychology. It is true that they do not con- rm a psychology which violently separates itself from nature. it it is exactly because psychology has thus unwarrantably vered itself from nature—of which the so-called morbid phe- mena are no less natural a part than are the phenomena of ‘alth—that it has not sure foundations; that it is not inductive; at it has not received the benefit of the corrective instances hich a faithful observation of the unsound mind would have forded. In reality the phenomena of insanity, presenting a wiation of conditions which cannot be produced artificially— ie wnstantia contradictoria—furnish what in such matter ought ‘have been seized with the utmost eagerness ; namely, actual ‘periments well suited to correct false generalization and to tablish the principles of a truly inductive science. The laws "mental action are not miraculously changed nor reversed in adness, though the conditions of their operation are different ; id nature does not recognise the artificial and ill-starred visions which men, for the sake of convenience, and not afrequently in the interests of ignorance, make. 2. Consciousness gives no account of the essential material mditions which underlie every mental manifestation, and de- ymine the character of it; let the function of an individual’s rtic ganglia be abolished by disease or otherwise, and he would yt be conscious that he was blind until experience had con- need him of it. On grounds which will not easily be shaken is now indeed admitted, that with every display of mental ‘tivity there is a correlative change or waste of nervous ement; and on the condition of the material substratum must spend the degree and character of the manifested energy or the ental phenomenon. Now the received system of psychology ves no attention to these manifold variations of feeling in the me individual, which are due to temporary modifications of the rdily state, and by which the ideas of the relations of objects self and to one another are so greatly influenced. The quality ‘the ideas which arise in the mind under certain circumstances, ie whole character indeed of our insight at the time, is notably termined in great part by the feeling which may then have 14 ON THE METHOD OF [cHaP- sway ; and that feeling is not always objectively caused, but may be entirely due to a particular bodily condition, as the daily experience of every one may convince him, and as the earlier phenomena of insanity often illustrate in a striking manner. Again, Bacon long ago set down individual psychology as want~ ing; and insisted on a scientific and accurate dissection of minds and characters, and the secret dispositions of particular men, so “that from the knowledge thereof better rules may be framed for the treatment of the mind.” (*) As far as the present psychology is concerned, the individual might have no existence in nature ; he is an inconvenience to a system which, in neglecting the individual constitution or temperament, ignores another large collection of valuable instances. As far as truth is concerned, however, the individual is of some moment, seeing that he often positively contradicts the principles arbitrarily laid down by a theoretical system. When the theologist, who occupies himself with the supersen- suous, has said all that he has to say from his point of view; when the jurist, who represents those principles which the wisdom of society has established, has in turn exhaustively argued from his point of view,—then the ultimate appeal in a concrete case must be to the physician, who deals with the bodily life; through his ground only can the theologist and jurist pass to their departments ; and they must accept their knowledge of it from him: on the foundation of facts which the faithful inves- tigation of the bodily nature lays, must rest, if they are to rest safely, their systems. Certainly it is not probable that this most desirable and inevitable result will come to pass in this day or generation ; for it is not unknown how slowly the light of know- ledge penetrates the thick fogs of ignorance, nor how furiously irritated prejudice opposes the gentle advent of new truth. Hap- pily, it is certain that in the mortality of man lies the salvation — of truth. 3. There is an appropriation of external impressions by the mind or brain, which regularly takes place without any, or only with a very obscure, affection of consciousness, As the various organs of the body select from the blood the material suitable to their nourishment, and assimilate it, so the organ of the mind unconsciously appropriates, through the inlets of the senses, the t] THE STUDY OF MIND. 15 influences of its surroundings. The impressions which it thus receives and retains do not produce definite ideas and feelings, but they nevertheless permanently affect the mind’s nature; so that as an individual consciously provides his food, and then leaves the due assimilation of it to the unconscious action of the organism, in like manner may he consciously arrange the cir- cumstances in which he will live, but cannot then prevent the unconscious assimilation of their influence, and the correspond- ing modification of his character. Not only slight habits of movement are thus acquired, but habits of thought and feeling are imperceptibly organized; so that an acquired nature may ultimately govern one who is not at all conscious that he has changed. Let any one take careful note of his dreams, and he will find that many of the seemingly unfamiliar things with which his mind is then occupied, and which appear to be new and strange productions, are traceable to the unconscious appro- priations of the day. There are other stories on record like that well-known one which Coleridge quotes of the servant-girl who, in the ravings of fever, repeated long passages in the Hebrew language, which she did not understand, and could not repeat when well, but which, when living with a clergyman, she had heard him read aloud.* The remarkable memories of certain idiots, who, utterly destitute of intelligence, will repeat the longest stories with the greatest accuracy, testify also to this un- conscious cerebral action; and the way in which the excitement of a great sorrow, or some other cause, as the last flicker of de- parting life, will sometimes call forth in idiots manifestations of mind of which they always seemed incapable, renders it certain that much is unconsciously taken up by them which cannot be uttered, but which leaves its relics in the mind. Tt is a truth which cannot be too distinctly borne in mind, that consciousness is not co-extensive with mind. From the first moment of its independent existence the brain begins to assimilate impressions from without, and to react thereto in corresponding organic adaptations ; this it does at first without * « A Lutheran clergyman of Philadelphia informed Dr. Rush that Germans and Swedes, of whom he had a considerable number in his congregation, when _near death, always prayed in their native language, though some of them, he was confident, had not spoken the language for fifty or sixty years. ” ABERCROMBIE, On the Intellectual Powers, p. 148. 16 ON THE METHOD OF [cuar. consciousness, and this it continues to do unconsciously more or less throughout life. Thus it is that mental power is being organized before the supervention of consciousness, and that the. mind is subsequently regularly modified as a natural process without the intervention of consciousness. The preconscious action of the mind, as certain metaphysical psychologists in Germany have called it, and the unconscious action of the mind, which is now established beyond all rational doubt, are assuredly facts of which the most ardent introspective psychologist must admit that self-consciousness can give us no account, 4, Everything which has existed with any completeness in con- sciousness is preserved, after its disappearance therefrom, in the mind or brain, and may reappear in consciousness at some future time. That which persists or is retained has been differently described as a residuum, or relic, or trace, or vestige, or again as potential, or latent, or dormant idea ; and it is on the existence of such residua that memory depends. Not only definite ideas, . however, but all affections of the nervous system, feelings of pleasure and pain, desires, and even its outward reactions, thus leave behind them their residua, and lay the foundations of modes of thought, feeling, and action. Particular talents are sometimes formed quite, or almost quite, involuntarily ; and complex actions, which were first consciously performed by dint of great applica- tion, become by repetition automatic ; ideas, which were at first consciously associated, ultimately call one another up without any consciousness, as we see in the quick perception or intuition of the man of large worldly experience ;-and feelings, once active, leave behind them their unconscious residua, thus affecting the general tone of the character, so that, apart from the original or inborn nature of the individual, contentment, melancholy, cowardice, bravery, and even moral feeling, are generated as the results of particular life experiences. Consciousness is not able to give any account of the manner in which these various residua : are perpetuated, and how they exist latent in the mind; but a fever, a poison in the blood, or a dream, may at any moment recall © ideas, feelings, and activities which seem for ever vanished. The _ lunatic sometimes reverts, in his ravings, to scenes and events of which, when in his sound senses, he has no memory ; the fever- stricken patient may pour out passages in a language which he © 1.] THE STUDY OF MIND. 17 understands not, but which he has accidentally heard ; a dream of being at school again brings back with painful vividness the school feelings; and before him who is drowning every event of his life seems to flash in one moment of strange and vivid consciousness. Some who suffer from recurrent insanity re- member only, in their lucid intervals, the facts of former lucid intervals, and in their paroxysms the ideas, feelings, and events of former paroxysms. Dreams not remembered in the waking state may yet affect future dreams, appearing in them as vague and confused recollections. It has been before said that mind and consciousness are not synonymous ; it may now be added, that the existence of mind does not necessarily involve the activity of mind. Descartes certainly maintained that the mind always thinks; and others, resting on that assumption, have held that we must always dream in sleep, because the mind, being spiritual, cannot cease to act; for non-activity would be non-existence. Sueh opinions only illustrate how completely metaphysical conceptions may overrule the best understanding: so far from the mind being always active, it is the fact that at each moment the greater part of the mind is not only unconscious, but inactive. Mental power exists in statical equilibrium as well as in manifested energy ; and the utmost tension of a particular mental activity may not avail to call forth from their secret repository the dormant ener- gies of latent residua, even when most urgently needed: no man can call to mind at any moment the thousandth part of his knowledge. How utterly helpless is consciousness to give any account of the statical condition of mind! Butas statical mind is in reality the statical condition of the organic element which ministers to its manifestations, tt is plain that, if we ever are to know anything of inactive mind, it is to the progress of physiology that we must look for information. 5. Consciousness reveals nothing of the process by which one idea calls another into activity, and has no control whatever over the manner of the reproduction ; it is only when the idea is made active by virtue of some association, when the effect solicits or extorts attention, that we are conscious of it; and there is no power in the mind to call up ideas indifferently. If we would recollect something which at the moment escapes us, confessedly c 18 ON THE METHOD OF [cHAP. the best way of succeeding is to permit the mind to work unconsciously ; and while the consciousness is otherwise occu- pied, the forgotten name or circumstance will oftentimes flash into the memory. In composition, the writer’s consciousness 1s engaged chiefly with his pen and with the sentences which he is forming, while the results of the mind’s unconscious working, matured by an insensible gestation, rise from unknown depths into consciousness, and are by its help embodied in appropriate words. Not only is the actual process of the association of our ideas independent of consciousness, but that assimilation or blending of similar ideas, or of the like in different ideas, by which general ideas are formed, is in no way under the control or cognizance of consciousness. When the like in two perceptions is appropriated, while that in which they differ is neglected, it would seem to be by an assimilative action of the nerve-cell or cells of the brain which, particularly modified by the first impression, have an attraction or affinity for a like subsequent impression: the cell so modified and so ministering takes to itself that which is suit- able and which it can assimilate, or make of the same kind with itself, while it rejects, for appropriation by other cells, that which is unlike and which will not blend. Now this organic process takes place, like the organic action of other elements of the body, quite out of the reach of consciousness; we are not aware how our general and abstract ideas are formed; the due material is consciously supplied, and there is an unconscious elaboration of the result. Mental development thus represents a sort of nutri- tion and organization ; or, as Milton aptly says of the opinions of good men that they are truth in the making, so we may truly say of the formation of our general and complex ideas, that it is mind in the making, When the individual brain is a well-con- stituted one, and has been duly cultivated, the results of its latent activity, starting into consciousness suddenly, sometimes appear like intuitions ; they are strange and startling, as the products of a dream ofttimes are, to the mind which has actually produced them. Hence it was no extravagant fancy in Plato that he looked | upon them as reminiscences of a previous higher existence. Plato’s mind was a mind of the highest order, and the results of its unconscious activity, as they flashed into consciousness, might 1] THE STUDY OF MIND. 19 well seem intuitions of a better life quite beyond the reach of present will. But the process of unconscious mental elaboration is suffi- ciently illustrated in daily experience. In dreams some can compose vigorously and fluently, or speak most eloquently, who can do nothing of the sort when awake; schoolboys know how much a night’s rest improves their knowledge of a lesson which they have been learning before going to bed; great writers or great artists, as is well known, have been truly astonished at their own creations, and cannot conceive how they contrived to produce them; and to the unconscious action of the mind is owing, most probably, that occasional sudden consciousness, which almost every one at some time has, of having been before in exactly the same circumstances as those which are then present, though the thing was impossible; but the action of the mind in the assimilation of events here anticipates consciousness, which, when aroused, finds a familiarity in them. Inventions seem, even to the discoverers, to be matters of accident and good fortune; the most voracious plagiarist is commonly the most unconscious ; the best thoughts of an author are always the unwilled thoughts which surprise himself; and the poet under the inspiration of creative activity is, so far as consciousness is concerned, being dictated to. If we reflect, we shall see that it must be so; the products of creative activity, in so far as they transcend the hitherto experienced, are unknown to the creator himself before they come forth, and cannot therefore be the result of a definite act of his will; for to an act of will a con- _ ception of the result is necessary. “The character,” says Jean Paul, speaking of the poet’s work, “must appear living before you, and you must hear it, not merely see it; it must, as takes place in dreams, dictate to you, not you to it; and so much so that in the quiet hour before you might perhaps be able to fore- tell the what but not the how. A poet who must reflect whether in a given case he shall make a character say yes or no—to the devil with him: he is only a stupid corpse.”