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‘ornell Universi

Studies in naval history.Biographies.

 
STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY

 
 

 

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

 

8vo. price 16s.

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES
oF

HORATIO, VISCOUNT NELSON, K.B.

DUKE OF BRONTE, VICE-ADMIRAL OF THE WHITE SQUADRON.

SELECTED AND ARRANGED BY

JOHN KNOX LAUGHTON, M.A.

Lecturer in Naval History at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich.

© Prof. LavGHTOoN’s book will, we trust, be added to every ship’s library,
for every naval officer or man would be the better for studying this record
of the ceaseless forethought, constant application, undeviating attention to
duty, and thorough grasp of details, which are here shown to have been
the guiding principles of our greatest and most glorious admiral.’
ARMY AND Navy GAZETTE,

 

 

London: LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.

 

 
BIOGRAPHIES

BY

JOHN KNOX LAUGHTON, M.A.

—
PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY AT KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON
LECTURER ON NAVAL HISTORY AT THE ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE, GREENWICH

LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1887
wT
L37

A767 5+
SSO

‘PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
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KvrP
PREFACE.

—1——

Turse SrupiEs, now collected from the different maga-
zines in which they have first appeared, will not, I hope,
be considered as merely reclaimed waifs; for the idea of
thus bringing them together in a more permanent form
has always been present to me, even whilst originally
writing them: and having carefully revised them by the
light of the most recent published information and of
our own Records, to which the Admiralty has been
pleased to permit me free access, I offer them, not only
as the relation of some stirring episodes in naval history,
but as, each in its own way, a contribution to the earnest
study of naval policy, strategy, or tactics. _

I have only to add that the dates relating to Conti-
nental affairs are given throughout in New Style: those
which belong to English correspondence, English records,
or to purely English incidents are in Old Style; though
occasionally I have given the double date. It is always
a troublesome point, and I can only hope that I have
minimised the customary confusion.

J. K, LAUGHTON.

I

1 July, 1887
CONTENTS.

—oo—

CHAPTER
I. Jean DE VIENNE: A CHAPTER FROM THE Nava
History oF THE XIVrH CENTURY .
II. Coipert: tHe Birra or a Navy
III. Dv Qvuesne: tHe Frencu Navy 1n toe XVIItH
CENTURY
TV. Le Barz pe SuFFREN
VY. TecerrHorr: EXprrRiences or STEAM AND ARMOUR
VI. PrivatEERS AND PrivaTEERING: I. Forrunatus
WRIGHT.
VII. PrrivaTEeRs AND PrivaTEERING: II. GrorGE WALKER
VIII. THe Frence Privateers: I. Jean Bart
IX. 5 7 II. Du Guay Trovin
X. on $i III. Tuuror
XI. Pavut Jonss, ‘THE Prrats’
XII. Tas Frencu Privateers: IV. Ropert Surcour

InpDEx .

PAGE

30

59
94

148

194
225
252
287
324
363
412

459
STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY,

 

CHAPTER I.
JEAN DE VIENNE.

A CHAPTER FROM THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY.!

Everyonge knows that, according to the Act of Parlia-
ment, it ison the Navy that, ‘under the good Provi-
dence of God, the wealth, safety, and strength of the
kingdom chiefly depend ;’ but there are probably few
who have realised the full meaning of that grave sentence.
Our fathers and grandfathers asserted our supremacy
at sea with such vigour, and bequeathed to us such a
‘transcendent prestige, that we are now apt to think of
these not only as our inheritance, but as our natural and
absolute right ; to forget that the one, as the other, was
of slow growth, has been often stoutly disputed, and at
times even well-nigh blotted out. Such times are now
of the distant past; it is our duty to provide that they
remain so. But, as inculcating that duty, as enforcing
the necessity for that provision, it is well, from time to
time, to examine into our old history, and to retrace—

1 United Service Magazine, October 1880.
2 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

however painfully—the sad lessons of disasters now very
imperfectly remembered. That we have suffered such
is matter of fact; and even if we were disposed to forget
them, others are not; for to them the memory—like the
glimmer of stars shining through the gloom—may serve
to brighten the past, or possibly to indicate the future.
It is the consciousness of this that leads me to recall the
life and career of Jean de Vienne, Admiral of France
during the latter quarter of the fourteenth century; a
man of whom, it may be said, little is known in England
beyond the bare name. Even by contemporary chroni-
clers his personality has been lost sight of, and his deeds
have been attributed to others, misunderstood, slurred
over, or omitted altogether; for, says Walsingham, with
surely a very false notion of the duties of a historian—
the record of all these untoward affairs is so shameful,
that we cloak in silence the things which we ought to
write about.

John of Vienne, or, in the official language of his
time and country, Jehan de Vienne, Chevalier, Sire de
Rolans et Amiral de France, was born, probably at Dole,
in Burgundy, in 1841; the son of a family collaterally
related, in no very distant degree, to the reigning House
of Burgundy, and through it to that of France; the
nephew of that elder John of Vienne with whom he is
often confused, who, in 1847, was Governor of Calais,
and whose name, as associated with our success, occupies
a more prominent place in our histories than that of his
more distinguished nephew. Of his childhood we have
no account, further than that he passed it at the castle

1 Jean de Vienne, Amiral de France, 1841-1396.’ Par le Marquis
Terrier de Loray. Paris, 8vo, 1877.
JEAN DE VIENNE. 3

of Rolans, the ruins of which still stand, near Besancon,
in a commanding position on the river Doubs. At the
age of eighteen, on the death of his father, he succeeded
to his small estate, and would seem to have made his
first experience in arms against the free companies,
English in name, often under English leaders, which
drew together the armed scum of Western Europe,
and infested France and Burgundy after the Treaty of
Bretigny. In 1363 he is said to have had command of
a small party that, near Chambornay, on the Ognon,
crushed and well-nigh exterminated one of the most
formidable of these companies, and to have overthrown
in single combat, with knightly spear, their leader,
Guichard Monnot, presumably a Gascon. As a reward
for this service, he was invested by the King of France
with the lordship of the village of Villey, by accepting
which he became the liegeman of the king, to whom he
continued faithful during the rest of his life. In the
war which raged between the parties of France and
Navarre, rival claimants of the Duchy of Burgundy, and
virtually of the French crown, he served with distinction
under the Constable du Guesclin, whom he followed to
Normandy in 1364, though it is doubtful whether he
was still with him at Auray, or was then serving with
the Duke of Burgundy, as he assuredly was in the follow-
ing month and through the winter.

It was after his release from the captivity which befell
him at Auray, that Du Guesclin led an army of adven-
turers into Spain to support the cause of the bastard
Henry against his legitimate brother, the King of Castile,
a war in which—as is familiarly known—the Black
Prince afterwards interfered ; in which he—as everywhere

B2
4 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

else—achieved the most brilliant success, but in whic
also, it would seem, he contracted that mysterious diseas
which carried him off in the flower of his age. With th
war, however, we are not now concerned. John of Vienr
had no part in it, having embarked in a so-called crusac
which the Count of Savoy led to the East in support «
his cousin, the emperor John Paleologus, then hel
prisoner by the Bulgarians.

This crusade, the history of which is little known, ma
perhaps more properly be called a chivalrous adventur
A number of knights of different nations—Gascor
Burgundian, French, German, Flemish—gathered tc
gether to support the cause of christianity. Fourtee
of them, including John of Vienne, with the Count
Savoy at their head, founded the Order of the Annuncig
tion. They then took ship at Venice, and the fore
having rendezvoused at Coron, went on to Gallipoli, a
that time in the hands of the Turks. This they carrie
‘by assault. They then passed into the Black Sea
occupied Sizeboli and other places of less importance
took Missirri by storm followed by general pillage an
massacre, and invested Varna. The fortifications c
Varna were strong, and the christians were but ill
provided to carry on a lengthened siege; the season to
was late; and the adventure might have ended badly
had not the courage of the Bulgarians failed them
Negotiations were entered on, in which Jeanne de Vienn
and Guillaume de Granson represented the crusaders
with such good effect, that their present claims wer
acceded to, and the emperor sent back safely to Con
stantinople. Thither the Western warriors went for th
winter, which would seem to have been spent in the usua
JEAN DE VIENNE, 5

squabbles between Greek and Frank. In suing for
assistance, the emperor had pledged himself to bring
about the reunion of the Greek and Latin churches.
This promise he now withdrew, and warned the crusaders
to quit the town if they would avoid being massacred by
the turbulent populace. They accordingly crossed over
to Pera, waiting for the return of the good season. But
the Turks, meanwhile, advanced and laid siege to Size-
boli. The emperor’s tone altered; he undertook to
repair to Rome; to have the reunion of the churches
solemnly proclaimed there; he bound himself by host-
ages; he would agree to anything, if only they would
drive back the Turk. This was again happily done, and
the expedition returned home in the course of the summer
of 1867.

Two years later the emperor did, to some extent,
carry out his promises. He came to Rome; acknow-
ledged, ‘in the presence of four cardinals, the supremacy _
of the Pope and the double procession of the Holy Ghost,’ !
and paid public homage to Urban V in the church of St.
Peter. But all this was probably due as much to future
hopes as to past promises ; and the real business of his visit
to Italy would seem to have been to enlist some of the
free companies in his service, and especially their distin-
guished leader, John Hawkwood. In this, for whatever
reason, he was unsuccessful; but we are scarcely doing
injustice to Hawkwood'’s memory if we suppose that he
insisted on some more tangible recompense than pro-
mises; and the empty state of the imperial purse is
proved by the fact that the emperor was detained at

1 Gibbon: chap. Ixvi.
6 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Venice, virtually a prisoner for debt incurred on accour
of the expenses of his journey.

With this adventure the earlier part of Jean d
Vienne’s career may be said to close. He was still onl
twenty-six years of age; but since he was eighteen, h
had been engaged in almost constant service of one sor
or another ; and though we have no account of the suc
cessive steps by which he rose to distinction, it appear
throughout that, by mere force of character, and inde
pendent of the claim his birth might have given him, h
took at once a foremost position in the armies of France
To have held responsible command, in a time of suc.
unceasing peril, under Philip the Bold and Bertrand d
Guesclin, was a training equivalent, and more tha:
equivalent, to the experience of a score of years.

It was in 1869 that the King of France, Charles V
had resolved no longer to endure the disgrace and the issu
of the Treaty of Bretigny. He had prepared for the in
evitable resumption of hostilities with England by an un
scrupulous economy,! by a wise administration of his fin
ances, by secret negotiations with the gentry of Guyenne
themselves unwilling subjects of the English rule, and b
a close alliance with Henry, the reigning King of Castile
whose personal inclinations were naturally adverse to th
supporters of his brother and rival. The immediat
cause of quarrel was the feeling that he was ready ; tha
his great enemy, Edward III, was old and incapable
and that the terrible Black Prince was worn with sick
ness. The war that ensued was primarily, and of ne
cessity, one on shore. To speak of it, as such, is n

' Amongst other instances of this may be counted the refusal to pa
his father’s ransom.
JEAN DE VIENNE. : 7

part of my present plan; in its general results the story
of it is familiar to every child amongst us; and in its
military details, would be but the description of an
empire disintegrating itself from the natural want of
cohesion, rather than from the force of the enemy’s
blows. How much this was accelerated by the physical
incapacity of the Black Prince, by the incompetence of
his deputies and successors, and by the prudence of the
French king, is all perfectly well known; but there are
probably many who have not realised the decisive cha-
racter of the naval operations during the following ten
years, and how curiously, how fatally, the supremacy of
the sea was—for the time being—reversed.

From the beginning, Charles V would seem to have
appreciated the advantage which the command of the
narrow seas had given to England, ever since the battle
of Sluys, in 1340, and of ‘Les Espagnols sur mer,’ in
1350. He had wished to contest it, and had assembled
a large number of ships at Rouen and in the Lower
Seine. But the naval resources of the country proved
to be too weak, the war on shore too absorbing ; and the
expedition to England, projected in 1369, fell through.
But the alliance with Spain furnished means far beyond
the power of France. The King of Castile had at his
disposal ships of a size and strength unknown in other
countries, formidable opponents to the petty trading
vessels which constituted the greater part of the English
navy; and though, these, when arrayed under the great
Edward and his greater son, had been able to defeat and
destroy the Spaniards off Winchelsea, in 1350, they were
at a vast disadvantage when barely equal in numbers
and under unskilled guidance.
8 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

The first meeting was decisive. It was on June 23
1872, that the young Earl of Pembroke came off Rochell
with some forty vessels, armed, indeed, for war, bu
laden also with stores and reinforcements for the army
They were there met by the Spanish fleet, which hac
been waiting for them, under the command of the Ad.
miral of Castile, Don Ambrosio Bocanegra. Althougl
the Spanish force was superior, both by the size of the
ships and their purely naval equipment, the English ad.
vanced at once to the attack, confident of victory, mind.
ful of their past glories, and persuaded. that the Spaniards
were quite unable to withstand them. It took them bul
a short time to find out their mistake, and the fight
became one not so much for victory as for life. The
English, though in disorder and without cohesion, foughi
desperately ; but their ships—so far as we can interpret the
details of the battle—were driven on shore before night-
fall, and were the next day burnt or captured ; whilst o:
the men, those that were not killed were taken prisoners.
The consequences of this defeat were most serious. The
constable, taking advantage of the panic spread amongst
the English, advanced in force into Poitou, and captured
almost on his march, Moncontour, Saint-Sévére, Poitiers,
Rochelle and Thouars ; whilst the Duke of Lancaster.
hastily ordered to Guyenne with reinforcements, wax
unable to sail by reason of continued bad weather, 01
was perhaps unwilling to do so whilst the Cpe fleet
commanded the Bay of Biscay.

It has been suggested by some modern French writers

1 M. Guérin among others: but this is only one and not the most as

tounding of the many errors with which Guérin’s Memoir (Les Marin:
illustres, pp. 37-68) is crowded.
JEAN DE VIENNE. 9

that Jean de Vienne commanded a French division in
the action off Rochelle; but this is not warranted by any
evidence: there is no reason to suppose that even one
French ship was there present, and it is sufficiently well
established that, in the month of July, Jean de Vienne
was serving under Du Guesclin at the siege of Saint-
‘Sévére. So far as history goes, he held his first com-
mand at sea in the spring of 1873. It was then that
the English fleet, under the Harl of Salisbury, had taken
up a position at the mouth of the Seine, to the hindrance
and stoppage of the coast and river navigation. To
oppose this, the Count de Narbonne, then Admiral of
France, having Jean de Vienne as his Vice-Admiral,
assembled a force of one hundred ships, before which
Salisbury had to retire. He drew back to Saint-Malo,
whither he was followed by Narbonne; and considering
himself unequal, passed on to Brest, where he remained
for some months, virtually blockaded by. the French,
who kept possession of the Channel, and that with so
firm a grip that the expedition under the Duke of Lan-
caster, instead of landing in Guyenne, as had been in-
tended, was compelled to cross over at the Narrows, to
land at Calais, and to undertake that disastrous march
through France in the summer and autumn of 1378,! the
result of which, more, perhaps, than any single episode
of the war, sealed the fate of the English provinces.

1 This account of Salisbury’s expedition to Brest is very different
from that generally given, and adopted by Longman (Life and Times of
Edward ITT, ii, 221-5) and Nicolas (History of the Royal Navy, ii. 150).
I would submit that the tests of its truth are the two facts that Lancaster
did land at Calais instead of Bordesux, and that in July a general array
of all fencible men in the maritime counties was ordered, to prevent in-
vasion.
10 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Almost as soon as it was known that Lancaster had
landed, Jean de Vienne quitted the fleet, and had an im-
portant share in the military operations of that autumn ;
but afloat, the conclusion of the campaign of 138738 was
less favourable to the French than its beginning had
been. They lost the command of the Channel, several
of their ships were taken, and the rest were content to
seek for safety in their own harbours. The Viscount de
Narbonne was old and feeble, and as the departure from
the fleet of his second in command seemed to mark the
turning point in its success, Jean de Vienne was not un-
naturally appointed Admiral of France in his stead. In
this there was nothing exceptional: the office of admiral,
as that of constable, was at that time an active, not a
mere honorary or titular appointment; and the greater
number of former admirals had held it for only a few
years. Jean de Vienne, appointed on December 27, 1873,
held it till his death.

The rights of the Admiral of France were then re-
latively more extensive, and the power greater, than
afterwards. He was the chief and ruler of the whole
shipping of the country, not only from an administra-
tive, but also from an executive, point of view; at once
the minister of the navy and the commander-in-chief ;
and in each capacity nearly absolute and autocratic.
Without his leave, no merchant ship could sail on a
distant voyage, or on a cruise against the enemy: and
it was his duty to see that every ship, so cruising, was
suitably equipped, manned and armed. He could levy,
for the king’s service, all the ships of every French
port. The jurisdiction of the admiralty courts included
all nautical matters, civil or criminal; the judges were
JEAN DE VIENNE. 11

appointed by the admiral, and their decisions given in
his name. As direct emolument, he received two-thirds
of all property found at sea, one-third of all thrown
up on the shore, a tenth of all prizes from the enemy, a
payment on the launch of every ship, and a yearly tax,
bearing some relation to her size; besides large per-
quisites arising from his charge of provisions and stores :
and as a personal honour, differing from and exceeding
anything ever granted in England, every ship wore the
admiral’s banner.!

With the exception of a few ships belonging to the
king, the naval force of France then consisted of
merchant ships levied by the admiral. This was also
the case in England, where, however, the special
charters of the Cinque Ports had in some measure pro-
vided a substitute for a standing navy. Charles V was
quick to see the disadvantage of the system, both to
commerce, which it annihilated, and to warlike efficiency,
which, in a fleet of small trading ships, hastily manned,
without experience or discipline, could scarcely be said
to exist. He had already endeavoured to increase the
number of royal ships, but it does not seem that any
real advance was made until after the appointment of
John of Vienne as admiral. It is difficult to say that
the energy then developed was all his; but it is at least
permitted us to believe that it was very directly due to

1 ‘Droits et Pré-6minences de l’Amiral de France,’ in The Black
Book of the Admiralty, i. 443 et seq. The usage of wearing the
admiral’s banner continued far into the sixteenth century; in the French
fleet of 1545 the ships wore the flag of Annebault, Gules, a cross vair.
Jean de Vienne’s arms, which were, presumably, worn by the French
ships during the operations detailed in the following pages, were Gules,
an eagle displayed or.
12 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

that man whose accession to office was the signal for
victorious enterprise, and whose conduct on different
occasions would show that he had himself a large share
of mechanical and constructive genius. The combat off
Rochelle had established the superiority of ships built
and equipped for war; the progress almost daily made
in the use of guns tended continually to make this
superiority greater ; and the naval efforts of France took
the direction of building ships distinctly as ships of war,
bigger and stronger than any that England could oppose
to them. A small dockyard and arsenal at Rouen,!
dating back in its origin to the early days of Norman
rule, and now enlarged, was chosen as the cradle and
nursery of this infant navy ; and ships on the Spanish
model, of the then enormous size of 800 tons, were built
and launched under the personal orders of Aubert
Staucon, the master of the yard.

The construction of such a navy was, however, a
work of time, and during the years immediately following
his appointment as admiral, Jean de Vienne remained
on shore, rendering good service to France, and notably
in command of the siege of Saint-Sauveur,? a fortress
of great strength, from which the English, without too
strict a regard to the distinction between times of war
and peace, dominated the Cotentin and the whole of
Western Normandy. In consideration of payments,
something of the nature of black-mail, they refrained
from plundering or destroying in their immediate neigh-

1 ‘Le Clos des Galées de Rouen sous Charles V’ (1864-1380), par
M. de Lafaye (Revue maritime et coloniale, 1877, vol. liv. p. 686).

? The conduct of this siege is generally, but wrongfully, ascribed to
Du Gueselin, who was not in Normandy at the time.
JEAN DE VIENNE. 13

bourhood ; but their maurading parties spread far and
wide; and, with or without their sanction, free com-
panies carried their evil fame to a still greater distance.
Complaint after complaint had been laid before the
king; but the siege of a first-class fortress with no
sympathising inhabitants to render treacherous assist-
ance, was a serious affair; and the course of the war,
occupying the constable in Poitou, did not permit him
to undertake it. It was thus left untried, till, in the
summer of 1374, Jean de Vienne, being in Normandy,
and with no active employment, received orders ‘ to take
all necessary measures to reduce the place.’ The means,
however, were not put at his disposal; it was left for
him to devise or create them as he best could.

His first care was to isolate the garrison; and by
fortified works on the Ouve, as well as by a sufficient
squadron at its mouth, he succeeded at once in closing
the direct water communication with England. But the
troops under his orders were raw levies, which were
laughed at or chased away by the hardened veterans of
the garrison, who scourged the country more severely
than ever, gathering in an enormous quantity of stores
and provisions. Little by little, however, the admiral
succeeded in forming his army, and in establishing it
in front-of Saint-Sauveur. Then followed, with varying
fortune, those daily encounters which Froissart has
loved to describe. But the event of the siege was to
turn on the employment of the new artillery. By the
beginning of 1875 the French had several large guns in
position, throwing stones or masses of lead, which knocked
down the ramparts or crushed through the houses. The
effect of the cannonade, kept up, however slowly, by
14 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

night as well as by day, rendered the position of the
garrison difficult, and when the admiral, determined to
make it still more so, brought up two new cannons, of
the enormous weight of 2,000 lbs. to throw a shot of
100 lbs., with the unheard of charge of 5 lbs. of powder,
the result declared itself almost instantaneously. We
may believe that these guns were specially designed by
the admiral himself. The making of them was com-
menced on 21 March, and finished on 3 May; they were
in position before Saint Sauveur on the 10th, and the
agreement to surrender, if not relieved within six weeks,
was signed on the 21st.

In signing this, the garrison had hoped to be relieved
by the Duke of Bretagne, who did, indeed, advance at
the head of 10,000 men. The French army prepared to
meet him, supported by thirty small guns which the
admiral had had newly constructed. These were of
copper, with strengthening rings of iron, and had a
wooden handle; they threw a leaden ball of small weight,
and though actually swivels or wall-pieces, may be fairly
considered as amongst the earliest types of the more
modern musket. No engagement, however, took place;
for on learning that a truce had been concluded between
the Kings of England and France, and being persuaded
by Lord Latimer, King Edward’s lieutenant in Bretagne,
the duke drew back. But in spite of the truce it was
maintained by the French that the convention was
binding ; and as they held the eight hostages given by
the English, and were backed up by the two 100-
pounders, their reading of the convention was admitted,
and Saint-Sauveur was delivered up on 8 July.

In the following year the conduct of Lord Latimer
JEAN DE VIENNE. 15

was the subject of a formal accusation; he was im-
peached by parliament as ‘ unprofitable to the king and
the realm,’ and as having—amongst more than ‘ three-
score notable faults,’ not now to our purpose—‘ sold the
castle of St. Saviour’s.’ Of these crimes he was found
guilty, and by judicial sentence was deprived of his office
of chamberlain; his goods were confiscated, and he was
ordered to be imprisoned during the king’s pleasure, and
‘thenceforth to be holden as infamous.’! The sentence
was, however, revoked by the influence of the Duke of
Lancaster after the death of the Black Prince.

Meantime, and whilst the ships were building: at
Rouen, the command afloat devolved on two foreigners,
the one, Renier Grimaldi, a son or nephew of that elder
Grimaldi who honourably commanded the Genoese
contingent at the battle of Sluys; the other, Evan, or
Owen—or, as he appears in the French chronicles, Yvain
de Galles—who claimed to be, by right of birth, a Prince
of Wales, robbed of his territory by the English. Evan
may or may not have been an impostor; the question is
of little consequence, and there is no evidence to decide
it; but he was undoubtedly a brave man and an enter-
prising corsair; whether with the main fleet, or in com-
mand of detached squadrons, he, as well as Grimaldi,
proved himself an able partisan; and the two, together
with a Spanish squadron, during the years 1374-5, well
nigh swept the English from the Channel, and wound
up the campaign by the wholesale capture of a rich fleet
of merchant ships returning from Bretagne on the faith
of the truce.

The English owners and merchants petitioned for

1 ¢ Contemporary Chronicle,’ in Archaologia, vol. xxii. p. 225.
16 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

vengeance, but in vain. The only answer they received
was that the king had done, and would continue to do,
his best to procure redress. He was, in point of fact,
powerless. The navy of England, which, thirty-five
years before, had sufficed to exterminate that of France ;
which, twenty-five years before had crushed that of
Spain, had now almost ceased to exist. The causes of
this were numerous; but—bearing in mind that an
English fleet was composed mainly of merchant ships
levied for the king’s service—they may be stated briefly
as, firstly: the frequency of these levies during the
thirty or forty years that the war had lasted, and the
custom of enforcing the levies, often, several months
before the ships were wanted, during which time they
were kept up at their owners’ cost; and secondly: the
granting to foreigners, in return for heavy loans or pay-
ments, such privileges and monopolies as virtually put
into their hands the whole export trade. By the action
of these, it had come about that the merchants were
impoverished, the seaport towns fallen into decay, their
walls in ruins, the shipping not kept up; and the sailors,
unable to find employment, had taken to other means of
earning a livelihood. The evils were repeatedly stated
in detail, both in petition to parliament, and by parlia-
ment to the king; but no remedy was applied, and for
many years their effects continued.

In France, the interval of truce had been carefully
utilised by the admiral. By the spring of 1877 he had,
actually afloat and ready for sea, thirty-five large ships,
built as men-of-war, armed with the newest guns, and
well equipped ; besides smaller vessels, merchantmen,
which raised the total of his fleet to 120. These were
JEAN DE VIENNE. 17

manned by about 15,000 men—-sailors, men-at-arms, and
archers. The force in itself was sufficiently formidable,
and was still further increased by a Spanish contingent,
which, by the terms of the treaty, numbered at least
thirteen large ships.

The truce of two years ended on 24 June, 1877; and
the fleet, assembled at Harfleur, immediately put to sea,
under the command of the admiral in person, Grimaldi,
Jean de Roye—a seaman of repute, the Sire de Torcy,
and many other nobles and knights. A few ships were
left to blockade the islands of Jersey and Guernsey,
and prevent their attempting any raid on the coast
of Normandy during the absence of the fleet, which at
once, in accordance with a prearranged plan, crossed
over to the coast of Sussex. On 29 June—eight days
only after the death of King Edward—Jean de Vienne
landed in the neighbourhood of Rye, the inhabitants of
which, trusting in the natural strength of their town,
and in a long immunity, had made but little preparation
to receive the enemy. The troops which opposed the
landing were driven back with great loss, and the town
itself was occupied the same afternoon. It was proposed
by the Sire de Torcy to keep possession of it asa
stronghold on English soil, a counterpoise to Calais ; but
the admiral, whether unwilling to weaken his force by
division, or judging that the place was not strong
enough, refused ; and notwithstanding the fierce anger
and abusive language of De Torey—who would seem to
have had the more immediate command of the army or
landing-party, he set fire to the town. From Winchelsea
he was repelled with considerable loss, but at Rottingdean

he. was more successful, although opposed by a strong
c
18 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

force levied by the prior of Lewes. Having defeated
this, after a sharp encounter, he marched inland, took,
plundered, and burnt the town of Lewes and the neigh-
bouring villages, and withdrew slowly to the ships.
Folkestone was sacked and burned on 20 July, Ports-
mouth—already rising into note as a naval port—came
next, and further west Dartmouth and Plymouth were
reduced to ashes. It would seem that nowhere, after
the combat of Rottingdean, was any serious opposition
offered. In the West little preparation had been made,
for it was expected that the first force of the invasion
would fall—as it had fallen—on the coast of Sussex, and
would there—as it was not—be broken.

Laden with booty, the fleet returned to Harfleur by
the beginning of August; and after refitting in haste,
sailed again, to assist in the siege of Calais, then under-
taken by the Duke of Burgundy. It was proposed on
the way to threaten the coast of England, so as to pre-
vent reinforcements being sent over to the besieged town ;
and the accident of weather turned the threat into a
reality. An easterly wind drove the fleet to the Isle of
Wight ; this was found to be practically undefended ; and
on 21 August the admiral effected a landing—apparently
near Yarmouth, which was immediately occupied ; the
island was ravaged, and a heavy contribution levied.
The invaders then made a demonstration against South-
ampton; and hastily re-embarking, landed at Poole,
which they burnt. On their way eastward, they sacked
and burnt Hastings, threatened Dover, and finally arrived
at Calais on 10 September. It was hoped that a more
“decided success than had yet been obtained would win
back this town to France; but the season was too far
JEAN DE VIENNE. 19

advanced, and bad weather compelled the fleet to with-
draw to Harfleur. But the confidence of the English
was rudely shaken; and up to the beginning of winter a
few active cruisers sufficed to blockade the coast, and by
preventing the fishing, to cause very real distress to the
inhabitants.

With the year 1378, the prospects of England in
Normandy seemed to brighten. The King of Navarre
had offered his daughter in marriage to Richard II. and
with her, the several towns which he held in Normandy,
Cherbourg alone excepted. The proposed treaty came
at once to the knowledge of the King of France, who was
quick to anticipate it, by seizing on the possessions of
Navarre before they could be given up to the English.
The Duke of Burgundy and the constable conducted the
war by land; by sea, the admiral occupied such places
as were near the coast, and guarded against the possi-
bility of any relief being sent from England. By the
end of April, Pont Audemer alone remained, a town care-
fully fortified, strongly garrisoned, and held to be of con-
siderable strategic importance by reason of its position
near the mouth of the Rylle, and threatening the navi-
gation of the lower Seine. The siege of this was en-
trusted to Jean de Vienne, whose success at Saint-
Sauveur had stamped his reputation; and he proceeded
to reduce it by means of the same guns which at
Saint-Sauveur had proved so effective; whilst Grimaldi,
with a sufficient force, guarded the approach by water.
An English fleet of some 120 ships, under the Harls
of Salisbury and Arundel, attempted to relieve it; but
being unable to force Grimaldi’s defences at the mouth
of the Rylle, wasted their energy in a vain attack on

c2
20 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Honfleur. Left thus to itself, Pont Audemer surrendered
on 12 June; and its walls, like those of all the other
captured places, were razed, so that they might not,
in future years, afford shelter to the enemies of
France,

Cherbourg was now the only town in Normandy re-
maining to the King of Navarre. In his treaty with _
England, he had specially reserved this to himself; but
alarmed by the rapid capture of his fortresses, and
threatened in Navarre itself by the de facto King of
Castile, he resolved to pledge Cherbourg to the English,
as the price of their support; and it was accordingly
given over to Salisbury and Arundel on their way home,
after their unsuccessful attack on Harfleur.

The news reached Jean de Vienne whilst engaged in
the razing the fortifications of Pont Audemer. He sent
immediately to the Spanish squadron, of probably twelve
ships, then on the coast of Bretagne, to meet him off
Cherbourg, whither he himself went with such force as
he had with him, twenty-five of the king’s ships and a
number of smaller vessels levied from the country. He
found the English fleet at sea, weakened, we must sup-
pose, by the garrison it had left at Cherbourg; but in
number so superior to that of the French that it
did not hesitate to attack. Though fewer, however, the
French ships were superior in size, equipment and arma-
ment, and held their own with advantage until, as for-
tune determined it, the Spanish squadron arrived on the
scene of action. This decided the day. The account. is
vague and confused to an extreme degree; but we are
led to conclude that a general rout followed, and that the
devoted courage of Sir Peter Courtenay—a son of the
JEAN DE VIENNE. 21

Earl of Devon—in command of the rear-guard, alone
saved the fleet from utter destruction; but Courtenay’s
ships were overwhelmed, he himself and many with him
taken prisoners ; and the loss in killed and drowned was
very great.

This was in the early days of July; and for nearly
two months the French fleet continued in command of
the Channel, and keeping up an effective blockade of
Cherbourg, against which the constable was advancing
byland. To preserve Cherbourg to the English, a serious
effort had to be made; and the Duke of Lancaster in
person, having collected a large force at Southampton,
sailed to its relief in the end of August. The number
of ships with Lancaster is not stated; but the 12,000
soldiers, which they carried, would represent a fleet of
vast numerical strength. Such as it was, Jean de Vienne
felt unequal to oppose it, and retired into the Seine ;
and Lancaster, having thrown a sufficient garrison into
Cherbourg, passed down the coast and laid siege to
Saint-Malo. There the Admiral of France permitted him
to stay undisturbed, whilst he, with the Spanish ships,
crossing the Channel, ravaged the coast of Devon and
Cornwall, the resources of which had been drained to
supply the absent fleet; burnt Fowey, then a leading
seaport, and returned, laden with booty. Saint-Malo
had, meantime, proved able to defend itself; and when
winter approached, Lancaster went back to Southampton,
the only result of his great and costly expedition hav-
ing been the laying open the coast of England, so
that a small squadron of the enemy was able to harry
it with impunity, which is thus commented on by an
unknown chronicler :—‘ Sicque, sub ducatu ducis nostri,
22 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

hic illieque percutimur, ubique vero generaliter flagel-
lamur. Quia
Si bubo lapidi jactetur, vel lapis illi,
Ictus dampna gravis semper habebit avis.’ !

The next year, 1379, opened less unfavourably. Sir
Hugh Calverley had been recalled from his government
of Calais to take command of the western fleet; Sir
Thomas Percy was admiral of the northern; and the
two together maintained the navigation of the Channel
with at least equal fortune. But the year closed with a
disaster equal in degree to any the fleet had ever sus-
tained, although different in character. Sir John
Arundel, the brother of the earl, had taken command of
an expedition to assist the Duke of Bretagne. With him
were Calverley, Percy, and a large number of knights
and gentlemen. They had scarcely sailed before a violent
gale sprang up, and drove them towards the coast of
Treland, on which, by the ignorance and obstinacy of
Arundel, some twenty-six ships were lost with all hands,
Arundel himself among the number. The name of
Arundel during these years had not been of good omen
to the English arms; nor indeed had it deserved to be,
if we are to judge of its owner’s capabilities of organising
an army or of maintaining discipline, by the fact of Sir
John’s having sacrilegiously and violently billeted his
men in a nunnery at Southampton, whilst waiting to
sail on this last voyage; conduct repugnant alike to re-
ligion and humanity, and which, by the then Articles of
War, was punishable by death.?

1 Chronicon Anglia, 1328-1388 ; Auctore Monacho quodam 8. Albani

(Rolls Series, No. 64), p. 206.
* Black Book of the Admiralty, vol. i. p. 24.
JEAN DE VIENNE. 23

The loss of this fleet seems to have, for the time,
completed the ruin of the English navy. The seacoast,
practically undefended, was harried, almost at will, by
the Admiral of France and his active cruisers. At Kin-
sale, indeed, they were repulsed with some loss; but on
the coast of England, from Yorkshire to Cornwall, no
point was secure from their attacks; they sacked and
burnt Scarborough; they sailed up the Thames and
burnt Gravesend ; they captured Winchelsea after a stout
resistance ; Hastings and Portsmouth were destroyed for
a second time; and nearer home, they captured and
held the islands of Jersey and Guernsey.

In England, the disgraceful conduct of the war, the
insolence of the invader, the loss of property and life, the
destruction of shipping, the ruin of trade, and the oppres-
sive taxation, all combined to give rise to great excite-
ment and irritation, which, among the better class, took
the form of petition and remonstrance, and among the
lower orders, culminated in popular and dangerous
insurrections. These, our historians have described and
discussed, without perhaps sufficiently marking the train
of events which ushered them in. The special outrage
which provoked John Tyler! at Dartford might have
passed as a private injury, or at most have caused a local
riot, had there not been a widespread and deep feeling
of dissatisfaction and indignation. That the lower orders,
more especially in the country, had many and very real
grievances, social, political and religious, is not to be dis-
puted; but the immediately exciting cause of the revolt
seems to me to have been, not so much the levying of a
cruelly oppressive tax, as the fact, so plainly proved to

1 Stubbs’s Constitutional History, ii. 456.
24 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the most ignorant, that the money was misspent. The
flames at Gravesend, in the autumn of 1880, were
characters that the unlettered peasants could quite well
read and understand; and which they proceeded to
expound, in their own rude fashion, at Whitsuntide,
1381.

The exhaustion of England on the one side, the death
of the King of France and the minority of his successor
on the other, rendered a cessation of arms mutually
acceptable, and a truce, agreed on in the spring of 1381,
was nominally continued for six years, although war of a
veiled or irregular character was waged through almost
the whole time. Much of this was in Flanders, where
the French, as supporting the Duke of Burgundy, were
summoned to reduce the revolted Flemings under Philip
van Artevelde, backed up by the English. In this war
Jean de Vienne took a leading part, as became his post
of Admiral of France ; but that part was on shore, not at
sea, and in the main against the Flemings ; it may there-
fore be passed over with a bare mention. Afterwards,
on the renewal of hostilities between England and Scot-
land, the opportunity of carrying the war into the
enemy’s country seemed to offer itself. This had always

been his favourite idea: to expel the English from

France by giving them work to do in England; to make
them feel, in their own homes, the horrors of war.

‘What an indignity is it,’ he had urged to the king, ‘to _

see everlastingly at our gates these English, who, after
all, are but few; to nurture them in our bosom, and to
provide them with weapons to use against ourselves!

1 So considered, this revolt of the English villeins, may be faintly
compared with the French Jacquerie in 1358, or the Commune in 1871.
JEAN DE VIENNE. 25

Can we not, in our turn, go and destroy their homes, so
that in their distress they may leave us masters of
Guyenne, of Normandy, and of Flanders? The Saxons
conquered England with but a handful of men, far from
their own country; William the Bastard, with nothing
but his sword. Is it to be doubted that you—with a
kingdom full of men, of provisions and of money—would
surely attain the desired end?’ Such arguments, when
addressed to Charles V, had fallen on stony ground;
when addressed to his son, Charles VI, they took root,
and finally led to the admiral’s expedition to Scotland
in 1385.

The story of that expedition is too well known to
need relating here; but it may be necessary to remind
the reader that, such as it was, it was only a small part
of the plan which the admiral had devised. According
to this, in fact, it was merely a feint, to draw away
towards Scotland the available army of England, and
leave the country, void of defenders, to be invaded
without opposition. And notwithstanding the difficulties
which he met with in Scotland and in his intercourse
with the utterly unsympathetic Scotch, the result, so far
as he was concerned, was quite commensurate with his
expectations. King Richard, his court and chivalry,
and an army of some 70,000 or 80,000 men, advanced
northwards as far as Aberdeen; and, had the projected
invasion of England been made at that time the result
must have been most serious. As it was, the great fleet
of nearly 600 vessels assembled at Sluys could not be got
ready, and the project fell through. It was revived the
next year, but without the same chances in its favour.
John of Vienne had returned from Scotland, and the
26 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

treatment he had received there was not such as to
encourage him to a repetition of his visit. Of the fleet,
too, many ships had. been lost, many had been captured
whilst seeking winter quarters. It was then proposed—
apparently by John of Vienne, whose genius seems to
have favoured engineering works, to construct a large
fortress of wood, which should be transported to England,
and there erected near the landing-place, as a place of
refuge for the invading army. Such a scheme did not
augur well for the invasion; it seemed to savour of
timidity, and, notwithstanding the invasion panic in the
summer of 1886, became ridiculous in the eyes of the
English when the seventy-two ships which were carrying
the ‘ ville de bois’ to Sluys were dispersed by a gale.
Two or three of them were driven up the Thames and
captured, and the pieces of the fort with which they
were laden were set up as a public show in the neigh-
bourhood of London. And so, waiting for their ‘ wooden
town’ and other equipments, the season passed away,
and it was again proposed to put off the invasion till
next year. But everyone felt that the opportunity had
passed. The money was spent, the men were wearied
and disgusted. The collection, too, of ships at Sluys
had left the English free to recover their losses, and
the cruisers from the English ports began again to be
active ; Dartmouth and Portsmouth had specially dis-
tinguished themselves, and private enterprise was doing
more than the king and his ministers could even promise.

I see no reason to doubt that this improvement in
the maritime affairs of the kingdom was due to the
abolition of some of the offensive privileges granted to
foreigners, and to the edict of 1881, ordering ‘ that none
JEAN DE VIENNE. 27

vf the king’s liege people do from henceforth ship any
merchandise in going out or coming within the realm of
England in any port, but only in ships of the king’s
liegeaunce,’! under penalty of forfeiture. The improve-
ment, at any rate, is certain, and in the spring of 1887
the Karl of Arundel, appointed Admiral of the North
and West, was able to get together a numerous fleet,
with which he scoured the Channel, and seemed to
resume the supremacy which England had of late years
ceased to hold. It was in the course of this cruise that
he captured nearly the whole of a mixed French and
Burgundian fleet numbering 120 ships, laden with wine
and other rich merchandise ; a prize so great, and follow-
ing so many disasters, that it has been specially spoken
of as though a glorious victory. It was nothing of the
sort, and, even as it was, was not entirely a success ; for
on the homeward voyage, a part of the fleet commanded
by Sir Hugh Spenser was met on the coast of Normandy
by a number of French ships, and after a stubborn fight
was overpowered, taken, or destroyed. In concert with the
constable, Olivier de Clisson, Jean de Vienne had deter-
mined to attempt a smaller but more united expedition
against England, and for that purpose had assembled his
fleet at Harfleur. It may fairly be presumed that the
squadron which overwhelmed Spenser was a part of this,
and was acting under instructions from the admiral.
The expedition was on the point of sailing, with the
intention of landing near Dover and marching on
London, when it was suddenly stopped by the news that
Clisson had been taken prisoner by the Duke of Bre-
tagne. The admiral was anxious to go on, but under
' 5 Richard Il. stat. i. cap. 3. Statutes at large, ii. 237.
28 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the circumstances the nobles and knights refused to
leave France. The army melted away, and when, after
a month, Clisson was set at liberty, it was too late to
begin again. But it by no means follows that even had
the expedition sailed it would have arrived at Dover or
the coast of England, for the English fleet was strong in
numbers and in spirit; the men-at-arms were under
the especial command of Sir Henry Percy, better known
perhaps as Hotspur; and every day the nation was re-
covering confidence in itself, so much so that the next
year, 1388, they kept the sea from May to November,
and cruising beyond the Channel, ravaged the enemy’s
coast as far as Poitou. But this was about the end of
the war for the time being, for in 1389 a truce was
concluded, which lasted, however imperfectly, beyond
the end of the century.

Of the part which Jean de Vienne took in politics or
diplomacy during the closing years of his life I do not
propose to speak, and the crusading adventure to Bar-
bary in 1390, in which English and French fought side
by side, may be lightly passed over. It was in 1896
that the great man, enemy though he was, whose career
I have here hastily sketched, fought his last battle and
died honourably at Nicopolis on 28 September. Gibbon’s
account of this battle is sufficiently incorrect. Neither
Jean de Vienne nor the Sire de Coucy can properly be
styled ‘ gay and thoughtless youths,’ and the statement
that at ten o’clock in the forenoon they were ‘heated
with wine’ is unwarranted. The fatal charge was due
solely to the youthful vivacity, impatience, and jealousy
of the constable, Philippe d’Eu, who ordered his own
immediate followers to advance. The two seniors hastily
JEAN DE VIENNE. 29

consulted as to what they should do. ‘Sire de Coucy,’
said the admiral, ‘rashness must command when truth
and reason can no longer be heard, and since the Count
d’Eu is determined on fighting, it becomes our duty to
follow him.’ It was thus that the little French army
plunged into the enemy’s ranks, and at their head rode
Jean de Vienne, bearing on high the banner of Our Lady.
‘ The battle,’ says Gibbon, ‘ would not have been lost if
the French would have obeyed the prudence of the Hun-
garians, but it might have been gloriously won had the
Hungarians imitated the valour of the French.’ This,
however, they did not attempt, and the French, over-
whelmed by numbers, were slain to a man, Jean de
Vienne amongst them, still clutching in his death grip
the sacred banner which he carried.

To an Englishman, even after the lapse of 500 years
it is not a pleasing task to recount the disasters of his
countrymen: but we can, none the less, honour the
memory of this great man, in the foremost rank of those
who won back—even though from our own princes—the
independence of France in the fourteenth century, and
who has stamped on the pages of our naval history a
bitter lesson which we should do well to lay to heart.
30 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

CHAPTER II.
COLBERT.

THE BIRTH OF A NAVY.

Tue reign of Louis XIV, celebrated alike for the sy
dour of its early, and for the gloom of its later y«
will always form a favourite chapter in French hist
but whilst the brilliance of the French court, and
warlike achievements of French soldiers, or of t
enemies, have been described in glowing terms by w
an enthusiastic writer ; whilst the poets, who shed ;
grace over their own age, still live in their works as
representatives of the literary genius of their nation—
in England at least, are too apt to ignore or sl
the memory of the statesmen who, by the developr
which they gave to the resources of the country—by
solidity which they gave to its power—were as much
real authors of its greatness as the king, by his
reaching ambition, was of its subsequent weakness.
these men, first in point of time as well as of intel
was he whose name stands at the head of this page.

Jean Baptiste Colbert, the son of parents who, w
ever may have been their ancestry, certainly occupi
very humble position, was born at Rheims on 29 Au;

1 §t. Paul’s Magazine, December, 1868.
COLBERT. 31

1619. He received his early training in the office of a
banker in Lyons, from which, at the age of twenty-four,
he was introduced into the service of Le Tellier, Secretary
of State for War.' He rapidly acquired Le Tellier’s
confidence, acted as his agent in the conduct of delicate
business, and was thus brought to the notice of Mazarin,
who eventually, in 1651, appointed him to be his own
private secretary. With Mazarin’s interests he seems to
have completely identified himself, and the cardinal when
dying, in 1661, formally bequeathed him to the king.
“I owe you much, Sire,’ he is reported to have said;
‘put I partly repay you in leaving you Colbert.’ The
recommendation was one to which Colbert was qualified
to give weight, and the malversations of Fouquet, the
Superintendent of Finance, afforded him the opportunity.

Between Fouquet and Colbert there had been a
friendship of long standing, but for the year before
Mazarin’s death the intimacy had given place to stiffness
and suspicion. Whether from honest care for the public
weal, or from some more personal motive, Colbert had
laid before Mazarin an exposition of gross irregularities
in the accounts of the revenue, and Fouquet, not un-
naturally, believed that in doing so Colbert was actuated
by a desire to oust him from an office which he coveted
for himself. Mazarin, however, was unwilling to stir in
the matter, and for the time it was allowed to drop.
Colbert now revived it. He laid before the king such a
clear account of the malpractices of the Superintendent
of Finance that his disgrace followed within a few days.

1 Lettres, Instructions et Memoires de Colbert, publiés d’apreés les
ordres de VEmpereur.... par Pierre Clément. 8 vols. royal 8vo.
1861-1882.
32 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

The process which ruined Fouquet was the foundat
stone of Colbert’s fortune ; for the king resolved to be
own minister, and struck with the ability which Col
had displayed in preparing the charges, appointed hir
the vacant office as Controller of Finance. The m
tact, acquired in long training in subordinate positi
and his aptitude for business, very shortly won
the entire favour of the king, and during the ten yi
which followed his first appointment, although nomin
holding only particular offices, he was, in reality, all
absolute throughout the kingdom.

The time, however, was one of extreme difficulty,
it was only by slow degrees that he was able to ente
any great policy. His work at the beginning was ne
sarily for the most part work of reform. His atten
was fully occupied with the struggle against the inte
confusion of the country, which had been brought to
verge of bankruptcy by the unprincipled and licent
administration of his predecessor, and which was
scourged by a famine of almost unexampled seve
caused in a great measure by the failure of the har
of 1661, but fearfully aggravated by a clause in the .
laws passed the same year, which distinctly forbade
formation of any company for the sale of grain, or
accumulation of grain in any magazines. There
thus no store in the country to meet the emerge
Out of Josephus we know of nothing so terrible as
description of the state of the French peasantry du
that spring of 1662. To say that they died in erc
conveys no idea of their sufferings. They were fc
dead in the fields, their mouths full of the grass
which they had vainly tried to stay the craving
COLBERT. 33

hunger. They were found dead in the church-porches,
their own hands and arms half-devoured; dead in the
houses, destitute of all furniture and clothes; dead in
the gutters, where they had been grovelling for carrion
and garbage. And many that lived were known to
have sustained life on food of a nature so loathsome
that at the very thought of it the blood runs cold with
horror.

Immediate and energetic measures on the part of the
government were necessary to-relieve this fearful desti-
tution. Corn was bought up in foreign countries, and
from the stores thus acquired, and from Paris, sufficient
was thrown into the provinces to bring the price down
to a moderate level. At the same time large grants of
money were made, and reiterated appeals to private
charity called forth supplies which served to relieve the
most pressing wants.

But the disorder which existed amongst the finances
of the country, though not so lethal as the famine, was
almost as important a consideration. It is difficult to
conceive anything worse than the state into which the
revenue had fallen. This was not only from the neglect
of crown property, but from the alienation of some of
the principal taxes; the misappropriation of others;
the wasteful expenditure of past years; the fraud, pecu-
lation, and gross misconduct of the collectors, not in
isolated cases, but all over the country. The people
were ground down by a heavy, almost intolerable taxa-
tion ; and the public chest contained little or no money.
To remedy this, to restore order where there seemed
nothing but impending ruin—work compared to which
the cleansing of the Augean stable might be considered

D
34 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the amusement of a summer afternoon—was the
that Colbert was called upon to perform.

The state of the government securities was the
point that demanded his attention ; they were in nee
a drastic treatment, and they got it. The direct t:
of Paris were almost swallowed up by charges secure:
irregular or illegal bonds. These were cancelled,
withstanding the excitement which such a step cai
amongst the many who had bought the stock in ¢
faith. Other loans which had been legally secured |
high rate of interest, were paid off with money borro
on more equitable terms, thus effecting an annual sa:
of eight millions of francs. Others, again, were bot
in, the holders being obliged to sell at the low price
which they had purchased the stock, during a perio
excessive depreciation. Very large sums were furi
raised by the Chamber of Justice, which compelled
financial agents of the former administration to disg:
a considerable portion of their ill-gotten wealth.
court, appointed by the king specially to examine :
and adjudicate on the numerous charges brought aga
these men, whilst sentencing many to corporal pun
ment or death, imposed on most of them fines which
in some individual instances as high as six millions,
amounted in the aggregate to upwards of 110 mill
of francs. When such sums could be recovered, a
several years of the unbounded extravagance
-splendour which rendered the name of financier alr
proverbial, we can form some estimate of the enorr
of the frauds which had been eating into the life of
country.

The same cankerworm existed in every departn
COLBERT. 35

of the public service. Careless and corrupt administra-
tion, winking at or directly allowing rights illegally
usurped, had reduced the revenue derived from the
royal forests to 150,000 francs. Ten years later it
averaged upwards of a million. The pernicious practice
of selling at a high price almost every office under
government had in itself given rise to incalculable evil ;
and as the salaries had been irregularly or seldom paid,
those purchasers who had the power naturally enough
indemnified themselves for the loss. Patents of nobility,
which carried with them exemptions from many govern-
ment claims, had been lavishly granted during past
years, and the system of raising supplies by the sale of
such patents was openly recognised. It had thus come
to pass that the large body of the rich, on whom the
payment of taxes would have fallen but lightly, paid
nothing ; and that the money for the necessities of the
government had to be wrung out of the earnings of the.
poor. Against this injustice a decisive blow was struck
by the edict of 1665, which revoked all letters of nobility
granted since 1634. At the same time several persons
were convicted of having usurped the privileges of
nobility without any authority whatever. These were
now punished and made liable to pay in the future.
The burden of the people was thus considerably relieved.
But the clamour against Colbert was very loud. Those
who were exposed, fined, and taxed, were men of wealth
and position, and their indignation was very great. This
sought a vent, not in a defence of their own inexcusable
conduct, of which they avoided all mention, but in a cry
that Colbert was undermining the constitution of the
country, lowering the royal prerogative, and putting the
D2
36 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

gentlemen on the same footing as the peasants. Colb
however, was too firmly seated in office to be influen
or disturbed by the complaints of these would-be ari:
crats; he was upheld by the king, and carried on

work of reform with energetic determination and

sparing severity. Highway robbery was put do
rioters punished, public peace insisted on; internal tre
was encouraged ; local dues, so far as feelings of prov
cial pride permitted, were equalised, and under the 1
of a government at once able and strong, the cour
began quickly to emerge from the abyss of barbari:
into which the last hundred years of anarchy, sedit
or rebellion, persecution, oppression, and civil war ]
thrown it.

Integrity, economy, and order were, however,
tributaries to the principal stream by which wealth -
to be poured into the country. Colbert was the son c
shopkeeper, educated in early youth with a view t
mercantile life; and the bias which his mind thus
ceived affected his whole policy, and led him to consi
that the true prosperity of the nation was to be sou
in manufactures and commerce. On this principle
determined that the capabilities of the kingdom shc
be developed ; and he carried the determination thro:
with an ardour that neither failure could chill, nor
fear of responsibility check. The labour which he
voted to each separate branch of industry was excess
As soon as a trade was introduced, or resolved on
received his fostering care, nor did he withdraw
attention as long as it showed a spark of vitality.
was thus that France became celebrated for her ma
factures of lace, ribbon, and silk; but the means
COLBERT. 37

which he established and nurtured them were of a most
absolute, often of an illegal nature. When he learned
that the ribbon-makers of Chevreuse were in the habit
of wasting their time in dissipation, he promulgated an
order forbidding the publichouse-keepers of the town to
sell them anything either to eat or drink during working
hours. When he heard of a workman at Lyons who
had found out some improvement in cloth-printing, and
was on the point of taking it to Florence, he had him
imprisoned, in order to prevent his leaving the country.
And many similar instances might be given; for one
of the distinguishing features in Colbert’s character was
a fixedness of purpose that, when he had once made up
his mind as to what ought to be done, went straight at
the end proposed with a determination to bear down all
obstacles. And his ideas were for the most part con-
formable to the period in which he lived; more enlarged
and clearer than those of ordinary men, but still subject
to the influences of the age, which centuries of tyranny
and misrule had prevented from receiving the more per-
suasive maxims of civilisation. Violent and extreme,
often illegal, punishments thus seemed to him the best,
as they were the quickest, means of attaining his end ;
and the men who were subjected to them, accustomed
to the oppression of the great and to the disorders of
rebellion and revolt, saw nothing strange in his arbitrary
method of carrying on the government. These influences,
acting on his industrial policy, caused him to believe
that a large and powerful country like France ought to
be almost entirely self-supporting ; that its manufactures,
its agriculture, its commerce ought to be sufficient to
provide for all the wants of both necessity and luxury,
38 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

and that strict protection and constant government sur-
veillance were the best means of making them so. It
was contrary to the spirit of the age, ignorant alike of
the theory and practice of commerce, to suppose that
the wealth and prosperity of adjoming nations were
really sources from which wealth and prosperity ought
to flow towards his own country, and with the whole
weight of his influence and power he endeavoured to
make France independent of any import trade with the
rest of Europe. It was thus that he devised the exorbi-
tant tariff of 1667, which, doubling, and in some cases
tripling the previously existing duties, amounted to a
partial or even total prohibition of both export and im-
port. The manufactures of the country, in their young
and undeveloped state, doubtless reaped a very decided
advantage from this prohibition. They could not pro-
duce enough to feel the clog of the export duties, whilst
those on imports gave them a sufficient sale within the
country. But agriculture suffered terribly ; for as corn
could not be exported at all except by permission from
government, and as this permission could never be
depended on, the farmers simplified their cares by not
growing more than would satisfy the demands of their
own neighbourhood. Thus the good land only was
cultivated, the inferior was neglected; and on any failure,
or partial failure, of the harvest, there was an immediate
famine; for as each province only sowed what would be
enough for its own consumption, when dearth occurred
in one the others had no excess out of which to relieve
the want. Very great suffering was therefore common;
a scarcity of bread—not merely a certain rise in price, but
an absolute scarcity—occurring about once in every three
COLBERT. 39

years; and on each occasion of this distress a fresh
attempt was made to prevent it in future by making still
stricter the laws against the export of grain.

And yet, whilst clogging with exorbitant duties the
commerce that was within his reach, he was still most
anxious to grasp at that which was beyond it. He
looked with great bitterness of feeling on the enormous
revenues which the Dutch drew from their Hast and West
India trade, from their trade in the Levant and the Baltic,
and from their Northern fisheries, whether of whale or
herring. He could not help seeing that it was this wide-
spread commerce which gave the Dutch an influence and
power in Europe wholly disproportionate tothe size of their
country and the number of their population; nor could
he avoid picturing to himself the magnificent future in
store for France when her commerce had taken the place
of that of Holland. To this end his labours were directed ;
and as companies, protected and assisted by the govern-
ment, were still believed to offer the best and surest
way of developing a new commerce, such companies were
formed with special privileges to trade, whether north,
south, west, or east. There was the Company of the
North, designed to divert the Baltic trade and the fisheries
to France ; the Company of the Pyrenees, which was to
bring timber, pitch, and tar from the mountain-slopes to
the sea-ports where they could be made available; there
was the African Company to trade in negroes, palm-oil,
ivory, and gold-dust ; the West Indian Company, to share
in the valuable commerce of the Antilles and the Spanish
Main ;—above all, there was the East India Company,
which, it was fondly hoped, would draw to France the
produce that had successively enriched Venice, Portugal,
40 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

and Holland. Three attempts to establish an East
India Company had already failed, when, in 1664, Col-
bert took the matter in hand, resolved to succeed if
trouble and expense could enable him to do so. But
the previous failures had made the commercial public
look coldly on the scheme, and much argument and per-
suasion were necessary to induce them to come forward
with their subscriptions. The mayors of the different
towns were invited to give both their money and influ-
ence; the government officials were permitted to under-
stand that their personal interest might be forwarded
by a liberal contribution, the king himself subscribed
three millions out of the fifteen with which the company
was started, and it was agreed that these three millions
should not bear interest for the first ten years, and that
any losses the company might sustain should be charge-
able on them. The company was further gifted with
numerous privileges, exemptions from duties and tolls,
and the rights of sovereignty over the countries which
it might acquire from the natives, or conquer from the
enemy. It was thus fairly started in 1664; but neither
protection, nor privileges, nor the assistance of the govern-
ment could support it against the unfortunate selection
of the superior officers, and the apparent incapacity of
the French people for colonisation. During the first
eleven years of its existence there was an actual loss of
six millions and a half; and though it lingered on for
upwards of a century, it never enjoyed more than the
‘most transient gleams of prosperity.

The fate of the other companies was still more de-
cisive. The Company of the West Indies became bank-
yupt for three and a half millions within ten years ; the
COLBERT. 41

Company of the North collapsed on the breaking out of
the war with Holland in 1672; and that of the Pyrenees
ceased to exist about the same time.

The bad success which attended all these companies
was far from making Colbert view with equanimity the
continued stream of commerce which poured its riches
into the lap of Holland. It was this probably that caused
him to adhere so firmly to the toll of fifty sous per ton.
levied on all foreign ships arriving in French ports—a
toll which pressed heavily on foreign merchants, more
particularly on the Dutch, and stirred up much ill-feeling
without producing to the revenue any direct advantage
worth speaking of, for it does not seem in any year to
have amounted to half a million of francs. But the toll
did undoubtedly at the time give a great stimulus to the
native ship-owners ; and though the Dutch remonstrated
against it, still, as they could only appeal to the faith of
ancient treaties, whilst Colbert was supported in his
resolve by the manifest advantage which it must bring
io French shipping, their remonstrance was unavailing.
The toll was continued, rankling in the minds of the
Dutch, whose material interests were again still more
severely injured by the tariff of 1667. This tariff pressed
aeavily on the industries and commerce of both England
ind Holland, and gave rise, in both countries, to the
nost serious discontent. It did not, however, suit the
surpose of the English king to break with the crown
hat paid his pension; and the English people, with no
roodwill, were forced to submit to the new duties and
he loss which they imposed on them. With the Dutch
t was different. Their government did not hesitate to
xpress its dissatisfaction in very plain terms; and Col-
42 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

bert, backed by the army of France, was by no means
anxious to allay the angry feeling. War, if war should
arise, was as likely a way as any other to lessen the
power and drain the resources of Holland. The grasp-
ing ambition of the king seconded his views. After years
of tedious and querulous correspondence, war broke out
in 1672; and in a few months Holland, overrun by the
French troops, with its strong places in the hands of the
enemy, seemed on the brink of destruction. It was then
(8 July, 1672) that Colbert, hoping to accomplish his
long wished-for purpose, endeavoured to persuade the
king to adopt a series of measures which, if acted on,
would have annihilated the Dutch trade. His proposals,
which amounted to a demand for the cession of all their
East and West Indian settlements, and of their right of
trade in the Mediterranean, were, however, rejected by.
the king as too moderate to be offered to a country
already completely subjugated. The result was—as is
well known—a continuance of the war, in which the
frenzy of despair lent an unexpected vigour to the Dutch
arms. The De Witts were massacred in a fit of popular
fury; and the Prince of Orange, raised to the head of
affairs, so ably conducted them in the cabinet at home
_. and in the field abroad, that France lost her advantage
almost as quickly as she had gained it. For six years
this bitter war continued, and ended at last in the treaty
of. Nimeguen, by which France—though gaining from
Germany and Spain some increase of her territory—lost
all the commercial advantages to the pursuit of which
Colbert had devoted his ministry and his life. The tariff
of 1667, one of the original causes of the war, was given
up; the special privileges and excessive duties by which.’
COLBERT. 43

he had sought to establish certain branches of commerce
and manufacture were abolished, and it was agreed
that reciprocal liberty of trade between the two countries
should not be prohibited, limited, or restrained.

In the conduct of this war on shore, Colbert, how-
ever, had no part beyond providing the money which it
devoured. At sea it was different. He had been actually ©
the head of the naval department since 1669, and vir-
tually so since 1665. It is in this capacity that his
career offers the greatest interest to us, as Englishmen ;
and doubly so when we find that, owing to his energetic
measures, France, a few years before entirely destitute
of any naval force, was able to send the Count d’Estrées
with a fleet of forty sail to witness the battle of Solebay
in May, 1672; and the Duke de Vivonne with upwards
of fifty ships to conduct the campaign of Sicily in 1676.
It is this sudden rise of the French navy, this extra-
ordinary development of the French maritime power—
which has been, with pardonable pride, compared to the
springing forth of Minerva from the head of Jupiter,
armed and ready for the combat—that must ever be
considered as the crowning point of Colbert’s fame.

Richelieu had indeed attempted to form a navy which
might be not quite unworthy of a great nation; and
succeeded in getting together a force respectable both in
numbers and efficiency; but the troubles of the Fronde
with its accompanying civil wars quickly undid the work
of the great cardinal, and the neglect of Mazarin com-
pleted the destruction. A fleet cannot be kept up with-
out a large and continuous outlay of money, and the
disordered state of the finances during Mazarin’s minis-
try did not admit of the requisite funds being supplied.
44 ' STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Whilst Mazarin himself was appropriating fifty millions
out of the public money; whilst Fouquet and the sub-
ordinate financiers were revelling in a display of luxury
and wealth which has seldom been approached, the sum
annually spent on the equipment of the king’s ships fell
from the five millions, which Richelieu had considered
necessary in 1647, to three hundred thousand francs,
which was all that Mazarin and his gang of attendant
harpies could allow. We cannot then feel surprised that
‘in 1662, Colbert found that the state possessed no more
than two or three ships of war in a seaworthy condition,
and that of the twenty galleys left by Richelieu, six only,
miserably inefficient, remained; the rest had rotted on
their slips, or sunk in the harbour of Toulon. With the
new ministry a new order of things was installed. Re-
solved that the state should have a naval force both
numerous and efficient, Colbert commenced the work of
reformation at once. In 1662 he caused three millions
to be allotted for that purpose; in succeeding years this
sum was doubled and trebled, and in 1671—in ten years,
that is, from the time of his taking office—he had raised
this part of his budget to thirteen millions. That the
government was in a position to afford this large sum
was due entirely to the financial and administrative
reforms which Colbert had introduced. That it did
afford it was as entirely due to the influence of Colbert
as head of the navy. Nor under the direction of
such a man was it possible for the money to be mis-
applied ; every expense was strictly inquired into; the
most severe economy was everywhere enjoined; and
however the public treasure might be squandered in
lavish profusion in other departments which were beyond
COLBERT, 45

Colbert’s control, there is little doubt that in this, at
least, France got very good value for her money.

Large quantities of stores were purchased in Sweden;
many ships, ready for sea, were bought from Holland,
then a friendly State, and many others were ordered to
be built. But Colbert was keenly alive to the necessity
of being independent of any foreign government. The
Dutch willingly lent him skilled workmen, whom he
brought from Holland to teach their trade to the raw
hands that he had to employ; and they taught it them
well, so that in a few years the French shipbuilders
became celebrated both for the rapidity and excellence
of their work; and down to the wars of the Revolution,
French ships were considered as models of men-of-war.

Quickness in the building of a ship was a point on
which Colbert laid great stress. Experience has shown
that this was a mistake; that the timbers, as they are
fixed in their places, require time to settle and become
firmly knit together. This was probably not known two
hundred years ago, or it would be difficult to explain the
importance which Colbert—who had a wonderful theo-
retical knowledge of even the details and technicalities
of the profession—attached to lessening the time in
which a ship could be built and equipped. In this, as
will generally be the case with anything to which an
earnest attention is paid, the success was almost in-
credible. Towards the latter part of his administration
a ship could be laid down, built, launched, rigged, and
got ready for sea in half a day. Wonderful as this
statement is, it rests on indisputable evidence. In July,
1679, a forty-gun frigate was actually built at Toulon
in seven hours; and about the same date, a galley
46 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

carried the Marquis de Seignelay and a large official
party from Marseilles to the Chateau d’If, within ten |
hours and a half from the time that the shipwrights .
commenced to build her. These, of course, were very
exceptional cases ; but they show what the ideal standard
of perfection was—a standard to which the different
controllers and superintendents were constantly urged
to approach as near as possible, on ordinary occasions.
‘When the head of the department showed himself always
energetic and watchful, when he was also at the head of
the finances of the kingdom, and could push forward his
projects with all the resources that money could buy, we
need not wonder at the results obtained. By the official
list of 1 January, 1677, the last year of the war with
Holland, the State possessed, exclusively of galleys,
199 ships of war of all sizes, actually afloat. Of these
sixty-eight were first, second, and third-rates, that is,
ships of not less than fifty guns, or 800 tons burden,
and several of them were much larger, as, for instance,
the Soleil Royal and the Royal Louis, each of 2,400 tons
burden and 120 guns.

To man the ships when built was a point of no less
importance than the mere building. In former ages, the
plan of manning a fleet, when one was got together, was
extremely simple. The ports throughout the kingdom
were closed, and a press-gang laid violent hands on
every available man, who was forthwith sent on board.
The pressed men were by a legal fiction supposed to be
seamen; but knowing as we do the traditions of the
press in our own country fifty years ago, we can have
little difficulty in understanding that in France more
than two hundred years since, an able-bodied man,
COLBERT. 47

whatever might be his trade, would find it far from easy
to persuade his captors that he was not a seaman; and
that, seaman or not, when once pressed, he had to serve.
This system Colbert attempted to abolish. He did, in
fact, abolish it in name, and substituted a strict enrol-
ment of sailors in all the provinces of the seaboard. The
maritime population was thus divided into three classes,
one of which was called out for service every year. Of
this year they actually served six months, and if no
longer wanted, received half-pay for the other six. In
the two years which intervened before their turn came
round again, they were free to serve in merchant ships,
or employ themselves as they liked. The system, how-
ever, did not fully answer the expectations which the
minister had formed; the men were suspicious, and
evaded the enrolment; a promise half-made, that those
who were enrolled should be exempt from taxation, was
never fulfilled; the half-pay, though distinctly agreed
on, could not be paid when the war which began in
1672 was calling for all the money the kingdom could
raise; but above all, the new system, by doing away
with many opportunities for jobbing, militated so directly
against the personal interests of several officers in high
position, that it became to a great extent a dead letter.
And the necessities of the state itself practically abro-
gated the law; for whenever war broke out, the class of
the year was insufficient, so that all the classes were
called on, in addition to which the ports were closed,
and the press again instituted. The men thus found
themselves in a worse position than ever. Obliged as
they were by the law to serve when it was their turn,
and seized on by the press when it was not, it is not to
48 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

be wondered at that they had recourse to all possible
subterfuges and evasions to escape the enrolment. The
fleets, however, were manned, and in the course of time
many out of the different crews doubtless became more
reconciled to the service, and settled down into regular
men-of-war’s men. These formed a future nucleus; and
the system of enrolment by classes, modified considerably
according to the requirements of the state, or as expe-
rience suggested improvements, remained in force for a
full century after Colbert’s death, and may fairly be con-
sidered as the basis of the system which exists at the
present day.

As supplemental to the sailors of the fleet, of whom
he was unable to find a sufficient number, Colbert
formed in 1669 two regiments of infantry, of 3,000 men
each, to serve in detachments on board the ships, in a
manner precisely similar to our own marines. These,
there can be little doubt, would have been a valuable
adjunct to the crews, had not the jealousy of Louvois,
who insisted on having the appointment of the officers,
rendered the plan abortive. The officers so appointed,
receiving their commissions from, and dependent for
promotion on, the Secretary of State for War, had little
care to win the good opinion of the Secretary for the
Navy, or of the naval officers under whom they served.
Being put on the same footing, with regard to pay and
promotion, as the officers of the line regiments, instead
of enjoying the peculiar advantages and privileges which
Colbert had offered in the first instance, they conceived
a distaste for the service afloat, which enhanced their
insubordinate disposition, and led to such constant diffi-
culties and quarrels, that in 1671, only two years after
COLBERT. 49

they were raised, they were turned over to the regular
army, and soldiers for the service afloat were entered as
each ship was put in commission.

The difficulty of finding officers for the ships was
scarcely less than that of finding men. A few there
were, indeed, who had served in the time of Richelieu,
or had since learnt the profession on board the Maltese
cruisers. These, however, were far from sufficient in
number, so that officers of the army were transferred, in
a wholesale manner, to the sister service, and gradually
attained a certain amount of nautical skill under the
instruction of the merchant skippers who were, at the
time, the real sailing-masters of the ships. But it was
far from Colbert’s idea that this state of things should
continue. He resolved that the officers of the several
ships should be such in reality as well as in name; and
being convinced of the advantage of early training, he
instituted a body of cadets which remained in existence
till the Revolution. These cadets, under the title of
‘Gardes de la Marine,’ were all gentlemen by birth, and
served on board as volunteers until they received their
promotion to the rank of ensign. They were, in fact,
on very much the same footing as midshipmen in our
own navy, and performed the same duties, but their
advancement as a rule was speedy, for the necessities of
the country required officers. These, as they grew up
to be men, having been carefully instructed in their
profession, theoretically and practically, formed a very
valuable class ; though the pride of birth, in many in-
stances, led them into difficulties with others who, by
long or daring service, had won their promotion from an
inferior rank of life. For of these there was a consider-

E
50 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

able number—a number, too, which increased rapidly
when war, putting a check on the rising commerce, con-
verted the bold skipper of many a fishing or coasting
boat into a dashing privateer, and in time into the com-
mander of his majesty’s ships and squadrons. Such
men were, in the succeeding age, Jean Bart and Du
Guay-Trouin, whose exploits, although for the most
part performed with but small force, read more like the
romantic tales of the Knights of the Round Table, than
the sober history of the seventeenth or eighteenth cen-
tury. The almost equally celebrated colleague of these,
De Forbin, was, on the other hand, a cadet of the
aristocratic guards, and served as such in the expedition
to Messina in 1675. De Langeron also was a cadet a
few years senior, and having stepped over the inter-
mediate grades, served as a captain in the same expe-
dition. Tourville, who commanded the French fleets in
the battles of Beachy Head and La Hogue, commenced
his career on board a Maltese galley, and quitting the
active service of the order in a fit of pique, won at an
early age considerable renown by a series of enterprises
in the Levant, which were then counted as honourable,
but which in a time of stricter morality would have
conducted him to the gallows. It was not till 1667 that
he entered the service of the French king. Chateau-
Renault also was a knight of St. John. Du Quesne,
whose conduct on the coast of Sicily rendered his name
dear to France, a skilful officer, but of a most perverse
and quarrelsome disposition, was one of the old school,
his commission as captain dating back as far as 1626.
Count d’Estrées, who for some years held the chief
command over the French fleets of the West, was a
COLBERT. 51

andsman until his appointment as Vice-Admiral of
France in 1669; as also was the Marquis de Villette till
he was forty years old. These are some of the men
who occupied a distinguished position in the navy of
Louis XIV, and it is not a little interesting to notice
the different points from which they started. A similar
diversity was then general throughout all ranks. But
as the navy became more and more a settled institution,
as the ships’ companies were more regularly raised by
enrolment, the officers were also more commonly, and
latterly almost entirely, entered as cadets of the guard
and trained to the discipline of the service from their’
youth.! Officers not gentlemen by birth were rare
during the second half of the eighteenth century ; and it
was this exclusiveness which, on the breaking out of the
Revolution, turned the popular rage against them in a
manner so fatal both to themselves and to the French
navy.

In the time of which we are speaking, however, when
there were no precedents to guide their conduct, when
passions were more unrestrained, when public morality
was a thing little understood, there was considerable
difficulty in binding the different elements together so
that they might act in unison. The executive officers
were inclined to treat the civil officers with disdain ; the
sailors looked down on the landsmen; the aristocratic
cadets scorned the company of their more humbly-de-

* D’Estaing, whose career, ashore or afloat, does not reflect much
honour on either his name or his country, was one of the very few
who, in the end of last century, held high naval command with-
out having worked their way through the subordinate grades. He
was thrust into the navy, with the rank of lieutenant-general, in
1763.

E2
52 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

scended messmates; quarrels were never-ending ; duels
were frequent; insubordination was by no means rare;
. the captains, and even the admirals, set but a bad
example to the lieutenants and ensigns; the enmity
between D’Hstrées and Du Quesne was notorious, and
although the latter was palpably in the wrong, though
his conduct as an inferior officer towards his superior
was contrary to all the rules of military service, still the
need which the kingdom had of officers possessing ability
and experience was so great, that Colbert could do
nothing more than persuade, entreat, or threaten. With
the juniors he took a more decidedtone. In their cases,
threats were generally followed by punishment which
might in some instances be counted unduly harsh, did
we lose sight of the extreme danger which the navy
ran of being utterly disorganised by the existing unruly
spirit.

The dishonesty of the commissaries presented another
serious difficulty. Hmbezzlement of money and fraudu-
lently making away with stores! were crimes painfully
common ; and the temptation to the captains, who acted
also as the pursers of their ships, to enrich themselves
by serving out provisions in short allowance and of
inferior quality was not often resisted. These were
taxes on the energy of the minister against which few
besides Colbert could have made adequate resistance;
but his iron will sustained him, and he did in the course
of time succeed in getting together a body of officers,
who could, under heavy pressure, live together without

1 These were vices of the age, not peculiar to France or the French
navy, but much too frequently manifested on board our own ships, or in
high places on shore.
COLBERT. 53

brawling, and, under constant surveillance, could take
charge of stores without stealing; but whilst these were
being selected, the number of those who were dismissed,
disgraced, or imprisoned was very large.

The mere numerical strength to which the exertions
of Colbert raised the French navy was alone sufficient to
give it prestige in the eyes of Europe. It was not till
the year 1676 that it had any opportunity of endeavour-
ing to win that prestige by force of arms. The skill of
the officers and crews must, however, have been still far
below the standard to which natural aptitude and long
experience had raised the Dutch, especially while under
the command of an admiral like De Ruyter. In the
battle of Alicudi, on 8 January, notwithstanding their
superiority in number, size, and in the equipment of
their ships, which were fresh from Toulon with complete
crews—notwithstanding their superiority in number and
weight of guns, the French were not able to gain even
the semblance of an advantage over their hardy enemy.
On 22 April, off Agosta, De Ruyter, with ten ships—
separated from the rest of his fleet by a division of the
most incapable of allies—held at bay and virtually beat
back the whole French fleet, a splendid achievement,
dearly paid for by the wound which proved mortal after
seven days. And whatever we may think of the arro-
gance or imbecility of the Spanish government, or of
the weakness of the Spanish navy, it is still evident
that the careful administration of Colbert, whilst able to
build and equip ships in a manner equal to those of any
country in Europe, was not able to improvise, in a
similar way, a race of men who could be compared with
the sailors of Holland.
54 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

The detailed accounts of these battles were, however,
by no means generally known through the kingdom of
France. The government of Louis XIV was perfectly
well skilled in the art of spreading favourable news; and
Colbert in particular held it as a point of duty to speak
highly of the achievements of the navy. In 1672, after
the battle of Solebay, he had repeatedly expressed his
indignation at the modest way in which the Count
D’Estrées had spoken of the French share in the action,
and had given positive orders that all reports meant for
the public eye should be made as favourable as possible.
If this was the case after the battle of Solebay, when
whatever accounts tended to the glory of the French
navy must have contained a very large proportion of
fiction, it was much more so in 1676, when two actions
had been fought, against De Ruyter, without defeat;
and when—at Palermo, on 2 June—one very decided
success had been gained. This, indeed, was so complete
a victory that the French minister had very solid
grounds for congratulating the navy and the country on
the splendid achievement. The other two battles got
mixed up with it, in the popular mind; and the general
impression throughout the kingdom was that the fleet
under Du Quesne had completely defeated the Dutch
with De Ruyter at their head. The death of De Ruyter
lent a colour to this view ; and the imagined victory over
De Ruyter has been spoken of in glowing language by
writers whose researches into the history of the time
ought to have cleared away all confusion.

The three battles, however, deservedly won a mar-
quisate for Du Quesne; the veteran’s grumblings were
forgotten in the splendour of his victory; and even
COLBERT. 55

Colbert, laying aside his usual coldness, wrote to express
his joy and satisfaction at the result of the campaign.
We can indeed easily understand that his satisfaction
must have been very great. The successes on the coast
of Sicily were the proof to the public of the success of
his endeavour to form a navy—the proof to himself,
perhaps, that his navy was capable of real service, and
not merely one that might look well in the roadstead, or
appear formidable on paper. To us, acquainted with
the difficulties against which he had to contend, the
figures which represent its strength are a conclusive
proof of the talent and energy which he had employed.
We have already given the number of ships of all classes
actually afloat during the last year of the Dutch war
as 199. To officer these, there were, on the official
list, 86 captains, 116 lieutenants, and 186 ensigns;
admirals, commanders of different grades, and officers
holding exceptional posts, brought the number up to 416.
After the peace the numerical strength of the navy was
not much increased during Colbert’s life, though his zeal
for its efficiency does not seem to have suffered any
diminution; and on his death in 1688, his son, the
Marquis de Seignelay, succeeded to the administration
of a force which, in respect to equipment and organisa-
tion, was far superior to that maintained by any other
power in the world.

If it were on the foundation of this alone that the
claims of Colbert’s memory to the gratitude of France
were based, he would even then be deservedly celebrated
as one of the most distinguished of her sons. When to
that, the principal and grandest labour of his life, we
join the consideration of the numerous other tasks which
56 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

he accomplished, of the permanent advantages which
accrued from his ministry; when we consider the enor-
mous stimulus which he gave to manufactures and com-
merce; the way in which he opened out the internal
resources of the kingdom by the construction of roads
and canals, and in an especial degree by the construction
of the canal of Languedoc, which had been the dream of
so many former reigns, we are driven to the conclusion
that not only in France but in the civilised world, he
takes a high place among those who have worked for the
benefit of their country.

And yet he died hated by the people, and all but
disgraced by the king. There is reason to believe
that jealousy of Louvois and chagrin at the coldness of
the king aggravated and rendered fatal an illness which
was brought on, in the first instance, by the severe toil
to which he had subjected himself, without necessary
repose. This toil was indeed excessive. During many
years he worked in his office regularly for sixteen hours
a day, and the results testify that the time was not
lightly employed. It was not the mere force of genius
which enabled him to accomplish such mighty tasks.
The labour which they cost him is manifest on every
page of his voluminous writings ; and whilst our opinion
of his natural gifts is at the highest, we cannot but
acknowledge that the gift which, of all others, conduced
the most to his success, was his wonderful industry and
determination.

In his comparative loss of the favour of the vain and
versatile king, there is perhaps nothing strange, but we
might be surprised at the bad odour in which his name
was held by the people. This may in part be attributed
COLBERT. 57

to the stern and cold manner which was natural to him,
and caused him to be spoken of as the ‘man of marble.’
Many anecdotes are told of him which well illustrate his
claim to the title; amongst others, this: Madame Cor-
nuel, who was celebrated in society for her wit and lively
disposition, had one day attempted to persuade him to
grant her some favour. Colbert listened to all she had to
say without making any answer, till at last, piqued by his
silence, the lady exclaimed, ‘ Monseigneur, faites moi au
moins signe que vous m’entendez.’ In part also it may
be attributed to the bold and unsparing way in which he
trampled on private interests, or suppressed class privi-
leges. I have spoken already of the hostile feeling he
excited by his arbitrary manipulation of the funds, and
by doing away with special exemptions from taxation ;
but other instances were not unfrequent where he had
steadily pursued what he conceived to be the path of
duty, without too much regard to the prejudices of those
for whom he legislated. The enemies whom he thus
stirred up were men for the most part of good position
or of provincial authority ; and of the dirt which they
so freely flung on his reputation, some doubtless ad-
hered.

But, above all, it was notorious that, being a man of
humble origin, he had provided splendidly for all his
relations, and had amassed a very large fortune. It is
impossible to think that the ten millions to which this
amounted were not acquired in a strictly legal manner,
more especially as he made no secret of the amount;
but the people could not help looking with suspicion on
a minister who, during twenty-two years of great finan-
cial distress—for the Dutch war pressed heavily on the
58 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

taxpayer—had managed, with but a small nominal
salary, to accumulate such a sum. The libels and savage
epigrams which appeared after his death, when the terror
inspired by his resolute conduct no longer restrained the
scribblers of the day, were almost countless. Gross and
frantic as most of them are, they still, with scarcely
an exception, cling to his dishonesty as the assailable
point in his character. The following verse of one of
them embodies the general spirit, with a certain sparkle
of wit to relieve the uncommonly plain-speaking which
runs through the rest of the ode:—

Enfin Colbert n’est plus, et c’est vous faire entendre
Que la France est réduite au plus bas de son sort ;

Car s’il restoit encore quelque chose 4 lui prendre,
Le voleur ne seroit pas mort.

We do not, as we have said, attach much importance
to these charges. It is scarcely credible that a man of
Colbert’s acumen would have laid himself open to such,
from a legal point of view; but the ten millions remain,
a fatal proof that, whatever the law might think of his
conduct, he could not say on his death-bed, with our
English admiral, Sir George Rooke, ‘I do not leave
much, but what I leave was honestly gotten. It never
cost a sailor a tear, or the nation a farthing.’
CHAPTER III.
DU QUESNE.

THE FRENCH NAVY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.!

Tue origin and early organisation of the navies of France
and England have been so different, that a student of
naval history has his attention naturally turned to the
consideration of them, in his endeavours to understand
the permanent differences between the two services—
differences which have especially shown themselves in
the relative standard of practical skill and of theoreti-
cal knowledge. With us, the navy in earlier ages was
simply the militia of our sea-coasts, a force composed
of ships which on ordinary occasions were traders or
pirates, and, when need was, assembled from their
several ports, subject to the orders of the king or his
admirals: this, as it gradually developed into a govern-
ment institution, long retained the essentially popular
character of its origin, possessing a remarkable degree
of elasticity in time of rare defeat or more frequent
maladministration. With the French it was on a very
different footing; it rested entirely on the whim or
ambition of the government, and its strength ebbed or

1 Fraser’s Magazine, November, 1874,
60 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

flowed according to the imbecility or vigour of the
administration. It was not till after many and extreme
fluctuations that, towards the end of the seventeenth
century, it settled into something like its present form.

Of this period of change and development, I have
already spoken in the last chapter. But the importance
of the subject seems to warrant my recurring to it in
connection with the life of the Marquis Du Quesne! whose
career occupies a prominent position in the early history
of the existing French navy. A captain under Richelieu
and Mazarin, when captains were few; an admiral
under Colbert, when ships were many, Du Quesne was
for more than fifty years mixed up with every naval
event of any importance. One of the few seamen whom
France could then boast amongst her officers, the
embodiment and mouthpiece of naval tradition, of ‘the
manners and customs used at sea,’ conservative to an
extreme, yet withal intensely anti-aristocratic, the story
of his life does in reality possess a singular interest,
whether we consider it from a personal or from a scien-
tific point of view.

Abraham Du Quesne was born at Dieppe in 1610.
His father, a shipmaster and shipowner in a small way,
was a self-made man, the son of a Huguenot tailor at

' Abraham Du Quesne et la Marine de son Temps, par A. Jal, Ancien
Historiographe et Archiviste dela Marine. Paris: 18738. Other important
works, bearing on the naval history of the time are:—Lettres dc. de
Colbert (Clément), see ante, p. 31; Mémoires du Marquis de Villette
(Monmerqué); Lettres dc. de Vivonne, et de Valbelle (as quoted in
Histoire de la Marine, par Sue); La Vie de Michel de Ruyter, par
Gerard Brandt; Annales des Provinces Unies, par Basnage. There is a
portrait of Duquesne at Greenwich, in the Painted Hall, to which it was

presented by Louis-Philippe; but its genuineness is, nevertheless, rather
doubtful,
DU QUESNE. 6f

Blangy, whose connection with one or other of the noble
Norman families of the same name must be regarded
as altoyether apocryphal. Of his boyhood we have ab-
solutely no information; and though he, in some way,
learned to read and write fairly, he was probably occu-
pied, from a very early age, on board the small coasters
which his father commanded. In 1627 he was serving
as his father’s chief officer, in a small privateer of 70
tons ; and, from the evidence given at a trial regarding
one of their prizes, it appears that both father and son
held commissions as ‘captains in the service of the
king.’ That his commission, dated in 1626, gave him
seniority as a captain, is a point on which Du Quesne
insisted throughout his whole career; but as given to a
boy of sixteen, who could, in fact, be nothing more than
his father’s apprentice, and who does not seem to have
ever served in a king’s ship, it can only be considered as
a species of enrolment, about which we have no certain
information. The father’s commission dated from 1625,
but neither father nor son appears to have had, at that
time, any further connection with the public service; on
the contrary, we find the father in 1628 still cruising on
his own account, and combining something like piracy
with his legitimate trade. Being at St. Malo, he fell in
with the skippers of two barques bound for Rouen,
and having struck up a sort of intimacy, undertook to
convoy them as far as the mouth of the Seine. When
they arrived off Honfleur he changed his tone, and by
a display of force, compelled them to accompany him
to Dieppe, where, at his instance, the officers of the
Admiralty condemned them for illegally trading from
one province to another. An appeal to the court of
62 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Rouen reversed this judgment, condemned Du Quesneé
to pay all the expenses, and fined the Dieppe officers who
had perverted justice to the advantage of their townsman.
It does not appear that young Du Quesne was engaged
in this discreditable affair; but it nevertheless gives us
a very clear insight into his early training, and the
influences under which he grew to manhood.

