a ete 4 a haat ae aoe aN Cornell Law School Library Cornell University Library KF 431.B15 decisions, wii 4 093 THE CONFLICT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS, BY o Ny WILLIAM H. BAILEY, LL. D. COUNSELLOR-AT-LAW, Author of “Onus PROoBANDI AND PREPARATION FOR TRIAL,” &c. BALTIMORE: M. CURLANDER, LAW BOOKSELLER, PUBLISHER & IMPORTER. 1888. Ml 1 Copyright, Wittiam H. Barney. ‘ 1888. Bis KING BROTHERS, PRINTERS, 123 E. Baltimore street, Baltimore, f DEDICATION. ——— TO HON. WILLIAM M. SHIPP, Who, by force of his incomparable intellect, learning, public and private virtwes, patience and impartiality, has, twice for a long period, adorned the Bench and won wniversal praise and regard, this Treatise is dedicated, by his friend and admirer, THE AUTHOR. PREFACE. This treatise, if the Author may so dignify the work now offered to the profession, was the result of his experience in a long and varied practice of the law. As practice increased and his studies correspondingly advanced, his attention was constantly arrested by discordant decisions on nearly every subject embraced by the common law. He likewise soon discovered that the text-writers as well as the courts were ever engaged in the impractica- ble effort to reconcile conflicting views and bring order out of chaos. This will be discovered upon reading the treatise. The text-writers, either, in that conservative spirit which so eminently characterizes our profession, followed in the rut worn by former works, or, in the bold spirit of advancing the true idea, like WHARTON and BisxHop, laid down the law, as viewed by them; but, in either case, unless a decision had been overruled, the authors of both schools bent their energies to demon- strate that no serious discrepancy existed. But, when the lawyer, in his lucubrations, proceeded from the text to the citations he could but be startled in findifg a con- flict at almost every step. When the argument was reached, if true to the court, he was called upon to display the discrepancy, and, failing so to do it was done for him by his astute antagonist. So, first or last, the conflict had to be appreciated and met. It occurred to the author that the best way to meet and overcome the difficulty was to vi PREFACE. present the divergent decisions arrayed against each other. 3 In connection therewith, the practioner should study the particular point on principle, and, then, as far as practicable, trace the assumed error up to its source. In doing this, he should weigh, when possible, the mental characteristics of the Bench, analogous decisions, custom, the particular situation and condition of the particular section of the country where promulgated, and statutes, as either bearing upon the particular sub- ject or its cognates. Thus we find that Lp. MansFI=xp, a man of great parts and profound learning, - being imbued with the principles of the Civil Law, discarded, in Texira v. Evans, the technicality of the common law requiring a power of attorney under seal to authorize the filling of blank in a single bill. This case was. overruled in England, but, before that circumstance occurred the great esteem in which the opinions of that eminent Jurist were held had its effect in this country, and quite a number of our courts followed his decision. So, we find that Judge Dickey, through the force of new word—consociation—inaugurated a line of decisions in Illinois, which, to say the least, are not followed elsewhere. Years ago, in a crude way, the author prepared for his. own use, lists of conflicting decisions upon points as they arose in his practice. It finally occurred to him that by enlarging these memoranda and confining his. work to salient points of difference and especially to subjects of growing importance, his labor would not be wasted. Many points of conflict have been everywhere settled by statute and there are many arising in the law PREFACE. vii of practice and procedure, the discussion whereot would not prove of practical utility. With regard to those arising under the criminal law the author proposes, if sufficiently encouraged in his present adventure, to incorporate them into a separate volume. ! The author has endeavored to make his notes simply suggestive and has refrained, except in a few instances, from giving expression to his individual views. He trusts that his work will prove of some value, at least, as a time-saver, in the search for the law. He has departed, in one respect, from the beaten track of law- writers, with reference to the repeated citation of cases. He has eschewed the use of supra and infra by way of reference unless the citations were in very close prox- imity. He confidently trusts that this course will meet the approval of the profession. The reader will discover immediately in front of the text, a list of cases overruled, doubted, &c., also a list of pivotal cases which the lawyer will find to his advantage to memorize. The scheme of the work which precedes these lists of cases is necessarily meagre, but the author has endeavored, by the employment of full cross-references, as otherwise, to present a full and exhaustive index. The lawyer’s brains are his scales—he has the cases before him pro and con—he has only to judge for himself which scale preponderates. W. H. BAILEY. SCHEME OF THE WORK. [Contents fully set forth in the Index.] PAGES ACTION HOR: A: DIP Byissiesaine suse sce sgaceerceceuveyereiinione ot 1-4 AGENCY. “sic ist seinen apis. wintuieaplacntran lente eater nares lauualaeaaian 4-13 Misrepresentations, without frauds sas. sian wacoosa nara sie 4-7 Contractors. Job-Masters, &C..... ...ccceeceeeeee ceeee 7-13 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS............ ceceeeeeeee 18 - 46 Sealed Instruments... 066i ee. ccc ce esd ediiews nbtew Deeees 13-17 POSSESSION, «. -ihe sie, sicnsrorsBiciaderd isin oie aie edyaas Sadloe Ra we MRE, 17 Apparent and extrinsic ............0s00 ceeeee: augue 17 Commercial Paper: Unsealed Contracts...... tener e ones 18 - 27 Material Gtr a tiODis aciesces 2 ciccen seense st aaveid weehnanareveiinersnsrecannud. eva 27 -50 Alteration by interested party.......... 0. eee eee ence eee 50 - 51 Filling blanks: Negotiable paper..........-.sseeeeeeeee 31 - 34 Filling blanks: Sealed instruments..........ee-s00 eee 34 - 38 Alteration by a stranger..........cec eens cee cee ween 38 - 40 Original consideration..........ccce ects cece eee enna 40 - 42 Suspicious alterations: Against Interest.........----.06- 42 - 48 Apparent: Indorsements: Evidence aliunde: Printed WOLds:. sitaciccde aatiaiens SeTRENe eeN aE hea eesen sey 44 Old documents: Indictments: Records: Depositions..... 45 - 46 As governed by the pleading...........eseeeeeeeeere cee 46 COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING.......ce00 ceeeeeeeeee 46 - 58 ‘CONTRACTS BY ADVERTISEMENT..........0:. 0.0.0 eee 53 ‘CONTRACTS BY CORRESPONDENCE...............-2055 54 CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING..... ...0....-.ee es 54 Labor? Business 2.0 sseicccsss Geawecwnsees tagees ie 55 Mortgages: Sales.......- cose e cece cee rece enone eee ees 56 Acts of charity......... 0 cece eee c eect eee ec ee ee ee eeeeees 56 - 57 Acts of necessity.. 6... cece eee e ete ence nee ene nen ees 57 - 59 Dies dominicus, &C........ cee ee cece eee eee e eee teees 59 - 62 ELECTIVE FRANCHISE..........cccseeeeene cone teen ee 62 - 63 BRAUD) esse: inten coueaarvecaiinis Detbieidaioanmsiba ais alesete Hatem erases 64 - 65 GQUARANTY—CONSIDERATION ....c0.eccceceeee ceseeees 65 - 71 INSANITY—DEED OF A NON COMPOS MENTIS........ 71-78 INSANITY—WILLS—ONUS PROBANDL.......:eeeeeeeeeee 73-27 x SCHEME OF THE WORK. PAGES. INSANITY... . cc cee eee cece teens cece eee e rere eneneess 77-78 INTENSITY OF THE PROOP.... ...ceceeecseencreeeesrees 78 - 103: Criminal act embraced by Civil issue... . +... seer eres ecee 78 - 81 Adjectival and adverbial expressions......+..+-++++ . .- 81-838 Account stated. ..c.ccce cece cee cece ee en re nr teeneneenes 83 Adulterine bastardy.......00 ceeeeeeee eee eer ee teens 83 - 84 Alteration: Assault: With intent, &c.: Bankrupcy.....-- 84 Bastardy: Bigamy: Boundary: Collision.........+.++++- 85 Contracts: Conversion: Correction: Damages......--.-- 86 Defamation: Beyond reasonable doubt..........+- «+++ 87 - 89 Same: Preponderance.........00+ secceveceeerereeenees 89 - 90° DiVOrCO ojccceccansvsncneals Jalsa wulateeaon.at sete da Rane LATS seee- 90-91 Ejectment: Outstanding title: Equities: Fatal malpractice. 91 Felonious trespass.......-cccccccsscccscecncenscoserenss 91 - 98: Forfeitures: Forgery...... eee eee eee eee canta eteeee 93 Braud) sa cenies nau os nok cng waeals abun kane Re. oe wie ereiaye'o 93 - 97 IGENTILY sce ceress sa) cresaneese Lana sedoue ehadieele: amis 97 ANSUPANCE: cs vsassaesareseitalaieewe Geekad deen ewiesinare ns 97 - 99: Letters patent: Marriage: Mortgage: Negative: Negli- gence: Negotiable instruments.... .. 0... -.eeee eee 99 Notoriety: Novation: Penalties: Resulting trusts........ 100 Renewals of lease: Seaworthiness: Seduction: Survivor- ship ina common calamity: Torts...........eeeeeee 101 Usulty: Vis majors Willgsnis ce. suede cstleeisnemsinnaneiews 102 LIMITATIONS wi seie ooisci nde aswel’ waste cecee et ere 103 - 167° Beyond SCasiess: «svuale) qaananaicemadunwee gs va veg newsreels 103 Without jurisdiction: Out of the State: sce cc cernca papi 104 Return of defendant:..s.c0000 sssaredewsvsacvesccascae 105 Absence of one of several joint-debtors...........eeeeee08 105 - 106 Absence of defendant from the State............eeseeeeee 106 - 109 Foreign corporation... 0... ccc cc cee ee cece eee eeeeeeceee 109 - 110: Tenants in common, as affected by.... 6. 2 seeeseeeeees 110 - 111 Agreement not to plead the bar ....... css ceceeeeeeeces 111-114 After bar: Nudum pactum.........00.ccecseeseeceeeenees 114 Promises or acknowledgments made on Sunday: Coupons. 115 Part-payment or acknowledgment, how viewed.........- 116 - 118: New promise, how pleaded....... 2. .scceeccccee ceuee 118 - 121 Payment after action brought.............cce eee eeeeeees 121 - 122 Promise before and after the bar...........cceeecseeeees 122 Promise by a joint-debtor............0.ccceeseeceeeceees 122 - 128 Indorsement of payments..........0.008 eeikaeatnays e Vatsraveuere: 128 - 182 Part-payment by personal representative................. 182-188. Promises or acknowledgments, to whom made............ 188 - 187, Acknowledgment or part-payment by others than the ODOR iirc 5 suais Gan citurelemmutweanvarande a Bae sas seleead 187 - 138 Part-payment by a surety..... 6. 6... ceecceeeee ceaees 138 - 189: Acknowledgment or part-payment by principal debtor.... 139 SCHEME OF THE WORK. | XE LIMITATIONS—continued. nent Promise &¢. to assignee... ..... cece eee ere ceee eee cones 189 - 140: Feme covert as affected by... 0... 0... cece eee cece cece 140 - 141 Collateral securities as affecting the question....... ..... 141 - 143° Acknowledgment contained in collateral documents... ... 148 - 147 Promises by partners after dissolution.................00% 147 - 152° Promise by personal representatives..................000. 152 - 156. Promises by one of several personal representatives....... 156 - 158 Directions in Wills... cies. ssaecwsne soeiswesenewecaiees 158 ~ 160: Mortgages we vives 0ia's caeneacinr s demnbeeen meneame sided 160 - 164 Trustees and quasi trustees...... 0... cece ce eeee eect eeees 164 - 165 No one to sue or be sued... 6... eee ee cece cece ee eee eee 165 — 167 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE................. 167 - 189: Debts of: English view.......-. 2.00.20 sreeeee seceeee . 167-171 AMOTICAH, VICWBiicicc ceded caduiciciscead ene: mages aoa ,. 171 - 180: Conveyances: English view.............. ties aire eens 180 American VIEWS... ..ceeseeseen erence feiesehte ieee aieiemuuare eae 180 - 185. Liability asisurety ens scistos sasonaigisicnsnweeinnesd cece 185 ~ 187 Mortpaces Ofsin soc aies tome deuieaionecuien eines ae aoe 187 - 189 OFFICEis.. ccone cane cay oed es weed oe seer tae epee even ee Ges 189 - 193: Property in: scgsics sews sae wesearwe « Rhea ee MieeAaeAy 189 Abolition 0f.........6. cece cece cece eeeeenee sienhayaa ens 190 - 191 Diminishing salary........ 0.0 :cceccee eee secrete re ereaes 191 - 192 OPINIONS maeicie Masiaeisntasides Quai seteascerd haces ene nnaan aia 193 - 194 ORIGINAL EVIDENCE—ENTRIES ..........:ccceeeceeces 194 - 197 RAILWAY LA Wosecvcses cox cen sisaateutcausmeses wanes en eees 197 - 892 Common carriers: Loss: Burden of proof...........+2-55 197 - 200: Carriers: Connecting lines: Passengers........+...++++-++ 200 — 202 Carriers: Connecting lines: Goods....... iio ta wise te ea eis 202 - 209: Carrier: Limiting liability: Negligence.................+5 209 - 211 Common carrier: Limiting liability...........00. sss eeeee 211 - 217 Limiting liability: Burden of proof.......... ceeeseseeees Q17 — 221 Carriers of live stock: Responsibility.............+.-e008 221 - 225 Contributive negligence: Burden of proof...... ..++..+. 225 — 234 Imputable negligence......1...ceecee te eeeeeeenes Sierevecuinie 234 - 241 Identification of passenger with carrier ........see-eseee 241 - 247 Comparative negligence.......ee.ee cence eee eeeereeee 247 — 249: Injury to stock... . ccc. ccc ce cee cere eceeee scene sanceees 249 — 250° Railroad fires: Emitted sparks........00.-eceeeee coeeee 250 - 254 Dry grass: Presumption of negligence.............++-00+ 254 - 256 Combustible material left by land-owner........-..++++0+5 256 — 260° Leaving door &c. open: Is it contributive negligence...... 259 - 260: Proximate injury, what..........+--- a aidinte mere ROSAS 261 - 262 Evidence of other fires caused by other ‘engines bn deguns ae 262 - 263 Concurring negligence: Crossing track.........+.+ dsunnssiae 263 - 271 Regulations: Usage: As affecting the question........... 271 - 274 xii SCHEME OF THE WORK. PAGES, RAILWAY LAW —continued. . Lease of railroads: Liability of lessor... ...0.sseceeereee 274 - 278 Receivers: Responsibility, GC......ccceecseveereeeeces +++ 278 ~ 280 Leave to sie him........ cccccceeencncesenerenesereees - 280 - 281 Judgment paid out of earnings........ . ceeeeeeceeeeeee 281 — 282 Sale of corporate property: Tangible...........+0+ soe. - 282 — 284 Rolling-stock: When or not saleable. . .......+-seeeeeee 284 — 285 Intangible: Not....... giigarShesigvenacare.ajesaiiaNaNe at ea nevayindy wayne 285 — 286 Fellow-servants ......... eve pd Ouablereehae sce pe acuersthes 286 — 388 Resume on fellow-servants........0. sescsseceerees oiete aia 388 - 390 Warehousemen: Proof required against.........ee+..0- -- 3890 - 392 REVESTING TITLE BY CANCELLATION.. ............. 392 - 398 Re-delivery of deed revests title, or otherwise............ 892 ~ 395 Subject discussed ss sscwssceee eis save cv ster ceconecasuc cvs 395 -— 398 SUR TPG) sescolsisate wstbieiscostusse pea, x ntecasiacaud co distal sarvaiah alaiaveis 'oeoglelgions 398 - 403 Released or not by statute extending time to principal.... 398 - 399 Delivery on condition as affecting................0cceeeee 399 — 403 EBLE GRAB ELY 336. . Simonson, 256. . Starr, 235. . Stearns, 247. . Still, 264. . Swanson, 305, 332, ss see 348, 379. ». Swett, 287, 334, 376. v. Taylor, 343, 354, 362. o. Triplett, 278. v. Troesch, 333. ». Van Patten, 264, 273. : _ 9 Whipple, 275. Chick v. Willetts, 161. Child v. Hearn, 242. Childs ». Drake, 119. Chippendale v. Lancashire Co., 211. Chism »v. Toomer, 20, 22, 43, 46. Chisman ». Bruce, 62. Chollar ». Temple, 185. Cholmondely ». Clinton, 164. Chouteau v. Burlando, 163. Chouteaux v. Leach, 208. Chowthan v. Allen, 141. Chrisman v. Wagner, 171. Christenson v. Am. E. Co., 220. Christian v. Keen, 188. Christy v. Flemington, 145. Cilley v. Cilley, 74. Cincinnati Co. v. Butler, 227. v. Eaton, 226. v. Peters, 227. , Pontius, 207, 217. Ciples ». Alexander, 1538, 156. Citizens’ Bank v. Johnson, 142. ». Knapp, 142. City v. Barnes, 284. . Benson, 39. . Butler, 115. . Inhabitants, 195. . Kelso, 189. . Kirby, 236. . Korbly, 189. . Lamson, 115. . Schulenberg, 161. ». Walker, 232. City Co. ». Illinois Co., 284. Claflin v. Meyer, 230, 391. v. Van Wagoner, 170. Claire v. Eadie, 238. Clapp v. Hale, 115. v. Ingersoll, 129, 130. Clare v. Clare, 90. Clark v. Allen, 37. ». Atchison, 140. . Burn, 127. . Boston Co., 269. . Chicago Co., 838, 349, 365. . Clark, 155. . Dibble, 88. . Eckstein, 19, 24, 28. . Hinkson, 180. . Hougham, 64, 134. . Lowa, 115. esseeteetee eeeteetet see e aaa XXVill TABLE OF CASHES CITED. Clark v, McCann, 141. v. McKenna, 172. o. Maguire, 156. v. Rhodes, 50. v. Rogers, 18, 26. »v. Sigourney, 123. v. Spence, 391. v. St. Louis Co., 224. v. Van Amburgh, 143. v. Vermont Co., 12. v. Vorce, 196. ». Wyatt, 51. Clarke ». Bank, 110. v. Barnwell, 218. v. Chicago Co., 255. v. Dutcher, 118. v. Jenkins, 156. v. Magruder, 195. v. Rochester, 219, 223. v, Spence, 219. v. White, 94. Clary v. Iowa Co., 276. Clawson v. McCune, 132. Clay ». Alderson, 50. v. Robinson, 50. Clayton ». Frazier, 182. v. Siebert, 49. Cleare ». Cleare, 102. Clemens 2. Hannibal Co., 251, 257. v. Patton, 195. Clements v. Cassidy, 401. Clendamil v. Hastings, 35. Cleveland ». Grand Trunk Co., 252. Cleveland Co. v. Crawford, 232, 270. v. Elliott, 278. v. Harrison, 163. v. Manson, 238. v. Rowan, 282. v. Terry, 245, 267. Cliff 0. Midland Co., 268. Clifford 0. Old Colony Co., 364. v. Parker, 19. Clifton », Davis, 72. v. U.S., 98, Clinkscales v. Hall, 186. Clinton Co. v. Coxe, 161. Clopton v. Matheny, 138. Clough v. McDaniel, 130. Clowers v. Wabash Co., 348. Clute v. Small, 41. Clyde v. Hubbard, 208. Coal Co. v. Reed, 308. Coale v. Hannibal Co., 251, 262. Coates v. Burlington Co., 228. v. Missouri Co., 251, 257, 258. Coatney v. Hopkins, 184. Coats v. Express Co., 206. ®, Robinson, 170, 181, 185. Cobb ». Illinois Co., 110. Cobham ». Administrators, 154, 157. Coburn v. Webb, 82. Cochran v. Nebeker, 20, 23, 39, 44, 46. Cochrane v. Dinsmore, 219. Cocke v. Hoffman, 128. Cockfield v. Farley, 126, 187. Coe v. Columbus Co., 288, 284. v. Turner, 898. Coffin ». Buckman, 128, 132. Coggin ». Central Co., 387, 365. Cohen v. Eureka Co., 270. v. Southern Co., 208. vo. Wright, 191. Coit v. Churchill, 95. ». Tracy, 123. Colcleugh v. Johnson, 162. Cole v. Cole, 73. v. Goodwin, 214. v. Hills, 44. v. Jessup, 109. o. McGlathry, 64. Colegrove v. N. Y. Co., 244. Coleman o. Fobes, 127, 185, 189, 150. v. Livingston, 391. 0. Walker, 112, 164. ». Wooley, 173. Coles v. Kelsey, 120. ». Withers, 163. Colgin v. Henley, 70. TABLE OF GASES CITED. Re eho Xx1x Collender ». Dinsmore, 213. Collester 2. Hailey, 107. . Collett v. Frazier, 185, 186. ». London Co., 387. o. Railway Co., 350, 380. Collier ». Steinhardt, 371. Collins ». Bane, 134. ». Bristol Co., 202. . Collins, 38. . Lavenberg, 168, 185. . N. Y. Co., 253, 258, 260. . Rudolph, 168, 185. . St. Paul, 293, 317, 322, 375, 383. see e:s v. Tracy, }190. v. Wassell, 180, 187. Colorado Co. v. Martin, 293, 302, 307. Colquitt ». Thomas, 81. Colt 0. McMechen, 199, 219. Colthurst 7. Sweet, 198. Colton v. Cleveland Co., 219. Columbus v. Arnold, 290, 309, 310, 811, 313, 318, 324, 335, 348, 351, 355. ». Troesch, 316, 317, 373. v. Webb, 297, 314, 328. Com. ». Bacon, 191. v. Boston Co., 228. o. Brayman, 78. v. Coe, 52. v. Dudley, 394. v. Eastman, 52. v. Fairbanks, 78. v. Gamble, 190, 191, 192. v. Holmes, 399. ». Jacobs, 58. o. Jeandall, 58. . Johnston, 58. v. Josselyn, 58. v. Lea, 68. v. Louisville Co., 57. v. Mann, 191, 192. v. Metropolitan Co., 241. ®. Pomeroy, 78. Com. v. Rich, 78. v. Runk, 279. o. Sheriff, 68. ». Tenth Corporation, 283. v. Vermont Co., 357. ». Whitney, 347. v. Williams, 58. v. Wilson, 78. Coman 2. State, 399. Com. Bank ». Kortright, 38. ». Lum, 20, 23, v. Perry, 149. Comstock v. Hadlyme Soc., 73. ». Smith, 23. Conant v. Hitt, 167. Condict v. Flower, 40. o. Grand Trunk Co., 207. Condon v. Missouri Co., 329, 359. Cone v. Delaware Co., 316, 317, 388, 359. Conkey v. Milwaukee Co., 208. Conklin». Doul, 178, 181. ». Pearson, 129. Conline ». Cantrell, 176. Conn. Co ». Bratt, 146. Connelly v. Doe, 392. vo. N. Y¥. Co., 265. ; v. Pierson, 129. Conner ». Abbott, 173, 184. v. Chicago Co., 296. v. N. Y. Co., 189, 190, 191. Connolly v. Davidson, 308, 363. v. Spragins, 17. Conover v. Van Mater, 102. Conoway ». Spicer, 157. Conrad ». Nall,.107. Conroy v. Oregon Co., 280. Continental Co. v. Delpeuch, 99. Converse v. T'ransportation Co., 205. Conway 2. Belfast Co., 294, 314, 353, 876, 877, 382.. ». Deerfield, 394. ». Raburn, 116. Conyers v. Kenan, 64, XXX TABLE OF CASES CITED. Cook ». Field, 89. : ». Holmes; 107. ». Martin, 116. v. Milwaukee Co., 277. ». St. Paul Co., 320. Cooke v. Husbands, 174, 181. ». Lamotte, 97. v. Oxley, 198, 194. Cookes v. Culbertson, 163. Coolbroth v. Maine Co., 350, 351. Coolidge v. Brigham, 197. Coombs v. New Bedford Co., 320, 340. Coon ». Brook, 175. ». Syracuse Co., 296, 329, 333, 3438, 375, 376, 382. Cooper ». Barton, 891. . Berry, 212. v. Cooper, 91. v. Hamilton, 340, 349. v. Iowa Co., 362. v. Milwaukee Co., 297, 323. v. Mullins, 287, 288, 289. v. Parker, 113. v. Pittsburg Co., 299, 352. v. R. R. Co., 829. v. Slade, 100. Cope »v. Creswell, 146. Copeley v. New Haven, 229. Copen v. Auburn, 116. ‘Copenrath ». Kienby, 72. Corbet 2. Salem, 68. Corbit v. Salem County, 67. v. Smith, 72. Corby o. Weddle, 48. Corcoran v. Boston Co., 229. v. Doll, 22, 44. 0. Holbrook, 841, 371. Cordell v. R. R. Co., 230. Corey ». Northern Co., 270. ». Pittsburg Co., 284, 285. Corithers ». Lay, 393. Cork v. Champlain Co., 258> Corley 0. Barcroft, 187. Corlies v. Fleming, 124. Corliss v. Corliss, 392. Corn Exchange »v. Babcock, 175, 187. Cornfoot v. Fowke, 4, 5, 6, 7. Corning v. Lewis, 176. Cornwall v. Charlotte Co., 307. Cornwell v. Spence, 395. Cornish v. Wilson, 160. Correll v. Burlington, 265. Cory ». Silcox, 61. Cosgrove v. N. Y. Co., 266. v. Ogden, 237. Costello ». Crowell, 52. Coster v. Brown, 161. Cotton 2. Ellis, 189, 192. v. Williams, 17. Coughtry v. Globe Co., 306, 337, 338, 365. Coulter ». Stewart, 89. Countess of Dunmore »v. Alexander, 54, County Com’rs ». Jones, 190. Covington ». Shepherd, 283. Cowart v. Perrine, 111. Cowdrey v. Galveston Co., 278. Cowles v. Marks, 189. v. Morgan, 185. v. Pollard, 169. v. Richmond Co., 299, 305, 315, 319, 382. Cox ». Bailey, 148. v, O'Riley, 390. v. Palmer, 42. v. Wood, 169. Coxon v. Great Western Co., 202. Coye v. Leach, 101. Crabtree v. Clark, 23. ». Reed, 82, 92. Crafts v. Boston Co., 229. Craig v. Brown, 136. ». Calloway, 124, 148. v. N.Y. Co., 269. Craighead v. McLoney, 29. Cragin v. N. Y. Co., 210, 223. TABLE OF OASES CITED.’ xxxi Crain v. Paine, 162. Crallan v. Oulton, 158. Cramer 9. City, 227. ». Hanatord, 178. Crandall ». Dawson, 88. v. Gallop, 154. Crane v. Smith, 112. Cranmer 2. Porter, 393. Cranwell v. Ship Fosdick, 218. Crawford ». Scovell, 72. v. Southern Co., 206. Cream City Co. v. Chicago Co., 219. Creigton v. Allen, 126. Cresman v. Castor, 159. Crew v. St. Louis Co., 280, 318, 362, 377, 3878. Cribben ». Maxwell, 72. Cripps v. Davis, 140. Crisman v. Wagner, 171. Crispin v. Babbitt, 292, 310, 325, 327, 335, 341, 356, 371, 379. Crissman ». Schoonover, 48. Crist v. State, 47. Crocker o. Arey, 109. Crockett 2. State, 59. ». Thomason, 40, 41. Croft ». Baltimore, 200, 203. ». White, 20, 39. Crommelin ». McCauley, 94. Cronkhite v. Herrin, 128, 150. v. Nebeker, 29. Crook 9. Glen, 164. Crooker ». Holmes, 162. Crooks ». Sully, 68. Crosby ». Church, 180. ». Dowd, 165, 166. Cross ». Cross, 84. / 0. Guthery, 2. 0. State Bank, 35. Crouch v. Railway Co., 202. Crouse v. Holman, 72. ». Miller, 197. Crow ». Vance, 161. Crowninshield », Crowninshield, 74, Crowther v. Crowther, 164. Cruger ». Cruger, 175. Crumless v. Sturges, 150. Cuddy ». Horn, 244, 246. Cuff v. N. Y. Co., 11. Culbertson 2. Smith, 66. Cumberland Bank v. Hall, 18, 24, 26. Cumberland Co. ». Scally, 301, 308, , 824, 327, 332, 336, 360, 376, 382. v. State, 340, 377. Cummings v. Cassidy, 35. v. Desmett, 68. v. Miller, 172. v. Williamson, 175. Cummins ». Coffin, 125, 127, 148. v. Dayton, 205. ». Hurlburt, 96. Cunningham v. Bucklin, 62. ». Hawkins, 161. . International Co., 12. o. Lyness, 249. Cupp »v. Campbell, 189. . Curley ». Harris, 306, 338, 366. Curran v. Merchants Co., 310, 340. ». Warren Co., 2380. Currie v. Mannington, 120. Curry ». Bott, 172. ». Hays, 149. Curtis ». Delaware Co., 199. v. Engel, 175. vo. Goodenow, 14. Cutter 2. Butler, 182. ». Roberts, 402. Cutting ». Seabury, 2. Cutts v. Brainerd, 208. Dabney ». Dabney, 118, 180. Dages v. Lee, 171. Dabl o. Milwaukee, 289. Dair ov. U. 8., 400. Dakay ». Darrah, 166. Dale v. Knapp, 57. ». Robinson, 178. Dallas v. Gulph Co,, 812, 385, XxXxii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Dallas v. Heard, 169, 181. Dallas Co. ». Spicker, 238. Daley v. Norwich Co., 238. Dalton »v. Rust, 182. Dalyell v. Tyver, 8. Damon ». Inhabitants, 36. Dana v. N. Y. Co., 318, 862, 374. ». Underwood, 36. Danforth v. Culver, 118, 119. Dangell v. Levy, 14. Daniel ». Commissioners, 112. ». Daniel, 20, 22. v. Day, 166. vo. N.Y. Co., 874. Daniels v. Clegg, 229, 238. _Danville Co. v. Stewart, 243. Darling v. Banks, 88. ». Boston Co., 205. v. Meacham, 105. Darnall . Smith, 170. Darrance ». Scott, 171. Darrigan v. N. Y. Co., 318. Daub ». Northern Co., 308, 347, 352, 363. Daubert ». Pickel, 324, 327, 334, 336, 356. Daughtery v. Am. Tel. Co., 404. Dauner v. 8. C. Co., 233. Davenport 0. Receivers, 281. 2. Sleight, 36, 38. Davidson v. Cooper, 34, 39. v. Delano, 130. v. Graham, 199, 220. v. Harrison, 118, 181. v. Lanier, 31, 188. v. Rothchild, 66. Davey v. London Co., 263, 272. Davie ». Briggs, 104, 105. Davies ». Edwards, 117, 137, 144. Davis v. Baker, 27. o. Carlisle, 19, 22, 40. ». Central Co., 299, 300, 328, 360, 361. v, Cooke, 111, Davis v. Davis, 45. ». Duncan, 278. v. First Bank, 174. v. Fish, 60, 61. v. Fredericks, 52. v. Henry, 29. v. Herring, 118. v. Inscore, 892. v, Jenny, 19, 23. v. Lee, 32. v. Loftin, 18. o. N. Y. Co., 270. v. Oliver, 15. v. People, 398. v. Ritchie, 186. ». Smith, 170. v. Tift; 68. v. Vermont Co., 328. v. Wilkerson, 171. Dawkins v. Sappington, 53, Dawson v. N. Y. Co., 206. Day »v. Baldwin, 126. v. Highland Co., 58. 2», Ridley, 198, 219. v. Toledo Co., 296, 376. Dayton 0. Walsh, 178. Deadrich ». Armour, 183. Dean v. Hewett, 120, 140. v. Monroe, 139. Deardorff v. Foreman, 401. DeArmond ». N. O. Co., 265. DeBenedetti ». Manchin, 229. Deck v. Johnson. 176. Decker v. Somerset, 97. Dedier ». Davison, 109. Dedford 0. Rainbolt, 227. Deems ». Philips, 15. Deering ». Boyle, 170, 181, 185. DeForrest ». Hunt, 116. o. Wright, 11. DeForth v. Wisconsin Co., 55. DeFreest ». Warner, 185, 148, 157. Delafield v. Parrish, 75. Delaney ». Hilton, 309. . TABLE OF OASES OITED. —_e pte —e XXX Delaware Co. »v. Carroll, 324, 335, 847, 354, 356, 388. ». Salmon, 254, 258, 277. ». Toffey, 278, 274. Deloach v. Turner, 117, 122. Demerritt ». Randall, 52. Deming ». Norfolk Co., 205. Demorest v. Wynkoop, 181. Den »v. Farley, 138, 42. o, Wright, 24. : Denechand ». Berrey, 180. Denham v. Holman, 104. Denison v. Gibson, 178, 189. Denmead ». Bank, 284. Dennie o. Williams, 124. Dennis v. Sharman, 115. Denny 2. Smith, 106, 109. Denton ». Chicago Co., 198, 391. ». Great Northern Co., 53. Denver v. State, 190, 192. DeRutte v. N. Y. Co., 406. Desbrow ». Farrow, 50. Despatch Line o. Bellamy Co., 37. Detroit ». McKenzie, 206. Detroit Co. v. Van Steinburg, 299, Deutsch v. Bond, 66. Devin ». Hiner, 37. Devlin v. Smith, 344, 363. Devine v. Tarrytown Co., 357. Devor 2. Rerick, 119. Dewart v. Soamer, 215. DeVoy v. N. Y. Co., 45. DeVrees v. Conklin, 178, 187, 189. Dexter o. Hall, 72. Dexterville Co. ». Case, 278. Deyo o. Jones, 153. Dibrell v. Carlisle, 182. Dick ». Indianapolis Co., 304, 317, 375, 376. o Dickey ». Tel. Co., 228. Dickenson ». Lott, 118. Dickerman v. Abraham, 1765. v. Miner, 29. eK Dickerson v. Turner, 126. Dickinson v. Barber, 78. ». Dodds, 1938. Dickson ». Dickson, 402, ». Hamar, 36. v. Miller, 171. Didier v. Davison, 108, 109. Dietrich v. Baltimore Co., 236. Diety »v. Harder, 14. Dillon v. N. Y. Co., 206. v. Union Co., 230. Dimmick v. Chicago Co., 264, 273. Dinguid v. Schoolfield, 186, 148. Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 123, 148. ». Duncan, 39. Disborough »v. Biddleman, 124. * v. Jones, 124. District Co. ». McHlligott, 372. Ditchett ». Spuyten Co., 277. Dixon ». Dixon, 402. Dobbin »v. Hubbard, 173. ». Richmond Co., 305, 306, 317, 382, 843, 379. Dodge ». Burlington Co., 273. v. Dodge, 392. ». Haskell, 19, 23, 44. Doe v. Alexander, 111. . Barksdale, 111. Catamore, 13. . Dignowitty, 95. . Jones, 167. . McGill, 45. . Suckamore, 47. ». Turford, 194. eeeekeese Doggett ». Richmond Co., 258, 261. Dolan v. Delaware Co., 274. Dolbier v. Norton, 15. Dolph »v. Barney, 45. Doro ». Sawyer, 195. Donaldson v. Mississippi Co., 838, 367, 369, 381, Donoho », Vulcan Co., 241. Donohoe ». Wabash Co., 248. Dorgan ». Tel. Co., 404, 406. XXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. Dorman 2. Bigelow, 68. ». State, 191. Dorr v. N. Y. Co., 214. ». Swartwout, 117. Dorrance v. Scott, 182, 184. Douglas ». Cline, 279. ». Elkins, 64. v. Texas Co., 345, 351, 857. Doughty v. Penobscot Co., 324, 334. Douthet ». Stinson, 37. Dotey v. Mitchell, 171, 182. Dow v. Jewell, 15. v. Kansas Co., 295, 300, 303, 815, 381. v. Speuny, 48. Dowling v. Allen Co., 325, 336, 340, 341, 354, 370, 371. ». Girard Co., 290, 321. Downey v. Murphy, 103. Downing v. Brown, 89. Downs v. N. Y. Co., 237. Dowzelot v. Rawlings, 148. Dozier ». Ellis, 64. Draper »v. Jordan, 171, 177. ». Stuvenel, 176. ». Wood, 28. Dresbach »v. California Co., 209. Dressler 0. Davis, 233. Drew v. Drew, 106. v. Red Line Co., 219. v. Sixth Av. Co., 237, 240. Drewe v. Coulton, 63. Drinkout ». Eagle Machine Works, 324, 835, 356 Drum »v. Drum, 28. Drumwright v. Philpot, 35. Drymali ». Thompson, 344. DuBignon v. Backer, 158. Dublin Co. v. Slattery, 284, 263. Dubois v. Baker, 48. Duckwall v. Rogers, 69. Duggins ». Watson, 248, 245, Duffield v. Robison, 76. Duffy v. Chicago Co,, 271, Duffy v. Upton, 825, 335, 340. Dukes v. Spangler, 394. Dummock »v. North Co., 250. Dun ov. Buckley, 138. Dunbar v. Meyer, 171. Duncan »v. Beard, 50. v. Hodges, 38. v. Watson, 196. Dunham ». Sage, 141. Dunlavy v. Chicago Co., 303, 379. Dunlop ». Silver, 50. Dunmead v. American Co., 357. Dunmore v. Alexander, 54. Dunpath v. Wade, 220, 225. Durant ». Palmer, 2382. Dusenberry v. Hoyt, 120. Dush 2. Fitzhugh, 249. Duty v. Graham, 161. Duval v. McLosky, 162.. Duvall v. Stafford, 64, Dwight v. Rice, 63. Dwinels v. Aiken, 89. Dwyer v. Adams Ex. Co., 320. v. American Ex. Co., 334, 343, 351. Dyer v. Erie, 244, 246. v. North Co., 175, 181, 182. v. Talcott, 226. v. U. 8., 192. v. Walker, 118. Eagan v. Tucker, 325, 336. Eagle v. Smith, 53. Eagleton ». Gutheridge, 34. Earle v. Dickson, 105. Earnest v. Ex. Co., 218. Eason v. Sabine Co., 384. East Co. ». Doe, 2838. East India Co. ». Paul, 111, 118, 114, 115. Eastman v. Foster, 162. East Saginaw Co. 0. Bohn, 238. East Tenn. Co. ». Brumley, 204. v. Clark, 230. o. Duffield, 344, fABLE OF CASES CITED. XXxXV East Tenn. Co. o. Fair, 249. : v. Gurley, 316, 372, | 886. , 3 ». Humphreys, 249. | ». Johnston, 220, 223. ». Nelson, 204. v. Rogers, 204. v. Rush, 297, 314, 818, 367. v. Whittle, 223. Eaton ». Boston Co., 244. ». Eaton, 73. v. Erie Co., 271. ». European Co., 11. ». Nason, 187. Eborn v. Canyon, 161. E. B. Ward, Jr., 4. Eckert v. Louis, 40. Eddy v. Bond, 29. Edmund ». Edmund, 91. Edsall 0. Camden Co., 210. Edward v. Davenport, 72. Edwards v. Cahaba, 219. v. Carr, 229. v. Culley, 144. v. Ross, 109. ». Thompson, 132. v. Whyte, 82. = v. Woolfolk, 164. Egbert v. Greenwault, 84. Egery v. DeCrew, 119. Eherwine v. State, 186. Eilert ». Green Bay Co., 271. Eisenlord v. Snyder, 176. Elbert v. McClelland, 20, 23. Elizabethtown Co. »v. Elizabethtown, 285. | { ! Elkins v. Boston Co., 236. v. Edwards, 162. Ellett v. Britton, 69. v. Wade, 184. Ellicott v. Nichols, 23, 149. Elliott v. Geise, 66. v Gower, 177, 183. Elliott ». Hayman, 50. v. Leake, 118, 120. v. Mills, 180. v. St. Louis Co., 308, 349, 888- ». VanBuren, 84. v. Welby, 74. Ellis v. American Co., 408, 406. . Baker, 170. v2. Buzzell, 88, 89. v. Lindley, 89. v. Ohio Ins. Co., 33. v. People, 48. v 0 s . P. & R. Co., 252. . Sheffield Co., 8. Ellison v. Jackson, 68. ». Mobile, 18. Ellsworth v. Tart, 201. Elmendorf a. Taylor, 164. Elmore v. Naugatuck Co., 201, 205. ». Robinson, 119. v. Sands, 214. Elms v. Chevis, 197. Eloi v. Eloi, 78. Elston v. Jasper, 73. Elting »v. Hull, 139. Elwood v. Western Co., 406. Ely »v. Ely, 15. Emerson v. Murray, 44. ». Thompson, 182, 154, 156. Emery v. Lord, 189. Emmons v. Haywood, 111. ». Overton, 126. Emory ». Keighen, 161. Engel v. Fischer, 109. English v. Chicago Co., 367, 356. v. Ocean Co., 218. ». Wathen, 130. Enos v. Buckley, 140. Enthoven v. Hoyle, 35. Epes v. Dudley, 153. Ephraims v. Murdock, 195. Erd ». Chicago Co., 252, 256, 259. Erie Co. v. Schwingle, 232. ». Wilcox, 208. Xxxvi TABLE Of CASHS cifHD. Ernst v. Hudson Co., 266, 273, 274. Erskine ». Messicar, 108. v. Wilson, 120, 121. Eskridge v. Glover, 193. Esseltyne 0. Weeks, 119. Estate of Desilver, 72. Estis ». Rawlens, 108. Eure v. Eure, 145. Evans »v. Arnold, 74. v. Atlantic Co., 316, 348, 268, 380. v. Cary, 134. ». Collins, 5, 6, 7. v. Curry, 136. v. Dunbar, 224. v. Duberry, 126. »v. Fitchburg, 224. v. Populus, 190. v. Pugee, 96. ». Smith, 128. ». Toreman, 41. v. Tweedy, 158. Evansich v. Gulph Co., 289. Evansville v. Androscoggin, 212. v. Crawfordsville Co., 236. Evansville Bank v. Kaufman, 67. Evansville Co. v. Dexter, 226. v. Hiatt, 226, 264. v. Lowdenwick, 268. ». Wolf, 236. v. Young, 216. Everett v. Robertson, 144. vo. Williams, 154. Everly v. Bradford, 195. Evoy v. Tewksbury, 68. Ewan v. Lippincott, 306, 348, 350. Ewart 2. Street, 200, 221. Ewell v. Daggs, 161. Ewen v. Chicago Co., 239, 271. Ewing v. Howard, 102. v. Smith, 172, 183. Exchange Co. v. Drew, 7. Exeter Bank ». Sullivan, 127, 150. Express Co. ». Ware, 109. Fackler v. Fackler, 105. Fairfax o. N. Y. Co., 199. Faison v. Bowden, 135. Fallon v. Central Co., 241. Falls v. Sherrill, 120, 122, 124, 127, 145, 148. Falls Co. ». Eastman, 231. Fannin v. Anderson, 106. Farley v. Parker, 72. Farmer 2. Calvert, 95. / v. Central Co., 364. Farmers’ Bank ». Champlain Trans. Co., 208, 209. v. Clark, 125. ». Whitehill, 49, 196. ». Wilson, 135. Farmers’ Co. 0. Champlain Co., 217. v. St. Joseph Co.. 284. Farmington Bank v. Buzzell, 187. Farnham »v. Camden Co., 200, 214. Farnsworth v. Sharp, 18, 24. Farr v. Williams, 174. Farrer ». Farrer, 392. Farrell ». Brennan, 74. v. Palmer, 134. Farris v. Cass Co., 238. Farrish » Reigle, 233. Farwell v. Boston Co., 300, 315, 316, 333, 881, 385. v. Rockland, 191. . Fatman 2. Cin. Co., 220. Faulkner ov. Bailey, 139. ». Delaware Co., 110. o. Heberd, 193. Faulks v. Burns, 394. Fausler ». Parsons, 63. Faut ». Gibbs, 191. Faw 0. Roberdeau, 105. Fawcetts ». Kimmey, 393. Fay ». Burdett, 72. v. Davidson, 308. v. Smith, 28. Fayson o. Prather, 166. Fears v. Brooks, 169, 181. TABLE OF OASES CITED. Fears 0. Shirley, 165. Fecel v. Guinault, 72. Federal Co. v. Gibson, 282. Fee v. Fee, 65. Feig o. Myers, 14, 43. Feigley ». Whitaker, 149. Felder v. Columbia Co., 202. Fellon v. Central Co., 237. Feltham o. England, 322, 324, 334. Felton o. Reid, 171, 177. Fenn o. Timpson, 199. Fergus ». Gore, 158. Ferguson v. Kennedy, 165. o. Wisconsin Co., 271. Fernandes v. Sacramento Co., 281. Fero 0. Buffalo Co., 258, 258, 260. Fibel o. Livingston, 214. Field 2. Boynton, 195. v. Chicago Co., 208, 216, 272. ». Dickinson, 104. vo. N. Y. Co., 253. v. Stagg, 37. Fifield v. Gaston, 95. v. Northern Co., 309, 310, 348. Fike ». Clark, 107, 108. Finch v. Marks, 188. Finley v. State Bank, 401. Finn 2. Donahue, 123. 0 Rose, 170. a. Vallejo Co., 231. Finney v. Boston Co., 296. v. Turner, 20. Finucane v. Small, 391. First Nat. Bank ». Franklin, 23, 42. » Fricke, 28. ». Lierman, 52. ». Robert, 48. Fisher v. Chapman, 212. v. Dennis, 29. v. Duncan, 153, 156. ». Fisher, 163. v. Kyle, 196. v. Mayer, 196. ». Metcalf, 154. xxxvii Fisher v. Morsman, 163. v. Tucker, 125, 188, 150, 156. vo. U. S., 109. Fitch v. Missouri Co., 251, 255. ». Pacific Co., 257. v. Snedaker, 53. Fitchburg Co. ». Hanna, 205. Fitzgerald v. Ld. Fauconberg, 13. v. Reed, 78. ». St. Paul Co., 236. Fitzhugh v. Anderson, 167. Fitzpatrick v. N. A. Co., 290, 351, Fitzsimmons 2. Joslin, 7. Flanagan v. Cushman, 161. Fleming v. Gilmer, 164. Flemming v. Western Co., 268. Fletcher v. Atlantic Co., 266, 271, 278. ». Austin, 402. v. Opdyke, 135, 141. v. R. RB. Co., 276. Flower v. Pennsylvania Co., 310, 344, 384. Floyd »v. Sugden, 371. Flynn v. City, 325. v. Hatton, 237. v. Salem, 341, 371. ». San Francisco Co., 252, 255, 257. Fogg v. Dennis, 50. Foley ». Chicago Co., 339, 348, 365. Follman » City, 244, 246. Folsom v. Brawn, 90. Fonda v. Sage, 394. Fones v. Phillips, 824. Fontaine v. Gunter, 19, 22. v. Southern Co., 275. Forbes v. Foot, 104. Ford v. Babcock, 109. », Chambers, 94. ». Fitchburg Co., 288, 341, 351, 371. ». Ford, 39. ». Monroe, 2. Fordham ». Wallis, 153. X¥XVIIi TABLE OF CASES CITRD. Forgey v. Bank, 51. Forney v. Benedict, 138, 155. Forshee ». Abrams, 89. Forsyth o. Ganson, 153. Fortier v. N. O. Bank, 178. Fortune v. Hays, 150. Fort Wayne Co. v. Hinebaugh, 276. Foster v. Chicago Co., 302. v. Evans, 124. v. Minnesota Co., 296, 314, 333, 343, 363, 375, 383. v. Napier, 66. o. Starkey, 182, 154. Foster’s Will, 48. Fountain ». West, 89. Foute v. Bacon, 127, 131, 150. Fowler v. Chicago Co., 297, 318, 314, 3872. v. McDonald, 68. ». Seaman, 175. Fox v. Abel, 55. v. Glastenbury, 225. v. McDonough, 51. v. Sanford, 290, 340. Fraker 0. St. Paul Co., 826, 334, 335, 386. Frame v. Kenney, 164. Frank ». Anderson, 187. v. Chemical Bank, 48. ». Lilienfield, 170, 184, 186. Franklin v. Waters, 64. Franklin Co. v. Young, 283. Frary 2. Booth, 178. Fraser ». Fralich, 393. v. Fraser, 393. Frazer v. Frazer, 129. v. Perdriaux, 125. Frazier »v. Brownlow, 171, 177. v. Pennsylvania Co., 297, 299, 330, 382. Frear v. Williams, 77. : Freake ov. Cranefelt, 167. Frech v. R. R. Co., 281. Frecking ». Rolland, 187. Frecklin 9. Rolland, 176. Free v. James, 195. Freeland ». Field, 197. ». Heron, 81, 83. Freeman »v. Freeman, 91. v. Minneapolis Co., 277. v. Wilson, 189. French »v. Buffalo Co., 210, 219. v. Brunswick, 228. ». State, 45. ». Taunton Co., 269. Frey v. Kirk, 118. Frick v. St. Louis Co., 288, 241. Fries v. Brisselin, 122. Frisbee v. Seaman, 119. Fritz v. Thomas, 188, 155. Frost 0. Bergough, 146. v. Union Co., 310, 340, 359. Fry v. Marks, 189. Frye v. Barker, 140. v. Hunter, 189. Fullman v. West Brookfield, 36. Fuller v. Boston Co., 269. v. Green, 28. v. Hancock, 129. v. Jewett, 319, 351, 352, 370, 372. ». McEwen, 160. ». Redman, 134. ». Wilson, 5, 6, 7. Fulmer 2. Seitz, 28. Fulton v. Hood, 49. o. Robinson, 69. Fung Schuey, 213. Funston v. Chicago Co., 265. Fuqua v. Dinwiddie, 128, 185. Furness ». McGovern, 173. Furstenheim v. Memphis Co., 204. Fyler ». Givins, 69. Gage v. Gates, 170. Gahagan v. Boston Co., 229. Gailey v. Washington, 155. Gaines v. Hennen, 85. ». Union Co., 217, 221. TABLE OF CASES CITED. Xxxix Galbreth ». Templeton, 395. Gale ». Carpern, 140. v. Norris, 195. Galena Co. v. Dill, 226, 264. v. Fay, 226. ». Jacobs, 226. ». Loomis, 264. v. Yarwood, 226. Gallagher v. Piper, 322, 324, 327, 334, 344, 362, 363, 366. Gallard ». Jackman, 15. Galliott v. Planters’ Bank, 150. Galloway v. Western Co., 358. Galpen v. Barney, 188. , o. Chicago Co., 252. Galusha v. Cobleigh, 104. Galveston Co. v. Delahunty, 344, 361. ». Faber, 297, 322. ». Moore, 289. v. Bracken, 271. Gamble’s Estate, 172. Gandy v. Chicago Co.,, 253, 391. Ganett ». Chicago Co., 253. Gannon v. Housatonic Co., 385. Gants v. Vinard, 88. Gardner v. Gardner, 175. v. King, 69. . McMahon, 112, 114, 115. . Rose, 238. ». Smith, 277. » Walsh, 27, 29. Garland ». Agee, 125, 149. . Garrahy v. Kansas Uo., 383, 384, 375, 383. v ® Garrard ». Hadden, 33. Garrison v. Mayor &c., 230. Garth ». Robards, 107. Gartland ». Toledo Co., 310, 340, 354. Garvin v. State, 52. v. Williams, 74. Gary ». May, 163. Gates v. Fisk, 149. Gavin v. Chicago Co., 235. Gawtry v. Doane, 196. \ Gay v. Bowen, 148. ». Ihm, 170. v. Winter, 231. Gaylord v. Van Loan, 118. Gayner v. Old Colony Co , 229, 269. G. C. & 8. F. Co. » Levy, 59. Gehrke v. State, 77. Geib v. Ins. Co., 95. George v. St. Louis Co., 231. Georgia v. Gann, 212. Georgia Co. ». Beatty, 224, v. Gibson, 47. v. Spears, 224, Georgia Ins Co. v. Ellicot, 186, 145. German v. Chicago Co., 224. German Co. ». Gerber, 23, 44. Geotchius v. Matthewson, 62. Gerow ». Clark, 66. Gerrish v. Nason, 74, 102. Getchell ». Held, 123. Gheens v. Golden, 227. ' Gibart 0. Dale, 391. Gibbes ». Greenville Co., 279. Gibbons v. Chicago Co., 295, 314. ». Wisconsin Co., 256. Gibbs v. Frost, 36, 37. Gibson v. City Co., 268. v. Jeyes, 97. v. Northern Co., 329, 380, 374, 387. ». Peoples, 129. v. Rees, 161. ». South Eastern Co., 250. ». Walker, 176. Gifford v. Ford, 51. Gilbert ». Anthony, 36. v. Bulkley, 398. v. Halpin, 8. v. Simpson, 48 Gildersleeve v. Carroway, 195. Gillaspie v. Kelly, 32. Gillenwater v. Madison Co., 287, 290, 310. Gillespie v. City, 230. xl TABLE OF CASES CITED. ‘ Gillespie ». Edmondston, 193. v. Moon, 96. v. Palmer, 62. Gillett v. Sweat, 23. Gillette o. Smith, 163. Gillighan v. Boardman, 68. Gillingham ». Gillingham, 135, 138. Gillman 2. Cutts, 106. ». Hastern Co., 301, 323, 331, 360, 366. Gilmore ». Northern Co., 325, 336. v. Union Pacific Co., 340. Gilpin v. Plummer, 183. Gilshannon 2. Stony Bank Co., 301, 303, 312, 831, 345, 371, 378, 879, 380, 381, 383. Gilson ». Soper, 73. Giltman 2. String, 69. Gimon ». Davis, 393. Gist 0. Evans, 41. v. Gans, 44. Glanville v. Paine, 18. Glassey ». Hestonville Co., 239. Gleason v. Bremen, 228. Glenn ». Glenn, 180. v. McCullough, 111. Glick ». Crist, 139. Glidden v. Redding, 239. Glover v. Gray, 248. v. People, 48. ». Robbins, 28. Goad v. Moulton, 185. Goate v. Goate, 146. Goddard ». Glolinger, 197. v. Ingram, 147. Godwin 2. Culley, 134. Gogarty ». Great Co., 92. Goldsmith o. Bain, 48. ». Kilbourn, 187. Goldy ». Pennsylvania Co , 225. Gonder v. Eastabrook, 105. Gonzales v. New York Co., 271. Gooch ». Bryant, 18, 23, 26. v. McGee, 288. Goodall ». McAdams, 175. Goodenow »v. Curtis, 14. Goodfellow 2. Boston Co., 306, 338, 366. Goodman ». Eastman, 34. Goodnow »v. Bond, 69. v. Hill, 185. Goodtitle ». Braham, 47. Goodwin ». Parton, 147. Gordan »v. Farrar, 63. Gorden v. Robertson, 39. Gordon ». McMahon, 115. v. Parmelee, 90, 95. v. Price, 49. v. Schmidt, 180. ». Seizer, 13. Gorman ». Sutton, 89. Gormley v. Ohio Co , 226, 324, 335, _ 356, 375, 380, 382, 383. Gormly ». Vulcan Works, 341, 371. Gorton », Erie Co., 266, 267, 273. Goslin v. Agricultural Bank, 8. Gosman »v. Cruger, 176. Goss ». Singleton, 165. Gothard v. Alabama Co., 248. Gotlieb v. N. Y. Co., 299, 807, 321, 351, 357. Goudy ». Gillam, 120, 121, 125, 150. Gould ». Cayuga Bank, 189. v. Chicago Co., 308. ». Combs, 41. ». Gould, 94. Gourdin v. Commander, 38. Government Co. v. Hanlen, 238. Governer Co. v. Hanlon, 230. Governor 0. Bowman, 398. v. Lagon, 398. v. Withers, 217. Gower v. Winchester, 161. Grabill ». Barr, 76. Grace v. Adams, 218. Graham v. Com., 107. v. Davis, 199, 220. v. Gillespie, 34. TABLE OF CASES CITED. xii Graham ». Holt, 36. v. Lelover, 127, 150. Grand Trunk Co. v. Richardson, 261. Granger v. George, 64. Grant v. Ashley, 126. v. Burgwyn, 128. o. Burr, 161. v. Cole, 195. v. Jackson, 147, 209. Gratz v. Prevost, 15. Graves 2. Graves, 108. o. Lake Shore Co., 2138. o. Tucker, 401. vo. Weeks, 107. Qravier v. Gravier, 193. Gray v. Brassey, 340. 0. Fifield, 106. v. Mobile Co., 220. o. Philadelphia Co., 307. 0. Robb, 183. Grayson v. Richards, 395. Great Western Co. v. Blake, 200, 208. vo. Hawkins, 223. v. Haworth, 256, 258, 259. ». McDonald, 198. Green v. Banta, 324, 328, 335, 344, 363. v. Gaston, 163. 0. Goble, 167. ». Greensboro’ College, 125, 189. ». Hudson Co., 2. 2. Mayor, 191. v. Scrange, 187. Greene ». Minneapolis Co., 308. Greenfield Bank ». Stowell, 32, 33, 34. Greenholtz v. Haeffer, 189. Greening v. Brown, 157. Greenleaf ». Birth, 81, 91. v. Dubuque Co., 265. ». Illinois Co., 227, 328, 9. Quincy, 123, 148, * * * * Greenough o. Wigginton, 170. Green Ridge Co. v. Brinkman, 251. Greenwald 0. Marquette Co., 296, 322, 378. Greenway v. Bromfield, 144. Greenwood ». Cline, 76. Gregg v. Sayre, 94. Gregory v. Gleed, 70. v. Logan, #6. Grenfell v. Girdlestone, 134, 144. Grethen v. Chicago Co., 235. Gridley ». Gridley, 159.. Griffin 0. Diffenderffer, 102. v. Justice, 158, 155. v. Mayor Co., 229. v. Rembert, 69. Griffiths 0. Earl of Dudley, 4, 358. Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 244. Grimes ». Coyle, 89. Grindle v. Eastern Co., 205. Grinnell ». Western Co., 406. Grippen v. New York Co., 267. Grizzle v. Frost, 321. Gross 2. Kenfield, 192. Grovelle ». Minneapolis Co., 287. Grover v. Mississippi Co., 206. Grubbs 0. McDonald, 76. Gue v. Tidewater Co., 283. Guggenheim v. Lake Shore Co., 269. Guging v. Van Gorder, 392. Guild ». Peck, 175. v. Thomas, 401. Guillaume ». Hamburg Co., 209. Guillon v. Perry, 1380. Qulf Co. ». Golding, 204. QGulph Co. »v. Holt, 254 Gunter v. Graniteville Co., 306, 341, 371. 0. Williams, 169, 185. Gustin ». Brattle, 105. Guthrie v. East Tenn. Co., 344, Guy v. Tams, 118, 119, 133. Gwyer »v. Continental Co., 99. Gwyn », Patterson, 402. xlii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Haas ». Central Co., 110. v. Grand Rapids Co., 265. v. Philadelphia Co., 10, 12. Hacker v. Everitt, 106. Hackett v. Kendall, 107. Hadd ». U. 8. Ex. Co., 208. Haffey v. Cary, 188. Hagan ». Parsons, 161. Hagenbuch ». Phillips, 188. Hager »v. Hager, 24. Hagins ». Scott, 162. Hagman ». Kelly, 166. Haines ». Tlinois Co., 265. Hale v. Johnson, 11. v. Lawrence, 109. vo. N. J. Co., 215. v. Russ, 37. o. Smith, 230. Haley v. Earle, 249. Halifax Union ». Wheelwright, 33. Hall v. Barnes, 86. v. Boyd, 155. v. Brown, 277. ». Bumstead, 160. v. Cheney, 199. ». Darrington, 153, 157. . Denkla, 162. v. Eccleston, 174. v. Huse, 52. v. Johnson, 342, 353, 354. v- Little, 108. o. McDuff, 394. ». McHenry, 29. v. Missouri Co., 368, 374. ». Nasmith, 108. v. Parker, 399. v. Pennsylvania Co., 218. v. Renfro, 222. o. Smith, 401. v. Boule, 67. v. State, 190, 191. v. Wisconsin Co., 192, v. Wolf, 83, 101, Hallett , Oakes, 78, I Halliday v. Kansas Co , 202. . ». Martinett, 196. v. McDougall, 196. ». Ward, 184. Hallock v. Com. Ins. Co., 198. Halsa v. Halsa, 69. Halverson v. Nisen, 352, 368. Hamilton v. Galveston Co., 297, 310, 380, 840, 355. . Hooper, 29. . Kirwan, 94. . Smith, 65. . Summers, 149. . Wird, 14. ». Wright, 13. Hammatt ». Emerson, 7. Hammon ». Huntley, 158, 155, 158. Hammond ». Railway Co., 387, 380. Hammond's Case, 51. Hance »v. Hair, 127. Hancock ». Bliss, 118. o. Franklin 141. Hanes ». State, 191. Hanford 2. Fitch, 140. v. McNair, 38. Hanley v. Gandy, 50. Hanna v. Jeffersonville Co., 119. o. Wilson, 163. Hannibal Co, v. Fox, 325, 331, 340, 359. se cs ¢ & Hanover v. Cogle, 267. Hanrathy v. Northern Co., 324, 384, 339, 354, 368. Hansee v. Dewitt, 176. Harnsberger »v. Yancy, 30. Harbison ». Lemon, 72. Hard o. Vermont Co., 311, 318, 818, 821, 352. Hardin ». Boyd, 162. Harding 2. International Co., 205. Hardy v. Holly, 177, 182. v. Merrill, 74, 77. Hare 2. Jernigan, 392. Hargrave v, Hargrave, 84. ‘ PABLE OF CASES CITED. xliii Hargraves v. Cooke, 68. Harlan v. Bernie, 119. ; v. St. Louis Co., 266. Harland 0. Berry, 23. v. Milwaukee Co., 304. Harpending ». Dutch Church, 108. Harper v. Fairley, 131, 188, 142, 145. v. Indianapolis Co., 305. v. R. R. Com'rs, 220. Harrer v. Wallner, 140. Harris v. Harris, 171, 177, 182. o. Hayes, 74. ». Jenkins, 177. . King, 159. . Mills, 161. . Packard, 391. o. Patten, 51. o. Vanderveer, 76. 0. Vaughn, 163. Harrisburg Bank ». Foster, 64. Harrison v. Collins, 12. v. Dignan, 146. v. Handley, 118. v. London Co., 222. v. Missouri Co., 282. v. Owen, 398. v. Rowan, 77, 102. ». Tiernans, 36. Harrison Machine Works ». Reiger, see 112. Harsh ». Klepper, 41. Harshburger v. Alger, 170. Hart 2. Grand Era, 202. v. Hudson Co., 280. 0. Nash, 142. o. N. Y. 825, 335. v. Pennsylvania Co., 209. v. Rensselaer,Co., 201, 206. v. Western Co., 251, 405. 2. Wilson, 196. Hartan v. Eastern Co., 202. Hartfield ». Roper, 237. Hartman v. Ogborn, 172. : v. Sharp, 124. Hartwell 0. Hopkins, 107. Hartwig v. Chicago Co., 99. Harvey v. N. Y. Co., 296, 823, 343, 373. v. Tobey, 111. Harwell v. McCulloch, 117. Harwood », Root, 169. Hasheagan v. Specker, 169. Haskell v. Bailey, 162. v. Champion, 29. Haskins o. Haskins, 101. ~o. Lombard, 401. vo. N. Y¥. Co., 362. Hass ». Philadelphia Co., 306, 338, 357, 366. Hastings v. Pepper, 199. v. Rider, 78. Haswell v. Chicago Co., 260. Hatch o. Hatch, 15, 394. v. Searles, 31. 0. Spofford, 108. Hatcher v. Toledo Co., 283. Hathaway v. Michigan Co., 296, 314, 328. v. Toledo Co., 226, 236. Hathorn ». King, 78. Haven v. Hathaway, 128, 142. Havens 2. Erie Co., 267, 278. Hawes 2. Burlington Co., 228. Hawkins v. Grimes, 51, 76. v. Johnson, 325, 336. Hawley »v. Griswold, 180, 181. v. Northern Co., 267. v. Screven, 203. Hay v. LeNeve, 242. Haycock v. Greup, 49. Haycroft v. Lake Shore Co., 241, 266. Hayden v. Goodnow, 22, 44. v. Hayden, 76. ». Smithfield Co., 357. Haydock ». Tracy, 115. Hayes v. Fry, 164. -o, Kennedy, 219. v. Western Corp., 295, 303, 315. Haynes v. East Tenn. Co., 290. xliv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Haynes v. Haynes, 76. v. State, 191. Hays v. Gallagher, 232. Haywood ». Miller, 247. Hazelton 0. Union Bank, 50. Hazleton ov. Whitesides, 156. Hazzard 2. Vickery, 51. Head ». Diggon, 193. v. Head, 83. v. Manners, 118, 182, 153. v. Providence, 81, 101. v. Temple, 183. Heard ». State, 50. Hearne 2. Southern Co., 263. Heath ». Grenell, 182, 187, 146, 157. Heburn v. Warner, 174, 188. Hedges v. Jones, 107. ». Roach, 107. Heffelfinger v. Shutz, 18, 24, 48. Heffner »v. Palmer, 35. ». Wenrick, 19, 24. Heil v. St. Louis Co., 219. Heine v. Chicago Co., 306, 381, 367, 368. Heinlin v. Castro, 161. Hellams ov. Abercrombie, 56. Helm 2. Cantrell, 126, 146. Helmetag v. Frank, 169, 185. Hemmenway ». Towner, 84. Hemstead v. Johnston, 94. Henderson ». Foote, 158, v. Hackney, 47. v. Henderson, 91. v. Ilsey, 182, 155. v. Johnson, 68. v. Nisen, 347. v, Stevenson, 211. v. Walker, 278. Hennequin v. Barney, 106. Henman ». Dickinson, 18. Henning »v. Trenery, 19. Henry v. Blackburn, 178. ». Confidence Co., 163. 2, Henry, 81, 96. Henry ». Ores, 196. ». Southern Co., 252, 255. v, Staten Co., 300, 315, 330, 381. Henze v. St. Louis Co., 266, 273. Hepburn’s Appeal, 183. Herbert v. Barrier, 76. Hercules Co. v. Hunter, 97. Herndon ». Pratt, 165. Herrick o. Gary, 101. v. Malin, 15, 40. v. Swomley, 48. Herron v. Marshall, 165. Hershizer v. Florence, 186. Hert v. Oehler, 29. Hess ». State, 49. Hestonville v. Kelly, 239. Hewitt v. Anderson, 58. Heyer v. Pruyn, 163. Hiatt o. Hiatt, 66. Hibblewhite o. McMorine, 34, 38. Hickey v. R. R. Co., 229. Hicks v. Goslin. 183. ». Lusk, 126, 148. ». Pacific Co., 232. v. Person, 49. v. R. R. Co., 279. Hidden v. Cozzens, 135, 145. Higgins ». Carlton, 76. v. Scott, 162. vo. R. R. Co., 226. Higginson ». Air, 125. Higham v. Ridgway, 182. Hilbery 0. Stover, 29. Hill o. Barnes, 19. v. Bellows, 107. . Boston Co., 206, 209. . Caledonian Co., 340. . City, 271. Coley, 42. . Gust, 310, 321, 340. . Henry, 120, 121. . LaCrosse, 285. . Louisville, 273. esseeecee TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlv Hill », Nashville Co., 249. o. New Haven Co., 233. ». Sturgeon, 219. Hiller ». English, 61. Hilliard 0. Richardson, 10, 11. Hills ». Goodyear, 93. Hilmert v. Christian, 395. Hinchliff . Hinman, 395. Hinckley v. N. Y. Co., 206, 214. o. R. R. Co., 229. Hinds v. Wabash Co., 275. Hiner 0. Sea Gull, 2. Hines »v. Spruill, 159. Hinny 2. Phillips, 172. Hinson ». Kinard, 165. Hirschman v. Budd, 46. Hitchcock ». Kiely, 169. 2. Munger, 100. Hoadley ». Trans. Co., 213. Hoag »v. Lake Co., 262. Hoagland ». R. R. Co., 206. Hobart v. Conn. Co., 167. ». Johnson, 173. Hobbit ». London Co., 8. Hocum »v. Weitherick, 2381. Hodge ». Gilman, 20. v. Higgs, 197. Hodges ». Darden, 141. Hodgdon ». Chase, 112, 118, 114. v. White, 154. Hodgkins v. Eastern Co., 295, 348, 368, 380. Hodson ». Davis, 169. Hoey »v. Dublin Co., 366. v. Jarman, 14, 44. Hofnagle v. N. Y. Co., 324, 335. Hoffman v. Western Co., 98. ‘Hogan v. Central Co., 294, 314. v. Kurtz, 166. 9. Strayhorn, 397. Hogtaling v. Osburn, 61. Hogg ». Orgill, 127. Hoke v. Henderson, 189, 190. v. St. Louis Co., 360. Holbreck v. Hunt, 116. Holbrook ». Gay, 197. v. Schenectady, 229. ». Tirrell, 394. Holden »v. Fitchburg Co., 296, 301, ; 309, 331. Holland v. Hatch, 29, 32, 41. Holliday ». Littlepage, 118. Hollingsworth v. McDonald, 184. Hollis ». Francois, 178, 182, 188. Hollister ». Bender, 81. ». Hollister, 81. i ». Nowlen, 214. . Holloway »v. Galloway, 74. Holly ». Boston Co., 236. Holmes ». Old Colony Co., 230. ». O. C. R. Co., 280. v. Trout, 393. v. Trumper, 27, 33, 34. Holsapple v. Rome, 223. Holstein v. Oregon Co., 248. Holt o. Agmen, 184. ». Brown, 83, 86. v. Gage, 134. Holton v. Daly, 287, 289, 357. Homan ». Stanley, 10. Home », Williams, 195. Homer 2. Illinois Co., 348, 383. ov. Fish, 64. ». Wallis, 52. Homes v. Smith, 195. Honesberger ». Second Av. Co., 237. Hood ». N. Y. Co., 201, 205. vo. Western Co., 404. Hooper v. Chicago Co., 208. v. Rathbone, 218. ». Smith, 169, 185. v. Stephens, 129, 142. v. Wells, 212. Hopgood », Southgate, 167. Hopkins ». Connell, 279. v. Megguire, 52. v. Smith, 88. v. Westcott, 212. xlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Hopkinson 2. Davis, 69. Hoppe ». Chicago Co., 239: Horang 2. Blane, 189. Hord ». Lee, 156. Horn ». Dorrance, 24. Horry District v. Harrison, 24. Hoskins ». Stanford Co., 338. Hoth 2. Peters, 233, 324, 326, 335, 356. Hot Springs Co. v. Trippe, 205. Hough 2. Bailey, 162. ». Dickenson, 95. v. Jones, 172. vo. R. R. Co., 280, 289, 299, 321. Hounshell v. Clay Co., 178. Houser ». Chicago Co., 324, 326, Be v. Irvine, 127. Houston o. Schindler, 51. Houston Co. v. Cowser, 233. ». Dunham, 360. . Gilmore, 297, 314. . Gorbet, 249. . Hampton, 337, 350, 380. Maddox, 357. Marcelles, 326, 334, 345, 350, 386. Miller, 310, 354. Rider, 317, 332, 364. . Simpson, 239. . Walker, 271. . Willie, 297. v. Willis, 313, v. Wilson, 271. Houton v. Ransom, 170. Hovenden ». Annesley, 164. Hovey v. Chase, 73. v. Hobson, 73. How ». Kendall, 68. Howard v. Colquhoun, 24, 42. v. Denver, 822. v. Fletcher, 106. ». Huffman, 394, v. Mississippi Co., 303, 882, 376. eee Sf eesesses Howard ». Moot, 75. 2. Patrick, 48. v. Simpkins, 186. v. St. Paul Co., 269. Howe »v. Freeman, 284. v. Howe, 78. v. Saunders, 130. ». Stortz, 171. v. Thompson, 140. Howell o. Hartford Co., 98. v. Kelly, 65. v. Mills, 224. Howells ». Landore, 324, 334, 340, 351. Howland ». Lounds, 53. v. Milwaukee Co., 331, 367 Hoye v. Chicago Co., 271. Hoyle v. Jones, 64. 2. Plattsburg Co., 284. o. Smith, 172, 183. Hoyt v. City of Hudson, 233. v. Sturges, 148. Hubbard v. Bughee, 178. v. Ins. Co., 161. v. Marsh, 125, 127, 148. v. Mason City, 228. v. Turner, 94. Hubgh ». N. O. Co., 811, 318, 318. Huchberger ». Merchants’ Co., 98. Hudson ». Reed, 24. v. Revett, 38. v. Union Ferry Co., 249. Huff v. Ames, 238. v. Bennett, 196. » Wright, 169. Huffman o. Chicago Co., 359. Hughes v. Great Western Co., 211. ». Hamilton, 171. v. Macfie, 237. v. Muscatine County, 248. v. Peters, 172, 188. ». Winona Co., 300, 308, 322. vo. Wynne, 158. Huidekoper »v. Cotton, 61. Hull v. Dealty, 166. TABLE OF CASES CITED. xvii Hull v. Richmond Co , 225. v. Sacramento Co., 252. o. Vermont Co., 110. Humble v. Langston, 34. Humphrey v. Kingman, 68. Humphreys 2. Guillow, 19, 24, 28, 387, 42. ». Switzler, 199. Hund ». Geiler, 235. Hunt o. Adams, 36, 69. . Bridgham, 124, 139. . Bullock, 285. . Chicago Co., 387. v. Cleveland Co., 198, 218. v. Gray, 18, 24, 28, 39. v. Morris, 198. o. Pennsylvania Co., 306, 338, e v v. 366. o. Salem, 241. v. State, 401. Hunter v. Hopkins, 392. v. Hunter, 96. v. Robertson, 123, 187, 139, 146. Huntington v. Breen, 227. ». Finch, 18, 24, 42, 43. Hunton ». Nichols, 107. Hurlbut v. Nichol, 127. ». Wade, 165. Hurley o. Cox, 161. v. Estes, 161. Hussey v. Coger, 325, 341. ». Kirkman, 135. Huston o. Vandlandingham, 106. Hutchins v. Colby, 178. Hutchinson »v. St. Paul Co., 269. ». Yorke Co., 294, 302, 304, 812, 318, 375, 382. Hutton v. Padgett, 66. Huyett o. Philadelphia Co , 253. Hyatt ». Lunnin, 75. Hyde o. Jamaica, 233. v. Proprietors, 212. 2. State, 191. Hyde v. Woolfolk, 48. Hynes ». McDermott, 48. v. San Francisco Co., 241. Hysinger ». Baltzell, 105. Ide v. Ingraham, 148. Thl v. Forty Second Co., 287, 240. Illinois Co. ». Adams, 216. - v. Buckner, 264. . Copeland, 201, 208, 208. . Cowles, 198. . Cox, 306, 316, 332, 333, 334, 381, 382, 385. . Ethomington, 272. . Finnigan, 275. . Fox, 332. . Frankenburg, 203, 215. . Frazier, 255, 256. . Goddard, 264. . Godfrey, 264. . Kanuse, 275. Keen, 294. . McClelland, 256. Mills, 250, 255, 256. Modglin, 307. Morrison, 216. Nunn, 256. Patterson, 334. . Smyser, 216. ». Welch, 358. Ilsley v. Jewett, 119, 130, 142. Imlay v. Huntington, 169, 180. Indiana Co. v. Green, 227. v. Harper, 335. v. Millican, 347, 367. v. Parker, 324, 335. Indianapolis Co. v. Allen, 216. . v. Chance, 61. . Jurey, 224. Keeley, 226, 268. McLin, 268. . Morgenstern, 293, 331, 379. ». Paramore, 251. ». Rutherford, 264, \ see eseeseeseeeee8ee28 e288 8 ee e sss xviii Indianapolis Co. ». Soloman, 276. v. Stables, 264. Ingersoll ®. Stockbridge Co., 259, 276. Ingram ». Little, 35. Inglish v. Breneman, 20, 22, 28. Inhabitants v. Hall, 205. v. Huntress, 37. v. Inhabitants, 78, 195, t ' | | 1 l | t TABLE OF CASES CITED. Jackson v. Mayo, 160. '», Nashville Co., 249. v. Osborn, 15. vo. Page, 394. v. Phillips, 48. vo. R. BR. Co., 226. v. Sacramento Co., 390. v. Van Dusen, 75. 196. Jacobs v. Calderwood, 187. v. Shaver, 401. Innis v. Templeton, 183, 184. In re Bingle, 19. Eldridge, 143, 144. Kingsley, 145. Ray, 145. Worthington, 59. Ins. Co. v. Owen, 188. v. St. Louis, 204. Insard »v. Torres, 33. International Co. v. Doyle, 307, 356. v. Hester, 363, 364. o. Timmerman, 254. Ipswich Co. ». Story, 162. Ireland ». R. R. Co., 266. Irish 0. Milwaukee Co., 206. Iron Bank ». Murdock, 23. Iron Co. ». Mowery, 232. Irving v. Veitch, 111, 119. Irwin ov. N. Y. Co., 207. 2. Sprigg, 231. Isabel o. Hannibal Co., 288. Isham ». Schafer, 176. Islands, 345. Ivens ». Cincinnati Co., 264. Ives v. Farmers Bank, 23. Ivory v. Murphy, 69. Jackson v. Anderson, 394. ». Chase, 394. v. Fairbank, 117, 140. v. Gardner, 394. v. Gould, 394. v. Jacoley, 15, 42, 48, 394. v. Malin, 40, v. Hart, 41. ». Hooker, 207. Jaeger v. Kelly, 81, 96. Jaffa o. Myers, 185. James ». Christy 2. v. Emmet Co., 353. v. Fisk, 182, 184. v. Mayraut, 172. v. Pontiac Co., 284. v. State, 81. v. Wharton, 197. Jamison v. Camden, 208. v. Jamison, 76, 188. Jaques ». Methodist Church, 175, 181. Jardine v. Payne, 41. Jarman v. Wilkinson, 178. Jarvis v. Woodruff, 162. Jefferis o. Philadelphia Co., 253, 257, 259. Jeffers v. Philo, 394. Jeffersonville Co. v. Bowen, 280, 236. v, Hendricks, 226. v. Lyon, 226, 227. Jeffrey v. Keokuk Co., 300, 303, 315, 381, 367, 379, 381. Jeffries v. Ankey, 62. Jenkins ». Cockerham, 90. v. Jenkins, 35. v. McConnico, 180, 188. v. Tobin, 73. v. Waldon, 62. Jenneson v. Parker, 220. Jetter vo. N. Y. Co., 287, 241, 273, Jewett v. Draper, 52. Jewit v. Petit, 118. TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlix John ». Hartfield, 40. Johns ». Harrison, 18, 32. Johnson ». Arnold, 65. ». Beardslee, 155. ov. Blasdale, 32. v. Boston Co., 306, 307, 338, 348, 352, 366. . Chicago Co., 239, 241, 252. e ». City, 349, 365. v. Com., 185. 2, Cummins, 174. v. Day, 60. » Duke of Marlborough, 18. ». Fritz, 172. 0. Gallagher, 167. ». Hacker, 399. ». Hudson, 230. ». Johnson, 163, 172. ». Louisville Co., 265. v. Missouri Co., 370. v. Moore, 27. o. Peugnet, 176. v. R. R. Co., 229. Smith, 107. . Tillson, 248. Waters, 154. Western Co., 218. Willis, 116. ». Wren, 166. Johnston v. R. R. Co., 229. Jones v. Bangs, 28. v. Conoway, 64. ». Durgin, 193. v. Florence Cv., 340. . Granite Mills, 298, 311, 313, 321, 247. eseseses o. Greaves, 96. ». Howard, 195. ». Ireland, 23. v. Jones, 180. v. Lake Shore Co., 298, 302, 320. v. Margaret, 172, Jones 0. Moore, 120, 127, 155. v. Neale, 395. N. Y. Co., 280. Palmer, 67. Porter, 184. Railroad Co., 321. . Rider, 41. . Scott, 152. v. State, 51. v. Voorhees, 406. Jones’s Appeal, 183. Jonesboro v. Baldwin, 226. Jordan v. Dobson, 94. o. Hubbard, 184, 186. v, Peak, 182, 186, 188. ». Pollock, 398. v. Stewart, 15, 24, 44. v. Wells, 278, 294, 314, 319, 322. sseegeees Joseph Co. v. Chase, 257. Joslin v. Agricultural Co., 8. Joslyn ov. Smith, 125. Joy v. Adams, 162. Judge of Probate v. Stone 74. Judson v. Western Co., 205. Jumpertez v. People, 47. Justice v. English, 184. v. Lang, 67. Juzan ov. Toulmin, 94. Kahn v. Love, 2380. Kain v. Smith, 280, 352, 359. Kaine v. Weigley, 81, 96. Kaiser v. Stickney, 181. Kallenback v. Dickinson, 126, 149. Kallman o. U. 8. Ex. Co., 199, 212, 218. Kamshall ». Goodman, 120, 121. Kane ». Cook, 64. v. Hibernia Co., 90, 98. Kannon 2. Galloway, 50 Kansas City v. Ewing, 276. Kansas Co, v. Butts, 258, 255. ». Kunkell, 268. ». Little, 325, 336, 342. TABLE OF CASES CITED. Kansas Co. v. Neville, 277. v. Nichols, 222, 224. v. Owen, 257. v. Peavy, 248, 302, 358, 3887, . Phillibert, 281. . Pointer, 281, 268. . Richardson, 268. . Salmon, 311, 312, 320, eo <4 € © Ss 345, 362, 381, 383. v. Wood, 279, 280. Kansas City Co. v. Simpson, 224. Kansas Ins. Co. ». Berry, 98. Kantrowitz 0. Prather, 169, 186. Kaples v. Orth, 271. Karasich ». Hasbrone, 233. Karle v. Kansas Co., 273. Karr v. Stivers, 195. Karson v. Milwaukee Co., 251, 257. Kavanagh 2. O’ Neill, 187. Kay v. Pennsylvania Co., 239, 241. Kearsing ». Killian, 393. Keaworthy v. Sawyer, 185. Keen v. Munroe, 17. Keener v. Crull, 134. Keeney v. Good, 172. Keep ». Indianapolis Co., 201. Keese v. Chicago Co., 255, 256. Keeton v. Keeton, 105. Keffe v. Milwaukee Co., 236. Kehn ». State, 192. Keilley o. Belcher Co., 298, 294, 314, 828, 847, 854, 355, 356. Kellar v. Sinton, 162. Kellog v. Chicago Co., 252, 256, 259. v. N. Y. Co., 270. v. Rand, 394. Kelley v. Weaver, 138. Kelly v. Boston Co., 309, 389. v. Hannibal Co., 266. v. Johnson, 339, 350. v. Lenihan, 81. %, Lanborn, 116, 127, 150, . Reynolds, 199, 212, 224. Kelly v. St. Paul Co., 269. v. Turner, 169. ». Wilson, 393. Kelty ». Long, 176. Kemp 2. Kemp, 177. ». Westbrook, 141. Kenan v. Holloway, 134, 137. Kendall v. Hughes, 81. v. Kendall, 394. v. London Co., 222. Kendig ». Overhulser, 92, 99. Kennard v. Burton; 325, 335. Kennayde ». Pacific Co., 266, 273. Kennedy ». Bank, 24. v. Carpenter, 112. v. Doyle, 196. . Fairman, 196. . Indianapolis Co., 278. . Knight, 164. . Lancaster Bank, 19. . Moon, 29. . Williams, 120. Kenney ». Central Co., 348. o. R. R. Co., 252, 255. », Shaw, 345, 371, 379. Kenniston v. Avery, 150. Kenny v. Hanibal Co., 254. Kent 0. Midland Co., 200. Kenutcky Co. v Barron, 253. v. Jenks, 193. 0. Thomas, 231, 248. Kepner v. Keefer, 55. Kepperly 2. Ramsden, 226. Ker o. Hill, 47. Kerner »v. Crull, 121. Kerr 0. Fergue, 235. 0 Parks, 235. Kersey 0. Chicago Co., 227. v. Kansas Co., 296, 322. v. St. Joseph Co., 824, Kershaw ». Hancock, 115. Kerwin v. Hibernia Co., 72. Ketcham v. Hall, 117. Ketchum o. Am, Ex. Co., 219, a6 Ss ¢= © ¢ ABLE OF CASES CITED. ii Key ». Davis, 73. o. Holloway, 77, 102. Keys v. Railways, 209. Keystone Bridge Co. 0. Newberry, $24, 826, 327, 334, 336, 358, 356. Kibbs o. Ditto, 140. Kidwell ». Houston Co., 329, 380. Kilby ». Goodwin, 180. Kilgore v. Magee, 191. Killea v. Faxon, 301, 331, 357. Kimball v. Greig, 898. v. Rutland Co., 210, 217, 225. Kimm o. Weippert, 170, 181, 186. Kimmel 2. Schwartz, 119. Kincade v. Bradshaw, 80, 90. King ». Boston Co., 328, 345, 370, 378. vo. Hunter, 189, 192. v. Kinsey, 102. v. Lane, 108. o. N. Y. Co., 11. v. Moon, 96. v. Ohio Co., 293, 298, 329, 330. 380. o, Riddle, 143. v. Shepard, 198. ». Smith, 408. v, Thompson, 169, 186. vo. Walker, 103. Kinney ». Crocker, 279, 280, 281. ov. Flynn, 49. Kinsloe v. Baugh, 180. Kirby o. Lake Shore Co., 110. v. Miller, 172, 188. _. 0 Mills, 135. Kirk ». Atlanta Co., 340, 360, 386. Kirkland ». Dinsmore, 213. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 47. Kirwin, ex parte, 38. Kiser o. State, 15. Kisler v. Sanders, 134. Kissenger vo. N. Y. Co., 270, 2'74. Kitteredge ». Brown, 116. Klein v. Jewett, 272. Klein vo. N. O. Co., 283. o. Raymond, 14. Kline v. Guthart, 138. Knaggs v. Maston, 170. Knapp ». Dagg, 245, 246. ! ». U. S. Ex. Co., 205. Knappen ». Barry, 192. : Knaresborough ». Minn. Co., 280. Knight v. Clements, 18, 19, 42, 126, 129, 189. v. Fox, 8, J. Portland, 202. v. Providence Co., 208. Knowles v. McComley, 175. ». scribner, 83, 88, 97. Knox ». Galligan, 164. v. McCall, 153, 156. Kohnstamm ». Foster, 148. Knoxville Nat. Bank ». Clarke, 33. Koons ». St. Louis Co., 238. Koontz v. Franklin Co., 191. v. Nabb, 174. Koskonong v. Burton, 115. Kountz v. Kennedy, 28, 42. v. Price, 56. Krouskop ». Shonntz, 29, 178. Kreig v. Wells, 287. Kroy v. Chicago Co., 300, 315. Kurtz ov. Mills, 135. Kyger v. Riley, 131, 161. Kyle v. Wells, 135, 138. Lacey ». Williams, 165. Lafayette Bank v. Bruff, 185. LaFayette Co. v. Hoffman, 236, 264. LaFayette Lamb, The, 82, 86. Lafond ». Ruddock, 108. Laing v. Colder, 214. v. Lee, 67. Laird ». Scott, 183. Lake Shore Co. ov. Bennett, 224. v. Davis, 216. ». Erickson, 365. v. Fitzpatrick, 321. . Knittal, 373, iii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Lake Shore Co. »v. Lavelly, 827, 336, 859, 362. v. Miller, 229, 265. v. Perkins, 223. v. Sprangle, 358. , ». Sunderland, 274. Lake Superior Co. v. Erickson, 337, 365. Lakin v. Williamette Co., 277. Lalor v. Chicago Co., 288, 308, 320, 342. Lamar v. Simpson, 36. Lamb »v. Camden Co., 206, 209, 392. ». Western Co., 390. L’Amereaux v. Van Rennselaer, 176. Lammon v. N. Y. Co., 384. Lampe ». Kennedy, 395. Lancaster 2. Dolin, 171, 182, 184. v. Walsh, 53. Landes ». Pacific Co., 206. Landis v. Shanklin, 88. Landt ». Hills, 62. Lane v. Atlantic Works Co., 229. v. Crumbie, 228. v. Doty, 139. Laner ». White, 393. Lang »v. Henry, 69. Langubier v. Fairbury Co., 60. Langan 2. St. Louis, 278. Langdon v. Dowd, 107. v. Paul, 18. v. Rowlston, 111. Langenberger v. Kroeger, 39. * Langhoff ». Minneapolis, 271. Langston v. Adderhold, 189. Laning v. N. Y. Co., 292, 326, 366. Lansing v. Bank, 163. Lanter v. McEwen, 88. Lapham 2. Kelly, 197. Larason v0, Lambert, 155: Lash 2. McCormick, 162. Lassiter 0. Western Co., 406. Lasure v. Graniteville Co., 371. Laub ». Paine, 29. Laugher ». Painter, 8. Laurence 2. Ballou, 110. Laverenze v. Chicago Co., 265. Lawler v. Androscoggin Co., 324, 327, 836, 342, 344, 350, 372. Lawrence v. Dunkle, 124, 189, 148. vo. Lawrence, 394. v. Sinnamon, 138. ». Winona Co., 206. Lawton v. Giles, 234, 252. v. Gordon, 393. Lazarus ». Fuller, 127. Lazier 0. Westcott. 45. Lea v. Hopkins, 115. Leaper 2. Tatton, 119. Leary v. Boston Co., 320. Leavenworth Co. ». Cork, 253. v. Rice, 268. Leavett v. Peel, 176. Leaycraft ». Hedden, 174, 181. LeBarron »v. Joslyn, 229. Ledelling v. Powers, 176. Ledlie ». Vrooman, 176. Lee v. Alexander, 40. v. Baldwin, 112. 2. Fleningsburg, 53. v. Lee, 76. v. Pearce, 96. a. Polk, 116. » R. & G. Co., 223. v. Woolsey, 321. Leech v. Leech, 393. Leffingwell v. Freyer, 187. Leftwich o. St. Louis, 218. Lehman 2. Brooklyn, 29, 81, 229, 237. Lehigh Valley Co. ». Jones, 297, 809, 314, 335, 354, 356. Lehigh Co. o. Hall, 232, 267, 271. v. McKean, 258. Leigh 2. Bank, 170. v. Smith, 165. Leland ». Cameron, 196. Le May ». Johnston, 14. TABLE OF CASHES OITHD. Leonard ». Hendrickson, 200, 219. ». Hughlett, 128. v. N. Y. Co., 406. o. Pitney, 64. o. Rogan, 178. o. Vredenburgh, 67. Lesan v. Maine Co., 265. Lesher v. Wabash Co., 10, 11, 275. Lessee of Hoge o. Fisher, 77. Lester o. Kansas Co., 257, 262. ». Pittsford, 283. Letcher v. Bates, 14, 30. Letson v. Kenyon, 138. Levering v. Union Co., 199, 213. Levi v. Earle, 177. Levy ». Cadet, 127, 150. ». Darden, 184. v. Merrill, 68. v. Pontchartrain Co., 219. Lewis ». Bacon, 165. ®. Bingham, 393. ». Commissioners, 401. v. Garretson, 81. ». Houston Co., 65. v. Johns, 178. o. Kramer, 41. v. Norton, 197. ». Payne, 24, 30, 394. v. People, 85. v. Schenck, 41. ' o. Smith, 199. v. St. Louis, 290, 298, 317, 360, 3638, 375. v. Yale, 169. : Lexington Ins. Co. ». Paver, 98. Lichtenhein 7. Boston Co., 390. Lillard o. Turner, 178, 181. Lillie 0. McMillan, 81. Lime Bank ». Hewett, 195. Limeburger 0. Westcott, 214. Linam ». Reeves, 184. Lincoln 9. McNally, 346. v. Rowe, 170. Lindley ». Richmond Co., 207. Lindsay ». Jamison, 111, 155. Lingan v. Henderson, 128, 162. Linker v. Long, 392. Linn v. Wright, 96, Lippencott ». Hopkins, 172. Listoff ». Hart, 394. Little v. Beazley, 47. v. Blunt, 108, 119, 121, 140. v. Boston Co., 199. v. Dusenberry, 279. v. Hackett, 248. v. Herndon, 18, 17. v. Nabb, 69. Littlefield v. Littlefield, 127, 189. Little Miami Co. ». Dodds, 199. v. Fitzpatrick, 297, 314, 328, 329, 330, 378. ». Hambleton, 277. ». Stevens, 232, 290, 305, 382, 379. Little Rock Co. v. Atkins, 229, 231. ». Corcoran, 218. v. Harper, 218. ». Talbot, 218. | Litton v. Baldwin, 172, 188. Live Yankee, 198. Livermore v. Johnson, 64. Livingston 0. Arnoux, 196. ». Ostrander, 120. o. Tyler, 195. Llewellin ». Mackworth, 164. Lock ». U. §., 98, ». Wilson, 117. Locke v. Caldwell, 161. v. Humphries, 66. Lockhard ». Beckley, 81, 96. Lockhart v. Eaves, 116. ' __», Litchtenthaler, 248. ». Roberts, 35. Lockland ». Beckley, $1. Lodge ». Phypher, 49. Logan ». Matthews, 391. ». Pontchartrain, 212. liv SABLE OF CASES CITED. i Lomax ». Robertson, 120, 157. Loomis v. Ruck, 176. Long ». Barnes, 177. v. Cason, 165. . Mason, 14. . Miller, 124, 163. . Moore, 41. . Pacific Co., 298, 329. . R. R. Co., 273. v. White, 173. Longabaugh v. R. R. Co., 252, 254. Longstreet v. Philadelphia Co., 284. Longworth ». Taylor, 163. Lonsdale v. Brown, 120, 121. Lord ». Morris, 160. v. Shaler, 119. Lord Ward v. Lumley, 393. Loucks ». Chicago Co., 270. Louisville Canal Co. » Murphy, 231. Louisville Co. . Boland, 226. v. Bowler, 288, 348, 344, 364, 376. v. Brook, 298, 314, 387. . Campbell, 204. . Cavens, 288. . Chase, 2438. . Collins, 287, 288, 317. . Conroy, 306, 318, 348. . Fillbern, 312, 328, . Fleming, 249. . Goetz, 231, 265, 270.- . Hamilton, 283. . Hagan, 227, 257. . Hedger, 198. . Krinning, 227, 257. . Lockridge, 227. . Mahoney, 288. . Moore, 298, 303. . Murphy, 231, 286. . Orr, 227. v. Richardson, 259. es see e ese e eeeeecet ete eeeee Louisville Co. v. Robinson, 289, 295, 802, 313, 367. v. Shanks, 227, 248. »v. State, 284. o. Stevens, 255. v. Weaver, 204, v. Wolf, 231. ». Yandall, 288. Loughlin 2. State, 308, 352. Love v. Hackett, 121. Lovegrove v. London Co., 327, 336, 346, 367, 374, 375, 382. Lovejoy ». Boston Co., 303. v. Whipple, 55. Lovell ». Howell, 298, 348, 350, 355. Lovett 0. Salem, 236. Low ». Allen, 161. v. Anderson, 187. Lowe ». Merrill, 20, 25. v. Sowell, 125. Lowell v. Boston, 10, 11. v. Sargent, 205. Lowenberg ». Jones, 202. Lowery ». Gear, 180. Lowry v. Dubose, 111. Lowther v. Chappell, 126,139. Lubering v. Kohlbrecker, 40. Lubz ». Kelly, 45. Luebke 9. Chicago Co., 308, 310, 318, 321, 324, 359, 384, 386. Lutz ». Kelly, 45. Luminary, 98. Lunt v. London, 272. Lyman v Norwich, 138. Lynch »v. Nurdin, 237. v. Smith, 236, 240. Lynn »v. Crouse, 171. Lyon ». Fleachman, 87. v. Lyman, 51. v. State Bank, 187, 142. McAndrews ». Burns, 296, 302, 314. v. E. T. Co., 405. McAllister v. McAlister, 51. McBeath v. Wabash Co., 219. TABLE OF CASES CITED. lv McBee ». Fulton, 89. McBey ». Cantrell, 176. McBride ». Hunter, 189. McCabe ». Illinois Co., 110. McCafferty v. Heritage, 51. v. Spuyton Duyvil, 11. McCaig »v. N. Y. Co., 258. McCain o. Sloan, 123, 157. McCall v. Brock, 200. o. N. Y. Co., 266. McCarthy ». White, 82, 94, 126. McCarty v. Terre Haute Co., 206. McCaughey ». Smith, 30. McCauley v. Gordon, 28. McCausland »v. Fleming, 197, McChesney 2. Brown, 170, 184. McClackey ». State, 77. McClintic ». Ochiltree, 184. McClory ». Insurance Co., 100. ». Wright, 100. McCluer v. Manchester Co., 277. McClurg » Howard, 124, 182, 148. McCollough v. Speed, 166. McComber 0. Scott, 51. McCommons ». Chicago Co., 253. McConilhe v. Sawyer, 96. McConnell v. Delaware Ins. Co., 97. o. Merrill, 139. McCorkle v. Binns, 49. ». State, 61. McCormick v. Bay City, 399. v. Fitzmorris, 17, 23. » McMutrie, 196. McCosker ». Long Island, 340, 377, 386. ’ McCoy 2. Erie, 213. v. Kansas, 198. vo. Keokuk, 224. v. People, 85. McCready v. South Carolina Co., 252, 258. McCrea v. Piermont, 135, 157. McOullen ». Porter, 390. McCulloch v; Dawes, 152, McCullock v. Eagle Co., 54. McCollough v. Henderson, 131. McCurry 0. McKesson, 120. McDaniel o. Chicago Co., 224. McDeed ». McDeed, 99. McDermott ». Boston, 335, 381. v. City, 825. v. Hannibal Co., 348. v. Pacific Co., 376, 382. McDonald ». Eggleston, 36. v. Underhill, 160. v. Walton, 166. v. Western Co., 208. McDougall v. Central Co., 231. McDowell v. Young, 64. McElroy o. Nashua Co., 277. McFarland ». People, 85. McFerrin v. White, 188. McGary v. Loomis, 237. McGatrick v. Wason, 58. McGeary ». Eastern Co., 236, 240. v. Loomis, 237. McGehee ». Greer, 129. McGinnis v. Canada Co., 321. v. Kempsey, 74. McGlenery ». Keller, 88. McGlensey v. Fleming, 116. McGovern »v. N. Y. Co., 274. McGowan ». LaPlata, 349. v. Mining Co., 321. v. St. Louis Co., 308, 306. McGrath »v. Clark, 28. ». Hudson, 266. vo. N. Y¥. Co., 266, 274. McGrew ». Forsyth, 134. McIntire v. Morris, 153. v. Oliver, 124, 127, 148. McIver »v. Ferguson, 156. McKane ». California Co./ 348, 375. McKean ». Thorp, 118. McKee ». Hicks, 36. McKeone ». Barnes, 52. McKimble-v. Boston Co., 228. McKeethan v, Atkinson, 125, 139, lvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. McKinley »v. Role, 88. McKinne ». California Co., 336, 352. 356, 377, 887. McKinney 0. Jewett, 210. ». Snyder, 135, 145. McKinsey ». Hill, 166. McKonkey 2. Gaylord, 49. McKown». Whitmore, 64. McLaren v. McMartin, 182, 137, 138, 146, 155, 157. McLaughlin 2. Spingler, 141. v. Venin, 29. Maclay ». Love, 178. McLean v. Blue Point Co., 335, 370, 871. v. Russel, 8. ». Van Zanot, 237, 266. McLeod 2. Ginther, 377. McLin ». McNamara, 116. McLurg v. Howard, 138. McMahon ». Davidson, 308, 363 ». Northern Co. 286. McManus v. Lancashire Co., 222. McMaster v. Mather, 129 McMecbin ». McMechin, 75. McMichen v. Beauchamp, 20, 28. McMillan v. Burlington Co., 238. ». Michigan Co., 213, 277. v. Peacock, 169, 180, 185. v. Richards, 160. v. Wood, 108. McMorris v. Hernden, 69. McMullen ®. Beatty, 171, 172, 183. ov. Rafferty, 189. McNabb vo. Young, 35. McNamee 2. Tenney, 146. McNaughten v. Caledonian Co., 289. a. Partridge, 36. McQueen v. Farquhar, 94. v. Great Western Co., 92. McQuie »v. Peay, 37. McQuiliken v. R. R. Co., 231. McRee v. Alexander, 111. McVey ». Ely, 29, Machir v. Burroughs, 177, 182. Mack ». Lancashire Co., 98. Mackie v. Lansing, 163. Mackin v. Boston Co., 295, 321, 328, 829, 330, 378. Macon ». Davis, 247. o. Johnson, 247. Macon Co. v. McConnell, 258, 256, 258, 259 v. Parker, 285. Macphurson ». Thoytes, 47. Macubbin 2. Lovell, 50. Madden v. Chesapeake Co., 315, 318 . Madison ». Kelso, 189. v. Korbly, 189. Magee v. Marks, 100. v. White, 182. Magnin »v. Dinsmore, 199, 210, 214. Magood v. Johnston, 172, 188. Magruder 2. Peter, 162. Mahler v. Lake Shore Co., 265. v. Wise, 178. Mahon v. Cooley, 161. v. Gormly, 172. v. Henning, 307. Mahoney 2». Atlantic Co., 276. v. Hunter, 95. Maiben ». Bebo, 169, 181. Major v. Hansen, 40. 9. Holmes, 185. Majors v. McNeilly, 400. Mallory ». Griffey, 232. v. Stodder, 398. v. Tioga Co., 110. - Malone »v. Boston Co., 218. v. Burlington Co., 387. vo. Hathaway, 301, 324, 327, 336. Maloney ». People, 85. Malpas v. Clements, 129. Man v. Warner, 155, 159. Manchester v. Sabler, 176. Manderton 2. Robertson, 122. Mangan »v. Atterton, 237, 288, TABLE OF CASES CITED. vii Mangan 0. Brooklyn Co., 237, 240. Manhattan Co., ». Thompson, 176. Manly 9. Ashmead, 13. Mann ». Locke, 150. ». Oriental Works, 288, 319, 322. . People, 85. Manning v. Burlington Co., 387. Mans v. Worthing, 35. Mansen ». Felton, 137, 154. Manville v. Cleveland Co., 304, 306, 812, 331, 367, 379. Marble ». Rop, 248. March 2. Clark 178. ». Walker, 84. Marcy 2. Barnes, 52. v. Dunlop, 40. Mares v. N. P. R. R. Co., 281. Marienthal @. Mosler, 138. Marietta Co. v. Picksley, 270. Marion v. Rockwood, 402. Mark o. St. Paul Co., 269. Marksbury ». Taylor, 95. Marshall ». Adams, 195. v. Dalliber, 116. v. Fisk, 394. v. Gouglar, 39. ». Stevens, 172, 183. o. Thames Co., 98. Marsteller ». Marsteller, 167. Marston » Brittenham, 187. Marsuttes v. Kenton, 112. Martin v. Broach, 117, 120. v. Cope, 196. v. Creditors, 20. v. Dwelly, 181. 0. Gage, 159. v. Lord, 29. v. Maguire, 52. v. Mayo, 160. v. Taylor, 50. v. Western Co., 258, 260, Martindale ». Follett, 41. Marvin v. Bates, 105, Marvin ». Treat, 53. Mary Washington, 198. Maryland Co. ». Newbern, 265, 273. Maskell v. Pooley, 116, 128, 130. Maskoss v. Steamship Co., 209. Maslin v. Baltimore Co., 210, 214, 225. Mason ». Beasley, 196. v. Edison Co., 825, 341. ». Howell, 126. ». Johnson, 104. v. Mason, 164. v. Shay, 87. Master v. Miller, 14, 20, 27, 39. Masterton v. N. Y. Co., 245. Mastin o. Branham, 136, 144, Mathis v. Morgan, 401. Matson v. Chicago Co., 387. Mattair v. Card, 169. Matthews 2. Case, 352. ». Coalter, 18, 23, 42. ». Huntley, 90. Mattock ». Glover, 50. Maurer’s Appeal, 171. Maurice ». Warden, 104. Mauritz v. N. Y. Co., 205. Maxfield ». Cin. Co., 226. Maxey »v. Strong, 150. Maxon ». Scott, 176. May v. Hansom, 231. ». Princeton, 228 Maybee ». Sniffen, 18, 24, 42, 43. Mayberry ». Willoughby, 127, 139, 150. Mayer v. Missouri Co., 238. v. Wright, 112. Mayhew ». Sullivan Co., 361, 372. Mayo ». Boston, 229. ». Hutchinson, 185, 187. v. Jones, 76. Mayor ». Lasser, 10. Mayton v. Texas Co., 310, 344, 384. Mazozow »v. Foot, 109. Mead ». Husted, 92. y. Jenkins, 166. lviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Mead ». Stratton, 87. Meara v. Holbrook, 279, 345, 358. Mechanics Bank v. Packing, 14. Medien ». Platte, 40. Medley » Elliott, 161. Medlicott v. O’Donel, 164. Meehan »v. Williams, 197. Meeks ». Southern Co., 235. ». Vassault, 166. Meers v. Meers, 76. Meble v. Lapeyrollerie, 91. Meike ». St. Sav. Inst., 44. Meikel ». St. L. Ins. Co., 20, 44. Meily v. Butler, 188. Mellican v. Marten, 23. Mellick ». DeSeelhorst, 117. Melville v. Missouri Co., 368. Melvin v. Easley, 55. Memphis Co. ». Copeland, 272. v. Jones, 290, 358. v. Reeves, 218. », Thomas, 333. Mendota ». Fay, 226. Menees v. Johnson, 172. Mercer ». Jackson, 301, 351. Merchants Bank v. Watson, 138. Merchants Co. v. Joesting, 216. v. Leyser, 216. ». Moore, 208. ». Theilbar, 216. Merk ». Gelzhaeuser, 88. Merriam v. Leonard, 144. . Merrick v. Boury, 41. Merrill ». Hampden, 228 v. Ithica, 196. Merrils v. Swift, 143. Merrit v. Pollys, 126. Merritt v. Day, 124, 148. Mersey Docks ». Gibbs, 8. Mersman v. Werges, 29. ‘Metcalf ». Baker, 245, 246. ». Cook, 117, 188. Methodist E, Church v. Jaques, 175. Metropolitan Bank »v. Taylor, 170, 181, 186. Metz v. Buffalo Co., 280. Meyers v. Rahte, 178. Michan v. Wyatt, 140. Michigan Co. v. Austin, 308, 349. v. Boyd, 216. . Brown, 130, 162. . Coleman, 229. . Dolan, 303, 331, 379. . Eaton, 216. . Hall, 223. . Lautz, 226. . McDonough, 222. Mineral Springs, 204. . Myrick, 2238. v. Smithson, 296, 314. Milberry v. Storer, 40. Milburn v. Walker, 178. Miles o. Barry, 65. «. Loomis, 48. Millen ». Steamship Co., 328 Miller v. Balthasser, 84. v. Brown, 170, 181, 186. . Dawson, 130. . Dorsey, 132, 137, 146. . Farley, 161. . Finley, 28. . Gilleland, 14, 20, 394. Glenworth, 171. . Helm, 162. . Irvine, 69. . Jolly, 139. Jones, 47. . Lancaster, 122. . Manwaring, 398. . Miller, 128. . Newton, 178, 180. N. Y. Co., 821. . Reed, 14, 19, 28, 29. . Rucker, 62. . Stewart, 80. . Talcott, 118. . Trustees, 162, Ses ees eseseece e@eeeeeteeeeeege2& erseeseess TABLE OF CASES CITED. lix Miller ». Tyler, 107. v. Union Pac. Co., 292, 325, I 1 ' 326, 340, 844, 363. | v. Voss, 180. v. Williains, 174. Millett ». Parker, 400, 401. Milligan 0. Wedge, 8. Millison ». Nicholson, 72. Mills ». Hyde, 125. ». Starr, 41. Milner o. Highland, 141. o. N. Y. Co., 207. Milton ». Hunter, 76. Milward ». Midland, 388. Milwaukee Co. ». Hunter, 233, 249, 271. ». Smith, 203. Mims o. Mims, 141. Miner »v. Pearson, 170. Minkler ». Minkler, 134, 188. Minnicie v. Jetter, 117, 187. Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 284. Mississippi Co. ». Mason, 229. Missouri Co., v. Abend, 226. ». Condon, 298, 380. v. Cornell, 257. v. Haley, 347, 385, 387. v. Kineaid, 257. v. Mackey, 322, 382, 387. ». Sandson, 258. ». Watts, 278. Mitchell ». Borden, 88. v. Chicago Co., 229. 0. Clay, 112. v. Levi, 112. v. Robinson, 327, 341, 342, 843, 371. ». Thompson, 64. Mitchener v. Atkinson, 159. Mix », Shattuck, 125, 149. v. Woodward, 88. Mobile Co. v. Brame, 1. ov. Copeland, 202. Mobile Co. v. Crensbaw, 2380. v. Gray, 251. v. Hopkins, 220. v. Jarboe, 220. v. Smith, 294. 300, 317, 827, 342, 361, 363, 371, 372. ». Thomas, 311, 313, 318. Mockring v. Mitchell, 101. Moens v. Heyworth, 5. Moffatt o. Moffatt, 196. Mohr ». Tulips, 73. Money »v. Lower Vein Co., 328. ‘ Monaghan »v. Agricultural Co., 83, 98. Monroe ». Collins, 62. Montag ». Linn, 15. Montgomery v. Bank, 171, 182. ». Chambers, 230. ». Culver, 201, 208, ». Eveleigh, 172. v. Moore, 198, 208. ». Wynns, 111. Montreal v. Griswold, 404, 406. Moody ». Pacific Co., 266. v. Rowell, 52. ». Threlkeld, 32. Mooers »v. White, 155. Moon v. Richmond Co., 305, 382, 363 | 379. Moore v. Andrews, 195. . Bank of Columbia, 185. . Carroll, 109. . Central Co., 282. . Cornell, 172. . Hardison, 156. . Hillebrant, 156. . Leseur, 137. . Mayor, 228, 391. . Petchell, 158. . Porcher, 153, 156. . Prance, 97. . Stovall, 69. . Titman, 187. eeseeeert ee eserieeeteetoe ix TABLE OF CASES CITED. Moore ». U. 8., 50. | ». Wabash Co., 309, 326, 359. | Moran »v. N. Y. Co., 299, 311, 313, 315, 348, 367. ». Rennard, 638. Moorehead 9. Wriston, 135. Morehead ov. Parkersburg Bank, 28. Moreton a. Harrison, 39, 162. Morgan v. Bridge Co., 230. . Dudley, 62. ». Elam, 172, 395. v. Illinois Co., 241, 278. v. Metayer, 126, 143, 146. v v e . Rebinson, 106. . Rowland, 133. v. Vale of Neath, 291, 294, 301, 314, 331, 375, 382, 383. Morrell v. Frith, 117. Morris v. Bowman, 42. v. Haslan, 266, 273. v. Hazlehurst, 137. v. Richmond Co., 299, 330, 363. v. Sargent, 48. Morris’s Lessee 2, Vanderen, 15. Morrison v. Erie Co., 237. v. Garth, 81. v. Norman, 140. 2. Phillips, 225. v. Solomon, 169. v. Thistle, 170, 186. Morse v. Minneapolis Co., 322, 328, 381. v. Vermont Co., 208, 209. ‘Mosby v. Arkansas, 36. Mosely v. Chamberlin, 297, 314. Moses v. Boston Co., 216. ». 8t. Paul Co., 141. Mosher v. Hubbard, 146. v. Southern Co., 208. Moulton v. Gage, 807, 356. v. St Paul Co., 224. Mountstephen v. Brooke, 134 Movar v. Harvey, 107. Mowery 2. Central Co., 287. Moye »v. Henderson, 52. : Muckelroy v. Bethany, 44. Mueller ». State, 55. Mulchey 2. Methodist Society, 301, 349, Muldowney ». Illinois Co., 227. Mullarkey » Baltimore Co., 208. Mullan ». Philadelphia Co., 341, 349, 369, 371. Muller »v. Bailey, 170. » McKesson, 344, 355. Mulligan v. Curtis, 236, 240. v. Illinois Co., 208, 212. Munger »v. Tonawanda Co., 237. Munroe v. Eastman, 14, 43. ». Thomas, 283. Munson ». Atwood, 92. Murch ». Concord Co., 277. Muriati ». Luciani, 50. Murphy ». Boston Co., 298, 311, 845, 352, 360. v. Cavalli, 306, 338, 366. v. Chicago Co., 227, 258, 259. v. Dean, 229. v. Hagerman, 49. v. Smith, 321. v. Staton, 200. Murray 2. Baker, 103. v. Blackledge, 165. v. Currie, 8, 289, 306, 307, 338, 365, 369. v. Keyes, 172. v. Mechanics Bank, 159. v. N. Y. Co., 88, 86.. Muschamp v. Lancaster Co., 202, 207. Muse 0. Donaldson, 128, 150. Musel ». Israel 104. Mussey »v. Holt, 392. Musson ». Trigg, 182. Muster v. Chicago Co., 337, 350. Mutual Co. 0. Brown, 48. 9. Wilcex, 400. Muzzey v. Reardon, 178. TABLE OF CASES CITED. dxi Myatts v. Bell, 126, 139, 149. Myer ». Beal, 163. Myers v. Indianapolis, 358. ». Meinrath, 55. o. Standart, 149. o. Toscan, 52. Mynard ». Syracuse Co., 210, 223. Mynning ». Detroit Co., 229, 248, 269. Myrick 0. Michigan, 202, 204. Mytton v. Midland Co., 200, 202. Nabb v. Koontz, 66. Najac v. Boston Co., 206. Nash v. El Dorado, 115. 0 Fugate, 403. v. Hobson, 117. o. Hunt, 78. Nashua Lock Co. o. Worcester, 204. Nashville Co. ». Brown, 10. ». Carroll, 290, 334, 339, 366, 383. v. Elliott, 290, 333, 385. ov. Foster, 297, 328, 329, 330, 378. v. Handman, 319, 322. v. Jones, 288, 290, 293, 819, 322. v. McDaniel, 346, 369. v. Sprayberry, 201. v. Wheless, 249, 297, 300, 318, 315, 316, 322, 361, 381, 385. Nason o. Grant, 394. Nathans ». Bingham, 105. National Bank ». Cotton, 126. 0. Smith, 186. National Co. v. Bedell, 353. National Ex. Co. v. Drew, 5, 7. Naugatuck Co. ». Waterbury But- ton Co., 205. Naylor v. Chicago Co., 381. Nazro », Fuller, 24. Neal v. Fesperman, 90. Nebitt ». Bacon, 162. Needham ». Ide, 78. Needles v. Shaffer, 27. Neely 0. Locke, 94. Neff v. Horner, 19, 20, 28, 33. Nehrbas «. Central Co., 231. Neil v. Case, 13, 18, 23, 42. Neilson 9. Sanborn, 69. Nelson v. Chicago Co., 227, 271. o. Herkel, 167. ». Woodruff, 198, 218. Neson v. D’Armond, 116. Neve v. Hollands, 137. Nevins 2. Bay Co., 214. Nevitt 2. Bacon, 162. Newbar », N. Y. Co., 301. Newbit ». Statuck, 88. Newcomb v. Presbrey, 15, 23. Newell v. Nichols, 101. ». Smith, 279. Newhouse ». Miller, 226. Newkirk v. Campbell, 133. Newlin ». Beard, 37. v. Duncan, 119, 123, 148. ». Freeman, 171, 177, 182. Newman ». DeLorimer, 161. v. McComas, 123, 149. New Haven Co. v. Goodwin, 197. New Jersey Co. v. Merchants Bank, 218. v. Nichols, 232, 249. 0. West, 272. New Orleans Co. v. Beard, 107. v. Harrison, 293, 305, 310, 332, 344, 384. v. Hughes, 303, 332, 376. v. Mitchell, 265. 0. Morris, 283. v. New Orleans Co., 219. Newson »v. N. Y. Co., 274. Newstadt ». Adams, 199. New York Co. ». Covert, 163. ». Dryburg, 406. \xii TABLE OF CASHS CITED. New York Co. v, Gleason, 93. v. Jones, 137, 146. Niblack ». Goodman, 134. Nichol v. Thomas, 72. Nicholas ». N. Y. Co., 210. Nichols v. Allen, 67. v. Dowding, 147. ». Goldsmith, 196. o. Great Western, 242. ». Johnson, 40, 42. v. Johnston, 14. v. Smith, 279. Nicholls v. Webb, 195. Nicholson v. Combs, 29. ». Erie Co., 267. vo. Halsey, 394. Nickerson v. Sweet, 40. Nieks v. Martindale, 166. Niemcewiez v: Bartlett, 132. Nimick v. Mutual Co., 98. Nims v. Bigelow, 178. Nixon »v. Rose, 170, 184. Noble v. McFarland, 140. Norfleet o. Edwards, 18, 24. Nolen v. Blackwell, 109. Nolton v. Western Co., 337, 350, 380. Northern Bank ». Buford, 51. Northern Co. ». Herbert, 359, 387. v. Shimmel, 284. v. State, 231. North Bank v. Abbot, 197. North Co. v. Ackers, 110. v. Dyett, 175. ov. Geis, 231. v. Heilman, 267, 273. v. Mahoney, 288. North Chicago Co. v. Monk, 248. Northcut v. Wilkinson, 153. North River Co. v. Shrewsbury Church, 18. North Western Co. 2, Blankenship, 72. North Western Packet Co. ». McCue, 849. | Northington o. Faber, 188. | Norton ». Colly, 149. . Nourse v. Husband, 185. ». McCay, 196. | Nowell o. Mayberry, 28. Noyes v. Blakeman, 176. a. Hall, 111. ». Rutland Co., 208. v. Smith, 316, 350. Nudd o. Hamblin, 64. Nunes 2. Perry, 52. Nunn 2. Givhan, 169. Nutting «0 Conn. Co., 205. Oakes v. Mitchell, 182, 153. Oakley v. Pound, 174. O’Bannon v. Chumasero, 67. O’Brien ». Boston Co., 312, 826, 345, i 346, 375, 376, 383. : v. McGenchy, 236. O’Byrne v. Burn, 340. Ocean Bank ». Carle, 196. O’Connell v. Baltimore Co., 303, 317, 331, 333, 379. O’Connor ov. Adams, 308, 320, 365. o. Auditor, 398. 2. Boston Co., 236, 241, 269. | | ». Haslem, 129, 159. v. Layton, 49. O'Donnell v. Allegheny Co., 288, 290, 301, 312, 381, 353. v. Baltimore Co., 306. v. Rodiger, 75. o. Segar, 95. o. Sweeney, 55. O'Flaherty v. Union Co., 238. O'Keefe v. Chicago Co., 248, O’Mara v. Hudson Co., 270. O'Neil v. Percival, 169. v. R. R. Co., 321. O’Rorke v. Union Pacific Co., 321. Offut o. Early wine, 88. Ogden v. Blydenburg, 176. v. Gledewell, 196, TABLE OF CASES CITED. Lxiii Ohio Co. ». Anderson, 279. v. Collarn, 317, 822, 334, 376, 382. o. Davis, 279. v. Dunbar, 224, 275. ». Hammersley, 324, 335, 355, 366. »v. Selby, 210. o. Shanefelt, 255. v. Stratton, 235. v. Tindall, 318, 316, 317, 324, 332, 335, 355, 367, 375, 385, vo. Winn, 162. Olcott v. Tioga Co., 110. Oldfield ». Harlem Co., 241. Oliver ». Gray, 118, 119, 133. o. Grimball, 183. Olson v. Clyde, 308, 347, 352, 363. Omery v. Fowler, 195. Oppenheimer v. N.S Ex Co., 216. Orange Bank v. Brown, 214. ». Travor, 178, 185. Orderman v. Lawson, 66. Organ ». Allison, 17. Ormond »v. Central Co., 256. Ormsbee v. Providence Co., 268. Orr ». Union Co., 33. Osborne 2. Baker, 67. v Knox Co., 310, 344, 384. * 9, Morgan, 301, 370. 2. Van Houton, 29. Oswalt ». Moore, 178. Otey ». Hoyt, 49. Otis v. Janesville, 245. Ott o. Oyer, 96. Outlaw o. Hurdle, 49. Overton v. Freeman, 8. Owen ». Adama, 195. v. Cawley, 175, 187. o. Perry, 37. v. Richmond Co., 234. Owens ». Johnson, 172. Oxley ». Ikleheimer, 169, 180, Ozman ». Reynolds, 162, Pack v. Mayor, 2. Packard v. Richardson, 69. Paddock 0. Colly, 113. Paducah 9. Hoehl, 2381. Pagan v. Wylie, 34, Page v. Danaher, 20, 44, v. Homans, 51. v. Smith, 279, 280, 358. Paine 0. Drew, 108. 0. Edsell, 19. Painter ». Drum, 96. ». Pittsburg, 12. Palmer ». Butler, 136, 143. ». City of Lincoln, 11. . Dodge, 127, 148. Forbes, 285. . Grand Junction Co., 222. v. Missouri Co., 257. v. Rankin, 173. v. Shaw, 108. Pancoast »v. Addison, 104. Paramore ov. Lindsey, 18, 28, 48. Pardington v. South Wales Co., 222. SS os -Pares »v. Pares, 94. Park v. Kleeber, 172. Parke ». Blackiston, 88. v. O’Brien, 225. Parker o. Adams, 228. 2. Butterworth, 124. v. Hall, 165. v. Kane, 395. v. Kelly, 106. . Merrill, 123. . Moore, 23, 126. . Parker, 172, 183. . Pitts, 55. . Shuford, 135. . St. Paul Co., 326, 835. . Wilmington Co., 267. v. Wimberly, 184. Parkhurst v. Johnson, 321. v. McGraw, 81, 95. Parks v. Alta Co., 405. Parrott o. Parrott, 393, @e@eeseesese es lxiv Parry v. Marsh, 321. v. Nicholson, 45, 46. ». Spikes, 68. Parshall v. Shirts, 394. Parson v. R. R. Co., 149. Parsons ». Parsons, 394. Paske ». Ollet, 102. Pasley o. Freeman, 5. Passmore v. Western Co., 404, 406. Passumpsic Bank ». Goss, 402. Patehin o. Swift, 70. Pate v. People, 47. Patmore v. Haggard, 66. Patrick v. Littell, 177, 182. Patridge v. Stocker, 178. Patterson . Clyde, 200. v. D’Auterive, 63. v. Cobb. 155. v. Gaines, 84. v. Pittsburgh Co., 311, 370. a R. R. Co., 227. i‘ v. Yeaton, 394. Patton v. Kinsman, 170. v. Merchants Bank, 170, 184. v. St. Louis, 257. v. Western Co., 374. Paty ». Davis, 187. Paul ». Stackhouse, 69. Paulding »v. U. 8., 400, 402. Paulk vo. Wolfe, 169, 185. Paulmier v. Erie Co., 306. Pave v. Mahone, 109. Pavey ». Pavey, 49. Pawlet v: Rutland Co., 12. Payne v. Burnham, 188. v. Chicago Co., 248, 246, 2778, 382. v. Gardiner, 127. v. Soloman, 82, 85, 96. v, Troy Co., 266. Peachey ». Rowland, 8. Peake v. Conlan, 115. v. La Baw, 174, 187. Pearce v, Atwood, 60, TABLE OF CASES CITED. Pearce ». House, 166. Pear] ». Allen, 52. Pearson ». Darrington, 134. Peart v. Grand Trunk Co., 268. Pease v. Barnett, 17. o. Chicago Co., 298, 299, 304, 316, 379. ». Hurst, 122. Peavey v. Robbins, 63. Peck ». Botsford, 116, 132, 154, 157. v. Callaghan, 49. . Gilmer, 196. N. Y. Co., 263. . North Co., 212. . Pease, 108. . Randall, 166. . Weekes, 198. . Wheaton, 156. Pell o. Ball, 101. Pelzer v. Campbell, 186. Penacook Bank ». Sanborn, 187. Pence v. Arbuckle, 37. v. Chicago Co., 265. Pendergast 0. Adams Ex. Co., 206. o. Foley, 164. vo. N. Y. Co., 241. Penley 0. Waterhous, 107. Penn ». Buffalo Co., 228. v. Whitehead, 170, 184. Pennock ». Freeman, 64. Pennoyer »v. David, 149. Pennsylvania Co. ». Ackerman, 267. v. Beale, 267. v. Bentley, 232, 267. v. Berry, 208. o. Bock, 239. o. Connell, 201. v. Fortney, 267. o. Foster, 171, 183. v. Frena, 264. v. Galentine, 227. 2. Henderson, 337, ' 350. es eseseeeese TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixv Pennsylvania Co. ». Hickman, 49. v. Hope, 362. v. James, 239. v. Kelley, 239. v. Kerr, 262. v. Leslie, 338. ». Lewis, 241. v. Mason, 313, 359. ». McKee, 49. vo. McTighe, 232. ». Price, 337, 350. ov. Righter, 249, 270, 273. v. Roney, 248. v. Rudel, 264. v. Schwarzenber- ger, 202, 208, 214. v. Sloan, 110. v. State, 265. v. Watchter, 295, 317, 822, 380, 338, 376, 382, v. Watson, 254. v. Webber, 232, 271. v. Whitehead, 184. ». Woodworth, 820, 834. v. Yerger, 254. Penny »v. Brice, 167. Pentland v. Stokes, 164. Pentz v. Simonson, 174. , People ». Bostwick, 38, 400. o. Bull, 191. v, Cantine, 85. v. Christman, 85. ». Cline, 48. e. Draper, 191. v. Dubois, 190, 191. v. French, 191, 192. v. Haske]l, 190. v. Hunt, 190. », Jansen, 399. v. Manistee, 192, . ee ee ** * People v. Marion, 95. v. McHatton, 398. v. Minck, 24, 45. v. Morrell, 190. 0. Murphy, 195. v. Oregon, 35. v. Raymond, 191. v. Spooner, 48. v. Van Gasken, 190. v. Van Vard, 190. 2. Whitlock, 190. Peoples v. Evening News, 90. Peoria Co. v. Lane, 275. Peoria v. Stillman, 263, 272, 273. Pepper ». State, 402. Pequawket Bridge v. Mathers, 14. Perean v. Frederick, 39. Pereira v. Central Co., 208, 209. Perham o. Raymal, 122, 139. Perigo v. Chicago Co., 346. Perkins v. Bennington, 155. v. Corbin, 191. ». Davis, 107. ». Eastern Co., 228. v. Elliott, 174. » Jones, 56. v. Perkins, 74. v. Portland Co., 205. v. Rogers, 119. v. Rowland, 186. v. Sterne, 161. Perley v. Eastern Co., 251. Perminter v. McDaniel, 37, 38. ‘Perry v. Adams, 283. ». Jackson, 110. v. Patterson, 400. ». Southern Co., 255. vo. Wagner, 118. Persons ¥. Jones, 64. Peschel v. Chicago Co., 825, 326, 336, 351, 363. Peters v. Dunells, 161. v. New Orleans Co., 224. Peterson 2, Ellicott, 160. lxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Peterson v. Whitebreast Co., 295, 314, 325, 326, 335, 856, Petit . Fritz, 172. Pettes 0. Bingham, 75, 102. Pettingill o. Pettingill, 159. Petty o. Grisard, 173, 187. Pevean v. Frederick, 23. v. Pharos, 198. Phelps v. Hartwell, 74. Phettiplace v. Sayles, 94. Phifer v. Barnhart, 392. Philadelphia Bank ». Officer, 196. Philadelphia Co ». Anderson, 270. ! v. Boyer, 232, 248, 267. s Carr, 271. v. Davis, 383. v. Derby, 289, 348, 369, 378. ». Hendrickson, 258, 260. . Hogeland, 244. Killips, 272. Long, 239. . Lehman, 58, 222. . Maryland, 338, 349, 365. . Schertle, 321. v. Shultz, 254, 255, 258. vo. Spearin, 197, 239. v. Steam Tow Boat, 57. ». Troutman, 270. Philipps v. Innes, 58. Phillipps v. Winslow, 285. Phillips o. Allen, 84. ». Beall, 157. v. Chicago Co., 299, 327, 388, 349, 365. v, Graves, 177, 182. ». Mahan, 131. v Mayor, 191. v N. O. R, R. Co., 207, esegse s Phillips v. Peters, 158. ». Phillips, 159. v. State, 50. Philo 2. Illinois Co., 387. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 174. Piatt ». Vattier, 103. Picard v. Hine, 167. Pickard ». Smith, 8. Pickett o. Leonard, 127, 187, 145, 146. v. Atlas Co., 344, 347, 360, 362. v. King, 118, 183. v. Pipkin, 94. Piedmont Co. v. Columbia Co., 209. Pierce v. Emery, 284. v. Getchell, 63. v. Northey, 50. v. Patridge, 283. ». Zimmerman, 156. Piercey v. Pierceey, 15, 20, 24. Piggott 0. Eastern Counties Co., 250, 262. Pike ». Megoun, 63. v. Vigers, 94. ». Warren, 123. Pinckney »v. Trans Co., 406. Pinkerton v. Bailey, 120, 140. Pinkney v. Western Co., 404, 405. Piper v. Wade, 82, 100. Pipes v. Hardesty, 15, 23. Pipkin v. Hewlett, 166. Pippin ». Wesson, 171, 177. Piquegno ». Chicago Co., 303. Pitcher v. Patrick, 22. Pitt v. Wooten, 126, 149, 157. Pittam o. Foster, 187. v. McClellan, 165. Pitts v. Hunt, 139. Pittsburg Co. ». Adams, 320, 334, 355. ». Andrews, 248. v. Bolner, 276. ». Bumstead, 235, 240. v. Caldwell, 239. FABLE OF CASES CITED. an Pittsburg Co. 0. Campbell, 251, 275. ». Devinney, 297, 302, 304, 318. . Grier, 249. Gundt, 274. . Hannon, 276. Heiskell, 282. eseeges ». Hunt, 276. o. Jones, 255, 257. v. Leech, 325, 331, 835, 356, 364. ». Lewis, 299, 814, 875. 0. Martin, 264. v. Morton, 205. v. Nelson, 255. ». Noel, 226, 251, 257. v. Pearson, 239, 241. ». Powers, 287, 288, 318, 322, 362. v. Ranney, 297, 300, 318, 315, 381. ». Vining, 226, 236, 264. 278. ». Wright, 227. Pitzer v. Burns, 163. Planters Bank ». Irwin, 22. Platt ». Hawkins, 169. Plaster 2. Illinois Co., 227. Pledger v. Esterling, 165. Plowes v. Bossey, 84. Plummer 2, Eastern Co., 268. v. Webb, 2. Plyler v. Elliott, 29. Plymouth Co. v. Colwell, 284. Poeppers v. Missouri Co., 252. Point Co. v. Keep, 195. Poirier . Carroll, 312. Police Jury 0. Duvalde, 142. Pollen v. James, 171. Pollock ». Eastern Co., 272. 2. Maison, 161. Henderson, 342, 371. 383, 384. v. Hixon, 251, 255, 257. lxvii Polston ». Lee, 88. Pomeroy 2. Ins. Co., 178. », Manhattan Co., 181. Pond »v. Carpenter, 178, 181. Pontius ». People, 48. Ponton v. W. & W. Co., 297, 314. Pool v. Chicago Co., 808, 347, 382. ». Dicas, 194. Poole v. Richardson, 77. Pope »v. Askew, 49. v. Fort, 69, o. Risley, 148. Poppleton v. Nelson, 102. Porcher v. Daniel, 183. Porter v. Chicago Co., 198. 2. Blood, 180, 142. v. Doby, 24. v. Haley, 171. v. Judson, 195. v. Mount, 102, 176. Porterfield v. Clark, 103, 104. Potez v. Glassop, 129. Pott v. Cleg, 148. Potter v. Bunnell, 279. v. Chicago Co., 238, 249, 387. v. Potter, 74. ». Sutter Co., 235. v. Stransky, 164. ». Warner, 249. Potts ». House, 74. v. Whitehead, 1938. Poucher v. N. Y. Co., 210, 223. Pourcelly v. Lewis, 48. Powell v. Divett, 41. v. Murray, 175. v. Pennsylvania Co , 225. v. Powell, 72. Powers v. R. R. Co., 290. v. Russell, 178. ». Southgate, 125, 138. Prairie v. Worth, 399. Prather ». Michigan Co., 98. ». Vineyard, 66. Pratt o. Huggins, 163. 5 645 |xvili Pratt ». R. R. Co., 209. ». Rawsom, 52. Prentice ». Decker, 214. Prentiss ». Boston, 229. Preston v. Hull, 36. Prevost v. Gratz, 15. Price v. Hannibal Co., 320. v. Highland Light, 2. v. King Philip Mills, 359. v. Price, 112. v. Torrington, 194. Prideaux v. City, 233, 245, 246. Priest v. Cone, 178. Prince George Co. v. Burgess, 281. Prince v. Skillen, 190. Pringle v. Chambers, 24, 42. v. Pennsylvania Co., 225. Printups v. Mitchell, 22. Pritchard v. Draper, 147. Prosser v. Rowe, 89. Pryce v. Security Ins. Co., 99. Pullen v. Hutchinson, 44. ». Shaw, 18, 43. Pulliam». Withers, 23. Purcell ». Parks, 192. ». Purcell, 91. Purdon v. Purdon, 117, Purdy v. Austin, 118, 120. Purl vo. St. Louis Co., 266. Puryear v. Puryear, 168. v. Reese, 76, 77. Puterbaugh »v. Reasor, 245. Putnam ». Clark, 18, 24, 44, 46, 84. Putnem v. Wadley, 47. Putney v. Farnham, 68. Pyne v. Chicago Co., 308, 347, 387. Pzolla v. Michigan Co., 229. Quaid ». Cornwell, 307, 356. Quaife v. Chicago Co., 99. Quarles v. Governor, 400. Quimby »v. Vanderbilt, 201, 206. Quincey Mining Co. v. Kitts, 342. Quynn ». Carroll, 154. Racouillat 2. Sansevain, 178. TABLE OF OASES CITED. aie ea 22 Radford ». Carwile, 170, 184. Ragan v. Ragan, 74. v. Simpson, 188. Ragsdale v.'Memphis Co., 304, 315. v. Robinson, 36. Rail v. Potts, 63. Rainbolt vo. Eddy, 32. Ramsay v. McCue, 24. Randall v. Baltimore Co., 294, 314, 316, 319, 373, 381, 389. v. Elwell, 284. vo. North Western Co., 233. v. Wilkins, 108. Randleson v. Murray, 8, 12. Randolph ». Loughlin, 48. Random ». Toby, 112. Rankin v. Blackwell, 24, 26, 45. v. Merchants Co., 310, 346, 369. v. Turney, 119. vo. West, 178. Ransier ». Minneapolis Co., 296, 314. Ransome »v. Christian, 88. Rapson »v. Cubitt, 8. Rathburn ». North Central Co., 110. Ratliff v. Trout, 68. Ranch ». Lloyd, 239. Rawlings v. Rickards, 194. Rawson v. Holland, 206. v. Pennsylvania Co., 214. Raymond 2. Burlington, 228. ». Simenson, 64. Raynor v. Wilson, 394. Rea v. Missouri, 94. Read ». Edwards, 163. v. Great Co., 4. ». Hurst, 118, 131. ». Wilkinson, 117. Reading Co. ». Latshaw, 254. v. Ritchie, 267. v. Weiser, 253. Reading Iron Works v. Devine, 313, 359. Reavis v. Reavis, 393. ®ABLE OF GASES OiTHD. jxix Redfield ». Shaver, 401. Redlick v. Doll, 32, 33. Redmond ». Collins, 165. Redpath ». Western Co., 406. Reed v. Evans, 69. v. Johnson, 146. v. Kemp, 28. v. Noxon, 81. vo. Puys, 187. ». Roark, 14, 28. . St. Louis Co., 199, 219. Reedie v. London Co., 8, 9. Rees v. Overbaugh, 39. Reese v. Biddle, 342, 354. ». Cochran, 169. v. Reese, 49. Reeves ». Corell, 134. v. Graffling, 86. ' Regan ». Howe, 894. Regina »v. Victoria, 283. Regnier ». Ins. Co., 98. Reid 0. Hodgson, 50. o. Lamar, 172, 183. 2. McNaughton, 158. v. State, 61. vo. U. §. Ex. Co., 207. Reigne v. Despartes, 120, 121, 156. Reinhart » Miller, 22. Relyea v. New Haven Co., 198. Remfelt ». Clemens, 172. Renn v. Lamond, 75. Renshaw ». Stafford, 154. Renwick vo. N. Y. Co., 270. Reppert v. Colvin, 127. Rex v. Gordon, 19. v. Inhs. Hardwick, 139. Reynolds v. Brandon, 183. v. Dechaums, 402. v. Hamilton, 155. ». Hindman, 227. ». Johnson, 111. v. N. Y. Co., 266. 9. Rowley, 126. vo. R. RB. Co., 280. Rhine v. Robinson, 197. Rhode ». Alley, 131. Rhodes ». Garrish, 107. ». Gibbs, 182, 186, 188. ». Green, 81. ». Smethurst, 158, 167. Rice ». Burt, 64. ». King, 313. o. R. R. Co., 177, 182. v. White, 65. Riceman v. Havemeyer, 2380. Rich v. Bowker, 76. v. Niagara Bank, 138. Richards ». O’Brien, 170. ». Turner, 87. Richardson ». Burleigh, 85. ». Canada Co., 87, 97. v. Chicago Co., 225. ». Hardwick, 194. ». Jubnson, 50. ». Newcomb, 52. ». Richardson, 104. 2. Thomas, 144. Richers v. Helcamp, 15. Richmond 2. Aiken, 163. Richmond Co. v. Davis, 37. ». Medley, 255, 258. Richmond Man’g Co. v. Davis, 28. Ricker v. Freeman, 244. Ricketts 0. N. Y. Co., 192. Riddell v. Johnson, 75. Riden ». Frion, 111. Rigdway ». English, 187. ». Bank, 196. Riest ». Goshen, 226. Rifener v. Bowman, 394 Rigby v. Norwood, 66 Rigg ». Milton, 74. Riggan v. Green, 72. Riggins ». Brown, 195. Riker v. Hooper, 100. Riley v. Norton, 89. v. Pierce, 189. »v. State Line, 11, 306, 338, 366. Ixx TABLE OF CASES CITHD. Ringgold v. Newkirk, 68. Rings v. Brooks, 134, 146. Rippey ». Miller, 92. Riser vo. Snoddy, 155. Ritch o. Hyatt, 168. Ritterhouse v. Tel. Co., 405. Ritz v. Pennsylvania Co., 225. Rivereau 0. St. Ament, 195. Rixford v. Smith, 224. Robarts v. Tucker, 33. Robbins ». Farley, 116, 135. Roberage ». Burnham, 87. Roberts v. Chicago Co., 298, 346, 374. v. Riley, 219. v. Rogers, 155. v. Sykes, 141. o. Unger, 15. vo. West, 169, 181. Robertson v. Bruner, 171. v. Hay, 39. v. Miller, 50. ». Terre Haute Co., 295, 318, 380, 335, 356, 377, 380. Robinson ». Burton, 117. v. Cone, 239, 240. v. Dart, 172, 183. v. Fitchburg Co., 229. ». Houston Co., 297. v. Imperial Co., 110. v. Myers, 15, 24, 44. ov. N. Y. Co., 229, 244, 246. v. O'Neal, 180. ». Phoenix Co., 14. ». Randall, 86. v. Reed, 42, 44. v. Trofitter, 174. v. Western Co., 231. ». White, 191. ° ». Wilburn, 183. Rochereau v. Hensa, 219. Rochester Co. v. Brick, 325, 835, 856. Rockford Co. v. Bryan, 273. v. Delaney, 235. Rockford Co. 0. Rogers, 255. Roe v. Archbishop of York, 898. Roesner v. Herman, 358. Rodman ». Michigan Co , 308, 305, 319, 379. Rogers v. Blackwell, 72. . Boyd, 169. . Hatch, 106. . Hinton, 171, 177. . Ludlow, 176, 318, 359. Mobile Co., 279. . Overton, 227. . Ritter, 50. . Rogers, 155, 159, 395. Shaw, 29. Smith, 171, 183. . State, 50. . Southern Co., 136, 143. . Thomas, 76. Vorbrergh, 24. v. Walker, 72. v. Ward, 174. o. Waters, 118. ». W.U. T. Co., 59. Rogstad v. St. Paul Co., 270. Rohback ». Pacific Co., 338, 375. Rohrback 2. Ins. Co., 176. Roller v. Sutter St. Co., 268. Rome Oo. o. Dodd, 247. Rood »v. Willie, 178. Roof v. R. R. Co., 238. Roosevelt ». Mark, 138, 159. Root o. R. R. Co., 209. Roscoe ». Hale, 187, 144. Rose v. Boston Co., 296, 362. ». Stephens, 230. Roseboom 9. Billington, 118, 129, 131. eseseesese 88 8828 8 eee Rosenfield v. Peoria Co., 220. Rosenthal v. Walker, 64. Ross v. Boston Co., 257, 259, 262.. v. Chicago Co., 304, 315, 379. v. Dysert, 18. v. Gould, 18. TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxxi Ross v. Mitchell, 161. o. N. Y. Co., 2538, 301, 304, 312, 332, 345, 372, 378, 379. o. Rees, 109. v. Ross, 148, 146. v. Tunis, 285. Rosser v. McGolly, 61. Rothschild v. Am. Co., 98. Rourke v. White Moss Colliery, 289, 306, 338, 366. Routledge v. Grant, 193. Rowan ». Little, 394. Rowe v. Atwater, 180. ». Thompson, 111. Rowell v. R. R. Co., 258, 259. Rowley v. Jewett, 40. Rowt 0. Kyle, 50. R. R. Co. o. Barrett, 221. ». Brown, 275. v. Campbell, 221. 0. Conrad, 307. o. Fort, 289, 320, 321, 340, 372. v. Gladmon, 230, 288. ». Graham, 265. ». Horst, 230. | v. Houston, 268, 271, 272. o. Jones, 307. ov. Keary, 382. v. Leach, 304. v. Lockwood, 210. 0. Man’g Co., 212. v. Medley, 255. v. Miller, 310, 340. v. Norton, 249. v. Pratt, 204. ». Price, 337. v. Renz, 370. ». Shearer, 230. o. Stockard, 204. o. Stout, 268. ». Sullivan, 300, 343. v. Walker, 249. v. Webb, 329, 330. R. R. Cos. v. James, 288. Ruck 0. Williams, 278, 358. Rucker o. Frazier, 117. v. Supervisors, 191, 192. Ruckmaboge ». Mottichund, 108. Ruddel v. Folsom, 128. Ruff . Bull, 166. Ruffner v. Cincinnati Co., 258. Ruggles o. Keeler, 108. Runals v. Harding, 112. Runnion ». Crane, 20, 23, 46. Runyan ». Price, 76. Runyon ». Central Co., 266, 278. Rusch v. City of Davenport, 227. Rush 2. Barr, 64. v. Fales, 158, 159. v. Megee, 76. Rushville v. Poe, 227. Russ v. Wingate, 182. Russell v. Freer, 400. v. Gass, 117. ». Hudsen Co., 305, 312. v. People, 187. 0. Peyton, 45. v. Stewart, 53. vo. Werntz, 197. Rutland Co. 2. Bliss, 107. Ryan ». Bagaley, 310, 341, 342, 353, 871. . Chicago Co., 287, 288, 289, 801, 317. ». Cumberland Co., 304, 317, 331, 333, 379. ». Curran, 10, 11. ». Missouri Co., 200, 221. v. N. Y. Co., 262. Sacramento v. Dunlap, 399. Sage v. Hawley, 107. ». Wilcox, 68. Sager v. Portsmouth Co., 213, 219, 222, e St. Clair v. Eadie, 288, 246. St. John v. Garrow, 134. y. Southern Ex. Co., 202. lxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED. St. John v. Van Santword, 206. St. Joseph Co. v. Chase, 257. St. Louis Co. v. Britz, 294, 300, 313, 315, 317, 367, 381. . Cleary, 224. . Curl, 276, 277. . Dorman, 224. Dunn, 272. Freeman, 235, 241. Gaines, 294. . Harper, 326, 384. . Matthias, 226, 273. . Montgomery, 251. . Piper, 204, 224. . St. Louis Co., 204. . Shackelford, 317, essseeeeeseee 331, 882. v. Valarious, 321. v. Weaver, 231, 318. v. Wright, 268. St. Paul ». Kirby, 231. Salem Bank ». Gloster Bank, 52. Sally o. Sandifer, 395. Salmon ». Delaware Co., 254, 258. Salter . Utica Co., 270. Sampson ». Williamson, 182, 188. Sanders ». Barlow, 68. ». Getchell, 63. o. Reister, 231. o. Robertson, 182, 155. Sanderson ». Frazier, 231. ». Jones, 169. Sanford v. Sanford, 166. Sangster v. Love, 161. ». Mazzaredo, 147. Sands v. Gelston, 118. v. St. John, 120. Sargent 2. French, 178. Sartor 0. Bohinger, 50. Satterly o. Morgan, 316, 317, 338, 373. Satterthwaite o. Abercrombie, 106. Saulisbury 0. Weaver, 169, 186. Savage v. Scott, 107, Savannah Co. v. Barber, 226. Sawyer 2. Peters, 392. v. Rutland Co., 389, 366. Saxon v. Whitaker, 75. Sayre v. Reynolds, 18, 24, 27. Scammon »v. Chicago Co., 11. Schaafer v. Tithian, 392. Schaefert 0. Chicago Co., 265. Schafroft 0. Amos, 170, 181, 185, 186. Scheff v. City of Huntingdon, 233. Schientz 7. McManamay, 38. Schierhold v. North Co., 235, 240. Schiett v. Harge, 394. Schindil ». Gates, 128, 139. Schlatterer 0. Nickodemus, 186. Schmidt v. Blood, 391. v. Milwaukee Co., 239. v. N. Y. Co., 89, 98, 98. Schmucker v. Sibert, 134, 148, 161. Schneider o. Evans, 208. Schnell a. Toomer, 95. Schoemaker 2. Benedict, 150. Schofield v. Chicago Co., 263, 268. Scholey v. Walton, 157. Schooner Norway ». Jansen, 362. Schoneman ». Fegley, 127. Schroeder v. Chicago Co., 311, 349, 378. ». Hudson Co., 206. Schuff v. Ransom, 72. Schultz v. Chicago Co., 325, 336, 348, 377. Schum v. Pa. Co., 271. Schwartz v. A. & P. Co., 406. o. Herrenkind, 23. Schweins v. McKie, 391 Scothorn 9. South Co., 202. Scott ». Atwell, 167. ». Bush, 67. ». Home Ins. Co., 98. ». Jones, 158. v. Sweeney, 310, 340, 0. Walker, 20, v. Ware, 162, TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxiii Scovel ». Gill, 142. Scruggs 0. Baltimore Co., 215. Scudder v. Woodbridge, 287, 288. Seabrook v. Brady, 169. Seals ». Edmondson, 230. Searight v. Craighead, 127, 150. Searle v. Lindsay, 327. Sears v. Brink, 67. v. Wigate, 199. Seaver ». Boston Co., 801, 312, 331. 345, 371, 378, 383. Secord ov. St. Paul, 230. ‘Seely v. Blair, 90. ‘ v. People, 401. Segond ». Garland, 170, 181, 185. Seifert ». Jones, 170. ; Seig ». Acord, 153, 156, 158. Sellars ». Richmond Co., 261. Semmes o. Magruder, 154, 157. Semon ». People, 85. Semple o. British Bank, 186, 187. Sessions v. Bacon, 182. v. Jones, 401. Sewell 0. McVay, 141. Sexton o. Fleet, 176. Seybolt s. New York Co., 99, 387, 350, 380. Seymore o. Street, 107. Shaber v. St. Paul Co., 269. Shacklett ». Polk, 171, 172, 183. Shaffer 0. Shaffer, 128. Shakelford 0. Douglass, 119. Shamokin v. Livermore, 284, 285. Shank 9. Butsch, 51. Shanck v. Northern Co., 311, 313, 318. Shannon ». Bartholomew, 170. 2, Fox, 50. Shanny v, Androscoggin Mills, 288, 298, 363. Sharp 2. Glushing, 270. 2. U. 8., 400. Sharpe v. Orme, 14. Sharpley o. Wyman, 269. * aa es Sharpless v. Westchester, 172. Shattock ». Shattock, 167. Shaw 2. Gardner, 199. v. Jewett, 230. v. McCombs, 61. v. Newell, 118. ». York Co., 211. Sheehan v. N. Y. Co., 322, 862, 374. Sheehy v. Adcrene, 70. Shelby v. Burtis, 182, 188. v. Guy, 103. Sheld ». Moran, 357. Shelden of Robinson, 199. Sheldon ». Betram, 196. v. Butler, 67. ». Hawes, 23. ». Hudson Co., 81, 253. Shelton v. Cocke, 125, 149. Shepherd v. Maylor, 199. Shepley v. Waterhouse, 123, 148. Sheridan v. Brooklyn Co., 244, 245, 246. Sherman v. Rochester Co., 296, 304, 313, 315. Sherwood v. Morrison Bank, 81. ». Sutton, 64. Shield o. Edinburgh Co., 8. Shields v. Washington Co., 406. ». West, 18. . v. Yonge, 2. Schinn v. Tucker, 82. Shirley v. Black, 69. Shnyder v. Nobles, 172. Shoemaker v. Benedict, 127. Shonk ». Brown, 183. Shorb v. Kinzie, 51. Short v. Battle, 169, 180, 189. Shorter v. Nelson, 176. Shoulty ». Miller, 88. Shreve v. Joyce, 154, 155, 156. v. Shreve, 159. Shriver v. Sioux City Co., 199, 220. Shuerman 2. Missouri Co., 232. Shuey v. U. 8., 58. Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Shulman ». Fitzpatrick, 169. Shultz »v. Astley, 31. o. Pacific Co., 97. v. Pennsylvania Co., 267. Shuwood ». Sutton, 64. Sibert ». Wilder, 134. Sibilrud ». Minn. Co., 251, 255. Sibley v. Fisher, 19. ». Lumbert, 128, 142. v. Phelps, 130. 9. St. Paul Co., 98. Sichel ». Connello, 120. Sierners v. Kleeburg, 170. Sigfried v. Levan, 37. Sigler v. Platt, 127.~ Sigourney v. Drury, 124. Silman ». Silman, 125. Silver Valley Co. ». Fall, 81. Silvers o. Nerdlinger, 10. Simmonds v. New York Co., 252. Simmons 2. Ins. Co., 99. Simms ». Herring, 37. Simon vo. Fung Schuey, 212, 218. Simpson 2. Davis, 39, 42, 46. v. Hast Tennessee Co., 252. ». Hand, 248, 245. v. Nichols, 56. v. Stackhouse, 24. Sims 2. Radcliff, 120. Sinclair o. Jackson, 86, 92, 93. Singer Co. v. Harned, 178, 185. Singleton v. East. Counties, 237. v. South Western Co., 275. Sioux v. Finlayson, 321. Sioux Co. v. Stout, 238, 241. Sirrine ov. Briggs, 28. Sissons v. Bickstell, 108. Siter v. McClanachan, 188. Skelton v, London Co., 263. Skinner ». Hall, 205. Slater v. Jewett, 296, 304, 822, 328, 831, 884, 362, 374, 378, 379. v. Lawson, 188. Slatterry », R. R. Co,, 335, Slatterry v. Toledo Co., 295, 330, 355, 363, 373. Slaughter v. Glenn, 178, 182. Slaymaker ». Wilson, 49. Slee v. Bloom, 2838. Sleigh v. U. 8., 192. Slim v. Great N. R. Co., 212. Sloan v. Central Co., 279, 281. ». Gilbert, 89. ». Maxwell, 76. v. Summers, 196. v. Stanley, 45. Sloman »v. Cox, 41. Slosson v. Burlington Co., 228, 256, 259. Sluby v. Champlin, 118. Sly v. Edgley, 8. ; Small v. Chicago Co., 258, 257, 259. v. Clewley, 26, 99, 391. Smart ». Foster, 183. Smedis v. Brooklyn Co., 270. Smidt v. Postel, 178. Smilie v. Biffle, 165. Smith ». Allen, 176. v. Atchison Co., 236, 241. v. Bartram, 104, », Battens, 129. . Bishop, 65. . Br. Bank, 94. Burlington, 387. . Caldwell, 125, 189. . Cockrell, 398. . Com., 399. Combs, 279. Coon, 187, 146. . Croom, 101. Crooker, 14, 36. . De La Garza, 107. . Dickinson, 36. . Dunbar, 15. . Hason, 14. . Haston, 232. . Fellows, 40. . Fenner, 50. eeeees seesceeeeeeee TABLE OF CASES CITED. Smith »v. Flint & Potter, 296, 300, 303, 314, 815, 328, 829, 330, 379, 381. Freeman, 66. Hannibal Co., 255, 257. Hestonville Co., 239. Hill, 167. Horn, 212. Ide, 70. Irwin, 132. Kay, 97. Lawrence, 111. Leper, 112. London Co., 250, 254. Mace, 41. McGowan, 15, 24, 40, 394. Mayo, 160. Memphis Co., 316, 333, 378. Moberly, 401. Moore, 53. Nashville Co., 249. - Newby, 108. New Haven Co., 224. N. Y. Co., 209, 316, 334, 387, 339, 343, 366, 373. N. C. Co., 217, 219. O’Connor, 239. Oxford Co., 289, 296, 314, 321, 341, 342. . Paythress, 169. Peoria, 35, 401. Poole, 146. . Potter, 296, 314. Porter, 159. . Richmond, 120, 121. R. R. Co., 307. Ryan, 127, 138, 142. St Lawrence, 234. Sims, 117, 128, 130. Sioux City, 325, 331, 341. . Smith, 28, 76, 82, 91, 99, 244. . Steamboat Co., 196. . Steele, 307, 308, 347, 356. . Thompson, 168, 181. sesssesgesssesseepeee8eee¢ sss sfsssss8ssee8e8 ixxv Emith »v. U.S8., 40. v. Walton, 48. v. Washington City Co., 163. ». Westmoreland, 118, 181. ». Williams, 186. Smithson o. U: S. T. Co., 407. Smoot v. Mayor Co., 280. v. Mobile Co., 329, 380. Smyrl o. Niolen, 200, 221. Snydam ». Beals, 393. Snyder ». Pittsburg Co., 238, 256, 258. ». Van Doren, 32. Solomon 2. Garland, 168. Somers v. Pumphrey, 72. Somerset Co. o. Usaw, 99. Somberger v. Lee, 142. Sorrell ». Jackson, 68. Souden v. Van Rensselaer, 135, 140. South Co. v. Henlein, 198, 215, 220. ». Wood, 208. Southern Ex. Co. v. Armistead, 215. v. Moore, 213. v. Purcell, 212. v. Shea, 203. South West. Co. v. Thornton, 2038. Southwork Bank v. Gross, 20. Souzer v. De. Meyer, 159. * Sparhawk ». Buell, 163. Sparks v. Dawson, 96. v. Pico, 162. Spann ». Baltzel), 195. Spaulding v. Chicago Co., 252. Speake ». U. S., 18. Spears v. Hartley, 162. Speer v. Speer, 392. Spelman ». Fisher, 321. Spencer v. Baltimore Co., 268. ». Illinois, 272. Speyers v. Lambert, 67. Spicer v. Boston Co., 358. Spinette o. Atlas Co., 210. Spitler o. James, 32, 401. Spooner v. Brooklyn Co., 244, ixxvi Sprague v. Shields, 180. v. Smith, 202, 208, 279. Springer v. Hall, 48. Springfield Bank ». Fricke, 29. Spruil v. Cooper, 89. Squire 6. Cent. Park Co., 230. Squires v. New York, 2138. Stackus v. N. Y. Co, 267. Stafford v. Bryan, 118. ». Richardson, 118. Stahl v. Berger, 18, 24, 87. ». Crouse, 188. Staley 0. Hamilton, 169, 186. Stamper v. Temple, 53. Stancil ». Keenan, 74. Standiford o. Wingate, 190. Stanford v. Anderson, 143. Stanley v. Stanton, 64. Stapley v. London Co., 272. Starr v. Lyon, 37. Starry 7. D. & S. W. R. R. Co., 227. State ». Allen, 49. o. Bank, 288. v. Barrow, 51. ov. Berg, 39. ». B. & P. Co., 281. ». Brown, 49. ». Brunst, 190, 191. ». Carleton, 399. », Carr, 52. ». Clark, 52. ». Clinton, 48. ». Cook, 192. »v. Daniels, 63. v. Davis, 190, 191. v. Dews, 190, 192. v. Douglas, 190, 191. v. Fritz, 51. ». Furlong, 107. ». Garton, 401. v. Givens, 47. v. Goff, 58. 2. Harris, 105. ». Hastings, 52, 192. State v. v. v. v. v v. v 0. v. v. v v ®. ® ® v ® %. v. v © . v. v. % v. ® v. v. v v v ® 9 v v v v v v. v. v. v TABLE OF CASES CITED, Hopkins, 52. Humphrey, 69. Jumel, 192. Kelsey, 192. . Knight, 61. . Lamantia, 190. . Lewis, 402. . Lorry, 58. . L. Co., 283. . McClothlen, 85. . McDonald, 62. . Maine Co , 228, 268, 270. . Manchester Co., 266. . Messanore, 191. . Miller, 50. . Nettleton, 51. . Nichols, 85. Pate, 88. Peck, 401. . Pepper, 401. . Phair, 52, 197. Pike, 77. . Porter, 62. . Potter, 401, 402. . Richets, 61. . Rives, 283. . Robb, 62. . Roberts, 399. . Rogers, 85. . Romaine, 84. . Scott, 48. . Shinborn, 52. . Smith, 63. . Stanley, 191. . Staten, 63. . Steele, 192. . Sweeney, 399. . Thompson, 88. Tompkins, 48. Troutman, 141. Ward, 52. Watts, 163. Western Co., 305, 312, 346, 355. TABLE OF CASES CITED. State o. Weston, 192. ». Wilis, 105. State Bank v. Evans, 400. v. Seawell, 108. o. Shaffer, 29. v. Scott, 187. o. Woody, 116, 128. Stead v. Nelson, 180. Steadman v. Western Co., 210. Steamer Nigra v. Cordes, 198. Stearns v. Atlantic Co., 276. v. Stearns, 111, 112. Stebbins 2. Duncan, 81, 97. Steel ». Central Co., 227. v. 8. E. Co., 8. v, Steel, 183, 156, 394. Steele v. Jennings, 114, 125, 138, 150. v. Kinkle, 94. ». Phillips, 89. o. Souder, 126, 139. . Soule, 149. . Spencer, 22. ». Townsend, 215, 220. x] ® Steers 0. Liverpool Co., 199, 210, 219. Stegall v. Stegall, 84. Steinman v. Ewing, 172. o. McWilliams, 89. Stephens ». McCormick, 141. Stephenson »v. Doe, 104. ». Stephenson, 74. Sterrett v. Ball, 197. Stevens ». Armstrong, 11. ». Buffalo, 284, v. Fisher, 108. ». Martin, 13, 18. vo. R. R. Co., 276. o. Van Cleve, 77. Stevenson ». Craig, 188. ». McLean, 193. Steves v. Oswego Co., 267. Stewart ». Connor, 195. v. Foster, 143, 146. ». Garrett, 133. ‘». Jones, 288. Ixxvil Stewart o. Preston, 18. v. Terre Haute Co., 205. Stiles o. Brobst, 14. v. Gersey, 249. v. Lightfoot, 94. Stillwell o. Adams, 173. Stinde v. Goodrich, 101. Stittson v. Hanibal Co., 238, 266. Stock v. Wood, 229. Stockett v. Sasseer, 112, 114. Stockton v. Graves, 23. Stoddard »v. Doane, 137, 144. v. Long Island Co., 210. ». Penniman, 28. v. St. Louis Co., 307, 841, 386. Stokes »v. Saltonstall, 198. Stone ». Cheshire Co., 10. v. Montgomery, 182. Stoner ». Ellis, 14, 18, 28, 42. Storrs v. Utica, 10, 11. Stoval o. State, 85. Stowers ». Blackburn, 126. Strahlendorf v. Rosenthal, 233. Stranger v. Searle, 47. Stratton v. Central Co., 247. Strauss vo. Friend, 186 Strawn 2. Norris, 393. Street Co. v. Bolton, 349, 356. v. Eadie, 245. Stribbling v. Bank, 188. Strickland v. Parker, 284. Stringham 2. Stewart, 309, 339. Strithorst v. Graeme, 108. Strader v. Mullane, 96. Strohn v. Detroit Co., 215. Strong v. McConnell, 128. ». Plaserville, 263. v. Skinner, 175. Strother v. Lucas, 50. Struggle v. U. 8., 102. Stuart v. Foster, 136. Stubbs v. Houston, 76. Stubley v. London Co., 263. Ixxviil Stucke v. Milwaukee Co., 249. Sturges v. Witham, 28. Sturgis 0. Robbins, 253. Sullivan », Holker, 154. v. India Co., 320. v. Kelly, 84. v. Mississippi Co., 295, 314. ». Rudisell, 29. v. Toledo Co., 226, 338. v. Union Pacific Co., 2. Summer v. Jones, 56. Summerhays v. Kansas Co., 294, 300, 313, 315, 881. Summons ». State, 196. Sunster v. Morse, 156. Sunwalt v. Ridgely, 66. Susquehannah Co. v. Bonham, 284. Sutherlin v. Roberts, 182, 150. Sutton v, Burrus, 113. , v. Jervis, 392. v. Kettell, 198. ». Toomer, 41. Svenson v. Atlantic Co., 306, 338, 365, 366. Swails v. Butcher, 88. Swainson v. N. E. Railroad Co., 289, 311, 329, 337, 348, 365, 368. Swan v. Australian Co., 35. v. North British Co., 33. Swartz v. Ballou, 37. Sweeny v. Old Colony Co., 272. ». Smith, 1738. Sweetland ». Illinois Co., 408, 405. Swiester v. Lowell, 51, 52. Swift 0. Castle, 173, 181. Swindler v. Hilliard, 200, 221. Swinney v. Barry, 14. Syme »v. Broughton, 76. Syracuse v. Tolman, 230. Taber v. Delaware Co., 267. Taberrer v. Brentnall, 109. Tabor v. Missouri Co., 266, 273. Taddiken ». Cantrell, 176. Taff o. Hosmer, 74. TABLE OF CASES CITED. Taft v. Adams, 190, 191. Tagart v. Indiana, 108. Talliaferro v. Rolton, 393. Tanner v. Smart, 121. Tappan v. Kimball, 150. Tarbox »v, Eastern Co., 199. Tardos v. Chicago Co., 206. v. Toulon, 219. Tarner v. Walker, 53. Tartle-v. Dunn, 96. Tate v. Clements, 126, 149. ». Tate, 74. Tatum v. Mohr, 80. Taylor v. Ashton, 5. v. Creswell, 76. v. Great Co., 35. ». Harwood, 82, 85, 86. v. Hendrie, 135. ». McDonald, 128. ». Meads, 180. v. Miller, 149. v. Morris, 102. v. Mosley, 19. v. Pratt, 68. ». Ross, 69. v. Shelton, 169. v. Stedman, 120. 0. U.S., 98. . Wilburn, 74. Tazewell v. Whittier, 156. Teessen v. Camblin, 134. Teipler v. Hilsendegan, 229. Telfer v. Northern Co., 266. Terre Haute Co. o. Clark, 226, 264. o. Graham, 248, 264. Territory o. Pyle, 191. Terry vo. Hammonds, 178. v. Hazlewood, 40. Texas Co. v. Capps, 392. v. Carlton, 355. v. Chapman, 271. v. Crowder, 355. v. Ferguson, 204. v. Fort, 204. s TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxix Texas Co. v. Harrington, 316, 338, 359. ». Herbeck, 239. v. Murphy, 2388. ». O'Donnell, 239. », Orv, 281. Texira v. Evans, 34, 36, 37, 401. Thatcher v. England, 53. Thayer v. Boyle, 93. ». Maun, 162. v. St. Louis Co., 295, 308. Themes v. Rembert, 94. Thomas v. Armstrong, 283. v. Black, 108. . Brewer, 107, 188. . Dardun, 390. . Delaware Co., 272. . Folwell, 171, 182. . Hammond, 70. Hunter, 56, 115. . McManus, 205. . Morning Glory, 212, 218. ». Rhymney, 200. v. Thomas, 164. Thomason v. Odum, 108. Thompkins »v. Nicols, 94. Thompson ». Blackwell, 195. v. Caldwell, 149. v. Central Co., 225, 387. v. Chicago Co., 318, 317, 367. eo © ¢ & & eee v. Drymala, 3438, 363. o. Duncan, 231. ». Ela, 188. ». Flint Co., 229. v. Gilreath, 120, 185, 140. o. Hall, 66. v. Hermann, 308, 352. v. Leach, 71. v. Massey, 27. v. Mosley, 45. p. Peter, 138, 158, 154. ». Richards, 127. v, R. R. Co., 282. Thompson v. Thompson, 392. v. Tioga Co., 110. ». Ward, 392. Thornburg v. Masten, 69. Thornton v. lingworth, 119. Thorogood ». Bryan, 242, 248, 244, 245, 247. Thrasher v. Geiger, 169. Thurber v. Harlem Co., 287, 266. Thurman v. Cherokee Co., 278. Thurmond v. Tramwell, 197. Thurston ». Fisher, 105. Thurtell o. Beaumont, 97. Tibeau v. Tibeau, 394. Tiemyer v. Turnquist, 176. Tierney v. Minneapolis Co., 300, 329, 331, 378. Tillinghast v. Nourse, 123, 148. Tillow ». Clinton, 24, 43. Tindal ». Touchberry, 69. Tingley v. Cowgill, 74. Tinn v. Donahue, 115. Tinney v. Boston Co., 323, 373. Tioga Co: v. Blossburg, 109, 110. Tissue v. Baltimore Co., 341, 357, 371. Titford v. Knott, 48. Titus v. Ashe, 133, 138. ». Ginhimer, 285. v. Maybee, 285. Todd ». Lee, 178. Toft v. Stephenson, 1538. Toledo Co. v. Bevin, 226. ». Branagan, 226. ». Cox, 802, 315. v. Frederick, 381. »v. Goddard, 236, 264. ». Ingraham, 290, 298, 311, 370. ». Larman, 251. v. Maxfield, 256. ». Merriman, 208. ». Miller, 235. v. Moore, 289, 319, 829, 330, 359. Ixxx TABLE OF CASES CITED. Toledo Co. v. O’Connor, 287, 288, 290, 812, 317, 328, 333, 375. ». Pindar, 256. ». Rhumbold, 275. v. Wand, 255. Tolman 2. Syracuse Co., 266. Tome »v. Parkerburg Co., 48. Tompkins v. Clay St. Co., 248. Tortle v. Dunn, 96. Town of Albion v. Hetrick, 243. Town of Mt. Vernon v. Dusonchett, 226. Townes v. Ferguson, 153. ». Mead, 106. Townsend ». Ingersoll, 140, 155. v. Lowfield, 98, 94. v. Moss, 402. v. Star Wagon Co., 29. Township ». French, 64. - Tracy v. Keith, 174. Trammel v. Salmon, 135. Trammell v. Hemphill, 195. Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 245. Transportation Co. v. Downer, 218. Travis 0. Brown, 49. Trentham ». Deverill, 129. Trenchard v. Wanley, 93. Trieber v. Stover, 173. Trigg v. Taylor, 20, 33. Trimblestown v. Kemmes, 18. Trish v. Newell, 74. Troewert v. Decker, 55. Trotter v. Erwin, 162. Troughear v. Lower Co., 342, 353, 354, 360. Troupe 2. Smith, 64. Trow v. Glen Cove Co., 48. Trowell v. Castle, 13. Trowsdale v. Anderson, 184. Troxler v. R. & D. Co., 254. True v. International Co., 404, 405. v. Plumly, 61. Trumbull . Gibbons, 76. Trustees v. Hartfleld, 126, 148. ». Misenheimer, 47. Tubb ». Madding, 22. Tucker ». Call, 88. ». Duncan, 263. v. Woods, 1938. Tuckerman v. Hinkley, 56. Tullock v. Dunn, 152, 157. Tully v. Fitchburg Co., 269. Tunney v. Midland Co., 301, 312, 328 881, 836, 345, 381, 383. Tunno »v. Rogers, 197. Tuppo v. Foulkes, 38. Turberville ». Ryan, 36. Turner v. Cheesman, 76. v. Cook, 76. v. Foxhall, 50. v. Great Eastern Co., 380, 337. v. Hannibal Co., 266. v. Hawkeye Co., 403. v. Indianapolis Co., 358. ». Ross, 125, 149. ov. Shearer, 108. Turney v. Dodwell, 129, 142. ». Wilson, 200, 221. Turnpike Co. v. Champney, 63. ov. Field, 64. Turrentine ». R. & D. Co., 234. Turton v. Burke, 68. Tyler ». New York Co., 236, 269. v. Todd, 51. v. Western Co., 404, 406. Tyman vo. Walker, 166. Tyree v. Rives, 22. Tyson v. North Co., 341, 371. o. Smith, 335. Underwood v. Campbell, 69. Union Bank ». Balderwick, 93. v. Coster, 67. ». Foster, 180. v. Knapp, 197. v. Roberts, 39. Union Co. o. Adams, 268, TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxxi Union Co. ». Cuppy, 280. v. Harris, 387. ». Thomason, 387. U.S. v. Chamberlain, 50. v. Craig, 50. ». Darnaud, 51. ». Galbraith, 45. ». Gillis, 62. ». Hartwell, 192. ». Jones, 50. v. Linn, 17. ». Lockman, 80. ». McComb, 195. ». Mitchell, 191. v. Open Boat, 93. ». Prowt, 50. 2. Shuey, 53. 9, Spalding, 39. v. Southern Colorado Co., 81, 99. v. Twenty-Five Cases of Cloths, 98. ». White, 195. v. Wood, 195. U.S. Co. ». Gildersleeve, 220, 403. U. 8. Ex. Co. v. Graham, 220. v. Haines, 208, 216, 316. v. Rush, 205. Upton v. Archer, 35. v. Else, 119. Urbank o. R. R. Co., 271. Utica Ins. Co. ». Bloodgood, 111, 112. Utz o. Utz, 133. Vail v. Meyer, 170. Valentine ». North Co., 219. Valle v. Oberhause, 141. Valtez v. Ohio Co., 316, 360. Van Aernam v. Van Aernam, 84. Van Allen o. Feltz, 158. Van Arsdale v. Joiner, 169. Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 30. Van Bibber ». Bierne, 96. Van Buren v. Webster, 120. * ee KK * ee * Vanderheyden v. Mallory, 175. Vanderplank v. Miller, 245.. Van Doren v. Tjader, 67. Van Dusen »v. Sweet, 72, 73. Van Duser v. Howe, 31. Van Dyke v. Wells, 171. Van Etta v. Evanson, 38. Van Hook v. Simmons, 395. Van Horn 2. Bell, 15, 30. Van Keuren v. Parmalee, 127, 150, 153. Vanlandingham v. Huston, 106. Van Lien v. Scoville, 229. Vann v. Pipkin, 189. Van Riper v. Van Riper, 61. Van Riernsdyk v. Kane, 147. Van Santvoord 2. St. John, 206: Van Sickle v. People, 48. Van Tassel v. State, 85. Vantrain v. St. Louis Co., 298, 350, 376. Van Vechten v. Paddock, 60. Van Wickle v. Manhattan Co., 375. Van Winkle v. 8. C. Co., 198. Van Wyck v. McIntosh, 48. Varner v. Varner, 119. Vaughn » Fowler, 14, 28. ». Hankinson, 130. v. Taff Co., 254, 257. Vaughton v. L. & W. Co., 92. Veiths v. Hagg, 74. Venuci v. Cadematore, 107. Vermont Co. v. Vermont Co., 279. Verner v. Switzer, 200, 214. Vernon ». Vernon, 84. Vernon Co. v. Stewart, 124, 154. Vick vo. N. Y. Co., 312, 345, 378. Vickery ». Kelly, 49. Vicksburg Co. v. Hennessey, 229. Vinal v. Burrill, 124, 148. Vinton »v. Peck, 48. Violett 2. Patton, 32, 68, 70. Viser v. Rice, 36. v. Scruggs, 171, 189. ixxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Visher v. Webster, 29. Vizonneau v. Pegram, 170, 184. Vliet ». Camp, 38. Vogel v. Mayor, 12. Vogle v. Ripper, 28, 40, 41. Vogt v. Ticknor, 178. Von Hemert ». Porter, 108. Vose v. Lancashire Co., 362. Vurchars 0. Dunbar, 173. Wabash Co. v. Brown, 279. ». Century Co., 230. v. Mayer, 226. v. Peyton, 275, 311, 338, 349, 350, 365. v. Rooker, 276. v. Shacklett, 243. Waddell ». Simonson, 310, 353. Waddingham ». Loker, 96. Wadhams ». Society, 175, 182. Wadsworth v. Glynn, 81. Wagner’s Estate, 171. Wain »v. Walters, 66, 68, 69. Wainman ». Kynman, 117. Wainwright v. Hardisty, 180. Wait v. Maxwell, 73. Waite v. Northeastern Co., 237, 240, 242. Wakefield v. Smart, 104, 108. Wakeman »v. Sherman, 135, 136. Walden v. Gratz, 166. Walker v. Bacon, 111. v. Boston Co., 318, 323, 361, 380. v. Butler, 117. ». Campbell Co., 159. ». Cincinnati Co., 190. v. Coover, 172. ». Cruikshank, 154. ». Curtis, 195. ». Duberry, 126. ». Herron, 233. ». McDonald, 67. v. State, 85. vo. Wait, 149. Walker v. Westfield, 233. v. York Co., 211. Wall ». Hill, 73. Wallace v. Coston, 171. ». Harmstadt, 28, 37, 395. ». Hudson, 69. v. Jewell, 28, 29. v. McElery, 45. v. Matthews, 212. ». Townsend, 193. v. Wallace, 14. Waller v. South Eastern Co., 327, 336, 375, 380, 382. Walsh v. Mayer, 126. v. St. Paul Co., 308. Waltermeyer v. Westover, 163. Walters ». Chicago, 238. v. Kraft, 125. v. Short, 20, 28, 48, 46. Walton v. N. Y. Co., 357, 377. v. Robinson, 124, 127, 148. Wann v. Western Co., 4038, 406. Waples v. Layton, 117. Warburton v. Great Western Co., 330, 339, 366. Ward, E. B. Jr., 4. Ward v. Cole, 104, 106. ». Hallam, 105. ». Howe, 106. ». Lumley, 393. ». Northern Bank, 401. o. Vanderbilt, 201. Wardlaw 2. S. C. Co., 391. Wardruff 2. Moore, 111. Ware », Curry, 162. o. Sharp, 172, 183. ». Ware, 78. Warfel vo. Frantz, 400. Warfield v. Ravesies, 169, 184. Waring v. Smyth, 24, 28, 39, 41. Warner ». People, 191, 192. o. BR. R. Co., 280. Warpole v. Ellison, 19. Warren v. Chickasaw, 46. TABLE OF CASES CITED. lxxxiii “Warren 2. Childress, 143. v. Fitchburg Co., 274. v. Layton, 19, 22. v. Nichols, 196. a. Perry, 118. ». Poff, 155. o. Wagner, 184. o. Walker, 112. “Warrengton 2. Early, 19. Warring ». Williams, 36. Washburn v. Nashville Co., 289, 318, 370. wv. R. R. Co., 290. Washington v. Gregory, 243. v. Ogden, 393. ‘Washington Bank v. Prescott, 196. Washington Co. v. Wilson, 99. Wasmer v. Delaware Co., 278. Watcher o. Albee, 134. Water Co. ». Ware, 12. Waterman v. Brown, 141. Waters v. Earl of Thanet, 111. v. Wing, 282. ‘Watkins v. Stevens, 135. ». Wallace, 95. ‘Watson v. Ambergate Co., 202. ». Dale, 129. 2. Hayes, 157. 0. Woodman, 123, 147. ‘Watt o. Wright, 106. Watts v. Lindsey, 100. Waugh ». Blevins, 392. “‘Waul v. Kerkman, 155. ‘Wave ». Sharp, 172. Way 0. Cutting, 64. ». Minois Central Co., 227. _ Wayland »v. Mosely, 198. ‘Wayne 0. Berry, 226. Wayt . Carwithen, 163. ‘Weaver v. Coolege, 61. ». Devendorf, 62. Webb ». Baird, 401. v. Gay, 177. v. Hazleton, 174. Webb ». Portland Co., 268. ». Richmond Co., 328, 340. v. Rome Co., 255, 258, 262. v. State, 77. Webber v. Great Western Co., 208. o Merrill, 61. v. N. Y. Co., 366, 270. v. Williams College, 111. Webster », Hudson Co., 244. o. Kirk, 111. Weckerley v. Geyer, 63. Weed 2. Saratoga Co., 201, 206. Weeks ». Sego, 169. Weger v. Pennsylvania Co., 324, 327, 335, 386, 358, 376, 382. Weigley v. Kane, 81, 96. Weiman ov. Anderson, 172. Weimburg ». Rampe, 170, 184. Weir v. Groat, 176. Weisner ». Zann, 141. Weiss v. Pa. Co., 232. Welch v. Coulborn, 42. ». Jugenheimer, 86, 89, 92. Weldin ». Porter, 66. Wellburn v. Finley, 165. Wellman v. Southard, 144. Wells v. McCall, 171, 183. v. Moore, 46. ». Thomas, 206. ». Thompson, 66. v. Thorman, 169. Welsh v. Barrett, 195. ». Pittsburg Co., 217. Wendell ». New York Co., 267. Wenman v. Mohawk Co., 142, 166. Werstler v. Custer, 76. Wesner v. Stein, 118, 135, 138, West vo. Druff, 101. we o. Laraway, 187, 189. v. Pickeismer, 104. v. Steward, 38. v. Weat, 170, 184. Westcott o. Fargo, 199. Western Co. v. Bishop, 358. lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. ‘Western Co. ». Blanchard, 404, 405, 406. Buchanan, 405. Carew, 406. Carter, 231. Catchpole, 404. Drew, 281. Fatman, 405. Fontaine, 404, 406. Hobson, 407. Hosking, 216. Johnston, 284, 285. McElwee, 204. Meek, 404. Neill, 404, 406. Newhall, 215, 220. Reynolds, 405, 407. Scircle, 404. v. Strong, 358. Westheimer v. Pennsylvania Co., 218. ssessss28s8ee8eseess Westmoreland ». Porfer, 66. Weston »v. Gravlin, 92. Wetherall v. Cloggett, 195. Wetherbee ». Potter, 69. Wetter v. Habersham, 74. Whaalen v. Mad River Co., 297, 314, 817, 319, 838, 375, 376, 382. Whalen »v. Centenary Church, 292, 346. Wheat o. Arnold, 19, 22. Wheeler v. Patterson, 63. o. San Francisco Co., 203. vo. Walker, 196. v. Wason Co., 820, 321. v. Westport, 233. Wheelock ». Boston Co., 229, 272, ava. ». Doolittle, 125, 149. v. Freeman, 28, 42. 0. Old Colony Co., 269. Wheelwright v. Boston Co., 229, 269. Wheelton o. Hardisty, 7. Whelan v. Kinsley, 141. Whipple v. Barnes, 164. ». Blackington, 143. ». Parker, 67. v. Stevens, 116, 127, 189, 150. Whirley v. Whitman, 239, 249. Whitaker v. Crutcher, 401. v. Rice, 124, 189, 150. ». Whitaker, 155. Whitby v. Whitby, 69. Whitcher ». McLaughlin, 196. Whitcomb ». Gilman, 59. ». Keator, 106. vo. Whiting, 117, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 147, 150, 151. White o. Bailey, 104. . Beaman, 128. . Comstock, 100. . Concord Co., 282. Gale, 82. . Hale, 124. . Hass, 18, 22, 41. . Jordan, 118. . McNutt, 175. . Perry, 81. . Story, 176. . Trotter, 95. ». Western Co., 406. esgesgeseeeeteesees ‘Whiteall 0. Clark, 175. Whiteley v. Stewart, 170, Whitesides ». Cannon, 170, 181, 185. v. Northern Bank, 28. v. Russell, 200, 219. Whiting v. Rust, 170. v. Stevens, 187. Whitlocke v. Walton, 105. Whitman v. Wisconsin Co., 297, 300. Whitney v. Atlantic Co., 276. v. Bigelow, 129, 130, 188. ». Chambers, 187, 138. ~. Clifford, 99. ». Goddard, 104. v. Reese, 150. TABLE OF CASES CITED. 1xxxv Whitsell ». Crane, 214. Whittier ». Chicago Co., 231. v. Frye, 41, 42. ‘Whitworth 2. Carter, 171. Wibert ». Erie Co., 206. Wicker v. Pope, 18, 24. Wickes ». Caulk, 13. Wickham »v. Morehouse, 94. Wicks v. Mitchell, 170, 181, 185. Wigzett 0. Fox, 289, 338, 369. Wightman v. Same, 98. Wilber ». Hicholtz, 47. Wilbur v. Wilbur, 19. Wilby o. Railway Co., 202. Wilcox v. Henderson, 82. v. Parmalee, 206. o. Pearman, 129, 181. v. Rodman, 191. v. Rome, 267, 273. Wild Cat Branch ». Ball, 401. Wilde ». Armsbey, 19, 42, 48. Wilder ». Ritchie, 174. v. Weakley, 73. Wilds ». Hudson Co., 249, 267, 271. Wiley ». Crist, 394. ». Moore, 37. v. West Jersey Go., 252. Wilkie 0. Wilkie, 395. Wilkins v. Murphy, 133, 154. v.&precht, 165. Wilkinson v. Cheatham, 169, 188. v. Flowers, 162. v. Wilkinson, 144, 146. Willard 0. Eastham, 174, 185. Willett v. Rich, 391. ». Shepherd, 20, 23. . Williams v. Alexander, 128. ». Cowardine, 53. ». Crutcher, 36. v. Drexel, 48. v. Greely, 269. ». Gunnels, 88. v. Holland, 230. ®. Hugunin, 173, 186. Williams v. King, 169. 0. Moray, 227. v. Otey, 165. . Paul, 56, 61. . Pound, 142. . Robinson, 75. Texas Co., 241. Urmston, 177, 182, 186. ». Vanderbilt, 201. v. Watson, 80, 81. v. Willard, 197. Williamson ». Beckham, 170. v. Doe, 195. v. Naylor, 159. v. New Jersey Co., 284. v. Patterson, 197. Willis 0. Hill, 124, 127, 147. v. Oregon Co., 324, 327, 335, 336. eeseege v. Ross. 66. Wilmet ». Harmer, 87. Wilson v. Appleton, 108. o. Barnett, 88. . Beauchamp, 52. . Cassidy, 392. . Charleston, 229. . Chesapeake Co., 201. . Hamilton, 225. . Harris, 18, 42. Henderson, 20, 23, 28. . Herbert, 174. . Hill, 394. . Jones, 174. . Kirkland, 48. . Keller, 108. . Madison Co., 295, 300, 303, 314, 315, 381, 333, 355, 366, 379, 381. eseeeeeeee8e8es8s 0. Merry, 294, 314, 344, 353, 370. v. Northern Co., 282. o. Pope, 180. v. Pryor, 128. ” .R. R. Co., 217. Ixxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Wilson v. Schnell, 67. ». Southern Co., 390. v. Torbert, 126, 149. ov. Trafalgar County, 227. ». Waugh, 150. 0. Willimantic Co., 327, 341, 371. ». Wilson, 140, 158, 156. Winchell v. Hicks, 127, 139, 146. Winchester Co. v. Vimont, 283, 285. Winnie ». Illinois Co., 198. Winyaw ». Kidd, 120. Wise v. Ray, 68. Wiswall v. Brinson, 9, 10. Wiswell v. Baxter, 163, 164. Witcher ». Wilson, 171. Withee v. Rowe, 52. Withers v. Bullock, 107. v. Sparrow, 171, 177. Withington v. Withington, 74. Witte ». Wolfe, 186. Wofford v. Unger, 143. Wolf v. American Ex. Co., 219. v. Foster, 129. v. Wyeth, 197. Wolff o. Central Co., 201,208. Womack v. Womack, 182. ‘Wonder 2. Baltimore Co., 295, 311, 313, 318, 329, 352, 380. Wonderly v. Nokes, 88. Wood v. Augustine, 163. v. Barker, 125. Braddick, 147, 150. Goodfellow, 161. Leslie, 109. . New York Co., 302. . Porter, 81, 95. . Steel, 27, 32. . Turnpike, 283, 285. v. U. S., 98. vo. Wylds, 128. Woodbeck ». Keller, 88. Woodbury ». Frinke, 197. Woodhouse ». Simmons, 128, 188. ssess ees Woodley v. Metropolitan Co., 388. Woodlie v. Towles, 120. Woodman »v. Dana, 52. Woods ». Hilderbrand, 394. Woodson ». Perkins, 170, 184. Woodward 2. Pickett, 69. v. R. R. Co., 209. v. Spiller, 51. Woodworth v. Anderson, 27. Woolley »v. Constant, 38. Woolridge v. Planters Bank, 165. Wootley v. Gregory, 393. Wordson »v. Milwaukee Co., 251. Works ». Bedell, 301. Worrall ». Gheen, 33. v. Munn, 38. Worth v. McConnell, 48. Worthy v. Johnson, 164. Wray v. Evans, 12. v. Gray, 66. Wren v. Pearce, 69. Wright v. Boston Co., 269. v. Boughton, 206. v. Brown, 171, 183. v. Court, 147. v. Dalton, 171. ». Hardy, 91. v. Hays, 182. v. Hessey, 50. v. Hicks, 83. ». Holbrook, 10, 11. v. Malden, 236. v. N. Y. Co., 296, 814. v. Weeks, 67. ». Williams, 52. Wyandotte v. Brennon, 192. Wyatt 0. Hodson, 122, 147. Wych ». East India Co., 164. Wylly ». Collins, 169, 181. Wyman v. Gould, 78. v. Gray, 66. v. Penobscott Co., 276.. Wynn ». Governor, 36. Wynne ». Cornelson, 64. TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxxvii Yager v. Atlantic Co., 299, 301, 3826, ; Young ». Detroit Co., 269. 330. ». Edwards, 96. ». Grote, 83. v. Kinney, 247. v. Mackrell, 121. v. Makepeace, 85. v. Monpoey, 116, 122, 125. vw. N. Y. Co., 306, 310, 337, 338, 366. Yale v. Dederer, 175, 187. Yandes v. Lafavour, 126, 149. Yates ». Donaldson, 143. v. Yates, 49. Yea ov. Fouraker, 119. Yeomans v. Contra Costa Co., 311, 812, 319, 334. ». South Nev., 380. ». Young, 172, 183. o. Steam Navigation Co., Youngman ». Elmira Co., 284, 285. 337, 350.| Zeigler v. Danbury Co., 304. Yocum ». Smith, 32, 33. ». Day, 824, 835, 341, 345, 371, York », Bright, 65. 3'72. 2. Crisp, 211. v. Railroad Co., 298. ». Jones, 24. Zimmerman v. Hannibal Co., 266, York Co ». Brooks, 401. 270, 273. Youll v. Sioux, 355. ». McMakin, 90. Young v. Dearborn, 196. Zonker v. Cowan, 83. A List or CasEs ‘Overruled, Denied, Doubted, Criticized, Aniagonizsed or Explained. Abraham v. Reynolds, 289. Adams v. Gibney, 13 7. Atchison v. Stanford, 253, 256. Ayres v. Milroy, 402. ‘Barton v. Thompson, 867, 92. Berckmans v. Berckmans, 90. Brown 2. Delafield, 106. Bryar ». Wilcocks, 146. Bush v. Steinman, 8, 9. ‘Carshire 0. Huyk, 185. ‘Chicago v. Elmore, 272. ‘Clark v. Van Amburg, 143. v. Wyatt, 51. ‘Clarke ». Hougham, 134. ‘Cleveland v. Terry, 245. ‘Cobham v. Administrators, 154. ‘Cole ». Goodwin, 214. ‘Collett ». Frazier, 135. ‘Cooke v. Oxley, 193, 194. ‘Connecticut v. Bratt, 146. ‘Cornfoot v. Fowke, 4, 7. ‘Cox ». Bailey, 123. ‘Cummins v. Coffin, 127. Davis »v. Fish, 61. DeF reest ». Warner, 135. Evans v. Cary, 134. Falls v. Sherrill, 127. ¥ero v. Buffalo, 260. Fitzgeral ». Ld. Fanconberg, 13 n. Fitzpatrick v. N. A. Co., 290. Gillenwater v. Madison, 287, 290, 310. Glanville v. Paine, 13. Halliday 0. Ward, 134. Hamilton ». Wright, 13 x. Hartfield v. Roper, 237. Hubbard v. Marsh, 127, 204. Illinois v. Copeland, 201. Indianapolis v. Paramore, 251. In re Worthington, 59. Jackson v. Malin, 40. Johnson v. Beardslee, 153. Jordan v. Hubbard, 134 7. Kansas »v. Butts, 258. Kirby ». Miller, 172, 183. Kissinger v. N. Y. Co., 274. Kohnstamm » Foster 148. Levi v. Earle, 177. McCormick ». Bay City, 399 n. McCrea v. Piermont, 135. McGovern »v. N. Y. Co., 274. McIntyre v. Oliver, 127. McNamee v. Tenney, 146. Megsher v. Hubbard, 146. Milwaukee v. Hunter, 249. Morgan v. Meteyer, 146. Morrison v. Norman, 1407. xe CASES OVERRULED, DENIED, DOUBTED, &C. Mountstephen v. Brooke, 184. Newsom v. N. Y. Co., 274. Noble v. McFarland, 1407. O'Donnell v. Allegheny, 312. People v. Bostwick, 400 x. Peoria ». Stillman, 272. Pittsburgh v. Adams, 320. Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 245. Rice ». Railroad Co., 177. Ross v. N. Y. Co., 312. v. Ross, 146. Souden v. Van Rensselaer, 185. St. John v. Garrow, 134. Steele v. Kinkle, 107. Stewart o. Foster, 148, 146. Stone v. Cheshire, 94. Stucke v. Milwaukee, 249, Succession of Ducker, 146. Texira v. Evans, 34-87. Tinn ». Donohue, 115. Thompkins v. Nichols, 94. Thorogood ». Bryan, 243, 245. Trowell v. Castle, 13 7. Walton ». Robinson, 127. Watkins v. Stevens, 135. Whitcomb v. Whiting, 126, et seq.. Williams ». Alexander, 128. Willis v. Hill, 127. Winchell v. Hicks, 146. Wiswall v. Brinson, 97. Yale v. Dederer, 175, 187. Yea v. Fouraker, 119. Young v. Grote, 33 n. LIST OF PIVOTAL CASES. Abraham v. Reynolds—Fellow Servants. Artz v. Chicago—Crossing Track. Ashby 0. White—Elective Franchise. Baird 0. Pettit—Fellow Servants. Baldwin v. U. 8. Tel. Co—Telegraphy. Barton 0. Barbour—Receiver. Barton’s Hill 0. Reid—Fellow Servants. Bell v. Morrison—Limitations. Blessing v. St. Louis Co.—Fellow Servants. Blumenthal ». Brainard—Receiver. Brann 0. Chicago—Fellow Servants. Burnett ». Ward—lIntensity of Proof. Bush v. Steinman—Agency. Butler 0. Pennsylvania—Office. Butterfield 0. Forrester—Contributive Negligence. Carr »v. Lancashire—Limiting Liability. Carshore o. Huyk—Limitations. Cassidy ». Maine—Fellow-Servants. Chalmers v. Shackell—Lutensity of Proof. Chicago v. Elmore-+Fellow-Servants. vo. Jackson— “ rf v0. Moranda— “ s vo. Ross— es ee vo. Swett— ° ne Coe vo. Columbus—Rolling Stock. Colthurst 0. Sweet—Bill of Lading. Columbus o. Arnold—Fellow-Servants. Cooke », Oxley —Options. Cooper v. Mullins—Fellow-Servants. Corey ». Pittsbnrg—Rolling. Stock. Cornfoot ». Fowke—Agency. Cowles ». Richmond—Fellow-Servants. Crispin v. Babbitt—Fellow-Servants. Cuddy ». Horn—Identification of Passenger. Cumberland ». Scally—Fellow-Servants. xeil LIST OF PIVOTAL CASES. Dair v. U. §.—Sureties. Davey ». London—Concurring Negligence. Dellafield o. Parish—Wills—Onus Probandi. Dobbin v. Richmond—Fellow-Servants. Doggett v. Raleigh—R. R. Fires. Dorgan v. Telegraph Co.—Telegraphy. Dow »v. Kansas—Fellow-Servants. Ellis v. Am. Co.—Telegraphy. Farwell ». Boston—Fellow-Servants. Fere v. Buffalo—R. R. Fires. Flynn v. San Francisco—R. R. Fires. Ford v. Monroe—Action for A Life. Fox v. Sanford—Fellow-Servants. Galena v. Jacobs—Comparative Negligence. Gillenwater v. Madison—Fellow-Servants. Goodtitle ». Braham—Comparison of Handwriting. Greenfell v. Girdlestone—Limitations. ‘Gue v. Tidewater—Sale of Corporate Property. Hardy v. Merrill—Insanity. Harrison v, Rowan—Wills—Onus Probandi. Hartfield ». Roper—Imputable Negligence. Heyer v. Pruyn—Limitations. Hibblewhite v. McMorine—Limitations. Hilliard v. Richardson—Contractors—Agency. Hoke v. Henderson—Office. Hough v. R. R. Co.—Fellow-Servants. Hovenden v. Annesley—Limitations. Howland ». Lounds—Contracts by Advertisements. Indianapolis v. Paramore Fellow-Servants. Irving ». Vitch—Limitations. Jaques v. Methodist Church—Married Women. Johnson v. Gallagher—Married Women. Judge of Probate ». Stone—Wills—Onus Probandi. Knight ». Clements—Alteration. Knowles ». Scribner—Intensity of Proof. Lalor 0. Chicago—Fellow-Servants. Lane v. Crumbie—Contributive Negligence. Lanter v. McEwen—Intensity of the Proof. Lehigh v. McKeen—R. R. Fires. Lesher v. Wabash—Responsibility of lessor of R. R. LIST OF PIVOTAL CASES. x¢ciii Lewis »v. St. Louis—Fellow-Servants. Little Miami v. Stevens—Fellow-Servants. Lynch v. Nurden—Imputable Negligence. Macon ». McConnell—Responsibility of Lessor of R. R. McManus 2. Lancaster—Carriers of Live Stock. McCrea v. Piermont—Limitations. Malone ». Hathaway—Fellow-Servants. Michigan v. Min. Springs—Connecting Lines. Miller ». Manwarring—Revesting Title. Morgan v. Vale of Neath—Fellow-Servants. Morrison o. Noriman—Limitations. Moon ». Richmond—Fellow-Servants. Muschamp ». Lancaster—Connecting Lines. Mytton o. Midland— ts Nashville 0. Wheeless—Fellow-Servants. New Jersey v. Merchants Bank—Limiting Liability. Noble v. McFarland—Limitations. O'Donnell o. Allegheny—Fellow-Servants. _ Parks 0. Alta Co.—Telegraphy. : Pease v, Chicago—Fellow-Servants. Peck v. Botsford—Limitations. Peoria v. Stillman—R. R. Signals. Perry v. Jackson—Limitations. Peterson 2. Whitebreast—Fellow-Servants. Pigot v. Case—Alteration. Piggott o. Eastern Counties—R. R. Fires. Philadelphia ». Anderson—R. R. Signals. Pittsburgh v. Adams—Fellow-Servants. o. Grundt—Crossing Track. Price ». Torrington—Original Evidence. Prideaux v. City—Identification of Passenger. Priestly ». Fowler—Fellow-Servants. R. R. Co. ». Fort—Fellow-Servants. ». Gladmore—Contributive Neg. v. Houston— e a v. Horst—Fellow-Servants. v Stout—Contributive Neg. Randall v. Baltimure—Fellow- Servants. Reedie v. London—Contractor’s Agency. Robertson v. Terre Haute—Fellow-Servants. xciv LIST OF PIVOTAL CASES. ‘Shanny v. Androscoggin—Fellow-Servants. Sloan v. Central—Receiver—Judgment paid out of Earnings. Smith v. Flint—Fellow-Servants. ». Oxford—Fellow-Servants. Speers ». Hartley—Limitation. State v. Rivers—Sale of Corporate Property. ‘St. Louis 7. Curl—Responsibility of Lessor. Sullivan 2. Union Pacific—Action for A Life. Sweetland v. Ilinois—Telegraphy. Tanner v. Smart—Limitations. ‘Texira v. Evans—Alteration. “Tierney v. Minneapolis—Fellow-Servants. ‘Thorogood v. Bryan—Identification of Passenger. ‘True v. International Co —Telegraphy. ‘Tullock ». Dunn—Limitations. Vaughn v. Taft—R. R. Fires. Whaalan v. Mad River—Fellow-Servants. Whitcomb v. Whiting—Limitations. ‘Wilson 0. Madison—Fellow-Servants. Wonder 2. Baltimore—Fellow-Servants. ‘Yale 0. Dederer—Married Women. Zeigler v. Danburg—Fellow-Servants. MAXIMS. Accessorium non ducit sed sequitur swum principalé.....ce.ccseceeeees 164 Actio personalis moritur CUM PELSONM.... crecceciceeceveetenernecesens 1 Cessante ratione cessat et ipsa let.......eeeeese Sieten Vases eeeGkee horas 26 Dies Dominicus non est juridicus.. cc cccccrecccee ree seneeneeeens 59 Medio tutissimis 103.0... cc ccc cee cece nee e eee seeSiwaeencsat Huxeeas 82 “Omnis ratihabitio retro trahitur et mandato priori equi paratur........ 188 Qui heret in litera heret tn cortic€ ......6..000 ehgieisleig Viele Selawrs seves 60 ‘Qui no prokabet cum prohibere possit, jubet.. ... Dense wentdaewcen eng 12 Ubi jus thi remedium....see-cevee sreitios Slade aioe. avs Sonya eeeeaes 42 THE CONFLICT JUDICIAL DECISIONS. ei ACTION FOR A LIFE. Actio personalis moritur cum persona. It is not proposed to discuss the discrepant decisions arising upon the various modified re-enactment of what is known in England as “Lord Campbell’s Act,” which in terms prescribes an action for damages in conse- . quence of the slaying of a human being. The decisions are as necessarily divergent as the statutes upon which they are predicated, and, in general, present a commend- able coincidence of views, taking into consideration their variant provisions. The question we propose to consider is whether an action for a life would lie at common law, and if yes, did it form such an integral feature as to be considered as incorporated into the body of our American common law. The negative of the proposition involved in the affirmative formulated in the maxim which heads this article is held by the great majority of the courts! in this country, and by an unbroken line of decisions in England, and is invariably adopted by the text books, excepting, perhaps, Smith M. & S. (3d Ed.,) 139. It is therefore only necessary to cite and comment upon those decisions which favor the contrary view. 'Perhaps it may not be amiss to cite as a specimen of the reasoning, gen- erally, in this direction (Mobile &c. Co. 0. Brame, 95 U. S. 754). 2 ACTION FOR A LIFE. Actio personalis moritur cum persona. The following cases hold that the circumstance of death does not debar a recovery: (Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210;! Plummer v. Webb, Ware, 75 S. CO. 1 Mas. (C. C.) 380; Oross v. Guthery, 2 Root, 90; Cutting v. Seabury, 1 Sprague 522; James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162; Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 S. C. 60 Am. Dec. 698; Hiner v. Sea Gull, 2 Am. L. T. 15; Price v. Highland Light, ib. 118; Sullivan v. Union Pacifie, &c. Co., 3 Dill, (0. 0.) 334 8. ©. 1 C. L. J. 595). It will be observed that several are admiralty cases, and it will be remembered that the admiralty courts do not consider themselves bound by the strict technicali- ties of the common law. Let us consider whether these common law cases are founded on principle. It would seem strange if the law of any peoples did not provide compensation by action, for the taking of - a life. That the common law provided for it, there can be no doubt. The weregild was well known; it came from the Scandinavian country (4 Black Com. 313), and re- mained a part of the common law of England, until appeals of felony were abolished by 59 Geo. III, ch. 46. If the appellee was acquitted, then, by virtue of West. 2, 13 Ed. I, ch. 12, the appellor was to suffer one year’s imprisonment, etc., which proved a great discouragement to appeals, so that thenceforward they ceased to be in common use (4 Black Com., 316; Fleta Lib. I, ch. 34, sec. 48.) But until the appeal was abolished by statute, it was the remedy afforded by the common law. The 1 Sed vide, Pack 0. Mayor &c., 3 Comst. 489; Green 0. Hudson &c. Co. 2 Keyes, 300. ACTION FOR A LIFE. 8 Actio personalis moritur cum persona. appeal never obtained in this country'—certainly not, unless in New York, where it was abolished at an early day (2 BR. 8. N. Y. 748, sec. 43). Is it fairly inferrible that such a barbarious eustom as “trial by battel” was ever accepted as part of the common law of this country? Now it may be appre- hended, with great show of reason, that when the ap- peal of felony was abolished by 59 Geo. III, the com- mon law, so expansive as to adapt itself to the ever increasing demands of society, might be regarded as conferring some remedy in lieu of that abolished. But how can such an idea be predicated of our American common law? It was substitutionary, not original, and as we accepted the common law without the ap- peal of felony, and as there certainly existed no other action or remedy for a death, prior to 59 Geo. III, how can we, in accepting the common law without the ap- peal, claim that a right of action for a death was guaranteed by our common law? There is much more plausibility for such a claim under the English law, as the right was existing to be enforced in a certain way: that way being abolished, the common law would so open itself as to let in another way. But how can that be claimed under our law, when we receive the common law without the doctrine of appeals? That great Judge (DmL0N), whose opinions are almost ipsa lex, holds in the Sullivan case,? views in opposition—see comments on this case in (2 C. L. J. 12, 117, 128, 165; Art, West. The statute 18 Ed. I, mentioned in the text, was reported as in force in North Carolina, (Mart. Coll. Br. Stats. 26) (1792), but was omitted from the schedule of British Statutes in force reported by the commissioners under the act of 1817, and to be found in 1 Potter, Taylor & Yancey’s Laws 85, and it was never in force in Maryland (Alex. Br. Stats. passim.) °The action was by a father on account of the loss of services of his son, who was killed by the negligence of the defendant. But it is apprehended that the eminent jurist who presided, intended to hold in all its integrity the doctrine that an action for a life can be maintained at the American common law. 4 AGENCY. Misrepresentation, without Fraud, by Agent. Jur., January, 1875; Cf. Read v. Great, &c. Oo., L. BR. 8 Q. B. 555; Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley, L. R. 9 Q. B. 357; E. B. Ward Jr., 4 Woods ©. C. 145 8S. 0. 16 Fed. Rep., 255. ‘ The right to compensation for the loss of a life, pre- vails on the continent of Europe. Tout fait quelconque de Vhomme, qui cause & autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé, a le reparer. According to the customs and laws prevailing within the scope of the Code Napoleon, the damaged party may either intervene in the criminal proceedings (as partie civile), or institute a private civil suit on the strength of the verdict of condemnation. AGENCY. Misrepresentation, without fraud, by agent. It was held as far back as 1840, by three of the Barons of the Exchequer, (PARKE, ALDERSON and RoLFE—Gur- ney not sitting and Lp. ABINGER dissenting), that a misrepresentation of a material fact by an agent, not fraudulently made, would not bind the principal, although such fact was known to be untrue by the principal (Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. & W., 358 S, C. Shirl? L. C. 72). Perhaps no case since Twyne’s has given rise to such opposing views. Mr. Smith says that the court of Hx- Trans.) Every act of man, which injures any ‘other person binds its author to give reparation for the damage done. We trust to be excused for giving the translation, our apology is that it proceeds from a most accomplished civil-law lawyer—M. A. Dufour of Geneva. 2 Mr. Shirley says, that it is far from chimerical to suppose, that the case of Cornfoot ». Fowke will be some day overruled in favor of the view there unsuccessfully contended for, and of the principal that if a man hay- ing no knowledge whatever on the subject takes on himself to represent a certain state of facts to exist he will do so at his peril. AGENCY. 5 Misrepresentation, without Fraud, by Agent. chequer reiterated its opinion in (Moens v. Heyworth, 10 M. & W. 147; and Taylor v. Ashton, 11 ib. 401; Pasley v. Freeman, 2 Smith L. 0. (5th Am. Ed.) 169 note), but those cases will be found, upon examination, not to be parallel. They do not present the doctrine that there is a distinction to be taken between knowl- edge of the principal and knowledge of the agent. Cornfoot v. Fowke was not cited in either, nor has it ever been cited and approved since its utterance. Mr. Smith says that this doctrine is still doubted and may give rise to future discussion (p. 170). The doctrine of Cornfoot v. Fowke is denied in Fuller v. Wilson, 3 Q. B. 58 (43 E. CO. L. BR.) 8. C. 2 G. & D. 460; and Evans v. Collins, 5 Q. B. 804 (48 E. C. L. R.). These cases were both reversed in the Exchequer chamber but upon different points. In their point of difference with Cornfoot v. Fowke, these cases were recognized by the House of Lords in Nat. Ex. Co. v. Drew, 2 McQ. 103 S. C. 32 E. L. & Eq. 1, and Cornfoot v. Fowke is only sustained on the plead- ings. It will be remembered that the action was ex contractu and the defence was not merely a misrepresentation, but fraud, covin and misrepresentation, whereas the others, and indeed nearly, if not quite, all of the cases decided on the point were in tort. Pollock thinks that, at utmost, it can only be sus- tained as a decision upon a point of pleading, and denies, or at least questions, its authority, (Poll. Prin. Cont. 502). The only English text-book which incorporates the principle enunciated in Cornfoot v. Fowke, is Addison (1 Add. Cont., sec. 67). Smith cites the dissenting opinion of Lp. ABINGER (Smith M. & S., 135, note 7). Wiuuss, J. declared that he “should be sorry to have it supposed that Cornfoot v. Fowke turned upon any- 6 AGENCY. Misrepresentation, with Fraud, by Agent. thing but a question of pleading (Barwick v. English, . &c. Co., L. R. (2 Ex.) 259, 262). And in this case the doctrine generally ascribed to Cornfoot v. Fowke, is squarely denied in the Exchequer chamber. The converse of the doctrine is stated by Dr. Whar- ton, and the authority of Cornfoot v. Fowke denied (Whart. Cont., sec. 270; Whart. Ag., sec. 167 et seq. ) So by Prof. Parsons (1 Par. Cont. 61; 2 ib. 780). See comments of the learned Mr. Rawle (Smith, Cont. (3d Am. Ed.) 224, note 1), and by Judge Bigelow (Big. Fraud, 367). Mr. Justice Story is silent in his text (Story Ag., (9th Ed.) sec. 139), but states in note to this section that Cornfoot v. Fowke “has been doubted and sometimes sharply criticised.” The text of Kent is silent and the notes non-com- mittal (2 Kent. Com., top p. 825, notes C and 2). Mr. Benjamin inclines to support the doctrine of Cornfoot v. Fowke, as does a learned writer in the American Law Review (1 Benj. Sales, (4th Am. Ed.) 598, 600, 608, 609, 621; art. 3, Am. L. Rev. 430). In weighing Cornfoot v. Fowke in English scales, it should be borne in mind that while Fuller v. Wilson was reversed in the Exchequer chamber, the considera- tion of the question of principal, discussed in Cornfoot v. Fowke was distinctly and expressly pretermitted. Evans v. Collins did not present the point precisely raised in Cornfoot v. Fowke, as there was not a principal sued on aceount of the conduct of an agent. The point involved was whether misrepresentations, to be actionable, must be coupled with moral fraud. The action was against the agent. The same court (Q. B.) which decided these two cases, entirely surrendered the doctrine enunciated in them in the later case of Barley v. Walford, 9 Q. B.197. (58 E. C. L. R.). But yet the principle assumed to have been decided AGENCY. 7 Contractors.—Job-Masters.—Respondeat Superior. by Cornfoot v. Fowke, and with which this discussion is begun, is confronted by a very determined dictum in Exchange &c. Co. v. Drew, 2 McQ. 105 8. ©. 32 B. L. & Eq. 1. Its consideration was waived in Wheelton v. Hardisty, 8 H. & B. 270 (92 HE. C. L. R.); 26 (L. J. Q. B.) 265, 275. The very point has never since been raised, by the facts, in any English case.1 So great a lawyer as Mr. RAWLE has erroneously concluded differently, but none of the cases cited by him involved the liability of a principal for the misrepresentations of an agent. In all, the point of agency is wanting (notes to Smith, Cont. supra). The principle of Cornfoot v. Fowke has been recog- nized in at least one American case (Hammatt v. Emer- son, 27 Me. 308 S. C. 46 Am. Dee. 598), in so far as it conflicts with Wilson v. Fuller, and Evans v. Collins, in holding that moral turpitude must coincide with false representations, to be actionable. But in one case, Corn- foot v. Fowke has been pungently criticised and its authority repudiated (Fitzsimmons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129 8. C. 52 Am. Dec. 46). We should be careful to distin- guish between the fraud of the principal, not partici- pated in by the agent, and that of the agent, not par- ticipated in by the principal. There is no difficulty as to the latter proposition. _The distinction is clearly demonstrated by the learned Dr. Wharton (Whart. Ag., secs. 167-173). Contractors. Job-Masters. Respondeat Superior. It was held in England that when one contracted with another to repair a house, and the contractee contracted with another to do the brick work, and he with a lime-burner to furnish the lime, whose servant carelessly left a quan- tity of it near by in the highway, whereby an actionable ‘For an able defence of Cornfoot 0. Fowke, see article in 3 Am. L. Rev. 430. 8 AGENCY. Contractors.—Job-Masters.—Respondeat Superior. injury was occasioned, the owner of the premises was liable to the party injured (Bush v. Steinman, 1 B. & P. 404). This principle was first doubted by ABBort, C. J. and LirrLEeDALE, J.,in Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, (11 BE. 0. L. R.) and is, in direct terms or by necessary im- plication, overruled in the following cases: (Hobbit ». London &c. Co., 4 Ex. 254 8. OC. 6 Rail. Cas. 188; Reedie v. London &c. Co., 4 Ex. 244 8. C. 6 Rail. Cas. 184; 2 Thomp. Neg. 902, sec. 25; Knight v. Fox, 5 Ex. 721 S. C. 1E. L. & Eq. 477; Overton v. Freeman, 11 C. B. 867 (73 B. C. L. B.) 8. C. 8 E. L. & Eq. 479; Allen v. Hay- ward, 7 Q. B. 960 (53 E. C. L. R.); Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710; Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. 735 (12 E. ©. L. R.); Peachey v. Rowland, 13 C. B. 182 (76 E. C. L. R.) 8. C. 16 E. L. & Eq. 442; Steel v. S. E. &e. Co., 16 ©. B. 550 (81 BE. C. L. RB.) 8. C. 32 E. L. & Kg. 366; Dalyell v. Tyver, El. BI. & El. 899 (96 E. C. L. R.); Mobile, 1 Swab., Adm. 127 S. 0. 10 Moo. P. C. 467; Butler v. Hunter, 7 H. & N. 826; Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 (H. of L.) 93, 114; Murray v. Currie, L. R. (6 ©. P.) 24; Goslin v. Agricultural &e. Co., L. R. (1 C. P. D.) 482; Ellis v. Sheffield &c. Co., 2 E. & B. 767 (75 E. ©. L. BR.) 8. C. 22 BE. L. & Eq. 198; Pickard v. Smith, 10 ©. B. (N. 8.) 470 (100 E. C. L. R.). There are Scotch decisions to the same effect (McLean v. Russell,! 12 Dict. 887 S. C. 3 Ross, L. 0. 0. L. 281, and 22 Jur. 394; Shield v. Edinburgh &c. Co., 28 Jur. 38.) And the following Irish case (Gilbert v. Halpin, 3 Irish Jurist. (N. 8.) 300). ‘ It was however approved by Lp. ELLENBOROUGH in Sly v. Edgley, 6 Esp.6. And in Randleson v. Murray, 8 'In this case Lp. FULLERTON says: “I think the courts of England have nibbled at the case (Bush v. Steinman), bit by bit until, though it stands in the books, its effect is now entirely gone.” AGENCY. 9 Contractors.—Job-Masters.—Respondeat Superior. A. & E. 109 (35 HE. C. L. B.) 8S. ©. 3 Nev. & P. 237; 2 Jur. 324, it is scarcely distinguishable. The text-books, generally, treat Bush v. Steinman as thoroughly overruled (Shear. and Red. Neg. (2d Ed.) see. 79, note 2; 1 Red. Rail., sec. 129; Whart. Neg., sec. 181, note 7, sec. 810; Story, Ag., sec. 454a and note 1; Wood, M.& 8, (1st Ed) 619, note 1; Pierce, Am. R. L. 286, 287; 2 Hill, Torts, 536; Camp. Neg: sec. 75). Addison, says that Bush v. Steinman is “qualified” by the later decis- ions (1 Torts, sec. 283, note z). JupGE BIGELOW, in both his Torts and Leading Cases on Torts, is silent, although citing many of the overruling cases. So is JupaE CooLEy (Cool. Torts, 605, 610). Mr. Smith does not state the doctrine, but cites it in a note with the over- ruling case of Reedie v. London &c. Co., cited supra (Smith M. & 8. 148, note i). Paley incorporates it into his text, (Dun. Pal. Ag.? (3d Am. Ed.) 296). | JUDGE THOMPSON gives it the sanction of his great authority (2 Thomp. Neg. 903, sec. 26), while admitting it to be “one of the most distinctly overruled cases in the books” (ib. 902, sec. 25), and he argues that the current of judical authority is gravitating towards the doctrine of Bush v. Steinman (ib. 905, sec. 27). The doctrine laid down in Bush v. Steinman is sup- posed to have been sanctioned directly or indirectly in the following American cases: (Wiswall v. Brinson,? 10 ‘See attempt to do so in Story Ag. sec. 4544, note 1, and Dunlap’s Pa- ley’s Ag. (8d Am. Ed.) 296. Perhaps it may be supported upon the idea that, from the nature of the thing done, control was implied, *This edition was published before the decision of several of the ovet- ruling cases. a "In weighing this case, it should be remembered that the court was com- posed of three justices; that the justice who delivered the opinion of the majority, presided on the trial in the court below; that Rorrin, C. J., of whom it was but meagre praise in the Supreme Court of Alabama, referring to this case, to say that he was “one of the ablest judges of that (North Carolina), or any other State,” dissented; and that the very justice who de- livered the opinion, in his Law Lectures, in touching upon the subject, not 10 AGENCY. Contractors.—Job-Masters.—Respondeat Superior. Tred. 554; Nashville v. Brown,! 9 Heisk. 1 8. 0. 24 Am. Rep. 289; Mayor &c. v. Lasser, 9 Hump. 760; Stone v. Cheshire &c. Co.,2 19 N. H. 427 8. 0. 51 Am. Dec. 192; Lesher v. Wabash &c. Co., 14 Il. 85 8S. ©. 56 Am. Dee. 494; Lowell v. Boston &c. Co.,3 23 Pick. 24 8. C. 34 Am. Dec. 33; Bailey v. Mayor &e. Oo.,* 3 Hill, 531 8. C. 2 Den. 433; 38 Am. Dec. 669; Homan v. Stanley,® 66 Pa. 464 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 389; Storrs v. Utica,’ 17 N. Y. 104 S. C. 72 Am. Dec. 437; Silvers v. Nerdlinger,® 30 Ind. 53). It will be seen from the observations in the notes that Bush v. Steinman has for its support mainly, if not entirely, the case of Wiswall v. Brinson, decided by a divided court. only fails to cite the case of Bush 0. Steinman, which was relied upon in his opinion, but actually cites several of the overruling cases (Pearson Law Lec. 261). 'While apparently sanctioning the doctrine of Bush ». Steinman, the court lays stress upon the circumstance that control of the work was never surrendered, and, independent of that consideration, it is to be observed that a different rule should apply to a municipal corporation, perhaps, than to a private individual. The corporation must, ev necessitate ret, act through agents; to allow them to employ men of straw when the power Tests with them to perform work which may result detrimentally, and in this way escape responsibility, would involve an injustice not to be attri- buted to the common law. That great juris consultus (DILLON), has demon- strated this view in such an able and lucid manner as to supersede any com- ments by another (2 Dill. Mun. Corp. (8d Ed.) secs. 974-980, particularly sec. 980; 1st Ed. secs. 772-778. This distinction may tend to reconcile a number of cases (Lesher ». Wabash &c. Co., 14 Ill. 85, cited supra, and note to 56 Am. Dec. 497). ?Doubted if not overruled by Wright ». Holbrook, and Carter 2. Berlin &e. Co., cited infra. 5'Fhis case may also, to a great extent, be referrible to the principles set forth in note 1. It is explained in the later case of Hilliard v. Richardson, cited infra, as involving the strict relation of master and servant. But, as usual, we find the cases in New York conflicting. Later authorites discard Bush v. Steinman, and will be found arrayed, infra. ’ Chancellor WaLLWoRTH in this case, only recognized Bush 0. Steinman as applicable to those instances in which a nuisance was created. ®Though cited by counsel, it is not noticed by the court in the later case of Haas 2. Phila. &c. Co., cited infra. 7 Remarks in note 1 apply. 8 This case may be regarded as overruled by Ryan 0. Curran, cited infra. AGENOY. 11 Contractors.—Job-Masters.—Respondeat Superior. Its authority is rejected by the following courts:— California (Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469 S. ©. 68 Am. Dec. 345). Ilinois (Lesher v. Wabash &c. Co., 14 Ill. 85 S. 0. 56 Am. Dec. 494; Scammon v. Chicago, 25 Il]. 425; Hale v. Johnson, 80 ib. 185 S. C. 4 C. L. J. 462). Indiana (Ryan v. Curran, 64 Ind. 345 8. ©. 31 Am. Rep. 128). Iowa (Callahan v. Burlington &e. Co., 23 Iowa, 562). Louisiana (Riley v. State Line &c. Co., 29 La. Ann. 791 8. 0. 29 Am. Rep. 349). Maine (Haton v. European &c. Co., 59 Me. 5208. 0. 8 Am. Rep. 430). Massachusetts (Hilliard v. Richardson,! 3 Gray, 349 S. ©. 63 Am. Dec. 741; and Big. L. ©. Torts, 636; 2 Thomp. Neg. 868). Michigan (De. Forrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368). Nebraska (Palmer v. City of Lincoln, 5 Neb. 136 S. C. 25 Am. Rep. 470). New Hampshire (Wright v. Holbrook, 52 N. H. 120 8. C.13 Am. Rep. 12; Carter v. Berlin &c. Oo., 58 N. H. 52S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 572; 7 0. L. J. 492). New Jersey (Cuff vw. N. Y. &e. Co., 35 N. J. L. 17, 574 8. C.10 Am. Rep. 205; 9 Am, L. Reg. (N. 8.) 541). New York (Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48 S. C. 55 Am. Dec. 304; McCafferty v. Spuyton Duyvil, 61 N. Y. 178 8. C. 19 Am. Rep. 267; King v. N. Y. &. Co., 66 N. Y. 181 S. ©. 23 Am. Rep. 37; Stevens v. Armstrong, 6 N. Y. 435; Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 8. O. 72 Am. Dec. 437; of. Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 531 8S. C. 38 Am. Dec. 1Judge Tuomas in his.opinion says that the decision of the case of Lowell 0. Boston &c. Co., cited supra, did not involve the rule laid down in Bush 9. Steinman. This is incomprehensible except upon a strained reluctance to overrule a previous case, as the point was directly presented by the facts of that case, unless a Railway Corporation stands on a different footing from a private individual. It was so treated by the court, and Bush o. Steinman was cited as “settling the question’—to paraphrase Judge Thomas’s own language as applied to Bush e. Steinman. 12 AGENCY. Contractors.—Job-Masters.—Respondeat Superior. 669; S. C. on error, 2 Denio, 433; Vogel v. Mayor, 92 N. Y.10 8. C. 44 Am. Rep. 349). Pennsylvania (Painter v. Pittsburg, 46 Pa. 213 8. C.3 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 529; Harrison v. Collins, 86 Pa. 153 S. 0. 27 Am. Rep. 699; Haas v. Phila. &c. Co., 88 Pa. 269 S. OC. 32 Am. Rep. 462; 6 W. N. 523; Allen v. Wil- lard, 57 Pa. 374; Wray v. Evans, 80 ib. 102). Texas (Cunningham v. International &c. Co., 51 Tex. 503 8. C. 32 Am. Rep. 632). Vermont (Clark v. Vermont &c. Co., 28 Vt. 103; Pawlet v. Rutland &c. Co., ib. 297). The Supreme Court of the United States hold a view adverse to Bush v. Steinman (Water Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. 566). If the execution of the act contracted to be done, in- volves a tort, or, as sometimes expressed, is necessarily injurious, the authorities are all agreed that the em- ployer is not exempt. So, generally, without reference to the character of the contemplated work as to municipal corporations. Per- haps, also, the owner of premises would be liable for the negligence of a contractor in performing work on them, while the proprietor remained in possession—such, for example, as repairs—under the maxim qui non pro- hibet cum prohibere possit jubet—of course, subject to the qualification that the effeet produced could have been fairly inferrible from the work in progress. Randleson v. Murray, falls somewhat in this line of thought. And whether the owner should have seen and averted the danger ought to be a question for the jury. So as to whether the relation was that of employer and contractor, or master and servant, should be left to them, as held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Haas v. Phila. &c. Co., cited supra). ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 13 Sealed Instruments: Before Execution, ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. A question often arises as to whether an erasure, interlineation or other alteration of a written instru- ment, is presumed to have been effected before or after execution. Sealed Instruments: Before Execution. The following au- thorities will be found to support the view that, in general, such alterations were presumably made before execution, whether the question shall arise in a civil or criminal action. The courts favoring this view proceed upon the presumption made in favor of innocence (Fitzgeral v. Ld. Fauconberg, Fitz-G.,1 207; Trowell v. Castle, Keble,? 22; Glanville v Paine, Barnard, Ch.? 19; Doe v. Catamore, 16 Q. B. 745 S. C. 20 L. J., (N. 8), Q. B. 364; 15 Jur. 728; 5 BE. L. & Eq. 349; Trimbles- town v. Kemmes, 9 Clark & F. 749, 775; see also, Chettle v. Pound, cited in Bull N. P. 251, 255). The American decisions favoring this view are: (Little v. Herndon, 10 Wall. 26, 31; Speake v. U. S&S. 9 Cranch, 28; Cox v. Palmer, 1 McCrary, 431; Wickes v. Caulk, 5 H. & J. 36; Stewart v. Preston, 1 Fla. 10: 8. C. 44 Am. Dec. 621; Dew v. Farlee, 21 N. J. L. 280; Barrett v. Thorndyke, 1 Geenl. 73; Ross v. Gould, 5 Greenl. 204; Gordon v. Seizer, 39 Miss. 805; Stevens v. Martin, 18 Pa. 33; Langdon v. Paul, 20 Vt. 217; notes to Neil »v. Case, 25 Kan. 51, in 37 1A book of no authority, per Lp. Harpwicke (Greenl. Ov. Cas, 169; the Reporters, 60; Mar. L. B. 311). : *Severely criticised (Greenl. Ov. Cas. 263; the Reporters, 42; Mar. L. B. 434; Adams ». Gibney, 6 Bing. 656, 664, but this case is doubted in Hamil- ton », Wright, 28 Mo. 199, 206, and this latter case is opposed by Mauly v. Ashmead, 20 Pa. 482 and Ross v. Dysert, 83 Pa. 452). 8Criticised (the Reporters, 58; Mar. L. B. 92; Greenl. Ov. Cas. 32). Notwithstanding these criticisms, one or all of these cases have been cited by text-books of the highest respectability, and whatever may be alleged to impugn the general credit of the reporters, the case of Doe v. Catamore, is an unquestioned authority to the same effect. 14 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Sealed Instruments: Before Execution. Am. Rep. 259; Stoner v. Ellis, 6 Ind. 152; Mun- roe v. Eastman, 31 Mich. 283; Dangell v. Levy, 1 Idaho, 722; Feig v. Meyers, 102 Pa. 10; Hoey v. Jarman, 39 N. J. L. 523; Sharpe v. Orme, 61 Ala. 263; Stiles v. Brobst, 69 Ill. 382; Letcher v. Bates, 6 J. J. Marsh, 524 8. 0. 22 Am. Dec. 92). ‘ The case from Dyer, fol. 261 b, (28), decides the point as resolved in Pigot’s case after an advisari. Our view is sustained by Aldous v. Cornwell, supra, though denied in the Irish Oourts (Swinney . Barry, 1 Jones, 109). And see Pigot’s case criticised in Bigelow v. Stilphens, 35 Vt. 521, 525. The resolution under consideration, however, has for its support the great weight of Mr. Wallace (note to Master v. Miller). Cf. (2 Par. Cont. 716, 717; Robinson v. Phoenix &c. Co., 25 Iowa, 430; Goodenow v. Curtis, 33 Mich. 505; Curtis v. Goodenow, 28 Mich. 18; Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. 119; McCoy v. Lockwood, 71 Ind. 219; Berguin v. Bishop, 91 Pa. 336; Miller v. Reed, 27 Pa. 246 S. C. 67 Am. Dec. 459; Hamil- ton v. Wird, 20 Ind. 306; Klien v. Raymond, 70 Ind. 271; Pequawket Bridge v. Mathers, 8 N. H. 139; Diety v. Harder, 72 Ind. 208; Vaughn v. Fowler, 14 8. ©. 355 8. C. 87 Am. Rep. 731; Bowers v. Jewell, 2 N. H. 5438; Smith v. Crooker, 5 Mass. 540; Le May ov. Johnston, 35 Ark. 325; Mechanics’ Bank v. Packing Co., 70 Mo. 643; Booth v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 22; Nichols v. Johnston, 10 Conn. 192; Reed v. Roark, 14 Tex. 329 8. C. 65 Am. Dec. 127; Smith v». Hason, 4 Jones, 34; Wallace v. Wallace, 8 Ill. App. 69; Long ». Mason, 84 N. C. 15). In Smith v. Eason, the learned Dr. Moore states in his argument, that the rule, as laid down in Pigot's case, is not followed anywhere. And a distinction is taken as to the intent with which it is affected. If innocently, it is not, if fraudulently, it is, avoided ALTERATION OF INSTRUMEN TS. 15 Presumption after Execution. (Hatch v. Hatch, 9. Mass. 311 8. ©. 6 Am. Dee. 69; Smith v. Dunbar, 8 Pick. 246). Presumption after Execution—The following cases hold that the burden is upon the party offering the instru- ment, to show that the alteration was made at or before execution: (Prevost v. Gratz,!1 Pet. 0. C. 364, 369; Ely v. Ely,? 6 Gray, 439, 441; Newcomb ». Presbrey, 8 Met. 406; Jackson v. Osbom: 2 Wend. 555 S. 0. 20 Am. Dee. 649; Jackson v. Javaby, 9 Cow. 125; Herrick v. Malin, 22 Wend. 388; Davis v. Oliver, 1 Ridg. P. ©. 1, 15; Smith v. McGowan, 3 Barb. 407; Acker.v. Ledyard, 8 Barb. 514; Dow v. Jewell, 18 N. H. 340 8. ©. 45 Am. Dec. 371, 378; Dolbier v. Norton, 5 Shepl. 307; Montag v. Linn, 23 Ill. 551; Jordon v. Stewart, 23 Pa. 244; Morris’ Lessee v. Vanderen, 1 Dall. 64, 67; Robinson v. _ Meyers, 67 Pa. 9; Van Horn v. Bell, 11 Iowa, 465 S. C. 75 Am. Dee. 506; Deems v. Phillips, 5 W. V. 168; Piercy v. Piercy, 5 W. V. 199; Galland v. Jackman, 26 Cal. 79 8. C. 85 Am. Dee. 172; Roberts v. Unger, 30 Cal. 676; Kiser v. State, 13 Tex. App. 201; Richers v. Héimoamp, 5 Rep. 765, went off on a dhestion of plead- ing; Pipes v. Hardesty, 9 La Ann. 652 S. C. 61Am. Dec. 202). The text books favoring the English view are: (Bur- ‘It is said in Cowen & Hill’s Notes to Phillips on Evidence, part I, 463, that the dictum of Mr. Justice Washington was destroyed by the reversal of his decree (Gratz 0. Prevost, 6 Wh. 481, 502), but it will be seen by an ex- amination of the latter case, that his decision was only reversed in part, and the point under consideration was left untouched. 3 The case of Ely 0. Ely is universally cited as deciding that the subject is a question for the jury; but, upon an examination of the case, it will be seen that the court hold, expressly overruling the opinion rendered in the court below, that there was a presumption that alterations were made at or be- fore execution, declaring that there is no such presumption. On the con- _ trary, this distinguished court decides that ‘the burden of proof is on the party offering the instrument, to prove the genuineness of the instrument and that the alterations apparent on the same were honestly and properly made.” This it seems to the.author is equivalent, practically, to hold- ing that the presumption is that alterations were made after execution. 16 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Presumption after Execution. ton, Real Property, sec. 443; 4 Greenl. Cruise, Real Property, 408; Smith, Real and Personal Property, 722; 1 Phillips, Evidence, 451, note (2); 1 Phillips & Amos, Evidence, 470, note (3); Stephens’ Digest of Evidence, art. 89; Best, Presumptions, 85; Best, Evidence, sec. 208; Coke Littleton (Harg. & Butler), 225 b, note 1; Taylor, Evidence, secs. 134, 1616; Williams, Real Prop- erty, 148; Martindale, Conveyancing, sec. 19; 12 Viner’s Abr.). Byles lays it down that it is said the presumption against the legality of an alteration is confined to the cases of bills, notes and wills (6 Am. Ed. note (i) ). Dr. Wharton lays it down that, if there is nothing suspicious on the face of the instrument, and the alter- ation is one that appears to accord with the object of the instrument, the burden of proving bad faith is on the party asserting it (1 Whart. Ev. sec. 649; see also 2 Whart. Cont. sec. 698). Prof. Greenleaf holds that it is incumbent on the party offering an altered instrument to explain this appear- ance (1 Greenl. Ev. (6th Ed.) sec. 564). He cites only Perkins on Conveyancing, 55, which does not sustain him, and several cases which were upon unsealed in- struments. He, however, adds that, generally speaking, if nothing appears to the contrary, the alteration will be presumed to have been made contemporaneously with the execution of the instrument. Mr. Broom holds that it is even as to deeds a ques- tion for the jury (Broom, L. M. 44). His citations, ex- cept Coke, Litt. which is directly against his view, are cases which arose under the stamp act. Judge Comstock, in his notes to Kent, holds that it is presumed before, ete. (4 Kent Com. 452, note 1). Judge Cooley holds that it is an open question for the jury (2 Cool. Black. 308, note 18). Mr. Parsons inclines to this view (2 Pars. Cont. (5th ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Wy Possession: Apparent and Extrinsic. Ed.) 721; Pars. N. & B. 576, 577). Also Judge Abbott (Trial Ev. 696), as to deeds. Mr. Daniel also concludes that it is a question for the jury (2 Dan. N. I. sec. 1421). Mr. Washburn is non-committal (Real Property, 3: Vol., (4th Ed.) 556, 557, and neither Addison, Metcalf or Pollock notice the point, while Mr. Bigelow, in his work on Bills and Notes, is non-committal, yet his treatise on Fraud, contains an interesting dissertation on the sub- ject (chap. IT. sec. 4). And to this effect see (Pease v. Barnett, 27 Hun. 378; Keen v. Munroe, 75 Va. 424). Possession.—Some courts hold that if the deed or note has been in the possession of the party claiming upon it, an alteration is presumed to have been made by him, and it lies upon him to show that he was not privy to it (1 Smith L. C. (6th Am. Ed.) 963, note; Ches- ley v. Frost, 1 N. H. 145; Bowers v. Jewell, 2 ib. 543; Barrington v. Bank &c. 14 8. & R. 405, 423; McCor- mick v. Fitzmorris, 39 Mo. 34). Apparent and Bxtrinsic—Other courts take a distinction between alterations apparent and those extrinsic, hold- ing that in the former the burden of explanation is cast upon the party claiming under the instrument—it being presumed to have been made while in his possession; but that where the instrument does not carry with it any appearance of alteration, the burden is upon the party alleging it (U. S. v. Linn, 1 How. 104; Cotten v. Williams, 1 Fla. 37, 49; Connolly v. Spragins, 66 Ala. 258; Organ v. Allison, 9 Baxt. 459). It is to be observed that U.S. v. Linn, was an action upon a penal bond, and perhaps the court assimilated it to a note, for this case is neither cited by counsel nor by the court in the subsequent case of Little v. Herndon, 10 Wall. 26. 2 18 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Commercial Paper: Unsealed Contracts: Before and After Execution. Commercial Paper: Unsealed Contracts:! Before Execution. —The following cases, in analogy to the rule respecting deeds, seem to hold that the presumption is that altera- tions in negotiable instruments are made at or before execution : (Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205 S. C. 49 Am, Dec. 775; Gooch v. Bryant, 1 Shepl. (13 Me.) 390; Clark v. Rogers, 2 Greenl. 143; Maybee v. Sniffen, 2 E. D. Smith, 1 8S. C. 16 N. Y. 560; 10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 18; Cumberland Bank v. Hall, 1 Halst. (6 N. J. L.) 215; Hunt v. Gray, (35 N. J. L.) 227 8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 232; North River Co. v. Shrewsbury Church, 2 Zab. (22 N. J. L.) 424 S. C. 53 Am. Dec. 258; Putnam v. Clarke, 33 N. J. Eq. 338, 343; Sayre v. Reynolds, 2 South, 737; Stevens v. Martin, 18 Pa. 101; Heffelfinger v. Shutz, 16 S. & R. 44; Mathews v. Coalter, 9 Mo. 696; Paramore v. Lindsey, 63 ib. 63, 67; Stoner v. Ellis, 6 Ind. 152, 159; Johns v. Harrison, 20 ib. 317; Wilson v. Harris, 35 Iowa, 507; Ault v. Flemming, 7 ib. 143; Huntington v. Finch, 3 Ohio, (N. 8.) 445; Neil v. Case, 25 Kan. 510 S. ©. 37 Am. Rep. 259; Bilison 2 Mobile &e. Co., 36 Miss. 572; Wicker v. Pope, 12 Rich. 387; Davis v. ‘Loftin, 6 Tex. 489; White v. Hass, 32 Ala. 470 8. C. 70 Am. Dec. 548; Brown v. Phelan, 2 Swan, 629; Bumpass v. Timms, 3 Sneed, 459; Farnsworth v. Sharp, 4 ib. 55; Shields v. West, 17 Cal. 324; Pullen v. Shaw, 3 Dev. 238; Semble: Norfleet v. Edwards, 7 Jones, 455). After Execution —The following English cases hold that the presumption is that the alteration was made afterwards (Johnson v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Stark. (3 E. ©. L. BR.) 313; Henman v. Dickinson, 5 Bing. (15 E. C. L. R.) 183 8. C. 2 M. & P. 281; Knight ». Clements,” 8 A. & EH. (35 E. C. L. BR.) 215 8. ©. 3 Nev. & P. 375; 'The reason of the rule applies with equal force to single-bills which, though under seal, are used and treated as notes (Stahl v. Berger, 108. & R. 170 8. C. 138 Am. Dec. 666, and notes). 9 Mr. Best treats this decision as under the stamp act. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 19 After Execution. Bishop v. Chambre, M. & M. 1168. 0.30. & P.'(14 B. O. L. BR.) 55; Clifford v. Parker,? 2M. & G. (40 E. O. L. R.) 909 S. C. ‘Scott, N. R.1; Carris v. Tattersall, 2M. & G. 890; Henning °. Trenery, 9 A. & E. (87 BE. C. L. BR.) 926; In re Bingle, 29 E. L. & Eq. 339; R. v. Gordon, | Pearce & D. 586, 591 S. ©. Dears, 592; 33 BE. L. & Eq. 556; Warrengton v. Harley, 2 El. & Bl. 763). The case of Sibley v. Fisher, 7 A. & E. (84 B.C. L. RB.) 444 8. ©. 2 Nev. & P. 420, has been sometimes cited as antagoniz- ing this view, but on examination it will be seen that it turned wholly upon a question of pleading. The American decisions favoring the view that the alteration is presumed to have been made after execu- tion are: (Humphreys v. Guillow, 13 N. H. 385 8S. ©. 38 Am. Dec. 499; Hill v. Barnes, 11 N. H. 395; Bowers v. Jewell, 2 N. H. 543; Davis v. Jenny, 1 Met. (Mass.) 221; Wilbur v. Wilbur, 13 ib. 405; Wild v. Armsby, 6 Cush. 314; Dodge v. Haskell, 69 Me. 429; Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50; Barrington v. Bank, 148. & R. 405; Paine v. Edsell, 19 Pa. 178; Clark v. Eckstein, 22 Pa. 507 S. C. 62 Am. Dec. 267; Heffner v. Wenrick, 32 Pa. 423; Kennedy v. Lancaster Bank, 18 Pa. 347; Miller v. Reed, 3 Grant Cas. 51 S. C. 27 Pa. 244; 67 Am. Dec. 459; Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa. 327 8. 0. 3 Am. Rep. 327; War- pole v, Ellison, 4 Houst. 322; Warren v. Layton, 3 Harr. (Del.) 404; Fontaine v. Gunter, 31 Ala. 258, 264; Davis v. Carlisle, 6 Ala. 707; Wheat v. Arnold, 36 Ga. 480; 'In Taylor o. Mosley, 6 C. & P. (25 E. C. L. R.) 278, Lp. Lynpaurst held that it was a question for the jury, and for this position cited Bishop », Chambre. Prof. Parsons says that Knight 0. Clements overruled Taylor ». Mosley (2 Par. B. & N. 579, note c). Judge Bigelow gives Bishop ». Chambre as overruled by Knight ». Clements (Big. Ov. Cas. 63), but this is an entire mistake, as Bishop ». Chambre was in that case cited, ex- plained and followed. It is noticeable that in his late work, (Leading ‘Cases on Bills and Notes), this learned author cites Bishop 0. Chambre (p. 581). * On the argument of this case, counsel criticised Knight v. Clements ; but it is cited by the court as a governing authority. 20 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. After Execution. Daniel v. Daniel, Dud, (Ga.) 239; Scott v. Walker, ib. 243; Inglish v. Brenneman, 5 Ark. 379 S. ©. 41. Am. Dec. 96 S. O. 9 Ark. 122; 47 Am. Dec. 735; Chism ». Toomer, 27 Ark. 108; McMichen v. Beauchamp, 2 La. 290; Martin v. Creditors, 14 La. Ann. 393; Elbert v. McClelland, 8 Bush, 577; Croft v. White, 36 Miss. 455; Wilson v. Henderson, 17 Miss. 375 S. C. 48 Am. Dee. 716; Com. Bank v. Lum, 7 How (Miss.) 414; Finney »v. Turner, 10 Mo. 207; Trigg v. Taylor, 27 ib. 955 S. C, 72 Am. Dee. 263; Walters v. Short, 5 Gilman (10 IIL.) 252; Hodge »v. Gilman, 20 Ill. 427; Meikel v. St. Sav. Ins., 36 Ind. 355; Runnion v. Crane, ‘4 Blackf. 466; Cochran v. Nebecker, 48 Ind. 459; Willett v. Shepherd, 32 Mich. 106; Piercy v. Piercy, 5 W. Va. 199; Lowe v. Merrill, 1 Pinn, 340; Page v. Danaher, 43 Wis. 221; Abbe v. Rood, 6 McL. 106; Burton v. Pressley, Cheves Eq. 1; Archer v. Ward, 9 Gratt. 622; Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. 119; Southwork Bank v. Gross, 35 Pa. 80; Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa. 330). The text-books generally lay it down that the holder must explain apparent alterations (2 Wm. Sanders, (5th Am. Ed.) 200 a, note b; 1 Chitty Contracts (10th Am. Ed.) 870; 1 Smith L. C. (5th Ed.) note to Master v. Miller, 490; 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 564; 1 Add. Cont. sec. 390; Smith Mer. L. 267). Chalmers holds that the burden of proof i in such case is upon the party attempting to enforce the instrument (Benj. Chal. Dig. art. 250). Parsons holds “that whether there be an alteration, and the time of it, the manner of it, by whom it was made, with what authority, or what design, or on what grounds, are all questions of fact for a jury. But every question that goes to a jury must go with an onus on one party or the other. And we should say, that if the alteration be manifest, or if the defendant can show that there is an alteration, he may stop there; and the onus is upon the plaintiff to show that the alteration was made under such circumstances, in regard to time, or person, or pur- ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 21 After Execution. pose, or justification, as would prevent it affecting his tights. We do not mean that the burden is a heavy one; but only that the plaintiff must offer what evidence he can, and the jury will take the question. But they cannot find for the plaintiff who sues on an altered note, unless they are in some legal way satisfied that the note is one on which the action may legally rest” (Parsons N. & B. 576, 577). Judge ABBOTT says, “four different rules contend for control on this vexed question: “1, That an alteration apparent on the face of the paper raises no presumption either way, but the ques- tion is for the jury. “9, That it raises a presumption against the paper and requires, therefore, some explanation to render the paper admissible. “3, That it raises such a presumption when it is sus- picious, otherwise not. “4, That it is presumed, in the absence of explanation, to have been made before delivery, and, therefore, re- quires no explanation in the first instance. The third rule, though somewhat vague, is the true one. It is impossible to sustain the unqualified assertion that every alteration must raise a presumption either way, or that there can be no alteration that will raise a presumption against the note. Thus a cancellation of the printed word ‘bearer’. and insertion of ‘order,’ in the same hand and ink as the other writing, could not ordinarily exclude the paper for want of explanation. On the other hand, an increase of amount, written over an erasure, and exceeding the marginal figures, would re- quire explanation before the case could go to the jury” (Abb. Tr. Ev. 406, note 9). Stephens lays it down that there is no presumption as to the time when alterations and interlineations appear- ing on the face of writings not under seal were made, 22 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Question for the Jury. except that it is presumed that they were so made that the making would not constitute an offence (Steph. Dig. Kv. art. 89). Taylor is to the same effect (Taylor Ev. sec. 1616). Mr Rawle in his note to Smith on Contracts (p. 8, note 1), holds it to be a question for the jury. Question for the Jury—Other courts hold that there is ; no presumption either way, but that it is an open ques- tion for the jury. If the alteration be against the interest of the party appearing to have made it, or claiming under it, or be immaterial, or there be other circumstances, this may be rebutted upon satisfactory evidence, the whole case being for the jury (1 Smith L. C. (5th Am. Ed.) 962, note; 1 Swift’s Syst. 310; 2 Dan. N. I. secs. 1417, 1418; 1 Whart. Hiv. 629; 2 Pars. N. & B. 576; Taylor Ev. sec. 1616; Smith Cont. (Rawle’s Ed.) 8, note 1). Supreme Court U. S.—Steele v. Spencer, 1 Pet. 552. Alabama (Pitcher v. Patrick, 1 Stew. & P. 478; Tubb v. Madding, Minor, 129; Davis v. Carlisle, 6 Ala. (N. 8.) 707; Fontaine v. Gunter, 31 Ala. 258, 264; White v. Hass, 32 Ala. 430 8. C. 70 Am. Dec. 548; Tyree v. Rives, 57 Ala. 173). Arkansas (Inglist v. Breneman, 9 Ark. 122 8. C. 47 Am. Dec. 745. It is very doubtful what the court decides. It is cited here, though perhaps it more correctly should be aligned with the cases which hold that the burden is upon the holder to show authority. See also Chism v. Toomer, 27 Ark. 109). California (Corcoran v. Doll, 32 Cal. 89). Connecticut (Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Oonn. 541 S. 0. 29 Am. Dee. 321; Hayden v. Goodnow, 39 Conn. 164, 169). Delaware (Warren v. Layton, 4 Harr. 404). Georgia (Daniel v. Daniel, Dudd, 239; Printups v. Mit- chell, 17 Ga. 558 S. C. 63 Am. Dec. 258; Reinhart v. Miller, 22 Ga. 402; Planters’ Bank v. Irwin, 31 ib. 371; Wheat v. Arnold, 36 ib. 480). ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 23 Question for the Jury. Illinois (Gillett v. Sweat, 6 Ill. 475; Walters v. Short, 10 ib. 252; Reed v. Kemp, 16 ib. 445; Schwarz v. Herren- kind, 26 ib. 208; German &c. Co. v. Gerber, 4 Ill. App. 222; Mellican v. Martin, 66 Ill. 13). Indiana (Runnion v. Orane, 4 Blackf. 466; Richmond Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 7 ib. 712; Stoner v. Ellis, 6 Ind. 152; Stockton v. Graves, 10 ib. 294; Cochran v. Nebecker, 48 ib. 459). Iowa (Harland v. Berry, 4 Greene, 212; Jones v. Ire- land, 4 Iowa, 63; Auth v. Flemming, 7 ib. 143). Kansas (First Nat. Bank v. Franklin, 20 Kan. 264; Neil v. Case, 25 ib. 510 8. C. 37 Am. Rep. 259). Kentucky (Adams v. Trye, 3 Met. 103; Pulliam ». Withers, 8 Dana, 98 S. C. 33 Am. Dec. 479; Elbert v. McClelland, 8 Bush, 577). Louisiana (McMicken v. Beauchamp, 2 La Ann. 290; Pipes v. Hardesty, 9 La Ann. 152 8. C.61 Am. Dec. 202). Maine (Gorch v. Bryant, 13 Me. 386; Boothby v. Stan- ley, 34 ib. 515; Crabtree v. Clark, 20 ib. 337; Dodge v. Haskell, 69 ib. 429). Massachusetts (Davis v. Jenney, 1 Met. 221; Newcomb v. Presbury, 8 Met. 406; Ives v. Farmers’ Bank, 2 Allen, 236). Cf. (Drum v. Drum, 133 Mass. 566). Michigan (Sheldon v. Hawes, 15 Mich. 519; Comstock v. Smith, 26 ib. 306; Sirrine v. Briggs, 31 ib. 443; Willett v. Shephart, 32 ib. 106). Mississippi (Com. Bank v. Lum, 8 Miss. 414; Wilson v. Henderson, 17 ib. 375 S. OC. 48 Am. Dec. 716). Missouri (Mathews v. Coalter, 9 Mo. 696; Parker v. Moore, 29 ib. 218; McCormick v. Fitzmorris, 39 ib. 34; Tron & Bank v. Murdock, 62 ib. 70; Paramore v. Lindsey, 63 ib. 63, 67). Nebraska (Bank v. Morrison, 17 Neb. 341 8. 0. 52 Am. Rep. 417; Pevean v. Frederick, 17 Neb. 341 S. C. 52 Am. Rep. 417). New Hampshire (Bowers v. Jewell, 2 N. H. 543; Cole v. 24 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Question for the Jury. Hills, 44 ib. 227; Humphreys v. Guillow, 13 ib. 385 S. C. 38 Am. Dec. 499). New Jersey (Den v. Wright, 7 N. J. L. 175 8. C. 11 Am. Dec. 546; Putnam v. Clark, 33 N. J. Eq. 338; Hunt »v. Gray, 35 N. J. L. 227 8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 232; Sayre v. Reynolds, 5 N. J. L. 737; Cumberland Bank v. Hall, 6 ab. 216; York v. Jones, 43 ib. 332), New York (Rankin v. Blackwell, 2 John Cas. 198; May- bee v. Sniffin, 2 E. D. Smith 1S. C. 16 N. Y. 560; 10 N. ‘YY. Leg. Obs. 18; Nazro v. Fuller, 24 Wend. 374; Hager v.: Hager, 38 Barb. 92; Smith v. McGowan, 3 ib. 404, 408; Waring v. Smityth, 2 Barb. ch. 119 S.C. 47 Am. Dee. 299; Lewis v. Payne, 8 Cow. 71 S. C. 18 Am. Dee. 427; Tillow v. Clinton &¢. Co., 7 Barb. 564; People v. Minck, 21 N. Y. 539; Pringle v. Chambers, 1 Abb. 58; Acker v. Ledyard, 8 Barb. 514; Artisans’ Bank v. Backus, 31 How. Pr. 242; Rogers v. Vorbrergh, 87 N. Y. 228). North Carolina (Norfleet v. Edwards, 7 Jones, 455). Ohio (Huntington v. Finch, 3 Ohio (N. 8.) 445). Pennsylvania (Horn v. Dorrance, 2 Dall, 306; Stahl ». Berger, 10 8S. & R. 170 S. ©. 13 Am. Dee. 666; Heffel- finger v. Shutz, 16 S. & R. 44; Simpson v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. 186 8S. C. 49 Am. Dec. 554; Hudson v. Reed, 5 Pa. 279; Jordan v. Stewart, 23 Pa, 244; Kennedy v. Bank, 18 Pa. 347; Clark v. Eckstein, 22 Pa. 507 S. C. 62 Am. Dec. 267; Heffner v. Wennict, 32 Pa. 428; Robinson ». Myers, 67 ib. 9; Burgwin v. Bishop, 91 4b. 336). South Carolina (Porter v. Doby, 2 Rich. Eq. 49; Horry District v. Harrison, 1 N. & M. 554; Wicker v. Pope, 12 Rich. 38). Tennessee (Farnsworth v. Sharp, 4 Sneed, 55). Tezas (Howard v. Colquhoun, 28 Tex. 134). Vermont (Bliss v. McIntyre, 18 Vt. 466 S. CO. 46 Am. Dec. 165; Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205 S. ©. 49 Am. Dec. 775). Virginia (Ramsay v. McCue, 21 Gratt. 349). West Virginia (Piercy v. Piercy, 5 W. Va. 199). ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 25 Question for the Jury. Wisconsin (Low v. Merrill, 1 Pinn, 340). It will be seen that several of these decisions have already been classified under the doctrine of presump- tion. This has been done as the doctrine in many, is not easily discernible, and there is to be found, in not a few, a contradiction in holding the presumption to be one way or the other, and then declaring that the question is for the jury. It amounts to the statement of a truism. Every controverted fact is for the jury, but often a presumption one way or the other super- sedes the necessity for proof. The distressing discrep- ancy in the decisions is attributable to the ascription by the courts to themselves of the authority of fastening a presumption on a certain state of facts. The reason -conducing to it is highly artificial and technical. It is based mainly on the presumption of innocence, but when that view is probed it will be seen that in many ‘instances gross injustice would be the result. A. sues or bases an action upon an instrument in writing—no matter what—and it bears or is supposed to bear upon it evidence of alteration; now, if by presumption it is assumed that it was made after ‘execution it may involve the imputation of crime, whereas that it was made before, would lead directly to the encouragement of spoliation, and in case of death would tend to convert courts of justice into instruments of oppression. ; Now the judgments of some courts are guided by the consideration as to whether the alteration is mate- rial or suspicious or to the interest of the holder, or whether effected by a stranger or by various other ‘considerations of fact. Why are not all such matters eminently the province of the jury? Judges may and will differ as to the effect of alterations, hence the ‘discrepancies which are so startling. Juries upon al] the facts decide pro hac vice and are certainly as, if not more, competent, to arrive at a correct conclusion than 26 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Question for the Jury. any courts however learned. It is a question emi- nently of human nature. Was it altered before or after execution? Who so presumably competent to draw a correct conclusion as an intelligent jury ? The English doctrine as to deeds probably had its origin in the feudal system and in conveyances. operating by transmutation of seizin. In such cases there could be but little room or motive for alterations, as no writing was required before 29 C. 2, and the whole ceremony was performed in the presence of the pares curtis. But why cling to this remnant or rather ghost of a former ignorant age since writing has become the rule, not the exception, and when seizin is transferred not by corporal tradition en pais, but by the magic of the statute of 27 Hen. 8? Every reason that applies to negotiable instruments applies under existing circumstances to deeds. Cesante ratione cessat et ipsa lex. The great stumbling block seems to. have arisen from confounding presumption with the burden of proof. When the execution of a written instrument is denied, the plaintiff holds the burden of proof throughout (Small v. Clewley, 62 Me. 155 S. ©. 16 Am. Rep. 410). But the question still recurs, what is the measure or intensity of proof required; and, as involved in this inquiry, is any burden cast upon the plaintiff to explain an alteration? Our view is to let each plaintiff solve that difficulty as he may be advised by offering or refraining to offer explanatory or excul- patory proof. The jury may decide with him without. proof. Not to mislead in our classification, it may be stated that in the following cases the doctrine that alterations. in commercial paper are presumably made after exe- cution, is either doubted or denied (Clark v. Rogers, 2 Greenl. 147; Grooch v. Bryant, 13 Me. 386; Rankin v. Blackwell, 3 John Cas. 198; Cumberland Bank v. Hall, ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 27 Material Alteration. 6 N. J. L. 215; Sayre v. Reynolds, 2 South, 5 N. J. L. 737; Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. 531 8S. ©. 29 Am. Dec. 321.) The authorities holding the question to be one for the jury have been cited, generally, without distinction as to the particular kind of instrument. Material Alteration—In general a material alteration avoids the instrument. As to what constitutes a ma- terial alteration, it may be stated as a criterion that it must be such as to effect an essential stipulation of the instrument. Or as otherwise expressed, it is such as in anyway alters the operation of an instrument, and the liabilities as originally fixed thereby, whether the change be prejudicial or not (Benj. Chal. Dig. art. 247). The point is necessarily so kaleidoscopic as to justify an omission to cite the adjudications, except a few leading cases, as their name is legion. The various illustrations will be found in the text books: (2 Par. N. & B. ch. XV. sec. IV.; 2 Par. Cont. ch. IIL, sec. VII; art. 15, C. L. J. 62.; 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 566, et seg.; Abb. Tr. Ev. 406; Chitty Cont. (10 Am. Ed.) 867, et seqg.; Byles Bills, 239; Shirl. L. C. (2d ed.) notes to Master v. Miller, and Aldous v. Cornwall, 150; 2 Whart. Cont. secs. 695, 696; Big. Fraud, ch. II. sec. 4; 2 Dan. N. I. (2d Ed.) ch. XLII; Story P. N. (6th Ed.) 408a; 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev. 76; Broom L. M. 65; Best Ev. sec. 208; 1 Add. Cont. sec. 388; Benj. Chal. Dig. art. 247 and notes; Big. L. C. B. & N. 576, et seq.; Master v. Miller, 1 Smith L. C. (5th Am. Ed.) 934; 8. ©. Shirl. L. ©. (2d Ed.) 149; Gardner v. Walsh, 5 El. & BI. 89, (85 E. C. L. BR.) S. C. 32 BE. L. & Eq. 162; Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall. 80; Thompson v. Massie, 41 Ohio (N. S.) 307; Woodworth v. Anderson, ‘63 Iowa, 503; Davis v. Baker, 41 Ohio (N. 8S.) 257; Johnson v. Moore, 33 Kan. 90; Needles v. Shaffer, 60 Iowa, 65; Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa, 166 S. C. 47 Am. Rep. 808; Holmes v. Trum- per, 22 Mich. 427 S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 661; Big. L. C., B. & 28 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Material Alteration. N. 544, and notes; Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 249, 8. 0. 12 Am. Rep. 306; Aldrich v. Smith, 37 Mich. 468 S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 536; Hunt v. Gray, 35 N. J. L. 2278. C. 10 Am. Rep. 232; Draper v. Wood, 112 Mass. 315 S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 92; Stoddard v. Penniman, 108 Mass. 366 8S. ©. 11 Am. Rep. 363; Cambridge &c. Co. v. Hyde, 131 Mass. 77S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 193; Wheelock v. Freeman, 13 Pick. 165 8. C. 23 Am. Dec. 674; Fay v. Smith, 1 Allen, 477 8. C. 79 Am. Dec. 752; Britton v. Diker, 46 Mo. 591 S. C. 2 Am. Rep. 533; First Nat. Bank v. Fricke, 75 Mo. 178 8. C. 42 Am. Rep. 897; Morehead v. Parkers- burg &c. Bank, 5 W. Va. 74 8S. C. 13 Am. Rep. 636; Wallace v. Jewell, 21 Ohio, N.S. 163 8S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 48; Sturges v. Witham, 9 Ohio, N. 8. 253 8. C. 75 Am. Dee. 473; Jones v. Bangs, 40 Ohio, N. 8.139 8. C. 48 Am. Rep. 664; Whitesides v. Northern Bank, 10 Bush, 501 S. C.19 Am. Rep. 74; Kountz v. Kennedy, 63 Pa. 187 S. C. 3 Am. Rep. 541; Fulmer v. Seitz, 68 Pa. 237 8. C. 8 Am. Rep. 172; Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa. 327 S. C.3 Am. Rep. 555; Clark v. Eckstein, 22 Pa. 507 S.C. 62 Am. Dee. 307; Wallace v. Harmstadt, 15 Pa. 462 S. C. 53 Am. ' Dec. 603; Miller v. Reed, 27 Pa. 2448. C.67 Am. Dee. 459; Waring v. Smyth, 2 Barb. ch. 119 8S. ©. 47 Am. Dec. 299; McGrath v. Olark, 56 N. Y. 34 8.0.15 Am. Rep. 372; Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 396 S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 382; Humphrey v. Guillow, 13 N. H. 385 S. ©. 38 Am. Dec. 499; Smith v. Smith, 1 BR. I. 398 S. ©. 53 Am. Dee. 652; Glover v. Robbins, 49 Ala. 219 8. C. 20 Am. Rep. 272; Cannon v. Grigsby, 116 Ill. 151 8. C. 56 Am. Rep. 769; Fuller v. Green, 64 Wis. 159 8S. C. 54 Am. Rep. 600; Vogle v. Repper, 34 Ill. 100 S. ©. 85 Am. Dec. 298; Inglish v. Brenneman, 5 Ark. 379 S. 0. 41 Am. Dec. 96; Wilson v. Henderson, 9 8S. & M. 375 S. 0. 48 Am. Dec. 716; Reed v. Roark, 14 Tex. 329 8S. O. 65 Am. Dec. 127; McCauley v. Gordon, 64 Ga. 221 S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 68; Vaughan v. Fowler, 14 8. C. 355 S. ©. 37 Am. Rep. 731; Nowell v. Mayberry, 3 Leigh, 250 S. ©. 23 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 29 Material Alteration. Am. Dec. 261; Eddy v. Bond, 19 Me. 461 8. C. 36 Am. Dec. 767; Hilbery v. Stover, 25 Me. 69 8. O. 46 Am. Rep. 361; Benjamin v. McConnell, 4 Gilm. 536 8. C. 46 Am. Dee. 474; Bank &c. v. Morrison, 17 Neb. 341 8. C. 52 Am. Rep. 412; State Bank &c. v. Shaffer, 9 Neb. 1 S. C. 31 Am. Rep. 394; Townsend v. Star Wagon Co. 10 Neb. 615 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 493; Brown v. Straw, 6 Neb. 536 S. O. 29 Am. Rep. 369; Holland v. Hatch, 11 Ind. 497 8. C. 71 Am. Dec. 363; Nicholson v. Combs, 90 Ind. 515 S. ©. 46 Am. Rep. 229; Laub v. Paine, 46 Iowa, 550 8S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 163; Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa, 166 S. C. 47 Am. Rep. 808; Hamilton v. Hooper, 46 Iowa, 515 8. C. 26 Am. Rep. 161; Martin v. Lord, 14 Md. 398 8S. C. 74 Am. Dec. 545; Fisher v. Dennis, 6 Cal. 557 S. C. 65 Am. Dec. 534; Visher v. Webster, 8 Cal. 112; Rogers v. Shaw, 59 Cal. 260; Krouskop v. Shoutz, 51 Wis. 204; McVey v. Ely, 5 Lea, 488; Bowman v. Mitch- ell, 79 Ind. 84; Hert v. Oehler, 80 ib. 83; Osborne v. Van Houton, 45 Mich. 444; Craighead v. McLoney, 99 Pa. 211; Kennedy v. Moon, 17 S. ©. 464; Spring- field Bank v. Fricke, 75 Mo. 178 8. C. 42 Am. Rep. 397; Cronkhite v. Nebeker, 81 Ind. 319 8S. OC. 42 Am. Rep. 127; Adair v. Egland, 58 Iowa, 314; Davis v. Henry, 13 Neb. 497; McLaughlin v. Venin, 2 Wyoming, 1; Plyler v. Elliott, 19 S. C. 257; Burnett v. McCluey, 78 Mo. 676; Miller v. Read, 27 Pa. 244 8S. C. 67 Am. Dec. 459). In some courts, it is held that a signing by a third person, not originally contemplated as party, of a note, and before delivery, avoided the instrument as to all (Bowers v. Briggs, 20 Ind. 139; Nicholson v. Combs, 90 ib. 515 S.C. 46 Am. Rep. 229; Sullivan v. Rudisell, 63 Iowa, 158; Dickerman v. Miner, ib. S. 0.50. L.J. 14; Hamilton v. Hooper, 46 Iowa, 515, S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 161; Hall v. McHenry, 19 Iowa, 521; Haskell v. Champion, 30 Mo. 138; Wallace v. Jewell, 21 Ohio, 171; Gardner v. Walsh, 2 El. & BI. 8. C. 32 B. & Eq. 162). Contra: (Mersman v. Werges, 112 U.S. 1398. C. 20 30 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Alteration by Interested Party. C. L. J. 48; Brownell v. Winnie, 29 N. Y. 400 8. ©. 86 Am. Dee. 314, citing Chappell v. Spencer, 28 Barb. 584), and taking a distinction between a joint or joint and several and a several note, applying the principle to the latter case (McCaughey v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 39), It was held in Iowa that an alteration by one of several mortgagors, by inserting additional property, does not avoid the instrument, as to him, at all, nor, as to his co-mortgagors except as the extent of the alteration (Van Horn v. Bell, 11 Iowa, 465 S. C. 79 Am. Dec. 506). Indeed, the court of Virginia holds that when one signed a completed note of principal and surety he and the other surety became co-sureties (Harnsberger v. Yancey, 33 Gratt. 527 S. C. 11 Rep. 29). A distinction is claimed to exist between several and joint notes, but no matter what the form of the instru- ment may be, it is inconceivable how the surety could be prejudiced by the act of another merely signing without some alteration in the body of the note tending to modify his legal status. Alteration by Interested Party.—But while material alter- ations thus avoid an instrument, it is said, that even an alteration of a trifling or unimportant nature will avoid it if made by a party who claims a benefit there- under (Chitty Cont. (10th Am. Ed.) 868; Shep. Touch. 69; Wms. R. P. 114; Wms. P. P. 75; Broom L. M. 65;> Pigot’s case, 11 Coke, 26a; Lewis v. Payne, 8 Cow. 71 8. ©. 18 Am. Dec. 427; Letcher v. Bates, 6 J. J. Marsh, 524 S. C. 22 Am. Dec. 92; Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 14.N.J.L.1788. C. 25 Am. Dee. 509). Although this was once the law, yet, by the weight of modern author- ity, that position cannot be maintained (Shirl. L. C. 151; Aldous v. Cornwall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 543). It is only incidentally ruled in Pigot’s case. The authority of Pigot’s case upon the point under consideration is denied by the Supreme Court of the United States (Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wh. 681, 718). Pigot’s case, so ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 31 Alteration by Interested Party: Filling Blanks: Negotiable Paper. often cited, was on a special verdict, and the only fact found was “that an immaterial interlineation was made without the privity or command of the obligee.” In the course of the discussion it was resolved that such an alteration, if made by the obligee, would avoid the instrument. In one court it was held that where one of several drawers was payee, and erased his name as drawer and indorsed the same, the co-drawers were discharged (Morrison v. Garth, 78 Mo. 434). Filling Blanks: Negotiable Paper.—There is only one point as to filling blanks in negotiable instruments, or, perhaps more accurately writing, parol! contracts, touch- ing which there is any serious discrepancy in judicial thought; and that is when the purchaser of it knew, at the time of his purchase, that it was signed in blank. Some authorities, according to Mr. Daniel, holding that, in such case, the transferee is put upon inquiry, and should, before purchasing, inform himself of the ex- tent of the holder’s authority (1 Dan. N. I. sec. 147;2 Hatch v. Searles, 2 Sm. & Giff. 147). 2 All contracts, declares that most accurate author, Chitty, are called parol, unless they either be specialties or matter of record. A written agreement, not under seal, is classed as a parol contract, and is usually considered as such just as much as any agreement by mere word of mouth (note 36, 2 Black. Com. (Chitty), 465). ?Mr. Daniel cites Byles, Sharswood’s Ed. (5th), (182), (808); (6th), (187), 291, 292, but Byles lays it down that the acceptor, &c. is only chargeable to the extent warranted by the stamp, and in the author’s note, he alludes to the difference in America where no stamp is required—see Shultz ». Astley, 2 Bing. N. C. 544 (29 E. C. L. R.). The only case cited by Mr. Daniel (Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531) so far from bearing out the proposition laid down by him, held that the acceptor was bound as upon an estoppel. Mr. Daniel also leaves out in his liberal quotation from the case of Davidson ». Lanier, 4 Wall., at page 456, these words, namely: “only authorizes the receiver as between himself and the drawer and endorser.” This qualification is necessary to be observed, for the action was between the immediate parties to the bill, and it was therefore a principle in the concrete. In the latter part of the opinion, the learned Chief-Justice states, “if,” (drawee), “having received the bill in blank, had accepted it and nego- 32 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Medio tutissimis ibis. It is almost needless to add that the courts and text- books present a moral unanimity in opposition to such view, and Mr. Daniel so holds (1 Dan. N. I. sec. 147; Benj. Chal. Dig. art. 23 and notes; Byles Bills (6th Ed.) Sharswood’s note, 187 (292); Violett v. Patton, 5 Cr. 147; Bank v. Neal, 22 How. 96; Johnson v. Blasdale, 1 8. & M.178.C.40 Am. Dec. 85; Holland v. Hatch, 11 Ind. 497 8. C. 71 Am. Dec. 363; Gillaspie v. Kelly, 41 Ind. 148, 161 S. ©. 13 Am. Rep. 318; Blackwell v. Kitchen, 53 Ind. 186;. Johns v. Harrison, 20 ib. 324;, Armstrong v. Harshman, 61 ib. 52, 55 S. C. 28 Am. Rep. 665; Coburn v. Webb, 56 Ind. 96 S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 15; Spitler v. James, 32 Ind. 202, 208 8. C. 2 Am. Rep. 334; Davis v. Lee, 26 Miss. 505 8. C. 59 Am. Dec. 267; Snyder v. Van Doren, 46 Wis. 602, 610 8. C. 32 Am. Rep. 739; Androscoggin Bank v. Kimball, 10 Cush. 378; Greenfield &c. Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196; S.C. 25 Am. Rep. 67; Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me. 194 8. C. 16 Am. Rep. 427; Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 234 8. C. 13 Am. Rep. 573; Rainbolt v. Eddy, 34 Iowa, 440 S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 152; Yocum v. Smith, 63 Ill. 321 8. ©. 14 Am. Rep. 120; Blakey v. Johnson, 13 Bush, 197 8. C. 26 Am. Rep. 254; Bank v. Curry, 3 Dana, (Ky.) 142; Moody v. Threl- keld, 13 Ga. 55. Medio tutissimis ibis. Perhaps the true rule is that laid down in Angle v. N. W. &e. Co., 92 U. 8. 330,. namely, that marks of suspicion should put on inquiry, whereas, when it is proposed to impeach the title of a holder for value by matters dehors the instrument itself, knowledge must be proved as an independent fact. A great many authorities are cited, amongst others, Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall, 80. An interesting question has also divided the courts. upon the point as to whether when an addition has been tiated it to a third person, without notice of the facts impeaching its validity between the antecedent parties, those parties would have been pound to the holder.” ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 33 Increasing. Amount. made it amounts to a forgery, or shall be deemed to have been authorized from the nature of the transac- tion. Several adjudications hold that where a sum is in- serted, but, space allowing, another sum is added, such addition stands upon the footing of, and is governed by the general principles applicable to the subject under consideration (Garrard v. Hadden,! 67 Pa. 82 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 412; Blakey v. Johnson, 138 Bush, 197 8. C. 26 Am. Rep. 254; Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 234 8. C. 13 Am. Rep. 573; Insard v. Torres, 10 La. Ann. 103; Yocum ». Smith, 63 Ill. 321 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 120; Cf. Young v. Grote,? 4 Bing. 253 (13 E. ©. L. BR.) 8. C. 12 Moore, 484 (22 E. C. L. R.); Shirl. L. C. (lst Am. Ed.) 358). 1Following Worrall v. Gheen, 39 Pa. 388, which had been doubted in Neff e. Horner, 68 Pa. 327; see also Zimmerman ». Rote, 75 Pa. 188, and Brown v. Reed, 79 Pa. 370 8. C. 21 Am. Rep. 75. ?This case, after having been distinguished, explained and qualified (Robarts v. Tucker, 16 Q. B. 560 (71 E. C. L. R.); Bank v. Evans’s Charities, 5 H. of L. C. 389, 410, 413; Orr v. Union &c. Co., 1 McQ. 107, 114 8. C. 29 E. L. & Eq. 1; Ex Parte Swan, 7 C. B. (N. 8.) 400, 431, 433, 440, 444 (97 E. C. L. R.); Arnold ». Cheque Bank, 1 L. R. (C. P. Div.) 578, 587, 588; Hali- fax Union v. Wheelwright, L. R. (10 Ex.) 183, 192; Barker ». Sterne, 9 Ex. 684, 687; British &c. Co. v. Caledonian &c. Co., 4 McQ. 107, 114; Holmes ». Trumper, 22 Mich. 427 S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 661; Trigg v. Taylor, 27 Mo. 245 8. C. 72 Am. Dec. 263), was shown by Lp. CocksurN “not to fairly raise the point for which it is generally cited; that the question arose i before an arbitrator and was decided without reference to any techni- cality” (Swan v. North British &c. Co. 2H. & C. 175, 189, 190); was doubted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Worrall v. Gheen, 39 Pa. 388; is shaken by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts (Greenfield &c. Bank ». Stowell, 123 Mass. 196 8. C. 25 Am. Rep. 67; Baxendale o. Bennett, 8 Q. B. D. 525 8. C. 19 Alb. L. J. 372); stated as an exception in Ellis ». Ohio &c. Ins. Co., 4 Ohio, (N. §.) 628 8. C. 64 Am. Dec. 610); and denied in Knoxville Nat. Bank v. Clarke, 51 Iowa, 264 8. C. 33 Am. Rep. 129. It is put questioningly by Judge BrczLow (B. & N.574); and “as explained by other cases” by Chalmers, and ranked in his list of overruled and doubted cases (Benj. Chal. Dig. 236, note 1, p. XLI.); though generally cited in the text-books without comment, with the exception of Mr. Morse, who says that “it has always been cited and discussed with great respect” (Morse on Banks &c. (1st Ed.) 302). 3 34 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Sealed Instruments. But this view is antagonized by very able courts (Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427 S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 661, and Big. B. & N. 544; Greenfield &c. Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196 S. C. 25 Am. Rep. 67; Goodman v. East- man, 4 N. H. 455). It is apprehended that the courts favoring the first stated view were governed, to some extent, by the doctrine of POTHIER (Cont. de charge Pt. I. ¢ 4, sec. 99) and by the two Scotch cases of Pagan v. Wylie and Grahame v. Gillespie S. C. Morrison’s Dict. Dec. 1453, 1660 and briefly in Ross. Com. Law, 194,195. It is well known that the Scottish Courts derive much of their learning from the civil law. The reason of the thing is with the Massachusetts and Michigan Cases. In the case of a blank left to be filled, general authority to fill must be assumed; “it amounts” as LORD MANSFIELD said “to a carte blanche ;” but when it has been once filled, the instrument becomes a fait accompli, and an alteration thereafter must produce the same results as when applied to any other completed transaction. Filling Blanks: Sealed Instruments.—We find a great dis- crepancy of judicial thought with reference to the effect of filling blanks, in specialities. The initial case was Texira v. Evans, cited in 1 Anstr, 228. There, one executed a single-bill, in blank as to the amount, and sent it into the money market to raise a loan upon, and it was negotiated and filled up by parol! authority only. Lp. MANSFIELD held it to be a good bond. This decision was questioned by Mr. Preston in his edition of Shep. Touch..68. This case was expressly overruled by Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 6 M. & W. 200, and the latter case has since been adhered to in the English Courts (Humble v. Langston, 7 M. & W. 517; Davidson v. Cooper, 11 ib. 778, 793; Eagleton v. Gutter- 1This word is used in the sense already ascribed to it ante, p. 31, note 1. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 35 idge, 11 ib. 465; Enthoven v. Hoyle, 13 C. B. 373 (76 B. C. L. BRB) 8. C. 9 EL. & Hg. 434; Taylor v. Great &e. | Co., 28 L. J. (ch.) 285; Swan v. Australian Oo., 7H. & N. 603 8. C. 2 H. & ©. 175, 185; 32 L. J. (Ex). 273; ‘Tayler v. Great &c. R. R. Co., 4 De Gex & J. 559 S.C. 28 L. J. (ch.) 709). The text books which favor! the English view are: (Co. Litt. 52a; 2 Greenl. Cruise, R. P.? tit. XX XTI, 32, (46); Story Ag. (9th Hd.) sec. 49; 1 Dan N. I. sec. 148; 1 Add. Cont. sec. 392; Whart. Ag. secs. 48, 49; 2 Whart. Cont. sec. 687; Shep. Touch. (Preston) 68; Perk. Conv. sec. 118; 3 Chitty, 0. & M. 195; 2 Tay. Ev. sec. 1633; 2 Par. Cont. 723, 724; Bull, N. P. 267, 281; 2 Stark. Ev. 431; Com. Dig. Farr A 1, 3 and Obl. B. O; 2 Rob. Prac. {1st ed.) 12-18). The American decisions adhering to this latter view are: Arkansas (Cross v. State Bank, 5 Ark. 531). California (Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85 8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 266). Delaware May be so classed (Clendamil v. Hastings, 5 Harr. 408). Georgia (Ingram v. Little, 14 Ga. 173 8. ©. 58 Am. Dec. 549; Drumwright v. Philpot, 16 Ga. 424 ee C. 60 Am. L360. 738). Illinois (Mans v. Worthing, 3 Ill. 26; Bragg v. Fessen- -den, 11 ib. 544; People v. Oregon, 27 ib. 27; Chase v. Palmer, 29 ib. 306; Hefner v. Palmer, 67 ib. 161; McNabb v. Young, 81 ib. 11; Cf. Smith v. Peoria Co., 57 ib. 412). ies (Ayers v. hoHALED, 14 Kan. 175). Kentucky (Cummings v. Cassidy, 5 B. Mon. 74; Bank ‘&c. v. Pennick, 5 Mon. 25; Lockhart v. Roberts, 3 Bibb, 36; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2 Dana, 102 S. C. 26 Am. Dee. 437). 1 That is, at least incorporate it in their texts. ‘Top paging—the figures between (__) indicate the paragraphs. 36 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Massachusetts (Hunt v. Adams, 5 Mass. 358 8. ©. 4 Am. Dec. 68; 6 Mass. 519; Banorgee v. Hovey, 5 ib. 11, 14; Smith v. Crooker, 5 ib. 538; Boardman v. Gore, 15 ib. 331; Damon v. Inhabitants of Granby, 2 Pick. 345; Dana v. Underwood, 19 ib. 99, 102; Warring v. Williams, 8 ib. 326; Boston &c. Co. v. Dana, 1 Gray 83, 97; Ful- lam v. West Brookfield, 9 All. 1, 6, 7; Burns v. Lynde, 6 ib. 305; Basford v. Pearson, 9 ib. 387). Maryland (Byers v. McClanahan, 6 G. & J. 250, 253, 254). Mississippi (Williams v. Crutcher, 5 How. 71 S. ©. 35 Am. Dec. 422; Lamar v. Simpson, 42 Miss. 345; Dickson v. Hamar, Freem. Ch. 284). North Carolina (McKee v. Hicks, 2 Dev. 379; Daven- port v. Sleight, 2D. & B. 381 8. C. 31 Am. Dec. 420; Graham v. Holt, 3 Ired. 300 8. C. 40 Am. Dec. 408; Beard v. O'Hagan, 64 N. C. 471; Barden v. Southerland, 70 N. C. 528). Ohio (McNaughten v. Partridge, 11 Ohio, 223; Ayers v. Harness, 1 ib. 368 S. C. 13 Am. Dec. 629). Tennessee (Mosby v. Arkansas, 4 Sneed, 324; Gil- bert v. Anthony, 1 Yerg. 69 8. C. 24 Am. Dec. 439; Wynn v. Governer, 1 Yerg. 149; Smith v. Dickinson, 6 Humph. 261; Turbeville v. Ryan, 1 ib. 118 8. C. 34 Am. Dee. 622). Texas! (Viser v. Rice, 33 Tex. 130; Ragsdale v. Robin- son2 48 ib. 397). Vermont (McDonald v. Eggleston, 26 Vt. 161). Virginia (Harrison v. Tiernans, 4 Rand, 177; Preston v. Hull, 23 Gratt. 600, 613 S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 153; 12 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 699). 1Tt should be borne in mind, in weighing the value of the decisions in Texas, Indiana and Louisiana, that private seals have been abolished in those States. °This decision pronounces such deeds valid in the hands of innocent purchasers for value, but the inclination is to align this court with those adhering to Texira o. Evans. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. | 37 West Virginia (Newlin v. Beard, 6 W. Va. 110). The decisions sustaining the doctrine, as laid down in Texira v. Evans, are: Alabama (Boardman v. Gore, 1 Stew. 517; Gibbs v. Frost, 4 Ala. (N. 8.) 720.) Cf. (Bibb v. Reed, 3 Ala. 38). Connecticut Inclines this way, (Starr v. Lyon, 5 Conn. 540; Bridgeport Bank v. N. Y. &c. Co., 30 %b. 231). Indiana (Richmond Sc. Co. v. Davis, 7 Blackf. 412). Iowa (Owen v. Perry, 25 Iowa, 412; Devin v. Hiner, 29 ib. 298; Clark v. Allen, 34 ib. 190; Swartz v. Ballow, 47 ib. 188 S. C. 29 Am. Rep. 470; correcting the dictum of DrLLon J. in Simms »v. Herring, 19 Iowa, 273). Louisiana (Bell v. Keefe, 13 La. Ann. 524,) seems to favor this view. The decision was predicated upon an official bond. . Maine Seems to incline this way (Hale v. Russ, 1 Greenl. 337; Inhabitants &c. v. Huntress, 53 Me. 89). Minnesota In favor of a purchaser for value without notice (Pence v. Arbuckle, 22 Minn. 417). Missouri (Burnside v. Wayman, 49 Mo. 356; Field v. Stagg, 52 ib. 534 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 435; Douthet ». Stinson, 63 Mo. 268; McQuie v. Peay, 58 ib. 56). Wew Hampshire It seems should be aligned in this way (Despatch Line v. Bellamy &c. Co., 12 N. H. 205, 234 S. ©. 37 Am. Dec. 203; Humphreys v. Guillow, 13 N. H. 385 8. C. 38 Am. Dec. 499). Pennsylvania (Sigfried uv. Levan, 68. & RB. 3088. C.9 Am. Dec. 427; Stahl v. Berger, 10S. & R. 170 8. C. 13 Am. Dec. 666; Wiley v. Moor, 178. & R. 488 8. C. 17 Am. Dec. 696; Wallace v. Harmstad, 15 Pa. 462 8. C. 53 Am. Dec. 603, is distinguishable).1 South Carolina (Boyd uv. Boyd, 2N. & Me. 125; Per- 1At least it seems to be, and there is no citation or distinguishing or overruling of the former cases. Mr Rawle ranks her courts as in the text, citing Wallace v. Harmstad (Smith, Cont. (8d Am. Ed.) 59, top, note 1.) 38 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. By Stranger. minter v. McDaniel, 1 Hill, 267 8. C. 26 Am. Dec. 179; Duncan v. Hodges,! 4 Me. 239 S.C. 17 Am. Dec. 734; Gourdin v. Commander, 6 Rich. 497, 504; Bank v, Ham- mond, 1 Rich. 291). Wisconsin (Van Etta v. Evanson, 28 Wis. 33 8. C. 9 Am. Rep. 486; Vliet v. Camp, 13 Wis. 198; Schientz v. McManamay, 33 ib. 299). In the State of New York the decisions are conflict- ing inter sese, and owing to the peculiar constitution of her courts it is deemed best not to attempt classification. The following cases have been adjudged pro and con: (Woolley v. Constant, 4 John, 54 8. C. 4 Am. Dee. 246; ex parte Decker, 6 Cow. 60; ex parte Kirwin, 8 Cow. 118; Hanford v. McNair, 9 Wend. 54; Blood v. Good- rich, 9 ib. 68 S. C. 24 Am. Dec. 121; Com. Bank ». Kortright, 22 Wend. 348 8. C. 34 Am. Dee. 317; Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229; Chauncey v. Arnold, 24 ib. 330; People v. Bostwick, 32 ib. 445). Alteration by a stranger—The proposition that a mater- ial alteration, no matter by whom made, vitiates the instrument, is firmly established in England. This is 1 While ranking South Carolina on this side, unquestionably the reason- ing in Duncan ». Hodge, is entirely in accord with the case of Hibblewhite ». McMorine. It strictly follows the case of Hudson ». Revett, 5 Bing. 368 (15 E. C. L. R.) 8. C. 2M. & P. 663. In that case an important blank was left in a deed executed. and afterwards the blank was filled in the presence and with the assent of the bargainor. This was held to be tantamount to a re-delivery of the deed. The case of Hudson v. Revett, has been repeatedly cited as antagonized to Hibblewhite ». McMorine. It preceded the latter case and was cited herein. In England it has always been distinguished (West ». Steward, 14 M. & W. 47; Tupper v. Foulkes, 9 C. B. (N. 8.) 797 8. C. 1 Jur. (N. 8.) 709; 30 L. J. C. P. 214; 9 W. R. 349; 3 L. T. (N. 8.) 741), and in several cases in this country (Duncan v. Hodge, 4 McC. 239; Davenport ». Sleight, 2 D. & B. 381 8. C. 31 Am. Dec. 420; Collins ». Collins, 51 Miss. 311 8. C. 24 Am. Rep. 632—see 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 568a, note 6). 2 Prof. Parsons, in his work on Contracts (2 Vol. 716), adheres to the English doctrine, but in his later treatise he calls it the “old doctrine” (2.N. & B. 574), And the late Mr. Justice Story pronounced the English doc- ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 39 sometimes called a spoliation (Shirl. L. C. 151; Master v. Miller, 1 Smith L. C. (5th Am. Ed.) 956; Chitty Cont. _ (10th Am. Ed.) 869; Wms. R. P. 114; Wms. P. P. 75; Broom L. M. 65; 2 Wms. Saund. 200), note (b); 2 Tay. Ev. sec. 1624; 2 Dan. N. I. sec. 1373; Robinson’s Prac. (N. Ed.) 187; Byles Bills (Shars. Ed.) 482; Thompson Bills, 110; Davidson v. Cooper, 11 M. & W. 795 8. 0. 13 ib. 343. See following: (Bank of Hindustan v. Smith, 36 L. J. C. P. 241; Pereau v. Frederick, 17 Neb. 117). But this view is denied and the contrary maintained by very respectable authorities: (Am. notes to Master v. Miller, supra; Smith on R. & P. P. 722; Shep. Touch. (Prest. Ed.) 69; Burton on R. P., sec. 443; 2 Par. N. & B. 574; 1 Add. Cont. sec. 389, note; Big. Fraud, ch. IT. sec. 4, p. 107; Big. L. C. B. & N. 581, 582; 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 566;1 Reynold’s Steph. Dig. Ev. art. 89, note; U.S. v. Spalding, 2 Mas. 478; art. 15 C. L. J. 62, 65; Union Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 45 Wis. 373; Gorden v. Robert- son, 48 Wis. 393; Bridges v. Winters, 42 Miss. 135 8. C. 2 Am. Rep. 598; Croft v. White, 36 Miss. 455; Cochran v. Nebeker, 48 Ind. 459; State v. Berg, 50 Ind. 496; Brooks v. Allen, 62 Ind. 401; Buckelew v. Huff, 53 Ind. 474; Broadwell v. Stiles, 8 N. J. L. 58; City &e. wv. Benson, 12 Cush. 61; Ford v. Ford, 17 Pick. 418; Simp- son v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269 8. C. 20 Am. Rep. 324; Hunt v. Gray, 35 N. J. L. 227 8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 232; Marshall v. Gouglar, 10 8S. & R. 164; Robertson v. Hay, 91 Pa. 342; Langenberger v. Kroeger, 48 Cal. 147 S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 418; Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y. 573 8. CO. 15 Am. Rep. 534; Rees v. Overbaugh, 6 Cow. 716; Waring v. Smyth, 2 Barb. Ch. 119 8. C. 47 Am. Dee. 299; trine as repugnant to common sense and justice, and deserving no better name than a technical quibble (U. 8. v. Spalding, 2 Mas. 478). 1In his note, the learned author seems to make fraud an element. But cui bono? why should the intention of a stranger have the slightest bearing ? Connivance should have the utmost. 40 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Original Consideration. Smith v. McGowan, 3 Barb. 404; Marcy v. Dunlop, 5 Lans. 365; Smith v. Fellows, 9 Jones & S. 51; Cutts v. U. S., 1 Gall. 69; Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192; Bailey v. Taylor, 11-Conn. 531 S. C. 29 Am. Dee. 321; Bigelow v. Stilphens, 35 Vt. 521; Bellows v. Weeks, 45 ib. 69; Boothby v. Stanley, 34 Me. 515; Medlen w. Platte Co., 8 Mo. 235 S. C. 40 Am. Dee. 135; Lubbering v. Kohl- brecker, 22 Mo. 596; Davis v. Carlisle, 6 Ala. 707; Boyd v. McConnell, 10 Humph. 68; Crockett v. Thomason, 5 Sneed, 342; Terry v. Hazlewood, 1 Duv. 104; Lee ». Alexander, 9 B. Mon. 25 8S. ©. 48 Am. Dec. 412; Blakey v. Johnson, 13 Bush, 197; Vogel v. Ripper, 34 Ill. 106; Major v. Hansen, 2 Biss. 195; Smith v. U. 8., 2 Wall. 219; Rowley v. Jewett, 56 Iowa, 492; John v. Hatfield, 84 Ind. 75; Eckert v. Louis, ib. 99; Milberry v. Storer; 75 Me. 69 S. C. 46 Am. Rep. 361; Nickerson v. Swett, 135 Mass. 514; Condict v. Flower, 106 Tl. 105). Dr. Wharton distinguishes, as to alterations made by a stranger, between instances where the alteration was made while in the custody of a person, claiming under it, and where otherwise. In the former he holds that the instrument is avoided, in the latter, not (2 Whart. Cont. sec. 702).1 Original Consideration—There has been a grave differ- ence upon the question as to whether there can be a resort in case of spoliation to the original debt or consideration (2 Par. N. & B. 572, 573). There are authorities both ways. The doctrine and exceptions are clearly stated in (Benj. Chal. Dig. art. 249 and illustrations, and 2 Dan. N. I. sec. 1411; Big. B. & N. 576 note). Byles lays it down that an alteration by the drawer ‘It seems that even great authors, (Judge Redfield, Dr. Wharton and Prof. Greenleaf), will not allow Jackson v. Malin to sleep quietly in its grave. This case is overruled by Herrick v. Malin, 22 Wend. 388. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 41 and payee of a bill, or the payee of a note, does not extinguish the consideration, but that it is otherwise as to the effect of an alteration made by the endorsers ‘(Byles Bills (L. L. Ed.) 243); of this opinion is Prof. Parsons (2 N. & B. 572, 573). The following cases may be consulted on this point: (Sutton v. Toomer, 7 B. & C. 416 (14 E. C. L. B.)S. ©. 1M. & Ry. 125 (17 E. C. L. R.); Jacobs v. Hart, 2 Stark. 45 (3 BE. C. L. RB.) 8S. C. 6M. & 8. 142; Byrom v. Thompson, 11 A. & EH. 31 (89 E. C. L. B.); Atkinson v. Hawdon, 2 A. & EH. 628 (29 H. C. L. BR.) S. 0.4 N. & M. 408 (30 E. C. L. R.); 1 Harr. & W. 77; Alderson »v. Langdale, 3 B. & Ad. 660 (23 E. C. L. R.); Powell v. Divett, 15 East. 29; Jardine v. Payne, 1 B. & Ad. 663 (20 E. C. L. R.); Long v. Moore, 3 Esp. 155 note; Gould v. Combs, 1 C. B. 543 (50 EH. OC. L. R.); Jones v. Ryder, 4M. & M. 32; Sloman v. Cox, 1 Cr. M. & R. 471; Holland v. Hatch, 11 Ind. 497 8. ©. 71 Am. Dec. 363; Merrick v. Boury, 4 Ohio, (N. 8.) 60; Harsh v. Klepper, 20 Ohio, (N. 8.) 200; Waring v. Smyth, 2 Barb. Ch. 119 S. 0. 47 Am. Dec. 299; Clute v. Small, 17 Wend. 238; Booth v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 22; Martindale v. Follett, 1 N. H. 95; Smith v. Mace, 44 N. H. 553; Boardman v. Gore, 15 Mass. 331; Lewisv. Schenck, 18 N. J. Eq. (3 Green), 459; Anison v. Hamstead, 2 Barr. 101; Lewis v. Kra- mer, 3 Md. 265; Whittier v. Frye, 10 Mo. 348; Evans v. ‘Toreman, 60 Mo. 449; White v. Hass, 32 Ala. 430 8. C. 70 Am. Dee. 548; Crockett v. Thomason, 5 Sneed, 342; Mills v. Starr, 2 Bail. 359; Angle v. N. W. &e. Ins. Co., 92 U. 8. 330, 342). Again a distinction is taken touching the resort to the original consideration in cases of alteration, as to a presumption, some holding against the idea of fraud in the alteration, others, that, if material, it shall be pre- sumed fraudulent (2 Dan. N. I. sec. 1412). Under the first class may be ranked: (Gist v. Evans, 30 Ark. 286; Vogle v. Ripper, 34 Ill. 100). 42 ALTERATION OF IN STRUMENTS. Suspicious Alterations: Against Interest. Under the latter: (Whittier v. Frye, 10 Mo. 348, 349; and see Wheelock v. Freeman, 13 Pick. 165 8. C. 23 Am. Dec. 674; Robinson v. Reed, 33 Wis. 488). Mr. Daniel adopts the latter view (N. I. sec. 1412). It may be added, on account of its great weight, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds that if the alteration be not fraudulent, and the rights of third persons have not attached or become involved, a recovery may be had upon the altered instrument. ' (Kountz v. Kennedy, 63 Pa. 187 8. ©. 3 Am. Rep: 541). Suspicious Alterations——By some authorities it is held that there is a presumption of law that suspicious alterations were made after, but other alterations before (1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 564; 1 Whart. Ev. sec. 629; 2 Dan. N. I. sees. 1417, 1418; Cox v. Palmer, 1 McCrary, 431; Stoner v. Hillis, 6 Ind. 152; Huntington v. Finch, 3 Ohio St. 445; Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192; Burn- ham v. Ayer, 35 N. H. 351; Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205 S. C. 49 Am. Dec. 775; First Nat. Bank v. Franklin, 20 Kan. 264; Neil v. Case, 25 Kan. 510 8. C. 37 Am. Rep. 259; Matthews v. Coalter, 9 Mo. 696; Jackson v. Jacoby, 9 Cow. 125; Wilde v. Armsby, 6 Cush. 314; Maybee v. Sniffen, 2 E. D. Smith 1 8. C. 16 N. Y. 560; 10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 18; Howard v. Colquhoun, 28 Tex. 134; Pringle v. Chambers, 1 Abb. Pr. 58; Burton v. Presley, 1 Cheves, (S. C.) pt. 2,11; Welch v. Coulborn, 3 Houst. (Del.) 647; Morris v. Bowman, 12 Gray, 467; Wilson, v. Harris, 35 Iowa, 507; Simpson v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269 S. C. 20 Am.. Rep. 324; Hill v. Coley, 46 Pa. 178). Against Interest Again the point is held to depend upon whether the alteration is or not against the interest of the party relying on the instrument. If not, it is presumed to have been made before execution (1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 564; Knight v. Clements, 8 A. & E. 215; Chesley v. Frost, 1 N. H. 145; Den v. Farlee, 21 N. J. L. 279; Humphreys v. Guillow, 13 N. H. 385 8. C. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 43 Suspicious. 38 Am. Dec. 499; Walters v. Short, 5 Gilm. 252; Barrington v. Bank, 14 8. & R. 423; Coulson v. Walton, 9 Pet. 62, 78; Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. 531; 8. C. 29 Am. Dec. 321; Jackson v. Jacoby, 9 Cow. 125; Wilde ». Armsby, 6 Cush. 314; Huntington v. Finch, 3 Ohio St. 449; Pullen v. Shaw, 3 Dev. 238; Tillow v. Clinton &c. Co., 7 Barb. 564; Heffelfinger v. Shutz, 16 8S. & R. 44, 46; Trow v. Glenn Cove Starch Co., 1 Daly, 280; but see Chism v. Toomer, 27 Ark. 108). Prof. Parsons in his treatise on Notes and Bills, 2 vol. 572, dissents from this idea, and according to our view on sound reasons. It is but another illustra- tion of the difficulty the courts always involve them- selves in when they attempt to decide an inference really of fact. Take two extreme cases. A holds a note on B for one hundred thousand dollars, and when the prescription or limitation is about to bar its. recovery, A enters a credit of one dollar. A holds a note on B for fifty dollars, and under like circum- stances he enters a credit of forty five dollars. In the great majority of cases the first indorsement would properly be determined fraudulent, and in the latter valid, yet a jury might find in each case just the other way. It all depends upon bona fides, and that question should always be left to the jury. . Suspicious—In some courts, it is held that if the alteration be not suspicious, explanatory evidence is not required (Feig v. Myers, 102 Pa. 10; Munroe v. East- man, 31 Mich. 283; Paramore v. Lindsey, 63 Mo. 67). In others, however, it is held that if the party who is bound to explain a suspicious alteration offers no evidence for the purpose, the instrument may be rejected by the court as inadmissible (Burgwin v. Bishop, 91 Pa. 336; Tillow v. Clinton &c. Co., 7 Barb. 564; but see Maybee v. Sniffen, 2 E. D. Smith, 18. ©. 16 N. Y. 560; 10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 18). 44 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Apparent: Indorsements: Evidence aliunde, &. &c. Apparent—Again it has been held that when the alteration is not apparent the burden of proof is upon the party alleging it (Pullen v. Hutchinson, 12 Shepl. 254; Muckleroy v. Bethany, 27 Tex. 551; Brown v. Phelon, 2 Swan, 629; Meike v. St. Sav. Inst., 56 Ind. 355). As to whether or not when the instrument is offered it bears upon its face indications of an alteration, it is necessary to produce evidence explanatory of such condition, there is a conflict of authority. The following cases seem to lay down the affirmative of the proposition: (Hoey v. Jarman, 39 N. J. L. 523; Robinson v. Reed, 43 Iowa, 218; Cochran v. Nebeker, 48 Ind. 459). The following, the negative: (Burgwin v. Bishop, 91 Pa. 336; Jordan v. Stewart, 23 Pa. 234; Robinson ». Myers, 67 Pa. 9; German &c. Co. v. Gerber, 4 Ill. App. 222; Page v. Danaher, 43 Wis. 221; Gist v. Gans, 30 Ark. 285—Consult on this point, 1 Whart. Ev. sec. 629, and cases cited). Indorsements.—Some decisions hold that an indorse- ment on the back of an instrument is to be deemed to have been made contemporaneously with its execution (Brooke v. Smith, Moor. (Iowa) 679). In others not (Emerson v. Murray, 4 N. H. 171). Submitted without Evidence Aliunde.—In others, still, the instrument, upon proof of execution, is submitted to the jury with or without explanatory evidence aliunde (Hoey v. Jarman, 39 N. J. L. 523; Dodge v. Haskell, 69 Me. 429; Cole v. Hills, 44 N. H. 227; Hayden v. Goodnow, 39 Conn. 164). But according to the New Jersey decisions the jury must be satisfied by a preponderance of the testimony that any material alteration was rightfully made (cases supra, and Putnam v. Olark, 33 N. J. Hg. 328, 348). Printed Words.—Alteration in printed words need not be explained (Corcoran v. Doll, 32 Cal. 89. See 2 Dan. N. I. sec. 1419). ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 45 Documents.—Records.—Depositions.—Official Papers, &c. Old Documents.— Alterations in old documents are pre- sumed to have been made at or before execution (Rus- sell v. Peyton, 4 Ill. App. 473). Indictments.— Alterations in indictments are presumed to have been made before finding (French v. State, 12. Ind. 670). Records.—So as to records (Lutz v. Kelly, 47 Iowa, 307). ‘Depositions.—So as to depositions (Wallace v. McElevy, 2 Grant Cas. 44). Official Papers.—So as to official papers (Devoy v. New York, 22 How. Pr. 226 S. C. 35 Barb. 264; Sloan »v. Stanley, 11 Ired. 627; People v. Minck, 21 N. Y. 539; Davis v. Davis, 48 Vt. 502; Doe v. McGill, 8 U. C. (Q. B.) 224. But see Dolph v. Bamiey, 5 Or. 192; U.S. . Galbraith, 2 Black. 394; Lazier v. Westeeus 26 N. Y. 146 S. OC. 82 Am. Dee. 454.) Evidence Touching.—It has been held in one case in the United States that where an alteration is apparent the impeaching party may prove alterations in other notes which formed the consideration for the note in suit, as tending to show that the alteration in question was made fraudulently (Rankin v. Blackwell, 2 John Cas, 198). But as Prof. Parsons observes this proposition is. open to doubt (2 N. & B. 579). In England the doctrine is denied (Thompson v. Mosley, 5 ©. & P. 501), (24 E. C. L. R.). If the defendant offers evidence tending to show that the alteration was made after execution, the burden of proof is shifted to the plaintiff to show that it was made by the defendant’s authority (Capital Bank v. Arm- strong, 62 Mo. 59). As Governed by the Pleading.—It seems that the defence must be raised in some way by the pleading (Parry 46 COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. Governed by the Pleading. v. Nicholson,! 13 M. & W. 778). This was a decision under the new rules, but should, perhaps, furnish an analogy to the pleader under the Code system—see Wells v. Moore, 15 Tex. 521. Independent of this consideration, if, by the practice, the execution of a particular instrument can only be denied under oath, - the burden, (according to the Supreme Courts of Illinois and Iowa), is upon the defendant (Walters v. Short, 5 Gilm. 252; Warren v. Chickasaw, 13 Iowa, 588). In an action upon a note in which the making is alleged in the declaration—the answer denying execution and alleging an alteration—the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant executed the note (Simpson v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269 8S. C. 20 Am. Rep 324; Putnam v. Clark, 33 N. J. Eq. 328, 338 S. ©. 29 N. J. Eq. 412). But even if there has been a judgment by default, the jury are not obliged to disregard the note (Runnion ». Crane, 4 Blackf. 466). But Mr. Justice McLean held on the circuit, in an action on notes in which there were erasures, that the plaintiff could not read the notes without explaining the erasures, although their execution was not denied by the pleading (Abbe v. Rood, 6 McL. 106). Where a signing and delivery are admitted but the answer avers that it has been altered in a material part, the burden is on the defendant to prove that it is a material alteration (Cochran v. Nebeker, 48 Ind. 459. Contra, Chism v. Toomer, 27 Ark. 109). COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. When -the issue is raised upon the genuineness of handwriting, can a witness be allowed to give an opinion ' See this,case explained in Hirschman o. Budd, L. R. 8 Ex. 171 8. C.5 E. R. (Moak), 361. -COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. 47 thereon merely by comparing the disputed writing with other writings admitted or shown to be genuine? The negative of this proposition is maintained by the following courts: England (Brookbord v. Woodley, Peake’s C. 21n; Mac- pherson v. Thoytes, ib. 20; Stranger v. Searle, 1 Esp. C. 14; Goodtitle v. Braham, 4 T. R. 497; Doe v. Sucker- more, 2 Nev. & P: 54 (BE. C. L. RB.) 8.0.5 A. & B. 703 (31 E. C. L. R.); changed by act of Parliament, 28 and 29 Vic. ch. 18, sec. 8). In the dlgssification which we now proceed to make, those courts which reject the evidence as applied to writings not in evidence in the cause, are cited, noting as we progress the modification as to these writings which have been received as pertinent evidence in the cause, and some other points not coming within the reason of the negative rule. Alabama—The courts of this State reject such testimony unless the writings are already in evidence; in which case the jury are allowed to make the comparison (Little v. Beazley, 2 Ala. 703 8. C. 36 Am. Dec. 431; State v. Givens, 5 Ala. 747; Crist v. State, 21 1b. 137; Bishop v. State, 30 ib. 34; Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 ib. 630). , Arkansas—The same rule obtains in this State as in Alabama (Miller v. Jones, 32 Ark. 338). Colorado—Same (Wilber v. Hicholtz, 5 Col. 240). Georgia—Followed Alabama until the rule was changed by statute, code, sec. 3840 (Henderson v. Hackney, 16 Ga. 521; Boggins v. State, 34 ib. 278; Georgia &c. Co., v. Gibson, 52 ib. 643). Illincis—The same rule prevails in this State (Pate v. People, 8 Ill. 644; Jumpertz v. People, 21 ib. 375; Ker v. Hill, 37 ib. 109; Putnem v. Wadley, 40 ib. 346; Brob- ston v. Cahill, 64 ib. 356; Trustees &c. v. Misenheimer, 78 ib. 22). Iowa—lIt is difficult to classify this court, as the subject is regulated by statute, but the leaning of the court is 48 COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. discoverable by the strict construction it has given to a. remedial statute, code, sec. 3655 (Hyde v. Woolfolk, 1 Iowa, 160; Baker v. Mygatt, 14 ib. 131; Morris v. Sargent, 18 ib. 97; Borland v. Walrath, 33 7b. 133). Maryland—Follows the Alabama rule with an extension to ancient writings (Smith v. Walton, 8 Gill, 77; Arm- strong v. Thurston, 11 Md. 148; Williams v. Drexel, 14 4b. 566; Tome v. Parkersburg &c. Co., 39 ib. 36 8S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 540; Herrick v. Swomley, 56 Md. 439). Michigan—So does this State (Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287; Van Sickle v. People, 29 ib. 61; Foster’s Will, 34 4b. 21; First &c. Bank v. Robert, 41 ib. 709; Worth »v. McConnell, 42 ib. 473; Howard v. Patrick, 43 ib. 128; People v. Cline, 44 ib. 291). Missouri—So does Missouri (Dow v. Speuny, 29 Mo. 387; State v. Scott, 45 ib. 302; Corby v. Weddle, 57 ib. 422; State v. Clinton, 67 ib. 380; Springer v. Hall, 83 ib. 693 S. C. 53 Am. Rep. 598; State v. Tompkins, 71 Mo. 452; Pourcelly v. Lewis, 8 Mo. App. 593). New Jersey—In this State the courts follow the Ala- bama rule and extend the rule as to other writings, where the writing in dispute is ancient (Crissman v. Schoonover, 3 N. J. L. 116; Goldsmith v. Bain, 8 ib. 87; Mutual &c. Co. v. Brown, 30 N. J. Eq. 193 S. C. 32 ib. 809). It is now allowed by statute (Rev. Stat. sec. 19). New York.—Follows the Alabama rule (Titford v. Knott, 2 John Cas, 210; Jackson v. Phillips, 9 Cow. 94, 112; Wilson v. Kirkland, 5 Hill, 183; People v. Spooner, 1 Den, 343 8. ©. 43 Am. Dec. 672; Frank v. Chemical &c. Bank, 5 J. & 8. 31; Glover v. People, 7 Hun. 232; Gilbert v. Simpson, 6 Daly, 30; Ellis v. People, 21 How. Pr. 358; Van Wyck v. McIntosh, 14 N. Y. 439; Dubois v. Baker, 30 ib. 355; Randolph v. Loughlin, 48 #b.. 456; Miles v. Loomis, 75 ib. 288 8. C. 31 Am. Rep. 4703: Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N. Y. 41 S. ©. 19 Alb. L. J. 367; 37 Am. Rep. 538; Pontius v. People, 82 N. Y. 339; COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. 