* If an inherited excellence of brain has conferred upon the indi- vidual great inborn capacity, it is well; but if he has not such heritage, then no amount of conscious effort will completely make * Aesthetik. c2 20 ON THE METHOD OF [omar. up for the defect, As in the germ of the higher animal there is the potentiality of many kinds of tissue, while in the germ of the lower animal there is only the potentiality of a few kinds of tissue; so in the good brain of a happily endowed man, there is the potentiality of great assimilation and of great and varied de- velopment, while in the man of low mental endowment there is only the potentiality of a scanty assimilation and of small develop- ment. But it is ridiculous to suppose that the man of genius is ever a fountain of self-generating energy ; whosoever expends much in productive activity must take much in by appropriation ; whence comes what of truth there is in the observation that genius is a genius for industry. To believe that any one, how great soever his natural genius, can pour forth with spontaneous ease the results of great productive activity, without correspond- ing labour in appropriation, is no less absurd than it would be to believe that the acorn can grow into the mighty monarch of the forest, without air and light, and without the kindly influence of the soil. It has been previously said that mental action does not neces- sarily imply consciousness, and again, that mental existence does not necessarily involve mental activity: it may now be affirmed that the most important part of mental action, the essential pro- cess on which thinking depends, is unconscious mental activity. We repeat, then, the question: how can self-consciousness suffice to furnish the facts of a true mental science ? 6. The brain not only receives impressions unconsciously, registers impressions without the co-operation of conscicusness, elaborates material unconsciously, calls latent residua again into activity without consciousness, but it responds also as an organ of organic life to the internal stimuli which it receives uncon- sciously from other organs of the body. As the central organ to which the various organic stimuli of a complex whole pass, and where they are duly co-ordinated, it must needs have most im- portant and intimate sympathies with the other parts of the harmonious system; and a regular quiet activity, of which we only become occasionally conscious in its abnormal results, does prevail, as the consequence and expression of these organic sym- pathies. On the whole, this activity is even of more consequence in determining the character of our feeling, or the tone of our 1] THE STUDY OF MIND. 21 disposition, than that which follows impressions received from the external world ; when disturbed in a painful way, it becomes the occasion of that feeling of gloom or discomfort which does not itself give rise to anything more than an indefinite anticipation of coming affliction, but which clouds ideas that arise, rendering them obscure, unfaithfully representative, and painful. The rapidity and success of conception, and the reaction of one con- ception upon another, are much affected by the state of this active but unconscious cerebral life: the poet is compelled to wait for the moment of inspiration; and the thinker, after great but fruit- less pains, must often tarry until a more favourable disposition of mind. In insanity, the influence of this activity is most marked ; for it then happens that the morbid state of some internal organ becomes the basis of a painful but formless feeling of profound depression, which ultimately condenses into some definite delu- sion. In dreams its influence is no less manifest; for he who has gone to sleep with a disturbance of some internal organ may find the character of his dreams determined by the feeling of the oppression of self of which the organic trouble is the cause: he is thwarted, he is afflicted, he is at school again, or under sentence of death; in some way or other his personality is oppressed. Most plainly of all, however, does the influence of the sexual organs upon the mind witness to this operation ; and it was no wild flight of “that noted liar fancy” in Schlegel, but a truly grounded creation of the imagination, that he represented a pregnant woman as being visited every night by a beautiful child, which gently raised her eyelids and looked silently at her, but which disappeared for ever after delivery.* Whatever then may be thought of the theory of Bichat, who located the passions in the organs of organic life, it must be admitted that he therein evinced a just recognition of the importance of that unconscious cerebral activity which is the expression of the organic sym- pathies of the brain. In dealing with unconscious mental activity, and with mind in a statical condition, it has been a necessity to speak of brain * “In Schlegels—viel zu wenig erkanntem—Florentin sieht eine Schwangere immer ein schénes Wunderkind, das mit ihr Nachts die Augen aufschlagt, ihr stumm entgegen liuft u. s. w. und welches unter der Entbindung auf immer verschwindet.”’—JuAN Pau, Aesthetth. 22 ON THE METHOD OF [cHap. and cerebral action, where I would willingly, to avoid offence that might be taken thereat, have spoken, had it been possible, of mind and mental action; but it was impossible, if one was to be truthful and intelligible, to do otherwise. When the impor- tant influence on mental life of the brain, as an organ of organic life, comes to be considered, there are no words available for expressing the phenomena in the language of the received psychology, which, though it admits the brain to be the organ of the mind, takes no notice whatever of it as an organ. Let us briefly add, then, what the relations of the brain as a bodily organ are. 1. The brain has, as previously set forth, a life of relation ; which may be properly distinguished into—(a) a relation with external nature through the inlets of the senses; and (0) a rela- tion with the other organs of the body, through the nervous system distributed throughout the body. These have already been sufficiently dwelt upon here ; they will receive fuller atten- tion afterwards. 2. But the brain has also a life of nutrition, or, if we might so call it, a vegetative life. In this, its true organic life, there is a nutritive assimilation of suitable material from the blood by the nerve-cell ; a restoration of the statical equilibrium being thereby effected after each display of energy. The extent of the nutri- tive repair, and the mould which it takes, must plainly be deter- mined by the extent and form of the waste which has been the condition of the display of function: the material change or waste in the nerve-cell, which the activity of an idea implies, is replaced from the blood according to the mould or pattern of the particular idea ; statical idea thus following through the agency of nutritive attraction upon the waste through functional repul- sion of active idea. The elements of the nerve-cell grow to the form in which it energizes. This organic process of repair is not usually attended with consciousness, and yet it may obtrude itself into consciousness: as the function of any organ, which proceeds, when all is well, without exciting any sensation, does, under conditions of disorder, give rise to unusual sensation or to actual pain ; so the organic life of the brain, which usually passes peaceably without exciting consciousness, may under certain conditions thrust itself forward into consciousness and produce 1] THE STUDY OF MIND. 23 anomalous effects, When this happens, the abnormal effect is not manifest in sensation, for the hemispheres of the brain, as physiologists well know, are not sensitive in that sense; but it is displayed in the involuntary appearance of emotional ideas in consciousness, and in consequent confusion of thought; the statical idea becomes energy, not through the usual train of asso- ciation, but by reason of the abnormal stimulus from the inner life. Thus it is that the presence of alcohol, or some other such foreign agent, in the blood will excite into activity ideas which lie out of the usual path of association, which the utmost tension of consciousness would fail to arouse, and which the will cannot repress nor control. Whosoever will be at the pains of attending to his own daily experience will find that ideas frequently arise into consciousness without any apparent relation ‘to those previously active ; without, in fact, any possibility of ex- plaining, guoad consciousness, why and whence they come. (°) To what has been before said of unconscious mental action this more may now be added—that the deep basis of all mental action lies in the organic life of the brain, the characteristic of which in health is, that it proceeds without consciousness. He whose brain makes him conscious that he has a brain is not well, but ill; and thought that is conscious of itself is not natural and healthy thought. How little competent, then, is consciousness to supply the facts of an inductive science of mind! Pneuma- tology was at one time subdivided into theology, demonology, and psychology ; all three resting on the evidence of the inner wit- ness. Demonology has taken its place in the history of human error and superstition; theology is confessedly now best sup- ported by those who strive to ascend inductively from nature’s law up to nature's God; and psychology, generally forsaken, stays its fall by appropriating the discoveries of physiology, preserving only in its nomenclature the shadow of its ancient authority and state. On what foundation can a science of mind surely rest save on the faithful observation of all available instances, whether psychical or physiological ? Why, however, it will naturally be’ asked, repudiate and dis- parage introspective psychology, now that it evinces some dispo- sition to abandon its exclusive mode of procedure and to profit by the discoveries of physiology ? Because the union, as desired 24 ON THE METHOD OF [cHaP. by it, is an unnatural and unhallowed union, which can only issue in abortions or give birth to monsters ; not otherwise than as Ixion, designing impiously to embrace Juno, had intercourse with the clouds and begat centaurs. It is not a mere skimming of physiological text-books, and a superficial acquaintance with the nature and functions of the nervous system, which will put meaning into the vague and abstract language of psychology ; that would simply be to subject physiology to the tortures of Mezentins—to stifle the living in the embraces of the dead ; but it is a sound general knowledge of the whole domain of organi- zation, at the head of which stands the nervous system, and the final achievement of which is mind, that is indispensably pre- requisite to the formation of fundamentally true conceptions of mental phenomena on a physiological basis. These conceptions, thus vitally impregnated, and the language in which they are expressed, cannot be reconciled with the language of psychology, which, borrowed at first from observation of the senses, has now become so abstract and been so depraved by its divorce from nature, as to be empty of real meaning. Words! words! words! but what an aching vacuum of matter! The question between modern physiology and the old psychology, is not a question of eclectic appropriation by the latter of the discoveries of the former, but a fundamental question of method of study. Such are the charges against seJf-consciousness whereon is founded the conclusion as to its incompetency : they show that he who thinks to illuminate the whole range of mental action by the light of his own consciousness is not unlike one who should go about to illuminate the universe with a rushlight. A reflec- tion on the true nature of consciousness will surely tend to con- firm that opinion. Whoever faithfully and firmly endeavours to obtain a definite idea of what is meant by consciousness, will find it nowise so easy a matter as the frequent and ready use of the word might imply. Metaphysicians, faithful to the vague- ness of their ideas, and definite only in individual assumption, are by no means agreed in the meaning which they attach to it; and it sometimes happens that the same mwetaphysician uses the word in two or three different senses in different parts of his book : Sir W. Hamilton uses it at one time as synonymous with mind, at another time as synonymous with knowledge, and at 4] THE STUDY OF MIND. 25 other time to express a condition of mental activity. That chere should be such little certainty about that upon which their philosophy fundamentally rests must be allowed to be no small misfortune to the metaphysicians. What consciousness is will appear better if its relations be closely examined without prejudice. It will then appear that it is not separable from knowledge ; that it exists only as a part of the concrete mental act; that it has no more power of withdraw- ing from the particular phenomenon and of taking full and fair observation of it, than a boy has of jumping over his own shadow. Consciousness is not a faculty or substance, but a quality or attribute of the concrete mental act; and it may exist in differ- ent degrees of intensity or it may be absent altogether. In so far as there is consciousness, there is certainly mental activity ; but it is not true that in so far as there is mental activity there is consciousness ; it is only with a certain intensity of representa- tion or conception that consciousness appears. What else, then, is the so-called interrogation of consciousness but a self-revela- tion of the particular mental act, whose character it must needs share? Consciousness can never be a valid and unprejudiced witness ; for although it testifies to the existence of a particular mental modification, yet when that modification has anything of a morbid character, consciousness is affected by the taint and is morbid also. Accordingly, the lunatic appeals to the evidence of his own consciousness for the truth of his hallucination or delusion, and insists that he has as sure evidence of its reality as he has of the argument of any one who may try- to convince him of his error: and is he not right from a subjective standpoint? To one who has vertigo the world turns round. A man may easily be conscious of freewill when, isolating the particular mental act, he cuts himself off from the consideration of the causes which have preceded it, and on which it depends. “There is no force,” says Leibnitz, “in the reason alleged by Descartes to prove the independence of our free actions by a pretended lively internal sentiment. It is as if the needle should take pleasure in turning to the north; for it would suppose that it turned independently of any other cause, not perceiving the insensible motions of the magnetic matter.”