After a few years more of trading and piracy the
father disappears; nothing certain is known of his fate,
but there is reason to believe that he was captured by
some Spanish cruisers from Dunkirk, and died there of
his wounds about the year 1635. At this time the son

. appears to have cast in his lot with the service of the
king, and to have become in reality, as before in name,
an officer of the king’s navy. He was appointed to the
Neptune, a vessel of 200 tons burden, carrying eight small
guns, and joined the fleet which assembled at Belle Isle
in June 1686, under the command of the Count d’Har-
court and M. de Sourdis, Archbishop of Bordeaux. This
fleet consisted of forty-two ships rated as men-of-war,
all belonging to the crown, of which the largest, the
flag-ship, Saint-Louis, was of 1,000 tons burden and 46
guns; and was collected with the view of its joining such
ships as could be got together at Toulon, and retaking
the Lérins Islands, which the Spaniards had seized on
during the past year, and fortified, with the evident
intention of making them a base for operations against
the neighbouring coast of Provence.

With thirteen transports in company, and carrying
14,000 soldiers, the fleet weighed from Belle Isle on 28
June, and reached Toulon on 29 July, having lost many
men by sickness: a fact not to be wondered at when we
DU QUESNE. 63

consider the crowded state of these small and filthy ships
during the hot season in the Mediterranean.

It might be supposed that, after fitting out an expe-
dition of this magnitude for a special purpose, measures
would have been taken to carry out that purpose as
speedily as possible, the more so as delay could only
serve to enable the Spaniards to complete their defences.
It was not so, however. Marshal de Vitry, the governor
of Provence, to whom the military command of the expedi-
tion was to be entrusted, could not think of embarking
under the naval command of Count d’Harcourt, who was
not, in fact, a seaman, although by his commission
‘lieutenant-general in command of the fleet.’ Vitry
would not acknowledge this commission as giving any
authority over the expedition; Harcourt, on the other
hand, asserted his right ; Sourdis supported him; and
months passed away in fierce and idie squabbles over the
council-table, in one of which Vitry went the length of
striking Sourdis with his cane. The Archbishop—though
permitted by his orders to act as a leader of the expedi-
tion and to fight the Spaniards—felt unable to wreak
his vengeance on Vitry personally; he complained to
Richelieu, who wrote, imploring them to agree; but no
attention was paid to this letter, and Vitry and Harcourt
arranged to settle their quarrel at the point of the sword.
A positive order from the king put a stop to the proposed
duel; it could not, however, put a stop to the ill-feeling
which existed and continued to exist, so that months
passed away and nothing was done. Vitry was supported,
by strong family interest, and it was not till the follow-
ing March that Richelieu ventured to recall him from his
government. Freed from his obstructive presence, Har-
64 _ STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

court and Sourdis carried on their operations with vigour,
Sainte Marguerite, the principal of the islands, held out
for six weeks; when it surrendered, the others followed
its example; and M. de Sourdis having, as general, taken
a leading part in the capture, now, as priest, chanted the
Te Deum for the victory. Marshal de Vitry was on this
permitted to return to his post; but as he immediately
resumed his quarrel with the two successful generals, he
was first seriously admonished by the king and shortly
afterwards arrested; he was sent to the Bastile, and
stayed there for more than five years, not being released
till after Richelieu’s death in December 1642.
Considered as a military operation, the reduction of
Sainte Marguerite was a very trifling affair, but it derives
interest from the illustration it offers of the curious state
of discipline and divided command which then prevailed,
and which was not apparently considered reprehensible
in itself, but only in so far as it hindered the public
service. It was here too that Du Quesne, as captain of
the Neptune, got his first insight into the realities of war
as distinguished from privateering ; and might, had he
been so minded, have carried away useful lessons as to
the necessity of unanimity and concord. He seems to
have been impressed rather the other way, and to have
learned that disagreement was the rule of the service.
In the two following years he commanded successively
the Saint-Jean, of 800 tons, and the Maquedo, a Spanish
prize, of 600, and was engaged under Sourdis in the
naval operations carried on on the north coast of Spain
in conjunction with the army under Condé. The active
share of the navy in these operations was, however,
considerably reduced by the crushing defeat which the
DU QUESNE. 65

Spanish fleet sustained from the Dutch off the South
Foreland in September 1639; and the next year the
Archbishop, being appointed to the command of the
Mediterranean fleet, took Du Quesne with him to Toulon.

At this time the material force of the French navy
consisted of 52 ships of all sizes actually in commission,
most of which were very small. There was, however, one,
the Couronne, which merits a particular notice as being
the largest ship then afloat. She is described as being
of 2,000 tons burden ; as measuring in length 200 feet
over all, in extreme breadth 46 feet, and as having a
height from poop to keel of 75 feet. She had a comple-
ment of 600 men, including two chaplains, and carried
72guns. The statement of her armament is noteworthy,

. for we find in it the germ of a principle in which foreign
ships have, till lately, differed widely from our own. To
the builders of the Couronne may, perhaps, be assigned
the discovery that a comparatively small number of guns
with roomy quarters is more advantageous than a much
greater number so crowded together that there is not
sufficient room to work them ; the truth of this we were
slow to realise ; and for nearly 200 years French ships
were, as a rule, heavier and larger than ours of the same
rate. Besides the Couronne, there was one ship of 1,000
tons, one of 700, two of 600, and ten of 500 tons; below
that they diminished rapidly, and several were of less
than 100 tons.

Mere numbers, however, are rarely to be depended
on; and this force, comparatively respectable on paper,
must be valued in accordance with a memoir sent in by
the Marquis de Brézé, a nephew of the cardinal, who
succeeded Sourdis in command of the Ocean fleet. ‘Ten

F
66 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

of the ships,’ he writes, ‘ are good for nothing; and nex
year it will be necessary to condemn as many more, fo
they are very old and strained. Even the flag-ship (th
Saint-Louis of 1,000 tons) is more than twenty year
old. The building-slips of Indret have (in the thre
years since they were established) turned out only tw
large ships and three frigates.’ He concludes by re
commending that the foreign ministers should find ou
whether the Dutch or Swedes would be willing to sel
some of their ships, of which they had more than the
wanted.

It must fairly be supposed that of the twenty ship
Brézé here condemns, a fair proportion were of the large:
class ; so that the estimated force of the French nav:
was, in reality, insignificant, not only in comparison witl
the state navy of England, but of Holland, Sweden, o:
Denmark. I dwell on this because later writers hav:
been much in the habit of speaking of the age of Richeliet
as having been a flourishing time for the navy; an ide:
which is far from correct, though worse times were await
ing it.

In 1640 Catalonia revolted from Spain, and applie
to Richelieu for assistance. Sourdis was directed to co
operate with the insurgents; but want of stores an
equipment prevented his leaving Toulon till late in th
following spring, when he established the blockade o
Tarragona, then besieged by the French troops in concer
with the Catalans. His force, however, was insufficien
to resist the strenuous efforts made by the Spaniards
and after several smart encounters in July and Augus
he was fairly beaten off the coast. Tarragona was re
victualled ; and the archbishop, already in disgrace fo
DU QUESNE, 67

his long delay at Toulon—a delay caused by want of
stores—was summarily removed from the command for
his want of success, although his failure was clearly due
to the numerical inferiority of his fleet. It gives an
idea of the very unformed state of discipline to find that
several of the captains, officers on active service, wrote a
semi-public letter expressing their regret at and strong
disapproval of this step by the government; and that
this letter is signed, amongst many others, by the
Chevalier de Cangé, who succeeded to the command of
the fleet, and by Du Quesne, who was appointed to the
command of an independent squadron.

Up to this time our information concerning Du Quesne
is very limited. That at the age of thirty-two he, a man
of no family interest, was appointed to such a command
affords a fair presumption that, during these six or seven
years of actual service, he had distinguished himself
by energy, zeal, and intelligence; and he seems to have
enjoyed the confidence and favour of Sourdis, himself,
undoubtedly, an able man. It is, however, quite certain
that he had a forward, pushing temper, which would
never permit him to lose anything for want of asserting
his own claims, and which-led him to insist on what he
conceived to be his rights in the most pertinacious
manner. A singular instance of this occurred almost
immediately after his appointment to this command,
and shows some at least of the peculiar difficulties which
stood in the way of the early organisation of the French
navy.

Being at anchor with his squadron in the Gulf of
Rosas, he was joined by a squadron of galleys commanded

by M. de Baumes. Du Quesne, as the senior captain,
F2
68 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

took command, and gave De Baumes orders not to weigh
without permission. De Baumes urged that whilst Du
Quesne’s seniority would undoubtedly give him the com-
mand if the two squadrons were carrying on any opera-
tion in concert, it did not give him any authority over
the squadron of galleys meeting him in a casual manner
and cruising independently ; at the same time offering to
follow him if he wished to undertake anything against
the enemy. Now, according to modern ideas, De Baumes
was quite wrong; under any circumstances the junior is
bound to obey the senior, and that not as a matter of
agreement, but of duty. At that time, however, the laws
of precedence were by no means settled ; the galleys and
the ships were, to a very great extent, distinct services,
and the right of an officer of the one to exercise command
over an officer of the other, without express commission,
was commonly enough disputed. The question, then,
between Du Quesne and M. De Baumes was one that
should properly have been referred to a higher authority,
and the more so as it involved no point of immediate
importance. This Du Quesne would not see; he repeated
his order in a violent and overbearing manner, ‘ more
suitable to a drunkard brawling in a pothouse than to the
general of an army’ (this is De Baumes’s way of describ-
ing it); and when, in the course of the night, the galleys
got under way, he fired into them without further
ceremony. ‘Our officers,’ wrote De Baumes to Marshal
de Brézé, the French viceroy and commander-in-chief in
Catalonia, ‘ were much astonished and enraged, as they
saw themselves murdered by cannon shot in the very
port, not knowing to what to attribute this insolence. I
beseech you to teach M. Du Quesne that, if he has no
DU QUESNE. 6¢

respect for the commander of this squadron, he must at
least have some for the king’s galleys.’ Marshal de
Brézé does not seem to have taken any action in conse-
quence of this letter ; he probably advised De Baumes tc
keep out of Du Quesne’s way, or Du Quesne to be more
moderate; but certainly nothing was done to render suck
an occurrence impossible for the future; the jealousies
between ships and galleys continued, and died out only
when the service of the galleys itself came to an end.

That this should be so was perhaps natural; the
officers of the ships were, to some extent, seamen ; those
of the galleys were, for the most part, soldiers; in ap-
pointing to the command of a ship, good service and ex.
perience were occasionally, though by no means generally
counted for something; the command of a galley was a
mere matter of purchase; the galleys considered them.
selves socially superior to the ships: the ships considered
the galleys ignorant and pretentious know-nothings. Dif-
ferences between the two were thus of frequent occurrence,
even after and notwithstanding the edict of 1677, whick
ordained that squadrons of ships and galleys, accidentally
meeting, should continue independent of each other,
but that when ships and galleys formed a combined ex-
pedition, the officers of the galleys ranked as junior tc
the ships’ officers of the same grade; a distinction oi
‘with but after’ which, as affecting relative rank, has
often, in our own service, given rise to much private ill-
feeling.

During the summer of 1642 and the following year
Du Quesne, still in the Maquedo, continued cruising on
the Catalan coast ; but the service, principally blockading,
has no special interest. Naval affairs were poorly sup-
70 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

ported after the death of Richelieu; and Du Quesne
being left in 1644 without employment, applied foi
service under the Swedish flag. His offer was accepted ;
he commanded the Swedish ship Regina in the battle off
Ribe on 16 May, and his conduct obtained for him pro-
motion to the rank of admiral-major, or, as we should
say, rear-admiral. He continued in the Swedish service
for about three years, and returned to France in charge
of four ships which Mazarin had bought from the
Swedish government.

The supreme command of the French navy was at
this period vested in a ‘ Grand Master of Navigation,’ a
title which Richelieu himself had held, and which was,
at his death, conferred on his nephew, the Marquis de
Brézé. Brézé was killed in action with the Spaniards
off Orbitello in 1647; after which the queen, Anne of
Austria, took the office on herself as ‘Grand Mistress,’
and continued to hold it till 1650, when it was conferred
on the Duke de Vendéme, a natural son of Henry IV.
During this time but little attention was paid to the
navy; the internal troubles distracted the government,
and Mazarin was notoriously averse to a liberal expendi-
ture. Under Richelieu the annual estimate for the navy
had been from three to five millions of francs, and this
sum, as we have seen, was barely sufficient to meet the
requirements of the small fleet. It now fell lower and
lower, till at last 800,000 francs was all the government
thought fit to devote to the maintenance of the navy.
It may well be supposed that these 800,000 francs might
better have been devoted to some other service, as they
were clearly inadequate to maintain a navy; of course,
then, the navy was not maintained, and the few ships
DU QUESNE, 71

whose names stood on the official lists rotted away and
became utterly unserviceable.

But the decay of the navy was not to be attributed
solely to the neglect and parsimony of the government.
Although too cautious to commit himself to any active
support of the failing cause of royalty in England,
Mazarin had favoured it so far as to permit privateers
to be fitted out. It is difficult to understand what gain
he or the royalist party expected to derive from this
step; the actual result was that the parliament issued
orders for reprisals ; and thus, without any declaration
of war, and whilst nominal peace continued to exist
between the two countries, English and French ships
fought whenever they met, with, as might be expected,

-advantage in the long run to the most numerous.
Blake’s alleged encounter with four vessels in the Straits,
in December 1650, may have been one of these skir-
mishes; another is pithily described by Whitelocke
under date 22 August, 1650—‘ Letters of some Fights at
Sea between the Parliament’s Frigates and some French
Men-of-war, who were soundly beaten.’ This, we may
conclude, was the fight which is reported by the French
to have taken place near Jersey, in which a squadron of
five ships under Du Quesne, bound for Bordeaux, was
rather roughly handled. This desultory war ended in
September 1652, in the seizure by Blake of the French
fleet which had been sent to the relief of Dunkirk, then
besieged by the Spaniards: seven ships were sent into
Dover, and those that escaped were so damaged as to be
valueless.

It is not too much to say that from that time the
French navy was altogether unable to undertake any
73 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

operation; it gradually dwindled away ; and when
Mazarin died, in 1661, had practically ceased to exist.
According to the inquest instituted by Colbert, it con-
sisted of seven ships ‘ good for nothing but to be broken
up,’ five ships which might possibly be made seaworthy,
and some four or five which might be reckoned as ser-
viceable. The country, then, was destitute of ships, of
sailors, of officers, and of money ; for the civil wars and
the shameless peculation of every servant of the govern-
ment had reduced it to the verge of bankruptcy.

During all this time there had been no employment
for Du Quesne. He had endeavoured, but without
. success, to re-enter the Swedish service, and had passed
the years from 1650 in domestic retirement. In 1661
he was appointed to the command of a squadron fitting
out at Brest, but nearly a year slipped away in dilatory
preparation and in grumbling about the want of stores.
With great difficulty a fleet of some ten ships of all rates
was at last assembled at Toulon, its object being an
expedition against the piratical states of Barbary; but
neither ships nor officers seem to have been fit for service:

I have already spoken of the ships; the officers were
almost worse: Du Quesne was an old and competent
sailor, but obstinate, jealous, and insubordinate in the
extreme. The command was entrusted to M. de Nuchézes,
a commander of the Order of St. John, with whom was
associated the Duke de Beaufort, the old leader of the
Fronde, and now Admiral of France and Grand Master
of Navigation, in succession to his father, the Duke de
Vendéme. Between these two there arose a bitterness
and ill-feeling which rendered vain any hope of effective
action: Nuchézes wrote against Beaufort, Beaufort wrote
DU QUESNE, 73

against Nuchézes; the officers declared themselves for
one side or the other, and duels were never-ending. The
fleet cruised for a short time, and having exhausted its
provisions, but attempted nothing, returned to Toulon.
It is impossible to conceive a department of the public
service in a worse condition—officers brawling, eager only
for their own advantage, disobedient, and utterly in-
capable; ships rotting at anchor or wrecking themselves
on the nearest rock as soon as they got under way; har-
bours choked with foul and worn-out hulks ; commissaries
dishonest, and the exchequer empty. Such was the state
of the navy in the early days of Colbert’s administration.

The reformation worked under Colbert in the course
of a few years was astonishing: the harbours were
cleared; the ships were numerous and in good order ;
the naval estimates were liberal, and were honestly
administered. The great difficulty lay in procuring sea-
men and officers; everi that was got over; and though
it would be too much to say that the crews or their
officers were sailors in the true sense of the word, there
was amongst them a sufficient sprinkling of the craft to
permit the work to be performed creditably. To a war-
like people the mere fighting comes by nature. That
the French officers of that time should fight was a matter
of course, but it was not easy to persuade them to fight
only according to order—to fight the proper enemy at
the proper time, and to fight no one else.

Of all offenders against strict discipline, Du Quesne,
from his high position, was one of the worst; he was
not, perhaps, quarrelsome in the ordinary sense; he
was not a duellist, but he was excessively cantankerous.
On every occasion we find him at variance with his
74 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

superiors; his experience as a seaman, his knowledge,
his ability, rendered his services indispensable, a fact of
which he was fully aware, and of which he took every
advantage. ‘A man irritable (épineux) and difficult to
persuade ;’‘an able man, but very fond of his own
opinion ;’ ‘difficult to control’—these are a few ex-
pressions, taken almost at random from the letters of
the intendant at Toulon to Colbert.

The fleet continued under the command of M. de
Nuchézes and the Duke de Beaufort, and as these two
set the example of quarrelling, it was not to be expected
that it could be in good order. Nuchézes wrote begging
that he might be relieved ; his health would furnish an
excuse. ‘Iam useless here,’ he says, ‘and, frankly, I
would rather herd cows than command a disorderly and
ill-disciplined army.’ Beaufort, indeed, seems to have
been a man altogether unfit for high command. His
birth and rank gave him a certain authority, and he
had a handsome person, a noble presence, and a hearty,
friendly manner which told well with the men; but he
was ignorant, obstinate, opinionated, and yet easily led
—an apparent contradiction which is not unfrequently
met with. He had in his youth gone through the usual
course of instruction, yet, of all the officers in the fleet,
he was probably the worst educated. Du Quesne’s
advantages had been few, but compared with Beaufort,
Du Quesne was a literary genius; Du Quesne could,
at least, write decently and with some appearance of
grammar ; Beaufort’s attempts at writing, spelling,! and
grammar were alike outrageous, and in one of his let-
ters to Colbert he attributes his shortcomings in these

’ For one delicious specimen of his letters, see Jal, i. 270.
DU QUESNE, 73

respects to the rolling of the ship. The evil of com-
petitive examinations is, now-a-days, a fertile subject
for declamation, and we hear much about the many able
men whom, it is assumed, they would have excluded ; it
is satisfactory to think that they would also exclude a
man such as the Duke de Beaufort. He was Grand
Master of Navigation, he was Admiral of France, he
commanded a French fleet for about eight years during
an exciting and anxious time of reform and progress;
but wherever he was concerned nothing prospered.
The expedition against Gigéri (Djidjelli) in 1664, suc-
cessful at first, eventuated in a miserable failure; in
1666 the fleet was to have joined the Dutch previous to
the battle off the North Foreland on 11 June (N.§.); he
received the news of the battle at Lisbon, and took no
part whatever in the war; finally, in 1669, he lost his
life in the vain attempt to relieve Candia; and without
saying that the blame of these and other smaller failures
rests entirely with him, his uniform want of success
affords, nevertheless, a fair presumption of his incapa-
bility.

During this time, however, the French navy was
rapidly becoming more worthy of a great Power. By
the purchase of ships and stores, and by the hiring
-workmen from Holland and Sweden, a numerically
respectable fleet was got together as early as 1666.
This, as I have just said, was, according to treaty, to
have taken part with the Dutch in the war against
England, but it did not arrive in the Channel till the
middle of September, after a delay which gave rise to
the idea that there was a secret understanding between
Louis and Charles. It is more probable that it was due
76 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

to a determination of the French king not to risk hig
newly formed fleet: and the marriage of Mademoiselle
d’Aumale! to the King of Portugal afforded a convenient
pretext. The young queen could only sail in summer,
for she suffered horribly from sea-sickness, and the
whole French fleet was necessary for a safe escort. As
a matter of fact, the squadron under Du Quesne, which
took her to Lisbon, arrived on 1 August, three days
after the fleet under Beaufort had sailed; the two had
no communication with each other, and their actual
movements seem to have been quite independent.
During all these years Du Quesne’s share in the
work was in no way prominent. He had no family
interest ; his captious temper did not make many friends ;
and though his ability and experience were respected,
his zeal and enterprise were considered doubtful. He
is constantly reported as fond of staying in harbour,
slow in refitting, exorbitant in his demands, overbearing,
petulant, and insubordinate. At the same time it must
be remembered that he was the oldest officer in. the
service, and almost the only seaman; that he thus
looked with the contempt traditional to the old sailor on
all landsmen who ventured to have an opinion on naval
affairs, and waged war equally on port-intendants and
soldiers turned admirals, whom he doubtless, in his
secret mind, classed indiscriminately as land-lubbers.
The work of the French navy was, however, at this
time, work of progress, not of war, and the credit of the
results belongs solely to Colbert. Beaufort was simply

1 Louise Frangoise Elisabeth de Savoie, duchesse de Nemours et
d’Aumale, daughter of the duc de Nemours and of Isabelle de Vendéme,
sister of the duc de Beaufort.
DU QUESNE. 77

a stumbling-block in his way, Du Quesne a source of
much anxiety; and these were the only officers of rank
he had to depend on. Tourville, whose name was pre-
eminent some twenty years afterwards, was of a later
generation ; he entered the French service as a captain
in 1667, having previously, as a knight of St. John,
distinguished himself in wild cruising against the Turks
in the Levant. D’EHstrées was altogether a landsman,
and having the rank of lieutenant-general in the army
on shore, came afloat in 1668, with the understanding
that he was shortly to be advanced to a high rank in
the navy. After a semi-diplomatic or political voyage to
the West Indies, he was made Vice-Admiral of France,
and commanded in chief the fleet which nominally acted
with the English at the battle of Solebay on 7 June
(28 May), 1672.

The appointment of D’Estrées as vice-admiral gave
great offence to Du Quesne ; he had possibly nourished a
secret idea that the rank might be conferred on himself,
or it may simply have been that he was determinedly
antagonistic to every officer put over his head. The
high value put on his technical knowledge preserved him
to the service, but it may be doubted whether his abrupt
dismissal would not have been more advantageous to it,
As it was, he was the ruin of all attempts to enforce dis-
cipline, for the squabbles between him and the vice-
admiral were as notorious as disgraceful. And yet these
two were the commanders of the squadron which joined
the English for the summer campaign of 1672.

The battle of Solebay was the first in which the new
navy of France took part, and its action in it has been
the subject of much adverse criticism, the value of which
78 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

can only be decided by an examination into ‘some of the
circumstances of the fight.

Tt is well known that the allied fleet was anchored in
Solebay, or, as it is now more commonly called, Southwold
Bay,' on the coast of Suffolk, in line parallel to the shore
—that is, nearly north and south—with the wind at
about E.N.E.; and, remaining in that position, in defi-
ance of all nautical rule, and notwithstanding the warning
counsel of the Earl of Sandwich, was taken at a dis-
advantage by the Dutch. The French division, which
formed the van of the fleet, was anchored to the south;
and, in the natural order, the fleet, on weighing, would
have stood towards the south, on the port tack, as had
probably been agreed on the day before. The Dutch,
however, came in unexpectedly from the north-east ; and
had the allies stood out on the port tack—that is, towards
the south-east—according to the original intention, it is
evident that they would have crossed the line on which
the Dutch were advancing; they would, in fact, have
presented their flank to the enemy, as Blake had done
off Portland in 16538, or as, many years afterwards, in
1805, Villeneuve did off Cape Trafalgar. The wind, too,
after a short lull, veered to the south of east, thus offer-
ing more sea-room to the north ; and the English, without
hesitation, adopted the only course open to them of es-
caping from the unfavourable position in which they
had allowed themselves to be caught. They hastily and
confusedly stood out towards the north-east, on the

1 This bay was a favourite anchorage of our fleets all through the
Dutch wars. The contour of the land has apparently changed a good
deal, and Southwold Bay now presents a nearly straight line of coast
running north and south.
DU QUESNE. 79

starboard tack; the rear division, commanded by the
Earl of Sandwich, thus becoming the van and leading
into action. Now, whether D’Estrées did not understand
the Duke of York’s signal, whether he was unwilling to
form the rear division of the fleet, or whether, as was
commonly said, he had private orders to keep his squadron
out of danger, cannot now be certainly known ; what he
did was to come to the wind on the port tack, in the
natural order, and to stand towards the south or south-
east, thereby at once separating and continuing to sepa-
rate from the rest of the fleet. It is beyond dispute that,
in so doing, D’Estrées committed a gross tactical error,
the result of which was that the Dutch, leaving a small
squadron under Bankert to occupy the French, fell in
force on the English. All our histories tell the rest ; the
fight was maintained with pertinacious courage on both
sides till nightfall, and neither English nor Dutch could
strictly claim the victory, though each considered that
it inclined in their favour. On one point only were they
agreed: the French had treacherously kept out of the
fight.

We have no evidence which will permit us to say
what secret orders D’Hstrées may have had; one, at
least, has recently come to light—an order from Colbert
to make his report as favourable as possible; but the
minister’s anxiety to encourage the rising navy, his
dread lest a too accurate statement might dispirit it,
is a ready excuse for some exaggeration, which, being
published, has crept into the current French histories.
Whether time may produce any other secret order, such
as has been spoken of, must be doubted; nor, indeed, is
it necessary to suppose that such ever existed. When we
80 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

consider the very rude system of signalling at that day ;
that D’Estrées had very little experience at sea, and ab-
solutely none of naval war; that he was on bad terms
with Du Quesne, the second in command, who would
delight in seeing him make a blunder; that Du Quesne
led the van of the French squadron, and with his captious
temper and bitter hatred of the English might probably
enough refuse to sail in their wake; that the Dutch
attack had the nature of a surprise, and the fleet had to
get under way so hurriedly that some of the ships cut
their cables ; that there was thus no time for explana-
tion ;—taking, I say, all these things into consideration,
it would seem strange indeed had no mistake occurred.
Supposing D’Estrées impressed with one idea that his
division was the van, the movements of the English
might easily be beyond his comprehension till he found
himself hopelessly separated from them. I do not, of
course, say that this is the true explanation of the prob-
lem, but it seems at least a plausible one, which is more
than can be said in support of the received story which
attributes a meaningless piece of treachery to an able if
rather unscrupulous government.

Asa matter of fact, however, Du Quesne’s conduct
on this occasion was very severely judged by the French
themselves. The vice-admiral distinctly accused him of
keeping out of the fight, and of edging away from the
enemy. This led to a violent quarrel; the matter was
referred to the court; and without pronouncing any
judgment on the case, it was so evident that D’Estrées
and Du Quesne could not advantageously serve together,
that Du Quesne was superseded. It is difficult now to
say what amount of truth there was in the charge. We
DU QUESNE. 81

can readily believe that Du Quesne was not very zealous
in a fight which, if won, tended so directly to the advan-
tage of the English, whom he detested, and of D’Hstrées
whom he hated. But on the other hand, it is far from
improbable that D’Hstrées was quite ready to sacrifice
Du Quesne, a personal enemy, to preserve his own credit ;
and he certainly did not win golden opinions when, the
next year, free from Du Quesne’s influence, with the
same allies and against the same enemies, he had every
opportunity of doing so. With all his faults Du Quesne
was a gallant man and an able seaman; D’Hstrées was
an incapable commander, and probably could not tell
whether a ship was close to the wind or not. His family
interest gained for him the high position and supported
him in it, leaving first Du Quesne, and afterwards
Martel, his successor, to bear the weight of the popular
indignation and of the Court’s displeasure.!

Du Quesne’s stay on shore was notlong. In January
1674 he was appointed second in command of a squadron
fitting out for service in the Mediterranean. After long
delay this squadron, consisting of nine ships, and com-
manded by the Count de Vivonne, sailed for Messina on
1 February, 1675, to assist the revolted townsmen against

1 M. Jal and others have maintained that the evidence of M. de Feu-
quiéres, a midshipman of Du Quesne’s own ship, the Terrible, as given
in a private letter to his father, is conclusive in Du Quesne’s favour
(Lettres inédites des Feuquiéres, par Etienne Gallois, ii. 47, 53). They
have not noticed that a midshipman of the Terrible was necessarily a
violent partisan, and that on a technical point the evidence of a sea-sick
boy has no great value. After all, so far as the conduct of the French
in the battle is concerned, the question is not, Did the Terrible keep
close to the wind or not? but, Why did the whole French division stand
away on the port tack? My own conclusion is that it was simply a
blunder on the part of D’Estrées.

G
82 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the Spaniards, in conjunction with a smaller squadron
of six ships which, under the Chevalier de Valbelle, had
sailed a month earlier. On 11 February, off Stromboli,
they met the Spanish fleet of twenty-nine ships and
fourteen galleys, a force numerically strong, but of very
inferior quality. Valbelle’s squadron came out to the
support of their friends, and the Spaniards, notwith-
standing their numbers, would not await the conjoint
attack. Suffering the loss of one ship, they crowded all
sail and fled to the northward ; while the French, with
the large convoy of victuallers, passed into Messina.

I do not propose to enter on any detailed account of
the operations at Messina during this war, which is
a matter of every-day history. My object is merely to.
trace the influence which the campaign had on the
development of the French navy, and on the career of
Du Quesne, whom we find now, for the first time, in
command of a fleet; for the Count de Vivonne, as vice-
roy, contented himself with the general direction of
affairs.

The local trade of Messina being entirely stopped by
the Spaniards, the town was dependent for sustenance
on the provisions brought by the French. Valbelle first,
and then Vivonne, had given temporary relief, but the
expedition was grudgingly supported, and neither the
troops required for maintaining the position nor the
provisions needed for the town were forthcoming. Great
exertions were thus necessary, not so much to extend the
French influence as to hold the bare town. Very strong
letters on this subject were written by the viceroy, but
Du Quesne, who had been sent back to France to convoy
the reinforcements, returned in the end of May with only
DU QUESNE. 83

3,000 men; he was afterwards despatched on a cruise
along the north coast of Africa, to arrange about the
transport of cattle and corn for the starving population ;
and then again to Toulon, which place he left in the
middle of December, with a fleet of twenty ships of war
and six fire-ships, his flag flying on board the Saint-
Esprit, and having under his orders, amongst others,
the Marquis de Preuilly, the Marquis de Villette, the
Chevalier de Valbelle, and the Chevalier de Tourville,
names dear to France and renowned in naval history.

It was with this fleet that, on 7 January, 1676, near
Stromboli, he met the Dutch squadron of cighteen ships,
which had been sent into the Mediterranean to the assist-
ance of the Spaniards. De Ruyter, who had been ap-
pointed to the command, at the special request of the
King of Spain, had vainly protested against being sent
out with a force so small; the Dutch authorities had
formed an idea that the French navy was merely
nominal, and certainly not superior in quality to the
Spanish; they judged, therefore, that the Spanish
contingent would raise the allied fleet to a decisive
superiority. De Ruyter thus found himself in presence
of the enemy with a force so inferior in strength as
to make it unadvisable for him to attack. His object
was to prevent, if possible, the relief of Messina; and,
with a southerly wind, he manceuvred between the
French fleet and their port, barring their passage, and
ready to seize on any advantage that might offer. The
French, on the other hand, being superior both in the
number and the size of their ships, were anxious to
defeat the covering fleet and to break the blockade.
During the night the wind shifted to the west or north-

G2
84 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

west, and Du Quesne having thus the advantage, ran
down towards the enemy. The Dutch, formed in line
towards the south-west, received them firmly ; the French
van, under M. de Preuilly, suffered a good deal; but the
fight extending along the whole length of the two lines,
continued at close quarters throughout the day, the
French losing two of their fire-ships in futile attempts
to burn the Dutch to leeward. Towards evening it fell
calm, and the fleets drifted apart, the damage sustained
on each side being nearly equal. The next day the
French were joined by a squadron of ten ships from
Messina; this gave them a decided superiority, for the
detachment of six Spanish ships which joined the Dutch
strengthened them in appearance only, and De Ruyter
could not venture on an attack, which Du Quesne, on
his part, did not press. The Dutch drew back towards
Melazzo, hoping to be able to cut off the rear division of
the French as they passed through the Straits; and Du
Quesne, fearing this, after some days’ manceuvring stood
away to the westward. The Dutch, being in much need
of repairs, went to Palermo to refit; and the French,
passing round the south of Sicily, got into Messina.

It seems the invariable rule that an indecisive action
is claimed as a victory by both sides; and this formed
no exception. The Dutch had perhaps fair grounds for
doing so, for they prevented the French from entering
Messina as they intended ; with very inferior force they
kept them at bay for more than a week, and obliged them
to make a détowr, which still longer delayed the relief of
the town; they did not arrive in Messina till the 22nd.
But the French accounts, deliberately and purposely
falsified at the time, have passed into history; and we
DU QUESNE. 85

frequently read, in a few words, that the Dutch gave
way, and that the French passed through to Messina
without hindrance. Du Quesne’s merit must be limited
to his having, with a force numerically large, of new and
heavy ships, but with inexperienced officers and men,
fought a gallant action against a fleet weaker indeed in
ships and numbers, but well manned, and commanded
by the most able and experienced seaman of the day.
To have met De Ruyter without suffering a crushing
defeat was, for the French, almost equivalent to a
victory; it gave them a confidence in themselves and in
their admiral which paved the way to future success. It
was not, however, till towards the middle of April that
they could muster resolution to endeavour to break
the blockade which the combined Dutch-Spanish fleet
had established. The mere fact that they endured this
blockade for more than two months is strong evidence in
contradiction of their claim to victory on 8 January ;
and it was not till De Ruyter threatened their position
at Agosta, that they felt-it necessary to take active
measures against him.

The two fleets met on 22 April, almost under the
shadow of Etna, their line extending towards the east ;
and De Ruyter, having the advantage of a southerly
wind, ran down with the van division and attacked the
French van with great vigour. Against thirty French
ships the allied fieet mustered seventeen Dutch and
ten Spanish. Unfortunately the Spanish admiral, Don
Francisco de la Cerda, who was the nominal commander-
in-chief, insisted on stationing himself with the Spanish
division in the centre of the line, a position to which his
rank and the numbers of his squadron gave him an
86 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

apparent right. The Dutch were thus divided; and as
the Spaniards still kept to the wind when De Ruyter
ran down against the enemy, the line was broken, and
Haan, who commanded the rear division, was kept out
of the fight. The whole brunt of the attack thus fell
on De Ruyter, who ought to have been overpowered.
The French were, however, slow to realise the utter
worthlessness of the Spaniards, who, keeping at. a
respectful distance, fired a few occasional shots; and
De Ruyter, having driven back several ships of the French
van, came next into contact with the centre, which,
under the immediate command of Du Quesne himself,
stood on to take their place.! Haan had, by this time,
managed to get into action; and obtaining a slight
advantage over the French rear, their whole line edged
away to leeward. Night separated the combatants ; the
French were lost in the darkness, and De Ruyter,
apprehending bad weather, which, in the shattered
condition of several of his ships, would have been
dangerous, did not care to follow too far. The next
morning broke in rain and mist; the French were
nowhere to be seen; it was conjectured that they had
retired to Messina; and the allied fleet went into

1 The manceuvres at this time have been very differently described.
Jal (ii. 218), following the despatch of M. de Vivonne, and to some ex-
tent also that of Du Quesne, seems to think that De Ruyter, with his
squadron, made a stern board and so came abreast of the French centre.
Brandt (689), on the other hand, says that Du Quesne ‘ seeing that the
Spanish admiral held his wind, crowded sail to join his van and support
it against De Ruyter.’ So also Basnage (ii. 681). I have little doubt
this was what really happened; and that in doing it, Du Quesne in-
vented a manceuvre which the French repeated several times in the next
century.
DU QUESNE, 87

Syracuse, the Spanish galleys taking in tow the more
disabled of the Dutch ships.!

The weather continued broken for several days, but
on the 29th the French, who had with great difficulty
kept at sea, appeared off Syracuse. The allies were not
in a mood to fight. No one amongst them doubted that
they had won a clear if not decisive victory on the 22nd ;
but their joy was now turned to sorrow. A wound in
the leg, which De Ruyter had received in the battle, not
considered dangerous at the time, proved fatal in a very
few days: mortification set in, and the admiral died on
the 29th, the last and greatest of the Dutch heroes of
the English wars, a victim to the parsimony of his govern-
ment and the miserable inefficiency of the Spaniards.
The sting of the allied fleet was drawn, for the Dutch
admiral, Haan, who succeeded to the command, was
not a man to win distinction under circumstances even
less disadvantageous than those in which he was now
placed.

The account which I have given of this battle of
Agosta is very different from that which it suited the
the French government to publish. We know that they
gave systematic orders that the official reports were to
be made as favourable as possible; and the story put
forth on this occasion was that the allies had been
completely defeated, had been chased into Syracuse, and
blockaded there. The death of De Ruyter gave a plausible
colouring to this story, which the Dutch accounts, De
Ruyter’s letter to the States, and Haan’s letters to the

1 The pictures and plans in Recweil de Combats et d’Hupéditions
Maritimes, d’aprés les dessins de N. Ozanne, give a clear and, on the
whole, very fair idea of this and Du Quesne’s later battles.
88 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

King of Spain, contradict in every detail, and which is
altogether at variance with the accusations freely made
in letters from Du Quesne to Colbert, and in the pri-
vate correspondence or memoirs of different officers.!
According to these, several ships, and even the Saint-
Esprit herself, did not keep as closely as possible to the
wind; in other words, they gave way before the enemy.
When, therefore, we find the Dutch accounts, public
and private, agreeing in the main with the non-official
letters of the French, and when we know that the French
official report was prepared to order, there is little
difficulty in deciding which is most worthy of credit;
and it is after a close comparison of many conflicting
statements that I have framed the description of this
celebrated battle.

The death of De Ruyter was, however, a terrible
blow to the allies, and one from which they could not
recover ;. they made no effort to resume the blockade of
Messina, and shortly afterwards went round to Palermo.
Here, whilst refitting, they were caught by the French
under Vivonne himself, who had embarked with the
Chevalier de Tourville on board the Sceptre. The idea
that Tourville was the real author of the plan of the
attack which followed seems well founded. Vivonne was
not a man of energy or experience; Tourville, on the
contrary, was a sailor from his youth, and had already
won a distinct reputation for enterprise and ability; in
a small boat he reconnoitred the position of the enemy,
anchored in a crescent along the coast in front of the
town ; and at a council of war held on board the Sceptre
after his return it was decided that the Marquis de

1 Basnage, ii. 683; Jal, ii. 220-229,
DU QUESNE, 89

Preuilly with a squadron of nine ships should, if the
wind held as it then was, at north-east, lead in against.
the eastern division, the main body of the fleet support-.
ing him by attacking the rest. The general outline of
the battle fought on this plan on the following day, June 2,
bears a striking resemblance to that of the battle of the
Nile, and the result was very similar. Preuilly’s squad-
ron stood in so close ‘that they let go their anchors on
the anchor-buoys of the enemy, and at these close
quarters opened an overwhelming fire. The Spanish
vice-admiral set the example of cutting his cable and
letting his ship drift on shore; the others soon followed
his example. The French fire-ships, driven by the
north-east wind, were let loose among them, and flames
and confusion spread in all directions. The ship of the
Dutch rear-admiral was blown up; the Spanish flag-
ship shared the same fate; Haan, the Dutch admiral,
was killed; three Dutch and five Spanish ships were
burnt or blown up; the destruction ceased only when
the French had expended their store of fire-ships, the
Spanish and Dutch taking refuge behind the mole, or
running themselves aground, out of reach of the enemy’s
guns. Naval history records few victories more com-
plete; and in the opinion of the French government a
great part of the credit reflected on Du Quesne, who was
second in command, whilst it was known that Vivonne
was not a seaman. Du Quesne, however, does not seem
to have taken much part, and certainly not a leading
part, in the action; the brunt of the fighting fell on
Preuilly’s squadron; and, as I have already said, the
ingenious tactics adopted were almost universally
attributed to Tourville. It was even said that Du Quesne.
90 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

had not shown any particular forwardness in the fight ;
but he was a man with few friends and many bitter
enemies, who lost no opportunity of speaking ill of him.

With this severe blow to the allies the active opera-
tions of the fleet on the coast of Sicily may be said to
have ended; for the Dutch squadron was shortly after-
wards recalled, and the Spaniards were unable to show
themselves at sea. The French ships were employed
principally in carrying troops or stores from Toulon, till,
in March 1678, the French government decided to eva-
cuate Messina ; peace was concluded with Spain,and the
revolted Sicilians were left unprotected and exposed to
the vengeance of their enemies.

The reconstruction of the French navy may be con-
sidered to have been by this time accomplished. Its
organisation and discipline were still imperfect; gross
irregularities were still frequent in the dockyards; but
the system was fairly inaugurated ; the ships were real,
new, large, and heavily armed; the officers were be-
coming more and more habituated to the sea; and men
were gradually being enrolled for the service of the
crown. In the further development of the young navy
Du Quesne had an important share, and he seems to
have been actively employed for some years in examin-
ing into and putting a stop to abuses, or in suggesting
remedies. One instance of his work will suffice.

A squadron of four ships, commanded by Tourville,
going round from Toulon to Brest, was caught in a gale
of wind in the Bay of Biscay. Two of them foundered
at sea, with great loss of life. Du Quesne was ordered
to inquire into the matter ; he reported that the masts
had been badly stayed, and the hulls weak ; that they
DU QUESNE. 91

were contract-built, and that the work had been scamped.
As the result of this report the intendant and master-
shipwrights at Toulon, where the ships had fitted out, were
put in prison. The intendant had friends, and his im-
prisonment was not long; the others, though mere sub-
ordinates, seem to have had a severe lesson.

In this formation of a new navy there is one point
worthy of a special notice; when the ships were em-
ployed as troopers, the sickness and mortality were
excessive. This tells unmistakably that no advance
whatever had been made in cleanliness. The filthy
habits on board were not so much the result of con-
servatism as of ignorance; and it was not till nearly a
hundred years later that the importance of cleanliness
and ventilation on board ship was fully understood. In
the seventeenth century but little attention was paid to
purification ; the lining of the ship was a convenient re-
ceptacle for filth of all sorts; and the state of the bilges
can be more easily imagined than described.

In 1681 Du Quesne was sent with a small squadron
into the Levant, to repress the Tripoli corsairs, who had
been preying on the rising French commerce; and in
1682-88, with a more powerful fleet, against Algiers.
These expeditions, which resulted in the liberation of
great numbers of Christian slaves, are, from a naval
point of view, chiefly remarkable for the first employ-
ment of mortar vessels, which were designed by Renau,
a young engineer then coming into notice.

In 1684 Du Quesne superintended, rather than com-
manded, the bombardment of Genoa, and with the close
of the year his service came toanend. He died suddenly
a few years later, being found dead in his bed on the
92 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

morning of 2 February, 1688, sixty-two years after the
date of his commission as captain. He had been pro-
moted to the rank of commodore (chef d’escadre) in
1647, on his return from Sweden; and in after-years he
claimed seniority as lieutenant-general—corresponding
to the modern rank of vice-admiral—from 1650; the
claim was allowed, though he does not seem to have had
any distinct commission. His naval rank never reached
higher ; his adherence to the reformed religion was used
as a pretext for not promoting him; but as it did not
hinder the government from rewarding his services with
the title of marquis in 1681, and with liberal gifts of
money and land, it is at least probable that they con-
sidered it unadvisable to give the highest service rank
to a man of his captious and obstinate temper, or to give
a place of exceptional distinction to a man of low birth.
The great length of time over which his service ex-
tended, and the excessive changes through which the
country, the government, and, still more, the navy
passed, have given to his name a celebrity, and still give
to the study of his career an interest, far beyond his
personal merits. That he was a man of energy and de-
termination is not to be doubted; but these qualities
were principally exhibited against his superiors or col-
leagues. It is not a little curious to notice that in every
action in which he held important command, and espe-
cially at Solebay, he was accused of being backward in
fight ; that he was everywhere accused of unnecessary
delay in fitting out, of making difficulties, of preferring
his own interests to the good of the service, of greediness
and selfishness. His own letters prove that, at least,
some of these were not idle charges. The only excuse
DU QUESNE. 93

we can find for him is that in an age and a society in
which eager selfishness was universal, and family connec-
tions of the basest kind were unblushingly turned to ad-
vantage, he alone had no one to urge his claims ; he had
no unchaste interest about the court; he had to take his
own part in the broad daylight of official correspondence.
He was perhaps not more greedy than his neighbours,
though he was so in a more direct and public manner.
Beyond this we cannot go. That he was an able officer
must be admitted, but that he was a great commander
is contrary to evidence; that he was the conqueror of
De Ruyter is contrary to fact.
94 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

CHAPTER IV.
LH BAILLI DE SUFFREN\!

On the two sides of the Channel there has often been
held a very different estimate of the conduct of naval
commanders, whether English or French; and in few
cases has this difference been more clearly shown than in
that of the Bailiff de Suffren, boasted of in France, as one
of the greatest heroes that has in any time adorned any
navy ; known in England—if known at all—merely as the
commander of a squadron in the East Indies, who fought
a series of unimportant actions, with no decisive results,
in support of a cause that was ultimately lost. And
yet Suffren was no ordinary man; notwithstanding the
exaggeration of the French estimate—an exaggeration
which almost unconsciously excites a spirit of opposition
and of unbelief; notwithstanding the want of result to
his labours; the want of that success by which, in Eng-
land, we prefer to judge of performance, he was a com-
mander of rare skill and energy; rich in resources, of
unflinching courage, and of untiring perseverance. I
conceive, therefore, that we shall derive both interest
and advantage from a critical examination of De Suffren’s
career ; unsurpassingly brilliant as are the achievements

1 United Service Magazine, May and June, 1867,
SUFFREN. 95

of so many of our own naval heroes, our good fame can
never suffer by a due award to the noblest and bravest
of our enemies.

Pierre André de Suffren Saint-Tropés,! a younger
son of a noble family of Provence, was born on 17 July,
1729. At the age of fourteen, he was admitted into the
navy of France, as a preparation for his entering, at
a later period, into the Order of St. John; and his
first service, as a cadet, was on board the Solide, a
64-gun ship, one of the allied fleet which, under Admirals
de Court and Navarro, fought the indecisive action
with the English, off Toulon, on 22 February, 1744.
Though the brunt of the battle fell on the Spaniards,
some of the French ships, and amongst others, the Solide,
were actually engaged, and Suffren, still a mere boy,
made acquaintance with the cruel realities of war. In
the following year, on board the Pauline, he was present
in the disastrous affair off Martinique, when Vice-Admiral
Townsend captured, or drove ashore, a great part of the
valuable convoy which, under the command of Com-
modore Macnamara, was intended to victual the French
West-Indian settlements; and the year after, 1746, in
the Trident, took part in the attempt made to recapture
Cape Breton. The anxiety consequent on the failure of
the expedition carried off the Duke d’Enville, the com-

! The principal authorities for the life of Suffren are: Histoire du
Bailli du Suffren, par Ch. Cunat; Histoire de la Campagne de I’ Inde
par V Escadre Frangaise sous les ordres de M. le Bailli de Suffren, par
le Citoyen Trublet (M. Trublet de la Villejégu), capitaine de Vaisseau;
Essai historique sur la Vie et les Campagnes du Bailli de Suffren, par
M. Hennequin; and best, though latest, Histoire dela Marine Francaise
pendant la Guerre de lV Indépendance Américaine, par E. Chevalier,
capitaine de vaisseau.
96 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

mander-in-chief, and so preyed on the mind of the cap-
tain of the Trident, M. d’Estourmel, on whom, after the
death of the duke, the command devolved, as to drive him
to commit suicide. Storm by sea, inclement weather on
land, improper exposure and small-pox proved themselves
more fatal than any hostile effort. Such numbers of
men, sailors as well as soldiers, perished, that a hasty
retreat to the ships became absolutely necessary ; and of
those ships, weakened by their losses, many were cap-
‘tured, almost without resistance, on their way across
the Atlantic.

The next year, 1747, Suffren was serving in the
advanced rank of ensign, on board the Monarque, of 74
guns, when that ship, with five others (the Trident
amongst the number), was captured by Rear-Admiral
Hawke, in the Bay of Biscay, on 25 October. He did
not remain long a prisoner, being exchanged in the
course of a few months; but the losses that France had
sustained during the war had reduced her navy to com-
parative inaction; the young ensign was unable to obtain
employment, and after the peace, which was signed on
7 October, 1748, he went,to Malta, to fulfil the wishes
of his family, by joining the Order. For six years he
remained amongst the Knights Hospitallers, serving
actively on board their ships in the perpetual war which
they waged against the Turk; and we may perhaps
fairly attribute a certain unscrupulousness of character
to the fact of his having been engaged for so long a
period, at the turning-point of his life, from the age of
nineteen to twenty-five, in this sort of semi-piratical
adventure.

On his return to France, Suffren was appointed to
SUFFREN. 97

the Dauphin Royal, of 70 guns, one of the fleet sent out
to North America, under M. Dubois de la Motte, in the
spring of 1755. Admiral Boscawen, in command of a
powerful fleet, left England about the same time, and off
Louisbourg seized on two ships of Dela Motte’s squadron
—the Alcide and Lys—separated from the rest in a fog.
The Dauphin Royal was nearly sharing the same fate,
but escaped into Louisbourg, from whence—being unable
to rejoin the admiral—she returned to Brest.

Though the two countries, in an unrecognised and
privateering sort of way, continued to prey on each
other's shipping, it was nearly a year after this before
there was a formal declaration of war. At that time
Suffren was a lieutenant of the Orphée, 64; and in her
was engaged in the notorious action off Minorca on
20 May, 1756. Early in the next year he was appointed
to the Océan, 80, carrying the flag of M. de la Clue (chef
d’escadre) and was serving in that ship when she, together
with a great part of the Toulon fleet, was blockaded in
Cartagena by Admiral Osborn. During that time he
had the pain of seeing his former ship, the Orphée, as
well as the Foudroyant, and the rest of the squadron
under the Marquis Du Quesne,! captured by the English
in their attempt to break the blockade, on 28 February,
1758. Dela Clue, who appears to have been wanting
in that daring energy which is one of the first qualities
in a naval commander, was content to witness their
capture without making an effort to save them from
their fate; although a junction with Du Quesne would
have raised his force to a numerical equality with that

1 Du Quesne-Menneville, son of Du Quesne-Monnier, the nephew of

Abraham Du Quesne, the first Marquis.
H
98 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

of the blockaders. The capture of these ships and the
lateness of the season, rendered it unnecessary or un-
advisable for the English to remain any longer off
Cartagena, and whilst Osborn withdrew to Gibraltar,
De la Clue got back to Toulon.

The next year, 1759, was singularly fatal to the
French arms afloat. Immense preparations were made
for landing on the coast of England; a large fleet was
collected at Brest, under the Marquis de Conflans, to
cover the expedition; and that not being considered
sufficient, De la Clue, with the Mediterranean fleet, was
ordered round from Toulon. But Boscawen, with a
powerful force, appeared before that port, and De la Clue
did not consider himself justified in trying the chances
of battle. In vain did the English admiral try to tempt
or to goad him into coming out; De la Clue firmly
adhered to his resolve to stay in, until want of water and
provisions compelled Boscawen to break up the blockade
and retire to Gibraltar. Whilst he was there, the French
having come out from Toulon, attempted to pass the
Straits. Boscawen, however, by a judicious distribution
of his frigates, had sufficient intelligence of their move-
ments ; he met them in the narrow waters, off Cape de
8. Maria, where, on 18 August, they sustained a signal
defeat. Dela Clue, although possessing a fair share of
personal courage, seems to have been entirely unfitted
for the command of an important fleet. On the day of
battle, things directed themselves ; several of the French
ships were out of the way altogether, and, as far as ren-
dering assistance went, might as well have remained
at Toulon. Of the ships of the squadron that did en-
gage, almost all were captured ; the Océan ran ashore
SUFFREN. 99

near Lagos, and M. de la Clue, who had been mortally
wounded in the action, was landed; the ship, however,
was taken possession of, and burnt by the English ; and
M. de Suffren, for the second time, became a prisoner
of war.

A few months later, the Brest fleet under M. de
Conflans experienced a fate similar to that of the Toulon
squadron. It was destroyed by Sir Edward Hawke, in
Quiberon Bay, on 20 November. As this fleet was larger
than the other, so was its defeat more severe; but the
combined result of the two actions was to leave France,
for the time, powerless in European waters. Suffren
returned home after a short captivity, but remained
unemployed till the peace in 1763, when he was ordered
in command of a small vessel, the Caméléon, to cruise in
the Mediterranean for the protection of trade. In her,
and afterwards in the Singe, he continued for four
years employed more or less actively in restraining the
Morocco pirates ; and was present at the bombardment of
Sallee in June, 1765, and in the severe repulse which
the French squadron subsequently met with at Larrache.
In 1767 he was promoted to the rank of commander
(capitaine de frégate), and after a few months, during
which he served as flag-captain on board the Union
frigate, in an embassy to the court of Morocco, he went
once more to Malta. For four years longer he remained
in the service of the Order—in which he acquired the
distinction of commander—and appears to have been
engaged in active cruising during a large proportion of
that time. Being made a captain (capitaine de vaisseau,)
in 1772, he returned to France, and commanded suc-
cessively the frigates Mignonne and Alcméne in a series

H2
100 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

of experimental cruises. In the early part of 1777 he
was appointed to the Fantasque, 64; which, on the de-
claration of war in March, 1778, was one of twelve ships
sent to America under the orders of Count d’Estaing.

In company with the fleet, or on specially detached
service, the Fantasque remained on that station for
nearly two years; was present when Howe’s position at
Sandy Hook was judged unassailable, July 1778; took
part in the abortive attack on Barrington at St. Lucia,
15 December 1778; and was the leading ship in the
battle of Grenada on 6 July 1779. The battle, like so
many others in the last century, was indecisive, and, as
usual in such cases, each has claimed a victory that
cannot rightly be assigned to either. Both fleets sus-
tained a good deal of damage, and the French drew off,
but retained the prize for which they were fighting.
Suffren, in his official letter, speaks of his loss in men,
and of the damage done to his ship and rigging as
serious, though less so than the honourable post he had
filled might lead one to apprehend: the number of
killed and wounded on board the Fantasque was re-
turned as sixty-two.

Suffren went back to France in the end of 1779, when
he appears to have been well received by the government.
In the following March he was given a pension of 1,500
livres, as a mark—so runs the order—of the king’s satis-
faction at the zeal and activity he had displayed in the
course of his service, and in particular whilst command-
ing the Fantasque, in the fleet of the Count d’Estaing ; as
well as at the bravery and talent which he had given
proofs of in various battles, and especially in the battle of
Grenada. Consequent on this, he was appointed in April
SUFFREN. 101

of the same year to the Zélé,! and sailed from Brest
to join the allied fleet then blockading Gibraltar, and
cruising off Cadiz.

It was shortly after his arrival that they fell in with
a large and valuable English convoy, which—for the
East and West Indies together—numbered no less than
sixty-three ships. This convoy was nominally under the
order and protection of Captain Moutray, in the Ramil-
lies (with the frigates Thetis and Southampton), who
made out the Franco-Spanish fleet about midnight of
8 August. He immediately, by general signal, directed
the convoy to alter course to the westward, at the same
time altering course himself. Unfortunately, the
merchant ships did not attend to the commodore’s
orders; they continued their southerly course, which
carried them, by daybreak, almost into the middle of the
enemy. They were thus taken possession of with only
two exceptions,—ships that were coppered, and had kept
with the Ramillies. The actual loss to England was
enormous, and was rendered greater by the circumstances
under which it happened; for in consequence of such
a heavy blow inflicted on their opponents, the court of
Spain abruptly broke off negotiations for a separate
peace ; whilst, at the same time, our establishments
abroad, both naval and military, were deprived of the
stores which were being sent out, and of which they
stood in great need. Captain Moutray was dismissed
his ship, by sentence of court-martial, 18 February 1781 ;
but the following year, under the new administration,

1 The same ship which, under another captain, was such an important
factor in the manceuvres of the French fleet prior to the battle of
. Dominica, on 12 April, 1782.
102 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

he was appointed to the command of another ship, the
Edgar; and a year or two later, to be commissioner of
the navy at Antigua.'

A squadron of seven line-of-battle ships, under M. de
Suffren, chased the Ramillies and her frigates for some
time; but finding themselves completely outsailed, they
returned to pick up the straggling merchant-men. It
was afterwards—and in consequence of this—that Suffren
addressed a strong paper to the minister of the navy, on
the importance of coppering the bottoms of ships of war.
In this paper he pointed out that, as the English had al-
ready coppered several of their ships, and were engaged in
coppering others as fast as possible, it must be considered
not merely advantageous, but absolutely necessary, for
the French to do the same; otherwise the enemy would
always have the option of battle, or of retreat; would
be able to keep the sea longer, and, even with inferior
forces, to prey on the French commerce. He then pro-
ceeded, in illustration of his views, to give instances where
ships had been manifestly at a disadvantage through not
being coppered ; he entered into the minute details of how
and where a sufficient supply of copper was to be obtained ;
and concluded with again strongly urging the necessity
of coppering their own ships, and of inducing their allies
to copper theirs. The recommendations of M. de Suffren
were too sensible to be strictly followed; and indeed,
notwithstanding his argument founded on the number of
ships in our service, already coppered, such ships were

1 Whilst commissioner at Antigua, a curious question arose as to his
right to fiy a broad pennant and, whilst on half-pay, do the duties of

senior officer. See my select Letters and Despatches of Lord Nelson,
p. 29-31,
SUFFREN. 103

then, and for some time after, exceptions to the general
rule. The first ship in the English navy which was
coppered was the Dolphin frigate, in 1764, when she was
being fitted for her voyage round the world, under Com-
modore Byron; the next was, I believe, the Alarm, a
32-gun frigate, which’ was commissioned for the Mediter-
ranean, 1769, by Captain John Jervis. The adoption of
the new sheathing was however very slow, and years
passed away before it became at all common. Till then,
ships’ bottoms were smeared over with some composition
of tallow or wax, which, of course, offered little or no
obstacle to the various plants and animals which infest
the sea; and even this slight protection was rubbed
off in a few weeks by the action of the waves, or by
the friction, as the vessel was forced through the water.

Early in the following year the French fleet returned
to Brest; the Zélé was put out of commission, and
Suffren appointed to the Héros, a new ship of 74 guns,
as senior officer in command of a squadron of five ships
of the line about to proceed to the East Indies; with an
order to take acting rank as commodore (chef d’escadre)
when past the Cape of Good Hope.

We thus arrive at the turning point in Suffren’s
history. After a career of extraordinary activity and.
incident,—after thirty-eight years of almost uninterrupted.
sea service, whether in the French navy or in the Maltese
cruisers, he was now appointed to a command in which
he would be able to reduce to practice the rules which
the hard chances of war had taught him. He had had,
indeed, unexampled opportunities of studying the higher
part of his profession. Engaged in almost every naval
action that had been fought since the time of his child-
104 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

hood ; twice a prisoner in the hands of the enemy; for
nearly five years captain of a ship forming part of an
experimental squadron ;—it is difficult to imagine a series
of-lessons more adapted to qualify a courageous and de-
termined man, a zealous and intelligent officer, for in-
dependent command. Such a man, such an officer, so
schooled was Suffren, when at the age of fifty-two he was
appointed to the command of the East Indian squadron.

At this time, the English government was fitting out
an expedition against the Dutch settlements at the
Cape of Good Hope; and to defend that colony was the
primary object of the French. Suffren accordingly left
Brest on 22 March 1781. The English had left a few
days before; the squadron, consisting of four ships of
the line, three frigates, and a very large number of
transports, store-ships, &c., sailed from Spithead on
13 March, under the command of Commodore George
Johnstone, a man of no.professional reputation, who by
loud talk, and virulent criticism of Lord Howe in the
House of Commons, had induced the public to form a
high opinion of his bravery and skill. Seldom has a
greater mistake been made. Johnstone proved himself
to be utterly unfit for such a position ; and through his
carelessness, ignorance, and incapacity, the objects of the
expedition were entirely frustrated.

The aim of M. de Suffren was to get to the Cape as
soon as possible; but one of his ships, the Artésien,
which had been destined in the first instance for the
West Indies, and had been ordered to the Cape at the
last moment, found it necessary to water at the Cape
Verd Islands. To avoid a separation which might be
dangerous, as well as to take advantage of the chance of
SUFFREN. 105

refreshing his ships’ companies, which were sickly,
Suffren with the whole squadron accompanied the
Artésien to Port Praya, in St. Jago, and arrived there
on 16 April. He found the bay occupied by the English
fleet, which Johnstone—although perfectly aware that a
French squadron was being sent out to oppose him—had
anchored in the most confused and promiscuous order ;
the transports outside and all round the ships of war,
whose fire they thus in a great measure masked. The
French commodore at once noticed the error of the
English ; and further conjecturing (as was the fact) that
they would probably be busy watering, and that their
boats and many of their men would be on shore, he re-
solved to attack immediately, and stood into the bay.
A more scrupulous man might have respected the
neutrality of the Portuguese harbour ; a less audacious
one might have shrunk from thrusting his squadron in
amongst a fleet that, in guns and men, far outnumbered
his own; but scrupulousness and timidity were equally
strangers to the character of Suffren; and the blunders
of Commodore Johnstone had so crippled the strength of
his fleet that, had the French ships followed into the
attack with as much determination as their commander
led, it would have been in very great danger. But
whilst the Héros and the Annibal anchored in the midst
of the English ships of war, and closely engaged the
Hero and the Monmouth, the others—whether from
timidity, from misapprehension, or from want of skill
and seamanship, allowed themselves to drift about the
bay, firing random broadsides into some of the merchant
ships, till they were carried by the tide down to leeward,
and were unable to take any effective part in the fight.
106 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Left thus to themselves, exposed to the fire of all the
English ships—men-of-war or armed transports—which
could bring a gun to bear, the Héros and the Annibal
were very roughly treated. The Annibal was completely
dismasted; had seventy killed—her captain, M. de
Trémigon, amongst the number—and a hundred and
thirty wounded. The Héros also suffered severely ;
though her masts were still standing, they were much
damaged, and most of the shrouds were shot away; she
had thirty-four killed and fifty-six wounded ; and Suffren,
under the circumstances, felt compelled to retreat. That
he was permitted to do so, speaks volumes as to the
incapacity of the English commodore. The two French
ships cut their cables and drifted out to sea; the Annibal,
commanded by her first lieutenant, M. de Galles, setting
some small sail on the stump of the foremast, until taken
in tow by the Sphinx. More than three hours after-
wards, the English ships got under way and stood out,
apparently in pursuit of the retreating enemy. But
Commodore Johnstone was a man of talk, not of action.
After wasting the afternoon in waiting for the Isis, which
had been partially dismasted by a passing broadside from
one of the French ships, he discovered towards evening,
that he had given no rendezvous to the convoy, and
that it would be imprudent to let himself be carried too
far to leeward of Port Praya; he accordingly hauled to
the wind and stood back into the bay.

Suffren not having been able to crush (as he had
hoped) the English before their arrival at the Cape,
resolved to hurry on to anticipate them there. With
the Annibal, now jury-rigged,in tow, the squadron
arrived in Simon’s Bay on 21 June, exactly a month
SUFFREN, 107

before the English appeared off Cape Town. Johnstone’s
dilatory conduct had saved the colony. The squadron was
not able to attempt anything against the combined French
and Dutch forces ; the troops were not even landed ; and
the seizure of a few merchant ships in Saldanha Bay was
the only result of this costly expedition. Commodore
Johnstone, fortunately for the country, was never em-
ployed again. He attempted to turn the indignation of
the government on to Captain Sutton, of the Isis, who
was tried by court martial, but was honourably acquitted.
Captain Sutton, in return, brought a civil action against
the commodore, for maliciously accusing him of an offence
of which he was innocent. He obtained a verdict assign-
ing him 5,000. damages; but years passed away in
appeals or counter-appeals to different courts; Captain
Johnstone died in 1787, and the fine was never paid.
The conduct of the French commodore in this action
has often been severely commented on. He has been
accused of rashness, of foolhardiness, of ignorance even,
in taking his squadron into a position such that nothing
but favouring fortune, added to the incapacity of his
enemy, could have saved him from destruction. Such a
charge seems to me inadmissible. The first object of the
French was to protect the Cape; to do that, Suffren had
been carrying on under a press of sail, in order, if pos-
sible, to pass the enemy who had left ten days before
him. By what he could only consider as a piece of luck,
he found that enemy, to whom haste ought to have been
as much a consideration as to himself, wasting precious
time in a neutral port. He had outrun him in the pas-
sage to St. Jago, but he could not certainly calculate on
being able also to outrun him in the further passage to
108 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY,

the Cape. The confused manner in which the English
fleet was anchored, tempted to an attack. The character
of the English commodore had probably not escaped the
acute intelligence of a man like Suffren: as a talker in
the House of Commons, Johnstone had brought himself
prominently before the naval world, and Suffren, who
had been in the fleet opposed to Lord Howe in North
America, and more particularly off Rhode Island on 10
August, 1778, was able to estimate at their proper value
the noisy and vituperative absurdities by which his present
antagonist had worked his way to public notice. And in-
dependently of all other reasoning, the result of Suffren’s
bold measure fully justified its adoption. It was not as
successful as it might have been; but it attained the
principal aim of the French as completely as if it had
towered beyond their wildest and most visionary hopes.
It so delayed the sailing of the English fleet, or—to
speak more correctly—it gave such an excuse for so
delaying it, that instead of a close race to the Cape, the
French and Dutch had ample time to make all possible
preparations. The attack in Praya Bay, although re-
pulsed with considerable loss, was the salvation of Cape
Colony ; and it is not for us to scrutinise too closely the
steps by which such a result was obtained, when our own
naval records so teem with instances where some of our
most justly distinguished commanders have set their
reputation and the safety of their fleet on a chance,
compared to which the hazard of a die might be con-
sidered security.

The first object of his mission having been thus
accomplished, Suffren, leaving behind him troops and
stores to render the Dutch settlements more secure for
SUFFREN. 109

the future, hoisted his broad pennant! and went on with
his squadron to the Isle of France. He anchored at Port
Louis on 25 October of the same year, 1781.

The war which was raging in Europe had early ex-
tended itself to the Indian seas ; and the French having
formed a close alliance with our inveterate enemy, Hyder
Aly, hoped, apparently, to regain a portion at least of
the Oriental influence which they had lost some five and
twenty years before. But their naval commanders in
that part of the world were not equal to the task. M. de
Tronjoli, having received a serious check from Commodore
Vernon, retired to the Mauritius, and the English took
possession of Pondicherry, the last important settlement
of France on the Indian coast. In the beginning of 1781
M. d’Orves, who had succeeded M. de Tronjoli in the
command, brought a strong squadron into Indian waters,
but only to retire without venturing on any undertaking
that could in any way benefit the common cause of
France and of Hyder Aly. In vain did this latter offer
supplies of provisions or water for the ships; in vain did
he offer to retake Pondicherry and to establish there a
naval magazine: M. d’Orves could not be tempted to
pursue a vigorous course; and—refusing even to land
any of his men to serve with the native army—he re-
turned to the Isle of France. He arrived there on 1
April, and there he remained till the end of the year.

Suffren, however, gave a new life to the French coun-
sels. Although his squadron had many defects after so

1 This, as was said above, was only local rank. On receiving his
account of the fight in Port Praya, the king ordered a commission as
chef d’escadre to be sent out to him; but it did not reach him till the
end of February, 1783.
110 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

long a voyage, and the fight in Praya Bay—the Annibal,
for instance, being only jury-rigged—and notwithstanding
the meagre resources of the small colony, such was the
commodore’s own energy, and the energy which he knew
how to instil into those with whom he came in contact,
that in less than a month he was ready for sea; and M.
d’Orves, yielding to the impulse of a will stronger than
his own, though nominally subservient to it, at last
made the signal to weigh. Accordingly the fleet— which,
with Suffren’s squadron, amounted to no less than eleven
ships of the line, besides six frigates and corvettes (three
of each)—left Port Louis on 17 December, and proceeded
towards the coast of India, capturing on their way, near
Point de Galle, on 21 January, the English 50-gun ship
Hannibal, which, with three others, had been detached
by Commodore Johnstone to join Sir Edward Hughes,
the English commander-in-chief in Indian waters. The
other three ships, the Hero, Monmouth, and Isis, were
more fortunate; they passed safely up the coast, and
joined the main body of the fleet at Madras.

M. d’Orves, whose health had been failing for some
time past, died on 9 February, leaving the command to
Suffren. With a resolution to which the fleet had long
been a stranger, he at once made his way to Madras,
where Sir Edward Hughes, with a very inferior force,
was known to be lying. The English, however, were
joined by the three new arrivals in time to prepare them
to meet their formidable enemy ; and when Suffren came
in sight of Madras, instead of finding, as he expected,
only a few ships which must fall an easy prey, he found
a squadron of respectable force, though still inferior to
his own, and posted so strongly under the batteries on
SUFFREN. 111

the shore, that he shrank from the designed attack. He
accordingly anchored at some little distance from the
English, and made the signal for all the captains to come
on board. He explained to them his reasons for thinking
an attack unadvisable ; and as the senior captains agreed
with him that it would be better to continue the voyage,
the thing was considered as settled ; when, to the astonish-
ment and annoyance of his elders, M. de Salvert, com-
manding the Fine, a 36-gun frigate, opposed this decision
on the grounds that their departure would have the appear-
ance of timidity, and would increase in the minds of the
natives the unfavourable impression which the conduct
of the fleet in the former year had created; and besides,
that there was room to pass in shore of the two southern-
most ships of the enemy, which were out of reach of the
forts, and might be attacked with advantage.!

The only effect of M. de Salvert’s opinion thus given
was to raise a feeling of ill-will against him among the
senior officers of the fleet ; and they seem even to have
hinted that it was easy for him to offer bold counsels, in-
asmuch as, being in a frigate, he could not be called on
to carry them into force. On 20 June in the following
year, De Salvert, then in a ship of the line, had an op-
portunity of showing the falsehood of such aspersions on
his courage; but, notwithstanding his gallant conduct

1 Trublet, p. 37. M. Chevalier thinks this.story more than doubtful,
Istly, because it is not mentioned in the journal of the major de
Vescadre; 2ndly and chiefly, because he considers it highly improbable
that a young officer of M. de Salvert’s rank and position—he was a
lieutenant de vaisseau—would have ventured on an opinion contrary to
that of the commander-in-chief, the hero of Port Praya. The major
might very well pass over a proposal to which no weight attached; and

it is exactly the supposed impudence of it which rendered it worthy of
M. Trublet’s notice.
112 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

and death, French writers, taking their tone from the
hostile feeling of the fleet, have perpetuated the calumny.
De Salvert was a brave and spirited man; and, as far
as we can judge from his actions, there is no reason to
believe that he would not gladly have shared in any
attempt to carry his counsel into execution. The com-
modore, however, thought it impracticable, and the fleet
continued on its way.

In the month of February, a northerly wind blows
pretty steadily in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal ;
and on this account, Suffren having in the first place
stood out to sea, had made the land to the north, that is,
to windward of Madras; he had then dropped down the
coast, and now continued his course southward. As
soon as he was well to sea, Sir Edward Hughes also
weighed. His doing so caused great surprise among the
French, as they could not conceive it possible that with
nine ships he would come out to attack them with
twelve ; and it is most probable that he had not any such
positive intention, ‘but that he wished rather to take,
destroy, or scatter their convoy, and perhaps also to pre-
vent or obstruct their landing the troops which they had
on board.! The French, however, were incredulous; and
thinking that the English were merely shifting berth,
took little or no notice of them, till the next morning
Suffren awoke from his dream of security to find that Sir

1 Cunat, whom Chevalier follows, thinks that Hughes’s object was to
slip down the coast in order to cover Trincomalee, which he supposed
might be Suffren’s aim. Hughes himself merely says: ‘ At four in the
afternoon the enemy weighed and stood to the southward; when I
immediately weighed and stood after them.’ I feel therefore at liberty
to suppose that what he actually did first was what he primarily hoped
to do.
SUFFREN, 113

Edward had, during the night, slipped past him, in
shore, and was now spreading destruction among the
convoy, which, asa precautionary measure, he had posted
to leeward of his fleet. He immediately hastened to the
rescue, but before he could arrive at the spot, the English
had seized on six merchantmen ; one of which, the Law-
riston, a transport carrying three hundred soldiers, and
laden with artillery, ammunition, and military stores,
was a very valuable prize. The sight of the French fleet
under press of sail compelled Sir Edward to call off his
own ships from the chase, and to form line of battle; but
darkness closing in prevented any encounter that night.
The next day, 17 February, the wind, though irregu-

lar and squally, being still from the north-east, gave the
French an advantage which Suffren at once endea-
voured to avail himself of. Sir Edward, on the other
hand, manceuvred throughout a great part of the day, in
order, if possible, to weather on the French line; but the
squalls and slight shifts of wind continually prevented
him ; and in one of these squalls, about four o’clock in
. the afternoon, Suffren was able to engage the rear division
of our fleet, which was formed in a somewhat irregular
line toward the south-east. The squall lasted but for a
short time, and was followed by a nearly perfect calm,
during which the principal part of the French fleet was
clustered round the five sternmost ships of the English.
The four ships in the English van could not tack to come
into the fight; the ships of the French rear kept aloof
from the combat; and in this way a partial, but very
severe struggle took place. The brunt of it fell on the
Exeter, a small 64, carrying the broad pennant of Com-

modore King. After suffering severely from the broad-
I
114 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

sides of all the French ships that joined in the battle,
she was, later on, closely engaged by the Brillant and
Flamand, ships of equal force; and the French at one
time believed that she was on the point of yielding to
the odds brought against her. Commodore King took a
different view of his position. When the two 64’s were
bearing down with the evident intention of bringing her
to close action, the master asked what was to be done.
‘There is nothing to be done,’ said the commodore, as
with his handkerchief he wiped away the brains of the
flag-captain, Reynolds, which a cannon-ball had just
dashed into his face—‘ there is nothing to be done but
fight her till she sinks.’

After two hours of this unequal combat, that is about
six o’clock, a lucky squall from the south-east materially
changed the position of affairs. The four ships of the
English van were able to come to the assistance of their
comrades; and Suffren, seeing this new enemy approach-
ing, drew his ships out of the fire, in order to reform his
line and receive the attack. The Exeter, however, was
so disabled, as also was the Superb, Sir Edward Hughes’s
flag-ship, which had, next to the Exeter, been the prin-
cipal aim of the enemy, that the admiral did not feel
able to renew the battle, and a slight distant interchange
of shots was all that followed the pause. The two fleets
separated during the night, and both had suffered too
much to permit them at that time to look for each other.
The English accordingly went to Trincomalee, and the
French to Pondicherry, which had been, a short time
before, occupied by the native troops.

In this battle, fought off Sadras, the loss of men in
the two fleets was singularly equal. The English had
SUFFREN. 115

thirty-two killed, eighty-three wounded; the French loss
is stated as thirty killed and a hundred wounded, but it
almost seems as if these were given as round numbers.
There was probably also but little difference in the damage
done to mast or hull; but it was, perhaps, more equally
divided among the French ships than among our own,
two or three of which, and in an especial degree, the
Exeter, suffered very severely.

The discontent of Suffren with the result was notori-
ous. He had fought well; he had made a most judicious
use of the advantage which the wind gave him, and which
the calm that followed his attack had preserved for him ;
four English ships, unable to tack, could not get near
the scene of action; and the rear division—that is the
five ships astern of the centre—opposed to twelve of the
enemy, ought to have been overwhelmed. They might
have been, had all the twelve fought with the same de-
termination as the Héros, the Flamand, or the Brillant.
But several of the others, and particularly the Artésien
and the Annibal, took little or no share in the battle,
and as far as being of any use went, were merely lookers
on, notwithstanding the signal, flying the whole time,
for them to come within pistol shot of the enemy.

The battle off Sadras, however, indecisive as it was,
and notwithstanding the capture of some of their convoy,
gave the French a definite advantage in the field of
Indian politics. They had fought what, at least, seemed
to be a gallant action with the English, till then all-
powerful at sea, and had not been beaten. Of Suffren
there could no longer be any doubt; he had entered
heartily into the cause, and Hyder Aly at once showed a

favourable disposition to form a closer alliance. During
12
116 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the commodore’s stay at Porto Novo, whither he had
proceeded from Pondicherry, he succeeded in making an
agreement, by the terms of which a French agent (M.
Piveron de Morlat) was to reside at Hyder’s court, and
the French troops, acting independently under their own
officers, with a considerable native force, cavalry as well
as infantry, attached to them, were taken into Hyder’s
pay.

Having landed the troops, and refitted the ships as
far as his resources permitted him, Suffren quitted Porto
Novo on 23 March; on the 25th off Tranquebar he was
joined by the frigate Bellone, and by the Chaser, an 18-
gun corvette, which she had captured off Madras ; from
these he learned the movements of Sir Edward Hughes,
who after having refitted at Trincomalee had returned to
Madras, and had taken from there a considerable number
of soldiers which he was now carrying to Trincomalee as
a garrison for the forts. De Suffren at once resolved to
go to the southward: but owing to the baffling wind that
then prevailed, he did not come abreast of Ceylon till
8 April. On the 9th, at daybreak, the English fleet was
discovered; but as it was to windward, and as Sir Edward
wished in the first place to land the troops and stores at
Trincomalee, M. de Suffren was unable to bring him to
action till the 12th. By that time the two fleets were
very close to the shore; and though only a few leagues
from his port, Sir Edward, by keeping away towards it
had got to leeward of the French, so that it was no longer
possible for him to avoid the battle. The circumstances
were far from favourable. Having taken it for granted
that the French would be unwilling to force him to fight,.
he now found himself jammed on 4 dangerous lee shore,
SUFFREN, 117

with a superior fleet outside, able to choose its own mode
of attack. He was, however, a brave man and a good
seaman ; although his judgment as an admiral may at
times have been at fault, he seems never to have felt
any hesitation about meeting his adversary; and on the
present occasion, though for the sake of the garrison
of Trincomalee, he had wished to avoid an immediate
action, he met it cheerfully when it was forced upon him.
Within the last few days two ships, the Sultan and Mag-
nanime, newly come from England had joined him; and
though these, after the long voyage, were foul and sickly,
a very large proportion of their crews being down with
scurvy, they still, in a measure, did away with the marked
inferiority of his numbers. His line now consisted of
eleven ships, which he formed on the starboard tack, to-
wards the north, and waited for the enemy, who came up
with the wind astern, and commenced the battle about
two o’clock in the afternoon.

De Suffren’s qualities as a tactician were of the first
order, and in that age of nautical pedantry, he appears
as one of the earliest who endeavoured to apply sound
principles to the conduct of battles at sea. As in armies
so in fleets, that one is effectively the most numerous
that can bring the greatest number into action at a
given point; and it is not a little curious that, on the
very same day, in different hemispheres, this, as a new
system of naval tactics, was inaugurated by the admirals
of two different nations; for it was on this same 12 April
1782, that Sir George Rodney, in the West Indies, gained
a decisive victory by means of a manceuvre which, though
widely different in detail, was essentially similar to that
which M. de Suffren put in practice in the Hast; the
118 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

concentrating, that is, the attack on a part of the
enemy’s fleet, instead of dispersing it along the whole.
Bound by the formule of the ‘Fighting Instructions,’
none of our admirals had ventured to apply it; and
since the days of Du Guay-Trouin, no Frenchman in
command of a squadron had thought of attacking. In
the West Indies, the accident of a varying wind gave
Rodney the opportunity of putting in practice the idea
which he had attempted to develop on 17 April 1780;
and we have already seen how, in the East Indies, on 17
February 1782, fortune had pointed out to Suffren the
way to attain tactical advantage. He was now, on 12
April, ready to avail himself of the favourable circum-
stances. The French fleet had an actual numerical
superiority ; Suffren had learnt how to make that supe-
riority still greater.

The wind was from about north-east, and the English
fleet was close hauled on the starboard tack; but the
four rearmost ships—Magnanime, Isis, Hero, and Wor-
cester—were somewhat astern and to leeward of their
station. The French commander therefore, directing
his four leading ships to engage the van and hold it in
check, threw himself, with the rest of his force, on the
English centre. The onset was tremendous. Suffren
himself in the Héros, backed up by the Orient, another
74, engaged the Superb, the English flag-ship, at close
range; afterwards, leaving the Superb to other ships as
they came up, passed on to the Monmouth, the ship
ahead, and turned her heavy metal against the little
sixty-four. But the Monmouth, worthy of her ancient
fame, and of the day when, twenty years before, her name-
sake had, singlehanded, captured the Foudroyant of 84
SUFFREN, 119

guns, heroically resisted the still greater odds now against
her. She, however, suffered terribly, and being reduced
almost to a wreck, and unmanageable, shot up into the
wind, and was thus thrown into a very prominent posi-
tion between the two lines. At this critical juncture Sir
Edward endeavoured to bring the Superb in between her
and the French flag-ship; but the Orient and Brillant
interposing, obliged him to pass to leeward, leaving the
Monmouth still exposed to the fire of the whole French
line. Other ships came up; and the battle raged furi-
ously round the little Monmouth. The Héros lost her
fore topmast, and received such other serious damage
that Suffren went on board the Ajax, where he hoisted
his flag. The Orient’s mizen-topmast was shot away, her
mainmast badly wounded, and her mainsail in flames.
On the other hand, the Monmouth had nothing but the
foremast standing; the Superb was on fire below, and in
both these ships the loss of men was very great. The
Superb had 59 killed, and 96 wounded; the Monmouth
45 killed and 102 wounded. Such loss in the two ships
of the English centre shows with what vigour the French
attack had been pushed against that particular portion
of the line. On the van, they had made no impression ;
and in the rear, whilst the English ships were to leeward,
the French held their wind and took but little part in
the action.

About four o’clock, Sir Edward Hughes made the
signal to wear, principally, it would seem, because the
fleet was getting into shoal water ; partly, perhaps, with
a wish to bring what remained of his line to windward
of the Monmouth. The French line endeavoured to
follow his example, but in the confusion which the evo-
120 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

lution threw them into, Captain Hawker of the Hero
took the Monmouth in tow, and placed her in compara-
tive safety to leeward. The fight continued some time
longer, though with slackened fury; and about half.
past five, when a violent squall, with heavy rain, came
down on the two fleets, the firing ceased as if by mutual
consent.

Both fleets anchored for the night, but in a very pro-
miscuous manner ; so mixed indeed were they, that M.
de Suffren’s flag-lieutenant having been sent a message,
went, by mistake, on his way back, on board the Superb,
and was detained as a prisoner. About the same time,
the Fine was sent to tow the disabled Héros off shore,
but in the darkness, and in the strength of the storm
which was then raging, in attempting to do so, she fell
foul of the Isis, whose bowsprit passed between her mizen
shrouds, the anchor at the same time hooking one of her
quarter ports. This caused great confusion in both;
neither one nor the other seems to have thought of any-
thing but getting loose, and before they had time to
recover their coolness and judgment, a fresh gust of the
storm separated the two ships.

In this second engagement, which has been called by
the French the battle of Providien, from the small island
of that name off which the fleets anchored, the loss on
both sides, as well as the damage sustained, was very
nearly equal. In men, the English had 187 killed, 430
wounded, and a very large proportion of these on board
the two ships Superb and Monmouth. The French loss
is given by M. Chevalier as also 187 killed, 8357 wounded,
but much more equally distributed. And the morning
showed how much the ships had suffered. All that the
SUFFREN. 121

respective commanders could do was to alter the position
of some of them, so as to bring them into better order.
Suffren, then on board the Ajax, a ship which had been
but slightly engaged, is indeed said to have expressed
a wish to fire on the Isis, which was anchored within
range ; but, on its being pointed out to him that this
could not lead to any definite result, he gave up the
half-formed intention. The story, as told, is very vague
and very doubtful. After seven days, however, having
refitted as far as possible, he did offer battle, which was
not accepted. Sir Edward, anxious to land the stores
and troops at Trincomalee, did not consider it prudent
further to risk them in the chances of a sea fight, except
on his own ground, where an advantageous position
might compensate for inferiority of force ; he accordingly
remained secure in his anchorage, and the French, un-
willing to attack him in it, after a parade of their strength,
sailed for Batacalo.

