a University Library E 727.W tii wnfall of Spain :naval history of ANT THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN NAVAL HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR Frontispiece. ADMIRAL DEWEY. Reproduced by kind permission of Mr. C. Klackner, 12 Haymarket, London, and 7 West 28th Street, New York, THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN NAVAL HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR BY EH. W. ps seo (SOMETIME SCHOLAR OF a COLLEGE, OXFORD) AUTHOR OF ‘IRONCLADS IN ACTIO WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, AND BATTLE PLANS BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 1900 Tat W74 /74 200 RicHarp Cray & Sons, LimiTxp, Lonpon & Bunaay. By transter OCT 26 1915 wai UP . Cuenta BUACATE FCI GGED PREPACE INNUMERABLE works have already been written upon the Spanish-American War. I can only plead as my excuse for adding one to the number, that the present work was almost completed in the autumn of 1808, before this flood of books and articles had issued from the press. It was, however, delayed from time to time by the necessity of re-writing first this and then that portion, in the light of fresh.evidénce. Thus the book has been written twice—in some chapters thrice—over. The interest of this war lies in the complete informa- tion which we possess on the American side. The United States Navy Department gives to the world freely what it knows, and does not hide its secrets away in confidential reports. On no other naval war as yet waged have we such a wealth of evidence; and hence the history of this three months’ struggle is far more instructive than might a year ago have been expected. That a free and intelligent nation gains by publishing the facts cannot be disputed. The most insignificant naval incidents seem to be followed with interest by the press vi PREFACE and public of the United States. We can well under- stand this interest. If the American Army was unprepared, the Navy was ready when the struggle came ; it was free from political jobbery ; it did its work splendidly ; and its fine achievements have endeared it to the heart of the people. And, whilst the spectacle of our kinsmen winning such brilliant victories upon the element which we have always claimed, rightly or wrongly, as our own, appealed to us as a nation in a peculiar degree, we can yet feel deep sympathy with and compassion for Spain. There was infinite tragedy in the spectacle of a people going to certain defeat, because national pride would not permit it to abandon its colonies at the dictate of a stronger Power. We can best learn what the thoughts of Spaniards were by interrogating our own hearts as to what ours would have been under such circumstances. There is something pitiful and moving in the very poverty and resourcelessness of that unhappy squadron which the council of Spanish admirals sent to perish on the far-off beaches of Cuba; something that appeals to us with especial force in the useless heroism and devotion of the weak, ill-fed garrison of Santiago. With her medizval organisation and eighteenth-cen- tury methods, Spain was, indeed, bound tosuccumb. In this hour of her defeat she produced not a man. What credit in the war was won by her sons, was won by her soldiers and seamen, not by her generals and admirals. PREFACE vii Cervera was personally brave; he was chivalrous to a degree ; and he was badly used by the politicians, yet he cannot be described as a great or commanding figure. As an Englishman, who will hardly be accused of any political bias in American affairs, I cannot refrain from expressing surprise at the unjust and cruel attacks which have been made in the American press upon Admiral Sampson, or from expressing admiration for the dignity, self-restraint, and nobility of heart with which he has borne himself under them. To Englishmen his ceaseless vigilance, his wise dispositions, his correct and accurate judgment, and his high courage seem to have deserved another recompense. And that I believe is the opinion of all Americans worthy the name. In this volume are incorporated small portions of various articles which I have written upon the war for the National Review, United Service Magazine, Harper's Magazine, Army and Navy Journal of New York, and others, but in no case have the articles from these sources been incorporated whole. They have been re-written and re-cast, since much in them has been affected by later evidence. The description of the American ships is taken from Jvonclads in Action, edition 5, corrected and brought up to date. The loss of the Maine, which is a naval incident of the utmost interest, has been included as it logically should be in a history of the naval war. My object being to print matter which shall be useful to the naval student, I have, as far as possible, given viii PREFACE important orders, dispositions, and descriptions in the words of the first-hand authorities—irritating though such interpolations may seem to some who hold that the writer should tell his own story. Some passages in trans- lations, prepared for the American Navy Department, I have altered to make the English more intelligible, but without affecting the sense. I have to thank Mr. Hearst of the New York Journal for his great kindness in permitting me to reproduce as many as I liked of his most interesting and valuable photographs, taken during the war. The United States’ Navy Department and the Sczentzfic American have also kindly allowed the reproduction of illustrations of which they hold the copyright. H. W. Wiutson. 144, Elgin Avenue, London, W. CONTENTS CHAPTER I THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE Riots at Havana The Maine arrives . She is blown up, Feb. 1 5s 1898 Experiences of the survivors Some narrow escapes . Admirable behaviour of the officers The death roll . The Court of Inquiry ‘ Did the magazines explode? Various hypotheses . The bunkers near the ne Divers’ evidence Signs that the 10-inch magazine exploded Verdict of the Court Difficulties which it involves No upheaval of the ship 5 How was the mine placed in position ? Motive for her destruction . Consequences of the affair CHAPTER II STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS American ships ready for sea in April The battleships described The monitors ; Armoured cruisers Cruisers Gunboats Torpedo flotilla PAGE a oe wm OO AM WwW A 16 18 19 24 26 28 29 31 33 37 x CONTENTS Auxiliary craft . Spanish ships ready for sea in April Added later Their description Torpedo flotilla Comparison of the two fleets Spanish auxiliaries Personnel of the two Navies Quality of the two forces The Naval Militia . Strength of American crews Spanish want of training Resourcelessness of the Spanish fleet . Idle boasts . Paper comparisons worthless : No Spanish plan of operations prepared . CHAPTER III PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST Cervera’s strategic views Captain Conchas’s views Raids considered An attack on the Ovegon A movement to Manila considered Cervera’s complaints of his fleet Council of war . Cervera ordered to the West Indies Remonstrances of Spanish Naval Officers The U.S. Navy Department forbids the bombardment of Havana Admiral Sampson’s proposals . j Bombardment panic in the U.S. Why no attempt was made to get touch of the é canis An attack on San Juan . ‘ i Sampson selected for command Plans in the eastern field of war Voyage of the Oregon , Captain Clark’s tactical views CHAPTER IV y THE WAR IN THE EAST Preliminary American movements Dewey leaves Mirs Bay . Enters Manila Bay Fired on by the Spanish forts 121 123 124 126 CONTENTS Condition of the Spanish squadron Admiral Montojo’s preparations Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898 The CRISTINA steams out to ‘the attack Dewey’s withdrawal The battle is resumed Spanish losses . . Effect of the American fire on the Spanish ships . Number of American hits . American deductions . Effect of the Spanish fire on the American ships Guns and appliances Narrow escapes The battle an execution Compared with the Nile Details of the victory delayed The need of bases Blockade of Manila American troops despatched Camara’s wanderings Dewey reinforced Capture of Manila . Transport difficulties Tables . CHAPTER V THE CUBAN BLOCKADE American fear of raids . Disposition of U.S. fleets Disposition of Spanish fleets Blockade of Havana begins, April 22, 1898 The Winslow at Cardenas Cable-cutting at Cienfuegos Cervera puts to sea, April 29, 1898 Sampson moves eastward . ‘ He attacks San Juan Results of the action Why he drew off News of Cervera’s arrival in the West Indies reaches him Sampson proceeds to Key West The Navy Department’s moves The Harvard gets touch of Cervera Schley’s Flying Squadron moves south Cervera’s voyage . Delays and mistakes xi PAGE 129 131 132 134 136 138 140 142 145 146 “147 149 150 152 154 156 158 160 161 162 165 168 169 171 174 176 178 180 183 186 188 190 193 196 197 199 201 202 204 205 207 208 xii CONTENTS At Curacao Arrives at Santiago, May 19 “State” of U.S. Navy in mid-May Schley proceeds to Cienfuegos He blockades Cienfuegos Fails to move to Santiago . Sampson in the Bahama Channel Orders of battle Sampson and Schley Schley retires from Santiago His grave error . Returns and forms the blockade, May 28 , The Spanish Squadron located First bombardment of Santiago Santiago described Fortifications CHAPTER VI CERVERA AT SANTIAGO Cervera’s arrival—general] disillusionment His delay in coaling Blanco’s correspondence with Cervera Capture of the Restormel Cervera’s last opportunity lost . “ Corking up the bottle” The Merrimac episode, June 3, 1898 . Chivalrous conduct of Cervera Bombardment of the Santiago forts, June 6 é Little damage inflicted on the forts Moral effect of the bombardment small Seizure of Guantanamo, June 7 Fresh bombardment of Santiago, June 14 and 6 Arrival of Shafter’s Expedition, June 20 Phantom fleets . Sampson’s orders for the disembarkation . The landing Spanish mistakes ; Cervera and Blanco exchange telegrams Cervera’s complaints and predictions of disaster . Cervera ordered to prepare to leave Sampson’s dispositions for the blockade Strain of the blockade . No torpedo attacks . g Engines and boilers in Sampson’s fleet Shafter’s check of July 2 PAGE 210 212 214 216 219 220 222 223 225 227 228 230 231 232 234 237 239 241 242 245 246 248 250 252 253 256 258 259 262 263 264 267 270 272 273 277 279 282 284 285 287 289 CONTENTS Cervera ordered to leave Council of war Last preparations Cervera goes out, July 3 CHAPTER VII. THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1808. Sampson leaves the blockading force, July 3. Preparedness of the U.S. fleet to steam . Signs of an imminent sortie “The enemy’s ships are escaping” The battle opens The Spanish destroyers crushed Their terrible condition The TERESA on fire She heads for the shore The OQUENDO follows her The Vizcaya fearfully punished The CRISTOBAL COLON’s battle She surrenders . American chivalry . The Jndiana’s fine work 5 The Ovegon distinguishes herself . The /owa in action The Zexas’ share of the battle | The Brooklyn’s turn Schley’s much-canvassed action Bravery of the Brooklyn's crew Spanish losses i Why the Spaniards steually failed Hits on the Spanish ships . American gunnery j : Artillery strength of the fleets Value of target practice Defensive strength of the fleets Speed of the fleets Torpedoes not used : ‘ An engineers’ and captains’ battle Lessons of the action—risk of fire . Extinction of fires in battle Injuries to the Spanish ships Recommendations of the U.S. Board. Big guns in the battle Disposition of atmour The conning-tower and its value . xiii PAGE 291 26. 295 2b. 297 298 300 301 302 304 306 308 310 312 314 315 318 319 321 323 324 327 329 330 332 334 335 338 339 342 344 346 348 350 351 354 356 358 363 365 369 372 xiv CONTENTS The engineers’ work Decisive results of the battle Santiago bombarded again, July 10-11 Santiago surrenders, July 13 CHAPTER VIII CABLE-CUTTING, AND MINOR INCIDENTS OF THE WAR IN THE WEST Mythical Spanish fleets The S¢. Louzs cuts cables off Santiago Difficulties of cable-cutting The Yankee and GALICIA, June 12 The S¢. Paul and TERROR, June 22 Attacks on Manzanillo Destruction of Spanish shipping at Manzanillo Seizure of Nipe Bay : The blockade of Havana Difficulties of the blockade Force required . . Effectiveness of the blockade Sufferings of Havana Possibilities of blockade-running 3 Performances of blockade-runners CHAPTER IX THE PUERTO RICO CAMPAIGN, AND SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM THE WAR General Miles sails from Guantanamo Lands at Guanica . Intended bombardment of San Juan ‘i Management of war by Boards Want of secrecy Forts against ships . Use of marines . 5 Engineering experiences Torpedo boats and their value . Effect upon commerce AUTHORITIES INDEX PAGE 374 375 378 379 382 384 387 391 392 395 398 403 404 407 410 413 415 421 422 424 426 428 430 433 435 438 440 442 445 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FACES PAGE Admiral Dewey 3 ‘ 5 . Frontispiece - The Wreck of the Maine . “ 2 P j s 24 The U.S. battleship Jowa é : : : ‘ 3 44 The U.S. cruiser Columbia ‘ : ; : : 50 The Spanish armoured cruiser VIZCAYA ‘ ; : s 62 Rear-Admiral Sampson. : : ‘ : : 112 The U.S. cruiser Baltimore. j ' : ; : 126 The U.S. revenue cutter McCulloch ‘ : ; zb. The U.S. cruiser Olympia. ; Q ‘ ; : 132 Admiral Montojo . : : é 152 The U.S. armoured cruiser New York : , ‘ 182 The U.S. monitor Amphitrite ‘ 4 ‘ s 196 Admiral Cervera 2 : ‘ 4 : 240 The U.S. dynamite cruiser Vesuvius : : : 262 The U.S.S. Suwanee, Vixen, and St. Louzs at Siboney % 270 The U.S. cruiser Mew Orleans off Santiago ‘ é : 283 Chief Engineer Milligan of the Oregon ‘ ‘ : ; 298 The U.S. armoured cruiser Brooklyn. ; ; 300 The Spanish destroyer PLUTON ‘i ss ‘ 304 The Maria TERESA: broadside view of wreck ‘ ; ¥ 310 The OQUENDO: stern view of wreck . és ‘ ‘ 312 The VIZCAYA : starboard-quarter view of wreck . ‘ : 314 The wreck of the CRISTOBAL COLON . : : : 320 The Oregon immediately after the battle . ; 3 i 324 The Maria TERESA: hole in 55-inch gun-shield_. 5 ; 352 Ss after turret z ; : ‘ 26. The IsLA DE Luzon: wreck after Manila. : ‘ 26. The Maria TERESA : interior view, showing effect of fire ‘ 354 The Gloucester bombarding Guanica . ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 422 MAPS, PLANS, AND DIAGRAMS FACES PAGE The Maine: profile . : ‘ ; : 8 3 5 plans of main and berth aes : ‘ ‘ 10 Forward bunkers and magazines of the Maine 3 ‘ é 16 Forward portion of the /azne, from divers’ sketches. 26 Elevation and deck plan of the Judiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon 49 ‘ Elevations of the Brooklyn, Texas, Jowa, New York, MARIA TERESA, and COLON é ‘ 3 ‘ : : 60 The Central Atlantic ‘ F ‘ : ‘ : 88 The Bay of Manila. ; 3 . P ; 124 The Island of Cuba ‘ : : : ‘ . 175 The action at Cardenas : : : ‘ : 186 The harbour of Cienfuegos : : ae 20. The bombardment of San Juan 3 i ‘ 194 Puerto Rico ‘ : 3 . ; 2b. The Theatre of War in the West ; ; 3 208 Sampson’s (1) order of cruising. ‘ 3 ‘ ; 222 3 (2) second order of battle . : : 2b. 5 (3) third order of battle ‘ é j 2b. Port of Santiago j ‘ F ‘ 234 Port of Guantanamo : : 3 : 260 Telegraph system of the West Indies . ; : 4 2b. Blockade of Santiago: dispositions of June2... 4 284 3 5 final dispositions . 20. First phase of the battle of Santiago, oe to ‘the New York Sun. s 302 Positions of U,S. ships when Geren came out A . 5 tb. Coast near Santiago ; . ‘ 2b. The official U.S. plan of the battle of Santiago : , 306 Elevations of Jowa and Brooklyn, showing external i apres: 328 Elevation of MARIA TERESA showing hits. , : 358 ‘5 5» CRISTOBAL COLON ,, % 4 2b. ” ” VIZCAYA ” ” ¢ . : 360 5 35 OQUENDO ; ‘ : 2b. Plans of Nipe Bay, Niguero, and ‘Manzanillo : ; ; 396 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN NAVAL HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR CHAPTER I THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE In December 1897 the growing tension between Spain and the United States inspired the American Government with anxiety for the safety of its numerous citizens in Havana. Accordingly the second-class battle- ship Mazne, Captain C. D. Sigsbee, was ordered south from Norfolk to Key West.? Captain Sigsbee was 1 Century (Captain Sigsbee), 57. 674, etc., etc. Destruction of United States Battleship Maine. Report of Court of Inquiry (cited as Znguiry), Washington, 1898. Files of Suz and Army and Navy Journal, 2 The A/aine was a twin-screw ship of 6682 tons. On the water-line she had a belt of armour six to eleven inches thick and 180 feet long. She had two turrets with 8-inch armour, resting upon redoubts of 10 to 12-inch armour, and these again stood upon the protective deck, which was from two to four inches thick. The turrets were disposed ex éche/on, the forward one to starboard and the after one to port. In each was mounted a pair of 10-inch guns. Six 6-inch guns were mounted on the ship’s super- structure. The boilers were eight in number, placed in two boiler- rooms. There were two masts and two funnels. The ship was 318 feet long, fifty-seven feet in beam, and drew twenty-one and a half feet. On trial she steamed eighteen knots. B 2 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February informed that in case of serious disturbances at Havana, he was to take his ship to that place and protect American interests. General Lee, the United States Consul-General for Cuba, was to give the word when he considered the presence of the ship necessary. Such a visit, even where strained relations exist, is in no way contrary to international usage, though under the circumstances the despatch of so exceedingly powerful a ship as the Mazne to the capital of Cuba had in it something very like a note of menace. On January 15, 1898, and the following days there were riots at Havana, accompanied by hostile demon- strations on the part of the Spanish volunteers against the United States. On the 24th Consul-General Lee was informed by the American Government that it was intended to “resume the friendly naval visits at Cuban ports,” and was told that the Mazne would reach Havana in a day or two. Armed with the telegram, Consul Lee interviewed the Spanish authorities on the afternoon of the 24th. They not unnaturally protested, insisting that the United States must have ulterior objects in sending the ship. They asked that, as delay did not matter, if the visit was really for friendly purposes, the despatch of the AZazne should be postponed until Madrid could be con- sulted. General Lee had himself, before this interview, telegraphed that the visit should not take place for six or seven days, to allow the excitement in the town to cool down. But the ship had already started, leaving Key West on the evening of the 24th; and even if the authorities at Washington had desired to delay her, it is doubtful whether they could have succeeded in doing so. February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 3 About 11 a.m. of the 25th the Mazne arrived off the entrance to Havana harbour. A Spanish pilot was forthwith sent off to her; he brought her in, and con- ducted her to Buoy No. 4. It was noted, when her bearings had been accurately determined, that Buoy No. 4 was not quite in its charted position, and it was after- wards stated by Captain Stevens, of the American mail steamer, City of Washington, that he had never known a man-of-war to be anchored at this buoy, and that it was the least used one in the harbour.’ The J/azne was placed 250 yards from the Spanish cruiser ALFonso XII, and 400 yards from the German warship Guezsenau. Subsequently other ships arrived, and were moored at distances of over 200 yards from her. Room had, of course, to be given for the vessels to swing at their buoys, so that there was nothing suspicious in this. The American officers maintained fairly friendly relations with the Autonomist Government, then recently established at Havana, but were very coldly received by the Spanish officers. Only five or six of these visited the ship, and they showed no cordiality. The Maine had apparently been selected for this mission because of the tact and experience of Captain Sigsbee and the excellent discipline of her crew. As relations between Spain and the United States were exceedingly strained—almost to the point of rupture— great precautions were very rightly taken on board her to prevent an external attack or surprise. Extra sentries 1 This was hearsay evidence, given by Captain Sigsbee. Captain Stevens was examined by the Court, but not on this point, which seems extraordinary. 4 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN {February were placed on the forecastle and poop with loaded rifles ; one-fourth of the watch was kept on deck ready to go to quarters, and a small quantity of ammunition for the quick-firers was stored in the chart-house. Steam was kept up to work the turret guns in case they should be required. The sentries were directed to warn off all unauthorised boats approaching the ship. To prevent infernal machines being placed on board by visitors, all persons who came up the ship’s side were carefully watched, especially when they had packages ; they were accompanied below, if they went below; and after they had gone the places where they had been were examined. Extreme vigilance was required of the ship’s company. A few days after the Mazne’s arrival a proclamation was circulated—not, of course, by the Spanish authorities —calling upon Spaniards to avenge the insult of the Yankees in sending a man-of-war of their “ rotten squadron” to Havana, and concluding, ‘‘ Death to the Americans!” There was also on one occasion a hostile demonstration by a crowd crossing the harbour in a ferry-boat. Such incidents at least showed the necessity of caution. It was obviously impossible to sweep the harbour about the ship for mines, nor could the search- lights of the Mazne be employed at night, as this would have been an act calculated to offend the Spanish authorities. Captain Sigsbee notes that in the harbour the Maine looked much bigger than her real size; she seemed enormous, and the populace believed that she was the finest vessel in the American Navy. On the night of February 15, when the disaster occurred, the Spanish ships Atronso XII and Lecazp1 February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 5 were moored to starboard, about 200 or 250 yards away from the Mazme ; and the American mail steamer Czty of Washington, Captain Stevens, about 200 yards astern. The night was a calm and still one, very dark. All the evening the Mazne had swung steadily in one direction, and that a somewhat unusual direction. It was not, however, the only time that she had headed thus. What is perhaps significant is, that her position on this particular night and at this particular hour was precisely that which she would have occupied to engage the shore batteries had she been inside the harbour during war. The sentries noticed no boats, and there had been nothing to cause any suspicion of foul play. The officer of the watch was on deck ; Captain Sigsbee was in his cabin letter-writing ; the other officers were either sitting on deck, in the ward-room, or in their cabins ; the crew, 328 in number, were all on board, and except the watch on deck had turned in; at the starboard boom rode one of the ship’s steam launches, with steam up and a watch on board. At 9.40 the catastrophe occurred. Observers, sitting on deck in the Czty of Washington, heard what sounded like the noise of a shot. They looked, and saw the Maine's bow, as it seemed to them, rise a little out of the water. An instant later there came a terrible rush of fire and smoke, accompanied by an appalling and pro- longed concussion from rather forward of the ship’s centre. The middle of the ship seemed to fly back, and as darkness again settled over the water she sank. There appears to have been some shock conveyed by 1 Inquiry, 115. 6 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February the water at the first explosion, since the captain of a British vessel in the harbour deposed that he “thought his ship had been collided with.” All the observers outside the Maine who gave evidence agreed on the two explosions, the first sounding like a gun-shot. The evidence of the survivors on board is, as we should expect, much more confused. In such moments of extreme strain the mind is peculiarly apt to accept inaccurate impressions, and its estimates of time cannot be accepted as correct. Under the stimulant of a great shock an instant becomes many seconds or even minutes; acts become sub-conscious, and men afterwards as little remember what they felt or did, as a sleep-walker after waking knows what he has done in his sleep. This explains many discrepancies in the evidence of obviously honest witnesses. Moreover, the shock of the second explosion (if there were two) was so violent as to exert a stunning and numbing effect upon the brain in many of the men on board. To Captain Sigsbee it seemed that there was one prolonged, bursting, crashing roar, followed by the metallic sound of falling debris. To Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright there only appeared one very heavy shock, which half-stunned him by its violence. He noticed no list till after the explosion. Chaplain Chidwick speaks of one loud report, after which “everything became dark.” Lieutenant Holman felt first a ‘low grumbling,” and then a “ heavy booming explosion.” His first thought was that the ship had been destroyed by a very heavy mine. He noticed no list of the ship. Cadet Cluverius experienced a slight shock like the concussion of a 6-pounder gun, followed by a very great February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 7 vibration and a very heavy shock. Cadet Holden, standing by the side of Commander Wainwright at the time of the explosion, felt first a shock of considerable force, and then a terrible and most violent explosion. At the first shock the ship was lifted and thrown con- siderably over to starboard. Chief-Engineer Howell felt a shock, and then a continued series of convulsions, accompanied by a noise like the rending of the ship in pieces, and followed by a tremendous crash. After the explosions came a list to port. Paymaster Ray remem- bered only one violent upheaval, and this was also the experience of Surgeon MHenneberger. The surgeon observed also a list to port. Lieutenant Blow felt first the shock of a gun—of a very heavy gun—and then a terrific concussion. Lieutenant Jungen was conscious, not of an explosion, but of a dull roar followed by a terrific crash. Lieutenant Catlin of the Marines felt only one violent shock, at which all the lights went out. Cadet Bronson first felt something like the shock of a salute— or of a very small gun—and thereafter, or simultaneously, a tremendous shock. Cadet Boyd remembered a “ crash- ing booming,” and was half-stunned. It was preceded by a shock which resembled that of the coupling up of “a large freight train.” This would exactly agree with the sensation caused by “a 10-inch gun fired close aboard,” with which Lieutenant Blow compares the first shock. All these officers were below in the after part of the ship. On the quarter-deck or poop it seemed to Lieutenant Blandin, officer of the watch, that there were two explosions. He was all but knocked down, and 8 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February died some months later of the mental shock. He saw no water thrown up. To Lieutenant Hood, sitting on the port side of the deck, it appeared that there was first a big under-water explosion, felt rather than heard. At this he turned and looked forward, and saw the whole starboard side of the deck fly upwards, like the edge of the crater of a volcano. Flames rose, and there was a violent explosion. He thinks that a portion of the superstructure of the ship was in the air when he first looked, and that the first explosion opened up the ship. Private Anthony of the Marines, on sentry duty on the quarter-deck, noticed first “a trembling and buckling of the decks, and then a prolonged roar.” The ship instantly dipped forward to port, broke in the middle, and seemed to cant over to port. A sheet of flame rose to the sky. Boatswain Larkin remembers an explosion, but was stunned. Private McKay felt one shock, accompanied by an upheaval of the ship, and was “‘hit in the face” by a flash of fire. Assistant-Engineer Morris “saw fire and felt the ship going from underneath him.” Apprentice Ham heard a sharp report and saw a flash of light, then felt a second explosion, when the ship lifted right out of the water. Seamen Larsen and Moriniere felt a heavy jar, saw flame, and were thrown in the air. Coal-passer Melville, close to these two, and slightly forward of the after-turret, felt an “electric shock” right under his feet, followed by a heavy explosion. Seaman McCann, swinging in his hammock on the quarter-deck, felt a jar and saw a flash, followed by a heavy explosion. It should now be explained that the Mazne had three superstructures, rising from the main-deck. There was ‘dn uaaup sea Zr Surely J [99% 9y1 YY 07 WYSIay SY} SMOYS PIVAIOY 1eyS YOLTG oYT, "8g aufor me INIZVOVH OF WOO CHUM a ree MaVD Ww ore FULO4d C4VOEN/ ‘mumyy S*. aUL February] DESTRUCTION OF THE AINE 9 one forward; then a clear space and the forward turret to starboard; then the midships superstructure, with two funnels and two boat-cranes, the funnels fore and aft-on its centre-line, the cranes on either side rising from the main-deck abreast the after funnel. At the forward end of the superstructure was the conning-tower, with the chart-house above it; at the after end, inside the superstructure, on the port side, the galley, and on the starboard side the armoury. Abaft the midships superstructure and between it and the after super- structure, well over to port, was the after-turret. In the after superstructure were Captain Sigsbee’s quarters ; above it the mainmast and a search-light platform. Rising from the forward superstructure was the fore- mast. The crew was berthed in the forward and midships superstructure, and underneath the main- deck, on the berth-deck, forward, and amidships. The officers were berthed aft, where were the ward-room and the gun-room. It will be observed, that as the explosion was obviously located forward, the survivors suffered from the shock more and more the further forward they were situated. The after-turret and awnings spread over the quarter- deck screened from the concussion most of the officers and men abaft the turret. Seaman Reden, sleeping in the after-turret, as we should expect, felt no shock behind the thick armour, but woke to a blaze of fire and the rush of water entering the turret. Much forward of this turret very few men escaped, and their narratives are of exceptional interest. Corporal Thompson, swinging in his hammock on the port side of the superstructure, 10 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN _ [February twenty feet forward of the turret, was thrown in the air through the awning above him and was stunned. His first recollections were darkness, steam, agonised cries, and the thought that the Spaniards had opened fire. Apprentice Dreisler on the midships superstructure was stunned, Sergeant Mehan, abreast the after funnel on the main-deck, was hurled through the air into the water. Master-at-Arms Load and Landsman Kane, standing just inside the after end of the midships superstructure, saw a red flame; “it seemed as if it was a small boat had struck the ship”; then the deck trembled, opened, and in a blaze of fire they fell or rose, and found them- selves below with the water pouring upon them, under a heavy weight. A second explosion seemed to lift the weight, and they escaped to the port side of the super- structure. Kane thought that there came first a noise like a gun being fired very close to the ship, “and you heard the roar for a good while afterwards.” Landsman Fox, sleeping just forward of the fore funnel inside the superstructure, was thrown in the air, and heard a rattling and a roar. He smelt something like burning cloth. The place in which he had been sleeping, the lamp-room, was turned upside-down. Seaman Mattson, standing on the starboard side of the main-deck abreast the after funnel, saw smoke, went up in the air, and found himself some forty feet away, lying on the quarter- deck. The men in the steam launch, riding amidships, saw only a flash and heard one great explosion. The launch was struck by debris and upset. From the forward superstructure only four or five men “Buidosjs sem (11 -d) ol 'g 200f oF uewdieg aye S,UleMSyeOg aToyAL aoxld ayy syieur 1eys aUuL IIVAS MIY? VITO HUI vz00y7 TIM ny7 NOMYCONOD2Y a > &F00¥7 Nolvoowoz2¥ CMMI ‘aumYy ST ONL February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE II escaped, and those all wounded. Landsman Lanahan, sleeping there, was thrown through the deck above him and cut on the head. He felt “just a trembling, and everything seemed dumb,” but he was not burned. From the berth-deck only two men escaped. One was boatswain's mate Bergman, whose hammock swung well forward, about frame 10. Two men just underneath him were killed. He “heard a terrible crash—an ex- plosion, I suppose it was. Something fell, and then after that I got thrown somewhere in a hot place. . . . I got burned on my legs and arms, and I got my mouth full of ashes and one thing and another. Then the next thing I was in the water.” From the lower part of the ship, below the armour- deck, only one man escaped. This was Fireman Gartrell, who was lying down in the steam-steering room, two decks below the berth-deck. He could see through the door into the engine-room, when all at once a blue flash came by the engine-room lamp ; there was a continuous trembling of the ship, and a terrible report. It seemed as if ‘the whole earth had opened up.” Another man with him failed to escape, and that Gartrell got away is simply wonderful. When Captain Sigsbee felt the explosion his first instinct was to escape. Then, as the mind’s domination over the body returned, he groped his way out of the now pitch-dark cabin to the quarter-deck, and ran into Private Anthony, who with admirable coolness reported that the ship was blown up. On deck a group of officers and men had already gathered from the ward-room and gun-room. All behaved with the utmost coolness and 12 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February courage, and the discipline was all that could have been expected of a great Navy with splendid traditions. The Mazne’s officers and men had learnt the rule of honour and self-sacrifice, which service in any military force tends to strengthen. Without exception, they thought first, not of their own safety, but of putting the ship in astate of defence against attack, and then of rescuing the wounded, dying, and drowning. Sentries were posted at once; orders were given to flood the after-magazine; and as fire was showing in the formless heap of debris amidships, and ammunition there exploding constantly, attempts were made to get the flames under. The darkness was so intense that at first it was difficult to be certain what precisely had happened. Then it was seen that no crowd of men poured up from below; that the ship was fast sinking; and that there were men in the water and on the burning super- structure crying for help. What boats could be launched were promptly manned with officers and men and sent to the rescue. Commander Wainwright, with Lieutenant Hood and Cadet Boyd, climbed forward on the wreckage, in spite of the frequent explosions, and passed to the boats two injured men. The few unwounded survivors amidships also climbed on the awnings and debris to get the wounded away. These had to be thrown into the water to save them from the flames, when the boats -picked them up. Cadet Bronson, when a man was thrown some distance away from his boat, bravely leapt into the water, which was “boiling” with the suction of the sinking ship, and filled with all manner of wreckage, February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 13 swam to him, and saved him. Certainly this was one of the most gallant acts of that eventful night. Search-lights from other ships and from the shore were quickly turned upon the wreck ; boats from all the ships at hand sped to the rescue. The Mazne’s own boats now returned to the poop, which still remained above water. They reported that all the wounded and unwounded in the ship had been removed. Nothing more could be done, and as Commander Wainwright expressed some fear that the 10-inch magazine might have been carried up and lodged in the burning wreckage, in which case its explosion might be expected every minute, Captain Sigsbee gave orders to abandon the ship. There was a chivalrous scene—two officers offering Sigsbee their arm to step into the boat. But in conformity with naval tradition he declined this help, and was the last to quit his ship. All the night the superstructure and mass of debris continued to burn, and from time to time minor explosions of the small-arms’ and other ammunition, which had been placed on deck in readiness for im- mediate use, occurred. In this terrible catastrophe perished Lieutenant Jen- kins, Assistant-Engineer Merritt, and 252 petty officers and men, whilst 24 officers and 76 of the crew were rescued, of whom 59 were wounded. Seven of these died subsequently. Of the surviving officers, several had hairbreadth escapes. Jenkins was with three other officers in the ward-room, and seems to have struck his head against something. He was seen in the glare of some blazing cellulose to fling up his arms and fall ; or it may be that he was carried off his feet by the violent 14 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February rush of water. Merritt was sitting by Cadet Boyd in the gun-room, was separated from him by a rush of water and cloud of steam, and was probably lost in the same way as Lieutenant Jenkins. Boyd escaped. Even aft, on the berth-deck, the water rose almost at once to a height of only one foot from the beams of the deck above. Forward and amidships the men in the ship were probably for the most part killed painlessly by the explosion, and knew nothing of what had happened. Yet several of the survivors tell of cries from the marines’ compartment, and Captain Sigsbee speaks of “the awful scenes of consternation, despair, and suffer- ing down in the forward compartments of the sinking ship; of men wounded or drowning in the swirl of water, or confined in a close compartment gradually filling with water.” Let us at least hope that to the dead death came swiftly and mercifully. The morning after the disaster the wreck was ex- amined. Lying as it did in shallow water, thirty-three to thirty-six feet deep, on a soft mud bottom, the after superstructure and a great heap of wreckage amidships remained above the surface. The ship was found intact from the after end of the midships superstructure ; the after-mast still remained standing. The destruction began © just between the funnels, about the middle of the ship. Both funnels had fallen. Forward of this point the superstructure and deck were torn up and folded back. The conning-tower was blown upside down, so that the armoured tube leading down from it and the supports to it protruded in the air. Well forward three portions of wreckage showed above water, and these were identified February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 15 by officers of the AZazne as parts of the berth-deck, of the protective deck, and of the bottom of the ship at frame 17. The night of the explosion, Captain Sigsbee tele- graphed to the Navy Department announcing the catas- trophe, and urging that “public opinion should be suspended until further report.” He was well aware of the tremendous effect upon American feeling which would be produced by the destruction of a fine battleship in a port that was not altogether friendly. He felt in- stinctively that her loss would be ascribed to Spanish treachery, and he was above all anxious that his country should not be hurried into an unjust and precipitate war, before it should have been proved that the destruction of the Mazne was not due to internal causes. On February 19, Captain W. T. Sampson, Captain F. E. Chadwick and Lieutenant-Commander W. P. Potter were ordered to form a Court of Inquiry, and, meeting on the 21st at Havana, commenced their investigation into the causes of her loss. Upon their verdict it was felt by all would depend the question of peace or war. They sat continu- ously, taking the evidence of survivors, whilst the wreck was carefully examined by divers. Attention must be drawn to one or two points in the narratives of the survivors. The first explosion was to port, and caused a shiver throughout the ship. In the opinion of one of the officers on deck at the time, the ship’s deck forward flew back at the first explosion," when the second and more terrible explosion followed, rather to starboard, opening up the ship like the crater of a volcano. After, or simultaneously with, the first explosion, the 1 [nguiry, 123-4. 16 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN __ [February Maine rose in the water, and yet no column of spray was thrown up.! The electric lights in the ship had burnt steadily all the evening, and did not flare up before the explosion. The first shock did not affect them,” but at the second all went out. Thus it is clear that the dynamos escaped injury in the first explosion, and were destroyed by the second. This is a very important matter, as it helps to fix the place and cause of the two explosions. The witnesses nearest to the centre of the catastrophe hardly distinguish between the two explosions. No one, so far as can be discovered, escaped who was anywhere between frames 16 or 17 and frames 32 or 33, and therefore the presumption is that this was the centre of the explosion. The position of the two explosions is fairly clearly determined. The first was, as we have seen, well forward, rather to port. The second was more astern, and to starboard, under or near the forward turret. It is noteworthy that several of the witnesses consider that one of the magazines, if not more, must have been in- volved in the second explosion. Thus Lieutenant Jungen in his evidence states, the second explosion “ was more violent than any explosion I had heard, [so] that I could not liken [it] to anything, except possibly the explosion of a magazine.” The forward part of the ship, taking the usual conve- 1 Inquiry, 219. 2 Jb. 134—219, “ We saw her raising [rising] dy her Lights.” Con- tradicted, however, on p. 129 by Lieutenant Blow, who says that all lights were put out by the first explosion. Yet the compiler is inclined to trust the vivid impression of those outside the ship, supported as it is by Lieutenant Jungen (p. 134). ‘aumDypy 34} Jo soulzesey pue siayung premio 7 "gr 'Y anf OL * -TIWUNLISPNOD G3LNASNI ‘gi-siv' 9—e @ ‘SaaNna eeootpe meee ‘awmveguned 7, NTWOWA HE a ea ozi_se 98 Le 8% 6t/ Va PAs So i= i— +#§— 1" 0006-0002 ANILYOWH WL TH) 1 i WOoY TISHS UTX ' H ! Np Ree mere ee ee anf t—— === -qnoqn “4, 008- 008 Pe 2.01 QUW UTI aAuasay | } : February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 17 nient means of fixing positions by the number of frames, includes frames No. 1 to 30. The turret was over frames 24 to 30, with the forward 10-inch magazine directly'tinder it. This magazine contained about eight or nine tons of powder in separate metal tanks. On the port side of the 10-inch magazine was the 10-inch shell room ; on the port side of that again the 6-inch reserve magazine containing about 400 or 500 lbs. of powder in tanks. Directly forward of these magazines and shell rooms, between frames 21 and 24, was the 6-pounder magazine with little powder in it; forward of that again over frames 18 to 21 was the 6-inch magazine containing 7000 to 9000 Ibs. of powder. All these magazines rested on the ship’s inner bottom. They were below the armour-deck, and two decks below the berth-deck. Over the 1o-inch magazine and shell room and the 6-inch reserve magazine were, on two separate decks, the hydraulic room and the dynamo room, the latter being uppermost. Abaft these magazines was an empty bunker running athwart-ships, and then the forward stokehold. On the outboard side of the 10-inch magazine was a series of small bunkers numbered Bs, B3, and A15, going from aft forward. On the outboard side of the 6-inch reserve magazine was a similar series, B6, Bs, and A16. The other magazines were not touched by any bunkers. The inquiry narrowed itself down to the condition of this group of magazines and bunkers, since all were in the region of the explosion. The evidence falls into two general heads: that given by officers and men of the JMJazne as to the internal condition of the ship before the explosion; and the c 18 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February evidence given by experts, officers and divers as to the condition of the ship and the harbour bottom after the explosions. The hypotheses which the Court had to examine, before setting aside the possibility of an internal explosion, were these :— 1, Spontaneous combustion, or generation of gas producing an explosion, in the bunkers. 2. Spontaneous explosion of the magazines, or explo- sion due to carelessness. The cause of such an explosion might be :— (a) High explosives in or near the magazines. (6) Steam pipes causing excessive heat, and leading to spontaneous explosion. (c) Badly-fitted electric lights and wires. (dz) Men working in the magazine in unsuitable shoes. 3. Boiler explosion, including coal torpedoes. 4. Inflammable vapour given off by preparations such as xerotine siccative, spirits, naphtha, etc, as in the Dotterel’s case. 5. Deliberate treachery on the part of some of the officers or crew. Of these causes the first was the most likely one. Cases of spontaneous combustion in the bunkers have occurred several times in the American Navy. There was one instance in the Vew Voré, just after the out- break of war; there were others just before the MJazne incident. It is the general opinion of foreign naval authorities, that to this cause must be ascribed the loss of the Maze. They disregard the finding of the February) DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 19 American Court, and refer its conclusions to prejudice. But this, though a very simple and easy method of getting over the trouble of studying the evidence, is not a plan which will commend itself to Englishmen or Americans. They will acknowledge that the Court may have been mistaken, but they will not credit the charge of producing a wicked and unnecessary war, when it is brought against officers such as Captains Sampson and Chadwick. 1. The position of the bunkers touching the magazines has already been given. It now remains to study their condition on February 15. B3, B4, B5 and B6 were all empty, and were painted during the days before the explosion, had been thoroughly ventilated, and were inspected the morning of the explosion. Apparently it was necessary to pass through B3 and Bs to get to Ars, and through Bq and B6 to get toA16. We are then left with bunkers A1r5 and A116. A115 was half full, and had been in use during the evening ; therefore could not have produced the explosion. A16, on the port side of the ship, abutting inboard against the 6-inch reserve magazine, hydraulic room and dynamo room, as it rose from the bottom of the ship right up to the armour-deck, was full, containing forty tons of soft Pocahontas coal, but had been inspected the morning of the explosion. The bulk- heads surrounding it on three sides could be felt by the hand, indeed, Aad to be felt by every one who went by the wing passage into the loading, hydraulic and dynamo rooms, as a narrow passage with a turn in it led round its forward end, and the tendency would be to place the hand on the bulkhead. Moreover, men loafed and lay against 20 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February the upper part of the bulkheads of the bunker. Any rise in temperature would therefore be felt at once. Another side which abutted against the empty B6 bunker had been painted just before the explosion, which shows that the coal inside could not have heated. The tanks of ' powder inside the 6-inch reserve magazine seem to have been stowed in actual contact with the metal of the bulk- head, which was no doubt dangerous,’ and which, if heating had occurred, might well have caused an ex- plosion. But in the presence of such strong evidence against any heating in the bunker this is not of much importance. All the bunkers were fitted with thermo- stats, which, though they were liable to give false alarms, would have given warning, and had on previous occa- sions given warning, of any undue heat. No case of spontaneous combustion had ever occurred on board. There is nothing whatever to suggest an explosion of coal gas or coal dust in these bunkers. Neither Ars nor A16 were in actual use at the moment of explosion; but another bunker much further aft, abaft the forward stokehold. 