* Is it not supremely ridicu- * Essais de Théodicée, Pt. I. 26 ON THE METHOD OF (cusp, lous that, while we cannot trust consciousness in so simple. a matter as whether we are hot or cold, we should be content to rely entirely on its evidence in the complex phenomena of our highest mental activity? The truth is, that what has very often happened before has happened here: the quality or attribute has been abstracted from the concrete, and the abstraction converted into an entity ; the attribute, consciousness, has miraculously got rid of its substance, and then with a wonderful assurance as- sumed the office of observing and passing judgment upon its nature from a higher region of being. Descartes was in this case the clever architect; and his success has fully justified © his art: while the metaphysical stage of human development lasts, his work will doubtless endure. ‘ That the subjective mnethod—the method of interrogating self- consciousness—is not adequate to the construction of a true mental science, has now seemingly been sufficiently established, This is not to say that it is worthless; for when not strained beyond its capabilities, its results may, in the hands of competent men, be very useful. D’Alembert compares Locke to Newton, and makes it a special praise to him that he was content to descend within, and that, after having contemplated himself for a long while, he presented in his “ Essay’’ the mirror in which he had seen himself; “in a word, he reduced psychology to that which it should be, the experimental physics of the mind.” But it was not because of this method, but in spite of it, that Locke was greatly successful ; it was because he possessed a powerful and well-balanced mind, the direct utterances of which he sincerely expressed, that the results which he obtained, in whatever nomenclature they may be clothed, are and always will be valu- able; they are the self-revelations of an excellently constituted and well-trained mind. The insufficiency of the method used is proved by the fact that others adopting it, but wanting his sound sense, directly contradicted him at the time, and do so still. Furthermore, Locke did not confine himself to the interrogation of his own consciousness ; for he introduced the practice—for which Cousin was so angry with him—of referring to savages and children. And we may take leave to suggest that the most valuable part of Locke’s psychology, that which has been a lasting addition to knowledge, really was the result of the 1.] THE STUDY OF MIND. 27 employment of the inductive or rather objective method.* Nay more: if any one will be at the pains to examine into the history of the development of psychology up to its present stage, he may be surprised to find how much the important acquisitions of new truth and the corrections of old errors have been due, not to the interrogation of self-consciousness, but to external observation, though it was not recognised as a systematic method. The past history of psychology—its instinctive progress, so to speak—no less than the consideration of its present state, proves the necessity of admitting the objective method. That which a just reflection incontestably teaches, the present state of physiology practically illustrates. Though very im- perfect as a science, physiology is still sufficiently advanced to prove that no psychology can endure except it be based upon its investigations. Let it not, moreover, be forgotten, as it is so apt to be, that the divisions in our knowledge are artificial; that they should be accepted, and used rather, as Bacon says, “for lines to mark or distinguish, than sections to divide and separate; in order that solution of continuity in sciences may always be avoided.”t Not the smallest atom that floats in the sunbeam, nor the minutest molecule that vibrates within the microcosm of an organic cell, but is bound as a part of the mysterious whole in an inextricable harmony with the laws by which planets move in their appointed orbits, or with the laws which govern the mar- vellous creations of godlike genius. Above all things it is now necessary that the absolute and unholy barrier set up between psychical and physical nature be broken down, and that a just conception of mind be formed, founded on a faithful recognition of all those phenomena of nature which lead by imperceptible gradations up to this its highest evolution. Happily the beneficial change is being gradually effected, and ignorant prejudice or offended self-love in vain opposes a progress in knowledge which reflects the course of progress in nature: the stars in their courses fight for such truth, and its angry adversary might as well hope to blow out with his pernicious breath the all-inspiring light of the sun as to extinguish its ever-waxing splendour. No one pretends that physiology can, for many years to come, * Psychology cannot, in fact, be truly inductive unless it is studied objec- tively. + De Augmentis Scientiarum, B. iv. 28 ON THE METHOD OF [cuap. furnish the complete data of a positive mental science: all that it can at present do is to overthrow the data of a false psychology. It is easy, no doubt, for any one to point to the completeness of our ignorance, and to maintain that physiology never will securely fix the foundations of a mental science, just as it was easy to say, before the invention of the telescope, that the ways of the planets could never be traced and calculated. The confident dogmatist in this matter might well learn caution from an instructive example of the rash error of a greater philosopher than he can claim or hope to be:—“TIt is the absurdity of these opinions,” said Bacon, “that has driven men to the diurnal motion of the earth ; which, I am convinced, is most false.” * What should fairly and honestly be weighed is, that mind is the last, the highest, the cousummate evolution of nature’s development, and that, there- fore, it must be the last, the most complex, and most difficult object of human study. There are really no grounds for ex- pecting a positive science of mind at present; for to its estab- lishment the completion of the other sciences is necessary ; and, as is well known, it is ‘only lately that the metaphysical spirit has been got rid of in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, and that these sciences, after more than two thousand years of idle and shifting fancies, have attained to certain principles. Still more recently has physiology emerged from the fog, and this for obvious reasons: in the first place it is absolutely dependent upon the physical and chemical sciences, and must, therefore, wait for the progress of them ;"and, in the second place, its close relations to psychology have tended to keep it the victim of the metaphysical spirit. That, therefore, which should be in this matter is that which is; and instead of being a cause of despair, is a ground of hope. But let it not be forgotten that the physiological method deals only with one (I.) division of the matter to which the objective method is to be applied; there are other divisions not. less valuable :— II. The study of the plan of development of mind, as exhibited in the animal, the barbarian, and the infant, furnishes results of the greatest value, and is as essential to a true mental science as the study of its development confessedly is to a full knowledge * De Augmentis Scientiarum, B. iii, 1] THE STUDY OF MIND. 29 of the bodily organism. By that means we get at the deep and true telations of phenomena, and are enabled to correct the erroneous inferences of a superficial observation; by examination of the barbarian, for example, we eliminate the hypocrisy which is the result of the social condition, and which is apt to mislead us in the civilized individual. IIT. The study of the degeneration of mind, as exhibited in the different forms of idiccy and insanity, is indispensable as it is invaluable. So we avail ourselves of the experiments provided by nature, and bring our generalizations to a most searching test. Hitherto the phenomena of insanity have been entirely ignored by psychologists and most grievously misinterpreted by the vul- gar, because interpreted by the false conclusions of a subjective psychology. Had not the revelations of consciousness in dreams and in delirium been constantly neglected by the professed in- ductive psychologists, truer generalizations must perforce have been formed ere this, and fewer irresponsible lunatics would have been executed as responsible criminals. Why those who put so much faith in the subjective method do reject such a large and important collection of instances as dreams and madmen furnish, they have never thought proper to explain. IV. The study of biography and of autobiography, which has already been described as the application of positive science to human life, will plainly afford essential aid in the formation of a positive science of mind. Thus we trace the development of the mind in the individual as affected by hereditary influences, education, and the circumstances of life. Concerning auto- biographies, however, it will not be amiss to bear in mind an observation made by Feuchtersleben, that “they are only of value to the competent judge, because we must see in them not so much what they relate as what, by their manner of relation, is undesignedly betrayed.” V. The study of the progress or regress of the human mind, as exhibited in history, most difficult as the task is, cannot be neglected by one who wishes to be thoroughly equipped for the arduous work of constructing a positive mental science. The unhappy tendencies which lead to individual error and degene- ration are those which on a national scale conduct peoples to destruction; and the nisus of an epoch is summed up in the 30 ON THE METHOD OF [cHap., biography of its great man.* Freed from the many disturbing conditions which interfere so much with his observation of the individual, the philosopher may perhaps discover in history the laws of human progress in their generality and simplicity, as Newton discovered, in the motions of the heavenly bodies, the law which he would in vain have looked for had he watched the fall of every apple in Europe. Moreover, in the language, literature, art, and the political, social and religious institutions of men, there are important materials for the construction of a science of mind. May we not then truly say that he only is the true psycho- logist who, occupied with the observation of the whole of human nature, avails himself not alone of every means which science affords for the investigation of the bodily conditions which assuredly underlie every display of function, conscious or uncon- scious, but also of every help, subjective or objective, which is furnished by the mental manifestations of animal and of man, whether undeveloped, degenerate, or cultivated? Here, as everywhere else in nature, the student must deliberately apply himself to a close communion with the external, must intend his mind to the realities which surround him, and thus, by patient internal adjustment to outward relations, gradually evolve into conscious development those inner truths which are the unavoidable expressions of the harmony between himself and nature. By diligent colligation of facts, patient observation of their relations, and careful consilience of inductions, he will attain to sound generalizations in this as in other departments of nature; in no other way can he do so. Of old it was the fashion to try to explain nature from a very incomplete know- ledge of man; but it is the certain tendency of advancing science to explain man on the basis of a perfecting knowledge of nature. Having fairly admitted a method, it behoves us to take heed that we are not too exclusive in its application, To this there is a strong inclination : even in the investigation of physical nature men now frequently write of induction as Bacon himself never * “When nature has work to be done,” says Emerson, ‘‘she creates a genius todo it. Follow the great man, and you shall see what the world has at heart in these ages, There is no omen like that.” 1] THE STUDY OF MIND. 31 wrote of it. It might seem, from the usual fashion of speech, that the function of the mind was merely that of a polished and passive mirror, in which natural phenomena should be allowed simply to reflect themselves; whereas every state of conscious- ness is a developmental result of the relation between mind and the impression, of the subject and object. What Bacon strove so earnestly to abolish was that method of systematically looking into the mind and, by torture of self-consciousness, drawing thence empty ideas, as the spider forms a web out of its own substance,—that ill-starred divorce between mind and nature which had been cultivated by the Schoolmen ag a method. What he wished, on the other hand, to establish was a happy marriage between mind and matter, between subject and object, to prevent the “ mind being withdrawn from things farther than was necessary to bring into a harmonious conjunction the ideas and the impressions made upon the senses.” * For, as he says, * “Nos vero intellectum longius 4 rebus non abstrahimus quam ut rerum imagines et radii (utin sensu fit) coire possint.” (Proleg. Instaurat. Magn.) This passage, as usually rendered, is not intelligible; the translation in the text, if not literally exact, evidently, as the context proves, expresses Bacon’s true meaning. He had objected to all before him that some had wrongly regarded the sense as the measure of things, while others, equally wrongly, ‘‘after having only a little while turned their eyes upon things, and instances, and experience, then straight- way, as if invention were nothing more than a certain process of excogitation, have fallen, as it were, to invoke their own spirits to utter oracles to them. But we,” he goes on, “modestly and perseveringly keeping ourselves conversant among things, never withdraw our understanding,” &c. Mr. Spedding, in his adinirable edition of Bacon’s works, translates the passage thus :—‘‘I, on the contrary, withdraw my intellect from them no further than may suffice to let the images and rays of natural objects meet in a point, as they do in the sense of vision.” According to this interpretation, —if there really is any meaning in it—the images