49 Pennsylvania and South Carolina Rule. Peck v. Callaghan, 95 ib. 73). The question is now de- pendent upon a statute, and under it, collateral writings shown to be genuine can be made the standard (Peck v. Callaghan, supra). North Carolina—Follows the Alabama rule (State v. Allen, 1 Hawks, 6 8S. C. 9 Am. Dec. 616; Pope v. Askew, 1 Ired. 16 8. C. 35 Am. Dec. 729; Gordon v. Price, 10 Ired. 385; McKonkey v. Gaylord, 1 Jon. 94; Outlaw v. Hurdle, ib. 150; Otey v. Hoyt, 3 Jon. 407; Yates v. Yates, 76 N. ©. 142). Ohio—May be so classified (Murphy v. Hagerman, Wright, 293; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5 8. C. 22 Am. Dee. 767; Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio, 426; Pavey v. Pavey, 30 ib. 600; Bragg v. Colwell, 19 Ohio, (N. 8.) 413). Pennsylvania—The Alabama rule prevails with the ex- tension of the doctrine, so as to allow collateral writings to be employed as the standard to corroborate testimony already delivered to the main point (Pennsylvania v. McKee, Add. 33; McCorkle v. Binns, 5 Binn. 340 S. C. 6 Am. Dec. 420; Baker v. Haines, 6 What. 284; Callan v. Gaylord, 3 Watts, 321; Farmers &c. Bank v. White- hill, 10 S. & R. 110; Lodge v. Phypher, 11 ib. 333; Vickery v. Kelly, 14 ib. 372; Bank v. Haldeman, 1 Pa. 161; Slaymaker v. Wilson, ib. 216; O’Connor v. Layton, 2 Am. L. Reg. 120; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Hickman, 28 ‘Pa. 313; Travis v. Brown, 43 ib. 9 8. C. 82 Am. Dee. 540; Haycock v. Greup, 57 Pa. 438; Burkholder v. Plank, 69 ib. 235; Fulton v. Hood, 34 ib. 365 S. ©. 75 Am. Dec. 664; Aumuck v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 211; Reese v. Reese, 90 Pa. 94; Berryhill v. Kirchner, 96 ib. 489; Clayton v. Siebert, 3 Brewst. 176). The comparison is to be made by the jury, and experts are excluded (Travis v. Brown, supra). Rhode Island, (Kinney v. Flynn, 2 R. I. 319; State v, Brown, 4 ib. 528 S. C. 70 Am. Dec. 168). South Carolina—This court follows substantially the Pennsylvania ruling, except in excluding experts (Bird 50 COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. Tenn: Texas: Va: W.Va: Wis.; 8.C.U.8.:° O.C. U.S. v. Miller, 1 MeM. 125; Robertson v. Miller, ib. 120, Boman v. Plunkett, 2 McC. 518; Duncan v. Beard, ib. 401; Richardson v. Johnson, 3 Brev. 51; Desbrow v. Farrow, 3 Rich. 282; Bennett v. Matthews, 5 S. C. 478; Benedict v. Flanigan, 18 8. ©. 506 8. C. 44 Am. Rep. 583). Tennessee——Not allowed except by consent (Fogg v. Dennis, 3 Hump. 47; Kannon v. Galloway, 58 Tenn. (2 Baxt.) 230; Wright v. Hessey, 3 ib. 42; Clark v. Rhodes, 2 Heisk. 208). Texas—Not allowed before the statute (Pas. Dig. art. 3182; Hanley v. Gaudy, 28 Tex. 211; Ballard v. Perry, ib. 347; Sartor v. Bohinger, 59 ib. 411; Mattock v. Glover, 63 ib. 231; Phillips v. State, 6 Tex. App. 364; Heard v. State, 9 ib. 18; Rogers v. State, 11 ib. 608). Virginia—Not allowed in this State (Rowt v. Kyle, 1 Leigh. 216; Burress’ Case, 27 Gratt. 946). West Virginia—Not allowed in this State (Clay v. Robin- son, 7 W. Va. 348; Clay v. Alderson, 10 ib. 49). Wisconsin—Followed the 8. C. rule before the statute (Pierce v. Northey, 14 Wis. 9; Hazleton v. Union Bank, 32 ib. 34, 47; State v. Miller, 47 ib. 530). Supreme Court U. 8—Adopts the Alabama rule (Strother v. Lucas, 6 Pet. 763; Rogers v. Ritter, 12 Wall. 317; Moore v. U. S. 91 U.S. 2708S. C. 3 ©. L. J. 187). Circuit Court U. S—Reject this testimony (Muriati v. Luciani, Bald. 49; Smith v. Fenner, 1 Gall. 170; Martin v. Taylor, 1 Wash. C. C. 1; U.S. v. Craig, 4 ib. 29; Dunlop v. Silver, 1 Cr. C. ©. 27; Shannon v. Fox, id. 133; Brook v. Peyton, ib. 96; Macubbin v. Lovell, ib. 184; Reid v. Hodgson, ib. 491; Turner v. Foxhall, 2 ib. 324; Elliott v. Hayman, ib. 678; U. S.-v. Prout, 4 ib. 301; U. S. v. Chamberlain, 12 Blatchf. 390; U. S. v. Jones, 20 ib. 235 S. OC. 13 Rep. 165; 10 Fed. Rep. 469). In the last case the court held that the United States Courts in criminal actions were not bound by the Statal decisions. There is one case in which the doctrine COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. 51 Modified Form. seems to have met with the approval of Mr. Justice Grier (U. 8S. v. Darnaud, 3 Wall. Jr. 181). The following courts allow this kind of evidence, some in a modified form, which will be noted as we proceed. Connecticut (State v. Nettleton, 1 Root, 308; Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 55; Tyler v. Todd, 36 ib. 218). - ; Delaware (McCafferty v. Heritage, 5 Del. 220. Indiana—The earlier decisions were conflicting and irreconcilable, but the rule finally settled on, seems to be that such evidence is permissible, provided the writ- ings offered as standards are agreed to be genuine, but, that they cannot be submitted to the jury (Clark v. Wyatt.) 15 Ind. 271 8. C. 77 Am. Dee. 90; Shank v. Butsch, 28 ib. 20; Chance v. Indianapolis &ec. Co., 32 4b. 472; Burdick v. Hunt, 43 ib. 281; Houston v. Schind- ler, 46 ib. 40; Jones v. State, 60 ib. 241; Forgey v. Bank, 66 ib. 125; Hazzard v. Vickery, 78 ib. 64; Shorb wv. Kinzie, 80 ib. 500 S. C. 100 ib. 429). Kansas—Admits it without qualification (McComber v. Scott, 10 Kan. 340; Abbott v. Coleman, 22 1b. 250). Kentucky—Allowed as to ancient writings or those already in evidence, as corroborative of testimony on the writing in dispute (Northern Bank v. Buford, 1 Duv. 335; Woodward v. Spiller, 1 Dana. 179 8. C. 25 Am. Dec. 139; McAllister v. McAllister, 7 B. Mon. 269; Bannister v. Weatherford, ib. 271; Hawkins v. Grimes, 13 ib. 260). Louisiana—Code, arts. 226, 2240, 2241, allows “com- parison” without any qualifying terms. The courts construing the statute incline to restrain the generality of that word (inter alia, Harris v. ‘Patten, 2 La. Ann. 217; Fox v. McDonough, 18 ib. 445; State v. Fritz, 23 éb. 55; State v. Barrow, 31 ib. 691). Maine (Hammond’s Case 2 Greenl. 33 S. C. 11 Am. Dec. 39; Page v. Homans, 14 Me. 478; Swiester v. 1 Said to have been overruled. 52 COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. Experts: Jury. Lowell, 33 ib. 446; Hopkins v. Megguire, 35 ib. 78; Withee v. Rowe, 45 ib. 571; Woodman v. Dana, 52 ib. 9). Massachusetts (Homer v. Wallis, 11 Mass. 309 S. C. 6 Am. Dec. 169; Hall v. Huse, 10 Mass. 39; Salem Bank v. Gloster Bank, 17 ib. 1, 25; Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 490 8S. C. 28 Am. Dec. 317; Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 189, 218; Cabot Bank v. Russell, 4 Gray, 167; Mar- tin v. Maguire, 7 ib. 177; Bacon v. Williams, 13 ib. 525; Marcy v. Barnes, 16 ib. 151; Jewett v. Draper, 6 All. 434; Richardson v. Newcomb, 21 :Pick. 315; McKeone v. Barnes, 108 Mass. 344; Nunes v. Perry, 113 ib. 274; Com. v. Coe, 115 ib. 481; Demerritt v. Randall, 116 ib. 331). Cf. (Costello v. Crowell, 133 ib. 352). Mississippi (Moye v. Henderson, 30 Miss. 110; Wil- son v. Beauchamp, 50 ib. 24; Garvin v. State, 52 ib. 209). Montana (Davis v. Fredericks, 3 Mon. 262). Nebraska—Semble (First &c. Bank v. Lierman, 5 Neb. 249). New Hampshire (Myers v. Toscau, 3 N. H. 47; State v. Oarr, 5 ib. 367; Bowman v. Sanborn, 25 ib. 90; State v. Shinborn, 46 ib. 497; State v. Hastings, 53 ib. 452; State v. Clark, 54 ib. 460). Vermont (Pearl v. Allen, 1 Ty. 4; Gifford v. Ford, 5 Vt. 532; Adams v. Field, 21 ib. 256; Wright v. Williams, 47 ib. 222; State v. Ward, 39 ib. 225; Pratt v. Rawson, 40 ib. 183; State v. Phair, 48 ib. 366; State v. Hopkins, 50 ib. 316). In Alabama, Michigan and New Jersey, when ad- missible in the modified form stated, non-experts are allowed to testify, and in the following, neither experts nor non-experts are allowed to testify, but the compari- son is to be made by the jury alone:—Illinois, Ken- tucky, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. CONTRACTS BY ADVERTISEMENT. : 53 Acting Upon A‘dvertisement. CONTRACTS BY ADVERTISEMENT. There is an irreconcilable conflict of judicial opinion between the English and some of the American Courts, upon the point whether the reward is recoverable at all, if the party suing for it did not act upon the faith of the advertisement. The following courts hold that, nevertheless, the action lies: England (Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Ad. 621 (24 E. “CO. L. B.) 8S. 0. Lang, 8. C. 13; Law L. ©. 22; Lancaster v. Walsh, 4 M. & W. 16; Smith v. Moore, 1 C. B. 438; Thatcher v. England, 3 C. B. 254; 15 L. J. (C. P.) 241; Tarner v. Walker, L. R. (1 Q. B.) 641; 2 Q. B. 301; Denton v. Great Northern &c. Co., 5 EL & Bl. (85 E. C. L. R.) 860, 864). Supreme Court U. 8.—Semble (Shuey v. U. S., 92 U.S. 73). Delaware (Hagle v. Smith, 4 Houst. 293). Indiana (Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199). Kentucky (Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush, 572 8. ©. 15 Am. Rep. 728; but see Lee v. Flemingsburg, 7 Dana, 28). Vermont (Russell v. Stewart, 44 Vt. 170). The following courts hold that to enable a party to recover he must show that he acted upon the advertise- ment. Connecticut—Semble (Marvin v. Treat, 37 Conn. 96 8. C. 9 Am. Rep. 307). New York (Howland v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 6048. C. 10 Am. Rep. 654; Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248 S. C. Lang, S. C. 110). : Tennessee—Obiter (Stamper v. Temple, 6 Hump. 113). In California, it is held that one cannot, where his acts were performed with knowledge of the offer of a reward, but without any intention of claiming it (Hewitt~ wv. Anderson, 56 Cal. 476 S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 65). 54 CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING. ww Lord’s Day. CONTRACTS BY CORRESPONDENCE. A question arises whether when, upon receipt of a letter offering terms, the recipient promptly mails a reply accepting them, does the posting of such reply consti- tute proprio vigore a consummation of the contract? The affirmative of this proposition is maintained by nearly all of the cases. The only opposing are: Scotland (Countess of Dunmore v. Alexander, 9 Shaw & Dunlop, 190 8. C. Lang, 8. C. 112). Massachusetts (McCullock v. Eagle &e. Co., 1 Pick. 278 8. C. Lang, S. C. 50). CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING. Lord’s day, commonly called Sunday, is generally regarded as dies non. The Statute of 29 Charles 2, see. 7, enacts “that no artificer, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever, shall do or exercise any worldly labour, business or work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord’s day, or any part thereof, works of necessity or charity alone excepted.” According to the settled English interpretation of this language, it has been confined to work done in their ordinary calling (Shirley L. C. 134; Smith Cont. 172; 2 Par. Cont. (5th Ed.) 757; 1 Add. Cont. sec. 291). In the Sunday laws of many of the States, the opera- tive words “ordinary callings” are omitted (2 Par. Cont. 757, n. fh: This’ circumstance accounts for the discrepancy on this point between the English and many of the Ameri- can decisions. The language of the statutes is so variant that it would not fall within the scope of this treatise to collate all of them, and the decisions made thereon, but some few have in terms, and others ap- proximately, re-enacted the English Statute, and to these CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING. 55 Labor: Business. our attention will be directed—Alabama, Michigan and Pennsylvania. The New England States forbid labor and business, without the qualification of being done in the ordinary calling. So their decisions need not be noticed at length. In New York, Ohio, California, and most of the Western States, labor, but not business, is inhibited. In the former, contracts are held void as constituting the transaction of business, and as being expressly pro- hibited, and in the latter, in general, contracts are up- held as not constituting labor within the purview of these statutes (Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379 S. C. 46 Am. Dec. 157; O’Donnell v. Sweeney, 5 Ala. 467 S. C.39 Am. Dec. 336; Kepner v. Keefer, 6 Watts, 231 S. C. 31 Am. Dec. 460; Allen v. Deming,! 14 N. H. 133 8. C. 40 Am. Dec. 179; Fox v. Abel, 2 Conn. 548; Adams v. Hamell, 2 Doug. 73 S. C. 43 Am. Dec. 455; Myers v. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 366 S. C. 3 Am. Rep. 368; Parker v. Pitts, 73 Ind. 597 S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 155; De Forth v. Wisconsin &c. Co., 52 Wis. 3208. C. 38 Am. Rep. 737 ; Troewert v. Decker, 51 Wis. 46S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 808; Mueller v. State,2 76 Ind. 310 8S. C. 40 Am. Rep. 245; Burns v. Moore, 76 Ala. 339 8S. C. 52 Am.Rep. 332). The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in which State the English Act has been re-enacted, in ipsissimis verbis, hold (Battle, J. dissenting), that if one was cheated in a horse-trade made on Sunday, with one known to him to exercise the business of horse-trading, he could recover for the deceit (Melvin v. Hasley, 7 1The Statute of N. H. is like 29 Ch. 2, substituting the word “secular” for “ordinary,” still employing the pronoun “his.” 2This case operates as a warning to those who follow the habit of our great dead captain, in always buying their Sunday cigars the night before. The court, though with a charity “that passeth all understanding,” holds that an inn-keeper, or, according to the fashionable American nomencla- ture hotellist, may, in conjunction with his business, keep open a cigar- stand on Sunday! Asa smokist we admire, as a lawyer we hold our peace. 56 CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING. Mortgages: Sales: Acts of Charity. Jones, 356). The dissenting opinion is clearly the better expression of law. This decision is in the teeth of the English cases. In South Carolina, where the Statute of 29 Ch. 2, has been literally re-enacted, it is held that a mortgage exe- cuted on Sunday is not void (Hellams v. Abercrombie, 15 8S. C. 1108. C. 40 Am. Rep. 684). And in Maryland, which only re-enacted sec. XI. it is held that an acknowl- edgment of a debt made on Sunday, was admissible in evidence to remove the bar of the statute of limitations. (Thomas v. Hunter, 29 Md. 406). There is a great conflict of decisions on the question as to whether the vendee becomes liable, (either under a new contract or by reason of a ratification of the old one), when he takes possession of the thing sold on some other day, after making a purchase of it on Sunday (2 Benj. Sales (4 Am. Ed.) sec. 850). (Williams v. Paul, 6 Bing. 653 (19 E. OC. L. R.) 8. 0. 4 M. & P. 532), is the leading case. In that case it was held that where an avoidable sale was made on Sunday, and the buyer re- tained the thing bought, and afterwards made a promise to pay, he was liable, not for the agreed price, but on a quantum valebat. In Simpson v. Nicholls, 3 M. & W. 240, 244 S. C. cor- rected report, 5 M. & W. 702, Parke, B. expressed the opinion that this decision could not be supported. On this cis-atlantic side, it has been doubted or denied in the following cases: (Sumner v. Jones, 24 Vt. 317, 322; Tuckerman v. Hinkley, 9 All. 454; Kountz v. Price, 40 Miss. 341; Cf. Boutelle v. Meludy, 19 N. H. 196; Perkins v. Jones, 26 Ind. 499). Acts of Charity—The point as to whether a subscription for a religious purpose, made on Sunday, is valid, has been made. The Supreme Court of Indiana decides in the nega- tive. But no reasons are assigned, and it is the mere CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING. 67 x Acts of Necessity. apse dizit of a very learned court! (Catlett v. Trustees &c. 62 Ind. 365 S. C. 30 Am. Rep. 197). The contrary is held by other courts (Allen v. Dufiie, 43 Mich. 1 8. ©. 21 Alb. L. J. 293; 38 Am. Rep. 159; Dale v. Knapp, 98 Pa. 389, shortly reported in note, 38 Am. Rep. 165). Acts of Necessity—In considering the value of conflict- ing decisions on this point, regard should be had to the evolution of society, the vast change in manners, cus- toms and the needs and requirements of an advanced eivilization.2 In the crude condition of a newly settled people, many things ought not to be regarded as neces- saries which become so, in view of more enlarged ideas and a higher scale of life. Thus the Court of Kentucky held (Hargis, J. dissenting), that a railroad furnishing hotel accommodations, necessary for travel, could not be treated as violating such enactments (Com. v. Louisville & Nashville &c. Co., 80 Ky. 291 8. C. 44 Am. Rep. 475.) And the same doctrine has been applied to vessels en- gaged in commerce (Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Steam Tow- Boat, 23 How. 209). The Court of Maryland holds that 1Perhaps if counsel had cited to the court, the celebrated Bolognian ‘decision, which exonerated the surgeon, who opened the vein of a man who fell in a fit on the streets, from the penalties of law, prescribing that whosoever drew blood upon the streets should be punished with great severity, the court would not have rendered so indefensible a decision. The author conceives that a subscription made on Sunday, to build a Masonic Temple or an Odd Fellows’ Hall, should be properly deemed a work of charity; and it may not be going too far to add that a subscription ‘then made to aid in suppressing, by lawful measures, the sale of intoxi- -cants, would be upheld. ; 2It is charged upon the New Englanders, that they would not allow a ‘man, on his return from a journey, to kiss his wife on Sunday. The author pronounces this a slander upon the good people of the Nutmeg State (Blue Laws, Hartford, Andrews and Son, passim). Mr. Bergh, however, will be pleased to know that they had a law against cruelty to animals, such as bull and bear baiting, but Macaunay says, (which Mr. ‘Bergh would regret to learn), that the offenders were punished, not out of regard to the wounded beasts, but because the sport gave pleasure to the spectators. 58 CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING. Barber-Shops: Saving Crops. it is lawful to transport cattle by rail on Sunday (Phila- delphia &c. Co. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 209 S. C. 40 Am. Rep. 415), but it should be borne in mind that the por- tion of 29 Ch. 2, we are considering, has never been re-enacted in that State. The Court of Ohio says that the works of necessity are not limited to the preservation of life, health and property from impending danger (McGatrick v. Wason,. 4 Ohio, (N. 8.) 566). In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania (Com. v. Jeandall, 2 Grant, 506; Com. v. Johnston, 22’ Pa. 102; contra in Georgia (Augusta &e. Co. v. Renz, 55 Ga. 126), it is held illegal to transport passengers on Sunday (Day v. Highland &c. Co., 135 Mass. 113 S. C. 46 Am. Rep. 447; 16 Rep. 335). The question as to whether public shaving by a bar- ber on Sunday is illegal, as not constituting an act. of necessity, has been differently determined. It is generally answered in the affirmative (Philips v. Innes, 4 C0. & F. 234; Com. v. Jacobs, 1 Pa. Leg. Gaz. R. 4915 Com. v. Williams, Pear. 61). But this view has been dissented from (State v. Lorry,.7 Baxt. 95 S. C. 32 Am.. Rep. 555). Contrary to the general current of decisions, the Court of Arkansas hold that over-ripeness of a crop of wheat did not justify its cutting on Sunday! (State v. Goff, 20 Ark. 289). And the Massachusetts Court con- cur as to a crop about to be taken by grass (Com. v. Josselyn,? 97 Mass. 411); contra in Vermont as to maple 1An English critic, writing of this decision, says the disciples who not. onfy gathered, but also threshed the wheat for their daily bread on the Sabbath day, would have had a small chance of an acquittal before this. court (art. 15, C. L. J. 145, 148). *The same critic says, touching this decision, ‘the judges in this case must have belonged to that school of the Rabbis, which insisted that it was. a sin to eat an egg laid upon the seventh day, or have been lineally de-- scended from the members of the Kirk Session of Humbie, who cited poor Margaret Brotherstone before them, ‘for that she did water her Kaill upon the Sabbath day, and ordered her, she having confessed her sin, ‘to give CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING. 5 Telegraphs: Non Est Juridicus. sugar (Whitcomb v. Gilman, 35 Vt. 297); and so as to malt in Indiana (Crockett v. State, 33 Ind. 416). Telegraphs.—In Indiana it is held that a contract to wire the words “come up in morning, bring all,” is void (Rogers v. W. U. T. Co. 78 Ind. 169 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 558; 14 C. L. J. 174). But with more consideration it is held in Texas that a contract to communicate this message, viz: “Betty and Baby dead—come to Cle- burne to-night train to my help,” is a legal contract (G. 0. & S. F. Co. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 542 S. C. 46 Am. Rep. 269). But while holding as above, the Indiana Court holds. that for refusing to send a far less’ equivocal message on Sunday viz: “Send me four girls * * * to tend fair,” a telegraph company was liable (W. U. T. Co. v. Ferguson, 57 Ind. 495). Dies Dominicus non est juridicus—Broom lays it down that the Sabbath day is dies non (Leg Max. 19), and cites authorities that preceded the 29 Ch. 2. This was. unquestionably the general rule of the common law, and the statute referred to was quoad judicial pro- ceedings, in the main, declaratory. Certain exceptions. arising, ex necessitate rei, have always obtained. It is needless to enumerate them, as they are well recog- nized (see Broom, 19 et seq). But as to the legality of some acts there is a notable discrepancy. Thus in District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Judge Hopkins held that a judgment could not be docketed on a holiday (In re Worthington, 3 C. L. J. 526); but Judge Drummond on appeal reversed this decision (9 C. L. N. 346) taking a distinction between evidence in public of her repentance the next Lord’s day,’” (7.); and the. writer, alluding to these narrow opinions, concludes, “alas for the rarity of christian charity under the sun,” (¢0.). 60 CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING. Heret in Litera. judicial and merely ministerial! acts. But when we consider the reason and spirit of the law it is difficult to appreciate the overruling case. The object of consti- tuting a dies non was to obliterate that day from busi- ness consideration; qui heret in litera, heret in cortice. Again as to the issuing of process we have a conflict between New York and Massachusetts. In the former it is held void, but valid in the latter (Van Vechten v. Paddock, 12 John, 178; Johnson v. Day, 17 Pick. 106; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324). The statute of 29 Char. 2, c. 7s. 6, declares it, with the exceptions therein stated, a dies non. Where that statute prevails no civil process can in general be executed on that day. But the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that an injunction may issue on Sunday to prevent an irreparable tort, ex gr. where a railroad company were about to take possession of, lay iron upon, and other- wise practically injure irreparably the streets of a town (Langabier v. Fairbury &c. Co., 64 Ill. 243 S. ©. 1We are aware that a distinction is generally taken between the per- formance of judicial and ministerial acts; even so learned a writer as Mr. Alexander gives it the weight of his authority (Alex. Brit. Stat. 562), but the policy of keeping holy the Lord’s day, was early established and formulated into statutes, amongst others (1 Eliz. ch. 2; 23 Eliz. ch.1; 1 Char. 1, ch. 1; Martin’s Col. Brit. Stat. 379); and it does seem that this policy would be as completely violated by allowing the sheriffs, clerks, registers, etc., to keep open their offices on Sunday, as for a judge to render a judg- ment—what a mockery of a recognized policy! There are certain excep- tions which may well consist with it, however, such as the arrest of prin- cipal by bail, arrests for breaches of the peace, and others, but it can be readily apprehended that such instances do not fall within the reason of the law; and as our master said, and said truly, that viewed with reference to the ancient condition of the Anglo-Saxon people, the common law is the perfection of reason, and that what is not reason is not law. The Statute of Elizabeth required every person to repair to his parish church every Sunday—so that, certainly since that enactment, the common law must be considered to be, at least, so modified as to comport with its pro- visions, and in that view, how could these ministerial officers be in two Places at the same time? This view is sustained by the Supreme Court of Iowa (Davis v. Fish, 1 Greene, 406 8. C. 48 Am. Dec. 387). CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING. 6E Judge High: Sunday Verdict. 6 C. L. N. 190; 13 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 747 and 16 Am. Rep. 550). Judge High has incorporated the syllabus into the 2d edition of his work on Injunctions (2 High Inj. sec. 1584). Rendering verdict on Sunday is held by some courts to be legal (Reid v. State, 53 Ala. 402 S.C. 4 0. L. J. 154; 25 Am. Rep. 627; Baxter v. People, 8 Ill. 368; Cory. v. Sileox, 5 Ind. 370; Rosser v. McGolly, 9 ib. 587, 589; McCorkle v. State, 14 ib. 39; True v. Plumly, 36 Me. 466; State v. Ricketts!, 74 N. C. 187; Webber v. Merrill, 34 N. H. 202; Van Riper v. Van Riper, 4 N. J. U. 156 8. C. 7 Am. Dec. 576; Hogtaling v. Osborn, 15 John, 119; Huidekoper v. Cotton, 3 Watts, 56; Hiller v. English, 4 Strob. 486; Trial of Penn and others?, 6 St. Tr. 651). Others not (Davis v. Fish3, 1 Greene (Lowa) 406, S. C. 48 Am. Dec. 387; Shaw v. McCombs‘, 2 Bay. 232). It was held in 1830, that where a sale was made on Sunday and the buyer retained the thing bought, and afterwards made a new promise to pay, he was liable, not for the the price agreed on in the void bargain, but as on a quantum valebat on the new promise (Williams v. Paul, 6 Bing. 653 (19 E. C. L. R.). The American cases are very inharmonious. Vide supra. 1Two out of five judges dissented on this point, ex rel. P. D. Walker, Esq., of counsel, and it will be observed that it was treated as the point. 2 See an account of the disgraceful conduct of the court on the return of the jury (Fors. Trial by Jury, 400, e¢ seg.). + But in order to weigh this case accurately, it must be borne in mind that not only the verdict but the judgment was rendered on Sunday, and the reasoning is more fairly attributed to that error than to the rendition of the verdict. This case was unendorsed, if not doubted, in subsequent cases (Weaver 0. Coolege, 15 Iowa, 244, 245; State o. Knight, 19 7b. 94, 99). ‘The authority of this case was denied in Maine (True ». Plumly, 36 Me. 466, 475). 62 ELECTIVE FRANCHISE. No Right without a Remedy. ELECTIVE FRANCHISE. Ubi jus ibi remedium. It was decided in monarchical England that, if a qualified elector was wilfully refused the right to vote, he could maintain an action against the officers ap- pointed to hold the election (Ashby v. White, 1 Smith, L. ©. 105 §. ©. Shirl. L. C. 233; Law L. C. (Com. Law), 252; followed in Bridge v. Lincoln, 14 Mass. 367; Capen -v, Foster, 12 Pick, 485 S. C. 23 Am. Dee. 632, and Bright, L. C. 51; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio, 372; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, 665; Anderson v. Milleken, 9 Ohio, (N. 8.) 568). In New York the element of malice is necessary to give a cause of action (Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns, 114 ‘8S. C.6 Am. Dec. 359; Bright, L. C. 190; Geotcheus. v. Matthewson, 61 N. Y. 420); or at least special damages must be shown (Butler v. Kent, 19 John, 223 8. ©. 10 Am. Dec. 219); and this court even went further and held that a judicial or rather a quasi judicial officer is not liable even for gross, intentional and malicious conduct when he acts within his jurisdiction (Cunningham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow. 178 S. C. 18 Am. Dec. 432; Weaver v. -Devendorf, 3 Den. 121; Landt v. Hills, 19 Barb, 291). The same view has been taken by other courts. 8.c.U.s. (Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335.) Circuit Court U. S. (U. 8. v. Gillis, 2 Cr. CO. C. 44), Delaware (State v. MeDonald, 4 Harr, 555; State v. Porter, ib 556). Indiana (Carter v. Harrison, 5 Blackf. 138; State v. Robb, 17 Ind. 536). Kentucky (Caulfield v. Bullock, 18 B. Mon. 494; Morgan v. Dudley, ib. 693; Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duy. 63; Miller -v. Rucker, 1 Bush, 135). FRAUD. 63 Judge Cooley's Opinion. Louisiana (Bridge v. Oakey, 2 La. Ann. 968; Dwight v. Rice, 5 ib. 580; Patterson v. D’Auterive, 6 ib. 467 S. 0. 54 Am. Dee. 564). Maine (Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158 S..C. 49 Am. Rep. 606; Pierce v. Getchell, 76 Me. 216). Maryland (Brevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479). Michigan (Gordan v. Farrar, 2 Doug. 411, 416). North Carolina (Peavey v. Robbins, 3 Jones, 339). Tennessee (Rail v. Potts, 8 Humph. 225; State v. Staten, 6 Cold, 234). West Virginia (Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W. ‘Va. 486 8S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 431). The authority of Ashby v. White is denied in the following cases besides those cited: (Brevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479; Anderson v. Baker, 23 ib. 531 S. C. Bright L. C. 27). And the general drift of American judicial decisions is to the effect that no action is maintainable against an election officer, unless, (according to some decisions,) for an act done corruptly (Humphrey v. Kingman, 5 Met. {Ky.) 162; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R. 35; Moran ». Rennard, 3 Brewst. 183; Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 491; Com. v. Lea, 1 Brewst. 273 8. C. Bright L. C. 98; Com. v. Sheriff, 1 Brewst. 183; Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88; Turnpike Co. v. Champney, 2 N. H. 199; State v. Smith, 18 N. H. 91; State v. Daniels, 44 N. H. 383). Judge Cooley lends the weight of his great name to the ruling in Ashby v. White (Cool. Torts, 414). The case of Ashby v. White has been modified in England by requiring proof of implied malice (Drewe v. Coulton, 1 East, 274, note 0). FRADD. Can fraud and concealment be replied at law? The affirmative of this question is maintained by the following courts: 64 FRAUD. Authorities. England.—(Bree’ v. Holbeck, Doug. 655; Clarke v. Hougham, 3 Dow. & Ry. 322; Granger v. George, 5 B. & ©. 149, (11 E. C. L. RB.) Supreme Court U. S. (Bailey uv. Glover, 21 Wall. 342; Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 185). Circuit Court U. Ss. (Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mas. 143; Mitchell v. Thompson, 1 McL. 96; Acorn. 2 Abb. U.S. 435; Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt. 230.) California (Kane v. Cook, 8 Cal. 449). Georgia (Conyers v. Kenan, 4 Ga. 308 S. C. 48 Am. Dec. 226; Hoyle v. Jones, 35 Ga. 40; Persons v. Jones, 12 ib. 371). Illinois (Campbell v. Vining, 28 Tl. 525). Indiana (Raymond v. Simonson, 4 Black, 85; Stanley v. Stanton, 36 Ind. 445; Wynne v. Cornelson, 52 ib. 312). Iowa (Township v. French, 40 Iowa, 601). Maine (Cole v. McGlathry, 9 Greenl. 121; McKown v. Whitmore, 31 Me. 448). Massachusetts (Turnpike Cor. v. Field, 3 Mass. 201 S. C. 3 Am. Dec. 124; Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 485 8. C.11 Am. Dec. 218; Rice v. Burt, 4 Cush. 208; Nudd v. Hamblin, 8 All. 131; Atlantic &c. Bank v. Harris, 118 Mass. 153). New Hampshire (Way v. Cutting, 20 N. H. 187; Doug- las v. Elkins, 28 ib. 26). Pennsylvania (Jones v. Conoway, 4 Yeates, 109; Mc- Dowell v. Young, 12 8. & R. 128; Rush v. Barr, 1 Watts, 110; Pennock v. Freeman, ib. 401, Harrisburg Bank v. Foster, 8 Watts, 12; Buckner v. Lightner, 40 Pa. 139). The negative in the following: Kentucky (Duvall v. Stafford, 4 Bibb. 318). Maryland (Franklin v. Waters, 8 Gill, 322). Mississippi (Dozier v. Ellis, 28 Miss. 736; but see Liver- more v. Johnson, 27 ib. 284), New York (Troupe v. Smith, 20 John, 33; Leonard v. Pitney, 5 Wend. 30; Allen v. Mille, 17 Wend. 202). GUARANTY—CONSIDERATION. 65 Old and New Systems. North Carolina (Hamilton v. Smith, 3 Murp. 115; Baines v. Williams, 3 Ired. 481; Allen v. McRae, 4 Ived. Eq. 325; Johnson v. Arnold, 2 Jon. 113; Blount v. Parker, 78 N. ©. 128). Ohio (Fee v. Fee, 10 Ohio, 469). South Carolina (Miles v. Barry, 1 Hill, 296; Howell v. Kelly, 2 McC. 26). Tennessee (York v. Bright, 4 Hump. 312). Texas (Lewis v. Houston, 11 Tex. 642). Vermont (Smith v. Bishop, 9 Vt. 110). Virginia (Callis v. Waddy, 2 Munf. 511; Rice v. White, 4 Leigh. 474). Treated as a point arising in those jurisdictions where law and equity are separately administered, it would seem that the negative is more in accordance with principle. Fraud formed no exception to the older statutes, and to hold that it forms one, smacks of judicial legislation, especially as applied in the law courts. In equity there is strong ground for the doc- trine that the analogy of the statute should be applied only from the discovery of the fraud. Under the code system the same observations apply, especially in those courts where they still think under the old system and apply strictly legal or broad equity relief according as the first pleading discloses the character of the action. The particular character of fraud entitling to relief is not discussed, but it is assumed that its sufficiency, according to the lex fori, has been sufficiently pleaded. GUARANTY—CONSIDERATION. By the terms of the Statute of Frauds, generally re- enacted in this country, a promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of a third person, must be in writing. A question then arose whether the con- sideration for the agreement must also appear in such 5 66 GUARANTY—CONSIDERATION. Wain v. Warlters Followed. writing. In England it was, at an early day, settled affirmatively by the leading case of Wain v. Warlters, 5 East 10 8. O. 2 Smith L. ©. 147; Shirl. L. O. 16, and that case has been affirmed by all the subsequent cases in that country. The doctrine is now abrogated there by statute (19 and 20 Vict. ch. 97, sec. 3). In this country, the principle enunciated in that case, has been the sub- ject of much debate and great conflict of decisions. The following courts adhere to the English doctrine, and maintain the affirmative of the proposition above stated. Canada (Gerow v. Clark, 9 U. C. Q. B. 223). Alabama (Thompson v. Hall, 16 Ala. 204; Rigby ». Norwood, 34 ib. 132). An affirmative statute was passed (R. C. sec. 2121). The language of the original statute used the word “promise” for “agreement,” employed in the English Statute (Davidson v. Rothchild, 49 Ala. 109; Wells v. Thompson, 50 ib. 85; Locke v. Humphries, 60 #b. 117; Bolling v. Munchus, 65 ib. 558; Foster v. Napier, 74 ib. 393; Westmoreland v. Porter, 75 ib. 452; Smith v. Freeman, ib. 285). Delaware (Weldin v. Porter, 4 Houst. 239). The Stat- tute uses the word “promise” (Rev. Code, (1874), ch. 63, sec. 7). Illinois (Prather v. Vineyard, 9 Ill. 48; Patmore v. Haggard, 78 ib. 609). A statute was passed prescribing that the consideration need not be expressed (Rev. Stat. (1883), ch. 59, sec. 3). Indiana (Gregory v. Logan, 7 Blackf. 112). A statute was passed in 1843, changing the law (Rev. Stat. sec. 4905); (Hiatt v. Hiatt, 28 Ind. 34. Cf. Willis v. Ross, 77 4b. 18. C. 40 Am. Rep. 279), Maryland (Wyman v. Gray, 7 H. & J. 409; Elliott v. Giese, ib. 457; Nabb v. Koontz, 17 Md. 283; Sunwalt v. Ridgely, 20 ib. 107; Hutton »v. Padgett, 26 ib. 231; Deutsch v. Bond, 46 ib. 168; Orderman v. Lawson, 49 ib. 155; Culbertson v. Smith, 62 ib. 634). GUARANTY—CONSIDERATION. 67 Same. Michigan (Jones v. Palmer, 1 Doug. 379; Hall v. Soule, 11 Mich. 494; Scott v. Bush, 26 ib. 420; Whipple v. Parker, 29 ib. 371). The law was charged as in Illinois by statute (Act 1882, ch. 233, sec. 9). Minnesota —Under Statute, Genl. Stats. (1878) ch. 41. sec. 6 (Walker v. McDonald, 5 Minn. 461; Wilson v.. Schnell, 20 ib. 40; Nichols v. Allen, 22 ib. 283; Sheldon v. Butler, 24 ib. 515). Under this statute requiring the consideration to be expressed, this court held that the words “value received” was a sufficient compliance (Osborne v. Baker, 34 Minn. 307 S. C. 57 Am. Rep. 55). Montana—Under statute, code 393, sec. 12 (O’Bannon v. Chumasero, 3 Mon. 419). Nevada—Under statute requiring consideration to be expressed (Van Doren v. Tjader, 1 Nev. 388). New Jersey (Laing v. Lee, 20 N. J. L. 337). Not now required to be in writing (Rev. Stat. (1878) 444, sec. 9), The court hold in this case that if the consideration appears inferentially it is a sufficient compliance with the statute. The older case of Buckley v. Beardslee, 2 South, 570 S. C. 8 Am. Dec. 620, seemed to favor the Massachusetts rule, but must be considered as substan- tially overruled. New York (Sears v. Brink, 3 John, 210 8. C. 3 Am, Dec. 475; Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 John, 29 8S. C. 5 Am. Dee. 317; Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Den. 45 8. C. 43 Am. Dec. 726; Speyers v. Lambert, 6 Abb. Pr. (N. 8.) 309; 37 How. Pr. 323; Castle v. Beardsly, 10 Hun. 343; Union Bank v. Coster, 3 N. ¥. 203 8. C. 53 Am. Dec. 280; Wright v. Weeks, 25 N. Y. 153; Justice v. Lang, 42 4b. 493, 522; Evansville &c. Bank v. Kanfmann, 93 N. Y. 273 8. ©. 45 Am. Rep. 204). The law as thus declared, was changed by statute and the consideration need not be expressed (Acts 1863, ch. 464). Oregon—Under similar statute (Corbit v. Salem County, 6 Oreg. 405). 68 GUARANTY—CONSIDERATION. Wain v. Warlters Denied. Wisconsin—The statute of this State prescribes (being a copy of the Rev. Stat. of New York in that regard) that the consideration shall be expressed, but the court holds that such is the law independent of the statute (Taylor v. Pratt, 3 Wis. 692; Turton v. Burke, 4 ib. 121; Putney v. Farnham, 27 ib. 189; Parry v. Spikes, 49 ib. 384 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 782). The doctrine advanced in Wain v. Warlters is denied by the following courts: Supreme Court U. S. (Violett v. Patton 1,5 Cr. 142). Circuit Court U. S. (How. v. Kendall, 2 McL. 103; San- ders v. Barlow, 21 Fed. Rep. 836; Fowler v. McDonald, 4 Cr. C. C. 297). California (Baker v. Cornwall, 4 Cal. 15; Evoy v. Tewks- bury, 5 ib. 285; Ellison v. Jackson, 12 ib. 242; Crooks v. Sully, 50 ib. 257). There is a declaratory statute to this effect (Civil Code, sec. 2793). Connecticut (Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81). Florida (Dorman v. Bigelow, 1 Fla. 281). Georgia (Hargraves v. Cooke, 15 Ga. 321; Baker v. Hern- don, 17 ib. 571; Sorrell v. Jackson, 30 ib. 901; Black v. McBain, 32 ib. 129; Davis v. Tift, 11 Am. L. Rec. 701). A declaratory act was passed (Code, secs. 1950, 1951). The earlier case of Henderson v. Johnson, 6 Ga. 390, sustaining Wain v. Warlters, was disapproved in Har- graves +. Cooke, supra. lowa—Under statute, McLean’s stats. (1880) secs. 3663, | 3664 (Wise v. Ray, 3 Iowa, 431). Kentucky (Ratliff v. Trout, 6 J. J. Marsh, 85). A like statute was passed (Acts 1881, ch. 22, sec. 1). Louisiana (Ringgold v. Newkirk, 3 Ark. 108). Maine (Levy v. Merrill, 4 Me. 180; Bean v. Burbank, 16 ib. 458, 460 S. OC. 33 Am. Dec. 681; Cummings v. Des- mett, 26 Me. 397; Gillighan v. Boardman, 29 ib. 79). 'In the case of Violett ». Patton, which was based upon the Virginia Statute, some stress was laid upon the use of the word “ promise” instead of “ agreement,” as used in the Statute 29 Car. IT.). GUARANTY—CONSIDERATION. 69 Same. Massachusetts (Hunt v. Adams, 5 Mass. 358 S. 0. 4 Am. Dec. 68; Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 122 8. C. 9 Am. Dec. 123; Wetherbee v. Potter, 99 Mass. 354, 361). A declaratory act was passed (Acts 1882, ch. 78, sec. 2), Mississippi (Wren v. Pearce, 12 Miss. 91). Missouri (Bean v. Valle, 2 Mo. 103; Halsa v. Halsa, 8 ab. 303; Little v. Nabb, 10 ib. 3; Ivory v. Murphy 36 4b. 539; Bartlett v. Matson, 1 Mo. App. 155). New Hampshire (Britton v. Angier, 48 N. H. 420; doubt- ing the earlier cases of Neilson v. Sanborne, 2 ib. 414, and Underwood v. Campbell, 14 ib. 393; Lang v. Henry, 54 ib. 59; Goodnow v. Bond, 59 ib. 150). North Carolina (Miller v. Irvine!, 1 D. & B. 103; Gard- | ner v. King, 2 Ired. 297, 300; Ashford v. Robinson, 8 ib. 114; Thornburg v. Masten, 88 N. 0. 293). Ohio (Reed v. Evans, 17 Ohio, 128; Duckwall v. Rog- ers, 15 Ohio, (N. 8.) 546.) Pennsylvania (Paul v. Stackhouse, 38 Pa. 306; Bowser ». Cravener, 56 ib. 132; Giltiman v. String, 64 ib. 245; Hopkinson v. Davis, 5 Phil. 148; Shirley v. Black, 45 Pa. 347). South Carolina (Fyler v. Givins, Ril. L. C. 56 8. C. 3 Hill, 48; Aiken v. Duren, 2 N. & McC. 370; Griffin v. Rembert, 2 Rich. (N. S.) 414; Woodward v. Pickett, Dud. 31; Tindal v. Touchberry, 3 Strob. 177 8. C. 49 Am. Dec. 637; MceMorris v. Herndon, 2 Bail. 57; Pope v. Fort, 2 MeM. 62). Tennessee (Taylor v. Ross, 3 Yerg. 330; Whitby »v. Whitby, 4 Sneed, 473; State v. Humphrey, 10 Hump. 444; Cf. Moore v. Stovall, 2 Lea, 542). Texas (Ellett v. Britton, 10 Tex. 208; Fulton v. Robin- son, 55 ib. 402); the first case discarded Wain v. Warlters. Two intermediate cases followed it (Wallace v. Hudson, 1That most reliable and conservative of judges (DANIEL), dissented, but with characteristic modesty and devotion to the maxim of stare decisis, acquiesced in the affirming decision in Gardner v. King. 70 GUARANTY—CONSIDERATION. 87 Tex. 456; Thomas v. Hammond, 47 ib. 49); bunt the Fulton case restored the law as held in the Ellett case. Vermont (Smith v. Ide, 3 Vt. 290; Patchin v. Swift, 21 ib. 292; Cf. Gregory v. Gleed, 33 4b. 405; Sheehy v. Aderene, 41 ib. 541). | Virginia (Colgin v. Henley, 6 Leigh, 85; Violett v. Patton,! 5 Or. (S. C. U. 8.) 142). Statute now provides that the consideration need not be expressed (Mumf. Code, chap. 140, sec. 1). West Virginia (Capehart v. Hale, 6 W. Va. 550). The Statute now provides that the consideration need not be expressed (Rev. Stats. 1879, chap. 95, sec. 1). It is observable that all of the statutes of the States re-enactatory of the English statute of frauds, employ the word “promise” in lieu of the word “agreement” except that of Oregon. Notwithstanding the great weight that always at- taches to the utterances of Westminster Hall, yet, upon principle, it would seem that the point decided in Wain v. Warlters is not tenable. One rule of construction, namely, that we should examine the old Jaw, understand the supposed mischief and then view the remedy, seems to have been ignored. What was the mischief? Why, the perjury in swearing to oral engagements to answer for the default of another. Oral agreements or promises—nuda pacta? Certainly not. They did not require the intervention of a statute. Now suppose a written parol promise had been made before the statute to answer for the debt of another, not expressing the consideration, could it not have been enforced? Upon what principle could relief have been denied? What difference can be suggested between the principles which should give at common law an action 3In the case of Violett v. Patton, which was based upon the Virginia Statute, some stress was laid upon the use of the word “promise” instead of “ agreement,” as used in the Statute 29 Car. II.). INSANITY-DEED OF A NON COMPOS MENTIS. 71 Void. based upon a written promise from A to B, to pay C a, hundred dollars, and a similar undertaking by A to B to pay the debt due from C to B of one hundred dollars? In each case the action could be maintained at common law upon proof of the consideration on the trial, there being no difference in written parol contracts and oral, except as to promissory notes and bills of exchange. Now, can it be fairly supposed that the statute intended to impose a burden in the one case and not in the other, when no possible reason could. be suggested therefor? Suppose A at common law had agreed by parol in writing to build for B a house, was it necessary to incorporate the consideration—was it not provable aliunde? The manifestation of the agreement is one thing and the proof to sustain it another. We say, that a parol agreement requires a consideration to support it: if A should promise B to pay him a hundred dollars ‘orally, this is nudum pactum without a consideration, but if one be shown, it is an enforcible engagement. The mistake seems to have originated in giving to the word “agreements” all the collateral evidential requisites for its enforcement, as distinguished from its popular ac- ceptation. As to the supposed distinction between the word “promise” and “agreement” it is purely fanciful, as a promise to be enforcible must be as fully supported by a consideration as an agreement, otherwise it is nudum pactum and hence not within the purview of the statute. INSANITY—DEED OF A NON COMPOS MENTIS. Is such a deed void or only voidable? The authorities differ. In England it is held that all deeds made by one bereft of his mind are void except feoffments with livery (Thompson v. Leech, 3 Salk, 300 8. C. Ew. L. C. 564). It is held void by the following courts: 72 INSANITY-DEED OF A-NON COMPOS MENTIS. Voidable. Supreme Court U. 8S. (Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall, 9). Circuit Court U. S, (Kerwin v. Hibernia &e. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 692; Edward v. Davenport, 4 McCrary, 34 8. C. 20 Fed. Rep. 756). Louisiana If notoriously insane (Fecel v. Guinault, 32 La. Ann. 91). Michigan (Rogers v. Blackwell, 40 Mich. 192). New Hampshire (Burke v. Allen, 29 N. H. 106 8. 0. Ew. L. ©. 576). New York (Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378). North Carolina (Millison v. Nicholson, Conf. Rep. 499; but see Riggan v. Green, 80 N. C. 236). Oregon (Farley v. Parker, 6 Oreg. 105 S. C.5C. L. J. 287). Pennsylvania (Estate of Desilver 5 Rawle, 111 S. C. 28 Am. Dec. 645; Bensell v. Chancellor, 5 Whart. 371 8. C. 34 Am. Dec. 561; Rogers v. Walker, 6 Pa. 371 S. C. 47 Am. Dee. 470; Clifton v. Davis, 1 Pars. 33; Crawford v. Scovell, 94 Pa. 48 S. C. 39 Am. Rep. 766). The following courts hold that such deed is voidable, not void: Indiana (Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 35; Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 ib. 231; Nichol v. Thomas, 53 ib. 42; N. W. &c. Co. v. Blankenship, 94 ib. 535 8. C. 48 Am. Rep. 185; Schuff v. Ransom, 79 Ind. 458; Copenrath v. Kienby, 83 ib. 18; Fay v. Burditt, 81 ib. 433 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 142; Harbison v. Lemon, 3 Blackf. 51S. ©. 23 Am. Dee. 376). Illinois (Burnham v. Kidwell, 113 Ill. 425), Iowa—Semble (Allen v. Berryhill, 27 Iowa, 534 8. C.1 Am. Rep. 309; Corbit v. Smith, 7 Iowa, 60 8. C. 71 Am. Dec. 431; Behrens v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333). Kansas (Cribben v. Maxwell,! 34 Kan. 8 8. 0.55 Am. Rep. 233). 1This court takes a distinction between the contract of marriage and executed conveyances, holding the former void (Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 871 S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 774). INSANITY—WILLS—ONUS PROBANDI. 73 On Propounder. Kentucky (Breckenridge v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh, 236 §. 0.19 Am. Dec. 71; Wall v. Hill, 1 B. Mon. 290 S. C. 36 Am. Dee. 578). Maine (Brown v. Hodgdon, 31 Me. 67; Hovey v. Hob- son, 53 ib. 453; Hovey v. Chase, 52 ib. 304 8. C. 83 Am. Dec. 514). Maryland (Key v. Davis, 1 Md. 32; Chew v. Bank, 14 ab. 299; Wilder v. Weakley, 34 ib. 181). Massachusetts (Allis Vv. Billings, 6 Met. 415 S. C. 39 Am. Dec. 744; Ew. L. C. 559; Arnold v. Richmond, &c. Co., 1 Gray, 434; Gilson v. Soper, 6 ib. 279 S. C. 66 Am. Dee. 414; Hallett v. Oakes, 1 Cush. 296; Carrier v. Sears, 4 Allen, 336 8. C. Ew. L. 0. 574; Howe v. Howe, 99 Mass. 98; Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick. 217 S. 0. 16 Am. Dee. 391). Mississippi (Fitzgerald v. Reed, 9 S. & M. 94). New Jersey (Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. L. 108 S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 716). New York (Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378). Tennessee (Cole v. Cole, 5 Sneed, 63). Texas (Elston v. Jasper, 45 Tex. 409). Wisconsin (Mohr Vv. Tulip, 40 Wis. 66). INSANITY—WILLS—ONUS PROBANDI. On the propounding of a will for probate, is it incum- bent upon the propounder, as part of his proof, to show the sanity of the testator, or is the burden of proof, in this behalf, cast, by formal proof of execution, upon the caveator? England (There is a discrepancy of decision in England, owing to the diverse views taken as to the nature of a will by the common law and ecclesiastical courts). It is held by the following courts to be upon the pro- pounder : Arkansas (J enkins v. Tobin, 31 Ark. 306). Connecticut (Comstock v. Hadlyme Soc. 8 Conn. 254 8. €. 20 Am. Dee. 100). 74 INSANITY—WILLS—ONUS PROBANDI. Same. Georgia (Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324 S. C. 50 Am. Dec. 329; Ragan v. Ragan, 33 Ga. Supp. 106; Stancil v. Kee- nan, 35 Ga. 103; Evans v. Arnold, 52 ib. 169; Wetter v. Habersham, 60 ib. 193). Illinois (Rigg v. Wilton, 13 Ill. 15; Potter v. Potter, 41 ib. 84; Holloway v. Galloway, 51 ib. 159; Trish v. Newell, 62 ib. 196; Tate v. Tate, 88 ib. 42). Iowa Under statutory regulations (Veiths v. Hagg, 8 Clark, 163; Matter of Will of Convey, 52 Iowa, 197 8. O. 1 Am. Prob. Rep. 90; see Stephenson v. Stephenson, 17 N. W. Rep. 546). Maine (Gerrish v. Nason, 22 Me. 438 S. C. 39 Am. Dec. 589; Cilley v. Cilley, 34 Me. 162; Robinson v. Adams, 62 ib. 369 S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 473). Massachusetts (Brooks v. Barrett, 7 Pick. 94; Phelps v. Hartwell, 1 Mass. 71; Buckminster v. Perry, 4 ib. 593; Crowninshield v. Crowninshield, 2 Gray, 524; Baxter v. Abbott, 7 ib. 71; Baldwin v. Parker, 99 Mass 79. Michigan (Beaubein v. Cicotte, 8 Mich. 9; Taff v. Hosmer, 14 ib. 309; McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 ib. 363). Missouri (Withington v. Withington, 7 Mo. 589; Garvin v. Williams, 44 ib. 465; Tingley v. Cowgill, 48 ib. 291; Harris v. Hays, 53 ib. 90; Benoist v. Murrin, 58 ib. 321; Elliott v. Welby, 13 Mo. App. 19; Taylor v. Wilburn, 20 Mo. 306 8. C. 64 Am. Dec..186). In this case formal execution was admitted, and the will contested on the ground of insanity. In this State, after a will has been admitted to probate in common form, and is at- tacked on the ground of the insanity of the testator, the burden of proof is upon the contestant. (Farrell v. Brennan, 32 Mo. 328 S. C. 82 Am. Dec. 137. This last case is doubted in Harris v. Hays, supra). New Hampshire (Perkins v. Perkins, 39 N. H. 163; Judge of Probate v. Stone, 44 ib. 593; Boardman v. Woodman, 47 ib. 120; Hardy v. Merrill, 56 ib, 227 S. C. INSANITY—WILLS—ONUS PROBANDL 75: On Caveator. 22 Am. Rep. 441; 3 Am. L. T. (N. 8.) 374; though the earlier case of Pettes v. Bingham, 10 N. H. 515, looks. the other way). New York (Delafield v. Parrish, (Parrish Will Case), 25 N. Y. 9; Taylor Will Case, 10 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 3005. overruled in the case of Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns, 144 8. C. 4 Am. Dec. 330; Hyatt v. Lunnin, 1 Den. 143, Cf. Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y. 262). Texas (Renn v. Lamon,! 33 Tex. 760). Vermont (Williams v. Robinson, 42 Vt. 658 8S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 359). Virginia is so classified (Riddell v. Johnson, 26 Grat- 152 S. C. 3 Am. L. T. (N. 8.) 171); but while the sylla- bus looks that way, it will be discovered on an exami- nation of the case, that this was not the point, and the reasoning of the court was directed to the onus pro- bandi, with reference to undue influence. West Virginia (McMechin v. McMechin, 17 W. Va. 683. S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 682). In several of the States, the subject is regulated by statutes; and in Massachusetts and West Virginia, the decisions are put upon a supposed requirement, con- tained in 34 and 35 Hen. 8. The American text-books favoring this view are: (Redfield, Wills, 29, 30; Abb. Tr. Ev. 113, 114; 6 Wait, A. & D. p. 383; but favors the other view on p. 3855, Redfield, L. & Prac. Sur. Courts, 106). The courts of following named States hold that sanity _is presumed, as in other cases, and that the burden is. upon the caveator: , Alabama (Saxon v. Whitaker, 30 Ala. (N. S.) 237; Stubbs v. Houston, 33 ib. 555; O'Donnell v. Rodiger, 76 Ala, 222 8. C. 52 Am. Rep. 322), 1The court holds according to the text, but also that if the will has been admitted to probate, and an original suit is instituted to set the probate: aside, the burden is upon the actor in that suit. 76 INSANITY—WILLS—ONUS PROBANDI. Same. Delaware (Chandler v. Ferris, 1 Harr. 454; Duffield v. Robeson, 2 ib. 375; Jamison v. Jamison, 3 Houst. 108). Indiana (Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69; Turner v. Cook, 4b, 129; Herbert v. Barrier, 81 ib. 1). Kansas (Rich VW. Bowker, 25 Kan. 7). _ Kentucky (Hawkins v. Grimes, 13 B. Mon. 257; Milton w. Hunter, 13 Bush, 163 8. C. 1 Am. Prob. Rep. 521; overruling the earlier decisions of Hayden v. Hayden, 6 J.J. Marsh, 48, and Rogers v. Thomas, 1 B. Mon. 390). Louisiana (Chandler v. Barrett, 21 La Ann. 58). Marylana (Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 141; Taylor »v. Oreswell, 45 ib. 422). North Carolina (Mayo v. Jones, 78 N. C. 402; Syme ». Broughton, 85 ib. 367). New Jersey (Trumbull v. Gibbons, 2 Zab. 117 S. C. 51 Am. Dec. 253; Sloan v. Maxwell, 2 Green Chan. (3 N. J. Eq.) 563; Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N. J. Eq. 248; Harris v. Vanderveer,! 21 ib. 561). Ohio (Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio, (N. 8.) 1S. C. 86 Am. Dec. 459; Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio, (N. S.) 598; Meers v. Meers, 15 ib. 90, under statutory regulations). Oregon (Greenwood v. Cline, 7 Oreg. 17). Pennsylvania (Grabill v. Barr, 5 Pa. 441 8. C. 47 Am. Dec. 418; Werstler v. Custer, 46 Pa. 503; Grubbs v. McDonald, 91 Pa. 236). South Carolina (Lee v. Lee, 4 McCord, 183 S. C. 17 Am. Dec. 722). Tennessee (Smith v. Smith, 4 Baxt. 293; Puryear v. ‘This case was a proceeding to propound a will, and seems irrecon- cilable with the others cited in the text. The court, without citing any of them, lays it down that “while the ‘courts of this State have ever guarded with exacting jealousy, the right of testamentary disposition, the burden has always been cast upon the pro- ponent of establishing a strict compliance with every essential to the validity of a will. The will in this case has been assailed upon three prin- cipal grounds. 1. Want of testamentary capacity. 2. Undue influence. 3. Imposition of the instrument upon the testator without a full knowlege, ,on his part, of its contents,” 562. The case went off on the third ground, ‘and it was assumed that the testator was compos mentis. INSANITY. 77 Non-Expert Testimony. Reese, 6 Cold. 21; Frear v. Williams, 7 Baxt. 550 8S. ©. 1 Am. Prob. Rep. 85; Key v. Holloway, 7 J. Baxter, 575. S. C. 1 Am. Prob. Rep. 360; Bartee v, Thompson, 8. Baxt. 508). This doctrine is also held in the Cireuit Court of the United States (Stevens v. Van Cleve, 4 Wash. C. C. 262; Harrison v. Rowan, 3 ib. 585; Lessee of Hoge v. Fisher, 1 Pet. C. C. 163). The American text-books favoring this view are: (Ewell’s Lead. Cases, note at p. 720; 2 Greenl. Ev. sec. 689; 6 Wait’s A. & D. at p. 385; Iredell on Executors, 9, (13), a capital treatise, which, it is to be regretted, is nearly out of print). INSANITY. Can a non-expert be allowed to give his opinion as to the mental insanity of a person? The affirmative of this proposition is held in England. and the great majority of our courts, with the added qualification that preliminarily he be required to state the facts upon which such opinion is based. The courts of five States only hold that such testi- mony is incompetent: Louisiana, Maine, Massa- chusetts, New Hampshire and Texas. The cases on which the court of New Hampshire rejected such testimony, notably Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120; State v. Pike, 49 ib. 399 S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 533, were overruled, on this point, by Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227 S. C. 22 Am. Rep. 441. The Texas case of Gehrke v. State, 13 Texas, 568, cited by Lawson as denying such testimony (Ex. & Op. Evd. 486), was overruled in 1879, by the Court of Appeals (McClackey v. State, 5 Tex. App. 320; Webb v. State, ib. 596). So that it may be confidently stated that the testimony of non-experts on the subject of the mental alienation 78 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Criminality involved. of a person, based upon the knowledge and observation of the witness is received in all the courts except Maine, Massachusetts and, it seems, Louisiana. Louisiana (Eloi v. Eloi, 36 La. Ann. 563). At least the court say, that non-experts should be restricted to stating facts, and that “their opinions as to the condition of his mind are of little or no weight.” When we con- sider that the system of jurisprudence in this State is assimilated to and based upon the French Code, allow- ing an expression of opinion by the judges, it may fairly be aligned with Maine and Massachusetts. Maine (Ware v. Ware, 8 Greenl. 42; Wyman v. Gould, AT ib. 159; Inhabitants v. Inhabitants, 77 ib. 28 S. ©. 52 Am. Rep. 741). Massachusetts (Poole v. Richardson, 3 Mass. 330; Buck- minster v. Perry, 4 ib. 593; Hathorn v. King, 8 ib. 371 S. C.5 Am. Dec. 106; Dickinson v. Barber, 9 ib. 225 S. C.6 Am. Dec. 58; Needham v. Ide, 5 Pick. 510; Com. v. Wilson, 1 Gray, 337; Baxter v. Abbott, 7 ib. 71; Com. ”. Rich, 14 ib. 335; Hubbell v. Bissell, 2 All. 196; Com. wv. Fairbanks, ib. 511; Inhabitants v. Inhabitants, 99 Mass. 40; Hastings v. Rider, ib. 622; Barker v. Comins, 110 ib. 447; Nash v. Hunt, 116 ib. 237; Com. v. Pomeroy, 117 ib. 143; Com. v. Brayman, 136 ib. 438). INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. The ordinary rule is that in civil actions only a pre- ponderance of the testimony is requisite—but, whether, when proof of a criminal, or quasi criminal act is involv- ed in the issue, the quantum of proof is measured by the preponderance of the evidence, or by such a degree thereof as should exclude a reasonable doubt—there is a wide and irreconcilable discrepancy in the authorities. These views, while to a great extent discordant, may yet be harmonized, in the main, by adverting to the de- cisions separately, and considering the particular facts INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 79 Presumption of Innocence. upon which they were predicated. Before doing so, however, let us examine the point on principle. What is the ground for the ordinary distinction as to the intensity or degree of proof required in criminal and civil actions? The distinction is based upon our knowledge, experi- ence, and observation of human nature. We have the presumption of innocence, i.¢., a presump- tion that men are influenced against committing a crime by the fear of punishment here, and with some, an ap- prehension of being punished hereafter; by the force of public sentiment; in rare instances, from principle. The juries in a greater or less degree appreciate this philosophy. Now, in the main, the common law only punished offences which were mala in se; they were comparatively few, and their character early taught at the family hearthstone, the Sunday-school, and the Bible-class. So that the presumption of non-committal of crime early obtained. With such a presumption im- bedded in their minds, the juries would not convict without evidence satisfying them beyond a reasonable doubt. Why? Not because of the severe punishment which would follow conviction—such a consideration would be a reflection upon the integrity of the juror— but, because a logical process of reasoning did not lead irresistibly to conviction. It was the evidence, not the consequences of the verdict, which swayed their minds as distinguished from their feelings. Acting upon an ag- gregate supreme knowledge of human nature (aggregatio mentiwm), the higher the grade of crime, weighed accord- ing to its religious or moral turpitude, in the inverse ratio, the stronger became their desire for “more light.” It is purely a matter of mental ratiocination. Thus: A jury should more readily believe, that A assaulted B than that he murdered him, and the mind grades evidence in this inverse ratio. They are satisfied of the commis- sion of the assault, upon, perhaps slight evidence, be- 80 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Quantum distinguished from Intensity. cause, as opposed to the presumption of innocence, their observation tells them that assaults are common, and not infrequent even with good men. But when the question of murder is involved, they will reason that this crime is unusual even with the wicked; that there is a natural repugnance to taking human life; that there must have been a powerful oper- ating motive, etc., and they naturally demand a greater quantum of evidence, as distinguished from degree or imtensity than in ordinary assaults. But, in either case, the intellectual process requires that the intensity of the evidence must exclude all reasonable doubt. Now, what influence can be exerted on the mental powers, which fails to satisfy a juror, in the criminal case, that a crime had been committed, but which, when the very identical question arises in a civil suit, produces assur- ance that such crime had been perpetrated? The reason of the law being the life of the law, no instruction ought to be treated as embodying it, which is repugnant to the usual and natural operations of the intellect. These views were forcibly illustrated by Ruffin! (atter- wards Chief Justice), in his argument, as counsel, in the case Kincade v. Bradshaw, 3 Hawks, 63. But, when facts, not criminal at common law, are converted into a misdemeanor by statute, pursuing the criterion we have assumed, no greater degree of proof should be required when they form the basis of a civil action, or defence thereto, than before the enactment; though if declared a felony or crime involving infamous punishment, the rule should, perhaps, be modified. Tested by the principle above stated, as we have said, many of the decisions may be reconciled. The doctrine that a preponderance of testimony is sufficient, generally obtains (U. 8. v. Lockman, 1 Law Rep. (N. S.) 151; Tatum v. Mohr, 21 Ark. 349; Williams v. “One blast upon Ais bugle-horn were worth a thousand men.” INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 81 Slight Proof: Beyond Controversy. Watson, 34 Miss. 95; Burnett v. Ward, 42 Vt. 80; James vw. State, 45 Miss. 572; Hollister v. Bender, 1 Hill, (N. Y.) 150; Campbell v. Clarke, 16 N. Y. Week. Dig. 508; Brittingham v. Brittingham, ib. 119; Sheldon v. Hudson &e. Co., 29 Barb. 226; Lehman v. Brooklyn, ib. 234; Wood v. Porter, 56 Iowa, 161; Lewis v. Garretson, 1b. 278; Sherwood v. Morrison Bank, 17 Ill. App. 591; Beach v. Clark, 51 Conn. 200; Silver Valley Co. v. Fall, 6 Nev. 116; Wadsworth v. Giguu, 131 Mass. 220; Kaine v. Weigley, 22, Pa. 179; Kendall v. Hughes, 8 B. Mon. 368; Reed v. Noxon, 48 Ill. 323; Carter v. Gunnels, 67 ib. 270; Colquitt v. Thomas, 8 Ga. 258; Rhodes v. Green, 36 Ind. 7; Kelly v. Lenihan, 56 ib. 448; Jaeger v. Kelly, 52 N. Y. ‘274; Henry v. Henry, 8 Barb. 588; Lillie v. MeMillan, 52 Iowa, 464; Lockland v. Beckley, 10 W. Va. 87; White v. Perry, 14 ib. 66; Parkhurst v. McGraw, 24 Miss. 134). It may be as well, before noticing the discrepancy on various particular subjects, to advert to various adjec- tival and adverbial expressions, which have been passed upon by the courts as qualifying the general expression —thus: Supreme Court U. S. It was held in one case that “slight proof” was correct (Stebbins v. Duncan, 108 U. S. 32). In another, it sustained the charge “beyond contro- versy” (Greenleaf v. Birth, 6 Pet. 302). In another, “full, direct and unequivocal” (Calais Steamboat Co. v. Van Pelt, 2 Black. 372). In others, that the case must be established “plainly” (Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 4 Cr. 306; Freeland v. Heron, 7 ib. 147). In another, that the evidence must be “clear” (Head v. Providence &c. Co., 2 Cr. 127). Circuit Courts U. 8. In these courts the following quali- fications, to the general expression “preponderance,” have been held necessary, “conclusive” (Newport, 28 Fed. Rep. 658); “very slender” (U. S. v. Southern Colorado Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 273); “clear” (Bullock v. Lamar, 8 L. 6 82 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Various Expressions. . Rep. 275; Taylor v. Harwood, Taney, 437; The Parkers- burg, 5 Blatchf. 247; The La Fayette Lamb, 20 Fed. Rep. 319; The Ontario, 2 Low. 40; The Roman, 14 Fed. Rep. 61); “plainly” (Baker v. Biddle, Bald. 394, 418); “fair” (Payne v. Solomon, 14 Bank. Reg. 162); “satis- factorily” (Bentaloe v. Pratt, Wall. C. C. 58). Alabama “Clearly convinced,” held to be too stringent (Wilcox v. Henderson, 64 Ala. 535); but in another case, the words “clear and satisfactory” were sustained, as meaning only preponderance (Edwards v. Whyte, 70 Ala. 365). “To justify the imputation of fraud, the facts must be such that they are only explicable on any other reasonable hypothesis,” held an erroneous charge (Adams v. Thornton, 78 Ala. 489 S. O. 56 Am. Rep. 49). Arkansas Held that “weight” is not synonymous with “preponderance” (Shinn v. Tucker, 37 Ark. 580). California The words “must be clearly made out,” were sustained (McCarthy v. White, 21 Cal. 495 S. C. 82 Am. Dec. 754). Georgia “Clear and satisfactory” approved (Piper »v. Wade, 57 Ga. 223). Illinois It is held that it is error to charge that the jury must be “satisfied” by a preponderance of the testimony; that the word “satisfy” is not equivalent to “believe” (Brent v. Brent, 14 Ill. App. 256; White ». Gale, ib. 275; Balohradsky v. Carlisle, ib. 289). So, a like criticism on the word “satisfactorily” (Bauchwitz v. Tyman, 11 Ill. App. 186). The same court held, in one case, that the word “clear” super- added to preponderance, constitutes error (Bitter v. Saathoff, 98 Ill. 266); but aliter in another (Crabtree v. Reed, 50 ib. 206). In another case, this court sustained a charge em- bodying the expression “clear and convincing evidence” Smith v, Smith, 87 Ill. 111). So, that the evidence should be “strong enough to produce conviction” (Bry- INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 83 Account Stated: Adulterine Bastardy. ant v. Simoneau, 51 Ill. 324). But, as to fraud, errone- eus to hold that it should be “irresistible” (Carter v. Gunnels, 67 Ill. 270). Indiana “Fair preponderance” held synonymous with preponderance (Zonker v. Cowan, 84 Ind. 395). Iowa The following expressions have been sustained: “clear” (Bradford v. Bradford, 60 Iowa, 201); “clearly and fairly proved” (Hall v. Wolff, 61 ib. 559); “clear and satisfactory” (Holt v. Brown, 63 ib. 319); “fair pre- ponderance” (Bryan v. Chicago &c. Co., 63 ib. 464). Michigan “Well satisfied” held erroneous (Monaghan w, Agricultural &c. Co., 53 Mich. 238). Pennsylvania “Must be clear, precise and indubitable,” held in one instance correct (Murray v. New York &c. Co.. 103 Pa. 37); but a charge that fraud must be estab- lished upon “clear and undoubted proof,” held errone- ous (Abbey v. Dewey, 25 Pa. 413). Tennessee A charge was sustained which declared that “slight preponderance” was sufficient (Chapman v. McAdams, 1 Lea. 500; McFaruanp and FREEMAN, J. J., dissenting). We will now proceed to analyze the cases decided on different phases of the question, arising on various sub- jects-matter, noting the discrepancies as we proceed. Account Stated—In an action to set aside a stated ac- count, the errors must be established not only by a pre- ponderance of testimony, but “plainly” (Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 4 Cr. (S. C. U. 8.) 306; Freeland v. Heron, 7 ib. 147; Baker v. Biddle, Bald. (C. C. U. 8.) 394, 418). Adulterine Bastardy—This need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, according to the decisions in Georgia and Maine (Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155 S. C. 56 Am. Dec. 451; Knowles v. Scribner, 57 Me. 497); but according to several of the courts, there should be ad- duced cogent facts and circumstances (Head v. Head, 1 84 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Alteration: Assault: Assault with Intent to Commit Rape. Sim. & 8S. 150 (1 Eng. Cond. Ch. Rep.); Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beay. 550, 552; Plowes v. Bossey, 2 Dr. & Sm. 145 8. C. 8 Jur. (N. 8.) 352; 31 L. J. Ch. 681; 10 W. R. 332; Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. (S. C. U. 8.) 5503 Vernon v. Vernon, 6 La. Ann. 243; Egbert v. Green- wault, 44 Mich. 245 8. C. 38 Am. Rep. 260). Other courts hold that the allegation should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Stegall v. Stegall, 2 Brock. 257, per MArsHauL, C. J.; Phillips v. Allen, 2 Allen, 453; Sullivan v. Kelly, 3 ib. 148; Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige, Ch. 139 8. C. 23 Am. Dec. 778; Hemmenway v. Towner, 1 Allen, 209; Van Aernam v. Van Aernam, 1 Barb. Ch. 375). In Iowa, the presumption of paternity must be re- butted by strong, satisfactory and conclusive evidence (State v. Romaine, 58 Iowa, 46 S. C. 3 Iowa Trans. No. 1, p. 46; 13 Rep. 778). Alteration.—Alteration of an instrument must be proved by showing affirmatively such a collocation of cireum- stances as will impress the mind with a conviction that the instrument was fraudulently altered (Putnam v. Clark, 33 N. J. Eq. 338). Assault—The plaintiff establishes his case by a pre- ponderance of the testimony. Illinois (Miller v. Balthasser, 78 Ill. 302). Even though charged as constituting a rape (Beseler v. Stephani, 71 tb. 400). So, in like manner, may self defence be shown (March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372). Assault with Intent to Commit Rape.—In a civil action, the gravamen of which is an assault with the intent to commit rape, the fact need only be proved by a pre- ponderance of the testimony. Michigan (Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 49 S. ©. 20 Am. Rep. 668). Bankruptcy.— If one contends that his dealing with certain securities, (relied upon as constituting an act of INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 85 Bastardy: Bigamy: Boundary: Collision. bankruptcy), was not fraudulent, &c., he can establish his defence by a “fair” preponderance of evidence (Payne wv. Solomon, 14 Bank. Reg. 162). | Bastardy.—The charge of bastardy may be sustained by & preponderance of the testimony. Illinois (Mann v. People, 35 Ill. 467; Maloney v. People, 38 ib. 62; Allison v. People, 45 ib. 37; McCoy v. People, 65 ib. 439; People v. Christman, 66 ib. 162; McFarland w. People, 72 ib. 368; Lewis v. People, 82 ib. 104). Indiana (Walker v. State, 6 Blackf. 1). Iowa (State v. MeGlothlen, 56 Iowa, 5448. C.9 N. W. Rep. 893; 24 Alb. L. J. 519). Massachusetts (Richardson v. Burleigh, 3 Allen, 479; Young v. Makepeace, 103 Mass. 50). Michigan (People v. Cantine, 1 Mich. N. P. 140; Semon v. People, 42 Mich. 141 S. C. 3 N. W. Rep. 304). Minnesota (State v. Nichols, 29 Minn. 357 8. C. 13 N. W. Rep. 153; 26 Alb. L. J. 458). North Carolina (State v. Rogers, 79 N. C. 609). Tennessee (Stoval v. State, 9 Baxt. 597 8. C. 3 L. & Hq. Rep. 490). Wisconsin—Aliter—In Wisconsin, they hold that the charge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Baker v. State, 47 Wis. 111 S. C. 2 N. W. Rep. 110; Van Tassel v. State, 18 N. W. Rep. 328). Bigamy.—In a civil action involving the charge of bigamy, the confessions of the alleged bigamist may be given in evidence against him as to the marriage (Gaines ». Hennen, 24 How. (S. C. U. 8.) 553, 605). Boundary.—Is shown by a preponderance of testimony, and it is error to qualify that expression by the word “clear” (Bitter v. Saathoff, 98 Ill. 266). _ Collision.—If at night, a collision occurs, and one of the vessels was unprovided with lights, such vessel must establish her excuse for the omission by “clear” evidence (Bullock v. Lamar, 8 L. Rep. 275; Taylor v. 86 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Contracts: Conversion: Correction: Damages. Harwood, Taney, 437; The Parkersburg, 5 Blatchf. 247; The La Fayette Lamb, 20 Fed Rep. 319; The Roman, 14 Fed Rep. 61; The Ontario, 2 Low. 40). In general, in case of collision, only a preponderance of testimony is required (Bergen v. Joseph Stickney, 1 Fed Rep. 624; Negaunee, 20 ib. 918). But in one case it was held that it must be ‘‘preponderating and conclu- sive” (Newport, 28 Fed. Rep. 658). It has also beer held that when a vessel breaks from her moorings and collides, she must show vis major or inevitable accident (Fremont, 3 Sawy. C. ©. 571). Contracts—In an action on a “guano” note, the de- fence thereto being, that the guano for which it was given had not been inspected and branded, need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Reeves v. Graff- fling, 67 Ga. 512). Conversion.—Proved by a preponderance (Sinclair v. Jackson, 47 Me. 102 8. C. 74 Am. Dee. 476). Correction and Impeachment.— When the action is brought to correct an instrument, a preponderance is sufficient, but the evidence must be clear and satisfactory (Holt v. Brown, 63 Iowa, 319). But if not merely to correct, but to impeach, then the testimony “must be clear, precise and indubitable” (Murray v. N. Y. &c. Co., 103 Pa. 37). Damages.—Must be “satisfactorily proved” (Bentaloe v. Pratt, Wall C. C. 58). Damages (Civil Law.)—The facts sufficient to maintain an action brought under these statutes, though they may involve a criminal violation of law, need only be proved by a preponderance of the testimony. Mlinois (Hall v. Barnes, 82 Ill. 228; Robinson v. Randall, tb. 521). Iowa (Welch v. Jugenheimer,! 56 Iowa, 11 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 77, and 25 Alb. L. J. 271). ’ Overruling Barton v. Thompson, 46 Towa, 80 S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 181. INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 87 Defamation—Beyond Reasonable Doubt. Massachusetts (Roberge v. Burnham, 124 Mass. 277). New York (Mead v. Stratton, 8 Hun. (15 N. Y. Supreme Ct.) 148). Ohio In Ohio the decisions are both ways, Lyon v. Fleachman, 34 Ohio, 17 (Preponderance); Mason v. Shay, (Ohio), 3 Am. L. Rec. 435 (Reasonable doubt). Defamation.—On principle, it would seem, when the de- fence to libel or slander consists in a justification, and such justification imports the charge of some common- law offence, (certainly, if one of the crimen falsi), that the same intensity of proof is demanded as would be re- quired on a criminal action involving the like charge. Buf there is quite a,conflict of judicial opinion on this point, and we will endeavor to give the authorities pro and con. The following text-books and adjudications, take the view assimilated to, if not entirely correspondent with, those already suggested (Taylor, Ev. 97a; Steph. Dig. Ey. art. 94; Cooke, Def. 164, 165; 2 Stark. Sland. 100, 101;? 2 Greenl. Ev. secs. 408, 426; Towns. Sland. sec. 404; 2 Leigh, N. P. 1239; 2 Arch. N. P. 284; 3 Steph. N. P. 2084, 2252, 2253, sec. 644; 1 Hill. Torts, (3d Ed.) sec. 46; 1 Am. L. Cas. (5th Ed.) (164), 189; 2 Add. Torts, sec. 1163; Best, Begin, (Crandall’s Ed.) 51, note 2; Bishop, M. & D. sec. 644). England (Chalmers v. Shackell, 6 C. & P. 475 (25 E. C. L. R.); Willmett v. Harmer, 8 ib. 695 (34 E. C. L. B.); Richards v. Turner, 1 Car. & M. 414 (41 E. C. L. R.). Canada (Richardson v. Canada &c. Co., 17 U. C. (C. P.) 343). 1 Though some of the text-books, cited under this sub-title, do not discuss this particular subject, yet as they hold, on the general question, the same view, without qualification, according to their alignment here, it is deemed sufficient to array them, in opposition, at the outset. ?Starkie says it may indeed happen that more precise evidence may be necessary to support such a justification than would be sufficient to sus- tain an indictment; for the proof in the former case is governed by the allegations in the plea, and these may frequently require a degree of proof not necessary under a defence to an indictment. 88 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Same. California (Merk v. Gelzhaeuser, 50 Cal. 631). Connecticut (Mix ». Woodward, 12 Conn. 262). Delaware (Parke v. Blackinston, 3 Harr. 373, 378). Georgia Beyond a reasonable doubt (Williams v. Gun- nels, 66 Ga. 521; Ransome v. Christian, 56 ib. 351). Illinois (Darling v. Banks, 14 Il. 46; Crandall v. Daw- son, 1 Gilm. 556). Indiana (Lanter v. McEwen, 8 Blackf. 495; Wonderly v. Nokes, 8 ib. 589; MeGlenery v. Keller, 3 ib. 488; Offutt v. Harlywine, 4 ib. 460 S. C. 32 Am. Dec. 40; Byrket v. Monohon, 7 Blackf. 83 8S. C. 41 Am. Dec. 212; Swails v. Butcher, 2 Cart. 84; Landis v. Shanklin, 1 ib. 92; Shoulty v. Miller, ib. 554; Gants v. Vinard, ibd. 476; Tucker v. Call; 45 Ind. 31; Wilson v. Barnett, 45 ib. 163). Maine (Newbit v. Statuck, 35 Me. 315 S. ©. 58 Am. Dec. 706). The subsequent case of Ellis v. Buzzell, 60 Me. 209 S. 0. 11 Am. Rep. 204; 12 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 426, is generally cited in support of the contrary view, but the case of Newbit v. Statuck was not cited by counsel, but by the court, as not in conflict with the case under consideration. Ellis v. Buzzell involved the point as to the quantum of proof required to sustain a charge of adultery, which we know was not a crime at common law, and its commission is not only opposed to any presumption of innocence, but is consistent with the promptings of nature. So, Knowles v. Scribner, 57 Me. 497, was a bastardy proceeding, whieh is a civil suit. This view is held also in North Carolina (State v. Pate, Busb. 244; State v. Thompson, 3 J ones, 365). Missouri (Polston v. See, 54 Mo. 291). New York (Woodbeck v. Keller, 6 Cow. 118; Clark ». Dibble, 16 Wend. 601; Hopkins v. Smith, 3 Barb. 592, 602; Bissell v. Cornell, 24 Wend. 354; McKinley v. Role, 20 John. 351; see Mitchell v. Borden, 8 Wendell, 570). INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 89 Same—Preponderance. Pennsylvania (Steinman v. McWilliams, 6 Pa. 170, 177; Gorman v. Sutton, 32 ib. 247). Tennessee (Coulter v. Stewart, 2 Yerg. 225; Steele v. Phillips, 10 Hump. 461). Vermont (Dwinels v. Aiken, 2 Tyler, 78; see to same -effect, Bradish v. Bliss, 33 Vt. 326). The following text-books! and adjudications favor the ‘view, that such justification need only be proved by a ‘preponderance of the testimony (2 Whart. Ev. sec. 1246; May, Ins. sec. 583; Cooley, Torts, 208; articles in 10 Am. L. Rev. 642, and 12 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) (notes to Ellis v. Buzzell), 426; Proffatt, Jury Trials, sec. 335; MecNally’s Ev. 578). Circuit Court U. S. (Baker v. Kansas City Times, (C. C. -Mo.) 18 Am. L. Reg. 101). Alabama (Spruil v. Cooper, 16 Ala. 791). Colorado (Downing v. Brown, 3 Col. 591). Iowa (Riley v. Norton, 19 Rep. 75; overruling the pre- ‘vious cases of Ellis v. Lindley, 38 Iowa, 461; Fountain v. West, 23 ib. 1; Forshee v. Abrams, 2 Clarke, 571; Bradley v. Kennedy, 2 Greene, 231, and re-affirming ‘Welch v. Jugenheimer, 56 Iowa, 11). Kentucky (Sloan v. Gilbert, 12 Bush, 51 S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 708; Grimes v. Coyle, 6 B. Mon. 301). Maryland (McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403). Massachusetts In Massachusetts it is.intimated that in actions for slander, the rule contended for by the author may apply (Schmidt v. N. Y. &e. Co., 1 Gray, 529, 534; 'Perhaps it would be as well to state here, that Abbott’s Trial Ev. 495, is non-committal, while Bliss L. Ins. does not, in the faintest manner, touch the subject. It is noticeable that a number of the decisions cited under this head, lay some stress on the circumstance that, under the English pro- cedure, when a defendant, being sued for defamation, justifies the words -charged, (imputing the commission of a felony), and his defence shall be sustained, the plaintiff may be tried, as for such felony, without the action -of the grand jury (Cook ». Field, 3 Esp. 133). But no notice is taken of the ‘matter in the English cases cited in the text. See also the notes to Prosser v. Rowe, 2 C. & P. 421. 90 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Divorce: Adultery in Divorce. see Gordon v. Parmelee, 15 Gray, 413, 416; but on page 417 the court fully sustains the doctrine of preponder- ance in all civil cases). Michigan (Peoples v. Evening News, 51 Mich. 12). New Hampshire (Folsom v. Brawn, 25 N. H. 114; Mat-- hews v. Huntley, 9 ib. 146). New Jersey Open question (Kane v. Hibernia &e. Co., 39 N. J. L. 697 S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 239). North Carolina (Kincade v. Bradshaw 3. Hawks, 635, Barfield v. Britt, 2 Jones, 41 S. C. 62 Am. Dec. 190; Neal v. Fesperman, 1 Jones, 446; but see Jenkins v. Cockerham, 1 Ired. 309). Ohio The later case (of Bell v. McGinness, 40 Ohio, (N. 8.) 204 S. C. 48 Am. Rep. 673), holds to a preponder- ance only. The case of Seely v. Blair, Wright, 683, is. not noticed. South Carolina (Zimmerman v. McMakin, 22 S. ©. 372: 8. C. 53 Am. Rep. 720). Divorce.—The text-books are not agreed on this point.. Mr. Stewart straddles the subject when he says, “that the burden is on the complainant to establish his case- by a preponderance of proof, and even, it has been held, beyond a reasonable doubt” (Stew. M. & D. sec. 3453. see Bish. M. & D. sec. 644). Adultery in Divorce.—In several of the States the charge: of adultery must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Berckmans v. Berckmans,! 17 N. J. Eq. 453; Freeman ‘The principle decided by this court is in conflict with the later case of Kane v. Hibernia &c. Co., 39 N. J. L. 697, and whilst not noticed in the latter case should be considered as overruled by it. The opinion in the latter case met with the unanimous concurrence of’ the judges, except Woodhull, J., who had tried the case below, and whose opinion, though reversed, would seem to be the better view, unless, indeed, a distinction can be taken between the degree of evidence required to sus— tain the allegation of adultery, and that of wilfully burning insured property... The later case of Clare ». Clare, 19 N. J. Eq. 37, without referring to Berckmans ». Berckmans, somewhat tones down the doctrine there enun-- ciated. INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 9t Cruelty: Outstanding Title: Equities: Malpractice: Trespass. v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235; see also Cooper v. Cooper, 10 La. (O. 8.) 249; Edmund’s appeal, 57 Pa. 232; Caton v. Caton,, 7 Ecce. & Mar. Cas. 15, in notes; Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & M. 507; Mehle ». Lapeyrollerie, 16 La. Ann. 4). While, in others, such charge, in civil actions, is sus-- tained by a preponderance of the testimony (Chestnut v. Chestnut, 88 Ill. 548, 550; Carter v. Carter, 62 ib. 439, 449; Smith v. Smith, 5 Oreg. 186, 188). Upon principle, in would seem that it ought to be sufficient to establish the allegation of adultery and for- nication by a preponderance of testimony. For here the presumption of innocence is weakened by the coun- tervailing force of the natural propensity to copulate, (especially if it arises in defamation of a single woman), _ and so, to a great extent, “sets the matter at large,” but must be full, clear and satisfactory (Case v. Case, 17 Col.. 578, 600, 601; Blake v. Blake, 70 Ill. 618, 626; Edmund. v. Edmund, 57 Pa. 232, 234). Cruelty—In Illinois it is held that the extreme cruelty alleged as a ground for divorce, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Henderson v. Henderson, 88 III. 248). Hjectment—Outstanding Title—An outstanding title set up by the defendant in ejectment, must be established : “beyond controversy” (Greenleaf v. Birth, 6 Pet. (S. C. U.S.) 302). Equities—As against a purchaser in good faith and for value, the proofs to impeach his title ought to be more full and direct, more unequivocal and certain, than would be required in the case of a hard or unequal bargain (Calais Steamboat Oo. v. Van Pelt, 2 Black, (S. C. U. 8.) 372). Fatal Malpractice—To sustain this kind of action, the evidence need only preponderate (Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348; Hoener v. Koch, 84 Ill. 408). Felonious Trespass.—In an action, in which the gravamen 92 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Felonious Trespass. is a felonious trespass or trover, it is held by the follow- ing courts that the plaintiff need only establish his case by a preponderance of the testimony. England (Vaughton v. L. & W. BR. R., L. R. (9 Ex.) 93; M’Queen v. Great Western &e. Co., L. R. (10 Q. B.) 569 S. C. 14 Eng. Rep. (Moak), 369). Ireland. Gogarty v. The Great &c. Co., 9 Ir. L. RB. C. L. (Ex. Ch.) 233, reversing same case, 8 ib. 344). Connecticut (Munson v. Atwood, 30 Conn. 102; Beach wv. Clark, 51 ib. 200 S. C. 18 Rep. 813; Mead v. Husted, 52 ib. 53S. C. 52 Am. Rep. 554; 19 Rep. 587). Illinois It is held that a “clear” preponderance is not required; it is sufficient that the evidence creates proba- bilities in favor of the plaintiff, and that the weight inclines to his side (Crabtree v. Reed, 50 Ill. 206). Indiana (Bissell Vv. West, 35 Ind. 54). North Carolina (Rippey v. Miller, 1 Jones, 479 S. C. 62 Am. Dee. 177). Vermont (Burnett v. Ward, 42 Vt. 80; Weston v. Grav- lin, 49 ib. 507; but see previous case of Bradish v. Bliss, 35 ib. 326). But in Iowa, in such cases, it was held that the proof must exclude a reasonable doubt (Barton v. Thompson, 46 Iowa, 30 8. C. 26 Am. Rep. 131). This case, how- ever, is overruled by Welch v. Jugenheimer, 56 Iowa, 11 8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 77, and the preponderance view established by the case of Kendig v. Oberhulser, 58 Iowa, 195. Whereas, in Maine, it is held, that in an action for trover, brought to recover damages for goods stolen, it is not necessary to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, but the jury is to give a verdict according to the weight of the evidence, as in other civil cases (Sinclair v. Jackson, 47 Me, 102 S. ©. 74 Am. Dee. 476). But in civil cases, where a criminal act is so set out INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 93 Forfeitures: Forgery: Fraud. in the pleadings, as to. raise that distinct issue before the jury, the crime charged must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, before the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict (Thayer v. Boyle, 30 Me. 475); but where there is no such issue, raised by the pleadings, the jury may decide upon the preponderance of the testimony! (Sin- clair v. Jackson, supra; Schmidt v. N. Y. Ins. Co., 1 Gray, 529). Forfeitures.—In a proceeding in rem for forfeiture, the charge upon which the same is based, need only be proved by a preponderance of the testimony (Lilien- thal’s Tobacco, 97 U. S. 237; Robert Edwards, 6 Wh. 187; Wood v. U. S. 16 Pet. 342; Locke v. U. 8. 7 Cranch,. 339; Luminary, 8 Wheat. 407; Taylor v. U. 8. 3 How. 197; U. S. v. Twenty-five Cases Cloths, 1 Crabbe, 356; Clifton v. U. S. 4 How. 242; Buckley v. U. 8S. 4 How. 251; Cliquot’s Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 143; John Griffin, 15 Wall. 29; U. S. v. an open boat, 5 Mas. C. C. 232; Short Staple, 1 Gall. 103). Forgery —In a civil action, involving the charge of forgery, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not re- quired, but only a preponderance of the entire evidence (New York &c. Co. v. Gleason, 78 N. Y. 503 S. C. 7 Abb. N. C. 334; Hills v. Goodyear, 4 Lea, 233 8S. C. 40 Am. Rep. 5; 11 ©. L. J. 288; Union Bank v. Balderwick, 45. Ml. 375). Praud.—In the following text-books and courts, it is. held, where fraud is the question involved, that it may be proved by a preponderance of the testimony (Big. Fraud, 474-476; Kerr, F. & M. 384; Bump, F. C. 584- 587; Wait, F. 0. sec. 281). England (Trenchard v. Wanley, 2 P. Wms. 166; Town- 1 Assuming that in any civil action wherein, upon a traverse of the declaration or plea, which brings directly in issue the commission of a. crime, it’is‘necessary to establish that allegation by proof beyond a reason- able doubt, it strikes the author that: the distinction taken by the Maine Court is eminently correct. "94 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Authorities. send v. Lowfield, 1 Ves. Sen. 35; M’Queen v. Farquhar, 11 Ves. 467; Hamilton v. Kirwan, 2 Jones & Lat. 401; Pike v. Vigers, 2 Dr. & Wal. 267; Bowen v. Evans, 2 House of L. Cases, 257; Pares v. Pares, 33 L. J. (Ch.) 218). The jury must be “quite satisfied” (Neeley v. Lock, 8 C. & P. 527 (34 B.C. L. R.)). : Supreme Court U. S. The Supreme Court of the United ‘States seems to favor the preponderance view (Rea v. Missouri, 17 Wall. 532; Gregg v. Sayre, 8 Pet. 224; ‘Clarke v. White, 12 ib. 178). Circuit Court U. Ss. But in the United States Circuit Court, there is some conflict on this point. In the first and seventh circuits, it has been held that fraud should be established beyond a reasonable doubt (Phettiplace v. Sayles, 4 Mas. C. C. 312; Gould v. Gould, 3 Story, 537; Hubbard v. Turner, 2 McLean, 519). And in others, that a preponderance is sufficient; but the “evi- dence should be clear and convincing,” or “clearly proved” (Wickham v. Morehouse, 16 Fed. Rep. 324; Babbit v. Dotten, 14 ib. 19). The failure of an insurance company is prima facie evidence of fraud, and the fact must be satisfactorily explained (Buck v. Piedmont &c. Co., 11 Rep. 215; Cf. Jordan v. Dobson, 2 Abb. U. S. 398). Alabama The rule is, that, when proved by circum- stances, they must afford a strong presumption (Juzan +. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662 8. C. 44 Am. Dec. 448; Adams »v. ‘Thornton, 78 Ala. 489 S. C. 56 Am. Rep. 49; Smith ». Br. Bank, 21 Ala. 125; Stiles v. Lighfoot, 26 ib. 442; Alabama &¢c. Co. v. Petway, 24 ib. 544; Themes v. Rem- bert, 63 ib. 561; Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 ib. 520; Crommelin v. McCauley, 67 ib. 542). Arkansas (Hempstead v. Johnston, 18 Ark. 123). - California (Ford v. Chambers, 19 Cal. 143); “must be clearly made out” (McCarthy v. White, 21 ib. 495 S. C. 'The former cases of Steele ». Kinkle, 3 Ala. 352, and Thompkins 9. Nichols, 53 2. 197, are overruled by this case. INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 95 Authorities: Opinion of Dillon, J. 82 Am. Dec. 754). And the evidence must be “strong and conclusive” (Bryan v. Ramirez, 8 Cal. 461 S. 0. 68 Am. Dee. 340). Florida (Alston v. Rowles, 13 Fla, 117). Georgia Must be so clear and strong as to produce satisfactory conviction (Schnell v. Toomer, 56 Ga. 168; Greer v. Caldwell, 14 ib. 207 S. C. 58 Am. Dee. 553). In -one case it was held that the evidence must be such, as satisfies the conscience of a common man, so that he would act, upon his conviction, in matters of the highest importance to his own interests (Greer v. Caldwell, 14 Ga. ‘207 S. C. 58 Am. Dev. 553). Iinois The circumstances must be strong enough to ‘produce conviction of the truth of the charge, although ‘there may remain some doubt (Bryant v. Simoneau, 51 Ill. 324; Carter v. Gunnells, 67 ib. 270). Indiana (Farmer v. Calvert, 44 Ind. 209; Mahoney v. Hunter, 30 ib. 246). Iowa A learned and eminent judge (Dillon) held that fraud must be proved, by clear and satisfactory evidence {Geib v. Ins. Co., 1 Dill. C. C. 443); and the statal cases are to the same purport (Behrens v. Insurance Co., 58 Iowa, 26; Bradford v. Bradford, 60 Iowa, 201; Coit v. ‘Churchill, 61 ib. 296; Wood v. Porter, 56 ib. 161; see also, Fifield v. Gaston, 12 Iowa, 218). Kentucky (Marksbury v. Taylor, 10 Bush, 519). Massachusetts (Gordon v. Parmelee, 15 Gray, 418). Michigan (Buck v. Sherman, 2 Doug. 176; Watkins wv. Wallace, 19 Mich. 57; O’Donnell v. Segar, 25 ib. 367; but see, People v. Marion, 29 ib. 31; Hough v. Dickinson, 58 ib. 89). Minnesota (Burr v. Willson, 22 Minn. 206). Mississippi (White v. Trotter, 14 8. & M. 308. C. 53 Am. Dee. 112; Doe v. Dignowitty, 4S. & M. 57; Park- hurst v. McGraw, 24 Miss. 134). 96 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Opinion of Chancellor Kent. Missouri (Waddingham v. Loker, 44 Mo. 132; King », Moon, 42 ib. 551). Nebraska Preponderance (Tortle v. Dunn, 6 Neb. 93). New Hampshire (McConihe v. Sawyer, 12 N. H. 396; Ossipee v. Grant, 59 ib. 70). New Jersey In procuring the making of a will, the evidence as to fraud must exclude a “serious” doubt (in re Will of Vanderveer, 20 N. J. Hq. 463). New York (Payne v. Solomon, (U. S. Dist. Ct.) 14 Bank Reg. 162). It was held by Chancellor Kent that the evidence must be clear, strong and satisfactory (Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582; Gillespie v. Moon, 2 ib. 585 8. C. 7 Am. Dec. 559; see also, Henry v. Henry, 8 Barb. 558; Jaeger v. Kelley, 52 N. Y. 274). Fair pre- ponderance (Campbell v. Clarke, 16 N. Y. Week. Dig. 508; Brittingham v. Brittingham, ib. 119). North Carolina (Lee v. Pearce, 68 N. CO. 76, 89). Ohio (Strader v. Mullane, 17 Ohio, 624; Jones v. Greaves, 26 Ohio, (N. 8S.) 2 8. C. 20 Am. Rep. 752). Pennsylvania In Pennsylvania, they confine the de- gree of proof to strict preponderance (Painter v. Drum 40 Pa. 467; Abbey v. Dewey, 25 ib. 413; Kaine v. Weigley,. 22 ib. 179). But the later case of Young v. Edwards, 72. ib. 257, seems, perhaps, to favor a reasonable doubt, though classified by Bigelow as only requiring a pre- ponderance. (See also, Cummins v. Hurlbut, 92 ib. 165; Ott v. Oyer, 106 ib. 6, which settles down on the prepon- derance rule). Texas (Sparks v. Dawson, 47 Tex. 138; Linn v. Wright, 18 ib. 317; Burch v. Smith, 15 ib. 219 8. CO. 65 Am. Dec. 154). West Virginia In West Virginia, fraud must be clearly proved (Van Bibber v. Bierne, 6 W. Va. 168; Lockhard. v. Beckley, 10 ib. 87; Hunter v. Hunter, ib. 321). Wisconsin (Evans v. Pugee, 57 Wis. 623). INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 97 Confidential Relations: Identity: Insurance. Confidential Relations—The burden to establish the fair- ness of a transaction must extend beyond a reasonable doubt (Kerr, F. & M. 386; Big. Fraud, 190, et seq.; Gib- son v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266; Benson v. Heathorn, 1 Y. & C. 326; Allfrey v. Allfrey, 1 Mac. & G.87; Billage v. Southee, 9 Hare, 534, 540; Moore v. Prance, ib. 299, 303; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 234, 240; Smith v. Kay, .7 H. of L. Cas. 750). Judge Bigelow lays it down that the party com- plained of, must establish the perfect fairness and honesty of the transaction, and show that he made a full and adequate disclosure to the party complaining, before the transaction (Big. Fraud, 493). Identity— “Slight” proof only is required of the identity of a grantor, if the deed is shown to have been duly executed (Stebbins v. Duncan, 108 U. S. 32). Insurance—When the defence to an action on a policy of insurance is suicide by the insured, or, in fire or marine, the wilful destruction of the res, we encounter another class of conflicting decisions.! Those favoring the view, that such defences must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, are: England (Thurtell v. Beaumont, 1 Bing. 339 (8 EH. C. L. R.)). Scotland (Hercules &c. Co. v. Hunter, 15 Court Sess. Cas. 800). Canada (Richardson v. Canada, West &c. Co. 16 U. C. Com. Pleas, 436). Florida (Shultz v. Pacific &c. Co., 2 Ins. L. J. 495). Illinois (McConnel v. Delaware Ins. Co., 18 Ill. 228). Maine (Butman v. Hobbs, 35 Me. 227; see Decker v. Somerset &c. Co., 66 ib. 406; Knowles v. Scribner, 57 1b. 495). 1 Wood says that, by the weight of both American and English authority, this defence must be established beyond a reasonoble doubt (Wood F. I, secs. 101, 504, 506). 7 “98 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Same. Ohio (Lexington Ins. Co. v. Paver, 16 Ohio, 324). The following named courts hold that the charge need only be established by a preponderance of the testimony: U. S. Circuit Court (Huchberger v. Merchants &c. Co.,. 4 Biss. 265). That great judge, (Dillon), also held, that a preponderance of evidence was sufficient (Scott v. Home Ins. Co., 1 Dill. C. ©. 105; see also, Bayly v. Lancashire &c. Co., (C. C. La.) 4 Ins. L. J. 503; Sibley v. St. Paul &e. Co., (C. C. Ill.) 8 ib. 461; Howell »v. Hartford &c. Co., (C. C. Tl.) 3 ib. 653; Mack v. Lan- cashire &c. Co., (OC. C. Mo.) 4 Fed. Rep. 59 S. C. 2 McCrary, 211; 9 Ins. L. J. 680; 10 Rep. 800; Prather v. Michigan &c. Co., (C. C. Ind.) 7 Rep. 293). After pre- sumptive evidence of suicide has been adduced, the plaintiff can only avoid its force by showing that the assured did not commit the act with knowledge that it would, and the intent that it should, result in death (Nimick v. Mutual &c. Co., 3 Brewst. 502 8. 0. 10 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 101; 3 Pittsb. L. J. 293). Kansas (Kansas Ins. Co. v. Berry, 8 Kan. 159). Kentucky (Atna &c. Co. v. Johnson, 11 Bush. 587 S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 223). Louisiana (Hoffman v. Western &c. Co., 1 La. Ann. 216, 219; Wightman v. Same, 8 Rob. 442; Regnier v. La. Ins. Co., 12 La. 336), Massachusetts (Schmidt v. N. Y. &c. Co., 1 Gray, 529). Michigan A charge requiring the jury to be well satis- fied, is erroneous (Mongahan v. Agricultural &c. Co., 53 Mich. 238). Missouri (Rothschild v. Am. Xe. Co., 62 Mo. 356; Mar- shall v. Thames &e. Co., 43 ib. 586). New Jersey (Kane v. Hibernia &e. Co.,! 39 N. J. L. 697 S. 0, 23 Am. Rep. 239; 17 Alb. L. J. 226). ‘The reasoning of the court is antagonized by that adopted in the earlier case of Berckmans v. Berckmans, 17 N. J. Eq. 453. INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 99 Letters Patent: Marriage: Mortgage: Negative: Negligence: Neg. Instrs. Pennsylvania (Somerset ce. Co. v. Usaw, 112 Pa. 80S. ©. 56 Am. Rep. 307; Continental &c. Co. v. Delpeuch, 82 Pa. 225). Texas (Gwyer v. Continental &c. Co., 57 Tex. 181). West Virginia (Simmons ». Ins. Co., 8 W. Va. 474). Wisconsin (Washington &c. Co. v. Wilson, 7 Wis. 169; Blaeser v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 37 ib. 31 8. C. 19 Am. Rep. 747. This last case explained and qualified, (Pryce v. Security Ins. Co., 29 Wis. 270). Letters-Patent.—A. preponderance of testimony is suf- ficient (Nor. L. P. 206). Marriage—The fact of marriage may be proved by a preponderance of the testimony (McDeed v. McDeed, 67 Til. 545). Mortgage, &c.—It requires “clear and convincing” evi- dence to overcome the presumption that the legal and equitable title to a note and mortgage, payable to a married woman, dated before her marriage, is not in her (Smith v. Smith, 87 Tl. 111). Negative—The degree of proof varies with the circum- stances, very slender testimony being sufficient to shift the burden to the party having greater opportunity of knowing the facts (U. S. v. Southern Colorado &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 273). Negligence—May be proved by a preponderance of tes- timony (Kendig v. Overhulser, 58 Iowa, 195; Bryan v. Chicago &c. Co., 63 ib. 464; Quaife v. Chicago &e. Co., 48 Wis. 513; S.C. 33 Am. Rep. 821; Hartwig v. Same, 49 ib. 358 S. C.1 A. & EB. RB. R. Cas. 65; Whitney v. Clifford, 57 Wis. 156; Seybolt v. New York &e. Co., 95 N. Y. 562 8S. ©. 47 Am. Rep. 75). Negotiable Instruments.—In an action by a payee on a note, where lack of consideration is relied on, and there is conflicting evidence, the jury must be satisfied of the fact by a preponderance of the whole testimony (Small wv. Clewley, 62 Me. 155 S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 410). 100 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. Notoriety: Novation: Penalties. Notoriety—It seems that one witness is not sufficient to prove this fact (Watts v. Lindsey, 7 Wh. (S. C. U. 8.) 158). Novation. The evidence to rebut a case of novation must be “clear and satisfactory” (Piper v. Wade, 57 Ga. 228). -Penalties—It was held in the case of Cooper v. Slade, 6 H. of L. Cas. 746, (reversing S. C. on appeal from the Exchequer Chamber, 6 El. & Bl. 447), that a preponder- ance of evidence was sufficient in an action for a penalty under the bribery act. That act makes the same facts a penalty and a misde- meanor. The following courts hold the same view: Ireland (McClory v. Wright, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 514; Magee v. Mark, 11 ib. 449). Supreme Court U.S. But the Supreme Court of the United States hold that the proof must exclude a reas- onable doubt (Chaffee v. U. S. 18 Wall. 516, 545). New Hampshire (Hitchcock v. Munger, 15 N. H. 97). Vermont The Supreme Court view is held in Vermont (White v. Comstock, 6 Vt. 405; Brooks v Clayes, 10 ib. 37; Riker v. Hooper, 35 ib. 457). But this rule is not appli- cable where one is seeking double or treble damages given by statute (Burnett v. Wood, 42 ib. 80). Resulting Trusts——When the legal estate in lands is conveyed to a trustee, and a trust declared as to part only, a resulting trust arises to the original owner. The burden here requires clear proof of the deed in trust, and the conclusion is a matter of law or legal in- ference (1 Greenl. Cruise, 362, sec. 55; Lewin, Trusts, 179; Hill, Trustees, 113, et seq.; Perry, Trusts, sec. 152; Smith, Man. Eq. 156, IT). So, where the whole of an estate is conveyed for par- ticular purposes, or on particular trusts only, which, by accident or otherwise, cannot take effect, a trust will result to the owner or his heirs. INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. 101 » Seaworthiness: Seduction: Survivorship: Torts. The burden in such case requires proof that the pur- poses of the trust, for some reason of fact, cannot be effectuated (1 Greenl. Cruise, 362, sec. 57; Perry, Trusts, secs. 157-160). Renewals of Leases—By a trustee in his own name in- dividually. Here the burden requires the simple proof of the original trust deed and the renewal (1 Greenl. Cruise, 364, sec. 62; Lewin, Trusts, 218; Hill, Trust. 438; Perry, Trusts, sec. 538; Smith, Man. Hq. 184, IV.). When a fraud is committed in obtaining a convey- ance of realty, the bargainee will be constituted a trus- tee for the party defrauded. In this instance, the bur- den requires proof, that the party so obtaining the con- veyance stood in some confidential relation to the party claiming to be defrauded; and a familiar illustration is the case of one who engages to buy for another ata sale, and then takes the deed in his own name (1 Greenl. Cruise, 365, sec. 66; Lewin, Trusts, 178). Seaworthiness —Must be proved by “clear” evidence (Head v. Providence &c. Co., 2 Cr. (S. C. U. 8.) 127). Seduction. May be proved by a preponderance of testimony, and it is error to charge that it must be “clearly and fairly proved” (West v. Druff, 55 Iowa, 335; Hall v. Wolff, 61 ib. 559). Survivorship in a common calamity.— There is no presump- tion, and the allegation is sufficiently sustained by a preponderance of the testimony (1 Greenl. Ev. secs. 29, 30 and notes; Pell v. Ball, 1 Cheves, (S. C.) part 2, 99; Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81; Coye v. Leach, 8 Met. (Mass.) 371; Mockring v. Mitchell, 1 Barb. Ch. 264; Newell v. Nickols, 19 N. Y. Supreme Ct. 604, (12 Hun); Stinde v. Goodrich, 3 Redfield, (N. Y.) 87). Torts—An action, for injury occasioned by defendant’s sheep communicating disease, may be sustained by a preponderance of the testimony (Herrick v. Gary, 83 Tl. 85; Haskins v. Haskins, 9 Gray, 390). 102 INTENSITY OF THE PROOF. _ Usury: Vis Major: Wills. Usury—This defence must be established, by proof, beyond a reasonable doubt. New Jersey (Taylor v. Morris, 22 N. J. Eq. 606;1 Con- over v. Van Mater, 18 ib. 481). Oregon (Poppleton v. Nelson, 12 Or. 349 S. O. 20 Rep. 152). Tyler lays it down, without citing authority, that the evidence must be clear and convincing (Tyler, Usury, 374), but that it does not exact proof beyond a reason- able doubt (ib. citing Porter v. Mount, 45 Barb. 422, 427; see also, Ewing v. Howard, 7 Wall. 499). New York In New York it was held that a preponder- ance was sufficient (Aeby v. Rapelye, 1 Hill, 9). Vis Major—Must be established beyond a reasonable doubt (Struggle v. U. S., 9 Cr. (8. C. U. 8.) 71). Wills —The weight of authority relieves the propounder from proof that the testator knew the contents of the will; such knowledge, on proof of execution, is pre- sumed (1 Jarman on Wills, 44, note 4; Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 580; Cuthbertson’s Appeal, 97 Pa. 163 8. C. 2 Am. Prob. Rep. 54; Key v. Holloway, 7 J. Baxter, 575 S C. 1 Am. Prob. Rep. 360; Griffin ». Diffenderffer, (Md.) 7 Rep. 527; King v. Kinsey, 74 N. C. 261; In re Piercy, 1 Robertson, Ecc. 278; Pettes v. Bingham, 10 N. H. 514; 1 Tay. Ev. 130). But, in a late English case, it was held that the burden was upon the propounder, to show that the testator knew and ap- proved of the contents of the will (Cleare v. Cleare, L. R. (1 Prob. & Div.) 655; see also, Gerrish v. Nason, 22 Me. 438 S. C. 39 Am. Dec. 589). According to the earlier English authorities, in case suspicion is thrown upon the instrument, as when a principal legatee has drawn the will and the like, knowl- edge of the contents must be shown (1 Jarman on Wills, 44, note 4; Paske v. Ollat, 2 Phill. 323). But this was 1 There seems to be an irreconcilable conflict between the law and equity decisions in New Jersey. LIMITATIONS. 103 Beyond Seas. modified, and the doctrine laid down that, such evi- dence, unexplained, should merely have great weight in causing the court to reject the will (Barry v. Butlin, 1 Curt. 637; note 4 to 1 Jarman on Wills, 44). See the subject fully and ably discussed in Downey v. Murphey, 1 Dev. & Bat. 82, where the apparent confusion is clearly stated. LIMITATIONS. Beyond Seas—The expression “beyond the seas,” em- ployed in the English Statute of Limitations, 21 James I, and incorporated into the statutes of several of the States, has given rise to no little conflict of judicial opinion. In England, it was held, at an early day, that Ireland was beyond the seas, but Scotland was not (Ang. Lim. sec. 200; Anon, 1 Show. 91; King v. Walker, 1 W. Black, 286). In the case of Ruckmaboye v. Mottichund, -8 Moo. P. 0. 4S. C. 32 BE. L. & Hg. 84. The judicial committee of the privy council, announced the conclu- sion that the words “beyond the seas” are, in legal import and effect, synonymous with the words “out of the realm,” “out of the territories.” In this country, the Federal Courts, when not hampered by Statal de- cisions to the contrary, hold that the expression is equivalent to “without the State,” or “without the jurisdiction of the State” (Bank v. Dyer, 14 Pet. 141; Murray v. Baker, 3 Wh. 541; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wh. 361; Bank v. McKenzie, 2 Brock, 393; Piatt v. Vattier, 1 ML. 146, 157; Peck v. Pease, 5 McL. 486). In one of the last cited cases, the Supreme Court of United States reserved the point as to whether they were bound to follow the construction given to these words by the statal tribunals, but, in later cases, held that they were (Harpending v. Dutch Church, 16 Pet. 455; Porter- 104 LIMITATIONS. Without Jurisdiction: Out of the State. field v. Clark, 2 How. 76; Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. 8. 628). rhe following courts hold that these words are synonymous with the expression “without the juris- diction of the State,” or “out of the State,” and the like: Arkansas (Field v. Dickinson, 3 Ark. 409 S. C. 36 Am. Dec. 458; Wakefield v. Smart, 8 Ark. 488). Georgia (Denham v. Holman, 26 Ga. 182 8. C. 71 Am. Dec. 198). Indiana (Stephenson v. Doe, 8 Blackf. 508 S. C. 46 Am. Dec. 489). Maryland (Alex. Br. Stats. 462, 463; Brent v. Tasker, 1 H. & McH. 89; Maurice v. Worden, 52 Md. 283 S. ©. 9 Rep. 119; Pancoast v. Addison, 1 H. & J. 3508. C. 2 Am. Dec. 520; Bank v. Dyer, 14 Pet. 141). Massachusetts! (White v. Bailey, 3 Mass. 271; Byrne v. Crowninshield, 1 Pick. 263; see, however, Whitney v. Goddard, 20 ib. 304 8S. C. 32 Am. Dee. 216). New Hampshire (Galusha v. Cobleigh, 13 N. H. 79; Ward v. Cole, 32 ib. 452; 8. C. 64 Am. Dee. 378). Ohio (Richardson v. Richardson, 6 Ham. 125 8. C. 25 Am. Dec. 745; West v. Pickeismer, 7 Ham. (Pt. 2), 235; Smith v. Bartram, 11 Ohio, (N. S.) 690). South Carolina (Forbes v. Foot, 2 McC. 331 S. C. 18 Am. Dee. 732). In Kentucky, the expression “out of the country,” is employed for “beyond seas,” and has been construed to mean “out of the State” (Musel v. Israel, 3 Bibb. 510). In the following States, the expression under consid- eration is construed to mean without the limits of the United States: Illinois (Mason v. Johnson, 24 Ill. 159 S. ©. 76 Am. Dec. 740). 1 But the courts of this State restrict this view to their own citizens and to defendants (Whitney v. Goddard, 20 Pick. 304 8. C. 82 Am. Dec. 216). LIMITATIONS. 105 Return of Defendant. Iowa (Darling v. Meacham,'! 2 Greene, 602). Missouri (Marvin v. Bates, 13 Mo. 217; Fackler »v. Fackler, 14 ib. 431; Keeton v. Keeton, 20 ib. 530; Cf. State v. Wilis, 46 ib. 236). Pennsylvania (Ward uv Hallam, 2 Dall. 217 8. CG. 1 Yates, 329; Thurston v. Fisher, 9 8. & R. 288; Gonder 4», Estabrook, 33 Pa. 374). In the following States the expression “beyond seas,” is construed literally : Connecticut (Gustin v. Brattle, Kirby, 299). North Carolina (Whitlocke v. Walton, 2 Murp. 23; Earle ~”. Dickson, 1 Dev. 16; State v. Harris, 71 N. ©. 174; Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628). Mr. Angel states that it may now be considered as an established general rule in this country, that the expres- sion “beyond seas,” and, “out of the State,” are analag- ous and must receive the same interpretation, quoting from MARSHALL, ©. J., in Faw v. Roberdeau, 3 Cr. (S. ©. U.S.) 173, Ang. Lim. sec. 200). Mr. Wood does not discuss the point. a Confined to plaintiffs, where— jean In England, before the statute of 4 Anne, C. ‘ip, the provision was confined to plaintiffs (Ang. Lim. sec. 205). So it is in: Pennsylvania (Nathans v. Bingham, 1 Miles, 164). Aliter in: Marylana (Hysinger v. Baltzell, 3 G. & J. 158). Return of Defendant, what Constitutes—The statutes of the States providing for a removal of the bar in case of the absence of a defendant are not identical, and different interpretations have been given to what constitutes a return. The following authorities may be profitably consulted (Wood Lim., sec. 244, et seq.; Ang. Lim., secs. 206, 207). Absence of One of Several Joint Debtors—In England the absence of one of several joint debtors saves the bar ' Construction of the Michigan Statute. 106 - LIMITATIONS. Absence of Defendant. (Fannin v. Anderson, 9 jur. 969 S. C. 14 L. J. (Q. B.) 282; Townes v. Mead, 29 E. L. & Eq. 271). Also in New York (Denny v. Smith,! 18 N. Y. 567). Held otherwise in New Jersey (Bruce v. Flagg, 25 N. J. L. (1 Dutch,) 219). Absence of Defendant from the State.—The character of the absence, whether temporary or domiciliary is so. dependent upon the phraseology of the different statutes, that it is deemed sufficient to array the decisions under the two divisions as indicated above. The following courts hold, that a temporary absence is sufficient to satisfy the language of the statute. California (Rogers v. Hatch, 44 Cal. 280; Watt v. Wright, 66 ib. 202). Illinois (Vandlandinigham v. Huston, 9 Ill. 124; Chenot. v. LeFevre, 8 ib. 637). Louisiana (Morgan v. Robinson, 12 Mar. 76 8S. ©. 13. Am. Dee. 366). Maine (Bucknam v. Thompson, 38 Me. 171 8. ©. 61 yo ec. 237; Cf. Hacker v. Everitt, 57 Me. 548; Drew v. , 37 Me. 389). Ne ampshire (Ward Vv. Cole, 32, N. H. 452 S. ©. 64 Am. Dge. 318; Gillman v. Cutts, 23 N. H. 376; Ward v. Howe, 38 a H. 35; Brown v. Rollins, 44 ib. 446 ; Bell v. Lamprey, 52 ib. 41 'S, C. 57 ib. 168; Gray v. Fifield, 59: tb. 131; Howard v. Fletcher, 59 ib. 151). Tennessee (Barbour v. Erwin, 14 Lea, 716; Cf. Carlin v.. Wallace, 13 ib. 571). Wisconsin (Parker v. Kelly, 61 Wis. 550; Whitcomb v. Keator, 59 ib. 609). In others, however, it is held that the absence must be permanent, or, at least, animo manendi. Circuit Court U. 8. (Satterthwaite v. Abercrombie, 24 Fed. Rep. 543; Hennequin v. Barney, ib. 580). 'Overruling Brown v. Delafield, 1 Den. 445. LIMITATIONS. 107 Animo Manendi. Connecticut (Sage v. Hawley, 16 Conn. 106 S. C. 41 Am. Dee. 128). Iowa (Penley v. Waterhous, 1 Clarke, 498; Hedges v Jones, 63 Iowa, 573 8S. C. 18 Rep. 521; Savage v. Scott, 45 Iowa, 130; Thomas v. Brewer, 55 ib. 227). Louisiana (N. O. &c. Co. v. Beard, 16 La. Ann. 345). Massachusetts (Collester v. Hailey, 6 Gray, 517; Lang- don v. Doud, 6 Allen, 423 8S. C. 83 Am. Dec. 641; Movar v. Harvey, 25 Mass. 574; Perkins v. Davis, 109 ib. 239). Michigan (Campbell v. White, 22 Mich. 178; Cf. Con- rad v. Nall, 24 ib. 275). Mississippi (Withers v. Bullock, 53 Miss. 539; but see State v. Furlong, 60 ib. 839). Missouri (Garth v. Robards, 20 Mo. 523 8. C. 64 Am. Dec. 203; Cook v. Holmes, 29 Mo. 61 8. C. 77 Am. Dec. 548; Tohuson: v. Smith, 43 Mo. 501; Venuci v. Cadema- tori, 59 ib. 354; Hartwell v. Hopkins, 2 ib. 220; Fike v. Clark, 55 ib. 105; Rhodes v. Farrish, 16 Mo. App. 430; see Miller v. Tyler, 61 Mo. 401. This court takes a dis- tinction between domicile and residence). Nebraska (Blodgett v. Utley, 4 Neb. 25; Seymore v. Street, 5 ib. 85; Hedges v. Roach, 16 ib. 673). New York (Bennett v. Cook, 43 N. Y. 537 8, C. 3 Am. Rep. 727; Bassett v. Bassett, 55 Barb. 505). The time is counted out even if defendant does business in the State. There must have been a residence abroad or continuous absence for one year. Pennsylvania Absence in military service, (Graham v. Com., 51 Pa. 255). Texas (Ayers v. Henderson, 9 Tex. 539; Smith v. De La Garza, 15 ib. 150 8S. C. 65 Am. Dee. 147); but in a later case, no effect is given to any absence (Hunton v. Nichols, 55 Tex. 217). Vermont Construction of words “residing abroad,” (Graves v. Weeks, 19 Vt. 178; Hackett v. Kendall, 23 o 275; Rutland &c. Co. v. Bliss, 57 ib. 23; Hill v. Bellows, 108 LIMITATIONS. Never in the State. 15 ib. 727; Stevens v. Fisher, 30 ib. 200; Hall v. Nasmith, 28 ib. 791). There is a third line of decisions in the case of de- fendants who have never been within the State. Some courts holding that, although the defendant fails to come within the State until after the statutory period has elapsed, his absence shall be deducted. England (Strithorst v. Greme,! 3 Wils. 145; Lafond v. Ruddock, 24 HE. L. & Eq. 239; 13 C. B. 813 (76 E. O. L. R.)). Alabama (Thomason v. Odum, 23 Ala. 480; State Bank v. Seawell, 18 ib. 616). Arkansas (Wakefield v. Smart, 3 Eng. 488; Wilson »v. Keller, ib. 507). California (Palmer v. Shaw, 16 Cal. 93). Connecticut (Hatch v. Spofford, 24 Conn. 432). Kentucky (Graves v. Graves, 2 Bib. 207 8S. C. 4 Am. Dec. 697). Maine (McMillan v. Wood, 29 Me. 217; Buckman »v. ‘Thompson, 38 ib. 171 S. C. 61 Am. Dee. 237). Massachusetts (Von Hemert v. Porter, 11 Met. 210; Bulger v. Roche, 11 Pick. 36; Little v. Blunt, 16 ib. 359; Hall v. Little, 14 Mass. 203; Wilson v. Appleton, 17 ib. 180; Cf. Turner v. Shearer, 6 Gray, 427). Michigan (Erskine v. Messicar, 27 Mich. 84). Mississippi (Hstis v. Rawlens, 5 How. 258; Bower ». Henshaw, 56 Miss. 619). Missouri (King v. Lane, 7 Mo. 241 S. 0. 37 Am. Dee. 187; Tagart v. Indiana, 15 Mo. 209); changed by statute {Thomas v. Black, 22 ib. 330; Smith v. Newby, 13 4b. 159, 165; Fike v. Clark, 55 ib. 105). New Hampshire (Sissons v. Bicknell, 6 N. H. 557; , Paine v. Drew, 44 ib. 306). New York (Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 John, 263 8. ©. 3 Am. Dec. 482; Randall v. Wilkins,? 4 Den. 577 ; Didier v. 'This was a case of a plaintiff, but is analogically apposite. * This case was overruled on another point. LIMITATIONS. 109 Foreign Corporation. Davison, 2 Barb. Ch. 477; Ford v. Babcock, 2 Sandf. 518). There are two contingencies within the purview of the N. Y. Statute—1. When the defendant is “out” at the accrual of the cause of action—2. Where being in at such time, he thereafter departs and resides, or remains continuously absent for a year. . In one case, the defendant, at the time of the accrual of the.cause of action, was in Austria, and thereafter came to New York and never left. The action was. held to be barrred (Engel v. Fischer, 102 N. Y. 400 8. O. 55 Am. Rep. 818; Cf. Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. 96; Denny v. Smith, 18 ib. 567). Rhode Island (Crocker v. Arey, 3 R. I. 178). Vermont (Mazozon v. Foot, 1 Aik. 282 8. C. 15 Am. Dec. 679). Aliter—Georgia The language of the statute is, “who shall remove,” &c., and this has been construed to ap- ply to those who have never been in the State (Bishop v. Sanford, 15 Ga. 1; Pave v. Mahone, 32 ¢b. 253; Moore v. Carroll, 54 ib. 126; Edwards v. Ross, 58 ib. 147). Iowa (Ross v. Rees, 55 Iowa, 296). New Jersey To the same effect are the New Jersey de- | cisions (Beardsley v. Southmayd, 15 N. J. L. 171; Taberrer v. Brentnall, 3 Harr. 262; Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N. J. L. 714; Wood v. Leslie, 35 N. J. L. 472). The doctrine in New Jersey is also applicable to set- off and absence of plaintiff (Nolin v. Blackwell, 31 N. J. L. 70 8. C. 86 Am. Dec. 207). Tennessee (Barbour v. Erwin, 14 Lea, 716). Foreign Corporation.—It is also held in some courts, that a foreign corporation is not within a saving of per- sons beyond the limits of the State. Supreme Court U. Ss. (Express Co., v. Ware, 20 Wall, 453; Tioga &c. Co. v. Blossburg, &c. Co., 20 Wall, 137 S. ©. 5 Blatch. 392). 110 LIMITATIONS. Tenants in Common. Alabama (Haas v. Central &e. Co., 66 Ala. 472). Arkansas (Clarke v. Bank, 10 Ark. 516 S. C. 52 Am. Dec. 248). But by others that it is within the saving of the statute. Circuit Court U. S. (Kirby v. Lake Shore &c. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 261; 14 Rep. 739; on appeal, 23 Rep. 385). California If it has a resident managing agent (Laur- ence v. Ballou, 50 Cal. 258). Illinois (Bank v. C. D. & V. R. RB. Co., 82 Tl. 495; Penn &e. Co. v. Sloan, 1 Brad. 365 8. C.10 L. N. 381; Bristol v. Chicago &c. Co., 15 Tll. 436). Iowa (Cf. Baldwin v. M. & M. &c. Co., 5 Iowa, 518; Cobb v. Illinois &c. Co., 38 ib. 601; McCabe v. Llinois &e. Co., 4 McCrary, C. Ct. 492 S. OC. 16 W. J. 486). Kansas (North &c. Co. v. Akers, 4 Kan. 458). Nevada (Robinson v. Imperial &c. Co., 5 Nev. 44; Bar- stow v. Union &c. Co., 10 ib. 386), New York (Mallory v. Tioga &c. Co., 3 Keys, 355; ‘Thompson v. Tioga &c. Co., 36 Barb. 79; Rathburn »v. North Cent. &c. Co., 50 N. Y. 656; Olcott v. Tioga &c. Co., 20 N. Y. 201; Faulkner v. Delaware &c. Co., 1 Den. 441; Boardman v. Lake Shore &c. Co., 84 N. Y. 157; Kirby v. Lake Shore &c. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 261; ‘Tioga &c. Co. v. Blossburg &e. Co., 5 Blatch. 392; 20 Wall, 137). Vermont Unless it has attachable property already in the State (Hull v. Vt. &e. Co.28 Vt. 401). West Virginia (Abell v. Pa. &c. Co. 18 W. Va. 400). Tenants in common as affected by.—A question arises as to whether, when one of several tenants in common is barred, all are. There is also a distinction taken be- tween real and personal property, in this regard. The following courts hold the affirmative of this proposition : England Personal estate (Perry v. Jackson, 4 T. R. 516). . LIMITATIONS. 111, Agreement not to Plead Bar. Missouri Real Estate (Walker v. Bacon, 32 Mo. 144). North Carolina Personal Property (Riden v. Frion, 3 Murph. 577; Montgomery v. Wyuns, 4 D. & B. 527; Cf. Davis v. Cooke, 8 Hawks, 608; changed by statute; Code, sec. 173). Others hold the contrary. England (Real. Estate Doe d. Bowyer v. Judge, 11 East, 287; Langdon v. Rowlston, 2 Taunt. 441). Circuit Court U. S. (Doe v. Barksdale, 2 Brock, 436). North Carolina Real Estate (Doe d. McRee v. Alexander, 1 Dev. 321; Cf. Caldwell v. Black, 5 Ired. 463). Agreement not to Plead the Bar.—On this point we find a considerable difference of opinion. The following courts hold that such an agreement is binding as in nature of an estoppel: England (Irving v. Veitch, 3 M. & W. 90; Waters v. Earl of Thanet, 2 Q. B. 757; 42 H.C. L. R.; 2G. & D. 166; Cf. Webster v. Kirk, 17 A. & E. (N.S.) 944, (79 E. C. L. R.); but see, East India Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. P. C. ©. 85 8. ©. 14 J. 253; 1 BE. L. & Eq. 44). California (Smith v. Lawrence, 38 Cal. 24). Massachusetts (Webber v. Williams College, 23 Pick. 302; Cf. Emmons v. Hayward, 6 Cush. 501; but see Harvey v. Tobey, 15 Pick. 99 S. C. 25 Am. Dee. 430). New Jersey (Cowart v- Perrine, 21 N. J. Hq. 101). New York (Rowe v. Thompson, 15 Abb. Pr. 377; Utica Ins. Co. v. Bloodgood, 4 Wend. 652; Cf. Wardruff v. Moore, 8 Barb. 171). / South Carolina (Lowry v. Dubose, 2 Bail. 425; Linds- day v. Jamison, 4 McC. 93; Cf. Glenn v. McCullough, Harp. 484 8. C. 18 Am. Dee. 661). Tennessee (Reynold v. Johnson, 9 Hump. 444). Texas (Baird v. Ratcliff, 10 Tex. 81). Vermont In Vermont it is held to be a bar, if accom- panied with a recognition of the agreement within the Statutory period (Noyes v. Hall, 28 Vt. 645; Stearns v. 112 LIMITATIONS. Advancing Maturity. Stearns, 32 ib. 678; Burton v. Stevens, 24 ib. 1381S. C. 58 Am. Dec. 153). Such agreements are not recognized as binding by the following courts: Delaware (Mayer v. Wright, 2 Houst. 