During the stay of the two fleets off Providien, the
admirals entered into a correspondence relative to a
mutual exchange of prisoners. Sir Edward refused to
consent to it; either, because, as he alleged, he did not
conceive that he had authority to make any such arrange-
ment, or because, as the French insist, he wished to
burden the enemy with their maintenance. Suffren,
however, was not a man to be burdened in this way. Of
resolute will and unflinching determination, when he
found that he could not exchange his prisoners, he handed
them all over to his ally, Hyder Aly. This was clearly
contrary to the custom of civilised war; for whatever
the French may pretend, Hyder Aly was in reality a
barbarian, and his treatment of his prisoners was such
122 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

as might have been expected from his savage nature. At
the same time, we must remember that Suffren’s resources
were extremely limited; and the providing for a large
number of useless mouths was a severe tax on his slender
stores. The measure which he adopted was politic ; was,
perhaps, under the circumstances, excusable; but the
very fact of having to excuse it, is a sufficient proof that
it was not altogether justifiable.

Suffren was undoubtedly a hard man; but in this
lies a great part of his merit: a man of a softer and
more genial nature, even with equal talents, would have
been overwhelmed in the course of the campaign ; for it
was not merely in battle, and under the flag of England,
that he found enemies. Detested by the senior officers
of the fleet, who rendered him an unwilling obedience ;
destitute of all supplies, of all stores,—for the loss of the
Lawriston was severely felt—he yet, purely by his own
unaided energy, was able to keep the fleet in working
order, and to make it, almost against its will, fight with
something like his own courage and resolution.

The state of things was indeed very bad. It is thus
described by M. Trublet, a zealous and experienced
officer, at that time first-lieutenant of the Flamand :—

‘ Scurvy was making frightful ravages in the fleet: 1,500
men suffering from it were landed; the medicines on board
the ships had all been used: the capture of the hospital ship
had deprived us of all further supply. The country (round
Batacalo) was unhealthy ; and though there was plenty of fish
and game; though we obtained, through the Dutch governor,
a few wretched bullocks, it was impossible to get either fruit
or vegetables, things which are the most powerful, if not the
only remedy against the disease. In addition to this, the
damage sustained by many of our ships, rendering it necessary
SUFFREN, 123

for them to be docked; our supply of rope exhausted ; the
provisions running short; the crews, sadly diminished in
number, overworked ; the certainty of more battles, in which
we could not promise ourselves any advantage more decisive
than in those which we had fought ;—all these were considera-
tions that threw a dark cloud over our future prospects, and
gaye rise to the most embarrassing reflections.’

It is no wonder, then, that under these circumstances
the fleet was not prepared to sail from Batacalo till
8 June.

On the 5th, Suffren anchored at Tranquebar, where
he found some store ships which had been sent by the
Dutch from Batavia. He continued there for several
days, during which his cruisers were busy at sea, and
captured several merchantmen, laden some with rice,
some with military stores, but all extremely valuable in
the existing want of supplies. From there he moved
down to Cuddalore, which had been lately ocerpied by
the French troops; and sending the flag captain, M. de
Moissac, to the camp of Hyder Aly, concerted measures
with him for the recapture of Negapatam, a settlement
formerly Dutch, which the English had seized on at the
first outbreak of the war. In accordance with the scheme
then arranged, he took 1,500 soldiers on board the
ships, and left Cuddalore on 3 July. He had received in-
telligence that the English fleet, now come north from
Trincomalee, had anchored before Negapatam ; and he
left his port, in the full intention of bringing it to
action, if necessary, in order to land his troops and to
carry on the siege. In this purpose he never wavered,
and, when according to his information, he found the
English at Negapatam, he at once made the signal to
124 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

prepare to anchor with a spring on thecable. In stand-
ing in, however, a sudden squall struck the fleet and
partially dismasted the Ajax; in the delay that this
occasioned, Sir Edward Hughes weighed and stood out
to meet them; but M. de Suffren, wishing to give the
Ajax time to repair the damage, avoided immediate
action, which Sir Edward on his part, did not press.
The wind was blowing from the west, and a too eager
pursuit of the French might have enabled them to pass
to windward of him, and to land troops sufficient to
overwhelm the settlement before he could recover his
position. This landing it was Sir Edward’s object to
prevent ; and he did prevent it by resolutely keeping his
fleet interposed between the French ships and the shore.
In this state of things, night closed in. Daylight on the
following morning showed little or no change; the fleets
were formed in line-of-battle, and about ten o’clock, both
being then on the starboard tack, with the wind from
south-west, Sir Edward commenced the action, signalling
each ship to engage the one abreast, in accordance with
Article XIX of the ‘ Fighting Instructions.’

In many battles at sea during the century the inef-
fectiveness of this mode of attack had been clearly
proved. A ship of the line was in those days so strongly
built ; her timbers were of such extreme thickness ; the
guns brought against her were, in comparison, so feeble,
that she could stand very severe pounding in the hull,
with but little loss : and by the time that any single
antagonist could reduce her to the point of striking, that
antagonist was herself so disabled as to be unable to
take advantage of her success. There were, no doubt,
some exceptions to this rule; but they were very rare,
SUFFREN. - 125

and, for the most part at least, capable of being explained
away. It was the same when ships were pitted one
against one, in line of battle, even when the whole line
succeeded in getting into action, which was rarely the
case. In the late fight off Providien, M. de Suffren had
suggested a different method of engaging, which from
the danger it occasioned to at least one ship of the English
centre, might have persuaded his enemy of its merit.
But Sir Edward, though brave, and skilled in his pro-
fession after the manner of the old school, was neither
by temper nor by genius fitted to receive new ideas ; he,
therefore, with all the advantage of the wind, wasted his
strength in a dispersed attack on the whole fleet, accord-
ing to the practice of the former age; and the result was
indecisive, as it always had been when such tactics were
followed.

The firing, was, however, kept up with great spirit on
both sides, and both fleets suffered severely ; so much so
that when, about half-past twelve, the wind suddenly
shifted to the south-east, and the respective ships, first
taken aback, were brought round in a confused manner
with their heads to the westward, neither one nor the
other was anxious to recommence an engagement which
did not seem likely to attain any further end: the
English took up their former position off Negapatam ;
and the French, having been unable to effect their pur-
posed landing, returned the next day to Cuddalore.

It was during the confusion consequent on the sudden
shift of wind in this battle, that the Sevére, a French 64,
came for a few minutes into very close action with the
Sultan, and struck her flag. The Sevére had not sus-
tained any great loss either in men or rigging ; she was
126 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

perfectly able to continue the fight; and no explanation
of the circumstance can be offered but that given by M.
Trublet, whose account presents such a remarkable phase
of human nature, and is so singularly opposed to all our
ideas of professional pride, and of the courage which
springs from education, that we should have been tempted
to reject it as impossible, were it not amply confirmed by
official testimony,' as well as being the deliberate testi-
mony of one actually present, and whose bias might be
supposed to tend rather the opposite way. His account
is this :—

‘The conduct of M. de Cillart, whilst in command of the
Bellone, had given rise to grave doubts of his courage; but in
this campaign, his weakness had hitherto been kept a secret
on board his own ship; for as he had been prudent enough to
leave the management of her, on important occasions, to his
officers, the ship had on the whole done well. In the present
instance, however, the two officers on whom he depended had
been carried below wounded. Left to himself, this weak-
minded man lost his head, in the heat of the action, to such
an extent that, without reflecting on the shame and disgrace
which he heaped on himself and which he threw on his
country, in presence of the whole French fleet, he made up
his mind to surrender himself to the enemy: he ordered the
flag to be struck. Two auxiliary officers (blues),? to whom he
gave the order, refused to execute it; but some others of the
crew to whom he repeated it, were cowardly enough to obey :
the captain meanwhile demanding quarter by the most un-
mistakeable gestures. When this was made known below,
one of the officers, a M. Dieu, rushed up on deck, and after
vainly endeavouring to make the captain ashamed of his
cowardice, he declared to him that he and the other officers
would not share in his disgrace; that they considered the flag

1 Trublet, p. 113 ; Chevalier, p. 422. ? See post, p. 256,
SUFFREN. 127

in such hands a mere trumpery rag, that they would not
surrender to the enemy, and that they were going to continue
the action. Accordingly, the fire which had ceased for some
minutes was reopened with increased vigour. It was unfor-
tunately at this moment that the Sultan, which had hove to,
lowered a boat in order to take possession of the Sevére ; she
thus sustained considerable loss, and was compelled to fill and
stand on. It was noticed at the time by the several ships of
the fleet that the Sevére’s ensign was not flying ; but it was
supposed that the halliards had been shot away, and that
they were too busy on board to repair the damage. It was
not till after the fleet anchored at Cuddalore, that the dis-
graceful truth became known.’

There were, however, several other captains in the
fleet whose misconduct deservedly called down on them
M. de Suffren’s displeasure. Three of these were sent
home; but even this severe step was not sufficient to
quell the spirit of insubordination which had manifested
itself; it checked it indeed for a time, but only that it
might break out again in a more resolute and dangerous
manner.

Notwithstanding the great difficulties which Suffren
had to contend with, he worked most energetically at
Cuddalore to get the fleet ready for sea. In the long
campaign, and in three hard-fought battles, the ships had
sustained damages which it was impossible thoroughly
to repair without large stores and the conveniences of a
dockyard. These were not to be had. The voice of dis-
content was loud in the fleet, pressing for an immediate
return to the Isle of France. Rather than abandon
the coast, said Suffren, I will sink the ships in the very
roadstead of Madras. He determined that the ships
should be repaired, and he carried that determination:
128 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

into effect by the mere force of his will. The requisite
timber was obtained on shore, often by pulling down
houses and converting the beams. For other purposes,
other makeshifts were adopted; and on 1 August the
fleet sailed for Batacalo, where the commodore expected
to find some reinforcements and stores lately arrived
from Europe.

It was at Batacalo, whilst waiting for these to come
on from Point de Galle, that, on 19 August, he received
a complimentary letter from the Grand Master of Malta,
conferring on him the dignity, and enclosing the insignia
of Bailiff, or Grand Cross of the Order. This is the
more noteworthy, as notwithstanding the honours that
were afterwards lavished on him by the King of France,
it is by this title of Bailiff that his name is, in France,
almost invariably distinguished.

Sir Edward Hughes was meanwhile refitting at
Madras, and such was his carelessness as to intelligence,
that he did not learn positively, till the 16th, that the
French had left Cuddalore. The frigate Coventry, which
met the Bellone off Batacalo on the 12th, and engaged
her in a running fight until close in with the fleet,
brought him the first news. The governor of Madras
had, indeed, sent him word, some days before, of their
having gone to the southward, and had pressed him to
sail, in order to prevent any operations against Negapatam
or Trincomalee ; but he had chosen to doubt the infor-
mation, and had answered that he was in no way re-
sponsible to the governor for the management of the
fleet. Alarmed, too late, for the safety of Trincomalee,
Sir Edward now hurried his preparations, and sailed,
from Madras on the 20th. Baffling winds made his
SUFFREN, 129

passage unusually long, and he did not arrive off Trin-
comalee till 2 September. The place had surrendered
to the French two days before.

Acting with characteristic energy, Suffren, after
being joined by the reinforcements at Batacalo on
21 August, appeared off Trincomalee on the 25th; on
the 26th landed the troops which had just joined him,
as well as others specially embarked at Cuddalore and
Batacalo, and a considerable part of the ship’s com-
panies ; pushed the works vigorously on the 27th and
28th ; opened fire on the 29th ; on the 80th summoned the
fort ; agreed hurriedly to all the demands of the governor,
Captain Hay Macdowal, relative to the honours of war ;
and took possession on the 81st. Two days after, when
the English fleet was signalled in the offing, he was at
liberty to re-embark his men, and prepare to meet his
old enemy at sea.

Sir Edward Hughes did not discover the loss he had
sustained till the next morning, when, as he was within
five or six miles of the shore, Suffren hoisted the French
flag. The surprise was so great that he recoiled, as it
were, from the unexpected contact, and stood out to sea.
Suffren followed, resolved, apparently, to complete his
conquest by a victory over the English fleet, for his
superiority in force had been made greater than ever, by
the addition of two ships and large numbers of men.
But the captains of his fleet were opposed to the idea.
They had fought often enough, they said; they could
not conquer the enemy, whose resources were inex-
haustible, and whose strength in the end would be over-
whelming ; the whole fleet ought to return to the Isle of
France ; and if the fleet did not go, they themselves would

K
130° STUDIES IN NAVAL: HISTORY.

demand permission to retire. It is difficult to under-
stand how a man of Suffren’s harsh disposition and
unyielding temper could tolerate such language from his.
subordinates. Some of them were, as captains, senior
to himself, and this may have occasioned a delicacy in his
behaviour towards them, which he would not otherwise
have felt necessary.. It is possible, too, that family con-
nections, or court interest, may have prevented him from
exercising the severe justice which the laws of strict
discipline demanded, or he may have found a dearth of
officers qualified to fill the places which would become
vacant; but whatever may have been the cause of his
leniency, he was content to expostulate..

It was then under such unfavourable circumstances
—with the higher officers of the fleet in a state bordering
on open mutiny—that Suffren sailed out to attack the
English. He had, however, the advantage of the wind
from south-west, which gave him again an opportunity
of essaying his new tactics. The English line was formed
on the starboard tack, heading about south-east, and the
French admiral made a general signal to engage its rear.
He had fifteen ships against the English twelve, and
his idea was to throw the whole of this superiority, at
close range, on the sternmost ships, leaving, at most,
an equal force-to hold the van in check. But the ill-will
of some of the captains, and the lubberly, unseamanlike
conduct of others, completely frustrated his plan. His
signals were not obeyed; his line of battle was never
formed ; the ships engaged in an independent and isolated
manner—some within pistol shot, where they sustained
considerable damage, as the flag-ship, the Illustre and
the Ajax; some almost out of range, where they suffered
SUFFREN, 131

little or no loss, as the Annibal, the Sevére, the Orient,
and the Sphinx ; others more or less closely, but without
that hearty and zealous co-operation so necessary to
ensure success. In this irregular way the battle con-
tinued for about three hours, when the wind shifted to
east-south-east. This brought the English fleet more on
an equality as regarded position; but it was too inferior
in numbers, the enemy had too many ships quite fresh to
permit it to become the assailant. Three French ships,
which had borne the brunt of the battle, had suffered
severely; in men, their loss was 64 killed and 178
wounded, out of a total of 82 and 255; the Héros had
lost her mainmast; the Illustre, her mizenmast and
maintopmast ; but twelve ships still remained practically
untouched, to put a good face on the backward movement
which the Bailiff was compelled to make. The firing
ceased at dark ; the English unable to press their enemy,
the French unwilling to do anything but get back into
Trincomalee. This, however, they effected with difficulty.
Although but a short distance from their port, they were
dead to leeward of it, and to beat up with their crippled
ships was a work of time. They did not arrive off the
harbour till the evening of the 6th, when, owing to the
ignorance and inexperience of the officer of the watch,
the Orient, carried by the currents which prevail at that
season, grounded heavily on the reef that stretches
out from Foul Point. She was an old ship, launched
at L’Orient in 1756, and was so damaged that she
could not be got off. Her masts, however, might have
served for the disabled ships; but the most impor-
tant, the mainmast, destined for the Héros, was, by the
unskilfulness of the officer in charge, broken short

Kk 2
132 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

off at the level of the upper deck, and rendered quité
useless.

Suffren felt deeply the cowardly and traitorous dis-
affection of the captains under him in this action. He
felt that through it he had missed what would have
been the crowning glory of his campaign ; that with the
superior force, and the advantage of position, he had had
a chance of breaking the power of the English, a chance
of—as he wrote a few months later—destroying Sir
Edward Hughes, and remaining master of India. We,
of course, looking from a different point of view, may
hold a different opinion ; we may think that he had no
better chance of annihilating the British fleet on 3 Sep-
tember than he had on the previous occasions, when with
a more united force he vainly attempted it; but we can
nevertheless understand the bitter disappointment he
experienced at not being allowed to try, when circum-
stances were externally so favourable to him.

It was, therefore, impossible that things could re-
main unchanged. Four captains were sent to the Isle of
France; among the number was M. de Tromelin, of the
Annibal, the senior captain in the fleet, and as such, the
leader of the cabal against the commander-in-chief. The
vacancies were filled up from the frigates and corvettes,
to which in turn some of the subordinate officers were
promoted. Amongst these we find a name afterwards
well known in naval history, that of M. Villaret de
Joyeuse, who some years later commanded the Republican
fleet in the battle off Ushant.

In refitting and reorganising the fleet, the month of
September passed away. It was 1 October before the
French left Trincomalee, and the season was then so
SUFFREN. 133

broken that it was advisable to seek winter quarters.
During the northerly monsoon the east coast of India is
so exposed that Suffren had some time before resolved
to go to Sumatra; he accordingly now carried this resolve
into execution, visiting on his way the several stations
on the Coromandel coast. .At Cuddalore, the Bizarre, a
64-gun ship, was run ashore by the carelessness and in-
capacity of her captain, M. de Trehouret, one of the late
promotions. M. de Trehouret was afterwards placed on
the retired list, as a punishment for his fault; but the
ship was irrecoverably lost, and even her spars, and such
of her stores as could be saved, being put on board a
Dutch transport, were, with her, captured by the Medea
a few months later. The fleet left the coast on 15 October,
and on 1 November arrived at Achen, in Sumatra, where
it remained during the bad season. The English fleet
left Madras on the same day, forced to sea by a hurricane
that swept over the roadstead, and caused most terrible
destruction. A great number of country ships, laden
with provisions, went down at anchor, and the direct
consequence of the loss was a famine which carried off
thousands of the inhabitants. And the fleet also suffered
very seriously. The Superb and Exeter were completely
dismasted, and for some hours were rolling about, the
mere sport of the waves, and in momentary danger of
foundering. The admiral moved for the time to the
Sultan, and the two ships finally made Bombay, jury-
rigged. It was the middle of December before all the
fleet had reached that port. They were here reinforced
by a squadron of five ships of the line, under Commodore
Sir Richard Bickerton, in the Gibraltar,' a fine 80-gun

' Formerly the Phoenix, flag-ship of Don Juan de Langara, and was
134 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

ship, which had been taken from the Spaniards two years
before, and this addition raised them to a number greater
than that of the French under the Bailiff de Suffren;
the more so, by reason of the loss of the two ships,
Orient and Bizarre. Accordingly, Sir Edward felt ina
position to act more vigorously, and with ships repaired
and men refreshed, put to sea on 20 March, 1783.

_ The French fleet had enjoyed no such good fortune
during the winter. It had remained at Achen for a
couple of months, where it had indeed been able some-
what to recruit the health of the men, as well as to refit
the ships to a certain extent, limited by the very scanty
allowance of stores; but the impatience of the Bailiff
was too great to permit him to stay there longer than
was absolutely necessary. He left Achen on 20 December,
and did not arrive at Cuddalore till the beginning of
February, having spent nearly two months in a desultory
cruise in the Bay of Bengal, and in a few abortive
attempts on some of the scattered English stations. He
was recalled to the coast of Coromandel by a rumour of
the death of Hyder Aly. The intelligence was doubtful,
but it was of too great importance for him not imme-
diately to inquire into it; for if Hyder’s son did not hold
the same views as to the war, did not entertain the same
friendly disposition towards the French as his father had
done, things might go hard with their forces, by sea as
well as by land. On his arrival at Cuddalore, he was
reassured, The news was correct; Hyder Aly had died
on 7 December; but the son, Tippoo Sahib, had inherited
the policy and the martial spirit of the father. He

captured by Sir George Rodney off Cape St. Vincent, on the night of
16 January, 1780.
SUFFREN. 135

readily renewed the agreement with the French, and
furnished them with a supply of the requisite provisions;
s0 that Suffren, satisfied.on the score of the native alli-
ance, sailed in a few days for Trincomalee, where he
received the news of his confirmation in the rank of chef
@escadre, and was joined, on 10 March, by a large rein-
forcement fresh from Europe and the Isle of France.
Three ships of the line, a frigate, and a liberal supply of
stores qualified the fleet for the approaching campaign ;
whilst a considerable number of soldiers (2,500), formed
a force that when joined to the troops already in the
South of India, and co-operating with the native army,
would be very formidable. Fortunately, however, the
command of this force had been given to M. de Bussy,
an officer who had fought his way to fame and wealth
more than twenty years before, as a contemporary and
rival of Lally, but who was now old, luxurious, and un-
enterprising ; more fortunately, because on the death of
Sir Eyre Coote, on 26 April, the command of the English
army devolved on Major-General Stuart, a man who—
whatever his talent—showed himself more eager to up-
hold his personal claims, as against the civil power in
the Presidency, than to wage a single-hearted war for the
good of the country. Against such, a bolder leader than
De Bussy might have achieved some fatal success.

The French troops were landed about 20 March, at
Porto Novo; Suffren, with part of the fleet escorting
them there, and covering the disembarkation. As Sir
Edward Hughes was daily expected to return to the east
coast, he was anxious to get back to Trincomalee, and
reunite his forces; but the absence of the flying squadron
delayed him, and it was 7 April before he could leave
136 STUDIES IN NAVAL. HISTORY.

Porto Novo. He was only just in time. As he entered:
the Bay of Trincomalee, the English fleet was seen pass-
ing at some distance to seaward.

Left to himself, to his own want of energy, and his
ineptitude of dissolute favourites, De Bussy frittered
away his time and resources. Having resolved not to
undertake any active operations against the English
army, he took up a strong position at Cuddalore; in
front of which General Stuart, after many delays, arrived
on 7 June. The English fleet had meantime possession
of the coast. Many of the French ships were in such a
wretched state—some of them needing the pumps con-
stantly going, in order to be kept afloat—that it was not
possible to leave Trincomalee without a thorough repair.
De Suffren, feeling how much his presence was called
for, pushed on the work with the energy of despair; but
under any circumstances, even far more favourable than
those which attended him, heaving down several line-
of-battle ships requires time, and De Bussy’s messages,
pressing him to come to the northward, could not be
obeyed. Sir Edward Hughes was thus able to enforce
a rigid blockade of the coast without opposition ; and
though he was a good deal distressed for want of water,
he had sufficient strength to permit of his keeping an
adequate squadron cruising off Cuddalore, and from that
as far south as Porto Novo: so that when General Stuart
closed the land communications, the French troops were
exposed to all the deprivations of a siege.

The strength of the English fleet was, however, to a
great extent, a hollow show; for such virulent scurvy
raged throughout, that the ships were scarcely more than
half-manned. In the beginning of June, upwards of a
SUFFREN, 137

thousand men were sent to hospital at Madras, and not-
withstanding this, a few days later, the sick lists of the
different ships mounted, on the average, to about a hun-
dred. The efficiency of the fleet was thus much impaired,
but it still continued at sea. On 24 May it was off Trin-
comalee, and perhaps meditated an attack on the ships
in the outer anchorage; but on closer observation Sir
Edward judged that they were posted too strongly to per-
mit such an attempt to be made. He therefore stood to
the southward, hoping to pick up some French store-
ships, supposed to be in the neighbourhood ; but returned
in a few days, and resumed his former cruising ground
between Cuddalore and Porto Novo.

It was at this time that Suffren wrote to M. de
Souillac, governor of the Isle of France, the following
letter, which gives a tolerably clear idea of his view of
his position :—

‘I cannot make out what Sir Edward Hughes's plan is.
Does he expect reinforcements ; is he looking out for those
which we expect; or is he waiting till I go to the relief of
Cuddalore to attack Trincomalee, which he would capture
easily, as I am obliged to take away five hundred of the
garrison in order that my ships may be—I cannot say manned,
but capable of going at all? Persuaded then that with fifteen
ships, of which eight only are coppered, I cannot attack seven-
teen which are all coppered, and stronger than mine, which have
the advantage of the wind, and, owing to their superior sailing,
can keep it ; persuaded also that they have left their eighteenth
ship, with some frigates, blockading Cuddalore, I have sent
two transports laden with provisions and stores, in convoy of
the Fendant, Cléopatre and Coventry. I believe that this is
the surest way to relieve Cuddalore, without at the same time
risking Trincomalee, on which our existence in Indian waters

depends.’
138 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

On 11 June the French left Trincomalee. Although
still believing himself inferior in force to the English,
ignorant as he was of the fearful sickness which was
making such havoc amongst our crews, Suffren neverthe-
less felt that an energetic effort must be made to relieve
Cuddalore, or rather the French army, whose very being,
as such, depended on the safety of the fort, now hard
pressed. On the 18th, a series of vigorous attacks,
obstinately resisted by the garrison, ended in its being
driven within the walls. The next day the French fleet
appeared in the offing.

Sir Edward Hughes, in consequence of the arrival of
the enemy, moved up off Cuddalore, while the French
anchored some miles to the southward. Suffren had,
however, resolved to relieve the place, if possible, at all
hazards. He accordingly weighed on the 17th, and stood
boldly in, as if to attack the English in their anchorage.
Sir Edward went out to meet him, forming line of battle
in expectation of immediate action; but the Bailiff’s first
object was to establish a free communication with the
besieged town, and to accomplish this end he maneuvred
during the whole day. By the evening he had passed,
with his whole fleet, inside the English, and was able to
anchor close in shore. This gave him the wished-for
opportunity of filling up his ships’ companies with men
from the garrison ; he borrowed no less than 1,200, half
of whom were Europeans, and at once distributed them
through the fleet; the crews were thus raised rather
above their complement; whilst those of the English,
reduced by sickness and death, were far below it. The
next day, he weighed again, and having the advantage
of the wind, was eager to engage; but Sir Edward,
SUFFREN., . 139

manoeuvring for the weather gage, refused the proffered
battle.

During the whole of the 18th and 19th, the English
admiral vainly endeavoured to recover the advantage
which he had allowed to be taken from him. On the
20th the relative position of the two fleets was but little
altered; but, Sir Edward, weary of manceuvring, and
perhaps somewhat out of temper at the idea that he had
been outwitted, made up his mind to fight. He accord-
ingly hove to, in line of battle, on the port tack, the wind
being almost due west, and received the onset of the
enemy, who opened fire a little after four o’clock.

The action continued from that time till dark; but
without the energy of spirit which had distinguished
former actions between the same admirals. Owing to a
recent order from France, issued consequently on the
capture of Count de Grasse, in the Ville de Paris, the
year before, Suffren hoisted his flag in the Cléopatre,
and took no personal share in the battle; and, whether
mistrusting his unskilled and motley crews, composed to
a very large extent of soldiers, Sepoys, Lascars, Cinga-
lese, and negroes, or from some other cause which we
cannot now guess at, he did not attempt to repeat his
former tactics. This is the more curious as, before sail-
ing from Trincomalee, he had, for the first time, reduced
‘his attack to a system, and had given out an order of
battle, according to which his five 74-gun ships were to
form the rear of the line and were to double on the rear of
the enemy, whilst the rest of the fleet, in very open order,
were to stretch along and occupy the English line. As
matter of fact, however, the whole French fleet extended

1 M. Chevalier says (p. 465) : ‘ This order of battle had been signalled
140 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

along and to windward of the English; which, on its
side, was. too weak from the late enormous loss of men
by sickness, to do more than maintain its ground till
night closed in.

This put an end to the combat. The loss in killed
was almost exactly equal; that of the English was 108,
of the French 102; but Sir Edward, by withdrawing to
Madras, thus raising the blockade of Cuddalore, must un-
doubtedly be considered as having admitted the inferiority
of his force.

General Stuart might thus have found himself in a
position of groat danger had his opponent possessed more
force of character; but while Suffren was endeavour-
ing to stimulate M. de Bussy into taking the offensive,
news arrived, 29 June, of the cessation of hostilities, and
the war terminated without either of the opposing forces:
having been able to gain over the other any advantage
that could be considered at all decisive.

The account, necessarily somewhat detailed, which I
have given of the campaign extending over a year and a
half, and of the battles fought by the fleets, will put the
relative merits of the two commanders and of the forces
under them, in a clearer light than any mere expression
of opinion. By this account we are led to the conclusion
that in state policy, or in naval tactics, Suffren was
alike the superior genius. Distinguished above his ad-
versary by energy of character, by a burning zeal which
considered little done so long as anything remained to
be done; a man of infinite resource, of perfect self-con-
fidence, and yet knowing how to conciliate the civil and

on 14 and 15 June: on the 20th, the circumstances probably did not
permit the application of this method of attack.’
SUFFREN. 141

military authorities, even whilst he differed from them
in opinion—it might well be asked how it happened that
his campaign was not more successful, and that his
labours were so fruitless. The cause of this is clear. Su- °
perior to Sir Edward Hughes in most of the qualifications
of a naval commander, he was not so in the one great
essential; Sir Edward, though opinionated, perverse,
with but little idea of tactics and less of policy, was still
at all times ready for battle; he did not know much
about manceuvring a fleet, but he could handle his indi-
vidual ship to admiration; he had not much judgment
as to the proper time or place to fight, but when he did
fight, he did so with a courage that was proof against all
odds. In this he was splendidly seconded by the captains
under him. According to all rule, the Exeter off Sadras,
or the Monmouth off Providien, ought to have struck ;
but they did not strike; nor does the idea of striking ap-
pear to have suggested itself to either Commodore King or
Captain Alms as even a possibility. Theoretically they
were beaten ; as a matter of fact, and in a matter-of-fact
way, they kept their flag flying till the end of the battle.
There was no attempt at theatrical display. They did not,
as M. de Suffren is said to have done when his masts went
by the board in the battle of 3 September, stamp on the
deck in a transport of rage, or cry, in a tone of exalta-
tion, ‘Bring flags, bring all the flags on board! hang
them.all round the ship!’ but they took the heaviest
pounding that the enemy could give, with the under-
standing, probably, that it was part of the day’s work.
With the French it was very different. Notwith-
standing the brilliant example which their courageous
admiral set them, the captains of the fleet were, with few
142 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

exceptions, resolute in hanging back in the hour of
danger. We by no means specially refer to the very
extraordinary case, already related, of the captain of the
Sevére, in the battle of Negapatam ; the conduct of M.
de Cillart is beyond the pale of criticism; but a want of
energy, a lukewarmness, a slackness in action—which
may have been spite and jealousy, but which savours
strongly of cowardice —was the rule amongst the superior
officers of the fleet. The Ajax, on the evening of 5 July,
lost her main and mizen topmasts in a squall; though
in presence of the enemy, though a battle the next day
might almost certainly be counted on, nothing was done
on board to repair the damage; the Ajax the next morn-
ing was in the same disabled state as on the previous
evening, and her captain, M. Bouvet, had the unblush-
ing assurance to make a signal for permission to part
company. The permission was refused; but the Ajax
lay to leeward of the fleet, and took no share in the
action. That Bouvet was a very old man and in bad
health is all that his friends seem able to allege in his
behalf. On 12 April, the Vengeur and Artésien persis-
tently disobeyed the signal, several times repeated, to
close on the enemy. The same two ships rendered them-
selves conspicuous on 6 July, by a similar disobedience
of signals, and their captains, De Forbin and De Maur-
ville, were in consequence sent to the Isle of France,
under arrest; family interest, it would appear, saved
them from further punishment. M. de Tromelin, com-
manding the Annibal, the senior captain in the fleet,
was notoriously the soul of a party against Suffren; and
the disgraceful and unsailorlike conduct of several of the
other captains in the battle of 8 September was principally
SUFFREN, 143

due to his machinations; but the insubordinate jealousy
of their senior by no means absolves the others. In
all this there is one circumstance especially remark-
able: it is that none of these mutineers was visited with
the penalties of martial law. In the history of our own
navy, we find a very close parallel in the West Indian
campaign of Vice-Admiral Benbow in 1702. I am by no
means sure that, morally, a large part of the blame does
not rest on Benbow,' whilst Suffren seems to be cleat ;
but of the captains implicated in that scandalous affair
off Santa Marta, two suffered capital punishment; one
escaped the same only by an earlier death ; and a fourth
was dismissed the service, and imprisoned during the
Queen’s pleasure. Of the many in M. de Suffren’s fleet who
were guilty of cowardice, disaffection, and disobedience,
only one—De Cillart—was cashiered.

Such painful considerations, however, tend to raise
the French admiral’s credit to a higher pitch. When we
reflect that men of all creeds, and of all nationalities,
freemen or slaves, often in want of provisions, of medi-
cines and of military stores, formed the crews of ships
many of which were so rotten that they could only be
kept afloat by continual pumping ;. that such crews were
commanded by cowardly and mutinous captains, and
efficered by inexperienced or ignorant leutenants, we
cease to wonder how it was that, with a force numerically
so imposing, so little was accomplished ; we begin rather
to admire the genius of the man who, under such diffi-
culties, could accomplish so much. What he did accom-
plish was this: by his bold and daring behaviour he won
on the natives to continue against us the war which

1 See Dictionary of National Biography, s.u. Benbow, John, iv. 210.
144 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

they had been on the point of abandoning; he conciliated
Hyder Aly in a personal interview to such an extent that
that wily old barbarian lent himself heart and soul to
the furtherance of the admiral’s plans and of the French
interest, as indissolubly wrapped up with his own; he

captured Trincomalee by a skilful combination of craft, . .

strategy, and force; and he fought an action in defence
of his capture, which, under all disadvantages, put it out
of the enemy’s power to undertake any operations against
his new possession. He relieved Cuddalore from a
blockade which must, if continued, have caused the ruin
of the army; and in doing so placed the French general
in a position to carry on an offensive war.

This much he did; but we cannot assent to the
exaggerated statements of French writers that he gained
great naval victories. Gaining a naval victory does
not consist in allowing an inferior force to stand firmly
at bay till nightfall, and at the close of the action to take
up an impregnable position; but this was the case in the
battle of Providien. Gaining a naval victory does not
consist in allowing an inferior force to cut off convoy, to
capture a transport and the hospital ship, under the
very eyes of the fleet, and to carry off the prizes after an
action fought to retake them; but this was the case
in the battle of Sadras: nor in being driven from the
manifest purpose of landing troops and prosecuting en-
terprises on shore, as happened at Negapatam. Such
actions, well fought as they undoubtedly were—at least,
on the part of the commander-in-chief—were not victories
in any sense of the word, and to style them such, far
from increasing, tends to lessen the glory of the admiral ;
for to speak of these, or of the battles of Providien, of
SUFFREN. 145

Trincomalee, or Cuddalore as victories, carries with it,
to our ears, an appearance of unfitness that borders on
the absurd—to our ears, accustomed to the name of
victory as belonging to such battles as La Hogue, Vigo,
Quiberon Bay, or Dominica, not to carry the glorious
roll-call into the wars of the Revolution.

The court of France, however, formed a much higher
estimate of the services of the Bailiff de Suffren. He
had already, in March 1788, on the news of his first
three battles, been raised to the rank of liewtenant-général,
though—during the war, at least—he remained ignorant
of his promotion.! On his arrival at Toulon on 26 March,
1784, he hastened to Paris, where he received the
greatest possible consideration from Louis XVI. The
Queen herself presented him to the Dauphin, as one of
the best servants of the King. ‘Learn my son,’ she said,
‘to pronounce properly the names of the heroes, the
defenders of their country.’? He was, shortly afterwards
—although there was no vacancy—created Vice-Admiral
of France, and an extraordinary chapter of the order of
Saint-Esprit was held, that he might be enrolled among
its knights. He was the hero of the day, cheered by the
crowd whenever he appeared in public, and everywhere
received with the highest honour and distinction.

1 Tt is worth calling attention to this, as illustrating what is said
in Chapter VIII, on the subject of French naval rank in the last century.
M. de Suffren, whilst commanding a fleet of from twelve to fifteen sail
of the line, was, during the greater part of the time, so far as he knew,
merely a captain having local rank, and through the whole campaign
wore only a broad pennant. His enemy, Sir Edward Hughes, holding a
corresponding command, was a vice-admiral.

2 It may be interesting to note that the Provengal and accepted pronun-
ciation of the name is as if written Suffrein; which may perhaps account
for the persistency with which, in this country, it has been misspelt.

L
146 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

He did not live long to enjoy his popularity and rank.
A very few years after, during a cloud on the political
horizon of Europe, he was appointed to the command of
a fleet ordered, as a measure of precaution, to be fitted
out at Brest, and was on the point of leaving Paris, when
he suddenly died, on 8 December, 1788. About his
death there is some mystery. He had been in his usual
health, and had been working with his accustomed energy
in forwarding the equipment of the fleet. His sudden
death was, at the time, attributed to a fit of apoplexy,
and his extreme corpulence would suggest that there was
nothing improbable in such a story. Various French
writers, however, consider that there is satisfactory
evidence that he was killed in a duel, provoked by the
Prince de Mirepoix, on account of his having, whilst in
the East Indies, put two of the prince’s nephews under
arrest and turned them out of the service. The witness
whose testimony is adduced was a servant of Suffren at the
time, and his story, related by M. Cunat as well as by M.
Jal in minute detail, is plausible enough. It is, however,
quite uncorroborated ; and the sudden death of distin-
guished men has so often led to a variety of contradictory
reports—as though the world strove to separate, even in
the manner of dying, the hero from the common herd—
that we should be careful how, even on such a point, to
which little importance attaches, we yield a too ready
belief to what may have been merely the monomaniacal
idea of a very old man.

But whatever was the cause of his death—whether
apoplexy or the sword—the loss to France was equally
severe. Had he lived, the next few years might have
been very different for his country. A man of keen fore-
SUFFREN. 147

sight and unclouded judgment, he might have obtained
the adoption of measures of sound policy and necessary
concession. A man of undoubted probity, his word
might have been accepted by a populace that put no
faith in the promises of the court, or in the pledges of
the king. A man of unscrupulous determination, his
prompt and vigorous action might have quelled in its
very cradle the young rebellion, which weak and timo-
rous opposition fostered to such a gigantic and terrible
growth.

And, though the estimate I have formed of his cha-
racter is in some respects less high than that which has
been formed by his own countrymen, I yield a ready
assent to the opinion that—cool and daring in action,
crafty in policy, of ready wit, and of singular genius as a
tactician, with much practical skill, added to a vast fund
of theoretical knowledge—the Bailiff de Suffren was one
of the most dangerous enemies that the English fleets
have ever met, and, without exception, the most illus-
trious officer that has ever held command in the French

navy.

L2
148 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

CHAPTER V.
THEGEHETTH OFF.

EXPERIENCES OF STEAM AND ARMOUR.!

TuErE is a certain tendency in the minds of those who
are most earnest in the cause of naval education to
confuse the means with the end, and to imagine that all
that is wanted is a competent knowledge of such sciences
as mathematics, physics, geography, astronomy, naviga-
tion even, or pilotage, gunnery or naval architecture.
In reality, and so far as the duties of a naval officer are
concerned, all these are but branches, however important,
each in its different degree, of that one science, the art
of war, which it is the business of his life to practise.
From this point of view, the raison d’étre of a ship of
war is her power of fighting ; that of her captain is the
skill to use that power. The captain of a ship of war is
therefore called on to possess not merely the skill of the
navigator, of the seaman, of the engineer, of the gunner,
or nowadays of the electrician, but of all together,
directed by the knowledge of how and when to use each
to the best advantage so as to attain the desired end.
As a matter of first necessity, young officers are specially

1 Fraser's Magazine, June, 1878.
TEGETTHOFF, 149

instructed in the details of those several branches, a
knowledge of each of which must be joined together in
the perfect commander ; but it is not by that detailed
instruction alone that they become fitted for the duties
which promotion will lay on them. Where the official
instruction ends, the higher education really begins.
From that time it is the man’s own experience, and
reading, and thought, and judgment, which must fit him
for the requirements of higher rank.

It is a trite proverb that experience teaches even
fools. But needful personal experience is not always to be
had, or the cost of its lessons may be ruinous. The wise
man will learn from the experience of others: and just
as a naval officer learns navigation from the theories
and practice of centuries, embodied in his Inman or his
Raper ; or as he learns seamanship from the traditions
of old, whether handed down by word of mouth or
recorded by Darcy Lever, or Boyd, or Nares; so also
will he learn the art of commanding ships or fleets from
the history of his great predecessors, of what they have
done, and how they have done it. But this is a higher
and graver study than all that has gone before. Certain
fixed rules can be laid down for observing the sun or
for regulating the chronometers. The different points of
seamanship are learned and understood by the average
boatswain as well as by his commanding officer. A
given battery will send an electric current through a
known resistance. Steam at a given pressure will drive
the ship at a known speed; and the measures necessary
for obtaining that pressure and that speed are acquired
by hundreds. But the science of war is not one of
mere rule and precedent, for changing conditions change
150 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

almost every detail, and that too ina manner which it is
often impossible to foresee.

The commanding officer who hopes to win, not
merely to tumble into distinction, must therefore be
prepared beforehand for every eventuality. The know-
ledge of what has happened already will not only teach
him by precedent; so far as that is possible, it is easy.
and within the compass of everyday abilities: it will also
suggest to him things that have never yet been done;
things in the planning of which he may rise to the
height of genius, in the executing of which he may rise
to the height of grandeur. And it is in this way that
the exact story of difficulties overcome, of brave defence
or brilliant achievement, interesting in itself as a story
of gallantry or heroism, becomes, to the naval officer, a
study of real and technical importance.

As a contribution to such a study I am going to
relate the story of the battle of Lissa, a battle of our
_ own time, the only battle between armoured squadrons;
a battle which Captain Colomb! has aptly described as
‘beyond all bounds the most important naval occurrence
since Trafalgar,’ and yet a battle of which—in this country
at least—little or nothing is accurately known. There
is scarcely an incident in it that is not every day mis-
represented, and even the name of the victorious admiral
is almost invariably misspelt.2 This is not very satis-
factory: to us, as a nation supposed to be the nursery

' Journal of the United Service Institution, vol. xi. p. 104.

? The misspellings show considerable ingenuity. Starting with the
data that its consonants are t, g, f, and a doubtful h, these have beep.
arranged by ones or twos, in almost every possible comibination.
Tegethoff, Tegetoff, Teggetoff, Teghetoff, are only some of the many
ways that have come under my notice,
TEGETTHOFF. 151

and the storehouse of naval science and naval tradition,
it is not very creditable.

Wilhelm, the son of Lieutenant-Colonel Karl von
Tegetthoff, was born at Marburg in Styria on 23 Decem-
ber, 1827. We are, as yet, told nothing of his childhood,
except that he spent some of it in the Gymnasium at
Marburg; but at the age of thirteen he was sent to the
College for Naval Cadets at Venice. There he stayed for
five years: he was nearly eighteen when he made his
first experience of sea-service. On 23 July, 1845, he
was appointed to the Montecuccoli brig, and after-
wards to the corvette Adria, on board which ships,
whilst cruising in the Adriatic and Archipelago, he
learned the more practical part of his duties. On 27
January, 1848, he was made an ensign of the second
class, and was raised to the first class three months
later, on 18 Apyil.

The Austrian navy was at this period a service of
extremely small importance, either from a national or
political point of view. It was feeble; it was neglected
by the government, and every kreuzer spent on it was
grudged. In the interior of the country it was scarcely
known that there was a navy at all. The officers were,
almost to a man, natives of the Italian provinces; the
few Germans amongst them—sons of government officials
civil or military, whose rank and position gave them
an opportunity of pushing forward their relations in a
service where competition was rot keen—had either to
assimilate themselves to their Italian comrades, or to
lead a life of solitude or seclusion. In Venice the fleet
was openly spoken of as belonging to the Italian nation,
and ‘ Young Italy’ counted many of its warmest sup-
152 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

porters on board the Austrian ships of war. The two
Bandieras, chiefs of the rising of 1844, who had been
shot at Cosenza, were naval officers, a lieutenant and
an ensign, and the sons of a naval officer, an admiral.
Of the seven who were executed with them one other,
Moro, was also an officer of the navy. They had tam.
pered, on a large scale, with the fidelity of the seamen,
and they had all but made themselves masters of the
Bellona frigate. These were things of public notoriety,
and those Austrians who knew that a navy did exist,
connected their idea of it principally with the memory of
convicted traitors ; an idea.which afterwards seemed to
be justified by the fact that when ‘the war of 1848 broke
out; and Venice threw off the Austrian yoke, most of the
naval officers flung in their lot with the revolutionary
cause. In doing so, however, they failed to secure the
ships. These were still held by the Austrians, but were
for the time useless, as the few officers that remained
were insufficient in number, and the Sardinian fleet,
mistress of the Adriatic, prevented all attempts at re-
organisation. It was not till the Sardinians, after their
defeat at Novara (23 March, 1849), and the pressure
thus brought on Piedmont by land, were compelled to
withdraw their ships, that the Austrian navy could show
signs of life, and was able with the few ships they could
fit out, to close the blockade of Venice, which finally sur-
rendered on 22 August, 1849.

During the early part of this period of enforced in-
activity, Tegetthoff was an ensign on board, one after the
other, the brig Montecuccoli, the brig Triest, and the
‘frigate Bellona, where, at best, he was but perfecting
himself in habits of discipline, and in the knowledge of
TEGETTHOFF. 153

the internal economy of ships of war. He was afterwards
aide-de-camp of Field-Marshal Martini, the then head of
the navy, and went with him in his embassy to Naples;
but returned in time to take his share of the blockading
on board his old ship Adria. After the peace he served
on board the steamer Maria Anna in the Levant, and
was present in the Peireus during the English blockade
of that port on account of the Don Pacifico affair, now
almost forgotten, or remembered only by Sir George
Dasent’s clever skit.1 He was promoted on 4 June,
1851, to the rank of lieutenant of the second class, and
on 4 November, 1852, to the first class, in which grade
he served again on board the Montecuccoli and the
corvette Carolina, and in 1854 was appointed to com-
mand the schooner Elisabeth, from which shortly after-
wards he was transferred to the steamer Taurus.

These rapid changes speak of the disorganised and
unsettled condition in which the Austrian navy was at
the time. The ships were there, though in bad state,
but the officers were very few, and seem to have been
transferred from one to the other, either at the caprice
of the authorities, or in accordance with the necessities
of the dockyard. In command of the Taurus, however,
Tegetthoff remained for some time, employed, during
the Crimean war, in a sort of police duty in the Sulina
mouth of the Danube. This duty was neither pleasant
nor easy, and Tegetthoff not only gained credit by the
way in which he performed it, but was brought to the
favourable notice of the Archduke Maximilian.

After the general break-up in 1848, and the dis-
appearance of the overwhelming Italian element, the

1 Jest and Earnest, vol. ii. p. 110.
154 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

navy seems to have become suddenly popular. Many
officers from North Germany and Denmark were induced
to take service under the Austrian flag. The command-
in-chief was given toa Dane, Admiral Dahlerup, who is
described as having some difficulty in accommodating
himself to the very mixed materials put at his disposal—
Old Austrian, North German, and Danish officers, mer-
chant skippers, Germans, Slaves, Dalmatians, and
Illyrians: to fuse them into one homogeneous whole was
no easy task.

Numbers of cadets, too, came in, members of the
best Austrian families, and among them, setting the
example, the emperor’s brother, the Archduke Ferdinand
Maximilian. After a short service in the subordinate
ranks, the archduke was appointed, in 1854, rear-
admiral and head of the navy. He was then only
twenty-two: but his zeal compensated, to some extent,
for his want of experience; and for the next ten years
he devoted himself to the good of the service over which
he really presided. Under his fostering care an excellent
dockyard and arsenal were constructed and fortified at
Pola. Many ships were built, amongst them a line-of-
battle ship and three large frigates. One of these, the
Novara, was sent on a combined scientific and training
expedition, a voyage round the world ; and in 1857, also
in the interests of navigation and the development of
Austrian commerce, Tegetthoff was despatched, in com-
pany with the distinguished ornithologist, Dr. Heuglin,
on a semi-official journey in Egypt and Arabia; the
object being to collect local information which might
throw new light on the project of cutting a canal through
the Isthmus of Suez, with a possible view to take an
TEGETTHOFF. 155

early advantage of the canal, if it should be completed,
and, amongst other ee to select a point suitable for
a coaling station.

The two travelled up the Nile to Thebes, from there,
by caravan, to Kosseir, on the Red Sea, and thence
southwards, examining both coasts as they went. Near
Bender Gam, in Somali Land, they were attacked by
the natives, taken prisoners, and detained until their
ransom was duly paid. Dr. Heuglin, who had been
severely wounded, crossed over to Aden and returned to
Cairo, whilst Tegetthoff pursued his investigations by
himself. In an open boat, and against the north-easterly
monsoon of the Gulf of Aden, he crossed over to
Makallah, coasted along to Ras Fartak, and crossed
again to Socotra. After exploring this island, he went
back to Aden, and so to Egypt and to Europe.

Whilst at Aden he received his promotion to the rank
of captain of the third class; and after serving on shore
at Trieste for a few months, he was, in the autumn of
1858, appointed to the command of the screw corvette
Erzherzog Friedrich, and sent to the coast of Morocco
to inquire after the crew of a merchant ship wrecked
there, who were said to have been carried as slaves into
the interior. What with the Spanish war, the wanton
attacks of some French ships, and the threatening
neighbourhood of an English squadron, the whole coast
was in a very disturbed state, and any Huropeans—Aus-
trians or others—thrown helpless on shore, would cer-
tainly be condemned to slavery, if not to death. The
Erzherzog Friedrich had examined the whole coast of
Morocco east of the Straits without obtaining any
tidings of the castaways. Before going west she put into
156 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Gibraltar for letters, and received orders to return at once
to the Adriatic. War with France and Italy was imminent,
and the safety of the ship, as well as the defence of the
home ports, rendered her immediate recall necessary.

In the Adriatic, however, nothing was done. The
French fleet, in overpowering force, swept the sea, but
was not at first strong enough to attack Venice. After-
wards, when a number of floating batteries and ships
of the line had been brought round, Louis Napoleon
judged it opportune to send an autograph note to Franz
Joseph; and on the basis of this, peace was shortly
afterwards concluded. During this time the Austrian
fleet was altogether unequal to any offensive measures,
though such were indeed proposed. Admiral Jurien de
la Graviére, who commanded the ships which instituted
the blockade, tells us that—

The officers of the Austrian squadron were full of ardour ;
they were, even then, the same brave officers who afterwards
triumphed at Lissa. They asked to be led out. They felt
humiliated by the blockade: they would endeavour to raise
it. But the archduke would not venture his fleet. If it
should be lost, Austria would never sanction its being
replaced. He chose rather to follow the example set by the
defenders of Sebastopol, and applied himself to prevent our
approaching the town. The line-of-battle ship Kaiser, which
had been lately launched at Pola, was anchored in mid-
channel; and instead of completing her equipment, arrange-
ments were made to sink her at once, if necessary, so as to
close the only passage available for ships having even a
moderate draught of water.!

We are told that amongst those anxious to make a
dash against the French squadron Tegetthoff was con-
1 La Marine d’ Aujourd’ hui, p. 158.
TEGETTHOFF. 157

spicuous; and it seems not improbable that a man of
courage and resource, such as he afterwards proved him-
‘self to be, might have cut off some of the small cruisers
or store ships in the Adriatic, and have made an un-
expected diversion by an attack on the coast of France.
But the attempt was not permitted; and till the close of
the war the Erzherzog Friedrich remained as inactive
as the other ships.

After the peace Tegetthoff was appointed aide-de-
camp to the archduke, and in this capacity accompanied
him to Brazil on board the steamer Kaiserin Elisabeth.
The account of this voyage has been written at great
length by the archduke himself. Apart from the cir-
cumstance of its being the journal of a prince and em-
peror—round whose name such a halo of romance has
circled—it is a very commonplace record of travel, and
has here no special interest beyond describing to us how
the archduke and his aide-de-camp T were ducked
on crossing the Line, and reminding us of the bond of
union between Tegetthoff and the head of the Austrian
navy. Of the two, Tegetthoff was five years the senior ;
he was altogether the stronger intellect, and there seems
reason to believe that the relation between them was that
of friend to friend rather than of commander to admiral,
or of lordling to prince. It is certain that there was a
close intimacy, and the archduke was able to advance
his friend’s interests at the same time that he advanced
those of the service.

On their return from Brazil, Tegetthoff was, on
24 April, 1860, made a captain of the second class, and
in this rank he commanded the frigate Radetzky in
the Levant until the autumn of 1861, when she was put

 
158 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

out of commission. On 8 November following he was
advanced to the first class, and appointed to the command
of the Novara, the 50-gun frigate which had just come
home from her voyage round the world. He was then,
notwithstanding his want of seniority, sent into the
Levant as commodore, and was present in Greek waters,
in Phalerum Bay or the Peireus, for a great part of
1862-3, during the Revolution and the accession of King
George. Afterwards, as the Novara was found to be
in want of extensive repairs, he was turned over to the
Schwarzenberg, a frigate of the same size, and in her,
in company with the Radetzky, of 31 guns, was, at the
end of 1868, at Port Said, inspecting the works of the
canal, on which, in fact, he is said to have written a clear
and valuable report. He was still there when he received
orders to go immediately to the North Sea, where the
naval power of Denmark threatened to baulk some ot
the military plans of the Germanic spoilers.

With the Schwarzenberg, Radetzky, and a gun.
vessel, the Seehund, Tegetthoff immediately went round
to Brest, where he was joined by three Prussian gun-
boats, the Blitz, Basilisk, and Adler. These were put
under his orders, and with the squadron so formed he
left for a cruise against the Danes, who were, it was said,
blockading the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. It
was about noon on 9 May, 1864, that, within sight of
Heligoland, he met the Danish squadron under Contmo-
dore Suenson. The Seehund was not in company,
and the three Prussian gunboats were paltry little things,
so that his effective force consisted of simply :

Schwarzenberg . ‘ - 400h.p. 48 guns
Radetzky Fi ‘3 : . 800 ,, 31 ,,
TEGETTHOFS, 159

As against the Danish force:

Niels Juel i : - 800h.p. 42 guns
Jylland i ‘ - . 400 ,, 44 ,,
Heimdal ‘ A : - 850 ,, 16 ,,

The Austrians were clearly overmatched; and the
Danes, both in prestige and efficiency, were not an enemy
to whom one would willingly give odds. Nevertheless,
Tegetthoff did not hesitate a moment. He was steering
towards the north, Suenson towards the south; and the
two, advancing straight against each other, came within
range about a quarter before two o’clock.

The action which followed was the first, and with
the exception of that, a few months later, between the
Kearsarge and Alabama, remains the only one fought
between wooden ships under steam and armed with
heavy shell guns; but on neither side does any excep-
tional use seem to have been made of the steam-power ;
and the damage and loss inflicted by the shells were no
greater than were in many cases, during the old French
war, inflicted by much smaller cold shot. The hostile
frigates, on each side in elose order, one astern of the
other, passed in opposite directions, interchanging their
starboard broadsides. The Danes then turned to star-
board, trying to cut off the Prussian gunboats, which
were a long way astern ; and to prevent this the Austrians
also turned to starboard, countermarching their line.
But in this they were a little late, and the Schwarzen-
berg, as she advanced towards the south, received a
raking broadside from the Niels Juel. They did, how-
ever, prevent any attack on the gunboats, and the two
squadrons ran in parallel lines at a distance of about
500 yards apart, and heading at first towards the south-
160 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

west, the Schwarzenberg and the Niels Juel, the
Radetzky and the Jylland, supported by the Heim-
dal, keeping up a brisk fire on each other. About three
a shell from the Niels Juel lodged in the bunt of the
Schwarzenberg’s foresail and burst there, setting it on
fire. This rapidly spread, and the fore topmast was
enveloped in flames. The fire of the Niels Juel pre-
vented all attempts at extinguishing them, and the ship
had to be kept right before the wind, which was easterly.
A little after four they were within the territorial waters
of Heligoland, and the action ended.

The question has often been mooted whether an
action, begun outside, may not be finished within neutral
waters. Bynkershoek laid down the rule that it may;
some of Stowell’s decisions seem to sanction it; and,
apart from the arguments of lawyers, there are cases on
record in which English commanders have taken the
same view—notably, that of 19 August, 1759, when
Boscawen captured or burnt De la Clue’s ships in Lagos
Bay. It is quite possible that Commodore Suenson, who
had the Austrians distinctly in his grip, might have fol-
lowed the precedent, and given risen to international
disputes and certain ill-feeling ; but the presence of the
English frigate Aurora, under the command of Sir Leo-
pold McClintock, prevented any such complication. The
Austrians anchored, and shortly afterwards the Schwar-
zenberg’s foremast went over the side, but the fire was
not completely extinguished till ten o’clock at night.
The Danes, meanwhile, after lying-to for some time,
repairing damages, had gone forth. They had suffered
heavily, and were in no condition to keep up a blockade
of Heligoland, so that the Austrians, getting under way,
TEGETTHOFF. 161

crossed over, unhindered, to Cuxhaven, where they
anchored early the next morning.

Independent of the damage done to the ships—and
the Schwarzenberg was certainly incapable of any pro-
longed defence—the loss in men stands thus: Danes, 14
killed, 54 wounded. Austrians, 36 killed, 52 badly
wounded, and a great many slightly ; of which total quite
six-sevenths fell on the Schwarzenberg. But the blockade
was raised: the Austrians had met the Danes with a
weaker force, and had not been crushed. The convenient
neighbourhood of neutral water was not put too pro-
minently forward, and the Germans claimed an effective
victory, as, in fact, it strategically was, for the Danish
operations on the coast were perforce ended. The Aus-
trian emperor acknowledged Tegetthoff’s telegraphic
message by one promoting him to the rank of rear-
admiral, and conferring on him the Order of the Iron
Crown, with a war decoration. Undoubtedly Tegetthoff
deserved well of the allied sovereigns. He had fought a
superior enemy, superior both in force and in prestige.
He had fought boldly, and though beaten, was still so
far successful that the Danish navy had no further in-
fluence on the war.

Tegetthoff was now employed for a few months in the
War Office at Vienna, and in 1865 was again in command
of a small squadron in the Mediterranean. With this,
in the beginning of 1866, he was recalled to Pola, to
take part in the war with Italy, which was finally declared
on 20 June.

This new war found the Austrian navy in a very un-
prepared condition. The popular idea seems to have
been that the late alliance with Prussia had inaugurated

M
162 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

a reign of peace; that there were to be no more wars;
and though, as a measure of precaution, an army might
be necessary, to spend money on a fleet was downright
waste, and, in the impoverished state of the treasury, a
thing not to be thought of. Accordingly, the ships which
were unfinished when the Archduke Maximilian went to
Mexico, were unfinished still; and what ships there were
had been permitted to lie by, waiting till it was convenient
to repair them. But though Maximilian was no longer
there to direct the work or to push it forward, when the
necessity occurred the navy still enjoyed the benefit of
his rule. He had insisted that the navy should be a
national force, that the ships and their engines, as well
as their men, should be Austrian. The arsenal at Pola
was a reality; and the ships, though unfinished, were
in their own hands, to be got ready as soon as possible.
The one point in which they had trusted to foreign re-
sources was the only one that utterly failed them. But
it was an important one. A number of heavy guns which
had been ordered from Krupp’s works were stopped by
the Prussians, and the want could not now be adequately
supplied.

The spirit of the service was, however, excellent.
Tegetthoff, with the few ships ready for sea, took up his
station at Fasana; and whilst the men—raw recruits
most of them—were drilled almost incessantly, the
admiral inspired the commanding officers, and through
them the seamen, with courage and confidence. Other
ships were fitted out, hastily, imperfectly, but still equal
to the emergency. The two large ships, armoured
frigates of the first class, were pushed forward; their
spars were not ready, but they were jury-rigged, and sent
TEGETTHOFF. 163

to Fasana. These were ships which, though somewhat
smaller, may, in horse-power and armour, be compared
to our Royal Oak; wooden ships, with 43-inch plating,
of 800 horse-power, of 5,130 tons displacement, and,
failing the Krupp guns, armed with 16 smooth-bore
48-pounders. On board one of these, the Erzherzog
Ferdinand Maximilian—which was shortly called Fer-
dinand Max, or, affectionately, Max—Tegetthoff hoisted
his flag: Presently came the Kaiser, a 90-gun ship,
similar to those two-deckers which, only three years
before, had formed the bulk of our Mediterranean fleet.
Then came the Novara, which had narrowly escaped
burning at the hands of an incendiary, but which had
been repaired as quickly and as well as circumstances
permitted; then also the Don Juan de Austria, meant
for an armour-plated ship, but ironclad only at the water
line and the after part; forward, the want of the plates
was supplied by wooden planking. By the end of June
the admiral had with him, under his immediate orders,
the whole of the available force of the Austrian navy :
seven (so-called) ironclad frigates, the 90-gun ship, two
50-gun frigates, four smaller, and a number of gun-
vessels, gunboats, and fast steamers, including one of
the Austrian Lloyd’s boats. But everything was in the
rough—the ships, as I have just said, very much so;
the masts and rigging, the fittings and the guns, such as
could be got most readily and most quickly. ‘Only send
them,’ wrote Tegetthoff—‘ send them as they are; I'll
find some use for them.’

The men were almost all newly raised; their gun-
drill went on all day and every day; they were exercised
more especially in firing concentrated broadsides—that

u 2
164 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

is, in laying the guns by marks on the ships’ decks, so
as all to converge to a focus, and firing them as one, at
the word.

Above all, the several captains were fully in the
admiral’s confidence. Promoted as he had been, for
actual service without reference to seniority, Tegetthoff
was probably junior to many of those under his command.
Possibly he felt this might be a difficulty in his way. It
does not appear to have been so; the hopes, and fears,
and plans, and strategy, and tactics of the campaign be-
fore them seem to have been discussed in friendly con-
clave, of which Tegetthoff was the president and the soul.
He imbued them with his fiery spirit. The wooden ships
might be roughly armoured with ranges of chain-cable
fastened on abreast of the boilers: it would give the
stokers some sense of protection. The guns were weak:
they must be supplemented by the ships themselves: if
a 48-pound shot would not pierce the enemy’s plates, a
5,000-ton ship might. Hence the determination to use
the ships freely as rams. To fire by concentrated broad-
sides and to ram—these were the elements of the tactics,
the details of which were discussed in all their probable
bearings. When the day came that saw them face to
face with the enemy, every captain knew the admiral’s
intention as well as the admiral himself did; every
officer knew what had to be done, and every man had
some idea of it, and above all knew that he had to
fight.

The Italian navy was on a widely different footing
from the Austrian. From the birth of the kingdom, six
years before, the fixed idea of the Italians had been to
have a navy. They aimed at being a great naval power ;
TEGETTHOFF, 165

and, by liberal expenditure, had got together a number
of ships that could compare even with the fleets of
England or France. They were able to collect at An-
cona a force of twelve armour-plated ships, besides a
large number of powerful wooden frigates and smaller
craft.

Of their armoured ships, most had been built abroad ;
the two largest, the Ré d’Italia and the Ré di Porto-
gallo, in America. These were wooden ships of 5,700
tons displacement; they were armoured with 54-inch
plates, had engines of 800 horse-power, and could steam
from 12 to 13 knots. Some controversy arose after-
wards as to whether their construction was as good as it
was believed to be; they were said to be unsound, built
of green wood, and incurably foul from the filth that had
been thrown down the lining, and so built into them.
Whether this was the case or not, it is difficult to deter-
mine; but there is reason to believe that their scantling
was too weak—a fault which proved fatal to the Ré
Italia. Their armament consisted of two 300-pounder
Armstrong guns, ten smooth-bore 10-inch guns, and
twenty-four rifle guns throwing shot of 90 pounds. If
we remember what our own navy was in 1866, we shall
see that the Bellerophon was the only ship we had
then afloat which, as an effective man-of-war, could be
said to be decidedly superior to these. Our ships of the
Prince Consort class, though a little bigger, had thin-
ner armour, and had no rifled guns; no more had the
Achilles, whose extreme length would have made her
compare unfavourably, as a tactical engine, with either
of these two Italians.

Two others, the Terribile and the Formidabile, had
166 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

been built in France; these were iron ships of 2,700
tons, with 44-inch plates over 14 inches of backing—
they had ram bows, then still a novelty, and were said
to have a speed of 12 knots. Of the others I will only
mention in detail the Affondatore, a turret ship, built
in England ; she was of 4,000 tons and 700 horse-power ;
she had a spur 80 feet long, and though she had only
two guns they were 300-pounder Armstrongs. Besides
these there were five others of about 4,000 tons, and two
smaller of 2,000 tons, the Palestro and Varese, which
were only partially plated, their bows and sterns being
left unarmoured. These ships were all armed with rifled
guns, principally of cast-iron with strengthening coils,
which threw 90-pound shot. In mere material force
the Italian fleet was at least double the Austrian; but
the government, whilst spending freely on their new
ships and guns, had neglected to ensure the quality of
their officers and the discipline of their seamen.

The officers were young, without knowledge or ex-
perience, without the discipline or even the social train-
ing which teaches men so thrown together to live in
mutual amity ; there was a lamentable want of harmony
between those of the same grade, and of deference from
inferiors to superiors. This was nothing new; it had
always been so in the Sardinian navy, and was aggra-
vated by the coalition with the Neapolitan. It was so
universal that the writer from whom I quote concludes
that it is the necessary condition of naval life: ‘ Every-
body,’ he says, ‘knows that this poisonous plant takes
root and flourishes amongst other seafaring people;
and it seems that the compulsory and continual living
together renders it difficult to avoid the clashing of in-
TEGETTHOFF. 167

dividual characters, and makes their differences more
acrimonious.’ !

The command in chief of this fleet was entrusted to
Persano, the one admiral of the Italian navy; under
him were Albini, vice-admiral, and Vacca, rear-admiral.
Vacca was a Neapolitan; Albini, a native of Sardinia.
Carlo Pellion di Persano, of noble family. was born at
Vercelli, in Piedmont, in 1806. At the age of eighteen
he entered the Sardinian navy, and having passed
through the regular grades of the service, was made a
captain in 1841. He then commanded the Eridano brig
for a three years’ commission in the Pacific; and,
during the Adriatic campaign of 18:8-9, had had com-
mand of the brig Daino, in which he is said to have
distinguished himself. In 1851 he was in command of
the Governolo, which carried to London the Pied-
montese contribution to that first International Exhibi-
tion. Afterwards, in 1859, he had command of the
Carlo Alberto, a 50-gun frigate; and having served in
her through the operations of that year, was, in October,
raised to the rank of rear-admiral. He then had charge
of the squadron which, in the early summer of 1860, was
co-operating with Garibaldi on the coast of Sicily; after
which he conducted the naval attack on Ancona, and
received the surrender of Lamoriciére on board the flag-
ship, the Maria Adelaide, on 30 September. For this
service he was made a vice-admiral; Albini, the second
in command, being at the same time made a rear-
admiral. In 1862 Persano was a member of the Ratazzi
cabinet, as minister for the navy, and, on its break up

1 La Guerra in Italia nel 1866. L’Esercito, la Flotta e i Volontarj
Italiani. Studio militare (Milan, 1867), p. 344.
168 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

‘in the end of the year, before he retired from office,
promoted himself to the rank of admiral.

This is a short outline of Persano’s service claims to
distinction. He was generally esteemed as a man of
‘good family and of amiable temper; he had married an
English lady, and being thus connected with English
society, was looked on as partly an Englishman, or at
least was supposed to have caught, as if by infection, the
good qualities of the typical English naval officer. When
the war broke out in 1866, he was considered the man of
the day, and great things were expected from him. He
proved, however, wanting in almost every gift which
raises an officer to the height of an emergency. At
‘Taranto, where he took the command on 16 May, he
found that a great deal was still wanting to make the
fleet fit for active service; the equipment was imperfect,
the men were newly raised, the senior and commissioned
officers were inefficient, and of petty officers there was a
great scarcity. Such defects were, of course, very real,
but Tegetthoff, at Fasana, was struggling manfully
against the same; at Taranto or at Ancona Persano
does not seem to have realised that it was his duty to do
this. ‘Send me what you have,’ wrote Tegetthoff to the
minister for the navy, ‘I will do something with it.’
Persano’s tone was rather, ‘If you don’t send me what
Task for, I can do nothing.’ And, meantime, he did
nothing. The drills were slack, discipline uncared for,
and the equipment left very much to itself.

Any competent witness who had been able to study
the condition, the preparation, above all the temper of
the two fleets, as they lay in their respective roadsteads,
would have had no doubt as to the result of a hostile
TEGETTHOFF. 169

meeting between them. Though the material superiority
lay so entirely with the Italians, he would have remarked
that a large proportion of the Austrian seamen were Dal-
matians, the descendants of the Uscocchi and other mari-
time tribes of the Gulf of Quarnero, the best and sturdiest
seamen that the Mediterranean has ever seen, the men
who had for centuries upheld the supremacy of Venice in
the Adriatic, or who, on their own account, had questioned
the rule alike of Venetian, Turk, or Spaniard; he would
have remarked the personal difference of the admirals,
and its effect on the courage and temper of their sub-
ordinates; and, finally, he would have remembered that
at St. Vincent, the Nile, or Trafalgar, an English fleet
had conquered against nominal odds as great as, or even
greater than, those which now told in favour of the
Italians.

But to the general public, or even to the government
of Italy, nothing of this was known. It was known that
the Austrian ships were paltry ; it was, perhaps, supposed
that they were worse than they really were. It was
known that 800 millions of lire (12,000,000/.) had been
spent on the Italian fleet within the last five years, and
it was taken for granted that good value had been got
for the money, as indeed it had. But beyond this public
knowledge did not go; and neither the government nor
the people doubted for a moment that Persano was master
of the situation. ‘The Adriatic,’ wrote Depretis, the
minister for the navy, ‘ is an Italian sea, and the Austrian
flag must disappear from it. Do as you think best, but
this end must be attained.’ In every café in Venice, in
Milan, throughout the north of Italy, this end was spoken
of as certain. Young Italy was as ready to discuss naval
170 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

as political affairs, and knew as little about one as about
the other.

As soon as war was declared, on 20 June, Tegetthoff
had despatched the Stadium, the Austrian Lloyd’s
steamer, to find out exactly where the Italian fleet was,
and what its force. The Stadium reported, on the
28rd, that as far south as Bari it was not to be seen.
The admiral jumped to the conclusion that it would be
coming round from Taranto, probably in scattered order,
possibly in small detachments, and at once resolved to
go with what force he had and look for it. With six
ironclads, the Schwarzenberg, and four gun-vessels, he
left Fasana on 24 June; at daybreak of the 27th he was
off Ancona. The main body of the Italian fleet had
arrived there two days before. They mustered eleven
ironclads, four large frigates, and sundry smaller vessels,
a force certainly more than double that of the Austrians.
But they were coaling in a promiscuous and disorderly
manner. The Ré d’Italia’s coal had caught fire in the
bunkers; the Ré di Portogallo had got water in her
cylinders; almost every ship had some defect due to
carelessness, stupidity, or ignorance, and none was ready
to go out and attack the enemy. When at last some of
them did get under way, they pottered about, performing
silly or pedantic evolutions in the entrance of the harbour,
while Tegetthoff, having seen all that he wanted to see,
and having encouraged his men by the sight of a timid
or disorganised enemy, went quietly back to Fasana.
Some rumours, much to Persano’s discredit, were not
slow to arise, but they do not seem to have then taken
any definite form. The minister urged him to do some-
thing—anything you will, provided you cause the Austrian
TEGETTHOFF. 171

flag to disappear from the Adriatic. Persano replied,
making difficulties: the Austrians would not meet him ;
Pola was impregnable; his ships were not properly
equipped ; his men were undisciplined ; his officers were
incompetent.

The Count Carlo di Persano and the Honourable
John Byng, few men have been more unlike each other.
Persano was gentle, amiable, social, and personally brave ;
Byng was a small-minded martinet, haughty and re-
served. But Persano’s correspondence has a curious
resemblance to Byng’s; it shows the same querulous in-
capacity, the same desire to have things done by others,
the same unwillingness to do anything for himself.
Byng’s letters have long been before the world: if I
quote one or two disjointed sentences it is only by way of
emphasis :—

I am firmly of opinion . . . that the throwing men into
the castle will only . . . add to the numbers that must fall
into the enemy’s hands, for the garrison, in time, will be
obliged to surrender.

I am afraid all communication will be cut off between
us; ... for ¢f the enemy have erected batteries . . . it will
render it impossible for our boats to have a passage.

Many of the ships that came out with me are foul. I fear
from the inconvenience we shall meet here there will be great
difficulty in keeping the ships clean, as there is but one wharf
for them to prepare and careen at.

And now for Persano :—

Tt is my dnty to submit to your Excellency that the ships
which join the fleet from day to day are incompletely manned,
especially in regard to their petty officers; and—which is of
more consequence—are without trained gunners, who are
now more than ever necessary, on account of the greater
172 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

number of rifled guns, which require long and careful drill.
And this when hostilities are every moment expected to begin!
This awakens very serious thoughts.
The fleet is not ready for war.

It will take at least a month to bring it to a tolerable
pitch.
Help me, I earnestly entreat you.

Finally, on 8 July, Persano was induced to put to
sea. He went for a five days’ cruise, but kept carefully
out of sight of land. It had been rumoured that the
fleet was to range the Istrian coast, and confront Tegett-
hoff at Fasana or Pola. It did nothing of the kind; it
stood to the south-east, and in mid-channel sailed back-
wards and forwards in open order, the ships keeping
1,000 yards apart from each other, and exercising none
of the manceuvres of battle. They were better hidden,
it was said, in the middle of the Adriatic than were the
Austrians at Pola. Boggio, a member of the Chamber
of Deputies, had embarked on board the Ré d'Italia, as
Persano’s guest, and seems to have understood that
he was to pay for his entertainment by indiscriminate
praise. ‘How cowardly are these Austrians!’ he said,
‘they will not give us a chance; they fly before us.’
But the Marquis Paolucci, Albini’s flag-captain, to whom
the remark was addressed, replied: ‘It is not the
Austrians who should be’ called cowardly, it is we who
have been hnmiliated,’ and Albini had previously per-
mitted himself to say in Paolucci’s hearing, ‘ This is not
the way to make war! We have lost an opportunity
which may never return.’

The feeling against Persano was general, and he was
urged to go out.
TEGETTHOFF. 173

‘ Would you tell the people,’ wrote Depretis, ‘the people
who are vain enough to believe our sailors the best in the
world, that after spending three hundred millions, we have
done nothing better than get together a squadron which dare
not meet the Austrian? Why, they'd stone us! As if the
mere name of the Austrian navy has not always been a sub-
ject of ridicule. If Tegetthoff declines to meet us, we will
effect a landing somewhere on the coast; at Lissa, for
instance. Lissa, by its central position, would ensure us the
sovereignty of the Adriatic; let us take Lissa.

There seems to have been no positive order to attack
Lissa, only to do something; but Lissa had been sug-
gested, and Persano had not sufficient force of character
or originality of judgment to disapprove of it, or to sug-
gest any distinct alternative. He would have preferred
remaining at Ancona, brilliant in a gold coat trimmed
with blue cloth, but that he was not allowed to do. And
so, on the afternoon of 16 July, in a state of hurry and
flurry, he put to sea, having neither detailed charts, nor
plans, nor information as to the defences of Lissa ; with-
out even the soldiers that had been offered him as a force
for landing.

But why Lissa? In England, Lissa, if known at all,
was known only as the head-quarters of our Adriatic
cruisers in the old French war, and as giving a name
to the brilliant little action (12 March, 1811) in which
Captain Hoste, with his squadron of three frigates and a
corvette, not only defeated the Franco- Venetian squadron
of six frigates, a brig, and four small craft, a force more
than double his own, but drove the French commodore’s
ship irrecoverably on shore, captured two others, and
compelled a third, which afterwards escaped, to strike
her flag.
174 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Lissa is an island, or rather a mass of hill and
mountain, eleven miles long from east to west, and six
broad from north to south, rising in some of its peaks to
a height of nearly 2,000 feet. Its principal productions,
according to the gazetteer, are wine, oil, almonds, and
figs; bees, sheep, and goats are reared in great numbers
by its inhabitants; and near its coasts are rich sardine
fisheries. But neither figs nor sardines formed its value
in Italian eyes. The English had fortified the principal
harbour, the Bay of San Giorgio, and on its recurring
to the Austrians the fortifications had been preserved and
added to. In time of war it evidently might, from its
position and security, become a place of the utmost im-
portance. Besides San Giorgo, in the north-east corner
of the island, there are two minor harbours, Comisa at
the extreme west, and Manego at the south-east corner,
the fortifications of which, though small, were situated
on high ground, so as to be secure against any mere
naval attack: they might very well have been left to
surrender when the forts of San Giorgio had been
carried.

Persano, however, thought differently. The fleet
arrived in the neighbourhood of the island on the night
of the 17th; by dawn of the 18th it was off San Giorgio.
Albini with the wooden ships was to attack Manego;
Vacca with three of the ironclads was to shell Comisa;
Persano with the main body was to operate against San
Giorgio. By eleven o’clock, fire was opened on Comisa.
It was quite futile. The forts were perched on the hills
at heights of 500 feet, which to Vacca seemed more than
twice as much. After an hour or two he gave up the
attempt, and joined Albini off Manego. The forts there
TEGETTHOFF. 175

were judged to be even higher than at Comisa, and
as the big Dahlgren gun which one of the frigates
carried on her forecastle could not reach up to them,
no other shots were fired. Towards evening, the two
divisions went round and rejoined the admiral off San
Giorgio.

There the action had been lively. The forts at the
entrance of the harbour had been blown up by shells
bursting in their magazines; and the main fort, Madonna,
which raked the harbour, had been silenced several
times ; but the Austrians stuck manfully to their guns,
and each time renewed their defence. The Ré d'Italia
alone fired 1,800 shot. Boggio enjoyed his holiday on the
poop, and wrote the next day to his friend Depretis : ‘ The
noise was infernal. Your humble correspondent remained
on the poop from eleven o’clock to half-past six, exposed
to a storm of shell.’ After which he was good enough
to send a certificate of the admiral’s conduct. ‘ Persano
is most unjustly accused ; he deserves the perfect con-
fidence of the government and the country. The heavy
responsibility may have rendered him unduly careful ;
but now that the time of action has arrived, what a dif-
ference is there between him and others!’ Nevertheless,
when evening closed in, no decisive advantage had been
gained, nor did it seem probable that, without troops,
any could be gained. And time was scant; for the
obvious precaution of cutting the telegraph wire had not
been adopted till the fleet had been seen and reported
from the island to Pola—not indeed till the engagement
had actually commenced, and the record of a return
message from Tegetthoff had been found: ‘ Hold out till
the fleet can come to you.’
176 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

The following day the Affondatore and two wooden
frigates joined from Ancona, bringing a strong detach-
ment of soldiers. This put Persano in a position to
land 2,200 men, and he determined to persevere. The
Terribile and Varese were again sent to occupy the
attention of Comisa. The Formidabile and Affonda-
tore were to go into the harbour and engage Fort
Madonna: Vacca in the Principe di Carignano was to
support them. For this, Vacca found there was no
room. The Formidabile, leading in, took up a position
in front of the fort; the Affondatore was held in play
by some flanking works which did her no more damage
than she did them; but the Formidabile had a hot
time, and after an hour she had had enough of it, and
drew off. She had three or four men killed and about
sixty wounded; her rigging, boats, bulwarks and every-
thing not covered by the armour were cut to pieces, her
funnel shot away, and six of her port-lids ; ' and though
neither shot nor shell had penetrated her armour, a
shell bursting on the sill of one of the ports had killed
two and wounded ten men at the gun, and filled the
battery with such a dense smoke that the guns’ crews
were nearly stifled. The attack for that day had failed ;
the only result of it had been to get the Formidabile
knocked to bits. It was resolved, therefore, to try on
the morrow what the landing party could do. And this
resolution Persano stuck to, notwithstanding Tegetthoff’s
intercepted telegram : ‘ Hold out till the fleet can come
to you.’ He seems to have been positively unable to
entertain or to weigh two ideas; the one, to capture San

1 The port-lids are the solid shutters that close the ports ; the idea
conveyed in the term would seem to be analogous to that in eye-lids.
TEGETTHOFF, 177

Giorgio, had filled his mind; the other, the probable
advent of Tegetthoff, could find no place.

Accordingly, the next morning preparations were
made for landing. The Terribile and Varese were
to renew the attempt on Comisa. Albini, from the
wooden ships, was to land the troops and small-arm
men. The ironclads were to engage the forts. No
intimation was given to the captains of the ships, nor
even to the vice and rear admirals, that the enemy’s
fleet might be expected. Vacca alone had heard of the
telegram; and that only by reason of the accident of
his having had direct communication with the flagship.
When, about eight o’clock in the morning (20 July, 1866),
the Esploratore, a despatch vessel, came in from her
look-out station, with the signal flying, ‘Enemy in
sight,’ it was to the whole fleet as startling as a thunder
clap. Albini, with his division, had the boats out and
full of military stores, waiting for the signal to land.
The signal was, instead, to hold on, and a few minutes
later, ‘Enemy in sight—prepare for action.’ It was the
first intimation he had that there was a near chance
of the enemy’s fleet coming. Neither on the previous
evening, nor at any other time, had there been any con-
sultation, or any explanation of the admiral’s wishes or
intentions. The order had indeed been given that, as
Albini had been placed by the minister in more im-
mediate command of the wooden or reserve squadron,
Vacca was to command the van or right wing, and
Ribotty, the captain of the Ré di Portogallo, to com-
mand the rear or left wing, according as the fleet was
in line ahead or abreast. But nothing more. Vacca’s
words, as afterwards given in evidence before the court,

N
178 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

are: ‘No council was calléd, nor was the plan of battle
discussed, as the regulations direct. I was unable to
form any idea of what the commander-in-chief meant.
to do.’

To interpret the thought of another man is difficult.
In this case I do not believe that there was a thought to.
interpret. Persano had formed no plan. He had either

‘not permitted himself to think of the possibility of Tegett-
hoff’s approach, or he had trusted to that inborn genius
which I often hear spoken of. When the hour of trial
came, the admiral was more utterly unprepared than any
of his subordinates. Tegetthoff was advancing from about
north-west. The Italian ironclad squadron, or so much
of it as was available, was hastily formed in line abreast,
and steered towards him. But the Terribile and
Varese were at the other end of the island, some ten
or twelve miles off, and the Formidabile was so shat-
tered that she made the signal for permission to part
company, and lay to, repairing damages. Her captain,
Saint-Bon—who had joined only just as she left Ancona,
and did not know his officers even by name—afterwards
deposed that her ports were so low, so near the water,
that it was impossible for him to prepare for action in
such a swell as was then on; so many of his port-lids
had been shot away that he must have been swamped.
He hoped to have rejoined the fleet within a few hours,
but, contrary to all expectation, the fight was over before
he was ready.

After standing towards the enemy for a short half-
hour, some hazy recollection of last century’s wars
seems to have flitted across Persano’s mind: he made
the signal to form line of battle towards the north-east,
TEGETTHOFF, 179

that is, nearly at right angles to the course on which the
Austrians were advancing. He expected—or at least
said so afterwards—-that Albini, with the wooden fri-
gates, would form a second line on his starboard, or
right-hand side, leaving the picking up of the boats and
soldiers to the small craft. But Albini had no orders,
and, failing these, fell back on a sort of general under-
standing that wooden ships were not needlessly to engage
ironclads. He accordingly stayed well to the rear, and,
as far as the fight which followed was concerned, might
‘as well—or better—have been at Ancona.

And meantime Tegetthoff was advancing at full
speed ; his seven ironclad ships, in a double oblique line
in front, the Erzherzog Ferdinand Maximilian leading,
the salient point of this wedge of war. L:hind, at a
distance of 1,000 yards, were the seven wooden ships, in
a similar formation, the Kaiser leading in the wake of
the Ferdinand Max, the 50-gun frigates Novara and
Schwarzenberg covering the right and left wings; and
another 1,000 yards farther astern were the gun-vessels,
also in double échelon; behind all, the despatch vessels
and miscellaneous small craft. But Tegetthoff’s plans
had been arranged long beforehand, and as he advanced
the only signals he had to make were: ‘ Clear for action’
—‘Close up ’—‘ Full speed;’ and lastly, at 10h. 35m.,
‘Tronclads are to rush against the enemy and sink
him.’ !

The charge of the Austrian squadron must be de-
scribed as brilliant; it was made in good order and with

1 The wording of this signal, which may be considered as Tegetthoff’s
tactical legacy, was, ‘Panzerschiffe den Feind anrennen und zum sinken
bringen.’

N2
180 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

an admirable unanimity and steadiness; but the speed
of it has, nevertheless, been very incorrectly stated. It
seems quite certain that none of the ships in the Austrian
fleet could steam at a rate exceeding ten knots, if so
much. I believe that the speed of the charge was not
more than eight knots; but probably enough it seemed
more, and especially to the thunderstruck Italians.

And now, as the crash was imminent, Persano carried
out the idea of changing his ship. His flag was flying
at the main of the Ré d'Italia. He signalled the
Affondatore to close. The Ré d'Italia was stopped for
quite ten minutes, and the admiral with his personal
staff, but leaving behind his guest and adulator, Boggio,
went on board the turret-ship. The two or three ships
immediately astern, which, owing to the unexpected
stoppage of the Ré d'Italia, had probably ranged up
abreast of her, saw what was going on, but no one else
did. The van had held on its course, and, at a distance.
of nearly a mile, only saw that a boat passed; and since
the ships were all dressed with flags, an ensign at every
masthead and everywhere else where an ensign could
be hoisted, the admiral’s flag—which differs but little
from an ensign—could not be distinguished. In their
subsequent examination, Vacca and Albini stated posi-
tively that they had no idea that any such change
had been made; they both looked to the Ré d'Italia for
signals and saw none. The Affondatore’s masts were
mere sticks, quite unsuitable for signalling; and in the
crowd of flags, any signals she made were little likely
to attract notice, and did not attract it. If signals
were made, no one saw them, and the battle fought
itself.
TEGETTHOFF. 181

About a quarter of an hour after the Ré d’Italia
had resumed her way, the front line of the Austrians—
the ironclads—in a compact mass passed through the
Italian line, or rather through the gap which the Ré
d'Italia had opened. As they approached, Vacca opened
fire at a distance stated by the Austrians as 1,000 or
1,200 yards, but which the Italians call 200; the dis-
' crepancy may perhaps be reconciled by supposing that
some straggling shots were fired at long range, but none
by Vacca’s orders until the ships were close to. It is
at least agreed that the Austrians did not fire till they
were within 200 yards. Then they did; and in the
cloud of smoke in which their own fire enveloped them,
passed harmlessly through the gap. Captain Colomb
suggests that the Ré d'Italia may have eased to let
them so pass through; but there is no evidence of this,
and the gap was already there, owing to the previous
stoppage. .