and rays of objects express the same thing. Mr. Wood’s translation, in Mr. Montagu’s edition, is :—‘‘ We abstract our understanding no further from them than is necessary to prevent the confusion of the images of things with their radiation, a confusion similar to that we experience by our senses.” This is worse still ; ut possint cotre means, certainly, ‘‘that they may come together,” not “that they may not mingle or may be prevented from mingling.” After all, the 95th Aphorism furnishes thejclearest and surest commentary on the passage—‘‘ Those who have treated the sciences were either empirics or rationalists. The empirics, like ants, only lay up stores and use them ; the rationalists, like spiders, spin webs out of themselves; but the bee takes a middle course, gathering her matter from the flowers of the field and garden, and digesting and preparing it by her native powers. In like manner, that is the true office and work of philo- sophy which, not trusting too much to the faculties of the mind, does not lay up the matter, afforded by natural history and mechanical experience, entire or unfashioned in the memory, but treasures it after being first elaborated and 32 ON THE METHOD OF | CHAP. the testimony and information of the senses have reference always to man, not to the universe; and it is a great error to assert that the sense is the measure of things. But by his method of effecting, as completely as possible, a reconciliation between the subjective and objective, he hoped to have “estab- lished for ever a true and lawful marriage between the empirical and the rational faculty, the unkind and ill-starred divorce and separation of which has thrown into confusion all the affairs of the human family.” The mind that is in harmony with the laws of nature, in an intimate sympathy with the course of events, is strong with the strength of nature, and is developed by its force. A contemplation of the earliest stages of human development, as exhibited by the savages, certainly constrains the admission that the conscious or designed co-operation of the mind in the adaptation of man to external nature was not great. The fact is, however, in exact conformity with what has already been asserted with regard to the nature and domain of consciousness ; assuredly it is not consciousness, the natural result of a due development, which gives the impulse to development; this coming from a source that is past finding out—from the primeval central Power which hurled the planets on their courses, and holds the lasting orbs of heaven in their just poise and move- ment. In virtue of the fundamental impulse of its being, mankind struggles, at first blindly, towards a knowledge of and adaptation to external nature, until that which has been insen- sibly acquired through generations becomes an inborn addition to the power of the mind, and that which was unconsciously : done becomes conscious method. , It were well, then, that this idea took deep and firm root digested in the understanding. And, therefore, we have a good ground of hope, from the close and strict union of the experimental and rational faculty, which have not hitherto been united.” In the very place where the obscure passage occurs, he says, after speaking of the inauspicious divorce usually made between mind and nature—“The explanation of which things, and of the true relation between the nature of things and the nature of the mind, is as the strewing and decoration of the bridal chamber of the Mind and Universe, the Divine Goodness assisting ; out of which marriage let us hope (and this be the prayer of the bridal song) there may spring helps to man, and a line and race of inventions that may in some degree subdue and overcome the necessities and miseries of humanity.” 1] THE STUDY OF MIND. 33 in our thoughts: that the development of mind, both in the individual and through generations, is a gradual process of orga- nization—a process in which Nature is undergoing her latest and most consummate development. In reality we do not fail virtually to recognise this in the case of language, whose organic growth, as we scientifically trace it, is the result of the unseen organization of thought that lies beneath, and alone gives it meaning. His own consciousness, faithfully interpreted, might suffice to reveal to each one the gradual maturing, or becoming, through which a process of thought continually goes in his mind. So has it been with mankind: at first there was an instinctive or pure organic development, the human race strug- gling on, as the child does, without being conscious of its ego ; then, as it reached a certain stage of development, it became, as the youth does, exceedingly self-conscious, and an extravagant and unhealthy metaphysical subjectivity was the expression of an undue self-feeling; and finally, as the happily developing individual passes from an undue subjectivity to a calm objective manner of viewing things, so Bacon may be said to mark the epoch of a corresponding happy change in the development of mankind. Let us entirely get rid, however, of the notion that the objective study of nature means merely the sensory per- ception of it; we see, not with the eye, but through it; and to any one who is above the level of the animal the sun is not a bright disc of fire about the size of ‘a cheese, but an immense orb moving through space with its attendant planetary system at the rate of some 400,000 miles a day.* Now, such is the wondrous harmony, connexion, and continuity pervading that mysterious whole which we call Nature, that it is impossible to get a just and clear idea of one pure circle of her works without that idea becoming most useful in flashing a light into obscure and unknown regions, and in thus aiding the conscious estab- lishment of a further harmony of adaptation between man and nature.t The brilliant insight or intuition of the man of genius, _ * “Weare deluded and led by the fallacies of the senses, for instance, to believe that it is the eye that sees, and the ear that hears ; although the eye and the ear are only the organs or instruments through which the soul perceives the modes of the ultimate world.”—SwEDENBoRG, Animal Kingdom, ii. 336. + “Denn wo Natur im reinen Kreise waltet ergreifen alle Welten sich.”— Gorrun, Faust. D 34 ON THE METHOD OF [cHap, who so often anticipates the slow result of systematic investi- gation, witnesses with singular force to that truth. Far Wiser than many of his commentators have been, Bacon accordingly failed not to appreciate clearly the exceeding value of idea in the interpretation of nature. But if the due co-operation of the mind is necessary, if the harmony of subjective and objective was Bacon’s real method, in the prosecution of physical science, how much more useful must the just union of the empirical and rational faculties be in the study of mental science; the task then being to apply the ideas of the mind to the interpretation of the mind’s processes of activity. It must assuredly be allowed that the light of one’s own train of thought is often most serviceable in interpreting the mind of another ;so much so, indeed, that one may know what is passing therein with not less certainty, sometimes even with greater certainty, than when it is actually uttered. In order to be successful in this sort of intuition, however, not only good natural insight, but a large experience of life and men, is most necessary, else the most grievous mistakes may be made; here, as elsewhere, power is acquired by intending the mind to external realities, by submitting the understanding to things. Plainly, too, this objective application of our ideas to the interpretation of another mind is a very different matter from the deliberate direction of consciousness to its own states,—that introspective analysis of the processes of thought whereby, as before said, the natural train of ideas being interrupted and the tension of a particular activity maintained, an artificial state of mind is pro- duced, and a tortured self-consciousness, like an individual put to the torture, makes confessions that are utterly unreliable. The genuine utterances of his inner life, or the sincere and direct revelations of the man of great natural ability and good training, are the highest truths—what Plato has written is of eternal interest ; but the contradictory anatomical revelations of internal analysis by the professed psychologists are the vainest word jugglings with which a tenacious perseverance has vexed a long- suffering world. They should justly be opposed, as by Bacon ; or shunned, as by Shakespeare ; or abhorred, as by Goethe :— “Ich habe nie an Denken gedacht.” As in the child there is no consciousness of the ego, so in the highest development of 1] THE STUDY OF MIND. 35 humanity, as represented by these our greatest, there seems to have been reached a similar unconsciousness of the ego; and the individual, in intimate and congenial sympathy with nature, carries forward its organic evolution with a child-like uncon- sciousness and a child-like success. Before concluding this chapter it may be well distinctly to affirm a truth which is an unwelcome one, because it flatters not the self-love of mankind; and it is this, that there is all the difference in the world between the gifted man of genius, who" can often anticipate the slow results of systematic investigation, and who strikes out new paths, and the common herd of mortals, who must plod on with patient humility in the old tracks, “with manifold motions making little speed:” it is the difference between the butterfly which flies and feeds on honey and the caterpillar which crawls and gorges on leaves. Men, ever eager o “pare the mountain to the plain,” will not willingly confess this; nevertheless it is most true. Rules and systems are necessary for the ordinarily endowed mortals, whose business it is to gather together and arrange the materials ; the genius, who is the architect, has, like nature, an unconscious system of his own. It is the fate of its nature, and no demerit, that the cater- pillar must crawl: it is the fate of its nature, and no merit, that the butterfly must fly. The question, so much disputed, of the relative extent of applicability of the so-called inductive and deductive methods, often resolves itself into a question as to what manner of man it is who is to use them—whether one who has senses only, who has eyes and sees not, or one who has senses and a soul; whether one who can only collect so-called facts of observation, or one who can bind together the thousand scattered facts by the organizing idea, and thus guarantee them to be facts. ‘What an offence to the chartered imbecility of industrious medio- crity that Plato, Shakespeare, Goethe, Humboldt, Bacon too, and, in truth, every man who had anything of inspiration in him, were not mere sense-machines for registering observations, but rather instruments on which the melody of nature, like sphere music, was made for the benefit and delectation of such as have ears to hear! That some so virulently declaim against theory is as though the eunuch should declaim against lechery: it is the chastity of impotence. D2 36 ON THE METHOD OF [cuap, So rarely, however, does nature produce one of thése men gifted with that high and subtile quality called genius—being scarce, indeed, equal to the production of one in a century—and so self-sufficing are they when they do appear, that we, gratefully accepting them as visits of angels, or much as Plato accepted his super-celestial ideas, need not vainly concern ourselves about their manner of working. It is not by such anxious troubling that one will come; it is not by introspective prying into and torture of its own self-consciousness that mankind evolves the genius; the mature result of its unconscious development flows at due time into consciousness with a grateful surprise, and from time to time the slumbering centuries are thus awakened. It is by the patient and diligent work at systematic adaptation to the external by the rank and file of mankind; it is by the conscien- tious labour of each one, after the inductive method, in that little sphere of nature, whether psychical or physical, which in the necessary division of labour has fallen to his lot—that a con- dition of evolution is reached at which the genius bursts forth, Tiresome, then, as the minute man of observation may sometimes seem as he exults over his scattered facts as if they were final, and magnifies his molecules into mountains as if they were eternal, it is well that he should thus enthusiastically esteem his -work ; and no one but will give a patient attention as he reflects how indispensable the humblest unit is in the social organism, and how excellent a spur vanity is to industry. Not unamusing, though somewhat saddening, is it, however, to witness the painful surprise of the man of observation, his jealous indignation and clamorous outcry, when the result at which he and his fellow- labourers have been so patiently, though blindly, working— : when the genius-product of the century which he has helped to create, starts into life—when the metamorphosis is completed: amusing, because the patient worker is supremely astonished at a result which, though preparing, he nowise foresaw ; saddening, because individually he is annihilated, and all the toil in which he spent his strength is swallowed up in the product which, gathering up the different lines of investigation and thought, and giving to them a unity of development, now by epigenesis ensues. We perceive, then, how it is that a great genius cannot come save at long intervals, as the tree cannot blossom but at its due season. 1] THE STUDY OF MIND. 37 But why should any one, great or little, fret and fume because he is likely soon to be forgotten? The genius himself, as indi- vidual, is after all of but little account ; it is only as the birth of the travailing centuries that he exists, only so far as he is a true birth of them and adequately representative that he is of value: the more individual he is the more transitory will be his fame. When he is immortal, he has become a mere name marking an epoch, and no longer an individual. "Whosoever, in a foolish conceit of originality, strains after novelty and neglects the scattered and perhaps obscure labours of others who have pre- ceded him, or who are contemporaneous with him ; whosoever, over-careful of his individual fame, cannot carry forward. his own evolution with a serene indifference to neglect or censure, but makes puerile demands on the approbation of the world— may rest content that he is not a complete birth of the age, but more or less an abortive monstrosity: the more extreme he is as a monstrosity the more original must he needs be.* Viewing mental development, whether in the individual or in the race, as a process of organization, as the consummate display of nature’s organic evolution, and recognising, as we must do, the most favourable conditions of such evolution to be the most intimate harmony between man and nature, we may rightly conclude, so far as concerns the rule of a conscious method of. inquiry, with the ancient and well-grounded maxim— Learn to know thyself in nature, that so thou mayest know nature in thyself.”() NOTES. 1 (p. 4).