2. (a) There were no high explosives in or near the magazines involved. No smokeless powder, except a small quantity of ammunition for the small guns in the 6-pounder magazine, and no high explosive shells were in the magazines. The torpedo war-heads, primers, and detonators were in the ship’s stern, and certainly did not 1 This is partially denied by Lieutenant Holman, Jnguiry, 37; but he thought any heating of the bunker would have been felt in the dynamo room. 2 Yet this evidence on p. 144 is contradicted on p. 24, where it is stated that the tanks did zof touch the bulkhead. February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 21 explode, else no officers would have lived to tell the tale. The powder stored was the ordinary brown prismatic explosive, which is chemically stable and trustworthy. (6) On board the French battleship Dugerré a dangerous explosion, details of which have been sup- pressed, occurred through the heating of a magazine containing some of the new explosives, by a steam pipe. There were no steam pipes in any of the AZazne’s forward magazines. The temperature was duly recorded and the magazines regularly inspected. In hot weather the after 10-inch magazine, which certainly did not explode, had at times shown a temperature of 112 degrees. This is nothing very abnormal, and certainly not dangerous, where there are no high explosives. The forward magazines were cooler. (c) The magazines were aropaly lighted, and there were no dangerous wires. The electric lights were in light-boxes, and they and the wires supplying the current were separated from the magazines by a double plating of glass. (d) There were no men working at the time in the magazines, which were locked, and the keys in Captain Sigsbee’s stateroom. There was no loose powder about, and proper shoes were always worn by working-parties in the magazines. The gunner was an exceptionally careful officer. 3. The boilers in use at the time of the explosion were the after pair, far away from the magazines. They were in good condition, and were working at a relatively low pressure. There is only one piece of evidence in the report which lends the slightest colour to the supposition 22 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February that they did explode, and this is Fireman Gartrell’s statement, already given, that he saw a blue flash “right by the lamps in the engine-room,” and even this does not involve as its explanation a boiler explosion. Had the first explosion occurred in the boiler-room, the dynamo would have ceased working and the lights have gone out at once, whereas we have seen that they were extinguished only at the second explosion. If the after pair of boilers had exploded and fired a magazine, it would have been the after and not the forward group of magazines, and in that case no officer would have escaped. These reasons preclude the idea of a coal torpedo, or mine, made to look like a lump of coal, charged with high explosive, and fired either by the heat of the boiler furnaces, or by clock-work. It is not likely that such a coal torpedo could have been in bunker A16, as this had been filled some time before—it would seem from the evidence a month—and properly inspected. A large torpedo, containing a charge sufficiently powerful to explode the magazines, would almost certainly have attracted the men’s notice in coaling. The coal at Key West was examined for such machines immediately after ‘the catastrophe and was found to contain none. Moreover, if an infernal machine of this type was employed, it was probably employed by Spanish agency, though no one would accuse the Spanish Government of complicity ; and therefore little is gained by advocates who insist upon the internal torpedo theory. 4. All driers of the xerotine siccative type were in proper tanks on deck. Alcohol, whiskies, and all in- flammable surgeon’s stores, with the exception of a bottle February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 23 or two, were aft, under the ward-room. Oily cotton waste, which has been known to take fire spontaneously —though not to explode—was kept in a metal case and thrown overboard regularly. 5. The supposition that a criminal lunatic was to be found amongst the officers and men of the J/azmne, and that such a lunatic would be allowed by his shipmates to explode one of the magazines and destroy the ship, is so improbable that it may be dismissed. It belongs to the same limbo of extravagant imaginations as a French Admiral’s statement that all American officers are liars, and that the M/azne Court of Inquiry was a deliberate attempt to establish a falsehood. Spanish stories of American indiscipline, and tales that all the officers were dining on boardthe Czty of Washington, are the most impudent and idle fabrications. American ideas of discipline are not altogether our ideas, but there is every reason for believing the statement of Lieutenant- Commander Wainwright—a well-known and able officer —that the crew were good and obedient. Moreover, the general behaviour after the explosion corroborates, in the most striking and satisfactory manner, his testimony on this point. All known internal causes were therefore eliminated. It remains possible that some unknown and unsuspected cause might have been responsible, but at least this is very improbable. If magazines are liable to be exploded by such causes, then the seaman’s lot is indeed “not a happy one,” and no modern ship, with every precaution, is at any moment safe. Such mysterious explosions have never occurred before in ships, and 24 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February therefore the presumption is strong against an unknown cause, The. divers’ evidence was of great interest and im- portance. Yet owing to the mud on the harbour bottom, which was stirred up by their movements and rendered the water so thick that they had to rely mainly upon the sense of touch, and could see little, this evidence was by no means decisive or clear. They did their work under difficulties, as they cannot but have felt a very natural anxiety lest the air-pipes and life-lines should foul the wreckage. They were seamen or petty officers, and had not much technical knowledge, which makes their reports all the harder to understand, though it did not, as has been suggested, render them altogether fallacious and untrust- worthy. On examination they found the part of the ship between frames 23 and 30 almost completely destroyed. The keel emerged from a heap of debris about frame 23, and bent sharply upwards to frame 17 or 18. Then it dropped again, making thus an inverted V, to the ram and forward part of the ship, which was nearly intact, but which was bent sharply down and sunk in the mud. At the port side of the ship, abreast of the apex of the inverted V in the keel, was a hole seven feet deep and about fifteen feet in diameter." The bottom in this hole was harder mud than was found elsewhere. The stem of the ship was turned almost at right angles to the rest of the hull, and the ram lay in this hole, or near it, for the evidence was not clear on this point. Thus, appearances indicated that some force drove up 1 Diver Dwyer (p..276) contradicted this, and denied that there was any hole. ‘IUIDT[, AY JO Yar Ay ‘tog avf or Isuvay oN February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 25 the keel at this point, scooped a hole in the mud, and broke the ship’s back. In settling, after the explosion, the hull might move some little distance, which may account for the hole not being immediately under the ship. The cavity, however, is capable of explanation without supposing a mine. The impact of the heavy ram descending would scoop up the mud and produce if not an actual hole, at least the appearance of a hole. A hole in the mud was found at the ship’s stern, a fact which favours this explanation. The side plating of the ship above the armour had disappeared forward of frame 41 (between the two fun- nels) both on the port and starboard sides. On the port side, at the point where the break began aft, the armour appeared to have been driven inward with great vio- lence, as the backing was splintered with the splinters pointing inward and the plating bent in. Where there was no armour the side plating near the gap was bent very sharply in, ‘‘ making an acute angle with the water- ways,” and the edges were sharp and ragged. Aft again of this point, and a few feet forward of the after turret, the plating on the water-ways was blown outwards. On the starboard side the forward turret could not be found, and must have been blown clean away ; the break in the ship corresponded with that on the port side, but here the edges were blown outwards, and the general appear- ance was as if this side of the ship had been driven out 1 The want of plans and drawings, and the fact that much of the evidence was given by the witnesses indicating points on plans which are not included in the Report of the Inquiry, have no doubt increased the difficulty of understanding what the divers meant, and made the investi- gation of the affair much more obscure. 26 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February by some very violent force within, The armour on this side at its lowest level was flush with the side ; at its upper level it leant outwards very sharply. Examining the ship’s wreck in the locality of the magazines, some indications were found to show that the 10-inch magazine had exploded. Its starboard bulkhead was bent over outwards till it was nearly horizontal, but curiously enough an electric-light box in it was in good state, with the glass broken but only very slightly bent. The rubber gasket of its water-tight cover was not burned. A man-hole plate in the bulkhead was, however, burned and damaged. On the other hand, woodwork from the magazine was sent up to the surface and showed no trace of fire, whilst a magazine swab was picked up uninjured. In the magazine floor was a big opening three feet wide, with ragged edges bent neither up nor down, leading into the double bottom. Here some unburned t1o-inch breech- obturators were discovered. Powder-cases from the 10-inch and 6-inch magazines were found on the bottom ; in some instances the charges had possibly exploded; in other instances the cases contained the cloth in which the powder is packed ; and a dark deposit was noticed in the mud, and a little of it sent up, dried, and examined. It was evidently powder sediment, and thus it is clear that if the magazines did explode, all the powder in them was not involved. As each charge is isolated from the others and in a separate metal case, it is quite possible for a few charges only to explode. Scattered about were 10-inch shells, 6-inch shells, 6-pounder cartridge-cases—some ex- ploded—and projectiles in the wildest confusion. The protective deck on the port side from frame 30 to oe a | To face p. 26. By permission of the U.S. Bureau of Navigation. Forward portion of the fae after the explosion. Sketched from Divers’ reports. February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 27 frame 41 was blown up and folded over towards the ship’s stern; the main-deck for the same distance was folded over towards the stern, but slightly to starboard. About frames 29 and 30 the protective deck stood straight up, out of water; on the starboard side, and over the forward starboard boiler it had been driven up about three feet. The forward boilers were examined and found in fair condition. What thwartship bulkheads remained between frames 30 to 40 were found buckled and bent heavily aft. Evidently the weight of the turret had held back the explosive force of the powder to starboard, and kept down the armour-deck for a time, whilst to port, as there was no such weight, the explosion had exerted more force upwards. © What remained of the ship’s bottom near the apex of the inverted V could be examined. The plates were found to be bulged in between the frames, as if by some external but gently applied pressure. The force, that is to say, was cushioned, and it was conjectured by Ensign Powel- son, in charge of the divers, that the effect had been pro- duced by a mine much further aft, transmitting its force through the water. It would, he thought, fail to drive up the ship’s hull where the framing was reinforced by the armour belt, giving great stiffness to the structure, but would so act forward of the armour, where the framing was weak. Only one expert in torpedoes and submarine mines was called by the Court. This was Commander Converse. He held that the explosion of the magazines could not have lifted the ship or produced the distortion of her keel. A large mine placed near the ship’s bottom would both 28 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February lift her and blow the bottom in. Such a mine, containing lower explosives, and placed some distance off the bottom of the ship, might be expected to cause the peculiar inverted V. This effect on the keel could not have been produced by the explosion of the magazines, first destroy- ing a large part of the ship, and then causing the two ends of the ship to sink and buckle up the keel. As to whether such a mine could have exploded one of the magazines—the 6-inch, over frames 18 to 21, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the inverted V, was men- tioned—Captain Converse expressed no opinion. But he thought the explosion of some and not all of the powder in the magazine more likely to occur when there was water in the magazine as the result of previous injury by amine. It was an important question whether the 6-inch magazine had exploded. Against this was the fact, which Captain Sigsbee thought decisive, that Bergman, sleeping about frame 10 on the berth-deck, had escaped. Captain Converse, however, did not consider that in- compatible with the magazine’s explosion. The verdict of the Court was that a mine had been exploded under the bottom of the ship, about frame 18, somewhat to port, and that this had involved the partial explosion of two or more of the M/azue’s forward maga- zines. It did not attempt to fix the guilt or determine the agent. The justice of this verdict has since been much can- vassed. It was reached by the process of elimination, confirmed by certain indications in the wreck and certain antecedent probabilities. No summing-up of the evi- dence was published, and the Court abstained from giving February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 29 the reasons for its decision. In an episode of this inter- national importance, it would have been better had they been clearly stated. Perhaps the most startling fact is the absence of any suggestion as to how a submarine mine could have been placed under the Mazne. The facts which seem to have had most influence in the decision were the clear evidence against any internal cause of explosion; the divers’ testimony that the port side of the ship was driven in; the fact that the inverted V in the keel was well away from the centre of the most violent explosion in the magazine system, which would be the 10-inch magazine with its eight or nine tons of powder, and not the 6-inch magazine with its three or four tons. If the 6-inch magazine, exploding, had uplifted the keel in its immediate neighbourhood, the ‘10-inch magazine with two to three times as much powder in it might well be expected to do the same in even a more marked manner. And therefore the Court probably concluded that the explosion of the 6-inch magazine was not the vera causa of the inverted V, inasmuch as the effect was wanting in the Zocus of the 10-inch magazine explosion. Other sus- picious circumstances were the uplifting of the ship, and the preliminary explosion, which does not seem to have been internal. There can be no doubt that the second explosion, with its prolonged, rending roar, was caused by the firing in quick succession of two or more of the forward group of magazines—probably the 6-inch, 6-pounder, and 1o-inch. The difficulties in the mine theory must now be dis- cussed. They are these:—1. The first explosion, as described, is not altogether characteristic of a submarine 30 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February mine. A dull heavy concussion, not a sharp report, would be expected. Some of the witnesses do, however, describe it as such. Thus Seaman Larsen likens it to ‘a jar, shaking all over.” Seaman Moriniere ‘heard a jar.” Cadet Boyd’s description of it as ‘‘the coupling up of a heavy freight train,” would be peculiarly apposite to the shiver produced in a water-borne metallic structure by the explosion of a mine underneath; and if those witnesses who compared it to the firing of a gun were thinking rather of the shock produced than of the noise, we should get over the difficulty. The firing of a heavy gun, of course, causes a violent vibration; and even a 6-pounder a very distinct shock, though only locally. Cadet Cluverius speaks of “a slight shock, as if a 6-pounder gun had been fired somewhere about the deck.” Lieutenant Blow’s impression, already quoted, was that the first explosion was under the ship in the water. 2. A second difficulty is thé apparent absence of any upheaval of water. No witness testifies to one. Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, however, Admiral Irwin, who had had great experience in sub- marine mining work, gave evidence, that whilst the explosion of a mine at less than six feet from the surface will throw up a noticeable column of water, at fifteen feet or more there will be hardly a bubbling on the sur- face.’ British experience would not altogether bear this evidence out. At depths of twenty-four to thirty feet a dome-shaped upheaval is to be expected. But if a column of water was thrown up by the first explosion in the Mazne, it may have been hidden from view by the dense cloud of 1 Army and Navy Journal, New York, April 23, 1898. February) DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 31 fire and smoke which followed almost immediately with the second explosion. It is also possible, as has been suggested, that the mine, if placed just under and fairly close to the ship’s bottom, would expend all its energy on driving up the hull and none in throwing water about. 3. A third difficulty is that many of the witnesses do not speak of any upheaval of the ship at the first ex- plosion. We should expect, with a mine under the port bow, that the ship would be thrown violently over to starboard and considerably lifted. Many witnesses allude to an upheaval at the second and main explosion ; only one (Cadet Holden) to an uplifting to starboard at the first. The upheaval at the second explosion seems to have been caused by the lifting of the stern as the water rushed in amidships and depressed the forward part of the ship. Here, however, there is great obscurity in the evidence, owing to the fact that witnesses indicated on plans, not published in the report, which part of the Maine rose in the air... We cannot now ascertain which part of the ship they indicated, and no help is given by the Court. The only method of explaining this absence of upheaval is to suppose that the mine, close to the bottom of the ship, cut a section clean out of it instead of uplifting the whole ship. But this rather presupposes a high explosive, whereas the other circumstances posit a low explosive. 4. Again, there is the apparent absence of any shock transmitted by the water to ships in the harbour. Ob- servers in the Czty of Washington felt no shock at the 1 Inquiry, 65, one of the worst examples of the recording of evidence. 32 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February first explosion. Captain Teasdale of the British ship Deva, about 600 yards from the Mazne, records, however, a shock immediately after this explosion and before the second. He thought his ship “had been collided with.”” Possibly the City of Washington, lying so very close to the Maine, felt nothing, because the shock was swallowed up in the terrific concussion of the second explosion. 5. The absence of dead fish in the harbour after the explosion is very curious and difficult to explain. It is suggested that fish left the harbour at night, and that fish are usually only stunned by submarine explosions. Admiral Irwin’s evidence before the Senate Committee on this point was that in four weeks’ work with submarine mines in Mobile Bay, a fine fish-producing water, he did not see one dead fish. In the firing of bomb torpedoes in the Mare Island Straits, in California, he never saw one. 6. There is no instance known in which an external mine or torpedo has exploded a ship’s magazine. This may be because the crucial experiment of firing a very heavy mine right under a ship’s magazine has never been tried, in peace or war. We have, to a great extent, to depend upon guess-work and induction. A 500 lb. mine might, and probably would, have quite different effects from a 200 lb. or 50 lb. mine. And if it be said that the explosion of the MMJazne’s magazines by a mine reveals to us startling dangers, hitherto undreamed of, we may reply that their explosion by an undiscoverable internal cause would be even more alarming. 1 Inquiry, 220, 63. * Tb. 53, 54- February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAJNE 33 7. How could a mine have been placed in such a position as to destroy the Maze? It is not at all likely that a harbour which was used by Spanish and foreign—English and German—men-of-war would be filled indiscriminately with submarine mines. The answer to this is, that a mine could have been placed in position between the news of her coming reaching the Spaniards and her actual arrival, and might have been laid as a military precaution. It would, then, be of the type which can be controlled from the shore, and which is innocuous until a firing battery is put into action by an observer ashore, when he sees that a shutter has been dropped by the contact of a hostile ship with the mine.’ A little consideration will show that the Spanish authorities might have been justified in placing such a safe form of mine at the berth to be occupied by the Maine. War was quite possible, and if war came this powerful armoured ship inside the harbour might have been the most dangerous of enemies. We do not sup- pose that the American Government had the remotest intention of acting in a treacherous manner, but the Spaniard, naturally enough, would not see with British or American eyes. With a mine, the Mazne could, on the outbreak of war, be disabled if she did not withdraw. The firing of the mine under the circum- stances involved treachery on the part, probably, of some unauthorised person, who gained access to the mine- station, and either short-circuited the firing key, thus converting the mine into an electric contact one—one, 1 Sleeman, Torpedoes, edition ii. p. 49. D 34 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February that is to say, which would explode instantaneously on being touched by the ship,—or depressed the key when on that fateful night the shutter dropped and showed the ship was over the mine. From the afternoon of the 24th, when Consul Lee gave notice to the Havana authorities, to the morning of the 25th, there was time to lay a mine had such been in possession of the Spaniards. That mines were in their possession the statement of Vice-Admiral Berenger, ex-Minister of Marine in Spain, and the experience of the subsequent war, leaves no reasonable doubt." Another possible supposition is that a dirigible torpedo of the Brennan or other pattern was used. There is no evidence on this subject. It is also just possible that at some point ashore near the ship a torpedo tube of the ordinary pattern had been mounted, and that a Whitehead was deliberately fired at her from this. She was under 800 yards, within easy range for an 18-inch Whitehead, from more than one point of the shore. Had a torpedo- tube, or dirigible torpedo, however, been thus employed the risk of detection must have been very great, and treachery must have been shown by some very high officials, since such a tube or such a dirigible torpedo could only be found in the hands of the responsible military or naval authorities. There is every reason for acquitting them of any complicity. Moreover, the watch officer of the M/azne would, probably, have seen something suspicious. Captain Sigsbee suggests that an electric contact mine might have been dropped by a steam lighter, crossing 1 Century, 57, 393- February] DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 35 the area through which the Maine swung. Lighters were constantly passing the Zazne, so this is certainly possible. No observer could have detected the laying of the mine, but there must have been on board the lighter at least twelve people in the secret. Great precautions were taken by the Spanish Government to prevent the importation and ownership of explosives, so that, even accepting this theory, there must have been some one of authority in the plot. Of all the theories the first seems the most probable, and involves the minimum of treachery. The destruction of the A/azne could then be ascribed to the madness and criminal wickedness of a single individual, who would be certain to keep the secret for the safety of his own skin. That no wires or connections were discovered may be explained by the softness of the mud in the har- bour. Two experts whom we have questioned gave diametrically opposite answers on this point, one hold- ing that the cable would not sink, and the other that it might. It therefore seems safe to consider that such a thing is, if unlikely, not impossible. If a drifting mine were used there would be less difficulty, but in such a harbour as Havana, where there is practically no tide and much shipping, it does not seem probable that a drifting mine could be employed. That the Maze was considered, in unofficial Spanish circles in Havana, to have been blown up by a Spaniard, is shown by the fact of which the author was informed by a friend, resident then and now in Havana, that on the night of her destruction, and on the following day, the health 36 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN (February of the men who destroyed her was being drunk in the cafés by Spaniards. This, of course, is not evidence, but it is an indication of the bitterness which prevailed, and so is important. There is some talk of the same nature in the evidence taken before the American Court of Inquiry. 8. A serious difficulty has always been to find the motive which led to her destruction. When the American Court pronounced that she had been sunk by a mine, it was virtually a declaration of war. Any educated Spaniard, one would think, must have seen that an act of treachery at a time of tension would precipitate a struggle, which could only issue in one way. Yet there was certainly a party in Havana which wanted war, which above all resented the presence of the Jazne in the harbour, and which may have imagined that by destroying her the American fleet would be so far weakened as to render it inferior to the Spanish naval forces. There were judges in England who held that the loss of the Jaime had placed the United States in a position of inferiority. Even Admiral Colomb, as will be seen later, expected on April 18 a desultory naval war, as he thought neither country strong enough to attack the other. Thus in pronouncing a final verdict we are given a choice between difficulties. One fact which the Court held to point in the direction of a mine—the inverted V in the keel—is thus, however, explained by an English expert naval officer. He holds that on an explosion taking place on board such a ship as the Mazne, the gas first drives out the bottom, and then, encountering a February) DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 37 layer of water supported downwards by the bottom, and at the sides by the pressure of thirty or forty feet of water, is forced back, so that to find an outlet it returns through the ship, carrying the outer skin up. On the return the heavy turret, which has hitherto confined the explosion below, is driven up. This officer states that experiments on a small scale at Portsmouth have reproduced the uplifting of the keel with an internal explosion. It will readily be acknowledged that the evidence of the American inquiry is far from being absolutely conclusive. Still it does seem to the author to have established the probability that the! J/azme was de- stroyed by a mine. Under the circumstances any people would have gone to war, and the Americans showed no exceptional forbearance.’ The American evidence was not issued to the public till March 28, but its general purport was known to 1 Whilst the American Court of Inquiry was sitting a Spanish official investigation took place, which resulted in the following verdict :— _“ (1) On the night of February 15 last an explosion occurred in the forward magazines of the Maine, causing the destruction of that portion of the vessel and resulting in her sinking at her anchorage. “‘(2) It is shown by the ship’s plans that these magazines contained other explosives than powder and shells of various kinds. “ (3) The same plans show that the said magazines were surrounded on the starboard side by bunkers containing coal, and those who witnessed the explosion are agreed in saying that it was due to a purely accidental cause.” The statements in (2) are absolutely contradicted in the American evidence, and were probably founded upon an old and incorrect plan of the Maine, which showed the gun-cotton and torpedo-detonator magazines in proximity to the group of magazines which probably did explode. 38 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [February responsible people far earlier. On March 8 Congress voted £10,000,000 for defensive measures, and war preparations began. On April 19 came the final breach, in the shape of Congress’ resolution declaring Cuba independent, and directing the President to use the forces of the United States to compel Spain’s withdrawal from the island. Next day an ultimatum to this effect was telegraphed to Madrid, and the Spanish minister at Washington demanded his passports. On the 2ist the Spanish Government notified the American minister at Madrid that diplomatic relations were suspended. CHAPTER II STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS At the outbreak of the war the American ships ready for sea were as follows :— Battleships, 5—Zexas, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon,* Lowa. Monitors, 6—Amphitrite, Miantonomoh, Monadnock,* Terror, Puritan, Monterey.* Armoured Cruisers, 2—Mew Vork, Brooklyn. Protected Cruisers, 8—Boston,* Raleigh,* Cincinnati, Baltimore,* San Francisco, Olympia,* Columbia,+ Minneapolis.t Small Cruisers, 9— Yorktown,* Concord,* Bennington,* Dolphin, Montgomery, Marblehead, Detroit, Machias, Castine. Ram, 1—Xatahdin. Dynamite Gunboat, 1— Vesuozus. Torpedo craft, 6—/orter, Dupont, Foote, Winslow, Ericsson, Cushing. Gunboats, 1o—Washville, Wilmington, Helena, Marietta,* Annapolis, Vicksburg, Newport, Princeton, Petrel,* Bancroft. To these were added during the course of the war :— Protected Cruisers, 4—Vew Orleans, Newark, Philadelphia, # Charleston.* Torpedo Boats, 4—Somers, Gwin, Rodgers, Talbot. Gunboat, 1— Zofeka. All the above had been specially built for war service. Particulars of these ships may now be given. The Zexas, laid down in 1889 and launched in 1892, * Pacific. + Not fully manned. 39 40 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN is of the “ écheloned” turret-ship type, having a diagonal breastwork across the ship plated with 12-inch armour, on which stand the two turrets, similarly protected, and each armed with one 12-inch gun. The breastwork does not descend to the armour-deck, or to the belt which, twelve inches thick, covers one-half of the water-line ; but coal-bunkers afford a measure of safety. The dis- position of the heavy guns is faulty, as, in spite of the diagonal arrangement, only one 12-inch weapon can fire right ahead or right astern, and on either broadside the arc of one gun is very limited. Four 6-inch guns are placed in separate sponsons, one on each bow and quarter, and two more are carried on the superstructure. There are two military masts and one funnel; the speed is seventeen knots. The hull of the ship has proved too weak, some of her frames having buckled up in dock. In 1896 her bulkheads were found to be far from water- tight, and she sank in dry dock, whilst in the present war her structure suffered a good deal from her own gun-fire. Still she has done excellent service in spite of her weak- nesses. Before the war her turrets were so altered that the heavy guns could be loaded in any position, a great improvement on the old single position for loading, to which the guns had always to be brought back after each round. The three large battleships, /xadiana, Oregon, and Massachusetts, were laid down-in 1891 ; officially classed as ‘“‘coast-line battleships,” they may for all practical purposes be regarded as sea-going. They displace 10,300 tons, and were expressly designed to face “ vessels carrying the heaviest guns and armour.” The battery Elevation and Deck plan of the Zzd/ana, Massachusetts, and Oregon. corer To face p~. 40. Aft guns show maximum fire as7originally proposed. Forward guns show maximum fire as finally modified. STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 41 with which they are armed is a very powerful one, though, as is the case with certain of the United States cruisers, there is an unnecessary multiplicity of calibres. All the guns of any size are very thoroughly protected by armour. Fore and aft are two pairs of 13-inch 60-ton guns in turrets, with a command of seventeen and a half feet. The weapons can be loaded in any position, and need not, as in our Royal Sovereign, be brought back to a fixed position. On the superstructure between these turrets, at a height of twenty-four and three-quarter feet from the water, are four more turrets, each containing a pair of 8-inch guns; and on the main-deck are four 6-inch weapons in casemates, which are protected by 5-inch armour. This disposition of the artillery enables a very heavy fire to be concentrated upon any given point, as these figures will show :— 13-inch. 8-inch. 6-inch. Guns Ahead orastern ‘ 2 ° ° bea Broadside : , 4 4 2 caring (Bow or quarter ‘ . 2 2 I Originally four 8-inch and two 6-inch guns, besides the 13-inch weapons, trained ahead or astern, but on experiment this disposition had to be modified. An observer was placed at the sighting-hood of the Indiana’s turret containing the 13-inch guns, and then the 8-inch weapons were fired at various angles forward. Between fifty and seventy degrees forward from the beam the effect of their blast was decidedly unpleasant ; at eighty degrees it was sufficient to show that with a greater angle it would be practically impossible to lay the 13-inch guns. Though no material injury was 42 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN inflicted upon the observer, he recommended that stops should be fitted to the 8-inch turrets to prevent a greater train than eighty degrees. Thus the four 8-inch guns lost their axial fire, but they still command a wide angle. Another experiment was the training of the 13-inch weapons in the after turret at the extreme angle forward, thus firing past one of the 6-inch casemates, whilst the 6-inch gun was trained right ahead. The effect of this shot would have been to kill or injure the crew of the 6-inch gun, had men been stationed there. To get rid of the danger the 6-inch weapons were deprived of their fore and aft fire. The defensive qualities of the Zudzana are fully equal to, if indeed they do not exceed, her offensive qualities. The 13-inch turrets are plated with 17-inch Harveyed steel, and the redoubts upon which they stand with 15- inch; the 8-inch guns are behind 6-inch plates, and rest on 8-inch plated redoubts. As the 8-inch turrets do not, like the turrets for the heavier guns, stand upon cylindrical redoubts descending to the protective deck, their bases are plated with 2-inch steel, and there is a 3-inch ammunition shaft to the magazine directly below that deck. On the water-line is a steel belt 196 feet long, seven and a half feet wide, and thirteen inches thick at its upper edge, but tapering below the water-line. On this is placed a 24-inch armour-deck ;' and to protect the upper works of the ship a belt of 5-inch steel with ten feet of coal behind it is carried up to the level of the upper deck between the main turrets. Care has been taken to keep the muzzles of the heavy guns quite clear of 1 At the ends of the ship 3-inch. STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 43 the deck, and thus to enable them to fire ahead with a minimum of damage to the ship. There is one military mast with a stairway and ammunition hoist, placed forward above the conning-tower. The coal-bunkers are large enough to contain 1550 tons, though the normal supply is only 400 tons; the sea speed is fourteen knots, and the coal endurance 3720 miles. The Massachusetts’ trial speed was 16°2 knots, and her coal endurance 4500 miles; the Ovegon, the fastest and best ship of the three, covered 16°7 knots, and has an actual tested endurance of 5500 miles at ten knots. The defects of this redoubtable class appear to be: first, the low freeboard, which is only twelve feet forward, and which would prevent the foremost 13-inch guns from firing ahead in anything of a sea; second, the low speed, which is yet lower when a full supply of coal is on board ; third, the absence of a powerful quick-firing armament of medium calibre, such as is carried in all modern battleships ;' fourth, the ventilation, which is very bad in the ammunition passages on the orlop deck. “At ordinary drills,” says the Ovegon’s surgeon, ‘‘ lasting less than an hour, the men stationed there soon became exhausted from the combined effects of the foul air and heat. I do not think it is possible for men to endure the _wretched conditions existing in these passages for much longer than an hour and be capable of effective work. The importance of this grave defect is at once recognised when it is known that all the ammunition for the 8-inch 1 Since the war the slow-firing 6-inch and 8-inch guns have been replaced with quick-firers. 44 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN and 6-inch guns and for the secondary battery is handled in these passages.” ? The Jowa, laid down in 1893 and completed in 1897, differs from the [udzana class in these respects: she has a higher freeboard forward ; her heavy guns are 12-inch in calibre instead of 13-inch; the four 6-inch weapons give way to six 4-inch quick-firers ; the extent of water- line protected is greater, being 774 per cent. against the Indiana's 66; the coal-supply and displacement are augmented ; and the side armour, owing to the satis- factory results given by experiments with Harveyed plates, is reduced in thickness from 18-inch to 14-inch. The high military mast becomes a stunted tower, the two funnels on the contrary grow taller; and the 8-inch turrets are moved a little nearer the ship’s side, and a little further from the keel-line. The six 4-inch guns are mounted, two in casemates forward, two in casemates amidships, and two on the after end of the superstructure, behind shields. Her trial speed was over one knot higher than the /zdzana’s, reaching 17°08 knots. She is a really sea-going ship. In action it was found that the blast of her heavy guns interfered with the men at the 6-pounders, some of whom were blown off their feet, and had their ear-drums split. The Monterey, of 4130 tons, laid down in 1889, is a low freeboard monitor, carrying two turrets plated with 8-inch and 73-inch armour, and standing upon redoubts armoured with fourteen inches and eleven and a half inches of steel. The fore turret contains two 12-inch, the after turret two 10-inch guns, There is a complete 1 Surgeon-General’s (United States Navy) report, 1898, 81. ‘voy diysapeg *S*pQ, SuroS-vas SS¥lo-JSUY ayy te anf of STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 45 belt of armour on the water-line, tapering from eighteen inches amidships to six inches at the ends, a 3-inch deck, and large water ballast tanks which render it easy to lower her freeboard for battle. Her speed on trial was very moderate, only reaching 13°6 knots, but she is a most formidable vessel for coast defence work. On her voyage across the Pacific to Manila she showed all the characteristic weakness of her type. Ata very moderate speed the water tanks on her decks retarding her grievously, whilst her small coal-supply and uncom- fortable and unhealthy accommodation for her crew are additional disadvantages. The following five double-turret monitors are new ships built on old hulls. After remaining for years on the stocks they were taken vigorously in hand in 1886, and, being remodelled entirely, were converted into powerful vessels for coast defence. The Amphitrite, Miantonomoh, Monadnock, and Terror, each displace 3990 tons, and carry four 10-inch breech-loaders in two turrets behind 114-inch plating, the first and the third having in addition two 4-inch quick-firers. The speed on trial varied from ten to fourteen knots with the new engines supplied, but in service does not exceed seven or eight knots. The Puritan, of 6060 tons, carries four 12-inch guns in two turrets behind 14-inch armour, has six 4-inch quick-firers on the superstructure, and steams twelve knots. All these ships are very wet at sea, and in warm weather are apt to be very hot and uncomfortable. Their ventilation was originally extremely bad, so that their crews were grilled alive, but great improvements in this direction have decreased the discomfort. 46 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN The armoured cruiser Mew York, commenced in 1890, is a twin-screw vessel of 8150 tons, with a trial speed of twenty-one knots, and a powerful and well- protected armament. Fore and aft she has two pairs of 8-inch guns mounted in turrets behind 54-inch armour, standing upon small redoubts plated with 10-inch steel, and connected by armoured tubes with the magazines. Amidships, on either beam, is an 8-inch gun sponsoned out, and protected only by a shield. Thus four 8-inch guns fire axially and five on the broadside. On the main-deck are twelve 4-inch quick-firers in sponsons, with 4-inch steel shields, four firing ahead or astern and six on the broadside. There are three funnels and two military masts, with three tops on the foremast and one on the mainmast. Two other tops on this mast were removed just before the war. Protection on the water- line is given by a belt of nickel steel five inches thick, including the inner skin, for 170 feet amidships, and this is supplemented by cofferdams. The armour-deck is six inches thick on the slope and three inches on the flat. The vessel verges on the battleship ; she has been called a cruiser destroyer, and with reason, as she is faster and stronger than most vessels of her size and class. The radius of action is 5000 miles. The weakness of her quick-fire battery was much criticised in England before and during the war. It should, however, be noted that she brings five 8-inch guns to bear on the broadside, which no English ship of her size does. Now that her 8-inch guns are being converted to the quick-firing pattern there is small fault to be found with her. STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 47 The Brooklyn, laid down in 1893, is an improvement upon the Mew York, and displaces g100 tons. Her main armament is composed of eight 8-inch guns mounted in four turrets behind 8-inch and 54-inch armour. The turrets are disposed lozenge-wise in the French fashion, and thus six 8-inch guns fire ahead, astern, or on the broadside. As an auxiliary battery there are twelve 5-inch quick-firers in 4-inch armoured casemates, four firing axially and six on the beam. The freeboard is higher than in the New Yor, and there is a forecastle on which is placed the foremost turret. The funnels, three in number, are immensely tall, rising one hundred feet from the furnaces, but the masts are dwarfed into two low iron towers each with two tops, thus somewhat injuring the appearance of the ship. On the water-line is a belt of steel 170 feet long and 4:2 inches thick, including the inner skin. The deck is of the same thickness as on the Wew York. The speed on trial was 21°9 knots, with a displacement of about 8000 tons ; her coal endurance is 5100 miles. The harbour defence ram Katahdin, generally similar to the Polyphemus, was laid down in 1891. She displaces 2183 tons, and was designed to steam seventeen knots an hour, a speed which, in practice, she has failed to attain. Her freeboard is low, and she must be an uncomfortable craft, as she has no superstructure in which to house her crew. She has a curving upper deck six inches thick on the slope and two and a half inches on the flat, but is, when her ballast tanks are filled, almost flush with the water. On her conning-tower is 18-inch armour, and her funnel and ventilator shafts are 48 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN also protected. She carries neither heavy guns nor torpedo tubes, trusting solely to her chisel-shaped ram for offence. It is not obvious how a comparatively slow vessel is to ram modern battleships faster than herself. The fact that she was not employed on active service during the war does not say much for her value. The Boston, laid down in 1883, is a partially protected cruiser, displacing 3000 tons, and propelled by a single screw. She is fully rigged, without poop or forecastle, and with a superstructure amidships. Two 8-inch guns are mounted in as many barbettes of 2-inch steel, placed fore and aft of the superstructure, but not in the centre line, the fore barbette being to port and the after barbette to starboard, which gives room for one 6-inch gun with axial fire to be mounted at each end of the superstructure. This disposition was novel, but it has not been repeated, and it must manifestly tend to strain the ship. In the superstructure are four more 6-inch weapons in addition to the guns firing axially. There is a 14-inch steel deck over, and a double bottom under, the boilers and engines. There are nine main water-tight compartments. The trial speed was 15°5 knots. A sister ship, the Aélanta, was undergoing reconstruction when the war broke out, and was not employed. The Charleston, laid down in 1887, was built to an Elswick design, reproducing with a lighter armament and an enlarged displacement the features of the famous L-smeralda. She is of 4040 tons, and 18°2 knots. Her battery consists of two 8-inch guns mounted fore and aft dehind 2-inch shields, and six 6-inch guns amidships on sponsons, two firing ahead and two astern. She has a STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 49 complete protective deck from three to two inches thick, coal-bunkers round the vitals, and a cellular system above the water-line. The ship has one funnel and two military masts, each with one top. The Baltimore, also laid down in 1887, is larger, displacing 4600 tons. Her deck is much thicker, reach- ing four inches on the slope, and remaining at two and a half inches on the flat and at the ends; her speed is higher, being 20°09 knots on trial, and her coal-supply is greatly augmented. Her battery includes four 8-inch guns, two on the forecastle and two on the poop, and six 6-inch guns mounted on sponsons in the waist of the ship. Two 8-inch and two 6-inch guns fire axially, and two 8-inch and three 6-inch guns on the broadside. There are two military masts and two funnels. The Sax Francisco and Newarh, laid down in 1888, are smaller by 500 tons. Their armament consists in each case of twelve 6-inch guns, all mounted on sponsons and protected by shields, six firing on the broadside and four axially. They have a continuous double bottom, a steel deck three inches and two inches thick, and a cellular system above it, whilst there are two pole masts in the Newark, and three rigged masts in the San Francisco. The Newark’s speed on trial was 19'2 knots ; the Sax Francisco's 19°5. The Philadelphia, laid down in the same year as the above, is of 4324 tons, and very similar design. She is armed with twelve 6-inch guns, of which four fire ahead and astern, and six on the broadside. She has a steel deck four inches thick on the slope and two and a half inches thick on the flat ; her trial speed was 19'7 knots. E 50 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN Two smaller sister ships, the Ralezgh and Czncinnate, commenced in 1889 and 1890, followed. They are of 3183 tons, with a speed of nineteen knots ; their battery consists of one 6-inch gun and ten 5-inch quick-firers, of which the 6-inch and two 5-inch guns fire ahead, the 6-inch and five 5-inch on the broadside, and four 5-inch astern. The deck is two and a half inches on the slope and one inch on the flat. The coal-supply is very insufficient, the heat in the engine and boiler rooms is excessive, the machinery is too delicate for hard work, and the type has been severely criticised by American naval officers. Perhaps the finest unarmoured cruiser possessed by the United States is the Olympza, laid down in 1890. She displaces 5800 tons, and combines in a high degree offensive and defensive qualities. Forward and aft, in two hooded barbettes, plated with 4-inch steel, are four 8-inch guns mounted in pairs twenty-six feet above the- water, and between them, in a high superstructure behind 2-inch steel, are ten 5-inch quick-firers, firing four ahead or astern and five on the broadside. There are two fixed and four training torpedo tubes; two masts, each with two tops and a light fore and aft rig ; and a protective deck four and three-quarter inches thick on the slope amidships, and elsewhere from three inches to two inches. The 8-inch barbettes are connected with this deck by tubes of 3-inch steel. From the armour- deck to a height of four feet above the water-line is a series of cofferdams packed with cellulose. The trial speed was twenty-one and a quarter knots, with about 17,000 horse-power, so that at sea she is good for ‘DImglunjoOD ISMAID *S'E) oy STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS © 51 nineteen or twenty knots. Of coal 1300 tons are stowed, which is sufficient for 13,000 knots steaming. There is a double bottom throughout; and the accommodation for officers and men is excellent. : The Columbia and Minneapolis, of a type known as commerce-destroyers or “pirates,” were laid down in 1890 and 1891. As their names denote, their primary object is to prey upon trade, and they are given an armament so feeble that they can scarcely hope to encounter any ordinary protected cruiser of their size with success. As a consequence of their weak battery, and to overtake merchant steamers, they have very powerful engines, triple screws, and a high nominal speed. The Columéza has done 22°8 knots, and the Mznneapolts 23°07 on trial; on a voyage across the Atlantic the Columbia maintained a continuous sea-speed of eighteen and a half knots, which is a very good figure for a cruiser. They are ships of 8050 tons displacement and 4114 feet length. Except for their armament and pro- tective deck, they resemble very closely in build an Atlantic liner. They have light masts without tops, and a battery of two 6-inch guns placed forward and firing right ahead, one 8-inch gun astern, and eight 4-inch quick-firers in sponsons, four firing ahead, astern, or on either broadside. The protective deck is four inches thick on the slope and two and a half inches on the flat; there is also a cellulose-packed cofferdam surrounding the ship. The horse-power is 21,000, and 2450 tons of coal can be stowed, giving a very large radius of action! The type has been sharply criticised, 1 6300 miles in the Minneapolis, and 7200 miles in the Columbia. 