As the Austrians advanced, Vacca, with the three
leading ships, bore to the left and enfiladed their line ;
then, also, the line of wooden frigates, and, circling
round, came into the rear of all, with the intention of
destroying some, at least, of the small craft in the third
division. But Commodore Petz in the Kaiser, and
with the wooden ships, was meanwhile edging away
towards the south, to attack the wooden division of the
Italian fleet. On his part, Ribotty had turned to the
left, and was steering with his three ships—the Varese
had just rejoined—to interpose between Petz and Tegett-
hoff, so as to let Albini have the undisturbed enjoyment
of his share of the fray; but Albini made no move to
take advantage of this, and Petz, seeing the Ré di Por-
182 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

togallo and the other two ships heading towards him,
turned to meet them.

On the way he encountered the Affondatore; the
two ships were running right against each other, bows
on; a collision seemed unavoidable, but the Affonda-
tore turned off and passed away. The Kaiser then
engaged the Ré di Portogallo, firing concentrated broad-
sides. Between two such ships, the Kaiser, an old-
fashioned line-of-battle ship, and the Ré di Portogallo,
an ironclad of 5,700 tons, carrying amongst her thirty-
six guns, all rifled, two 300-pounder Armstrongs, the
word combat ought to be inapplicable. That the Kaiser
ever came out of it, speaks, more positively than any
detailed evidence, of the inefficiency of the Italians.
What happened was this. The Kaiser, finding that her
guns produced no impression on the ironclad’s sides,
resolved to ram her and did so. The shock carried
away her own stem and bowsprit; her figure-head re-
mained on the Ré di Portogallo’s quarter-deck; her
foremast also went, sweeping away the funnel in its fall;
flames and smoke smothered the upper deck, and the
ship, grinding alongside the ironclad, received her broad-
side at this very close range. That she was not de-
stroyed seems almost to confirm the report, that the
Italian gunners in their flurry fired blank cartridges.

Still firing, the Kaiser passed on, and on her way
was again met by the Affondatore. This ship was
fitted specially as a ram. She had a spur thirty feet
long—a touch would have been fatal. She was coming
straight on. Her quarry was before her, nearly square ;
a slight turn towards the left would have made its
destruction certain. Her commander gave the order for
TEGETTHOFF. 183

the men to throw themselves flat on their faces, ‘Pancia
a terra /’ when to his surprise, to the surprise of every-
body who could see, her helm was put hard over, and
she turned away to the right, receiving at a very close
range the Kaiser’s concentrated broadside on her thinly
armoured deck. The true reason of the Affondatore’s
conduct will for ever remain doubtful. It is certain
that the order to turn to the right was given, and
given with repeated emphasis, by Persano himself; but
whether his doing so was a simple, well-meaning error
of judgment, whether he was afraid of the effect of the
shock on the exaggerated spur, or whether his humanity
revolted from the idea of putting nine hundred Austrians
into the water, cannot possibly be decided.

But the Kaiser, closely followed by the Novara
and the others, passed through the rear of the Italian
line, interchanging a heavy fire with the ships of that
division—the Ré di Portogallo, Maria Pia, and Varese.
The loss fell almost entirely on the Kaiser and Novara.
The Kaiser,in addition to the loss of her masts and fun-
nel, had 24 men killed, and 75, amongst whom was the
commodore, wounded. The Novara had 7, including her
captain, killed, and 20 wounded. The rest of the division
had in all but 3 killed and 9 wounded. But the Kaiser
was disabled; her engineer reported that he could not
keep up steam ; and she made her way with difficulty,
though unopposed, into St. Giorgio.

- The crisis of the fight was, however, farther north,
amongst the ironclads. The three leading ships, forming
Vacca’s division, had encircled the rear of the Austrian
small craft, but too slowly to enclose them or even to
do them any harm. The three sternmost ships under
TEGETTHOFF. 187

captain of it. As our rudder had been rendered almost un-
serviceable by the enemy’s fire, he gave the order, ‘ Full speed
astern!’ but it was too late to prevent the enemy striking us
just abreast the foremast. The ship did not feel any such
shock as one would think the necessary consequence of the
blow, but heeled over to port, very gradually, and sank.’

With the Ré d’Italia sunk, and the Palestro at a
distance trying to extinguish the flames, the action in
the centre was at an end. The two fleets collected
themselves, but in a changed position. The Austrians
were now in-shore and covering Lissa. The Italians
had been pushed out to seaward; the Palestro blew up
about two o’clock; and, thoroughly cowed by the loss
they had sustained, they were in no humour to attempt
to regain their position. The Austrians, on the other
hand, had accomplished their purpose, and there was no
reason why they should hazard their advantage by a
fresh attack on a force still numerically superior. They
waited for a couple of hours, and seeing no intention on
the part of the enemy to renew the engagement, they went
into St. Giorgio; the gun-vessels first, then the wooden
frigates, the ironclads following; the Ferdinand Max,
the last of all, let go her anchor about sundown.

Such in its broad facts was the battle of Lissa, con-
cerning which, as I have already said, some curiously
wrong ideas have got into circulation. These are as-
suredly not worth looking for and contradicting one by
one; but perhaps the most common of them is, that an
Austrian wooden line-of-battle ship rammed and sank an
Italian ironclad, and from that the inference is drawn
that a wooden ship can encounter an ironclad on fairly
equal terms. As giving rise to and supporting such an
188 STUDIES.IN NAVAL HISTORY.

inference the mistake is therefore important. So far as
it is possible to trace its origin, I think it arose from a
confusion between the Ferdinand Max and the Kaiser
Max, and the Kaiser, three totally distinct ships; the
two first were ironclads, the third a 90-gun ship. What
the Ferdinand Max and the Kaiser severally did, I have
already told at length; but as opposed to the popular
misrepresentation, I will say, in so many words: The
ship which rammed and sank the Italian ironclad was
herself an ironclad of nearly the same size; and the line-
of battle ship, which rammed an ironclad, injured herself
very much and her enemy very little. That of the whole
Austrian loss of 88 killed, 85 were on board the wooden
ships, and 24 of them on board the Kaiser alone, shows
how little the efficiency of the two classes of ships can
be compared. Asto other absurd stories that have been
circulated, it would be trouble thrown away to repeat
them or to contradict them.

As is very well known, the Italians were excessively
disgusted with the result of the action, so different from
what they had flattered themselves it would be. Persano
was loudly accused of gross misconduct—of cowardice—
of treason—of everything that was vile; and that so
persistently, that after some delay it was determined to
bring him totrial. But he was a Senator—a peer of the
realm, so to speak—and could not, according to the con-
stitution, be tried by a court-martial. The whole Senate
was therefore formed into a High Court of Justice. The
trial lasted for several months: a vast number of wit-
nesses were examined ; and their evidence, joined to the
detailed Austrian accounts, leaves us little to wish for so
far as knowledge of the facts is concerned; a knowledge
TEGETTHOFF. 189

of motives can never perhaps be satisfactorily ascer-
tained.!

The court, which on 29 January, 1867, acquitted the
admiral on the more serious charges of cowardice and
treason, on 15 April found him guilty of negligence and
incapacity (negligenza e imperizia). On 27 June he had
manifestly disobeyed his instructions, which were to clear
the Adriatic of the enemy’s ships; on the cruise from
8 to 183 July he had equally violated his instructions by
not seeking an opportunity to attack the enemy, or to
blockade him in his harbours; and finally at Lissa he
had let himself be surprised by the enemy, he had made
no disposition for battle, had called no council of war,
had gone without general intimation on board the Affon-
datore, had permitted the enemy to break his line, had
managed the Affondatore badly, and had left the battle
to itself; and the court therefore sentenced him to be
deprived of his rank as admiral, to be dismissed the
service, and to pay the costs of the trial.

' Rendiconti delle udienze pubbliche dell’ Alta Corte di Giustizia
nel dibattimento della causa contro l’Ammiraglio Senatore Conte Carlo
Pellion di Persano, preceduti dalla relazione della Commissione d’Is-
truttoria (Firenze, 1867). The fullest Austrian account is in Oesterreichs
Kémpfe im Jahre 1866; Nach Feldacten bearbeitet durch das k. k.
Generalstabs. Bureau fiir Kriegs-Geschichte (Wien, 1869), vol. v. As
Tegetthoff was, in 1869, at the War Office, I think it is probable that he
revised this history of the naval campaign, and the sketch of his own
life which accompanies it. The account given in the Archiv fiir Seewesen
for 1866 must also be considered semi-official; but is much shorter, and,
by so much, less perfect. There are, of course, many other Austrian
and Italian accounts. Persano’s own version of the story is L’ Ammt-
raglio C. di Persano nella campagna navale dell’ anno 1866. Confuta-
zioni, schiarimenti e documenti (Torino, 1873). The French accounts,
as given in the Revue Maritime, vols. xviii. and xix., may also be referred
to; and the very interesting narrative that appeared in the Revue des
Deux Mondes (15 Nov., 1866), and which, rightly or wrongly, has always
been attributed to the Prince de Joinville.
‘190 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

There has been in England a tendency to believe that
Persano was a victim, sacrificed to the Italians’ wounded
self-love: for myself, after a careful study of the minutes
of the trial, I would accept the decision as just, and even
lenient. It is, of course, impossible to offer at length
the grounds for this opinion; they fill a closely printed
quarto of nearly 300 pages. But in a few words, nothing
would more strongly support it than the opening sen-
tences of Persano’s own address in reply to the charge.
He might almost have been condemned out of his own
mouth.

‘T cannot understand (he began) how I should be accused
of having failed in my duty against the enemy’s fleet, which
came upon us almost before it was signalled, and whilst we
were in considerable embarrassment from the fact that our
ships had lately come in from a long voyage and were short
of stores.’

He then enumerated a number of defects, some of
which had been repaired a month before, and went on:

“So that of the eleven ironclads there were not more than
four fit for a long chase. The other seven were, at best, only
fit to take part in a battle, but could not be relied on for a
chase; and the more so as most of them wanted the guns and
ammunition necessary for fighting with ironclads.

‘If Tegetthoff had come really with a wish to fight, he
would not have withdrawn as soon as we were ready to meet and
attack him. I could not, of course, suppose that he had come
merely to go away again; and it was therefore my duty, in
‘the first place, to form the fleet so as not to expose it to need-
less risk; and then to oppose and attack the enemy. But
instead of that, he went off after a short time, two or three
hours perhaps, much to our regret, and notwithstanding the
dashing conduct of our ships’ companies.’
TEGETTHOFF, 191

Of which, a great part is not true; a great part is
irrelevant ; a great part is self-condemnatory ; and all is
extremely silly. It is impossible to think or speak with
respect of a man who at such a critical period, when
honour, perhaps life, was at stake, could give voice to
such imbecile maunderings; and so, in the words of the
old sagas, he is now out of the story.

Tegetthoff’s reception from his country was, as might
be expected, very different. It is believed that the result
of the battle had a very distinct influence on the terms
of the peace which was concluded shortly afterwards,
and was the direct means of preserving to Austria the
Dalmatian and Illyrian provinces. It may well be that
this was so; undoubtedly, had Lissa fallen, Austria
would have stood in a very different position with regard
to the Adriatic. But coming in a time of great depres-
sion and calamity, the moral effect of the victory was
greater than any mere material advantage, and the
nation and the government hastened to show honour to
their champion. The news was sent to Vienna by tele-
graph; and by telegraph on the very next day Tegetthoff
received a message from the emperor promoting him to
be a vice-admiral. Decorations were showered on him;
but perhaps of all these, the one most grateful to him
was that sent by the Emperor of Mexico in an autograph
letter, dated Chapultepec, 24 August, 1866, which ran
thus :

My pear REeAR-ADMIRAL BARON von TEGETTHOFF,—The
glorious victory which you have gained over a brave enemy,
vastly superior in numbers and nurtured in grand old naval
traditions, has filled my heart with unmixed joy. When I
handed over to others the care of the navy which had become
192 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

so dear to me, and relinquished the task of making the land
of my birth great and mighty by sea, amid the clash of con-
tending nations, I looked hopefully to you and the young
generation of officers and men whom I had been proud to see
growing up and striving in a noble emulation under my com-
mand. I felt deeply thankful at being able to leave to Adria
so many ships—a body of which such an able staff of officers
and such brave sailors constituted the soul. Although Pro-
vidence has led me into another track, my heart still burns
with the fire of naval glory; and bright and joyful for me
was the day when the heroic fleet to which I had dedicated
my youth, under your heroic leadership, wrote down, with a
blood-red pen, 20 July, 1866, on the pages of naval history.
For with the victory of Lissa your fleet becomes enrolled
amongst those whose flag is the symbol of glory, and your
name is added to the list of the naval heroes of all time. To
you, the officers, and the ships’ companies, I send my heart-
felt good wishes; and you, as a remembrance of your admiral
and friend, and as a proof of my admiration, I invest with the
Grand Cross of my Guadalupe Order.
Maxim Inian.

After the end of the war, Vice-Admiral Tegetthoff
travelled for a few months in France, England, and the
United States. His visit could scarcely be called private,
though in name, at least, unofficial; but he had never-
theless the direct object of seeing the great naval arsenals
of those countries, and studying their organisation. He
had returned from America, and was on his way to Paris,
the seat, then in 1867, of a ‘ Great Exhibition,’ when he
was recalled by telegraph to Vienna. There he received
the honourable though melancholy commission to go to
Mexico, to reclaim from the government (if it may be so
called) and bring home the body of the late Emperor
Maximilian, This duty was performed, though not
TEGETTHOFF, 193

without difficulty and delay raised by the government and
Juarez : the body was recovered and brought to Vienna,
where it now lies in the imperial vault. So great
throughout Germany was the interest felt in this deep
Mexican tragedy, and—notwithstanding the recent de-
velopment of the North German and Austrian navies—
so little familiarity is there with nautical matters, that
I am barely overstating the case if I say that to the
majority of even educated Germans, Tegetthoff is not so
much the victor of Lissa, as the bringer home of Maxi-
milian’s body.

But his career was drawing to a close. In March,
1868, he was appointed head of the naval section of the
War Office, and commander-in-chief of the navy, and
this he held till his death, which took place, after a short
illness, on 7 April, 1871; in the words of the semi-official
notice—‘ zu frih fiir Oesterreich.’

The portraits of Tegetthoff that I have seen represent
a hard Scotch type of face. I do not know how far they
are to be trusted, but they are not out of keeping with
his recorded character. Ue is described as a man of few
words, emphatically a man of action, one able to execute
his meaning, but not always able to tell it; at the same
time ready to speak out, and sharply too, if occasion
called for it or the good of the service required it. But,
as has happened to other naval officers, there were
moments when he was tempted by feelings of disgust or
dissatisfaction ; and once, at least, he had made up his
mind to retire into private life. That he was persuaded
to remain for the glory and welfare of his country, is
perhaps not the least of the benefits which the Austrian
navy received from the unfortunate Maximilian.

0
194 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

CHAPTER VI.
PRIVATEERS AND PRIVATEERING.

I. FORTUNATUS WRIGHT.

Since the Congress of Paris, in 1856, declared that
‘ privateering is, and remains abolished,’ the expediency
of England’s assent to this, from a national as well as
from an international point of view, has been often. dis-
cussed. On the one side it has been alleged that such
assent is a wanton sacrifice of one of our most powerful
weapons; that in consequence of it we should now enter
on a naval war with, so to speak, our right hand tied
behind our back. On the other, it has been urged that
privateering is prejudicial to our commercial interests,
would tell more against us than for us, would destroy
our carrying trade, would cause our ships to transfer
their allegiance to other flags, is repugnant to the ad-
vanced civilisation of the age, and converts war against
nations into piracy against individuals. The case as it
stands gives room for a very pretty quarrel, and will
probably so continue until the sharp experience of war
solves the question one way or another; nor do I think
it is difficult to foresee what that way will be. It is
scarcely to be doubted that, when we are engaged in a

) Fraser’s Magazine, October, 1881.
FORTUNATUS WHIGHT. 195

European war, our enemy will endeavour to attack us,
to injure us, by ‘cruisers,’ such as a few years ago
Russia openly proclaimed her intention of fitting out;
and the defensive measures adopted by our own admiralty,
the instructions under which merchant steamers are
built and surveyed, leave as little room to doubt that we
should at least follow suit. But between such cruisers
and the privateers of old there would be little effective
difference. The command might be vested in regularly
commissioned officers, but it would be equally the duty
of these to plunder and destroy rather than to fight. The
work done would be very much the same as that which
was done formerly by private men-of-war; though the
cruisers would have a higher responsibility, would be
more under control, and would add enormously to the
cost of the war. They would have to be paid for doing
what the old privateers paid for permission to do.
Whether the system of waging maritime war against
an enemy’s commerce is altogether advantageous is
another point on which much argument has been ex-
pended. That it may cripple the enemy’s resources is
obvious ; but the advantage does not necessarily lie all
on one side, and it may occasion serious injury to our
own. In former days the treasure ships belonged to the
enemy until they became ours by capture ; in the present
age the treasure and the ships that carry it are English,
and it is difficult to picture the consternation in the City
on hearing of the loss of some steamer bringing home-
ward a rich freight of diamonds from the Cape or of gold
from Australia. But as we clung steadfastly to the right
of making prize of the Spanish plate-ships, it is not to
be expected that any enemy which fate may now send
0 2
196 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

us will waive his claim to the English steamers, if only
he has the power to assert it, and against that it behoves
us to be on our guard. It seems, however, probable that,
under the existing rules of the Declaration of Paris, but
few large prizes will be made, such as founded many a
fortune in the last or earlier centuries, when international
scruples did not exist, and naval opinion was absolutely
single as to the advisability and even necessity of making
captures and sharing them out amongst the captors.
This opinion, rooted in the ‘custom’ of the sea, was as
old as the English nation, and had descended from the
days of Hengist and Horsa, of Harry Page—the Arripay
of the French chroniclers—of Drake, or Frobiser, or
Lancaster, down to the times when Commodore Wager
took the great galeon, or Anson gutted the Acapulco ship.

The stories of such times seem to the seaman of to-
day like the fairy tales of childhood, too good to be true;
but from a strictly naval point of view they have their
dark side, and it is very certain that, of the quarrels
between senior officers which so often disgraced our
service, a great number were due, directly or indirectly,
to the natural but unchivalrous desire of making money.
The feud between Rodncy and Arbuthnot, on the coast
of North America, in 1780, was one of these. The
friendly relations between Lord St. Vincent and Nelson,
which led to such glorious results, were interrupted by a
lawsuit on their rival claims for prize-money; and the
ill-feeling which Nelson and Sir John .Orde entertained
for each other was at least strengthened by pecuniary
considerations.! Lord Howe’s conduct on the ‘ First of

1 See Nicolas’s Nelson Despatches, vol. vi. pp. 207, 319, &c.
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 197

June’ was angrily criticised by many, as though he
might have rendered the victory still more decisive had
he not been over-anxious about the security of the prizes:
Sir John Jervis was similarly spoken of after the battle
of St. Vincent; and after the battle of the Nile, the
burning several of the prizes, whose preservation would
have taxed the efficiency of the fleet, appeared to Nelson
a measure of very grave responsibility, as defrauding the
men under his command of moneys to which they were
justly entitled! The bitterness which frequently arose
out of considerations of prize-money was undoubtedly
increased by the disproportionate share of the senior
officers. Of the prizes just referred to as burnt at the
Nile, Nelson estimated the share of the commander-in-
chief as 8,7501., of a captain as 1,0001.; but of a lieu-
tenant as 751., and of a seaman as 21. 4s. 1d. In face of
such figures it is all very well to talk of prize-money as
encouraging seamen to do their duty, but its principal
use was to offer great chances to the senior officers, and
its real evil was the promoting jealousy and ill-will
between the flag-officers, and even the captains. This,
however, naval officers would have been slow to acknow-
ledge.

But whilst blind to the evil that not unfrequently
resulted from the distribution of prize-money amongst.
ships of war, every officer had a keen, perhaps an exag-
gerated sense of the evil effects of privateering. On this
point there was a unanimity so marked as to lead to a
suspicion that sometimes atleast it arose out of a grudge
that private ships should carry off rich prizes which

1 Nelson Despatches, vol. iii. p. 115.
198 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

might otherwise have fallen to the king’s cruisers.
Privateers were of course men whose main idea in
coming afloat was to make the war profitable to them-
selves and their owners; they had not the same respon-
sibility as the captains of ships of war, and they were
practically independent even of the commander-in-chief
of the station, to whom, therefore, they were at once
a source of annoyance and pecuniary loss. Vernon’s
opinion of them in 1740 was that they were little better
than pirates. He wrote to the governor of the French
Leeward Islands, who had complained of their conduct :
‘Your Excellency well knows that the granting commis-
sions to privateers is no part of my province, nor are
they immediately under my control. I know too well what
lawless libertines they are, in all nations, and heartily
wish no nation countenanced them. And I believe your
Excellency may have heard of my inclination for bring-
ing them to answer for any of their base or treacherous
proceedings, which, as far as lays in my way, I shall
always give a helping hand to.’! And, sixty years later,
Nelson’s opinion was no whit more favourable. ‘I have
exceedingly to lament,’ he wrote from the Mediterranean
in 1804, ‘ that conduct so disgraceful to the character of
the British nation is practised by the Gibraltar privateers
in these seas every day, as complaints are constantly
laid before me, from the government of Sardinia, of their
nefarious conduct, which I have transmitted to the
governor of Gibraltar for his interference, as naval com-
manders have no authority whatever over those pirates.’
And again: ‘The conduct of all privateers is, as far as I

' Home Cifice Records (Admiralty), No. 77; 12 Sept. 1740.
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 199

have seen, so near piracy that I only wonder any civilised
nation can allow them.’ !

When, therefore, it is urged, as is frequently done,
that the Declaration of Paris ought to be cancelled, it is
well that those who so urge should be reminded that, in
the old days of privateering, whilst Liverpool or Bristol
was rapidly growing rich at the expense of his Majesty’s
enemies, as Dartmouth or Poole had done centuries
before, every naval officer, and more especially every
naval officer in high position, considered the system
a disgrace to civilisation, and the men who worked
it as scarcely better than pirates. It is impossible
to say how much of this was real hatred of ruffianly
practices, how much envy of their success, how much
jealousy of their independence. A naval commander is
necessarily a despot, even if a beneficent one, and an
armed ship carrying on independent war within the
limits of his command trenches on his prerogative, and
may occasionally complicate or prevent the execution of
his plans. One instance of this is worth relating.

On January 27, 1781, Sir George Rodney, then com-
manding in the West Indies, received instructions to
wage active war against the Dutch, and more especially
to seize on St. Eustatius and other settlements which
had been prominent in carrying on an illicit trade with
the Americans. This was done at once. But whilst
Rodney was arranging matters at St. Hustatius, the
Dutch governor of Demerara and Essequibo, conscious
of his defenceless condition, opened negotiations, as the
result of which his Majesty’s ships Surprise and Barbuda
were sent to take possession of the colonies, and arrived

1 Nelson Despatches, vol. vi. pp. 62, 79.
200 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

on 27 February. But, as the Dutch feared, they had
been anticipated by a squadron of privateers, which had
entered the river on the 24th, had seized on all the ships,
and, with scant courtesy, had enforced a surrender of
the town. They agreed that the inhabitants should
remain in peaceful possession of their property, but, as
the Dutch afterwards complained, their people went
on shore and took everything they liked.

‘They also,’ the complaint ran, ‘ released all our prisoners,
white and black; some of them were under the sentence of
death, which did put us in the greatest anxiety for our own
negroes, who would be glad of such an opportunity to rise
against the inhabitants, and which situation was represented
to the captains: and what made our case more dismal was
that all the passages up and down the river were stopped; by
which we were prevented from sending any news up the rivet
to put the inhabitants at ease, which occasioned the greatest.

. uneasiness amongst the women and children, some of whom
were several days in the woods, and some people who were in
their boats were robbed of their baggage.’

Such as it was, however, the capture was effected
by the privateers; the men-of-war had no share in the
‘prize-money, and but small consolation in finding out
that the privateers had none either, that they had no
commission to attack the Dutch, and that the whole be-
came a droit of the admiralty.

Many similar instances might easily be gathered.
The conduct of the privateers too frequently needed pal-
liation, which angry and disappointed naval officers
were not in any humour to give, and the very name of
privateer became.a reproach, not only in the service but
in the country at large; so that, at the present day,
many a wealthy man would be almost more ashamed of
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 201

having it believed that his grandfather or great-grand-
father made his money as a privateer, than that he had
made it as a smuggler or a highwayman. And yet the
privateers were, in their day, a most important item in
the naval strength of the country, with this additional
and especial merit, that they were most numerous and
strongest when the royal navy was weakest or most
severely taxed. Evidently the time when the king’s ships
swept the enemy’s flag from the seas was not the best for
private adventurers to go a-cruising ; but when the king’s
ships could barely hold their own, the chances of rich
prizes were numerous and tempting. It is thus that in
looking for valuable services of privateers, we find them,
not in the periods of our national glory, not during the
wars of the French Revolution, when Howe, and Hood,
and Nelson crushed the French navy; not during the
later years of the Seven Years’ War, when Hawke, and
Boscawen, and Saunders grandly maintained England’s |
supremacy ; but during the war of American Independence,
or the war of the Austrian Succession, when the fortunes
of the navy were at a low ebb, and disgraceful courts-
martial, such as those on Keppel, or Palliser, or Brereton,
on Mathews, or Lestock, or Mostyn, or Cornelius Mitchell
fill a large space of our naval annals. In such times of
disaster and disgrace, the rough and ready work of the
privateers appeared more brilliant, and had a very real
national importance. To attempt any statistical mea-
surement of it would be difficult, if not impossible, but
some idea may be formed from the statement that on
2 January, 1781, thirteen days after the declaration of
war against Holland, 545 letters of marque passed the
Stamp Office. The number of ships in the country was
202 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

scarcely equal to the extraordinary demand; but the
curious nature of the Dutch led them to supply it; and
just as in 1672 they sold gunpowder to the French, so in
1781 they built privateers specially for the English
market.!

It is scarcely less difficult to attempt any relation of
the services rendered by the privateers, or of the bold
deeds which they frequently performed ; but of the many,
some few have escaped oblivion, and may be still worthy
of record. Here, for instance, is one.

In July 1781, the Tygress of Appledore, carrying 22
six-pounders, and 1380 men, whilst cruising on the west
coast of Ireland, fell in with a Dutch 50-gun ship, escort-
ing two large merchantmen, who had gone north about,
to avoid the Channel. This 50-gun ship, under British
colours, chased her and overtook her. The Tygress,
being well within gun-shot, lay to, supposing that,
according to custom, a number of her men were to be
pressed. She found out her mistake, when the stranger,
hoisting the Dutch flag, ordered her to strike. She
refused to do so, and made sail, to try and escape. A
running fight thus began and continued for two hours,
when the Dutchman’s mainmast went over the side; and
the Tygress, taking up a position on her bow, plied her
with the six-pounders and small arms for nearly an
hour ; at the end of which time, having succeeded, though
with heavy loss, in clearing the wreck, the Dutch ship
got round, and beat off her enemy by the superior weight
of her stern guns. She was, however, in no condition
to pursue ; and the Tygress, leaving her helpless, went
to look for the two merchant ships, both of which she

» Morning Herald, 3 January, 1781.
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 203

captured the next day. They were each of about 600
tons, laden with ‘ masts, cordage, pitch, tar, turpentine, .
and other naval stores,’ from Ostend to Cadiz. The
money value of the prize was the privateer’s only reward.
Had the Tygress belonged to the navy, had a king’s ship
of her force beaten off a 50-gun ship and taken two large
prizes from under her convoy, the commander would
have been posted, and his distinguished services blazoned
in our naval records. Being as it was, we can say no
more than that his name was Thomas Hall.

The same might be said of Captain Devereux, com-
manding the Drawblood, of Milford, mounting twelve
guns, which on 6 March, 1781, off Cape Clear, captured
a Dutch privateer, carrying eighteen 9-pounders and one
hundred men. Dutchmen do not yield readily, and it
took three hours’ hard fighting and the killing or wound-
ing of sixty men, before this ship hauled down her
colours. She proved to be of 700 tons burden, laden,
as the others, with naval stores. The Drawblood had
eleven killed and sixteen wounded—a loss on both sides
which compares with or exceeds that of any single action
of the war, if we except that of the Serapis and Bon-
homme Richard, which neither English nor Americans
are disposed to consider a single action, and in which,
at any rate, the ships were of immensely greater force.

Scarcely less notable was the capture on 16 April,
1780, of a Spanish sloop of war by the privateer Ellen,
apparently of Liverpool, commanded by Captain Borrow-
dale. The Ellen, ,which mounted eighteen light 6-
pounders, and had on board sixty-four men, all told—
of whom many, including a Captain Blundell of the 79th

1 See post, Chap. XI.
204 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

regiment, were passengers—was making a passage to
the West Indies, under orders of urgent haste. Her
small complement shows that she had no aggressive
intentions; but, when overhauled by the Spaniard, she
prepared to defend herself. She shortened sail, and—
to prevent the enemy opening fire at long range, and
thus getting the advantage of a presumably heavier ar-
mament—hoisted American colours. At the same time
her guns were double-loaded with round shot and grape;
and Borrowdale, encouraging his men, ‘ recommended
to them a cool and determined courage, entreated them
lo fire quick, to take good aim, and to fight the ship to
the last extremity.’ We seem almost to have before us
the old sea-dog described by Captain Marryat :—

The Captain stood on the carronade: ‘First Lieutenant,’
says he,

‘Send all my merry men aft here, for they must list to me;

IT haven’t the gift of the gab, my sons—because I’m bred
to the sea;

That ship there is a Spaniard, who means to fight with we ;

That ship there is a Spaniard, and if we don’t take she,

’Tis a thousand bullets to one, that she will capture we.’!

And so, as the Spaniard ranged up alongside to wind-
ward, he hauled down the American colours, hoisted the
English, and poured into her his whole broadside, with
a volley of musketry. The astonished and entirely dis-
abled Spaniard fell to leeward and received the Ellen’s
other broadside in the same fashion, after which she put

} The verses, which I have here adapted, occur in Snarley-yow. It
is curious to find a writer, with Marryat’s intimate knowledge of sea-
affairs, speaking of carronades in the time of William III. They were

first ordered for use in the navy in 1779. The Ellen had not any; but,
in 1780, she might have had, if her owners had chosen.
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 205

before the wind and endeavoured to make off. But the
privateer held on to her advantage, and after a running
fight of an hour and a half the Santa Anna, a commis-
sioned sloop of sixteen guns—heavy 6-pounders—ex-
clusive of swivels, and 104 men, hauled down her colours,
and accompanied the Ellen to Jamaica.

I give these as instances of our privateers doing good
and valiant services as men-of-war. Their capability of
annoying or distressing the enemy in the special way
for which they were licensed, has never been doubted ;
but, when put into figures, it appears that from the
commencement of the war with France, in July 1778,
to the following May—that is to say, in a period of ten
months—the value of the prizes taken by Liverpool ships
alone amounted to 1,025,6001., of which 170,000I. is
assigned to the Knight, and 75,000I. to the Ellen, pre-
sumably the same whose gallant action the next year I
have just related. But the list to which I here refer
ends before the beginning of the war with Spain, the
country which had always furnished the richest prizes.
War was declared on 16 June; and on 23 October, almost
before the Grand Fleet of England, under an incompetent
administration, had done sheltering itself behind the
shoals of Spithead from the combined fleet of France
and Spain, two privateers, the Amazon of Liverpool, and
Ranger of Bristol, captured, off the Azores, a ship of 800
tons homeward bound from Manila. She carried eighteen
guns and a complement of 150 men; but her defence
would seem to have mainly consisted in a resolute attempt
to escape; for though she lost heavily, her captors had
only one man killed. This was a prize worth having.
‘She was deeply laden with gold, silver, silk, coffee, china,
206 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

cochineal, and indigo, and also great private adventures
which were not registered. The value of the whole was
supposed to exceed 300,0001.’

Here is part of the bill of lading of another, a ship
of 700 tons, from the South Seas, captured about the
same time by the Shark of London and Sprightly of
Guernsey: 8 chests of doubloons, 47 chests of silver,
200,000 dollars, 1 chest of white silver, 270 marks, 9
small chests of gold, 400 tons of cocoa, 15 bales of fur,
150 tons of bar copper, and many other things.

No such prizes at this time fell to the lot of the royal
navy; nor indeed, considering the small numbers
amongst which they were divided, have such prizes often
been taken. But my object here is not so much to
tantalise our seamen with these golden memories of the
past, or to make them regret that their lot is cast in an
age of iron and of international forbearance ; it is rather
to speak of the privateers as an effective constituent of
England’s naval power, such as they certainly were, not-
withstanding the many abuses to which the system was
liable. In doing so, it would be easy to gather together
a number of isolated examples; of names which, being
nothing more than names, would convey little meaning
and excite little interest. I prefer rather to dwell on the
careers of two men, whom superior merit distinguished
above all others, and of whose services romance or history,
or the dusty records in Fetter Lane, have preserved some
of the details.

Fortunatus Wright lives in the pages of Smollett.
He is there described as ‘a native of Liverpool, who,
though a stranger to a sea life, had, in the war of the
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 207

Austrian Succession, equipped a privateer, and dis-
tinguished himself in such a manner by his uncommon
vigilance and valour that if he had been indulged with a
command suitable to his genius he would have deserved
as honourable a place in the annals of the navy as
that which the French have bestowed upon their boasted
Du Guay-Trouin, Bart, and Thurot.’ I doubt, however,
whether Smollett is entirely correct in his statements
regarding Wright’s early life. His father, who was of
Cheshire origin, was a master mariner and shipowner,
and I have little doubt that Wright himself followed the
sea in his youth, probably as his father’s apprentice, or
afterwards in command of one of his father’s ships. The
evidence is indeed very strong that he was far from a
stranger to a sea life. William Hutchinson, for many
years dock-master at Liverpool, and who, on the title-
page of his ‘ Treatise on Practical Seamanship,’ styles
himself as distinctively ‘ Mariner ’—the sort of man who,
in the last century, would have divided the human race
into seamen and landlubbers—speaks with evident pride
of having served under Fortunatus Wright, and fre-
quently refers to the practice of ‘that great,’ ‘ that
worthy hero,’ as illustrating different points of seaman-
ship. He had, however, retired from the sea, and settled
down as a merchant and shipowner. Beyond that little
is known, but it is believed that he became involved in a
tedious and costly lawsuit on account of one of his ships
with letters of marque detaining a vessel in which the
Turkey Company had an interest. In this there is
possibly some confusion with a later incident, the cir-
cumstances of which are before us;! but at any rate we
1 See post, pp. 214-6.
208 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

may accept the statement that, consequent on this law-
suit, and not caring to abide another with which he was
threatened, he realised his property, and left Liverpool.!
In June, 1742, we find him in Italy, where he got into a
curious, though half-comical, difficulty with the guard at
the gate of Lucca. It appears that there was a standing
order that all strangers coming into the town should
deliver up their pistols or other firearms. Wright, being
ignorant of this rule, and having but an imperfect
knowledge of the language, refused to comply. On this
the officer on duty, with much violence of voice and
manner, ordered out the guard of twenty men, who
advanced against him with levelled muskets. Wright,
not to be behindhand, cocked his pistol and swore he’d
be the death of the foremost of them; but then, as in
ancient days

 

Was none who would be foremost
To lead such dire attack :

But those behind cried ‘ Forward ! ’
And those before cried ‘ Back!’

Eventually thirty more men were ordered up, and, some
way or other, the fifty managed to escape the threatened
pistol shot, to seize Mr. Wright, disarm him, and convey
him to the inn, where they confined him, with a guard
at the door, and two sentries in his bedroom. The
guard was, however, taken off immediately afterwards on

‘ For these personal details I am indebted to the kindness of Mr.
Fortunatus Evelyn Wright, at present Consul for Sweden and Norway
at Christchurch, New Zealand. Mr. F. E. Wright, or rather his elder
brother, Mr. Sydney Evelyn Wright, formerly a paymaster in the Navy,
is the lineal representative of the hero of this chapter, as well as of
John Evelyn, the author of ‘Sylva,’ and the first treasurer of Greenwich
Hospital.
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 209

the interposition of a Lucchese nobleman to whom he
had introductions, and on his giving his word not to
stir out; but three days later, at four o’clock in the
morning, he received a message by an officer that spoke
English—‘ That since he had been so daring as to insult
the Republic by endeavouring to enter the town by force
of arms, it was therefore ordered that he should forth-
with leave the State and never presume to enter it again
without particular permission; that there were post-
horses waiting at the door of his house, as also a guard
of soldiers to see him out of the territories of the
Republic.’ And so he was put on his way to Florence,
where, or at Leghorn, I fancy that he lived for the next
three or four years.}

When war with France was proclaimed in March,
1744, the English merchants in Leghorn suffered much
annoyance from the French privateers that swarmed on
the coast ; and it seems to have been at their instigation
if not also, in the first instance at least, at their expense,
that Wright fitted out the brigantine Fame, and waged
a war of reprisals.

This is Mr. Hutchinson’s account of it, written in
1777 :— :

Cruising the war before last, in the employ of that great
but unfortunate hero, Fortunatus Wright, in the Mediter-
ranean Sea, where the wind blows generally either easterly or
westerly, that is either up or down the Straits, it was planned,

with either of these winds that blew, to steer up or down the
common channels the common course, large or before the

1 Dr. Doran’s Mann and Manners, vol. i. p. 72. A fuller account of
this and other little known episodes in Wright’s career is to be found in
the official correspondence of Mr. (afterwards Sir Horace) Mann, and of
Mr. Goldsworthy or Mr. Dick, Consuls at Leghorn.

P
210 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

wind in the daytime without any sail set, that the enemy's
trading ships astern, crowding sail with this fair wind, might
come up in sight, or we come in sight of those ships ahead
that might be turning to windward ; and at sunset, ifnothing
appeared to the officer at the masthead, we continued to run
five or six leagues, so far as could then be seen, before we laid
the ship to for the night, to prevent the ships astern coming up
and passing out of sight before the morning, or our passing
those ships that might be turning to windward ; and if nothing
appeared to an officer at the masthead at sunrise, we bore
away and steered as before. And when the wind blew across
the channels, that ships could sail their course either up or
down, then to keep the ship in a fair way; in the daytime to
steer the common course, under the courses and lower stay-
sails, and in the night under topsails with the courses in the
brails, with all things as ready as possible for action, and to
take or leave what we might fall in with.

This manner of cruising proved successful. In the
‘Gentleman’s Magazine,’ under date 31 December, 1746,

we read: ‘Came advice that the Fame, privateer, had

taken sixteen French ships in the Levant, worth
400,0001.’ One of these, carrying twenty guns and 150
men, had been fitted out by the French factories on the
coast of Caramania, specially to put an end to Mr.
Wright’s cruise, but was herself captured and sent into
Messina. Anadventure, which savours strongly of fiction,
though it is probably enough founded on fact, is related
in the ‘Gentleman’s Magazine’ for 1757, but refers to
this time.

A certain Selim, an Armenian, on his passage to
Genoa, had, in the usual style of the eighteenth century
romances, been captured by Algerine corsairs, and
carried into slavery, from which by the aid of and in
company with his master’s daughter, the beautiful Zaida,
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 211

he escaped on board a French private ship-of-war, then
on the coast, but ordered to cruise off Malta and capture
a bold Englishman called Fortunatus Wright. Ten days
later they sighted Malta, and at the same time a ship
which turned out to be the one they were looking for,
and which they presently engaged. Selim conducted
Zaida below, and stayed by her for some time; but
anxious to take part in the fight he rushed on deck, was
the foremost to repel the English boarders, whom he
followed to their own ship, calling to the French to come
on. He was speedily overpowered and thrown below.
Selim’s narrative continues :—

Thus I was made a prisoner, and my fair Moor left a prey
to all the wretchedness of despair. After several vain attempts
to board each other, the two ships parted ; the French steered
towards France, and I was carried into Malta. . . . The good
captain whose prisoner I was, observing my despondence,
ordered me to be set free, though I had killed one of his men,
and when I informed him, by a Maltese interpreter, of my
unhappy story, and my resolutions to go in quest of Zaida, he
gave me 100 guineas and advised me to sail for England,
where, though I am unhappily exiled from it, said he, you
will be generously treated, and will hear the fate of the French
privateer.

Shortly afterwards Selim got a passage to Bristol,
where the first thing he saw was the French vessel,
which had been captured by some other cruiser and sent
in as a prize, and a few days later discovered his lost
Zaida. The story on the face of it is a romance, but
there is in it nothing impossible or even improbable.
Fortunatus Wright was cruising in the neighbourhood of
Malta, and his whole career, so far as we know it, was a

succession of romances.
P22
212 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Here is another story of the same date, which we
have on the authority of the first Earl of Charlemont,
who says it came to his knowledge during his residence
at’ Malta, about 1750, and was related to him ‘ by the
most credible eye-witnesses.’! No names are mentioned,
but there is scarcely room for doubt that the hero of
it was Fortunatus Wright. He is described by Lord
Charlemont as a captain, commanding an English pri-
vateer of some force, and ‘of such skill and bravery,
that he reigned paramount in the Mediterranean, daily
sending into the port of Malta French prizes of consider-
able value.’ In a society such as then ruled in Valetta,
this stirred up much angry feeling, the Austrians or
Piedmontese jeering the French or Spaniards, and many
duels took place in consequence. At length the French
knights, irritated beyond measure by the taunts of their
adversaries, and the continued success of the English
captain, determined to put a summary stop to both, and
sent urgent representations to Marseilles ; in consequence
of which an armed vessel, of force almost double that
of the Englishman, was specially equipped and sent to
Malta, under the command of ‘an officer of the highest
character for courage and naval knowledge.’ After being
duly féted by the French party he sailed out of harbour
to look for the Englishman, as to a certain victory.
Days passed by; both parties were aglow with expecta-
tion, and the ramparts on the sea front were constantly
thronged by anxious crowds. Two ships at last appeared
in sight. As they came nearer it was seen that the one
was towing the other; that the one was the French ship

1 Memoirs of James Caulfield Earl of Charlemont, by Francis
Hardy, vol. i. pp. 47 et seg.
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 213

for which they were looking; that the other was much
shattered. They hoisted French colours, and who so
jubilant as the French knights! Amid exulting cheers
they turned into the harbour, between St. Elmo and
Ricasoli. All Valetta, Senglea, and I] Borgo were called
to witness the triumph of the French; when—O cruel
disappointment !—the white flag suddenly disappeared,
giving place to the victorious flag of England. The
Marseilles ship was a prize to the English privateer.

Hutchinson relates an experience of his own in 1747,
but does not state whether he was then in the Fame
with Fortunatus Wright. From the tone of his book
generally, my impression is that he was, and was officer
of the watch at the time; but he may have been in
independent command. He says:

Cruising in the Mediterranean with the prisoners of three
French prizes on board, at their entire liberty upon deck,
apprehending no danger from them, upon an occasion I
imprudently ordered all our sails to be clued up, and all our
people upon deck to go up and hand them with all possible
expedition. One of our French captains thought to avail
himself of the advantage of our people being mostly aloft, I
providentially, however, perceived he was going to give the
alarm for his people to rise and take the ship; and putting
my hand in my pocket, took hold of my pocket pistol, and ran
close up to him, and told him coolly that he should be the
first that should die by the attempt, which stopped his pro-
ceeding, and I calmly ordered our people to come down as
fast as possible; which they did.

Meantime Wright, with a genius peculiarly his own,
was becoming the focus of a series of international dis-
putes, in themselves not uninteresting. On 19 Decem-
ber, 1746, the Fame seized a French barque, on her
214 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

way from Marseilles to Naples, carrying the servants and
equipage of the Prince of Campo Florida, and furnished
with a pass from the King of England. About the
prince’s goods and chattels there was no dispute, but the
vessel’s name was not mentioned in the pass, and she
was accordingly sent in. The British consul was aghast
at the insult, as he chose to call it, offered to his
Majesty’s pass; and wrote a very strong letter to Wright,
who was not in the Fame at the time, urging on him
that the French ship must be set at liberty. This
Wright would not admit; but afterwards, on the repre-.
sentation of the minister, he consented to refer the
matter to the naval commander-in-chief, who directed
him to release his prize.! A more serious affair happened
very shortly afterwards. .

Early in 1747 complaints were made by the Ottoman
Porte that Turkish property on board French ships had
been seized by English privateers, and especially by
Captain Fortunatus Wright in the Fame. The matter
was referred to Mr. Goldsworthy, the English consul at
Leghorn, with instructions to inquire into it ; and, calling
on Captain Wright for an explanation, he received a
reply which was far from satisfactory to the Turkish
merchants. The two ships named, he wrote, ‘had each
of them a French pass, and both of them belonged to
Marseilles. They also hoisted French colours and struck
them to me; nay, the latter engaged me for a consider-
able time under these colours. For these reasons I
brought them to Leghorn, and have had them legally
condemned in the admiralty court, by virtue of which

1 Goldsworthy to Duke of Newcastle, 26 December, 1746; 2, 9, 23
January, 1747.
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 215

sentence I have disposed of them and distributed the
money.’ !

The Turkey Company had, however, sufficient interest
to enable them to procure an order that Turkish property
on board even French vessels was not prize; and in-
structions to that effect were sent out both to the
privateers and admiralty courts in the Mediterranean.
These additional instructions were dated 80 March,
1747. Wright positively refused to allow them, in his
case, to be retrospective; and having got the money,
he had, above all other claims, the very strong one of
actual possession. As he would not give it up, an order
came out from home to have him arrested and sent to
England. The Tuscan government readily lent their aid,
and clapped him into prison, but there their assistance
ended. They would not give him up to Mr. Goldsworthy,
who vainly urged that, as captain of an English private
ship, he was subject to consular jurisdiction ; and so
poor Wright was kept in the fortress of Leghorn for
about six months, when orders came from Vienna to
hand him over to Goldsworthy, who, whilst waiting for
an opportunity to send him to England, received orders
to set him at liberty, ‘as he has now given bail in the
High Court of Admiralty to answer the action commenced
against him.’

The action, however, seems to have run on to great
length. The special ground of it was the seizure of
Turkish property on board a French ship, Hermione,
captured by the Fame on 26 February, 1747, the pro-
ceeds from which Wright refused to disgorge. He was

! Goldsworthy to the Deputy-Governor of the Turkey Company,
20 February, 1747.
216. STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

arrested on 11 December, 1747 ; was set at liberty on or
about 10 June, 1748; but in June, 1749, the suit was
still pending; and Wright, in a letter to Goldsworthy,
dated 4 June, after a long statement of his case, con-
cludes in no ignoble manner :

The cargo was all sold at public auction, for which I have
proper vouchers; therefore I am surprised at the manner the
Turkey Company have represented this affair, or that they
should trouble his Grace, after they have prosecuted me, after
they had caused me to be confined near six months at their
instance, and have since found their. libel totally rejected,
and that I am acquitted from the charge. They attacked me
at law: to that law I must appeal; if I have acted contrary
to it, to it I must be responsible; for I do not apprehend I
am so to any agent of the Grand Signior, to the Grand Signior
himself, or to any other power, seeing 1am an Englishman
and acted under a commission from my prince.

The body of this letter is in a clerk’s writing; the
subscription and signature only are by Wright; but these
are sufficient to show that he wrote like a gentleman of
culture and education. The hand is not of a commercial
character, still less is it the hand of a rude seaman, more
familiar with the marling-spike than the pen.

A year later the correspondence about the Hermione
was still going on, with, as-far as Wright was concerned,
no results. Whether it died out from exhaustion or
whether it merged in some diplomatic settlement with
the Porte, I do not know ; but it seems quite certain that
Wright did not pay. It would, however, appear that the
statement—to which I have referred—that the Fame’s
prizes in 1746 were valued at 400,000/., was a gross
exaggeration. Wright was owner as well as captain of
the brigantine, and her ship’s company must have been
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 217

small; his share of such a sum would have rendered him
wealthy ; but he does not come before us in the after
years as a wealthy man. In 1750 he was engaged with
Hutchinson, the ‘ Mariner,’ in buying and fitting out as
a merchant ship the old 20-gun ship Lowestoft; and,
as she made sundry trading voyages to the West Indies
and to the Mediterranean, it would seem that Wright was
settling down into a man of business at Leghorn, where
he resided with his wife and family, though I am unable
to say what degree of truth, if any, there is in his alleged
statement to Selim, that he was ‘unhappily exiled’ from
England. =, te

When the troubled relations between France and
England, in 1755 and early in 1756, foretold a speedy
renewal of war, Wright prepared at once to take his part,
and set about building a small vessel at Leghorn. But
the interests and policy of Tuscany, closely bound up
with those of Austria, were this time linked to those
of France, and the neutrality professed by the Tuscan
Government was in reality a very thinly-veiled partiality.
On the declaration of war they at once took measures to
prevent the English ships in port increasing their crews
or armament, whether with a view to going a-privateering,
or merely in order the better to defend themselves from
attack. Wright's character was well known; the desti-
nation of his little vessel, the St. George, more than
suspected ; and precautions were thus, as a matter of
course, taken to prevent her equipment for purposes of
war. Captain Wright, therefore, with assumed candour,
applied to the authorities to know what force he might
take on board to leave the port as a merchant ship, and,
after some consultation, this was fixed at four small guns
218 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

and 25 men. The government took every precaution to
ensure this limit not being exceeded; and Wright, in, as
we must suppose, a spirit of fun, urged them to have
guard boats rowing round him, to make more certain.
Finally, as he took leave of the governor, he asked him
if he was satisfied that he had complied with the limitation,
and obtained from him a certificate to that effect.

And so he sailed out of port on 28 July, 1756; but
with him also sailed four richly laden merchant ships,
homeward bound to England, which, amongst other
valuable things, carried an efficient armament and ship’s
company for the St. George. They had scarcely gained
an offing, before they saw coming towards them a vessel,
which they made out to be a large French xebec, known
to be cruising in the neighbourhood. The guns and men
were hastily sent on board the St. George, which then,
though still very inferior to the xebec, stood towards her.
The xebec, on her part, came on, expecting an easy victory.
It is said, in the ‘Gentleman’s Magazine,’ that she had
been fitted out by the merchants of Marseilles with the
special object of destroying Wright, whose exploits in the
last war still rankled in their memory; it is certain that
she had been waiting for him for some time; that her
captain had asked in Leghorn, ‘ Pray, when does Wright
intend to come out? He has already made me lose too
much time ;’ that he was well informed of the very small
force of the St. George, and counted on securing the
whole five, without much difficulty. Hecaughta Tartar.
The St. George had still no more than twelve guns,
including the four of very small calibre with which she
left Leghorn; and her crew, got together in this way, at
the last moment, numbered only seventy-five, of which
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 219

the additional fifty were men of all nations—Slavonians,
Venetians, Swiss, Italians, anda few English. Thexebec
was of at least double the force, and had her crew pre-
sumably in efficient order ; the more astonishing, therefore,
the merit of Captain Wright, who plied his guns with
such vigour, that the enemy attempted to carry him by
boarding, but was repulsed with great slaughter, and
finally took to flight, so badly treated that it was doubtful
whether she would be able to get to port. Wright pur-
sued her for some little way ; but seeing another French
ship making towards his convoy, he returned to cover
them, signalling to them to return to Leghorn, where he
also anchored the next morning.

He had scarcely done so, when he was ordered by the
governor to bring his vessel within the Mole, under pain
of being brought in by force. As holding a commission
from the King of England, he refused; and two snows!
were ordered to anchor alongside him, to. take charge of
him. The masters of the English ships in the Mole
offered to haul out, and make common cause with Captain
Wright ; who, however, preferred putting the thing into
Mann’s hands. Mann immediately demanded redress
from the regency. They would not give it; they com-
plained that Wright had deceived them; had gone out
with more men and arms than he had shown to the
examining officers; had violated the neutrality of the
port ; had made an improper use of the emperor’s colours,
and had repeatedly disobeyed their orders to come within
the Mole. Mann’s position, in reply, was that he had

1 Of vessels which in the last century were peculiar to the Mediter-
ranean, a snow differed but slightly from a brig; a xebec had lateen sails
o. three masts; a tartan had only one mast, also with a lateen sail.
220 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

not deceived them: that the men and arms went out of
Leghorn on board other ships; that the engagement was
twelve miles outside; that the Frenchman was the aggres-
sor; and that as to their orders, they had no business to
give them; that Wright, before sailing was within their
jurisdiction; that he had then complied with their in-
structions, and that he held a certificate to that effect
from the governor; but that after sailing under the
English flag and now bearing the king's commission, he
owed no obedience to the authorities of Leghorn, and
that their action was a gross injustice and a breach of
neutrality.

And so the affair was argued for a couple of months,
and might have been argued for many more, had not
Sir Edward Hawke, the naval commander-in-chief, who
had just been sent out to supersede the Hon. John Byng,
explained his view of the matter. As soon as it came to
his knowledge, he sent Sir William Burnaby in the Jersey
of 60 guns, with the 50-gun ship Isis, to convoy what
merchant ships were waiting, and to bring the St. George
away, maugre the captain of the port, the governor of
Leghorn, the regency, or the emperor himself. The
governor protested; but Sir William put it, without un-
due periphrasis, ‘that his orders were to take Captain
Wright away under his protection; and in case either
the barks or the forts fired, he would be sorry to see
himself under the indispensable necessity of returning
shot for shot.’ The governor preferred dealing with the
men of the pen, and sought comfort from Mr. Dick, the
consul, who, however, had none to give him, and told him
‘he had heard Sir William Burnaby say he would take
her away.’ ‘ Well then,’ said the governor piteously,
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 221

‘there’s an end of it; what can we do? the French will
see it’s not our fault.’ And so on 23 September, the
Jersey and Isis departed, the St. George accompanying
them, and sixteen rich merchant ships, homeward bound.
Wright, being thus at liberty, after a short and fairly
successful cruise, put into Malta, where, however, the
partiality for the French was as dominant as at Leghorn.
The English ships in the harbour were kept in the closest
seclusion. ‘Our ships, persons, and colours,’ wrote one
of the sufferers, ! ‘are treated with the utmost scandal,
.ame, and indignity, even to the highest degree, and
with such cruel severity that it is almost impossible for
anybody to believe it that have not been eye-witnesses
of it... . Captain Fortunatus Wright, of the St. George
privateer, has been used here in a most barbarous manner.’
Barbarous is the writer’s way of saying arbitrary, or un-
friendly. Unfriendly, for he was not allowed to buy
slops and bedding for his men, of which he was sorely in
need. Arbitrary, for having received on board a number
of English seamen, put ashore there from ships taken by,
French privateers, he was ordered to land them again.
He refused to do so; he would be unworthy the commis-
sion he had the honour to bear if he delivered up British
subjects who had taken refuge under the British flag;
whereupon a galley royal came and lay alongside him.
Her captain told Wright his orders were to sink him, if
he offered to stir an anchor, and, if he made any resist-
ance, ‘to board him and cut every soul to pieces.’ So
the men were forcibly taken out of the ship and landed, to
wait for some more convenient season ; and the St. George,

* Captain Robert Miller of the ship Lark at Malta, to Consul Dick at
Leghorn, 3 November, 1756.
222 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

without the stores she was in want of, put to sea on
22, October.

‘The large French privateer,’ wrote Mr. Miller, ‘ of thirty-
eight guns, and upwards of 800 men, commanded by Captain
Arnoux, was in this port at the same time, and sailed just
twenty-four hours after Wright, to take him, as Wright still
was in sight of the port. But when the great beast of a
French privateer came out, Wright played with him, by
sailing round him and viewing him, &c., just to aggravate
him, as Wright sailed twice as fast as him; and indeed she
is a prodigious dull sailer for a privateer, and very crank.’

And beyond the fact that he cruised for some months,
and made many prizes, we know little more. On 22
January, 1757, Mann wrote to Mr. Pitt that the regency
had been lamenting the decay of the Leghorn trade ;
that he had pointed out that their gross partiality, and
their violent action in the matter of Fortunatus Wright,
were two of the causes of this decay; that, yielding
to these representations, they had assured him of their
intention to observe a strict neutrality ; and that, on
- the strength of this, he had written to Captain Wright,
‘that he might send all the French prizes he had made
to Leghorn, as, at my request, he had kept them in
deposit till he should hear from me that he might do it
with safety.’ Butin two months’ time he had to write :—

‘The council sent a gentleman belonging to the Secre-
tary’s office to me, earnestly to desire that, in order to avoid
any further inconveniences with regard to him, I would order
Captain Wright to keep at such a distance from the port as
would not oblige the government to take any notice of his
being there. . . . Finding that they thought themselves tied
up by the orders they received lately from Vienna with regard
to Captain Wright, I thought it my duty, purely for the sake
of avoiding any new disputes, to write to the consul in the
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 223

manner they desired. The estafette was immediately sent
back to Leghorn with my letter, in order that, as soon as
Captain Wright’s vessel appears in sight of the port, a bark

may be sent off to him, with the consul’s directions not to
enter into the harbour.’

The end is sad enough, not only as telling the fate of
a man whose whole career is more romantic than any
romance, but as telling of the low ebb to which, for the
moment, the incompetence of the government and the
misconduct of the commander-in-chief had reduced the
English power and the English prestige in the Mediter-
ranean. Under date 2 July, 1757, Mann wrote :—

‘The trade of Leghorn, upon which the wealth of thig
whole state chiefly depends, is reduced to the lowest ebb,
msomuch that the arrival in that port of a single prize a few
days ago was looked upon as an object of such importance and
exaggerated by the Italians in terms that sufficiently showed
that they are now convinced how much their welfare depends
upon the navigation of the English merchant ships not being
interrupted. The French have many tartans disguised, but
well armed, that cruise between Leghorn and Porto Ferrajo,
ready on all occasions to intercept such as are of no force, at
the [same] time that they can run near the shore when a ship
of any strength appears. A few stout privateers, as in the
last war, would totally prevent this, and they would enrich
themselves by the. French vessels from Marseilles that would
fall into their hands. Captain Wright, of the St. George
privateer, did great service of this kind in the beginning of
the war; but itis feared by some circumsiances, and by his
not having been heard of for some months, that he foundered
at sea. Several prizes made by him have lain some months
at Cagliari in Sardinia, waiting for an opportunity to get with
safety to Leghorn.’ .

There would seem to be no doubt that Fortunatus
Wright perished in the way here suggested--a man of
224 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY,

whom history has said but little; of whom, judging
from what I have been able to recover after this lapse of
time, it might have said a good deal. But the narration
I have given, though wanting in many details, is still
sufficient to explain the fact, recorded in the ‘ Gentle-
man’s Magazine,’ that the French government, and the
merchants of Marseilles, or the échelles of the Levant,
offered large rewards for his capture; and the more
certain fact that, at the request of the English mer-
chants at Leghorn, he was specially commended to the
home government by Mr. Mann. Of his more purely
personal history, what I have been able to collect amounts
to very little. I have already said that during these last
years he lived at Leghorn with his wife and family;
that his handwriting is that of a man of education;
and that when he first appeared at Lucca, in 1742, he
was travelling as a gentleman of means, with a private
servant, and letters of introduction to a Lucchese noble-
man. We might thus confidently assume that he was a
man of good social position, even if we did not know that
his daughter Philippa married Charles, the grandson of
John Evelyn of Wotton, whose daughter Susanna in due
time married John Ellworthy Fortunatus Wright, her
first cousin once removed. This John Ellworthy served
as a lieutenant in the navy during the war of American
Independence, and retired after the peace of 1783. He
was accidentally killed in 1798 at Liverpool, where he
was master of St. George’s Dock, and where some of his
descendants still reside. Others, of an elder branch,
emigrated several years ago to New Zealand, where—as
I understand—there is no present likelihood of the race
becoming extinct.
225

CHAPTER VIL.
PRIVATEERS AND PRIVATEERING.
Il. GEORGE WALKER.!

In the last chapter I related the career of Fortunatus
Wright, a man who, though captain only of a privateer,
did, in a time of very great abasement, nobly support
the honour of the English flag in the Mediterranean.
I propose now to speak of another whose name may well
be paired with his—a man who resembled him alike in
bravery, in success, in misfortune. His history, written
by one of his followers, but modestly curtailed of almost
all personal matter by himself, has come down to us.?
The book is scarce, and very little known; but even in
its condensed and abridged form, the narrative is one
which, from the quaint simplicity of its style, the life-
like character of its portraits, the rollicking, reckless
nature of the adventures it describes, may compare not
unfavourably with some of the most admired romances
of Defoe. And I have every confidence in its truth. I
have tested it in many particulars, and have convinced
myself of the author’s perfect honesty. Even the slight

! Frazer’s Magazine, November, 1881.
2 The Voyages and Cruises of Commodore Walker during the late
Spanish and French Wars. 12mo. Dublin: 1762.

Q
226 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

mistakes are evidence of it: they are mistakes, perhaps
of mere carelessness, perhaps of imperfect recollection,
very different from the class of mistakes which a clever
forger would have made. I have thus felt authorised to
trust to the guidance of this nameless writer, checking
his narrative by reference to other accounts to which I
have had access, but to which he certainly had not, and
in every case with satisfaction and approval.

As to when, or where, or of what parentage George
Walker was born, I have been unable to gain any infor-
mation. But indirectly I am led to suppose that he was
a Londoner, and of respectable, probably commercial,
family. At an early age he entered the. Dutch navy,
and served in it in several actions against the Turks—
actions of which history takes no notice, and which we
may presume to have been really against corsairs in the
Levant, whilst cruising for the protection of trade. Later
on, he returned to England, and having acquired or
inherited sufficient money to purchase a merchant ship,
commanded her himself for some years.

When the war which followed the stupid excitement
about Jenkins’s ear broke out in 1739, he was principal
owner and commander of the ship Duke William, trading
from London to South Carolina, and in order the better
to prepare for defence, or to be ready for whatever might
turn up, but with no immediate intention of cruising, he
took out letters of marque. His ship mounted twenty
guns, but had only thirty-two men; the object of her
voyage being, in the first place, simply trade.

On arriving at his destination, he found that the
coast of the Carolinas was infested by two Spanish
privateers; and, in the absence of any man-of-war,
GEORGE WALKER, 227

offered his ship to the colonial government. The offer
was accepted, the men put on wages as in the king’s
ships, and their number increased to 180. Several
gentlemen of the country entered as volunteers, and
Walker, in command, cleared the coast without diffi-
culty. He took and destroyed a fortified depét which
the Spaniards had established on one of the small islands
adjacent, and convinced them that their continued cruis-
ing in that neighbourhood would be more dangerous than
they had expected. Towards the end of 1742 he sailed
for England, having three merchantmen in convoy; but
in a tremendous gale in December, whilst still 200 leagues
westward of the Scilly Islands, the convoy having been
scattered, the Duke William sprang a most serious leak
—a number of most serious leaks, and was with great
difficulty, and by incessant pumping, kept afloat, until,
just at the last extremity, one of her convoy came in
sight. The utterly exhausted crew were taken on board
her, their ship sinking directly afterwards. The change
was, however, but little for the better, and their new
ship was able to keep afloat only by the aid of the ad-
ditional hands at the pumps; and so with much dis-
comfort and great danger they made the land; when,
on his arrival in town, Mr. Walker found that, by some
mistake, the insurance of the Duke William had been
allowed to run out about two months before she
foundered.

His fortune was thus at alow ebb, and for the next
year he served as master of a vessel trading to the Baltic,
till, in the autumn of 1744—war having been declared
against France in the previous spring—he was offered
the command of the Mars, a private ship of war of 26

a2
228 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

guns and 180 men, to cruise in consort with another—
the Boscawen, a larger ship belonging to the same owners.
The two sailed from Dartmouth in November, and within
a couple of days fell in with a French frigate of 26 guns and
270 men of force—that is, about equal to the Boscawen.
This ship, however, was unfortunate in her captain: the
Mars attacked the Frenchman, but was left unsupported,
so that after a smart action she was beaten to a stand-
still; and the enemy, also roughly handled, was able to
get away before the captain of the Boscawen could make
up his mind to prevent him. ‘

A few weeks later, one wild, rainy night in the begin-
ning of January, they came suddenly upon two large
ships. So dark was it, that they did not sight them
until close to them; when, by the voices and language,
they knew them to be French, and, by their state of
confusion and dismay, judged them to be rich Martinico-.
men, homeward bound. Now two rich Martinico-men
would agree wondrous well with two hungry privateers,
who accordingly hung on to them all night, waiting for
day to make their attack. When day broke, however,
they discovered them to be two ships of war, one of
74, the other of 64 guns. The Boscawen, being on the
weather quarter, and having a captain gifted with a
large share of prudence, immediately hauled her wind
and made off; the Mars, being to leeward, was unable to
do so; and going free had little chance of escaping two
large vessels. The officers of the Mars thought that if the
Boscawen had joined them, and the two ships had kept
together, the Frenchmen would not have meddled with
them, being anxious to get into Brest without any avoid-
able delay; but seeing the Mars by herself they could
GEORGE WALKER. 229

not resist the temptation of picking up an easy prize.
A signal was made from the other for the 64-gun ship
to chase, which she did, and rapidly gained on the
Mars. On this, Captain Walker, addressing himself to
his officers and ship’s company, said :—

‘Gentlemen, I do not mean to be so rash as to attempt a
regular engagement with so superior a force. All I ask of
you is to confide in me and my orders, to get away if pos-
sible without striking; and be assured I shall employ your
assistance neither in revenge, or vainglory, or longer than I
think it of use to our design. The ship which pursues us is
certainly the best sailer of the enemy, by being ordered to
the chase ; if by good fortune we bring down a topmast or
yard, or hurt her rigging, so as to retard her pursuit, we
may entirely get cleayr.’

So, with colours flying, and firing from time to time
what guns would bear, the Mars kept ahead of the
64-gun ship, which, however, continued to gain, though
but slowly. The 74 too, began to come up, but it was
two hours before they had so far advanced as to bring
their broadsides to bear; when, as they ran out their
lower tier, Walker ordered the colours to be struck, and
considering that he surrendered to the ship whose first
pursuit had embarrassed him, he went on board the
smaller of the two. This was the Fleuron,! with her
consort, the Neptune, homeward bound from the West
Indies, carrying an enormous treasure in specie, French
and Spanish combined, amounting, it is said, to near
four millions sterling, and with their ships’ companies
almost disorganised by sickness. The captain of the

1 Undoubtedly Fleuron; but by some mistake, which I cannot ex-
plain, the narrative calls her Florissant.
230 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Fleuron received Mr. Walker and his officers with no
more politeness than any captain of a ship of war would
have shown to a privateer.

‘How dare you,’ he said, ‘in so small a ship, fire
against a force like me?’

‘If you will look at my commission,’ answered
Walker, ‘you will find I had as good a right to fight as
you; and if my force had not been so inferior, I had
shown you more civil treatment on board my ship.

“How many of your men have I killed?’ asked the
Frenchman.

‘None at all, sir,’ was the reply.

‘Then sir,’ he continued, ‘you have killed six of
mine, and wounded several. You fired pieces of glass.’

This Walker denied, but to little purpose; and he
and his officers were, rudely and uncomfortably enough,
penned between two guns on the main deck. The
question of the broken glass was, however, inquired into,
when it appeared that what had been reported as bits
of glass were in reality bits of silver money; and that
an Irishman had rammed a pocketful of shillings and
halferowns into the last gun that was fired, swearing
that if the Frenchmen wanted his money, they might
take it and be damned. The little joke once explained,
mollified the Frenchmen; the prisoners were treated
with more courtesy, and in the course of the next day
the relations between Walker and the captain of the
Fleuron became almost friendly. It was thus that on
the third and fourth days of his imprisonment, Mr.
Walker had full cognisance of one of the most dis-
graceful incidents in the history of the British navy.

At daybreak on Sunday, 6 January, 1745, the two
GEORGE WALKER. 231

Frenchmen, with the Mars in company, were seen and
chased by four English ships of the line. The Frenchmen
were in much alarm, for their treasure was enormous, and
their crews, enfeebled by pestilence, were in no condition
to defend it. The captain of the Fleuron spoke frankly
enough of their danger, telling Mr. Walker that he had
at the time thought it ill-judged of the commodore, under
the peculiar circumstances, to lose time and distance
over an object so paltry as the Mars; but for that con-
founded chase, they would have been now well-nigh into
Brest.

Shortly after, as the English ships were fast gaining
on them, Mr. Walker was sent below; and though per-
mitted from time to time, as the action did not begin, to
visit the deck, it was not till the following evening, when
the danger was over, that he was allowed full liberty.
What happened during these two days was briefly this:
One of the ships, the Captain, of 70 guns, turned aside
to run down and take possession of the Mars. Another,
the Sunderland, a 60-gun ship, carried away her main-
topmast, and dropped astern out of sight. The other
two, the Hampton Court, of 70 guns, and the Dread-
nought, of 60, continued the chase ; the Hampton Court
came up with the flying enemy, ranged alongside, but
waited for the Dreadnought’s coming up, to engage ; but
the Dreadnought was a dull sailer, and could not get up;
so the Hampton Court shortened sail to wait for her.
The same thing was repeated again and again; till, on
the afternoon of the second day, the English ships gave
over the pursuit as useless. As a matter of course, the
captain of the Hampton Court was afterwards tried by
court-martial; but, almost equally as a matter of course
232 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

—in the then existing state of naval discipline—he was
pronounced to have ‘done his duty as an experienced
good officer and as a man of courage and conduct.’ The
minutes of this court-martial were published at the time,
and excited much controversy, public opinion by no
means accepting the decision of the court as satisfactory.
When philosophic readers of history are nowadays dis-
posed to consider the execution of Byng, twelve years
later, as unjustifiable or unnecessary, they ought to re-
member that a number of cases such as the one I have
here referred to had forced the Parliament to pass a new
Naval Discipline Act, in 1749; and that, supported by
this, the accumulated wrath of years fell on Byng asa
first example ; a second was not found necessary.

But meantime the Neptune and Fleuron, with much
exulting and self-glorification, got safely into Brest,
where the officers of the Mars were landed as prisoners
at large. The very next day, Mr. Walker was writing to
his friend, the captain of the Fleuron, begging that he
might have back his letter of credit, which had been
impounded along with his other papers, when people
came running into the inn, crying that the Fleuron had
been blown up, and that all her crew had perished.
This was in the main true. As a first step towards
clearing out the ship, the gunner had sent the greater
part of the powder on shore, leaving, however, four
barrels still in the magazine, and a good deal of loose
powder which had been spilled in emptying back the
cartridges. Whilst the men were sweeping this together,
a glass lantern which hung in the gun-room was handed
down to them. The handle of it gave way; the lantern
fell on the deck and was smashed. The lamp rolled
GEORGE WALKER, 233

amongst the loose powder, which acted as a train leading
tothe four barrels. The after part of the ship was blown
up, and with it, the captain, the officers, and a great part
of the ship’s company. The rest took refuge in the fore
part of the ship, which almost immediately burst into
flames and burnt with great fury. By some extra-
ordinary neglect the guns had been left loaded, probably
since the meeting with the Hampton Court, and now
discharged themselves in quick succession, as the fire
reached them. Boats from the shore were thus afraid
to venture to the assistance of the refugees, the most of
whom perished miserably ; and the wreck, having burnt to
the water’s edge, went down, taking with it the treasure and
everything else on board, nothing having been discharged,
excepting the fatally insufficient part of the powder.

Mr. Walker’s letter of credit was thus lost, and his
party consequently threatened with some inconvenience.
They were, however, able to arrange matters in a satis-
factory manner, and, after some pleasant adventures,
to negotiate an exchange, and to return to England
within a little more than a month; when they found
that the Mars had been bought in by her former owners,
who were fitting her out for another cruise with the
Boscawen. They had, however, resolved not to employ
again the former captain of the Boscawen; and now
offered the command to Mr. Walker, and at his sugges-
tion appointed his late first-lieutenant to be captain of
the Mars.

The Boscawen had been the French frigate Médée,
and captured by Boscawen in the Dreadnought, almost
immediately on the declaration of war. She had then
carried twenty-six nine-pounders, and a complement of
234 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

238 men; but Walker now thought proper to increase
her armament to thirty guns, many of them twelve-
pounders, and to give her a complement of 314 men,
making her, of course, more powerful as a fighting ship;
though, as was afterwards proved, her scantling was not
strong enough for the increased weight. Her equipment
being finished before that of the Mars, she put to sea
by herself on 19 April, 1745, and four days later, on the
edge of the Soundings, fell in with the privateer Sheer-
ness, mounting twenty-two guns. The next morning,
25 April, at daybreak, they sighted eight ships in com-
pany, and gave chase. The Boscawen, which sailed
remarkably well, left the Sheerness far behind; and the
eight ships, which were French, seeing only one of the
enemy coming up, formed line and waited for her.
These were all privateers, and though on a much smaller
scale than the Boscawen, carried in the aggregate about
120 guns, most of them probably three- or four-pounders,
and 400 men. The largest of them was in the middle,
and the Boscawen receiving the fire of the sternmost
ones, reserved her fire till she was abreast of this, when
she poured in a heavy broadside. It was stoutly re-
turned ; five others of the French ships clustered round
her, raking her ahead and astern and firing into her as
they best could; so that for a time the Boscawen was
closely pressed. But after three-quarters of an hour the
largest of the enemy, to which her principal efforts had
been devoted, drew out of the fight, hauled down her
colours, and presently sank. It was impossible to
render any assistance, for four of the others continued
the engagement. The fifth, the smallest of all, had
previously struck, and now did what she could to succour
GEORGE WALKER. 235

the drowning men; but she was only able to pick up
sixteen out of a complement of eighty-four. After
another three-quarters of an hour the Sheerness came
up, and the enemy, having had enough of the Boscawen,
waited for no further attack. Two of them had made
off at the beginning, and the largest was sunk; but the
other five were taken possession of; and Walker, finding
all the prizes, as well as his own ship, much shattered,
and having also some 220 prisoners, resolved to put into
the first port, and anchored in King’s Road, Bristol, on
30 May.

Two months later he sailed again, but under cir-
cumstances that the superstitious nature of seamen in
the middle of last century rendered awkward. There
was an old story of the French prisoners, when the
Médée was captured, that the wife of a gunner had been
murdered on board; and this now cropped up again,
when a seaman of good and sober character declared
that he had seen a ghost which told him the ship would
be lost. It was not without great difficulty that Walker
got his men ‘reassured; and even then, from time to
time, the old terror returned, and the cruise was not
successful. They met few ships, and what they did
meet were not prizes ; they got into trouble at Madeira,
where some of the men, in silly and ignorant jest, visited
a church and put some soot into the holy water; and,
cruising from there to the northward, they got into a
gale of wind.

It was by this time December ; the scantling of the
ship was slight for her size, her planks insecurely
fastened with iron nails whose heads were rusted away ;
her guns were too heavy for her strength, and she
236 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

suffered a violent shock from the fall of her main-yard,
the rope that supported it (strap of the jeer-block) having
given way. She thus leaked like a sieve; it was impos-
sible to keep her dry; it was soon deemed impossible to
keep her afloat. Walker consented therefore to make the
best of his way to the nearest port; but the men, panic-
struck and mindful of the ghost, formed a design to seize
the boats. This was frustrated by the captain’s watchful-
ness ; but from that time ‘he never quitted the quarter-
deck, nor once lay down for seven days, sleeping only as he
stood, leaning on the barricade or rail of the quarter-deck ;
for the men watched every motion and every word, and,
had he disappeared a minute, it is believed the duty of
the ship had stopped, the officers themselves sometimes
being as desponding as the men.’ And thus, after.
twelve days of extreme danger, they made St. Ives, on
the coast of Cornwall. Boats at once put off to their
assistance, and towed the ship into the bay; but her
anchors had been cut away long before, and she was
extremely deep from the quantity of water in her hold;
it was thus impossible to anchor her in the roadstead,
and difficult to tow her within the pier. This last they
attempted to do, but, with the heavy sea rolling into the
bay, she was thrown to leeward, and struck on the rocky
shore, parting asunder as she touched. ‘The land was
' fortunately near, and a great number of boats close at
hand, so, one way or another, all the men were picked
up, except four; and of these, three had seen, or had
persuaded themselves that they had seen, the ghost.
Walker’s ill-success did not, however, stand in the way
of his career; it was known that, but for his determina-
tion and conduct, the loss would have been a disaster,
GEORGE WALKER. 237

and he was presently asked to undertake a much more
important command.

During the summer of 1745 a number of London
merchants had fitted out three large privateers, which had
cruised in company, under the command of a Captain
Talbot as commodore. Their success had been enormous.
The share of each seaman amounted to 8501.; that of
the officers in proportion. The owners received the sum
of 700,000I., which, as the rebellion in Scotland was just
breaking out, they offered as a loan to the government.
Captain Talbot’s share would seem to have dulled his
appetite for adventure. He now joined himself to the
number of the owners, who resolved to fit outa still more
powerful squadron, the command of which they offered
to Captain Walker. The fame of Captain Talbot’s success,
and Walker’s reputation, ‘drew together such numbers
of seamen to offer themselves, that near as many were
refused as would have manned a like number of ships,
though at this time there was a great scarcity of hands,
both in the government’s and merchants’ service.’
There was thus little delay in completing the equipment,
and by the end of April, the four ships, King George,
Prince Frederick, Duke, and Princess Amelia, styled
collectively, the Royal Family, were ready to sail from
Bristol. They carried in the aggregate 122 guns and
970 men. In going out the Prince Frederick took the
ground, and the others, having waited for her till 3 May
put to sea without her.

On the 11th they saw a large fleet to leeward, and
drawing nearer, made them out to be merchant ships
under the convoy of several ships of force, which, how-

1 Beatson’s Naval and Military Memoirs, i. 294.
238 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY,

ever, were all to leeward of them. Walker saw his
opportunity and continued his course towards them.
They turned out to be the English outward-bound trade,
for Newfoundland and the West Indies, with the Milford
and Rye, ships of war. Walker went on board the Rye,
to inform the captain of the whereabouts of three French
men-of-war he had seen the day before; and in course
of conversation pointed out that had he been a French-
man, or, being English, had the fleet been French, he
could have made any number of prizes, and brought
them off in spite of the convoy. ‘ True, sir,’ answered
the captain (his name was Craven), ‘and what censure
would have fallen on his Majesty’s officers! And yet,
let me do all I can, these masters of common vessels who
sail better than the rest will keep to windward ; for as
to firing at them, I have done it till I am tired, and may
fire away every shot in the ship.’ In this instance,
Walker, stretching to windward, compelled the convoy
to bear down under the lee of their escort; but similar
misconduct was the rule of ships under convoy all
through last century, and was the direct cause of several
serious misfortunes.

The men had been engaged for eight months, and at
the end of that time, the Royal Family put into Lisbon,
having made prizes estimated at considerably over
220,000/., without the loss of a single man. There the
ships refitted, and the majority of the men entered for
another period of eight months; the place of those who
did not do so was easily filled up, and on 10 July, 1747,
the Royal Family again put to sea, being increased to
six by the addition of the Prince George, and of the
Prince Edward tender. Three days afterwards the Prince
GEORGE WALKER. 239

Edward foundered by reason of a curious accident. Being
in chase of a number of strange ships, and crowding sail,
the heel of her mainmast started out of the step; and
the mast forcing its way through the ship’s bottom, and
at the same time falling aft, sent her down immediately,
stern first. Her commander and two men only were
picked up.

After many interesting and exceedingly lucrative ad-
ventures, the squadron put into Lagos Bay to water, and
about five o’clock on the morning of 6 October, the King
George and Prince Frederick, having filled up, were
standing out of the bay, when they sighted a large ship
coming in towards Cape St. Vincent. The commodore
immediately made the signal to chase. He himself, in
the King George, of 32 guns and 300 men, tried to cut
her off from the land; the Prince Frederick, of 26 guns
and 260 men, to keep to seaward of her; the Duke and
Prince George, which were far to the eastward, but still
in sight, crowded sail after them; and a settee, acting
as tender to the King George, was sent in to hurry out
the Princess Amelia, which was still engaged in watering.
‘The chase,’ says our narrator, ‘seeing herself likely to
be hemmed in by the King George and Prince Frederick,
was obliged to bear away, making all the sail she could
to the westward, without doubt taking us for larger ships
than we were, whilst we took her-for a less than she
really was.’

What she really was, was the Spanish line-of-batile
ship Glorioso, of 70 guns and 700 men. From first to
last she had a strange adventurous voyage. Whilst
homeward bound from the Spanish main with an enor-
mous amount of treasure, said to be three millions, on
240 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

board, she had been met near the Azores by the English
ships Lark of 40, and Warwick of 60 guns. The Warwick
attacked her manfully enough, but, being unsupported
by the Lark, was reduced to a wreck, her masts shot
away, or crippled, her rigging cut to pieces, and the
Glorioso pursued her way. The captain of the Lark,
who was the senior officer, was tried by court-martial
and cashiered; but the mischief had been done. A few
days later, the Glorioso fell in with the Oxford of 50 guns,
in company with the Shoreham frigate and Falcon sloop ;
but these, recognising her as of superior force, left her
alone; conduct for which a court-martial afterwards
honourably acquitted them. And so the Glorioso got
safely into Ferrol, where she landed her precious freight,
and had sailed thence for Cadiz, when, as has just been
said, she was sighted off Cape St. Vincent by the Royal
Family.

The ships, as already detailed, continued to chase,
and about noon the King George came up with her. As
she did so, it suddenly fell a dead calm; and the two
ships lay within gunshot of each other—the Prince Fre-
derick being some distance to the southward, and the
others out of sight astern. Thus lying, the Spaniard
hoisted her colours, and ran out her lower tier, thereby
showing that she was a 70- or 74-gun ship; but there
was no wind to blow out her colours, or permit it to
be seen whether they were Spanish or Portuguese.! In
this state of uncertainty, and anxious, even if the
stranger was Spanish, to have the assistance of her

1 At that time both ensigns were white, with the royal arms in the
middle. Evidently, in a calm, it would be difficult or impossible to dis-
tinguish them.
GEORGE WALKER. 241

consorts, the King George made no’ sign, but waited for
the chase to take the initiative. Why, on the other
hand, the Glorioso did not fire at the King George as at
a target, it is impossible to say. Her treasure having
been landed, she had no uneasiness on that score; and
her heavy scantling and weight of metal made her, in
any comparison of force, superior to the whole Royal
Family together. She ought assuredly to have begun
by sinking the King George. But she did not; and after
about an hour of apparent indecision, ran in her lower
tier and shut her ports.

On board the King George, meantime, there was some
speculation as to. what the stranger was ; but the general
opinion was that she was a moneyed ship homeward
bound from the West Indies; and this was confirmed
when, as, about five o’clock, a light breeze sprang up
from the northward, she again put her head to the east.
The King George followed, but, the wind being extremely
light, did not come up with her till eight o’clock. The
Prince Frederick, not having got the breeze so soon, was
still far astern, and the others were quite out of sight,
even if it had been daylight. The moon shone brightly
and concealed neither the insignificance of the one nor
the huge bulk of the other, as the King George, ranging
alongside the Glorioso, hailed her in Portuguese; she
received no answer. She hailed again in English, and
was answered in English by a cross question, demanding
the name of the ship. On her reply, the Spaniard,
without further word or notice fired his whole broadside,
dismounting two of the King George’s guns, and bringing
down her maintopsail yard. This ‘salute’ was not un-
expected nor unprepared for; the men were lying down

R
242 STUDIES [IN NAVAL HISTORY.

at their quarters, and jumping up, returned it before the
sound was well out of the guns; and thus began a battle
that has absolutely no parallel in naval history:

There are plenty of instances of a frigate hanging on
to and embarrassing the retreat of a line-of-battle ship,
detaining her till some heavier ship came up. Thus, in
1756, the English 60-gun ship Warwick was brought to
bay by the French frigate Atalante; thus, in 1795, the
Berwick of 74 guns was captured by the action of the
Alceste; and thus, in 1800, was the French Guillaume
Tell of 80 guns delayed and finally captured by the per-
tinacity of the Penelope. Other noteworthy actions have
there been between frigates and ships of the line; as
when, in 1781, the French Minerve defended herself for
an hour against the 74-gun ship Courageux, being aided
by the heavy sea, which prevented the Courageux open-
ing her lower deck ports. But I know of no instance
except the present in which a frigate of any nation volun-
tarily placed herself, in smooth water and fine weather,
alongside an enemy’s ship of the line and engaged her
yard-arm to yard-arm ; and that this frigate should be
a much-despised privateer makes the affair still more
remarkable. The narrator of Captain Walker’s voyages
has tried to explain the peculiar circumstances which
rendered such an engagement possible. He says:

The Spaniards repeated their firings with incessant warmth,
but not with a continued execution ; for, though they fired as
fast as they could, yet their firings after the two first broad-
sides were extremely irregular, only firing four or six guns at
one time, owing, we may suppose, to the great weight of their
guns, which made them less governable than ours were to us.
And in this we had the advantage of them from our nearness ;
GEORGE WALKER, 243

for as we continued to fire our broadsides so equally regular
and well throughout the whole engagement, that the last was
near as good as the first, not a shot could possibly miss them ;
and thereby, also, the fire of our small arms took place, which,
like a storm of fiery hail, beat against the enemy with such
incessant force that, as we were afterwards informed, they
fled from their quarters more than once. .. .