—“Insomuch that many times not only what was asserted once is asserted still, but what was a question once is a question still, and instead of being resolved by discussion, is only fixed and fed.”— Bacon, Proleg. Inst. Magn. 2 (p. 10).—The received psychology M. Comte calls an “illusory psychology, which is the last phase of theology,” and says that it * « What is all history but the work of ideas,” says Emerson, “‘a record of the indisputable energy which his infinite aspirations infuse into man? Has any grand and lasting thing been done? Who did it? Plainly not one man, but all ‘men: it was the prevalence of, and inundation of an idea.” 38 ON THE METHOD OF [cwap, “ pretends to accomplish the discovery of the laws of the human mind by contemplating it in itself ; that is, by separating it from causes and effects.” (Miss Martineau’s Translation, p. 11.) Again, he says: “In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity that you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe; if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe. The results of such a method are in proportion to its absurdity.” (Ibid. p. 11.) 3 (p, 12).— But the truth is, that they are not the highest in- stances which give the best or securest information, as is expressed, not inelegantly, in the common story of the philosopher, who, while he gazed upon the stars, fell into the water; for if he had looked down, he might have seen the stars in the water, but, looking aloft, he could not see the water in the stars.” —De Augment. Scient. B. ii. * (p. 14).—Individual Psychology Bacon set down as wanting ; he euforces its study, “so that we may have a scientific and accurate dis- section of mind and characters, and the secret dispositions of particular men may be revealed, and that from the knowledge thereof better rules may be framed for the treatment of the mind.”—De Augment. Scient. B. vii. 5 (p. 23).—“ It is to be regretted that he (Dugald Stewart) had not studied (he even treats it as inconceivable) the Leibnitzian doctrine of what has not been well denominated obscure perceptions or tdeas—that is, acts and affections of mind, which, manifesting their existence in their effects, are themselves out of consciousness or apperception. The fact of such latent modifications is now established beyond all rational doubt; and on the supposition of their reality, we are able to solve various psychological phenomena otherwise inexplicable. Among these are many of those attributed to habit.” (Sir W. Hamilton, in his edition of Reid, p. 551.) “Ich sehe nicht,” says Leibnitz, “dass die Cartesianer jemals beweisen haben oder beweisen kénnen, dass jede Vorstellung von Rewusstsein begleitet ist.” And again :—“ Darin namlich haben die Cartesianer sehr gefehlt, dass sie die Vorstellungen, deren man sich nicht bewusst ist, fiir nichts rechneten. Das war auch der Grund, warum sie glaubten, dass nur die Geiste Monaden waren, und dass es keine Seelen der Thiere oder andere Entelechien gebe.”—Leibnitz als Denker. Auswahl seiner kleinern Aufsdtze. By G. Schelling. Pp. 108 and 115. Fichte, in his Bestimmung des Menschen—“ In jedem Momente ihrer Dauer ist die Natur ein zusammenhingendes Ganze; in jedem Momente 1.] THE STUDY OF MIND. 89 muss jeder einzelne Theil derselbe so sein wie er ist, weil alle tibrigen sind wie sie sind ; und du kénntest kein Sandkdrnchen von seiner Stelle verriicken, ohne dadurch vielleicht alle Theile des unermesslichen Ganzen hindurch etwas zu veriindern. Aber jeder Moment dieser Dauer ist bestimmt ‘durch alle abgelaufenen Momente, und wird bestimmen alle kiinftigen Momente, und du kannst in dem gegen- wartigen keines Sandkirne Lage anders denken als sie ist, ohne dass du gendthigt wiirdest die ganze Vergangenheit ins Unbestimmte hinauf, und die ganze Zukunft ins Unbestimmte herab dir anders zu denken.”—Stimmtliche Werke, ii. 178. It is only right to add, that the fullest exposition of unconscious mental action is to be found in Beneke’s works. A summary of his views is contained in his Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft. 6 (p. 37).—Since this chapter was written, and, indeed, separately published, Mr. J. S. Mill has made a powerful defence of the so-called Psychological Method. In his criticism of Comte in the Westminster Review for April 1865, and in his “ Examination of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy,” he has said all that can be said in favour of the Psycho- logical Method, and has done what could be done to disparage the Physiological Method. This he had already done many years ago in the second volume of his “System of Logic,” and he is now only consistent in returning to the charge. Nevertheless, the admirers of Mr. Mill may well experience regret to see him serving with so much zeal on what is a so desperately forlorn hope. Physiology seems never to have been a favourite study with Mr. Mill—in none of his writings does he exhibit any indications of being really acquainted with it; for itis hardly possible to conceive that any one having a knowledge of the present state of this science, would disparage it as he has done, and exalt so highly the psychological method of investi- gating mental phenomena. The wonder is, however, that he who has done so much to expound the system of Comte, and to strengthen and complete it, should on this question take leave of it entirely, and follow and laud a method of research which is so directly opposed to the method of positive science. Of course, I speak now strictly of the method, not of Comte’s application of it in his unfounded phreno- logical speculations, which are scarcely less wild and absurd than his religious delirium appears to be. However, though one may suspect Mr. Mill to be unfortunate in his ignorance, or entirely mistaken in his estimate, of the physiological method, one cannot fail to profit by the study of his arguments on behalf of the psychological method, and by his exposition of its merits. By parading the whole force 40 ON ?THE METHOD OF THE STUDY OF MIND. of the reasons in favour of it, he has exhibited, not so much its ‘strength as its weakness, and has undesignedly given important assistance to the physiological method. For the reasons why he has not been convincing, and why this chapter has been left unmodified, I may refer to the arguments set forth in a review of his “ Examina- tion of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy” in the Journal of Mental Science for January 1866. “Mr. Mill,” it is there said, “has a high opinion of the psychological method of inquiry into mental phenomena, and thinks Comte to have committed a great error in discarding it, Whether that be true or not is not the question now; we may admit it to be true, and still ask whether it is a sufficient reason for ignoring those important results of the physiological method of research which bear vitally on psychology ; whether, in fact, because a certain method has some worth, it can therefore afford to dispense entirely with the aid furnished by other methods.” And again :—“ The present complaint against Mr. Mill is that he takes no notice of the effects of recent scientific conceptions on the questions referred to philosophy ; that he goes on exactly as he might have gone on if he had lived in the days of Aristotle ; that at a time when a new method, highly fertile in fact and of more fruitful promise, was available, he persists in trying to do, by the old method, what Plato, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and a host of others have not done. Now, we have not the slightest faith that ten thousand Mills will, following the same method, do what these great men have not done; but there can be no question that, had Mr. Mill chosen to avail himself of the new material and the new method, which his great predecessors had not in their day, he would have done what no other living man could have done.” CHAPTER II. THE MIND AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. “ That which perceives is a part of nature as truly as the objects of perception which act on it, and, as a part of nature, is itself an object of investigation purely physical. I+ is known to us only in the successive changes which constitute the variety of our feelings : but the regular sequence of these changes admits of being traced, like the regularity which we are capable of discovering in the successive changes of our bodily frame. There isa Physiology of the Mind, then, as there is a Physiology of the Body—a science which examines the phenomena of our spiritual part simply as phenomena, and from the order of their succession, or other circumstances of analogy, arranges them in classes, under certain general names; as, in the physiology of our corporeal part, we consider the phenomena of a different kind which the body exhibits, and reduce all the diversities of these under the names of a few general functions.”—Sketch of a System of Philosophy of the Human Mind, by T. Brown, M.D. CREE crude proposition of Cabanis,* that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, has been a subject of much ridicule to those who have not received it with outcries of dis- approbation and disgust. Assuredly it is not an exact expression of the facts; one may rightly admit the brain to be the principal organ of the mind, without accepting the fallacious comparison of mental action with biliary secretion. Here as elsewhere, con- fusion is bred by the common use of the word “ secretion” to express, not only the functional process but the secreted product, both the insensible vital changes and the tangible results of them. It is of great importance to try to fix, with as much precision as possible, what we mean by mind. ; In the first place, mind, viewed in its scientific sense as a natural force, cannot be observed and handled and dealt with as a palpable object.; like electricity, or gravity, or any other * “Nous concluons avec Ja méme certitude que le cerveau digére en quelque sort les impressions; qu’il fait organiquement la sécrétion dela pensée.”—Rapport du Physique et du Moral de? Homme, par P. J. G. Cabanis. ; 42 THE MIND [cHap. of the natural forces, it is appreciable only in the changes of matter which are the conditions of its manifestation. Few, if any, will now be found to deny that with each display of mental power there are correlative changes in the material substratum ; that every phenomenon of mind is the result, as manifest energy, of some change, molecular, chemical, or vital, in the nervous elements of the brain. Chemical analysis of the so-called extrac- tives of nerve testifies to definite change or “waste” through functional activity ; for there are found, as products of a retro- grade metamorphosis, lactic acid, kreatin, uric acid, probably also hypoxanthin, and, representing the fatty acids, formic and acetic acids, These products are very like those which are found in muscle after its functional activity: in the performance of an idea, as in the performance of a movement, there is a retrograde metamorphosis of organic element; the display of energy is at the cost of the highly-organized matter, which undergoes degene- ration or passes from a higher to a lower grade of being; and the retrograde products are, so far as is at present known, very similar in muscle and nerve. While the contents of nerves, again, are neutral during rest in the living state, they become acid after death, and after great activity during life: the same is the case also with regard to muscle. Furthermore, after pro- longed mental exercise, the products of the metamorphosis of nerve element, into the composition of which phosphorus enters largely, are recognised in an increase of phosphates in the urine; while it is only by supposing an idea to be accompanied by a sorrelative change in the nerve-cells that we can explain the ex- haustion following excessive mental work and the breaking down of the brain in extreme cases. These things being so, what is it which in a physiological sense we designate mind? Not the material products of cerebral activity, but the marvellous energy which cannot be grasped and handled. Here, then, is made manifest a fallacy of the axiom propounded by Cabanis: it is plain that the tangible results of the brain’s activity, the waste matters which pass into the blood for assimilation by tissues of a lower kind, and for ultimate excretion from the body, might not less rightly be called the secretion of the brain, and be com- pared to the bile, than the intangible energy revealed in the mental phenomena, 11] AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 43 Secondly, it is most needful, in order to avoid confusion, to apprehend the exact signification of what is understood by mind, according to the common and vague use of the word. It is really a general term acquired by observation of and abstraction from the manifold variety of mental phenomena: by such obser- vation of the particular phenomena and appropriate abstraction from them we get, as an ultimate generalization; the general conception, or the, so to speak, essential idea, of mind. An ‘illustration will help to exhibit what we mean, The steam- engine is a complicated mechanism, of the construction and mode of action of which many people know very little, but it has a very definite function of which those who know nothing of its construction can still form a sufficiently distinct con- ception ; the co-ordinate, integral action of the steam-engine, as we conceive it, is different from the nicely-adjusted mechanism or from the action of any part of it. But the function of the engine is dependent on the mechanism and on the co-ordinate action of its parts, cannot be dissociated from these, and has no real existence apart from them, though it may exist separately as a conception in our minds. By observation of the mechanism and appropriate abstraction we get the essential idea of the steam-engine,—a fundamental idea of it, which, as our ultimate generalization, expresses its very nature as such, containing, as Coleridge would have said, “the inmost principles of its possibility as a steam-engine.” So likewise with regard to the manifold phenomena of mind; by observation of them and abstraction from the particular we get the general conception or the essential idea of mind, an idea which has no more existence out of the mind than any other abstract idea or general term. In virtue, however, of that powerful tendency m the human mind to make the reality conformable to the idea, a tendency which has been at the bottom of so much confusion in philo- sophy, this general conception has been converted into an objec- tive entity, and allowed to tyrannize over the understanding. A metaphysical abstraction has been made into a spiritual entity, and a complete barrier thereby interposed in the way of positive investigation. Whatever be the real nature of mind—and of that there is no need to speak here—it is most certainly dependent for its every manifestation on the brain “4 THE MIND [cHap. and nervous system ; and now that scientific research is daily disclosing more clearly the relations between it and its organ, it is plainly most desirable to guard against the common’ meta- physical conception of mind, by recognising the true subjective character of the conception and