52 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN in particular by Rear-Admiral Meade of the United States Navy, who considers these ships no faster than the swift liner, and not conspicuously better for fighting than an armed merchant steamer. The protected cruiser Mew Orleans, purchased in England from the Armstrong firm, is a vessel of 3600 tons. On trial she steamed 21°05 knots with forced. draught. She has a protective deck three inches thick on the slope and one inch on the flat. Her guns, all of fifty calibres in length and of the most modern pattern, are six 6-inch, four 4°7-inch, and fifteen small, all quick- firers. Two 6-inch guns are mounted fore and aft on the keel-line ; two are sponsoned out on each beam, so that three fire axially and four on the broadside. The 47-inch guns are in the waist of the ship, two on each broadside. The coal-supply is 800 tons. There are two masts, each with a search-light platform and two military tops, and the usual armoured conning-tower. The torpedo tubes are three in number. Altogether the Vew Orleans is an exceptionally fine and speedy cruiser of low displacement, combining powerful battery, large coal- supply, and excellent conditions of habitability. Her guns, as they were of British pattern, were supplied with cordite ammunition, which is of course smokeless. American officers express the utmost satisfaction with them. The Detroit, Montgomery, and Marblehead, laid down in 1890, are small and unsatisfactory craft, coming midway between the gunboat and the cruiser. They displace 2000 tons, steam eighteen to nineteen knots, are armed with nine 5-inch quick-firers, and carry decks less than half-an-inch thick. STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 53 The Dolphin, laid down in 1883, displaces 1485 tons, steamed fifteen knots on trial, and originally carried a 6-inch pivot forward, which has since been replaced by two 4-inch guns. She is a single-screw vessel, weak and unsatisfactory. The Yorktown, laid down in 1887, displaces 1700 tons, and resembles closely the English Avcher; with a speed of seventeen knots, she carries six 6-inch guns mounted on sponsons, and has a deck 32-inch thick. Two similar vessels, the Bennington and Concord, were laid down in 1888. The Machias and Castine are small cruisers of 1177 tons, laid down in 1891. As originally designed they were deficient in stability, and were altered, receiving a lighter armament than had been originally proposed, at the same time being lengthened. They carry each eight 4-inch quick-firers and eight small guns, whilst their trial speed was about fifteen and a half knots. The dynamite gun cruiser Vesuvius is the most original conception that the American Navy has yet produced. She is a vessel of 929 tons, steaming twenty-one knots, and is quite unprotected. Her singularity lies in her main armament, which consists of three 15-inch pneumatic guns, mounted: parallel to each other in the keel-line, with a fixed elevation of eighteen degrees. The muzzles project from the deck at a distance of thirty-seven feet from the bow, Since the ship was designed the gun has been greatly improved, and as it may have a great future before it, it merits a detailed examination. Its chief advantage is 54 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN that it can discharge shells loaded with the highest explosives with great speed and perfect safety from premature explosions in the gun. Compressed air is the propulsive agent. The shells can be fired at the rate of one a minute or rather less, and are of four sizes, con- taining respectively 500 lbs., 350 Ibs., 200 Ibs., and 100 Ibs. of explosive. In a preliminary trial during May 1891, against a stationary target, the Vesuvius, moving slowly, made seventy-eight per cent. of hits, rejecting errors due to a bad system of firing; and when the target was towed at the rate of ten knots across her bows the practice was good, though the. Vesuvzus herself was steaming seventeen knots. In a later trial against a target representing the Phzlade/phia, at ranges varying from 2000 to 1000 yards, the average for the three guns was forty-four per cent., the practice being best at the longer range. The middle gun, which had received certain improvements, performed far better than the other two. Yet further progress has been achieved since the war, and Admiral Sampson is of opinion that the gun’s efficiency will be greatly increased. The torpedo flotilla was of modern construction, fast and formidable, with the exception of the Somers, Gwin, and Zalbot, which were small second-class boats. The other seven displace from 105 to 185 tons, and steam from twenty-two and a half to twenty-seven and a half knots. Each carries three torpedo tubes and three or four I-pounder guns. They draw from five to six feet when fully loaded, and thus were able to render great service in the shallow water of the Cuban coast. Their artillery 1 Century, vol. 57, 911. STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 55 equipment, however, was so inadequate that they could effect little, when unsupported, against the most insignifi- cant Spanish defences. They proved seaworthy craft, the Porter distinguishing herself on a long voyage to San Juan. The best of the boats was the Avzcsson, which was also almost the oldest. The gunboats were of several different types. The Nashville, Wilmington, and Helena all have 24-inch steel decks, displace just under 1400 tons, and carry each eight q-inch quick-firers and ten smaller weapons. On trial they steamed from fourteen to fifteen and three-quarter knots. The Mashvzll/e differs from the other two in drawing eleven feet of water against their eight feet ten inches. The coal-supply is moderate—275 to 315 tons. These vessels were launched in 1895 or 1896. The Marietta, Wheeling, Annapolis, Vicksburg, Newport, and Princeton all displace about 1000 tons, draw twelve feet of water, steam twelve knots, and carry six 4-inch and eight smaller guns. They are sheathed and coppered to fit them for tropical work. As for the Zofeka, she was purchased in England from the Thames Iron Works, where she had been fitted for service in the China-Japan war. She displaces 1800 tons, steams sixteen knots, and was armed with six 4°7-inch guns and several smaller weapons. To the regularly-built warships of the American Navy a host of auxiliary craft, revenue cruisers, yachts, liners, fast steamers, and tugs, was added before and during the war. The purchase or hire of such ships began on March 8, when Congress voted £10,000,000 56 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN for defence, and continued far into the war. The revenue cruisers, whose crews are in peace drilled and disciplined, were an especially valuable reinforcement, and two of them, the A/cCulloch and Hudson, dis- tinguished themselves in the war. The most important of the vessels taken over from the merchant service were as follows :— Tons. Sea- Coal. Guns.. speed. Tons. er ee 10,800 20 4,500 ee ‘ach Yale (ex-Paris) J of chang hoa aie Si Louis eight 6-pounders. St Paul \ 11,600 20 5,000 Yankee (ex-E/ Norte) 6,888 10 5-inch Q.-F., 6 6-pounders. Yosemite (ex-El Sol) 6,179 ro 6-inch, 6 6-pounders. Dixie (ex-El Sud) 6,114 He M88 Tag 5-inch Q.-F., 6 6-pounders. Prairie (ex-El Rio) 6,872 8 6-in., 2 5-in. Q.-F., 6 6-prs. But in most of the above the full armament was never placed on board. At least three of the big ocean-going steamers started out to scout with nothing heavier than the 6-pounder in their battery. Their high speed and great coal-endurance, however, rendered them most serviceable. One of the four big liners kept the sea continuously for six weeks without coaling. These vessels had American crews, who volunteered for war service when they were taken over. They were navigated by their own officers and crews, but when in action a naval captain, who was on board, with a cadet as aide, and a detachment of marines, took charge. Among the other auxiliary craft acquired the following were of most importance :— STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 57 Tons. Speed. Guns. Mayflower 2,690 18'°8 2 5-inch, 12 6-pounders. Scorpion 627 17°8 4 5-inch, 6 6-pounders. Gloucester 786 Vixen 800 16 6-pounders, Eagle 492 to 3-pounders, 1-pounder, Hawk 545 18 and Colt automatics. Wasp 750 Solace 3,800 hospital-ship. Vulcan 3,500 repair-ship. Rainbow 6,200 | Tris 6 so | condensing-ships. At the close of the war the Auxiliary Navy numbered 123 ships, of which eleven were fast auxiliary cruisers, twenty-eight yachts converted into gunboats, twenty- eight armed tugs, nineteen colliers, seventeen store, repair, and hospital ships, fifteen revenue-cutters, four lighthouse tenders, and two steamers of the Fish Com- mission. For the most part these vessels received only small guns—6- and 3-pounders—to protect them against the attacks of privateers. These improvised warships played some part in the minor actions of the war, when engaged in the blockade of the Cuban coast. The large fast liners were employed as transports during July. Lastly, in this survey of the ships at the disposal of the American Navy Department, thirteen old-fashioned single-turret monitors, dating back to the era of the Civil War, should not be forgotten. One was on the Pacific coast ; the other twelve were scattered round the exposed American ports on the Atlantic. Three were hurriedly refitted with water-tube boilers. They only mounted old smooth-bore guns, but they served to reassure the timid and ignorant, who saw in them what had at least the appearance of strength. 58 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN The ships which the Spanish Navy had ready for sea, or nominally ready, at the outbreak of war were as follows :— Armoured cruisers, 4—INFANTA Maria TERESA, VIZCAYA, ALMIR- ANTE OQUENDO, CRISTOBAL COLON. Old. cruisers, 12—MarQues DE LA ENSENADA, ISLA DE CuBa, Ista DE Luzon, ALFonso XII, Reina Cristina, REINA MERCEDES, ConDE DE VeNapITo, Don ANTONIO DE ULLoa, Don JUAN DE Austria, IsapeL II, VELasco, CAsTILia. Torpedo gunboats, 5—Fitipinas, NUEVA ESPANA, MARQUES DE Mo.ins, Martin ALoNzo Pinzon, TEMERARIO. Destroyers, 3—FuRoR, TERROR, PLUTON. Torpedo boats, 3—ARIETE, Azor; Rayo. Gunboats, 4—Don Jorce Juan, CANO, GENERAL LEzo, GENERAL ConcuHa. But such was the state of Spain’s Navy, that it is very doubtful if, outside the four armoured cruisers, three destroyers and three torpedo boats, more than two or three of the others were in an efficient state for service. For instance, the ALronso XII, MeErcepes, CasTILa, Uxtoa and Verasco were all in such a state of disrepair as to be worth very little. There were fifty or sixty small gunboats on the Cuban coast or in the Philippines, which could hardly be reckoned as fighting ships. By the close of the war Spain had added to the above list the following warships, ready for sea :— Battleship, 1—PELayo. Armoured cruiser, r—CaRLos V. Old ironclad, 1—NuMancia. Destroyers, 4—DrstTRuUcToR, AUDAZ, OSADO, PROSERPINA. Of the above ships the PELayo was a sea-going battleship of the French type, carrying four heavy guns in a quadrilateral, much as does the Marceau or Carnot, STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 59 with a battery of quick-firers entirely devoid of protec- tion. She had been re-fitted at La Seyne just before the war, receiving Niclausse boilers and new quick-firers. Her battery consists of two 124-inch Hontoria guns fore and aft, in 18-inch steel-armoured barbettes, and two 11-inch Hontoria guns sponsoned out on either beam, also in armoured barbettes. Armoured tubes for the passage of ammunition lead down from the guns to the armoured deck, which is at its stoutest point three and a half inches thick. The barbettes could, however, be put out of action by shell bursting beneath. There are nine 54-inch quick-firers, eighteen smaller guns, and seven torpedo tubes; but the quick-firers were not mounted in April. An armoured redoubt was being constructed to protect them: this was not finished till some weeks after the war began. On the water-line the Petayo is defended by a narrow belt from twelve to seventeen inches thick at its upper edge. Her speed with her old boilers on trial was 16°7 knots; her dis- placement 9900 tons; she carried from 800 to 1000 tons of coal as her extreme load. In military strength the PeLayo as a unit was decidedly superior to the Zexas, and as decidedly inferior to the Indiana class, which was just about as fast, and infinitely better armed and armoured. The want of protection in the Spanish vessel amidships, and the feebleness of her auxiliary battery, when contrasted with the /udzana's array of 8-inch, 6-inch, and 6-pounder guns, were such that she could have no chance of success in moderate or calm weather. With her high freeboard, however, she would have had an element of advantage in a heavy sea, No 60 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN attempt was made to send her to the West Indies, and we can only conjecture that she was not in a fit state to make a long voyage across the Atlantic. She was the only battleship possessed by the Spanish Navy, and in consequence of this fact was known in that service by the pathetic nickname of Ex Sorirario. The Emperapor Cartos V, which was not ready at the outbreak of war, is a large but feebly armed and ill-protected armoured cruiser. On the water-line she has no other defence than that afforded by an armour- deck, ranging from six to two inches in thickness, and deeply curved downwards at the sides. Above this isa stretch of unprotected side, and then side armour two inches thick over the battery amidships. This plating is in two layers, one inch of chrome steel and one inch of Siemens-Martin steel, but it has the disadvantage of being too thin to keep out projectiles of 4-inch calibre or upwards. It is, in a word, so thin as to be positively dangerous. Mounted fore and aft in ro-inch barbettes are two 11-inch Hontoria guns, handled by electricity. The barbettes are not carried down to the armour-deck and are open to attack below. The secondary battery is of a very heterogeneous character, including ten 54-inch Hontoria quick-firers, four 3°9-inch, two 10-pounders, four 6-pounders, and eight small machine guns. There are six torpedo tubes. Under forced draught the engines developed 18,500 horse-power, giving a speed of twenty and a half knots. The extreme stowage of coal is 1800 tons. This ship was only just ready for sea by the end of June; she was obviously by construction and design fitted to co-operate with the four armoured cruisers. of ‘NOTOD pue ‘vVSaUaL VIUVIN ‘YO, many ‘vmoz ‘svxaz ‘udjyoorg ay) JO sUOTeATTT 09 °F af or Viwn MYOA MN VLNVANI NATNOON” STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 61 Cervera’s squadron, and would have been a most valuable reinforcement to them. The Numancia is a very early ironclad, dating back to 1863, but re-fitted, re-boilered, and re-armed. She has a broad iron belt of 4 to 5-inch armour, and a battery of quick-firers—four 6°3-inch and eight 54-inch. Her speed being low she was not a very formidable vessel, and was not suited for employment in Cervera’s Flying Squadron. Of the armoured cruisers which constituted the main strength of the latter command, incomparably the finest was the CrisTopaL Coton. Laid down at Sestri Ponente in Italy in 1895, she represented a type of cruiser in which extraordinary qualities of offence and defence are obtained upon a very moderate displacement. She was an Italian development of the well-known Dupuy de Léme, in which very wide-spread protection by thin armour is given on the one hand, and a very powerful battery of guns on the other. On the water-line she had a complete nickel-steel belt eight and a quarter feet wide, tapering from six inches thick amidships to two inches at the ends, with a protective deck one and a half inches thick. Amid- ships for 150 feet there rises a citadel of 6-inch steel, with bulkheads of the same thickness, sheltering the bases of two barbettes, which are placed fore and aft and armoured with 5-inch steel. The two barbettes should have carried each one 10-inch Armstrong gun, but these weapons had not been placed on board when the ship was sent to sea. She was thus without armour-piercing guns during the war. Inside the armoured citadel, however, she had ten 6-inch Armstrong quick-firers, five on each broadside. Above the citadel, on the upper deck, were carried six 62 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN 4°7-inch quick-firers, protected only by shields. The Coton’s engines developed 14,000 horse-power with natural, and 15,000 horse-power with forced draught. Her sea-speed in competent hands should have been between eighteen and nineteen knots. Her boilers were of Niclausse type. She had four torpedo tubes above water but in the citadel, and so behind armour, whilst a fifth was submerged at the bow. The coal-supply, ex- clusive of liquid fuel, was 1200 tons. In rig the ship was curious, having one military mast between her two funnels. The Americans had no cruiser to compare with the Coton. By the admission of American officers them- selves, the Brooklyn, though more than 2000 tons larger, was no match for her, and it is difficult to say what she might not have accomplished with competent seamen and good gunners. Virtually she was a small battleship of exceptionally powerful type, and though wanting her heaviest guns, her splendid battery of quick-firers was quite capable of making her an awkward antagonist for the Jxdzana and her sisters. By keeping her side bear- ing at an angle of thirty-five or forty degrees—no - impossible feat, as Admiral Fournier has shown—she could have defied the attack of even the 1 3-inch gun. The three sister-ships, Inranra Marita TERESA, ALMIRANTE OgueENDo, and Vizcaya, were also armoured cruisers, but of a type resembling the British Aurora class. They were built at Bilbao, and launched in 1890-1. In displacement they were little under 7000 ‘tons. On the water-line they had a narrow belt of compound armour 216 feet long, five and a half feet VAVOZLY Josthid PotnouLy ystuvdg ouL STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 63 broad, and ten to twelve inches thick. They carried two 11-inch Hontoria guns fore and aft in 10-inch barbettes, with domed hoods three inches thick. On the upper deck, and protected only by shields, were ten 5°5-inch quick- firers, five on each broadside. The Spanish authorities filled these ships with unnecessary wood-fittings, placing “tons of timber” in the cabins and state-rooms. More- over, they installed two ammunition hoists, leading straight down, without any sort of cover or protection, to the 5'5-inch magazines. There was nothing to prevent shells or burning matter from dropping down the hoists into the magazines. The deck was of 2 to 3-inch steel. Each ship had eight 6-pounders and twenty small machine guns. The torpedo tubes were eight in number, all above water, two bow, two stern, and four amidship tubes. Under natural draught (7s-inch air pressure) the horse-power was 9500 and the speed eighteen and a half knots ; under forced draught twenty and a quarter knots. This was on trial with only 420 tons of coal on board. The full coal stowage was 1050 tons. These three vessels differed little from protected cruisers ; their big guns were too heavy for use against anything but a hostile battleship, yet their want of side armour rendered them incapable of encountering such an enemy. The old cruisers were for the most part of low fight- ing quality, with much wood about them, little or no protection and low speed. The Atronso XIJ, Cristina, and Mercepes carried each six 62-inch Hontoria guns and seventeen smaller weapons. They were of iron, and steamed on trial, with forced draught, about seventeen knots. The Casritia, of about the same size, but built 64 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN six years earlier, in 1881, with iron upper works and frames and a wooden hull, steamed only fourteen knots at the best, and carried old pattern Krupp guns. The others in the list of old cruisers were steel or iron vessels of 1100 to 1000 tons, armed with four or six Hontoria 4°7-inch guns each, and steaming at the very best less than sixteen knots. Of the torpedo craft, the gunboats were of modern construction, with the defects of the type—low speed, poor coal endurance, and want of protection. They carried each two 4°7-inch guns fore and aft. Of the destroyers all except the DEsTRucToR were of the most recent type, built in England just before the war, and displacing 370 to 400 tons. Their speed was twenty- eight knots on trial for the two 370-ton boats (TERROR and Furor) and thirty knots for the other four. But in service they were not found capable of more than twenty-one or twenty-two knots, probably because their machinery and boilers were not handled with sufficient care, whilst in a sea-way their thin plates were driven in and their frames bent and broken by the force of the waves. Each destroyer carried two tubes for the 14-inch Schwartzkopf torpedo—unlike the British destroyers, which carry the 18-inch tube. The coal capacity was 100 tons, and was found to be insufficient to take them across the Atlantic. The Destructor, of 386 tons and twenty knots, was an older vessel, launched in 1886. As for the three torpedo boats, they were built in 1887, were of the large sea-going class, and steamed twenty-four to twenty-six knots on trial. The Azor had three tubes ; the other two, two each. All three had old boilers, and were in poor order. Ray ae LiBR A ARY. STRENGTH OF THE TWO Fit MED 6. Comparing the two fleets before the war began, it appeared that there was little to choose, so far as ships went, though the United States were somewhat stronger. This was because the actual unreadiness or unfitness for sea of many of the Spanish ships was not known. A table will best show the difference between the apparent strength of the two combatants on April 20, and the actual strength at about that date. Apparen: Actual. United States. Soa United States. Spain. Battleships ‘ 65 I 5 ° Monitors. : . 6 ° 6 ) Armoured Cruisers 2 7 2 4 Old Ironclad ° I ° ° Protected Cruisers . 14 3 8 ° Other Cruisers. #56 14 9 12 Torpedo Gunboats I Il I 5 Destroyers . ° 7 ° 3 Torpedo boats 6 12 6 3 The “apparent” list was one of the estimates actually published in America before the war. Had the Spanish Navy been able to send to sea with trained crews, all the vessels that figure in it, the issue might well have remained in doubt for months. On deducting ships either under repair or not sufficiently completed for work in war, the position of the United States vastly improves. The dangerous weakness in torpedo craft disappears ; the inferiority in armoured cruisers is vastly reduced ; whilst the superiority in protected cruisers is emphasised. Nor should it be overlooked, that in ships actually ready for sea the United States had the more modern fleet. Only nine of the American ships in the table, as against thirty-two of the Spanish ships, were launched before 1890. F 66 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN The Spanish Navy was to a great extent a paper force, whereas the American Navy was generally under- rather than over-estimated, even in America. Spain especially lacked heavy armoured ships of the battleship class, without which she could scarcely hope for success in pitched battles. Her slight advantage in torpedo craft would be reduced or converted into a positive disadvan- tage as the war went on, since the United States had building or completing no less than eighteen torpedo boats or destroyers of 100 feet length and upwards. In her merchant marine Spain had no such reserve of fast ships available as had the United States. Most of the steamers of the Compajia Transatlantica were taken over for service, either as cruisers or transports, before the war, whilst three fast vessels of great displacement were purchased from Germany. The following are the details of these ships :-— Tons. Speed. Knots. Patriota (ex-lVormannia) 10,500 19 \each 4 6'3-in., 4 4’7-in., 2 Rapipo (ex-Columbia) . 9500 195 3'2-in., and 4 machine guns. METEORO (ex-Have/) - 6963 19 MAGALLANES . . . 6932 17 A.ronso XIII. 3 . 4381 16 REINA CRISTINA ‘ » 4381 16 Santo DoMINGO : » 5400 14 Aronso XII . : - 5063 15 Leon XIII. : . 5186 15 PRINCIPE DE SATRUSTAGUI 4713 15 MONTEVIDEO . : . 5096 14% BUENOS AIRES ; - §3II 14 CruDAD DE CaDiz . - 3084 13h MINDANAO. 3 . 4195 134 IsLA DE PANAY : - 3636 13% Ista DE Luzon ‘ - 4252 13 STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 67 It does not appear that any of these vessels were employed in naval operations. Three or four of them received guns, but they were not put to the use for which they were best adapted—the harrying of the enemy’s commerce and coast. The Parriora, Raprpo, and METEoRO were not ready for sea before June. The personnel of the two Navies was, on paper, as follows in 1897 :— United Spain. States. United States, 1897. August 1898. Admirals. ‘ ‘ 5 22 18 Captains. . . : 61 45 ; ,| Total Commanders’. : : 87 85 963'+348 strength Lieutenants and Ensigns . 622 573 officers Cadets, etc. : 5 - 168 310 and men, Warrant Officers and Seamen 14,000 12,750 \ 24,123° | 30,247.4 Marines. - : - 8,500 2,670! Of the Spanish force perhaps 1500 were in the Far East and another 1500 in Cuba manning the small gun- boats and cruisers on the station. That should have left an available total of 11,000 seamen. Yet we know that Cervera’s squadron of four armoured cruisers and three destroyers was not properly manned, so far as the engine-room complements were concerned, and that the utmost difficulty was experienced in finding crews for the Petayo, Cartos V, and the vessels which in June were despatched on the aimless voyage to Manila. It would therefore appear that the effective strength of the Spanish fevsonnel was very much below the paper strength. In the American Navy, on the other hand, 1 Permanently commissioned officers, July 1, 1898. 2 Appointed only during continuance of hostilities. 3 August 15, 1898. * Lieutenant-Commander Beehler. 68 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN the effective strength was considerably above the nominal strength, as at the prospect of war men were recruited vigorously. In training, discipline, education and seamanship there was no comparison between the two forces. They were thus contrasted in August 1898, by a Madrid periodical :—‘ The Americans have for a year been preparing for war, and for three months there was not a day that they did not fire all their guns. We have had but one target practice, and that over a year ago. This was limited to expending the least possible amount of ammunition. Half our vessels had not cleaned their bottoms for a year, and all had been anchored in Cuban waters for about two months. The Americans are constantly making voyages in all seas with their vessels, so that they have a trained Zersonnel for the machinery. We have the greatest scarcity of engineers, and hardly any stokers at all.” The American naval officer has a world-wide reput- ation for professional knowledge and capacity. The American seaman—though not always recruited on the long-service system as in England—is intelligent, brave and resourceful. Coming from a nation of engineers, the engineering staff on board the warships was of remarkable efficiency, and as a consequence breakdowns were very few and far between, whilst such performances as the fast steaming of the Oregon and Zexas at Santiago indicated the trustworthiness of American machinery in skilled hands. The American Navy generally had been constantly exercised at sea, and not only in the mere cruising which gives seamanship if STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 69 not tactical knowledge, but also in such evolutions as the blockade of a supposed hostile port. During the early months of 1897 the North Atlantic squadron was required to blockade Charleston, which it did with great skill and success. Much attention was devoted to target practice. ‘Men in general service on board cruising ships,” says the Report of the Bureau of Navigation, issued after the war, “had received, during the nine months preceding the outbreak of the war, better training and more experience at target practice than had been the case for many years previous. The old regulations for target practice which had been in force for years were superseded on July 22, 1897, by a new set of regulations, which practically doubled the frequency of regular practice, making the practice simpler and less irksome, systematising and increasing the facilities for preliminary training and subcaliber practice, and adapting the whole system to the conditions demanded by the accuracy of the modern rifle of the United States Navy.” Thus, though apparently weak on paper, the American Navy had achieved practical efficiency of the very highest type, and was a vastly more formidable force than its insignificant numbers seemed to show. Yet how enor- mous was its superiority to the Spanish Navy could not be altogether grasped, even by Americans, without the actual test of battle. It is safe to say that most English- men—with their knowledge of 1812 and the feats of the Civil War—confidently expected the Americans to win. It is equally safe to say that no one anticipated that two important victories would be secured at the cost of but one American life. To ‘the trained personnel of the 70 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN American Navy should be added 1000 men enlisted for three years’ service in the revenue cruisers, and little inferior to the blue-jackets of the Navy. To supplement the regular enlisted force of the United States Navy no reserve of the true kind was available. But fifteen of the maritime States, in January 1898, possessed enrolled bodies of men known as Naval Militia, mustering 200 officers and 3700 men. These bodies were organised purely for local defence, and could not be compelled in time of war to serve outside the United States. Thus the New York Naval Militia could only be employed on the United States coast, and could not be sent to Cuba or Puerto Rico. Just before the outbreak of war Naval Militia corps were embodied in two other States, making a total of seventeen separate bodies with about 4400 officers and men. For the most part the Naval Militia was composed of intelligent, well-educated, and well-to-do men. It mustered in its ranks, in the blue-jacket ratings, uni- versity graduates, doctors, lawyers, clergymen, engineers and yachtsmen. It was representative of the best in- telligence and highest patriotism of the country. But its training and sea experience had been small. Boat and camp exercise, and an occasional short cruise in an old man-of-war represented the sum-total of its practical knowledge. It was similar, in fact, in training to the British Naval Volunteers, a force which was abolished some years ago. ‘“ Men holding the ordinary blue- jacket ratings were of a class entirely unsuited to perform the duties that of necessity fall to the blue-jacket. Men who had been clerks, lawyers, professional men, whilst STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 71 they might have been able to camp on shore and look out for themselves and their surroundings, found it a much more difficult matter on board a crowded ship, where only a thorough understanding of how to make the best of everything would make their position bearable.” } Yet in the want of officers and men the Navy had to fall back upon this force. To get over the difficulty as to employing the organisations outside the United States, and to eliminate the dual control, by the State and the United States authorities, they were called upon to enlist in the “ United States Auxiliary Naval Force,” and were mustered into that service with the consent of the State governors. They were informed that as far as possible they would: be employed for coast defence, but that in case of emergency the Navy Department would reserve the right to send them upon foreign service. In all 196 executive officers and 3832 men were enlisted for the Navy and the “ Auxiliary Naval Force” from the Naval Militia. The response to the call was prompt and satis- factory, a battalion of New York Naval Militia reporting, armed, uniformed, equipped, and ready for duty in six hours after receiving notice, and the Massachusetts contingent reporting at the New York Navy Yard in twenty hours from the call. All displayed great zeal and enthusiasm, university graduates eagerly undertaking coal-trimmers’ and stokers’ work that they might thereby be sent on foreign service. When called out, the Naval Militia was employed for the following purposes :— ! Bureau of Navigation Report, 8. 72 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN (1) Signal service ashore, where their work was “most satisfactorily” performed, to quote the words of the Official Reports. (2) The manning of harbour defence vessels, such as the old single-turret monitors, and armed tugs employed in harbour service and patrolling mine-fields. The monitors were taken over in a very dirty and dilapidated state. They had all lain for thirty years or more at the various Navy yards with very little repairs. They were put in working order at the dockyards, but their crews had to do a great deal to fit them for service. When ready, they cruised from port to port, and the men were regularly exercised at target practice with the old 15-inch smooth-bores. No mishaps occurred, and the vessels were handled with skill and care. At the close of the war they were brought back to be put out of commission in excellent order, after fourteen weeks’ service. In the management of the small tugs the officers and men also showed great aptitude. (3) Four of the oldest organisations were called upon to furnish complete crews for the cruisers Vanhee, Yosemite, Pratrie and Dixie. Massachusetts manned the Prairie, Michigan the Yosemite, New York the Yankee, and Maryland the Dive. The Yankee was at sea only eleven days after her crew had been mustered into the Navy. She took part in several of the minor actions of the war, and Admiral Sampson himself expressed the warmest satisfaction with her men in the following report :— “As the Commander-in-Chief of the American Naval Squadron blockading Santiago and the Cuban coast, the STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 73 auxiliary cruiser Yankee, manned by the New York Naval Reserves, came immediately under my observa- tion, and it is a pleasure for me to speak of the spirit and efficiency shown by the officers and crew during their stay under my command. “The young men forming the ship’s company of the Yankee were called into service several weeks prior to any other Naval Reserve battalion; they came from all walks of civil life, and their minds, devoted to peaceful pursuits, were suddenly diverted to the needs and.requirements and the usages of naval routine. “Notwithstanding this radical change, they have made the name of their ship a household word through- out the country, and have proved that the average American, whether he be clerk or physician, broker, lawyer, or merchant, can, on the spur of the moment, prove a capable fighter for his country, even amid such strange and novel surroundings as obtain in the naval service. ‘These young men have especially upheld the American supremacy in the art of gunnery, and have on all occasions proved brave and efficient. “The conclusion of the Spanish-American War released them from their voluntarily assumed positions in the regular Navy, but when they returned to civil life they carried with them the consciousness of duty well done at Santiago and Cienfuegos, and wherever their guns were used in hostile action. In a word, the Naval Reserves manning the Yazee, in common with those on board other vessels in the service, have proved their aptitude for sea duty, and made apparent the wisdom of the Government in calling them into active service.” 74 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN Yet it was not all plain sailing. There was some friction with the Michigan detachment when they found that they were going to be placed under the orders of United States naval officers, and complaints were made. Similar difficulties occurred with the New Jersey Militia. But on the whole the men accepted hardship and discomfort with honourable alacrity. (4) Detachments were furnished by the Illinois Naval Militia to many of the warships of Admiral Sampson’s squadron. Thus the /xdana and Newaré received each seventeen men ; the Ovegon and Cincinnati each sixty ; the AZontgomery twenty ; the Newport twenty-six ; the Wilmington thirteen, and several of the torpedo boats two to three men each. All volunteered for this special work. ‘Possessing a high average of education and intelligence,” says the Assistant Secretary of the Navy’s report,’ “they picked up their duties quickly, especially in those cases where they were surrounded by trained men-of-war’s men, and when the war ended were becom- ing quite efficient in their various grades and stations.” Yet from the very nature of things they could not be expected to fill the place or to do the work of the trained seaman. At best they were a makeshift, and the necessity of a national naval reserve to supplement the active force is one of the first lessons of the war. “ For the actual needs of warships and such auxiliaries as were required for deep-sea work,” says the Assistant Secretary, ‘there was needed a reserve which could be promptly mobilised.”* And this reserve, it is added, must not be too dependent upon the merchant service, the demands 1 p. 54. 2 Report, p. 13. STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 75 on which for transport are likely to be enormous. In these words lies a suggestion of great value to England. It is difficult to say whether the want of trained men did in any degree seriously hamper the American Navy. It looks as though the Minneapolis and Columéza, both of which had some trouble with their machinery, and both of which were weakly manned, did suffer from this cause. They were not ready for work at the outset. In most of the other ships the normal crews were augmented ; in their case the crews were reduced. The figures given in the Surgeon-General’s report on this head are interesting.’ Ships with crews above normal complement — Name. War-crew. Excess. Name. War-crew. Excess. Amphitrite . 200 40 Miantonomoh . 175 15 Annapolis . . 139 17 Montgomery . 281 4 Bancroft . . 143 13 Nashville . . 179 29 Brooklyn . - 552 52 New Orleans . Att III Dolphin . . 125 15 Newport . . 142 20 Helena... . 183 33 New York . 652 86 Indiana . - 571 101 Oregon. . 524 51 Lowa : - 587 101 Puritan . ~ 233 3 Katahdin . . ol 3 San Francisto . 372 72 Marietta . - 144 32 Texas : < 433 53 Massachusetts . 480 10 Vesuvius . . 78 2 Ships with crews below normal complement :— Name. War-crew. Deficiency. Castine . é : 3 : 146 22 Columbia : , : 3 450 50 Detroit . 5 ‘ ‘ ; 252 25 Machias . ‘ ‘ ‘ ; 158 10 Marblehead. ; : : 267 10 Minneapolis . : 3 3 427 73 Terror 167 13 1 pp. 187-8. 76 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN .It will be noted that the battleships and armoured cruisers, which did by far the hardest work, were given by far the greatest augmentations to their crews. The engine-room complements in the large ships were strengthened by drafts of mechanics. Thus the Vew York alone received an addition of sixty. Eighteen of these were machine-shop hands from small towns, and though without warship knowledge and in some cases without any experience with any form of steam-engine, they proved very useful, from their adaptability and skill in improvising methods of repairs with inadequate tools. The engine-room and machinists’ force was run in three watches.’ To the Spanish Zersonnel the converse of all that has been said in favour of the American seamen and engineers may be applied without much injustice. The officers showed small professional capacity during the war, and the state of discipline may be guessed from a general order of Cervera’s on leaving Spain. “I need not,” ran this order, ‘call upon you to give proof of conscientiousness in your attention to duty, especially that of watch-keeping, a task often irksome.” No British or American Admiral would exhort his officers and men to keep watch vigilantly, any more than he would exhort them to eat, breathe or sleep. The Spanish engineer was of poor quality ; Scotchmen had kept the machinery in order before the outbreak of war, and it does not appear that their place was properly filled. As for the Spanish seaman he displayed heroic courage, but he was unintelligent, awkward, and in many instances of bad 1 p. A. Engineer Bennett in Casster, 1898, ii. 219. STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS "7 physique. The war training of the Spanish Navy was thoroughly defective. Gunnery was an almost unknown art; manoeuvres were never held; even drill and evolutions were neglected, as Captain Sigsbee of the Mazne records that during some weeks’ stay in Havana harbour he saw “‘ very little drilling of any kind on board the Spanish men-of-war.” The Vizcaya and OqueEnpo, two crack ships, when they reached Havana and lay there after the J/azue’s destruction, did not drill their crews, though war was then imminent. There was little opportunity afforded of learning seamanship. Essentially the Spanish Navy in 1898 stood where it had been in 1779, in 1796, and 1804, when British seamen regarded it with humorous contempt. To ascertain which side was likely to win, and to foretell the disasters of Manila and Santiago, we have only to go back to the pages of our own naval history. In all our past wars the Americans are the people who have most seriously challenged our claim to be lords of the sea. Paul Jones, Hull, and Decatur are the names to us of men who were the equals of our great sea-captains. The Spaniards, on the other hand, since the days of Drake and Hawkins, have been the enemies we have feared least. Rodney, in the war of American Independence, defeated them with scarcely an effort, and time after time British frigates captured Spanish frigates with absurdly small loss to our crews. It is curious to note that in his Zzfe of Rodney, Mr. Hannay speaks of “ the extraordinary fatuity which has distinguished the modern Spanish Admiral and General.” ‘Extraordinary fatuity ” 78 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN is the one phrase for Spain’s course of action in the present war. ‘“ A war with Spain,” says Brenton, “was always popular with our sailors, who despised her for her want of skill.” In our fight for life of 1796—1808, the battle of St. Vincent serves to illustrate once more the hopeless feebleness of the Spanish Navy. Nelson? and our great captains looked upon “the Dons” with undisguised contempt. ‘A Spanish ship chased is a Spanish ship taken,” was a saying of those days, which seems still to hold true. Of all things, national character changes most slowly, and what Spaniards were in the last century they still remain, whilst the introduction of steam and machinery into naval war has yet further handicapped them. They lack mechanical aptitude as a race, and have, to judge by the records of the present war, failed to make the best use of the admirable weapons with which English and Italian designers have supplied them. Bad as they were in handling sailing- ships—when it would take them twenty-four hours to form line of battle,?a manceuvre which British seamen executed in as many minutes—they are yet worse in husbanding the frail structures of steel and the com- plicated engines and machinery which make up the modern ship of war. The maintenance of a modern fleet in good and serviceable order is a very expensive matter, and Spain, being desperately poor, exhausted by the protracted 1 He said “the Dons may make fine ships—they cannot, however, make men.”—Desfatches, i. 309. 2 The fact that the Spaniards took twenty-four hours to form line of battle is noted in Nelson’s Despatches, i. 312. STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 79 struggle with the Cuban insurgents, and by the war with the Philippine rebels, had not the funds to provide her ships in peace time with the proper material for war. Her dockyards were without stores and appliances required by the fleet. “We are extenuated, absolutely penniless,” writes Admiral Cervera in his tragic corre- spondence with the Madrid authorities. “In this Arsenal [Cadiz] we have not been able to coal, and at Barcelona and Cadiz we could obtain only half the biscuit we wanted, and that only because I had ordered 8000 kilos [about eight tons] to be made here.” This was in February 1898. He notes further a want of charts of American waters. There was an extraordinary lack of ammunition, and of machinery for its manufacture. The Coron could not engage in target practice because there were no appliances for the re- annealing and re-charging of the empty cases, and there was no money with which to purchase reserve ammunition abroad. The Marta Teresa had only thirty sound cartridge cases for her ten 55-inch quick-firers, instead of 1000, and, adds the Admiral in a letter dated March 16, “it is to be supposed that the magazines of the Vizcaya and OguENDO are no better supplied.” Orders were given in Spain for more, but the best output of the manufacturers was only one hundred rounds per week, which would have meant something like thirty weeks before the three ships were properly supplied, whilst the first deliveries, though due in January, had not been effected by the middle of March. Even the guns were in bad condition. The Vizcaya had a 55-inch gun in which the breech plug had been declared defective in 80 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN 1897, but which does not appear to have been changed before she left for the West Indies. There were com- plaints of the breech-actions of all the 5°5-inch Hontoria guns; and, if. Cervera can be believed, these weapons were practically useless from this cause and from the want of proper ammunition noted above. Such was the exhaustion.of the arsenals that a broken awning line in the Marta Teresa could not be replaced for days, whilst the changing of certain tubes in the boiler of her steam-launch had been demanded early in February, but had not been carried out late in March. The armoured cruiser CaratuNa had been eight years in hand at Cadiz, and yet in 1898 was nowhere near completion. ‘‘We have nothing at all,” Cervera wrote in March to Madrid. The Vizcaya from want of docking, and from continuous service in warm waters, was so foul that her speed did not exceed thirteen knots. The condition of the Spanish Navy was indeed vastly worse than that of the Italian Navy before Lissa or of the French Navy in the revolutionary war. Troude and Chevalier’s complaints of _ ill-trained personnel and unreliable material contain no such revelation of disgraceful inefficiency as Cervera’s letters. Even the Chinese fleet when it put out to battle, laden with cast-iron shells and with sand charges, was better equipped than the unfortunate vessels which the Spanish Cabinet sent forth to destruction. Yet what are we to think of the foresight which could boast in this manner : “We shall conquer at sea, and I will tell you why. In the first place, because of the admirable discipline which is found in our ships; in the second, because as STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 81 soon as action begins the nondescript crews of the American warships will desert. And therefore we need have no fears of defeat, ship to ship. . . . The squadron at the Cape Verdes, and particularly the destroyers, have nothing to fear from the American fleet.”