All which amounts to little more than saying that a
12-pounder is lighter than a 24, and a line-of-battle
ship is easier to hit than a frigate; statements which
may be accepted as true, without admitting that they
explain the very remarkable facts of the engagement.
One condition alone was in the frigate’s favour. The
Spanish ships of that time, and through the century,
were remarkably large, stout, and roomy; but their
ports were so small that they could not admit heavier
ordnance than 24-pounders, and their sides were so thick
that the angle of training or depression was unduly
limited; and it might thus quite well happen that a very
inferior vessel, being outside this angle, could be reached
only by an occasional shot. Nevertheless, after about
three hours, the position of the King George began to
get critical. Most of her running rigging was cut to
pieces ; her maintopsail yard was shot away, her fore-
mast quite disabled, the mainmast badly wounded. ‘ We
could not work our ship, and bravery became a virtue of
necessity.’ There was all this time so little wind that it
was half-past ten before the Prince Frederick came up
and drew off some of the enemy’s fire. She did more—
she put the enemy to flight; for the Glorioso, not caring
to continue the fight with two, when one had kept her
so well employed, made sail at eleven o’clock, and so

left them.
R2
244 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

The English loss of men was trifling compared with
what might have been expected: the King George had
but one man killed and fifteen wounded, though of these
seven afterwards died; the Prince Frederick had three
men severely wounded. The King George was, however,
so shattered that Captain Walker would not run the risk
of ordering the Prince Frederick to hang on to the flying
enemy: it was too possible that he might himself stand
in need of her assistance. But with the. morning the
state of the King George was less threatening, and the
Duke and Prince George having also come up, Walker
sent the three in chase of the Spaniard, following slowly
in his own ship.

And shortly, coming in from the eastward, was seen
a large ship. After an anxious hour, she was made out
to be an English man-of-war—a ship of the line; and
Walker, to save time, sent one of his little tenders to
her with a note, hastily explaining the situation. She
was found to be the 80-gun ship Russell, homeward
bound from the Mediterranean ; and her captain, Buckle,
sending a verbal message to Walker, thanking him for
his intelligence, crowded sail in pursuit. After the
Russell came the Princess Amelia, which also was sent
on; and so, pursued and pursuing, they passed away to
the westward, the crippled King George being left a long
way astern. And suddenly her anxious officers saw the
flying enemy in hot action with the headmost ship. This
they took to be the Prince Frederick, but the distance
was too great to make her out. The fire was exceed-
ingly brisk. Walker was inclined to blame her captain
for engaging so determinedly without support, and said,
“ Dottin will fire away all his cartridges and be obliged
GEORGE WALKER. 245

to load with loose powder, by which some fatal accident
may happen.’ The words had scarcely left his lips,
when the ship at which their eyes were straining
appeared a pillar of smoke. ‘Oh, Heavens!’ he cried,
‘she’s gone. Doittin and all his brave fellows are now
no more.’

_ The ship was indeed blown up, but she was not the
Prince Frederick. The Dartmouth, of 50 guns, cruising
to the westward, had heard the firing of the previous
night, and was plying to windward to see what it was all
about. She thus fell in with the Glorioso, and engaged
her in a running fight, which, as the two ships closed,
gradually became warmer, until by some accident, never
explained, the fire reached her magazine, and she blew
up. The Prince Frederick, then fast coming up, had
her boats out at once, but of the 800 that formed her
crew fourteen only were saved. One of these, a young
lieutenant named O’Brien, a cadet of the Inchiquin
family, had been blown out through a port, and was
picked up insensible on top of a floating gun-carriage.
He recovered himself as he was being taken on board,
and greeted Captain Dottin with the light-heartedness
once supposed to be a national characteristic. ‘ Sir,’ he
said, ‘ you must excuse the unfitness of my dress to come
aboard a strange ship ; but really I left my own in such
a hurry that I had no time to stay for a change.’
Appalled, we may believe, by the fate of the Dartmouth,
the privateers ventured no further attack, though they’
still continued the chase; but about one o’clock in the
morning the Russell came up alongside and within pistol-
shot of the flying enemy. A couple of guns, fired rather
as asummons to surrender, were responded to by her
246 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

broadside; and the action, thus begun, continued with
great warmth for nearly five hours, when, about six
o’clock, the Spaniard’s maintopmast was shot away, upon
which he directly struck.

All the fime of the engagement (wrote Captain Buckle
in his official letter) we were within musket-shot of each
other. Both ships are in a very shattered condition: all my
stays and backstays, a great many of my shrouds, and the
boats shot through and through. I called to them to get
out theirs, but they was in the same condition, which obliged
me to stay until one of the privateer’s boats came on board,
when I immediately sent her away for the captain. . . . The
time of the action I was greatly put to it, having but 400
men when I begun, Mr. Byng! having stripped me to that
number when I left him, and twenty of them were sick and
not able to come to their quarters. Upon this consideration,
being so very weak, and their numbers so much superior, I
have sent away the Prince George privateer with 230 of the
prisoners, to Lisbon, under the convoy of her consort the
Prince Frederick, with a letter to our minister there relating
thereto. I have also taken 100 of the privateersmen on board
me, and sent away the same number of our own on board the
prize. I find myself obliged to leave between 300 and 400 of
her seamen to help work her, but have this day taken out all
the powder to prevent their doing any mischief.

The very weak state of the Russell will partly
explain why the Glorioso, which did not destroy the
King George, was able to make such a long defence
against an 80-gun ship; but the Spanish 70-gun ships of
that date were extremely stoutly built, and thus capable
of a great deal of passive resistance. Notwithstanding
her heavy armament, her offensive powers were clearly

1 The Honourable John Byng, then (in 1747), as nine years after-
wards, to our woe, commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean.
GEORGE WALKER. 247

very limited, which may have been due to the causes
spoken of above. Her guns may have been, in some
measure, masked when in action with smaller vessels ;
and it would appear, from the report of Captain Erskine
of the Warwick, as well as from the experience of Captain
Walker, that her powder was bad—spoiled possibly from
careless stowing whilst in the tropics. It is only thus
that I can interpret Captain HErskine’s attributing his
small loss in men, though his rigging and masts were cut
to pieces, not only to—

First, the enemy being a much higher ship, so his upper
deck shot on a level must have gone over us in close engage-
ment, which is the reason we suffered so much in our rigging,
mast, and sails; and as it was night, he did not perceive the
advantage of his height for his small arms. Second, his
endeavouring to dismast us to facilitate his escape.

But also to—

Lastly, his overcharging his guns with too great weight of
shot, that but few of them came through our sides, although
most part of the engagement we were within pistol-shot.

And the historian of Mr. Walker’s voyages, whilst
dwelling most especially on reasons similar to the first
and second of these, speaks also of the enemy’s shot as
not having force to come through, but sticking in the
ship’s side.

The King George was nevertheless a great deal
knocked about, and put into Lisbon to refit, her consorts
being directed to return to their cruising ground. Of
course their chagrin was great when they learned that
the Glorioso—which was said to have three millions
sterling on board—had landed her treasure at Ferrol ;
but it was the fortune of war, and they were doubtless
248 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

to some extent consoled by the reflection that they had
worthily assisted in bringing such a powerful enemy to
action. One of their owners, however, who had come
out to Lisbon, did not take quite the same view; and
going on board the King George almost as soon as she.
anchored, ‘ gave Mr. Walker a very uncouth welcome
for venturing their ship against a man-of-war.’ ‘Had
the treasure,’ said Mr. Walker, ‘been aboard, as I
expected, your compliment had been otherways; or had
we let her escape from us with that treasure on board,
what had you then have said ?’

After some months more cruising, without any
notable occurrence, peace was concluded, and, his ship
having been disposed of at Lisbon, Mr. Walker returned
home in the packet, which, on the passage, he, by
presence of mind and ‘bounce,’ preserved from an
Algerine corsair. Afterwards, he commanded a ship in
the North Sea trade; but, having lost what money he
had accumulated, and having got involved in a dispute
with his former owners about the accounts of the Royal
Family, as to the circumstances of which we have no
details, he was by them imprisoned for debt shortly
after the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, and kept
in durance vile during its continuance. His career may
thus be considered as having closed with the brilliant
episode of the capture of the Glorioso. Of his further’
life I have no account; but a notice in the Gentleman’s
Magazine tells us that he died on 20 September, 1777.)

I have related the career of Commodore Walker at
this length, because it seems to me to afford a remarkable
and typical instance of the good service which a privateer

1 Gent. Mag. vol. xlvii. p. 460.
GEORGE WALKER. 249

was capable of rendering, not only by destroying the
commerce of the enemy—though the value of the prizes
made by the Royal Family was said to amount to 400,0001.
—but, and more especially, by supplementing the work
of the royal navy. It is admitted that privateers are
not to be employed in future wars. The name, at least,
is abolished : the reality, in its more important character-
istics, will, I do not doubt, revive on the first pinch. If
the ships of the royal navy prove insufficient in number
for the requirements of a maritime war, they will assuredly
be supplemented in the future, as they have been in the
past, by the ships of private owners.

It seems, therefore, most desirable that the relation-
ship between the navy and the merchant service should
be re-established on something like its former footing.
Formerly, an officer of the merchant service could enter
the navy, be rated at once as a midshipman, and after
two years be made a lieutenant ; the number who did so
enter, and serve as midshipmen, master’s mates, masters,
and lieutenants, was considerable. If few rose beyond
the rank of lieutenant, it was that they were stopped by
want of interest rather than by their antecedents ; and a
sufficient number did rise to accentuate the possibility.
Formerly, also, on the other hand, an officer of the navy,
in time of peace—if a poor man, as a naval officer very
commonly is—took service in a merchant ship, almost as
a matter of course. He earned his living, he cultivated
his professional knowledge ; and when war again broke
out, he was as ready as ever

To point the guns upon the chase,
And bid the deadly cutlass shine.

This is—unfortunately, as I think—a thing of the
250 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

past. Nowadays, when a naval officer finds it difficult to
get employment—a difficulty that in time of peace ‘is of
common occurrence—he retires; he goes into trade, he
becomes a stock-broker, a wine merchant, an ironmonger,
a grocer, a director of companies, or whatnot? He earns
his living —sometimes ; but the quarter-deck knows him
no more. It is not only that he has been taught from
his boyhood to look down on his brothers of the merchant
service; it is that they also, by a feeling of reciprocity,
are doubtful about him. On this point I may quote the
words of Sir Donald Currie:

An immense additional advantage by way of strength to
the Royal Navy and to our maritime power would be drawn
from the union of the Mercantile Marine with the Royal Navy,
in the event of war. At present, there is so much jealousy
between the services, that naval officers cannot get employment
in merchant shipping to the extent to which their merits
entitle them. The captain or officer of a merchant ship has
no chance of joining the navy. But this interchangeableness
or harmony of action would engender such feelings of mutual
sympathy and support as would present a power of vital energy
and patriotic vigour such as Russia, France, or Germany can
never be expected to display. }

I fully believe, with Sir Donald, that the gain to the
country by thus drawing closer the bonds between the
two services, would be enormous—an increase of power
and efficiency which might prove of the most vital
importance. I believe also that it would conduce to
another gain of very great and real, though, as compared
to the increase of efficiency, of secondary importance—it
would, and more and more each year, tend to reduce the

! Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. xxiv. (1880),
p. 92.
GEORGE WALKER. 251

naval estimates, now swollen, in time of peace, to some-
thing like eleven millions sterling. The retired pay of
officers who have been virtually driven out of the service
by the necessity of living, however small it may be to the
individual, amounts, in the aggregate, to a very large sum.

If war was declared and our fleet suddenly increased, the
active list of all ranks would have to be increased in
proportion. Juniors would have to be promoted by hun-
dreds. War, in the present day, however sharp and de-
cisive, would probably be short; and on the return of
peace—with or without honour—the overloaded list would
be again reduced by some system of retirement similar to
that previously enforced. The country would thus have
to pay, not only its officers for doing the work, but also
a very large and continually increasing number for not
doing it; would, in short, be taxed in order to maintain
the gulf between the queen’s and the merchants’ ser-
vice. But if this gulf is itself an evil, why should it
be maintained? I believe that it is an evil, and that it
might be done away with—not by any violent or radical
innovation, but rather by a judicious return to the practice
of the past. The exclusiveness, which I deplore, is itself
the innovation; a thing but of yesterday—of yesterday,
that is, as compared to the age of our navy, which I love
to trace back beyond the times of the Tudors, beyond the
times of Ethelred or Alfred, back even to those early
times when our rude forefathers scoured the North Sea,
and made ‘the Saxon shore’ no safe dwelling-place for
folk of Welsh blood or unfriendly tongue.
252 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

CHAPTER VIII.
THH FRENCH PRIVATEERS.

I. JEAN BART.!

In one of the most solid of his essays,? Mr. (not then
Lord) Macaulay drew an interesting and instructive
comparison between the policy of the Church of Rome
and that of the Church of England, in respect of their
treatment of enthusiasts-—a class of men whom the one
converts into dangerous enemies, the other into grateful
and energetic supporters. ‘The Church of Rome,’ he
said, ‘ unites in herself all the strength of establishment
and all the strength of dissent. With the utmost pomp
of a dominant hierarchy above, she has all the energy
of the voluntary system below.’ A man may be vulgar,
ignorant, and extravagant, yet ready to do and suffer
things which it is for her interest that somebody should
do and suffer. ‘She accordingly enlists him in her ser-
vice, assigns to him some forlorn hope, and sends him
forth with her benediction and applause.’

If it were allowable to do so, a somewhat similar .
comparison might be made between the naval systems
of France and England. Notwithstanding its popular

1 Fraser’s Magazine, March, 1882,
? Ranke’s History of the Popes.
JEAN BART. 253

origin and national growth, notwithstanding the glories
of the Elizabethan age, and the stout-hearted if un-
scrupulous service of men like Drake, or Hawkyns, or
Frobiser, the English navy, becoming, during the last
two hundred years, more and more a close body, has
ended by excluding from its ranks all talent, all genius,
all energy, except that which has been regularly culti-
vated within itself. This exclusiveness has, undoubtedly
its advantages. In a service like ours, scattered, in
peace, all over the world ; whose captains have frequently
to take on themselves diplomatic or political functions,
to exercise magisterial powers, to decide on questions of
national right or international law, it is well that its
officers should be trained by a strict and uniform edu-
cation and discipline to the performance of the many
and varied duties which may, without warning, be
thrust upon them. There is thus a tendency for them to
become more and more citizens of the world; for their
conduct to be judged at home by their tact and delicacy
in settling disputes abroad, without trouble to the govern-
ment or excitement to the newspapers.

It is, no doubt, a very great convenience to a govern-
ment to have such a body of diplomatic agents spread
over the world. But, after all, the first requirement for
the navy is efficiency in war; as compared with that,
every other quality is of little value; and there is per-
haps room to think that this, in its fullest extent, is not
to be obtained by barring a seaman from fighting for
his country, because the accident of his birth and up-
bringing has kept him clear of her Majesty’s training
ships. The rule, though more absolute now than ever
before, is no new one. Early in last century it was
254 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

ordered that no one should be made a lieutenant unless
he had served six years at sea, two of them in the rating
of midshipman on board one of his Majesty’s ships;
and this regulation was seldom broken through—never,
perhaps, without some quibble which family interest
suggested and permitted. The rule gradually changed
itself into one still stricter: it became customary to
require six years’ service in the navy as a qualification ;
and though this was done without admiralty order, the
examining officers commonly enough enforced it.

In 1740 it was proposed to Mr. Walker—whose for-
tunes I have related in the last chapter—to enter the
king’s service. He refused; for, by the regulations, he
could not enter in any capacity higher than midshipman;
and even as a lieutenant, he would have been loth to
serve except in an independent command. But Walker
was undoubtedly a man who, under a more elastic
system, might have proved a worthy compeer of
Saunders or Saumarez or Brett. Another and similar
instance is that of Captain Phillips, of the Alexander
privateer, whose name was a good deal talked of in 1746.
His Majesty’s ship Solebay, of 20 guns, had been picked
up on the coast of Portugal, in the summer of 1744, by
the French fleet under M. de Rochambeau, and had been
since fitted out as a French ship of war. On 10 April
(0.8.), 1746, she was standing into St. Martin’s Road, in
the Isle of Ré, in convoy of a ship laden with naval
stores, when she was sighted by the Alexander, chased,
and captured. The account given to the admiralty, by
Captain Phillips himself, was that he came up with the
Solebay just at the entrance of the road, and boarded
her athwart the bowsprit, sword in hand, and cut her
JEAN BART. 255

out, about 3 p.m.; the wind at §.9.W., fair for his run-
ning in and coming out. He was asked how many men
she had on board, and answered ‘ that she had 230, and
he had but 140; that they kept a very bad look-out, but
as soon as he boarded her they were forced to fly from
their quarters; they killed fifteen of her men, and he
lost but three.’ !

A private letter from Mr. Legge,? one of the lords
of the admiralty, to Anson, who also was a member of
the board, adds, ‘The king has been spoken to in rela-
tion to Captain Phillips, who retook the Solebay, and is
so well satisfied with his behaviour, that he gives us
leave to reward him as we think proper. In all respects
the action seems to be as gallant as one need wish to see
in a summer’s day. Phillips himself is very desirous to
be made a captain in the king’s service. But this, we
suppose, you will have a great objection to, as well as we
have. Medals and money, we think, should be given
liberally, and should be glad of your thoughts, and his
Grace’s (the Duke of Bedford, then first lord of the
admiralty), if with you, upon this subject.’ Eventually
the acknowledgment took the form of 500 guineas in
cash and a gold medal of the value of 200 guineas; and
Mr. Phillips was heard of no more in naval history. Of
his antecedents we now know nothing: he gave his
address at Lloyd’s Coffee House, and was therefore
presumably of respectable appearance and behaviour :
that he was a good seaman and a gallant officer would
seem beyond question ; and of such, in that gloomy year
of 1746, the service had not one too many.

1 Admiralty Minute, 29 April, 1746.
21 May, 1746. Barrow’s Life of Anson, 139.
A

\

256 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Considering this point of discipline and order, it is
interesting to examine how it has been dealt with in the
navy, to which, more than any other, it was our lot
during the last century to be opposed. We find that the
French have gone on a system not, indeed, diametrically
opposite to our own, but still differmg from it in an
extreme degree. The French navy as reorganised by
Colbert was, in name and reality, a purely aristocratic
corps. The officers, necessarily of noble family, entered
as cadets, under the name of gardes de la marine, and
formed a most exclusive body, jealous, im an extreme
degree, of their privileges and their birthright. Officers
who, in the beginning, were entered from the merchant
service, were styled ‘blues’ (officiers bleus),) a term
analogous, in usage at least, to the English ‘tarpaulin’
of the seventeenth century. The ‘hostility of the more
aristocratic gardes towards the ‘blues’ was unrelenting:
as ensigns, they might be tolerated; but as lieutenants,
we are led to understand that they had a very rough
time of it. In the long run, the feeling against the
‘blues’ proved too strong; officers from the merchant
service seldom rose to the higher ranks; the navy con-
tinued the most aristocratic service under the Crown,
and at the Revolution paid the penalty, in being denuded
of officers.

In the regular line of navy, then, there was no room
for those ‘ blues’ who aimed at distinction; they stood
aloof from it, taking service rather in private ships of
war, which thus attained an importance in the scale of
national defence far beyond that of the English priva-

1 So called from their uniform breeches being blue. The more aris-
tocratic officers of the navy wore red breeches,
JEAN BART. 257

teers. It seems to have been no unusual thing to confer
naval rank on these men; to permit them the use of a
king’s ship ; to sanction their engaging a ship’s company
under the king’s authority, though at private cost, and
to warrant their cruising against the enemy in the
interest and advantage of those who fitted her out, as
well as of the country at large. Ships so cruising were of
course privateers in name and in reality, but privateers
of a force and efficiency which strictly private ships of
war were scarce likely to equal; and, with little or no
cost to the government, they formed a powerful supple-
ment to its established navy. Large ships, even ships
of the line, were frequently so employed; and though
these were sometimes owned by private individuals, they
were more commonly lent by the king; for, though
wealthy and patriotic merchants or corporations might
equip such, they were clearly of a strength and cost
beyond the requirements or the commercial advantage
of the mere freebooter.

This custom, which seems to have grown up or, at
least, to have received a marked development after the
battle of Malaga (18-24 August, 1704), gave rise to a
curious difficulty about the exchange of prisoners, the
circumstances of which are best detailed in the official re-
presentation of the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded
to Lord Dartmouth, one of the Secretaries of State,
1 March, 1710-11.) It runs thus :—

The French king, within these four years having had no
fleet at sea, has made a sort of piratical war, and for that
purpose has not only given great encouragement to privateers,

1 Home Office Records (Admiralty), No. 28.
258 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

but also lent his capital ships, with guns and ammunition, to
such as would be at the charge of fitting them out and arming
them as they call it ‘on course,’ and these men of war are
then called ‘corsairs.’ Sometimes they are commanded by
the French king’s officers of a lower rank, as a lieutenant of
a capital ship, a lieutenant of a frigate or an ensign of a ship ;
and sometimes they are commanded by one who never had
any commission of the French king, but only an order from
the Secretary of State for marine affairs and a commission
from the Grand Admiral of France; and this is the case of
M. de Varennes, who (as we are credibly informed) is no more
than a garde-marine, and had only for that voyage and that
course a commission from the Count de Toulouse to command
the Happy, a man-of-war of 60 guns. As the French would
never recede from their demands about the exchange of our
commanders of 6th rates, sloops and brigantines, and as
(notwithstanding these reasons given by us, that they had
neither commissions as captains, nor any rank in the fleet)
the French did still insist that the said commanders (being
actually in the queen’s service and pay’ could not be exchanged
but as captains of men of war, that is, for 20 men, we have
complied with it; but at the same time, whenever any of the
French king’s ships of force have been taken, we thought we
could do no less than to propose an exchange of the com-
manders of the said ships for our captains of men-of-war, or
for 20 men. To that end we gave leave last year to M. de
Varennes and lately to M. Lamoinerie, commander of the
Superbe, a ship of 56 guns,! to go into France, taking
their parole to return into England after three months, in
case they could not procure their exchange for a captain
of a British man-of-war, or 20 men; and by these means we
thought to have established that as a rule in the exchange.
But it seems the French court is unwilling to yield that point;
and for that purpose M. Pontchartrain has sent back M. de

‘ Captured by the squadron under Admiral Aylmer in the Soundings,
30 July, 1710.
JEAN BART. 259

Varennes, according to the term of his parole, and (as we are
informed) he will send back M. Lamoinerie.

Your lordship sees now where the point lies. The French
pretend that a private commission of the Grand Admiral does
not give any post or any rank in their navy, and they will not
allow of any to be sea-officers but those who are commissioned
by the French king himself. To this we answer that the
queen gives no commission, and that the commanders of our
men of war have no other commission but from the Lord High
Admiral of Great Britain, or the Lords appointed to execute
that office; and we cannot but think the commission of the
Grand Admiral of France to be equivalent to that of the Lord
High Admiral here.

In the next place we have a very great disadvantage in
that part of the exchange. All our officers having their com-
missions by them when they are taken, there cannot be the
least dispute about their rank, and the number of men to be
allowed for each; but it is quite otherwise with the French.
Within these two years we have taken three or four large
French men-of-war, and when we receive the list of the
prisoners, we find a vast number of officers, as first, second
and third captain, three or four lieutenants and as many
ensigns ; but when we come to examine into their qualities,
most of them allege they are not the French king’s officers
but only corsairs, having only the Grand Admiral of France’s
commission ; and in the very case of M. de Varennes, as also
M. Lamoinerie of the Superbe, they pretend there is not one
officer. This we look upon as chicanery, for at this rate, if
we could take the whole French fleet, perhaps they would not
allow one single commander to be the king’s officer. This
we signified to [the French agent for exchange], as also that
we had nothing to do with their new distinctions between
corsairs and French men-of-war, when in reality they were
the same ships. . . . The argument of M. de Varennes that
he has no rank nor post in France, and should be commanded
at sea by the least officer of the king’s, is of no weight with

s 2
260 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

us, since we are not to be governed by their rules and by their
subordination of their marine officers; besides that our com-
manders of 6th rates, sloops and brigantines, have no more
rank in the British fleet than M. de Varennes has in France,
and as for what the French commissaries have alleged, that
this is a new pretence set up by us, nothing of it having been
mentioned in our original agreement, we own it is a new
proposal; but they must also confess that their turning their
French men-of-war into corsairs is likewise a new thing.

The French, however, seem to have carried the point,
which told much in their favour, not only with respect
to the corsairs, but also on account of the practice,
which continued through the century, of appointing lieu-
tenants to the command of frigates or even ships of the
line. M. Chadeau de la Clocheterie, who commanded
the Belle-Poule in her song-renowned combat with the
Arethusa, was a lieutenant, and was immediately after
the action promoted to be captain. Had the Belle-Poule
been captured, M. de la Clocheterie’s value in the table
of exchange was 10 men; if, on the other hand, the
Arethusa had succumbed, Captain Marshall’s value was
15 men, although the Arethusa was by much the smaller
ship of the two. As to corsairs the old rule held; their
captains were exchangeable for 4 men.! And yet, even
at this time, some of the corsairs were very large.

In the summer of 1780, the Comte d’Artois, a 64-
gun ship lent by the king, and commanded by a lieutenant
of the navy, was for some time a very serious trouble on
the south coast of Ireland. No ordinary cruisers could
tackle such a foe. At last Captain Macbride, in the
Bienfaisant, of 64 guns, was sent to look after her, and,
in company with the 44-gun ship Charon, fell in with

1 Code des Prises (1784), p. 832.
JEAN BART. 261

her on 18 August, off the Old Head of Kinsale. The
Comte d’Artois was crowded with men—her ship’s com-
pany numbered upwards of 600; that of the Bien-
faisant certainly not more than. 500, probably not more
than 450. The Charon was at some little distance,
and the Comte d’Artois attempted to close with her
principal antagonist, and carry her by boarding. ‘It
was a daring though unsuccessful attempt,’ wrote Cap-
tain Macbride ; ‘after an hour and ten minutes’ smart
action, her rigging and sails cut to pieces, twenty-
one men killed and thirty-five wounded, she struck.
The Bienfaisant had three killed, twenty-two wounded,
one man slightly wounded in the Charon.’ The Bien-
faisant had been three years in commission and several
times in action; she had thus, even without the support
of the Charon, a distinct advantage over the compara-
tively untrained privateer : had the Comte d’Artois been
able to lay her on board, and bring on a hand-to-hand
fight, with her superiority of brute force the result might
have been very different.

But this is only one instance of the great force of
some of these private ships of war. Another may be
cited in the 50-gun ship Apollon, which on almost
exactly the same spot captured the Anglesea, of 40 guns,
on 29 March, 1745 (O. 8.), an event to which the decision
of the consequent court-martial gave a tragic interest.
The Anglesea was caught quite unprepared, her captain
having persuaded himself that the ship coming down on
him before the wind was his consort, the Augusta. He
was killed by the second broadside; so also was the
master; the first lieutenant was on shore, sick; the
second lieutenant, Baker Phillips, on whom the command
262 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

devolved, was a young man of scanty experience; he
consulted hastily with Mr. Taaffe, the third heutenant,
and the boatswain. There seemed nothing to be done;
the ship was in no posture for fight, and lay at the mercy
of a more powerful enemy. He ordered the colours to
be struck; and it is difficult, even now, to see what else
he could have done: but the court-martial assembled
to inquire into the affair, whether influenced by the
political crisis then pending, by a suspicion that Mr.
Phillips was an adherent of the House of Stuart, and
had traitorously betrayed his trust, or on some other
grounds more difficult to conceive, pronounced that he
had not done his duty, that he had not done his utmost
to put the ship in order of fighting, or to encourage the
inferior officers and men; and therefore sentenced him
to death—to be shot by a platoon of musketeers: but,
having regard to the distress and confusion the ship was
in at the captain’s death, when he came to the command,
and to his being a young man and inexperienced, they
recommended him for mercy. This recommendation the
Lords Justices refused to act on, and the sentence was
duly carried out. There is a romantic tradition—but,
as far as I have been able to trace the course of events,
quite unsupported by facts—that the wife of Mr.
Phillips, on the refusal of the Lords Justices, obtained
a pardon or reprieve for her husband from Queen Caro-
line; that she herself posted to Portsmouth, the bearer
of this message of mercy, but arrived only to find that,
at his own request, in order to avoid the pain of a parting
interview with his wife, the hour of his execution had
been anticipated, and he was already dead.

Another instance, which I may not omit, is that of
JEAN BART. 263

the Elizabeth, a 64-gun ship, belonging to the king,
but privately fitted out, in 1745, to convoy the young
Pretender to Scotland. Whilst on this service she was
met, on 9-20 July, broad off Ushant, by the Lion of
60 guns, commanded by Captain (aftewards Sir Peircy)
Brett. The two ships pounded each other to a standstill,
and made the best of their way to their respective ports.
‘As I was not so happy as to take him,’ wrote Captain
Brett, ‘I have only the satisfaction left that I spoiled
his voyage.’ He mentions also one little incident of an
especial interest, and which has, I think, been generally
misrepresented. In company with the Elizabeth was a
small ship of sixteen guns, on board which Prince Charles
and his personal staff were tempting their fortune. I
believe it is commonly said that this small ship—no
match, of course, for the Lion—made off at once during
the engagement. This was not the case. What Captain
Brett, quite ignorant of the peculiar circumstances, wrote,
is—‘ The small ship, in the beginning of the engagement,
made two attempts to rake me; but I soon beat him off
with my stern chase. He did us little or no harm; and
after that lay off at a great distance.’ That she after-
wards pursued her way, whilst the Elizabeth put back—
her voyage being spoiled—is, of course, matter of familiar
history.

More remarkable than any of these are the Mediter-
ranean campaigns of M. de Lage, during the years
1745-6; campaigns which in England have been little
known, because, in truth, there is little to know; the
noteworthy-facts about them being the peculiar circum-
stances of their organisation and equipment. M. de Lage
was not a nice man. I know of nothing about him
264 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

worthy of admiration or approval, except, perhaps, his
excessive impudence. Some forty years before, he had
gone, in the train of the Bourbons, into Spain; and
voyaging from there to the Pacific, and, in some way or
other, trading between China and Peru, had got together
a very considerable fortune. On his return to Spain, by
mingled self-assertion and bribery, he obtained a com-
mission as captain in the Spanish navy, and was ap-
pointed to the San Isidro, of seventy guns, in which ship,
and in the fleet under Navarro, he served during 1740,
1741, and 1742.

In the course of this latter year he was separated
from the fleet in a gale of wind, and took refuge in
Ajaccio; where on 2 March, 1748, his ship was burnt by
Commodore Martin, whose respect for the neutral port
was satisfied with sending a message to the governor
that he was going to attack the enemy’s ship, but would
give him time to order his people out of the way, unless
the Spanish ship fired first.

De Lage, after this, seems to have been borne as a
supernumerary on board the Spanish flagship; he was
in her in the indecisive action fought off Cape Sicie on
11-22 February 1744; and took charge of the ship when
her captain was killed and the admiral wounded. After-
wards, with his bombastic humour, he did very real
service to the English. He claimed for himself the
honours of the day. According to him, the Real would
have been taken had he not fortunately been on board.
The captain was killed; the admiral was an arrant
coward, who went down to the cockpit, and sat there on
a coil of rope, with his face buried in his hands. It was
he, De Lage, that defended the ship against the Marl-
JEAN BART, 265

borough ; it was he that pointed the guns which sank
the fire-ship; it was he that did everything. The
French, already sick of the Spaniards, gladly accepted
De Lage’s story, and scouted their allies as not able even
to defend their own ships. A deadly feud between the
two services was the consequence; and any concerted
action of Spaniards and French became an impossibility.

After this, Spain was no safe dwelling-place for De
Lage. He returned to France, and, with unblushing
effrontery, succeeded in persuading the Duke de Pen-
thiévre, then Admiral of France, that he, De Lage, was
the hero of the age, the one man who might re-establish
the old glories of the French navy. The duke accord-
ingly gave him a provisional commission as commodore,
and authority to equip, at his own expense, a squadron
of two ships of the line and two frigates. The ships’
companies were to be stronger than those in the king’s
service; were to be subject to the same discipline, and
their pay was to be one-third more than usual, in ad-
dition to their share of prize-money and a provision for
their widows. Soldiers of the marines were to be allowed
him in the same way ; with the additional condition that
an indemnity of forty francs was to be paid to the cap-
tains of companies for each one who deserted or was
killed ; and the number of these available not being suffi-
cient, he was authorised to raise a company of 150 men.

Notwithstanding the high pay offered, the sailors had
the greatest repugnance to embark in this expedition ;
they had an idea it was bound to the West Indies, where,
a few years before, the squadron under the Duke d’Antin
had lost nearly half its men by sickness; and they had
a special dislike and mistrust of De Lage himself, whose
266 STUDIES. IN NAVAL HISTORY.

manners and language and actions spread terror amongst
the seafaring population all along the coast. The ap-
pointed levy was not sufficient to man him; and the
want was increased by continual desertions. He there-
fore, on his own authority, instituted a press, and laid
violent hands on all the fishing and coasting boats. On
this, all the sailors of the neighbourhood took to the
mountains ; the terror spread, and the inhabitants of the
villages followed ; the petty officers, who had always been
counted on, also went off, and the workmen in the dock-
yard, afraid of being sent on board the ships, were no
longer to be found. Proclamations and punishments
were of no good, and not till after De Lage had sailed
did things resume their wonted course. This was in the
middle of April, 1745.

Fifteen days after his departure, De Lage returned,
his ships having been damaged in a gale. His temper,
and insolence, and the airs which he—a mere privateer,
as they considered him—put on, had rendered him hate-
ful to all the officers of the port; and it was with the
greatest difficulty that the commander-in-chief could ob-
tain for him the necessary assistance. Again, and once
again, he put to sea, and each time returned after a short
and unavailing cruise. In a fourth attempt he succeeded
in capturing two small prizes of no great value, and in
safely bringing in a convoy to Marseilles. But at each
return his men deserted by scores; after this last, they
went off in crowds, even by swimming, in spite of De
Lage’s threats, sword and pistol in hand. They com-
plained of ill-usage and of bad provisions. During the
last cruise sixty men had died, and on coming into port
200 had been sent sick on shore. Finding himself thus
JEAN BART. 267

weakened, De Lage resolved to lay up the largest of his
ships, one of seventy-four guns; but it was not till
January 1746 that the others were ready for sea, and-
they were still sadly short of men. Even the sailors
they had were ready to desert if they got the chance:
they feared the voyage, suspected they were not likely to
get any prize money, and doubted even of their wages.
Finally the squadron put to sea on 2 April; it consisted
of the 54-gun ship Oriflamme, and the two 80-gun
frigates Diane and Volage.

On 4 April, being then in the neighbourhood of Cape
St. Martin, on the coast of Spain, the Volage, which
had chased out of sight of her consorts, fell in with
the Stirling Castle of 70 guns. She took to flight, the
Stirling Castle pursuing. A stern chase is proverbially
a long one: the Stirling Castle could only fire her bow
guns, and those occasionally and with but little effect ;
with her stern guns the Volage manfully held her own ;
it was not till after her main-topmast was shot away,
and she lay exposed to the Stirling Castle’s broadside, at
short range, that she hauled down her colours. During
the night she rolled away her fore-topmast and her mizen-
mast; and the next morning, whilst her captors were
trying to get her a little in order, the Oriflamme and
Diane came in sight. The Stirling Castle had herself
received a good deal of damage from the Volage’s stern
guns, and her captain hastily judged that she was not
equal to the two ships of the enemy. He abandoned his
prize, leaving in her a lieutenant and twenty-five men,
and some of the prisoners. The Volage was thus retaken ;
but De Lage made no attempt to pursue the Stirling
Castle, feeling probably, on his part, sufficiently well
268 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

satisfied to be left alone. For not destroying the Volage,
the captain was afterwards reprimanded by a court-
martial; but at that time our naval prestige was not
brilliant ; and for a 70-gun ship to decline an engage-
ment with a ship of 54 guns, supported by a frigate, was
considered prudent and not blamable.

This affair, however, put an end to De Lage’s cruise ;
he returned to Toulon, where he arrivedon1 May. The
three ships were put out of commission; but the men’s
pay was not forthcoming. The thing had been a specu-
lation, and had not succeeded : no prizes had been taken,
and neither M. de Lage nor the merchants who had fitted
him out had the necessary funds. The accounts were
thus not settled for a long time; and the greater part of
the charge would seem to have been eventually defrayed
by the government.!

Notwithstanding the scale of his adventure, or,
perhaps I should rather say, in consequence of the very
peculiar circumstances of his equipment and his dis-
mantling, as well as the very slight success that attended
his cruising, the name of De Lage has no great place in
the naval history of France. A different fate has been
that of some of De Lage’s predecessors; men who,
starting from a much lower point than De Lage, and
with much less pretension, did accomplish a good deal,
and achieve a renown which, overspread with much
fable, has towered over all the more orthodox glories of
the French navy. Of these, the most remarkable in
point of popular fame is Jean Bart.

Ii is difficult to explain—indeed, I do not clearly

1 VY. Brun, Guerres Maritimes de la France: Port de Toulon, ses
armements etc., tom. i. pp. 311-319.
JEAN BART. 269

know—why popular fancy should have taken hold of
Jean Bart for the sort of apotheosis with which he
has been honoured. In general estimation he is the
ideal and quintessence of heroic achievement and naval
glory; a sort of French counterpart of Drake, Hawke,
Rodney, and Nelson, all rolled into one, with an
additional seasoning of Faulknor, Sidney Smith, and
‘brave’ Broke. Bartiana are innumerable; and he has
been the subject of as much fable and as wild romance
as Arthur or Charlemagne. Possibly enough some
Englishmen have thus been led to look on his very
existence as a myth. This, however, is a mistake. He
was, in his day, a very real personage, a bold seaman
and a successful cruiser; his services, as such, were
acknowledged and rewarded by the king; but his very
peculiar fame—which belongs principally to a later
period—is, I believe, due to his being of very humble
origin; it was thus a glorification of the ‘ people’ that
afterwards claimed the attributive ‘sovereign,’ and a
protest against the imbecility and ignorance of some
courtly favourites of the ruling ‘ harlotocracy.’

Jean Bart,’ a native of Dunkirk, and thus by birth a
subject of France, but by blood a countryman rather of

1 There are three lives of Jean Bart which have some pretensions to
being original works. One by Richer, published in 1776, which is little
more than a collection of floating legends. One by Eugéne Sue, published
in 1835 under the imposing title of Histoire de la Marine francaise,
which is in reality an absurd romance; the author’s part of the work
scarcely pretends to be authentic, but it contains a number of original
papers, letters, and reports, which are really valuable. The third is that
by Vanderest, published in 1840; undoubtedly the best, though far
indeed from perfect. All others (and they are very numerous) are based
on these, mostly on Richer ; they appear as éloges, chapbooks or volumes
in libraries for the young, and have no historical value whatever.
270 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the Tromps and De Ruyter, was born in 1650, of poor
but perhaps not too honest parents: his father and his
grandfather before him followed the sea; privateers—
not without a taint of piracy—in time of war, as French-
men, or Dutchmen, against Spain ; and in time of peace,
fishermen, coasting traders, and apparently smugglers.
In some such employment Jean Bart spent his early
years; but in 1665 or 1666 he is said to have taken
service with the Dutch, and, if tradition may be accepted,
under the personal command of De Ruyter himself. In
this there is nothing improbable; he was certainly more
Dutch than French; and there is no difficulty in the
way of our believing that he was present in one or both
of the actions of 1666, and at the burning of the English
ships in the Medway in 1667. He continued in the
Dutch service for six years ; he is said to have risen in it
to the rank of lieutenant, which is possible, and—as he
was a bold man and a thorough seaman—not improbable.
IT accept, then, the statements that he learned his early
seamanship, that he acquired his intimate knowledge of
the coasts and tides of the North Sea as a fisherman
and a smuggler; and that he gained his first experience
of naval war and naval discipline under De Ruyter.
When war between France and Holland broke out in
1672, his double nationality pulled each way; but he
elected to be a Frenchman. As by blood and by six
years’ service he was a Dutchman, it is not, perhaps, too
uncharitable to suppose that the commerce of the Dutch,
incomparably richer than that of the French, was the
lure that decided his choice ; that it seemed to offer more
direct profit and advantage ; whilst, on the other hand,
he would have, as a Frenchman, fewer rivals. That
JEAN BART. ‘271

this is the correct view of his conduct would appear
more probable from the fact that, on returning to France,
he did not seek for service under the crown, although
the young navy was then mustering its strength to send
forth the squadron which, under D’Estrées, was effec-
tively, or in appearance, united with the English during
the campaigns of 1672 and 1673. On the contrary, he
entered on board a Dunkirk privateer, where he saw a
better opening for his talents, and served in a subordi-
nate capacity for two years; it was not till 1674 that he
was entrusted with a small command. Here he quickly
came to the front, and till the end of the war continued
actively cruising against his former associates, in com-
pany with others, like himself, of doubtful nationality—
men with such names as Keyser, Jacobsen, Doorn, or
one, if not three, that appears in French travestied as
Hennarker, Mesmaker, or Neumarker.

That his cruising was fairly successful may be as-
sumed. Some of his prizes are spoken of as frigates—
whether state’s ships or privateers is uncertain; and
though he seems thoroughly to have understood the im-
portant tactical axiom that ‘two are greater than one,’
and with the help of Keyser, Jacobsen, or others, to have
taken care to be in the majority at the point of attack,
we may easily believe that he had numerous opportunities
of proving his courage and determination, as well as his
forethought and tactical skill. Especial mention is made
of his capturing the Neptune, of 30 guns, and the Palme,
of 24, a feat which, added to others before it, brought
his name to the notice of the minister. On 18 Sep-
tember, 1676, Colbert wrote to the superintendent of
Dunkirk :—
272 ‘ STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

His Majesty has been pleased to learn that a Dunkirk
privateer, commanded by Captain Jean Bart, has taken a
Dutch man-of-war of thirty-two guns. As it is important to
stimulate these captains to continue the war which they wage
against the Dutch, herein is enclosed a gold chain, which his
Majesty has thought fit to award to Captain Bart, as a recom-
pense for what he has done.

The letter then continues:

As his Majesty might derive considerable advantages from
these privateer captains of Dunkirk, if they would form them-
selves into a squadron under the command of one of their
number, in order to carry on the war against the enemy, his
Majesty desires you to forward a nominal list of the captains,
with a report as to their several characters and capabilities,
a statement of what they have done during the war, and of
the size and efficiency of their ships: and also to ascertain
whether, in return for such aid as his Majesty might be able
to give them, as, for instance, by furnishing them with ships
for the cruise, free of payment, or by offering other advan-
tages, they could be induced to carry out the plan above
mentioned.

To this, on 24 September, the superintendent replied
that, if such a scheme should be carried out, he believed
most of the privateers would willingly serve under Bart,
who, though still young, had won a high reputation
amongst them by his bravery and success. ‘ But,’ he
added, ‘on whatever service they are ordered, their
actions will depend on their own interest, and I think
that they will be ready to receive and requite the assist-
ance his Majesty proposes. At any rate, it will induce
them, when cruising, to consider ships of war as a special
object of attack.’ And a few days later, 28 September,
after more exact inquiries, he wrote :—
JEAN BART. 273

The thing still seems to me feasible, if the proper measures
are taken with the merchants and the seamen, who are always
mistrustful of engagements for the service of his Majesty. If
you are prepared to lend the king’s ships without payment, I
would recommend that one should be put at the disposal of
Captain Bart and his owners, who have lost by his last
voyage, and who now ask, as a recompense for the capture of
the Dutch man-of-war, the remittal of the claim of the ad-
miralty, instead of the regulation grant of five hundred livres
per gun. If this should be allowed, it will put into the heads
of other owners to desire the same, and thus to give in to your
ideas of utilising them. All the rest will be easy.

To this is appended an exact list of thirty-three pri-
vateer captains belonging to Dunkirk, with fifteen frigates
and twelve smaller craft.

Colbert’s design, however, fell through, whether from
jealousy amongst the shipowners and the several cap-
tains, or because the government was not prepared to
pay what these would have considered an equivalent for
giving up the more lucrative branch of privateering to
follow the more warlike ; and thus Jean Bart continued,
in company for the most part with his friend Keyser, to
cruise against the Dutch for the private advantage of
himself and his owners.

After the peace of 1678, he received a commission as
lieutenant in the navy, which he is said to have accepted
unwillingly, preferring to be the captain of his own
ship, if only a privateer, rather than a lieutenant, even of
a king’s ship. It was urged on him that he would pro-
bably be a captain at the end of a year. ‘I’ma captain
already,’ he answered. ‘Of a king’s ship?’ was sug-
gested. ‘Of a Dunkirk privateer,’ was his reply. In
point of fact, Bart probably knew very well the discom-

T
274 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

forts to which he would have been subjected, had he
consented to leave the social rank to which he was born
and bred, to enter one whose restraints his rough temper
would have felt to be unbearable. He thus never served
in the subordinate capacity, but in 1681 was appointed
by a certain M. Omaér, a shipowner of Dunkirk, to the
command of a small squadron which he fitted out
against the Salee pirates. The expedition was, however,
so far sanctioned by the government that it hired out
the frigate Vipére to M. Omaér, and allowed Bart his
pay as a lieutenant. Bart applied for pay as a com-
mander (capitaine de frégate), but this was refused. On
3 June he put to sea in the Vipére, with two smaller
ships, and off the mouth of the Tagus fell in with the
frigate Mutine, commanded by M. de Béthune, a captain
in the navy (capitaine de vaisseau), who took Bart’s little
squadron under his orders, and a few days later drove
two of the Salee rovers ashore on the coast of Portugal.
The pirates were seized on shore by the Portuguese, who
made slaves of them, and at first refused to give them
up, a refusal which drew forth a letter, 6 August, from
Colbert to the French ambassador at Lisbon :—

The King understands that the Chevalier de Béthune and
the commander of the Dunkirk frigates, having met two Salee
vessels, engaged them, and drove them ashore, one near Cape
Mondego, the other at some other place on the coast; and as
the Turks who were on board these vessels clearly belong to
those who defeated and reduced them to this extremity, his
Majesty orders me to acquaint you that it is his desire that
you represent this to the Prince of Portugal, and earnestly
move him to be pleased to give the nevessary orders to have
the said Turks given up to the Chevalier de Béthune and the
Dunkirk commander.
JEAN BART. 275

From all which it appears that Lieutenant Bart’s
share in the transaction, such as it was, was merely of
secondary importance, and very different from what his
eulogists—ignoring M. de Béthune and the Mutine
frigate— have represented it to be.! Amidst the tissue
of fiction woven round Bart’s history, it is refreshing to
come across a passage of which the late M. Jal has given
us an authentic account.

Bart’s cruise was of no long duration; on 15 Oc-
tober he arrived back at Dunkirk, peace having been
made with the Moors; and during the next seven years
would seem to have been engaged in the peaceful pur-
suits of commerce, though he is said to have been em-
ployed during the autumn of 1683 in giving effect to the
aggressive policy of Louis XIV, and, whilst cruising in
the Serpente frigate, to have seized on a Spanish ship
laden with 350 soldiers for Flanders. This is doubtful ;
but it is at any rate certain that for a few months in the
following spring he did command the Serpente, then
one of a small squadron which, under M. d’Amblimont,
cruised for the protection of the coasting trade against
the Ostend privateers.?, His commission as commander
(capitaine de frégate) was dated 14 August, 1686; but he
had no further service under the government until the
breaking out of the war with Holland and England,
when he was appointed to the frigate Railleuse, of 24
guns.

In the early days of this command he is said to have
been guilty of an act of the most unmitigated brutality,

1 Jal’s Abraham Du Quesne et la Marine de son temps, ii. 390.
2 Ibid. ii. 479. M. Jal clearly does not attach any credit to the story
of the Spanish transport: I am inclined to think it true in fact, but

that M. Vanderest has wrongly dated it.
T 2
276 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

which even modern French writers have professed to
admire, as worthy, they say, of the heroic virtue of a
Brutus or a Manlius. In an engagement with a Dutch
privateer, his son Cornil, a child of ten years old, showed
symptoms of fear. Enraged at such behaviour in a
child of his, Bart, with his own hands, bound the boy
to the mainmast, and kept him there so long as the
fight lasted, preferring to expose his son thus to the
greatest danger, rather than permit him to survive as a
coward. We may not quite see the greater bodily danger
to which the boy was exposed, though there can be little
doubt of the mental; but, in point of fact, there is no
reason to suppose that the story has a word of truth in
it. There is absolutely no evidence in support of it,
beyond some hearsay gossip that Richer picked up and
printed nearly a hundred years afterwards. It was
then, as it has been ever since, the aim to describe Bart
as a brutal ruffian, a character which had unspeakable
charms for the Jacobin spirit then latent, but shortly to
attain such a terrible development.

The events of the following summer are more his-
torical. In the early spring Bart was directed to take
under his command the Chevalier Forbin in the Ser-
pente, and to go to Havre, thence to convoy a number
of ships to Brest. Forbin was an officer of the aristo-
cratic navy, a brave man and a good seaman, but boast-
ful to an extreme degree, full of contempt for all ‘ blues,’
mixed with hatred of the particular one under whose
orders he was now put, or—as he would have preferred
to say—with whom he was associated. His memoirs,
written professedly by himself, and certainly under his
direct sanction, are most amusing, but very far from
JEAN BART. 277

trustworthy.! The reputed author assumes to himself
throughout the principal part in every adventure of
which he had a share, and loses no opportunity of say-
ing spiteful things of his companions, especially of Jean
Bart, whom he describes as tall, stout, well-made, but
of mean presence, rude in manner and in speech, unable
to read, or write beyond signing his name; brave, indeed,
but without talent, and quite unequal to any compre-
hensive design. The memoirs of Forbin would, by
themselves, be of little historical value, but they become
useful when compared with other records, and on their
negative evidence full dependence may be placed. When
they omit a story that tells in favour of Forbin, or to
the discredit of Jean Bart, the omission amounts almost
to proof of that story’s falsehood.

It was in May, 1689, whilst convoying some twenty
merchant vessels to Brest, that these two were met off
the Casquets by the Nonsuch, of 48 guns, commanded
by Captain Roomecoyle. They vainly attempted to per-
suade the convoy to stand by them and make a good fight.
The merchant ships fled, and the Railleuse and Serpente
were taken after a stout resistance, in which the captain
and master of the Nonsuch were killed, the command
devolving upon the boatswain, Robert Sincock, who took
the prizes into Plymouth, and was shortly afterwards
promoted to the rank of captain. Bart and Forbin were
meantime put in prison; but, as their good luck had it,
a kinsman of Bart’s, commanding an Ostend vessel—
probably a small privateer—put into Plymouth, and being

1 Mémoires du Comte de Forbin, Chef d’Escadre, Chevalier de l’Ordre
Militaire de St. Louis. 2 vols.12mo. Amst. 1729. They are reprinted

in the Petitot collection.
278 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

informed of Bart’s condition, went to see him. He was
easily persuaded to assist in a project to escape, the more
readily as Forbin had been able to get a bill cashed, and
had plenty of ready money. A Flemish surgeon who had
been allowed to visit them, and two boys told off to attend
on them, were also made parties to the plot. The Ostender
had a boat ready for them, with provisions and a compass.
The surgeon got them a file; they filed away the bars of
the window, twisted their sheets into a rope, and went
down. There was no further obstacle, and they embarked
without delay. In going out through the Sound they
were hailed by a man-of-war, near which they were
obliged to pass. Bart could speak sufficient English, and
answered ‘ Fishing-boat!’ and so they got clear out to
sea. The weather was fine, though foggy, and without
further adventure they made the coast of Bretagne, near
St. Malo, after a passage of nearly forty-eight hours,
Bart having rowed the whole time without resting except
to snatch a mouthful of food.

Their bold defence and their hazardous escape com-
mended them to M. de Seignelay, the minister of the
navy, and they were both promoted to be captains
(capitaines de vaisseau) ; nor was it long before further
employment was found for them. In December, Bart
was appointed to the Alcyon, a frigate of 830 guns, which
during the next year was attached to the grand fleet
under Tourville, and was present at the battle off Beachy
Head. This seems to have been his only service with
the fleet. During the rest of the war he was employed
strictly as a cruiser in the North Sea, slipping in and out
of Dunkirk with a skill and craftiness that set the watchful
care of his enemies at defiance. These evasions were s0
JEAN BART. 279

numerous that it is difficult, if not impossible, to dis-
tinguish them; but in no one instance were they made
by force. I note this specially, as giving the direct lie to
one of the silliest and most absurd of the stock stories of
his biographers. It is said that, on going to court, the
king asked him how he had got out of Dunkirk. On this,
he ranged some dozen of the gentlemen standing round
in a crowd before him; then suddenly rushing into the
thick of them, knocking down some, tripping up others,
or violently elbowing them on one side, he passed through,
and turning round, said, ‘ That’s the way I did it.’ And
we are gravely called on to believe that the king laughed
approvingly at this outrage, and that the gentlemen of
his court tamely endured it. Our conception of a French
gentleman at the end of the seventeenth century is widely
far of the mark if such conduct would not have ensured
M. Bart’s being spitted on one of a dozen small swords
before the day was an hour older.

Although it is not exactly stated, it is implied by
Richer, whom all follow, that this incident took place
after his cruise of 1691. Now, in this cruise he was
accompanied by Forbin, who has given us an account of
it that, in many details, is worthy of belief. If by any
stretch of conscience Forbin could have boasted that they
passed out by force, or even with any risk of it, he would
certainly have done so. What he says is—

We put to sea in the night-time, passed without any obstacle
through intervals between the enemy, and sailing very well,
were by daybreak out of sight of them. Towards the next
evening we saw four sail steering the same course. Bart was
at first of opinion that these were enemy’s ships, detached from
the blockading squadron in pursuit of us ; but I pointed out to
280 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

him that, as we had been out of sight of the enemy in the
morning, as our ships were clean and all fast sailers, and as
we had been carrying a press of sail all day, it was quite
impossible for any of the blockaders to have thus gained on us.

They were, in fact, he says, three English merchant
ships, under convoy of a 44-gun ship, all of which they
took and sent into Bergen. They then came across the
Dutch herring-fleet, with a man-of-war, which they took
and burnt; afterwards landed on the coast of Scotland
and burnt some houses, but were driven off by the yeo-
manry, and so went on to join their prizes at Bergen.
In all this, allowing for Forbin’s exaggeration and bragga-
docio, there is nothing in the least unlikely; but none of
our naval histories mention the circumstances of the
cruise further than Burchett, who has shortly—

About this time—the end of July—fifteen or sixteen
privateers got out of Dunkirk, and ranging along the northern
coast, under command of Monsieur Du Bart, landed in North-

umberland, where they burnt a house of the Lord Widdrington’s
and did some other mischiefs.

Burchett is generally correct, so far as he goes; but it
appears from Hodgson’s ‘ History of Northumberland’
that it was in 1698 that the French burnt some cottages
belonging to Lord Widdrington, though it is possible
enough that they paid two visits to that remote and
exposed neighbourhood.

Bergen is the scene, and this autumn of 1691 is there-
fore the time of another absurdity of Bart’s biographers.
He made there, says Richer, the acquaintance of an
Englishman commanding a large ship, who expressed
the great desire he had to meet him at sea. This Bart
assured him would be quite easy, if he chose to wait a few
JEAN BART. 281

days, which the Englishman agreed todo. When he was
ready, he therefore sent the Englishman word that he
would sail the next day, who answered, with all his heart,
but meantime invited Jean Bart to breakfast. At first,
unwilling to interchange any such civilities with an
enemy, Jean Bart refused ; afterwards, however, he
consented, and went on board. He breakfasted, drank
his glass of brandy, smoked his pipe, and said, ‘It’s time
to go.’ Said the Englishman, ‘No: you’re my prisoner.
I have pledged my word to carry you to England.’ Jean
Bart, with a look of rage and indignation, lighted his
match, and rushed out of the cabin, upsetting some of the
crew who were in his way, and calling out, ‘No! I am
not your prisoner! I will blow up the ship.’ So saying,
and holding the lighted match, he ran to a barrel of
powder which they had, by chance, hoisted up out of the
magazine. This barrel, we may suppose also by chance,
must have been open. The English crew, in this immi-
nent danger, were panic-struck, and the Frenchmen from
the neighbouring ships, having heard Jean Bart’s cry, at
once took boat, came on board in numbers, cut down
many of the English, made the rest prisoners, and took
possession of the ship, which they carried out of the
neutral port and brought safely to Dunkirk.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the numerous absurdities
of such a story: it is sufficient to say that Forbin, who
dwells in some detail on their stay in Bergen, does not
speak of it. We may be quite sure that if they had
captured an English ship of war there, or an English
ship of any kind, Forbin would have described himself as
the captor; that if there had been anywhere an open
barrel of powder, Forbin’s would have been the hand
282 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

that held the match. On their return from this expedi-
tion, the two presented themselves at Court. ‘Here comes
Forbin with his bear,’ said the courtiers, according to
Forbin. If the bear had been guilty of any distinct
barbarism, Forbin would certainly have told us of it; and
this negative evidence is, I have already said, positive
proof that Bart did not engage the gentlemen-in-waiting
in fisticuffs, nor insist on smoking in the anteroom.

It would be tedious, as well as difficult, to follow out
in detail M. Bart’s numerous cruises, in all of which,
either by ruse or good fortune, he eluded our blockading
squadrons. But his principal achievements were against
the Dutch. In the summer of 1694, in command of a
squadron of six ships, ranging from one of 54 guns
downwards, he encountered a similar Dutch force, which
had made prize of a large grain-fleet destined for France.
This squadron he engaged, captured two of the ships of
war, recaptured the convoy, and in a season of great
scarcity, brought the grain safely in. It was in acknow-
ledgment of this service that he received letters of nobility,
and was made Chevalier of the Order of St. Louis.

In 1695, when the English fleet under Lord Berkeley
made an unavailing attack on Dunkirk, Bart commanded
one of the forts, and took a prominent part in the defence ;
but perhaps his most brilliant exploit was in the summer
of 1696. In May of that year it became known in England
that Monsieur du Bart—as he was always called on this
side of the water—was preparing to sail from Dunkirk
with a squadron of nine ships. It was of course an
object to prevent him; the port was closely blockaded by
a large force, English and Dutch, of which Rear-Admiral
Benbow had the command. Benbow, in his boat, went
JEAN BART. 283

almost into the harbour ; found that the enemy was ready
for sea, and, from the wind and tide, was led to suppose
that they would attempt to go out by the north passage.
He took his measures accordingly. The next day was
hazy ; when the fog lifted on the following morning, Bart
and his ships were not to be seen. They had slipped out
through the east passage. To look for them was a vain
task. On 30 May the English admiral learnt that Bart
had been seen to the northward ; he wished to follow; but
the Dutch contingent, having been put under his orders
for the blockade of Dunkirk, refused to go with him else-
where. Bart meantime was on the Dogger Bank, in the
neighbourhood of which, on 18 June, he fell in with a fleet
of seventy Dutch merchant ships, under convoy of five
ships of war, of inferior force. These last he captured
and burnt, dispersed the convoy, and took some thirty of
them. He was interrupted by the approach of a large
fleet of what seemed to be men-of-war. If they really
were so, they must have been Dutch; for Benbow spent
the summer vainly looking for him. Bart, like a will-o’-
the-wisp, seemed to be everywhere, except where he was
heard of. It was not till the middle of September that
Benbow succeeded in getting a distant view of the object
of his search, and then the pursuit was to little purpose ;
his only satisfaction was that by falling in the day before
with a number of English and Dutch East Indiamen, he
had kept them out of the Frenchman’s clutches. After
this Bart returned into Dunkirk, and laid up for the
winter ; but his services were considered deserving of
special recognition. He was promoted to the rank of
commodore (chef d’escadre) in a letter from the king,
which, in no commonplace manner, praises his bravery
284 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

and conduct, ‘as having been useful to the state during
the scarcity of provisions,’ and adds, ‘that after having
entrusted him at different times with the command of our
squadrons in the North Sea, in which he has acquitted
himself to the advantage and glory of our arms, it is just
to join to the duties of commodore, the rank also, and
the privileges.’ This is dated 1 April, 1697, and may be
considered as closing his peculiar career. His only service
in the new rank was the conveying the Prince de Conti,
a candidate for the throne of Poland, to Dantzic, in the
following September.

M. Jal, at once the most learned and the most accurate
of French naval historians, assures us that Bart carefully
selected his squadron, taking with him none but light
fast-sailing ships, because he knew that the important
mission was entrusted to his reason and prudence rather
than to his courage; and that thus he passed without
misadventure through those seas where the English and
Dutch were cruising.! The voyage is, in fact, now and
to us, principally remarkable as affording a text for what
is perhaps the most absurd of the many absurd stories
which are supposed to illustrate Bart’s character. During
the passage, it is said, his little squadron was chased by
the enemy’s fleet. Bart, as soon as they were reported,
called his son, the same whom eight years before he had
bound to the mainmast, and who, thanks to that rude
lesson, was now fit for any service, however desperate—
and gave him whispered instructions. The chase con-
tinued for eight hours—-from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. is specified—
at the end of which time the enemy was no longer in
sight. Bart then went down to the cabin, where the prince,

' Dictionnaire Critique, s.v. Conti,
JEAN BART. 285

knowing nothing of the day’s excitement— though it
had lasted over breakfast and dinner time—was quietly
sitting.

‘You’ve had a narrow escape, Monseigneur,’ said he.

‘What do you mean ?’ asked the prince.

‘Why,’ answered Bart, ‘that we've been chased by
three 80-gun ships and nine frigates; we’ve run them
out of sight, and there’s nothing more to fear.’

‘ The devil! Monsieur Bart: but if they had taken us ?’

‘Oh, Monseigneur, that was quite impossible.’

‘Eh! what? why impossible?’

‘ Because,’ answered Bart, ‘I had stationed my brave
Cornil in the gun-room with a lighted match, and strict
orders to put it into the powder if we should be over-
powered.’

‘Good heavens!’ cried the prince, ‘you would never
have done such a thing!"

‘Certainly I would have done it,’ said Bart. ‘It shall
never be said that I let you be taken, when the king
ordered me to take care that you were not taken.’

This stony, utterly absurd and entirely without foun-
dation, is supposed to illustrate the unflinching and de-
sperate courage of the man; many other stories equally
absurd, equally without foundation, have the same ten-
dency. French writers and gossipmongers have chosen
to represent him as of the most reckless courage, d’une
bouillante intrépidité, which went headlong against all odds,
with uncalculating impetuosity. The other side of his
character, according to the same illustrations, was a
violence of manner, a coarseness and indecency of lan-
guage, which have rendered his name almost proverbial,
and more especially won the affections of the sans-culottes
286 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

of the Revolution. For these stories there is no historical
evidence ; they are absurd, improbable, impossible on the
very face of them; but I reject them, in the mass, not
for their absurdity, improbability, or impossibility, but
because there is no trace of them for more than fifty
years after Commodore Bart’s death, which happened,
peacefully in 1702, just as the new war was breaking out.
It is these absurd inventions which have stood in the way
of Bart’s fame; people, English people especially, have
doubted the worth of the hero of such fables. But putting
on one side everything which is not historical, his repu-
tation will rise far higher; he will then appear, not as a
coarse, imbruted ruffian, but as a bold seaman, a skilful
pilot, and a daring warrior; of undaunted courage, but
crafty and prudent, rather than blindly ferocious; illite-
rate, it may be, but not uneducated ; rude in speech and
gesture, but not bestial; in fact, neither god, nor devil,
nor baboon; an enemy, but still a man.

Of Bart’s personal appearance I can say nothing
beyond what Forbin has told us, which should, perhaps,
be read with the most favourable interpretation. There
are, indeed, pictures of him in existence ; whether contem-
porary or not, I am unable to say ; but, judging of them
from prints I have seen, they differ so widely from each
other, that it is utterly impossible they can all be likenesses.
In his private capacity he seems to have been amiable
and domestic; a fond husband and an affectionate father.
He was twice married, and left a numerous offspring,
whose descendants still keep alive in France his deservedly
honoured name.
287

CHAPTER IX.
THE FRENCH PRIVATEERS.

II. DU GUAY-TROUIN.!

Ir we put on one side the peculiar and more than half-
mythical history of Jean Bart, there is perhaps no officer
of the French navy whose fame has taken deeper hold of
the popular fancy than Du Guay-Trouin. Itis certainly
more widely spread than that of Tourville, Gallissonniére,
or Suffren, any one of whom a critical judgment might
pronounce superior to him in the qualities of high com-
mand. Tourville, although, indeed, with a considerable
superiority of force, won, off Beachy Head, the one decisive
French victory over a fleet of which the English formed
a chief part; Gallissonniére, by cool skill and cautious
bravery, turned the blundering and the negligence of
his antagonist to good effect, and was the real captor of
Minorca ; and Suffren, in the Hast Indies, distinguished
above all his compeers by his audacious and restless
energy, showed himself in tactical genius the direct pre-
cursor of our own Nelson. But though history acknow-
ledges these as the greatest names in the French naval
chronicle, and though the names of large ironclads or

1 Fraser’s Magazine, April, 1882.
288 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

cruisers keep alive among seamen the memory of their
distinguished services, to the intelligence of the great
mass of the people their fame is, as I understand it, at a
far lower pitch than that of Du Guay-Trouin. This may,
to some extent, be due to the fact that Du Guay-Trouin’s
exploits had about them an adventurous and personal
character which was wanting to those of the other officers.
Ihave named. Suffren, for instance, served principally:
on board ships of the line and in large fleets; he never
held any independent command, never was employed on
detached service, until, as a commodore, he sailed for
the East Indies. Du Guay-Trouin, on the other hand,
never served except as his own commander-in-chief.
Whether the force with him was large or small, it
was his; his personality thus pervades the whole of his
career, and renders him the one prominent feature in
every action in which he had part. This circumstance
had undoubtedly a very great influence in the spreading,
or rather—if I may use a French word which has no
exact English equivalent—in the vulaarisation of his
fame; but much is still due to the fact that the man
was sprung from the ranks of the people, was amongst
naval officers a ‘ blue,’ and nothing but a ‘blue.’ This
appealed to the secret instincts of a large body of the
people; and when Hawke or Boscawen or Rodney were
capturing or destroying the king’s fleets, and banging!
the aristocrats who commanded them, it was pleasing to
the unwitting fathers of future republicans to remember
that the time had been when an officer whom the aris-
tocrats looked on with scorn, had reversed the fortune of

1 This is the word used by a naval minstrel of last century. See
post, p. 326.
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 289

the great-game, and had shown that the English might
possibly be beaten, even at sea.?

For at least a couple of centuries the Trouins had held
n leading place amongst the merchants and shipowners
ef St. Malo, and for many successive generations some
member of the family had been French consul at Malaga.
Yn the third quarter of the seventeenth century this
office was held by René Trouin, the younger brother of
Luc Trouin, who owned and commanded a ship named
La Vierge sans Macule, a privateer in time of war, a
trader, chiefly to the Spanish ports, in time of peace.
He possessed also a small landed property, La Barbinais,
from which according to custom, he took a distinguishing
name. This Luc Trouin de la Barbinais had married a
young Maloine, Marguérite Boscher, whose name, how-
ever, would seem to tell of a German or Dutch ancestry,
and by her had sons and daughters. Luc, the eldest
bon, was destined to succeed his father in the somewhat
mixed business which he carried on; the second, Rodolphe,
died young; the third, René, named after his uncle and
fodfather, the consul at Malaga, was born on 10 June,

} The principal authority for the life of Du Guay-Trouin is his own
Mémoires, published at Amsterdam in 1748, and since then in the
Petitot collection. The memoir by Cunat (Saint-Malo illustré par ses
marins, p. 170) is also a valuable, and in many respects an independent
work; that by Landelle is » mere compilation. Since this sketch was
originally written, another and interesting work has been published,
Duguay-Trouin et Saint-Malo, la Cité Corsaire, d’aprés des documents
inédits, par Abbé M. J. Poulain. A close comparison of the Mémoires
with our own histories, and with our unpublished records, has led me
to form a very high opinion of Du Guay-Trouin’s truthfulness : a certain
partiality or occasional exaggeration he may have yielded to, but
assuredly not to such an extent as our own historians, wlio had no
excuse but that of paltry and ill-timed ‘spread-eagleism.? The name
$s foreign: the vice is not—I grieve to say—un-English.

U
290 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

1678. There were two still younger, Etienne and
Nicolas.

In aceordance with the old and still prevalent custom
of Franee, René was entrusted to the nursing care of a
peasant woman living in the village of Le Gué, nigh to
the paternal estate, a simple circumstance which led to
his being afterwards known as Trouin du Gué, a name
which was gradually corrupted till it became Du Guay-
Trouin, and so, in his later years, he himself wrote it,
‘though officially he was René Trouin du Guay. As the
consul at Malaga enjoyed the friendship of the arch-
bishop, it was determined that his interest should be
used in favour of his godson, who was accordingly, at
an early age, sent to the college at Rennes, where his
young head was duly tonsured, and his neck encircled
with the little collar of the divinity student. René,
whose infancy had been passed on the wharf and
amongst the ships of St. Malo, and who had already
pictured himself a sailor, objected strongly to the process,
but in vain. Old Luc had a strong will, a keen eye to the
family interest, and had quite made up his mind that,
for his son number three, the clerical would be a profit-
able line of business. He died, however, in the spring
of 1688, and, as his brother at Malaga had died the year
defore, young René’s mother so far yielded to her son’s
objection to the church as to allow him to exchange it for
the law. The lad was therefore sent to Caen, where his
studies took the form of fencing, brawling, love-making,
and drinking. It was his ambition to fight a duel, and in
two or three he succeeded in getting himself duly pinked,
so that his time was pretty fairly divided between ‘the
preliminary dissipation and the resulting sick-bed. He
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 291

made the acquaintance of a professional gambler, ‘a
capital fellow,’ who taught him how to control fortune,
‘but,’ he adds, * of these lessons I never made any bad
use.’ He assisted an older comrade in the abduction of
a young girl, and finally, having got possession of some
twenty louis, set off to Paris for a spree. Fortunately
for the lad, his elder brother, Luc, now De la Barbinais,
who had succeeded his uncle in the consulship at
Malaga, had been driven home by the outbreak of war
between Spain and France. He was thus in Paris
when René came there, and the boy, accidentally
hearing his brother’s name, took fright, and forthwith
fled back to Caen. Here De la Barbinais found him a
few days later, and having been informed of his irre-
gular, not to say vicious line of life, took him home,
convened a family meeting to consider his case, and
straightway packed him off to sea on board the Trinité,
a so-called frigate of eighteen guns, fitting out as a priva-
teer by the house of Trouin. He was then just turned
sixteen.

It was the summer of 1689. War had broken out
with England and Holland, in addition to Spain. Pri-
vateering promised to be active, and René Trouin found
himself engaged in a life which offered all the charms of
excitement and adventure. He had fallen on his true
vocation, and, during this autumn of 1689 and the next
year, won golden opinions from the officers to whose care
he was entrusted ; so much so that in the spring of 1691
his brother, De la Barbinais, the head of the house,
judged him fit to command one of their cruisers. He
was thus barely eighteen, and had been at sea not more
than nine or ten months in all, when he was appointed

n2
292 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

captain of the Danycan! of 14 guns. His popular
biographers attribute this speedy promotion to his sut-
passing merit. Without questioning this merit, we
would rather attribute it simply to his relationship to
the head of the firm; for to talk of his being under the
circumstances a thorough seaman is downright nonsense.
The Danycan had no sooner got to sea than she was
caught by a gale of wind and blown right out of the
Channel. She managed, however, without any great
harm, to put into the Shannon, where, as the storm
moderated, Trouin landed in Clare, pillaged, burnt a
couple of vessels lying in the mud, and embarked again
in face of a detachment of troops from Limerick. The
remainder of his cruise was to no purpose. The Danycan
sailed so badly that she could not overtake anything,
and on her return to St. Malo her young captain was
transferred to the Coétquen, of 18 guns. In this he put
to sea on 4 June, 1692, having, it is said, a commission
from the ex-king of England, James II, and in company
with the Saint-Aaron, of similar force, commanded by a
certain Jacques Welch, the son of an Irishman settled
at St. Malo,? and now commissioned by King James.
These two ships cruising together presently fell in with
a large fleet of English merchantmen, of which they took
five and the two small men-of-war that formed their
escort. They were standing, with their prizes, for the
Breton coast, when they were chased by an English
squadron. The Saint-Aaron and the prizes got into
St. Malo, but the Coétquen’s retreat was cut off, and she

' The name of a family of St. Malo ship-owners and corsairs. Conia
St. Malo, éc., p. 272.
2 Cunat, Saint-Malo, &., p. 248.
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 293

only escaped by running into the shoal water and in-
tricate passages inside the Isle of Brehat, and so into
the anchorage of Erqui, nine leagues to the westward.
Here the English ships could not follow, and in attempt-
ing to do so got into great danger. Trouin himself,
when he wished to come out, was sorely put to it, for
his pilot, and all the officers who might have taken his
place, had been killed or wounded. If, as he has re-
corded, he brought the ship out without previous know-
ledge and without assistance, it speaks vastly more for
his nerve and power of command than does the capturing
of dozens of defencelesg merchantmen, or of the pitiful
small craft then employed to convoy them. It speaks
also of a wonderful instinct or intuition, and of a great
deal of good luck, for, as is shown on our modern charts,
the place is as nasty a one as a sailor would wish to see
his ship in. For the rest of the cruise he had the entire
charge. A storm drove him into the Bristol Channel.
He anchored under the lee of Lundy Island; but pre-
sently an English ship of 60 guns was seen making for
the same shelter. The position of the Coétquen was
critical, but Trouin cut his cable, and went out on one
side of the island whilst the enemy was coming in on
the other. It was some time before the line-of-battle
ship could get round and followin chase. The Coétquen
sailed well, night came on, and she escaped; and, after
capturing two West Indian ships laden with sugar,
Trouin returned to St. Malo. In this cruise he had
undoubtedly shown himself possessed of the ready wit
and presence of mind requisite for his adventurous pro-
fession. The strain which had been put upon him
enforced the lessons which were presented to him, and
294 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

under such circumstances a man such as René Trouin
learns quickly.

Towards the end of the year his brother gave him
the command of the Profond, of 32 guns; a king’s ship
equipped for cruising on terms of partnership between
the government and the house of Trouin. The govern-
ment provided the ship with her rigging, naval stores,
and armament, receiving in return one-fourth of all
prizes. The merchants found the officers and men,
their pay and provisions. The ship, though built and
fitted as a man of war, was to all intents a privateer,
although probably better suited to the work than an old
merchant ship turned into a cruiser by the simple pro-
cess of putting a few guns on board. The Profond sailed
from Brest in the last days of December 1692 ; but. she
proved a dull sailer, and her cruise was every way un-
successful and unfortunate. A Swedish man-of-war met
her in the night, mistook her for an Algerine pirate,
and engaged her warmly till daybreak ; fever broke out
amongst the crew ; she had eighty men sick; and finally,
early in March, had to put into Lisbon in great distress.
On returning to Brest, Trouin was, in June, appointed
to the Hercule, of 28 guns, also a king’s ship, fitted out
in the same way as the Profond, and after a fairly suc-
cessful cruise, came back to Brest in the end.of the year.
His next ship, still on the same footing, was the Dili-
gente, of 836 guns and 250 men, in which he sailed from
Brest on 16 January, 1694, and after cruising for a
couple of months off Cape St. Vincent and the entrance
of the Straits, was joined in the Tagus by the Hercule,
now commanded, for the same owners, by a M. de la
Bouéxiére, and having, as second captain—or, as we
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 295

would say, first lieutenant—Trouin’s cousin, Jacques
Boscher. Off Ushant they fell in with four Duteh mer-
chant ships, which would appear to have been East
Indiamen ; at any rate, they carried from twenty to
thirty guns; and the one that was engaged by the Her-
cule succeeded in beating her off. The Diligente, of
greater force, and more daringly commanded, captured
the commodore of the squadron, but the others escaped.
The prize was sent in under the command of Boscher;
and, Trouin separating himself from La Bouéxiére, by
whose misconduct, cowardice, or ill-fortune he felt him-
self aggrieved, went for a solitary cruise in the English
Channel.

On 3 May he was chased by the Prince of Orange, of
60 guns,! and finding that the Diligente could leave her
at pleasure, he kept ahead under easy sail, flying the
English ensign, which, presently, by way of insult and
bravado, he tied up into a weft, thus making to his
pursuer the signal to ‘come on board.” Hereupon the
Prince of Orange fired three or four guns at him, which
Trouin—who about this time began to be publicly called
Du Gué—returned, forgetting or careless of the fact that

1 A hired ship, but evidently of force, even if not quite of sixty guns.
She was on her way from Milford to Plymouth, with a fleet of celliers in
convoy, and her log for this day reads :—‘ April 23 (0.S.).—This. morn-
ing see a sail in the SSE, who came bearing down to us, which proved
to be a French privateer of fifty guns, who, finding how he wronged us
in sailing, played with us, we using our endeavour to speak with him,
firing several shot at him, and he too at us again, under English colours ;
but viewing us well, made sail from us, being, as I suppose, for pur-
chase which might be easierly gotten. Land’s End, SE3E., 6 leagues.’
‘May 8 (0.8.).—Yesterday evening anchored in Plymouth Sound.’ Her
captain at this time was Samuel Vincent, afterwards favourably known
in his association with Benbow in the West Indies.
296 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

he was under English colours. And so they separated,
But nine days later, on 12 May, the Diligente fell in
with a squadron of six ships of the line then cruising °
between the Land’s End and Cape Clear, which chased
her in amongst the Scilly Islands, and having shot away
her fore and main topmasts, captured her, notwith-
standing all the fine things Captain Trouin du Gué
meant to do if untoward fate had not prevented him.
The affair, as simply described from the English point
of view, offers nothing very remarkable. I quote from
the journal of Captain Thomas Warren, of the Monk,
merely translating his dates into ordinary reckoning :—

May 2 (0.8.), 1694:—At 4 this morning had sight of a
sail SE of us. Commodore made a signal to chase—a hard
gale—all gave chase. At 10 saw Cape Cornwall, at which
time I was within five miles of the chase—the Adventure
close by her—he hoisted his colours, and the Adventure his—
the former, a white ensign—-the Dragon next to the Adven-
ture. All run in between Sicily and the Seven Stones. At
11 the Adventure fired several broadsides into her, he in the
meantime plying his stern chase. At noon were abreast of
St. Mary’s Sound, where several ships lay at anchor. Wind
NNE, hard gale with rain. At half-past two the Adventure
shot the Frenchman’s main-topmast by the board, then the
Dragon fired a whole broadside into her. I being at the same
time under his stern, gave him a broadside also, upon
which he struck. My boat was the first aboard and brought
the captain and the rest of the officers aboard of me. She
-was one of the King of France’s men-of-war carrying thirty-
six guns, but could mount forty.

After this the Adventure, and the next day the
Dragon, took the prize in tow, and at noon on 5 May
(0.8.) the squadron, consisting of the Monk, Mary,
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 297

Dunkirk, Ruby, Dragon, Adventure, and prize anchored
in the Sound. On the following day the French captain
and officers were sent on shore to prison. This, then, in
its naked simplicity, is the English story ; but as related
in the ‘Memoirs of Du Guay-Trouin’ it is something
much grander, and puts a very different colour on the
business. Yet I feel bound to consider Du Guay-Trouin’s
account: firstly, because it is that which the French
accept as history, and on which, or similar stories, they
to a great extent base their estimate of the man; and,
secondly, because I cannot say that it is not correct. It
was, indeed, written long after the event, but the broad
facts agree with those noted at the time by Captain
Warren. What Du Guay-Trouin says is, that finding
himself jammed between the enemy’s squadron and the
coast of England, he was obliged to fight.

One of the English ships named the Adventure first over-
took me, and we maintained a running fight for nearly four
hours, before any other of their ships could come up. . . . At
length my two topmasts were shot away; on which the Ad-
venture ranged up alongside me, a short pistol-shot off, and
hauled up her courses. Seeing her so near, it occurred to me
to run foul of her and board her with my whole crew. Forth-
with I ordered such of the officers as were near to send the
people on deck, got ready the grapnels, and put the helm
over. We were just on the point of hooking on to her, when
unfortunately one of my lieutenants, looking out through a
port and seeing the two ships so close together, took it into
his head there was some mistake, as he could not think that,
under the circumstances, I had any intention of boarding ;
and so, of himself, ordered the helm to be reversed. I had
no idea of what had been done, and was impatiently waiting
for the two ships to clash together, ready to throw myself on
board the enemy ; but seeing that my ship did not obey her
298 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

helm, I ran to the wheel, and found that it had been changed
without my order. I had it again jammed hard over; but
perceived, with the keenest vexation, that the captain of the
Adventure, having guessed by the expression of my face what
I had meant to do, had let fall his courses, and was sheering
off. We had been so near that my bowsprit had broken his
taffrail ; but the mistake of my lieutenant made me lose the
opportunity of one of the most surprising adventures ever
heard tell of.!| In the determination I was in to perish or to
capture this ship, which was much the fastest sailer of the
squadron, it is more than probable that I should have suc-
ceeded, and should thus have taken back to France a much
stronger ship than that which I abandoned. And, not to
speak of the credit which would have attached to the execution
of such a plan, it is quite certain that, being dismasted, there
was absolutely no other way for me to escape from forces so
superior.

So he was surrounded, and brought to close action
by five of the ships, whereupon his men began to fly-
from their gung and to take refuge in the hold.

I was busy trying to put a stop to this panic, had cut
down one and pistolled another, when, to crown my misfor-
tune, fire broke out in the gun-room. The fear of being
blown up made it necessary for me to go below; but having
got the fire put out, I had a tubful of grenades brought me,
and began throwing them down into the hold; by which
means I compelled the deserters to come up and to man some
of the lower deck guns; but when I went up on the poop I
found, to my astonishment and vexation, that some cowardly
rascal had taken advantage of my absence to haul down the
colours. I ordered them to be hoisted again ; but my officers
represented. that to do so would be simply giving up the rem-

1 Unfortunately no log or journal of the Adventure for this date
has been preserved ; it would have been interesting to have had her
captain’s version of this.
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 299

nant of my ship’s company to be butchered by the English,
who would give no quarter if the flag was hoisted again after
being struck for so long, and that further resistance was
hopeless, as the ship was dismasted.

He was still hesitating when he was knocked over by
a spent shot and stunned. When he came to himself
the ship was in possession of the English. He was
taken on board the Monk, whose captain treated him
with much kindness and generosity: ‘with as much
care,’ he says, ‘as if I had been his own son.’ After
cruising for twenty days! the squadron returned to
Plymouth, and Du Guay-Trouin, after receiving many
civilities from the officers, was allowed to go about a
prisoner at large, making many pleasant acquaintances,
and an especially intimate one with a young person
whom he describes as ‘une fort jolie marchande,’ an
extremely pretty shop-girl. This good time was rudely
put a stop to by the Prince of Orange coming in, and
her captain accusing him of firing on him under English
colours. On this charge he was put under close arrest,
though his friends were allowed to come and see him;
amongst others ‘la jolie marchande,’ with whom one of
his guards, a refugee French officer, now fell desperately
in love. He implored his prisoner’s good offices with
the girl, and between the two the poor refugee was fooled
to the top of his bent, whilst Trouin ran down to the
wharf, got on board a boat already provided, and with
four of his companions pushed out to sea. It was ten

1 This possibly means from the time of leaving Plymouth; the dates
of Captain Warren’s journal show that it does not mean from the time
of the capture. But as the Mémoires were written many years alfter-
wards, a mistake of this kind would be pardonable.
300 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

o’clock in the evening of 18 June.’ As they passed out
through the Sound, they were hailed by two men-of-war
lying there. ‘Fishers,’ they answered, and went on
without hindrance.

All night, and all the next day, they rowed on with
but little wind. As night again came on a breeze sprang
up, and they made sail; but being worn out with fatigue
they all went to sleep, Trouin holding the tiller. Sud-
denly they were struck by a squall and nearly swamped.
Fortunately, as the steersman woke, let fly the sheet and
put the helm hard up, the boat answered the helm and
righted; but she was full of water, all their provisions
were spoiled, and they were some fifteen leagues from
the land. However, they managed to bale out the boat
with their hats, and about eight o’clock on the following
evening made the coast of Bretagne, where they stumbled
into the nearest village, ate black bread, drank milk, and
slept the sleep of the weary on a bundle of clean straw.
Afterwards they made the best of their way to St. Malo,
where Trouin learned that his brother, La Barbinais,
was at Rochefort, engaged in fitting out the king’s ship
Frangois, of 48 guns, intending to appoint him to the
command as soon as he was exchanged. On this news,
M. du Gué was speedily at Rochefort and on board the
Francois, which he found ready for sea, and in her he
started at once in search of fortune.

Being well to the westward, he met it on 18 January
1695, in the shape of the Nonsuch, also of 48 guns,

1 In the Mémoires the time is said to be ‘ vers les sia heures du soir,’
and the date is not mentioned. As it appears from the context that it
was dark, the six is undoubtedly a misprint for dix; and it is so given
by Cunat, who refers to the official depositions.
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 301

convoying a number of mast ships from New England.
One of these, named the Falcon, evidently a stout ship
and well armed, mounting, according to Du Guay-
Trouin, 38 guns,! he engaged sharply, and, having
crippled her, ran down to the Nonsuch, in the smoke of
a broadside ranged alongside her, and threw his grapnels,
intending to board; but he was compelled to haul off by
a fire which broke out in the poop of the Nonsuch and
raged for a while with great violence. Presently the fire
was extinguished and he returned to the charge; but as
he again threw his grapnels, fire broke out in his own
foretop; the foremast was enveloped in flames, and he
was obliged, for a second time, to haul off. Before he
could get the fire under, it was dark; the convoy had
dispersed, and he, and the two English ships with which
he had been engaged, lay to, repairing their damages.
With daylight on the 14th he renewed his attack on the
Nonsuch, with great guns and small-arms, and was on
the point of again attempting to board her, when the
fall of her fore and main masts obliged him hastily to
sheer off; then as the Nonsuch could no longer defend
herself or escape, he went to take possession of the
Falcon, which was trying to make off. Having cap-
tured her, he returned to the Nonsuch, whose mizenmast
had followed the others, and which, being quite helpless,
hauled down her flag on his approach.