the mode of its origin and ‘growth. A third important consideration is, that mental power is truly an organized result, not, strictly speaking, built up, but ‘matured by insensible degrees in the course of life. The brain is not, like the liver, the heart and other internal organs, capa- ble from the time of birth of all the functions which it ever discharges ; for while, in common with them, it has a certain organic function to which it is born equal, its high special character in man as the organ of conscious life, the supreme instrument of his relations with the rest of nature, is developed only by a long and patient education. Though the brain, then, is formed during embryonic life, its highest development only takes place after birth; and, as will hereafter appear, the same gradual] progress from the general to the special, which is exhibited in the development of the organ, is witnessed in the development of our intelligence. How inexact and misleading in this regard, therefore, is any comparison between it and the liver! Nevertheless, it must be distinctly laid down, that mental action is as surely dependent on the nervous structure as the function of the liver confessedly is on the hepatic structure: that is the fundamental principle upon which the fabric of a mental science must rest. The countless thousands of nerve- cells which form so great a part of the delicate structure of the brain, are undoubtedly the centres of its functional activity: we know right well from experiment, that the ganglionic nerve- cells scattered through the tissues of organs, as for example through the walls of the intestines or the structure of the heart, are centres of nerve force ministering to their organic action; and we may confidently infer that the ganglionic cells of the brain, which are not similarly amenable to observation and experi- ment, have a like function. Certainly they are not inexhaustible centres of self-generating force; they give out no more than what they have in one way or another taken in; they receive 1.] AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 45 material from the blood, which they assimilate, or make of the same kind with themselves; a correlative metamorphosis of force necessarily accompanying this upward transformation of matter, and the nerve-cell thus becoming, so long as its equili- brium is preserved, a centre of statical power of the highest vital quality. The maintenance of the equilibrium of nerve element is the condition of latent thought—it is mind statical ; the manifestation of thought involves the change or destruction of nerve element. The nerve-cell of the brain, it might in fact be said, represents statical thought, while thought repre- sents dynamical nerve-cell, or, more properly, the energy of nerve-cell. So far from discussing whether mind is the function of the brain, the business which science now has. immediately be- fore it is the more special investigation of the conditions of activity of the ganglionic nerve-cell or groups of nerve-cells. If we look to those humbler animals in which nervous tissue wakes its first appearance, it is plain that the simple mode of its existence in them allows of no other manner of proceeding ; if we trace upwards the gradual increasing complication of the nervous system through the animal kingdom, it is evident that such manner of proceeding is the only one to furnish the materials of a comprehensive and sound induction; and if we duly weigh the results of physiological experiment and patho- logical research, it is no less certain that we must discard scientific investigation altogether in cerebral physiology, if we reject the ganglionic nerve-cell of the brain as a centre of mental force. In the lowest forms of animal life nerve does not exist: the Protozoa aud many of the Zoophytes are destitute of any trace of nervous system. The most simple beings consist of a uniform, homogeneous substance, by means of which all their functions are executed. They are nourished without digestive organs ; breathe without respiratory organs; feel and move without organs of. sense, without muscles, without nervous system.. The stimulus which the little creature receives from without produces some change in the molecular relations of its almost homogeneous substance, and these insensible movements would seem to amount collectively to the sensible movement which it 46 THE MIND [cuap, makes; the molecular process in such case being not unlike that which takes place and issues in the coagulation of the blood, when the fibrine is brought in contact, as some think, with a foreign substance.* The perception of the stimulus by the creature is the molecular change which ensues, the imperceptible motion passing, by reason of the homo- geneity of its substance, with the greatest ease from element to element of the same kind, as it were by an infection, or as happens in the sensitive plant; and the sum of the mole- cular motions, as necessarily determined in direction by the form of the animal, or by some not yet recognised cause, results in the visible movement. The recent researches of Graham into the colloidal condition of matter have proved the necessity of considerable modification in our usual conception of solid matter: instead of the notion of impenetrable, inert matter, we must substitute the idea of matter which, in its colloidal state, is penetrable, exhibits energy, and is widely susceptible to external agents, “its existence being a continued metastasis.” This sort of energy is not a result of chemical action, for colloids are singularly inert in all ordinary chemical relations, but a result of its unknown intimate molecular constitution ; and the un- doubted existence of colloidal energy in organic substances which are usually considered inert and called dead, may well warrant the belief of its larger and more essential operation in organic matter, in the state of instability of composition in which it is when under the condition of life. Such energy would then suffice to account for the simple uniform movements of the homogeneous substance of which the lowest animal consists; and the absence of any differentiation of structure is a sufficient reason of the absence of any localization of function and of the general uniform reaction to different impressions. But it will be observed that even the movements of these simplest crea- tures, in which there is not the least indication of the ele- ments of a nervous system, are not entirely vague, confused, and indefinite; they present certain indications of adaptation to functional ends, : With the differentiation of tissue and increasing. complexity * Croonian Lecture before the Royal Society, 1863. By Professor J. Lister, F.R.S. + Philosophical Transactions, 1862. 11] AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. AZT of organization, which are met with as we ascend in the animal kingdom, the nervous tissue appears, but at first under a very simple form. Its simplest type may be represented as two fibres that are connected by a nerve-cell or a ganglionic group of nerve- cells ; the fibres are apparently simple conductors, and might be roughly compared to the conducting wires of a telegraph, while the cell, being the centre in which nerve force is generated, may be compared to the telegraphic apparatus ; in it the effect which the stimulus of the afferent or centripetal nerve excites, is transmitted along the efferent or centrifugal nerve, and therein is displayed the simplest form of that reflex action which plays so large a part in animal life.* This type of structure is re- peated through the complex nervous system of all the higher animals. Cut across the afferent nerve, or otherwise interrupt its continuity, the impression cannot reach the centre ; cut across the efferent nerve, the central excitation is powerless to influence the muscles or parts to which it is distributed. Not all the passion and eloquence of a Demosthenes couid force its way outwards into words, if the motor nerves of the tongue were cut across. Owing to the differences of kinds of tissue, and to the specialization of organs in the more complex animal, there cannot plainly be that intimate molecular sympathy between all parts which there is in the homogeneous substance of the simplest monad ; the easy motion, as by an infection, from particle to particle, is not possible in the heterogeneous body, where the elements are of a different kind: accordingly special provision is required for insuring communication between different parts, and for co-ordinating and harmonizing the activity of different organs. The animal * The fibres act as simple conductors, and have like physiological properties, Philippeau and Vulpian (Comptes Rendus, vi.) and Rosenthal (Centralblatt, No. 29, 1864) have succeeded in uniting the central end of the cut lingual nerve, the sensory nerve of the tongue, with the peripheral end of the cut hypo- glossal, the motor nerve of the tongue. Stimulation of the central part of the lingual produced contractions of the tongue, such as normally follow stimulation of the hypoglossal. Thus it is proved that the end of a sensory nerve may be united with the end of a motor nerve, and when the union is complete, excitation of the sensory may be transmitted to the motor fibres. Inversely, stimulation of the peripheral end of the hypoglossal produced evidence of pain. It would seem that the neurility is the same in all nerves ; the difference of function being due, not to difference of physiological properties, but to difference of connexion of the fibres. Sce also Legons sur la Physiologie Générale, et comparée du Systéme Nerveux, par A. Vulpian. 1866. 48 THE MIND [cHap. must be rendered capable of associating a number of distinct actions for definite ends. This function, necessitated by the physiological division of labour, the nervous system subserves ; and we might compare it to that which the gifted generalizer fulfils in human development: he grasps the results of the various special investigations which a necessary division of labour enforces, brings them together, and elaborates a result in which the different lines of thought are co-ordinated, and a unity of action is marked out for future progress. The nervous system effects the synthesis which the specialization of organic instruments in the analysis of nature renders necessary ; it is the highest expression of that principle of individuation which is the characteristic feature of life in all its forms, but most manifest in its highest. To this function it is well adapted, first, by the extent of its distribution, and, secondly, by its exceeding sensibility, whereby an impression made at one part is almost instantly felt at any distance. With the increasing complexity of organization, which marks the increasing speciality of organic adaptation to external nature, or, in other words, which marks an ascent in the scale of animal life, there is a progressive complication of the nervous system: special developments ministering to special purposes take place, The fibres appear to preserve their characters as simple conduc- tors, while a development of special structures at their peripheral, and of special ganglionic cells at their central endings, reveals the increasing speciality and complexity of function. Upon the special structures at the peripheral ends, which are, as it were, the instruments of analysis, depends the kind of the impression made ; and by the nature of the nerve-cells with which the cen- tral end of the nerve is connected, the kind of impression that is perceived and the character of the reaction thereto are deter- mined, Accordingly, we find that, with the appearances of the organs of the special senses, as we mount in the scale of animal life, there is a corresponding increase in the ganglionic centres, which, being clustered together, form the primitive rudiments of a brain, and represent, in the main, those sensory ganglia which in man lie between the decussation of the pyramids and the floors of the lateral ventricles. It is not known with certainty when the different organs of the special senses severally make 1.] AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 49 heir first appearance, for they are at first very rudimentary ; in che starfish, which belongs to the humble Echinodermata, there s at the extremity of each ray a small red spot which is said to oresent the characteristics of a rudimentary eye; but whether ‘his be so or not, it is certain that special structures, adapted to he reception of particular impressions, as of light, of sound, f touch, render the higher animal capable of more numerous, special, and complex relations with external nature. There is \ diffusion through the entire substance of the simplest creatures f physiological properties which are specialized and localized in the higher animals,* Not till we arrive as high as the fishes, and not then in the ‘ingular Amphioxus, do we discover anything more in the. brain ‘han sensory ganglia connected with the origins. of nerves ; so ar there is no trace of cerebral hemispheres, or of brain proper. -t is plain then that the cerebral hemispheres are not essential 0 sensation and the motor reaction to sensation; for they are together wanting where both these functions are displayed in \ lively and vigorous way. To the simpler relation between the ndividual organism and external nature, which is denoted by ‘eflex action, there now succeeds that more complex relation tf sensory perception and sensorimotor reaction, as Dr. Carpenter ras called it; in place of reaction to a general stimulus, discri- ninations of impressions, and corresponding special reactions vy virtue of structures specially adapted, are witnessed. This ‘ondition of the development of the nervous system, which is * When a special sense fails in man, the general sensibility may partially eplace it. ‘‘I have known several instances,” says Abercrombie, ‘of persons ffected with that extreme degree of deafness, which occurs in the deaf and dumb, zho had a peculiar susceptibility to particular kinds of sounds, depending, appa- ently, on an impression communicated to their organs of touch or simple sensa- ion. They could tell, for instance, the approach of a carriage in the street rithout seeing it, before it was taken notice of by persons who had the use of all heir senses.”—On the Intellectual Powers, Kruse, who was completely deaf, evertheless had a bodily feeling of: music ; and different instruments affected im differently. Musical tones seemed to his perception to have much analogy ‘ith colours. The sound of a trumpet was yellow to him ; that of a drum, red; hat of the organ, green ; &.