! Such was the utterance of a responsible Spanish official, who must have known the substance of Cervera’s letters, and who, having been himself Minister of Marine, was well acquainted with the resourcelessness of the Spanish Navy. His talk was echoed by well-educated, thoughtful Spaniards of the writer's acquaintance; it even found some acceptance in British newspapers. It must be remembered, in fairness to the latter, that in peace time it is excessively difficult for those without inside knowledge to gauge the efficiency of military or naval forces. There were plenty of people who in 1870 foretold the triumph of France. One fact must be noticed here out of its historical order. It is that no one in Spain has as yet been punished for the shameful inefficiency and corruption of the naval administration. The French Revolutionists would have beheaded both guilty ministers and innocent admirals; even calm England, judging by the precedent of Byng, and the warning of Sir Vesey Hamilton, would, whilst sparing the politicians, have shot an admiral or two to appease popular indignation. In Spain the politicians have been allowed with impunity to send brave men to wholesale massacre and torture, and no one has been punished. No words of condemnation can be too strong for the ministers who wilfully and knowingly 1 Madrid, Heraldo, April 6, 1898, in Reports 28. G oe @ 82 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN despatch an inadequate, ill-equipped force to certain destruction, because they have not the moral courage to resist the ill-advised demands of an uninformed public opinion. It is the absence of clearly-defined responsibility which conduces to such acts. Nor should it be forgotten that large sums had been expended on the Spanish Navy in the years before the war. ‘“ Thrice the amount of money necessary for building a large fleet was voted, with the greatest enthusiasm, more than nine years ago, and no one knows where most of the money has gone,” wrote in May 1898 a Spanish editor. Information as to the real condition of the fleet was withheld from the public. Yet where the Government is democratic, it is essential that the people should know the truth and the whole truth. And thus the paper comparisons of the two com- batant Navies were useless and worthless. There could be no comparison between the two. Whenever an American ship met a Spanish ship of anything like her own size, the American ship was almost bound to win. A well-organized, modern force, vastly superior in numbers, had not the slightest cause to fear a dis- organised medieval force, weak in every imaginable respect. The vigour of initiative, which might for some time have enabled the weaker to puzzle and paralyse the stronger, is wanting in the Spanish character. The Spaniard does not attack, but waits to be attacked. When war became inevitable, each day's and each hour's delay told in favour of the United States, with their vast industrial, financial, and engineering resources. STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS 83 The numerous battleships and torpedo boats on the stocks in American yards were pressed actively forward, and had the war continued the Kearsarge and Kentucky, with a dozen torpedo vessels, would have been ready by the close of 1898. Spain could, perhaps, have sent to sea the ALFonso XIII and LeEpanto by the same date, though these vessels were so defective in design and speed—having been built in Spain—that they could not be considered very useful items of naval strength. As for the CarpinaL CrsNERoS and PRINCESA DE ASTURIAS, armoured cruisers of the Vizcaya type, though one had been launched in 1897 and the other in 1896, both were in a very backward state, and could not have been counted upon for use before 1900. To aggravate the weakness of the Spanish Navy, no plan of operations had been prepared beforehand, nor was any carried out during the war. Everything was done at haphazard, in obedience to popular clamour. It is, of course, quite impossible, besides being inadvisable, to settle in peace the exact detail of what each ship and each Admiral and officer is to do during the con- tinuance of a campaign, though it will be well to draw up in outline the plan to be followed on each station. What is required is that the general direction of effort— whether open attack upon the enemy by heavy squadrons, or warfare upon his commerce, or raids upon his coast— should be determined beforehand ; ships built in accord- ance with the direction in which energy is to be exerted ; bases prepared at the proper places; arrangements made for speedy mobilisation and for the concentration of vessels at the most favourable points; and above all, a 84 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN scheme for the re-coaling of the fleet, or of its scattered ships, worked out. Harmonious co-operation between the Army and Navy has also to be arranged. Nothing of this had been done by the Spanish General Staff. When war came the bases, whether at home or abroad, were without stores, provisions, ammunition and coal, and the commanders without orders or instructions. What ships were in commission were scattered. A victorious engagement, as Admiral Cervera repeatedly points out in his letters, would have meant at the best only the postponement .of ultimate, inevitable disaster, since Spain had no resources with which to repair and refit damaged ships, whereas the United States had splendid shipbuilding yards and unlimited money. CHAPTER III PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST WHEN war became inevitable each side had to make its plans. The Spanish authorities, as we have seen, had made no preparations or calculations. The first question for them must necessarily have been, whether what ships they possessed should be hazarded at sea or kept in port, as were the German ships in 1870, and the Russian ships in 1854-6, and again in 1877. Sucha policy of inactivity may be masterly where the strength of the inactive force is wholly inadequate—as the Spanish fleet actually was— but can rarely be carried out except where there is some strong governing element which does not fear public opinion. Such there was in Prussia in 1870, and in Russia in 1854-6 and 1877. But in Spain, with its pseudo- democratic form of government and its weakly-planted royal house, there was no backbone to resist popular clamour. Moreover, neither Prussia nor Russia had owned distant colonies in which were locked up large forces of troops. The sympathies of the Army—a very powerful factor in Spain—and of the relatives of the soldiers in Cuba and the Philippines, had necessarily to be considered by the Spanish Ministers. As the force in 85 86 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN Cuba was far larger than the force in the Philippines, the former point became the more important toa Government which depended wholly upon public opinion. The retention of the Spanish fleet in harbour was the course for which Cervera and Captain Concas, a dis- tinguished Spanish naval officer, commanding the Marta Teresa, pleaded. ‘To carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing necessary is to secure control of the sea,’ wrote the former, ‘“ which can only be done by defeating the enemy’s fleet, or rendering it powerless by blockading it in its military ports. Can we do this with the United States? It is evident to me that we cannot. And, even if God should grant us a great victory, contrary to our reasonable expectations, how and where could we repair the damage sustained ? ... Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this island would cost us enormous sacrifices, as we should be compelled to be constantly armed to the teeth. And here the question already suggested by a speaker ! must be asked : Is the island worth the ruin of Spain? I say nothing of commerce-destruction, because it Seems to me that no man acquainted with history can attach any value to such enterprises, which are almost impossible in our days on account of the character of modern vessels... . I think it of the utmost importance that the whole council of ministers should be, without exception, fully and clearly informed of our terrible position. . . . I under- stand that the Government persists in the idea of sending the small torpedo craft to Cuba. This seems to mea very risky adventure, which may cost us very dear, as 1 Sefior Silvela, at Burgos. Cervera, 13. PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 87 the loss of our squadron and defeat of our division in the Caribbean Sea would entail great danger for the Canaries, and perhaps the bombardment of our sea-coast cities. I Say nothing of the fate of Cuba, because I have long since anticipated it. A naval defeat would only precipi- tate its ultimate loss, whilst, if left to defend itself with its present means, it might cause the Americans some annoyance. .. . lam very much afraid for the Philippines and the Canaries ; above all, I fear the possibility of a bombardment of our coast towns, which is not impossible if we remember the audacity of the Yankees, who can count upon four or five vessels of higher speed than ours.” Captain Concas’ opinion was as follows :—‘ The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in number and class of ships, armour, artillery, and preparations made, besides the advantage given them by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible insur- rection in Puerto Rico, and the still unsuppressed rising in the East, that they have sufficient forces to attack us in the West Indies, in Spain and the adjoining islands, and in the Philippines. . . . Any division of our limited forces and any separation from European waters involves a strategic mistake which would bring war to the Peninsula, a frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of large ransoms, and perhaps the loss of some island [ probably Minorca or one of the Canaries]. As soon as this fleet sails for the West Indies, it is evident, as has already happened more than once, that the American Flying Squadron will leave for Europe, and even if its purpose were only to make a raid or demonstration against our coasts, the well-founded alarm of all Spain would compel 88 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN the return of the fleet, though it might be too late. .. . Adding the three battleships [Oquenpo, Vizcaya, Teresa], and the CristopaL Coton, without her big guns, to the two remaining in the Peninsula [PrELayo and Cartos V], and to the few and old torpedo boats which we have left, it is possible to defend our coast... thanks to the distance of the enemy from his base of operations.” This opinion was given on April 21. It will be observed that both these officers are for the virtual abandonment of Cuba, and for a policy of complete inaction. Neither so much as suggests raids against the American coast-line, the object of each being evidently to keep as far away from the Americans as possible, yet they expect the American Navy to expend all its energy in such raids. With their inner knowledge of the utter rottenness of the Spanish Navy the course which they recommend can be understood. But it is strange that neither mentions the bombardment panic which was at this time very prevalent on the seaboard of the United States, or considers that if public opinion would compel the recall of the Spanish squadron did an American fleet appear off the Spanish coast, it might equally be expected to compel the recall of the American fleet did the Spanish squadron appear off the coast of the United States. It is instructive to note that the American naval authorities felt no little uneasiness as to Spanish raids, as will be shown later. How far such raids were possible remains an open question. The only Spanish ships capable of effecting them on the outbreak of war were the Maria TERESA, ‘SoU TENN UI aruvysip a6 saimbsy * S2in0y Tsanavo aniuvians ++ ---++e* 8 ~ 0 — eS Bs ae aL QLINWUY WEIN) JHL 1 PPR PACE Ui «| a LY of Pe (asanby TINO i vin 8 ngs al Bash aah Oor6 1 bia ag id} g] Padma my Reet (2sombiysag) Bie 7 Saalaawn mes wanna ENS A gs > (osan byJ0— ) 6, Se et Sayozy* ogT ge caveat pear e earns: fetes Ser genes eg ae lig aan wide ee iT NO” BT Je OS PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 89 OguENpo, and CristosaL Coon, and two of these were, as we have seen, not properly supplied with ammunition. The Vizcaya, in the same plight, was too foul to steam fast. Among the ships not ready for sea was the Cartos V. Had the expeditionary squadron waited till the middle or end of May, she would have been fit for service ; the Vizcaya could have been docked, the Coton could have been furnished with her big guns, and fresh supplies of ammunition for the ships might have been obtained. A force of three cruisers with only a few rounds of ammunition could obviously not be trusted to effect much on the American coast, and there was further the question of coaling to be considered. But with bunkers full and a deck load, the endurance of the Spanish ships should have been sufficiently great to take them at economical speed 3000 miles, from the Cape Verdes to Boston, or to Portland, and thence, after bombarding or making demonstrations, to Halifax, where they could have demanded coal sufficient to carry them back to Ferrol or Cadiz. Rule 3 of the British neutrality proclamation ran :—‘‘No ship of war of either belligerent shall be permitted to take in any supplies, except provisions and such other things as may be requisite for the sub- sistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her own country or to some nearer destination ;” and ships so supplied were not to receive more coal or provisions in British ports till three months had expired. Under this rule the Spaniards could plainly have claimed fuel sufficient to take them back to Spain. But the go THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN delay at Halifax must have been such that an American blockading squadron would have been able to arrive off the port before they could have got away to sea. Still it appears to the writer that the mere presence of these cruisers on the United States coast-line, would have led to a popular demand for the recall of a part, at least, of Sampson’s fleet, since American opinion was quite uninstructed on questions of naval strategy. And if reports had been spread by the Spanish Government to the effect that the Vizcaya, Cartos V, and PELAyo were also moving on the American coast—above all, if at the earliest possible date these vessels had been sent ostentatiously to sea, and had then retired to some rendezvous under Cape Blanco, when their where- abouts would have been unknown,—the panic might have been greatly augmented. For the American authorities were obviously ignorant of the complete inefficiency of the Spanish marine, and had to judge by appearances and externals. If there was any chance of six large Spanish ships being concentrated off Halifax or the Maine coast- line, Schley’s Flying Squadron might well have appeared too weak to be risked against the enemy, and the recall of Sampson might have become a necessity under the circumstances. If operations were to be undertaken at once by a weak detachment of the fleet in western waters, it would seem that such a raid by the three cruisers which could be counted upon to steam, was the most promising plan to be followed. It was certainly not more likely to lead to disaster than the despatch of Cervera to the West Indies with four cruisers and three destroyers, which was PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST gI finally decided upon by the Government. With delay the practicability of such a raid diminished, as the Americans would either have fortified their ports or despatched a powerful fleet to meet the Spanish squadron. Without an expeditionary force they could have made little use of this respite in the West Indies. Cuba was too powerfully garrisoned to be more than threatened ; Puerto Rico was open to attack, and was likely to fall in this case, but the effects of its loss, however serious, could not be compared with those of a defeat of the Spanish squadron. In European waters the Americans would have had to reckon with the PrLrayo and—on paper—a formidable torpedo flotilla in addition to the five armoured cruisers, and it is open to question whether they would have ventured to send more than three or four of their fastest scouts. A second course open to the Spaniards was to seek out and destroy or capture the Oregon, then making her way slowly north from the Horn to Key West. In this enterprise three of the Spanish cruisers and the three destroyers might have been employed ; the Vizcaya was too slow to stand any chance of overhauling the American battleship. It is true that with the facts now known one may doubt the possibility of a Spanish victory even when the numerical odds were six to one, but it is self- apparent that if these six ships could not place this one American battleship ors de combat, the Spanish Navy could not have the faintest hope of success against Sampson and Schley—for the latter was certain to be sent south the moment the direction of the Spanish movements was ascertained. 92 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN A successful attack on the Ovegon would have had very far-reaching results. It would have been a terrible blow to the United States; it would have caused great exultation in Spain; but above all it would have reconciled the Spanish public to the policy of waiting at Cadiz or the Canaries till the PeLayo and Cartos V were ready. The Spanish fleet “in being” would then have been a fruitful cause of embarrassment to the strategists of the United States. Looking at the war from the political side, an attack on the Ovegox must be pronounced to have been the wisest plan of campaign. Nor should there have been much difficulty in ascertaining her where- abouts. Her course, as she steamed up the Brazilian coast, was fairly well known to the world. Captain Clark, her commander, was warned by the American Navy Department that Cervera might be moving against him, and decided upon the tactics to be adopted in the event of encountering the Spaniards. To waylay the Oregon, Cervera’s squadron should have been ready to move out on April 22 or 23, when the war began. But the Vizcaya and OqueENpo, which, as relations between Spain and the United States grew worse, had sailed from Havana to Puerto Rico, and then from Puerto Rico to the Cape Verdes, only arrived at the latter point on the 19th. They had to coal, and to coal in a neutral harbour, where no special facilities were granted, and where, as Cervera said, the Spaniards did not feel at home. The later history of the war, above all the protracted delays at Port Said and Santiago, showed that the Spanish Navy was quite unequal to such feats as have been performed by British crews—for PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 93 example, by the Powerful’s men at Hong Kong, who in an emergency took in 2700 tons of coal in twenty-three hours. The coaling of a Spanish ship seems ordinarily to have required a week. Thisis only a further instance of the inefficiency and lack of equipment which are to be noted throughout the war in the Peninsular marine, reacting disastrously upon Spain’s strategy, and depriving her of her opportunities. Another course which has to be considered, was that of sending the efficient Spanish ships to the Far East. Had Cervera’s squadron succeeded in reaching Manila in May, it is just possible that a success might have been obtained against Admiral Dewey’s none too strong squadron. But the difficulties in the way of such a voyage were stupendous. Cervera would have been compelled to depend upon neutral coaling stations for fuel, since from Barcelona to Manila there is not a single Spanish colony, and his ships did not carry a sufficient supply of fuel to enable them to cover the distance with- out refilling their bunkers. Under the various neutrality proclamations, he would have found no port open to his ships, and would have been compelled to resort to the difficult and dangerous evolution of coaling in the open sea from colliers—an operation demanding appliances which he did not possess, and a degree of seamanship which the Spaniards had certainly not reached. More- over, the withdrawal of his squadron from the western field of action would have abandoned Cuba and Puerto Rico to their fate, and the coasts of Spain to attack by the Americans. The menace which the fleet in being exerts, would have been removed. Whether he could have 94 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN reached Manila before the arrival of the Charleston, Monterey, and possibly the Péhzladelphia, is at least doubtful, as reinforcements would have been hurried out by the Americans the moment his destination was ascertained. But the Charleston had to wait for the ammunition required to replenish Admiral Dewey’s magazines, and for various repairs, and thus was not able to leave San Francisco till May 25, so that there was some chance of Cervera arriving before her. In that . case Dewey’s position might have been dangerous. In war, however, probabilities, not possibilities, have to be considered, and the arrival of a Spanish fleet at Manila before June was not a probability. If the despatch of the Spanish fleet to the West Indies was decided upon, as it finally was, it was absolutely essential to despatch not a few ill-equipped ships, with no means of re-coaling, but the strongest possible squadron, with magazines and bunkers filled, and with colliers and store-ships inattendance. For that reason it was necessary to wait till the Cartos V was ready for sea, and till the destroyers Aupaz, PROSERPINA, and Osapo were able to join the Furor, Terror, and Piuton. In the interval the division of armoured cruisers and the three destroyers might have been brought to Cadiz, docked, cleaned, their woodwork re- moved, and their defective ammunition exchanged. The presence of the Prrayo with the squadron, remembering her much lower speed and her comparatively low coal- supply, was not desirable. Whilst the squadron was pre- paring, arrangements for coaling in the West Indies could have been concerted, and colliers placed on the April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 95 Venezuelan coast, at Santiago, and at Cienfuegos, Even then the squadron could have had but little prospect of success. Its fighting strength was vastly inferior to that of the four American battleships and two armoured cruisers combined. In the end it must, after a more or less protracted chase, have been beaten or driven into some fortified or neutral harbour and there blockaded. But before this had been accomplished by the Americans it might have done a great amount of mischief. Suppos- ing it had started from the Canaries with bunkers ‘full, and that, without putting in to any harbour connected with the outside world by telegraph, it had repaired to some such point as Cumana or Los Roques to re-coal, its whereabouts would have been quite unknown for many days, and a successful entry into Cienfuegos, after destroy- ing the scattered American cruisers on the southern coast of Cuba, would have been easy. Yet the practical effect of this success on the issue of the war would have been insignificant, though Cienfuegos would never have been captured as was Santiago, and though a blockade of this place might have severely tried the American Navy. On April 19 the concentration of Cervera’s fleet at St. Vincent was completed. That same day Cervera wrote to Madrid :—“ The boilers of the ARIETE are prac- tically out of service, so that this vessel, instead of being an element of strength, is the nightmare of the fleet. She can only be used for harbour defence. The boilers of the Azor are eleven years old and are of the locomotive type. As for the Furor and Terror, their bow plates give as soon as they are in a sea-way.” On the 21st acouncil of 96 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April Spanish officers was convened, according to the Spanish regulations, and contrary to the injunctions of men who have made and understood war. Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Moltke required no councils to tell them what to do, and thought such assemblies of officers harmful in the highest degree. ‘He who calls a council of war,” says Prince Hohenlohe, ‘“‘is half defeated. It is better to adopt an inferior plan and carry it out than to consult subordinates, thereby losing time and raising doubts.” The undecided commander alone requires the advice of inferior officers. In this case there is only too much reason to suppose that the council did no good and very much harm. It must have effaced the last illusions of Cervera and his captains, and though illusions may not be a very hopeful foundation on which to fight, they are better than blank despair. The council met on board the Coton and lasted four hours. What views Cervera expressed we are not told. Doubtless he submitted the calculations, which we find scattered through his letters, and which showed that in battleships the Americans had 41,589 tons to the Spanish 30,917; in armoured cruisers 17,471 tons to 6840; in protected cruisers 51,098 to 18,887 ; in fast unprotected cruisers 6287 to none, a total of 116,445 tons to 56,644, whilst the American artillery preponderance was repre- sented by 132,397 units to 50,662. Hecould have had no need to remind his officers of the want of resources, of equipment, of coal, and of sea training. All this they would know. Finally he propounded this question—* Under the present circumstances of the mother-country, is it ex- pedient that this fleet should go at once to America, April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 97 or ought it to stay to protect our coasts and the Canaries, and to provide for any emergency ?” The opinion of the captains—at least two of whom knew the West Indies well—was to retreat to the Canaries. All agreed with Captain Concas, a précis of whose advice has already been given. On April 22, to Cervera’s stupefaction, orders were received from Madrid for the fleet to sail to the West Indies.. A council of eighteen Admirals had been held at the Spanish capital, when a large majority voted for Cervera’s immediate departure from the Cape Verdes. Admirals Gomez, Imez, and Lazaga were for first re- inforcing the fleet with the PeLavo, Cartos V, ALFonso XIII, and Lepanto ; whilst Admirals Butler and Mozo held that this was the correct course, but subordinated their wishes to the needs of the Government. It must not be forgotten that there was in Spain at this time the usual popular demand for “something to be done ”—the same cry which had sent Persano out to his defeat at Lissa, and which had driven McDowell with his weak, ill-organised army to catastrophe at Bull Run—a cry which gains in impatience and fury as the evidence of military and naval neglect and disorganisation accumu- lates, till its influence upon a weak Government may be irresistible. For accepting the decision of this council of war, far from the scene of action, ignorant of the actual condition of Cervera’s fleet, a Ministry of politicians, not of expert strategists, cannot be blamed, though no doubt it is a danger of exceeding magnitude for the fortunes of a country to be committed to men who H 98 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April know nothing of war. This, in the case of England, the events which led up to the Crimean War showed very clearly. It would appear that Cervera’s letters were not laid before the council, and for this the Ministry deserves the utmost censure. Finally, it was most unwise to keep in command an officer who had spent his whole time in protesting, and protesting rightly, against the insane course which the Ministry now ordered him to take. One of the Admirals who had voted for the despatch of the squadron to the West Indies should have been chosen, if not before, at this last moment. Though the sudden replacement of Cervera must have disorganised the squadron, it would on the whole have been a lesser catastrophe than the retention of a commander who despaired of success. Yet as the Ministry had known for months Cervera’s attitude, it might perfectly well have chosen another commander in March or early April. The selection of the Admiral to command in war is a matter of the extremest moment. Reciprocal con- fidence must exist between him and the Government, yet in this instance Cervera distrusted Madrid, and Madrid appears to have been deaf to Cervera’s remonstrances. By his professional attainments Cervera was peculiarly qualified to lead the Spanish Navy. His reputation as an officer was great, and he was admired and trusted by his subordinates. His valour, as subsequent events showed, was above all reproach, whilst his chivalry and tenderness of heart won the regard of his enemies. In warning the Spanish Government persistently and strenuously of the weakness of the Navy, he displayed a high degree of moral Apri] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 99 courage.! But it is quite evident that he was by nature despondent and a pessimist, of much the same mental temper as Villeneuve or MacClellan, who always saw the defects of the forces they commanded and never those of the enemy; who forgot that, as Abraham Lincoln once said, “ God sends his rain upon the unjust as well as the just.” He lacked energy and initiative ; he was crushed by the terrible circumstances in which he found the Spanish Navy, and he was obviously unfit to command upon a desperately dangerous and risky enterprise. “How,” asks a French commentator, “can you make war if you have never believed in war? How lead to victory, if you have always foretold defeat?” The commander must be sanguine and hopeful—a Nelson, not a Byng. ‘“‘Surprise,” he telegraphed to Madrid, “is well justified [at the order to sail], for nothing can be ex- pected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralising return. . . . You speak of plans, but in spite of all my efforts to have such prepared, as was only wise and prudent, my wishes have been disappointed. How can it be said that I have been supplied with everything I asked for? The Coxon as 1 This interesting opinion of Cervera’s is cited by Captain Mahan from a Spanish technical magazine:—“‘ A little more than a year ago we visited General Cervera in La Carraca [the Cadiz arsenal], and we said to him: ‘You appear to be indicated, by professional opinion, for the command of the squadron in case war is declared.’ ‘In that case,’ he replied, ‘I shall accept; knowing, however, that I am going to a Trafalgar.’ ‘And how could that disaster be avoided?’ ‘ By allowing me to expend beforehand 50,000 tons of coal in evolutions and 10,000 projectiles in target practice. Otherwise we shall go to a Trafalgar. Remember what I say.’” 100 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April yet has not her big guns. The ammunition for the 55-inch guns with the exception of about 300 rounds is bad. The defective guns of the Vizcaya and OQuENpo have not been changed. The cartridge-cases of the Coton cannot be re-charged. We have not a single Bustamente mine. There is no plan or concert which I so much desired. . . . In short, this is already disaster, and it is to be feared that it will become a yet more fear- ful one before long. Even now all might be well, but I suppose it is too late for any course which does not involve the ruin and desolation of our country... . The die is cast ; it remains for me to find the best means of carrying out this terrible enterprise.” Nor was Captain Villaamil, in command of the destroyers, less despondent. On this same day, April 22, he telegraphed to the Spanish premier :—‘‘ Whilst as seamen we are all ready to die with honour in the fulfil- ment of duty, I think it an undoubted fact that the sacrifice of this naval force will be as certain as it will be fruitless and useless.” When the fatal day of July 3 came, Villaamil redeemed his promise. His name was in the list of dead who fell for Spain. These remonstrances were useless. The die was cast. On the 24th Cervera received final orders to coal his ships from the transport Capiz, and to put to sea for San Juan. He was informed that colliers had been chartered to proceed to that point, and thereupon expressed fears as to their capture. He was told that he could accept or decline. battle as he wished, but this optimistic conclusion he demolished with the remark that “the Vizcaya is nothing but a buoy and I cannot April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST ior abandon her.” Coaling occupied no less than five days —from the 24th to the 29th—though, according to Lieuten- ant Miiller,’ the ships only filled their bunkers and took no deck-load on board. It is uncertain whether the three belted cruisers of the TeREsa type shipped their utmost load of coal—1o50 tons—or only their normal supply of 420 tons. Probably they took about 1000 tons of inferior coal. The light which Cervera’s letters shed upon the Spanish plans is afforded in the case of the American plans by Captain Mahan’s discussion of American strategy, and by Captain Crowninshield’s report on the work of the United States Navigation Bureau for 1898, with its full collection of letters and despatches which passed between the Navy Department and the American commanders. In the first place, the war was professedly undertaken by the United States for the liberation of Cuba, and popular opinion demanded that Cuba should be the first objective of attack. This demand a democratic form of government could not very well resist. In the active ranks of the Navy, as generally throughout the country, there was a strong desire to take the earliest opportunity of trying conclusions with the fortifications of Havana. On April 6 Admiral Sampson received from the secretary of the Navy Department the following official letter :— ‘The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbours. Even 1 Miiller, p. 78. 102 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object, viz. the destruction of the enemy’s vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. There are two reasons for this :— ‘1, There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and arson, until after the dry season begins, about the rst of October. “2, The lack of docking facilities makes it particu- larly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain’s most formidable vessels.” To this he replied, strongly urging a direct attack, on April 9 :— “JY sympathise with all you say about guarding our big ships against a possible serious loss whilst the enemy’s fleet is still intact. At the same time, I regard it as very important to strike quickly and strike hard as soon as hostilities commence. Havana is well defended by three or four batteries to the eastward of the entrance, mount- ing guns from 6 to 12-inch calibre. On the western side of the entrance there are three batteries, the guns varying in calibre from 8 to 12-inch, and two mortar batteries. All the batteries face seaward, and those to the west of the entrance are quite near the shore. All are open batteries, with heavy traverses between the guns. The guns and people who serve them are quite unprotected. “These batteries are well calculated to keep off a fleet from seaward, which approaches to within a moderate April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 103 distance of a few thousand yards. I do not think they are well placed to resist an attack (for instance, the western batteries) from the westward and close in shore, where the batteries would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the fire of our big ships at short range, where the secondary batteries would have full effect. Even under these circumstances the ships must have sucha heavy fire that the men in the batteries would be overwhelmed by its volume. Before the Purztan and Amphitrite arrived I was not entirely sanguine of the success of such an attack. Since their arrival yesterday I have little doubt of its success. “ Although the monitors are weak in secondary fire, I expected to put a cruiser with heavy secondary fire in the interval between each two of them. In this way I do not think the Spaniards would be able to fire. They would be driven away from their guns and kept away, whilst the fire of the ships would so injure the guns or mounts that they would be unserviceable. Although the defences west of the entrance are stronger than those east, the first has the advantage for us, that all the pro- jectiles which miss the batteries will fall in the city, and furnish an additional inducement for the surrender of the city. “In the memorandum which I furnished to the com- manding officers of ships I provided, that if our ships were not numerous enough, or the Spaniards proved better than I expected, we were at once to haul off and substitute for the direct attack a close blockade of the port, which was to be extended east and west to adjoin- ing ports as quickly as possible. Having silenced the 104 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April western batteries, it would be quite practicable to shell the city, which I would do only after warning given twenty-four hours in advance. “T see the force of your reasoning that we would have no troops to occupy the city if it did surrender, yet, Mr. Secretary, it will be very unfortunate, besides a great loss of time, if we must delay until the rainy season is over. Probably a close blockade would terminate the trouble before October. ‘‘T shall do my utmost to carry out your wishes as set forth in your letter. At the same time I hope you will consider the plan I have here outlined. I have discussed the matter freely with Captains Evans, Taylor and Chadwick, and all unite with me that the direct attack is sufficiently promising to warrant its trial.” This communication is of great interest, since it shows that Admiral Sampson was prepared to dare and risk everything. But it must be doubted whether there was any real prospect of success against Havana. Parker's and Dupont’s attacks upon Charleston; Persano’s bombardment of Lissa; Seymour’s bombardment of Alexandria ; and, in the course of the Spanish-American war, the bombardments of San Juan and Santiago, have shown that ships can rarely be trusted to silence even weak and ill-constructed batteries. The resources and armament of Havana were vastly more formidable than those against which Sampson had to contend in the two latter instances, whilst the naval force available for employment was little greater—if indeed as great. As to the men in the shore batteries being overwhelmed by the violence and volume of the ships’ fire, when six April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST _ 105 Spanish guns were attacked at Santiago by at least ninety-one guns in the American fleet with one of the most terrific bombardments of the war, we do not learn that the Spanish garrison in the forts was overwhelmed or lost heart.’ “At San Juan,” says Lieutenant Staunton, ‘‘whilst the [American] vessels were approaching and firing, the Spanish fire slackened, our shells driving their men away from the guns and under shelter ; but as soon as the ships ceased firing and turned, the Spaniards came back to their guns and re-opened fire with energy. It was the first illustration, of which there were a number during the war, of the difference between szlencing a battery and destroying it by artillery fire. The first can be readily effected by superior fire; the second is exceedingly difficult of accomplishment by azy fire, as it requires the actual destruction of guns or their mounts —1z. e. they must be actually struck by shell.” Granting that one or two of the Havana batteries might have been silenced, it is difficult to see what practical effect this would have produced upon the issue of the war. And almost certainly the American fleet would have had to suffer severely. It could not well afford to lose ships so long as it was possible that a powerful Spanish squadron might at any moment appear in the West Indies, and so long as the exact fighting value of the Spanish Navy was unknown. It was, then, the wisest thing the Navy Department could do to forbid any bombardment or attack of Havana when the war began. To give a base for the blockading fleet and to open communications with the insurgents, the seizure of 1 Lieutenant Miiller, 30. 106 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April Matanzas by a small expeditionary force was planned. It is lucky for the United States that the attempt was never made. Though the whole eastern half of Cuba had practically been abandoned by the Spanish army to the insurgents, in the west the latter had no forces capable of efficiently supporting the American troops. The Spanish army in Havana was exceptionally strong, well armed, well supplied with ammunition, and inured to war. Even with the support of the ships it is doubt- ful whether the Americans could have long retained Matanzas, whilst on the withdrawal of the ships their posts would have been liable to attack and capture. As this was brought home to the American Government by men who knew Cuba well, the idea of seizing the place was abandoned. It was suggested in England by Admiral Colomb that troops would be landed in Cuba by the Americans in numerous small vessels. No such attempt was made, and the forecast was probably based upon an erroneous conception of the fighting value of the Cuban. He further suggested that the American fleet might remain concentrated at Key West and the Spanish fleet at Havana, neither fighting the other. This again points to the fact that the Spanish Navy was generally over- estimated and the American Navy under-estimated in Europe as in America. Many foreign critics and American officers had expected that an American squadron would be sent on the outbreak of war to Europe, to seize a base and make demonstrations against the Spanish coast-line. It will have been observed that this was the course anticipated April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 107 by Cervera. The only bases, however, which could have been attacked with any prospect of success were Minorca, Ceuta, or one of the Canaries. Troops, colliers, and storeships would have had to accompany the squad- ron, and these were not ready in April. Without a secondary base at which to coal and tranship ammuni- tion, the American flotilla could have accomplished little, whilst, as Captain Mahan has pointed out, it is far from certain that desultory bombardments of a few sea-coast towns would have done more than provoke general sympathy for Spain among her European friends. There were political reasons which rendered it in- expedient for the United States to undertake serious operations in Europe until they had gained some striking success, the prestige of which would have rendered the enemies of América unwilling to intervene. These reasons, it is true, did not operate so strongly in the case of the Canaries, and an attack upon these latter was generally anticipated at an early date in the war. At the same time a considerable part of the American Navy, the four monitors in Atlantic waters, were quite unfit for long-distance cruising and open-sea fighting, whilst the Ovegox had not as yet arrived. Perhaps it was the exaggerated alarm felt on the ‘sea-coast of the United States that prevented the despatch of a powerful squadron with this object. Such ships as the Mew Vork, Brooklyn, Iowa, Columbia, and Minneapolrs, with a large coal-supply and good sea-keep- ing qualities, might have been spared if the interests of local defence had not retained the vessels forming Commodore Schley’s Flying Squadron on the coast-line 108 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April of the United States. The American public, being generally ignorant of naval matters, had not grasped the fact that a vigorous offence is the best defence— especially against such a power as Spain. Immense schemes of coast defence, involving the expenditure of tens of millions, and the mounting of hundreds of guns in fixed positions, had occupied the minds of its strategists, and those wise officers who, like Captain Mahan, required a far stronger Navy, had not been able to get their way. In consequence, when war came, every town and village on the seaboard wanted fortifications or ships to defend it. A few guns of moderate calibre might no doubt have been needed to protect important places on the coast against the raids of cruisers. But these inordinate demands, to which, in a democracy, some concession had to be made, hampered the American strategists grievously. ‘Our sea-coast,” said a good judge of public opinion to Captain Mahan, ‘‘was in a condition of unreasoning panic, and fought to have little squadrons scattered along it everywhere, according to the theory of defence always favoured by stupid terror.” It is instructive for Englishmen to notice that some outcry was raised—with perhaps far more reason—by certain of the British seaboard towns when in the autumn of 1898 the coast and port-guard ships were withdrawn and mobilised—on the eve of what might have been war with France. If it is bad policy in peace time to encourage such claims by station- ing ships at fixed points, it is impossible wholly to disregard them in war, however foolish they may be. Those who censure the American Navy Department for April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 109 yielding to this clamour forget the weight and influence of public opinion in a free country; forget that the famous report of three British Admirals on the 1888 manceuvres required a reserve fleet always confined to British waters ; forget that the strategists who directed the British Navy in the eventful years 1803-5 kept a reserve in the Channel, besides distributing a few cruisers amongst the chief outlying ports. Theoretically, it may be the soundest policy to place every ship in the foremost line, close up to or watching the enemy. Practically, it is impossible unless the public has thoroughly grasped and understood the principles of naval war. As the Press guides and directs opinion, the importance of a censorship not only upon war news, but also upon the comments on war news, is very evident. But if no squadron could be sent with any serious purpose against the Canaries, or with the object of meeting Cervera’s ships the moment they put to sea from the Cape Verdes, it has yet to be considered why no attempt was made to gain touch of the enemy the moment hostilities became inevitable. In the warships Minneapolis and Columéza, and the auxiliary cruisers St. Louts, St. Paul, and Harvard the United States had scouts which could have shown a clean pair of heels to the Spaniards, and which possessed a large radius of action. Since their fighting qualities were not great, their detachment for the purpose of watching the enemy would not have weakened the battle squadrons. But, starting from New York or Hampton Roads, they could not have reached the Cape Verdes under a fortnight 110 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April at economical’ speed,’ and as the concentration of Cervera’s fleet at the Cape Verdes was only known in the United States on April 20, they could not have appeared off St. Vincent before May 4 or 5, which would have been too late. It was quite uncertain whether Cervera would steer north-west for New York, 2955 miles distant, or west for San Juan, 2400 miles off. In the one case the scouts might easily have missed him ; in the other they were not certain to meet him, and their services would thus have been lost at the very time when he was approaching the field of action. On the whole, then, the Department acted for the best in watch- ing only the approaches to the Caribbean and the trade route to New York with its available scouts. Political reasons may have prevented the despatch of a pair of cruisers to St. Vincent before the war. Another course suggested was an early attack on San Juan, a point of great importance to Spain as the connecting link between the Canaries and Havana, and the only serviceable base for operations against the American coast-line. The fortifications of San Juan were very weak, even so late as the end of April, and the place could probably have been taken without serious loss or injury, had a small military force been available. As an advanced position from which to watch and wait for the approach of Cervera, San Juan had no little value to the United States. That no attack upon it was made, was due in part to the retention in the north of 1 At full speed they could have reached St. Vincent in seven to eight days, but then they might have been in an awkward position from want of coal, at the most critical moment in the campaign. April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 111 Schley’s squadron, which deprived Sampson of the mobility needed to make a quick rush on the place before Cervera appeared ; in part to the menace of the enemy’s squadron ‘“‘in being.” The Americans, however, would have been quite safe from any such surprise as happened to Persano at Lissa, with Cervera still at St. Vincent, and we now know that on Sampson learn- ing of the supposed return of the Spanish squadron to Cadiz, he decided to seize San Juan, thus showing practically that a fleet in being at great distance has no controlling influence on naval movements. The enemy could not fall upon the Americans as from the clouds, since he had first to cross the Atlantic. If it be said that an attack upon San Juan must have divided the American fleet between Cuba and Puerto Rico, the answer is, that the fleet was so divided towards the end of May, when Cervera was actually in the West Indies. It should further be noted, that Sampson’s presence off San Juan on May 12 led directly up to the Spanish disasters at Santiago by precluding Cervera’s access to the best supplied and defended naval base that Spain possessed in the West Indies, after Havana, and that had San Juan been left absolutely open—had Admiral Sampson not decided upon this eastward journey to meet the enemy, as he confidently anticipated—the results might have been serious for the United States. San Juan is, roughly speaking, 1400 miles from New York, 950 from Havana, and 1000 from Cienfuegos. Thus Cervera’s arrival at San Juan would have given no trustworthy indication of his future movements, such as his “location” at Curacao undoubtedly did afford. This 112 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April made it all the more urgent to keep a sharp eye upon Puerto Rico. The plan, then, finally adopted in the west was to blockade