42). Iowa (Price v. Price, 34 Iowa, 404). Kentucky (Coleman v. Walker, 3 Met. 65). Maine (Warren v. Walker, 23 Me. 453; Cf. Hodgdon v. Chase, 29 Me. 47). Maryland (Stockett v. Sasscer, 8 Md. 374). Mississippi (Crane v. Smith, 38 Miss. 503). Pennsylvania (Marsutles v. Kenton, 17 Pa. 238; Kennedy v. Carpenter, 2 Whart. 344). There is still a third view taken by some courts, namely, that while ordinarily such agreement is no estoppel, yet, if the creditor forbears to sue upon the faith of such promise, it is binding. England (Gardner v. McMahon, 3 A & E. (N. 8.) 561). Supreme Court U. S. (Randon v. Toby, 11 How. 493). Arkansas (Brown v. State Bank, 5 Ark. 135), Georgia (Lee v. Baldwin, 10 Ga. 208). Ilinois (Runals v. Harding, 83 Ill. 75). Louisiana (Mitchell v. Levi, 28 La. Ann. 946). New York (Allen v. Webster, 15 Wend, 284; Utica &c. Co. v. Bloodgood, 4 ib. 652). North Carolina (Smith v. Leper, 10 Ired, 86; Daniel v. Commissioners, 74 N. C. 494). Texas—In Texas it is held, that when mutual notes fall due at different time, and the makers agree that default in payment of the one first becoming due should operate to mature the other, such agreement was valid, and that the statute ran on both from the date of such defauit (Harrison Machine Works v. Reigor, 64 Tex. 89 S. C. 19 Rep. 738). s LIMITATIONS. 113 Agreement not to Plead Statute. Vermont (Paddock v. Colly, 18 Vt. 485; Cooper v. Parker, 25 ib. 502; Burton v. Stevens, 24 ib. 1381 8. C. 58 Am. Dec. 153). Virginia (Holliday v. Littlepage, 2 Munf. 539; but see, Sutton v. Burrus, 9 Leigh, 381 S. C. 33 Am. Dee. 246). Again it is held by some courts that an action will lie for a breach of an agreement, not to take advantage of the statute. England (Hast India &c. Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. P. C. C. 85 8. C.14 J. 253; 1 EH. L. & Hq. 44). Tennessee (Bank v. Hill, 10 Hump. 176). But otherwise in Maine (Hodgdon v. Chase, 29 Me. 47). It is hard to conceive how the decisions ranged under the first elass, can stand the test of principle. When it became the settled doctrine that these statutes did not merely import a presumption, but were statutes of repose, if the bar had accrued, the original cause of action could not be made available on a plea to that effect, unless there was a promise, &c., in which case it was considered that the moral obligation formed a sufficient consideration to support the promise, &c., and revive the original cause of action. The judges were astute to strain, in favor of the very equity, the principles of law thus far. But the courts, until in quite modern times, never went an inch beyond. Then as it cannot be contended that such an agreement is tantamount to either a promise, acknowledgment or part-payment, upon what principle of the common law can such an agreement be upheld? It cannot form a part of the declaration, as that is based upon the debt, and the agreement was not made at its inception, or if so, its generality must be controlled by the specific date fixed for the performance. Nor could it be replied, as that would constitute such a de- parture in pleading as to justify a repleader. 8 114 LIMITATIONS. After Bar: Nudum Pactum. The principle to be deduced from the common law was that the plaintiff must succeed secundum allegata et probata. This idea would exclude evidence of a fact not pertinent to the allegations. But over and above all this is the lack of a consideration, for it is nothing but a bare request followed by a bare promise. The criterion is, could the creditor disregard such promise and sue at the maturity of the debt? Unques- tionably. Our line of authorities confine the assertion of the doctrine first discussed to promises founded upon a consideration, or when the conduct of the debtor fur- nishes ground for affecting him with a parol estoppel. But if our views are tenable, the same objection ap- plies to either kind of promise. With much more plausi- bility it has been held that if the debtor should recede from his agreement, and plead the statute, while such agreement could not avail as against such defence, yet, if the agreement was founded upon a valuable consider- ation, or, in other words, constituted a binding con- tract, an action would lie against him for its non-per- formance. See East India Co. v. Paul;} Bank v. Hill, supra. Though this doctrine is rejectedin Maine. Hodgdon v. Chase supra. After Bar—Nudum Pactiun. Maine (Brown v. Edes, 37 Me. 318). Maryland (Stockett v. Sasscer, 8 Md. 374). South Carolina (Steele v. Jennings, 1 McM. 297). Aliter if predicated on a consideration. ‘The case of Gardner . McMahon, 8 A. & E. (N. 8.) 561, is sometimes cited as sustaining the first view, but it will be discovered that there was enough in the letter relied on to constitute an acknowledgment without the aid of the promise not to take advantage of the statute. Two of the judges do not notice that promise, and the remark of Lp. DENMAN, should be read with reference to the context. At any rate, in the case cited in the text, it is said substantially that no authority could be produced which upheld, as against the plea of the statute, an agreement that advantage should not be taken of it. , LIMITATIONS. 115 Sunday Promises: Coupons. England (East India Co. v. Paul, 7 Moo. P. C. C. 858. ©. 14 J. 253; 1 EH. L. & Hg. 44; Gordon v. McMahon, 3 A. & E. (N. 8.) 561). Promises or acknowledgments made on Sunday.—Some courts hold that promises or acknowledgments made on the Sabbath are valid. Connecticut! (Beardsley v. Hall, 36 Conn. 270 S.C. 4 Am. Rep. 74). : Iowa (Ayres v. Vane, 39 Iowa, 518; Peake v. Conlan, 43 ib. 297). Maryland (Thomas v. Hunter, 29 Md. 406). Pennsylvania (Haydock v. Tracy, 3 W. & S. 507; Lea v. Hopkins, 7 Pa. 492). In the following courts they are held void:?. Alabama (Baumgardner v. Taylor, 28 Ala. 687). Massachusetts? (Clapp v. Hale, 112 Mass. 368 S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 111). Georgia (Dennis v. Sharman, 31 Ga. 607). Coupons.—It is well settled that the Statute of Limita- tions begins to run upon Coupons from their maturity, whether detached or not (Clark v. Iowa, 20 Wall, 583; Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470 8. C. 2 Am. L. T. 133; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668; reversing S. C. 4 Fed. Rep. 373; 11 Rep. 87; City &c. Co. v. Lamson, 9 Wall, 477; City &c. Co. v. Butler, 14 ib. 282; Kershaw v. Hancock, 18 Blatch. 383 S. C. 10 Fed. Rep. 541; Nash v. El Dorado, 20 Rep. 164; 24 Fed. Rep. 252). 'Tt had been held previously, that part-payment on Sunday was invalid (Tinn v. Donahue, 35 Conn. 216), and the court in the case cited, say that it is questionable whether a promise or acknowledgment made on Sunday would avail, but an acknowledgment on Sunday that a payment had theretofore been made was sufficient. 1To appreciate fully the value of some of these decisions, it should be remembered that their Sunday laws do not follow the Statute of Chas. 2, but prohibit all secular work. : *But the case of Johnson v. Willis, 7 Gray, 164, holds that a payment *made on Sunday, is a good payment. : 116 LIMITATIONS. Part Payment: Acknowledgment. Part-Payment or Acknowledgment—How Viewed.— There is a discrepancy on the question as to the legal effect of acknowledgment or part-payment, that is to say, whether it revives the debt as a question of law, or whether it is merely evidence of a new promise, to be submitted to the jury. The following courts maintain that it is a question of law, and that as such, the promise is inferrible, at least. presumptively, from part-payment: Arkansas (State Bank v. Woody, 5 Eng. 638; Conway v. Reyburn, 22 Ark. 290). Connecticut (Buckingham v. Smith, 23 Conn. 453; Cook v. Martin, 29 ib. 63; Marshall v. Dalliber, 5 ib. 480; De Forest v. Hunt. 8 ib. 185; see also, Belknap v. Gleason, 11 ib. 160 S. C. 27 Am. Dec. 721; Austin v. Bostwick, 9 ib. 496; Peck v. Botsford, 7 ib. 172). Kansas—Semble (Board v. Higinbotham, 19 Kan. 62 S. C.3 0. L. J. 738). Louisiana (Beatty v. Clement, 12 La. Ann. 82; Maskell v. Pooley, 12 ib. 661; Nesom v. D’Armand, 13 ib. 294). New Hampshire (Whipple v. Stevens, 22 N. H. 219; At- wood v. Colburn, 4 ib. 315; Russell v. Cop, 5 ib. 154; see also, Bank v. Sullivan, 6 ib. 124; Blair v. Drew, ib. 235; Kelley v. Sanborn, ib. 46; Kitteredge v. Brown, 9 ib. 377). North Carolina (Arey v. Stephenson, 11 Ired. 86; McLin v. McNamara, 2 D. & B. Eq. 82; McGlensey v. Flem- ing, 4 D. & B. 129). South Carolina (Robbins v. Farley, 2 Strob. 348; Lock- hart v. Eaves, Dud. 321; Young v. Monpoey, 2 Bail. 278; Alleock v. Ewan, 2 Hill, 326; see also, Copen v. Auburn, 2 Bail. 283; Of. Holbreck v. Hunt, 1 MeMull. L. 197; Lee v. Polk, 4 McCord, 215; Lee v. Perry, 3 McCord, 552). But acknowledgment, before the bar of the statute, is sufficient to take the case out of the LIMITATIONS. 117 Question for the Jury. statute (Deloach v. Turner, 7 Rich, 143; Rucker ». Frazier, 4 Strob. 93). Tennessee (Lock v. Wilson, 10 Heisk. 441; Belote v. Winne, 7 Yerg. 534; Russell v. Gass, 1 M. & Y. 270, see also, Harwell v. M’Culloch, 2 Tenn. 275; Butter v. Winters, 2 Swan, 61; Broddie v. Johnson, 1 Sneed, 464). The following courts hold that it is a question for the jury: England (The earlier English cases held that an ac- knowledgment or part-payment. raised in law a promise to pay the remainder, and that it was conclusive against the debtor (Whitcomb v. Whiting, ante; Jackson v. Fair- bank, 2 H. Black, 340; see other cases collected in note 6 to Smith Cont. (Rawle’s Ed.) 313, 314, and 3 Pars. Cont. 62, note c), but the later cases have receded from this doctrine, and take the ground that it is evidence from which a promise may be inferred, subject to be rebutted (Wainman v. Kynman, 1 Ex. 118; Baildon v. Walton, 4b. 617; Bradfield v. Tupper, 21 L. J. (N. 8S.) Ex. 65S. C. 7B. L. & Eq. 541; Purdon v. Purdon, 10 M. & W. 562; Walker v. Butler, 6 El. & Bl. 506 (88 H. C. L. R.); Burn v. Boulton, 2 C. B. 476 (52 B.C. L. B.); Cf. Davies v. Edwards, 7 Ex. 22 8. C. 6 E. L. & Eq. 520; Bird v. Gam- mon, 3 Bing, N. C. 883 (32 E. O. L. R.); Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W. 402; Nash v. Hobson, 31 E. L. & Hq. 555)). Circuit Court U. S. (Dorr v. Swartwout, 1 Blatch. 179; Read v. Wilkinson, 2 Wash. C. ©. 514). Alabama (Minnicie v. Jetter, 65 Ala. 222). Delaware (Waples v. Layton, 3 Harr. 508; Black v. Rey- bold, ib. 528; Robinson v. Burton, 1 Houst. 540). Georgia (Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21S. C. 50 Am. Dec. 306; Smith v. Simms, 9 Ga. 418). Illinois (Mellick v. DeSeelhorst, Breese, 221 8. CO. 12 Am. Dee. 172). Indiana (Ketcham v. Hall, 42 Ind. 64). 118 LIMITATIONS. New Promise—How Pleaded. Kentucky (Warren v. Perry, 5 Bush, 447; Bell v. Row- land, Hardin, 301; Harrison v. Handley, 1 Bibb, 443; Head v. Manners, 5 J. J. Marsh, 255; 4 Dana, 505). Maine (White v. Jordan, 27 Me. 370; Dyer v. Walker, - 54 ib. 18). Maryland (Oliver v. Gray, 1 H. & G. 204; Rogers v. Waters, 2 G. & J. 69; Frey v. Kirk, 4 ib. 509; Guy v. Tams, 6 Gill, 82). Michigan (Jewit v. Petit, 4 Mich. 508). Mississippi! (Smith v. Westmoreland, 12 S. & M. 663; Davidson v. Harrison, 33 Miss. 41). Missouri (McKean v. Thorp, 4 Mo. 358; Davis v. Her- ring, 6 ib. 21; see also, Elliott v. Leake, 5 ib. 208 S. C. 32 Am. Dec. 314; Buckner v. Wheaton, 4 ib. 100; Boyd v. Hurlbut, 41 ib. 264). New York (Read v. Hurst, 7 Wend. 408; Roseboom v. Billington, 17 John. 182; Arnold v. Downing, 11 Barb. 554; Sluby v. Champlin, 4 John. 461; Danforth v. Cul- ver, 11 ib. 146; Sands v. Gelston, 15 ib. 511; Purdy »v. Austin, 3 Wend. 187; Hancock v. Bliss, 7 ib. 267; see also, Bradley v. Field, 3 ib. 272; Stafford v. Bryan, ib. 535; Gaylord v. Van Lean, 15 ib. "308; Allen v. Webster, ab. "284; Stafford v. Richardson, wb. 302; Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674; but see Pickett v. King, 34 Barb. 195; Miller v. Talcott, 46 ib. 172). Pennsylvania CWeaner v. Stein, 97 Pa. 322). Rhode Island (Shaw v. Newell, 2 R. I. 264). Texas (Mitchell v. Clay, 8 Tex. 443; Dickenson v. Lott, 29 ib. 172). Vermont (Chapin v. Warden, 15 Vt. 560). Virginia (Dabney v. Dabney, 2 Rob. 622 S. C. 40 Am. Dec. 761). New Promise—How Pleaded.—The settled English prac- tice is to declare on the original debt or promise (Wood, 'The courts of this State, hold that mere part-payment, without an ex- press promise or acknowledgment, is not sufficient to take the case out. LIMITATIONS. 119 English Rule Followed. Lim. sec. 81; Angel, Lim. sec. 288; Yea v. Fouraker,! 2 Burr. 1099; Leaper v. Tatton, 16 Hast, 420); termed by Best, C. J., inveterate (Upton v. Else, 12 Moo. (22 E, 0. L. BR.) 303; vide Irving v. Veitch, 3 M. & W. 91). In this country the decisions are not harmonious. In the following States the English rule is followed: Arkansas (Harlan v. Bernie, 22 Ark. 217; Biscoe v. Stone, 11 ib. 39). Connecticut (Lord v. Shaler, 3 Conn. 132 S. C. 8 Am. Dec. 160; Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 164). , Delaware (Newlin v. Duncan, 1 Harr. 204 S. ©. 25 Am. Dee. 66). . Ilinois (Kimmel v. Schwartz, 1 Ill. (Breese), 216; Varner v. Varner, 69 ib. 445). Indiana (Hanha v. Jeffersonville &c. Co., 32 Ind. 118; Perkins v. Rogers, 35 ib. 124; Cf Hevar v. Rerick, 181 Ind. 337). Iowa (Frisbee v. Seaman, 49 Iowa, 95). Kentucky (Carr v. Robinson, 8 Bush, 269; Childs ». Drake, 2 Met. 146; Rankin v. Turney, 2 Bush, 555). Louisiana (Elmore v. Robinson, 18 La. Ann. 651). Maine (Barrett v. Barrett, 8 Greenl. 355; Egerey v. De Crew, 53 Me. 392). Maryland (Oliver v. Gray, 1 H. & G. 204, 214; Guy ». Tams, 6 Gill, 82). Massachusetts (Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. 488; Isley v. Jewett, 3 Met. 439; Baxter v. Penniman, 8 Mass. 133). Mississippi (Briscoe v. Anketell, 28 Miss. 361 S. C. 61 Am. Dec. 553; Shakleford v. Douglas, 31 Miss. 95). New York? (Esselstyn v. Weeks, 12 N. Y. (2 Kern), 635; 1This case is noted as overruled by Judge Bigelow (Big. Ov. Cases, title, Yea v. Fouraker; but its authority was recognized in Thornton ». Illing- worth, 2 B. & C. 824, (9 E. C.L. R.) and is at least recognized as having been rightly decided, WHEN DECIDED, as the doctrine of presumption then prevailed, by the case cited as the overruling case, namely, Bateman ». Pinder, 3 A. & E. (48 E. C. L. RB.) 574. ?See Danforth v. Culver, 11 John. 146 8. C. 6 Am. Dec. 361. 120 LIMITATIONS. English Rule Denied. Dusenberry v. Hoyt, 53 N. Y. 521; Purdy v. Austin, 3 Wend. 187; Dean v. Hewitt, 5 ib. 257, 262; Pinkerton v. Bailey, 8 ib. 600; Livingston v. Ostrander, 9 ib. 306; Sands v. St. John, 36 Barb. 628; Baldwin v. Martin, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 9). North Carolina’ (Falls v. Sherrill, 2 D. & B. 371; McCurry v. McKesson, 4 Jones, 510). Tennessee (Woodlie v. Towles, 9 Baxt. 592). West Virginia—Semble (Currie v. Mannigton, 23 W. Va. 14). via (Smith v. Richmond, 19 Cal. 481; Sichel v. Cannello, 42 ib. 498). Colorado (Buckingham v. Orr, 6 Col. 587). In the following courts it is held that the declaration should be based upon the new promise: Georgia (Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21 S. C. 50 Am. Dee. 306; Bird v. Adams, 7 Ga. 506; Van Buren v. Webster, 12 ib. 617; Winyaw v. Kidd, Dud. 116). Ohio (Hill v. Henry, 17 Ohio, 9). Minnesota (Kennedy v. Williams, 11 Minn. 314). Missouri (Elliott v. Leake,? 5 Mo. 208 S. C. 32 Am. Dee. 314). South Carolina—Semble (Reigne v. Desportes, Dud. 118; Lomax v. Robertson, ib. 366; Sims v. Radcliffe, 3 Rich. 287; Goudy v. Gillam, 6 Rich. 28). Texas (Coles v. Kelsey, 2 Tex. 541 S. 0. 47 Am. Dec. 661; Erskine v. Wilson, 20 Tex. 77 S. C. 27 ib. 117). Pennsylvania (J ones v. Moore,’ 5 Binn, 573). Circuit Court U. S. (Kamshall v. Goodman, 6 McL. 189;: Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. 148). 1 Aliter if the promise is to pay in something other than money (Taylor . Stedman, 18 Ired. 97; Thompson ». Gilreath, 3 Ji ones, 493). Semble, that if the promise is made by or to an executor, the declaration must be based upon the new promise. *This case is based upon a promise made after the bar of the statute had accrued: it is apprehended the rule is otherwise, where statute had not run out (Boyd ». Hurlbut, 41 Mo. 268). ° However, this was an action by an executor, based upon a promise to the testator. LIMITATIONS. 121 Payment After Action Brought. The weight of authority is with the English view, but, as a criterion, it may be stated that the solution of the -question, in a particular locality, presumptively depends upon the view taken by the courts as to whether the Statute of Limitations is one of repose or presumption. If the former, the logical analogy would require the nar. to be predicated upon the old debt. If the latter, upon ‘the new promise. Again, a distinction is taken as to the effect of the new codes, some courts holding that the new codes of practice and proceedure, by abolishing the distinction between the forms of actions at law and suits in equity, necessitate declaring on the new promise. ‘On this point, see observations of Field J. (vow on Supreme Court U. 8.) in Smith v. Richmond, cited ante. A further distinction is taken as to whether the new promise was made before or after the debt was barred; Some courts holding that in the former instances the plaintiff may declare on the original debt or promise, in in the latter, only upon the new promise (Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. 488; Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. 148; Kamshall v. Goodman, 6 McL. 189; Hill v. Henry, 17 , ‘Ohio, 9; Reigne v. Desportes, Dud. (S. ©.) 118; Erskine v. Wilson, 20 Texas, 77; Young v. Mackrell, 3 Md. Ch. 398; Goudy v. Gillam, 6 Rich. (S. C.) 28). Payment after Action brought.—This is held, in some States, sufficient to remove the bar of the statute. Georgia (Love v. Hackett,! 6 Ga. 486). England In England it is held otherwise (Bateman v. Pinder, 3 A. & H. 574 (43 E. C. L. B.); 2 G. & D. 790; ‘Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & C. 602 (13 E. C. L. R.); also in the following States: Alabama (Bradford v. Spyker, 32 Ala. (N. 8.) 134). Illinois (Kerner v. Crull, 19 Ill, 189, 198). 1 This case was predicated upon the recognition of the old theory of pre- sumption. 122 _ LIMITATIONS. Promise Before and After Bar. Maine (Miller v. Lancaster, 4 Greenl. 159, 161). ' North Carolina (Falls v. Sherrill, 2 D. & B. 371, per Ruffin, C. J.). Pennsylvania (Fries v. Boisselin, 9 8. & R. 128, 131). Virginia (Butcher v. Hixton, 4 Leigh. 519, 531). Promise before and after the bar.—The general rule is. that the same character of promise is sufficient to revive a debt without reference to the circumstance of its being” or not barred at the time the promise is made (Am. notes to Whitcomb v. Whiting, 1 Smith L. C. 318, 713 (5 Am. Ed.); Wood Lim., sec. 68; Shirley’s L. C. 219). The courts of South Carolina, however, take a dis- tinction between those cases in which the debt is barred before the acknowledgment, and those in which it is made before the bar has accrued, holding that much slighter evidence is required in the latter instance than the former (Young v. Monpoey, 2 Bail. 278; Bowdre v.. Hampton, 6 Rich. 208; Deloach v. Turner, 7 ib. 143). An analagous decision was made in Georgia with. reference to the effect of an acknowledgment by one- partner (Brewster v. Hardeman, Dud. 188). Promise by a joint debtor’—It is well settled,? in England,’ that an acknowledgment, new promise or 1 This subject is discussed as a common-law doctrine. The principle. has been modified in many of the States by statute (Wood, Lim. sec. 285). A discussion of the doctrine, even in the light of the statutes, cannot be deemed inuseful, as they generally except the effect of the part-payment. of principal or interest. ‘The doctrine of Whitcomb ». Whiting was somewhat questioned in Atkins v. Tredgold, 2 B. & C. 23 (9 E. C. L. R.), but this case was dis-- tinguished, and decided a point not covered by the former, namely, that a promise by a surviving joint-debtor, will not have the effect to remove the bar. Whitcomb v. Whiting has, however been repeatedly sustained in quite a number of English cases (Perham v. Raynal, 2 Bing. 306 (9 E. C. L. R.); Burleigh »v. Stott, 8 B. & C. 36 (15 B.C. L. R.); Pease v. Hurst, 10 2. 122 (21 E. C. L. R.); Wyatt o. Hodson, 8 Bing. 309 (21 E. C. L. R.); Mander-- ston v. Robertson, 4 Man. & R. 440; Channell ». Ditchburn, 5 M. & W. 494). * See an interesting analogous case (Abernethie ». Brutton, 20 L. J. (Ex.) 41;1E, L. & Eq. 446), LIMITATIONS. 123: Whitcomb ». Whiting followed. payment, made by one of two or more joint contractors,. will remove the statutory bar as to all (Whitcomb v.. Whiting, supra ; Wood Lim., sec. 285). The same view is taken as to the power of a co-partner before dissolu-. tion (Watson v. Woodman, L. R. 20 Eq. Cases, 721). There is great contrariety of decision on the point in. this country. The following States accept the doctrine enunciated in Whitcomb v. Whiting: Connecticut (Bound v. Lathrop, 4 Conn. 336 S. C. 10: Am. Dec. 147; Coit v. Tracy, 8 Conn. 268 8. C. 20 Am. Dec. 110; Austin v. Bostwick, 9 Conn. 496 8. C. 25. Am. Dec. 42; Clark v. Sigourney, 17 Conn. 511; Cald- well v. Sigourney, 19 Conn. 37; Finn v. Donahue, 35. Conn. 216; Bissell v. Adams, 35 Conn. 299; Beardsley v. Hall, 36 Conn. 270 8. C. 4 Am. Rep. 74). Delaware (Newlin v. Duncan, 1 Harr. 204 S. C. 25 Am.. Dec. 66). Georgia (Brewster v. Hardeman, Dud. 138; Cox! v Bailey, 9 Ga. 467 S. C. 54 Am. Dee. 358; 1 Liv. L. Mg. 19; Tillinghast v. Nourse, 14 Ga. 641, 648; Hunter v.. Robertson, 30 Ga. 479). Maine (Parker v. Merrill, 6 Me. 41; Getchell v. Held, 7 Me. (Greenl.) 26; Greenleaf v. Quincey, 12 Me. (3 Fair), 11 S. CO. 28 Am. Dec. 145; Pike v. Warren, 15 ib. 3995. Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 21 ib. 433; Shepley v. Water- house, 22 ib. 497). Maryland? (Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland, 236, 277;. Ellicott v. Nichols, 7 Gill, 85 S. C. 48 Am. Dec. 546;. Newman v. McComas, 43 Md. 70; Abrahams v. Movers, 40 Md. 511; Schindil v. Gates, 46 Md. 604 S. C. 24 Am. 1The soundness of this view is doubted in Tillinghast v. Nourse, 11 Ga. 641, but the case itself followed; as to partners, this or holds otherwise (Chamberlain v. Bancroft, 24 Ga. 310). * Aliter if the statute has barred (Leonard v. Hughlett, 41 Md. 387; Elli- cott v. Nichols, 7 Gill, 85 9. C. 48 Am. Dec. 546; McCain ». Sloan, 25 Md.. 588). 124 LIMITATIONS. Same. Rep. 526; 6 Rep. 112; Burgoon v. Bixler, 55 Md. 384 S. ‘C. 39 Am. Rep. 417). Massachusetts (Hunt v. Bridgham, 2 Pick. 581 8. C. 13 Am. Dec. 458; White v. Hale, 3 Pick. 291 8S. C. 15 Am. Dec. 209; Cady v. Shepherd, 11 Pick. 400 S. C. 22 Am. Dec. 379; Sigourney v. Drury, 14 Pick. 387; Vinal ». Burrill, 16 ib. 401; Dennie v. Williams, 135 Mass. 28). Minnesota In this State, even an acknowledgment or part-payment by one joint obligor will take the debt out of the statute, if it has not run (Brisbie v. Farmer, 16 Minn, 219; Whitaker v. Rice, 9 ib. 13 8. C. 86 Am. Dec. 78). Missouri (Craig v. Calloway, 12 Mo. 94; Lawrence Co. v. Dunkle, 35 ib. 395; McClurg v. Howard, 45 ib. 365; Hartman v. Sharp, 51 ib. 29, 31; Foster v. Evans, ib. 39; Block v. Dorman, 51 ib. 31; Vernon Co. v. Stewart, 60 ib. 408 8. C. 27 Am. Rep. 250). New Jersey (Parker v. Butterworth, 46 N. J. L. 2448. C. 50 Am. Rep. 407; Disborough v. Biddleman, 20 N. J. L. (Spencer), 275; Disborough v. Jones, 21 N. J. L. (1 Zab.) 677; Corlies v. Flemming, 30 N. J. L. (1 Vroom), 349; Merritt v. Day, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vroom), 32 S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 362; Anthony v. Fritts, 45 N. J. L. (16 Vroom), 1; Casebolt v. Ackerman,! 46 ib. 169 S. C. 19 Rep. 21). North Carolina’ (McIntire v. Oliver, 2 Hawks, 209 S. C. 11 Am. Dec. 760; Willis v. Hill, 2 D. & B. 2318. ©. 31 Am. Dee. 412; Falls v. Sherrill, 2 D. & B. 371; Walton v. 'The court give a good “send-off” to Whitcomb o. Whiting—thirteen justices voting for the decision, and none opposed. *The later case of Long ». Miller, 93 N. C. 238, contains a misleading head-note in the statement of a truism, namely, “that this was a payment on the note, and prevented the bar of the Statute of Limitation, as to the surety, making the payment.” For, although the action was brought against several, as the paying surety alone appealed, his obligations only were brought under review. In the case of Campbell ». Brown, 86 N. C. 3768. C. 41 Am. Rep. 464, the Supreme Court take the distinction between sealed and unsealed in- struments, holding as to the former that a promise by one joint-debtor, be- fore maturity, will not prevent the bar of the statute. LIMITATIONS. 125. Before and After Accrual of Bar. Robinson, 5 Ired. 341; Cummins v. Coffin, 7 ib. 196; Hub- bard v. Marsh, ib. 204; McKeethan v. Atkinson, 1 Jones, 421; Lowe v. Sowell, 3 Jones, 67; Green v. Greensboro College, 83 N. C. 449 8. ©. 35 Am. Rep. 579; Wood v. Barber, 90 N. C. 76). Rhode Island (Turner v. Ross, 1 R. I. 88). South Carolina In this State a distinction seemed at one time to prevail between promises made by a joint debtor before and after the accrual of the bar, and much confusion existed owing to conflicting decisions (Silman v. Silman, 2 Hill, 416, practically overruled by Smith v. Caldwell, 15 Rich. 365; Beitz v. Fuller, 1 McC. 541 S. C.. 10 Am. Dec. 693; Fisher v. Tucker, 1 McC. Ch. 1673. Frazer v. Perdriaux, 1 Bail. 172; Young v. Monpoey, 2 Bail. 278; Goudy v. Gillam, 6 Rich. 28; Bowdre v. Hampton, ib. 208; Higginson v. Air, 1 Deas. 427; Steele v. Jenning, 1 McM. 297; Briggs v. Starke, 2 Mill. 11 S. C. 12 Am. Dec. 659). But every vestige of the doctrine of Whitcomb v. Whiting, was swept away by the case of Walters v. Kraft, 23 8. C. 578 S. C. 55 Am. Rep. 44; unless indeed in the case of partnership held affirmatively in the cases of Higginson v. Air and Fisher v. Tucker, which are not adverted to in the Walters’ case, that being the case of . an attempt of the principal debtor to preclude the bar of the statute as to sureties by payments. (Cf. Chardon v. Oliphant, 3 Brev. 183 8. C. 6 Am. Dee. 572). Vermont (Joslyn v. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Powers v. South- gate, 15 Vt. 471 S. C. 40 Am. Dec. 691; Wheelock v. Doolittle, 18 Vt. 440 S. CO. 46 Am. Dec. 163; Mix v. Shattuck, 50 Vt. 421; Mills v. Hyde, 19 Vt. 59S. C. 46 Am. Dee. 177; Cf. Bailey v. Corlies, 51 Vt. 366, under statute). Virginia (Shelton v. Cocke, 3 Munf. 191; Farmers’ Bank v. Clark, 4 Leigh, 603; Garland v. Agee, 7 Leigh, 362). 126 LIMITATIONS. Whitcomb v. Whiting denied. Wisconsin—Semble—National Bank of Delavan #. Cot- ‘ton, 53 Wis. 31 8. C. 13 C. L. J. 346; 24 Alb. L. J. 451). The syllabus of the case of Walsh v. Mayer, 111 U.S. 31, as generally given, may seem to favor Whitcomb v. Whiting, but it will be found upon a careful reading to be clearly distinguishable. The following States reject the doctrine of Whitcomb wv. Whiting: Canada (Creighton v. Allen, 26 U. P. C. (Q. B.) 627). Alabama (Wilson v. Torbert, 3 Stew. 296 S. C. 21 Am. Dec. 632; Lowther v. Chappell,! 8 Ala. 353 S. C. 42 Am. Dec. 643; Pitt v. Wooten, 24 Ala. 474; Myatts v. Bell, -41 Ala, 222; Knight v. Clements, 45 Ala. 89 S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 693). Arkansas (Trustees v. Hartfield, 5 Ark. 551; Biscoe v. -Jenkins, 10 ib. 108; Hicks v. Lusk, 19 ib. 692; Grant v. Ashley, 12 tb. 762; Mason v. Howell, 14 ib. 199; Burr v. ‘Williams, 20 ib. 171). California (McCarty v. White, 21 Cal. 495 8S. C. 82 Am. Dec. 754.) Florida (Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339 S. ©. 26 Am. Rep. 709; 6 Rep. 519). Illinois (Helm v. Cantrell, 59 Ill. 524; Kallenbach v. Dickinson, 100 ib. 427 8. C. 39 Am. Rep. 47). Indiana (Yandes v. Lafavour, 2 Blackf. 371; Dickerson v. Turner, 12 Ind. 223, 230). Iowa (Day v. Baldwin, 34 Iowa, 380). Kansas (Steele v. Souder, 20 Kan. 39). Kentucky (Walker v. Dilenese 1 Marsh, 189; Merritt ». Pollys, 16 B. Mon. 357; Emmons »v. Overton, 18 B. Mon- roe, 643). Louisiana (Reynolds v. Rowley, 2 La, Ann. 890; Parker v. Moore, ib. 1017; Morgan »v. Metayer, 14 ib. 612; Stowers v. Blackburn, 21 ib. 127; but see Cockfield v. Farley, ib. 521; Voorhies’s Case, ib. 659; Boullt v. Sar- pey, 30 ib. 494). 1 Provided the statute has barred. LIMITATIONS. 127 Same. Michigan (Thompson v. Richards, 14 Mich. 172, 189; Sigler v. Platt, 16 Mich. 206). Mississippi (Bibb v. Peyton, 11 8S. & M. 275; Foute v. Bacon, 24 Miss. 156; Briscoe v. Anketell, 28 ib. 361 S. O. 1 Am. Dec. 553). Nebraska (Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368 S. ©. 25 Am. Rep. 491). , New Hampshire (Exeter Bank v. Sullivan, 6 N. H. 124; Kelly v. Sanborn, 9 ib. 46; Burnham v. Sweatt, 16 N. H. 418, 421; Whipple v. Stevens, 22 N. H. 219). New York (Van Keuren v. Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 5238. ©. 51 Am. Dec. 322; Shoemaker v. Benedict, 11 N. Y. 176 S. C. 62 Am. Dec. 95; Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N. Y. 558; Bogert v. Vermilya, 10 Barb. 32; Barger v. Dur- vin, 22 Barb. 68; Graham v. Selover, 59 Barb. 313; Littlefield v. Littlefield, 91 N. Y. 203 8. C. 43 Am. Rep. 663; Hulburt v. Nichol, 20 Hun. 454; Pickett v. Leon- ard, 34 N. Y.176; Payne v. Gardiner, 29 ib. 146, 178; Smith . Ryan, 66 ib. 352, 356). North Carolina! (Campbell v. Brown, 86 N. O. 376 8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 464). Ohio (Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio, (N. 8.) 21, 36; Hance . Hair, 25 ib. 349). Pennsylvania (Jones v. Moore, 5 Binn. 573 8. C. 6 Am. Dec. 428; Levy v. Cadet, 17 S. & R, 126 8. C. 17 Am. Dec. 650; Searight v. Craighead, 1 P & W. 135; Estate of Davis, 5 Whart. 530 8S. C. 34 Am. Dec. 74; Houser v. Irvine, 3 W. & S. 345 8. C. 38 Am. Dec. 768; Schone- man v. Fegley, 7 Pa. 433; Coleman v. Fobes, 22 ib. 156 S. C. 60 Am. Dec. 75; Hogg v. Orgill, 34 Pa. 344; Bush . Stowell, 71 ib. 208 S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 694; Clark v. Burn, 86 Pa. 502; Lazarus v. Fuller, 89 Pa. 331; Reppert v. Colvin, 48 Pa. 248, 253). 1It is noticeable that the court, while holding adversely to Whitcomb o. Whiting, do not cite the previous cases of McIntire ». Oliver, 2 Hawks, ‘209 S. C: 11 Am. Dec. 760; Willis v. Hill, 2 D. & B. 281 8. C. 31 Am. Dec. 412; Falls v. Sherrill, 2 D. & B. 871; Walton v. Robinson, 5 Ired. 341; ‘Cummins ». Coffin, 7 2. 394; Hubbard ». Marsh, 73. 204, See note 1, page 120. 128 LIMITATIONS. Endorsement of Payment. 4 Tennessee (Belote v. Wynne, 7 Yerg. 534; Muse v-. Donalson, 2 Hump. 166 8. C. 36 Am. Dec. 309; Cocke v.. Hoffman, 5 Lea, 105 S. C. 40 Am. Rep. 23; see Fuqua v. Dinwiddie, 6 Lea, 645). Supreme Court U. S. (Bell Vv. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351). District of Columbia (Miller v. Miller, McArthur & Mack, 109 S. C. 48 Am. Rep. 738). Circuit Court U. Ss. (Wisconsin) (Cronkhite v. Herrin, 15 Fed. Rep. 888). Indorsement of Payments—Upon this question there is. great diversity of judicial thought. Only indorsements by the holder are considered. By some courts it is held that if the indorsement be made before the statute has run, it is admissible evi- dence, and, in general, the date must be truly proved aliunde. Arkansas (State Bank v. Woody, 5 Ark. 348; Alston v. State Bank, 9 Ark. 455; Wood v. Wylds, 11 ib. 754, Brown v.’ Hutchings, 14 ib. 83; Ruddell v. Folsom, ib. 213; Wilson v. Pryor, 44 ib. 532). Georgia (Smith v. Simms, 9 Ga. 418). Louisiana (Beatty v. Clement, 12 La. Ann. 82; Maskell v. Pooley, 12 ib. 661). Maine (Coffin v. Buckman, 12 Me. 471; Haven v. Hath- away, 20 ib. 345; Sibley v. Lumbert, 30 ib. 253; Evans v. Smith, 34 ib. 33). Michigan (Chandler v. Lawrence, 3 Mich. 261). North Carolina (Williams v. Alexander,! 6 Jones, 137; Grant v. Burgwyn, 84 N. C. 560; White v. Beaman, 85 ib. 3; Cf. Woodhouse v. Simmons, 73 ib. 30). Pennsylvania (Addams Vv. Seitzinger, 1W. & S. 243; Shaffer v. Shaffer, 41 Pa. 51). South Carolina (Taylor v. McDonald, 2 Const. 178; Chambers v. Walker, 4 Rich, 548). Vermont (Strong v. McConnell, 5 Vt. 338). 1 Overruling 8. C. 5 Jones, 162. LIMITATIONS. 129 Indorsements: Presumption. England In England there is a presumption that the indorsements were made at the time they bear date (Smith v. Battens, 1 Mood & R. 341; Trentham ». Deverill, 3 Bing. N. C. 397 (32 HE. C. L. R.); Anderson v. Weston, 6 ib. 296 (37 HE. C. L. R.); Potez v. Glassop, 2 Ex. 191; Malpas v. Clements, 19 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 435; Cf. Hooper v. Stephens, 4 A. & E. 71 (31 E. 0. L. B.); Turney v. Dodwell, 3 El. & Bl. 136 (77 E. 0. L. B.)). Aliter if an action upon the instrument was barred. England (Burke v. Jones, supra; O’Connor v. Haslam, 5 H. of L. Cases, 170). Alabama (M’Gehee v. Greer, 7 Port. 537). Arkansas (Brown v. Hutchins, 11 Ark. 83). Connecticut (Fuller v. Hancock, 1 Root. 238; Coon’s Appeal, 52 Conn. 186 S. C. 20 Rep. 397). Ilinois (Connelly v. Pierson, 9 Ill. 108). Louisiana (McMaster v. Mather, 4 La. Ann. 419; Beatty v. Clement, 12 ib. 82). Maine (Clapp v. Ingersoll, 11 Me. 83; Of. Baker v. Mitchell, 59 ib. 223). Massachusetts (Whitney v. Bigelow, 4 Pick. 110; Bailey v. Crane, 21 ib. 323). New York (Roseboom v. Billington, 17 John, 182; Read v. Hurst, 17 Wend. 408). South Carolina (Gibson v. Peoples, 2 McC. 418; Conklin v. Pearson, 1 Rich. 391). Virginia (Butcher v. Hixon, 4 Leigh. 519; Wilcox v. Pearman, 9 ib. 144). In the following courts a presumption prevails against such indorsement, at least, without heing corroborated: Alabama (Watson v. Dale, 1 Port. 247; M’Gehee v. Greer, 7 ib. 537; Knight v. Clements, 45 Ala. 89 8. C. 6 Am. Rep. 693; Acklen v. Hickman, 60 Ala. 568). Kansas (Wolf v. Foster, 13 Kan. 116). Kentucky (Frazer v. Frazer, 13 Bush. 397). 9 130 LIMITATIONS. Consent or Privity of Debtor. Louisiana! (Beatty v. Clement, supra; Maskell v. Porley, supra; Gordon v. Schmidt, 20 La. Ann. 427; Areaux v. Mayeux, 23 ib. 172). Maine (Clapp v. Ingersoll, 11 Me. 83; Howe v. Saun- ders, 38 ib. 350). Maryland (Beltzhoover v. Yewell, 11 G. & J. 212). Michigan (Michigan Ins. Co. v. Brown, 11 Mich. 265; Rogers v. Anderson, 40 ib. 290). New Jersey (Vaughn v. Hankinson, 35 N. J. L. 79). New Hampshire (Jones v. Jones, 21 N. H. 219; Clough v. McDaniel, 58 ib. 201). New York (Wilson v. Pope, 37 Barb. 321; Hawley v. Griswold, 42 Barb. 18). Pennsylvania (Clark v. Hinkson, 86 Pa. 502 S. C. 6. Rep. 28; Guillon v. Perry, 1 W. N. C. 39; Kinsloe v. Baugh, ib. 147; Rowe v. Atwater, ib. 149). South Carolina (Chambers v. Walker, 4 Rich. 548). Virginia (Dabney v. Dabney, 2 Rob. 622 S. ©. 40 Am. Dee. 761). Other courts hold that such indorsements are unavail- ing unless made with the consent, or at least privity, of the debtor. Arkansas (Brown v. Hutchins, 11 Ark. 83). Georgia (Smith v. Simms, 9 Ga. 418), Illinois (Lowery v. Gear, 32 Ill. 382). Indiana (Elliott v. Mills, 10 Ind. 368). Iowa (Miller v. Dawson, 26 Iowa, 186). Kentucky (English v. Wathen, 9 Bush, 387). Massachusetts (Whitney v. Bigelow, 4 Pick. 110; Porter v. Blood, 5 ib. 54; Isley 7. Jewett, 2 Met. 168; Sibley »v. Phelps, 6 Cush. 172; Davidson v. Delano, 11 Allen, 523; Blancherd v. Blancherd, 122 Mass. 558 S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 397). 'It is however, held in this State, that a credit indorsed “at a time not suspicious by an officer of a bank, in the regular discharge of his duty, is sufficient evidence,” &c. (Union Bank ». Foster, 14 La. Ann. 159). LIMITATIONS. 131 Presumably Sufficient. Mississippi (Smith v. Westmoreland, 12 S. & M. 663; McCullough v. Henderson, 24 Miss. 92; Foute v. Bacon, ib. 156; Anderson v. Robertson, ib. 389; Davidson v. Harrison, 33 ib. 41). Missouri (Phillips v. Mahan, 52 Mo. 197). Nebraska (Kyger v. Ryley, 2 Neb. 20). New York (Harper v. Fairley, 53 N. Y. 442; Roseboom v. Billington, 17 John. 182; Read v. Hurst, 7 Wend. 408; Hawley v. Griswold, 42 Barb. 18). Virginia (Butcher v. Hixon. 4 Leigh, 519; Wilcox v. Pearman, 9 ib. 144). In others such indorsements are held presumably sufficient: . Missouri (Carter v. Carter, 44 Mo. 195). Texas (Rhode v. Alley, 24 Tex. 443). It occurs to the author that the foregoing discrepant views are mainly induced by the error of forcing pre- sumptions from equivocal acts. Why not let the evidence, pro and con, go to the jury, who, from their supposed knowledge of human nature, aided by the aggregatio mentium, inherent in their very constitution, are presumably more competent to form a correct conclusion than any court, however learned? Thus, the littleness of the sum endorsed, or whether the amount is in proximity to the efflux of the time, the contract has to run on the one hand, or its being in the handwriting of the debtor or collaterally recognized, would be weighed by a jury in mint scales; and when we consider in this connection, the supervisory power of the courts over verdicts rendered contrary to the weight of the testimony, it would seem that the English cases are more in accord with common sense and the reason of the thing. It may be well to mention here, that indorsements made by deceased creditors against interest, may per- haps be regarded as governed by reasons peculiar to 132 LIMITATIONS. Part payment by Personal Representative. themselves, at least, so far as the question of admissi- bility extends, and as coming within the principle enun- ciated in the celebrated case of Higham v. Ridgway (Coffin v. Bucknan, 12 Me. 471; Carter v. Carter, 44 Mo. 195). a Part-Payment by Personal Representative—In some courts, it is held that part-payment by personal representatives. has the effect to take the case out of the statute. Maryland (Semmes v. Magruder,! 10 Md. 242). Massachusetts (Baxter v. Penniman, 8 Mass. 134; Brown v. Anderson, 13 ib. 201; Emerson v. Thompson, 16 1b. 429; Foster v. Starkey, 12 Cush.? 324). New York 3 (Heath v. Grenell, 61 Barb. 190). Ohio (Niemcewicz v. Bartlett, 13 Ohio, 271). Oregon (Sutherlin v. Roberts, 4 Oregon, 378). In others not. Connecticut (Peck v. Botsford, 7 Conn. 172 S. C. 18 Am. Dec. 92). Kansas (Clawsen v. McCune, 20 Kan. 337). Kentucky (Head v. Manners, 5 J. J. Marsh, 255). Maine (Oakes v. Mitchell, 15 Me. 360). Maryland (Miller v. Dorsey, 9 Md. 317). Mississippi (Henderson ‘v. Isley, 19 Miss. 9 S. C. 49 Am. Dec. 41; Sanders v. Robertson, 23 Miss. 389). Missouri (Smith v. Irwin, 37 Mo. 169; McClurg v. How- ard, 45 ib. 365). New York (McLaren v. McMartin, 36 N. Y. 88, 92; Har- 1 And this court further holds, in the case cited, that if the administrator, being a creditor, retains certain sums in part-payment, the same rule ap- plies. ? These decisions are predicated upon the necessary implication from the language of the Massachusetts Statute. 3 New York is also arrayed on the other side. 4These cases were payments made either by compulsion or after the statute had operated as a bar—if it has not so operated, it is held sufficient in New York, at least, in the Supreme Court (Heath ». Grenell, 61 Barb. 190). LIMITATIONS. 133 Promise to whom made. per v. Fairley, 53 N. Y. 442; Arnold v. Downing, 11 Barb. 554; Pickett v. King, 34 ib. 198; Smart v. Foster, 18 Abb. Pr. 305). Pennsylvania (Fritz v. Thomas, 1 Whart. 66 S. C. 29 Am. Dec. 39; Forney v. Benedict, 5 Pa. 225; Steel v. Steel, 12 Pa. 64, 66). South Carolina (Fisher v. Tucker, 1 McC. Ch. 169, 175). Supreme Court U. S. (Thompson v. Peter, 12 Wh. 565). Circuit Court U. Ss. (Doubted by Marshall C. J. in Wilk- ings v. Murphy, 2 Hay (N. C.) 282; Gilpin v. Plummer, 2 Cr. C. C. 54). England There seems to be a dearth of authority in the English Courts on the point under consideration. The only cases where the point is expressly decided are (Slater v. Lawson, 1 B. & Adol. 394 (20 BE. O. L. R.); Morgan v. Rowland, L. R. (7 Q. B.) 493, 498); but while it is there held that part-payment by the executors did not take the case out of the statute, yet both of the learned justices, in delivering their opinions, lay stress upon the circumstance that the payment was compul- sory, made by order of court, and that the defendants resisted payment. Promises and Acknowledgments, to whom made.—There is a distressing conflict of authority on the point, whether a promise or admission to a stranger, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute. The courts of the following States maintain the affir- mative of this proposition: Delaware (Newkirk v. Campbell, 5 Harr. 380). Georgia (Bird v. Adams, 7 Ga. 505). Louisiana (Utz v. Utz, 34 La. Ann. 752). Maryland (Oliver v. Gray, 1 H. & G. 204; Stewart v. Garrett, 65 Md. 392 8S. C. 57 Am. Rep. 333; Guy v. Tams, 6 Gill, 82). Massachusetts (Whitney v. Bigelow, 4 Pick. 110). New Hampshire (Titus v. Ashe, 24 N. H. (4 Fost.) 319; 134 LIMITATIONS. Not to a Stranger. Badger v. Gilmore, 33 N. H. 361 8. C. 66 Am. Dee. 729; Cf. Holt v. Gage, 60 N. H. 536). Vermont (Minkler v. Minkler, 16 Vt. 194). Supreme Court U. S. In the case of Moore v. Bank of Columbia, 6 Pet. 86, the acknowledgment was made to a stranger; the court, however, do not, even incident- ally, touch that point, and rest their decision upon the vagueness of the admission per se. The following named courts deny the validity of such promise or acknowledgment: England! (Fuller v. Redman, 26 Beav. 614; Grenfell v. Girdlestone, 2 Y. & ©. 662; Godwin v. Culley, 4 H. & N. 373; Bodger v. Arch, 10 Ex. 333, 341, per Parke B.). Alabama (Kenan v. Holloway,? 16 Ala. 53 8. OC. 50 Am. Dec. 162; Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227). Arkansas (Ringo v. Brooks, 26 Ark. 540). California (Farrell v. Palmer, 36 Cal. 187; Biddell v. Brizzolara, 64 ib. 354). Illinois (Reeves v. Corell, 19 Ill. 189; Keener v. Crull, ib. 189, 191; Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 ib. 127; Wachter v. Albee, 80 Ill. 47; McGrew v. Forsyth, ib. 596; Teessen v. Camblin, 1 Dl. App. 424). Indiana (Kisler v. Sanders, 40 Ind. 78; Niblack v. Good- man, 67 ib. 174, 183). Iowa (Collins v. Bane, 34 Iowa, 385). Kansas (Sibert v. Wilder, 16 Kan. 176 S. C. 22 Am. Rep. 280; Schmucker v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104 S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 765). , Kentucky (Trowsdale v. Anderson, 9 Bush. 276). Mississippi (Adams v. Torrey, 26 Miss. 499). !The earlier cases took the other view (Halliday v. Ward, 3 Camp. 32; Clarke v. Hougham, 2 B. & C. 149 (9 E. C. L. R.); Mountstephen ». Brooke, 3B. & Ald. 141 (5 E.C. L. R.)). ? This case is in direct antagonism with the previous one of St. John ». Garrow, 4 Port. 223 8. C. 29 Am. Dec. 280, but which is not noticed therein. The cases cited are directly in point, and are in conflict with Jordan ». Hubbard, 26 Ala. (N. S.) 483; Evans v. Cary, 29 2b. 99. LIMITATIONS. 135 Same. Missouri (Cape Girardeau Co. v. Harbinson, 58 Mo. 90; Allen v. Collins, 70 ib. 138 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 416). Nevada (Taylor v. Hendrie, 8 Nev. 243). New York! (Bloodgood v. Bruen, 8 N. Y. 362; Wake- man v. Sherman, 9 ib. 85; Fletcher v. Opdyke, 67 Barb. 364 8. C. 3 Hun. 350; 5 Thomp. & C. 518). North Carolina (Thompson v. Gilreath, 3 Jones, 493; | Parker v. Shuford, 76 N. ©. 219; Faison v. Bowden,? ib. 425; Kirby v. Mills, 78 N. C. 124 8S. C. 24 Am. Rep. 460; Morehead v. Wriston, 73 ib. 398; Hussey v. Kirkman, 95 ib. 63). South Carolina (Robbins v. Farley, 2 Strob. 348; Tram- mel v. Salmon, 2 Bail. 308). Pennsylvania (Kyle v. Wells, 17 Pa. 286 S. C. 55 Am. Dec. 555; Gillingham v. Gillingham, 17 Pa. 302 8S. C.1 Liv. Law Magazine, 114; Coleman v. Fobes, 22 Pa. 156 8. C. 60 Am. Dec. 75; Zacharias v. Zacharias, 23 Pa. 452; McKinney v. Snyder, 78 ib. 497 S. C. 7 Leg. Gaz. 253; Cf. Farmers &c. Bank v. Wilson, 10 Watts, 261; Wessner v. Stein, 97 Pa. 322). Rhode Island (Hidden v. Cozzens, 2 R. I. 401). Tennessee (Bachman v. Roller, 9 Baxt. 409 S. 0.40 Am. Rep. 97). The acknowledgment is only available where intended to be communicated to the creditor (Fuqua v. Didwiddie, 6 Lea, 645). Supreme Court U. Ss. (Moore v. Bank of Columbia,? 6 Pet. 86). ‘The earlier decisions were the other way (Watkins 2. Stevens, 4 Barb. 168; Carshore v. Huyk, 6 Barb. 583; Souden v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Wend. 297; M’Crea v. Piermont, 16 Wend, 477). The case of DeFreest ». Warner, 98 N. Y. 217 8S. C. 50 Am. Rep. 657, seemingly in conflict, is based upon the idea that the acknowledgment, though made to a stranger, was in- tended and expected to. influence the conduct of the creditor. Upona whole, the decisions of this court are irreconcilable. '2The earlier case of Collett v. Frazier, 8 Jones Eq. 80, is in antagonism with the decisions cited, and while not expressly overruled, is, by necessary implication. ‘This is the only case, within the researches of the author which con- tains an exposition of the word “damned.” 136 LIMITATIONS. Theory. Circuit Court U. S. (Georgia Ins. Co. v. Ellicott, Taney, 130; Craig v. Brown, 3 Wallace C. C. 503). The earlier decisions were grounded upon the theory that the statutes of limitation merely raised a presump- tion of payment; and where this doctrine prevailed, an admission that the debt was subsisting was, of course, evidence to rebut the presumption with regard to the per- son to whom it was made; but after, the original rationale was gradually abandoned, and the seemingly sounder view taken that they are to be treated as statutes of repose, it could no longer be plausibly maintained, that an acknowledgment casually made to a stranger could have the effect to take the case out of the statute. Hence, it may be stated, the weight of modern auth- ority decidedly preponderates in favor of the negative of the proposition under discussion. The text writers not always examining into the reason of discrepancies, are in conflict. Some holding the affirmative (Ang. Lim. sec. 289; Joynes, Lim. 120; Am notes to 1 Smith L. C. (6 Am. Ed.); Chitty Cont. (3 Am. Ed.) 935). Others in the negative (Wood, Lim. sec. 79; note to Allen v. Collins, cited, supra; 3 Pars. Cont. (5th Ed.) 85; Abb. Tr. Ev. 823, par. 3; Story Eq. Jur. sec. 1521a). But, although the acknowledgment shall be made to a stranger, if so made with intent that it should influ- ence the action of, or be communicated to the creditor, it is held by some courts to be sufficient to avoid the statute (Wakeman v. Sherman, 9 N. Y. 85; Collett v. Frazier, 3 Jones, Eq. (N. C.) 80; Jordan v. Hubbard, 26 Ala. (N. 8.) 433; Evans v. Curry, 29 ib. 99; Dinguid ». Schoolfield, 32 Gratt. 803; Rogers v. Southern, 4 Baxter, 67; Palmer v. Butler, 36 Iowa, 576; Stuart v. Foster, 18 Ab. Pr. 305; Mastin 7. Branham, 86 Mo. 643 S. C. 1 West. Rep. 744). \ LIMITATIONS. 137 By others than the Debtor. But an acknowledgment to a stranger may be proved in corroboration of one to the creditor (Paty v. Davis, 12 Lea, 286; Cape Girardeau Co. v. Harbison, 58 Mo. 90). Acknowledgment or Part-Payment by others than the Debtor. —Here we find a discrepancy: The following courts hold that an acknowledgment or part-payment made by others than the debtor, himself or his agent, constituted for that purpose, does not avail to remove the bar of the statute. England (Davies v. Edwards, 7 Ex. 22; 15 Jur. 1014 S.C. 6 E. L. & Hq. R. 520; Cf. Pittam v. Foster, 1 B. & ©. 248; Neve v. Hollands, 21 L. J. (N. 8S.) Q. B. 259; 16 Jur. 933; 12 E. L. & Eq. 398). Alabama (Lyon v. State Bank, 12 Ala. 508; Kenan v. Holloway, 16 Ala. 53 8. C. 50 Am. Dec. 162; Cf. Moore v. Leseur, 18 Ala. 606). In some cases, the question must be left to the jury (Minnice v. Jeter, 65 Ala. 222). Georgia (Hunter v. Robertson, 30 Ga. 479; Cf. Bird v. Adams, 7 Ga. 595). Louisiana! (Succession of Ducker, 10 La. Ann. 758; Jacobs v. Calderwood, 4 La. Ann. 509; N. Y. &. Co. v. Jones, 22 La. Ann. 530; Smith v. Coon, 22 La. Ann. 445; Of. Brandt v. Maier, 32 La. Ann. 51). Maryland (Miller v. Dorsey, 9 Md. 317; Goldsmith v. Kilbourn, 46 Md. 289; Morris v. Hazlehurst, 30 Md. 362). Massachusetts (Roscoe v. Hale, 7 Gray, 274; Stoddard ». Doane, ib. 387; Butler v. Price, 110 Mass. 97 8. C. 115 ib. 578; Cf. Manson v. Felton, 13 Pick. 206; Campbell v. Baldwin, 130 Mass. 199). Nebraska (Whitney v. Chambers, 17 Neb. 70 8. C. 52 Am. Rep. 398). New Jersey (Ridgway v. English, 22 N. J. L. 409). New York (Pickett v. Leonard, 34 N. Y. 175; Bank v. Ballou,? 2 Lans. 120 8. C. 49 N. Y. 155; McLaren v. 1 Aliter if the statute had not run (Cockfield v. Farley, 21 La. Ann. 521). °This was the case of a voluntary payment after the statute had run— ‘held otherwise when the statute has not run (Heath ». Grenell, 61 Barb. 190). 138 LIMITATIONS. Contra: Part Payment by Surety. McMartin,! 36 N. Y. 88; Harper v. Fairley, 53 N.Y. 442; Smith v. Ryan, 66 N. Y. 352 S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 60; Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 John. Ch. 266; Arnold v. Downing, 11 Barb. 554; Rich v. Niagara &c. Bank, 3 Hun. 481; Kelley v. Weaver, 27 Hun. 8). North Carolina (Woodhouse v. Simmons, 73 N. C. 30). Ohio (Marienthal v. Mosler, 16 Ohio, (N. 8.) 566). Pennsylvania (Merchants &c. Bank v. Watson, 46 Pa. 310; Kyle v. Wells, 17 Pa. 286 S. C. 55 Am. Dee. 555;. Gillingham v. Gillingham, 17 Pa. 302; Kline v. Guthart, 2 Pa. 290; Wessner v. Stein, 97 Pa. 322.) South Carolina (Steele v. Jennings, 1 McM. 297). Vermont (Powers v. Southgate, 15 Vt. 471; Lyman v. Norwich &c., 28 Vt. 560; Galpin v. Barney, 37 Vt. 627). But see (Minkler v. Minkler, 16 Vt. 194). Wisconsin—Semble (Dunn v. Buckley, 56 Wis. 190 S. C. 16 C. L. J. 34). The following courts hold contra: Connecticut (Bissell v. Edwards, 35 Conn. 299). Iowa (Lawrence v. Sinnamon, 24 Iowa, 80; Thomas v. Brewer, 55 ib. 227). Kansas (Letson v. Kenyon,’ 31 Kan. 301 S. ©. 18 Rep. 302; Horton, C. J., dissenting, reported in note to Whitney v. Chambers, 52 Am. Rep. 398 and 401). Missouri (McLurg v. Howard, 45 Mo. 365). Mississippi (Clopton v. Matheny,’ 48 Miss. 498). New Hampshire (Titus v. Ash. 24 N. H. 349). Of the debtor may ratify a payment by a stranger, which will operate as a prior command under the maxim omnis ratihabitio retro trahitur, et mandato priori equip- aratur. Part-Payment by a Surety —In some courts, a part-pay- 1This case, however, decides that a payment made by the maker of a note, ratified by the indorser, would bind the latter. * Based on statute. This was promise by husband as to wife’s debt, he being treated by the court as an agent. LIMITATIONS. 139: Part Payment or Acknowledgment by Principal. ment by a surety takes the case out, as to the principal (Perham v. Raynal, 2 Bing. 306 (9 E. C. L. R.); Rex v.. Inhs. of Hardwick, 11 East, 578; Langston v. Adderhold,. 60 Ga. 376; Whipple v. Stevens, 22 N. H. 219). In others not (Succession of Voorhies, 21 La. Ann.. 659; Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N. Y. 558; Coleman v. Fobes, 22 Pa. 156 8. C. 60 Am. Dec. 75; Eltinge v. Hull, 2: Demarest, 562). Acknowledgment or Part-Payment by Principal Debtor.—- In some States, such payment by a principal debtor has the effect to take the case out of the statute, as to a. surety, especially if he be present, though silent (Hunt v. Bridgham, 2 Pick. 581; Lawrence v. Dunkle, 35 Mo.. 395; Whitaker v. Rice, 9 Minn. 13; Glick v. Crist, 37 Ohio, (N. 8.) 385; Schindell v. Gates, 46 Md. 604 8S. C. 6 Rep. 112; Caldwell v. Sigourney, 19 Conn. 37; Semble, Smith v. Caldwell, 15 Rich, 365; McKeethan v. Atkin-. son, 1 Jones, 421; Green v. Greensboro College, 83 N. C. 449 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 579). In Vermont, it is not neces- sary that the payment should be made from the funds. of the party making, to arrest the running of the statute; it is sufficient if he promises it to be done (McConnell v.. Merrill, 53 Vt. 149). Aliter in others (Faulkner v. Bailey, 123 Mass. 588 S.. CO. 5 Rep. 335, decided on a statute; Lowther v. Chappell, 8 Ala. 353 S. C. 42 Am. Dec. 643; Myatts v. Bell, 41 Ala. 222; Knight v. Clements, 45 ib. 89 S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 693; Lane v. Doty, 4 Barb. 530; Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N. Y.. 558; Littlefield v. Littlefield, 91 N. Y. 203; Hunter v. Robertson, 30 Ga. 479; Dean v. Monroe, 32 Ga. 28; Butcher v. Hixon, 4 Leigh. 519; Steele v. Souder, 20 Kan. 39; Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368 S. OC. 25 Am. Rep. 491; Bush v. Stowell, 71 Pa. 208 S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 694; Pitts v. Hunt, 61 N. Y. 637; McMullen ». Rafferty, 24 Hun. 363; McBride v. Hunter, 64 Ga. 6553: Gould v. Cayuga &c. Bank, 86 N. Y. 75). Promise &c. to Assignee.—By some courts it is held that 140 LIMITATIONS. Femes Covert as affected by. a promise, acknowledgment, &c., made to the original creditor, will enure to the benefit of a subsequent holder (Frye v. Barker, 4 Pick. 382; Little v. Blunt, 9 ib. 488; Dean v. Hewitt, 5 Wend. 257; Pinkerton v. Bailey, 8 ib. 600; Soulden v. Van Rensselaer, 9 ib. 293; Clark v. Atkinson, 2 E. D. Smith, 112; Howe v. Thompson, 11 Me. 152; Bird v. Adams, 7 Ga. 505). This view is pushed to extreme in Townsend v. Inger- soll, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. 8.) 354 S. C. 43 How. Pr. 276. Contra—(Thompson v. Gilreath, 3 Jones, 493). In England the question is left open (Cripps v. Davis, 12 M. & W. 159; Gale v. Capern, 1 A. & E. 102 (28 E. ©. L. R.) generally cited contra, was decided on a ques- tion of pleading. Cf. Jackson v. Fairbanks, 2 H. BI. 340; Blanchard v. Wharton, 1 B. & A. 220). Femes Covert as affected by,—There is no difficulty as to the saving as to femes covert independent of the statutes whereby they are ex vi termini or may be constituted, by some proceeding prescribed as to legal rights and obligations, femes-sole, or, whereby they are authorized to sue alone. The following courts hold that in such cases, a married woman is bound by the running of the statute: Alabama—Analogy (Michan v. Wyatt, 21 Ala. 813). Connecticut (Hanford v. Fitch, 41 Conn. 487). California (Wilson v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 447; Cameron v. Smith, 50 ib. 303). Illinois (Castner v. Walrod,! 83 Ill. 171 8. C. 25 Am. Rep. 369; 5 C. L. J. 420; Kibbe v. Ditto, 93 U. 8. 674, ‘679; Enos v. Buckley, 94 Ill. 458; Cf. Harrer v. Wallner, 80 Ill. 197). 1 See full extract in Wells, M. W. sec. 658. This case overrules Morrison #. Norman, 47 Ill. 477; Noble ». McFarland, 51 4b. 226. Of. (Harrer v. Wallner, 80 Il. 197). LIMITATIONS. 141 Collateral Securities, how viewed. Maine (Brown v. Cousens, 51 Me. 301). Missouri (Valle v. Obenhause, 62 Mo. 82). The following hold that the right is, notwithstanding the provision in such statutes, saved as before: Indiana (Bauman v. Grubbs, 26 Ind. 419; Cf. Milner v. Hyland, 77 ib. 458). Kentucky (Stephens v. McCormick, 5 Bush, 181). . Louisiana (Sewell v. McVay, 30 La. Ann. (Pt. 1st.) 673), but this was the case of a suit by wife on a debt of the husband. Minnesota (Burke v. Beveridge, 15 Minn. 205). Mississippi (Hodges v. Darden, 51 Miss. 199; McLaugh- lin v. Spengler, 57 Miss. 818). New York (Dunham v. Sage, 5 Lans. 451; Clark v. McCann,! 18 Hun. 13; see previous contrary decisions of Ball v. Bullard, 52 Barb. 145 and Fletcher v. Apdike, 3 Hun. 350). North Carolina (State v. Troutman, 72 N. C. 551; Briggs v. Smith, 83 ib. 306; Campbell v. Crater, 95 ib. 156). Ohio (Hurlbut v. Wade, Ohio, (Com.) 111; Ashley v. Rockwell, 43 ib. 386 8. C. 20 Rep. 628). Wisconsin (Weisner v. Zann, 39 Wis. 210; Wertcott v. _ Miller, 42 ib. 306). Collateral Securities as affecting the question.— On the de- posit of collaterals,” although the debt may have become barred, the pledgee may still resort to the security for his indemnity (Hancock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 114 Mass. 155; Chowteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290, 341; Whelan v. * Kinsley, 26 Ohio, (N. 8.) 1381; Moses v. St. Paul, 67 Ala. 168, 172; Cf. Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. Sr. 278; Mims v. Mims, 3 J. J. Marsh, 103, 106; Waterman v. Brown, 31 Pa. 161; Roberts v. Sykes, 30 Barb. 173; Jones v. Merchants’ Bank &c., 6 Robt. 162 S. C. 4 ib. 221; Oakley, in re, 2 Edw. Ch. 478). 1 Before the statute was passed, omitting the saving clause. ® Multiplied iteration justifies the employment of this sententious collo- quialism. 142 LIMITATIONS. Re-Delivery of Collateral. In Louisiana it is held that such a pledge prevents prescription as against the debt secured; provided, the pledgee retains possession of the collateral (Police Jury v. Duvalde, 22 La. Ann. 107; Citizens’ Bank v. Knapp, ib. 117; Blane v. Hartzog, 23 ib. 199). It has also been held that when an action upon the ‘collateral has been suspended by injunction, the effect is to preserve the remedy in the debt (Williams v. Pouns, 48 Tex. 141 S. C. 5 Rep. 82). It is held in England (Turner v. Dodwell, 3 El. & BI. 136 (77 E. C. L. R.)), and some States, that the giving of a -collateral to secure payment of a note past due, operates as an acknowledgment so as to take such note out of the operation of the statute (Smith v. Ryan, 66 N. Y. 352 S. C, 23 Am. Rep. 60; Citizens’ Bank v. Johnson, 21 La. Ann. 128; Scovel v. Gill, 30 La. Ann. (Pt 2), 1207; Sornbergen v. Lee, 14 Neb. 193 8. C. 45 Am. Rep. 106). Contra (Brown v. Latham, 58 N. H. 30 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 568). It is held in Alabama and New York, that a payment on a note by the sale of collaterals would not operate to defeat the operation of the statute (Lyon v. State Bank, 12 Ala. 508; Harper v. Fairley, 53 N. Y. 442). Contra (Sornbergen v. Lee, 14 Neb. 193 8. C. 45 Am. Rep. 106; Haven v. Hathaway, 20 Me. 345; Porter v. Blood, 5 Pick. 54; Ilsley v. Jewett, 2 Met. 168). But when a collateral was redelivered to the pledgor to collect and credit, and a sum of money was by him ‘collected and handed over to the pledgee, it was held, 1The decision of the Nebraska Court, it strikes the author, is clearly right. As giving the note of another for a debt is payment, why should not the transfer of it, as collateral, amount to either part-payment when ‘collected (Butts 0. Perkins, 41 Barb. 509; Sibley v. Lumbert, 30 Me. 253; Hart v. Nash, 2 Cr. Mees. & Ros. 337; Hooper 2. Stephens, 4 A. & E. 71 (31 E. C. L. R.)), or as an acknowledgment when delivered. The tendency of the earlier New York cases was in that direction (Wenman v. Mohawk &c. Co., 13 Wend. 267). LIMITATIONS. 143 Collateral Documents. that the running of the statute was stopped thereby (Whipple v. Blackington, 97 Mass. 476). Acknowledgments Contained in Collateral Documents.— When an admission is found in some paper writing, formulated by the debtor, but not addressed to the creditor, the courts are not harmonious on the point whether this is sufficient to take the case out of the Statute. The instances are tod numerous to justify a recapitulation. In the following cases, the admission was held suf- ‘ficient: Connecticut (Merrils v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257). Indiana (Spraigler v. McDaniel, 3 Ind. 275). Iowa (Palmer v. Butler, 36 Iowa, 576). Kansas (Schmucker v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104 S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 765). Louisiana (Morgan v. Metayer, 14 La. Ann. 612; War- ren v. Childress, 23 ib. 184; Behrens v. Boutté, 31 ib. 112; Succession of Ariek, 22 La. Ann. 501). Maine (Blue Hill Academy v. Ellis, 32 Me. 200). Maryland (Allender v. Vestry, 3 Gill, (Md.) 166; Yates v. Donaldson, 5 Md. 389 S. C. 61 Am. Dee. 283). New York! (Ross v. Ross, 13 N. Y. Sup. Ot. 80; Clark v. Van Amburgh, 14 Hun. 558; Stewart v. Foster, 18 Abb. Pr. 305; Kohnstamm v. Foster, 28 ib. 273; DeFreest v. Warner, 98 N. Y. 217 S. C. 50 Am. Rep. 657). Tennessee (Stanford v. Andrews, 12 Heisk. 664; Rogers v. Southern, 4 Baxt. 67). Texas (Grayson v. Taylor, 14 Tex. 672; but see Wofford ». Unger, 55 Tex. 480). Vermont (Brigham v. Hutchins, 1 Wms. (Vt.) 569). Virginia (Dintgnid v. Schoolfield, 32 Gratt. 803). Supreme Court U. S. (King v. Riddle, 7 Cr. 168). District Court U. S. (In re Eldridge, 12 N. B. Reg. 540). The following courts reject this view, and hold that 7 1See New York, contra, post. 144 LIMITATIONS. Must be to Creditor. the acknowledgment or promise must at least be made to the creditor or his agent: England (Edwards v. Culley, 4 H. & N. 378; Everett v. Robertson, 1 E. & E. 16 (102 E. C. L. B.); 4 Jur. N.S. 1083; 28 L. J. (Q. B.) 23; Grenfell v. Girdlestone, 2 Y. & C. 662; Davies v. Edwards, 7 Ex. 22; 15 Jur. 1014; 6 E. L. & Eg. R. 520; Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 9 Hare, 204; 12 HE. L. & Eq. R. 191; Topping, Ex Parte, 4 Dels. J. & S. (Banky), 551; 34 L. J. (Bank), 44; 13 W. R. 1025; 12 L. J. (N. 8.) 787; Pott v. Cleg, 16 M. & W. 321; 11 Jur. 289; 16 L. J. (Ex.) 210). Some of the earlier cases were decided contra (Kicke v. Nokes, Moo. & R. 359; but see as distinguished, Holmes v. Mackrell, 3 ©. B. (N. 8.) 789 (91 E. ©. L. R.); Greenway v. Bromfield, 9 Hare, 201; 12 BE. L. & Eq. R. 189). Circuit Court U. S. (In re Kingsley, 1 Low, 221 8. 0.1 N. B. Reg. 67; In re Eldridge, 12 ib. 544). Alabama (Bradford v. Spyker, 32 Ala. 134). Georgia (Abercrombie v Butts, 72 Ga. 74S. 0. 53 Am. Rep. 832). ; Maine (Wellman v. Southard, 30 Me. 425). Massachusetts (Merriam v. Leonard,! 6 Cush. 151; Ros- coe v. Hale, 7 Gray, 274; Stoddard v. Doane, ib. 387; Richardson v. Thomas, 13 Gray, 381 8. C. 74 Am. Dec. 636). Missouri (Allen v. Collins,2 70 Mo. 138 8. ©. 35 Am. Rep. 416). ?The point as to how it might have been, had the mortgage taken effect,. is pretermitted by the court. That was the fact in Balch ». Onion, 4 Cush. 559, but was not necessarily raised by the point made in that case, and the question is left open in the case cited. In that, the mortgage had never be- come a fatt accompli. * But this court takes a distinction between an admission contained in a writing, with which the creditor has no concern, and those made expressly for his benefit, ev gr. if contained in an application for a life policy, on the life of the debtor, when the policy is to be issued in the name of the credi- tor (Mastin v. Branham, 86 Mo. 643 8. C. 1 West. Rep. 744). LIMITATIONS, 145 Rationale. New York (Bloodgood v. Bruen, 8 N. Y. 362; Pickett v. Leonard, 34 ib. 175; Harper v. Fairley,! 53 ib. 442). North Carolina (Bank of New Berne v. Sneed, 3 Hawks, 500; Eure v. Eure, 3 Dev. 206; Falls v. Sherrill, 2 D. & B. 371). Pennsylvania (Brown v. Bridges, 2 Miles: (Pa.) 425; Christy v. Flemington, 10 Pa. 129 8. C. 49 Am. Dec. 590; Bell’s Estate, 25 Pa. 92; McKinney v. Snyder, 78 ib. 497). Rhode Island (Hidden v. Cozzens, 2 R. I. 401 S. C. 60 Am. Dee. 93). Circuit Court U. S. (Georgia &c. Co. v. Ellicott, Taney, 130). U. S. District Court (In re Kingsley, 1 Low, 2168. C. 7 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 423; In re Ray, 2 Ben. 53; 7 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 283). On principle, it would seem that the latter view is correct; for, whether the narr. should be framed as upon the old debt or new promise, the substantial feature in a contract of any kind is an offer by one person made to another and accepted by the latter, and the negative of the former doctrine may be illustrated to a reductio ad absurdum by an example, thus: Suppose A admits to B that he had purchased a horse from C on a named day, for $100, and that he still owed him that sum, could a declaration in a suit by O against A, embodying those facts, be sustained ? ? This observation is alike applicable to admissions verbally, as those in writing, and the solemnity of the writing, (save perhaps a will), does not affect the propo- sition. Perhaps implied assumpsits may form an excep- tion (King v. Riddle, supra). As to the effect of admis- sions contained in collateral instruments, not, in fact, 1As usual, there is a conflict of decisions in New York, see Bryar v. Willcocks, and others cited ante, as sustaining the former view. ?See 2 Chitty Plead. 10 146 LIMITATIONS. Collateral Documexts. prepared by the debtor, in taking the debt out of the operation of the statute, there is a conflict of decisions. In the following courts, such admissions have been held to have such effect. England! (Smith v. Poole, 12 Sim. 17; Frost v. Bergough, 1 Bing. 266, but see Goate v. Goate, 1 H. & N. 29; Coope v. Creswell, L. R. (2 Ch. App.) 112). Arkansas (Ringo v. Brooks, 26 Ark. 540). Maine (Blue Hill Academy v. Ellis, 32 Me. 260). New York” (Mosher v. Hubbard, 13 John. 510; Bryar v. Wilcocks, 3 Cow. 159; Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N. Y. 560; McNamee v. Tenney, 41 Barb. 506; Conn. &c. Co. »v. Bratt, 44 Barb. 489; Stewart v. Foster, 18 Ab. Pr. 305; Ross v. Ross, 13 N. Y. Supreme Court, 80). This doctrine is rejected by other courts. Ireland (Harrison v. Dignan, 1 Con. & L. 376). Georgia (Hunter v. Robertson, 30 Ga. 479). Louisiana (Smith v. Coon, 22 La. Ann. 445; New York &c. Co. v. Jones,? ib. 530). Maryland (Miller v. Dorsey, 9 Md. 317). New York (Pickett v. Leonard, 34 New York, 175; McLaren v. McMartin, 36 ib. 88, and Arnold v. Down- ing, 11 Barb. 554), decide that a partial payment by a personal representative does not take the case out of the statute if it has run, aliter if not (Heath v. Grenell, 61 Barb. 190). Oregon—Semble (Anderson v. Baxter, 4 Oreg, 105). Pennsylvania (Bell’s Estate, 25 Pa. 92). Rhode Island (Reed v. Johnson, 1 R. I. 81). There are cases both ways in England, and to be weighed accurately, will have to be examined critically: inter alia (Wilkinson ». Wilkinson, 9 Hare, 204 8. C. 12 E. L. & Eq. R. 191). ‘The later case of Pickett ». Leonard, cited injra, holds the contrary view. *The earlier cases of Succession of Ducker, 10 La. Ann. 758, and Mor- gan v. Meteyer, 14 La. Ann. 612, contra. LIMITATIONS. 147 Promise by Partner. Promises, &c., by Copartners after Dissolution.—The ques- tion as to the power of a partner to take a claim, as against the firm, out of the operation of the statute by promises, acknowledgments or part payment, has given rise to, perhaps, a greater conflict of judicial opinion than any other branch of the general subject under con- sideration. The right to do so has been recognized by the follow- ing courts: England! (Whitcomb v. Whiting, 1 Smith L. C. (5th Am. Ed.) 318). It is true that the debt in that case was joint and several, but a fortiori if one of such debtors can take a case out by his promise or acknowledgment, the same principle should apply to the case of a partner, certainly before dissolution. This reasoning was adopted and the very point de- cided in (Wood v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 104; Lacy v. McNeil, 4 Dow. & Ry. 7 (16 E. C. L. R.); Pritchard v. Draper, 1 Russ. & Myl. 191; Wright v. Court, 2 0. & P. 332; Brown v. Richardson, 1 Peake, 23; Nichols »v. Dowding, 1 Starkie, 81; Sangster v. Mazzaredo, 1 Star- kie, 162; Grant v. Jackson, 1 Peake, 268; Wyatt v. Hodson, 8 Bing. 309 (21 E. C. L. R.); Burleigh v. Stott, 8 B. & C. 36 (15 HE. C. L. B.); 2M. & R. 93; Goddard v. Ingram, 3 G. & D. 46; 3A. & E.999 (43 EB. 0. L.R.); Cf. Goodwin v. Parton, 41 L. T.(N. 8.) 91; Watson v. Woodman, L. R. 20 Eq. 721). Circuit Court U.S. (Van Riemsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gall. 630, per Story, J).? 1The Statute of 19 and 20 Vict. chap. 97, has emasculated these decis- ions, but they are cited for their weight in determining the question under discussion, in those jurisdictions which have not re-enacted it, and where the matter is res integra. *It is noticeable that this distinguished Jurist delivered the opinion in Bell v. Morrison. 148 LIMITATIONS. Whitcomb ». Whiting followed. Arkansas (Trustees &c. v. Hartfield, 5 Ark, 551; Burr v. Williams,! 20 ib. 174). Connecticut (Austin v. Bostwick, 9 Conn. 496, 5018. C. 25 Am. Dec. 42; Hoyt v. Sturges, 28 Conn. 540; Bissell v. Adams, 35 ib. 302; Beardsley v. Hall, 36 ib. 270 8. C. 4 Am. Rep. 74). Delaware (Newlin v. Duncan, 1 Harr. 204 8. C. 25 Am. Dec. 66). Georgia (Brewster v. Hardeman, Dud. 138; Cf. Cox v. Bailey, 9 Ga. 467 S. ©. 54 Am. Dee. 358; Tillinghast v. Nourse, 14 Ga. 641; Chamberlain v. Bancroft, 24 Ga. 310). Maine 2 (Cf. Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 21 Me. 433; Shep- ley v. Waterhouse, 22 ib. 497). Before statute held the affirmative (Greenleaf v. Quincy, 12 Me. 11 S. OC. 28 Am. Dee. 145). Massachusetts (Cady v .Shepherd, 11 Pick. 400 S. C. 22 Am. Dec. 379; Bridge v. Gray, 14 Pick. 55; Vinal »v. Burrill, 16 ib. 401; Gay v. Bowen, 8 Met. 100; Ide v. Ingraham, 5 Gray, 106; Buxton v. Edwards, 134 Mass. 567). Missouri (Craig v. Calloway, 12 Mo. 94; Pope v. Risley, 23 ib. 185; Lawrence Co. v. Dunkel, 35 ib. 395; McClurg v. Howard, 45 ib. 365; Cf Block v. Dorman, 51 ib. 313. Dowzelot v. Rawlings, 58 Mo. 75). New Jersey (Merritt v. Day, 38 N. J. L. 32 8S. ©. 20 Am. Rep. 362, Casebolt v. Ackerman, 17 Vroom, (46 N. J. L.) 169; 19 Rep. 21). North Carolina? (McIntire v. Oliver, 2 Hawks, 209 8. C. 11 Am. Dec. 760; Willis v. Hill, 2 D. & B. 2318S. ©. 31 Am. Dec. 412; Falls v. Sherrill, ib. 371; Walton v. Rob- inson, 5 Ired. 341; Cummins v. Coffin, 7 ib. 196; Hub- bard v. Marsh, ib. 204). Ohio (Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio, (N. 8.) 21 8. C. 62 Am. 1That is, if the statute has not already barred; aliter if it had (Hicks o. Lusk, 19 Ark. 692; Borden v. Pray, 20 2b. 293). * Altered by statute. LIMITATIONS. 149 Whitcomb v. Whiting denied. Dec. 271; Myers v. Standart, 11 ib. 29; Feigley v. Whitaker,! 22 ib. 606 S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 778). Rhode Island (Turner v. Ross, 1 R. I. 88). Vermont (Joslyn v. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Wheelock v. Doo- little, 18 ib. 440 S. C. 46 Am. Dec. 163; Mix v. Shattuck, 50 Vt. 421 S. C. 28 Am. Rep. 511; Walker v. Wait, 50 Vt. 668). Virginia (Brockenbrough v. Hackley, 6 Call. 51; Shelton ®. Cocke, 3 Mun. 197; Garland v. Agee, 7 Leigh. 362). This doctrine is denied in the following courts: Alabama (Wilson v. Torbert, 3 Stew, 296 8. C. 21 Am. Dec. 632; Pitt v. Wooten, 24 Ala. 474: Myatts v. Bell, 41 ib. 222). Florida (Tate v. Clemants, 16 Fla. 339 S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 709; Abs. 6 Rep. 519). Mlinois (Ayer v. Richards, 12 Ill. 148; Parson ». RB. R. Co., 38 ib. 433; Norton v. Colby, 52 ib. 202; Helm v. ‘Cantrell, 59 ib. 524; Kallenback v. Dickenson, 100 1b. 427 S. C. 39 Am. Rep. 47; Bank of Montreal v. Page, ‘98 Ill. 109). Indiana (Yandes v. Lafavour, 2 Blackf. 371; Bond v. Nave, 62 Ind. 505). Kansas (Steele v. Soule, 20 Kan. 39). Kentucky (Thompson v. Caldwell, 3 Litt. 136; Hamil- ton v. Summers, 12 B. Mon. 11 8. C. 54 Am. Dee. 509). Louisiana (Com. Bank v. Perry, 10 Rob. 61S. C. 43 Am. Dec. 168; Curry v. Hayes, 19 La. Ann. 325; Succession of Voorhies, 21 ib. 659). Maryland—After the statute has barred (Ellicott v. Nichols, 7 Gill, 85 S.C.48 Am. Dee, 546; Taylor v. Miller, 36 Md. 501; Newman v. McComas, 43 Md. 70). Michigan (Pennoyer v. David, 8 Mich. 407; Gates v. Fisk, 45 Mich. 522). 1These cases, while not deciding the very point, do, it seems, especially the last, uphold the view under considezation, though the first named looks the other way. 150 LIMITATIONS. Text-Books favoring Whitcomb ». Whiting. Minnesota (Whitaker v. Rice, 9 Minn. 13; Whitney v- Reese, 11 Minn. 138). Mississippi (Bibb v. Peyton, 11S. & M. 275; Foute v. Bacon, 24 Miss. 156; Maxey v. Strong, 53 Miss. 280). Nebraska (Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368 S. C. 25. Am. Rep. 491). New Hampshire! (Exeter Bank v. Sullivan, 6 N. H. 124; Kelly v. Sanborn, 9 ib. 46; Mann v. Locke, 11 ib. 246; Whipple v. Stevens, 22 N. H. 219). New York (Van Keuren v. Parmalee, 2 N. Y. 523 8. C. 51 Am. Dec. 322; Schoemaker v. Benedict, 11 N. Y. 176; Graham v. Selover, 59 Barb. 313). Oregon (Sutherlin v. Roberts, 4 Oreg. 378). Pennsylvania (Levy v. Cadet, 17 8S. & R. 1268. C. 17 Am. Dec. 650; Searight v. Craighead, 1 P. & W. 135; Estate of Davis, 5 Whart. 538 S. C. 34 Am. Dee. 74; Coleman v. Fobes, 22 Pa. 156 8. C. 60 Am. Dec. 75; Bush v. Stowell,? 71 Pa. 208 8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 6943. Wilson v. Waugh, 101 Pa. 233 S. C. Pitt, L. J. 176). South Carolina (Fisher v. Tucker, 1 McC. Ch. 169; Hig- ginson v. Air, 1 Deas. 427; Steele v. Jennings, 1 McM. 297; Fortune v. Hayes, 5 Rich. Eq. 112; Gowdy v. Gillam, 6 Rich. 29; Cf. Galliott v. Planters’ Bank, 1 MeM. 209 S. 0. 36 Am. Dec. 256). Tennessee (Belote v. Wynne, 7 Yerg. 534; Muse v. Donalson, 2 Humphrey, 166 S. C. 36 Am. Dec. 309; Crumless v. Sturges, 6 Heisk. 190). Supreme Court U.S. (Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351). Circuit Court U. S. (Bispham 'v. Patterson, 2 McLean, 87; Oronkhite v. Herrin, 15 Fed Rep. 888). The following text-books favor Whitcomb v. Whiting and Wood v. Braddick: (Lind. Part. 373; 1 Coll. Part. 1 Aliter if the plaintiff had no notice of the dissolution (Kenniston ». Avery, 16 N. H. 117; Tappan 0. Kimball, 30 7d. 136). 2 But if the statute has not run, the English rule is followed (McCoon 2. Galbraith, 29 Pa. 293). LIMITATIONS. 151 Those rejecting it—Reasoning of Story, J. (6 Am. Ed.) secs. 107, 432, 433; 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 174, n. 3). ~The following reject the English cases and sustain Bell v. Morrison: (Par. Part. 190; Story, Part. sec. 323; Ang. Lim. sec. 260, n. 5; Wood Lim. 433; Metcalf, Cont. 135; Ab. Tr. Ev. 219). Several of the cases cited do not directly decide the very point, but are so intimately analogous as to justify their citation in showing the tendency and leaning of the courts on cognate questions. Some courts it will be seen, take a distinction as to whether the claim at the time the promise was made, was or was not barred; others, between promises to pay - and the giving of a new-firm note for the debt, and others still between the power of one of several joint- debtors, not partners, and that of a partner after disso- lution ; in others yet as to. whether the creditor had been or not fixed with notice of the dissolution. It strikes the author that these distinctions are not based upon principle, and that the reasoning of Srory, J. in Bell v. Morrison, in unanswerable. In many of the States the English Statutes have been substantially re-enacted, but if the statute only superadds the solem- nity of writing, the power to make acknowledgments or promises is in no wise affected, except by the require- ment that it shall be in writing. Sometimes the lan- guage of the statute may not extend to its being effected ‘by an agent, and other language may be employed materially modifying the force and effect of even a promise in ‘writing. The intelligent practitioner in this regard, will have to judge for himself whether any and what change has been statutorily effected, as it would swell this volume, without corresponding benefit, to cite and comment upon the various discrepant provisions to be found in them. The case of Whitcomb v. Whiting, is but one of the 152 LIMITATIONS. Promise by Personal Representative. many illustrations of Ld. Mansfield’s persistent efforts to, as it were, hyperdermically incorporate the principles of the civil law into our common law jurisprudence. It is well known that the English Courts push the maxim of stare decisis to extreme, and sometimes un- warrantable lengths, and unfortunately some of our American Courts follow servilely in the legal rut made across the Atlantic. The suggested distinction taken by some courts between the right of a partner after dissolution to revive a debt barred, by promise, &c., and the denial of his power to give a new note for the old debt in the - firm-name, is exceedingly refined, and its fallacy may be illustrated thus: B & C, being partners, owe A a note of $100, due 1st June, 1880: after dissolution, and we will assume that three years is the statutory bar, B, according to these decisions may, on 1st June, 1886, give A a paper-writing in these words: We acknowledge that we owe A $100, due 1st June, 1880. June 1, 1886. Signed, B&C. and that this will take the debt out of the operation of the statute: but he is incapacitated to give to A this kind of an instrument, namely: We promise to pay A $100, bearing interest from June 1, 1880, the same being in lieu of our indebtedness to him for that amount. June 1, 1886. Signed, BE&C. Promise by Personal Representatives.—There are various views taken as to this point. Some courts hold that a case can only be taken out of the statute by an express promise (Ang. Lim. sec. 264), Formerly so held in England (M’Oulloch v. Dawes, 9 D. & R. 40; Tullock v. Dunn, Ry. & Moo. 416 (21 E. 0. L. R.); Jones v. Scott, 1 Russ. & Mylne, (4 E. Con. Ch. R.) 255). But this doctrine has been abandoned there, and it is LIMITATIONS. 153 Acknowledgment by. now held that a promise by an executor need not be more explicit than that by the debtor himself. So held in (Ball. on Lim. 228; Briggs v. Wilson, 5 DeG. M. & G. 12 8. C. 39 BE. L. & Hq. 62; Browning v. Paris, 5 M. & W. 120; Toft v. Stephenson, 1 DeG. M. & G. 28 8S. C.9 E. L. & Eq. 80; Fordham v. Wallis, 10 Hare, 217; 17 Jur. 228; 22 L. J. (Ch.) 548; 1 W. R. 118; 17 E. L. & Eq. 182). Delaware (Chambers v. Fennemore, 4 Harr. 368). Kentucky (Head v. Manners, 5 J. J. Marsh, 255; North- ‘cut v. Wilkinson, 2 B. Monroe, 348). Maine (Oakes v. Mitchell, 15 Me. 360; Bunker v. Ath- earn, 35 ib. 364). New Hampshire (Buswell v. Roby, 3 N. H. 467). New York (Johnson v. Beardslee,! 15 John. 3; Ham- mon v. Huntley, 4 Cow. 493; Forsyth v. Ganson, 5 Wend. 558; McIntire v. Morris, 14 Wend. 90; Deyo v. Jones, 20 Wend. 491; Cayuga Bank v. Bennett, 5 Hill, 236, 240). South Carolina (Knox v. McCall, 1 Brev. (S. C.) 531; Moore v. Porcher, 1 Bail. Eq. 195; Wilson v. Wilson, 1 MeM. Eq. 331; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 4 Strobh. 63; Ciples v. Alexander, 2 Const. Rep. (1st Ser.) 767). Virginia (Henderson v. Foote, 3 Call. 248; Fisher v. Duncan, 1 H. & M. 5638. C. 3 Am. Dee. 605; Lewis v. Bacon, 3 H. & M. 105; Epes v. Dudley, 5 Rand. 437; Seig v. Acord, 21 Gratt. 365 S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 605). Supreme Court U. S. (Thompson v. Peter, 12 Wh. 565). The following cases hold that an acknowledgment is sufficient : Alabama (Hall v. Darrington, 9 Ala. 512; Townes ». Ferguson, 20 ib. 141). Delaware (Chambers v. Fennemore, 4 Harr. 368). Georgia (Griffin v. Justice, 17 Ga. 96; DuBignon ». Backer,? 61 Ga. 206). 1This case is overruled on another point by Van Keuren v. Parmelee, 2 IN. Y. 523. 2 If made before bar had attached. 154 LIMITATIONS. After Statute has run. Louisiana (Walker v. Cruikshank, 23 La. Ann. 252; Suc- cession of Romero, 29 ib. 493; Renshaw v. Stafford, 30: ib. 853; Behrens v. Boutté, 31 ib. 112). Maryland (Quynn v. Carroll, 10 Md. 197; Semmes v. Magruder, 10 ib. 242). Massachusetts (Baxter v. Penniman, 8 Mass. 133; Brown v. Anderson, 13 ib. 201; Sullivan v. Holker, 15 ib. 3743, Emerson v. Thompson, 16 ib. 429; Manson v. Felton, 13 Pick: 206; Foster v. Starkey, 12 Cush. 324; Lamson ».. Schutt, 4 All. 360; Fisher v. Metcalf, 7 All. 209). Missouri (Vernon Co. v. Stewart, 64 Mo. 408). New Hampshire (Hodgdon v. White, 11 N. H. 211; Brewster v. Brewster, 52 N. H. 52, 60). New Jersey—Semble (Shreve v. Joyce,! 36 N. J. L. (7 Vroom), 44, 49 8S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 417; Everett v. Wil- liams, 45 ib. (16 Vroom), 140, 148). North Carolina (Cobham v. Administrators, 2 Hay, 6 S. C. 2 Am. Dec. 612). U. S. Supreme Court (Thompson v. Peters, 12 Wh. 565;, Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. 8. 640). Circuit Court U. S. (Wilkings v. Murphy,’ 2 Hay, 282). There is still a third class of decisions, which hold ‘that a personal representative cannot, even by express promise, after the statute has run, preclude himself from pleading the Statute of Limitations. Connecticut (Peck v. Botsford, 7 Conn. 172 S. C. 18 Am. Dec. 92, 98; Crandall v. Gallup, 12 Conn. 365). 1Qnly partially reported in 18 Am. Rep. 417, that portion of the opinion pearing on the point under consideration, being omitted. 29d Haywood is scarcely regarded as authority by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and when counsel have the temerity to cite it, the court takes it cum grano salis. The cases cited are nis? prius decisions, and have never been cited by the court since. 3 This was a dictum of Marshall,C.J. The verdict which was for plaintiff, based upon the admission, was in fact set aside, and the learned Chief- Justice expressed a doubt whether an admission of the debt by an adminis- trator, would take the case out of the Statute. LIMITATIONS. 155 General and Special Statutes. Delaware (Perkins v. Bennington, 1 Harr. 209; Gailey v. Washington, 2 ib. 204). Florida (Patterson v. Cobb, 4 Fla. 481). Georgia (Griffin v. Justices, 17 Ga. 96). Indiana (Riser v. Snoddy, 7 Ind. 442). Kansas (Hanson v. Towle, 19 Kan. 273). Massachusetts—The Massachusetts Court takes a distine-- tion between the power of a personal representative by admission or promise to remove the bar of the general statute, and his right to waive the provisions of the. statute prescribing the time within which such repre- sentative may be sued; allowing effect to it in the former instances, and denying it in the latter (Cases,, supra). Mississippi (Henderson v. Ilsley, 19 Miss. 9 8S. C. 49 Am. Dec. 41; Sanders v. Robertson, 23 ib. 389; Roberts. v. Rogers, 28 ib. 152 8. C. 61 Am. Dee. 542; Waul V. Kerkman, 25 Miss. 620). New Hampshire (Brewster v. Brewster, 52 N. H. 52). New Jersey (Larason v. Lambert, 12 N. J. L. (7 Halst.), 247; Shreve v. Joyce, 36 ib. 44 8. C. 13 Am. Rep. 417). New York (Bloodgood v. Bruen, 8 N. Y. 362; McLaren v. McMartin, 36 ib. 88; Whittaker v. Whittaker, 6 Johns- 112; Mooers v. White, 6 Johns. Ch. 360; Johnson v. Beardslee, 15 Johns. 3; Hammond v. Huntley, 4 Cowan,, 493; Rogers v. Rogers, 3 Wend. 503 S. C. 20 Am. Dec. 716; Cayuga v. Bennett, 5 Hill, 236; Clark v. Clark, & Page Ch. 152 S. ©. 35 Am. Dec. 676; Arnold v. Down- ing, 11 Barb. 556; Warren v. Poff, 4 Bradford, 260; Townsend v. Ingersoll, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) S. ©. 43 Howard Pr. 276). Pennsylvania (Jones v. Moore, 5 Binn. 573 8. C. 6 Am. Dec. 428; Reynolds v. Hamilton, 7 Watts, 420; Fritz v. Thomas, 1 Whart. 66 S. C. 29 Am. Dec. 39; Man v. Warner, 4 Wharton, 479; Agnew v. Fetterman, 4 Pa. 59; Forney v. Benedict, 5 ib. 225; Hall v. Boyd, 6 ib.. 156 LIMITATIONS. Promise by one of several Representatives. 270; Steel v. Steel, 12 ib. 64, 66; Clark v. Maguire, 35 ib. 259). South Carolina (Knox v. McCall, 1 Brev. 531; Ciples v. Alexander, 2 Treadw. 767; Briggs v. Stark, 2 Mill, Const. 111; Lindsay v. Jamison, 4 McCord, 93; Pierce v. Zimmerman, Harp. 305; Fisher v. Tucker, 1 McCord, 175; Moore v. Porcher, 1 Bail. Eq. 195; Sunster v. Morse, 2 Hill, 87; McIver v. Ferguson, Riley, 159; Reigne v. Desportes, Dud. 118; Wilson v. Wilson, 1 McM. Ch. 329; Clarke v. Jenkins, 3 Rich. Eq. 318; Hazleton v. ‘Whitesides, 2 Strob. 353). ‘ Tennessee (Peck v. Wheaton, M. & Y. 353). Texas (Moore v. Hardison, 10 Tex. 467; Moore v. Hille- brant, 14 ib. 312 S. 0. 65 Am. Dee. 118). Virginia (Fisher v. Duncan, 1 H. & M. 563 S. ©. 3 Am. Dec. 605; Tazewell v. Whittier, 13 Gratt. 329; Seig v. Acord, 21 Gratt. 465 8. C. 8 Am. Rep. 605). It is difficult to see, on principle, if it be conceded that a personal representative may revive the debt at all, why an acknowledgment should not be as available ‘aS an express promise. The sounder view seems to be that last discussed, and especially as held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, namely, that it is not competent for such party in any way, whether the statute has run ‘or not, to revive a barred or keep alive a lingering claim. Promises by one of several Personal Representatives —The question as to whether one of several personal represen- tatives can either by promise or admission remove the bar of the statute,! has given rise to great conflict. The following named courts hold in the affirmative: Kentucky (Hord v. Lee, 4 Mon. 36). ~ Massachusetts (Emmerson v. Thompson, 16 Mass. 429). New Jersey (Shreve v Joyce, 36 N. J. L. 44 8. ©. 13 Am. Rep. 417). 1The subject is treated with reference to the general statute of limita- tion as applicable to the cause of action, and not to those purely protec- dive of the representative gua such. LIMITATIONS. 157 Power Denied. But this highly respectable court, in the opinion de- livered in case cited, say, “no argument from the danger of fraud by one executor is tenable, for the co-executor can always set up fraud or collusion in the promise; besides, the courts on settlement of executors’ accounts, where the power of the office has been abused, could make an executor personally account,” p. 49. North Carolina (Cobham v. Administrator, 2 Hay,!7 8. C. 2 Am. Dee. 612). South Carolina (Briggs v. Starke, 2 Mill. 111 S. C. 12 Am. Dec. 659; Lomax v. Spierin, Dud. 365; but see Watson v. Hayes, 5 Rich. Eq. 112). The following named courts hold in the negative: England (Tullock v. Dunn, Ry. & M. 416; Scholey v. Walton, 12 M. & W. 510; Phillips v. Beall, 32 Beav. 26). Alabama? (Greening v. Brown, Min. 353; Carruthers v. Mardis, 3 Ala. 590, 599; Pitt ». Wooten, 24 ib. 474). Connecticut The point was squarely made on the trial below, in Peck v. Botsford, 7 Conn. 172 S. ©. 18 Am. Dec. 92; but in ordering a new trial, the Supreme Court goes a bow-shot beyond contention of counsel, and hold that the acknowledgment of an executor, after the debt was barred, would not take the case out of the statute. Delaware (Conoway v. Spicer, 3 Harr. 425). Maryland (Semmes v. Magruder, 10 Md. 242; McCann v. Sloan, 25 Md. 575). New York (Defreest v. Warner, 98 N. Y. 217; McLaren v. MeMartin,? 36 N. Y. 88; Heath v. Grenell, 61 Barb. 12 Haywood must be taken cum grano salis. *Aliter if the action is against the promising executor only, after the death of his co-executor (Hall ». Darrington, 9 Ala. 502). 3In one part of the opinion, the court say, “but in respect to demands. barred at the death of the intestate, the administrator is under no such obligation. “The immunity of the estate is absolute. His position is purely fiduciary. It is his right and duty to apply the funds in his hands to the satisfaction of all legal demands; but he has no retrospective authority to contract. debts in the name of the intestate, or to revive those which were extin- 158 LIMITATIONS. Directions in Wills. 190;1 Hammon v. Huntley, 4 Cow. 493; Cayuga v. Ben- nett, 5 Hill, 236; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460 S .C. 80 Am. Dec. 103; Reid v. McNaughton, 15 Barb. 183; Phillips v. Peters, 21 Barb. 359; Van Alen v. Feltz, 32 Barb. 143 8. C. 9 Abb. Pr. 282). Virginia (Seig v. Acord, 21 Gratt. 365 S. C. 8 Am. Rep. ‘605). Directions in Wills.—This subject may be segregated by ‘considering, firstly, directions as to debts upon which ithe statute had not fully operated; and, secondly, those upon which it had. Debts upon which the statute had not run: England—aAs to these, a distinction is taken in England, between devises of realty and bequests of personalty ‘for payment of debts; the courts there holding that with regard to the former the statute does not run (Fergus v. Gore, 1 Sch. & Lef. 107; Hughes v. Wynne, 1 Turn. & Russ. Ch. 307; Crallan v. Oulton, 3 Beav. 1; Moore v. Petchell, 22 ib. 172). But does as to the latter (Scott v. Jones, 4 Cl. & F. 383 S. OC. 1 Russ. & Myl. 255, reversed on appeal; Evans ‘v. Tweedy, 1 Beav. 55; Freake v. Cranefeldt, 3 Myl. & Cr. 499; Cf. Rhodes v. Smethurst, 4 M. & W. 42; Ex parte Dewdney, and Ex parte Seaman, 15 Ves. Jr. 488; Ex parte Roffey, 19 ib. 470). And the English cases hold still another view,? ‘namely, that if a provision is made for payment of debts already barred, generally, there must be a specific guished by law in his lifetime. There is a moral obligation on the debtor to pay demands, which he knows have never been satisfied; but there is none on his executor or administrator to pay claims which the statute has barred. He is not at liberty to misapply assets which the law awards to the creditors and next of kin.” 1 According to this case partial payment made by one of several repre- -Sentatives before the statute of limitations has set its bar, saves the obliga- tion up to the time of such payment. * This view is also held in America (Braxton v. Wood, 4 Gratt. 25; Rush -v. Fales, 1 Phil. 463). LIMITATIONS. 159 As to Debts already Barred. or implied recognition of the very debt sought to be revived, in order to remove the bar (Burke v. Jones, 2 V. & B. 275; O'Connor v. Haslam, 5 H. of Lds. Cases, 170; Cf. Williamson v. Naylor, 3 Y. & C. 208; Phillips ». Phillips, 3 Hare, 281). The distinction is predicated upon the doctrine that tthe devise is subjected to a charge in equity, but, this principle is inapplicable to a bequest of personalty, the executor taking that on a general trust. The personalty 4s a fund appropriated by law to the payment of debts. The courts of the following States adopting in their entire integrity or approximately, the views of the English Courts, are: Arkansas (Harris v. King, 16 Ark. 122). Kentucky—The Court of Kentucky holds the English wiew as to personal estate (Campbell v. Sullivan, Hard. 17). Maine (Pettingill v. Pettingill, 60 Me. 411). New Jersey—In this State, it is held that when the di- rection is to the executor, the realty is not thereby charged (Shreve v. Shreve, 17 N. J. Hq. 487). New York—In this State, the English authorities are followed, except that no effect is given to the devise of realty for payment of debts (Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 John. ‘Ch. 290; Souzer v. DeMeyer, 2 Paige Ch. 577; Martin V Gage, 9 N. Y. 398; Murray v. Mechanics’ ‘Bank, 4 Edw. 567; Cf. Rogers v. Rogers, 3 Wend. 503; Gridley w. Gridley, 24 N. Y¥. 130; Buckley v. Buckley, 11 Barb. 48). ‘North Carolina (Walker v. Campbell, 1 Hawks, 304; Hines v. Spruill, 2 D. & B. Eq. 93; Cf. Mitchener v. Atkinson, 63 N. C. 585; Ex Parte Crocker, ib. 652; Little v. Hagar, 67 ib. 135, 139). Pennsylvania (Smith v. Porter, 1 Binn. 209; Cresman «. Castor, 2 Brown, 123; Alexander v. M’Murray, 8 Watts, 303; Man «. Warner, 4 Whart. 477; Rush v. 160 LIMITATIONS. Mortgage Debt Barred: Effect on Foreclosure. Fales, 1 Phil. 463; Agnew v. Fetterman, 4 Pa. 56; Cadbury v. Duvall, 10 ib. 257; Baldy v. Brady, 15 ib. 103). Virginia (Chandler v. Hill, 2 H. & M. 124; Lewis v. Bacon, 3 ib. 106; Brown v. Griffith, 6 ib. 450). The following courts hold that such directions do. not, whether as to realty or personalty, have the effect to take the debts out of the operation of the statute: Alabama (Carrington v. Manning, 13 Ala. 611). Kentucky—In this State, it is held that a direction to. pay a certain debt barred, but not to pay interest, only amounts to a new promise to pay the principal (McDon- ald v. Underhill, 10 Bush. 584). Maryland (Cornish v. Wilson, 6 Gill, 223, 315; Cf. Peter- son v. Hllicott, 9 Md. 52). Massachusetts (Hall v. Bumstead, 20 Pick, 2; Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 62; Martin v. Mayo, 10 ib. 137; Jackson v. Mayo, 11 ib. 147). Ohio (Fuller v. McEwen, 17 Ohio, (N. S.) 288). The following court holds that a direction in a will to. pay debts removes the bar: Tennessee (Rogers v. Southern, 4 Baxt. 67). This was decided upon an acknowledgment contained in a schedule prepared at the time of the making of the: will. This discrepancy on the point discussed is not glar- ing, but, it was deemed not inuseful to array the author- ities. Mortgages.—A very important question often arises when the debt secured by a mortgage is barred by the lapse of time. : In such case is the mortgagee, proprio vigore, pre- cluded from the right to foreclose? The following courts maintain the affirmative of this. proposition: California (McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365 8. C. 70: Am. Dec. 655; Lord v. Morris, 18 ib. 482; McCarthy v.. LIMITATIONS. 161 Foreclosure Barred. 7 White, 21 ib. 495 S. C..82 Am. Dec. 754; Heinlin v. Castro, 22 Cal. 100; Coster v. Brown, 23 éb. 142; Cun- ningham v. Hawkins, 24 ib. 403 S.C. 85 Am. Dec. 73; Miller v. Farley, 24 Cal. 498; Low v. Allen, 26 ib. 141; Wood v. Goodfellow, 43 ib. 185; Cf. Grant v. Burr, 54 ib. 298). Ilinois (Harris v. Mills, 28 Ill. 44 8. C. 81 Am. Dee. 259; Pollock v. Maison, 41 Ill. 516; Gibson v. Rees, 50 ib. 405; Brown v. Devine, 61 ib. 260; Medley v. Elliott, 62 ib. 534; Hagan v. Parsons, 67: ib. 171; Locke v. Cald- well, 91 ib. 419; Emory v. Keighen, 94 ib. 543). Iowa—Falls under this classification, but, it is observ- able that the question is now governed by statute, which was doubtless enacted to incorporate into the written law the essence of the decisions (Crow v. Vance, 4 Iowa, 434; Sangster v. Love, 11 ib. 500; Burton v. Hintrager, 18 ib. 348; Newman v. DeLorimer, 19 ib. 244; Gower v. Winchester, 33 ib. 303; Mahon v. Cooley, 36 ib. 479; Clinton Co. v. Coxe, 39 or 37 ib. 570; Brown v. Rock- hold, 49 ib. 282). Kansas (Chick v. Willetts, 2 Kan. 384; City of Fort Scott v. Schulenberg, 22 ib. 648; Cf. Schmucker »v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104 S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 765; Hubbard v. Ins. Co., 25 Kan. 172). Nebraska (Kyger v. Riley, 2 Neb. 20; Hurley v. Estes, 6 ib. 386; Peters v. Dunnells, 5 ib. 460; but see, Chaney v. Cooper, 14 ib. 415; Hurley v. Cox, 9 ib. 230), Texas (Duty v. Graham, 12 Tex. 427 8. C. 62 Am. Dec. 534; Perkins v. Sterne, 23 Tex. 561 S. ©. 76 Am. Dec. 72; Ross v. Mitchell, 28 Tex. 150; Eborn v. Canyon, 32 ib. 231; Flanagan v. Cushman, 48 ib. 241; Blackwell »v. Barnett, 52 ib. 332; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143 8. ©. 3 Woods, 344, reversed on appeal). The negative is held by the following courts—in some instances, only by analogy, which will be noted: 11 162 LIMITATIONS. , Foreclosure not Barred. England (Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. & Ad. 413 (22 E. ©. L. R.); Spears v. Hartley, 3 Esp. 81). Supreme Court U. Ss. (Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756); Analogy—Vendor’s lien for unpaid purchase money. District of Columbia (Sparks v. Pico, 1 Mc. & Me. 497). Circuit Court U. S. (Buckner v. Street, 15 Fed. Rep. 365; Almy v. Wilbur, 2 Wood & M. 404). Alabama—Analogy (Chapman v. Lee, 4 Ala. 485; Biz- zell v. Nix, 60 ib. 281 S. C. 31 Am. Rep. 38). These were the cases of a vendor’s lien for unpaid purchase- money; Cf. (Duval v. McLoskey, 1 Ala. 746; Scott v. Ware, 64 ib. 174; Ware v. Curry, 67 ib. 284). Arkansas (Hall v. Denkla, 28 Ark. 507; Birnie v. Main, 29 ib. 591; Cf. Coleleugh v. Johnson, 34 ib. 312). Connecticut (Baldwin v. Norton, 2 Conn. 163; Belknap v. Gleason, 11 ib. 160; Jarvis v. Woodruff, 22 ib. 548; Haskell v. Bailey, 1b. 569; Hough v. Bailey, 32 ib. 288). Florida (Browne v. Browne, 17 Fla. 607 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 96). Georgia (Elkins v. Edwards, 8 Ga. 325). Kentucky (Kellar v. Sinton, 14 B. Mon. 307). Michigan (Michigan &c. Co. v. Brown, 11 Mich. 265). Maine (Joy v. Adams, 26 Me. 330; Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me. 195). Maryland (Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland, 282; Moreton v. Harrison, ib. 499; Ohio &c. Co. v. Winn, 4 Md. Ch. 253; Magruder v. Peter, 11 Gill & J. 217). Massachusetts (Thayer v. Mann, 19 Pick. 536; Ipswich &c. Co. v. Story, 5 Met. 310; Eastman v. Foster, 8 ib. 19; Crain v. Paine, 4 Cush. 483 8. C. 50 Am. Dee. 807). Minnesota (Ozman v. Reynolds, 11 Minn. 473; Lash ». McCormick, 17 7b. 409). Mississippi (Miller v. Helm, 2 8S. & M. 697; Miller »v. Trustees, 5 ib. 651; Trotter v. Erwin, 27 Miss. 772: Nevitt v. Bacon, 32 4b. 212 S$. C. 66 Am. Dee. 609; Wilkinson v. Flowers, 37 Miss. 579 S. ©. 75 Am. Dec. LIMITATIONS. 163 Same. 78; Green v. Gaston, 56 Miss. 751; Bush v. Cooper, 26 ib. 599 S. C. 59 Am. Dec. 270). Missouri (Chouteau v. Burlando, 20 Mo. 482; Wood v. Augustine, 61 ib. 50; Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 81 ib. 331). New Hampshire (Lansing Bank v. Ladd, 4U N. H. 463). Nevada (Read v. Edwards, 2 Nev. 262; Mackie v. Lan- sing, ib. 302; Cookes v. Culbertson, 9 ib. 199; but see, Henry v. Confidence &c. Co., 1 ib. 619). New Jersey (State v. Watts, 44 N. J. L. 126; 45 ib. 184 S. C. 14 Rep. 467). The very point was not decided, but the principle that the mortgage might be enforeed, not- withstanding that the note which it was given to secure was barred, is emphatically announced and authorities cited. New York (Heyer v. Pruyn, 7 Paige Ch. 465 S. C. 34 Am. Dec. 355; New York &c. Co. v. Covert, 29 Barb. 441; Pratt v. Huggins, ib. 277; Waltermeyer v. West- over, 14 N. Y. 20; Bost v. Borey, 15 ib. 505; Gillette v. Smith, 18 Hun. 12; Jones v. Merchants’ Bank, 4 Rob. > 227). North Carolina (Capehart v. Dettrick, 91 N. OC. 344; Long v. Miller, 93 ib. 227). Ohio (Gary v. May, 16 Ohio, 66; Fisher v. Morsman, 11 ib. (N. S.) 42; Longworth v. Taylor, 2 Cin. Supt. Ct. 39). Oregon (Myer v. Beal, 5 Or. 130). Rhode Island (Ballou v. Taylor, 14 R. I. 277). Tennessee (Harris v. Vaughn, 2 Tenn. Ch. 483; Cf. Fisher v. Fisher, 9 Baxt. 71). Vermont (Sparhawk v. Buell, 9 Vt. 74; Richmond v. Aiken, 25 ib. 324). Virginia (Smith v. Washington City &c. Co., 33 Gratt. 617 S. ©. 15 W. J. 228; Coles v. Withers, 33 Gratt. 186; Cf. Hanna v. Wilson, 3 Gratt. 242). West Virginia (Pitzer v. Burns, 7 W. Va. 77; Wayt v. Carwithen, 21 ib. 516). Wisconsin (Cleveland v. Harrison, 15 Wis. 670; Wis- - 164 LIMITATIONS. Trustees and Quasi Trustees. well v. Baxter, 20 ib. 680; Whipple v. Barnes, 21 ib. 327; Knox v. Galligan, ib. 470; Kennedy v. Knight, 7b. 340; Potter v. Stransky, 48 ib. 235; Hayes v. Fry, 50 ib. 503). Many of the cases cited may be reconciled by refer- ring to the course of decision, as to the character of the statutory prescription, whether treated as statutes of re-- pose or presumption. The solution of this vexed ques- tion, however, on principle, is dependent upon the true- character of a mortgage. In those courts which hold that the mortgage passes the legal title, it would seem that the negative of our proposition would logically fol- low; whereas, when the mortgage is regarded only as a. security—an incident—then it must follow as a legal corrolary, that if the debt becomes non-recoverable, the accessory must fall under the maxim of accessorium non ducit sed sequitur suum principale. Trustees and Quasi Trustees.—If a cause of action becomes. barred as against a trustee, (including executors and the: like), is the cestui- que trust likewise barred? The affir- mative of this proposition is held by a vast preponder- ance of the cases (Allen v. Sayer, 2 Vern. 368; Llewellin v. Mackworth, 3 Eq. C. Abr. 579; 15 Vin. Abr. 125; 2 Atk. 40; Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 607; Cholmon--: dely v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & W.1; Wych v. East India Co., 3 P. Wms. 309; Pentland v. Stokes, 2 Ball & B. 75; Medlicott v. O’Donel, 1 ib. 156; Crowther v. Crowther, 23 Beav. 305; Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Kay & J. 79; Elmen- dorf v. Taylor, 10 Wh. 152; Bryan v. Weems, 29 Ala. 423 S. C. 65 Am. Dec. 407; Fleming v. Gilmer, 35 Ala. 625. Pendergast v. Foley, 8 Ga. 1; Worthy v. Johnson, 10 id. 358 8. OC. 54 Am. Dec. 393; Mason v. Mason, 33 Ga. 435. 8. C. 83 Am. Dee. 172; Fieamoein: Kenney, 2 A. K. Marsh, 145 8. C. 12 Am. Tac, 367; Edwards v. Woolfolk, 17 B. Mon. 381; Coleman ». Walker, 3 Met. 65S. C. 77 Am.. Dec. 163; Barclay »v. Goodloe, Ky. not rep.; Crook wv. LIMITATIONS. 165 No one to Sue or be Sued. - Glen, 30 Md. 55; Redmond v. Collins, 4 Dev. 441 8. C. 27 Am. Dec. 208; Leigh v. Smith, 3.Ired. Eq. 182 8S. C. 42, Am. Dec. 182; Herndon v. Pratt, 6 Jon. Eq. 327; Wellburn v. Finley, 7 Jon. 228; Smilie v. Biffle, 2 Pa. 152 S. ©. 44 Am. Dec. 156; Hinson v. Kinard, 3 Strob. Hq. 341; Pledger v. Hsterling, 4 Rich. 101; Long v. Cason, 4 Rich. Eq. 60; Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head. 67; Parker v. Hall, ib. 646; Ferguson v. Kennedy, Peck, 321 S. C. 14 Am. Dec. 761; Bayliss v. Eleen, 1 Cold. 99; Wilkins v. Sprecht, 7 ib. 585; Herron v. Marshall, 5 Hump. 543 S. C. 42 Am. Dec. 444; Williams v. Otey, 8 Hump. 563 8. C. 47 Am. Dee. 632; Wooldridge v. Plant- ers’ Bank, 1 Sneed, (‘Tenn.) 297). The following courts maintain fully, or in a modified form, the negative: California (Crosby v. Dowd, 61 Cal. 557 S. C.10 P. ©. L. J. 299). Mississippi (Bacon v. Gray, 23 Miss. 140; Pittman v. McClellan, 55 ib. 229; Fearn v. Shirley, 31 ib. 301). Ohio (Hurlbut v. Wade, 40 Ohio, (N. S.) 603). Texas (Lacy v. Williams, 8 Tex. 182). The number of decisions on this point is equivalent to the weight. This is apparent, when we consider that the cestui que trust could always use the name of his trustee to bring suit. In some courts, a distinction has been attempted to be drawn between those cases where the remedy was concurrent and where exclusive in equity. The Court of North Carolina has, by its decis- ions, cut the gordian knot by holding that the cestut que trust may bring ejectment in his own name (Murray v. Blackledge, 71 N. C. 492). No one to sue or be sued.—If a cause of action has ac- crued and thereafter the party to whom or from whom it accrued dies‘or becomes non sui juris, is the operation of the statute suspended? The negative of this query iis held by a moral unanimity upon the axiomatic princi- 166 LIMITATIONS. Statute does not Operate, ple, that when once the statute is set in motion no subsequent change of legal status will arrest its force. Only a few leading cases will be cited to this effect: Supreme Court U. Ss. (Hagman v. Kelly, 3 Cr. 825; Wal- den v. Gratz, 1 Wh. 296; Hogan v. Kurtz, 94 U, S. 778). * Girouit Court U. S. (Meeks v. Vassault, 3 Sawy. 206). Alabama (Johnson v. Wren, 3 Stew. 84; Pipkin v. Hewlett, 17 Ala. 291; Daniel v. Day, 51 Ala. 431). Arkansas (Brown v. Merrick, 16 Ark. 612; Bozeman v.. Browning, 31 ib. 364). California (Tyman v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634; Cf. Crosby v. Dowd, 61 ib. 557). Illinois (Baker v. Brown, 18 Ill. 91). Kentucky (Baker v. Baker, 13 B. Mon. 406; Hull v Dealty, 7 Bush, 687). Maryland (Ruff v. Bull, 7 H. & J. 148. C. 16 Am. Dec. 290). Mississippi (Byrd v. Byrd, 28 Miss. 144; Abbott v. McElroy, 10 8. & M. 100). Missouri (McDonald v. Walton,! 1 Mo. 726 8. ©. 14 Am. Dec. 318; McKenzie v. Hill, 51 Mo. 103). New Jersey (Dakay v. Darrah, 14 N. J. L. 288). New York (Peck v. Randall, 1 John. 165; Wenman v.. Mohawk &c. Co., 13 Wend. 267 8. C. 28 Am. Dec. 464; Sanford v. Sanford, 62 N. Y. 553; Mead »v. Jenkins, 95- ib. 31). North Carolina (Andrews v. Mulford, 1 Hay. 311; Anon. tb. 416; Pearce v. House, N. ©. T. R. 305). South Carolina (Nicks v. Martindale, Harp. L. 135 S. C. 18 Am. Dec. 647; Adamson v. Smith, 2 Mill, 269 S. C. 12 Am. Dec. 665; McCollough v. Speed, 3 McO. 455; Bugg v. Summer, 1 MeM. 333; Fayson v. Prather, 1 N. & McC. 296 8. C.9 Am. Dec. 691; Bolt v. Dawkins, 16 S. C. 198). 1 The syllabus is misleading. MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 167 Debts. Vermont (Conant v. Hitt, 12 Vt. 285; Hopgood v. South- gate, 21 ib. 584). Virginia (Fitzhugh v. Anderson, 2 H. & M. 289, 306 8. C. 3 Am. Dee. 625). England (Smith v. Hill, 1 Wils. 34; Doe v. Jones, 4 T. R. 300; Rhodes v. Smethurst, 4 M. & W. 4208. C. 6 M. & W. 351; Freake v. Cranefeldt, 3 My. & Cr. 455; Penny v. Brice, 18 C. B. (N. 8.) 393 (114 E. C. L. B.)). The affirmative is held substantially by the following courts: Connecticut (Hobart v. Connecticut &c. Co., 15 Conn. 145). Georgia (Scott v. Atwell, 63 Ga. 764). Kansas (Nelson v. Herkel, 30 Kan. 456; but see Green v. Goble, 7 ib. 297). Pennsylvania (Marsteller v. Marsteller, 93 Pa. 350). “MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Debts—In what way can a married woman, who has separate estate, contract? According to the doctrine as finally settled in the English Courts, it must be shown, in order to charge her, that she professed to act quoad hoc as a feme sole (Kelly’s Contracts, M. W. 250; Mrs. Matthewson’s Case, L. BR. (8 Eq.) 71; Shattock v. Shat- tock, L. R. (2 Eq.) 182; Picard v. Hine, L. R. (5 Ch. App.) 274; Jobnson v. Gallagher, 3 DeG. F. & J. 494; 7 Jur. (N. 8. 273). There is a great contrariety in the American decis- ions, and they do not admit of more than an approxi- mate classification. The author found himself con- fronted with divers alignments of the American Courts in Story, Pomeroy, Bishop and Keuiy. Upon even a cursory review of the authorities, he found each of these classification in a number of instances, materially inaccurate and misleading. He has therefore taken the 168 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. English View. pains to array the courts under what, he trusts, is, at least, a more intelligible alignment than any heretofore attempted. It is not pretended to be entirely unassail- able, as statutes, commonly termed “Married Women Laws,” have crept in and the decisions have, in the same courts, varied in consequence thereof; some hold- ing that these statutory provisions did not change the nature and quality of the separate estate or its incidents, whilst others have held otherwise, and the course of decisions, since the introduction of these enactments, has involved, in some instances, an apparent departure from previous decisions, based upon the equitable doc- trine alone. The local practitioner, where such is the case, can easily distinguish. But it was deemed per- tinent for the benefit of the profession, in those juris- dictions, where a statute had not intervened, to give the result of the adverse decisions, as a help to the formation of a principle as res integra. The author is not insensible to the difficulties which surround his path, as eloquently described by Mr. BisHop, in the foot note.1 The following courts seem to follow the English cases: District of Columbia (Smith v. Thompson, 2 McA. 291 8. C. 29 Am. Rep. 621; Ritch v. Hyatt, 3 McA. 554; but see Solomon v. Garland, 2 Mack, 113). Alabama (Puryear v. Puryear, 16 Ala. 486; Bradford v. Greenway, 17 ib. 797 8. C. 52 Am. Dec. 203; Collins v. Rudolph, 19 Ala. 616; Collins v. Lavenberg, ib. 682; 1Since the confusion of tongues, at the Tower of Babel, there has been nothing more noteworthy, in the same line, than the discordant and ever- shifting utterances of the judicial mind on the subject of the present sub- title. True, there has been sometimes a language which, though limited in its sphere, was tolerably plain; but, no sooner was the language in the way of becoming understood, than, lo! some conquering power of another sort came in, and all was confusion once more. Let us see, however, if we cannot draw out from the mass of discordant sound, something which shall call to mind the heaven which ought to be, resting over the hell which is. MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 169 = Same. Hooper v. Smith, 23 ib. 643; Jenkins v. McCounico, 26 4b. 213; Baker v. Gregory, 28 ib. 544 8. C. 65 Am. Dee. 366; Oxley v. Ikleheimer, 26 Ala. 332; Caldwell v. Saw- yer, 30 ib. 283; Rogers v. Boyd, 33 ib. 181; Paulk v. Wolfe, 34 ib. 541; Gunter v. Williams, 40 ib. 561; Nunn ». Givhan, 45 ib. 375; Wilkeson v. Cheatham, ib. 341; Cowles v. Pollard, 51 ib. 445; Warfield v. Ravesies, 38 ib. 521; Short v. Battle, 52 ib. 456; McMillan v. Peacock, 57 4b. 127; Helmetag v. Frank, 61 ib. 67; Shulman v. Fitz- patrick, 62 Ala. 571; Kelly v. Turner, 74 ib. 513). Connecticut (Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146; Platt v. Hawkins, 43 Conn. 143; Wells v. Thorman, 37 Coun. 318; Taylor v. Shelton, 30 Conn. 122; Buckingham v. Moss, 40 Conn. 461; Hitchcock v. Kiely, 41 ib. 611; Donovan’s Appeal, ib. 551; Williams v. King, 43 1b. 569). Florida (Smith v. Paythress, 2 Fla. 92; Caulk v. Fox, 13 Fla. 148; Alston v. Rowles, ib. 117; Abernathy v. Aber- nathy, 8 ib. 243; Sanderson v. Jones, 6 ib. 430; Maiben ». Bebo, ib. 381; Lewis v. Yale, 4 ib. 418; Harwood v. Root, 20 ib. 940; Mattair v. Card, 18 ib. 761; Thrasher v. Geiger, ib. 809; Staley v. Hamilton, 19 1b. 275); not as to mechanic’s lien (O’Neil v. Percival, 20 ib. 937 8. C. 51 Am. Rep. 634). Georgia (Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Wylly v. Collins, 9 Ga. 223; Weeks v. Sego, 9 Ga. 199; Dallas v. Heard, 32 Ga. 604; Roberts v. West, 15 ib. 123; Morrison v. Solomon, 52 4b. 206; Huff v. Wright, 39 Ga. 41; Sea- brook v. Brady, 47 ib. 650; Van Arsdale v. Joiner, 44 ib. 41; Cf. Saulisbury v. Weaver, 59 ib. 354; King v. ‘Thompson, ib. 380). Indiana—Before statute (Reese v. Cochran, 10 Ind. 195; Cox v. Wood, 20 Ind. 54; Abdil v. Abdil, 26 Ind. 287). ‘Since the statute the English doctrine has been entirely repudiated (Kantrowitz v. Prather, 31 Ind. 92; Hash- eagan v. Specker, 36 ib. 413; Hodson v. Davis, 43 id. 170 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Same. 258; Shannon v. Bartholomew, 53 Ind. 54; American &c. Co. v. Avery, 60 ib. 566; Richards v. O’Brien, 64 ib.. 418; Vail v. Meyer, 71 ib. 159). Iowa (Greenough v. Wigginton, 2 Greene, 435; Pattom v. Kinsman, 17 Iowa, 428). But the cases of Case v.. Semple, 13 ib. 596, and Finn v. Rose, ib. 565, would. seem to align this Court under our third division. Kansas (Knaggs v. Maston, 9 Kan. 532; Wicks ».. Mitchell, 9 Kan. 80; Deering v. Boyle, 8 Kan. 525 S. C. 12 Am. Rep. 480. Miner v. Pearson, 16 ib. 27). Missouri (Whitesides v. Cannon, 23 Mo. 457; Segond v. Garland, ib. 547; Coates v. Robinson, 10 ib. 757; Scha- froth v. Amos, 46 Mo. 114; Claflin v. Van Wagoner, 32. tb. 252; Miller v. Brown, 47 ib. 504 8. C. 4 Am. Rep. 345; Kimm v. Weippert, 46 ib. 532 S. C. 2 Am. Rep. 541; Lincoln v. Rowe, 51 Mo. 571; Siemers v. Kleeburg, 56. tb. 196; Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 62 ib. 338; Gage. v. Gates, 62 Mo. 417; Whiteley v. Stewart, 63 ib. 363; Morrison v. Thistle, 67 ib. 596; Seifert v. Jones, 84 ib. 591; Davis v. Smith, 75 ib. 219; Boatman’s &c. Bank v.. Collins, ib. 280; Gay v. Ihm, 69 ib. 584; Hooton v. Ransom, 6 Mo. App. 19). Virginia (West v. West, 3 Rand. 373; Vizonneau v.. Pegram, 2 Leigh, 183; Williamson v. Beckham, 8 ib. 203. Leigh v. Bank of U.S. 9 ib. 200; Whiting v. Rust, 1 Gratt. 483; Ellis v. Baker, 1 Rand. 47; Woodson »v. Per-- kins, 5 Gratt. 345; Nixon v. Rose, 12 ib. 425; Penn », Whitehead, 17 ib. 503; Muller v. Bailey, 21 ib. 528; Darnall v. Smith, 26 ib. 878; McChesney v. Brown, 25 ib. 393; Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 ib. 377; Burnett v. Hawpe, 25 ib. 481; Bain v. Buff, 76 Vay 371; Harshbur-- ger v. Alger, 31 Gratt. 52), West Virginia (Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Vir. 572; Pat-. ton v. Merchants’ Bank, 12 ib. 587; Weinberg v. Rempe, 15 ib. 829). There must be a consideration (Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Vir. 571 8. ©. 43 Am. Rep. 790). But a MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 171 Power to Contract must be Conferred. general creditor can only subject the rents and profits. (Howe v. Stortz, 27 W. Vir. 555; Hughes v. Hamilton,. 19 ib. 366; Dages v. Lee, 20 ib. 584). The following courts do not follow the English decis-- ions, but hold that the wife has no power to contract . debts, except such as may be conferred, in express. terms, or by necessary implication, contained in the in-- strument creating the estate: Mississippi (Viser v. Scruggs, 49 Miss. 409; Shacklett v.. Polk, 51 1b. 378; Armstrong v. Stoval, 26 ib. 275; Pollen v. James, 45 ib. 129; Whitworth v. Carter, 43 ib. 615. Dunbar v. Meyer, ib. 679; Robertson v. Bruner, 24 ib. 242; Witcher v. Wilson, 47 ib. 663; Davis v. Wilkerson, 48 ib. 585; Dotey v. Mitchell, 9 8S. & M. 435; Montgom-- ery v. Bank, 10 ib. 567; Dickson v. Miller, 11 ib. 594 S. C. 49 Am. Dec. 71). The wife must “distinctly design” that the debt shall constitute a charge upon her sepa- rate estate (Dickson v. Miller, supra; Wright v. Dalton,, 56 Miss. 1; Porter v. Haley, 66 ib. 56 S. C. 30 Am. Rep. 502). North Carolina (Harris v. Harris, 7 Ired. Eq. 111; Fraz-. ier v. Brownlow, 3 ib. 237; Newlin v. Freeman, 4 ib. 312; Draper v. Jordan, 5 Jones Eq. 175; Rogers v. Hinton, Phil. Eq. 101; Felton v. Reid, 7 Jones, 269; Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. ©. 442; Atkinson v. Richardson, 74 %b.. 458; Withers v. Sparrow, 66 ib. 129). Pennsylvania (Vandyke v. Wells, 103 Pa. 49; Miller w.. Glenworth, ib. 84; Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle, 231 8. C. 18 Am. Dec. 625; Lynn v. Crouse, 1 Pa. 111; Rogers. v. Smith, 4 Pa. 93; Wright v. Brown, 44 ib. 224; Dar- rance v. Scott, 3 Whart. 309 S. C. 31 Am. Dec. 509;. Wells v. McCall, 14 P. F. Smith, 207; Thomas v. Fol- well, 2 Whart. 11 S. ©. 30 Am. Dec. 230; Wagner’s. Estate, 2 Ash. 448; Pa. &c. Co. v. Foster, 11 Cas. 134; Chrisman v. Wagner, 9 Pa. 473; Wallace v. Coston, 9 Watts, 137; Maurer’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 380; McMullen v. 172 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Or Debt made with reference to the Estate. Beatty, 6 Smith, 389; Sharpeless v. Westchester, 1 Grant, 257; Curry v. Bott, 3 Smith, 408; Johnson v. Fritz, 8 Wright, 449; Gamble’s Estate, 1 Parsons, 489; Lippencott v. Hopkins, 7 Smith, 328; Moore v. Cornell, 18 ib. 320; Murray v. Keyes, 11 Casey, 384; Hough ». Jones, ib. 432; Petit v. Fritz, 9 ib. 118; Brunner’s Ap- peal, 47 Pa. 67; Weiman v. Anderson, 42 ib. 311; Hinny v. Philips, 50 ib. 382; Mahon v. Gormly, 12 Harris, 80; Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Grant, 468; Cummings v. Miller, 3 ib. 146; Steinman v. Ewing, 43 Pa. 63; Hartman »v. Ogborn, 54 ib. 120; Remfelt v. Clemens, 46 ib. 455; Parke v. Kleeber, 37 Pa. 251; Keeney v. Good, 21 ib. 349; Walker v. Coover, 65 ib. 430). But she is bound for the purchase-money of the corpus (Shnyder v. Nobles, 94 Pa. 286). South Carolina (Ewing v. Smith, 3 Des. 417 S: C. 5 Am. " Dec. 557; Magood v. Johnston, 1 Hill, 228; Robinson v. Dart, Dud. Eq. 128; Clark v. McKenna, Cheves Eq. 163; Reid v. Lamar, 1 Strob. 127; Carter v. Eveleigh, 4 Des. 19 S. C. 6 Am. Dec. 596; James v. Mayrant, 4 Des. 591; Montgomery v. Eveleigh, 1 McC. Ch. 267; Adams v. Makey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75). Tennessee—There must be an express charge (Morgan v. Elam, 4 Yerg. 375; Wave v. Sharp, 1 Swan, 489; Marshall v. Stevens, 8 Hump. 159 S. C. 47 Am. Dee. 601; Litton v. Baldwin, 8 Hump. 209 S. C. 47 Am. Dec. 605; Cherrey v. Clements, 10 Hump. 555; Hoyle v. Smith, 1 Head. 91; Shaklett v. Polk, 4 Heisk. 115; Hughes ». Peters, 1 Cold. 70; Kirby ». Miller! 4 ib. 4; Young v. Young, 7 ib. 471; Chatterton v. Young, 2 Tenn. Ch. 7 70; Menees v. Johnson, 12 Lea, 561; Owens v. Johnson, 8 Baxt. 265). The following courts hold that the wife cannot charge her separate estate, unless the instrument professes to confer the power, or the debt is made with reference to ’ ' This case has been overruled on one point (Parker ». Parker, 4 Lea, 392.) MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 173: Or for its Benefit. the estate, or for its benefit, or for the benefit of the wife. The particular holdings will be noticed as the courts are cited: Circuit Court U. s—It is assumed that the wife must intend to charge, and such intention is gathered, if the note is expressed to be “on the credit” of her separate estate (Orange N. Bank v. Traver, 7 Sawy. 2108S. C. 7 Fed. Rep. 150; or shown aliunde, March v. Clark, 14 Fed. Rep. 406; Hobart v. Johnson, 19 Blatehf. 359). Arkansas—The contract must be made with direct re- ference to the estate, or be for its benefit, or that of the wife (Oswalt v. Moore, 19 Ark. 257; Dobbin v. Hubbard, 17 ib. 189 S. C. 63 Am. Dec. 425; Buckner v. Davis, 29 ib. 444; Palmer v. Rankin, 30 ib. 771; Stillwell v. Adams, 29 ib. 346; Henry v. Blackburn, 32 ib. 450; Trieber v. Stover, 30 ib. 727; Petty v. Grisard, 45 ib. 117; Conner v. Abbott, 35 ib. 365). Illinois (Pomeroy v. Ins. Co. 40 Ill. 398; Carpenter »v. Mitchell, 50 ib. 470; Smidt v. Postel, 63 ib. 58; Furness v. McGovern, 78 ib. 338; Williams v. Hugunin, 69 ib. 214 8. C. 18 Am. Rep. 607; Swift v. Castle, 23 ib. 209; Conklin v. Doul, 67 ib. 355; Vurchars v. Dunbar, 82 ib. 453). Kentucky—The wife may deal with her separate estate as if sole, in the absence of any restraint in the instru- ment creating it, but the debts must be contracted upon the faith of the estate, and the execution of a note is deemed sufficient evidence of her intent to charge (Bell v. Kellar, 13 B. Mon. 381; Lillard v. Turner, 16 ib. 374; Burch v. Breckinridge, ib. 482 8. C. 63 Am. Dec. 553; Coleman v. Wooley, 10 B. Mon. 372; Jarman v. Wilker- son, 7 ib. 293; Sweeny v. Smith, 15 ib. 325; Long v. White, 5 J. J. Marsh, 226, Hounshell v. Clay &c. Co., 81 Ky. 304; Singer &ec. Co. v. Harned, 79 ib. 279). Maryland—The wife has absolute power to bind her 174 MARRIED WO MEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Implication from giving Note: Effect of living Apart. separate estate, unless restricted in the creating instru- ment; but it must appear affirmatively that her engage- ments were contracted with reference to her estate, and ‘intended to have been so charged (Farr v. Williams, 4 Md. Ch. 68; Miller v. Williams, 5 ib. 219; Cooke v. Husbands, 11 ib. 492; Koontz v. Nabb, 16 ib. 549; Hall v. Hiecleston, 37 ib. 510; Wilson v. Jones, 46 ib. 349). Massachusetts—The feme may charge her separate ‘estate with debts, if expressly charged upon the estate, or if expressly contracted on its credit, or where the ‘consideration goes to the benefit of such estate, or to enhance its value. But her note raises an implication, in the absence of a different understanding, that her ‘separate estate is to be charged with its payment (Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray, 328 S. ©. 77 Am. Dee. 366; Rogers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 387 S. 0. 85 Am. Dec. 710; Tracy v. Keith, 11 Allen, 214; Robinson v. Trofitter, 109 Mass. 479; Heburn v. Warner, 112 ib. 277; Wilder »v. Ritchie, 117 ib. 382; Allen v. Fuller, 118 ib. 402; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 127 ib. 561). Nebraska (Webb v. Hazleton, 4 Neb. 808; Davis v. First -&e. Bank, 5 ib. 242 8. O. 25 Am. Rep. 484; Barnum v. Young, 10 Neb. 309). New Jersey—The wife has absolute power as stated with regard to Maryland. The debt must be contracted ‘for the benefit of the estate or herself, and on the faith and credit of the estate. If living apart, the intention ‘to charge is presumed and imputed to her. Accommo- dation paper cannot constitute such a charge; nor can a contract of suretyship, except in consideration of a benefit to herself or her estate (Leaycratt v. Hedden, 4 N. J. E. 512; Johnson v. Cummins, 16 ib. 97 8. 0. 84 Am. Dec. 142; Armstrong v. Ross, 20 ib. 109; Peake v. LaBaw, 21 ib. 269; Perkins v. Elliott, 23 ib. 526; Pentz v. Simonson, 13 ib. 232; Oakley v. Pound, 14 ib. 178; Wil- ‘Son v. Herbert, 41 N. J. L. 454 8. C. 32 Am. Rep. 243). { MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 175 Yale v. Dederer Vindicated. New York—The wife is held, as to her separate estate, sub modo a feme sole. She may dispose of it even with- out the consent of her trustee, unless restrained by the creating instrument; that a particular mode of disposi- tion therein specified is not exclusive, but that, in order to charge her estate, she must indicate such intention to do so, and the charge must be for the benefit of the estate, or herself, the wife being at liberty, however, by express words, to charge it otherwise (Jaques v. Metho- dist E. Church, 17 Johns. 548 S. C. 8 Am. Dec. 447; overruling Methodist E. Church v. Jaques, 3 Johns. ‘Ch. 78; Dyett v. North &c. Co. 20 Wend. 570 S. C. 32 Am. Dec. 598; Powell v. Murray 2 Edw. Ch. 636 8S. C. 10 Barb. 597; Wadhams v. Society, 2 Kern. 415; Albany Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 Comst. 9; Oruger v. Cruger, 5 Barb. ‘227; Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526; Vanderheyden w. Mallory, 1 N. Y. 452; Strong v. Skinner, 4 Barb. 546; Guild v. Peck, 11 Paige, 475; Whiteall v. Clark, 2 Edw. 149; North &c. Co. v. Dyett, 7 Paige, 9; Gardner v. Gardner, ib. 112; Cummings & P.-v. Williamson, 1 Sandf. 17; Dickerman v. Abraham, 21 Barb. 551; Coon v. Brook, ib. 546; Curtis v. Engel, 2 Sandf. 287; Knowles v. MeComley, 10 Paige, 343; Calvin v. Currier, 22 Barb. 871; Goodall v. McAdams, 74 How. Pr. 385; Yale v. Dederer? 18 N. Y. 265 S. C. 72 Am. Dec. 503; 78 Am. Dee. 216; 68 N. Y. 329; White v. McNutt, 33 N. Y. 371; Owen v. Cawley, 36 ib. 600 S. C. 42 Barb. 105; Ballin v. Dillaye, 37 N. Y. 35; Fowler v. Seaman, 40 1b. 592; ‘Corn Ex. Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 ib. 613; 9 Abb. Pr. (N 1The intent to charge, must, in general, be expressed in the note, but ‘may be implied where the consideration enures to the benefit of the wife, or her estate. _ The case of Yale ». Dederer, though often criticized, and said by a learned author to be overruled (Wells M. W. sec. 452), is probably the most accurate statement of the doctrine, generally prevalent in the United States, when read with reference to the character of the note upon which it was founded, it having been signed by the wife, as surety for her hus- band. t 176 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Concurrence of Trustee. S.) 176; Frecklin v. Rolland, 33 N. Y. Sup’r Ct. 499; Ledelling v. Powers, 39 Barb. 555; Ledlie v. Vrooman, 41 Barb. 109; White v. Story, 43 ib. 124; Bank v. Scott, 59 ib. 641; Hansee v. Dewitt, 63 ib. 53; Bogart v. Gullick 65 ib. 323; 45 How. Pr. 385; Noyes v. Blakeman, 2 Seld. 567; 3 Sanf. 531; Rogers v. Ludlow, 3 Sandf. 