—Early History of Mankind, by J. B. Tylor. In is Reminiscences of the Opera, My. Lumley tells of a friend who used to compare he voices of the different celebrated singers to different colours, distinguishing hem so. It is an old saying of a blind man, that he thought scarlet was like the ound of a trumpet. : a = E 50 THE MIND © [cHaP. natural and permanent in so many of the lower animals, cor- responds to that artificial state of things which may be produced experimentally in a higher animal by depriving it of its hemi- spheres. The kind of function manifest is strictly comparable to the early brief stage of the infant’s mental life before the cerebral hemispheres have come into action, or to those phenomena of mental life sometimes displayed by the adult, as for example by the somnambulists, when the influence of the cerebral hemi- spheres is suspended. Here let us make a reflection: how important it is clearly to distinguish and denote special features, which, being included. under, or described by, a general term, are so commonly con- founded. What different perceptions or reactions, for example, are confounded by the loose way of using the word sensibility ! The infusorial animalcule, which has no nervous tissue, is said to be sensible of a stimulus ; the higher animal, with its special senses, to be sensible of light, or of sound, as the case may be; and, if made to suffer, to be sensible of pain ; while itis common enough to speak of man being sensible of pleasure, horror, or disgust, according to the nature of the active ideas. If we use the generic term sensibility to express the fundamental reaction, as we may perhaps properly do, it is highly important that we proceed further to distinguish by appropriate terms the special differences ; the sensibility of pain is not the sensibility of sense, nor is the sensibility of the infusorial animalcule equivalent to either of these. So far we have taken pains to distinguish that form of sensibility and reaction proper to the lowest animals, and which might be called irritability; that form of reaction, or reflex action, which is the lowest expression of nervous function ; and that form of reaction to which the sensory ganglia minister, and which is rightly called sensorial. It is in fishes that the rudiments of cerebral hemispheres first appear. In them they are represented by a thin layer or projec- tion of nervous matter in front of the corpora quadrigemina, covering the corpora striata and the optic thalami; in the Amphibia, they have already increased somewhat in size ;* in Birds, the corpora quadrigemina are pushed out to some extent ; * The Perenni-branchiate reptiles retain the fish character of brain all their lives; the Batrachians have it only during their tadpole state. 1] AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 51 oy their further increase ; in the Mammalia, they begin to cover he corpora quadrigemina, and, as we ascend in the scale of life, gradually increase backwards until, in some of the higher nonkeys, and in man, they entirely cover the cerebellum. In this ascent through the series of vertebrate animals, it is ound that the relations of the sensory ganglia remain alike shroughout, the chief differences being differences in the relative size of them. Their functions, as primary constituents of the grain, may then fairly be counted the same in all the vertebrata, md indeed in all the animals in which they exist. As the 1emispheres appear as secondary constituents—secondary, be it 10ted, in the order of development, but primary in dignity—we nay rightly conclude their function to be secondary to that which ihe primary constituents or sensory ganglia fulfil, The impres- sions received by the sensory centres, when they do not react lirectly outwards, as they may do where hemispheres exist, and as ‘hey must do where hemispheres do not exist, are in fact passed mwards in the brain to the cells which are spread over the 1emispheres, and there further fashioned into what are called ‘deas or conceptions. Here then we come to another kind of sen- ‘ibility, with its appropriate reaction, to which a special nervous sentre ministers ; and it is known as perception, or, more strictly, deational perception. As the hemispheres have this function, ind are not necessary to sensory perception, it is quite in accord- mce with what might be predicted, that, as experiments prove, they are insensible to pain, and do not give rise to any display f that kind of feeling when they are injured.* They have, wwreeably to their special nature, a sensibility of their own to he ideas that are fashioned in them ; so that these may be plea- urable or painful, or have other particular emotional qualities.t Observation of the mental phenomena of those animals in vhich cerebral hemispheres exist, fully confirms the foregoing ‘ew of their function and import. In Fishes there is the first listinct appearance of simple ideas, and of the lowest rudiments f emotion ; carp will collect to be fed at the sound of a bell, * An animal—a hen, for example—which makes violent movements while the kin is being cut and the roof of its skull removed, remains quite quiet while its emispheres are being sliced away bit by bit. + Emotion is strictly, perhaps, the sensibility of the supreme centres to ideas. E2 32 THE MIND [cuap, thus giving evidence of the association of two simple ideas ; and a shark, suspicious of mischief, will avoid the baited hook. In Birds, conformably to the increased development of the hemispheres, the manifestations of intelligence are much greater ; the tricks which some of them may be taught are truly marvel- lous, and those who teach them know how much different birds differ in intelligence and temper. Nor are simple emotional exhibitions wanting amongst them ; very evident at times is the feeling of rivalry or jealousy in canaries, and there are undoubted instances on record in which an orphan bird has owed its life to the kindly care of birds of a different species.* In Mammalia a gradual advance in intelligence may be traced from very lowly manifestations up to those highest forms of brute reason which assuredly differ only in degree from the lowest forms of human intelligence.t Consider how plainly, in the dog, a conception often intervenes between the sensation and the usual respondent movement, so that the animal refrains from doing what it has a strong impulse to do; the impression has been passed on to the hemispheres, and their controlling action brought into play. It is needless to speak of the various emotions, nay, the veritable moral feeling, displayed by the dog and other domesticated animals, A single reflection will show, what anatomy might lead us to predicate, how limited is the range of animal intelli- gence: if the fox, cunning as it is, had but the sense to learn to climb a tree, like the cat, men would soon give up hunting it, But the fox, like so many men, cannot get out of the usual groove of thought, cannot originate anything; and, like not a few scheming plotters, it wastes a great deal of low cunning in efforts which a little larger view of things would render quite unnecessary. As we ascend through the Mammalian series, we find that not only do the hemispheres increase in size by gradually extending backwards, but that the grey surface of them is further increased by being thrown into folds or convolutions. While the lower Mammals are entirely destitute of such convolutions, these are present, as a rule, in simple forms in the Ruminantia and , * Anatomie comparée du Systtme Nerveux, par Leuret et Gratiolet. + For examples of wonderful intelligence in different animals, I may refer to a paper by me on the Genesis of Mind in the Journal of Mental-Science, 1862. 1] AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 53 Pachydermata ; they are more fully developed in the Carnivora, and most fully developed in the apes and in man. It is true that we cannot at present unfold an exact relation between the development of the convolutions and the degree of intelligence in different animals; for the brains of the ass, the sheep, and the ox are more convoluted than those of the beaver, the cat, and the dog. But the relative size of the animals must be taken into account in such comparison, The volume of a body such as the brain, which increases in size, increases in greater propor- tion than the supertficies, and the latter again in greater proportion than the diameter. Now in each natural group or order of Mammalia, the head, but especially the capacity of the skull, has a certain relation to the body, a relation which remains pretty constant in different species; the head of the tiger or of the lion, for example, has about the same relation to the body as that of the cat’s head to its body, although the sizes of the animals are so different. It follows then that, the volume of the brain of the tiger in relation to the size of the body being the same as in the cat, the superficies of the brain is proportionately greater in the smaller animal; and that, consequently, in order to get a proportionate extent of grey surface in the larger animal, this must be convoluted in it, when it may remain nearly smooth in the smaller one. If in two animals of equal size, and of like form of structure, the con- volutions are differently fashioned, then it may be said with certainty that one will be more intelligent than the other in proportion as its convolutions are more numerous and com- plicated, and the sulci deeper. That proposition is true of man. The intellectual differences which exist between the Bosjesman, or the Negro, and the European are attended with differences in the extent and com- plication of the nervous substance of the brain. Gratiolet has carefully figured and described the brain of the Hottentot Venus, who was no idiot; and what is at once striking in the figure is the simplicity sont regular arrangement of the convolutions of the frontal: lobe; they present an. almost perfect symmetry in the two hamieshaiea: “such ag is never exhibited in the normal brains of the Caucasian race,” and which involuntarily recalls the regularity and symmetry of ‘the cerebral convolutions in the 54 THE MIND [cHap, lower animals. The brain of this Bosjeswoman was, in truth, inferior to that of a white woman arrived at the normal stage of development: “it could be compared only with the brain of a white who is idiotic from arrest of cerebral development.” Moreover, the differences between it and the brain of the white are unquestionably of the same kind as, though less in degree than, those which exist between the ape’s brain and that of man, as Professor Huxley has distinctly pointed out.* Mr. Marshall has recently examined a Bushwoman’s brain, and has found like evidence of structural inferiority; the primary convolutions, though all present, were smaller than in the European, and much less complicated ; the external connecting convolutions were still more remarkably defective; the secondary sulci and convolu- tions were everywhere decidedly less developed; there was a deficiency of the system of transverse commissural fibres ; and in size, and in every one of the signs of comparative inferiority, “ it leaned, as it were, to the higher quadrumanous forms.” t The brain of the Negro is superior to that of the Bushman, but still it does not reach the levek of the white man’s brain; the weight of the male Negro’s brain is less than that of the average European female; and the greater symmetry of its convolutions, and the narrowness of the hemispheres in front, are points in which it resembles the brain of the ourang-outang, as even Tiedemann, the Negro’s advocate, has admitted. Among Europeans it is found that, other circumstances being alike, the size of the brain bears a general relation to the mental power of the individual, although apparent exceptions to the rule sometimes occur. The average weight of the brain in the educated class is certainly greater than in the uneducated; and some carefully-compiled tables in a valuable paper by Dr. Thurnam prove that, while the average brain weight of ordinary Europeans is 49 oz. in distinguished men it is 54:6 oz{ On the other hand, the brain is commonly very small in idiots; * Man’s Place in Nature. + Philosophical Transactions, 1865. + On the Weight of the Human Brain, by John Thurnam, M.D. ; Journal of Mental Science, April 1866. Professor Wagner has carefully figured and described the brains of five very distinguished men. The extremely complex arrangement of the convolutions was most remarkable.—The Convolutions of the Human Cerebrum, by W. Turner, M.B, 1866. u.] AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 25 the parts being not only smaller, but less complex, and the con- volutions in particular being simpler and less developed. Mr. Marshall found the convolutions of the cerebra of the two idiots which he examined to be fewer in number than in the apes, the brains being in this respect more simple than the brain of the gibbon, and approaching that of the baboon. In fact, there are microcephalic idiots which present a complete series of stages of descent. from man to the apes. As a general proposition, it is certainly true that we find the evidence of a correspondence between the development of the cerebral hemispheres and the degree of intelligence, when we examine the different races or kinds of men, as we do when we survey the scale of animal life. As in the series of the manifold productions of her creative art Nature has made no violent leap, but has passed by gentle gradations from one species of animal to another, and from the highest animal to the lowest man, it is not surprising that the embryonic development of man should present indications of the general plan.* It admits of no question that man does, in the course of his development, pass through stages closely resembling those through which other vertebrate animals pass; and that these transitory conditions in. him are not unlike the forms that are permanent in the lower animals. There is a very close mor- phological resemblance between the human ovum and the lowest animals with which we are acquainted, the microscopic Grega- rinida;t in both, an outer membrane contains a soft semi-fluid * «That there should be more species of intelligent beings above us,” says Locke, ‘‘than there are of visible or material below us, is probable to me from hence that in all the corporeal world we see no chasms or gaps.” But how can it be safe to apply to the unseen a generalization from the seen ? + “The Gregarinida,” says Huxley, ‘are all microscopic, and any one of them, leaving minor modifications aside, may be said to consist of a sac, comprised of a more or less structureless, not very well defined membrane, containing a soft semi-fluid substance, in the midst or at one end of which lies a delicate vesicle ; in the centre of the latter is a more solid particle. No doubt many persons will be struck with the close resemblance of the structure of this body to that which is possessed by the ovum. You might take the more solid particle to be the representative of the germinal spot, and the vesicle to be that of the germinal vesicle ; while the semi-fluid sarcodic contents might be regarded as the yelk, and. the outer membrane as the vitelline membrane. I do not wish to strain the analogy too far, but it is at any rate interesting to observe the close morphological resemblance between one of the lowest of animals, and that form in which all the higher animals commence their existence.” —Lect. on Comp. Anat. 1864. 