Havana, Matanzas, and Bahia Honda, and to retain a sufficient force in the north to meet Cervera if he moved towards the American coast-line. That force was placed at Hampton Roads, an admirably central position, nearer to the West Indies than New York, easier of access in all conditions of weather and tide, and close at hand to the great shipbuilding yard of Newport News. About two-thirds of the available naval strength in the Atlantic was placed under Sampson for the work of blockade ; the other third was at Hampton Roads or scattered along the American coast. In the words of the Official Reports—‘‘ The whole fleet was ready on April 15 —four weeks before Admiral Cervera’s fleet reached this side—for any emergency, gathered practically in two fleets, each within striking distance of one of the two points from which attack might come. Four months before the vessels were distributed much as in ordinary times. On April 15 all of the more powerful vessels were fully manned, the legal quota having been exceeded on account of the emergency.” In the selection of an Admiral to command, the Government showed great judgment. Passing over Captains Robeson, Casey, and Schley, it selected Captain Sampson, who stood fourth on the captains’ list, with ten commodores and six rear-admirals above him, for the North Atlantic squadron—the squadron which was entrusted with the work of blockade. Captain Sampson, famous as an artillerist, was on the eve of war in To face pb 112. REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON. April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 113 command of the Jowa. His age was 58, for in the American Navy promotion is exceedingly slow. He is the typical American officer—quiet and undemonstrative in manner, reserved in speech, abundantly endowed with scientific knowledge, cool and cautious in action, yet with all the moral and physical courage required of a leader in war. He was the son of a day-labourer, and had risen to his position by his own indomitable grit and pluck. In England the nomination system would have excluded him from an aristocratic service. He had seen some hot work in the Civil War, and was on board the moni- tor Patapfsco when she was blown up by a torpedo at Charleston, and his ‘cool intrepidity” won his commander’s well-merited praise. Admiral Sampson’s management of the North Atlantic squadron throughout the naval campaign was such as to confirm his great reputation. His judgment, perhaps, was never very severely tasked, owing to the amazing mistakes of the enemy. But all that he planned and did seems to have been sound and judicious, with the possible exception of his wish to bombard Havana. To command the Hampton Roads squadron Com- modore Schley was chosen. He had a high reputation in his profession, fought well in the Civil War, took part in 1871 in the hostilities on the Corean coast, and in 1884 rescued the survivors of the Greely expedition. Un- fortunately, when placed under Admiral Sampson’s orders, Schley seems to have been unable to forget that he was first in seniority. In the eastern field of war there could be little doubt as to the objective, and an early attack upon Manila and I 114 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April the Spanish squadron there was determined upon. The Olympia had received instructions to return to the United States, but she was ordered on February 25 to remain on the Asiatic coast pending events. About the same time Commodore Dewey was directed to keep full of coal, and to enlist all the men he could get. His squadron had been concentrated at Hong Kong by orders of February 25, and was strongly reinforced. Commodore George Dewey had not been specially selected for the command in view of the war, but had been some months on his station. He, like Sampson and Schley, had fought in the Civil War. Under Farragut, he took part in the fierce action of March 21, 1863, at Port Hudson, when his ship, the MJsszss¢ppz, ran aground and was burnt. In the war with Spain he gained fresh distinction by the vigour and dash which he showed at Manila. His work was not, perhaps, difficult, yet it is to his credit that he seems more than any other American officer to have realised the hopeless rottenness of the Spanish Navy and of the Spanish defences. Placed in a trying position after his success, he displayed as much tact and forbearance to neutral powers as he had shown courage in action. He was a great stickler for correct- ness of etiquette and dress; in fact, something of the ‘gilded popinjay,” at whom in time of peace popular agitators in England and the United States are wont to scoff, but whose sterling qualities all men recognise in war. Some weeks before the war it was decided to move from the Pacific coast to the Atlantic the fine battle- ship Ovegon and the gunboat Marietta. The Oregon April] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 115 accordingly left Puget Sound on March 6, and proceeded to San Francisco, which port she left on the 19th for Callao. She arrived at the Peruvian port on April 4, having steamed at an average of 1o°7 knots—a very fine performance on a long run of 4726 miles, through tropical waters, where the heat in the engine-rooms and stokeholds was excessive. At Callao she was met by the American gunboat /arzetta, whose commander had received orders to have coal ready. On April 7, having filled her bunkers and completed some slight repairs to her engines and boilers, the Oregon put to sea once more for Sandy Point in the Straits of Magellan. The J/arzetta was sent on ahead to make sure that 600 tons of coal were ready at this place. The weather was generally good, but there was a very heavy swell, and the ship pitched heavily, the seas sweeping all but the superstructure deck. On April 16, when in Magellan’s Straits, a furious gale broke, and the ship had to be anchored. Next day she was off Sandy Point, having completed the run from Callao at an average of 11'7 knots. Four days’ stay was made here owing to difficulty in getting at the coal which had been ordered, and which was found stowed in a hulk beneath a cargo of wool. On the 21st she left Sandy Point, and reached Rio de Janeiro on the 30th, having been much delayed by the low speed of the Marietta. All preparations were made for disposing of the TEMERaRIO in case that vessel showed herself. At Rio the Oregox learnt of the declar- ation of war. She was also informed that the TEMERARIO had left Montevideo for Rio, and that four Spanish armoured cruisers and three destroyers were at sea. At 116 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April the same time the purchased ship Wzctheroy* was placed under Captain Clark’s orders. She had 6000 tons of coal on board, and from her the Ovegon filled her bunkers. Captain Clark appears to have had some apprehension of an attack upon his ship, whilst lying in this neutral port, by the Trmerarro. He took every precaution against such treachery, and warned the Brazilians that if the Spanish gunboat entered the harbour and approached the Oregon he would fire upon her. The Marietta was placed near the entrance to the harbour, and directed to order the TEMERARIO, in the event of her appearance, not to approach within half-a-mile of the Ovegon. The Marietta was also to follow her with her search-light. But the Brazilian authorities took every precaution, and the TEMERARIO never appeared. As the Ovegon on her way to Key West would necessarily have to pass through waters in which Cervera’s fleet might very well be found, the possibility of her encountering this fleet had to be considered. The Navy Department gave Captain Clark an absolutely free hand; it decided against laying down the exact course to be steered with the object of sending reinforcements to some pre-arranged point, if necessary, on the ground that it was impossible to keep a secret in Washington, and that such a measure would simply reveal to Cervera where he could find the quarry. In case the Ovegon did meet the enemy, the Department was convinced that she would not succumb without crippling Cervera’s ships. Captain Clark was perfectly confident, knowing the 1 Re-named Buffalo. May] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 117 strength of his battleship and the high efficiency of his crew. His plan of action was to make a running fight and string his enemy's squadron out, by compelling a long pursuit, in which one or more of the Spaniards would probably fall behind. He knew that singly Cervera’s armoured cruisers were not to be feared. If there had been good leading, however, on the part of the Spanish Admiral all seven vessels would have closed in simultaneously, and used the torpedo. ‘“‘ What I feared,” wrote Captain Clark, “ was that he [Cervera] would be able to bring his ships up within range together, supposing that the slowest was faster than the Oregon; but there was the chance that their machinery was in different stages of deterioration, and there was also the hope that impetuosity or excitement might after a time make some press on in advance of the others. I, of course, had in mind the tactics of the last of the Horatii, and hopefully referred to them. ... I knew that the Spaniards might all close to rapid-fire range, overpower all but our turret guns, and then send in their torpedo boats. . . . The torpedo boat wasa rattle- snake to me, that I feared would get in his work while I was fighting the tiger; but I felt that the chances were that Cervera was bound to the West Indies, and that the need of the Ovegon there was so great that the risk of his turning south to meet me should be run; so I hurried to Bahia, and cabled to the Department my opinion of what the Oregon might do alone and in a running fight. . . + My object was to add the Ovegon to our fleet, and not to meet the Spaniards if it could be avoided.” On May 4 the Ovegox left Rio with the Marietta and 118 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May Nictheroy in company, but they delayed her so much that at last she parted company with them off Cape Frio, instructing their commanders to run them ashore in case they were attacked by the Spaniards. The separation from the Marietta, which carried a powerful quick-fire battery, and upon which Captain Clark had chiefly relied to beat off the destroyers, exposed the Ovegon to grave risks, but in war risks must always be faced, and the Oregon was urgently wanted at this juncture in the Caribbean. On the 8th the Ovegon reached Bahia, and gave out that her machinery had broken down, and that some days’ delay for repairs would be necessary. This, of course, was done to put Cervera off the track. On the oth, however, after telegraphing to the Navy Department his confidence that the Ovegon “could steam fourteen knots for hours, and in a running fight might beat off and even cripple the Spanish fleet,” Captain Clark put to sea. The Marietta and Buffalo (ex-Nictheroy) arrived at Bahia on the 11th. As yet nothing had been heard of Cervera’s destina- tion, and it was possible and probable that he meant intercepting the American battleship. Good speed was therefore maintained, the ship cleared for action, and every precaution taken which ingenuity and foresight could suggest. On the night of May 12, when off Cape San Roque, for a moment the Ovegon's crew supposed that battle was at hand. Four ships were sighted to the south, and the Ovegon increased speed, preparing to put the plan of stringing out the Spaniards into execution. But the strange vessels showed no curiosity ; the Oregon May] PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST 119 was not followed, and next morning there was no ship to be seen on the horizon. On the 18th Bridgetown, Barbados, was reached, a uniform speed of 11°7 knots having been maintained from Bahia. Here Captain Clark requested to be allowed to take on board 400 tons of coal, and here also he learnt for the first time of the presence of Cervera’s fleet in the West Indies. He heard that it had been at Martinique—at least four armoured cruisers and three destroyers strong—and was probably still there, apparently waiting athwart his course. Accordingly he coaled ship till midnight and then put to sea steering west. As soon, however, as he was out of sight of land, he headed the Oregon back eastwards, round the north of the island, and kept well out to sea till he reached the latitude of the Bahamas. On May 24, at last, he sighted the Floridian coast at Jupiter Inlet, and communicated to Washington news of the Ovegon's magnificent performance. He, his officers, and his crew were deservedly congratulated in reply, and the Ovegon was instructed to proceed to Key West. On her remarkable voyage from Puget Sound to Jupiter Inlet the Ovegon covered 14,700 nautical miles in 1299 hours of steaming and a total time of seventy-nine days, including time spent in port shipping stores and coal and waiting for orders. The average speed of the run was 11°6 knots; the highest speed recorded 14°6 and the lowest 10°: knots. She burnt on this voyage just over 4100 tons of coal. She arrived in a fit and efficient condition, and was able to take her place in Admiral Sampson’s fleet after filling up with coal and water. The Marietta reached Key West on June 4, 120 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May some days after the Oregon, having been much delayed by breakdowns on board the Buffalo, from which ship she parted company at Para on May 21. The Buffalo in due course reached the United States in safety. CHAPTER IV THE WAR IN THE EAST THE opening of 1898 found Commodore George Dewey in command of the American forces on the Asiatic station, which included the protected cruisers Olympia and Boston, and the gunboats Petref and Monocacy.. To reinforce him, the protected cruiser Raleigh was ordered to join him from the European station, and the gunboat Concord from the Bering Sea fishery protection service. On January 27 the Com- modore was instructed to retain time-expired men; a month later, on February 25, he was directed to con- centrate his force at Hong Kong, with the exception of the old Monocacy, a paddle-steamer of no practical value, and he was ordered to keep the Olympza with him till further orders. There had been some intention of recalling her. On the 26th he was ordered to “keep full of coal, the best that can be had.” A few days later the gunboat Mohican was despatched with a quantity of ammunition on board to Honolulu, where she was to meet the protected cruiser Baltimore, then 1 Reports, 65-130; Ellicott (War Notes, No. V.); Century, 56. 611 ff.; Harper, 98. 476 ff. ; Army and Navy Journal (New York); New York Sun; An American Cruiser in the East, 479 ff. 121 122 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April flagship on the Pacific station. The Baltimore was to embark the ammunition, and proceed to Hong Kong to reinforce Commodore Dewey. She left Honolulu on March 19, and reached her destination on April 22. As far back as April 1, Dewey was directed to fill up with provisions. Then on April 4 came instructions, which showed hostilities were near at hand, ordering him to purchase a storeship, and, a day or two later, to land all surplus stores and woodwork. In obedience to these instructions he bought the British collier Nanshan, with over 3000 tons of coal on board her, and ordered from the Monocacy fifty-three officers and men to act as her crew. On the goth he purchased another British steamer, the Zajfivo, with 600 tons of coal on board, and proceeded to fill her with provisions, and with the spare stores of his ships. On April 17 the armed revenue cutter, Hugh McCulloch, joined the squadron from Singapore. Two days later the colour of the ships was changed, a slate grey being substituted for the snowy white paint which is the dress of American war-vessels in time of peace. On the 22nd the Baltimore came in, and was at once docked, coaled, and repainted. Next day, the blockade of Cuba having begun the war, the governor of Hong Kong issued a pro- clamation requesting the withdrawal of the squadron within twenty-four hours. On the 24th, accordingly, the Boston, Concord, Petrel, McCulloch, and the two store- ships left for Mirs Bay, whither the others followed them as soon as they could get away, on the 25th. April] THE WAR IN THE EAST 123 On the 24th Dewey received his orders from the Secretary of the Navy. He was briefly directed to proceed at once to the Philippines, commence operations against the Spanish fleet there, and capture or destroy it. His first intentions were to proceed instantly to Manila, but learning that the American consul at that place, Mr. Williams, was already on his way to Hong Kong, and that he had valuable local information, he decided to wait his arrival and take him with him. At 11 a.m. of the 27th the consul arrived; at 2 p.m. the squadron was under way to open a new chapter of American history. All the days of the stay in Mirs Bay the ships had been drilling, or engaged in Morris tube practice. The American consul brought reports that the Spaniards were laying mines in the entrance to Manila Bay, and that they were busy improvising defences. He also had detailed information as to the forts which protected Manila, and as to the Spanish ships. As accurate knowledge is of the utmost importance in war, Commodore Dewey showed great wisdom in delaying. It will not derogate from his high reputation if we conjecture that Mr. Williams’ account of the dis- organisation and unpreparedness prevailing at Manila contributed in no small degree to the bold and decided course adopted by the American commander. After an uneventful passage at eight knots, on the morning of the 30th the squadron was off Bolinao Point in Luzon, where a stop was made to land a Filipino leader. The ships prepared for battle, stripping all the woodwork and heaving it overboard, where there was 124 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April not space to stow it below. Chairs, tables, and chests were remorselessly thrown into the sea. Cables were wound round the ammunition-hoists; the boats were stowed inboard and covered with strong netting; all wooden bulkheads were taken down. Meanwhile the Boston and Concord were sent in advance to reconnoitre Subic Bay, where the Spaniards were reported ‘to be in position. As a matter of fact, Admiral Montojo had at first intended to fight there, but finding the harbour too badly protected, and the water close inshore so deep that his crews would have found escape difficult if, as he confidently anticipated would be the case, his ships were sunk, had withdrawn to Manila Bay. Before the Con- cord and Boston had disappeared on the horizon the Baltimore was sent off to support them, and act as linking-ship to the rest of the squadron. They returned, however, with the news that the Spaniards were at Manila. A captains’ meeting was at once convened on board the Olympia to receive Commodore Dewey’s final orders and instructions. At this meeting the Com- modore discussed with his officers the plan of forcing his way into Manila Bay at midnight. The fleet slowed to six knots, and no lights were shown at nightfall, with the exception of one screened light on each ship’s taff- rail At 11 p.m. all hands were called to general quarters. The arrival of the Americans off Bolinao had been signalled to Manila, and therefore there was every reason for Montojo and the commanders of the Spanish forts to be on the alert. The water at the entrance to the bay was so deep as to render the placing of mines Se / O Z le 2GLOF a, ng huce Core: ZY 2 CI Gra Feira <= ao w ae _ 124. To face p. April] THE WAR IN THE EAST 125 ‘difficult, but numerous powerful contact mines were none the less anchored in the channel by the Spaniards. They were, however, placed with the greatest careless- ness at depths far beyond the reach of any ship’s hull, and were simply wasted. The Spaniards put great trust in them, and talked very confidently of them to foreigners. It is possible, indeed, that the false sense of security given by the mines led to the relaxation of precautions afloat and ashore. ‘“ The entrance to the bay,” it was reported by a British steamer coming from Manila, “is commanded by fifty or sixty heavy guns. It would be impossible for the Americans to enter without battleships or a strong land force.” American officers with the fleet spoke—before the battle —of “the dangerous pass, guarded by forts and supposed to be planted with mines and torpedoes.” The calm way in which Commodore Dewey disregarded these alarming reports, correctly gauged the fighting value of the Spaniards and the efficiency of their appliances, and steamed into the harbour as if there had been no such things as batteries and mines, is his true distinction. He risked much—of this there can be no dispute—for the rottenness of Spanish administration and organisation had not been demonstrated as yet; the stories of prodigious forts and guns were plausible ; and if Admiral Montojo had shown any enterprise or vigilance, he might have had to pay dearly for his daring. Leaving, as he did, the forts behind him unsilenced, his line of retreat might be threatened with attack, if not altogether closed, in the event of a failure. Moreover, by entering without delay, at night, when the Spaniards appear to 126 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April have imagined navigation of the wide channel impossible 5 to strangers, he made the most of his opportunity, ‘and gave his enemy no respite for preparations in the bay. : The order on entering the bay was single line ahead, as follows :—Olympia, Baltimore, Petrel, Raleigh, Con- cord, Boston, McCulloch, Nanshan, Zafiro. The six fight- ing ships led, and of these the two weakest—the Petre/ and Concord—were placed between powerful vessels. The speed was ten knots—the best the A/cCudloch and the colliers could do. The entrance to the Bay of Manila is ten miles wide. About two miles from the northern coast is the island of Corregidor, rising 600 feet in a lofty cone, with a signal- post upon it, and a fort hastily constructed by the Spaniards in April. In this had been mounted certain guns from the CastiLLa, probably 4°7-inch, 3°4-inch, and 2'9-inch weapons. The guns were placed very high, and could not have been touched by the Americans running past, whilst on the American ships they could direct a plunging fire. To the south of Corregidor the channel is seven miles wide, with the islands of Caballo, 400 feet high, and EI Fraile lying in it, the first a mile to the south of Corregidor; the second two miles from the coast of Luzon. Thus between Caballo and El Fraile there is a clear channel about three and a half miles wide. On El] Fraile there was a battery. After passing the entrance the bay widens out considerably, forming a great land-locked sheet of water, twenty-two miles long and thirty-two miles wide. The course usually steered by ships follows the channel between Corregidor and the northern coast, and probably this 4 The U.S. Protected Cruiser Baltimore. To face p. 126. The U.S. Revenue Cutter IZcCulloch. The first ship fired at by the Spanish in the Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898. May] THE WAR IN THE EAST 127 alone was mined. The Americans went in by the southern entrance, and thus may have avoided what danger was to be feared from hastily and imperfectly laid mines. The fighting ships were abreast of Corregidor, undis- covered, about 11.30. Just as the W/cCulloch neared the island flames from her funnel or the stern-lights of the ships ahead of her, which must have by now showed to the Spaniards in the forts, attracted attention. Rockets went up at once from Corregidor and from the mainland opposite, and a shot was fired from El Fraile. Immedi- ately the McCulloch replied with three shots. Two more rounds answered from El Fraile. The Coxcord and Raleigh replied to these with two shots, when the order was given from the flagship to cease firing. The squadron then headed up the bay at a low speed for Manila, twenty-two miles away, and the men were allowed to sleep at their stations. The ease with which the bay was entered, and the harmlessness of the shots fired by the Spaniards, had an excellent moral effect upon the crews, who had before been somewhat anxious. Proceeding slowly up the bay, the squadron detached the WeCulloch, Nanshan, and Zafiro, which were to take no part in the fighting, and about 5.15 a.m. of May 1 was off Manila. A shot from the Manila batteries was quickly followed by another from Cavite. The range was excessive; the Spanish projectiles fell short ; and the squadron, without making any reply, turned just opposite Manila and headed southwards towards Cavite, where the Spanish fleet had now come into sight. It was moored in an irregular line east and 128 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May west ; the western extremity in Cafiacao Bay, close to the Cavite arsenal, and protected by the guns of Fort St. Philip and Sangley Point; the eastern extremity, on which were placed the Correo, Lezo, and transport Mrinpanao, all three, it is claimed by Spaniards, in an ineffective state, close to shallow water in Bakor Bay, and within distant range of the Malate battery at Manila, which could afford some little support. The position was therefore a fair one, when once the idea of giving battle under steam had been abandoned by Admiral Montojo. At Manila several powerful Krupps! were mounted in well-constructed earthworks, though the gunners serving them would have been exposed to machine-gun fire. At Sangley Point a little to the north of Cavite were two 5°9-inch Ordofiez guns and, it is said by Spanish officers, three 64-pounder muzzle-loading Pallisers. The latter do not seem to have been used, possibly because the range was too great for them. A mile to the south-west of the Sangley Point battery was an earth- work containing a modern 4°7-inch gun. It does not appear that this would bear upon the American ships during their engagement with the Spanish squadron, whilst it is certain that only one of the Ordoftez guns could be brought into action. The Spaniards assert that these guns ashore, which should have proved a valuable asset, were useless for all practical purposes, But if so, Admiral Montojo’s mistake in taking shelter under them was all the graver. 1 In the Luneta work, a little to the north of Malate, were four 94-inch weapons; at Fort San Antonio others of as large calibre. These guns would be from 5000 to 8000 yards distant from the American fleet, May] ‘THE WAR IN THE EAST 129 Something must now be said of the condition of the Spanish squadron.! Its largest vessel, the CasTILa, a composite cruiser, was helpless from the leaky state of her hull, the dilapidated condition of her boilers, and the fact that the leaks could not be stopped or kept water-tight if the engine was going.” She had given great trouble on the voyage to and back from Subic, and was nothing more than a floating battery. Steps were taken to protect her hull on the side turned towards the enemy with sand-bags and lighters filled with sand. The ULoa was undergoing repairs, and had most of her machinery on shore. She was moored just behind Sangley Point, in Cafiacao Bay, with her starboard broadside bearing. Her port guns had been removed, and probably the 4°7-inch weapon in battery south of Sangley Point came from her. The VELasco was moored off Cavite Arsenal, and had neither guns nor boilers on board. The Cristina, Admiral Montojo’s flagship, was the best of the squadron, but she was old, carried much wood about her, and was vastly inferior in armament to the Ralezgh or Boston of her own size. She had no protection of any kind beyond shields to her 6:2-inch Hontoria guns. The Cusa and Luzon were small ships, fairly armed for their size, but inferior in most respects to the little American PetvelZ. The other vessels were mere gunboats. The Spaniards had nothing to compare with the magnificent Olympia, a 1 For details of ships see Tables, page 171. 2 Her port battery was used. Some guns had been removed from her and placed at Corregidor, but as it is uncertain which guns these were she is given her full battery in the Table. K 130 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May ship which, with her heavy quick-firing armament, was alone far more than a match for Admiral Montojo’s scratch assemblage of rossignols. The Olympza has 4-inch hardened steel on her 8-inch gun barbettes, 3-inch on the ammunition hoists, and 4-inch gun-shields. She has a steel deck, on the slopes 44 inches thick, a 33-inch cellu- lose belt, and coal protection. She was therefore virtually invulnerable in her vitals. The enormous number of calibres in the Spanish artillery—there were no less than eleven reckoning upwards from the 6-pounders—placed serious difficulties in the way of ammunition supply, but a large quantity of powder and projectiles arrived on the day before the battle in the Minpanao. Those vessels, which were afterwards recovered by the Americans, were found to have plenty of ammunition in their magazines. The total weight of the Spanish broadside was about one-third of the American, or even less in actual practice, since the Spaniards had very few quick-fire guns mounted in their ships. The nineteen Spanish torpedo tubes were useless, as Admiral Montojo had no proper torpe- does. It is said, however, that he rigged up two launches of low speed with spar torpedoes. There were three alternatives open to the Spaniards. They might decide with this miserably heterogeneous collection of ships to land the men, guns and ammunition for use on shore, preparing the hulls of the ships so that these could be burnt, scuttled or blown up on the appear- ance of the Americans. This course would have averted 1 So Spanish contemporary accounts in the Press. But Schwartzkopff 14°2-inch torpedoes—though without war-heads—were found in the raised ships. April] THE WAR IN THE EAST 131 a fruitless sacrifice of life and prolonged the defence of Manila, if indeed the ships’ guns mounted at the entrance to the bay had not been able altogether to forbid the ingress of Commodore Dewey’s squadron. It is said that Montojo’s own wishes lay in this direction, but he had been placed under the command of the military governor of the Philippines, who refused his consent, though the actual situation of the Spanish fleet and the utter impossibility of its victory in a sea-fight should have been known to him. The second alternative was to meet the Americans under steam with the four service- able vessels. Being weak in artillery, without effective torpedoes, and fighting in confined waters, the ram might well have been used. By a sudden onslaught in the darkness, as the American ships were passing Corregidor at low speed, great damage might have been inflicted, and with luck, perhaps one or two of the enemy sunk. Such would probably have been the course selected by a daring and enterprising commander. The third alternative was to fight at anchor under the fort, and this was adopted for most of the ships. In fact, the Cavite fortifications, though weak, exercised the same attractive force on the Spanish squadron as did the obsolete works of Sedan on MacMahon’s army in 1870. At 7 p.m. of April 30 Montojo had learnt of the presence of the American squadron at Subic; at midnight he heard the gun-fire in the entrance to the bay, and sent his men to quarters, whilst fires were spread in all boilers. The ships were cleared for action, with topmasts and yards down, hulls painted a uniform grey, and cables ready 132 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May to slip ata moment’s notice. The awning stanchions and ridge ropes were not, however, shipped, and many of the boats were left on the davits. The position off Cavite had been chosen to save the city of Manila. Had the Spanish vessels drawn up in front of the latter place, projectiles from the American squadron must have exploded in the city. But though few will blame Montojo for his anxiety to save the civilian population from suffer- ing and injury, it was a military mistake not to take position under the far more powerful batteries of Manila, when the issue of the engagement might have been different. The General or Admiral must in war steel his heart and neglect no advantage. As the American squadron neared Cavite the Spaniards exploded two mines, at a great distance from the squadron. The mines were fired, not in all probabil- ity with any intention of injuring Commodore Dewey’s ships, but to free the Spaniards from an embarrassment. They could not move or manceuvre over water in which mines had been planted. Ten minutes later, the Cavite batteries opened on the Americans, long before the latter were within effective range of the old-fashioned 64-pounder and 5‘9-inch guns. The Spanish fleet joined in almost immediately, and a furious storm of projectiles lashed the water well ahead of Commodore Dewey’s squadron. Still, the strain upon the American seamen’s nerves of receiving a heavy fire, to which their ships made no reply, was so great that, by order of Commodore Dewey, at 5.41 a.m., when still 4000 yards from the Spaniards, the Olympia opened fire, discharging one of her forward 8-inch guns. Like an echo the batteries. ‘piguljQ IMI peed “S°Q eYL ‘2EI “g af or May] THE WAR IN THE EAST 133 of the vessels astern followed her, as the port broad- side of each was discharged at the enemy. The Olympia passed slowly down the Spanish front, closing in upon the enemy as much as her heavy draught would allow. Though it was so early in the day the smoke and heat were very trying to the men, and as the sun rose the temperature in some of the magazines went up to 116°. The American shooting was not good at the outset; many shots went wide, but as the action progressed the marksmanship improved. One of the earliest hits was that inflicted by an 8-inch projectile on the Cristina’s forecastle. It entered under the break, exploded, put the crews of four small quick-firers out of action, and drove splinters from the foremast as far as the bridge, where the quartermaster was wounded. The American ships passed in stately procession, per- fectly handled by their skilled and cool officers, down the Spanish line, ablaze with the incessant fire of their guns; then turned and retraced their course. The Spanish ships were now firing with extreme vigour, but their cannonade was quite ineffective. Their projectiles either passed clean over Commodore Dewey’s squadron, or splashed into the water short of it. Nor were the guns in the Manila forts, which had also opened a fierce fire, served to more purpose. Their projectiles invari- ably fell short, and the Americans paid no attention whatever to them, till at 7.40, when he hauled off, the masterful Commodore sent an intimation that unless they ceased their waste of ammunition, he would shell the city of Manila. This message at once silenced the Manila batteries. 134 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May Five times the Americans steamed up and down the Spanish line, at ranges of 5000 to 2000 yards, using chiefly the heavier guns, and only employing the 6-pounders and lower calibres when the distance was shortest. Some time before the fifth counter-march had begun, it dawned upon Admiral Montojo that his chances were hopeless, unless indeed he could close with or ram one of his enemies. He slipped the Cristina’s two cables, accordingly, and steamed out towards Admiral Dewey, ordering by signal his other ships to follow his example. As the Cristina advanced, however, a fearful fire was turned upon her, and upon two yellow launches, which suddenly darted out from Cavite, and seemed to be closing the Olympia. Rightly or wrongly they were taken for torpedo boats, For some seconds the Olympza’s fire produced no apparent effect on them; then at about 800 yards the rain of 6-pounder shells tore one to pieces, whilst the Petvel’s small guns made short work of the other and drove her back, riddled and sinking.’ Under a rain of projectiles the Cristina advanced, with smoke and steam pouring from her forward, amid- ships, and astern, showing that she was suffering griev- ously. A shell bursting on the orlop deck had set the seamen’s bags on fire. Another large shell swept the bridge, destroyed the starboard search-light, and put the steering-gear out of action ; another again struck the 1 There is some dispute as to these so-called torpedo boats. Admiral Dewey (Reforts, 70) speaks of two; Captain Gridley (2. 73) and Com- mander Wood (7. 80) only of one. Mr. Stickney in Harper, xcviii. 479, mentions only one, and alludes to and dismisses the report that it was only “an innocent market boat.” May] THE WAR IN THE EAST 135 stern and killed or wounded nine men ; yet another burst in the ward-room, which was crowded with wounded, and put an end to their misery, working horrible devastation ; another entered amidships, struck a steam-pipe and killed or wounded thirteen men; the mizzen-truck and gaff with the Admiral’s flag and the national ensign were shot away, but the ensign was at once replaced ; finally, a heavy projectile exploded in or near the ammunition room, filling it with smoke, and causing a fire which could not be controlled. The magazines had at once to be flooded. Further resistance was hopeless with the vessel in this plight, burning furiously, and with only two men left to fight her broadside guns. She succeeded in turning shorewards, when the order was given to the crew to abandon her and sink her, the Cusa, Luzon and Duero being signalled to come to the assistance of her men. She had six officers and over 200 men, out of a total crew a little over 400, killed or wounded. Amongst the latter were Montojo, Captain Cadarso, and the flag- lieutenant. Captain Cadarso, who had shown the greatest gallantry throughout, and who delayed to leave his ship till all the survivors of his crew had been rescued, was struck by a shell and instantly killed whilst superintending their transference to the boats. : The ships now left in the Spanish line were the Cusa, Luzon, Uttoa, Castitta, and Durro. The ULtoa had only two serviceable guns left when she was struck upon the water-line by a shell which killed her captain and disabled half her surviving complement. The CastTILLa had been originally moored with her port broadside bearing, and on this side she was protected by 136 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May sand-bags and lighters laden with sand. Early in the action her moorings forward were shot away and she swung round, bringing her defenceless starboard broad- side to bear. She had all her guns put out of action except one, and suffered very heavy loss. She was riddled with shells and repeatedly set on fire. At last her commander, Captain Algado, ordered her crew to sink and abandon her, and almost at once flames burst forth fore and aft. The survivors were rescued by boats which put. off from the shore and by the Austria, which cruiser came to her aid though seriously wounded and on fire. The Luzon had three of her guns out of action, but had not received any noteworthy injury. The Duero could use only one engine and only one of her three heavy guns. Such was the terrible plight of the squadron, when the Americans were noticed to be drawing off. Their fire ceased, and they steamed out of range. Admiral Montojo at once gave orders for his remaining vessels to retire to the inmost recesses of Bakor Bay, and there, in the event of a fresh attack, to resist to the last, and sink the ships when nothing more could be done. The actual reason for this withdrawal is now known to have been anxiety of Commodore Dewey on account of the rapid expenditure of his ammunition. He had been erroneously informed, in answer to a signal, that only 15 per cent. of his squadron’s ammunition remained in the magazines. Had this actually been the case the position of the Americans would certainly have been a dangerous one. As yet, little sign of serious injury could be seen in the Spanish squadron, and the American pro- May] THE WAR IN THE EAST 137 jectiles had appeared to fall short of, or pass over, the enemy. ‘‘It is true,” says Mr. Stickney,’ an observer on board the Olympia, “at least three of his [the enemy’s | ships had broken into flames, but so had one of ours— the Boston. These fires had all been put out without apparent injury to the ships. Generally speaking, nothing of great importance had occurred to show that we had seriously injured any Spanish vessel. They were all steaming about in the bight back of Sangley Point or in Bakor Bay, as actively as when we first sighted them in the early dawn. . . . In a smooth sea we ought to have made a large percentage of hits; yet, so far as we could judge, we had not sensibly crippled the foe. ... The gloom on the bridge of the Olympza was thicker than a London fog in November.” To avoid dispiriting the men, the crews of the ships were informed that the object of the retreat was to take breakfast. This would sound the more plausible as the heat was suffocating, whilst the smoke blowing down the hatchways made the work for the powder divisions below the armoured deck very hard. In the magazines and stokeholds temperatures of from 120° to 160° were regis- tered. It is probable that the withdrawal greatly con- tributed to the comfort of the engineers and _ stokers, though the gun crews clamoured to be allowed to finish their work, and shouted, “‘ To hell with breakfast,” with a correcter instinct of the results obtained. Yet in the end the retreat was not prejudicial, as, though the Commodore did not know it, the victory was already three parts won. It did, however, temporarily encourage the Spaniards 1 Harper's Magazine, February 1899. 138 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN {May who fancied, naturally enough, that they had repulsed the enemy. As the ships drew off they cheered each other, and the captains went on board the Olympza to confer with the Commodore. We can imagine with what relief and exultation he received from each in turn the news that there was no serious damage to report and no loss of life. The Spanish fire had been so fierce, so steadily main- tained, that this sounded incredible. Moreover, on inquiry it turned out that the ammunition in all the ships was far from being so low as Commodore Dewey had supposed. Instead of only 15 per cent. of ammuni- tion remaining, barely 15 per cent. had been expended. Whilst the conference was proceeding a fresh cause of satisfaction was given the Americans. A strong blaze showed from the Cristina and from the CasTILua, and the explosions of ammunition on board them could be heard. It was now clear that the back of the Spanish resistance was broken. At 11 the battle was resumed by Commodore Dewey. The Baltimore, Olympia, Raleigh, Boston, Concord, and Petrel steamed in one after another, in this order. The Baltimore took the lead, as a strange steamer had been made out coming up the bay during the conference, and she had been directed to intercept this craft. She had already started on her errand, and was two miles south of the flagship—and by that distance nearer to Cavite— when the signal to engage a second time was made. The stranger was examined by the McCuWoch, and proved to be a British merchant steamer. Meantime the Baltimore drew in to a position 2800 yards off Sangley St fe L&T ye a Pee’ esa Y, RECKVED May] THE WAR IN THE EAST 139 Point, and opened on the Don Antonio DE ULLoa, which was lying just behind the point, and on the battery ashore, with her starboard broadside. The distance, going dead slow, she gradually reduced to 2200 yards, and when she had got the range stopped. Her fire was slow, careful, accurate and destructive. The battery was speedily silenced, and the ULtoa was observed to be sinking fast. The Olympia gave aid, delivering a full broadside at the Spanish works, whilst the Boston played her guns upon the enemy’s ships and batteries. She was a good deal hampered by the heating of her guns, which made the breech-plugs hard to work. One of the 8-inch weapons was unavailable for quite twenty minutes after the interval, because of this. The Raleigh came up behind the Olymfza, and also fired on the battery and on the ULtoa, and then, being directed to enter Bakor Bay, in order to destroy the Spanish vessels which had withdrawn thither, made an attempt to do so, but was at once compelled to retire by the shallowness of the water. The Concord and Petre/, whose lighter draught fitted them for this work, were immediately sent in behind Sangley Point. The Cozcord opened at 2500 yards upon the Spanish steamer Minpanao, which was seen in Bakor Bay. At once the Spanish crew deserted their ship and set her on fire, though not before two boats had been despatched from the American vessel with instructions to burn her. At this moment the Uttoa could be made out lying on the bottom just behind Sangley Point, with her upper works showing well above water, and the Spanish flag still flying ; the Cristina was burning in her upper works, 140 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May with constant explosions, on the bottom off Cavite, and the Castitza lay a mass of flames in Cafiacao Bay. The Petrel meantime pushed round the Arsenal at Cavite, firing at the Uttoa and at the Government offices near the Arsenal mole, thus attempting to reach the Spanish vessels which were lying behind. These shots brought up the white flag over the Arsenal. At once the firing ceased. The Petve/ lowered one of her undamaged boats, and despatched it to destroy the Don Juan DE Austria, Cusa, Luzon, GENERAL Lezo, Arcos, and MARQUES DEL Duero. All these vessels were set on fire. The Cusa, Luzon and Don Juan DE Austria were found to be aground and full of water. Their sea-cocks and valves were opened by the Americans to complete the destruc- tion. The. Maniza, a small unarmed surveying ship which was found in Bakor Bay, was, however, spared by the Americans, and brought off on May 4. Finally the VELasco and Correo were also destroyed, and the work of the squadron was completed by carrying off the tugs Rapipo and HercuLe and three steam launches. In this second stage of the battle the Spanish squad- ron offered little or no resistance. When the Americans approached, Admiral Montojo gave the order to sink the vessels which still remained afloat, and this was done, their papers being carefully removed and the breech- blocks of the guns carried ashore. Some of the latter were recovered by the Americans on taking possession of Cavite. Thus ended the battle of Manila, after a sharp but unequal struggle. The Spanish losses in ships are thus May] THE WAR IN THE EAST 141 detailed by Commodore Dewey :—sunk, Rrina CrisTINa, Castitta, Don Antonio DE Uttoa; burned, Don Juan DE Austria, Ista pE ‘Luzon, IsLa DE Cuspa, GENERAL Lrzo, Ex Cano [Correo], Arcos, VeLasco and IsLa DE Minpanao; captured, Rapipo, HeErcuLe and_ several launches. The losses in men are estimated by American officers at from 380 to 400. Some Spanish estimates are smaller. According to a naval officer who served in Montojo’s fleet, the number of men engaged on board was but 1134, which is only half the American estimate; the total of killed was but 58, and of wounded, amongst whom was Admiral Montojo, struck in the leg by a splinter, only 236.1 Admiral Montojo puts the casualties at 381, ‘including losses in the Arsenal and batteries,” a figure which agrees with Lieutenant Ellicott’s (United States Navy) results. His figures are as follows for the various ships :— Killed. Wounded. Total. CRISTINA . : , ‘ i 130 go 220 CasTILLa . j : . : 23 80 103 CuBa ‘ : : ; ° 2 2 Luzon ; 3 ° 6 6 Don JUAN DE AUSTRIA : ° 22 22 Don ANTONIO DE ULLOA . ‘ 8 10 18 DuERO ° ° ° Shore Batteries . 6 4 10 167 9-214 381 This gives a loss of 371 afloat, or nearly 19 per cent. of the nominal force. If the Spanish estimate of the number of men engaged is accepted, the loss would rise to the appalling proportion of one-third, about the 1 Le Yacht, October 15, 1898. 142 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May heaviest figure ever inflicted in a squadron action. The officers killed were seven in the Cristina, one in the CastitLa, and three in the Uttoa. The escape of the Cusa and Luzon with such insignificant loss points to the fact that they took little part in the action. They were on the Spanish right, somewhat to the rear, and were in fairly rapid motion during the engagement, circling together. ‘““The damage done by our ships,” says an American officer, ‘‘ was frightful. One smoke-stack of the CasTILLa was struck eight times, and the shells through the hull were so many and so close that it is impossible that a Spaniard could have lived on her deck. The other large ship, the Cristina, was perforated in the same way. The lesson I draw from the fight is the great utility of target practice. The Spaniard has none; we have it every three months. Strengths of Navies are compared generally ship for ship; the fersonne/ is just as important.” “The Castitia after the action,” says a correspondent with the American fleet, “‘ was so littered with pieces of our shells that it was impossible to walk there without displacing some of them.”