104; L’Amoreaux v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Barb. Ch. 34; Maxon v. Scott, 55 N. Y. 247; Weir v. Groat, 4 Hun. 193; Bank v. Miller, 63 N. Y. 639; Rohrback v. Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 47; Manhattan B. & M. Co. v. Thompson, 58 N. Y. 80; Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 N. Y. 217; Loomis v. Ruck, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. 8.) 385; Deck v. Johnson, 1 Abb. Ap. Dec. 497; Shorter v. Nelson, 4 Lans. 114; Manchester v. Sahler, 47 Barb. 155; Isham v. Schafer, 60 ib. 317; Barnet v. Lichtenstein, 39 ib. 194; Kelty v. Long, 4 N. ¥. Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 163 8. C. 1 Hun. 714; Johnson v. Peugnet, 17 Hun. 540; Baker v. Harder, 4 ib. 272; Eisenlord v. Snyder, 71 N. Y. 45; Gosman v. Cruger, 69 ib. 87 8. C. 25 Am. Rep. 141; Taddiken v. Cantrell, 69 N. Y. 597 8S. C. 25 Am. Rep. 253; MeVey v. Cantrell, 70 N. Y. 295 S. ©. 26 Am. Rep. 605; Cashman v. Henry, 75 N. ¥. 103 8. C. 31 Am. Rep. 437; Tiemyer v. Turnquist, 85 N. Y. 516 8. C. 89 Am. Rep. 674; Ainsley v. Mead, 3. Lans. 116; Corning v. Lewis, 54 Barb. 51; 36 How. Pr. 425; Smith v. Allen, 1 Lans. 101; Sexton v. Fleet, 1 Hilt, 477; Draper v. Stuvenel, 35 Barb. 507; Ogden ». Blydenburgh, 2 Hilt. 182; Porter v. Mount, 41 Barb. 561; Barton v. Beer, 35 ib. 78; Adams v. Honness, 62 id. 326; Leavett v. Peel, 25 N. Y. 474; Gibson »v. Walker, 20 ib. 476). North Carolina—The wife may charge her separate es- tate with debts, (if so permitted by the terms of the creating instrument), but it must be with the express understanding that they are to be paid out of it, and with the concurrence of her trustee. This doctrine was. MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 177 Ohio: R. I. and Vermont Doctrine. settled by the leading case of Draper v. Jordan, 5 Jones Eq. 175, correcting the generality of view as enunciated in Harris v. Harris, 7 Ired. Eq. 111 S. ©. 53 Am. Dee. 393, and has been ever since followed (Harris v. Harris, 7 Ired. Eq. 111; Frazier v. Brownlow, 3 ib. 237; Newlin wv. Freeman, 4 ib. 312; Felton v. Reid, 7 Jones, 269; Rogers v. Hinton, Phillips Eq. 101; Withers v. Sparrow, 66 N. C. 129; Harris v. Jenkins, 72 ib. 183; Hardy v. Holly, 84 ib. 661; Cf. Pippen v. Wesson, 74 ib. 442; Atkinson v. Richardson, ib. 458; Webb v. Gay, ib. 447; Kemp v. Kemp, 85 ib. 491; Burns v. McGregor, 90 ib. 222, Arrington v. Bell, 94 ib. 247). The properties and incidents of separate estate, arising under the constitu- tion of 1868, are entirely assimilated to the old separate use trust (Long v. Barnes, 87 ib. 329). Ohio—The wife may charge her separate estate with debts contracted for its benefit, or her own, or on the credit of the estate, and the intent to charge may be express or implied (Machir v. Burroughs, 14 Ohio, (N. S.) 519; Phillips v. Graves, 20 ib. 371 8S. C. 5 Am. Rep. 675; Williams v. Urmston,! 35 Ohio, (N. S.) 296 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 611; Patrick v. Littell, 36 Ohio, (N.S.) 84 8. C. 38 Am. Rep. 552; Avery v. Vansickle, 35 Ohio, (N. S.) 276; Brewer v. Maurer, 38 ib. 543 8. C. 43 Am. Rep. 436; Cf. Rice v. R. R. Co., 32 Ohio, (N. 8.) 380 8S. C. 30 Am. Rep. 610, (overruled) ). Rhode Island—The feme, unless restricted in the cre- ating instrument, may charge her estate by declaring expressly in writing her intention, or, orally, if for her benefit or that of the estate (Metcalf v. Cook, 2 R. I. 355; Elliott v. Gower, 12 ib. 79 S. C. 34 Am. Rep. 600). Vermont—The feme, unless restricted by the creating instrument, may charge her separate estate with debts 1The previous cases of Levi v. Earle, 30 Ohio, (N. 8.) 147, and Rice v. Railroad Co., 32 7b. 380 S. C. 30 Am. Rep. 610, are overruled by this case. It is quite remarkable that such excellent lawyers as PomERoy and KELLY, should cite both of the overruled cases as part of the law of Ohio. 12 178 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Wis.: Cal.. La.: Mich.: Minn.: N. H.; Texas—Doctrine. contracted in its management and for its benefit, or for her benefit, on the credit of the estate (Patridge v. Stocker, 36 Vt. 108 S. C. 84 Am. Dec. 664; Frary v. Booth, 37 Vt. 78; Dale v. Robinson, 51 ib. 208. C. 31 Am. Rep. 669; Priest v. Cone, 51 Vt. 495 8. C. 31 Am. Rep. 695; Rood v. Willie, 58 Vt. 474; Hubbard v. Bughee, 55 ib. 506 8. C. 45 Am. Rep. 637; Sargent v. French, 54 Vt. 384). Wisconsin—The feme may charge her separate estate with debts, when necessary or convenient, for its proper use and enjoyment, and upon its faith and credit (Todd v. Lee,.15 Wis. 365 8. C. 16 ib. 480; Leonard v. Rogan, 20 Wis. 540; Mahler v. Wise, 23 ib. 300; Meyers v. Rahte, 46 ib. 658; Dayton v. Walsh, 46 ib. 113 8S. C. 32 Am. Rep. 757; Krouskop v. Shontz, 51 Wis. 204 S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 817; Cramer v. Hanaford, 53 Wis. 85). The following decisions are rendered under statutes: California (Miller v. Newton, 23 Cal. 554; Maclay v. Love, 25 ib. 367 S. C. 85 Am. Dec. 133; Terry v. Ham- monds, 47 Cal. 35, which seems to go with N. Y.; Racouillat v. Sansevain, 32 Cal. 385; Cf. Lewis v. Johns, 24 Cal. 98 S. C. 85 Am. Dee. 49). Louisiana (Barbet v. Roth, 16 La. Ann. 271; Fortier v. N. O. &e. Bank, 112 U.S. 439). Michigan (Powers v. Russell, 26 Mich. 176; Rankin v. West, 25 ib. 195; DeVries v. Conklin, 22 ib. 255; Den- ison v. Gibson, 24 ib. 187). Minnesota (Pond v. Carpenter, 12 Minn. 430). New Hampshire (Hutchins v. Colby, 43 N. H. 159; Nims v. Bigelow, 45 ib. 343; Vogt v. Ticknor, 48 ib. 242; Batchelder v. Sargent, 47 ib. 262; Blake v. Hall, 57 ib. 373; Muzzey v. Reardon, ib. 378). Texas (Hollis v. Francois, 5 Tex. 195 S. ©. 51 Am. Dec. 760; Milburn v. Walker, 11 Tex. 329; Slaughter v. Glenn, 98 U. 8. 242). By a comparison and close reading of the decisions there seems to exist’a general correspondence of views, 1 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 179 4 Rationale. ‘in requiring an intention to charge, and great unanimity in implying such intention, when the consideration enures to the benefit of the wife personally, or for the benefit or enhancement of her estate, but the main contention arises on engagements of the feme, not so made, but from which neither she nor her estate does or can derive advantage ex. gr., when signed as surety for another. The line of cases classified as following the English doctrine hold that she is presumed when she signs a note, juris et de jure, to mean that it shall take effect, and as she cannot bind herself personally, it must mean with reference to her estate; else, the giving such a note, would be a fraud, or at least, the transaction would be nugatory. This. view is technical by holding the feme as fully sui juris quoad her separate estate; whereas, the Courts of our third class hold that she is only such sub modo, and that to allow her to bind her separate estate for the debts of others. would amount to @ virtual surrender of the separate use trust itself. The whole scheme is a creature of Equity, and there seems as much plausibility in this view, as in that allowing a fetter upon anticipation. Of course these remarks are not applicable to instances, where the creating instru- ment, in terms, confers the power. It will also be per- ceived that the courts differ on the point as to whether, even when a personal benefit is derived, the intention to charge, is inferrible from the giving of a note, as in ALABAMA, ARKANSAS, Iowa, KENTUCKY, MARYLAND, Mississippi, Missouri and OHI0; or must be proved aliunde, as in CALIFORNIA, CONNECTICUT, ILLINOIS and New YORE. It is proper to add that the foregoing observations have been addressed to the law, as judicially declared with reference to the separate use trust, and it may be as well here to warn the practitioner that in many of the 180 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Conveyances: Alabama Rule. States, constitutional or legislative changes have been made, of a more or less radical character, resulting, in many instances, in the overturning of the ante-dating decisions. But, in those jurisdictions, where the questions. discussed are res integra, the character of judicial views. was deemed valuable as an aid in giving direction to the attorney in the preparation of his brief, and, perhaps, to the court in forming its opinion. Married Women.—Conveyances. England—It has been finally settled in England, after some vacillation, that the wife may convey her separate estate as if she were a feme sole (Stead v. Nelson, 2 Beav. 245; Wainwright v. Hardisty, ib. 363; Crosby v. Church, 3 ib. 485; Baggett v. Meux, 1 Coll. 138; 1 Phil. 627; Taylor v. Meads, 4 DeG. J. & S. 597; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 166; 34 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 203; 12 L. T. (N. S.) 6; 13 W. R. 394; full extract in Bish. on M. W. sec. 853). In the United States there is a great diversity of judicial views: Alabama—The feme has full power to alien or encum- ber, unless restrained by the creating instrament (Brad- ford v. Greenway, 17 Ala. 797, 805; Jenkins v. McConico, 26 ib. 213; Oxley v. Ikilheimer, ib. 332; Glenn v. Glenn, 47 ib. 204; Denechand v. Berrey, 48 ib. 591; Short v. Bat- tle, 52 ib. 456; Robinson v. O'Neal, 56 ib. 541; McMillan v. Peacock, 57 ib. 127; Blakeslee v. Mobile &c. Co., ib.. 205; Sprague v. Shields, 61 ib. 428; Miller v. Voss, 62 ib.. 122). Arkansas—Adopts the Alabama rule (Collins v. Was- sell, 34 Ark. 17). California—Adopts/Alabama rule (Miller v. Newton, 23. Cal. 554). Connecticut—Adopts Alabama rule (Imlay v. Hunting- ton, 20 Conn. 146), Delaware—Adopts Alabama rule (Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61). MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 181 Alabama Rule followed: Aliter. Plorida—Adopts Alabama rule (Maiben v. Bebo, 6 Fla. 381; Lewis v. Yale, 4 ib. 418). Georgia—Adopts Alabama rule (Wylly v. Collins, 9 Ga. 223; Fear v. Books, 12 ib. 195, 200; Robert v. West, 15 4b. 122; Dallas v. Heerd, 32 ib. 604). Ilinois—Adopts Alabama rule (Swift v. Castle, 23 Ill. 209; Pomeroy v. Manhattan &c. Co., 40 ib. 398; Conklin ». Doul, 67 tb. 355). Kentucky—Adopts Alabama rule (Lillard v. Turner, 16 B. Mon. 374). Maryland—Adopts Alabama rule (Cooke v. Husbands, 11 Md. 492; Buchanan v. Turner, 26 ib. 1). Minnesota—Adopts Alabama rule (Pond v. Carpenter, 12 Minn. 430). New Jersey—Adopts Alabama rule (Leaycraft v. Hed- den, 4 N. J. Eq. 512). The following maintain the doctrine of the jus dispo- mendi of the wife as if she were sole: District of Columbia (Smith v. Thompson, 2 McA. 291 S. ©. 29 Am. Rep. 621; but see, Kaiser v. Stickney, 3 McA. 418). Kansas (Deering v. Boyle, 8 Kan. 525 S. C. 12 Am. ‘Rep. 480; Wicks v. Mitchell, 9 Kan. 80).1 Missouri (Coats v. Robinson, 10 Mo. 757; Whitesides v. Cannon, 23 ib. 457; Segond v. Garland, ib. 547; Scha- froft v. Amos, 46 ib. 114; Kimm v. Weippert, ib. 532 S. C. 2 Am. Rep. 541; Miller » Brown, 47 Mo. 504 S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 345; Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 53 Mo. 444; 62 ib. 338). New York (Jaques v. Methodist &c. Church, 17 John. 648 §. C. 8 Am. Dec. 447; Demorest v. Wynkoop, 3 John. Ch. 129 8. C. 8 Am. Dec. 467; Martin v. Dwelly, 6 Wend. 9 S. C. 21 Am. Dec. 245; Ew. L. C. 298; Dyett v. 1These were cases of contracts, but the language employed in reference thereto, would necessarily imply a recognition of a feme covert guoad her separate estate as a feme sole. 182 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Conferred in Creating Instrument. North &c. Co., 20 Wend. 570 S. C. 32 Am. Dee. 5985, Albany &¢. Co. v. Bay,! 4 N. Y. 9; Wadham v. Am. Home So. 12 ib. 415) Texas (Callahan v. Patterson, 4 Tex. 61 S. 0. 51 Am. Dec. 712; Womack v. Womack, 8 Tex. 397 8. C. 58 Am. Dec. 119; Hollis v. Francois, 5 Tex. 195 S. C. 51 Am. Dec. 760; Sampson v. Williamson, 6 Tex. 102; Shelby v. Burtis, 18 ib. 650; Jordan v. Peak, 38 ib. 429; Rhodes v.. Gibbs, 39 ib. 432; Magee v. White, 23 ib. 187; Clayton v.. Frazier, 33 ib. 91; Dalton v. Rust, 22 ib. 133; Wright v.. Hays, 10 Tex. 130; Slaughter v. Glenn, 98 U. S. 242). The following courts deny such power, unless con- ferred in the creating instrument: Mississippi (Doty v. Mitchell, 9 S. & M. 435; James v. Fisk, ib. 144; Montgomery v. Agricultural Bank 10 4b. 566, 576; Sessions v, Bacon, 23 Miss. 272; Armstrong v. Stovall, 26 ib. 275; Russ v. Wingate, 30 ib. 440; Stone v. Montgomery, 35 ib. 83; Dibrell v. Carlisle, 48 ib. 691; Musson v. Trigg, 51 ib. 172). New Hampshire (Cutter v. Butler, 25 N. H. 343). North Carolina (Newlin v. Freeman, 4 Ired. Eq. 312; Harris v. Harris, 7 ib. 111; Hardy v. Holly, 84 N. C. 661). Ohio (Machir v. Burroughs, 14 Ohio, (N. 8.) 519; Phil- lips v. Graves, 20 ib. 371 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 675; Williams. v. Urmston, 35 ib. 296 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 611; Patrick v. Littell, 36 Ohio, (N. 8.) 84 S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 5525. Rice v. R. R. Co.,2 32 Ohio, (N. 8.) 380 8. C. 30 Am. Rep. 610; Avery v. Vansickle, 35 Ohio, (N. 8.) 276; Brewer v. Maurer, 38 ib. 543 8. C. 43 Am. Rep. 436). Pennsylvania (Thomas v. Folwell, 2 Whart. 11 S. C. 30 Am. Dec. 230; Dorrance v. Scott, 3 Whart. 309 S. C. 31 Am. Dee. 509; Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle, 231 S. C. 18. 1 As the author understands the New York doctrine, the wife, guwoad her separate estate, is treated as a feme sole, unless some particular mode of appointment is pointed out in the creating instrument. If that be the case, she is restricted to that particular form of appointment. 20n this point is in accord with Williams ». Urmston. MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 188 R. I. View Discussed. Am. Dec. 625; Stahl v. Crouse, 1 Pa. 111; Rogers v. Smith, 4 ib. 93; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Foster, 35 ib. 134; Wright v. Brown, 44 tb. 224; Shonk v. Brown, 61 ib. 320; McMullen v. Beatty, 56 ib. 389; Jones’ Appeal, 57 ib. 369; Wells v. McCall, 64 ib. 207; Hepburn’s Ap- peal, 65 ib. 468; Maurer’s Appeal, 86 ib. 380; Buchanan v. Hazzard, 95 ib. 240; Innis v. Templeton, ib. 262 S. C. 40 Am. Rep. 643). Rhode Island—May be so classified (Metcalf v. Cook, 2 R. I. 355; Elliott v. Gower, 12 ib. 79 8S. C. 34 Am. Rep- 600). This last case has sometimes been treated as qualifying the former, but it is in perfect accord. It ‘simply decides that a married woman may charge her separate estate with a debt, when the consideration enures either to the benefit of herself, or her estate. If she can charge, why not convey? South Carolina (Ewing Uv Smith, 3 Dess. 417 8. C.5 Am. Dec. 557; Reid v. Lamar, 1 Strob. Hq. 27, 37; Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 ib. 232 S. C. 49 Am. Dec. 667; Robinson v. Dart, Dud. Eq. 128 8S. C. 31 Am. Dec. 569; Magwood v. Johnston, 1 Hill Ch. 228; Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75; Porcher v. Daniel, 12 Rich. Eq. 349; Oliver v. Grimball, 14 S. C. 556). Tennessee (Marshall v. Stephens, 8 Hump. 159 S. C. 47 Am. Dec. 601; Litton v. Baldwin, 8 Hump. 209 8. ©. 47 Am. Dec. 605; Deadrich v. Armour, 10 Hump. 596; Ware v. Sharp, 1 Swan, 489; Cherrey v. Clement, 10 Humph. 555; Hoyle v. Smith, 1 Head, 91; Hughes v. Peters, 1 Cold. 1; Kirby v. Miller,! 4 ib. 3; Young v. Young, 7 ib. 461; Reynolds v. Brandon, 3 Heisk, 593; Head v. Temple, 4 ib. 34; Gray v. Robb, ib. 74; Shacklett v. Polk, ib. 115; Laird v. Scott, 5 ib. 350; Brown v. Foote, ‘2 Tenn. Ch. 255; Cheatham v. Huff, ib. 616; Chatterton v. Young, ib. 770; Hix v. Gosling, 1 Lea, 560; Robinson v. Wilburn, ib. 633). 1This case has been overruled as to one point (Parker v. Parker, 4 Lea, 392). 184 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Same Formality as other Realty. Virginia (West v. West, 3 Rand. 373; Vizonneau v. Pegram, 2 Leigh, 183; Woodson v. Perkins, 5 Gratt. 346; Nixon v. Rose, 12 ib. 425; Penn v. Whitehead, 17 ib. 503; Burnett v. Hawpe, 25 ib. 481; McChesney v. Brown, ib. 393; Justis v. English, 30 ib. 565; Bank v. Chambers, ib. 202; Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 ib. 377). West Virginia (McClintic v. Ochiltree, 4 W. Va. 249; Patton v. Merchants’ Bank, 12 ib. 587; Radford v. Car- wile, 13 ib. 572; Coatney v. Hopkins, 14 ib. 338; Wein- berg v. Rempe, 15 ib. 829). The following courts hold that the separate estate must be conveyed with the same formality as her other realty. Alabama (Beene v. Randall, 23 Ala. 514; Warfield v. Ravesies, 38 ib. 523; Parker v. Wimberly, 78 ib. 64; Holt v. Agnew, 67 ib. 360; Linam v. Reeves, 68 ib. 89; Cf. Ellett v. Wade, 47 ib. 464; Warren v. Wagner, 75 ib. 188 S. C. 51 Am. Rep. 446). Arkansas (Conner Vv. Abbott, 35 Ark. 365). Maryland (Hollingsworth v. McDonald, 2 H. & J. 230 S. C. 3 Am. Dee. 545; (modified, and the power extended by Statute,) R. S. (1878); Art. 51, sec. 20). Mississippi (James v. Fisk, 9 S. & M. 1448. ©. 47 Am. Dec. 111; but as to personalty, see Levy v. Darden, 38 Miss. 64; Jones v. Porter, 59 Miss. 628). Ohio!—So aligned because the court has held the wife to be almost a feme sole with regard to charging debts upon her separate estate. See authorities collected under previous sub-division DEBTS. Pennsylvania (Dorrance v. Scott, 3 Whart. 309 S. ©. 31 Am. Dec. 509; Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle, 231 S. C. 18 Am. Dee. 625; Buchanan v. Hazzard, 95 Pa. 240; Innis v. Templeton, ib. 262 8. C. 40 Am. Rep. 643). ' Although the cases referred to, turn upon the power to charge, the reasoning, by irresistible inference, would assume the right to convey. If the feme covert can bind her realty by a mere note, a fortiori can she con- vey. MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 185 Liability as Surety. Liability as Surety—A question, in this connection, of great practical importance, arises, as to whether a ‘married woman can bind her separate estate, as surety “merely. The following courts maintain the affirmative of this proposition: Circuit Court U. S. (Orange Bank v. Travor, 7 Sawy. C. ‘©. 210 8. C. 7 Fed. Rep. 146). Alabama (Collins v. Rudolph, 19 Ala. 616; Collins v. Lavenberg, 1b. 682; Bradford v. Greenway, 17 Ala. 797 S$. C. 52 Am. Dec. 203; Cowles v. Morgan, 34 Ala. 535; McKune v. Rowlett, 68 ib. 186; Paulk v. Wolfe, 34 ib. 541; Gunter v. Williams, 40 7b. 561; McMillan v. Pea- cock, 57 ib. 127; Hooper v. Smith, 23 ib. 643; Jenkins v. McConico, 26 ib. 213; Caldwell v. Sawyer, 30 ib, 283; Helmetag v. Frank, 61 ib. 67). Arkansas (Chollar v. Temple, 39 Ark. 238). California (Alexander v. Bouton, 55 Cal. 15; Goad ». Moulton, 67 ib. 536). Kansas (Deering v. Boyle, 8 Kan. 525 S. ©. 12 Am. Rep. 480; Wicks v. Mitchell, 9 Kan. 80). Kentucky (Johnson v. Comm. 2 Duv. 410; Bell v. Kel- lar, 13 B. Mon. 381; Singer &c. Co. v. Harned, 79 Ky. 279). Louisiana (Kellar v. Ruiz, 21 La. Ann. 283; Jaffa v Myers, 33 ib. 406; Lafayette Bank v. Bruff, ib. 624). Maine—Under statute (Mayo v. Hutchinson, 57 Me. 547; Bell v. Packard, 69 ib. 105 8. C. 31 Am. Rep. 251). Massachusetts'—Under Statute (Major v. Holmes, 124 “Mass. 108; Keaworthy v. Sawyer, 125 ib. 28; Goodnow v. Hill, ib. 588; Cf. Nourse v. Husband, 123 ib. 98). Missouri (Coates v. Robinson, 10 Mo. 757; Whitesides ». Cannon, 23 ib. 457; Segond v. Garland, ib. 547; Scha- 1 Before the statute, it was held that a married woman’s engagements, as “surety, should not be enforced against her separate estate, unless charged upon it by an express instrument (Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray, 328 8. C. ‘77 Am. Dec. 366). 186 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Her Liability Denied. froft v. Amos, 46 ib. 114; Kimm v. Weippert, ib. 582 S.. C. 2 Am. Rep. 541; Miller v. Brown, 47 Mo. 504 8S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 345; Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 62 Mo. 338; Morrison v. Thistle, 67 ib. 596). Ohio—Under Statute (Williams v. Urmston, 35 Obio,. (N. S.) 296 8. ©. 35 Am. Rep. 611; Hershizer v. Florence,. 39 Ohio, (N. 8.) 516). Pennsylvania (Dando’s Appeal, 94 Pa. 76). South Carolina! (Pelzer v. Campbell, 15 8. C. 5878. C.. 40 Am. Rep. 705; Clinkscales v. Hall, 15 S C. 604; Witte: v. Wolte, 16 ib. 256). Texas (Jordan v. Peake, 38 Tex. 429; Rhodes v. Gibbs,. 39 ib. 432). Virginia (Burnett v. Hawpe, 25 Gratt. 481; Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 ib. 377). The following Courts maintain the negative: Circuit Court U. s. (Semple v. British &c. Bank, 5 Sawy.. C. C. 394). Connecticut (National Bank v. Smith, 43 Conn. 327;. Smith v. Williams, ib. 409). Florida (Staley v. Hamilton, 19 Fla. 275). Georgia (Saulisbury v. Weaver, 59 Ga. 254; King v.. Thompson, ib. 380; Strauss v. Friend, 73 ib. 782; but see Perkins v. Rowland, 69 ib. 661; Howard v. Simpkins, 70: ib. 322, in which she is held bound to an endorsee for value without notice and before maturity). Illinois (Williams v. Hugunin, 69 Ill. 220; Burchard v. Dunbar, 82 ib. 453). Indiana (Kantrowitz v. Prather, 31 Ind. 98; Eherwine v. State, 76 ib. 266). Iowa (Davis v. Ritchie, 55 Lowa, 719). Kentucky (Bidwell v. Robinson, 79 Ky. 29). Michigan (Schlatterer v. Nickodemus, 51 Mich. 6263: 'It was found extremely difficult to align the South Carolina Court.. The decisions we cite are all previous to the amendment of 1882, and since. that they all go for naught (Aultman v. Rush, 2 8. E. Rep. 402). MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. 187 Power to Mortgage asserted. Reed v. Puys, 44 ib. 80; Russell v. People &c. Bank, 39: ib. 671 S. C. 33 Am. Reports, 444; De Vries v. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255; West v. Laraway, 28 ib. 464). Nebraska (State &c. Bank v. Scott, 10 Neb. 83). New Hampshire (Farmington Bank v. Buzzell, 60 N. H. 189; Penacook &c. Bank v. Sanborn, ib. 558). New Jersey (Corley v. Barcroft, 43 N. J. L. 363; Boake v. La Baw, 21 N. J. Hg. 269; ; Perkins v. Elliott, 23 ib. 526). New York (Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265 S. 0. 72 Am. Dec. 503; 22 N. Y. 4508. C. 78 Am. Dec. 216; Owen v. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 603; Frecking v. Rolland, 53 ib. 424; Deck v. Johnson, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 498; 2 Keyes, 3493. Corn Exchange v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613; 640; 9 Abb. Pr.. (N. S.) 194 S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 601). Tennessee (Frank v. Anderson, 13 Lea, 695). West Virginia (Carey v. Burrus, 20 W. Va. 571 8S. C. 43. Am. Rep. 790). Wisconsin (Leffingwell v. Freyer, 21 Wis. 394; Kava-- nagh v. O'Neill, 53 ib. 101). Mortgages, &c,—A question also arises, whether a wife- can mortgage, or, otherwise pledge, her separate estate,, to pay her husband’s or other person’s debt. The affirmative of this proposition is held by the- following courts: Circuit Court U. Ss. (Semple v. British &c. Bank, 5 Sawy. C. C. 394 8. C. 9 Rep. 9). Arkansas (Collins v. Wassell, 34 Ark. 17; Petty v. Gris-- ard, 45 ib. 117). | Connecticut (Whiting v. Stevens, 4 Conn. 44). Illinois (Moore v. Titman, 33 Ill. 358; Marston v. Brit-. tenham, 76 ib. 616). Iowa (Green v. Scrange, 19 Iowa, 461 S. C. 87 Am. Dec. 447; Low v. Anderson, 41 Iowa, 478). Maine (Mayo v. Hutchinson, 57 Me. 547; Eaton v. Nason, 47 ib. 132). 188 MARRIED WOMEN—SEPARATE ESTATE. Denied. Massachusetts (Ins. Co. v. Owen, 15 Gray, 491; Heburn v. Warner, 112 Mass. 271 S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 86). Nebraska (Stevenson v. Craig,! 12 Neb. 464). Nevada—Under Statute (Cartan v. David, 18 Nev. 310). New Hampshire—Before Statute (Thompson v. Ela, 58 N. H. 490). And it seems since (Babbit v. Morrison, 1b. 419). New Jersey (Baldwin v. Flagg, 36 N. J. Eq. 48). New York (Payne v. Burnham, 62 N. Y. 74). Ohio—Semble (Meily v. Butler, 26 Ohio, (N. 8S.) 536). Pennsylvania (Jamison v. Jamison, 8 Whart. 457 8. C. 31 Am. Dec. 536; Black v. Galway, 24 Pa. 19 8. C. 1 Phil. 494; Haffey v. Cary, 73 Pa. 432; Hagenbuch v. Phillips, 112 Pa. 284; Andrews’ Estate, 14 Phil. 240; Cf. Bayler v. Com., 40 Pa. 37 8. C. 80 Am. Dee. 551). Tennessee (McFerrin v. White, 6 Cold. 499). Texas (Sampson v. Williamson, 6 Tex. 102 S. C. 55 ‘Am. Dee. 762; Hollis v. Francois, 5 Tex. 195 8. C. 51 Am. Dec. 760; Shelby v. Burtis, 18 Tex. 650; Jordan v. Peake, 38 ib. 429; Rhodes v. Gibbs,? 39 ib. 432). Virginia (Siter v. McClanachan, 2 Gratt. 280; Finch v. Marks, 76 Va. 207; Christian v. Keen, 80 ib. 369). Wisconsin (Ragan v. Simpson, 27 Wis. 355). And in the negative by the following: Alabama—Since Statute (Bibb v. Pope, 43 Ala. 197; Stribling v. Bank, 48 ib. 451; Davidson »v. Lanier, 51 ib. 321; Nordliineton o. Faber, 52 ib. 45; Wilkinson v. Cheat- ‘In the earlier case of Kansas &c. Co. ». Gandy, 11 Neb. 448 S. C. 838 Am. Rep. 370, this court held that a mortgage given by a wife to secure the debt of her husband, on which she was not bound, and which was not due, and no extension of time given or other benefit accrued to her, could not be enforced, for want of consideration. It would seem that such an equitable view is equally applicable, by parity of reason, to a mortgage given to secure a note, on which she was surety for her husband. ° A strenuous effort was made in this case, to cause the prior ones to be overruled, and the reasoning, in Magee v. White, 23 Tex. 187, of Judge Bell, was relied upon, and pressed upon, the court, but the previous cases were sustained. OFFICE. 189 Office is Property. ham, 45 ib. 337; Cowles v. Marks, 47 ib. 612; Fry v. Hunter, 50 ib. 52; Riley v. Pierce, ib. 93). Before, she could (Short v. Battle, 52 ib. 456). Indiana (Brown’s Will, 103 Ind. 71; Cupp v. Campbell,, ib. 213). Louisiana (Horang v. Blane, 34 La. Ann. 632). Maryland (Greenholtz v. Haeffer, 53 Md. 184). Michigan (De Vries v. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255; Denison v. Gibson, 24 ib. 187, 199; Emery v. Lord, 26 ib. 431; West v. Laraway, 28 ib. 471). Mississippi (Viser v. Scruggs, 49 Miss. 705; Freeman v. Wilson, 51 ib. 785; Chandler v. Morgan, 60 ib. 471). South Carolina—The latest (Aultman v. Rush, 2 S. E. Rep. 402; the dissenting opinion of McGowan J. pre-. sents a very strong view). The foregoing classification is made without reference: to statutory provisions, and is deemed valuable as an aid in showing the drift of judicial thought with refer- ence to the mortgage of the separate use trust, anterior to legislation or constitutional changes. OFFICE. Property in.—It is held in North Carolina and Indiana, that a public office is property and constitutes a vested right (Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 1 S. C. 25 Am. Dec. 677; Cotton v. Ellis, 7 Jon. 545; King v. Hunter, 65 N. C. 603 8S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 754; Brown v. Turner, 70 ib. 93; Vann v. Pipkin, 77 ib. 408; City of Madison v. Korbly, 32 Ind. 74; City of Madison v. Kelso, 32 Ind. 79). But this doctrine has been denied with great unanim- ity, by nearly all of the other courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States. ‘ It is deemed sufficient to refer to the leading case of Conner v. New York, 2 Sanf. 355 8. C. on appeal, 5th New York, 285). 190 OFFICE. Is not: Abolition of: Effect of. It is settled by our highest tribunals that the grant and acceptance of an oflice does not constitute a con- tract (Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Fisher v. U.S., 15 Ct. of Cl. 323). Abolition of —Upon the question as to whether an offi- ‘cer may be legislated out of office and another substi- ‘tuted, there exists a discrepancy in the decisions. The affirmative of this proposition is held by the fol- lowing decisions: (Taft v. Adams, 3 Gray, 126; Chandler v. Lawrence, 128 Mass. 215; Beeman v. U.S., 19 Ct. of Cl. 5; Bryan v. Cattill, 15 Iowa, 538; People v. Vanvard, 27 ib. 470; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2S. C. (N. 8.) 81; State v. Davis, 44 Mo. 129; ‘Bryan v. Jumel, 32 La. Ann. 442; Evans v. Populus, 22 ib. 121; State v. Lamantia, 33 ib. 146; People v. Hunt, 41 Cal. 435; Re Bulyer, 45 ib. 553; Peo- ple v. Haskell, 5 ib. 357; Atto. Gen. v. Squires, 14 ib. 12; Standiford v. Wingate, 2 Duy. (Ky). 440; People v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y. 191; Evans v. Populus, 22 La. Ann. 121; Prince v. Skillin, 71 Me. 361 S. ©. 36 Am. Rep. -825; Hall v. State, 39 Wis. 79; Connor v. New York, supra; People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563, 576; State v. Dews, R. M. Charlton, (Ga). 397; Denver v. State, 10 Nev. 228; People v. Van Gasken, 5 Montana, 352; Au- gusta v. Sweeney, 44 Ga. 463; County Coms. v. Jones, 18 Minn. 199; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio, (N. 8.) 14 8. ©. -8 Am. Rep. 24). To the contrary are: (Com. v. Gamble, 62 Pa. 343 S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 422; People v. Dubois, 23 Ill. 547; Hoke v. Henderson, supra; State v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 412 8. C.7 Am. Rep. 84; State v. Douglas, ib. 428 8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 87; Collins 2. Tracy, 36 Tex. 456). But a distinction is taken as to the creation of an office. If created by the constitution and the term fixed thereby, it cannot be thus abolished (Com. v. Gam- OFFICE. 191 Right to Diminisb Salary Affirmed. ble, 62 Pa. 343 8. C. 1 Am. Rep. 422; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 552; People v. Raymond, 37 ib. 433; Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401; Rucker v. Supervisors, 7 W. Va. 661; State v. Stanley, 66 N. C. 59; People v. Dubois, supra; State v. Messanore, 14 Wis. 163; Com. v. Gamble, supra; Warner v. People, 2 Den. 272 S. C. 48 Am. Dec. 740; Faut v. Gibbs, 54 Miss. 396; Butler v. Pennsylva- nia, supra; Baker v. Plattsburg, 4 Pa. 49; Territory v. Pyle, 1 Oreg. 149; Bryan v. Cattill, swpra; Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103 8. C. 6 Am. Rep. 698; Dorman v. State, 34 ib. 216). Aliter if created by the legislature merely (Conner v. New York, supra; Com. v. Bacon, 6 S. and R. 322; Com. v. Mann, 5 W. & 8. 418; State v. Douglas, 26 Wis. 428; Robinson v. White, 26 Ark. 139; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2.8. C. (N. 8.) 81). Many of these decisions are predicated of a removal by the Governor or other appointing power, but the principle underlying all is the same. Some of them proceed upon a constitutional negation of such power, but the reasoning employed seemed to justify their class- ification as above. Diminishing Salary—Some Courts hold that from what- ever source derived, the salary of the office may be diminished (Butler v. Pennsylvania, supra; Haynes v. State, 3 Hump. 480 8S. C. 389 Am. Dec. 187; Com. v. Bacon, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 622; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2 S. C. (N. S.) 81; State v. Davis, 44 Mo. 129; Barker v. Pittsburg, 4 Barr, (Pa.) 51; People v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57 S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 302; Conner v. New York, 2 Sand. 355 8. 0.5 N. Y. 285; People v. French, 24 Hun. 263; Green v. Mayor, 8 Abb. Pr. 29; Phillips v. Mayor, 1 Hilt, 490; State v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 413; Farwell v. Rockland, 62 Me. 298; Taft v. Adams, 3 Gray, 126; Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 320; U. 8S. v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 146; Wilcox v. Rodman, 46 Mo. 322; Hall xv. State, 39 Wis. 79; Farwell ». Rockland, 62 Me. 296; Koontz v. Franklin Co., 76 Pa. 194; Ex parte Lambert, 52 Ala. 79; Beebe v. Robinson, 192 OFFICE. Denied: Distinction. ib. 66; Denver v. State, 10 Nev. 228; Cassell v. Unita, 2: Wy. 126; Black v. Merrill, 51 Ind. 32; Hyde v. State, 52 Miss. 65; Knappen v. Barry &c., 46 Mich. 122; S. P. People v. Mainstee &c., 40 ib. 585; Wyandotte v. Bren-. non, 46 ib. 478). Others not (Sleigh v. U.S. 9 Ct. of Cl. 369; Cotton v. Ellis, supra; King v. Hunter,! supra; Warner v. People, supra; State v. Kelsey, 44 N. J. L. 1; State v. Jumel, 30 La. Ann. 861; People v. French, 91 N. Y. 265; O’Leary v. Board of Education, 93 N. Y. 1 S. ©. 45 Am. Rep. 156; State v. Dews, R. M. Charlt, (Ga.) 397; State v. Hastings, 10 Wis. 525; Auditor v. Cochran, 9 Bush. (Ky.) 7; Purcell v. Parks, 82 Ill. 346; State v. Weston, 6. Neb. 16; Gross v. Kenfield, 57 Cal. 626; State v. Steele, 57 Tex. 200; State v. Cook, ib. 196; Kehn v. State, 93 N. Y¥. 291; Ricketts v. New York &c., 67 How. Pr. 320; Adams v. U. S. 20 Ct. of Cl. 115; Dyer v. U. S. ib. 166). A distinction must be taken between the power to: diminish the emoluments of an office, and that of abro- gating an agreement to pay for services rendered by one, although he might have been styled an officer. If the employment prescribed is not in legal effect. tanta- mount to an office, an attempt to lessen the stipulated compensation would contravene that provision of the national constitution which inhibits the impairment of the obligation of contracts (Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5; U.S. v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 393). And again, if, with regard to an office, there exists a constitutional provision prohibiting the diminution of the salary, an act of the legislature to that effect would be invalid (Com. v. Gamble, 62 Pa. 343 8. C. 1 Am. Rep. 422; Com. v. Maun, 5 W. & S. (Pa) 403; Rucker »v. Supervisors, 7 W. Va. 661). ‘The later case of State ex rel. Bunting ». Gales, 77 N.C. 283, decides substantially the affirmative, but the court claim a distinction between its. facts and those of the elder cases, and cite them with approval, OPTIONS. 193 Agreement to Sell in the Future. OPTIONS. Suppose that A having goods to sell, says to B “I will give you until 4 o’clock to take these goods at my price” which is then named. And suppose B goes to A at 4 o'clock with money sufficient to pay for the goods and tenders it, and A declines to sell. Can B maintain an action against A for breach of his agreement? The following Courts hold that the Emposee cannot maintain the action: England (Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653 S. C. Shirl. L. C. 8; Lang, 8. OC. 3; Routledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. (13 E. C. L. BR.) 653 8. C. Tang, 8. C. 6; Dickinson v. Dodds, L. R. (2 Ch. Div.) 463; Head v. Diggon, 3 M. & R. 97 S. O. Lang, S. C. 11). It is noticeable that Cooke v. Oxley is explained and interpreted in a late case (Stevenson v. McLean, L. R. (5 Q. B. Div.) 346). Alabama (Eskridge v. Glover, 5 Stew. & P. 264 8S. C. 26 Am. Dee. 344). Louisiana (Gravier v. Gravier, 15 Mart. 206). Missouri (Jones v. Durgin, 16 Mo. App. 370). New Hampshire (Beckwith v. Cheever, 1 Fost. 41). New York (Tucker v. Woods, 12 John. 190 8S. C. 7 Am. Dec. 305; Chicago &c. Co. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240). Ohio (Wallace v. Townsend, 43 Ohio, (N. 8S.) 537 8. C. 54 Am. Rep. 829). Tennessee (Gillespie v. Edmondston, 11 Hump. 553). Vermont (Faulkner v. Heberd, 26 Vt. 452). The following courts rejecting the doctrine of Cooke v. Oxley, hold that such action can be maintained: Indiana (Kentucky Se. Co. v. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96, 100). Massachusetts (Boston &c. Co. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 228 S. C. Lang, S. ©. 94; Law, L. C. 3). New Jersey (Hallock v. Com. Ins. Co., 26 N. J. L. 268; 27 N. J. L, 645; Potts v. Whitehead, 20 N. J. Eq. 55, 59). 13 194 ORIGINAL EVIDENCE—ENTRIES, Cooke ». Oxley doubtful Law. It is observable with reference to the case of Richard- son v. Hardwick, 106 U.S. 252 8. C. 5 Morr. Tr. 341, that it was a bill filed for specific performance—and Richard- son who held the option, had failed to pay the purchase money. Specific performance resting in the sound dis- cretion of the court, is often denied when an action at law might be maintained. In dismissing Richardson’s bill, therefore, it can hardly be claimed that this august tribunal intended to decide the point raised in Cooke v. Oxley. The case is not cited. The principle decided in Cooke v. Oxley, has been rejected by the following text-books (Bell, Cont. Sales, 35; 2 Kent, Com. 477, note d; 1 Duer on Ins., 118; Story on Sales, (2d Ed.) sec. 127; Met. on Cont., 19 et seq; 1 Whart. Cont. sec. 13); and sustained by the following (Benj. on Sales, secs. 64-66; Bish. on Cont., secs. 174, 180; Poll. Prin. Cont. 8; 1 Add. Cont. sec 20). ORIGINAL EVIDENCE—ENTRIES. We propose to present the discrepant decisions on the subject of entries, made in the course of business. In treating this subject we cite the authorities hold- ing that such entries are only admissible upon proof of the death of the declarant, and secondly, when other- wise admissible, noting the particular qualification. The following named courts hold that proof of death is an essential pre-requisite to its reception: England (Price v. Torrington, 1 Salk. 285 S. C. 1 Smith L. ©. (5th Am. Ed.) 139; Doe v. Turford, 3 B. & Ad. 898; Rawlings v. Rickards, 28 Beav. 370; Poole v. Dicas, 1 Bing. N. C. 649 (27 E. C. L. R.)). There are numerous other succeeding English cases, but the point is so fully settled there that it is deemed unnecessary to cite them. ORIGINAL EVIDENCE—ENTRIES. 195 Death of Declarant. Supreme Court U. S. (Nicholls Vv Webb, 8 Wh. 326; Bea- ver v. Taylor, 1 Wall, 637, 642). Circuit Court U.S. (Gale v. Norris, 2 McLean, 469; Beale v. Petit, 1 Wash. C. C. 241; Owen v. Adams, 1 Brock. 72; U. S. v. McComb, 5 Mcl. 286; U.S. v. White, 5 Cr. ©. C. 457; U. 8. v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. 440). Alabama (Moore v. Andrews, 5 Port. 107; Clemens v. Patton, 9 Port. 289; Everly v. Bradford, 4 Ala. 371; Batre v. Simpson, 4 Ala. 305, 312; Brown v. Steel, 14 Ala. 63; Stewart v. Connor, 9 Ala. 803; Grant v. Cole, 8 ab. 519; Gildersleeve v. Carroway, 10 Ala. 260). California (People v. Murphy, 45 Cal. 137). Connecticut (Livingston v. Tyler, 14 Conn. 494, 499; Free v. James, 27 ib. 77). Delaware (Bank v. Bradun, 1 Harr.14; Bank v. Cooper, 4b. 10). Florida (Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 302, 321). Georgia (Field v. Boynton, 33 Ga. 239; Riggins v. Brown, 12 ib. 271; Trammell v. Hemphill, 27 ib. 525). Indiana (Williamson v. Doe, 7 Black, 12, 18; Ephraims v. Murdock, ib. 10; Home v. Williams, 23 Ind. 37). Illinois (Marshall v. Adams, 11 Ill. 37; Point &c. Co. v. Keep, 22 ib. 9). Iowa (Rivereau v. St. Ament, 3 Greene, 118; Karr v. Stivers, 34 Iowa, 123). Kentucky (Bank v. Smith, 9 B. Mon. 609, 611; Thomp- son v. Blackwell, 17 B. Mon. 609). Maine (Inhabitants v. Inhabitants, 19 Me. 317; Omery ». Fowler, 39 ib. 326; Dow v. Sawyer, 29 tb. 118; Lime Bank v. Hewett, 52 ib. 531; Homes v. Smith, 16 ib. 181). Maryland (Clarke v. Magruder, 2 H. & J. 77; Blaked v. Cockey, 1 H. & M. 230; Black v. Woodrow, 39 Md. 194; Wetherall v. Cloggett, 28 ib. 465). Massachusetts (Welsh v. Barret, 15 Mass. 380; City v. Inhabitants, 5 Cush. 542; Porter v. Judson, 1 Gray, 175; Walker v. Curtis, 116 Mass. 98; Jones v. Howard, 3 196 ORIGINAL EVIDENCE—ENTRIES. Same. Allen, 223; Washington Bank v. Prescott, 20 Pick. 3393. Kennedy v. Doyle, 10 Allen, 161; Inhabitants v. Inhab- itants, 99 Mass. 40; Whitcher v. McLaughlin, 115 ib. 167). ga (Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415; Fisher v. Kyle, 27 ib. 454). Mississippi (Ogden v. Gledewell, 5 How. 179; Bodley v. Scarburrough, 6 Miss. 729; Mason v. Beazley, 27 ib. 106; Smith v. Steamboat Co., 1 How. 479; Duncan v. Watson, 10 Miss. 121). Nevada (Buckley v. Buckley, 12 Nev. 423). New Hampshire (Cass v. Bellows, 31 N. H. 501; Young v. Dearborn, 22 ib. 372; Wheeler v. Walker, 45 ib. 345). New Jersey (Sloan v. Summers, 20 N. J. L. 66). New York (Halliday v. Martinett, 20 John, 168; Hart v. Wilson, 2 Wend. 513; Butler v. Wright, ib. 369; Nichols v. Goldsmith, 7 ib. 160; Merrill v. Itheca &c. Co., 16 ib. 587; Brewster v. Doane, 2 Hill, 537; Sheldon v. Bentram, 4 ib. 129; Livingston v. Arnoux, 56 N. Y.. 518; Fisher v. Mayer, 67 ib. 73; Leland v. Cameron, 31 N. Y. 115; Clark v. Vorce, 15 Wend. 193; Huff v. Ben-- nett, 6 N. Y. 337; Martin v. Cope, 3 Abb. App. 1825. Warren v. Nichols, 6 Cow. 162; Moffat v. Moffat, 10 Bosw. 468; Halliday v. McDougall, 20 Wend. 81; Gaw-- try v. Doane, 51 N. Y. 90; Ocean &c. Bank v. Carll, 9 Hun. 239 8. C. 55 N. Y. 440). North Carolina (Kennedy v. Fairman, 1 Hay. 458; Alston v. Taylor, ib. 381; Peck v. Gilmer, 4 D. & B. 249; Bland v. Warren, 65 N. ©. 372; Bank v. Clarke, 1 Hawks, 36). Ohio (Summons v. State, 5 Ohio, (N. S.) 325). Pennsylvania (Philadelphia Bank v. Officer, 12S. & R. 49; Farmers’ Bank v. Whitehill, 16 ib. 89; Henry v. Ores, 4 Watts, 46; Nourse v. McCay, 2 Rawle, 70; Ridge-. way v. Bank, 128. & R. 256; Birmingham v. Anderson,,. 40 Pa. 506; McCormick »v, MecMurtrie, 4 Watts, 192;. RAILWAY LAW. 197 Common Carriers: Loss: Burden of Proof. Goddard v. Glolinger, 5 ib. 209; Russell v. Werntz, 24 Pa. 337; McCausland v. Fleming, 63 ib. 36; Meehan v. Williams, 48 ib. 238; Wolf v. Wyeth, 11 S. & R. 149; Rhine v. Robinson, 27 Pa. 30; Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Spearen, 47 ib. 300; Brown v. Coin. 73 ib. 321). South Carolina (Williamson v. Patterson, 2 McCord, 132; ‘Tunno v. Rogers, 1 Bay, 480). Tennessee (Calloway v. McMidan, 11 Heisk. 557). Texas (Thurmond v. Trammell, 28 Tex. 371). Vermont (State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366; Bacon v. Vaughn, 34 tb. 195; Lapham v. Kelly, 35 ib. 195; Williams v. Willard, 23 ib. 369). Virginia (Lewis v. Norton, 1 Wash. 76; Freeland v. Field, 6 Call. 12). In several cases of these courts, however, whilst hold- ing the general rule as to death, there are two exceptions made: one when the party who made the entry is out the jurisdiction, and one when he has become mentally’ insane (James v. Wharton, 3 McLean, 492; Hodge v. Higgs, 2 Cr. C. C. 552; Union Bank v. Knapp, 3 Pick. 36 S. C. 15 Am. Dec. 181; Holbrook v. Gay, 6 Cush. 216; Coolidge v. Brigham, 5 Met. 68; New Haven &c. ©o. v. Goodwin, 42 Conn. 230; Alton v. Berghaus, 8 Watts, 77; Sterrett v. Ball, 1 Binn. 234; Crouse v. ‘Miller, 10 S. & BR. 155; Elms v. Chevis, 2 McC. 349; North Bank v. Abbot, 13 Pick. 465 S. 0. 25 Am. Dee. 334). RAILWAY LAW. Common_Carriers.—Loss,—Burden of Proof—In an action brought to recover damages for the loss of goods, against a common carrier, is the plaintiff required to produce any more evidence than his bill of lading, shipping receipt or the like, and a demand and non- complience therewith? The affirmative of this propo- sition is held by the following courts: Illinois (Woodbury v. Frinke, 13 Ill. 279). The com- 198 RAILWAY LAW. Bill of Lading Sufficient. plaint alleged non-delivery, and the case went off on a question of pleading. This court on the merits, will be found classified in the negative. Maryland (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Shumacher, 29 Md. 168). Vermont (Day v. Ridley, 16 Vt. 48 S. C. 42 Am. Dec. 489). The following courts hold the negative: England (Colthurst v. Sweet, L. R. (1 CO. P.) 649). Supreme Court U. Ss. (Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181; Steamer Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. 7; Nelson v. Wood- ruff, 1 Black, 156; Lady Franklin, 8 Wall. 325). Circuit Court U.S. (Sutton v. Kettell, Sprague, 309; Bearse v. Roper, Sprague, 331; Emma Johnson, ib.. 527; Bazin v. Steamship Co., 3 Wall., Jr. 229; King v. Shepard, 3 Story, 356; Hunt v. Cleveland, 6 McLean, 76; Mary Washington, 1 Abb. U. 8. C. ©. 1; J. W. Brown, 1 Biss. 76; Wellington, ib. 279; Live Yankee, Deady, 420; Pharos, 9 Fed. Rep. 912). Alabama (Wayland v. Mosely, 5 Ala. 430 S. ©. 39 Am. Dec. 335; Montgomery &c. Co. v. Moore, 51 Ala. 394; South &c. Co. v. Henlein, 52 ib. 606 8. C. 23 Am. Rep. 578; Alabama &c. Co. v: Little, 71 Ala. 611; 12 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 37). California (Agnew v. Steamer Costa Rica, 27 Cal. 425). Connecticut (Relyea v. New Haven &c. Co., 42 Conn- 579; Peck v. Weekes, 34 ib. 152). Georgia (Van Winkle v. 8. CO. &c. Co., 38 Ga. 32). Iowa (McCoy v. Kansas &c. Co., 44 Iowa, 424; Winnie v. Illinois &e. Co., 31 ib. 533; Angle v. Miss. &. Co., 18 ib. 555; Denton v. Chicago &c. Co., 52 ib.. 161 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 263). Tilinois (Bissell v. Price, 16 Ill. 408; Great Western &e. Co. v. McDonald, 18 ib. 172; Illinois &c. Co. v. Cowles, 32 ib. 117; Porter v. Chicago &ec. Co., 20 ib. 407). Kentucky (Louisville &c. Co. v. Hedger, 9 Bush, 645 8. ©. 15 Aim. Rep. 740). RAILWAY LAW. 199 Same. Kansas (Kallman v. U.S. Ex. Co., 3 Kan. 205; Kansas &c. Co. v. Reynolds, 8 ib. 624). Louisiana (Chapman v. New Orleans &c. Co., 21 La. Ann. 224; Hunt v. Morris, 6 Mart. 676 8. C. 12 Am. Dec. 489; Humphreys v. Switzler, 11 La. Ann. 320). Maine (Little v. Boston &c. Co., 66 Me. 239; Tarbox v. Eastern &c. Co., 50 ib. 339). Massachusetts (Alden v. Pearson, 3 Gray, 342; Shaw v. Gardner, 12 ib. 488; Hastings v. Pepper, 11 Pick. 43; Lewis v. Smith, 107 Mass. 334; Shepherd v. Naylor, 5 Gray, 591; Sears v. Wigate, 3 Allen, 103). Minnesota (Shriver v. Sioux &c. Co., 24 Minn. 506 S. C. 31 Am. Rep. 353). Mississippi (Chicago &c. Co. v. Moss, 60 Miss. 1003 S. C. 45 Am. Rep. 428). Missouri (Reed v. St. Louis &c. Co., 60 Mo. 199; Lever- ing v. Union Se. Co., 42 ib. 88). New Hampshire (Shelden v. Robinson, 7 N. H. 157; Hall v. Cheney, 36 ib. 26). New York (Fenn v. Timpson, 4 E. D. Smith, 276; Colt v. MeMechan, 6 John, 160; Westcott v. Gargo, 6 Lan. 319; Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542 S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 300; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168; Curtis v. Delaware &c. Co., 74 N. Y. 124; Burnell v. N. Y. &c. Co., 45 ib. 185; Newstadt v. Adams, 5 Duer, 43; Beards- lee v. Richardson, 11 Wend. 25 S. C. 25 Am. Dee. 596; Steers v. Liverpool &c. Co., 57 N. Y.1; Fairfax v. N. Y. &c. Co., 73 N. Y. 167; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 70 N. Y. 410 S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 608). North Carolina (Black v. Wilmington, &c. Co., 92 N. C. 42 8. C. 53 Am. Rep. 450). Ohio (Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio, (N. 8.) 362 8. C. 62 Am. Dee. 285; Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio, (N. 8.) 141; Little Miami &c. Co. v. Dodds, 1 Cin. Sup. C. 47). Pennsylvania (Beckman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle, 179 S. C. 28 Am. Dec. 653; Brown v. Arnott, 6 W. & S. 422; 200 RAILWAY LAW. Carriers: Connecting Lines: Passengers. Whitesides v. Russell, 8 W. & S. 49; Camden &c. Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. 67 S. C. 55 Am. Dec. 481; Leonard v. Hendrickson, 18 Pa. 40 S. ©. 55 Am. Dec. 587; Patter- son v. Clyde, 67 Pa. 507; Verner v. Switzer, 32 7b. 213; Farnham v. Camden &c. Co. 55 ib. 61; Am. Ex. Co. v. Sands, 55 ib. 140). South Carolina (McCall v. Brock, 5 Strob. 119; Ewart v. Street, 2 Bail. 157 S. C. 23 Am. Dec. 131; Smyrl v. Niolen, 2 Bail. 421 S. C. 23 Am. Dec. 146; Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Rich. L. 286 8. C. 45 Am. Dec. 732; Cameron v. Rich, 4 Strob. 168 S. C. 53 Am. Dec. 670; Cameron », Rich, 5 Rich, 352 8. C. 57 Am. Dec. 747; Baker v. Brin- son, 9 Rich, 201 S. C. 67 Am. Dec. 548). Tennessee (Turney v. Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340 S. C. 27 Am. Dec. 515). Texas (Ryan v. R. R. Co., 65 Tex. 13 8. C. 57 Am. Rep. 589). Virginia (Murphy v. Staton, 3 Munf. 239). West Virginia (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Morehead, 5 W. Va. 293). Carriers—Connecting Lines—Passengers.— A. question arises when a passenger purchases what is known as a through ticket, over several connecting lines of railway, whether the selling carrier is to be held responsible for his safety over the whole line. The affirmative of this proposition is held by the following courts: England (Mytton v. Midland &c. Co., 4 H. & N. 614 S. C. 28 L. J. (Ex.) 385; Great Western &c. Co. v. Blake, 7 H. & N. 986 S. C. 8 Jur. (N. 8S.) 1013; 31 L. J. (Ex.) 346; Thomp. Car. Pas. 403; Buxton v. North Eastern &c. Co., L. R. (3 Q. B.) 549 8. C. 37 L. J. (Q. B.) 549; Kent v. Midland &c. Co., L. R. (Q. B.) 18. 0. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 18; 31 L. T. (N. S.) 430; 23 Weekly Rep. 25; Thomas v. Rhymney &c. Oo., L. R. (6 Q. B.) 366 S. C. Shirl, L. C. 270). District of Columbia (Croft v. Baltimore &c. Co., 1 McA. 492). RAILWAY LAW. 201 Through Tickets. Circuit Court U.S. (Keep v. Indianapolis &c. Co., 3 McCrary, ©. C. 208, 302). Georgia (Central &e. Co. v. Coombs, 70 Ga. 533 S. C. 18 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 298; 48 Am. Rep. 582; Wolff v. Central &c. Co., 68 Ga. 653 8. C. 45 Am. Rep. 501). Kansas (Atchison &c. Co. v. Roach, 35 Kan. 740 S. C. 57 Am. Rep. 199). New York (Weed v. Saratoga &c. Co., 19 Wend. 534; Hart v. Rensselaer &c. Co., 8 N. Y. 37 S. C. 59 don, Dec. 447; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306 8. ©. 72 Am. Dec. 469; Thomp. Car Pas. 423; Williams v. Van- derbilt, 28 N. Y. 217 8. ©. 84 Am. Dec. 333; Burnell v. N. Y. &e. Co., 45 N. Y. 184; Ward v. Vanderbilt, 4 Abb. App. Dee. 421). Tennessee! (Carter v. Peck, 4 Sneed, 202; Nashville &c. Co. v. Sprayberry, 8 Baxt. 341 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 705; 10. L. J. 541). . Virginia (Wilson v. Chesapeake &c. Co., 21 Gratt. 654). Wisconsin (Candee v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 21 Wis. 582 S. C. Thomp. Car. Pas. 419). The following in the negative: Alabama (Ellsworth v. Tart, 26 Ala. 733; Montgomery &e. Co. v. Culver, 75 ib. 578 8. C. 51 Am. Rep. 483). Connecticut (Hood v. N. Y. &c. Co., 22 Conn. 1; Elmore uv. Naugatuck &c. Co., 23 Conn. 457 S. ©. 63 Am. Dee. 143). Illinois (Chicago &c. Co. v. Fahee, 52 Ill. 81; Pennsyl- vania &c. Co. v. Connell,? 112 ib. 295 8.0.18 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. -339; 54 Am. Rep. 238). 1These cases, at first blush, appear to be irreconcilable, but on examina- tion of the facts, show that, whilst in both through tickets were purchased, in the Carter case, the ticket was not couponed as it was in the Sprayberry case—and it is inferrible from the opinion in the latter case, that that ‘circumstance guided the court to its decision. 2This court had previously held in Illinois &c. Co. ». Copeland, 24 Ill. 337 8. C. 76 Am. Dec. 749, that if a through ticket was sold by the first carrier of 2 connecting line, he would be liable for injuries sustained on a 202 RAILWAY LAW. Connecting Lines: Goods. Maine (Knight v. Portland, 56 Me. 235 S. C.8 Am. L.. Reg. (N. 8.) 654). Massachusetts (Hartan v. Eastern &c. Co., 114 Mass.. 44), Michigan (Brooke v. R. R. Co., 15 Mich. 332). Mississippi (Lowenberg v. Jones, 56 Miss. 688 S. C. 31 Am. Rep. 379). Missouri (Cf. Halliday v. Kansas &e. Co., 74 Mo. 159 S.. C. 41 Am. Rep. 309). Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania &e. Co. v. Schwarzenberger, 45 Pa. 208 8. ©. 84 Am. Dec. 490). South Carolina (Felder v. Columbia &c. Co., 21 8. ©. 35: S. 0. 53 Am. Rep. 656). Vermont (Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421 S. C. 70 Am. Dec. 424). Carriers.—Connecting Lines of Carriage.—T here are three distinct views taken by the courts as to the receiving: carrier’s liability for goods shipped to a point beyond its. own terminus. I. The first view taken is that such receipts to deliver,. (without any special restrictive agreement) obliges him. to deliver the goods at the point of destination: England (Muschamp v. Lancaster &c. Co., 8 M. & W.. 421; Watson v. Ambergate &c. Co., 3 E. L. & Eq. 4973, 11 Ex. 790; Collins v. Bristol &c. Co., 7 H. of L. Cas.. 194; Scothorn v. South &e. Co., 8 Ex. 341 8. 0. 18 E. L. & Eq. 553; Crouch v. Railway, 2 H. & N. 4918. C. 3 ib.. 383; Wilby v. Railway, 2 ib. 703; Mytton v. Midland Railway Co., 4 ib. 615; Coxon v. Great Western &c. Co.,. 5 H. & N. 274). Circuit Court U. S. (Myrick v. Michigan &c. Co., 9 Biss. 44; Hart v. Grand Era, 1 Woods, 184; St. John v. Southern Ex. Co., 10 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 777). Alabama (Mobile &c. Co. v. Copeland, 63 Ala. 219 S. C.. connecting road, and without citing this earlier and initial case, hold here that no such liability arises on even a through ticket if couponed. RAILWAY LAW. 2038: Through Luggage. 35 Am. Rep. 13; 10 Rep. 625; Montgomery Sc. Co. v.. Moore, 51 Ala. 394; Cf. Montgomery &c. Co. v Culver,, 75 ib. 578 S. C. 51 Am. Rep. 483, which corrects South. &c. Co. v. Wood, 71 Ala. 215 8. C. 46 Am. Rep. 309; 16. A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 267). California—Under Statute (Code, secs. 2201, 2202;, Wheeler v. San Francisco &c. Co., 31 Cal. 52; Pereira v.. Central &c. Co. 18 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 565; 4 West.. Coast Rep. 372). District of Columbia (Croft v. Baltimore &c. Co.1 1 McA. 492), , Florida (Bennet v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403). Georgia” (Mosher v. Southern &c. Co., 38 Ga. 37; South-- ern &c. Co. v. Shea, ib. 519; Cohen v. Southern &e. Co.,. 45 Ga. 148; Wolf v. Central Se. Co., 68 Ga. 653 S. C. 45. Am. Rep. 501; Cf. South-Western &c. Co. v. Thornton, 71 Ga. 61). Now governed by statute (Hawley v. Screven, 62 Ga. 347 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 126). Illinois (Central &c. Co. v. Johnson, 33 Tl. 382; Mlinois. &c. Co. v. Copeland, 24 ib. 232 8. C. 76 Am. Dec. 7493. Chicago &c. Co. v. People, 56 ib. 365; Chicago &c. Co. v.. Monfort, 60 ib. 175; Field v. Chicago &c. Co., 71 ib. 4583, Milwaukee &c. Co. v. Smith, 74 ib. 197; Adams Ex. Co. v. Wilson, 81 ib. 339; Erie, &c. Co. v. Wilcox, 84 ib. 239: S. C. 25 Am. Rep. 451; Chicago &e. Co. v. Church, 12 Il]. App. 17; Illinois &c. Co. v. Frankenburg, 54 Ill. 88. 8. 0.5 Am. Rep. 92; U.S. Ex. Co. v. Haines, 67 Tl. 137;. Merchants &c. Co. v. Moore,.88 ib. 136 8. C. 30 Am. Rep.. 541; Toledo, &c. Co. v. Merriman, 52 Ill. 123 8. C. 4 Am. Rep. 590). . Iowa (Angle v. Mississippi &c. Co., 9 Iowa, 487; Mulli-- gan v. Illinois &c. Co. 36 ib. 181 8. C. 2 Am. R. Rep. 322; 14 Am. Rep. 515). 1This case only involved the point of through tickets and baggage, as to- loss of, or injury thereto. *The matter is now regulated by statute in this State (Code, sec. 2084 ;: Hawley ». Screven, 62 Ga. 347 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 126). 204 RAILWAY LAW. Terminus of First Line. Kansas (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Piper,! 13 Kan. 505 S. C. 8 Am. R. Rep. 204; Berg v. Atchison &c. Co., 30 Kan. 5615. C.16 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 229; Atchison &c. Co. v. Roach, 35 Kan. 740 8. C. 57 Am. Rep. 199). New Hampshire (Nashua Lock &c. Co. v. Worcester &c. ‘Co., 48 N. H. 3398. C. 2 Am. Rep. 242; 10 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8S.) 244; Barton v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 434). Tennessee (Louisville &c. Co. v. Campbell, 7 Heisk. ‘253; Hast Tennessee &c. Co. v. Nelson, 1 Cold. 272; Carter v. Peck, 4 Sneed, 203 S. ©. 67 Am. Dec. 608; Furstenheim v. Memphis &c. Co.,2 9 Heisk. 238; East ‘Tennessee &c. Co. v. Brumley, 5 Lea, 401 8. C.6 A. & H. R. R. Cas. 356; East Tennessee &c. Co. v. Rogers, 6 Heisk. 143 8. C. 19 Am. Rep. 589; Western &c. Co. v. McElwee, 6 Heisk. 208; R. R. Co. v. Stockard, 11 ib. 568; Louisville &c. Co. v. Weaver, 9 Lea, 38 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 654; 16 A. & E. R.R. Cas. 218). Texas (Texas &c. Co. v. Fort, 9 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 392; ‘Texas &c. Co. v. Ferguson, 9 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 395; ‘Gulf &e. Co. v. Golding, 23 A. & E. R.'R. Cas. 732). II. The second is that a mere reception of goods under these circumstances, only requires delivery at the terminus of the line of the receiving carrier. Supreme Court U.S. (Michigan &c. Co. v. Mineral Springs &e. Co., 16 Wall. 318 S. C. 2 Am. R. Rep. 331; BR. BR. Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 124; Insurance Co. v. St. Louis &ec. Co., 104 U.S. 146 8.C.3 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 260; Myrick v. Michigan &c. Co., 107 U. S. 102 S. C. 15 Rep. 129; 9 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 25; Atchison &c. Co. v. Denver &c. ‘Co., 110 U.S. 667 8S. 0.16 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 57). Circuit Court U. S. (St. Louis & Co. v. St. Louis &e. Co., 1This case construes a contract “to forward,” as tantamount to a con- tract “to deliver.” * This court differentiates the case of passengers from that of freight, in- cluding peaae (Louisville &c. Co. », Weaver, supra). RAILWAY LAW. 205 Same. 3 A. & E.R. R. 260; Stewart v. Terre Haute &e. Co., 1 McCrary, 312 8. C. 10 Rep. 618; Deming v. Norfolk &c.. Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 25 8S. C. 16 A. & E, R. R. Cas. 2323. Harding v. International &e. Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 168; Mauritz v. N. Y. &c. Co., 21 A. & EB. BR. R. Cas. 286; 23. Fed. Rep. 765; Thomas v. McManus, 24 Fed. Rep. 509). Arkansas—Semble (Hot Springs &c. Co. v. Trippe, 42: Ark. 465 S. C. 48 Am. Rep. 68; 18 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 562). Connecticut! (Converse v. Transportation Co., 33 Conn. 166; Hood v. N. Y. &e. Co., 22 ib. 1; Elmore v. Nauga- tuck &c. Co., 23 ib. 457 S. C. 63 Am. Dec. 143; Nauga- tuck &c. Co. v. Waterbury Button Co., 24 ib. 468). Indiana (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Morton, 61 Ind. 539 S. C. 28 Am. Rep. 682; U. S. Ex. Co. v. Rush, 24 Ind. 403; Cummins v. Dayton &c. Co., 9 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 36). Kentucky (Bryan v. Memphis &c. Co., 11 Bush. 597). Louisiana (Tardos v. Chicago &c. Co., 35 La. Ann. 15. S. C. 16 Rep. 432). Maine (Skinner v. Hall, 60 Me. 477; Grindle v. Eastern &¢e. Co., 67 ib. 317 8. C. 24 Am. Rep. 31; 10. L. J. 541; Perkins v. Portland &c. Co., 47 Me. "593 8. C. 74 ‘Ann, Dec. 507; Inhabitants v. Hall, 61 Me. 517; Knapp v. U. S. Ex. Co., 54 ib. 348). Maryland (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Schumaker, 29 Md. 176). Massachusetts (Nutting v. Connecticut &e. Co., 1 Gray,. 502; Fitchburg &c. Co. v. Hanna, 6 Gray, 539 S. C. 66 sh Dec. 427; Judson v. Western &c. Co., 4 Allen, 520: S. C. 81 Am. Dec. 718; Lowell v. Sargent, 8 ib. 1893, Aigen v. Boston &c. Co., 182 Mass. 423 8. C. 6 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 426; Darling v. Boston &c. Co., 11 Allen, 295; Gass v. N. Y. &c. Co., 99 Mass. 220; Borroughs 1The courts of this State differentiate the case of passengers from that of freight (Hood ». N. Y. &e. Co., 22 Conn. 1). 206 RAILWAY LAW. Same. v. Norwich &c. Co., 100 ib. 26 8. C. 1 Am. Rep. 78; Pendergast v. Adams Ex. Co., 101 Mass. 120; Najac w. Boston &¢c. Co., 7 Allen, 3298S. C. 83 Am. Dee. 686; Hill &c. Co. v. Boston &c. Co., 104 Mass. 122 8. C.6 Am. Rep. 202). Michigan (Detroit &c. Co. v. McKenzie, 43 Mich. 609 S.C.9 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 16). Minnesota (Irish v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 19 Minn. 376 S. C.18 Am. Rep. 340; Lawrence v. Winona &c. Co., 15 Minn. 390 8. C. 2 Am. Rep. 130). Mississippi (Crawford v. Southern &c. Co., 51 Miss. 222 S. C. 24 Am. Rep. 626). Missouri (Landes v. Pacific &c. Co., 50 Mo. 346 8S. C. 3 Am. R. Rep. 288; Grover &c. Co. v. Mississippi &c. Co., ‘70 Mo. 672 S. OC. 35 Am. Rep. 444; 11 ©. L. J. 65; Hoagland v. R. R. Co., 39 Mo. 451; Coates v. Express ‘Co., 45 Mo. 238; McCarty v. Terre Haute &c. Co., 9 Mo. Any. 159; Wells v. Thomas, 27 Mo. 7 8. ©. 72 Am. Dee. 228). New York (Weed v. Saratoga &c. Co., 19 Wend. 534; ‘Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 312 s. C. 72 Am. Dee, 469; Wibert v. Erie &e. Co., 12 N. Y. 256; Burtis ». Buffalo &e. Co., 24 N. Y. 269; Hart v. Renaselabe &e. Co., 8 N. Y. 37 8. C. 59 At, Dec. 447; Champion v. Bostwick, 11 Wend. 571 S. C. 18 N. Y. 174; Wright v. Boughton, 22 Barb. 561; Dawson v. N. Y. &c. Co., 3 Lans. 235 S. C. 34 N. Y. 487; St. John v. Van Santword, 26 Wend. 660; Van Santrord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 3; Schroeder v. Hudson &c. Co.! 5 Duer, 5B; Wilcox v, Parmalee,! 3 Sandf. 610; McDonald v. Western &e. Co., 34 N. Y. 497; Lamb v. Camden &c. Co., 46 N. Y. 271 S, C. 7 Am. Rep: 327; Dillon v. N. Y. &e. Co. 1 Hill, 231; Hinckley v. N. Y. &e. Co., 56 N. Y. 429; Rawson v. Holland, 46 N. Y. 611 8S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 394; Babcock 1In these cases it was held that a contract “to forward,” meant a con- ‘tract “to deliver.” RAILWAY LAW. 207 Various Reasons Assigned. ‘v. Lake Shore &c. Co., 49 N. Y. 491 8. C. 3 Am. R. Rep. 381; Irwin v. N. Y. &c. Co., 1 Thomp. & C. 473; Jacobs v. Hooker, 1 Edm. 8. Cas. 472; Condict v. Grand Trunk &e. Co., 54 N. Y. 500 8. C. 6 Am. BR. Rep. 410; Reid v, U.S. Ex. Co., 48 N. Y. 462; Milner! ». N. Y. &c. Co., 53 N. Y. 363). North Carolina (Phillips v. N. C. R. BR. Co., 78 N. C. 294; Lindley v. Richmond &c. Co., 88 N. ©. 5478.0.9 A & E. BR. BR. Cas. 31). Ohio (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Campbell,? 36 Ohio, (N. 8.) 647 S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 617; 3 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 246; Cf. Cincinnati &c. Co. v. Pontius, 19 Ohio, (N. 8.) 221 8. C. 2 Am. Rep. 391). Several of the foregoing cases, cited under this propo- ‘sition, and apparently favoring the ‘first rule, were de- ided upon the point that the receiving carrier had united with other carriers to form a continuous route; some upon the ground that an agreement to forward was synonymous with one to deliver; others upon the ground that the receiving carrier had received pay for the entire route; others upon a custom established iby the receiving carrier, and others still upon the ground that the liability might be implied: and, they should be weighed accordingly. By adverting to these considerations, decisions cited from the same court under our different propositions are reconcilable. It is also to be remembered that in some of the States, .a disposition manifested in some of the earlier cases to follow the case of Muschamp v. Lancaster &c. Co., was gradually receded from, and in one State, (Illinois), the ‘court substantially allowed the railway companies, by 1 This case involved the point of through tickets and baggage. The question was not distinctly decided in this case, but the reasoning, it was thought, justified its citation and alignment under our second ‘proposition. 208 RAILWAY LAW. Not Matter of Law—only of Evidence. an ingenious device—coupon tickets—to overturn the leading case (Illinois &c. Co. v. Copeland, supra). Pennsylvania (Clyde v. Hubbard, 88 Pa. 358; Mullarkey v. Baltimore &c. Co., 9 Phil. 112; Pennsylvania &c. Co., v. Berry, 68 Pa. 272 S. C. 1 Am. R. Rep. 501; Jamison v. Camden &c. Co. 4 Am. L. Reg. 234; American Ex. Co. v. Second &c. Bank, 69 Pa. 391 S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 268; Choteaux v. Leach, 18 Pa. 224; Baltimore &e. Co. v. Brown, 54 ib. 77; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Schwarzen- berger, 45 Pa. 208 S. C. 84 Am. Dee. 490). Rhode Island (Knight v. Providence &c. Co., 13 R. I. 572 8. C. 43 Am. Rep. 46; 9 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 90). Vermont (Farmers’ Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co., 16 Vt. 52 S. C. 42 Am. Dec. 491; 23 Vt. 186; 56. Am. Dec. 68; Noyes v. Rutland &c. Co. 27 Vt. 110; Hadd v. U. 8. Ex. Co., 52 Vt. 38358. C.6 A. & E.B.R. Cas. 443; 36 Am. Rep, 757; Sprague v. Smith,! 29 Vt. 421 S. C. 70 Am. Dee. 424; Morse v. Vt. &e. Co., 41 Vt. 550; Cutts v. Brainerd, 42 ib. 566 S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 353). Wisconsin (Candee v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 21 Wis. 582 8. C. Thompson on Car. 419; Schneider v. Evans, 25 Wis. 241 S. 0. 3 Am. Rep. 56; 9 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8S.) 536; Conkey v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 31 Wis. 619 S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 630; 2 Am. R. Rep. 353; Hooper v. Chicago &c. Co., 27 Wis. 81S. C. 5 Am. R. Rep. 302). III. The third view is, that the mere acceptance of goods marked to a destination beyond its own line, as a matter of law, imports no-absolute undertaking on the part of the carrier to transport beyond its terminus, but is, as a matter of evidence, to be submitted to the jury, from which, in connection with other testimony to be ad- duced, they may determine, as a question of fact, what the real agreement was (Great Western &e. Co. v. Blake, 7 H. and N. 987; Webber v. Great Western &c. Co., 3. ‘This case distinguishes between the case of passengers and that of freight. RAILWAY LAW. 209 Carrier—Limiting Liability—Negligence. H. & ©. 771; Keys v. Railways, 8 Irish Com. L. 167; Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9 8. ©. 6 Am Rep. 434; Gray v. Jackson, 51 N.. H. 9 8. C. 12 Am. Rep. 1; Farmers &c. Bank v. Champlain &c. Co., 23 Vt. 186 8. C. 56 Am. Dec. 68; Morse v. Vermont &c. Oo., 41 Vt. 550; Root v. R. R. Co. 45 N. Y. 532; Pratt v. R. R. Co., 22 Wall. 132; Woodward v. R. R. Co. 1 Biss. 403; Dres- bach v. California &c. Co., 57 Cal. 462 8. 0.3 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 281; (under Statute) Pereira v. Central &c. Co., 66 Cal. 92 8. C. 18 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 565; 4 West Coast Rep. 372; (under Statute) Kyle v. Laurens &c. Co., 10 Rich. 382 8. C. 70 Am. Dec. 231; Bradford v. South Caro- lina &e. Co., 7 Rich. 201 8. C. 62 Am. Dee. 231; Piedmont &e. Co. v. Columbia &e. Co. 19 8. C. 353 8. C.16 A. & BH. R. R. Cas. 194; Hill v. Boston &c. Corporation, 104 Mass. 122 8. C.6 Am. Rep. 202; Maskoss v. Steamship Co., 13 Rep. 714). Carrier.—Limiting Liability.—Negligence—Can a carrier by notice or contract relieve itself from losses incurred by its negligence or that of its servants? This proposition is with great unanimity answered in the negative. We believe that the affirmative is alone held by the courts of New York, and in one case in the Circuit Court of the United States (Hart v. Pennsylvania &ce. Co.,2 2 McCrary, 333 S. C. 7 Fed. Rep. 630; Smith v. N. Y. &c. Co., 29 Barb. 1382 8. 0. 24. N. Y. 222; Bissell v. N. Y. &c. Co., 25 N. ¥. 442; Guillaume v. Hamburg &c. Co., 42 N. Y. 212; Lamb v. Camden &e. Co., 2 Daly, 454 1The earlier decisions would apparently align the South Carolina court under our second proposition, but the point was squarely made in the Piedmont case, and the question of liability, where the terms were not clear, or the evidence was conflicting, was held to be for the jury. 2This decision was affirmed on appeal (Hart v. R. R. Co., 112 U. 5. 331 8. C. 18 A. &E. BR. R. Cas. 604). The court, adhering to its well-settled doc- trine, disallowing such exemptions, distinguish this case, which was based on a contract of stipulated valuation, in the event of loss. 14 \ 210 RAILWAY LAW. Release of Negligence—N. Y. 8. C. 46 N. Y¥. 271; Steadman v. Western &c. Co., 48 Barb. 97; Stoddard v. Long Island &c. Co., 5 Sandf. 180; Poucher v. N. Y. &c. Co., 49 N. Y. 263 8. 0. 10 Am. Rep. 364; Edsall v. Camden &c. Co., 50 N. Y. 661; French v. Buffalo &c. Co., 4 Keys, 108; Cragin v. N. Y. &e. Co., 51 N. Y. 61S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 559; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168; Steers v. Liverpool &c. Co., 57 N. Y. 1 S.C. 15 Am. Rep. 453; Blair v. Erie &c. Co., 66 N. Y. 313; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 62 ib. 35 S.C. 20 Am. Rep. 442; Mynard v. Syracuse &c. Co., 71 N. Y. 1808S. ©. 27 Am. Rep. 28; Nicholas v. N. Y. &c. Co., 89 N. Y. 370 8S. ©. 9 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 103; McKinney v. Jewett, 90 N. Y. 267 S.C.9 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 209; Spinetti v. Atlas &c. Co., 80 N. Y. 71; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 70 N. Y. 410 8. C. 26 Am. Rep. 608). The anomolous and now unsupported New York doc- trine at one time received support from the decisions in West Virginia (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Rathbone, 1 W. Va. 87 8. CO. 88 Am. Dec. 664; Baltimore &c. Co. v. Skeels, 3 W. Va. 556); but these cases have been distinctly over- ruled (Maslin v. Baltimore &c. Co., 14 W. Va. 180 S. ©. 35 Am. Rep. 748, and Brown v. Adams Ex. Co., 15 W. Va. 812). The case of Kimball v. Rutland &c. Co., 26 Vt. 247 8. C. 62 Am. Dec. 567, has been mistakenly cited as hold- ing that a common carrier may contract for exemption as against his own negligence (R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 367; Ohio &c. Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 485); but this is not a fair deduction from what is decided by that case. It was held that a common ecarriér “may, by an express contract or agreement with the owner, (shipper), so vary and change his relation as to become a private carrier.” But when read in the light of the context, and in view of its citation, with approval of and as evi- dently intending to conform its decisions to, the case of N. Y. Steam &c. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank &c., 6 How. RAILWAY LAW. 211 Common Carrier—Limiting Liability—Goods. 344, which is the leading case as opposed to the New ‘York adjudications, we think that respectable court did not intend to adopt the view attributed to it. With equal accuracy, the Circuit Court of U. S. is liable to criticism (Bank &c. v. Adams Ex. Co., 8.0.1 Am. L. T. (N. S.) 451). There is a case in Wisconsin (Betts v. Farmers &c. Co., 21 Wis. 80), in which, as applied to the transporta- tion of live stock, it was held that the carrier could stipulate as against his own negligence. That eminent jurist, REDFIELD, holds that the decision is unsupported and “cannot be regarded as law.” Common Carrier.—Limiting Liability —Can a common Car- rier, otherwise than by special contract, founded upon a consideration, limit his common-law liability as an in- ‘surer? (The carriage of live stock, perils of navigation, and ‘contracts to carry beyond the carrier’s own line are not considered under this heading). In treating the sub- ject, bills of lading are not regarded as a contract in this behalf. The affirmative of this much vexed question is held ‘by the following courts: England—The decisions before 1832, and since 1854, the former at common-law and the latter under the car- riers’ act—-17 and 18 Vic. Chap. 31, sec. 7—are embraced. No apology is deemed necessary for giving the decis- ions pro and con. See interesting case of Henderson v. Stevenson, 15 Am. Rep. 457, in note. England (Shaw v. York &c. Co., 13 Q. B. 347; Austin v. Manchester &c. Co., 16 ib. 600; Chippendale v. Lan- eashire &e. Co., 21 L. J. (N. 8.) Q. B. 22; Austin v. Man- ehester &c. Co., 10 C. B. 454; Carr v. Lancashire &c. ©o., 7 Exch. 707; Walker v. York &c. Co., 2 El. & BI. 750; Gt. N. BR. Co. v. Morville, 21 L. J. (N. 8.) Q. B. 319; York &c. Co. v. Crisp, 14 C. B. 527; Hughes v. Great 212 RAILWAY LAW. §.C.U.8.: ©.C.U.S: Cal: Ga: Ia: Kan.: La. W. R. Oo., ib. 637; Slim v. Great N. R. Co., ib. 6475. Peek v. North &e. Co., 10 H. of L. Cases, 473; Smith v.. Horn, 8 Taunt. 146; Hyde v. Proprietors, 1 Esp. 36). Supreme Court U. S. (N. J. &ec. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. 344 (Contract); Evansville &c. Co. v. Andros-- coggin &c., 22 Wall, 594 (Bill of Lading); Bank v. Adams Ex. Co., 93 U. 8. 174 (Bill of Lading).). But while this court treat the bill of lading as a contract, they hold that a mere notice or shipping receipt is in-- sufficient (R. R. Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall, 318). vg Court U. S. (Hopkins v. Wescott, 6 Blatch. 64 S.. C. 7 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 533 (Check); Ayres v. Western &c. Co., 14 Blatch. 9 (Receipt).). California—Semble (Hooper U. Wells, 27 Cal 11 S. C. 85. Am. Dec. 211 (Bill of Lading); but the court declare. that these restrictions are to be construed strictly). Georgia (Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349 S. C. 46 Am. Dec.. 393; Cooper v. Berry, 21 Ga. 526 8. C. 68 Am. Dee. 468. (Usage); but see, Southern Ex. Co. v. Purcell, 37 Ga. 103; Wallace v. Matthews, 39 Ga. 617; Georgia v. Gann, 68 Ga. 350; this court holds that notice, to be effectual, must be brought home to the knowledge of the shipper). Iowa (Mulligan v. Illinois &c. Co., 836 Iowa. 181 8. 0. 14 Am. Rep. 514 (Bill of Lading); this court holds the shipper bound to a knowledge and acceptance of the terms contained in the bill of lading). Kansas (Kallman v. U.S. Ex. Co., 3 Kan. 205 (Bill of Lading).). But not when obtained under moral duress (Kansas &c. Co. v. Reynolds, 17 Kan. 251 8. 0.4 6. L. J. 54). Louisiana (Logan v. Pontchartrain, 11 Rob. 24 8. 0. 43. Am. Dee. 199 (Notice); Thomas v. Morning Glory, 13. La. Ann. 269 8. C. 71 Am. Dec. 509 (Notice).), This. court holds that notice, to be effectual, must be brought. home to the knowledge of the shipper (Cf. Simon »v. RAILWAY LAW. 213 Me.. Md.: Mass.: Mich.: Miss.: Mo.: N. Y. Fung Schuey, 21 La. Ann. 363); not by custom (Cran- well v. Ship Fosdick, 15 La. Ann. 436 S. C. 77 Am. Dec. 190). Maine (Sager v. Portsmouth &c. Co., 31 Me. 228 S. 0. 50 Am. Dec. 659 (Notice); Fillebrown v. Grand Trunk &c. Co., 55 Me. 462 (Notice).). But the notice must be brought home to the shipper. Maryland (Barney v. Prentiss, 4 H. & J. 317 8. C. 7 Am. Dec. 670 (Notice).). But it must be plain, explicit and free from all ambiguity (Brehme v. Adams Ex. Co., .25 Md. 328; R. R. Co. v. Brady, 32 ib. 333; McCoy »v. Erie &c. Co., 42 ib. 509). Massachusetts! (Judson v. Western &c. Oo., 6 Allen, 486; Brown v. Eastern &c. Co., 11 Cush. 99; Squires v. New York, 98 Mass. 239; Buckland v. Adams Ex. Co., 97 Mass. 124; Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass. 505 S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 131 (Receipt); Gott v. Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45; Hoadley v. Transportation &c. Co., 115 Mass. 304; Graves v. Lake Shore, 137 Mass. 33 S. C. 50 Am. Rep. 282 (Notice).). But it is held that the words “look on the back,” printed in small type in front is insufficient (Malone v. R. R. Co., 12 Gray, 388). Michigan (McMillan v. Michigan &c. Co., 16 Mich. 79 (Bill of Lading).). A very strong case. Mississippi (Southern Ex. Co. v. Moore, 39 Miss. 822 (Bill of Lading).). But the shippers’ free, fair, and ex- press assent must be shown. Missouri (Levering v. Union Trans. Co., 42 Mo. 88). New York? (Kirkland v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y.171 S.C. ‘20 Am. Rep. 476 (Receipt); Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 1The Massachusetts Courts hold otherwise as to notices, the contents of ‘which are not brought home to the shipper (Brown ». Eastern &c. Co., 11 «Cush. 97; Malone v. Boston &c. Co., 12 Gray, 388; Buckland ». Adams Ex. Co., 97 Mass. 124; Johnson v. Western &c. Co., 6 Allen, 486). 2A distinction is taken in this State, between a general and a special motice. In the former, it is held that the carrier cannot limit 214 RAILWAY LAW. Pa: W. Va. N. Y. 200 S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 224 (Receipt); Magnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168 (Receipt); Hinckley v. N. Y.. &c. Co., ib. 429 (Receipt); Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 ib. 166. 8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 575 (Receipt).). As to tickets, also, a distinction is taken between limitations expressed on. their face and on the back; sustaining the former and. denying the validity of the latter (Elmore v. Sands, 54. N. Y. 512 S. C. 13 Am. Rep. 617; Rawson v. Pennsyl- vania &c. Co., 48 N. Y. 212 8. C.8 Am. Rep. 543; Blos- som v. Dodd, 43 N. Y. 264 8. C. 3 Am. Rep. 701). A bill of lading or receipt is treated as a special con- tract. Pennsylvania (Camden &c. Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. 67 (Notice) S. C. 55 Am. Dec. 481; Farnham v. Camden &c. Co., 55 Pa. 53 (Notice); Beckman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle, 179 8S. C. 28 Am. Dec. 653 (Notice); Bingham v. Rogers, 6 W. & S. 495 S. C. 40 Am. Dee. 581 (Receipt); Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Schwarzenberger, 45 Pa. 215 8. C. 84 Am. Dec. 490; Whitsell v. Crane, 8 W. & S. 369 (Notice); Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208 (Custom).). But a limitation expressed in small type is ineffectual (Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479, 484 S. ©. 49 Am. Dee. 533). The drift of the decisions, however, is to the effect that the restriction, in whatever form adopted, must be brought home to the shipper, and be clear, explicit and free from ambiguity. West Virginia (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Skeels, 3 W. Va.. 556). In so far as this case is assumed to decide that carriers may stipulate against their own negligence, it has been overruled (Maslin v. Baltimore &c. Co., 14 W. his liability (Hollister ». Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234 8. C. 82 Am. Dec. 455 ; Dorr v. N. Y. &e. Co., 11 N. Y. 485 S. C. 62 Am. Dec. 125; Orange &c. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. 85 8. C. 24 Am. Dec. 129; Nevins ». Bay &c. Co.,. 5 Bosw. 233; aliter as to special (Cole ». Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251 8. ©. 32 Am. Dec. 470; it is sometimes claimed that this case has been overruled) ; and see (Fibel v. Livingston, 64 Barb. 179; Prentice o. Decker, 49 i. 213 Limburger v. Wescott, 7b. 283.)). RAILWAY LAW. 215 Wis.: ©.0.U.8.: Ala.: Conn.: IIL Va. 180 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 748). But it remains unre- versed for the purposes for which it is here cited (Brown ». Adams Ex. Co., 15 W. Va. 812). Wisconsin (Boorman v. Am. Ex. Oo., 21 Wis. 152 (Bill of Lading); Strohn v. Detroit &c. Co, 21 Wis. 554 Receipt).). The following courts hold that the carrier cannot by general notice limit his liability, and in some, by either special notice or by the receipt or bill of lading. In pursuing this view we shall not re-cite those decis- ions which reject the view that a carrier may restrict his liability by general notice, but which hold that he may by bill of lading or special notice : Circuit Court U. Ss. (Scruggs v. Baltimore &c. Co., 5 McCrary, 590 S. C. 18 Fed. Rep. 318). Alabama (South &c. Co. v. Henlein, 56 Ala. 368; Steele v. Townsend, 37 Ala. 247 8. C. 79 Am. Dec. 49 (Bill of Lading); Alabama &c. Co. v. Little, 71 Ala. 614 8. C. 17 W. J. 416 (Bill of Lading).). The court holds that the carrier cannot limit by a general notice, but decide that a bill of lading is a contract by which the shipper is bound, and that in that he may, but it must be assented to (Southern Ex. Co. v. Armstead, 50 Ala. 2003). nor by custom (Boon v. Steamer Belfast, 40 Ala. 1848. C. 88 Am. Dee. 761). Connecticut—Semble (Hale v. N. J. Se: Co., 15 Conn. 539 S.C. 39 Am. Dec. 398). This case was decided upon the law of New York, that being the lex loci contractus (Dewart v. Soamer, 21 Conn. 245). Ilinois—This court takes a distinction between the effect of a contract and notice and the like. It holds that common carriers may restrict their common-law liability as insurers by express contract (Western Trans. Co. v. Newhall, 24 Ill. 466 S. C. 76 Am. Dec. 760; Illinois &c. Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88 S. ©. 5 Am. Rep. 92). But a general notice by advertisement or by conditions 216 RAILWAY LAW. Indiana: N. H. printed on the back of a bill of lading, &c., are insuffi- cient as likewise a usage. It further holds that the carrier may so limit by language inserted in the body of the bill of lading, or receipt if assented to by the. shipper; but aliter if in small type or otherwise decep- tively inserted. It should also be borne in mind, that this course of decisions is not applied to regulations touching the manner of delivery, &c. By bearing these distinctions in mind apparent dis- crepances are reconciled: (Anchor Line Co. v. Dator, 68 Ill. 369; U. S. Ex. Co. v. Haynes, 67 ib. 137; Illinois &c. Co. v. Smyser, 38 ib. 355; Adams Ex. Co. v. Haynes, 42 ib. 89; American &c. Co. v. Schier, 55 ib. 140; Illinois &c. Co. v.. Morrison, 19 ib. 136; Mllinois &c. Co. v. Read, 37 ib. 484; Boskowitz ». Adams Ex. Co., 107 ib. 660 S. C. 16 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 102; 5 C. L. J. 58; Baker v. Michigan &c. Co., 42 Mil. 73; Illinois &c. Co. v. Adams, ib. 474; Adams Ex. Co. v. Stettaners, 61 ib. 184 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 57; Oppen- heimer v. U.'S. Ex. Co. 69 Ill. 62 8. ©. 18 Am. Rep. 596; 9 Alb. L. J. 187; Erie &c. Co. v. Wilcox, 84 Ill. 239 8. ©. 25 Am. Rep. 451; Field v. Chicago &c. Co., 71 Ill. 458; Merchants &c. Co. v. Theilbar, 86 ib. 72; Mer- chants &c. Co. v. Leyser, 89 ib. 43; Merchants &c. Co. v. Joesting, 89 ib. 152; American Ex. Co. v. Spellman, 90 tb. 455; Michigan &c. Co. v. Boyd, 91 ib. 268; Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Davis, 16 Ill. App. 425; Western &c. Co. v. Hosking, 19 ib.. 607). Indiana (Evansville &c. Oo. v. Young, 28 Ind. 519; Indianapolis &e. Co. v. Allen, 31 ib. 394; Michigan &ce. Co. v. Haton, ib. 397, note). New Hampshire—This court holds that the carrier can- not restrict his common-law liability by general notice, even though brought home to the shipper (Moses v. Boston &c. Oo., 24 N. H. 71 8. ©. 55 Am. Dee. 222; Moses v. Boston &c. Co., 32 N. H. 523 8. C. 64 Am. RAILWAY LAW. 217 N. C.: Ohio: W. Va. Dec. 381; Brown v. Grand Trunk &e. Co., 54 N. H. 535). North Carolina (Smith v. N. C. &c. Co., 64 N. C. 235). ‘This case was based upon an express contract, but the court intimate that the same result might be effected by a notice brought home to the knowledge of the shipper. Ohio (Welsh v. Pittsburg &c. Co., 10 Ohio, (N. 8.) 65 S. ©. 75 Am. Dec. 490 (Notice); Gaines v. Union &c. Co., 28 Ohio, (N. 8.) 4388 (Notice); Baltimore v. Camp- bell, 36 ib. 658 (Notice); Cincinnati &c. Co. v. Pontius, 19 ib. 221 8. C. 2 Am. Rep. 391 (Bill of Lading); was based upon a bill of lading treated as a contract). Vermont (Farmers &c. Co. v. Champlain &¢. Co., 23 ‘Vt. 186 8. C. 56 Am. Dec. 68; 2 Red. Am. Rail. Cas. 52). ‘This court holds that general notice is insufficient, wnless there is very clear proof that the shipper assented to the terms embodied in it as forming the BASIS OF THE CON- ‘TRACT, ALITER if merely. brought home to his notice (Kimball v. Rutland &e. Co., 26 Vt. 247 8. C. 62 Am. Dec. 567). And that such notice affords no evidence of a contract (Blumenthal v. Brainard, 38 Vt. 410). Virginia (Wilson v. R. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 654 (Card); Cf. ‘Governor v. Withers, 5 Gratt. 25 S. C. 50 Am. Dee. 95). Carrier.—Limitation.—Burden of Proof.— Where goods are received for transportation by a common carrier under a special contract, whereby his common-law liability as an insurer is limited, and the goods are proved to be lost, is the carrier, after showing that the loss fell within the limitation, bound to establish himself to have been free from fault in the first instance, or is the burden of proof thereupon shifted to the shipper to prove the earrier’s negligence? The following courts maintain that proof by the carrier that the loss fell within the exception, devolves the burden of proof of negligence 218 RAILWAY LAW. Limitation: Burden of Proof. upon the shipper. We shall only attempt an approxi- mate alignment. England—The matter under discussion, at an early period was made the subject of Acts of Parliament repeatedly altered, and as it is deemed that citation of the author-- ities would subserve no practical purpose, we forego it. The cases mainly turn upon a construction of the various statutes. Supreme Court U. S. (N. J. & Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6. How. 344; Clarke v. Barnwell, 12 ib. 272; Memphis &c. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176; Transportation &c. Co. v. Downer, 11 ib. 129; Mohler, 21 ib. 230; Nelson v. Wood-. ruff, 1 Black, 156). Circuit Court U. S. (Emma Johnston, 1 Sprague, 527; Bearse v. Ropes, ib. 331; Hunt v. Cleveland, 6 McLean, 76S. C. Newb. Ad. 221; Cf. Westheimer v. Pennsylvania. &c. Co., 17 Blatch. 421 S. C. 1 Fed. Rep. 232; 19 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 323; 14 Am. L. Rev. 431; 26 Int. Rev. Rec. 42; 9 Rep. 234; Hall v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 226; 19 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 250; 26 Int. Rev. Rec. 44; 9 Rep. 306; Black Warrior, 1 McAl. 181; May Queen, 1 Newb. Ad. 461; English v. Ocean &e. Co., 2 Blatch. 425; Zone, 2 Sprague, 19 S. O. 12 L. Rep. (N. S.) 725; Bazin v. Steamship &c. Co., 3 Wall. Jr. 229 8. 0. 5- Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 459; Live Yankee, Deady, 420; Hooper v. Rathbone, Taney, 519; Mohler, 2 Biss. 5053. Bullard v. Roger Williams &c. Co., 1 Curt. C. C. 148; Earnest v. Ex. Co., 1 Woods, 577). Arkansas (Little Rock &c. Oo. v. Talbot, 39 Ark. 523 8.. C.18 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 598; Little Rock &c. Co. v. Corcoran, 40 Ark, 375 8. 0.18 A.& E.R. R. Cas. 602; Little Rock &c. Co. v. Harper, 44 Ark. 208 S. C. 21 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 97). Kansas (Kallman v. U. S. Ex. Co., 3 Kan. 205). Louisiana (Leftwitch v. St. Louis &c. Co., 5 La. Ann. 706; Thomas v. Morning Glory, 13 La. Ann. 269 8. C.. RAILWAY LAW. ‘ 219° Same. 71 Am. Dec. 509; Edwards v. Cahawba, 14 La. Ann. 224; Tardos v. Toulon, ib. 429; Rochereau v. Hensa, 1b.. 431; Roberts v. Riley, 15 ib. 103 8. C. 77 Am. Dec. 1835. N. O. &c. Co. v. N. O. &e. Co., 20 La. Ann. 302 S. 0. 24 ib. 100; Levy v. Pontchartrain &c. Co., 23 ib. 477). Maine (Sager v. Portsmouth &e. Co., 31 Me. 228 S. O.. 50 Am. Dec. 659). Missouri (Hill v. Sturgeon, 28 Mo. 353; Valentine v., North &c. Co., 40 ib. 491; Wolf v. American Ex. Co., 43. 4b. 421; Ketchum v. American Ex. Co., 52 ib. 390; Read v. St. Louis &c. Co., 60 ib. 199; Heil v. St. Louis &e. Co., 16 Mo. App. 363; McBeath v. Wabash &c. Co., 20: ib. 445; Cf. Drew v. Red Line &e. Co., 3 ib. 595). New York (Colt v. McMechen, 6 John. 160; Beardslee- v. Richardson, 11 Wend. 25; Arend v. Liverpool &e. Co., _ 6 Lan. 4578. C. 64 Barb. 118; French v. Buffalo &c. Co.,, 4 Keys, 108; Clarke v. Rochester &c. Co., 14 N. Y. 5703, Lamb v. Camden &c. Co., 46 ib. 271 8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 327; Cochran v. Dinsmore, 49 N. Y. 249; Steers v. Liver- pool &c. Co., 57 N. Y. 18. 0.15 Am. Rep. 453). North Carolina (Smith v. N. C. &e. Co., 64 N. C. 235). Pennsylvania (Atwood v. Reliance &c. Co., 9 Watts, 87 8S. C. 34 Am. Dec. 503; Clarke v. Spence, 10 Watts, 335;: Whitesides v. Russell, 8 W. & 8. 44; Leonard v. Hen- drickson, 18 Pa. 40 8. C. 55 Am. Dec. 587; Hayes v. Kennedy, 41 Pa. 378; American Ex. Co. v. Sands, 55 ib. 140; Colton v. Cleveland &c. Co., 67 Pa. 211 S. C. 5- Am. Rep. 424; Beckman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle, 179 8. ©. 28 Am. Dec. 653; Bell v. Reed, 4 Binn. 127 8S. C.5 Am. Dec. 398; Bingham v. Rogers, 6 W. & S. 495 S. C. 40: Am. Dec. 581). Vermont (Day v. Ridley, 16 Vt. 48 S. C. 42 Am. Dec.. 489). Wisconsin (Cream City &c. Co. v. Chicago &e. Co., 21 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 70). 220 RAILWAY LAW. Burden of Carrier. The following hold that the carrier must not only show a valid restriction, but likewise negative negli- gence: Alabama (Mobile &c. Co. v. Hopkins, 41 Ala. 486; Mobile &c. Co. v. Jarboe, ib. 644; Steel v. Townsend, 37 Ala. 247 8. ©. 79 Am. Dec. 49; South &c. Co. v. Hen- lein, 52 Ala. 606 8. C. 23 Am. Rep. 578; Gray v. Mobile &e. Co., 55 Ala. 387 S. C. 28 Am. Rep. 729; Alabama &c. Co. v. Little, 71 Ala. 611 S.C. 12 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 37; 17 W. J. 416; East Tenn. &c. Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 696 S. C. 51 Am. Rep. 489; 22 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 427). Connecticut—Semble (Harper v. R. R. Com., 37 Conn. 272). Georgia (Berry v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 543; Southern Ex. Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 635). Illinois (Dunpeth v. Wade, 2 Scam. 288; Adams Ex. Co. v. Stettaners, 64 Ill. 184 8. ©. 14 Am. Rep. 57 ; Western &c. Co. v. Newhall, 24 Ill. 466 S. C. 76 Am. Dec. 760; Adams Ex. Co. v. Haines, 42 Ill. 89). Indiana (Rosenfield v. Peoria &c. Co., 21 A. & EB. RB. R. Cas. 87). Maryland (U.S. &c. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 29 Md. 249), Michigan (Jenneson v. Parker, 7 Mich. 363). Minnesota (Shriver v. Sioux City &c. Co., 24 Minn. 506 8. C. 31 Am. Rep. 353; Christenson v. Am. Ex. Co., 15 Minn. 270 S. C. 2 Am. Rep. 122). Mississippi (Chicago &c. Oo. v. Moss, 60 Miss. 1003 8. ©. 45 Am. Rep. 428; 21 A. & BE. RB. R. Cas. 98; Chicago &c. Co. v. Abels, 60 Miss. 1017 S. ©. 21 A. & EB. R. R. Oas. 105). Ohio (Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio, (N. S.) 41; Graham v. Davis, 4 ib. 362 S. OC. 62 Am. Dee. 285; U. S. Ex. Oo. v. Bachman, 28 Ohio, (N. S.) 144; Fatman v. Cincinnati &c. Oo., 2 Dis. 254; Union Ex. Co. »v. Graham, 26 Ohio, RAILWAY LAW. 22% True Rule Suggested. (N. S.) 595; Gaines v. Union Ex. Co., 28 ib. 438; R. R. Co. v. Barrett, 36 ib. 483; R. R. Co. v. Campbell, ib. 658).. South Carolina (Swindler Vv Hilliard, 2 Rich. 286 S. C. 45 Am. Dec. 733; Ewart v. Street, 2 Bail. 161 S. C.. 23. Am. Dec. 181; Smyrl v. Niolon, 2 Bail. 4218. C. 23 Am.. Dec. 146; Cameron v. Rich, 4 Strob. 168 S. C. 53 Am. Dec. 670; Baker v. Brinson, 9 Rich. 201 8. C. 67 Am. Dec. 548). Tennessee (Turney v. Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340 8. C. 27 Am. Dec. 515). Texas (Ryan v. Missouri &c. Co., 65 Tex. 13 8. C. 57 Am. Rep. 589). West Virginia (Brown v. Adams Ex. Co., 15 W. Va. 812). The true rule, it is suggested, must be found in the science of pleading. Presumptively, the common car- rier is an insurer as against all acts, except the acts of God and the public enemy. This is his obligation fixed by the law. Hence, if he claims that by an arrangement, recognized as binding by the lez loci con- tractus, he has been released from such common-law liability, -he should set it up by a plea in confession and avoidance. This is made manifest by supposing a dec- laration on the duty alleging loss: upon the general issue, the only inquirable point is the loss, unless shown to be within the common-law exception. Suppose the exemption should be robbery—could it be shown under the general issue? The error in regarding any onus as resting with the shipper, must have originated in treating the re- striction as an exception to be negatived; but, can it so be regarded? Does not each contract treat it rather as a proviso? Again, even if originally on the carrier, it is not, technically, shifted; it is a ques- tion of rebutting, not shifting the evidence. Carriers of Live Stock.—Responsibility——Are common car- 222 RAILWAY LAW. Live Stock. . tiers liable for the carriage of live stock to as full an -extent as with reference to goods? The following courts maintain that the full measure -of responsibility of a common carrier does not attach to a shipment of live stock: England! (McManus v. Lancashire &c. Co., 2 H. & N. 693 8S. C. 4 H. & N. 327; Palmer v. Grand Junction &c. Co., 4 M. & W. 749; Pardington v. South Wales &c. ‘Co., 1 H. & N. 392, 396 S. C. 38 E. L. & Eq. 432; Carr ‘vw. Lancashire &c. Co., 7 Ex. 707 S. C. 14 HB. L. & Eq. 340; Kendall ». London &c. Co., L. R. (7 Ex.) 373 S. C. -2 EH. R. (Moak), 705; Austin v. Manchester &c. Co., 10 C. B. (70 E. CO. L. RB.) 454; Harrison v. London &c. Co., 2 B. & S. (110 BE. C. L. BR.) 121; Great Western &c. Co., v. Blower, L. R. (7 O. P.) 655 S. C. 2 E. R. (Moak), 700). Kentucky (Hall v. Renfro, 3 Met. 51; Louisville &c. Co. v. Hedger, 9 Bush. 645 S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 740; 13 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 145). Maine —Semble (Sager v. Portsmouth &c. Co., 31 Me. ‘228 S. C. 50 Am. Dec. 659). Maryland—Under a statute incorporating the defend- -ant (Bankard v. Baltimore &c. Co., 34 Md. 1978. C. 6 Am. Rep. 321; Cf. Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 209). Michigan” (Michigan &ec. Co. v. McDonough, 21 Mich. 'These decisions were rendered on the several carriers’ acts, but involve ‘the principle for which they are cited. In the Kendall case, James, Q. C., contended that railway companies were not common carriers of animals, when Martin, B., replied, “that point has been settled the other way.” * These decisions were rendered by the very able tribunal of this State, notwithstanding the existence of a statute (Sess. Law, 1867, p. 165), for- bidding railway companies from changing or limiting their common-law liability as common carriers. The South Carolina Court thinks that the Michigan Court. was not successful in its attempt to reconcile their cases (Bamberg ». 8. C. &. Co., 9S. C. 61S. C. 30 Am. Rep. 13); and the Kan- sas Court account for these decisions on the ground that in Michigan, railway companies are not public agencies (Kansas &c. Co. 9. Nichols, 9 Kan. 235 8. C. 12 Am. Rep. 496). RAILWAY LAW. 223 Same. 165 8. C. 4 Am. Rep. 466; Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Per- ‘kins, 25 Mich. 329 8. C. 12 Am. Rep. 275; 5 Am. R. Rep. 249; overruling the earlier cases of Michigan &c. ‘Co. v. Hall, 6 Mich. 273; and limiting Great Western &c. ‘Co. v. Hawkins, 18 Mich. 427). New York (Clarke v. Rochester &c. Co., 14 N. Y. 570 S. 0. 67 Am. Dec. 205; Penn v. Buffalo &e. Co., 49 N. Y. 204 8. C.10 Am. Rep. 355; 3 Am. R. Rep. 355; Poucher w. N. Y. &e. Co., 49 N. Y. 263 8S. ©. 10 Am. Rep. 364; 3 Am. R. Rep. 525; Mynard v. Syracuse &c. Co., 71 N. Y. 180 S. C. 27 Am. Rep. 28; Cf. Cragin v. N. Y. &e. Co., 51 N. Y. 61 8. C. 10 Am. Dec. 559; 4 Am. R. Rep. 418; Holsapple v. Rome &e. Co., 3 A. & HE. BR. RB. Cas. 487). North Carolina (Lee v. R. & G. &e. Co., 72 N. C. 236). Tennessee (Baker v. Louisville &c. Co., 10 Lea, 304 S. 0.16 A. & E.R, RB. Cas. 149). In the following courts the carrier of live stock is held liable to the same extent as for the carriage of goods, except that in some they are relieved when the injury is attributable to inherent defects in the animals, contributing thereto or when carried under a legally limiting liability contract: U.S. Supreme Court (Michigan &c. Co. v. Myrick, 9 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 25). Alabama (South &c. Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606 S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 578). This was a case of special contract, and the court hold that the burden of proof to show non- liability, rests upon the carrier (Hast Tenn. &c. Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 596 S. C. 22 A. & EH. R. BR. Cas. 437; 51 Am. Rep. 489). California (Agnew v. Contra Costa, 27 Cal. 424). Georgia (Hast Tenn. &c. Co. v. Whittle,’ 27 Ga. 535 8. 1The shipper had chartered the cars in this case, and the court, whilst holding the carrier not liable, on that account, as a common carrier, declare: “(Tt will be understood that if there was no contract of charter or hire, other than*what is to be inferred from the published rates and rules of 224 RAILWAY LAW. Same. C. 73 Am. Dec. 741; Georgia &¢. Co. v. Beatie, 66 Ga. 438 S. 0. 42 Am. Rep. 75; Georgia &c. Co. v. Spears, 66. Ga. 485 8. C. 42 Am. Rep. 81). Illinois (Ohio &c. Co. v. Dunbar, 20 Ill. 623 S. C. 71 Am. Dee. 291; St. Louis &. Co. v. Dorman, 72 Ill. 4045, Indianapolis &¢. Co. v. Jurey, 8 Il. App. 160). Indiana—Semble (Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Bennett, 6 A. & BE. R. BR. Cas. 391). Iowa (German v. Chicago &c. Co., 38 Iowa, 1283. McCoy v. Keokuk &e. Co., 44 ib. 424 8. 0. 3 L. & Eq. Rep. 131; McDaniel v. Chicago &c. Co., 24 ib. 412). Kansas (Kansas &c. Oo. v. Reynolds, 8 Kan. 623 S. C.. 12 Am. Rep. 500, in note; 5 Am. R. Rep. 260; Kansas. &e. Co. v. Nichols, 9 Kan. 235 8. C. 12 Am. Rep. 494; 5 Am J:. Rep. 275; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Piper, 13 Kan. 505 8. C. 8 Am. R. Rep. 204; Cf. Kansas City &c. Co. v. Simpson, 30 Kan. 645 S. ©. 46 Am. Rep.'104). Louisiana (Peters v. N. O. &c. Co., 16 La. Ann. 222 8. C. 79 Am. Dee. 578). Massachusetts (Smith v. New Haven &c. Co., 12 Allen, 531; Evans v. Fitchburg &c. Co.,! 111 Mass. 142 8. ©. 15 Rep. 19; Evans v. Dunbar, 117 Mass. 546). Minnesota (Moulton v. St. Paul &c. Co., 31 Minn. 85 8. C. 12 A. & EB. BR. R. Cas. 13; 47 Am. Rep. 781). Mississippi (Chicago &c. Co. v. Abels, 60 Miss. 1017; Howell v. Mills, 37 ib. 691). Missouri (Clark v. St. Louis &c. Co., 64 Mo. 440; Cant- ling v. Hannibal &c. Co., 54 ib. 385 S. C. 14 Am. Rep. A476; Cf. St. Louis &e. Co. v. Cleary, 77 Mo. 634 8. C. 46 Am. Rep. 13). Nebraska (Atchison &c. Co. v. Washburn, 5 Neb. 117). New Hampshire (Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355 8. C. 13 Am. Rep. 42). transportation, as given in evidence, then the earrier is liable as a common. carrier.” 1 This was the case of injury occasioned by viciousness of the animal. RAILWAY LAW. 225 Contributive Negligence: Burden of Proof on Plaintiff. Ohio (Wilson v. Hamilton, 4 Ohio, (N. 8.) 722; Welch v. Pittsburg &e. Co., 10 ib. 73 8. C. 75 Am. Dec. 490). Pennsylvania (Ritz v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 3 Phil. 82 S. C. 15 Leg. Int. 75; Cf. Powell v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 32 Pa. 414 8. OC. 75 Am. Dec. 564; Goldey v. Penn- sylvania &c. Co., 30 Pa. 246; Pringle v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 3 Phil. 82). South Carolina (Bamberg v. 8. C. &e. Co., 9 8. C. 61). Vermont (Kimball v. Rutland &e. Co., 26 Vt. 247). West Virginia (Maslin v. Baltimore &c. Co., 14 W. Va. 180 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 748). Wisconsin (Morrison v. Phillips &c. Co., 44 Wis. 405; Of. Richardson v. Chicago &c. Co., 58 ib. 534 8. C.18 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 530). Contributive Negligence.—Burden of Proof—An important question of practice constantly arises, in actions predi- cated of the defendant’s negligence. It is this: Should contributive negligence on the part of the plaintiff be negatived by testimony to be produced by him, or is it a matter of defence? The following courts hold that the burden of disprov- ing contributive negligence is upon the plaintiff: Circuit Court U. S. (Dunmead v. American &c. Co., 4 McCrary, 44; Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb. & M. 337; Beardsly v. Swant,. 4 McLean, 333). Connecticut (Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507 S. C. 50 Am. Dec. 261; Beers v. Housatonic, 19 Conn. 566; Park v. O'Brien, 23 ib. 339; Fox v. Glastenbury, 29 ib. 204; Bell v. Smith, 39 ib. 216; Button v. Frink, 51 ib. 342 S.C. 50 Am. Rep. 24). Georgia (Brannan v. May, 17 Ga. 136; Campbell v. A. &c. R. R. Co., 53 ib. 488; Thompson v. Central &e. Co., 54 ib. 509, has sometimes been cited to sustain an alignment of Georgia on the negative of our proposi- tion, but it was decided under the provisions of' secs. 3033, 3034, 3036 of the Georgia Code; but. the case of 15 226 RAILWAY LAW. Contributive Negligence: Burden on Plaintiff. Campbell v. Altanta &c. Co., is doubted in the last cited case; Cf. Savannah &c. Co. v. Barber, 71 Ga. 644). Illinois (Aurora &c. Co. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585; Galena &c. Co., v. Yarwood, 15 ib. 468; Dyer v. Talcott, 16 ib. 300; Galena &c. Co. v. Fay, ib. 558 8. C. 63 Am. Dec. 323; Chicago &c. Co. v. Major, 18 Ill. 349 S. C. 68 Am. Dec. 553; Galena &c. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478; Galena &e. Co. v. Dill, 22 ib. 264; Chicago &c. Co. v. Hazzard, 26 ib. 373; Chicago &c. Co. v. Gregory, 58 ib. 272; Kep- perly v. Ramsden, 83 ib. 354; Chicago &c. Co. v. Har- wood, 90 ib. 425; Chicago &c. Co. v. Lewis, 5 Ill. App. 242; Chicago &c. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 512 S. C. 8 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 225; Missouri v. Abend, 107 Ill. 44 8. C. 47 Am. Rep. 425; Mendota v. Fay, 1 Il. App. 418). Indiana (Town of Mt. Vernon v. Dusouchett, 2 Ind. 586 S. C. 54 Am. Dec. 467; Wayne Co. v. Berry, 5 Ind. 286; Wabash &c. Co. v. Mayer, 10 ib. 400; Evansville R. R. Co. v. Hiatt, 17 ib. 102; Indianapolis &e. Co. v. Keeley, 23 ib. 133; Evansville &c. Co. v. Dexter, 24 ib. 411; Jeffersonville &c. Co. v. Hendricks, 26 ib. 228; Toledo &c. Co. v. Bevin, 26 ib. 443; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Vining, 27 ib. 513; Michigan &c. Co. v. Lantz, 29 ib. 528; Maxfield v. Cin. &c. Co., 41 ib. 269 S. OC. 5 Am. Rep. 201; Bellefontaine v. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335; New- house v. Miller, 35 ib. 463; Riest v. Goshen, 42 ib. 339; Hathaway v. R. RB. Co., 46 ib. 25 8S. C. 6 Am. RB. Rep. 399; Jackson v. R. R. Co., 47 ib. 454; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Matthias, 50 ib. 65; Higgins v. R. R. Co., 52 ib. 110; Cincinnati &c. Co. v. Eaton, 53 ib. 307 ; Louisville &c. Co. v. Boland, ib. 398; Jeffersonville &c. Co. v. Lyon, 55 wb. 477; Jonesboro v. Baldwin, 57 ib. 86; Sullivan xv. Toledo &¢. Co., 58 ib. 26; Toledo &e. Co. v. Branagan, 75 Ind. 490 8. 0. 5 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 630; Gormly v. Ohio &c. Co., 72 ib. 31; Terre Haute &e. Co. v. Clark, 73 Ind. 168; Pittsburg &e. Co. xv. Noel, 77 ib. 110 8. C.7 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 524; Anderson ». Hervey, 67 Ind. 420; RAILWAY LAW. 227 Contributive Negligence: Burden on Plaintiff. Jeffersonville &c. Co. v. Lyon, 72 ib. 107; Williams v. Moray, 74 ib. 25; Huntington v. Breen, 77 ib. 29; Louis- ville &c. Co. v, Head, 80 ib. 117; Pennsylvania &c. Co. ©. Galentine,! 77 ib. 320 8. C. 7 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 517; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Wright, 80 Ind. 182 8. C.5 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 628; Cincinnati &c. Co. v. Peters, 80 Ind. 168 8.0.6 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 126; Bloomington &c. Co. v. Rogers, 83 Ind. 261; Wilson v. Trafalgar County, 83 ib. 326; Louisville &c. Co. v. Orr, 84 ib. 50; Rushville v. Poe, 85 ib. 83; Louisville &c. Co. v. Krimmings, 87 4b, 351; Louisville &c. Co. v. Hagen, 87 Ind. 602; Rogers v. Overton, ib. 411; Gheens v. Golden, 90 ib. 427; Louisville &c. Co. v. Lockridge, 93 ib. 191 S. ©. 22 A. & BE. R. RB. Cas. 649; Louisville &c. Co. v. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598 8S. C. 19 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 28; Dedford &c. Co. v. Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551 8. C. 21 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 466; Cincinnati &c. Co. v. Butler, 103 Ind. 31; Indi- ana &¢c. Co. v. Greene, 106 ib. 2798. C. 55 Am. Rep. 7386). Iowa (Rusch v. City of Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443; Don- aldson v. M. M. R. R. Co., 18 ib. 281; Greenleaf v. Illinois &c. Co., 29 ib. 14 8S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 181; Baird v. Morford, 29 Iowa, 531; Kersee v. Chicago &c. Co., 30 ib. 78; Reynolds v. Hindman, 32 ib. 146; Plaster v. Illi- nois &c. Co., 35 ib. 449; Carlin v. C. R. &e. Co., 37 ab. 316; Patterson v. R. R. Co., 38 tb. 279; Nelson v. Chicago &e. Co., 38 ib. 564; Muldowney v. Mlinois &e. Co., 39 ib. 615; S. P. 36 ib. 462; 32 ib. 176; Way v. Illinois Central -&e. Co., 40 ib. 341; Benton v. Central R. BR. Co., 42 ib. 192; Cramer v. City of Burlington, ib. 315; Steel v. ‘Central &c. Co., 43 ib. 109; Bellair v. Chicago &c. Co., 43 ib. 662 8. C. 14 Am. R. Rep. 575; Murphy v. Chicago &¢e. Co., 45 Iowa, 661; 8. P. 38 ib. 539; Starry v. D. & S. W. R. R. Co., 51 ib. 419; Bonce v. Dubuque &c. Co., 53 1The court hold in this case, that where wilful negligence is charged, «contributive need not be negatived. 228 RAILWAY LAW. Contributive Negligence: Burden on Plaintiff. ib. 278; Slosson v. Burlington &c. Co., 55 ib. 294; Bur- lington &c. Co. v. Raymond, 13 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 63. Hubbard v. Mason City, 60 Iowa, 400; Coates v. Bur- lington &c. Co., 62 ib. 486; Hawes v. Burlington &c. Co., 64 ib. 315 S. C. 19 A. & EH. R. BR. Cas. 220; but see Raymond v. Burlington &e. Co.,! 65 Iowa, 122). Louisiana (Moore v. Mayer &c. Co., 3 La. Ann. 645). Maine? (French v. Brunswick, 21 Me. 29 S. C. 38 Am.. Dec. 250; Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39 S. ©. 43 Am. Dec. 249; Merrill v. Hampden, 26 Me. 234; Perkins v. Eastern &c. R. R. Co., 29 ib. 307; Dickey v. Telegraph Co., 43 tb. 492; Buzzell v. Laconia &c. Co., 48 ib. 113; Gleason v. Bremen, 50 ib. 222; Bigelow v. Reed, 51 ib. 325; Benson v. Titcomb. 72 ib. 31; State v. Maine &c. Co., 76 ib. 357 S. C. 19 A. & B. BR. RB. Cas. 312; 49 Am. Rep. 622; Chase v. Maine &c. Oo., 77 Me. 62 8S. ©. 52 Am. Rep. 744; 1 East. Rep. 96; Lesan v. Maine &c. Co., 77 Me. 62 S. C. 1 East. Rep. 100). Massachusetts? (Lane v. Crumbie, 12 Pick. 177; Adams: v. Carlisle, 21 ib. 146; Carsley v. White, ib. 254; Bos- worth v. Swansey, 10 Met. 363; May v. Princeton, 11 ib. 442; Parker v. Adams, 12 ib. 415; Lucas v. New Bedford 1The very proposition, deducible from this case, that, when the plain- tiffs, or both plaintiff's and defendant’s testimony discloses no negligeace or due care upon the part of the plaintiff, the burden of proving contribu- tive negligence is cast upon the defendant, is tantamount to a surrender of the Massachusetts rule, so hastily and inconsiderately taken by that very able court through a misapprehension of Butterfield 9. Forrester, 11 East. 60: for, practically, such negligence is rarely disclosed in the plaintiff's tes— timony, and, even when it does occur there must be a non-suit under But-- terfield o. Forrester, and this emasculates the very point. The question is, does the plaintiff have to show, as a burden of proof, freedom from con- tributory negligence? This case antagonizes the older Iowa decisions, but, as the court does not therein see tit to overrule them, we feel bound to align it in the affirmative. “See next preceding note, as applicable to some of the Maine decisions. In case of death, it is now provided by statute that the plaintiff need not negative contributive negligence (Pub. Stats. c. 112, sec. 212, Com. o. Boston &c. Co., 134 Mass. 211; M’Kimble 2. Boston &c. Co., 189 Mass. 552.. S.C. 21 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 213). RAILWAY LAW. 229 Contributive Negligence: Burden on Plaintiff. Co., 6 Gray, 64 8. C. 66 Am. Dec. 406; Robinson v. Fitchburg &c. Co., 7 Gray, 92; Edwards v. Carr, 13 ib. 234; Gahagan v. Boston &e. Co., 1 Allen, 187 8. 0. 79 Am. Dec. 724; Wilson v. Charleston, 8 Allen, 137; War- ren v. R. R. Co., 1b. 227 8. C. 85 Am. Dee. 700; Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen, 401; Hickey v. R. R. Co., 14 ib. 429; Bigelow v. Rutland, 4 Cush. 247; Gaynor v. Old Colony Co., 100 Mass. 208; Murphy v. Dean, 101 ib. 455; Mayo v. Boston &e. Co., 104 ib. 187; Allyn v. R. BR. Co., 105 a. 77 8. C. 2 Am. R. Rep. 399; Wheelock v. B. &e. Co., 105 ib. 202; Lane v. Atlantic &c. Works, 107 ib. 104; Crafts v. Boston &c. Co., 109 1b. 519; Prentiss v. Boston &e. Co., 112 ib. 43; Hinckley v. R. R. Co., 120 ib. 257; €orcoran v. Boston &e. Co., 133 ib. 507; Wheelwright v. Boston, 135 ib. 225; Stock v. Wood, 136 ib. 353; Copeley ». New Haven &e. Co., 136 1.68. C.19 A. & H.R. R. ‘Cas. 373). Michigan (Detroit &c. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. ‘99, 119; Lake Shore &e. Co. v. Miller, 25 ib. 274 8. C. 5 Am. R. Rep. 478; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32; Michi- gan &c. R. R. Co. v. Coleman, ib. 440; Le. Barron v. Joslin, 41 ib. 313; Teipler v. Hilsendegan, 44 ib. 461; Pzolla v. Michigan &c. Co. 54 Mich. 273 8. C. 19 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 334; Thompson v. Flint &¢. Co., 23 A. & EB. BR. BR. Cas. 289; Mynning v. Detroit &c. Co., 23 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 317; Cf. Mitchell v. Chicago &e. Co. 51 Mich. 236 S. C. 47 Am. Rep. 566). Mississippi (Miss. C. R. R. Co. v. Mason, 51 Miss. 234; Vicksburg &c. Co. v. Hennessey, 54 ib. 391). New York (Johnston v. R. R. Co. 5 Duer, 21; De Bene- -detti v. Manchin, 1 Hilt. 213; Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 234; Robinson v. N. Y. BR. R. Co. 65 ib. 146; Van Lien v. Scoville Man. Co., 14 Abb. Prac. 74; Griffin v. Mayor &c. ©o., 9 N. Y. 456; Button v. R. R. Co., 18 ib. ‘248; Holbrook v. Schenectady &c. Co., 12 N. Y. 236 S. 230 RAILWAY LAW. Contributive Negligence: Burden on Defendant. C. 64 Am. Dee. 502; Johnson v. Hudson R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 65; 6 Duer, 633 S. C. 75 Am. Dec. 375; Curran v. Warren Chemical Co., 36 N. Y. 153; Warner v. R. R.. Co., 44 ib. 465; Gillespie v. City, 54 ib. 468; Reynolds v. R. RB. Co., 58 ib. 248 S. CO. 7 Am. R. Rep. 6; Claflin v.. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260 S. C. 31 Am. Rep. 467; Cordell v. R. R. Co., 75 N. Y. 330 8. C. 19 Alb. L. J. 134; Hale wv. Smith, 78 N. Y. 480; Riceman v. Havemeyer, 84 ib. 6475. Garrison v. Mayor &c., 5 Bosw. 497; Williams v. Hol- land, 22 Howard Pr. 137; Squire v. Cent. Park &¢. R. R. Co., 4 Jones & Sp. 436; Hart v. Hudson &c. Co., 84 N. Y. 56; Jones v. N. Y. &e. Co., 10 Abb. N. C. 200 S. C. 64 How. Pr. 450; Shaw v. Jewett, 6 A.& E.R. BR. Cas. 111; Syracuse &c. Co. v. Tolman, 98 N. Y. 198 S. ©. 23. A. &. E. R. R. Cas. 318). Oregon (Kahn v. Love, 3 Oreg. 206; see also, Walsh v.. O. R. N. Co., 10 ib. 253). The following hold that it is a matter of defence: U. S. Supreme Court (Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall, 401; R. R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. 8. 291; Hough v. R. R.. Co., 100 U. 8. 213). Circuit Court U. S. (Dillon v. Union &e. Co., 3 Dill. 319; Morgan v. Bridge Co., 5 Dill. 96; Secord v. St. Paul &e. Co., 5 McCrary, 515 S. C. 18 Fed. Rep. 221; Knares- borough v. Min. Co., 3 Sawy. 500 S. C. 6 Pitts. Ley. J. 503. 1 N. Y. Week. Dig. 335; Holmes v. 0. C. R. Co., 6 Sawy. 289; Conroy v. Oregon &e. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 71 8. C. 19 Rep. 486; Crew v. St. Louis &c. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 87; Wabash &ec. Co. v. Century &c. Co., 22 Alb. L. J. 963. Rose v. Stephens, 21 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 522). Alabama (Smoot v. Mayor We. Co., 24 Ala. 112; Gover-. nor &e. Co. v. Hanlon, 53 ib. 70; R. RB. Co. v. Shearer, 58 ib. 672; Mobile &c. Co. v. Crenshaw, 65 ib. 567 S. C.. 8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 340; Seals v. Edmondson, 71 Ala. 509; Montgomery &c. Co. v. Chambers, 2 South L. T. 350; East Tenn. &e. Co. v. Clark, 74 Ala. 443 8. ©. 19 RAILWAY LAW. 231 Contributive Negligence: Burden on Defendant. A. & HE. BR. BR. Cas. 345; Thompson v. Duncan, 76 Ala. 334). Arkansas (George v. St. Louis &c. Co., 34 Ark. 613; Texas &c. Co. v. Orr, 46 Ark. 182; Little Rock &c. Co. v. Atkins, tb. 423). California (May v. Hansom, 5 Cal. 360 8S. C. 63 Am. Dec. 135; Gay v. Winter, 34 Cal. 153; Robinson v. Western &c. Co., 48 ib. 409; McQuiliken v. R. BR. Co., 50 ib. 78. C. 16 A. & E. R. R. 353; Fernandes v. Sacra- mento &c. Co., 52 Cal. 45; McDougall v. Cent. R. R- Co., 63 ib. 431 S. C. 12 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 143; 16 Rep. 228; Finn v. Vallejo &e. Co., 7 Cal. 255 8. 0. 10 Pae. C. L. J. 599; Nehrbas v. Central &c. Co., 62 Cal. 330 8. C. 14 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 670). Colorado (Sanderson v. Frazier, 19 Am. L. Rev. 312). Dakota (Mares v. N. P. R. R. Co., 18 Rep. 782; 17 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 620; Sanders v. Reister, 1 Dak. 151). Kansas (Kansas P. R. R. Oo. v. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37; S. P. 9 ib. 620; Kansas &c. Co. v. Phillibert, 25 Kan. 583; St. Louis &e. Co. v. Weaver, 35 ib. 412). Kentucky (Louisville Canal Co. v. Murphy, 9 Bush. 522; Paducah &c. Co. v. Hoehl, 12 ib. 41; Louisville &c. Co. v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 442 8. C. 42 Am. Rep. 227; 14 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 627; Kentucky &c. Co. v. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160; Louisville &c. Co. v. Wolfe, 5 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 625). Maryland (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; Northern &c. Co. v. State, 31 ib. 357; Frech v. R. R. Co., 39 ib. 574 8S. C. 10 Am. R. Rep. 474; North &c. Co. v. Geis, 31 Md. 367; State v. B. & P. &e. Co., 58 tb. 482; Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill, 206; Prince George County v. Burgess, 61 Md. 29; Western &c. Co. v. Carter, 11 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 482). Minnesota (St. Paul v. Kitby, 8 Minn. 154; St. Anthony Falls &c. Co. v. Eastman, 20 ib. 277; Hocum v. Weith- erick, 22 ib. 152; Whittier v. Chicago, 24 1b. 394; Wilson 232 RAILWAY LAW. Contributive Negligence: Burden on Defendant. v. Northern &c. Co., 23 ib. 278 8. C. 387 Am. Rep. 410; 386 in note; 9 Rep. 146). Missouri (Thompson v. R. R. Co., 51 Mo. 190 8.C. 3 Am. R. Rep. 492; Hicks v. Pacific &c. Co., 65 Mo. 34; S. P. 64 ib. 430; Buesching v. St. Louis &e. Co., 73 ib. 219 8. O. 39 Am. Rep. 503; Shuerman v. Missouri R. R. Co., 3 Mo. App. 565; Harrison v. Missouri &e. Co., 74 Mo. 364 8.0.7 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 382). Nebraska (City of Lincoln v. Walker, 18 Neb. 244 S. ©. 20 N. W. Rep. 113). New Hampshire (White v. Concord &c. Co., 30 N. H. 188; Smith v. Haston, 35 ib. 366). New Jersey (Moore v. Cent. &c. Co., 24 N. J. L. 268; Durant v. Palmer, 29 ib. 544; N. J. Ex. Co. v. Nichols, 33 ib. 434; S. P. 32 ib. 166). Ohio (Little Miami &c. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio, (N. 8.) 415; Cleveland &c. R. R. Co. v. Crawford, 24 ib. 631 S. C.7 Am. R. Rep. 172; Baltimore &c. Co. v. Whitacre, 35 Ohio, (N. 8.) 627; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Heiskell, 38 Ohio, (N. 8.) 668. C. 13 A. & H. R. R. Cas. 555; Iron &ec. Co. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio, (N. 8S.) 418 8. C. 38 Am Rep. 597). Pennsylvania (Hays v. Gallagher, 72 Pa. 136; opposing the earlier cases of Waters v. Wing, 59 ib. 211; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 ib. 463; Pa. &c. Co. v. MeTighe, 46 ib. 316; Lehigh &c. Co. v. Hall, 61 ib. 361; and Cleveland Co. v. Rowan, 66 ib. 393). The latest cases sustaining the view that the burden if upon the defendant are: (Pa. Canal Co. v. Bentley, 66 Pa. 30; Pa. &e. Co. v. Weber, 76 ib. 157; S. P. 72 ib. 27 S. C. 8 Am. L. T. BR. (N. S.) 364; Weiss v. Pa. &c. Co., 79 ib. 387; Mallory v. Griffey, 85 ib. 275; see the following other cases in that court: Erie &c. Co. v. Schwingle, 22 ib. 384; Bush v. Johnston, 23 ib. 209; Allen v. Willard, 57 ib. 374; but see however Federal St. &e. Co. v. Gibson, 96 Pa. 83; Baker v. Fehr, 97 ib. 70; Philadelphia &e. Co. v. Boyer, 97 ib. 918. C.2 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 172; 11 Rep. 513). ! RAILWAY LAW. 233 Contributive Negligence: Burden on Defendant. Rhode Island (Cassidy v. Angell, 12 R. I. 447 S. ©. 34 Am. Rep. 690). South Carolina (Dauner v..8. C. &e. Co. 4 Rich. L. 329 . C. 55 Am. Dec. 678; Roof v. R. R. Co., 4 8. C. 61; Carter v. Columbia We. Co., 19 ib. 20 S. C. 45 Am. Rep. 754). Texas (Walker v. Herron, 22 Tex. 55; Texas &e. Co. v. Murphy, 46 ib. 356; Dallas &c. Co. v. Spicker, 61 ib. 427 8. ©. 48 Am. Rep. 297; 18 Rep. 378; 21 A. & H. R. R. Cas. 160; Houston &c. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 293; Cf. Texas &e. Co. v. Crowder, 63 ib. 502). \ Utah (Bowers v. R. R. Co., 20 Rep. 58). Vermont (Lester v. Pittsford, 7 Vt. 158; Barber v. Essex .&e. Co., 27 ib. 62; Hyde v. Jamaica, ib. 443; Hill v. New Haven &c. Co., 37 ib. 500; Walker v. Westfield, 39 ib. ‘246; Bovee v. Danville &e. Co., 53 Vt. 183). Virginia (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Whittington, 30 Gratt. 805; Farrish v. Reigle, 11 Gratt. 697 S. C. 62 Am. Dec. ‘666; Baltimore &c. Co. v. McKenzie, 24 A. & E.R. R. ‘Cas. 395). West Virginia (Snyder v. Pittsburg &c. Co., 11 West Va. 14; Scheff v. City of Huntington, 16 W. Va. 317). Wisconsin (Chamberlaine v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 7 Wis. 425; Dressler v. Davis, 1b. 527). The two above cases holding the Massachusetts’ view were overruled by (Milwaukee &c. Co. v. Hunter, 11 ib. 1608. C. 78 Am. Dec. 699; Achtenhagen v. Watertown We. Co., 18 Wis. 8381 S. C. 86 Am. Dec. 769; Potter v. Chicago &c. Co., 29, Wis. 615; S. P. 21 ib. 372; Castello v. Landwehr, 28 ib. 522; Karasich v. Hasbrone, 29 ib. 569; Wheeler v. Westport, 30 ib. 392; Strahlendorf v. Rosenthal, 1b. 674; Hoyt v. City of Hudson, 41 ib. 105 8. C. 4 Cent. L. J. 573; 22 Am. Rep. 714; Prideaux v. City &e., 43 Wis. 513 ‘8. C. 28 Am. Rep. 558; 6 CO. L. J. 428; Hoth v. Peters, 55 Wis. 405; Randall v. Northwestern &ec. Co., 54 ib. 147). , North Carolina—It is impossible to align the court of 234 RAILWAY LAW, N. Y. and Penn. Cases discussed: Imputable Negligence. this State by any reliable interpretation of their decis-- ions (Owen v. Richmond &e. Co., 88 N. C. 502; Aycock v. Richmond &c. Co., 89 ib. 321; Lawton v. Giles, 90 ib. 374; Turrentine v. Richmond &c. Co., 92 ib. 638 S. C. 23. A. & E. R. R. Cas. 460). The question is now set at. rest by a statute imposing the burden of proof upon the defendant (Session Laws, 1887, chap. 33.). As to the New York cases, Mr. Justice Hunt, (a former Justice of the Court of Appeals of that State), in R. R. Co. v. Gladmon, quotes from the decisions of that State, and seems to gonsider the courts thereof as ranged on the side he was maintaining; but, we think that upon examination of all the cases from that State, the weight of its own authority, though not harmonious,. ranks it as we have placed it. The Pennsylvania Court, by its later decisions, seems. to be gravitating towards the Massachusetts rule. The doctrine, that the burden is upon the defendant, seems to be consistent with principle, and is based upon the settled rules of pleading. For a full exposition of: this view, see Bail. O. Prob. 58-60. In England, the burden is held to be with the defend- ant (Caswell v. Worth, 5 El. & Bl. (85 BE. C. L. R:) 8493. 2 Jur. 116; 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 121; Smith «. St. Lawrence &e. Co. L. R. 5 Priv. ©. C. 308 8. 0. 8 BE. R. (Moak), 236). In 1878, the point was involved in the ease of Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Railway Co. v. Slattery,, L. R. 3 App. Cas. H. of L. 1155, and Ld. PENZANCE,. delivering the opinion of a majority of the Law Lords, holds, quite emphatically, that the onus is with the- defendant, and even the dissentient Lords do not take the contrary view, but one of them (Ld. BLACKBURN), expressly coincides, on this point, with the view of Ld. Penzance (P. 1209). Imputable Negligence.—The question often arises, as to: RAILWAY LAW. 235: Doctrine Maintained. whether the negligence of the parent, or one standing in loco parentis, is imputable to a young child. The following courts maintain, substantially, .the affirmative of this proposition: U. S. Circuit Court (Grethen v. Chicago &e. Co., 19 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 342). Arkansas—Semble (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Freeman, 36. Ark. 411 8. C. 4 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 608—action by parent). California (Kerr v. Parks, 40 Cal. 188; Schierhold v. North &c. Co., ib. 447; Meeks v. Southern Sc. Co., 52; Cal. 602 S. C. 56 ib. 513 S.C. 8 A. & H.R. RB. Cas. 3145. 38 Am. Rep. 67; Potter v. Sutter St. R. RB. Co., 19 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 333). The affirmative of the proposition seems to be assumed by this court, although the decis- ions turn upon the point, as to whether, in each case,. the facts amounted to contributive negligence, on the- part of the parent. Illinois! (Chicago &ec. Co. v. Schumilowsky, 8 Ill App.. 613; Aurora &c. Co. v. Grimes, 13 Tl. 585; Chicago &c. Co. v. Major, 18 ib. 349 8. C. 68 Am. Dec. 353; Chicago: &c. Co. v. Starr, 42 Ill. 174; Chicago &c. Co. v. Gregory, 58 ib. 226; Hund v. Geiler, 72 ib. 393; Chicago &c. Co.. v. Becker, 76 ib. 25 8. C. 84 ib. 482; Ohio &e. Co. v. Stratton, 78 ib. 88 8. C.3C. L. J. 415; Chicago &c. Co.. v. Hesing, 83 Ill. 204; Gavin v. Chicago, 97 ib. 663. Toledo &c. Co. v. Miller, 76 ib. 278; Ross v. Tunis, 26 ib.. 259; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Bumstead, 48 ib. 221; Rock-. ford &c. Co. v. Delaney, 82 ib. 198; Kerr v. Fergue, 54 Ill. 482 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 146). 1Any apparent discrepancy, in the Illinois cases,. is reconciled by ad-- verting to the circumstance that this court takes a distinction between the: children of parents who are able, by nurses, governesses, &c., to keep their offspring out of danger, and those who labor for their living and are com- pelled to let their children shift for themselves: but it is difficult to appre- ciate how, under our American Institutions, the rights of litigants can be: determined by the social status of parents. 