This is Du Guay-Trouin’s account of this engagement,
and is in the main fully confirmed by the evidence given
at the court-martial on the officers of the Nonsuch, after
their return from captivity. No mention was, indeed,

1 He speaks of her throughout as the Boston. Her name was cer-
tainly Falcon, but it may have been distinctively Falcon of Boston.
302 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

made of the fire in the poop, or of the enemy’s attempts
to board; but the independent actions with the Falcon
and the Nonsuch, the crippling them separately, and the
surrender of the Nonsuch on the 14th, when she lay a
helpless log on the water, all these are clearly enough
stated, and would quite bear out the judgment of the
court that Captain Taylor had not made the necessary
preparations for fight, and had thus exposed the convoy
to great hazard. Of Captain Taylor’s courage, however,
there was no question. With a really very superior
foree—for the Nonsuch and Falcon together were far
more than a match for the Francois, which, nominally,
was not more powerful than the Nonsuch alone—he had
been taken at such disadvantage as to be altogether
inferior; but he fought his ship bravely, and fell,
endeavouring to repair his fault. After his death
no further defence was made; and, indeed, none was
possible.

This Nonsuch! was the ship which, in 1689, had
captured the Railleuse and Serpente, and carried Jean
Bart and Forbin prisoners to Plymouth. Du Guay-
Trouin, referring to this circumstance, says that he
found the commissions of these officers in the captain’s
cabin. I am quite unable to explain this; nor can I
understand how they could possibly be there. The
statement that the ship was commanded by the same
captain is certainly wrong. In the engagement with the
Railleuse and Serpente, the Nonsuch was commanded
by Captain Roomcoyle, who was killed, as well as the
master, and was succeeded by the boatswain, who, being
made a captain, served honourably for many years, and

1 See ante, p. 277.
DU GUAY-TROUIN, 303

died a natural death in 1702. It does not appear
that Captain Taylor had had any connection with the
Nonsuch till his promotion to her, in North America,
a few months before his death; though he may have
been a midshipman or mate in her in 1689. It is the
only suggestion that I can offer, and for it I have no
authority.

It was already blowing hard when the English ships
surrendered. They had scarcely been taken possession
of when a violent gale sprang up. The Nonsuch was a
wreck; and it was with great difficulty that Trouin’s
cousin Boscher succeeded in getting her into Port Louis.
The Falcon, shattered by shot and the storm, fell in
with four Dutch privateers off Ushant, and was recap-
tured: the Francois herself, having lost her mizenmast
and both fore and main topmasts, managed to fetch
into Brest. The story of his achievement ensured
Trouin an honourable welcome. France began to be
proud of him, and the king sent him a sword of honour,
to which M. de Pontchartrain, then Secretary of State
for the Navy, added a flattering letter, desiring him, in
conclusion, to refit his ship as soon as possible, and to
join the squadron under the Marquis de Nesmond then
at Rochelle. This he did.

The squadron consisted, besides the Francois, of four
ships of from 50 to 62 guns, and putting to sea, pre-
sently—on 26 April, 1695—met three English ships in
the chops of the Channel. These were the Hope of 70
guns, Anglesea of 48. and the Roebuck fire-ship. They
had sailed from the Nore in the end of March, in com-
pany with the Captain of 70 guns, the Montagu of 60,
and a large convoy for the Straits ; but two days before,
304 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

by the negligence of the officer of the watch on board the
Hope, they had parted company, and were now caught at
a disadvantage by this very superior force. As the French
squadron bore down against. them, one, the St. Antoine,
of 56 guns, attacked the Anglesea, and endeavoured to
lay her on board ; but her captain, M. de la Villestreux,
being killed at the critical moment, the attempt was
repulsed, and her fore topmast being shot away about
the same time, she fell astern, whilst the Anglesea made
good her escape. The Roebuck, also, having no force,
and under the circumstances being useless as a fire-ship,
made off unpursued, and the five Frenchmen clustered
round the Hope, which, after stoutly defending herself
for some seven or eight hours, was forced to yield;
having, according to the deposition of her lieutenant,
“both pumps going most of the time, and seven feet
water in the hold; we had lost all our masts, and the
ship rolled so much that we could not manage any of
our guns.’ For his gallant defence Captain Robinson
was rightly commended by the court-martial, which
recognised that the loss of the Hope was due to her
having separated from her consorts and convoy; the
circumstances of which were somewhat curious. On
sailing from the Nore, two of her lieutenants were left
behind on impress service; she had only one lieutenant
on board, and her captain was most of the time sick and
prostrate with alternate attacks of gout and gravel. Her
ship’s company consisted, for the most part, of newly
raised, perfectly raw men, and by the captain’s orders,
the one lieutenant devoted himself to day duty, and to
the exercising these raw men at the great guns, the
night watches being taken by the master and the senior
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 305

mate. On the night of 23-24 April, this mate had the
middle watch, that is from midnight to four o’clock; he
let the ship get taken aback, paid her off on the wrong
tack, made no signal to the other ships, and said nothing
about it to the captain, who was confined to bed with an
attack of gravel, and might probably, if he had been
disturbed, have made use of unparliamentary, not to
say un-Christian language. The weather was thick;
and nothing was known about it till daylight, when
the lieutenant came on deck; but it was then too late.
All this was proved to the satisfaction of the court,
which decided that the officer of the watch, the mate,
was guilty of negligence and disobedience. Had no par-
ticular result attended on his fault, possibly no severe
notice would have been taken of it. As it was, his
sentence seems, in the present day, peculiar. It was
ordered ‘ that he be carried with a halter about his neck
from ship to ship, to all the ships at Chatham and Gilling-
ham, and his crime be read by beat of drum by each
ship’s side ; that all the pay due to him in his Majesty’s
service be forfeited to the chest at Chatham ; and that he
be rendered incapable of for ever serving his Majesty in
any capacity for the future as an officer.’ That the mate
was very much in the wrong is not to be disputed;
whether the admiralty, that sent a 70-gun ship to sea
with a perfectly raw ship’s company, an invalid captain,
and only one lieutenant, was not very much more in the
wrong, is a question that was not raised at the court-
martial, but which can scarcely help suggesting itself to
a thoughtful reader.

On the return of the squadron to Brest, Trouin, still
in the Francois, was ordered to cruise to the northward,

x
306 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

towards the Orkneys and Shetlands, with the Fortune, of
56 guns, in company ; and, after some fruitless months,
was coming south round the west of Ireland, when, near
the Blaskets, he fell in with three large Hast Indiamen,
all heavily armed. But an armed merchantman is no
match for a properly equipped man-of-war, even though
of the same nominal force, and, after a stout resistance,
these three were taken possession of by the Francois and
Fortune, and conveyed to Port Louis. Du Guay-Trouin,
in his Mémoires, says that ‘the riches with which they
were laden gave a profit of more than 2,000 per cent., in
addition to all the pillage which it had not been possible
to prevent.’ The English accounts estimate the loss
roughly at a million sterling. Possibly on the strength
of his share of this money, M. Trouin du Gué started
for Paris.

He was still in the first flush of youth, and we may
fairly suppose that the spoils of the Indies lay uneasy
in his pockets; but in his Mémoires he attributes his
journey to his desire to be introduced to the Count de
Toulouse and to M. de Pontchartrain. The latter was
pleased to present him to the king, for whom, he says,
‘from my earliest youth I had felt an extreme love and
reverence. On actually seeing this great monarch my
admiration was redoubled. He deigned to appear satis-
fied with my humble services, and I went out from the
presence-chamber with my heart deeply touched by the
sweetness and nobility which marked his words and his
most trifling actions, so that my desire to render myself
worthy of his esteem became still more ardent.’ He
went, therefore to Port Louis, and fitted out the Non-
such, or, as he calls her, the Sans-Pareil, reducing her
DU GUAY-TROUIN, 307

armament to forty-two guns, and on 7 July, 1696, he
sailed for a cruise on the coast of Spain.

The Sans-Pareil, being an English-built ship, lent
herself readily to a privateer’s ruse; and, having learned
that three Dutch merchant ships were at Vigo, waiting
for an English man-of-war which was appointed to
convoy them, M. du Gué appeared off that port one morn-
ing at daybreak, and brought the ship to in English
fashion and under English colours. Suspecting no evil,
two of the Dutch ships came out at once; the third,
fortunately for herself, was not quite ready to sail, and
so escaped. In charge of his two prizes, laden with
masts and naval stores, Trouin was making his way
back to Port Louis, when, on the morning of 24 J uly, at
daybreak, he found himself close in with and to leeward
of the whole English fleet, then cruising in the Bay of
Biscay, under the command of Lord Berkeley.!

‘ There was no time,’ he says, ‘ for hesitation: I ordered the
prize officers to hoist Dutch colours, and to run away to lee-
ward, saluting me with seven guns each ; and trusting to the
goodness and soundness of the Sans-Pareil, I stood towards
the fleet, as boldly and peaceably as if I had really been one
of their number rejoining after having spoken the Dutchmen.
Two capital ships and a 36-gun frigate had at first left the
fleet to overhaul me; but on seeing what I was doing, the
ships returned to their station: the frigate—impelled by her
unlucky fate—persisted in endeavouring to speak the two

1 This fleet left the Channel on July 4 (June 24, 0.8.), and anchored
at Spithead on its return on August 9 (July 30, O.S.), between which
dates, therefore, the incident above described must have taken place.
Eugéne Sue, giving a copy of Du Guay-Trouin’s official letter (Hist. de
la Marine frangaise, tom. v., p. 110), dates it ‘ Au Port Louis, le 30 mai,
1796 ’—that is with two palpable blunders: the letter is, however, I
believe, genuine.

x
308 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

prizes, and I saw that she was rapidly coming up with them.
I had by this time joined the fleet, tranquil enough in appear-
ance, though inwardly I was fuming at the prospect of my
two prizes being taken by this frigate: and as I perceived
that my ship sailed much better than those of the enemy who
were near me, I kept away little by little, at the same time
forereaching on them, and then suddenly bearing up, ran
down to place myself between the prizes and the frigate. I
should have liked to lay this on board and carry her in sight
of the whole fleet; but her captain, being suspicious, would
not let me get within musket-shot of him, and sent his boat
tome. But when the boat was half-way, her people made
out that we were French, and turned to go back; on which,
seeing that we were discovered, I hoisted my white flag and
poured my broadside into the frigate. She answered with
hers; but not being able to sustain my fire, she hauled her
wind, and with a signal of distress flying, stood to meet the
' capital ships, which hastily ran down towards us: as they
stopped to render her assistance. and to pick up her boat, I
was able to rejoin my prizes, and without misadventure to
take them to Port Louis.’

This is Du Guay-Trouin’s unsupported, uncorrobo-
rated narrative; but it seems to me probable enough
and perfectly credible. There is no question that, with
a crew of nearly three times the numerical strength of
the frigate’s, and favoured by the surprise, he would
have carried her, if only he had been able to lay her on
board. It would have been a brilliant feat, but really
not a very difficult one. The incident is one not likely
to be found, and it is not found, in our English histories.
It may have been mentioned by Lord Berkeley in his
official report of the cruise; but, unfortunately, Lord
Berkeley’s letters, or, indeed, any admiral’s letters of
that date, have not been preserved, at least in their
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 309

proper place. More probably still, it may be mentioned
in the log of the frigate, or of one or other of the capital
ships; but not having their names, I have not yet been
able to find any traces of it. However, as I have said,
I incline to believe that Du Guay-Trouin’s narrative, as
it stands, is a fair description of what occurred, and
gives a correct though curious idea of the very lax
organisation of the fleet, when a stranger could thus
come into it and not be immediately detected. But not-
withstanding the laxness in this respect, Lord Berkeley’s
cruise in the Bay was by no means an idle one. He
met, indeed, no formidable enemy at sea; but applying
himself to harrying the coast, he burned all the villages,
houses, and shipping, and swept off all the cattle of the
islands Groix, Houat, and Hoedic; whilst a detached
squadron, sent into the Isle of Ré, bombarded and de-
stroyed the towns of St. Martin and Olonne.

On Du Guay-Trouin’s return to Port Louis he wrote
an account of the cruise to M. de Pontchartrain, describ-
ing his success at Vigo, his meeting with and escape
from the English fleet, and passing on to speak in fuller
detail of a cireumstance which—more, indeed, than his
mere adventures—bears on the point to which I have
already called attention, the peculiar relation and atti-
tude of officers of the navy to the officers of privateers,
even when employed in the king’s service. It is for
this reason that I give here the account of it as written
by himself :!—

Off the Isle Groix I met a large ship which for some time
did not show any flag, and flew no pennant nor any other

1 Not in his Mémoires, but in the official letter, quoted by Sue (Hist.
de la Marine frangaise, tom. v. p. 110, &.) with many mistakes or mis-
prints, both of place and time.
310 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

mark of distinction. I hailed her, and was answered that she
was from Bayonne. The rate at which we passed each other
did not permit me to hear more; but I and all my officers
supposed that she was a Bayonne privateer. Shortly after, I
lowered a boat to send a message to the prizes; on seeing
which the ship hoisted her pennant, fired several musket-
shots at the boat, and then began firing great guns. At last,
one of her shot cut the halliard of the boat’s sail; on which
I went straight to the ship to speak to the captain and ask
why he had thus fired on me without any provocation. I was
told to come on board ; when the captain, far from hearing
what I had to say, threatened, in the most violent manner, to
have me ducked from the yard arm,' and that, although I
protested, as was truly the case, that we had believed him to
be a Bayonne privateer. This threat, so contrary to what
seems to me due to my rank, would have goaded me to some
extreme measures if I had not considered my own private
honour as subordinate to the king’s orders; so that I made
no reply beyond saying that I should complain to your
Grandeur, in whose justice I had every confidence. . . . Your
Grandeur is not unaware that several of the officers of the
navy look on our success with anything rather than pleasure;
as this one showed very clearly on this occasion by thus in-
sulting me, whilst he behaved civilly enough to the skippers
of the two Olonne vessels in company, who had committed
the same fault as I had, if fault there was; neither threaten-
ing to duck them, nor making use of the abusive language
which I pass over in silence; for your Grandeur well knows
that such unmeasured threats cannot but cause bitterness.
This, then, Monseigneur, is what makes me call on you for
justice, without which I shall be unwillingly compelled to give
up the idea of my intended cruise: and, in fact, this affair is

1 ‘De me faire donner la cale’—to have me keel-hauled; but keel-
hauling did not usually mean hauling under the keel, though sometimes
it did: ordinarily it meant nothing more than tricing the criminal up to
the yard-arm, and letting him go by the run.
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 311

of importance to all my associates, who—but for your pro-
tection—would be daily exposed to similar outrages. The
captain of whom I complain is M. de Feuquiéres, commanding
the Entreprenant.

Of the steps which M. de Pontchartrain took to salve
the wounded feelings of the insulted privateer, or to re-
strain the jealousy and insolence of the king’s officers,
no mention is made; and not the least curious part of
the whole transaction is that there is no allusion to it in
the Mémoires. But when he wrote these in his old age,
Du Guay-Trouin was a ‘ Lieutenant-General of the king’s
naval’s forces,’ had commanded fleets and expeditions,
and had probably learned to consider himself as one of
the nobility and an officer of the navy, having altogether
different interests from those of a plebeian, captain of a
privateer. /

When the Sans-Pareil was refitted she again put to
sea, having in company the Léonore of 16 guns, com-
manded by Etienne Trouin, René’s younger brother, and
at this time not quite twenty years old. After a short
cruise on the north coast of Spain they were in want of
water, and attempted to force a landing in the face of
the Spanish militia, who mustered to oppose them. A
sharp conflict took place, in which Etienne received a
mortal wound. He was carried on board the Sans-
Pareil, and died in the course of two days. The elder
brother was deeply affected by the loss of this youth,
whom he tenderly loved; and returning shortly after-
wards to Brest, he went into retirement for several
months, sick in mind and body, haunted by the memory
of his logs, and the idea of the boy expiring in his arms.
It was not till the beginning of the next year, 1697, that
312 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

he returned to active life, and then only at the persua-
sion of M. Desclouzeaux, the intendant of the navy at
Brest, who was fitting out a squadron of three ships,
apparently on his own account, although not improbably
at the charge of the government; for, indeed, it is im-
possible to conceive a wider opening for peculation and
appropriation than that afforded by allowing the in-
tendant thus to equip a private squadron. The allowing
a foreman of labourers to keep hogs in the biscuit store-
‘house, whilst his wife kept a marine store outside, as
happened, once at least, at Portsmouth, was trifling in
comparison.}

Of this squadron, sent out specially to look for a
Dutch merchant fleet from Spain, Du Guay-Trouin took
the command, in the St. Jacques des Victoires, of 48
guns; the Sans-Pareil, commanded by his cousin, Jacques
Boscher, was the second; and the third was the little
Léonore. They sailed from Brest towards the middle of
March, and on the 22nd, being then some thirty miles
north-west from Ushant, they sighted the object of their
cruise, but convoyed by three ships of war, two of fifty,
and one of thirty guns. Du Guay-Trouin did not con-
sider his force equal to the attack of such an escort, and
for two days hung on to it, hoping for some opportunity
of getting in amongst the convoy. But on the 24th he
was accidentally joined by two privateers out of St.
Malo, the one of thirty, the other of thirty-eight guns,
and, so reinforced, he resolved to attack. The three
Dutchmen were lying to, to windward of their convoy
and in line ahead, the smallest ship in the middle; and

1 Parliamentary Reports, 1783.
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 313

Du Guay-Trouin determined to push on in the St.
Jacques, and engage the Dutch commodore, who headed
the line in the Delft. The Sans-Pareil was to engage
the rearmost ship, the Hondslaardijk, and the two St.
Malo men were to pit themselves against the frigate in
the middle, whilst the Léonore went in amongst the
convoy. The allotment of antagonists was rendered un-
availing by the action of the Hondslaardijk, which pre-
vented the St. Jacques from passing her, and the two
ships fell foul of each other, whilst the Sans-Pareil
pressed on to attack the Delft, which received her with
extreme warmth. Fire broke out under her poop, ex-
ploded a number of cartridges, killed or blew overboard
more than eighty men, and threatened to extend to the
magazine, so that Boscher was forced to cut loose his
grapnels, and to bear away as fast as possible. Du
Guay-Trouin had meantime thrown half his ship’s com-
pany on board the Hondslaardijk, and without much
difficulty had made himself master of her. He now
pushed on to support or to avenge Boscher, and ran his
ship aboard the Delft.

‘This new attack,’ he tells us, ‘was very bloody, both by
the very heavy fire, on both sides, of guns, muskets, and gre-
nades, and by the splendid courage of the Baron de Wasse-
naer,! who received me with astonishing boldness. Four
several times the bravest of my officers and men were re-
pulsed ; and so many of them were killed that, in spite of my
vexation and efforts, I was constrained to bear away in order
to give a short breathing-time to my people, who were some-

1 Willem, Baron van Wassenaer Starreburgh, nephew of that Opdam

van Wassenaer who commanded the Dutch fleet in the great fight off
Lowestoft on 3-13 June, 1665, and lost his life in the blowing up of the

Eendracht.
314 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

what disheartened, and also to repair damages, which were
more than slight.’

The two privateers had meantime captured the Dutch
frigate, and Du Guay-Trouin now ordered the largest of
these, the Faluére, of 388 guns, to occupy the attention
of the Delft, while the St. Jacques was lying by. Sans-
Pareil, St. Jacques, or Faluére, it was much the same to
Van Wassenaer, who received his new assailant with his
old determination ; and the Faluére, roughly handled
and having lost her captain, ran down to leeward as her
consorts had done before her. Du Guay-Trouin hailed
her to follow him, and together they would avenge the
death of her captain.

‘And then,’ he says, ‘ with head down, I rushed against
the redoubtable Baron, resolved to conquer or to perish. This
last act was so sharp and so bloody that every one of the
Dutch officers was killed or wounded. Wassenaer himself
received four very dangerous wounds, and fell on his quarter-
deck, where he was seized, his sword still in his hand. The
Faluére had her share in the engagement, running alongside
of me, and sending me forty men on board as a reinforce-
ment. More than half of my own crew perished in this
action. I lost in it one of my cousins, first lieutenant of my
own ship, and two other kinsmen on board the Sans-Pareil,
with many other officers killed or wounded.’ !

The night following this battle was extremely stormy,
and the ships, with shattered rigging and torn hulls,
leaking at every seam, with crews weakened and ex-
hausted, were in a position of extreme peril. The St.
Jacques was kept afloat only by pumping and baling, in

1 De Jonge (Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen, vol. iii.

pp- 521 et seg.) accepts Du Guay-Trouin’s account of this stubborn
fight as substantially correct.
DU GUAY-TROUIN, 315

which work the Dutch prisoners were made to assist,
and by throwing overboard all her upper-deck and
-quarter-deck guns, spare masts, shot, everything that
could go. But the horrors of the night, the dead and
dying below, the ship scarcely floating, the swelling
waves threatening each moment to engulf her, the wild
howling of the storm, and the iron-bound coast of Bre-
tagne to leeward, were all together such as to try
severely the courage of the few remaining officers and
men. At daybreak, however, the wind went down ; they
found themselves in with the Isle Groix and the Breton
coast ; on their firing guns and making signals of dis-
tress, a number of boats came off to their assistance ;
and in this guise was the St. Jacques taken into Port
Louis, followed in the course of the day by the three
Dutch ships of war, twelve of the merchant ships, the
Léonore, and the two St. Malo privateers. The Sans-
Pareil did not get in till the next day, ‘after having been
twenty times on the point of perishing by the fire and by
the tempest.’

Du Guay-Trouin’s success naturally won for him a
distinguished renown. He had captured three Dutch
ships superior in force to his own three. The St. Malo
men were probably overlooked, and an exaggerated ac-
count of his victory went abroad; but in any case his
victory was brilliant enough, and all the more so by reason
of the brilliant defence of Baron van Wassenaer. It was
so considered by the king on the report of the Count de
Pontchartrain; and he rewarded the service by sending
Du Guay-Trouin a commission as commander in the navy
(capitaine de frégate), on which the young commander
set off to Paris, and was again presented to the king,
316 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

who was pleased personally to express his satisfaction,
and some little time after to allow him to equip—at his
own expense, or at that of his friends —two of the royal
ships, Solide and Oiseau. With these and two private
ships he was on the point of sailing for a cruise, when
the Peace of Ryswyk, in September 1697, put an end to
his hopes of glory or of gain. When war with England
and Holland again broke out in 1702, Du Guay-Trouin
was a king’s officer; and the story of his career from
this time belongs rather to the history of the war, in its
connection with which it ought to be considered. I do
not propose, therefore, to follow out the events of his
riper age with the same exactness with which I have
dwelt on those of his earlier years, whilst he was forcing
his way into notice; but some of his adventures have a
purely personal interest, and as such tend to illustrate
the character of the man. This is one.

On 23 November, 1704, being then in the Jason of
54 guns, having in company the Auguste of the same
force, and the frigate Valeur commanded by his brother
Nicolas, he met, in the Soundings, the two English ships
Elizabeth of 70, and the Chatham of 48 guns. That the
Elizabeth, brought to close action by the Jason, hauled
down her flag after a feeble defence, is to be read in our
own chronicles,! as well as the wretched fate which fell
on her captain as the punishment of his misconduct:
the Auguste, being a heavy sailer, was unable to overtake
the Chatham, which thus escaped. On their way back
to Brest with their prize they fell in with two large
Dutch privateers, one of which, the Amazone of 40 guns,

1 Charnock, Biographia Navalis, vol. ii. p. 386.
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 317

they captured after a stout resistance; but the Valeur,
having gone on an independent cruise, and after some
success, met a large privateer, which brought ber to close
action. The Valeur made good her defence, and escaped ;
but during the action the young Trouin had his hip
shattered by a cannon ball, and survived his return to
Brest only a few days.

When the Jason and Auguste were refitted, Du Guay-
Trouin sailed once more in quest of adventures, and
on the night of the second day again fell in with the
Chatham. When morning broke the Jason and Auguste
had her between them, within musket-shot, and a sharp
action began, which continued for several hours, the
Chatham putting herself before the wind and making all
sail in her endeavour to escape. So intent were the
pursuers on the chase, that they suddenly found them-
selves at no great distance from the English fleet, then
cruising in the Soundings, under the command of Sir
George Byng, and towards which the Chatham, whether
intentionally or by accident, had led them. The position
was now reversed, and the Jason and Auguste were
chased by the fastest ships of the squadron, which came
up with them rapidly, the Auguste being at all times a
very dull sailer. On this, after a hasty consultation,
the Frenchmen separated ; the Auguste keeping well to
windward, and the Jason going away free, hoping to
draw the English ships after her in a wild-goose chase.
But the English were numerous enough to separate too.
According to Du Guay-Trouin, six ships followed the
Auguste, engaged as they came up with her, and took
her after a stubborn fight. The Jason, on her side, was
overtaken and brought to action by the Worcester, or, as
318 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Du Guay-Trouin has preferred to call her, the Honster 1
only the Worcester was of 50 guns, and the Honster
of 64; a difference which explains Du Guay-Trouin’s
statement that after a short engagement, yard-arm to
yard-arm, the Honster found herself very much mauled
and dropped astern. ‘I should have taken her right
off,’ he says, ‘if she had not borne up very sharply, and
if’—it is difficult not to notice the French use of the if
in such cases,—‘ if she had not been sustained by several
largé ships close at hand, which would have fallen upon
me before I could have got clear of her.’ So he kept on
his way, gaining on his pursuers, till, some three-quarters
of an hour afterwards, he was again engaged by the
Honster, which this time, however, was content to hang
on his quarters, firing as opportunity offered; and so
midnight came, and with it the wind died away. The
other English ships had crept up, and now lay becalmed
in different directions, all round the Jason.

‘ They did not annoy me,’ he says, ‘ for they were persuaded
that I could not escape them, and that at daybreak they would
capture my ship with less risk and greater ease. I was myself
so convinced of this, that I called together my officers to tell
them that, seeing no probability of saving the king’s ship, I
was determined to maintain the honour of his arms to the
last extremity ; that I therefore meant to make no reply to
the fire of the ships which surrounded us, but to steer straight
for the commander-in-chief of the enemy; that I myself would
take the helm until we were grappled with him ; and that as
such an attack would be unexpected by him, we might have
a chance of performing a brilliant feat before succumbing to

u Honster in the Mémoires, and thence in all published French
accounts. It was possibly written Houster, which for a Frenchman
would not be a bad shot at the real name.
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 319

numbers; and that in any case the king’s flag should not,
whilst I lived, be hauled down by any hands but those of his
enemies.’

After this discourse, he says, he felt his mind more
at ease, and went below to lie down ; but finding it im-
possible to sleep, he came again on deck, and spent the
time in looking at the ships by which he was surrounded,
and especially at that of the commandant, distinguished
by her three lanterns at the stern and a light in the
main-top. I will let him tell the rest.

In the midst of this melancholy occupation I fancied, about
half an hour before daybreak, that the horizon right ahead of
us was growing black, and that this blackness was increasing.
I judged that we should have the breeze from that quarter ;
and as my courses were hauled up and my topsails lowered
on account of the calm, I had them set at once. without any
noise, and all the other sails as well, ready to catch the breeze
which was coming up: then with what oars I had, I got the
ship’s head round, bringing her broadside to the expected
wind. It really did come; and as my sails were all ready, set
and trimmed, I forged ahead at its very first breath. The
enemy, who had gone to sleep in confidence, were quite un-
prepared : they were all taken aback, and before they could
make sail and wear their ships I was a good gun-shot away;
and as the wind was freshening, I rapidly increased my dis-
tance. The Honster alone could get near me, and cannonaded
me on the quarter, but could not sustain my broadsides. In
this way the chase lasted till noon, by which time it was blow-
ing fresh, and I had left the other ships far astern. I began
now to drop the Honster, and looked on myself as though
risen from the dead, for I had firmly resolved to be buried
under the ruins of the poor Jason.

In relating this I am obliged to trust almost entirely
to the Mémoires; for the account given in our English
320 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

histories is so curiously incorrect, that no dependence
whatever can be placed on it. It would appear from
these that the Jason and Auguste were chased and the
Auguste captured in July or August 1703 ; and that the
ships which captured her were the Chatham, Greenwich,
and Medway.! But there is no doubt whatever that the
Auguste was captured about the middle or end of January
1705, the date to which, by inference, Du Guay-Trouin’s
Mémoires would assign it; and it is equally certain
that neither the Chatham, Greenwich, nor Medway was
engaged with the Auguste. The minutes of the court-
martial on the wretched captain of the Elizabeth prove
that the ship was taken, as I have already said, on
12 November (0.8.), 1704; and a letter from Captain
Bokenham, of the Chatham, dated ‘Crookhaven, 17
January (0.8.), 1704-5,’ says :—

On the 18th past, in the night, I lost company with the
admiral, and the next morning by daylight fell in with Mouns™
Dugee in the Jason and L’August, the two ships that took
the Elizabeth. They both gave me chase till about one
in the afternoon. Soon after I saw a sail, and gave chase
and came up with him (being the Constable of St. Malo, of
80 guns and 169 men), who after half an hour’s dispute
struck, his mainmast coming by the board at the same time,
being then about WSW, thirty leagues from Cape Clear. . .
The French captain confirms that the ships were the same
that took the Elizabeth, he having been on board Mouns*
Dugee the day before.

It is thus quite certain that the Chatham did not turn
on the Auguste, and had no hand in her capture. Her
log has, unfortunately, not been preserved, neither has

} Lediard, p. 775; Charnock, Biographia Navalis, vol. iii. p. 39..
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 321

that of the Worcester. The logs of the Greenwich and
Medway are, however, extant, and have no mention of
the capture of the Auguste; though it appears that the
Medway was engaged with a French ship of war of 60
guns—probably enough the Jason—which escaped in the
darkness. But our records of this period are almost as
defective as our histories are inaccurate; there are no
letters from the admiral in command of the fleet; and it
is at present quite impossible to say more on this matter
than that nothing appears in evidence that can controvert
or, indeed, does not support Du Guay-Trouin’s narrative.

To follow out the rest of Du Guay-Trouin’s life would.
be almost to write the naval history of France during
this period. I will therefore only refer to the action of
21 October, 1707, when he, in company with Forbin,
captured or destroyed an English squadron of two 80- and
two 50-gun ships; a third, 80 alone, the Royal Oak, had
the doubtful good fortune to escape.' Du Guay’s share
in this was brilliant, and on his return to France, the
king, Louis XIV, conferred on him a pension of 1,000
livres; which, however, he begged might be passed on to
his second captain, who was, he represented, a poor man,
and had lost a leg in the engagement. Afterwards, being
at court, and called on to relate to the king the events of
the fight, he is described as having said incidentally,
‘ Jordonnai a la Gloire de me suivre ;’ on which the king
interrupted him with ‘Et elle vous fut fidéle!’? The

1 Charnock, Biog. Nav., vol. ii. p. 117.

2 The genuineness of this anecdote seems very doubtful. It is not
mentioned by Du Guay-Trouin, to whom the royal joke would have been
a neat compliment; and it bears a suspicious resemblance to the really
historical remark of M. de St. George to Anson after the battle off Cape

Y
322 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Gloire, however, passed over to the English eighteen
months later, when she, in company with the Achille, .
commanded by Du Guay in person, and their prize, the
Bristol, a 50-gun ship, fell into the midst of the Channel
fleet. The Achille, escaped, not without difficulty; but
the Bristol was recaptured, and the Gloire lowered her
flag to the Chester, whose captain was that Thomas
Mathews who some thirty-five years afterwards, com-
manded our fleet in the Mediterranean.

Du Guay Trouin’s good services were considered as
far above the loss of the Gloire, and in the following
July, 1709, they were formally acknowledged by letters
of nobility and the grant of arms, the blazon of whichis:
Argent, an anchor sable; on a chief azure, two fleur de
lys or; with the motto ‘ Dedit hec insignia virtus.’ The
arms which, under the similar circumstances, had been
given to Jean Bart were: Argent, on a fess azure, a fleur
de lys or ; in chief, a saltire sable ; in base, a lion passant
gules: both thus bearing a distinct reference to the arms
of France. Many other noble and valiant deeds did Du
Guay-Trouin after this, including the capture of Rio in
1712. After the peace he was, in 1715, raised to flag
rank as chef d’escadre, having, for ten years before, had
the actual command of squadrons. He received the
higher grade of leutenant-général in 1728, and, older in
honour than in years, died on 27 September, 1786.

And now, looking back on the chronicle of the past
which I have here faintly outlined, can we wonder that,
in France, popular esteem has been lavished on the
memory of Du Guay-Trouin? From small beginnings

Finisterre on 3 May (0.8.), 1747: ‘Monsieur,’ he said, ‘ vous avez vaincu
l'Invincible, et la Gloire vous suit.’
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 323

he forced his way out of the cold shade into the hot sun-
light. Ata time of great depression, when at La Hogue,
at Gibraltar, at Toulon, the French navy had been pretty
nigh destroyed, he, almost alone, supported the French
cause at sea, and won many signal successes. It matters
not that he often won them by means of superior force :
the greater, in fact, was his merit, that with very inferior
resources he could so often find himself superior at the
place of meeting. But the points to which I have more
especially wished to call attention are these: that Du
Guay-Trouin was not, in the early part of his brilliant
career, an officer of the French navy ; that he was received
into the French navy only when his name was already
famous both in France and England ; and that, even
now, the French navy is not so exclusive but that officers
from the merchant service may—though exceptionally—
obtain commissions in it. In the English navy it is not
so. Whatever laxity there may have been in the seven-
teenth century, there is none now. In our army, some
fifteen commissions are each year given to men from the
ranks; but, in our navy as at present organised, promo-
tion whether from the merchants’ service, or from before
the mast, is utterly impossible ; and though this impossi-
bility may have certain advantages, may render our service
more self-contained and more homogeneous, the study of
careers such as those of Jean Bart and Du Guay-Trouin,
on the one hand, of George Walker and Fortunatus Wright
on the other, leads me to doubt whether a possibility the
other way might not also sometimes have its own advan-
tages, of greater national importance than even strict
homogeneity, and strict conformity to regulation pattern.

v2
324 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

CHAPTER X.
THE FRENCH PRIVATEERS.

Il. THUROT.!

Tue question of fortifying the several commercial har-
bours and seaports round our coasts has been often
proposed and argued on, and is, in reality, one which
too closely affects our material interests to be treated
as lightly or carelessly as it often is treated, and which
deserves more consideration than it commonly gets..
‘Britannia needs no bulwarks’ is a favourite reply; a
poetical vaunt,a bit of bounce, that sounds well, and
that, in 1801, when it was first written, sounded almost
better. With the tidings of the First of June, of St.
Vincent, Camperdown, and the Nile still ringing in the
public ears, we can quite understand the proud boast
which a few years’ further experience showed thinking
men might be a very unsafe one. Had Villeneuve been
a man of moderate ability and moderate nerve, Britannia.
might have wished very heartily for bulwarks; and the
martello towers, which were built shortly after, showed
that it was even then considered just as well to have
some such things along the steep.

It is not, however, of that stirring period of eighteen
hundred and war-time, that I am now about to write..

1 Fraser’s Magazine, January, 1878.
THUROT. 325

I am going to endeavour to recall the memory of an
older war, and a still earlier scare ; when a French
invasion seemed imminent; when flat-bottomed boats
were got ready all along the north coast of France ; when
all along the south coast of England soldiers, militia
and volunteers, were mustered to oppose the expected
landing; when Garrick wrote, and Boyce composed, and
Champness sang that spirit-stirring song, ‘ Hearts of
Oak,’ which is still the recognised call of our seamen to
quarters, though such lines as—

We'll still make them fear, and still make them flee,
And drub ’em on shore as we’ve drubbed ‘em at sea—

hint at a possibility of invasion after all.

But then, as half a century later, the boldness and
decision of English admirals, acting on the timidity and
vacillation of the French, nullified the well-planned
strategy of the French government ; then, on 18 August,
1759, Boscawen—‘Old Dreadnought,’ as our sailors
loved to call him—broke up, dispersed, captured, burnt,
or drove on shore the Toulon fleet, under M. de la Clue,
as it tried to pass out of the Mediterranean to join the
fleet at Brest, and obtain the command of the Channel ;
then Hawke—‘ as a hawk on his quarry ’—pounced down
on that Brest fleet, as, on 20 November, 1759, it was
entering Quiberon Bay, to embark the troops mustered
in Morbihan ; and made that brilliant and glorious smash
of the French navy which was historically, nautically,
and politically, the precursor and rival of Trafalgar ; the
memory of which in France is perpetuated as ‘ la journée
de M. de Confians,’ though in England it is but feebly
remembered as Hawke’s action, and to many of us the
name of Quiberon Bay now conveys no definite meaning.
326 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

But, nevertheless, so far as we were concerned, Quibe-
ron Bay was the decisive battle of the Seven Years’ War.
Had the result of it been reversed, had it been the
English fleet that was annihilated, the relative positions
of France and England during the next four years, and
in the negotiations which then ensued, would have been
extremely different. Historians have not recognised
this ; and even at the time the victory seems to have been
taken very much as a matter of course. The possibility
of the result of a meeting between the two fleets being
not exactly what it was, seems never to have occurred to
our enthusiastic countrymen, who had, less than three |
years before, shot one of their admirals for strategic
defeat and tactical imbecility ; not, indeed, for positive
cowardice, but, at any rate, for very gross misconduct.
Hawke was thanked by Parliament for his great victory,
and a pension followed shortly after, but he did not get
his peerage for seventeen years. Even at the time, the
fleet was so neglected by the government, now that the
strain—unacknowledged though it was—was taken off,
that the necessary stores and provisions were not sent to
it; and our seamen were exposed to great and uncalled-
for hardships and privations, while keeping up the strict
blockade on the shattered remnants of the enemy’s navy.
The feeling of the fleet was expressed in some wretched
doggrel, which none the less conveys a very painful idea
of injustice and neglect :

Ere Hawke did bang
Monsieur Conflans,
You sent us beef and beer ;
Now Monsieur’s beat,
We've nought to eat,
Since you have nought to fear.
THUROT. 327

All this, however, is matter of history more or less
familiar. But coincident with these great events, smaller
events were taking place. Coincident with the French
idea of a great invasion in the south of England, which
was extinguished by Boscawen and Hawke, was enter-
tained by the French another idea, that of a landing in
the north of England or Ireland, not indeed in any force,
but still in such force and under such circumstances as
might, and as it was hoped would, direct to the north a
considerable part of the army mustered in the south,
would thus weaken the defence, and render the under-
taking of the invaders comparatively easy. The charge
of this expedition was given to a man whose name
indeed, Thurot, is in all our histories, but of whose
career no one English book, or French book either, gives
any complete or correct account. In the local records,
the corporation books of many towns, the mention of
Thurot’s name shows that he was a much more real
personage in the minds of the worthy burghers than
De la Clue or Conflans. And yet, even then, he was to
some extent mythical, and his earliest biographer, the
Rev. John Francis Durand,! writing immediately after
his death, in 1760, says :—

In the course of a few weeks I have known him to be
a Scotchman, an Englishman, and an Hibernian; he was

1 Genuine and Curious Memoirs of the famous Captain Thurot,
written by the Rev. John Francis Durand, with some of Mons. Thurot’s
Original Letters to that Gentleman, now in England. To which ts
added a much more faithful and particular Account than has been
hitherto published of his Proceedings since his Sailing from the Coast of
France, October 18, 1759. Dublin, 12mo, 1760. I have said in the text
that these Memoirs are curiously inaccurate. Even such a trifling
matter as this last-mentioned date is incorrect.
328 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

successively the young Pretender, a reformed pirate, and a
bastard of the blood royal of France, and I make no doubt
that if he had kept the sea a little longer he would, in his
turn, have been the brother ofthe Grand Turk, or the nephew
of the Pope of Rome, unless the newspapers had thought fit
to give us broad hints that he was those very great person-
ages themselves in disguise.

Durand’s little book is the only Life of Thurot which
has been written in English; but though the author
makes great claim to authenticity, as having been an
intimate friend of Thurot for many years, he has left
us a farrago of nonsense which we may believe Thurot
himself crammed him with. Durand was a clergyman,
and is said by Entick, also a clergyman, to be worthy of
credit ; it is more than can be said of his book, which
can only be trusted for the few years when Thurot was
living in London, or a frequent visitor to it; or when, in
the latter part, it quotes or refers to official papers; but
the account which it gives of Thurot’s early life and
active career is simply and entirely false; it has not
even the semblance of truth.

Francois Thurot,! the son of an innkeeper and post-
master in a small way of business, was born at Nuits, a
petty town of Burgundy (Cote d’Or) on 22 July, 1726.
As a boy he is said to have been of a violent and quarrel-

1 The French notices of Thurot referred to are:

(1) Adresse & Messiewrs les Représentans de la Nation Francaise.
Par Mile. Thurot. 1790.

(2) Vie du Capitaine Thurot. Par M. * * *, Paris, 1791.

(3) Journal Historique du Capitaine Thurot dans sa Croisiére sur
les Cotes d’ Ecosse et d’Irlande. Dunkerque, 1760.

(4) Journal de la Navigation dune Escadre Frangoise, partie du
port de Dunkerque aux ordres du capitaine Thurot, le 15
Octobre, 1759.
THUROT. 329

some disposition; and when, after having had a fair
education at the Jesuits’ College at Dijon, he was, at
the age of sixteen, bound apprentice in the shop of a
druggist in that town, he launched out into all sorts of
juvenile dissipations and debauchery. This, as is often
the case, led to the worst kind of rowdyism ; and he
ended his career in Dijon by robbing his aunt of her
Silver dishes and flying from the town. Naturally
enough, he ignored Dijon and Nuits for the rest of his
life; he seems to have passed himself off as a native of
Boulogne, when, some short time after, he turned up at
Dunkirk, and, being almost or quite destitute, obtained
employment as a surgeon on board a privateer fitting
out to take advantage of the war with England. He
was then barely eighteen, and his knowledge of surgery
was such as he had picked up during his few months in
the druggist’s shop; so that it was, perhaps, in some
respects, fortunate for the crew of the privateer that she
was captured by the English almost at once; and that
they and their surgeon were put out of harm’s way in a
prison at Dover.

Thurot remained a prisoner for about a year, during
which time he learned English; and having won the
good opinion of his gaolers, and probably being out on
parole, he one night seized a small boat, and put to sea
with no further equipment than a pair of sculls; with
these, and with his shirt for a sail, he reached Calais in
the course of the next day. The success of this bold
escape made some noise, and was the means of intro-
ducing him to the Maréchal de Belle-Isle, who advised
him to study navigation and take to a seafaring life.
He did both; he entered as boy on board a privateer,
330 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

and rose rapidly to higher ratings; after two cruises he
was entrusted with an independent command, and by
his activity, energy, and good fortune, won some repu-
tation and a large share of prize-money; so that, when
peace was concluded in 1748, although but twenty-two,
and having been only three years at sea, he was ina
position to fit out a merchant-ship at his own risk and
expense. For the next few years he lived a good deal
in London, lodging—according to Mr. Durand—at the
house of an apothecary in Paddington, where he passed
asa gentleman. He spoke English remarkably well for
a foreigner, sang, played the flute and the French
horn, was free with his cash, and was, altogether, good
company.

‘But,’ says Durand, ‘ the chief bent of his inclination leaned.
towards navigation and fortification; he had always some
little plans, purely the efforts of his unformed genius, relative
to those arts about him, which he was constantly showing to
his companions; and never seemed so thoroughly happy as
when he got with people that had a smattering of the above-
mentioned sciences. The last time he was in England he
lived in a court in Carey Street, Lincoln’s Inn Fields, and
was there instructed in the mathematics by one Mr. Donnelly,
an Irish gentleman, famous for his knowledge and abilities in
mathematical studies.’

He seems, then, to have passed his time in London
in an easy, social, sometimes studious, occasionally dis-
sipated manner; vanishing for months together, no one
knew where, when his money ran short. Durand clearly
knew nothing about him during these absences, beyond
what Thurot himself chose to tell; and in that there was
evidently a good deal of romance. It is, however, quite
certain that he was actively engaged in smuggling;
THUROT. 331

possibly in piracy also; and that his misdeeds brought
him within the grasp of the law, apparently both in
England and in France. In 1758, his ship, the Ar-
gonaute of Dunkirk, of 160 tons, which sailed from Ré
for Ostend in March, was in July seized by the custom-
house officers of the Baltimore district—a district
embracing the south-west extremity of Ireland, and
notorious enough as the haunt of smugglers and pirates,
for which, as the map will show, it was curiously well
adapted. The allegation on behalf of Thurot runs :—

The seizure was made on a charge of illegal practices
contrary to the revenues and to the other laws of the country,
but no instances are given of these illegal practices, nor is
there any other mention of what laws he had broken. Nor
could such be cited; for the officer who made the seizure has
affirmed on oath, in his deposition, that he seized the ship
only because it had, in a former voyage, fraudulently intro-
duced a cargo and had carried wools out of it. It is admitted
that in his second voyage he had met with a tempest, and
that since his arrival on the coast, where he had been tossed,
he had not committed any act contrary to law.

If the statement is true, Thurot had been singularly
unfortunate in his choice of an anchorage, for there
is not a port in the whole district at which a foreign
merchant-ship could have any legitimate business. It
would appear that this was the opinion of the English
government, for the claim for redress was not allowed at
the time, and must have been summarily ended by the
outbreak of hostilities in the following year. But in
1790 Thurot’s daughter reverted to it, and in her ad-

' Foreign Office, France, No. 467. Mémoire touchant le vaisseau
lV’ Argonaute, le 5 juin, 1754.
332 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

dress to the French government, urged her claims for a
pension on the grounds that her father had been ruined
by legal process in England, on suspicion of being en-
gaged in contraband trade. The suspicion was, ap-
parently, not confined to England, if, as Durand says,
he was imprisoned in France, first in Dunkirk and after-
wards in Paris, for smuggling; the French laws, in
respect to that offence, being extremely severe. It is
quite possible that Thurot’s peculiar views of commerce
and navigation were objected to on’ both sides of the
Channel; and Durand’s account is consistent, and pre-
tends to be based on actual knowledge.

Nevertheless, smuggler or pirate, he had in France
a reputation as a bold seaman; and when war was
on the point of breaking out, his name was mentioned
at court as that of a man likely to prove serviceable.
The king sent him a commission in the royal navy, and
his old patron, the Maréchal de Belle-Isle, procured for
him the command of the Friponne, a small sloop, in
which he cruised, as before, in the Channel, waging a
profitable war against English commerce.

Whilst thus employed, he is said to have conceived
the possibility of setting fire to Portsmouth and utterly
destroying the dockyard. His plan was simplicity itself.
He was, it is stated, to glide (glisser) into the harbour in
the dead of night, in a large boat carrying fifty men.
His biographer, M. * * *, thinks that nothing prevented
his doing this but the jealousy of the aristocratic
courtiers, and the carelessness of the minister who dis-
cussed the project in presence of some traitor, who sold
the secret to the English government. Had it not been
for that, it was only ‘necessary to elude the most active
THUROT. 333

vigilance, and to face the guard of a harbour the entrance
of which bristled with cannon.’ These, to Thurot, would
have been trifles; but the English, being forewarned,
took such additional precautions as rendered the brilliant
scheme quite hopeless.

It is difficult to say how much, or how little, truth
there is in this, but I see no reason to doubt that a wild
and daring adventurer, like Thurot, may have proposed
some such scheme ; partly, perhaps, with a real intention
of attempting it; partly also, with a view of being pre-
vented by the government, and of adding to his reputa-
tion at a cheap rate. But certainly, if the project was
seriously proposed, the French government refused to
entertain it ; instead of doing so, it appointed Thurot to
the command of a squadron to cruise in the Channel.

This squadron, consisting of two 36-gun frigates, the
Maréchal de Belle-Isle and the Chauvelin, each mounting
twenty-eight twelve-pounders on her maindeck, and two
small sloops, sailed from St. Malo on 16 July, 1757. Very
shortly after starting, one of the sloops, looking out ahead,
was picked up by some English cruisers ; but the others
escaped. On the early morning of 25 July, off Portland,
they fell in with the English frigate Southampton (82
guns, Captain Gilchrist'!), on her way from Portsmouth
to Plymouth, with stores and specie. As the action that
ensued is one which the French biographer considers
especially glorious, it is well to point out that the French
frigates were each of them more than a nominal match
for the Southampton ; that the two together had a very
great superiority of force, independently of three small

1 The maternal grandfather of Admiral the Earl of Dundonald.
Autobiography of a Seaman, i. 34.
334 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

craft in company, which took no part in the engagement;
that they attacked and were beaten off; and that whether
they were silenced and dropped astern, as Gilchrist! re-
ported, or were simply unable to follow and prevent the
Southampton making off, as M. * * * says, is a matter
of little consequence. The main point is the same; that
Thurot, with two frigates against one, each larger,
heavier, and with a more numerous crew, did not capture
the one; and with the best will in the world, it is diffi-
cult to see the great glory which, from this non-capture,
redounds to the French navy.

A comparative statement of the force of the com-
batants will put this in a clearer light:

Southampton 2612-pounders 6 6-pounders 220 men.

Belle Isle 28 12-pounders 8 6-pounders 400 men.
Chauvelin 28 3 8 45 400 _,,

Total 56 12-pounders 16 6-pounders 800 men.

It looks to me, indeed, as if M. Thurot had conceived
his special work to be plundering comparatively helpless
merchant-ships, rather than fighting sturdily defended
men-of-war ; and that, when he found the Southampton
no easy capture, he stomached his loss—amounting, on
board the Belle-Isle alone, to 14 killed, 26 wounded—
and hauled tothe wind. Clearly it was no part of Captain
Gilchrist’s duty, when he was specially employed in
carrying specie, to go out of his way to engage an enemy
of more than double his strength. That this is the
correct view to take of Thurot’s conduct seems confirmed
by the facts of another action which he fought off Flush-

1 Captain’s Letters, G. No. 12, 26 July, 1757. Beatson’s account
(Naw. and Mil. Memoirs, ii. 86) is a pretty close copy of Gilchrist’s letter.
THUROT. 335

ing, on 1 August, with the Seahorse (Captain Taylor), a
24-gun frigate, carrying twenty-two 9-pounders, two
8-pounders, and 160 men. The Belle-Isle, which, in her
engagement with the Southampton, had suffered much
in her rigging, had been partially dismantled in a squall
off Ostend, and was in tow of the Chauvelin, their sloop,
the Gros Thomas, in company, when the Seahorse, with
two small craft, the Raven and Bonetta, bore down
against them. After an engagement lasting three hours
and a half, at first with the Chauvelin alone, and after-
wards with the two together, the Seahorse was almost
dismantled and had 8 men killed, 17 badly wounded.
She was of much smaller force than either the Belle-Isle
or the Chauvelin, and ought to have been captured.
That she was not, was due not so much to her material
strength, as to the moral weakness of her opponents, who
have boasted—as of a victory—of having forced her to
sheer off. In point of fact, she was too much disabled
either to sheer off or to continue the attack, and the
French frigates were content to leave her and retire into
Flushing.

It was 18 September before they were refitted and put
to sea. According to the story told by the French chro-
niclers, they were scarcely well out of the port before they
were chased in again by an English squadron, consisting of
three ships of the line and two frigates. The Chauvelin
got back without difficulty; but the Belle-Isle, carrying
away her foretopsail-yard, was overtaken, and sustained
a heavy fire before she could escape. It is difficult to
say that any story, plausibly told, is absolutely and en-
tirely false; but if this is not so, it is certainly much
exaggerated. The York, the only line-of-battile ship on
336 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the coast at the time was anchored off Gravelines from
the 183th to the 21st, and did not see the ships in the
interval. This, it might be said, is only negative evi-
dence ; what is very positive evidence is that Vice-Ad-
miral Smith—Tom of Ten Thousand—the commander:
in-chief in the Downs, writing to the admiralty on
Tuesday, 20 September, said:

‘Yesterday Mr. Berkley came in a cutter from Flushing
and acquaints me the two French frigates sailed from thence
on Sunday morning, with two Ostend and two Dunkirk pilots
on board: that they steered towards Ostend, but shortly hauled
their wind, as he supposed to chase him, when he observed
the large ship carry away her topmast, and he seems certain
the head of her mainmast was likewise gone. They both im-
mediately returned to Flushing and anchored within the
buoys.’

It is, of course, quite possible that the Frenchmen
did get a distant view of some ships which Mr. Berkley
did not see; that they believed them to be English ships
of the line, and that they hauled their wind to avoid
them. But the heavy fire—the several broadsides poured
into the Belle-Isle within pistol shot—must be admitted
to be pure imagination.

When Thurot had again refitted, the two ships, Belle-
Isle and Chauvelin, stood out to the northward, and
cruised with some success on the east coast of England
and Scotland. On 5 October they were driven by stress
of weather into the Moray Frith, and anchored off Banff,
to the no small dismay of the provost and burgesses,.
who expected nothing less than the enforcement of a
heavy contribution. The accident of opportunity might
have suggested this to Thurot, and there was no force to
THUROT. 337

prevent him ; but during the night the gale freshened ;
the Chauvelin parted her cables and drifted out to sea,
leaving her anchors behind; and in the morning the
Belle-Isle weighed, and went to look for her, very much
to the relief of the townspeople of Banff, who, for once,
realised the danger to which they were exposed so far as
to raise a sum of 4001. to construct a battery for their
future defence.!

The two ships did not meet outside, and we may con-
clude that the Chauvelin made the best of her way back
to France: the Belle-Isle, on the other hand, kept north-
wards ; and having, under the Dutch flag, obtained some
provisions at the Shetland Islands, crossed over to
Bergen, picking up on her way (19 October) a prize, de-
scribed as a royal frigate of 26 guns: this it certainly
was not; but it may have been an armed merchant-ship,
or possibly a privateer. During this year the French
cruisers were very active, and took—according to Beat-
son 2—571 British ships, most of which, however, were
of triflmg value. The number of prizes taken by us
amounted to no more than 364; but of these, ‘115 were
either privateers of force or armed merchant ships,
carrying a great number of guns, and manned with
upwards of 10,000 seamen ;’ so that, on the whole, the
balance was believed to be in our favour.

Thurot anchored at Bergen on 80 October, and re-
mained there a couple of months, refitting his ship,
which, though only a month at sea, was much in want

1 The Statistical Account of Scotland (vol. xiii. p. 20) gives a ludi-

crous description of the meeting of the corporation of Banff; the date
there given (1759) is, however, a mistake: Thurot was not near Banff

in 1759. it
2 Naval and Military Memoirs, ii. 90.
338 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

of it. Here a curious incident oceurred, which marks
the character of the man: he was short of naval stores
such as blocks, ropes, and spars; and offered to buy
them from the captain of a French ship, in the port,
consigned to a Norwegian merchant. The captain re-
fused to sell; and Thurot, not to be baulked, or, as his
biographer puts it, ‘ guided by his zeal for the interests
of his country,’ sent a party on board, and with the
strong hand seized on what he wanted; ‘an act of vio-
lence,’ adds M. * * *, ‘ which would, under other circum-
stances, have been most blamable,’ and which, as it
was, nearly got him into trouble with the Norwegian
authorities.

He left Bergen on 25 December, and was no sooner
outside than he got into a furious storm, which again
dismasted the Belle-Isle, whose ill-luck in that respect
suggests that Thurot was not quite such a good practical
seaman as he is represented. Under jury-masts, and
with continual bad weather, the Belle-Isle was driven
north beyond the 65th parallel ; it was slowly, and with
much difficulty, that she worked her way south again,
and did not reach Gothenburg till 1 February, 1758.

At Gothenburg Thurot remained till 12 May, and
then, going south, capturing several coasters and col-
liers, he was, on the morning of the 26th, off the entrance
to the Frith of Forth. There he met and engaged the
Dolphin of 24, and the Solebay of 28 guns. The two
English frigates, caught a mile apart, were very roughly
handled ; but Thurot, who apparently mistook them, in
the first instance, for merchant ships, was quite satisfied
with having secured his own safety, and made no attempt
to push his advantage to the point of victory. The
THUROT. 339

match between the two sides was tolerably equal, though
the Belle-Isle had a certain superiority both in weight of
metal and in number of men; and, in boarding, might
perhaps have carried one before the other could assist
her ; but she had lost 19 killed, 34 wounded, and simple
hard fighting was not the vocation of her crew.

Thurot, however, remained in Scotch waters, and
made many prizes between 8. Abb’s Head and the Naze
of Norway ; his continued presence deeply impressed the
coast population ; his engagement with the Dolphin and
Solebay was magnified by vulgar report, and he became
the bugbear of a people who were unaccustomed to the
neighbourhood of enemies’ ships. Twelve vessels, mostly
small snows, brigs, or brigantines, are named as prizes
taken between 26 May and 12 July; and on the 138th,
off the Skaw, he encountered a fleet of merchant ships—
seventeen armed pinks—presumably the Baltic trade.
With these he had a brisk engagement; they mounted
an aggregate of 130 guns, and clustering round the Belle-
Isle, seemed for a time as if they might take her; in the
end, Thurot broke through them, put them to flight, and
cut off one of their number, the George and Joseph :
heavy rain and a dark night permitted the rest to
' escape.

The English government, wearied with the continual
complaints about one frigate being left to threaten the
coasts of England and Scotland, and almost to stop the
North Sea trade, sent several ships to look after the
Belle-Isle; but though constantly chased, Thurot suc-
ceeded in eluding his pursuers, in maintaining his ground,
and in making several captures, till towards the middle
of August; when, finding the station too hot for him, he

z2
340 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

stretched across to the Faroe Islands. Having obtained
some fresh provisions, he came back; and as the ship
was making a good deal of water, put into Lough
Swilly.

It gives a curious idea of the conditions of naval war
in the year 1758, to read of an enemy’s frigate quietly
taking up her position in Lough Swilly to refit ; but even
then it was not safe to stay long. Thurot resumed his
cruise, and off the west coast of Scotland and northern
entrance to St. George’s Channel, took several prizes;
amongst which are named the Henry, mounting 18 guns;
the Charleston, of 12 guns, laden with cloth stuffs, from
Liverpool to Carolina ; the Britannia, of 14 guns, with
porcelain, to New York; and the Admiral Ruyter of 18
guns, laden with sugar, coffee, and indigo; but, formid-
able as the armament of these sounds, it must be borne
in mind that the guns of a merchant-ship were small,
meant merely to repel any desultory attack of petiy
pirates, and were useless against a regularly armed ship;
not one of these prizes seems to have even attempted any
resistance.

By 18 September Thurot was back at Bergen, and
cruising from there, again took several prizes; but towards
the end of the year he ran down to Ostend, and early in
January discharged his crew and officers, or, as we should
say, paid off, at Dunkirk.

M. Thurot seems now to have spent some time at
Paris, and to have been consulted freely by the govern-
ment as to the projected invasion of England. The
public feeling of France—so far as France had a public
feeling—was no. doubt just then very bitter against
England.
THUROT, 341

Not only was England at war, and a natural enemy,
but four times within the last two years had she
defiled the soil of France; and though on the first
occasion, the attempt on Rochefort, in September 1757,
was altogether abortive; and on the last, the troops
which landed near St. Malo, on 8 September, 1758, were,
to the number of 800, killed, made prisoners, or driven
into the sea at St. Cas, on the 11th; the success on the
two other occasions had been sufficient to kindle not only
material fires at the time, as at St. Malo in June 1758,
but also very much and noisy indignation. The attack
on Cherbourg in August 1758, was worst of all; and even
St. Cas following directly afterwards could not wipe away
the memory of it.

Cherbourg, though very different from what it now
is, had been a pet fancy of Louis XV and of Cardinal
Fleury: there is no doubt that it was meant, from the
beginning, as a standing menace to England: as such
its docks had been dug out and fortified against wind and
waves and English arms; and as such it was broken up
and destroyed by the expedition under Commodore Howe,
— Black Dick’ as he was more familiarly called: the
mole and fortifications were turned over into the harbour
and basins: the work of years was undone in a few days:
it seemed almost in mockery that the gate of the grand
sluice bore the inscription :

Hane jussit Lodovix, suasit Floreus, et undis

Curavit mediis Asfeldus surgere molem :

Non aliis votis almx preesentior urbis.

Ars frenavit aquas, fluctus domuitque minaces :

Hine tutela viget, stat copia, gloria crescit ;

Hine Rex, hine sapiens, herosque manebit in evum.—
342 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

which was, not unaptly under the circumstances, para-
phrased by one of the English officers :

Louis and Fleury must, with Asfeld, now

Resign to George, to Pitt, to Bligh and Howe.
One blast destroyed the labour of an age,

Let loose the tides and bid the billows rage ;
Their wealth and safety gone, their glory lost,
The king’s, the statesman’s, and the hero’s boast.

The wrath of France and of the French government
was extreme, and it was not lessened by Rear-Admiral
Rodney bombarding Havre-de-Grace, on the 8rd and
following days of July, 1759, as he wrote in his official
letter, ‘for fifty-two hours without intermission, with
such success that the town was several times in flames,
and their magazines of stores for the flat-bottomed boats
burnt with great fury, for upwards of six hours.’ Albion
was to be crushed; Carthage was to be destroyed; and
whilst the Marquis de Conflans and the Duke d’Aiguillon
arranged this in the south, Thurot undertook, with a
small force, to make a diversion in the north, according
as circumstances rendered expedient.

The force put at his disposal for this purpose con-
sisted of his old ship, the Maréchal de Belle-Isle, now
mounting 44 guns, of which four were 18-pounders,
carried, it would seem, in extra ports on the lower deck;
three smaller frigates, and two corvettes; and all of
these, in addition to their complements, which were
smaller than was usual in French ships, carried a
number of soldiers, amounting in the aggregate to about
1,200: these were borne for service on shore, under the
command of a brigadier-general, M. de Flobert.
THUROT, 343

In more exact detail, the squadron was as follows :—
Maréchal de Belle-Isle 44 guns . 600 men

Bégon : : . 86 ,, - 600 ,,
Blonde . ‘ . 86 ,, - 400 ,,
Terpsichore ‘ . 24 ,, . 800 ,,
Amarante . A +) AB. 45 . 2150 ,,
Faucon . ‘ . 18 ,, . 2150 ,,

With this force, nominally most respectable, Thurot
weighed from Dunkirk on 15 October, 1759. On the
26th he arrived at Gothenburg, having not only passed
through the English cruisers which, under Commodore
Boys and Sir Peircy Brett, blockaded the coast off
Dunkirk and Ostend, but taken several prizes on the
way.

A quaint letter, which Durand has preserved, gives
the impressions of a Liverpool skipper, a Captain Rim-
mer, who had seen the squadron at Gothenburg. The
Belle-Isle, he says, ‘has a black lion-head, and appears
very ill-hogged in the midships, and is painted black
and red;’ one of the other frigates ‘has a yellow lion-
head standing remarkably high, is painted yellow and
black ;’ and so on through the rest of them. The fashion
which prevailed to the last, of painting ships of the line
and frigates black with white stripes, and which was, I
believe, definitely introduced by Sir John Jervis when in
command of the Mediterranean fleet, no doubt had some
advantages; but the artistic eye, comparing it with the
fashions of the past, as exemplified in some of the
models at Greenwich, in the museum of the Royal Naval
College, may almost regret the uniform simplicity which
superseded them.

But a more remarkable passage in the letter just
344 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY,

referred to, is that which speaks ofthe condition of the
squadron :—

The frigates when they came into Gothenburg were very
foul, as if come off from a long voyage, and were destitute of
many necessaries—had very few seamen on board, but full of
land forces, commanded by a major-general; most of the
soldiers were in blue, faced with white, and others all white.
Whilst they remained at Gothenburg, nineteen days, they
were fully employed cleaning their ships, getting new top-
masts, new rigging for their vessels, victualling and watering;
and the Swedes assisted them all in their power, sending
them their East Indian ships’ boats to water with, and pro-
curing them cables in lieu of those they had ordered to be
made, which would have detained them before finished.

And this after eleven days at sea from their first
leaving France !

The squadron left Gothenburg on 15 November, and
meeting with a succession of southerly gales, was driven
northward, and put into Bergen ; the Bégon, of 86 guns,
presumably the ‘ yellow and black’ frigate mentioned by
Captain Rimmer, and one of the corvettes had parted
company; and as Bergen had been given out as a
rendezvous, Thurot waited there for several days; they
did not, however, appear, and he left without them on
5 December.

The weather, that winter, seems to have been ex-
ceptionally and persistently bad, and the squadron, now
reduced to four ships, was driven away to the westward,
and on 28 December came to an anchor in Westmanna-
haven in Stromsoe, one of the Faroe Islands. Whilst
there Thurot wished to procure fresh provisions for his
ships’ companies ; and as the governor made difficulties,
he landed a party of men, at once to intimidate the
THUROT, 345

authorities, and to lay hands on whatever they could
get. The display of force was sufficient, and a small
supply of bullocks, flour, brandy, and tobacco was sent
on board. It may be noticed that at that time the Faroe
Islands were a favourite haunt of smugglers, and a place
of call for Danish and Dutch East Indiamen ; now that
smuggling, as well as these branches of the East India
trade, has been done away, the resources of the islands
have probably much diminished, and any supplies they
could furnish would scarcely be worth the notice of a
body of more than 1,200 men.

During the stay of the squadron at Stromsoe a
quarrel broke out between M. de Flobert and Thurot,
which was the cause of serious embarrassment both then
and afterwards. Flobert had displayed all along a feel-
ing of jealousy at being subordinated to Thurot, as well
as of pique at Thurot’s refusal to communicate the tenor
of his private instructions and the full purport of the
expedition. A circumstance, trivial in itself, was suffi-
cient to set the match to the ready fuel. Thurot had
learned that one of the soldier-officers had been grum-
bling about the hardships of the cruise, and the pro-
visions, in what he rightly considered an unofficer-like
way ; and had felt it his duty to reprimand him sharply.
Flobert took up the matter in support of his junior ;
worked himself into a rage, and, mad with passion,
ordered up a corporal and two file of the guard to put
Thurot under arrest. This obliged Thurot to produce
an order from the king, in proof that he was absolutely
commander-in-chief of the expedition; and Flobert—I
quote here from the ‘ Life,’ by M. * * *—
346 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

‘fearing to compromise his authority by persisting in his
imprudent step, drew back, and the quarrel was for the time
appeased; leaving, however, a leaven of animosity which con-
tinued to ferment, occasioned many difficulties, and threw
into the minds of the soldiers a germ of insubordination
which produced very bad effects.’

In point of fact this quarrel between Flobert and
Thurot was an extreme instance of a cause which, in the
last century, and in England more than in France, ren-
dered futile so very many expeditions in which sea and
land forces were required to act in conjunction. Of
these Vernon’s failure at Cartagena in 1741 was perhaps
the most marked and the most disastrous; but there
were scores of others; and the constant recurrence of
difficulties seems to point to a radically false system and
an honest misunderstanding, rather than to mere cap-
tiousness and personal dislike. At the same time, it is
too true that there was, between soldiers and sailors, a
very mutual feeling of jealousy and contempt, which the
officers in no small degree shared with their men. This
was strong enough, no doubt, on the part of the soldiers,
but was perhaps even stronger amongst the sailors, who
saw their favoured and courtly rivals sea-sick and help-
less on board ship, but had no opportunity of seeing
them in their own sphere of duty and distinction. The
pipe-clay, the powdered head, the stiff clothing and
etiquette of the soldier were all repulsive to the ‘ tar’ of
the olden time. Had he been versed in Shakespeare, he
would probably have described the object of his scorn in
the words of Hotspur, as ‘ neat and finely dressed—fresh
as a bridegroom—perfumed like a milliner ;’ as it was,
he drew up a table of precedence, which continued in
THUROT. 347

vogue till not very many years ago. I have myself
heard it said, and meant too, ‘A messmate before a
shipmate; a shipmate before a stranger; a stranger
before a dog ; but—a dog before a soldier.’

When we remember the numerous instances to be
found in our own annals in which joint expeditions failed
from disagreement or want of perfect concord between
two commanding officers of the different services, not
otherwise connected, it is not to be wondered at if a
French soldier of good family, M. de Flobert, was in-
dignant at the circumstances that compelled him to
act subordinately—or rather insubordinately—to a
sailor, not even a genuine naval officer, an ex-smuggler,
a privateer, a man of no family, a roturier, a Frangois
Thurot. Possibly, nay probably, Thurot was at fault in
some of the conventionalities of French society, for he
had never had any opportunity of seeing or practising
them: but, after all, Thurot’s name lives in history;
Flobert’s probably comes before many readers now for
the first time.

The constant succession of gales which obliged
Thurot to remain at the Faroe Islands, compelled him
to put the men on short allowance of bread, ten ounces
per day, and to stop the double rations issued to officers
and servants, promising, however, that they should be
paid savings, that is, the equivalent in money. Flobert
insisted that a council of war should be called, and stated
that, in his opinion, as their force had been lessened
by the loss of the two ships, Bégon and Faucon, and
was now weakened by the want of provisions, it was im-
perative on him to return to France at once. Thurot re-
‘plied: the speech, as reported, is most likely apocryphal,
348 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

but it has been accepted by the French, and serves
at any rate to illustrate the sense in which they have
considered his character. He said, then :—

That as they could not get provisions at the Faroe Islands,
they must go and look for them in England, where they would
find abundance. That the winds, which had long been con-
trary, would change, and three days would bring them to
their destination : the only honourable way to be useful to
their country was to make a diversion— which might lead to
great results—by attacking the enemy in their homes, and by
braving all risks in this glorious attempt; certainly not by
returning shamefully to France after so much toil and fatigue,
without having ventured to undertake anything. For the
rest, the direct route lay past England, and on the English
coast he would land; it was absolutely necessary to make a
descent ; he was determined to do so; the reasons offered for
a retreat so dishonourable as had been proposed could have
no influence with a force on which the safety of the country
depended ; and, in fine, that to grumble at the difficulties, or
even the calamities incidental to war, was not showing the
courage and firmness necessary to the career of arms.

Thurot carried his point. On 26 January, 1760, the
squadron left Stromsoe, with a fresh wind from north-
west, and by the 30th was on the north coast of Ireland.
It was his intention to enter Lough Foyle, and attack
Londonderry ; there does not seem to have been any-
thing to prevent him, except the weather, which, with a
southerly gale, drove him off the coast. And meanwhile,
a mutiny broke out amongst the officers of the troops,
which was the more dangerous as the soldiers formed
the largest part of the ships’ companies. The Amarante
deserted the squadron ; the Terpsichore had arranged to
do the same; Thurot hailed to say that if the wind did
THUROT. 349

not shift he would run back to Bergen and get pro-
visions ; the Blonde replied that it was none too soon.
M. de Rusilly, commanding the troops on board the
Terpsichore, complained bitterly of the short allowance
of provisions, and said that all the officers were decided
to return to France. Thurot pointed out that their
doing so might lead to results disagreeable to them-
selves; but finding his authority set at naught, he con-
sented, as a compromise, to go-to Bergen.

The wind, however, now changed to the north-west,
and he proposed to enter St. George’s Channel; but
Rusilly impudently notified to him, in the name of the
officers of the Terpsichore, that they were going to pass
to the west of Ireland, and return to France. Thurot
ordered Dernaudais, the captain of the Terpsichore, to
follow the Belle-Isle, saying that if he refused he should
be responsible before the king for his conduct. Rusilly
answered that he would take all the responsibility on
himself; that it was his intention, as soon as he arrived
in France, to lay a complaint of Thurot’s conduct before
the court, and have him punished. Dernaudais, who
had every wish to obey his commodore, was forced by
Rusilly and the other soldier-officers to yield, and to
make off towards the west ; Thurot fired a shot across
the Terpsichore’s bows; he had to fire a second before
she would bring to; and Dernaudais, having gone on
board the Belle-Isle, had to prove that he had been
constrained by his officers. He was sent back to his
ship, bearing to the mutineers the assurance that they
should be severely punished. The Blonde seems to have
been just at that time more favourably disposed; she
passed under the Belle-Isle’s stern, and her captain,
350 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

M. Larréguy, hailed that Thurot might count on
him.

The next day Thurot judged it necessary to reduce
the ration of bread to eight ounces. Flobert ordered
that only five ounces should be issued to the soldiers.
These naturally complained that they got less than the
sailors, and Thurot at once gave directions that they
should get the same. Flobert, whose order seems to
have been quite unwarranted—to have been given only
to provoke disturbance amongst his men—was furious.
He insisted on a council, and demanded that the captain
should explain his navigation, for the day before it had
been agreed that he was to enter St. George’s Channel,
and now he was standing towards Londonderry. Thurot
replied that, in fact, he meant to go to Londonderry.
Flobert asked what he would do if the wind still pre-
vented his entering. In that case Thurot would con-
tinue his route. ‘Well then!’ cried Flobert, ‘if to-
morrow morning, at six o’clock, we are not in the port of
Londonderry, and you do not then give up this project,
I will have you arrested, and will myself take charge of
the ship.’ Thurot is described as being more surprised
than angry, and as contenting himself with saying, ‘If
you take it in that way there’s nothing more to be said ;
your threats do not intimidate me; I do not fear you,
and I defy you to arrest me.’

Flobert, screaming with rage, rushed out of the
cabin, ordered the sentry to prevent Thurot leaving it,
and called the guard to arms. Thurot took his pistols,
pushed past the sentry, and went out on the quarter-
deck. The guard had fallen in, but the men were un-
willing to execute off-hand the orders of their command-
THUROT. 351

ant, whose fellows had, meantime, pointed out to him
that he was exceeding his power. Flobert gave way,
and Thurot, to put an end to the scandalous scene, and
to prevent anything of the sort happening again, wished
to read out his instructions from the king, and the com-
mission appointing him commander-in-chief of the
squadron. Flobert forbade the soldiers to listen to him.
Thurot then said that he would have it posted up for all
to read. Flobert gave orders that whoever attempted to
post it up should be arrested. It was now Thurot’s turn
to give way; ‘he had the complaisance not to make his
instructions public ’—not to post them up—and so calm
was restored.

That same night the Belle-Isle hove-to off the
entrance to Lough Foyle, and in the darkness her two
consorts left her, having agreed between themselves to
pass round to the west of Ireland. By a mistake in
their reckoning, however, they rejoined her next day,
but too late to carry out the commodore’s purpose. The
wind had shifted to the south-west, and it was no longer
possible to enter the Lough.

Meanwhile, in gales, disturbances, and quarrels, time
slipped away. It was 15 February; the daily allowance
of bread was reduced to five ounces, and Thurot, firmly
resolved not to go back to France, anchored in Claigeann
Bay in the island of Islay. Here he learned froma man,
McDonald, who came off as pilot, of the decisive defeat
which Conflans had sustained. It was an event three
months past, but was news to him, and disturbed his
plans, as he saw that, of course, the great project of
“invasion could not be carried out. He was, however,
still unwilling to return without attempting something.
352 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

which might be for the honour, if not very much for the

-material advantage of France. But it was absolutely
necessary, in the first place, to get some fresh provisions
and bread, for his crews were sickly ; and, as the popu-
lation of the island, with the repressive measures of the
English Government after ‘ the Forty-five’ still in their
memories, refused to furnish any supplies, the natural
course would have been to take them by force. This
Thurot was unwilling to do; for his instructions were
positive not to attempt any hostile landing in Scotland,
where it was hoped the Jacobite feeling might itself
make a diversion in favour of French arms.

In this dilemma he came to an arrangement with
McDonald—who seems to have acted throughout as his
agent—to land his men as a demonstration. It was
the merest of demonstrations. The poor, half-starved,
scurvy-smitten wretches were no sooner landed than they
‘began to dig up every green thing they saw upon the
ground, even the grass, which they devoured with the
utmost eagerness.’ The bullocks, nevertheless, were
produced ; forty-eight were driven in, and after a diffi-
culty with Flobert, who wished to ‘requisition’ them,
were very honestly paid for by Thurot. In a similar
way, he got a small but grateful supply of oatmeal and
flour ; and putting to sea on the 19th, a Lisbon trader,
laden with oranges, was, under the circumstances, a
most valuable prize.

About midnight on the 20th he entered Belfast
Lough. On the previous evening he had detailed his
plans to Flobert.

‘There are two objects before us,’ he had said, ‘ Belfast
and Carrickfergus. I will land you at Whitehouse. You will,
THUROT. 353.

in the first instance, attack Belfast; it is a rich commercial
town, and has neither fortifications nor troops. Threaten to
set fire to it, and the inhabitants will hasten to furnish the
stores and provisions of which we are so much in need. You
will be able, besides, to levy a large contribution. After that
you will go to Carrickfergus, a town of but small size, and
poor. It will be quite easy to seize on the castle, which is
old, ruimous, and without defence. You will set at liberty
the French prisoners who are there, and extract from the
people such a contribution of provisions and money as their
small means will permit; and will re-embark before the
English ships are apprised of our landing. The whole thing
is to be done off-hand; the enemy must not have time to
organise any opposition.’

The plan seems to have been excellent, but Flobert,
either out of contradiction, or a pedantic adherence to
prescribed rules, insisted on attacking Carrickfergus
first. He would land at Kilroot, two or three miles to
the north-east of Carrickfergus, or nowhere; and unable
to overcome his mutinous obstinacy, Thurot, sooner than
do nothing, consented. The landing of about 600 men
was effected by noon on 21 February, 1760.

As soon as Lieut.-Col. Jennings, who commanded at
Carrickfergus, learned that three strange and suspicious
ships had anchored at Kilroot, whilst waiting for further
information, he sent all the prisoners to Belfast, and
made what preparations he could for defence. These
were but few. Although Carrickfergus was, in a way,
the military depot of the north of Ireland, the castle was
ruinous, the town was unfortified, and there were in
garrison only 200 men, almost all young recruits, and,
as yet, quite undisciplined. Accordingly, when Flobert
attacked, little opposition could be made ; the men retired

AA
354 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

into the castle, and after a short stand, in which some
50 French were killed ‘and wounded, they capitulated on
terms sufficiently favourable. The troops were not to
be sent prisoners to France, but exchanged against an
equal number of French; the castle (such as it was)
was not to be demolished ; the town was not to be burnt
or pillaged, but was, as a ransom, to supply the squadron
with provisions. The course of events rendered these
conditions practically vain; and though the town was
not set on fire, it was pretty well ransacked, as was,
indeed, to be expected from men whose officers had set
them no good example of obedience, and who had been
confined on board ship for four months.

Thurot had meanwhile weighed, stood further into
the bay, and anchored off Whitehouse. From there, on
the next day, he landed, and in an interview with
Flobert, pressed him to advance at once on Belfast,
which, he understood, was defended by only 200 regulars
and some militia. Flobert, notwithstanding this and
the wish of his own officers, refused to move.

The next day, the 23rd, Thurot wrote to Flobert, still
urging him to attack Belfast; again pointing out that
they could get plenty of provisions there, could levy a
rich contribution, and that it would be easier to re-
embark. That he could not stay long, as the enemy
would gather in on him; that, in fact, he must sail
next day; and that, unless he got provisions, he would
not re-embark the troops: it would be better that
they should remain prisoners in Ireland than die of
hunger on board. Flobert’s reply to his commanding
officer is a valuable commentary on the discipline of the
period.
THUROT. 355

a he wrote, you had done with your ships the hundredth
part of what I have done with the quarter of my detachment,

we‘ghould not be in the wretched plight in which, by your
fault alone, we now are; for this you shall answer to the

king, who, when he entrusted you with the conduct of a de-
tachment, did not give you permission to sacrifice it, in a
barefaced manner, in trying to carry out impossible and
chimerical plans. If you had had the common sense to see
that famine is the only evil without remedy and beyond the
courage of the king’s troops, you would not now be reduced
to the cruel threat of abandoning us to the discretion of the
king’s enemies. It is your duty to abide whatever may hap-
pen, rather than not re-embark the detachment. I summon
you, in the king’s name, to run all hazards rather than
abandon us.

M. de Cavenac, who, on Flobert being wounded, had
taken the command, wrote in much the same sense ; and
again, shortly afterwards, that the enemy were muster-
ing in force, and that it was necessary to re-embark at
once. Thurot, in threatening to abandon the troops,
had undoubtedly threatened what he could not and durst
not perform; and finding that their officers would not
lead them against Belfast, he embarked them on the
evening of the 25th. Of provisions he seems to have
obtained none, except a few potatoes. The mayor and
three townsmen had been taken on board as security
for the promised supplies ; but as these were not
forthcoming on the 24th, it was arranged that the town
should pay 1,000J. instead; and two of the hostages
were sent on shore to see about it; the two others,
Mr. Chaplin, the mayor, and Mr. Spaight, a merchant
of Carrickfergus, being kept on board. Thurot was
anxious to get out of the bay, but a stormy wind from

AA
356 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. \

the northward prevented him, and he could not weigh
till midnight of the 27th. It was half-past four on the
morning of the 28th when he rounded the light outthe
island of Copeland. /

The delay which had been enforced on him’‘had per-
mitted the government to bring up a smali squadron
from the south of Ireland. It cannot but appear strange
that there should have been at that time nO ships of war
in the northern waters; for it had been kriown for weeks
past that Thurot was on the coast, and great alarm
had been felt at all places which were, o1| thought they
were, worth attacking. At Whitehaven, where some 200
merchant ships, coasting vessels and othes, were lying,
there was great excitement, and 600 volurjteers took up
arms to defend the place; but how these were to defend
the shipping does not appear. Liverpool in the same
way, then rising fast into importance, and especially
obnoxious for the number of its privateers, assembled
a considerable number of troops, mostly of the local
militia. An old townsman, who, under the name of a
‘nonagenarian,’ published his recollections a few years
ago, has described the scene, which would be still fresh
in the memory of his mother when he was a little
boy :—

 

‘ Everton Hill,’ he says, ‘ was alive with people from the
town waiting the freebooters’ approach. A party of soldiers
was then encamped on the hill, and I have been told that the
men had orders, on Thurot’s appearance, to make signals if by
day, and to light up the beacon if at night, to communicate
the intelligence of the French fleet being off the coast to the
other beacons at Ashurst and Billinge, Rivington Pike, and
elsewhere, and so spread the news into the north; while
THUROT. 357

signals would also be taken up at Halton, Beeston, the
Wrekin, and thence to the southward.’ !

But there seems to have been no attempt to defend
the river, and Thurot might, practically without opposi-
tion, have done a good deal of mischief amongst the
shipping, and have destroyed the rising fortunes of the
Bolds, the Colquitts, and others whose names are per-
petuated in the modern streets.

Notwithstanding all this preparation and excitement,
no ships had been sent north; and when the Duke of
Bedford, then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, had news of
the landing at Carrickfergus, he had to send, quite
promiscuously, to the different seaports, to inform the
captains of any of his Majesty’s ships that might happen
to be there, of the enemy being on the coast. Luckily,
and only luckily, there did happen to be three frigates at
Kinsale : the Holus, of 32 guns, Captain Elliot, Brilliant
and Pallas, each of 86 guns. They belonged to Hawke’s
fleet on the coast of France, had been blown off their
station, had run short of provisions, had put into Kin-
sale, and had been detained by a succession of southerly
gales. Their presence at Kinsale when the Lord-
Lieutenant’s letter arrived on 24 February, was the
result of a very curious succession of accidents. On re-
ceipt of the news they had got to sea with all haste, and
had come off the entrance of Belfast Lough on the even-
ing of the 26th, but during the gale had not ventured
inside. It was thus that, on the morning of the 28th,
when the French squadron came round Copeland Island,

1 Recollections of Old Liverpool, by a Nonagenarian (Liverpool, 1863),
p. 146,
358 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

it saw, and was immediately seen by, the Alolus and het
consorts.

It was no part of Thurot’s plan to fight a squadron of
Finglish frigates, and he did not wait for their attack.
They gave chase, and closed with him about nine o’clock ;
the Molus, leading, engaged the Belle-Isle; the Pallas
and Brilliant, as they came up, assisted her ; and after a
smart action, lasting for about an hour and a half,
Thurot was killed, and his ship hauled down her colours.
The Blonde and Terpsichore had not shown any wish to
ight, and being chased by the Pallas and Brilliant,
struck almost at once; they thus sustained little or no
Jamage or loss; but the Belle-Isle had suffered consider-
ubly in men, in spars, and in hull. Captain Elliot, in
ais official letter, estimates the enemy’s loss, in killed
and wounded, at 3800; the French accounts—probably
rot including the less severe cases—speak of 90 hors de
combat ; and, whichever account we accept, the loss was
very great, and had fallen almost entirely on the Belle-
[sle, which was also with difficulty kept from sinking, as
she was taken, with the other prizes, into Ramsay Bay,
n the Isle of Mann.'

The presence of the French frigates on the coast had
xaused such vivid alarm, that the rejoicing over their
sapture was somewhat excessive, and was accompanied by
nuch boasting. The action was no doubt highly credit-
ible to Elliot and his companions, and a very important
service was performed just when it was most needed;

1M. de Flobert had been left at Carrickfergus, wounded, and thus
ell into the hands of Lord Charlemont, who seems to have been favour-
bly impressed by his manners and kindly disposition, though he speaks
so of his pedantic notions of military science and discipline. See
dardy’s Memoirs of the Earl of Charlemont, i. 110 et seq.
THUROT. 359

but there was not in reality much to boast about; and I
cannot but think that Nelson was prompted by an im-
perfect knowledge of the facts when he wrote on 11
January 1804:! ‘his [Elliot’s] action with Thurot will
stand the test with any of our modern victories.’ Nomi-
nally the French squadron was superior to the English ;
independent of the result, it was not so effectively. The
French guns were heavier, but several had been struck
below during the bad weather in the northern seas, and
had not been remounted; the ships too were of slighter
scantling, the Belle-Isle more especially, which was badly
hogged even at Gothenburg, and after her capture was
not thought worth buying into the service. The number
of men, again, was nearly double that of the English, but
very many of them were sickly, if not sick; and the bulk
were soldiers, who—under such officers as they had—
were not only useless in action, but worse than useless,
as getting in the way, and swelling the list of killed and
wounded. Even had the Blonde and Terpsichore stuck
gallantly by their consort, the result must have been the
same ; for the three English frigates were in good order,
well manned and ably commanded; but the manner in
which these two kept aloof, by throwing the whole weight
of the contest on the Belle-Isle, rendered it beyond ques-
tion easier and the sooner come at.