56 THE MIND [cuar. substance, at one end of which is a delicate vesicle, having in it a solid particle or spot. At the earliest stages of its develop- ment no human power can distinguish the human ovum from that of a quadruped; and, as it proceeds to its destined end, it passes through similar stages to those through which other vertebrate embryos pass. That which is true of the whole body is true also of the development of the brain, The brain of the human fcetus at the sixth week consists of a series of vesicles, the foremost of which, a double one, representing the cerebrum, is the smallest, and the hindmost, representing the cerebellum, the largest. In front of the latter is the vesicle of the corpora quadrigemina ; and in front again of this, the vesicle of the third ventricle, which contains also the thalami optici, and which, as development proceeds, becomes covered, as do the corpora quad- rigemina, by the backward growth of the hemispheres in front of it. At this stage the human brain resembles the fully-formed brain of the fish, more closely the brain of the foetal fish, in the small proportion which the cerebral hemispheres bear to the other parts, in the absence of convolutions, in the deficiency of commissures, and in the general simplicity of structure. About the twelfth week of embryonic life there is a great resemblance to the brain of the bird: the cerebral hemispheres are much increased in size, and arch back towards the thalami optici and the corpora quadrigemina, though there are still no convolutions, and the commissures are very deficient. Up to this time the cerebral hemispheres represent no more than the rudiments of the anterior lobes; they do not yet completely cover the thalami optici, nor indeed pass the grade of development which is per- manent in the Marsupial Mammalia. During the fourth and early part of the fifth month, the middle lobes develop back- wards and cover the corpora quadrigemina; and, subsequently, the posterior lobes sprout out, so to speak, and gradually extend backwards so as to cover and overlap the cerebellum. It was upon the erroneous assumption that the posterior lobes were peculiar to man, that Professor Owen grounded his division of the Archencephala ; but it has now been proved unquestionably that the posterior lobes exist in the apes, and that in some of them they extend as far back as they do in man. It is easy to perceive, then, that an arrest of development of the human brain 11] AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 57 may leave it very much in the condition of an animal brain; and it is found in some cases, as a matter of fact, that congenital idiots have brains very like those of the monkeys. As man is thus a sort of compendium of animal nature, paralleling nature, as Sir Thomas Browne has it, in the cosmo- graphy of himself, all the different modes of nervous function are exhibited in the workings of his organism. The so-called irritability of tissue, whereby it reacts to a stimulus without the help of nerve, may be of the same kind as that molecular energy of matter manifest in the movements of the humblest animal : whether the nerve ends outside the sarcolemma of muscle, or within it, there can be no doubt that it is not distributed to every part of the sarcous element; and, at any rate, when all nervous influence is withdrawn, an energy still exists sufficient to produce rigor mortis of the muscle.* The simplest mode of nervous action in man, comparable to that of the lowest animals that possess nerve, is exhibited by the scattered ganglionic cells belonging to the sympathetic system, which are concerned in certain organic processes. The heart’s action, for example, is due to the ganglionic cells dispersed through its substance ; Meissner has recently shown that nerve-cells disseminated through the tissues of the intestines govern their motions; and Lister thinks it probable that cells scattered’ in the tissues pre- side over the contractions of the arteries, and even the remark- able diffusion of the pigment granules which takes place in the stellate cells of the frog’s skin. The separate elements of the tissue are co-ordinated by the individual nerve-cells; and these co-ordinating centres, again, are found to be under the control of the cerebro-spinal centres. In the spinal cord the ganglionic nerve-cells are collected together, and so united that groups of * Tt has furthermore been recently maintained by Bilharz and Kiihne, that the nerves pass by continuity into the muscular substance, as in the electric organs of the fishes they pass continuously into the protoplasm of the electric plates. The controversy respecting the manner in which nerves end in muscles seems, then, likely to terminate in the conclusion that they do not end at all, but pass by continuity of substance into the sarcous elements, The observations of Kiihne and Rouget prove that the nerve fibre, reduced to its axis cylinder, penetrates the sarcolemma, and is lost. The nervous filaments of insects cannot sometimes be distinguished from the other elements by means of the microscope. Pfliiger has discovered that the nerves to the glands penctrate the walls of the cells, and, as he believes, end in the nuclei. 58 THE MIND [cuar. them become independent centres of combined movements in answer to stimuli; this arrangement representing the entire nervous system of those animals in which no organs of special sense have yet appeared. Still higher in the scale of the nervous system, the sensory ganglia, formed of multitudes of specially endowed cells, are clustered together, and form a very important part of the brain of man, while in many animals, as already seen, they constitute the whole of the brain. In the cerebral hemispheres there is a still greater specialization of structure with corresponding exaltation of function ; and, conformably to its highest degree in man, there are in him the highest and the most complex manifestations of mental function. In the human organism, then, is summed up the animal kingdom, which actually presents us with a sort of analysis of it; for in the functions ‘of man we observe, as in a microcosm, an integration and barmonious co-ordination of different vital actions which are separately displayed by different members of the animal kingdom. In dealing with the function of the nervous system in man, it is, then, most necessary to distinguish the different nervous centres :— 1, There are the primary centres, or ideational centres, consti- tuted by the grey matter of the convolutions of the hemispheres. 2. There are the secondary nervous centres, or sensory centres, constituted by the collections of grey matter that lie between the decussation of the pyramids and the floors of the lateral ventricles. 3. There are the tertiary nervous centres, or centres of reflex action, constituted mainly by the grey matter of the spinal cord. 4, There are the organic nervous centres, as we might call them, belonging to the sympathetic system. They consist of a set of ganglionic bodies distributed mainly over the viscera, and connected with one another and with the spinal centres by internuntiant cords. Each distinct centre is subordinated to the centre immediately above it, but is at the same time capable of determining and maintaining certain movements of its own without the inter- vention of its supreme centre. The organization is such that a due independent local action is compatible with the proper 11.J AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 59 control of a superior central authority. The ganglionic cell of the sympathetic co-ordinates the energy of the separate ele- ments of the tissue in which it is placed, and thus represents the simplest form of a principle of individuation ;* through the cells of the spinal centre the functions of the different organic centres are so co-ordinated as to have their subordinate but essential place in the movements of animal life—and herein is witnessed a further and higher individuation; the spinal centres are similarly controlled by the sensory centres, and these, in their turn, are subordinate to the controlling action of the cerebral hemispheres, and especially to the action of the will, which, properly fashioned, represents the highest display of the principle of individuation. The greater the subordina- tion of parts in any animal, the higher and the more perfect it is.| Were it not well if man in his social life could contrive to imitate this excellent organization ? Most important and varied functions having been assigned to nerve-cells, it may be asked, On what evidence do the statements rest? On the evidence of anatomical investigation, experiments upon animals, and physiological and pathological researches. (a) Anatomical Evidence.—It is certainly not possible to trace every nerve fibre to its connexion with a cell, and till lately no such connexion had been distinctly seen ; but it has now been observed in many instances, and most investigators believe that neither in the brain nor in the spinal cord does there exist an isolated apolar nerve-cell; such, if supposed to be seen, being in reality one which has had its processes torn away, or not being a nerve-cell at all, but a connective tissue corpuscle. This is an inference which has scarcely less certainty than an observed fact; it is not necessary, as Goethe has said, to travel round the world in order to feel sure that the heavens are everywhere above it. * Coleridge, in his “Hints towards the Formation of a comprehensive Theory of Life,” takes from Schelling the definition—“ Life is the principle of Indi- viduation.” + After speaking of an organisn as a collection of individual elements, Goethe goes on to say :—“Je unvolkommener das Geschopf ist desto mehr sind diese Theile einander gleich oder Shnlich, und desto mehr gleichen sie dem Ganzen. Je volkommener das Geschépf wird, desto untbnlicher werden die Theile einander. Je abnlicher die Theile einander sind, desto weniger sind sic einander subordinirt. Die Subordination der Theile deutet auf ein volkommeneres Geschopf.” 60 THE MIND [cHar. Granting the constant connexion of the fibre with the cell, are the ganglionic cells so numerous and so arranged as to render it conceivable that they can adequately minister to the manifold and complex manifestations of our mental life? Most certainly they are: Mr. Lockhart Clarke’s careful and valuable researches into the structure of the cortical layers of the hemispheres reveal a variety, delicacy, and complexity of constitution such as answer to the varied and complex manifestations of mind. The following concise summary of those important researches, for which I am indebted to Mr. Lockhart Clarke’s kindness, will indicate exactly how the complexity of physical structure agrees with the complexity of mental function :— “Tn the human brain most of the convolutions, when properly examined, may be seen to consist of at least seven distinct and concentric layers of nervous substance, which are alternately paler and darker from the circumference to the centre. The laminated structure is most strongly marked at the extremity of the posterior lobe. In this situation all the nerve-cells are small, but differ considerably in shape, and are much more abundant in some layers than in others. In the superficial layer, which is pale, they are round, oval, fusiform, and angular, but not nume- rous. The second and darker layer is densely crowded with cells of a similar kind,in company with others that are pyriform and pyramidal, and lie with their tapering ends either toward the surface or parallel with it, in connexion with fibres which run in corresponding directions. The broader ends of the pyra- midal cells give off two, three, four, or more processes, which run partly towards the central white axis of the convolution and in part horizontally along the plane of the layer, to be continuous, like those at the opposite ends of the cells, with nerve fibres running in different directions. “The third layer is of a much paler colour. It is crossed, however, at right angles by narrow and elongated groups of small cells and nuclei of the same general appearance as those of the preceding layer. These groups are separated from each other by bundles of fibres radiating towards the surface from the central white axis of the convolution, and together with them form a beautiful fan-like structure. “The fourth layer also contains elongated groups of small 11.] AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 61 cells and nuclei, radiating at right angles to its plane; but the groups are broader, more regular, and, together with the bundles of fibres between them, present a more distinctly fan-like arrangement. “The fifth layer is again paler‘and somewhat white. It con- tains, however, cells and nuclei which have a general resem- blance to those of the preceding layers, but they exhibit only a faintly radiating arrangement. “The sixth and most internal layer is reddish-grey. It not only abounds with cells like those already described, but con- tains others that are rather larger. It is only here and there that the cells are collected into elongated groups which give the appearance of radiations. On its under side it gradually blends with the central white axis of the convolution, into which its cells are scattered for some distance. “The seventh layer is this central white stem or axis of the convolution. On every side it gives off bundles of fibres, which diverge in all directions, and in a fan-like manner, towards the surface through the several grey layers. As they pass between the elongated and radiating groups of cells in the inmwer grey layers, some of them become continuous with the processes of the cells in the same section or plane, but others bend round and run horizontally, both in a transverse and longitudinal direction (in reference to the course of the entire convolution), and with various degrees of obliquity. While the bundles themselves are by this means reduced in size, their component jibres become finer in proportion as they traverse the layers towards the sur- face, in consequence, apparently, of branches which they give off to be connected with cells in their course. Those which reach the outer grey layer are reduced to the finest dimensions, and form a close network with which the nuclei and cells are in connexion. “ Besides these fibres, which diverge from the central white axis of the convolution, another set, springing from the same source, converge, or rather curve inwards from opposite sides, to form arches along some of the grey layers. These arciform fibres run in different planes—transversely, obliquely, and longitu- dinally—and appear to be partly continuous with those of the divergent set which bend round, as already stated, to follow a 62 THE MIND [orap. similar course. All these fibres establish an infinite number of communications in every direction between different parts of each convolution, between different convolutions, and between these and the central white substance. “The other convolutions of the cerebral hemispheres differ from those at the extremities of the posterior lobes, not only by the comparative faintness of their several layers, but also by the appearance of some of their cells, We have already seen that, at the extremity of the posterior lobe, the cells of ALL the layers are small and of nearly uniform size, the inner layer only con- taining some that are a little larger. But, on proceeding forward from this point, the convolutions are found-to contain a number of cells of a much larger kind.