236 RAILWAY LAW. Imputable Negligence: Doctrine Asserted. Indiana (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Vining, 27 Ind. 513; LaFayette &c. Co. v. Hoffman, 28 ib. 289; Jeffersonville &e. Co. v. Bowen, 40 ib. 545 8. C. 49 ib. 154; Hathaway v. Toledo &c. Co., 46 ib. 25; Evansville &c. Co. v. Wolf, 59 ib. 89; Cf. Toledo &e. Co. v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185; Evansville v. Crawfordsville &c. Co., 69 Ind. 89). Kansas (Smith v. Atchison &c. Co., 25 Kan. 738 8. C. 4 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 554; Atchison &e. Co. v. Smith, 28 Kan. 541). Kentucky (Louisville &c. Co. v. Murphy, 9 Bush. 522). Maine (Brown v. European &c. Co., 58 Me. 384; Leslie wv. Lewiston, 62 ib. 468; Cf. O’Brien v. McGlenchy, 68 ib. 552). ‘ ae (Baltimore &c. Co. v. McDonnell, 43 Md. 534 S. ©. 14 Am. R. Rep. 272; Bannon v. Baltimore &c. Co., 24 Md. 125; Cf. Baltimore &c. Co. v. State, 30 ib. 53; Dietrich v. Baltimore &c. Co., 58 Md. 347 8. C.11 A. & B. R. B. Cas. 115; McMahon v. Northern &e. Co., 39 Md. 438). Massachusetts (Wright v. Malden, 4 Allen, 283; Lovett v. Salem &c. Co., 9 ib. 557; Callahan v. Bean, ib. 401; Holly v. Boston &c. Co., 8 Gray, 123 S. C. 69 Am. Dec. 233; Mulligan v. Curtis, 100 Mass. 512; Lynch v. Smith, 104 ib. 52 S. C.6 Am. Rep. 188; McGeary v. Eastern &c. Co., 135 ib. 363 S. 0.15 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 407; O’Con- nor v. Boston &c. Co.,! 135 Mass. 352 8. 0.15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 362; Cf. Tyler v. N. Y. &c. Co., 137 Mass. 238; Elkins v. Boston &e. Co., 115 Mass. 190). Minnesota (Fitzgerald v. St. Paul &e. Co., 29 Min. 336 8. C.8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 310; 14 Rep. 592; 43 Am. Rep. 212). This case seems in its reasoning to be in conflict with, and substantially overrules, the two previous cases of City &c. v. Kirby, 8 Minn. 166, and Keffe v. Mil- waukee We. Co., 21 ib. 207 S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 393. It is, indeed, remarkable that neither of these cases is noticed 1TIn this case, there is evident sign of weakening on this point, as on the general view of contributive negligence. RAILWAY LAW. 237 Imputable Negligence: Doctrine Denied. in the opinion. Mr. Beach, (Con. Neg.) aligns this court as we have, but Dr. Wharton cites it in the negative. New York (Hartfield v. Roper,! 21 Wend. 615 S. ©. 34 Am. Dec. 273; 2 Thomp. Neg. 1121; Thurber v. Harlem &c. Co., 60 N. Y. 326 S. C. 10 Am. BR. Rep. 126; Man- gam v. Brooklyn &e. Co., 36 Barb. 239 S. C. 38 N. Y. 456; Lehman v. Brooklyn &e. Co., 29 N. Y.237; Mowrey v. Central &e. Co., 66 ib. 43; McLain v. Van Zant, 7 J. & S. 351; MeGary v. Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104 8S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 510; Morrison v. Erie &c. Co., 56 N. Y. 302; Honesberger v. Second Avenue R. R. Co., 1 Keyes, 552 8. C. 33 How. Pr. 193; 2 Abb. App. Dec. 378; Burke v. Broadway &c. Co., 49 Barb. 532; Kreig v. Wells, 1 B. D. Smith, 77; Ib] v. Forty-Second St. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 323 8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 460; Feilon v. Central &c. Co., 64 N. Y. 13; Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255 8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 361; Jetter v. New York &e. Co., 2 Abb. App. 458; Drew v. Sixth Ave. &e. Co., 26 N. Y. 49; Downs v. New York &e. Co., 47 N. Y. 83; Munger v. Tonawanda &c. Co., 4 N. Y. 349 S. ©. 53 Am. Dec. 384; Bulger v. Albany &c. Co., 42 N. Y. 459; Flynn v. Hatton, 4 Daly, 552; Castello v. Syracuse &c. Co., 65 Barb. 92; Brown »v. Maxwell, 6 Hill, 592 S. C. 41 Am. Dec. 771; Button v. Hudson &c. Co., 18 N. Y. 251). The following courts repudiate this doctrine: England? (Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. (41 EH. 0. L. BR.) 29 S. C. 2 Thomp. Neg. 1140; Big. L. C. Torts, 729; but distinguish Waite v. Northeastern &c. Co., El. Bl. & El. 719; Cf. Abbott v. Macfie, and Hughes v. Macfie, 33 1 This, the initial case, has been severely criticised. Indeed, the later de- cisions of this State point to a relaxation of the doctrine of this case (Cf. Casey v. New York &c. Co., 15 Daily Reg. 301; Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 258 S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 361). 2The doctrine of Lynch ». Nurdin has been somewhat toned down by later decisions, notably (Mangan »v. Atterton, L. R. (1 Ex.) 239; Waite o. Northeastern &c. Co., and Singleton v. East Counties &c., 7 C. B. (N. 8.) 287). 238 RAILWAY LAW. Imputable Negligence: Doctrine Denied. L. J. Ex. 177; Mangan v. Atterton, L. R. 1 Ex. 239; ‘Gardner v. Rose, 1 F. & F. 359). Supreme Court U. 8. (Sioux &e. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 S. C. 2 Dill. C. C. 294; 11 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 226; Cf. RB. RB. Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401). Aiabama (Government &c. Co. v. Hanlen, 53 Ala. 70). Connecticut (Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507 S.C. 50 Am. Dec. 261; Daley v. Norwich &c. Co., 26 Conn. 591 ‘§. ©. 68 Am. Dec. 413; Bronson v. Southbury, 37 Conn. 199). Iowa (Walters v. Chicago &c. Co., 41 Iowa, 61; Cf. MeMillan v. Burlington &ec. Co., 46 ib. 231). Michigan (Kast Saginaw &c. Co. v. Bohn, 27 Mich. 503 §. C. 10 Am. BR. Rep. 309; 12 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 745; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32). Missouri (Farris v. Cass &¢c. Co., 8 Mo. App. 589; Boland v. Missouri &c. Co., 36 Mo. 484; Frick v. St. Louis &c. Co., 75 ib. 542, 595 8. C.8 A. & EH. R. BR. Cas. 280; Koons v. St. Louis &c. Co., 65 Mo. 392; Isabel v. Hannibal &c. Co., 60 Mo. 475 8S. C. 2 C. L. J. 590; 9 Am. R. Rep. 261; O’Flaherty v. Union &e. Co., 45 Mo. 74; Cf. Stillson v. Hanibal &c. Co.,! 67 ib. 671; 7 C. L. J. 107). Nebraska (Mayer v. Missouri &c. Co., 2 Neb. 337; Huff ‘vy. Ames, 16 Neb. 139 8. C. 49 Am. Rep. 716; 19 N. W. Rep. 623). Ohio (Bellafontaine &c. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio, (N. 8S.) 399; 24 ib. 670; 7 Am. R. Rep. 186, note; Cleveland Wc. ‘Co. v. Manson, 30 Ohio, (N. 8.) 451 8. C. 6 Rep. 470; St. Claire &c. Co. v. Eadie, 23 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 269). Pennsylvania (North &c. Co. v. Mahoney, 57 Pa. 187 S. 1The head-note of the Stillson Case is misleadingly too broad. The general principle, in denial of the doctrine, had been previously adjudged, but, in this case, the father was present and pointed out to his infant child, the exact place where she was to cross the track, and she was following his directions when the accident happened. Of course, on these facts, there could be no recovery. RAILWAY LAW. 239 Imputable Negligence: Doctrine Denied. C. 6 Phila. 242; Kay v. Penn. &c. Co., 65 Pa. 269 S. C. 3 Am. Rep. 628; Penn. &c. Co. v. Kelley, 31 Pa. 372; Rauch v. Lloyd, ib. 358 S. C. 72 Am. Dec. 747; Phila. &e. Co. v. Spearin, 47 Pa. 300; Smith v. O’Connor, 48 4b. ‘218; Phila. &c. Co. v. Long, 75 Pa. 257; Smith v. Hes- tonville &c. Co., 92 ib. 450 8. 0.10 C. L. J. 272; 9 Rep. 454; 2 A. & EH. RB. R. Cas. 12; 37 Am. Rep. 705; Glassey v. Hestonville &c. Co., 57 Pa. 172; Pittsburg &e. Co. v. ‘Caldwell, 74 ib. 421; Penn. &c. Co. v. Bock, 93 ib. 427 S. C.6 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 20; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Pearson, 72 Pa. 169; Penn. &c. Co. v. James, 81 ib. 94; Heston- ville &c. Co. v. Kelley, 17 0. L. J. 150; Cauley v. Pitts- ‘burg &e. Co., 12 C. L. J. 281; 14 West. Jur. 546; 2 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 4; 4 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 533). Tennessee (Whirley v. Whitman, 1 Head, 610; Hast ‘Tenn. &c. Co. v. St. John, 5 Sneed, 524). Texas (Galveston &c. Co. v. Moore, 59 Tex. 64 8. C. 46 Am. Rep. 265; 10 A. & EH. B. RB. Cas. 745; 16 C. L. J. ‘273; 1 Tex. L. Rev. 145; Texas &c. Co. v. O'Donnell, 58 ‘Tex. 28; Houston &c. Co. v. Simpson, 60 ib. 103; Texas .&e. Co. v. Herbeck, 60 ib. 612; Evansich v. Gulph &c. ‘Co., 57 ib. 126 S. C. 6 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 182; 44 Am. Rep. 586). Vermont (Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213 8. C. 54 Am. Dee. 67; 2 Thomp. Neg. 1129; Cf. Glidden v. Redding, 38 Vt. 52). Wisconsin—Negligence of parents is for the jury to dertermine (Hoppe v. Chicago &c. Co., 61 Wis. 357; 19 A. & BE. B.R. Cas. 75; Dahl v. Milwaukee Se. Co., 9 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 121; Schmidt v. Milwaukee Se. Co., 23 Wis. 186; Ewens v. Chicago &c. Co., 38 ib. 613; Johnson v. Chicago &c. Co., 49 ib. 529 8. C.1 A. & E.R. R. ‘Cas. 155). In order to arrive at the true solution of this vexed question, we should first ascertain whether any act of the parent, or one standing in loco parentis, can amount 240 RAILWAY LAW. Rationale. to contributive negligence on the part of the infant. Now it is unanimously agreed, that if the parent is present, and the child acted under his direction or immediate control, the infant cannot recover. What. difference, in principle, can there be between the in- stance of a parent who, at the track, ‘directs his infant child to cross the track, whereby it is injured, and the case of the parent, who at his house, one hundred yards or a mile off, sends him to a point, to gain which, he must cross the track of a railroad, traversed every few minutes by trains? There might be none, or there might be a great deal. This would depend greatly upon the age, intelligence, quickness and prudence of the child.1 Again, suppose there is no errand, but the child of poor parents, without nurse, wanders off and on to a railroad track, how can it be predicated of any such, and other, illustrations, that the parent is guilty of contributive negligence, and so imputable to the child? The cases, as they arise, are kaleidoscopic, and it would seem better, in all cases, to leave the question to the jury, and quite a number of cases support this view (Drew v. Sixth Avenue &c. Co., 26 N. Y. 49; Lynch v. Smith, 104 Mass. 52 S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 188; Mulligan v. Curtis, 100 Mass. 512; Schierhold v. North &e. Co., 4 Cal. 447; Waite v. North &c. Co., Hl. Bl. & El. 719; Callahan v. Bean, 9 Conn. 101; Boland v. Missouri &c. Co., 36 Mo. 484; Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213 8. C. 54 Am. Dec. 67; Mangan v. Brooklyn &c. Co. 36. Barb. 239 S. C. 38 N. Y. 456; Ihl v. 42d St. R. RB. Co., 47 N. Y. 317, 323 8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 450; Pittsburg &e. Co. v. Bumstead, 48 Ill. 221; McGeary v. Eastern &c. 1This is most admirably illustrated by DuBoisgobey, in his “Old Age of Monsieur Lecogq,” in the scene where the little child “spreads” herself on the track before the approaching engine, and is unharmed, although it passes over her body. RAILWAY LAW. 241 Question for Jury: Identification. Co., 1385 Mass. 363; Smith v. Atchison &c. Co., 25 Kan. 738; Pittsburg We. Co. v. Pearson, 72 Pa. 169; Chicago &c. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 226; St. Louis v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41 8. ©. 4 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 608; Johnson v. Chicago, 49 Wis. 529 S. C. 1 A. & EH. BR. R. Cas. 155; Frick v. St. Louis, 75 Mo. 542, 595 8.0.8 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 280; Oldfield v. Harlem &c. Co., 14 N. Y. 310; Hynes v. San Francisco &c. Co., 65 Cal. 316 8S. C. 20 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 486; Com v. Metropolitan R. R. Co., 107 Mass. 236; Williams v. Texas &c. Co., 60 Tex. 205 8. C. 15 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 403; Hunt v. Salem, 125 Mass. 294; Pendergast v. N. Y. &c. Co., 58 N. Y. 652; Kay v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 65 Pa. 269 8. C. 3 Am. Rep. 628; Fallon v. Central &c. Co., 64 N. Y. 13; O’Connor v. Boston &e. Co., 135 Mass. 352 S. 0.15 A. & E. Rt. BR. Cas. 362; Haycroft v. Lake Shore &c. — Co., 64 N. Y. 636; Jetter v. N. Y. &c. Co., 2 Abb. App. Cas. 358; Bahrenburg v. Brooklyn &c. Co., 56 N. Y. 652; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33; Donoho v. Vulcan &c. Co., 7 Mo. App. 447; such also seems to have been the views of that consummate Jurist, DILLON; Sioux &e. Co. v. Stout, 2 Dill. C. C. 294; Morgan »v. Illinois &e. Co., 5 ib. 96). It should not escape observation that a distinction must be noted between actions, brought in the name of the infant, which are the kind we have discussed, and those brought by parents. There is no appreciable discrepancy on the point that parents, in such case, stand, as to their own contributive negligence, as if the injury was done to themselves. The rationale of the question will be found discussed by Judge Bigelow with his usual ability (Big. L. C. Torts, 729, et seq.). Identification of Passenger with Carrier—The rule former- ly prevailed in England and in several of the States, that a passenger, by assuming that relation, becomes so far 16 242 RAILWAY LAW. Thorogood ». Bryan. identified with his carrier, that the negligence of the latter in an action by such passenger against another, through whose negligence an injury to him has occurred, is im- putable to him.1 The leading case in which this doctrine was promul- gated is Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115 (65 E. C. L. R.) S. 0. 18 L. J. (C. P.) 336, and Thomp. Car. Pas. 273. It was followed in England by Waite v. N. E. &c. Co., El. Bl. & El. 719 (96 E. C. L. R.); Armstrong r. Lancashire &c. Co., L. R. (10 Ex.) 47 8. C. 12 E. R. (Moak), 508; Child v. Hearn, L. R. (9 Ex.) 176; Nichols v. Great Western &c. Co., 27 U. C. (Q. B.) 382; and was, until quite recently, regarded as the settled law of the English Common Law Courts. Its doctrine was rejected by the High Court of Admir- alty (Milan, 1 Lush. Adm. 388, 403 8S. C. 5 L. T. (N.S.) 590); and by the Scotch Courts (Hay v. LeNeve, 2 Shaw, Scotch Appeals, 395, 405; Brown v. McGregor, F. C. 1813; Hay, 10); and finally overruled by the Court of Appeals (Bernina, 12 Prob. Div. 58, reported in 57 Am. Rep. 494, et seq.). The following text-books are unfavorable to the doc- trine of Thorogood v. Bryan: (Beach, Con. Neg. secs. 34-37; Shear. and Red. Neg.? sec. 46; Law L. C. (Com. Law), 236; Pierce, Rail. 282; Thomp. Car. Pas. 284, sec. 2; Wood, M. & S. 632; 2 Wood,? R. L. 1340; Hutch. Car. sec. 672; 1 Smith, L. C. (6th Eng. Ed.) 266, (6th Am. Ed.) 450, (4th Eng. Ed. 220; Whart. Neg.* sec. 395, note 'Mr. Shirley most humorously puts the reductio ad absurdum, and, quot- ing a distinguished novelist, exclaims, “such is the law!” (Shirl, L. C. 258). *But Judge Redfield, in his work on Railways, Vol. 2, p. 230, sec. 9 (4th Ed.), and Carriers, secs. 364, 466, incorporates the doctrine of Thorogood ». Bryan, into his text. 3In his edition of Brown on Carriers, Mr. Wood leaves the text of his author, favoring Thorogood v. Bryan, unchallenged. His later work re- pudiates it. 4Jn his work on Agency, Dr, Wharton says that the question discussed is one of much difficulty (sec. 423). RAILWAY LAW. 243 Thorogood v. Bryan: Adopted. 6; Big. Torts, 317; Big. L. C. Torts, 728, 729; Bail. O. P. 61). The principle of Thorgood v. Bryan, is incorporated into the text of the following treatises: (2 Red. Rail. 230, et seg.; Red. Car. secs. 364, 466; Ang. Car. sec. 561; 1 Add. Torts,! sec. 533; Browne, Car. (Wood), 513, 522; Smith, M. & S.2 162; 2 Greenl. Ev. sec. 232a). Judge Cooley is non-committal (Cool. Torts, 684). The doctrine under discussion has been, in this country, adopted orejected as indicated below. Adopted in: Arkansas (Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark. 118 8. ©. 60 Am. Dec. 560). This decision only: applied, however, to the case of a shipper and is cited in that behalf. Iowa—Semble (Artz v. Chicago &e. Co., 34 Iowa, 153; ‘Cf. Payne v. Chicago &e. Co., 39 ib. 523). Pennsylvania (Simpson uv. Hand, 6 Whart. 311 8. C. 36 Am. Dee. 231; Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. 151, Phila. &c. Co. v. Boyer, 97 ib. 918. C.2 A. & E. R. R. ‘Cas. 172). Rejected in: Supreme Court U.S. (Washington v. Geegory: 9 Wall. 513; Little v. Hackett, 116 U. 8. 366 8. C. 21 Rep. 129; 54 Am. Rep. 135). California (Tompkins v. Clay St. &c. Co., 66 Cal. 163 S. 0.19 Rep. 70; 18 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 144). Illinois (Wabash &ec. Co. v. Shacklett, 105 Ill. 364 8. C. 44 Am. Rep. 791; 12 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 166). Indiana? (Town of Albion v. Hetrick, 90 Ind. 545 8. C. 46 Am. Rep. 230). Kentucky (Danville &c. Co. v. Stewart, 2 Met. 119; Louisville &c. Co. v. Chase, 9 Bush. 728). 1 1The author cites his previous work for what it may be worth. 2 Quoting, however, the criticism of Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith says, “it may indeed be doubted how far the case in which ithis decision was arrived at, will be supported.” ~ 244 RAILWAY LAW. Rejected. Maryland (Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Hogeland, reported substantially in 57 Am. Rep. 492, et seq.). Massachusetts—This court has generally been ranked on the other side, and the case of Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621 S. C. 13 Am. Dec. 464, cited to that end, but, as pungently remarked by Mr. Beach, “it has nothing to do with the question” (Beach, Con. Neg. sec. 35, note: 3). The doctrine was squarely rejected in Eaton v. Bos- ton &c. Co., 11 Allen, 500. It is to be noted, however,. that Thorogood v. Bryan, though cited by counsel, is not alluded to in the opinion, and that it is cited in a later case (Allyn v. Boston &c. Co., 105 Mass. 77 S. C. 2 Am. Rail. Rep. 399, 402). Michigan (Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 596 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 178). Minnesota (Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81; Foll- man v. City, 57 Am. Rep. 488n). New Hampshire! (Ricker v. Freeman, 50 N. H. 4205S. C.. 9 Am. Rep. 267). New Jersey (Bennett v. N. J. &e. Co., 36 N. J. L. 225 S.. C. 13 Am. Rep. 435; Thomp. Car. Pas. 281; N. Y. &e. Co. v. Steinbrenner, 47 N. J. L. 161 8. C. 54 Am. Rep. 126). New York (Chapman v. N. H. &c. Co., 19 N. Y. 341 S. ©. 75 Am. Dec. 344; Colegrove v. N. Y. &e. Co., 6 Duer,. 382 8S. C. 20 N. Y. 492; 75 Am. Dec. 418; Robinson v. N. Y. &e. Co., 66 N. Y. 11 8. C. 23 Am. Rep. 1; 3. C. L. J. 441; Webster v. Hudson &c. Co., 38 N. Y. 260; Barrett v. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 628; Spooner v. Brook- lyn &e. Co., 54 N. Y. 230 8. C.13 Am. Rep. 570; Dyer v. Erie &e. Co. 71 N. Y. 228; Sheridan v. Brook- ‘Although these cases do not decide the very point, yet, the principle- decided, as well as the reasoning embraced in them, we think, authorize their alignment,as above. Mr. Beach takes a different view as to Wiscon- sin (Beach Con. Neg. sec. 35). Tbe Prideaux case is commented on in the text infra. RAILWAY LAW. 245 Weight of Authority against Thorogood »v. Bryan. lyn &c. Co., 36 N. Y. 39; Metcalf v. Baker, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. 8.) 431; Masterson v. N. Y. &c. Co., 84 N. Y. 247 S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 510; Knapp v. Dagg, 18 How. Pr. 165). Ohio! (Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 Ohio, (N. 8S.) 86S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 558; 3 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 335; Street &e. Co. v. Hadie, 43 Ohio, (N. 8.) 91S. C. 54 Am. Rep. 802). Wisconsin? (Prideaux v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 8S. C. 28 Am. Rep. 558; 6 ©. L. J. 428; but see Otis %. Janesville, 47 Wis. 422). While the great weight of authority is shown to have discarded Thorogood v. Bryan, perhaps it is more evenly balanced when applied to an injury caused to goods shipped. Such is, indeed, the view taken, by some of the courts which reject the doctrine of the identifi- eation of the passenger (Beach, Con. Neg. sec. 37; Vanderplank v. Miller, 1 M. & M. 169 (22 BE. ©. L. R.); Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark. 118 S. C. 60 Am. Dec. 560; Arctic &c. Co. v. Austin, 69 N. Y. 470 8S. ‘C. 25 Am. Rep. 221; Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 311 S. C. 36 Am. Dec. 231). For the reasons assigned by him in his work on the Onus Probandi, page 61, the author conceives that the term “absurd,” as employed by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Transfer Co. v. Kelly, supra, with reference to the doctrine of identification, is not too antense. There is also a discrepancy in judical thought, on the application of the doctrine enunciated in Thoro- 1 Ohio is classified, generally, in the text-books as having adopted Thoro- good v. Bryan, and the cases of Cleveland &c. Co. v. Terry, 8 Ohio, (N. 8.) 570, and Puterbaugh ». Reasor, 9 7b. 484, are cited therefor, but though seemingly tending that way, the cases cited in the text squarely reject athe doctrine. *See Note 1, page 244. 246 RAILWAY LAW. Riding by Invitation: Prideaux Case. good v. Bryan, to the case of persons seeking redress for injuries occasioned by a third person, the negli- gence of the driver or manager of the vehicle con- curring, when the plaintiff was so riding by invitation. The right to recover, in such cases, is recognized or denied as indicated below: Recognized: Michigan (Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 596 S. C. 41 Am.. Rep. 178). ; Minnesota (Follman v. City, 57 Am. Rep. 488, et seq.). New York (Dyer v. Erie &c. Co., 71 N. Y. 228; Robin- son v. N. Y. &c. Co., 66 ib. 11S. 0. 28 Am. Rep. 1; Met-. calf v. Baker, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. 8S.) 431; Sheridan ». Brooklyn &c. Co., 36 N. Y. 39; Knapp v. Dagg, 18 How.. Pr. 165). . Ohio (St. Clair &c. Co. v. Eadie, 43 Ohio, (N. 8.) 91 8.. C. 54 Am. Rep. 144). Pennsylvania (Borough &c. Co. v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. 544 S. C. 57 Am. Rep. 483). Denied: Iowa (Payne v. Chicago &e. Co., 39 Iowa, 523; Artz v.. Chicago &ec. Co., 34 ib. 153), Wisconsin (Prideaux v. City, 43 Wis. 513 S. C. 28 Am. Rep. 558; 6 ©. L. J. 428). Notwithstanding the weight of authority the Prideaux case seems to stand upon the sounder reasoning. It is. true that the party invited to ride has no control over the driver, but, does he not voluntarily assume all risks—. or may it not be fairly construed as a joint undertaking ? It is noticeable that although the Pennsylvania Court stands almost alone in its full endorsement of Thoro-. good v. Bryan, in its application to carriers, it upholds. the action when the plaintiff accepted an invitation to. ride and was injured, the negligence of the driver con- tributing thereto—presenting the singular anomaly of ; RAILWAY LAW. 247 Comparative Negligence: Adopted. holding that a man who travels on business by a public conveyance, over which he can exercise no control is barred from maintaining an action for injuries caused by the concurrent negligence of a third person and his carrier, but that the idle youth who jumps into his friend’s buggy for a drive to Fairmount Park, if similarly injured, can maintain an action therefor. The Ohio case was that of a daughter riding with her father, who drove, and is distinguished by the court from the case of Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Ohio, (N. 8.) 484, the facts in that case being that the driver was the servant of the plaintiff. This court as shown supra repudiates Thorogood v. Bryan in this, as well as in the St. Clair case. That case is clearly distinguishable, as the daughter was under the father’s control, and her father not under hers. Comparative Negligence.—If the defendant is shown not to have used ordinary care, and the plaintiff has been guilty of contributive negligence, if only slight as com- pared with that of defendant, can he recover? The following courts maintain the affirmative: Georgia!—In a modified form (Macon &c. Co. v. Davis, 18 Ga. 679, 686 S. C. 27 Ga. 113; Central &e. Co. v. Gleason, 69 Ga. 200; Macon v. Johnson, 38 ib. 409; Rome &e. Co. v. Dodd, 58 ib. 238; Augusta &c. Co. v. McElmory, 24 ib. 75; Cf. Young v. Kinney, 28 ib. 111; Central &c. Co. v. Brinson, 10 Ga. 207 S. C. 19 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 42). Ilinois (Haywood v. Miller, 94 Ill. 349 S. C. 34 Am. Rep. 229; Stratton v. Central &c. Co. 95 Ill. 25; Chicago &e. Co. v. Dimick, 96 ib. 42; Chicago &c. Co. v. John- son, 103 ib. 512; Chicago v. Stearns, 105 ib. 554; Chicago &e. Co. v. Clark, 108 ib. 113; Chicago &c. Co. ». Langley, 2 Bradw. 505; North Chicago &c. Co. v. 1We have followed the alignmerft of Dr. Wharton (Neg. sec. 384). Judge Thompson places the decisions of this court in the negative (2 Neg. 1165, sec. 15). 248 RAILWAY LAW. Same—Rejected. Monk, 4 ib. 664; Chicago &c. Co. Lewis, 5 ib. 242; Glover v. Gray, 9 ib. 329). See a complete collec- tion of the Illinois cases in Beach Con. Neg. 82, 83. Oregon—Semble (Bequette v. Peoples &c. Co., 2 Oreg. 200; Holstien v. Oregon &c. Co., 8 ib. 163). The following courts hold the negative of the propo- sition: Alabama (Gothard v. Alabama &c. Co., 67 Ala. 114). Indiana (Penn. &e. Co. v. Roney, 89 Ind. 453 S. C. 46 Am. Rep. 173; Louisville &c. Co. v. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598; Terre Haute v. Graham, 95 Ind. 286 8S. C. 48 Am. Rep. 719; 12 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 77; Cf. Bruker v. Town &c., 69 Ind. 33 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 202; Bedford &c. Co. v. Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551 8. C. 21 A. & HE. R. R. Cas. 466). Iowa (O'Keefe v. Chicago &c. Co. 32 Iowa, 467 S. C. 10 Am. R. Rep. 63; Artz v. Chicago &c. Co., 38 Iowa, 293 8. ©. 5 Am. R. Rep. 469; Johnson v. Tillson, 36 Iowa, 89; Cf. Hughes v. Muscatine County, 44 ib. 672). Kansas! (Kansas &c. Co. v. Peavey, 29 Kan. 1708. C. 11 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 260; Atchison &c. Co. v. Morgan, 31 ib. 77 S.C. 13 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 499). Kentucky—Semble (Kentucky &c. Co. v. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160 8S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 208). Maryland (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Andrews, 39 Md. 329 S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 568, 576; Geis’ Case, 31 Md. 366; but see, Baltimore We. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 35 ib. 32). Massachusetts (Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44 S. C. 5 Rep. 596). Michigan (Mynning v. Detroit &e. Co., 23 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 317). Missouri (Donahoe v. Wabash &c. Co. 83 Mo. 560 8. C. 53 Am. Rep. 594). 1Mr. Beach, in his superb treatise on Contributory Negligence, after a review of all the cases, except Morgan’s, concludes that this court has sub- stantially adopted the affirmative of the doctrine under discussion, but, in view of its express repudiation of the previous cases on the doctrine under discussion, we feel compelled to align it in the negative. RAILWAY LAW. 249 Injury to Stock. New Jersey (Penn. &ce. Co. v. Righter, 42 N. J. L. 180 S.C.2 A. & BE. R. BR. Cas. 220; New Jersey &c. Co. v. Nichols, 33 4b. 434). New York! (Wilds v. Hudson &c. Co., 24 N. Y. 432; Cf. Hudson v. Union Ferry &c. Oo., 47 ib. 176 8. 0.7 Am. Rep. 435; Haley v. Earle, 30 ib. 208; Chapman »v. New Haven &c. Co., 19 ib. 341 S: C. 75 Am. Dec. 344). Pennsylvania (R. R. &c. Co. v. Norton, 24 Pa. 469; Stiles v. Gersey, 71 1b. 439; Potter v. Warner, 91 ib. 362 8. C. 36 Am. Rep. 668; Cf. Pittsburg v. Grier 22 Pa. 54). Tennessee (Nashville v. Wheless, 10 Lea, 741 S. C. 43 Am. Rep. 317; Dush v. Fitzhugh, 2 ib. 307; Whirley v. Whiteman, 1 Head, 610; Railroad Co. ». Walker, 11 Heisk. 383; Hill v. Nashville &c. Co., 9 ib. 823; Louis- wille &c. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea, 128 S.C.18 A. & E.R. R. Cases, 847; Hast Tennessee &c. Co. v. Fair, 12 Lea, 35; Jackson v. Nashville, 13 Lea, 491 8. C. 49 Am. Rep. 663; Cf. Hast Tennessee &c. Co. v. Humphreys, 12 Lea, 200 8.0.15 A. & EH. BR. BR. Cas. 472; Smith v. Nashville -&e. Co., 12 Lea, 174). But when the negligence is slight, but not sufficient to preclude a recovery, it may yet be considered in re- ‘duction of damages. Texas (Houston &c. Co. v. Gorbett, 44 Tex. 575). Wisconsin? (Potter v. Chicago &c. Co., 21 Wis. 372 S. ‘©. 22 ib. 615; Cunningham v. Lyness, 22 ib. 245). Injury to Stock.— While there is a glaring discrepancy an the result of the decisions upon this question, it will be found upon a critical examination, that it is more ap- parent than real. By the common law of England, stock were required to be kept up, and hence it would follow that, indepen- 1The decisions are not uniform, but we think the weight of authority inter sese justifies our alignment. 2The earlier cages were the other way (Stucke v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 9 “Wis. 202; Milwaukee &c. Co. ». Hunter, 11 7. 160). 250 RAILWAY LAW. Railroad. Fires. dently of gross negligence, railway companies would not be liable for an injury done to them in running their trains. But our ancestors, upon the settlement of this country, repudiated the common law, as above- stated, and allowed stock free range. Unless, therefore,,. this American Common Law has been changed by statute, such companies could be held for negligent injuries. We know, however, that in the northern, and a large portion of the southern, section of the United States, the English Common Law has been restored by what are known as the “stock” or “fence” laws.. Hence, where they prevail, the principles of the- ancient common law are applicable. It would there-. fore be superfluous to cite the various decisions which are, in the main, in harmony in principle, and only diverge in the result attained. Consult 3 Wood, R. L. chap. 27. RAILROAD FIRES. I. Sparks from Passing Train.—If a damaging fire be shown. to have been propagated by sparks emitted from the- engine of a passing railroad train of a chartered com- pany, does such proof raise a presumption of negli-. gence? The affirmative of this proposition is held by the- following authorities: England (Aldridge v. Great Western &c. Co., 3 M. & G. (42 E. C. L. R.) 515; Pigott v. Bastern Gonneles &e. Co., 3 0. B. (54 E. OC. L. BR.) 229; Gibson v. South- Eastern &e. Co. 1 F. & F. 23; Cf. Smith v. London &c. Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 14; Duinmack, North &e. Co., 4 F.. & F. 1063). Illinois! (Bass v. Chicago &c. Co., 28 Ill. 9; Mlinois. &e. Co. v. Mills, 42 ib. 407; Chicago &c. Co. v. Quain-- 1 Based on Statutes passed, incorporating the principle decided. RAILWAY LAW. 251. R. R. Fires: Presumption of Negligence. tance, 58 ib. 389; Chicago &c. Co. v. McCahill, 56 ib. 283. St. Louis &c. Co. v. Montgomery, 39 Ill. 335; Chicago. &c. Co. v. Clampit, 63 ib. 95; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Camp-- bell, 86 ib. 443; Toledo &c. Co. v. Larman, 67 ib. 68;, Chicago &c. Co. v. Bennett, 94 ib. 448). Indiana (Pittsburg S&c. Co. v. Noel, 77 Ind. 110; Pitts- burg &c. Co. v. Hixon,! 79 ib. 111 8.0.8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 717). Maryland (Baltimore &e. Co. v. Woodruff, 4 Md. 242 8. C. 59 Am. Dee. 72; 2 Am. R. R. Cas. 30; Baltimore &c. Co. v. Dorsey, 37 ib. 19; Annapolis &c. Co. v. Gantt, 39: ib. 119; Baltimore &c. Co. v. Shipley, ib. 251; Green Ridge &c. Co. v. Brinkman, 64 Md. 52 S. C. 54 Am. Rep. 755; 23 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 342). Massachusetts—In this State the subject is regulated by statute, and in the decisions the court constantly avoids. any dictum as to the rule at common law (Hart v. Western &c. Co., 13 Met. 99 S. C. 46 Am. Dec. 719; Perley v. Eastern &c. Co., 98 Mass. 414). Attention is. exceptionally called to this statute, as even the silence of this great court is appreciable. Minnesota? (Wordsou v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 21 Minn. 60; Karson v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 20 Minn. 12 S. C. 13. Rep. 432; 7 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 501; Sibilrud v. Minn. &c. Co., 29 Minn. 58 8. C.7 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 499). Mississippi? (Mobile &c. Co. v. Gray, 62 Miss. 383 S. C. 23 A. & B. R. R. Cas. 378). Missouri? (Bedford v. Hanibal &c. Co., 46 Mo. 4563. Fitch v. Missouri &c. Co., 45 ib. 322; Clemens v. Hani- bal &c. Co., 53 ib. 366 8S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 460; Coates v, Missouri &c. Co., 61 Mo. 38 S. C. 3.C. L. J. 209; Coale v. Hanibal &c. Co., 60 Mo. 227 S. C. 9 Am. R. Rep. 210; 1 Overruling Indianapolis &c. Co. ». Paramore, 31 Ind. 143. 2A statute has been passed, enacting substantially, that evidence of fires, caused by sparks emitted from passing trains, devolves the burden. of proof on the defendant. 3 Based on statutes passed, incorporating the principle decided. 252 RAILWAY LAW. Such Presumption denied. Kenney v. R. R. Co. 75 Mo. 243 8. C. 11 C. L. J. 172; ‘Poeppers v. Missouri &c. Co., 67 Mo. 715 8. C. 29 Am. Rep. 518; 6 Rep. 589). Nebraska (Burlington &c. Co. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268). Nevada (Lonobaugh v. R. R. Co., 9 Nev. 271). New Jersey! (Wiley v. West Jersey We. Co., 44 N. J. L. 247), North Carolina (Ellis v. P. & R. &c. Co., 2 Ired. 138; Anderson v. Steamboat Co. 64 N. C. 399; Aycock », Railroad Co., 89 ib. 321; Cf Lawton v. Giles, 90 ib. 374). South Carolina (McCready v. South Carolina &c. Co., 2 Strob. 356; Brown v. Atlanta &c. Co., 19 S. C. 383 S. C. 13 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 479; 17 Rep. 569). Tennessee (Burke v. Louisville &c. Co., 7 Heisk. 451 S. €.19 Am. Rep. 618; Simpson v. East Tenn. &c. Co., 5 Lea, 455). Utah (Anderson v. Wasatch &c. Co. 2. Utah, 518). Vermont (Cleveland v. Grand Trunk &c. Co., 42 Vt. 449), Wisconsin (Spaulding v. Chicago &c. Co., 30 Wis. 110 S.C. 11 Am. Rep. 550; 7 Am. R. Rep. 507; Galpen v. Chicago &c. Co., 19 Wis. 604; Kellogg v. Chicago &c. Co. 26 Wis. 223 8. C. 2 Am. R. Rep. 483; 7 Am. Rep. 69; Erd v. Chicago &c. Co., 41 Wis. 65; Johnson v. Chicago &e. Co., 56 Wis. 274 S.C. 16 N. W. Rep. 488; 13 A. & H. R. R. Cas. 460). The following hold the negative: California (Hull v. Sacramento &c. Co., 14 Cal. 387 S. ‘C. 73 Am. Dee. 656; Henry v. Southern &c. Co., 50 Cal. 176; Flynn v. San Francisco &e. Co., 40 Cal. 14 8S. 0.6 «1m. Rep. 595; Butcher v. Vaca &c. Co., 67 Cal. 518 S. ‘C. 19 Rep. 294). Connecticut (Burrough v. Housatonic &e. Co., 15 Conn. 124 8. C. 38 Am. Dec. 64; Red. Am. R. R. Cas. ° {1st Ed.) 341). Now changed by statute (Simmonds v. New York &c. Co., 19 Rep. 526). 1 Based on statutes passed, incorporating the principle decided. RAILWAY LAW, 253: Same. Delaware (Jefferiss v. Phila. &c. Co., 3 Houst. 447). Georgia (Macon &c. Co. v. McConnell, 27 Ga. 481).. Iowa! (Gandy v. Chicago &c. Co., 30 Iowa, 420 8. 0. 6 Am. Rep. 682; MeCommons v. Chicago &c. Co., 33 Iowa, 187; Ganett v. Chicago &c. Co., 36 ib. 121). Kansas” (Atchison &. Co. v. Bales, 16 Kan. 252;. Atchison &c. Co. v. Campbell, ib. 200; Leavenworth &c. Co. v. Cork, 18 ib. 261; Kansas &e. Co. v. Butts, 7 ib. 308 8. C. 2 Am. R. Rep. 477; Atchison &c. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354 8S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 362; 8 Am. R. Rep. 230; Missouri &c. Co. v. Sandson, 14 Kan. 349; Cf Atchison &c. Co. v. Riggs, 15 A. & EH. BR. R. Cas. 531). Kentucky (Kentucky S&c. Co. v. Barron, 18 Rep. 820; 6 Ky. L. Rep. 240). Maine (Bachelder v. Heagan, 18 Me. 32; Sturgis v. Robbins, 62 ib. 287; the rule, as to railroads, has been. changed by statute). New York (Ross v. N. Y. &c. Co., 18 Barb. 80; Sheldon v. Hudson &c. Co., 14 N. Y. 218 8. C. 67 Am. Dec. 1553 Field v. N. Y. &c. Co., 32 N. Y. 339; Collins ». N. Y. &c. Co., 5 Hun. 503; McCaig v. N. Y¥. &e. Co., 8 ib. 599; Fero v. Buffalo &c. Co., 22 N. ¥. 209; but see Bedell v. Long Island &c. Co., 44 N. Y. 367 8. C. 4 Am. Rep. 6883. Case v. Northern &c. Co., 59 Barb. 644). Ohio (Ruffner v. Cin. &c. Co., 84 Ohio, (N. 8.) 96 S. C. 7 Rep. 23). Pennsylvania (Reading &c. Co. v. Yeiser, 8 Pa. 366 8S. C.. 2 Am. Rail. Cas. 325; Huyett v. Phila. &c. Co., 23 Pa. 1 Now made responsible by statute (Small ». Chicago &c. Co., 50 Iowa, 8388 S. C. 6 C. L. J. 810; 8 C. L. J. 276; Babcock »v. Chicago &e. Co., 11 A- & E.R. R. Cas. 63; 18 7. 477). 1The first case, (Kansas &c. Co. v. Butts), was not conclusive, and the negative of the proposition under discussion was only assumed in the second case (Atchison &c. Co. ». Stanford), for the purposes of the decision. Kansas has been generally aligned as in the text, though otherwise ranked by the editor of the American Reports (19 Am. Rep. 623). The later cases were decided under statute. 254 RAILWAY LAW. Dry. Grass: Presumption of Negligence held. 873; Pa. &c. Co. v. Yerger, 73 ib. 121; Phila. &e. Co. v. Schultz, 93 Pa. 341 8.C.2 A. & E. R.R. Cas. 271; but see Pa. &c. Co. v. Watson, 813 Pa. 293; Reading &c. Co. . Latshaw, 93 Pa. 449 8. C. 9 Rep. 798; 2 A. & E. R. BR. ‘Cas. 267). Texas (Gulph &c. Co. v. Holt, 11 A. & E. R. R. Cas. ‘72; International &c. Co. v. Timmerman, 61 Tex. 660). The text-books generally favor the negative of the proposition: (1 Red. on Rail., sec. 125, par. 5, et seg.; Pierce on Railroads, 437; Angell on Carriers, sec. 566, 566a, et -seq.; Wharton on Negligence, sec. 870; Shearman & Redfield on Rail., sec. 332; 2 Wood on Rail., sec. 328). Wait holds both ways (4 A. & D. 671; 5 ib. 328). Judge Thompson very ably maintains the affirmative (1 Thomp. Neg. 152, sec. 8, (3),), and so does Judge Lawson, very emphatically, not to say dogmatically, in note to Kenny v. Hanibal &c. Co., 11 C. L. J., at page 174, asserting quite rashly that “all the authorities” ‘fvaor the affirmative of the proposition. Ii. Dry Grass, &c.—Is any presumption of negligence raised from the act of a railroad company, allowing dry grass or other combustible material to accumulate on or near its roadbed ? The affirmative of this proposition is held by the fol- lowing courts: England (Smith v. London &c. Co., L. R. 6 O. P. 14; Cf. Vaughn v. Taff &e. Co., 5 H. & N. 678 8. C. 1 Thomp. Neg. 122). Nevada (Longabaugh v. Virginia &c. Co., 9 Nev. 271). New Jersey (Salmon v. Delaware &c. Co., 38 N. J. L. 5 8. C. 20 Am. Rep. 356; Delaware &c. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. J. L. 299 8. C. 23 Am. Rep. 214), North Carolina (Troxler v. R. & D. &e. Co., 74 N. C. 377; Aycock v. Raleigh &. Co., 89 ib. 321). RAILWAY LAW. 255 Such Presumption denied The following maintain the negative, to the extent, at least, that it is merely evidence to be considered by the jury: California (Flynn v. San Francisco &c. Co., 40 Cal. 14 S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 595; Henry v. Southern &c. Co., 50 ‘Cal. 176; Perry v. Southern &c. Co., ib. 578). Illinois (Bass v. Chicago &c. Co., 28 Tl. 9; Illinois &c. Co. v. Mills, 42 ib. 407; Ohio &e. Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 ib. 497; Illinois &c. Co. v. Frazier, ib. 505; Rockford &c. Qo. v. Rogers, 62 ib. 346). Indiana (Toledo &c. Co. v. Wand, 48 Ind. 476; Pitts- burg &e. Co. v. Nelson, 51 ib. 150; Louisville &c. Co. v. Stevens, 87 ib. 198; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Jones, 86 ib. -496 8. C. 44 Am. Rep. 334; 11 A. & EH. R. BR. Cas. 76, Pittsburg &ec. Co. v. Hixon, 79 Ind. 111 8.0.8 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 717). Iowa (Keese v. Chicago Sec. Co., 30 Iowa, 78 S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 648). Kansas (Kansas &c. Oo. v. Butt, 9 Kan. 308 S. C. 2 Am. R. Rep. 477; White v. Missouri &c. Co., 31 Kan. ‘280 8. C.13 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 473). Minnesota (Clarke v. Chicago &c. Co., 20 Rep. 148; Sibilrud v. Minnesota &c. Co., 29 Minn. 588. C.7 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 499). Missouri (Smith v. Hanibal &c. Co., 37 Mo. 287; Ken- ney v. R. R. Co., 70 ib. 243 S. C. 11 C. L. J. 172; Fitch v. Missouri &c. Co. 45 Mo. 322). Nebraska (Burlington &c. Co. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268). New York (Webb v. Rome &c. Co., 49 N.Y. 4208. ©. 10 Am. Rep. 389). Pennsylvania (Philadelphia Se. Co. v. Schultz, 95 Pa. 341 8.0.2 A. & E. RB. B. Cas. 271). Vermont (Bryant v. Central &c. Co. 56 Vt. 710). Virginia (R. & D. &e. Co. v. Medley, 75 Va. 499 S. C. 40 Am. Rep. 734; 7 A. & E. RB. BR. Cas. 493; Brighthope &¢e. Co. v. Rogers, 8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 710; 15 C. L. J. 314). 256 RAILWAY LAW. Cont. Neg.: Combustible materials: Presumption against Land Owner. West Virginia (Snyder v. Pittsburg &e. Co., 11 W. Va. 15 8. 0. 18 Am. R. Rep. 154). Wisconsin (Kellogg v. Chicago &¢. Co., 26 Wis. 223 8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 69; 2 Am. R. Rep. 483; Gibbons v. Wis- consin &¢. Co., 58 Wis. 335 S.C. 13 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 469; Erd v. Chicago &c. Co., 41 Wis. 65). It is seen from the array of the decisions, that the weight of authority decidedly preponderates in support of the negative of the proposition. It may be observed that as applied to the prairie country, the negative view as supportable on: principle, as the clearing off of the right of way would not appreciably affect the danger from emitted sparks unless, indeed, where the adjecent land was in cultivation, cessante ratione, cessat et ipsa lex. Il. Contributive Negligence—Is it incumbent upon the owner of adjecent premises to remove combustible ma- terial from contiguity to emitted sparks, and does his. failure so to act, constitute, per se, contributive negli- gence disentitling him to recover? The affirmative of the proposition is held by the following authorities: Georgia (Macon v. McConnell, 27 Ga. 481). Illinois! (Illinois &c. Co. v. Mills, 42 Tl. 407; Great Western &c. Co. v. Haworth, 39 ib. 347; Ohio &c. Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 ib. 497; Illinois &c. Co. v. Frazier, ib. 505; Illinois &c. Co. v. Nunn, 51 ib. 78; Toledo &c. Co. v. Maxfield, 72 ib. 82; Illinois &c. Co. v. McClelland, 42 ib. 355; Chicago &c. Co. v. Simonson, 54 ib. 504 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 155; Toledo &ec. Co. v. Pindar, 53 Tl. 447 8. 0.5 Am. Rep. 57). Iowa (Keese v. Chicago &c. Co. 30 Iowa, 78 8S. C. 6 Am. Rep. 643; Ormond v. Central &c. Co., 58 ib. 742; Slosson v. Burlington &c. Co., 60 ib. 2158. C.7 A. & E. 1The law, as so declared, has been changed by statute. RAILWAY LAW. 257 Contributory Negligence: Combustible Materials. R. RB. Cas. 509; Small v. Chicago &c. Oo., 55 Iowa, 582 8.0.6 ©. L. J. 310; 8 C.L. J. 276). Vermont! (Bryant v. Central &c. Co., 56 Vt. 710). The negative is held in the following cases: England (Vaughn v. Taff &c. Co., 5 H. & N. 678 8. C. 1 Thomp. Neg. 122; Bliss v. Doridon &e. Co. 2 F. & FB. 341). California (Flynn v. San Francisco &¢. Co., 40 Cal. 14 8. C. 6 Am. Rep. 595). Connecticut (Burroughs v. Housatonic &e. Co., 15 Conn. 124 8. C. 38 Am. Dec. 64). Delaware (Jefferis v. Phila. &c. Co., 3 Houst. 447). Indiana (Louisville &c. Co. v. Krinning, 87 Ind. 351; Louisville &c. Co. v. Hagan, 87 ib. 602; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Noel, 77 ib. 1108. C.7 A. & BE. BR. R. Cas. 524; 10 C. L. J. 197; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Jones, 86 Ind. 496 8. 0.11 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 76; 44 Am. Rep. 334; Pitts- burg &c. Co. v. Hixon, 79 Ind. 111 8.0.8 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 717). Kansas (Kansas &c. Co. v. Owen, 25 Kan. 419; Mis- souri &c. Co. v. Cornell, 30 ib. 35; Missouri &c. Co. v. Kincaid, 29 ib. 654 8. 0. 11 A. & B. R. R. Cas. 83; St. Joseph &e, Co. v. Chase, 11 Kan. 47). Massachusetts—Under Statute (Ross v. Boston &c. Co., 6 Allen, 87). . Minnesota (Karson v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 20 Minn. 12 8.C.7 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 501). Missouri (Patton v. St. Louis &e. Co., 87 Mo. 117 8. C. 23 A. & HE. RB. R. Cas. 364; Smith v. Hanibal &c. Co., 37 Mo. 287; Fitch v. Pacific &c. Co., 45 ib. 322; Lester v. Kansas &c. Co., 60 ib. 265 S.C. 2 C. L. J. 641; Cf. Clem- ens v. Hanibal &c. Co., 53 Mo. 366 S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 460; Coates v. Missouri &c. Co., 61 Mo. 38 8. C. 3 C. L. J. 209; Palmer v. Missouri &c. Co., 76 Mo. 217). 1The law, as so declared, has been changed by statute. 17 258 RAILWAY LAW. Same. Nebraska (Burlington &c. Co. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268). New Hampshire! (Rowell v. R. R. Co., 57 N. H. 132 S. C. 24 Am. Rep. 59). New Jersey—Under Statute (Salmon v. Delaware &c. Co., 38 N. J. L.5 8. C. 20 Am. Rep. 356; Delaware &c. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. J. L. 299 S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 214.) New York (Webb v. Rome &c. Co., 49 N. Y. 420 S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 389; Fero v. Buffalo &e. Co., 22 N. Y. 209; Bevier v. Delaware &c. Co., 13 Hun. 254; Cork v. Cham- plain &c. Co., 1 Den. 91; Cf. Collins v. N. Y. &c. Co., 5 Hun. 499). North Carolina (Doggett v. R. & D. &c. Co., 78 N. C. 305). Serene (Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. 182 S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 97; Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Schultz, 93 Pa. 341 8S. C. 2 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 271; Lehigh &c. Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. 122 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 644). 4 Carolina (McCready v. South Carolina &c. Co., 2 Strob. 356). Tennessee (Cf. Burke v. Louisville &c. Co., 7 Heisk. 451 S. C. 19 Am. Rep. 618). Virginia (Richmond &c. Co. v. Medley, 75 Va. 498 S. C. 7A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 493; 40 Am. Rep. 734). West Virginia (Snyder v. Pittsburg &c. Co., 11 W. Va. 148. C.18 Am. R. Rep. 154). Wisconsin® (Martin v. Western &¢. Co., 73 Wis. 437 : ‘This, notwithstanding the statute, makes railroad companies prima facie liable. * These were cases of grass, weeds, etc., but as to buildings, this court holds an intermediate view, and decided that a man may build so near a completed railway as to preclude recovery for loss by fire (Murphy 0. Chicago &c. Co., 45 Wis. 222 S.C. 4 N. W. Rep. 81). This view is also held in Illinois (Great Western &c. Co. 9. Haworth, supra); New York (Fero ». Buffalo &c. Co., Collins 0 N. Y. &e. Co., supra); Georgia (Macon ». McConnell, supra); and Missouri (Coates ». Missouri &c. Co., supra). The author is unable to perceive upon what principle a man should not be entitled to the same rights as appurtenant to buildings erected, on even RAILWAY LAW. 259 Whether Affected by Statute: “ Building near. Kellogg v. Chicago &c. Co., 26 ib. 223 8. C. 7 Am. Rep. 69; 2 Am. R. Rep. 483; Caswell v. Chicago &c. Co., 42 Wis. 193; Erd v. Chicago &e. Co., 41 ib. 65; Ward v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 29 ib. 144; Murphy v. Chicago &c. Co., 45 ib, 222 S. C. 30 Am. Rep. 721). A question is raised whether under statutes making railway companies prima facie liable for injuries caused by emitted sparks, cinders, &c., the defence of contribu- tive negligence can be asserted. In Iowa the affirmative on this point is held (Small v. Chicago, 50 Iowa, 338 S. C. 6 C. L. J. 310; 8 ib. 276; Slosson v. Burlington &c. Co., 51 Iowa, 294). In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the negative (Ingersoll v. Stockbridge &c. Co., 8 Allen, 438; Rowell v. Railroad, 57 N. H. 182 8. C. 24 Am. Rep. 59). If a building, contiguous to a railway, contains com- bustible material, does the leaving of a door or window open constitute contributive negligence? The affirmative of this proposition is held by the following courts: Georgia! (Macon &c. Co. v. McConnell, 27 Ga. 481). Ilinois (Great Western &c. Co. v. Haworth, 39 Ill. 347). The negative by the following: Delaware (Jefferis v. Phila. &c. Co., 3 Houst. 447). Indiana (Louisville &c. Co. v. Richardson, 66 Ind. 43 8. C. 32 Am. Rep. 94). Massachusetts (Ross v. Boston &e. Co., 6 Allen, 87). New Hampshire (Rowell v. Railroad Co., 57 N. H. 132 S. C. 24 Am. Rep. 59). the very edge of the land, and after the completion of a railroad, as if the same had been placed there before. The denial thereof would seem to be substantially an application of the power of eminent domain, without compensation. 1In the Georgia case, the contributive negligence consisted in building a house very near to the defendant’s wood-yard. 260 RAILWAY LAW. Shavings left near to a Building. New York (Fero v. Buffalo &c. Co.,! 22 N. Y. 209). Pennsylvania (Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. 183 S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 97). Tennessee? (Burke v. Louisville &c. Co., 7 Heisk. 451 8. C. 19 Am. Rep. 618). Wisconsin (Martin v. Western &c. Co., 23 Wis. 437; Haswell? v. Chicago &c. Co., 42 ib. 193). There is to be found a discrepency on the point also, as to whether allowing shavings, straw, &c., to remain in close proximity to a building, near a railway, consti- tutes contributive negligence. It is so held in New York, Missouri, Vermont and Wisconsin (Cases of Coates, Murphy,’ Bryant? and Collins,‘ supra). It is denied in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsyl- vania and Delaware (Cases of Jefferis, Ross, Fero* and Hendrickson, supra). ‘The case of Collins v. N. &c. Co., 5 Hun. 499, affirmed 71 N. Y. 609, is almost if not quite in conflict with the case cited. Thus presenting the not unusual New York conflict. *In the Georgia case, supra, the contributive negligence consisted in build- ing a house very near to the defendant’s wood-yard. In the Tennessee case, a house was built within thirty rods of the railway. In the Wisconsin case, the building was standing “ dangerously near the track.” *In the Murphy and Bryant Cases, the accumulation, &c., is said to be evidence of contributive negligence. ‘It is greatly to be regretted that there is not more conservatism in the New York decisions. The Court of Appeal has been graced by signal ability and profound learning, yet, when for example, a case from 101st, (latest. volume at this writing), is cited, we not uncommonly hear it re- plied with a smile: “perhaps you had better wait until the 102d N. Y. is out.” The clash referred to, in the text, is the author’s construction, on a comparison of the two cases. A kind of implied overruling owing to the irreconcilability of the two opinions, as applied to the facts. It is to be regretted too, that no opinion was delivered in the Collins’ Case, on ap- peal, as apparently the Fero Case was overlooked. What difference in principle can be suggested between the case of a house thirty feet distant in having a door open, and a room filled with shavings, (Fero Case), and a barn two feet from the line fence, by the side of which, as incidental to its use, straw was permitted to accumulate? (Collins’ Case). It may be said that, in the latter case, the supposed contributive negligence occurred in summer time, but, that circumstance is hardly appreciable, as affecting RAILWAY LAW. ‘261 Proximate. A question often arises as to whether the injury was proximate. Mr. Wood lays it down that a railway company is not excused from liability, because the fire injuring or destroying the plaintiff’s property first fell upon the land of another, and from thence was communicated to the plaintiff's land by means of dry grass, stubble or other combustible materials, or even passes over the land of several intervening owners before it reaches the plaintiff’s land, at a great distance from the point where it was first kindled (Beach, Con. Neg. sec. 75 at page 249; 2 Wood, R. L. sec. 332; Pierce, Rail. 441; Whart. Neg. 149 et seg.; see also, Grand Trunk &c. Co. v. Rich- ardson, 91 U.S. 454). A moral unanimity in the decis- ions, support this view. The only opposing cases are: North Carolina (Doggett v. Richmond &c. Co., 78 N. C. 305; adhered to in Sellars v. Richmond &c. Co., 94 N. C. 655, 659 S. C. 25 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 451). the legal proposition as laid down. Indeed, without intimating any opinion as to the correctness of either case, it would seem that if con- tributive negligence is to be predicated of the facts in either case, it is more strongly apparent in the’ Fero Case, as the house was being repaired; whereas, in the Collins Case, the accumulation of the straw occurred in the usual and regular course of husbandry. It is observable that the Fero Case has been frequently cited by two other courts with approval. It might be pertinently suggestive by what reasonable means could the plaintiff have avoided the injury: the straw used, presumably, first in stalls, and as it accumulated therein, thrown out of the barn. Ought this plaintiff to have added a new factor in his farming operations, by hauling it off to some distance, or another by using hydraulic works of some kind, to play upon the pile, and, if so, being summer time it might be that it would repuire a constant stream of water. The very suggestion of these difficulties shows that such requirements, by adding to the cost of his operations, (not adding to the amount of production), would or might, materially, diminish the value of the farm itself, and indeed, to the extent perhaps, of necessitating the removal of the barn or its abandonment, and the erection of another. Then again, suppose the farm to consist of a narrow strip running parallel with the railway, it might amount to a destruction by enforced abandonment of his prop- erty. 262 RAILWAY LAW. Other Fires by Other Engines. Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Kerr,! 62 Pa. 353 S. CO. 1 Am. Rep. 4381; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373 S. C. 21 ‘Am Rep. 100; Hoag v. Lake &c. Co. 85 Pa. 293 S. OC. 27 Am. Rep. 653; Lehigh &c. Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. 122 8S. C. 35 Am. Hep. 644). In an action brought to recover damages for injuries caused by the emission of sparks, cinders, &c., from a railway train, can evidence that other fires had been caused by other engines of the same company, be re- ceived? The question is answered with a moral unan- imity in the affirmative. The courts holding the negative view are: Maryland (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Woodruff, 4 Md. 242 S. C. 59 Am. Dec. 72; Annapolis &c. Co. v. Gantt, 39 Md. 137). Missouri (Lester v. Kansas &c. Co., 60 Mo. 265 S. C. 9 Am. R. Rep. 219; 2 0. L. J. 641; Coale v. Hanibal &c. Co., 60 Mo. 227 S. C. 9 Am. R. Rep. 210). The Massachusetts Court holds that evidence, that on a previous occasion the same engine using the same species of fuel had emitted sparks, &c., was competent (Ross v. Boston &c. Co., 6 Allen, 87). This is good sense, but notwithstanding the great array of authori- ties supporting the. affirmative of our proposition, it occurs to the author that such evidence is purely con- jectural and calculated to mislead the jury and induce a guessing verdict. The leading English case of Piggot v. Eastern Coun- 1It is said by Judge Thompson (1 Thomp. Neg. 171), and by the learned editor of the American Decisions (88 Am. Dec. 77), and also by Beach (Con. Neg. page 250), that the Kerr Case has been virtually over- ruled. This is a mistake. The court in the McKeen Case distinctly adhere to it, and note the distinction to be taken when the facts are admitted or disputed, and reconcile all the cases cited thereupon. The Court of New York formerly held the same view as Pennsylvania (Ryan v. N. Y. &e. Co., 35 N. Y. 210; but this case was overruled by Webb v. Rome &c. Co., 49 N. Y. 420 8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 389). RAILWAY LAW. 263 Concurring Negligence: Crossing Track. ties &c. Co., 3 C. B. 229, which formed the basis of the great current of authority does not sustain the affirma- tive in its full bearing—as the evidence there offered and received, was that other engines of the same descrip- tion, as that which caused the fire, had been seen to throw particles of ignited matter to a distance from the line as far off as the spot in question. The initial error consists in blindly following English cases without nar- rowly examining the exact facts upon which they pro- ceeded. The element of the fuel used, relied upon in the Coale case, was unnecessary, as there is only one species. of fuel used in English Railways, namely, coal. CONCURRING NEGLIGENCE. Crossing the Track.—Is a traveler precluded from recov- ery for an injury sustained from a collision while cross- ing a railroad track, unless he stops, looks and listens? The affirmative is held in the following courts: England (Davey v. London &c. Co., 11 L. R. (Q. B. Div.) 213 8. ©. 14 A. & E. RB. BR. Cas. 650; Dublin v. Slattery, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1155; Stubley v. London &c. Co., L. R. 1 Ex. 13; Skelton v. London &c. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 631; Cliff v. Midland &e. Co., L. RB. 5 Q. B. 258). U. S. Circuit Court (Schofield v. Chicago &c. Co., 2 McCrary, 268 S. C. 8 Fed. Rep. 488; Tucker v. Duncan, 6 A. & BE. BR. RB. Cas. 268; 13 Rep. 100; 9 Fed. Rep. 867; 14 C0. L. J. 13). California (Flemming v. Western S&c. Co., 49 Cal. 253 S. C. 7 Am. R. Rep. 265; Hearne v.. Sonthamn &ce. Co., 50 ib. 482; Cf. Strong v. Placerville &e. Co., 61 ib. 326 S. C. 8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 273). Connecticut (Peck v. New York &e. Co., 50 Conn. 379 S.C. 14 A. & BE. RB. RB. Cas. 633). IMinois (Peoria &c. Co. v. Stillman, 88 Ill. 529; Chicago &c. Co. v. Hatch, 79 Ill. 137; Chicago &c. Co. v. Lee, 264 RAILWAY LAW, Must Stop, Look and Listen. 68 ib. 576; Chicago &c. Co. v. Bell, 70 ib. 102; Illinois &c. Co. v. Godfrey, 71 ib. 500; Chicago &c. Co. v. Dim- ick, 96 ib. 42 8. C. 2 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 201; Chicago &c. Co. v. Screeney, 52 ib. 325; Chicago &c. Co. v. Van Patten, 64 ib. 510; Illinois &c. Co. v. Goddard, 72 ib. 567; Chicago &c. Co. v. Donohue, 75 ib. 106; Chicago &ec. Co. v. Harwood, 80 ib. 88; Dimick v. Chicago &e. Co., 80 Ill. 338; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Frena, 13 Ill. App. 91; Galena &c. Co. v. Loomis, 13 Ill. 548; Chicago &c. Co. v. Still, 19 ib. 499; Galena &e. Co. v. Dill, 22 ib. 264; Illinois &e. Co. v. Buckner, 28 ib. 303; Chicago &c. Co. v. Gretzner, 46 ib. 74; Chicago &c. Co. v. Fears, 53 Ill. 115; Indianapolis &e. Co. v. Stables, 62 ib. 313 8. C. 7 Am. R. Rep. 365; Chicago &e. Co. v. Jacobs, 63 Ill. 1788. C. 6 Am. R. Rep. 125; Cf. Pennsyl- vania &c. Co. v. Rudel, 100 ib. 603 8. 0.6 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 30). Indiana (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Vining, 27 Ind. 513; Lafayette &c. Co. v. Huffman, 28 ib. 287; Toledo &e. Co. v. Goodard, 25 ib. 185; Evansville &c. Co. »v. Hiatt, 17 ib. 102; Bellefontaine &c. Co. v. Hunter, 33 ib. 365 8. ©. 5 Am. Rep. 201; Indianapolis &c. Co. v. Rutherford, 29 ib. 82; Terre Haute &c. Co. v. Clark, 73 ib. 168 8. ©. 6 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 84; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Martin, 82 ib. 4768.C.8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 253; Terre Haute v. Graham, 95 ib. 286 S. 0.12 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 77; Ivens v. Cincin- nati &c. Co., 103 ib. 27 S. ©. 23 A. & EB. RB. R. Cas. 258). Iowa (Artz v. Chicago &c. Oo., 34 Iowa, 153 S. ©. 5 Am. R. Rep. 469). In this case.a distinction is taken between the instance of an unobstructed view, &c., and the reverse; the court holding that if the traveller had an unobstructed view, and knew of the approach of the train, it would be negligence per se to attempt to cross; but if the view was obstructed so as to render it impossible or difficult to learn of the approach, or there are circumstances RAILWAY LAW. 265 Obstructed and Unobstructed View. calculated to deceive and throw a party off his guard, the question of negligence would be one for the jury. This distinction is also taken by other courts. It will be noticed as to them, by reference to the Artz case (Greenleaf v. Dubuque Se. Co., 33 Towa, 59; Haines v. Illinois &c. Co., 41 ib. 227; Laverenze v. Chic- ago &c. Co., 56 ib. 689 8. C. 6 A. & HE. R. R. Cas. 274; Funston v. Chicago &e. Co., 61 ib. 452 S.C. 14 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 640; Schaefert v. Chicago &c. Co., 62 Iowa, 624 8. C. 14A.& E. RB. RB. Cas. 696; Pence v. Chicago &c. Co., 63 Iowa, 746 8. 0.19 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 366; Correll v. Burlington &e. Co., 38 ib. 120 8. 0.18 Am. R ep. 22; Baldwin v. St. Louis &c. Co., 63 Iowa, 210). Kentucky (JobLunson v. Louisville &c. Co., 13 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 623; Cf. Louisville &c. Co. v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 442 S.C. 14 A. & E.R. RB. Cases, 627; 42 Am. Rep. 227). In this case, when a.person was found killed by the train, no presumption of due care was suggested, but the ques- tion left to the jury. Louisiana (DeArmond v. New Orleans Se. Co., 23 La. Ann. 264). Maine (LeSan v. Maine We. Co., 23 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 245; 1 East. Rep. 100). Maryland (Baltimore &c. Co. v. Hobbs, 19 A. & E.R. BR. Cases, 337; Baltimore v. Brenning, 25 Md. 378; Rail- way &¢. Co. v. Graham, 46 ib. 240; Cf. Maryland &e. Co. v. Newbern, 19 A. & E. R. R. Cases, 261, which adopts the view of the Artz case, (Iowa), as does also Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. State, 61 Md. 108 8. C.19 A. & E. R. R. Cases, 326). Michigan (Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 374 S.C. 5 Am. R. R. 478; Haas v. Grand Rapids &c. Co., 47 Mich. 401 S. C. 8 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 268; Mahlen v. Lake Shore &c. Co., 49 Mich. 585 8. C.14 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 687). Mississippi (New Orleans S&c. Co. v. Mitchell, 52 Miss. 808). 266 RAILWAY LAW. Same. Missouri (Tabor v. Missouri &ec. Co., 46 Mo. 353 8. C. 2 Am. Rep. 517; Kennayde v. Pacific &c. Co., 45 Mo. 255; Henze v. St. Louis &c. Co., (Napton and Norton, J. J., dissenting,) 71 ib. 686 8S. C. 2 A. & EB. BR. BR. Cas. 212; Fletcher v. Atlantic &c. Co., 64 Mo. 484; Harlan v. St. Louis &e. Co., 65 ib. 22 8. 0. 5 C. L. J. 221; Purl v. St. Louis &c. Co., 73 Mo. 168 8. C.6 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 27; Moody v. Pacific &c. Co., 68 ib. 472; Turner v. Hannibal &c. Co., 74 Mo. 603 8. C.6 A. & BE. RB. R. Cas. 38; Kelly v. Hannibal &e. Co., 75 ib. 1388 8S. 0.138 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 638; Zimmerman v. Hannibal &e. Co., 71 Mo. 4763. Cf. Stitton v. Hannibal &e., 67 ib. 671). New Hampshire (State v. Manchester &c. Co., 52 N. H. 528; Haycroft v. R. R. Co., 64 ib. 636). New Jersey (Morris &e. Co. v. Haslan, 33 N. J. L. 147, 189; Runyan v. Central Se. Co., 25 ib. 558; Telfer v. North- ern &e. Co., 30 ib. 188 8. CO. 3 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 665). New York! (Barker v. Savage, 45 N. Y.191 8S. ©. 6 Am. Rep. 66; Gorton v. Erie &c. Co., 45 ib. 661; McLean ».. Van Zandt, 7 Jones & 8. 347; ireiand v. R. R. Co., 24 How. 177; 79 N. Y. 76; McGrath v. Hudson &e. Co, 32 Barb. 144; Webber v. Wew York &e. Co., 58 N. Y. 451 8. C.7 Arm, R. R. 188; Reynolds v. New York &e. Co., 58 N. Y. 248 8S. C. Y Am, Rep. 6; McCall v. N. Y., &e. Co., 54 N. Y. 642; Payne v. Troy &¢e. Co.,? 83 N. Y. 572. S. 0. 6 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 54; Connelly v. ‘New York S&e.. Co., 88 N. Y. 346 8.0. 8 A. & EB, R. R. Cases, 459; Tol- rah #, Syracuse &e. Co., 98 N. Y. 198 8. C. 50 Am. Rep. 649; McGrath v. N. Y. &e, Co., 59 N. Y. 468 8. C. 17 Am. Rep. 359; Cosgrove v. New Vouk &e. Co., 87 N. Y. 88 8S. C. 41 ‘Aun, Rep. 355; Earnst v. Hudson &e. Co., 35 ib. 93. 39 ib. 61, 68; Thurber v. Harlem &c. Oo., 60 ab. 3263 !'The devistona of this court are conflicting, is Beacls states that the- New York Courts hold the affirmative (Beach, Con. Neg. sec. 82), *This case was decided on its peculiar circumstances in favor of the: plaintiff. RAILWAY LAW. 267 Same. Taber v. Delaware &c. Co., 71 ib. 489; Hawley v. North- ern &c. Co., 17 Hun. 115; Wilds v. Hudson &c. Co., 29 N. Y. 315 8. C. 24 ib. 430; Wilcox v. Rome &c. Co., 39 N. Y. 358; Steves v. Oswego &c. Co., 18 N. Y. 422; Wendell v. New York Wc. Co., 91 N. Y. 420 8. C. 14 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 663; Havens v. Erie &c. Co., 41 N. Y. 296; Stackus v. New York, 7 Hun. 559; 79 N. Y. 464; Baxter v. Troy &c. Co., 41 N. Y. 502; Nicholson v. Erie &c. Co., 41 ib. 525; Grippen v. New York &e. Co., 40 ib. 34; Gonzales v. Same, 38 ib. 440; Gorton v. Erie &c. Co., 45 ib. 660). North Carolina (Parker v. Wilmington Wc. Co., 86 N. Y. 221). The question decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as to the presumption of due care, &c., when death occurs, might have been made, but was not in this case, but the court seems, arguendo, to hold against it. Ohio (Baker v. Pendergast, 32 Ohio, (N. 8.) 494 S. C. 30 Am. Rep. 620; Cleveland &c. Co. v. Terry, 8 Ohio, (N. S.) 570). Pennsylvania (North &c. Co. v. Heilman, 49 Pa. 60; Hanover &c. Co. v. Coyle, 5 P. F. Smith, 396; Pennsyl-- vania &c. Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 503 S. C. 6 Am. R. Rep. 158; 13 Am. Rep. 754, (Williams and Mercur, J. J., dis- senting); Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Fortney, 90 Pa. 324 S.. C.1 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 128; Philadelphia &c. Co. v- Boyer, 97 Pa. 91 8.0.2 A. & E. BR. BR Cas. 172; 11 Rep. __ 513; Lehigh &. Co. v. Hall, 61 Pa. 361; Pennsylvania. &e. Co.1 v. Bently, 66 ib. 90; Shultz v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 5 Rep. 376; Baughman v. Shenango &e. Co., 92 Pa. 335 8. C. 6 A. & BE. RB. R. Cases, 51; 37 Am. Rep. 690; Reading &c. Co. v. Ritchie, 102 Pa. 425 8. C.19 A. & BE. R. R. Cases, 267; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Ackerman, 74 Pa, 265 §. ©. 7 Am. R. Rep. 165). 1The duty to look, &c., was here applied to the driver of a horse-car. 268 RAILWAY LAW. ‘Failure not Negligence per se. Rhode Island (Ormsbee v. Providence &c. Co., 14 BR. I. 102 S. C. 51 Am. Rep. 354; Cf. Cassiday v. Angell, 12 R. J. 447 S. C. 34 Am. Rep. 690). In this case, a man was found dead in a pit, and the question of his due care was left to the jury. See similar decision in Kentucky. The following decisions hold that such failure is not per se negligence, but all the evidence should go to the jury, who must decide pro re nata: Canada (Peart v. Grand Trunk &e. Co., 10 Ont. App. 191 S.C. 19 A. & EB. R. BR. Cas. 239). Supreme Court U. S. (Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657; Railroad Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697; but see Schofield v. Chicago &e. Co., 114 U.S. 615 s. CO, 19 A, & E.R. BR. Cases, 353). District of Columbia (Spencer v. Baltimore &e. Co., 4 Mack, 138 8. C. 54 Am. Rep. 269). California (Roller v. Sutter Street Co., 19 A. & E.R. R. ‘Cas. 333). Indiana (Indianapolis &c. Co. v. Keeley, 23 Ind. 133; Evansville &c. Co. v. Lowdenwick, 15 ib. 120; P. C. and St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Wright, 80 Ind. 182 8.0.5 A. & E. R. R. Cases, 628; P. C. and St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Wright, 6 A. & E. BR. R. Cases, 114; Indianapolis &c. ‘Co. v. McLin, 82 Ind. 435 S. C. 8 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 237). Kansas (Leavenworth &c. Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan. 426; Kansas &c. Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37; Kansas &e. Co. v, Kunkel, 17 ib. 145; Kansas &c. Co. v. Richardson, 25 ab. 391 8. 0. 6 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 96; Cf Union &c. Co. ». Adams, 19.A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 376; Gibson v. City &c., 20 Kan. 158). satis (Plummer v. Eastern &c. Co., 73 Me. 591 S. C. 6 A. & H.R. R. Oas. 165; Webb v. Portland &c. Co., 57 Me. 117; but see State v. Maine &c. Co.,! 76 ib. 357 S.C. 19 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 312; 49 Am. Rep. " 622), ‘This case may seem to involve the assumption of the affirmative of the proposition, but it should be observed that it was a criminal action for a RAILWAY LAW. 269 Same. Massachusetts (Alleyn v. Boston &ec. Co., 105 Mass. 77; Gayner v. Old Colony W&c., 100 ib. 208; Wheelock ‘v. Old Colony, 105 ib. 203; Chaffee v. Boston &c. Co., 104 ib. 108; O’Connor v. Boston &e. Co., 135 ib. 352 8. C. 15- A. & HE. R. R. Cases, 362; Tully v. Fitchburg &c. Co.,! 134 Mass. 499 S.C. 14 A. & E. RB. BR. Cases, 682; Fuller ». Boston &e. Co., 153 Mass. 191 8. 0. 14 A. & E.R. R. Cases, 695; Wheelwright v. Boston &c. Co., 135 Mass. 225 S. C. 16 A. & HE. BR. BR. Cases, 315; Tyler v. New York &c. Co., 187 Mass. 283 8. 0. 19 A. & E.R. R. Cases, 296; Williams v. Greely, 112 Mass. 79; French v, Taunton &c. Co., 116 Mass. 537 S. C. 7 Am. R. BR. 460; Craig v. New York &c. Co., 118 ib. 431; Carland v. Young, 119 ib. 150; Bowser v. Wellington, 126 ib. 391;, Shapley v. Wyman, 134 ib. 118; but see Clark v. Boston &e. Co., 128 ib. 1 8S. OC. 1 A. & EB. RB. R. Cases, 134; Wright v. Boston &e. Co., 129 ib. 440 8. C.2 A. & E. R.. R. Cases, 121). Michigan (Chicago &c. Co. v. Miller, 46 Mich. 532 8. C. 6 A. & B. BR. BR. Cases, 89; Young v. Detroit &c. Co., 56 Mich. 430 8.0.19 A. & E. BR. BR. Cases, 417; 23 N. W. Rep. 67; 20 C. L. J. 479; Mynning v. Detroit &c. Co., 23 A. & E. R. R. Cases, 317; Guggenheim v. Lake Shore &e. Co., 22 A. & EB. BR. R. Cases, 546). Minnesota (Howard v. St. Paul &c. Co., 32 Minn. 214. 8.0.19 A. & E. BR. BR. Cases, 283; Shaber v. St. Paul &c. Co., 28 Minn. 103 8. C. 2 A. & BE. R. R. Cases, 1853 Kelly v. St. Paul &c. Co., 29 Minn. 1S. 0.6 A. & E.R. R. Cases, 93; Mark v. St. Paul &c. Co., 30 Minn. 493. S.C.12 A. & BE. R. RB. Cases, 86; Hutchinson v. St. Paul negligent killing, and according to the well-settled principle, the prosecu-. tion was compellable to prove that the deceased used his senses, as other- wise the defendant would be convicted on a presumption. 1In weighing the Massachusetts decisions, it should not be lost sight of that that court holds that the burden of proof, as to contributive negli- gence, is upon the plaintiff. 270 RAILWAY LAW. Same. &e. Co., 19 A. & E. RB. R. Cases, 280; Cf. Rogstad ». St. Paul &c. Oo. 14 A. & BE. R. BR. Cases, 648; but see, Brown v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 22 Minn. 165; Loucks v. Chicago &c. Co., 31 Minn. 526 8. S. 19 A. & E. BR. R. Cases, 305; Corey v. Northern &c. Co., 32 Minn. 467 S. C. 19 A. & E. BR. BR. Cases, 352). Missouri (Zimmerman! v. Hanibal &c. Co., 71 Mo. 476 S. 0.2 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 191). Nevada (Cohen v. Eureka &c. Co., 14 Nev. 376; Bun- ting v. Central &c. Co., ib. 351). New Jersey (Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Righter, 42 N. J. L. 180 8.C.2 A. & E. BR. R. Cases, 220). New York (Kellogg v. New York &e. Co., 79 N. Y. 72; O'Mara v. Hudson &c. Co., 38 N. Y. 445; Renwick v. New York &c. Co., 36 ib. 132; Beisiegal v. New York &e. Co., 34 ib. 622; 40 ib. 9; Davis v. New York, 47 N. Y. 400; Cf. Kissenger v. New York &c. Co., 56 N. Y. 538 S. C.6 Am. R. R. 154; Weber v. New York &c. Co., 58 N.Y. 451 8S. C.7 Am. R. Rep. 188 (Iowa distinction); Salter %. Utica &c. Co., 88 N. Y.428.C.8 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 437; Smedis v. Brooklyn &e. Co., 88 ib. 13 8. C. 8 A. & E. R. R. Cases, 445; Sharp v. Glushing, 96 N. Y. 676 S. 0.19 A. & E. BR. BR. Cases, 372). Ohio (Cleveland &c. Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio, (N. 8.) 631 S. C. 7 Am. R. Rep. 172; 15 Am. Rep. 633; Marietta ec. Co. v. Picksley, 24 Ohio, (N. 8.) 654 S.C. 7 Am. R. Rep. 186). Pennsylvania (Philadelphia &e. Co. v. Anderson,? 94 Pa. 351 8S. C. 39 Am. Rep. 787; 10 Rep. 790; Philadel- 'This was the case of a pedestrian. The court reserves the point as to wagoners and the like. “This was a case of killing, and the court, one of the most able, decided the affirmative of our proposition, and held that there was a presumption that the deceased used due care. The editor of the American Reports states it to be in conflict with the case of State v. Maine &c., cited under sub- title Maine. But it can scarcely be said to be so, as this case was a civil, and the other a ertminal, action. An intermediate view is taken in Kentucky {Louisville &c. Co. v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 442 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 227). RAILWAY LAW. 271 Regulations: Usage. phia &c. Co. v. Troutman, 6 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 117; Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Carr, 99 Pa. 505 S. 0. 6 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 185; Central &e. Co. v. Fuller, 84 ib. 226; Penn- sylvania S&c. Co. v. Weber, 76 Pa, 157 8. C. 18 Am. Rep. 407; Lehigh v. Hall, 61 Pa. 36; Schum v. Pa. &e. Co., 107 Pa. 8S. C. 52 Am. Rep. 468; 19 Rep. 184). Texas (Texas &c. Co. v. Chapman, 57 Tex. 75; Hous- ton &ec. Co. v. Walker, 56 ib. 38318. C.8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 431; Galveston &c. Co. v. Bracken, 59 ib. 71 8. C. 14 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 691; Houston &c. Co. v. Wilson, 60 Tex. 142). Wisconsin (Milwaukee &c. Co. v. Hunter, 11 Wis. 160; Ewen v. Chicago &c. Co., 38 ib. 613; Nelson v. Chicago &e. Co., 60 Wis. 324; Hoye v. Chicago &c. Co., 19 A. & E. R. RB. Cases, 347; 23 N. W. Rep. 14; Bower v. Chi- cago &c. Co., 61 Wis. 457 S. ©. 19 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 301; Langhoff v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 19 Wis. 489; Hilert v. Green Bay &c. Co., 48 ib. 606; Duffy v. Chicago &e. Co., 32 ib. 269; Bohan v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 15 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 374; Ferguson v. Wisconsin &c. Co., 19 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 285; Hill v. City &c., 56 Wis. 246; Kaples v. Orth, 61 ib. 531 S. C. 21 N. W. Rep. 633; Urbank v. R. BR. Co., 47 ib. 59). It may be added that the conceit of comparative neg- ligence has been applied by some courts in cases in- volving the proposition under discussion (Railroad Co. v. Houston, 95 U. 8. 697; Chicago v. McKean, 40 Ill. 218; Chicago v. Fears, 53 ib. 115; Fletcher v. Atlantic &c. Co., 64 Mo. 485; Wilds v. Hudson &e. Co., 29 N. Y. 315; Gonzales v. New York &c. Co., 50 How. Pr. 126 8. C. 38 N. Y. 440; Eaton v. Erie &c. Co., 51 N. Y. 544). REGULATIONS—USAGE. Two propositions are presented: I. If a precaution, such as a sign-board, flagmen, etc., are enjoined by statute, is a traveller’s duty, in crossing 272 RAILWAY LAW. May Rely on Giving Signals. the track, to stop, look and listen, excused, in case such prescribed caution shall not have been given? In other words, may he rely upon the expectation that such statutory duty will be performed, and finding no such caution given, attempt to cross the track without stopping, looking or listening, and yet be free from con- tributive negligence? The following courts hold the affirmative of the proposition: Illinois (St. Louis &e. Co. v. Dunn, 78 Hl. 197; Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Sunderland, 2 Bradw. 307). Iowa (Spencer v. Illinois &e. Co., 29 Iowa, 55). Massachusetts—To a modified extent (Sweeny v. Old Colony &c. Co., 10 All. 368 (Flagman); Chaffee v. Bos- ton &e. Co., 104 Mass. 108; Wheelock v. Boston &c. Co., 105 ib. 203; Cf. Pollock v. Eastern &c. Co., 124 ib. 158), New Jersey (New Jersey &c. Co. v. West, 32 N. J. L. 91 (Flagmen).). Pennsylvania—This court holds that whether the obliga- tion to stop, look and listen, may be dispensed with if a statutory duty as to signals be neglected, is for the jury to determine (Phila. &c. Co. v. Killips, 88 Pa. 405 8. C. 8 W. N. 526 (Gate).). : The following courts hold the negative: England (Davey v. London &e. Co., L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 2138. C.14 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 650; 49 L. T. 739 (Man- isty, J., not assenting); but see, Lunt v. London “e. Co., L. R. 1 Q. B. 277; Stapley v. London Xe. Co., L. R. 1 Ex. 21). Supreme Court U. S. (R. R. Co. v. Houston, 95 U.S. 697.) Circuit Court U. S. (Field v. Chicago &e. Co., 16 W. Jur. 546; Thomas v. Delaware Wc. Co., 12 Rep. 739). Alabama (Memphis &c. Co. v. Copeland, 61 Ala. 376). Illinois! (Illinois &c. Co. v. Ethornington, 83 Ill. 510; 'The two cases of Peoria ». Stillman, 67 Ill. 72, and Chicago &c. Co. 9, Elmore, 7. 76, are in conflict on the point under discussion, but the set of judicial thought is clearly with the negative of our proposition. RAILWAY LAW. 278 May not. Chicago &e. Co. v. Triplett, 38 ib. 482; Peoria &c. Co. v. Stillman, 88 ib. 529; Dimmick v. Chicago &e. Co., 80 ib. 338; Chicago &c. Co. v. Van Patten, 74 ib. 91; Rockford &c. Co. v.-Bryan, 80 ib. 528; Chicago &c. Co. v. Har- wood, ib. 88; Chicago &c. Co. v. Fins, 53 tb. 115). Indiana (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Matthias, 50 Ind. 65; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Vining, 27 ib. 515). Iowa (Artz v. Chicago &c. Co., 34 Iowa, 153 8. O. 5 Am. R. Rep. 469; Long v. R. R. Co., 49 Iowa. 469; Dodge v. Burlington &e. Co., 34 ib. 276; Payne v. Chicago &e. Co., 39 ib. 523 8. C. 9 Am. R. Rep. 176). Maryland (Maryland &c. Co. v. Newbern, 19 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 261). Missouri (Taber v. Missouri &e. Co., 46 Mo. 353; Lan- gan v. St. Louis &e. Co., 4 Mo. App. "485; Kennayde v. Pacific &e. Co., 45 Mo. 255; Karle v. Kansas &¢e. Co., 55 ib. 476; Zimmerman v. Hanibal &e. Co., 71 ib. 476 8. C. 2A. & E.R. R. Cas. 191; Henze v. St. Louis &¢. Co., 2 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 212; Fletcher v. Atlantic &c. Co., 64 Mo. 480). These were all cases of failure to ring or sound the whistle. New Jersey (Delaware &c. Co. v. Toffey, 38 N. J. L. 525; Penn &c. Co. v. Righter, 42 ib. 180 S.C. 2 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 220; Runyon v. Central &c. Co., 25 N. J. L. 556; Morriss &c. Co. v. Haslan, 33 N. J. L. 147). New York (Wilcox v. Rome &c. Co., 39 N. Y. 358; Havens v. Erie &c. Co., 141 ib. 296; Baxter v. Troy &e. Co., ib. 502; Gorton v. Erie &c. Co., 45 ib. 660; Beisiegel v. New York &c. Co., 40 1b. 9; Jetter v. New York &e. Co., 2 Abb. App. Dec. 458; Ernst v. Hudson &c. Co., 39 N. Y. 61). Ohio (Cleveland &c. Co. v. Elliott, 28 Ohio, (N. 8.) 340 S. OC. 14 Am. R. Rep. 123; but see, Baker v. Pendergast, 8 0. L. J. 334). Pennsylvania (North &c. Co. v. Heileman, 149 Pa. 60). Tennessee (Hill v. Louisville, 9 Heisk. 823). 18 274 RAILWAY LAW. Custom as Affecting the Point. Wisconsin (Berg v. Chicago &c. Co., 50 Wis. 419). IL. Suppose a railroad company, in the absence of a statute enjoining it, has been accustomed to keep a flagman or give other direct notice of danger at a cross- ing, may a traveller rely upon the presumption of a continuance of such custom and thus be relieved of the duty to stop, look and listen? We put this proposition separately, as it seems to be settled by the weight of authority that, independent of legislative interference, a railroad company is under no obligation to station flagmen, ete. The following courts hold the affirmative in a more or less modified form: Ilinois (Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Sunderland, 2 Brad. 307). Massachusetts (Warren v. Fitchburg &c. Co., 8 Allen, 227; Wheelock v. Boston &c. Co., 105 Mass. 203). New Jersey (Delaware &c. Co. v. Toffey, 39 N. J. L. 525). The following, the negative: Indiana (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Gundt, 3 A. & E. BR. Cas. 502). This case held that such pretermission of usage might be considered as evidence of the defend- ant’s negligence. New York (McGrath v. New York &c. Co., 59 N. Y. 468 S. C. 17 Am. Rep. 359; Cf. Dolan v. Delaware &c. Co., 71 N. Y. 285; Ernst v. Hudson &c. Co., 39 N. Y. 61; Casey v. N. Y. &e. Co., 78 N. Y. 518), The principle decided in the previous case of Newson v. N. Y. &e. Co., 29 N. Y. 383, is irreconcilable with the McGrath case; and the subsequent cases of Kissinger v. New York &e. Co., 56 N. ¥. 5°88. 0.6 Am. Rep. 154, and McGovern v. New York &c. Oo., 67 N. Y. 417, seem to be in conflict. Lease of Railroads—Is the lessor, (being a corporation), ' RAILWAY LAW. i 275 Lease of Railways. of a railroad, responsible for injuries or loss caused by the negligence of the lessee? It may be stated, introductorily, that the authorities are agreed that such lessor is certainly responsible, in such case, if its charter, or the laws of the State cre- ating it, does not confer the power to lease; and gener- ally, that even when it does, it is liable, if the road is operated by its lessee, in the name of the lessor, and also, if operated by permission or license. But our imquiries are addressed to the instance of a valid lease, by one railway corporation to another, or to an individ- ual, and loss or injury, occasioned by the negligence of the lessee in operating the road. Upon this point the decisions are not uniform, and proceed upon diverse reasoning. The following cases are cited, as sustaining the affirmative of our proposition: Supreme Court U. S. (Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445, 450; Chicago &c. Co. v. Crane, 113 U. 8. 424). California—Under Statute (Fontaine v. Southern &c. Co., 54 Cal. 645 S. OC. 1 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 159 (injury to stock).). Georgia—May be so aligned (Singleton v. South-West- ern &¢. Co., 70 Ga. 464 8. C. 48 Am. Rep. 574; 21 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 226 (injury to passenger).). Illinois (Lesher v. Wabash, 14 Ill. 85 8. C. 56 Am. Dee. 494; Hinds v. Wabash, 15 Ill. 72; Chicago v. McCarthey, 20 ib. 385 S. O. 71 Am. Dee. 285; Illinois &c. Co. v. Finnegan, 21 Ill. 646 (stock killed); Chicago &c. Co. v. Whipple, 22 ib. 105; Peoria &c. Co. v. Lane, 83 Ill. 450; Wabash &c. Co. v. Peyton, 106 Ill. 534 8. C. 46 Am. Rep. 705 (injury to person); Ohio v. Dunbar, 20 IIl. 623 8. OC. 71 Am. Dec. 291 (non-delivery of freight); Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Campbell, 86 Ill. 443; Illinois &. Co. v. Kanuse, 39 Ill. 272; Toledo &e. Co. v. Rhumbold, 40 Ill. 143). 276 RAILWAY LAW. Lessor Responsible. Indiana—Semble (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Hannon, 60 Ind. 417; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Hunt, 71 Ind. 229; Wabash &c. Co. v. Rooker, 90 Ind. 581 8. C. 15 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 558 (injury to stock).). This decision went upon a question of pleading, but the principle is put under a “perhaps.” It was formerly held that the lessor was not liable, but by R. S. (1881), sec. 4025, they, as well as. their lessees, are made so, and the Rooker case was. decided after the passage of the statute (Pittsburg &e. Co. v. Hannon, 60 Ind. 417). But this court, prior to. the passage of the statute, held the lessor responsible for defective fencing (Fort Wayne &c. Co. v. Hinebaugh, 43 ib. 354; Indianapolis &c. Co. v. Solomon, 23 Ind. 534; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Bolner, 57 ib. 572). Iowa (Stevens v. R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 327; Clary v. Towa &c. Co., 37 ib. 344; Bower v. Burlington &c. Co., 42 Iowa, 546). Stress was here laid upon the fact that the road was operated under the corporate name of the lessor. Kansas (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Curl, 28 Kan. 622 8. ©. 11 A. & H.R. RB. Cas. 458; Cf. Kansas City &e. »v. Ewing, 23 tb. 273 (defective fences, cattle guards, &c.).). Maine (Whitney v. Atlantic &c. Co., 44 Me. 362 8. C. 69 Am. Dee. 103 (failure to fence road); Stearns v. At- lantic &¢. Co., 46 ib. 117 (communicating fire); Wyman v. Penobscot &c. Co., ib. 166 (fencing—cattle guards); Bean v. Atlantic &c. Co., 03 ib. 294 (communicating fires).). But in an action by a passenger, for an assault by a conductor, this court held that the lessee, alone, was responsible (Mahony v. Atlantic &c. Co., 63 Me. 68; full synopsis, note, 48 Am. Rep. 580). It is to be noted however, that Walton, Barrows and Virgin, J. J., dis- sented, perceiving no distinction between the principle underlying this case and those already cited. Massachusetts (Fletcher v. R. R. Co., 1 Allen, 9; Inger- soll v. Stockbridge &ec. Co., 8 Allen, 488; McElroy »v. " RAILWAY LAW. 277 Is not. Nashua &c. Co., 4 Cush. 400 8. C. 50 Am. Dec. 794 {communicating fires).). There are other cases usually cited to same effect, but have no application, as they were based upon the statute creating the lessor a corpo- ration, and provided in terms for its liability in the event of leasing (McCluer v. Manchester &c. Co., 13 Gray, 1248. C. 74 Am. Dee. 624). Michigan (Gardner v. Smith, 7 Mich. 410; McMillen v. Michigan &e. Co., 16 ib. 79; Bay &c. Co. v. Austin, 21 ab. 390). Minnesota (Freeman v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 28 Minn. 443 8. C. 7 A. & E.R. Rep. 410 (injury to person from defects in the track).). New Jersey (Delaware &c. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. J. L. 299). Ohio (Little Miami &c. Co. v. Hambleton, 14 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 126 (injury to adjoining owner).). Oregon—In absence of statutory provision, otherwise as to lease (Lakin v. Williamette &c. Co., 13 Oreg. 436 S. C. 57 Am. Rep. 25). Wisconsin (Cook v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 36 Wis. 45). The following cases support the negative of the proposition : Kansas (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Curl, 28 Kan. 622). This case is aligned, also, in support of the affirmative of our question. The court, while holding the lessor re- sponsible for defective fencing, &c., note a distinction between such negligence and that arising out of the handling of trains, holding in the latter instance, that the lessor company is not responsible (Kansas &c. Co. v. Neville, 25 ib. 632). New Hampshire (Murch v. Concord &c. Co., 29 N. H. 9 S. C. 61 Am. Dec. 631 (injury to passenger): This was not the case of a lease, but the user of the defen- dant’s road by contract (Cf. Hall v. Brown, 54 ib. 495). New York (Ditchett v. Spuyten &c. Co., 67 N. Y. 425; 278 RAILWAY LAW. Receivers Responsible. Wasmer v. Delaware &c. Co., 80 N. Y. 2128. 0.1 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 122), The later case of Abbott v. Johns- town &c. Co., 80 N. Y. 27 S. C. 36 Am. Rep. 572; 2 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 541; 21 Alb. L. J. 193, has no bearing, as. it was there held that the lease was invalid. Texas (Missouri &c. Co. v. Watts, 63 Tex. 549 S. C. 22 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 277). Perhaps the distinction, taken by the Kansas Court, reflects the true view, namely: that as to that class of cases, originating in a neglect to observe some statutory duty, devolved upon the lessor company, touching the preservation of its road-bed, &c., such company is liable, but not for an injury occurring through the negligent running of trains. Receivers.—It may not be deemed inappropriate to dis- cuss in this connection the liability of receivers, operat- ing railroads. We will first consider the question gen- erally, and then, as to whether leave to sue, must be obtained, and thereupon, whether the judgment may be enforced against the current earnings of the road. The courts of the following States hold them responsible for injuries to passengers, &c., and also liable as common carriers: England (Ruck v. Williams, 3 H. & N. 308). Supreme Court U. Ss. (Cowdrey v. Galveston &c. Co., 93 U.S. 352; Cf. Bartin v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126). Circuit Court U. S. (Jordan v. Wells, 3 Woods, 527; Ken- nedy v. Indianapolis &c. Co., 2 Flip C. Ct. 704 8. C. 10 Rep. 359; 11 C. L. J. 89; Tut. Rev. Rec. Dee. 6, 1880; 3 Fed. Rey. 50; Dexterville &c. Co. v. Case, 11 Rep. 2165 Davis v. Dunant, 19 Fed. Rep. 477 S. C. 18 ©. L. J. 249;, 17 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 295; Morgan v. Illinois &e. Co., 5 Dill. C. C. 96; 70. L. J. 311). Aeorgin—Senible (Cf. Henderson v. Walker, 55 Ga. 481; Thurman v. Cherokee &c. Co., 56 ib. 376). s RAILWAY LAW. 279 Are not. 3 Ilinois (Ohio &c. Co. v. faite 10 Ill. App. 31; Cf Wabash &c. Co. v. Brown, 5 Ill. App. 590). Indiana (Ohio &e. Co. v. Davis, 23 Ind. 553; Cf. Ball v. Indianapolis &e. Co., 53 ib. 57). Iowa (Allen v. Central &e. Co., 42 Iowa, 683 S. C. 2 L. & Hq. R. 202; 3 0. L. J. 434; Central &c. Co. v. Sloan, 23 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 398; Sloan v. Central &c. Co., 62 ib. 728 8. C. 11 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 145). Kentucky—Obiter (Douglass v. Cline, 12 Bush, 608, 628). Massachusetts (Page v. Smith, 99 Mass. 395; Nichols v. Smith, 115 ib. 332). * Missouri (Smith v. Combs, 78 Mo. 32 8. C. 20 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 209). New Jersey (Klein v. Jewett, 26 N. J. Eq. 474; Little v. Dusenberry, 19 Rep. 788). Ohio (Meara v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio, (N. 8.) 1378. C.5 Am. Rep. 633; Potter v. Bunnell, ib. 150, 159). Pennsylvania (Com. v. Runk, 26 Pa. 235), South Carolina (Gibbes v. Greenville &c. Co., 15 8. C. 518 8.C.9 A. & EB. R. BR. Cas. 723). Tennessee (Cf. Hopkins v. Connell, 2 Tenn. Ch. 323; Rogers v. Mobile &e. Co., 16 Rep. 536; 12 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 442). Texas—Semble (Hicks v. R. BR. Co., 18 Rep. 479). Vermont (Blumenthal v. Brainard, 38 Vt. 402; Newell v. Smith, 49 ib. 260; Cf. Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421 8. C. 70 Am. Dec. 424; Vermont &c. Co. v. Vermont &e- Co., 50 Vt. 500). Wisconsin (Kinney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 481). The negative of the proposition is held by the fol- lowing courts: Kansas—In this State, it is held that a railroad corpo- ration is liable for an injury caused to stock from a failure to fence its road, though the drainage happened whilst the road was in the hands of a receiver (Kansas 280 RAILWAY LAW. Leave to Sue. &e. Co. v. Wood, 24 Kan. 619; Union &c. Co. v. Cuppy, 26 ib. 754. S. 0. 11 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 562). New York (Metz v. Buffalo &e. Co., 58 N. Y. 618. ©. 17 Am. Rep. 201; Cardot v. Barney, (Church, C. J., dis- senting), 63 N. Y. 281 S. C. 20 Am. Rep. 533; Kain v. Smith, 11 Hun. 552 8. 0. 2 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 545.) The dissenting opinion of the LEARNED P. J., in the last case, is clearly the better law, as in this case, the receiver sued was appointed by the Court of Vermont, and as such, took a lease of the New York road; and the in- jury occurring in New York. The views of the learned! P. J. is sustained by the case of Page v. Smith, 99 Mass. 395, as well as Kinney v. Crocker, and Allen v. Central &c. Co., cited supra; and the decision of the court was itself reversed on appeal (Kain v. Smith, 80 N. Y. 458 8.0.2 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 545). It is quite remarkable that Mr. Wood, (3 Railway Law, 1667), should have aligned New York in the affir- mative, citing Camp v. Barney, 4 Hun. 373, with the Cardot case in view, and actually cited at the end of his note, as the defendant Barney was not only an assignee in bankruptcy, but a receiver as well. It is yet noticeable that the case from 4th Hun. was not cited by counsel or adhered to by the court. Must leave to sue be obtained? Y The affirmative of this proposition is generally held: Supreme Court U.S. (Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126, and a large number of other cases). It is not deemed necessary to cite other cases in the same line. Some courts hold that such leave is not required (Kinney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74; Allen v. Central &e. Co., 42 Lowa, 683 8. ©. 3 C. L. J. 434; 2 L. & Hq. R. 202). Of course, no leave is necessary, when sued out of that State by whose court he was appointed. 1No pun intended. RAILWAY LAW. 281 Paid out of the Earnings. Perhaps the proposition stated so broadly is mislead- ing. In those States where the distinction between the ‘forms of actions at law and suits in equity, is adhered to, it would seem that a plea in an action at law, em- bodying the fact that plaintiff had failed to obtain leave, would be demurrable. There can be no precedent ‘found for it in any English treatise or case. The argument of Mr. Justice Miller, in his dissenting opinion, in Barton v. Barbour, as also that of the court, in Kinney v. Crocker, is unanswerable. But, practically, the negative of the proposition is law, because the party suing, may be enjoined or punished as for a contempt, should he fail to obtain leave, by the court of equity which appointed the receiver. In those States, which have adopted the Code System, no good reason can be assigned why the failure to obtain leave might not be interposed as an answer (Chautauque &c.. Bank v. Risley, 19 N. Y¥. 369 8. C. 75 Am. Dee. 347). Shall the judgment, recovered for personal injuries, .&e., be paid out of the earnings of the road in prefer- ence to the mortgage-creditors? The following courts maintain the affirmative: Iowa—So held, but under a statute constituting a judg- ment a preferable lien (Sloan v. Central &c. Co., 62 Towa, 728 8. ©. 11 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 145; 16 N. W. Rep. 331; Central &c. Co. v. Sloan, 23 A. & HE. R. R. Cas. 398). The following court holds the negative: Circuit Court U. S. (Cf. Davenport v. Receivers, 2 Woods, 519; Western &c. Co. v. Drew, 3 ib. 691). The reasoning of Mr. Justice Woods, in the Davenport ease, is far from satisfactory. He says that “if the ‘road had been run by the president and directors, when the injury was sustained, no such claim could ‘have priority. The party would have traveled over 282 RAILWAY LAW. Sale of Corporate Property. the road, taking the risk of the ability of the com- pany to respond, just as every man, who obtains a right or contract, does so with a risk of the ability of the party to answer to him.” The learned Justice: seems to have lost sight of the circumstance that, by filing a bill, the mortgagees have done an act equiv- alent to taking possession in person. Suppose they had, instead of filing their bill, taken possession, would not a judgment against them, if they were personally unable to respond, have been satisfied out of the earn-- ings, nay, even out of the property itself? In the Davenport case, the mortgagor company was stripped of its power to operate the road; it was run by one, in no sense their agent; upon what principle of law then, can it be maintained, that the company, out of possession, should be held liable for the tortious or negligent acts of one, over whom they could exercise no control? The receiver, it is universally conceded, is not liable personally, nor on his bond for merely neg- ligent acts. So, that if the conclusion of the learned Justice be upheld, it amounts to a denial of justice to- an injured person, to the uncontrolled and even reck-. less user of that great motor, steam. It is a funda-- mental maxim, that neither the act of the law, nor the'act of the court, shall injure any one; but if the decision in the Davenport case shall be followed, we will have, in judicial form, a negative of this hitherto cherished prin-- ciple. Sale of Corporate Property—Can the estate of a railway company be sold under execution? First as to tangible property other than the road-bed. and rolling stock.! ‘There is no discrepancy as to property not necessary to the enjoyment of the franchise, so that the authorities cited refer to property employed to operate the corporation. RAILWAY LAW. 283: May be Sold—may not. The affirmative of this proposition is held by the following courts: England (Regina v. Victoria &c. Co., 1 Q. B. (N. 8.) 289: 41 E. C. L. RB.) Per Ld. Denman). Maryland (State v. Bank &e., 6 G. & J. 219), Massachusetts (Pierce v. Partridge, 3 Met. 44; Perry v. Adams, ib. 51; but see, Com. v. Tenth Cor. &. Co., 5: Cush. 509). Mississippi—Semble (Arthur v. Commercial &c. Bank, 9 S. & M. 394 8S. C. 48 Am. Dec. 719). Missouri—Semble (Stewart v. Jones, 40 Mo. 140). New York (Slee v. Bloom, 19 John. 456, 475). North Carolina (State v. Rives, 5 Ired. 297). This case gave rise to a statute providing for the sale of the fran- chise at “dutch auction,” see (Gooch v. McGee, 83 N. C. 59). Ohio (Coe v. Columbus &c. Co., 10 Ohio, (N. 8.) 3723, Atkinson v. Railroad Co., 15 ib. 21). Tennessee (Franklin &c. Co. v. Young, 8 Hump. 103;, State v. L. &c. Co., 4 Hump. 488). The negative by the following: Supreme Court U. S.1 (Gue v. Tidewater &c. Co., 24 How. 257, 263; New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 6003. East &ec. Co. v. Doe, 114 U. 8. 340; S. P. as to munici- pal corporations; Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U.S. 149). California (Munroe v. Thomas, 5 Cal. 470; Thomas v. Armstrong, 7 ib. 286; Wood v. Turnpike &c. Co., 24 ib. 478). Illinois (Hatcher v. Toledo &c. Co., 62 Ill. 477; Bruffett v. G. W. BR. Co., 25 ib. 353). Kentucky (Winchester &c. Co. v. Vimont, 5 B. Mon. 13. Louisville v. Hamilton, 3 A. & E. Corp. Cas. 421). 1It may be as well to observe that this court holds that when, by the: statute law of a State, a judgment is constituted a lien upon the real estate, the same may be enforced in equity by a sale. The Gue case is cited (Railroad Companies 0. James, 6 Wall. 750; Cf. Covington &c. Co. v. Shep- herd, 21 How. 112). : 284 RAILWAY LAW. Rolling Stock: Liable to Sale. Michigan (James v. Pontiac &c. Co., 8 Mich. 91). Montana (Northern &c. Co. v. Shimmell, 24 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 1). Pennsylvania! (Plymouth &e. Co. v. Colwell, 39 Pa. 337; Ammant v. New Alexandria &e. Co., 13 8. & R. 210 S. C. 15 Am. Dec. 593; Susquehanna &c. Co. v. Bonham, 9 W. & S. 28S. C. 42 Am. Dec. 315; Corey v. Pittsburg &e. Co., 3 Phila. 173; Western &c. Co. v. Johnston, 59 Pa. 290; Longstreet v. Philadelphia &c. Co., 11 W. N. C. 19; Byard’s Appeal, 72 Pa. 453; Youngman v. Elmira &e. Co., 65 Pa. 275). Texas (City v. Barnes, 50 Tex. 538). Rolling-Stock, Ete-——Some hold that it may be sold under execution: Supreme Court U. S.—Semble (Minnesota &e. Co. v. St. Paul &e. Co., 2 Wall. 209). U. S. Circuit Court (Cf. Farmers &c. Co. v. St. Joseph &c. Co., 3 Dill. 412) Indiana (Louisville &c. Co. v. State, 25 Ind. 177). Iowa (City &c. Co. v. Illinois &e. Co., 37 Iowa, 56). Maine (Strickland v. Parker, 54 Me. 263). Maryland (Denmead Vv Bank, 9 Mad. 179). Massachusetts (Howe Uv. Freeman, 14 Gray, 566). New Hampshire (Boston &c. Co. v. Gilmore, 37 N. H. 4108. C. 72 Am. Dec. 336; Pierce v. Emery, 32 ib. 485). New Jersey (Williamson v. New Jersey &c. Co., 29 N. J. Hq. 311). New York (Stevens v. Buffalo, 31 Barb. 590; Bennett v. Plattsburg &ec. Co., 47 Barb. 104; Beardsley v. Ontario Bank, 31 tb. 619; Randall v. Elwell, 52 N. Y. 521 8. ©. 11 Am. Rep. 747; Hoyle v. Plattsburg &e. Co., 54 N. Y. 314 8. C.7 Am. R. Rep. 283). Onio. (Coe v. Columbus &e. Co., 10 Ohio, (N. 8.) 372). 'Aliter as to property not necessary to the operation or enjoyment of ‘the corporate franchise (Plymouth &c. Co. 0. Colwell, 39 Pa. 339; Sha- mokin ». Livermore, 47 1b, 470; see sub-title, Rolling Stock, injra). RAILWAY LAW. 285 Not. Franchise. Wisconsin (Hill v. LaCrosse &c. Co., 11 Wis. 214; Chi- cago &c. Oo. v. Howard, 21 ib. 44). Following courts hold the negative of the proposi- tion: California (Wood v. Turnpike &c. Co., 24 Cal. 478). Georgia (Macon &c. Co. v. Parker, 9 Ga. 377). Illinois (Titus v. Ginhimer, 27 Il. 462; Palmer v. Forbes, 23 tb. 301; Hunt v. Bullock, ib. 320; Titus v. Maybee, 25. ib. 257). Kentucky (Winchester &c. Co. v. Vimont, 5 B. Mon. 1; Phillipps v. Winslow, 18 B. Mon. 431, 438; Elizabeth- town &c. Co. v. Elizabethtown, 12 Bush. 433; Applegate: v. Ernest, 3 Bush. 649). Pennsylvania (Corey v. Pittsburg &c. Co., 3 Phila. 173; West Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Johnston, 59 Pa. 290; Youngman v. Elmira &c. Co. 65 Pa. 278; Shamokin &c.. Co. v. Livermore, 47 ib. 465). Perhaps the true rule with regard to the seizure of the property of a corporation, is that none of its prop- erty can be levied on, which is essential to its existence, or the deprivation whereof would render it incapable of fulfilling its public duty. And viewed from this standpoint, as a converse proposition, it may be stated that the property of a municipal corporation not required for the exigences of its existence, is as much the subject of execution sale as the same kind of property would be in the case of a private individual. See an able monograph on the subject from the pen of Mr. L. A. Jones. INTANGIBLE PROPERTY, TOLLS, STOCK, FRANCHISE, &C.~ Franchise.—There is an universal current of authority to the effect that the franchise of a corporation is not liable to execution sale independent of a statute; the text-books too are all agreed upon this point. 286 RAILWAY LAW. Tolls: Stock: Fellow-Servants. Tolis—The same view is taken as to tolls, which are ‘but the product of the franchise. Stock.—And so as to stock. In some of the States the stock is held liable to attachment, but, as attachments of property, as now employed, were unknown to the common law, the right to attach must be predicated of the statute authorizing it. The remedy of the creditor is generally held to be by bill in equity, or analogous proceedings where the Code System prevails. FELLOW-SERVANTS.! As to what duties will constitute one the fellow- ‘servant of an employee, there is a considerable diversity ‘of opinion. That a middle-man is not such is quite clear, but it is equally well settled that in order that an employee should be so regarded, whether termed middle- man or vice-principal, he must, with reference to the ‘common master, fill the idea of an alter ego. The solu- tion, however, of this vexed question cannot, it is deemed, be so well determined by laying down abstract Tules, as by a consideration of the particular and relative duties as appertaining to a given status.2 ‘The author trusts that no apology is required for the manner in which this very important subject, growing in importance every day, is treated. Doubtless, every lawyer who has had practice involving the sub-title under ‘consideration, has been perplexed by the manner in which it has been treated in the text-books: very often the different points being scattered indiscriminately through long notes, and what is still more annoying, general expressions being used, such as hands, employees and the like, ne- cessitating an, often useless, reference to the authorities cited for law, bearing on the particular matter in hand. The author has, too, repeated his citations several times, where the sub-subjects discussed were not in close proximity, rather than impose the labor of hunting under a supra or infra, and wading through pages to find it; and again as a time-saver, he thinks that the lawyer in active practice will not object to the repetition of citations, as the cost to him will prove infinitesimal. He trusts that the arrangement of the sub-title Lasorer will meet with approval, as it is a nomen generalissimum. 7A very clear and sententious criterion as to what constitutes fellow- service, is given by Judge Thompson, viz: all who serve the same master, RAILWAY LAW. 287 Consociation. We will, to its elucidation, select several well known situations and discuss them separately. _ Consociation.!—Before, however, proceeding to particu- lar instances, it may be as well to observe that in several States, it is held that where there does not exist any connective influence, the one with or over the other, the rule of the assumption of risk has no application. Circuit Court U. S. (Grovelle v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 3 McCrary, 352). California (Brown v. Central &c. Co., 6 West. C. Rep. 797). Georgia (Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195; Cooper v. Mullins, 30 ib. 150 8. C. 76 Am. Dec. 638; Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72 Ga. 217 8. C. 53 Am. Rep. 838; 18 Rep. 105). Illinois (Chicago &c. Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302 S. C. 34 Am. Rep. 168; 17 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 564; 10 0. L. J. 348; Chicago &c. Co. v. Swett, 45 Ill. 197; Holton v. Daly, 4 Ill. App. 25; Toledo &e. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 Til. 391; Chicago &c. Co. v. Keefe, 47 Ill. 110; Ryan v. Chicago &c. Co., 60 Ill. 171, 174 8S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 82; Pittsburg &ec. Co. v. Powers, 74 Ill. 341; Chicago &c. Co. v. Henry, 7 Il. App. 322; i &e. Oo. v. McLal- len, 84 Ill. 109). Indiana (Gillenwater v. Madison &c. Co.,? 5 Ind. 339 8. C. 61 Am. Dec. 101). Kentucky (Louisville &c. Co. v. Collins, 2 Duv. 114 8. “work under the same control, derive authority and compensation from the same common sources, and are engaged in the same general business, though it may be in different grades or departments of it, are fellow-ser- vants, who take the risk of each other’s negligence (2 Thomp. Neg. 1026, sec. 31). 1y ae Thompson calls this an exceptional dotrine (2 Thomp. Neg. 1026, sec. 82). The word was coined by Judge Dickey, of Illinois. This case has been substantially overruled, but is cited for its reason- ing. 288 RAILWAY LAW. Grades of Employment. C. 87 Am. Dec. 486; Louisville &c. Co. v. Yandall, 17 B. Mon. 586; Louisville &c. Co. v. Cavens, 9 Bush. 559). Maine (Shanny v. Androscoggin &e. Co., 66 Me. 420). Massachusetts (Ford v. Fitchburg &c. Co., 110 Mass. 240 S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 598). Pennsylvania (O’Donnell v. Allegheny &c. Co., 59 Pa. 239). Rhode Island (Mann v. Oriental &c. Works, 11 R. I. 152 In this last-named case, the notion is clearly and strongly put. Tennessee (Nashville &c. Co. v. Jones, 9 Heisk. 27). Vermont (Davis v. Central &c. Co., 55 Vt. 848. C. 45 Am. Rep. 590; 11 A. & E, R. R. Cas. 173; 15 Rep. 286). Grades of Employment.—It is held in the following courts, that in order to bring the principle into operation the general rule as to assumption of risk by a fellow- servant, is, that he must be a servant in the same grade of employment as the one causing the injury. Georgia (Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195; Cooper v. Mullins, 30 Ga. 146, 150 S. C. 76 Am. Dec. 638). Illinois (Chicago &c. Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302 8. OG. 34 Am. Rep. 168; 10 C. L. J. 348; 17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 564; Chicago &c. Co. v. Swett, 45 Ill. 197; Lalor v. Chicago &c. Co., 52 Ill. 401 S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 616; Chi- cago &c. Oo., v. Jackson, 55 Ill. 492 8. C. 8 Am. Rep. 661; 1 Ai. R. Rep. 592; Toledo &c. Co. v. O’Connor, 77 Ml. 391; Ryan v. Chicago &e. Co., 60 ib. 171 8. ©. 14 Am. Rep. 32; Chicago &e. Co. v. Gregory, 58 ib. 272 S. C. 11 Am. R. Rep. 273; Cf. Chicago &c. Co. v. Patterson, 69 Ill. 650; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Powers, 74 ib. 341). Iowa (Donaldson v. Mississippi &e. Co., 18 Iowa, 280 8. C. 87 Am. Dee. 391), Kentucky (Louisville &c. Co. v. Collins, 2 Duv. 114 8. C. 87 Am. Dec. 486; Louisville &. Co. v. Mahoney, 7 Bush, 235; Louisville &c. Co. v. Cavens, 9 ib. 559; Louis- ville &c. Co. v. Bowler, 9 Heisk. 866 8. ©. 11 Alb. L. J. RAILWAY LAW. 289 Different Departments of Service. 119; but see, Louisville &c. Co. v. Robinson, 4 Bush. 507). New Jersey—Semble (Smith v. Oxford &c. Co., 42 N. J. L. 471). Tennessee—(Quere (Washburn v. Nashville &c. Co., 3 Head, 638 8. C. 75 Am. Dec. 784; Nashville &c. Co. v. Jones, 9 Heisk. 27). The weight of authority is overwhelmingly opposed to these decisions: Different Departments of Service.—The general rule and almost universally held, is that all servants in the em- ployment of the same master, under the same general control and engaged in the same common object, are to be deemed fellow-servants, engaged in the same com- mon employment; and, if so, the circumstance that they are employed in different departments of the same ser- vice, does not take the case out of the rule. The following courts have rendered decisions seem- ingly opposed to this principle: England (Bartonshill &e. Co. v. McGuire, 3 McQ. (H. of L.) 307; Abraham v. Reynolds,! 5 H. & N. 143). Scotland (McNaughton v. Caledonian &c. Co., 19 Ct. of Sess. Cases, 271). Supreme Court U.S. (Philadelphia &¢. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468; Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553; Hough v. R. RK. Co., 100 U. S. 213). Georgia (Cooper v. Mullins, 30 Ga. 150 S. C. 76 Am. Dee. 638). Ilinois (Holton v. Daly, 4 Ill. App. 25; Chicago &c. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 272 8. C. 11 Am. R. Rep. 273; Ryan v. Chicago &c. Co., 60 Ill. 171 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 32; Toledo &c. Co. v. Moore, 77 Ill. 210; Lalor v. Chi- 1This case has been shaken by subsequent cases (Murray v. Currie, L. R. (6 C. P.) 24; Rourke ». White Moss Colliery, L. R. (1 C. P. Div.) 556; Cf. _ Wiggett ». Fox, 11 Ex. 832 8. C. 25 L. J. (Ex.) 188; Swainson 0. Railroad Co., 87 L. J. 105). 19 290 RAILWAY LAW. Doctrine Opposed to Weight of Authority. cago &e. Co., 52 tb. 401 S. Cc. 4 Am. Rep. 616; Toledo &c. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 Ill. 391; Toledo &c. Co. v. Ingraham, 77 Ill. 309). Indiana (Gillenwater v. Madison! &c. Co., 5 Ind. 339 8. ©. 61 Am. Dee. 101; Fitzpatrick v. N. A. &e. Co., 7 Ind. 436; but the notion was repudiated in the later case of Columbus &e. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 182; and the Fitz- patrick case was overruled). Missouri (Lewis v. St. Louis &. Co., 59 Mo. 495 S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 385; 8 Am. R. Rep. 450; Dowling v. Girard &¢. Co., 14 C. L. J. 92). Ohio (Little Miami &c. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio, 415; Cin. &c. Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio, (N. S.) 201). Pennsylvania (O’Donnell v. Allegheny &c. Co., 59 Pa. 239; Baird v. Pettit, 70 ib. 477, 482; Catawissa &e. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. 186). Tennessee (Nashville v. Jones, 9 Heisk. 27; Nashville &c. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347; Fox v. Sanford, 4 Sneed, 36; Washburn v. Railroad Co., 3 Head, 638; Memphis &c. Co. v. Jones, 2 ib. 517; Nashville &c. Co. v. Elliott, 1 Cold. 616: Haynes v. East Tenn. &c. Co., 3 ib. 223). Utah (Powers v. R. R. Co., 20 Rep. 58). These decisions are exceptional, and the weight of authority is decidedly opposed to their conclusions. It is not deemed necessary to cite the opposing cases, either under this sub-title or the next preceding, as their name is legion. The notion, advanced by Judge Dickey in his coined expression of con-sociation, is not, perhaps in a restricted sense, assailable. There can be readily supposed cases where no connective influence, as we choose to term it, can be possibly inferred ez. gr. an attorney is a servant; every one would admit that whilst attending to professional business of the common 1The opinion in this case is the ablest exposition of the minority view that we have read, and although substantially overruled, is cited as a very strong defence of a very indefensible position. RAILWAY LAW. 291 Doctrine Discussed. master, generally a railway or steamboat company, he should be transported free—on what is commonly termed a free pass—now can it fairly be assumed, that whilst so traveling, he impliedly assumed the risk of his person or his life induced by the negligence of a conductor, engineer, brakesman, switchman, train-dispatcher, tele- grapher and other employees? If so, he must refuse to be carried free even on business of emergency to the master he represents. Now, such a conclusion, when so applied, seems absurd. Other instances might be cited but this will suffice to show that, in one sense, Judge Dickey’s idea of con-sociation is not wholly devoid of consideration. In Morgan v. Vale of Neath R. Co., 5 B. & S. 736, (117 E. C. L. BR.) the plaintiff was employed by a rail- ‘way company as their servant, to do work as a car- penter to the roof of an engine shed at their station, whilst the railway traffic was being carried on in it by their servants. In the course of this employment he was standing upon a scaffold which was erected near to who, one of the turntables. The porters of the company were engaged in shifting a locomotive engine allowed it to project so far beyond the turntable that, in turning it, the end of the engine, by their negligence, struck against a ladder which constituted one of the supports of the scaffold. The scaffold gave way in consequence, and the plaintiff was thrown off and injured. In an action by the plaintiff against the company, held by the Exch. Ch. affirming the judgment of the court below, that the nature of the plaintiff’s employment was such as to make him and the servants by whose negligence he suffered servants in a common employment, within the rule which exempts the employer from responsibility to his servant for the consequences of the negligence of a servant in a common employment. 292 RAILWAY LAW. Acting Man.. Agent: Architect: Bearing-Operator. CHIEF BARon POLLOCK with his characteristic com- mon-sense, puts it with great antithetical force. He says: I will only add to the judgment which has been delivered, that by a decision in favor of the plaintiff, we should open a flood of litigation, the end of which no one could foresee. If a carpenter, in a railway com- pany, were distinguished from a porter in their employ- ment so as to create a liability of the company, every large mercantile or manufacturing establishment, would be split up into different departments of labor. But, in truth, the workmen employed in such an establishment have all a common object, viz: to further the business. of the establishment, and we ought not to be too nice in defining the common object, with reference to the rule which governs this class of cases, so as to make a master not liable unless there were a common, imme- diate object, in which the servant suffering, and the servant doing the wrong, were engaged. Acting Manacer and employee, are when working together. New York (Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516 8. C. 37 Am. Rep. 521 (Earl, Danforth and Finch, J. J., dissent- ing).). AGENT—Wwith full power to command and discharge workmen, and such workmen, are not. Circuit Court U. S. (Miller v. Union Pacific &c. Co., 17 Fed. 67). AGENT TO HIRE HANDS and foreman hired by him, are not. New York (Laning v. N. Y. &c. Co., 49 N. Y. 521 8. C. 10 Am. Rep. 417). ARCHITECT and laborer, are not. Missouri (Whalen v. Centenary Church, 62 Mo. 326). BeaRING-OPERATOR and laborers, are. RAILWAY LAW. 293 Baggage-Master: Blasters: Boat-Rowers: Boiler-Makers, etc. Massachusetts (Jones v. Granite Mills, 126 Mass. 84; 30 Am. Rep. 661; 7 Rep. 146). BaGGaGE-MAsTER and switchman, are, and conductor, are not. Colorado (Colorado &c. Co. v. Martin, 5 Col. 562 8. C. 17 A. & E.R R.. Cas. 592; 4 West. C. Rep. 563). And inspector, are not. (Chicago &¢c. Co. v. Jackson, 55 Ill. 492 S. C. 1 Am. R. Rep. 569; 8 Am. Rep. 661; Indianapolis &c. Co. v. Morgenstern, 106 Ill. 216 S.C. 12 A. & HE. BR. R. Cas. 228; Brann v. Chicago &c. Co., 53 Iowa, 595 S. O. 36 Am. Rep. 243; 10 Rep. 202; King v. Ohio &c..Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 799 S. C. 15C. L. J. 367; 8 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 118). And switchmen, are. (Roberts v. Chicago &e. Co., 33 Minn. 218; Cf. Collins ®. St. Paul &. Co., 30 Minn. 34 8. C.8 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 150; 45 Am. Rep. 590). BLASTERS and rock-haulers, are (Bogard v. Louisville &c. Co., 100 Ind. 491). And miners, are (Keilley v. Belcher &c. Co., 3 Sawy. (C. C. U. 8.) 500). Boat-RowER.and laborers, are (Lovell v. Howell, L. R. (1 C. P. Div.) 161 S. C. 45 L. J. (C. P.) 387). BorLeR-MAKERS, and boiler-testers, are (Murphy v. Boston &c. Co., 88 N. Y. 146 8. C. 8 Abb. Prac. N. O. 41; 59 How. Pr. 197; 42 Am. Rep. 240). And fireman, are not, (Nashville &c. Co. v. Jones, 9 Heisk. 27 (Tenn.); and engineer, are not, (éb.)). BoILER-TESTERS—see next supra. Boy NOT IN SERVICE and conductor, are not (N. O. &c. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112 8. C. 12 Am. Rep. 356). In the following courts, a brakesman is held with reference to the several employees specified, a fellow- servant within the rule. 294 RAILWAY LAW. Brakesmen are. BRAKESMAN and engineer! (Hutchinson v. York &c. Co., 5 Ex. 343; Bartonshill &c. Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. 266; Bartonshill &c. Co. v. McGuire, ib. 300; Wilson v. Merry, L. R. (1 House of L. Se. App. Cas.) 326; Morgan v. Vale of Neath &c. Co, 5 B. & S. 570 (117 EH. C. L. BR.) S. C. L. R. (1 C. P.) 291; Charles v. Taylor, L. R. (8 C. P. Div.) 491; Conway v. Belfast &c. Co., Ir. R. (9 C. L.) 498; Ir. R. (11 C. L.) 345). Supreme Court U. S—and engineer (Randall v. Balti- more &c. Co., 109 U.S. 478 S.C. 15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 243); and brakeman acting as switchman and car- repairer (ib.) BLATCHFORD, BRADLEY, MaTTHEws and Gray, J. J. dissenting. Circuit Court U. S.—and engineer (Keilley v. Belchre &c. Co., 3 Sawy. 500; Jordan v. Wells, 3 Woods, 327). Alabama and supervisor of roads (Mobile &c. Co. v.. Smith, 59 Ala. 245 S. C. 6 Rep. 264); and engineer (ib.); and section-master (ib.). Arkansas and inspector (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Gaines, 46 Ark, 555). California and engineer (Hogan v. Central &c. Co., 49 Cal. 128). Colorado and engineer (Summerhays v. Kansas &c. Co., 2 Col. 484). Illinois and conductor (Chicago &c. Co. v. Jackson, 55: Ill. 492 S.C. 1 Am. R. Rep. 592; 8 Am. Rep. 661); and inspector (Chicago &c. Co. v. Bragonier, 11 Ill. App. 516); and engineer-shovelers (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Britz, 72 Ill. 256; Illinois &c. Co. v. Keen, 72 Ill. 512); and shovelers (ib.); and other brakesmen (Chicago &c. Co. v. Rush, 84 Tl. 570). 'This word, though perhaps not strictly accurate, is adopted in prefer- ence to the English word engine-driver, as in England, the operator of the locomotive power has no skill outside of that required for running the train—locomotive engineer is rather too confined a term. RAILWAY LAW. 295 Same. Indiana—and conductor (Thayer v. St. Louis &c. Co., 22 Ind. 26 8. C. 85 Am. Dec. 409; Wilson v. Madison &c. Co., 18 Ind. 226); and engineer (case last cited); and train-dispatcher (Robertson v. Terre Haute &c. Co., 78 Ind. 77 8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 552; 8 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 175); with switchman (last and next case,) and section- master (Slattery v. Toledo &e. Co., 23 Ind. 81). . Iowa—and conductor (Burlington &c. Co. v. Dowell, 15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 153); and engineer (Sullivan v. Missis- sippi &c. Co., 11 Iowa, 421; Peterson v. Whitebreast &c. Co., 50 (ib.) 673 8. C. 32 Am. Rep. 143; Gibbons v. Chicago &c. Co.,1 66 Towa, 231 S. C. 20 Rep. 143; 23 N. W. Rep. 644). Kansas—and conductor (Dow v. Kansas &c. Co., 8 Kan. 642 S. C. 5 Am. R. Rep. 401). Kentucky—and engineer-shoveler, brakesman ( Louis- ville &c. Co. v. Robinson, 4 Bush. 507); and engineer (ib.); and shoveler (ib.)). Maine—and conductor acting as engineer (Cassidy v. Maine &c. Co., 76 Me. 488 8. C. 17 A. & H. BR. R. Cas. 519). Maryland—and inspector (Wonder v. Baltimore &c. Co., 32 Md. 411 S. C. 3 Am. Rep. 143); and engineer (Abell v. Western &c. Co., 21 A. & HE. RB. R. Cas. 503); and track-repairer (Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395 8.0.15 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 187). Massachusetts—and brakesmen (Hayes v. Western &c. Co., 3 Cush. 270; and conductor (ib.); train-dispatchers and station-master (Hodgkins v. Eastern &c. Co., 119 Mass. 419 8. C. 9 Am. R. Rep. 271); and inspector (Mac- kin v. Boston &c. Co., 185 Mass. 208. C.15 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 196; 46 Am. Rep. 456); and derrick-operator 1This case fully illustrates and emphasizes the correctness of the often iterated view of the author, that the courts should refrain from forcing presumptions. The court, substantially, hold that there could be no re. covery upon the plaintiff’s own testimony; that was that he was a section- hand. 296 RAILWAY LAW. Same. (Holden v. Fitchburg &c. Co., 129 Mass. 268 8. C. 2 A. & BH. R. R. Cas. 94). Michigan—and engineer (Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 158 8. C. 2 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 140; 41 Am. Rep. 161; Hatha- way v. Michigan &c. Co., 51 Mich. 253 8. C. 47 Am. Rep. 569; 16 N. W. Rep. 634; Michigan v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212); and conductor (Day v. Toledo &c. Co., 42 Mich. 523 8. C. 2 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 126); and car-in- spector (Smith v. Flint, 46 Mich. 248 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 161); and firemen (Greenwald v. Marquette &c. Co., 49 Mich. 197 8. C. 8 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 133). Minnesota—and engineer (Foster v. Minnesota &c. Co., 14 Minn. 360; Ransier v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 11 A. & H. R. R. Cas. 647). Mississippi—and conductor (Chicago &c. Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977 S. C. 8 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 171). Missouri—and conductor (Conner v. Chicago &c. Co., 59 Mo. 285); and fireman (Kersey v. Kansas &¢. Co., 79 Mo. 362); and train-dispatcher (Blessing v. St. Louis! &c. Co., 77 Mo. 410 8. C. 15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 298). New Jersey—and engineer (McAndrews v. Burns, 39 N. J. L. 117 8. C. 5 Rep. 120; Smith v. Oxford Iron Co., 42 N. J. L. 467). New York—and inspector (Besel v. N. Y. Co., 70 N. Y. 171); and brakesmen (ib.); and yard-master (ib.); and conductor (Sherman v. Rochester &c. Co., 17 N. Y. 153; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61S. ©. 39 Am. Rep. 627; Coon v. Syracuse &c. Co., 5 ib. 462; Besel v. N. Y. &e. Co., 70 N. Y. 171); and engineer (ib.); and Wright v. N. Y. Se, Co., 25 N. Y. 562); and train-dispatchers (Rose v. Boston &c. Co., 58 N. Y. 217); and yard-master (Besel v. N. Y. &e. Co., supra); and switchmen (Finney v. Boston &e. Co., 52 N. Y. 632; Harvey v. N. Y. &e. Co., 88 ib. 4818. C.8 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 515). 1 This case was decided upon a question of pleading. RAILWAY LAW, 297 Same. North Carolina—and engineer (Ponton v. W. & W. &e. Co., 6 Jones, 245). Ohio—and engineer (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Ranney, 37 Ohio, (N. 8.) 665 8.C.5 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 533; (OkEY and Wars, J. J., dissenting,) Whaalen v. Mad. River &c. Co. 8 Ohio, (N. 8.) 249; Pittsburgh &c. Co. v. Devinney, 17 ib. 197); and conductor and inspector (Little Miami &c. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Ohio, (N. S.) 318; 17 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 578; Columbus &c. Co. »v. Webb, 12 Ohio, (N. S.) 475). Pennsylvania—and car-repairer (Campbell v. Pennsyl- vania &c. Co., 24 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 427); and inspector and conductor (Frazier v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 38 Pa. 104 8S. C. 80 Am. Dec. 467); and engineer (Lehigh. Valley Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432). Tennessee—and brakesmen and conductor and inspector (Nashville &c. Co. v. Foster, 11 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 180; Nashville &c. Co. v. Wheeless, 10 Lea, 741 8.C.4 A. & E- R. R. Cas. 633); and engineer (Nashville &c. Co. v. Wheeless, 10 Lea, 741 8. C. 15 A. EB. BR. BR. Cas. 315; 43 Aw. Rep. 317; Hast Tennessee &c. Co. v. Rush, 15 Lea, 145). Texas—and conductor (Houston &e. Co. v. Gilmore, 62 ‘Tex. 361); and engineer (ib.); and other brakesmen (i.). and conductor (Robinson v. Houston &c. Co., 46 Tex. 540); and firemen (Galveston &c. Co. v. Faber, 63 Tex. 347); and engineer (Houston &c. Co. v. Willie, 53 ‘Tex. 318). In this case the master was held irrespon- sible for an injury attributable to the malice of the engineer toward the brakesman and other employees (Hamilton v. Galveston &e. Co., 54 Tex. 556). Wisconsin—and engineer (Mosely v. Chamberlin, 18 Wis. 731; Fowler v. Chicago &c. Co., 61 Wis. 759); and flagman (Cooper v. Milwaukee &c. Co. 23 ib. 668); and car-coupler (Whitman v. Wisconsin &c. Co., 58 Wis. 408 298 RAILWAY LAW. Not. S. 0.12 A. & B. RB. R. Cas. 214); and conductor (Pease v. Chicago &c. Co. 61 Wis. 163 8. C.17 A. & E, R. R. Cas. 527). In the following courts he is held not to be a fellow- servant in connection with the other employees indicated below. Circuit Court U. S.—and inspectors (King v. Ohio &c. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 277 8. C. 15 C. L. J. 367; 25 Fed. Rep. 799; 8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 119). Connecticut—and conductor, when not (Zeigler v. Rail- road Co., 52 Conn. 543 8. C. 21 Rep. 201). Illinois—and train-dispatchers (Toledo &c. Co. v. Ingra- ham, 77 Ill. 309); and switchman (Chicago &e. Co. v. Henry, 7 Bradw. 322); and inspector and _ train-dis- patchers (Chicago &e. Co. v. Jackson, 55 Ill. 492 S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 661; 1 Am. R. Rep. 569); and car-repairer (ib.); and other servants when (Central &c. Co. v. Welch, 52: Il. 183; Tuledo &c. Co. v. Ingraham, supra). Iowa—and inspector (Brann v. Chicago W&e. Co., 53 Towa, 595 S. C. 36 Am. Rep. 243; 10 Rep. 202). Kentucky—and engineer (Louisville &c. Co. v. Brook, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 110); and conductor (Louisville &e. Co. v. Moore, 24 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 443). Maine—and section-master (Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills Co., 66 Me. 420). Michigan—and inspector, when compelled, against his protest, to perform extra hazardous work, is not (Jones v. Lake Shore &c. Co., 49 Mich. 573 8. C. 14 N. W. Rep. 551). Missouri—and inspector (Long v. Pacific &e. Co., 65 Mo. 225; Missouri &e. Co. v. Condon, 78 ib. 567 8. 0. 17 A. & HE. R. R. Cas. 583); and section-master (Lewis v. St. Louis, 59 Mo. 495 8. C. 21 Am. Rep. 385; 8 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 450); and track-repairer (Vantrain v. St. Louis &c. Co., 8 Mo. App. 558). RAILWAY LAW. 299° Bridge Builders. New York—and engineer (Moran wv. N. Y. &c. Co., 67 Barb. 96); and master-machinist (Gottlieb v. N. Y! &e. Co., 100 N. Y. 462 8. C. 24 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 421). North Carolina—and engineer (Cowles v. Richmond &c. Co.,! 84 N. C. 309 8. C. 37 Am. Rep 620; 12 C. L. J. 546; 2A.& E.R. R. Cas. 90; 12 Rep. 219). Ohio—and engineer (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Lewis, 33. Ohio, (N. 8S.) 196 (Scorr and AsHBuRN, J. J., dissent- ing).). And laborer, are (Frazier v. Pennsylvania &e. Co., 38: Pa. 104 8. C. 80 Am. Dee. 467). Virginia—and section-hand (Morris v. Richmond &c. Co.,, 8 Va. L. J. 540). West Virginia and mechanic (Cooper v. Pittsburg &c.. Co., 24 W. Va. 37). Wisconsin and general manager (Phillips v. Chicago &e. Co., 64 Wis. 475 8. C. 23 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 453); and train-dispatchers (ib.); and foreman (Brabbits v. Chi- cago &¢c. Co., 38 Wis. 289); and conductor (Pease v. Chi- cago, 61 Wis. 163 S. C.17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 527). BRIDGE BUILDERS and carpenters are (Yager v. At- lantic &c. Co., 4 Hughes, (C. 0. U. S.) 192); and fore- man, road-master and section-master, are not (Davis v. 1This decision is contrary to the current of authority, and was based upon an evident misapprehension of the drift of the decision in Hough v. Railroad Co., 100 U.S. 213; in that case it appeared that the employee was. injured by ' dafective machinery, furnished by the middle-man of the master,, and so, quacunque via data, does it not, according to the Cowles case, fur- nish an instance of a right of an employee to recover for a negligent in-- jury caused by a fellow-servant? It will be observed that as the Hough case was decided upon an issue framed upon the allegation that the defen. dant had failed to furnish proper machinery, the position taken, as to fellow-servants, was altogether supererogatory, and substantially a dictum. The cases cited by the learned judge who delivered the opinion, (who was a. great ornament to the bench), only relate to the furnishing by the master, of defective machinery and appliances. The defendant was represented by one of the finest judicial minds that this continent has produced, but he: evidently had not made railroad law a specialty. 300 RAILWAY LAW. Burden of Proof: Car-Coupler. ‘Central &c. Co. 55 Vt. 84S. C. 45 Am. Rep. 590; 11 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 173; 15 Rep. 286); and laborer, are not (Railroad Co. v. Sullivan, 5 Tex. Law Rev. 183). Buckine Snow. See FIREMAN, infra. BURDEN OF PRooF of negligence is upon the plaintiff (Mobile &c. Co. v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245 S. C. 6 Rep. 264). CaAR-COUPLER and brakesmen, are (Whitman v. Wis- consin &e. Co., 58 Wis. 408 8. C.12 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 214); and car-inspector, are not (Tierney v. Minneapolis &e. Co., 33 Minn. 311 S. C. 53 Am. Rep. 35; 20 Rep. $4; 21 A. & H. R. R. Cas. 545 (MircH ELL, J. dissenting); and conductor, are (Wilson v. Madison &c. Co., supra); and engineer, are (Kroy rv. Chicago &ec. Co., 32 Iowa, 357; Wilson v. Madison &c. Co., 18 Ind. 226; Farwell v. Boston &c. Co., 4 Met. 49 S. ©. 38 Am. Dec. 339; Red. Am. R. Cas. 384; Dow v. Kansas &c. Co., 8 Kan. 642 S. C.5 Am. R. Rep. 401; Summerhays v. Kansas &c. Co., 2 Col. 284; St. Louis &e. Co. v. Britz, 72 Ill. 256; Henry v. Staten &c. Co., 81 N. Y. 873 8. C.2 A. & BE. RB. RB. Cas. 60; Smith v. Flint & Potter, 46 Mich. 258 S. ©. 2 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 140; 41 Am. Rep. 161; Nashville &c. ‘Co. v. Wheeless, 10 Lea, 741 8.0.4 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas.! 633; 43 Am. Rep. 317; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Ranney, 37 Ohio, (N. 8.) 665 8.0.5 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 533; Jeffrey v. Keokuk &¢. Co., 56 Iowa, 546 8. C.5 A. & E.R. R. ‘Cas. 568); and car-inspector, are (Smith v. Flint, supra) ; and fireman, are (Hughes v. Winona &e. Co., 27 Minn. 137). 1The American and English Rail Road Cases are a most valuable addi- tion to the law learning of the country, and we acknowledge great in- — debtedness to it in the compilation of this treatise, but, in the spirit of kindly criticism, we think it quite indefensible to republish the same case, as is done in the case of Nashville &c. Co. 7. Wheeless, which is reported -sub-nom Wheeler in both 4 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 6338, and 15 7b. 315. RAILWAY LAW. 301 Carpenter: Chain Carrier, &c. CARPENTER and engineer, are not (Ryan v. Chicago: &c. Co., 60 Ill. 171 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 32); and flagman,, are (Gilman v. Hastern &c. Co., 10 Allen, 233 8. C. 87 Am. Dee. 635; see 8. C. 13 All. 483); Holden v. Fitchburg &c. Co., infra);, and track-repairer, are (Gilshannon v. Stony Brook &e. Co., 10 Cush. 228; Seaver v. Boston &c. Co., 14 Gray, 466); and superintendent, are (Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102); and draftsman, are not (Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa. 477); and mason, are (Mercer v. Jackson, 54 Il. 397); and laborers, are (Morgan v. Vale of Neath, 5 B. & 8. 736 (117 E. C. L. R.); L. RB. (1 Q. B.) 149; 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 23; 13 L. T. BR. (N. 8.) 564; 14 W. R. 144); are not, peculiar circumstances (Mulchey v. Methodist &c. Society, 125 Mass. 487); and laborer (in brewery), are not (Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y.5 S.C. 21Am. Rep. 573); and switechman, are (Gilman v. Eastern &c. Co., supra); Holden v. Fitchburg &e. Co., 129 Mass. 272); and foreman, are (Yager v. Atlantic &c. Co., 4 Hughes, 192; Newbar v. N. Y. &c. Co., 101 N. Y. 607 (Mem.) 8S. C. 4 N. E. Rep. 125); and plumber, are (Killea v. Foxon, 125 Mass. 485); and turn-table employee, are (Morgan v. Vale of Neath, supra; Cf. Tunney v. Mid- land &c. Co., L. BR. (1 C. P.) 391 8. C. 2 Jur. (N. 8.) 691); and mill-wright, are (Works v. Bedell, 96 Pa. 195); carried free to his work and train-hands, are (Gilshannon v. Stony Brook &e. Co., 10 Cush. 228; Seaver v. Boston &e. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Cf. Gilman v. Eastern, supra; ) are not (O’Donnell v. Allegheny &c. Co., 59 Pa. 239). CHAIN-CARRIER and conductor are (Ross v. N. Y. &c. Co., 5 Hun. 488 S. C. on appeal, 74 N. Y. 617). CoAL-HEAVERS. See TRACK-WALKER. CoaL-HoIstER and other employees, are (islands, 28 Fed. Rep. 478 (C. ©. U. 8.)). Coau-MINER detailed to repair track, and conductor, are (Cumberland &c. Co. v. Scally, 27 Md. 589). f 302 RAILWAY LAW. Collision: Common Sense Test.: Comparative Neg., &c. Couuision. When the trains of the same company collide, the employees operating either train, cannot maintain an action for injuries sustained in consequence thereof. England (Hutchinson v. York &c. Co., 5 Ex. (W. H. & G.) 343 8. C. 6 Eng. Rail. Cas. 580; 14 Jur. 837; 19 L. J. ( Ex.) 296). Kentucky (Louisville &c. Co. v. Robinson, 4 Bush, 507). Ohio (Pittsburg &e. Co. v. Devinney, 17 Ohio, (N. 8.) 197). ComMoM-SENSE CRITERION—Common employment is service of such kind that in the exercise of ordinary Sagacity, all who engage in it may be able to forsee, when accepting it, that through the negligence of fel- low-servants, it may probably expose to injury (McAn- drews v. Burns, 39 N. J. L. 117 8. C. 5 Rep. 120). COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE as affecting the subject (Cf. Foster v. Chicago &e. Co., 84 Ill. 164; Wood v. N. Y. &e. Co., 70 N. Y. 195; Kansas &c. Co. v. Peavy, 29 Kan. 169 S. C. 11 A. & B. R. BR. Cas. 260; 44 Am. Rep. 630). CompuLtsory Lasor—When an employee is com- pelled against his protest, to perform extra-hazardous work, the rule is discharged (Jones v. Lake Shore &c. Co., 49 Mich. 573 8. C. 8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 221). ConDuctoR—A conductor is held to be a fellow- servant with the various employees enumerated below, by the following courts: Colorado—and baggage-master (Colorado &e. Co. v. Martin, 5 Col. 562 8S. C. 4 W. ©. Rep. 563; 17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 592). Illinois—and engineer, tireman and wood-hauler under a contractor (Toledo &¢. Co. v. Cox, 21 Ill. 20 8. C. 71 Am. Dee. 298). RAILWAY LAW. 303 Conductor Is. Indiana—and engineer and car-coupler (Wilson v. Mad- ison &e. Co. 18 Ind. 226); and brakesman (Thayer v. St. Louis &¢. Co., 22 ib. 26 S. C. 85 Am. Dec. 409). Iowa—Applying brakes, and brakesman (Dunlavy v, Chicago &e. Co., 66 Iowa, 435 8. C. 21 A. & E.R. R, Cas. 542); and train-hands (Jeffrey v. Keokuk &c. Co., 56 Iowa, 5468. C.5 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 568). Kansas—and brakesman and engineer (Dow v. Kansas &c. Co., 8 Kan. 642 8. C. 5 Am. R. Rep. 401). Kentucky—and brakesman (Louisville &c. Co. v. Moore, 24 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 443). Maine—and laborer (Cassidy v. Maine &c. Co., 76 Me. 488 8. C0. 17 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 519). Maryland—and laborer (O’Connell v. Baltimore &c. Co., 20 Md. 212 8S. C. 83 Am. Dec. 549); and coal-miner detailed to repair track (Cumberland &c. Co. v. Scally, 27 Md. 589). Massachusetts—and engineer! (Lovejoy v. Boston &c. Co., 125 Mass. 79 S. C. 28 Am. Rep. 206); and brakesman and engineer (Hayes v. Western &c. Corp., 3 Cush 270); and train-hands (Gilshannon v. Stony Brook &c. Co., 10 Cush. 228). Michigan—and brakesmen (Piquegno v. Chicago &c. Co., 52 Mich. 40 S. C. 50 Am. Rep. 243; 12 A. & HE. R. R. Cas. 210; Smith v. Flint, 46 Mich. 248 8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 161; Rodman v. Michigan &c. Co., 55 Mich. 57 8. C. 54 Am. Rep. 348; 20 N. W. Rep. 788; 17 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 521); and train-hands (Michigan Sc. Co. v. Dolan, 32 Mich. 510). Mississippi—and _ track-repairer (N. O. &c. Co. v. Hughes, 49 Miss. 258; Howard v. Mississippi &c. Co., 50 tb. 178). Missouri—and laborer (McGowan v. St. Louis &c. Co., 61 Mo. 528). 1 This word is used as synonymous with engine-driver, (in England), and locomotive-engineer, switch-engineer, &c.—as the engine-drivers in this sountry are machinists, which is not necessarily the case in England. 304 RAILWAY LAW. Not. New York—and brakesmen and engineer (Sherman v. Rochester &c. Co.,17 N. Y. 153); and train-hands (Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 8. C. 39 Am. Rep. 627; 5 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 515; Ross v. N. Y. &c. Co., 74 N. Y. 617). ‘Ohio—and train-hands (Manville v. Cleveland &c. Co., 11 Ohio, (N. 8.) 417); and brakesmen and engineer (Pitts- burgh &c. Co. v. Devinney, 17 Ohio, (N. 8.) 197); and section-hands and engineer (R. R. Co. v. Leech, 13 Week. Bull. 153); and track-repairer (Dick v. Indianapolis &c. Co., 38 Ohio, (N. 8.) 389 8S. 0.8 A. & EB. RB. BR. Cas. 101). Bocca train-hands (Ryan v. Cumberland &c, Co., 23 Pa. 384). Tennessee—and engineer (Ragsdale v. Memphis &c. Co., 59 Tenn. (3 Baxt.) 426). Wisconsin—and train-hands (Harland v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 54 Wis. 226 8. 0.5 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 578; Pease v. Chicago Se. Co., 61 Wis. 163 8. C.17 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 527). In the following courts he has been held not to be a fellow-servant within the rule: England—Whether a passenger when riding free (Cf. Hutchinson v. York &c. Co., 5 Ex. 343 8. C. 6 Eng. R. & Can. Cases, 438). Supreme Court U. S.—and engineer (Chicago &c. Co. v- Ross,! 112 U. 8. 377 S. 0. 20 C. L. J. 27; 19 Rep. 97; 31 Alb. L. J. 81; 17 A. & BE. R. RB. Cas. 501; BRADLEY, Matruews, Gray and BLatcuHForD, J.J., dissenting). ). Circuit Court U. S.—and train-hands (Ross v. Chicago &c. Co., 2 McCrary, 235 8. 0. 8 Fed. Rep. 54). Connecticut—and brakesman of different companies using the same road (Zeigler v. Danbury &c. Co., 52 Conn. 543; GRANGER and SANFORD, J. J., dissenting). ). Georgia—and train-hands (Central &c. Co.-v. DeBray, 71 Ga. 406). ‘Severely criticised, 20 C. L. J. (Art.) 86. RAILWAY LAW. | 805 Driving Engine: Of Const. Train: Freight Train. Maryland—When riding free, substantially a passenger (Baltimore &c. Co. v. State, 33 Md. 542; State v. Western &c. Co., 63 ib. 433). Michigan—and train hand, when (Chicago &c. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205 S. C. 6 Rep. 654). Mississippi—and boy not in service (N. O. &c. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112 S. OC. 12 Am. Rep. 356). Missouri—and fireman (Harper v. Indianapolis &c. Co., 47 Mo. 567 S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 353). Nebraska—and laborer (Chicago &c. Co. v. Swanson, 16 Neb. 254 S. C. 49 Am. Rep. 718). New York—When riding free, substantially a passenger (Russell v. Hudson &c. Co., 5 Duer. 39). | North Carolina—and gravel-train hand (Dobbin v. Rich- mond W&ce. Co., 81 N. C. 446 8. C. 31 Am. Rep. 512); and brakesman and engineer (Cowles v. Richmond W&c. Co., 84 N. ©. 309 S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 620; 12 C. L. J. 546; 2A. & E. R. R. Cas. 90; 12 Rep. 219). Ohio—and train-hands on another train—case of colli- sion (Little Miami &c. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio, 415). Virginia—and train-hands or section-master (Moon v Richmond &c. Co., 78 Va. 745 S. C. 49 Am. Rep. 401, 17 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 531). CONDUCTOR DRIVING THE ENGINE—Does such action discharge the rule? We have only been able to find one case on the point (Rodman v. Michigan &c. Co., 55 Mich. 57 S. C. 54 Am. Rep. 348; 17 A. & BE. R. RB. Cas. 521). The judges were equally divided in opinion. CONDUCTOR OF CONSTRUCTION TRAIN and laborers, are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Swanson, 16 Neb. 254 S. C. 49 Am. Rep. 718). ConpucToR OF FREIGHT TRAIN and brakesmen, are not (Cowles v. Richmond &c. Co., 84 N. C. 309! S. C. 37 1 See this case criticized in note under BRAKESMAN, ante page 299. 20 306 RAILWAY LAW. Of Gravel Train: Contractor's Servants: Contributory Negligence. Am. Rep. 620; 12 0. L. J. 546; 2 A. & BE. RB. BR. Cas. 90; 12 Rep. 219). CoNDUCTOR OF GRAVEL TRAIN and train-hand, are not (Dobbin v. Richmond &c. Co., 81 N. C. 446 S. C. 31 Am. Rep. 512). Contra (O’Donnell v. Baltimore &c. Co.; McGowan v. St. Louis &e. Co., cited supra under con- puctTor; Heine v. Chicago &e. Co., 58 Wis. 525). CONDUCTOR TRAVELLING ON ANOTHER TRAIN and train-hands thereof, are (Manville v. Cleveland &c. Co., cited supra under CONDUCTOR). CONTRACTOR'S SERVANTS and those of sub-contractors, are not (Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 H. & N. 142; Murphy v. Caralli, 3 ib. 462; Murray v. Currie, L. R. (6 C. P.) 24; Young v. N. Y. &e. Co., 30 Barb. 229; Svenson v. At- lantic &c. Co., 57 N. Y. 108; Coughtry v. Globe &e. Co., 56 ib. 124 S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 387; Hunt v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 51 Pa. 475; Hass v. Philadelphia &c. Co., 88 ib. 269 8. C. 32 Am. Rep. 462; Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, 113; Goodfellow v. Boston &c. Co., 106 Mass. 461; Riley v. State Line &ec. Co., 29 La. Ann. 791 8. C. 29 Am. Rep. 349). It is otherwise, however, if the two classes of servants above indicated are brought into consociation (Rourke v. White Moss &c. Co., L. R. (1 C. P. Div.) 556; Johnson v. Boston &c. Co., 118 Mass. 114); and engineer and conductor, are (Illinois &c. Co. v. Cox, 21 Ill. 208. C. 71 Am. Dec. 148); and engineer, are (Ewan v. Lippin- cott, 47 N. J. L. 192 S. C. 54 Am. Rep. 148; Contra Louisville &c. Co. v. Conroy, 63 Miss. 562 8S. C. 56 Am. Rep. 835). Contractors and laborer under a sub-contractor, are (Chicago &e. Co. v. O'Bryan, 15 Ill. App. 154). CoNTRIBUTIVE NEGLIGENCE of the master may de- stroy the rule (Paulmier v. Erie &c. Co., 34 N. J. L. 151; Gunter v. Graniteville &e. Co., 15 S. C. 443 S. C. 13 Rep. RAILWAY LAW. 307 Crew: Crucial Test. 378; Chicago &e. Co. v. Rush, 84 Ill. 570; Illinois &c: Co. ~». Modglin, 85 ib. 481; Mahon v. Henning, 1 McCrary, (C. C. U. 8.) 516; Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439; Central &c. Co. v. Kenney, 58 Ga. 485; Smith v. Rail- way Co., 18 Fed Rep. 304; Colorado &c. Co. v. Martin, 5 Col..562 8. C. 4 West. Coast Rep. 563; 17 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 592); of the servant, (plaintiff), precludes recovery (Railway Company v. Conrad, 19 Rep. 445); or may, even with employees of another company—peculiar cir- cumstance (Gray v. Philadelphia Sc. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 168; 22 A. & BH. R. R. Cas. 351); a question for the jury, when (Stoddard v. St. Louis &c. Co., 65 Mo., 514 S. ©. 5 Rep. 177; Gottlieb v. N. Y. &. Co.; 100 N. Y. 462 8S. ©. 24 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 421); but it is not necessarily eontributive negligence to work “short-handed” (Stod- dard case, supra). Crew and master of vessel, are (Johnson v. Boston &c. Co., 135 Mass. 209 S. C. 46 Am. Rep. 458); and stevedore, are not (Murray v. Currie, L. R. (6 C. P.) 24); and pilot, are not (Smith v. Steele, L. R. (10 Q. B.) 125 S.C. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 60). Cructat TEST 4S TO APPLIANCES—The degree of care and diligence, due from the master to furnish and maintain suitable appliances, should be proportioned to the degree of risk, which may be reasonably presumed to ‘be involved, as proximately consequent upon their defec- tiveness. (International &c. Co. v. Doyle, 49 Tex. 190 S. 0.5 Rep. 631). But this criterion has no applicability to patent or ostensible defects (Case next, supra; Quaid v. Cornwell, 13 Bush, 601 8. C. 5 Rep. 693; Batterson v. Chicago &c. Co., 53 Mich. 125; Cornwall v. Charlotte &c. Co., 97 N. ©. 11; English v. Chicago &c. (C. C. U. 8.) 28 Fed. Rep. 906; Moulton v. Gage, 138 Mass. 390). 308 RAILWAY LAW. Custom: Dangerous Contrivances: Def. Machinery: Detective, &c. As to latent defects (Cf. Michigan &c. Co. v. Austin, 40 Mich. 247 8. C. 7 Rep. 784; Elliott v. St. Louis &c. Co., 67 Mo. 272 S. C. 7 Rep. 84; Hughes v. Winona &e. Co., 27 Minn. 137; Walsh v. St. Paul &c. Co., ib. 367; Coal &c. Co. v. Reed, 5 W. N. C. 10). Custom—A custom may discharge the rule, whem (Luebke v. Chicago &c. Co., 59 Wis. 127 8. C. 48 Am. Rep. 483; 53 Am. Rep. 266; 15 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 183). DANGEROUS CONTRIVANCES do not abrogate the rule (Gould v. Chicago &c. Co., 66 Iowa, 590; but if the em- ployee is a minor, they must be notified (O’Connor v. Adams, 120 Mass. 427). Drck-HaAnp and mate, are (Olson v. Clyde, 32 Hun. 425; Daub v. Northern &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 625); and. master of vessel, are not (Thompson v. Hermann, 47 Wis. 602 8. C. 9 Rep. 359; Loughlin v. State, 23 Rep. 789); and pilot, are not (Titan, 23 Fed. Rep. 413; Smith v. Steele L. R. (10 Q. B.) 125 8. C. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 60); and employee on another vessel, owned by same part- ners, are not (Connolly v. Davidson, 15 Minn. 519 S. C.. 2 Am. Rep. 154; McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 357; Fay v. Davidson, 13 ib. 528). DEFECTIVE MACHINERY when used at master’s re- quest discharges the rule (Greene v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 31 Minn. 248 8. O. 47 Am. Rep. 785; 17 Rep. 15); the master must at least notify its condition to the employee (O’Connor v. Adams, 120 Mass. 427). DETECTIVE and train-hands, are (Pyne v. Chicago &c.. Co., 54 Iowa, 223 S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 198); are not (Pool v. Chicago &e. Co., 53 Wis. 657 8. ©. 14 C. L. J. 57). DEPOT-SUPERINTENDENT and laborer, are not (Lalor v. Chicago, 52 Ill. 401 S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 616). DIFFERENT Masters. See SERVANTS IN DIFFERENT: EMPLOYMENTS. RAILWAY LAW. 309 Derrick-Hand: Directors: Draftsman: Driving Boss: Dual Relation. DERRICK-HaND and brakesman, when not (Holden v. Fitchburg &c. Co., 129 Mass. 268 8S. 0.2 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 94). Drrecrors and employees, are not (Fifield v. North- ern &e. Co., 42 N. H. 225; Columbus &c. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174). DRAFTSMAN and carpenter, are not (Baird v. Pettit,! 70 Pa. 477). DRAWERS OF IRON and hammerers, are (Bartonshill &e. Co. v. Reid, 3 McQ. (A. of Lords’ Cas.) 266). DrivER OF StaGe-CoacH and guard are (next, supra). Drivine Boss and mining boss, are (Lehigh &c. Co. w. Jones, 86 Pa. 432 8. C. 6 Rep. 125; 17 Alb. L. J. 518; 5 W.N. 436). DuaL RELATION, what (Moore v. Wabash &c. Co., $4 Mo. 2708. ©. 21 A. & E. RB. BR. Cas. 509). ELEVATOR-ENGINEER and elevator-conductor, are not, when (Delaney v. Hilton, 50 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 341, Sepe- wick, C. J., dissenting); and laborers, are (Stringham w. Stewart, 27 Hun. 562 8. C. 64 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 5). ELEVATOR-OPERATOR and minors,? are not, when (At- Janta &c. Co. v. Speer, 60 Ga. 137 S. C. 47 Am. Rep. 750); and elevator-engineer, are not, when (Delaney v. Hilton, supra); and laborer, are (Stringham v. Stewart, supra ; Kelly v. Boston &c. Co., 128 Mass, 456). 1The author respectfully suggests to Judge Lawson that he should, after ‘such an indefensible decision against the railroad interest, retract his ‘severe denunciation of the Pennsylvania Court. The Massachusetts Court has gone far beyond the Pennsylvania Court in its railroad rulings. If Judge Lawson is right in his invective against the one, why should he not apply it to the other? °The author feels disinclined to employ so untechnical a word, but the popular mind, it seems, cannot be brought to appreciate the word infant, except in its colloquial form, so he yields and uses it where the word infant would be more appropriate. 310 RAILWAY LAW. Employees. EmpLoyEes—This term is used as a nomen generalissi- mum, and whilst it embraces the specific terms of ser- vice, yet, as there were quite a number of instances, more accurately referrible to the general rather than any specific term, it was deemed not inuseful to employ it. And laborers, off duty, travelling on train, are not (Scott v. Sweeney, 34 Hun. 292, Bockss, J. dissent- ing); and stevedore, are (Rankin v. Merchants &c. Co., 73 Ga. 229 S. ©. 54 Am. Rep. 874); and car-repairer,. when not (Luebke v. Chicago &e. Co., 59 Wis. 127 8. C. 48 Am. Rep. 483; 53 ib. 266; 15 A. & BE. BR. R. Cas. 183); and minor, are (Houston &c. Co. v. Miller, 51 Tex. 270; Curran v. Merchants &c. Co., 130 Mass. 374 8. C. 39 Am. Rep. 457; Gartland v. Toledo &c. Co., 67 Ill. 498); are not, when (Hamilton v. Galveston &e. Co., 54 Tex. 562; Cf. Railway Co. v. Miller, 49 ib. 328; Coombs: v. New Bedford &c. Co., 102 Mass. 572; Hill v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45; Frost v. Union &c. Co., 2 Dill. (C. C. U. 8.) 259); and bridge-contractor, are not, when (Young v. N. Y. &c. Co., 30 Barb. 229); and directors, are not (Fifield v. Northern &c. Co., 42 N. H. 225; Columbus &e. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 74); ‘and volunteers, are (May- ton v. Texas &e. Co., 63 Tex. 77 8. C. 51 Am. Rep. 637; Osborne v. Knox &c. Co., 68 Me. 49S. C. 28 Am. Rep. 16; Flower v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 69 Pa. 210 S. ©. 8 Am. Rep. 261; N. O. &c. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112 8, C. 12 Am. Rep. 356); and employees managing train, are not, when (Gillenwater v. Madison &c. Co.,! 5 Ind. 339 8S. C. 61 Am. Dec. 101); and mining-boss, are not (Ryan v. Bagaley, 50 Mich. 179 8. C. 45 Am. Rep. 35); are (Wad- dell v. Simonson, 112 Pa. 567); and superintendent, are, when (Crispin v. Babbitt? 81 N. Y. 516 8S. ©. 37 Am. '1This case has been overruled, but some of the general views are welk expressed and are well worthy of consideration. ? The plaintiff was an employee in the defendant’s iron works, which were under the management and control of defendant’s agent, B—the 4 RAILWAY LAW. 311 Same. Rep. 521); are not (Patterson v. Pittsburg &c. Co., 76 Pa. 389 8S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 412); and other employees using the same track, are not (In re Merrill, 54 Vt. 200 8S. 0. 11 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 680; Wabash v. Peyton, 106 Ill. 534 S. ©. 18 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 1); in a repair-shop and mechanic, are (Murphy v. Boston &c. Co., 88 N. Y. 146 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 240); whose duty it is to. put the engine in condition, and firemen, are (Mobile &c. Co. v. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672; Columbus &c. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174; Hubgh v. N. O. &e. Co. 6 La. Ann. 495 8. C. 54 Am. Dee. 565; Shanck v. Northern &c. Co., 25 Md. 462; Wonder v. Baltimore &c. Co., 32 io. 411 S. C. 3 Am. Rep. 143; Hard v. Vermont &c. Co., 32 Vt. 473); not connected with the running of trains, and co-employee, are not (peculiar circumstances) (Schroe- der v. Chicago &c. Co., 47 Iowa, 375); going to his work, and signal-man, are (Moran v. N. Y. &c. Co., 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 770 8. C. 67 Barb. 96); even when the signal-men and such employee are hired by two com- panies (Swainson v. North-Eastern &c. Co., 25 Week. Rep. 676); on steamship or railway company, and ex- press-agent who travels as such upon the steamship or railway, are not (Yeomans v. Contra Costa &e. Co., 44 Cal. 71; Kansas &c. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kan. 83); bound to keep fire-apparatus in order, and mill-hand, are (Jones v. Granite Mills Co., 126 Mass. 84 8. C. 30 Am. Rep. 661; 7 Rep. 146); whose duty it is to send out trains, and brakesman, are not (Toledo &c. Co. v. In- graham, 77 Ill. 309); gross negligence of employee dis- entitles him from maintaining an action (Louisville &c. defendant, living elsewhere, and only occasionally visiting the works. B carelessly let steam on an engine, near which plaintiff was working, where- by plaintiff was injured. In an action for the injury, the court charged that B represented the defendant only in respect to the duties confided to him as managing agent, but refused to charge that as to other duties, he was to be regarded as a fellow-servant with the plaintiff, and left it as a question of fact. Held that such refusal was error. 312 RAILWAY LAW. Employees in different Capacities. Co. v. Filbern, 6 Bush, 574; Toledo &c. Co. v. O’Connor, 77 Til. 391). EmpiLoyees Ripinc Freez, and other train-hands, are not (Yeomans v. Contra Costa &c. Co., 44 Cal. 71; O'Donnell v. Allegheny &c. Co., 59 Pa. 239; Ross v. N. Y. &c.! Co., 5 Hun. 488 S. C. 74 N. Y. 617; Russell v. Hudson &c. Co., 5 Duer, (N. Y.) 39; State v. Western &ec. Co., 63 Md. 433; Baltimore &c. Co. v. State, 33 ib. 542; Cf. Hutchinson v. York &c. Co., 5 Ex. (W. H. & G.) 343 8. C. 6 Eng. R. & Can. Cas. 438; 14 Jur. 837; 19 L. J. (Ex.) 296); are (Vick v. N. Y. &e. Co.,2 95 N. Y. 267 S. C. 47 Am. Rep. 36; 17 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 609 (Dan- FORTH and Finca, J. J., dissenting); Dallas v. Gulph &c. Co., 61 Tex. 196; Gilshannon v. Stony Brook &e. Co., 10 Cush. 228; Seaver v. Boston &c. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Manville v. Cleveland &c. Co., 11 Ohio, (N. S.) 417; Capper v. Louisville &c. Co., 103 Ind. 305 8. C. 22 A. & HE. RB. R. Cas. 277; Blake v. Maine &c. Co., 70 Me. 60 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 297; Kansas &c. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kan. 83; Tunney v. Midland &c. Co., L. R. (1 ©. P.) 291). EMPLOYEES FOR A LiMiTED Time and another, not (Poirier v. Carroll, 35 La. Ann. 1166). EMPLOYEES OF LESSOR AND LESSEE, are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Clark, 2 Ill. App. 596 S. C.18 C. L. J. 170). EMPLOYEES USING Hanp-Car and others, are (O’Brien v. Boston &c. Co., 138 Mass. 387 8S. ©. 52 Am. Rep. 279; 19 Rep. 462). EMPLOYEES ON A STEAMSHIP and express-agent, are not (Yeomans’ case, supra). ENGINE OPERATOR IN Factory and laborer, are 1 But see contra in New York, the Vick cases cited infra. *The court had the temerity to characterize the O’Donnell case, cited supra, as not “sound law.” When doctors disagree, who shall decida? RAILWAY LAW. 318 Engine Rep.: Engine-Stripper: Shoveller: Brakesman. (Jones v. Granite Mills Co., 126 Mass. 84S. C. 30 Am. Rep. 661; 7 Rep. 146). ENGINE REPAIRER and engineer, are (Mobile &c. Co. w. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672; Columbus &c. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174; Hubgh v. N. O. &e. Co., 6 La. Ann.-495 S. C. 54 Am. Dec. 565; Schanck v. Northern &c. Co., 25 Md. 462; Wonder v. Baltimore &c. Co., 32 ib. 411 8. C. 3 Am. Rep. 148; Hard v. Vermont &c. Co., 32 Vt. 473); are not, when (Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Mason, 109 Pa. ‘296 S. C. 58 Am. Rep. 722); so as to fireman (ib.); unless such engineer or fireman assisted in making the re- pairs (Reading Iron Works v. Devine, 109 Pa. 246; Cf.. Rogers v. Ludlow &c. Co., 144 Mass. 144; Rice v. King Philip Mills, ib. 229). ENGINE-STRIPPER and yard-hand, are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Scheuring, 4 Ill. App. 533). ENGINE STEAM-SHOVELLER and laborer, are (Thomp- son v. Chicago &c. Co., (C. C. U. 8.) 18 Fed. Rep. 239). ENGINEER and brakesman, are (Nashville &c. Co. v. Wheless, 10 Lea, 741 8. C. 43 Am. Rep. 317; 4 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 633; 15 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 15 (Turney, J., dissenting); Sommerhays v. Kansas &c. Co., 2 Col. 484; ‘Houston &e. Co. v. Willis! 53 Tex. 318; Pittsburg Se. Co. v. Ranney, 37 Ohio, (N. 8.) 665 8. C.5 A. & BE. BR. RB. Cas. 533; Louisville &c. Co. v. Robinson, 4 Bush, 507; Moran v. N. Y. &c. Co., 1 T. & C. (N. Y.) 270 S. C. 67 Barb. 96; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Devinney, 17 Ohio, (N. §.) 197; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Britz, 72 Ill. 256; Ohio &c. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 8. C. 74 Am. Dee. 257; Sherman v. Rochester &c. Co., 17 N. Y. 153; Fowler v. Chicago &c. Co., 61 Wis. 159; Hutchinson v. York &e. Co., 5 Ex. 343; Barton’s Hill &c. Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. 1™Tn this case the master was held irresponsible for an injury attributable ito the malice of the engineer towards the brakesman. 314 ' RAILWAY LAW. Brakesman. 266; Barton’s Hill &c. Co. v. McGuire, ib. 300; Wilson v. Merry, L. R. (1 H. of L. Se. App. Cas.) 326; Morgan v. Vale of Neath &c. Co., 5 B. & S. 570 (117 E. C. L. RB.) 8. C. L. BR. (1 C. P.) 291; Charles v. Taylor, L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 491; Conway v. Belfast &c. Co., Ir. R. (9 C. L.} 498; Ir. R. (11 CO. L.) 345; Randall v. Baltimore &c. Co., 109 U. S. 478 S. C.15 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 243 (BLatcH- FORD, BRADLEY, MATTHEWS and Gray, J. J., dissent- ing); Keilley v. Belcher &c. Co., 3 Sawy. 500; Jordan v. Wells, 3 Woods, 327; Hogan v. Central &c. Co., 49 Cal. 128; Wilson v. Madison &c. Co., 18 Ind. 226; Sullivan v. Mississippi &e. Co., 11 Iowa, 421; Peterson v. White- breast &c. Co., 50 ib. 673 S. C. 32 Am. Rep. 143; Gib- bons v. Chicago &c. Co., 66 Iowa, 231 S. C. 20 Rep. 143; 23 N. W. Rep. 644; Abell v. Western &c. Co., 21 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 503; Smith v. Potter, Flint &c. Co., 46 Mich. 158 8. C. 2 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 140; 41 Am. Rep. 161; Hathaway v. Michigan Se. Co., 51 Mich. 253 8. C. 47 Am. Rep. 569; 16 N. W. Rep. 634; Michigan v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212; Foster v. Minnesota &c. Co., 14 Minn. 360; Ransier v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 11 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 647; McAndrews v. Burns, 39 N. J. L. 117 S. C. 5 Rep. 120; Smith v. Oxford Iron Co., 42 N. J. L. 467; Besel v. N. Y. &c. Co. 70 N. Y. 171; Wright v. N. Y. &c. Co., 25 ib. 562; Ponton v. W. & W. &e. Co., 6. Jones, 245; Whaalan v. Mad River &c. Co., 8 Ohio, (N. S.) 249; Little Miami &e. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Ohio, (N. S.) 318 S.C. 17 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 578; Columbus &e. Co. v. Webb, 12 Ohio, (N. S). 475; Lehigh Valley &c. Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432; East Tennessee v. Rush, 15. Lea, 145; Houston &e. Co. v. Gilmore, 62 Tex. 361; Mosley v. Chamberlin, 18 Wis. 731; Fowler v. Chicago: &c. Co., 61 Wis. 759). ENGINEER and brakesman, are not (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Lewis, 33 Ohio, (N. 8.) 196 (Scorr and ASHBURN, J. J.,, dissenting); Louisville &c. Co. v. Brook, 7 Ky. L. Rep. RAILWAY LAW. 315 Car-Coupler: Conductor. 110; Moran v. N. Y. &e. Co., 67 Barb. 96; Cowles v. Richmond &c. Co., 84 N. C. 309 8S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 620;, 12 C. L. J. 546; 2 A. & BE. BR. RB. Cas. 90; 12 Rep. 219.) ENGINEER and car-coupler, are (Kroy v. Chicago &c. Co., 32 Iowa, 357; Wilson v. Madison &c. Co., 18 Ind. 226; Farwell v. Boston &c. Oo., 4 Met. 49 S. C. 38 Am. Dec. 339; Red. Am. R. Cas. 384; Dow v. Kansas &c. Co., 8 Kan. 642 8S. C. 5 Am. R. Rep. 401; Summerhays. v. Kansas &e. Co., 2 Col. 484; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Britz, 72 Ill. 256; Henry v. Staten &c. Co., 81 N. Y. 373 8. C. 2 A. & HE. BR. BR. Cas. 60; Smith v. Flint, Potter &c. 46 Mich. 258 8. C. 2 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 140; 41 Am. Rep. 161; Nashville &e. Co. v. Wheless, 10 Lea, 741 8. C. 43. Am. Rep. 317; 4 A. & HE. R. R. Cas. 633; Pittsburg &e. . Co. v. Ranney, 37 Ohio, (N. S.) 665 8. C.5 A. & BE. R. R.. Cas. 533; Jeffrey v. Keokuk &c. Co., 56 Towa, 546 8. C. 5 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 568). ENGINEER and conductor, are (Ragsdale v. Memphis. &e. Co., 59 Tenn. (3 Baxt.) 426; Sherman v. Rochester &e. Co., 17 N. Y. 153; Madden v. Chesapeake Sc. Co., 28 W. Va. 610 8. C. 57 Am. Rep. 695; Toledo &c. Co. vw. Cox, 21 Ill. 20 8S. C. 71 Am. Dee. 298; Dow v. Kansas. &c. Co., 8 Kan. 642 8. C.5 Am. R. Rep. 401; Lovejoy v. Boston &c. Co., 125 Mass. 79 S. ©. 28 Am. Rep. 206; Hayes v. Western &c. Corp., 3 Cush. 270; R. R. Co. »v.. Leech, 13 Week. Bull. 153; Chicago &c. Co. v. Ross, 112. U.S. 377 8. C. 20 ©. L. J. 27; 19 Rep. 97; 31 Alb. L. J.. 81; 17 A. & BE. R. BR. Cas. 501 (BRADLEY, MaTTHEWS, Gray and BLATcHForD, J. J., dissenting);' Cowles v. Richmond S&e. Co., 84 N. C. 309 8. C. 37 Am. Rep. 620; 12 C. L. J. 546; 2 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 90; 12 Rep. 219). ENGINEER and conductor, are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 877 8.0.17 A. & E. RB. BR. Cas. 501; 19 Rep. 97; 31 Alb. L. J. 81; Ross v. Chicago &c. Co., 2 316 . RAILWAY LAW. Yard-Men: Repairers: Station-Agent: Laborer. McCrary, 235 8. C. 2 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 640; 8 Fed. Rep. 544; Pease v. Chicago &c. Co., 61 Wis. 163 8. CO. 17 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 527). ENGINEER and yard-men, are (Bradley v. Nashville &e. Co., 14 Lea, 374); and switchmen, are (Farwell v. Boston &c. Co., 4 Met. 49 8S. C. 38 Am. Dec. 339; 2 ‘Thompson Neg. 924; Big. L. C. Torts, 688; Barton’s Hill &c. Co. v. Reid, L. R. 3 McQ. (H. of L.) 266; Smith v. Memphis &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 304 (C. C. U. 8.); Satterly v. Morgan, 35 La. Ann. 1166; Chicago v. Henry, 7 Ill. App. 322; Columbus &c. Co. v. Troesch, 68 Ill. 545); are not (Hast Tennessee &c. Co. v. Gurley,! 12 Lea, 46; Smith v. N. Y. &e. Co., 19 N. Y. 127 8S. ©. 75 Am. Dec. 305); and brakesman, as switchman, are (Randall v. Bal- timore &c. Co., 109 U. S. 478); and machinist are (Noyes #. Smith, 28 Vt. 59). ENGINEER and repairer of cars, are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Murphy, 53 Ill. 336 S.C. 5 Am. Rep. 48; Valtez v. Ohio &e. Co., 85 Il. 56 8. C. 5 C. L. J. 426); are not (Cone v. Delaware &c. Co. 81 N. Y. 206 8. CO. 37 Am. Rep. 491); and wood-haulers, are (Illinois &c. Co. v. Cox, 21 Ill. 20 S. C. 71 Am. Dee. 298; Nashville &. Co. v. Wheless, 10 Lea, 741 8. C. 43 Am. Rep. 317). ENGINEER and station-agent, are (Brown v. Minne- apolis &c. Co., 31 Minn. 553 (GiLFALton, O. J., dissent- ing); Evans v. Atlantic &c. Co., 62 Mo. 49). ENGINEER and laborer, are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Keefe, 47 Ill. 108; Ohio &c. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 S. C. 74 Am. Dec. 259; Texas &c. Co. v. Harrington, 62 Tex. 597; Nashville &c. Co. v. Wheless, 10 Lea, 741 8. ©. 43 Am. Rep. 317; 4 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 633; 15 ib. 15; ‘The court held that the company would have been liable if it had known of the incompetency of the switchman, but, this qualification necessarily implies the principle to be decided, as stated in the text. RAILWAY LAW. 317 Shoveler: Switchman: Track-Repairer. Mobile &c. Co. v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245 S. ©. 6 Rep. 261;, Ryan v. Cumberland, 23 Pa. 384; Chicago &c. Co. v. Cox, 21 Ill. 20 8. C. 71 Am. Dec. 298; Thompson v. Chi- cago &c. Co., (C. C. U. S.) 18 Fed. Rep. 239; Chicago. &c. Co. v. Murphy, 50 Ill. 336 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 48; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Shackelford, 42 Ark. 417); are not (To- ledo &c. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 Tl. 391; Louisville &c. Co. v. Collins, 2 Duv. 114; Cone v. Delaware &c. Co., 15 Hun. (N. Y.) 172; 81 N. Y. 2068. ©. 37 Am. Rep. 491; 2 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 57; Dobbin v. Richmond &c. Co., 81 N. C. 446 S. C. 31 Am. Rep. 512; Ryan v. Chicago &c. Co., 60 Ill. 171 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 32). ENGINEER and shoveler, are (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Britz,, 72 Ul. 256; Thompson v. Chicago &c. Co., (C. 0. U. 8.) i8 Fed. Rep. 239); and carpenter, are not (Ryan v. Chicago &c. Co., 60 Ill. 171 S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 32). ENGINEER OF YARD ENGINE and switchman, are (Col- umbus &c. Co. v. Troesch, 68 Ill. 545 §. C. 18 Am. Rep. 578; Satterly v. Morgan, 35 La. Ann. 1166). ENGINEER and track-repairer, are (O’Connell v. Balti- more &c. Co., 20 Md. 21 S. C. 83 Am. Dec. 549; Ryan v. Cumberland &c. Co., 23 Pa. 384; Baltimore &c. Co. v. State, 41 Md. 288; Pennsylvania S&c. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395 8.0.15 A. & E.R. RB. Cas., 187; Collins v. St. Paul &c. Co., 30 Minn. 31; Houston &c. Co. v. Rider, 62 Tex. 597; Ohio &c. Co. v. Collarn, 72 Ind. 261 8. C. 38 Am. Rep. 134; 8 C. L. J. 12; 7 Rep. 1438; Ohio &c. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 S. C. 74 Am. Dee. 259; Whaalen v. Mad River &c. Co., 8 Ohio (N. 8.) 249; Boldt v. N. Y. &c. Co., 18 N. Y. 482). ENGINEER and track-repairer, are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302 8S. C. 34 Am. Rep. 168; 17 A. & WB. BR. R. Cas., 564; 10 C. L. J. 348; Dick v. Indian- apolis &c. Co. 38 Ohio (N. 8.) 390 S.C. 8A. & E.R. R. Cas., 101; Lewis v. St. Louis &c. Co., 59 Mo. 495 8S. C. 318 RAILWAY LAW. Engineer on other Train: Train-Dispatcher: Section-Master, &c. ‘21 Am. Rep. 385; 8 A. & E.R. R. Cas., 450; Pittsburg &ec. Co. v. Powers, 74 Ill. 341; Calvo v. Charlotte &c. Co., 23 S. C. 526 8S. C. 55 Am. Rep. 28). ENGINEER ON ONE TRAIN and engineer on another, are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977 8. C. 8 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 171); and road-master, are (Walker v. Bos- ton &c. Co., 128 Mass. 8); and engine-repairer, are (Mobile &c. Co. v. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672; Columbus &c. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174; Hubgh v. N. O. &c. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495 S. C. 54 Am. Dee. 565; Schanck v. North- ern &c. Co., 25 Md. 462; Wonder v. Baltimore, 32 ib. 411 8. C. 3 Am. Rep. 143; Hard.v. Vermont &c. Co., 32 Vt. 473). ENGINEER and train-dispatcher, are (Blessing v. St. Louis &c. Co., 77 Mo. 410; Robertson v. Terre Haute -&e. Co., 78 Ind. 77 S. ©. 41 Am. Rep. 552); are not (Crew v. St. Louis &c. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 87; Booth v. Boston &c. Co., 73 N. ¥. 38 8. C. 29 Am. Rep. 97; Darri- gan v. New York &c. Co., 52 Conn. 285 8. 0.52 Am. Rep. 590; Chicago &c. Co. v. MeLallen, 84 Ill. 108). ENGINEER and section-master, are (Blake v. Maine &e. Co., 70 Me. 60 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 297); and yard- master, are (Luebke v. Chicago &c. Co., 63 Wis. 91 8. C. 53 Am. Rep. 266; 15 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 183); are not (Calvo v. Charlotte &c. Co., 23 8. C. 526 S. C. 55 Am. Rep. 28; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Weaver, 35 Kan. 412 S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 176); and telegrapher, are (Dana v. N. Y. &e. Co., 23 Hun. 473; Madden v. Chesapeake &c. Co., 28 W. Va. 610 8. C. 57 Am. Rep. 695). ENGINEER and signal-man, are (East Tenn. &e. Co. v. Rush, 15 Lea, 145); and contractor and servants, are not, when (Louisville &c. Co. v. Conroy, 63 Miss. 562 S. C. 56 Am. Rep. 835); and tunnel-repairer, are (Capper v. Louisville &c. Co., 103 Ind. 305 8. 0.22 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 277); and superintendent, are not (Washburn v. RAILWAY LAW. 319 Brakesman: Fireman: Mining-Engineer: Express-Agent. Nashville &c. Co., 3 Head, 638 8. C. 75 Am. Dec. 784); and superintendent of repairs, are not (Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 8. C. 36 Am. Rep. 575); and master-mechanic, are not (ib.); and car inspector, are not (Toledo &c. Co. v. Moore, 77 Tl. 217). ENGINEER, being the conductor who took the regular engineer’s place—the question arose whether he, in his assumed role, was a fellow-servant with the brakesman —upon this point the Court was equally divided (Rod- man v. Michigan, 55 Mich. 57 S. C. 54 Am. Rep. 348; Cf. Cassidy v. Maine &c. Co., 76 Me. 488 S. C. 17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 519). ENGINEER ON ONE TRAIN and brakesman on another, are (Randall v. Baltimore &c. Co., 109 U.S. 478). ENGINEER who is conductor also, and brakesman, are not (Cowles v. Richmond &c. Co.,! 84 N. ©. 309 8. C. 37 Am. Rep. 620; 12 C. L. J. 546). ENGINEER and fireman, are (Jordan v Wells, 3 Woods, (C. C. U. 8.) 527; Nashville &c. Co. v. Handman, 13 Lea, 423; Bull v. Mobile &c. Co., 67 Ala. 206; Whaalen v. Mad River &c. Co., 8 Ohio, (N. 8.) 249; Boldt v. N. Y. &e. Co., 18 N. Y. 432). ENGINEER and fireman, are not (Mann v. Oriental Works, 11 BR. I. 152; Nashville &c. Co. v. Jones, 9 Heisk. 27). Excavators and mining-engineer, are (Bartonshill &e. Co. v. Reid, 3 McQ. (H. of L.) 2668. C. 4 Jur. (N. 8.) 767). EXprREss-AGENT and employees of steamship, are not (Yeomans v. Contra Costa &ec. Co. 44 Cal. 71); and road-master, are not (Baltimore &c. Co. v. McKenzie, (Md.) 21 Rep. 479; 24 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 395); and 1 See this case criticised in note under head of brakesman, ante 299. 320 RAILWAY LAW. Ex. Co. Employees: Section-Master: Extra Risks. employee of railway company, are not (Kansas &c. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kan. 8%); and laborers, are (Dwyer v. Adams Ex. Co., 55 Wis. 453 8. C. 8 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 159; 5 Wis. L. N. 43; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Wood- worth, 26 Ohio, (N. 8.) 585; Blair v. Hrie &c. Co., 66 N. Y. 313 8S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 55). Express Company’s EMPLOYEE and manager, are (Dwyer v. Adams Ex. Co., 55 Wis. 453 8. C.8 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 159; 5 Wis. L. N. 43). EXPRESS MESSENGER and section-master, are not (Baltimore &c. Co. v. McKenzie, supra). Extra-HaZARbDOUS Risks, unless notified, discharge the rule (Lalor v. Chicago &e. Co., 52 Tl. 401 S. 0. 4 Am. Rep. 616; Wheeler v. Wason &c. Co., 135 Mass. 294 S. C. 16 Rep. 721; Atlas Engine Works v. Randall, 100 Ind. 293 S. ©. 50 Am. Rep. 798; Cook v. St. Paul &c. Co., (Minn.) 24 N. W. Rep. 311; Coombs v. New Bedford &c. Co,, 102 Mass. 572; Sullivan v. India &c. 113 ib. 396; O'Connor v. Adams, 120 ib. 427; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151 8. C. 23 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 408; Price v. Hannibal &c. Co., 77 Mo. 508 S. C. 1The court hold that the servant’s implied assumption of risks is con- fined to the particular work and class of works, for which he is em- ployed. The plaintiff, it is true, was a minor, but no stress is laid upon that circumstance, as it was with reference to another aspect of the case, so it cannot be deemed to have influenced the court. In R. R. Co. 9. Fort, emphasis is laid upon the fact of the infancy of the employee. The Adams. case though seems to derive support from Jones ». Lake Shore &c. Co., 49: Mich. 573, and Chicago ». Bayfield, 37 7b. 205. It is difficult to reconcile the sweeping doctrine, above-stated, with the overwhelming weight of authority, to the effect, that, although engaged in different grades or departments of labor, they were fellow-servants within the principle of assumed risks for co-employees, and it is difficult to con- ceive an instance in railway service where, (unless one is shown to be the alter ego of the common-master), one employee i is not the fellow-servant of his co-employee. The doctrine of the Adams case is denied in Leary 0. Boston, 1389 Mass. 580 8. C. 23 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 883. RAILWAY LAW. 321 Failure to Inspect: Fire Extinguishers. 15 A. & BE. BR. R. Cas. 168; Luebke v. Chicago &e. Co., 59 Wis. 127 S. C. 48 Am. Rep. 483; 63 Wis. 91 8. C. 53 Am. Rep. 266; 15 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 183; O’Rorke v. Union Pacific &c. Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 189 8.0.18 A. & H. R. BR. Cas. 19; Sioux &c. Co. v. Finlayson, 16 Neb. 578 S. C. 18 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 68; Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Schertle, 97 Pa. 450 8. C. 2 A. & HE. BR. BR. Cas. 158; McGinnis v. Canada &c. Co., 49 Mich. 436 8. C. 8 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 135; Dowling v. Girard &c. Co., 74 Mo. 13 8. C. 13 Rep. 698; 41 Am. Rep. 298; McGowan v. Mining &c. Co., (U. 8. C. C.) 3 McCrary, 393 S. C. 13 Rep. 294; Rail- road Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553; Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213 8. C. 9 Rep. 193; Baxter v. Roberts, 44 Cal. 187 S. C. 13 Am. Rep. 160; Hill v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45; Spelman v. Fisher, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 151; St. Louis &c. Co. v. Valarious, 56 Ind. 511; Murphy v. Smith, 19 ©. B. (N. 8.) 361; Grizzle v. Frost, 3 F. & F, 622; Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 31 Ohio, (N. 8.) 479 S. C. 6 Rep. 596; Chicago &c. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205 S. C. 6 Rep. 654; Parkhurst v. Johnson, 50 Mich. 70 8. C. 45 Am. Rep. 28; 16 Rep. 19; Wheeler v. Wason &Xc. Co., 135 Mass. 294 S. OC. 16 Rep. 721; Semble—Aliter— Hard v. Vermont &c. Co., 32 Vt. 473); when (Smith v. Oxford Iron Co., 42 N. J. L. 467 8. C. 36 Am. Rep. 535; Parry v. Marsh, 25 Ala. 659; Lee v. Woolsey, 20 Rep. 469 (peculiar circumstances).). FAILURE TO INSPECT FOREIGN-CARS may operate to discharge the rule (Gottlieb v. N. Y. &c. Co., 100 N. Y. 462 8S. 0. 24 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 421; O’Neil v. Railroad Co., (0. C. U. 8.) 9 Fed. Rep. 337; Mackin v. Boston &e. Co., 135 Mass. 201 8. C. 15 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 196; 46 Am. Rep. 456; Jones v. Railroad Co., 32 N. Y. 628; Miller v. N. Y. &c. Co., 99 N. Y. 657) Fire-Damp. See MINor. FIRE-EXTINGUISHERS and laborers, are (Jones v. 21 322 RAILWAY LAW. Fireman and Brakesman: Engineer: Car Coupler: Tel. Granite Mills Co., 126 Mass. 84S. C. 30 Am. Rep. 661; 7 Rep. 146). Fireman and brakesman, are (Kersey v. Kansas &c. Co., 79 Mo. 362; Greenwald v. Marquette &c. Co., 49 Mich. 197 8. C. 8 A. & BE. R. RB. Cas. 133; Galveston &c. Co. v. Faber, 63 Tex. 344; Pennsylvania &e. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395 8. C. 15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 187; Collins v. St. Paul &c. Co., 30 Minn. 31 8. 0.8 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 150). FIREMAN and engineer, are (Ohio &c. Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind 261 S. ©. 38 Am. Rep. 134; 8 OC. L. J. 12; 7 Rep. 143; Jordan v. Wells, 3 Woods, (C. C. U. 8.) 527; Nash- ville &c. Co. v. Handman, 13 Lea, (Tenn.) 423; Bull v. Mobile &c. Co., 67 Ala. 206; Bryant v. Burlington &e. Co.,! 66 Iowa, 305 8S. C. 55 Am. Rep. 275; 21 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 593 (BEcK, ©. J., and Resp, J., dissenting); Morse v. Minneapolis &c. Oo.,1 30 Minn. 465 §. C. 11 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 168; Howard v. Denver Sc. Co., 26 Fed. Rep. 837; 24 A. & HE. BR. R. Cas. 448; 21 Rep. 675); are not (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Powers, 74 Ill. 341; Mis- souri &c. Co. v. Mackey, 33 Kan. 298; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 S. C. 39 Am. Rep. 627; Mann v. Oriental &c. Works, 11 R. I. 152; Nashville &c. Co. v. Jones, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 27); and other employees, are (Slater v. Jewett, supra); and boiler-maker, are not (Nashville &e. Co. v. Jones, supra). Fireman and car-coupler, are (Hughes v. Winona &c. Co., 27 Minn. 137); and laborer, are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Scheuring, 4 Ill. App. 533; Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C. B. (N. 8.) 665; Feltham v. England, L. R. (2 Q. B.) 33). FIREMAN and telegrapher, are not (Sheehan v. N. Y. &e. Co., 91 N. Y. 332). The court distinguish this case from Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 8. C. 39 Am. Rep. 627; 5 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 515, on the ground that as the 18ee note on page 323. RAILWAY LAW. 323 / Fireman; Flagmen: Flying Switch. defendant took all proper precautions to notify the fire- man, he was rightly, in that case, adjudged to be a fel- low-servant. And bridge-builder are not (Davis v. Central &e. Co., 55 Vt. 848. C.15 Rep. 286; 45 Am. Rep. 590; 11 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 173); and road-master, are (Walker ®. Boston &c. Co., 128 Mass. 8 8. C. 1 A. & EB. BR. RB. Cas. 141); are not (Davis v. Vermont &c. Co., supra); and section-master, are not (Davis v. Vermont &c. Co., supra); and master of steam-tug, are not (Clatsop Chief), 7 Sawy. (C. ©. U. S.) 274); and switch-constructor, are (King v. Boston &¢c. Co., 9 Cush. 112). FIREMEN and switchman, are (Harvey v. N. Y. &c. Oo., 88 N. Y. 481 8. C. 8 A. & EH. RB. R. Cas. 515; Tinney v. Boston &c. Co., 52 N. Y. 632); and conductor, are {Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 8. C. 39 Am. Rep. 627; 5 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 515; DanrortH and Finca, J. J., dissenting); must take the risk of “bucking” snow (Bryant v. Burlington &c. Co.,! 66 Iowa 305 S. C. 21 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 593; 55 Am. Rep. 275; Morse v. Minne- apolis &c. Co.,! 30 Minn. 465 S.C. 11 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 168). FLAGMEN and brakesman, are (Cooper v. Milwaukee &ec. Co., 23 Wis. 668); and carpenter, are (Gilman v. Eastern &c. Co., 10 Allen, 233; 13 1b. 433); and yard- master, are (Webb v. Richmond &c. Co., 97 N. C. 387). Fiuvine-Switch—Making is extra-hazardous, and dis- charges the rule (Greenleaf v. Illinois &c. Co., 29 Iowa, 148. C. 4 Am. Rep. 181). 1These were cases of injury resulting from “bucking snow,” by which phrase is understood the running a train into the snow covering the track, ‘at a high rate of speed, and thus taking the chance of pushing through by the momentum gained by the increased speed. It strikes the author that the employee, who takes service in the high latitude where this practice prevails, must be considered as assuming the risk of occasionally “ bucking snow;” and the question as to whether proper appliances were used, pro hae vice, ought to be one for the jury under all the circumstances. 824 RAILWAY LAW. Foreman and Brakesman: Laborer, etc. FOREMAN and brakesman, are (Kersey v. St. Joseph &e. Co., 79 Mo. 362). And laborer, are (Brown v. Winona &c. Co., 27 Minn. 162 8. C. 38 Am. Rep. 285; Albro v. Agawam &c. Co., 6 Cush. 75; Zeigler v. Day, 123 Mass. 152; Walker- v. Boston &c. Co., 128 ib. 8; Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C. B. (N. 8.) 669; Wilson v. Merry L. R. (1 H. L. Se.) 326; Howells v. Landore &c. Co., L. R. (10 Q. B.) 62; Feltham v. England, L. R. (2 Q. B.) 33; Luebke v. Chicago &c.. Co., 59 Wis. 127 8. C. 48 Am. Rep. 483; 53 Am. Rep. 266; 15 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 183; Chicago &c. v. Simmons, 11 Ill. App. 147; Houser v. Chicago &e. Co., 60 Iowa, 230 8. C. 46 Am. Rep. 65; Lawlor v. Androscoggin &c.. Co., 62 Me. 463 8. C. 16 Am. Rep. 492; Cumberland &c. Co. v. Scally, 27 Md. 589; Daubert v. Pickel, 4 Mo. App. 590; Barring v. Delaware &c. Co., 19 Hun. 216; Charles v. Taylor, L. R. (3 CO. P. Div.) 492 S. ©. 38 L. TR. (N. 8.) 773; 27 W. R. 32; 6 Rep. 446; Malone v. Hath- away, 64 N. Y. 5 S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 573; Weger v. Pennsylvania &¢. Co., 55 Pa. 460; Keystone Bridge Co.. v. Newberry, 96 ib. 246 8S. ©. 42 Am. Rep. 543; Willis v. Oregon &c. Co., 11 Oreg. 257; 3 West Coast Rep. 240; 17 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 539; Fones v. Phillips, 39 Ark. 17;, Hanrathy v. Northern &c. Co., 46 Md. 280 S. ©. 5 Rep.. 698; Hoth v. Peters, 55 Wis. 405; Hofnagle v. N. Y. &e. Co., 55 N.Y. 608 S.C. 6 Am. BR. Rep. 234; Chicago &e. Co. v. Scheuring, 4 Ill. App. 533; Green v. Banta, 48 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 156; Doughty v. Penobscot &c. Co., 76 Me. 143; Berea &e. Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio (N. 8.) 287 8. ©. 27 Am. Rep. 510; 5 Rep. 625; Ohio &c. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366; Ohio &¢. Co. v. Hammersley, 28 id. 371; Col- umbus &c. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 74; Bryce v. Fitzpat-. rick, 80 Ind. 282; Indiana &c. Co. v. Parker, 100 ib. 191; Gormley v. Ohio &e. Co., 72 ib. 31 8.0.5 A. & BR. R. Cas. 581; Drinkout v. Eagle Machine Works, 90 Ind. 423; Brazil &c. Co. v. Kane, 78 ib. 282; Delaware &c.. RAILWAY LAW. 325 Foreman and Mason: Car-Repairer, etc. ©o. v. Carroll, 89 Pa. 374; Wright v. N. Y. &e. Co., 25 N. Y. 562; Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 ib. 516 S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 521; Rochester &c. Co. v. Brick, 98 N. Y. 211 8S. C. 21 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 605; Pittsburgh &c. Oo. v. Leech, 13 Week. Bull. 153; Peterson v. Whitebreast &e. Co., 50 Iowa, 673 8. C. 32 Am. Rep. 143; McDer- mott v. City, 133 Mass. 349; Flynn »v. City, 134 ib. 351; Beilfus v. N. Y. &c. Co., 29 Hun. 556; Kennard v. Bur- ton, 25 Me. 39 8S. C. 43 Am. Dee. 249; Duffy v. Upton, 118 Mass. 544); and laborer, are not, when (Shultz v. Chicago &c. Co., 48 Wis. 375; Eagan v. Tucker, 18 Hun. 347; Hart v. N. Y. &e. Co., 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 460; Gil- more v. Northern &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 866; 15 A. & HB. R. R. Cas. 304; Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Lavelley, 36 Ohio, (N. 8.) 221; 5 A. & B. RB. R. Cas. 549; 21 N. W. Rep. 269; Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 298; 13 Rep. 673; Hawkins v. Johnson, 105 Ind. 39 S. C. 55 Am. Rep. 169; Brown v. Sennet, 21 Rep. 450; Miller v. Union &c. Co., 4 McCrary, (C. C. U. 8.) 115; Hannibal &c. Co. v. Fox, 31 Kan. 586 8. C. 15 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 325; Chicago &c. Co. v. May, 108 ill. 288 S. C. 18 OC. L. J. 282; 15 A. & B. RB. RB. Cas. 320 (SHELDON, C. J., and Scorr and Crate, J. J., dissenting); Mason v. Edison &c. Works, 28 Fed. Rep. 228; Hussey v. Coger, 39 Hun. 639; Smith v. Sioux City &c. Co., 15 Neb. 583 8. C. 17 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 561; Kansas &c. Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 267 8S. C. 6 Rep. 199); and mason, are (Peschel v. Chicago &c. Co., 62 Wis. 338 S. C. 21 N. W. Rep. 269; 20 C. L. J. 203; 17 A. & EB. BR. R. Cas. 545 (Taytor, J., dissenting); and watchman, are (Chicago &e. Co. v. Geary, 110 Ill. 383 S. ©.17 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 606); and car-repairer, are not (Hannibal &c. Co. v. Fox, 31 Kan. 586 8. 0.15 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 325; Luebke v. Chicago &c. Co., 59 Wis. 127 8S. C. 48 Am. Rep. 483; 53 Am. Rep. 266; 15 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 183 (Cassopax and Taytor, J. J., dissenting); 326 RAILWAY LAW. Fireman and Master-Carpenter: Night Watcher: Agent: Ganger. Moore v. Wabash &c. Co., 81 Mo. 499 8S. C. 21 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 509); and track répairer, are (O’Brien v. Bos- ton &¢c. Co., 138 Mass. 387 S. C. 19 Rep. 462; 52 Am. Rep. 279); and engineer, are (Peterson v. Whitebreast &c. Co., 50 Iowa, 673 S. C. 32 Am. Rep. 143; Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa. 246 8S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 543; Abend v. Terre Haute &e. Co., 111 Ill. 203 8. C. 18. Rep. 814; 19 C. L. J. 350; 53 Am. Rep. 616; 17 A. & BE. R. BR. Cas. 614); of lumber-yard and laborer, are (Hoth v. Peters, 55 Wis. 405); of shops and watchman, are not (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Harper, 44 Ark. 524); to repair trains, and laborer (Peschel v. Chicago &c. Co., 62 Wis. 338 S. C. 21 N. W. Rep. 269; 20 C. L. J. 203;17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 545); with power to command and dis- charge workman and laborers, are not (Miller v. Union &e. Co., (C. ©. U. 8.) 17 Fed. Rep. 67); building bridge and carpenter under him, are (Yager v. Atlantic &c. Co., (C. ©. U. S.) 4 Hughes, 192); and yard-hand, are (Parker v. St. Paul &c. Co., (Minn.) 19 N. W. Rep. 249; 30 Alb. L. J. 290; and master-carpenter, are, though the latter has authority to employ and discharge hands. (Peschel v. Chicago Sec. Co., 62 Wis. 338 S. 0.17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 545; 21 N. W. Rep. 269, 20 ©. L. J. 203. (TaYLor, J., dissenting); and night-watcher, are (Chi- cago &c. Co. v. Geary, 110 Ill. 383 8.C.17 A. GER. R. Cas. 606); and agent, are not, when (Laning v. N. Y. &e. Co., 49 N. Y. 521 8. ©. 10 Am. Rep. 417); and track- repairer, are (O’Brien v. Boston &c. Co., 138 Mass. 387 S. C. 19 Rep. 462; 52 Am. Rep. 279); and yard-hand,. are (Fraker v. St. Paul &e. Co., 32 Minn. 548. 0.15 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 256; Semble—Contra—Houston v. Mar- celles, 59 Tex. 334 S. 0.12 A. & BE. R.R. Cas. 231). GanGer?! and laborer, are (Chicago v. Simmons, 11 II. App. 147; Houser v. Chicago &e. Co., 60 Iowa, 230 C. 8. This is a purely English word, not to be found in the American diction- aries; coined to signify the overseer of a gang of employees—vide, Nuttall’s. Dict. RAILWAY LAW. 327 Ganger: General Agent: Genera! Manager: General Superintendent. 46 Am. Rep. 65; Lawler v. Androscoggin &e. Co., 62 Me. 463 S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 492; Cumberland &e. Co. v. Scally, 27 Md. 589; Daubert v. Pickel, 4 Mo. App. 590; Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y.5 8S. ©, 21 Am. Rep. 573; Barring v. Delaware &c. Co., 19 Hun. 216; Weger v. Pennsylvania &e. Co., 55 Pa. 460; Keystone &c. Co. v. Newberry, 96 ib. 246 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 543; Lovegrove v. London &c. Co., 16 ©. B. (N. 8S.) 669 S. C. 33 L. J. (C. P.) 329; Willis v. Oregon &c. Co., 11 Oreg. 257 8. C. 3 West Coast Rep. 240; 17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 539); are not (Chicago &ec. Co. v. May, 108 Ill. 288 8. 0.15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 320; 18 C. L. J. 232; Lake Shore &c. Co. »v. Lavelly, 36 Ohio, (N. S.) 221 8S. 0.5 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 549; 21 N. W. Rep. 269). GANGER and the guard! on an English train, are (Waller v. South Eastern &c. Co., 32 L. T. (Ex.) 205; L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 325). GENERAL AGENT and laborer, are not, when (Mitchell v. Robinson, 80 Ind. 281 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 812). GENERAL MANAGER and laborer, are (Searle v. Lind- say, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 429); and brakesman, are not, (Phillips v. Chicago &c. Co., 64 Wis. 475 8. 0. 23 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 453); and scaffolder, are (Gallagher v. Piper, 16 ©. B. (N. 8.) 669 S. C. 33 L. T. Rep. (C. P.) 329). GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT and laborers, are not (Wilson v. Willimantic &c. Co. 50 Conn. 433 8. C. 47 Am. Rep. 653; Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516 8. C. 37 Am. Rep. 521); are (Mobile &c. Co. v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245 S. ©. 6 Rep. 264); and supervisor, are (ib.); and engineer, are (ib.); and section-master, are (ib.) ). 1They have no conductors, properly so called, in the English railway service, but an employee accompanies the train and performs most of the functions of our conductor, and is styled a guard. 828 RAILWAY LAW. Gross Neg.: Guard: Head Stevedore: Implied Knowledge. Gross NEGLIGENCE of employee, debars recovery (Louisville &c. Co. v. Filbern, 6 Bush. 574; Toledo &e. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 Ill. 391; does not, when (Hathaway v. Michigan &c. Co., 51 Mich. 253 8. C. 47 *Am. Rep. 569; 16 N. W. Rep. 634). Guarp and driver of stage-coach, are (Bartonshill &c. Co. v. Reid, 3 McQ. (H. of L. Cas.) 266 S. C. 4 Jur. (N. 8.) 767). See GaneeR. And laborer travelling by train, according to duty (Tunney v. Midland &c. Co., L. R. (1 C. P.) 291). HamMERERS AT Force and drawers of Iron, are (Bartonshill &c. Co. v. Reid, supra). HAULERS and miners, pickers and blasters, are (Keil- ley v. Belcher &c. Co., 3 Sawy, 500). HEAD-STEVEDORE and stevedore, are (Millen v. Steam- ship Co , 9 Phil. 16). Hop-CarrieR and foreman, are (Green v.' Banta, 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 156). HoistTiInc-ENGINEER and miner, are (Buckley v. Gould &c. Co., 8 Sawy. (C. C. U.S.) 3948. CO. 14 Fed. Rep. 833; 15 Rep. 133; Bartonshill &c. Co. v. Reid, supra). IMPLIED KNOWLEDGE of risks discharges the rule (Money v. Lower Vein &c. Co., 55 Iowa, 671). Inspector! and brakesman are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Bragonier, 11 Ill. App. 516; Smith v. Flint & Potter, 46 Mich. 258 8S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 161; 2 A. & BH. BR. R. Cas. 140; Little Miami We. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Ohio, (N. 8.) 318 8.0.17 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 578; Columbus &c. Co. v. Webb, 12 Ohio, (N. 8.) 475; Mackin v. Boston &c. Co., 135 Mass. 201 8. ©. 46 Am. Rep. 456; 15 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 196; Nashville &c. Co. v. Foster, 10 Lea, 351 1The classification in the note to Chicago &c. Co. ». Ross, 17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 514, et seg., is unreliable and misleading. RAILWAY LAW. 329 Inspectors: Joint Staff. S.C. 11 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 180; Coon v. Syracuse &e. ©o., 5 N. Y. 492; Wonder v. Baltimore &c. Co., 32 Md. 411 8. C. 3 Am. Rep. 143); are not (Condon v. Missouri &c. Co., 78 Mo. 567 S. C. 17 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 583; Brann v. Chicago &c. Co., 53 Iowa, 595 8. C. 10 Rep. 202; 36 Am. Rep. 243; King v. Ohio &c. Co., 8 A. & E- R. R. Cas. 119; 14 Fed. Rep. 277; 15 ©. L. J. 367; Long v. Pacific &c. Co., 65 Mo. 225; Cooper v. Railway Co., 24 W. Va. 37); and car-coupler, are not (Tierney v. Minne- apolis &c. Co., 33 Minn. 311 8S. C. 53 Am. Rep. 35; 20 Rep. 84 (MiITcHELL, J., dissenting).). INSPECTOR and engineer, are not (Toledo &c. Co. v. Moore, 77 Ill. 217); and train-makers, are not (Tierney wv. Minneapolis &c. Co., 33 Minn. 311 S.C. 21 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 545; 53 Am. Rep. 35; 20 Rep. 84); and laborers, are (Coon v. Syracuse &c. Co., 5 N. Y. 492); are not (Tierney v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 33 Minn. 311 8. C. 53 Am. Rep. 35; 20 Rep. 84; 21 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 545); and switchman, are (Gilson v. Northern &c. Co., 22 Hun. {N. Y.) 289); and brake-repairer, are (Nashville &c. Co. v. Foster, 10 Lea, 351 8. C.11 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 180); and yard-switchman, are (Gibson v. Northern &c. Co., 22 Hun. 289). INSPECTORS and subordinate employees, are (Smoot v. Mobile &c. Co., 67 Ala. 13; Railroad Co. v. Webb, 12 Ohio, (N. 8.) 475, 494; Little Miami &c. Co. v. Fitzpat- rick, 42 ib. 318 S.C. 17 A. & EH. RB. R. Cas. 578; Smith v. Flint &c. Co., 46 Mich. 258 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 161; 2 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 140; Mackin v. Boston &¢c. Co., 135 Mass. 2U1 S. C. 46 Am. Rep. 456; 15 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 196; Kidwell v. Houston, 3 Woods, (C. C. U. 8.) 313). JOINT-STAFF of employees, of different masters, are not fellow-servants (Swainson v. North Eastern &c. Co., L. R. (3 Ex. Div.) 341 8. ©. 26 W. R. 413); but the rule 330 RAILWAY LAW. Journey-Men: Laborers. does not apply where the user extends to property only (Warburton v. Great Western &c. Co., L. BR. (2 Ex.) 30; Turner v. Great Eastern &c. Co., 33 L. T. R. (N. S.) 102; '25 W. R. 676). JOURNEY-MEN and foreman, are (Yager v. Atlantic &c. Co., 4 Hughes, (C. C. U. 8.) 192). LABORERS—This is a nomen generalissimum, and is am- plified as tending to assist the practitioner in a rapid search for particular situations. Laxsorer and brakesman, are (Frazier v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 38 Pa. 104 8. C. 80 Am. Dec. 467; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395 8. C. 15 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 187; Slattery v. Toledo &c. Co., 23 Ind. 81; Robert- son v. Terre Haute &c. Co., 78 ib. 77 8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 552; Henry v. Staten &c. Co., 81 N. Y. 373 8. 0.2 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 60). Are not (Hamilton v. Galveston &c. Co., 54 Tex. 556; Morris v. Richmond &c. Co., (Va.) 8 Va. L. J. 540). And car-inspector, are (Gibson v. Northern &c. Co., 22 Hun. (N. 8.) 289; Smoot v. Mobile &e. Co., 67 Ala. 13; Railroad Co. v. Webb, 12 Ohio, (N. S.) 475,. 494; Little Miami &c. Co. v Fitzpatrick, 42 ib. 318 8. C. 17 A. & HE. BR. R. Cas. 578; Smith v. Flint &e. Co., 46- Mich. 258 S.C.2 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 140; 41 Am. Rep. 161; Mackin v. Boston &c. Co., 135 Mass. 201 S. ©. 46 Am. Rep. 456; 15 A. & BE. BR. B. Cas. 196; Nashville &c. Co. v. Foster, 10 Lea, 351 8. 0. 11 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 180; Kidwell v. Houston &e. Co., (C. 0. U. 8.) 3 Woods, 313). LABORER and car-inspector, are not (King v. Ohio &c. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 799; 15 ©. L. J. 367; 8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 119; Toledo &e. Co. v. Moore, 77 Il. 217; Chi- cago &e. Co. v. Jackson, 55 Ill. 492 8. 0. 8 Am. Rep. 661; 1 Am. R. Rep. 592; Brann ». Chicago &e. Co., 53. RAILWAY LAW. 33t Laborer and Car-Repairer: Carpenters: Conductor. Iowa, 595 §. ©. 10 Rep. 202; 36 Am. Rep. 243; Toledo: &c. Co. v. Frederick, 71 Ill. 294; Indianapolis &c. Co. wv. Morgernstern, 103 Ill. 216 8S. ©. 12 A. & HE. BR. R. Cas. 228; Tierney v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 33 Minn. 311 _ 8. C. 53 Am. Rep. 35; 20 Rep. 84; 21 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas.. 545 (MITCHELL, J., dissenting).). And car-repairer, are not, when (Hannibal &c. Co. v. Fox, 31 Kan. 586 8. C.15 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 325; Smith v. Sioux City &c. Co., 15 Neb. 5838. 0.17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 561). And carpenters, are, when (Morgan v. Vale of Neath, 5 B. & S. 7368. C. L. BR. (1 Q. B.) 149; 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 23; 13 L. T. (N.S.) 564; 14 W. R. 114; Tunney v. Midland &e. Co., L. R. (1 CO. P.) 391 8. C. 2 Jur. (N. 8.) 691; Gilshannon v. Stony Brook &c. Co. 10 Cush. 2285. Seaver v. Boston &c. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Holden v. Fitch- burg S&e. Co., 129 Mass. 268 S. C. 2 A. & EB. RB. BR. Cas. 94; Killea v. Faxon, 125 Mass. 485 S. C. 6 Rep. 7785, Cf. Gilman v. Eastern &c. Co. 10 All. 233 S. C. 87 Am. Dec. 635). Are not, when (O’Donnell v. Allegheny &c. Co., 59 Pa. 239). And conductor, are (Jeffrey v. Keokuk &c. Co.,, 56 Iowa, 546 S. C.5 A. & HE. BR. R. Cas. 568; Pittsburg &ce. Co. v. Leech, 13 Week. Bull. 153; Wilson v. Madison &c. Co., 18 Ind. 226; Michigan &c. Co. v. Dolan, 32 Mich. 510; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 8. C. 389 Am. Rep. 627; 5 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 515; St. Louis &e. Co. v. Shackelford, 42 Ark. 417; Ryan v. Cumberland Se. Co., 23 Pa. 384; Naylor v. Chicago &c. Co., 53 Wis. 6613. Howland v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 54 ib. 226 8.C.5 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 578; Heine v. Chicago &c. Co., 58 Wis. 525; O’Connell v. Baltimore &¢ Co., 20 Md. 212 8. C. 83 Am. Dec. 549; Manville v. Cleveland &e. Co., 11 Ohio, (N. 8.) 332 RAILWAY LAW. Laborer and Engineer, are. 417; Frazier v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 38 Pa. 104 Ss. C. 80 Am. Dec. 467; Cassidy v. Maine &c. Co., 76 Me. 488 S. OC. 17 A. & EB. BR. R. Cas. 519; Illinois &c. Co. v. Cox, 21 Ill. 20 8. C. 71 Am. Dec. 298; Cumberland &c. Co. v. Scally, 27 Md. 589; Howard v. Mississippi &c. Co., 50 Miss. 178; N. O. &e. Co. v. Hughes, 49 ib. 258; Ross v. N. Y. &c. Co., 74 N. Y. 617). Are not, when (Chicago &c. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377 8S. 0.17 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 501; 19 Rep. 97; 31 Alb. L. J. 81S. C. below 2 McCrary, 235; 8 Fed. Rep. 544; Little Miami &c. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio, 415; Moon »v. Richmond &c. Co., 78 Va. 745 8. C. 49 Am. Rep. 401; 17 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 531; Dobbin v. Richmond &e. Co.,1 81 N. ©. 446 S. OC. 31 Am. Rep. 512; Chicago &e. Co. v. Swanson, 16 Neb. 254 8. C. 49 Am. Rep. 718; Chicago &c. Co. v. Bayfield,? 37 Mich. 205 8. C. 6 Rep. 654; N. O. &c. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112 8. C. 12 Am. Rep. 356; Central &e. Co. v. De Bray, 71 Ga. 406; Cowles v. Richmond &c. Co., 84 N. C. 309 8. C. 37. Am. Rep. 620; 12 ©. L. J. 546; 12 Rep. 219; 2A. & E.R. R. Cas. 90; Chicago &e. Co. v. Lundstrong, 16 Neb. 254 S. C. 21 A. & BE. R. BR. Cas. 528; Railway Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio, (N. 8.) 201). LABORER and engineer, are (St. Louis &e. Co. v. Shackelford, 42 Ark. 417; Ohio &c. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 S. C. 74 Am. Dec. 259; Nashville &c. Co. v. Wheless, 10 Lea, 741 8S. C. 43 Am. Rep. 317; 15 A. & HE. BR. R. Cas. 15; Bradley v. Nashville &c. Co., 14 Lea, (Tenn) 374; Houston &c. Co. v. Rider, 62 Tex. 267; ‘In this case, it appeared that one person was both conductor and engi- neer of a gravel-train, with power to employ and discharge hands. 2In this case, it appeared that the conductor ordered a minor, who had been employed as a commom laborer, to act as brakesman, and that the in- jury occurred whilst he was performing or attempting to perform the duties required of a brakesman. RAILWAY LAW. 333 Laborer and Engineer, are not. Texas &c. Co. v. Harrington, 62 Tex. 597; O'Connell v. Baltimore &c. Co., 20 Md. 212 S. C. 83 Am. Dee. 549; Baltimore &c. Co. v. State, 41 Md. 288; Ryan v. Cumberland &c. Co., 23 Pa. 384; Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Davis, 111 Pa. 597 8. C. 56 Am. Rep. 305; Cone v. Dela- ware &c. Co., 81 N. Y. 206 8. O. 37 Am. Rep. 491; 2 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 57; Chicago &c. Co. v. Keefe, 47 Tl. 108; Abend v. Terre Haute &c. Co., 111 Ill. 203 8. 0. 53 Am. Rep. 616; 19 C. L. J. 350; 18 Rep. 814; 17 A. & B. R. BR. Cas. 614; Illinois &c. Co. v. Cox, 21 Ill. 208. C. 71 Am. Dee. 298; Chicago &c. Co. v. Murphy, 53 Ill. 336 S. C.5 Am. Rep. 48; Blake v. Maine &c. Co., 70 Me. 60 S. C. 10 Rep. 426; 35 Am. Rep. 297; Wilson v. Madison &e. Co., 18 Ind. 226; Brown v. Central &c. Co., 20 Rep. 259; 6 West. Coast Rep. 797; Smith v. Memphis &c. Co.,. (0. C. U.S.) 18 Fed. Rep. 304; Farwell v. Boston, 4 Met. 49 8.C. 38 Am. Dee. 339; 2 Thomp. Neg. 924; Memphis &c. Co. v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 637; Chicago &e. Co. v. Troesch, 68 Ill. 545; 57 Tl. 155 S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 578; Foster v. Minne- sota &c. Co., 14 Minn. 360; Coon v. Syracuse &e. Co., 5 N. Y. 492; Capper v. Louisville &c. Co., 103 Ind.305'8.C.22 A, & E. R. R. Cas. 277; Rohback v. Pacific &e. Co., 43 Mo. 187; Whaalan v. Mad River &c. Co., 8 Ohio, (N. 8.) 249; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395 S. ©. 11 Md. L. Rec. No. 6; 15 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 187; Slatterly v. Morgan &c. Co., 35 La. Ann. 1166; Nashville &c. Co.. v. Elliott, 1 Cold. 611 S. C. 78 Am. Dee. 506). Are not (Toledo &c. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 Ill. 391; Chicago &c. Co. v. McMillan, 84 Ill. 109; Garrahy v. Kansas &e. Co. (C. C. U. 8.) 25 Fed. Rep. 258; 20 Rep. 777; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Leslie,! 20 Rep. 55; Illinois 1The laborer in this case was a workman in the machine shops of the defendant, and the plaintiff, (a locomotive-engineer), running on the road, and the injury arose from an explosion of the boiler, which had been furnished to him from the shops of the company. It will be seen upon examination of the case, that it turned upon the point that the superinten-. dent of the shops and engineer were not fellow-servants within the rule. 334 RAILWAY LAW. Laborer and Express Agent: Fireman: Foreman. &e. Co. v. Patterson, 69 Ill. 650; Nashville &c. Co. v. Car- roll, 6 Heisk. 347; Smith v. N. Y. &c. Co., 19 N. Y.1278.C. 75 Am. Dee. 305). LABORER and express-agent, are (Pennsylvania &c ‘Co. v. Woodworth, 26 Ohio, (N. S.) 585; Blair v. Erie -&¢e. Co., 66 N. Y. 3138'S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 55; Dwyer v. American Ex. Co., 55 Wis. 453 8. O. 5 Wis. Leg. News, 43; 8 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 159). Are not (Yeomans v. Contra Costa &c. Co., 44 Cal. 71). LABORER and firemen, are (Illinois v. Cox, 21 Ill. 20 S. C. 71 Am. Dec. 298; Fraker v. St. Paul &c. Co., 32 Minn. 54 8. C0. 15 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 256; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61S. C. 39 Am. Rep. 627). Are not, when (Ohio &c. Co. v. Collarn,! 73 Ind. 261 S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 134; 8 C. L. J. 12; 7 Rep. 143 (peculiar circumstances); Garrahy v. Kansas &c. Co., C. C. U.S.) 25 Fed. Rep. 258; 20 Rep. 777; Semble Houston &c. Co. v. Marcelles, 12 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 231; Chicago &ce. Co. v. Swett, 45 Ill. 197). Lasorer and foreman, are (Pittsburg &c. Co. »v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151 8. ©. 23 A. & BE. BR. R. Cas. 408; Doughty v. Penobscot &c. Co., 76 Me. 143; Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa. 246 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 543; Daubert v. Pickel, 4 Mo. App. 590; Hanrathy v. Northern &c. Co., 46 Md. 280 8. ©. 5 Rep. 698; Brabbits wv. Chicago &c. Co., 38 Wis. 289; Feltham v. England, L. R; (2 Q. B.) 33; Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C. B. (N.S.) 665, 669; Howells v. Landore, L. R. (10 Q. B.) 62; Albro v. Agawam Sc. Co., 6 Cush. 75; Wilson v. Merry, L. RB. (1 1The injury in this case grew out of a negligent practice or custom which was known, and if not assented to by the middle-man, was not abrogated. RAILWAY LAW. 335 Laborer and Foreman, are. H. of L. Se.) 326; Zeigler v. Day, 123 Mass. 152; Walker v. Boston &e. Co., 128 ib. 8 8S. C.1 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 141; McDermott v. Boston, 133 ib. 349; Duffy v. Upton, 113 Mass. 544; McLean v. Blue Point &c. Co., 51 Cal. 255; Peterson v. Whitebreast &c. Co., 50 Iowa. 673 S. C. 32 Am. Rep. 143; Green v. Banta, 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 156; Hart v. N. Y. &e. Co., ib. 460; Shultz v. Chicago &e. Co., 48 Wis. 375; Hoth v. Peters, 55 ib. 405; Tyson v. Smith, 61 Ala. 554; Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39 S. ©. 43 Am. Dec. 249; Willis v. Oregon &c. Co., 11 Oreg. 257 8. 0.17 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 539; 3 West Coast Rep. 240; Brown v. Sennett, 21 Rep. 450; Charles v. Taylor, L. R. (3 C. P. Div.) 492 8. C. 38 L. T. R. (N. 8S.) 773; 21 W. R. 32; 6 Rep. 446; Weger v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 55 Pa. 460; Hofnagle v. N. Y. &e Co., 55 N. Y. 608 S. C. 6 Am. R. Rep. 234; Fraker v. St. Paul &e. Co., 32 Minn. 548. 0.15 A. & BE. BR. RB. Cas. 256; Parker v. St. Paul &c. Co.,19 N. W. Rep. 249; 30 Alb. L. J. 290; Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill. (N. Y.) 592 8. C. 41 Am. Dee. 771; Ohio &. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 8. C. 74 Am. Dec. 259; Slattery v. Railway Co., 23 Ind. 81; Ohio &c. Co. v. Hammersley, 28 Ind. 371; Columbus &c. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 74; Gormley v. Ohio &c. Co., 72 Ind. 318.0.5 A. & BE. BR. R. Cas. 581; Robertson v. Terre Haute &c. Co., 78 Ind. 77 8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 552; Bryce wv. Fitzpatrick, 80 Ind. 526; Drinkout v. Eagle Machine Works, 90 Ind. 423; Brazil &c. Co. v. Cain, 78 Ind. 282; Indiana &c. Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 191; Lehigh &c. Co. wv. Jones, 86 Pa. 482 S. C. 6 Rep. 125; 17 Alb. L. J. 513; 5 W. N. 436; Delaware &c. Co. v. Carroll, 89 Pa. 374; Wright v. N. Y. &e. Co., 25 N. Y. 562; Crispin ». Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516 S. C. 37 “Atta. Rep. 521; Pittsburgh &e. Co. v. Leech, 13 Week. Bull. 153; Rochester &c. Co.'v. Brick, 98 N. Y. 211 8. ©. 21 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 605). Are not (Hart v. N. Y. &c. Co., 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 336 RAILWAY LAW. Are not: Laborer and Ganger. 460; Schultz v. Chicago &c. Co., 48 Wis. 375; Hagan v. Tucker, 18 Hun. (N. Y.) 347; Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Lavelly, 36 Ohio, (N. 8S.) 221 8.C.5 A. & E. RB. BR. Cas. 549; 21 N. W. Rep. 269; Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 298; 13 Rep. 693; 14 C. L. J. 92; Haw- kins v. Johnson, 105 Ind. 39 8. C. 55 Am. Rep. 169; Berea &c. Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio, (N. 8.) 287 S. C. 27 Am. Rep. 510; 5 Rep. 625; McKinne v. California &c. Co., 21 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 539; Peschel v. Chicago &c. Co., 62 Wis. 338 8. C. 21 N. W. Rep. 269; 20 C. L. J. 203; 17 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 545; Kansas v. Little, 19 Kan. 267 S. C. 6 Rep. 199; Gilmore y. Northern &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 866 S.C. 15 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 304). A laborer vut to work, out of hours, and foreman, are not (Broderick v. Detroit &c. Co., 56 Mich. 261 S. C. 56 Am. Rep. 382). LABORER and ganger are (Lovegrove v. London &c. Co., 16 C. B. (N.S.) 669; 33 L. J. (N. 8.) 329; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 879; 12 W. R. 988; 10 L. T. (N. S.) 718; Tunney »v. Midland &c. Co., L. BR. (1 C. P.) 291; Waller v. South Eastern &c. Co., 2 H. & C. 102 8. C. 32 L. J. (Bx.) 205; 8 L. T. R. (N.S8.) 325; 11 W. R. 731; 9 Jur. (N. 8.) 501; McKinne v. California &c. Co. 5 West. Coast Rep. 159; Willis v. Oregon &c. Co., 11 Oreg. 257 S. C. 3 West. Coast Rep. 240; 17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 539; Keystone &c. Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa. 246 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 543; Daubert v. Pickel, 4 Mo. App. 590; Chicago &c. Co. v. Simmons, 11 Ill. App. 147; Houser v. Chicago &c. Co., 60 Iowa, 230 S. C. 46 Am. Rep. 65; Lawler »v. Androscoggin &c. Co., 62 Me. 463 8S. ©. 16 Am. Rep. 492; Cumberland &c. Co. v. Seally, 27 Md. 589; Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y.5 8. ©. 21 Am. Rep. 573; Barring v. Delaware &c. Co., 19 Hun. (N. Y.) 216; Weger ». Pennsylvania &c. Co., 55 Pa. 465). RAILWAY LAW. 337 Laborers and Mail-Agent, &c. Are not, when (Chicago &e. Co. v. May, 108 Ill. 288 8. C. 15 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 320; 18 C. L. J. 232 (SHEL- pon, C. J., Scorr and Crate, J. J., dissenting).). LABORERS and mail-agents are not (Collett v. London &c. Co., 16 Q. B. 984; Nolton v. Western &e. Co., 15 N. Y. 444; Seybolt v. New York &c. Co., 31 Hun. 100; 95 N. Y. 562 8. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 75; Blair v. Erie Railway Co., 66 N. Y. 313 8. O. 23 Am. Rep. 55; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Price, 96 Penn. 256, reversing S. C. reported in 22 Alb. L. J. 391; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Hender- son,! 1 Smith, (Pa.) 315; Yeomans v. Steam Navigation Co., 44 Cal. 71; Hammond v. Railway Co. 6 Rich. (8. C.) 130; Houston &c. Co. v. Hampton, 64 Tex. 4278. 0.1 Tex. Ct. Rep. 337). But in Wisconsin it is held, that the laborer is a fellow-servant with the mail-agents, though they are not, as to him (Muster v. Chicago &c. Co., 61 Wis. 325 8. C. 49 Am. Rep. 41). LABORER and overseer, are (Brown v. Winona &c. Co., 27 Minn. 162 S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 285). LABORER under one master,.and employees under another, are not, when (Coggin v. Central &c. Co., 62 Ga. 685 8. C. 35 Am. Rep. 132; Turner v. Great Hastern &c. Co., 83 L. T. BR. (N. S.) 431; Swainson v. North Eastern &c. Co., L. R. (8 Ex. Div.) 341; Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124 S. ©. 15 Am. Rep. 387). Are, when (Lake Superior &c. Co. v. Erickson, 39 Mich. 492 S. C. 33 Am. Rep. 423; Chicago &c. Co. v. O'Bryan, 15 Ill. App. 134; Young v. N. Y. &c. Co., 30 Barb. 229; Smith v. N. Y. &c. Co. 19 N. ¥. 1278. ©. 75 Am. Dee. 305). 1A statute, changing the law, was passed after this decision was ren- dered (Act April 4th, 1868; see Railway Co. ». Price, 96 Pa. 256). 22 338 RAILWAY LAW. Laborcrs of Lessor and Lessee, &c. Of lessor and lessee respectively, are not (Phillips v. Chicago &c. Co., 64 Wis. 475 8S. C. 23 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 453; Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Maryland, 58 Md. 372 8.0.10 A. & BE. R. B. Cas. 792; In re Merrill, 54 Vt. 200 S. C.11 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 680; Wabash &c. Co. v. Peyton, 106 Ill. 534 S. C.18 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 1; Clark v. Chicago &c. Co., 92 Til. 43). And other servants on another train, are (Sullivan v. Toledo &c. Co., 58 Ind. 26). Are not (Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Maryland, supra). LABORER of a contractor and those of a sub-contrac- tor are, generally, not (Wiggett v. Fox,! 11 Ex. 832 S. C. 25 L. J. (Ex.) 188; Woodley v. Metropolitan &c. Co., L. R. (2 Ex. Div.) 384; Murphy v. Caralli, 3 H. & C. 462; Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 H. & N. 143; Murray v. Currie, L. R. (6 O. P.) 24; Young v. N. Y. &e. Co., 30 Barb. 229; Svenson v. Atlantic &c. Co., 57 N. Y. 108; Hunt ». Pennsylvania &c. Co., 51 Pa. 475; Hass v. Philadelphia &c. Co., 88 Pa. 269 S. ©. 32 Am. Rep. 462; Riley »v. State Line &c. Co., 29 La. Ann. 791 S. C. 29 Am. Rep. 349; Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, 113; Goodfellow ». Boston &c. Co., 106 Mass. 461; Donaldson v. Mississippi &ce. Co., 18 Iowa, 280 8. C. 87 Am. Dec. 391). But servants of a contractor, if placed under the general direction, control and supervision of the con- tractee with employees of the latter and brought into consociation, are (Hoskins v. Standford &c. Co., 112 Mass. 400; Johnson v. Boston &c. Co., 118 ib. 114; Rourke v. White Moss &c. Co., L. R. (1 ©. P. Div.) 556). Are not (Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. _ 124 8. C. 15 Am. Rep. 387). But where one railway company, under an agree- ment with another, is permitted to run its trains upon the 1But see the observations of Martin, B., in Abraham e. Reynolds, 5 H. & N. 142. RAILWAY LAW. 339 Laborer and Machinist, &c. track of the other, the servants, employed by the re- spective companies, are not co-servants, within the meaning of the rule under discussion (Sawyer v. Rut- land, 27 Vt. 370; Nashville &c. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347; Smith v. N. Y. &c. Co., 19 N. Y. 127 8. ©. 75 Am. Dee. 305; Catawissa &c. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. St. 186; Carroll v. Minnesota &c. Co., 13 Minn. 30; Warburton v. Great Western &c. Co. L. R. (2 Ex.) 30; 4 H. & C. 695; L. J. (36 Ex.) 9; 15 W. R. 108; 15 L. T. (N. S.) 361). Of one party, and machinist of another, are not, when (Kelly v. Johnson, 128 Mass. 530 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 398). And switchman of another company, are (Smith v. N. Y. &e. Co., 19 N. Y. 127 8. C. 75 Am. Dee. 305; Cf. Foley v. Chicago &c. Co., supra). Are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Henry, 7 Ill. App. (7 Bradw.) 322). LABORER under a railway company, and those of a consignor, are, when (Foley v. Chicago &c. Co., 48 Mich. 622 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 481). And elevator-operator, are not (Atlanta &c. Co. ». Speer, 60 Ga. 137 S. C. 47 Am. Rep. 750). Are (Kelly v. Boston &c. Co., 128 Mass. 456; Stringham v. Stewart, 27 Hun. 562). And stevedore’s foreman, are not (Brown v. Sen- nett, 68 Cal. 225 S. C. 58 Am. Rep. 8; 21 Rep. 450). On steam-tug, and others on canal-boat, when not (Arctic &c. Co. v. Austin, 69 N. Y. 470 8. C. 25 Am. Rep. 221 (Miuuzr, J., dissenting, RAPALLo, J., absent, and ANDREWS, J., non-committal). And steam-hammer operator, are (Hanrathy ». Northern &c: Co., 46 Md. 280 S. ©. 5 Rep. 698). 340 RAILWAY LAW. Laborer of Landlord and those of Tenant, &c. LABORER of landlord and those of tenant, are no (Cooper v. Hamilton, 14 Allen, 193). And other laborers (being minors), are, wher (Curran v. Merchants &c. Co., 130 Mass. 374 S. ©. 3¢ Am. Rep. 457; Gartland v. Toledo &c. Co., 67 Ill. 498: Frost v. Union &¢. Co., 2 Dill. (C. C. U. 8.) 459). Are not, when (Hamilton v. Galveston &¢. Oo., 54 Tex. 556 8. C. 4 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 528; Railway Co. v. Miller, 49 Tex. 328; Coombs v. New Bedford &c. Oo., 102 Mass. 572; Hill v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45; Jones v. Flor- ence &c. Co., 66 Wis. 268 8S. C. 57 Am. Rep. 269; Rail- way Oo. v. Fort, 17 Wall. (8S. O. U. 8.) 553; Dowling ». Allen, 74 Mo. 13 8. ©. 41 Am. Rep. 298; 13 Rep. 693; Cf. O'Byrne v. Burn, 1G Court of Session Cas. (Scotland) 1025; Baird v. Addie, ib. 490; Brownlie v. Tennant, ib. 998; Hill v. Caledonian Ry. Co., ib. 569; following Gray v. Brassey, 15 ib. 135). LABORER and manager, are (Allen v. New Gas Co., L. R. (1 Ex. Div.) 251; Howells v. Landore &c. Co., L. R. (10 Q. B.) 62). And manager of derrick, are (Fox ». Sanford, 4 Sneed, 36 S. C. 67 Am. Dec. 587; Duffy v. Upton, 113 Mass. 114; Scott v. Sweeney, 34 Hun. 292 (Bocxss, J., dissenting). And traffic-manager, are not (Cumberland &ec. Co. v. State, 44 Md. 283 S. ©. 45 ib. 229). And yard-master, are (Miller v. Union Pacific &e. Co., 4 McCrary, (C. 0. U. 8.) 115; MeCosker v. Long Island &c. Co. 84 N. ¥. 77 8.0.5 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 564; Hannibal &c. Co. v. Fox, 31 Kan. 586 8. 0.15 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 325; Gilmore v. Union Pacitic &e. Co., (C. O. U.S.) 15 A. & EB. R. RB. Cas. 304; Kirk v. Atlanta &e. Co., 94 N. O. 625 S. ©. 55 Am. Rep. 621; Chicago &c. Co., v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205 8. 0. 6 Rep. 654; Webb v. Richmond &c. Oo., 97 N. C. 387). RAILWAY LAW. 341 Laborers, &c. Are not, when (Stoddard v. St. Louis &c. Co., 65 Mo. 514 S. C. 5 Rep. 177; Bessex v. Chicago &c. Co., 45 Wis. 477; Chicago &c. Co. v. May, 108 Ill. 288 8. C. 15 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 320; 18 C. L. J. 232 (SaHEeLpon, CO. J., Scott and Craic, J. J., dissenting); Smith ». Sioux City &c. Co., 15 Neb. 583 8. C. 17 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 561; Mason v. Edison &c. Works, 28 Fed. Rep. (C. C. U. 8.) 228; Hussey v. Coger, 39 Hun. 639). And superintendent, are (Flynn v. Salem, 134 Mass. 351; Zeigler v. Day, 123 ib. 152; Albo v. Agawam &ec. Co., 6 Cush. (Mass.) 75; Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516 8. C. 37 Am. Rep. 521 (a strong case) (HaRL, Dan- FORTH and Fincu, J. J., dissenting); S. P. Floyd ». Sugden, 193 Mass. 563). And are, even though the injury occurred whilst performing extraordinary duty under a threat (Capper ». Louisville &c. Co., 103 Ind. 305 8. C. 22 A. & E.R. B. Cas. 277; Tissue v. Baltimore &e. Co., 112 Pa. 918. C. 56 Am. Rep. 310; 2 Cent. Rep. 596). Are not (Smith v. Oxford &c. Co., 42 N. J. L. 467 S. ©. 36 Am. Rep. 535; Brothers v. Cartter, 52 Mo. 373 S. 0.14 Am. Rep. 424; Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517 8. 0.17 Am. Rep. 369; Mullan v. Philadelphia &c. Co., 78 Pa. 25 S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 2; Ford v. Fitchburg &c. Co., 110 Mass. 240 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 598; Gunter ». Graniteville &c. Co., 18 S. C. 262 S. C. 44 Am. Rep. 573; Mitchell v. Robinson, 80 Ind. 281 S. ©. 41 Am. Rep. 812; Tyson v. North &c. Co., 61 Ala. 544 8. OC. 32 Am. Rep. 8; Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13.8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 298; 13 Rep. 693; Wilson v. Willimantic &c. Co., 50 Conn. 433 8. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 653; Ryan v. Bagaley,! 50 Mich. 179 S. C. 45 Am. Rep. 35; 15 N. W. Rep. 72; Gormly v. Vulcan &c. Works, 61 Mo. 492; Brabbits v. Chicago &c. ‘The court, however, in so holding, exclude the idea that the action could be maintained in consequence of the negligence of a mere foreman, department-leader or sub-chief. 342 RAILWAY LAW. Laborer and General Superintendent, &c. Oo., 38 Wis. 289; Pittsburgh &c. Co. v. Henderson, : Ohio, (N. 8.) 549 8. C.5 A. & BE. BR. RB. Oas. 529; 14 ©.: J. 235; Kansas &c. Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 267 S. CO. Rep. 199). And general superintendent, are not (Smith Oxford &c. Co., supra). Are, when (Mobile &c. Co. v. Smith, 59 Ala, 2¢ S. ©. 6 Rep. 264). LaBorER and depot-superintendent, are not (Lalor : Chicago &ec. Co., 52 Ill. 401 8. CO. 4 Am. Rep. 616). And full superintendent of mine, are not (Rya v. Bagaley, 50 Mich. 179 8S. C. 45 Am. Rep. 35; 15 } W. Rep. 72). And mine-roof superintendent, are (Hall v. John son, 3H. & C. 589 8. C. 11 Jur. (N. 8S.) 180; 34 L. J (Ex.) 222; 13 W. R. 411; 11 L. T. BR. (N. 8S.) 799 Troughear v. Lower &c. Co., 62 Iowa, 576). And superintendent of wrecking train, are (Beil fus v. N. Y. &c. Co., 29 Hun. 556). And general agent, are not (Mitchell v. Robinson 80 Ind. 281 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 812). And ‘superior servant, are not, when (Berea Stone Co v. Kraft, 31 Ohio, (N. S.) 287 S. C. 27 Am Rep. 510; 5 Rep. 625). Are (Lawler v. Androscoggin &c. Co., 62 Me. 463 8. C. 16 Am. Rep. 492). And mining boss, are (Reese v. Biddle, 112 Pa. 72). Are not (Ryan v. Bagaley, 50 Mich. 179 S. ©. 45 Am. Rep. 35; 15 N. W. Rep. 72; Of. Quincey Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. 34). And under-boss of a gravel-train, are not (Bur- lington &e. Co. v. Crockett, 19 Neb. 138). RAILWAY LAW. 343 Laborer and Conductor, &c. And conductor, who was also engineer of a gravel-train, are not (Dobbin v. Richmond &e. Co., 81 N. C. 446 S. C. 31 Am. Rep. 512; Chicago &c. Co. v. Swanson, 16 Neb. 254 8. OC. 49 Am. Rep. 718). In an express company, and manager, are (Dwyer v. American Ex. Co., 55 Wis. 453 S. C. 5 Wis. Leg. News, 43; 8 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 159). And master of vessel, are (Johnson v. Boston &c. Co., 135 Mass. 209 S. C. 46 Am. Rep. 458). And inspector of track, are not (Coon v. Syracuse &c. Co., 5 N. Y. 492). And general agent, are not, when (Mitchell v. Robinson, 80 Ind. 281 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 812). And station-agent, are (Foster v. Minnesota &c. Co., 14 Minn. 360; Thompson v. Drymala, 1 N. W. Rep. ° 255; Brown v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 31 Minn. 533 S. C. 15 A. & BE. R. BR. Cas. 333; Evans v. Atlantic &c. Co., 62 Mo., 49). Are not (Louisville &c. Co. v. Bowler, 9 Heisk. 866 S. C. 11 Alb. L. J. 119). .And bridge-builder, are not (R. RB. Co. v. Sullivan, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 183). And switchman, are (Harvey v. N. Y. &e. Co., 88 N. Y. 481 8. 0.8 A. & BE. R. RB. Cas. 515; Smith v. N. Y. &c. Co., 19 N. Y. 127 S. ©. 75 Am. Dec. 305; Foley v. Chicago &c. Co., 48 Mich. 622 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 481). Are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Taylor, 69 Ill. 461; Chicago &c. Co. v. Henry, 7 Ill. App. (7 Bradw.) 322). And section-master, are (Barring v. Delaware &c. Co., 19 Hun. 216; Kenney v. Central &c. Co., 61 Ga. 590; Foster v. Minnesota &c. Co., 14 Minn. 360; MecDer- mott v. Hannibal &c. Co., 87 Mo. 285; Clowers v. Wabash &c. Co., 21 Mo. App: 218). 344 RAILWAY LAW. Laborer and Night-Watchman, &c. Are not (Atchison &c. Co. v. Moore, 29 Kan. 633 8. C. 11 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 243, 251; Drymala v. Thomp- son, 26 Minn. 40; Miller v. Union &c. Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 67 (C. C. U. S.); Louisville &c. Co. v. Bowler, 9 Heisk. 866 S. C.11 Alb. L. J. 119; East Tenn. &c. Co. v. Duf- field, 12 Lea, 63 8S. C. 47 Am. Rep. 319; Guthrie v. East Tenn. &c. Co., 11 Lea, 372 S. C. 47 Am. Rep. 286). And night-watchman, are not (Muller v. McKes- son, 73 N. Y. 195 S. C. 29 Am. Rep. 123). And road-master, are (Atchison &c. Co. v. Moore, 31 Kan. 197; Lawler v. Androscoggin &c. Co., 62 Me. 463 S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 492). Are not (Galveston &c. Co. v. Delahunty, 53 Tex. 206; Atchison &c. Co. v. Moore, 29 Kan. 633 S. OC. 11 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 243, 251). And scaffolder, are (Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C. B. (N. 8.) 669 S. C. 33 L. T. R. (C. P.) 329). And hoisting-engineer, are (Buckley v. Gould &c. Co., 8 Sawy. 394 8S. O. 15 Rep. 133; 14 Fed Rep. 833; Barton’s Hill &c. Co. v. Reid, 3 McQ. (H. of L.) 266 8. C. 4 Sur. (N. 8.) 767). And sub-mine-manager, are (Wilson v. Merry, 19 L. T. N.S. 30). And mining-engineer—See hoisting-engineer. And scaffold builder, are (Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470 8. ©. 42 Am. Rep. 311; Pickett ». Atlas &e. Co., 12 Daly, (N. Y.) 441). Are not (Green v. Banta, 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 156). And volunteers, are (Mayton v. Texas &c. Co., 63 Tex. 77 S. C. 51 Am. Rep. 637; Osborne v. Knox &c. Co., 68 Me. 49 8. 0. 28 Am. Rep. 16; 6 Rep. 110; Flower v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 69 Pa. 210 S. ©. 8 Am. Rep. 251; N. O. &ec. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112 8. G. 12 Am. Rep. 356). x RAILWAY LAW. 345 Laborer, Master-Mechanic, &c. And master-mechanic, when not (Douglas ». ‘Texas &c. Co., 63 Tex. 564). And mechanic in repair-shop, are (Murphy v. Boston &ce. Co., 88 N. Y. 146 8. C. 42 Am. Rep. 240). Are not (Houston &¢c. Co. v. Marcelles, 59 Tex. 334 8. C.12 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 231). And engine-stripper, are (Chicago &c. Co. ». Scheuring, 4 Il. App. 533). And surveyor, are (Ross! v. N. Y. &c. Co., 5 Hun. 488). And coal-hoister, are (Islands, (C. C. U. 8S.) 28 Fed. Rep. 478). LABORER carried free to and from his work, and the train-hands operating the train on which he is being carried, are (Gilshannon v. Stony Brook &c. Co., 10 Cush. 298; Seaver v. Boston &c. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Kansas &c. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kan. 83; Tunney v. Mid- land &c. Co., L. R. (1 C. P.) 291; Vick v. N. Y. &. Co., 95 N. Y. 267 S. C. 47 Am. Rep. 36; 17 A. & H. BR. R. Cas. 609). Are not (Ross v. N. Y. &e. Co.,1 5 Hun. 488 8. C. 74.N. Y. 617). LABORER and employees carred free, are (King ». Boston &c. Co.,9 Cush. 112; Zeigler v. Day, 123 Mass. 152; Kenney v. Shaw, 133 ib. 501). And others using hand-ear, are (O’Brien v. Boston &c. Co., 138 Mass. 387 S. C. 52 Am. Rep. 279; 19 Rep. 462). And telegrapher, are (Chapman v. N. Y. &e. Co., 55 N. Y. 579). And receiver, are not (Meara v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio, (N. 8.) 137 8. C. 5 Am. Rep. 633). 1This case is irreconcilable with the Vick case, cited just supra; the court attempt to distinguish, but do not in so many words, overrule it. 346 RAILWAY LAW. Laborer, Track-Layers, &c. And track-layers, are (Lovegrove v. London, 16 C. B. (N. 8.) 669; 10 Jur. (N. 8.) 879; 33 L. J. C. P. 329; 12 W. R. 988; 10 L. T. (N. 8.) 718). And _ stock-adjuster, are (Nashville &c. Co. v. McDaniel, 12 Lea, 386 8. C. 17 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 604). Taking train under orders, and train-hands, are (O’Brien v. Boston, 138 Mass. 387 S. C. 52 Am. Rep. 279; 19 Rep. 462). Off duty travelling on train, and train-hands on same train, are not (State v. Western &c. Co., 63 Md. 433). And others, though authorized to employ jand discharge servants, are (hinegln &c. Co. v. MeNally,! 15. Il. App. 181). And stevedore, are not (Rankin v. Merchants. &c. Co., 73 Ga. 229 8. C. 54 Am. Rep. 874). And architect, are not (Whalen v. Centenary Church, 62 Mo. 326). And baggage-master, are (Perigo v. Chicago &c. Co., 52 Iowa, 276; Roberts v. Chicago &c. Co., 33 Minn. 40). 1This decision, it strikes the author, is the true exposition of the law. Why should the mere right to employ and discharge hands, have any ap- preciable efféct in the solution of the question as to what constitutes an alter ego? Nearly every foreman or ganger is invested with such author- ity, but, how does that put him in the place of the master? The mere right to employ and discharge hands falls far short of coming up to. the duty of the master in that behalf. He must inquire before em- ploying, and discharge on knowledge or reliable information of incom- petency. And a dereliction, by a foreman, in either particular, would con- stitute a dereliction of the master, and so guoad hoc, the foreman is an alter ego, not because he has the power to employ and discharge, but, because he fails to take proper precautions in selecting, or neglects upon proper know]l- edge or information of incompetency, to discharge. The mere power as distinguished from its ¢mproper exercise, ought not to constitute any one a. middle-man or vice-principal. RAILWAY LAW. 347 Laborer, Engine Operator, &c. And engine operator in factory, are (Jones v. Granite Mills, 126 Mass. 84 S. OC. 30 Am. Rep. 661; 7 Rep. 146). LABORER and another, being a miner, are (Berns v. Gaston &c. Co., 27 W. Va. 285 S. C. 55 Am. Rep. 3045. Keilley v. Belcher &c. Co., 3 Sawy. (C. C. U. S.) 500). And mate of a vessel, are not (Daub v. Northern &c. Co., (C. C. U. 8.) 18 Fed. Rep. 625). Are (Henderson v. Nisen, 3 Sawy. (C. CO. U. 8.) 18 Fed. Rep. 625; Olson v. Clyde, 32 Hun. (N. Y.) 425). And mining-boss, are (Delaware &c. Co. v. Car- roll, 89 Pa. 374). And rigger, are (Pickett v. Atlas &c. Co. 12 Daly, (N. Y.) 441). And pop-corn vender, are not (Com. v. Whitney, 108 Mass. 7). ; And haulers, are (Keilley v. Belcher &c. Co., 3. Sawy. (C. C. U. S.) 500). And rock-blaster, are (éb.). And water-carriers, are (Missouri &c. Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35). And pilot, are not (Smith v. Steele, L. R. (10 Q-. B.) 125 S. ©. 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 60). And detectives, are (Pyne v. Chicago &c. Co., 54 Towa, 223 S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 198). Are not (Pool v. Chicago &c. Co., 53 Wis. 657 8. 0. 14 0. L. J. 57). And watchman on vessel, are not, when (Harold, (C. C. U. 8.) 21 Fed. Rep. 428). And servant, employed without inquiry, are not. (Indiana &c. Co. v. Millican, 87 Ind. 87). 348 RAILWAY LAW. Laborer, Boat-Rowers, &c. And boat-rowers, are (Lovell v. Howell, L. R. (1 C. P. Div.) 161 S. ©. 45 L. J. (C. P.) 387). LABORER and train-dispatcher, are not, when (McKane wv. California &c. Co., 66 Cal. 302; Booth v. Boston &c. ©o., 73 N. Y. 38; 67 ib. 593 S. C. 29 Am. Rep. 97). Are (Hodgkins v. Eastern &c. Co., 119 Mass. 419 8. C. 9 Am. R. Rep. 271). On joint-staff, in general, are (Swainson v. North Eastern &c. Co., 25 W. R. 676). And signal-man, are (Swainson v. North Eastern &c. Co., supra; Moran v. N. Y. &c. Co.,3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 770 8. CO. 67 Barb. 96). And turn-table operative, are (Homer v. Illinois &e. Co., 15 Il. 550). And coal-heavers, are (Schultz v. Chicago &c. Co., 67 Wis. 616 S. C. 58 Am Rep. 881). And track-walker, are (ib.). And stock-holder, are not, when (Philadelphia &e. Oo. v. Derby, (S. C. U. 8.) 14 How. 468). LABORER and guard, are (Barton’s Hill &c. Co. »v. Reid, 3 McQ. (H. of L. Cas.) 266). (Under contractor), and engineer, are not (Louis- ville &c. Co. v. Conroy, 63 Miss. 562 8. C. 56 Am. Rep. 835). Are (Ewan v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 192 8. ©. 54 Am. Rep. 148). And directors, are not (Fifield v. Northern &e. Co., 42 N. H. 225; Columbus &c. Co. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174). And operator of mail-catcher, are not (Chicago &e. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 272 8. O. 11 Am. RB. Rep. 273). Assisting in shipping lumber, and ordered by a ‘conductor to couple cars, is not, as to such conductor, a RAILWAY LAW. 349 Laborer, Other Employees, &c. fellow-servant (Eason v. S. & E. &c. Co., 65 Tex. 577 8. C. 57 Am. Rep. 606; 8. P. Street &c. Co. v. Bolton, 43 Ohio, (N. 8.) 224 S. C. 54 Am. Rep. 803). And other employees, using same track, are not (In re Merrill, 54 Vt. 200 8. C. 11 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 680; Wabash &c. Co. v. Peyton, 106 Ill. 534 8. C. 18 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 1). When called to perform unusual duties, is not (N. W. Packet Co. v. McCue, (C. .C U.S.) not rep.). LABORER and other laborers, are, peculiar circum- stances (Johnson v. City &c. 118 Mass. 114). Are not, peculiar circumstances (Mulchey v. Methodist &c. Society, 125 Mass. 487; Schroeder v. Chicago &e Co., 47 Iowa, 375). Must be informed of facts affecting the risk or rule discharged, when (McGowan v. La Plata, 3 McCrary, (C. ©. U.S.) 398). Being or not a fellow-servant a question for the jury, when (Mullan v. Philadelphia &c. Co., 78 Pa. 25 8. C. 21 Am. Rep. 2). LANDLORD AND TENANT—Servants of, using elevator, are not (Cooper v. Hamilton, 14 Allen, 193). Latent Derects, if known to the master must be notified to the servant or the rule is discharged (Michi- gan &¢. Co. v. Austin, 40 Mich. 247 8. C. 7 Rep. 784 (Marston, J., dissenting); Cf Elliott v. St. Louis &e. Co., 67 Mo. 272 8. C. 7 Rep. 84). LESsoR AND LESSEE, respective servants of, are not fellow-servants within the rule (Clark v. Chicago &c. Co., 92 Ill. 43; Chicago &e. Co. v. Clark, 18 C. L. J. 170; Phillips v. Chicago Ce. Co. 64 Wis. 475 S. C. 23 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 453; Of. Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Maryland, 58 Md. 372 S. O. 10 A. & BE. RB. RB. Cas. 792; In re 350 RAILWAY LAW. Loaders, Machine-Repairer, Machinist, &c. Merrill, 54 Vt. 200 S. ©. 11 A. & EH. R. RB. Cas. 680; Wabash &c. Co. v. Peyton, 106 Ill. 534 8. C. 18 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 1). LoaDERs and boat-rower, are (Lovell v. Howell, L. R. (1 Q P. Div.) 161 S. C. 45 L. J. 387). MACHINE-REPAIRER and employee using it, are not (Houston &c. Co. v. Marcelles, 59 Tex. 334 8. C. 12 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 231). , MACHINIST and-engineer and laborers, are (Noyes »v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59). Not, when (Kelly v. Johnson, 128 Mass. 530 8S. ‘©. 35 Am. Rep. 398). And engineer of a mill, are (Ewan v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 192 8. ©. 54 Am. Rep. 148). Mart AGENT on railway, and employees of the com- pany, are not (Collett v. Railway Co., 16 Q. B. 984; Nolton v. Railway Co., 15 N. Y. 444; Seybolt v. N. Y. &e. Co., 31 Hun. 100; 95 N. Y. 562 S. ©. 47 Am. Rep. 75; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Price, 96 Pa. 256, reversing S. ©. reported in 22 Alb. L. J. 391; Blair v. Erie Rail- way Co., 66 N. Y. 313 S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 55; Pennsyl- vania &c. Co. v. Henderson, 1 Smith, (Pa.) 315; Hous- ton &c. Co. v. Hampton, 64 Tex. 427 S. ©. 1 Tex. Ct. Rep. 337; Yeomans v. Steam &c. Co., 44 Cal. 71). But are, as to the employee, when (Muster »v. ‘Chicago &c. Co., 61 Wis. 325 S. C. 49 Am. Rep. 41). Matt-CatcHEeR TENDER and brakesman, are not (At- ‘chison &c. Co. v. Moore, 31 Kan. 197 S.C. 11 A. & EB. R. RB. Cas. 243; Vautrain v. St. Louis &e. Co., 8 Mo. App. 538). And fireman, are not (Chicago &c. Co. ». Greg- ory, 58 Ill. 272 8. C. 11 Am. R. Rep. 273). Mai Trower and engineer, are (Coolbroth »v. RAILWAY LAW. 351 Manager and Laborer, &c. Maine &c. Co., 77 Me. 165 S. C. 21 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 599). MANAGER and laborer, are (Allen v. New Gas Co., L. R. (1 Ex. Div. 251; Howell v. Landore &c. Co., L. R. (10 Q. B.) 62). MaNnaGER OF DERRICK and laborer, are (Ante, 340). MANAGER OF EXPRESS COMPANY and servants, are {Dwyer v. American Ex. Co., 55 Wis. 453 S. C. 5 Wis. Leg. News, 43; 8 A. & HE. BR. R. Cas. 159). MANAGER OF GAS CompAany—See MANAGER. MANAGER OF MINES—See MANAGER. Mason and carpenter, are (Mercer v. J ackson, 54 Ill. 397). And foreman, are not, when (Peschel v. Chicago &e. Co., 62 Wis. 338 8S. C. 17 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 545; 21 N. W. Rep. 269; 20 C. L. J. 203 (Taytor, J., dissent- ing). Mastrer CARPENTER and foreman, are, although the latter has authority to employ and discharge hands (Peschel case, just supra). Master Macuinist and fireman, are (Columbus &c. ©o. v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174, overruling Fitzpatrick v. Albany &c. Co., 7 Ind. 436). And brakesman, are not (Gottlieb v. N. Y., 100 N. Y. 462 8S. 0. 24 A. & BE. BR. BR. Cas. 421). Master MrcuHanic and plumber, are not (Douglas v. Texas &c. Co., 63 Tex. 564). And engineer, are not (Ford v. Fitchburg &e. Co., 110 Mass. 240 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 598; Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46S. C. 36 Am. Rep. 575). 352 RAILWAY LAW. Master of Steamship, &c. ‘Are (Hard v. Vermont Central Co., 32 Vt. 473). And brakesman, are not (Cooper v. Pittsburg &e. Co., 24 W. Va. 37). And mechanic, are (Murphy v. Boston &c. Co., 88 N. Y. 146 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 240). And car-repairer, are not (Kain v. Smith, 25 Hun. (N. Y.) 146). MASTER OF STEAMSHIP and firemen, are (Clatsop Chief, 7 Sawy. 274). \ MaAsTER OF STEAM TuG—See next, supra. . MASTER OF VESSEL and crew, are (Johnson v. Bos- ton &c. Co., 135 Mass. 209 S. OC. 46 Am. Rep. 458; Loughlin v. State, 23 Rep. 789). Are not (Thompson v. Hermann, 47 Wis. 602 S. C. 9 Rep. 359). And mate, are (Matthews v. Case, 61 Wis. 491 S. C. 50 Am. Rep. 151; 19 Rep. 95). Mate oF a VESSEL and deck-hand, are (Olson v. Clyde, 32 Hun. (N. Y.) 425; Halverson v. Nisen, 3 Sawy. 562). Are not (Daub v. Northern &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 625). And the master, are (Matthews v. Case, 61 Wis. 491 8. C. 50 Am. Rep. 151; 19 Rep. 95). MATERIAL-MEN and train-dispatcher, are, when (Mc- Kinne v. California &¢. Co., 5 West. Coast Rep. 159). MECHANICS and laborers, are (Murphy v. Boston &c. Co., 88 N. Y. 146 8. ©. 42 Am. Rep. 240). And brakesman, are (Wonder v. Baltimore &c. Co., 32 Md. 411 8S. 0.3 Am. Rep. 143). But not with engineer (Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 8. C. 36 Am. Rep. 575). RAILWAY LAW. 853 Members F. D.: Milesman: Mill-Wright: Miner. Transported free, after work-hours, ceases to be a fellow-servant (O’Donnell v. Allegheny &e. Co., 59 Pa. 239). MEMBERS OF FIRE DEPARTMENT and street depart- ment, are not, when (Turner v. Indianapolis &c. Co., 96 Ind. 51). MeMBERS OF STREET DEPARTMENT and members of fire department, are not, when, next supra. MILESMAN and general traffic-manager, are (Conway v. Belfast &c. Co., I. R. (9 C. L.) 498). MILL-WRIGHT and carpenter, are, when (National &c. Co. v. Bedell, 96 Pa. 175 8S. C. 11 Rep. 207; Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa. 246 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 543). Miners and road-man, are (Troughear v. Lower &c. Co., 62 Iowa, 576). And mining-hands, are not, when (James v. Emmet Mining Co., 55 Mich. 335). And sub-foreman, are (Wilson v. Merry, L. R. (1 H. L. Se. App.) 326). MinER and mining-boss, are (Waddell v. Simmons, 112 Pa. 562; Brazil &c. Co. v. Cain, 98 Ind. 282). Are not (Ryan v. Bagaley, 50 Mich. 179 S. C. 45 Am. Rep. 35; 15 N. W. Rep. 72). And wheel-men lowering miners, are (Barton’s Hill v. Reid, 3 McQ. (H. of L. Cas.) 266, 301). And roof-protector, are (Troughear v. Lower &c. Co., 62 Iowa, 576; Hall v. Johnson, 3 H. & C. 589 S. C. 11 Jur. (N. S.) 180; 34 L. J. (Ex.) 222; 13 Week. Rep. 411; 11 L. T. Ex. (N. 8.) 799). And superintendent, are not (Ryan v. Bagaley, supra). 23 354 RAILWAY LAW. Mining Operatives. And foremen, are (Hanrarthy v. Northern &c. Co., 46 Md. 280 S. C. 5 Rep. 698). Are not, when (Berea &c. Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio, (N. 8.) 287 8. C. 27 Am. Rep. 510; 5 Rep. 625). And pickers, are (Keilley v. Belcher &e. Co., 3 Sawy. (C. C. U.S.) 500). And blasters, next supra. And shovellers, next supra. MrIninG ENGINEERS and excavators, are (Barton’s Hill &c. Co. v. Reid, 3 McQ. 266; Buckley v. Gould &c. Co., 8 Sawy. 394 8S. C. 14 Fed. Rep. 833; 15. Rep. 133). Mrinine Pickers and blasters are (Keilley v. Belcher &e. Co., 3 Sawy. 500). And ore-haulers, are, next supra. Mryine Roor-Guarp and miners, are (Troughear v. Lower &c. Co., 62 Iowa, 576; Hall v. Johnson, 3 H. & C. 589 8. C. 11 Jur. (N. S.) 180; 34 L. J. (Bx.) 222; 13 W. R. 411; 11 L. T. (Ex. N. 8.) 799). MrntnG-Boss and driving-boss, are (Lehigh Valley Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432 8. C. 6 Rep. 125; 17 Alb. L. J. 513; 5 W. N. 436). Are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Taylor, 69 Ill. 461). And miner, are (Brazil &e. Co. v. Cain, 98 Ind. 282; Delaware &c. Co. v. Carroll, 89 Pa. 374; Reese v. Biddle, 112 ib. 72). Minor and other employees, are (Houston &e. Co. v. Miller, 51 Tex. 270; Gartland v. Toledo &c. Co., 67 Tl. 465). Are not (Dowling vr. Allen, 74 Mo. 13 8. CG. 41 Am. Rep. 298; 13 Rep. 693): RAILWAY LAW. 355 Minor: Night Watchers: Outside of Hours. Employed, without consent of parent as brakes- man and other employees, are not (Hamilton v. Galves- ton &c. Oo., 54 Tex. 556 8. C.4 A. & BE. RB. RB. Cas. 528). Minor when not, a fellow-servant (Chicago &c. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205 S. C. 6 Rep. 654). When a fellow-servant (Youll v. Sioux &e. Co., 66 Towa. 346 8. C. 21 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 589; Texas &e. Co. v. Crowder, 61 Tex. 262; Pittsburgh &c. Co. v. Adams,! 105 Ind. 1518. 0.23 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 408; Of. Texas &c. Co. v. Carlton, 60 Tex. 397 8. 0.15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 350). NiegHt-WaTcHERS and foreman of night-crew, are {Chicago &c. Co. v. Geary, 110 Ill. 883 8S. C.17 A. & B. R. RB. Cas. 606). And other employees, are not, when (Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195 S. C. 29 Am. Rep. 123). Orr Dutry—travelling on train and employees on train, are not (State v. Western &c. Co., 63 Md. 433). OrE HAULERS and pickers and blasters, are (Keilley wv. Belcher &c. Co., 3 Sawy. (C. C. U. 8.) 500). Ore LoapeErs and boat-rower, are (Lovell v. Howell, L. R. (1 C. P. Div.) 161; 45 L. J. (C. P.) 387). OvuTSsIDE OF Hours—Employees working outside of hours, are not within the rule (Broderick v. Detroit &c. o., 56 Mich. 261 S. C. 56 Am. Rep. 382). OVERSEER and station-agent, are (Brown v. Winona &c. Co., 27 Minn. 162 8. C. 38 Am. Rep. 285). And foreman, are (Ohio &c. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 S. C. 74 Am. Dec. 259; Columbus v. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174; Wilson v. Madison, 18 Ind. 226; Slattery v. Toledo &c. Co., 23 ib. 81; Ohio &c. Co. v. Hammersley, 28 ib. 371; Bryce v. Fitzpatrick, 80 ib. 526). See note 320 ante. 356 RAILWAY LAW. Overseer: Patent Defects: Pilot: Pleadings. OVERSEER and laborer, are (Drinkout v. Eagle Ma- chine Works, 90 ib. 423; Gormley v. Ohio &c. Co., 72 ib. 318.C.5 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 581; Robertson v. Terre Haute &c. Co., 78 Ind. 77 8S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 552; 8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 175; Brazil &c. Co. v. Cain, 98 Ind. 282; Indiana &c. Co. v. Parker, 100 ib. 191; Lehigh &e. Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa, 432 8. C. 6 Rep. 125; 17 Alb. L. J. 513; 5 W. N. 436; Delaware &c. Co. v. Carrol, 89 Pa. 374; Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96 ib. 246 S. ©. 42 Am. Rep. 543; Wright v. N. Y. &c. Co., 25 N. Y. 562; Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516 S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 521; Rochester &c. Co. v. Brick, 98 N. Y. 211 8. ©. 21 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 605; Pittsburgh &c. Co. v. Leech, 13 Week. Bull. 153; McKinne v. California &e. Co., 21 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 539; Daubert v. Pickel, 4 Mo. App. 591; Hoth v. Peters, 55 Ind. 405; Peterson v. Whitebreast &c. Co., 50 Iowa, 673 S. C. 32 Am. Rep. 143; Cf. Brown v. Winona &e. Co., supra). PASSENGER acting in the role of a servant and driver of street car, are not (Street Railway Co. v. Bolton, 43 Ohio, (N. 8.) 224 S. C. 54 Am. Rep. 803; 20 Rep. 278). Patent DEFEcts do not discharge the rule (Moulton v. Gage, 138 Mass. 390; English v. Chicago &e. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 906; Batterson v. Chicago &c. Co., 53 Mich. . 125; International &¢. Co. v. Doyle, 49 Tex. 190 8. C. 5 Rep. 631; Quaid v. Cornwall, 13 Bush, 601 S. C. 5 Rep. 693). PickERS and miners and blasters, are (Keilley v. Belcher &c. Co., 3 Sawy. 500). Pinor and crew, are not (Smith v. Steele, L. RB. (10 Q. B.) 125; 44 L. J. (Q. B.) 60; Titan, 23 Fed. Rep. 413), PLEADINGS AS AFFECTING THE SUBJECT—Even when entitled to sue for injuries occasioned by a fellow-ser- RAILWAY LAW. 357 Plumber: Porter: Question for Jury. vant, the plaintiff must, in his declaration or complaint, negative any contributive negligence on his part (Dun-. mead v. American &c. Co., 4 McCrary, 244). PLUMBER and carpenter, are (Killea v. Faxon, 125 Mass. 485 S. C. 6 Rep. 778). And master-mechanic, not, when (Douglas v. Texas &c. Co., 63 Tex. 564). Pop-CorN VENDER and train-hands, are not (Com. v. Vermont &c. Co., 108 Mass. 7). Porter oF SLEEPING CAR and track-repairer, are (Walton v. N. Y. &c. Co., 139 Mass. 556). QUESTION FOR THE JURY—Whether a foreman and laborer using a derrick, were fellow-servants, was held, in one court, to be a question for the jury (Sheld v. Moran, 10 Ill. App. 618). Held to be in the instance of workmen employed to set up machinery for use, and those working it (Hol- ton v. Daly, 4 Il. App. 25). On facts touching excavations (Devine v. Tarry- town &¢. Co., 22 Hun. (N. Y.) 26). Capacity of a minor, held to be (Hayden v. Smith- field &c. Co., 29 Conn. 548). Contributive negligence, a (Gottlieb v. N. Y. &c. Co., 100 N. Y. 462 S. 0. 