About Thurot himself there seems little room for
doubt ; his contemporaries, alike friends and enemies,
speak of him as a bold, daring man, active, energetic, and
full of resource; and the fact that during the greater
part of three years he kept the English coast in a state
of continual apprehension, escaping from, eluding, and,

1 Nicolas’s Nelson Despatches, v. 366.
360 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

when need was, fighting the English cruisers with which
the narrow seas were swarming, is sufficient evidence of
his high qualities as a corsair and a leader of a flying
squadron. I have already shown how, on different occa-
sions, he declined to push his success against English
ships of war to a decisive issue; notably against the
Southampton and against the Seahorse—against this
last more especially. In doing so I have not wished to
impute any base motive to Thurot, whose courage must
have been of proof; but I do think that both these
actions, and in a less degree that which he fought against
the Dolphin and Solebay, illustrate the principle which
was then, and continued to be during the century, the
ruling principle of the French navy—that of avoiding
decisive action;! a principle which might occasionally
lead to strategic advantage, but which on the other hand
exposed them to great tactical danger and absolute loss
.—as was Clearly exemplified on 20 November, 1759, ‘ la
journée de M. de Conflans’—and which effectually pre-
vented their winning any brilliant success. Thurot
fought well when he was forced to fight; but he con-
sistently avoided action whenever he could avoid it, and
when he could not, he quitted it at the earliest possible
opportunity. He thus, throughout his career, obtained
only the reputation of an active and untiring corsair.
Had it been otherwise, he might have gained a higher
reputation as a warrior, by capturing the Southampton
or the Seahorse, against each of which he had an over-
‘whelmingly superior force; and at the last, might have
made a much sturdier resistance against the Aolus and
her consorts. Had he stood boldly towards the English

1 Compare. Victoires et Conquéies, tom. vii. p. 251.
THUROT, 361

squadron, his companions would scarcely have had the
unblushing cowardice to stand away ; but as he crowded
sail from the enemy, they did the same; and by rate of
sailing and accident of position, had an excuse—sufficient
for them, though it would not have been sufficient for
single-hearted, honest, and honourable men—to keep
out of the fight.

As to the conduct of M. de Flobert, and the whole
body of soldier-officers, the story of which throws a
curious light on the capabilities or incapabilities of French
discipline, there can be but one opinion. Whatever
grievances he had, or thought he had, it was his duty to
his country and his king to have backed up the com-
modore. His complaints might and should have waited,
after due remonstrance, till their return to France.
There can be little doubt that had Flobert entered into
Thurot’s views and schemes, Belfast would have been
sacked. Against a sudden onset such as Thurot proposed,
there were no possible means of effective resistance ;
though after three days’ delay, things would certainly
have been very different.

And the history of Thurot’s whole career, and more
especially of this last campaign, seems to me to show
that a naval force, however numerous and active, is not
in itself sufficient to protect our commerce from loss, our
coasts from insult, and our towns from pillage, at the
hands of a small squadron, or even of a single ship,
commanded by a man of talent and enterprise. That
Thurot failed in inflicting very serious loss on our towns
and our shipping, seems to have been due not to any
wise precautions of the government—though the elder
Pitt was secretary of state—-not to the superior might of
362 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

our navy, though that crushed him at last; but to the
exceptional severity of the season, to the inherent weak-
ness of French sailors, the inefficiency of French equip-
ment, and the bad discipline of French soldiers. But it
is not wise always to trust our safety, our prestige, or
our honour either to the caprice of the weather or to the
presumed incapacity of a possible enemy.

In person, Thurot is described as of middle height,
stout-built and well-made, ‘rather robust than genteel,
rather comely than handsome; very brown and extremely
florid, with a small scar under his left eye.’ Of his
private life we know little or nothing; he died poor,
leaving an Irishwoman (née Smith) who passed as his
wife, and a daughter six months old, dependent on the
state, which at that time, meant Madame de Pompadour.
We find the daughter coming forward in 1790, with a
petition for further support, and being awarded, at the
instance of Barrére, a pension of 1,000 francs. His
biographer, M. * * *, says that he married about the
year 1750; but according to Durand, who appears to
write in good faith and of personal knowledge, he was,
about that time and after, living in Shadwell with an
Irish trull whom he had picked up in that not very re-
putable neighbourhood. Whether this was Miss Smith,
the future Mdme. Thurot, or not, is a point on which
history does not pronounce an opinion.
363

CHAPTER XL

PAUL JONES,
‘THE PIRATE.)

In the foregoing chapter I have related one of our past
experiences of a bold and energetic corsair ; but Thurot
is not the only man who, in spite of our naval power,
has spread alarm along our coasts; and the lesson is
too important to be lightly set aside. I propose, there-
fore, to follow up that story with an account of the
remarkable man whose name served for many years as
the controller of the peace of northern nurseries—a, police
duty that has more recently, as I am told, been entrusted
to the Jabberwock or the Bandersnatch.

It is close on one hundred years since an unnamed
minstrel of the streets sang in a ballad more frank than
polite:

Of heroes and statesmen I’1l just mention four

That cannot be matched if we trace the world o’er;

For none of such fame ever stept o’er the stones

As Germain, Jemmy Twitcher, Lord North and Paul Jones.
Through a madheaded war which old England will rue,
At London, at Dublin, and Edinburgh too,

The tradesmen stand still, and the merchant bemoans
The losses he meets with from such as Paul Jones.

1 Fraser’s Magazine, April 1878.
364 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY,

If success to our fleets be not quickly restored,

The Leaders in Office to shove from the board,

May they all fare alike, and the De’il pick the bones

Of Germain, Jemmy Twitcher, Lord North and Paul Jones.

Of the first three members of this quartette, I have
nothing to say here: their misdeeds are chronicled in
every English history. The fourth is, to most English
readers, only a name, or if he is anything more, he is
‘the pirate.’ Paul Jones strongly objected to the word
as applied to himself; he had, he said, looked in the dic-
tionary, and found the meaning of pirate to be ‘an enemy
of mankind.’ Now, he was not the enemy of mankind,
but only the enemy of England.

Antonio never yet was thief or pirate,

Though I confess, on base and ground enough,
Orsino’s enemy.

With a tu quoque argument, not wanting in ingenuity,
he urged, that as England was then at war with the
whole of America, the greater part of Europe, and much
of Asia, not to speak of a bit of Africa, she, in point of fact,
came as near being the enemy of mankind as could well
be conceived ; that England was therefore the pirate, not
Paul Jones.

But pirate or not, his career and conduct are worth
inquiring into and discussing. Jn doing so I shall en-
deavour to write as becomes a student of naval history,
not asa professional eulogist, still less as an angry reviler.
If I can do this I may claim some degree of merit; for
though the life of Paul Jones has often been written, it
has never yet been written except in a tone of extravagant
praise or of senseless disparagement. It is not so that
any man’s life ought to be written. Fas est ab hoste doceri.
PAUL JONES. 365

Tf Paul Jones did us great harm at a very trying period of
our history, it is worth our while seriously and calmly to
inquire what he did, how he did it, and how, in the future,
similar harm, injury, or insult is to be guarded against.

The Lives of Paul Jones, to which I have just referred,
divide themselves broadly into the two classes I have
named. The latter are either chap-books or are based
on chap-books: they are dictated by ignorance, or spite,
or panic: they have little or no foundation in fact, and,
as historical records, they are of no value whatever. The
others, whatever pretext of originality they make, may
be virtually resolved into two, which, being written or
edited under a strong personal as well as national bias,
call for great caution in accepting their statements. Of
these, one was published as far back as 1825: its author,
Mr. Sherburne, was Registrar of the United States’ Navy,
and had access to many public records and papers, which
he quotes from or embodies: he was also able to collect
various private or semi-private letters, and was on terms
of familiar and domestic intimacy with men who had
themselves taken part in the events he has described. He
is thus, in many respects, a competent witness, and is
entitled to every consideration which his avowed partisan-
ship permits. The other, published in 1830, is based on
certain private papers in the possession of Miss Janette
Taylor, a niece of Paul Jones: it supplements the first
in many interesting points, but is, more even than Mr.
Sherburne’s, Jones’s own account of his conduct under
circumstances which writers less partial than himself
might well speak of in less favourable terms.’

1 Of the other Lives of Paul Jones, I may mention one by Captain
A. Slidell Mackenzie, U.S.N., which, take it all in all, is the most satis-.
366 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

‘John Paul was born in Scotland, in the stewartry of
Kirkcudbright, in the parish of Kirkbean,' on 6 July, 1747.
About his birth and early years there was no romance
whatever, and there is no mystery. He was of respec-
table though humble parentage; his father, John Paul,
being head gardener to Mr. Craik, of Arbigland, and his
mother, Jean Macduff, the daughter of a neighbouring
farmer. He was the youngest of five children—two, still
younger, dying in infancy. He received the ordinary
education of a Scottish peasant lad at the parish school,
and at the age of twelve was bound apprentice on board
the Friendship, of Whitehaven, a ship belonging to Mr.
Younger, a merchant in the American trade. His first
voyage was to the Rappahannock.

Neither is there anything remarkable, romantic, or
mysterious in his early career. He is described as
steady, anxious to learn, and devoting much of his
spare: time on shore to study. His elder brother had
settled in Virginia, where he was doing well; and with
him, in a society above what he might otherwise have

factory that has been published; and a short one by Mr. J. Fenimore
Cooper, in his Lives of Distinguished American Naval Officers. In
these there is nothing original, and their value is purely critical. There
is also one more, which is of no value, but ‘which, on account of lis
pretensions, ought not to be overlooked: its title is, Mémoires de Paul
Jones... écrits par lui-méme en Anglais, et traduits sous ses yeu par
le citoyen André, An. VI. 1798. Itis probable enough that the subject-
matter was furnished by Jones, but rather, I incline to think, as current
gossip than in a written form.

1 A distinguished officer of our navy was also born in Kirkbean—
Admiral John Campbell. He was the son of the parish minister; en-
tered into the service as a volunteer from a small coasting vessel in which
he was apprentice; served as midshipman, master’s mate, and master
with Anson, in the Centurion; was flag captain to Hawke at Quiberon
Bay, and captain of the fleet under Keppel in the action off Ushant, .
PAUL JONES. 367

had access to, young Paul seems to have resided whilst
in America. After he had made a few voyages in this
service, Mr. Younger failed, and the boy, thrown out of
employment, obtained a berth as third mate on board
the King George of Whitehaven, a slaver. He remained
in her, or under the same owners, for some three or
four years. He was nineteen when he was appointed
first mate of the Two Friends of Jamaica, also a slaver,
and in her he continued for two years. Altogether, he
would appear to have served in the not very ennobling
capacity of mate of a slaver for not less than five years,
up to the critical age of twenty-one ; and though he then
left the Two Friends and the slave trade, there is not
the slightest authority for saying, as Captain Mackenzie
has said, that he did so ‘impelled by an irresistible
feeling of disgust at the cruelties and horrors with which
it was attended.’ There is simply no evidence as to the
cause of his leaving the Two Friends: he may have
quarrelled with the skipper; but as he went home a
passenger in a brigantine, the John of Kirkcudbright, it
is perhaps more likely that five or six years of a tropical
climate, of the coast of Africa and the slave trade, had
told on his health and had made him desirous of a change.
It is also likely enough that, after serving actually at sea
for nine years, he thought himself fit for a higher rank
than that of mate of a slaver, and had determined to
chance the finding it.

Fortune stood his friend. The master and the mate
of the John both died on the homeward voyage; the
passenger, John Paul, took the command and brought the
vessel safely to Kirkcudbright ; and the owners, to whom
he was thus introduced, appointed him, in acknowledg-
368 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

ment of his services, to the joint office of master and
supercargo. In command of.the John, he made two
voyages to the West Indies ; and his owners having then
dissolved partnership, he seems to have been engaged
for some time in smuggling between the Isle of Mann
and the Solway Frith.

It is only natural that there should be some little
doubt as to this period of Paul’s life. A smuggler who
afterwards attains some social distinction, is scarcely
likely to speak too plainly of the past ; and his American
biographers, jealous of their hero’s reputation, have
maintained that he was engaged in legitimate trade.
They have argued that between home ports—between
the Isle of Mann and England or Scotland—smugegling
was out of the question. A reminiscence of Dirk
Hatteraick might have corrected such an error, even
had they no other sources of knowledge ; for, in point of
fact, smuggling continued to be carried on between the
Isle of Mann and England until the customs dues were
equalised in 1853.

Whether smuggling did or did not agree with Paul’s
prospects we have no certain knowledge. A year or two
later he was in command of the Betsy of London, in
the West Indian trade, and was afterwards trading on his
own account at Tobago and Grenada. To enter on this
business he must have had some capital, which, we
may suppose he got together by his smuggling specu-
lations. In 1773 his brother in Virginia died without
children, and intestate, leaving, itis said, a considerable
property. John Paul ‘ took charge of the estate on be-
half of his family,’ but it does not appear that the family
ever got one penny of it. It is impossible to say what
PAUL JONES. 369

bectame of this money : perhaps it had no real existence ;
pe |haps it was swallowed by the ventures in Tobago
or \Grenada; perhaps it was squandered in reckless
di fipation: there is simply no evidence. A confused
le jer written by John Paul four years later speaks of
s joe 1,200/. as due to him from Tobago; but how or
wuty these debts had been left outstanding for so long a
tinhe is not explained. All that seems certain is, that
aft Jer his brother’s death he spent the next two years in
Anherica, and most of the time, according to his own
statement in the letter just referred to, in a state of

poiperty, almost of destitution.

Whether a bustling, energetic man like John Paul
woifild subsist for twenty months on a small sum if he
hac 1 a good business, may seem more than doubtful. Of
his | reasons for so subsisting, for abandoning, at the age
of t twenty-six, both his business as a merchant and his
cal! Jing as a seaman to go into hiding so close that all the
ree searches of his admiring biographers have not been able
to-\find out where he was or what he was doing, there is -
ndt a trace: and we cannot be surprised that the world,
and those who know the world, such as Sir Peter Teazle

“described it, have been ready to doubt both the honesty
of John Paul, and the purity of John Paul’s character.

From this mysterious hiding he emerged in December
1775, and under the assumed name of Jones—an alias
which his future career rendered notorious—joined the
revolutionary navy, then first forming.

I have been thus particular in tracing the early life
of John Paul, because its detail, uninteresting in itself,
appears to offer some explanation of both his character

and his choice of a career. A peasant lad, who had been
BB

 
370 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

‘knocking about the world in small trading ships from] the
time he was twelve years old; who had served du} ing
five or six years, as he was growing from boyhood f ito

 
  
 
  
 
 
 

manhood, on board a slaver; a Manx smuggler, a ru} ed
merchant, possibly, a fraudulent bankrupt, or too ch ‘er
executor, is not the man whose path we should expe to

find obstructed by needless or even customary scruyg.es.
The world was his oyster ? with his sword he would ofpen
it. He felt himself capable of achieving distinctiorf{, if
only he had a field for his talents; and he had seen
enough to make him believe that in the war then brealf ‘ing
out, the revolutionary side would give him the greag test
opportunities. To him, country was an idle wf ord,
patriotism an unknown idea. Through life, the } one
object of his worship and-admiration was himself. It} has
been urged plausibly enough, that mere selfishness or
greed would have prompted John Paul to have sorjight
for service rather in command of a privateer, andl to
have cruised against English commerce, which wojuld
have been decidedly more lucrative than service on board
a ship of war. It does not, however, follow that John
Paul so considered it. He may—for aught we know to
the contrary—have been unable to find a merchant will-
ing to entrust him with a command. He may have felt
that a commission in the national navy would gratify his
vanity more than sacks of dollars or doubloons. He was—
his whole after-life proves him to have been—the vainest
of men; and it is quite possible that on this, the turning
point in his career, it was his vanity that steered his
selfishness. It is difficult to detect in his conduct,
apart from his assertions, any trace of what Captain
Mackenzie has called ‘a chivalrous longing for glory;’

TQ
PAUL JONES. 371

and, in any case, I positively deny the ‘enthusiasm in
the cause of America.’

But whatever were the guiding motives of Paul, or
Jones, as he now became, what is certain is that he
applied for and obtained a commission in the newly
born continental navy; that in December 1775 he was
appointed first lieutenant of the Alfred, a frigate of
thirty guns, and three hundred men, the flagship of
Commodore Hopkins; and that he served in her in the
first operation undertaken by an American squadron—
the attack on and capture of New Providence—and on
6 April, 1776, as they were returning, in the engage-
ment with the English 20-gun frigate, Glasgow. The
six American ships ought to have effected an easy
capture ; but they were badly fitted, badly manned, badly
officered ; and notwithstanding their enormous superiority
in numbers, the Glasgow, though roughly handled in a
running fight of several hours’ duration, succeeded in
making good her escape.

After this, Jones was appointed to the command of
the Providence, sloop, carrying 12 four-pounders, and
employed in convoying American ships along the coast,
or in cruising against English commerce, in which he
had a very marked success. On September, he fell
in with the Solebay,! of 28 guns, nine-pounders, near
Bermuda, and, mistaking her for a merchant ship, ran
down to engage her. Between a frigate such as the
Solebay, and the little Providence, there could be no
contest ; the sloop hauled her wind and endeavoured to

!

1 Built in 1763, of 619 tons. The old one, mentioned ante pp. 254,
338, of 429 tons, built in 1742, had been sold out of the service very
shortly after her engagement with the Belle-Isle.

BB2
372 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

escape: but the frigate outsailed her, and, after a chase
of four hours, got within musket-shot on her lee quarter.
The situation was critical. Jones edged away to leeward
so gradually that Captain Symonds of the Solebay pro-
bably thought that he was weathering on the chase ; but
having thus, without awakening suspicion, brought the
frigate on her weather quarter, the Providence’s helm
was put sharply up, and, crowding sail, she went off dead
before the wind. The Solebay’s lee ports were closed,
her lee guns apparently not cast loose; and before she
could follow, or get a gun to bear, the Providence was
well away, on her best point of sailing. Jones’s escape
is by no means without a parallel: that of Lord Dun-
donald in the Pallas,' from under the guns of three
French line-of-battle ships, will probably at once recur
to the reader, and other similar, instances might easily
be found ; but it is no light praise to compare, even with
a difference, the deed of an untried man and an untried
crew, under the guns of an English frigate, with one of
Dundonald’s smartest pieces of seamanship.

A few days later, the Providence was again chased by
the Milford, a frigate of the same force as the Solebay,
but her she outsailed with ease, and the occurrence is no
further noteworthy than as having given Jones the op-
portunity of writing a grandiloquent despatch. He was
shortly afterwards appointed to the Alfred for a cruise,
and then again to the Providence; and finally, after
various plans and changes of plans, to the command of
the Ranger, a new frigate-built ship of 26 guns, which
was ordered to cross over to France.

His appointment is conveyed in a resolution of Con-

1 Autobiography of a Seaman, i. 177.
PAUL JONES. 373

gress dated 14 June, 1777 ; the same which also decreed
that ‘the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen
stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be
thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new
constellation ;’ and it is said, principally—I believe
entirely—on Jones’s own authority, that this flag was
first hoisted on board the Ranger, and. by Jones’s own
hands. But Jones also claimed to have.hoisted, on board
the Alfred, two years before, the earlier revolutionary
flag—a pine-tree, with a rattle-snake coiled round its
root, and the motto, Don’T TREAD ON ME; and though it
is undoubted that these flags were first hoisted at or
within a few days of the dates named, and though there is
nothing impossible involved in the statement that Jones
hoisted them both for the first time, the coincidence is im-
probable; and on such a point, flattering to his vanity,
Jones’s unsupported testimony, difficult to contradict, is
entitled to very little weight.

The difficulties in the way of fitting out the Ranger
were very great. The supply of stores was extremely
scanty, and there was no money ; it was 1 November
before she sailed, and then with only a single suit of sails
and one 80-gallon cask of rum. The ship herself was
of ascantling so slight that Jones determined not to take
the quarter-deck or forecastle guns on board; and her
armament was thus reduced to 18 guns on her main deck '
—probably 6-pounders.” On the passage, she showed her-
self extremely crank, and after her arrival at Nantes her

1 Thave here, and throughout, used the term main deck in its modern
sense ; in the last century what we now call the main deck was called
the upper deck, and really was so from the main to the foremast.

2 When the Ranger was taken at Charleston in April 1780, she
carried 20 six-pounders.
374 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

masts had to be shortened and her stowage re-arranged,
in hopes of making her stiffer ; but when all was done,
she was still very far from being an efficient cruiser.

The relations between England, France, and the
revolted States of America were at that time peculiar.
The Peace of Paris, in 1768, which had wound up the
Seven Years’ War with England, still rankled in French
bosoms. It was felt that, by its terms, this peace was a
standing injury and insult to France, to which the war
had been a series of disasters and humiliations, sustained
—it is difficult to apportion exactly the praise or blame—
at the hands of Hawke and Conflans, Boscawen and
De la Clue, Saunders, Wolfe, Pitt, and Madame de
Pompadour. The French navy had been destroyed, the
French colonial empire had been wiped out, and now,
after fifteen years’ peace, nursing their strength, enlisting
soldiers and building ships, under a new king and a male
government, it was hoped that the time for revenge had
arrived. There was no present cause of quarrel with
England, but the French people caught eagerly at the
idea of England’s embarrassment, and brought the pres-
sure of what public opinion France had on the govern-
ment, which gave a not unwilling friendship to the
American States, extended it into an official recognition,
and, on 6 February 1778, to a distinct treaty of alliance
with ‘the United States of America,’ in which stand,
amongst others, such articles as these:

II. The essential and direct end of the present defensive
alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and
independence, absolute and unlimited, of the said United
States, as well in matters of government as of commerce.

VIII. Neither of the two parties shall conclude either
PAUL JONES. 375°

truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent
of the other, first obtained ; and they mutually engage not to
lay down their arms until the independence of the United
States shall have been formally or tacitly assured by the
treaty or treaties that shall terminate the war.

Notwithstanding this, and though the American
commissioners, Benjamin Franklin and his colleagues,
were publicly and officially received at the French Court,
though the English seas swarmed with French privateers
under the American flag, there was no declaration of
war; and when, some few months afterwards, the Eng-
lish government, weary of the duplicity of the French
ministry, and of the real though veiled hostility of the
French people, forced their hand by seizing the Licorne
and Pallas (18 June, 1778), they and their partisans in
England complained bitterly of the breach of interna-
tional faith, in commencing hostile operations without a
formal declaration. An amusing sample of this is con-
tained in one of Mason’s letters to Horace Walpole, 14
August, 1778:

‘Our poor country,’ he says, ‘ from being once a well-bred
gentleman, is now turned a downright blackguard. A gentle-
man, when he has received an affront, sends his challenge, and.
then fights his duel. A blackguard, in similar circumstances,
drives his fist directly at the jowl of his adversary, and waives
the ceremonial of the challenge. I leave you to make the ap-
plication ; only I protest that had Keppel been victorious, I
should have hesitated about ringing the three cracked bells
in my country steeple; for I can never think a fair victory
can be gained over an enemy before war has been declared.’

We may think it strange that Mr. Mason, living in

the society of the eighteenth century, should be so
ignorant of the customs of the duello as not to know that
376 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

disputes or quarrels between armed gentlemen were, by’
almost legal right, settled off-hand in a ‘casual ren-
counter,’ or that his poetical reading did not furnish
him with many a precedent; for, according to the text of
the Faery Queene, a mere unwelcome presence was, in
the days of chivalry, sufficient reason for couching the
‘steele-headed speare.’ His ignorance of historical pre-
cedent is not so singular, for writers of the present day,
men far above Mason in both knowledge and ability, have
been influenced by a similar error.

But, looking back through our modern annals, the
fact stands out clearly that a declaration on either side,
as a beginning of war, is very exceptional. The wars
with Spain in 1588, in 1718, and in 1739; the wars
with Holland in 1652, in 1665, and, infamy and all, in
1672; or with France in 1744, in 1755, and now again
in 1778, were all opened by actual hostilities on one part
or the other, which, after a more or less long interval,
a declaration sometimes followed. It is well that this
should be remembered ; for though international lawyers
lay down the rule that hostilities, actually undertaken,
may be considered, at the option of the injured party, as
equivalent to a declaration of war, there is a very general,
but, as I have just shown, a very mistaken idea that such
a course is irregular, one that is not to be looked for—
one, therefore, that need not be guarded against.

Jones, having taken the Ranger from Nantes to
Brest—and having on the way obtained, after some
negotiation, and, as he asserted, for the first time, a
return salute and the formal recognition of the American
flag from M. de la Motte Picquet, commanding the
French fleet in Quiberon Bay—refitted at Brest, and.
PAUL JONES. 377

from thence sailed on 10 April for a cruise. His local
knowledge had suggested to him the possibility of harry-
ing the coasts of the Irish Sea, of Cumberland, Wigton
or Kirkcudbright, Antrim, and the Isle of Mann. He
arrived on what may be considered as his station on 18
April; and having a fair wind, determined to commence
operations by burning the shipping in Whitehaven, a
considerable port at the present time, but relatively of
more importance a hundred years ago, when Liverpool
and Glasgow had not yet swallowed up all the American
trade. But the next morning, as he was off the harbour,
the wind freshened to a gale blowing dead on shore; and,
far from being able to land his men, Jones had to exert
himself to the utmost to save his ship. It was not
without difficulty that he escaped from this very serious
danger.

On the 21st, being off the entrance of Belfast Lough,
he learned that the Drake, a sloop of war, was at anchor
inside, and conceived the bold idea of carrying her by
surprise. His plan was to run in in the dark, let go his
anchor on top of the Drake’s, swing down across her
bow, and board. It was not known, not even suspected,
that an American cruiser was on the coast; some pri-.
vateers had, indeed, been giving trouble, capturing and
destroying coasting vessels and others; but the idea of
one of these attacking a ship of war had probably never
been entertained: for all practical purposes, to the
officers and men of the Drake at anchor, it was a time
of peace; and as was then, and for long after, the
custom of the service, the watch was most negligently
kept. It was a cold night, blowing fresh, and the
chances are that not a dozen men on board were awake,.
378 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

whilst on shore there were neither forts nor soldiers. In
any case, the Ranger had more guns, and a larger ship’s
company than the Drake; and the plan, though dashing,
was by no means extravagant. As it happened, how-
ever, the Ranger had too much way on, and though she
let go her anchor accurately enough, she passed the
Drake, and brought upon her quarter. Even then there
was no alarm; and Jones, with apt presence of mind,
immediately cut the cable, so as to make it appear that
it had parted, and stretched out to seaward, intending
to return and try again. But this he was not able to
do, for the wind freshened to a fierce gale, and he had
again to provide for the Ranger’s safety, and to shelter
under the lee of the Scotch coast.

The next day, 22 April, the weather had moderated,
and he determined to have another try at Whitehaven.
A light breeze brought the Ranger off the town in the
early part of the night; and by midnight the two boats,
carrying thirty-one officers and men, all told, shoved off
from the ship. They had hoped to be inside the harbour
while it was still dark, but the strong ebb tide delayed
them somewhat, and, by the time they had reached the
outer pier, day was beginning to break.

The harbour was, as it still is, dry at low water ; this
Jones knew, and had counted on. The ships, to the
number of nearly 800, of all sizes up to 400 tons burden,
were helplessly aground ; nor, if they were set on fire,
could water possibly be got to extinguish the flames.
One of the boats was sent to burn the ships on the north.
side; Jones with the other, landed on the New Quay ;
the West Pier had not then been built. At the land
end of the quay stood a battery, which had been built
PAUL JONES. 379

eighteen years before, after Thurot had frightened the
burghers into some sense of possible danger; but the
danger had been forgotten, and the battery had been
neglected : it was little more than a ruin, armed with a
few worn-out and honeycombed old guns, in charge of a
few equally worn-out old pensioners, who at four o’clock
in the morning were sound asleep in their beds. Jones,
with a few men, clambered over the rampart of the
‘battery,’ captured ‘the guard,’ and spiked ‘the guns,’
of which, he says, there were thirty: he does not say
what condition they were in. Then, leaving his party
to set fire to the ships on the south side, he, with one
man, went off to another so-called battery, 200 yards
distant, on the point of the beach opposite Tom Hurd’s
rock; this had apparently no guard at all, and its guns,
such as they were, were spiked without opposition.

When he returned to the quay he found that his
orders to set fire to the ships had been disobeyed ; that
the candles had burnt out, and there was no light. The
boat had come back from the north side without doing
anything; the lieutenant in charge of it said that
‘nothing could be gained by burning poor people's pro-
perty;;’ the officer left in charge of the second party
had possibly the same idea. It was almost sunrise; the
inhabitants were beginning to wake up, to assemble in
alarm ; and nothing had been done.

Jones, excessively angry, did at the last moment get
a light, kindle with his own hands a large fire in the
steerage of one ship, high and dry amongst a number of
others, empty a tar barrel into the flames, and, having
seen it well a-low, make off to the boat. It was time, for
the sun was now up, and the townsmen were gathering
380 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

in numbers that threatened every moment to become
formidable. But the guns, even if there were any that
could be called serviceable—which is doubtful—had been
spiked, and the boats effected their retreat without loss.
One man only was missing, and he had deserted; he
seems to have been a Whitehaven man, David Freeman
by name; to have slipped away from his party in the
grey of the morning, and to have done his best to wake
up his fellow-townsmen. It was thus to the double
treachery of this rascal, as much as to the incapacity or
sentiment of the subordinate officers, that Whitehaven
owed its safety.

The injury to the English or Irish trade might have
been enormous; as it was, the affair was regarded rather
as an insult, the irony of which was heightened by the
fact that it was offered on St. George’s Day. But that
this insignificant little party, notwithstanding all delays
of wind and tide, of fools and traitors, came still so near
to the destruction of the town and the shipping, is a fact
that no lapse of time should permit us to forget.

Jones had a particular weakness, common, perhaps,
to most self-half-educated men, for fine writing, and his
report of this attempt is very ‘ fine.’

‘ The inhabitants,’ he says, ‘began to appear in thousands,
and individuals ran hastily towards us; I stood between them
and the ship on fire, with a pistol in my hand, and ordered
them to retire, which they did with precipitation. The flames
had already caught the rigging, and began to ascend the
mainmast : the sun was a full hour’s march above the horizon,,
and as sleep no longer ruled the world, it was time to retire.
We re-embarked without opposition, having released a number
of prisoners, as our boats could not carry them. After all my
people had embarked I stood upon the pier for a considerable
PAUL JONES. 381

space, yet no person advanced. I saw all the eminences
round the town covered with the amazed inhabitants.’

As soon as the boats got on board, the Ranger stood
across into Kirkeudbright Bay, and anchoring there,
landed a small party on St. Mary’s Isle, a prettily wooded
peninsula about a mile below the town, on which stood
the house of the Earl of Selkirk. From earlychildish recol-
lections, Jones had an exaggerated idea of the political
importance of the earl: it was therefore his intention
to carry him off asa prisoner; to hold him as, in some
measure, a hostage for the safety of several self-called
Americans, prisoners of war, and compel, or through his
influence persuade, the English government to acknow-
ledge a system of exchange. Kidnapping a private gentle-
man, and constituting him a prisoner of war, is an idea
that in modern times has occurred only to Captain John
Paul Jones; but it did occur to him, and Lord Selkirk’s
accidental absence from home was the only reason why
effect was not given to it.

Jones, on learning that his project had thus fallen
through, ordered his men down to the boat. They re-
monstrated. They said that the English, landing on the
American coast, did not spare private property, and they
thought it very hard that they should be made to do so,
now that they had a chance of reprisal. They demanded,
rather than requested, leave to go up and loot the house.
As a compromise Jones sent them up under the orders
of two lieutenants, Simpson and Elijah Hall, the last of
whom was afterwards Mr. Sherburne’s father-in-law, and
may fairly be supposed to have biassed his judgment in
respect to this affair. The robbery seems to have been
committed with almost burlesque civility ; the men stayed
382 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

outside, and drank Lady Selkirk’s health in prime Scotch
whisky, whilst Messrs. Simpson and Hall, indoors,
cleared the breakfast table of the silver tea equipage—the
teapot with the tea-leaves still in it. With this they
returned to their boat, went on board, and the ship
immediately weighed and stood out to sea.

The value of the booty is said to have been, at the
outside, not more than 100/., though vulgar report ab-
surdly magnified it. Jones’s share in the transaction
seems to have been altogether against his will, and caused
by the rowdyism and want of discipline of his men, whom
he was unable to control; none the less, it was on Jones
that the weight of popular indignation fell; he was cried
down as a pirate, a buccaneer, or a burglar of the lowest
and most brutal type, and it is as such that, in the minds
of many, his fame has been preserved, thanks to sundry
outrageous pictures and jingling ballads. A few verses
of one of these will be sufficient :

You have heard 0’ Paul Jones ?
Have you not? Have you not?
And you’ve heard o’ Paul Jones ?
Have you not ?

He was a rogue and a vagabond ;
Was he not? Was he not ? ua

He « came to dlidivk: ha’,
Did he not? Did he not? (dis)

And stole the rings and the jewels a’,
Did he not? Did he not ?
Stole the rings and the jewels a’,
Did he not ?

And so on, and so on, till the hearers have had enough of it.
PAUL JONES. 383

The morning after this ill-judged or unfortunate affair,
24 April, Jones was again off the entrance of Belfast
Lough, intending to find some opportunity of attacking
the Drake should she be still there. As if to meet his
wishes, she was seen slowly working out against the tide
and a light easterly breeze.

The Drake had been warned of the Ranger’s presence
on the coast, whether by signal smokes or otherwise.
The occurrences of the night of the 21st had excited her
curiosity, and still more so as, when she weighed her
anchor on the afternoon of the 22nd, she had found a
strange anchor and 56 fathom of cable, newly cut,
entangled with it. She is said even to have received
information of the previous day’s attempt on Whitehaven :
but evidently, whatever information she had was very
vague ; and seeing the Ranger hove-to off the mouth of
the Lough, she unsuspiciously sent her boat on board to
ask the news. The boat, boat’s crew and officer, were of
course detained. The wind was easterly, a nice working
breeze, but it was evening before the Drake got outside,
clear of the land. The Ranger ran down towards her,
-hauled up her courses, and lay-to, with the main-topsail
to the mast ; but as the Drake came within hail on her lee
quarter she filled again and gathered steerage way. The
Drake hailed: ‘What ship is that?’ Answered the
Ranger in the Jonesian dialect, ‘This is the American
continental ship Ranger; we wait for you, and beg you
will come on; the sun is little more than an hour high,
and it is time to begin.’

In language, Jones was the most wordy of men ; in
deed, he was short, sharp, and to the point. Almost
whilst the answer to the hail was being shouted back he
384 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

put his helm up, and as his ship paid off, passed slowly
across the Drake’s bows and poured in a raking fire at
very close range. The Drake thus began the action at
a serious disadvantage, and as she in turn bore up and
engaged broadside to broadside, the heavier armament
and better-sustained fire of her opponent knocked her to
pieces: in sixty-five minutes she was a wreck and struck
her flag ; her captain shot through the head, her lieutenant
mortally wounded, three others killed and twenty
wounded. The loss of the Ranger was in comparison
trifling—one officer and two men killed, five wounded.
This action, such as it was, was the first naval suc-
cess of the Americans. They had captured in open fight
a British ship of war ; their exultation was very great,
and the more so as Jones, in his report, described the
Drake as a 20-gun frigate—mounting two guns more
than the Ranger. This was true only to the uninitiated.
The Drake was rated as a 14-gun sloop; and though she
did actually carry 20 guns, they were but four-pounders,
and all exposed. He was, however, right in saying that,
in addition to her complement of 100, she had taken on
board some 50 or 60 volunteers for the occasion: they
were mostly landsmen, but able to do duty as small-arm
men. But it appears from the evidence on the court-
martial that the ship was not in a fit state for actual
service. She had no lieutenant, gunner, boatswain or
master’s mate; though while she was under way, work-
ing out of the lough, ‘Lieutenant William Dobbs,! from
a principle that does honour to his memory,’ voluntarily
came on board and acted in the station of a lieutenant.

1 Mr. Dobbs was at Belfast on impress service, and was thus able to
bring with him a number of the newly raised men.
PAUL JONES. 385

The powder was worthless ;’ ‘our shot had not force
enough to go through her sides, though we were not
above half a pistol-shot distance from her all the time of
the engagement; the impression of which was shown me
on the 7 May, 1778.’ The matches were bad, cartridges
were not filled, powder was not handed: ‘many people
placed at the great guns, early in the action, were obliged
to quit their quarters to light matches, which frequently
used to extinguish, and in search of cartridges, which
were, a great part of the time of the engagement, not to
be had; the people stationed at the small arms obliged
to quit their quarters for want of ammunition.’ And
every witness tells the same story. ‘She wanted powder
for the great guns and small-arms, owing to the acting
gunner not handing the powder up: there was not a suffi-
cient number of musket cartridges filled; the matches
frequently went out during the engagement. I believe
it was owing to the badness of the match and unskilful-
ness of some of the men.’ ‘Four of the aftermost guns,
by the sudden rise of the quarter-deck, were rendered
useless; the major part of the other guns, when fired,
used to fall upon their muzzles. I apprehend from the
fore-trucks being too low. I believe the guns were pur-
chased by the merchants.’ A ship in such a condition—
without officers, without guns, without powder, without
match—scarcely needed to meet a more powerful enemy
to become a ready prize. The American was more power-
ful: her scantling was stouter, her guns were heavier
and were sheltered. Against such, the Drake could have
little chance; and what chance she might have had she

threw away, in permitting the Ranger to rake her at the
avtant and in aftarwarda anoacing hroadside to hroadside.
386 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Nothing but superior skill and seamanship could possibly
have given her the victory, and these she does not seem
to have had. The Ranger was well handled and well
fought; the Drake was neither one nor the other; and,
in point of mere pluck, there could be little difference
between the two.

Her expiring efforts, however, were sufficient to cut
short the Ranger’s cruise; and when he had somewhat
refitted, Jones, with the two ships, stood away to the
northward, rounded the north coast of Ireland, and pass-
ing down the west side, returned to Brest, where he
arrived on 8 May, having thus been absent rather less
than a month. He seems to have occupied some of his
leisure during the return voyage in concocting a letter to
Lady Selkirk—a letter which his American biographers,
after some extraordinary process of reasoning, have called
romantic, but which is, in reality, as offensively silly
as anything that even Jones ever wrote: itis, indeed,
only its extreme silliness that prevents its being called
by some worse name. The purport of it is his extreme
admiration for Lady Selkirk, his regret that his men had
taken her plate, his intention of buying it in, and his
hope that she would accept it as a present from him:
his only object had been to mitigate the horrors of war,
by carrying off the earl, her husband. The description
of the fight with the Drake is, however, too rich to be
slurred over; it is unique of its kind. It runs:

‘Had the earl been on board the Ranger the following
evening, he would have seen the awful pomp and dreadful
carnage of a sea engagement; both affording ample subject
for the pencil, as well as melancholy reflection for the con-
templative mind. Humanity starts back from such scenes of
PAUL JONES. 387

horror, and cannot sufficiently execrate the vile promoters of
this detestable war. The British ship of war Drake, mounting
twenty guns, with more than her full complement of officers
and men, was our opponent. The ships met, and the advan-
tage was disputed with great fortitude on each side for an
hour and four minutes, when the gallant commander of the
Drake fell, and victory declared in favour of the Ranger.
The amiable lieutenant lay mortally wounded, besides near
forty of the inferior officers and crew killed and wounded; a
melancholy demonstration of the uncertainty of human pro-
spects, and of the sad reverses of fortune which an hour can
produce. I buried them in a spacious grave, with the honours
due to the memory of the brave.’

As a note to the letter, I may add that, after a delay
of some years, the plate was restored—teapot, tea-leaves
and all.

The strong feeling against England, which agitated
France in May 1778, gave a certain welcome in that
country to Paul Jones. A short, thick-set man, with a
vulgar type of face, swarthy and sunburnt, bright
sparkling eyes, perky expression and a restless manner
—anything less like the courtly old French noblesse can
scarcely be imagined. But he seems to have been the
fashion for a time, the hero of the people, the lion of
the Court, and—principally on his own assertion—the
darling of the ladies. How far his overweening vanity
and unblushing mendacity gave a brevet rank to his fair
admirers there is no oceasion to inquire. But when he
attempted to turn his popularity and the applause of the
vulgar to good account, he found, as others have done
that, in the affairs of the world, such froth does not

weigh much.
Ha wanted manev hnth for the necessarv revairs and
388 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the current expenses of his ship. The commissioners
could not and would not give it him; and when Jones
drew on them for 24,000 livres—say, 1,000/.—they
promptly dishonoured the bill. On this, naturally
enough, an angry correspondence ensued ; and it appears
that for some time Jones was left absolutely dependent,
not only for ship’s stores, but for men’s provisions, on
what money he could raise by the sale of various small
prizes which he had sent in.

Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered
at that the ship’s company, bound together by no tie
of patriotism or discipline, became discontented and
mutinous. Simpson, the first lieutenant, headed the
mutineers at Brest, as he had headed the robbers at St..
Mary’s Isle. He said that Jones had formally promised
him the command of the Ranger, and that, at any
rate, he and the ship’s company were Americans, and
were not going to be put upon by a foreigner such. as
Jones. Neither Jones nor the commissioners had au-
thority to stamp out this mutiny. It seems that the
command of the Ranger really had been promised to.
Simpson, when it was hoped that the Amsterdam ship
—the Indienne, or South Carolina, as she was eventually
called—would be ready for Jones; and though this hope
had been rendered vain by the energetic or threatening
remonstrances of the English minister at the Hague, the
only plan that could be devised for quieting the dis-
turbances on board the Ranger was to give Simpson the
promised command, and send the ship and him and the
mutinous crew home together.

Meantime Jones had been anxiously proposing several
schemes for, as he conceived, forwarding the American
PAUL JONES. 389

cause by harrying the coast of his native country.
Amongst these, the burning the shipping and town of
Whitehaven occupied a prominent place; others were
the sacking and burning of Ayr, of Greenock, of Port
Glasgow, of the shipping in the Clyde; on the other side,
Newcastle might, he thought, be burned, and the Baltic
trade might be cut off. There is no doubt that many or
all of these schemes might have been carried out, had the
means at Jones’s disposal been equal to his will; but he
had no ship, no men, and no money, and the commis-
sioners were unable, the French government unwilling,
to entrust him with them. At first, indeed, there
seemed a chance of his being put in command of a
French ship, or even of a French squadron, to cruise
against England under the American flag; but when, in
July, war between England and France was declared,
effectively, though without the customary formalities,
there was no longer any occasion for this duplicity, and
the French ships sailed under the French flag. The
minister of the French navy, M. de Sartine, who had
before then rather encouraged his pretensions, would
no longer hold out any hopes of employment; and in his
rage and vexation Jones’s correspondence passed through
various and amusing phases of vanity, self-love, flattery,
and invective.

It was not till the following spring that he could
obtain authority to commission, as a ship of war under
the American flag, the Duc de Duras, an old East India-
man, then lying at L’Orient, and capable of mounting
forty guns. She was to be fitted out and armed by the
French government, and Jones was to endeavour to pick
nn a. erew of Americans.
390 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

‘But,’ wrote Sartine, ‘as you may find difficulty in raising
a sufficient number, the king permits you to levy volunteers
until you obtain men enough. It shall be my care,’ he added,
‘to procure the necessary officers, and you may be assured
that I shall contribute every aid in my power to promote the
success of your enterprise.’

He—the French minister—then went on to give him
—the American captain—his instructions :

As soon as you are prepared for sea, you will set sail,
without waiting for any ulterior orders ; and you will yourself
select your own cruising ground, either in the European or
‘American seas, observing always to render me an exact
account of each event that may take place during your cruise,
as often as you may enter any port under the dominion of the
king. So flattering a mark of the confidence with which you
are honoured cannot but encourage you to use all your zeal in
the common cause; and I am persuaded that you will justify
on every occasion my favourable opinion of you.

In conclusion, he gave him permission to change
the name of his ship from Duc de Duras to Bonhomme
Richard, as Jones had requested, out of compliment to
Dr. Franklin, whose ‘ Poor Richard’s Almanac’ had given
him the hint,! ‘If you would have your business done,
go; if not, send,’ on which he had acted at the turning
point of the negotiations regarding the ship.

The armament of the Bonhomme Richard was
peculiar : it consisted of 12-pounders on the main-deck,
9-pounders on the quarter-deck, and 6-pounders on
the forecastle; but in addition, in the gun-room on the
lower deck, were six 18-pounders; and extra ports were

1 Poor Richard’s Almanac had been translated into French under
the title La Science du Bonhomme Richard.
PAUL JONES. 391

cut, to permit her to fight these all on one side. She
thus mounted forty guns in all. The ship, a converted
merchantman, was a makeshift throughout, including
what seems now the curious device of a frigate-built ship
thus carrying a partial lower battery.’

The crew was as mixed as the armament. A fewself-
called Americans were got together: merchant seamen
out of employ loafing about the French ports, or renegade
prisoners of war ; but even these did not at first amount
to more than thirty. About 150 were French volunteers,
peasants newly enlisted by promises of bounty and booty ;
the rest were outcasts from every nation in Europe and
from some in Asia ; English or Irish, Swedes, Norwegians,
Portuguese, Lascars, are all prominently named. Before,
however, the ship was finally ready for sea, a cartel arrived
with 119 American prisoners of war, and of these it is
believed that a large proportion entered on board the
Bonhomme Richard; some of them certainly did; but
when all is said, it is doubtful whether of the 380 men
with which she sailed from L’Orient on 14 August, 1779,
even the eighty were Americans.

With the Bonhomme Richard were associated the
Alliance, an American-built frigate of 36 guns, manned,
for the most part, by Americans, but commanded by a
Frenchman, Pierre Landais, the master of a French
merchant ship, who had taken service under the Ameri-
can government; a man, it would appear, of low birth
and disreputable antecedents; a man of neither temper,
courage, nor conduct; the Pallas, a French ship of 32

1 Thurot’s Belle-Isle was apparently armed in a similar manner on
her last cruise (cf. ante, p. 342); and it seems probable that the practice
was not uncommon amongst French corsairs or privateers.
392 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

guns, commanded also by a Frenchman, Cottineau; the
Cerf of 18 guns and the Vengeance of 12; French like
the Pallas, in all respects; but like her also sailing
under the stars and stripes. In the whole squadron the
only American of character or reputation was Richard—
afterwards well known in American naval history as Com-
modore—Dale. He was now twenty-three years of age,
and having just escaped from an English prison, joined
the Bonhomme Richard while she was fitting out, and
was appointed her first lieutenant.

The first proceeding of the squadron was as remark-
able as its composition. The several captains of the five
ships signed an agreement, or concordat as it has been
called. By it they pledged themselves to act together
under the commission from the United States govern-
ment, unless ordered otherwise by the French minister ;
the proportion of prize money to each ship was to be
regulated by the French and American ministers jointly ;
but the division to the men was to be made according
to American prize law. The practical effect of this con-
cordat was to constitute the command of the squadron
a petty republic, of which the several captains formed
what may be styled the Directory, and according to their
individual pleasure or whim, obeyed or disobeyed the
orders of the nominal commander-in-chief.

The squadron put to sea on 14 August ; on the 28rd,
being off Cape Clear, a number of men, twenty in all,
with one of the officers—the third lieutenant—of the
Bonhomme Richard, took the opportunity of a calm and
fog to desert with two of the ship’s boats; the Cerf also
parted company and did not rejoin. The independent
PAUL JONES, 393

feeling of the captains showed itself in insolence and in-
subordination. Landais came on board and reproached
Jones in the most disrespectful manner for losing his
boats, saying that he—Landais—was the only American
in the squadron, and that he meant henceforth to act ac-
cording to his own judgment. It may perhaps be thought
doubtful how far all this is true; but it does not rest
merely on Jones’s report; it is fully corroborated by other
and independent witnesses ; for Landais’s conduct was
afterwards officially inquired into, and his gross mis-
conduct throughout the whole cruise officially proved.
Party intrigue, indeed, prevented his being punished ;
but he was eventually retired from the service as insane.

From the neighbourhood of Cape Clear, where
several prizes were made, the squadron passed to the
north, along the west coast of Ireland. The rendezvous
seems to have been Cape Wrath, and the ships, sepa-
rated by carelessness or bad weather, rejoined each
other in that neighbourhood, where they made two
valuable prizes estimated as worth 40,000). These
prizes Landais, without orders, sent to Bergen, where
the Danish government gave them up to the English: a
restitution which afterwards gave rise to some curious
negotiations.

A day or two later, the Alliance again parted company,
and the other three ships sailed down the east coast of
Scotland. On 14 September they were off the Forth,
and having a leading wind up the firth, Jones conceived
that he might lay Leith and Edinburgh under a heavy
contribution, capture a 20-gun ship that was at anchor
in Leith roads, and second the attack which he had been
394 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

given to understand the grand fleet of France and Spain
was, about the same time, to make in the south of
England. The idea was formed with correct judgment ;
though, in point of fact, that fleet had been already
repelled; beaten back, not by the prudence and fore-
thought of the English government, represented by Lord
Sandwich; not by the tactical skill of our admirals,
represented by Sir Charles Hardy; not even by the
valour of British seamen, compelled, by a shameful par-
simony and their inadequate numbers, to shelter behind
the sandbanks of Spithead; but by the culpable ignor-
ance and criminal carelessness of M. de Sartine; by the
bad provisions, the dirt, and the uncalled-for hardships
of the French and Spanish sailors and soldiers ; by scurvy,
dysentery, and putrid fever. M. d’Orvilliers, with his
utterly disorganised fleet, anchored in Brest roads on the
same day that Jones, hoping to make a diversion in his
favour, was off the Forth.

But Jones, although commodore of the squadron, was
powerless ; he could not order, he could only advise ; and
neither of his colleagues, the captains of the Pallas and
Vengeance, would agree to the bold measure he advo-
cated. It was only after a long discussion carried far into
the night, and the argument that 200,000/. were waiting
to be picked up, that they at last consented. But in
the morning the wind was foul, and the progress of the
squadron working against it was slow. A small collier
was captured, and the master—Andrew Robertson by
name—agreed, as a ransom, to pilot them into the Leith
roads. On the next day, the 16th, as they were in with
the coast of Fife, under English colours, a boat came off
from a gentleman of the neighbourhood to ask for some
PAUL JONES. 395

powder and shot to defend himself against ‘the expected
visit of the pirate Paul Jones.’ Jones, in the quality
of a king’s officer, sent him a polite message anda barrel
of powder, regretted that he had no shot of the size
wanted, and had taken the liberty of keeping one of his
boatmen as a pilot. These little incidents are important
as showing that a bold corsair has no difficulty in laying
hands on the requisite pilots.

The wind continued westerly, and during the 16th
and 17th the squadron beat slowly up the firth. Its
character had by this time been recognised. The alarm
was extreme; the excitement was intense. A rude
pretext at a battery was hastily thrown up at Leith, but
the confusion and panic were too great to permit hopes
of any serious resistance. In making a tack to the
northward, the ships headed towards Kirkaldy, and stood
over to within about a mile of the town. The minister
—celebrated amongst even Fife eccentricities—held a
prayer-meeting on the beach. On both sides of the
Forth the game seemed to be in Jones’s hands. The
ships were almost within gunshot of Leith, when the
wind, foul all along, freshened suddenly to a fierce gale,
and drove them back: they were obliged to bear up and
run out of the Forth.

When the squall had passed, they were too far to
seaward to return at once; arid Jones, thinking that the
alarm had been given too effectually to allow him to
repeat the attempt, determined to direct his course to the
southward. His wish was to carry out in the Tyne what
he had failed to do in the Forth. He fully understood
that the wholesale destruction of Tyne shipping would,
by stopping the supply of sea-coal at the beginning of
396 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

winter, be a most severe blow to London; but Captain
Cottineau, whom, by the terms of the concordat, he was
bound to consult, was obstinate in his refusal. They
accordingly continued their voyage, and on the morning
of 23 September fell in with the Alliance.

Landais’s conduct throughout would seem to have
been directed by hatred of Jones and by cupidity, rather
than by cowardice, or even treason. Had he wished
merely to provide for his own safety, it would have been
easier to return, as he had come, by the west of Ireland.
As he decided to go rather by the east of England, it
would seem that he was quite aware of the possible
advantage of cruising in a sea alive with English
commerce, and of doing so by himself. Such considera-
tions will, I think, explain many of his so-called
‘vagaries.’ He was disgusted at meeting again with the
squadron, and did not pretend to be otherwise when, an
hour or two later, they sighted a large fleet of merchant
shipping—pronounced by the pilot to be the Baltic
trade—coming southwards round Flamborough Head.
It was under the convoy of two ships of war, the Serapis
of 44 guns, and the Countess of Scarborough, a hired
vessel, mounting 20 guns, presumably 6-pounders, on a
flush deck. These, on making out the American ships,
of which they probably had warning, stretched to the
southward, with the wind at about south-west, so as to
place themselves between their charge and the possible
enemy; whilst the convoy stood in shore on the other
tack. Jones made the signal to form line of battle, a
signal to which the Alliance paid no attention, but stood
towards the convoy, hoping perhaps to be able to pass
by the ships of war, and to capture a number of the
PAUL JONES. 397

merchanimen. Jones’s idea was to fight, Landais’s to
plunder.

About six o’clock the two English ships, which had
been standing together towards the south, tacked, thus
crossing ahead of the Americans, and keeping between
them and the convoy. It was a lovely autumn evening,
aud Flamborough Head, distant barely a league, was
crowded with people, whom the rumours of the day had
drawn to the neighbourhood: as the sun set, the full
harvest moon rose and lighted up the scene, permitting
them to see, or to fancy they saw, the events that were
passing off their coast.

About half-past seven the Bonhomme Richard was
within hail of the Serapis, to windward but somewhat on
her quarter, both ships standing in for the land on the
port tack. The hail was answered, as it was followed, by
a broadside; the fire seems to have been simultaneous ;
and in this way began a fight which, in modern naval
history, has no parallel. I will therefore pause a
moment to take an exact view of the opposing forces.

The Pallas,? a 32-gun frigate, mounting, in all prob-
ability, 9-pounders on her main-deck, bore away for
the Countess of Scarborough, a ship utterly unable to
contend effectively with such an opponent. She did
indeed offer a very creditable resistance, but after an hour
was obliged to haul down her colours, and the Pallas,

1 There was meantime great excitement at Hull. See Albemarle’s
Memoirs of Rockingham, ii. 383.

2 The French frigates of 32 guns were of two classes, one mounting
12-, the other 8-pounders (French weight) on the main-deck. I fancy
this Pallas was of the smaller class—if indeed she was a king’s ship at
all, which is not quite clear ; for a Pallas had been captured by Keppel
in the preceding year.
398 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

occupied for the rest of the time in taking possession of
her prize, had no share in the fight with the Serapis.

The Alliance is spoken of as of 86 guns, but being
‘American, without any establishment, it is difficult to
say what her armament was. In the English or French
navies, 36-gun frigates at that time carried 12-pounders
on the main-deck; and I should think it most likely
that the Alliance did so too, though it is of course
possible that she had only 9-pounders. I believe that,
of the squadron, the Alliance was most like a ship of
war, had she only been properly commanded ; but under
a man like Landais she proved of little value. In the
early part of the engagement she is described as sailing
at some distance round the Pallas and the Countess of
Scarborough, firing promiscuously at both of them,
which, in the dark, while the moon was only yet rising,
did as much harm to friend as to foe; and she does not
seem to have at any time really engaged the Serapis in
support of her consort, the Bonhomme Richard.

But the force of the Serapis was such as might be
considered not a very unequal match for the Bonhomme
Richard and the Alliance together. She was of a class
then much esteemed for service in the narrow seas and
smooth water, being particularly handy by reason of their
shortness. She was a 44-gun two-decker ; on her lower
deck she mounted 18-pounders; 12-pounders on her
main-deck. The double battery and the heavier guns
gave her an undoubted superiority over the Bonhomme
Richard, two of whose makeshift 18-pounders in the gun-
room—old worn-out guns—burst at the second round,
killing and wounding a number of the men, and partly
blowing up the deck overhead. The accident spread a
PAUL JONES. 399

panic amongst the ship’s company, which Jones, by
personal exertions, was able to stop; but, naturally, no
further attempt was made to use the rest of these guns.

But, more even than in armament, the Serapis was
superior to the Bonhomme Richard in rate of sailing and
handiness. She seems to have had it in her power to
sail round her enemy and to weather on her at pleasure.
Although she began the action to leeward, broadside to
broadside, she presently shot ahead, and crossed the
Bonhomme Richard’s bows, passing to windward and
raking her as she did so, then back again, again raking
her. The advantage lay entirely with the Serapis
which ought, beyond a doubt, to have won an easy
victory. Captain Pearson was a brave man and a good
seaman, but he was not equal to unwonted emergencies ;
and when, after about an hour’s engagement, Jones,
finding the Bonhomme Richard seriously ill-treated by
the heavier guns and superior sailing of the Serapis
resolved to grapple with her, Pearson had not the
tactical skill nor the presence of mind to prevent him or
to free his ship.

It may be left an open question by what mancuvre
Jones caught the Serapis. In their official reports,
Jones said, and Pearson said, that the Bonhomme
Richard being to windward, kept away, and so ran
across the bows of the Serapis; and these were the men
in charge of the two ships at the time. On the other
hand, Dale, who was in command of the Bonhomme
Richard’s main-deck, and could not possibly see what
was being done, wrote in a private account that the
Serapis ‘wore short round on her heel,’ and tried to
pass astern of the Bonhomme Richard to rake her; and
400 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

his statement, made in greater detail to Mr. Cooper,
described the ‘ Serapis’ as having been ‘ box-hauled,’
an evolution now practically obsolete, but then in favour
amongst short ships in smooth water. Except from a
purely technical point of view, it is not of much conse-
quence ; but the fact is certain that the jib-boom of the
Serapis was caught in the starboard mizen rigging of
the Bonhomme Richard; that Jones, with his own
hands, lashed it to the Bonhomme Richard’s mizen-
mast ; that the Serapis’s starboard anchor hooked the
Bonhomme Richard’s quarter ; and that the two ships
swung together bow and stern, their starboard sides
touching each other.

Pearson, hoping that the Bonhomme Richard might
drift apart, let go his other anchor ; but he did not
know, and was probably unable to learn, bow it was
that the two ships were so closely locked: they swung
together with the tide, setting to the north-west, and so
continued.

In number of men the adversaries were nearly equal,
but whilst the lower deck battery of the Serapis gave her
an overpowering superiority below, it employed more
men, and left the Bonhomme Richard with a marked
superiority above. The 18-pounders of the Serapis
smashed the Bonhomme Richard into chips, and
silenced her main-deck guns; but the men, thus driven
on deck and to the tops, swept the quarter deck and
forecastle of the Serapis with musketry and hand
grenades, and drove her men below. There was some
skirmishing below, through the ports ; some above, across
the nettings ; but on neither side was there any organised
attempt to board.
PAUL JONES, 401

Meantime the Alliance, which might, under the
existing circumstances, have anchored athwart the stern
of the Serapis, and, without danger to herself, have
ended the action in a few minutes, contented herself
with sailing round the two ships, firing indiscriminately
at either or both, not only with round shot but with
grape. Pearson in his report naturally speaks only of
the damage he sustained from this fire; but American
writers maintain that the loss which it inflicted on the
Bonhomme Richard was much greater; and it seems
well established that the material assistance rendered by
the Alliance was worse than useless; though, of course,
Pearson could not know that at the time, and her
presence had a very positive and dispiriting effect.

Still, even under the disadvantageous circumstances
in which the Serapis was placed, the crushing power of
her 18-pdunders against the rotten timbers of the
Bonhomme Richard must, sooner or later, have ended
matters in her favour, had not a singular accident, or
rather the union of ingenious daring on one side and
unpardonable carelessness on the other, changed the
appearance of affairs about ten o’clock. A seaman of
the Bonhomme Richard had laid out on the main-yard,
carrying with him a bucket full of hand grenades. One
of these he succeeded in throwing down the Serapis’s
main’ hatchway on to her lower deck. A number of
cartridges had been placed there in the rear of the guns,
and amongst these the grenade fell. The explosion ran:
from the mainmast aft, disabled many of the guns, and
killed, wounded, or horribly scorched every man at them.
The effect was disastrous, and for a minute it was de-
bated whether the Serapis should not surrender.

DD
402 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

But on board the Bonhomme Richard things were as
bad. The carpenter came up to Jones and said the ship
was sinking; the gunner hearing this ran aft to haul
down the flag ; but finding that the flagstaff and flag had
already been shot away, began to bellow: ‘ Quarter! for
God’s sake, quarter!’ till Jones stopped his noise by
staving in his skull with the butt end ofa pistol. Pear-
son, on this, attempted .to board, but was repelled; a
counter attempt by Jones was also repelled. The
master-at-arms of the Bonhomme Richard, hearing the
carpenter’s statement and the gunner’s outcry, released
the prisoners from the hold. More than a hundred of
them rushed on deck; they might and should have
rendered themselves masters of the ship, or at least
have enabled their friends of the Serapis to do so, but
they were bewildered and panic-stricken ; Jones, with a
presence of mind and an impudence that rises to the
sublime, set them to work at the pumps, and at the
pumps they continued. One only amongst them retained
his self-possession, and escaping on board the Serapis
through a port, told Captain Pearson the state the
enemy was in. It was too late to be of any real use.
Both ships were, in fact, thoroughly beaten, and it was
almost a matter of chance which should give in. I
believe the Alliance decided it. She had not assisted
the Bonhomme Richard as she ought to have done; her
fire had caused as much damage to friend as to foe, but
she served to discourage the Serapis, and that discour-
agement was sufficient to turn the scale. About half-
past ten the Serapis struck and was taken possession of.
The Bonhomme Richard was with difficulty kept afloat
through the night, and sank about ten o’clock the next
PAUL JONES. 403

‘forenoon. There is no trustworthy return of killed and
wounded ; the numbers are said to have been about 200
on board the Serapis, 120 on board the Bonhomme
Richard ; but this is little better than a guess, and it is
very probable that they were much larger: the accounts
are widely different, rising to nearly 800 for each ship;
and all that can be positively said is, that, as compared
with the numbers engaged, it is the bloodiest combat on
modern record.

Throughout the action, Jones's conduct as the captain
of a ship of war is beyond all praise. His ship was in
every way very inferior to the Serapis, and Pearson was
a man of known courage and good repute. I do not
think, though every American writer thinks, that Jones
took the Serapis, not only single-handed, but against
the treasonable assistance of Landais, in the Alliance. I
think, though contrary to the position of every American
writer, that it was the mere presence of the Alliance that
determined the result. The presence of the Pallas was
also not without effect. In this I think that Pearson’s
report is agreeable to common sense, untrammelled by
national prejudice, if indeed national prejudice has any-
thing to do with the matter. But, on the other hand, I.
think that it is impossible to overrate the ability, the
pluck, the determination, and the presence of mind with
which Jones fought and won the battle. The Alliance
gave Pearson an excuse for striking his flag. It was
Jones, Jones alone, rather than the Bonhomme Richard,
who first beat him to a standstill.

The Countess of Scarborough was captured, the
Serapis was captured; the convoy, valued at 600,000/.,

was saved; the Bonhomme Richard was sunk, and Paul
DD2
404 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Jones’s cruise was of necessity ended. The court
martial, held at Sheerness on 10 March, 1780, decided
‘that Captains Pearson and Piercy, assisted by their
officers and men, had not only acquitted themselves of
their duty to the country, but had, in the execution of
‘such duty, done infinite credit to themselves by a very
obstinate defence against a very superior force.’ Put-
ting, too, the credit or discredit of the affair on one side,
the material advantage was held to be in favour of
England; and the statesmen of the time, the illustrious
trio of the ballad, did not care to examine too critically
into the rest. Neither did the merchants of London,
whose merchandise was safe. They presented Pearson
with a sword of honour; and the king knighted him.
He was a decent, honest man, and had done his best;
but his best was not what ought to have been rewarded.
A government that wishes its officers to achieve impossi-
bilities should not reward even the best intended failures.
Jones’s remark on hearing of it is characteristic and
pardonable: ‘ Should I have the good fortune to fall in
with him again, I'll make a lord of him.’

With the sinking of the Bonhomme Richard, leaving

the conqueror, with his mongrel crew, afloat in the dis-

masted ship, the interest of Jones’s career as affecting
English naval history ends. Jones wished to go to
Dunkirk, but his orders were to put into the Texel, and
thither his colleagues insisted on his going. The ships
lay there for some time, but as Sir Joseph Yorke, the
English minister at. the Hague, protested against their
being admitted, asserting that Jones was a rebel and a
pirate, the prizes flew French colours, and were afterwards
bought in, at a low figure, by the French government,

dd
PAUL JONES, 405

It is unnecessary to enter on any detailed account of
Jones’s stay at the Texel, of his taking the command
of the Alliance, of his breaking the blockade established
by the English squadron under Captain: Reynolds, and
of his passage to L’Orient. Neither will I more than
mention his quarrels with Landais, with the: mutinous
crew of the Alliance, and with the commissioners at
Paris. Franklin alone appears to have supported him ;
and as our information eoncerning the whole affair is
based almost entirely on Jones’s own reports, it is
impossible to pronounce any decided: opinion about it.
Eventually Landais was restored to the command of the
Alliance, sent to America, and retired. from: the service.
He lived to an extreme old age, and: to the last main-
tained that it was he, and not Jones, that captured
the Serapis.

After hanging about the French court and Parisian
society for some months, making love, as it would
appear, in very indifferent verse to women of very in-
different morals, Jones was ordered to take the Ariel, a
20-gun ship lately captured from the English, across the
Atlantic. He did not, however, sail till 18 December,
1780; and having in the course of his voyage inter-
changed shots one dark night with an unknown vessel,
an English, or possibly an American, privateer, which
his report magnified into a large English frigate, he
arrived at Philadelphia on 18 February, 1781.

This was the end of his service in the American
navy: there was either no command for him, or no
willingness ‘to entrust him with one. His deeds had
been brilliant. His aptitude for command in actual
fight was undoubted ; but we may very well believe that
406 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

his aptitude for command under the every-day circum-
stances of long-continued cruising was seriously ques-.
tioned. His whole service had been one prolonged.
quarrel with his subordinates, and it is impossible to
suppose that everybody he had to deal with was always.
in the wrong, he himself always in the right. He was
vain, greedy, and selfish. Whatever was done, he.
claimed the whole credit of it; and he is, perhaps, the
one only instance of a commander of daring, skill, and
good luck, who was always unpopular, whose men, in all
ranks, were always on the verge of mutiny.

After the peace of 1783, Jones proposed to the
American government to commission a large frigate, at
once for the instruction of young officers, and to show
the flag in European waters: he, of course, would be
the proper person to command her, with the rank of
rear-admiral. Congress did not see things quite in the
same light, and Jones was not employed. He then, as
none of the prize money due by the French government
had yet been paid, volunteered to go to Paris and urge. a
settlement. His offer was accepted. He went to Paris,
and after many delays, extending over nearly two years,
and after much chicanery on the part of the French
government and its agents, he did recover the money—
181,000 livres. Of this sum Jones claimed 18,000
livres as his own share, but, in addition, he charged
against the fund 48,000 livres as his expenses during the
two years; and as he had the money in his own hands,
he paid himself first.

Even his biographers have been unable to see in this
that philosophic indifference to money of which he used
to boast. The only excuse that he condescended to
PAUL JONES. 407.

make was that he had to go to court and'to keep good
society ; that the ambassador, who did the same, was
allowed 2,000/. a year, and that he therefore was certainly
entitled to 2,000l. for two years. He professed great
indignation that his claim should be questioned at all.
‘The Board of Treasury,’ he wrote, ‘have been pleased,
in their report, to treat me as a mere agent, though
employed in that delicate concern. In France I was
received and treated by the king and his ministers as a
general officer and a special minister from Congress.’
‘Eventually,’ adds Captain Mackenzie, ‘his claim was
allowed, the fact of his having already received and dis-
posed of the money contributing, no doubt, to narrow
down and simplify the question.’

In 1787, after this business had been settled, he
returned to America, and, a few months later, back again
to Europe with a special but carefully defined mission to
Copenhagen, to push the claim against the Danish
government on account of the two prizes which Landais
had sent into Bremen. These had been valued at
40,0007. There had been some negotiation at London
and Paris about this, and the Danes had offered 10,0001.,
but the offer had been refused. Jones was now sent as
‘agent,’ but with no power to settle anything without
authority from the United States’ minister at Paris, or
to receive the money; and he was to be allowed for
expenses five per cent. on whatever should be recovered.
This, we may suppose, Jones thought paltry ; and, as the
Danish government found it inconvenient to pay up, it
seems to have had no trouble in persuading Jones to accept _
the patent of a pension of 1,500 crowns, and say no-
thing more about it. Jones naturally kept his share in
408 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

this transaction secret ; and when, after a year or two,
the knowledge of it leaked out, he urged that the patent
was given purely as a mark of esteem, and that the pen-
sion had never been paid. How much of this is true
there are no means of knowing, and I am content to rest
my opinion on the remark of Captain Mackenzie, that
‘an awkward coincidence with regard to this pension is
that it was dated on the very day that he agreed to sus-
pend the negotiation and remove it to Paris.’

Meantime Jones had entered into a correspondence
with the Russian government, and had agreed to take
service in the Russian navy with the rank of rear-
admiral. In April, 1788, he started from Copenhagen
for St. Petersburg. He got easily enough as far as
Stockholm ; but as the sea was still partially frozen, he
had some difficulty in getting farther, and it was only
after an adventurous passage of four days in an open
boat that he landed at Reval.

In Russia he remained for about a year, serving
creditably enough for some months against the Turks;
and being present, though having no active share in the
decisive victory in the Liman on 7 June, 1788.! But as
before with his subordinates, so now with his superiors,
he could not agree. He was under the orders of Potem-
kin, with whom he speedily got up a quarrel. Potemkin
was as vain as Jones, and had the advantage of un-
controlled power. Jones was therefore sent back to
St. Petersburg, and while living there, very much in the
shade, a charge was preferred against him of having
committed a criminal assault on a little girl, twelve

1 See Dictionary of National Biography, sn. Samuel Bentham,
iy. 282, :
PAUL JONES. 409

years old. It was possibly false: it certainly was never
proved, nor was it insisted on; and Jones was permitted
to leave the country. He retired to Amsterdam, and
seems to have entertained the idea of entering the ser-
vice of Sweden: the negotiation fell through; so also did
his endeavours to return to Russia. He was anxious to
fight somebody, but does not seem to have cared very
much as to the flag he was under or opposed to. In the
course of 1790 he went to Paris, where, on 18 July,
1792, he died of dropsy, induced or aggravated by disease
of the liver.

The character of Paul Jones resolves itself very dis-
tinctly under two different heads—professional and
moral. As a commander, Jones’s merits and faults will
sufficiently appear from the account I have given of his
services. He was a man of distinguished talent and
originality ; a thorough seaman, and of the most deter-
mined and tenacious courage. On the other hand, his
vanity was excessive; his desire for ‘glory,’ as he him-
self wrote, was ‘infinite ;’ and in aiming at it, he never
hesitated to throw over the claims of all others. His life
was thus spent in a never-ending series of squabbles, all
more or less discreditable, with his subordinates, with
his equals, with his superiors. The governments which
he served showed their sense of his conduct by awarding
him, in America, a gold medal; in France, a sword of
honour ; and in both, by not employing him again. His
biographers have lamented that a man of his genius
had not greater opportunities of distinction: If—they
have argued—he had only had command of an efficient
squadron, what might he not have done! Judging from
the invariably mutinous conduct of his men and officers,
410 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

we may doubt whether he could have held command of
an efficient squadron.

His moral character may be summed up in one word
—detestable. I do not here speak only of the great
damning fact that, without sense of injury on the one
side, or of affection on the other, but merely as a matter
of vulgar self-interest, he waged war against his native
country, although

‘this alone might from his part
Sever each true and loyal heart.’

T speak equally of his character in its more personal
relations. The same selfish vanity which made him a
renegade, made him a calculating liar, incapable of
friendship or love. He is said to have been free with
his purse; his conduct relative to the Paris or Copen-
hagen prize money shows that he was unscrupulous in
filling it. Whenever his private actions can be examined,
they must. be pronounced to be discreditable; and as to
many others that appear to be-so, there is no evidence
in his favour, except his own unsubstantiated and worth-
less testimony.

But it is not specially to say this that I have written
this chapter. So far as our country is concerned, the
moral character of our enemy is a matter of indifference.
The points of importance are his manner of carrying on
war, and the probability of that being repeated. I have
sufficiently described the first ; I would urge the necessity
of considering the second.

Many of our seaports, with shipping and warehouses
far more valuable than any of 100 years ago, are still
as utterly defenceless; nay, more so, for the offensive
PAUL JONES. 411.

powers of an enemy are increased enormously. Shoals
and sandbanks will not stop a commander of skill and
determination: even if every Englishman or Scotchman
was of approved honesty, if there was none ready to sell
his birthright for a mess of pottage, there are hundreds
of Americans, Germans, Frenchmen, Russians, men of
every nation in or out of Europe, who know the way into
the Forth or the Tyne, the Clyde or the Mersey, just as
well as do the local pilots. French pamphleteers have,
within the last few years, revelled in the anticipation of
the mischief that might be done to our undefended
towns, with a minimum of cost or risk. Plans have been
put forward for fitting a steam launch to squirt blazing
petroleum over ships or buildings. With such a boat,
incalculable damage might be done before the presence
of an enemy was thought of; and I conceive there would
be no difficulty in scattering liquid fire in a more de-
structive manner and from a much greater distance than
by a squirt. We, threatened with such weapons, may
pronounce them atrocious, illegal, monstrous; but the
real question is not whether it is right to use such
weapons, but whether there is a possibility of their being
used. All history teaches that, in war, there is no such
thing as an illegal weapon, if only it suits the conveni-
ence of the enemy. I have been endeavouring to show,
from the story of the past, that we ought to be armed
against the indefinite possibilities of the future.
412 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

CHAPTER XII.
THE FRENCH PRIVATEERS.

Iv. ROBERT suRCOUF.!

Tue gigantic development of modern commerce will
necessarily give to its defence in time of war a more
serious importance than it has ever yet had. That, by
either belligerent, the enemy’s commerce will be a prin-
cipal object of attack may be assumed; in what particular
way the attack may be madeis supposed to be uncertain.
The supposition seems, if not a mere pretence, to be
based on ignorance of human nature and the custom of
war. Can any sane person really believe that a future
Napoleon—whatever his nationality—would be bound by
the rules of a Declaration of Paris? or that, if it suited
his purpose, he would scruple to declare the Declaration
null and void? I cannot doubt that in future wars with
a maritime country, the main fact of privateering will
remain as in time past. The details may be modified ;
the form.of commission may be different ; but the abso-
lute fact will be as heretofore. To what extent it may
be carried will depend on the wealth and the trade, the
power, ability, and moral scruples of the respective
belligerents. So considered, we have, as very practical
1 United Service Magazine, February and March, 1883.
SURCOUF. 413

questions, to discuss what effect such an attack is
capable of producing, and what may be the best way
of guarding against it.

Our forefathers, as is well known, gathered their
merchant ships in large convoys under the escort of
ships of war. It was a mode of proceeding distasteful
to the one and irksome to the other. Naturally the
officers of our ships of war did not like it, for it withdrew
them from active, brilliant, or possibly lucrative enter-
prise, to a service on which the enemy was to be avoided
rather than sought, on which dull safety was the aim,
rather than glorious victory, and which, with a great
deal of difficulty and vexation, brought with it small
chance of distinction and none of emolument. And on
the other hand, the masters of merchantmen, if they
found themselves in a good ship, and had, as was com-
monly the case, a pecuniary interest in an early market,
chafed under the delay which worse-sailing ships forced
on them; and the delay was not always the fault of the
ships ; the ignorance and incompetence of some of the
masters was as irritating and embarrassing as the undue
eagerness, obstinacy, and inattention of others. It has
therefore been assumed that in any future naval war the
system of convoys will not be attempted.’ Most certainly,
naval officers will not be anxious that it should be.
Whether the merchants, for whose benefit it was devised,
may not be driven to a different opinion is a question
which time alone can answer. But if not in convoys,
how then is our commerce to be protected? Is it to

1 See a paper by Rear-Admiral Colomb on Convoys, are they any
longer possible ? in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,
25 March, 1887.
414 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

protect itself? I believe the theory that it may do so
is widely accepted, though the way in which it is to do
so has never been satisfactorily explained ; and though I
read of merchant-ships carrying 40-pounders, or even
‘heavier guns, and flying the blue ensign, I doubt very
much whether the few guns, or the scanty, imperfectly-
trained crew, would enable the blue ensign to fly long.in
the immediate presence of an enemy’s ship of war. But
Iam not now going to dwell on my own personal doubts.
I prefer examining into the historical antecedents of the
theory; and, by seeing how far armed merchant-ships
have, in former days, been able to defend themselves,
forming some warranted opinion as to how far they may
be able to do so in time to come.

Many hundred years ago, practical experience decided
in favour of a permanent distinction between merchant-
ships and ships of war; notwithstanding which, mer-
chant-ships continued to be armed, chiefly as a defence
against pirates and savages. Sometimes, however, the
armament was spoken of as efficient against men-of-war ;
and was carried to such an extent that engagements
with merchant-ships have been added to the roll of naval
achievement. Notably has this been the case with the
celebrated capture of the Acapulco ship by Commodore
Anson. Every boy has read the story and admired the
boldness with which the Centurion—her crew reduced
by sickness and death—sailed from Macao to look for
this gigantic adversary, of nearly double her tonnage,
and with more than double her number of men: and not
only to look for, but to find, to fight, and to capture.
It may be well to instil into the boyish mind a belief
‘that Englishmen are a match for double their number of
SURCOUF. 415

Spaniards, or of any other people; it is a belief that has
often led to very practical results: but in this particular
instance, when we examine the story technically and
critically, the consideration is forced on us that. the
Centurion was a man-of-war, and that—however big—
the Nuestra Sefiora de Covadonga was only a merchant-
ship; as emphasizing which, it is well to look beyond
the familiar account written by the commodore and his
friends. This does indeed tell how the Spaniard had 67
men killed and 84 wounded, whilst on board the Centurion
were only 2 killed and 17 wounded; and remarks: ‘of
so little consequence are the most destructive arms in
untutored and unpractised hands.’ This short comment
is, however, not likely to catch the attention, or even be
fully understood by the ordinary reader; for the exact
meaning of it we have to refer to the little-known nar-
rative by Mr. Thomas, the ship’s schoolmaster, which,
describing the Covadonga, says :—

‘She had ports for mounting 64 guns, but had, I think,
to the best of my remembrance, but 40, and was so
lumbered that she could not fight all of them; 17 of those
were brass, I think all twelve-pounders, but no two of them
alike, but I suppose picked up here and there at different
times as they could procure them. . . . Her defensive wea-
pons were swords and cutlasses, poleaxes, and a dangerous
sort of pike, the wood handle of which was about seven foot
long and headed with a double-edged iron about eighteen
inches long, very sharp, and which alone was enough to destroy
all the men who should enter on the nettings, or to push back
those who might attempt to enter in any other parts: but I
fancy they were in so much haste and hurry that they forgot
most of these below ; for we afterwards found many of them
in the gun-room, a place where they could be of no manner of
416 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

service. . . . Though indeed it appears that the general was
really very confident of success and expressed himself after
that manner before the fight to some of his officers . . . it
would never bear to charge him with not clearing the guns
between decks, they being so lumbered that it would have
been morally impossible for him to have got them clear in
three times the time he had for it from the first sight he had
of us to the time of the engagement. Indeed what I think
they might very justly and with the most reason imaginable
call him to a strict account for, was his not endeavouring to
get away from us at first.’} ,
And yet this Covadonga was a half-and-half sort of
craft; was a government ship, regularly commissioned,
and entitled to fly the royal standard. She was, how-
ever, a Spaniard ; and there are many amongst us who
would fain believe that the victory was won by English-
men over Spaniards, rather than by a man-of-war over
a merchantman. I propose, therefore, in more fully
inquiring into this question, to eliminate, or indeed to
reverse the supposed advantage of nationality; and to
do this, by tracing, in some detail, the history of priva-
teering in the Indian seas during the last great war
with France, and in following out the career of a certain
Captain Surcouf, with whose name few English readers
are perhaps now acquainted, but who, some eighty years
ago, was a very real power in the eastern seas, and
whose memory still lives in France as the one bright
spot in a time of deep naval gloom.
Robert Surcouf? may be properly enough described
1 A True and Impartial Journal of a Voyage to the South Seas and
round the Globe in His Majesty’s Ship Centurion, by Pascoe Thomas,
Teacher of the Mathematics on board the Centurion (1745); pp. 288-

290. The book has never been reprinted, and is now scarce.
2? So far as the French side of his career is concerned, I base my
SURCOUF. Al

as a privateer by birth. A native of St. Malo, the
chosen home of French privateers, he was descended, on
the mother’s side, from a grand-uncle of Du Guay-
Trouin: on the father’s side, he was the great-grandson
of an earlier Robert Surcouf, a contemporary of Trouin’,,
and himself also a daring and successful cruiser. He
was born on 12 December, 1778; and after a childhood
distinguished—we are told—by a high-couraged fondness
for fighting, for tearing his clothes, and for kicking his
schoolmaster’s shins, he was sent to sea in March, 1789,
on board the Aurore, a merchant-ship bound to the
Kast Indies, and trading at first between Mauritius and
the coast of India. In the following February she took
in a cargo of negroes for the West Indies; but she had
scarcely left her port before she got into a storm—a
pre-scientific cyclone—which dashed her on the African
shore. The crew, and the black women with their chil-
dren, who were unfettered, were saved; but it was found
impossible to release the four hundred wretches chained
below, and they perished to the last man: the hull was
thrown up on the beach, and seemed capable of being
repaired ; but it was a full fortnight before the fearful
mass of putrefaction could be cleared out. In the loath-
some task, young Surcouf came to the front by his
energy and courage; and when the captain chartered a

narrative principally on the Histoire de Robert Surcouf, Capitaine de
Corsaire, publiée d’aprés des documents authentiques: par Ch. Cunat.
The author claims also to have gained much of his information first-
hand, from Surcouf himself or the companions of his voyages; and,
judging by a close scrutiny of the leading facts, I have come to the
conclusion that he has not been purposely untruthful, though he
has written throughout in a spirit of almost grotesque exaggeration not
perhaps uncommon in the lower class of French historians. ‘
EE
418 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

country vessel to carry part of his crew to the Mauritius,
he took the lad with him as his chief officer. By what
series of accidents it does not appear, but the crazy and
ill-found boat was driven far to the eastward; after
great suffering for want of water and provisions, they
made the coast of Sumatra; and so, after a three months’
voyage, got to Penang, or, as it was then more commonly
called by the English, Prince of Wales Island. From
there they took a passage to Pondicherry in a French
merchant-ship, and finally arrived at Mauritius, towards
the middle of December. For some months longer Sur-
couf continued with his old captain, as chief officer of a
brig trading to Madagascar. The school of seamanship
was rude, but, we may believe a thoroughly good one;
and when, towards autumn, the lad, not yet eighteen,
made up his mind to return to France, and shipped on
board the corvette Bienvenue, he was rated as quarter-
master (timonier), and served as such during the home-
ward voyage. She was put out of commission at
L’Orient, on 8 January, 1792.

After a few months at home, Surcouf was off again
to Mauritius, chief officer of a vessel which would seem
to have been engaged partly in the slave-trade, until the
war with England broke out, when the blockade of the
island drove him on board a corvette equipped by the
governor, who gave him the local rank of ensign. M.
Cunat implies, rather than asserts, that he continued in
this employment for more than a year, and had his small
part in the engagement on 22 October, 1794, between
the French squadron Cybéle and Prudente, large frigates,
with the Coureur, brig, and the Jean Bart, privateer, and,.
on the other side, the two English ships, Centurion of 50,.
SURCOUF. 419

and Diomede of 44 guns; an engagement in which
the Centurion received such damage as to be obliged to
withdraw from the station, taking with her also the
Diomede. Although not quite so heroic, so Curtius-
like, as Cunat describes it—for the forces were not so
utterly disproportioned—the affair was, no doubt, as
creditable to the French as it was the reverse to the
English ;! but leaving that on one side, there seems no
clear reason for supposing that Surcouf had anything to
do with it. We may believe that if he had, his future
career would have been very different; not impossibly,
more distinguished; and we may be quite sure that if
his biographer could have adduced one jot of evidence
of his being in any one of the ships, he would have
described him as the hero of the day. It seems to me
more probable that the young man’s service on board
the ship of war—whichever it was—was short; that the
constraint and discipline of even a colonial and revolu-
tionary ship was irksome to him, and that he got out of
her at the first opportunity.