* Her upper works were so entirely consumed by fire that traces of many hits must have been effaced. Yet on inspection after the battle the following injuries were discovered. Her forward funnel had fallen to starboard, probably through the explosion beneath it or near it of a large shell. Through it seven small shells had passed, whilst a 5-inch and 6-pounder projectile had perforated the after funnel. A 5-inch shell had dismounted the 1°4-inch gun on the port side of the ' Mr. Stickney, Harper, March 1899. Ellicott, 7. May] THE WAR IN THE EAST 143 forward bridge ; another had passed through the shield of the port side 1‘4-inch gun on the after bridge, also dismounting the weapon. There were four large holes in the side, from one to four feet in diameter, presumably caused by 8-inch shells. One of these large holes was amidships in the port side, with a corresponding injury to starboard; a second and third were under the after funnel. On the sponsons or on the edges of the gun- ports were the wounds of two 5-inch, one 6-pounder and one I-pounder shell; whilst the port after 5:9-inch gun- shield showed two small shell-marks. Six 5-inch holes were discovered, mostly in the port side of the ship; through the forward drum-room were several small shots ; and over the port forward sponson a 6-inch shell had cut through a beam. From survivors it was learnt that three 8-inch shells had burst on the orlop deck forward, amid- ships and aft, causing fires. In all forty hits were examined or traced, and there is reason to conclude that at least twice as many projectiles struck the ship. Some details have already been given of the CRIstTiIna’s injuries. It may here be added, that two 8-inch and two 6-pounder shells had struck the fore funnel; one 8-inch, one 5-inch, and two 6-pounders the after funnel, which had fallen to port owing to the explosion under it of a large shell in the super-heater. Two 6-pounder shells struck a ventilator forward of the fore funnel ; six projectiles had pierced the mizzen-mast and one each the fore and main-masts. An 8-inch shell struck the shield of the port forward 6°3-inch gun and exploded just behind it on the left of the gun, shattering 1 See pp. 134-5. 144 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May the elevating gear, and tearing a huge hole in the sheet- iron bulwark arched over the sponson gun-port. A frag- ment of this shell struck and wrecked the elevating gear on the right of the opposite gun. Thirty-nine hits, of which thirteen were from large projectiles, were traced or discovered, but Admiral Montojo’s own estimate of the hits his flagship received was ‘‘ about seventy.” The Don Antonio DE U toa had the slings of her fore-yard cut by a shell during the action, and the yard fell on deck. She showed four 8-inch hits. One of these had dismounted her starboard 6-pounder, shattering the mount ; the shield of the same gun was perforated by a 6-inch shell. Another 6-inch shell had pierced the after 4'7-inch gun-shield, whilst three 6-pounder shells passed through the mount of the starboard 6-pounder. She is stated by Admiral Montojo to have been struck on the water-line. The number of shell-wounds discovered on what could be seen of her hull was thirty-three. The Cusa showed only five wounds, four from 6-pounder - shells. One of the latter had glanced off the shield of her starboard 4°7-inch gun and another had struck the conning-tower. No other injuries could be detected when at the end of 1898 she was raised and sent to Hong Kong. The Luzon, which ship was also raised after the war, had suffered very little. A large shell disabled her two forward guns; another gun was put out of action by another projectile perforating the gun-shield ; and the fore-gaff topping lift was cut by a shell. Her structural injuries, other than those caused by fire, were quite in- significant. The Don Juan pe Austria had been struck May] THE WAR IN THE EAST 145 by two large, 6- or 8-inch, shells, of which one passed through the superstructure deck and burst in the captain’s galley, whilst the other glanced up from the superstructure deck and destroyed the steering-wheel and the engine- room telegraphs. 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American Artillery. Total Perforation Weight weight through of shot of shot wrought iron Number Ib. Ib. Inches 8-inch 10 250 2500 19'2 6-inch 23 100 2300 137 . 5-inch 20 50 1000 11°8 6-pounder 28 6 S44 79 81 = 5944 4. Spanish Artillery. Total Perforation Weight weight through of shot of shot wrought iron Number Ib. Ib. Inches. 6°2-inch H 6 [s 83 498 °° 96 62-inch A,M 1fo] 64 64 37 sg-inch KK = 4[4] 85 9340 14°5 47-inch K 2[2] 43 86 9 47-inch H = 26[15] 35 gIo 6? 3°4-inch K 2{4] 14 14 2? 3'4-inch H r[4] 14 14 ae 2°9-inch K 2{o 9 18 2? 27-inch H 2fo 6 12 2? 6-pounder Q 19[15] 6 114 79 47-inch M 2fo] 32? 64 ? 67[s0] — 2134 — A = Armstrong. M = Muzzle-loading. Figures in brackets are those given H = Hontoria. Q = Quick-fire. by a Spanish officer in Ze Vacht, K = Krupp. October 15, 1898. 5. The Two Fleets. Average Guns Guns Weight Ships age. 6" and 3 and Guns of Displace- Torpedo Engaged Years Men _ over over small Metal ment Tubes American 9 1743 33 + «420 74 5944lb. 19,272 19 Spanish 10 14 1965 II 33 55 2134lb. 13,505 19 or 1134 6. Ammunition Expended in the American Squadron. Ship 8-inch 6-inch 5-inch 6-pounder 3-pounder 1-pounder Totals Olympia 36 — ~ 281 1000 _ 361 1678 Boston 48 162 — 220 256 400 1086 Baltimore 73 122 —_ 547 —_— 692 1434 Raleigh — 53. 341 137 — 100 631 Concord — 182 — 220 120 60 582 Petrel — «Ww — _ 313 19 448 157 635 622 2124 689 1632 5859 THE WAR IN THE EAST 173 7. Ammunition remaining after battle. Ship 8-inch 66-inch 5-inch 6-pounder 3-pounder 1-pounder Olympia 312 — 318 6080 — 3539 Boston 138 «6248 = =— 948 2131 1712 Baltimore 21r 454 — 1319 — 3428 Raleigh _— 86 565 3863 — 2267 Concord — 25 — 718 814 1250 Petrel — 24 — _— 745 ? 8. Details of hits found or recorded, Unspecified. Mostly 8-inch 6-inch 5-inch 6 pndr. Small large Total Remarks i CRISTINA 5 fo) 5 7 ? 22 39 ~@©About half the hits. Soe 3 2 12 3 16 4 40 5 53 a ON ANTONIO DE ULLOA i 4 3 I 10 I 14 33 ” ” ” Deen ie i I I 4 5 2 0 13 Complete record. Luzon ° ° ° oO o 3 3 35 5 CUBA fo) ° ° 4 Oo I 5 a DUERO I I ° 2 o 1 § Notall. VELASCO ° ° ° oO o 1 1 _ Probably all. ARGOS Oo ° o ° o 1 dt. 9 3 GENERAL LEZO o oO oO o o 1 ft “ 5 14* 7* 22 31 19 48 141 * Of the two hits recorded as ‘‘either 6” or 8” one has been counted to each calibre. 9. Percentage of hits. 8-inch 6-inch 5-inch 6-pounder Small Hits found 14 7 22 31 19 Rounds fired 157 635 622 2124 2321 Per cent. of hits to rounds 9 I 35 15 I Number of guns in battle 10 23 20 28 46 CHAPTER V THE CUBAN BLOCKADE April—May THE action of the American fleet in the western field of war necessarily depended to a great extent upon the Spanish movements.’ The whole of May was passed in a strategic game between Admirals Sampson and Cervera, the first striving to head off the Spanish fleet from Havana and Cienfuegos, and to destroy or blockade it; the second attempting to reach Havana. Mistakes were made, as must be expected when men are groping in the fog of war, by the Americans, and surprise can only be felt at the extraordinary inertness of the Spaniards which led them to throw away all their brilliant oppor- tunities. They had chance after chance which they uniformly failed to take. The disposition of the American fleet at the outset was due, as has been seen, largely to the general uneasi- ness in the United States as to the defenceleéssness of the seaboard. Popular alarm compelled the defending of the American harbours with mines, which proved, as 1 Reports, 163 ff.; Admiral Sampson in Century, 57. 886 ; Captain Chadwick in Scribner's, 24. 529; Lieutenant Staunton in Harger’s, 98. 175; Jacobsen, 1; Goode, 28 ff.; Miiller (complete edition), 17—23. 174 April] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 175 might have been expected, a hindrance and danger to commerce. It was supposed that the four fast Spanish armoured cruisers, supported by armed mail steamers, which had been purchased by Spain from Germany, would bombard the sea-coast cities, especially threatening Philadelphia, Boston, and Newport, all of which were open to attack in mid April, though by May they were probably in a state to offer some resistance. The action of the American fleet meanwhile was scarcely taken into account. It was supposed that the Spaniards would move their torpedo boat and destroyer flotillas to the Cuban coast before the war began. Actually on the Cuban coast, at the end of April, they had four good torpedo gunboats.1 These, reinforced by the seven destroyers and six respectable torpedo boats which were available, and handled with energy, must have caused the Americans great annoyance—if nothing more. The harbours of the northern coast of Cuba would have proved excellent ports of refuge from which to issue and strike the enemy. But all these interesting anticipations failed to take into account the passive lethargy of the Spaniard. “The Spaniards,” said General Garcia, the Cuban leader, to Admiral Sampson, “‘ zever attack; they never attack.” Captain Chadwick, who reports the con- versation, considers the saying true. The Spaniards will resist, “but they do not seem to have in them the capacity of initiative.” At each turn in their naval operations we shall discover the truth of these reflections. For defensive purposes the eastern seaboard of the 1 Gaticia, NuEVA EsPANa, MARQUES DE MOLINS, VINCENTE YANEZ PINzoN. ‘ 176 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April United States was divided into eight districts, to each of which a few'armed steamers, tugs or yachts were appro- priated. In this total of vessels the most important were the ships of the Northern Patrol squadron under Commodore Howell, including the cruiser San Francisco, and armed mail steamers Yankee, Yosemite, Prairie and Dixie. Besides these there was the Mosquito Fleet of about forty armed tugs and ten old monitors. Gradually the patrol ships were taken away from their merely defensive duties and sent south. The distribution of the American fleet on the out- break of war and during the early weeks, up to Cervera’s sailing, varied from day to day, but was approximately as follows :— Actinc Rear-ApMIRAL Sampson (to blockade Cuba and watch Cervera in the West Indies). Armoured Cruiser Mew York . Sea speed 19 knots.? Battleships . . Jndiana ; ” TI” 55 4 vs . . lowa.. . ‘ 154 55 Monitors . . Puritan. . ¥ Io ,, ns . . Amphitrite . os 8 , a . . Levror . . 55 8 4) 4 . . Miantonomoh # 8 oss Cruisers . . Detroit . . 5 15» 3 . . Cincinnati . ss ays % . . Marblehead . ‘4 T+ 35 % . . Montgomery. $5 er 3 . . Dolphin. . 45 I2 4 Gunboats . . LMashville . ‘5 T2 45 i; - . Wilmington. ” I2 4; Bs . . Castine . . ss T3i> he 1 Necessarily an approximation ; extreme speed for a short run. * Her bottom was foul, hence her abnormally low speed. April] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 177 Gunboats . . Machias . . Sea speed 13 knots. 3 Helena . . 3s 2 44, . . LMewport. . is Io 4, Yacht . . Mayflower . iy 15 4, Torpedo Boats . Dupont. . 3 22 yy 45 . . Porter. . a 22\> 355 5 . . Foote. . . 3 20, 3 . . Winslow. . 5 20 4, 53 Cushing . .. i 20), $y . . Ericsson. . 3 BY 45 By the middle of May Admiral Sampson was reinforced by the following ships :— Armed Liners . Harvard. . Sea speed 20 knots. 5 dose, Vale? op seas <5 20 5 . . St Paul. . 53 ZO 3; 45 . . St Louis. 5 Bl sy Dynamitegunboat Vesuvius. . i ie 4; Gunboat . . . Vicksburg Torpedo Boat . Rodgers Yachts. . . . Hawk Armed Ships . . Scorpion $5 . . L£agle 8 Vixen 3 Mangrove Windom and many more. Commopore ScuiEy (Hampton Roads). Armoured Cruiser Brooklyn. . Sea speed 194 knots ) MovedtoKey Battleships . . Massachusetts 5 14 45 {ves arriving 6 . . Lexas . . is 16 ,, May 19. Cruisers . . . Minneapolis . #9 20 ,, Detached to coast of Maine and then to West Indies. Columbia. . Sea speed 20 knots. Afterwards de- tached to coast of Maine. New Orleans Sea speed 19 knots. Sent to Key West. N 178 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April On THEIR way Nortu (from the Pacific), Battleship . . . Ovegon . . Sea speed 15 knots. Arrived May 16 at Key West. Gunboat . . . Marietta. . Sea speed 1o knots. Arrived June 4 at Key West. Against these ships were pitted the following Spanish squadrons— : Cupan WATERS. Old Cruisers . . Rerna MERcEDEs (Santiago). Engines broken down. Atronso XII. Sea speed ro knots (Havana). Boilers out of order, and guns removed. CONDE DE VENADITO. Sea speed ro? knots (Havana). 43 MARQUES DE LA ENSENADA. Sea speed 10? knots (Havana). Torpedo gunboats Nueva Espana. Sea speed 14? knots (Havana). 33 es Mons. . . i I4? 4, + a GALICIA. . . 5 14? ,, (Cienfuegos). i" i V.Y. Pinzon . 4 14? ,, (Cardenas). and several gunboats. Puerto Rico. Old Cruisers . . IsapeL II. . . Sea speed 10? knots (San Juan). 7; Inranta ISABEL % to? ,, (Havana). Cape VERDES. REAR-ADMIRAL CERVERA. Armoured Cruisers Marta TERESA. . . Sea speed 16 knots. 5 535 Vizcaya. .... - 13.) 5 5 ‘3 ALMIRANTE OQUENDO = 16 4, 3 5 CRISTOBAL COLON. . - yo Destroyers . . FuroR ..... 9) 20-24 4, $5 PLUTON. . .. . 9 20-24 4, $5 . . TERROR. . .. . 9 20-24 4, Torpedo Boats . ARIETE . ... . $5 I5? 4, 3 AZOR, 6.46 Se Bs 45 15? 5, ” ea) TRAVO ss oe em es 8 a 15? 4, Armed Liner. . Crupap DE Capiz. Hospital Ship. . ALICANTE. April] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 179 These represented all the Spanish ships ready for sea up to the end of May. The composition of Admiral Sampson’s squadron was very heterogeneous. It had only two armoured ships of any speed, and this pair—the Mew York and Jowa— could not be reckoned as fast as Cervera’s squadron. The Jowa could not keep up with the Spanish cruisers when they dashed out of Santiago. The monitors were very slow and defective, unable to steam more than eight or nine knots in a sea-way, and carrying very little coal. ‘They were hells of suffering to their crews,” says Captain Chadwick, “which bore their discomforts most heroically; and above all, their rapid period of oscillation made them such poor gun-platforms, that accurate shooting from them, unless the water was per- fectly smooth, was impossible.” The three monitors— for the fourth did not arrive till some time after the out- break of war—were therefore vessels upon which no reliance could be placed in facing Cervera. They could not by any possibility have kept up with the Spanish cruisers, and might even have been a source of danger, as their weak auxiliary battery exposed such craft in a peculiar degree to torpedo-boat attack. For the two distinct purposes of blockading the Cuban coast from Car- denas to Cienfuegos, and covering the blockade, Admiral Sampson’s squadron must be accounted very weak. Had the Hampton Roads squadron from the first been kept in the south the position would have been much better, as then Sampson could have reckoned upon four excellent and seaworthy armour-clads, all faster than the slower of the Spanish armoured cruisers. He would not have been 180 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April embarrassed at every turn by the want of mobility which marked his mixture of battleships and monitors. With cruisers he was very poorly supplied. He had at the outset no large and fast scouts, though this want was supplied by the middle of May. His own flagship was indeed the only long-radius cruiser upon which he could reckon, and naturally she could not be detached. He was thus unable to send ships to get touch of Cervera and watch his movements from the start. On the evening of April 21 Admiral Sampson at Key West received orders from Washington to blockade the western coast of Cuba, from Sta. Clara Bay on the east to Bahia Honda on the west, the blockade of Cienfuegos on the south being left to his discretion. One by one the ships left Key West Bay, and at 9 a.m. of the 22nd the fleet was outside the reefs. Half-an-hour later it headed south towards Havana, capturing on the way two Spanish merchant steamers, the Buena VENTURA and the PEpro, the first chased by the /Vashvzlle, the second by the flagship. At 5 p.m. the fleet was off Havana. Here it dispersed, the various ships proceeding to their several blockading stations, and the Jowa, /ndiana, and New York remaining in the offing of the great fortress, whilst the- torpedo boats cruised close up to the harbour entrance. All the ships were painted a greenish grey, and fully prepared for battle, with the woodwork cut away and landed. In the Mew Vork the valuable and finely-finished oak fittings had not been spared, and all the boats except three were left ashore. Early on the 23rd the Italian cruiser Grovannt Bausan was sighted, making for Havana, and caused April] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 181 some excitement, as she was mistaken for the Vizcaya, especially when it was seen that the Wilmington and the Porter were in chase of her. Her nationality, however, was speedily discovered. A schooner was captured that day off the eastern batteries of Havana by the torpedo boat Porter, and two small smacks by the Wilmington and Cushing. On the 24th there were several more captures, including the merchant steamers, CaTaLina and MIGUEL Jover. On the 25th the schooner Sox of Sagua was cap- tured, and the little lighthouse tender, Mangrove, distinguished herself by taking the liner Panama. A touch of burlesque was given to this capture by the fact that the M/angrove’s crew had no uniforms, and only one revolver between them, whilst their only guns were two 6-pounders. The Panama mounted two 14-pounders, of which, however, she made no use. The Mangrove was further only good for eight knots against the Panama’s twelve, so the Spanish liner can hardly have made any serious attempt to get away. On the 26th the Spanish liner MonTSERRaT ran the blockade into Cienfuegos with a number of soldiers, a cargo of provisions, and a large quantity of gold. She had attempted to get into Havana, but had failed in this. On May 6 she ran out of Cienfuegos, and without incident or adventure got safe back to Corufia. On the 27th the steamer Gurpo, from Liverpool to Havana, was captured off the latter port by the Zervor. On the same day occurred the so-called bombardment of Matanzas, in which the Mew Vork, Puritan, and 182 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [April Cincinnati took part. It was discovered that the Spaniards were constructing fresh earthworks there on Point Rubalcaya. The New York ran in to reconnoitre them, and was immediately fired upon. At once the three ships opened on the works, and maintained a steady fire from 12.50 to 1.20 p.m., at ranges varying between 6000 and 3000 yards. The Spaniards replied quite in- effectively, and the Americans claim that their batteries were silenced. The Spaniards, however, only owned to the loss of a mule. In all about 200 rounds were fired by the ships, and twenty-five by the shore batteries. The affair was of no serious importance, as no attempt was made completely to reduce Matanzas. Probably the bombardment was due largely to the wish to give the American seamen target practice under battle conditions, with an enemy firing back—a motive which will explain the many resultless bombardments engaged in by the American fleet. On this day the Botrvar, a merchant steamer, was captured by the blockading squadron. On the 29th the Mew York exchanged shots with a detachment of Spanish cavalry near Mariel, and the steamer ARGONAUTA was captured by the Mashvzlle and Marblehead off Cienfuegos. The Arconauta had run the Havana blockade with mails and stores. Shots at the same time were exchanged between the Warbdehead and Eagle on the one side and the Spanish torpedo gunboat Gaticia and gunboat Vasco NuNez DE BALBOA in Cienfuegos harbour. The torpedo gunboat is said to have been hit by a 6-pounder from the Zagée in one of her boilers.? 1 Reports, 182-6. ‘1eM ay} aroyaq ysn{ paaowas d19aM JsvUTUTEPY 9YI UO sdoq oY Jo OMT —q'N "‘y40X MANT IOSINID psmMouLIy ‘Ss’ WL ‘zgi *¢ 20vf OF May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 183 On May 2 the Mew York, Indiana, Iowa, Amphitrite, and Puritan coaled at Key West and prepared for a long voyage. At the same time the Zevror filled her bunkers, apparently at sea. The difficulty of keeping the blockad- ing squadron supplied with fuel was found to be very great, though the base of Key West lies only eighty miles from Havana. The torpedo boats and monitors, from their small storage, were always in need of coal. They filled their bunkers, often at sea, from colliers, schooners, or the battleships, but not without having to face grave risk of injury ; and the breakdowns of the monitors were frequent. Meantime there were continual brushes with the Spanish batteries, and several more prizes were captured. On the 5th the French steamer Lafayette was stopped and seized as she was attempting to enter Havana. She was taken to Key West, but was there set at liberty, as she had received a special permit authorising her to enter Havana. On the 8th the torpedo boat Wzxslow, Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou, steamed into Cardenas Bay and fired sixty rounds from her 1-pounders at three small Spanish gunboats, the Licrera, AnTonio Lopez, and ALERTA,? which she endeavoured to draw outside the bay into deeper water, where they could be attacked by the American gunboats Wilmington and Machzas? This all 1 The Licera was of forty tons and eleven knots ; she carried one 3-pounder and one 1-pounder. The ALERTA was of much the same size, but had only one gun. The Lopez is described as an armed tug, though no particulars of her can be procured. Lieutenant Bernadou mentions also the LraLTaD, but this seems to be a mistake, as the LEALTAD was too big a ship to get into Cardenas. 2 Century, 57. 698; Harper, 98. 123 ; Reports, 200 ; Goode, 96. 184 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May but issued in the loss of the torpedo boat, as the Spanish vessels were far better armed, and made good shooting at her. On the 11th the Winslow, with the armed revenue cutter Hudson [two 6-pounders], and the gunboats Wilmington and Machias, once more entered the bay, the Hudson and Winslow having swept and sounded one of the channels leading in. They discovered one of the Spanish gunboats lying by a wharf amongst some shipping, and the Wznslow was directed to examine her, the water being too shallow for the larger vessels. Nearing the quarry, a number of red buoys were noticed ahead in the channel by the Winslow's crew, but it was not understood that they marked the range for a masked battery ashore, and no attention was paid to them. The moment the Winslow had reached them the Spanish gunboat fired one shot, when a furious fire with smokeless ammunition was opened by six 6-pounders in this battery upon the torpedo boat.1 The second shell struck her forward, , set the paint-room on fire, and exploded in the conning- tower, cutting the steam-pipe to the steering engine, and knocking the wheel from the helmsman’s hands without injuring him. The next again pierced the conning tower, and a splinter from it wounded Lieutenant Bernadou in the groin. Yet another shell, exploding in the after conning tower, destroyed the wheel-ropes. The rudder had jammed hard over and could not be moved, so that the boat could be steered only with her engines. At once the torpedo boat’s three 1-pounders began to reply, but 1 The calibre and number of the Spanish guns is doubtful. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 185 the fight was a terribly unequal one, though the We/ming- ton’s 4-inch guns at long range were now firing at the concealed battery. The Spaniards’ smokeless powder completely concealed the whereabouts of their guns. Flashes were seen from time to time but could not be exactly located. Lieutenant Bernadou tied up his wound with a towel when, only a moment later, the forward boiler was pierced. The forced draught, however, saved the men in the stokehold from being scalded. A shot struck the head of one of the torpedoes on deck, but missing the primer, did not explode the gun-cotton of the war- head. Next the port engine was disabled. The Winslow was now utterly helpless and disabled, but aid was near at hand. In the most gallant style the Hudson, Lieutenant Newcomb, came up to her help and flung her a tow-line. This parted, and another had to be sent on board. A group of six men were standing amidships, passing ammunition, or getting up the fresh hawser, when a shell struck the hose reel on deck, glanced, and burst amongst them, killing Ensign G. Bagley and two other men, whilst mortally wounding two more. Four other men were less severely wounded, making a total of ten casualties in a crew of twenty-five. Almost immediately after this the Hudson succeeded in getting alongside and picking up the torpedo boat's hawser. The damage to the Wznslow’s steering-gear had now been made good, and she was hauled out of danger. The wounded were transferred to the Hudson. The action lasted well over an hour. It is not surprising that the torpedo boat suffered so severely, as she was 186 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May despatched upon work for which she was totally unfitted by construction, It is only fair to the officer who sent her in to say that no trace of the battery could be discovered before the action, and that Lieutenant Bernadou was only ordered to “locate” the enemy’s gunboats, not to engage them. The smoke from the American guns made accurate shooting most difficult. Whilst this fight was going forward the Machzas shelled a signal station on Diana Cay, and sent a boat’s crew ashore to burn it. The Spaniards report the loss of the Antonio Lopgz, an old armed tug, which was probably _ the gunboat seen by the Americans. She was hit twelve times, and was hopelessly wrecked, whilst of her crew two were killed. The LicEera was disabled; on shore the American shells set fire to the town of Cardenas, and wounded twelve men. The injuries to the Wzns/ow, though serious, were repaired after some weeks’ work at Mobile. In the forward boiler eight rows of water-tubes on each side were wrecked, and the fire-box doors were forced open, fragments of the shell falling out of them. The shell which disabled the port engine lodged in one of the cylinders without exploding. The two thinly-armoured conning towers were completely perforated. The W2n- slow was sufficiently in order to leave for Key West under her own steam on May 12, a fact which says much for the mechanical skill of her crew. On the 11th a second skirmish took place, but on the southern coast of Cuba, off Cienfuegos. Here the ships engaged were the gunboat WVashvzlle, cruiser Marblehead, and revenue cutter Windom. The Americans were Ly ; UY Sig), Dee i ioe y) A Yyjy Typ. Zi Figures geve squrdin. tnfathoms pare Pa pony, May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 187 anxious to cut the three telegraph cables which ran eastward to Santiago, and which kept up communication between Havana and Spain.! On the morning of the 1ith volunteers were called for to cut the cables, and two steam launches and two sailing launches were sent in from the larger ships, manned by 55 officers and men. The launches carried each one 1-pounder, and a detach- ment of marine marksmen. As the boats ran in the Nashville and Marblehead shelled the beach, which. is low, and covered with dense scrub and grass. But in spite of this covering fire the Spaniards from the scrub opened with rifles on the boats. Ninety feet from the shore the first cable was grappled and some feet of it cut away. The second was also severed, though the enemy’s fire at a range of only 200 yards was growing furious. Finally the third was picked up, but by this time the men in the boats were falling fast. One had been killed, three mortally wounded, and five more less seriously injured. The disabled men showed great heroism, utter- ing not a groan or complaint. With losses so heavy, considering the number of men engaged, the third cable was left uncut, and the boats retreated after three hours of the hottest work. The cutting of the heavy armoured cables, 13 inches in diameter, was very difficult in the heavy swell which was running. The water was very clear, and the cables could be seen, else getting hold of them would have proved exceptionally difficult, as the 1 Five cables touch here, viz. cables from Cienfuegos to Havana (in duplicate, two cables); from Cienfuegos to Santiago (in duplicate, two cables) ; and from Cienfuegos to Casilda and Manzanillo. The two cables cut were probably one Cienfuegos-Havana and one Cienfuegos- Santiago, if they were not dummies placed to mislead. 188 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May uneven coral bottom constantly caught the grapnels. The Windom afterwards steamed in and shelled the light- house which had been used by the Spaniards as a shelter for their machine-guns. In a few minutes she struck it with a 4-inch shell and brought it down. The order to cease firing was then given. The attempt to break Havana’s telegraph communi- cation with Spain thus miscarried, as three cables remained undamaged. On May 13 the steamer Gussze, convoyed by the armed vessels Manning and Wasp, landed three Cuban leaders in Cabajias Bay, thirty miles west of Havana. To cover their landing a small detachment of American troops was sent ashore, and these had a sharp skirmish with a Spanish force before they re-embarked. It will now be necessary to go back some days to the proceedings of Cervera on the one hand and Sampson on the other. Cervera’s squadron at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands had been greatly hampered by the loss of its foreign engineers, who withdrew from the Spanish service shortly before the war began. It was also short of stores and ammunition. Its continued delays during the earlier days of the war—from April 22 to 29—may have been due to the wish to wait for reinforcements in the shape of the PELayo and Cartos V, which were nearly ready for sea, or may have been the result of the invariable Spanish lack of resources, inertness, and apathy. During this uneventful stay at St. Vincent arrange- ments were probably made to coal the Spanish fleet in the West Indies. The British colliers Zwzckenham, April] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 189 Roath, and Restormel seem to have been engaged to proceed to San Juan, and thence, if they did not find the Spanish fleet there, to Martinique, Santiago, or Cienfuegos. On April 29 news arrived that Cervera had at last sailed, but had almost immediately detached the three torpedo boats and the Crupap DE Capiz, which had started with him. These had returned to the Canaries. For a fortnight, so far as the Americans were concerned, the four Spanish armoured cruisers and the three destroyers vanished. They had not been watched in any way, and it was quite uncertain whether they were moving against the Oregon, or north to the American coast-line, or due west to the West Indies, San Juan, and Havana. The retention of Schley on the American coast till Cervera could be located now became a matter of necessity, to satisfy public opinion, as the wildest reports were circulated of the presence of Spanish vessels in the North Atlantic. Spanish battleships, cruisers, and torpedo craft were reported off Barbados, on the Nova Scotian coast, near Key West, and off the coast of Maine. In a telegram of April 29, the Navy Department expressed by cable to Admiral Sampson the opinion that Cervera would make either for San Juan or for the east of Cuba. In case the Spaniards went to San Juan, Sampson was urged to blockade them there. The possibility of a Spanish movement against the United States coast-line was also discussed. This being the 1 The Roath left Cardiff on April 22, arriving at San Juan late on May 12. The Twickenham had orders to go to a rendezvous on the coast of Venezuela, but delayed at Martinique. She was captured on June ro by the S¢. Louis off Jamaica. She sailed from Shields on April 23. The Restorme/ was taken off Santiago. 190 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May position on May 4, at 4.55 a.m., Admiral Sampson decided to move eastwards, hoping to meet the enemy in the Windward Passage. He had to face the possibility of Cervera coming round by the Yucatan Channel, and for that reason had to divide his fleet, leaving Commodore Watson off Havana with a strong enough force to with- stand Cervera, strengthened as Watson could quickly be from Key West and Hampton Roads. Commodore Watson. Admiral Sampson. Puritan Monitor. New York Armoured Cruiser. Miantonomoh iy Indiana Battleship. Marblehead Cruiser. lowa ¥ Cincinnatt 9 Amphitrite Monitor. Castine Gunboat, Terror i Machias a Detroit Cruiser. Dolphin - Montgomery ‘i Dupont ‘Torpedo boat. Porter Torpedo boat. Foote ” Wompatuck Tug. Ericsson 7 Niagara Collier. Cushing 4 Rodgers re And numerous small gunboats and armed vessels. Admiral Sampson’s ships were prepared for battle, with chain-cable and sand-bag defence at weak points. His squadron was, however, wretchedly slow: as a combined force it was good for little more than eight knots, and was, so far as its monitors were concerned, badly supplied with coal. To economise fuel the /owa towed the Amphitrite, and the Mew York the Terror, as well as the Porter. ‘There resulted,” says Admiral Sampson, “endless trouble and delay from the breaking of tow-lines.” On the 5th the Jzdzana disappeared, owing to an accident to one of her cylinder valve-stems. She completed her repairs and rejoined the squadron on May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 191 the 6th. But in the afternoon the crown of one of her boilers came down, and her speed fell to eight knots. The Zerror’s steering-gear failed at the same time, and a very little later the two hawsers by which she was being towed parted. This was the fourth occasion on which such an incident had occurred in the squadron. Off Cape Haytien the monitors Detrozt and Montgomery had to refill their bunkers, after only four days of slow steaming. The afternoon of the 8th and morning of the goth were spent in this work. Luckily the sea was so smooth that the Mzagara was able to take both the monitors alongside. The Porter at the same time made fast to one of the latter, and got in coal across the monitor’s deck. From the Cape Haytien telegraph station Samp- son conferred with the Navy Department. Telegrams from Washington, dated May 6, directed him not to risk so’ crippling his ships against fortifications, as to prevent them from soon afterwards coping with the Spanish fleet, which was now supposed to consist of the Petayo, Cartos V, OquEnpDo, Vizcaya, TERESA, CoLon, and four destroyers. It will be noticed that the Washington authorities represented the Spanish squadron as far stronger than it had been supposed to be. If thus composed, it was on paper much superior to Sampson’s hetero- geneous medley of ships. He was informed that the Harvard had been sent to scout eastwards of Martinique, and the S¢. Louzs eastwards of Guadeloupe, 1 Through some mistake “so” was read by Sampson as “or.” The message as he interpreted it ran: “Do not risk or cripple,” etc. which quite changed its meaning.—Goode, 65. 192 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May whilst the Yade was watching the approaches to Puerto Rico. Rumours followed closely on the heels of each other, as there were reports of Spanish colliers at Guadeloupe, and of Cervera’s whole squadron at St. Thomas. A conference of captains was called by Admiral Sampson, who finally decided to stand on to Puerto Rico in the hope of discovering Cervera at San Juan, and seizing Culebra Island as a base, if a blockade became necessary. At the same time the Admiral asked that the scouts Harvard, Yale, and Sé. Louis might be placed under his orders—a request which was promptly granted—and that on the arrival of the Spaniards in the West Indies the Jassachusetts and Texas might be at his disposal. On the oth he was informed by the Department that on May 7 the Spanish fleet had been seen east of Martinique, but that the Petayo and Cartos V were not with it. ‘You should be quick in your operation at Puerto Rico,” the Depart- ment told him. “In everything the Department has utmost confidence in your discretion, and .. . does not wish to hamper you.”’? On the roth a report came from Cadiz that Cervera’s squadron had returned to that place, and the Navy Department, because it could scarcely believe that the Spaniards would send a weak detachment to the West Indies, seems to have credited the story. It was, how- ever, false, and fortunately did not reach Sampson till after the attack on San Juan. Proceeding towards San Juan,’ on the 11th, when 1 Reports, 460. 2 J. R. Spears, Scribner's, xxiv. 145 ff. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 193 fifty miles from his destination, Admiral Sampson temporarily shifted his flag to the Jowa. Early on the 12th the lights of the city came into sight, and the American crews were called. The fleet approached warily, expecting at each moment to see Cervera’s ships putting to sea. The Detrozt led 1000 yards in advance of the flagship; then, in line ahead, at intervals of two cables, came the /owa, [ndiana, New York, Amphitrite and Terror. The Wompatuck, 500 yards off on the flagship’s starboard bow, towed a boat which was to be anchored as soon as the water shoaled to ten fathoms, as a mark to the fleet. The Porter was stationed close under the lowa’s lee, with orders to cross the harbour mouth as soon as the battle began, take station close in under the bluffs to the east of the Morro, and there lie in wait for, and torpedo, any Spanish vessel that attempted to leave the harbour. It was supposed that no guns would bear upon her in her position, but here a mistake was made. No sooner had she taken up her station than a furious fire was opened upon her. Last in the order of battle came the Montgomery, stationed on the Zerror’s star- board quarter, with orders, like the Detvozt, to be on the watch for torpedo boats. At 5 a.m. general quarters were sounded, and a little later each ship hoisted three United States ensigns. At 5.17 Admiral Sampson, standing beside the conning- tower, gave the order for the first shot to be fired by a 6-pounder from the /owa, and an instant later the 12-inch turret guns of the big battleship took up the battle. Simultaneously the Detrozt opened with her 5-inch quick-firers ahead of the /owa, and O 194 TUE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May the J/udiana with all her battery astern. For eight minutes the ships fired without any reply from the Spaniards ; then the Morro spoke, and from the Tierra Gate a battery opened on the Porter. The torpedo boat withdrew from her station, which was far too hot for an unarmoured vessel of her type. It is not quite certain what guns were mounted in the Spanish defences. Reports before the war speak of seventeen 6-inch breech-loaders and ten 9'4-inch howitzers, a very formidable battery. Probably, how- ever, all these weapons were not in place on May 12, though undoubtedly some heavy guns were in position.’ The Spaniards used several smooth-bore weapons in addition. Admiral Sampson’s ships moved very slowly in line ahead from N.N.E. to S.S.W. at twenty-five revolutions, firing as they passed, and when about 1250 yards from the Morro Point, turned in succession and retraced their course. At 6.10 a.m. the last round was fired by the Zervvor, and the signal was made from the flagship “ Use only large guns,” as the smoke from the smaller weapons blanketed the fire. On the whole the American shooting was poor. ‘The aim of the big guns,” says Mr. J. R. Spears, a correspondent with the fleet,’ “ was particularly bad, for many shots intended for 1 Jacobsen, ii. 27, after the bombardment, gives the following guns in place :— 6-inch _9‘q-inch B.L, Howitzers Morro ‘ 2 Cristobal Castle . To rear of Castle Princesa Battery Escambron Battery 2 Scribner, xxiv. 144 ff. OBRW NM 3 ° 2 3 THE BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN IN PUERTO RICO LE OF | STATUTE MIL % ae on ne : Ff pV éscambron Pr De. “i Y Bi Ba y) Le Y Y a: ee Sa, = d : ee = 10 20 Miles ( geogr) iid Red om Peavey To face p. 194. Puerto Rico, May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 195 the Morro, built on a hill sixty feet above the sea, really splashed in the water at the foot of the bluff.” The range-finders gave the distance correctly, but proper allowance was not made for the height of the fort. There was also a heavy swell, whilst the dense smoke from the powder fired by the ships and forts hung on the water, and rendered rapid fire impossible. ‘“ At times it was impossible to see even the outlines of the shore,” says Mr. Goode. ‘‘ Accurate aim was almost out of the question, and the keeping of distances between ships became a matter of great difficulty, hence made collisions hard to avoid.” The quick-tirers and smaller guns made much better practice than the heavy guns, the Detvozt’s 5-inch weapons effecting many good hits. The Spanish shooting was erratic in the extreme. The Montgomery fired with some effect, moral if not material, at the unarmed Fort Canuelo, which stands on a sand-bank to the west of the harbour. After a respite the fleet turned in once more, and at 6.35 the Jowa opened again. This time the heavy guns ‘ shot better, and great clouds of dust and smoke went up from the Morro walls, and from the part of the city of San Juan which lies behind it. At 7.12 the Amphitrite’s after turret was disabled. At 8.15 the Zerror,as before, fired the last shot and the ships drew off. The Porter, Montgomery, and Detrozt excited great and justly-merited enthusiasm by the splendid manner in which, though they were wholly unarmoured, they steamed to and fro, and kept their predetermined stations within easy reach of the Spanish guns. The Porter especially for two and a 196 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May half hours moved slowly backwards and forwards close to the Spanish works. The loss of the American fleet was very small. The New York was only struck once by a 6-inch shell which cut off the top of the after stanchion of the superstructure deck, and burst near the port waist 8-inch gun, killing one and wounding four of the crew, who had no other protection than was afforded by a shield. The Lowa was struck by a shell eight or six inches in calibre on the skid-frames abreast the after port 8-inch turret, and three men were wounded, one severely. The second whaleboat was knocked to splinters and set on fire. Fragments from this shell only just missed Admiral Sampson, Captain Evans, and Lieutenant-Commander Rodgers, who were standing outside the conning-tower. The Zerror’s pneumatic handling gear worked well, but the Amphitrite’s forward turret broke down through the bursting of the exhaust pipe in the hydraulic system. The heat in her turrets was so suffocating that one gunners mate died, and it was excessively difficult to work the guns. The Jxdtana, Detroit, and Porter were not hit. In San Juan two or three guns were dismounted ; several houses were damaged, and eight men were killed and 20 wounded according to Spanish reports. Few of the American shells exploded. Admiral Sampson had no object except to discover Cervera; to look into the harbour he had to pass close to the entrance, and for the protection of his ships whilst doing so, opened fire. He did not attempt to silence or destroy the works, in obedience to the orders of the Navy Department, not to ‘agraqtygut Py IOWUOW “S'Q MUL May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 197 risk crippling his ships ;? but a good many American officers were of opinion, probably wrongly, that there would have been no difficulty in reducing the town. The affair was really nothing more than a_recon- naissance, and therefore it is useless to moralise upon its results or want of results. Yet the retreat of the fleet conveyed to the Spaniards the impression that they had defeated Admiral Sampson and his ships, and they complained at the same time that the town had been bombarded without notice. This, however, was due to accident, not design—to the swell and smoke, which made the American shooting bad. Admiral Sampson’s despatches explain clearly his retreat. ‘It was soon seen,” he says, “that Admiral Cervera’s squadron was not in the port. It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would not have had any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place ; but the fact that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the Flying Squadron was still north and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera’s natural objective, was thus open to entry by such a force as his, whilst we were a thousand miles distant, made an immediate movement towards Havana imperative.” The arguments used by the Admiral are convincing, and no 1 Reports, 366. A further order, however, had given him full liberty of action. But no judicious commander would have taken any risks at this moment. 198 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May one can doubt that he was right thus to surrender any chance of success he may have had. The Spanish fleet “in being” was indeed the true objective, and when it had once been beaten the fall of San Juan was only a matter of time. A further consideration dictating an immediate retreat was the unsatisfactory behaviour of the monitors and their extreme want of mobility. At San Juan their quick rolling had led to very bad shooting. When under way they had to be towed, and thus retarded the squadron, and placed it in a very disadvantageous position to meet the enemy. In fact, the experiences of this 2000 miles voyage were conclusive against the type, and have resulted in its complete condemnation. On the other hand, the Porter's run of 2800 miles without a breakdown seems to show that the seaworthiness of a well-constructed torpedo boat in skilful hands is far greater than had been supposed. This was one of the great feats of the war, all the greater in that she carried no engineer officer. Moving westwards once more, Sampson on the 13th fellin with the Sodace from Key West, and heard from her the report of Cervera’s return to Cadiz. His mind was at once occupied with the project of seizing San Juan in the leisure thus afforded, and he telegraphed for the Vesuvius to be sent to him should the rumour prove true. As he states in his report on the operations of the North Atlantic fleet,’ time to occupy the place was assured in the event of Cervera’s failure to cross the Atlantic. The squadron was stopped off Puerto Plata 1 Reports, 460. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 199 all the 14th and part of the 15th, On May 15 telegrams were brought out to him by the Porter. They stated first that the Spanish squadron had been at Martinique on the 12th; second, that it had been at Curacao on the 14th; third, that the Flying Squadron had sailed for Charleston, where it would be near at hand to reinforce the fleet off Havana; fourth, that the Minneapolis had been despatched to cruise between Hayti and Caicos Bank in the Bahamas, whilst the S¢. Paul was to watch between Jamaica and Hayti; fifth, they directed Sampson to return with all speed to Key West, and use all efforts to keep touch, by his fast scouts, with the Spaniards. The news was all the more serious since the American ships were for the most part short of coal, and in many cases in need of repairs. This same day the S¢. Zouzs joined the fleet, and was ordered by Sampson to cut the cables off Santiago, Guantanamo, and Ponce. He directed the Yale and Harvard to coal at St. Thomas and await orders, whilst instructions were sent to Key West to be ready to coal the fleet. Late in the afternoon of the 15th the squadron headed westwards, and on the 16th was off Cape Haytien, where fresh news reached the Admiral. This was to the effect that the Spanish ships Teresa, Vizcaya, OQuENDo: Coton, Furor, and PLuton had been at Curagao, short of coal and provisions, and with foul hulls ; that two only had been admitted to the port; that they were to leave on the 15th; that five supposed Spanish men-of-war had been seen off Martinique on the 14th, which looked as though a second Spanish fleet was in the West Indies ; that London reports indicated colliers would meet the 200 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May Spaniards on the Venezuelan coast; and finally, that the Flying Squadron was ex route for Key West. Cervera’s squadron might be steering for any one of the following points :— Santiago, from Curagao . ; ‘ about 600 miles. Cienfuegos. 5 9» goo ,, Havana, by Bahama Charset. ‘i 2 EI50 45 9» 99, Yucatan a ‘ : %. TZ00 45 San Juan ‘ » 460 ,, N. American doaek wa Mans Paccize 3, 1700 4, Tampa and Key West . - . » 1450 4, By Sampson’s information, 6 p.m. of the 15th was the hour of Cervera’s start from Curacao. It was probable that there would be some days’ delay on the Venezuelan coast to obtain coal, so that it was almost impossible for Cervera to move on Havana with success by either route. The Bahama Channel would be held by Sampson’s fleet ; the Yucatan Channel would be threatened by Schley at Key West. San Juan was ruled out, as Cervera would have steered straight for it from Martinique had it been his destination, instead of going to Curacao, whilst the possibility of finding Sampson off the port would be a fresh deterrent.'_ Operations against the northern coast- line of the United States were, for the same reason, un- likely to be the plan of action ; still less operations against Tampa and the gathering fleet of transports, in the face of Schley’s Flying Squadron. Santiago and Cienfuegos alone remained, and of these two all probabilities pointed to the selection of the second. The Marblehead, Eagle, 1 Yet Sampson seems himself to have expected the Spaniards even now to steer for either San Juan or Santiago. He had not fully appre- ciated the deterrent effect of his fleet, in regard to the former place. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 201 and Nashville, blockading that port, were therefore in the most imminent danger. Sampson directed that they should be informed of the probability of Cervera’s immediate appearance, which was accomplished by means of the Hornet. He issued orders to the Yaée to support the Sz. Pau/ scouting in the Windward Passage, and to the Harvard to cruise in the Mona Passage. On the 17th Sampson received by the torpedo boat Dupont a despatch with fresh information from the Navy Department: “It has just heard that the Spanish fleet have munitions of war essential to the defence of Havana, and that the order of the Spanish fleet is imperative to reach Havana or Cienfuegos, a railroad port connected with Havana, at all hazards; and as Cienfuegos appears to be the only port fulfilling the conditions, Schley with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts,and Texas, to arrive at Key West on the morning of the 18th, will be sent to Cienfuegos as soon as possible.” As a matter of fact this information was not correct. Sampson was in- structed to send his best battleship to Schley’s support, and to place a fast cruiser off Cienfuegos instead of the Nashville and Marblehead. The Castine (15°4 knots) was the only vessel available, but she was not able to leave till the 2oth. Nothing more had been heard of the second Spanish squadron in the West Indies, and neither Sampson nor the Navy Department appear to have attached the slightest importance to the reports of its arrival. The New York with the Admiral had already parted company with the slower vessels of the squadron, and was steaming at full speed to Key West, where she arrived on the 202 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May afternoon of the 18th. The /owa came in some hours later, the remainder of the squadron on the 19th. There was no further news of the Spanish fleet. It next remains to follow out'in detail the steps taken by the American Navy Department to watch Cervera, and get touch with his squadron, and the movements of the Spanish fleet. On April 29 definite news of Cervera’s departure from the Cape Verdes reached Washington. Orders were at once issued to the S¢. Louzs and Harvard, both at New York, and capable of steaming twenty to twenty-one knots at sea with ease, to proceed to the West Indies. The Harvard was directed to steam at fourteen knots from New York to the westward of Martinique, when she was to patrol the area of water between 14° 25’ and 15° 38’ N. latitude, and 59° 30’ and 59° 40’ W. longitude. The distance which she had to cover from New York to the furthest extremity of her patrol area was about 1700 miles, so that at fourteen knots she would require a little over five days to reach her station. This would bring her there on May 4. Cervera to the same point would have to cover 2000 miles, and thus, even if he proceeded at seventeen knots, could not pass before she had arrived. In case the Harvard obtained no information by May ro, she was to go to Martinique for intelligence, and if she heard that the Spaniards were elsewhere, to proceed in search of them. In case she obtained touch of the Spaniards she was to telegraph to Key West and Washington, and then either to follow Cervera, maintain- ing touch, or to proceed straight to Sampson and inform him. From the time when the Spaniards appeared in May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 203 the West Indies she was to be under his orders. Incase, however, nothing was heard of Cervera the Harvard was to telegraph to Washington, wait twenty-four hours for a reply, and if none were received, to steam to Hampton Roads. Precisely similar orders were issued to the S¢. Louzs, except that she was to patrol an area west of Guadeloupe, to the north of the AHarvara’s area, and bounded by latitude 16° 55’ and 15° 38’ N., and longitude 59° 4o’ and 59° 50’ W. If she saw nothing she was to proceed to Guadeloupe. A line of about 150 miles in length would thus be watched, covering the sector through which would lie Cervera’s probable approach to either Cuba or Puerto Rico. Yet the line of patrol did not run far enough to the south, since the actual course of the Spaniards to Martinique fell just outside it. It remained to prolong the line of patrol to the north. The Yad, of the same armed liner type as the ffarvard and St. Louis, was ready for work on May 1, and that day received orders to cruise round the island of Puerto Rico until the evening of May 13, when she was to proceed to St. Thomas, or in any other direction where news could probably be obtained of the Spanish squadron. She was to reconnoitre San Juan, if prudent. In other particulars the tenor of her orders was identical with that of those given to the Harvard and St. Lowzs. She left New York on May 2, and was on her station on the 6th. On the 8th she captured a Spanish vessel with coal, bound for San Juan; on the oth she reconnoitred the port, and discovered two gunboats and an armed liner in it. The latter steamed out and fired a few shots at the Yaé, and 204 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May the American cruiser, carrying nothing heavier than the 6-pounder gun, was obliged to retire. On the next day the forts fired at her ineffectually; on the 12th she communicated with the S¢ Lows, and on the 13th proceeded to St. Thomas, and telegraphed that nothing had been heard of the Spanish fleet. The Sz. Louzs discovered nothing, and after touching at Guadeloupe was apparently ordered to join Admiral Sampson. This she did on May 15. On May 11, at 9.30 a.m., the Harvard, Captain C. S. Cotton, arrived at St. Pierre, Martinique, and communi:- cated with Washington.’ In the evening news reached Captain Cotton that a Spanish destroyer had arrived at Fort de France at 4 p.m., and was to leave at 7 p.m. This was the first indication of Cervera’s presence in the West Indies. At the same time Captain Cotton, in accordance with the well-known twenty-four hours’ law, was instructed by the French authorities that he could not leave for sea till 7 p.m. on the 12th. He sent an officer to Fort de France, who reported a second destroyer and ° five large steamers hull down in the offing. In the harbour there was the Spanish hospital ship ALicanTE, with troops and stores. On the 11th the presence of the destroyer, and on the 12th the presence of the five * other Spanish ships, was telegraphed to Washington and Key West by Captain Cotton. It has been stated that his despatches were wilfully delayed by the French authori- - 1 Reports, 408. 2 What the fifth ship was remains uncertain. She did not go to Santiago. Possibly she was a collier; possibly she did not belong to the squadron. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 205 ties ; this story he absolutely contradicts in his report. He had little doubt that the Spanish squadron was waiting to catch him, and so, afraid of being forced out by the French authorities owing to Spanish protests— though there was really no ground for this fear, as the French attitude was friendly and correct—he asked for seven days’ delay to allow him to repair boilers and engines. This request was granted, and Captain Cotton was informed that he must give twenty-four hours’ notice before he put to sea. On the nights of the 11-12th and 12-13th rocket signals were made by some one on shore, and answered from the sea by coloured lights. They were supposed by Captain Cotton to have been signals exchanged between Cervera and some Spanish sympathiser ashore, but this does not seem to have been the real case, since on the afternoon of the 12th the Spanish squadron had left for Curagao. The signals, therefore, remain unexplained. On the 14th Captain Cotton telegraphed that the destroyer TERROR remained at Martinique disabled, but that nothing more could be ascertained of the other Spanish ships. He did not know of their departure, but seems to have supposed that they were still blockading him. On receipt of Captain Cotton's telegram, the Navy Department ordered the Flying Squadron, on May 13, to proceed to Charleston, leaving the Mew Oréeans in Hampton Roads. Key West was instructed to have the monitors Puritan and Miantonomoh, both of which had been lying there for some weeks, ready for service. The St. Paul was directed to proceed with all possible despatch to cruise between Hayti and Morant Point in 206 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN {May Jamaica. If she sighted Cervera’s fleet she was to telegraph news, and to follow the Spaniards. The Minneapolis, with similar orders, was to watch the line of approach along the north of Hayti, cruising between Monte Christi and the Caicos Bank. On the 14th the American Consul at Willemstad telegraphed the arrival of the Spanish squadron at Curacao. Fresh orders were at once issued. The Flying Squadron was to proceed from Charleston to Key West with all possible despatch, The St. Pau, which had not yet left Hampton Roads, was directed to steam at full speed to Key West, to connect the look-out ships in the Yucatan Channel with the base. The Cincinnati and Vesuvius were sent to Cape San Antonio, and stationed in the Channel as look-outs ; all the blockading ships off Cienfuegos were to be recalled, except the smallest, which could be sacrificed if the Spaniards appeared, whilst if they did not appear, she would serve to maintain a legal blockade; all the blockaders on the north coast of Cuba were warned, but not removed, and the outlying scouts were ordered in to Key West. The Minneapolis had sailed for her station, and fresh orders could not be issued to her. On the 15th there were yet fresh orders, based on information received from London to the effect that coal was being sent from England to the Venezuelan coast. It was now decided to collect in Venezuelan waters a number of fast ships to search these waters thoroughly. Accordingly steps were taken to intercept the Minneapolis and send her to the Gulf of Venezuela, where, under the lee of the Paraguana Peninsula, ‘coaling could easily be May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 207 accomplished. The Harvard and St. Paul were also to _ proceed thither. These orders were, however, revoked by Admiral Sampson. The opinion of the Navy Department was that Cervera, when he had coaled, would strike for Santiago or Cienfuegos, not for Havana, as when once he entered the Gulf of Mexico he would have Schley’s squadron, now ordered to proceed to Cienfuegos as soon as it had finished coaling, behind him, and Sampson’s squadron, nearing Key West, in front. This opinion was com- municated to Admiral Sampson by a letter dated May 16, and was correct as events proved. Meanwhile Cervera left Porto Grande in the Cape Verdes at midnight of April 28-29, with the TEREsa, OgvuENbo, Vizcaya, Coton, Furor, TERROR, PLuton, AuicanTE, and possibly another vessel. The only ship’s log’ which remains informs us that between April 16 and 28 the Coton, and therefore presum- ably the other ships, had been steadily coaling. The average tonnage shipped during a four-hour watch appears to have been twenty-five tons, which is not a good figure for a large modern cruiser with a crew of over 500 men, and illustrates the want of smartness, or perhaps of proper appliances, in the Spanish squadron. On the 29th the squadron stopped and manceuvred, only covering thirty-three miles. The run of the squadron was as follows for each day, up to May 11:— 1The Coton’s log, Reports, pp. 429 ff. Spanish sea days are reckoned from 12 (midday) of, say, the 29th to 12 (midday) of the 3oth. This day would be the 3oth. ‘ 208 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN - [May MILES. MILES. April 28-9 33 May 5-6 170 » «29-30 go 3» 6-7 179° April 30-May 1 180 » 7-8 180 May 1-2 152 » 8-9 170 “5 2-3 182 9) 9-10 160 3 3-4 175 ») IO-II 218 4 4-5 170 y) 11-12 go The highest speed recorded is ten knots; the average was six or seven. There was great trouble with the destroyers, which had to be towed, with the usual consequence that the tow-ropes were constantly break- ing. The Teresa had the Piuton in charge; the Ogvuenpo the Terror, and the Coton the Furor. The Vizcaya, probably because of her foulness, was left un- hampered. Signal was made to exercise frequently at general quarters, day and night, but there is no record in the log of any kind of target practice, except on the part of the Terror. The Coton’s starboard air-pump gave trouble on the first day out. On the evening of the 1oth all the vessels cleared for action, and the speed was increased to ten knots, as the zone of danger was entered. The destroyer Furor was sent on in advance to Fort de France, Martinique, probably to telegraph and to ascertain whether the fleet would be permitted to coal. During the night of the 11th and early morning of the 12th the squadron was standing off and on, with Martinique in the distance ; the TERROR was sent in for repairs, and the AricanTE left behind. The object of this delay, when every moment was precious, was probably to give time for the arrival of the colliers Roath, Restormel, and Twickenham, and to obtain from Madrid US. Terrtlory oanish ie Te Nevtral .. GULF OF MEX/CO THE THEATRE OF WAR IN THE WEST. AP ap ig Jo £2, St hincent CERVERAS RUN, ST VINCENT ‘oO rege fee. ~ i! Fee eS, 51 THOMAS ~~ 50 Frailways & laporlant pocnts Submarine Cable Stations used by the Fleets Spanish postliars wm Cerveras COUrSE The figures gove the Aays rn. American Ships & Freel May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 209 and Havana exact particulars of Admiral Sampson’s whereabouts. On May 10 American newspapers had published the fact that he was off Hayti moving eastwards, which was a clear indication that he was steering for San J uan. For Cervera to divulge his whereabouts by thus putting in to Martinique was a great mistake. He should certainly have passed the island at night, or have only communicated with his Consul by a destroyer, keeping the rest of his fleet out of sight. Secrecy was all- important in the game which he was playing; and the mystification and uncertainty caused by the low speed at which he had crossed the Atlantic, were dissipated by his “location” at Martinique. A study of the Alabama's tactics would have helped him. Captain Semmes managed secretly to coal and refit on the Yucatan coast, and what he did Cervera could have done. Probably, however, the real blame for all these mistakes rests with the Spanish Government, which had failed to make the necessary preparations. The French authorities appear to have refused to permit the Spaniards to coal, and soon after 8 a.m. of the 12th the squadron resumed its voyage, steering west- south-west for Curacao. On the 13th the speed was raised from ten to thirteen knots, and a total run of 290 miles was covered. On the 14th the run was 195 miles; at 6.30 a.m. Curagao came into sight, whereupon the TEReEsa and Vizcaya went into the harbour and the Coton, OquENDo, and the destroyers remained outside. Curacao was selected by Cervera as a central position, 1 Semmes, My Adventures Afloat, 538. 210 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May near the southern coast of Cuba, but well away from the American scouts. Here, in touch with Madrid by telegraph, he could ascertain where Sampson was. Here, too, he hoped to pick up his colliers. Of these the Roath was in San Juan; the Twickenham, with 2800 tons of coal, had arrived at Martinique some days after his departure, but was not permitted to coal the TERROR; the Restormel was toiling after him, but an unfortunate breakdown in her engines delayed her. Entering Willemstad harbour, Cervera requested leave to coal and provision his ships, whose fuel was now very low indeed. Immediately on his arrival [14th, 8 a.m.] the American Consul telegraphed the news to Washington. Cervera was not allowed to coal more than two of his ships and the Piuton, and all that he could procure was 500 tons of very poor stuff. This was shipped in the TEREsa and Vizcaya, and at the same time a quantity of provisions and fresh meat was pur- chased. Meanwhile the Vizcaya repaired her engines, the OquEenpDo and Coton lay-to outside the harbour, and the destroyer Furor received thirty-four and a half tons of fuel by boat from the latter. On the 15th Cervera heard by telegraph of the bombardment of San Juan, and at once left, at 5.15 p.m., giving out San Juan as his destination, and steering eastwards, but soon changed his course. There can be no doubt that he had decided to use the chance which Sampson’s absence off Puerto Rico gave him, and to make a dash for one of the Cuban ports. It is said by Spanish officers that he had not enough coal to take him the 900 miles to Cienfuegos, and that this circumstance compelled him to steer for May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 211 Santiago, which was only 600 miles away. The Re- stormel, whose arrival might have saved everything, did not reach Curagao till the 2oth, five days after the Spaniards’ departure. Cervera’s want of coal was a very fortunate accident for the American Government. Had the Festormel joined the Spanish squadron the latter could easily have filled its bunkers in one of the unfrequented harbours of the Venezuelan coast. So late as the 16th Sampson, with the ships returning from Puerto Rico, had only got so far as Cape Haytien, 650 miles from Havana. Unless he left the monitors behind him he could not steam more than seven or eight knots. Cervera should have been able to do thirteen, which would have carried him to Cienfuegos in three days. There he could have dis- embarked his war stores—if he had any on board '—for Marshal Blanco’s army. He would have had two more days to coal and leave the port, as Schley was not off it until midnight of the 21st-22nd, and with moderate luck he might have got away east to San Juan and re-coaled there, thus indefinitely protracting the game of hide-and- seek and seriously embarrassing the American Navy Department. His squadron was so defective in fighting strength that it had no chance of success in a pitched engagement with the main body of the American fleet. Its only advantage lay in its pace, but of this no use was made. We now know that the speed of one of Cervera’s cruisers was very much lower than any one supposed, whilst the other three must have been in some degree hampered by poor coal, bad management of the 1 As a matter of fact he had not. 212 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May boilers and engines, and the ever-growing foulness of the ships’ hulls. The hulls of the Vizcaya and TERESA when at Curacao were noticed to be covered with marine growths. Not till the 18th was the news that Santiago was the destination of the squadron communicated by signal from the flagship to the other vessels. The speed maintained was low, the runs being 135, 195, 162 and 145 miles. On the evening of the 18th the squadron prepared for action, but no enemy appeared during the night. When day broke the mountains of Cuba, in sight of which the squadron was doomed to perish, were in full view. At 6 a.m. of the roth the flagship led the way up the narrow entrance to Santiago, and the squadron was two hours later at anchor in the harbour, having accomplished with success the long and perilous voyage from the Cape Verdes in the face of a greatly superior enemy. It just missed by only one hour the S¢. Louzs, which had been cable-cutting off Santiago on the 18th and night of the 18-19th; it was two days ahead of the Sz. Pawd. On the 13th Schley had moved out from Hampton Roads with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, armed yacht Scorpzon, and collier Sterdimg. The latter was left behind at once and could not rejoin the squadron. On the 14th the Mznneapolts, and on the 15th the Sz. Pawd, followed him to sea, to scout independently. On the 17th the Mew Orleans weighed anchor and proceeded south to Key West. Off Charleston Bar on the 15th Schley lay-to, and received the order from Washington to proceed to Key West, where he arrived on the 18th. The American plan was to cover the western May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 213 approach to Havana with his squadron, whilst Sampson took care of the eastern approach. The latter, upon his arrival at Key West on the 18th, gave Schley the follow- ing orders, under which he sailed for Cienfuegos by way of the Yucatan Channel on the roth, at 9 am.: “It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible. Should the Spanish vessels show themselves in that vicinity, and, finding you on the look-out, attempt to come round the island, either east or west, please send me notice by the best vessel you have for that purpose as to their direc- tion, that I may be prepared for them at Havana.” In conformity with orders from the Navy Department on the 2oth Sampson sent off the /owa, though her coaling had not been completed, torpedo boat Dupont, gunboat Castine, and collier Merrimac, to follow and join Schley. On this same day he wrote a private letter to Schley,’ covering a telegram from the Navy Department of May 19, in which it was suggested that Cervera was at Santiago, and that this place should be blockaded. Sampson’s letter said that he had duly considered this course and resolved to make no change ; that even if the Spaniards had put into Santiago, and he gave reasons for doubting it, they would have to run to Cienfuegos or Havana to land the munitions of war for the troops in the west of Cuba, and might be captured or destroyed by the American squadron off these places; that finally, ‘‘if later it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago, we could then ? Does not appear in the Reports: published in Mew York Sun, February 21, 1899. Reached Schley May 23. 214 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May assemble off that port the ships best suited for the pur- pose and completely blockade it. Until, then, we receive more positive information we shall continue to hold Havana and Cienfuegos.” This letter is of great im- portance from its influence upon the subsequent action of Schley. It will be observed that it contemplated the blockade of the Spanish fleet as soon as the latter was definitely located. It was possible that the Spaniards had been in Santiago and had again put to sea, in which case to move Schley’s fleet prematurely from Cienfuegos would only be to open this port to the wily Cervera. But Schley evidently construed the letter as deciding fora blockade of Cienfuegos under all circumstances. The following was the ‘‘ state” of the American fleet in southern waters at this time (only the most important fighting ships can be given) :— [ac.=armoured cruiser. bs.=battleship. m.=monitor. cr.= cruiser. gb.=gunboat. tb.=torpedo boat. co.=collier. +t in need of coal. * inneed of repairs. a.=armed ship.] ON way TO CIENFUEGOS. BLOCKADE OF HAVANA, AT KEY WEST AND TAMPA. Brooklyn, ac. Puritan, vo. +Lndiana, bs. Texas, bs. Miantonomoh, m. +Mew York, ac. Massachusetts, bs. Dolphin, gb. *+ Amphitrite, m. Lowa, bs. Annapolis, gb. *+ Terror, mM. Castine, gb. . LMewport, gb. + Montgomery, cr. Dupont, tb. Vicksburg, gb. +Marblehead, cr. Scorpion, a. Wilmington, gb. t£agle, a. Merrimac, co. awh, a. +Detroitt, cr. Mangrove, a. Hornet, a. Tecumseh, a. Bancroft, gb. Oncas,a. Helena, gb. Mayflower, a. Machias, gb. Rodgers, tb. Nashville, gb. Osceola, a. Suwanee, a. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 215 AT KEY WEST AND TAMPA. Wasp, a. Windom, a. Vixen, a. Cushing, tb. Ericsson, tb. Morrill, tb. * Winslow, tb. Foote, tb. Porter, tb. SCOUTING, ETC. ON PASSAGE. Cincinnati, cr.) in Yucatan Oregon, bs., to Key West. Vesuvius, gb. } Channel. Marietta, gb., to Key West. Minneapolis, cr. Vew Orleans, cr., to Key West. Yale, a. Wompatuck, a. flarvard, a. St. Paul, a. St. Louis, a. Cable-cutting. The Puritan and Miantonomoh \eft Key West for Havana on the 20th. The S¢. Pau/ and Yade had been detached to scout in the Windward Passage on the 18th. Thither on the 19th the Harvard from Martinique and the Mona Passage, and the Minneapolis from St. Thomas, followed them. On the 19th reports that Cervera had entered San- tiago reached the Navy Department, apparently by secret service from Havana. The presence of the enemy on the Cuban coast made Admiral Sampson, and not unnaturally, anxious for reinforcements. He urgently requested the Navy Department to send him the fine cruiser Mew Orleans, which had as a matter of fact already left Hampton Roads for Key West. “The small auxiliaries,” he telegraphed, “can blockade in the absence of [the] enemy ; [but] are useless for repelling attacks of armoured cruisers. For [the] difficult task of holding 216 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May both sides of Cuba, you should put at my disposal all your fighting force.” On the evening of the 20th he com- plained to the Department of the monitors’ inefficiency. They should not be sent from the base, he concluded. That same night he received these fresh instructions : “The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct; so the Depart- ment strongly advises that you send immediately by the Iowa to Schley to proceed off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cien- fuegos . . . Auxiliary No. 461 [.S¢. Paul ?] will proceed at once to Santiago to join Schley, who should keep up communication v7@ Mole, Hayti, or Cape Haytien, Hayti. If the /owa has gone, send order to Schley by the fastest despatch vessel.”’ Accordingly the MJardde- head, Vixen, and Eagle left on the 21st with these orders : ‘«Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba—four ships and three torpedo boat destroyers. If you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch but cautiously to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there, blockade himin port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants—fishermen or others—to learn de- finitely that the ships are in port, it being impossible to see into it from the outside.” This order, it will be noticed, was not peremptory ; it gave a certain amount of latitude to Commodore Schley.2. And as some time must neces- sarily have elapsed before it could reach him, it was quite 1 Reports, 46 5. 2 Especially when taken in connection with Sampson’s letter of the 2oth. See p. 213. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 217 possible that in the meanwhile the bird might have flown. From Santiago to Cienfuegos is a little over 300 miles—an easy day’s steam for fifteen-knot ships. This must be remembered in bare justice to Schley, as it was by no means beyond the reach of probability that the Spaniards had arrived at Santiago, left it, and reached Cienfuegos before midnight of the 21Ist-22nd, at which time Schley was off the latter port. Indeed, there was an @ priorz probability in favour of such a course, as at Santiago Cervera was not in communication with Havana, but was as much isolated as if he had been at San Juan. The selection by the Spaniards of Santiago can only be defended by their want of coal. ; Meanwhile Schley had covered the 500 miles from Key West to Cienfuegos, at the very leisurely rate of about ten knots, with lights out and guns loaded, making a great detour off Cape San Antonio, and expecting each hour to meet Cervera. Several times during the 19th and 20th suspicious ships were sighted, and the decks were cleared for action. On the 21st at midday the course was set direct for Cienfuegos, and at midnight the squadron was off that port. During the night, whilst forty miles from the harbour, Schley thought he heard heavy firing, but no one else in the fleet observed it. At daylight of the 22nd the squadron steamed slowly in, cleared for action. The harbour of Cienfuegos is of a type common in Cuba. There is a narrow long channel, bordered by high ground, and giving access to an extensive bay. The length of the channel is two miles and the width at the narrowest point about 4oo yards. There is 218 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May a bend half-way up, and this, coupled with a strong current, renders navigation very difficult. The sheltered sheet of water inside measures about ten miles long by four wide. It is evident that there was abundant space here to contain a large fleet, whilst close reconnaissance would be necessary to determine exactly what ships were inside. The masts of vessels in the harbour could just be seen from the sea. At 8 a.m. Schley’s squadron circled in front of the entrance at a distance of 4000 yards to draw the fire of the batteries, if there were any. No guns, however, were fired. At noon the Dufont and Jowa arrived, and the Scorpion was despatched eastwards to obtain further information from the scouts in the Windward Passage. Then the squadron steamed in once more, and circled off the entrance a second time. Schley thought he saw the masts of the Spanish squadron inside, and felt satisfied that he had at last located Cervera. But other officers could only make out one steamer and two schooners inside the bay.’ Still the general opinion’ was strongly in favour of the Spaniards’ presence inside. At night the big ships cruised three miles off the entrance, whilst the Dupont steamed close in and looked into the harbour. She reported several ships inside. Signal-fires were seen upon the hills to the west; they were lighted by the insurgents to show that they wished to communicate, but were not understood by Schley, to whom by some oversight the system used by the Cubans had.not been communicated. On this day Schley sent by the Vesuvzus 1 How Schley’s conduct struck a very enterprising and determined American officer, Captain Evans, can be read between the lines of every page in his contribution to Mr. Goode’s book. Goode, 137—142. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 219 a despatch to Sampson, stating that he was uncertain as to the presence of Cervera in the harbour, and com- plaining of the difficulty of coaling in the heavy swell.’ All the 23rd the squadron was off the harbour with engines stopped, where it was joined by the Cas¢zne, the collier Merremac, and the armed yacht Hawk. The Lowa, Dupont, and Castine coaled from the Merrimac, the first-named in eight and a half hours, taking on board 255 tons, a fine performance on the open sea. At noon the Adu/a, a British steamer, was permitted to enter the port. She came from Jamaica, and her captain told Schley that cablegrams had been received in Kingston to the effect that Cervera had been in Santiago on the roth, but had left on the 20th. The Adula had been in Santiago on the 18th, and during the night had seen the lights of seven vessels, which were, of course, the Spanish squadron. This confirmed Schley’s own conclusion, based on inherent probability, the firing heard, which he took for salutes exchanged between Cervera and the shore, the shipping supposed to have been seen in the harbour, and the large amount of smoke which rose as if from funnels of vessels inside. The Hawk had been despatched from Havana on the 21st, a short time after the J/a7rdlehead, which she had overtaken on the way. She brought these orders from: Sampson :—“ It is thought that the enclosed instructions will reach you by 2 a.m. May 23.’ This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded very important), so that your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago 1 See plan, p. 186. 2 She arrived on the 23rd. 220 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May a.m. May 24. It is thought that the Spanish squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make and coal to take. The St. Paul and Minneapolis have been telegraphed to scout off Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron goes westward, one is to keep in touch and one is to go west and attempt to meet you; if the Spanish squadron goes east, one will keep in touch, and one will go into St. Nicolas Mole to telegraph me at Key West. I shall be off Cay Frances, 200 miles east of Havana. If you arrive off Santiago and no scout meets you, send a vessel to call at Nicolas Mole, and get information to be left there by scout as to direction taken by Spanish, in case they may have left Santiago de Cuba. The Yad has been ordered to cruise in the Bahama Channel till May 24. It is thought possible that the Spanish, hearing of your departure from Cienfuegos, may attempt to go there. If this word does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to mask your real direction as much as possible. Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they take.” It would seem that these orders left Schley no dis- cretion, unlike those sent by the Marélehead, which arrived on the 24th. There can, therefore, be no dis- puting the fact that he was bound to move to Santiago and blockade that port. He was not in touch with the telegraph, and could not know what information Sampson had to work upon—presumably the reports of the cruiser captains, secret intelligence from Havana, and news from Madrid, where Cervera’s arrival at Santiago had been published on the 20th. But instead of acting on the Flawk's instructions he followed the earlier orders of the May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE ~ 221 Marblehead ; announced to Sampson that he was by no means satisfied the Spaniards were not at Cienfuegos ; recounted the reasons for his belief; and suggested that going to Santiago would be “chasing up a probability,” as it was quite likely that the story of Cervera’s presence there was only a Spanish ruse. To the Mew York Sun correspondent he said positively, “he was sure Cervera was inside: he had seen the ships himself.” And this in spite of the fact that Commander McCalla of the Marbde- head had during that afternoon communicated with the insurgents ashore, and learnt from them that there were no Spanish ships in the harbour. Finally, at 6 p.m. of the 24th, Schley decided to withdraw and move east- wards, leaving the Cas¢zve (in trouble with her machinery) to watch Cienfuegos, and the Dupont to return to Key West. The squadron now comprised the /owa, Texas, Massachusetts, Brooklyn (flag), Marblehead, Vixen, Hawk, Eagle, and Merrimac. A speed of nine knots was main- tained at first, and no lights were shown. But encoun- tering very heavy weather the ships had to slow down, first for the Zag/e and then for the Mardlehead. The Eagle's coal-supply was falling dangerously low, and she was therefore detached and ordered to go to Jamaica, obtain fuel, and return to Key West. It was not till the 26th that Santiago was reached. Squalls of rain hid the land from the ships till after noon. In the evening the Minneapolis, Yale,and St. Paul came up, but none of the three had seen anything of the Spaniards. Meantime Sampson had left Key West in the Mew York during the night of the 2oth-21st, and arrived on the blockade next day, after issuing orders to the 222 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May Yale at Cape Haytien to cruise down the Bahama Channel, and then join Schley off Santiago on the 24th. On the 21st the Puritan and Miantonomoh were ordered to be off Cay Frances, where the flagship, /xdzana, Newport, Vicksburg, Mayflower, Machias, Rodgers, Foote, and Montgomery were to join them, to hold the Bahama Channel. Thither the Mew Ordeans, which had now arrived at Key West, wanting coal, was to follow when ready. Sampson’s position was somewhat anxious, as he wished to be certain of intercepting the Spaniards, in case they moved towards Havana from the east, whilst at the same time keeping within reach of Key West and his weak blockading force, in case they had slipped past Schley, and were attempting to move up from the west. He had information that on May 21 the Spanish cruisers, and at least one destroyer, were in Santiago harbour. The Navy Department now anticipated an eastward move thence on the part of the Spaniards to San Juan. On his cruise in the Bahama Channel, Admiral! Sampson gave out three orders of battle, which have considerable tactical interest. The first was as follows :— The American ships were to form in one column at intervals of two cables, heading eastward, the enemy being supposed to be heading to the west. The Mew York, Indiana, Puritan, and Miantonomoh were to lead, and behind them were to come the cruisers in order of their strength. After passing the Spanish rear, the four armour-clads were to turn in succession towards the enemy and double on his rear, whilst his van was still engaged by the cruisers. The torpedo boats Foote and ot oe 2 4.900. -A.....!200.....5. FP... .1200. 800.8 MONTGOMERY NEWPORT NEW YORK OETROIT NEW ORLEANS rodre — roocers INDIANA & 4 @ macnias 4 Q euritan Awiemineton Q miantonomon Sampson’s Order of Cruising, May 23. Figures give distance in yards. SPANISH SHIPS cle Boe. 4 v INDIANA @ @ new yorx MIANTONOMOH @ @ puritan DETROIT ® Owew onceans WILMINGTON @ amacnHias NEWPORT @ @onTGomERY ' VICKSBURGg @mavrcowea Qwase Sampson’s Second Order of Battle. Spaniards in line abreast. SHIPS SPANISH oooo°o .f5OYe | asooy es 4 MONTGOMERY ¢ i NEW YORK NEW ORLEANS §@ Q@ iNolaANA DETROIT § CINCINNATI @ MAY FLOWER @ MIANTONOMOoH @ PuRITAN @ TERROR AMPHITRITE UOISTNT pind @ witmineton @ MACHIAS @ vicxsBuRc @ NewPrort Sampson’s Third Order of Battle. Spaniards in line ahead. To face p. 222. 3*4 Division @ wase May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 223 Rodgers were to lie under the lee of the cruisers, and were to take advantage of any opportunity of torpedoing the enemy. Fire was to be concentrated amidships just above the water-line on the Vizcaya, Teresa, and OguEnDo. In the second order, which was to be employed if the Spaniards were in line abreast, there were to be two columns, as follows :— PORT. STARBOARD, Indiana New York Miantonomoh Puritan Detroit New Orleans Wilmington Machias Newport Montgomery Vicksburg Mayflower Wasp which were to pass through the second and third intervals from the left of the Spanish line, and then to turn outwards, doubling on the second and fourth ships in the Spanish line. In the third order of battle there were to be two columns 3000 yards apart :— PORT. Montgomery New Orleans} Detroit Cincinnati + Mayflower Division II. Division I. Division ITI. | STARBOARD. New Vork Indiana Miantonomoh Puritan Terror Amphitrite} Wilmington Machias Vicksburg Newport Wasp And the Spaniards, in line ahead, were to be caught between the two. 1 Joined on the 2 3rd or 24th. The distinctive feature is, that the 224 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May fast ships were separated, that cruisers and gunboats were placed in the line of battle and used to supplement the weakness of the monitors in secondary armament with their numerous small guns. The most powerful ships headed the line. Whether this coupling of weak, unprotected ships, such as the Wzlmzngton and Was, with heavy armour-clads might not have led to a wholly unnecessary sacrifice of life, had the Spanish squadron been encountered, should be considered. It should be remembered, however, that none of the Spanish ships were classed as battleships, and that only one of the four was much superior to the ordinary protected cruiser. The importance of stopping the Spaniards at all costs was impressed upon the American officers. From the 23rd to the 27th, Sampson’s fleet cruised steadily near the junction of the Nicolas, Bahama, and Santarem Channels, whilst the Admiral was in constant communication by despatch vessels with Washington. On the 28th news from Washington arrived that 30,000 troops would be sent to Cuba, and he was requested to be ready to send convoy. As always, the monitors by their low speed, wretched coal-supply, and general unseaworthiness gave trouble. ‘“ Movements,” Admiral Sampson telegraphed to Washington on the 25th, “are greatly hampered by monitors, constituting the principal force under my command. I cannot despatch armoured vessels until movements of Spanish squadron thoroughly known.” Cay Piedras, a small islet in the Nicolas Channel, was used by the American squadron as a secondary base for the purpose of coaling the small craft and giving the monitors shelter. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 225 In the Bahama Channel, on May 26, Sampson learnt from Schley’s letters that the Flying Squadron was not at Santiago, as had been intended, on the 23rd. He learnt, too, to his surprise and consternation, that no steps had seemingly been taken by Schley to “locate” the enemy. Indeed, Schley had committed the fault of ‘making pictures,” snatching at any shred of evidence to justify his conduct and want of enterprise. He sent off fresh and urgent orders to his subordinate “to proceed with all possible despatch to Santiago to block- ade that port,” and directed him not to leave it unless he received ‘“‘Zosztive information” that the Spaniards had flown. These orders were despatched by the Wasp on the 27th. On the previous day the scouts Yak, Minneapolis, and St. Paul had been directed by telegrams despatched to Mole St. Nicolas, to inform Schley that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago, in case he was not off that place. In the afternoon of the 27th, however, very alarming news came by Key West from Schley, dated May 24, to the effect that he had ascertained that the Spanish fleet was not in Cienfuegos, but that owing to shortness of coal he could not blockade Santiago. He wanted at least two more colliers, each equipped with hoisting engines, buckets and strong sacks. He would therefore proceed to St. Nicolas Mole and there coal his ships, especially the Zexas, which carried a very small supply of fuel. Sampson instantly despatched the New Orleans with yet more peremptory orders to blockade Santiago at all hazards, and in the last resort to close the harbour by sinking the collier Stex/zng in the entrance. He himself returned to Key West to Q 226 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May coal and get leave to go to Santiago. There he found the Oregon, which had reached Key West on the 26th, none the worse for her long voyage, and perfectly ready for sea. She was an invaluable reinforcement, worth the whole squadron of monitors. On the 28th fresh orders were issued to Schley to open communications with the shore at Santiago, and make certain that the Spaniards were inside. That same night, however, a telegram came from the Commodore, which caused consternation at Key West and Washington. It said Schley was coming to Key West to coal, and must have been sent from before Santiago on the 26th. It will not have escaped the reader that the inter- change of messages between Schley and Sampson would have been slow and difficult, but for the facilities afforded by neutral telegraph stations. The two most used were Port Antonio in Jamaica, 110 miles from Santiago, and Mole St. Nicolas in Hayti, 140 miles away. How far the persistent use of these centres of communication was an infraction of neutrality may be debated, although no objection seems to have been made by the authorities in Hayti,' and there is nothing in any of the proclamations of neutrality to prevent it. But it is a new condition, and may have to be regulated by new rules. On the other side Cervera had been allowed to use the telegraphs at Martinique and Curagao, and by this means had been able to communicate with Madrid and Havana. What had happened before Santiago was as follows. ‘In Jamaica the colonial authorities forbade the transmission of intelligence from the American ships to Washington, and also vetoed all cipher messages, according to the ew York Sun of June 18, 1898. May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 227 All the 26th the Flying Squadron had lain twenty miles out in the offing, the weather continuing stormy. At this distance nothing could be seen of Cervera’s ships. A consultation was held on board the Brooklyn, in which Captain Sigsbee told Schley that the S¢. Paud had captured a British collier, the Aestorme/, with coal for Cervera, and that her captain had told him his orders were to go to San Juan, then to Martinique if the Spaniards were not at San Juan, then to Santiago, and finally to Cienfuegos. This information pointed to the presence of the Spaniards in Santiago, without, how- ever, rendering it absolutely certain. It should be said that the Restorme/ had been captured on the 25th, “right in front of the port,” and that the Spanish squadron inside, though it had steam up, did not stir to give help. Captain Sigsbee stated in a telegram to Washington— and therefore also probably to Schley—his surprise at not being attacked by the Spanish destroyers if these were really inside Santiago. Schley’s difficulties had now been enhanced by the breakdown of the Merrimac’s engines. In conversation Captain Wise of the Yaée gave it as his positive opinion that the Spaniards were inside Santiago. This did not, however, convince Schley, who, to the general amazement of all, that evening signalled to the squadron: ‘“ Destination Key West as soon as collier is ready, 774 south side Cuba and Yucatan Channel ; speed nine knots,”* The S¢. Paw/ was directed 1 When this signal was being made it was taken at first for a joke. “ Vid S—— ” seemed to indicate ‘‘vé@ Santiago,” and it was only when ‘Fo, u, t, h,” etc. followed, that the ships learnt the blockade was to be abandoned. 228 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May to remain and watch the port. The Minneapolis had ‘only just sufficient coal left to get to Key West, and her machinery was in bad order, whilst the Ya/e’s supply was much reduced. At 9.15 p.m. the fleet started, when, fortunately for the United States, the collier Merrimac distinguished herself. Her intermediate cylinder valve had broken down, and could not be repaired at once. She was therefore ordered to be taken in tow by the Yate. Four times, however, the hawser parted, and only after twenty-four hours of effort was her chain cable got on board: the big cruiser. During this interval, early on the 27th, the Harvard came in from Mole St. Nicolas with a despatch from Washington, ordering the Flying Squadron to prevent the Spaniards leaving Santiago without a decisive action, and urging Schley to ascertain exactly what ships were in the harbour. For that purpose he was advised to send ashore and communicate with the insurgents. The Navy Depart- ment stated that coal was being sent to Mole St. Nicolas to replenish his ships. Commodore Schley appears to have given not the slightest attention to these orders. The Harvard's coal was running short, and he directed her to proceed to Jamaica and take on board sufficient fuel to reach the nearest American port. She left the squadron at noon of the 27th. At 3.40 p.m. Schley started westward once more, the Vaée towing the Merrimac. He was thus leaving Santiago and the Windward Passage in flat defiance of orders received both from Admiral Sampson and the Navy Department, and as there was now little or no doubt that the Spaniards were in May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 229 Santiago, was giving Admiral Cervera an excellent Opportunity of getting clear away to sea, when all the work of locating him might have to be begun afresh. His defence of his action was that his coal was low, and that the weather rendered coaling at sea impossible ; that Sampson was so placed as to be certain of bringing to action the enemy if the latter moved by the north coast of.Cuba to Havana, whilst he himself with the Flying Squadron could prevent any attempt to move by the south coast ; that the Merrimac and Mzinneapolts were in bad order. These excuses cannot justify the abandon- ment of his position in face of such peremptory and urgent commands as he had received, and betray a want of firmness and resolution such as we do not expect in a great seaman or soldier. The truth was that none of the powerful armoured ships had less than five days’ coal, and most of them had very much more, whilst there was a collier with the squadron.’ Soon after 7 p.m. the weather improved so that coaling at sea became possible, and the squadron stopped. The Zexas and Marblehead were sent alongside the 1 The facts are stated on page 3 of Executive Document C, Fifty- fifth Congress, third session : “During the twenty-four hours in which Commodore Schley signalled that his destination was Key West, and telegraphed the Department that he would be unable to remain at Santiago, there were still on board the Brooklyn between ten and twelve days’ coal-supply, being 940 tons for full steaming in squadron ; between eight and ten days’ supply, or 789 tons, on board the Massachusetts ; between five and six days’ supply, or 394 tons, on board the Zexas ; between three and four days’ supply, or t1o tons, on board the Maré/ehead ; between eight and ten days’ supply, or 762 tons, on board the Jowa, and 4300 tons on board the collier Merrimac, from which during the two following days his vessels were coaled. The Department had suggested the possibility of a near coaling 230 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May Merrimac to coal. The first-named was at work all night and until 11.50 a.m. of the 28th, when she had got 267 tons on board. The Marblehead finished at 10 am. The projecting sponsons of the Zexas gave great trouble when alongside the collier, and Commodore Schley notes the advantage of a tumble-home, from the freedom from accidents which it ensures when alongside another ship. At noon of the 28th the squadron turned and steamed slowly to Santiago, off which port it arrived in the evening. At 6 p.m. the blockade of Santiago was at last duly formed. The squadron lay eight miles off shore, with the W/arblehead closer in. The want of small vessels for picket work—he had only the Vizxen—at once impressed itself upon the Commodore, and he sent by the S¢. Pau/, which was now going with the VYaée to Key West, an appeal to Admiral Sampson for several to be despatched to him. The (/tuneapolis was sent off to the same destination during the 28th. On the 28th Schley announced both to his squadron and to the Navy Department and Sampson, his intention to remain off Santiago till the failure of his ships’ coal compelled his retirement. He would then proceed to the Hayti coast to refill his bunkers. In the meantime Sampson had received permission, on the 29th, to go with two ships to Santiago. He was recommended to seize Guantanamo as a coaling base. With the Mew base, but no effort was made to reach it, although Commodore Schley had sent the Zag/e to Port Antonio for coal. There was coal enough to return to Key West, and therefore to remain at Santiago until further supplies came. He could also have counted on the Department sending him a further coal-supply.” May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 231 York, Oregon, Mayflower, and Porter he proceeded east at thirteen knots about midday of the 30th. At the same time he learnt that the fast auxiliaries S¢. ZLouzs and Yankee were on their way to Santiago. On the 29th the Massachusetts went alongside the Merrimac, and during the day took 183 tons of coal on board. The V2xen also filled her bunkers. Meanwhile the rest of the squadron circled inshore, and at 7.40 a.m. a large cruiser, which was identified as the Coton, a second of the Vizcaya class, and two destroyers were seen in the harbour mouth ; later in the day the tops of a third cruiser were made out. Thus it was now practically certain that all Cervera’s serviceable vessels were in the harbour, for the fourth cruiser, though not as yet seen, was not likely to have been detached. The Coton opened fire at a range of 15,000 yards, and of course hit nothing. A council of war was held on board the flagship, in which Schley expressed his intention, in case the Spaniards came out, of concentrating the fire of all his ships upon the Spanish vessels as one by one they came down the channel. In this way terminated a most instructive series of incidents, showing, in these days of long-range guns which prevent close reconnaissance, the extreme difficulty of determining whether and in what strength the enemy is inside a port. Schley’s mistake all through was to reason that the Spaniards would do what was obviously expedient. He knew that if they went to Santiago they would be isolated and must eventually be destroyed, and therefore he could not believe that they would go there. On the 3oth the weather was fine and coaling was 232 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May possible. The /owa went alongside the Merrimac, and began coaling at 7.45 a.m. By 6 p.m. she had taken on board 357 tons—a very fair average. The Mew Orleans arrived in the afternoon with the collier Ster/img. In the evening the Vzxen sighted a supposed torpedo boat close in shore, and shots were fired at it, but it proved to be a train on the railway from Santiago to Juragua. On the 31st the Brooklyn and Marblehead coaled from the Merrimac, and the Texas from the Ster/ing. During the morning Schley shifted his flag to the Wassachusetts, his own ship, the Brooklyn, being unavailable, and at 11.10 signalled that the Massachusetts, Iowa, and New Orleans would go in after dinner to 7000 yards, fire on the Coton with the heavier guns, and reconnoitre the works ashore, which the Yaée had reported to be very strong. At 12.45 p.m. the signal “clear for action” was made ; at 1.5 ‘general quarters,” and at ten knots the three moved in. At 2 p.m. the Americans opened, using the heavy guns on the Coton, the lighter ones on the fortifications. The fire was at once returned by the Coton’s 6-inch port guns and the forts. After ten minutes’ action, during which the Mew Orleans’ guns with smokeless powder made very fine shooting, the Americans drew off, but the Coton’s 47-inch guns and the batteries continued to fire till 3 p.m., the Coton alone expending seventy-six 6-inch and 4°7-inch projectiles. No damage was inflicted upon the American ships—as was only to be expected, con- sidering the long range and the feeble weapons mounted ashore. Many of the American shells fell near the Spanish ships in the harbour and round the Coron, but here also no damage was done. One projectile struck a May] THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 233 Spanish magazine on Ratones Cay, and, fortunately for the Spaniards, failed to explode. The Morro was hit and a portion of a staircase shot away, but the injuries to the works were insignificant, and there was no loss of life. The necessity of close reconnaissance and the utter futility of firing a few shots at long range to locate and determine the precise strength of works ashore, are shown by the incorrect conclusions which Commodore Schley deduced from his skirmish. ‘ The fortifications,” he wrote, “are well provided with long-range guns of large calibre. They used smokeless powder almost exclusively, with the exception of the batteries to the westward of the entrance.” In both facts he was mistaken; possibly the masked howitzer battery on Punta Gorda, the smoke of which might not have been seen, led him to suppose that numerous heavy guns were firing at him with smokeless powder. It was on this day that he received despatches from the Navy Department to the following effect :—‘‘ The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively ‘whether the Spanish division is in Santiago de Cuba harbour, as, if so, immediate movement against it and the town will be made by the Navy and division of about 10,000 men of the American troops, which are ready to embark. You must surmount difficulty regarding coaling by your ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, and the Department relies upon you to give information quickly as to the presence of Cervera, to be ready for concentrated action with the army. Two colliers have been ordered to Mole, Hayti. Your vessels 234 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [June may coal there singly, or in Gonaives, Hayti Channel, or leeward of Cape Cruz, Cuba... . It is your duty to ascertain immediately the Spanish fleet, if they be at Santiago, and report. Would be discreditable to the Navy if that fact were not ascertained immediately.” On June 1 the Spaniards constructed a boom across the direct channel up the harbour past Cay Smith, leaving open only the circuitous channel which runs round the island. They also sank two lighters laden with stone lower down the channel to narrow it. At 6 a.m. of this day Sampson arrived and took command. The town of Santiago, which at this time counted about 30,000 inhabitants, lies at the northern end of the land-locked harbour, one of the finest and safest in the West Indies. The distance from the city to the harbour mouth is just about four miles. The mouth is narrow with high ground on either side: to the east rises Punta Morillo, on which is the Morro Castle, 200 feet above sea level, an old masonry structure; to the west is Socapa Point, of about the same elevation. The cliffs fall precipitously on their seaward face, and just under the Morro are great caverns. Just opposite the Morro the width of the channel is 300 yards, but the rocks of the Diamante Bank, extending 180 yards out from Socapa, reduce the fair-way to 120 yards. To the north-west of the Morro, and just opposite Estrella Cove, a small sheltered inlet with shallow water, the passage further contracts, and is at its narrowest one hundred yards. After this it widens out a little till, opposite Smith Cay, a small rocky island rising to a good height above the water, it divides, one channel making a sharp bend and To face THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 235 passing to the south and west of the Cay, whilst the other proceeds by the east and north, leaving two other sheltered inlets, Gaspar and Nispero, on the right. These inlets have deep water. Above Smith Cay the harbour opens out and navigation is easy, leaving on the right Punta Gorda bank, and on the left Colorado shoal. Here there is another turn in the harbour, and the anchorage, to the south of which lies the low islet of Ratones Cay, is reached. The bottom in the anchorage is muddy. The north of the harbour is shallow, and no vessel drawing over fourteen feet can go alongside the two piers by the town, which are built of wood. A little to the south of the town is the Las Cruces pier of iron, in about twenty-eight feet of water. To this runs the narrow-gauge railway from Juragua and Aguadores. There is also a pipe conveying fresh water down from the mountains to the pier. On the opposite side of the harbour a disused railway comes down from the Cobre mines to the water's edge. The difficulty of entering the harbour, through what Tom Cringle’s Log describes as a “ zigzag chasm in the rock, very narrow, inlaid at the bottom with polished blue steel,” is great for a ship of any size, and warping and the help of tugs are generally necessary. The twists and turns, of course, with such a narrow fair-way, render it absolutely impossible for two vessels to be navigated abreast. One ship sunk well in the middle of the channel at its narrowest point, even though not placed athwart the course, would debar entrance. It was this fact which at once made it extremely hard for a squadron 236 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN inside to escape, and for a squadron outside to force an entrance. When the war began Santiago was an open town, surrounded only on the land side by wire entanglements to keep the insurgents at a respectful distance. The only works of defence were the Morro, absolutely worth- less from a military point of view; Sta. Catalina battery commanding the narrowest portion of the entrance, but in - ruins; and the Blanca battery near the town, containing old smooth-bores, used for saluting. In the town were about 9000 troops and volunteers under Generals Linares and Vara del Rey. The country round had been hope- lessly ravaged by the insurgents, so that the place was entirely dependent upon the sea for supplies; it had no communication with the interior, the only railway in that direction stopping short at San Luis, twenty-one miles off, and sending out a branch six miles long to Songo. Mountains on all sides render communications very difficult. During April two rows of mines, of the electro- contact type, were placed in the channel, the first of seven between Estrella and Socapa Points, the second of six, a little higher up. On Punta Gorda, which rises high above the water, an earthwork was erected looking down the entrance, and in it were mounted two 6-inch howitzers, breech-loading, and two 3°5-inch Krupp guns. In a small work at Estrella Cove were mounted two old muzzle-loading 8:3-inch rifled howitzers, two 3°2-inch short breech-loaders, and two old 4°7-inch rifled bronze muzzle-loaders. During May two 6°3-inch breech-load- ing Hontoria guns of good and modern pattern, from the THE CUBAN BLOCKADE 237 MERCEDES, were mounted in a work on the crest of the Socapa, and during the third week of June three 8°3-inch muzzle-loading howitzers were also placed in position there. During April the Morro received two 6°3-inch muzzle-loaders, during May three more, and during June two 8°3-inch muzzle-loading howitzers. On June 2 a 6°3-inch breech-loader from the MERcEDES was mounted at Punta Gorda, and on the 17th a second. Under the Socapa heights, and overlooking the mine-field, were placed one 6-pounder, four 3-pounders, and one 1-pounder quick-firing gun. The total artillery strength of the defences at their strongest was then as follows :— 2 4 A a ee ae Pee: a wt a . . . ot 2s By 8M Ei 84 24 85 23 36 3 + ome AA 4 SS #8 ae a a 3 = © oO ) ~~ 7 to) © ” _ a 1. Morro. . . 2 5 - - -—- -—- —- —- —- — F 2. Socapa, Upper 3 — 2 — ~—~ — ~—~ ~—~ ~—~ — 5 3. Socapa, Lower — — — — ~— —~— — 1 4 I 6 4. Estrella 2 — oy 2 — 2 a Bes Cees GS 5. PuntaGorda. — _— 2 2 — 2 eee Ate ee te OG 5. 4 2 I 4 I 30 w Of these there were . 5 3 e a - “ : i gee in place on June 6 Of these batteries only the guns in the first two would bear upon a fleet outside in most positions. Not only were the guns few in number and weak in power ; they were also for the most part of antiquated pattern, con- verted smooth-bores, and, being muzzle-loaders, could only be fired at considerable intervals. Even the MErcr- DES’ 6°3-inch guns could not be expected at 2000 yards, and under the conditions of actual service, to pierce the thin armour on the American ships. Their shell weighed 238 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN 112 lbs.; the shell of the 8°3-inch howitzer about 250 lbs.; of the old 6°3-inch muzzle-loaders 80 lbs. In the harbour were the Mercepbes, which still retained her two 6°3-inch bow guns; the gunboat ALvarapo, little larger than a small torpedo boat, and armed only with one 6-pounder and one 1-pounder.; and three or four tugs and steamers. Two and three-quarter miles east of the Morro, and four miles in a direct line from the heart of the city, were the bay of Aguadores and mouth of the San Juan river, which is hereabouts crossed by the Juragua and Santiago railway on a high bridge. The bay offers a good landing- place for boats. Five and a quarter miles from the Morro is the roadstead of Sardinero, and six miles again from here the bay of Siboney, where is a good but exposed beach for landing ; two miles from Siboney is the Juragua beach, and five miles from Siboney, or just over sixteen east from the Morro, is Daiquiri Bay, with a stone jetty and an iron pier used for shipping ore from the mines. Two miles or more west of the Morro is the bay of Cabajias, which will only admit small vessels, but is yet very safe, affording secure landing-places. Further to the west the bay of Guicabon has landing-places which can be used by boats, and beyond that again, about eighteen miles from the Morro, is the small harbour of Aserraderos. CHAPTER VI CERVERA AT SANTIAGO AT 5.50 a.m. of May 19, the look-outs in the Morro at the entrance to Santiago harbour signalled the approach of five steamers from the south ; a few minutes later the new-comers were seen to be warships, and Spanish warships! They were the Inranta Maria TERESA, Vizcays, OQUENDO, and CrisrospaL Coton, with the destroyer PLuton. They anchored about 7.30, with the exception of the PLuton, which ran out, and in about an hour returned with the Furor. The morning was a superb one, still, clear, and intensely hot, and the advent of the long-looked-for, eagerly-desired squadron caused transports of enthusiasm amongst the Spanish sympathizers. It was taken to be only the vanguard of the invincible fleet which Spain was to despatch against the Yankees. For the worst of the pessimists had expected eight large cruisers, and at least a dozen torpedo craft. Yet here were only six ships great and small! Nor were the people of Santiago alone under illusions. Cervera had expected to find at Santiago a 1 Miiller, 27—96. Consul Ramsden. Telegrams interchanged between General Blanco and Cervera, in ew York Journal. 239 240 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [July secure fortified harbour, well-provisioned, and stocked with coal and stores for his ships. He found a harbour defended by only four modern guns, of small calibre, almost destitute of coal, without stores, without provisions, without funds ; its weak garrison harassed by the insurgents, with pay ten months in arrear. He discovered that his arrival, with empty bread-rooms and half-empty magazines, far from contributing to the salvation of Cuba, was nothing more nor less than a danger to this unhappy port. It meant 2000 more mouths to feed at a time when, as a Spanish witness in Santiago writes, ‘everything was wanting: food, prospects, money; our credit and financial resources -were exhausted.” General Linares, in command of Santiago, followed up Cervera’s telegram announcing his arrival to General Blanco, the Captain-General of Cuba at Havana, by a message which seems even at this early date to forbode disaster. ‘‘Cervera’s squadron arrived here this morn- ing... . The TERRoR remained in Martinique repairing the damage sustained on the voyage. The ALICANTE is with the Terror. Both need coal and provisions. Owing to the increase in consumption caused by the arrival of the squadron the provisions of this place will only hold out to the end of June.” Next day he emphasized this discouraging missive with the news that this poor squadron, weak in numbers and wretchedly equipped, was Spain’s all; that the PELayo and Cartos V were quite unavailable. It was evident to him that the position of the squadron was more than perilous. It could not fight, and the best it could hope for was to To face p. 240. ADMIRAT. CERVERA. May] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 241 get away. “If it remains here long enough it will be blockaded, and thus completely shut off from com- munication with the world, and compelled to fall back on the feeble resources of this place... . I have furnished to the squadron 2400 tons of coal—6oo from the San Luis Railway Company, and 1800’ tons from the Juragua and Daiquiri mines.” Besides this there was some quantity of Cardiff coal at the Navy Depot. Every motive dictated the coaling and re-provision- ing of the squadron with the most imperious haste. With each hour Cervera’s chance of escape lessened. But provisions we have seen were scarce; water could only be obtained by tricklets and with difficulty, at an exorbitant price; coal there was little on the spot—it had to be fetched from a distance, and the appliances for placing it on board were wanting. The stowage (extreme) of the four cruisers would reach 5000 tons, of the two destroyers, perhaps 220 tons. In the harbour were but one tug—the Coton—and only three small steamers, ALcyon, JuraGua, and Esmeratpa. The Coton was under repair, and could not be ready before the 26th; launches and lighters were few, and for the most part in very bad condition. The ships do not appear to have been supplied with Temperley transporters, or with sacks and baskets for handling coal. In the emergency the poverty-stricken Spaniards could buy or procure only a very few baskets in the town. Labour was scarce, for the troops, in expectation of an almost immediate attack, were busy strengthening the land defences. And thus it came about that though the 1 Miller, p. 10, says only 600 tons. * Miiller, pp. 8, 9. R 242 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN May] squadron was coaling, on and off, in a half-hearted, desultory fashion for nearly six weeks, its bunkers were not filled when the final and terrible catastrophe arrived. It was thus locked up in the harbour through the very time when; had there been proper organization and preparation, had there, perhaps, been Anglo-Saxon energy ashore and afloat, the door of escape might have been open.’ Cervera was doomed to watch, in impotent agony, the jaws of the vice slowly closing on his unhappy fleet. On the 2oth Blanco telegraphed a long string of complaints—but too fully justified—to Madrid :—-“ The squadron comes without provisions and coal... . If it had brought the Peravo and Cartos V and a torpedo flotilla it might have effected something of moment, and contributed powerfully to the defence of the island. Reduced as it is [he did not as yet know the whole appalling truth] it will be obliged to avoid battle as far as possible, limiting itself to manceuvres which .. . can- not produce great results. . . . The question of pro- visions threatens to be very serious, as hardly enough food remains for one month. The efforts which I have been making to get supplies have so far been unsuccess- ful. . . . I consider it indispensable that the squadron should be reinforced as much as possible, and that the destroyers should be sent here to increase our strength. I am assured on good authority that the enemy plans an invasion with 28,000 men next week.” This latter statement was well founded; for though the available 1 Admiral Sampson calculated that Cervera would need five days to coal. (Goode, 112.) May] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 243 American force was not so great as Blanco supposed, Washington was at this very time talking of sending 30,000 men to Cuba. The next two or three days came warning to Cervera of forces moving to crush him. Through the Spanish secret service at Montreal, on May 21, arrived the news that Schley’s squadron of “four monitors and a coast defence vessel ” (szc) had sailed for the south of Cuba; on the 22nd Blanco wired that the Jowa, Brooklyn, and five other ships were off Cienfuegos, and that a British collier from Curagao was heading for Santiago ; on the 23rd that the /xdiana, New York, Montgomery, Dolphin, Wilmington, and three other American cruisers had left the blockade of Havana, and that the Czucinnatz and Vesuvius were patrolling the Yucatan Passage. Already on the 21st two American scouts had been observed off Santiago—these must have been the Sv. Paul and Minneapolis; on the 22nd they were again sighted, far off, going slowly, and hovering round the port; on the 23rd there was an addition to these sentinels in the Yade, and later in the day a fourth big steamer (the Harvard) joined the watch. The toils were indeed closing rapidly. So great was Cervera’s uneasiness that he determined to put to sea, with or without coal, early on the 24th, and to abandon Cuba. The night of the 23rd-24th pilots were directed to go on board, the Ardois lights on all the ships twinkled with signals, and observers ashore noted that steam was being raised. Day came; there were still two scouts waiting and watching outside, but the weather was rainy and the sky overcast, so that they 244 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May quickly vanished from the sight of the Morro. The opportunity was favourable for escape, and the PLuton was sent out to prospect, whilst Cervera held a council of war. As usual the council decided against action. The squadron was to wait till the Americans made a move on Puerto Rico; then to dash out for Curacao. Opinion was against running the blockade into Cien- fuegos. The childishness of the idea that the American expedition, which Blanco and Cervera knew to be pre- paring, would be directed towards the purely secondary object of capturing San Juan, not to the primary object, the capture and destruction of the Spanish squadron, does not need to be exposed. The American movements plainly indicated an imminent attack on Santiago. The Piurton returned in the evening; she had seen four hostile ships, which had chased her but without success, and then disappeared to the west. At 5.30 p.m., however, the ceaseless, vigilant watch had been resumed, and two cruisers showed to the south and west. Blanco was evidently disappointed to learn on this same day that, after all, the fleet had not gone out. “If it had gone,” he wired to General Linares, “to Cien- fuegos, it might certainly have entered that port without incident. . . . It is to be hoped that the ingenuity and valour of the Admiral and other chiefs will enable a departure to be effected with success.” He reports the Oregon’s arrival at Key West—a fresh and redoubtable enemy to be reckoned with—and the news that Schley and Sampson are both moving on Santiago. This, we know, was premature. He concludes with “Report to te DY RECEIy=5 Ve May] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 245 Cervera that he may take steps to prevent himself from being shut up in the harbour.” Already people in Santiago—as everywhere through- out the world—were beginning to ask why Cervera did not go out, why he waited in the trap inactive. The goings and comings of the American scouts outside the harbour were equally puzzling to the Spaniards. It was not understood that these ships had as yet to watch the whole Windward Passage, and to keep touch with the cable stations at Port Antonio and Mole St. Nicolas. Next day there was further cause for astonishment. At dawn two steamers were sighted, and it was soon realized that one was chasing the other—which was the collier Restorme/, But Cervera made no move. The CRISTOBAL CoLon went down towards the entrance, and all expected a fight. To the general stupefaction, she merely anchored across the mouth of Caspar Bay, and waited, though the Restorme/ could be seen with volumes of smoke pouring from her funnel, rushing desperately for the harbour. Whilst still some distance away the merchantman was overhauled and captured : a little later she vanished with her captor towards the south. No condemnation for the apathy or positive cowardice which allowed such an incident to take place can be too strong. The Coton had ample coal to run out and save the collier ; her mere appearance must have driven off the Sz. Paul. With the Restorme/ a large quantity of excellent coal and some coaling appliances would have been at Cervera’s disposal. He was to have yet more opportunities of escape, but of what use is the gods’ help to those who will not help themselves ? On this day meat in Santiago 246 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [May rose to 2s. 6d. a pound. The Coton remained south of Punta Gorda with her battery raking the entrance, whilst the Vizcaya anchored south of Ratones Cay to support her. The destroyers were placed in Nispero Inlet. On the 26th the weather was thick and rainy, so that the arrival of Schley’s squadron off the port—distant from which it remained twenty miles—was not observed. It was known, however, that Schley had on the 25th been missing from Cienfuegos. During the day three American scouts were seen. On the 27th the fact that the port was at last definitely blockaded was ascertained. Far away eleven ships could be made out, lying motion- less on the water. There were the two towering funnels of the Jowa,; the three of the Brooklyn ; the two lower funnels of a ship of the /zdzana class; a one-funnelled battleship, and seven cruisers of all sorts and sizes. The trap had closed. And now came strenuous warning from Blanco that the Americans contemplated “ corking up” the passage with hulks, which were to be taken in and sunk in the channel. The imminent departure of an expedition from Key West was also announced. Cervera’s last chance had come. On May 28 but one ship was seen patrolling the coast outside the harbour, and at noon she vanished swiftly to the south. The way was clear for a determined dash; it was broad daylight, and no Schley was in sight. But now the pilots professed that they could not take the squadron out. If Cervera ever thought of vigorous action he may have been deterred by their talk of the heavy swell, and the risk of grounding, though at the shallowest point there were May] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 247 thirty-three feet, and though the Coton’s maximum draught with far more coal than in all probability she now carried stood on her trial at twenty-four and a half feet. But the Nelson spirit had been needed at Copen- hagen to rise above the timid advice of the pilots; it was wanting at Santiago. As the evening came on the watchers reappeared though far away ; with nightfall, as no lights were shown, they vanished in the darkness, but were still off the port. Early next morning the PLuron and Furor went out to reconnoitre. They returned in the course of the morning, and soon after the enemy came within nine miles of the Morro, drawing the Coton’s fire. At night they did not withdraw, and the beams of their search-lights played up the entrance and flickered over the hills. On the 30th the Americans were still there; on the 31st the roar of guns told the inhabitants of Santiago that active operations had began. Shells fell right and left in the bay, but this foretaste of what was to come passed off harmlessly. On June 1 in the morning gunshots were heard: they were the salute which marked at once the arrival of Admiral Sampson, and the beginning of a more strenuous invest- ment. The blockading force now consisted of the Vew York, Oregon, Iowa, Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, New Orleans, Marblehead, Harvard, Vixen, Mayflower, and Porter, with the colliers Merrimac and Sterling. As far back as May 27 the idea of blocking the entrance to Santiago harbour had occurred to Admiral Sampson, and instructions had been sent by him to Schley to sink the collier Ster/img in the narrowest part of the channel when she arrived. On May 29 Sampson 248 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [June directed Lieutenant Hobson to study the details of such a plan, which were submitted and approved on the 3oth. ‘ Surprise under any condition,” said Lieutenant Hobson, ‘‘would only be partial at best, since a certain amount of light was necessary” for the navigation of the channel. It was decided that the ship to be sunk should be taken in on a flood tide just before the moon set, and that the sinking should be effected by ten mines, each containing 78 lbs. of powder, and placed on the outside of the ship. The mines were to be exploded by electric primers. Lieutenant Hobson wished also to be allowed to place two torpedo war-heads abreast of the two most important bulkheads, but this was not permitted by the Admiral, out of regard for the safety of Lieutenant Hobson and his men. After the arrival of the Mew York the harbour entrance was carefully reconnoitred by Hobson in her launch. During the afternoon the flagship’s starboard watch and detachments from the Brooklyn and other ships set to work to strip the collier Merrimac for the work. Her great length, 350 feet, and her untrustworthy machinery made her particularly suitable. She had a good deal of coal on board, which could not be quickly disposed of, and which was therefore left in her holds. Batteries were collected from ail the ships to work the electric primers. Volunteers were called for, and so many officers and men responded that the utmost difficulty was experienced in making the necessary choice. But owing to the haste and confusion the Merrimac was not pre- pared as Hobson had intended. The port bower anchor, which should have been taken aft and slung over the S June] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 249 starboard side by lashings, so that a man with an axe could cut it loose on a signal, could not be handled ; a stream anchor was, however, got aft and lashed to another already slung there, to give holding power. Trouble was experienced in getting the chain cable aft, and in fixing the torpedoes outside the ship; whilst the batteries placed on board were only powerful enough to fire six of the ten. Through various delays the ship was not ready to start on her perilous mission till 4 a.m. of the 2nd. Her crew consisted of Hobson, in com- mand, Assistant-Engineer Crank, Mullen, boatswain of the New York, and six petty officers and seamen selected from the ships. The spirit of the fleet was such that after their exchange, these men thanked the Admiral for allowing them to go. Just as the Merrzmac started the flagship signalled the recall. During the 2nd Hobson, anxious, after his inspection of the entrance, to have good light when going in, solicited permission to take the Merrimac in at sunset, but this plan the Admiral considered too dangerous. A second request for two war-heads of torpedoes was also refused. Fresh batteries were, however, sent on board the Merrimac, so that the other four mines could be connected up and fired. It was found, unfortunately, that something was wrong with the connection of three mines, so that only seven could be relied upon. Ai life-boat and cata- maran were slung over the side; and Mullen, who was worn out with hard work, was replaced by a petty officer from the /owa. The final arrangements were as follows. At a signal the forward anchor was to be cut away. Special prepar- 250 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN (June ations were made to bring the ship up quickly without the cables parting. For this purpose eight stops of rope were put on the cable, between fathoms forty and sixty, and attached to a long hawser, the elasticity of which would be brought into play. The stern anchors were to be let go just after the bow anchor; the cable would be checked by tearing down the bulwarks and hatch coamings, finally bringing up against the mainmast. Signals were given by the pull of a cord from the bridge; the man at the forward anchor was to cut it away and fire torpedo No. 1; another man was to fire Nos. 2 and 3; the quarter- master was to put the helm hard a-port and fire No. 4; another man took charge of No. 5; two men, the one in the engine and the other in the boiler room, were to stop the engines, open the sea connections, and fire torpedoes Nos.6 and 7. The New York's steam launch, under Ensign Powell, was to stand in towards the entrance and wait just outside for the MZerrimac’s boat, near the caves below the Morro. At the last moment, most reluctantly, in obedience to orders, Engineer Crank left the ship. The men stripped to their drawers, put on life-belts and revolvers, and went to their stations. The night was dark, but there was a bright moon, and as the Merrimac headed in at nine knots about 3.30 a.m. of the 3rd, the shore works came into view. The ship must have been plainly visible, but no shot was fired till she was within 4oo yards of the entrance. She entered the channel under a sputtering fire, and made out a picket- boat lying in shadow, and firing rapidly at very close range at her rudder. As she neared the quick-firing June] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 251 guns in the lower Socapa battery, these opened upon her with a tremendous crash. Just abreast of the Morro the engines were stopped ; an instant later the steering-gear was shot away, when only two ships’ lengths from the desired point, by a large projectile which burst in the stern, destroying the connection of one of the torpedoes, and cutting and bruising one of the crew. The bow anchor was promptly dropped ; the first torpedo exploded ; but Nos. 2, 3, and 4 refused to act. No. 5 went off; Nos. 6 and 7 failed. A hail of projectiles from the Socapa swept the ship at the very closest range. At this instant three of the mines in the channel were exploded. Pro- bably one of the three exploded just under the Merrimac, as off Soldados Point she filled rapidly and sank. An instant later the MeRcepEs and Puiuton fired four tor- pedoes at her, which probably missed. Two torpedoes drifted out to sea with the tide and were recovered by the Americans, and one of these was actually found to have its dummy head on. The J/errimac sank almost across the channel ; the tide, however, moved the hull from the athwart position, so that she finally rested on the bottom, lying across the Nispero inlet, with the channel round the south side of Smith Cay still clear. As the Merrimac went down her gallant men were swept in all directions by the violent suction. They had, all but one, escaped injury under the heavy fire concen- trated upon them by the Spanish batteries—which could only, it must be remembered, bring guns of sniall calibre to bear. It is stated by Lieutenant Hobson that the fire of the Merceprs across the channel killed 14 and wounded 37 Spaniards in the Morro. Thereis, however, 252 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [June no notice of this in Consul Ramsden’s diary, or in Lieutenant Miiller’s account of the blockade. Probably Lieutenant Hobson was misinformed. The only American wounded was merely bruised by a shell. All, however, were much knocked about in the violent swirl of the water, carrying round with it casks and tins and spars. The catamaran floated on the surface, and to it the seven clung, with only their heads above the surface, whilst the Spanish boats sped to the spot, searched for survivors, and found none. With daylight an armed launch came down to reconnoitre; in it was Admiral Cervera himself, and to him Hobson and his companions surrendered. They were treated with the extremest kind- ness, conveyed to the Mercenzs, clothed and fed. They found that the Spaniards were under the impression that they had sunk the Vew Yoré, the flashes of their own exploding shells on board her being taken for the flashes of her guns, whilst several of the crew professed to have made out two turrets fore and aft with heavy guns. Even when it was known that the Merrimac and not the ew York had been sunk, the Spaniards could not understand why 2000 tons of coal had been left in the collier, and sent to the bottom. With the truest kindness and courtesy, Cervera sent out a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson to inform the Americans that the Merrimac’ s crew was safe. As for Ensign Powell, with the Mew York's launch, he waited near the harbour mouth till daybreak. He was seen by the Spaniards ashore, and was at first taken for a friend, but afterwards a heavy fire was opened upon his boat. He held his ground bravely, and did not June] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 283 relinquish his fruitless but gallant watch till the approach of daylight, and the certainty that his little vessel would be clearly visible to the hostile gunners compelled retreat. As he came back to the flagship, his launch was scru- tinized by every glass in the fleet. It was seen that it was empty, and a deep hush fell upon the Mew York. In silence absolute and complete Powell made his report—‘ No one came back, sir.” During the 1st the Spanish, ships had shifted their position. The Coton and Oguenpo anchored just above Ratones Cay, the TEresa and Vizcaya off Punta Gorda. On the night of the 3rd the alarm of a torpedo boat was given in the American fleet, and the auxiliary cruiser Yankee, which had arrived during the day, and the New Orleans opened fire. The torpedo boat, however, proved to be only a mass of seaweed. The scene, looking out to sea, on the 4th is thus painted by Lieutenant Miiller, a Spanish officer in Santiago :— “The evening was most beautiful; the sea was as smooth as alake ; there was hardly any wind, and the sky was perfectly clear. At a distance of about five miles seventeen ships could be seen, among them seven battle- ships and one torpedo boat. The other nine were mer- chant ships, the nearest about six miles from the harbour. They formed a large arc, one extremity of which was at Aguadores and the other at Punta Cabrera. The largest and most powerful ships were in the centre . . . All had their engines stopped, and their bows in different direc- tions according to the current. From time to time one 254 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [June of them would move a short distance forward, and then return again to her place.” Warning that a bombardment was proposed had already been given from Havana, so that this armada rode in the evening sun with the menace of death and destruction to the unhappy town and the Spanish squadron. On June 5 Admiral Sampson issued orders to pre- pare for a bombardment of the forts on the 6th. The ships were to steam in in two divisions, the first led by Sampson, circling east when inside 3000 yards range, the second led by Schley circling west. The Dohin on the east and the Suwanee and Vixen on the west were to search the coast for Spanish positions with their fire. The gunners were instructed not to aim at the Morro, in which Hobson and his fellow-prisoners were confined. Early on June 6 smoke rose from the funnels of the blockading fleet, denoting immediate action. About 7.40 its ships formed in two squadrons and advanced towards the harbour mouth. On the east were the Vew York, Iowa, Oregon, Yankee (auxiliary cruiser manned by Naval Militia), and Do/phzn ; on the west the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Vixen and Suwanee (armed yachts). They came slowly in, gleaming grey with their war paint; the batteries, which had been reinforced during the night with 120 men, waited with their feeble guns to repulse the attack. There were only three weapons, of 6°3 inches calibre, mounted in the Santiago harbour defences which could be at all trusted, and which could bear on the assailants. Against these were now in line eight 13- inch, six 12-inch, thirty-eight 8-inch, twenty-four 6-inch, June] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 255 twelve 5-inch, twenty 4-inch, and innumerable smaller guns. Most of the ships advancing were protected on their heavy guns and vitals by armour, which the Spaniards could not hope to penetrate, whilst the batteries were of the rudest and simplest construction. The Spaniards, moreover, had little ammunition; the Americans, with storeships close at hand, an unlimited supply. And the bravery, the devotion, the resolution of the little band of men standing ready to work the guns in the shore works are the more conspicuous and admirable, because many of them had for days been ill fed, and because all knew that surgical stores and the appliances which relieve the misery of the wounded were failing, or had already failed. To support the forts there were the Spanish ships. The old unarmoured cruiser Retna MeERcEDEs lay be- tween Smith Cay and Socapa; one destroyer was close to her, and another in Nispero Bay; the TEREsa and Vizcaya were ready to rake the entrance. The CoLon and OQquENDo, north of Ratones Cay, formed the second line of defence. At 8 a.m. the Americans opened, ship after ship firing as the first squadron circled eastwards and the second west- wards. ‘The fire,” says Lieutenant Miiller, ‘‘was so intense, and the shots followed each other in such quick succession, that it resembled a musketry fusillade, if the mighty thunder of the cannon could be compared with the crackle of small arms.” The big American shells came through the air with the peculiar sound like the rumbling of a train on a distant railway bridge, and fell steadily in the bay amongst the ships, throwing up sheets of 256 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [June water and foam. “During the first moments,” says Lieutenant Miiller, “the fire was so intense that it resembled one prolonged thunder. In fact, I had no idea that any firing could be so terrific as that of these ten ships. Much has been said of the bombardments of Sevastopol and Alexandria, but I do not believe that they could have been as terrible as the bombardment we suffered that sixth day of June—a day which the inhabitants of Santiago will never forget.” The Spanish batteries at first replied bravely, but in the storm of projectiles, and short of ammunition for their short-range guns, soon slackened their fire. The Spanish gunners fell back from their guns to pits in the rear, running out and firing only when the bombardment slackened. “This,” says Lieutenant Hobson, who watched the Socapa upper battery in action from his cell in the Morro, “occurred over and over; and then I realized, even more than at the bombardment of San Juan, that ships cannot destroy shore batteries without coming within machine-gun range. It is necessary actually to strike the gun itself in order to put it out of action. I saw some of our shells literally bury guns with dirt and yet do virtually no injury. Our marksmanship was excellent, splendid line shots that tore up the earth and shrubs along the whole front of the battery, but I did not see a single gun disabled, and every time we slackened the Spaniards would come out and fire away.” Socapa’s guns ceased after expending forty-seven rounds; Punta Gorda, which was out of the action most of the time, discharged but seven ; what the Morro fired is unknown. Not a single Spanish gun was hit or disabled, and the June] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 257 damage done to the works was small, though round the Morro the earth was covered with shell fragments. The houses on Smith Cay were almost all injured, and many of the inhabitants there had narrow escapes. The loss in the forts, however, does not appear to have exceeded 3 killed and 51 wounded, among the latter being Colonel Ordofiez. The Spanish cruisers suffered more severely, the Remva Merceves being the apparent target of an indirect, high-angle fire. Several projectiles struck her hull or rigging, and she was twice set on fire.t Whilst fighting the flames in her forecastle, Commander Acosta y Eyerman was horribly mutilated by a large shell, which tore off his right hip and right arm. Yet though thus mortally wounded he would not leave his post, but kept to it whilst the fire was being got under, giving orders calmly to the last. Five seamen in the ship were killed and 14 officers and men wounded, 3 dangerously. About the Vizcaya and the Teresa the American shells fell constantly, but did no damage. As the day was still, and the continuous concussion of the guns quickly brought down the rain, the smoke hung in dense yellow clouds about the American ships, render- ing it difficult for them to hit or tobe hit. The shooting on their part was for this reason indifferent. As the morning advanced the Mew Oréeans, with new pattern quick-firers and smokeless powder, and the Marblehead, joined in the attack, which at times was pressed within 2000 yards of the coast. Admiral Sampson’s fleet received only the most insignificant injuries. In the 1 In all, during the blockade and bombardments she was struck thirty-five times. s 258 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [June Suwanee a man was wounded; the Wassachusetts’ mili- tary mast was hit on the starboard futtock bar, probably by a projectile from one of the Spanish howitzers, and some damage was done to the other ships by their own guns. The moral effect of this tremendous bombardment, in which from 15001 to 8000 projectiles are said to have been fired, was excellent upon the Spaniards. Their few feeble and old guns and improvised works had faced a battering such as might have been expected to put them completely out of action. In expending his ammunition Admiral Sampson had had two objects—in the first place to injure the shore works sufficiently to enable his ships to lie close in at night; in the second place, to give his gunners target practice and fire discipline under the _enemy’s guns. The shortest range indicated during the action was 1900 yards in the case of the Vew York. He was under the impression at the time. that he had com- pletely silenced the Spanish guns, whilst the Spaniards were under the impression that they had driven off his fleet and inflicted severe injury upon it. Both were wrong, but the mistake of each was natural and intelligible: On the civilian population of Santiago the effect was the reverse of terrifying. ‘The more one considers the bombardment matter of Monday,” says Mr. Ramsden, the brave and devoted British Consul in the place, ‘the more ridiculous it appears to have been. It was probably one of the heaviest bombardments 1 The Massachusetts and New York alone fired between them twenty-two 13-inch shells, ninety-five 8-inch, thirty-six 6-inch, forty-two 4-inch, 247 6-pounders, and thirty-nine 1-pounders (Reports, 438-40). June] CERVERA AT SANTIAGO 259 known, and done with the most modern artillery, and yet the result has been comparatively small.” After the bombardment Sampson telegraphed that with 10,000 men the city could be taken in forty-eight hours, and urged an immediate movement—he had been informed week after week that the army was only waiting for him—so as to prevent the Spaniards from strengthening the defences by mounting guns from the ships. His plan of attack was to capture the forts at the harbour mouth, and thus give access for his ships to the harbour. The American fleet now proceeded to seize Guanta- namo Bay as a secondary base. It lies thirty-seven miles east of Santiago, and is an even finer harbour than Santiago. It has a wider and easier entrance, and deep water within, in the outer part, though the inner part, the Bay of Joa, is shallower, and will not admit large ships. There are numerous creeks with steep sandy banks, where an expeditionary force could have been landed with great ease. The chief town on the bay is Caimanera, which is connected by road with Santiago. On June 7 the auxiliary cruisers S¢. Louzs and Yankee and the cruiser Marblehead cannonaded Caimanera and cut and buoyed the cable which runs thence to Cape Haytien in Hayti. The gunboat Sanpova. was driven up the shallows of the Bay of Joa. At the same time the telegraph between Santiago and Guantanamo ceased to work, cut by the Sz. Zouzs. About 500 Spanish troops were observed in Caimanera, but these could offer no effective resistance. The Americans here, as all through the war, had luck on their side. At the entrance of 260 THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [June Guantanamo Bay were a large number of mines, each charged with 120 lbs. of gun-cotton. No precautions against these were taken, and the Zevxas' and Marble- head’s screws actually struck two and tore them loose from their anchors. The bay was not systematically swept and searched till June 21, when no less than thirty-five mines were recovered. Many showed signs of contact with ships, but the firing plungers and de- tonators were in such a defective condition that it was plain the mines had been laid down carelessly and without proper supervision. A Spanish intercepted letter from Guantanamo stated, “The American squadron, in possession of the outer bay, has taken it as if for a harbour of rest. They have anchored as if in one of their own ports since the 7th.” From the same source we learn that the only guns mounted there were two small muzzle-loaders of weak pattern. On June 9 the Spaniards attached planks and spars to the cable which had been stretched across the entrance to Santiago harbour, between Cay Smith and Punta Soldado, leaving clear the passage between the Cay and Socapa. The planks were intended to keep the cable on the surface, and so prevent the passage of floating mines or torpedo craft. The next few days passed without incident, as far as the Spaniards were concerned. On the 11th Lieutenant Blue was landed from the Suwanee, and carefully reconnoitred the harbour from a hill to the north-west of it, to which Cuban insurgents guided him. He made out three at least of Cervera’s squadron, and several other vessels in the harbour. x 2 KY bane + ‘ YY \ 8 , \\ \\ . ’ CMY \ QSAR IW: \ S ANY NS YX ee \\ eS TA oF GUANTANAMO \ § go - te cape : ee ve RRR Ss a = Qe SAN w & SRR gs Se] ft - x ’ & CARIBBEAN "eae . payner Parts Plate is “ SEA ef oN wo : ay, be