24 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 421). QUESTION FOR THE JURY, when generally (Hass v. Phil- adelphia &c. Co., 88 Pa. 269; 32 Am. Rep. 462; Houston &ec. Co. v. Maddox, 21 A. & EH. RB. R. Cas. 625; Baker v. Allegheny &c. Co., 95 Pa, 211 8S. C. 40 Am. Rep. 634; Tissue v. Baltimore &c. Co., 112 Pa. 91 8. C. 56 Am. Rep. 310; 2 Cent. Rep. 596; Chicago &c. Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302 S. C.17 A. & BE. BR. B. Cas. 564; 34 Am. Rep. 168; 10 C. L. J. 348; Central &e. Co. v. Roach, 64 Ga. 358 RAILWAY LAW. Receiver: Release: Repairers. 635 §. C. 8 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 79; Spicer v. Boston &e. Co., 138 Mass. 426; Myers v. Indianapolis &c. Co., 113 Ill. 386 8. C. 1 N. E. Rep. 899) RECEIVER liable, under the same contingencies as would apply to the person represented by him (Meara v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio, (N. 8.) 137 S. C. 5 Am. Rep. 633; Ruck v. Williams, 3 H. & N. 308; Paige v. Smith, 99 Mass. 395; Blumenthal v. Brainard, 38 Vt. 402). And common laborer, are not (Meara case, supra). RELEASE in advance valid, when (Illinois &c. Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183 8. 0. 4 Am. Rep. 593; Galloway v. Western &c. Co., 57 Ga. 512; Western &c. Co. v. Bishop, 50 ib. 465; Western &c. Co. v. Strong, 52 ib. 461; Grif- fiths v. Earl Dudley, L. BR. (9 Q. B. ne 357 s. C. 44 Am. Rep. 633, note). RELEASE in advance is against public policy, and void (Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Spangle, 44 Ohio, (N. S.) 471 S. C. 58 Am. Rep. 833; Roesner v. Hermann, 10 Biss. (C. C. U. 8.) 486 8S. C. 8 Fed. Rep. 782; Cf. Kansas &ec. Co. v. Peavey, 29 Kan. 169 8. C. 44 Am. Rep. 630; 11 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 260). Not available as against gross negligence (Mem- phis &c. Co. v. Jones, 2 Head, 517). REGULATIONS—See RULEs. ReEPAIR-GANG and foreman, are (Weger v. Pennsyl- vania &c. Co., 55 Pa. 460) Are, with switch-engineer (Chicago &c. Co v. Murphy, 53 Ill. 336 S. ©. 5 Am. Rep. 48). REPAIRER OF Cars, ENGINES, Erc. and brakesman, are (Campbell v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 24 A. & B. BR. RB. Cas. 427; Besel v. N. Y. &e. Co., 70 N. Y. 171). RAILWAY LAW. 359 Repairers. Are not, when (Northern &c. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. 8S. 642 8. 0. 24 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 407 (Brapiey, Gray, MarTHEws and BLatcurorD, J. J., dissenting); Chicago &c. Co. v. Jackson, 55 Ill. 492 S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 661; 1 Am. R. Rep. 592; Huffman v. Chicago &¢. Co., 78 Mo. 50; Condon v. Missouri &e. Co., ib. 567 8. 0.17 A. & BE. BR. BR. Cas. 583). REPAIRER and engineer, are (Texas &c. Co. v. Har- rington, 62 Tex. 597 S. C. 21 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 571; Luebke case, infra). Are not (Pennsylvania &¢c. Co. v. Mason, 109 Pa. 296 S. C. 58 Am. Rep. 722). Unless such engineer assisted in making the re- pairs (Reading Iron Works v. Devine, 109 Pa. 246; Cone v. Delaware &c. Co., 81 N. Y. 206 8S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 491; 2 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 57; Cf. Rogers v. Ludlow &c. - Co. 144 Mass. 144; Price v. King Philip Mills, ib. 229; Toledo &c. Co. v. Moore, 77 Ill. 217). REPAIRER, &¢. and fireman, are not (Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Mason, and other cases, supra). And foreman, are (Frost v. Union Pacific &c. Co., 2 Dill. (C. CO. U.S.) 259). And foreman, are not (Luebke v. Chicago &c. Co., 59 Wis. 127 S. C. 48 Am. Rep. 483; 53 Am. Rep. 266; 15 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 183; Hannibal &c. Co. v. Fox, infra; Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Lavelly, 36 Ohio, (N. 8.) 221). And laborer, are not, when (Hannibal &c. Co. v. Fox, 31 Kan. 586 8. 0.15 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 325; Moore ». Wabash &¢. Co., 84 Mo. 481 S. C. 21 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 509). And master-mechanic, are not (Kain v. Smith, 25 Hun. (N. Y.) 146). 360 RAILWAY LAW. Rigger: Road-Master. REPAIRER, &e. and switchman, are (Gilman v. Eastern &c. Co., 10 Allen, 233). And engineer of a switch-engine, are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Murphy, 53 Ill. 336 8S. C. 5 Am. Rep. 48; Valtez v. Ohio &c. Co., 85 Ill. 500 8. C. 5 Rep. 127). And yard-master, are (Besel v. N. Y. &c. Co.,, supra; Kirk v. Atlanta &c. Co., 94 N. C. 625 S. C. 55 Am. Rep. 621). And watchmen, are (Luebke case, supra). REPAIRER and other repairers, are (Murphy v. Boston &c. Co., 88 N. Y. 146 8. C. 42 Am. Rep. 240). REPAIRER oF TRACK and conductor, are pence land &c. Co. v. Seally, 27 Md. 589). ‘Are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Moranda, 93 IIL. 302; 17 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 564; 34 Am. Rep. 168; 10 C. L. J, 348; Lewis v. St. Louis &e. Co., 49 Mo. 495 S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 385), And brakesman, are not (Houston &¢. Co. v. Dunham, 49 Tex. 181; Chicago &e. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 272). Riecer and scaffold-builder, are (Pickett v. Atlas &c. Co., 12 Daly, (N. Y.) 441). Roap-Man and miner, are, when (Troughear v. Lower &e. Co., 62 Iowa, 576). Roav-MasterR and foreman and bridge- -builder, are not (Davis v. Central &c. Co., 55 Vt. 84 8S. 0. 45 Am. Rep. 590; 15 Rep. 286; 11 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 173). ROAD-MASTER and laborer, are (Lawler v. Andro- scoggin &c. Co., 62 Me. 463 8. ©. 16 Am. Rep. 492; Hoke v. St. inde &e. Co. 11 Mo. App. 574; Cf. At- chison &c. Co. v. Moore, sean RAILWAY LAW. 361 Rules. Are not (Galveston &c. Co. v. Delahunty, 53 Tex. 206). And engineer, sre (Walker v. Boston &c. Co., 128 Mass. 8). And bridge-builder, are not (Davis v. Central &c. Co. 55 Vt. 848. C. 45 Am. Rep. 590; 15 Rep. 286; 11 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 173). Roap-MasTer and station-agent, are (Brown v. Winona &c. Co., 27 Minn. 162-8. C. 38 Am. Rep. 285). And track-repairer, are (ib.). And express-messenger, are not (Baltimore &c. Co. v. McKenzie, 24 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 395). And section-master, are (Brown v. Winona &c. Co., supra). And brakesman, are not, when (Nashville &c. Co. v. Wheeless, 10 Lea, 741 8. 0. 4 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 633; 15 A. & B. BR. R. Cas. 315; 43 Am. Rep. 317; Atchi- son &c. Co. v. Moore, 31 Kan. 197 8. C. 11 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 243). Roap-SuPERVISOR and brakesman, are (Mobile &c. Oo. v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245 8. C. 6 Rep. 264). Rock-BuASTER and teamster, are (Bogard v. Louisville &e. Co., 100 Ind. 491). Rock-BREAKER at mine and superintendent, are not (Mayhew v. Sullivan &c. Co., 76 Me. 100). Rocx-Havuuer and mining blaster, are (Bogard case, supra). RowERs and steersman of a boat, are (Barton’s Hill v. Reid, 3 McQ. (H. of L. Cas.) 266). RuiEs—If employee, on entering service knows that there are no rules, he cannot recover, by reason of the 362 RAILWAY LAW. Sailor: Scaffolder. failure of the master to provide same (Haskins v. N. Y. &c. Co., 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 129). Employee may, for injury caused by co-employee, if the fair result of the non-adoption of proper rules, recover (Crew v. St. Louis &c. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 87). Ru.LEs—Generally a railway company is bound, as to its servants, to make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the running of its trains, &c., and will be held liable for a failure so to do (Chicago &c. Co. v. Taylor, 69 Ill. 461; Cooper v. Iowa &c. Co. 44 Iowa, 134; Pittsburgh &c. Co. v. Powers, 74 Ill. 341; Chicago &c. Co. v. McLallen, 24 Ill. 109; Kansas &c. Co. v. Salmon, 14 Kan. 512; Baltimore &c. Co. v. Woodward, 41 Md. 268; Rose v. Boston &c. Co., 58 N. Y. 217; Besel v. N.Y. &c. Co., 70 N. Y. 171; Vose v. Lancanshire &e. Co., 2 H. & N. 723; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 S.C. 5 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 515; 39 Am. Rep. 627; Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Lavally, 36 Ohio, (N. 8.) 221 8.0.5 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 549; 21 N. W. Rep. 269; Sheehan v. N. Y-. &e. Co., 91 N. Y. 332 8. C. 12 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 235). For car-repairing must be promulgated or re- pairer, negligently injured, may recover (Abel v. Dela- ware &c. Co., 103 N. Y. 581 S. C. 57 Am. Rep. 773; Slater v. Jewett, supra; Besel v. N. Y. &c. Co. 70 N. Y. 171; Sheehan case, supra; Dana v. N. Y. &e. Co., 92 N. Y. 632, 639). SAILOR not, with employees whose duty it was to. prepare rigging and tackle in good order (Schooner Norway v. Jansen, 52 Ill. 373). SCAFFOLDER and car-repairer, are (Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C. B. (N. 8.) 669; 33 L. T. R. (0. P.) 329). And rigger, are (Pickett v. Atlas &c. Co., 12 Daly, (N. Y. 441). RAILWAY LAW. 363 Seamen: Section Boss. And laborer, are (Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. &e. Co., 470 S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 311). Are not (Green v. Banta, 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 156). -And general manager, are (Gallagher v. Piper, supra; Peschel v. Chicago &e. Co., 62 Wis. 338 8. ©. 17 A. & H.R. R. Cas. 545; 21 N. W. Rep. 269; 20 ©. L. J. 203). SEAMEN and mate, are not (Daub v. Northern &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 625). Are (Olson v. Clyde, 32 Hun. (N. Y.) 425; Halver- son v. Nisen, 3 Sawy. 562). And seaman on another vessel, are not, though owned by the same partners (Connolly v. Davidson, 15. Minn. 519; McMahon v. Davidson, 12 ib. 357; Fay v. Davidson, 13 ib. 528). SrecTion-MastTEr! and brakesman, are (Slattery v. Toledo &c. Co., 23 Ind. 81; Mobile &c. Co. v. Smith, 59: Ala. 245 8. CO. 6 Rep. 264). Not (Lewis v. St. Louis &c. Co., 59 Mo. 495 S. ©. 21 Am. Rep. 385; 8 Am. R. Rep. 450; Morris v. Rich- mond &c. Co., 8 Va. L. J. 540; Moon v. Richmond &e. Oo., 78 Va. 745 8. C. 49 Am. Rep. 401; Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 420. And switchman, are not (Hall v. Missouri &c. Co., 74 Mo. 298). And road-master, are, when (Brown v. Winona &c. Co., 27 Minn. 162 S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 285). And section-hand, are (Foster v. Minnesota &c. Co., 14 Minn. 360; International &c. Co. v. Hester, 64 Tex. 401 S.C. 21 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 535; Thompson v. Drymala, 1 N. W. Rep. 255). And track-repairers, are not (Miller v. Union &c. \Indifferently termed Section-Master, Section-Boss or Section-Foreman. 364 RAILWAY LAW. Section Boss. 7 €©o., 17 Fed. Rep. 67; Louisville &c. Co. v. Bowler, 9 Heisk. 866). Section-HanpD and _ section-master, are (Clifford ». Old Colony &c. Co., 141 Mass. 564; International &c. Co. v. Hester, supra; Farmer v. Central &c.1 Co., 67 Iowa, 136 S. C. 20 Rep. 719). And engineer, are (Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Leech, 13 Week. Bull. 153; Houston &c. Co. v. Rider, 62 Tex. 267). And engineer, are not (Calvo v. Charlotte &e. Co., 23 8. C. 526 8. C. 55 Am. Rep. 28; 21 Rep. 473). SECTION-MASTER and express-agent, are not (Balti- 'This case but illustrates the correctness of the often iterated view of the author, that the courts should refrain from forcing presumptions. The court substantially hold that no recovery could be had upon the plaintiff's own testimony. That was, that he was a section-hand under a section-boss, and was proceeding with the boss and other hands, in a hand- car, to a point on this section, where it was necessary to remove the snow. The thermometer was 37° below zero. About half way, the plaintiff com- plained to the boss that he feared that his feet were freezing, and re- quested that he might be allowed to get off and walk. The request was not acceded to. The party arrived at a tank-house where all took shelter, except plaintiff. In ten minutes the journey was resumed, and the party proceeded to the point of destination, and to their work of shovel- ling the snow. Shortly afterwards, the plaintiff's feet became so painful as to require him to be carried home. Now, how the plaintiff could be said to have been guilty of contributive negligence, under these facts, as a matter of law, is incomprehensible to the author. Cuz bono go into the tank house, when by walking about he might possibly produce a sufficient circulation of the blood to have prevented his feet from being frozen? And even according to defendant’s testimony, if there was a fire in the tank-house, the sudden thaw might have precipitated the catastrophe. At least, all these matters were eminently fit for the consideration and deter- mination of the jury. The case was clearly decided correctly, as the plaintiff, by a moral unanimity of the authorities, was a fellow-servant with his boss; but we feel justified in characterizing the opinion on the point criticized, as alto- gether indefensible, and the more so proceeding from a court, who, as possessing the scriptural “ten talents,” ranks in the very first line. RAILWAY LAW. 365 Servants under Different Masters. more &¢. Co. v. McKenzie, 24 A. & EB. BR. RB. Cas. 391 8. C. 21 Rep. 479). And night watchman, are not (ib.). SERVANTS OF CoNsIGNoR and laborer in railway employ, are, when (Foley v. Chicago &c. Co., 48 Mich. 622 8. C. 42 Am. Rep. 481). SERVANTS OF DIFFERENT MASTERS—Servant on light- ering steamer and servant on another steamer, not em- ployed by a common master, are not (Svenson v. Atlantic &c. Co., 57 N. Y. 108). Are, when (Johnson v. City, 118 Mass. 114). SERVANTS UNDER DIFFERENT Masters, are (Swain- son v. North Eastern &c. Co., 37 L. T. (N. S.) 102; 25 W. RB. 676 (Ex. Div.); Lake &c. Co. v. Erickson, 89 Mich. 492 8. O. 33 Am. Rep. 423). Are not (O'Connor v. Adams, 120 Mass. 427; Coggin v. Central &c. Co., 62 Ga. 685 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 132; Clark v. Chicago &c. Co., 92 Jl. 43; Phillips v. Chicago &c. Co., 64 Wis. 475 S. C. 23 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 453; Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Maryland, 58 Md. 372 S. C. 10 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 792; In re Merrill, 54 Vt. 200 S. 0.11 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 680; Wabash &c. Co. v. Peyton, 106 Ill. 534 8. 0. 18 A. & BE. BR. BR. Cas. 1; Coughtry v. Globe &c. Co., 56 N. Y. 124 S. C. 15 Am. Rep. 387). Servant of steam-tug and those of a canal boat, when not (Arctic &c. Co. v. Austin, 69 N. Y. 470 8. C. 25 Am. Rep. 221 (MiuuEr, J., dissenting, RAPALLO, J., absent and ANDREWS, J., non-committal) ). (Connecting roads), when not (Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Maryland, 58 Md. 3728. 0.10 A. & EB. R. BR. Cas. 792). . Servants of a contractor, and those of a sub-con- tractor are not fellow-servants within the rule (Murray 366 . RAILWAY LAW. Exceptions. v. Currie, L. R. (6 C. P.) 24; Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 H. & N. 142; Murphy v. Caralli, 3 H. & C. 462; Young v. N. Y. &c. Co., 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 229; Hunt v. Pennsyl- vania, 51 Pa. 475; Hass v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 269 S.. ‘C. 32 Am. Rep. 462; Riley v. State Line &e. Co., 29 La. Ann. 701 8S. C. 29 Am. Rep. 349; Goodfellow v. Boston &c. Co., 106 Mass. 461; Svenson v. Atlantic &c. Co., 57 N. Y. 108; Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, 113). But where the servants of the contractor are under the general control and supervision of the person for whose benefit the work is being done, the servants of the former are co-servants with those of the latter, so as to exonerate him from the consequences of their negligence (Johnson v. Boston &¢c. Co., 118 Mass. 114; Rourke v. White Moss &c. Co., L. R. (1 ©. P. Div.) 556). So, where one railway company, under an agree- ment with another, is permitted to run its trains upon the track of the other, the servants employed by the respective companies, are not co-servants; and an action may therefor be maintained by the servant of one com- pany to recover for injuries caused by the negligence of the servants of the other (Sawyer v. Rutland &c. Co., 27 Vt. 370; Nashville &c. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 347; Smith v. N. Y. &e. Co., 19 N. Y. 127 8. ©. 75 Am. Dec. 305; Catawissa &c. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. 186; Carrol v. Minnesota &e. Co., 13 Minn. 30; Warburton v. Great Western &c. Co., L. R. (2 Ex.) 30). And the principle just stated is applicable to a license or permission as well (Case cited last, supra; Cf. Ohio &ec. Co. v. Hammersley, 28 Ind. 37 1; Gilman v. Eastern &c. Co., 10 Allen, 233; Laning v. N. Y. &e. Co., 49 N. Y. 521 S.C. 10 Am. Rep. 417; Hoey v. Dublin &c. Co., C. P. (Ire.) 18 W. R. 930; Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill, (N. Y.) 592 S. C. 41 Am. Dec. 771; Wilson v. Madison, 18 Ind. 226; Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 669; RAILWAY LAW. 367 Servants taken without Inquiry: Of Lessor and Lessee. Chamberlain v. R. R. Co., 11 Wis. 238; Manville »v. Cleveland &e. Co., 11 Ohio, (N. 8.) 417; Donaldson v. Mississippi &c. Co., 18 Iowa, 280 S. C. 87 Am. Dec. 391; _ Barrett v. Singer Manfg. Co., 1 Sweeney, (N. Y.) 545). SERVANTS EMPLOYED WITHOUT Inquiry—An em- ployee is not a fellow-servant with another, within the rule, if such other was employed without inquiry (In- diana &c. Co. v. Millican, 87 Ind. 87). SERVANTS OF LESSOR AND LESSEE, are fellow-ser- vants when the road is to be operated under the rules of the lessor, to as great an extent within the rule as inter sese (Chicago &c. Co. v. Clark, 2 Ill. App. (Bradw.) 596 8. C. 18 C. L. J. 170). SHOVELLERS and conductor, are (Howland v. Mil- waukee &c. Co., 54 Wis. 2268. 0.5 A. & HE. RB. R. Cas. 578; Jeffrey v. Keokuk, 56 Iowa, 5468.C.5 A. & HE. R. R. Cas. 568). And conductor of gravel-train, are (Heine v. Chi- eago &c. Co., 58 Wis. 525). SHOVELLERS and engineer, are (St. Louis &e. Co. v. Britz, 72 Il, 256; Thompson v. Chicago &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 239 (C. C. U. 8.); Louisville &c. Co. v. Robinson, 4 Bush, (Ky.) 507; Ohio &c. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 S. C. 74 Am. Dee. 259). And brakesman, are (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Britz, supra; Louisville &c. Co. v. Robinson, supra; Ohio &e. Co. v. Tindall, supra). And track-layers, are (Lovegrove v. London, 16 ©. B. (N. S.) 666). S1gNAL-MaN and engineer, are (East Tenn. &c. Co. w. Rush, 15 Lea, 145). And employee going to his work, are (Moran v. 368 RAILWAY LAW. Skillfulness: Station-Agent, &c. N. Y. &c. Co., 3N. Y. Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 770; 67 Barb. 96). (When the signal-men are hired by two compa- nies) and he is injured by the servant of one of them, cannot recover (Swainson v. North Eastern &c. Co., 25 W. R. 676). SKILLFULNESS—Extraordinary skillfulness of an em- ployee amongst others, does not operate to vary the rule that constitutes all of such employees fellow-ser- vants (Melville v. Missouri &c. Co., 4 McCrary, (C. C. U. S.) 194). STEAM-ENGINE OPERATOR in mine, and the miners, are (Buckley v. Gould &c. Co., 8 Sawy, (C. C. U. 8.) 394 S. C. 14 Fed. Rep. 833). STEAM-HAMMER OPERATOR and laborer, are (Han- rathy v. Northern &c. Co., 46 Md. 280 8. C. 5 Rep. 698). SraTion-AGENT! and brakesman, are (Hodgkins v. Eastern &c. Co., 119 Mass. 419 S. C. 9 Am. R. Rep. 371). STATION-AGENT and engineer, are (Evans v. Atlantic &c. Co., infra; Brown v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 31 Minn. 553 S. C. 18 N. W. Rep. 834; 18 Rep. 114; 15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 3383 (GILFALLAN, ©. J., dissenting); Heine v. Chicago &c. Co., 17 Minn. 420; Brown v. W. & St. Paul, 27 ib. 162). And laborer, are (Brown v. Minneapolis &c. Co., supra; Evans v. Atlantic &c. Co., 62 Mo. 49). And road-master, are (Brown v. Winona &c. Co., 27 Minn. 162 S. OC. 38 Am. Rep. 285). STEERSMAN and rowers of boat, are (Barton’s Hill &c. Co. v. Reid, 3 McQ. (H. of L. Cas.) 266). 1Indifferently, otherwise styled Station-Master, Station-Foreman and Station-Boss. : RAILWAY LAW. 869 Stevedore: Stock-Adjuster: Sub-Contractor. STEVEDORE! and crew, are not (Murray v. Currie, L. R. (6 ©. P.) 24). . And laborer, are not (Mullan v. Philadelphia &c. Co., 78 Pa. 25 8. C. 21 Am. Rep. 2; Rankin v. Merchants &e. Co., 73 Ga. 229 8. 0. 54 Am. Rep. 874). And head-stevedore, are (Mullan case, supra). STEVEDORE’S ForEMAN and laborer, are not (Brown v. Sennett, 68 Cal. 225 8. C. 58 Am. Rep. 8; 21 Rep. 450). Stock AND FuEL AGENT and track-repairers, are not (Central &c. Co. v. DuBray, 71 Ga. 406). Srock-ADJUSTER and laborer, are (Nashville &c Co. v. McDaniel, 12 Lea, 386 8. ©. 17 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 604). Strock-Ho.Lpsr riding by invitation, and train-hands, are not (Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Derby, (8. C. U.S.) 14 How. 482). Sus-ConTRAcToR, laborers under, and those under contractor, are (Wiggett v. Fox, 11 Ex. 832; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 955; 25 L. J. (Ex.) 188). And train-hands, are not (Donaldson v. Missis- sippi &c. Co., 18 Iowa, 280 8. OC. 87 Am. Dee. 391). And engineer, are not (ib.). 1A stevedore is a person employed in loading and unloading ships, and is really the master of the hands he may employ, and occupies the position of vice-principal as to the crew of the vessel to be loaded or unloaded ; is an independent contractor or job-master, and, in no sense, a ganger or foreman. This and other matters touching mines, factories, ete., do not fall with strict accuracy under railway law, but, as they tend to illustrate the doctrine of fellow-servants, in the aspect under discussion, it was deemed appropriate to digest them. 24 370 RAILWAY LAW. Sub-Manager: Sunday Laws: Superintendent. Sus-FoREMAN and mining hand, are (Wilson »v. Merry, L. R. (1 H. of L. Se. App. Cas.) 326; 19 L. T. (N. S.) 80; McLean v. Blue Point &c. Co., 51 Cal: 255). Are not (Dowling v. Allen &c. Co., 74 Mo. 13 8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 298; 14 C. L. J. 92; 13 Rep. 693). Sup-MANAGER and mining hand, are—See Sus-ForE- MAN, ante. SuB-STEVEDORE and head-stevedore, are (Mullan case, supra). Sunpay Laws as affecting the point—Employees in- jured by the negligence of a co-employee, whilst work- ing on the sabbath, can recover in an, otherwise, suable state of facts, notwithstanding that the labor in the performance of which the injury happened occurred on Sunday (Johnson v. Missouri &c. Co., 18 Neb. 690 S. 0. 23 A. & EB. R. R. Cas. 429; Railway Co. v. Renz, 55 Ga. 126). SUPERINTENDENT and conductor, are not (Patterson v. Pittsburgh &c. Co., 76 Pa. 389 S. C. 18 Am. Rep. 412), _ And engineer, are not (Washburn v. Nashville &c. Co., 3 Head, 638 S. ©. 75 Am. Dec. 784; Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 S. C. 36 Am. Rep. 575). And brakesman, are not (Toledo &¢. Co. v. In- graham, 77 Ill. 309). And carpenter, are (Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102). SUPERINTENDENT and laborers, are (King v. Boston 'In this case it appeared that the injury occurred whilst the laborer was performing extraordinary duties under a threat. RAILWAY LAW. 371 Superintendent. &ec. Co., 9 Cush. 112; Gilshannon v. Stony Brook &c. ©o., 10 Cush. 228; Seaver v. Boston &c. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Kenney v. Shaw, 133 Mass. 501; Capper v. Louis- ville &c. Co.,1 103 Ind. 305 8. C. 21 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 525; Albro v. Agawam &c. Co., 6 Cush. 75; Crispin v. Babbitt,! 81 N. Y. 5168. ©. 37 Am. Rep. 521; Zeigler v. Day, 123 Mass. 152; Collier v. Steinhardt, 51 Cal. 116; McLean v. Blue Point &c. Co., ib. 255; Flynn v. Salem, 134 Mass. 351; Mobile &c. Co. v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245 8. ‘©. 6 Rep. 264; S.. P. Floyd v. Sugden, ib. 563). Are not, when (Wilson v. Willimantic &c. Co., 50 Conn. 433 8S. OC. 47 Am. Rep. 653; Gormley v. Vulcan Works, 61 Mo. 492; Babbits v. Chicago &c. Co., 38 Wis. 289; Gunter v. Graniteville &c. Co., 18 8. C. 262 S. C. 44 Am. Rep. 573; Lasure v. Graniteville &c. Co., 18S. C. 275; Brothers v. Cartter, 52 Mo. 373 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 424; Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517 8. C. 17 Am. Rep. 369; Mullan v. Philadelphia &c. Co., 78 Pa. 25 8. ‘C. 21 Am. Rep. 2; Ford v. Fitchburg &c. Co., 110 Mass. 240 S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 598; Mitchell v. Robinson, 80 Ind. 281 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 812; Tyson v. North &c. Co., 61 Ala. 554 8. C. 32 Am: Rep. 8; Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 298; 13 Rep. 693; Ryan v. Bagaley,? 50 Mich. 179 8S. C. 45 Am. Rep. 35; 15 N. W. Rep. 72; Tissue v. Baltimore &c. Co.,? 112 Pa. 918. C. 56 Am. Rep. 310; 2 Cent. Rep. 596; Pittsburgh &c. Co. v. Henderson, 37 Ohio, (N. 8.) 549 S.C. 5 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 529; 14 C. L. J. 235). 1It appeared, in this case, that the superintendent took upon himself to perform the duties of an inferior servant. ?In this case the plaintiff’s intestate was a common laborer in a mine, and was killed in consequence of the negligence of a mining captain, who had entire and absolute management of the mine. \ 3In this case it appeared that the superintendent was acting under or- ders of the road-master. 372 RAILWAY LAW. Superior Servant: Surveyor: Switchman. SUPERINTENDENT and rock-breakers at mine, are not (Mayhen v. Sullivan, 76 Me. 100). SUPERINTENDENT OF A WRECKING TRAIN and la- borer, are (Beilfus v. N. Y. &c. Co., 29 Hun. (N. Y.) 556). SUPERINTENDENT OF REPAIRS and engineer, are not (Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 8. C. 36 Am. Rep. 575). SUPERIOR SERVANT and laborer, are (Lawler v. An- droscoggin &c. Co., 62 Me. 463 S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 492). Are not (Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. (S. ©. U. 8.) 553; Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio, (N. 8.) 287 S. C. 27 Am. Rep. 510; 5 Rep. 625). SUPERVISOR and general superintendent, are (Mobile &c. Co. v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245 S. C. 6 Rep. 264). And section-master, are (ib.). And laborer, are (ib.; District &c. Co. v. McEIli- gott, 117 U.S. 621). And engineer, are (ib.) SuRVEYOoR and conductor, are, when (Ross v. N. Y. &e. Co., 5 Hun. 488, aff. on appeal, 74 N. Y. 617). SuRvEyor and train hands, are (ib.). Swircuman! and engineer, are not (East Tenn. &c. Co. v. Gurley,? 12 Lea, (Tenn.) 46). 'Indifferently termed switchman and switch-tender. ?The court held that the company would be liable, if it knew of the in- competency of the switchman, but this qualification necessarily implies the principle stated in the text. RAILWAY LAW. 373 Switchman. Are (Fowler v. Chicago &c. Co., 61 Wis. 159 S. C. 17 A. & E.R. BR. Cas. 536; Brown v. Central &c. Co., 6 W. C. Rep. 797; Smith v. Memphis &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 239; Columbus &c. Co. v. Troesch, 68 Ill. 545 8. C. 18 Am. Rep. 578; Satterly v. Morgan &e. Co., 35 La. Ann. 1116). SwITcHMAN and engineer, are (Brown v. Central &c. Co., 6 W. Coast. Rep. 797; Randall v. Baltimore &c. Co., 109 U. 8. 478 8. C.15 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 248; Smith v. Memphis &c. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 304; Satterly v. Morgan &c. Co., 35 La. Ann. 1166; Columbus &c. Co. v. Troesch, 68 Ill. 545 8. C. 18 Am. Rep. 578; Barton’s Hill &c. Co- ». Reid, 3 McQ. (H. of L. Cas.) 2665 Chicago &c. Co. v. Henry, 7 Ill. App. 322). And engineer, respectively, of lessor and lessee, are not (Smith v. N. Y. &c. Co. 19 N. ¥. 127 S. C. 75 Am. Dec. 305). And conductor, are (Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Knit- tal, 33 Ohio, (N. S.) 468). And employees of another company, are (Foley w. Chicago &c. Co., 48 Mich. 622 8. C. 42 Am. Rep. 481; Smith v. N. Y. &e. Co., 19 N. Y. 1278. ©. 75 Am. Dee. 305). Switcuman and brakesman, are (Slattery v. Toledo &e. Co., 23 Ind. 81). And fireman, are (Tinney v. Boston &e. ‘Co., 52 N. Y. 632; Harvey v. N. Y. &. Co., 88 N. Y. 481 8. C. 8A. & E. B. R. Cas. 515). And conductor, are (Lake Shore &c. Co. v. Knit- tal, 33 Ohio, (N. 8.) 468). SwitcHMan and laborer, are not, when (Chicago &c. Co. v. Henry, 7 Ill. App. (Brader), 322). 3874 RAILWAY LAW. Teamster: Telegrapher: Test as to alter ego. And baggage-master, are (Roberts v. Chicago &c. Co., 33 Minn. 218). And car-inspector, are (Gibson v. Northern, &c. Co., 22 Hun. (N. Y.) 289). And section-master, are not (Hall v. Missouri &c. Co., 74 Mo. 298). TEAMSTER and rock-blaster, are (Bogard v. Louisville &c. Co., 100 Ind. 491). TELEGRAPHER and engineer, are (Dana v. N. Y. &. Co., 22 Hun. (N. Y.) 473; Daniel v. N. Y. &c. Co., 23 N. Y. 473). And conductor, are (Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 S. C. 39 Am. Rep. 627; 5 A. & EH. BR. RB. Cas. 515). And firenfan, are (Slater v. J. ewett, supra (DAN- FORTH and Fincu, J. J., dissenting).). And fireman, are not (Sheehan v. N. Y. &e. Co., 90 N. Y. 332). And laborers and train hands, are (Chapman v. Central &c. Co., 55 N. Y. 579; Slater v. J ewett, supra). TESTERS OF WorRK—See BoruER TESTERS. TEST AS TO A VicE-PRINCIPAL IN Norta CAROLINA —Where the common master invests one of his em- ployees with the power to hire, discharge, command and direct the other employees, such person is not a fellow- servant although he works as any other servant (Patton v. Western &. Co.,! 96 N. ©. 455). Track-LayerRs and shovellers, are (Lovegrove v. London &c. Co., 16 C0. B. (N. 8.) 669). ‘This decision is contrary to the current of authority, but, as emanating from a highly respectable and conservative court, it was thought not amiss to give the point. RAILWAY LAW. 375 Track-Repairer. And laborer, are (Collins v. St. Paul, 30 Minn. 31 8.0.8 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 150). And train-dispatcher, are not (McKane v. Cali- fornia, 66 Cal. 302). TRACK-REPAIRER and engineer, are (Ohio &c. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 S. ©. 74 Am. Dec. 259; Collins v. St. Paul &c. Co., 30 Minn. 31; Van Wickle v. Manhat- tan &c. Co., 23 Blatch. 422; Rohback v. Pacific &c. Co., 43 Mo. 187; Foster v. Minnesota &c. Co., 14 Minn. 360; Coon v. Syracuse &c. Co., 5 N. Y. 492; Whaalan v. Mad River &c. Co., 8 Ohio, (N. 8.) ). Are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Moranda, 108 Il. 576 8.0.17 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 564; 10 C. L. J. 348; Dick v. Indianapolis &c. Co., 38 Ohio, (N. 8.) 389 8. C.8 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 101; Lewis v. St. Louis &c. Oo., 59 Mo. 495 S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 385; 8 Am. R. Rep. 450; Toledo &c. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 Ill. 391; Calvo v. Charlotte &c. Co., 23 S. O. 526 S. C. 55 Am. Rep. 28; Pittsburgh &c. Co. v. Lewis, 33 Ohio, (N. 8.) 196 (Scorr and AsHBURN, J. J., dissenting); Garrahy v. Kansas &c. Co., (C. C. U. 8.) 22 A. &. BE. R. R. Cas. 360). And other employees, (train-hands, etc.), are (O’Brien v. Boston &c. Co., 188 Mass. 387 8. 0. 52 Am. Rep. 279; Gormley v. Ohio &c. Co., 72 Ind. 31 8. C. 2 A. & E. RB. BR. Cas. 581; Foster v. Minnesota &e. Co., 14 Minn. 360; Waller v. South Eastern &c. Co., 2H. & O. 102; 9 Jur. (N. 8.) 501; 32 L. J. Ex. 205; 11 W. BR. 731; 8 L. T. (N. 8.) 325; Hutchinson v. York &e. Co., 5 Ex. (W. H. & G.) 343 8. ©. 6 Rail. Cas. 580; 19 L. J. (Ex.) 296; Morgan v. Vale of Neath &c. Co. 5 B. & 8. (117 B. ©. L. BR.) 570; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 260; in Ex. Ch. 5 B. & S. 736; L. RB. (1 Q. B.) 149; 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 33; 138 L. T- (N. 8.) 564; 14 W. R. 144; Lovegrove v. London &e. Co. 16 C. B. (N. 8S.) 669 (111 BE. 0. L. R.); 10 Jur. (N. 8.) 879; 10 L. T. (N. S.) 718; 33 L. J. (GC. By 376 RAILWAY LAW. Same. 329; 12 W. BR. 988; Conway v. Belfast &c. Co., Ir. 9 (C. L.) 498; Ir. L. T. 217; 11 Ir. RB. (C. L.) 345; Cumberland &e. Co. v. Seally, 27 Md. 587; McDermott v. Pacific &ec. Co., 30 Mo. 115; Coon v. Syracuse &c. Co., 5 N. Y. 192; Boldt v. N. Y. &e. Co., 18 N. Y. 432; Whaalan v. Mad River &c. Co., 8 Ohio, (N. S.) 249 S.C. 9 Am. R. Rep. 224; Ohio &c. Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261 8. C.8 C0. L. J. 12; 7 Rep. 143; 38 Am. Rep. 134; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395 S. C. 11 Md. L. Ree. No. 6; 17 A. & E. RB. R. Cas. 188; Weger v. Pennsylvania &e. Co., 55 Pa. 460). And brakesman, are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 272 8. C. 11 Am. R. Rep. 273; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Wachter, supra). Are not (Vantrain v. St. Louis &c. Co., 8 Mo. App. 538). And conductor, are (Day v. Toledo &c. Co., 42 Mich. 523; Howard v. Mississippi &c. Co., 50 Miss. 178; N. O. &e. Co. v. Hughes, 49 ib. 258). When not (Dick v. Indianapolis &c. Co., 38 Ohio, (N. S.) 389 8. C.8 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 101). TRACK-REPAIRER and road-master, are (Brown v. Winona &c..Co., 27 Minn, 162 S. 0. 38 Am. Rep. 285). And section-master, are not (Louisville &c. Co. v. Bowler, 9 Heisk. 866). And foreman, are (O’Brien v. Boston &c. Co., 138 Mass. 387 S. C. 52 Am. Rep. 279; 19 Rep. 462). And engineer, are (Whaalen v. Mad River &c. Co., 8 Ohio, (N. S.) 249; Boldt v. N. Y. &c. Co., 18 N. Y. 432). Not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Swett, 45 Ill. 197; Ohio &c. Co. v, Collarn, 73 Ind. 261 S. C. 38 Am. Rep. 134; 7 Rep. 143; 8 C. L. J. 12). RAILWAY LAW. 377 Track-Manager: Train-Dispatcher: Train-Makers. And porter of sleeping-car, are (Walton v. N. Y. &c. Co., 139 Mass. 556). TRACK-REPAIRER and train-dispatcher, are not (Mc- Kinne v. California &c. Co., 21 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 539; 5 West. Coast Rep. 159). And stock and fuel agent, are not (Central &c. Co. v. DeBray, 71 Ga. 406). TRACK-WALKER and coal-heavers, are (Shultz v. Chi- cago &e. Co., 67 Wis. 616 S. C. 58 Am. Rep. 881). TRAFFIC-MANAGER and milesman, are (Conway v. Belfast &c. Co., Ir. R. (9 C. L.) 498; Ir. L. T. 217; 11 Iv. R. (C. L.) 345) And laborers, are not (Cumberland &c. Co. v. State, 44 Md. 283 8. C. 45 ib. 229). TRAIN-DISPATCHER and engineer, are not (Crew v. St. Louis &c. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 87). And train-masters, are not (ib.). And engineers, are (Robertson v. Terre Haute &c. Co., 78 Ind. 77 8S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 552; Blessing v. St. Louis &c. Co., 77 Mo. 410 8S. C. 15 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 298). And brakesman, are (ib.). And material-man, are, when (McKinne v. Cali- fornia &c. Co., 5 West. Coast Rep. 159 S.C. 21 A. & EH. R. BR. Cas. 539). And track-repairer, are (ib.). TRAIN-DISPATCHER and conductor, are not (McLeod wv. Ginther, 80 Ky. 399 S. 0. 8 A. &. E. R. R. Cas. 162). TRAIN-MAKERS and yard-master, are (McCosker v. Long Island &c. Co., 84 N. Y. 778.0.5 A. & BE. BR. R. Cas. 564). 378 RAILWAY LAW. Train-Masters: Train-Repairers: Train-Hands. And inspectors, are not (Tierney v. Minneapolis &e. Co., 33 Minn. 311 8. C. 53 Am. Rep. 35; 21 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 545; 20 Rep. 84). TRAIN-MASTERS and train-dispatchers, are not (Crew v. St. Louis &e. Co., 19 Fed. Rep. 87). TRAIN-REPAIRERS and car-inspector, are (Nashville &c. Co. v. Foster, 10 Lea, 351 8. C.11 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 180; Mackin v. Boston &¢c. Co., 135 Mass. 201 8. C. 46 Am. Rep. 456; 15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 196). And brakesman, are (ib.; Little Miami &c. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Ohio, (N. S.) 318 S.C.17 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 578). TRAIN-HANDS and telegrapher, are (Chapman v. Cen- tral &c. Co.,.55 N. ¥. 579; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 S. C. 39 Am. Rep. 627; 5 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 515). And under-boss of gravel train, are not (Burling- ton &e. Co. v. Crockett, 19 Neb. 138). And brakesman, are (Greenwald v. Marquette &c.. Co., 49 Mich. 197 8. C. 8 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 133). And surveyor, are (Ross v. N. Y. &c. Co., 5 Hun. (N. Y). 488). And employee ‘travelling free, are not (Vick ». N. Y. &e. Co., 95 N. Y. 267 8. ©. 47 Am. Rep. 36; 17 A. & E. R. R. Gas. 609). And stockholders riding by ein are not (Philadelphia &e. Co. v. Derby, (S. ©. U. S.) 14 How. 482). And carpenter, are, when (Shroeder v. Chicago. &c. Co., 47 Iowa, 375). And superintendent, are (Albro v. Agawam &c. Co. 6 Cush. 75; King v. Boston &c. Co., 9 ib. 112; Gil- shannon v. Stony Brook &e. Co., 10 ib. "998; Senver v. RAILWAY LAW. 379: Train-Hands. Boston &c. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Zeigler v. Day, 123 Mass. 152; Kenney v. Shaw, 133 ib. 501; Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516 8S. C. 37 Am. Rep. 521). TRAIN-HANDS and conductor, are (Wilson v. Madison &e. Co., 18 Ind. 226; Michigan &c. Co. v. Dolan, 32 Mich. 510; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 S. C. 389 Am. Rep. 67; 5 A. & E. BR. RB. Cas. 515; Ryan v. Cumberland &c. Co., 23 Pa. 384; O’Connell v. Baltimore &c. Co., 20 Md. 212 S. C. 83 Am. Dec. 549; Gilshannon v. Stony Brook &c. Co., 10 Cush. 228; Howland v. Milwaukee &c. Co., 54 Wis. 226 8. C.5 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 578; Jeffreys. v. Keokuk &c. Co., 56 Iowa, 546 8. C.5 A. & HE. BR. R. Cas. 568; Ross v. N. Y. &e. Co., 74 N. Y. 617; Rodman ». Michigan &c. Oo., 55 Mich. 57 8. 0.17 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 521; 20 N. W. Rep. 788; 54 Am. Rep. 348; 31 Alb. L. J. 34; Pease v. Chicago &c. Co., 61 Wis. 163 8. C. 17 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 527; Manville v. Cleveland &c. Co., 11 Ohio, (N. 8.) 417; Dunlavy v. Chicago &c. Co., 66: Iowa, 435 S. 0. 21 A. & E. R. RB. Cas. 542). Are not (Chicago &c. Oo. v. Ross, 112 U. 8. 377 (S. C. U. S.); Ross v. Chicago &c. Co. , 2 McCrary, (C. C.. U. S.) 235; Little Miami &c. Co. v. Miavens. 20 Ohio, 415; Moon v. Richmond &c. Co., 78 Va. 745 8. C.. 49 Am. Rep. 401; 17 A. & EH. R. BR. Cas. 531; Dob- bin v. Richmond &c. Co., 81 N. C. 446 S.C. 32 Am. Rep. 512; Chicago &c. Co. v. Swanson, 16 Neb. 254 8. ©. 49 Am. Rep. 718; Chicago &c. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205. 8. C0. 6 Rep. 654). And ear-inspector, are (Smith v. Flint, 46 Mich. 258 8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 161; 2 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 140). Are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Jackson, 55 Ill. 492 S. C. 8 Am. Rep. 461; 1 Am. R. Rep. 592; Indiana &c. Co. v. Morgenstern, 103 Ill. 216 8. C.12 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 228; Braun v. Chicago &c. Co., 53 Iowa, 595 8. 0. 36 380 RAILWAY LAW. Same. Am. Rep. 243; 10 Rep. 202; King v. Ohio &e. Co., 11 Biss. (C. C. U. 8. 8268. C. 8 A. & EH. R. BR. Oas. 119; 15 ©. L. J. 367; 25 Fed. Rep. 799; Missouri &c. Co. v. Con-. don, 78 Mo. 567 8. C.17 A. & E. BR. BR. Cas. 583). TRAIN-HANDS and train dispatcher, are (Robertson v. ‘Terre Haute, 78 Ind. 77 8. C. 41 Am. Rep. 552; 8 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 175; Chicago &c. Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 9778S. 0.8 A. & BE. R. BR. Cas. 171; Blessing v. Missouri &c. Co., 77 Mo. 410 S. C. 15 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 298; Hodgkins v. Eastern &c. Co., 119 Mass. 419). And section-master, are (Waller v. South Eastern &c. Co., 2 H. & C. 102; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 501; 32 L. J. (Ex.) 205; 11 W. R. 731; 8 L. T. (N. 8.) 825; Chicago &c. Co. v. Bliss, 6 Brader, 411; Walker v. Boston &c. Co., 128 Mass. 8; Blake v. Maine &c. Co., 70 Me. 60; 35 Am. Rep. 297; Gormley v. Ohio &c. Co., 72 Ind. 31 8. ©. 5 A. & HE. R. R. Cas. 581; Brann v. Chicago &c. Co., 53 Iowa, 595 8. C. 36 Am. Rep. 243; 15 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 564; 10 Rep. 202). : And station-agent, are (Brown v. Minneapolis, 31 Minn. 553; Evans v. Atlantic &c. Co., 62 Md. 49; Hodg- kins v. Eastern &c. Co., 119 Mass. 419). TRAIN-HANDsS and fireman, are not, when—See—and engineer, post 382. And inspector of machinery, are (Wonder v. Bal- timore &c. Co., 32 Md. 411 8. C. 3 Am. Rep. 143). And mail-agent, are not (Collett v. Railway Oo., 16 Q. B. 984; Nolton v. R. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 444; Blair v. Erie &e. Co., 66 N. Y. 313 S. 0. 23 Am. Rep. 55; Ham- mon v. R. R. Co., 6 Rich. 130; Houston v. Hampton, 64 Tex. 427 S. C. 1 Tex. Ct. Rep. 387; Cf. Seybolt v. N. Y. &ec. Oo., 95 N. Y. 562 8. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 75; Yeomans v. South Nev. Oo., 44 Oal. 71). TRain-Hanps and common laborers, are (Gilshannon RAILWAY LAW. 381 Same. v. Stony Brook &c. Co., 10 Cush. 228; Leaver v. Boston &c. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Kansas &c. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kan. 83; Tunney v. Midland &c. Co., L. R. (1 ©. P.) 2915 12 Jur. (N. S.) 691). TRAIN-HANDS and sub-contractors, are not (Donald- son v. Mississippi &c. Co., 18 Iowa, 280 8. 0. 87 Am. Dec. 391). TrRaIN-HANDs and firemen, are (McDermott v. Boston, 133 Mass. 349). And engineer, are (Farwell v. Boston, 4 Met. 49 8. C. 38 Am. Dec. 339; Red. Am. R. Cas. 384; 2 Thom. Neg. 924; Dow v. Kansas &c. Co., 8 Kan. 642 8. 0. 5 Am. R. Rep. 401; St. Louis &e. Co. v. Britz, 72 Ill. 256; Summerhays v. Kansas &c. Co., 2 Col. 484; Illinois &c. Co. v. Cox, 21 Til. 80 S. C. 71 Am. Dee. 298; Wilson v. Madison &c. Co., 18 Ind. 226; Bryant v. Burlington &e. Co.,! 66 Iowa, 305 S. OC. 55 Am. Rep. 275; 21 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 593 (Brox, C. J., and Reep, J., dissenting); Morse v. Minneapolis &c. Co.,! 30 Minn. 465 8. C. 11 A. & BH. R. RB. Cas. 168; Henry v. Staten, 81 N. Y. 373 S. C. 2A. & E.R. R. Cas. 60; Smith v. Flint, Potter &c., 46 Mich. 258 S. CO. 41 Am. Rep. 161; 2 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 140; Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Ranney, 37 Ohio, (N. 8.) 665 8. C.5 A. & E. BR. R. Cas. 533 (OkEY and WHITE, J. J., dissenting); Jeffrey v. Keokuk &c. Co., 56 Iowa, 546 8S. C.5 A. & EH. R. B. Cas. 568; Harvey, 88 N. Y 481 8.0.8 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 515; Randall v. Baltimore &c. Co., 109 U. S. 478; Nashville &c. Co. v. Wheeless, 1These were cases of injury resulting from “bucking snow,” by which phrase is understood the running a train into the snow covering the track, at a high rate of speed, and thus taking the chance of pushing through by the momentum gained by the increased speed. It strikes the author that the employee, who takes service in the high latitudes where this practice. prevails, must be considered as assuming the risk of occasionally “ bucking snow;” and the question as to whether proper appliances were used, pro hac vice, ought to be one for the jury under all the circumstances. 382 RAILWAY LAW. Same. 10 Lea, 741 S. C. 43 Am. Rep. 317; 4 A. & EB. B. B. Cas. 633; 15 4b. 315). And engineer, are not (Missouri &c. Co. v. Mackey, 33 Kan. 298 8. C. 22 A. & E. R. BR. Cas 306). TrAIN-Hanps and wood-haulers, are (Illinois v. Cox, 21 Ill. 20 S. C. 71 Am. Dee. 298). And detectives, are (Payne v. Chicago &c. Co., 54 Iowa, 223 S. OC. 37 Am. Rep. 198). Are not (Pool v. Chicago &e. Co., 53 Wis. 657 8. ©. 14 C. L. J. 57). TRAIN-HaNDs and track-repairer, are: Englana (Waller v. South Eastern &c. Co. 2 H. & C. 102; Hutchinson v. York &c. Co., 5 Ex. (W. H. & G.) ‘343; Morgan v. Vale of Neath &c. Co. 5 B. & S. (117 E. C. L. BR.) 570 8. C. 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 260; in Ex. Ch. 5 B. & S. 736; L. RB. (1 Q. B.) 149 S. 0. 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 23; 13 L. T. (N. 8.) 564; 14 Week. R. 144; Lovegrove v. London &c. Co., 16 ©. B. (N. S.) 669 (111 E. C. L. R.) ). Ireland (Conway v. Belfast &c. Co., I. B. (9 ©. L.) 498 S. C. Ir. L. T. Rep. 217). Indiana (Ohio &c. Co. v. Collarn, 72 Ind. 261 S. 0. 8 6. L. J. 12; 7 Rep. 148; 38 Am. Rep. 134; Gormley v. Ohio &e. Co., 72 Ind. 32). Maryland (Cumberland &c. Co. v. Scally, 27 Md. 589; Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395 8. 0. 15 A. ‘& HE. R. R. Cas. 187). Missouri (McDermott v. Pacifie &c. Co., 30 Mo. 115). New York (Coon v. Syracuse &c. Co. 5 N. Y. 492; Boldt v. New York &e. Co., 18 ib. 432). Ohio (Whaalan v. Mad River &e. Oo., 8 Ohio, (N. 8.) 249). Pennsylvania (Weger v. Pennsylvania &e. Co., 55 Pa. AGO). RAILWAY LAW. 383 Turn-Table Hands: Under-Boss: Unreasonable Regulations. Are not (Chicago &c. Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 272; 11 Am. R. Rep. 273; Nashville &c. Co. v. Carrol, 6 Heisk. 347). TraIn-HANpDs and hands on a hand-car, are (Gorm- ley v. Ohio &c. Co., 72 Ind. 31 8. C.5 A.& BR. R. Cas. 581; Collins v. St. Paul &c. Co., 30 Minn. 31 S. C. 8 A. & HE. R. R. Cas. 150; Foster v. Minnesota &c. Co., 14 Minn. 360). Are not (Garrahy v. Kansas &c. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 258). TRAIN-HANDS and laborers taking train under orders, are (O’Brien v. Boston &c. Co., 188 Mass. 387 8. ©. 52 Am. Rep. 279). TraIn-Hanps and laborer, (train-hand), are (Gil- shannon v. Stony Brook &c. Co., 10 Cush. 298; Seaver v. Boston &c. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Tunney v. Midland &c. Co., L. R. (1 C. P.) 291; Kansas &c. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kan. 83). TURN-TABLE EMPLOYEES and shoveler, are (Morgan ». Vale of Neath, 5 B. & 8.°736 (117 EH. ©. L. R.); 1 L. R. (Q. B.) 149; 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 23; 13 L. T. (N. 8.) 564; 34 L. J. (Q. B.) 23; 14 W. R. 144; 5 B. & 8. 570; 10 Jur. (N. 8.) 1074; 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 260; 13 W. R. 1031). And other employee, are (Horner v. Illinois &c. Co., 15 Til. 550). Unprr-Boss OF A GRAVEL-TRAIN and other em- ployees, are not (Burlington &c. Co. v. Crockett, 19 Neb. 138). UNREASONABLE REGULATIONS—A servant may be exempted from the ordinary rule by the formulation of unreasonable regulations of superintendent (Pittsburg 384 RAILWAY LAW. Volunteer: Watchman. &c. Co. v. Henderson, 37 Ohio, (N. 8.) 549 S. C. 14 C. L. J. 235). , VoLUNTEER and employees, are (Mayton v. Texas &c. Oo., 63 Tex. 77 S. C. 51 Am. Rep. 637; Osborne », Knox &e. Co., 68 Me. 49 S. C. 28 Am. Rep. 16; 6 Rep. 110; Flower v. Pennsylvania &c. Co., 69 Pa. 210 8. ©. & Am. Rep. 261; New Orleans &c. Co. ». Harrison, 48 Miss. 112 S. C. 12 Am. Rep. 386). And cannot recover (Blair v. Grand Rapids &Xce. Co.,1 24 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 430). Can (Eason v. Sabine &c. Co.,1 65 Tex. 577 S. C. 57 Am. Rep. 606; 6 Tex. L. Rev. 178). Or is, at least, to be treated as a fellow-servant (Mayton v. Texas &c. Co., 63 Tex. 77 8. 0. 51 Am. Rep. 637). WATCHMAN and switchman, are (Lammon »v. N. Y. &ce. Co., 62 N. ¥. 251). And foreman, are (Chicago &c. Co. v. Geary, 110 Tl. 383 8. 0.17 A. & E. R. BR. Cas. 606). _ And foreman of shops, are not (St. Louis &c. Co. v. Harper, 44 Ark. 524). And car-repairer, are (Luebke v. Chicago &c. Co., 59 Wis. 127; 63 ib. 91 S. C. 48 Am. Rep. 483; 53 Am. Rep. 266; 15 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 183). WATCHMAN ON VESSEL and laborer, are not, when (Harold, 21 Fed. Rep. 428 (C. 0. U.S.)). WATCHMAN TRAVELLING FREE and the engineer, are 1'The author thinks that latitude had its effect in the forming of these discrepant decisions. The plaintiff in the Michigan case was truly : hero, and if a court could have been swerved from plumbing the lega. line, this case would have justified, or, at least, extenuated such a depar ture. But public policy requires that the expounders of the law shoul¢ be deaf, on occasion, as well as blind at all times. RAILWAY LAW. 385 Watchman: Wife: Working out of Hours: Workman. (Dallas v. Gulph &c. Co.,! 61 Tex. 196 S. ©. 21 A. & BE. R. R. Cas. 575). WaTER-CARRIER and laborers, are (Missouri &c. Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35). WHEEL-MAN AT MINE and miners, are (Barton’s Hill &e. Co. v. Reid, 3 McQ. (H. of L. Cas.) 266; 4 Jur. (N. 8.) 767). WIFE OF EMPLOYEE and servant, are not (Gannon v. Housatonic &c. Co.,? 112 Mass. 234 8. ©. 17 Am. Rep. 82). Woop-HavLeErs and conductor, are (Illinois &¢. Co. v. Cox, 21 Il. 20 8. C. 71 Am. Dee. 298), And fireman, are (ib.). And engineer, are (ib.; Nashville &c. Co. v. Whee- less, 10 Lea, 741 8. C. 43 Am. Rep. 317; 4 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 633; 15 A. & EB. R. RB. Cas. 315). Woop-PassER and engineer, are (Nashville &c. Co. v. Elliott, 1 Cold. 611 8S. C. 78 Am. Dee. 506). WORKING OUT OF HOURS—Servant put thus to work, and foreman, are not (Broderick v. Detroit &c. Co., 56 Mich. 261 S. ©. 56 Am. Rep. 382). ‘WoREMAN and road-master, are (Atchison v. Moore, 3 Kan. 197; Ohio &c. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 S. C. 74 Am. Dec. 259; Nashville &c. Co. v. Wheeless, 10 Lea, 741 S. C. 43 Am. Rep. 317; 4 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 633; 15 id. 515). 1If this case be decided correctly, the railway attorneys would do well to consider the risk they run in travelling on a free-pass. 2 This is about the first modification that this very disinguished and con- servative court has made touching the doctrine laid down in the great case of Farwell v. Boston &c. Co. A gallant exception to an almost unbroken line of decisions, following in the rut of that celebrated case. 25 386 RAILWAY LAW. Yard-Hand: ‘Yard-Master. YaRD-HAnpD and engineer, are (Bradley v. Nashville &c. Co., 14 Lea, (Tenn.) 374; Chicago &c. Co. v. Murphy, 53 Ill. 336 S. 0.5 Am. Rep. 48). And foreman, are (Fraker v. St. Paul &c. Co., 32 Minn. 54S. 0.15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 256). Semble, are not (Houston &c. Co. v. Marcelles, 59 Tex. 3348. C.12 A. & EB. RB. BR. Cas. 231). And engine-stripper, are (Chicago &c. Co. »v. Scheuring, 4 Ill. App. 533). YaRpD-MASTER and engineer, are (Luebke v. Chicago &c. Co., 63 Wis. 91 S. C. 53 Am. Rep. 266; Hast Tenn. &e. Co. v. Gurley, 12 Lea, 46S. C. 17 A. & E. RB. RB. Cas. 568). Are not (Houston &c. Co. v. Marcelles, 59 Tex. 334 8. 0.12 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 231). YARD-MasTER and foreman, are not, when (Chicago &e. Co. v. May, 108 Ill. 288 S. C. 18 ©. L. J. 232 (Suxx- pon, C. J., Scorr and Oraie, J. J. dissenting) ). And car-repairer, are (Kirk v Atlanta &. Co., 94 N. © 625 8. 0. 55 Am. Rep. 621; Besel v. N. Y. &c. Co., 70 N. ¥. 171). And brakesman, are (Besel case, supra). And train-maker, are (McCosker v. Long Island &e. Co., 84 N. Y.77 8.0.5 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 564). YaRD-MasteR and laborer, are (McCosker v. Long Island &c. Co., 84 N. Y. 77 8. 0.5 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 564). Are not (Stoddard v. St. Louis &c. Co., 65 Mo. 514 8. 0. 5 Rep. 177). Are not, when (Bessex v. Chicago &c. Co., 45 Wis. 477). RAILWAY LAW. 387 Yard-Switchman: Decisions under Statutes. YARD-SWITCHMAN and car-repairer, are (Gibson »v. Northern &c. Co., 22 Hun. (N. Y.) 289). In several of the States, statutes have been enacted, giving, under diverse terms, a right of action for a negligent injury caused by a fellow-servant. The author conceives that an analytical classification could not subserve any useful purpose, or be of practical benefit, and therefore contents himself with giving a reference to the leading decisions instead: California (Beeson v. Green Mt. &c. Co., 57 Cal. 20; McKinne v. California &e. Co., 21 A. & E.R. R. Cas. 539 8. 0. 5 Pac. Rep. 482). Colorado (Atchison &c. Co. v. Farrow, 5 Col. 498 8. C. 16 Rep. 264). | Dakota (Northern &c. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 8. ©. 24 A. & EB. R. RB. Cas. 407). ' Georgia (Thompson v. Central &¢. Co., 54 Ga. 509). Iowa (Houser v. Chicago &c. Co., 60 Iowa, 230 8. C. 46 Am. Rep. 65; Hunt v. Chicago &c. Co., 26 Iowa, 363; Philo v. Illinois &c. Co., 33 ib. 49; Pyne v. Chicago &e. Co., 54 Iowa, 223 8. C. 37 Am. Rep. 198; Smith v. Bur- lington &c. Co., 59 Iowa, 73; Malone v. Burlington &c. Co., 61 ib. 326 8S. 0. 47 Am. Rep. 813; Manning v. Bur- lington &c. Co., 64 Iowa, 240; Foley v. Chicago &c. Co., 64 ib. 644; Malone v. Burlington &c. Co., 65 Lowa, 417 8. C. 54 Am. Rep. 11; 19 Rep. 238; Matson v. Chicago &c. Co., 25 N. W. Rep. 911; Potter v. Chicago &c. Co., 46 Iowa, 399). Kansas (Union &c. Co. v Thomason, 25 Kan. 1; Mis- souri &¢c. Co. v. Haley, ib. 35; Kansas &c. Co. v. Peavey, 29 ib. 169 S. C. 44 Am. Rep. 630; Union &c. Co. v. Harris, 33 Kan. 416 S. ©. 19 Rep. 716; 20 C. L. J. 414; 21 A. & VE. R. RB. Cas. 584; Missouri &e. Co. v. Mackey, 33 Kan. 298 8. C. 22 A. & BE. RB. R. Cas. 306). Kentucky (Louisville &c. Co. v. Brook, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 110). 388 RAILWAY LAW. Resume. Maryland (Highland Light, Chase Dec. 150). Missouri (Elliott v. St. Louis &c. Co., 67 Mo. 273 S. C. 7 Rep. 84). Pennsylvania (Delaware &c. Co. v. Carrol, 89 Pa. 374). England (Milward v. Midland &e. Co., L. R. (14 Q. B. Div.) 68). RESUME. The leading and initial case in this country, is Farwell! v. Boston &c. Co. It will be perceived upon weighing the decisions and observing the drift of judicial thought, that the Farwell case has been very generally followed. Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Georgia and Ohio, all led out in opposition, to a greater or less extent, but, Illi- nois, by her later decisions is evidently gravitating towards a full acknowledgment of the Farwell case. We find, too, a toning down in the other States men- tioned except Ohio, whose courts have more persistently resisted the doctrine of the Farwell case than any other. South Carolina, on the other hand, at an early day, was. almost abreast with Massachusetts, but her later decis- ions tend in the other direction. In the opinion of the author, the courts of Connecticut and West Virginia have rendered more, uniformly, conservative decisions, on this interesting question, whose discussion is about to be closed, than any others, whilst the courts of Wis- consin, Iowa, Indiana and Texas have displayed, per- haps, greater ability in its treatment. The practising lawyer must, however, not rely too much upon the reputation of any particular court, but, study, analyze and digest the decisions pro and con, and, then, he may, intelligently advise. In considering the value of later decisions, too, where an initial error was committed, he must bear in mind that courts as well as men have their amour propre, and . pride of opinion has doubtless had its effect in shaping shai RAILWAY LAW. 389 Chicago v. Ross commented on. the judicial utterance. The two courts of Massachusetts and Illinois, who, in their earlier decisions, illustrated the extremes of the principle, may well be subjected to this crucial test. It will be seen upon an examination of their decisions, that, whilst Illinois has gradually drifted away from such indefensible cases as Moranda, on'the other hand Massachusetts has not receded one jot or tittle from the resultant analogies and corollaries of the Farwell case. That august tribunal, the Supreme Court of the United States, has generally ranged itself with the minority, but with far less unanimity in its latest holdings than formerly. In the case of Chicago &c. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 337, four justices of profound learning and signal ability, dissented, and without presuming to criticise this decision, the fact itself, that it is opposed to the great weight of authority is a circumstance that cannot be ignored, and should not be overlooked in considering its intrinsic value. Again, by the death of Mr. JUSTICE ‘Woops, should the question again be brought before that court, we can well assume that the court will be equally divided until his successor shall have been appointed, and should he hold with the present mi- nority, we may reasonably expect to see this case re- versed. A notable precedent, for such action, it will be remem- bered occurred in the legal-tender cases. It is quite remarkable that the previous case of Randall v. Balti- more &c. Co., 109 U. S. 478, should, in view of the decision in the Ross case, have met with no dissent. There, it was held, that a brakesman working a switch for his train in a railroad yard, was a fellow-servant with the engineer of another train of the same corpora- tion upon an adjacent track. The facts in either case disclose confplete consociation, and it is difficult to see why they were decided differently. 390 RAILWAY LAW. Warehousemen: Intensity of Proof. WAREHOUSEMEN. Intensity of Proof—In an action against a warehouse- man, for damages for loss of goods, does the plaintiff make out a prima facie case by proving the bill of lading, receipt or delivery of the goods to the ware- houseman, a demand and non-compliance therewith, and value? The affirmative of this proposition is held by the following courts, involving the devolution of proof, as distinguished from the technical shift of the burden, upon the warehousemen: California—There it is held that a prima facie case of negligence is made out against a warehouseman, who refuses to deliver property stored with him, on proof of demand and refusal. Upon such proof alone the bur- den is on him to account for the property (Jackson v. Sacramento &c. Co., 23 Cal. 268); but if it appears that the property, when demanded, was consumed by fire, the burden of proof is then on the bailor, to show that the fire was the result of the negligence of the ware- houseman! (Wilson v. Southern &c. Co., 62 Cal. 164 8. C.7 A. & E.R. RB. Cas. 400). Connecticut (Boies v. Hartford &c. Co., 37 Conn. 272 S. C. 9 Am. Rep. 347). Indiana (Cox v. O'Riley, 4 Indiana, 368). Louisiana—Same rule prevails as in California (McCul- len v. Porter, 17 La. Ann. 89; Babcock v. Murphy, 20 ib. 399; ‘Thomas v. Dardun, 22 ib. 413). Massachusetts—Seems to adopt the California rule (Al- den v. Pearson, 3 Gray, 342; Brown v. Waterman, 10 Cush. 117; Litchtenhein v. Boston &c. Co., 11 ib. 70; Lamb v. Western &c. Co.,? 7 Allen, 98; Cass v. Boston 1 Technically, the burden of proof is never shifted when a pure negation , in pleading is arrived at, but, as practically upon production of prima facie evidence, the party holding the affirmative would recover, without more, the courts, have dropped into the convenient error of terming this the shift of the burden. i *The court, in this case, held that when plaintiff alleges loss from de- fault, by theft, the burden is upon him. It is a mistake to suppose that RAILWAY LAW. 391 Same. &c. Co., 14 ib. 448 (BIGELOW, C. J., dissenting); Willett v. Rich, 142 Mass. 356 S. C. 56 Am. Rep. 684). Pennsylvania (Clark v. Spence, 10 Watts, 335; Beek- man v. Shouse, 5 Rawle, 179; Logan v. Matthews, 6 Pa. 417). South Carolina (Wardlaw v. S. C. &c. Co., 11 Rich. 337). The following hold the negative of our proposition: England (Finucane v. Small, 1 Esp. 315; Cooper wv. Bar- ton, 3 Camp. 5, in notes; Harris v. Packard, 3 Taunt. 264; Gilbart v. Dale, 5 A. &. E. (31 E. ©. L. B.) 543). Alabama (Moore v. Mayer &c. Co., 1 Stew. 284). Iowa (Gandy v. Chicago &c. Co., 30 Iowa. 420; Denton v. Chicago &c. Co., 52 ib. 161 S. C. 35 Am. Rep. 263). New York! (Schmidt v. Blood, 9 Wend. 268 S. C. 24 Am. Dec. 143; Arent v. Squire, 1 Daly, 347; Coleman v. Livingston, 45 How. Pr. 483; 36 N. Y. Sup. Court, 32; Schweins v. McKie, 5 Rob. 404 8. ©. 51 N. Y. 180; 10 Am. Rep. 581; Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260 S. C. 31 upon the general issue, the burden of proof, technically viewed, is ever shifted (Small v. Clewly, 62 Me. 155 8. C. 16 Am. Rep. 410); as seems to be the idea, advanced in some of the cases. In every case, either negligence or conversion is charged, and the point really embraces the quantum or the intensity, as distinguished from the burden of proof. It is suggested also, {n some of the cases, that there is a difference in the quantum of proof when the action is brought in contract or tort, but, that distinction, if available at all, only applies to the case of carriers (Bail. O. Prob. 217, 218), where the distinction is discussed. There is a great doubt whether the point decided in the Lamb case can be sustained. Perhaps by the strict rules of pleading at common-law, it may be (Bail. O. Prob. 583), but. hardly under the liberal rules of the code-system (2d. 593; Bliss, C. Pl. 214, 215). That question must be solvable alone by the local practice. If allowable, then an important right, namely, to open and conclude may be acquired by this ingenious device. However this may be, the technical burden rests upon the plaintiff on the general issue, and only on the de- fendant when the general issue is pretermitted, and the defence is asserted by way of confession and avoidance. Tt is difficult to place the New York decisions. Some seem to favor the California rule, but Claflin o. Meyer seems to hold the affirmative squarely. The decisions are conflicting and irreconcilable. 392 REVESTING TITLE BY CANCELLATION. Cancellation re-vests Title. Am. Rep. 467; Lamb v. Camden &e. Co., 46 N. Y. 271 S. C. 7 Am. Rep. 327). Texas (Brown v. Johnson, 29 Tex. 43; Texas &c. Co. v. Capps, 18 C. L. J. 211; 16 A. & EH. R. R. Cas. 118). REVESTING TITLE BY CANCELLATION. If a deed be delivered, and, before it is recorded, the grantee re-delivers it to the grantor, with the intent thereby to re-vest the title in the grantor, will effect be given to such act so as to place the title as if the deed had not been executed? The affirmative of this proposition is held by the fol- lowing courts: Indiana—Semble (Wilson v. Cassiday, 2 Ind. 562; Speer w. Speer, 7 ib. 178 8S. C. 63 Am. Dec. 418). The court seem to rest their decisions upon the doctrine of estop- pel (Anderson Bridge Co. v. Applegate, 13 Ind. 341; Sutton v. Jervis, 31 ib. 267; Thompson v. Thompson, 9 ib. 323 8. C. 68 Am. Dec. 638; Schaeffer v. Tithian, 17 Ind. 463; Connelly v. Doe, 8 Blackf. 320). Iowa—Semble (Blaney v. Hanks, 14 Iowa, 400). Michigan (Guging wv. Van Gorder, 10 Mich. 523; Hunter v. Hopkins, 12 ib. 227). New Hampshire (Mussey v. Holt, 24 N. H. 248 8. 0. 55 Am. Dec. 234; Dodge v. Dodge, 33 N. H. 487; Thomp- son v. Ward, | tb. 19; Farrar v. Farrar, 4 ib. 191 8. 0.17 Am. Dee. 410; Bank v. Eastman, 44 N. H. 438; Sawyer v. Peters, 50 ib. 143). North Carolina (Waugh v. Blevins, 68 N. C. 167; Hare v. Jernigan, 76 ib. 471; Davis v. Inscoe, 84 ib. 396; Phifer v. Barnhart, 88 ib. 333). The court, in the last case, styles it “a new principle,” and it is in direct oppo- sition to the principle enunciated in the previous case of Linker v. Long, 64 N. C. 296). Vermont (Corliss v. Corliss, 8 Vt. 373). REVESTING TITLE BY CANCELLATION. 393 Does not. The negative by the following courts: England (Leech v. Leech, 2 Ch. Rep. 100; Bolton »v. Bishop of Carlisle, 2 H. Black. 263; Miller ». Manwar- ing, Cro. Ch. 399; Harrison v. Owen, 1 At. R. 520; Roe w. Archbishop of York, 6 East, 86; Parrott v. Parrott, 14 East, 423; Doe d. Lewis v. Bingham, 4 B. & Ald. 672 (6 B.C. L. R.); Lord Ward v. Lumley, 5 H. & N. 87; Wootley v. Gregory, 2 Y. & J. 536). Canada (Fraser v. Fraser, 14 U. C. (C. P.) 70; Cf. Laner v. White, 18 ib. 99; Doe d. Burr v. Denison, 8 W. C. (Q. B.) 185; Fraser v. Fralick, 21 ib. 343). Supreme Court U. S.—Deeds under seal can only be sur- rendered and cancelled by other deeds under seal (Washington v. Ogden, 1 Black, 450, 458). Circuit Court U. Ss. (Snydam v. Beals, 4 MeL. 12). Alabama (Faweetts v. Kimmey, 33 Ala. 261; Kimball v. Greig, 47 ib. 230; Reavis v. Reavis, 50 ib. 60; Gimon v. Davis, 36 ib. 589; Corithers v. Lay, 51 ib. 390; Smith v. Cockrell, 66 ib. 64; Mallory v. Stodder, 6 tb. 801). Arkansas (O’Connor v. Auditor, 27 Ark. 242; Strawn v. Norris, 21 ib. 80; Talliaferro v. Rolton, 34 tb. 503). California (Kearsing v. Kilian, 18 Cal. 491; Lawton ». Gordon, 34 ib. 36 and 38 ib. 207; Bowman v. Cudworth, 31 ib. 149; Kelly v. Wilson, 33 ib. 690; Cranmer v. Porter, 41 ib. 462; Ahrens v. Adler, 33 ib. 608). Connecticut (Gilbert v. Bulkley, 5 Conn. 262 8. ©. 13 Am. Dee: 57; Botsford v. Morehouse, 4 Conn. 550; Coe w. Turner, 5 ib. 86). Delaware (Cannon v. Collins, 3 Del. Ch. 132). In this case, the general principle involved in the negative of our proposition was substantially decided, though on the principle of equitable estoppel, effect was given to an agreement to cancel, founded on a valuable consid- eration. Georgia (Jordan v. Pollock, 14 Ga. 145). Kentucky (Holmes v. Trout, 7 Pet. (S. C. U. S.) 171, 213). ‘ 394. REVESTING TITLE BY CANCELLATION. Same. Maine (Patterson v. Yeaton, 47 Me. 308; Hall v. Mc- Duff, 24 ib. 311; Nason v. Grant, 21 ib. 160; Chase v. Hinkley, 74 ib. 181). Massachusetts (Marshall v. Fisk, 6 Mass. 24 S. ©. 4 Am. Dec. 76; Chessman v. Whittemore, 23 Pick. 231;. Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Mass. 307 8. C. 6 Am. Dec. 67; Ken-. dall v. Kendall, 12 Allen, 92; Regan v. Howe, 121 Mass. 424; Holbrook v. Tirrell, 9 Pick. 105; Conway v. Deer- field, 11 Mass. 327, 332; Com. v. Dudley, 10 ib. 403; Cf. Steel v. Steel, 4 Allen, 417). Mississippi (Bolton v. Wells, 30 Miss. 692). Missouri (Parsons v. Parsons, 45 Mo. 268; Alexander v. Hickox, 34 ib. 496 S. C. 86 Am. Dec. 118; Tibeau v. Tibeau, 19 Mo. 78 8. C. 59 Am. Dec. 329; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 24 Mo. 269; Cf. Woods v. Hilderbrand, 46. ib. 284 S. C. 2 Am. Rep. 513; Listoff v. Hart, 25 Mo. 245). New Jersey (Wilson v. Hill, 13 N. J. Eq. 143; Alpaugh v. Roberson, 27 ib. 96; sed vide Faulks v. Bren, 16 ib. 250). New York (Jackson v. Page, 4 Wend. 585; Kellog v. Rand, 11 Paige, 59; Parshall v. Shirts, 54 Barb. 154; Rowan v. Litle, 11 Wend. 616; Lewis v. Payne, 8 Cow. 71 8. ©. 18 Am. Dec. 427; Jackson v. Gould, 7 Wend. 364; Raynor v. Wilson, 6 Hill, 469; Jackson v. Ander- son, 4 Wend. 474; Jackson v. Chase, 2 John. 84, 87; Fonda v. Sage, 46 Barb. 122; Schiett v. Harge, 6 ib. 373; Nicholson v. Halsey, 1 Jatin, Ch. 417; Jackson d. But- ler v. Gardner, 8 John. 394; Jackson v. Jacoby, 9 Cow. 125; Smith r. McGowan, 3 Barb. 407; Chappell v. Spen- cer, 23 ib. 586). Ohio (Jeffers v. Philo, 35 Ohio, (N. S.) 173; Dukes v. Spangler, 35 ib. 119). Pennsylvania (Wiley v. Crist, 4 Watts, 199; Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. 119 8. ©. 1 Am. L. J. 672; Carver v. McNulty, 39 Pa. 473; Rifener v. Bowman, 53 ib. 313). REVESTING TITLE BY CANCELLATION. 396. Rationale. But if a deed is destroyed by the grantor, for any fraudulent purpose, or under such circumstances as. to make it inequitable for him afterwards to rely upon title under it, he will be precluded from offering secon- dary evidence of its contents (Wallace v. Harmstad, 44- Pa. 492). South Carolina (Sally v. Sandifer, 2 Mills, 445 S. C. 12' Am. Dec. 687; Cornwell v. Spence, Harper’s Ch. 258). Tennessee (Howard v. Huffman, 3 Head, 562 S. C. 75. Am. Dec. 783; Morgan v. Elam, 4 Yerg. 375). Texas (Galbreath v. Templeton, 20 Tex. 45, 47; Van Hook v. Simmons, 25 ib. 323 8. 0. 78 Am. Dee. 578). Virginia (Grayson v. Richards, 10 Leigh, 57; Jones »v.. Neale, 2 Patt. & H. 339). Wisconsin (Parker v. Kane, 4 Wis. 1S. C. 65 Am. Dec. 283; 22 How. (S. C. U. 8.) 1; Wilke v. Wilke, 28 Wis.. 296, 298; Lampe v. Kennedy, 56 ib. 249; Rogers v- Rogers, 53 Wis. 36 8. C. 40 Am. Rep. 756; 10 N. W-. Rep. 3; Hinchliff v. Hinman, 18 Wis. 130; Bogie v. Bogie, 35 ib. 659; Hilmert v. Christian, 29 tb. 104). If the rights of third persons are affected by allowing a title to be set up under a deed that has been cancelled with reference to such rights, the principle of injunctive relief is easily apprehended. But, that very principle imports, proprio vigore, that, at law, the legal estate acquired by the destroyed deed, might yet be asserted. It amounts to a tacit admission that, without the ex- traordinary relief of “equity, the legal title might yet be upheld. The decisions, in some of the States, may, in this way, inter sese, be reconciled. But several of the courts. base their decisions upon the ground, that even under the Statute of Uses, an unrecorded deed passes no title. Let us examine this question. Before that statute was. enacted, corporeal hereditaments could only be con- veyed by livery of seizin—a corporal tradition of the 396 REVESTING TITLE BY CANCELLATION. Same. land. After that statute was passed, the use which was raised on a bargain and sale, was immediately trans- ferred into possession, and, in deeds operating without transmutation of possession, the use was executed out of the seizin of the bargainor, and by the plain language of the statute, the bargainee was, by a kind of parlia- mentary magic, invested with seizin upon the delivery of the deed to all intents and purposes of the law, as if the bargainor had gone upon the land and in the pres- ence of the pares curtis, put him in actual possession by the delivery of the twig or turf. Such was the plain mandate of the statute. The delivery of the deed was, to all intents, tantamount to livery of seizin. It is true, that in the same session of Parliament which passed this radical statute, another statute was enacted which required all deeds purporting to convey an estate of freehold, to be enrolled. It was seen that the convey- ances contemplated by the Statute of Uses, would not give that notoriety which was inherent in the livery of seizin; hence the statute of enrollments. It was never supposed that this statute added any requisite of title. The only difference being, that before 27 Hen. 8, the livery of seizen, ex vi termini, gave actual notice, whereas the enrollment, as a substitute, constituted constructive notice. As between the parties, the title passed without enrollment. Now, the title having passed to the bargainee, he could only transfer it ac- cording to the then rules of law, e%. gr. by either deed of bargain and sale, lease and release, or feoffment with livery of seizin. We are confining our observations to corporeal hereditaments. Then came the 29th of Charles II. requiring all assurances for land to be in writing. How then can it be pretended, that a cancellation of a deed delivered—a fait accomplimis a memorandum suffi- cient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds? In North Carolina, stress is laid upon the REVESTING TITLE BY CANCELLATION. 397 View of Text-Books. registration act of 1715 (Hogan v. Strayhorn, 65 N. C. 279); the court having apparently lost sight of the fact that this statute was but a substantial re-enactment of the English Statute of enrollments, only extending the provisions to the conveyance of every kind of estate, and thereby practically abolishing the astute contrivance of lease and release; the operative words are the same in legal and grammatical effect, as those employed in the statute of enrollments, and a statute was only re- quired because the custos rotulorum was an officer un- known to cis-atlantic law, and the provisions under the English Statute, as to enrollment in the “King’s Courts of record at Westminster” was practically impossible. The North Carolina Statutes declare that no con- veyance shall “be good,” etc., unless registered; the English Statute prescribing ‘no manors, lands,” etc., “shall pass,” etc., “except the same” * * * “be en- rolled” (Martin, Coll. Brit. Stat. 213). The learned judge who delivered the opinion in Hogan v. Stray- horn, supra, states that before the passage of the Act of 1715, lands were conveyed by deed and livery of seizin, but neither the legal history of North Caro- lina, nor does tradition assert, that the ceremony of livery of seizin ever obtained there. The text-books present a solid phalanx in support of the negative of our proposition (3 Wash. R. P. ch. IV. sec. 2, 45a; 2 Greenl. Cruise, R. P. Tit. XXXII. ch. 27, sec. 19; 1 Green]. Ev. sec. 265; 2 Black. Com. (Chitty), 309, n. 22; 2 Coke Lit. (Thomas), 540, n. (G. 1); 2 Par. on Contr. 724, and note (a); 2 Reed, Statute of Frauds, sec. 782). It is well put by the learned Mr. Smith: “So far as regards the operation of an assur- ance in vesting an estate, or interest in real or per- sonal property, as distinguished from those operations of the assurance which are merely accessory or inciden- tal, it is immaterial, except as to the evidence of ! 398 SURETIES. Giving Time to Principal or Public Officer. original validity, whether the deeds continue in force or not, for their whole effect to this purpose is instan- taneous, and the estate which has once passed cannot be recalled. And hence, an estate or interest in real ‘or personal property, which has once vested by a deed, ‘cannot be devested by cancelling the deed; because, ‘once vested, it exists, independently of the deed, in the person in whose favour it was created, or to whom it was transferred. So that any freehold estate, or a money fund, once absolutely vested by a settlement, ‘cannot be devested by merely cancelling the deed cre- ating or transferring it; nor can a lease for years as- signed, be revested in the assignor, by cancelling the assignment. To accomplish the purposes intended, the freehold estate must be conveyed, the benefit of the Settlenient must be released, the lease for years must be surrendered, and the leasehold estate must be as- signed. But a mere contract or obligation, of which the deed is the essence, may be extinguished by de- stroying the deed with that intent” (Smith on R. & P. Prop, 734, citing Burton, R. P. sec. 444; 2 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 285). : SURETIES. Giving Time to the Principal_—The relation of surety and principal presents one question of paramount public im- portance, upon which there is an irreconcilable con- flict of judicial thought. Are the sureties of a public officer released by an -act of the public, extending time for collection or settle- ment of public dues? The affirmative of this proposition is maintained by ‘the following courts: Illinois (Governor v. Lagow, 43 Ill. 134; Governor v. Bowman, 44 ib. 499; Davis v. People, 1 Gilm. 409; Peo- ple v. McHatton, 2 ib. 638). SURETIES. 399 Estoppel En Pais. Indiana (Coman v. State, 4 Blackf. 241). Missouri (State v. Roberts, 68 Mo. 234 8. C. 30 Am. Rep. 788). New York (People v. Jansen, 7 John. 332 8. C. 5 Am. Dec. 275). Tennessee (Johnson v. Hacker, 8 Heisk. 388, reported substantially in 45 Am. Rep. 406). The negative is held in the following decisions: Maryland (State v. Carleton, 1 Gill, 249). Mississippi (State v. Swinney, 60 Miss. 39 S. 0. 45 Am. Rep. 405). North Carolina (Prairie v. Worth, 78 N. C. 169). Virginia (Com. v. Holmes, 25 Gratt. 771; Smith v. Com. ab. 780). West Virginia (Bennett v. Auditor, 2 W. Va. 441). Estoppel En Pais—As a cognate subject, we will con- sider the question whether a surety on a note, whether sealed or not, perfect on its face, can defeat a recovery by evidence that he delivered the same to the principal, on condition that it should be signed by another surety, which was not done. The affirmative is maintained by the following courts: California—Semble (Sacramento v. Dunlap, 14 Cal. 421). Michigan—Semble! (Hall v. Parker, 37 Mich. 590 8. C. 26 Am. Rep. 540). 1Jt is extremely difficult to align the Michigan Court, which is the more regretable, as it ranks so high. We have classified it under the affirmative because the case cited is the later case. The action was on a cost bond, signed by surety, on condition that the principal would sign—he did not sign—it was held void. This case does not cite a former decision, which it seems to antagonize (McCormick »v. Bay City, 23 Mich. 457). This «ase was that of an official bond, but its circumstances were almost identical with those of the case cited in the text, and the court held the ‘sureties liable. Indeed, as ordinarily a party to a suit is bound anyway for costs, his signature is an act of supererogation, and as there is no reason assigned by the court why the party should have signed, it is difficult to understand why such a decision should have been made by such,a court. 400 SURETIES. Same. New Jersey (State Bank &c. v. Evans, 15 N. J. L. 1554 §. C. 28 Am. Dec. 400). New York (Bronson v. Noyes, 7 Wend. 188; People v. Bostwick,? 43 Barb. 9 S. O. 32 N. Y. 445).? Pennsylvania (Sharp vw. U.S. 4 Waits, 21 S. C. 28 Am. Dec. 676; Warfel v. Frantz, 76 Pa. 88). Tennessee (Perry v. Patterson, 5 Hump. 133 8. ©. 42 Am. Dec, 424; Carrick v. French, 7 Hump. 460; Majors v. McNeilly, 7 Heisk. 294; Cf. Quarles v. Governor, 10 Hump. 122). The following hold the negative: Supreme Court U. s.4 (Dair wv. U. S., 16 Wall. 1). Circuit Court U. S. (Mutual &c. Co. v. Wilcox,® 8 Biss. 197 S. C. 6 Rep. 8). 1The reasoning in this case is highly technical, and goes to the length of deciding that, although a sealed instrument may be perfect in all of its parts, and nothing suspicious appears upon it or in its apparent execution, yet, if one of the obligors, when he signs, declares not to be obligee, but pri- vately, that it is not to operate as his deed unless certain extrinsic and collat- eral acts shall have been performed, it is inoperative. Now, in the great majority of official bonds, the sureties sign and léave it with the principal to deliver. According to the force of this decision, it would never be safe to accept such a bond before consulting the sureties. The inconvenience of such a doctrine shows its untenability. A very small modicum of undetectible after-thought perjury would upset nine-tenths of such instruments. This decision, however, is approved in later cases (Black v. Lamb, 12 N. J. Eq. 108, 117, and Black ». Shreve, 13 2b. 456, 481). ?The case of Millett ». Parker, which the New York Court held to be “irreconcilable with principle, and opposed by a strong current of author- ity,” is cited with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States, and many of the Statal Courts, and ig now deemed the leading case on the negative of our proposition—and the Paulding case has been distinguished by our highest tribunal, and the opposite ground taken on the very point, decided in the Bostwick case by Dair o. U. 8. *But this case has been recently shaken, if not overruled, by that of Russell o. Freer, 56 N. Y. 67. ‘Our highest court, in commenting on the previous case of Paulding 9. U. 8. 4 Cr. 219, declare that the surety was relieved in that case, “because the additional sureties to be procured were named on the face of the bond, and this fact is stated in the plea,” page 5. * While this case professes to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of the U. 8. cited supra, they are not in point as in the case under review, SURETIES. 401 Bound though he Signed on Condition. Alabama (Finley v. State Bank, 6 Ala. 244; but see, Guild v. Thomas, 54 Ala. 414 8S. C. 25 Am. Dee. 703). Georgia (Lewis v. Commissioners, 70 Ga. 486; Mathis v. Morgan, 72 ib. 517 S. ©. 53 Am. Rep. 847). : Mlinois (Smith v. Peoria Co., 59 Ill. 412; Cf. Seely v. People, 27 Ill. 173). Indiana (Deardorff v. Foreman, 24 Ind. 481; State v. Pepper, 31 ib. 76, overruling same case in 22 ib. 399; Webb v. Baird, 27 ib. 368; Hunt v. State, 53 ib. 321; State v. Garton, 32 ib. 1; Blackwell v. State, 26 ib. 204). The later case of Bagot v. State, 33 ib. 262, does not wnilitate against these decisions, and Allen v. Marney, 65 ib. 398 S. C. 32 Am. Rep. 73, falls under the Pauling case; see also, Spitler v. James, 32 Ind. 202 S. ©. 2 Am. Rep. 334; Wildcat Branch v. Ball, 45 Ind. 213). Kentucky (Smith v. Moberly, 10 B. Mon. 266 8S. C. 52 Am. Dec. 543; Millett v. Parker, 2 Met. 608; Whitaker v. Crutcher, 5 Bush. 621; Hall v. Smith, 14 Bush. 604 S. 0.8 0. L. J. 398; Ward v. Northern Bank, 14 B. Mon. 355; Cf. Chamberlin v. Brewer, 3 Bush. 561). Louisiana (Canal &c. Co. v. Brown, 4 La. Ann. 545; distinguishable from Clements v. Cassily, ib. 380, which ‘falls under the Pauling case). Maine (York &ec. Co. v. Brooks, 51 Me. 506 8S. C. 3 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 399; Redfield v. Shaver, 50 ib. 36; State v. Peck, 53 ib. 284; Inhabitants v. Shaver, 50 ib. 36 S. C. 79 Am. Dec. 592, distinguished as falling under the Pauling case; Cf. Haskins v. Lombard, 16 Me. 140). Mississippi (Graves v. Tucker, 10 S. & M.9; but see, Sessions v. Jones, 6 How. 123). Missouri (Bank v. Phillips, 17 Mo. 29; Ferrell v. Hun- ter, 21 ib. 436; State v. Potter, 63 ib. 212 8.0.40. L. J. the sealed instrument was signed in blank—and its validity or invalidity should have been determined, not upon the doctrine of estoppel en pais but upon the question of agency, either sustaining or denying the author- ity of Texira v. Evans. See sub-title Filling Blanks: Sealed Instruments. 26 402 SURETIES. Same. 85; 21 Am. Rep. 440). In the case of Ayres v. Milroy, 53 Mo. 516 8. C. 14 Am. Rep. 465, this court adhering to the principle involved in the negative of our proposition as to negotiable instruments, took the opposite view as to those non-negotiable. It is quite remarkable that one of the cases cited in support of their then view, (Pepper v. State), has since been overruled, and another, (Pauling v. U. S.,) shown by the court of its utterance not to be within the reason of the rule embraced in the negative of the present question. The court also entirely ignore the doctrine of estoppel en pais as applicable, and rest their decision upon a lack of delivery which was equally applicable in the case of Bank v. Phillips, and which the court declare is as necessary in negotiable as well as non-negotiable instruments. But with commendable frankness the court, in State v. Potter, supra, repudiate the reasoning upon which the Ayres case went, -and squarely align themselves with the Dair decision. The opinion in State v. Potter is able and exhaustive, and the note to the report in the Central Law Journal is instructive. Nebraska! (Cutter v. Roberts, 7 Neb. 4S. ©. 5 Rep. 239; 29 Am. Rep. 371). New Hampshire (Marion v. Rockwood, 47 N. H. 81). North Carolina (Townsend v. Moss, 5 Jon. Eq. 145; Gwyn v. Patterson, 72 N. ©. 189; State v. Lewis, 73 1b. 138 S. C. 21 Am. Rep. 461). Texas (Reynolds v. Dechaums, 24 Tex. 174 8. CG. 76 Am. Dee. 101). Vermont (Dixon v. Dixon, 31 Vt. 450 8. C. 76 Am. Dee. 128; distinguished from Fletcher v. Austin, 11 ib. 447 S. CO. 34 Am. Dec 698, which latter was in its circumstances entirely assimilated to the Pauling case; Passumpsic Bank v. Goss, 31 Vt. 318). 'The surety was discharged in the Nebraska case, but the principles there enunciated are in full harmony with the Dar case, and hence it is classified in support of the negative of our proposition. TELEGRAPHY. 403 Against Telegrapher need only show formation and breach. Virginia (Nash v. Fugate, 32 Gratt. 595 8. C. 34 Am. Rep. 780; the prior case of King v. Smith, 2 Leigh. 157, is not cited. That case supports the affirmative view). No doubt, as stated in the Ayres case, that a delivery is as essential to a negotiable instrument as to a bond, but, when an instrument of any kind, signed by a surety is complete, and the requirement of such surety to his principal to have another sign before delivery, is not communicated to the named obligee to allow him to escape from the apparent liability, shocks all ideas of fairness, and no stronger instance of the doctrine of estoppel en pais, could be suggested. The negative of the proposition may now be regarded as settled law, so far as reason and the weight of authority extend. TELEGRAPHY. In order to recover against a telegrapher for failure to comply with his undertaking, when he (not being by the local law permitted so to do), stipulates against his own negligence, is it necessary to prove more than the formation and breach of the contract? ‘In other words, is it encumbent upon the plaintiff to prove affirmatively the negligence of the telegrapher? The affirmative of this proposition is held by the fol- lowing courts: Iowa (Sweetland v. Illinois &c. Co., 27 Iowa, 432 8. C. 1 Am. Rep. 285; All. T. C. 471; Cf. Turner v. Hawkeye &c. Co., 41 Iowa, 316 8. C. (opinion) 20 Am. Rep. 606). Kentucky (Camp v. Western &c. Co., 1 Met. 1648. C. All. T. ©.:85; 6 Am. L. Reg. 443, 734). Maryland (U. 8. &¢. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 29 Md. 232 S. C. All. T. C. 390). Massachusetts (Ellis v. American &c. Co., 13 Allen, 226 8. C. All. T ©. 306). Missouri (Wann v. Western &c. Co., 37 Mo. 4728. C. All. T. ©. 261). 404 TELEGRAPHY. Alliter: Cipher—What proof required. New York (Breese v. U. 8S. &e. Co., 48 N. Y. 182 S. C. All. T. C. 679; 8 Am. Rep. 526). Pennsylvania (Passmore v. Western &c. Co., 9 Phil. 90; 78 Pa. 238). Texas (Western &c. Co. v. Neill, 57 Tex. 283 S. C. 44 Am. Rep. 589; Western &c. Co. v. Catchpole, Tex. Ct. App. Civ. Cas. (White & Wilson), sec. 268). The negative by the following courts: Circuit Court U. S. (Dorgan v. Tel. Co., 1 Am. L. T. Rep. (N. 8.) 406). Georgia (Western &c. Co. v. Fontaine, 58 Ga. 299; Western &c. Co. v. Blanchard, 68 ib. 299). Illinois (Tyler v. Western &c. Co., 60 Ill. 421 8S. ©. 14 Am. Rep. 38; Tyler v. Western &c. Co., 74 Ill. 168 8. C. 24 Am. Rep. 279). Indiana (Western &c. Co. v. Meek, 49 Ind. 53; Western &c. Co. v. Scircle, 103 ib. 227). Maine (True v. International &c. Co., 60 Me. 9 S. C. 11 Am. Rep. 156; Bartlett v. Western &c. Co., 62 Me. 209 S. C. 16 Am. Rep. 437). Onio (Barnesville Bank v. Western &c. Co., 30 Ohio, 555; Montreal &e. Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio, (N. 8.) 301 S. C. 41 Am. Rep. 500; Hood v. Western &c. Co., (Superior Ct. Cin.) 6 Am. L. Ree. 529). South Carolina (Pinkney v. Western &c. Co., 19 8. ©. i}. Suppose a telegram (ex. gr. cipher) fails to show that it is of any pecuniary value or importance, is the bur- den of proof upon the plaintiff, if he seeks to recover more than nominal damages and the cost of the tele- grain, to show by notice or otherwise, that the tele- grapher had knowledge of such value or importance? The affirmative is held by an almost moral unanimity of the courts. The dissenting decisions are: Alabama (Daughtery v. American &c. Co., 75 Ala. 168 S. C. 51 Am. Rep. 435; 18 ©. L. J. 428; 18 Rep. 299). TELEGRAPHY. * 405 Status—held a Common Carrier. California (Hart v. Western &c. Co., 18 Rep. 676; 4 Pace. Rep. 685). But the same case, on review, was substan- tially overruled by a bare majority of the court (Hart v. Western &c. Co., 66 Cal. 579 S. C. 56 Am. Rep. 119). Georgia (Western &c. Co. v. Blanchard, 68 Ga. 299 8. C. 45 Am. Rep. 480; Western Xv. Co. v. Fatman, 73 Ga. 285 S. C. 54 Am. Rep. 877). South Carolina—Dictum (Pinckney v. Western &c. Oo., 19 S. CO. 71; meagerly reported, 45 Am. Rep. 765). Virginia—Under Statute (Western &c. Co. v. Reynolds, 17 Va. 173 8. ©. 46 Am. Rep. 715). While there is a statute in this State, it is very general in terms (Ch. 65 Code, 1873), and the court treats the question on general principles. Status of the Telegrapher—This is viewed in three sepa- rate lights and by diverse decisions in some of the States. Some courts hold that he occupies the status of a common carrier: England (McAndrew v. E. T. Co., 17 C. B. 3 (84 B.C. L. B.) 8. 0. 33 B. L. & Eq. 180; All. T. C. 38). Canada (Bell v. Dominion &c. Co., Sup. Ct. Montreal; 25 L. C. J. 248 8. 0. 15 W. J. 123; 3 Leg. News, 405; Baxter v. Dominion &c. Co., 37 U. ©. (Q. B.) 470). California (Parks v. Alta &, Co., 13 Cal. 422 8. C. All. T. 0.114; 73 Am. Dee. 589). Indianal—Semble (Western &c. Co. v. Buchannan, 35 Ind. 440). Iowa—Goes to verge (Sweetland ». Illinois &. Co., 27 Towa, 433 S. C. 1 Am. Rep. 285). Maine—Semble (True v. International &e. Co., 60 Me. 9 8. C. 11 Am. Rep. 156). New York (Rittenhouse v. T. Co., 1 Daly, 475; 44 N.Y. 263 S. C. 4 Am. Rep. 673). 1(Central &c. Co. v. Bradbury, 106 Ind. 1). This case was applied to a telephone company, but the principle is equally applicable to a telegraph company. 406 TELEGRAPHY. "Status analagous to ‘Common ‘Carrier. Others hold that his status is analagous to that of a common carrier, and that he is called upon to exercise the utmost skill and diligence: Circuit Court U.S. (Dorgan v. Tel. Co.,1 Am. L. T. Rep. (N. 8.) 406, 410; Abraham v. Western &e. Co., 19 Rep. 583; White v. Western &e. Co, 22 Fed. Rep. 710). Georgia (Western We. Co. v. Fontaine, 58 Ga. 433; Western &c. Co. v. Blanchard, 68 ib. 299). Illinois (Tyler v. Western &c. Co., 60 Il. 421 8. 0. 14 Am. Rep. 38; 74 Ill. 168). Kentucky (Camp v. Western &c. Co., 1 Met. 164 8. C. 6 Am. L. Reg. 443). Louisiana (Shields v. Washington &c. Co., All. T. C. 5; 9 W. L. J., 583). Massachusetts (Ellis v. American &ec. Co., 13 Allen, 226; Grinnell ». Western &ec. Co., 113 Mass. 299 8. C. 18 so, Rep. 485; Redpath v. Western &c. Co., 112 Mass. 71). Michigan (Western &c. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525 8. C. 2 Thomp. Neg. 828). Missouri (Wann v. Western &c. Co., 37 Mo. 472). New York (DeRutte v. N. Y. &c. Co., 1 Daly 547; 30 How. Pr. 403; Baldwin v. U. 8. &c. Co., 45 N. Y. 7448. C. All. T. C. 6138; 6 Am. Rep. 165; Breese v. U.S. &e. Co., 45 Barb. 274 8. C. 8 Am. Rep. 526; 48 N. Y. 132; Schwartz v. A. & P. &c. Co., 18 Hun. 157; Leonard v. N. Y. &c. Co., 41 N. Y. 544 8. 0.1 Am. Rep. 446; El- wood v. Western, 45 N. Y. 549 8. C. All. T. C. 594). North Carolina (Lassiter v. Western &c. Co., 89 N. C. 334). Ohio (Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 145; Montreal &c. Co. v. Griswold, 37 ib. 301 S. O. 41 Am. Rep. 500). Pennsylvania (New York &c. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298 8S. ©. All. T. C. 157; Passmore v. Western &c. Co., 78 Pa, 238). South Carolina (Pinckney v. T. Co., 19S. C. 71 8S. C. 16 Rep. 635). Texas (Western S&c. Co. v. Neill, 57 Tex. 283; Western TELEGRAPHY. 407 “The third view. - &e. Co. v. Bertram, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. (White & Wilson), sec. 1152 8. C. 17 Fed. Rep. 825). Virginia (Western &c. Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173). Others still hold that they are only required to exer- cise reasonable skill and diligence: Maryland (Birney v. New York &e. Co., 18 Md. 341; Smithson v. U. 8. T. Co., 29 ib. 162 8. C. All. T. C. 385). Virginia (Western &c. Co. v. Hobson, 15 Gratt. 122 8. ©. All. T. C. 120). INDEX. 409 INDEX. A. ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT. (See Lrurratrons). ABSCONDING DEBTOR. (See Limitations). ACCEPTOR. (See ALTERATION). ACCIDENTAL FIRES. (See Rarnway Law). ACCOMMODATION PAPER. (See ALTERATION). ACCOUNT STATED. (See INTENSITY or THE PROOF). ACKNOWLEDGMENT. (See Limtrations). ACTION. (See ELEcTIVE FRANCHISE). ACTING MANAGER. (See Ratuway Law). ACTION FOR A LIFE lies not, under American Common Law, 1. such, at least, by weight of authority, 1. decisions to the contrary, 2. subject discussed, 2-4. continental law, as to, 4. ACT OF GOD. (See IntTENs!TYy). ADJOINING LAND OWNERS. (See Raruway Law). ADMINISTRATOR. (See Action For A Lire; Limrravions). ADMIRALTY. (See Action For A Lire; LimrTarrons). ADULTERINE BASTARDY. (See IntEnstty or PRooF). ADULTERY IN DIVORCE. (See IntENsrty or Poor). ADVANCING MATURITY. (See Limrrations).’ ADVERTISEMENT. (See Conrract BY ADVERTISEMENT). AFTER EXECUTION. (See ALTERATION). AFTER STATUTE HAS RUN. (See Limirarions). AGENCY; misrepresentation, without fraud, by agent, 4. If principal is guilty, can he recover? 1 affirmative held, 4, 5. negative, 7. owner of premises, formerly liable for tort of contractor, 7. modern doctrine, contra, 8, 9. except in a few States, 9, 10. (See Rarpway Law). 410 INDEX. AGAINST INTEREST. (See ALTERATION). AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. (See INTENSITY oF PROOF). AGREEMENT AS DISTINGUISHED FROM PROMISE. (See Liur- TATIONS). ‘AGREEMENT NOT TO PLEAD BAR. (See LIMITATIONS). ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. when presumption before execution, 13, 18. when after, 15, 18, 19. if suspicious, how, 16. when a question for the jury, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25. how far affected by possession, 17. distinction between apparent and extrinsic, 17. view of the text-books, 20, 21, 22. doctrine discussed, 25, 26, 27. material, avoids, 27, 28, 29, 30. so held as to immaterial, when, 30, 31. filling blanks, effect of in negotiable paper, 31. 32, 33, 34. as to sealed instruments, by what courts rejected, 34, 35, 36, 37. by what courts sustained, 37, 38. effect of, by stranger, when vitiates, 38, 39. when not, 39, 40. point discussed, 40, 41, 42. suspicious alterations, 42, 43. against interest, 42, 43. apparent to be explained, 44. need not, 44. indorsements, 44. é submitted without evidence, 44. printed word, need not be explained, 44. in old documents, presumed rightful, 45. so as to indictments, records, 45. depositions and official papers, 45. evidence as to alterations in other papers, when and not admissible, 45. governed by the pleading, 45, 46. ALTER EGO. (See Ratuway Law). ANCIENT DOCUMENTS. (See ALTERATION). ANIMO MANENDI. (See Limrrations). ANTE NUPTIAL AGREEMENTS. (See MarriED WoMEN). APPARENT ALTERATION. (See ALTERATION; COMPARISON OF HAND- WRITING). APPEAL OF MURDER. (See Action ror A LIF®8). ARCHITECT. (See Raruway Law). ASSAULT. (See InvENstTy or PRooF). oe WITH INTENT TO COMMIT RAPE. (See INTENSITY OF ROOF). INDEX. : 41t ASSIGNEE, promise to. ‘(See Limrratrtons). AUCTION. (See Ratuway Law). R. BAGGAGE. (See Raruway Law). BAGGAGE MASTER. (See Ratupway Law). BAILMENTS. (See Rainway Law). BARON AND FEME. (See Marrrep Women). BASTARDY. (See InTENsIrvy). BATTEL, trial by. (See Action ror A LIFE). BEARING-OPERATOR. (See Ratpway Law). BEFORE EXECUTION. (See ALTERATION). BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (See Inrensitry &c.). BEYOND THE SEAS. (See Limitations). BIGAMY. (See Intensity, &c.). BILL OF LADING. (See Ratbway Law). BLASTERS. (See Same). BOILER-MAKERS AND BOILER-TESTERS. (See Samu). BOOKS IN EVIDENCE. (See OntaInaL EVIDENCE). BOUNDARIES. See Inrensiry, &c.). BOY NOT IN SERVICE. (See Rattway Law). BRAKESMAN. (See Same). BRIDGE-BUILDERS. (See Samg). BUCKING SNOW. (See Same). BURDEN OF PROOF. (See ALTERATION; INSANITY—WILLS; IN- TENSITY ; MARRIED WoMEN; OPTIons; ORIGINAL EvipeNcE; Ratn- way Law). BUILDING NEW TRACK. (See Ratuway Law). BUSINESS ENTRIES. (See OntetnaL EVIDENCE). C. CANCELLATION. (See Revestine TITLE). CAR-COUPLER. (See Raruway Law). CARRIERS OF GOODS. (See Same). CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. (See Samez). CASES OVERRULED, &c. (See Front or THE Book). CATTLE. (See Rarnway Law). CAUSE OF ACTION. (See Action ror A LIFE). 412 INDEX. CAVEATOR. (See Insanity; WILLS). CHAIN-CARRIER. (See Rammway Law). CHARTER. (See Same). CHILD BOUND FORITS PARENT’S NEGLIGENCE. (See Same). CIVIL DAMAGE LAWS. (See Inrensity, &c.). COAL-HEAVER. (See Ratnway Law). COAL-HOISTER. (See Same). COAL-MINER. (See Same). CORE LEON, (See Action ror A YR Luray Soe Skt (See LIMIrattons). COLLISION. (See IntEnstry, &c.). COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL. (See Rarnway Law). COMMERCIAL PAPER. (See AcENcy; ALTERATION, &C.). COMMON CALAMITY. (See Intensity, &c.). COMMON CARRIER. (See Rartway Law). COMMON LAW. (See Action For A LIFE). COMMON SENSE CRITERION. (See Rarmmway Law). COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. (See Ramway Law). COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING, doctrine generally denied, 47, 48. modified, as to writings in evidence, 47, et seg. in Pennsylvania, to be made by jury, 49, 52. in Tennessee, not allowed except by consent, 50. allowed as to ancient writings, 51. or when standards are agreed to be genuine, 7d. COMPULSORY LABOR. (See Raruway Law). CONCURRING NEGLIGENCE. (See Same). CONDUCTORS. (See Same). CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS. (See Inrensrry, &c.). CONNECTING LINES. (See Raruway Law). CONSENT OR PRIVITY OF DEBTOR. (See Limrratrons). CONSIDERATION. (See Guaranty; Oprions). CONSIGNORS AND CONSIGNEES. (See Ratbway Law). CONSOCIATION. (See Rarnway Law). CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Sce OrrFice). CONTRACTS BY ADVERTISEMENT. action lies, though not acted on, 53. contra, zd. in California, service must be performed, with intent to claim reward, 7d. \ INDEX. 413. CONTRACTS BY CORRESPONDENCE. posting an acceptance, in general, a consummation, 54. aliter in Scotland and Massachusetts, 7. CONTRACTS—SABBATH BREAKING, 7d. Lord’s day, generally, dies non, 7d. provisions of 29 Ch. 2, 7d. generally confined to ordinary calling, éd. variant statutes, 7d., 55. variant decisions on the statutes, 55. cheat in horse-trade, how viewed, 7d. mortgages, 56. taking possession of thing sold on Sunday, 7d., acts of charity, how viewed, 57. acts of necessity, how regarded, 57, 58. over-ripe crops must not be gathered, 58. nor crops be saved from grass, 7d. telegraphing, how viewed, 59. dies dominicus, &c., 7d. distinction between judicial and ministerial acts, 60, 61. Sunday verdict upheld, 61. contra, 7d. CONTRACTS, unsealed. (See ALTERATION). CONTRACTORS. (See AcENcy; Raruway Law). CONTRACTOR’S SERVANTS. (See Raruway Law). CONTRIBUTIVE NEGLIGENCE. (See Rartway Law). CONVERSION. (See INTENSITY). CONVEYANCES. (See Insantty—DEED; MarRIED WOMEN). CORRECTION AND IMPEACHMENT. (See InrEnsrry). COUPONS. (See Limrratrons). OREW. (See Rarpway Law). CRIM. CON. (See INTENSITY). CROSSINGS. (See Same). CRUCIAL TEST. (See Same). CRUELTY. (See INTENSITY). CUSTOM AS TO SIGNALS. (See Raruway Law). D. DAMAGES. (See INTENSITY). DANGEROUS GONTRIVANCES. (See Rarpway Law). DEATH. (See Action ror A Lire; OrrarnaL EVIDENCE). DEBT ALREADY BARRED. (See Limitations). DEBT OF MARRIED WOMAN. (See Marriep WoMEN). Al4 INDEX. DECK-HAND. (See Ratnway Law). ; DEED. (See InsanttY—DEED). eared toe Bes Ae IF. a) DEFAMATION. (See InTENsrTy). _ DEFECTIVE MACHINERY. (See Raruway Law). DEPOSITIONS. (See ALTERATION). DEPOT SUPERINTENDENT. (See Rarbway Law). DERRICK-HAND. (See Same). DETECTIVE. (See Samu). DEVISE. (See Limitations). DIES NON. See Contracts—SaBBaTH BREAKING). DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF SERVICE. (See Raruway Law). DIFFERENT MASTERS. (See Same). DILLON, J., opinion in the Sullivan case. (See AcTION For A LIFE), DIRECTIONS IN WILLS. (See Limitations). DIRECTORS. (See Ratupway Law). DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP. (See Limitations). DIVORCE. (See Intensity, &c.). DOCUMENTS. (See Comparison or HanDWwRITING ; Lim1rarrons). DOMICIL. (See Liurrations). DRAFTSMAN. (See Ratuway Law). DRAWERS OF IRON. (See Same). DRIVER OF COACH. (See Same). DRIVING BOSS. (See Same). DRY GRASS. (See Same). DUAL RELATION. (See Same). DUTCH-AUCTION. (See Same). Ei. EARNINGS. (See Rarpway Law). EJECTMENT. (See Inrensrry). ELECTIONS. (See ELECTIVE FRANCHISE). ELECTIVE FRANCHISE. : elector denied his vote may, in England, sue, . malice a necessary element in New York, 7d., 63. American authority opposed to English view, 63. but English view approved by Judge Cooley, id. ELECTIVE TELEGRAPH. (See TELEGRAPHY). INDEX. 415 ELEVATOR ENGINEER. (See Raruway Law). ELEVATOR OPERATOR. (See Same). EMINENT DOMAIN. (See Same). EMPLOYEES. (See Same). ENGINEER. (See Sams). ENGINE-OPERATOR IN FACTORY. (See Same). ENGINE REPAIRER. (See Samn). ENGINE STEAM-SHOVELLER. (See Same). ENGINE STRIPPER. (See Samr). ENTRIES. (See ORIGINAL EVIDENCE). EQUITABLE OWNER. (See Limrrations). EQUITIES. (See INTENSITY). ERASURES (Sce ALTERATION). ESTOPPEL. (See INsantry—Drep; Limrrations; SURETY). EVIDENCE. (See ORtGInaL EVIDENCE). EXCAVATOR. (See Rarupway Law). EXECUTION. (See Same). EXECUTORS. (See Lrmirations). EXPERTS. (See Comparison of HANDWRITING). EXPRESS AGENT. (See Ratuway Law). EXTRA HAZARDOUS RISKS. (See Same). EXTRINSIC AND APPARENT. (See ALTERATION). F. FALSE REPRESENTATIONS. (See AGENCY). FATAL MALPRACTICE. (See INTENSITY). FEES. (See Orrice). FELLOW-SERVANTS. (See Raruway Law’. FELONIOUS TRESPASS. (See INTENSITY). FEME COVERT. (See MarriED WoMEN). FEOFFMENT. (See Insantry—DzeEp). FILLING BLANKS. (See ALTERATION). FIREMAN. (See Ratuway Law). FIRES. (See Same). FLAGMEN. (See Sams). FORECLOSURE. (See Limrrartons). FOREIGN CORPORATION. (See Same). FOREMAN. (See Ratuway Law). 416 INDEX. FORFEITURE. (See INTENSITY). FORGERY. (Sce Same). FRANCHISE. (See ELectTIVE FRANCHISE; Ratuway Law). FRAUD may be replied, at law, 63, 64. denied, 64. negative view preferable, 65. rationale, zd. we should think under the old system, td. how in equity, ¢d. FRAUDS, statute of. (See Limrrations). FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS. (See AGENCY). FREE TRADER. (See MaRRIED WOMEN). FUTURES. (See Options). G. GANGER. (See Ratnway Law). GENERAL AGENT. (See Same). GENERAL MANAGER. (See Same). GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT. (See Same). GRADES OF EMPLOYMENT. (See Samer). GUARANTY—consideration must appear, 65, 68. need not, 68, 71. word “promise” generally used for agreement,” 73. rationale, 70, 71. H. HAND-WRITING. (See Comparison oF HANDWRITING). HEAD-STEVEDORE. (See Raruway Law). HEIRS. (See Limitations). HUSBAND AND WIFE. (See MarrreD WoMEN). L IDENTIFICATION OF PASSENGER. (See Rarbway Law). IDENTITY. (See Intensity). IDIOTS. (See Insanity). IMPUTABLE NEGLIGENCE. (See Ratuway Law). INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. (See AGENCY). INDORSEMENT OF PAYMENTS. (See Limrratton). INDORSEMENTS. (See ALTERATION). INDEX. 417 INFANTS. (See Rarpway Law ). INJUNCTION. (See Limitations). INSANITY—DEED OF NON-COMPOS held void, 71, 72. except feoffments with livery, zd. held voidable, by what courts, 72, 73. distinction between contract of marriage and others, 72. INSANITY—WILLS—ONUS PROBANDI, 73-77. burden on propounder, by what courts held, 73-75. on caveator. by what courts held, 75-77. non-expert testimony, by what courts allowed, 77. by what courts disallowed, 77, 78. (See OrnratnaL EvipENcE). INSPECTORS. (See Exective Francuise; Rarpway Law). INSTRUMENTS, sealed. (See ALTERATION). INSURANCE. (See INTENSITY). INTENSITY OF THE PROOF, 78-103. what, when criminality involved, 78. presumption of innocence as affecting, 79. rationale of the doctrine, 78-80. quantum as distinguished from, 80. when issue involves crime, preponderance sufficient, 80, 81 various expressions touching, construed, 81-83. account stated, what evidence required to prove, 83. adulterine bastardy, by preponderance, 83, 84. in other courts beyond a reasonable doubt, 84. alteration, what proof required, 7d. assault, by only a preponderance, 7d. even where, with intent to commit rape, / bankruptcy, fraud, how proved, 7d., 85. bastardy, in most courts, by preponderance, 85. contra in Wisconsin, 7d. bigamy, evidence in, éd. boundary, proved by preponderance, td. collision, evidence touching, 7d., 86. contracts, by preponderance, 86. conversion, same, éd. correction, same, 7d. but impeachment, indubitable, 7d. damages, how proved, id. damages for selling intoxicants, by preponderance, 86, 87. defamation beyond a reasonable doubt, where held, 87-89. by a preponderance, where held, 89, 90. divorce, for adultery, beyond a reasonable doubt, where held, 90. by preponderance, where held, 91. for cruelty, beyond a reasonable doubt, 7d. 27 418 INDEX. INTENSITY OF THE PROOF—continued. ejectment, outstanding title must be proved, beyond controversy, td. equities, how proved, 7d. fatal malpractice by preponderance, 7d. felonious trespass by preponderance, where, 7d., 92. the Maine view, 92, 93. forfeitures, by preponderance, 93. forgery, by same, 7d. fraud, how proved, éd., 97. confidential relations, beyond reasonable doubt, 97. identity, how proved, 7d. insurance beyond reasonable doubt, where held, éd., 98. only by a preponderance, where, 98, 99. letters-patent, by preponderance, 99. marriage, by same, 7d. mortgage to a feme-covert, evidence touching, 7d. negligence, by a preponderance, ¢d. negotiable instruments, want of consideration, by preponderance, 7d. notoriety, how proved, 100. novation, how proved, 7d. penalties, by preponderance, 100. resulting trusts, how proved, 7d., 101. renewals of leases, how proved, 101. seaworthiness, how proved, éd. seduction, by preponderance, éd. survivorship in common calamity, by preponderance, 7d. torts, in general, by preponderance, éd. usury, beyond reasonable doubt, where held, 102. by preporderance, where held, id. wills—knowledge of contents—proof touching, id., 108. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. (See InrENsrry). INVENTIONS. (See Samp). J. JOB-MASTERS. (See AcENcy). JOINT-OBLIGORS. (See Limrratrons). JOINT-STAFF. (See Rarnway Law). JUDGES OF ELECTIONS. (See Exzctrvg FRANCHISE). K. KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECTS. (See Rarnway Law). L. LAPSE OF TIME. (See Lim rrarions), LEASE. (See Rarnway Law). INDEX. 419 LETTERS. (See ContRacT BY CORRESPONDENCE). LETTERS PATENT. (See InrEnsiry). LIBEL. (See Same). LIFE. (See Action ror A Lire). LIMITATIONS. expression beyond seas, how interpreted in England, 103. how in the Federal Courts, 7d. they follow statal construction, id. where held synonymous with, “out of the State,” &c., 104. where “without the limits of the United States,” 104, 105. where, literally construed, 105. what Angell says, 7d. before Stat. Anne., confined to plaintiff, zd. return of defendant, what constitutes, 7d. absence of one joint-debtor saves bar, where, 7d., 106, not in New Jersey, 106. temporary absence avoids bar, where, 7d. where not, zd., 107. New York requires absence of one year, 107. absence in military service does not save bar, ¢d. Texas gives no effect to absence, 7d. expression “residing abroad” construed, dd. defendants never in State, absence deducted, 108. held otherwise, where, 109. foreign corporation not within the saving, id. it is, where, 110. one tenant barred, all are, éd., 111. this rule denied, 111. agreement not to plead bar, valid, zd. held invalid, where, 112. estoppel as applied to this point, 7d. how viewed in Texas, mutual notes, ¢d. action lies for breach of such agreement, 113. does not, 7d. rationale of the matter, éd., 114. promise after bar—nudum pactum, 114. aliter, if based on consideration, éd. promises, etc., on Sunday valid, where, 115. where not, 7d. coupons, rule as to, 7d. part-payment, etc., question of law, where, 116, 117. question for jury, where, 117, 118. declaration on old debt, where, 118, 119, 120. where, on the new promise, 120. weight of authority, as to, 121. payment after action available, where, ¢d. where not, 7d., 122. 420 INDEX. LIMITATIONS—continued. promise before and after bar, how viewed, 122. promise by one joint-debtor removes bar, where, éd., 123, 124, 125, 126. does not, where, 126, 127, 128. indorsement, before bar, valid, where, 128, 129. aliter, if bar had accrued, 129. presumption against, where, 129, 130. at least without consent or privity of debtor, 130, 131. held presumably sufficient, where, 131. discussion by author, 131, 132. part-payment by administrator, &c., held sufficient, where, 132. where not, ¢d., 133. promise to stranger available, where, 133, 184. denied, where, 134, 135, 186. how viewed by text-writers, 186. estoppel as affecting the point, 2d. may be used in corroboration, 187. part-payment, &c., by stranger not available, where, 137, 138. held sufficient, where, 138. debtor may ratify, ¢d. part-payment by surety takes case out, where, id., 139. where not, 139. part-payment by principal, &c., removes bar as to surety, where, 7d. where not, zd. promise to creditor available to assignee, where held, éd., 140. contra, 140. femes covert, when barred, ¢d., 141. when not, 141. after bar creditor may exhaust collaterals, d., 142. how viewed in Louisiana, 142. effect of injunction, 7d. giving collateral operates to revive, 7d. payment by sale of collateral does not revive, zd. except when, 7d. acknowledgment in collateral document available, where, 143. where not, 7d., 144, 145. rationale, 145. if are in document not executed by debtor, available where, 6. this doctrine rejected, where, éd. promise by partner, after dissolution, available where, 147, 148, 149. denied, where, 149, 150. how this point is viewed by text-writers, 150, 151. point discussed by the author, 151, 152. promise by administrator, &c., how viewed, 152, 153. acknowledgment by, held sufficient, where, 153, 154. express insufficient after the bar has accrued, 154, 155, 156. 1 INDEX. 491 LIMITATIONS—continued. discussed by the author, 156. promise by one of several administrators held sufficient, where, id., 157. held unavailing, where, 157. directions in wills as to realty held sufficient, (England), 158. but not as to personalty, ¢d. English view as to debts barred, ¢d. English view followed, where, 159, 160. rejected, where, 160. bar of mortgage debt, bars mortgage, where held,,7d., 161. denied, where, 162, 1638. decisions how reconcilable, 164. bar of trustee, bar to cestui que trust, where held, 164, 165. denied, where, 165. if no one to sue, statute does not run, 7d., 166, 167. it does, held where, 167. Lp. CAMPBELL’S ACT. (See Action For A LiFe). LIMITING LIABILITY. (See Rarnway Law; TeLeerapuay). LIQUOR SELLING. (See InTENsrTy). LIVE STOCK. (See Ratpway Law). LORD’S DAY (See Conrracts—SaBBATH BREAKING). LUNATIC. (See Insanrry). M. MALPRACTICE. (See InrTENsrry). MARRIAGE. (See Same). MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. (See MarrieD WomEn). MARRIED WOMEN. contracts of, how viewed, English doctrine, 167. must profess to act as a feme sole, zd. courts following the English view, 168, 169, 170. no power unless conferred in creating instrument, 171, 172. or the debt is made with reference to the estate, 172. or, for its benefit, 173. or, for the benefit of the wife, 7d. where held, 173, 174, 175. in New York, how viewed, 175. how in North Carolina, 176. in Ohio, Rhode Island and Vermont, 177. in Wisconsin, 178. decisions under statutes, 7d. doctrine reviewed and discussed, ¢d., 179, 180. her conveyances, English view, 180. in Alabama she may convey, unless restrained, 180. 429 INDEX. MARRIED WOMEN—continued. Alabama doctrine followed, zd., 181. treated, quoad hoc, as a feme sole, where, 181, 182. power denied unless conferred, where, 182, 183, 184. must be conveyed with full formality, where held, 184. may bind herself as surety, where held, 185, 186. denied, where, 186, 187. may mortgage for another's debt, where held, 187, 188. denied, where, 188, 189. MASTER AND SERVANT. (See Acmncy; Rartpway Law). MATERIAL ALTERATION. (See ALTERATION). MAXIMS. (See Page rn Front). MIDDLEMAN. (See Rarnway Law). MINERS. (See Same). MINORS. (See Same). MISREPRESENTATIONS. (See AGENCY). MORTGAGES. (See Intensity; Limrrations). MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. (See AcENcy). N. NEGATIVE PROOF. (See Intenstty). NEGLIGENCE. (See Action ror A Lira; Inrensrry; Rarway Law; TELEGRAPHY). NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (See ALTERATION; INTENSITY). NEVER IN THE STATE. (See Liwrrations). NEW PROMISE. (See Same). NON EXPERTS. (See Comparison or Hanpwritine; Insanrtry— WILLs). NON-RESIDENTS. (See Limitations). NOTICE. (See Rarpway Law). NOTORIETY. (See Inrensrry). NOVATION. (See Intensity). NUDUM PACTUM. (See Limitations; Oprtrons). O. OBSTRUCTED VIEW. (See Raruway Law), OFFICE. is property, where held, 189. denied, where, ¢d., 190. holder may be legislated out, where held, 190. INDEX. 423 OFFICE—continued. ‘denied, where, éd. how if created by constitution, éd., 191. salary may be diminished, where held, 191, 192). denied, where, 192.’ distinction as to contract to pay for services, 7d. so as'to constitutional provision touching, id. OFFICIAL PAPERS. (See Liurratrons). OLD DOCUMENTS. (See ALTERATION; COMPARISON OF HANDWRIT- Ing; LimrratTrons). ONUS PROBANDI. (See BURDEN or PROOF). OPTIONS. promise to sell without more, not actionable, where, 193. is where, 7d. the holding of the text-writers, stated, 194. ORIGINAL CONSIDERATION. (See Limitations). ORIGINAL EVIDENCE—ENTRIES. proof of death held pre-requisite to admissibility of, where, 194, 195, 196, 197. exception if out of the jurisdiction, 197. or insane, 7d. OUT OF THE JURISDICTION. (See Limrratrons). OUT OF THE STATE.. (See Same). OUTSTANDING TITLE. (See Intensrty). OVERRULED CASES. (See Front oF THE Boox). BP, PARENT'S NEGLIGENCE imputable to child. (See Rarnway Law). PAROL CONTRACTS. (See ALTERATION; CoNTRACTS). PARTNER, promise by. (See Limrrarrons). PART-PAYMENT. (See Same). PASSENGER. (See Rarnway Law). PAYMENT AFTER ACTION. (See Limrrations). PENALTIES. (See INTENSITY). ; PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. (See Limitations). PLEADING. (See ALTERATION; Limitations; RaAILway Law). POSSESSION. (See ALTERATION). PREPONDERANCE OF TESTIMONY. (See Intenstry). PRESCRIPTION. (See LimrraTtons). PRESUMPTION. (See ALTERATION; LIMITATIONS). PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. (See AGENCY). 424 INDEX. PRINCIPAL DEBTOR. (See SuRETIXzS). PRINCIPAL DEBTOR, acknowledgment by. (See LrumiraTrons). PRINTED WORDS. (See ALTERATION). PROMISE AS DISTINGUISHED FROM AGREEMENT. (See Guar- ANTY). PROMISE BEFORE AND AFTER BAR. (See Limirarions). PROMISE BY JOINT DEBTOR. (See Same). PROMISE BY PARTNER. (See Same). PROMISE TO WHOM MADE. (See Same). PROMISSORY NOTE. (See ALTERATION). PROOF. (See InTENsrry). PROPERTY IN OFFICE. (See Orfice). PROPOUNDER. (See Insanrry—WILLS). PROXIMATE INJURY. (See Rainway Law). Q. QUANTUM MERUIT. (See ContTracts—SassaTH BREAKING). QUANTUM OF PROOF. (See Inrensrry). QUANTUM VALEBAT. (See Contracts—SaBBaTH BREAKING). QUESTION FOR JURY. (See ALTERATION; ComPARISON oF HAND WRITING; Limitations; Rattway Law). R. RAILWAY LAW—Carriers of Goods. in action against, must show more than bill of lading, ect., where held, 197, 198. denied where, 198, 199, 200. bill of lading obliges delivery at the point of destination, where held, 202, 208, 204. only at terminus of his own line, where held, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208. apparent discrepancy, explained, 207. & question for the jury, where held, 208, 209. cannot stipulate against negligence, 209. contrary only held in New York, 7d. authorities apparently with New York, distinguished, etc., 210, 211. can limit liability as insurer by other means than a special contract, 211, 212, 218, 214, 215. denied where, 215, 216, 217. as to destroyed goods, carried under an exempting contract, he discharges the burden of proof that the loss fell within the ex- ception, by proof thereof, where held, 217, 218, 219. other courts hold that he must also negative negligence, 220, 221. INDEX. : 495 RAILWAY LAW—Carriers of Goods—continued. the true rule suggested, 221, 222. not an insurer in carriage of live stock, where held, 222, 228. other courts hold him to full accountability, 223, 224, 225. unless injury attributable to viciousness, 228. Carrier of Passengers. selling through-ticket liable for actionable injury, occurring on connecting road, where held, 200, 201. denied, where, 201, 202. burden of proof is upon plaintiff to disprove his contributory neg- ligence, where held, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230. other courts hold contributory negligence to be a matter of defense, where held, 280, 281, 282, 233. question discussed, 234. negligence of parent, imputable to child, where held, 234, 235, 236, 237. the doctrine denied, where, 237, 288, 239. question discussed, 239, 240, 241. passenger assumes the negligence of his carrier, where held, 241, 242, 243. views of the text-writers, 242, 243. the doctrine is rejected, where, 243, 244, 245. how, with reference to goods shipped, 245. doctrine applied to party riding by invitation, 246. denied, where, 7d. doctrine discussed, 246, 247. though guilty of contributive negligence, if slight, as compared with defendant’s, may recover, 247, 248. this doctrine denied, where, 248, 249. injury to stock, discussed, 249, 250. presumption of negligence held to arise from sparks, etc., where, 250, 251, 252. denied, where, 252, 253, 254. presumption of negligence against rail road company for allowing dry grass, etc., to accumulate near its track, held where, 254. denied, where, 255, 256. ‘under statute making railroad companies liable prima facie, the defence of contributive nelgigence can be asserted, where held, 259. denied, where, 7d. leaving an aperture open in an adjacent building, constitutes con- tributory negligence, where held, 7d. denied, where, 7d., 260. go ag to allowing shavings, etc., pro and con, 260. proximate injury from fires discussed, 261, 262. other fires caused may be shown, where held, 262. denied, where, 7d. discussed, 262, 263. 28 426 INDEX. ‘ RAILWAY LAW—Carrier of Passengers—continued. persons crossing track must stop, look and listen, where held, 268, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268. obstructed or unobstructed view as affecting, 264, 265. not per se negligence, where held, 268, 269, 270, 271. if required by statute, party may rely on sign-board, etc., where ‘held, 271, 272. party may rely on sign-board, etc., where held, 271, 272. may not, where held, 272, 278, ¢'74. may, if it has been kept up as a custom, where held, 274. may not, where held, ¢d. lessor of railway is liable for lessee’s acts, where held, 275, 276, 277. this doctrine denied, where, 277, 278. Kansas view the true one, 278. receiver responsible for injuries, where held, 278, 279. not, where held, 279, 280. cannot be sued withont leave, where held, 280. can, where held, id. point discussed; 281. judgment must be paid out of earnings, where held, 281. negative held, where, 7d. subject discussed, 282. tangible property of, liable to sule, where held, éd., 283. cannot be, where held, 285. the true rule suggested, id. franchise, tolls, stocks, not salable, éd., 286. alter ego, who is, 286. consociation, doctrine of, where held 287, 288. grades of employment doctrine, where held, 288, 289. weight of authority, opposed, 289. different departments of service idea, where held, zd., 290. weight of authority opposed, 290. matter discussed, 7d., 291, 292. Fellow-servants and placemen following, held to be or not, ag indi- cated, (ellipsis “by what courts held” to be understood). Acting Manager and employee, are, when working together, 292. Agent to hire hands and foreman hired by him, are not, 7d. Architect and laborer, are not, ¢d. Bearing-Operator and laborers, are, 202. Baggage-Master and switchman, are, and conductor, are not, 293. and inspector, are not, ¢d. Blasters and rock-haulers, are, id. Boat-Rower and laborers, are, id. Boiler-Makers and boiler-testers, are, zd. Boy not in Service and conductor, are not, id. INDEX. ‘427 RAILWAY LAW —continued. Brakesman and engineer, are, 204, 296, 207, are not, 298, 299. and inspector, etc., are, 294, 205 and supervisor, etc., are, 294. and conductor, are, 294, 295, 296, 297. and car-repairer, are, 297. are not, 298. and brakesman, are, 295, 297. and train-dispatchers, are not, 298. and switchman, are not, 298. and inspector, are not, 298. and section-master, are not, 298, 299. and track-repairer, are not, 298. and master-machinist, are not, 299. and laborer, are, 299. and section-hands, are not, 299. and mechanic, are not, 299. and general manager, are not, 299. Bridge-Builders and carpenters, are, 299. Bucking Snow. (See Fireman, infra). Burden of Proof of negligence is upon the plaintiff, 300. Car-Coupler and brakesmen, are, 300. and car-inspector, are not, 300. and conductor, are, 300. and engineer, are, 300. and fireman, are, 300. Carpenter and flagmen, track-repairer, superintendent, mason, laborer, switchman, foreman and plumber, are 301. and engineer, draftsman, are not, 7d. Chain-Carrier and conductor, are, 301. Coal-Heavers. (See TrRack-WALKER). Coal-Hoister and other employees, are, 301. Coal-Miner detailed to repair track, and conductor, are, 301. Collision occurring, can operatives of either train recover for injury? 302. Common Sense Criterion as to what constitutes common employ- ment, 302. Comparative Negligence, as affecting the subject, ad, 428 INDEX. RAILWAY LAW —continued. Compulsory Labor, how viewed, id. Conductor and baggage-master, are, 302. and engineer, are, 302, 303, 304. and fireman, are, 302. and wood-hauler, are, 302. and car-coupler, are, 303. and brakesman, are, 303, 304. and train-hands, are, 303. and laborer, are, 303. and coal-miner, are, 303. and track-repairer, are, 303, 304. and section hands, are, 304. and engineer, are not, 304, 305. and train-hands, are not, 304, 305. and brakesman, are not, 304. and boy not in service, are not, 305. and fireman, are not, ¢d. and gravel-train hand, are not, dd. and laborer, are, 7d. and section-master, are not, ¢d. riding free, substantially a passenger, éd. driving engine, how to be regarded, dd. of construction train and laborers, are not, éd. of freight train and brakesman, are not,