It is at any rate quite certain that shortly after this
he was busy carrying slaves from Africa to Bourbon, or
rather Réunion, a traffic which, in February, 1794, the
Republic had pronounced illegal and contrary to the
rights of man. It was, however, profitable; and to
young Sureouf the chance of breaking the law and
oppressing the nigger was a further inducement. The
colonists wanted slaves; the making them contraband
raised the price; the smuggling required and remu-
nerated daring, and the unholy trade went on briskly
for some months. At length the attention of the colonial

1 See James’s Naval History (edit. 1860), i. 236.
EE2
420 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

government was called to the continued malpractices
of M. Surcouf in the brig Créole; and orders were
given, both in the Isle of France and in Réunion, to
arrest him. The news reached him as he was taking in
a cargo in Madagascar; but none the less he ran his
slaves, landed them by night at Grande Chaloupe, on
the west side of Réunion, and stood, impudently enough,
into St. Paul’s Bay, where he anchored at daybreak.
His people were still busy removing the traces of negro
occupation, when three police agents came on board.
They were earlier than was expected, and had no diffi-
culty in finding sufficient proof of the business the
Créole had been upon. It was a new and very flagrant
breach of the law; and as they drew up their report,
they told Surcouf he must accompany them on shore.
‘Quite at your service, citizens,’ said the young captain,
with the blandest courtesy ; ‘but the cook is just bring:
ing aft the breakfast which I hope you will do me the
pleasure of taking before we go.’ The invitation was
accepted, and the party went down to the cabin;
Surcouf, in a few hasty words, leaving his chief mate in
charge.

The breakfast was good ; the wine was excellent; and
the guests enjoyed themselves without thought of the
future, or of their host’s probable anxieties; whilst on
deck, the chief mate, having sent the officers’ boat on
shore, quietly cut the cable and made sail to seaward.
Tt was not till the Créole got out of the bay and felt
the swell of the south-east wind, that the officers below
had any idea of what was going on. They rushed
on deck, and saw their position with dismay. Realising
that under existing circumstances their host was not a
_SURCOUF. 421

man to stick at trifles, they ordered him to return
instantly, threatening him with the terrors of the legis-
lature ; to which Surcouf replied that just to keep clear
of these he was going to carry them over to Africa
and put them on shore amongst their dear friends the
negroes. And so he left them to their own reflections.
As the day wore on, they lost sight of land: the brig,
under small sail, rolled heavily in the swell, and they
were extremely sea-sick.

Night came on, with the horrors of darkness; the
wind blew fresh and they fancied it a storm; they were
excessively miserable—miserable enough in the present,
still more miserable as to the future when they could
bring themselves to think of it. So, in very humble
spirit, they entered into a negotiation with their master,
and were able to come to terms. They were to write a
new report to the effect that they had found no trace of
negroes on board the Créole; that she had none of the
marks of a slaver, and that she had been forced out to
sea by the rollers setting in. Surcouf, on his part,
agreed to put them on shore; but not to let them off too
easily, carried them to the Isle of France, where he
landed them eight days later, and where, thanks to the
complicity, or, as M. Cunat calls it, the good-will (bien-
veillance) of three most respectable and deservedly
influential men, members of council, he escaped the
penalties to which his nefarious traffic had properly sub-
jected him.

He did not, however, care to tempt fortune again in
this particular way; and the course of the war seemed
to offer him a more honourable as well as more lucrative
path. He accepted the command of a vessel of 180 tons
422 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

fitting out as a privateer. Her name was Modeste, and
her equipment was conformable; she carried four guns
—6-pounders, and thirty men. The name could be
changed and she became the Emilie; but her armament
was unaltered, being probably limited by the means or
credit of her owners. The colonial government refused
her a letter of marque, thinking her, perhaps, too con-
temptible, and wishing rather to concentrate the forces
of the island. Much to Surcouf’s disgust, he had to sail
as a peaceful trader to the Seychelles for turtle; and
left Port North-West, as the republicans had named Port
Louis, on 3 September, 1795. Itis a date that marks
the beginning of Surcouf’s career.

Whether Surcouf had already made up his mind to
go privateering, with or without a letter of marque, or
whether he was purely the child of circumstance, may
seem doubtful; he certainly went to the Seychelles, and
lying in the roadstead of Mahé, began taking in his
cargo. By chance, or otherwise, he had also received on
board a number of sailors who were scattered amongst
the islands and wanted a passage to the Isle of France,
when one afternoon—it was 7 October—two large Eng-
lish ships were seen making for the anchorage. They
may have been men-of-war; it suited Surcouf to think
they were, and cutting his cables, he went out on one
side as they came in on the other. He concluded that
as the English had made the Seychelles their cruising
ground, it was unsafe for him to return, and that he
was free to go in quest of adventure. The quest led him
over to the neighbourhood of the Andaman Islands and
the coast of Sumatra, sailing, according to his biogra-
pher, in an aimless kind of way for three months, and
SURCOUF. 423

once only interrupted by an English wood-boat, which
had the impertinence to fire on him as a summons to
bring to, and which, purely in self-defence, he was
obliged to take possession of, and send to the Isle of
France. The fact is, of course, that he was cruising :
having no licence or letter of marque, he was, in point
of law, a pirate; and his having provisions for this
lengthened time at sea, with an increased crew, is
presumptive evidence that the whole thing was pre-
determined.

Having taken his first step with the wood-boat, the
rest came naturally. A few days later, he met, off the
Sandheads, two vessels laden with rice, in charge of a
pilot brig; he had no difficulty in making himself
master of all three; sent the two rice-ships and the
Emilie to the Isle of France, and transported himself
with the remainder of his crew, twenty-three in number,
on board the pilot brig, which is spoken of as the Car-
tier, and which appeared better suited for his purpose
than his former ship. After another week he captured
another rice-ship, the Diana, and having put a prize
crew on board her, resolved to accompany her to the
Isle of France. He was proceeding to carry this into
effect, when standing over to the Orissa coast, he caught
sight of the Company’s ship Triton, lying in Balasur
Roads. She was a vessel of 800 tons, and is described,
with perhaps not very much exaggeration, as mounting
26 twelve-pounders on her main deck, and as having on
board 150 men. As compared with the Cartier, she was,
very literally, a ‘ Triton among the minnows.’ On board
the Cartier, reinforced by all the available men from the
Diana, there were nineteen, exclusive of a few, perhaps
424 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

balf-a-dozen, Lascars from the different prizes; but the
Cartier’s appearance favoured a surprise, and with his
people all hidden from view, the Lascars only showing,
and himself steering, Surcouf ran down to the big ship.
The officers and passengers were at dinner; in the heat
of the afternoon most of the crew were probably asleep ;
the careless watch took for granted that the brig was, as
she looked, the expected pilot-boat, and thought nothing
more about it till they suddenly found her alongside,
and the Frenchmen, armed with pistol and cutlass,
jumping on board. Of defence, in the strict sense of the
word, there was none. The few who made any oppo-
sition were at once killed; the others were thrown down
the hatchways, and the hatches clapped on; the halliards
of the port-lids were cut, so that the ports could not
be opened; and the English were virtually prisoners
between decks. A few volleys of musketry down the main
hatchway anticipated an attempt to blow up the quarter-
deck; a little desultory firing from the poop windows
was easily quelled, and with the loss of one man killed
and one wounded, the Frenchmen were masters of the
ship. The loss of the English was greater, but small
compared to what it might have been had resistance
been possible. The captain, a midshipman, one of the
passengers—a soldier officer, and two seamen, five in all,
were killed, and six wounded; the prisoners were put on
board the Diana and allowed to make the best of their
way. The little Cartier was recaptured off Madras by
the English 74-gun ship Victorious; but the Triton,
under the command of Surcouf, was carried safely to
Mauritius.

As a bit of privateering—which the English, if it had
SURCOUF, 425

failed, would rightly have called piracy—the capture of
the Triton seems to me really very clever, though the
heroics in which M. Cunat indulges are of course utterly
out of place. ‘At the sight of the English,’ he says, ‘at
the recollection of their country, these eighteen heroes
chose rather to die than to dishonour themselves by
cowardly surrender.’ There was no question of either
dying or surrendering, if they had not thought fit to
attack: the Triton would certainly not have begun.
‘This ship ’"—the words are attributed to Surcouf—< this
ship shall be our tomb, or the cradle of our glory.’ I
don’t suppose for a moment that he said anything of the
sort; I think he most probably put the case very plainly
and truthfully before his eighteen men; that his words
were somewhat like :—‘ Here’s a fine fat Indiaman with
a hold full of dollars and rupees. It’s all ours, if you'll
make a dash: most of her men are asleep, and those
that aren’t will think we’re the pilot. Only remember
if they should overcome us, they'll hang us as pirates.’
But whilst I think that M. Cunat’s description of the
combat is absurd, I am bound to say that the one which
was published at the time in England is entirely false,
and self-contradictory. According to the ‘Gentleman’s
Magazine’ for June, 1796—

‘The Triton was seized by a party of Frenchmen in a
schooner which had been captured a few days before by the
Modeste, French privateer. The whole number did not exceed
twenty-five, who, it was proved, had broken their parole,
escaped from Calcutta in a dingey, and contrived to get pos-
session of the pilot schooner, under which description they
“were permitted to come alongside the Triton. The moment
‘they had boarded her they killed every person who had the
426 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

misfortune to be upon deck. Those who unfortunately fell
victims to the treachery of these savages were, &c. &c.’

How the pilot boat, schooner, or brig was captured
by the Modeste and got possession of by the dingey, does
not appear; and for the rest, the men had, as I have
narrated, come there fairly enough. Their attack was a
legitimate surprise, and they do not seem to have acted
as savages, or to have killed more than the circumstances
rendered justifiable and necessary. It is said, too, on
independent authority, that the prisoners were kindly
and liberally dealt with ; that they were allowed to take
their private property with them on board the Diana,
and that some ladies, passengers, were treated with
great politeness.!

When Surcouf arrived at the Isle of France, he was
excessively disgusted to find that the government claimed
his prizes—the wood-boat, the rice-ships, and, above all,
the Triton—on the simple ground that he had no letter
of marque. About the law of the case there could be
no doubt; it was in France the same as in England,
and in England the prizes would have unquestionably
been droits of admiralty. If a merchant-ship, being
attacked, should capture her assailant, the government
claim might properly be waived in her favour; but in
the case of the Emilie, cleared for the Seychelles, and
making prizes off the Sandheads, there seemed no reason
why the law should not take its course.

The owners complained loudly. They had flattered
themselves they had fallen on a good thing, and were pro-

1 Madras Courier, 9 and 10 February, 1796, quoted by M. Cunat. I

‘have not been able to verify the reference, but see no reason to doubt its
correctness.
SURCOUF, 42%

portionally disappointed. They asserted that the prizes
had been taken for the public benefit, that the arrival
of the rice-ships had saved the island from famine; that
the colony owed a debt of gratitude to Surcouf and
themselves. ‘It is,’ they wrote, ‘with the most lively
grief that we learn that in place of those sentiments of
gratitude which the conduct and success of the Emilie
ought to give rise to, the ship is, on the contrary,
threatened with confiscation, and deprived of the fruit of
her captures, because she was not provided with a com-
mission for cruising. . . . We hope that the colony may
be spared the pain of seeing those who have saved it
from distress now punished and ruined.’ This remon-
strance, however, produced no effect. Public opinion on
the island, and several of the leading members of the
government declared in favour of the Emilie; but the
law was implacable; on which account Surcouf deter-
mined to carry his cause to France, and plead it before
the nation. The home government took a friendly view
of the case; poor as they were, it was of more conse-
quence to encourage maritime enterprise than to enrich
the treasury with the spoil; and the prizes, or the amount
they had realised, were ordered to be made over to the
owners, officers, and ship’s company of the Emilie. It
was found that they had been sold nominally for 1,700,000
livres, which, reduced to cash, was valued at 660,000
livres, and this was the sum that Surcouf would seem
finally to have received.

The decision, however, had taken time. Before it
was settled, fourteen months had slipped away, part of
which time Surcouf had occupied in making love to
a townswoman, Mlle. Marie Blaize, and part in super-
428 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

intending the equipment of the ship Clarisse, of Nantes,
the command of which, as a privateer, had been offered
to him. When his lawsuit was happily ended, and the
ship ready to sail, he decided, apparently, that his
marriage might wait, and he put to sea towards the end
of July, 1798; the Clarisse carrying 14 guns, eight- and
twelve-pounders, and having a crew of 140 good men of
Nantes, or St. Malo, with Nicolas Surcouf, her captain’s
elder brother, as chief officer.
_ After a quick run to the line, he fell in there with a
large English ship, which mounted, it is said, 26 guns,
22 of them on a main deck ; a merchant-ship, no doubt;
well armed, and possibly an Indiaman, but, if so, not
under the Company’s flag.! Possibly she trusted to her
strength, possibly she did not recognise her danger until
it was too late for her to avoid the Clarisse’s attack.
She defended herself stoutly, and after a sharp fight,
succeeded in beating her off, shooting away her fore top-
mast, and so left her. To the Clarisse ‘ there remained,’
according to M. Cunat, ‘from this terrible struggle,
nothing but the glory of having seen the Jack of the
three United Kingdoms fly before our victorious flag.’
The privateer would, no doubt, rather have had the gold
than the glory; and to the merchant-ship to escape was
« full measure of success. But even in his sorry brag,
M, Cunat is incorrect ; for in 1798, Ireland was not repre-
sented in the Jack, and the three kingdoms were not united,’
Off Rio Janiero, the Clarisse had a little compensation,
1 As the flag, like the Company, is now a thing of the past, there are
many who will not know that it differed from the flag of ordinary
merchant-ships in having a striped field, red and white, resembling in

this the flag of the United States of America. It was colloquially known
as ‘the Company’s Gridiron.’
SURCOUF. 429

capturing a brig, which was sold at Bourbon for 400,000
francs; and on 5 December, she herself arrived at the
Mauritius. After refitting, Surcouf went for a cruise
in the Bay of Bengal ; and in the Bay of Soosoo, on the
coast of Sumatra, he found two English ships at anchor,
taking in a cargo of pepper. A shoal prevented his
running them on board at once. In number of guns they
were superior ; and it was no part of his policy to batter
or be battered more than necessary. After a sharp
cannonade, the larger of the two was carried by the
Clarisse’s boats, commanded by Nicolas Surcouf, who, at
the head of 40 men, boarded her in the smoke. The
other cut, and tried to run herself ashore, but was inter-
cepted by the Clarisse, and captured. ‘It was a brilliant
feat of arms,’ says Cunat, ‘in which our flag had
triumphed over an enemy of superior force.’ I repeat
such expressions, not because they are true, not because
they are not absurd; but because English writers have
often been guilty of similar exaggerations; and English
newspapers daily describe petty skirmishes, afloat or
ashore, in terms that would be ridiculous if applied to
Trafalgar or Waterloo.

Short and unequal as the combat had been, the
Clarisse had suffered considerably in hull, spars, and
rigging, and Surcouf determined to accompany his prizes
to the Isle of France, and there refit. Having done this,
he again put to sea, on 16 August, 1799, and presently
stretched over to his old cruising ground on the coast of
Java or Sumatra, where, on 1 October, he picked up a
Dane, neutral as to her flag, but English as to her cargo:
he sent her to the Isle of France. A Swede that he next
fell in with had better fortune, being outward bound from
430 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

Stockholm with a Swedish cargo. A Portuguese vessel,
with 116,000 dollars on board in hard cash, paid the
penalty for the English alliance ; after which the Clarisse,
turning northwards into the Bay of Bengal, captured a
country ship off Madras; and on 10 November another,
the Auspicious, a large vessel mounting 20 guns, on the
Orissa coast. From this time onwards she seems virtually
to have blockaded Calcutta, cruising off the Sandheads
in the most persistent and audacious manner. Early
on the morning of 30 December, however, having chased
an American ship in shore, she was espied by the Sybille
frigate, then lying at single anchor, which immediately
weighed and put to sea in chase. The wind was light
and the weather hazy, but slowly and steadily the frigate
gained on the privateer. The Clarisse’s case appeared
desperate, and Surcouf resorted to extreme measures—
eight of her guns he hove overboard, and all her spare
spars and booms; started and pumped out a quantity of
her water ; eased off the lanyards of the shrouds and
backstays ; knocked away the stanchions of the decks,
and struck out the wedges of the masts—measures which
gave the ship an incredible elasticity, and which, in a
very light breeze dying away to an almost perfect calm,
enabled the Clarisse gradually to increase her distance,
By midnight she was lost in the darkness ; being further
to seaward, she probably had more wind, and was push-
ing under a press of sail to the southward, while the
Sybille was lying becalmed, with her head all round the
compass; and thus, when day dawned, she had run
her pursuer clean out of sight.1. We may suppose that

1 Cunat describes this chase as having begun after dark on the 30th,
and as having continued all that night, all the next day, and into the
SURCOUF. 431

81 December was spent in bringing her back, so far as
possible, to her proper trim and condition. On the next
day she captured the Jane, a ship laden with rice for
Bombay. The capture of the Jane does not, in itself,
differ from the capture of many other armed ships which
were quite unequal to sustain the attack of a regularly-
equipped ship of war, even if only a privateer ; it differs
only in this, that I have been fortunate enough to obtain
a copy of a letter! written on 8 January by the Jane’s
master to her owners, giving a detailed account of the
circumstances attending on her loss, and which is most
interesting as evidence concerning this special, perhaps
extinct phase of maritime war.

“You will no doubt be surprised to receive a letter from
me dated at Bemblepatam (? Bimlipatam), but such is the
fortune of war. We were captured by the Clarissa, French
privateer, M. Surcouf, commander, on 1 January, after a very
respectable defence for a country ship. But that you may
have a clear view of our proceedings, I will begin my narrative
from the 30th ult. On the morning of that day we passed
through Saugor Roads; and in a few hours after, we joined
the Honourable Company’s ships Manship and Lansdowne,
bound to Negapatam and Madras. In the afternoon a boat
from the American ship Mount Vernon came alongside of all
the ships, the officer of which informed us that they had been
chased the day before by a French privateer mounting 18
guns, but had happily been relieved by the Sybille frigate,
who pursued the privateer out of the roads.? This information

second night—the night of the 31st: buton this question of date I have
preferred following the Sybille’s log.

2 Pp, R. O.—Admiral’s Despatches, East Indies, No. 11.

2 There is here a strange confusion of dates. ‘The day before’ is
29 December ; Cunat puts the chase of the American through the night
of the 30th and all through the 31st; but from the Sybille’s log it is
quite certain that she weighed anchor on the 30th, at 8 a.m. ©
432 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

determined me to keep company with the Indiamen two or
three degrees to the southward of Point Palmyras, conceiving
them to be a very sufficient protection against privateers,
On the 31st, at 7 a.m., the pilot left us, Point Palmyras bear-
ing W.byS. 27 leagues. We pursued our course to the 8.W.
in company. Between 7 and 8 o’clock we were spoke by
H.M.S. Sybille returning from the chase of the privateer.
Throughout the night we had moderate winds from the east-
ward. At daylight on 1 January, the Indiamen were five or
six miles ahead. At the same time we saw a strange sail to
the windward, standing to the northward, who, on perceiving
us, bore .down with great caution, because, as M. Surcouf
afterwards told me, he took one of the ships to be either the
Sybille or Nonsuch ! seeing the other two ships safe into the
sea. When I saw the strange sail altered her course, I took
it for granted that she was the privateer which the American
had given intelligence of, and immediately ordered a gun to
be fired as a signal to the Indiamen. We continued the signal
till about 8 o’clock. When the privateer saw that the ships
ahead paid no attention to our firmg, she hoisted English
colours, up studding-sails and royals, and came on with more
confidence. At half-past 8 she gave us a shot, hauled down
the English colours, and hoisted the French national flag.
We returned her fire from a 6-pounder which we got down off
the deck into a stern port in the great cabin, at the same
time carrying every sail after the Indiamen, anxiously hoping
that the continual firing would bring them to our assistance;
but we looked in vain, for they never made the smallest move-
ment to assist us.

‘ At 9, the privateer having got very near us, they began to
fire grape shot from the two brass 36-pounder cohorns, which
they had mounted forward. At this time it came on a light
squall from the southward, which brought the Indiamen
directly to windward of us. During the squall we carried a
press of sail, and the firing ceased on both sides. The superior

1 Some other ship was meant: the Nonsuch was not on the station.
SURCOUF. 433

sailing of the privateer soon brought her up again, when she
commenced a smart fire of musketry and grape shot from one
of the 36-pounder cohorns, the other having been disabled
early in the action. At 11 our powder was wholly expended,
the last gun we fired being loaded with musket cartridges.
The Frenchman then prepared to board us; they triced up
graplins to their main and foreyard arms, and Surcouf gave
orders to board, animating his men with a promise of liberty
to plunder. Seeing that we were incapable of resisting the
force that was ready to be thrown on board of us, I was under
the necessity of ordering the colours to be hauled down, and
we were taken possession of by an officer from the-Clarissa,
formerly mounting 18 guns, but now no more than nine
4-pounders, one 9-pounder, and 2 cohorns already mentioned.
She has likewise several bell-mouthed blunderbusses in each
top, which we saw them sending down after we were on board.
Her reduced force is owing to her being chased by the Sybille
frigate. At that time she threw overboard four 12-pounders,
three 9-pounders, with their carriages, and all the spars;
sawed through a bulkhead which runs across abaft the main-
mast and separates the officers from the crew; knocked down
all her stanchions, and got the axes and saws up to cut off the
poop, when unfortunately it fell little wind, and they found
they could save themselves without having recourse to this
last resource.!

‘The crew consists of M. Surcouf, his brother, four officers
and a surgeon, sixty Europeans of several nations, ten Kaffirs,
eleven Lascars, and a Serang, who entered when he took
the Albion, and a few Malays. Surcouf sent on board the
prize one officer, by trade a tailor, sixteen Frenchmen, and
ten Lascars; they were employed until sunset shifting the
prisoners and refitting the rigging. All this time the India-
men were in sight to the S.W. At sunset, Surcouf, viewing
them from the poop, requested I would tell him, upon my

1 I repeat this here as a measure of the trustworthiness of Cunat
notwithstanding some mistakes, and much absurd chawvinisme. :
FF
434 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

honour, whether they were Indiamen or not. I repeated what
I had said, that they were two Company’s ships with whom
I had kept company ever since we left the pilot. He replied
they were two Tritons, alluding to the easy capture which he
made of that ship, and said the commanders deserved to be
shot. This was the universal opinion of the French officers.
I fear their conduct will be attended with bad consequences
to the Honourable Company’s ships, as it has given the
Frenchmen a very contemptible opinion of them, and will
subject them to many attacks, which a spirited behaviour
would have freed them from. The prize made sail about 7
p.m., steering §.5.E., and was accompanied by the priva-
teer until daylight on the 2nd, when they parted, the pri-
vateer steering to the westward, and the prize continuing her
course. On the 4th, we fell in with a Pariah snow, from
Bengal, bound to Madras, which the privateer brought to,
took out all her bales, 40 bags of rice, two bales of twine, a
coir cable, and a chest of sugar-candy, and then put the crew
of the Jane on board her, together with the second officer of
the Auspicious—a very rich prize which he captured about
seven weeks ago, bound from Bengal to Bombay, loaded with
4,000 bags of rice, 500 bags of sugar, and 875 bales of piece
goods. We landed at Bemblepatam yesterday, from whence
I have written you these particulars. Surcouf does not mean
to come any more near the Sandheads, being very much afraid
of the Sybille and Nonsuch; but intends to cruise in the
latitude of 19° or 20°; and should he be joined by La
Constance, as he expects, the trade of Bengal will be entirely
cut off, until they have surfeited themselves with prizes, and
return to the Mauritius to recruit their crews.’

This letter is a very remarkable voucher for M.
Cunat’s general good faith. The capture of the Aus-
picious and the Jane, which he miscalls James—the
seizure of the Pariah snow, a native coasting vessel—
and the chase by the Sybille, are all described in
SURCOUF. 435

essentially the same manner by the two widely different
writers. It is also evidence that there was nothing
exceptionally brutal in the behaviour of Surcouf and his
men. Plunder, of course, was their main object, but
the captain of the Jane has nothing to tell of any gross
ill-usage; on the contrary, he implies that Surcouf’s
behaviour towards himself was friendly, and that the
prisoners as a body were fairly well treated. On one
point only are our two authorities in apparent contra-
diction: on the composition of the Clarisse’s crew. On
leaving France they were, according to Cunat, a specially
fine body of French seamen; on capturing the Jane
they were, according to the Jane’s captain, a miscel-
laneous gathering of the nations. The discrepancy is
only apparent, for, counting only her present cruise, the
Clarisse had sent away many men in prizes, from which
she had probably enough entered others in their place ;
Danes, Portuguese, Swedes, Irish, even English, had all
come before her, just as much as the Lascars or Malays
more particularly mentioned. As to the statement that
the officer who took charge of the Jane was a tailor by
trade, its rigid accuracy cannot now be gauged; it may
have been the writer’s way of saying that he differed
from him in some details of seamanship; on the other
hand, he may have been the purser or the master-at-
arms. We may at any rate assume, as beyond contro-
versy, that on board a ship which cruised, as the
Clarisse did, on an enemy’s coast for six months, and
that, apparently, without even carrying away a spar, the
executive officers were sailors, whether they were also
tailors or not.

On the day after he had disembarrassed himself of

FF2
436 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

his prisoners, Captain Surcouf fell in with two large
American! ships, sailing in company. They mounted
each some 16 carronades, and confident in their strength,
closed, one astern of the other, and stood on under easy
sail. Against such an armament the Clarisse, with
all her biggest guns at the bottom of the sea, could do
little. Surcouf saw at once that his only chance was to
board, and went straight at the sternmost of the two.
His jib-boom caught in her main shrouds, and was
broken off, but it served as a bridge by which Nicolas
Surcouf and some 80 men gained the American’s deck,
and carried her without much trouble. Her consort
fled; the Clarisse attempted to pursue, but having
already lost her jib-boom, she carried away her fore top-
mast, and the chase escaped. With her armament, and
in the disabled state of her pursuer, the American might
have chosen her distance, and, avoiding being laid on
board, have pounded the Clarisse into submission. But
fighting was not her trade, and even 16 carronades of
large bore did not convert a merchant-ship into a man-
of-war.

His damage, however, and the heavy drain on his
ship’s company, decided Surcouf to return to the Isle of
France, and he anchored at Port North-West (Louis) in
the early days of February. He had no wish to stay
idle, and as the Clarisse was in need of a thorough refit,
he accepted the offer of the Confiance, a remarkably fine
ship—one of the wonders of the sea, says M. Cunat—
which had just come out from France. His brother

1 There was not at this time declared war between France and the
United States; but there was much angry feeling, and their ships
mutually preyed on each other. Cf. Brenton’s Naval History, ii. 185, 187.
SURCOUF. 437

Nicolas would seem, about the same time, to have taken
command of the Adéle, a small vessel mounting 12 guns,
and in her to have gone a-cruising on his own account,
but with what success I know not. Cunat makes no
mention of this chapter in Nicolas’s career, so all I can
say regarding it is that it was rudely stopped by his
falling in the way of the English sloop Albatross on the
night of 12 November, 1800.

In the story of Surcouf the Clarisse has no more
place. Under another captain she sailed again, when
refitted, made one valuable prize—a ship from London
to Calcutta, which had been insured for 60,0001.; but
after this, changing her cruising ground to the Gulf of
Aden and the upper part of the Arabian Sea was, about
the middle of August, herself picked up by the 50-gun
ship Leopard, carrying the flag of Rear-Admiral Blankett,
on his way from the Red Sea to Bombay.

Surcouf had meantime transformed the Confiance
from a merchant ship into a privateer. It was the
middle of April before the necessary work was com-
pleted. When ready, the ship was a model of beauty
and symmetry ; and, painted black, with her upper works
straw colour, would appear lower in the water and more
‘varmint’ like. She mounted 18 guns. Her crew was
made up of 160 Europeans, 25 volunteers from the
Bourbon militia, and some negro servants, about 200
in all. During the south-west monsoon the Bay of
Bengal was neither a safe nor an advantageous cruising
ground, and Surcouf’s first idea was to establish himself
in the Straits of Sunda, and off Batavia. He found,
however, that station occupied by the American frigate
Essex, whose immediate neighbourhood might, he judged,
438 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

be disagreeable, so he drew back, and having watered
at the Seychelles, cruised for a while off the south-east
end of Ceylon, from Dondra Head to the Little Basses,
by which all ships for Madras or Calcutta, whether from
Bombay or Europe, must needs pass.

The place was no doubt well chosen, though it was
one where he was almost as likely to find an English
frigate as an English merchant ship. He was chased
more than once, and though the fast sailing of the
Confiance saved her, he got disgusted with the station,
which, by the fortune of war, had given him nothing but
danger. He preferred to risk the chance of bad weather
in the Bay, where the luck immediately changed, and
he made several captures in rapid succession. Fourteen
ships are reported as having fallen, about this time,
either to the Confiance or to a fellow-cruiser, the
Malarcic. The largest and richest of all was the Com-
pany’s ship Kent, from England for Calcutta, which, at
the very end of her voyage was, on 7 October, 1800, met
by the Confiance. The result of the meeting was de-
scribed by the Bengal correspondent of the ‘ Gentleman’s
Magazine,’ under date 8 October.

With great concern we announce the capture of the Kent,
East Indiaman, yesterday, in the Bay of Bengal, off the
Sandhead, by the Confiance, French privateer, of 26 guns,
and 250 men, after an obstinate engagement of nearly one
hour forty-five minutes, in which Captain Rivington was un-
fortunately killed, bravely defending the Company’s property
‘till the last moment of his existence, when he exclaimed, ‘ Do.
not give up the ship!! Mr. Cator, a free merchant, also fell,

1 Thirteen years, it may be remarked, before Lawrence rendered
these words classical for Americans. They are surely more noble and
BF =
SURCOUF. 439

covered with wounds. The Kent was in 25 fathoms, and
took the Confiance for a pilot sloop. The crew of the Con-
fiance were all armed with sabres and pistols, and had been
thrice encouraged with liquor previously to their boarding,
after which the fight continued desperate for twenty minutes.
General St. John and his family were on board the Kent, and
appear to have been particularly unfortunate: all his jewels,
plate, and baggage had been burnt on board the Queen; and
he was now almost destined to behold his lovely wife, daughter
to the Margravine of Anspach, and his three charming
daughters, victims to the lawless excesses of a savage banditti.
The gallant Captain Pilkington, the general’s aide-de-camp,
was severely wounded in defending the general’s family. The
French behaved with a cruelty almost unexampled in sea-
fights, giving no quarter, and stabbing with their sabres even
the sick in their hammocks. Previous to their boarding, the
Kent had evidently the advantage, and had the crew been
equally armed with offensive weapons, or had more musketry,
the Confiance would, in all probability, have paid dearly for
the rashness of her attempt. This is the same ship which
was beat off formerly by the Arniston.! . . . In violation of
the rights of humanity as those of war, the commander of
the banditti who took them pillaged them of every article of
wearing apparel, and after having done so put them, in-
cluding six ladies, in an open Arab boat, with no other
sustenance than a little bad water and some dates ; in this
dreadful state they continued four days, till they reached.
Calcutta.

As the writer’s information must have been got from

more appropriate in the mouth of a dying merchant-captain—+to whom
the assurance of his ship’s safety is victory—than as spoken by the
captain of a frigate which had just sailed out of port to fight an enemy
of somewhat inferior force.

1 This is probably a mistake; Cunat, at any rate, knew nothing
about it, or he would have described it, even if he had to rate the
Arniston as a line-of-battle ship.
440 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the people in the boat, and as he dated his letter the day
after the capture, the four days, at any rate, is a very
evident exaggeration. Otherwise, so far as the bare
facts are concerned, there is little to object to. Clearly
the writer could know nothing about the liquor that was
thrice served out, and he over-estimates the force of the
Confiance both in guns and men; but on the whole
his facts are fairly correct, judged even by M. Cunat’s
standard. The colouring of the whole affair is, of
course, very different: brutality, or heroic determina-
tion ; savage banditti, or worthy sons of France—the
terms are interchangeable, according to the views and
nationality of the writer. But in point of fact, the
charges which the English reporter brings against the
assailants are frankly enough admitted by Cunat. ‘My
lads,’ he describes Surcouf as saying, as he turned the
hands up, while the two ships were yet some distance
apart, ‘ you mustn’t let the look of this big fellow frighten
you; it is not a ship of war; I pledge you my word it is
only a Company’s ship. She would indeed be too much
for us with guns, so we'll board her. Get your arms
ready. It'll be warm work no doubt; but you shall have
an hour’s pillage to pay you for it.’!

The numbers on board the Confiance had been re-
duced by her many prizes: Cunat estimates them as
about 130 on 7 October. It is impossible to say how
many souls were on board the Kent: she had received
some— possibly all—who had been saved when the Queen,
a fellow-Indiaman, was burnt in San Salvador Bay, on
the coast of Brazil; and may thus have held, what

1 The actual words, according to Cunat, were ; ‘ Pour prix de l’assaut
terrible que vous allez livrer, je vous accorde une heure de pillage.’
SURCOUF. 441

with men, women, and children, nearly 200. This is, of
course, no measure of the Kent’s fighting strength : of
men, she may have had about 150; but these were
neither trained to arms, nor indeed had they arms.
With the Kent’s heavier armament, they might have
done very well if they could have kept the Confiance at
a distance: for hand-to-hand fighting they were utterly
unprepared. When the Confiance ranged alongside and
grappled the Indiaman; when musketry from her tops
swept the Indiaman’s decks; when Captain Rivington
fell, killed by a grenade thrown from the privateer’s
main-yard ; when the Frenchmen, Creoles, and Negroes,
armed with cutlass and pistol, jumped on board, the
Englishmen offered indeed such resistance as they could ;
but without a captain, without organisation, without
skill, almost without arms, they were speedily beaten
below, and their flag hauled down. The bulk of the
Kent’s crew were on the main-deck, stationed at the
guns: the chief officer attempted to rally them and re-
take the ship; but they were unarmed and scattered:
volleys of musketry were fired into them from the upper
deck, and a determined charge swept them into the orlop,
where a third struggle took place. ‘It was warm,’ says
Cunat, ‘for the Frenchmen were exasperated by the
obstinate resistance of the enemy.’ The warmth was
mainly on one side; and the obstinate resistance was
made with handspikes, rammers, or any bits of wood that
could be picked up; as the result of which, the English
lost 11 killed and 44 wounded: the French had 16
wounded, three of whom afterwards died.

And then came the pillage. Surcouf had promised
it— French privateers frequently did ; I daresay English,
442 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

privateers did too—and the men were now determined
to have it. And they did have it: in that Cunat agrees
with the reporter; but on one point he differs, and I be-
lieve Cunat is right.

«As soon,’ he says, ‘as Surcouf learned that there were
ladies among the passengers, he himself went respectfully
to reassure them, and had sentries placed on their cabins,
Amongst them was a German princess, daughter of the Mar-
grave of Anspach, who accompanied her husband, General
St. John. One of these sentries was a young Creole named
Durhéne, with whom I was afterwards, in the years 1808-9,
a fellow-prisoner at Pondicherry for eighteen months.! He
has often spoken to me of the incidents of this combat, and
amongst others, of his driving back two sailors who attempted
'* to force his post.’

Undoubtedly, however, in this time of pillage, there
was much roughness and excess: Cunat deplores it, and
says that Surcouf was much vexed at it, and cut the
hour very short; but the English, who were the sufferers,
naturally spoke of it in much stronger language. The
next day the two ships made sail together for Mauritius,
where they arrived about the middle of November; and
Sureouf, feeling perhaps that he could now afford a
holiday, agreed to take the Confiance back to France in
her original capacity of merchant ship, although with a
letter of marque, or, as the French and English then
called such a ship, as an aventurier. On the passage
he captured and ransomed for 10,000 dollars a Portuguese
bound from Lisbon to Rio Janeiro; and, escaping the
blockading squadron, although at one time hardly pressed,
he anchored at Rochelle on 18 April, 1801.

1 M. Cunat was a young officer on board the ‘ Adéle’ privateer, which
was captured by the 74-gun ship Russell, on 5 December, 1807.
SURCOUF. 443

The tender memory of Mlle. Blaize had very pos-
sibly a good deal to do with the home-coming of Robert
Surcouf: he was married to her on 28 May ; and the
happy couple went to spend the honeymoon and their
spare cash in Paris. They then took up their abode at
St. Malo, where, if the peace, which about this time in-
tervened, had continued, Surcouf would probably have
settled down into a respectable merchant and ship-owner.
The change from a life of rude adventure was very great,
and his wild energy found various outlets and gave rise
to a number of semi-comical anecdotes. This is one:

In investing his money, which must have amounted
to a very considerable sum, he became the owner of a
house then occupied by M. Bléchamp, the father of Mme.
Lucien Bonaparte, holding in St. Malo the office of naval
commissioner and marine superintendent.! For some
reason which does not appear, Bléchamp was annoyed
at the sale of his house: possibly he wished to buy it
himself; possibly he thought a merchant skipper’s buy-
ing a house over the head of a naval commissioner was
a piece of impertinence: at any rate, he permitted him-
self to speak somewhat slightingly of his new landlord.
The disparaging remark was repeated, of course with
exaggerations, until it reached his landlord’s ears: and
a formal notice to quit at the end of the term was the
immediate consequence. Shortly afterwards Surcouf
was told that his tenant, in preparing to move out,
was carrying away a number of the fixtures. He took
measures to ascertain that it really was so; and having
armed himself with a pistol, proceeded to the house,
forced his way in past the orderly at the door, and

. «4 Commissatre-ordonnateur : we have nothing exactly corresponding:
444 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

rushing upstairs, found a workman busy taking down the
cranks of the bells. He had him down the ladder in
less than no time; and the bell-hanger, terrified out of
his wits at the sight of the pistol, took to his heels and
fled. Sureouf then marched into the office, and, with
angry voice and gesture, demanded to see the commis-
sioner. M. Bléchamp was fortunately not at home;
but when he came in and learned what had happened,
he made out an order to Surcouf to repair to Brest im-
mediately, and sent it by a couple of gendarmes, who
had instructions to accompany him. Surcouf, who was
not only a rated merchant captain, of several years
seniority, but had, some time before, 29 June, 1800, been
appointed an unattached ensign in the navy, felt the
indignity thus put upon him. In order to evade it, he
pretended to be sick, too sick to travel; and meantime
wrote an account of the affair to his friends in Paris, and
to Decrés, the minister of the navy, demanding redress
for the way in which the commissioner had abused his
power. When he thought his letters must have reached
Paris, he managed to slip out of his house unknown to
the sentries at his door, and set off for Brest in a post-
chaise. The commissioner, however, having discovered
the evasion, sent off the gendarmes riding post after him,
and one of them overtook him at the last stage. Sur-
couf was determined not to appear in Brest as a prisoner;
and between him and the gendarme there was a lively
altercation, in which—as it would appear—the pistol was:
again produced. They managed, however, to compromise
matters, and the gendarme agreed to follow the post-
chaise at such a distance as to seem in no way connected
with it. Surcouf thus drove into Brest, and went at
SURCOUF. 445

once to report himself to the prefect, who had already
received a telegraphic message very much in his favour.
The conduct of M. Bléchamp was disapproved; and in
the end, he was sentenced to make compensation for the
damage he had done to Surcouf’s property.

When the war with England again broke out, the
first corisul, who had heard of Surcouf as a thorn in
the side of his enemy, sent for him, and is said, in a
personal interview, to have proposed giving him the rank
of captain in the navy, and the actual command of two
frigates, for a cruise in the Indian seas. It is impossible
to say how far this proposal was real: that something
of the sort was said is possible ; but it is still more pos-
sible that Surcout’s vanity mistook a vague suggestion
for a definite proposal. Whatever it may have been, he
declined it ; not choosing to subject himself to the orders
of an admiral, even though that admiral were Linois,
‘whose prowess at Algesiras was,’ according to M. Cunat,
‘the presage of a series of brilliant successes.’ M. Linois’s
successes in the East are a favourite theme with a certain
class of minor French historians, but no one has ever
yet calmly and honestly enumerated them. So far as
IT can trace them, they were of a distinctly negative
character: his success against the fleet of merchant
ships under Commodore Dance, on 14 February, 1804 ;
his success in Vizagapatam Roads, on 18 September, 1804;
his success against the convoy escorted by the Blenheim,
on 7 and 8 August, 1805, would each, in the English
service, have merited a court-martial, and been rewarded
with a severe reprimand.

As we have said, even under the orders of an admiral
so distinguished, Surcouf declined to serve. He was
446 STUDIES IN NAVAL ‘HISTORY.

made a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour; but he pre-
ferred the company, or the rule, of Mme. Surcouf, née
Blaize, to that of even the hero of Algesiras ; and devoted
himself, his talents, and his capital, to fitting out a
number of privateers, and carrying on the war in his
own fashion, and very much, it would appear, to his
own profit. One, the Caroline brig, he despatched to
the Indian Ocean, under the command of his brother
Nicolas, whom the peace of Amiens had, presumably,
set at liberty. Two others cruised in the Channel. It
was not till towards the end of 1806, when news had
come of the capture of Linois in the Marengo, on 18
March, that Surcouf could resolve to adventure himself.
He then had a ship specially built, a ship of 400 tons,,
carrying 18 guns and 192 men; and, as indicating his
return to his former station, he called her the Revenant.
Now revenant, which primarily means ‘one who comes
back,’ has the every-day though secondary meaning of
‘a ghost;’ and Surcouf, in grim humour, gave his
vessel a ghost for a figure-head—a corpse in the act of
throwing off its shroud. This ghostly craft put to sea
on 2 March, 1807, and in due time arrived at the Isle
of France.

Of his petty adventures on the way, it would be
tedious to speak; but the discipline and drill which
Surcouf established on board the Revenant, a privateer
pure and simple, are worth noticing. The tactics to
which he trusted for success were closing and boarding
as soon as possible: it would clearly be very bad policy
to remain at a distance, pounding and being pounded
with great guns, till the enemy—and possibly also the
Revenant—wss reduced to a wreck: the value of his
x

SURCOUF. 447

prize would be less; the difficulty of sending her into
port might be very great; and his own cruise might be
brought to an untimely end. Besides all which, many
of the large Indiamen carried a much heavier armament
than the Revenant, and might very well be able to beat
her off or disable her, if only they could keep her at a
proper distance. Surcouf’s object was, therefore, to
train his men for close fighting; and for this end he
established systematic exercise with small arms and
cutlass. Fencing, sword-play, or shooting at a bottle
hanging from one of the studding-sail booms, occupied
a great part of the time. And not only had he to drill
them to the use of arms: he had to train them to their
work as sailors, and to teach them the habits of civilised
beings. He had, too, a most unpromising lot of raw
material. Cunat is not likely to have erred in the
direction of unduly disparaging a French crew; he pre-
fers speaking in terms of exaggerated praise; so that,
in the present instance, his evidence may be frankly
accepted. The crew of the Revenant was—he says—a
heterogeneous collection of men of every country and
of every profession, recruited from all possible quarters,
even from prisons and hospitals. Such a ship’s com-
pany was a mixture of all conceivable vices ; to maintain
strict discipline was at once important and difficult ; and
very severe punishments were requisite. The captain’s
manner of life was thus the very opposite of that free-
and-easy association which is commonly supposed to be
the essence of privateering. Surcouf, we are told,
maintained an extreme formality, even with his officers :
they were sometimes invited to dine with him; but,
ordinarily, he spoke to no one but the first lieutenant or
448 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

the officer of the watch: when he came on the quarter-
deck, no one but himself might walk the weather side;
more frequently he reclined on the taffrail, smoking, in
company with a few passengers, towards whom he did
not preserve the same formality. His system answered ;
he got his crew well together and in good order; they
became, in the words of Cunat, ‘ brave sailors, true sons
of old Armorica.’ And, as commonly happens, success
followed on painstaking.

After refitting, and when the south-west monsoon in
the Bay of Bengal was coming to an end, Surcouf took
up his old cruising-ground: the frigate Piémontaise was
there also; and the two continued for several months
virtual masters of the bay. This was particularly hard
on the merchants of Calcutta, whose commerce had,
only the year before, been similarly scourged by the
Bellone privateer, commanded by one Jacques Perroud.
The Bellone, however, had been happily caught on
9 July, 1806, as in a trap, between the coast of Ceylon,
the Little Basses, the Rattlesnake sloop, and the
74-gun ship Powerful. Several other privateers were
caught about the same time, ‘but ’—wrote Sir Edward
Pellew, better known, perhaps, as Lord Exmouth, who
then commanded in India—‘I reflect with much plea-
sure on the capture of La Bellone in particular, as well
from her superior sailing, as her uncommon success
in the present and preceding war against the British
commerce, in the Indian and European seas. The com-—
mercial interests of this country are particularly secured
by her capture, which could not have been expected but
under very favourable circumstances.’

Things had thus looked brighter at Calcutta; and
SURCOUF. 449

now this Revenant, in company with the Piémontaise,
was making them worse than ever. The East India
Company, and the independent merchants of Bombay,
had been in the habit of collecting their ships in con-
voys, a system which those of Calcutta had disdained,
as causing delay. The loss thus fell almost entirely on
them, merchants, shipowners, and underwriters 3 and
they lost not only their money, but also their temper.
They sent a wildly angry memorial to the admiralty,
blaming everybody, except themselves ; and more espe-
cially charging the admiral with neglecting their interests.
This document, dated 10 December, 1807, says :—

“Your memorialists cannot decline the painful duty of
more particularly adverting to the recent capture of no less
than nineteen British ships and vessels within the short period
of two months, and ata station which the regular visitation
of the enemy’s cruisers, at the opening of the north-east
monsoon, obviously pointed out as pre-eminently requiring
protection. . . . All the captures to which your memorialists
here particularly refer were made in the Bay of Bengal by
two French frigates, and a privateer named the Revenant, of
16 guns. It was the lot of this privateer to make the greater
part of these captures; and his depredations were committed
chiefly in view of the coast of Coromandel, where he has re-
mained upwards of three months, distant little more than
400 miles from Calcutta, and within 100 leagues of Madras
Roads, the principal station of his Majesty's ships; and
where, at the same time, the flag of a British rear-admiral,
and several of his Majesty’s pennants, were displayed. It will
scarcely be believed that the privateer, in which the enemy
has thus extended with success his depredations along our
defenceless shores, still continues on his station; and not-
withstanding the extent of the British naval force in this
country, such is the unprotected state of our seaboard, that

GG
450 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

this successful privateer, already so destructive to our com-
merce, and though of a force contemptible when compared
with the smallest of his Majesty’s ships, continues to spread
consternation throughout the ports of India. ... Nor can
your memorialists foresee any probable cause to induce the
enemy’s privateer to relinquish the station he thus trium-
phantly maintains, until the number of his captures be such
as to require more men to navigate them than the privateer
can supply, or until, satiated with success, he may voluntarily
retire from our coast. . . . Your memorialists conceive that
there is no similar instance of a privateer continuing an un-
interrupted series of operations for a period of upwards of
three months, on a coast of the British empire, in the direct
track of their chief navigation, and within less than 800 miles
of a principal station of his Majesty’s ships: nor do your
memorialists believe that the most extensive branch of British
commerce, either European or colonial, ever suffered such a
series of single captures, in so short a period, as has been
made by the Revenant privateer, on the coast of Coromandel.’

And they go on to say that the sums paid by the
insurance offices in Calcutta alone, for losses during
September and October 1807, amounted to no less than
291,2561.

Sir Edward Pellew had little difficulty in showing
that, beyond the necessary hazard in time of war, the
fault was mainly their own, inasmuch as they had neg-
lected or refused the convoy which had been liberally
offered. And the numbers of French privateers—among
others the Adéle, already spoken of—captured by the
English cruisers at this very time; the capture of the
Piémontaise herself a few months later, 8 March, 1808 ;
and the fact that the Revenant was repeatedly but vainly,
chased, sufficiently show that her success was due not to
any carelessness of the admiral, or of the captains under
SURCOUF. 451

him, but to her own superior sailing, and still more to the
care and watchfulness of her captain. How much these
last, the personality of Surcouf himself, had to do with it,
would seem established by the future fortunes of the ship.

By the middle of January, 1808, the time spoken of
by the Calcutta merchants had arrived: the Revenant’s
crew was reduced to 70, and Surcouf determined to re-
turn to the Mauritius, where he anchored on the 81st
of the month. When the ship was again ready, he sent
her to sea in the charge of Potier, his chief officer, to
look for a Portuguese, homeward-bound from Goa, of
which he had intelligence. Potier took up his station on
the coast of Natal, where, on 24 May, he sighted, over-
took, and captured the object of his search. The Por-
tuguese is described as a ship of the largest size, of—we
may suppose—1,200 or 1,500 tons ; pierced for 64 guns,
but actually mounting 34; and having on board, amongst
other passengers, a body of 50 soldiers—possibly in-
valids. In mere numerical estimation, the disparity was
excessive: but the question was really one of the relative
value of men and arms on board a merchant ship and a
ship of war. Against such numbers of men and soldiers,
presumably effective, Potier felt that their usual tactics
would be rash; he was obliged to try, in the first in-
stance to reduce, or at any rate, to weaken, the enemy
by force of guns; and so, taking up and cleverly main-
taining a position on her quarter, he kept up a continuous
fire. The mark was big, and every shot told; whilst
the fire of the Portuguese, at a smaller target, was wild
and desultory: presently her port-lanyards were cut by
grape shot; the guns were blinded, and the sea was too
heavy to risk blowing the port-lids away. On deck, the

aa2
452 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

soldiers, passengers, and men taken from the useless
guns, plied the assailant with musketry, and were an-
swered with showers of grape and langridge; the fight
was going on briskly, and the merchant ship was bravely
holding her own, when, through some carelessness, a
barrel of powder caught a spark and blew up. The
accident was decisive, and after a few minutes’ vain
attempt to overcome its effect, the Portuguese was com-
pelled to lower her flag.!

When the privateer. and her prize returned to Port
Louis—which, having discarded the republican name of
Port North-West, was now Port Napoleon—the governor,
General Decaen, laid his official hands on the Revenant.
The French men-of-war on the station had just then
been practically wiped out: the last of them, the Sémil-
lante frigate, had returned disabled, barely escaping from
the Terpsichore. The resources of the colony were not
equal to refitting the Sémillante as an effective ship of
war; and Decaen accordingly claimed the Revenant,
which he established as a corvette. Surcouf in vain
protested against the forced sale of his property, which
to him seemed very like confiscation. Decaen was not
only firm, but threatened to embark Surcouf on board
her as a sub-lieutenant—an ensign. Forced thus to
yield to fate, Surcouf accepted the command of the Sé-
millante, which had been bought by a mercantile house
at Port Louis, had been re-named the Charles, and was

1M. Cunat’s note may be here properly reproduced: ‘The account
of this combat is taken from the journals kindly lent me by my friends
MM. Lamarre-Peigné, Michel-Villeblanche, and A. Duhaut-Cilly, dis-
tinguished sailors and companions of Captain Potier.’ The combat is

unquestionably a very brilliant episode in the history of privateering,
even though Surcouf personally had nothing to do with it.
SURCOUF. 453

now fitting to go home as an aventurier. When this
was agreed on, a fresh quarrel arose with the governor,
who gave Surcouf a positive order to carry to France
all the officers of the Portuguese ship, lately captured.
Surcouf refused, pointing out that his doing so would be
extremely dangerous, as his crew was very largely com-
posed of Portuguese sailors, who had preferred service
to imprisonment, but—with their own officers to lead
them—might probably prefer Lisbon to St. Malo as a
destination. Decaen would not listen to his objections,
but bluntly said that unless the Charles took the pri-
soners, he would not sign herclearance. In order to get
his legal papers, therefore, Surcouf was compelled to re-
ceive the prisoners; and with them on board put to sea
on the morning of 21 November ; but as soon as he got
an offing, he unceremoniously bundled them and their
traps into the pilot-boat, leaving them to make the best
of their way on shore, whilst the Charles, under a press
of sail, was leaving the island far behind. Decaen was
furious, and sequestrated all Surcouf’s property in the
colony ; in happy ignorance of which Surcouf pursued
his way, and reached France in safety, though not without
risks run both from the English cruisers and from ship-
wreck. It was his last voyage, and, ending successfully,
as did all his other voyages, we cannot but assign a large
share of credit to this man, who at such a time and
under such circumstances as his, pursued such a career,
without one single instance of what the world is apt to
call bad luck, but which is more frequently the result of
bad management. Uniform success means unceasing

care.
The Revenant, which, under Surcouf’s command, had
454 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

cruised—as the memorialists of Calcutta had pointed out
—for five months in the very thick of the English
squadron, was sent, as the Jean corvette, commanded by
Lieutenant Morice, to cruise on the same station. She
had scarcely got well into the Bay of Bengal, before, on
8 October, she was captured by the Modeste. Nor was
this difference of fortune only for Lieutenant Morice,
who seems to have been a brave and able officer. The
ship was again re-named Victor, and put to sea as an
English man-of-war, commanded by Captain Edward
Stopford, one of a family whose name has been honour-
ably known in our navy for the last hundred years.
About a year afterwards, 2 November, 1809, she was
captured by the French frigate Bellone; and still keep-
ing the name of Victor, again became a French corvette.
As such, she was surrendered at the capitulation of
Mauritius, 8 December, 1810, and was—I believe—
broken up.!

Surcouf had meantime claimed and obtained an order
for the restitution of his property in Mauritius, and had
settled down on shore as the owner of a fleet of privateers.
M. Cunat names eight of his ships employed in European
seas; one of which, the Renard—a cutter of 70 tons,
with a crew of 60 men, mostly Portuguese—fought, on
9 September, 1813, one of the most desperate actions
on record, with the Alphea schooner, of 111 tons and
41 men and boys. The Renard’s armament consisted

‘In attempting this comparative estimate of Surcouf’s abilities, it
must not be forgotten that he had—in the matter of escaping pursuit—
one great advantage over both Stopford and Morice. In presence of any
probable danger, it was his first business to get away from it: it was
the business of these others rather to see if they could not overcome the
danger.
SURCOUF, 455

of ten 8-pounder carronades, and four 4-pounders; that
of the Alphea, of eight 18-pounder carronades. Between
the two there was not much to choose in point of
strength ; and the fight continued with equal fortune
and fury until by—what James has called—a fatal acci-
dent, the Alphea blew up. It would seem uncertain
whether any of Surcouf’s cruisers found their way to
Eastern waters: Cunat does not speak of any; but a
letter from Vice-Admiral Bertie, the commander-in-chief
at the Cape of Good Hope, to the secretary of the
admiralty, dated 2 September, 1809, would imply that
Surcouf had not forgotten the scene of his own exploits.

‘Of the number of aventuriers fitted out and running for
the Isle of France, I am to state that the Charwell has cap-
tured the Hyéne, a very fine vessel of 230 tons, pierced for
18 guns and masted as a man-of-war, which is arrived here;
and the ‘ Néréide’ has captured the Agile, of a similar de-
scription . . . and it appears, by an intercepted letter found
on board the latter vessel, addressed by Captain Surcouf to
General Decaen, that, besides a number of privateers fitting
out by himself and a society of merchants with whom he is
associated, he is in treaty with the Minister of Marine for La
Revanche frigate, which they intend to arm and send out
with a cargo!’

Whatever schemes of this sort Surcouf may have had
were of course put an end to by the capture of Mauritius ;
and the peace, in 1814, necessarily altered the nature
of his business. He continued, however, a prosperous
ship-owner and ship-builder, and one of the most influ-
ential burghers of St. Malo, until his death in 1827.

In person, Robert Surcouf was somewhat short and
stout; in his later years, almost corpulent. His whole
life having been spent in command, often of very rugged
456 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

subjects, his force of character was strongly developed ;
and -in civil life he was often violent if not brutal.
M. Cunat tells many anecdotes illustrative of this, which
he considers a most honourable feature; they are not
worth repeating, and are very possibly grossly exagge-
rated. In his family he was brusque and taciturn ; little
given to talk over past adventures, except, occasionally,
when the pride of an old privateer led bim to relate the
story of the capture of the Kent. Withal, generous to the
poor. One anecdote not less grotesque, perhaps, but less
rude than others, will enable us to part from him in
kindlier mood. Walking home one night, as he passed
the gate of his ship-building yard, he saw a man come
out carrying a heavy bundle, which he vainly tried to
hoist up on his shoulders. Surcouf went up to him and
asked what he was doing. The man, who, in the dark,
did not recognise him, said, ‘You might give us a lift
up with this bundle of wood, that’s a good fellow.’ ‘Did
anyone give it you, then?’ asked the owner. ‘Faith
no,’ was the answer: ‘I might have waited long enough
for that.’ Surcouf made no further objection, and helped
the man to get the bundle on his back; only, as he went
off muttering his thanks, the owner called after him—
‘T advise you not to try that on again: M. Surcouf is
just the man to have you taken up for it.’

Surcouf is gone; honourably buried at St. Malo
beneath a tombstone which—according to the picture of
it given by M. Cunat—hbears a ridiculous likeness to a
clock-face. Another war may very well see a successor,
his equal in daring and conduct, playing the same part
on a larger field. The points to which I have specially
wished to call attention are those facts which may be
SURCOUF. 457

repeated in the future; and—whether a ship correspond-

ing to the Confiance or the Revenant is commanded

by an independent rover, or by a regularly-commis-

sioned officer—the capture of the Kent, and the destruc-

tion of trade in the Bay of Bengal, are incidents which

a bold enemy will try to repeat in the next naval war.

What the Bay of Bengal was at the beginning of the

north-east monsoon, the several ‘ crossings’ will be now.

And the trade that will be aimed at on these will be, not.
the wealth of the East, but the every-day necessities of
English life—the corn, the beef, the mutton. The stress

will be felt not by a few wealthy merchants or brokers

in Calcutta, but by the millions of hungry fathers of
starving children in London, in Liverpool, in Manchester,

and throughout the length and breadth of the country.

Are ships laden with these invaluable commodities able
to fight their way or to run the gauntlet of the enemy’s
cruisers? It was seen in 1807 how difficult it was to
stop the ravages of one ship ably commanded, even when
her cruising ground was known within a comparatively
short distance, and when there was an overpowering

naval force almost on the spot. A similar difficulty may

again occur ; a similar problem may demand a solution :

but in this, as in other things, to be forewarned is, or

should be, to be forearmed.
INDEX.

paces
ADM BEL

Apes of France, his prero- said to have committed an act

gatives, 10 of gross brutality, 276; is

Agosta, battle of, 85-8

Algiers, bombardment of, by Du
Quesne, 91

Alms, Captain, his gallant conduct
in command of the Monmouth,
119, 141

Anglesea, capture of the, 251

Anson, Commodore, captures the
Acapulco ship, 196, 414-6

Aristocratic nature of the French
navy, 51

Arundel, Earl of, regains command
of the Channel, 27

Arundel, Sir John, his fleet
wrecked, 22; infamous conduct
of, 76.

Austrian navy, of but slight im-
portance, 151-3; its develop-
ment after 1848, 153-4 ; inactive
in the war of 1859, 156; state of
in 1866, 162-3

ART, Jean, mention of, 50;

birth and early service, 270 ;
a Dunkirk privateer, 271; liew-
tenant de vaisseau, 273; serves
in squadrons of the navy, 274-5 ;
capitaine de frégatie, 275; is

 

associated with Forbin, 276-7,
281-2 ; is captured and taken to
Plymouth, 277; escapes, 278;
capttaine de vaisseau, ib.; com-
mands the Alcyon at Beachy
Head, 2b. ; his boorish behaviour
at Court, 279; ravages the coast
of Northumberland, 280; adven-
ture at Bergen, 281; ‘Forbin
with his bear,’ 282 ; Chevalier of
the Order of St.’ Louis, 282; his
arms, 322; is pursued by Ben-
bow, 283; chef d’escadre, 1b.;
carries the Prince de Conti to
Dantzic, 284-5 ; his death, 286;
his character, 285-6

Baumes, M. de, commands the
galleys, 67; his quarrel with Du
Quesne, 68

Beaufort, Duc de, Admiral of
France, 72; quarrels with Nu-.
chézes, 74; his want of educa-
tion, 7b.; his incompetence, 75 ;
his death, 70.

Belfast, proposed attack on, 353

Belle Isle, Maréchal de, patron of
Thurot, 329, 332

Belle Isle, Maréchal de, a ship,
commanded by Thurot, 333 et:
460
BER

seq., 342 et seg.; is captured off
Ramsay, 358
Bergen, Bart’s adventure at, 281;
Thurot refits at, 337-8; Paul
Jones sends prizes to, 393
Berkeley, Lord, curious incident
during his command, 307-9
Blues (officiers bleus), their difficult
position, 256; origin of the
name, 256 .; gallant conduct of
two, 126
Bocanegra, Admiral of Castile, 8
Bonhomme Richard, the, her
equipment, 390-1; her cruise,
392-402; engagement with the
Serapis, 397-402; founders, 402
Boscawen, Admiral, attacks the
French off Louisbourg, 97; de-
feats M. de la Clue off Lagos,
98, 160, 325
Boscawen privateer, the; was the
Médée, 233; her cruises, 228,
' 234-5 ; a ghost on board of, 235 ;
she founders, 236

APE of Good Hope, defended by
Suffren, 107

Carrickfergus, taken and pillaged,
354

Carronades, introduction of, 204 ».

Chateau-Renault, a Knight of St.
John, 50

Cherbourg, English defeated at,
21; destroyed by Howe, 341

Cillart, M. de, astounding conduct
of, 125-7; is cashiered, 143

Clarisse privateer, the, commanded
by Surcouf [g.v.], 428-36; is
chased by the Sybille, 430; -is
captured by the Leopard, 437

Classes, enrolment of,in France, 47

 

STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

cuD

Clisson, Olivier de, Constable of
France, taken prisoner, 27

Clue, M. de la, chef d’escadre, is
blockaded in Cartagena, 97; de-
feated off Lagos, 98, 160, 325

Colbert, Jean Baptiste, his birth,
30; Mazarin’s secretary, 31;
overthrows Fouquet, 7b.; Con-
troller of Finance, 32; financial
reform, 34 e¢ seg.; encourages
manufactures, 36, and com-
merce, 39; reconstructs the
French navy, 43 e¢ seqg.; his
death, 56; character, 56-7

Commerce, developed by Colbert,
39; protection of, considered,
413; scourged by Surcouf, 449

Companies, founded by Colbert, 39

Comte d’Artois, a French pri-
vateer, is captured, 251

Confiance privateer, commanded
by Surcouf, 437-42; captures
the Kent, 438-42; returns to
France, 442

Conflans, M. de, defeated by Hawke,
99, 325

Conti, Prince de, his voyage to
Dantzic, 282-3

Convoy, convoys; disastrous loss

‘ of, 101; bad conduct of, 238;
are they any longer possible? 413
and note

Copper, first used for ships’ bot-
toms, 102-3

Couronne, description of the, 65

Courtenay, Sir Peter, death of,
21

Cruising, method of, in Mediter-
ranean, 209-10

Crusade of 1366-7, 4

Cuddalore, siege of, 136; is re-
lieved, 188 ; battle of, 189
INDEX.

DAN

ANES, the, at the battle of
Heligoland, 158-61
Dartmouth, plundered and burnt,
18; ship so named blown up,
245
De Ruyter, his death, 58, 54, 87;
engages the French near Strom-
boli, 83; blocks the Straits of
Messina, 84 ; commands the van
in the battle of Agosta, 85-8
Dreadnought (see Hampton Court)
Du Guay-Trouin, René, mention
of, 50; his family and birth,
289; early education, 290; he
gets into scrapes, 291; is sent to
sea, 1b.; commands a privateer,
ib. ; narrow escapes, 293; active
service, 294; chased by the
Prince of Orange, 295; is cap-
tured by the Monk, 296-9; es-
capes from prison, 300; com-
mands the Francois, ib. ; captures
the Nonsuch [g. v.], 301-3; re-
ceives a sword of honour from
the king, 303; captures the
Hope, 304; and three East In-
diamen, 306 ; is presented to the
king, 7b.; commands the Non-
such under the name of Sans-
pariel, ib.; captures two Dutch
ships off Vigo, 307; curious ad-
venture with Lord Berkeley’s
fleet, 307-9; is threatened to be
ducked by M. de Feuquiéres,
809-11; his brother, Etienne,
killed, 311; stubborn encounter
with a Dutch squadron, 312-4;
is made capitaine de frégate,
815; is again presented to the
king, ib.; commands the Jason,
316; captures the Elizabeth,
ib. ; engages the Worcester, 318 ;

 

461
ELL

is surrounded by the English
fleet, 318-9; engagement with
an English squadron, 321; he
relates the details to the king,
ib.; is ennobled, 322; chef d’es-
cadre, ib.; leutenant-géneral,
4b.; his death, ib.

Du Quesne, Abraham, mention of,
50; his quarrel with D’Estrées,
52, 81; is made a marquis, 54,
92; his birth, 60; a captain in
the French navy, 61; early life,
62; joins the fleet under Sour-
dis, ib.; commands a squadron
on the Catalan coast, 67; his
quarrel with De Baumes, 67-9;
takes service in Sweden, 70;
commands a squadron at Brest,
72; is very cantankerous, 73;
escorts the Queen of Portugal to
Lisbon, 76; battle of Solebay,
77-81; second in command in
the Mediterranean, 81; battle
of Stromboli, 83-5 ; of Agosta,
85-8; of Palermo, 88-9; com-
mands in the Levant, 91; bom-
bards Algiers and Genoa, 7b.;
his death, 1b.; his naval rank,
92; his character, 67, 73, 92;
portrait of, 60

Du Quesne-Menneville, Marquis,
chef d’escadre, captured by the
English, 97

IDUCATION, naval, remarks on,
148-9
Elizabeth, the, capture of, 316;
engagement with the Lion, 263
Elliot, Captain John, puts into
Kinsale, 357; his engagement
with Thurot, 358; Nelson’s
opinion of, 359
462
ENV

Enville, Duc d’, his death, 95

Estaing, Comte d’Estaing (Amiral
de France in 1792), his entry
into the navy, 51 ”.; commands
in North America and West
Indies, 100; is repulsed at St.
Lucia, ib.

Zstourmel, M. d’, commits suicide,
96

istrées, Comte d’, vice-amiral, 51,
77; commands the French divi-
sion at Solebay, 1b.; his secret
instructions, 79; his quarrel
with Du Quesne, 52, 81

axchange of prisoners, refused by
Sir Edward Hughes, 121; curious
difficulty about, 257-60

ixeter, the, her great loss at Sa-
dras, 114

AMINE, terrible, 32

Financial, confusion in France,
83; reforms introduced by Col-
bert, 34 et seq.

‘lag, the U.S., first hoisted, 373;
the rattlesnake, ib. ; the E.I.C.’s,
428 n.

"leuron, the, captures the Mars
privateer, 229; is chased by the
Hampton Court and others, 231;
is blown up, 232-3

"Nobert, M. de, commands the
troops in Thurot’s squadron,
342; quarrels with Thurot, 345
et seg.; refuses to attack Bel-
fast, 353 ; is wounded, 355 ; and
made prisoner, 358 n.

'olkestone, plundered and burnt,
18

‘orbin, Chevalier de; his early
career, 50; is associated with

 

STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

HOP
Bart [q.v.], 276-7, 281-2; his
Mémoires, 277
Forth, Firth of, Paul Jones enters
the, 394-5 ; is blown out of, 395
Foudroyant, capture of the, 97
Fouquet, his downfall, 31

ENOA bombarded, 91

Gilchrist, Captain James,
commands the Southampton,
333-4

Glasgow, the, escapes from an
American squadron, 371

Gloire, anecdote about the, 321 and
note

Glorioso, the; her homeward
voyage, 240; beats off the
Warwick, 2b.; puts into Ferrol,
ib.; engaged by the Royal
Family, 239-45; by the Dart-
mouth, 245; is captured by the
Russell, 246

Gravesend sacked and burnt, 23

Grenada, battle of, 100

Guernsey taken by the French, 23

AMPTON Court, the; does
not engage the Neptune

and Fleuron, 231; her captain
(Savage Mostyn) acquitted by
court-martial, 232

Hastings, plundered and burnt,
18, 23

Hawke, Sir Edward, defeats the
French in the Bay of Biscay, 96;
and at Quiberon Bay, 99, 325

Heligoland, battle of, 158-61

History, naval, technical import-
ance of, 150

Hope, capture of the, 303-5
INDEX.

HOT

Hotspur commands at sea, 28

Hughes, Sir Edward, commands
in the East Indies, 110; his de-
fensive position at Madras, 2b. ;
fights the battles of Sadras,
113-5 ; Providien, 117-20; Ne-
gapatam, 124-7; Trincomalee,
129-31; and Cuddalore, 139;
his carelessness as to intelli-
gence, 128; comparative esti-
mate of, 141

Hutchinson, William, Mariner ; his
Treatise on Practical Seaman-
ship, 207; serves under For-
tunatus Wright, 209; an adven-
ture in the Mediterranean, 213

TALIAN ironclad sunk at Lissa,
185; common mistake about,
188
Italian navy; formation of, 164;
state of, in 1866, 165

AN DE VIENNE; birth, 2;

early service, 3; joins a cru-
sade, 4; Vice-Admiral of France,
9; Admiral of France, 10; lays
siege to Saint Sauveur, 13; con-
structs large guns, 14; reduces
Saint Sauveur, 1b.; sacks and
burns Rye, 17; is repulsed at
Winchelsea, ib. ; gains a victory
at Rottingdean, 1b. ; burns Lewes,
Folkestone, Portsmouth, Dart-
mouth, Plymouth, Poole, and
Hastings, 18; lays siege to Pont
Audemer, 19; and captures it,
20; gains a victory off Cher-
bourg, 70.5; sacks and burns
Scarborough, Gravesend, Win-

 

463
LIN

chelsea, Hastings and Ports-
mouth, 23; takes Jersey and
Guernsey, 1b. ; goes to Scotland,
25; devises a ‘wooden town,’
26; is slain, 29

Jersey taken by the French, 23

Johnstone, Commodore George ;
his character, 104; is attacked at
Port Praya, 105-6 ; his attack on
the Cape frustrated, 107 ; is sued
by Captain Sutton, 7d.

Jones, Paul; see Paul Jones

Ke" East Indiaman, the ; cap-
ture of, 438-42; alleged bar-
barity on board, 439, 442
King, Commodore, his gallantry,
114, 142

AGE, M. de; his early history,

264; he fits out a squadron
of privateers, 265; his cruises,
266-8.

Lancaster, Duke of ; his disastrous
march through France, 9;
general discontent against, 22

Landais, Pierre; commands the
Alliance in company with the
Bonhomme Richard [g.v.], 391;
his gross misconduct, 393, 401,
403; desirous of plunder, 397;
his pretension, 405; his death,
ad,

Latimer, Lord ; accused of selling
Saint Sauveur, 15; sentence on,
ab.; afterwards revoked, ib.

Lewes, plundered and burnt, 18

Linois, M., contre amiral; brilliant
successes of, 445; is captured
in the Marengo, 446
464

LIO

Lion, the; engagement with the
Elizabeth, 263

Lissa, frigate action near, in 1811,
173 ; its importance, 174; attack
on, by the Italian fleet, in 1866 ;
174-6; battle of, 179-87

i\ ACNAMARA, chef d’escadre, is
defeated in the West Indies,
95

Manufactures, encouragement of,
by Colbert, 36

Marines, French corps of, 48; a
failure, ib.

Mars privateer, the; captured by
the Fleuron, 229 ; is recaptured,
231

Maximilian, the Archduke (Em-
peror of Mexico); head of the
Austrian navy, 154; visits Brazil,
157; goes to Mexico, 162; con-
gratulates Tegetthoff on his vic-
tory at Lissa, 191; his body
brought home by Tegetthoff,
193

Men, enrolment of, by Colbert, 47 ;
are pressed by De Lage, 265;
quality of, under Suffren, 143 ;
under Tegetthoff, 169; under
Paul Jones, 391; under Surcouf,
433, 485, 447-8

Merchant service, gulf between it
and the royal navy, 249-51,
253-5, 323

Messina, the French at, 81 et seq.

Monmouth, the, suffers severely at
Providien, 119

Moutray, Captain, in charge of
convoy, 101, which is captured,
ib.; dismissed his ship, 70. ;
naval commissioner at Antigua,
102 and note

 

|

STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

PAU

“\7AVY, Austrian; see Austrian

I Navy, French; under Riche-
lieu, 43-4, 65-6, 70; under Ma-
zarin, 43-4, 70; reconstructed
by Colbert, 44 et seg.; a purely
aristocratic service, 51, 256

Navy, Italian ; see Italian

Navy, the Royal; gulf between,
and the merchant service, 249-
51, 253-5, 323

Negapatam, battle of, 124-7

Neutral waters, question as to, 105,
160

Nicopolis, battle of, 28

Nonsuch, the, captures the Rail-
leuse and Serpente, 227; is cap-
tured, 301; becomes the Sans-
pareil, 306; is commanded by
Du Guay-Trouin [g.v.], 307

Nuchézes, M. de, in joint command
of the French fleet, 72; his
quarrel with Beaufort, 74; ‘would
rather herd cows,’ ib.

FFICERS of the French navy,
49 et seg.; numbers of, 53;
an aristocratic body, 51,256
Orves, M. d’, commands in the
East Indies, 109; dies, 110
Osborn, Admiral, blockades the
French in Cartagena, 91

PABESNO, French victory at,
54, 88-9

Paul Jones; ballads about, 363,
382; Lives of, 365; birth and
early life, 367-9 ; joins the revo-
lutionary navy, 369; escapes
from the Solebay, 371-2; first
hoists the U.S. flag, 373; com-
mands the Ranger, ib.; refits
INDEX,

PAU

at Nantes, 374; goes for a
cruise in the Irish Sea, 377;
attempts to carry the Drake
in Belfast Lough, 377-8; to
burn the shipping at White-
haven, 378-80 ; to kidnap Lord
Selkirk, 381; carries off Lady
Selkirk’s tea-pot, 382; which he
restores, 387 ; engages the Drake,
383; and captures her, 384-6;
his letter to Lady Selkirk, 386 ;
he returns to France, 386-7 ; his
popularity, 387; his money dif-
ficulties, 388; gives up com-
mand of the Ranger, ib.; fits
out the Bonhomme Richard,
390-1; has nominal command
of a squadron, 392; fails in an
attempt on Leith, 393-5 ; meets
the Baltic trade, 396; his en-
gagement with the Serapis, 397—
404; lashes the Serapis’s jib-
boom tothe Bonhomme Richard’s
mizenmast, 406; knocks down
the craven gunner, 402; sets
the prisoners to the pumps, 70. ;
proposes to make Pearson a
lord, 404; he visits Paris, 405;
returns to America, ib.; is sent
to Paris as agent for the prize
money, 406; a large part of
which he appropriates, 406-7 ;
is sent to Copenhagen to settle
a claim for compensation, 407;
and accepts a pension to himself
in lieu, 408 ; enters the Russian
service, 7b.; is present at the
battle in the Liman, 1b; leaves
St. Petersburg in disgrace, 409 ;
his death, ib.; his character,
professional, ib., and moral,

410

 

465

PRE

Pearson, Captain Richard; com-
mands the Serapis [g.v.], 399;
is presented with a sword of
honour and knighted, 404

Pembroke, Earl of, defeated at
Rochelle, 8

Persano, Count, Admiral; birth
and early service, 167; is made
rear-admiral, ib.; vice-admiral,
ab.; admiral, 168; minister for
the navy, 167; married to an
Englishwoman, 168; his want
of energy and resource, 168, 173,
178 ; is compared with Admiral
Byng, 171; is defeated at Lissa,
179-87; hoists his flag on
board the Affondatore, 180; his
vacillation, 183; is accused of
misconduct, 188; is tried and
dismissed the service, 189; his
silly defence, 190

Petroleum, crude; proposed use
of, 411

Phillips, Lieut. Baker; surrenders
the Anglesea, 262; is tried and
executed, 7b.

Phillips, Captain, recaptures the
Solebay, 254-5 ; wishes to enter
the navy, 255; receives u gold
medal, ib.

Pilots, easily obtained by an enemy,
894-5

Plymouth, plundered and burnt,
18

Pont Audemer, besieged, 19; and
captured, 20

Poole, plundered and burnt, 18

Portsmouth, plundered and burnt,
18, 23; proposal to burn, 332

Praya, Port, action at, 105-6

Preuilly, Marquis de, commands
the French van at Palermo, 89

H H
466
PRI

Prize money, quarrels arising out
of, 196-7

Privateering ; abolished, 194; pos-
sible revival of, 194-5, 412

Privateers; Vernon’s opinion of,
198; and Nelson’s, 2b.; naval
opinion of, 199; capture Deme-
rara, 200; render valuable ser-
vices, 201; brilliant services of,
202-5; remarkable success of,
205-6, 237; extreme develop-
ment of, in France, 257; inter-
national difficulty consequent
on this, 257-60; activity of
French, 337; without commis-
sions are pirates, 423. See
Bart ; Boscawen ;, Clarisse ; Con-
fiance ; Du Guay-Trouin ; Mars ;
Revenant; Royal Family ; Thu-
rot; Surcouf; Walker; Wright

Providien, battle of, 117-20

Ce Du, see Du Quesne

ANGER, the; fitted out by
Paul Jones, 373; refits at

Nantes, 874; engagement with
the Drake, 383-6; returns to
France, 386; and to America,
888 ; is captured at Charleston,
373 n.

Renau, designs mortars for sea
service, 91

Revenant privateer, commanded by
Surcouf (q. v.], 446-52; claimed
by the governor of Mauritius,
452; future career of, 454

Rivington, captain of Kent, is slain,
438; his dying words, 2b.

Rochelle; English de‘eated at, 8

 

STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY.

soL

Rooke, Sir George;
words, 58

Rottingdean, skirmish at, 17

Rouen, early dockyard at, 12

Royal Family, « squadron of f
vateers, 237; its cruise, ib.
seq.; engagement with the G
rioso, 241-4

Rye, plundered and burnt, 17

his dyi

ADRAS, battle of, 113-5
St. Cas, defeat of the Engl:

at, 341

St. Malo, ships burnt at, 341

Saint Sauveur, besieged, 13; a
captured, 14

Salvert, M. de, his supposed imy
dence, 111

Scarborough, sacked and burnt,

Seahorse, the, engagement w:
Thurot’s squadron, 335

Seignelay, Marquis de, minister
the French navy, 55

Selim and Zaida, romantic st
of, 210-1

Serapis, the, engagement w
Bonhomme Richard, 397-40:

Sevére, extraordinary case of t
125-7

Ships, quickness in building, 4
built for France by Holland ¢
Sweden, 45, 75; want of cleai
ness and ventilation, 91 ; rott
143

Slave trade, horrible story of, 4:
pronounced illegal by the Frez
Republic, 419; continued
Surcouf, 420

Soldiers, naval scorn of, 846; x
tinous conduct of, 348 ct seq.

Solebay, battle of, 54, 77 et seq.
INDEX. 467

SOL

Solebay, frigate, recaptured,
254-5; engages the Belle Isle,
338; Paul Jones escapes from,
371-2

Sourdis, Archbishop of Bordeaux,
commands the French fleet, 62;
quarrels with De Vitry, 63; re-
duces Ste. Marguerite, 64; is
superseded, 67

Southampton, frigate, engagement
with Thurot’s squadron, 333-4

Spenser, Sir Hugh, defeated, 27

Stirling Castle, captures and aban-
dons the Volage, 267

Stromboli, actions off, 82, 83

Suffren, le Bailli de, birth and
early service, 95; a Knight of
St. John, 96, 99; prisoner of
war, ib. ; service as capitaine de
frégate, 99 ; as capitaine de vais-
seau, 99-103; commands a
squadron ordered to the Hast
Indies, 103 ; battle of Port
Praya, 105-8 ; protects the Cape,
107-8; arrives at Mauritius,
109; chef d’escadre, ib.; does
not attack at Madras, 110-1;
battles of Sadras, 113-5; Pro-
vidien, 117-20; Negapatam,
124-7; Trincomalee, 129-31;
Cuddalore, 139; entrusts his
prisoners to Hyder Aly, 121;
receives the Grand Cross of St.
John, 128; captures Trincoma-
lee, 129; goes to Achen for the
stormy season, 133; relieves
Cuddalore, 138; his captains
mutinous or cowardly, 125-7,
129-30, 132, 142-3; difficulties
in his way, 122, 143 ; quality of
his ships’ companies, 139, 143 ;
lieutenant-général, 145; vice-

 

SUR
amiral, ib.; his reception in
France, ib.; a Knight of the St.
Esprit, 7b.; his death, 146; es-
timate of his character, 117,
127, 140, 149

Surcouf, Robert, birth and child-

hood, 417; is sent to sea on
board a slaver, ib. ; which is lost,
with a full cargo, ib.; serves on
board a ship of war, 418; com-
mands a slaver, 419; tricks the
police agents, 420; fits out the
Emilie, 422; but is refused a
letter of marque, 7b.; cruises
without one, 423 ; makes several
prizes, ib. ; including the Triton,
423-5; returns to the Isle of
France, 426 ; his prizes claimed
by the government, 7b. ; but are
restored, 427; he returns to
France, ib.; becomes engaged,
7b.; and marries, 442; fits out
the Clarisse, 428; and sails for
the East Indies, 2b.; makes se-
veral captures, 429; is chased
by the Sybille, 430; captures
the Jane country ship, 431-5;
and an American ship, 436; fits
out the Confiance, 437 ; cruises
on the coast of Ceylon, 438 ;
goes into the Bay of Bengal, 2d. ;
captures many vessels, ib.; in-
cluding the Kent, 438-42; re-
turns to France, ib.; his ex-
periences as a landlord, 443 ; an
enseigne de vaisseau, 444; de-
clines the rank of capitaine de
wvaisseau, 445; receives the
Cross of the Legion of Honour,
446 ; fits out several privateers,
ib.; and the Revenant, which
he commands, ib.; manner of
468

SUT

life on board, 447; his success
in the Bay. of Bengal, 449-50 ;
returns to Mauritius, 451; takes
command of the Charles, 453 ;
refuses to carry prisoners, ib. ;
and returns to France, ib.; in
business as ship-owner and
builder, 454-5; his death, 455;
his character, 456

Sutton, Captain Evelyn, sues
Commodore Johnstone, 107

EGETTHOFF, Baron von,
birth and early service, 151-3 ;
his journey through Egypt and
Arabia, 154-5; captain of third
class, 155; of second class, 157 ;
of first class, 158 ; rear-admiral,
161; vice-admiral, 191; com-
mands the Erzherzog Friedrich,
155; aide-de-camp of the Arch-
duke Maximilian, 157; senior
officer in the Peireus, 158;
action off Heligoland, 158-60;
receives the Order of the Iron
Crown, 161; commands a squad-
ron in the Mediterranean, 7b. ;
war preparations, 162-4; defeats
the Italians at Lissa, 179-87;
sinks the Ré d’ Italia, 185; re-
ceives honours and congratula-
tions, 191; travels in France,
England, and the United States,
192; brings home the body of
Maximilian, 193 ; his death, 7d. ;
character, ib.
Thurot, Francois, parentage and
birth, 328; education and early
life, 329; prisoner of war, ib.;
escapes, ib. ; sojourn in London,
330; engaged in smuggling,

 

STUDIES IN NAVAL. HISTORY.

WaL

331; proposes to burn Ports-
mouth, 332; commands a squad-
ron in the Channel, 333; en-
gages the Southampton, 333-4 ;
the Seahorse, 335; the Dolphin
and Solebay, 338 ; threatens the
eoast of Scotland, 336-9; refits
at Bergen, 337; and in Lough
Swilly, 340 ; undertakes to make
a diversion in the North, 342;
his squadron, 3483; provisions
at the Faroe Islands, 345 ;
quarrels with Flobert, ib. et seq. ;
is deserted by several of , his
ships, 349 ; lands on Islay, 351;
proposes to attack Belfast, 353 ;
attacks Carrickfergus, 353-4 ;
alarm on the coast, 356; is
chased and engaged by an Eng-
lish squadron, 357-9; is slain,
358; his character, 359-60 ; ap-
pearance, 362

Tourville, Comte de, early career,
50; at Palermo, 88

Trincomalee, capture of, 129;
battle of, 129-31

Triton East Indiaman, captured,
423-5

Trouin, Du Guay- (see Du Guay-
Trouin)

Turkey Company, prosecutes
Wright, 207, 215-6

Tyler, John, insurrection headed
by, 23

ALKER, George, clears the
coast of Carolina of Spanish
privateers, 226-7; declines to
enter the navy, 254; his ship
founders, 227; he commands
the Mars, 228; is captured by
INDEX. 469

WAR

the Fleuron, 229; a prisoner on
board, 230-1; is exchanged,
233; commands the Boscawen,
233-6 ; commands the King
George, 237; is commodore of
the Royal Family, 1b.; acts as
whipper-in to a convoy, 238;
falls in with the Glorioso, 239 ;
and engages her, 241-4; puts
into Lisbon, 247; saves the Lis-
‘bon packet, 248; is imprisoned
for debt, 1b. ; his death, ib.
War, renewal of the, in 1369, 6
Winchelsea, taken by the French,
23

Wright, Fortunatus, lineage and
early life, 207; adventure at
Lucca, 208; settles at Leghorn,
209; fits out the Fame, ib.; his
method of cruising, 7b. ; his suc-

 

WRI

cess, 210; takes a prize into
Malta, 211; captures a French
ship with an English pass, 214 ;
with Turkish property on board,
214-5 ; refuses to disgorge, 215 ;
imprisoned, 4b. ; correspondence
about the Turkish property,
216-7; fits out the St. George,
217; evades the Tuscan pro-
hibition, 218 ; engages a French
xebec, 218-9; accused of violat-
ing the neutrality of the port,
219; is detained at Leghorn,
ib.; is released by order of Sir
Edward Hawke, 220; detained
at Malta, 221; plays with a
French privateer, 222; is lost at
sea, 223; his descendants, 208,
224

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